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             C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


            Tuesday, August 8, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 155



                            Headlines

59 MURRAY: Rodriguez Seeks Unpaid Minimum Wages under Labor Law
1125 KOSHER: Faces "Gomez" Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
ALLERGAN INC: September 11 Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set
AMAZON.COM LLC: Faces "Makenna" Suit over Prime Membership Fees
AMERICAN EXPRESS: Blind People Can't Access Website, Suit Says

APPLE INC: Judge Won't Certify Class in False Advertising Suit
ARENTZ LAW: Illegal Solicitation Calls Suit Partly Dismissed
BANK OF AMERICA: Judge Narrows Claims in Interest-Rate Swap Case
BMW: Settles Class Action Over Defective Takata Airbags
BMW: Faces Class Action in Canada Over Cartel Allegations

BMW AG: Briscoe and Lewis Sue German Automakers
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: Loses Bid to Dismiss "Afzal"
CANADA: Nov. 5 Beekeepers Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set
CAPITAL ONE: Court Narrows Claims in "Ramos"
CHAD STEUR: Faces "Navarroli" Suit in Northern Dist. of Illinois

CHICAGO, IL: Aldermen Back Emanuel's Red Light Ticket Settlement
CHICAGO, IL: Council Approves $39MM Red Light Camera Settlement
CNN: Judge Tosses Racial Discrimination Class Action
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE: Court Certifies Class in "Caufield"
COMCAST CORP: Judge Won't Dismiss Suit over Subscription Fees

COMMODITY FORWARDERS: Huitron Seeks Overtime Pay Under Labor Code
CORECIVIC OF TENNESSEE: "Richards" Suit Moved to S.D. California
CORINTHIAN COLLEGES: Sept. 25 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL: Democratic Voters' Class Action Ongoing
DISH NETWORK: $61MM Judgment in "Krakauer" Not Appropriate

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Class in Civil Forfeiture Suit Certified
ENERGY MAINTENANCE: Sandt Barred from Further Collection
ESURANCE INSURANCE: Giavasis Sues over Misleading Advertisements
EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Sued Over Excessive Health Record Fees
FARMERS GROUP: "Salatian" Sues over Wildfire Smoke Damage Claims

FIRST & FIRST: Faces "Espinobarros" Suit in S.D. New York
FLINT, MI: 6th Circuit Revives Water Contamination Suits
FLINT, MI: Court Consolidates 8 Water Cases
FLORIDA: FSU Donors Join Matching Fund Class Action
FORD MOTOR: ACCC Launches Suit Over Vehicle "Systemic Issues"

FXCM INC: 2nd Cir. Vacates Dismissal of Securities Fraud Suit
FXCM INC: NY Court Orders Amendment of Securities Fraud Suit
GENERAL MOTORS: Seeks Dismissal of Defective Engines Class Action
GERDAU SA: October 20 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
GOLD FIELDS: Sets Aside $30.2MM for Silicosis Class Action

GREEN STREET TAVERN: Prints Credit Card Info, Puente Says
GREEN TREE: New Jersey Court Certifies Class in "Grubb"
GUAM: Judge Denies Class Certification of H2B Denials Suit
HARMAN INT'L: Del. Court Dismisses Class Action with Prejudice
HOMEWARD RESIDENTIAL: Court Denies Class Certification in "King"

HOTELMACHER LLC: Exploits Filipino Workers, "Casilao" Suit Says
JIMMY JOHN'S: Court to Rule on Franchisee Responsibility Issue
JUST BORN: Judge Refuses to Dismiss Class Action
KAISER PERMANENTE: "Samora" Suit Moved to C.D. California
LEXMARK INT'L: Faces Shareholder Class Action in New York

LOCKHEED CORP: Summary Judgment for Exxon, Unocal Affirmed
LVNV FUNDING: Faces "Auletta" Suit in N.Y. Supreme Court
MALLINCKRODT PLC: Sept. 22 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
MARYLAND: State High Court Affirms Involuntary Admission
MASTERCARD INC: UK Antitrust Suit Ruling Won't Doom Class Regime

MASTERCARD INC: Antitrust Case Ruling Loss for Litigation Funders
MISSISSIPPI: Court Denies Certification in "Britton"
MORGAN STANLEY: Accused by "Alpari" of Reneging on Trade Orders
MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS: Faces "Evans" Suit in S.D. Alabama
NATIONAL CREDIT: Faces "Smith" Suit in Eastern Dist. of New York

NEW YORK, NY: Faces "M.G." Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL: "Santello" Suit Moved to D. Massachusetts
OSTERKAMP TRUCKING: Castro Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
OXY USA: Bid to Remand "Stoddard" to State Court Denied
PETLAND INC: Animal Legal Defense Fund Files RICO Class Action

PRESSLER & PRESSLER: Faces "Khavasova" Suit in E.D. New York
PURDUE PHARMA: Faces Class Action Over Unjust Enrichment Claims
RAMARY LLC: Prints Credit Card Info on Receipt, "Rubio" Suit Says
REGAL-PIEDMONT: "Loza" Suit Sues over Wage and Hour Violation
SAINT-GOBAIN: Bennington Residents Vow to Continue PFOA Case

SANDISK LLC: Summary Judgment in Antitrust Suit Affirmed
SINGING RIVER: 5th Cir. Vacates Order Approving Class Settlement
SNAP FITNESS: Faces Class Action Over Club Enhancement Fee
SPOTIFY USA: Judge Refused to Certify Class in "Ingalls" Case
SPRINT SPECTRUM: Court Denies Class Certification in "Emilio"

SQUARETWO FINANCIAL: Fights Bids to Lift Stay of Class Actions
STATE FARM: "Kennedy" Suit Moved to Maryland Federal Court
STELLAR RECOVERY: Bid to Enforce "Garcia" Class Settlement OK'd
STRATASYS: Court of Appeals Quashes Shareholders' Class Action
TAKATA CORP: Settles Class Action Over Defective Airbags

THAI NUM: Faces "Pareja" Suit in Southern District of New York
TOYOTA MOTORS: Quinn Emanuel Files Open Class Action Over Airbags
TRANSUNION LLC: Faces "Clements" Suit in Southern Dist. of Texas
UBER TECH: Asks Judge to Dismiss Suit over New Fare Model
UBER TECH: Judge Advances Drivers' Suit over Pricing Scheme

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Continues to Fight Drivers' Class Action
UNITED SERVICES: 8th Circuit Ruling Vindicates Defense Attorneys
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS: Loses Bid to Dismiss "Tackett"
VERISMA SYSTEMS: Court Certifies Class in "McCracken"
VOLKSWAGEN: States Can't Pursue Additional Penalties, Judge Says

VOLKSWAGEN AG: Montreal Lawyers File Car Cartel Class Action
VOLKSWAGEN AG: Cartel Class Action Probably Not the Last One
WAL-MART STORES: Faces "Pitre" Suit in C.D. California
WALMART STORES: Settles Herbal Supplements Class Actions
WALT DISNEY: Scraping Data from App-Playing Kids, Rushing Claims

WELLS FARGO: Must Face Suit over Non-U.S. Citizens Student Loans
ZAHAV: Settles Employees' Class Action Over Tip Policy
ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES: Robbins Geller Files Class Action in New York
ZISHAN INC: Court Enters Default Judgment in "Castillo"

* Gibson Dunn Attorneys Analyze Class Action Settlements



                            *********



59 MURRAY: Rodriguez Seeks Unpaid Minimum Wages under Labor Law
---------------------------------------------------------------
KELSEY RODRIGUEZ, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. 59 MURRAY ENTERPIRSES, INC. d/b/a NEW
YORK DOLLS GENTLEMEN'S CLUB; BARRY LIPSITZ; BARRY LIPSITZ, JR.;
and any other related entities, the Defendants, Case No.
156600/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., July 21, 2017), seeks to recover
unpaid minimum wages, illegally retained tips, and improperly
withheld wages owed to Plaintiff and all similarly situated
persons under the New York Labor Law.

The complaint says Defendants engaged in a policy and practice of
demanding, accepting and retaining gratuities from Plaintiff and
other members of the putative class. Defendants engaged in a
policy and practice of improperly deducting "fines," "fees," and
miscellaneous improper surcharges from wages received by Plaintiff
and other members of the putative class action. Defendants'
customers were required to provide tips to employees for private
dances. However, Defendants retained a significant portion of
these tips and failed to distribute all of these tips to
employees.

Defendants operate an adult entertainment establishment.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brett R. Cohen, Esq.
          Jeffrey K. Brown, Esq.
          Michael A. Tompkins, Esq.
          LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
          One Old Country Road, Suite 347
          Carle Place, NY 11514
          Telephone: (516) 873 9550


1125 KOSHER: Faces "Gomez" Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against 1125 Kosher Deli
Corp. The case is captioned as Rafael Basurto Gomez and Reynaldo
Basurto, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
the Plaintiffs, v. 1125 Kosher Deli Corp., doing business as:
Pastrami Queen, Barry Friedman, and Steven Doe, the Defendants,
Case No. 1:17-cv-05565 (S.D.N.Y., July 21, 2017).

Kosher Deli prepares overstuffed sandwiches of pastrami, smoked
turkey and more, plus soups and sides.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear pro se.


ALLERGAN INC: September 11 Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set
------------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Bernstein Litowitz
Berger & Grossmann LLP and Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

IN RE ALLERGAN, INC. PROXY VIOLATION SECURITIES LITIGATION
Case No. 8:14-cv-2004-DOC (KES)
CLASS ACTION
Honorable David O. Carter

SUMMARY NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION

To: (I) All persons who sold Allergan, Inc. ("Allergan") common
stock during the period February 25, 2014 through April 21, 2014,
inclusive (the "Class Period") and were damaged thereby ("Class
Members"); and

(II) All persons who traded price-interdependent derivative
securities of Allergan ("Non-Class Member Derivative Investors").

I. To Class Members:

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District
Court for the Central District of California, Southern Division,
that the above-captioned action (the "Action") has been certified
to proceed as a class action on behalf of the Class as defined in
Roman Numeral (I), above.  Please Note:  At this time, there is no
judgment, settlement or monetary recovery.  Trial in this Action
is currently scheduled for January 30, 2018.

IF YOU ARE A MEMBER OF THE CLASS, YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY
THIS ACTION.  A full printed Notice of Pendency of Class Action
(the "Notice") is currently being mailed to known potential Class
Members.  If you have not yet received the full printed Notice,
you may obtain a copy of the Notice by contacting the
Administrator:

Allergan Proxy Violation Securities Litigation
c/o GCG
P.O. Box 10436
Dublin, OH 43017-4036
(855) 474-3851
www.AllerganProxyViolationSecuritiesLitigation.com

Inquiries, other than requests for the Notice, may be made to the
following representative Class Counsel:

Jeremy P. Robinson
BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP
1251 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020
(800) 380-8496
(212) 554-1400

Lee Rudy
KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
280 King of Prussia Road
Radnor, PA 19087
(888) 299-7706
(610) 667-7706

If you are a Class Member, you have the right to decide whether to
remain a member of the Class.  If you want to remain a member of
the Class, you do not need to do anything at this time other than
to retain your documentation reflecting your transactions and
holdings in Allergan common stock.  If you are a Class Member and
do not exclude yourself from the Class, you will be bound by the
proceedings in this Action, including all past, present, and
future orders and judgments of the Court, whether favorable or
unfavorable.  If you move, or if the Notice was mailed to an old
or incorrect address, please send the Administrator written
notification of your new address.

If you ask to be excluded from the Class, you will not be bound by
any order or judgment of this Court in this Action, and you will
not be eligible to receive a share of any money which might be
recovered for the benefit of the Class.  To exclude yourself from
the Class, you must submit a written request for exclusion
postmarked no later than September 11, 2017, in accordance with
the instructions set forth in the full printed Notice.  Pursuant
to Rule 23(e)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is
within the Court's discretion as to whether a second opportunity
to request exclusion from the Class will be allowed if there is a
settlement or judgment in the Action.

II. To Non-Class Member Derivative Investors:

The Action to which this notice refers is brought only on behalf
of investors who sold Allergan COMMON STOCK during the Class
Period and were damaged thereby.  IF YOU TRADED PRICE-
INTERDEPENDENT DERIVATIVE SECURITIES OF ALLERGAN (I.E., DERIVATIVE
SECURITIES WITH A VALUE THAT IS A FUNCTION OF OR RELATED TO THE
VALUE OF ALLERGAN COMMON STOCK) ("ALLERGAN DERIVATIVE
SECURITIES"), YOUR TRANSACTIONS IN THOSE SECURITIES ARE NOT
COVERED BY THE ACTION.  THE COURT HAS NOT DETERMINED, AND THIS
NOTICE DOES NOT EXPRESS ANY OPINION AS TO, WHETHER TRADING IN
ALLERGAN DERIVATIVE SECURITIES GIVES RISE TO ANY CLAIMS.  BUT
BECAUSE DEFENDANTS' LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES IS LIKELY CAPPED AT
THEIR GAINS OR LOSSES AVOIDED FROM THE SECURITIES LAW VIOLATIONS
ALLEGED IN THIS ACTION, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT PLAINTIFFS WILL
RECOVER THE ENTIRETY OF THE DAMAGES POOL AVAILABLE TO PERSONS
ALLEGEDLY HARMED BY THE DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT.  IF SO, IT IS
POSSIBLE THAT THERE WILL BE NOTHING LEFT FOR OTHERS TO RECOVER
FROM DEFENDANTS on any similar claims AGAINST DEFENDANTS that they
may have AND THOSE CLAIMS MAY BE EFFECTIVELY PRECLUDED.  If you
engaged in transactions in Allergan Derivative Securities and wish
to determine whether you have a cause of action with respect to
those transactions, you should consult with your own attorney as
soon as possible.

Further information regarding this notice may be obtained by
directing your inquiry in writing to the Administrator at the
address provided above.

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT REGARDING THIS NOTICE.

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
United States District Court
For the Central District of California
Southern Division
[GN]


AMAZON.COM LLC: Faces "Makenna" Suit over Prime Membership Fees
---------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
federal class action in San Francisco accuses Amazon.com of
charging people annual Amazon Prime membership fees without their
knowledge or consent.

The case is, LAURA MAKENNA, REGINALD SCOTT, LORI MARIE WEAVER,
MARK CASTRO, and DRESSTIN WAGONER, individually, and on behalf of
other members of the general public similarly situated, Plaintiff,
vs. AMAZON.COM, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-04412 (N.D. Cal.,
August 3, 2017).

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

     Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
     Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
     Meghan E. George, Esq.
     Thomas E. Wheeler, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
     21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
     Woodland Hills,  CA 91367
     Phone: 877-206-4741
     Fax: 866-633-0228
     E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
             abacon@toddflaw.com
             mgeorge@toddflaw.com
             twheeler@toddflaw.com


AMERICAN EXPRESS: Blind People Can't Access Website, Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
JUAN CARLOS GIL, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL RELATED
SERVICES COMPANY, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 156596/2017 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct., July 21, 2017), seeks to put an end to systemic civil
rights violations committed by Defendant against the blind in New
York State and across the United States.

According to the complaint, the Defendant is denying blind
individuals throughout the United States equal access to the goods
and services American Express provides to its non-disabled
customers through https://www.plenti.com/  Plenti.com provides to
the public a wide array of the goods, services, price specials,
and other programs offered by American Express.  Yet, Plenti.com
contains extensive access barriers that make it difficult if not
impossible for blind customers to use the website. In fact, the
access barriers make it impossible for blind users to complete a
transaction on the website. American Express thus excludes the
blind from the full and equal participation in the growing
Internet economy that is increasingly a fundamental part of the
common marketplace and daily living. In the wave of technological
advances in recent years, assistive computer technology is
becoming an increasingly prominent part of everyday life, allowing
blind people to fully and independently access a variety of
services, including shopping online.

The Plaintiff is a blind individual. He brings this civil rights
class action against Defendant for failing to design, construct,
and/or own or operate a website that is fully accessible to, and
independently usable by, blind people.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          Anne Seelig (4192803)
          30 East 39th Street, Second Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 465 1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465 1181


APPLE INC: Judge Won't Certify Class in False Advertising Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Iovino, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that a federal judge in San Francisco, California, refused to
certify a class of consumers who claim Apple used false
advertisements to trick them into believing their data would be
secure on iPhones and other Apple devices.

U.S. District Judge Jon Tigar found little evidence to support
claims that Apple led a "pervasive" marketing campaign on data
security to influence consumers.

"Having now reviewed the body of evidence offered by plaintiffs in
support of class certification, the Court finds they have failed
to demonstrate that Apple's privacy-related marketing was
sufficiently extensive to support an inference of class-wide
exposure," Tigar wrote.

The consolidated class action began in 2013 when lead plaintiff
Marc Opperman sued Apple and a host of app makers, in one of two
lawsuits filed in Texas and California. Opperman claims Apple
touted its commitment to privacy while allowing apps to download
users' contacts data without consent.

Apps must ask for permission to access a user's contacts to inform
them which contacts also use the app. But some apps also
downloaded contacts data to external servers without permission,
including email addresses and birthdays, according to the lawsuit.

Apple has changed its policies and security features to prevent
the unauthorized downloading of data.

Opperman says Apple misrepresented its "curated" and "sandboxing"
security features for its devices. It claimed its app store was
curated to meet privacy standards and that a sandboxing feature
would prevent apps from access to outside data without consent.

But Tigar found the plaintiffs failed to show that consumers "saw,
heard, or relied upon" those representations on a class-wide
scale.

"Plaintiffs offer only a handful of statements per year, contained
in 'buzz marketing' materials, press releases, statements in
investor calls, and similar materials. These materials were not
widely disseminated to consumers, and they do not support
plaintiffs' claim that Apple's privacy claims were 'widely
publicized and disseminated through the mainstream and non-
traditional media,'" Tigar wrote.

He also rejected the plaintiffs' theory that Apple orchestrated a
"Big Tobacco-style" long-term ad campaign touting privacy and data
security on the same scale as the cigarette industry's push to
misinform the public about the health effects of cigarettes.

"Plaintiffs here have not established an equivalent, pervasive
campaign by Apple that it valued consumer privacy," Tigar wrote.

But Tigar told Apple it could not counter the allegations by
citing a privacy policy that warned users about its privacy
limitations. Tigar found it was unlikely most users read that
policy, just as it was unlikely that most consumers were exposed
to the "handful of marketing materials" cited by plaintiffs.

"Here, Apple attempts to have its cake and eat it too," Tigar
wrote. "If Apple wants to show class members were exposed to
countervailing information, it must show they actually read it."

Additionally, Tigar found the plaintiffs' proposed damages model
inadequate because it sought to estimate the value of data privacy
generally, instead of the value of the sandboxing and curated
security features that Apple was accused of misrepresenting.

Tigar refused to certify a class of consumers to pursue false
advertising claims against Apple. However, in 2016, he did certify
a separate class of 480,000 Apple device users to pursue claims
that Apple distributed "invasive versions" of the Path app, which
allegedly downloaded users' contacts without their knowledge or
consent, from November 2011 to February 2012.

Tigar this month tentatively approved a $5.3 million settlement
with several of the accused co-defendant app makers in this case,
including Twitter, Instagram, Yelp, Foursquare, Foodspotting,
Gowalla, Kik Interactive and Kong Technologies, which acquired the
social media app Path.

In the present case, class attorney David Given with Phillips
Erlewine Given & Carlin in San Francisco did not immediately a
return phone call seeking comment Tuesday afternoon.

Apple attorney Robert Hawk, with Hogan Lovells in Menlo Park,
deferred comment to Apple media relations, which did not
immediately return a phone call and email seeking comment.


ARENTZ LAW: Illegal Solicitation Calls Suit Partly Dismissed
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, Northern District of Texas, Fort
Worth Division, issued an Order granting the motion for summary
judgment of defendants Arentz Law Group, Attorneys at Law, PLLC,
Arentz Law Group, PC, and the Johnston Law Group in the case
captioned  JOHN R. MACLEAN, INDIVIDUALLY ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND
ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, v. ARENTZ LAW GROUP,
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, P.L.L.C., ET AL., Defendants, No. 4:16-CV-797-A.
(N.D. Tex).

Plaintiff's claims are based on an automated telephone call he
received at his home that he says was designed to illegally
solicit his participation in mass tort litigation involving
inferior vena cava filters. Plaintiff asserts two causes of
action: first, for violation of Tex. Gov't Code Section
82.0651(a), and second, for violation of Tex. Gov't Code Section
82.0651(c).

The Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as to the
first cause of action because plaintiff was never their client;
hence, section 82.0651(a) does not afford him any relief. Second,
movants did not solicit or knowingly cause or finance any third
party to solicit plaintiff.

The Texas Government Code provides, in pertinent part: (a) A
client may bring an action to void a contract for legal services
that was procured as a result of conduct violating Section
38.12(a) or (b), Penal Code, or Rule 7.03 of the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of
Texas, regarding barratry by attorneys or other persons, and to
recover any amount that may be awarded under Subsection (b)(c) A
person who was solicited by conduct violating Section 38.12(a) or
(b), Penal Code, or Rule 7.03 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Texas, regarding barratry
by attorneys or other persons, but who did not enter into a
contract as a result of that conduct, may file a civil action
against any person who committed barratry.

As movants note, subsection (a) of section 82.0651 says that a
client may bring an action thereunder. As plaintiff readily admits
that he never became a client of movants, this provision does not
apply to him.

The Court held that the Movants have established that Arentz Law
Group, Attorneys at Law PLLC, handles criminal and bankruptcy
cases and did not participate in the calling practice about which
plaintiff complains. Accordingly, judgment for that defendant is
being granted.

The court Orders that movants' motion for summary judgment be, and
is, granted in part and (1) plaintiff's claims asserted in count
one of plaintiff's complaint be, and are dismissed; and (2)
plaintiff's claim asserted in count two of plaintiff's complaint
as to defendant Arentz Law Group, Attorneys at Law PLLC, be, and
is dismissed. The court otherwise Order that the motion for
summary judgment be, and is, denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 27, 2017 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available http://tinyurl.com/y9v85owzfrom
Leagle.com.

John R MacLean, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew W. Bobo, The Law
Office of Matthew Bobo PLLC. 4916 Camp Bowie Blvd, Fort Worth, TX
76107, USA

Arentz Law Group, Attorneys at Law, PLLC, Defendant, represented
by David Michael Hymer -- dhymer@sheppardmullen.com -- Quintairos,
Prieto, Wood & Boyer PA, Gregg James Lytle, McDaniel Acord, PLLC,
9343 E. 95th Ct., Tulsa, OK 74133 U.S.A., Jeffrey M. Tillotson --
jtillotson@tillotsonlaw.com -- Tillotson Law, Jonathan Patton --
jpatton@tillotsonlaw.com -- Tillotson Law & Joseph Austen Irrobali
-- airrobali@tillotsonlaw.com -- Tillotson Law.

Arentz Law Group, P.C., Defendant, represented by David Michael
Hymer, Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer PA, Gregg James Lytle,
McDaniel Acord, PLLC, Jeffrey M. Tillotson, Tillotson Law,
Jonathan Patton, Tillotson Law & Joseph Austen Irrobali, Tillotson
Law.

Johnston Law Group, Defendant, represented by David Michael Hymer,
Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer PA, Gregg James Lytle, McDaniel
Acord, PLLC, Jeffrey M. Tillotson, Tillotson Law, Jonathan Patton,
Tillotson Law & Joseph Austen Irrobali, Tillotson Law.


BANK OF AMERICA: Judge Narrows Claims in Interest-Rate Swap Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
Adam Klasfeld, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
a Manhattan federal judge in New York advanced part of a
consolidated lawsuit accusing 12 major banks -- including Bank of
America, Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs -- of colluding to rig a
$275 trillion market on interest-rate swaps.

An increasingly common and complex form of financial derivatives,
interest-rate swaps allow two parties to trade interest-rate-based
cash flows on a specific amount of money over a fixed time period.

U.S. District Judge Paul Engelmayer noted in his ruling that this
market has ballooned over the past three decades, estimating that
its notional quantity grew from roughly $230 trillion in 2006 to
$381 trillion by 2014.

Reuters reported that the market size in the lawsuits at issue is
between those two numbers, around $275 trillion.

Last June, the Southern District of New York consolidated actions
across the nation filed by investors and start-up companies, which
accused the banks of anti-competitive actions.

Engelmayer dismissed counts against HSBC and gave the green light
to some allegations against others: Barclays PLC, BNP Paribas SA,
Citigroup Inc., Credit Suisse Group AG, Deutsche Bank AG, Goldman
Sachs Group Inc., Morgan Stanley, Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC
and UBS Group AG.

Ironically, the banks argued that the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act --
designed to increase transparency and accountability in the
markets -- precluded the lawsuits.

But Engelmeyer rejected their reading of the statute.

"In short, the antitrust savings clause applies here," he wrote in
a 108-page ruling. "Dodd-Frank preserves, rather than precludes,
plaintiffs' . . . claim."

In approving allegations by two start-up competitors -- Javelin
Capital and Tera Group, creators of two electric platforms for
anonymous IRS trading -- Engelmayer found it plausible that the
banks' actions tried to crowd them out of the market.

"Any one [of the actions], if engaged in by multiple dealers,
could result from unilateral decisions," the 108-page ruling
states. "But, viewing these areas of symmetry in combination, the
inference of communication and coordination among dealers with the
shared goal of grinding down the new platforms is entirely
plausible. To put the point differently, each dealer's independent
interest in maintaining the status quo would explain each's
decision not to supply liquidity to Javelin or Tera."

Tera alleged the banks referred to it as a "Trojan Horse" and
vowed not to let it "off the mat," borrowing a wrestling metaphor.

But Engelmeyer pruned the claims considerably, dismissing the
investors' claims for conduct between 2008 and 2012. Allegations
based on conduct between 2013 and 2016 can proceed.

The judge also booted Javelin or Tera's allegations of tortious
interference with business relations and unjust enrichment.

Bank of America declined to comment, and attorneys for several
other banks did not respond Friday to requests for comment.

Neither did attorneys for the investors and start-ups.


BMW: Settles Class Action Over Defective Takata Airbags
-------------------------------------------------------
Settlements have been reached in a class action lawsuit alleging
that consumers sustained economic losses because they purchased or
leased vehicles from various auto companies that manufactured,
distributed, or sold vehicles containing allegedly defective
airbags manufactured by Takata Corporation and its affiliates.
The Settlements include certain vehicles made by BMW, Mazda,
Subaru, and Toyota (the "Subject Vehicles").  BMW, Mazda, Subaru,
and Toyota deny any and all allegations of wrongdoing and the
Court has not decided who is right.

Owners or lessees of Subject Vehicles who have already received a
separate recall notice for their BMW, Mazda, Subaru, or Toyota
vehicle requesting that they bring it to their local retailer to
have the Takata airbags repaired and have not yet done so, should
contact their local retailer to make an appointment for this
repair as soon as possible.   Some vehicles will be recalled for
repair at a later date, and some vehicles may not be recalled.
When recalled Takata airbags deploy, they may spray metal debris
toward vehicle occupants and may cause serious injury.  Please see
the original recall notices and www.AirBagRecall.com for further
details.

The Settlements include the following persons and entities:

Owners or lessees, as of June 9, 2017, of a Subject Vehicle that
was distributed for sale or lease in the United States or any of
its territories or possessions, and Former owners or lessees of a
Subject Vehicle that was distributed for sale or lease in the
United States or any of its territories or possessions, who,
between April 11, 2013 and June 9, 2017, sold or returned pursuant
to a lease, a Subject Vehicle that was recalled before June 9,
2017.

A full list of the Subject Vehicles can be found at
www.AutoAirbagSettlement.com.  The Settlements do not involve
claims of personal injury or property damage to any property other
than the Subject Vehicles.

BMW, Mazda, Subaru, and Toyota have agreed to Settlements with a
combined value of approximately $553 million, including a 10%
credit for Rental Car/Loaner Programs.  The Settlement Funds will
be used to pay for Settlement benefits and cover the costs of the
Settlements over an approximately four-year period.

The Settlements offer several benefits for Class Members,
including, (1) payments for certain out-of-pocket expenses
incurred related to a Takata airbag recall of a Subject Vehicle,
(2) a Rental Car/Loaner Program while certain Subject Vehicles are
awaiting repair, (3) an Outreach Program to maximize completion of
the recall remedy, (4) additional cash payments to Class Members
from residual settlement funds, if any remain, and (5) a Customer
Support Program to help with repairs associated with affected
Takata airbag inflators and their replacements.  The Settlement
website explains each of these benefits in detail.

Class Members must file a claim to receive a payment during the
first four years of the Settlements.  If a Class Member still owns
or leases a Subject Vehicle, they must also bring it to an
authorized dealership for the recall remedy, as directed by a
recall notice, if they have not already done so. Class Members can
visit www.AutoAirbagSettlement.com and file a claim online or
download one and file by mail.  The deadline to file a claim will
be at least one year from the date the Settlements are finalized
and will be posted on the website when it's known.

Class Members who do not want to be legally bound by the
Settlements, must exclude themselves by September 25, 2017.  If
Class Members do not exclude themselves, they will release any
claims they may have against BMW, Mazda, Subaru, and Toyota, in
exchange for certain settlement benefits.  The potential available
benefits are more fully described in the Settlements, available at
the settlement website.  Class Members may object to the
Settlements by September 25, 2017.  Class Members cannot both
exclude themselves from, and object to, the Settlements.  The Long
Form Notices for each Settlement available on
www.AutoAirbagSettlement.com explains how to exclude or object.
The Court will hold a fairness hearing on October 25, 2017 to
consider whether to finally approve the Settlements and a request
for attorneys' fees of up to 30% of the total Settlement Amount
and incentive awards of $5,000 for each of the Class
Representatives.  Class Members may appear at the fairness
hearing, either by themselves or through an attorney, but don't
have to.  For more information, including the relief, eligibility
and release of claims (excluding certain personal injury or
property damage claims), in English or Spanish, call 1-888-735-
5596 or visit www.AutoAirbagSettlement.com


BMW: Faces Class Action in Canada Over Cartel Allegations
---------------------------------------------------------
Strosberg Sasso Sutts LLP on July 26 disclosed that a class action
was commenced against BMW, MERCEDES-BENZ, VOLKSWAGEN, AUDI and
PORSCHE alleging that they conspired to set the price, output,
innovation, and technical standards of components used in the
motor vehicles they manufactured, and that were sold in Canada.

The Notice of Action alleges that these German car manufacturers
colluded in this way for over two decades and that the conspiracy
caused and is causing significant loss and damage to consumers in
Canada who purchased or leased motor vehicles manufactured by the
defendants.

The Class Action was filed in the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice on behalf of all Canadians, excluding residents of Quebec,
who purchased or leased vehicles from the above-mentioned
manufacturers beginning in the mid-1990s until present.

"If the allegations in the claim prove to be true, then Canadian
consumers have been harmed by a long-standing cartel of German car
manufacturers to provide inferior components in their vehicles
while charging premium prices for these vehicles," said David
Wingfield -- dwingfield@strosbergco.com -- Partner at Strosberg
Sasso Sutts LLP.

The Class Action suggests that the defendants conspired, agreed or
arranged with each other directly or indirectly to fix, maintain,
increase or control the price, the supply of, the design of, or
the technical standards of, components used in or forming part of
the fuel systems, exhaust systems, emissions systems, engines,
transmissions, braking systems, and electronic systems of motor
vehicles manufactured by the defendants in breach of the
Competition Act.

"Dieselgate resulted in North American settlements valued in
excess of $10 billion dollars.  It appears that European Union
anti-trust regulators have widened their investigation and that
German auto manufacturers may have colluded to sell consumers
vehicles with components that were, and are, inferior to what has
been marketed," said Jay Strosberg, Partner at Strosberg Sasso
Sutts LLP. "Canadian consumers unwittingly may be part of an even
more widespread conspiracy than Dieselgate."

The lawsuit seeks $1B in damages and an additional $100 million in
punitive damages.

Vehicle owners wishing to obtain more information can visit
https://www.strosbergco.com/class-actions/autopartscartel/

Strosberg Sasso Sutts LLP -- https://www.strosbergco.com -- is one
of Canada's preeminent boutique litigation law firms.  The firm
has recovered more than $2 billion dollars for its clients. [GN]


BMW AG: Briscoe and Lewis Sue German Automakers
-----------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that a pair of antitrust class
actions filed in federal court accuse big German automakers --
BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Volkswagen, Audi, Porsche and Daimler -- of
colluding on technology development since the 1990s, allowing them
to charge premium prices without the cost of independent
innovation.

Gabriel Briscoe, et al. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke AG; BMW North
America LLC; Volkswagen AG; Volkswagen Group of America LLC; Audi
AG; Audi of America LLC; Dr. Ing h.c. F. Porsche AG; Porsche Cars
of North America Inc; Daimler AG; Mercedes-Benz USA LLC, Case No.
3:17-cv-04320 (N.D. Cal., July 28, 2017).

Counsel to Briscoe plaintiffs:

     Jeffrey Lewis (SBN 66587)
     KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.
     300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000
     Oakland, CA 64612
     Tel: (510) 463-3900
     Fax (510) 463-3901
     E-mail: jlewis@kellerrohrback.com

          - and -

     Lynn Lincoln Sarko, Esq.
     KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.
     1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200
     Seattle, WA 98101
     Tel: (206) 623-1900
     Fax (206) 623-3384
     E-mail: lsarko@kellerrohrback.com

Steven Lewis; Travis Burton v. BMW AG; BMW North America LLC;
Volkswagen AG; Volkswagen Group of America Inc; Audi AG; Audi of
America LLC; Dr. Ing h.c. F. Porsche AG; Porsche Cars of North
America Inc; Daimler AG; Mercedes-Benz USA; Mercedes-Benz Vans
LLC: Mercedes-Benz US International; Robert Bosch GmBH; Robert
Bosch LLC, Case No. 3:17-cv-04314 (N.D. Cal., July 28, 2017).

Counsel for Steven Lewis, Travis Burton, and the Proposed Classes:

     Lesley E. Weaver (SBN 191305)
     Matthew S. Weiler (SBN 236052)
     Emily C. Aldridge (SBN 299236)
     BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD LLP
     1999 Harrison Street, Suite 670
     Tel:  (415) 445-4003
     E-mail:  lweaver@bfalaw.com
     E-mail:  mweiler@bfalaw.com
     E-mail:  ealdridge@bfalaw.com


BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: Loses Bid to Dismiss "Afzal"
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of New Jersey, issued
an Opinion denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case
captioned DAVID AFZAL, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC and
BAVARIAN MOTOR WORKS, Defendants, Civil Action No. 15-8009.
(D.N.J.).

This matter comes before the Court by way of Defendant BMW of
North America, LLC's (BMW NA) partial motion to dismiss Plaintiffs
David Afzal and Andy Dechartivong's (Plaintiffs) Second Amended
Complaint (SAC).

In this putative class action, Plaintiffs seek damages against BMW
NA and Bavarian Motor Works (BMW GER) (together, BMW or
Defendants) for fraudulently concealing and failing to disclose
alleged safety defects present in the engines of certain BMW motor
vehicle models.

Afzal purchased his Class Vehicle in May 2013. In March 2015, at
28,253 miles, while his BMW vehicle was still within the express
warranty period, Afzal noticed knocking and rattling noises that
appeared to be coming from inside or below the engine.  He brought
the vehicle to Steve Thomas BMW, an authorized BMW dealership, on
March 30, 2015.  On multiple occasions, Steve Thomas informed
Afzal that the noise was attributed to normal exhaust heat
expansion.

Next, Afzal sought the opinion of an independent BMW repair
specialist on May 1, 2015. After performing an inspection of the
rod bearings, the technician concluded that they were excessively
worn and that Afzal was in danger of imminent and catastrophic
engine failure.  Afzal then replaced his connecting rod bearings,
rod bolts, and oil filter at a total cost of $2,217.18 for parts
and labor. The noise has not returned.

The SAC repeats the allegations of the Amended Complaint. In
summary, Plaintiffs allege that the S65 engine of the Class
Vehicles contains defective rotating assemblies the Rotating
Assembly Defect), which leads to catastrophic engine failure,
often shortly after the warranty period expires. As background,
connecting rod bearings and main bearings together allow other
engine parts to rotate during a combustion cycle.

First, the SAC alleges that the rod bearings in the S65 failed to
meet industry standards set forth by Mahle-Clevite, a well-known
manufacturer of bearings in the automotive industry -- and BMW's
own supplier -- until at least 2011.

Second, Plaintiffs alleges that Defendants had actual notice of
the bearing defect no later than June 2008, based on consumer
posts in message boards.

Third, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were aware of the defects
inherent in the S65 engine because the previous model -- the S85
engine -- exhibited the same defects. According to the online
posting, this particular engine was presented to a BMW dealership
in July 2007, with the findings of catastrophic engine failure due
to premature rod bearing wear reported to Defendant BMW NA.
Plaintiffs allege that BMW routinely monitors the internet for
complaints about their vehicles, and therefore should have been
aware of the Rotating Assembly Defect.

Plaintiffs have pled a theory of fraud against BMW NA. They allege
that in 2005, BMW introduced an S85 ten-cylinder engine. Vehicles
with this engine began to exhibit a rod bearing defect, which was
directly reported to BMW NA as early as July 2007.

Notwithstanding such reports, BMW chose to launch an eight-
cylinder version of the same engine, the S65, using specifications
that deviated from an industry standard in 2008. Shortly
thereafter, they began to receive direct reports of the Rotating
Assembly Defect, but did not disclose any material information
about the defect prior to Plaintiffs' purchases in 2013 and 2014.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims sounding in fraud cannot be
dismissed for failure to plead knowledge at the time of sale.

Under the FAL, a plaintiff may assert a cause of action based on
alleged omissions only where a defendant has a duty to make
disclosures. Such a duty exists in the following four situations:
(1) when the defendant is in fiduciary relationship with the
plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of
material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant
actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; or (4) when
the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses
some material facts.

Here, Plaintiffs have alleged facts to establish a duty to
disclose under at least the second prong of the Judkins test.
Plaintiffs allege that in its written and oral statements to
prospective Class Vehicle purchasers, BMW NA omitted material
facts regarding the safety, reliability, and functionality of its
Class Vehicle by failing to disclose the Rotating Assembly Defect.
Plaintiffs allege that BMW NA had superior knowledge of these
facts on the basis of their insight into the design and
manufacture of the engines in the Class Vehicles, as well as
Plaintiffs' inability to learn of the defect until its
manifestation.

Accordingly, the FAL claim cannot be dismissed at this time.  BMW
NA's motion to dismiss is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 27, 2017 Opinion is
available http://tinyurl.com/y8gknv9kfrom Leagle.com.

DAVID AFZAL, Plaintiff, represented by JOSEPH BRYCE KENNEY --
jbk@mccunewright.com -- MCCUNEWRIGHT LLP.

DAVID AFZAL, Plaintiff, represented by MATTHEW D. SCHELKOPF --
mds@mccunewright.com -- McCune Wright Arevalo LLP.

ANDY DECHARTIVONG, Plaintiff, represented by MATTHEW D. SCHELKOPF,
McCune Wright Arevalo LLP.

BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC, Defendant, represented by CHRISTOPHER
J. DALTON -- christopher.dalton@bipc.com -- BUCHANAN, INGERSOLL &
ROONEY, PC, DANIEL ZEV RIVLIN -- daniel.rivlin@bipc.com --
BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC, LAUREN ADORNETTO WOODS, --
lauren.woods@bipc.com -- BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC & ROSEMARY
JOAN BRUNO -- rosemary.bruno@bipc.com -- BUCHANAN, INGERSOLL &
ROONEY, PC.


CANADA: Nov. 5 Beekeepers Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set
-----------------------------------------------------------
Are you an individual, corporation other legal entity who keeps or
has kept more than 50 honeybee colonies in Canada for commercial
purposes after December 31, 2006? If so, you may be a class member
in a class action which has now been certified by the court.  The
lawsuit seeks money (damages) and other benefits for class
members.

This class action alleges that Canada negligently denied
beekeepers their lawful right to seek import permits for honeybee
packages from the U.S. in so doing, Canada substituted political
opinion for what the law required to be an evidence-based
assessment of pest and disease risk, and enabled some beekeepers
to profit from the denial of rights of others.

Class members are automatically included in the class action
unless they take steps to exclude themselves (opt out) by November
5, 2017. If you want to stay in the class action, do nothing.

If you opt out, you will not be part of the lawsuit and you will
not be able to share in any money or any other benefit obtained
for the class if the lawsuit is successful.  To get a copy of the
Opt Out Form, visit the website below.

Please visit www.kmlaw.ca/cases/beekeepers-class-action-
government-negligence/ to get more information about this class
action and your rights, or contact us at
beekeepersclassaction@kmlaw.ca or 1 (800) 216-3016.


CAPITAL ONE: Court Narrows Claims in "Ramos"
--------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, Northern District of California,
San Jose Division, issued an Order granting in part the
Defendants' motions to dismiss claims of statutory damages on a
per violation basis with leave to amend only allegations directed
to actual damages in the case captioned JOSE ANTONIO RAMOS,
Plaintiff, v. CAPITAL ONE, N.A., et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-
cv-00435-BLF (N.D. Cal.).

The Court, however, denies in part Defendants' motions to dismiss
Counts I and II based on the statute of limitations and a failure
to state a claim.

Plaintiff Jose Antonio Ramos brings this suit against Defendants
HSBC and Capital One, former employers of his wife, for allegedly
recording personal phone calls between him and his wife on the
company phone.

Before the Court are Defendants' motions to dismiss Ramos' First
Amended Complaint (FAC).

Plaintiff Ramos is a California resident whose wife was employed
by Defendants HSBC Card Services Inc. (Card Services) and HSBC
Technology & Services (USA) Inc. (HSBC) at a facility in Salinas,
California.

During the relevant time period, Ramos had "numerous personal
telephone communications" with Defendants' employees, including
his wife.  According to Ramos, Defendants intentionally recorded,
intercepted, or received the conversations without his consent or
knowledge.

Defendants also required their employees to keep their policies,
procedures, and internal activities confidential and prohibited
employees from disclosing such information. Ramos alleges that at
the time he had no reason to believe that his personal telephone
calls were being recorded.

Generally, HSBC and Capital One seek dismissal on the following
grounds: (1) the action is barred by the one-year statute of
limitations and Ramos has failed to allege facts to support
delayed discovery or tolling; (2) Ramos has failed to state a
claim for violations of Penal Code Sections 632 or 632.7; and (3)
Ramos' request for statutory damages per violation" under Section
637.2 is improper and, instead, limited to $5,000 per action.

In the FAC, Ramos requests statutory damages of $5,000 per
violation under California Penal Code Section 637.2, the section
governing damages for CIPA civil suits. Defendants move to dismiss
or strike Ramos' claims for statutory damages because the
statutory damages are limited to $5,000 per action and not per
violation.

The court disagreed with the claimant and held that Section
593d(f) does not provide for $5,000 in statutory damages for each
violation. It only provides a single $5,000 liability for any
person who violates this section.

The state of the law prior to the Legislature's amendment of
California Penal Code Section 637.2 does not persuade this Court
otherwise.

In Lieberman v. KCOP Television, Inc., the court also considered
the statute in response to the defendant's argument that a
plaintiff may not recover damage without showing actual injuries
caused by the violation. 110 Cal.App.4th 156, 166 (2003). In
reaching its conclusion that actual injuries were not necessary,
the Lieberman court stated that a plaintiff may recover up to
$5000 in statutory damages for each incident,

The Court now turns to Defendants' others grounds for dismissing
Ramos' claims. First, Defendants argue that the CIPA claims are
untimely because the allegations are insufficient and without
specificity to show that the statute of limitations period should
be tolled. In California, the discovery rule postpones accrual of
a claim until 'the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover,
the cause of action.

Here, the Court finds that the FAC sufficiently alleges facts
demonstrating that Ramos' claims did not accrue until September
2015.  Ramos' wife was employed by Card Services from March 23,
2009 to about May 1, 2012, and by Capital One from about May 1,
2012 through October 2013.  Ramos did not file his suit until
November 18, 2016. However, HSBC did not remove the confidential
designation from the transcripts of recording in the Rojas case
until September 2015, and his wife was only contacted as a
potential witness thereafter.  Ramos then learned about the
recording and his wife being contacted as a potential witness in
or around November 2015. Prior to November 2015, Ramos had no
reason to believe that his personal telephone calls were recorded,
received, or intercepted by Defendants.

The Court finds that the FAC has plausibly alleged that Ramos had
no reason to suspect that his phone conversations were recorded
and would not be subject to an inquiry notice to question his wife
in regards to Defendants' recording practices. Accordingly, the
Court Denies the motions to dismiss on the ground that the claims
are untimely.

Defendants further contend that the FAC is devoid of any facts
regarding their purported intent to record Ramos's personal
conversations because merely installing a recording device on
company phones does not meet the intentional requirement of Cal.
Pen. Code Section 632

Smith controls. 70 Cal.2d 123, 133 (1969). Defendants submit that
under Smith, Ramos must allege facts showing that Defendants
intended to record his personal conversations. Defendants further
rely on a California Superior Court ruling in the Rojas case

As such, the Smith case appears to support the proposition that
the intentional element could not be met by merely placing a
recording device without a specific intention to record or
intercept a conversation of a target person. However, even if this
Court were to wholly accept this interpretation of intentional,
proffered by Defendants, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has
alleged sufficient facts to state his claim. As such, the Court
Denies Defendants' motion to dismiss Count I.

California Penal Code Section 632.7 makes unlawful conduct by any
person who, without consent, intercepts or receives and
intentionally records personal communications transmitted between
telephones.

The plaintiff in Simpson called Best Western's reservation center
to make hotel reservations, and her calls were allegedly recorded
without her knowledge or consent.  The defendant argued on a
motion to dismiss that the claim fails because it was a party to
the alleged communications. After examining the case law and the
legislative history, the court concluded that the law prohibits
any party, not just third parties, to a confidential communication
from recording that communication without knowledge or consent of
the other party.

The Court is satisfied that Ramos has adequately pled this claim.
Defendants' motions to dismiss Count II are denied.

This Court may assert subject matter jurisdiction over a case when
the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the parties are
citizens of different states.

Ramos in opposition also proffers no additional facts in support
of the claim for actual damages. The vagueness of actual damages
sought in Ramos' FAC is not sufficient to satisfy the
jurisdictional amount. Thus, it is not facially apparent from the
notice of removal, the FAC, and even Ramos' opposition papers,
that the jurisdictional amount could be satisfied.

The Court recognizes that the burden is on Defendants to
demonstrate the sufficiency of the jurisdictional amount.
Nonetheless, the Court grants Ramos leave to amend the allegations
directed to actual damages to show that at least $75,000 is in
controversy, in the event Ramos desires an opportunity to make
such an amendment. Because this Court has denied Defendants'
motions to dismiss on the remainder of the grounds submitted,
there is no leave to amend any other part of the complaint.

For these reasons, the Court grants in part, Defendants' motions
to dismiss claims of statutory damages on a per violation basis
with leave to amend only allegations directed to actual damages;

The Court denies in part, Defendants' motions to dismiss Counts I
and II based on the statute of limitations and a failure to state
a claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 27, 2017 Order is
available http://tinyurl.com/y9xfbmzkfrom Leagle.com.

Jose Antonio Ramos, Plaintiff, represented by Deborah Lynn Raymond
-- draymondlaw@gmail.com -- Law Offices of Deborah L. Raymond.
Capital One, N.A., Defendant, represented by Connie Tcheng --
ctcheng@dollamir.com -- Doll Amir and Eley LLP & Hunter Randolph
Eley -- heley@dollamir.com -- Doll Amir & Eley LLP.

HSBC Card Services Inc., Defendant, represented by Holly Anne
Farless -- hfarless@stroock.com -- Stroock and Stroock and Lavan
LLP, Julia B. Strickland -- strickland@strook.com -- Stroock &
Stroock & Lavan LLP & Shannon E. Dudic -- sdudic@strook.com --
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP.

HSBC Technology & Services (USA) Inc., Defendant, represented by
Holly Anne Farless, Stroock and Stroock and Lavan LLP, Julia B.
Strickland, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP & Shannon E. Dudic,
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP.


CHAD STEUR: Faces "Navarroli" Suit in Northern Dist. of Illinois
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Chad Steur Law, LLC.
The case is captioned as Nicholas Navarroli, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Chad Steur
Law, LLC and Federal Pacific Credit Company, the Defendants, Case
No. 1:17-cv-05517 (N.D. Ill., July 27, 2017).

Chad Steur Law is a Salt Lake City based law firm practicing in
the areas of criminal defense, personal injury, divorce and family
law, privacy, and general civil.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


CHICAGO, IL: Aldermen Back Emanuel's Red Light Ticket Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
John Byrne, writing for Chicago Tribune, reports that Chicago
aldermen on July 24 backed Mayor Rahm Emanuel's plan to enter into
a $38.75 million settlement of a lawsuit alleging the city broke
its own rules on issuing automated camera traffic tickets.

The City Council Finance Committee advanced the package, which
includes money from a $26.75 million pot the city will use to
reimburse people who paid tickets after the city failed to issue
second notices of violation as required until 2015.  The city will
forgive another $12 million in unpaid tickets.  The full council
was set to consider the proposal on July 26.

Mr. Emanuel on July 24 tried to focus on fraud under the red light
camera ticket firm that was in place when he took office, saying
he dealt with problems he inherited.

City Corporation Counsel Ed Siskel told aldermen the settlement
could head off a much worse finding for the city if the case went
to trial.

"If the circuit court rules that all tickets issued during the
five-year statute of limitations period for plaintiffs unjust
enrichment claims, which the city contends is the correct time
period, if the court rules that those are void, the city could be
required to refund approximately $264 million and could not
collect approximately $164 million in outstanding debt,"
Mr. Siskel said.

The refund tab to the city could have gone up to $700 million if
the court ruled the statute of limitations didn't apply,
Mr. Siskel said.

Ald. Anthony Beale continued his long-running attack on the
automated cameras, saying an unjust system designed to make money
off Chicagoans "came back to bite the city."

"Let me just start by saying how disturbing it is that we have to,
today, pay out $39 million for a corrupt system that was corrupt
from the very beginning," said Mr. Beale, 9th.

And after Mr. Siskel said the city will tap general fund revenue
and other funds to pay the settlement, Mr. Beale marveled the
administration can find "a pot of gold" to cover the payout. More
than $11 million of the $26.75 million payment could go to
attorneys who filed the class-action lawsuit, Mr. Siskel said.

Ald. Leslie Hairston, 5th, wondered why nobody has been fired for
messing up the process of issuing the tickets.  Mr. Siskel
countered that the problem was an institutional one that went on
for years, not a mistake for which particular people could be held
accountable.

Under the deal to settle a class-action lawsuit, the paybacks will
equal half of whatever people paid for the tickets, and those who
qualify will be notified in the mail in the next few months.

More than 1.2 million tickets issued from 2010 to 2015 could
qualify for money back under the settlement. [GN]


CHICAGO, IL: Council Approves $39MM Red Light Camera Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jessica D'Onofrio and Sarah Schulte, writing for abc7, reports
that the Chicago City Council approved a $39 million settlement
that could reimburse some drivers who got tickets from red-light
and speed cameras.

Drivers who qualify will receive letters in the mail during the
next few months with instructions on how to collect.  While $39
million is a lot, it could have cost the taxpayers hundreds of
millions if a class-action lawsuit succeeded in court, city
attorneys said.

The red-light camera program, which has been riddled with
controversy and corruption, and will cost taxpayers millions.
However, Mayor Rahm Emanuel continued July 26 to defend the
program, which he said saves lives.

"I take responsibility under my tenure on what happened,"
Mr. Emanuel said.

For years, the city did not follow its own law by failing to give
ticketed motorists a second notice and enough time to pay the
fine.  A class-action lawsuit was filed two years ago.  About $12
million of the settlement is for forgiving unpaid tickets and a
big chunk of the dough goes to attorneys.

"Attorneys are getting $11.7 million of this that is flawed that
money should be reimbursed to the people not the lawyers," said
Ald. Anthony Beale (9th Ward).

Beale said if 100 percent of ticketed motorists submit to get
reimbursed, they will only get $7.

"A whopping $7, if county has its way that will get you a two
liter," Mr. Beale said.

Besides the settlement, the city has made changes to the program
and sued the red-light company Redflex over a bribery scandal.
However, that is not enough for many citizens, some of whom voiced
their concern during the city council's public comment period.

"The moral thing for the city to do is to draft a resolution
ending red light/speed cameras," said Mark Wallace, of the
Citizens to Abolish Red Light Cameras.

As of now, the city has no plans of abandoning the 14-year-old
program.  Some alderman would like to see more cameras downtown,
where there is more traffic and less cameras in poor
neighborhoods.  Many feel the program unfairly targets minority
residents. [GN]


CNN: Judge Tosses Racial Discrimination Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
Rodney Ho, writing for AJC.com, reports that a federal judge has
thrown out a racial discrimination class action suit filed by
current and former black CNN employees against CNN, Turner
Broadcasting and New York based parent company Time Warner.

"This discrimination represents a company-wide pattern and
practice," the lawsuit asserted back in December, 2016, "rather
than a series of isolated incidents."  Attorney Daniel Meachum at
the time said the company has been discriminating against blacks
for more than 20 years.

Although only two people were named plaintiffs in the original
case, he said he had found many more people who qualified for the
class-action suit.  In an interview on July 26, he said he has now
more than 190 people willing to attach their names to the lawsuit.

U.S. District Court judge William Duffey Jr. didn't buy the
argument, saying it "is fraught with conclusory claims,
unsupported by factual allegations sufficient to support the
inferences claimed by Plaintiffs."

He hammered the lawsuit for lacking factual support for
allegations like an interview process stacked against black
candidates and the concentration of black employees in less
important departments.  He also noted statistics about individuals
"of color" included minorities beyond blacks.

Meacham, the attorney for the plaintiffs, said he plans to address
Judge Duffey's issues with the initial lawsuit and re-file
sometime in the future.  "I won't say I'm disappointed or
surprised," he said.  "He made the observations that he made. I
respect and like Judge Duffey."

He tried to look at this from a positive light, calling this a
blessing in disguise.  "This is a battle, not a war," he said.
"The first scrimmage, it was in the favor of CNN and Turner.  I
applaud them for it.  But the war is not over.  We endeavor to
keep on fighting." [GN]


COLGATE-PALMOLIVE: Court Certifies Class in "Caufield"
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, Southern District of New York,
issued an Opinion and Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned PAUL CAUFIELD and REBECCA
STALEY, Plaintiffs, v. COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO., et al., Defendants,
No. 16 Civ. 4170 (LGS)(KNF) (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiffs Rebecca McCutcheon (formerly Staley) and Paul Caufield
(Plaintiffs) bring this action under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act  (ERISA), against Defendants Colgate-Palmolive
Co. (Colgate), Colgate-Palmolive Co. Employees' Retirement Income
Plan (the Plan), Laura Flavin, Daniel Marsili and the Employee
Relations Committee of Colgate-Palmolive Co. (the Committee).

Plaintiffs move for class certification on their claim for denial
of benefits (Count II) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23 with Plaintiff McCutcheon acting as the sole class
representative.

McCutcheon took her benefits under the Plan in the form of a lump
sum when she left Colgate in 1994. She was eligible to receive
benefits under Appendix C Section 2 of the Plan because she
elected to make employee contributions to continue earning
benefits under the pre-July 1989 final average pay formula. She
was not eligible under Appendix D.

Defendants granted additional benefits under the RAA to a few
hundred Plan participants. McCutcheon was not among them. In a
letter to the Plan Administrator . McCutcheon stated that it had
come to her attention that she should be receiving a RAA benefit
in addition to her original lump sum benefit. She requested that
the Plan provide her a RAA benefit and an explanation of how it
was calculated.  Flavin, Colgate's Vice President for Global
Compensation and Benefits, responded on behalf of the Committee
and denied McCutcheon's claim for an RAA benefit.

The Court held that Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is
granted because they have proven, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Rule 23's requirements are met and that McCutcheon
has class standing.

Plaintiffs estimate based on a spreadsheet produced by Defendants
that the proposed class consists of approximately 1,200
individuals. The numerosity requirement is satisfied.

Where the same conduct or practice by the same defendant gives
rise to the same kind of claims from all class members, there is a
common question. Here, whether Defendants committed each of the
four errors on which Plaintiffs base their claim for benefits are
common questions of fact, and their answers will drive the
resolution of the litigation. The commonality requirement is
therefore satisfied.

Defendants' arguments that McCutcheon is atypical are
unpersuasive:

   * First, McCutcheon's deposition testimony regarding the
purpose of the RAA will not become the focus of the litigation.

   * Second, McCutcheon is motivated to pursue all four alleged
errors even though the Complaint focuses on Error 1. Because under
Plaintiffs' theory the proposed class members are entitled to an
RAA benefit based on the larger of two benefit formulas, and each
formula is impacted by different alleged errors, McCutcheon has
incentive to investigate all four errors to ensure that she
receives her maximum RAA benefit.

   * Third, the statute of limitations defense that Defendants
raise against McCutcheon's claim is not a unique defense that
warrants denial of class certification. A court need not
definitively resolve whether such defenses would succeed on their
merits, but also need not deny certification merely because of the
presence of a colorable unique defense.

McCutcheon has raised two colorable arguments for not enforcing
the limitations period against her. First, she argues that the
limitations period is unenforceable because Defendants omitted it
from their denial letter in violation of 29 C.F.R.  Second, she
contends that Defendants waived the limitations period or should
be estopped from asserting it because the denial letter stated
that she had one year to file suit. Because Defendants have not
clearly shown that the limitations period will apply to bar
McCutcheon's claim, this defense does not render McCutcheon
atypical at this stage of the litigation.

Defendants' argument that McCutcheon is not an adequate class
representative because she does not understand the case and defers
to her lawyer is not persuasive. The claims in this case implicate
highly technical Plan language, legal rules and actuarial
calculations. It is understandable that McCutcheon, a non-lawyer,
would have difficulty answering questions about the claims.

McCutcheon showed in her deposition a general understanding of the
case and expressed her desire to be a watchdog for the proposed
class] to make sure that we all get our calculations corrected and
to make sure her counsel is handling everything correctly. This is
sufficient to meet the adequacy requirement.

The Complaint seeks judgment against Defendants on all claims and
an order requiring the benefit amounts due or past due under the
terms of the Plan in accordance with the requirements of ERISA,
and, where applicable, for the Plan to pay the difference to the
affected class members.

Thus, the objective of this action is to determine the correct
method for calculating the RAA, which could have the incidental
effect of causing the Plan to distribute monetary benefits to
class members. Plaintiffs have cited many similar cases that were
certified under Rule 23(b)(1)  while Defendants have not cited any
authority specifically stating that certifying claims for denial
of benefits under Rule 23(b)(1) violates class members' due
process rights.

Because all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, and
certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and Rule
23(b)(1)(B), Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is
granted.

In a putative class action, a plaintiff has class standing if he
plausibly alleges (1) that he personally has suffered some actual
injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the
defendant, and (2) that such conduct implicates the same set of
concerns as the conduct alleged to have caused injury to other
members of the putative class by the same defendants.

McCutcheon alleges that she personally has been deprived of
benefits to which she is entitled under the RAA due to the four
alleged errors. She alleges that the other class members,
including those to whom Appendix D applies, were injured due to
the same errors in calculating the RAA benefits. The cases
Defendants cite in support of their class standing argument are
inapposite.

Here, McCutcheon claims that the four alleged errors caused injury
to participants covered by Appendix D as well as participants,
such as herself, who are covered by Appendix C. Because McCutcheon
alleges that she personally has been denied benefits as a result
of the four alleged errors and that all putative class members
have been denied benefits based on the same alleged errors  --
albeit under a different appendix in some cases  --  McCutcheon
has class standing.

Plaintiffs' counsel is responsible for first identifying the four
alleged errors and served as class counsel in Colgate I.
Plaintiffs have shown that the appointment of the Gottesdiener Law
Firm as class counsel is warranted.

Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is granted. It is
ordered that Plaintiff Rebecca McCutcheon is appointed the class
representative to sue on behalf of a class of any person who,
under any of Appendices B, C or D of the Plan, is entitled to a
greater benefit than his or her Accrued Benefit as defined in Plan
Section 1.2, provided such person received a lump sum payment from
the Plan, and the beneficiaries and estates of any such person. It
is further ordered that Gottesdiener Law Firm, PLLC is appointed
class counsel.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 27, 2017 Opinion and
Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y9d4wlc4from Leagle.com.

Paul Caufield, Plaintiff, represented by Albert Huang,
Gottesdiener Law Firm, PLLC.

Paul Caufield, Plaintiff, represented by Steven Dana Cohen,
Gottesdiener Law Firm, PLLC & Eli Gottesdiener --
eli@gottesdienerlaw.com --  Gottesdiener Law Firm, PLLC.

Rebecca M Staley, Plaintiff, represented by Albert Huang,
Gottesdiener Law Firm, PLLC, Steven Dana Cohen, Gottesdiener Law
Firm, PLLC & Eli Gottesdiener, Gottesdiener Law Firm, PLLC.

Colgate-Palmolive Co., Defendant, represented by Brandon Brigham,
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Jeremy P. Blumenfeld, --
jeremy.blumenfeld@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP,
Jeffrey A. Sturgeon -- jeffrey.sturgeon@morganlewis.com -- Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP & Mara Eileen Slakas Brown, --
mara.slakasbrown@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP.

Colgate-Palmolive Co. Employee's Ret. Income Plan, Defendant,
represented by Brandon Brigham -- brandon.brigham@morganlewis.com
-- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Jeremy P. Blumenfeld, Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP, Jeffrey A. Sturgeon, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
LLP & Mara Eileen Slakas Brown, Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP.

Laura Flavin, Defendant, represented by Brandon Brigham, Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP, Jeremy P. Blumenfeld, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
LLP, Jeffrey A. Sturgeon, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP & Mara
Eileen Slakas Brown, Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP.

Daniel Marsili, Defendant, represented by Brandon Brigham, Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP, Jeremy P. Blumenfeld, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
LLP, Jeffrey A. Sturgeon, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP & Mara
Eileen Slakas Brown, Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP.

Employee Relations Committee of Colgate-Palmolive Co., Defendant,
represented by Brandon Brigham, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP,
Jeremy P. Blumenfeld, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Jeffrey A.
Sturgeon, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP & Mara Eileen Slakas Brown,
Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP.


COMCAST CORP: Judge Won't Dismiss Suit over Subscription Fees
-------------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Iovino, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that a San Francisco federal judge refused to dismiss a class
action claiming Comcast siphoned billions of dollars from TV
subscribers through phony, undisclosed fees.

U.S. District Judge Vince Chhabria denied Comcast's motion to
dismiss claims of breach of contract, intentional
misrepresentation and fraud, finding it plausible that the company
added bogus charges to cable bills beyond the prices it promised
new customers.

Lead plaintiff Dan Adkins sued Comcast in October 2016, claiming
the company increased cable bills by up to $10 per month with
"newly invented" broadcast TV and regional sports fees, which it
tried to pass off as government-imposed taxes.

"The plaintiffs have alleged the existence of a valid contract,
which was created when Adkins and [co-plaintiff Christopher]
Robertson submitted their order for Comcast services through
Comcast's website," Chhabria wrote in his 4-page ruling.

Comcast argued online order summaries did not serve as a contract
because customers agreed to pay any additional fees in a separate
subscriber agreement. But Chhabria found that subscriber agreement
did not specify a particular price for the service.

The judge also found a copy of Adkins' order summary quoting
$79.99 as the "base monthly total for all recurring charges"
supported claims of fraud and misrepresentation against Comcast
for charging a higher monthly price.

Chhabria refused to dismiss claims for injunctive relief because
Comcast did not brief the issue, but the judge acknowledged the
plaintiffs will likely have to pursue any injunctive relief claims
through a separate state court action.

Additionally, the judge dismissed a claim of bad faith against
Comcast without leave to amend, finding "the theory of breach the
plaintiffs allege is the same as the breach of contract theory."

The judge previously removed six out-of-state named plaintiffs
from the suit, finding the court lacked jurisdiction to resolve
their claims. That reasoning was validated by the Supreme Court's
decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. San Francisco County
Superior Court in June, holding that courts cannot hear claims
brought by out-of-state plaintiffs against out-of-state companies
without an adequate connection between the forum and claims at
issue.

Comcast is the nation's largest cable-media company and the 31st
largest publicly traded company on the planet, with $80.4 billion
in annual revenue and $193.5 billion in market capitalization as
of May 2017, according to Forbes.

Plaintiffs' attorney Daniel Hattis and Comcast attorney Michael
Stortz did not immediately return phone calls seeking comment.

Stortz is with Drinker Biddle & Reath in San Francisco. Hattis is
in private practice in Bellevue, Washington.

The case is, DAN ADKINS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COMCAST
CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:16-cv-05969-VC (N.D.
Cal.).


COMMODITY FORWARDERS: Huitron Seeks Overtime Pay Under Labor Code
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SANTIAGO HUITRON and JOE NAPOLES, as individuals and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. COMMODITY
FORWARDERS, INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive, the Defendant, Case No. BC669622 (Cal. Super. Ct., July
21, 2017), seeks to recover overtime and/or double-time in an
amount according to proof under Labor Code.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs and Class Members
regularly worked over 8 hours per day and 40 hours per week. The
Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs, and Class Members overtime
premium and/or double-time premium for hours worked in excess of
over 8 hours per day and 40 hours per week for work performed for
the Defendant. The Defendant failed to schedule Plaintiffs and
Class Members in such a manner that allowed Plaintiffs and Class
Members to be relieved of their shift immediately, thereby causing
Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs Class to work in excess of 8 hours per
day and/or 40 hours per week.[BN]

CFI specializes in worldwide logistical services for perishable,
frozen and dry products by providing transportation,
documentation, warehouse and consulting services.

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kevin Mahoney, Esq.
          Derek R. Guizado, Esq.
          Keren B. Serrano, Esq.
          MAHONEY LAW GROUP, APC
          249 E. Ocean Blvd., Ste. 814
          Long Beach, CA 90802
          Telephone: (562) 590 5550
          Facsimile: (562) 590 8400
          E-mail: kmahonev@mahoney-law.net
                  dguizado@mahoney-law.net
                  kserrano@mahonev-law.net


CORECIVIC OF TENNESSEE: "Richards" Suit Moved to S.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Thomas Richards, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC formerly known as: CCA of Tennessee,
LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 37-201700022588-CU-OE-CTL, was
removed on July 21, 2017 from the Superior Court of California,
County of San Diego, to the U.S. District Court for Southern
District of California (San Diego). The District Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 3:17-cv-01484-LAB-WVG to the proceeding. The
case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Larry Alan Burns.

CoreCivic, formerly the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA),
is a company that owns and manages private prisons and detention
centers and operates others on a concession basis.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard Street, Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206 4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633 0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Paul M Gleason, Esq.
          GLEASON & FAVAROTE LLP
          4014 Long Beach Blvd., Suite 300
          Long Beach, CA 90807
          Telephone: (213) 452 0510
          Facsimile: (213) 452 0514
          E-mail: pgleason@gleasonfavarote.com


CORINTHIAN COLLEGES: Sept. 25 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
-------------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP regarding the Corinthian Colleges Securities Litigation:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WESTERN DIVISION

JIMMY ELIAS KARAM, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff,
vs.

CORINTHIAN COLLEGES, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

No. 2:10-cv-06523-RGK(PJWx)
CLASS ACTION


SUMMARY NOTICE

TO:

ALL PERSONS WHO PURCHASED OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRED CORINTHIAN
COLLEGES, INC. ("CORINTHIAN" OR THE "COMPANY") COMMON STOCK
BETWEEN OCTOBER 30, 2007 AND AUGUST 19, 2010, INCLUSIVE

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that pursuant to an Order of the United
States District Court for the Central District of California, a
hearing will be held on September 25, 2017, at 9:00 a.m., before
the Honorable R. Gary Klausner, at the United States District
Court, Central District of California, 255 East Temple Street,
Courtroom 850, Los Angeles, California 90012, for the purpose of
determining: (1) whether the settlement of the Litigation set
forth in the Stipulation of Settlement dated May 9, 2017
("Stipulation" or "Settlement") for the sum of $2,250,000 in cash
should be approved by the Court as fair, reasonable, and adequate;
(2) whether the Plan of Allocation of Settlement proceeds should
be approved by the Court as fair, reasonable, and adequate; and
(3) the reasonableness of Lead Counsel's request for an award of
attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in connection with this
Litigation, together with interest thereon.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Corinthian common stock
between October 30, 2007 and August 19, 2010, inclusive, your
rights may be affected by this Litigation and the Settlement
thereof.  If you have not received a detailed Notice of Proposed
Settlement of Class Action ("Notice"), and a copy of the Proof of
Claim and Release form, you may obtain copies by writing to
Corinthian Securities Litigation, Claims Administrator, c/o
Gilardi & Co. LLC, P.O. Box 30225, College Station, TX 77842-3225,
by calling toll-free 1-866-683-9354, or by downloading this
information at www.corinthiancollegessecuritieslitigation.com.  If
you are a Class Member, in order to share in the distribution of
the Net Settlement Fund, you must submit a Proof of Claim and
Release form by mail postmarked no later than November 2, 2017, or
submitted electronically no later than November 2, 2017, at
www.corinthiancollegessecuritieslitigation.com, establishing that
you are entitled to a recovery.  You will be bound by any order
and final judgment rendered in the Litigation unless you request
to be excluded from the Class.  If you desire to be excluded from
the Class, you must submit a request for exclusion such that it is
postmarked no later than September 1, 2017, in the manner and form
explained in the detailed Notice referred to above.

Any objection to the Settlement, the Plan of Allocation, and/or
Lead Counsel's request for an award of attorneys' fees and
expenses must be filed with the Court and received by counsel
listed below no later than September 11, 2017.

Court:
CLERK OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WESTERN DIVISION
312 North Spring Street, Room G-8
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Lead Counsel:

ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
JEFFREY D. LIGHT
655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
San Diego, CA 92101

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT OR THE CLERK'S OFFICE REGARDING
THIS NOTICE.

DATED: July 7, 2017

BY ORDER OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WESTERN DIVISION


DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL: Democratic Voters' Class Action Ongoing
------------------------------------------------------------
Francisco Alvarado, writing for FloridaBulldog.org, reports that
an ongoing legal battle playing out in Fort Lauderdale federal
court over the Democratic National Committee's presidential
nominating process has devolved into accusations of harassment and
intimidation conducted by unknown political operatives.

In June, an attorney representing 150 Democratic voters in a
little-noticed class action lawsuit against the DNC and its former
chairwoman, U.S. Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz, sought court-
ordered security guards for himself, his clients, and his co-
counsels and their employees following a string of bizarre
incidents in June, including strange phone calls and emails by
individuals disguising their voices and a mysterious break-in at
the home of one of the plaintiffs.

On June 15, Senior U.S. District Judge William Zloch denied Fort
Lauderdale lawyer Cullin O'Brien's motion after determining that
his request would overburden the U.S. Marshals Service because the
plaintiffs reside in 45 states and Washington, D.C.  The judge
also noted that Mr. O'Brien had not provided any evidence directly
linking the incidents to the DNC and Weston-based Wasserman
Schultz.

"The undertaking would in all likelihood require the entire U.S.
Marshals Service to direct all of its efforts and attention to
this specific case," Judge Zloch wrote in his order.  "The Court
notes that plaintiffs' motion contains absolutely no factual nexus
between Defendants and the conduct set forth in the motion."

O'Brien did not respond to two phone messages and an email request
for comment.  Mark Caramanica, an attorney for Wasserman Schultz,
referred questions to DNC lawyers Bruce Spiva and Marc Elias, who
also did not return two phone messages and emails requesting
comment.

Elizabeth Beck, an attorney for the plaintiffs, told Florida
Bulldog that it was not her legal team's intent to show that the
DNC and Ms. Wasserman Schultz were involved in the incidents.  "We
are not saying the DNC or the congresswoman ordered the harassment
against us, the plaintiffs and our staff," Ms. Beck said.  "We
don't know who is doing it, but it did happen."

The stakes are high for the DNC and Ms. Wasserman Schultz.  The
complaint accuses both of fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence by
rigging Democratic primaries to favor former Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton over U.S. Sen. Bernie Sanders.  More than
half of the plaintiffs are Sanders supporters who donated money to
his campaign.  The lawsuit claims the 150 Democrats are entitled
to punitive damages in addition to refunds for their political
donations.

Despite the explosive accusations in the lawsuit and the
subsequent motion seeking court-ordered protection, there has been
no coverage of the case in mainstream media outlets, including
South Florida's newspapers, since it was filed in June 2016.

'Funny Business'

Ms. Beck and her husband, Jared Beck, are Miami-based personal
injury lawyers who decided to support Sanders in early 2016.  "I
was phone banking and also hosted phone banks to teach other
people," Ms.  Beck said.  "I joined a lot of Facebook groups where
I was sharing information and political memes.  That's when I
started hearing about all this funny business happening during the
primaries in various states."

She said her suspicions that the DNC was in the tank for Hillary
Clinton were confirmed when Russian hackers publicly released
internal documents from the committee on the Internet.  "The
lawsuit was filed based on that information," Ms. Beck said.
"Everyone, including the people who hired us, reached the same
conclusion that the process was rigged."

Ms. Beck also launched a Facebook page that has grown to more than
57,000 followers and started the political action committee
JamPAC.  She uses the JamPAC's website to post updates and
documents related to the lawsuit.

According to the 39-page complaint, the DNC and Wasserman Schultz
violated DNC's charter and bylaws that say the party chair "shall
exercise impartiality and evenhandedness" and "shall be
responsible for ensuring that the officers and staff of the DNC
maintain impartiality and evenhandedness." Further, that while
Wasserman repeatedly made public statements between September 2015
and May 2016 that she was committed to running a neutral primary,
the congresswoman and the DNC was on team Clinton from the
beginning of the 2016 presidential election cycle, the lawsuit
claims.

To support their claims, the plaintiffs cited internal DNC
documents obtained by Russian hackers and published on the
Internet by purported hacker Guccifer 2.0.  For example, on
May 26, 2015 the DNC issued a memo outlining the party's goals in
providing a contrast between the "GOP field and HRC [Hillary
Rodham Clinton]."  The memo also added the DNC would use "specific
hits to muddy the waters around ethics, transparency and campaign
finance attacks on HRC."

The DNC has confirmed that the emails are legitimate.

During an April 25 motion hearing, DNC lawyer Spiva argued the
plaintiffs don't have standing to bring the lawsuit because the
courts don't have jurisdiction over how political parties decide
to pick their candidates.  "The Supreme Court and other courts
have affirmed the party's right to make that determination," Mr.
Spiva said.  "Those are internal issues that the party gets to
decide basically without interference from the courts."

DNC 'not obligated' to follow own rules

The DNC is not obligated to follow its charter and its bylaws,
Spiva added.  "We could have voluntarily decided that we're gonna
go into back rooms like they used to do and smoke cigars and pick
the candidate that way," he said.  "That's not the way it was
done. But they could have.  And that would also have been their
right."

Ms. Beck told Florida Bulldog she was taken aback by Mr. Spiva's
legal argument since Wasserman Schultz had always denied the DNC
was playing favorites.  "It's a pretty outrageous position to
take," she said.  "It was very different from what the
congresswoman had been saying on national TV during the
primaries."

A little over a month later, things got even more strange.  On
June 1, Ms. Beck sent an email to DNC attorneys to inform them
that her secretary had received a phone call from an unknown
individual seeking information about the case.  "The caller
refused to identify himself/herself," Ms. Beck wrote.  "My
secretary stated that it sounded like the caller was using a voice
changer because the voice sounded robotic and genderless."

Ms. Beck also noted that the phone number that showed up on the
caller ID was the same one for Wasserman Schultz's Aventura
district office.  According to a June 1 reply filed in court by
the congresswoman's lawyers, Wasserman Schultz had no knowledge of
the call being made and did not authorize it.

"Further, it is highly unlikely that the call did in fact
originate with that office, as no one is currently working in the
office associated with the subject number -- or has anyone been
working there for several months -- due to ongoing repairs," the
reply states.  "Given that the matter involves congressional phone
lines, the incident has been reported to Capitol Police."

The following day, Fort Lauderdale attorney O'Brien received three
phone calls from an unknown number from a person who identified
himself only as "Chris" inquiring about the lawsuit, according to
the motion requesting protection.  During the second phone call,
"Chris" allegedly said, "This is bigger than you and your family
and your law partners" and made a reference to news about the
mysterious death of Assistant U.S. Attorney Beranton Whisenant in
Fort Lauderdale.  Mr. O'Brien also submitted under seal 11 emails
allegedly sent by "Chris."

Mr. Whisenant's body was spotted floating just off Hollywood beach
shortly before dawn on May 24. The cause of death has not been
released, but the Miami Herald has reported that Hollywood police
have said Mr. Whisenant suffered some trauma to his head.

On June 3, plaintiff Angela Monson from Dassel, Minn., said she
woke up around 5:45 a.m. to use her laptop computer only to find
it in a different spot from where she had last left it, which she
thought was odd, according to an affidavit she filed as part of
the motion for protection.  "When I plugged in my laptop, it made
a snapping noise and did not turn on," Ms. Monson said.  "When I
turned it over, the bottom cover of the laptop fell off.  I then
noticed that the bottom cover, which is attached to the laptop
with 10 screws, had all the screws missing."

After noticing that two patio doors she had locked the night
before were unlocked, Monson called local police to file a report
about a possible break-in, her affidavit states.  The same day,
Mr. O'Brien claims he received a call from the far-right militia
group Oath Keepers offering him and his clients protection. [GN]


DISH NETWORK: $61MM Judgment in "Krakauer" Not Appropriate
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, Middle District of North
Carolina, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting
Defendant's Motion for Post-Trial Procedures in the case captioned
THOMAS H. KRAKAUER, Plaintiff, v. DISH NETWORK, LLC, Defendant,
No. 1:14-CV-333 (M.D.N.C.).

The defendant, Dish Network, LLC, willfully violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act when its agent made 51,119 telephone
solicitations to 18,066 residential phone numbers on the National
Do Not Call Registry. Each class member is entitled to damages of
$1,200 for each violative solicitation call.  Having considered
proposals from the parties, the Court by this order outlines a
process for entry of judgment in favor of those class members who
are clearly identified and a general claims administration process
for all other class members.  The Court directs the parties to
confer and submit motions, forms, and proposed additional
procedures that follow the Court's outline and schedule.

The Court held that an aggregate judgment in the full amount is
inappropriate in this case in light of the particular
circumstances and inability to presently identify all class
members.  The plaintiffs may move for judgment for any group of
class members who are identified fully and without contradiction
in the existing data.  Beyond that, claimants must submit a
completed claim form, Dish will have a reasonable opportunity to
raise concerns about whether a particular individual is a class
member, and when appropriate, the Court will enter individual
judgments.

The plaintiffs ask the Court to enter judgment in the amount of
$61,342,800, based on a total liability of $1,200 per call
multiplied by 51,119 calls.  The plaintiffs make a strong
argument.  Dish willfully violated the TCPA tens of thousands of
times when its agent willfully made repeated solicitation calls to
persons on the Registry; the jury set the amount of damages for
each violative call; and a simple mathematical calculation leads
to the appropriate judgment amount.  While that judgment is no
doubt appropriate, the Court concludes in its discretion that the
better course in this case is to take a different approach that
takes into account the uncertainties in some of the data about
class membership.

It is ordered that:

   1. The defendant's motion for post-trial procedures, and the
plaintiffs' requests for post-trial procedures are granted in part
and denied in part.

   2. The parties will confer as directed and file these motions
and submissions as are required by this order.

   3. Unless stated otherwise in this order, the time frame and
word limits for briefing are those set forth in the Local Rules.

   4. For all matters where joint submissions are required, the
joint submission will specifically state areas of agreement and
disagreement and will include proposed orders, if applicable. If
the parties do not reach full agreement, each party may file a
brief at the time of the joint submission addressing areas of
disagreement. In view of the degree of advance consultation
required, the Court expects the parties to address all issues in
the initial briefs, which are limited to 6,000 words. The parties
may file short response briefs no longer than 2500 words within
ten days, if necessary, and no reply briefs are allowed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 27, 2017 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available http://tinyurl.com/y8j5a65afrom
Leagle.com.

THOMAS H. KRAKAUER, Plaintiff, represented by ANTHONY I. PARONICH,
BRODERICK & PARONICH, P.C., 125 Summer StreetSuite,1030, Boston,
MA 0211
THOMAS H. KRAKAUER, Plaintiff, represented by BRIAN A. GLASSER
bglasser@baileyglasser.com --  BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP, EDWARD A.
BRODERICK, BRODERICK LAW, P.C., 727 Atlantic Avenue, Second Floor
Boston, MA, 02111, JOHN W. BARRETT -- jbarrett@baileyglasser.com -
- BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP, JOHN J. RODDY -- jroddy@baileyglasser.com
-- BAILEY & GLASSER LLP, MATTHEW P. MCCUE, LAW OFFICE OF MATHEW P.
MCCUE, 340 Union Avenue, Framingham, MA 01702, PATRICK MUENCH --
pmuench@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP & JACOB MATTHEW
NORRIS, THE NORRIS LAW FIRM, 1033 Bullard Court, Suite 207,
Raleigh, NC 27615 USA
DISH NETWORK L.L.C., Defendant, represented by ALLEGRA A. NOONAN -
anoonan@orrick.com -- ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, BENJAMEN
E. KERN --  bkern@beneschlaw.com -- BENESCH, FRIEDLANDER, COPLAN &
ARONOFF, LLP, DAVID M. KRUEGER -- dkrueger@beneschlaw.com --
BENESCH, FRIEDLANDER, COPLAN & ARONOFF, LLP, DAVID LITTERINE-
KAUFMAN -- dlitterinekaufman@orrick.com -- ORRICK HERRINGTON &
SUTCLIFFE LLP, ELYSE D. ECHTMAN -- eechtman@orrick.com -- ORRICK
HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, ERIC L. ZALUD -- ezalud@beneschlaw.com
-- BENESCH, FRIEDLANDER, COPLAN & ARONOFF, LLP, JOHN L. EWALD, --
jewald@orrick.com -- ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, JULIE
GORCHKOVA -- jgorchkova@orrick.com -- ORRICK HERRINGTON &
SUTCLIFFE LLP, LAURA E. KOGAN -- lkogan@beneschlaw.com -- BENESCH,
FRIEDLANDER, COPLAN & ARONOFF, LLP, LOUISA S. IRVING --
lirving@orrick.com -- ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, PETER A.
BICKS -- pbicks@orrick.com -- ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP,
RICHARD J. KESHIAN -- rkershian@kilpatricktownsend.com --
KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP & SHASHA Y. ZOU --
szou@orrick.com -- ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP


DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Class in Civil Forfeiture Suit Certified
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Columbia, issued a
Memorandum Opinion granting Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned NICKOYA HOYTE, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant, Case No. 1:13-cv-
00569 (CRC) (D.D.C.).

Over a dozen plaintiffs have sued the District of Columbia for
damages stemming from the seizure of their property incident to
arrests. The seizures were effected under the city's former asset
forfeiture statute, which authorized the District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) to seize and seek civil
forfeiture of any property that it had probable cause to believe
was involved in criminal activity, whether or not the property was
owned by the arrestee.

Plaintiffs now seek class certification under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 with respect to four of the remaining claims.

That the District failed to take reasonable steps to notify
property owners that their property had been seized and was
subject to forfeiture (Claim Five); that MPD failed to return
seized cars to their owners after it determined that the cars were
no longer subject to forfeiture (Claim Seven); and that MPD
routinely denied (and discouraged applications for) waivers of the
statute's requirement that property owners post a cash bond in
order to challenge the forfeiture.

The Council of the District of Columbia amended the civil
forfeiture law in 2015, the Civil Asset Forfeiture Amendment Act.
Among other changes, the new law shifted the burden of proof in
forfeiture hearings from the property owner to the government,
eliminated drug possession as a forfeitable offense, and gave
owners an opportunity to request the interim release of their
property. Notwithstanding these reforms, the District remains
liable for any Constitutional deficiencies in the pre-amendment
forfeiture regime.

Proposed Class Definitions

Claim Three

Claim Three consists of each person whose vehicle at any time
during the period beginning three years before the date of filing
of the original complaint (4/25/13) and ending on June 2015 (1)
had been taken by the District of Columbia for civil forfeiture
and was being detained in the custody of the Mayor; or (2) was
taken for civil forfeiture and detained in the custody of the
Mayor; and (3) was not given a prompt post seizure hearing within
five days from the date of taking, or within 35 days of the date
of taking if a prosecution relating to the vehicle was initiated
and the vehicle was also held for investigation or evidence.

Claim Five

Claim Five consists of each person (who was not a member of either
of the Hardy classes) whose property at any time during the period
beginning three years before the date of filing of the original
complaint (4/25/13) up until the termination of this action (1)
had been taken by the District of Columbia for civil forfeiture
and was being detained in the custody of the Mayor; or (2) was
taken for civil forfeiture and detained in the custody of the
Mayor; and (3) did not receive Notice of Intent to
Administratively Forfeit the Following Property.

Claim Seven

Claim Seven consists of each person whose property at any time
during the period beginning three years before the date of filing
of the original complaint (4/25/13) up until the termination of
this action (1) had been taken by the District of Columbia for
civil forfeiture and was being detained in the custody of the
Mayor; or (2) was taken for civil forfeiture and detained in the
custody of the Mayor; and (3) the District did not (i) return the
property or (ii) send notice and provide a hearing regarding the
owner's right to the property (4) within two weeks after the
latter of (a) the Property Clerk or the Office of Attorney General
determined that the property was not subject to forfeiture, or (b)
90 days if the District did not conduct a forfeiture determination
by that time.

Claim Fourteen

Claim Fourteen consists of all persons who had been declared CJA
eligible or who satisfied the in forma pauperis criteria of the
Superior Court at the time their property was taken, whose
property at any time during the three year period beginning three
years before the date of filing of the original complaint
(4/25/13) and ending on 8/22/2013 when the District adopted the
Superior Court criteria for evaluating a litigant's in forma
pauperis status (1) had been taken for civil forfeiture and was
being detained by the District for civil forfeiture or (2) was
taken and detained for civil forfeiture; and (3) was declared
forfeited in a Mayor's forfeiture determination hearing or who
lost the property in a judicial forfeiture proceeding for non
payment of the penal bond.

Claim Three: Interim Post-Seizure Hearings

Plaintiffs satisfy Rule 23(a)'s requirements for Claim Three,
which alleges that the former statute violated their due process
rights by failing to provide interim hearings at which they could
challenge the seizure and continued retention of their vehicles
pending a final forfeiture determination. First, Plaintiffs have
met their burden to establish numerosity. This tally is more than
enough for the Court to find that there is a reasonable basis for
determining that numerosity has been satisfied.

Moving to the commonality requirement for Claim Three, the Court
agrees with Plaintiffs that the District's civil forfeiture
statute constitutes a uniform policy or practice that affects all
class members, insofar as the absence of interim hearings was a
feature of the statute itself.

With respect to typicality, the District maintains that the claims
of the representative Plaintiffs are too distinct to meet this
requirement. For example, the District argues that Plaintiffs
Ishebekka Beckford, Nickoya Hoyte, and Steven May are atypical
because they could have received a post-seizure hearing under
Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g), thus obtaining
the post-seizure hearing they claim they were entitled to under
the Fifth Amendment.

Plaintiffs also satisfy Rule 23(a)'s final requirement of adequacy
of representation. Plaintiffs all share the same interest in
obtaining damages from the District's failure to provide post-
seizure hearings, and the District has not alleged that Plaintiffs
lack competent legal representation.

Because Plaintiffs seek individualized monetary damages, they must
meet Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirements of predominance and superiority.

The alleged injury in Claim Three -- the failure to provide prompt
post-seizure hearings -- was the result of a systemic District
policy implemented consistent with the former asset forfeiture
statute, which did not require such hearings. There is no need to
assess the injury on a member-by-member basis because the District
did not provide the required hearings to any property owners. This
was the District's policy and practice, and thus, from a pragmatic
standpoint, class adjudication is appropriate.

The District's arguments to the contrary are unavailing. It
contends that Claim Three will require an examination of each
class member's individualized circumstances" because: (1) some
class members may have sought the return of property by filing a
motion under Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g); (2)
some class members may have filed a petition for remission or
mitigation of an administrative forfeiture under D.C. Code Section
48-905.02(d)(3)(F); (3) some class members may have submitted a
property claim form; and (4) some of the seized vehicles were held
as evidence in criminal proceedings.

While the Court need not adopt this precise damages framework now,
it is satisfied that methods are available to determine damages on
a class-wide basis. It therefore finds that Plaintiffs have
satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3), and will
grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification with respect to
Claim Three.

Claim Five: Post-Seizure Notice

Which alleges that the District had a custom and practice of
failing to notify property owners that their property had been
seized and was subject to forfeiture. While the former forfeiture
law required the District to provide notice to any person having a
right of claim to the seized property,  Plaintiffs contend that
the District violated their due process rights by mailing the
required notices to obviously incorrect addresses or by not
mailing them at all.

Plaintiffs satisfy Rule 23(a)'s factors for Claim Five. To
demonstrate numerosity, Plaintiffs have filed with the Court an
affidavit from their expert, Samuel Strickland.

According to the affidavit, Strickland reviewed the records that
the District provided to Plaintiffs during discovery from MPD's
Evidence On Q property database.  The data was exported into a
spreadsheet that, according to Strickland, "has fields which seem
to be populated when the District sends notice of intent to
administratively forfeit property to the owners of vehicles and
money which the District has seized for forfeiture determinations.

The District has not offered any documentary evidence to rebut
Strickland's conclusions.

Plaintiffs' position on numerosity is further supported by Lt.
Gray's prior deposition testimony in the Hardy litigation. To be
sure, Hardy concerned allegations that the District failed to
provide forfeiture notices to incarcerated prisoners; MPD's
evidence control division allegedly did not check if a property
owner was incarcerated before mailing the notice to the owner's
last known address.

The Court reaches the same conclusion for commonality. True, the
alleged failure to provide notice was not an explicit policy; the
former forfeiture statute, after all, required the District to
provide notice. The Court is thus satisfied that Plaintiffs'
allegation that the District failed to make reasonable efforts to
provide notice here poses a common question of law or fact.

Turning to typicality, the District offers evidence that it
contends establishes that certain named Plaintiffs for Claim Five
were, in fact, given notice that their property was subject to
forfeiture. Specifically, the District has provided copies of the
notices that were ostensibly sent to several Claim Five
Plaintiffs, including Kelly Hughes, Terrence Thomas, and Shane
Lucas.

The Court next turns to adequacy of representation. After closely
reviewing the record, the Court finds no basis for the District's
contention that the named Plaintiffs would not fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class. The Claim Five
class is adequately defined, Proposed Order 3, and it is
ascertainable given that the District has provided Plaintiffs with
specific seizure records from its Evidence On Q database that
indicate whether notice was sent.

The Court also finds that Plaintiffs satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s
requirements of predominance and superiority for Claim Five. Given
the Evidence On Q data obtained in discovery, which provides more
than 10,000 seizure records, it would appear that Plaintiffs can
present evidence of injury on a class-wide basis without
conducting individualized inquiries. And as Judge Wilkins noted in
certifying a very similar notice claim in Hardy, even assuming the
District has evidence that it did follow up on any particular
undelivered notice, the District can come forward with that
evidence without disrupting the class action.

When one or more of the central issues in the action are common to
the class and can be said to predominate, the action may be
considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even though other important
matters will have to be tried separately.

The Court is also satisfied that individualized damages can be
calculated for Claim Five without resorting to separate mini-
trials. While Plaintiffs initially asserted that the measure of
damages is the value of the property seized, they later contended
that the same formula for determining damages in Claim Three could
be used for Claim Five.

Finding that Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of Rule
23(a) and 23(b), the Court will grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification with respect to Claim Five.

Claim Seven: Failure to Promptly Return Non-Forfeitable Property

The Court next turns to Claim Seven, which alleges that MPD
violated certain Plaintiffs' due process rights by failing to
promptly return their property after it determined the property
was no longer subject to forfeiture. Plaintiffs have not satisfied
Rule 23's requirements for this claim primarily because they have
not offered evidence showing the frequency with which the alleged
injury occurred.

While the Court must deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification with respect to Claim Seven since numerosity has not
been satisfied, it will briefly address the remaining Rule 23
factors out of an abundance of caution.  For this reason,
Plaintiffs also cannot satisfy typicality, predominance, and
superiority. The Court must therefore decline to certify Claim
Seven.

Claim Fourteen

Plaintiffs attempt to satisfy numerosity by arguing that the class
for Claim Fourteen includes every property owner who was deemed
eligible for a bond waiver. Not so. Because the Court dismissed
Plaintiffs' facial challenge, the potential class for what remains
of Claim Fourteen includes anyone who was discouraged from
applying for bond waivers, and anyone who was unreasonably or
arbitrarily denied a bond waiver.

Plaintiffs have not offered additional evidence in support of
numerosity. The Court, therefore, must find that numerosity has
not been satisfied. Plaintiffs also fall well short of meeting
Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirements that class-wide issues predominate
over individual issues, and that a class action is superior to
other forms of adjudication.

The Court will therefore deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification with respect to Claim Fourteen.

The Court will grant Plaintiffs' motion with respect to Claims
Three and Five, and will deny the motion with respect to Claims
Seven and Fourteen. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 27, 2017 Memorandum
Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/yclmzpuvfrom
Leagle.com.

KIM KATORA BROWN, Plaintiff, represented by William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III. 717 D St NW Ste 300, Washington, DC, 20004-2815
KIM KATORA BROWN, Plaintiff, represented by Bennett B. Borden, --
bennett.borden@dbr.com -- DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP.

NIKOYA HOYTE, Plaintiff, represented by William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III, Bennett B. Borden, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP &
Lynn E. Cunningham, -lcunningham@law.gwu.edu -- LAW OFFICES OF
LYNN E. CUNNINGHAM.

KELLY HUGHES, Plaintiff, represented by William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III, Bennett B. Borden, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP &
Lynn E. Cunningham, LAW OFFICES OF LYNN E. CUNNINGHAM.

TAKIA JENKINS, Plaintiff, represented by William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III, Bennett B. Borden, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP &
Lynn E. Cunningham, LAW OFFICES OF LYNN E. CUNNINGHAM.

STEPHEN MAY, Plaintiff, represented by William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III, Bennett B. Borden, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP &
Lynn E. Cunningham, LAW OFFICES OF LYNN E. CUNNINGHAM.

RAMONA PERSON, Plaintiff, represented by William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III, Bennett B. Borden, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP &
Lynn E. Cunningham, LAW OFFICES OF LYNN E. CUNNINGHAM.

DORIAN URQUART, Plaintiff, represented by William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III, Bennett B. Borden, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP &
Lynn E. Cunningham, LAW OFFICES OF LYNN E. CUNNINGHAM.

SHANITA WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, represented by William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III, Bennett B. Borden, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP &
Lynn E. Cunningham, LAW OFFICES OF LYNN E. CUNNINGHAM.

TANISHA WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, represented by William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III, Bennett B. Borden, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP &
Lynn E. Cunningham, LAW OFFICES OF LYNN E. CUNNINGHAM.

JARRETT ACEY, Plaintiff, represented by William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III, Bennett B. Borden, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP &
Lynn E. Cunningham, LAW OFFICES OF LYNN E. CUNNINGHAM.

JULIUS GORDON, Plaintiff, represented by William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III, Bennett B. Borden, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP &
Lynn E. Cunningham, LAW OFFICES OF LYNN E. CUNNINGHAM.

MARILYN LANGLY, Plaintiff, represented by William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III, Bennett B. Borden, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP &
Lynn E. Cunningham, LAW OFFICES OF LYNN E. CUNNINGHAM.

DAVID LITTLEPAGE, Plaintiff, represented by William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III, Bennett B. Borden, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP &
Lynn E. Cunningham, LAW OFFICES OF LYNN E. CUNNINGHAM.

TERRENCE THOMAS, Plaintiff, represented by William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III, Bennett B. Borden, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP &
Lynn E. Cunningham, LAW OFFICES OF LYNN E. CUNNINGHAM.

SHANE LUCAS, Plaintiff, represented by William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III, Bennett B. Borden, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP &
Lynn E. Cunningham, LAW OFFICES OF LYNN E. CUNNINGHAM.

STEPHANIE MCCRAE, Plaintiff, represented by William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III, Bennett B. Borden, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP &
Lynn E. Cunningham, LAW OFFICES OF LYNN E. CUNNINGHAM.

ALL PLAINTIFFS, Plaintiff, represented by William Charles Cole
Claiborne, III, Bennett B. Borden, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP &
Lynn E. Cunningham, LAW OFFICES OF LYNN E. CUNNINGHAM.

MUSLIMAH TAYLOR, Plaintiff, represented by Bennett B. Borden,
DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP.

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant, represented by
Esther Yong, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, Christine Leigh Gephardt, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Fernando Amarillas, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA & Ty Micha Johnson,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.


ENERGY MAINTENANCE: Sandt Barred from Further Collection
--------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Texas, First District, Houston, issued an
Opinion affirming the judgment of the District Court in the cases
captioned JIM AND ROXANNE SANDT, Appellants, v. ENERGY MAINTENANCE
SERVICES GROUP I, LLC N/K/A ENERGY MAINTENANCE SERVICES GROUP I,
INC., Appellee. AND ENERGY MAINTENANCE SERVICES GROUP I, LLC N/K/A
ENERGY MAINTENANCE SERVICES GROUP I, INC., Appellant, v. TIMOTHY
NESLER, Appellee, Nos. 01-15-01070-CV, 01-16-00362-CV (Tex. App.).

These companion cases arise from efforts to enforce a judgment
against an executive officer and his company.  The Appellate Court
interprets the provisions of two agreements -- the company's
agreement to indemnify the officer, and the company's later
settlement agreement with the plaintiff in the underlying case --
to determine whether the company must indemnify the officer for
the judgment against him and whether the settlement released the
plaintiff's collection of that judgment if the company is
obligated to pay it.

Jim Sandt was a former officer and shareholder of Energy
Maintenance Services Group I, LLC, a closely held Delaware limited
liability company.  Timothy Nesler was the chief executive officer
of Energy Maintenance.  In 2005, Sandt sued Energy Maintenance and
Nesler, among other officers of the company.  The gravamen of
Sandt's suit was that Energy Maintenance, Nesler, and the other
officers wrongfully had diluted Sandt's ownership interest in
Energy Maintenance, committing fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.
Nesler receives indemnification for the Sandt lawsuit

While Sandt's suit was pending, Energy Maintenance's board of
directors agreed to indemnify Nesler for any liability arising out
of or relating to the Sandt litigation. The board memorialized
that agreement in a company resolution.

A Fort Bend County jury found in favor of Sandt and against both
Energy Maintenance and Nesler. The jury found that Nesler had
breached his fiduciary duty to Sandt by diluting Sandt's interest
in the company.  It further found that Energy Maintenance and
Nesler had committed statutory fraud against Sandt.  The trial
court entered judgment in Sandt's favor in July 2009.  The
judgment awarded $780,000 in damages and attorney's fees to Sandt
from Energy Maintenance, Nesler, and two other officers, jointly
and severally. In addition, the judgment awarded Sandt $300,000 in
punitive damages against Energy Maintenance and Nesler
individually.

The defendants in the Sandt case appealed the judgment. While the
appeal was pending, Energy Maintenance's primary creditor took
control of the company and fired Nesler from his position as chief
executive officer.

A new board of directors voted by written consent to revoke the
indemnification that the board had authorized in August 2007
effective as of the date indemnification was purportedly granted.
In support of its revocation, the board passed a resolution
stating that its investigation to date indicates that Mr. Nesler
misrepresented to the Board the facts, circumstances and status of
the Sandt Matter.

The settlements resolved all liability other than the $300,000
exemplary-damages award assessed against Nesler individually. The
settlement agreement between Energy Maintenance and Sandt
expressly provided that Sandt would not seek recovery of the
$300,000 owed by Nesler from Energy Maintenance, either directly
or indirectly.

Energy Maintenance also sued Sandt. It requested the trial court
to construe the settlement agreement between Energy Maintenance
and Sandt and declare that, based on their agreement, Sandt was
not owed the $300,000 Nesler judgment if Energy Maintenance was
obligated to indemnify Nesler.

Energy Maintenance and Nesler moved for summary judgment. The
trial court denied Energy Maintenance's motion and granted
Nesler's motion in part, ruling that Nesler was entitled to
indemnity based on the board's August 2007 indemnity resolution,
and that Energy Maintenance's failure to indemnify Nesler was a
breach of that agreement.

Energy Maintenance subsequently amended its pleadings to add
additional claims against both Sandt and Nesler. Energy
Maintenance sued Sandt for breach of the parties' settlement
agreement, alleging that Sandt's attempts to collect the $300,000
from Nesler breached the settlement agreement. Energy Maintenance
sued Nesler for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. Energy
Maintenance alleged that Nesler breached his fiduciary duty to the
company by engaging in self-dealing when he diluted Sandt's
ownership interest in December 2003 and when he obtained indemnity
from the board of directors by misleading it in August 2007.
Energy Maintenance alleged that Nesler committed fraud by
concealing the nature of Sandt's allegations and the extent of his
misconduct from the board when he sought indemnity.

                     Trial Court Rulings

The trial court then submitted the issue of damages for Nesler's
claim for indemnity to a jury. The jury found that Nesler was
entitled to recover $164,092.18 for attorney's fees incurred as a
result of Energy Maintenance's failure to indemnify him in
connection with Sandt's lawsuit. It further found that Nesler was
entitled to recover $537,418.35 in attorney's fees incurred in
this litigation. The trial court signed a judgment incorporating
the jury's verdict and its separate orders on Energy Maintenance's
fiduciary duty and fraud claims.

The parties tried to the bench Energy Maintenance's claim against
Sandt for breach of the settlement agreement. The trial court
found in favor of Sandt on that claim, and it awarded Sandt
$15,000 in attorney's fees. The final judgment also included a
declaration that any further attempt by Sandt to collect the
$300,000 award against Nesler remaining from the Sandt litigation
would breach the settlement agreement's clause barring indirect
recovery from Energy Maintenance, because Energy Maintenance owed
Nesler indemnity for the Sandt litigation.

                  Appellate Court Ruling

The Appellate Court concludes that the company owes indemnity to
the officer and, because the company is obligated to indemnify its
officer, the settlement agreement precludes further collection of
the judgment.  Because the trial court similarly ruled, the
Appellate Court affirms its judgment.

The Appellate Court held that the board's indemnity agreement was
enforceable.

The agreement expressly specifies that an adverse judgment does
not create a presumption of bad faith, and states a company policy
of indemnifying corporate officers to the fullest extent legally
possible.  Energy Maintenance's company agreement does not, in
express and affirmative terms, make members and directors
ineligible for indemnification previously granted simply because a
jury finds that they did not act in good faith, and the Appellate
Court says it cannot rewrite its company agreement to say
something it does not.

The agreement provides the board with the option of advancing the
costs of litigation and leaving the indemnification question for a
later time.  As Energy Maintenance's later board acknowledged,
however, the 2007 resolution was one that obligated the company to
indemnify its officers in the Sandt suit, not one that merely
advanced the officers' litigation expenses, the Appellate Court
held.

Energy Maintenance has not identified any decision in which a
Delaware court upheld a Delaware corporation's decision to rescind
an agreement to indemnify one of its officers or directors after
an adverse jury decision. Delaware law is to the contrary,
providing that an indemnified person's continued service to the
firm provides the consideration necessary to form a binding
contractual agreement.  This general principle of contract is
equally applicable to limited liability companies, like Energy
Maintenance. Accordingly, unless Energy Maintenance had a
contractual right to reconsider its decision to indemnify Nesler,
it could not do so. Neither its company agreement nor the board's
2007 indemnity resolution reserved a right to revisit Nesler's
right to indemnity. Energy Maintenance therefore could not rescind
its agreement to indemnify him.

The board was authorized to indemnify Nesler.

These decisions, however, do not support Energy Maintenance's
position that its board lacked authority to grant indemnity when
it did. Rather, in each of these cases, the company and its former
officer were at loggerheads regarding advancement or indemnity,
and the court determined that a ruling enforcing an indemnity
obligation at the outset of the litigation was premature.

In contrast, Energy Maintenance's board determined that Nesler had
acted in good faith and agreed to indemnify him when he requested
it. Section 8.1 of the agreement expressly permits indemnification
with respect to a threatened, pending, or completed action. Energy
Maintenance's company agreement thus authorized its board of
directors to indemnify Nesler at the outset of the Sandt suit,
without regard to a jury's later finding of liability.

Energy Maintenance next contends that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment on its claims for fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty based on the four-year statute of limitations.
Relying on the discovery rule and relation-back doctrine, Energy
Maintenance asserts that its claims did not accrue until its board
learned of Nesler's misconduct and that the board did not do so
until 2011, less than four years before it initially filed suit in
2013.

Nesler responds that Energy Maintenance's claims were not
inherently undiscoverable or, alternatively, that the Sandt
litigation put Energy Maintenance on notice of its potential
claims against him more than four years before the company filed
suit.

The company's tort claims accrued more than four years before it
sued.

The evidence shows Energy Maintenance was on inquiry notice of the
allegations against Nesler. The nature of these allegations was
detailed in publicly available court filings. The board was
obligated to investigate Sandt's allegations when it became aware
of them in August 2007, and a rudimentary inquiry by the board
would have divulged the nature of Nesler's alleged wrongdoing at
that time.  The Appellate Court therefore holds that Energy
Maintenance's corresponding claims for fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty against Nesler were not inherently undiscoverable.
Because the discovery rule does not apply, the four-year statute
of limitations bars Energy Maintenance's fraud and fiduciary duty
claims. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary
judgment in Nesler's favor on these claims.

Energy Maintenance maintains, and the trial court ruled, that
Sandt agreed to forgo any collection of the judgment against
Nesler for which Energy Maintenance would be liable. Sandt
responds that the settlement agreement with Energy Maintenance
allows him to collect the remaining $300,000 in exemplary damages
that Nesler owes because Nesler was not a party to the settlement
agreement.

The settlement agreement bars further collection efforts.

Sandt's interpretation of the agreement, however, fails to account
for two provisions that have that effect. Under the settlement
agreement, Energy Maintenance paid Sandt $1,450,000. Sandt
released the company and its officers from any and all claims,
liabilities, actions, causes of action, demands, damages,
payments, reimbursements, remedies or relief of any kind or
nature. Section 6(d) of the settlement agreement provides that
Sandt "will not seek to execute and will not accept recovery, in
each case whether directly or indirectly, against Energy
Maintenance for any remaining liability arising from the suit.

The lone circumstance in which Sandt could indirectly recover from
Energy Maintenance notwithstanding this broad release is if the
company is obligated to indemnify Nesler, whom Sandt had not
released from liability. Sandt's interpretation of the agreement,
which would allow him to collect from Nesler despite Energy
Maintenance's indemnity obligation, would impermissibly render the
release from indirect recovery meaningless.

Considering the agreement's language as a whole, as we must, we
conclude that the parties agreed that their settlement would not
affect the liability of Nesler, a non-signatory whom Sandt had not
released, with the exception that Sandt could not recover from
Energy Maintenance -- even indirectly -- any more than the company
already had paid him in settlement.

In sum, the settlement agreement bars Sandt from recovering from
Nesler because it would result in an indirect recovery from Energy
Maintenance, which is obligated to indemnify Nesler for the Sandt
judgment. The appellate court holds that the trial court properly
interpreted the settlement agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court of Appeals' July 27, 2017 Opinion
and Order is available https://is.gd/9Ybmpe from Leagle.com.

Timothy F. Lee -- timlee@warejackson.com -- Chester Dennis Barrow,
Jr., ., 1212 H St, Ramona, CA 92065, Michelle Meriam --
michellemeriam@warejackson.com -- for Energy Maintenance Services
Group I, LLC N/K/A Energy Maintenance Services Group I, Inc.,
Appellant.

Sara Sherman, Millard A. Johnson, Chris A. Stacy, for Timothy
Nesler and Melinda Nesler, Appellee.


ESURANCE INSURANCE: Giavasis Sues over Misleading Advertisements
----------------------------------------------------------------
NIKKI GIAVASIS, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. ESURANCE INSURANCE SERVICES,
INC., the Defendant, Case No. BC669492 (Cal. Super. Ct., July 21,
2017), seeks to stop Defendant's practice of falsely advertising
its services and to obtain redress for a nationwide class of
consumers who changed position, within the applicable statute of
limitations period, as a result of Defendant's false and
misleading advertisements.

According to the complaint, Defendant's misrepresentations to
Plaintiff and others similarly situated caused them to purchase
the Class Products, which Plaintiff and others similarly situated
would not have purchased or attempted to purchase absent these
misrepresentations by Defendant and its employees. In so doing,
Defendant has violated California consumer protection statutes,
including the Unfair Competition Law and False Advertising Law.

Esurance Insurance is an American insurance company. It sells
auto, home, motorcycle, and renters insurance direct to consumers
online and by phone.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          Thomas E. Wheeler, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C
          21550 Oxnard St. Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206 4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633 0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                  twheeler@toddflaw.com


EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Sued Over Excessive Health Record Fees
-------------------------------------------------------
Wadi Reformado, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that a
Florida woman is alleging a pharmacy benefit management service
charged an excessive fee for her health records.

Cynthea Harrod filed a complaint on behalf of all others similarly
situated on May 26 in the 13th Judicial Circuit Court of Florida -
- Hillsborough County Civil Division against Express Scripts Inc.
alleging violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act, breach of contract and other counts.

According to the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that she was
charged a fee of $75 by the defendant to release a copy of her
prescription health records.  The suit states that this fee is
charged even if the search for records produces no results.

The plaintiff requests a trial by jury and seeks compensatory,
consequential and statutory damages; interest; exemplary and
punitive damages; restitution; all legal fees; and any other
relief as the court deems just.  She is represented by Jason K.
Whittemore of Wagner McLaughlin PA in Tampa, Florida.

The defendant removed the case to U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Florida on July 3.

U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida case number
8:17-cv-01607-JSM-TGW [GN]


FARMERS GROUP: "Salatian" Sues over Wildfire Smoke Damage Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
SHAKEH SALATIAN, ADRINEH SHAHBAZIAN, HERMINE CHAKHMAKHCHIAN, RAFFI
AGAZARIAN, MATISRA GARABEDIAN, HANNA ALKASE, CHRIS MISSIRIAN ON
BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, the
Plaintiff, v. FARMERS GROUP INC., a Nevada Corporation; AMCO
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Iowa Corporation; FIRE
INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a California reciprocal insurer, and exchange
of the Farmers Insurance Group of Companies; NATIONWIDE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Wisconsin Corporation; ALLIED INSURANCE COMPANY, a
California Corporation; and DOES 1-100, the Defendants, Case No.
BC669499 (Cal. Super. Ct., July 21, 2017), seeks to recover
compensatory and punitive damages, restitutionary disgorgement,
and injunctive relief.

The lawsuit alleges breach of contract, bad faith, and unfair
business practices against Defendants, arising out of Defendants'
improper handling of wildfire smoke damage claims, and utilization
of an unlawful $5,000.00 sublimit for claims resulting from wild
fire "smoke, soot, char, ash, [and] odor damage". The Defendants
are improperly refusing to recognize, as a companywide policy,
soot, ash and char as "actual fire damage", covered under the
policy. Moreover, the Wildfire Smoke Sublimit is unlawful because,
among other things, it fails to meet minimum requirements for fire
damage, imposes an unlawful appraisal procedure, is not disclosed
on the Declarations Page of Plaintiff's policies, and contains
numerous unlawful provisions. The Plaintiff and Class members have
been damaged as a result of Defendants' unlawful conduct.

Farmers Insurance is an American insurer group of automobiles,
homes and small businesses and also provides other insurance and
financial services products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Garabed Kamarian, Esq.
          KAMARIAN LAW, INC.
          210 North Glenoaks Blvd. Suite D
          Burbank, CA 91502
          Telephone: (818) 859 7090
          Facsimile: (747) 283 1132
          E-mail: garo@kamarianlaw.com


FIRST & FIRST: Faces "Espinobarros" Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against First & First Finest
Deli Corp. The case is titled as Paulino Espinobarros, also known
as: Pablo, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. First & First Finest Deli Corp., doing
business as: First & First Finest Deli and Ali Kareem, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-05587 (S.D.N.Y., July 21, 2017).

First & First is a retail food store licensed by New York State
Department of Agriculture.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


FLINT, MI: 6th Circuit Revives Water Contamination Suits
--------------------------------------------------------
Joe Harris, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
residents of Flint, Michigan, can pursue civil claims against the
city and state municipal officers in a water-contamination suit
because the Safe Drinking Water Act does not pre-empt civil rights
claims, the Sixth Circuit ruled.

The appeals court found, however, that the state of Michigan is
entitled to immunity.

The ruling concerns two consolidated civil suits claiming Flint
began pumping water from the Flint River in April 2014 to save
money, and that the water caused health problems like high levels
of copper in blood, hair loss and chronic throat problems.

The two lawsuits -- one filed against Flint and its city officials
and the other against Michigan and state officials -- had
previously been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by U.S.
District Judge John Corbett O'Meara. But the three-judge Sixth
Circuit panel reversed that decision and remanded the case to
federal court.

"Having resolved that there is no textual indication in the SDWA
that Congress expressly chose to pre-empt Sec. 1983 claims and
that the provisions of the remedial scheme do not demonstrate such
an intention, we also find that the contours of the rights and
protections found in the constitutional claims diverge from those
provided by the SDWA such that we infer lack of congressional
intention to foreclose Sec. 1983 claims," Circuit Judge Jane
Branstetter Stranch wrote. "The defendants have not demonstrated
that 'Congress intended to abandon the rights and remedies set
forth in 14th Amendment equal protection jurisprudence' when it
enacted the SDWA. Under the governing precedent, primarily that of
the Supreme Court, the defendants have not carried their burden
and the plaintiffs may thus move forward with their cases."

But the panel did find the claims against Michigan and its
governor are barred.

"Even if we were to find that the complaint alleges an ongoing
violation of federal law, it is not clear what injunctive relief
is sought," Stranch wrote. "Though each count alleged requests
injunctive relief, and the prayer for relief asks for '[a]ny other
relief, including injunctive relief, as [the c]ourt deems fair,'
the plaintiffs provide no indication as to what this injunctive
relief might be."

Chief Circuit Judge R. Guy Cole Jr. and Circuit Judge Bernice B.
Donald concurred.


FLINT, MI: Court Consolidates 8 Water Cases
-------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan,
Southern Division, ordered that Case Nos. 16-cv-10796, 16-cv-
11173, 16-cv-11247, 16-cv-12875, 16-cv-14498, 17-cv-10343, 17-cv-
10360, and 17-cv-10799 are consolidated with Case No. 16-cv-10444
for all purposes, including trial, in the case captioned In re
Flint Water Cases, No. 5:16-cv-14498-JEL-APP (E.D. Mich.).

At a hearing, the Court discussed pending motions to consolidate
Waid v. Snyder, Case No. 16-cv-10444, and Guertin v. State of
Michigan, Case No. 16-cv-12412. For reasons set forth on the
record, the Waid motion is granted in part, and the Guertin motion
is denied.

All subsequent papers filed after the date of this order regarding
those cases shall be entered in Case No. 16-cv-10444; and
Case Nos. 16-cv-10796, 16-cv-11173, 16-cv-11247, 16-cv-12875, 16-
cv-14498, 17-cv-10343, 17-cv-10360, and 17-cv-10799 are closed in
light of the consolidation order.

It is further ordered that all pending dispositive motions in Case
No. 16-cv-10444 (Dkts. 122, 124, 125, 131, 132, 135) are denied
without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 27, 2017 Order is
available http://tinyurl.com/y7dw6ofufrom Leagle.com.

Village Shores LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew P. Abood,
Abood Law Firm.470 N Old Woodward Ave, Suite 250, Birmingham, MI
48009, USA

Village Shores LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Beth M. Rivers,
Pitt, Dowty, 117 West Fourth Street, Suite 200, Royal Oak, MI
48067, Cary S. McGehee, 117 West Fourth Street, Suite 200, Royal
Oak, MI,  Pitt, McGehee, Cynthia M. Lindsey --
infor@cmlindseylaw.com -- Cynthia Lindsey & Associates, Deborah A.
LaBelle, 221 North Main Street, Suite 300, Ann Arbor, MI 48104,
Emmy L. Levens -- elevens@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein
Sellers and Toll PLLC, Esther Berezofsky --
eberezofsky@wcblegal.com -- Williams Cuker Berezofsky, LLC,
Gregory Stamatopoulos, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., Crysler House, 719
Griswold, Suite 620, Detroit, Michigan 485226, Hunter Shkolnik,
Napoli Shkolnik Law PLLC, Jessica B. Weiner --
jweiner@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC,
Jordan W. Connors -- jconnors@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey
L.L.P., Julie H. Hurwitz, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C., 1394 E
Jefferson Ave Detroit, MI 48207 Kathryn Bruner James, 1394 E
Jefferson Ave Detroit, MI 48207, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C.,
Michael L. Pitt, Pitt, McGehee, Paul F. Novak, Weitz & Luxenberg,
P.C., 719 Griswold, Suite 620, Detroit, Michigan 485226, Stephen
E. Morrissey -- smorrisey@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godrey
L.L.P., Teresa Ann Caine Bingman, Law Offices of Teresa A.
Bingman, Theodore J. Leopold -- tleopold@cohenmilstein.com --
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC & William H. Goodman, Goodman
and Hurwitz. 1394 E Jefferson Ave Detroit, MI 48207.

ANGELOS CONEY ISLAND PALACE, INC., Plaintiff, represented by Beth
M. Rivers, Pitt, Dowty, Cary S. McGehee, Pitt, McGehee, Cynthia M.
Lindsey, Cynthia Lindsey & Associates, Deborah A. LaBelle, Emmy L.
Levens, Cohen Milstein Sellers and Toll PLLC, Esther Berezofsky,
Williams Cuker Berezofsky, LLC, Gregory Stamatopoulos, Weitz &
Luxenberg, P.C., Hunter Shkolnik, Napoli Shkolnik Law PLLC,
Jessica B. Weiner, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Jordan W.
Connors, Susman Godfrey L.L.P., Julie H. Hurwitz, Goodman and
Hurwitz, P.C., Kathryn Bruner James, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C.,
Michael L. Pitt, Pitt, McGehee, Paul F. Novak, Weitz & Luxenberg,
P.C., Stephen E. Morrissey, Susman Godrey L.L.P., Teresa Ann Caine
Bingman, Law Offices of Teresa A. Bingman, Theodore J. Leopold,
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC, William H. Goodman, Goodman
and Hurwitz & Andrew P. Abood, Abood Law Firm.

JAN BURGESS, Plaintiff, represented by Beth M. Rivers, Pitt,
Dowty, Cary S. McGehee, Pitt, McGehee, Cynthia M. Lindsey, Cynthia
Lindsey & Associates, Deborah A. LaBelle, Emmy L. Levens, Cohen
Milstein Sellers and Toll PLLC, Esther Berezofsky, Williams Cuker
Berezofsky, LLC, Gregory Stamatopoulos, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C.,
Hunter Shkolnik, Napoli Shkolnik Law PLLC, Jessica B. Weiner,
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Jordan W. Connors, Susman
Godfrey L.L.P., Julie H. Hurwitz, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C.,
Kathryn Bruner James, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C., Michael L. Pitt,
Pitt, McGehee, Paul F. Novak, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., Stephen E.
Morrissey, Susman Godrey L.L.P., Teresa Ann Caine Bingman, Law
Offices of Teresa A. Bingman, Theodore J. Leopold, Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll, PLLC, William H. Goodman, Goodman and Hurwitz &
Andrew P. Abood, Abood Law Firm.

DAVID MUNOZ, Plaintiff, represented by Beth M. Rivers, Pitt,
Dowty, Cary S. McGehee, Pitt, McGehee, Cynthia M. Lindsey, Cynthia
Lindsey & Associates, Deborah A. LaBelle, Emmy L. Levens, Cohen
Milstein Sellers and Toll PLLC, Esther Berezofsky, Williams Cuker
Berezofsky, LLC, Gregory Stamatopoulos, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C.,
Hunter Shkolnik, Napoli Shkolnik Law PLLC, Jessica B. Weiner,
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Jordan W. Connors, Susman
Godfrey L.L.P., Julie H. Hurwitz, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C.,
Kathryn Bruner James, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C., Michael L. Pitt,
Pitt, McGehee, Paul F. Novak, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., Stephen E.
Morrissey, Susman Godrey L.L.P., Teresa Ann Caine Bingman, Law
Offices of Teresa A. Bingman, Theodore J. Leopold, Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll, PLLC, William H. Goodman, Goodman and Hurwitz &
Andrew P. Abood, Abood Law Firm.

JOSHUA BOGGESS, Plaintiff, represented by Beth M. Rivers, Pitt,
Dowty, Cary S. McGehee, Pitt, McGehee, Cynthia M. Lindsey, Cynthia
Lindsey & Associates, Deborah A. LaBelle, Emmy L. Levens, Cohen
Milstein Sellers and Toll PLLC, Esther Berezofsky, Williams Cuker
Berezofsky, LLC, Gregory Stamatopoulos, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C.,
Hunter Shkolnik, Napoli Shkolnik Law PLLC, Jessica B. Weiner,
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Jordan W. Connors, Susman
Godfrey L.L.P., Julie H. Hurwitz, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C.,
Kathryn Bruner James, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C., Michael L. Pitt,
Pitt, McGehee, Paul F. Novak, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., Stephen E.
Morrissey, Susman Godrey L.L.P., Teresa Ann Caine Bingman, Law
Offices of Teresa A. Bingman, Theodore J. Leopold, Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll, PLLC, William H. Goodman, Goodman and Hurwitz &
Andrew P. Abood, Abood Law Firm.

Michael Snyder, Plaintiff, represented by Beth M. Rivers, Pitt,
Dowty, Cary S. McGehee, Pitt, McGehee, Cynthia M. Lindsey, Cynthia
Lindsey & Associates, Deborah A. LaBelle, Emmy L. Levens, Cohen
Milstein Sellers and Toll PLLC, Esther Berezofsky, Williams Cuker
Berezofsky, LLC, Gregory Stamatopoulos, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C.,
Hunter Shkolnik, Napoli Shkolnik Law PLLC, Jessica B. Weiner,
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Jordan W. Connors, Susman
Godfrey L.L.P., Julie H. Hurwitz, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C.,
Kathryn Bruner James, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C., Michael L. Pitt,
Pitt, McGehee, Paul F. Novak, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., Stephen E.
Morrissey, Susman Godrey L.L.P., Teresa Ann Caine Bingman, Law
Offices of Teresa A. Bingman, Theodore J. Leopold, Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll, PLLC, William H. Goodman, Goodman and Hurwitz &
Andrew P. Abood, Abood Law Firm.

SHERRY MULHERIN, Plaintiff, represented by Beth M. Rivers, Pitt,
Dowty, Cary S. McGehee, Pitt, McGehee, Cynthia M. Lindsey, Cynthia
Lindsey & Associates, Deborah A. LaBelle, Emmy L. Levens, Cohen
Milstein Sellers and Toll PLLC, Esther Berezofsky, Williams Cuker
Berezofsky, LLC, Gregory Stamatopoulos, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C.,
Hunter Shkolnik, Napoli Shkolnik Law PLLC, Jessica B. Weiner,
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Jordan W. Connors, Susman
Godfrey L.L.P., Julie H. Hurwitz, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C.,
Kathryn Bruner James, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C., Michael L. Pitt,
Pitt, McGehee, Paul F. Novak, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., Stephen E.
Morrissey, Susman Godrey L.L.P., Teresa Ann Caine Bingman, Law
Offices of Teresa A. Bingman, Theodore J. Leopold, Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll, PLLC, William H. Goodman, Goodman and Hurwitz &
Andrew P. Abood, Abood Law Firm.

LAQUISHA JACOBS, Plaintiff, represented by Beth M. Rivers, Pitt,
Dowty, Cary S. McGehee, Pitt, McGehee, Cynthia M. Lindsey, Cynthia
Lindsey & Associates, Deborah A. LaBelle, Emmy L. Levens, Cohen
Milstein Sellers and Toll PLLC, Esther Berezofsky, Williams Cuker
Berezofsky, LLC, Gregory Stamatopoulos, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C.,
Hunter Shkolnik, Napoli Shkolnik Law PLLC, Jessica B. Weiner,
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Jordan W. Connors, Susman
Godfrey L.L.P., Julie H. Hurwitz, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C.,
Kathryn Bruner James, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C., Michael L. Pitt,
Pitt, McGehee, Paul F. Novak, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., Stephen E.
Morrissey, Susman Godrey L.L.P., Teresa Ann Caine Bingman, Law
Offices of Teresa A. Bingman, Theodore J. Leopold, Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll, PLLC, William H. Goodman, Goodman and Hurwitz &
Andrew P. Abood, Abood Law Firm.

ZHANNA GARDIN, Plaintiff, represented by Beth M. Rivers, Pitt,
Dowty, Cary S. McGehee, Pitt, McGehee, Cynthia M. Lindsey, Cynthia
Lindsey & Associates, Deborah A. LaBelle, Emmy L. Levens, Cohen
Milstein Sellers and Toll PLLC, Esther Berezofsky, Williams Cuker
Berezofsky, LLC, Gregory Stamatopoulos, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C.,
Hunter Shkolnik, Napoli Shkolnik Law PLLC, Jessica B. Weiner,
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Jordan W. Connors, Susman
Godfrey L.L.P., Julie H. Hurwitz, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C.,
Kathryn Bruner James, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C., Michael L. Pitt,
Pitt, McGehee, Paul F. Novak, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., Stephen E.
Morrissey, Susman Godrey L.L.P., Teresa Ann Caine Bingman, Law
Offices of Teresa A. Bingman, Theodore J. Leopold, Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll, PLLC, William H. Goodman, Goodman and Hurwitz &
Andrew P. Abood, Abood Law Firm.

EDDIE HAMMOND, Plaintiff, represented by Beth M. Rivers, Pitt,
Dowty, Cary S. McGehee, Pitt, McGehee, Cynthia M. Lindsey, Cynthia
Lindsey & Associates, Deborah A. LaBelle, Emmy L. Levens, Cohen
Milstein Sellers and Toll PLLC, Esther Berezofsky, Williams Cuker
Berezofsky, LLC, Gregory Stamatopoulos, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C.,
Hunter Shkolnik, Napoli Shkolnik Law PLLC, Jessica B. Weiner,
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Jordan W. Connors, Susman
Godfrey L.L.P., Julie H. Hurwitz, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C.,
Kathryn Bruner James, Goodman and Hurwitz, P.C., Michael L. Pitt,
Pitt, McGehee, Paul F. Novak, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., Stephen E.
Morrissey, Susman Godrey L.L.P., Teresa Ann Caine Bingman, Law
Offices of Teresa A. Bingman, Theodore J. Leopold, Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll, PLLC, William H. Goodman, Goodman and Hurwitz &
Andrew P. Abood, Abood Law Firm.

Lockwood, Andrews & Newnam, P.C., Defendant, represented by David
C. Kent -- david.kent@dbr.com -- Drinker Biddle Reath LLP, Philip
A. Erickson -- perickson@plunkettcooney.com -- Plunkett & Cooney &
Robert G. Kamenec -- rkamenec@plunkettcooney.com -- Plunkett &
Cooney.

Lockwood, Andrews & Newnam, Inc., Defendant, represented by David
C. Kent, Drinker Biddle Reath LLP, Philip A. Erickson, Plunkett &
Cooney & Robert G. Kamenec, Plunkett & Cooney.

Leo A. Daly Company, Defendant, represented by David C. Kent,
Drinker Biddle Reath LLP, Philip A. Erickson, Plunkett & Cooney &
Robert G. Kamenec, Plunkett & Cooney.

Veolia North America, Inc., Defendant, represented by Michael R.
Williams -- williams@bsplaw.com --  Bush Seyferth & Paige PLLC &
Cheryl A. Bush -- bush@bsplaw.com -- Bush, Seyferth & Paige, PLLC.

Veolia North America, LLC, Defendant, represented by James M.
Campbell -- jmcampbell@campbell-trial-lawyers.com -- Campbell,
Campbell, John A.K. Grunert -- jgrunert@campbell-trial-lawyers.com
-- Campbell, Campbell, Michael R. Williams, Bush Seyferth & Paige
PLLC & Cheryl A. Bush, Bush, Seyferth & Paige, PLLC.

Veolia Water North America Operating Services, LLC, Defendant,
represented by Michael R. Williams, Bush Seyferth & Paige PLLC &
Cheryl A. Bush, Bush, Seyferth & Paige, PLLC.

Governor Rick Snyder, Defendant, represented by Eugene Driker, --
edriker@bsdd.com -- Barris, Sott, Margaret A. Bettenhausen,
Michigan Department of Attorney General, Morley Witus --
mwitus@bsdd.com -- Barris, Sott, Denn & Driker, PLLC, Nathan A.
Gambill, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Richard S. Kuhl,
Assistant Attorney General, Todd R. Mendel, Barris, Sott & Zachary
C. Larsen, Michigan Department of Attorney General.

State of Michigan, Defendant, represented by Margaret A.
Bettenhausen, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Nathan A.
Gambill, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Richard S. Kuhl,
Assistant Attorney General & Zachary C. Larsen, Michigan
Department of Attorney General.

Flint, City of, Defendant, represented by Frederick A. Berg, --
berg@butzel.com -- Butzel Long, Reed E. Eriksson, City of Flint,
Sheldon H. Klein -- klein@butzel.com -- Butzel Long & William
Young Kim, City of Flint.

Daniel Wyant, Defendant, represented by Christopher B. Clare,
Clark Hill PlC, Jordan S. Bolton -- jbolton@clarkhill.com -- Clark
Hill & Michael J. Pattwell -- mpattwell@clarkhill.com -- Clark
Hill, PLC.


FLORIDA: FSU Donors Join Matching Fund Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
Jim Ash, writing for WFSU News, reports that Former Florida State
University football player Tommy Warren and wife Kathleen
Villacorta , both FSU law school grads, are joining  a class-
action lawsuit over the state's failure to match more than $600
million in private donations.

Tallahassee civil rights attorneys Tommy Warren and Kathleen
When the couple wanted to honor FSU's first black football player,
they donated $100,000 and established the Calvin Patterson Civil
Rights Endowed Scholarship in 2003.  The state matched it with
$50,000.

But the state didn't match another $100,000 donation the couple
made to the scholarship in 2011, or another $100,000 they donated
in 2015 to create the Coastal and Marine Conservation Research
Student Endowment.

And that violates state laws requiring matching funds, says the
couple's Miami attorney, Grace Mead.

"They want the full benefit that they expected for the students
that they gave the money to benefit.  And they expected the
match."

Lawmakers suspended matching programs when the recession hit.  But
Mead says the state was obliged to restart them when budget
surpluses returned in 2012.

"Not only was funding cut dramatically, but they hiked tuition the
maximum allowable, which was 15 percent a year. So we come out of
the Great Recession and they start to see billions of dollars in
revenue surpluses and they still don't fund the match."

The suit is a companion to one filed by two University of Florida
students who say the lack of matching funds hurt their education.
[GN]


FORD MOTOR: ACCC Launches Suit Over Vehicle "Systemic Issues"
-------------------------------------------------------------
News.com.au reports that car maker Ford's Australian business is
facing legal action from the consumer watchdog over allegations it
misled customers who bought faulty cars.

And despite being aware of widespread problems, the company
allegedly unsold problem vehicles to unsuspecting new buyers.
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has begun court
action against Ford Motor Company of Australia.

Ford allegedly blamed drivers for the car problems despite being
aware of "systemic issues" with its vehicles.

The case centres on its dealings with customers who had problems
with Ford Focus, Fiesta and EcoSport vehicles with a PowerShift
transmission bought between 2011 and 2016.

The watchdog has made allegations including that Ford refused to
give refunds or replacement vehicles and blamed customers' driving
for transmission problems in the cars despite being aware of
"systemic issues" from at least 2013.

Ford has responded saying it strongly refutes the claim and will
be challenging the ACCC. [GN]


FXCM INC: 2nd Cir. Vacates Dismissal of Securities Fraud Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, issued a
Summary Order vacating the judgment of the District Court
dismissing the putative class action in the case captioned
RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN'S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF
CHICAGO, on Behalf of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of
Chicago, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FXCM INC., DROR NIV, ROBERT
LANDE, Defendants-Appellees, No. 16-3775-cv (2d Cir.), and
remanding the case to the District Court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff-appellant Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity
and Benefit Fund of Chicago (plaintiff), on behalf of the
Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, appeals from the
opinion and order and judgment of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York dismissing plaintiff's
putative class action complaint alleging securities fraud against
defendants-appellees FXCM Inc., (FXCM), Dror Niv, FXCM's Chairman
and CEO during the class period, and Robert Lande, FXCM's CFO
during the class period (defendants).

Subsequent to plaintiff filing, information relating to the
results of two enforcement actions against FXCM became publicly
available (the enforcement evidence).  Plaintiff described the
enforcement evidence in its reply brief and made arguments based
on it. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration before the District
Court based on the enforcement evidence, and that motion remains
pending. Plaintiff asks this Court to consider its new arguments
based on the enforcement evidence.

It is the general rule that a federal appellate court does not
consider an issue not passed upon below.  Singleton v. Wulff, 428
U.S. 106, 120 (1976).  Moreover, arguments not raised in an
appellant's opening brief, but only in his reply brief, are not
properly before an appellate court even when the same arguments
were raised in the trial court.

The Second Circuit has held that it may disregard this prudential
rule if necessary to remedy an obvious injustice, or if the
elements of the claim were fully set forth and there is no need
for additional fact finding.

The Second Circuit held that it does have the complete context for
the enforcement evidence, as the record before it has not been
supplemented; instead, plaintiff merely described the evidence in
its reply brief. There is also no amended pleading, nor even a
proposed pleading, before the Second Circuit containing any new
allegations based on the enforcement evidence; as a result, the
elements of the claim are not before the circuit court.

Defendants have had no opportunity to respond to these new
arguments, as they appeared only in plaintiff's reply brief. Nor
has the District Court had an opportunity to consider them, and
under these circumstances, allowing the District Court to consider
these new arguments in the first instance would not create any
manifest injustice.

The District Court should have the opportunity to assess the
parties' arguments, whether in the context of the pending motion
for reconsideration, or on a motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint, or in such other context as the District Court,
in its discretion, determines is appropriate.

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is vacated and
this case is remanded to the District Court.

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's July 27, 2017 Opinion and
Order is available http://tinyurl.com/ybtkr9alfrom Leagle.com.

Deborah Clark Weintraub -- dweintraub@scott-scott.com --
Scott+Scott, Attorneys at Law, LLP (Beth A. Kaswan --
bkaswan@scott-scott.com -on the brief), New York, NY., Appearing
for Appellant.

Paul R. Bessette -- pbessette@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP,
(Israel Dahan -- idahan@kslaw.com -- Michael Biles --
mbiles@kslaw.com -- Tyler W. Highful -- thighful@kslaw.com --
Srimath S. Subasinghe -- ssubasinghe@kslaw.com -- James P.
Sullivan -- jsullivan@kslaw.com -- on the brief), New York, NY.,
Appearing for Defendants-Appellees


FXCM INC: NY Court Orders Amendment of Securities Fraud Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, Southern District of New York,
issued an Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint
in the case captioned RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN'S ANNUITY
AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO ON BEHALF OF THE POLICEMEN'S ANNUITY
AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. FXCM INC., DROR NIV, and
ROBERT LANDE, Defendants, No. 15-CV-3599 (KMW) (S.D.N.Y.).

After the District Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss,
and while Plaintiffs appeal was pending, the U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (the CFTC) filed two separate
enforcement actions against Forex Capital markets, LLC, the U.S.
trading subsidiary of FXCM.

In light of the newly available enforcement evidence, the Second
Circuit vacated this Court's previous judgment and remanded for
further proceedings consistent with its Summary Order.  The Second
Circuit's Order obviates Plaintiffs request for 62.1(a)(3) and
60(b) relief, and those motions are denied.

Plaintiffs motion to file an amended complaint, which incorporates
the enforcement evidence, is granted. Plaintiff must file an
amended complaint.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 27, 2017 Opinion and
Order is available http://tinyurl.com/yb6ccj3wfrom Leagle.com.

Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of
Chicago on Behalf of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of
Chicago, Plaintiff, represented by Beth Ann Kaswan, Scott Scott,
L.L.P..

Teamsters Local 710 Pension Fund, Movant, represented by David Avi
Rosenfeld -- DRosenfeld@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP.

Inter-Local Pension Fund GCC/IBT, Movant, represented by David Avi
Rosenfeld, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Twin City Pipe Trades Pension Trust, Movant, represented by Joel
B. Strauss -- strauss@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer
LLP.

Luzerne County Retirement System, Movant, represented by Ralph M.
Stone, Stone Bonner & Rocco LLP, 1700 Broadway, 41st Floor
New York, NY 10019

Dienger and Weidhorn, Movant, represented by Phillip C. Kim --
pkim@rosenlegal.com- The Rosen Law Firm P.A..
Orlando Police Pension Fund, Movant, represented by Curtis Victor
Trinko, Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 16 W 46th St Fl 7th,
New York, NY 10036-4503

FXCM Inc., Defendant, represented by Paul Richard Bessette, --
pbessette@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP & Israel Dahan --
idahan@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP.

Dror Niv, Defendant, represented by Paul Richard Bessette, King &
Spalding LLP & Israel Dahan, King & Spalding LLP.

Robert Lande, Defendant, represented by Paul Richard Bessette,
King & Spalding LLP & Israel Dahan, King & Spalding LLP.

683 Capital Partners, LP, Interested Party, represented by Phillip
C. Kim, The Rosen Law Firm P.A..

Shipco Transport Inc., Interested Party, represented by Phillip C.
Kim, The Rosen Law Firm P.A.


GENERAL MOTORS: Seeks Dismissal of Defective Engines Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Olivia Olsen, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that a hearing
was held on July 6 before Judge Edward M. Chen to review a motion
to dismiss filed by General Motors in a class action lawsuit led
by Monteville Sloan Jr. against the vehicle manufacturer.

The motion was filed to have the plaintiffs' suit, which sought
damages from the company in lieu of their use of an allegedly
defective engine, dismissed on a variety of grounds.

The first amended complaint filed by the plaintiffs alleged there
was a fault with the Generation IV 5.3-liter V8 Vortec 5300 engine
used in several of General Motor's models between the years 2010
and 2013.  The GMC Sierra and Chevrolet Tahoe were among the 11
models named in the suit referred to as class vehicles.

The first amended complaint stated that the engines consumed
"abnormally and improperly high quantity of oil that far exceeds
industry standards."

The original filing also claimed that the company was aware of the
defect in the engine but did not make an effort to replace it in
their later models.  The engine's issues allegedly caused an
excessive loss of oil and made the vehicles' Oil Life Monitoring
System (a feature meant to monitor the quality of oil though not
quantity to alert drivers of when they need a change) fail,
causing drivers to continue operating with insufficient
lubrication.

The motion to dismiss was brought before the U.S. District Court
of the Northern District of California to determine if the case
had merit.

According to the motion filed by General Motors, there are several
issues with the plaintiffs' filings including, but not limited to,
failing to plead an injury caused by the issue or facts.

Also alleged as problems were failing to give pre-suit notice to
General Motors and failing to plausibly show proof that there was
a breach of the implied warranty.  The 51-page motion contained an
extensive review of each of the issues with the lawsuit, including
the plaintiffs' alleged lack of Constitutional standing.

A case management conference is scheduled for Thursday, Aug. 17.
[GN]


GERDAU SA: October 20 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
-----------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP regarding the Boland v. Gerdau S.A. Securities
Litigation:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DONALD P. BOLAND and MARY A. BOLAND,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated,

Plaintiffs,
vs.
GERDAU S.A., et al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-03925-LLS
CLASS ACTION
SUMMARY NOTICE

TO: ALL PERSONS WHO PURCHASED OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRED GERDAU S.A.
("GERDAU") AMERICAN DEPOSITARY RECEIPTS ("ADRs") BETWEEN APRIL 23,
2012, AND MAY 16, 2016, INCLUSIVE

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that pursuant to an Order of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, a
hearing will be held on October 20, 2017, at 12:00 p.m. ET, before
the Honorable Louis L. Stanton at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan U.S.
Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007, for the purpose
of determining: (1) whether the proposed settlement of the
Litigation for the sum of $15,000,000 in cash should be approved
by the Court as fair, reasonable and adequate; (2) whether,
thereafter, this Litigation should be dismissed with prejudice
against the Defendants as set forth in the Stipulation of
Settlement dated July 5, 2017; (3) whether the Plan of Allocation
of settlement proceeds is fair, reasonable and adequate and
therefore should be approved; and (4) the reasonableness of the
application of Lead Counsel for the payment of attorneys' fees and
expenses incurred in connection with this Litigation, together
with interest thereon (which request may include a request for
reimbursement of Lead Plaintiff's reasonable costs and expenses
pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995).

IF YOU PURCHASED OR ACQUIRED GERDAU ADRS BETWEEN APRIL 23, 2012,
AND MAY 16, 2016, INCLUSIVE, YOUR RIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED BY THIS
LITIGATION AND THE SETTLEMENT THEREOF.  If you have not received a
detailed Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class Action and a copy
of the Proof of Claim and Release form, you may obtain copies by
writing to Boland v. Gerdau S.A. Securities Litigation, Claims
Administrator, c/o Gilardi & Co. LLC, P.O. Box 404014, Louisville,
KY 40233-4014 or by downloading this information at
www.bolandvgerdausa.com.  If you are a Class Member, in order to
share in the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, you must
submit a Proof of Claim and Release online at
www.bolandvgerdausa.com by November 28, 2017, or postmarked no
later than November 28, 2017, establishing that you are entitled
to a recovery.  You will be bound by any judgment rendered in the
Litigation unless you request to be excluded, in writing,
postmarked by September 29, 2017.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Gerdau ADRs during the
Class Period and you desire to be excluded from the Class, you
must submit a request for exclusion such that it is postmarked no
later than September 29, 2017, in the manner and form explained in
the detailed Notice referred to above.  All Members of the Class
who do not validly request exclusion from the Class will be bound
by any judgment entered in the Litigation pursuant to the
Stipulation of Settlement.

Any objection to any aspect of the Settlement must be filed with
the Clerk of the Court and also delivered by hand or first-class
mail to each of the following addresses such that it is received
no later than September 29, 2017:

Court:

CLERK OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Daniel Patrick Moynihan U.S. Courthouse
500 Pearl Street
New York, NY 10007
Lead Counsel:

ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN
& DOWD LLP
ELLEN GUSIKOFF STEWART
655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
San Diego, CA 92101

Defendants' Counsel:

SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
JAY B. KASNER
ANDREW R. BEATTY
4 Times Square
New York, NY 10036

KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP
MICHAEL J. DELL
KAREN S. KENNEDY
JULIANA OLIVEIRA MAGGIO
1177 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT OR THE CLERK'S OFFICE REGARDING
THIS NOTICE.

DATED: July 10, 2017
BY ORDER OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK


GOLD FIELDS: Sets Aside $30.2MM for Silicosis Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
BusinessDay reports that Gold Fields expects interim earnings to
roughly halve in dollar terms, it said on July 22.

It also gave an estimate of its liability in a silicosis and
tuberculosis class action suit.

Gold Fields said earnings per share (EPS) for the six months to
end-June would be 43%-57% lower than the 14 US cents reported a
year ago, coming in at between 6c and 8c.

Headline earnings per share (HEPS) will fall 38%-50%, to 8c-10c,
from 16c a year ago.

Dollar-denominated earnings in the first half were hit by stronger
local currencies and higher amortisation rates, which Gold Fields
said were largely due to lower reserve ounces at the Tarkwa mine
in Ghana, and "an increase in ore mined and stockpiled" at that
mine.

Gold Fields has made a provision of $30.2m or R390m for its share
of a possible settlement of current and former mineworkers' class
action suit against a group of mining companies.

"The nominal value of this provision is $39.5m (R509m)," Gold
Fields said.

"The ultimate outcome of these matters remains uncertain, with a
possible failure to reach a settlement or to obtain the requisite
court approval for a potential settlement.

"The provision is consequently subject to adjustment in the
future, depending on the progress of the working group
discussions, stakeholder engagements and the ongoing legal
proceedings," it said.

Gold Fields is a member of a working group with African Rainbow
Minerals, Anglo American, AngloGold Ashanti, Harmony and Sibanye
Gold, to address issues related to lung diseases suffered by
workers in SA's gold mining industry.

The class action for which Gold Fields has made the $30.2m
provision is one of several cases brought against mining
companies.

Gold Fields said the mining companies intended to defend the
suits, but would continue to work with the government, labour and
claimants "to seek a solution to this South African mining
industry legacy issue".[GN]


GREEN STREET TAVERN: Prints Credit Card Info, Puente Says
---------------------------------------------------------
RUBY PUENTE, and ANELGA ASATURIAN, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. GREEN STREET TAVERN,
INC. (d/b/a Green Street Tavern), and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive, the Defendant, Case No.BC669241 (Cal. Super. Ct., July
21, 2017), seeks to recover statutory damages, punitive damages,
costs and attorney fees, all of which are expressly made available
by statute, as a results of Defendants' violations of the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs and members of the
Class were each customers of Defendants, each having made a
purchase or transacted other business with Defendants within two
years from the date of filing this action, using a credit and or
debit card.  At the point of such sale or transaction with
Plaintiffs and members of the Class, Defendants provided to
Plaintiffs and each member of the Class a receipt in violation of
15 U.S.C. section 1681 c(g) [i.e., a receipt on which is printed
more than the last 5 digits and expiration date of the credit card
or debit card].

Green Street serves cozy, tucked-away restaurant with refined
Californian cuisine and a brunch menu.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Chant Yedalian, Esq.
          CHANT & COMPANY
          A Professional Law Corporation
          1010 N. Central Ave.
          Glendale, CA 91202
          Telephone: (877) 574 7100
          Facsimile: (877) 574 9411
          E-mail: chant@chant.mobi


GREEN TREE: New Jersey Court Certifies Class in "Grubb"
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of New Jersey, issued
an Order denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the
case captioned CAROL GRUBB, on behalf of herself and all those
similarly-situated, Plaintiff, v. GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC,
Defendant, Civ. Action No. 13-07421 (FLW) (D.N.J.).  The
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification is also granted.

Plaintiff Carol Grubb (Plaintiff) brings this putative class
action, on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated
individuals, against Defendant Green Tree Servicing (Green Tree),
a mortgage loan servicer, under the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (FDCPA), for failing to effectively convey the alleged debt
owed, and providing misleading information that is confusing to
the least sophisticated debtor in two separate debt collection
letters.

Defendant moves for summary judgment, arguing, among other things,
that: (a) Plaintiff lacks standing; (b) the FDCPA is inapplicable;
and (c) the debt collection letters comply with the FDCPA.

Bank of America transferred the servicing rights of a mortgage, on
which Plaintiff had defaulted, to Green Tree.  At the time of
transfer, it is not disputed that Plaintiff had not made a payment
towards her mortgage in more than twelve months, and the loan was
past due in an amount exceeding $75,000.

Plaintiff filed a two-count Complaint, on behalf of herself and
all other similarly situated individuals. In Count I, Plaintiff
alleges violations of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e, which prohibits
debt collectors from using any false, deceptive, or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of any
debt; and in Count II, Plaintiff avers violations of 15 U.S.C.
Section 1692g, which requires debt collectors to provide
consumers, inter alia, with written notice of the amount of debt
owed, either in the initial communication or within five days
after the initial communication with a consumer, in connection
with the collection of any debt.

Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification is opposed by
Defendant.

             Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

In the instant matter, the parties' dispute is confined to the
first element of standing, or whether Plaintiff has properly
established an injury-in-fact.  The Court finds that the FDCPA's
protections under Section 1692e are substantive, and thereby,
holds that Plaintiff has standing to bring her FDCPA claim.

According to Plaintiff, these letters were confusing; they
contained various numeric figures, each of which could have
plausibly represented the alleged debt owed. In that connection,
Plaintiff maintains that she was unable to ascertain the balance
of her loan, in order to satisfy her financial obligation under
her defaulted mortgage. Thus, by failing to clearly state the
amount of her debt, Plaintiff alleges that Green Tree acted in a
false, deceptive, or misleading manner, in violation of Section
1692e of the FDCPA.

Plaintiff's purported injury here is sufficient to establish
standing under Article III. First, Plaintiff's allegations are not
conjectural or hypothetical; instead, Plaintiff identifies
concrete, albeit intangible, harm. Indeed, Plaintiff asserts that
Green Tree acted in a false, deceptive, and/or misleading manner,
because the debt collection letters at issue failed to accurately
state the amount of the debt owed to Green Tree.

Thus, since Plaintiff's alleged injury is both concrete and
particularized, Plaintiff has standing to bring this suit against
Green Tree, pursuant to Section 1692e of the FDCPA.

               Green Tree is a Debt Collector

Next, Defendant argues that, even if there is standing, it is a
creditor, and, therefore, the FDCPA is not applicable in this
case, as that statute only governs debt collectors' activities.

Green Tree has failed to establish that it is exempt from the
FDCPA. First, although Green Tree operates as a loan servicer, it
does not automatically fall within the FDCPA's definition of a
creditor.

Significantly, Green Tree acquired the right to service
Plaintiff's Mortgage after Plaintiff had defaulted on the loan.
Defendant's Statement of Facts. Green Tree, by its own admission,
concedes that Plaintiff was delinquent under the Loan at the time
that Green Tree acquired the servicing rights from Bank of
America.

Because the Mortgage was not current at the time of transfer,
Green Tree cannot claim creditor status simply because it provided
Plaintiff with various loan mitigation options, approximately
eight months after the loan was transferred from Bank of America.
Rather, because the loan was in default, Green Tree would only
qualify as a creditor, if it does not provide debt collection
services as its principal purpose of business, or regularly
collect on defaulted loans.

Significantly, while this case stands on its own facts, this
finding is consistent with numerous district court decisions,
wherein Green Tree has been determined to be a debt collector.
15 U.S.C. 1692g

Defendant argues that, even if the FDCPA is applicable,
Defendant's communications with Plaintiff are not in violation of
that statute, because they do not contain inconsistent
information.

Section 1692g mandates that debt collectors must provide to
consumers a written notice of (1) the amount of the debt; (2) the
name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; and (3) a statement
notifying the consumer that he or she has the right to dispute the
validity of the debt within thirty days. 15 U.S.C. Section
1692g(a). The language in a communication providing this required
information is known as the validation notice.

In Jensen, the Third Circuit held that a false statement under
Section 1692e of the FDCPA must be material in order for it to be
actionable.  A false statement is material if it is capable of
influencing the decision of the least sophisticated debtor.
In that regard, the Court finds that the misleading information
contained in Defendant's debt validation notice -- which failed to
clearly state an amount owed by Plaintiff, or to provide a
calculation as to how that amount was determined -- are material,
because that information is capable of influencing the least
sophisticated debtor.

Indeed, the inconsistent and misleading information would hamper
the least sophisticated debtor's ability to dispute whether a debt
is owed, as he or she is entitled to do under the FDCPA. For
instance, a least sophisticated debtor who receives multiple
communications providing various figures possibly representing the
alleged debt, would be confused as to which of those debts to
dispute. Moreover, due to the accumulation of interest, the amount
due under the original loan and the amount being collected,
typically constitute different figures.

Thus, a debt collection letter which solely provides for the total
due, without providing an explanation as to how that amount was
calculated, fails to provide the least sophisticated debtor with
an adequate basis to dispute whether the alleged debt was properly
configured, and, in turn, whether that debt should be challenged.
The errors in the May letters are material, because they are
capable of influencing the decision of the least sophisticated
debtor.  Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.

                    Class Certification

The Court held that Plaintiff's Class Definition is not an
impermissible fail-safe class.

A fail-safe class is one that is defined so that whether a person
qualifies as a member depends on whether the person has a valid
claim.

Significantly, based upon a plain reading, the language contained
in the proposed class definition does not state that Green Tree's
conduct was impermissible or prohibited by the FDCPA, or that its
communications contained misleading or contradictory information.
Instead, because Plaintiff's definition uses objective language
and criteria in defining the potential class, it does not presume
that its members are entitled to relief.

Ascertainability

Defendant does not provide a sworn affidavit or declaration, from
a corporate representative who would attest that Defendant cannot
determine from the records whether a debtor should be excluded
from the class, based on the objective factors proposed in the
class definition.

In fact, Defendant's concern, with respect to the status of each
debt, is undercut by Defendant's own admission: Green Tree has
researched the number of New Jersey consumers. Who were in default
at the time of the transfer. At this time, Green Tree believes
there are 9,177 consumers that fall within this classification.
Defendant's argument that it is difficult to ascertain the purpose
of each potential class member's loan is also unavailing. For one,
numerous district courts have found that a class, in the context
of a FDCPA action, is ascertainable, even where a question exists
as to whether the loan is consumer based.

Numerosity

As stated, this showing merely requires an identification of 40
potential plaintiffs; Defendant, itself, has ascertained over
9,177 potential class members. Although, upon further review, the
class size may decrease, Defendant has not adequately demonstrated
that the class will reduce by 99% after accounting for all
applicable exemptions under the FDCPA, nor does the Court find
this outcome probable.

Commonality

Defendant argues that commonality and typicality requirements
cannot be met, because it has raised a bona fide error defense
under the FDCPA.

Defendant's argument is wholly without merit. First, Defendant did
not argue its bona fide error defense in either of its motions for
dismissal or summary judgment; rather, Defendant, for the first
time, raises it in opposition to Plaintiff's class certification.
Defendant has not established that its alleged violation under the
FDCPA was inadvertent, or that it has implemented and enforced a
system of procedures designed to avoid legal error. To the
contrary, Defendant, on this motion, solely argues, in a
conclusory manner, that it has raised a bona fide error defense,
with no evidentiary support.

Defendant's unsubstantiated bona fide error defense, therefore, is
inapplicable.

Adequacy

Defendant's argument that counsel is not adequate solely because
it is named as a defendant in a lawsuit does not warrant
consideration. Although Plaintiff's counsel has been named as a
defendant in a class action proceeding, the Court notes that the
suit is at the pleading stage, and the merits of the plaintiffs'
claims have not been examined.

In fact, Plaintiff's counsel has recently moved for Rule 11
sanctions in that matter. And, more to the point, Defendant fails
to cite a case, or any other authority, wherein Class Counsel was
deemed inadequate, based solely upon mere allegations, in a
separate and unrelated matter. Accordingly, I find that Plaintiff
has met the element of adequacy.

Predominance

Defendant contends that certification is not appropriate, because
Plaintiff fails to establish why arbitrarily limiting the class to
New Jersey consumers is superior to certification of a nationwide
class of consumers.  However, this argument is without any merit.
Indeed, the Court is not aware of any case law or authority that
requires a Plaintiff to bring only a nationwide class action that
involves the FDCPA, nor does Defendant cite to any support for
this contention.

To the contrary, in addressing state-wide class actions under the
FDCPA, the Seventh Circuit has found:

The FDCPA has a short, one-year statute of limitations making
multiple lawsuits more difficult. Further, if a debt collector is
sued in one state, but continues to violate the statute in
another, it ought to be possible to challenge such continuing
violations. In any event, the case before us does not present
multiple or serial class actions to recover for the same
misconduct. Hence, it would be premature to require a nation-wide
class at this juncture.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 27, 2017 Opinion is
available http://tinyurl.com/ycz7y3bbfrom Leagle.com.

CAROL GRUBB, Plaintiff, represented by JOSEPH K. JONES, Jones,
Wolf & Kapasi, LLC, 100 Park Avenue20th FloorNew York, NY 10017.
CAROL GRUBB, Plaintiff, represented by BENJAMIN JARRET WOLF,
Jones, Wolf & Kapasi, LLC, 100 Park Avenue20th FloorNew York, NY
10017.

GREE TREE SERVICING LLC, Defendant, represented by MARTIN C.
BRYCE, JR. -- Bryce@ballardspahr.com -- BALLARD, SPAHR LLP.


GUAM: Judge Denies Class Certification of H2B Denials Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Janela Carrera, writing for PNC News First, reports that the
lawsuit filed against the federal government over H2B visa denials
will not be certified as a class action lawsuit -- at least for
now.

Chief District Court Judge Frances Tydingco-Gatewood ruled in
favor of the US Attorney General's Office which is representing
the USCIS.  In her decision, Judge Gatewood agreed that no
decision on class certification will be made at least until all
dispositive motions are resolved.

The Guam Contractors Association and other local contractors are
suing the federal government over the near 100 percent denial of
H2B visas for foreign labor.  The denials has caused a shortage in
labor for the construction industry that's resulted in the price
of construction work and projects going up.

It's also created a rift between Adelup and the US Navy with
Governor Calvo renouncing support for the military buildup.

The next hearing on the case is scheduled for August 24 at 8:30
am. [GN]


HARMAN INT'L: Del. Court Dismisses Class Action with Prejudice
--------------------------------------------------------------
If you held shares of Harman International Industries,
Incorporated between November 14, 2016 and March 10, 2017 this
Notice contains important information regarding the dismissal of a
putative class action concerning the acquisition of Harman
International Industries, Incorporated, and an agreement to pay
attorneys' fees and expenses to counsel for Co-Lead Plaintiffs in
that action.

The purpose of this notice is to inform former stockholders of
Harman International Industries, Incorporated ("Harman") about
developments with respect to the litigation in the Delaware Court
of Chancery styled In Re Harman International Industries,
Incorporated Stockholders Litigation, Consol. C.A. No. 13001-CB
(the "Action").

On November 14, 2016, Harman announced that it had entered into an
agreement and plan of merger with Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
("Samsung"). As a result of the Transaction, Harman stockholders
received $112.00 per share in cash in exchange for each share of
Harman they owned.

On December 12, 2016, Harman filed a Preliminary Proxy Statement
on Schedule 14A (the "Preliminary Proxy") with the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in connection with the
Transaction.

On December 22, 2016, Plaintiff Harinath Nampally filed a verified
Class Action Complaint against Harman's Board of Directors (the
"Board") for breach of fiduciary duty (the "Nampally Complaint").

On December 29, 2016, Plaintiff Nampally filed a Motion for
Expedited Proceedings and Discovery and a Motion for Preliminary
Injunction to enjoin the shareholder vote on the merger agreement
until Defendants cured certain alleged disclosure violations (the
"Motions").

On January 3, 2017, Plaintiff Robert Fine filed a verified Class
Action Complaint against the Board with substantively similar
allegations (the "Fine Complaint") (collectively, with the
Nampally Complaint, the "Actions").

On January 6, 2017, Defendants provided Plaintiffs' counsel with
certain limited documents pursuant to a confidentiality agreement.

On January 12, 2017, the Court consolidated the Actions and
appointed Plaintiffs Nampally and Fine Co-Lead Plaintiffs.

On January 12, 2017, Co-Lead Plaintiffs sent a letter to
Defendants demanding disclosure of additional information Co-Lead
Plaintiffs claimed to be material to the decision whether to
approve the Transaction.

On January 12, 2017, the parties agreed on categories of
disclosures Harman would provide to moot the Motions.

On January 13, 2017, the parties agreed on a draft of additional
disclosures to be filed with the SEC that would resolve the
Motions (the "Additional Disclosures");

On January 18, 2017, the Court granted a stipulation between the
parties to withdraw the Motions as moot.

On January 20, 2017, Harman filed a Definitive Proxy Statement on
Schedule 14A (the "Definitive Proxy") with the SEC that
incorporated the Additional Disclosures.

On February 17, 2017, a special meeting of Harman stockholders was
held and the Transaction was approved. On March 10, 2017, the
Transaction was completed.

On April 7, 2017, the Delaware Court of Chancery entered a
Stipulation and Order dismissing the Action with prejudice as to
Co-Lead Plaintiffs, and without prejudice as to any other putative
class member, and retaining jurisdiction solely for the purpose to
determine Co-Lead Plaintiffs' counsel's anticipated application
for an award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement of expenses
based upon the alleged benefits provided by certain supplemental
disclosures set forth in the supplement to the Proxy Statement
(the "Fee and Expense Application").

After negotiations, Harman has agreed to make a fee and expense
payment to Plaintiff's counsel in the Action in the amount of
$195,000 to resolve the Fee and Expense Application.  The Delaware
Court of Chancery has not been asked to review, and will pass no
judgment on, this payment of fees and expenses or its
reasonableness.

If you have any questions regarding the Action, please contact the
attorneys below:

MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
Juan E. Monteverde
The Empire State Building
350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4405
New York, NY 10118
Tel: (212) 971-1341
Fax: (212) 601-2610

LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP
Shannon L. Hopkins
Sebastian Tornatore
733 Summer Street, Suite 304
Stamford, CT 06901
Tel.: (203) 992-4523
Fax: (212) 363-7171

Co-Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs

WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ
Ryan A. McLeod
51 West 52nd Street
New York, NY 10019
Tel: (212) 403-1000
Fax: (212) 403-2000

Counsel for Defendants
[GN]


HOMEWARD RESIDENTIAL: Court Denies Class Certification in "King"
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, Eastern District of Arkansas,
Jonesboro Division, issued an Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for
Class Certification in the case captioned SAVOIL KING and DOROTHY
KING for themselves and all Arkansas residents similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. HOMEWARD RESIDENTIAL, INC. and OCWEN LOAN
SERVICING, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 3:14-CV-00183 BSM (E.D.
Ark.).

The motion to certify class is denied because the proposed class
definition does not satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

Plaintiffs Dorothy and Savoil King first filed this class action
complaint asserting claims under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (ADTPA) and unjust enrichment. Notice of Savoil
King's death was filed and so plaintiff Dorothy King is henceforth
referred to in the singular. King claims she purchased a home in
1994, her mortgage was serviced by Homeward Residential Inc.
(Homeward) and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (Ocwen), and the mortgage
contract expressly gave her servicer the right to purchase
insurance for King's home and charge her for (force place) it if
she allowed the insurance on the home to lapse or become
inadequate.

On remand, King is proceeding on theories of unjust enrichment and
conversion based on the allegations in her second amended class
action complaint, and she moves for class certification. She wants
an injunction, restitution, and punitive damages. King admits that
defendants have returned her force place insurance premiums to her
but appears to be requesting the payment of interest on those
payments.

Numerosity is not a contested issue and it does not likely pose a
problem for King's proposed class.  Numerosity requires that the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
Classes containing as few as 25 and 35 members have been
certified.

Commonality, typicality, and adequacy, however, do present
problems for King's proposed class.  The class members' claims
must depend upon a common contention the truth or falsity of which
will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one
of the claims in one stroke.  Because adequacy merges with the
requirement that a class representative possess the same interest
and suffer the same injury as the class members, a representative
that fails commonality and typicality also fails adequacy.

Although King asserts that the common issue is whether defendants
participated in a scheme to inflate premiums and receive
kickbacks, that alone is insufficient.  King is proceeding on
theories of unjust enrichment and conversion, both of which will
require showing that the defendants wrongfully charged people for
insurance.

To find unjust enrichment, a party must have received something of
value, to which he or she is not entitled and which he or she must
restore. There must also be some operative act, intent, or
situation to make the enrichment unjust and compensable. One who
is free from fault cannot be held to be unjust enriched merely
because he or she has chosen to exercise a legal or contractual
right.

Accordingly, the fact that King admits that defendants had the
contractual right to force place insurance on the members in her
proposed class whose insurance lapsed presents a material
difference between her claim for being double-billed and the
claims of other class members whose insurance lapsed.  King cannot
satisfy Rule 23(a) because her claims are neither common nor
typical of her proposed class, and she is therefore an inadequate
representative.

King has also failed to show her class satisfies any of the three
prongs in Rule 23(b). King's complaint asserts that certification
is proper under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), and (3). The only prong of
Rule 23(b) addressed by King's briefing is Rule 23(b)(3).

With respect to the second amended class action complaint, the
Court finds that King presents no evidence in this regard. She
simply reiterates the broadest theory available and asserts that
other courts have found that common issues predominated in similar
cases. Some of the class certification decisions in these forced-
placed insurance cases have discussed common damage modeling. In
those cases, the courts were provided a report from [an expert],
and these courts found that there is a common methodology for
providing restitution and presenting damages on a class-wide basis
here. Merely asserting that other courts have certified similar
classes does not provide a sufficient bases upon which to properly
determine whether Rule 23(b)(3) has been met.

Accordingly, a class action will not be a superior method of
adjudicating this case because the reasonableness of any insurance
premium paid may have to be individually analyzed. King does not
rebut defendants' contention that the analysis required for King's
class will rely heavily on the facts of each individual class
member and the specific property insured. Thus, whether and to
what extent [the defendant] charged any particular borrower more
than the true cost of insurance would thus be an individual
question, not a common question.

Finally, the same result is reached on King's request to certify
under Rule 23(b)(1) because class members in a Rule 23(b)(1) class
also lack the ability to opt out, (noting that class members in a
Rule 23(b)(1) are all bound by the outcome of a lawsuit, but class
members in a Rule 23(b)(3) class may opt out).

Thus, King's request to certify also fails under Rule 23(b).

The motion for class certification is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 27, 2017 Order is
available http://tinyurl.com/y9oxshd4from Leagle.com.

Savoil King, Plaintiff, represented by Joe R. Whatley, Jr. --
jwhatley@whatleykallas.com -- Whatley Kallas, LLP, pro hac vice.
Savoil King, Plaintiff, represented by Joel G. Hargis, Hargis Law
Office, 512 West Washington Avenue, Jonesboro, AR 72401-2780,
Kathy A. Cruz, Cruz Law Firm, PLC, 1325 Central Ave, Hot Springs,
AR 71901 Garland County & Scott E. Poynter, Poynter Law Group. 500
President Clinton AvenueSuite 305Little Rock, AR 7220

Dorothy King, Plaintiff, represented by Joe R. Whatley, Jr.,
Whatley Kallas, LLP, pro hac vice, Joel G. Hargis, Hargis Law
Office, Kathy A. Cruz, Cruz Law Firm, PLC & Scott E. Poynter,
Poynter Law Group.

Homeward Residential Inc, Defendant, represented by Brian V.
Otero, -botero@hunton.com -- Hunton & Williams, pro hac vice,
Jamie Marie Huffman Jones -- jjones@fridayfirm.com -- Friday,
Eldredge & Clark, LLP, Kevin A. Crass -- crass@fridayfirm.com --
Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, Ryan A. Becker --
rbecker@hunton.com -- Hunton & Williams, pro hac vice, Stephen R.
Blacklocks -- sblacklocks@hunton.com -- Hunton & Williams, pro hac
vice & Mary Kathleen McCarroll, Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP. 400
W Capitol Ave, Ste 2000, Little Rock, AR 72201-3493

Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, Defendant, represented by Brian V.
Otero, Hunton & Williams, pro hac vice, Jamie Marie Huffman Jones,
Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, Kevin A. Crass, Friday, Eldredge &
Clark, LLP, Ryan A. Becker, Hunton & Williams, pro hac vice,
Stephen R. Blacklocks, Hunton & Williams, pro hac vice & Mary
Kathleen McCarroll, Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP.


HOTELMACHER LLC: Exploits Filipino Workers, "Casilao" Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
David Lee, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that the
American Civil Liberties Union of Oklahoma claims a Holiday Inn
Express, steakhouse and water park operator exploited a group of
Filipino nationals as cheap labor and intimidated them with ties
to law enforcement.

Lead plaintiffs Madelyn Casilao, Harry Lincuna and Allan Garcia
filed a class-action lawsuit in Oklahoma City federal court on
against Walter and Carolyn Schumacher, of Clinton, Okla., and
their companies: Hotelmacher LLC dba Holiday Inn Express,
Steakmacher LLC dba Montana Mike's Steakhouse and Schumacher
Investments LLC dba Water Zoo.  They also sued Apex USA Inc.,
which allegedly recruited the foreign workers and functioned as a
human resources office for the other defendants.

Casilao, Lincuna and Garcia -- represented by the ACLU of Oklahoma
-- claim they were only paid $4.25 per room cleaned, less than
their contracted pay or federal wage and hour minimums.  They
allege servers at Montana Mike's Restaurant were paid a little
over $2 per hour plus tips and that breakfast cooks and water park
employees were paid up to $2 less per hour than what was promised.

The plaintiffs also claim they were not given full-time work as
promised, instead working only three to four days per week for a
few hours per day.

"Due to their sparse and fluctuating work hours, plaintiffs and
other putative class members were barely able to earn enough to
pay their living expenses in Oklahoma, and were not able to send
money home to the Philippines to repay any debts they had incurred
to obtain the H-2B visas," the 42-page complaint states.
"Defendants refused to reimburse plaintiffs and other putative
class members for their travel expenses to the United States or
for the amounts paid in recruitment expenses."

Casilao, Lincuna and Garcia say they were promised "stable, long-
term work potential," full-time jobs, free housing, food and
transportation under their guest-worker visas.  They were also
allegedly induced to pay "substantial fees" for their recruitment,
the immigration process and their travel to Oklahoma.

The plaintiffs say they could not have returned to the Philippines
or left their jobs without first repaying the debts, which was
impossible due to the alleged reduction in working hours, wage
rates and unexpected living expenses of up to $300 a month to be
put up at a local motel, often in shared rooms with other workers.
They were also not given transportation to their work sites and
had to cross a highway on foot, according to the lawsuit.

The workers allege Walter Schumacher made it known that he "was a
current and/or former police sheriff, suggesting his close ties
with law enforcement," the complaint states, and would intimidate
them by talking to them from a police patrol car.  They claim he
told Garcia and other workers that he had a gun in his car as he
was picking them up from the airport.

"When plaintiff Garcia and other putative class members inquired
about the promised airfare to and from the Philippines, defendant
W. Schumacher informed them he would only pay for a return airfare
to the Philippines if the employee was returned 'in a box,'" the
complaint states.

Up to 100 Filipino nationals who received H-2B visas through the
defendants from 2008 to 2014 are included in the proposed class.

An employee at one of the Schumacher businesses told Fox affiliate
KOKH last week that immigrant workers were paid a fair wage, but
that they have not been recruited for years.

Holiday Inn Express parent InterContinental Hotels Group PLC is
not a party to the lawsuit, but it said in a statement that its
business strategy is "underpinned by a commitment to operating
responsibly."

"While we are aware of the allegations against the independently-
owned and operated Holiday Inn Express & Suites Clinton, IHG has a
long-standing commitment to human rights, including establishment
of a formalized Human Rights Policy in 2009 and signing of the UN
Global Compact in 2010, through which we aligned with universal
principles that include commitments to human rights and labor
standards," the company said Monday afternoon.

Casilao, Lincuna and Garcia seek class certification and
compensatory and punitive damages for alleged breach of contract
and violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act.

Their lead attorney in the case is Brady Henderson with the ACLU
of Oklahoma, based in Oklahoma City.

They are also represented by attorneys from Legal Aid at Work in
San Francisco, Pro Bono Law in Boston and Washington, D.C., and
the Equal Justice Center in Austin, Texas.


JIMMY JOHN'S: Court to Rule on Franchisee Responsibility Issue
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Bilyk, writing for Cook County Record, reports that
facing a growing number of lawsuits over its alleged treatment of
assistant store managers, sub sandwich restaurant chain Jimmy
John's has asked a Chicago federal judge to determine exactly how
much responsibility it should bear for how its franchisees
classify, pay and manage those assistant managers.

U.S. District Judge Charles P. Kocoras is expected to soon weigh
in on that legal question, as the legal team for Champaign-based
Jimmy John's and attorneys representing a putative class of
assistant store managers are squaring off over whether the
sandwich chain should be considered a joint employer of its
franchisee's workers under federal labor law.

Since 2014, Jimmy John's has contested two primary class action
lawsuits, brought by assistant managers who alleged the sandwich
chain should be held responsible for the decision to classify the
ASMs as management employees exempt from the overtime and other
wage requirements under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act.

The plaintiffs have contended the classification was improper, as
assistant managers at Jimmy John's rarely, if ever, actually
manage anyone or anything.  Rather, plaintiffs estimated at least
90 percent of the ASMs' duties are little different from those of
hourly, so-called non-exempt restaurant employees, who qualify for
overtime under the FLSA.

The first such action was brought in Ohio federal court by
attorneys with the firm of Landskroner Grieco Merriman LLC, of
Cleveland, representing named plaintiff Scott Watson. That case
was transferred in 2015 to Chicago federal court.

A second class action lawsuit was filed in Chicago federal court
by a group of attorneys with various law firms, including Myron M.
Cherry & Associates, of Chicago; Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil,
of Geneva; Werman Salas, of Chicago; Klafter Olsen & Lesser, of
Rye Brook, N.Y.; and Outten & Golden, of Chicago.  They
represented named plaintiff Emily Brunner and others who were
employed as "second assistant store managers" at Jimmy John's
restaurants.

In 2016, the cases were consolidated, and putative classes were
conditionally certified, over the objections of franchisee
defendants, who said they feared "financial ruin" from the cases.

However, at the same time, other cases have sprung up, as others
have sought to bring similar actions against specific Jimmy John's
franchisees in other federal court districts.  Those filings
prompted the court in March to grant Jimmy John's request for an
injunction blocking those cases from moving forward while the
primary litigation proceeds.

Most recently, however, Jimmy John's has asked the court to
declare the plaintiffs can't sue the sandwich chain for decisions
it says were made by franchise owners who actually hired and
managed the workers who are suing in the pending actions.

In May, Jimmy John's moved for summary judgment, arguing it should
not be considered a "joint employer" along with its franchisees,
and thus should not be liable to answer for the alleged
misclassification of the ASMs.

"Plaintiffs are unable to establish a genuine issue of material
fact as to any of the factors that this Court articulated and
considered in dismissing claims against (Jimmy John's founder
Jimmy John Liautaud), including: (1) whether Jimmy John's has the
power to hire and fire franchisee employees; (2) whether Jimmy
John's exercises supervision and control over franchisee employee
work schedules or conditions of payment; (3) whether Jimmy John's
determines the rate and method of payment to franchisee employees;
and (4) whether Jimmy John's maintains employment records of
franchisee employees," Jimmy John's wrote in a memorandum in
support of its summary judgment motion.

"Moreover, fatal to their joint-employer theory is Plaintiffs'
inability to show that Jimmy John's imposes any requirements --
under the authority of its franchise agreements or otherwise --
with respect to how assistant store managers are to be classified
and paid, which is the alleged FLSA violation at issue in this
case."

"The undisputed evidence here shows that there is no requirement
that franchisees even employ someone as an 'Assistant Store
Manager,' much less a requirement that the assistant manager be
classified and compensated in a specific way, further confirming
how far removed Jimmy John's is from the franchisee-level conduct
of which Plaintiffs complain."

The plaintiffs, however, fired back in a memorandum of their own,
filed in late June, asserting Jimmy John's argument relies on "
four old, artificial and formalistic" standards for determining
joint employer status.

In more recent rulings on the question, the plaintiffs said,
courts have found franchisers and others can be considered joint
employers, even if they never "hired, fired or paid" any of the
workers.

In this case, the plaintiffs said Jimmy John's should be
considered a joint employer because the standards and "checklists"
it applies to franchisee shops actually define the work
environment at such restaurants.

"In this case, what ASMs do day-in-and-day out is the product of
Jimmy John's direction of store operations," the plaintiffs wrote
in the memo, signed by attorney Seth R. Lesser, of Klafter Olsen &
Lesser.  "Jimmy John's defines the work like of ASMs -- what they
do, how they do it, and when they do it.  Franchisees may cut the
paychecks, but Jimmy John's exercises control over working
conditions."

Judge Kocoras has not indicated when he might rule on the
question.

Jimmy John's is represented in the action by attorneys with the
firm of Seyfarth Shaw LLP, of Chicago. [GN]


JUST BORN: Judge Refuses to Dismiss Class Action
------------------------------------------------
Traci Rork, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
federal judge in Jefferson City, Mo. refused to throw out a class
action accusing the maker of Mike and Ike and Hot Tamales of
deceptively packing their candy boxes less than two-thirds full.

On behalf of a nationwide class and a Missouri subclass, Daryl
White Jr. sued Just Born Inc. in February, for unjust enrichment
and violations of the Missouri Merchandising Purposes Act. He
claims that 35 percent of each candy box is air.

U.S. Judge Nanette Laughrey denied Just Born's motion to dismiss.

Getting right down to it, Laughrey wrote in the second paragraph
of her 22-page ruling: "Consumers spend an average of 13 seconds
making an in-store purchasing decision. The decision is heavily
dependent on a product's packaging, in particular, the package
dimensions. When faced with a large box and a smaller box, both
containing the same amount of product, a consumer is more likely
to choose the larger one, thinking it is a better value. . . .
Yet there is 35 percent nonfunctional, slack-filled space in a Hot
Tamales box and 34 percent in a Mike and Ike box."

Laughrey found that sufficient to allege a cause of action under
the Missouri Merchandising Purposes Act.

White said in his complaint that Bethlehem, Pa.-based Just Born
used slack filling for no reason but to "create a false impression
as to the quantity of food they contain." "Customers would not
have purchased the products had they known that the containers
were substantially empty," the lawsuit states.

Just Born is facing a similar lawsuit filed in March in Los
Angeles Federal Court (Stephanie Escobar v. Just Born Inc.).

Just Born argues that the empty space in its boxes serves the
purpose of conveniently dispensing the candies through the
perforated opening, and that "reasonable consumers would not
expect the candy boxes to be filled to the brim."

After considering several similar cases presented by both sides,
Laughrey refused to dismiss claims of deceptive packaging or
unjust enrichment.

White is represented by David Steelman, with Steelman, Gaunt &
Horsefield, of Rolla, who did not immediately respond to requests
to comment.

Matt Pye, vice president of Just Born, has previously said that
the company will "vigorously defend" itself against "baseless
allegations."

"Our products and labels comply with all FDA regulations and
provides consumers with the information they need to make informed
purchase decisions," Pye said in a statement.


KAISER PERMANENTE: "Samora" Suit Moved to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Otillia Samora, On Behalf of
Himself and All Others Similarly Situated and on Behalf of the
General Public as Private Attorneys General, the Plaintiff, v.
Kaiser Permanente International, a California Corporation; and
DOES 1 through 250, inclusive, the Defendant, Case No. BC662669,
was removed on July 27, 2017 from the Los Angeles County Superior
Court, to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California (Western Division - Los Angeles). The District Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 2:17-cv-05560 to the proceeding.

Kaiser Permanente is an integrated managed care consortium, based
in Oakland, California, United States, founded in 1945 by
industrialist Henry J. Kaiser and physician Sidney Garfield.

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


LEXMARK INT'L: Faces Shareholder Class Action in New York
---------------------------------------------------------
Cheryl Truman, writing for Lexington Herald Leader, reports that
Lexmark "made false and misleading statements" about demand,
inventory and growth prospects for its supplies business in 2014-
15 that cost shareholders more than half a billion dollars,
according to a class-action lawsuit filed July 20 in United States
District Court for the southern district of New York.

The suit was filed by the Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and
Retirement System. Various law firms are making online pitches to
former Lexmark investors to join the lawsuit.

Defendants in the lawsuit are Lexmark International; Paul Rooke,
former president and chief executive officer of Lexmark
International; David Reeder, formerly Lexmark vice president and
chief financial officer who made a quick departure in June after
being Lexmark CEO for just six months; Gary Stromquist, who had
been an interim chief financial officer; and Martin Canning,
former executive vice president and president, imaging solutions
and services at Lexmark.

Lexmark spokesman Jerry Grasso said the company would have no
comment on the lawsuit.  Francis McConville with the New York law
firm of Labaton Sucharow said that he would have no comment or
further explanation of the suit.

Lexmark was acquired in 2016 by a consortium of investors led by
Apex Technology Co. and PAG Asia Capital in a $3.6 billion all-
cash transaction.  The completion of the transaction meant that
Lexmark stock ceased to be traded on the New York Stock Exchange.

The suit claims that Lexmark "made false and misleading statements
regarding its end-user demand, channel inventory, and growth
prospects for its high-margin supplies business."

Lexmark "also failed to disclose deterioration in end-user demand
and excessive inventory levels at its European wholesale
distributors," according to the suit.

Ultimately, according to the suit, in July 2015, Lexmark reported
poor results for its second quarter, blaming the disappointing
results on lower-than-expected supplies revenue from its European
wholesale distributors.  Lexmark "explained that the Company had
increased supplies for its European distributors three times
between October 2014 and June 2015."

Rather than the growth that made investors want to buy the stock,
the suit says that the prior increased sales were more
attributable to European distributors trying to build up stock to
get ahead of the next price increase.

That news sent Lexmark stock plummeting, the suit says. It dropped
$9.57 a share, or 20.2 percent, "wiping out approximately $550
million in market capitalization."

The suit contends that Lexmark's claim that higher demand was
driving growth was wrong because "end-user demand and growth for
the Company's supplies was deteriorating."

In fact, the suit says, the company's pricing increases were the
primary driver of supplies revenue growth and customers had
reacted by buying ahead of anticipated pricing increases, leaving
excessive inventory levels at European wholesale distributors.

After Lexmark was acquired by the Asian investors' consortium,
Rooke, who had been with Lexmark since 1991, left the company and
was succeeded by Reeder.

The suit says that the class action may ultimately include
"hundreds of thousands of members" because during the period 2014-
2015 Lexmark was actively traded on the NYSE.  Several law firms
have posted online notices since July 20 seeking Lexmark investors
to join the lawsuit.

The suit seeks a jury trial and seeks compensatory damages as well
as "other relief as deemed appropriate by the court."

Under the federal Sarbanes-Oxley Act, certifying a misleading or
fraudulent financial report can result in penalties of as much as
$5 million in fines and 20 years in prison. [GN]


LOCKHEED CORP: Summary Judgment for Exxon, Unocal Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California for Second District, Division
Three, issued an Opinion affirming the District Court's grant of
Defendants Exxon Mobil Corporation and Union Oil Company of
California's Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned
LOCKHEED LITIGATION CASES, No. B262820 (Cal. App.).

Between 1986 and 1994, more than 600 current and former employees
of Lockheed Corporation filed dozens of lawsuits, alleging
personal injuries caused by occupational exposure to chemicals at
Lockheed's facilities. The Judicial Council coordinated the
lawsuits into the Lockheed Litigation Cases, JCCP No. 2967
(Lockheed Litigation), and the trial court sought to manage the
coordinated proceeding by separating the plaintiffs into groups
for trial. Over the past two decades, the Lockheed Litigation has
produced five trials, one retrial, and nine decisions by the Court
of Appeal.

The remaining plaintiffs appeal from a summary judgment entered in
favor of defendants Exxon Mobil Corporation and Union Oil Company
of California, doing business as Unocal. Plaintiffs contend the
trial court improperly applied collateral estoppel to preclude
them from offering expert evidence demonstrating defendants'
chemicals were capable of causing their alleged injuries.
Specifically, plaintiffs challenge the court's determination that
they were in privity with other plaintiffs in the coordinated
litigation, whose claims were dismissed for lack of adequate
scientific foundation supporting their expert's causation opinion.

The judgment is affirmed. Exxon Mobil Corporation and Union Oil
Company of California are entitled to their costs.

A full-text copy of the Court of Appeals July 27, 2017 Opinion is
available http://tinyurl.com/yc8g68vefrom Leagle.com.

Law Offices of Martin N. Buchanan and Martin N. Buchanan, 655 West
Broadway, Suite 1700, San Diego, CA 92101, Girardi | Keese and
Robert W. Finnerty for Plaintiffs and Appellants, 1126 Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90017

Horvitz & Levy, David M. Axelrad -- daxelrad@horvitzlevy.com --
Shane H. McKenzie -- smckenzie@horvitzlevy.com -- Steptoe &
Johnson and Jason Levin -- info@storchamini.com -- for Defendants
and Respondents.


LVNV FUNDING: Faces "Auletta" Suit in N.Y. Supreme Court
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against LVNV Funding LLC
The case is entitled as AULETTA, REGINA OBO HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, the Plaintiff, v. LVNV FUNDING LLC , ALLIED
INTERSTATE, LLC AND SHERMAN FINANCIAL GROUP, LLC, the Defendants,
Case No. 604349/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., July 21, 2017). The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge John H. Rouse.

LVNV Funding purchases portfolios of consumer debt throughout the
United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mitchell L. Pashkin, Esq.
          775 Park Ave, Suite 255
          Huntington, NY 11743
          Telephone: (631) 629 7709

The Defendant is represented by:

          REED SMITH, LLP
          599 Lexington Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 521 5400


MALLINCKRODT PLC: Sept. 22 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
-------------------------------------------------------------
Stull, Stull & Brody ("SS&B") on July 26 disclosed that a class
action lawsuit was commenced in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri on behalf of purchasers of
stock of Mallinckrodt Public Limited Company's ("Mallinckrodt")
(NYSE:MNK), between November 25, 2014 and January 18, 2017 ("Class
Period"), in Mallinckrodt's voluntary and contributory employee
benefit plans.  If you contributed money in any of Mallinckrodt's
voluntary employee benefit plans and acquired Mallinckrodt ADSs as
a result of such contributions, your rights may be affected.

The complaint alleges, among other claims, that Mallinckrodt's
Registration Statement filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission violated Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 by
omitting material facts and otherwise containing inaccurate,
misleading and untrue statements of fact pertaining to, among
other things, the long-term sustainability of Mallinckrodt's
revenues for HP Acthar Gel ("Acthar"), the only FDA-approved
adrenocorticotropic hormone preparation.  The action alleges that
Acthar's monopoly status was the product of unlawful
anticompetitive practices and failed to disclose that its
increasing reliance on Medicare and Medicaid meant that
Mallinckrodt's monopolistic Acthar revenue would be threatened if
the government took action to limit the price paid for this drug
by taxpayers.

If you purchased or acquired Mallinckrodt stock in any of the
Company's employee benefit plans during the Class Period and wish
to serve as a lead plaintiff you may move the Court no later than
September 22, 2017; however you must meet certain legal
requirements.  If you wish to discuss this action or have any
questions concerning this notice or your rights or interests,
please contact Michael Klein, Esq. of SS&B at MNK@ssbny.com,
telephone 212-687-7230 x147, or by fax to 212-490-2022.

SS&B -- http://www.ssbny.com-- has litigated class actions for
violations of securities laws and breaches of fiduciary duty on
behalf of defrauded investors over the past 40 years and has
obtained court approval of substantial settlements on numerous
occasions.  SS&B has offices in New York and Beverly Hills.
[GN]


MARYLAND: State High Court Affirms Involuntary Admission
--------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland issued an Opinion
affirming the judgment of Administrative Law Judge for involuntary
admission of the Plaintiffs to Defendant's facility in the case
captioned J.H., ET AL., v. PRINCE GEORGE'S HOSPITAL CENTER, No.
1056 (Md.).

Suffering from the harmful effects of mental illness, J.H., C.B.,
M.G., and B.N., were brought to Prince George's Hospital Center on
separate occasions for emergency mental health evaluations to
determine whether each should be admitted for involuntary
psychiatric treatment.  Each Appellant was afforded a hearing
before an administrative law judge (ALJ), during which their
counsel argued for their release on the ground that the Hospital
failed to comply in various respects with the preadmission
procedures set out in Maryland Code.

The lower court concluded the evidence established that Appellants
qualified for involuntary admission to the Hospital's inpatient
psychiatric unit in accordance with Health-Gen. Section 10-632(e),
and that none of the alleged preadmission procedure violations
warranted Appellants' release.

Counsel filed a petition for judicial review for each Appellant
and a motion to consolidate their cases in the Circuit Court for
Prince George's County. The circuit court granted the motions to
consolidate and, after argument, affirmed the ALJs' decisions with
respect to each Appellant.

The Maryland Supreme Court held that the individual bears the
burden at an involuntary admission hearing to raise any
preadmission procedural violations.  Once the issue is raised, the
burden shifts to the hospital to establish, by a preponderance of
the evidence, either its compliance with respect to the alleged
procedural violation, or that the violation was not substantial or
that "[n]o other remedy [wa]s consistent with due process and the
protection of the individual's rights.

Appellants assert that an individual is not lawfully in [a
hospital's] custody if the hospital failed to comply with the
preadmission procedures and, as a result, the hospital's
noncompliance deprives the OAH of jurisdiction to conduct an
involuntary admission hearing.

Nothing in the legislative history indicates that the General
Assembly intended that a hospital must demonstrate compliance with
the preadmission procedures as a condition precedent to ordering
involuntary admission.  Appellants, therefore, are incorrect in
their contention that it is a jurisdictional prerequisite that a
hospital establish compliance with preadmission procedures during
an involuntary commitment hearing. Instead, a hospital must only
demonstrate compliance with preadmission procedures in those cases
in which the patient raises procedural irregularities with
particularity.

In all of four cases, the records demonstrate that the Hospital
presented evidence on, and the ALJs examined, each element
contained in Health-Gen. Section 10-632(e)(2), establishing that
the patients were suffering from serious mental illness and
required inpatient treatment in order to protect them from harming
themselves or others.

The Maryland Supreme Court holds that the ALJs' decisions ordering
the involuntary admissions of Appellants were legally correct and
supported by substantial evidence.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's July 27, 2017
Opinion and Order is available http://tinyurl.com/y9oxshd4from
Leagle.com.


MASTERCARD INC: UK Antitrust Suit Ruling Won't Doom Class Regime
----------------------------------------------------------------
Melissa Lipman, Alex Davis and Eric Kroh, writing for Law360,
report that the first two suits brought under the U.K.'s young
antitrust class action regime have fallen short, but attorneys say
the competition court's recent rejection of a GBP14 billion
consumer suit over MasterCard's swipe fees doesn't portend failure
for the nascent system.

The Competition Appeal Tribunal denied a petition on July 21 from
proposed class representative Walter Merricks for permission to
recover damages on behalf of millions of consumers who allegedly
overpaid for products because the credit card giant set anti-
competitive interchange fees.

Mr. Merricks, a former U.K. chief financial services ombudsman,
and his legal team had portrayed the suit as the "absolute
archetype" of the kinds of cases the 2015 law creating the
country's first-ever opt-out class action system was meant to
address.  And Merricks on July 21 worried that the decision meant
the regime "may never get off the ground."

But experts pointed out that the tribunal sided with the claimants
on several key principles, suggesting that the problem had more to
do with the factual complexity of a case spanning tens of millions
of customers buying everything from sweets to diamonds from
countless retailers over more than a decade.

"I don't think it is particularly bad news for others trying to
bring a class action in the U.K.  Whilst they said it's the
archetypal class action case, in fact I think it was a pretty
ambitious case," said Osborne Clarke partner Andrew Bartlett --
andrew.bartlett@osborneclarke.com --  "To allow this would have
been to start the whole system with a very difficult case that
might have attracted a lot of criticism."

The British government introduced the opt-out system when the
Consumer Rights Act went into effect in October 2015 in a bid to
help consumers and small businesses recover damages for cartels
and other antitrust violations.

Since then, however, the tribunal has only seen two cases seeking
a collective proceeding order, perhaps in part because of the
transitional rules that apply to claims predating the law.

The first application for class status followed a U.K. enforcement
decision against a mobility scooter manufacturer and several
dealers.  But the claimant ultimately withdrew the case when the
tribunal's concerns about the proposed class and estimated damages
would have drastically reduced the value of the suit.

"Some people possibly thought when the jurisdiction was introduced
that the CAT would want to encourage lots of claims in early years
and would want to get a bit more restrictive once jurisdiction was
a bit more established," said Covington & Burling LLP's Elaine
Whiteford -- ewhiteford@cov.com -- "That has not been the approach
the tribunal has taken."

Instead, the opinions make reference to the Canadian class action
system and its level of scrutiny for the way experts calculate
damages when deciding whether the claimants have enough in common
to qualify for class status.  The tribunal emphasized that the
collective proceedings application didn't require a mini-trial,
but stressed that it still had to take "particular care" to make
sure that inappropriate cases didn't forge ahead.

"It does want to scrutinize these cases carefully," Ms. Whiteford
said. "It is conscious it can impose a significant burden on
defendants if it wrongly certifies a class."

In the MasterCard case, Mr. Merricks sought to build on a European
Commission decision finding the credit card company's European
cross-border interchange fees anti-competitive by arguing that
those fees affected the level of fees on purely domestic U.K.
purchases.

The court conceded that while the only "truly" common issue was
whether that liability question carried through, other issues
could also be relatively easily handled on a collective basis,
such as how much higher the fees were because of the anti-
competitive conduct and the share of the interbank fees passed on
to the retailers.

Instead, the bulk of the tribunal's problems with allowing class
status had to do with the question of how much of any overcharge
retailers passed through to consumers -- unlike in the U.S., U.K.
legislation allows defendants to use the pass-on defense in
damages suits -- and the amount each claimant would have spent at
the retailers in question.

Nonetheless, the court cautioned that didn't inherently mean the
case wasn't appropriate for class status.

"There is no requirement that all the significant issues in the
claims should be common issues, or indeed -- and by contrast with
the position under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the
United States -- that the common issues should predominate over
the individual issues," the tribunal noted.

The real problem, the court said, was that Mr. Merricks' proposal
to award aggregate damages to be distributed after the fact lacked
a workable methodology to calculate the aggregate damages or for
estimating individual loss to divvy up any eventual judgment.

"The tribunal said that there simply wasn't any data available to
allow them to calculate what the aggregate damages were," said
Hogan Lovells partner Nick Heaton --
nicholas.heaton@hoganlovells.com -- "It's a good example of the
issue of the principle going the claimants' way, they can use
aggregate damages to get around the lack of commonality on the
issue, but as a matter of fact in this case the data wasn't
available to allow that calculation to be done."

The lesson, Ms. Whiteford said, was that claimants will have to do
much more work before even filing a claim in order to support a
request for a collective proceedings order.

"You have to have a very clear idea of what you're going to do all
the way, and what data you're going to use to prove what you need
to prove or calculate what you're going to have to calculate," Ms.
Whiteford said.  "The CAT doesn't seem to like the idea of, 'Well,
this is how we think it's going to be, and this is what we think
we'll probably do.'"

But perhaps the most crucial win for claimants generally,
attorneys said, was the court's conclusion that the litigation
funder backing the case could be permitted to recover costs from
the pool of unclaimed damages at the end.

The issue is that the rules for the collective proceedings regime
block contingency fee-style models known in the U.K. as damages-
based agreements, but class representatives can apply to use some
of any undistributed damages to cover costs and expenses.  But it
had been unclear whether the payment owed back to a third-party
funder would count as a cost or expense.

The tribunal, however, ruled that it would, and noted that the
question of how much of a return would be appropriate could be
dealt with at a later point.

"The regime in the U.K. essentially depends on the funder being
able to receive the profit element out of any funding from
unclaimed damages at the end of the day," Mr. Heaton said.  "If
that had gone the other way, that pot of money would never have
been available for funders and there's no other practical way for
funders to make a recovery."

"That would have been a very serious blow to the regime," Heaton
added.

The overall takeaway, experts said, is that a narrower case
following a cartel enforcement decision dealing with a particular
product could well find success before the tribunal.

"With the right case, I think there's no reason to believe there
won't be a class certified," Mr. Bartlett said.  "This just
happened to be the wrong case, particularly when it might have
been the first case."

At the same time, the tribunal's rejection of the first two
requests for collective action status does offer good news to
future defendants as well.

"It is quite reassuring to see that the tribunal has had the
courage to reject the first two claims when they have not met the
criteria, notwithstanding the fact that clearly it is keen to see
that the regime succeeds," Mr. Heaton said.  "That gives some
comfort that class actions are going to receive some scrutiny and
class certification is not just going to be a rubber stamp."
[GN]


MASTERCARD INC: Antitrust Case Ruling Loss for Litigation Funders
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Strickler, Adam Rhodes, Melissa Lipman and Eric Kroh,
writing for Law360, report that MasterCard's recent win in a GBP14
billion antitrust case in the U.K.'s new class action forum is a
loss for litigation funders eager for a slice of massive potential
recoveries in antitrust actions in the country, raising questions
about whether similar cases can gain traction there and trigger
payouts for investors, experts said.

When the U.K.'s Competition Appeal Tribunal on July 21 found that
consumer litigation against MasterCard over swipe fees couldn't
move forward as a class action, it was a blow for not only
consumers but also for U.S.-based Burford Capital LLC, which had
committed up to GBP40 million to carry the landmark case through
to completion.

Now, funders are facing raised stakes in other antitrust class
actions being prepared for the tribunal, particularly a
multibillion-dollar truck price-fixing action that's backed by
millions in private investments.

The MasterCard litigation wasn't all bad news for funders, said
Leslie Perrin, chairman of London litigation fund Calunius Capital
LLP. He cheered the tribunal's endorsement of the Burford
investment structure as a long-term positive for third-party
investors working in the U.K.'s emerging antitrust arena.

But the court's stiff-arm of the class will also undermine faith
among U.S. and U.K. legal investors that the tribunal is ready to
embrace the "alien life-form" of U.S.-style collective actions.

"These kinds of complicated follow-on actions clearly have more of
a question mark over them after this decision," said
Ms. Perrin, who also heads a U.K. litigation funder association.

In only the second proposed class action ever in the Competition
Appeal Tribunal, former chief financial services ombudsman
Walter Merricks sought unprecedented damages for MasterCard
overcharges on card transactions over a 16-year period, but a
three-judge panel concluded that the action filed on behalf of
millions of consumers wasn't sound.

The tribunal, set up after the Consumer Rights Act 2015 created
the U.K.'s first forum for "opt-out" class actions, found various
faults with the consumer class's case, particularly in a failure
to design "even a very rough-and-ready approximation" of losses
per claimant.

In light of various types of spending and the disparities in the
so-called swipe fee "pass throughs" to consumers, "it is
impossible in this case to see how the payments to individuals
could be determined on any reasonable basis," the panel said.

Mr. Merricks, who was represented in part by a Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan LLP team, said after the ruling that he was
considering an appeal.

Despite the broader finding for MasterCard, the panel looked
carefully at the funding arrangement and accepted the legality of
placing an explicit obligation on Mr. Merricks, if successful, to
pay funders out of undistributed proceeds of the case, Perrin
noted.

The tribunal also rejected MasterCard's objection that the deal
created a conflict of interest with class members because it
obligated Mr. Merricks to ensure there would be enough
undistributed money to fully satisfy investors.

"On the whole, I think it was a good case for funders because of
the way the judges handled these issues and accepted totally that
funding was an integral part of these cases being successful in
compensating consumers for real losses," Ms. Perrin said.

Still, the decision is likely "a total loss" of the Burford money
put into the complex case thus far, he said.

U.S.- and U.K.-based legal funders have in recent years announced
a series of investments in European antitrust cases and in
jurisdictions where courts are looking at high-value competition
and anti-cartel litigations, particularly in Ireland and the
Netherlands.

Such cases have obvious appeal to deep-pocketed legal funders. In
addition to high-value claims that may span anti-competitive
behavior over years, many are also led by sophisticated legal
teams with deep connections in their local jurisdictions, lowering
the risk that investor analysis of a winning case will prove
faulty.

Like the MasterCard action, many are also "follow-on" cases to
decisions by antitrust regulators, shortcutting liability
questions.  In one notable decision of interest to investors, the
European Commission last year announced a record EUR2.93 billion
in fines on five truck makers for price-fixing and collusion. That
has triggered a series of announced antitrust actions in the EU.

Based on that finding, U.K. trucker group Road Haulage Association
Ltd. in June invited any U.K. entity, regardless of association
membership, to sign on to an multibillion-pound antitrust action
being prepared for the Competition Appeal Tribunal.  That action
has the financial backing of Therium Capital Management Ltd., a
major London-based fund with offices in the U.S., Germany and
Norway.

Under the terms of that deal, Therium would reap three times the
return on its total investment in the CAT case if successful --
less if the case settles early -- or up to 30 percent of all
recoveries.  RHA has said he case could ultimately cover some
650,000 truck purchases between 1997 and 2011 in the U.K., and
ú6,000 in compensation per vehicle.

The rush for third-party investment in antitrust and class actions
is also apparent in Germany, where a transportation and logistics
industry association has hired international antitrust specialist
Hausfeld LLP to lead a suit that could include as many as 100,000
truck purchases and rentals.

In a then-unprecedented kind of international expansion and risk-
share deal with a funder, Hausfeld announced in 2015 the launch of
its Berlin office in a $30 million venture with Burford Capital.
Hausfeld and Burford also said in July they would press a trucks
cartel case in the U.K. following the EU commission finding,
although that case will not be pursued in the CAT.

Travis Lenkner, managing director of Burford Capital, declined to
comment on the MasterCard decision, citing a possible appeal, or
on how much the fund had expended on the case up to the recent
decision.

"Our funding agreement with the representative of the proposed
class would provide resources to see the case through to
conclusion, including the costs of distributing damages to U.K.
consumers harmed by MasterCard's anti-competitive conduct," he
said.  "This result happened in a very early stage of the case."

With the MasterCard funding deal already signed, Burford announced
in December it would acquire Gerchen Keller Capital LLC for $160
million. At the time of the sale, Gerchen Keller reported it had
some $1.3 billion under management, mostly from public pensions,
financial institutions, university endowments, foundations and
family offices.

Mr. Lenkner predicted that large commercial funders would continue
to put money behind EU antitrust actions, even with the
difficulties presented in the U.K. tribunal and questions about
the court's ability to "get off the ground."

In May, the representative of the first U.K. class in the tribunal
-- the relatively paltry ú7.7 million price-fixing case filed last
year on behalf of mobility scooter buyers -- withdrew the opt-out
proceeding following a panel conclusion that estimated losses
exceeded those attributable to the defendant, Pennsylvania-based
Pride Mobility Products Ltd.

Many contingency-adverse EU jurisdictions and tribunals "lend
themselves or implicitly rely on third-party capital for their
existence and effectiveness," Mr. Lenkner said.

In addition to the high value and huge profit potential, "part of
the interest on behalf of litigation funders are the policymakers
expressly creating a place where third-party capital will allow
these antitrust cases to function," he said.

Mark Simpson -- mark.simpson@nortonrosefulbright.com -- an
antitrust and competition partner at Norton Rose Fulbright in
London, said he was aware of other CAT cases being prepared by
city firms that would need to be reanalyzed in light of the
MasterCard decision.

He also characterized the Therium-backed trucks action as a
simpler and better test case for the U.K. forum than the complex
MasterCard action.

"I do expect to see more cases in the CAT, but more like you have
in the U.S., with direct purchase issues, a defined list of
defendants and a limited number of transactions," he said.  "But
for the funders, this is a little bit of setback for the more
ambitious claims, and people will be back to the drawing board,
looking for simpler cases." [GN]


MISSISSIPPI: Court Denies Certification in "Britton"
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, Southern District of
Mississippi, Southern Division, issued an Order denying
Certification of Class Action in the case captioned M. DESEAN
BRITTON, #167394, Plaintiff, v. PELICIA HALL, et al., Defendants,
Cause No. 1:17-cv-96-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss.).

Plaintiff alleges that the conditions of confinement at the South
Mississippi Correctional Institution violate the constitutional
rights of the inmates.  Plaintiff states that he filed this civil
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and is pursuing a class
action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.  The Court liberally construes Plaintiff's Complaint as
asserting a class action on behalf of Plaintiff and nine other
inmates.

Plaintiff and the other inmates referred to in the Complaint are
inmates at the South Mississippi Correctional Institution. Because
of being in lock-down, Plaintiff and the other class action
plaintiffs claim that they were denied the First Amendment right
to talk to friends and family on the phone, denied the right to
religious activity, denied the right of equal protection,
subjected to unsanitary conditions, denied the opportunity to
exercise outside of their cell, and subjected to retaliation.

Having reviewed the Complaint, the Court finds that it fails to
meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). As
a result, this civil action will not be treated as a class action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 27, 2017 Order is
available http://tinyurl.com/y7h9k58tfrom Leagle.com.

M. DeSean Britton, Pro Se.


MORGAN STANLEY: Accused by "Alpari" of Reneging on Trade Orders
---------------------------------------------------------------
ALPARI (US), LLC, on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. MORGAN STANLEY, MORGAN STANLEY & CO., LLC,
and MORGAN STANLEY & CO. INTERNATIONAL PLC, Defendants, Case No.
1:17-cv-05283 (S.D.N.Y., July 12, 2017) alleges that Defendants
have a practice of reneging on orders to trade a given volume of
currency that they matched and accepted through their own and
third-party electronic trading platforms.  Allegedly, instead of
executing the trade as promised once they had been matched with an
outstanding and still valid streaming price, Morgan Stanley
delayed the execution of matched trades and, when they determined
during the delay that the trade would be unfavorable to their
position or that they could extract a larger profit, they reneged
on the agreed price and either cancelled Plaintiff's and Class
members' orders or filled them at worse prices.

Morgan Stanley is one of the largest currency dealers in the FX
market and is a well-known "Liquidity Provider" or "Market
Maker."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     George A. Zelcs, Esq.
     Robert E. Litan, Esq.
     Randall P. Ewing, Jr., Esq.
     KOREIN TILLERY LLC
     205 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 1950
     Chicago, IL 60601
     Phone: (312) 641-9750
     Fax: (312) 641-9751

        - and -

     Stephen M. Tillery, Esq.
     Robert L. King, Esq.
     Aaron M. Zigler, Esq.
     Steven M. Berezney, Esq.
     Michael E. Klenov, Esq.
     KOREIN TILLERY LLC
     505 North 7th Street, Suite 3600
     St. Louis, MO 63101
     Phone: (314) 241-4844
     Fax: (314) 241-3525

        - and -

     Christopher M. Burke, Esq.
     Walter W. Noss, Esq.
     Kate Lv, Esq.
     SCOTT+SCOTT, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, LLP
     707 Broadway, Suite 1000
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Phone: (619) 233-4565
     Fax: (619) 233-0508

        - and -

     David R. Scott, Esq.
     Kristen M. Anderson, Esq.
     Peter A. Barile, Esq.
     Sylvia Sokol, Esq.
     Thomas K. Boardman, Esq.
     SCOTT+SCOTT, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, LLP
     The Helmsley Building
     230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
     New York, NY 10169
     Phone: (212) 223-6444
     Fax: (212) 223-6334

        - and -

     Michael D. Hausfeld, Esq.
     Reena A. Gambhir, Esq.
     Timothy S. Kearns, Esq.
     Jeannine M. Kenney, Esq.
     HAUSFELD, LLP
     1700 K Street, NW, Suite 650
     Washington, DC 20006
     Phone: (202) 540-7200
     Fax: (202) 540-7201

        - and -

     Bonny E. Sweeney, Esq.
     Michael P. Lehmann, Esq.
     HAUSFELD, LLP
     600 Montgomery Street, Suite 3200
     San Francisco, CA 94111
     Phone: (415) 633-1908
     Fax: (415) 358-4980


MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS: Faces "Evans" Suit in S.D. Alabama
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mylan
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The case is captioned as Kenneth Evans,
individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
persons, the Plaintiff, v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Mylan
Specialty, L.P., the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-00336-WS-B (S.D.
Ala., July 21, 2017). The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge
District Judge William H. Steele.

Mylan is an American global generic and specialty pharmaceuticals
company registered in the Netherlands, with principal executive
offices in Hatfield.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Archibald I. Grubb, II, Esq.
          BEASLEY, ALLEN, CROW,
          METHVIN, PORTIS & MILES PC
          Post Office Box 4160
          Montgomery, AL 36103-4160
          Telephone: (334) 269 2343
          Facsimile: (334) 954 7555
          E-mail: archie.grubb@Beasleyallen.com


NATIONAL CREDIT: Faces "Smith" Suit in Eastern Dist. of New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Credit
Services, Inc. The case is titled as Essence Smith, on behalf of
herself individually and all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. National Credit Services, Inc., the Defendant, Case
No. 1:17-cv-04448-WFK-JO (E.D.N.Y., July 27, 2017). The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge William F. Kuntz, II.

National Credit operates as collection agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Novlette Rosemarie Kidd, Esq.
          FAGENSON & PUGLISI
          450 Seventh Avenue, Suite 704
          New York, NY 10123
          Telephone: (212) 268 2128
          Facsimile: (212) 268 2127
          E-mail: nkidd@fagensonpuglisi.com


NEW YORK, NY: Faces "M.G." Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against New York City
Department of Education. The case is entitled as M. G., a minor,
by and through his parent and natural guardian R.G., on behalf of
themselves and a class of those similarly situated; G. J., a
minor, by and through his parent and natural guardian, C.J., on
behalf of themselves and a class of those similarly situated; and
Bronx Independent Living Services, a nonprofit organization, the
Plaintiffs. v. The New York City Department of Education; The City
Of New York; and Carmen Farina, in her official capacity as
Chancellor of the New York City, Department of Education, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-05692-PGG (S.D.N.Y., July 27, 2017).
The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Paul G. Gardephe.

New York City comprises 5 boroughs sitting where the Hudson River
meets the Atlantic Ocean. At its core is Manhattan, a densely
populated borough that's among the world's major commercial,
financial and cultural centers. Its iconic sites include
skyscrapers such as the Empire State Building and sprawling
Central Park.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Rebecca Catherine Serbin, Esq.
          Seth Emmanuel Packrone, Esq.
          Michelle Anne Caiola, Esq.
          DISABILITIES RIGHT ADVOCATES
          675 Third Ave., Ste. 2216
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 644 8644
          Facsimile: (212) 644 8636
          E-mail: rserbin@dralegal.org
                  spackrone@dralegal.org
                  Mcaiola@dralegal.org


NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL: "Santello" Suit Moved to D. Massachusetts
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Matthew Santello, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, the Defendant, was
moved to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
(Boston). The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:17-cv-
11383-FDS to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge F. Dennis Saylor, IV.

Northwestern Mutual is an American financial services mutual
organization based in Milwaukee.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John P. Regan, Jr., Esq.
          REGAN, LANE & MESSINGER LLP
          41 Winter Street, Fifth Floor
          Boston, MA 02108
          Telephone: (857) 277 0902
          E-mail: john@reganlanemessinger.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Peter J. Mee, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          One Federal Street
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 341 7726
          Facsimile: (617) 341 7701
          E-mail: pmee@morganlewis.com


OSTERKAMP TRUCKING: Castro Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
--------------------------------------------------------------
JESUS R. CASTRO, an individual; on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. OSTERKAMP TRUCKING,
INC.; and 15 DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, the Defendants, Case
No. BC669582 (Cal. Super. Ct., July 21, 2017), seeks damages and
all other relief allowable including all wages due while working
as Defendants' drivers, attorneys' fees, liquidated damages,
prejudgment interest, and as to those employees no longer employed
by Defendants, waiting time penalties pursuant to Labor Code.

This is a class action for wage and labor violations arising out
of, among other things, Defendants' misclassification of its truck
drivers as independent contractors and other labor violations,
including but not limited to, failure to pay wages, failure to
compensate for rest breaks, failure to provide meal breaks,
failure to reimburse business expenses, and other labor code
violations and unfair business practices.

Osterkamp Trucking provides trucking services. The Company offers
truckload building materials and dry goods transportation
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua H. Haffner, Esq.
          Graham Lambert, Esq.
          HAFFNER LAW PC
          445 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2325
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 514 5681
          Facsimile: (213) 514 5682
          E-mail: jhh@haffherlawyers.com
                  gl@haffnerlawyers.com


OXY USA: Bid to Remand "Stoddard" to State Court Denied
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas issued
an Order denying Plaintiff's Motion to Remand to state court the
case captioned DEANNA GUYLENE STODDARD, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. OXY USA INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 17-1067-EFM-GLR (D. Kan.).

Plaintiff Deanna Guylene Stoddard originally filed this action on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated against
Defendant Oxy USA, Inc. in the District Court of Grant County,
Kansas.  Stoddard alleges Oxy breached lease agreements by
underpaying royalty fees. Oxy removed this action to this Court
under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Stoddard filed this
Motion to Remand, alleging Oxy failed to plausibly allege the
Court's jurisdiction in its Notice of Removal.

Oxy was one of the largest operators of natural gas wells in
Kansas. Stoddard is a royalty owner in several wells in Kansas and
seeks to represent a proposed class of others similarly situated.
Oxy and the proposed class members entered into lease agreements
where Oxy operated natural gas wells in return for paying royalty
fees for use of the land.

A civil action filed in state court is only removable to federal
court if the action could have been originally brought in federal
court. Federal courts possess limited jurisdiction and specific
jurisdiction requirements must be met.

Under CAFA, this Court has original jurisdiction to hear a class
action if the class has more than 100 members, the parties are
minimally diverse, and the matter in controversy exceeds that sum
or value of $5,000,000.

Oxy has plausibly alleged that the amount in controversy exceeds
$5,000,000.

The amount in controversy is not the amount the plaintiff will
recover, but an estimate of the amount that will be put at issue
in the course of the litigation.

Stoddard failed to allege a specific amount in controversy in good
faith. Stoddard claimed that the damages resulting from
defendant's breaches would only result in an actual amount less
than the $5 million threshold. Stoddard is simply seeking to keep
the damages below this Court's jurisdictional minimum.

Stoddard's complaint claimed a proposed class containing all of
the gas wells and royalty owners in Kansas who have lease
agreements with Oxy. Stoddard alleges the damages arise from the
underpayment of royalties for gas, NGL's, and helium sales as well
as deductions for the Conservation fee over a seven-year period.
Oxy's calculation of the amount in controversy derives from
Stoddard's allegations of underpayment of royalties due to
deductions, royalties based on below market prices, and Oxy
shifting the Conservation Fee to royalty owners.

Oxy removed Stoddard's complaint under CAFA. Stoddard filed this
motion alleging Oxy failed to satisfy the amount in controversy
requirement. Under the circumstances of this complaint, Oxy
successfully provided a plausible basis for the $5 million
requirement. After Stoddard challenged Oxy's removal, Oxy proved
by the preponderance of the evidence that federal jurisdiction is
proper. Accordingly, the Court denies Stoddard's motion to remand.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 27, 2017 Memorandum
and Order is available http://tinyurl.com/y9r6v5ktfrom
Leagle.com.

Deanna Guylene Stoddard, Plaintiff, represented by Barbara C.
Frankland -- bfrankland@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA., 5301
West 75th Street, Prairie Village, KS 66208

Deanna Guylene Stoddard, Plaintiff, represented by Rex A. Sharp,
Rex A. Sharp, PA, Ryan C. Hudson -- rhudson@midwest-law.com -- Rex
A. Sharp, PA & Scott B. Goodger -- sgoodger@midwest-law.com -- Rex
A. Sharp, PA.

OXY USA Inc, Defendant, represented by Deborah C. Milner --
cmilner@velaw.com -- Vinson & Elkins LLP, James M. Armstrong,
Foulston Siefkin LLP, 1551 North Waterfront Parkway, Suite 100,
Wichita, KS 67206-4466, Mark C. Rodriguez --
mrodriguez@velaw.com -- Vinson & Elkins LLP & Mikel L. Stout,
Foulston Siefkin LLP., 1551 North Waterfront Parkway, Suite 100,
Wichita, KS 67206-4466


PETLAND INC: Animal Legal Defense Fund Files RICO Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
10TV.com reports that the Animal Legal Defense Fund announced the
filing of a nationwide consumer class action lawsuit against
Petland and the chain's Kennesaw, Georgia location, according to a
press release from ALDF.  The group filed in United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia alleging
Petland violated the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization (RICO) Act and Georgia RICO Act.

The lawsuit is filed on behalf of a putative nationwide class of
consumers allegedly victimized by Petland's predatory business
practices of charging premium prices for puppies Petland has
"guaranteed" to be healthy -- as certified by Petland's
veterinarians, the release stated. It alleges that Petland sold
the puppies knowing they were prone to illness and other defects.

Petland's Elizabeth Kunzelman, director of public affairs, said
the press release is all the company has seen so far, but emailed
the following statement:

"For the past 50 years, Petland is proud of our commitment to
healthy pets, our relationships with our veterinarians and our
breeders. We continue to raise the bar in supporting higher
standards for breeders and for pet stores across the country.  It
is not surprising that California-based activists file lawsuits. A
similar class action lawsuit filed in federal court years ago was
rejected by the court, and we expect the same outcome here. While
we have not received a copy of the lawsuit, we are confident that
we will prevail."

According to its website, Petland, Inc. is a privately held Ohio
corporation founded in 1967. [GN]


PRESSLER & PRESSLER: Faces "Khavasova" Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pressler & Pressler,
LLP.  The case is styled as Alla Khavasova, on behalf of herself
and all other similarly situated consumers, the Plaintiff, v.
Pressler & Pressler, LLP, the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-04326
(E.D.N.Y., July 21, 2017).

Pressler & Pressler provides legal services. The Company offers
full service legal advice, asset management, and network
infrastructure utilizing software.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


PURDUE PHARMA: Faces Class Action Over Unjust Enrichment Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
Wadi Reformado, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that a
consumer has filed a suit against several manufactures and/or
sellers of prescription opioids over allegations of
misrepresentations about the drugs.

Michael Ray Lewis filed a complaint on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated on June 29 in the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas, Fayetteville Division
against Purdue Pharma LP, Purdue Pharma Inc.; Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA Inc., Cephalon Inc. and Johnson & Johnson, et al. alleging
unjust enrichment and other counts.

According to the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that he was
prescribed opioids in 2005 and has had numerous prescriptions
filled over the years.  The suit states he has been treated for
addiction related to his opioid prescriptions.

The plaintiff holds Purdue Pharma LP, Purdue Pharma Inc.; Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., Cephalon Inc. and Johnson & Johnson, et
al. responsible because the defendants allegedly made materially
misleading misrepresentations regarding the addictive nature of
opioids and were enriched at the expense of the plaintiff and the
proposed class.

The plaintiff requests a trial by jury and seeks damages,
restitution, disgorgement, monetary relief, interest, all legal
fees and any other relief as the court deems just.  He is
represented by Thomas P. Thrash and Marcus Neil Bozeman of Thrash
Law Firm PC in Little Rock, Arkansas and by Kenneth R. Shemin of
Shemin Law Firm in Rogers, Arkansas.

U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas case
number 5:17-cv-05118-TLB
[GN]


RAMARY LLC: Prints Credit Card Info on Receipt, "Rubio" Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SANDRA RUBIO, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. RAMARY LLC (d/b/a Little Rodeo
Restaurant), and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, the Defendant,
Case No. BC669243 (Cal. Super. Ct., July 21, 2017), seeks to
recover statutory damages, punitive damages, costs and attorney
fees, all of which are expressly made available by statute, as a
results of Defendants' violations of the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs and members of the
Class were each customers of Defendants, each having made a
purchase or transacted other business with Defendants within two
years from the date of filing this action, using a credit and or
debit card. At the point of such sale or transaction with
Plaintiffs and members of the Class, Defendants provided to
Plaintiffs and each member of the Class a receipt in violation of
15 U.S.C. section 1681 c(g) [i.e., a receipt on which is printed
more than the last 5 digits and expiration date of the credit card
or debit card].[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chant Yedalian, Esq.
          CHANT & COMPANY
          1010 N. Central Ave.
          Glendale, CA 91202
          Telephone: (877) 574 7100
          Facsimile: (877) 574 9411
          E-mail: chant@chant.mobi


REGAL-PIEDMONT: "Loza" Suit Sues over Wage and Hour Violation
-------------------------------------------------------------
ROY LOZA, individually, and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. REGAL-
PIEDMONT PLASTICS LLC, an 15 II unknown business entity; PIEDMONT
PLASTICS, INC., an unknown business entity; 16 11 and DOES I
through 100, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. RG17868565 (Cal.
Super. Ct., July 21, 2017), seeks to recover compensatory damages,
restitution, penalties, wages, premium pay, and pro rata share of
attorneys' fees under California Business and Professions Code.

According to the complaint, Defendants continue to employ hourly-
paid or non-exempt employees within the State of California. The
Plaintiff and the other class members worked over 8 hours in a
day, and/or 40 hours in a week during their employment with
Defendants. The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in a
uniform policy and systematic scheme of wage abuse against their
hourly-paid or non-exempt employees within the State of
California. This scheme involved, inter alia, failing to pay them
for all hours worked; missed meal periods and rest breaks in
violation of California law.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
          LAWYERS for JUSTICE, PC
          410 West Arden Avenue, Suite 203
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 265 1020
          Facsimile: (818) 265 1021


SAINT-GOBAIN: Bennington Residents Vow to Continue PFOA Case
------------------------------------------------------------
Jim Therrien, writing for VTDigger, reports that attorneys for
Bennington residents affected by PFOA contamination continued to
press their clients' interests on July 26, declaring that the
state's agreement with Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics to fund
$20 million in water line extensions to about half the affected
properties is only a first step.

"In particular, residents living east of the railroad tracks along
Route 7A in Bennington will continue to lack a public water
source," the attorneys said in a news release.

"Moreover, the settlement does nothing to compensate the hundreds
of local residents who have been damaged because their properties,
wells and bodies have been contaminated with PFOA
(perfluorooctanoic acid) from the former Saint-Gobain plants in
Bennington and North Bennington," the statement continued.  "Even
for those who eventually will get town water, the settlement does
not compensate them for the fact that now, for the first time,
they will have to pay for that water."

Four law firms are representing affected households in a state-
defined contamination zone around the former ChemFab plants,
having sued in U.S. District Court in Rutland, seeking class-
action status for hundreds of potential clients in the area.

In addition to the lawsuit, the state has been negotiating with
Saint-Gobain to fund municipal water line extensions to all
affected properties.  The announcement covered a settlement for
about half the properties, located west of Route 7A and a rail
line, while talks are continuing for residents who live in the
rest of the area contaminated by the chemical.

Residents are being briefed in Bennington on the settlement and
plans for construction, and the agreement has been posted online.

Patrick Bernal, one of the lawyers representing plaintiffs in the
lawsuit, wrote that "Hundreds of Bennington and North Bennington
residents have had their properties contaminated with PFOA, have
consumed water contaminated with PFOA and have elevated levels of
PFOA in their blood, have lost the use of their wells, have lost
property value, have incurred significant expenses and
inconvenience, and will incur significant expense, such as paying
for public water once the water lines are extended. In addition,
the community has lost the use of its aquifer for decades, and
possibly forever."

Residents not covered by Saint-Gobain's partial settlement will be
forced to continue using filter systems supplied by the company,
which lead to low water pressure, high costs of upkeep and
maintenance, and concerns about contaminant breakthrough, the
release said.

The plaintiffs in the suit support the partial settlement between
Vermont and Saint-Gobain, according to the release, but the class
action will continue "until Saint-Gobain provides all affected
residents with a permanent source of safe water and fully
compensates all affected residents for the damage it has caused."
[GN]


SANDISK LLC: Summary Judgment in Antitrust Suit Affirmed
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming District Court's order granting the Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned ALFRED T.
GIULIANO, CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE OF THE RITZ ESTATE, CPM ELECTRONICS,
INC, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
E.S.E. ELECTRONICS, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, MFLASH, INC., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
SANDISK LLC, Defendant-Appellee, No. 2016-2166 (Fed. Cir.).

Plaintiffs-Appellants Alfred T. Giuliano, Chapter 7 Trustee of the
Ritz bankruptcy estate; CPM Electronics Inc.; E.S.E. Electronics,
Inc.; and MFLASH, Inc., filed this Walker Process antitrust class
action against SanDisk LLC.  The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of SanDisk.

To establish materiality, Ritz relied on a summary judgment ruling
in a prior district court action involving the '338 and '517
patents brought by SanDisk against STMicroelectronics (STM) and an
administrative law judge determination from a concurrent
International Trade Commission (ITC) investigation involving the
same patents.

The court determined that there was a question of fact regarding
the materiality of the Simko references. In reaching this
decision, the court relied on expert testimony presented by STM
and findings from the concurrent ITC investigation involving the
'338 and '517 patents. Here, although Ritz submitted the prior
summary judgment ruling and ALJ determination from that ITC
investigation to the district court, Ritz did not proffer any
separate expert testimony.

To establish intent to deceive, Ritz again relied primarily on the
STM summary judgment ruling. According to Ritz, the STM court had
identified at least three circumstances that created a material
issue of fact as to SanDisk's intent. First, SanDisk had retained
Dr. Simko, the inventor of the undisclosed references, as a
consultant in connection with a re-examination of the '338 patent.
Second, SanDisk cited the Simko references during the prosecution
of related U.S. Patent No. 5,293,560 just a few years prior to the
'338 patent reexamination and '517 patent application. Third,
SanDisk had entered the Simko references into a searchable
database designed to ensure compliance with its disclosure
obligations to the PTO.

The district court determined that the STM summary judgment order
and the ALJ determination were inadmissible as evidence. After
finding that Ritz failed to provide independent evidence of intent
to deceive, the court granted SanDisk's motion for summary
judgment. Ritz appeals.

Ritz argues that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment. SanDisk intended to defraud the PTO by failing to
disclose the Simko references: (1) SanDisk hired Dr. Simko as a
consultant in the '338 patent reexamination proceedings, which
took place at the same time as the '517 patent application; (2)
SanDisk cited the Simko references in a related patent application
for the '560 patent a few years prior to the '338 patent
reexamination and '517 patent application; and (3) SanDisk had
entered the Simko references into a searchable database created
specifically for identifying relevant prior art.

To overcome summary judgment, a Walker Process claimant must
present evidence showing that the patentee obtained a patent
through actual fraud upon the PTO.

The misrepresentation or omission alleged to be fraudulent must
evidence a clear intent to deceive the examiner and thereby cause
the PTO to grant an invalid patent. And a finding of inequitable
conduct does not by itself support a finding of Walker Process
fraud. The claim must be based on independent and clear evidence
of deceptive intent. Direct evidence of intent to deceive or
mislead the PTO is rarely available but may be inferred from clear
and convincing evidence of the surrounding circumstances.

The appeals court concludes that Ritz has not brought forward
sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that SanDisk
intended to deceive the PTO. Ritz overstates the record when it
argues SanDisk hired Dr. Simko as a consultant in the '338 patent
re-examination proceedings. At the district court, Ritz relied
predominantly on the STM summary judgment order to support its
contention that Dr. Simko was hired as a consultant for the '338
patent re-examination.

Notwithstanding the fact that the STM summary judgment order is
inadmissible as evidence, the summary judgment order's description
of the evidence states only that Dr. Simko was hired as a
litigation consultant for the ITC 382 Investigation" and does not
state that Dr. Simko was hired for the '338 patent re-examination.

The additional fact that SanDisk had cited the Simko references
during the prosecution of the '560 patent is still not enough to
survive summary judgment. This is because Ritz has not pointed to
any evidence showing that when SanDisk cited the Simko references,
it knew of the specific information in the Simko references
alleged to be material to the '338 and '517 patents. The fact that
SanDisk had entered the Simko references in a database is not
sufficient to close that gap.

The appeals court finds that Ritz has not come forward with enough
evidence to create a triable issue of material fact on intent to
deceive. In light of this, the appeals court does not reach Ritz's
remaining arguments on appeal.

Accordingly, the appeals court affirms the district court's grant
of SanDisk's motion for summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court of Appeals' July 27, 2017 Opinion is
available http://tinyurl.com/yccqea7efrom Leagle.com.

PETER SLATIN RATNER -- partner@kellogghansen.com -- Kellogg,
Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, PLLC, Washington, DC, argued
for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by AMELIA FRENKEL,
JOSEPH S. HALL.

RAOUL D. KENNEDY, raoul.kennedy@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Palo Alto, CA, argued for defendant-
appellee. Also represented by MICHAEL H. MENITOVE --
michael.menitove@skadden.com -- New York, NY.


SINGING RIVER: 5th Cir. Vacates Order Approving Class Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, issued an
Opinion vacating the District Court's approval of Class Settlement
in the case captioned THOMAS JONES, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated; JOSEPH CHARLES LOHFINK, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated; SUE BEAVERS, on behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated; RODOLFOA REL, on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated; HAZEL REED
THOMAS, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SINGING RIVER HEALTH SERVICES FOUNDATION;
SINGING RIVER HEALTH SYSTEM FOUNDATION; SINGING RIVER HOSPITAL
SYSTEM FOUNDATION, INCORPORATED; SINGING RIVER HOSPITAL SYSTEM
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT FUND, INCORPORATED; SINGING RIVER HOSPITAL
SYSTEM; MICHAEL J. HEIDELBERG; MICHAEL D. TOLLESON; TOMMY LEONARD;
LAWRENCE H. COSPER; MORRIS G. STRICKLAND; IRA POLK; STEPHEN
NUNENMACHER; HUGO QUINTANA; GARY C. ANDERSON; STEPHANIE BARNES
TAYLOR; MICHAEL CREWS; SINGING RIVER HEALTH SYSTEM; ALLEN CRONIER;
MARTIN BYDALEK; WILLIAM DESCHER; JOSEPH VICE; ERIC WASHINGTON;
MARVA FAIRLEY-TANNER; GRAYSON CARTER, JR, Defendants-Appellees, v.
CYNTHIA N. ALMOND; FRANCISCO C. AGUILAR; KITTY PATRICIA AGUILAR;
TANYA R. ARDOIN; RAY J. BARBOUR, ET AL, Appellant, REGINA COBB, on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, ET AL,
Plaintiffs, v. SINGING RIVER HEALTH SYSTEM; BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR
THE SINGING RIVER HEALTH SYSTEM; MICHAEL J. HEIDELBERG, in their
individual and official capacities; MICHAEL D. TOLLESON, in their
individual and official capacities; ALLEN L. CRONIER, in their
individual and official capacities; TOMMY L. LEONARD, in their
individual and official capacities; LAWRENCE H. COSPER, in their
individual and official capacities; MORRIS G. STRICKLAND, in their
individual and official capacities; IRA S. POLK, in their
individual and official capacities; STEPHEN NUNENMACHER, in their
individual and official capacities; HUGO QUINTANA, in their
individual and official capacities; MARVA FAIRLEY-TANNER, in their
individual and official capacities; WILLIAM C. DESCHER, in their
individual and official capacities; JOSEPH P. VICE, in their
individual and official capacities; MARTIN D. BYDALEK, in their
individual and official capacities; ERIC D. WASHINGTON, in their
individual and official capacities; G. CHRIS ANDERSON, in their
individual and official capacities; KEVIN HOLLAND, in their
individual and official capacities, Defendants-Appellees, v.
CYNTHIA N. ALMOND; FRANCISCO C. AGUILAR; KITTY PATRICIA AGUILAR;
TANYA R. ARDOIN; RAY J. BARBOUR, ET AL, Appellants, No. 16-60550
(5th Cir.), and the case is remanded to the District Court with
instructions.

The Singing River Health System (SRHS), a community hospital owned
by Jackson County, Mississippi, created a defined benefits pension
fund into which employees have recently been paying three percent
of their paychecks and to which SRHS was obliged to contribute
whatever additional amounts were actuarially required to fund the
Plan's promised benefits. From 2009-14, however, the hospital fell
into serious financial difficulties and made only one plan
contribution. The Plan was frozen in late November 2014.

This appeal considers objections to the settlement of class
actions that arose in the wake of the financial crisis.

According to the Fifth Circuit, the most troubling issues center
on the extraordinarily long-term, unsecured, and unpredictable
proposed payout of the settlement amount and the release of the
County, a non-party, from liability.

SRHS is a community-owned not-for-profit health system owned by
Jackson County. It consists of two hospitals and five primary care
clinics .and it employs about 2,400 people. SRHS is the largest
employer in Jackson County. County Supervisors appoint seven of
the nine members of the SRHS Board; the Chief of Staff and Chief-
elect of SRHS occupy the other two seats. SRHS created the
Employees' Retirement Plan and Trust (the Plan) in 1983 as a
successor to the Public Employees' Retirement System of
Mississippi.

The most recent version of the Plan has required employees to
contribute three percent of their salaries to the Plan. Further,
SRHS shall have the sole responsibility for making the
[actuarially determined] contributions necessary to provide
benefits under the Plan, as administered by the Board of Trustees
of SRHS.

Without informing the employees, SRHS failed to make all but one
of its contributions needed to maintain the Plan's fiscal
integrity from 2009 to 2014. The Board, decided to liquidate the
Plan. SRHS announced it was freezing the Plan and, in the coming
months, the Plan will be officially liquidated. At that point,
there were over three thousand Plan participants, both current and
past employees, of whom approximately 600 were retirees receiving
monthly payments.

Counsel for retirees, immediately sought injunctive relief. The
Chancery Court, which ordered SRHS not to terminate the Plan. The
Plan has remained frozen in that no contributions have been made
by employees or SRHS. Plan assets are being steadily depleted,
however, because benefit payments to retirees have continued
without interruption. The Chancery court held SRHS indebted as a
matter of law to the Plan for the missed contributions plus lost
earnings, a sum exceeding $55 million.

Numerous lawsuits were soon filed in state and federal court after
the announced termination of the Plan. Pertinent here are three
Rule 23 class actions commenced and later consolidated in the
federal district court. When the Jones Plaintiffs moved for
preliminary approval of a settlement, the court granted the
motion, conditionally certified the class.

The Plaintiffs moved for approval of the final settlement the
Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement contains the
following terms specifically touted in the district court opinion,
inter alia:

   * SRHS must deposit a total of $149,950,000 into the retirement
trust under a thirty-five year schedule. According to the
testimony of the Plaintiff's accountant, the present value of this
sum equals the $55 million sum owed by SRHS to the Plan for missed
contributions and lost earnings from 2009-14, calculated with a
six percent discount rate.

   * Jackson County, Mississippi, will pay SRHS $13,600,000 over
eight years [t]o support the indigent care and principally to
prevent default on a bond issue by supporting the operations of
SRHS. Jackson County earlier guaranteed the bond issue;

   * SRHS will pay attorneys' fees of $6.45 million and expenses
up to $125,000 of all Plaintiffs' counsel; and

   * SRHS will pay incentive awards to the individual class
representatives in an amount totaling $12,500.

Additional important features of the Settlement Agreement not
mentioned in the court's opinion are the following: There is no
collateral or security for the payments owed the Plan by either
SRHS or Jackson County; these are wholly unsecured promises to
pay.

The schedule of payments, Ex. A to the settlement agreement, calls
for SRHS to make full payout of the Plaintiffs' attorney fees and
expenses (over $6.5 million) by the end of September 2018.

According to the Ex. A payment schedule, SRHS must pay the Plan
$6.4 million by September 2017. Then SRHS commits to pay annual
amounts totaling $2.4 million for the next two years (through
2019), escalating to $4.2 million from 2020 to 2023. Payments
totaling $5.7 million are due in 2024, and annual payments of $4.5
million follow until completion of the payout in 2051.

Jackson County owes, under Ex. A, $5.2 million through September
2017, followed by annual payments of $1.2 million through 2024.
Objectors to the settlement agreement, about 200 of whom are
retirees currently receiving benefits under the Plan and, in many
cases, substantially depending on those benefits. Their clients
comprise about one-third of the Plan's current beneficiaries. The
Objectors argued the "settlement is illusory, provides no real
protection for class members, and lacks any specificity as to how
different class members will be treated should the class be
certified and the settlement approved.

The district court held a fairness hearing on the Settlement
Agreement at which thirteen live witnesses testified. Lee Bond,
CFO of SRHS, testified about the financial stability of SRHS, the
Settlement Agreement, and how the settlement will affect the
Singing River hospital system.

Three of the five class representatives, Joseph Lohfink, Hazel
Thomas, and Sue Beavers, also testified in support of the
settlement at the Fairness Hearing. The Objectors offered
testimony of members of their group in opposition. Attorney
Stephen Simpson, the Special Fiduciary in the Chancery Court
proceeding, was permitted to make a brief statement supporting the
Settlement Agreement.

The district court entered a memorandum opinion and order granting
the motion for final approval of the class action settlement.

After carefully considering the issues, the court determined that
the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, is ordered
finally approved, and shall be consummated in accordance with its
terms and provisions. The class was certified pursuant to Fed.
Rule Civ. Pro. 23(b)(1)(A).

The Objectors timely appealed.

On appeal, the Objectors assert that the district court abused its
discretion by (1) ignoring evidence of collusion and by failing to
order further discovery; (2) finding the Settlement Agreement was
fair, reasonable, and adequate although its future payments to
Plan participants are uncertain, SRHS was not required to
reimburse contributions owed to the Plan through 2016, and a large
number of class members object; (3) overlooking perjury and the
alleged destruction of documents; (4) approving the release of
Jackson County; (5) approving the settlement where there is known
pending litigation against Jackson County; and (6) admitting
testimony" of Simpson at the fairness hearing without cross-
examination.

Class certification under Rule 23 has four requirements: (1)
numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of
representation.

The Objectors challenge only the fourth requirement: The Objectors
argue, among other things, there was no evidence that class
counsel met with class representatives to explain the settlement,
no evidence that counsel produced any detailed documentation that
would allow class members to understand the settlement, and no
evidence provided to the district court on how or how much the
settlement will pay out to each class member.

The district court explained that the class counsel were
experienced in complex litigation and qualified to represent the
interests of the proposed class. In regard to the representatives
themselves, the district court found that the class
representatives have the same interest and desire as the rest of
the proposed class to receive retirement benefits as promised by
the Plan, and there was no evidence that the class representatives
suffer from a conflict of interest. The court concluded the
representatives would adequately represent the interests of the
class.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that class representation was adequate for certification.
The Objectors argue that there was evidence of collusion between
class counsel and the defendants sufficient to warrant
disapproving the Settlement Agreement. Without citing the state
court record, the Objectors emphasize numerous curious events in
the state court proceedings.

The time to present evidence regarding collusion would have been
at the fairness hearing. Despite the court's admonishing
Objectors' counsel to substantiate their allegations with
competent evidence at least four times during the fairness
hearing, the Objectors presented none. Their request for
additional discovery was thus a fishing expedition that the court
justifiably pre-empted.

The district court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion in
holding that the proposed settled was not the product of collusion
or fraud.

The Objectors next argue that the Settlement Agreement is not
fair, reasonable, or adequate.

One of their principal propositions is that the court evaluated
only the terms of SRHS's reimbursing the Plan without considering
how the settlement would affect individual beneficiaries. A second
proposition is that no evidence at the fairness hearing
demonstrated how SRHS will comply with its payment obligations in
the future or how the Plan's inevitable termination will affect
the class members.

Because the district court's discussion focused too narrowly on
SRHS's proffered payments, the Fifth Circuit vacates and remands
for further elucidation of points relevant to the hospital's
ability to sustain the promised settlement payments, how the
settlement affects the plaintiffs, and why class counsel should
receive their multimillion dollar fees up-front while significant
uncertainty surrounds SRHS's future compliance.

Objectors initially challenge the fairness and adequacy of the
Settlement Agreement because the settling parties concededly
provided no information regarding the actual payments retirees
would receive in the future under the agreement. Appealing on
behalf of their clients, many of whom currently rely on the Plan's
retirement payments, the Objectors urge that SRHS and the class
counsel had a duty to inform the class members transparently about
how the settlement would affect their individual financial
positions in the future.

The testimony taken as a whole was remarkably vague about SRHS's
future ability to fund its share of payments as well as the
results to retirees and other class members if it did not. The
court's very brief treatment of these issues in its opinion chose
to credit boilerplate summations by the hospitals' CFO Lee Bond
that SRHS should be able to make its scheduled settlement
payments, and approval of the settlement would result in an
immediate contribution to the Plan and subsequent scheduled
contributions that would have the potential to generate earnings
for the Plan.

According to Bond, SRHS's financial condition, as of the date of
the fairness opinion, had moved from unsustainable losing $39
million annually in 2014 to a very small positive margin a few
hundred thousand in mid-2016. Under Bond's stewardship over two
years, SRHS had built up a necessary 65-day cash operating reserve
of $51 million, whereas it had less than 30 days cash on hand when
he arrived.

These facts tend to support the necessity of some settlement, but
they do not address whether over the extraordinarily lengthy 35-
year contemplated term, SRHS, still in precarious shape, will be
able to handle the escalating annual installment payments.

Another factor bearing on the financial fairness of the settlement
is that SRHS's recoveries, if any, from SRHS from KPMG and
Transamerica are not treated as sums owed directly to the Plan but
may be petitioned to be used to reduce SRHS's Plan payments.
The fiscal doubts about payments even in the relatively near term
heightened the need for an inquiry into the sufficiency of Plan
assets to make promised payments to Plan beneficiaries because
they come due over, say, the coming ten to fifteen years. There is
no assurance in the record that the Plan will not run out of money
to pay the class members' claims well before 2051.

For these reasons, the Fifth Circuit vacates and remands for the
development of further information in regard to the settlement.

A full-text copy of the Fifth Circuit's July 27, 2017 Opinion is
available http://tinyurl.com/yavtt7xlfrom Leagle.com.

John Anderson Banahan -- john@bnsch.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.
William Harvey Barton, II, for Appellant. 3007 Magnolia St.,
Pascagoula, MS 39567-4126

Earl Lamar Denham, for Appellant, 424 Washington Avenue, Ocean
Springs, MS 39564

Donald Claire Dornan, Jr. -- info@dorman-law.com -- for Defendant-
Appellee.

John L. Hunter, for Defendant-Appellee, 6131 Orangethorpe Ave
#300, Buena Park, CA 90620, USA

Stephen Giles Peresich, for Defendant-Appellee, 759 Howard
AveBiloxi, MS, 39530-4305

Brett Keith Williams, for Defendant-Appellee --
bwilliams@dwwattorneys.com -- Pieter Teeuwissen, for Defendant-
Appellee, PO Box 16787, Jackson, MS 39236-6787

Alexander Kelly Sessoms, III -- ksessoms@dwwattorneys.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

James Robert Reeves, Jr., for Plaintiff-Appellee, 160 Main St.,
Biloxi, MS 39530

Matthew Gerard Mestayer, for Plaintiff-Appellee, 160 Main St.,
Biloxi, MS 39530

Roy D. Campbell, III, for Defendant-Appellee --
dlstewart@bradlwy.com -- Steven L. Nicholas, for Plaintiff-
Appellee -- sln@cunninghambounds.com -- George W. Finkbohner, III,
for Plaintiff-Appellee, gwf@cunninghambounds.com -- David George
Wirtes, Jr., for Plaintiff-Appellee -- dgw@cunninghambounds.com -
Catherine Carter Servati, for Defendant-Appellee, 363 N Broadway
St Tupelo, MS, 38804

Lucy Elizabeth Tufts -- let@cunninghambounds.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellee.

Carly D. Duvall, for Defendant-Appellee, 4520 Main St., Ste 1100,
Kansas City, MO 64111-7700

Jason R. Scheiderer -- jason.scheiderer@dentons.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.


SNAP FITNESS: Faces Class Action Over Club Enhancement Fee
----------------------------------------------------------
Wadi Reformado, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that an Ohio
man alleges that a fitness club is unlawfully charging its members
a fee.

Thomas Dwyer filed a complaint on behalf of all others similarly
situated on May 25 in the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court
against Snap Fitness Inc. alleging violation of the Ohio Consumer
Sales Practices Act and the Prepaid Entertainment Contracts Act.

According to the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant charges a $35 Club Enhancement Fee but that the
membership agreement users sign contains no provision authorizing
the fee.  He also alleges the defendant failed to provide a notice
of cancellation form to contracts of Ohio members.

The plaintiff requests a trial by jury and seeks actual damages,
restitution, disgorgement, treble or exemplary damages, enjoin the
defendant, interest, all legal fees and any other relief as the
court deems just.  He is represented by Bryce Lenox of Giles Lenox
in Cincinnati, Ohio.

The defendant removed the case to U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio on July 3.

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio Case number
1:17-cv-00455-MRB
[GN]


SPOTIFY USA: Judge Refused to Certify Class in "Ingalls" Case
-------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that,
citing problems with the reliability of a plaintiff, a federal
judge in San Francisco refused to certify a class of plaintiffs
who claim Spotify charged them for a free or reduced-price trial
period though they never used the paid service.

The case is, GREGORY INGALLS and TONY HONG, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SPOTIFY
USA, INC., a Delaware corporation, and DOES 1--10, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. C 16-03533 (N.D. Cal.).


SPRINT SPECTRUM: Court Denies Class Certification in "Emilio"
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, Southern District of New York,
issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in
the case captioned VINCENT EMILIO, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SPRINT SPECTRUM L.P.,
d/b/a SPRINT PCS, Defendant, No. 11-CV-3041 (JPO) (S.D.N.Y.),
however, Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification is denied.

In the operative amended class action complaint, Emilio alleges
that Defendant Sprint Spectrum L.P. (Sprint) violated the Kansas
Unfair Trade and Consumer Protection Act (KCPA) primarily by
misrepresenting a discretionary charge as a mandatory tax imposed
on customers by New York state. Emilio cites provisions of the
KCPA that bar companies from misrepresenting or willfully omitting
material facts from consumers or engaging in unconscionable acts.
Pending before the Court are Sprint's motion for summary judgment
Emilio's motion for class certification and certain other related
motions.

This case focuses on Sprint's billing for a New York state excise
tax that, during the relevant period, imposed a 2.5% tax on gross
receipts, including ancillary charges, from the sale of mobile
telecommunications services to a customer who primarily used those
services in New York. N.Y. Tax Section 186-e, 1111(1)(1). It is
undisputed that, since 1997, Sprint has passed the excise tax
through to its customers by including a surcharge on their regular
invoices.

According to the Court, the summary judgment standard saves
Emilio's claims at this stage.  Emilio points to other statements
that demonstrate a genuinely contested and highly fact-intensive
dispute about how he actually thought about his bill, why he
continued to renew his contract with Sprint, and to what extent he
found the line items, placement, and explanations on the bill to
be, in fact, problematic.

Sprint further argues that the doctrine of voluntary payment
provides an affirmative defense on which it should be awarded
summary judgment as a matter of law. Emilio, in fact, described
himself as a loyal Sprint customer who continued to renew his
service in large part due to cell coverage, even after he was
aware of potential issues with Sprint's billing.

Kansas' voluntary payment doctrine applies when payment is
voluntarily made with full knowledge of all the facts and is not
induced by any fraud or improper conduct. In other words, where a
party makes a payment 'with their eyes open,' they are estopped
from maintaining an action to recover that payment.

Emilio argues that his continuing to pay his bills is evidence of
unequal bargaining power in the context of his wireless bill.
This, too, presents a dispute of material fact that survives
summary judgment, as it requires a determination of Emilio's
credibility and how he weighed various factors in making choices
to continue paying and renewing his Sprint service.

Emilio's amended complaint alleges that Sprint violated KCPA
Section 50-626(b)(2) by its willful use, in any oral or written
representation, of exaggeration, falsehood, innuendo or ambiguity
as to a material fact, and (3) by its willful failure to state a
material fact, or the willful concealment, suppression or omission
of a material fact.

The record contains evidence supporting the allegedly deceptive
conduct -- specifically, the excerpts of the bills. Demonstrating
the placement and description of the New York State excise tax,
and Emilio's deposition testimony, suggesting, for example, that
he needed a magnifying glass in order to read the text.

There is also arguably evidence of Sprint's willfulness, including
statements from employees questioning whether billing methods
might cause customer confusion together with the structure of the
billing and its persistence, which provide support for the theory
of the case that this Court has previously held could state a
claim. A dispute of material fact with respect to how Emilio's
view of the unfairness of the New York State excise tax related to
-- or failed to relate to -- a specific billing practice.

Sprint challenges Emilio's ability to seek declaratory and
injunctive relief on his overcharge claim, but this Court has
already decided that the claim was fairly included in the Amended
Complaint and could proceed.

Emilio brings class claims based on more than misrepresentation
including allegations of unconscionability and because the Court
concludes that the class does not satisfy the Rule 23(a)
requirements (as discussed below), obviating the need to resolve
this question of Kansas law that primarily implicates Rule
23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement and could further provide a
complete legal bar to Emilio's claim.

This putative class, however, stumbles at Rule 23(a)'s commonality
and typicality requirements, and also fails to satisfy Rule
23(b)'s predominance requirement. In fact, some of the very
arguments advanced by Emilio to avoid summary judgment on his
individual claim demonstrate why his claims are ill-suited to
class-wide resolution.

Commonality and Typicality

Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there be questions of law or fact
common to the class. That is, the class members' claims must
depend upon a common contention, which must be of such a nature
that it is capable of classwide resolution which means that
determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that
is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one
stroke.

One feature of this case that identical bills and disclosures went
out to Emilio and to all the putative class members counsels for
commonality and typicality on its face. But other aspects, lying
below the surface, undercut this superficial impression.

Emilio argues that he, like all class members, alleges that Sprint
deceptively effectuated a hidden price increase by stating or
implying that one of the line items in Sprint's bill was a tax
each class member was required to pay. But, as the factual
complications of Emilio's case (considered in the context of the
summary judgment ruling make clear, it is hard to flush out
whether Emilio suffered an 'injury or loss,' stemming from the
allegations as explained in the complaint and set forth in the
putative class definition and thus whether he actually is, as he
contends, like all other class members.

Emilio fails to establish typicality: the highly specific question
of whether Emilio, in fact, found Sprint's labels to be
problematic, and the further fact-intensive question of whether he
was injured which, in turn, implicates his standing, aggrieved, or
suffered a loss which remains up in the air  means that Emilio
jeopardizes the claims of all putative class members. These same
issues also implicate commonality, as they make clear the
necessity of a fact-intensive inquiry of each consumer's specific
relationship to Sprint's disclosures the complexity of which was
made clear above, as to Emilio.

Predominance and Superiority

The considerations that doom this class as to commonality and
typicality also cause it to fail with respect to predominance
irrespective of whether a showing of individual reliance is
required because of fundamental, fact-specific and heterogeneous
issues surrounding causation that overwhelm the common questions
of law and fact.

Beyond the potentially plaintiff-specific legal defense of
voluntary payment, Emilio's continuing to pay his bill where other
putative class members did not, may introduce individualized
damages calculations that could predominate over the common
damages claims

Sprint's motion for summary judgment is denied, and Emilio's
motion for class certification is denied.

As to the other pending motions in this case, the motion for
adverse inference sanctions against Sprint is denied. The motion
to strike the expert report of Michael Levine is denied. The
motion to strike Sprint's rebuttal report by Joseph P. Dooley is
also denied. The letter motion for a pre-motion conference is
denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 27, 2017 Opinion and
Order is available http://tinyurl.com/ydhpepdkfrom Leagle.com.

Vincent Emilio, Petitioner, represented by Jason Allen Zweig,
jasonz@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Vincent Emilio, Petitioner, represented by Steve W. Berman --
steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, William
Robert Weinstein, Law Offices of William R. Weisnstein, 199 Main
Street, 4th White Plains, New York 10601 & Daniel Kurowski --
dank@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Michael Levine, Movant, represented by John B. Harris --
jharris@fkks.com -- Frankfurt Kurnit Klein & Selz, P.C..
Sprint Spectrum L.P., Respondent, represented by Joseph Andrew
Boyle -- jboyle@kellydrye.com --  Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, Damon
William Suden -- dsuden@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley Drye & Warren,
LLP, Elizabeth D. Silver -- esilver@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley Drye
& Warren LLP, Jonathan Michael Wilan, Baker & McKenzie LLP, Lauri
A. Mazzuchetti -- lmazzuchetii@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley Drye &
Warren LLP, Nainesh Ramjee, Kelley Drye & Warren LLP & Vincent P.
Rao -- vrao@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley Drye & Warren LLP.


SQUARETWO FINANCIAL: Fights Bids to Lift Stay of Class Actions
--------------------------------------------------------------
Rick Archer and Alex Wolf, writing for Law360, report that
SquareTwo Financial Services Corp. on July 25 asked a New York
bankruptcy court to deny requests to lift its Chapter 11
litigation stay for a pair of suits alleging illegal debt
collection practices, saying there is no money available for the
plaintiffs.

The two suits -- a putative class action claiming illegal
robocalls and a certified class action alleging debt collection
law violations -- would not be covered by insurance and would not
be entitled to an award from the bankruptcy estate even if they
won, the consumer debt collector said.

SquareTwo, a Colorado-based firm that buys up charged-off consumer
and commercial accounts receivable, entered Chapter 11 in March
with plans to wind down its U.S. operations and sell off its
Canadian businesses to help address $460 million in liabilities.

The company is facing motions asking for a lift of the automatic
bankruptcy stay to allow two claims against the company to go
forward.  The first, a putative class action filed in California
federal court in November by Derek Schiavone, alleges a subsidiary
of SquareTwo made unsolicited robocalls in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act in 2013 and 2014.

The other is a counterclaim to a debt collection action filed in
Ohio state court in December 2009 by Vicki Young alleging state
and federal debt collection law violations by the same subsidiary.
Ms. Young's counterclaim was granted class certification in
September 2015.

In its motion opposing lifting the stay, the company said neither
claim was covered by insurance.  The company argued Mr.
Schiavone's claims carried a maximum $6,000 statutory award, well
below the $500,000 deductible in the applicable insurance policy,
and that SquareTwo had not tendered Young's claim to its insurance
carrier during the policy period.

Since the suits are based on alleged prepetition conduct, they
would fall under general unsecured claims, which will receive no
recovery under the Chapter 11 plan. Being forced to defend the
suits would therefore simply be a waste of money that would
otherwise go to the lien lenders who are the only beneficiaries
under the plan, SquareTwo said.

Patric Lester, Mr. Schiavone's attorney, said in a phone interview
on July 26 they had filed to lift the stay for the sole purpose of
seeking damages from the insurance. He said the argument that the
damages don't reach the deductible assumes the class will not be
certified.

"It's filed as a class action.  If it's allowed to proceed, who
knows what would happen," he said.

And Robert Belovich, counsel for Ms. Young, disputed SquareTwo's
claim that Ms. Young's claim is not covered, calling the issue an
"open question."

"That's their opinion, but that's not their job," he said.

Counsel for SquareTwo did not immediately respond to requests for
comment on July 26.

In June, SquareTwo filed motions seeking to deflect challenges
raised by federal and state regulators to its Chapter 11 plan's
proposed third-party litigation releases, saying they are needed
to protect directors who stepped into their roles in May 2016,
after a recapitalization transaction. As a consumer debt
collector, SquareTwo and affiliated professionals are regularly
targeted for alleged violations of fair debt collection laws, it
said.

Mr. Schiavone is represented by Patric A. Lester of Lester &
Associates.

Ms. Young is represented by Robert S. Belovich of Robert S.
Belovich Attorney LLC.

SquareTwo is represented by Matthew Feldman --
mfeldman@willkie.com -- Paul Shalhoub -- pshalhoub@willkie.com --
Robin Spigel -- rspigel@willkie.com -- and Debra McElligott --
dmcelligott@willkie.com -- of Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP.

The unsecured creditors committee is represented by Robert Hirsh -
- robert.hirsh@arentfox.com -- George Angelich ---
george.angelich@arentfox.com -- Mark Angelov --
mark.angelov@arentfox.com -- and Jordana Renert --
jordana.renert@arentfox.com -- of Arent Fox LLP.

The case is In re: SquareTwo Financial Services Corp. et al., case
number 1:17-bk-10659, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York. [GN]


STATE FARM: "Kennedy" Suit Moved to Maryland Federal Court
----------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Debra R. Kennedy and Thomas F.
Kennedy, On behalf of themselves and on behalf of All Others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs. v. State Farm and Casualty;
Keith Sigur, State Farm Insurance Agent; and John and Jane Does 1
to 5,000, State Farm Insurance Agents, Case No. 432466-V, was
removed from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, to
the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland (Greenbelt).
The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 8:17-cv-02119-RWT to
the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Roger W
Titus.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear pro se.

The Defendants are represented by:

          Laura Basem Jacobs, Esq.
          BUDOW AND NOBLE PC
          7315 Wisconsin Ave Ste 500 West
          Bethesda, MD 20814-3206
          Telephone: (301) 654 0896
          Facsimile: (301) 907 9591
          E-mail: ljacobs@budownoble.com


STELLAR RECOVERY: Bid to Enforce "Garcia" Class Settlement OK'd
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, Northern District of California,
San Jose Division, issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Motion to
Enforce Settlement Agreement in the case captioned vDINA GARCIA,
Plaintiff, v. STELLAR RECOVERY INC., Defendant, Case No. 16-cv-
00521-BLF (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Dina Garcia (Garcia) filed this putative class action
against Defendant Stellar Recovery Inc. (Stellar), asserting
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, violations of
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and violations of
California's Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, (FDCA)
Garcia and Stellar thereafter reached settlement with respect to
Garcia's individual claims.

Garcia filed the present motion to enforce the Settlement
Agreement, asserting that Stellar had not made the first payment.
Garcia sought an order enforcing the Settlement Agreement and
awarding attorneys' fees and costs that Garcia incurred in
bringing the motion to enforce.

The Settlement Agreement provides in relevant part as follows:  If
any installment payment is not timely received, Plaintiff's
attorneys shall provide written notice of the delinquency to
Defendant's attorney via e-mail. In the event Defendant's
delinquency is not cured within 5 business days following its
attorney's receipt of notice, then Plaintiff shall be entitled to
attorney's fees and costs relating to any effort to enforce the
Agreement.

To the extent that Stellar seeks to be relieved from its
contractual obligations under the Settlement Agreement on
equitable grounds, it has cited no legal authority which would
permit the Court to grant such relief even if it were so inclined.
Garcia's motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 27, 2017 Order is
available http://tinyurl.com/y7r6mnnjfrom Leagle.com.

Dina Garcia, Plaintiff, represented by Joel Dashiell Smith,
- jsmith@bursor.com --   Bursor & Fisher.

Dina Garcia, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas A. Reyda --
treyda@bursor.com -- Burosr and Fisher, P.A. & Annick Marie
Persinger, Bursor & Fisher, P.A.. 483 9th St Ste 200. Oakland, CA
94607-4051.

Stellar Recovery Inc., Defendant, represented by Alison Nicole
Emery, 3733 University Boulevard West Suite 212B, Jacksonville, FL
32216, Assurance Law Group, PA, pro hac vice, Jeanne Louise Zimmer
-- zimmer@cmtlaw.com --
Carlson & Messer LLP, June Grace Felipe -- felipej@cmtlaw.com --
Carlson & Messer LLP & Tyler Austin Carle tcarle@hinshawlaw.com
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.


STRATASYS: Court of Appeals Quashes Shareholders' Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
3D Printing Industry reports that a class action brought against
Stratasys by the company's shareholders has been quashed in the
United States Court of Appeals.

Initially brought to court in Minnesota, the case was a securities
fraud action, taken in response to a line of desktop 3D printers
that left shareholders feeling shortchanged.

Stratasys acquire MakerBot

In August 2013 Stratasys acquired MakerBot as an entry into the
highly lucrative desktop 3D printer market.

Following this acquisition, the company's now subsidiary released
a 5G model of the MakerBot Replicator, advertised by Stratasys to
be ""unmatched" in quality, reliability, ease of use, speed, and
performance."

Stratasys also "made positive statements about MakerBot's past and
future finances" as outlined by the Court of Appeals official
document.

Shareholders believe the 5G was "rushed" to market

The 5G 3D printer was designed to have an interchangeable nozzle,
and it was here that customers kept finding problems. The case
claims,

"STRATASYS KNEW THE 5G PRINTERS WERE ESSENTIALLY INOPERABLE BUT
STILL RUSHED THEM TO MARKET WHILE PUBLICLY PROCLAIMING THEIR
QUALITY AND RELIABILITY."

Printer errors and nozzle clogging resulted in costly refunds and
replacements, leading to a drop in Stratasys share price.

The shareholders' argument was that the claims made by Stratasys
about the 5G 3D printer had led them to believe that their
investment in the company was safe.

They state that "Stratasys knew the 5G printers were essentially
inoperable but still rushed them to market while publicly
proclaiming their quality and reliability."

"mere puffery"

On July 25, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit dismissed the charges made by the shareholders for
a second time.

The decision states that promotional claims made by Stratasys
about the 5G's performance were "mere puffery", defined as "so
vague and such obvious hyperbole that no reasonable investor would
rely upon them." Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc.

In another update on a separate court case, Stratasys are
appealing a recent loss against Just 3D Print, the company charged
with copyright infringement against a number 3D designers
including Louise Driggers aka Loubie.

More information about the case was reported by 3D Printing
Industry when the saga began in 2016. [GN]


TAKATA CORP: Settles Class Action Over Defective Airbags
--------------------------------------------------------
Settlements have been reached in a class action lawsuit alleging
that consumers sustained economic losses because they purchased or
leased vehicles from various auto companies that manufactured,
distributed, or sold vehicles containing allegedly defective
airbags manufactured by Takata Corporation and its affiliates.
The Settlements include certain vehicles made by BMW, Mazda,
Subaru, and Toyota (the "Subject Vehicles").  BMW, Mazda, Subaru,
and Toyota deny any and all allegations of wrongdoing and the
Court has not decided who is right.

Owners or lessees of Subject Vehicles who have already received a
separate recall notice for their BMW, Mazda, Subaru, or Toyota
vehicle requesting that they bring it to their local retailer to
have the Takata airbags repaired and have not yet done so, should
contact their local retailer to make an appointment for this
repair as soon as possible.   Some vehicles will be recalled for
repair at a later date, and some vehicles may not be recalled.
When recalled Takata airbags deploy, they may spray metal debris
toward vehicle occupants and may cause serious injury.  Please see
the original recall notices and www.AirBagRecall.com for further
details.

The Settlements include the following persons and entities:

Owners or lessees, as of June 9, 2017, of a Subject Vehicle that
was distributed for sale or lease in the United States or any of
its territories or possessions, and Former owners or lessees of a
Subject Vehicle that was distributed for sale or lease in the
United States or any of its territories or possessions, who,
between April 11, 2013 and June 9, 2017, sold or returned pursuant
to a lease, a Subject Vehicle that was recalled before June 9,
2017.

A full list of the Subject Vehicles can be found at
www.AutoAirbagSettlement.com.  The Settlements do not involve
claims of personal injury or property damage to any property other
than the Subject Vehicles.

BMW, Mazda, Subaru, and Toyota have agreed to Settlements with a
combined value of approximately $553 million, including a 10%
credit for Rental Car/Loaner Programs.  The Settlement Funds will
be used to pay for Settlement benefits and cover the costs of the
Settlements over an approximately four-year period.

The Settlements offer several benefits for Class Members,
including, (1) payments for certain out-of-pocket expenses
incurred related to a Takata airbag recall of a Subject Vehicle,
(2) a Rental Car/Loaner Program while certain Subject Vehicles are
awaiting repair, (3) an Outreach Program to maximize completion of
the recall remedy, (4) additional cash payments to Class Members
from residual settlement funds, if any remain, and (5) a Customer
Support Program to help with repairs associated with affected
Takata airbag inflators and their replacements.  The Settlement
website explains each of these benefits in detail.

Class Members must file a claim to receive a payment during the
first four years of the Settlements.  If a Class Member still owns
or leases a Subject Vehicle, they must also bring it to an
authorized dealership for the recall remedy, as directed by a
recall notice, if they have not already done so. Class Members can
visit www.AutoAirbagSettlement.com and file a claim online or
download one and file by mail.  The deadline to file a claim will
be at least one year from the date the Settlements are finalized
and will be posted on the website when it's known.

Class Members who do not want to be legally bound by the
Settlements, must exclude themselves by September 25, 2017.  If
Class Members do not exclude themselves, they will release any
claims they may have against BMW, Mazda, Subaru, and Toyota, in
exchange for certain settlement benefits.  The potential available
benefits are more fully described in the Settlements, available at
the settlement website.  Class Members may object to the
Settlements by September 25, 2017.  Class Members cannot both
exclude themselves from, and object to, the Settlements.  The Long
Form Notices for each Settlement available on
www.AutoAirbagSettlement.com explains how to exclude or object.
The Court will hold a fairness hearing on October 25, 2017 to
consider whether to finally approve the Settlements and a request
for attorneys' fees of up to 30% of the total Settlement Amount
and incentive awards of $5,000 for each of the Class
Representatives.  Class Members may appear at the fairness
hearing, either by themselves or through an attorney, but don't
have to.  For more information, including the relief, eligibility
and release of claims (excluding certain personal injury or
property damage claims), in English or Spanish, call 1-888-735-
5596 or visit www.AutoAirbagSettlement.com. [GN]


THAI NUM: Faces "Pareja" Suit in Southern District of New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Thai Num Soup Inc.
The case is captioned as Alberto Pareja, Lorenzo Espindola, and
Rigoberto Juarez Galindo, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. Thai Num Soup Inc., doing
business as: Thai Soup, and Wachara Nittayarot, also known as:
Jaki, the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-05579 (S.D.N.Y., July 21,
2017).[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear pro se.


TOYOTA MOTORS: Quinn Emanuel Files Open Class Action Over Airbags
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sol Dolor, writing for Australasian Lawyer, reports that with the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC)
investigating the recall of Takata Corp. airbags, a global law
firm known for its litigation expertise is heading to the Federal
Court of Australia to file an open class action.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan is filing the suit against
manufacturers, including Toyota, Honda, and Mazda, for allegedly
breaching numerous provisions under the Australian Consumer Law
(ACL).

"It is quite frankly, outrageous and almost inconceivable that
there are over one million cars on Australian roads that contain a
'safety' product that could, at any time, explode with lethal
force.  People who are driving these cars need to enforce their
consumer rights before there are any more tragedies," said partner
Damian Scattini, who has been working on the claim with litigation
funder Regency Funding for more than a year.

The ACCC is currently seeking information from the Department of
Infrastructure and Regional Development (DIRD) and car
manufacturers regarding Takata airbags, which are at the centre of
the world's largest vehicle recall ever.  The consumer watchdog is
also urging people to heed notices from manufacturers and
retailers to have their cars' airbags replaced.

Starting 2009, more than 2.3 million vehicles in Australia alone
have been subject to recalls because of the Takata-made airbags.
The ACCC said that 60 models of cars sold in the country --
including from Honda, Toyota, BMW, Mitsubishi, Subaru, Lexus,
Jeep, Nissan, Chrysler, and Dodge -- have Takata airbags.

The investigation and the class action come after a man in New
South Wales died on 13 July after his airbag "misdeployed," the
ACCC said.  According to multiple reports, the 58-year-old man was
driving a Honda CR-V under recall when he crashed into a Toyota
vehicle in Cabramatta.  The death could be the first Takata-
related death in Australia.

A woman in the Northern Territory was also severely injured in
April.

"[Under the ACL], goods specifically need to be safe. It is hard
to imagine something which is less safe. These airbags have killed
at least 18 people and injured more than 180 worldwide," Mr.
Scattini said. [GN]


TRANSUNION LLC: Faces "Clements" Suit in Southern Dist. of Texas
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Transunion, LLC.
The case is captioned as Amanda Clements, Katherine Angus, Randall
Leslie, and Clinton Perry, the Plaintiffs, v. Transunion, LLC, TXU
Energy Retail Company LLC, and John Does 1-25, the Defendants,
Case No. 3:17-cv-00237 (S.D. Tex., July 27, 2017).

Transunion offers total credit protection all in one place from
credit score, credit report and credit alert.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dennis McCarty, Esq.
          MCCARTY & RABURN
          A CONSUMER LAW FIRM, PLLC
          PO Box 1448
          Cedar Hill, TX 75106
          Telephone: (817) 704 3375
          Facsimile: (817) 887 5069
          E-mail: dmccartylaw@att.net


UBER TECH: Asks Judge to Dismiss Suit over New Fare Model
---------------------------------------------------------
Helen Christophi, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that an attorney for Uber asked a federal judge in San Francisco
to toss a proposed class action accusing the ride-hailing company
of shortchanging drivers on fares using its new "upfront" pricing
model, saying the plaintiff has misread the contract.

Asking U.S. District Judge William Alsup to dismiss the lawsuit
for failure to state a claim, Uber attorney Jonathan Bass said
drivers are paid based on actual time and distance driven, and
not, as the complaint says, on the fare a rider pays.

"The text of the contract we think is plain-spoken and clear,"
Bass said. "We have complied with that. We think that justifies
dismissal."

North Carolina driver Martin Dulberg claims in a lawsuit filed
this past February that Uber stopped giving drivers the 80 percent
of fares it had promised them in a 2015 driver contract when it
switched to an upfront pricing model the following year.

The 2016 pricing model calculates fares before a ride so that
riders know beforehand how much they will be charged. Uber
previously calculated a rider's fare at the end of the ride based
on actual time and distance driven.

According to Dulberg, the upfront pricing model uses "aggressive"
time and distance estimates to calculate fares, often resulting in
a fare that is higher than what a passenger would have paid under
the old model.

Dulberg claims Uber isn't giving drivers the higher payments
they're owed for the higher upfront fares. Instead, he says, Uber
collects the upfront fares and then performs a separate
calculation after the ride is over, resulting in a lower fare due
to the aggressive upfront calculation. Uber then pays drivers 80
percent of that lower fare, so drivers get less than 80 percent of
the fare assessed to riders.

"Nothing in the agreement contemplates the use of two different
fares," said Andrew Dressel, Dulberg's attorney. "Whatever is
charged to the customers is what the driver should be paid for."

Judge Alsup did not indicate how he would rule. But he expressed
puzzlement over Dulberg's request that riders receive 80 percent
of an upfront fare.

"Isn't it a natural and necessary result of your argument that in
those cases where the actual fair turns out to be less than the
estimated fare that then your client gets less money under your
theory?" he asked Dressel.

"Drivers would have to look elsewhere if it turns out that driving
for Uber is not economical," Dressel replied. "Our point is this
contract does not permit Uber to charge customers one fare and use
a totally separate fare [to pay drivers]."

Bass echoed Alsup's conclusion, telling the judge that "the logic
of the complaint is the driver would share that loss."

"The driver doesn't share that loss, nor would it be appropriate
to do so," Bass said, adding the upfront model is a promotional
tool targeted toward riders, not drivers.

"What the drivers get for a particular ride is not subject to or
dependent on promotions," he said. "The driver is entitled to a
fare based on actual time and distance. In our view, that is
compliant with and not in breach of the contract."

Bass is with Coblentz Patch Duffy & Bass in San Francisco. Dressel
is with Napoli Shkolnik in New York.


UBER TECH: Judge Advances Drivers' Suit over Pricing Scheme
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Advances Uber Drivers' Beef Over Pricing Scheme
Helen Christophi, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that a San Francisco federal judge advanced a proposed class
action accusing Uber of stiffing drivers on fares using its new
"upfront" pricing model, adding another driver-initiated suit to
the long roster of complaints bombarding the ride-hailing company.

U.S. District Judge William Alsup denied Uber's motion to dismiss
the suit for failure to state a claim, calling lead plaintiff
Martin Dulberg's breach of contract allegations over the pricing
model "well-pled" while condemning Uber's counterarguments as
"counterfeit logic."

"In short, the amended complaint plausibly alleges that, after
shifting to 'upfront pricing,' Uber had to calculate fares for
drivers under the driver agreement using the same aggressively
estimated time and distance amounts that it uses for charging
passengers," Alsup wrote in an order. "Uber, however, continues to
use actual time and distance amounts to calculate fares and
shortchange its drivers under the driver agreement, while
retaining more money for itself. At this stage, these allegations
are sufficient to survive dismissal."

North Carolina driver Martin Dulberg claims in a lawsuit filed in
February that Uber stopped giving drivers the 80 percent of fares
it had promised them in a 2015 driver contract when it switched to
an upfront pricing model the following year.

The 2016 pricing model calculates fares before a ride so that
riders know beforehand how much they will be charged. Uber
previously calculated a rider's fare at the end of the ride based
on actual time and distance driven.

According to Dulberg, the upfront pricing model uses "aggressive"
time and distance estimates to calculate fares, often resulting in
fares that are higher than what a passenger would have paid under
the old model.

Dulberg claims Uber isn't giving drivers the higher payments
they're owed for the higher upfront fares. Instead, he says, Uber
collects the upfront fares and then performs a separate
calculation after the ride is over based on actual time and
distance driven. Uber then pays drivers 80 percent of that lower
fare, so drivers get less than 80 percent of the rider-assessed
fare promised to them under their contract.

"Because the upfront fare calculation always yields a higher
amount, drivers have been getting the short end of the stick,"
Dulberg's attorney Paul Maslo said in an email. "The court's
ruling recognizes that the agreement supports drivers' position
and allows them to move forward with their case."

However, Uber contends drivers are paid based on actual time and
distance driven, and not on the fare a rider pays. It says that
that payment scheme is consistent with the contract, and that
Dulberg has misinterpreted it.

Dulberg, meanwhile, says the contract doesn't permit Uber to
charge customers one fare and then calculate a second fare to pay
drivers, because the contract references only one fare calculation
on which both figures must be based.

Alsup agreed, referencing the agreement's single fare calculation
multiple times in his 10-page order.

"The bottom line is that, whatever method Uber chooses, it must
apply that same method to determine time and distance amounts for
both charging its passengers and remitting payments to its drivers
-- or so the amended complaint plausibly alleges," he wrote.

Alsup also agreed with Dulberg's contention that Uber's pricing
model shortchanges drivers while the company pockets the
difference.

"Since Uber's aggressive upfront estimates consistently exceed the
actual time and distance amounts, this results in drivers
receiving less than what they would be entitled to under the
driver agreement," he wrote. "The difference remains with Uber,
effectively allowing Uber to retain a higher service fee than it
is actually entitled to under the driver agreement."

Maslo, who is with Napoli Shkolnik in New York, said he is
optimistic about a victory.

"This case all comes down to the correct interpretation of the
agreement. And I firmly believe that ours is the only correct
reading," he said.

Dulberg is also represented by Andrew Dressel of Napoli Shkolnik
in New York.

Uber is represented by Jonanthan Bass with Coblentz Patch Duffy &
Bass in San Francisco. He could not be reached for comment.

Uber also did return a request seeking comment.


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Continues to Fight Drivers' Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Caroline O'Donovan, writing for BuzzFeed News, reports that four
years after attorney Shannon Liss-Riordan first took legal action
against Uber for allegedly misclassifying its driver workforce as
independent contractors, the company is still fighting her class-
action lawsuit.  And now Uber is taking action against Liss-
Riordan directly.

Uber is currently attempting a tectonic culture shift after a
series of scandals.  In February, a former employee's viral blog
post about discrimination and harassment launched two separate
internal investigations into workplace culture; ultimately, Uber's
CEO Travis Kalanick stepped down and at least 20 employees were
terminated.  Executives have publicly apologized, and promised
change, both for the Uber's employees and the drivers who keep the
app running.

But on July 21, Uber took a more typically pugilistic approach
when it filed a motion to sanction Liss-Riordan, accusing her of
willful misconduct and saying she contacted drivers using
confidential information found in court documents to solicit their
business.

But Ms. Liss-Riordan says these drivers were already her clients,
and told BuzzFeed News there's "nothing improper" about
communication between them and her firm.  "We would not be
representing them responsibly if we did not keep them informed
about the defendant's attempt to strip them of their right to
participate as class members," she told BuzzFeed News.

Ms. Liss-Riordan, otherwise known as Sledgehammer Shannon, became
famous in Silicon Valley four years ago when she started filing
class-action lawsuits accusing gig-economy companies including
Uber, Lyft, Handy, Postmates, and DoorDash of misclassifying their
employees as independent contractors in order to cut down on labor
costs.

In March, Lyft agreed to settle its class action for $27.5
million.  But the lawsuit against Uber has stalled.  In April
2016, Ms. Liss-Riordan negotiated what would have been a
significant $100 million settlement with Uber -- but it was thrown
out that August by a judge who felt she could have pushed for a
larger payout. Since then, the class has splintered, with some
named plaintiffs seeking new representation, and Ms. Liss-Riordan
being forced to defend herself against allegations from class
members and other law firms who say she's more interested in
personal profit than helping drivers.

Ms. Liss-Riordan is still fighting to keep the class-action suit
together and to prevent Uber from sending drivers into individual
arbitration.  But she's also preparing for the possibility that
she won't succeed.  So in March she sent an email survey to
drivers asking them to provide their personal information if they
wanted her to represent them in private arbitration.

"In the event that Uber succeeds in breaking up the class, we want
to ensure that all class members have the opportunity to continue
pressing their claims individually if necessary," she told
BuzzFeed News.

But Uber says the means by which Liss-Riordan contacted these
drivers violated rules around confidentiality.  In the motion,
Uber says she "willfully misused the name and contact information
contained within the Class List -- Uber's very own "Highly
Confidential -- Attorneys' Eyes Only Information" -- to solicit
some, if not all, drivers on the Class List for the purpose of
initiating new, individual-plaintiff actions against Uber."

Uber says, by sending the survey, Ms. Liss-Riordan confused
drivers, leading them to believe that they have to sign up with
her firm in order to continue to participate in the class-action
lawsuit, which is not the case.  In the filing, Uber points to a
number of posts on popular driver message board UberPeople.net as
proof that the email from Ms. Liss-Riordan's firm led to confusion
among the drivers.

Uber is asking the court to disallow Ms. Liss-Riordan from
representing individually any driver who received the email in
question. The company declined a request for comment on this
story.

"Uber is (as I predicted) trying to stop at all costs the drivers
pursuing their claims," Ms. Liss-Riordan wrote in an email.  The
company's decision to ask for sanctions against her is, she
continued, "just their first step to block drivers from pursuing
their rights."

Uber has been taking steps to improve the driver experience in
recent months.  They can collect tips now, and in 25 states they
can opt in to injury insurance, which gives them some of the
protections employees are typically guaranteed. But drivers are
still independent operators, working for themselves, and earning
very little money in the process.

Meanwhile, most of the lawsuits Ms. Liss-Riordan has brought
against gig-economy companies have fizzled out; she settled with
DoorDash for $5 million, and a suit against Postmates looks to be
headed the same way.

But in September, four years after she initially sued Uber over
misclassification, she might finally get her day in court, albeit
against a slightly less infamous startup.  She'll be representing
a former contractor who worked for Grubhub, a website that
facilitates delivery of restaurant takeout, at trial in Northern
California.  The outcome of that case could finally provide
insight on the question of who on-demand workers are really
working for. [GN]


UNITED SERVICES: 8th Circuit Ruling Vindicates Defense Attorneys
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lisa Hammersly, writing for Arkansas Online, reports that a
federal judge in Fort Smith was wrong in deciding University of
Arkansas System Trustee John Goodson and 14 other class-action
plaintiff and defense lawyers acted improperly when they removed a
case from federal court to settle it in state court on more
favorable terms, an 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals panel ruled
on July 25.

The lawyers' actions are permitted under federal court rules,
according to an opinion written by the circuit's Chief Judge
Lavenski Smith.

U.S. District Judge P.K. Holmes III erred in deciding last year
that the lawyers abused the judicial process and violated federal
court rules regarding dismissal of cases, the appeals panel said.

Judge Holmes also was wrong to impose reprimands on five of the
lawyers.

In reversing Judge Holmes' decision, the St. Louis appeals court
sent the case back to federal court in Fort Smith for further
proceedings.

"The district court's frustration with what it perceived as an
abuse of the federal court system and lack of candor with the
court is understandable," the opinion said.  But the lawyers "did
not violate" court rules in removing a class-action complaint
against an insurance company from Holmes' federal district court
without his knowledge for settlement in state court.

The attorneys also had a plausible legal argument that the
district court's approval wasn't required, the opinion said.

Attorneys for the lawyers declined to comment or did not return
emails and calls on July 25.  Judge Holmes' office doesn't comment
on his rulings.

The 8th Circuit decision should result in lifting Judge Holmes'
reprimands of Goodson and law partner Matt Keil of Texarkana,
Jason Roselius of Oklahoma City, and Richard Norman and Martin
Weber Jr. of Houston.  They were among plaintiffs' lawyers in
Adams v. United Services Automobile Association (2:14-cv-2013).

The appeals court decision also justifies the actions of other
lawyers in the Adams case whom Holmes criticized but didn't
reprimand.  Those plaintiffs' attorneys were Casey Castleberry and
Tom Thompson of Batesville; Timothy Myers, William Putnam, W.H.
Taylor and Steven Vowell of Fayetteville; and Matthew Mustokoff of
Radnor, Pa.

All 12 have worked together suing large companies through class-
action cases.  Mr. Goodson is known in Arkansas for winning
millions in class-action settlements and as a large donor to
political campaigns. He is married to Arkansas Supreme Court
Justice Courtney Goodson.

The defense attorneys vindicated in the appeal are Lyn Pruitt of
Little Rock and Wystan Ackerman and Stephen Goldman of Hartford,
Conn.

All of the lawyers worked on Adams v. USAA in Judge Holmes'
courtroom. The class action involved a group of claims holders
suing the insurance company for underpayment.

Lawyers on both sides agreed in June 2015, after 17 months of
litigation, to move the class action from Judge Holmes' federal
court to Polk County Circuit Court for settlement.

When Judge Holmes learned of the switch through an article in
Arkansas Business newspaper, he ordered the lawyers to show why
they shouldn't be sanctioned for improper conduct.

The judge said he wouldn't have approved the state court
settlement and that it benefited the lawyers and the insurance
company at the expense of policyholders who were harmed.

Plaintiffs' lawyers received $1.85 million in fees and expenses in
the Adams case, court records show.  Only 4 percent of eligible
policyholders filled out a lengthy form to claim part of the
insurance company's estimated $3.44 million settlement pool.

Holmes' reprimand of the five attorneys in August said they acted
in "bad faith," or with previous knowledge that what they did was
improper.

The other seven plaintiffs' lawyers took similar actions in the
Adams case but didn't exhibit bad faith, Holmes wrote.  The judge
didn't reprimand or punish them.

Attorneys for the plaintiffs' lawyers said in their appeal that
Judge Holmes was wrong on all counts.

In a 26-page opinion on July 25, the three-judge panel agreed.

The appellate panel said Holmes cited precedents under one rule
for dismissal, 41(a)(2), which the judges said applied to
contested dismissals.

But the panel applied a different rule, 41(a)(1), for dismissals
in which all parties agree.  That rule requires "no judicial
approval or review as a prerequisite to dismissal; in fact, the
dismissal is effective upon filing, with no court action
required."

"The reason for the dismissal is irrelevant," the opinion
continued.

"The appeals court correctly recognized the district court's
'understandable frustration' with the tactics used here," said an
email from Ted Frank, a Washington lawyer known for criticizing
class-action settlements he claims are unfair.

Mr. Frank filed a brief in the 8th Circuit appeal in support of
Judge  Holmes' rulings.

After the July 25 opinion, Frank wrote, "District courts can and
should avoid the problem in the future by creating a standing
order at the beginning of a case requiring court approval for a
dismissal or compromise of an uncertified class action."

The 8th Circuit's decision saying the Fort Smith court "abused its
discretion" when it wrongly found the lawyers at fault "doesn't
mean the judge did anything improper or illegal," said Joshua
Silverstein, a professor at the William H. Bowen School of Law in
Little Rock.

"It's a technical legal term.  It just means the judge got it dead
wrong." [GN]


UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS: Loses Bid to Dismiss "Tackett"
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas issued
a Memorandum and Order denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
case captioned DAISY TACKETT, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS,
Defendant, Case No. 16-2266-JTM (D. Kan.).

Plaintiff Daisy Tackett (Tackett) filed this action in state court
against defendant University of Kansas (KU) pursuant to Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972, alleging a hostile
educational environment and retaliation. KU removed Tackett's
lawsuit to this court, and argues the doctrine of res judicata
bars her claims.

The plaintiffs claimed that Tackett was sexually assaulted in
Jayhawker Towers while she was a student at KU. The plaintiffs
alleged that KU repeatedly represented to them and other students
and their family members that KU's residence halls were safe, but
these representations were false.

It is undisputed that Tackett's Title IX lawsuit contains the same
parties as the KCPA lawsuit. It is also undisputed that Judge
Huff's decision was a final judgment. However, the parties
disagree whether Judge Huff's dismissal of the KCPA lawsuit for
lack of standing was a decision on the merits.

KU is correct that Judge Huff found that Tackett was not an
aggrieved consumer as contemplated by the KCPA statute. However,
as recognized by Judge Lungstrum in Stein, aggrieved is a
constitutional component to statutory standing under the KCPA. In
other words, the constitutional and statutory standing
requirements overlap. If the consumer was not aggrieved, then
there would not be a sufficient injury in fact to allow for
constitutional standing.

Even if Judge Huff considered Tackett to lack statutory standing
because she was not an aggrieved consumer, Judge Huff previously
found that Tackett lacked constitutional standing because she
could not show an imminent threat of injury to warrant prospective
relief; thus, Judge Huff lacked jurisdiction to consider the
merits of Tackett's KCPA claim.

The court finds that Judge Huff's dismissal of Tackett's KCPA
lawsuit was not a final judgment on the merits. KU has not met its
burden to show that res judicata is applicable to Tackett's Title
IX case.

KU's motion to dismiss is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 27, 2017 Memorandum
and Order is available http://tinyurl.com/ycchg7bkfrom Leagle.com

Daisy Tackett, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel G. Curry, --
info@brownandcurry.com -- Brown & Curry, LLC.

Daisy Tackett, Plaintiff, represented by Sarah A. Brown, --
info@brownandcurry.com -- Brown & Curry, LLC.

University of Kansas, Defendant, represented by Megan K.
Walawender, The University of Kansas, Office of General Counsel &
Michael C. Leitch, University of Kansas, Office of the General
Counsel.


VERISMA SYSTEMS: Court Certifies Class in "McCracken"
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, Western District of New York,
issued a Decision and Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned ANN McCRACKEN, JOAN FARRELL,
SARAH STILSON, KEVIN McCLOSKEY, CHRISTOPHER TRAPATSOS, and
KIMBERLY BAILEY, as individuals and as representatives of the
classes, Plaintiffs, v. VERISMA SYSTEMS, INC., STRONG MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL, HIGHLAND HOSPITAL, and UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER,
Defendants, No. 6:14-cv-06248 (MAT)(W.D.N.Y.).

This is a putative class action by Ann McCracken, Joan Farrell,
Sara Stilson, Kevin McCloskey, Christopher Trapatsos, and Kimberly
Bailey (collectively, Plaintiffs) against Verisma Systems, Inc.
(Verisma), Highland Hospital (Highland), Strong Memorial Hospital
(Strong), and the University of Rochester Medical Center (URMC).
Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that Defendants systematically
overcharged them and other patients who requested copies of their
medical records from the Rochester Healthcare Defendants, in
violation of New York Public Health Law (PHL).

Plaintiffs seek certification of one proposed class, the URMC
Medical Records Class, defined as follows:

     All persons who (1) requested copies of medical records
(either by themselves or through a lawyer, personal
representative, or other qualified person acting on their behalf)
from a health care facility owned and/or operated by the
University of Rochester,

(2) were charged by or through Verisma Systems, Inc. for copies of
such records in accordance with Verisma's NY Fee Schedule PHL 18,
and (3) paid such charges (either directly or through the person
making the request on their behalf) and had their records released
by or through Verisma on or after May 14, 2011, excluding any
principals or employees of Defendants.

Plaintiffs also seeks certification of two proposed subclasses,
defined as follows:

     Highland Sub-Class: All persons in the URMC Medical Records
Class who requested copies of medical records through Highland
Hospital and whose records were released on or after May 14, 2011.

     Strong Sub-Class: All persons in the URMC Medical Records
Class who requested copies of medical records through Strong
Memorial Hospital and whose records were released on or after May
14, 2011.

Numerosity

Plaintiffs have established that at least 38,000 medical record
requests were fulfilled, invoiced, and paid pursuant to Verisma's
NY Fee Schedule PHL 18 during the relevant time period. The Court
finds that the numerosity requirement is readily met here.

Commonality

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have affirmatively demonstrate[d]
[their] compliance with Rule 23(a)(2)'s commonality requirement by
proving that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties,
common questions of law or fact, etc.. Plaintiffs have identified
several common questions, including whether PHL Sectiohn 18 allows
Defendants to charge per page for copies of medical records, even
if their actual costs of producing such records are less; what
actual costs did Defendants incur in fulfilling class members'
records requests; which categories of costs are reasonable" under
PHL

Typicality

Here, the class representatives' claims and those of the members
of the proposed class arise from the same conduct by Defendants,
that they uniformly charged more than their actual and reasonable
costs incurred in fulfilling medical records requests, in
violation of PHL Sec. 18. All class members were charged under
Verisma's NY Fee Schedule which calculates class members' invoices
at a $0.75 per page rate without regard to the actual costs in
fulfilling a particular request.

Plaintiffs argue, the only way to determine any individual
requester's damages is to calculate Verisma's aggregate costs and
allocate them to particular requests. Plaintiffs indicate this
methodology is the same for all class members and is the
methodology its expert proposes to utilize. The Court therefore
finds that the typicality requirement has been met.

Adequacy

Plaintiffs' attorneys' qualifications, experience, capability to
conduct this litigation are not in dispute. Accordingly, the Court
finds that the adequacy requirement is met as to class counsel

Ascertainability

Plaintiffs here have established the general parameters of
membership in the proposed class and sub-classes are determinable
at the outset and they refuted Defendants' arguments that their
proposed class and sub-classes are truly indeterminable.
Therefore, the Court concludes that the implied requirement of
ascertainability has been met.

Predominance

Verisma argues that they are not amenable to class certification
because the elements of the cause of action are not subject to
class-wide proof. The district court in Ruzhinskaya II rejected
the same argument, and distinguished the case on which Verisma
principally relies, Vaccariello v. XM Satellite Radio, Inc., 295
F.R.D. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

Unlike in Vaccariello, the relevant issue here is simply whether
Verisma charged fee was excessive. A class member's voluntary
accession to such a fee is no defense. Ruzhinskaya II, 2015 WL
9255562, rejecting the argument that voluntary payment of Health
Port's fee would bar an unjust enrichment claim)). The Court finds
that Plaintiffs have satisfied the predominance requirement.

Superiority

In light of the manner in which the proposed class and subclasses
have been defined by Plaintiffs here, the Court finds that a class
action would be superior to the alternative of an individual
lawsuit.

The costs of bringing this lawsuit would be prohibitive for any
single class member or even a small group of them, because "[t]he
out-of-pocket costs alone (apart from legal fees) for an
individual to bring this suit would have almost certainly dwarfed
even the highest realistically imaginable recovery for that
individual. This weighs heavily in favor of finding a class action
to be superior in this case.

The Court grants Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification
pursuant to Rule 23.

Accordingly, the Court certifies a class defined as follows:

     All persons who (1) requested copies of medical records
(either by themselves or through a lawyer, personal
representative, or other qualified person acting on their behalf)
from a health care facility owned and/or operated by the
University of Rochester, (2) were charged by or through Verisma
Systems, Inc. for copies of such records in accordance with
Verisma's NY Fee Schedule PHL 18, and (3) paid such charges
(either directly or through the person making the request on their
behalf) and had their records released by or through Verisma on or
after May 14, 2011, excluding any principals or employees of
Defendants (the Class or the URMC Medical Records Class).

The Court also certifies two provider-level sub-classes, which are
respectively defined as follows:

     All persons in the URMC Medical Records Class who requested
copies of medical records through Highland Hospital and whose
records were released on or after May 14, 2011 (the Highland Sub-
Class).

     All persons in the URMC Medical Records Class who requested
copies of medical records through Strong Memorial Hospital and
whose records were released on or after May 14, 2011 (the Strong
Sub-Class).

The Court appoints Ann McCracken, Joan Farrell, Sara Stilson,
Kevin McCloskey, Christopher Trapatsos, and Kimberly Bailey as
class representatives. Finally, the Court appoints Faraci Lange
LLP as class counsel.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 27, 2017 Decision
and Order is available http://tinyurl.com/yb98oxqhfrom
Leagle.com.

Ann McCracken, Plaintiff, represented by Kai H. Richter --
krichter@nka.com Nichols Kaster, PLLP.

Ann McCracken, Plaintiff, represented by Kathryn Lee Bruns, Faraci
Lange LLP, Stephen G. Schwarz -- sschwarz@faraci.com -- Faraci
Lange LLP & Eleanor E. Frisch, Nichols Kaster, PLLP. 28 E Main St
Ste 1100, Rochester, NY 14614-1916, United States

Joan Farrell, Plaintiff, represented by Kai H. Richter, Nichols
Kaster, PLLP, Kathryn Lee Bruns, Faraci Lange LLP, Stephen G.
Schwarz, Faraci Lange LLP & Eleanor E. Frisch, Nichols Kaster,
PLLP.

Sara Stilson, Plaintiff, represented by Kai H. Richter, Nichols
Kaster, PLLP, Kathryn Lee Bruns, Faraci Lange LLP, Stephen G.
Schwarz, Faraci Lange LLP & Eleanor E. Frisch, Nichols Kaster,
PLLP.

Kevin McCloskey, Plaintiff, represented by Kai H. Richter, Nichols
Kaster, PLLP, Kathryn Lee Bruns, Faraci Lange LLP, Stephen G.
Schwarz, Faraci Lange LLP & Eleanor E. Frisch, Nichols Kaster,
PLLP.

Christopher Trapatsos, Plaintiff, represented by Kai H. Richter,
Nichols Kaster, PLLP, Kathryn Lee Bruns, Faraci Lange LLP, Stephen
G. Schwarz, Faraci Lange LLP & Eleanor E. Frisch, Nichols Kaster,
PLLP.

Kimberly Bailey, Plaintiff, represented by Kai H. Richter, Nichols
Kaster, PLLP, Kathryn Lee Bruns, Faraci Lange LLP, Stephen G.
Schwarz, Faraci Lange LLP & Eleanor E. Frisch, Nichols Kaster,
PLLP.

Verisma Systems, Inc., Defendant, represented by Caroline Jacobsen
Berdzik -- cberdzik@goldbergsegalla.com -- Goldberg Segalla LLP,
Daniel Barrie Moar -- dmoar@goldbergsegalla.com -- Goldberg
Segalla LLP, Ryan Grant Pitman, Goldberg Segalla LLP & Christopher
J. Belter -- obetter@goldbergsegalla.com -- Goldberg Segalla LLP.
Strong Memorial Hospital, Defendant, represented by Eric J. Ward -
- eward@wardgreenberg.com -- Ward Greenberg Heller & Reidy LLP.
Highland Hospital, Defendant, represented by Eric J. Ward, Ward
Greenberg Heller & Reidy LLP.

University of Rochester, Defendant, represented by Eric J. Ward,
Ward Greenberg Heller & Reidy LLP.

Strong Memorial Hospital, Cross Claimant, represented by Eric J.
Ward, Ward Greenberg Heller & Reidy LLP.

Highland Hospital, Cross Claimant, represented by Eric J. Ward,
Ward Greenberg Heller & Reidy LLP.

University of Rochester, Cross Claimant, represented by Eric J.
Ward, Ward Greenberg Heller & Reidy LLP.

Verisma Systems, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Caroline
Jacobsen Berdzik, Goldberg Segalla LLP, Daniel Barrie Moar,
Goldberg Segalla LLP, Ryan Grant Pitman, Goldberg Segalla LLP &
Christopher J. Belter, Goldberg Segalla LLP.


VOLKSWAGEN: States Can't Pursue Additional Penalties, Judge Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Iovino, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that a San Francisco federal judge signaled that states like
Wyoming likely can't seek additional penalties against Volkswagen
for installing emissions-cheating software in some 580,000
vehicles sold in the United States.

"Did Congress intend to permit states to enforce these standards
as it applies to manufacturers?" U.S. District Judge Charles
Breyer asked during a hearing. "I just don't see it that way."

Volkswagen had moved to dismiss the state of Wyoming's lawsuit,
arguing its claims are pre-empted by federal law because only the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency can regulate emissions
standards under the Clean Air Act.

Seven states and a county in Texas filed amicus briefs opposing
Volkswagen's motion to dismiss Wyoming's complaint. The states --
Alabama, Illinois, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Ohio, Tennessee, and
Texas -- say each state has a responsibility to protect its
citizens by enforcing state environmental laws to ensure the
attainment of national air quality standards.

But Volkswagen attorney Robert Giuffra Jr. said Tuesday that the
Clean Air Act expressly forbids states from adopting or attempting
to enforce emissions standards for new vehicles.

"Congress put this in because it was concerned about having a
patchwork of rules among different states," Giuffra said.

Although California enacted tougher standards under a Clean Air
Act waiver, and Volkswagen paid penalties to California, Wyoming
is not one of the 15 states that adopted California's tougher
emissions standards.

Wyoming says it's not trying to regulate federal emissions
standards, but rather to enforce two state laws that prohibit
tampering with a pollution-control device.

"The tampering is the problem, not the standard," Wyoming
assistant attorney general Elizabeth Morrisseau told the judge.

But Breyer appeared unconvinced. He said attempting to enforce air
quality laws, even indirectly, would still be forbidden by federal
law.

"There's always an indirect way to do something," Breyer said. "I
can't go in a straight line so I'm going to go in a crooked line.
It's the same effect. I don't think there's an argument to say,
?We're doing it indirectly [so] it's okay.'"

Volkswagen says Wyoming seeks to impose "Draconian" penalties of
$37,500 per vehicle per day on the automaker. Those fines would
allow Wyoming to obtain $13.6 million per vehicle each year for an
estimated 370 affected vehicles in the state, according to
Volkswagen.

Volkswagen has paid out $22.9 billion in U.S. penalties and
settlements thus far, including a $2.8 billion criminal fine.
Under prior settlements, Wyoming residents will receive more than
$9 million in consumer relief and the state will get $8 million
for environmental mitigation, according to Volkswagen's motion to
dismiss.

"It's hard to imagine an auto manufacturer being penalized as much
as Volkswagen has," Giuffra said.

But Morrisseau cited a recent ruling, issued on July 17, by a New
Jersey state appeals court, Felix v. Volkswagen. In that ruling, a
three-judge panel upheld a lower court ruling denying Volkswagen's
motion to dismiss, finding the plaintiffs did "not seek to enforce
an EPA emission standard or force the manufacturer to adopt a
different emission standard."

Morrisseau said the same situation exists here because Wyoming
only seeks to enforce its own state laws that prohibit tampering
with pollution-control devices.

"Our case does not rise or fall on whether the standards were
violated," Morrisseau said. "Our case rises and falls on whether
the vehicles were tampered with."

Giuffra replied that states can only regulate that kind of
"tampering" when it occurs after vehicles are manufactured and on
the road, not when they are coming off the assembly line in
Germany.

To make Volkswagen liable for additional state and local
government penalties would ignore the plain language of the Clean
Air Act, he argued.

"These sorts of state copycat, pile-on enforcement actions are
preempted by federal law," Giuffra said.

Breyer seemed inclined to side with Volkswagen on the issue, a
move that several states and local governments oppose.

"I have to wonder whether Congress really wanted to have 50 states
or even other subdivisions enforce these regulations," Breyer
said. "You say, 'We're not enforcing the regulations, but
enforcing our anti-tampering laws,' but that's by another name
. . . the purpose here is to enforce the emissions control
standard."

Breyer took the arguments under advisement.

The EPA first revealed to the public on Sept. 18, 2015, that
Volkswagen used illegal defeat devices to mask nitrogen oxide
pollution during emissions tests. The German carmaker later
acknolwledged installing defeat devices in some 11 million diesel-
powered vehicles worldwide.

In March, Volkswagen pleaded guilty to conspiracy and obstruction
of justice, and agreed to pay $4.3 billion in criminal and civil
penalties. It has also struck three settlements with U.S.
consumers, regulators, and dealerships, totaling more than $17
billion.

In June and July, Breyer refused to dismiss two separate
shareholder class actions against Volkswagen, claiming the company
misled U.S. investors by failing to disclose liabilities related
to its emissions cheating scandal.


VOLKSWAGEN AG: Montreal Lawyers File Car Cartel Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Safia Ahmad, writing for Montreal Gazette, reports that Montreal
lawyers filed a request to the city's Superior Court on July 25
for a class action lawsuit against three German car companies
accused of price-fixing and collusion.

According to the lawsuit, Volkswagen Automobile Group (AG), BMW AG
and Daimler AG have been accused of conspiring on technology,
strategy and parts since the 1990s in order to gain competitive
advantage over other car companies.

Such behaviour is illegal according to Quebec Civil Law and
Canada's Competition Act.

Allegations of collusion began surfacing on July 21, and the
following day, the European Commission and Germany's Cartel Office
announced they'd been informed about such alleged illegal
behaviour.  Volkswagen AG, which also owns Audi and Porsche,
voluntarily disclosed information to Germany's Federal Cartel
office for an unknown reason.

The class action lawsuit filed in Montreal by lawyers
Michael Vathilakis and Joey Zukran applies to residents in Quebec
who have purchased or leased a vehicle from these brands.
Mr. Vathilakis said the lawsuit is considered to be a standalone,
meaning "it would not be joined to other lawsuits."

Messrs. Vathilakis and Zukran represent Nick Bountounis, a digital
technician for a marketing company in Montreal.
Mr. Bountounis leased two Volkswagen Jettas in 2011 and 2015.
According to the lawsuit, he paid around $375 in monthly
instalments for the vehicle he leased in 2011. In 2015, he leased
the second Volkswagen Jetta for 48 months and is paying $342
monthly.

Since Dieselgate in 2015, when the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency discovered that Volkswagen AG was cheating on its emission
tests, Mr. Bountounis said he has paid close attention to the
news.

After reading about reports on the alleged collusion, Mr.
Bountounis, frustrated, decided to contact Mr. Vathilakis.

"I just don't think it's right," Mr. Bountounis said over the
phone. "Why am I overpaying for my car?"

He said he hopes those who have purchased or leased a vehicle from
these German brands will be compensated.

"It's just very upsetting, disturbing news that cars companies
like that, worldwide, are doing stuff like this," he said.

Many people across Quebec and Canada could be affected by these
allegations.  According to Statista, Canadians have purchased over
6,600 Volkswagen AG cars since June, "accounting for over three
per cent of the Canadian car market."  BMW AG sold over 3,800 cars
and Mercedes Benz, which is part of Daimler AG, sold over 5,000
cars since June.

In Quebec, Volkswagen AG sold over 16, 500 vehicles in 2016
according to the website Protegez-vous, a not-for-profit
organization that specializes in consumer research and testing.

Representatives from BMW AG denied the accusations from European
news outlets on July 23, while spokespeople from Volkswagen AG and
Daimler AG refused to comment. [GN]


VOLKSWAGEN AG: Cartel Class Action Probably Not the Last One
------------------------------------------------------------
Bertel Schmitt, writing for Forbes, reports that billion euro
fines for breaking EU antitrust laws aren't the only dangers
looming for Germany's automakers.  Just a few days after a
presumptive car cartel between Volkswagen, Daimler, and BMW made
first headlines in Europe, the matter is turning into possibly
very costly legal problems on the more litigious side of the
Atlantic.  The Toronto Strosberg Sasso Sutts lawfirm commenced a
class action suit against BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Volkswagen, Audi and
Porsche.  The lawsuit seeks a billion Canadian dollars in damages
and an additional CAD 100 million in punitive damages, the firm
said in a statement.

Lead attorney is David Wingfield, and he is a formidable opponent:
Mr. Wingfield headed the antitrust law division of the Canadian
Department of Justice, as Executive Director and Senior General
Counsel, between 2011-2014.  His suit alleges that the German
carmakers "conspired to set the price, output, innovation, and
technical standards of components used in the motor vehicles they
manufactured, and that were sold in Canada."

In Germany, the argument du jour appears to be that the secret
talks between the German Five falls into a legal grey zone not
much worse than agreeing on standards for nuts and bolts.  After a
meeting of Volkswagen's supervisory board on July 26 in Wolfsburg,
the company said that it is "quite common for car manufacturers
all over the world to engage in an exchange on technical issues in
order to accelerate the pace and quality of innovations."  Stephan
Weil, Prime Minister of the German state of Lower Saxony, whose
20% share in Volkswagen Weil represents in the board, said after
the meeting that "the core question is: What are legal
conversations between automakers, and where does an illegal, anti-
competitive collusion begin?"

"There is no grey zone," Mr. Wingfield insisted the phone from
Toronto.  "When people are acting lawfully, they don't hide what
they are trying to do."  In meeting minutes seen by Der Spiegel
[German, paywall] participants often warned that what they were
doing might have been illegal.  There is nothing wrong with
standardization per se, Mr. Wingfield argued, "but if say Apple
and Samsung would agree to standardize on an inferior chip for the
next ten years, that would be a cartel, and that is what seems to
be happening here."

In the end, it will be up to the courts to decide on the shade of
grey.

The class action suit, which is yet to be certified as such, is
"the first of that kind in North America" as far as Mr. Wingfield
knows, "but it probably will not be the last one."  In the U.S.,
awards could be "ten times more" than what his law firm is
seeking, Mr. Wingfield said.  In both jurisdictions, lawyers can
depose defendants, and seek documents in discovery. "Unlike with
the US federal rules, we here can depose only one representative
of each defendant," said Mr. Wingfield "But that can be the CEO if
appropriate." [GN]


WAL-MART STORES: Faces "Pitre" Suit in C.D. California
------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Randy Pitre, on behalf of himself,
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and Does 1 through
100, inclusive, the Defendant, Case No. 30-02017-00927449, was
removed on July 21, 2017 from the Orange County Superior Court, to
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
(Southern Division - Santa Ana). The District Court Clerk assigned
Case No. 8:17-cv-01281-DOC-DFM to the proceeding. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge David O. Carter.

Wal-Mart is an American multinational retailing corporation that
operates as a chain of hypermarkets, discount department stores,
and grocery stores.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chaim Shaun Setareh, Esq.
          Thomas Alistair Segal, Esq.
          SETAREH LAW GROUP
          9454 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 907
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (310) 888 7771
          Facsimile: (310) 888 0109
          E-mail: shaun@setarehlaw.com
                  thomas@setarehlaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Leanna Costantini, Esq.
          Robert J Herrington, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP
          3161 Michelson Drive Suite 1000
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (949) 732 6500
          Facsimile: (949) 732 6501
          E-mail: costantinil@gtlaw.com
                  herringtonr@gtlaw.com


WALMART STORES: Settles Herbal Supplements Class Actions
--------------------------------------------------------
Josh Long, writing for Natural Products Insider, reports that
consumers who accused national retail chains of selling herbal
supplements that allegedly failed to contain the labeled
ingredients have agreed to settle multi-district litigation, court
records show.

The parties "represented that they have reached a settlement in
all of the MDL [multi-district litigation] cases," according to a
July 11 filing from the clerk in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois.

Several putative class action lawsuits were filed against Target
Corp., Walgreens Boots Alliance Inc., Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and
NBTY Inc. after New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman
announced results in 2015 from testing of herbal supplements using
DNA barcode technology.

The results, New York authorities said, could not verify that
products contained the labeled herbs, such as Echinacea and St.
John's Wort, and the supplements were contaminated with undeclared
substances.  Only 21 percent of the product tests verified DNA
barcodes from the plant species listed on the labels, according to
New York authorities.

The probe, reported widely in the mainstream media including The
New York Times, ignited criticism that the dietary supplement
industry lacked adequate oversight and perpetrated a massive
fraud.

Experts in the botanical industry questioned the accuracy of
Mr. Schneiderman's tests, and they pointed out DNA can become
degraded and lost during the processing of botanical extracts.
Critics, nonetheless, cited the investigation as evidence that the
supplement industry is in need of regulatory reforms.

GNC Holdings Inc. was initially among the defendants in the class
action litigation, but the company maintained it manufactured its
supplements in compliance with FDA regulations, and the lawsuits
were eventually dismissed against the retailer.

Some companies, including GNC, have reached agreements with
Mr. Schneiderman to incorporate DNA technology as part of their
various testing methodologies to help ensure ingredients found in
supplements correspond to the product labels.

In the class action litigation, two court filings entered by the
clerk point to a settlement being reached. Had a settlement not
been reached, the plaintiffs were up against a deadline of July 21
to file a third amended complaint.

Steve Berman, a lawyer in New York representing the plaintiffs,
did not respond to a request for comment, nor did Target, Walmart
and Walgreens.  NBTY, which makes herbal supplements and changed
its name to The Nature's Bounty Co., also declined to comment.

Amy J. St. Eve, the federal judge overseeing the class action
litigation, ruled in May that the plaintiffs could not seek
injunctive relief in a second consolidated lawsuit, and she
dismissed without prejudice certain claims for breach of
warranties. But she denied the retailers' request to strike the
plaintiffs' allegations regarding Mr. Schneiderman's investigation
and related materials, including a Feb. 3, 2015 press release
announcing his findings.

"Defendants have not clearly articulated why they would suffer
prejudice, and the allegations related to the NYAG's study are
relevant to the issues in this case," the judge wrote in her May
19 order.

But since the litigation has been settled, the questions of
whether consumers of herbal supplements were actually defrauded,
or got what they paid for, aren't likely to be answered in the
courts. [GN]


WALT DISNEY: Scraping Data from App-Playing Kids, Rushing Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that parents claim in a federal
class action filed in San Francisco that The Walt Disney Co. and
others are scraping data from their app-playing children for use
in targeted advertising.

Other defendants include Disney Enterprises; Disney Electronic
Content; Upsight; Unity Technologies SF; and Kochava Inc.

The case is, AMANDA RUSHING, and her child, L.L., on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE
WALT DISNEY COMPANY; DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.; DISNEY ELECTRONIC
CONTENT, INC.; UPSIGHT, INC.; UNITY TECHNOLOGIES SF; and KOCHAVA,
INC., Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-4419 (N.D. Cal.).

Attorneys for Plaintiffs individually and on behalf of all others
similar situated:

     Michael W. Sobol, Esq.
     LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
     275 Battery Street, 29th Floor
     San Francisco, CA  94111-3339
     Telephone:  415.956.1000
     Facsimile:  415.956.1008
     E-mail: msobol@lchb.com

          - and -

     Nicholas Diamand, Esq.
     Douglas I. Cuthbertson, Esq.
     Abbye R. Klamann, Esq.
     LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
     250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor
     New York, NY  10013-1413
     Telephone:  212.355.9500
     Facsimile:  212.355.9592
     E-mail: ndiamand@lchb.com
             dcuthbertson@lchb.com
             aklamann@lchb.com

          - and -

     Hank Bates, Esq.
     Allen Carney, Esq.
     David Slade, Esq.
     CARNEY BATES & PULLIAM, PLLC
     519 West 7th St.
     Little Rock, AR 72201
     Telephone:  501.312.8500
     Facsimile:  501.312.8505
     E-mail: hbates@cbplaw.com
             acarney@cbplaw.com
             dslade@cbplaw.com


WELLS FARGO: Must Face Suit over Non-U.S. Citizens Student Loans
----------------------------------------------------------------
Maria Dinzeo, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
San Francisco federal judge refused to dismiss a class action
claiming Wells Fargo unlawfully turns down non-U.S. citizens for
student loans.

University of California, Riverside, junior Mitzie Perez sued
Wells Fargo in January, a few months after she applied for and was
denied a student loan through its website. Perez says the denial
happened after she answered a question about her citizenship
status, a violation of equal rights to enforce contracts under 42
U.S. Code Sec. 1981.

"We think Wells Fargo has common policies that treat noncitizens
and DACA recipients differently than they would citizens," Mike
Litrownik, one of Perez's attorneys, said in a phone interview
Thursday.

While not a citizen, Perez is one of some 800,000 young people who
has been granted protection from deportation through Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA. The program created
through executive order by President Barack Obama in 2012 protects
qualified applicants from deportation if they were brought here as
children and have clean records. They may apply for and be granted
work permits good for two years, which can be renewed. In addition
to being a DACA recipient, Perez also holds a federal work permit.

Litrownik said Perez and the other plaintiffs offered to have a
U.S. citizen co-signer to guarantee the loan, but were still
denied credit. Perez says she had to cover her tuition with credit
cards.

U.S. District Judge Maxine Chesney denied Wells Fargo's motion to
dismiss, rejecting its argument that the statute is precluded by
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which doesn't cover non-
citizens.

"Congress, by enacting the ECOA, did not intend to authorize
creditors to discriminate on the basis of alienage or otherwise to
remove protections against discrimination afforded under other
statutes," Chesney wrote.

In a statement, Wells Fargo spokesman Jason Vasquez said Chesney's
ruling isn't an indication that the plaintiffs will prevail.

"The court's decision to allow the lawsuit to proceed, while
disappointing, in no way suggests that the claims ultimately will
prevail and we are prepared to defend our record as a responsible
lender," he said.

While the plaintiffs' major civil rights claim will go forward,
Chesney dismissed their unfair competition law claim with leave to
amend, finding no proof that any of them lost money as a result of
the credit denials. She also ruled that Perez and another
plaintiff, Teresa Diaz Vedoy, were unable to show that they were
financially harmed by using their credit cards for tuition.

Litrownik said the ruling underscores the importance of equal
treatment in lending policies.

"We're extremely pleased with the court's decision denying Wells
Fargo's motion to dismiss. The court reaffirmed that all people,
including those with DACA status and other noncitizens, should be
treated equally in accessing credit," he said.


ZAHAV: Settles Employees' Class Action Over Tip Policy
------------------------------------------------------
Michael Tanenbaum, writing for PhillyVoice, reports that
Philadelphia's powerhouse Israeli restaurant Zahav, the jewel of
Steve Cook and Michael Solomonov's CookNSolo family, has agreed to
settle a class-action lawsuit filed by a former server who
challenged the restaurant's pooling of tips.

Zahav will pay a total of $230,000 to 41 current and former
employees of the Old City restaurant, according to court documents
obtained by the Associated Press.

The lawsuit was filed over the restaurant's requirement that the
server give $5 in gratuities she earned per shift to an employee
who polished silverware. Lawyers backing the server argued
polishers are not entitled to tips because they do not have any
contact with customers.

Servers represented in the lawsuit contended that the restaurant
was in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Pennsylvania
Minimum Wage Act, and Philadelphia's Gratuity Protection Bill.
The latter does allow for restaurants to require pooling tips, but
only among employees who directly provide service to patrons.

Under the agreement reached in June, the owners of the restaurant
admit no wrongdoing or liability.  The settlement remains subject
to a judge's approval. [GN]


ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES: Robbins Geller Files Class Action in New York
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP ("Robbins Geller") on July 26
disclosed that a class action has been commenced by an
institutional investor on behalf of purchasers of Zebra
Technologies Corporation ("Zebra" or the "Company") common stock
during the period between March 17, 2015 and May 9, 2016 (the
"Class Period").  This action was filed in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York and is
captioned City of Warren Police and Fire Retirement System v.
Zebra Technologies Corp, et al., No. 2:17-cv-04412.

"first quarter results [were] below . . . expectations, with lower
sales and earnings reflecting the continuation of a cautious
enterprise spending environment."

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than 60 days from July 26, 2017.  If you wish to discuss
this action or have any questions concerning this notice or your
rights or interests, please contact plaintiff's counsel,
Samuel H. Rudman or David A. Rosenfeld of Robbins Geller at
800/449-4900 or 619/231-1058, or via e-mail at djr@rgrdlaw.com. If
you are a member of this class, you can view a copy of the
complaint as filed at http://www.rgrdlaw.com/cases/zebra. Any
member of the putative class may move the Court to serve as lead
plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may choose to do
nothing and remain an absent class member.

The complaint charges Zebra and certain of its officers and
directors with violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Zebra designs, manufactures, and sells a wide range of products
that capture and move data, including, mobile computers, barcode
scanners and imagers, radio frequency identification device
readers, wireless LAN solutions and software, and specialty
printers for barcode labeling and personal identification.

The complaint alleges that during the Class Period, defendants
issued materially false and misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose adverse information regarding Zebra's business, prospects
and financial results.  Specifically, defendants failed to
disclose that Zebra had understated its income taxes through the
end of 2015, underaccrued certain 2015 estimates, in particular
with respect to its sales commission plan, and overstated the net
realizable value of trade receivables acquired in connection with
the Company's acquisition of Motorola's Enterprise division.
Zebra also failed to disclose the impact of material weaknesses
identified in its internal controls and procedures over financial
reporting and disclosure, which caused the misstatements and
rendered the Company's financial guidance for 2015 and the first
and second quarters of 2016 materially false and misleading.  As a
result of defendants' false statements, Zebra common stock traded
at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period.

On May 10, 2016, before the open of trading, Zebra announced
disappointing financial results for its first quarter of 2016,
stating that "first quarter results [were] below . . .
expectations, with lower sales and earnings reflecting the
continuation of a cautious enterprise spending environment." Also
on May 10, 2016, Zebra filed its quarterly report on Form 10-Q
with the SEC for the first quarter of 2016, which confirmed that
Zebra had found defects in its internal controls in 2015 that had
impaired its ability to accurately forecast its pretax income and
deferred taxes.  On this news, the price of Zebra stock dropped
more than $11 per share, from a close of $62.58 per share on May
9, 2016 to close at $51.46 per share on May 10, 2016, a one-day
decline of approximately 18%, and a 56% decline from the stock's
Class Period high.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on behalf of all purchasers of
Zebra common stock during the Class Period (the "Class"). The
plaintiff is represented by Robbins Geller, which has extensive
experience in prosecuting investor class actions including actions
involving financial fraud.

With 200 lawyers in 10 offices, Robbins Geller --
http://www.rgrdlaw.com-- represents U.S. and international
investors in securities litigation and portfolio monitoring.
[GN]


ZISHAN INC: Court Enters Default Judgment in "Castillo"
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, Southern District of New York,
issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order entering Default Judgment
against Defendant in the case captioned FREDDY CASTILLO,
Plaintiff, v. ZISHAN, INC., ET AL., Defendants, No. 16 Cv. 6166
(JGK) (S.D.N.Y.), and Defendant's Answer is stricken.

The plaintiff brought this action against the individual defendant
Muhammad Zishan and the corporate defendant Zishan, Inc., alleging
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor
Law.

Then-counsel for the defendants moved to withdraw from the case
and included a notarized consent form signed by Zishan consenting
to the withdrawal. The Court granted the motion and directed
Zishan to find new counsel or submit a statement that he was
appearing pro se, and instructed the corporate defendant Zishan,
Inc. to file a notice of appearance for new counsel.

Order further warned that if either defendant fails to comply with
this order, the plaintiff may seek a default judgment against any
defendant who fails to comply. Deadline passed with no response
from either Zishan or Zishan, Inc. The defendants failed to appear
at the hearing.

There has been a persistent default by the defendants. The
defendants' answer is stricken, and a default judgment against the
defendants is warranted.

Defendants' answer is stricken and a default judgment should be
entered against them after the amount of the judgment is
determined. Therefore, the case is referred to the Magistrate
Judge for an inquest on damages.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 27, 2017 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available http://tinyurl.com/y926j29gfrom
Leagle.com.

Freddy Castillo, Plaintiff, represented by Giustino Cilenti,
Cilenti & Cooper, P.L.L.C. 708 Third Avenue, 6th Floor, New York,
NY 10017

Zishan, Inc., Pro Se.

Muhammad Zishan, Pro Se.


* Gibson Dunn Attorneys Analyze Class Action Settlements
--------------------------------------------------------
Kahn Scolnick, Esq. -- kscolnick@gibsondunn.com -- and
Sheldon Evans, Esq. -- sevans@gibsondunn.com -- of Gibson Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, in an article for Law360, reports that class action
settlements in federal court must be deemed "fair, reasonable, and
adequate" before courts will approve them.  In recent years,
however, obtaining judicial approval of class action settlements
has become more and more difficult, due largely to increased
judicial skepticism of plaintiffs counsel, who face incentives to
sell out the interests of their clients in order to obtain a large
fee award.  Sometimes these concerns are well-founded; other times
they are misplaced.

For instance, judges will often reject settlements as seemingly
unfair on their surface merely because the class plaintiffs do not
recover much.  But this metric of settlement fairness is overly
simplistic and overlooks the economics of settlement: Class
recovery should be commensurate with the strength of the case.  A
weak case is a weak case, and a small settlement is not unfair
when there is a high likelihood that the class could recover
nothing at all if the case moved forward.  Therefore, judges and
practitioners should take a more pragmatic approach at the
settlement approval phase by considering the strength of the case
as the most important factor in the fairness analysis.

In part 1 of this two-part series, we discuss the practical
considerations that parties and their counsel must take into
account when deciding whether to settle or move forward -- and how
judicial hostility to class settlements alters this calculus. We
suggest that settlement fairness is most properly viewed through
the lens of the case's merits, because low-value settlements for
low-value cases are inherently fair, reasonable and adequate.  In
part 2, we will address a maligned and misunderstood tool of class
settlements: the coupon (or voucher) settlement.  In appropriate
cases, vouchers can help ensure that class members receive value
even for weak claims, and they can often leave class members in a
better position than they could hope to achieve without
settlement.

The Class Settlement "Racket"

The Seventh Circuit recently observed that meritless class actions
that "yield[] fees for class counsel and nothing for the class"
are "no better than a racket" and "must end."   There are
countless examples of real-world class action lawsuits that seem
right up this alley, which are almost too absurd to be true and
are brought for the sole purpose of exacting attorneys' fees.
Take, for instance, the plaintiffs who sued the makers of Cap'n
Crunch cereal because they believed "Crunch Berries" were real
fruit.  Or consider the class that sued the makers of soy milk
products, purportedly on behalf of consumers disappointed upon
learning that such products did not contain "milk" from a cow.

Lawsuits like these reflect poorly on our system of justice; they
take up the valuable time of courts and their staff, waste
defendants' resources in defending the case, and offer no real
benefit to the class members in whose name the suit is brought.
While it is optimal to dispose of such cases at the earliest
opportunity, liberal pleading rules may leave courts reluctant to
dismiss even the most dubious legal theories at the pleading
stage.  As a result, rational defendants often elect to settle
these class actions early on in order to minimize the exposure
from legal fees and to ensure finality, given the risk -- however
slight -- of massive liability due to damages that aggregate
across huge classes.

With this backdrop, it is no wonder that a significant number of
class actions settle before trial. But inking a class settlement
is just the start of a new phase of litigation: Class settlements
require court approval to ensure that they are fair, reasonable
and adequate.

Thus, when a class action enters the settlement phase, courts
apply a degree of skepticism, since class plaintiffs lawyers face
an economic incentive to "sell out" the interests of their clients
with a settlement that provides substantial attorneys' fees and
little actual value to the class.  To be sure, this suspicion is
sometimes justified.  And to some extent, a rational defendant
"cares only about the size of the settlement, not how it is
divided between attorneys' fees and compensation for the class."
Therefore, when a class action enters a settlement posture, courts
tend to view themselves as fiduciaries to the absent class
members, rather than as strictly neutral umpires calling balls and
strikes between the parties.

Yet the case law trend may be going too far in the other direction
in rejecting settlements that are entirely fair, reasonable and
adequate -- particularly where the underlying claims serve no
purpose other than the possibility of generating fees for class
counsel.

Settlement Economics 101

Settlement Value Should Largely be Based on the Likely Outcomes of
Litigation

It is well-understood that class actions can impose in terrorem
settlement pressure on defendants.  Even when a plaintiff has only
a small chance of prevailing, a class action may introduce such a
massive potential liability from the defendant's perspective that
it may be too risky to litigate the case through trial -- as the
U.S. Supreme Court recently noted, even "plaintiffs with weak
merits claims" know that "class certification often leads to a
hefty settlement."  Moreover, a successful defense through trial
and appeals can be unduly expensive and burdensome on a company's
executives, employees and in-house legal team.

However, the increased judicial skepticism of class settlements
has had the unintended consequence of making class actions even
more costly and onerous. Even when the underlying claims have
little to no merit, rational defendants may still have no
practical choice but to incur sizable attorneys' fees (and to
stomach the possibility of massive liability exposure, however
unlikely) to litigate the case, faced with the alternative of a
proposed settlement that -- in order to ensure court approval --
may need to overcompensate a class of uninjured and generally
uninterested plaintiffs who in reality deserve nothing from the
case.  After all, when courts ultimately deem a settlement as
"unfair" to the class, the defendant will have wasted considerable
legal fees in connection with the approval briefing and responding
to objectors, as well as the costs of providing notice to the
class. Not only is this inefficient; it is inherently unjust.

Courts across the country utilize a similar set of factors when
considering whether a settlement is "fair, reasonable, and
adequate."  These factors include the risk, expense, complexity
and likely duration of further litigation; the extent of discovery
that has been completed and the current phase of the litigation;
the risk of maintaining class status through trial; the settlement
amount offered; and the views of experienced counsel.

As a matter of common sense and basic fairness, the most important
consideration when evaluating a settlement ought to be the likely
outcome of the case if it proceeded to a resolution on the merits.
In reality, it is exceedingly time consuming, expensive and risky
for plaintiffs to litigate a class action from the pleadings
through discovery, class certification, summary judgment and then
through trial and appeal.  With each successive hurdle in the
litigation, the likelihood of plaintiffs losing and recovering
zero increases substantially. For instance, a string of recent
Supreme Court decisions (including Walmart v. Dukes[12] and
Comcast v. Behrend) have clarified the stringent standards applied
at the certification phase. Moreover, trials are inherently
uncertain and risky.  Even in the abstract, plaintiffs are likely
to prevail less than half the time at best because they generally
bear the high burdens of proof and persuasion.

Notwithstanding these considerations, courts evaluating class
settlements may occasionally become so bogged down in weighing the
various "factors" and looking out for subtle signs of plaintiffs
lawyers behaving badly that they risk overlooking the obvious:
Settlement value is based on likely outcomes of the litigation, so
weak cases should not be worth very much at all. Simply put, the
class members should not fare better with a settlement than they
would without it.

Therefore, courts should take a more pragmatic approach to
settlement approval by putting an increased focus on the merits of
the case -- which is already one of several factors courts are
supposed to consider, but too often this factor receives
insufficient weight in the calculus.  Treating a case's underlying
merit as the primary measuring stick in assessing settlement
fairness would better serve class members, defendants and notions
of judicial economy. [GN]




                         *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Joy A. Agravantefor, Valerie Udtuhan, Julie Anne L. Toledo,
Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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