CAR_Public/170925.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


           Monday, September 25, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 189



                            Headlines

ACE USA: Class Member Challenges Attorney's Fees in Settlement
AJM PACKAGING: Court Refuses to Certify Class in "Copeland" Suit
ALASKA AIR: Virgin America Still Defends Flight Attendants' Suit
ALBUQUERQUE, NM: Court Finds County in Contempt in "McClendon"
ALLIANCE ONE: Certification of Class Sought in "Sievert" Suit

AMERICAN EAGLE: Court Approves $4.8MM TCPA Class Settlement
AMICA MUTUAL: Sued by Carter for Not Paying Auto Insurance Fees
ARROWHEAD PHARMACEUTICALS: Class Action Appeal Pending
ARROWHEAD PHARMACEUTICALS: California Class Suit Underway
AT&T INC: DIRECTV's Motion to Compel Arbitration Denied as Moot

ATWOOD OCEANICS: Defending Class Suits over Merger
AUSTRALIA: Gets Favorable Ruling in Christmas Island Class Action
AVEO GROUP: Denies Claims in Class Actions Over Unfair Contracts
AVEO GROUP: Levitt Robinson Files Suit Over Unfair Contracts
AVEO GROUP: Maurice Blackburn Mulls Suit Over Unfair Contracts

BOB EVANS FARMS: Fails to Pay All Earned Minimum Wages, Carr Says
BOSTON SCIENTIFIC: 48,000 Mesh Claims Filed as of July 26
BOSTON SCIENTIFIC: "Stevens" Class Action Stayed
BOSTON SCIENTIFIC: "Turner" Class Action Stayed
BUHRMAN DESIGN: Chevarria Sues Over Unpaid Work Done Off Clock

CALVARY STAFFING: Wins Prelim. Nod of "Copper" Suit Settlement
CANADA: Oct. 2 Deadline Set for Lemon Creek Fuel Spill Claims
CANADA: CAF Class Action Plaintiffs Seek Consolidation of Cases
CENTRAL AMUSEMENT: Faces "Anderson" Suit in E.D. of New York
CENTRAL FLORIDA: Faces "Carrasquillo-Rivera" Suit in M.D. of Fla.

CHESAPEAKE ENERGY: Faces ERISA Class Suit in Oklahoma
CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Court Consolidates 2 Credit Card Cos.' Suits
CITIGROUP INC: Tomeo Seeks Certification of 2 Classes Under TCPA
CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Class Certification Sought in "Al" Suit
CR BARD: Court Denies Certification Bid in "Barraza"

CYTRX CORPORATION: Motion to Dismiss Class Suit Pending
DIVERSICARE HEALTHCARE: Class Suit in Early Stages
EMCORE CORPORATION: Accrued $0.2MM Cost Related to Mirasol Suit
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Branch" Suit in N. Dist. Calif.
EQUIFAX INC: Faces 3 Data Breach Class Actions in Alabama

EQUIFAX INC: Faces Data Brach Class Action in Washington
EQUIFAX INC: November 13 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
EQUIFAX INC: East Bay Resident Files Data Breach Class Action
EQUIFAX INC: Faces $550MM Data Breach Class Action in Canada
EQUIFAX INC: Faces Data Breach Class Action in Colorado

EQUIFAX INC: Jones Ward Files Data Breach Class Action
EQUIFAX INC: ERI's Shegerian Comments on Data Breach Class Action
FABER AND BRAND: Collection Letter Disputed by "Blakeley" Suit
FIFTH THIRD: Brown Sues for Breaching Promises on Overdraft Fees
FIRED UP HOLDING: "Bates" Suit Alleges FLSA & WARN Act Violations

FITNESS 19 REDLANDS: "Gallion" Hits Unauthorized Account Debiting
FLINT, MI: 6th Cir. Affirms Remand of "Mays" to State Court
GENERAL CABLE: Still Faces ERISA Litigation in Kentucky
GLOBAL TRUST: Al Asks E.D. Wisconsin for Order Certifying Class
GREENSPOON MARDER: Faces "Carlson" Suit in S.D. of New York

GROUP HEALTH: Faces Class Action Over Out-of-Network Coverage
HANOVER INSURANCE: Discovery Ongoing in Durand Litigation
HEALTH INSURANCE: Kirby McInerney Files Securities Suit in NY
HILTON GRAND: Glasser Moves for Certification of Class Under TCPA
ILLINOIS: Prelim. Injunction Bid in Medicaid Applications OK'd

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Talcum Plaintiffs Appeal Class Action Ruling
JOHNSON CONTROLS: Status Hearing Rescheduled for November 28
JOHNSON CONTROLS: Motion to Dismiss "Gumm" Class Suit Pending
LINCOLN NATIONAL: Court Narrows Claims in COI Litigation
LOS LIMONES GROCERY: Santana Sues Over Unpaid Minimum Wage and OT

LUTECH RESOURCES: "Cantrell" Action to Recover Unpaid Overtime
M.L. ZAGER: Settlement in "Griffin" FDCPA Suit Has Final Approval
MARIETTA MEMORIAL: Court Certifies Class in FLSA Suit
MECC CONTRACTING: Faces "Castro" Suit in E.D. of New York
MIDLAND CREDIT: Bid for Judgment on Pleadings in "Sharpe" Denied

MINNE INC: Fails to Pay Overtime Under FLSA & IMWL, Cortez Claims
NCB MANAGEMENT: Faces "Watson" Suit in E.D. of New York
OCWEN FINANCIAL: Accrued $56 Million Cost as of June 30
OCWEN FINANCIAL: Settlement of TCPA Case Awaits Documentation
PACIFIC GAS: Court Narrows Claims in "Greer"

PEOPLE'S UNITED: Investor Fraud Class Action Can Proceed
PHILADELPHIA: School District Faces Gender Discrimination Case
PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Bid to Dismiss Broiler Chicken Suit Underway
PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Motion to Dismiss "Fuller" Action Underway
PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Oklahoma Suit by Chicken Farmers Underway

PULASKI COUNTY, IN: Court Certifies Class in ADA Suit
PPL CORPORATION: Class Suit Filed Against LG&E in Kentucky
RESCARE INC: Misclassifies Class as Exempt Workers, Bradley Says
RICHARD SOKOLOFF: Faces "Bonti" Suit in Eastern District of NY
RIVIANA FOODS: New York Court Dismisses "Stewart"

RIZZA BUICK: Sued by "Fusilier" Over Unpaid Minimum Wages
SANDRIDGE MISSISSIPPIAN: Court Narrows Claims in "Nibur"
SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS: First Circuit Appeal Underway
SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS: Appeal in "Kader" Case Pending
SEVCON INC: Rigrodsky & Long Files Securities Class Action

SOUTHWESTERN ENERGY: New Trial Sought in Arkansas Royalty Suit
SPEEDWAY: Sued Over Illinois Biometrics Privacy Law Violation
SPEEDWAY LLC: Teggerdine Seeks to Certify Class of Gas Purchasers
SQUARETWO FINANCIAL: Ohio Consumers Class Can't Proceed with Suit
ST. AUGUSTINE OLD: Accused by "Armas" Suit of Not Paying Overtime

SUNRISE CREDIT: "Aguilar" Disputes Collection Letter
UNIT CORP: Class Certification Issues Pending in Panola Case
UNIT CORP: Cockerell Oil Suit Remains Pending in Oklahoma
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Court Narrows Claims in ERISA Suit
UNIVERSAL ELECTRIC: Class Certification Sought in "Kotov" Suit

US TOBACCO: Approval of Class Settlement Sought in "Speaks" Suit
VIP SYSTEMS: Faces "Arguinzonez" Suit in S.D. of Florida
VOLKSWAGEN AG: October 30 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
WD MASONRY: Refuses to Pay Overtime, "Austria" Class Suit Alleges

* Congress Holds Hearing on FCRA Liability Harmonization Act
* Wells Fargo, Equifax Cases Amplify Importance of Senate Bill 33






                            *********


ACE USA: Class Member Challenges Attorney's Fees in Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
Charmaine Little, writing for Florida Record, reports that a class
member in a Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) lawsuit has
ruffled feathers as he challenged the attorney's fees requested in
a $9.7 million settlement.

Freddie Glover was a part of the lawsuit that revolved around
American Insurance Company and ACE USA Inc. (Ace) allegedly making
illegal calls to people on the National Do Not Disturb Call
Registry.  He allegedly received more than one phone call from Ace
within a year, despite his telephone number being registered on
the registry for at least 30 days.

The class of nearly 1 million people was granted $9.7 million from
Ace.

On August 24, Mr. Glover took to the United States District Court
Southern District of Florida, Miami Division to object to the
settlement and attorneys' fee request of $2.9 million in Justin
Mark Boise v. ACE American Insurance Company.  In that case,
Boise, the lead plaintiff in the class-action suit, claims the
class counsel only incurred $151,714.26 in attorney's fees,
despite asking for nearly $3 million.

Mr. Glover argues, among other things, that the class counsels'
proposed 30 percent fee goes beyond 25 percent limit set by the
11th Circuit. Ultimately, Glover wants the "excess from the
reduced fee" to be given to class members, according to court
filing.

Mr. Boise responded to Mr. Glover's objection on August 25. He
claimed that Mr. Glover's counsel, Christopher Bandas, "is a known
serial or repeat objector who routinely lodges cookie-cutter
objections in consumer class-action settlements."

The counsel submitted a subpoena against Mr. Glover to appear at a
deposition "and for production of documents."

Boise also has requested Glover's "basis" for challenging the
settlement as well as the part he played in objecting to this and
other settlements and even his connection to Mr. Bandas "behind
the scenes" as Boise has alleged that Mr. Bandas could be
"manipulating" Mr. Glover.

Mr. Boise petitioned the court for a leave to research the matter
and for the deposition the following week. [GN]


AJM PACKAGING: Court Refuses to Certify Class in "Copeland" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Robert H. Cleland entered an opinion and order in the
lawsuit styled DARIUS COPELAND v. A.J.M. PACKAGING CORPORATION,
Case No. 2:17-cv-10216-RHC-SDD (E.D. Mich.), denying the
Plaintiff's motion for conditional class certification, without
prejudice unless and until he can make the requisite evidentiary
showing.

The Plaintiff's affidavit claiming confusion over his method of
overtime payment is bereft of any "facts showing that he has
actual or constructive knowledge that his fellow crew members"
suffered the same problems he alleges, Judge Cleland opines,
citing Combs v. Twins Group, No. 16-295, 2016 WL 7230854, at *3
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 12, 2016); and Lankford v. CWL Investments, LLC,
No. 13-14441, 2014 WL 3956184, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2014).

"Though only a 'modest factual showing' is required, Plaintiff has
failed to meet that burden at this time," Judge Cleland notes,
among other things.

In his complaint, the Plaintiff contends that while he worked for
the Defendant he was paid inadequate overtime wages in violation
of Section 206 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and he asks the
court to conditionally certify a class of other employees that
Defendant admits to paying under the same method of wage
calculation.

A copy of the Opinion and Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=P9vP3MFJ


ALASKA AIR: Virgin America Still Defends Flight Attendants' Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska Air Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that Virgin America
continues to defend class suit filed by flight attendants.

In 2015, three flight attendants filed a class action lawsuit
seeking to represent all Virgin America flight attendants for
damages based on alleged violations of California and City of San
Francisco wage and hour laws. Plaintiffs received class
certification in November 2016.

Virgin America filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to
dismiss all claims on various federal preemption grounds.

In January 2017, the Court denied in part and granted in part
Virgin America's motion.

Virgin America believes the claims in this case are without
factual and legal merit and intends to defend this lawsuit.

Alaska Air completed the acquisition of Virgin America on December
14, 2016, positioning it as the fifth largest airline in the U.S.
with a unique ability to serve West Coast travelers.


ALBUQUERQUE, NM: Court Finds County in Contempt in "McClendon"
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
issued a Memorandum opinion and Order denying Plaintiff and
Plaintiff-Intervenors' Joint Motion for Show Cause Order in the
case captioned JIMMY (BILLY) McCLENDON, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, et al., Defendants. E.M., R.L., W.A., D.J.,
P.S., and N.W., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff-Intervenors, Case No. 95 CV 024 JAP/KBM
(D.N.M.).

Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Intervenors ask the Court to order the
County Defendants to show cause why they are not in contempt of
the Settlement Agreement approved by the Court on June 27, 2017,
and other orders of the Court.  The Movants also ask the Court to
order additional remedial relief.  The County opposes the Joint
Motion.

On March 2, 2017, the Court allowed the American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees Council 18, Local 2499, AFL-
CIO, CLC, to intervene for purposes of addressing the Joint
Motion.  The Union represents a large majority of MDC's security
employees.

On June 13, 2017, the Court held an evidentiary hearing. At the
end of the hearing, the Court asked Movants, the County, and the
Union to file post-hearing briefs.

Movants argue that the County is violating certain provisions of
the SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT and CHECK-OUT AUDIT AGREEMENT No. 2: THE
PROVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES AT THE BERNALILLO COUNTY
METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER.  Specifically, Movants claim that
the County is failing to provide the requisite training to
security employees3 who work in units where inmates with mental
illness and mental disabilities (special management inmates) are
housed (special management units). Movants argue that under the
2015 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the Union, the
County must allow MDC security employees, who do not have the
necessary training or specialized skills, to bid according to
seniority into positions in special management units. Movants
further assert that when those security employees are accused of
misconduct, MDC does not reassign them and timely investigate the
allegations of misconduct. Movants contend that by failing to
train, supervise, and reassign security employees, the County
violates COA2 and the Court's orders. In addition, Movants assert
these failures violate the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. Sec 12132 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. Sec 794 (RA) (together, the ADA).

2015 Collective Bargaining Agreement

Section 10.5 of the 2015 CBA provides:

     "Any permanent change of work schedule (shift/days off/post
assignment) requires a two week notice in writing to the employee
by the Chief of Corrections. Reassignments due to disciplinary
issues can be immediate (post final action), but the two-week
notice before the permanent change is still required. An employee
may not be moved from their bid position without just cause. Just
cause is not defined in the CBA. The 2015 CBA expired on June 30,
2017, and the Union and the County are negotiating a replacement
CBA. The 2015 CBA, however, remains in effect until a new CBA is
executed."

In response to the complaints of inmate mistreatment, MDC
administrators disbanded HSU 6 and moved the special management
inmates into other housing units known as PAC units. Recently, Dr.
Metzner has recommended that MDC reinstate HSU 6 because housing
segregated special management inmates in the same unit better
facilitates treatment and access to programming. However, Movants
maintain that whether or not the HSU 6 is reinstated, MDC must
ensure that security employees in all special management units are
properly trained and have the specialized skills and temperament
to accommodate the needs of special management inmates and to
comply with COA2 and the Court's orders.

Movants argue that the County is violating COA2 and the 1996 ORDER
by allowing untrained employees to work in special management
units and that the County is violating the ADA by not removing
abusive or negligent employees from those units. Movants allege
specifically that MDC violates COA2, the Court's orders, and the
ADA in three ways: (1) MDC fails to adequately train security
employees who work with special management inmates; (2) MDC allows
security employees to bid into special management units despite
their lack of training and special skills necessary for
appropriate treatment of special management inmates; and (3) MDC
inadequately supervises and disciplines security employees who
violate MDC policies or mistreat special management inmates.
Movants further contend that to the extent the CBA causes the
County to violate this Court's orders or the ADA, it is
unenforceable.

The Court agrees with Professor Hughes' general finding that
temporary removals do not per se require just cause. The Court
concludes that under CBA Section 10.5, MDC has authority to
immediately transfer, pending an investigation, any security
employee in a bid position in a special management unit who acts
abusively toward special management inmates. Under COA2, the
Court's extant orders, and the ADA, the MDC must temporarily
reassign a security employee who abusively interacts with a
special management inmate. In sum, CBA Section 10.5 does not
require MDC to prove just cause before temporarily reassigning a
security employee while conducting an investigation of the
security employee's alleged mistreatment of a special management
inmate. Moreover, CBA Section 10.5 allows MDC to permanently
reassign that same security employee if the allegations are
confirmed because misconduct constitutes just cause under Section
10.5.

Despite MDC's training deficiencies and hesitance when faced with
allegations of abuse, the Court believes that, at this time, there
is insufficient evidence to hold the County in contempt of the SA
or COA2 and its incorporated orders. However, the County must
improve in the MDC's mental health services before the Court will
be able to find substantial compliance with COA2.

First and foremost, the County must require all MDC security
employees (1) to successfully complete the 40-hour training to
prepare them for working with special management inmates, and (2)
to undergo annual in-service mental health training. The County
should direct MDC to closely supervise security employees and to
promptly investigate of allegations of abuse of special management
inmates by security employees.

This will go a long way toward improving MDC's mental health
services and ensuring an eventual finding of substantial
compliance for this domain.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 11, 2017,
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/yauern34from Leagle.com.

Peter Sumatkaku, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan Jacob Guss --
jon@ginlawfirm.com --  Garcia Ives Nowara.

Peter Sumatkaku, Plaintiff, represented by Mark T. Baker, Peifer -
mbaker@peiferlaw.com -- Hanson and Mullins, Mark H. Donatelli,
Rothstein Law Firm, 1215 Paseo De Peralta, Santa Fe, NM 87501,
USA, Mary (Molly) E. Schmidt-Nowara, GARCIA IVES NOWARA, 924 2nd
Street NW, Suite A, Albuquerque, NM 87102, Peter Schoenburg,
Rothstein Donatelli LLP, 500 4th Street NW Suite 400 Albuquerque,
NM 87102, Philip B. Davis, Philip B. Davis, Attorney at Law, 814
Marquette NW, Albuquerque, USA NM 87102, & Zachary A. Ives --
zach@ginlawfirm.com -GARCIA IVES NOWARA.

Marc A Gillette, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan Jacob Guss,
Garcia Ives Nowara, Mark T. Baker, Peifer Hanson and Mullins, Mark
H. Donatelli, Rothstein Law Firm, Mary (Molly) E. Schmidt-Nowara,
GARCIA IVES NOWARA, Peter Schoenburg, Rothstein Donatelli LLP,
Philip B. Davis, Philip B. Davis, Attorney at Law & Zachary A.
Ives, GARCIA IVES NOWARA.

George Chavez, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan Jacob Guss,
Garcia Ives Nowara, Mark T. Baker, Peifer Hanson and Mullins, Mark
H. Donatelli, Rothstein Law Firm, Mary (Molly) E. Schmidt-Nowara,
GARCIA IVES NOWARA, Peter Schoenburg, Rothstein Donatelli LLP,
Philip B. Davis, Philip B. Davis, Attorney at Law & Zachary A.
Ives, GARCIA IVES NOWARA.

Eliseo Baca, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan Jacob Guss, Garcia
Ives Nowara, Mark T. Baker, Peifer Hanson and Mullins, Mark H.
Donatelli, Rothstein Law Firm, Mary (Molly) E. Schmidt-Nowara,
GARCIA IVES NOWARA, Peter Schoenburg, Rothstein Donatelli LLP,
Philip B. Davis, Philip B. Davis, Attorney at Law & Zachary A.
Ives, GARCIA IVES NOWARA.

Clint Barras, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan Jacob Guss,
Garcia Ives Nowara, Mark T. Baker, Peifer Hanson and Mullins, Mark
H. Donatelli, Rothstein Law Firm, Mary (Molly) E. Schmidt-Nowara,
GARCIA IVES NOWARA, Peter Schoenburg, Rothstein Donatelli LLP,
Philip B. Davis, Philip B. Davis, Attorney at Law & Zachary A.
Ives, GARCIA IVES NOWARA.

Francisco Melendez, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan Jacob Guss,
Garcia Ives Nowara, Mark T. Baker, Peifer Hanson and Mullins, Mark
H. Donatelli, Rothstein Law Firm, Mary (Molly) E. Schmidt-Nowara,
GARCIA IVES NOWARA, Peter Schoenburg, Rothstein Donatelli LLP,
Philip B. Davis, Philip B. Davis, Attorney at Law & Zachary A.
Ives, GARCIA IVES NOWARA.

Samual Herrod, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan Jacob Guss,
Garcia Ives Nowara, Mark T. Baker, Peifer Hanson and Mullins, Mark
H. Donatelli, Rothstein Law Firm, Mary (Molly) E. Schmidt-Nowara,
GARCIA IVES NOWARA, Peter Schoenburg, Rothstein Donatelli LLP,
Philip B. Davis, Philip B. Davis, Attorney at Law & Zachary A.
Ives, GARCIA IVES NOWARA.

Vincent Padilla, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan Jacob Guss,
Garcia Ives Nowara, Mark T. Baker, Peifer Hanson and Mullins, Mark
H. Donatelli, Rothstein Law Firm, Mary (Molly) E. Schmidt-Nowara,
GARCIA IVES NOWARA, Peter Schoenburg, Rothstein Donatelli LLP,
Philip B. Davis, Philip B. Davis, Attorney at Law & Zachary A.
Ives, GARCIA IVES NOWARA.

Carl Duckworth, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan Jacob Guss,
Garcia Ives Nowara, Mark T. Baker, Peifer Hanson and Mullins, Mark
H. Donatelli, Rothstein Law Firm, Mary (Molly) E. Schmidt-Nowara,
GARCIA IVES NOWARA, Peter Schoenburg, Rothstein Donatelli LLP,
Philip B. Davis, Philip B. Davis, Attorney at Law & Zachary A.
Ives -- zach@ginlawfirm.com --  GARCIA IVES NOWARA.

EM, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by Claire Dickson -
cdickson@disabilitylawco.org -- David Meilleur, Law Offices of
Nancy L. Simmons,  120 Girard Boulevard, South East Albuquerque,
NM 87106-2228, Mary (Molly) E. Schmidt-Nowara, GARCIA IVES NOWARA,
Nancy L. Simmons, Law Offices of Nancy L Simmons PC, 120 Girard
Blvd SE, Albuquerque, NM 87106, USA, Peter Cubra, Law Office of
Peter Cubra, 3500 Comanche Rd NE; Albuquerque, New Mexico 87107,
Philip B. Davis, Philip B. Davis, Attorney at Law, 1000 Lomas
Blvd. NW, Albuquerque, NM 87102, Ryan J. Villa & Kelly K.
Waterfall, Law Firm of Ryan J. Villa, 2501 Rio Grande Blvd NW a,
Albuquerque, NM 87104, USA

RL, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by Claire Dickson, David
Meilleur, Law Offices of Nancy L. Simmons, Mary (Molly) E.
Schmidt-Nowara, GARCIA IVES NOWARA, Nancy L. Simmons, Law Offices
of Nancy L Simmons PC, Peter Cubra, Law Office of Peter Cubra,
Philip B. Davis, Philip B. Davis, Attorney at Law, Ryan J. Villa &
Kelly K. Waterfall, Law Firm of Ryan J. Villa.

WA, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by Claire Dickson, David
Meilleur, Law Offices of Nancy L. Simmons, Mark H. Donatelli,
Rothstein Law Firm, Mary (Molly) E. Schmidt-Nowara, GARCIA IVES
NOWARA, Nancy L. Simmons, Law Offices of Nancy L Simmons PC, Peter
Cubra, Law Office of Peter Cubra, Philip B. Davis, Philip B.
Davis, Attorney at Law, Ryan J. Villa & Kelly K. Waterfall, Law
Firm of Ryan J. Villa.

DJ, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by Claire Dickson, David
Meilleur, Law Offices of Nancy L. Simmons, Mark H. Donatelli,
Rothstein Law Firm, Mary (Molly) E. Schmidt-Nowara, GARCIA IVES
NOWARA, Nancy L. Simmons, Law Offices of Nancy L Simmons PC, Peter
Cubra, Law Office of Peter Cubra, Philip B. Davis, Philip B.
Davis, Attorney at Law, Ryan J. Villa & Kelly K. Waterfall, Law
Firm of Ryan J. Villa.

PS, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by Claire Dickson, David
Meilleur, Law Offices of Nancy L. Simmons, Mark H. Donatelli,
Rothstein Law Firm, Mary (Molly) E. Schmidt-Nowara, GARCIA IVES
NOWARA, Nancy L. Simmons, Law Offices of Nancy L Simmons PC, Peter
Cubra, Law Office of Peter Cubra, Philip B. Davis, Philip B.
Davis, Attorney at Law, Ryan J. Villa & Kelly K. Waterfall, Law
Firm of Ryan J. Villa.

NW, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by David Meilleur, Law
Offices of Nancy L. Simmons, Mary (Molly) E. Schmidt-Nowara,
GARCIA IVES NOWARA, Nancy L. Simmons, Law Offices of Nancy L
Simmons PC, Peter Cubra, Law Office of Peter Cubra, Philip B.
Davis, Philip B. Davis, Attorney at Law, Ryan J. Villa & Kelly K.
Waterfall, Law Firm of Ryan J. Villa.

City of Albuquerque, Defendant, represented by Debra J. Moulton,
Kennedy, Moulton & Wells PC, 2201 San Pedro N.E.Building 2Suite
105Albuquerque, NM 87110 & Kathryn Levy, City of Albuquerque Legal
Department.

Martin Chavez, Defendant, represented by Kathryn Levy.
County of Bernalillo, Defendant, represented by Marcus J. Rael,
Jr., Robles, Rael & Anaya, PC,  500 Marquette Ave. NW Suite 700
Albuquerque, NM 87102

Alan C. Torgerson, Miscellaneous, Pro Se.

AFSCME Local 2499, Intervenor, represented by Shane C. Youtz,
Youtz & Valdez PC & Stephen Curtice, Youtz & Valdez, PC, 900 Gold
Avenue SouthWestAlbuquerque, NM 87102

Michael Sisneros, Defendant, Pro Se.

Bernalillo County Board of Commissioners, Defendant, represented
by Luis E. Robles, Robles, Rael & Anaya, P.C. & Marcus J. Rael,
Jr., Robles, Rael & Anaya, PC.


ALLIANCE ONE: Certification of Class Sought in "Sievert" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judith Sievert moves the Court to certify the class described in
the complaint of the lawsuit styled JUDITH SIEVERT, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. ALLIANCE ONE
RECEIVABLES MANAGEMENT, INC., Case No. 2:17-cv-01217-WED (E.D.
Wisc.), and further asks that the Court both stay the motion for
class certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant)
relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules
and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Damasco and decisions like it imposed significant burdens on the
Court and on Plaintiff's Counsel, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011),
overruled, Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th
Cir. 2015).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence, the
Plaintiff states.  The Plaintiff asserts that the Plaintiff is
obligated to move for class certification to protect the interests
of the putative class.

The Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 2016
U.S. LEXIS 846 *14-15 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2016) (internal citations
omitted) and Chapman should have put a stop to this practice.
Unfortunately, they have not, the Plaintiff notes.  In dicta, the
Supreme Court left open the possibility that a defendant facing a
class action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's claim with the court and having the court enter
judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to a class certification
motion.  Campbell-Ewald Co., 2016 U.S. LEXIS 846 *19 ("We need
not, and do not, now decide whether the result would be different
if a defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff's
individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the
court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount.").

As the Motion is a placeholder motion as described in Damasco, the
parties and the Court should not be burdened with unnecessary
paperwork and the resulting expense when a one paragraph, single
page motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative
and further asks the Court to appoint Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as
class counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=VV0ZfFCT

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
                  jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com


AMERICAN EAGLE: Court Approves $4.8MM TCPA Class Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order certifying the Settlement Class,
approving the Class Settlement as fair and reasonable, and denying
in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Service Awards, Attorneys' Fees,
and Costs, in the case captioned CHRISTINA MELITO, CHRISTOPHER
LEGG, ALISON PIERCE and WALTER WOOD, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN EAGLE
OUTFITTERS, INC., and AEO MANAGEMENT CO., Defendants. AMERICAN
EAGLE OUTFITTERS, INC., and AEO MANAGEMENT CO., Third-Party
Plaintiffs, v. EXPERIAN MARKETING SOLUTIONS, INC., Third-Party
Defendant, No. 14-CV-2440 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiffs and Defendants American Eagle Outfitters, Inc., and AEO
Management Co. (AEO) reached a conditional settlement of the
action.  The Court conditionally certified a settlement class
(Settlement Class), preliminarily approved the class action
settlement (Class Settlement), approved the notice plan, and
scheduled a final approval hearing (Final Approval Hearing).

Nine Class Members asked to be excluded from the Settlement Class.
Class Counsel received timely objections from: Kara and Brooke
Bowes, Patrick Sweeney and Kerry Ann Sweeney, and Third-Party
Defendant Experian Approximately three months after the deadline
to submit objections, Preliminary Approval Order, The Court
received via email an objection from Kristian Mierzwicki who
purports to be a class member. The Sweeney objections were
ultimately withdrawn.

Experian's primary objection to the Class Settlement is that
Plaintiffs lack Article III standing, and therefore, the Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Class Settlement and
the case.

To establish Article III standing, the plaintiff must have (1)
suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.

The Second Circuit elaborated, "Where Congress confers a
procedural right in order to protect a concrete interest, a
violation of the procedure may demonstrate a sufficient 'risk of
real harm' to the underlying interest to establish concrete injury
without 'need [to] allege any additional harm beyond the one
Congress has identified. In considering whether a bare procedural
violation is sufficient to constitute a concrete injury, the
central inquiry is whether the alleged bare procedural violation
of a statute presents a material risk of harm to the underlying
concrete interest Congress sought to protect in passing" the
statute.   It follows that if a bare procedural violation can
cause concrete injury, then a violation of substantive rights
created by Congress must surely cause a concrete injury."

Concrete Injuries Under the TCPA

In the context of the TCPA, the Second Circuit has held, post-
Spokeo, that the plaintiff's receipt of "a prerecorded voicemail
message, to which [the plaintiff] later listened, on an answering
device in the place where [the plaintiff] resided and to which he
had legitimate access" was a concrete injury sufficient for
Article III standing.

The Second Circuit explicitly did not decide whether the alleged
violation of the TCPA would, by itself, be sufficient to establish
injury in fact. But because the TCPA protects consumers from
certain telephonic contacts, the plaintiff's receipt of such an
alleged contact in the way described demonstrates more than a bare
violation and satisfies the concrete-injury requirement for
standing.

Experian Contends That Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged A Concrete
Injury.

The Court held that in any event, Leyse v. Lifetime Entertainment
Services controls the outcome in this case. The Second Circuit in
Leyse concluded that the plaintiff's receipt of an unconsented to
voicemail message was sufficient to establish a concrete injury.
If an unauthorized voicemail is concrete injury, then this Court
fails to see how unauthorized text messages are not also concrete
injury.

Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have adequately
alleged injury in fact sufficient to establish Article III
standing.

In certifying a class action for settlement, the Court must ensure
that the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure have been met. Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443
F.3d 253, 270

Rule 23(a) is Satisfied.

The Court finds that the Settlement Class satisfies the
requirements of Rule 23(a). Because there are 618,301 individual
members in the settlement class, the numerosity requirement is
satisfied.

The case raises numerous questions of law and fact common to the
class, including the issue of whether AEO is vicariously liable
for text messages that were sent on its behalf and whether the
system by which the texts were sent is an ATDS; accordingly, the
commonality requirement is satisfied.

The Court also finds that the typicality requirement is satisfied
because the claims and defenses of the class representatives are
typical of those of the Settlement Class; all claims arise from
the same events their receipt of AEO text messages on their cell
phones) and are based on the same legal theory liability under the
TCPA.

Lastly, to find adequacy, the Court must consider "(i) whether the
class representatives' claims conflict with those of the class and
(ii) whether class counsel is qualified, experienced, and
generally able to conduct the litigation  Both of those
considerations are met here. The class representatives' interests
are aligned with the interests of the Settlement Class: all seek
recovery under the TCPA for receipt of unwanted text messages from
AEO. In addition, Class Counsel are attorneys experienced in class
action (including TCPA) litigation.

The statutory damages available under the TCPA (up to $500 per
violation or up to $1,500 if the violation is willful, see 47
U.S.C. Section 227(b)(3)) are small in comparison to the time,
effort and expense of litigation. In addition, the resolution of
all TCPA claims held by the Settlement Class in a single class
action proceeding promotes judicial efficiency and the uniformity
of decision. Therefore, the Court finds that a class action is a
superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this
case.

Experian's Objections to Class Certification Are Unavailing.
Experian propounds two objections that are not mooted by the
Court's rejection of its standing objection: the Settlement Class
is unascertainable, Exp. Obj. 13; and the class definition
improperly includes members who did not receive a text message via
an ATDS,  The Court is not convinced that Experian has standing to
raise these objections, but even if it does, its objections are
without merit.

Experian's Standing to Object

If the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have standing and approves
the Class Settlement, Experian's previously-filed motion to
dismiss the third-party action, in which Experian argued that
Plaintiffs lack standing, will be denied. Although true,15
Experian was allowed to press its objection that Plaintiffs lack
standing. Having denied that objection, the Court sees no legal
prejudice to Experian from this settlement.

Because the Class Settlement will not deprive Experian of any
legal claim or defense, it lacks standing to object to that
settlement. But even if Experian had standing, its objections
would fail.

Even if Experian Had Standing, Its Objections Would Fail.

The ascertainability doctrine that governs in this Circuit
requires only that a class be defined using objective criteria
that establish a membership with definite boundaries. Experian's
objection to ascertainability is meritless because the settling
parties have identified the 618,301 individual members comprising
the Settlement Class, and that Class List has been filed with the
Court and placed under seal. The Settlement Class is clearly
ascertainable.

In short, all of Experian's objections to this Class Settlement
are either overruled or dismissed. For the reasons discussed
supra, the Court concludes that the requirements of Rule 23(a) and
Rule 23(b)(3) are satisfied and certifies the Settlement Class.

The Class Settlement Is Fair, Adequate, and Reasonable.

The district court may approve the class-action settlement only if
it determines that the settlement is fair, adequate, and
reasonable, and not a product of collusion. The court determines
that the settlement is fair by looking at both the settlement's
terms and the negotiating process leading to settlement.  In doing
so, the court reviews the settlement for both procedural and
substantive fairness.

The Objections to Class Settlement Are Overruled

There were four timely objections to the Class Settlement, and one
that was untimely. Two of the timely objections were withdrawn.
The Court dismisses two other objections for lack of standing and
overrules one as meritless.

Ms. Brooke Bowes and Mr. Mierzwicki Lack Standing to Object.

Brooke Bowes and Mr. Mierzwicki objected to the fairness of the
Class Settlement, but neither is a member of the Settlement Class.
Because they are not parties to the settlement, their rights and
claims, if any, against AEO are not impacted by this Class
Settlement.

Therefore, Ms. Brooke Bowes and Mr. Mierzwicki's objections are
dismissed for lack of standing.

Motion for Service Awards, Attorneys' Fees, and Costs

Plaintiffs move for: incentive awards in the amount of $10,000 to
each of the four named Plaintiffs; attorneys' fees for Class
Counsel in the amount of $4,832,850, which is one-third of the
settlement fund; and $110,732.71 in costs.

To the extent that the class representatives incurred any expenses
in furtherance of this litigation, the Court is not opposed to
reimbursing those expenses. But Class Counsel have not provided
any documentation of the class representatives' expenses. In
addition, Class Counsel have neither provided documentation of the
time or effort that each representative expended in furtherance of
this case nor identified any personal risks or burdens incurred by
the representatives. At the Final Approval Hearing, Class Counsel
proffered that each class representative searched for and produced
documents, assisted in the preparation of interrogatory responses
concerning their claims, and provided seven to eight hours of
deposition testimony.

Based on these facts, the Court concludes that an incentive award
of $2,500 to each of the class representatives, which represents a
recovery of more than ten times what class members receive and
reflects ample compensation for the limited time they invested, is
fair and reasonable.

Plaintiffs also move for an award of attorneys' fees and costs,
requesting an award of $4,832,850 (one-third of the settlement
fund) in attorneys' fees and reimbursement of $110,732.71 in
litigation costs.

The Court concludes that an award of $4,350,000, which is 2.1
times the reported lodestar (which, as noted, the Court finds to
be somewhat inflated), or 30% of the settlement fund) in
attorneys' fees is fair and reasonable.

It is well-established that counsel who create a common fund like
this one are entitled to the reimbursement of litigation costs and
expenses.  Class Counsel seek reimbursement of $110,732.71 in
litigation expenses, comprised of expert fees to identify class
members, among other things, as well as general litigation
expenses.

The Court finds that most of these litigation expenses are
reasonable, with the exception of Class Counsel's requests for
reimbursement of: "Reproductions & Scans," which Ms. Terrell
withdrew during the Final Approval Hearing; and Westlaw expenses,
which as explained during the Final Approval Hearing, should be
part of a law firm's overhead. Accordingly, the Court grants Class
Counsel $104,785.52 in litigation expenses.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 11, 2017
Opinion and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y7wgkpjo
from Leagle.com.

Christina Melito, Plaintiff, represented by Adrienne D. McEntee --
amcentee@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell Marshall Daudt & Willie
PLLC, pro hac vice.

Christina Melito, Plaintiff, represented by Beth Ellen Terrell --
beth@terrellmarshall.com --  Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC, pro
hac vice, Brian Scott Schaffer, Fitapelli & Schaffer LLP, Frank
Joseph Mazzaferro, Fitapelli & Schaffer LLP, Joseph A. Fitapelli,
Fitapelli & Schaffer, 28 Liberty Street, New York, NY 10005,
Joseph Jeremy Siprut, Siprut PC -- jsiprut@siprut.com -- pro hac
vice, Keith J. Keogh, Keogh Law, Ltd,  55 W Monroe St #3390,
Chicago, IL 60603, USA & Mary B. Reiten --
mreiten@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell Marshall Daudt & Willie,
pro hac vice.

Ryan Metzger, Plaintiff, represented by Adrienne D. McEntee,
Terrell Marshall Daudt & Willie PLLC, pro hac vice, Joseph Jeremy
Siprut, Siprut PC, pro hac vice & Beth Ellen Terrell, Terrell
Marshall Law Group PLLC, pro hac vice.

Alison Pierce, Plaintiff, represented by Adrienne D. McEntee,
Terrell Marshall Daudt & Willie PLLC, pro hac vice, Joseph Jeremy
Siprut, Siprut PC, pro hac vice, Keith J. Keogh, Keogh Law, Ltd &
Beth Ellen Terrell, Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC, pro hac vice.
Gene Ellis, Plaintiff, represented by Brian Scott Schaffer,
Fitapelli & Schaffer LLP.

Walter Wood, Plaintiff, represented by Ismael Tariq Salam, Siprut
PC, pro hac vice, Joseph Jeremy Siprut, Siprut PC, pro hac vice,
Adrienne D. McEntee, Terrell Marshall Daudt & Willie PLLC, Bradley
Keith King, Ahdoot and Wolfson, P.C., pro hac vice, Keith J.
Keogh, Keogh Law, Ltd & Beth Ellen Terrell, Terrell Marshall Law
Group PLLC, pro hac vice.

Christopher Legg, Plaintiff, represented by Keith J. Keogh, Keogh
Law, Ltd, pro hac vice, Keith J. Keogh, Keogh Law, LTD, Michael
Hilicki, Keogh Law LTD, pro hac vice, Patrick Christopher Crotty,
The Law Office of Scott D. Owens, Scott David Owens, SCOTT D.
OWENS, P.A., pro hac vice, Adrienne D. McEntee, Terrell Marshall
Daudt & Willie PLLC, pro hac vice, Joseph Jeremy Siprut, Siprut
PC, pro hac vice, Michael Karnuth, Keogh Law, Ltd & Beth Ellen
Terrell, Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC, pro hac vice.

American Eagle Outfitters, Inc., a Delaware corporation,
Defendant, represented by Craig Mariam -- cmariam@grsm.com --
Gordon and Rees LLP, Kristie Morgan Simmerman
ksimmerman@gordonrees.com  -- Gordon & Rees LLP & Richard T.
Victoria -- rvictoria@grsm.com -- Meyer, Unkovic & Scott, LLP, pro
hac vice.

eBay Enterprise, Inc., f/k/a eBay Enterprise Marketing Solutions,
Inc., Defendant, represented by Ana Tagvoryan --
ATagvoryan@BlankRome.com -- Blank Rome LLP, Jeffrey Neal Rosenthal
-- Rosenthal-J@BlankRome.com -- Blank Rome, LLP, Joshua Briones --
Jbriones@mintz.com -- Blank Rome LLP, pro hac vice & Sridavi
Ganesan --  sganesan@romeandassociates.com -- Blank Rome LLP.

American Eagle Outfitters & AEO Management Co., ThirdParty
Plaintiff, represented by Richard T. Victoria, Meyer, Unkovic &
Scott, LLP.

Kara Bowes, Objector, represented by Eric Alan Isaacson --
ericalanisaacson@icloud.com -- Law Office of Eric Alan Isaacson.
Brooke Bowes, Objector, represented by Eric Alan Isaacson, Law
Office of Eric Alan Isaacson & Charles Benjamin Nutley, Attorney
At Law,1055 E Colorado Blvd Fl 5. Pasadena, CA 91106

eBay Enterprise, Inc., f/k/a eBay Enterprise Marketing Solutions,
Inc., Miscellaneous, represented by Ana Tagvoryan, Blank Rome LLP
& Jeffrey Neal Rosenthal, Blank Rome, LLP.

American Eagle Outfitters & AEO Management Co., ThirdParty
Plaintiff, represented by Richard T. Victoria, Meyer, Unkovic &
Scott, LLP.


AMICA MUTUAL: Sued by Carter for Not Paying Auto Insurance Fees
---------------------------------------------------------------
FRISBY MILES CARTER, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a Rhode Island
Corporation, and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Case No. 1:17-cv-02156 (D.
Colo., September 7, 2017), arises out of AMICA's alleged practice
of unlawfully failing to pay its insureds -- specifically holders
of AMICA automobile insurance policies -- certain statutory
mandated fees in the event an automobile accident or other event
results in a total loss determination by AMICA for the insured's
vehicle.

AMICA is a Rhode Island corporation, with its corporate
headquarters located in the state of Rhode Island.  AMICA also
conducts a substantial amount of business nationwide, including in
Colorado.  The Plaintiff is unaware of the true names and capacity
of the Doe Defendants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brett N. Huff, Esq.
          HUFF & LESLIE LLP
          2480 Gray Street
          Edgewater, CO 80214
          Telephone: (303) 232-3622
          Facsimile: (303) 274-9638
          E-mail: bhuff@huffandleslie.com


ARROWHEAD PHARMACEUTICALS: Class Action Appeal Pending
------------------------------------------------------
Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that plaintiffs' appeal
of the dismissal of the consolidated class action to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remains pending.

The Company and certain of its officers and directors were named
as defendants in a putative consolidated class action in the
United States District Court for the Central District of
California regarding certain public statements in connection with
the Company's hepatitis B drug research.  The consolidated class
action, initially filed as Wang v. Arrowhead Research Corp., et
al., No. 2:14-cv-07890 (C.D. Cal., filed Oct. 10, 2014), and
Eskinazi v. Arrowhead Research Corp., et al., No. 2:14-cv-07911
(C.D. Cal., filed Oct. 13, 2014), asserted claims under Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and sought
damages in an unspecified amount.

Additionally, three putative stockholder derivative actions
captioned Weisman v. Anzalone et al., No. 2:14-cv-08982 (C.D.
Cal., filed Nov. 20, 2014), Bernstein (Backus) v. Anzalone, et
al., No. 2:14-cv-09247 (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 2, 2014); and
Johnson v. Anzalone, et al., No. 2:15-cv-00446 (C.D. Cal., filed
Jan. 22, 2015), were filed in the United States District Court for
the Central District of California, alleging breach of fiduciary
duty by the Company's Board of Directors in connection with the
alleged facts underlying the securities claims.

An additional consolidated derivative action asserting similar
claims is pending in Los Angeles County Superior Court, initially
filed as Bacchus v. Anzalone, et al., (L.A. Super., filed Mar. 5,
2015); and Jackson v. Anzalone, et al. (L.A. Super., filed Mar.
16, 2015).

Each of these suits seeks damages in unspecified amounts and some
seek various forms of injunctive relief.  On October 7, 2016, the
federal district court dismissed the consolidated class action
with prejudice.  On October 10, 2016 the plaintiffs appealed the
dismissal of the consolidated class action to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  The Weisman and Johnson
derivative actions have been dismissed without prejudice.  The
Bernstein derivative action remains pending and is stayed pending
the related consolidated class action.

The Company believes it has meritorious defenses and intends to
vigorously defend itself in each of these matters.  The Company
makes provisions for liabilities when it is both probable that a
liability has been incurred and the amount can be reasonably
estimated.  No such liability has been recorded related to these
matters.  The Company does not expect these matters to have a
material effect on its Consolidated Financial Statements. With
regard to legal fees, such as attorney fees related to these
matters or any other legal matters, the Company recognizes such
costs as incurred.

Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals, Inc. develops novel drugs to treat
intractable diseases by silencing the genes that cause them.


ARROWHEAD PHARMACEUTICALS: California Class Suit Underway
---------------------------------------------------------
Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that a class action
lawsuit in California remains pending.

The Company and certain executive officers were named as
defendants in a putative consolidated class action in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California
regarding certain public statements in connection with the
Company's drug research programs.  The consolidated class action,
initially filed as Meller v. Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et
al., No. 2:16-cv-08505 (C.D. Cal, filed Nov. 15, 2016 ), Siegel v.
Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., No. 2:16-cv-8954 (C.D.
Cal., filed Dec. 2, 2016), and Unz v. Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., et al., No.2:17-cv-00310 (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 13, 2017)
asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 regarding certain public statements in
connection with the Company's drug research programs and seek
damages in an unspecified amount.

Additionally, a putative stockholder derivative action captioned
Johnson v. Anzalone, et al., (Los Angeles County Superior Court,
filed January 19, 2017) asserting substantially similar claims is
pending in Los Angeles County Superior Court and is stayed pending
the related consolidated class action.

Two additional putative stockholder derivative actions, captioned
Lucas v. Anzalone, et al., No. 2:17-cv-03207 (C.D. Cal., filed
April 28, 2017), and Singh v. Anzalone, et al., No. 2:17-cv-03160
(C.D. Cal., filed April 27, 2017), alleging breach of fiduciary
duty by the Company's Board of Directors in connection with the
alleged facts underlying the securities claims, are pending in the
United States District Court for the Central District of
California.  The Lucas and Singh actions have been consolidated.

The Company believes it has meritorious defenses and intends to
vigorously defend itself in these matters.  The Company makes
provisions for liabilities when it is both probable that a
liability has been incurred and the amount can be reasonably
estimated.  No such liability has been recorded related to these
matters.  The Company cannot predict the ultimate outcome of this
matter and cannot accurately estimate any potential liability the
Company may incur or the impact of the results of this matter on
the Company. With regard to legal fees, such as attorney fees
related to these matters or any other legal matters, the Company
recognizes such costs as incurred.

Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals, Inc. develops novel drugs to treat
intractable diseases by silencing the genes that cause them.


AT&T INC: DIRECTV's Motion to Compel Arbitration Denied as Moot
---------------------------------------------------------------
AT&T Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2017, that in light of the order granting
the motion to dismiss, the court denied DIRECTV's motion to compel
arbitration as moot in the litigation challenging DIRECTV's NFL
Sunday ticket.

More than two dozen putative class actions were filed in the U.S.
District Courts for the Central District of California and the
Southern District of New York against DIRECTV and the National
Football League (NFL). These cases were brought by residential and
commercial DIRECTV subscribers that have purchased NFL SUNDAY
TICKET. The plaintiffs allege that (i) the 32 NFL teams have
unlawfully agreed not to compete with each other in the market for
nationally televised NFL football games and instead have "pooled"
their broadcasts and assigned to the NFL the exclusive right to
market them; and (ii) the NFL and DIRECTV have entered into an
unlawful exclusive distribution agreement that allows DIRECTV to
charge "supra-competitive" prices for the NFL SUNDAY TICKET
package. The complaints seek unspecified treble damages and
attorneys' fees along with injunctive relief. The first complaint,
Abrahamian v. National Football League, Inc., et al., was served
in June 2015.

In December 2015, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
transferred the cases outside the Central District of California
to that court for consolidation and management of pre-trial
proceedings. In June 2016, the plaintiffs filed a consolidated
amended complaint.

"We vigorously dispute the allegations the complaints have
asserted," the Company said.

In August 2016, DIRECTV filed a motion to compel arbitration and
the NFL defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The
court held a hearing on both motions on February 13, 2017.

On June 30, 2017, the court granted the NFL defendants' motion to
dismiss the complaint without leave to amend, finding that: (1)
the plaintiffs did not plead a viable market; (2) the plaintiffs
did not plead facts supporting the contention that the exclusive
agreement between the NFL and DIRECTV harms competition; (3) the
claims failed to overcome the fact that the NFL and its teams must
cooperate to sell broadcasts; and (4) the plaintiffs do not have
standing to challenge the horizontal agreement among the NFL and
the teams.

In light of the order granting the motion to dismiss, the court
denied DIRECTV's motion to compel arbitration as moot.


ATWOOD OCEANICS: Defending Class Suits over Merger
--------------------------------------------------
Atwood Oceanics, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that the Company is
defending against class action lawsuits related to a merger
transaction.

On May 29, 2017 the Company entered into an Agreement and Plan of
Merger (the "Merger Agreement") with Ensco plc ("Ensco") and Echo
Merger Sub LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Ensco ("Merger Sub"),
pursuant to which Ensco will acquire the Company in an all-stock
transaction.

On June 23, 2017, a putative class action captioned Bernard Stern
v. Atwood Oceanics, Inc., et al, was filed in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas against the Company, the
Company's directors, Ensco and Merger Sub. The Stern complaint
generally alleges that the directors and the Company disseminated
a false or misleading registration statement, referring to the
registration statement as filed with the SEC on June 16, 2017,
which omitted material information regarding the proposed
transaction between Ensco and Atwood, in violation of Section
14(a) of the Exchange Act. Specifically, the complaint alleges
that the Company how and the directors omitted material
information regarding the parties' financial projections, the
analysis performed by Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC ("Goldman Sachs"),
the Company's financial advisor, in support of its fairness
opinion, the timing and nature of communications regarding post-
transaction employment of the Company's directors and officers,
potential conflicts of interest of Goldman Sachs, and whether
there were further discussions with another potential acquirer of
the Company following the May 30, 2017 announcement of the
transaction.

The complaint further alleges that the directors, Ensco, and
Merger Sub are liable for these violations as "control persons" of
the Company under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. With respect
to Ensco, the complaint alleges that Ensco had direct supervisory
control over the composition of the registration statement. The
complaint seeks injunctive relief, including to enjoin the
transaction, rescission or rescissory damages in the event the
Merger is consummated, and an award of attorneys' fees, in
addition to other relief.

On June 27, June 29 and June 30, 2017, additional putative class
actions captioned Joseph Composto v. Atwood Oceanics, Inc., et al,
Booth Family Trust v. Atwood Oceanics, Inc., et al, and Mary
Carter v. Atwood Oceanics, Inc., et al, respectively, were filed
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas
against the Company and the Company's directors.

These actions allege violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act by the Company and the Company's directors similar to
those alleged in the Stern complaint; however, neither Ensco nor
Merger Sub is named as a defendant in these actions.

Additional lawsuits arising out of the Merger may be filed in the
future. There can be no assurance that any of the defendants will
be successful in the outcome of pending or potential future
lawsuits. A preliminary injunction could delay or jeopardize the
completion of the Merger, and an adverse judgment granting
permanent injunctive relief could indefinitely enjoin the
completion of the Merger.

"We believe that the lawsuits are without merit and intend to
defend vigorously against the lawsuits and any other future
lawsuits challenging the Merger," the Company said.


AUSTRALIA: Gets Favorable Ruling in Christmas Island Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jamelle Wells, writing for ABC News, reports that a court has
ruled in favour of the Federal Government in a case brought
against it after a boatload of asylum seekers smashed onto rocks
at Christmas Island in 2010.

Fifty Iraqi and Iranian asylum seekers drowned when large seas
forced their boat, known as SIEV 221, a suspected illegal entry
vessel, crashed into cliffs at Christmas Island in the early hours
of December 15, 2010.

Those who died included 35 adults and 15 children, but some others
were rescued.

In the monsoonal weather the boat was not detected by Australian
patrols and it was residents on Christmas Island who raised the
alarm.

A number of the families involved in the tragedy sued the Federal
Government, arguing the Commonwealth breached its duty of care by
not rescuing their loved ones and that there was not a proper
lookout.

They also said the Government did not have adequate search and
rescue capabilities nearby at the time and that is was responsible
for the boat when it came within 12 nautical miles of the island.

The class action included passengers who had suffered physical
and/or psychological injury, passengers who lost material
possessions, and relatives of passengers who suffered
psychological injury.

The New South Wales Supreme Court ruled that the Government did
not have duty of care to them because it had no control over the
primitive nature of the vessel or of those controlling it, had no
control over the weather, and did not send the boat out to sea.

"The Commonwealth had no control over the risk that a SIEV, if not
intercepted, might be shipwrecked on the coast of Christmas Island
due to factors such as poor weather, poor navigation or running
out of fuel," Justice Geoffrey Bellew said.

"Further, the Commonwealth did not put the plaintiffs at any risk
of harm." [GN]


AVEO GROUP: Denies Claims in Class Actions Over Unfair Contracts
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Australian Associated Press reports that aged care company
Aveo Group has denied taking advantage of its elderly residents
after a law firm said it may launch a second class action against
the company for allegedly using "unfair and unconscionable"
contracts.

Lawyers Maurice Blackburn on Sept. 13 said it will look into
running a no-win no-fee class action for former residents, calling
for stronger rights and protections for older residents and their
families.

The retirement communities owner has come under fire in recent
months following a Victorian government inquiry into problems in
the retirement housing sector and a consumer watchdog
investigation.

Another law firm, Levitt Robinson Solicitors, announced in June it
plans to launch a class action against Aveo.

Aveo said it is not aware of a class action from Maurice
Blackburn, and has not been contacted.

Chief executive Geoff Grady denied Aveo has acted wrongly, saying
it has and always will act with the best interests of its
residents.

"We vigorously deny any suggestion to the contrary and we are
confident that we can show that we have at all times met our
statutory and other obligations and our commitment to residents,"
Mr Grady said in a statement.

Gary Landells, whose mother Ruth moved into Aveo's Veronica
Gardens in Victoria at the age of 91, said the contract his mother
signed was a "mammoth scam".

He said Ruth was forced to pay for a number of general services
after vacating and selling the premises four years later, which
accumulated to more than $54,000.

"This is what happens in these places to elderly people, even
though they might have their marbles, they trust a lot of people
too easily," Mr Landells told AAP.

He said he hopes a class action will prompt the government to
better protect the community's most vulnerable.

Maurice Blackburn class action principal Brooke Dellavedova said a
no-win, no-fee class action -- which means clients will not be out
of pocket if the case is unsuccessful -- could be the best option
for those affected.

"We don't think it's fair or legal to subject elderly people to
complex and confusing contracts that contain unfair terms," Ms
Dellavedova said.

"If enough people want to take action against Aveo, then we will
look to step in and stand up for these people." [GN]


AVEO GROUP: Levitt Robinson Files Suit Over Unfair Contracts
------------------------------------------------------------
Nick Lenaghan, writing for Australian Financial Review, reports
that Sydney law firm Levitt Robinson has filed a Federal Court
class action against retirement village operator Aveo over its use
of residential contracts.

In a day of drama, Levitt Robinson moved swiftly to file its
lawsuit after Melbourne-based litigation heavyweight Maurice
Blackburn said it had begun registering interest from former Aveo
residents as it investigated concerns over allegedly unfair and
unconscionable contracts used by the listed company.

Levitt Robinson lodged its litigation four weeks later than it
originally intended as it considered whether to run the matter as
an open or closed action and how that would affect its US funder,
Galactic.

"The entry of a 'Johnny-come-lately' competitor on to the scene
led to the decision to bite the bullet and file an open class
action in which all eligible persons can participate," lawyer
Stewart Levitt said.

Mr Levitt said his firm was also aware of other operators in the
sector using methods similar to Aveo.

"We are sharpening our scalpels, with a view to embarking on
corrective legal surgery in relation to further industry victims,"
he said.

By late Sept. 13, Mr Levitt's firm was still waiting to receive a
sealed copy of the pleadings from the court's Victorian registry
in order to serve on Aveo.

Earlier, Maurice Blackburn's class action principal Brooke
Dellavedova said it was not fair or legal to subject elderly
people to complex and confusing contracts that contained unfair
terms.

"There is understandably a high level of concern that people
looking to enjoy their retirement, and who may be physically or
mentally vulnerable, should not be taken advantage of by
unscrupulous business models," she said.

The legal moves follow weeks of intense scrutiny and adverse
publicity around Aveo's retirement model.

The retirement giant responded to that criticism last month, with
pledges to simplify its sales contracts and improve its complaints
process.

On Sept. 13, Aveo said it had not been contacted regarding a class
action by Maurice Blackburn.

"We have and always will act with the best interests of our
residents first and foremost in our minds and actions," chief
executive Geoff Grady said.

"We vigorously deny any suggestion to the contrary and we are
confident that we can show that we have at all times met our
statutory and other obligations and our commitment to residents."

Endorsed reforms

The scrutiny of Aveo's model spurred the Australian Competition &
Consumer Commission to launch its own investigation into the
retirement village giant in July.

The Victorian government endorsed a number of reforms recommended
by a parliamentary inquiry into the retirement living sector.

Among them, the government supports a review of current
legislation to ensure it provides adequate consumer protection.

The Consumer Action Law Centre welcomed Maurice Blackburn's move
to investigate concerns of unfair and unconscionable contracts in
view of a potential class action against Aveo.

"Older people should be able to move into retirement housing
without having to worry about being bamboozled by complex
contracts and unfair fees," chief executive Gerard Brody said.

"Until now, the retirement village sector has avoided proper
scrutiny of its contracts, and it's about time someone stood up
for the rights of residents.

"Residents and their families have struggled to take on the unfair
fees charged by retirement village operators in courts and
tribunals alone.  Accessing justice has simply been too expensive
and complex for most."

Separately, a group of investors is suing Aveo in the Supreme
Court of Victoria in a dispute over the failed sale of two
residential lots worth more than $1 million in total on a
Melbourne housing estate. [GN]



AVEO GROUP: Maurice Blackburn Mulls Suit Over Unfair Contracts
--------------------------------------------------------------
Simone Ziaziaris, writing for The Australian Associated Press,
reports that Aveo Group is facing a possible second class action
over its alleged use of "unfair and unconscionable" contracts. The
retirement home owner and operator's shares (AOG) slipped at the
open on Sept. 13 after legal firm Maurice Blackburn announced
plans to run a no-win no-fee class action for former residents.

Maurice Blackburn said the class action would call for stronger
rights and protections for older Australians and their families
who are allegedly exposed to confusing and complex contracts.

Aveo shares fell as much as one per cent before rallying to sit
down 0.2 per cent at $2.535 by 10.45am (AEST).

The retirement communities owner has come under fire in recent
months following heavy media coverage, a Victorian government
inquiry into problems in the retiring housing sector, and a
consumer watchdog investigation.  Another law firm, Levitt
Robinson Solicitors, also announced plans to launch a class action
against Aveo in June.

Maurice Blackburn class action principal Brooke Dellavedova said a
no-win, no- fee class action -- which means clients will not be
out of pocket if the case is unsuccessful -- could be the best
option for those affected by unnecessarily complicated and unfair
contracts.

"We don't think it's fair or legal to subject elderly people to
complex and confusing contracts that contain unfair terms,"
Ms Dellavedova said on Sept. 13.

"If enough people want to take action against Aveo, then we will
look to step in and stand up for these people."  Consumer Action
Law Centre chief executive Gerard Brody welcomed the opportunity
for a class action regime saying residents and their families have
previously struggled to access justice due to court and tribunal
expenses.  "Older people should be able to move into retirement
housing without having to worry about being bamboozled by complex
contracts and unfair fees," Mr Brody said.

"Until now, the retirement village sector has avoided proper
scrutiny of its contracts, and it's about time someone stood up
for the rights of residents." [GN]


BOB EVANS FARMS: Fails to Pay All Earned Minimum Wages, Carr Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Carr and Shureene Newsome, on behalf of themselves and
all other persons similarly situated, known and unknown v. Bob
Evans Farms, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Bob Evans Holdings,
Inc., an Ohio corporation, Bob Evans Farms, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company, and Bob Evans Restaurants, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company, Case No. 1:17-cv-01875 (N.D.
Ohio, September 7, 2017), is a lawsuit arising under the Fair
Labor Standards Act for the Defendants' alleged failure to pay the
Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated employees all earned
minimum wages.

The Defendants own and operate more than 500 Bob Evans
restaurants.  Bob Evans Restaurants is a chain of family style
restaurants founded and headquartered in Columbus, Ohio, which
owns and operates approximately 523 family restaurants, primarily
in the Midwest, Mid-Atlantic and Southeast regions of the United
States.

As a private company owned by Golden Gate Capital, Bob Evans
Restaurants is focused on providing quality food and hospitality
to every guest at every meal, each and every day.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Clifford P. Bendau, II, Esq.
          Christopher J. Bendau, Esq.
          THE BENDAU LAW FIRM PLLC
          P.O. Box 97066
          Phoenix, AZ 85060
          Telephone AZ: (480) 382-5176
          Telephone OH: (216) 395-4226
          E-mail: cliffordbendau@bendaulaw.com
                  chris@bendaulaw.com

               - and -

          James L. Simon, Esq.
          6000 Freedom Square Dr.
          Independence, OH 44131
          Telephone: (216) 525-8890
          Facsimile: (216) 642-5814
          E-mail: jameslsimonlaw@yahoo.com


BOSTON SCIENTIFIC: 48,000 Mesh Claims Filed as of July 26
---------------------------------------------------------
Boston Scientific Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that as of July 26,
2017, approximately 48,000 product liability cases or claims
related to transvaginal surgical mesh products designed to treat
stress urinary incontinence and pelvic organ prolapse have been
asserted against the Company. The pending cases are in various
federal and state courts in the United States and include eight
putative class actions. There were also fewer than 20 cases in
Canada, inclusive of one certified and three putative class
actions, and fewer than 25 claims in the United Kingdom.

Generally, the plaintiffs allege personal injury associated with
use of our transvaginal surgical mesh products. The plaintiffs
assert design and manufacturing claims, failure to warn, breach of
warranty, fraud, violations of state consumer protection laws and
loss of consortium claims. Over 3,100 of the cases have been
specially assigned to one judge in state court in Massachusetts.

On February 7, 2012, the Judicial Panel on Multi-District
Litigation (MDL) established MDL-2326 in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia and
transferred the federal court transvaginal surgical mesh cases to
MDL-2326 for coordinated pretrial proceedings.

The Company said, "During the fourth quarter of 2013, we received
written discovery requests from certain state attorneys general
offices regarding our transvaginal surgical mesh products. We have
responded to those requests."

"As of July 26, 2017, we have entered into master settlement
agreements in principle or are in final stages of entering one
with certain plaintiffs' counsel to resolve an aggregate of
approximately 38,000 cases and claims. These master settlement
agreements provide that the settlement and distribution of
settlement funds to participating claimants are conditional upon,
among other things, achieving minimum required claimant
participation thresholds. Of the approximately 38,000 cases and
claims, approximately 14,500 have met the conditions of the
settlement and are final. All settlement agreements were entered
into solely by way of compromise and without any admission or
concession by us of any liability or wrongdoing.


BOSTON SCIENTIFIC: "Stevens" Class Action Stayed
------------------------------------------------
Boston Scientific Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that the class action
lawsuit by Teresa L. Stevens remains stayed.

The Company said, "On or about January 12, 2016, Teresa L. Stevens
filed a claim against us and three other defendants asserting for
herself and on behalf of a putative class of similarly-situated
women, that she was harmed by a vaginal mesh implant that she
alleges contained a counterfeit or adulterated resin product that
we imported from China. The complaint was filed in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia,
before the same Court that is hearing the mesh MDL. The complaint,
which alleges Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) violations, fraud, misrepresentation, deceptive trade
practices and unjust enrichment, seeks both equitable relief and
damages under state and federal law. On January 26, 2016, the
Court issued an order staying the case and directing the plaintiff
to submit information to allow the FDA to issue a determination
with respect to her allegations. In addition, we are in contact
with the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District
of West Virginia and are responding voluntarily to their requests
in connection with that office's review of the allegations
concerning the use of mesh resin in the complaint. We deny the
plaintiff's allegations and intend to defend ourselves
vigorously."

Boston Scientific Corporation is a worldwide developer,
manufacturer and marketer of medical devices that are used in a
broad range of interventional medical specialties.


BOSTON SCIENTIFIC: "Turner" Class Action Stayed
-----------------------------------------------
Boston Scientific Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that the class action
lawsuit by Carolyn Turner remains stayed.

The Company said, "On February 27, 2017, Carolyn Turner filed a
complaint against us and five other defendants asserting for
herself and on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated
women, that she was harmed by a vaginal mesh implant that she
alleges contained a counterfeit or adulterated resin product that
we imported from China. The complaint was filed in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando
Division and alleges violations of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), negligence, strict liability,
breach of an express or implied warranty, intentional and
negligent misrepresentation, fraud and unjust enrichment. Ms.
Turner served this complaint against the Company on April 7, 2017.
As of April 27, 2017, this case has been stayed, pending
resolution of the transfer petition to the mesh multidistrict
litigation. We deny the plaintiff's allegations and intend to
defend ourselves vigorously.

Boston Scientific Corporation is a worldwide developer,
manufacturer and marketer of medical devices that are used in a
broad range of interventional medical specialties.


BUHRMAN DESIGN: Chevarria Sues Over Unpaid Work Done Off Clock
--------------------------------------------------------------
OSCAR CHEVARRIA, on behalf of himself, and all other plaintiffs
similarly situated known and unknown v. BUHRMAN DESIGN GROUP INC.,
AND WILLIAM L. BUHRMAN, INDIVIDUALLY, Case No. 1:17-cv-06447 (N.D.
Ill., September 7, 2017), is brought under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the Portal-to-Portal Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage
Law and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act arising from
the Defendants' alleged practice of requiring work to be performed
off the clock, without pay for that time.

Buhrman Design Group Inc. provides landscaping maintenance,
nursery design, and landscape planting and construction services.
William L. Buhrman is the owner and operator of Buhrman
Design.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John William Billhorn, Esq.
          BILLHORN LAW FIRM
          53 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 840
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 853-1450
          E-mail: jbillhorn@billhornlaw.com

               - and -

          Neil Kelley, Esq.
          FARMWORKER & LANDSCAPER ADVOCACY PROJECT
          33 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 900
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 784-3541
          E-mail: nkelley@flapillinois.org


CALVARY STAFFING: Wins Prelim. Nod of "Copper" Suit Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Frederic Block granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
preliminary approval of the parties' settlement agreement and
release, certification of settlement class, appointment of class
counsel and approval of proposed notice of settlement and class
action settlement procedure in the lawsuit entitled DEREK COPPER
and LESLIE MINTO, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly-situated v. CALVARY STAFFING, LLC, and ENTERPRISE
HOLDINGS, INC., and TRACY LEE HESTER, in his individual and
professional capacities, Case No. 1:14-cv-03676-FB-RLM (E.D.N.Y.).

The Court certifies, for settlement purposes only, the settlement
class defined as:

   a. under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3), all Service Agents
      and Supervisors employed by Cavalry Staffing at an
      Enterprise Rent-A-Car location in New York between June 11,
      2008 and October 18, 2016; and

   b. under 29 U.S.C. Section 2l6(b), all Service Agents and
      Supervisors employed by Cavalry Staffing at an Enterprise
      Rent-A-Car location in New York between June 11, 2011 and
      October 18, 2016.

Derek Copper and Leslie Minto are appointed as Class
Representatives.  Borrelli & Associates, P.L.L.C., is appointed as
Class Counsel.

Judge Block approves the Parties' proposed Notice of Pendency of
Class Action Settlement.  Judge Block also appoints Simpluris Inc.
as Claims Administrator.

Judge Block also sets this schedule:

   -- the Defendants are to furnish Simpluris with a list of all
      Class Members by September 25, 2017;

   -- the Parties are directed to require Simpluris to send such
      Notice, and Claim Form to putative class members by
      October 11, 2017;

   -- Claims Forms filed by Settlement Class Members must be
      postmarked by December 10, 2017;

   -- Class Counsel shall file their Motion for Final Approval of
      Settlement on or before January 9, 2018; and

   -- the Court will hold a Fairness Hearing on the Settlement on
      February 9, 2018.

A copy of the Order is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=1b32Ybwy


CANADA: Oct. 2 Deadline Set for Lemon Creek Fuel Spill Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
John Boivin, writing for The Nelson Daily, reports that people who
were forced out of their homes by the Lemon Creek Fuel spill in
2013 are being asked to estimate what the evacuation cost them --
and they've got until October 2 to do it.

About a dozen participants in the lawsuit met on Sept. 10 at the
Slocan Park Community Hall to find out about the next step in the
drawn-out search for compensation for the spill.

"You have been incredibly patient.  We are four years into it and
we are only getting started," Nelson lawyer David M. Aaron told
the group.  He noted this was the first-ever environmental class-
action lawsuit launched in British Columbia.

"You guys are breaking ground for environmental justice," he told
the group.

In July 2013, a tanker truck carrying 35,000 litres of helicopter
fuel for firefighting efforts got lost on a logging road and
overturned into Lemon Creek near Winlaw, spilling its contents
into the creek.

About 2,700 properties in the river valley from WInlaw to Crescent
Valley were forced out of their homes in the middle of the night,
and many had to stay away for several days while crews cleaned up
the toxic mess.

Last May a judge ruled that a valley farmer, Robert Kirk, could
sue the government, trucker and transportation company for
evacuation expenses, loss of enjoyment of property and harm to
property values.  The judge ruled that anyone living in the
affected area that night could join the lawsuit.

This class-action civil case is only one of many court proceedings
now underway because of the spill.  Mr. Aaron told the crowd the
government was suing the contractors, contractors were suing each
other and the government, and personal injury claims were also
being considered.

"It's an absolute rats' nest of litigation," he said.  "The good
news is the civil claim -- for loss of property value, for loss of
enjoyment of property and for evacuation expenses -- that claim is
moving forward and has been certified for a class action. "

The next step is to determine just what that claim will be- the
scope of it, the number of people claiming different damages, and
just what those damages were.  To do that, Mr. Aaron and
co-counsel Rosenberg Kosakoski, a Vancouver firm, have hired a
private investigator to collect people's stories.  Ken Porth of
Progress Investigations will take those stories and produce a
report outlining people's damages for the court to review.

"I'm on a fact-finding mission," Mr. Aaron said.  "We're going to
take the report, potentially to the court or potentially to the
negotiating room, and make a claim for damages in respect to
specific things."

"For example, if you couldn't harvest your crops," Aaron
continued.  "Or you couldn't do your laundry so you had to go into
Nelson to do your laundry.  Everyone has a story."

The lawyer handed out an eight-page form for residents to fill
out. While he says, he doesn't need individuals' receipts for
proof now, he does need to know the kinds of things people will
claim for.

The questionnaire only seeks information about personal expenses.
Other issues, like the impact on property values, and
environmental damage, are being handled by other researchers for
the legal team.

But there's not much time for locals to return the questionnaires.

"We really want them back in a week," Aaron told the group. "So
that Ken [Porth] can do a report so you can get compensated for
these expenses."

People who attended the meeting were hopeful they would see some
good come from this step in the process.

Russell Hulbert lives about a kilometre from the spill site, on
Lemon Creek, and says he can still occasionally smell the fumes
from the jet fuel.  While it's getting better, he says this legal
hangover is the worse part of the process.

"You don't want to have this kind of thing in life.  You don't
want to be having to fill out paperwork," he said after the
meeting.  "It should have been dealt with a long time ago.  This
is hard on people."

"I know the community was really impacted by it," stated
Marilyn Burgoon, the local resident whose private criminal
proceedings led to the federal government laying charges in the
case.  "When it's your home, your water, people are quite furious
about it."

She says despite the long, drawn-out procedure, residents are
determined to see it through.

"We don't give up, ever.  That's the thing about standing up for
what's right.  You just keep going forward," she says.

Locals who are eligible to be part of the class-action suit can
download and print a copy of the questionnaire from
www.rklitigation.ca.  Details on how to submit the information by
October are on the form.

The next court date for the class-action case is in October.  The
criminal trial will also resume this fall. [GN]


CANADA: CAF Class Action Plaintiffs Seek Consolidation of Cases
---------------------------------------------------------------
Carolyn Gruske, writing for The Lawyer's Daily, reports that what
were formally five separate class actions against the Canadian
Armed Forces are attempting to come together under a single
umbrella.

The complaints against the federal government are seeking policy
changes to redress systemic sexual assault, harassment and
discrimination in the Canadian Armed Forces.  Initially, they were
filed in Ottawa, Toronto, Quebec City, Halifax and Victoria.

The plaintiffs in all five cases have entered into an agreement to
prosecute the cases together.  Currently, they are co-operating
and sharing resources in order to take a more national approach.
Koskie Minsky LLP represents the plaintiffs in Toronto.  Raven,
Cameron, Ballantyne & Yazbeck LLP is handling the suit in Ottawa.
Quessy Henry St-Hilaire filed in Quebec City. Wagners is working
on behalf of the Halifax plaintiffs.
Acheson Sweeney Foley Sahota LLP represents the plaintiffs in
Victoria.

The motions for certification, which will decide if the cases can
proceed as class actions will be heard in the Federal Court the
week of July 9, 2018.

According to Nov. 2016 data from Statistics Canada, 4.8% of women
in the Canadian Armed Forces had reported being sexually assaulted
in the previous 12 months.  Among those serving in the Primary
Reserve, 8.2% of female members reported being victims of sexual
assault in the previous 12 months.  Additionally, 27.3% of women
reported having been victims of sexual assault at least once since
joining the Canadian Armed Forces.

Nicola Peffers is a plaintiff in the Victoria suit.  "Staggering"
is the word she uses to describe the Statistics Canada figures.

"Among working Canadians, 0.9% reported being victims of sexual
assault in any situation.  Why are the numbers almost five to ten
times higher in the military? How many victims must there be in
order for Canada to take action?" [GN]


CENTRAL AMUSEMENT: Faces "Anderson" Suit in E.D. of New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Central Amusement
International LLC. The case is styled as Derrick Anderson, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Central Amusement International LLC doing business as: Victorian
Gardens, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-05493 (E.D. N.Y., September
19, 2017).

Central Amusement International, LLC is an international amusement
park planner, developer, and operator whose management team has
more than 150 years of combined amusement industry experience.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


CENTRAL FLORIDA: Faces "Carrasquillo-Rivera" Suit in M.D. of Fla.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Central Florida
Cancer Institute, P.A.  The case is styled as Iris Carrasquillo-
Rivera and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Central
Florida Cancer Institute, P.A., Defendant, Case No. 6:17-cv-01657-
PGB-DCI (M.D. Fla., September 19, 2017).
Central Florida Cancer Institute is a medical group - health care
provider in Davenport Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   William John Gadd, Esq.
   The Law Office of W. John Gadd
   BANK OF AMERICA BUILDING
   2727 Ulmerton Rd, Suite 250
   Clearwater, FL 33762
   Tel: (727) 524-6300
   Fax: (727) 524-6330
   Email: wjg@mazgadd.com


CHESAPEAKE ENERGY: Faces ERISA Class Suit in Oklahoma
-----------------------------------------------------
Chesapeake Energy Corporation is defending against an ERISA class
action lawsuit, the Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2017.

On July 10, 2017, Chesapeake, its Benefits Committee, its
Investment Committee and certain employees were named as
defendants in a purported Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) class action filed in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma (the "ERISA Lawsuit").
The ERISA Lawsuit alleges violations of Sections 404, 405, 409 and
502 of ERISA with respect to the Company's common stock held in
its Savings and Incentive Stock Bonus Plan (the "Plan"). The
plaintiffs seek to represent a class of persons who were
participants in the Plan after June 1, 2014. The plaintiffs also
seek damages, imposition of a constructive trust and other relief,
including attorneys' fees, based on allegations that the
defendants breached their fiduciary duties by continuing to allow
the Company's common stock to remain as an investment option under
the Plan during the class period.

Chesapeake Energy owns interests in approximately 20,500 oil and
natural gas wells.


CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Court Consolidates 2 Credit Card Cos.' Suits
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned BELLWETHER COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION, on behalf
of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL, INC., Defendant, Civil Action No. 17-cv-
1102-WJM-STV (D. Colo.), Judge William J. Martinez of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Colorado granted the Parties'
Joint Motion for Consolidation and Appointment of Interim Class
Counsel/Leadership Structure.

The same group of attorneys has filed two substantially similar
cases in the Court on behalf of two different Plaintiffs: (i) the
captioned case; and (ii) Alcoa Community Federal Credit Union v.
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., Case No. 1:17-cv-1283-RM-STV.  The
Counsel for the Defendant is the same in both cases.

Although the precise details of each case are somewhat different,
both actions are substantively identical and are in the same stage
of litigation.  Both actions: (i) are brought by payment-card-
issuing financial institutions against the same, single Defendant;
(ii) are brought as a putative class action seeking to certify the
same class of financial institutions; (iii) allege the same legal
claims for negligence, negligence per se, and
declaratory/injunctive relief; and (iv) arise out of the same
occurrence: a data breach involving payment card information at
Chipotle restaurants during the approximate period of March 2017
to the present.  All parties therefore agree that these cases
should be consolidated.

Judge Martinez consolidated the Civil Action No. 17-cv-1283-RM-STV
into the captioned case.  The captioned action will be the lead
case and all future filings will be made in this action.

The Judge directed the Clerk to terminate all pending motions in
Civil Action No. 17-cv-1283-RM-STV and re-docket the following
filings on the captioned docket: from 17-cv-1283-RM-STV, ECF Nos.
1 and 17.  Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 40.1(d)(4)(C), the Clerk is
further directed to reassign 17-cv-1283-RM-STV to the Judge, and
to maintain U.S. Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak on both cases.
A copy of Judge Martinez's Order will be docketed in 17-cv-1283-
RM-STV.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 1, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/0cFzcj from Leagle.com.

Alcoa Community Federal Credit Union, Plaintiff, represented by
Karen Sharp Halbert -- karenhalbert@robertslawfirm.us -- Roberts
Law Firm, P.A..

Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., Defendant, represented by Paul
Gregory Karlsgodt -- pkarlsgodt@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler,
LLP.


CITIGROUP INC: Tomeo Seeks Certification of 2 Classes Under TCPA
----------------------------------------------------------------
Eduardo Tomeo, one of the Plaintiffs in the lawsuit entitled
EDUARDO TOMEO; JOSEPH MORDEN; PAMELA SLAUGHTER; and FRANK LOPEZ,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
CITIGROUP, INC. and CITIMORTGAGE, INC., Case No. 1:13-cv-04046
(N.D. Ill.), seeks to certify these Classes:

     Cease and Desist Class: All persons (1) during the period of
     October 27, 2010 to November 30, 2014 (2) to whom Citi
     placed two or more voice calls or short message service
     (SMS) calls (3) using the Aspect UIP or Genesys dialers (4)
     and Citi's business records indicate the person requested
     not to be called.

     Wrong Number Class: All persons (1) during the period of
     October 27, 2010 to November 30, 2014 (2) to whom Citi
     placed two or more voice calls, (3) using the Aspect UIP
     dialer, (4) and Citi's business records indicate that Citi
     was told it had called the wrong number.

The Defendants systematically and repeatedly violated the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act by placing calls with an
autodialer to the cell phones of 12,269 persons, who told Citi to
stop and whose request to stop calling was logged by Citi in its
records, the Plaintiffs allege.  They add that Citi also used an
autodialer to call at least 11,585 telephone numbers that Citi
logged as wrong numbers.

Mr. Tomeo also asks the Court to designate him as Class
representative, and to appoint the Plaintiffs' attorneys as Class
counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=iXbMCCeV

Plaintiffs Joseph Morden, Pamela Slaughter, and Frank Lopez and
the Proposed Classes are represented by:

          Beth E. Terrell, Esq.
          Mary B. Reiten, Esq.
          Jennifer Rust Murray, Esq.
          TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC
          936 North 34th Street, Suite 300
          Seattle, WA 98103-8869
          Telephone: (206) 816-6603
          Facsimile: (206) 319-5450
          E-mail: bterrell@terrellmarshall.com
                  mreiten@terrellmarshall.com
                  jmurray@terrellmarshall.com

               - and -

          Alexander H. Burke, Esq.
          BURKE LAW OFFICES, LLC
          155 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 9020
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 729-5288
          Facsimile: (312) 729-5289
          E-mail: aburke@burkelawllc.com

               - and -

          Syed Ali Saeed, Esq.
          SAEED & LITTLE, LLP
          1433 North Meridian Street, Suite 202
          Indianapolis, IN 46202
          Telephone: (317) 614-5741
          Facsimile: (888) 422-3151
          E-mail: ali@sllawfirm.com

Plaintiff Eduardo Tomeo and the Proposed Classes are represented
by:

          Adam J. Levitt, Esq.
          Amy E. Keller, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT & CASEY LLC
          10 North Dearborn Street, 11th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 214-7900
          E-mail: alevitt@dlcfirm.com
                  akeller@dlcfirm.com

               - and -

          Sergei Lemberg, Esq.
          LEMBERG & ASSOCIATES
          1100 Summer Street, Third Floor
          Stamford, CT 06905
          Telephone: (203) 653-2250
          Facsimile: (203) 653-3424
          E-mail: slemberg@lemberglaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Alejandro Valle, Esq.
          CITIZENS ENERGY GROUP
          2020 N. Meridian Street
          Indianapolis, IN 46202
          Telephone: (317) 987-6986
          E-mail: avalle@citizensenergygroup.com

               - and -

          Hans J. Germann, Esq.
          Debra Bogo-Ernst, Esq.
          Lucia Nale, Esq.
          Joseph M. Snapper, Esq.
          Michael H. Bornhorst, Esq.
          MAYER BROWN LLP
          71 South Wacker Drive
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 782-0600
          Facsimile: (312) 701-7711
          E-mail: hgermann@mayerbrown.com
                  dernst@mayerbrown.com
                  lnale@mayerbrown.com
                  jsnapper@mayerbrown.com
                  mbornhorst@mayerbrown.com


CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Class Certification Sought in "Al" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Adel Al moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit titled ADEL AL, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING,
INC., Case No. 2:17-cv-01218-LA (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks
that the Court both stay the motion for class certification and to
grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the Local
Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring briefs
and supporting material to be filed with the Motion.

Damasco and decisions like it imposed significant burdens on the
Court and on Plaintiff's Counsel, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011),
overruled, Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th
Cir. 2015).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit in Damasco instructed plaintiffs to file a certification
motion with the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on
the certification motion until discovery could commence, the
Plaintiff states.  The Plaintiff asserts that the Plaintiff is
obligated to move for class certification to protect the interests
of the putative class.

The Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 2016
U.S. LEXIS 846 *14-15 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2016) (internal citations
omitted) and Chapman should have put a stop to this practice.
Unfortunately, they have not, the Plaintiff notes.  In dicta, the
Supreme Court left open the possibility that a defendant facing a
class action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's claim with the court and having the court enter
judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to a class certification
motion.  Campbell-Ewald Co., 2016 U.S. LEXIS 846 *19 ("We need
not, and do not, now decide whether the result would be different
if a defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff's
individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the
court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount.").

As the Motion is a placeholder motion as described in Damasco, the
parties and the Court should not be burdened with unnecessary
paperwork and the resulting expense when a one paragraph, single
page motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative
and further asks the Court to appoint Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as
class counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Lcyg9pBO

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
                  jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com


CR BARD: Court Denies Certification Bid in "Barraza"
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona
issued an Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification
in the case captioned Maria E. Barraza, et al., Plaintiffs, v. C.
R. Bard Inc., and Bard Peripheral Vascular Inc., Defendants, No.
CV16-01374-PHX-DGC (D. Ariz.).

Plaintiffs have filed a motion for class certification.

Plaintiffs Maria E. Barraza and others bring this case against
Defendants C.R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular Inc.
(Bard) seeking medical monitoring. Plaintiffs sue on behalf of
themselves and classes of individuals who have been implanted with
a Bard inferior vena cava filter, have not had that filter
removed, and have not filed a claim or lawsuit for personal injury
related to the filter.

Plaintiffs seek certification of classes consisting of persons
with Bard filters in the following 11 states: Arizona, California,
Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. Each of these classes is
represented by a single named Plaintiff.

Under Rule 23(a), a district court may certify a class only if (1)
it is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of
the class, and (4) the representatives will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
Rule 23(b)(3).

Predominance.

The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed
classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation.

Plaintiffs argue that medical monitoring claims in all the
relevant jurisdictions have the following elements: (1) exposure,
(2) to a toxic substance or hazard, (3) which exposure was caused
by the defendant's negligence or tortious conduct, (4) resulting
in an increased risk of a serious illness or injury, (5) for which
a medical test for early detection exists, (6) is reasonably
necessary, and (7) is beyond that which is offered in the ordinary
course.

Elements One & Two: Exposure to a Toxicity or Hazard.

Defendants do not dispute that the named Plaintiffs each have been
implanted with Bard IVC filters, nor that thousands of additional
individuals currently carry such filters. Thus, unlike a case
where exposure to toxic substances might require individualized
proof, exposure to Bard filters exists for each person who has
received such a filter.  Defendants do not contend that individual
issues will predominate on this element.

Element Three: Negligence and Causation.

Plaintiffs argue that they can establish this element with class-
wide law and evidence whether Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiffs
is a question of law that will not vary among class members, and
whether Defendants were negligent in designing and marketing the
filters will be decided on the basis of Defendants' actions, not
individual issues.

Design and Testing Issues.

Plaintiffs allege that structural and manufacturing differences
between the filters are insignificant and that tests on the
various filters were deficient. They note that the filters were
approved by the FDA through the Section 510(k) clearance process,
not the FDA's more onerous pre-market approval process for new
devices.  But even in the face of these arguments, there are still
design, manufacturing, and testing differences between the various
generations of Bard filters that would need to be addressed at
trial.

Whether the manufacturing changes and product tests were
sufficient to ensure the safety of the filters is hotly contested
and would be decided by the trier of fact, but only in the context
of seven generations of filters with differing specifications and
testing histories. And for states that require a comparison to the
state of the art, the design and manufacturing standards for blood
filters generally would also have to be considered for each year.

Failure to Warn Issues.

Plaintiffs contend that Bard's warnings were inadequate and
incomplete. But these examples show that the trial for each class
would need to assess the warnings in place at a particular time
for the particular filter implanted in each class member. Trial of
a single class representative's claim would not suffice because
the representative would have received a different filter with
different warnings than many members of the class.

Affirmative Defenses.

Class members would also be subject to affirmative defenses that
turn on individual factual allegations.

Defendants assert various affirmative defenses.  For example, the
eleven relevant states each recognize assumption of the risk, or
comparative or contributory negligence, as defenses to negligence
that either negate or reduce a defendant's liability.

Plaintiffs contend that these affirmative defenses "do not
undercut the case-critical predominant issues of risk and need for
monitoring, as many of them only apply to either failure to warn
(learned intermediary) or negligent design (proof of safer
alternative; risk/benefit analysis) claims.

But there are two problems with this argument.

First, Plaintiffs' negligence claims are based on failure to warn
and negligent design. Although Plaintiffs' say in their briefing
that their claims are not so limited. they identify no other basis
for their negligence claims.

Second, the classes cannot be certified simply because Plaintiffs
allegedly face a common risk and need medical monitoring. Tortious
conduct by Defendants is required for medical monitoring claims in
all the relevant jurisdictions. The fact that Plaintiffs face a
common risk and require medical monitoring to reduce that risk is
not sufficient to state a claim for relief; Plaintiffs must also
show that Defendants were negligent and caused Plaintiffs'
increased risk.

Element Four:  Increased Risk.

Defendants contend that establishing increased risk will require
individualized proof for two reasons.

First, Defendants contend that unlike medical monitoring for toxic
exposure, the increased risk in the medical device context is
measured against the risks from exposure to a non-defective
filter, rather than exposure to no filter at all. Defendants cite
no authority for this proposition. And even if it is true,
Defendants present no reason to conclude that this comparison
could not be made through common evidence.

Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs will actually need to
quantify the increased risk of injury for each individual class
member to be entitled to medical monitoring. But Defendants cite
cases concerning levels of exposure to toxic substances that are
common in the environment. This case is different. The level of
exposure is not disputed each class member is 100% exposed to the
IVC filter in his or her body. Plaintiffs contend that the filters
create an increased risk of adverse health consequences, a fact
they intend to prove by common expert evidence.

The Court does not find that individual issues will predominate on
this issue.

Elements Five, Six, and Seven.

Plaintiffs argue that CT scans are needed for class members
because most doctors do not follow their patients carefully and
monitor the condition of their filters. Even if that is true, can
that failure be blamed on Defendants without an inquiry into
whether the doctor's actions are due to the doctor's own failings
or a failure by Bard to adequately advise the doctor?
As Defendants' expert notes, there are risks associated with
exposing individuals to CT scans due to ionizing radiation
inherent in a CT scan. Whether a class member and her doctor
decide that these risks are worth the potential benefits of a CT
scan, especially where the class member has received previous
scans, is an individualized question not capable of proof by
common evidence.

The Court concludes that individual issues would predominate if
the classes were certified.

Superiority.

The superiority inquiry asks whether a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating
the controversy.

Rule 23(b)(2).

Rule 23(b)(2) permits certification of a class if the requirements
of Rule 23(a) are satisfied and the party opposing the class has
acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the
class, so that injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.

Nature of the Relief Sought.

Class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate only where
the primary relief sought is declaratory or injunctive.  A class
seeking monetary damages may be certified pursuant to Rule
23(b)(2) where such relief is merely incidental to the primary
claim for injunctive relief.

Damages, by contrast, are defined as money claimed by, or ordered
to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury. That
is what Plaintiffs seek here an order that Defendants pay money to
compensate them for an injury (the need for medical monitoring
created by Defendants' negligence). Plaintiffs cannot transform a
claim for damages into injunctive relief simply by asking for an
injunction that orders the payment of money. As other courts have
recognized, absent anything more than an exchange of money, as
requested by plaintiffs, these damages cannot be injunctive in
nature.

Nor can Plaintiffs bring their claim within Rule 23(b)(2) simply
by crafting it in way that looks like equitable relief. Rule
23(b)(2) does not speak of 'equitable' remedies generally but of
injunctions and declaratory judgments. The relief must be
injunctive to come within the rule, and the Court cannot conclude
that a remedy requiring Defendants to do nothing more than write a
check can properly be viewed as an injunction.

Cohesiveness.

Defendants argue that Rule 23(b)(2) contains a "cohesiveness"
requirement. Plaintiffs acknowledge this requirement, but appear
to disagree on its content. A cohesiveness requirement has been
widely applied by other circuits and by district courts within the
Ninth Circuit, but the Ninth Circuit has yet to speak
unequivocally regarding it.

Trial of the class representative's claims will not fairly
adjudicate the claims of all class members because most of the
class members have different filters, implanted at different
times, with different warnings by Defendants, and are subject to
different affirmative defenses. Stated differently, the named
Plaintiffs cannot, by trying their claims, obtain final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief [that] is appropriate
respecting the class as a whole.  Whether this defect is labelled
a lack of cohesion or a simple failure to come within the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(2), it defeats class certification.

Typicality.

The Court also concludes that Plaintiffs cannot show typicality
under Rule 23(a)(3). This defect prevents certification under both
23(b)(2) and (b)(3).

Plaintiffs' counsel asserted during oral argument that, at trial,
the parties could introduce facts, allegations, and defenses that
pertain to individual class members and not to the named
Plaintiffs. But such an approach is contrary to the representative
nature of class actions, under which the named Plaintiff's claim
is tried and binds the absent class members.  Class actions are
representative suits on behalf of others similarly situated. Class
members are not named adversary parties before the court.

They are absent, unnamed parties who did not initiate the action
but who will be bound by any class judgment, whether favorable or
adverse, assuming that they have been adequately represented with
respect to issues that they share in common with the class
representative. Plaintiffs' proposed approach would also make the
trial entirely unworkable. Evidence regarding the unique issues
related to hundreds of class members (or more) would overwhelm the
trial and make it confusing to the jury and otherwise
unmanageable. This is because the named Plaintiffs' claims are not
truly typical of those of all absent class members.

Leave to Amend.

The Court concludes that Defendants have not shown prejudice or
bad faith. Plaintiffs clearly should have been more diligent and
sought to amend once they knew that their expert recommended a
remedy different than the remedy pleaded in their complaint. But
Plaintiffs did disclose their proposed new remedy in expert
reports months ago, Defendants' experts were able to respond to
the new remedy, and the experts were deposed on the new remedy.
The motion to amend will be granted.

Motion to Exclude.

Defendants ask the Court to preclude Plaintiffs from relying on
two papers: (1) a white paper titled Background White Paper from a
Medical Monitoring Program Administrator: IVC Retrievable Filter
Medical Monitoring Program Design, authored by Garretson
Resolution Group (specifically, Candace Young and Amy Gernon)
(White Paper); and (2) a supporting expert report titled Estimated
Range Number of People with Bard IVC Filters, authored by Dennis
Tolley (Tolley Report). Defendants also ask the Court to exclude
any testimony or opinions of Plaintiffs' experts that rely on the
White Paper or the Tolley Report.

Plaintiffs contend that Bard's own sales data, along with numerous
documents reflecting sales of thousands of Bard's filters during
the class period, readily establish the minimal numerosity
requirement.

Plaintiffs also contend that Defendants first received the Papers
on May 9, 2017, and then again on May 16, 2017, but failed to ask
more than a few questions about them at the expert depositions.
But Defendants had no opportunity to depose the authors of the
Papers, and questioning experts in other fields who read the
Papers is no substitute. Nor do Plaintiffs dispute that Defendants
had no chance to produce rebuttal expert reports.

Because Plaintiffs have not shown that their failure to disclose
the Papers was substantially justified or harmless, they cannot
rely on the Papers in their motion for class certification.

Plaintiffs' motion to certify is denied.  Plaintiffs' motion to
amend is granted. The Clerk is directed to accept for filing
document lodged as in this case.  Defendants' motion to exclude
is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 11, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/yd2yx9vnfrom Leagle.com.

Maria E Barraza, Plaintiff, represented by:

     Ben C. Martin, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF BEN C MARTIN
     3710 Rawlins Street, Suite #1230
     Dallas, Texas 75219

        -- and --

     Christopher Thomas Kirchmer, Esq.
     PROVOST & UMPHREY LAW FIRM LLP
     490 Park Street
     Beaumont, TX 77701

        -- and --

     Daniel Seltz, Esq.
     Elizabeth Joan Cabraser, Esq.
     Wendy R. Fleishman, Esq.
     LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
     250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor
     New York, NY 10013-1413

        -- and --

     Donald A. Migliori, Esq.
     MOTLEY RICE LLC
     Email: dmigliori@motleyrice.com

        -- and --

     Eric M. Terry, Esq.
     TorHoerman Law LLC
     Email: ETerry@THLawyer.com

        -- and --

     Evan Michael Zucker, Esq.
     Russell W. Budd, Esq.
     BARON & BUDD PC
     3102 Oak Lawn Avenue, Suite 1100
     Dallas, TX 75219
     Email: ezucker@baronbudd.com

        -- and --

     Hadley L. Matarazzo, Esq.
     FARACI LANGE LLP
     Email: hmatarazzo@faraci.com

        -- and --

     Howard L. Nations, Esq.
     NATIONS LAW FIRM
     Sterling Mansion
     4515 Yoakum Boulevard
     Houston, TX 77006-5895

        -- and --

     John A. Dalimonte, Esq.
     DALIMONTE RUEB LLP
     Email: info@dalimonterueb.com

        -- and --

     Joseph R. Johnson, Esq.
     BABBITT & JOHNSON PA
     1641 Worthington Rd, Suite 100
     West Palm Beach, FL 33409

        -- and --

     Joseph A. Osborne, Jr., Esq.
     OSBORNE & ASSOCIATES
     433 Plaza Real, Suite 271
     Boca Raton, FL 33432

        -- and --

     Julia Reed-Zaic, Esq.
     HEAVISIDE REED ZAIC
     Email: info@hrzlaw.com

        -- and --

     Matthew Ryan McCarley, Esq.
     FEARS NACHAWATI PLLC
     4925 Greenville Ave., Suite 715
     Dallas, TX 75206

        -- and --

     Matthew David Schultz, Esq.
     LEVIN PAPANTONIO THOMAS
        MITCHELL RAFFERTY & PROCTOR PA
     1515 S Denver Ave.
     Tulsa, OK 74119
     Tel: 918-599-8118

        -- and --

     Michael T. Gallagher, Esq.
     GALLAGHER LAW FIRM LLP
     2905 Sackett St.
     Houston, TX 77098-1127

        -- and --

     Michael A. Kelly, Esq.
     WALKUP MELODIA KELLY & SCHOENBERGER
     60 California Street
     San Francisco, CA 94108

        -- and --

     Nathan Craig Van Der Veer, Esq.
     FARRIS RILEY & PITT LLP
     505 20th St N Ste 1700
     Birmingham, AL 35203-4611

        -- and --

     Ramon Rossi Lopez, Esq.
     LOPEZ MCHUGH LLP
     Email: rlopez@lopezmchugh.com

        -- and --

     Richard S. Lewis, Esq.
     Steven Rotman, Esq.
     HAUSFELD LLP
     Email: rlewis@hausfeld.com
            srotman@hausfeld.com

        -- and --

     Sheila M. Bossier, Esq.
     BOSSIER & ASSOCIATES PLLC
     1520 N State St.
     Jackson, MS 39202-1645

        -- and --

     Stuart Goldenberg, Esq.
     GOLDENBERG LAW PLLC
     Email: slgoldenberg@goldenberglaw.com

        -- and --

     Thomas P. Cartmell, Esq.
     Wagstaff & Cartmell LLP
     4740 GRAND AVENUE, SUITE 300
     KANSAS CITY, MO 64112

        -- and --

     Troy Alexander Brenes, Esq.
     Brenes Law Group
     Email: tbrenes@breneslawgroup.com

        -- and --

     Turner Williamson Branch, Esq.
     Branch Law Firm
     2025 Rio Grande Blvd NW
     Albuquerque, NM 87104-2525

Thomas Flournay, Plaintiff, represented by Ben C. Martin, Law
Offices of Ben C Martin, Christopher Thomas Kirchmer, Provost &
Umphrey Law Firm LLP, Daniel Seltz, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP, Donald A. Migliori, Motley Rice LLC, Elizabeth
Joan Cabraser, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, Eric M.
Terry, TorHoerman Law LLC, Evan Michael Zucker, Baron & Budd PC,
Hadley L. Matarazzo, Faraci Lange LLP, Howard L. Nations, Nations
Law Firm, John A. Dalimonte, Dalimonte Rueb LLP, Joseph R.
Johnson, Babbitt & Johnson PA, Joseph A. Osborne, Jr., Osborne &
Associates, Julia Reed-Zaic, Heaviside Reed Zaic, Matthew Ryan
McCarley, Fears Nachawati PLLC, Matthew David Schultz, Levin
Papantonio Thomas MItchell Rafferty & Proctor PA, Michael T.
Gallagher, Gallagher Law Firm LLP, Michael A. Kelly, Walkup
Melodia Kelly & Schoenberger, Nathan Craig Van Der Veer, Farris
Riley & Pitt LLP, Ramon Rossi Lopez, Lopez McHugh LLP, Richard S.
Lewis, Hausfeld LLP, Russell W. Budd, Baron & Budd PC, Sheila M.
Bossier, Bossier & Associates PLLC, Steven Rotman, Hausfeld LLP,
Stuart Goldenberg, Goldenberg Law PLLC, Thomas P. Cartmell,
Wagstaff & Cartmell LLP, Troy Alexander Brenes, Brenes Law Group,
Turner Williamson Branch, Branch Law Firm & Wendy R. Fleishman,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP.

James Holt, Plaintiff, represented by Ben C. Martin, Law Offices
of Ben C Martin, Christopher Thomas Kirchmer, Provost & Umphrey
Law Firm LLP, Daniel Seltz, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein,
LLP, Donald A. Migliori, Motley Rice LLC, Elizabeth Joan Cabraser,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, Eric M. Terry, TorHoerman
Law LLC, Evan Michael Zucker, Baron & Budd PC, Hadley L.
Matarazzo, Faraci Lange LLP, Howard L. Nations, Nations Law Firm,
John A. Dalimonte, Dalimonte Rueb LLP, Joseph R. Johnson, Babbitt
& Johnson PA, Joseph A. Osborne, Jr., Osborne & Associates, Julia
Reed-Zaic, Heaviside Reed Zaic, Matthew Ryan McCarley, Fears
Nachawati PLLC, Matthew David Schultz, Levin Papantonio Thomas
MItchell Rafferty & Proctor PA, Michael T. Gallagher, Gallagher
Law Firm LLP, Michael A. Kelly, Walkup Melodia Kelly &
Schoenberger, Nathan Craig Van Der Veer, Farris Riley & Pitt LLP,
Ramon Rossi Lopez, Lopez McHugh LLP, Richard S. Lewis, Hausfeld
LLP, Russell W. Budd, Baron & Budd PC, Sheila M. Bossier, Bossier
& Associates PLLC, Steven Rotman, Hausfeld LLP, Stuart Goldenberg,
Goldenberg Law PLLC, Thomas P. Cartmell, Wagstaff & Cartmell LLP,
Troy Alexander Brenes, Brenes Law Group, Turner Williamson Branch,
Branch Law Firm & Wendy R. Fleishman, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein LLP.

Gregory Lester, Plaintiff, represented by Ben C. Martin, Law
Offices of Ben C Martin, Christopher Thomas Kirchmer, Provost &
Umphrey Law Firm LLP, Daniel Seltz, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP, Donald A. Migliori, Motley Rice LLC, Elizabeth
Joan Cabraser, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, Eric M.
Terry, TorHoerman Law LLC, Evan Michael Zucker, Baron & Budd PC,
Hadley L. Matarazzo, Faraci Lange LLP, Howard L. Nations, Nations
Law Firm, John A. Dalimonte, Dalimonte Rueb LLP, Joseph R.
Johnson, Babbitt & Johnson PA, Joseph A. Osborne, Jr., Osborne &
Associates, Julia Reed-Zaic, Heaviside Reed Zaic, Matthew Ryan
McCarley, Fears Nachawati PLLC, Matthew David Schultz, Levin
Papantonio Thomas MItchell Rafferty & Proctor PA, Michael T.
Gallagher, Gallagher Law Firm LLP, Michael A. Kelly, Walkup
Melodia Kelly & Schoenberger, Nathan Craig Van Der Veer, Farris
Riley & Pitt LLP, Ramon Rossi Lopez, Lopez McHugh LLP, Richard S.
Lewis, Hausfeld LLP, Russell W. Budd, Baron & Budd PC, Sheila M.
Bossier, Bossier & Associates PLLC, Steven Rotman, Hausfeld LLP,
Stuart Goldenberg, Goldenberg Law PLLC, Thomas P. Cartmell,
Wagstaff & Cartmell LLP, Troy Alexander Brenes, Brenes Law Group,
Turner Williamson Branch, Branch Law Firm & Wendy R. Fleishman,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP.

Eddie Mims, Plaintiff, represented by Ben C. Martin, Law Offices
of Ben C Martin, Christopher Thomas Kirchmer, Provost & Umphrey
Law Firm LLP, Daniel Seltz, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein,
LLP, Donald A. Migliori, Motley Rice LLC, Elizabeth Joan Cabraser,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, Eric M. Terry, TorHoerman
Law LLC, Evan Michael Zucker, Baron & Budd PC, Hadley L.
Matarazzo, Faraci Lange LLP, Howard L. Nations, Nations Law Firm,
John A. Dalimonte, Dalimonte Rueb LLP, Joseph R. Johnson, Babbitt
& Johnson PA, Joseph A. Osborne, Jr., Osborne & Associates, Julia
Reed-Zaic, Heaviside Reed Zaic, Matthew Ryan McCarley, Fears
Nachawati PLLC, Matthew David Schultz, Levin Papantonio Thomas
MItchell Rafferty & Proctor PA, Michael T. Gallagher, Gallagher
Law Firm LLP, Michael A. Kelly, Walkup Melodia Kelly &
Schoenberger, Nathan Craig Van Der Veer, Farris Riley & Pitt LLP,
Ramon Rossi Lopez, Lopez McHugh LLP, Richard S. Lewis, Hausfeld
LLP, Russell W. Budd, Baron & Budd PC, Sheila M. Bossier, Bossier
& Associates PLLC, Steven Rotman, Hausfeld LLP, Stuart Goldenberg,
Goldenberg Law PLLC, Thomas P. Cartmell, Wagstaff & Cartmell LLP,
Troy Alexander Brenes, Brenes Law Group, Turner Williamson Branch,
Branch Law Firm & Wendy R. Fleishman, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein LLP.

Delmar Lee Peck, Plaintiff, represented by Ben C. Martin, Law
Offices of Ben C Martin, Christopher Thomas Kirchmer, Provost &
Umphrey Law Firm LLP, Daniel Seltz, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP, Donald A. Migliori, Motley Rice LLC, Elizabeth
Joan Cabraser, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, Eric M.
Terry, TorHoerman Law LLC, Evan Michael Zucker, Baron & Budd PC,
Hadley L. Matarazzo, Faraci Lange LLP, Howard L. Nations, Nations
Law Firm, John A. Dalimonte, Dalimonte Rueb LLP, Joseph R.
Johnson, Babbitt & Johnson PA, Joseph A. Osborne, Jr., Osborne &
Associates, Julia Reed-Zaic, Heaviside Reed Zaic, Matthew Ryan
McCarley, Fears Nachawati PLLC, Matthew David Schultz, Levin
Papantonio Thomas MItchell Rafferty & Proctor PA, Michael T.
Gallagher, Gallagher Law Firm LLP, Michael A. Kelly, Walkup
Melodia Kelly & Schoenberger, Nathan Craig Van Der Veer, Farris
Riley & Pitt LLP, Ramon Rossi Lopez, Lopez McHugh LLP, Richard S.
Lewis, Hausfeld LLP, Russell W. Budd, Baron & Budd PC, Sheila M.
Bossier, Bossier & Associates PLLC, Steven Rotman, Hausfeld LLP,
Stuart Goldenberg, Goldenberg Law PLLC, Thomas P. Cartmell,
Wagstaff & Cartmell LLP, Troy Alexander Brenes, Brenes Law Group,
Turner Williamson Branch, Branch Law Firm & Wendy R. Fleishman,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP.

Denise Tomlin, Plaintiff, represented by Ben C. Martin, Law
Offices of Ben C Martin, Christopher Thomas Kirchmer, Provost &
Umphrey Law Firm LLP, Daniel Seltz, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP, Donald A. Migliori, Motley Rice LLC, Elizabeth
Joan Cabraser, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, Eric M.
Terry, TorHoerman Law LLC, Evan Michael Zucker, Baron & Budd PC,
Hadley L. Matarazzo, Faraci Lange LLP, Howard L. Nations, Nations
Law Firm, John A. Dalimonte, Dalimonte Rueb LLP, Joseph R.
Johnson, Babbitt & Johnson PA, Joseph A. Osborne, Jr., Osborne &
Associates, Julia Reed-Zaic, Heaviside Reed Zaic, Matthew Ryan
McCarley, Fears Nachawati PLLC, Matthew David Schultz, Levin
Papantonio Thomas MItchell Rafferty & Proctor PA, Michael T.
Gallagher, Gallagher Law Firm LLP, Michael A. Kelly, Walkup
Melodia Kelly & Schoenberger, Nathan Craig Van Der Veer, Farris
Riley & Pitt LLP, Ramon Rossi Lopez, Lopez McHugh LLP, Richard S.
Lewis, Hausfeld LLP, Russell W. Budd, Baron & Budd PC, Sheila M.
Bossier, Bossier & Associates PLLC, Steven Rotman, Hausfeld LLP,
Stuart Goldenberg, Goldenberg Law PLLC, Thomas P. Cartmell,
Wagstaff & Cartmell LLP, Troy Alexander Brenes, Brenes Law Group,
Turner Williamson Branch, Branch Law Firm & Wendy R. Fleishman,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP.

Diane Washington, Plaintiff, represented by Ben C. Martin, Law
Offices of Ben C Martin, Christopher Thomas Kirchmer, Provost &
Umphrey Law Firm LLP, Daniel Seltz, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP, Donald A. Migliori, Motley Rice LLC, Elizabeth
Joan Cabraser, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, Eric M.
Terry, TorHoerman Law LLC, Evan Michael Zucker, Baron & Budd PC,
Hadley L. Matarazzo, Faraci Lange LLP, Howard L. Nations, Nations
Law Firm, John A. Dalimonte, Dalimonte Rueb LLP, Joseph R.
Johnson, Babbitt & Johnson PA, Joseph A. Osborne, Jr., Osborne &
Associates, Julia Reed-Zaic, Heaviside Reed Zaic, Matthew Ryan
McCarley, Fears Nachawati PLLC, Matthew David Schultz, Levin
Papantonio Thomas MItchell Rafferty & Proctor PA, Michael T.
Gallagher, Gallagher Law Firm LLP, Michael A. Kelly, Walkup
Melodia Kelly & Schoenberger, Nathan Craig Van Der Veer, Farris
Riley & Pitt LLP, Ramon Rossi Lopez, Lopez McHugh LLP, Richard S.
Lewis, Hausfeld LLP, Russell W. Budd, Baron & Budd PC, Sheila M.
Bossier, Bossier & Associates PLLC, Steven Rotman, Hausfeld LLP,
Stuart Goldenberg, Goldenberg Law PLLC, Thomas P. Cartmell,
Wagstaff & Cartmell LLP, Troy Alexander Brenes, Brenes Law Group,
Turner Williamson Branch, Branch Law Firm & Wendy R. Fleishman,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP.

Nancy Mosher, Plaintiff, represented by Ben C. Martin, Law Offices
of Ben C Martin, Christopher Thomas Kirchmer, Provost & Umphrey
Law Firm LLP, Daniel Seltz, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein,
LLP, Donald A. Migliori, Motley Rice LLC, Elizabeth Joan Cabraser,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, Eric M. Terry, TorHoerman
Law LLC, Evan Michael Zucker, Baron & Budd PC, Hadley L.
Matarazzo, Faraci Lange LLP, Howard L. Nations, Nations Law Firm,
John A. Dalimonte, Dalimonte Rueb LLP, Joseph R. Johnson, Babbitt
& Johnson PA, Joseph A. Osborne, Jr., Osborne & Associates, Julia
Reed-Zaic, Heaviside Reed Zaic, Matthew Ryan McCarley, Fears
Nachawati PLLC, Matthew David Schultz, Levin Papantonio Thomas
MItchell Rafferty & Proctor PA, Michael T. Gallagher, Gallagher
Law Firm LLP, Michael A. Kelly, Walkup Melodia Kelly &
Schoenberger, Nathan Craig Van Der Veer, Farris Riley & Pitt LLP,
Ramon Rossi Lopez, Lopez McHugh LLP, Richard S. Lewis, Hausfeld
LLP, Russell W. Budd, Baron & Budd PC, Sheila M. Bossier, Bossier
& Associates PLLC, Steven Rotman, Hausfeld LLP, Stuart Goldenberg,
Goldenberg Law PLLC, Thomas P. Cartmell, Wagstaff & Cartmell LLP,
Troy Alexander Brenes, Brenes Law Group, Turner Williamson Branch,
Branch Law Firm & Wendy R. Fleishman, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein LLP.

Linda Walker, Plaintiff, represented by Ben C. Martin, Law Offices
of Ben C Martin, Christopher Thomas Kirchmer, Provost & Umphrey
Law Firm LLP, Daniel Seltz, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein,
LLP, Donald A. Migliori, Motley Rice LLC, Elizabeth Joan Cabraser,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, Eric M. Terry, TorHoerman
Law LLC, Evan Michael Zucker, Baron & Budd PC, Hadley L.
Matarazzo, Faraci Lange LLP, Howard L. Nations, Nations Law Firm,
John A. Dalimonte, Dalimonte Rueb LLP, Joseph R. Johnson, Babbitt
& Johnson PA, Joseph A. Osborne, Jr., Osborne & Associates, Julia
Reed-Zaic, Heaviside Reed Zaic, Matthew Ryan McCarley, Fears
Nachawati PLLC, Matthew David Schultz, Levin Papantonio Thomas
MItchell Rafferty & Proctor PA, Michael T. Gallagher, Gallagher
Law Firm LLP, Michael A. Kelly, Walkup Melodia Kelly &
Schoenberger, Nathan Craig Van Der Veer, Farris Riley & Pitt LLP,
Ramon Rossi Lopez, Lopez McHugh LLP, Richard S. Lewis, Hausfeld
LLP, Russell W. Budd, Baron & Budd PC, Sheila M. Bossier, Bossier
& Associates PLLC, Steven Rotman, Hausfeld LLP, Stuart Goldenberg,
Goldenberg Law PLLC, Thomas P. Cartmell, Wagstaff & Cartmell LLP,
Troy Alexander Brenes, Brenes Law Group, Turner Williamson Branch,
Branch Law Firm & Wendy R. Fleishman, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein LLP.

Ana Hernandez, Plaintiff, represented by Evan Michael Zucker,
Baron & Budd PC & Daniel Seltz, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP.

C R Bard Incorporated, Defendant, represented by Amanda Christine
Sheridan -- asheridan@swlaw.com -- Snell & Wilmer LLP, James R.
Condo- jcondo@swlaw.com --  Snell & Wilmer LLP, Richard B. North,
Jr. -- richard.north@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough LLC, Brandee J. Kowalzyk, Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough LLC, & Elizabeth C. Helm, Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough LLC, Atlantic Station, 201 17th Street NW, Suite 1700,
Atlanta, GA 30363

Bard Peripheral Vascular Incorporated, Defendant, represented by
Amanda Christine Sheridan, Snell & Wilmer LLP, James R. Condo,
Snell & Wilmer LLP, Richard B. North, Jr., Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough LLC, Brandee J. Kowalzyk, Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough LLC & Elizabeth C. Helm, Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough LLC.


CYTRX CORPORATION: Motion to Dismiss Class Suit Pending
-------------------------------------------------------
CytRx Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that defendants' motion to
dismiss a class action in California remains pending.

The Company said, "On July 25 and 29, 2016, nearly identical class
action complaints were filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, titled Crihfield v. CytRx Corp.,
et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-05519 and Dorce v. CytRx Corp., Case No.
2:16-cv-05666 alleging that we and certain of our officers
violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by allegedly making
materially false and/or misleading statements, and/or failing to
disclose material adverse facts to the effect that the clinical
hold placed on the Phase 3 trial of aldoxorubicin for STS would
prevent sufficient follow-up for patients involved in the study,
thus requiring further analysis, which could cause the trial's
results and/or FDA approval to be materially adversely affected or
delayed.  The plaintiffs allege that such wrongful acts and
omissions caused significant losses and damages to a class of
persons and entities that acquired our securities between November
18, 2014 and July 11, 2016, and seek an award of compensatory
damages, costs and expenses, including counsel and expert fees,
and such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and
proper."

On October 26, 2016, the Court entered an Order consolidating the
actions titled In re: CytRx Corporation Securities Litigation,
Master File No. 16-cv-05519-SJO and appointing a Lead Plaintiff
and Lead Counsel.

Following the filing of a first amended complaint on January 13,
2017, on March 14, 2017 the Company and the individual defendants
filed a Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiff filed an Opposition thereto on April 28, 2017. The
Company and the individual defendants filed a Reply on May 30,
2017 and the matter was heard by the Court on June 12, 2017.

On June 14, 2017, the Court issued an Order granting the Motion to
Dismiss with leave to amend. Plaintiff filed a Second Amended
Complaint and the Individual Defendants filed a renewed Motion to
Dismiss. Plaintiff filed an Opposition thereto on July 24, 2017.

The Company and the Individual Defendants filed a Reply on July
31, 2017 and the matter was set to be heard by the Court on August
14, 2017.

The Company intends to vigorously defend against the foregoing
complaints. CytRx has directors' and officers' liability
insurance, which will be utilized in the defense of these matters.
The liability insurance may not cover all of the future
liabilities the Company may incur in connection with the foregoing
matters. These claims are subject to inherent uncertainties, and
management's view of these matters may change in the future.

CytRx Corporation is a biopharmaceutical company specializing in
oncology.


DIVERSICARE HEALTHCARE: Class Suit in Early Stages
--------------------------------------------------
Diversicare Healthcare Services, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3,
2017, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that a class
action lawsuit remains in its early stages.

In January 2009, a purported class action complaint was filed in
the Circuit Court of Garland County, Arkansas against the Company
and certain of its subsidiaries and Garland Nursing &
Rehabilitation Center (the "Center"). The Company answered the
original complaint in 2009, and there was no other activity in the
case until May 2017. At that time, plaintiff filed an amended
complaint asserting new causes of action. The amended complaint
alleges that the defendants breached their statutory and
contractual obligations to the patients of the Center over a
multi-year period by failing to meet minimum staffing
requirements, failing to otherwise adequately staff the Center and
failing to provide a clean and safe living environment in the
Center. The Company has filed an answer to the amended complaint
denying plaintiffs' allegations and has asked the Court to dismiss
the new causes of action asserted in the amended complaint because
the Company was prejudiced by plaintiff's long delay in filing the
amended complaint. The lawsuit remains in its early stages and has
not yet been certified by the court as a class action. The Company
intends to defend the lawsuit vigorously.

Diversicare Healthcare Services, Inc. provides long-term care
services to nursing center patients in ten states, primarily in
the Southeast, Midwest, and Southwest.


EMCORE CORPORATION: Accrued $0.2MM Cost Related to Mirasol Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
EMCORE Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that during the nine months
ended June 30, 2017, the Company recorded an accrual of $0.2
million within Operating Expenses related to the settlement in the
Mirasol Class Action.

On December 15, 2015, Plaintiff Christina Mirasol ("Mirasol"), on
her own behalf and on behalf of a putative class of similarly
situated individuals composed of current and former non-exempt
employees of the Company working in California since December 15,
2011, filed a complaint against the Company in the Superior Court
of California, Los Angeles County. The complaint alleged seven
causes of action related to: (1) failure to pay overtime; (2)
failure to provide meal periods; (3) failure to pay minimum wages;
(4) failure to timely pay wages upon termination; (5) failure to
provide compliant wage statements; (6) unfair competition under
the California Business and Professions Code Sec. 17200 et seq.;
and (7) penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act. The
claims were premised primarily on the allegation that Mirasol and
the putative class members were not provided with their legally
required meal periods. Mirasol sought recovery on her own behalf
and on behalf of the putative class in an unspecified amount for
compensatory and liquidated damages as well as for declaratory
relief, injunctive relief, statutory penalties, pre-judgment
interest, costs and attorneys' fees.

In exchange for a one-time cash payment offered by the Company,
certain current and former employees previously agreed to release
the Company from all potential claims related to the matters
alleged in the Mirasol lawsuit. The Company had recorded an
accrual for these amounts at September 30, 2016 that was not
material to the Company's results of operations, financial
condition or cash flows, which had been recorded within Operating
Expenses for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2016.

On January 6, 2017, the Company and Mirasol agreed to a class
action settlement of $0.3 million with regards to all outstanding
claims. The parties have agreed to a formal settlement agreement,
which will require approval by the Court. During the nine months
ended June 30, 2017, the Company recorded an accrual of $0.2
million within Operating Expenses related to the settlement.

EMCORE Corporation, together with its subsidiaries, designs and
manufactures Indium Phosphide (InP) optical chips, components,
subsystems and systems for the broadband and specialty fiber
optics market.


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Branch" Suit in N. Dist. Calif.
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Equifax Inc.  The
case is styled as Michael Branch, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Equifax Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-05429-MEJ (N.D. Cal., September 19,
2017).

Equifax Inc. is a global provider of information solutions and
human resources business process outsourcing services for
businesses, governments and consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Richard Alexander Saveri, Esq.
   Saveri & Saveri, Inc.
   706 Sansome Street
   San Francisco, CA 94111
   Tel: (415) 217-6810
   Fax: (415) 217-6813
   Email: rick@saveri.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces 3 Data Breach Class Actions in Alabama
---------------------------------------------------------
Ivana Hrynkiw, writing for AL.com, reports that three class-action
lawsuits have been filed in the Northern District of Alabama
against the credit monitoring company Equifax.

The suits were filed on both September 8 and September 11.  All
plaintiffs are filing for damages regarding the massive Equifax
data breach.  According to the company, hackers used a website
application vulnerability to access the personal information of
about 143 million U.S. consumers from Equifax.

In the class action suit filed September 8, Huntsville attorneys
Dennis Mastando and Eric Artrip are representing four people --
including one man from Huntsville.

Messrs. Mastando and Artrip are asking the federal court to allow
them to represent all members of the "class" affected, or all
Equifax users nationwide who had their data hacked.

The second case, filed on Sept. 11, is from Birmingham attorneys
Jason Yearout and M. Stan Herring, Jr. Their client, a Jefferson
County resident, is seeking damages of equal or more than $75,000.
Messrs. Yearout and Herring too are asking for permission to
represent "All individuals in the United States, including
Alabama, whose data was breached between May 2017 and August 2017
and whose personal and private consumer information was
compromised."

The third suit was also filed on Sept. 11, by three attorneys from
the Southern Institute for Medical and Legal Affairs.  Their two
clients are both from Alabama -- one from Jefferson County and one
from Walker County.

"The data breach was a direct and proximate result of Equifax's
failure to properly protect Plaintiffs' and Class members' PII
from unauthorized access, use, and disclosure, as required by
state and federal regulations, industry practices, and common
law," the suit's complaint states.

The Atlanta-based company said the hackers gained access to the
files between mid-May and July of this year, but they didn't
announce the breach until September.  Equifax has set up a special
website where people can check to see if their personal
information may have been stolen.  Consumers can also call 866-
447-7559 for more information. [GN]


EQUIFAX INC: Faces Data Brach Class Action in Washington
--------------------------------------------------------
Heather Bosch, writing for KING, reports that a Seattle law firm
has filed a national class action lawsuit against Equifax, over a
data breach that left 143 million customers' vulnerable to
hackers.

Residents of Washington state and a small business owner are
listed as plaintiffs in the suit filed by the firm Stritmatter
Kessler Whelan on Sept. 12, in U.S. District court.

In a statement, the firm called Equifax's actions after revealing
the breach, "amateur hour at its best and profiteering at its
worst."

The lawsuit claims customers, who tried to find out if their
information may have been stolen, were referred to an unsecured
website. Calls went unanswered.

"Days later, no one we have spoken to has clear confirmation that
their data was compromised," read a statement.

The lawsuit notes Equifax has offered complimentary identity theft
protection, but it expires in a year, forcing customers to pay
about $20 per month to keep the service.

Equifax's identity protection is provided by its own wholly owned
subsidiary, TrustedID, which will likely see increased business.

Hackers gained access to up to 143 million Equifax customers'
data, including some credit card and Social Security numbers, the
credit-reporting service announced.

In most cases, the hackers accessed names, Social Security
numbers, birth dates, addresses and some driver's license numbers,
Equifax explained.

"Everyone should be worried," said plaintiff Jennifer Mertlich
from Puyallup.

Ms. Mertlich had her identity stolen before and had someone open
credit cards and get a driver's license in her name.

She fears the information from Equifax will open her up to worse.

"It'll never be repaired entirely," said Ms. Mertlich.

Over 209,000 credit card numbers and other documents with personal
information for 182,000 customers were also accessed in the
breach.

"Criminals" used a U.S. website application to gain access to the
files from mid-May to June 2017, the company said in a statement.

The company said it discovered the intrusion on July 29 and worked
immediately to stop it.  An investigation should be finished
within weeks.

"This is clearly a disappointing event for our company, and one
that strikes at the heart of who we are and what we do.  I
apologize to consumers and our business customers for the concern
and frustration this causes," Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Richard F. Smith said.

In a USA TODAY editorial, Equifax wrote they are working to make
changes.

"It was a painful announcement because of the concern and
frustration this incident has created for so many consumers,"
Mr. Smith wrote.  "We apologize to everyone affected.  This is the
most humbling moment in our 118-year history.

Equifax has set up a website for customers to see if their data
has been compromised and access complimentary credit monitoring
and identity theft services for a year.

Questions to the company can be directed to 866-447-7559

Customers will receive a notice in the mail if they were affected.
[GN]


EQUIFAX INC: November 13 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
-----------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC, notifies investors that a
class action lawsuit has been filed against Equifax,
Inc.("Equifax" or the "Company") (NYSE: EFX) and certain of its
officers, on behalf of a class who purchased securities of Equifax
between February 25, 2016 through September 7, 2017, inclusive
(the "Class Period").  Such investors are encouraged to join this
case by visiting the firm's site: www.bgandg.com/efx.

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws.

The complaint alleges that throughout the class period Defendants
issued materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed
to disclose that: (1) the Company failed to maintain adequate
measures to protect its data systems; (2) the Company failed to
maintain adequate monitoring systems to detect security breaches;
(3) the Company failed to maintain proper security systems,
controls and monitoring systems in place; and (4) as a result of
the foregoing, the Company's financial statements were materially
false and misleading at all relevant times.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed.  If you wish to
review a copy of the Complaint you can visit the firm's site:
www.bgandg.com/efx or you may contact Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or
his Investor Relations Analyst, Yael Hurwitz of Bronstein, Gewirtz
& Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484.  If you suffered a loss in
Equifax you have until November 13, 2017 to request that the Court
appoint you as lead plaintiff.   Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC is a corporate litigation
boutique.  Its primary expertise is the aggressive pursuit of
litigation claims on behalf of our clients.  In addition to
representing institutions and other investor plaintiffs in class
action security litigation, the firm's expertise includes general
corporate and commercial litigation, as well as securities
arbitration. [GN]


EQUIFAX INC: East Bay Resident Files Data Breach Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Ethan Baron, writing for Silicon Beat, reports that while America
waits to see what use the criminals believed to have hacked
Equifax will make of the names, Social Security numbers, addresses
and birth dates stolen from up to 143 million people, some
consumers are wasting little time in their efforts to drag the
disgraced credit-reporting firm into court.

To some two dozen lawsuits filed and seeking class-action status,
add a local one, filed Sept. 12 by East Bay resident Andrew
Galpern.

"Equifax maintained an insufficient and inadequate system to
protect the personal information of plaintiff and class members,"
said Mr. Galpern's lawsuit, filed in U.S. District Court in San
Jose.

"Personal data such as that hacked in the data breach represents a
major score for cybercriminals.

"Personal information is 'as good as gold' to identity thieves
because they can use victims' personal data to open new financial
accounts and take out loans in another person's name, incur
charges on existing accounts, or clone ATM, debit or credit
cards."

Equifax announced Sept. 7 that criminal hackers had accessed
highly personal identifying information for up to 143 million
people in the U.S.  The hackers also gained access to credit card
numbers for about 209,000 U.S. consumers, along with credit-report
dispute documents that identify about 182,000 more people in the
country, Equifax said at the time.

Anyone who ever applied for a credit or debit card, taken out any
kind of loan or debt, or even applied for an apartment rental that
requires a credit report is likely in Equifax's database, if the
actions were taken in the U.S., experts said.

Mr. Galpern's suit seeks class-action certification for all U.S.
consumers whose data was stored by Equifax and/or accessed in the
breach, and another class composed of California consumers whose
data was stored by Equifax and/or exposed in the breach.

The hackers had access to Equifax databases from mid-May through
July, according to the company.  Equifax said it discovered the
breach July 29 "and acted immediately to stop the intrusion."

In the six-week delay between discovery of the breach and
notification of the public about it, Equifax executives sold $1.8
million worth of stock, the lawsuit said. That information likely
came from a Bloomberg report, which said the company claimed the
execs didn't know about the breach when they sold the stock.

The suit filed by Mr. Galpern, of Albany, accuses Equifax of
negligence and violation of state and federal law.  It seeks
unspecified damages.

It's likely that lawsuits seeking class action against Equifax
over the security breach will be consolidated.

Equifax declined to discuss the lawsuit.

"We cannot comment on pending litigation, but want to reassure
consumers that we are remaining focused on helping them to
navigate this situation and providing the best customer support
possible," the company said in a statement Sept. 12.

"We are listening to issues consumers have experienced and their
suggestions, which are helping to further inform our actions as we
continue to improve this process." [GN]


EQUIFAX INC: Faces $550MM Data Breach Class Action in Canada
------------------------------------------------------------
Sotos LLP on Sept. 12 disclosed that an Ontario resident has
started a proposed class action in the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice, seeking $550 million in damages on behalf of Canadian
victims of a massive cybersecurity privacy hack of the consumer
credit reporting agency Equifax.

Equifax issued a press release on September 7, 2017, in which it
disclosed that criminals exploited a U.S. website application
vulnerability to obtain Social Insurance Numbers, dates of birth,
names, addresses, credit card numbers and other personal
identifying information of millions of U.S. consumers and an
undisclosed number of Canadians.  Equifax set up a dedicated
website to provide information to US customers who may have been
affected, but there is no way for Canadians to identify if they
were affected.

"The scope of the privacy breach is unlike virtually any other
previous breach," explains Sotos Partner Jean-Marc Leclerc --
jleclerc@sotosllp.com  "Retailers typically do not store
information about social insurance numbers, or track bills, or
keep records of items purchased with credit.  Equifax does.
Fighting identity theft takes years, during which a consumer's
ability to obtain anything with credit is compromised: purchasing
a house; renting an apartment; or obtaining a credit card or line
of credit, for example."

As of the date of issuance of the claim, Equifax has failed to
provide any information to Canadians affected by the breach.
Therefore, the proposed class action seeks an order from the Court
requiring Equifax to notify Canadians who have been affected.

The proposed class action includes all residents of Canada whose
information was stored on Equifax databases and was accessed
without authorization between May 1, 2017 and August 1, 2017.

The statement of claim alleges, among other things, that Equifax
breached its contract with class members as well as their privacy
rights, was negligent in handling their information, and breached
provincial privacy statutes.

Sotos LLP represents the plaintiff.

A copy of the Statement of Claim issued September 12, 2017 can be
found on the Sotos LLP website.

For further information: contact Jean-Marc Leclerc at
jleclerc@sotosllp.com, Sotos LLP, 416-977-0007, www.sotosllp.com
[GN]


EQUIFAX INC: Faces Data Breach Class Action in Colorado
-------------------------------------------------------
Dave Young, writing for KDVR, reports that the first class-action
lawsuit has been filed against Equifax in Colorado by Hannon Law
over the company's huge security breach.

Denise Farmer Watts said Equifax and other major companies have to
be held accountable for putting consumers at risk.

"I'm appalled.  Equifax is a gatekeeper, it holds the key to
employment, mortgages, car loans and right now it's big, bad and
it's ugly," she said.

Ms. Watts suspected she had been a victim of the Equifax security
breach.

"They're ready for me to sign for a loan and I'm thinking what
loan so that there alarmed me and then I saw your report and I got
involved," she said.

Ms. Watts works in finance with a criminal justice background and
is one of thousands of Colorado consumers joining the class-action
lawsuit.

"How do you regain your trust back with these companies I feel
victimized," she said.

The Colorado lawsuit alleges serious harm to victims in violation
of federal laws and the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, joining
27 others filed nationwide likely to be combined by a panel of
federal judges.

"It's a slap in the face and I think it's pretty much criminal,"
Ms. Watts said.  "I think it's not honesty and you're supposed to
believe in a company and especially as big as Equifax is."

Two key congressional committees are also demanding answers from
Equifax about why the company delayed reporting the breach, how
it's identifying 143 million consumers affected and what's being
done to protect them

"I've got to continue to be on alert at this point if they're not
doing it and doing it properly then who will besides us the
consumers," Ms. Watts said. [GN]


EQUIFAX INC: Jones Ward Files Data Breach Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Thomas Novelly, writing for The Courier-Journal, reports that in
the wake of Equifax's massive security breach, a Louisville law
firm wants to hit back at the credit reporting giant.

Jones Ward PLC has filed a class action lawsuit in district court
seeking that they install better security measures and provide
financial compensation for damages on behalf of all consumers
affected in the Bluegrass State.

"People are outraged that the company allowed this data breach to
happen, and then made the problem worse by failing to notify them
as soon as it found out," said Alex Davis -- alex@jonesward.com
-- a lawyer at Jones Ward PLC.

The company faces at least 23 proposed class-action lawsuits since
its disclosure that personal identifying information for 143
million U.S. consumers may have been compromised by a massive
cyber breach, according to USA TODAY.

Federal court records show the lawsuits were filed through the
weekend after the credit-reporting giant's Sept. 7 disclosure that
a cyber attack by criminal hackers provided unauthorized access to
information for nearly 44 percent of the U.S. population.

The lawsuit states that Equifax knew about the security breach in
late-July and that a top executive for the company sold nearly
$1.8 million in shares in August before the hack was made public.

Christine Anderson, of Independence, Kentucky, who is one of the
names on the suit, found out that she was one of the 143 million
that had her information leaked and approached Jones Ward seeking
a lawsuit, Mr. Davis said.

"Equifax must be held accountable for letting hackers steal
personal information from tens of thousands of Kentuckians,"
Mr. Davis said. [GN]


EQUIFAX INC: ERI's Shegerian Comments on Data Breach Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The announcement of a class-action lawsuit against credit
reporting company Equifax after its recent massive data breach is
a game changer that will likely open the door to thousands more
lawsuits in similar situations, according to John Shegerian,
Founder and Executive Chairman of ERI, the nation's leading
recycler of electronic waste and the world's largest IT asset
disposition (ITAD) and cybersecurity-focused hardware destruction
company.

Victims of the Equifax breach, one of the largest in U.S. history,
have filed a multibillion-dollar class-action lawsuit in response
to the announcement that hackers had stolen Social Security
numbers and other personal information belonging to 143 million
people, leaving them potentially vulnerable to identity theft and
fraud.

The data breach is among the worst in history because of the
number of people affected and the sensitive types of information
exposed.  As many as 143 million people in the United States were
hit.  Others in the U.K. and Canada were also impacted.  Credit
card numbers for about 209,000 U.S. customers were compromised, in
addition to "personal identifying information" on about 182,000
U.S. customers.

The class-action complaint claims that the lawsuit could have cost
implications of $68.6 billion.

"This lawsuit surrounding the Equifax data breach comes at a time
when hackers have become more sophisticated and data is simply not
being protected well enough," said Mr. Shegerian.  "It's truly the
tip of the iceberg and it's very likely that thousands more
lawsuits will be filed as more and more of these data breaches
happen. A big part of the problem that is not being properly
addressed is hardware mismanagement."

The class action suit also follows on the heels of last month's
federal appeals decision in Washington, D.C. for Attias v.
CareFirst (csrps.com/Attias-v-CareFirst), which ruled that
consumers may sue companies that fail to safeguard their personal
data.

"Every business in the US -- large or small -- should pay very
close attention to the paradigm shift in data privacy in both the
digital and physical realm, and to what lengths businesses are
responsible for it," Mr. Shegerian added.  "To avoid being sued in
what is sure to be a feeding frenzy of litigation over compromised
data, the best thing businesses can do now is to make sure they
perform their due diligence protecting the data of their
constituent customers, vendors, and employees. Properly destroying
hardware using a certified organization that permanently
eliminates all digital data is now critical."

Mr. Shegerian noted that ERI currently provides the only dually
certified nationwide solution offering 100 percent guaranteed data
destruction for consumer electronics devices, e-waste, and
hardware.

ERI -- https://eridirect.com -- the nation's leading recycler of
electronic waste and the world's largest cybersecurity-focused
hardware destruction company, is certified to de-manufacture and
recycle every type of electronic waste in an environmentally
responsible manner.  ERI processes more than 275 million pounds of
electronic waste annually at eight locations, serving every zip
code in the United States. [GN]


FABER AND BRAND: Collection Letter Disputed by "Blakeley" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Nicole Blakeley, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Faber and Brand, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
5:17-cv-05172, (W.D. Ark., September 5, 2017), seeks actual and
statutory damages, prejudgment and post-judgment interests, costs
of litigation and reasonable attorney's fees and all other relief
for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Plaintiff incurred financial obligations arising from medical
expenses. Faber sent a collection letter to Blakely that did not
clearly specify the amount of debt and its corresponding
additional charges and fees, says the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Russell S. Thompson IV, Esq.
      THOMPSON CONSUMER LAW GROUP, PLLC
      5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618
      Mesa, AZ 85206
      Telephone: (602) 388-8898
      Facsimile: (866) 317-2674
      Email: rthompson@consumerlawinfo.com


FIFTH THIRD: Brown Sues for Breaching Promises on Overdraft Fees
----------------------------------------------------------------
HEATHER BROWN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. FIFTH THIRD BANK, Case No. 1:17-cv-06451 (N.D. Ill.,
September 7, 2017), accuses the Defendant of breaching its
promises that it will charge no overdraft fees for non-recurring,
everyday debit card transactions and to assess no more than five
Overdraft Fees per business day.

Even though Fifth Third knows (or should know) that Lyft and Uber
customers pay per ride, and do not pay recurring pre-arranged
fees, it repeatedly charges overdraft fees for these on one-time
transactions, Ms. Brown alleges.

Fifth Third is a national bank with its headquarters and principal
place of business located in Cincinnati, Ohio.  Among other
things, Fifth Third is engaged in the business of providing retail
banking services throughout the United States to consumers.  Fifth
Third regularly and systematically provides retail banking
services throughout the state of Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward A. Wallace, Esq.
          Adam Prom, Esq.
          WEXLER WALLACE LLP
          55 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3300
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 346-2222
          Facsimile: (312) 346-0022
          E-mail: eaw@wexlerwallace.com
                  ap@wexlerwallace.com

               - and -

          Jeff Ostrow, Esq.
          KOPELOWITZ OSTROW FERGUSON WEISELBERG GILERT
          1 West Las Olas Blvd., Suite 500
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 525-4100
          Facsimile: (954) 525-4300
          E-mail: ostrow@kolawyers.com


FIRED UP HOLDING: "Bates" Suit Alleges FLSA & WARN Act Violations
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL BATES; GREGORY GRICE; ALISHA OLIVER; JEFFREY TATE; DARCI
RONAN; KAMI JACKSON and STEPHEN RAMOS, Individually and on behalf
of and all others similarly situated v. FIRED UP HOLDING COMPANY,
INC.; RICHARD KEVIN FOOTE; MAGDALENA BAIER; R TEQUILA ACQUISITION,
LLC; CHALAK MITRAS GROUP, LLC; GURDEV SINGH GILL, M.D.; and RAJEEV
SINGH GILL, Case No. 2:17-cv-00174-J (N.D. Tex., September 7,
2017), alleges violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification.

The Defendants jointly operated and controlled four restaurants
doing business in Amarillo and Lubbock, Texas, as Ruby Tequila's
Mexican Kitchen.

The Plaintiffs allege that without warning or notice, the
Defendants closed down all four restaurants on July 26, 2017,
terminating hundreds of employees.  Adding insult to injury, the
Plaintiffs contend, the Defendants have completely failed to pay
these employees for several weeks during which they worked
immediately prior to closure of the restaurants.

Fired Up Holding Co., Inc., is a domestic for-profit corporation
headquartered in Lubbock, Texas.  The Individual Defendants are
officers, managers or employees of the Corporate Defendants.

R Tequila Acquisition, LLC, is a domestic limited liability
company.  Chalak Mitras Group, LLC, is a domestic limited
liability company.

On or about May 1, 2017, Fired Up contracted with RTA to purchase
all or a portion of the restaurants operating as Ruby Tequila's
Mexican Kitchen.  The Plaintiffs say the sale was never closed.
Even so, beginning in early May 2017, Fired Up, Richard Kevin
Foote, and Magdalena Baier began to assume responsibility for some
of the day-to-day operations of the restaurants.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jeremi K. Young, Esq.
          Tim Newsom, Esq.
          Collin J. Wynne, Esq.
          YOUNG & NEWSOM, P.C.
          1001 S. Harrison St., Suite 200
          Amarillo, TX 79101
          Telephone: (806) 331-1800
          Facsimile: (806) 398-9095
          E-mail: jyoung@youngfirm.com
                  tim@youngfirm.com
                  collin@youngfirm.com

               - and -

          Jeff Blackburn, Esq.
          Ryan Brown, Esq.
          BLACKBURN & BROWN, LLP
          718 S.W. 16th Avenue
          Amarillo, TX 79101
          Telephone: (806) 371-8333
          Facsimile: (806) 350-7716
          E-mail: blackburn@blackburnbrownlaw.com
                  ryan@ipoftexas.org


FITNESS 19 REDLANDS: "Gallion" Hits Unauthorized Account Debiting
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Steve Gallion, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Fitness 19 Redlands and Does 1-10,
inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 8:17-cv-01530 (C.D. Cal., September
5, 2017), seeks injunctive relief, statutory damages, treble
damages and all other relief for violation of the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act.

Defendants debited Plaintiff's debit card on a recurring basis
despite clear revocation of any authorization to do so and without
any authorization to begin with. This is in connection with the
use of Defendant's gym facility.

Fitness 19 Redlands was a company engaged in licensing use of its
gym services to consumers. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
     Meghan E. George, Esq.
     Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
     Thomas E. Wheeler, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
     21550 Oxnard St. Suite 780,
     Woodland Hills, CA 91367
     Phone: (877) 206-4741
     Fax: (866) 633-0228
     Email: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
            mgeorge@toddflaw.com
            abacon@toddflaw.com
            twheeler@toddflaw.com


FLINT, MI: 6th Cir. Affirms Remand of "Mays" to State Court
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the Decision of the District Court remanding the
case back to the state court the case captioned MELISSA MAYS;
MICHAEL MAYS; JACQUELINE PEMBERTON; KEITH JOHN PEMBERTON; ELNORA
CARTHAN; RHONDA KELSO, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF FLINT,
MICH., et al., Defendants, PATRICK COOK; ADAM ROSENTHAL; MICHAEL
PRYSBY; STEPHEN BUSCH; LIANE SHEKTER SMITH; BRADLEY WURFEL,
Defendants-Appellants, No. 16-2484 (6th Cir.).

The Plaintiffs objected to removal. They filed a motion seeking to
have the district court remand the case back to the state court,
which the district court granted. On appeal, the MDEQ Defendants
ask the Sixth Circuit to reverse the remand order.

This case arises out of the drinking-water crisis in Flint,
Michigan. The Plaintiffs are residents of the City of Flint who
represent themselves and seek to represent a class of similarly
situated individuals. They allege that they have been harmed since
April 2014 by the toxic condition of the Flint water supply. The
Plaintiffs filed suit against several City and State officials in
the Genesee County Circuit Court, asserting various state-law tort
claims.

Four of the State officials who are present or former employees of
the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ Defendants)
removed the action from the state court to federal court on two
grounds. They first invoked the federal-officer removal provision
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1442(a)(1), contending that all of their
conduct in question was performed under the supervision and
direction of the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(the EPA). Second, the MDEQ Defendants contend that the
Plaintiffs' claims necessarily implicate a substantial federal
issue that merits federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1441.

Removal by the MDEQ Defendants under the federal-officer removal
statute was properly denied, the Sixth Circuit held.

The federal-officer removal statute allows removal of actions
against the United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or
any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of
any agency thereof, in an official or individual capacity, for or
relating to any act under color of such office. Persons like the
MDEQ Defendants, who are not federal officers, must satisfy three
requirements in order to invoke the federal-officer removal
statute: (1) the defendants must establish that they acted under a
federal officer, (2) those actions must have been performed under
color of federal office, and (3) the defendants must raise a
colorable federal defense.

The Supreme Court discussed the federal-officer removal statute
most recently in Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142
(2007).

The Watson Court explained that these early cases illustrate that
the removal statute's 'basic' purpose is to protect the Federal
Government from the interference with its 'operations that would
occur if a federal officer could be tried in state court for a
state offense related to the operation. Concerns about 'local
prejudice' against unpopular federal laws or federal officials
thus underlie the federal-officer removal statute. As the Court
explained, states that were antagonistic toward federal government
operations might use state court proceedings to thwart the
enforcement of federal law.

Watson did not formulate a clear test for when the acting-under
requirement is satisfied. But the Court set forth several
considerations that are helpful in analyzing the present case.

After reviewing the history of the federal-officer removal
statute, the Court concluded that "the word 'under' must refer to
what has been described as a relationship that involves 'acting in
a certain capacity, considered in relation to one holding a
superior position or office. The acting-under relationship
typically involves subjection, guidance, or control. In addition,
the Court explained that a private entity must be assisting the
federal government in carrying out the government's own tasks in
order to invoke federal-officer removal.. Simply complying with a
regulation is insufficient, even if the regulatory scheme is
highly detailed and the defendant's activities are highly
supervised and monitored.

Watson supports the conclusion that the MDEQ Defendants were not
acting under the EPA for purposes of the federal-officer removal
statute.

The MDEQ Defendants cite several communications with the EPA in
their brief. But because the MDEQ Defendants did not cite these
exhibits in the notice of removal, the communications are not
among the pleadings that we can review on an appeal of the
district court's determination that it facially lacked
jurisdiction.  And even if the Sixth Circuit could review these
communications, they simply suggest that the EPA and the MDEQ
discussed issues related to the Flint water crisis, but not that
the EPA ordered the MDEQ to take any specific action.

The Sixth Circuit also finds telling the MDEQ Defendants'
statement in their notice of removal that the clearest indicator
that they were acting under the EPA is the emergency order issued
on January 21, 2016. That order, however, was issued two days
after January 19, 2016, the date on which the Plaintiffs filed
their complaint. So any actions that the MDEQ Defendants took
pursuant to that order were obviously unrelated to the actions
that the Plaintiffs challenge.

True enough, the EPA retains the ability to intervene when a state
with primary enforcement authority fails to meet the requirements
to maintain such authority.  But we disagree with the MDEQ
Defendants' argument that this ability to intervene supports their
invocation of federal-officer removal. The fact that the EPA can
intervene if a state fails to properly exercise its primary
enforcement authority suggests that, absent any such failure by
the state, the state retains the freedom to enforce its own safe-
drinking-water laws and regulations. Michigan was so governing
itself when the alleged actions and inactions giving rise to the
Plaintiffs' claims occurred.

Allowing the MDEQ Defendants to invoke the federal-officer removal
statute would not serve the purpose of the statute.

Removal in these cases thus clearly served the historical purpose
of the federal-officer removal statute. The present case is
markedly different because the MDEQ Defendants are state officers
who have been sued for actions and inactions related to their
enforcement of state law.

The Sixth Circuit therefore concludes that the MDEQ Defendants
were not acting under the EPA and thus are not eligible for
federal-officer removal. Because we conclude that the acting-under
requirement is not satisfied, we need not decide whether the MDEQ
Defendants are being sued for actions taken under color of federal
law or whether the MDEQ Defendants have raised a colorable federal
defense.

This case does not present a substantial federal question that
merits removal under 28 U.S.C. Section 1441.

In the present case, the Plaintiffs have alleged state-law claims
of gross negligence, fraud, assault and battery, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The MDEQ Defendants argue that
this case nevertheless meets all of the requirements for removal
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1441 because the complaint alleges that
the MDEQ Defendants breached duties to the Plaintiffs that were
based on the SDWA and the LCR. According to the MDEQ Defendants,
the interpretation of the LCR is inherently tied to the
determination of whether the MDEQ Defendants were negligent. They
contend that there is a sufficient federal interest to merit
removal because of the need to avoid inconsistent interpretations
of the LCR. The Plaintiffs counter that the district court
correctly concluded that this case does not raise a substantial
federal issue.

The Sixth Circuit agreed with the Plaintiffs and the district
court. As the removing party, the MDEQ Defendants bear the burden
of demonstrating that a basis for federal jurisdiction exists. The
MDEQ Defendants have vaguely alleged that the Plaintiffs' gross-
negligence claims are inextricably related to the interpretation
of the LCR because those regulations are ambiguous and susceptible
to multiple interpretations as applied to Flint.

In light of the precedents, the MDEQ Defendants have not met their
burden of demonstrating that federal jurisdiction exists.  The
Sixth Circuit therefore concluded that removal under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1441 is inappropriate in the present case.

A full-text copy of the Sixth Circuit's September 11, 2017 Opinion
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y9rdmq59from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Charles E. Barbieri, FOSTER, SWIFT, COLLINS & SMITH, P.C.,
Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants, 313 South Washington Square,
Lansing, MI 48933-2114, William H. Goodman, GOODMAN & HURWITZ,
P.C., Detroit, Michigan, for Appellees, 1394 E Jefferson Ave
Detroit, MI 48207

ON BRIEF: Charles E. Barbieri, Allison M. Collins, FOSTER, SWIFT,
COLLINS & SMITH, P.C., 313 South Washington Square, Lansing, MI
48933-2114, Thaddeus E. Morgan -- tmorgan@fraserlawfirm.com --
FRASER, TREBILCOCK, DAVIS & DUNLAP, Lansing, Michigan, Jay M.
Berger -- jberger@clarkhill.com -- Michael J. Pattwell --
mpattwell@clarkhill.com -- CLARK HILL PLC, Lansing, Michigan,
Philip A. Grashoff, Jr. -- pgrashoff@kotzsangster.com  -- KOTZ
SANGSTER WYSOCKI, P.C., Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for
Appellants.

Beth M. Rivers, Michael L. Pitt, Cary S. McGehee, PITT MCGEHEE
PALMER & RIVERS, PC, 117 West 4th StreetSuite 200Royal Oak, MI
48067, Michigan, for Appellees.


GENERAL CABLE: Still Faces ERISA Litigation in Kentucky
-------------------------------------------------------
General Cable Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that an ERISA class action
remains pending.

The Company said, "On March 15, 2017, litigation was initiated
against us and certain of our current and former directors,
executive officers and employees by a former employee on behalf of
a purported class of employees who invested in the common stock of
General Cable through our 401(k) plan.  The Plaintiff alleges that
we should have not retained the General Cable stock fund as an
investment option in our 401(k) plan during the period 2003-2016,
when they claim the price of the Company stock was artificially
inflated.  The suit alleges various violations of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") and was filed in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky.  At this early stage in the litigation, we cannot
determine the likelihood of, nor can we reasonably estimate the
range of, any possible loss."

General Cable is a global leader in the development, design,
manufacture, marketing and distribution of copper, aluminum and
fiber optic wire and cable products for use in the energy,
industrial, construction, specialty and communications markets.


GLOBAL TRUST: Al Asks E.D. Wisconsin for Order Certifying Class
---------------------------------------------------------------
Adel Al moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit captioned ADEL AL, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. GLOBAL TRUST
MANAGEMENT, LLC, Case No. 2:17-cv-01219-NJ (E.D. Wisc.), and
further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class
certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant)
relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules
and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.  More than one defendant has already attempted the
scheme contemplated in Campbell-Ewald.  See Severns v. Eastern
Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24, 2016).  Judge Randa
denied the defendant's request to deposit funds on grounds that a
class certification motion was pending.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.

http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=SixOdrqY

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: sademi@ademilaw.com
                  jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com


GREENSPOON MARDER: Faces "Carlson" Suit in S.D. of New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Greenspoon Marder
P.A. The case is styled as Jesse Carlson, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Greenspoon Marder
P.A., Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-07132 (S.D.N.Y., September 19,
2017).

Greenspoon Marder P.A. is a law firm.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Joseph H Mizrahi Law PC
   337 Avenue W Suite 2f
   Brooklyn, NY 11223
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (347) 665-1545
   Email: jmizrahilaw@gmail.com


GROUP HEALTH: Faces Class Action Over Out-of-Network Coverage
-------------------------------------------------------------
Louie Torres, writing for Pennsylvania Record, reports that a
retired New York City police officer now residing in Pennsylvania
alleges an indemnity insurer deceived plan members with its out-
of-network coverage.

Steven Plavin filed a complaint on behalf of all others similarly
situated on Aug. 16 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania against Group Health Inc. alleging unjust
enrichment and other counts.

According to the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that he and
class members were injured by the defendant's practice of denying
out-of-network coverage and became personally responsible for the
amounts due to health care providers.

The plaintiff holds Group Health Inc. responsible because the
defendant allegedly misled consumers regarding the out-of-network
coverage it provided and the rates of reimbursement.

The plaintiff requests a trial by jury and seeks compensatory
damages, restitution, disgorgement, statutory damages, actual
damages, treble damages, court costs, interest and any further
relief the court grants.  He is represented by Bill Carmody --
bcarmody@susmangodfrey.com -- and Arun Subramanian --
asubramanian@susmangodfrey.com -- of Susman Godfrey LLP in New
York.

U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania case
number 3:17-cv-01462-RDM [GN]


HANOVER INSURANCE: Discovery Ongoing in Durand Litigation
---------------------------------------------------------
The Hanover Insurance Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3,
2017, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that the
summary judgment motion in the Durand Litigation has been stayed
pending additional discovery, which is ongoing.

On March 12, 2007, a putative class action suit captioned Jennifer
A. Durand v. The Hanover Insurance Group, Inc., and The Allmerica
Financial Cash Balance Pension Plan, was filed in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The
named plaintiff, a former employee of our former life insurance
and annuity business who received a lump sum distribution from the
Company's Cash Balance Plan (the "Plan") at or about the time of
her separation from the company, claims that she and others
similarly situated did not receive the appropriate lump sum
distribution because in computing the lump sum, the Company and
the Plan understated the accrued benefit in the calculation. The
plaintiff claims that the Plan underpaid her distributions and
those of similarly situated participants by failing to pay an
additional so-called "whipsaw" amount reflecting the present value
of an estimate of future interest credits from the date of the
lump sum distribution to each participant's retirement age of 65
("whipsaw claim").

The plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint adding two new named
plaintiffs and additional claims on December 11, 2009.  Two of the
three new claims set forth in the Amended Complaint were dismissed
by the District Court, which action was upheld in November 2015 by
the U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.  The District Court,
however, did allow to stand the portion of the Amended Complaint
which set forth claims against the Company for breach of fiduciary
duty and failure to meet notice requirements arising under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") from the
various interest crediting and lump sum distribution matters of
which plaintiffs complain, but only as to plaintiffs' "whipsaw"
claim that remained in the case. On December 17, 2013, the Court
entered an order certifying a class to bring "whipsaw" and related
breach of fiduciary duty claims consisting of all persons who
received a lump sum distribution between March 1, 1997 and
December 31, 2003. The Company filed a summary judgment motion
that was based on the statute of limitations and seeks to dismiss
the subclass of plaintiffs who received lump sum distributions
prior to March 13, 2002.  This summary judgment motion has been
stayed pending additional discovery, which is ongoing.

Hanover Insurance's business operations consist of four operating
segments: Commercial Lines, Personal Lines, Chaucer and Other.


HEALTH INSURANCE: Kirby McInerney Files Securities Suit in NY
-------------------------------------------------------------
Kirby McInerney LLP on Sept. 12 disclosed that a class action
lawsuit has been filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York on behalf of all persons or entities that
acquired Health Insurance Innovations, Inc. (HIIQ) securities
during the period from August 2, 2017 through September 11, 2017
(the "Class Period").  The suit asserts claims for violation of
the federal securities laws against Health Insurance Innovations,
Inc. (the "Company") and several of its senior officers.  Pursuant
to applicable law, investors have until November 10, 2017 to apply
to the Court to be appointed as lead plaintiff in the lawsuit.

The lawsuit alleges that during the Class Period, defendants
failed to disclose that the Company had been denied a key
insurance license in Florida due in part to material errors and
omissions in the Company's application.  Following a September 11,
2017 public report of this licensing rejection, the Company's
share price fell from $29.90 to $23.35, a decline of $6.55 per
share.

If you acquired Health Insurance Innovations, Inc. securities
during the Class Period, have information about this matter, would
like to learn more about these claims, or have any questions
concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with
respect to these matters, please contact Sarah Lynch by email at
slynch@kmllp.com, or telephone at (212) 371-6600, or by filling
out this contact form. There is no cost or obligation to you.

Kirby McInerney LLP -- http://www.kmllp.com-- is a New York-based
plaintiffs' law firm concentrating in securities, whistleblower,
antitrust and consumer litigation. [GN]


HILTON GRAND: Glasser Moves for Certification of Class Under TCPA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled MELANIE GLASSER, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. HILTON GRAND
VACATIONS COMPANY, LLC, Case No. 8:16-cv-00952-JDW-AAS (M.D.
Fla.), moves the Court for an order certifying that the action
asserting a claim against the Defendant under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act may proceed on behalf of a class.

The redacted class is defined as:

     All persons in the United States whose cellular telephone
     number Defendant called using the _____ between October 16,
     2013 and April 2, 2014 where the ____________________.

The case is about a massive telemarketing campaign where Grand
Vacations placed automated telemarketing calls to the Plaintiff's
cellular telephone number in an effort to sell her timeshares for
which she has never expressed any interest, much less provided
express written consent as required by the TCPA.

A copy of the Redacted Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=APmv7kdF

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Timothy J. Sostrin, Esq.
          Keith Keogh, Esq.
          KEOGH LAW, LTD
          55 W. Monroe St., Suite 3390
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 726-1092
          Facsimile: (312) 726-1093
          E-mail: Keith@Keoghlaw.com
                  TSostrin@KeoghLaw.com

               - and -

          William Peerce Howard, Esq.
          Amanda J. Allen, Esq.
          THE CONSUMER PROTECTION FIRM
          210 A-South MacDill Ave.
          Tampa, FL 33609
          Telephone: (813) 500-1500
          E-mail: Billy@TheConsumerProtectionFirm.com
                  Amanda@TheConsumerProtectionFirm.com


ILLINOIS: Prelim. Injunction Bid in Medicaid Applications OK'd
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases captioned Doctors Nursing and Rehabilitation Center,
LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Felicia F. Norwood, in her official
capacity as the Director of Illinois Department of Healthcare and
Family Services, Defendant, and related cases, Nos. 1:16-cv-9837,
1:16-cv-9842, 1:16-cv-9922, 1:16-cv-10255, 1:16-cv-10614, 1:17-cv-
104, 1:17-cv-640, 1:17-cv-1750 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Elaine E. Bucklo
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, granted the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction requiring the Defendant to process Medicaid
applications and to provide Medicaid benefits with reasonable
promptness in accordance with the Medicaid Act and timeliness
standards set by federal regulations.

These related cases concern Illinois's provision of Medicaid
benefits and the timeliness requirements for approving and
providing such benefits.  The Plaintiffs in these matters are
residents 24-hour, long-term nursing care facilities who seek
long-term care benefits under Illinois's state Medicaid plan and
the healthcare providers that operate these nursing facilities.
The Patient Plaintiffs fall into two major categories: (i) those
who are awaiting Medicaid or long-term care eligibility
determinations; and (ii) those who, despite receiving approval,
are still awaiting long-term care benefits.

The Plaintiffs bring suit against Felicia Norwood, the Director of
HFS, in her official capacity, because, they allege, she has
failed to process their Medicaid applications and to provide
Medicaid benefits with reasonable promptness, as required by the
Medicaid Act and its implementing regulations.  According to them,
HFS violates the regulatory timeliness requirements whenever it
takes longer than 90 days to make a benefit eligibility
determination and whenever it takes longer than twelve months to
process and furnish payment for Medicaid benefits.  The Plaintiffs
additionally assert that Norwood's inaction violates the ADA,
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Plaintiffs ultimately seek injunctive and declaratory relief
to compel the Defendant's future compliance with the regulatory
time limits for determining applicant eligibility and processing
claims.  In the interim, they seek preliminary injunctive relief
because, they assert, the Patient Plaintiffs require the twenty-
four hour nursing care they are currently receiving, have no means
of paying for it, and are now in danger of losing it.  They seek
preliminary relief to prevent irreparable harm to these
individuals.

In the instant actions, the Plaintiffs move for a preliminary
injunction addressing individual Patient Plaintiffs in seven
related cases and a class of approximately 300 patients in a
related class action.

Judge Bucklo held that the public has an interest in ensuring that
Medicaid eligible individuals promptly receive necessary medical
services.  This, after all, is why Medicaid exists.  Illinois
elected to participate in the Medicaid program and to accept
federal funds for the purpose of providing medical assistance to
its needy citizens.  There is a public interest in making sure the
state's designated Medicaid agency complies with federal law.
These interests are not outweighed by any ancillary impact this
preliminary relief may have on the state's budget.  Weighing all
of these factors together, she finds that the Plaintiffs are
entitled to preliminary injunctive relief.

For these reasons, Judge Bucklo granted in part the Plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction.  Defendant Norwood is ordered
to determine eligibility for certain Patient Plaintiffs' Medicaid
or long-term care applications that have been pending for more
than 90 days and to notify the applicants or their authorized
representatives by Oct. 16, 2017.  This includes all applications
for A. Martinez, S. Vogel, J. Watson, B. Noel, G. Ostermueller, D.
Jones, M. Urban, and B. Lawrence.  The Judge did not grant the
Plaintiffs' request for presumptive eligibility.

Judge Bucklo further directed the Defendant Norwood to
additionally bring HFS' claims processing procedures into
compliance with 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(8)'s reasonable
promptness requirement and the timely payment provisions of 42
C.F.R. Section 447.45.  The Judge ordered Defendant Norwood, with
respect to the 27 identified Patient Plaintiffs and the Heritage
class, to prospectively process claims for payment of services
within 12 months of having notice of those claims.

The Defendant will be deemed to have notice either on (i) the date
a claim is received or (ii) for claims for services predating Dec.
1, 2016, the date of services, so long as the Patient Plaintiff at
issue had an application for long-term care services approved or
pending for more than 90 days at the time of those services that
would have put the agency on notice of the claim.  The state must
provide medical assistance to eligible individuals with reasonable
promptness, and HFS' own administrative delays may not prevent
timely payment of claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept 1, 2017 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/VrFyDZ from Leagle.com.

Doctors Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC, Plaintiff,
represented by Katie Z. Van Lake.

Evergreen Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC, Plaintiff,
represented by Katie Z. Van Lake.

Felicia F. Norwood, Defendant, represented by Brian Franklin Kolp,
Office of the Illinois Attorney General & Michael D. Arnold,
Illinois Attorney General's Office.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Talcum Plaintiffs Appeal Class Action Ruling
---------------------------------------------------------------
HarrisMartin reports that talcum powder plaintiffs whose putative
class action claims were dismissed by the court overseeing the
national coordinated multidistrict litigation docket have filed a
notice of appeal, contesting the MDL Court's opining that the
plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to bring the claims.

The plaintiffs filed the notice of appeal to the 3rd Circuit U.S.
Court of Appeals on Sept. 9.

In July, the MDL Court granted Johnson & Johnson's motion to
dismiss the first amended complaint filed in the putative class
action, but allowed the plaintiffs leave to amend. [GN]


JOHNSON CONTROLS: Status Hearing Rescheduled for November 28
------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson Controls International PLC said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3,
2017, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that a status
hearing has subsequently been rescheduled for November 28, 2017,
in the case, Laufer v. Johnson Controls, Inc., et al.

On May 20, 2016, a putative class action lawsuit, Laufer v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., et al., Docket No. 2016CV003859, was filed
in the Circuit Court of Wisconsin, Milwaukee County, naming
Johnson Controls, Inc., the individual members of its board of
directors, the Company and the Company's merger subsidiary as
defendants. The complaint alleged that Johnson Controls Inc.'s
directors breached their fiduciary duties in connection with the
merger between Johnson Controls Inc. and the Company's merger
subsidiary by, among other things, failing to take steps to
maximize shareholder value, seeking to benefit themselves
improperly and failing to disclose material information in the
joint proxy statement/prospectus relating to the merger. The
complaint further alleged that the Company aided and abetted
Johnson Controls Inc.'s directors in the breach of their fiduciary
duties. The complaint sought, among other things, to enjoin the
merger.

On August 8, 2016, the plaintiffs agreed to settle the action and
release all claims that were or could have been brought by
plaintiffs or any member of the putative class of Johnson Controls
Inc.'s shareholders. The settlement is conditioned upon, among
other things, the execution of an appropriate stipulation of
settlement.

On November 10, 2016, the parties filed a joint status report
notifying the court they had reached such agreement. On November
22, 2016, the court ordered that a proposed stipulation of
settlement be filed by March 15, 2017 and scheduled a status
hearing for April 20, 2017.

On March 10, 2017, the parties filed a joint letter requesting
that the filing and hearing be adjourned and that the parties be
allowed an additional 90 days to update the court in light of the
Gumm v. Molinaroli action proceeding in federal court.  The status
hearing has subsequently been rescheduled for November 28, 2017.

There can be no assurance that the parties will ultimately enter
into a stipulation of settlement or that the court will approve
the settlement. In either event, or certain other circumstances,
the settlement could be terminated.

Johnson Controls International plc, headquartered in Cork,
Ireland, is a global diversified technology and multi industrial
leader serving a wide range of customers in more than 150
countries. The Company creates intelligent buildings, efficient
energy solutions, integrated infrastructure and next generation
transportation systems that work seamlessly together to deliver on
the promise of smart cities and communities.


JOHNSON CONTROLS: Motion to Dismiss "Gumm" Class Suit Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson Controls International PLC said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3,
2017, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that the
Company's motion to dismiss the "Gumm" class action lawsuit
remains pending.

On August 16, 2016, a putative class action lawsuit, Gumm v.
Molinaroli, et al., Case No. 16-cv-1093, was filed in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin,
naming Johnson Controls, Inc., the individual members of its board
of directors at the time of the merger with the Company's merger
subsidiary and certain of its officers, the Company and the
Company's merger subsidiary as defendants.

The complaint asserted various causes of action under the federal
securities laws, state law and the Taxpayer Bill of Rights,
including that the individual defendants allegedly breached their
fiduciary duties and unjustly enriched themselves by structuring
the merger among the Company, Tyco and the merger subsidiary in a
manner that would result in a United States federal income tax
realization event for the putative class of certain Johnson
Controls, Inc. shareholders and allegedly result in certain
benefits to the defendants, as well as related claims regarding
alleged misstatements in the proxy statement/prospectus
distributed to the Johnson Controls, Inc. shareholders, conversion
and breach of contract. The complaint also asserted that Johnson
Controls, Inc., the Company and the Company's merger subsidiary
aided and abetted the individual defendants in their breach of
fiduciary duties and unjust enrichment. The complaint seeks, among
other things, disgorgement of profits and damages.

On September 30, 2016, approximately one month after the closing
of the merger, plaintiffs filed a preliminary injunction motion
seeking, among other items, to compel Johnson Controls, Inc. to
make certain intercompany payments that plaintiffs contend will
impact the United States federal income tax consequences of the
merger to the putative class of certain Johnson Controls, Inc.
shareholders and to enjoin Johnson Controls, Inc. from reporting
to the Internal Revenue Service the capital gains taxes payable by
this putative class as a result of the closing of the merger.

The court held a hearing on the preliminary injunction motion on
January 4, 2017, and on January 25, 2017, the judge denied the
plaintiffs' motion. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on
February 15, 2017, and the Company filed a motion to dismiss on
April 3, 2017.

Although the Company believes it has substantial defenses to
plaintiffs' claims, it is not able to predict the outcome of this
action.

Johnson Controls International plc, headquartered in Cork,
Ireland, is a global diversified technology and multi industrial
leader serving a wide range of customers in more than 150
countries. The Company creates intelligent buildings, efficient
energy solutions, integrated infrastructure and next generation
transportation systems that work seamlessly together to deliver on
the promise of smart cities and communities.


LINCOLN NATIONAL: Court Narrows Claims in COI Litigation
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum granting in part and denying in
part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint in the case captioned
IN RE: LINCOLN NATIONAL COI LITIGATION, No. 16-06605 (E.D. Pa.).

This case is a consolidated class action brought on behalf of the
named Plaintiffs1 and all similarly situated owners of JP Legend
300 and JP Lifewriter Legend 100, 200 and 400 life insurance
policies.  Plaintiffs are all owners of flexible premium universal
life insurance policies (Policies) issued between 1999 and 2007 by
Jefferson-Pilot Life Insurance Company, a subsidiary of Jefferson-
Pilot Corporation, which was acquired by Lincoln National in a
cash and stock merger in 2006.  Plaintiffs allege that as a result
of the merger, the Policies were absorbed, owned and controlled by
the combined company, Lincoln National, which sold and operated
its universal life insurance products through its subsidiary
Lincoln Life and Lincoln National's marketing arm doing business
as Lincoln Financial Group.

Specifically, the Complaint alleges claims for (1) breach of
contract; (2) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing; (3) injunctive relief as to illustrations; (4) injunctive
relief as to the COI increase; and (5) declaratory relief as to
the COI increase, as well as violations of (6) the North Carolina
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. Section
75-1.; (7) the Texas Administrative Code and the Texas Insurance
Code, 28 Texas Admin Code Sections 21.2206-21.2212 and Tex. Ins.
Code. Art. 21.21; (8) the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.
Stat. Ann. Section 56:8-1; (9) the New York General Business Law
Section 349; (10) the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal Bus.
& Prof. Code Sections 17200, et seq.; and (11) the California
Elder Abuse Statute, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Sections 15610.

According to Plaintiffs, the size of the COI charge is important
for two reasons: it is typically the highest expense a
policyholder pays and it is deducted from the Policy Account so
the policyholder forfeits the COI charge entirely.

Defendants contend the five contract-based claims must be
dismissed against Lincoln National because Plaintiffs have not
adequately alleged that Lincoln National is in contractual privity
with Plaintiffs.

At this stage in the proceedings, Plaintiffs have adequately
supported their allegation that Lincoln National is successor-in-
interest to Jefferson-Pilot, in privity of contract with
Plaintiffs and in that capacity and in conjunction with Lincoln
Life, the Lincoln Defendants have subjected the plaintiff owners
to unlawful cost of insurance increases. The standard is not
whether supporting facts are dispositive, but whether they make
Plaintiffs' allegation plausible. Here, given the billion dollar
stock merger, and in the absence of any counterarguments or
forthcoming details from Defendants, Lincoln National will
continue as a party in this matter and Plaintiffs may proceed with
their contract-based claims against both Defendants.

In order to state a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must
allege the existence of a contract, including its essential terms,
a breach of a duty imposed by the contract and resultant damages.
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants breached the contract by basing
the COI increase on impermissible factors, failing to apply the
increases in a uniform manner across rate classes and refusing to
provide some policyholders with illustrations when requested.

Defendants appear to acknowledge that, if Lincoln did raise the
COI based on non-enumerated factors, it would constitute a breach
of contract. However, they deny doing so. They argue that the
considerations outlined in their statements all fall within the
four permissible factors and Plaintiffs have not otherwise alleged
facts showing that Lincoln Life relied on anything other than the
contractually permitted factors in implementing the COI
Adjustment. In support of their contention that Lincoln considered
impermissible factors, Plaintiffs point to Lincoln's notice and
update, a statement allegedly made by Lincoln's CEO and publicly
available information relevant to some of the permissible factors.
Next, Plaintiffs argue that even taking Lincoln's explanation as
true, several of the factors on which it purported to base the COI
rate increase, such as lower investment income as a result of
continued low interest rates and updated expenses, including
higher reinsurance rates, do not fit within the permissible
considerations.

Defendants reject this argument, claiming that reinsurance is an
expense Lincoln incurred" and Plaintiffs failed to allege any
basis for distinguishing between various types of expenses.
Plaintiffs, however, alleged that the reinsurance costs cannot be
included in the permissible category of expenses because they are
not a cost of directly administering the policy.

Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Lincoln's admitted
consideration of lower investment income and higher reinsurance
costs constituted breaches of the Policies terms.

Plaintiffs alleged that mortality the most important element and
the driving factor in setting the COI rate has improved nationwide
since the Policies were issued and is expected to continue
improving.

Defendants objections with respect to the mortality factor do not
render Plaintiffs' allegation meaningless; the fact that Lincoln
expects mortality to continue improving even if at a reduced
degree than previously expected nevertheless makes it less likely
that expectations with respect to this factor have changed so
significantly so as to support an increase of the huge magnitude
alleged.

In any event, Plaintiffs have stated a claim.

Plaintiffs also contend Defendants breached the policies terms by
failing to apply the COI rate increase uniformly across
policyholders in the same rate class. Plaintiffs contend this is
illogical and contrary to how the policy was originally priced,
and was not replicated across the class. Other named plaintiffs,
and other victimized policyholders of the same rating class, did
not receive an increase with this strange and illogical slope.
These allegations are sufficient to state a claim.

Plaintiffs claim that Defendants breached the contract by refusing
to provide policyholders with illustrations during the Policy's
grace period.

Defendants, however, relying on the Continuation of Insurance
provision, argue that the Policy only remains in force as long as
the cash surrender is sufficient and, though it does not terminate
until the end of the grace period, it is not in force during that
time.  In theory, the needed to continue the policy language could
support either interpretation.  Moreover, both parties contend
that Couch on Insurance supports their reading of the provisions.
The Court cannot say that the Policy language is unambiguous or
plainly inconsistent with Plaintiffs' reading at this stage, and
Plaintiffs have stated a claim.

In Count two, Plaintiffs assert a claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and contend the implied
covenant requires Lincoln to act in a manner that does not
frustrate policyholders' reasonable expectations under the
Policies, and to the extent it has limited discretion to set the
COI rates to exercise that discretion reasonably and in good
faith.

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' claim is defective because it
is based on the same facts as the breach of contract claim and
therefore duplicative and cannot be brought as a separate cause of
action.  Defendants also argue that state law does not recognize
implied covenants that are based on breaches of express contract
terms.

Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Defendants breached the
implied covenant by exercising their limited discretion under the
Policies in an unreasonable and unfair manner with the bad faith
intent of inducing lapses, frustrating policyholders' expectations
and depriving them of the benefit of the agreement.

In Count three, Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief prohibiting
Defendants from refusing to provide illustrations during the grace
period and requiring Defendants to provide certain Plaintiffs with
illustrations.

Defendants argue the claim seeking injunctive relief is defective
for the additional reason that it does not allege a threat of
irreparable injury.

Plaintiffs do not appear to seek preliminary injunctive relief
prior to the final adjudication of their claims. Rather, they
request only that injunctive relief be included among the various
remedies available to them should the Court find, pursuant to
their breach of contract claim, that Lincoln is obligated to
contractually provide the requested illustrations. At this stage,
such a remedy appears to be appropriate in these circumstances and
does not require Plaintiffs to plead irreparable harm.

In Count four, Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief prohibiting
Defendants from continuing to collect the allegedly unlawful COI
charges and ordering Defendants to reinstate any Policies that
were forfeited or terminated due to the COI increase. Defendants
do not move for the dismissal of this claim.

In Count five, Plaintiffs request declaratory relief resolving the
parties' obligations under the Policies, the factors on which
Lincoln may base a COI rate increase, the lawfulness of the COI
increases and whether the policyholders must continue to pay the
allegedly unlawful COI charges. Defendants contend that
Plaintiffs' claim for declaratory relief should be dismissed
because it is duplicative of the breach of contract claim, would
not be practical or useful and is not ripe for review.

The Court nevertheless fails to see how the issue of the factors
Lincoln may consider when increasing COI rates is independent of
the success of Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, as
adjudication of the latter will necessarily require resolution of
the former. The Court therefore declines to exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction and grants Defendants' Motion with
respect to this claim.

In Count six, Plaintiffs contend Defendants violated the North
Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. (UDTPA).
To state a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices, a
plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant committed an unfair or
deceptive act or practice; (2) the act in question was in or
affecting commerce; and (3) the act proximately caused injury to
the plaintiff.

Plaintiffs' Response articulates their theory: they do not contend
that Plaintiffs were injured as the result of being induced into a
course of action by a misrepresentation made by Defendants.
Plaintiffs' injuries resulted from the overall course of conduct,
which they contend was inherently deceptive and unfair. Plaintiffs
therefore need not allege reliance, and have stated an actionable
UDTPA claim.

In Count seven, Plaintiffs assert a claim for violation of Tex.
Admin. Code Sections 21.2206 to 21.2212 and Tex. Ins. Code Section
541.061.

Tex. Ins. Code Section 541.061 (formerly Article 21.21) provides:

     "It is an unfair method of competition or an unfair or
deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance to
misrepresent an insurance policy by:(1) making an untrue statement
of material fact;(2) failing to state a material fact necessary to
make other statements made not misleading, considering the
circumstances under which the statements were made;(3) making a
statement in a manner that would mislead a reasonably prudent
person to a false conclusion of a material fact;(4) making a
material misstatement of law; or(5) failing to disclose a matter
required by law to be disclosed, including failing to make a
disclosure in accordance with another provision of this code."

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not pled injury. Plaintiffs
have done so by alleging that the misleading illustrations caused
US Life to pay more in premiums than it otherwise would have. As
they assert, if Policyholders were aware of the massive COI
increases that would be imposed in the last years for which
premiums were due, that would have significantly changed their
calculus about whether to continue paying premiums or cash out or
surrender their policies.

In Count eight, Plaintiffs assert claims for violations of the New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. Sections 56:8-1
(NJCFA).

To state a claim under the NJCFA, plaintiffs must allege (1) an
unlawful practice; (2) an ascertainable loss; and (3) a causal
relationship between the unlawful conduct and the ascertainable
loss.

Plaintiffs allegations are sufficient to state a claim.

In Count nine, Plaintiffs assert a claim for violation of New York
General Business Law Section349. Section 349 prohibits deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or
commerce or in the furnishing of any service. To state a claim
under Section 349, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the act or
practice was consumer-oriented; (2) the act or practice was
misleading in a material respect; and (3) the plaintiff was
injured as a result.

Plaintiffs have adequately alleged independent losses. The breach
of contract claims rest upon payments after the increase or
Policyholders being forced to surrender or cash out policies
prematurely. Plaintiffs allege alternatively that Lincoln has
hidden this increase for a long time through misleading
illustrations designed to induce policyholders to continue paying
premiums under false pretenses. These misleading illustrations
caused Zirinsky to pay more in premiums than he otherwise would
have.

In Count ten, Plaintiffs assert claims for violations of the
California Business and Professional Code Sections 17200 (UCL). To
state a claim under Section 17200, a plaintiff must allege an
unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.
Plaintiffs' allegations that Lincoln has used the COI rate
increase to force Policyholders to subsidize its own interest
guarantees, recoup its past losses and force shock lapses falls
squarely within the ambit of the statute.

In Count eleven, Plaintiff Mindlin and the California Sub-Class
members aged 65 years or older assert a claim for violations of
the California Elder Abuse Statute.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff Mindlin is not permitted to seek
punitive damages under California Civil Code Section 3294(a)
because the Elder Abuse claim is premised on the same allegations
underlying the breach of contract claim. California courts have
held that punitive damages should not be granted in actions based
on breach of contract though they may be recovered in a tort
action upon a showing of malice, fraud or oppression even though
the tort incidentally involves a breach of contract.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 11, 2017,
Memorandum is available at http://tinyurl.com/ybe9t42afrom
Leagle.com.

BHARTI R. BHARWANI, Plaintiff, represented by JEFFREY W. GOLAN --
jgolan@barrack.com -- BARRACK RODOS & BACINE.

BHARTI R. BHARWANI, Plaintiff, represented by ANDREW S. FRIEDMAN -
- afriedman@bffb.com -- BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN AND BALINT,
P.C. & FRANCIS JOSEPH BALINT, Jr. -- fbalint@bffb.com -- BONNETT
FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN & BALINT.

ROBERT A. ZIRINSKY, Plaintiff, represented by JEFFREY W. GOLAN,
BARRACK RODOS & BACINE, ANDREW S. FRIEDMAN, BONNETT, FAIRBOURN,
FRIEDMAN AND BALINT, P.C. & FRANCIS JOSEPH BALINT, Jr., BONNETT
FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN & BALINT.

US LIFE 1 RENDITEFONDS GMBH & CO. KG, Plaintiff, represented by
DOUGLAS E. ROBERTS -- DER@Pietragallo.com -- PIETRAGALLO GORDON
ALFANO BOSICK & RASPANTI, GAETAN ALFANO -- GJA@Pietragallo.com --
PIETRAGALLO GORDON ALFANO BOSICK & RASPANTI LLP, JEFFREY W. GOLAN,
BARRACK RODOS & BACINE, KEVIN E. RAPHAEL -- KER@Pietragallo.com -
PIETRAGALLO GORDON ALFANO BOSICK & RASPANTI LLP, LUCAS E.
ISSACHAROFF -- lissacharoff@susmangodfrey.com -- SUSMAN GODFREY
LLP, SETH D. ARD -- sard@susmangodfrey.com -- SUSMAN GODFREY LLP,
STEVEN G. SKLAVER -- ssklaver@susmangodfrey.com -- SUSMAN GODFREY
LLP & FRANCIS JOSEPH BALINT, Jr., BONNETT FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN &
BALINT.

US LIFE 2 RENDITEFONDS GMBH & CO. KG, Plaintiff, represented by
DOUGLAS E. ROBERTS, PIETRAGALLO GORDON ALFANO BOSICK & RASPANTI,
GAETAN ALFANO, PIETRAGALLO GORDON ALFANO BOSICK & RASPANTI LLP,
JEFFREY W. GOLAN, BARRACK RODOS & BACINE, KEVIN E. RAPHAEL,
PIETRAGALLO GORDON ALFANO BOSICK & RASPANTI LLP, LUCAS E.
ISSACHAROFF, SUSMAN GODFREY LLP, SETH D. ARD, SUSMAN GODFREY LLP,
STEVEN G. SKLAVER, SUSMAN GODFREY LLP & FRANCIS JOSEPH BALINT,
Jr., BONNETT FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN & BALINT.

LOWELL RAUCH, Plaintiff, represented by BRIAN D. PENNY --
penny@gsplaw.com -- GOLDMAN SCARLATO & PENNY PC, PATRICK F. MADDEN
-- pmadden@bm.net -- BERGER MONTAGUE PC, PAUL J. SCARLATO --
scarlato@gsplaw.com -- GOLDMAN, SCARLATO & PENNY, PC & SHANON J.
CARSON -- scarson@bm.net -- BERGER & MONTAGUE PC.

CAROL ANNE RAUCH, Plaintiff, represented by BRIAN D. PENNY,
GOLDMAN SCARLATO & PENNY PC, PATRICK F. MADDEN, BERGER MONTAGUE
PC, PAUL J. SCARLATO, GOLDMAN, SCARLATO & PENNY, PC & SHANON J.
CARSON, BERGER & MONTAGUE PC.

BARRY MUKAMAL, Plaintiff, represented by ADAM M. MOSKOWITZ --
aam@kttlaw.xom -- KOZYAK TROPIN & THROCKMORTON, GAIL A. MCQUILKIN
-- gam@kttlaw.com -- KOZYAK TROPIN & THROCK MORTON PA, JEFFREY W.
GOLAN, BARRACK RODOS & BACINE & FRANCIS JOSEPH BALINT, Jr.,
BONNETT FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN & BALINT.

MILGRIM INVESTMENTS, LP, Plaintiff, represented by ADAM M.
MOSKOWITZ, KOZYAK TROPIN & THROCKMORTON, GAIL A. MCQUILKIN, KOZYAK
TROPIN & THROCK MORTON PA, JEFFREY W. GOLAN, BARRACK RODOS &
BACINE & FRANCIS JOSEPH BALINT, Jr., BONNETT FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN &
BALINT.

JOEL STEPHEN AGEL, Plaintiff, represented by ANGELICA M. ORNELAS -
- amo@girardgibbs.com -- GIRARD GIBBS LLP, DANIEL C. GIRARD --
dcg@girardgibbs.com -- GIRARD & GIBBS, DAVID J. COHEN --
dcohen@stephanzouras.com -- STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP, JAMES B. ZOURAS,
STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP & RYAN F. STEPHAN, STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP.

LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP., Defendant, represented by AARON L. RENENGE
-- arenenger@milbank.com -- MILBANK TWEED HADLEY & MCCLOY, JOHN
WESLEY SCOTT -- SCOTTJ BALLARDSPAHR.COM -- BALLARD SPAHR LLP,
MICHAEL L. HIRSCHFELD -- mhirschfeld@milbank.com -- MILBANK,
TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY LLP, ROBERT C. FOLLAND --
rob.folland@btlaw.com -- BARNES & THORNBURG, STACEY J. RAPPAPORT -
- srappaport@milbank.com -- MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY LLP &
TIMOTHY D. KATSIFF -- KATSIFFT BALLARDSPAHR.COM -- BALLARD SPAHR
LLP.

LINCOLN NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, represented by
AARON L. RENENGER, MILBANK TWEED HADLEY & MCCLOY, JOHN WESLEY
SCOTT, BALLARD SPAHR LLP, MICHAEL L. HIRSCHFELD, MILBANK, TWEED,
HADLEY & MCCLOY LLP, ROBERT C. FOLLAND, BARNES & THORNBURG, STACEY
J. RAPPAPORT, MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY LLP & TIMOTHY D.
KATSIFF, BALLARD SPAHR LLP.


LOS LIMONES GROCERY: Santana Sues Over Unpaid Minimum Wage and OT
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE MIGUEL ALEGRIA SANTANA, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated v. LOS LIMONES GROCERY CORP. (D/B/A LOS LIMONES
DELI), and NICHOLAS ESTEVEZ, Case No. 1:17-cv-05264 (E.D.N.Y.,
September 7, 2017), alleges that the Plaintiff worked for the
Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week, without appropriate
minimum wage or overtime compensation for the hours he worked, in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor
Law.

Los Limones Grocery Corp., doing business as Los Limones Deli, is
a domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the state of New York.  Nicholas Estevez serves or served as
owner, manager, principal, or agent of the Defendant Corporation.

The Defendants own, operate or control a Deli located at 1330
Halsey St., in Brooklyn, New York, under the name "Los Limones
Deli."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Michael@Faillacelaw.com


LUTECH RESOURCES: "Cantrell" Action to Recover Unpaid Overtime
--------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Cantrell, individually and for others similarly
situated, v. Lutech Resources, Inc., Case No. 4:17-cv-02679 (S.D.
Tex., September 5, 2017) seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages
and other damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Lutech is a recruitment and integrated resource management agency
to engineering, energy and manufacturing companies worldwide.
Cantrell worked for Lutech as a QC Inspector in Houston TX,
normally working between 40-55 hours in a week without overtime
compensation. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
     Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
     JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
     11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
     Houston, TX 77046
     Tel: (713) 352-1100
     Fax: (713) 352-3300
     Email: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
            adunlap@mybackwages.com

            - and -

     Richard J. Burch, Esq.
     BRUCKNER BURCH, P.L.L.C.
     8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
     Houston, TX 77046
     Tel: (713) 877-8788
     Fax: (713) 877-8065
     Email: rburch@brucknerburch.com


M.L. ZAGER: Settlement in "Griffin" FDCPA Suit Has Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned DORIS GRIFFIN, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. M.L. ZAGER, P.C.; and
JOHN DOES1-25 Defendant, Civil Action No. 16-1234 (ES) (MAH) (D.
N.J.), Judge Esther Salas of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey (i) certified the class for purposes of
settlement; (ii) granted final approval of the Settlement; and
(iii) awarded costs, attorneys' fees, and statutory damages.

On March 30, 2011, Griffin incurred a financial obligation to
"Andrew S. Quirk, P.T., P.A.."  Sometime between March 30, 2011
and Jan. 29, 2016, Griffin defaulted on the financial obligation.
To collect on the debt, Quirk placed the financial obligation with
Zager.  On Jan. 29, 2016, in an attempt to collect on the debt,
Zager sent a letter to Griffin stating that Zager was a "firm"
that was "retained to contact Griffin regarding payment" of the
debt owed to Quirk.  No attorney with Zager signed the letter sent
to Griffin.

The Complaint alleges that neither Zager nor any attorney employed
by Zager was licensed to practice law in New Jersey as of Jan. 29,
2016.  Griffin asserts that Zager's letter violated the Fair Debt
Collection Act as to her and a class of similarly situated New
Jersey consumers to whom it was sent.

On Aug. 30, 2016, the parties informed the Court that they reached
a class-wide settlement and that they intended to move for
preliminary approval.  On Dec. 23, 2016, the parties jointly moved
the Court to preliminarily approve their class action settlement.

On Jan. 23, 2016, the Court held a hearing on the parties' joint
motion.  The Court then issued an order granting the parties'
motion which effectuated the following (among other things): (i)
certification of a class for settlement purposes; (ii) preliminary
approval of the class settlement; (iii) appointment of settlement
class counsel; (iv) appointment of a Claims Administrator; (v)
approval of forms and procedures for class notice; and (vi)
appointment of Griffin as the Class Representative.

The proposed Settlement Agreement provides that Zager will create
a "Settlement Fund" of $3,000. The Settlement Class Members are
defined as all persons in the State of New Jersey to whom Zager
sent a written communication which is materially similar to the
form attached as Exhibit A to the Plaintiff's Complaint, in an
attempt to collect a debt, which was not returned as undeliverable
by the United States Post Service, during the period beginning
March 3, 2015 to March 3, 2016.  Based on discovery, the parties
estimate there are approximately 124 individuals in the Settlement
Class.

Further, the parties agreed that Zager will pay all costs incurred
by the Claims Administrator in the course of providing the Class
Notice and other services related to the administration and
payment of the Settlement.  The parties also agreed that the Class
Counsel would move the Court for attorneys' fees and that Zager
agrees to pay Class Counsel $28,000 as reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs incurred.

On Feb. 14, 2017, the Class Administrator served, among other
things, the Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement and a Proof
of Claim on individuals in the Settlement Class.  Of the 232
notices sent out, the Class Administrator received 27 completed
proof-of-claim forms.

At the Fairness Hearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(e)(2) on June 13, 2017, no objectors appeared.  As of
the date of the Opinion, there are no exclusion requests or
objections to the Settlement.

Judge Salas certified the Settlement Class for purposes of the
Settlement and granted final approval of the Settlement.  She
further approved the requested (i) $28,000 in attorney fees and
costs, and (i) $1,000 in an incentive award to the Named
Plaintiff.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 1, 2017 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/M7ziiU from Leagle.com.

DORIS GRIFFIN, Plaintiff, represented by GLEN H. CHULSKY --
g.chulsky@att.net.

DORIS GRIFFIN, Plaintiff, represented by JOSEPH K. JONES --
jkj@legaljones.com -- Jones, Wolf & Kapasi, LLC & BENJAMIN JARRET
WOLF, Jones, Wolf & Kapasi, LLC.

M.L. ZAGER, P.C., Defendant, represented by ELLIOTT ABRUTYN --
eabrutyn@morganlawfirm.com -- MORGAN, MELHUISH & ABRUTYN, ESQS.,

MICHAEL D. BAER, LAW OFFICE OF CHRISTIAN P. STUEBEN & THOMAS G.
RANTAS -- trantas@morganlawfirm.com -- MORGAN MELHUISH ABRUTYN.


MARIETTA MEMORIAL: Court Certifies Class in FLSA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, Eastern Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned
YNNETT MYERS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MARIETTA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:15-CV-2956 (S.D. Ohio.).

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Issuance of Opt-Out Notice.

Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify the following class, which is
a discrete subclass of the Collective Class that the Court
conditionally certified as a collective action:

     "All of Defendants' current and former Nurses and Patient
Care Technicians who were hourly employees and subject to
Defendants' automatic meal deduction policy during the three years
before this Complaint was filed up to the present."

Plaintiffs Lynnett Myers, Carol Butler, and Arva Lowther are
former nurses at Defendant Marietta Memorial Hospital, which is
operated by Memorial Health System.  Memorial Health System also
operates Defendants Selby General Hospital and Marietta Health
Care, Inc., and all of these entities function as joint employers
of Memorial Health System's employees and operate as a single
integrated system.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' policy of automatically
deducting thirty minutes for a meal break for nurses and patient
care technicians violates the FLSA and Ohio wage laws because
employees are routinely prohibited from either taking an
uninterrupted meal break or canceling the automatic deduction.

This is a hybrid FLSA collective action and Rule 23 class action.
There is "nothing inherently incompatible between an FLSA opt-in
suit and Ohio Act Rule 23 class action and they are able to
coexist within the same litigation. While Rule 23 "requires a
significantly higher showing" for class certification than the
FLSA, a collective action under the FLSA that is based on the same
set of facts has been approved, there is an inclination to grant
class certification of state labor law claims.
Plaintiffs Meet the Requirements of Rule 23(a).

Numerosity

Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the class be so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable. Plaintiffs are not required to
establish that it is impossible to join all members of the
proposed class, but simply that joinder would be difficult and
inconvenient.

Here, the numerosity requirement is satisfied by the sheer number
of potential litigants in the class. Defendants have provided a
class list that contains 1,168 nurses and patient care
technicians, and this list is not yet complete.  A potential class
of 1,168 employees is more than sufficient to satisfy numerosity,
and Defendants fail to challenge Plaintiffs on this point.

Commonality

Where there are questions of law or fact common to the class, Rule
23(a)(2) is satisfied. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). This element
referred to as commonality not required on every question raised
in a class action. Rather, there is commonality when the legal
question linking the class members is substantially related to the
resolution of the litigation.  Individual class members need not
be 'identically situated' to meet the commonality requirement.
Plaintiffs have not argued only that Defendants have violated the
same statutory provision with regard to all the potential class
members; rather, they argue that putative class members have all
been injured by Defendants common policies and pay practices. And,
while Plaintiffs may have testified that they did not cancel their
lunch deductions for varying reasons, they have uniformly
testified that they were discouraged from doing so.

Accordingly, the commonality requirement is met here.

Typicality

Under Rule 23(a)(3), the claims or defenses of the representative
parties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class.
Although they are separate and distinct requirements, commonality
and typicality 'tend to merge' and are often discussed together.
Plaintiffs claim that they worked for various managers and in
different departments, and also stated that they spoke with many
coworkers who were subject to the same policies and practices --
of not receiving lunch breaks, of being told not to clock out no
lunch, and of not being paid for all hours worked. For this
reason, Plaintiffs meet the typicality requirement, just as they
meet the commonality requirement.

Adequacy

Finally, Rule 23(a)(4) requires the Court to determine whether the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class. This requirement calls for a two pronged
inquiry: (1) the representatives must have common interests with
unnamed members of the class, and (2) it must appear that the
representatives will vigorously prosecute the interests of the
class through qualified counsel.

In their opposition to Plaintiffs' motion, Defendants do not
address the adequacy requirement. Thus, the Court assumes
Defendants concede that Plaintiffs have met this requirement.
Plaintiffs Satisfy the Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).
Defendants offer no arguments against predominance that are
different than those raised against the commonality requirement,
and completely ignore the superiority requirement. For these
reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).

Opt-out Notice

Plaintiffs ask the Court to order opt-out notices to be sent to
class members immediately. Defendants do not object to the
issuance of an opt-out notice. The Court orders the parties to
meet and confer and submit a joint proposed notice form to the
Court within 14 days of the date of this Order.

The Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for class certification under
Rule 23, and ordered the parties to submit a joint proposed opt-
out notice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 11, 2017
Opinion and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y98mtfp3
from Leagle.com.

Lynnett Myers, Plaintiff, represented by Lance Chapin, Chapin
Legal Group, LLC, 580 S. High Street, Suite 330

Lynnett Myers, Plaintiff, represented by Steven Charles Babin,
Jr., Chapin Legal Group LLC, 580 S. High Street, Suite 330

Carol Butler, Plaintiff, represented by Lance Chapin, Chapin Legal
Group, LLC & Steven Charles Babin, Jr., Chapin Legal Group LLC.

Arva Lowther, Plaintiff, represented by Lance Chapin, Chapin Legal
Group, LLC & Steven Charles Babin, Jr., Chapin Legal Group LLC.

Marietta Memorial Hospital, Defendant, represented by James Edward
Davidson -- james.davidson@icemiller.com -- Ice Miller LLP &
Catherine L. Strauss -- Catherine.Strauss@icemiller.com -- Ice
Miller LLP.

Marietta Health Care Inc, Defendant, represented by Catherine L.
Strauss, Ice Miller LLP & James Edward Davidson, Ice Miller LLP.

Selby General Hospital, Defendant, represented by Catherine L.
Strauss, Ice Miller LLP & James Edward Davidson, Ice Miller LLP.


MECC CONTRACTING: Faces "Castro" Suit in E.D. of New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against MECC Contracting
Inc.  The case is styled as Randall Castro, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MECC
Contracting Inc. jointly and severally, Joseph Meccariello,
jointly and severally and Luigi Moccia, jointly and severally,
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-05471 (E.D. N.Y., September 19,
2017).

Mecc Contracting Inc. is engaged in the Building Board-up
Contractor business.[BN]
The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


MIDLAND CREDIT: Bid for Judgment on Pleadings in "Sharpe" Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned SHIRLEY D. SHARPE, And all others similarly
situated Plaintiff, v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT and MIDLAND
FUNDING, LLC, Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-6256 (E.D. Pa.),
Judge Jan E. Dubois of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania denied the Defendants' Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings.

The Plaintiff initiated the instant suit on Dec. 1, 2016,
asserting a single claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act ("FDCPA"), against the Defendants.

Midland Funding purchased consumer debt from Capital One Bank
(U.S.A.) N.A. and engaged MCM to collect the debts, including debt
owed by the Plaintiff.  On Dec. 2, 2015, Defendant MCM sent the
Plaintiff a one-page, double-sided letter demanding payment of the
alleged debt.  After receiving the Letter, the Plaintiff commenced
the lawsuit on behalf of herself and others who have received
similar letters from the Defendants.  The Plaintiff contends that
the Letter buries or obscures the statutorily mandated Validation
Notice, which informs a consumer of the right to dispute a debt
and requires a debt collector to cease collection of that debt
pending validation.  The Defendants files their Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings.

After examining both the physical characteristics and the content
of the Letter and the Complaint, Judge Dubois concludes that the
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the validation notice is
overshadowed or contradicted by other text and therefore violates
the FDCPA.  The Letter's confusing and contradictory instructions
with respect to the location of the debtors rights, coupled with
the small and inconspicuous text of the validation notice itself,
could make the least sophisticated debtor uncertain as to her
rights.

For the reasons stated, Judge Dubois denied the Defendants' Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings.  And because he denied the
Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the Complaint
will not be dismissed as to the proposed class.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 1, 2017 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/ai0A8o from Leagle.com.

SHIRLEY D. SHARPE, Plaintiff, represented by CARY L. FLITTER --
cflitter@consumerslaw.com -- FLITTER MILZ, P.C..

SHIRLEY D. SHARPE, Plaintiff, represented by ANDREW M. MILZ,
FLITTER MILZ, P.C..

MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, Defendant, represented by MICHAEL E.
FITZGERALD -- mefitzgerald@mdwcg.com -- MARWILL DENNEHEY WARNER
COLEMAN & GOGGIN PC & RONALD M. METCHO, II -- rmmetcho@mdwcg.com -
- MARWILL, DENNEHEY, WARNER, COLEMAN & GOGGIN.

MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC, Defendant, represented by MICHAEL E.
FITZGERALD, MARWILL DENNEHEY WARNER COLEMAN & GOGGIN PC & RONALD
M. METCHO, II, MARWILL, DENNEHEY, WARNER, COLEMAN & GOGGIN.


MINNE INC: Fails to Pay Overtime Under FLSA & IMWL, Cortez Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JAVIER CORTEZ v. MINNE, INC. d/b/a RON'S ITALIAN OVENS and KARON
MINNE, individually, Case No. 1:17-cv-06479 (N.D. Ill., September
7, 2017), arises under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Illinois Minimum Wage Law for the Defendants' alleged failure to
pay the Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees overtime
wages at a rate of one and one half times their regular rate.

Minne, Inc., is an Illinois corporation doing business within this
judicial district.  Karon Minne is the President of Minne, Inc.
The Defendants operate a restaurant under the name "Ron's Italian
Ovens."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Carlos G. Becerra, Esq.
          BECERRA LAW GROUP, LLC
          11 E. Adams St., Suite 1401
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312)957-9005
          Facsimile: (888)826-5848
          E-mail: cbecerra@law-rb.com


NCB MANAGEMENT: Faces "Watson" Suit in E.D. of New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against NCB Management
Services Inc. The case is styled as Terrel M. Watson, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NCB
Management Services Inc, Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-05494 (E.D.
NY, September 19, 2017).

NCB Management Services, Inc. provides call center/business
process outsourcing solutions in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Sanders Law, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@sanderslawpllc.com


OCWEN FINANCIAL: Accrued $56 Million Cost as of June 30
-------------------------------------------------------
Ocwen Financial Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that the Company has
accrued an aggregate of $56.0 million as of June 30, 2017 in
connection with the settlement in principle in a class action
lawsuit.

The Company said, "We have previously disclosed several securities
fraud class action lawsuits filed against Ocwen and certain of its
officers and directors that contain allegations in connection with
the restatements of our 2013 and first quarter 2014 financial
statements and our December 2014 Consent Order with the NY DFS,
among other matters. Those lawsuits have been consolidated and are
pending in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida in the matter captioned In re Ocwen Financial
Corporation Securities Litigation, 9:14-cv-81057-WPD (S.D. Fla.)
(such consolidated lawsuit, the Securities Class Action).
On July 19, 2017, following a mediated settlement process
resulting in all parties' acceptance of the mediator's
recommendation for settlement, the parties advised the court that
we have reached an agreement in principle to settle this matter.
Following the filing of a joint motion requesting adjournment, the
court has adjourned further proceedings pending approval of the
final settlement. Subject to documentation of a definitive
settlement and final approval by the court, the settlement will
include an aggregate cash payment by Ocwen to the plaintiffs of
$49.0 million (of which Ocwen expects to recover $14.0 million
from insurance proceeds), and an issuance to the plaintiffs of an
aggregate of 2,500,000 shares of Ocwen's common stock. Under
certain circumstances related to the price of Ocwen's common stock
over the five trading days prior to court approval of the
settlement, the amount of shares issuable could be increased so
that the aggregate number of shares issued has a total value of
$7.0 million. However, in no event will Ocwen be required to issue
more than 4% of the number of shares of its common stock
outstanding as of the date of court approval. Further, in lieu of
issuing shares, Ocwen may elect to pay the plaintiffs $7.0 million
in cash. Attorneys' fees for the plaintiffs will be paid from the
amounts described above."

"We have accrued an aggregate of $56.0 million as of June 30, 2017
in connection with this settlement in principle as we believe this
loss is probable and reasonably estimable based on current
information regarding this matter. We cannot currently estimate
the amount, if any, of reasonably possible loss above such
accrual. The $56.0 million is included within the $86.1 million
litigation accrual referenced above. Recoveries from insurance
will reduce our aggregate exposure for this matter and have been
recorded as a reduction of Professional services expense in the
unaudited consolidated statements of operations.

"While Ocwen believes that it has sound legal and factual
defenses, Ocwen agreed to this settlement in principle in order to
avoid the uncertain outcome of litigation and the additional
expense and demands on the time of its senior management that a
trial would involve. There can be no assurance that the settlement
in principle will be finalized and approved by the court. In the
event the settlement in principle is not ultimately finalized and
approved, the litigation would continue and we would vigorously
defend the allegations made against Ocwen. If our efforts to
defend against such claims were not successful, our business,
financial condition, liquidity and results of operations could be
materially and adversely affected."


OCWEN FINANCIAL: Settlement of TCPA Case Awaits Documentation
-------------------------------------------------------------
Ocwen Financial Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that the settlement of
the TCPA litigation is subject to documentation.

Ocwen has been named in putative class actions and individual
actions related to its compliance with the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act. Generally, plaintiffs in these actions allege that
Ocwen knowingly and willfully violated the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act by using an automated telephone dialing system to
call class members' cell phones without their consent.

On July 28, 2017, Ocwen entered into an agreement in principle to
resolve two such putative class actions, which have been
consolidated in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois. See Snyder v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC,
1:14-cv-08461-MFK (N.D. Ill.); Beecroft v. Ocwen Loan Servicing,
LLC, 1:16-cv-08677-MFK (N.D. Ill.).

Subject to documentation of a definitive settlement and final
approval by the court, the settlement will include the
establishment of a settlement fund to be distributed to impacted
borrowers that submit claims for settlement benefits pursuant to a
claims administration process.

"Our accrual with respect to this matter is included in the $86.1
million litigation accrual referenced above. We cannot currently
estimate the amount, if any, of reasonably possible loss above the
amount accrued," the Company said.


PACIFIC GAS: Court Narrows Claims in "Greer"
--------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned
BECKY GREER, TIMOTHY C. BUDNIK, ROSARIO SAENZ, IAN CARTY, HALEY
MARKWITH, MARCIA GARCIA PESINA, AND MONICA MULDROW, individually
and as class representatives, Plaintiffs, v. PACIFIC GAS AND
ELECTRIC COMPANY, IBEW LOCAL 1245, and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 1:15-cv-01066-EPG (E.D. Cal.).

Defendants Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) and IBEW Local
1245 (IBEW) have filed motions for summary judgment that together
challenge the Court's jurisdiction to proceed on Plaintiffs' Becky
Greer, Timothy C. Budnik, Rosario Saenz, Ian Carty, Haley
Markwith, and Maria Garcia Pesina, individually and as Class
Representatives, (Plaintiffs) claims.

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that PG&E failed to pay wages due
under the collective bargaining agreement because PG&E failed to
give them credit for their "directly related clerical job
experience."  Plaintiffs assert breach of contract claims as well
as various related labor code violations and similar claims.
Defendants generally challenge the Court's ability to proceed on
these claims on the basis that they have already been finally
resolved between PG&E and the union, IBEW, as part of the dispute
resolution process provided in the governing collective bargaining
agreement.  PG&E raised this challenge at the motion to dismiss
stage, but the Court allowed the claims to proceed based on
factual allegations in the complaint about the lack of finality of
PG&E and IBEW's resolution and breach of IBEW's duty of fair
representation.  Defendants raise their jurisdictional defense
again in the context of their motions for summary judgment based
on a developed factual record.

The Court will grant Defendants' motion in part and deny in part
as it related to the causes of action One and Eight in the Third
Amended Complaint, which concern the breach of contract claim and
breach of the duty of fair representation claim.  The Court agrees
with Defendants that Plaintiffs are precluded under the law from
challenging the contractual interpretation of "directly related
clerical job experience" that resulted from the resolution of
Grievance 21052.  The resolution regarding contractual
interpretation, as reflected in Pre-Review Committee Number 21052
letter of November 24, 2013, was a final and binding decision
under the CBA.  It resulted from a properly filed grievance and
proceeded through the first four steps of the grievance process.
It properly addressed an ambiguity in the CBA regarding the
meaning of "directly related clerical job experience," and does
not clearly contradict the terms of the CBA.  While the Court
understands Plaintiffs' arguments regarding why the interpretation
that resulted from that process too narrowly defined applicable
experience, the Court must defer to the result of the CBA
grievance process under the law.  Moreover, the Union did not
breach its duty of fair representation because the Union properly
investigated the issue, proceeded through the grievance process,
and used its judgment.  Although it did not confer with individual
employees before agreeing to the resolution, the employees did not
have any unique relevant information and the Union was not legally
obligated to solicit their opinions on an issue of CBA contractual
interpretation.

The same cannot be said of the individual determinations as to
which employees qualified for a higher rate of pay under the CBA,
which followed from the Grievance 21052 resolution. When it came
to who was entitled to the wage increase, the Union (and PG&E)
completely side-stepped the grievance process. Instead, they
agreed on a list of qualifying employees informally between
themselves and then prohibited any employees from filing a
grievance challenging that decision. Under the terms of the CBA,
such a decision is not treated as final and binding. Moreover,
Plaintiffs have raised disputes of fact regarding whether the
Union engaged in an adequate investigation to make such
determination. They agreed to look only at resumes submitted at
the time of application, without the knowledge of the relevant
criteria, even though documents indicate the Union itself conceded
that the resumes were not sufficiently detailed to conduct the
evaluation required by the CBA and Grievance 21052 guidance.
Moreover, the Union never sought any employee input, even though
the employees would have relevant information about their
background to help determine whether they possessed relevant
experience. The Union agreed to further limit qualifying
experience based on criteria outside, and arguably contradicting,
the CBA and Grievance 21052 guidance. Accordingly, the Court will
deny Defendants' motions to the extent they seek to preclude
Plaintiffs from challenging their entitlement to the wage increase
under the terms of the CBA as interpreted by the Pre-Review
Committee Number 21052 resolution letter.

As to the remaining arguments raised in the summary judgment
motions, the Court seeks supplemental briefing regarding whether
and to what extent the parties believe summary judgment as to
other causes of action is appropriate consistent with this
decision.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 11, 2017
Opinion and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/ybcuf344from
Leagle.com.

Becky Greer, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Swanston,
Fitzpatrick, Spini & Swanston, 555 S Main St Salinas, CA 93901-
3302.

Becky Greer, Plaintiff, represented by Erin Tsitidis Huntington --
ehuntington@wjhattorneys.com --  Wanger Jones Helsley PC, Michael
S. Helsley -- mhelsley@wjhattorneys.com -- Wanger Jones Helsley PC
& Patrick D. Toole -- ptoole@wjhattorneys.com -- Wanger Jones
Helsley PC.

Timothy C. Budnik, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Swanston,
Fitzpatrick, Spini & Swanston, Erin Tsitidis Huntington, Wanger
Jones Helsley PC, Michael S. Helsley, Wanger Jones Helsley PC &
Patrick D. Toole, Wanger Jones Helsley PC.

Rosario Saenz, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Swanston,
Fitzpatrick, Spini & Swanston, Erin Tsitidis Huntington, Wanger
Jones Helsley PC, Michael S. Helsley, Wanger Jones Helsley PC &
Patrick D. Toole, Wanger Jones Helsley PC.

Ian Carty, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Swanston,
Fitzpatrick, Spini & Swanston, Erin Tsitidis Huntington, Wanger
Jones Helsley PC, Michael S. Helsley, Wanger Jones Helsley PC &
Patrick D. Toole, Wanger Jones Helsley PC.

Haley Markwith, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Swanston,
Fitzpatrick, Spini & Swanston, Erin Tsitidis Huntington, Wanger
Jones Helsley PC, Michael S. Helsley, Wanger Jones Helsley PC &
Patrick D. Toole, Wanger Jones Helsley PC.

Maria Garcia Pesina, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Swanston,
Fitzpatrick, Spini & Swanston, Erin Tsitidis Huntington, Wanger
Jones Helsley PC, Michael S. Helsley, Wanger Jones Helsley PC &
Patrick D. Toole, Wanger Jones Helsley PC.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Defendant, represented by Robert
G. Hulteng, Littler Mendelson, Aurelio J. Perez, Littler
Mendelson, P.C., Joshua D. Kienitz, Littler Mendelson & Matthew
Richard Dardenne, DLA Piper LLP.

IBEW Local, Defendant, represented by Philip C. Monrad --
pmonrad@leonardcarder.com -- Leonard Carder, LLP.

IBEW Local Union, Movant, represented by Alexander Jordan Pacheco
-- ajp3@ibew1245.com -- IBEW Local Union & Philip C. Monrad,
Leonard Carder, LLP.


PEOPLE'S UNITED: Investor Fraud Class Action Can Proceed
--------------------------------------------------------
Alan J. Keays, writing for VTDigger, reports that a federal judge
has given the green light for a proposed class-action investor
fraud lawsuit to proceed against Jay Peak owner Ariel Quiros and a
bank he used.

The recent ruling by Judge Federico A. Moreno in federal court in
Miami comes over the objections of the bank and the ski resort
developer.

The lawsuit, led by Brazilian investor Alexander Daccache, accuses
Quiros and People's United Bank in an alleged scheme to improperly
use hundreds of millions of dollars in investor funds meant to pay
for developments at Jay Peak and Burke Mountain ski resorts, as
well as projects in Newport.

The case had been on hold since earlier this year when one of the
defendants, Raymond James & Associates Inc., reached a nearly $150
million settlement with Michael Goldberg, a court-appointed
receiver now overseeing the assets at the center of investor fraud
allegations brought by federal and state regulators.

The settlement barred further lawsuits against Raymond James and
its employees, and as a result the financial institution has been
dropped as a defendant from the proposed class-action lawsuit.
Also dropped as a defendant was Joel Burstein, Mr. Quiros' former
son-in-law, who served as the branch manager of a Raymond James
office in Coral Gables, Florida.

The lawsuit by Mr. Daccache and other investors alleges People's
played a role in a scheme to defraud them.

"People's Bank transferred investors' escrow funds in flagrant
violation of the terms of the offering documents and escrow
agreements, and in doing so, breached its agreements as well as
fiduciary duties it owed to the investors," Thomas Tucker
Ronzetti, an attorney for the investors, wrote in a motion earlier
in the case opposing the bank's bid to be dismissed from the
proceeding.

The attorney added, "People's Bank was a substantial and active
participant in a massive fraud that caused millions of dollars in
damages to Plaintiffs and the Class."

People's has argued for the case to remain on hold at least until
the judge ruled on the bank's filing to dismiss the lawsuit. In
that motion, People's argued in part that the federal court in
Miami lacked jurisdiction over the bank, a non-Florida resident
which does no business in the state and has no offices there.

The lawsuit is pending in federal court in Miami, which is where
Mr. Quiros lives and many of his businesses are based.

Mr. Quiros also has a pending motion to dismiss the case, and he
argued for maintaining the stay on the lawsuit until a ruling on
that matter.

People's also contended that if the stay in the case is lifted,
the only matter left for the court to decide should be any damages
investors may have incurred, especially in light of the recent
multimillion-dollar settlement with Raymond James and a recent
agreement in a case brought by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commision against Mr. Quiros.

The SEC accuses Mr. Quiros and his onetime business partner, Bill
Stenger, the former president and CEO at Jay Peak, of raising
money from foreign investors to fund specific developments, then
using $200 million in a "Ponzi-like" scheme to cover losses in
other projects.

In addition, the SEC claims Mr. Quiros "looted" $50 million to pay
for personal expenses, including a luxury condo in New York City.

In that agreement with the SEC, Mr. Quiros promises not to
challenge the allegations against him, leaving open only the
question of any damages or penalties he should pay.

The Raymond James settlement resolves claims Goldberg brought over
the firm's alleged role in the "Ponzi-like" scheme.  Money from
the settlement goes to several entities, including unpaid
contractors, and to provide refunds to certain investors. Money
also will be used to finish some of the projects.

People's United Bank argued in its filing that any damages in the
class-action case should be offset by any money investors have
received from previous settlements.

Mr. Daccache, the lead plaintiff, who lives in Brazil, invested
$500,000 in the Penthouse Suites project, which is part of the
Hotel Jay, in 2010 under the federal EB-5 visa program.  EB-5
investors put up at least $500,000, plus an administrative fee, in
a qualified project.  If that investment creates at least 10 jobs,
the investor becomes eligible for permanent U.S. residency.

According to the Daccache lawsuit, the action was brought on
behalf of a proposed class of 836 people who invested more than
$400 million in the projects headed by Messrs. Quiros and Stenger.

Jonathan E. Minsker, a Florida attorney representing People's
United, could not be reached on Sept. 12 for comment.

Melissa Visconti, Mr. Quiros' attorney, said in an email on
Sept. 12 that she was disappointed but not surprised by the ruling
to lift the stay.

"It is hard to get a stay under the circumstances we had," she
wrote.  "We will now work with all parties to set a workable
discovery and litigation schedule." [GN]


PHILADELPHIA: School District Faces Gender Discrimination Case
--------------------------------------------------------------
WTXF reports that the School District of Philadelphia is facing a
federal class action lawsuit.  Some female lacrosse players are
claiming they've been discriminated against because of their
gender and race.

A 2017 Strawberry Mansion High School graduate is currently the
face of this action lawsuit for black girls who play what they
call the traditional 'white' sports of lacrosse and field hockey.
Her name is Nadirah McRae.

When those sports were first introduced at McRae's school in 2015,
she fell in love.  Her academic performance even improved as a
result of her newfound passion.  For the first time in her life,
Ms. McRae says she saw path to college.

But in her senior year, Ms. McRae saw that path cut off.
Ms. McRae was reportedly unable to claim her Division I
scholarship to the University of Hartford because she says the
Philadelphia school district keeps girls of color from playing
anyone but other mostly black high schools.

"It made me feel that like we weren't good enough to play lacrosse
because we were discouraged so many times from not playing," she
says.  "And not being noticed for the great potential that we have
[not getting] the long-time training that other female lacrosse
players got."

Jazmine Smith, a former coach, says they faced many obstacles.

"Games canceled, buses canceled, playing the same teams over and
over again," she says.  "Which I then deemed the 'Negro League'
based upon only playing girls of color, the three teams that were
in the public league division we were participating in."

Aaron Freiwald, a lawyer in the case, doesn't mince words in
describing the school district's attitude toward athletes of
color.

"The key people are cultured to think that these girls don't have
these real opportunities, won't be able to handle these kinds of
opportunities and, therefore, don't put the effort into supporting
these girls in taking advantage of these opportunities," he says.
"That is, in effect, racial discrimination."

As one might expect, the school district disagrees, releasing the
following statement:

"One of our core values as a school district is increasing
opportunity in the classroom and on the playing field for all of
our students, regardless of race or gender.  We work every day to
ensure equity across the School District and that every child is
given the opportunity to succeed.  Last year we had more than 250
female student athletes participating on 20 of our school teams in
field hockey and girl's lacrosse, and we continue to promote all
sports within the Philadelphia Public League." [GN]


PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Bid to Dismiss Broiler Chicken Suit Underway
-------------------------------------------------------------
Pilgrim's Pride Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for
the quarterly period ended June 25, 2017, that a ruling by the
court on defendants' motion to dismiss all complaints in the case,
In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation, is pending.

Between September 2, 2016 and October 13, 2016, a series of
purported federal class action lawsuits styled as In re Broiler
Chicken Antitrust Litigation were brought against Pilgrim's and 13
other producers by and on behalf of direct and indirect purchasers
of broiler chickens alleging violations of federal and state
antitrust and unfair competition laws. The complaints, which were
filed with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, seek, among other relief, treble damages for an alleged
conspiracy among defendants to reduce output and increase prices
of broiler chickens from the period of January 2008 to the
present.

The plaintiffs have filed three consolidated amended complaints:
one on behalf of direct purchasers and two on behalf of distinct
groups of indirect purchasers. The defendants (including the
Company) moved to dismiss all complaints on January 27, 2017,
which are fully briefed and a ruling by the court is pending.

Pilgrim's Pride is one of the largest chicken producers in the
world, with operations in the United States ("U.S."), Mexico and
Puerto Rico.


PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Motion to Dismiss "Fuller" Action Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------
Pilgrim's Pride Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for
the quarterly period ended June 25, 2017, that the defendants'
motion to dismiss the class action lawsuit by George James Fuller
remains pending.

On October 10, 2016, Patrick Hogan, acting on behalf of himself
and a putative class of persons who purchased shares of Pilgrim's
common stock between February 21, 2014 and October 4, 2016, filed
a class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Colorado against the Company and its named executive
officers. The complaint alleges, among other things, that the
Company's SEC filings contained statements that were rendered
materially false and misleading by its failure to disclose that
(i) Pilgrim's colluded with several of its industry peers to fix
prices in the broiler chicken market as alleged in the In re
Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation, (ii) the Company's conduct
constituted a violation of federal antitrust laws, (iii) Pilgrim's
revenues during the class period were the result of illegal
conduct and (iv) the Company lacked effective internal control
over financial reporting, as well as stating that Pilgrim's
industry was anticompetitive.

On April 4, 2017, the court appointed another stockholder, George
James Fuller, as lead plaintiff. On April 26, 2017, the court set
a briefing schedule for the filing of an amended complaint and the
defendants' motion to dismiss.

On May 11, 2017, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which
extended the end date of the putative class period to November 17,
2016. The defendants moved to dismiss on June 12, 2017, and the
plaintiff filed its Opposition on July 12, 2017. The defendants
replied on August 1, 2017.

Pilgrim's Pride is one of the largest chicken producers in the
world, with operations in the United States ("U.S."), Mexico and
Puerto Rico.


PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Oklahoma Suit by Chicken Farmers Underway
----------------------------------------------------------
Pilgrim's Pride Corporation continues to defend against a class
acton lawsuit in Oklahoma by chicken farmers, the Company said in
its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 3, 2017, for the quarterly period ended June
25, 2017.

On January 27, 2017, a purported class action on behalf of broiler
chicken farmers was brought against Pilgrim's and four other
producers in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, alleging, among
other things, a conspiracy to reduce competition for grower
services and depress the price paid to growers. Plaintiffs allege
violations of the Sherman Act and the Packers and Stockyards Act
and seek, among other relief, treble damages. The complaint was
consolidated with a subsequently filed class action complaint
styled as In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation. Answers or
responses to the consolidated amended complaint were due September
8, 2017.

Pilgrim's Pride is one of the largest chicken producers in the
world, with operations in the United States ("U.S."), Mexico and
Puerto Rico.


PULASKI COUNTY, IN: Court Certifies Class in ADA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification in the case
captioned EMILY HIZER, on behalf of herself and on behalf of a
class of those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PULASKI COUNTY,
INDIANA, Defendant, Case No. 3:16-CV-885-JD-MGG (N.D. Ind.).

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Class
Certification filed by Plaintiff Emily Hizer (Plaintiff).
Defendant Pulaski County (Defendant) does not oppose certification
of the Plaintiff's proposed class. Also pending is Plaintiff's
Motion to Submit Evidentiary Material in support of her Motion for
Class Certification.

Plaintiff presents a claims on her own behalf, and on the behalf
of those similarly situated, for a violation of both the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act.  The
Pulaski County Courthouse is a three-story building located in the
county seat of Winamac. The first floor of the Courthouse includes
the offices of the County Assessor and County Surveyor, the second
floor of the Courthouse holds the offices of the County Auditor,
County Treasurer, and the Clerk of the Courts, and the third floor
of the Courthouse houses the Pulaski Circuit Court, including its
offices and the courtroom. The Pulaski County Commissioners also
meet several times per month on the third floor of the Courthouse.
For various reasons, Plaintiff alleges that she is frequently
required to visit the Courthouse: she works as a legal assistant
for her father, which necessitates her access to the Clerk's
office and other parts of the Courthouse; and she sits on the ADA
Board, which meets regularly on the first floor of the Courthouse.
Based on her physical condition and the structural characteristics
of the Courthouse's elevator and public restrooms, Plaintiff
alleges that she has great difficulty in accessing the government
services provided at the Courthouse and that other persons with
physical disabilities experience the same issue.

In this case, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently
alleged standing. Plaintiff suffers from a physical disability.
Her job as a legal assistant and her involvement on the County's
ADA Board require her to frequently visit the Courthouse, and she
is therefore repeatedly subjected to embarrassment and an enhanced
burden when having to manage the Courthouse's allegedly
inaccessible features, namely the elevator and public restrooms.

Class Certification

Rule 23(a) sets four requirements: numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation. A party seeking class
certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with
the Rule that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in
fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or
fact, etc.

Ascertainability

Here, the class meets the requirement that it be ascertainable.
The class is defined using objective criteria persons with
mobility impairments or other physical impairments who are
attempting, or who will attempt, to access the Pulaski County
Courthouse.

Plaintiff outlines in her complaint the ways that the Courthouse
is allegedly not accessible due to the layout of its restrooms and
elevator. These are impediments that will be burdensome to many
persons who are mobility impaired and who have other physical
limitations.

Numerosity

The first requirement under Rule 23(a) is that the purported class
be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. To be
impracticable, joinder need not be impossible, but instead must be
shown to be inconvenient and difficult.

The Court may use common sense assumptions to support a finding of
numerosity. Kerrigan, 248 F.R.D. at 474. Plaintiff states that
many people with physical disabilities live in Pulaski County, and
the statistics provided indicate that that number may very well be
in excess of 1,000 individuals. Common sense dictates that when a
proposed class is this large, joinder of all would be
impracticable.

Therefore, the number of potential class members, as well as the
judicial inefficiency of attempting to try a case with so many
individual plaintiffs and future class members, convinces the
Court that the class is so numerous as to make joinder
impracticable.

Commonality

The second requirement under Rule 23(a) is that the plaintiff must
show that there are questions of law or fact common to the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Where the same conduct or practice by
the same defendant gives rise to the same kind of claims from all
class members, there is a common question.

With respect to the Proposed Class, Plaintiff argues that in this
case all class members are faced with a courthouse that is not
properly accessible. Furthermore, Plaintiff's allegation that the
conditions at the Courthouse violate the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act poses a question of law that is common to the class. The
determination of that contention 'will resolve an issue that is
central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.
Therefore, commonality is established with respect to the Proposed
Class.

Typicality

The third requirement under Rule 23(a) is that the plaintiff must
show that the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class. A claim is typical
if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct
that gives rise to the claims of other class members and are based
on the same legal theory.

With respect to the Proposed Class, Plaintiff maintains that all
putative class members are affected by the accessibility problems
at the Courthouse. Indeed, her claims have the same essential
characteristics as the claims of the class at large.

Accordingly, it appears that Plaintiff's claims are typical of the
Proposed Class, in that each of those claims are based on the same
legal theory that the Courthouse's alleged inaccessibility
constitutes a violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
Therefore, typicality is established with respect to the Proposed
Class.

Adequacy of Representation

The final requirement of Rule 23(a) is that "the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class. Adequacy of representation is composed of two parts: the
adequacy of the named plaintiff's counsel, and the adequacy of
representation provided in protecting the different, separate, and
distinct interest of the class members.

With respect to the adequacy of class counsel, the Court agrees
that counsel is certainly skilled and experienced in this type of
litigation, and has appeared before this Court in similar
circumstances. Counsel has evidenced his skill in the past by
successfully appealing matters before this Court and following its
rules in seeking to certify classes.

Mr. Falk also personally represents that he is skilled and
experienced in this type of litigation, and that his employer, the
ACLU of Indiana, has the resources and ability to vigorously
litigate the matter. The Court believes that named counsel will
work for the benefit of the proposed class in seeking relief that
will protect the rights of class members both known and to become
known. The Court is therefore satisfied that Mr. Falk will be an
adequate representative of the Proposed Class.

Common Grounds for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief

Plaintiff asks that her prayer for declaratory relief be certified
under Rule 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(2) covers cases where the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that
apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the
class as a whole.

Rule 23(b)(2) is the appropriate rule to enlist when the
plaintiffs' primary goal is not monetary relief, but rather to
require the defendant to do or not do something that would benefit
the whole class. Here, Plaintiff is attempting to accomplish the
same to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief that is designed
to benefit the whole class. Thus, the Rule 23(b)(2) requirement is
met as to the Proposed Class.

Because Plaintiff has demonstrated that certification is
appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P Rule 23, the Court ordered
that the case be certified as a class action. The Court certifies
a class comprised of all persons with mobility impairments or
other physical disabilities who access or attempt to access, or
who will access or will attempt to access, the Pulaski County
Courthouse. The class may pursue claims for relief under the ADA,
42 U.S.C. Section 12131, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. Section 794.

The Court also granted Plaintiff's Motion to Submit Evidentiary
Material as unopposed. Furthermore, because Plaintiff has
demonstrated that certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. Rules 23(a) and (b)(2), the Court granted Plaintiff's
Motion for Class Certification; ordered that the case be certified
as a class action; and appointed Kenneth Falk of the ACLU of
Indiana as class counsel.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 11, 2017
Opinion and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y7xvrehf
from Leagle.com.

Emily Hizer, Plaintiff, represented by Jan P. Kubicki-Mensz, ACLU
of Indiana, 1031 E. Washington Street Indianapolis, IN 46202 w
Emily Hizer, Plaintiff, represented by Kenneth J. Falk, ACLU of
Indiana, 1031 E. Washington Street Indianapolis, IN 46202 w

Pulaski County Indiana, Defendant, represented by Alexander P.
Will, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Anthony W. Overholt, Frost Brown Todd
LLC, 201 North Illinois Street, Suite 1900, Indianapolis, Indiana
46204-4236  & Kevin C. Tankersley, Tankersley Law Office,  115 W.
Main St.Winamac, IN 46996-0363.


PPL CORPORATION: Class Suit Filed Against LG&E in Kentucky
----------------------------------------------------------
PPL Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that the plaintiffs have
filed a class action complaint in Jefferson Circuit Court,
Kentucky, against Louisville Gas and Electric Company regarding
the state law nuisance, negligence and trespass tort claims.

In December 2013, six residents, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, filed a class action complaint against
LG&E and PPL in the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Kentucky alleging violations of the Clean Air Act and Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976. In addition, these
plaintiffs assert common law claims of nuisance, trespass and
negligence. These plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and civil
penalties, plus costs and attorney fees, for the alleged statutory
violations. Under the common law claims, these plaintiffs seek
monetary compensation and punitive damages for property damage and
diminished property values for a class consisting of residents
within four miles of the Cane Run plant.

In their individual capacities, these plaintiffs sought
compensation for alleged adverse health effects. In response to a
motion to dismiss filed by PPL and LG&E, in July 2014, the court
dismissed the plaintiffs' RCRA claims and all but one Clean Air
Act claim, but declined to dismiss the common law tort claims.

In November 2016, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint removing
the personal injury claims and removing certain previously named
plaintiffs. In February 2017, the District Court issued an order
dismissing PPL as a defendant and dismissing the final federal
claim against LG&E under the Clean Air Act, and directed the
parties to submit briefs regarding whether the court should
continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction regarding the
remaining state law-only claims.

On April 13, 2017, the District Court issued an order declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismissing the case in its
entirety, subject to certain federal appeals or state court re-
filing rights of the parties.

On June 16, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a class action complaint in
Jefferson Circuit Court, Kentucky, against LG&E regarding the
state law nuisance, negligence and trespass tort claims. The
plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages for alleged
property damage due to purported plant emissions on behalf of a
class of residents within one to three miles of the plant.

PPL, LKE and LG&E cannot predict the outcome of this matter. LG&E
retired one coal-fired unit at the Cane Run plant in March 2015
and the remaining two coal-fired units at the plant in June 2015.


RESCARE INC: Misclassifies Class as Exempt Workers, Bradley Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
PETRINA M. BRADLEY, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. RESCARE, INC., and EDUCARE COMMUNITY LIVING
CORPORATION - GULF COAST D/B/A RESCARE, Case No. 4:17-cv-02700
(S.D. Tex., September 7, 2017), alleges that the Defendants
misclassified the Plaintiff and the Class Members as exempt
workers under the Fair Labor Standards Act and failed to pay them
appropriate overtime wages required by the FLSA.

Rescare, Inc., is a Kentucky corporation doing business in Texas.
Educare Community Living Corporation - Gulf Coast, doing business
as Rescare, is a Texas corporation.  Educare is a subsidiary of
Rescare.

The Defendants provide home care services to elderly and invalid
clients.  The Defendants' direct care employees provide assistance
with bathing, grooming, toileting, transfer/ambulation, exercise
regimens, medication administration, feeding, meal preparation,
cleaning, laundry, shopping and escorting.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd Slobin, Esq.
          Ricardo J. Prieto, Esq.
          SHELLIST LAZARZ SLOBIN LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1515
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 621-2277
          Facsimile: (713) 621-0993
          E-mail: tslobin@eeoc.net
                  rprieto@eeoc.net


RICHARD SOKOLOFF: Faces "Bonti" Suit in Eastern District of NY
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Richard Sokoloff.
The case is styled as Coleen Bonti, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Richard Sokoloff,
Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-05478 (E.D. N.Y., September 19, 2017).

The Defendant is an attorney at law offering debt collection
services.
The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


RIVIANA FOODS: New York Court Dismisses "Stewart"
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the case captioned MELISSA STEWART, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. RIVIANA FOODS
INC., Defendant, No. 16-CV-6157 (NSR) (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Melissa Stewart (Stewart), a resident and citizen of New
York State, filed this purported class action, alleging that
Defendant Riviana Foods, Inc. (Riviana) violated Sections 349 and
350 of the New York General Business Law (N.Y. GBL) by engaging in
deceptive marketing practices.  Defendant Riviana1 is a Texas
corporation that advertises, distributes, markets, and sells its
pasta products throughout New York State.  Stewart contends that
Riviana has engaged in a deceptive packaging scheme that misleads
consumers into believing its healthy pasta boxes contain the same
net weight of product contained in traditional pasta boxes.

Specifically, Defendant allegedly packages only 12 ounces of
healthy pasta in the same iconic boxes traditionally sized and
priced to contain 16 ounces (i.e., one pound) of product, as to
induce consumers into paying a premium for healthy pasta without
realizing that they are purchasing less product.

Defendant moves to dismiss on several grounds. First, it argues
that Plaintiff's state law claims are preempted by federal law and
regulations.  Second, it moves, pursuant to N.Y. GBL Section
349(d) (a safe harbor for defendants), which provides a complete
defense whenever a challenged act or practice complies with
federal rules and regulations.  Finally, Defendant moves pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to
dismiss all counts for failure to state a claim.

Pre-emption

The Court finds the Plaintiff correct in so far as N.Y. GBL claims
may survive even when manufacturers comply with the labeling laws.
It is well-established that even if  the labeling meets the floor
established by federal regulations, there is nothing to indicate
that it could not still be misleading and therefore actionable
under the state consumer protection laws. More to the point,
nothing in the applicable federal laws expressly preempts state
law claims for deceptive practices premised on an alleged failure
to follow federal food labeling requirements.

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims are not
precluded by the FDCA. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for
dismissal on this grounds is denied.

Regulatory Scheme

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) derives its authority to
regulate food labels from two primary sources: the FDCA and the
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA). Under the FDCA,
Congress granted the FDA power to ensure foods are safe,
wholesome, sanitary, and properly labeled. The FDCA expressly
forbids the misbranding of food in interstate commerce. Section
343 of the FDCA sets forth circumstances under which food is
considered misbranded. In general, a food is misbranded if any
particular of its labeling is false or misleading. 21 U.S.C.
Section 343(a)(1).

Pre-emption Analysis

Turning to the merits, the Court notes that Defendant did not
explain whether Plaintiff's claims were expressly pre-empted by
federal law, or in the alternative, whether they are barred by
implied conflict pre-emption. A defendant asserting pre-emption
bears the burden of proving that it applies. Federal pre-emption
is an affirmative defense upon which the defendants bear the
burden of proof.  Instead, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's
claims are pre-empted because the label at issue discloses the net
quantity of contents in the exact manner required by FDA
regulations: namely, the net quantity8 is displayed on the
principal display panel,  the net quantity statement is placed as
a distinct item in the bottom 30 percent of the principal display
panel, it lines generally parallel with the base of the containe,
and the minimum type size complies with the calculations outlined
in 21 CFR 101.105(h) and (i).

This argument presumes that any state-law claim requiring
Defendant to include supplemental statements about product
quantity or to avoid misleading packaging tactics is pre-empted by
the FDCA and, consequently, misconstrues Plaintiff's claims.
Because the N.Y. GBL does not amount to something different from
or in addition to what federal law already requires regarding
weight labeling in general, under 21 U.S.C. Section 101.105, pre-
emption does not bar Plaintiff's claim.

The Adequacy of Plaintiff's N.Y. GBL Claims

Although the Court concludes that federal preemption does not bar
Plaintiff's state claims, this suit ultimately fails on the merits
because Plaintiff cannot plausibly state that the alleged practice
rendered Ronzoni's label false or misleading to the reasonable
consumer.

Judicial Notice

Before considering Defendant's specific arguments regarding
Plaintiff's N.Y. GBL claims, the Court must first consider whether
it may take judicial notice of the documents and advertisements
Defendant submitted at the same time as its Memorandum of Law.
None of these documents were attached to the Complaint. While a
court must generally treat a 12(b)(6) as one for summary judgment
under Rule 56 when it relies on matters outside the pleadings,14
the court may consider documents beyond the pleadings in deciding
a motion to dismiss.

The Merits of Plaintiff's Claims

Defendant moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims, pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion
challenges the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint.
Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiff's claims under N.Y. GBL
Sections 349 and 350, which prohibit deceptive business practices
and false advertising, on the ground that the conduct alleged is
not materially misleading as a matter of law, and rather,
Plaintiff's claims are objectively unreasonable.

To state a prima facie claim under either Section, a plaintiff
must allege that the defendant (1) engaged in consumer-oriented
conduct; (2) that the conduct was materially misleading; and (3)
that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly
deceptive act or practice.

According to Plaintiff the traditional box is so ubiquitous on the
market, meaning the same package since 1915 there is a reasonable
expectation that all Ronzoni dry pasta products, including healthy
pastas, contain 16 net-ounces of product.

But the Court agrees with Defendant that consumers who expect to
receive 16 ounces of healthy pasta solely because she has
purchased different Ronzoni pasta products in similarly-sized
boxes, is not reasonable. Considering the information of which the
Court took judicial notice, the healthy box label sports several
features that distinguish it from the alleged traditional line.
The healthy pasta labels indicate that pasta contains different
ingredients (e.g., now with natural oat fiber), the net weight is
listed on a corner different than the traditional spaghetti, and
the healthy boxes are tinted in a variety of vibrant colors that
are visually quite distinct from the traditional yellow and blue
colored-box. Moreover, all the pastas, whether healthy or white
flour, are sold in a range of net-weight ounces. For example, the
Ronzoni(R) Healthy Harvest Thin Spaghetti is sold both in 12-ounce
and 16-ounce versions, with the 16-ounce box prominently noting
that it contains '33% more free' 'than the former 12 oz. package.
The disclaimer appears in red font and is highlighted in yellow.
Thus, there are sufficient differences between the boxes, and
within the healthy line of pastas, that the practice, as alleged,
is unlikely to mislead consumers.  But even assuming nearly
identical boxes, the weight and price of the dry good are clearly
the most material aspect of this type of product.

Having considered the content of the label in context, the Court
finds that Plaintiffs N.Y. GBL claims fail.

The Court grants Defendant's motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 11, 2017
Opinion and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y7lly7d9from
Leagle.com.

Melissa Stewart, Plaintiff, represented by Joanna Frances Sandolo
-- jsandolo@belowichwalsh.com -- Belowich & Walsh LLP.
Melissa Stewart, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey I. Carton --
jcarton@denleacarton.com -- Denlea & Carton LLP & Joanna Frances
Sandolo, Belowich & Walsh LLP.

Melissa Stewart, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Jeffrey Berg --
rberg@denleacarton.com -- Denlea & Carton LLP.

Melissa Stewart, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey I. Carton,
Denlea & Carton LLP.

Riviana Foods Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey S. Jacobson
-- jjacodson@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP.


RIZZA BUICK: Sued by "Fusilier" Over Unpaid Minimum Wages
---------------------------------------------------------
Jarrett Fusilier, Plaintiff, v. Rizza Buick GMC Cadillac, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-06394 (N.D. Ill., September 5, 2017),
is a collective action on behalf of plaintiff and the Class
seeking to recover money damages for unpaid minimum wages under
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law,
including liquidated damages, costs and reasonable attorneys'
fees.

Plaintiff was employed as a Sale Representative, on pure
commission basis. Fusilier made no sales and was paid nothing by
the Defendant despite working approximately 414 hours from October
19 until November 14, 2016. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Mark T. Lavery, Esq.
     Christopher V. Langone, Esq.
     James Batson, Esq.
     17 N. Wabash, Suite 500
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Tel: (312) 344-1945
     Email: mlavery@langonebatson.com


SANDRIDGE MISSISSIPPIAN: Court Narrows Claims in "Nibur"
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma issued an Order denying defendant Tom L. Ward's Motion to
Dismiss, nominal defendant SandRidge Energy, Inc.'s Motion to
Dismiss, and defendant SandRidge Mississippian Trust I's Motion to
Dismiss the case captioned  IVAN NIBUR, LAWRENCE ROSS, JASE LUNA,
MATTHEW WILLENBUCHER, and the DUANE & VIRGINIA LANIER TRUST,
Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, v. SANDRIDGE MISSISSIPPIAN TRUST I, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. CIV-15-634-M (W.D. Okla.).

Before the Court are the motions to dismiss of defendants
SandRidge Mississippian Trust I, James D. Bennett, Matthew K.
Grubb, and Tom L. Ward and nominal defendant SandRidge Energy,
Inc. (Moving Defendants).

Nominal defendant SandRidge Energy, Inc. (SandRidge) is an oil and
gas company headquartered in Oklahoma City. In December 2010, in
an effort to monetize certain properties in the Mississippian lime
formation, SandRidge created a royalty trust, Mississippian Trust
(Trust I), and conveyed to Trust I royalty interests in 160 wells
located in an area of mutual interest (AMI) spanning five counties
in Northern Oklahoma (Alfalfa, Garfield, Grant, Major and Woods).
Holders of common units in Trust I and Trust II were joined as
plaintiffs in a putative securities class action that had been
filed several months earlier by common stockholders of SandRidge.
The unitholders claims were dismissed.  Plaintiffs filed the
instant action asserting two independent claims. First, plaintiffs
asserted claims and remedies against defendants under Sections 11,
12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, and these claims
have been dismissed. Second, plaintiffs assert claims and remedies
against defendants under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder (17 C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5) (Exchange Act
Claims).

Summary of plaintiffs' Exchange Act Claims

Plaintiffs allege that the Trust I registration statement
projected that the Trust I Development Wells would produce
approximately 18% more oil than the Trust I Producing Wells.
Plaintiffs further allege that by the end of Trust I's second
reporting period in August 2011, it had become clear to the Moving
Defendants that Trust I would not meet its projections because
through August 2011, the oil production of the Trust I Development
Wells was only matching that of the Trust I Producing Wells
Additionally, plaintiffs allege that in reporting Trust I's
production and cash distribution beats on conference calls with
analysts, Moving Defendants falsely stated, among other things,
that oil production was on trend and on target even though the oil
production of the Trust I Development Wells (accounting for two-
thirds of the Trust I reserves) was not meeting forecasts.
Plaintiffs further allege that Moving Defendants made these false
and misleading statements with scienter.

Pleading requirements of the PLSRA

To state a claim under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5 a plaintiff must allege: (1) a misleading statement or
omission of a material fact; (2) made in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities; (3) with intent to defraud or
recklessness; (4) reliance; and (5) damages.

First, the PSLRA requires that a complaint asserting a violation
of Section 10(b): "shall specify each statement alleged to have
been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or
omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall
state with particularity all facts on which that belief is
formed." 15 U.S.C. Section 78u-4(b)(1).

Second, the PSLRA heightens the standard for pleading scienter
with the following requirement: "in any private action arising
under this chapter in which the plaintiff may recover money
damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular
state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or
omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind."

Scienter

Moving Defendants assert that the consolidated amended complaint
falls far short of pleading the requisite strong inference of
scienter. Specifically, Moving Defendants contend that plaintiffs
fail to identify any report or witness describing information
actually known by defendants Ward, Bennett, and Grubb (Officer
Defendants) that caused them, or should have caused them, to know
any of their statements were inaccurate or misleading and instead
plaintiffs attempt to plead scienter by alleging that the Officer
Defendants, by virtue of their positions, had access to well
production data, such as reports with unspecified content from the
Reservoir Engineering department and unspecified information
presented at weekly senior management meetings.

The Court finds that plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged
scienter as to defendant Bennett. Particularly, the Court finds
that plaintiffs have not set forth sufficient facts that give rise
to a strong inference that defendant Bennett acted with the
required state of mind. There are no specific allegations in the
complaint that identify defendant Bennett as participating in the
above referenced meetings or receiving any specific reports. The
Court finds plaintiffs' allegations with respect to defendant
Bennett are nothing more than generalized imputations of knowledge
and are not sufficient to establish scienter.

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs' Section 10(b) claim
against defendant Bennett should be dismissed.

Material misrepresentation or omission

Moving Defendants also assert that the complaint fails to plead a
material misrepresentation or omission. As to falsity, a plaintiff
must specify each fraudulent statement, explain why the statement
was misleading, and allege with particularity [the] basis for
believing that the statement was false.

The Court finds plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged material
misrepresentations and/or omissions. Specifically, the Court finds
plaintiffs have specified each fraudulent statement, have
explained why the statement was misleading, and have alleged with
particularity [the] basis for believing that the statement was
false when made. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs'
Section 10(b) claim should not be dismissed on this basis.

Section 20(a) claim

Moving Defendants also contend that plaintiffs' Section 20(a)
claim should be dismissed. Specifically, Moving Defendants assert
that the complaint does not adequately plead the element of
control.

For plaintiffs to state a prima facie case of control person
liability, plaintiffs must establish: (1) a primary violation of
the securities laws and (2) 'control' over the primary violator by
the alleged controlling persons. To establish control, plaintiffs
must point to facts which indicate the defendants had possession,
direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction
of the management and policies of a person, whether through the
ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.

The Court has found that plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a
violation of Section 10(b). Having carefully reviewed the
Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violations of the Federal
Securities Laws, the Court finds that plaintiffs have also
sufficiently alleged control over SandRidge and Trust I by
defendants Ward, Grubb, and Bennett.

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs' Section 20(a) claim
should not be dismissed.

The Court denied defendant Tom L. Ward's Motion to Dismiss nominal
defendant SandRidge Energy, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss and defendant
SandRidge Mississippian Trust I's Motion to Dismiss and grants in
part and denies in part defendants James D. Bennett and Matthew K.
Grubb's Motion to Dismiss as follows: (A) the Court grants the
motion to dismiss as to plaintiffs' Section 10(b) claim against
defendant James D. Bennett and dismisses that claim, and (B) the
Court denies the motion to dismiss in all other respects.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 11, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/ya85wxdbfrom Leagle.com.

Duane and Virginia Lanier Trust, Plaintiff, represented by
Laurence M. Rosen -- lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm
PA, pro hac vice.

Duane and Virginia Lanier Trust, Plaintiff, represented by Phillip
Kim -- pkim@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm PA, pro hac vice,
Darren B. Derryberry, Derryberry & Naifeh LLP, 4800 N Lincoln
Blvd, Oklahoma City, OK 73105, USA & Nicholas G. Farha
nick@farhalawfirm.com -- Farha Law PLLC.

Matthew Willenbucher, Plaintiff, represented by Laurence M. Rosen,
The Rosen Law Firm PA & Nicholas G. Farha, Farha Law PLLC.

Lawrence Ross, Plaintiff, represented by Laurence M. Rosen, The
Rosen Law Firm PA & Nicholas G. Farha, Farha Law PLLC.

Luna Jase, Plaintiff, represented by Laurence M. Rosen, The Rosen
Law Firm PA & Nicholas G. Farha, Farha Law PLLC.

Ivan Nibur, Plaintiff, represented by Laurence M. Rosen, The Rosen
Law Firm PA & Nicholas G. Farha, Farha Law PLLC.

Sandridge Energy Inc, Defendant, represented by Kiran A.
Phansalkar -- kphansalkar@cwlaw.com -- Conner & Winters & Mitchell
D. Blackburn -- mblackburn@cwlaw.com -- Conner & Winters.

SandRidge Mississippian Trust I, Defendant, represented by Carolyn
R. Bilanko -- cbilanko@bakerlaw.com -- Bracewell LLP, pro hac
vice, Patrick A. Caballero -- patrick.caballero@bracewell.com --
Bracewell & Giuliani, Ryan S. Wilson, Wilson Law Firm 7612 Cooper
Oaks Dr, Edmond, OK 73025-1718, & William S. Benesh --
steve.benesh@bracewell.com -- Bracewell & Giuliani.

SandRidge Mississippian Trust II, Defendant, represented by
Carolyn R. Bilanko, Bracewell LLP, pro hac vice, Patrick A.
Caballero, Bracewell & Giuliani, Ryan S. Wilson, Wilson Law Firm &
William S. Benesh, Bracewell & Giuliani.

Tom L. Ward, Defendant, represented by Christopher J. Fawal --
christopher.fawal@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins, George S. Corbyn,
Jr. -- gcorbyn@corbynhampton.com -- Corbyn Hampton PLLC, James C.
Word -- christian.word@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins, Joe M. Hampton
-- jhampton@corbynhampton.com -- Corbyn Hampton PLLC & Steven M.
Bauer -- steven.bauer@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins.

James D. Bennett, Defendant, represented by Joanne Sum-Ping --
jsumping@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP, Mark P. Gimbel --
mgimbel@cov.com  -- Covington & Burling & Thomas B. Snyder --
thomas.snyder@crowedunlevy.com -- Crowe & Dunlevy.

Matthew K Grubb, Defendant, represented by Joanne Sum-Ping,
Covington & Burling LLP, Mark P. Gimbel, Covington & Burling &
Thomas B. Snyder, Crowe & Dunlevy.

Randall D. Cooley, Defendant, represented by Joanne Sum-Ping,
Covington & Burling LLP, Mark P. Gimbel, Covington & Burling &
Thomas B. Snyder, Crowe & Dunlevy.

Jim J. Brewer, Defendant, represented by Joanne Sum-Ping,
Covington & Burling LLP, Mark P. Gimbel, Covington & Burling &
Thomas B. Snyder, Crowe & Dunlevy.

Everett R. Dobson, Defendant, represented by Joanne Sum-Ping,
Covington & Burling LLP, Mark P. Gimbel, Covington & Burling &
Thomas B. Snyder, Crowe & Dunlevy.

William A. Gilliland, Defendant, represented by Joanne Sum-Ping,
Covington & Burling LLP, Mark P. Gimbel, Covington & Burling &
Thomas B. Snyder, Crowe & Dunlevy.


SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS: First Circuit Appeal Underway
---------------------------------------------------
Sarepta Therapeutics, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that the First Circuit has
not yet issued a decision in the appeal in a class action lawsuit.

Purported class action complaints were filed against the Company
and certain of its officers in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts on January 27, 2014 and January 29,
2014. The complaints were consolidated into a single action
(Corban v. Sarepta, et. al., No. 14-cv-10201) by order of the
court on June 23, 2014. Plaintiffs' consolidated amended
complaint, filed on July 21, 2014, asserted violations of Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the
"Exchange Act") and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5
against the Company, and Chris Garabedian, Sandy Mahatme, and Ed
Kaye ("Individual Defendants," and collectively with the Company,
the "Corban Defendants"), and violations of Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act against the Individual Defendants.  Plaintiffs
alleged that the Corban Defendants made material
misrepresentations or omissions during the putative class period
of July 24, 2013 through November 12, 2013, regarding a data set
for a Phase 2b study of eteplirsen and the likelihood of the FDA
accepting the Company's new drug application for eteplirsen for
review based on that data set. Plaintiffs sought compensatory
damages and fees.

On August 18, 2014, the Corban Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss, which the Court granted on March 31, 2015.  Plaintiffs
subsequently sought leave to file a second amended complaint,
which the Corban Defendants opposed.  On September 2, 2015, the
Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend as futile.

Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on September 29, 2015, seeking
review of the Court's March 31, 2015 order dismissing the case and
the Court's September 2, 2015 order denying leave to amend.  On
January 27, 2016, Plaintiffs filed in the district court a motion
for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(2), arguing that the FDA Briefing Document
published on or about January 15, 2016, was material and would
have changed the Court's ruling.

On February 26, 2016, the First Circuit stayed the appeal pending
the district court's ruling on the 60(b)(2) motion.  Defendants
opposed the 60(b)(2) motion, and on April 21, 2016, the Court
denied Plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment.  On May 19,
2016, Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the April 21,
2016 order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).

On May 20, 2016, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion, and
Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal of the Court's April 21, 2016
denial of their 60(b)(2) motion and May 20, 2016 denial of their
59(e) motion.  On June 13, 2016, the First Circuit granted
Plaintiffs' motion to consolidate the two appeals.  Oral argument
took place on March 7, 2017.  A decision has not yet been issued
by the First Circuit. An estimate of the possible loss or range of
loss cannot be made at this time.

Sarepta is a U.S. commercial-stage biopharmaceutical company
focused on the discovery and development of unique RNA-targeted
therapeutics for the treatment of rare neuromuscular diseases.


SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS: Appeal in "Kader" Case Pending
----------------------------------------------------
Sarepta Therapeutics, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that the Court has not yet
scheduled a date for oral argument in plaintiff's appeal in a
class action lawsuit.

A complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Massachusetts on December 3, 2014 styled William Kader,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
Sarepta Therapeutics Inc., Christopher Garabedian, and Sandesh
Mahatme (Kader v. Sarepta et.al 1:14-cv-14318).

On March 20, 2015, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint asserting
violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 against the Company, and Chris
Garabedian and Sandy Mahatme ("Individual Defendants," and
collectively with the Company, the "Kader Defendants"), and
violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against the
Individual Defendants. Plaintiffs alleged that the Kader
Defendants made material misrepresentations or omissions during
the putative class period of April 21, 2014 through October 27,
2014, regarding the sufficiency of the Company's data for
submission of an NDA for eteplirsen and the likelihood of the FDA
accepting the NDA based on that data. Plaintiffs sought
compensatory damages and fees.

The Kader Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint on May
11, 2015.  On April 5, 2016, following oral argument on March 29,
2016, the Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss.  On April
8, 2016, Lead Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file an
amended complaint, which Defendants opposed.

On January 6, 2017, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for leave
to amend and dismissed the case.  Plaintiffs filed a notice of
appeal on February 3, 2017. A briefing schedule was set on March
13, 2017. Appellants' brief was filed April 24, 2017. Appellee's
brief was filed May 24, 2017.

The Court has not yet scheduled a date for oral argument. An
estimate of the possible loss or range of loss cannot be made at
this time.

Sarepta is a U.S. commercial-stage biopharmaceutical company
focused on the discovery and development of unique RNA-targeted
therapeutics for the treatment of rare neuromuscular diseases.


SEVCON INC: Rigrodsky & Long Files Securities Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., on Sept. 12 disclosed that it has filed a
class action complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts on behalf of holders of Sevcon, Inc.
("Sevcon") (Nasdaq:SEV) common stock in connection with the
proposed acquisition of Sevcon by BorgWarner Inc. and its
affiliates (together, "BorgWarner") announced on July 17, 2017
(the "Complaint").  The Complaint, which alleges violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against Sevcon, its Board of
Directors (the "Board"), and BorgWarner, is captioned Scarantino
v. Sevcon, Inc., Case No. 1:17-cv-11580 (D. Mass.).

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions
concerning this notice or your rights or interests, please contact
plaintiff's counsel, Seth D. Rigrodsky or Gina M. Serra at
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., 2 Righter Parkway, Suite 120, Wilmington,
DE 19803, by telephone at (888) 969-4242, by e-mail at info@rl-
legal.com, or at http://rigrodskylong.com/contact-us/.

On July 14, 2017, Sevcon entered into an agreement and plan of
merger (the "Merger Agreement") with BorgWarner.  Pursuant to the
Merger Agreement, shareholders of Sevcon will receive $22.00 in
cash for each share of Sevcon stock they own (the "Proposed
Transaction").

Among other things, the Complaint alleges that, in an attempt to
secure shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction,
defendants issued materially incomplete disclosures in a proxy
statement (the "Proxy Statement") filed with the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 8, 2017.  The
Complaint alleges that the Proxy Statement, which recommends that
Sevcon stockholders vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction,
omits material information necessary to enable shareholders to
make an informed decision as to how to vote on the Proposed
Transaction, including material information with respect to the
analyses performed by Sevcon's financial advisor and potential
conflicts of interest.  The Complaint seeks injunctive and
equitable relief and damages on behalf of holders of Sevcon common
stock.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than November 10, 2017.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  Any member of the proposed class may
move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their
choice, or may choose to do nothing and remain an absent class
member.

With offices in Wilmington, Delaware and Garden City, New York,
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A. -- http://www.rigrodskylong.com--
regularly prosecutes securities fraud, shareholder corporate, and
shareholder derivative litigation on behalf of shareholders in
state and federal courts throughout the United States. [GN]


SOUTHWESTERN ENERGY: New Trial Sought in Arkansas Royalty Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Southwestern Energy Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that the plaintiff in
the Arkansas Royalty Litigation has moved for a new trial.

In June 2017 the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Company
on all counts in Smith v. SEECO, Inc. et al., a class action in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas.  The plaintiff had alleged that the Company had
underpaid lessors of lands in Arkansas by deducting from royalty
payments costs for gathering, transportation and compression of
natural gas in excess of what is permitted by the relevant leases
and asserted claims for, among other things, breach of contract,
fraud, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment and violation of
certain Arkansas statutes.

Following the verdict, the court entered judgment in favor of the
Company on all claims.  The plaintiff has moved for a new trial,
and the court has not yet ruled on that motion.

The plaintiff class in Smith comprises the vast majority of
lessors of lands in Arkansas for which leases permit deductions
for these types of costs.  Most of the remaining lessors are named
plaintiffs or members of classes in other pending lawsuits; in
particular, two actions on behalf of certified classes of only
Arkansas residents pending in state courts in Arkansas (no trial
date set) and three cases (all currently stayed) that were filed
in Arkansas state court on behalf of a total of 248 individually
named plaintiffs, two of which have been removed to federal court
have been assigned to the same court that held the Smith trial.

Management believes that, as the Smith jury concluded, the
deductions from royalty payments were calculated in accordance
with the leases.  The Company currently does not anticipate that
these other cases are likely to have a material adverse effect on
the results of operations, financial position or cash flows of the
Company.

Southwestern Energy Company is an independent energy company
engaged in natural gas, oil and NGL exploration, development and
production ("E&P"). The Company is also focused on creating and
capturing additional value through its natural gas gathering and
marketing businesses ("Midstream Services").  Southwestern
conducts most of its businesses through subsidiaries and operates
principally in two segments: E&P and Midstream Services.


SPEEDWAY: Sued Over Illinois Biometrics Privacy Law Violation
-------------------------------------------------------------
Justin Lee, writing for Biometric, reports that Gas station
convenience store chain The Speedway and the Lettuce Entertain You
group of restaurants have been hit with class action lawsuits
alleging the businesses violated Illinois' biometrics privacy law,
according to a report by Cook County Record.

Lawyers with the Chicago legal firm Stephan Zouras LLP filed two
lawsuits in Cook County Circuit Court on behalf of plaintiffs
alleging the companies should be required to compensate for
storing biometrics data from either their employees or their
customers.

In the lawsuit against Lettuce Entertain You, plaintiff
Regina Morris alleges the company's Wow Bao chain illegal collects
and stores facial scans of customers who use their self-order
kiosks to order food and drinks.

The lawsuit states that Wow Bao uses the data collected from the
kiosks "as a means of authentication for future food and beverage
purchases", but fails to notify customers of "the extent of the
purposes for which it collects their sensitive biometric data or
to whom the data is disclosed, if at all."

The suit also alleges that Lettuce did not obtain collect written
consent from their customers, nor did it explain in writing how it
will store the face scan and when it will delete the data from
their systems -- all of which allegedly violated the Illinois
Biometric Information Privacy Act.

In her lawsuit, Ms. Morris said she allowed her facial biometrics
to be scanned and stored at a Wow Bao kiosk at the chain's
restaurant on North Michigan Avenue, and did not receive the
information she asserts was required under the Illinois law.

In the lawsuit against Speedway, plaintiff and former employee
Christopher Howe alleged the chain of improperly collecting and
storing his fingerprints and those of all of its co-workers in
Illinois.
The lawsuit states that Speedway employees were required to scan
their fingerprints to clock in and out of their work shifts.

The plaintiff alleges that Speedway did not inform him and other
employees of its policies for collecting, storing and managing the
fingerprints, including how long the fingerprints would be stored
in the company's database following an employee's departure of the
company.

Mr. Howe also said he never received a written consent authorizing
Speedway to collect and store his fingerprints, which is required
by Illinois law.

The lawsuit follows similar lawsuits recently brought forward by
other law firms against several Illinois companies, including
Roundy's Supermarkets, Inc. and the Intercontinental Hotels Group.

In the lawsuit against Speedway, Stephan Zouras' attorneys have
called on the court to expand the action to include a class of
additional plaintiffs.

This would include all current and previous employees at Speedway
stores in Illinois who had their fingerprints collected and stored
by the company, which they say could amount to "hundreds or more."

Similarly, the lawsuit against Lettuce asks the court to expand
the case into a class action, including "hundreds or more" of
Wow Bao customers whose facial biometrics were scanned and stored
by the restaurant.

Both lawsuits are asking the court to order the defendants to pay
damages of $1,000-$5,000 per violation, in addition to attorney
fees. [GN]


SPEEDWAY LLC: Teggerdine Seeks to Certify Class of Gas Purchasers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned KARA TEGGERDINE,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
SPEEDWAY LLC, Case No. 8:16-cv-03280-JDW-TGW (M.D. Fla.), asks the
Court to certify this class:

     All persons residing in the United States who made a
     gasoline purchase with a debit/check card at a Speedway
     station from November 16, 2016 through and including
     November 17, 2016, and had a hold placed on their personal
     financial account as a result of Speedway's $125
     preauthorization request.

In this action, the Plaintiff challenges the actions of Speedway
which, without notice to its customers, required a $125 pre-
authorization request for payment card transactions at self-
service pumps, regardless of the actual purchase price.  Speedway
made this request with the expectation that banks would place a
hold on cardholders' financial accounts, again without advising
customers that a hold would result, Ms. Teggerdine contends.

Ms. Teggerdine also asks the Court to appoint her as Class
Representative, and to appoint her Counsel as Class Counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=U4djPGRt

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
          Patrick A. Barthle II, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN
          COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
          201 N. Franklin Street, 7th Floor
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 223-5505
          Facsimile: (813) 223-5402
          E-mail: jyanchunis@ForThePeople.com
                  pbarthle@ForThePeople.com

               - and -

          Jean Sutton Martin, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JEAN SUTTON MARTIN PLLC
          2018 Eastwood Road Suite 225
          Wilmington, NC 28403
          Telephone: (910) 292-6676
          Facsimile: (888) 316-3489
          E-mail: jean@jsmlawoffice.com


SQUARETWO FINANCIAL: Ohio Consumers Class Can't Proceed with Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
New York issued a Memorandum denying motion to lift the automatic
stay in the bankruptcy case captioned In re: SquareTwo Financial
Services Corporation, et al., Chapter 11, Reorganized Debtors,
Case No. 17-10659 (JLG), Jointly Administered (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.).

Vicki Young is a defendant, counterclaim plaintiff and class
representative in a law suit pending in Ohio's Mohoning County
Court of Common Pleas. CACH LLC ("CACH") is the plaintiff in that
action and, together with its affiliate, Square Two Financial
Corporation, are counterclaim defendants. They are also
reorganized chapter 11 debtors (the "Reorganized Debtors")
pursuant to that certain confirmed Modified Joint Prepackaged
Chapter 11 Plan for SquareTwo Financial Services Corporation and
Its Affiliated Debtors.

Young and the Certified Classes of Ohio Consumers seek an order
modifying the automatic stay to permit them to prosecute their
counterclaims against the Reorganized Debtors, with monetary
relief limited to insurance. They also seek an award of the
attorneys' fees and costs they have incurred in bringing the
Motion.

After the Class Claimants filed the Motion, the Plan was
confirmed. As a consequence, the automatic stay has been replaced
by the Plan Injunction, the Bankruptcy Court held.

Subject to certain irrelevant exceptions, section 12.5 of the Plan
permanently enjoins, as of the Confirmation Date creditors that
hold Claims against the Debtors or their bankruptcy estates from
conducting or continuing in any manner, directly or indirectly,
"any suit, action or other proceeding of any kind" against the
Reorganized Debtors or any of their property.  The Court's
authority to issue that injunction originates in sections 1141 and
524 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Pursuant to section 1141(d)(1),
confirmation of the Plan discharged CACH and SquareTwo from any
debt that arose before the date of such confirmation, the Court
said.

In determining whether there is cause to modify a plan injunction,
courts in this district apply the factors set forth in Sonnax
Indus., Inc. v. Tri Component Prods. Corp. (In re Sonnax Indus.,
Inc.), 907 F.2d 1280.

The Sonnax Factors are as follows: (1) Whether relief would result
in a partial or complete resolution of the issues; (2) Lack of any
connection with or interference with the bankruptcy case; (3)
Whether the other proceeding involves the debtor as a fiduciary;
(4) Whether a specialized tribunal with the necessary expertise
has been established to hear the cause of action; (5) Whether the
debtor's insurer has assumed full responsibility for defending it;
(6) Whether the action primarily involves third parties; (7)
Whether litigation in another forum would prejudice the interest
of other creditors; (8) Whether the judgment claim arising from
the other action is subject to equitable subordination; (9)
Whether movant's succession to other proceeding would result in a
judicial lien avoidable by the debtor; (10) The interests of
judicial economy and the expeditious and economical resolution of
litigation; (11) Whether the parties are ready for trial in the
other proceeding; and (12) The impact of the stay on parties and
the balance of harms.

In this light, application of Sonnax Factor #12 (i.e., the impact
of the stay on the parties and the balance of harms) also clearly
weighs against granting the Motion, the Bankruptcy Court held. The
continued prosecution of the Counterclaims will impair Reorganized
CACH's fresh start, interfere with the wind down of the Dissolving
Debtors and the implementation of the Plan, and unjustifiably deny
the 1.5 Lien Lenders payments called for under the Plan on account
of their claims. In contrast, the Class Claimants will not be
harmed at all, because their only recourse, with or without relief
from the injunction, is to the Creditors' Trust, since they are
not entitled to any distributions under the Plan. Finally,
application of Sonnax Factor #10 weighs against granting the
Motion. In evaluating this factor, courts consider whether lifting
the stay might invite similar motions from similarly situated
creditors.

Here, there is a real threat that allowing the Class Claimants to
prosecute the Counterclaims would indeed open the "floodgates" to
other similar litigation against the Reorganized Debtors since, as
the record of these cases reflects, there are pending lawsuits in
state court actions similar to the Ohio Class Action.

To summarize: only Sonnax Factors ## 5, 7, 10 and 12 are relevant
to the disposition of the Motion and application of each factor
weighs against granting the Motion. Accordingly, the Class
Claimants have not established cause for relief from the Plan
Injunction.

The Court finds that the Class Claimants have not met their burden
of establishing cause to justify granting them relief from the
Plan Injunction. Nor have they established a right to recover
their attorneys' fees and costs from CACH and SquareTwo.

Accordingly, the Motion is denied.

A full-text copy of the Bankruptcy Court's September 11, 2017,
Memorandum Decision and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/yalo6mws from Leagle.com.

SquareTwo Financial Services Corporation, Debtor, represented by
Matthew Allen Feldman -- mfeldman@willkie.com -- Willkie Farr &
Gallagher LLP, Benjamin P. McCallen -- bmccallen@willkie.com --
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, Paul V. Shalhoub --
pshalhoub@willkie.com -- Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP & Robin
Spigel- rspigel@willkie.com -- Willkie Far & Gallagher LLP.
CACH, LLC, Joint Debtor, represented by Martin A. Mooney,
Schiller, Knapp, Lefkowitz & Hertzel LLP, 8 Thurlow TerraceAlbany,
NY 12203 & Mitchell L. Williamson -- hlenett@bn-lawyers.com --
Barron & Newburger, P.C.

United States Trustee, U.S. Trustee, represented by Susan A.
Arbeit, Department of Justice.

Prime Clerk, LLC, Claims and Noticing Agent, represented by Adam
M. Adler aadler@primeclerk.com -- Prime Clerk LLC.

Official Committee Of Unsecured Creditors, Creditor Committee,
represented by Robert M. Hirsh -- robert.hirsh@arentfox.com --
Arent Fox LLP.


ST. AUGUSTINE OLD: Accused by "Armas" Suit of Not Paying Overtime
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ARTEMIO ARMAS, EMA ARMAS and all others similarly situated under
29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) v. ST. AUGUSTINE OLD ROMAN CATHOLIC
CHURCH, A PARISH OF THE OLD ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN NORTH
AMERICA, and JOHN PARNELL, Case No. 3:17-cv-02383-D (N.D. Tex.,
September 7, 2017), accuses the Defendants of willfully and
intentionally refusing to pay the Plaintiffs' overtime wages as
required by the Fair Labor Standards Act.

St. Augustine Old Roman Catholic Church, a parish of the Old Roman
Catholic Church in North America, is a corporation that regularly
transacts business within the Northern District of Texas.  John
Parnell is a corporate officer or manager of the Defendant
Company.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          J.H. Zidell, Esq.
          Robert L. Manteuffel, Esq.
          Joshua A. Petersen, Esq.
          J.H. ZIDELL, P.C.
          6310 LBJ Freeway, Suite 112
          Dallas, TX 75240
          Telephone: (972) 233-2264
          Facsimile: (972) 386-7610
          E-mail: zabogado@aol.com
                  rlmanteuffel@sbcglobal.net
                  josh.a.petersen@gmail.com


SUNRISE CREDIT: "Aguilar" Disputes Collection Letter
----------------------------------------------------
Hugo Aguilar, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Sunrise Credit Services, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 3:17-cv-01787 (S.D. Tex., September 5, 2017), seeks
actual and statutory damages, costs of litigation and reasonable
attorney's fees and all other relief for violation of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act and the Rosenthal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Plaintiff incurred financial obligations to Comenity Capital Bank
for a personal credit card of which Sunrise attempted to collect.
Defendant's collection letter indicated additional unauthorized
charges were almost as high as the principal balance sought and
that Sunrise was never authorized to collect collection fees
allegedly disguised as "other charges." [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joshua Swigart, Esq.
      Yana A. Hart, Esq.
      HYDE AND SWIGART
      2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101
      San Diego, CA 92108
      Telephone: (619) 233-7770
      Facsimile: (619) 297-1022 to 26
      Email: Josh@westcoastlitigation.com

             - and -

      Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
      KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
      245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
      Costa Mesa, CA 92626
      Telephone: (800) 400-6808
      Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
      Email: ak@kazlg.com

             - and -

      Daniel G. Shay, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL G. SHAY
      409 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101B
      San Diego, CA 92108
      Telephone: (619) 222-7429
      Facsimile: (866) 431-3292
      Email: danielshay@tcpafdcpa.com


UNIT CORP: Class Certification Issues Pending in Panola Case
------------------------------------------------------------
Unit Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that class certification
issues are pending in the case, Panola Independent School District
No. 4, et al. v. Unit Petroleum Company, No. CJ-07-215, District
Court of Latimer County, Oklahoma.

Panola Independent School District No. 4, Michael Kilpatrick, Gwen
Grego, Carla Lessel, Thelma Christine Pate, Juanita Golightly,
Melody Culberson, and Charlotte Abernathy are the Plaintiffs in
this case and are royalty owners in oil and gas drilling and
spacing units for which the company's exploration segment
distributes royalty. The Plaintiffs' central allegation is that
the company's exploration segment has underpaid royalty
obligations by deducting post-production costs or marketing
related fees. Plaintiffs sought to pursue the case as a class
action on behalf of persons who receive royalty from us for our
Oklahoma production.

"We have asserted several defenses including that the deductions
are permitted under Oklahoma law. We have also asserted that the
case should not be tried as a class action due to the materially
different circumstances that determine what, if any, deductions
are taken for each lease.

"On December 16, 2009, the trial court entered its order
certifying the class. On May 11, 2012 the court of civil appeals
reversed the trial court's order certifying the class. The
Plaintiffs petitioned the supreme court for certiorari and on
October 8, 2012, the Plaintiff's petition was denied.

"On January 22, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a second request to
certify a class of royalty owners that was slightly smaller than
their first attempt. Since then, the Plaintiffs have further
amended their proposed class to just include royalty owners
entitled to royalties under certain leases located in Latimer, Le
Flore, and Pittsburg Counties, Oklahoma.

"In July 2014, a second class certification hearing was held
where, in addition to the defenses described above, we argued that
the amended class definition is still deficient under the court of
civil appeals opinion reversing the initial class certification.
Closing arguments were held on December 2, 2014. There is no
timetable for when the court will issue its ruling. The merits of
Plaintiffs' claims will remain stayed while class certification
issues are pending."

Unit Corporation has three principal business segments: Oil and
Natural Gas, Contract Drilling, and Mid-Stream.


UNIT CORP: Cockerell Oil Suit Remains Pending in Oklahoma
---------------------------------------------------------
Unit Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2017, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2017, that the Company continues
to vigorously defend against each of the pending claims in the
case, Cockerell Oil Properties, Ltd., v. Unit Petroleum Company,
No. 16-cv-135-JHP, United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma.

On March 11, 2016, a putative class action lawsuit was filed
against Unit Petroleum Company styled Cockerell Oil Properties,
Ltd., v. Unit Petroleum Company in LeFlore County, Oklahoma.

The Company said, "We removed the case to federal court in the
Eastern District of Oklahoma. The plaintiff alleges that Unit
Petroleum wrongfully failed to pay interest with respect to
untimely royalty payments under Oklahoma's Production Revenue
Standards Act. The lawsuit seeks actual and punitive damages, an
accounting, disgorgement, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees.
Plaintiff is seeking relief on behalf of royalty owners in our
Oklahoma wells. We have asserted several defenses including that
the case cannot be properly certified as a class action because of
the wide variety of circumstances that determine whether a royalty
payment was timely made or has accrued interest under Oklahoma
law. At this point, the court has not taken any action on the
issue of class certification."

"We continue to vigorously defend against each of the pending
claims. At this time we are unable to express an opinion with
respect to the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome or provide an
estimate of potential losses, if any."

Unit Corporation has three principal business segments: Oil and
Natural Gas, Contract Drilling, and Mid-Stream.


UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Court Narrows Claims in ERISA Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in
part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned THE MEDICAL
SOCIETY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, et al., and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. UNITEDHEALTH GROUP INC.,
et al., Defendants, No. 16-CV-5265 (JPO) (S.D. N.Y.).

United moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.

Plaintiffs The Medical Society of the State of New York; the
Society of New York Office Based Surgery Facilities; Dr. Jeffrey
Adler; Podiatric OR of Midtown Manhattan, P.C.; Dr. Darrick
Antell; Columbia East Side Surgery, P.C.; and Dr. Albert B. Knapp,
M.D., P.C., in his own name and in the name of his eponymous
business (Plaintiffs), bring this putative class action under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), against
Defendants UnitedHealth Group Inc.; United HealthCare Services,
Inc.; United HealthCare Insurance Company; United HealthCare
Service LLC; Optum Group, LLC; Optum, Inc.; and Oxford Health
Plans LLC (United).

In their First Amended Complaint (Complaint), Plaintiffs allege
that United has systematically violated the terms of its health
insurance plans by refusing to pay the facility fees charged by
out-of-network office-based surgery practices.

United makes four arguments: (1) the United Plans held by Patients
A through G do not cover out-of-network OBS facility fees; (2)
Patients B and G failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (3)
various plaintiffs lack a cause of action because they do not hold
a validly assigned claim; and (4) the Association Plaintiffs lack
standing.

Plan Coverage

United first argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under
the United Plans covering Patients A through G.  United accurately
points out that when "a plan gives the administrator 'authority to
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the
plan,' [courts] review the administrator's interpretation of
benefits for abuse of discretion.

Plaintiffs, however, have plausibly alleged that United's conduct
precludes application of an abuse-of-discretion standard and
instead requires de novo review, the Court said.

Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that United has refused to pay
out-of-network OBS facility fees in violation of the terms of
Plaintiffs' United Plans. The Court cannot conclude from the face
of the complaint, and matters of which the court may take judicial
notice, that the plaintiff's claims are barred as a matter of law.
As a result, Patients A through G's claims survive United's motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim for benefits under the
terms of their United Plans.

Exhaustion

United next argues that Patients B and G failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies available under their United Plans and, as
a result, cannot bring their claims in federal court.

The Complaint contains sufficient factual allegations that
Plaintiffs complied with their United Plans' exhaustion
requirements. Plaintiffs allege that Patient G did, in fact,
appeal more than once and that Patient B fully exhausted her
administrative remedies by completing two levels of appeal to
United.

Plaintiffs allege that United failed to comply with the
requirement that denials include the specific reason or reasons
for the adverse determination and reference to the specific plan
provisions on which the determination is based. Accepting the
facts alleged in the Complaint as true, the Court cannot conclude
that United's affirmative exhaustion defense appears on the face
of the complaint. Accordingly, Patients B and G's claims survive
United's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.

Assignment of Claims

The rights of action that Plaintiffs seek to assert are available
only to participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries of benefit
plans. 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(1), (3). Although physicians and
their practices do not fall into any of these three categories,
the Second Circuit has recognized a narrow exception that allows
physicians to bring claims under Section 1132(a)] based on a valid
assignment from a patient.

United argues that: (1) the Physician Plaintiffs cannot bring
claims on their patients' behalf because those patients' claims
were assigned to the practices only, and (2) Podiatric cannot
bring claims on behalf of Patients A and B because those patients'
plans include anti-assignment provisions.

Assignments to Physician Plaintiffs

United argues that none of the Physician Plaintiffs hold valid
assignments from their patients.  This assertion is partially
accurate. Plaintiffs concede that Patients A through F assigned
their claims only to the OBS practices that treated them Podiatric
and Columbia and not to Drs. Adler and Antell as natural persons.
Plaintiffs also concede that Patient G assigned his claim to Dr.
Knapp as a natural person, and not to Dr. Knapp's Practice as an
incorporated entity. Consequently, Dr. Adler, Dr. Antell, and Dr.
Knapp's Practice are dismissed from this suit.

Assignments to Podiatric by Patients A and B

United argues that Patients A and B cannot validly assign their
claims to Podiatric. A claim is not validly assigned and is
therefore the assignment is void where the health plan in question
unambiguously prohibits assignment.

Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that Podiatric may pursue this
claim as the authorized representative or attorney-in-fact for
Patients A and B. But this argument is unavailing. ERISA
unambiguously provides that a civil action may be brought 'by a
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary.

Associational Standing

In addition to Physician and Practice Plaintiffs, MSSNY and NYOBS
join this suit in their associational capacities. Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Commission held that
an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members
when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in
their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane
to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted
nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit. 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). United
challenges the Association Plaintiffs' standing under the first
and third prongs of the Hunt test.

As to the first prong, United accurately notes that to support
associational standing, some individual association member must
hold a validly assigned claim such that the member could sue in
its own right. But United's conclusion -- that no member has
standing to sue because only physicians are members while only
practices hold assignments -- takes too restrictive a view of
associational membership.

As to the third prong, the Association Plaintiffs appropriately
emphasize that they seek only injunctive and declaratory relief
from United's alleged Uniform Refusal to Pay policy. The
Association Plaintiffs do not seek payments for individual
benefits. As a result and contrary to United's contention the
Association Plaintiffs need not show that every member has a
validly assigned claim for which administrative remedies were
fully exhausted.

For these reasons, United's motion to dismiss the First Amended
Complaint is denied in part and granted in part.  The motion to
dismiss the superseded complaint is denied as moot.  United is
directed to file an answer to the surviving claims by September
25, 2017.

The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motions at Docket
Numbers 32 and 50 in this case.  The Clerk of Court is further
directed to dismiss Plaintiffs Dr. Jeffrey Adler; Podiatric OR of
Midtown Manhattan, P.C.; Dr. Darrick Antell; and Dr. Albert B.
Knapp, M.D., P.C., in the name of his business only.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 11, 2017
Opinion and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/yd7y2h8vfrom
Leagle.com.

The Medical Society of the State of New York, Plaintiff,
represented by Anant Kumar, Zuckerman -- akumar@zuckerman.com --
Spaeder LLP.

The Medical Society of the State of New York, Plaintiff,
represented by Cyril V. Smith -- csmith@zuckerman.com -- Zuckerman
Spaeder LLP, Jason Samuel Cowart jcowart@zuckerman.com --
Zuckerman, Spaeder LLP, John William Leardi, Buttaci & Leardi, LLC
103 Carnegie Center Dr #323, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA & Donn Brian
Hufford -- bhufford@zuckerman.com -- Zuckerman, Spaeder LLP.

Society of New York Office Based Surgery Facilities, Plaintiff,
represented by Anant Kumar, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Cyril V. Smith,
Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Jason Samuel Cowart, Zuckerman, Spaeder
LLP, John William Leardi, Buttaci & Leardi, LLC & Donn Brian
Hufford, Zuckerman, Spaeder LLP.

Columbia East Side Surgery, P.C., Plaintiff, represented by Anant
Kumar, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP & Donn Brian Hufford, Zuckerman,
Spaeder LLP.

Podiatric OR of Midtown Manhattan, P.C., on its own behalf,
Plaintiff, represented by Anant Kumar, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP,
Cyril V. Smith, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, Jason Samuel Cowart,
Zuckerman, Spaeder LLP, John William Leardi, Buttaci & Leardi, LLC
& Donn Brian Hufford, Zuckerman, Spaeder LLP.

Dr. Jeffrey Adler, on its own behalf, Plaintiff, represented by
Anant Kumar, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP & Donn Brian Hufford,
Zuckerman, Spaeder LLP.

M.D, P.C. Albert B. Knapp, on its own behalf, Plaintiff,
represented by Anant Kumar, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP & Donn Brian
Hufford, Zuckerman, Spaeder LLP.

Dr. Darrick Antell, on its own behalf, Plaintiff, represented by
Anant Kumar, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP & Donn Brian Hufford,
Zuckerman, Spaeder LLP.

UnitedHealth Group Inc., Defendant, represented by Anton
Metlitsky, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, 1625 Eye Street, NW, New York
City, New York 20006, United States.

Brian David Boyle -bboyle@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP,
Danielle Carim Gray -- dgray@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers, LLP,
Gregory Frederick Jacob -- gjacob@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP
& Sloane Ackerman -- sackerman@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP
United HealthCare Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by Anton
Metlitsky, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, Brian David Boyle, O'Melveny &
Myers LLP, Danielle Carim Gray, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, Gregory
Frederick Jacob, O'Melveny & Myers LLP & Sloane Ackerman,
O'Melveny & Myers LLP.

United HealthCare Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by
Anton Metlitsky, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, Brian David Boyle,
O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Danielle Carim Gray, O'Melveny & Myers,
LLP, Gregory Frederick Jacob, O'Melveny & Myers LLP & Sloane
Ackerman, O'Melveny & Myers LLP.

United HealthCare Service LLC, Defendant, represented by Anton
Metlitsky, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, Brian David Boyle, O'Melveny &
Myers LLP, Danielle Carim Gray, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, Gregory
Frederick Jacob, O'Melveny & Myers LLP & Sloane Ackerman,
O'Melveny & Myers LLP.

Optum Group, LLC, Defendant, represented by Anton Metlitsky,
O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, Brian David Boyle, O'Melveny & Myers LLP,
Danielle Carim Gray, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, Gregory Frederick
Jacob, O'Melveny & Myers LLP & Sloane Ackerman, O'Melveny & Myers
LLP.

Optum, Inc., Defendant, represented by Anton Metlitsky, O'Melveny
& Myers, LLP, Brian David Boyle, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Danielle
Carim Gray, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, Gregory Frederick Jacob,
O'Melveny & Myers LLP & Sloane Ackerman, O'Melveny & Myers LLP.

Oxford Health Plans LLC, Defendant, represented by Anton
Metlitsky, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, Brian David Boyle, O'Melveny &
Myers LLP, Danielle Carim Gray, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP, Gregory
Frederick Jacob, O'Melveny & Myers LLP & Sloane Ackerman,
O'Melveny & Myers LLP.


UNIVERSAL ELECTRIC: Class Certification Sought in "Kotov" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned VIKTOR KOTOV, individually
and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated who were
employed by UNIVERSAL ELECTRIC MOTOR SERVICE, INC. and/or any
other entities affiliated with or controlled by UNIVERSAL ELECTRIC
MOTOR SERVICE, INC. v. UNIVERSAL ELECTRIC MOTOR SERVICE, INC.,
STEVEN ADZIMA, JOHN DOES 1-2 and JANE DOES 1-2, Case No. 2:17-cv-
01438-JMV-JBC (D.N.J.), asks the Court for an order:

   (1) certifying an "opt-out" class action consisting of all
       persons employed by the Defendants for the six (6) years
       preceding the commencement of this action until present,
       pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
       Procedure;

   (2) strictly in the alternative, certifying an "opt-in"
       collective action consisting all persons employed by the
       Defendants in the six (6) years preceding the commencement
       of this action until present, pursuant to the Fair Labor
       Standards Act;

   (3) providing a form of notice for all potential class
       members; and

   (4) ordering that the Defendants will produce to the
       Plaintiff's counsel the last known addresses all
       individuals that have worked for the Defendants for the
       six (6) years preceding the commencement of this action
       until present, within foutteen (14) days of the order.

The Court will commence a hearing on October 2, 2017, at 9:30
a.m., to consider the Motion.

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=5F8XWmt2

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Darius A. Marzec, Esq.
          MARZEC LAW FIRM, PC
          776A Manhattan Ave., Suite 104
          Brooklyn, NY 11222
          Telephone: (718) 609-0303
          Facsimile: (718) 841-7508
          E-mail: dmarzec@marzeclaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          James Lisovicz, Esq.
          KINNEY LISOVICZ REILLY & WOLFF PC
          299 Cherry Hill Road, Suite 300
          Parsippany, NJ 07054
          Telephone: (973) 957-2560
          Facsimile: (973) 710-1054
          E-mail: jim.lisovicz@klrw.law


US TOBACCO: Approval of Class Settlement Sought in "Speaks" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled TERESA M. SPEAKS, TOBY
SPEAKS, STANLEY SMITH, EDDIE BROWN, ROBERT POINDEXTER, MIKE
MITCHELL, ROY L. COOK, ALEX SHUGART, H. RANDLE WOOD, ROBIN ROGERS
and DANIEL LEE NELSON v. U.S. TOBACCO COOPERATIVE, INC. f/k/a
FLUE-CURED TOBACCO COOPERATIVE STABILIZATION CORPORATION, Case No.
5:12-cv-00729-D (E.D.N.C.), ask the Court to:

   (1) certify the class set forth in the parties' Stipulation of
       Settlement and Agreement of Class Action Compromise
       Settlement and Release dated September 6, 2017, for
       settlement purposes;

   (2) grant preliminary approval of the Settlement;

   (3) approve the form and means of dissemination of the Class
       Notice; and

   (4) set a Final Fairness Hearing for 120 days after
       preliminary approval.

A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at
http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=fLZioBYK

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Gary K. Shipman, Esq.
          William G. Wright, Esq.
          SHIPMAN & WRIGHT L.L.P.
          575 Military Cutoff Road, Suite 106
          Wilmington, NC 28405
          Telephone: (910) 762-1990
          Facsimile: (910) 762-6752
          E-mail: gshipman@shipmanlaw.com
                  wwright@shipmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Namon Leo Daughtry, Esq.
          DAUGHTRY, WOODARD, LAWRENCE & STARLING
          P.O. Drawer 1960
          Smithfield, NC 27577
          Telephone: (919) 934-5012
          Facsimile: (919) 934-9536
          E-mail: leodaughtry@hotmail.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Derek L. Shaffer, Esq.
          QUINN, EMANUEL, URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP
          777 6th Street NW, 11th Floor
          Washington, DC 20001
          Telephone: (202) 538-8000
          E-mail: derekshaffer@quinnemanuel.com

               - and -

          Lee M. Whitman, Esq.
          Paul J. Puryear, Esq.
          WYRICK, ROBBINS, YATES & PONTON, LLP
          4101 Lake Boone Trail, Suite 300
          Raleigh, NC 27607
          Telephone: (919) 781-4000
          E-mail: lwhitman@wyrick.com
                  ppuryear@wyrick.com


VIP SYSTEMS: Faces "Arguinzonez" Suit in S.D. of Florida
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against VIP Systems, Inc.
The case is styled as Oscar Ali Farrera Arguinzonez and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. VIP Systems, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 1:17-cv-23453-DPG (S.D. Fla., September 19, 2017).

VIP Systems specializes in fire safety, security and surveillance
equipment and services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jamie H. Zidell, Esq.
   300 71st Street, Suite 605
   Miami Beach, FL 33141
   Tel: (305) 865-6766
   Fax: 865-7167
   Email: ZABOGADO@AOL.COM


VOLKSWAGEN AG: October 30 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
------------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP on Sept. 12 issued the following statement:

To: All persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired
securities of Volkswagen AG ("Volkswagen") (OTCMKTS:VLKAY)
(OTCMKTS:VLKPY) between March 14, 2013 and July 26, 2017.  You are
hereby notified that a securities class action lawsuit has been
commenced in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey. To get more information go to:

http://www.zlk.com/plsra-c/volkswagen-ag?wire=3

or contact Joseph E. Levi, Esq. either via email at
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com or by telephone at (212) 363-7500, toll-
free: (877) 363-5972. There is no cost or obligation to you.

The complaint alleges that throughout the class period Defendants
issued materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed
to disclose that: (1) Volkswagen AG wrongfully colluded with other
auto manufacturers on a range of technical and pricing issues for
decades; (2) as a result, Volkswagen AG's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.  On July
21, 2017, Bloomberg reported that "BMW, Daimler and Volkswagen's
VW, Audi, Porsche brands met starting in the 1990s to coordinate
activities related to their vehicle technology, costs, suppliers
and strategy as well as emissions controls in diesel engines . .
."

If you suffered a loss in Volkswagen you have until October 30,
2017 to request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your
ability to share in any recovery doesn't require that you serve as
a lead plaintiff.

Levi & Korsinsky -- http:/www.zlk.com -- is a national firm with
offices in New York, California, Connecticut, and Washington D.C.
The firm's attorneys have extensive expertise and experience
representing investors in securities litigation, and have
recovered hundreds of millions of dollars for aggrieved
shareholders. [GN]


WD MASONRY: Refuses to Pay Overtime, "Austria" Class Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
FERNANDO AUSTRIA, on behalf of himself and other similarly
situated individuals v. WD MASONRY, L.L.C., WILLAIM MATHIS, AND
GUY KOONTZ, Case No. 3:17-cv-00624-JJB-EWD (M.D. La., September 7,
2017), alleges that the Defendants willfully refuse to pay
overtime to the Plaintiff and the collective action members, whom
he seeks to represent for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per
week.

WD Masonry is a limited liability company organized under the laws
of the state of Louisiana and is authorized to do and is doing
business in Louisiana.  Guy Koontz was the managing member of WD
Masonry.  William D. Mathis is a member of WD Masonry.

WD Masonry provides construction services throughout the greater
Baton Rouge area and elsewhere in Louisiana.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James R. Bullman, Esq.
          Daniel B. Davis, Esq.
          Randall E. Estes, Esq.
          ESTES DAVIS LAW, LLC
          850 North Boulevard
          Baton Rouge, LA 70802
          Telephone: (225) 336-3394
          Facsimile: (225) 384-5419
          E-mail: james@estesdavislaw.com
                  dan@estesdavislaw.com
                  randy@estesdavislaw.com


* Congress Holds Hearing on FCRA Liability Harmonization Act
------------------------------------------------------------
Thomas Ahearn, writing for ESR, reports that on September 7, 2017
-- ironically the same day nationwide credit reporting agency
Equifax announced it had suffered a massive data breach --
Congress held a hearing entitled "Legislative Proposals for a More
Efficient Federal Financial Regulatory Regime" to consider six
proposals including one called "The FCRA Liability Harmonization
Act" (H.R. 2359) that would amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) to limit damages related to class action lawsuits filed
under the FCRA.

Introduced by U.S. Representative Barry Loudermilk (R-Georgia),
the "The FCRA Liability Harmonization Act" amends the FCRA to
establish certain limits -- the lesser of $500,000 or one percent
of the net worth of the defendant -- on potential liability for
statutory damages.  The Act also eliminates punitive damages that
can awarded under the FCRA. Specifically, it amends Section 616 of
the FCRA (15 U.S.C. 1681n) and Section 617 of the FCRA (15 U.S.C.
1681o7).

(a) Willful Noncompliance. -- Section 616 of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681n) is amended -- (1) in subsection
(a) (A) by striking paragraph (2); (B) by redesignating paragraph
(3) as paragraph (2); and (C) in paragraph (1)(B), by inserting
"and" after the semicolon; (2) by redesignating subsection (d) as
subsection (e); and (3) by inserting after subsection (c) the
following new subsection: "(d) Class Action Lawsuits.  With
respect to a class action (as such term is defined in section 1711
of title 28, United States Code), or series of class actions
arising out of the same failure to comply of a person, brought by
consumers against a person who willfully fails to comply with any
requirement imposed under this title, such person is liable to
such consumers in such an amount as a court may determine, except
that "(1) the court may not apply a minimum amount of damages for
each member of the class; and "(2) the total recovery (excluding
reasonable attorney's fees as determined by the court) of the
class shall not exceed the lesser of "(A) $500,000; or "(B) 1
percent of the net worth of such person.".

(b) Negligent Noncompliance. -- Section 617 of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681o7) is amended by adding at the end
the following new subsection: "(c) Class Action Lawsuits.  With
respect to a class action (as such term is defined in section 1711
of title 28, United States Code), or series of class actions
arising out of the same failure to comply of a person, brought by
consumers against a person who negligently fails to comply with
any requirement imposed under this title, such person is liable to
such consumers in an amount equal to the sum of any actual damages
sustained by the consumers as a result of the failure, except that
the total recovery (excluding reasonable attorney's fees as
determined by the court) of the class shall not exceed the lesser
of "(1) $500,000; or "(2) 1 percent of the net worth of such
person.".

"I have seen how a small technical error, turned into a lawsuit,
can affect everyone in a business, including employees, customers,
and vendors.  Unfortunately, suits under the FCRA have skyrocketed
in recent years while leaving consumers inappropriately
compensated.  My bill protects both consumers and businesses by
bringing liability under the FCRA in line with other consumer
financial protection laws," Representative Loudermilk stated in a
press release.

Besides Representative Loudermilk, other Republican members of
Congress listed on the webpage for the hearing include U.S.
Representative Dave Trott (R-MI 11th District), U.S.
Representative Blaine Luetkemeyer (R-MO 3rd District), U.S.
Representative Ed Royce (R-CA 39th District), U.S. Representative
Claudia Tenney (R-NY 22nd District), and U.S. Representative
French Hill (R-AR 2nd District).

Enacted in 1970, the FCRA (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681) is federal
legislation that promotes the accuracy, fairness, and privacy of
consumer information contained in the files of consumer reporting
agencies (CRAs) and protects consumers from the willful or
negligent inclusion of inaccurate information in credit reports.
To that end, the FCRA also regulates the collection,
dissemination, and use of consumer information, including consumer
credit information. [GN]


* Wells Fargo, Equifax Cases Amplify Importance of Senate Bill 33
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Press Democrat reports that within hours after Equifax's
disclosure of a massive data breach involving Social Security
numbers, birth dates and other personal information for more than
140 million people, a class-action lawsuit was filed in federal
court, accusing the credit reporting company of failing to
maintain adequate safeguards for the consumer financial records it
stockpiles.

In the case of Wells Fargo, where employees under pressure to meet
aggressive sales quotas used customer data to create as many as
3.5 million unauthorized checking, savings and credit card
accounts, victims had to overcome mandatory arbitration clauses
before heading to court.

Wells Fargo eventually agreed to pay $185 million to settle a
class-action lawsuit filed on behalf of defrauded customers.

But efforts to bar the courthouse doors continue in Washington and
in the courts themselves.

Wells Fargo argued recently in a federal appeals court to end a
separate class-action suit, this one involving the bank's alleged
manipulation of overdraft fees, and move the matter into mandatory
arbitration, a private litigation system that generally puts
consumers at a disadvantage.

Meanwhile, the House of Representatives recently voted to overturn
a regulation promulgated by the federal Consumer Fraud Protection
Bureau that bars companies from denying groups of consumers the
option of going to court when they believe they have been treated
unfairly.  The rule and its protection will be lost if the Senate
concurs in the House vote.

All of that amplifies the importance of state Senate Bill 33,
which legislators approved and sent on to Gov. Jerry Brown.

The bill, introduced by state Sen. Bill Dodd of Napa, sets aside
mandatory arbitration agreements in disputes involving state- or
federally chartered depository institutions accused of creating
the contract in question without authorization.

SB 33 is narrower in scope than the Consumer Fraud Protection
Bureau regulation, but Brown should sign it to ensure that
California residents have a legitimate opportunity to recover
their losses in a fraud case involving a financial institution.

Some analysts believe the Wells Fargo scandal would have been
uncovered sooner if early complaints hadn't been quietly shuttled
off into private arbitration hearings.

That isn't the only reason to allow class-action lawsuits.  The
cost of individual litigation can easily exceed relatively small
losses, but class-actions spread those costs across a large group
of plaintiffs.  And, as Dodd noted in an interview, there is an
implicit bias against consumers in arbitration cases because the
arbitrator's fee is paid by the bank.

Another problem with class-action suits is that they come after
damage, be it an unethical business practice or inadequate
defenses against hackers, has been done.

As Richard Cordray, the director of the Consumer Fraud Protection
Bureau, wrote recently in the New York Times, banks themselves
have joined together to file class-action suits, including one
against Home Depot after its computers were hacked in 2014,
exposing credit accounts and other information. Why shouldn't
consumers have the same right? [GN]




                             *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Marion
Alcestis A. Castillon, Ma. Cristina Canson, Noemi Irene A. Adala,
Joy A. Agravantefor, Valerie Udtuhan, Julie Anne L. Toledo,
Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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