CAR_Public/170928.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


          Thursday, September 28, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 192



                            Headlines

A-CHECK AMERICA: Court Approves Class Settlement in "Smith"
ABRA AUTO: Collects Employee Biometric Data, "Fields" Suit Says
ACACIA COMMUNICATIONS: "Kebler" Sues Over Share Price Drop
AETNA INC: Non-discreet in HIV Prescriptions, Says "Doe" Suit
AMERICAN HONDA: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Katz" Class Suit

AMERICAN NATIONAL: "Duvall" Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Calls
APPLE INC: Selling Defective Headphones, Class Suit Says
AUDI AG: Barker et al. Sue over Vehicle Price-Fixing
BERNALILLO COUNTY, NM: Albuquerque Judges Face Class Suit
CAPRI INSTITUTE: NJ App. Div. Reverses Dismissal of "Stanley"

CARE ROADSIDE: "Coston " Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages & OT under FLSA
CASH BIZ: Can't Arbitrate Claims, Texas Justices Told
CENTRICSIT LLC: "Chachas" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay under FLSA
CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE: Settlement in "West" Has Preliminary Nod
CREDIT PROTECTION: Court Suggests Classes in "Lanteri"

CREDITORS ADJUSTMENT: "Hassas" Suit Disputes Collection Letter
CVS HEALTH: Florida, Illinois and Massachusetts Classes Certified
DUBUQUE, IA: Faces Legal Action Over Buses w/ Defective Engines
DYNAVAX TECHNOLOGIES: Securities Suit Dismissed w/ Leave to Amend
EAGLE COUNTY, CO: Judge Rejects Suit Opposing Drug Facility Dev't

EQUIFAX INC: Faces Biggest Litigation Threat from State AGs
EQUIFAX INC: NY Attorney General Began Probe over Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: "McGonnigal" Sues Over Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Joof" Suit in California Over Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Myers" Class Suit in Calif. Over Data Breach

EQUIFAX INC: Fails to Secure Consumers' Info, Morris Suit Claims
EQUIFAX INC: Fails to Secure Private Info, "Krawcyk" Suit Claims
EQUIFAX INC: "King" Suit Alleges FCRA Violations Over Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Raffin Sues Over Data Security Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Smart Sues Over Breach of Consumer Info in Calif.

EQUIFAX INC: Kuhns Files Securities Suit over Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Manaher" Suit over Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Smart" Suit over Consumer Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Myers" Suit over Data Breach Incident
EQUIFAX INC: "Neilan" Suit Moved to Northern District of Georgia

EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Santomauro" Suit in District of Columbia
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Spicer" Suit in Northern Dist. of California
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Abraham" Suit over Consumer Data Theft
EQUIFAX INC: Brandon Sues over Massive Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Brown" Suit in Northern Dist. of Georgia

EQUIFAX INC: Cary Sues over Consumer Data Theft
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Derby" Suit over Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Durham" Suit in Northern Dist. of Georgia
EQUIFAX INC: Fiore Sues over Cybersecurity Incident
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Kealy" Suit over Data Breach

EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Kuss" Suit over Massive Security Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Lapter" Suit over Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Lipchitz Sues over Consumer Data Theft
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Martin" Suit over Consumer Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Menzer" Suit over Data Breach

EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Pagliarulo" Suit over Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Barker" Suit in Northern Dist. of California
EQUIFAX INC: Pugliese Sues over Consumer Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Ruscitto Sues over Massive Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Samson" Suit over Cybersecurity Breach

EQUIFAX INC: Washburn Sues over Cybersecurity Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Wolf Sues over Data Security Breach
EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Accused by "Lang" Suit of Violating FCRA
EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Faces "Knepper" Class Suit Over Data Breach
EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Fails to Safeguard Info, "Kendall" Suit Says

EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Fails to Safeguard Info, "McCall" Suit Says
FCA US: Amended "Spratley" Defective TPMS Suit Partly Dismissed
GLASSDOOR INC: Can Compel Arbitration in Data Breach Suit
GODADDY.COM LLC: Schellenbach Appeals Decision to Ninth Circuit
GOOGLE INC: Faces Gender-Bias Class Action in San Francisco

HEADWATERS GROUP: Uncompensated "Elkins" for Overtime Hours
HSN INC: "McClure" Sues Over Proposed Sale to Liberty Interactive
KITE PHARMA: Shareholders Challenge $10.3 Billion Merger
KITE PHARMA: "Gordon" Suit Seeks to Block Gilead Merger
KROGER CO: Court Narrows Claims in "Perez" Consumer Suit

LAZ PARKING: Faces Class Action for Failing to Pay Overtime
LOW COUNTRY LAUNDRY: Faces "McNeil" Suit over Unpaid Wages
MARYLAND: Court Dismisses Claims Against Medical Defendants
NATIONAL OILWELL: Unpaid Overtime Premium Claimed by "Gammill"
NEW ORLEANS REGIONAL: Jones Seeks to Recover Minimum and OT Wages

NHCASH.COM LLC: Court Narrows Claims in "Hunter" FDCPA Suit
NHCASH.COM LLC: Court Stays "Hunter" Suit Pending Arbitration
NUTRACEUTICAL CORP: 9th Cir. Eases Time for Appeal of Rulings
NY THRUWAY AUTHORITY: Appeals Decision in Employees Local 72 Suit
NY THRUWAY AUTHORITY: Appeals Order in "Donohue" Suit to 2nd Cir.

O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE: "Weishaar" Suit Moved to E.D. Missouri
PEOPLE'S UNITED: Hit With CA for Wrongfully Charging Fees
PHILADELPHIA SCHOOL DISTRICT: Black Lacrosse Player Files Suit
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Lindenbaum Wants to Stop Calls to Consumers
POTESTIVO & ASSOCIATES: Court Narrows Claims in FDCPA Suit

PTZ INSURANCE: Court Denies Certification Bid in TCPA Suit
REPUBLIC SCHOOLS: Settles Lawsuit Over 'Spam' Text Messages
RESURGENT CAPITAL: Loses Bid to Dismiss FDCPA Suit
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Pushes to Arbitrate Overheating Phone Claims
SCOTTS MIRACLE-GRO: Seeks Return of Docs in Tainted Seed Suit

SEDGWICK CLAIMS: $2.5MM Overtime Settlement Granted Prelim OK
SEPTIC 2010: "Sok" Suit Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
SERVICE FINANCE: "Sparks" Remanded to New Jersey State Court
SOUTHEAST ALABAMA: "Carrigan" Suit Remanded to State Court
SPAN-AMERICA MEDICAL: Court Closes and Terminates "Berg" Suit

SYNCHRONY BANK: Fails to Properly Pay Workers, "Mason" Suit Claims
TANGOE INC: Jardin Files Suit Over Sale to Marlin Equity
TEXAS STANDARD: Accused by Munguia of Abusing OT Pay Standards
TIME WARNER: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of FCRA Suits
TOYOTA MOTOR: Dismissal of MCPA Claim in "Rosenbaum" Affirmed

U.S. AVIATION: March 5 Deadline to File Class Certification Bid
VIGO COUNTY: Remains Under Legal Pressure Over Jail
VOLKSWAGEN: Judge Bars States from Suing Over Emissions Scandal
WAL-MART STORES: Wants California Wage Suit to Stay Federal
WALMART STORES: Truck Drivers' Counsel Awarded $15.2MM in Fees

WAYNE COUNTY, MI: 6th Cir. Affirms Ruling in Strip Searches Suit
WELLS FARGO: Faces Class Action Over Biased Employment Practices
WELLS FARGO: Faces Suit over Discriminatory Employment Practices
YUMMY EARTH: "Sandoval" Suit Moved to Central Dist. of California
ZB N.A.: Court Withdraws Referral Bid in "Evans" Suit




                            *********


A-CHECK AMERICA: Court Approves Class Settlement in "Smith"
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement
and Attorney's Fees, Costs, and Class Representative Service
Payments in the case captioned JOHN SMITH, individually and as a
representative of the Class, Plaintiff, v. A-CHECK AMERICA INC.
d/b/a A-CHECK GLOBAL, Defendant, Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-1235
(JLL) (C.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff applied to work for Ricoh Logistics Corporation and was
offered a job.  As part of the application process, Ricoh obtained
a confidential background report regarding Plaintiff from
Defendant A-Check America Inc., a consumer reporting agency.
After receiving Plaintiff's background report, Ricoh contacted
Plaintiff and told him that he should not report for work on his
start date because of information contained in the report.

In the operative complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims on behalf of
himself and those similarly situated who were harmed by
Defendant's conduct. He alleges, inter alia, that Defendant
negligently and willfully violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA), 15 U.S.C. Section 1681c(a), by generating background
reports that contained one or more items of criminal information
which are non-convictions, where such information antedates the
report by more than seven years.

The settlement agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant defines
the settlement class as:

     "All Persons who were the subject of a background report
prepared by Defendant, whose report contained one or more items of
criminal information which were non-convictions, where such
information antedated the report by more than seven years, and
whose report was issued at any time to the date of execution of
this Agreement."

Parties have agreed to a settlement fund of $400,000.00. Class
Counsel seeks attorneys' fees in the amount of $133,333.33,
expense reimbursement in the amount of $17,224.22, a class
representative award of $3,500.00, and a settlement administrator
payment of $23,000.00 leaving a remainder of $222,942.45 to be
distributed among participating class members.

To approve the settlement at this stage, the Court must first find
it is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion
between, the negotiating parties. There is no evidence to suggest
the current settlement was the product of uninformed or collusive
negotiations. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of final approval.
Strength of the Plaintiff's Case and Future Risks

The strength of Plaintiff's claim under the FCRA appears strong.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the FCRA by producing
background reports that included information relating to non-
convictions that predated the reports by more than seven years. If
that allegation is true, Defendant appears to have violated the
FCRA.

Given the relative strength of Plaintiff's claim, and the risks
and costs associated with future complex litigation, the
settlement agreement terms appear to be reasonable. Hence, these
factors favor final approval.

Class Counsel stipulated to the Court that the settlement
agreement provides that the Court may reduce the attorneys' fees
award to an appropriate amount to afford the class a greater
recovery. Indeed, Paragraph 37 of the settlement agreement states,
"Should the Court decline to approve any requested payment, or
reduce such payment, the Settlement shall still be effective After
the reduction to the attorneys' fees award, participating class
members will be left with a remainder of approximately
$256,275.78, depending on the final administration costs."

The Court finds that the increased award is within the range of
reasonableness for this factor to favor final approval.

Extent of Discovery Taken in the Case

This factor requires the Court to evaluate whether the parties
have sufficient information to make an informed decision about
settlement. The parties litigated diligently for almost a year,
including filing a motion to dismiss, beginning formal discovery,
and engaging in a full-day mediation. Accordingly, the Court finds
this factor weighs in favor of final approval.

Experience and Views of Counsel

Class Counsel has ample experience litigating class actions
similar to this case and has demonstrated the ability to prosecute
vigorously on behalf of the class members. Class Counsel feels
that the settlement in this case is impressive when considering
the range of possible recoveries for the Class, the Defendant's
affirmative defenses, and the number of procedural hurdles between
Plaintiffs and final judgment. Accordingly, the Court finds this
factor weighs in favor of final approval.

Presence of a Governmental Participant

There is no governmental participant in this action. Thus, this
factor is irrelevant for the purposes of final approval.

Reaction of Class Members to the Settlement

The settlement administrator mailed notices to 2668 class members
and activated a settlement website and a toll-free telephone line
for Class Members. No class members requested to opt-out, none
objected to the settlement, and the reaction has been
overwhelmingly positive. Where the overwhelming majority of the
class willingly approved the offer and stayed in the class, there
is at least some objective positive commentary as to its fairness.
This factor, therefore, favors final approval of the settlement.

Balance of Factors

The Court finds that, after the reduction to the attorneys' fee
award, the balance of the factors favors final approval and that
the settlement agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Accordingly, the Court grants final approval of the settlement.

Approval of Notice Procedures

The Court previously accepted the proposed notice form and
administration procedures.  According to Corinne Lefler, a Senior
Project Manager for the settlement administrator, notice was
disseminated through procedures that were in conformity with the
Court's preliminary approval order.  Given Lefler's
representations, the Court finds that the Notice was reasonable as
to its content and the method of communication.

Accordingly, the Court approves the notice procedures.

Attorneys' Fees, Costs, Incentive Award, and Settlement
Administration Costs

Attorneys' Fees

Plaintiff seeks to employ the percentage-of-the-fund method,
whereby Class Counsel requests $133,333.33 or one-third of the
gross $400,000.00 settlement fund for attorneys' fees. When using
the percentage-of-the-fund method, courts typically set a
benchmark of 25% of the fund as a reasonable fee award, and
justify any increase or decrease from this amount based on
circumstances in the record.

Benchmark Departure Factors

Results Achieved

The statutory guidelines for FCRA violations provide that $100 is
the minimum award and that each class member could have
potentially been awarded up to $1000 had the class been successful
at trial. Class Counsel represents that, after attorneys' fees,
settlement administration costs, and the class representative
award are deducted, the average award per class member will be
approximately $114 for each class member that had criminal charges
on his or her report and $28 for each members that had outdated
traffic violations on his or her report.

These calculations appear inaccurate, as they do not consider that
Class Counsel is seeking an expense reimbursement of $17,224.22.
Regardless, even if the Court considers the inflated awards, the
results achieved remain at or below the low-end of the statutory
range. Indeed, results of this type appear to be quite common in
FCRA cases.

Accordingly, this factor weighs against a fee award above the 25%
benchmark.

Risks of Litigation

The Court, however, is not persuaded that these risks are more
significant than those presented in a typical FCRA case. As the
Court noted in its preliminary approval order, although Class
Counsel did assume some degree of risk by representing Plaintiff,
this case does not carry the type of extreme risk that would merit
a departure from the 25% benchmark.

Accordingly, this factor weighs against a fee award above the 25%
benchmark.

Skill and Quality of the Work

As noted in the preliminary approval order, the Court does not
doubt Class Counsel are skilled litigators. This case, however,
presents a simple dispute as to the willfulness of an FCRA
violation with few novel points of law and little distinguishing
it from the many others like it.

Accordingly, Class Counsel has not shown exceptional skill or
quality of work to warrant a departure from the 25% benchmark.
This factor, therefore, weighs against departing from the
benchmark.

Burdens Carried by Class Counsel

Class Counsel seeks a $17,224.22 expense reimbursement and the
lodestar figures show that Class Counsel spent 525.2 hours in
total on this case.  Such expenses, although significant, do not
appear to be unusual in FCRA class action cases. Thus, Class
Counsel has not established a significant burden to justify
departing from the 25% benchmark.

Lodestar Cross-Check

The lodestar is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the
prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a
reasonable hourly rate.

Class Counsel has provided information demonstrating the amount of
hours spent working on the case and the hourly rate of each
attorney. The total amount in attorneys' fees is $238,328.60,
resulting in a lodestar multiplier of 0.56. Three law firms served
as Class Counsel during the pendency of this lawsuit. The hourly
rates of their attorneys, paralegals, and support staff, as well
as the hours billed on this matter.

Nichols Kaster, PLLP

Class Counsel represents that the above figures establish that
Nichols Kaster's lodestar is $46,285.

Berger & Montague, PC

Class Counsel represents that the above figures establish that
Berger & Montague's lodestar is $187,496.10.

Tatar Law Firm, AP

   Timekeeper          Position Hourly Rate Hours Billed
   ----------          -------- ----------- ------------
   Stephanie R. Tatar Principle $425.00          10.7

Class Counsel represents that the above figures establish that
Tatar Law's lodestar is $4,547.50.

The Court grants the motion for final approval of the settlement.
The Court grants in part and denies in part the motion for
attorneys' fees, expenses, incentive award, and settlement
administrator payment. Class Counsel's request for attorneys' fees
in the amount of $133,333.33 is denied. Instead, the Court grants
Class Counsel's attorneys' fees of no more than $100,000.00. All
other administrative costs are approved.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 18, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y88s3dd6from Leagle.com.

John Smith, Plaintiff, represented by Eleanor Emmons Frisch --
efrisch@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster PLLP.

John Smith, Plaintiff, represented by E. Michelle Drake --
emdrake@bm.net -- Berger and Montague PC, pro hac vice, James A.
Francis, Francis and Mailman PC, 100 South Broad Street, Suite
1902 | Philadelphia, PA 19110, pro hac vice, Joseph C. Hashmall --
jhashmall@bm.net -- Berger and Montague PC, pro hac vice, Lauren
K.W. Brennan -- lbrennan@consumerlawfirm.com -- Francis and
Mailman PC, pro hac vice, Robert F. Brennan, Law Offices of Robert
F Brennan APC, 2103 Montrose Ave, Ste D, Montrose, CA 91020  &
Stephanie R. Tatar -- stephanie@thetatarlawfirm.com -- Tatar Law
Firm APC.

A-Check America Inc., Defendant, represented by Jonathan Lawrence
Brophy -- Jbrophy@Seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Timothy L.
Hix, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Pamela Q. Devata, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 131 S
Dearborn St # 2400, Chicago, IL 60603, USA pro hac vice & Monica
A. Rodriguez -- morodriguez@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP.


ABRA AUTO: Collects Employee Biometric Data, "Fields" Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
RANDY FIELDS, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. ABRA AUTO BODY & GLASS LP and KRONOS,
IN CORPORA TED., the Defendants, Case No. 2017-CH-12271 (Ill. Cir.
Ct., Sep. 8, 2017), seeks declaratory relief, injunctive and
equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests of
Plaintiff and the Class by requiring Defendants to comply with the
Biometric information Privacy Act's requirements for the
collection, storage, and use of biometric identifiers and
biometric information.

According to the complaint, Abra uses a biometric time tracking
system that requires employees to use their fingerprints as a
means of authentication. When Illinois employees begin their
employment at Abra, they are required to scan their fingerprints
and are enrolled in the Kronos employee database. Defendants do
not provide a publicly available retention schedule or guidelines
for permanently destroying its employees' biometric identifiers
and biometric information as specified by BIPA. By negligently,
recklessly or willfully collecting, storing, and using Plaintiffs
and the Class's biometric identifiers and biometric information,
Defendants violated Plaintiffs and the Class's rights to privacy
in their biometric identifiers or biometric information as set
forth in BIPA.

Abra Auto Body is based in Brooklyn Park, Minnesota and operates
auto body and glass repair shops in Illinois and in this
Circuit.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew C. Ficzko, Esq.
          Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
          James B. Zouras, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          205 N. Michigan Avenue, Suite 2560
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 233 1550
          Facsimile: (312) 233 1560
          E-mail: lawyers@stephanzouras.com


ACACIA COMMUNICATIONS: "Kebler" Sues Over Share Price Drop
----------------------------------------------------------
Chris Kebler, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Acacia Communications, Inc., Murugesan
Shanmugaraj and John F. Gavin, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-11695,
(D. Mass., September 7, 2017), seeks compensatory damages,
reasonable costs and expenses incurred in this action, including
counsel fees and expert fees and such equitable/injunctive or
other relief under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Acacia designs, develops, manufactures and markets high-speed
coherent optical interconnect products for cloud infrastructure
operators and content and communication service providers.

Its 2017 second quarter financial results were adversely affected
by the quality issue regarding a circuit board cleaning process,
notes the complaint. As it experienced supply constraints as
capacity was used to both build replacement units and to meet new
demand from customers, Acacia reported second quarter earnings per
share of $0.17-$0.20 on revenues of $77-$79 million, far lower
than the $0.31 on $91 million in revenues the market had been led
to expect.

On this news, the price of Acacia common stock declined from its
close of $41.62 per share on July 13, 2017 to close at $39 per
share on July 14, 2017, on unusually high volume of more than 3.5
million shares traded. Kebler acquired Acacia securities and has
lost substantially. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Alan L. Kovacs, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF ALAN L. KOVACS
      257 Dedham Street
      Newton, MA 02461
      Telephone: (617) 964-1177
      Fax: (617) 332-1223

             - and -

      SAMUEL H. RUDMAN MARY K. BLASY
      ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
      58 South Service Road, Suite 200
      Melville, NY 11747
      Telephone: (631) 367-7100
      Fax: (631) 367-1173

             - and

      Frank J. Johnson, Esq.
      JOHNSON FISTEL, LLP
      600 West Broadway, Suite 1540
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Telephone: (619) 230-0063
      Fax: (619) 255-1856

             - and -

      Michael I. Fistel, Jr., Esq.
      JOHNSON FISTEL, LLP
      40 Powder Springs Street
      Marietta, GA 30064
      Telephone: (770) 200-3104
      Fax: (770) 200-3101


AETNA INC: Non-discreet in HIV Prescriptions, Says "Doe" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
John Doe, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Aetna Inc., Aetna Health and Life
Insurance Company; Aetna Insurance Company of Connecticut and
Aetna Health of California Inc., Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-
05191, (N.D. Cal., September 7, 2017), seeks damages, including
statutory and/or punitive damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs and expenses and other and further relief under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.

Aetna caters to HIV patients and mail-orders their HIV medicines.
However, HIV medication prescriptions are sent in an opaque
envelope with a large transparent glassine window clearly
indicating the name of the patient, thus failing to respect the
privacy rights of people who are taking HIV-medications, says the
complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Laurence D. King, Esq.
      Linda M. Fong, Esq.
      Matthew B. George, Esq.
      Mario M. Choi, Esq.
      KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
      350 Sansome Street, Suite 400
      San Francisco, CA 94104
      Telephone: (415) 772-4700
      Facsimile: (415) 772-4707
      Email: lking@kaplanfox.com
             lfong@kaplanfox.com
             mgeorge@kaplanfox.com
             mchoi@kaplanfox.com


AMERICAN HONDA: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Katz" Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Samuel Katz filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit entitled Samuel Katz v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., et
al., Case No. 2:15-cv-04410-CBM-RAO, in the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California, Los Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Hon.
Consuelo B. Marshall denied the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification in the lawsuit.  In the Motion, the Plaintiff sought
to certify a class defined as:

     All individuals in the U.S. whose cellphone number(s) were
     called by or on behalf of Defendants, where such call(s)
     were made between October 16, 2013 and the present, were
     placed by Survey Sampling International, LLC, and were made
     pursuant to Defendants' Acura Client Excellence Program.

The appellate case is captioned as Samuel Katz v. American Honda
Motor Co., Inc., et al., Case No. 17-80190, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner SAMUEL KATZ, individually and on behalf of a
class of similarly situated individuals, is represented by:

          Evan M. Meyers, Esq.
          MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
          161 N. Clark Street, 47th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 216-5179
          E-mail: emeyers@mcgpc.com

               - and -

          Suzanne Lucille Havens Beckman, Esq.
          David C. Parisi, Esq.
          PARISI & HAVENS LLP
          212 Marine Street
          Santa Monica, CA 90405
          Telephone: (818) 990-1299
          E-mail: shavens@parisihavens.com
                  dcparisi@parisihavens.com

Defendants-Respondents AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., a
California corporation, and JD POWER AND ASSOCIATES, a Delaware
corporation, are represented by:

          Michael Lawrence Mallow, Esq.
          SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
          555 West 5th Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90013
          Telephone: (213) 896-6000
          E-mail: Mmallow@Sidley.com

Defendant-Respondent AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., a California
corporation, is represented by:

          Eric S. Mattson, Esq.
          SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
          1 South Dearborn Street
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 853-7000
          E-mail: emattson@sidley.com


AMERICAN NATIONAL: "Duvall" Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Calls
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Nick Duvall, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. American National Insurance Company,
Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-00269 (S.D. Tex., September 7, 2017),
seeks actual and statutory damages, injunction requiring Defendant
and its agent to cease all unsolicited telephone calling
activities, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on monetary
relief, reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs in this action
and all other and further relief under the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

Defendant is a large insurance company operating in Texas and
utilizes a telephone dialing system to call individuals en masse
to promote its products. Defendant contacted Plaintiff on his
cellular telephone number throughout the months of July and August
2017, without first obtaining Plaintiff's prior express written
consent. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     W. Craft Hughes, Esq.
     Jarrett L. Ellzey, Esq.
     HUGHES ELLZEY, LLP
     2700 Post Oak Blvd., Ste. 1120
     Galleria Tower I
     Houston, TX 77056
     Phone: (713) 554-2377
     Fax: (888) 995-3335
     Email: craft@hughesellzey.com
            jarrett@hughesellzey.com


APPLE INC: Selling Defective Headphones, Class Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
federal class action in Oakland, Calif., accuses Apple of selling
defective, and expensive, Powerbeats headphones.

The case is captioned, DEONN MORGAN, LYDIA ZEPEDA, SOPHIA IVY,
KELLY OKOROCHA, and JENNIFER ZIELINSKI, individually and on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
Apple Inc., Defendant, Case No. 4:17-cv-05277 (N.D. Cal.,
September 9, 2017).

Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Classes:

     Hassan A. Zavareei, Esq.
     Sophia J. Goren, Esq.
     Kyra A. Taylor, Esq.
     TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
     1828 L Street, NW, Suite 1000
     Washington, DC 20036
     Telephone: (202) 973 -- 0900
     Facsimile: (202) 973 -- 0950
     E-mail: hzavareei@tzlegal.com
             sgoren@tzlegal.com
             ktaylor@tzlegal.com

          - and --

     Annick Persinger, Esq.
     TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
     483 Ninth St, Suite 200
     Oakland, CA 94607
     Telephone: (510) 254 -- 6808
     Facsimile: (202) 973 -- 0950
     E-mail: apersinger@tzlegal.com

          - and --

     E. Powell Miller, Esq.
     THE MILLER LAW FIRM, P.C.
     950 West University Drive, Suite 300
     Rochester, MI 48307
     Tel: 248-841-2200
     Fax: 248-652-2852
     E-mail: epm@miller.law

          - and --

     Greg F. Coleman, Esq.
     GREG COLEMAN LAW
     First Tennessee Plaza
     800 S. Gay Street, Suite 1100
     Knoxville, TN 37929
     Tel: (865) 247 -- 0080
     E-mail: greg@gregcolemanlaw.com


AUDI AG: Barker et al. Sue over Vehicle Price-Fixing
----------------------------------------------------
SIMON BARKER, MARY KATHLENE HARMON, and HOLLY BUFFINTON, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs,
v. AUDI AG, AUDI OF AMERICA, INC., AUDI OF AMERICA, LLC,
BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE AG, BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC,
DAIMLER AG, MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, MERCEDES-BENZ U.S.
INTERNATIONAL, INC., MERCEDESBENZ VANS, LLC, DR. ING. H.C.F.
PORSCHE AG, PORSCHE CARS OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., VOLKSWAGEN AG,
VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., and BENTLEY MOTORS LIMITED, the
Defendants, Case No. 9:17-cv-81021-RLR (S.D. Fla., Sep. 8, 2017),
seeks damages, injunctive relief, and other relief pursuant to
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, state unfair competition, consumer
protection, and unjust enrichment laws.

This action arises from two decades of concerted activity by
Defendants -- the five largest and most profitable German
automobile manufacturers -- to unlawfully fix the prices of German
Passenger Vehicles, stifle innovation, reduce competition, and
mislead American consumers, all for the purpose of increasing
their market shares and their financial bottom lines. In
furtherance of their grand conspiracy, Defendants erected a
metaphorical smokescreen, which was intended to -- and, in fact,
did -- deceive American consumers into believing that the inflated
prices of their automobiles were the product of "superior German
engineering" rather than illegal, anti-competitive conduct.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent all persons and entities who,
between January 1, 1996 and the present, purchased or leased a
"German Passenger Vehicle," in the United States primarily for
personal, non-commercial use.

Audi AG is a German corporation with its principal place of
business in Ingolstadt, Germany.  Audi AG is the parent company of
Audi of America, Inc. and Audi of America, LLC and is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Volkswagen AG.  Audi AG designed, developed,
manufactured, and/or sold German Passenger Vehicles throughout
Florida and the United States.  Audi AG directs the activities of
its subsidiaries which act as its agents in marketing and selling
German Passenger Vehicles throughout the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Andrew Bennett Spark, Esq.
          SPARKLAW
          9654 W. Hillsborough Ave., No. 187
          Tampa, FL 33626
          Telephone: (941) 321 5927
          Facsimile: (813) 441 1117
          E-mail: abspark@msn.com

               - and -

          Joshua H. Grabar, Esq.
          GRABAR LAW OFFICE
          1735 Market Street, Suite 3750
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (267) 507 6085
          E-mail: jgrabar@grabarlaw.com

               - and -

          Marc H. Edelson, Esq.
          EDELSON & ASSOCIATES, LLC
          3 Terry Drive, Suite 205
          Newtown, PA 18940
          Telephone: (215) 867 2399
          Facsimile: (267) 685 0676
          E-mail: medelson@edelson-law.com


BERNALILLO COUNTY, NM: Albuquerque Judges Face Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Victoria Priescop, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that New Mexico's Chief Public Defender has filed a class action
in Albuquerque against the judges of Bernalillo County
Metropolitan Court, which covers Albuquerque, for failing to
release felony detainees who wait more than 10 days before being
seen by a judge.

A Bernalillo County judicial rule states that people accused of
felony offenses must be given a preliminary examination within 10
days if they're in custody, or 60 days if they are not, or the
case against them must be dismissed without prejudice and the
defendant released.

But lead plaintiffs Dairon Romero and Dustin Jessamine were held
in custody for weeks without a preliminary examination before
their cases were dismissed, and the 37-page complaint lists many
other current and recent cases where defendants were held well
past the 10-day limit before their felony cases were dismissed.

The petition for a writ of mandamus enforcing the preliminary
examination rule was filed on September 11, by Bennett Baur, the
state's Chief Public Defender, against the judges in charge of
Romero's and Jessamine's cases and all other Bernalillo Metro
judges who have violated the rule.

Baur is no stranger to confrontation with New Mexico's courts. In
December 2016, he was held in contempt of court and fined $5,000
for refusing to represent clients in five criminal cases. Baur
said he turned down the cases because the strained resources of
the Public Defender's Office prevented his staff from adequately
representing the clients.

Baur's predecessor, Jorge Alvarado, resigned in March 2016, citing
inadequate funding and "resistance" and interference that kept him
from doing his job. He cited low pay for staff attorneys and
contract attorneys. According to the NMPoliticalReport.com,
Alvarado asked for a large funding increase for the year he
resigned, but his office was funded with less than $1 million.

Now Baur says in his complaint in Bernalillo County Court that
Albuquerque's metro judges have no consistent system to identify
cases which are approaching or have passed the time limit for
preliminary examinations.

For a while, Baur's office would submit daily lists to Bernalillo
Country Metropolitan Court Chief Judge Edward Benavidez, who would
dismiss cases which passed the 10-day limit. But Benavidez never
addressed cases that had passed the 60-day limit, and eventually
stopped dismissing any cases, Baur says.  He seeks a writ of
supervisory control ordering the judges to implement the dismissal
rule immediately.

The petition was filed by Assistant Public Defender Alan Wagman.


CAPRI INSTITUTE: NJ App. Div. Reverses Dismissal of "Stanley"
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Mitchel E. Ostrer of the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division, reversed the trial court's dismissal with
prejudice of the case captioned OSEMARY STANLEY, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
CAPRI TRAINING CENTER, INC., d/b/a CAPRI INSTITUTE, Defendant-
Respondent, No. A-4175-15T4 (N.J. Super. App. Div.), for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Defendant operates four cosmetology schools in New Jersey.
Each school has a clinic that provides cosmetology services to the
general public in exchange for a fee paid to the Defendant.  The
services are primarily and/or exclusively provided by the
Defendant's unlicensed cosmetology students.  In 2011 and 2012,
the Plaintiff visited one of the clinics where she received and
paid the Defendant for various cosmetology services.

The Plaintiff alleges that the fees she and other putative class
members paid the Defendant for cosmetology services exceeded those
permitted under the Cosmetology and Hairstyling Act of 1984.  More
particularly, she alleges N.J.S.A. 45:5B-3(h) bars a cosmetology
school clinic from charging the general public fees that exceed
the amount required to recoup the costs of the materials used in
the performance of the services.  The Plaintiff alleges the
Defendant charged her and the putative class members fees that
exceeded the costs of the materials used to provide the
cosmetology services they received.

Based on those facts, the Plaintiff's complaint alleges four
causes of action: violation of the Consumer Fraud Act; violation
of the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act; breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and unjust
enrichment.

The Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and requested oral
argument.  It appears the Defendant argued in its papers that the
Plaintiff's claims turned on an interpretation of what constitutes
the cost of materials under N.J.S.A. 45:5B-3(h), and therefore the
New Jersey Board of Cosmetology and Hairstyling had exclusive
jurisdiction over the claims.

The trial court did not hear oral argument, but issued an order
granting the dismissal motion.  The order was untethered to any
findings or conclusions of law other than a notation on the order
stating per N.J.S.A. 56:8-140 and N.J.A.C. 13:28-6.1, the Board
has jurisdiction and there is no private cause of action.

The Plaintiff appealed the order dismissing the complaint, arguing
that the trial court erred to the extent it determined the Board
has exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims.  The Appellate
Court granted the Association of Cosmetology and Hairstyling
Schools of New Jersey, Inc. and the Robert Fiance Beauty Schools,
Inc. leave to appear as amicus curiae.

Judge Ostrer held that the Act and the Uniform Enforcement Act do
not include any express grant of exclusive authority to the Board
over the Plaintiff's statutory and common law claims.  Under the
principles in Campione v. Adamar, Boldt v. Correspondence Mgmt.,
Inc., and Smerling v. Harrah's Entm't, Inc., the Judge therefore
is constrained to reverse the trial court's order based on its
apparent determination that the Board has exclusive jurisdiction
over the Plaintiff's statutory and common law claims.

Because the Judge has determined the trial court erred by
dismissing the complaint based on its erroneous determination that
the Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's claims,
on remand, the trial court will consider whether to invoke the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction based on the factors relevant to
that determination as defined by our Supreme Court in Estate of
Kotsovska.  If it determines to invoke the doctrine, it will stay
its proceeding pending the Board's determination of any issues the
trial court in its discretion finds the Board should resolve in
the first instance.

Judge Ostrer offers no opinion as to whether the trial court
should invoke the doctrine; that determination must be made by the
trial court.  The court, however, will make detailed findings of
fact and conclusions of law supporting its decision on the issue.

It appears the trial court also dismissed the complaint based on a
determination that N.J.S.A. 56:8-140 bars the Plaintiff's claims,
Judge Ostrer finds.  The court's order vaguely states that the
dismissal was required as per N.J.S.A. 56:8-140 and N.J.A.C.]
13:28-6.1.  In sum, he is convinced the court erred in dismissing
the complaint based on its apparent determination that the Board
had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the Plaintiff's causes of
action and its clear determination that the Plaintiff's claims
were legally barred under N.J.S.A. 56:8-140 and N.J.A.C. 13:28-
6.1.

Accordingly, Judge Ostrer remanded for further proceedings for the
trial court to consider and decide, with detailed findings and
conclusions of law, whether it should invoke the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.  The Appellate Court does not retain
jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 12, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/14eZE9 from Leagle.com.

DeNittis Osefchen, PC, attorneys for appellant (Stephen P.
DeNittis -- sdenittis@denittislaw.com -- and Joseph A. Osefchen,
on the briefs).

Bielan, Miklos & Makrogiannis, PC, attorneys for respondent
(Judith Q. Bielan and Robert H. Benacchio, on the brief).

Gibbons P.C., attorneys for amicus curiae Association of
Cosmetology and Hairstyling Schools of New Jersey, Inc., and
Robert Fiance Beauty Schools, Inc. (Michael R. McDonald --
mmcdonald@gibbonslaw.com --and Jennifer Marino Thibodaux, on the
brief).


CARE ROADSIDE: "Coston " Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages & OT under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
SHAWN COSTON, Individually and on behalf of all those Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, v. CARE ROADSIDE SERVICE, LLC, and
GREGORY MILLER, Jointly and Severally, the Defendants, Case No.
1:17-cv-03462-LMM (N.D. Ga., Sep. 8, 2017), seeks to recover
unpaid minimum wages and overtime premium pay, pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff worked for Care Roadside
Service as a roadside assistance technician. The Plaintiff was not
paid minimum wages and overtime wages for all hours worked,
despite working well in excess of 40 hours per week throughout his
employment.

Defendant operate a roadside assistance company called Care
Roadside Service, LLC.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brandon A. Thomas, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF BRANDON A. THOMAS, PC
          1800 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 300
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 343 2441
          Facsimile: (404) 352 5636
          E-mail: brandon@brandonthomaslaw.com


CASH BIZ: Can't Arbitrate Claims, Texas Justices Told
-----------------------------------------------------
Michelle Casady, writing for Law360, reports that when payday
lender Cash Biz LP filed criminal charges against borrowers for
allegedly writing bad checks it substantively invoked the judicial
process, and it can't now try to force into arbitration a would-be
class action malicious prosecution lawsuit from those borrowers,
the Texas Supreme Court was told in oral arguments on September
15.

For the first time in more than a decade, the Texas Supreme Court
heard oral arguments at the University of Houston Law Center.
Twice each year, Chief Justice Nathan Hecht explained to the
auditorium where law students and professors had gathered, the
court hears arguments in a venue outside of the court's home base
in Austin.

Daniel Dutko, arguing on behalf of the borrowers, told the court
Cash Biz is trying to "have it both ways" by arguing that the
criminal cases had nothing to do with the underlying debts of his
clients.

Justice Eva Guzman asked if there had been other criminal conduct,
like fraud, underlying the complaints filed against hundreds of
clients, if that would make a difference. Dutko responded that
there is simply no evidence in the record that any of his clients
committed fraud and argued the criminal cases were all "bad-check
cases."

"Cash Biz seems to take some pride in the fact that they never
sought civil relief, the problem with that is they didn't have to,
they got paid back by going to the criminal courts," he argued.
"They didn't need to seek civil relief because they went to the
criminal courts, they had the district attorney file charges on
their behalf, they then call [my clients] and threaten them, and
say 'haha we're going to put you in jail,' and they got paid
back."

Justice Guzman asked Edward Hubbard, who argued on behalf of Cash
Biz, if the arbitration clause is broadly written to say all
disputes must go to arbitration, why Cash Biz wasn't required to
go through arbitration before going to criminal courts "if what
we're talking about is the check that was given to you when you
gave them the loan."

Hubbard said he would begin with the "if" Guzman mentioned.

"There is no evidence in the record as to what actually all of
these criminal complaints were . . . . there's no actual evidence
as to whether these were all bad-check claims," he said. "You
don't arbitrate criminal proceedings. If there is a belief that
there is criminal activity, a citizen can go and take that
complaint to the district attorney while at the same time seeking
civil relief. All we did is refer a criminal complaint."

Hubbard told the court there's no evidence that in filing the
criminal complaints Cash Biz received a benefit in this lawsuit.

"They're alleging that what we did there created this lawsuit," he
argued. "And that's not a benefit."

The borrowers argued in an October 2016 petition for review that
Cash Biz can't enforce an arbitration provision and class action
waiver in their lending agreements after the company pursued
criminal charges against hundreds of them for allegedly writing
bad checks, and say they should be able to move forward with a
class action for alleged malicious prosecution, fraud and
violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Texas
Finance Code.

According to court documents, Cash Biz filed the criminal
complaints against the former borrowers when the lender could not
cash post-dated checks they had written at the time they took out
loans. The Texas Office of Consumer Credit Commissioner fined the
company $10,000.

A Bexar County District Judge in July 2015 denied Cash Biz's
motion to compel arbitration and enforce the class action waiver,
saying in an order Cash Biz had illegally used the criminal
justice system to enforce civil debts. The judge found the
borrowers' allegations relate solely to the company's use of the
criminal justice system, which she said happened after the lending
agreements had expired, and that because all damages at issue in
the case are related to criminal fines, jail time and lost
reputation related to the borrowers' criminal convictions, the
arbitration clauses and class action waivers are not applicable.

In a 2-1 decision, a Fourth Court of Appeals panel in July 2016
reversed that ruling and ordered the cases to arbitration. The
majority said no Texas case law addresses the specific issue of
whether the filing of a criminal complaint constitutes substantial
invocation of a judicial process sufficient to waive arbitration
in a civil suit, but concluded Cash Biz's criminal complaints did
not rise to the extent of "active engagement in litigation" that
Texas courts have held to be inconsistent with a right to
arbitrate.

Cash Biz is represented by Patrick Gaas, Esq. --
pgaas@coatsrose.com -- and Edward Hubbard, Esq. --
ehubbard@coatsrose.com -- of Coats Rose PC.

The borrowers are represented by Daniel Dutko, Esq. of Hanszen
LaPorte LLP.

The case is Henry et al. v. Cash Biz LP et al., case number 16-
0854, in the Texas Supreme Court. [GN]


CENTRICSIT LLC: "Chachas" Suit Seeks Overtime Pay under FLSA
------------------------------------------------------------
MARY CHACHAS AND ANGELA MOSLEY, individually, and on behalf of
others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. CENTRICSIT, LLC, the
Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-03434-SCJ (N.D. Ga., Sep. 8, 2017),
seeks to recover monetary damages, liquidated damages, and costs,
including reasonable attorney's fees, as a result of Defendant's
willful violations of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act

According to the complaint, the Defendant violated the FLSA
overtime requirement by misclassifying Plaintiffs and other
members of the FLSA Collective as salary-exempt employees and
paying them a fixed weekly salary, without overtime pay calculated
at time-and-a-half of their regular rates of pay for each hour
worked in excess of 40 in a workweek.

CentricsIT LLC provides technical support service, IT hardware
maintenance on various products to customers worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Roger W. Orlando, Esq.
          THE ORLANDO FIRM, P.C.
          315 West Ponce de Leon Avenue, Suite 400
          Decatur, GA 30030
          Telephone: (404) 373 1800
          Facsimile: (404) 373 6999
          E-mail: roger@OrlandoFirm.com

               - and -

          Jason T. Brown, Esq.
          Nicholas Conlon, Esq.
          JTB LAW GROUP, LLC
          155 2nd Street, Suite 4
          Jersey City, NJ 07302
          Telephone: (201) 630 0000
          Facsimile: (855) 582 5297
          E-mail: jtb@jtblawgroup.com
                  nicholasconlon@jtblawgroup.com


CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE: Settlement in "West" Has Preliminary Nod
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Frank D. Whitney of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division, granted the
Parties' Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of a Settlement in
the case captioned MARK WEST, RICKIE DON BASH, RAYNARD STEWART
MOORE, SHARLENE KNIGHT, ANNA MARIE ROSS, BRUCE ADAMS, BRIAN
THOMPSON, MICHAEL MCMANUS, STEVEN PRICE, CARL HARVELL, STACIA
ANDREA WILKES, and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE, INC., et al., Defendants, No. 3:16-cv-
00502-FDW-DSC (W.D. N.C.).

This Action was brought by the Plaintiffs asserting claims for
alleged violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, as amended, ("ERISA") against the Defendants.  The
parties filed their Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval.

Having considered the Parties' Joint Motion for Preliminary
Approval and the Settlement Agreement, Judge Whitney preliminarily
approved the Settlement. The Fairness Hearing is set for Feb. 5,
2018, at 2:00 p.m.

Judge Whitney approved the form and content of the Supplemental
Class Action Notice.  He directed that the Defendants will within
10 calendar days of the entry of his Order cause the Supplemental
Class Action Notice, with such non-substantive modifications
thereto as may be agreed upon by the Parties, to be disseminated
to the last known address of each Class Member who can be
identified by reasonable effort.

At or before the Fairness Hearing, the Defendants will file with
the Court a proof of timely compliance with the mailing
requirements.  Any Objector must file with the Court all papers
and briefs they propose to discuss at the Fairness Hearing.  The
Objector must also mail the objection and all supporting law
and/or evidence to counsel for the Parties.

The addresses for filing objections with the Court and service on
counsel are as follows: Court Clerk, U.S. District Court Charles
R. Jonas Federal Building 401 West Trade Street Charlotte, NC
28202 CLASS COUNSEL Norris A. Adams, II Essex Richards, P.A. 1701
South Boulevard Charlotte, NC 28203 Defendants' Counsel Susan P.
Dion McGuireWoods LLP 201 N. Tryon Street Suite 3000 Charlotte, NC
28202.

The Objector, or, if represented by counsel, his, her, or its
counsel, must both effect service of the objection on counsel
listed and file the objection with the Court at least 21 calendar
days prior to the Fairness Hearing, or by no later than Jan. 15,
2018.  The Objectors or their attorneys intending to appear at the
Fairness Hearing must effect service of a "Notice of Intention to
Appear," and a statement of how long the Objector anticipates
needing to present the objection to the Court, and file it with
the Court at least 21 calendar days prior to the Fairness Hearing,
or by no later than Jan. 15, 2018.  The Objector must also mail
the "Notice of Intention to Appear" to counsel for the Parties.
The Parties will respond to any Objector at least seven calendar
days prior to the Fairness Hearing or by no later than Jan. 29,
2018.

All expenses incurred in disseminating the Supplemental Class
Action Notice and locating corrected addresses for any
Supplemental Class Action Notices returned as undeliverable will
be paid by the Defendants, as set forth in the Settlement
Agreement.

The Class Counsel will file a Motion for Final Approval of the
Settlement, application for an award of fees and costs, and all
briefs and supporting papers, at least 28 calendar days prior to
the Fairness Hearing, or by no later than Jan. 8, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 12, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/KchUMM from Leagle.com.

Mark West, Plaintiff, represented by Caitlin Hale Walton --
CWalton@essexrichards.com -- Essex Richards.

Mark West, Plaintiff, represented by Edward G. Connette --
EConnette@EssexRichards.com -- Essex Richards, PA & Norris Arden
Adams, II -- nadams@essexrichards.com.

Rickie Don Bash, Plaintiff, represented by Caitlin Hale Walton,
Essex Richards, Edward G. Connette, Essex Richards, PA & Norris
Arden Adams, II.

Raynard Stewart Moore, Plaintiff, represented by Caitlin Hale
Walton, Essex Richards, Edward G. Connette, Essex Richards, PA &
Norris Arden Adams, II.

Anna Marie Ross, Plaintiff, represented by Caitlin Hale Walton,
Essex Richards, Edward G. Connette, Essex Richards, PA & Norris
Arden Adams, II.

Bruce Adams, Plaintiff, represented by Caitlin Hale Walton, Essex
Richards, Edward G. Connette, Essex Richards, PA & Norris Arden
Adams, II.

Brian Thompson, Plaintiff, represented by Caitlin Hale Walton,
Essex Richards, Edward G. Connette, Essex Richards, PA & Norris
Arden Adams, II.

Michael McManus, Plaintiff, represented by Caitlin Hale Walton,
Essex Richards, Edward G. Connette, Essex Richards, PA & Norris
Arden Adams, II.

Steven Price, Plaintiff, represented by Caitlin Hale Walton, Essex
Richards, Edward G. Connette, Essex Richards, PA & Norris Arden
Adams, II.

Carl Harvell, Plaintiff, represented by Caitlin Hale Walton, Essex
Richards, Edward G. Connette, Essex Richards, PA & Norris Arden
Adams, II.

Continental Automotive, Inc., Defendant, represented by Meredith
Anne Pinson -- mpinson@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuire Woods LLP &
Susan Pyle Dion -- sdion@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP.

Pension Plan for Hourly-Paid Employees of Continental Automotive,
Inc. and Certain Affiliate Companies, Defendant, represented by
Meredith Anne Pinson, McGuire Woods LLP & Susan Pyle Dion,
McGuireWoods LLP.


CREDIT PROTECTION: Court Suggests Classes in "Lanteri"
------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned KATHERINE LANTERI, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT PROTECTION
ASSOCIATION L.P., et al, Defendants, Cause No. 1:13-cv-1501-WTL-
MJD (S.D. Ind.), alleges that the Defendants violated the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by continuing to send
text messages to her cellular telephone number regarding a debt
after she replied stop when instructed to reply STOP to opt out
from receiving further text messages and by contacting her while
the debt was subject to an automatic stay order of a bankruptcy
court.  She moves the Court to certify two TCPA classes: a TCPA
Stop Texting Class and a TCPA Bankruptcy Class.

The Plaintiff proposes the following class definitions:

TCPA Stop Texting Class: (1) All persons within the United States
(2) to whose cellular telephone number (3) CPA sent a text message
in an attempt to collect an alleged debt (4) using its vendor,
RingClear (5) within four years(6) where the cellular phone owner
previously replied to the text message with the message to stop,
which includes, but is not limited to: (a) STOP TEXT; (b) STOP
CALLIN; (c) STOP SENDIN'; (d) PLEASE STOP; (e) PLZ STOP; (f) the
first 2 letters of the message RE followed by 2 non-alpha
characters, followed by the exact phrase STOP (such as RE:|Stop).

TCPA Bankruptcy Class: (1) All persons within the United States
(2) to whose cellular telephone number (3) CPA called in an
attempt to collect an alleged debt (4) using its vendor LiveVox
(5) within four years (6) during a period of an automatic stay as
ordered from a Bankruptcy Court, or after the alleged debt was
discharged in a Bankruptcy.

TCPA STOP TEXTING CLASS

The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division, addresses the Plaintiff's TCPA
Stop Texting Class first.  This class fails to meet the
ascertainability requirement because it is impermissibly vague. As
the Court noted in its entry on the Plaintiff's prior amended
motion for class certification, one class proposed by the
Plaintiff "refers to replying to a text message 'with the message
to stop. Plaintiff again uses this language in the currently
proposed TCPA Stop.

This failure, however, is not reason enough to avoid certifying
the class. In the instance where a class definition is not
ascertainable because it creates a fail-safe class, the Seventh
Circuit suggests that the "problem can and often should be solved
by refining the class definition rather than by flatly denying
class certification on that basis.

Although the Defendants state that the Plaintiff fails to
establish the four elements required under Rule 23(a), they do not
address numerosity at any length.2 For the sake of this Entry, the
Court assumes that numerosity is met and turns to the other Rule
23 requirements.

Commonality

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff has failed to show that
she satisfies the commonality requirement because she does not
provide evidence of common answers to the issues presented.
Commonality requires a common contention that is capable of class-
wide resolution which means that determination of its truth or
falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of
each one of the claims in one stroke.

The Plaintiff presents two additional questions it believes are
common to the TCPA Stop Texting Class, which the Defendants
dispute.  The Court need only evaluate the first of these: whether
an automated telephone dialing system was used to send the text
messages. This question is common to all call recipients, and the
"determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that
is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one
stroke.  For purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) even a single common
question will do.

For this reason, the TCPA Stop Texting Class meets the commonality
requirement.

Typicality

Typicality means that there must be enough congruence between the
named representative's claim and that of the unnamed members of
the class to justify allowing the named party to litigate on
behalf of the group. The requirement is meant to ensure that the
named representative's claims have the same essential
characteristics as the claims of the class at large.

Because it is not clear that each of the messages revoked consent,
the Plaintiff's claim and the claims of the individuals who sent
each of the six text messages are distinct from one another and do
not have the same essential characteristics.

For these reasons, the Plaintiff's claims are not typical of the
claims of individuals who sent the six text message variations
listed in the TCPA Stop Texting Class definition. Moreover,
without the broad language of the TCPA Stop Texting Class
definition, the Plaintiff and other individuals who sent text
messages that simply contained the single-word reply stop are not
even included in the proposed class. As a result, typicality is
lacking.

Adequacy of Representation

Similar issues thwart the Plaintiff's showing of adequacy of
representation. The adequacy of representation requirement focuses
on the quality of the Plaintiff to serve as the named
representative: It requires the representative parties [to] fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Without addressing whether counsel for the Plaintiff is adequate,
the Plaintiff herself is not capable of representing the interests
of the proposed TCPA Stop Texting Class because, again, without
the broad and vague language in the proposed TCPA Stop Texting
Class definition, she is not a member of the class she defined.
That is, she did not send one of the text messages listed in the
TCPA Stop Texting Class definition. This difference disqualifies
her as an adequate class representative.

Predominance

Ordinarily, the Court would "only turn [its] attention to Rule
23(b) after [being] certain that all of Rule 23(a)'s requirements
had been met." Bell, 800 F.3d at 374. Nonetheless, the Court
quickly addresses Rule 23(b)'s predominance requirement. "[T]he
predominance criterion is far more demanding" than Rule 23(a)'s
commonality requirement.

The Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that common questions of
law or fact predominate over questions affecting individual class
members, or at the very least, over questions affecting the
Plaintiff apart from each of the six groups of individuals who
sent the text messages listed in the TCPA Stop Texting Class
definition.

For all of the above reasons, the Court denies the Plaintiff's
motion to certify the TCPA Stop Texting Class.

TCPA BANKRUPTCY CLASS

The Plaintiff also seeks to certify this class:

     "(1) All persons within the United States (2) to whose
cellular telephone number (3) CPA called in an attempt to collect
an alleged debt (4) using its vendor LiveVox (5) within four years
of September 8, 2013 (6) during a period of an automatic stay as
ordered from a Bankruptcy Court, or after the alleged debt was
discharged in a Bankruptcy."

Typicality is not met because the Plaintiff has not shown that she
was called after the alleged debt was discharged in a Bankruptcy.
The Plaintiff obtained a discharge of her bankruptcy. Notice was
sent to Credit Protection Association, L.P. The Plaintiff did not
receive any calls (or texts) from the Defendants after that time.

For this reason, the Plaintiff's claim does not have the same
essential characteristics as the claims of the class at large.
The fact that some putative class members received calls after
their debts were discharged in bankruptcy distinguishes their
claims from the Plaintiffs. As a result, typicality is lacking.
For the same reasons, the Plaintiff is not an adequate
representative of the class as defined. She is not a member of a
class of individuals who received calls after their bankruptcies
were discharged, and thus cannot adequately represent their
interests as a class.

Accordingly, the Court denies the Plaintiff's motion to certify
the TCPA Bankruptcy Class.

ALTERNATIVE CLASSES

The Court believes that the Plaintiff might be an adequate
representative of the following classes:

Stop Class: All persons within the United States (2) to whose
cellular telephone number (3) Credit Protection Association, L.P.
sent a text message in an attempt to collect an alleged debt (4)
using its vendor RingClear (5) within four years (6) where the
cellular phone owner previously replied to the text message with
the one-word reply stop in any combination of capital and
lowercase letters.

Bankruptcy Class: (1) All persons within the United States (2) to
whose cellular telephone number (3) Credit Protection Association,
L.P. called in an attempt to collect an alleged debt (4) using its
vendor LiveVox (5) within four years (6) during a period of an
automatic stay as ordered from a Bankruptcy Court.

Without additional information, however, the Court cannot make a
determination on certification of these proposed classes.  Should
the Plaintiff seek to certify the Court-proposed classes, she
should file a new motion for class certification.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 22, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y8bys2l8from Leagle.com.

KATHERINE LANTERI, Plaintiff, represented by Angie K. Robertson,
PHILIPPS AND PHILIPPS, LTD., 9760 S. Roberts Rd., Suite 1, Palos
Hills, IL. 60465

KATHERINE LANTERI, Plaintiff, represented by Keith James Keogh,
KEOGH LAW, LTD, 55 W. Monroe St #3390, Chicago, IL 60603, Mary E.
Philipps, PHILIPPS AND PHILIPPS, LTD., 9760 S. Roberts Rd., Suite
1, Palos Hills, Il. 60465, Michael S. Hilicki, KEOGH LAW, LTD, 55
w. Monroe St., #3390, Chicago, IL 60603, Steven James Halbert,
Timothy J. Sostrin, MACEY & ALEMAN, P.C. 9465 Counselors Row
Suite 200, Carmel IN 46240 & David J. Philipps, PHILIPPS AND
PHILIPPS, LTD., 9760 S. Roberts Rd., Suite 1, Palos Hills, IL
60465

CREDIT PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, LP, Defendant, represented by David
M. Schultz -- dschultz@hinshawlaw.com -- HINSHAW & CULBERTSON &
Justin M. Penn -- jpenn@hinshawlaw.com -- HINSHAW & CULBERTSON,
LLP.

ETAN GENERAL, INC., Defendant, represented by David M. Schultz,
HINSHAW & CULBERTSON & Justin M. Penn, HINSHAW & CULBERTSON, LLP.


CREDITORS ADJUSTMENT: "Hassas" Suit Disputes Collection Letter
--------------------------------------------------------------
Niloofar Hassas, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Creditors Adjustment Bureau,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-06606 (C.D. Cal., September 7,
2017), seeks actual and statutory damages, costs of litigation and
reasonable attorney's fees and all other relief for violation of
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Rosenthal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Plaintiff incurred financial obligations to an original creditor,
Law Offices of H. Michael Soroy. Defendant's collection letter
failed to provide notice to Plaintiff of debtor's rights as
prescribed by the California Civil Code. Defendant's letter
threatened to report to a national business credit file if
Hassas's account is not resolved immediately, thus contradicting
and overshadowing the protections provided by consumers' rights
with respect to debt collection activities. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joshua Swigart, Esq.
      HYDE AND SWIGART
      2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101
      San Diego, CA 92108
      Telephone: (619) 233-7770
      Facsimile: (619) 297-1022 to 26
      Email: Josh@westcoastlitigation.com

             - and -

      Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
      KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
      245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
      Costa Mesa, CA 92626
      Telephone: (800) 400-6808
      Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
      Email: ak@kazlg.com


CVS HEALTH: Florida, Illinois and Massachusetts Classes Certified
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that in
an amended case accusing CVS Healthcare of overcharging millions
of insured patients for prescription drugs, a federal judge
granted in part motions to certify classes in California, Florida,
Illinois and Massachusetts and denied without prejudice motions to
certify classes in New York and Arizona.

The case is captioned, CHRISTOPHER CORCORAN, ET AL., Plaintiffs,
vs. CVS HEALTH, ET AL., Defendants. Case 4:15-cv-03504-YGR (N.D.
Cal.).


DUBUQUE, IA: Faces Legal Action Over Buses w/ Defective Engines
---------------------------------------------------------------
KCRG-TV9 reports defective engines have left bus riders stranded
in Dubuque. Now the city is looking to replace those engines.

A city memo says a dozen Jule buses have Navistar engines that are
the subject of a class action lawsuit that claims the company
knowingly concealed defective engines.

In the last month, the city says five Jule buses have shut down,
stranding riders until a second bus could resume the route.

On September 11 the city council will vote on a plan to repair
half of those bus engines and replace the other half with used
buses. [GN]


DYNAVAX TECHNOLOGIES: Securities Suit Dismissed w/ Leave to Amend
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California dismissed with leave to amend the
case captioned In re DYNAVAX SECURITIES LITIGATION. This Document
Relates To: ALL ACTIONS, Case No. 4:16-cv-06690-YGR (N.D. Cal.).

Lead Plaintiff Kwok Pang, individually and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated, brings this consolidated class action
against the Defendants for violation of federal securities laws.
The Plaintiff alleges violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder based upon
knowingly or recklessly disseminating false and misleading
statements about the Dynavax's development and efforts to gain FDA
approval of HEPLISAV-B, an investigational adult hepatitis B
vaccine.  The consolidated amended complaint on behalf of the
putative class was filed March 17, 2017.

The Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds
that the Plaintiff has not pleaded the elements of the 10(b) claim
with sufficient particularity as required by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, and that the claim for control
person liability under section 20(a) fails for the same reason.

Judge Rogers finds that the Plaintiff allegations regarding false
and misleading statements all turn on the assertion that adverse
cardiac events occurring in the company's latest clinical trial
should have been disclosed along with other Adverse Events of
Special Interest ("AESIs") that were disclosed to investors.
However, at the hearing on the motion, the Plaintiff acknowledged
the fatal flaw argued by the Defendants, conceding that the
complaint as drafted misconstrued the term AESIs.

The Plaintiff now contends that failure to disclose the cardiac
events -- in the context of Defendants' other statements about the
safety of the HEPLISAV-B vaccine, the clinical trial results, and
FDA approval timeline -- made the statements false and misleading,
even if cardiac events are not AESIs.  Consequently, the
Plaintiff's repeated incorporation of this same mistaken
allegation undermines the viability of the entire complaint.

Accordingly, Judge Rogers granted with leave to amend the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.  In amending, the Judge directed
the Plaintiff to specify each statement upon which the claim is
based, whether such statement is alleged to be an affirmative
misrepresentation or an omission, and why each statement was
materially false or misleading.  The Plaintiff will file an
amended complaint no later than Oct. 3, 2017.  The Defendants will
file their response within 21 days of the filing of the amended
complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 12, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/DCVqzk from Leagle.com.

David Soontjens, Plaintiff, represented by J. Alexander Hood, II -
- ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice.

David Soontjens, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice & Jennifer
Pafiti -- jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Michael Shumake, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Adam Marc Apton
-- aapton@zlk.com -- Levi Korsinsky, LLP, Adam Christopher McCall
-- amccall@zlk.com -- Levi Korsinsky, LLP & Nicholas Ian Porritt -
- nporritt@zlk.com -- Levi and Korsinsky.

Dynavax Technologies Corporation, Defendant, represented by
Kathlyn Anne Querubin -- kquerubin@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP,
Jeffrey Michael Kaban -- jkaban@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Jeffrey
David Lombard -- jlombard@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Joan Renxin Li
-- Laurence M. Rosen, The Rosen Law Firm, P.A. -- Cooley LLP &
John C. Dwyer -- dwyerjc@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP.

Eddie Gray, Defendant, represented by Kathlyn Anne Querubin,
Cooley LLP, Jeffrey Michael Kaban, Cooley LLP, Jeffrey David
Lombard, Cooley LLP, Joan Renxin Li, Cooley LLP & John C. Dwyer,
Cooley LLP.

Michael S. Ostrach, Defendant, represented by Kathlyn Anne
Querubin, Cooley LLP, Jeffrey Michael Kaban, Cooley LLP, Jeffrey
David Lombard, Cooley LLP, Joan Renxin Li, Cooley LLP & John C.
Dwyer, Cooley LLP.

Robert Janssen, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey David Lombard,
Cooley LLP, Joan Renxin Li, Cooley LLP & John C. Dwyer, Cooley
LLP.

Karen Dwyer, Movant, represented by Robert Vincent Prongay --
RProngay@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Brendan Dwyer, Movant, represented by Robert Vincent Prongay,
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Van Trinh, Movant, represented by Robert Vincent Prongay, Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP.

Kwok Pang, Movant, represented by Jacob Alexander Goldberg --
jgoldberg@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., Keith R.
Lorenze -- klorenze@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm &
Laurence M. Rosen - lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm,
P.A.

Glenn Dietel, Movant, represented by Adam Christopher McCall, Levi
Korsinsky, LLP.


EAGLE COUNTY, CO: Judge Rejects Suit Opposing Drug Facility Dev't
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jason Blevins, writing for Denver Post, reports an Eagle County
District Judge has dismissed a last-chance lawsuit filed by
residents of Vail Valley's luxury Cordillera neighborhood opposed
to plans to convert their community's centerpiece lodge into
residential drug treatment facility. After a series of judicial
setbacks, the administrative appeal of the county's approval was
the last hope for residents seeking to block a $136 million plan
to change the Lodge and Spa at Cordillera into a high-end drug
rehabilitation facility.

Residents sued the Eagle County Board of Commissioners and the
former owner of the lodge over a county-approved 2009 change in
the Cordillera planned-unit-development guidelines that permitted
a potential medical facility at the lodge. The lodge sold last
month to an investment group led by the Concerted Care Group,
which plans to offer drug treatment services -- to the tune of
$60,000 a month -- in the former 56-room luxury lodge.

In his 30-page ruling issued on September 15 afternoon, Eagle
County District Court Judge Paul Dunkelman noted that the lodge,
while a selling point for buyers in Cordillera, suffered an
operating loss of "several million dollars" in 2008, a year after
Texas investment group Behringer Harvard purchased the building
and adjacent parcel. In 2009, only 53 residents had memberships at
the lodge and hotel occupancy "had dwindled to approximately
half," reads the decision. That year, Behringer Harvard secured
approval to change planning documents that allowed for as many as
34 additional uses for the lodge, including "medical
offices/facility."

In 2016, three years after Behringer Harvard put the lodge on the
market, Concerted Care Group emerged as "the only serious
potential buyer," according to the ruling. Residents have battled
the plan since 2016, filing a $100 million class-action lawsuit
arguing the project had injured property values in the affluent
golf community.

A federal judge in February refused to delay the sale of the
lodge, striking a fatal blow to the class-action lawsuit, which
Cordillera residents dropped. That left only the District Court in
Eagle County as a last chance to thwart the drug rehabilitation
project.

Dunkelman disagreed with the residents on all points, including an
argument that the drug rehab clinic violates zoning that requires
some sort of "resort residential component" at the lodge.

"The property will continue to be operated with resort residential
use with a price tag of $60,000 per month: it's only the proposed
'members' who will change," Dunkelman wrote. "The role of zoning
is to determine allowed uses, not mandate preferred uses."

Concerted Care Group chief Noah Nordheimer said he would begin
construction on the first phase of his project soon and intends to
have the facility open and treating people by next summer.

"Certainly we are not out celebrating," he said. "Unfortunately
the stigma of addiction and everything people associate with it is
wrong and we do feel vindicated for all the people who will have
access to treatment, but we never should have gone through all
this." [GN]


EQUIFAX INC: Faces Biggest Litigation Threat from State AGs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Francine Mckenna, writing for Marketwatch, reports that while
Equifax already is facing a $70 billion class action lawsuit filed
immediately in Oregon after their announcement of an unprecedented
hack exposing personal data of 143 million consumers, there could
be a bigger legal threat: state attorneys general.

Several state attorneys general, including from Illinois,
Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania, have already contacted
Equifax in response to the announcement by the company on Sept. 7
that criminals hacked a U.S. website application to gain access to
private information such as Social Security numbers, birth dates,
addresses and even drivers' license numbers.

The Massachusetts Attorney General, Maura Healey, has already
notified Equifax CEO Richard Smith that she intends to file a
lawsuit against the company. The Massachusetts Consumer Protection
Act provides civil penalties of up to $5,000 per violation of its
data breach notification statute.

"Each state maintains its own requirements for consumer
notification of breaches, enforced by state AGs, that have express
deadlines and significant penalties for each occurrence," said
Eileen Ridley an attorney with law firm Foley & Lardner who tries
complex cases. Foley & Lardner maintains a chart of the data
breach notification laws for all fifty states, not an easy feat
since they are updated constantly.

"State law generally defines when injury has occurred and, if it
occurs, as in the data breach cases, state law may set the amount
consumers or the State can recover," said David Sugerman, an
attorney in Oregon who represents consumers in state court class-
action cases.

State civil penalties don't always require direct financial harm
and range from $100 to as much as $10,000 per incident.

"If Equifax incurred a penalty for just the 143 million U.S.
incidents it has already admitted to, it's easy to see," said
Sugerman, "the total of class action claims and state statutory
damage claims putting the company's survival at risk. If the
average penalties were $5,000 per incident, like in Massachusetts,
Equifax could face more than $700 billion just from the states."

Most states, according to a blog post by professionals from law
firm Foley & Lardner, require that notification be made in the
"most expeditious time possible," while some set forth a specific
timeframe such as within 30, 45, or 60 days. A federal
notification law proposed in 2015 set a 30-day deadline, but
received little support.

Equifax announced in its press release on Sept. 7 that it became
aware of the breach on July 29, more than 30 days later, and that
the breach may have first occurred in May, almost four months
before notifying the public.

Equifax did not respond to a request for comment on their
potential state notification liabilities.

Equifax stock EFX, +1.51%   dropped 3% on September 15 and 33% in
the last month. Its market cap has dropped by about $5.8 billion
since the disclosure.

There's also the question of whether the number of data breach
incidents could go even higher.

"Estimates of consumer harm typically increase after additional
analysis and investigation," said Justin Baxter, an Oregon
attorney who represents consumers in class action lawsuits. The
number of consumers harmed by the Wells Fargo WFC, +2.03%   fake
accounts scandal, for example, nearly doubled after the bank
performed additional analysis, compared to estimates given at the
time of the original settlement with regulators.

"We don't really know the full extent of the harm Equifax has done
to consumers, in the U.S. let alone abroad," said Baxter. "The
disclosures so far are vague and don't tell us who the breach has
affected and how it may affect them." [GN]


EQUIFAX INC: NY Attorney General Began Probe over Data Breach
-------------------------------------------------------------
Josh Russell, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
noting that New Yorkers make up nearly 18% of the Americans whose
data was compromised by Equifax's data breach, state Attorney
General Eric Schneiderman opened an investigation on September 8,
of the credit-monitoring website.

Atlanta-based Equifax announced a day earlier that the sensitive
information of 143 million Americans had been compromised after
"criminals" exploited a U.S. website application to access files
between mid-May and July of this year.

Schneiderman paired his formal-investigation announcement on
September 8, tied together with a consumer alert, urging all New
Yorkers to check with Equifax if their information was breached
and to take additional measures to protect themselves from
identity theft.

"The Equifax breach has potentially exposed sensitive personal
information of nearly everyone with a credit report, and my office
intends to get to the bottom of how and why this massive hack
occurred," the attorney general said in a statement.

Statistics that Schneiderman's office published just this past
March found that the personal records of 1.6 million New Yorkers
were exposed by data breaches in 2016.

Schneiderman urged New Yorkers to take precautions when sharing
and storing data online. "It's on all of us to guard against those
who try to use our personal information for harm -- as these
breaches too often jeopardize the financial health of New Yorkers
and cost the public and private sectors billions of dollars," he
said in a statement.

The March study showed that there had been close to 1,300 reported
data breaches in 2016 -- a 60% rise in frequency, but a threefold
increase in quantity of the public in exposed compared the
previous year.

External hacking was the No. 1 cause of data breaches, according
to the report, accounting for 40% of the figures, but another 37%
were attributable to employee negligence, which consists of a
combination of inadvertent exposure of records, insider
wrongdoing, and the loss of a device or media.

Equifax reportedly waited more than a month to warn consumers on
September 8, having discovered the hack on July 29. The Atlanta-
based company has set up a special website for consumers to check
if their personal information was compromised. Consumers can also
call 866-447-7559 for more information.

Equifax said it has also engaged independent cybersecurity firm to
conduct ongoing investigation into the breach.

"Once discovered, we acted immediately to stop the intrusion," the
company posted to Twitter.

Equifax claimed that it found no evidence of unauthorized activity
on its core consumer or commercial credit-reporting databases,
explaining that the breached data consisted primarily of names,
Social Security numbers, birth dates and addresses. Driver's
license numbers were also compromised in certain isolated
instances, the company said.

Besides all the personal information that was stolen in its
breach, Equifax said the credit card numbers for about 209,000
U.S. consumers were also taken.

The first of what will likely be many class actions over the data
breach was filed on September 8, in U.S. District Court in
Portland, Oregon.

Representatives from Equifax did not immediately respond to
request for comment on Schneiderman's announcement and alert.


EQUIFAX INC: "McGonnigal" Sues Over Data Breach
-----------------------------------------------
James McGonnigal and Brian F. Spector, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Equifax, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-03422, (N.D. Ga., September 7, 2017),
seeks statutory damages under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and
state consumer protection statutes, reimbursement of out-of-pocket
losses, other compensatory damages, further and more robust credit
monitoring services with accompanying identity theft insurance and
injunctive relief including an order requiring Equifax to
implement improved data security measures.

Equifax is a credit-reporting company that track and rates the
financial history of U.S. consumers. The companies are supplied
with data about loans, loan payments and credit cards, as well as
information on everything from child support payments, credit
limits, missed rent and utilities payments, addresses and employer
history. Equifax experienced a cybersecurity incident impacting
approximately 143 million U.S. consumers exposing their names,
Social Security numbers, birth dates, addresses, driver's license
numbers and credit card numbers.

Plaintiffs claim to be victims of the data breach. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Roy E. Barnes, Esq.
     John R. Bevis, Esq.
     J. Cameron Tribble. Esq.
     BARNES LAW GROUP, LLC
     31 Atlanta Street
     Marietta, GA 30060
     Tel: (770) 227-6375
     Fax: (770) 227-6373
     Email roy@barneslawgroup.com
           bevis@barneslawgroup.com
           ctribble@barneslawgroup.com

           - and -

     John Yanchunis, Esq.
     Marisa Glassman, Esq.
     MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
     201 North Franklin Street, 7th Floor
     Tampa, FL 33602
     Tel: (813) 223-5505
     Fax: (813) 223-5402
     Email: jyanchunis@forthepeople.com
           mglassman@forthepeople.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Joof" Suit in California Over Data Breach
-------------------------------------------------------------
HENAN LOUIS JOOF, an individual, AKOP SOGOMONYAN, an individual,
individually and on behalf of similarly situated California
consumers v. EQUIFAX INC., a Georgia corporation, Case No. 2:17-
cv-06659 (C.D. Cal., September 11, 2017), is brought on behalf of
California consumers, whose personal and credit information was
collected and stored by Equifax and who had to pay to enroll in a
credit monitoring system because they were subject to a risk of
data loss, credit harm and identity theft as a result of the
unauthorized access by third parties to Equifax's data from May to
July 2017.

Equifax Inc. is a Georgia corporation. Equifax is a consumer
credit reporting agency, who conducts business in the United
States.  The Company collects and stores personal and credit
information of millions of American consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Armen Kiramijyan, Esq.
          Hovsep Hovsepyan, Esq.
          KAASS LAW
          313 East Broadway, #944
          Glendale, CA 91209
          Telephone: (310) 943-1171
          E-mail: akiramijyan@kaass.com
                  hhovsepyan@kaass.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Myers" Class Suit in Calif. Over Data Breach
----------------------------------------------------------------
TERRY MYERS, SR., CHARLES O'NEAL, and those similarly situated v.
EQUIFAX INC., and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 2:17-at-
00933 (E.D. Cal., September 8, 2017), arises from a data breach
incident.

On July 29, 2017, the Defendants became aware of a data breach
incident in which the personal data of some 143 Million people in
the United States was improperly accessed and copied by persons
outside the Equifax enterprise.  Equifax admitted that the subject
data breach occurred in or about mid-May of 2017 and July of 2017,
though for the purposes of this Complaint, it is alleged that the
data breach occurred during a broader period of time spanning the
first half of 2017 up until the date of disclosure.

Equifax Inc. is a publically traded Georgia corporation registered
with the California Secretary of State, with its principal place
of business and headquarters located in Atlanta, Georgia.  The
true names and capacities of the Doe Defendants are currently
unknown to the Plaintiff.  Equifax is a global provider of
information solutions and human resources business process
outsourcing services for businesses, governments and
consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Joshua H. Watson, Esq.
          Gina M. Bowden, Esq.
          CLAYEO C. ARNOLD, APC
          865 Howe Avenue
          Sacramento, CA 95825
          Telephone: (916) 777-7777
          Facsimile: (916) 924-1829
          E-mail: jwatson@justice4you.com
                  gbowden@justice4you.com

               - and -

          John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
          Marcio W. Valladares, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
          201 North Franklin Street, 7th Floor
          Tampa, FL 33602-3644
          Telephone: (813) 223-5505
          Facsimile: (813) 222-4733
          E-mail: jyanchunis@forthepeople.com
                  mvalladares@forthepeople.com


EQUIFAX INC: Fails to Secure Consumers' Info, Morris Suit Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
JASON MORRIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. EQUIFAX, INC., Case No. 1:17-cv-02178 (D. Colo.,
September 8, 2017), is brought against the Defendant for its
alleged failure to secure and safeguard consumers' personally
identifiable information, which it collected from various sources
in connection with the operation of its business as a consumer
credit reporting agency, and for failing to provide timely,
accurate and adequate notice to Plaintiff and other class members
that their PII had been stolen and precisely what types of
information were stolen.

Equifax has acknowledged a cybersecurity incident potentially
impacting approximately 143 million U.S. consumers.

Equifax, Inc., is a Georgia corporation with its principal place
of business located in Atlanta, Georgia.  Equifax is one of three
nationwide credit-reporting companies that track and rates the
financial history of U.S. consumers.  The companies are supplied
with data about loans, loan payments and credit cards, as well as
information on everything from child support payments, credit
limits, missed rent and utilities payments, addresses and employer
history.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kevin S. Hannon, Esq.
          THE HANNON LAW FIRM, LLC
          1641 Downing Street
          Denver, CO 80218
          Telephone: (303) 861-8800
          Facsimile: (303) 861-8855
          E-mail: khannon@hannonlaw.com

               - and -

          Robert E. Caldwell, Jr., Esq.
          SAWAYA, ROSE, MCCLURE & WILHITE, P.C.
          1600 Ogden Street
          Denver, CO 80218
          Telephone: (303) 839-1650
          Facsimile: (303) 832-7102
          E-mail: RCaldwell@sawayalaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Fails to Secure Private Info, "Krawcyk" Suit Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
JESSICA KRAWCYK, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. EQUIFAX INC., Case No. 4:17-cv-00760-FJG
(W.D. Mo., September 8, 2017), is brought against Equifax for its
alleged failure to secure and safeguard the private information of
approximately 143 million Americans.

On July 29, 2017, Equifax discovered unauthorized access to
databases storing the confidential and private consumer
information of millions of U.S. consumers.

Equifax Inc. is a nationwide consumer reporting agency
headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.  Equifax collects, assesses,
and maintains the Private Information of millions of consumers
around the world in order to sell this information to third
parties in the form of consumer credit reports, consumer insurance
reports, or consumer demographic or analytics information.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mitchell L. Burgess, Esq.
          BURGESS LAW FIRM, P.C.
          4310 Madison Avenue, Suite 100
          Kansas City, MO 64111
          Telephone: (816) 471-1700
          Facsimile: (816) 471-1701
          E-mail: mitch@burgesslawkc.com

               - and -

          Ralph K. Phalen, Esq.
          RALPH K. PHALEN, ATTORNEY AT LAW
          4310 Madison Avenue, Suite 140
          Kansas City, MO 64111
          Telephone: (816) 589-0753
          Facsimile: (816) 471-1701
          E-mail: phalenlaw@yahoo.com

               - and -

          Phyllis A. Norman, Esq.
          NORMAN & GRAVES LAW FIRM
          4310 Madison Avenue, Suite 120
          Kansas City, MO 64111
          Telephone: (816) 895-8989
          Facsimile: (816) 895-8988
          E-mail: phyllis@ngkclaw.com

               - and -

          Ben Barnow, Esq.
          Erich P. Schork, Esq.
          Anthony L. Parkhill, Esq.
          Jeffrey D. Blake, Esq.
          BARNOW AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          One North LaSalle Street, Suite 4600
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 621-2000
          Facsimile: (312) 641-5504
          E-mail: b.barnow@barnowlaw.com
                  e.schork@barnowlaw.com
                  aparkhill@barnowlaw.com
                  j.blake@barnowlaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: "King" Suit Alleges FCRA Violations Over Data Breach
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JUSTIN KING, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. EQUIFAX, INC., Case No. 1:17-cv-03157-JMS-MJD (S.D.
Ind., September 8, 2017), asserts claims against Equifax for
alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Indiana's
consumer laws, negligence, and unjust enrichment.

Between mid mid-May and July 2017, Equifax was subject to one of
the largest data breaches in history when hackers stole the
personal and financial information of 143 million consumers.

Equifax, Inc., is one of three nationwide credit reporting
companies that track and rates the financial history of U.S.
consumers. Equifax is supplied with data about loans, loan
payments and credit cards, as well as information on everything
from child support payments, credit limits, missed rent and
utilities payments.  Equifax is incorporated in Delaware and
headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Irwin B. Levin, Esq.
          Richard E. Shevitz, Esq.
          Scott D. Gilchrist, Esq.
          Vess A. Miller, Esq.
          Lynn A. Toops, Esq.
          COHEN & MALAD, LLP
          One Indiana Square, Suite 1400
          Indianapolis, IN 46204
          Telephone: (317) 636-6481
          Facsimile: (317) 636-2593
          E-mail: ilevin@cohenandmalad.com
                  rshevitz@cohenandmalad.com
                  sgilchrist@cohenandmalad.com
                  vmiller@cohenandmalad.com
                  ltoops@cohenandmalad.com


EQUIFAX INC: Raffin Sues Over Data Security Breach
--------------------------------------------------
SHEENA RAFFIN, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. EQUIFAX, INC., Case No. 2:17-cv-06620 (C.D. Cal.,
September 8, 2017), was filed over Defendant's failure to secure
and protect its users' personal information.

On September 7, 2017, the Plaintiff received a notification from
the Defendant which stated that her sensitive and private
information had been stolen from Defendant's possession since
approximately May of 2017.  The Defendant announced that the
Information for over 140 million customers worldwide had been
compromised.

Equifax, Inc. is a Georgia corporation and is engaged in
maintaining, selling, and distributing of consumer information and
credit reports with a large share of its business in
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Smart Sues Over Breach of Consumer Info in Calif.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Valorie Anne Smart, David Waterstram Miller, and Angela Lynn
Miller, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Equifax Inc.; Equifax Information Services LLC; and
Does 1-10, Case No. 2:17-at-00928 (E.D. Cal., September 8, 2017),
is brought on behalf of over an estimated 20 million consumers
located in the state of California that have been harmed by the
Defendants' alleged negligence.

The Defendants harvest massive amounts of consumer data for sale
and use by its partners and customers, the Plaintiffs tell the
Court.  While obtaining, exploiting, and selling sensitive
consumer data is the Defendants' business, the Plaintiffs contend,
the Defendants admitted in September of 2017 that hackers were
able to penetrate their computer systems to steal consumer
information belonging to over 140 million Americans.

Equifax Inc. is a Georgia Corporation with its principal place of
business in Atlanta, Georgia.  Equifax Information Services LLC is
a Georgia Limited Liability Company with its principal place of
business in Atlanta.  The Plaintiffs do not know the true names of
the Doe Defendants.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Richard Morin, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF RICK MORIN, PC
          555 Capitol Mall, Suite 750
          Sacramento, CA 95814-4508
          Telephone: (916) 333-2222
          Facsimile: (916) 273-8956
          E-mail: rick@rickmorin.net


EQUIFAX INC: Kuhns Files Securities Suit over Data Breach
---------------------------------------------------------
HAMPDEN KUHNS, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX INC., RICHARD F. SMITH and
JOHN W. GAMBLE, JR., the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-03463-WSD
(N.D. Ga., Sep. 8, 2017), seeks to pursue remedies under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The case is a federal securities class action against Equifax and
certain officers and/or directors for violations of the federal
securities laws. The Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of all
persons or entities that purchased or otherwise acquired the
publicly traded shares of Equifax common stock between February
25, 2016 and September 7, 2017, inclusive,

According to the complaint, Equifax made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) the Company failed
to maintain adequate measures to protect its data systems; (2) the
Company failed to maintain adequate monitoring systems to detect
security breaches; (3) the Company failed to maintain proper
security systems, controls and monitoring systems in place; and
(4) as a result of the foregoing, the Company's financial
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times.

On September 7, 2017, Equifax disclosed a cyber-security incident
involving consumer information impacting 143 million U.S.
consumers. On release of the news, the Company's share price fell
$24.09 per share, from a closing price on September 7, 2017 of
$142.72 per share to a low of $118.63 per share on September 8,
2017, a drop of approximately 16.8%.  On August 1 and 2, 2017,
after the breach was discovered but before Equifax disclosed it,
the Company's CFO and Individual Defendant Gamble, as well as two
other executive officers, sold an aggregate amount of 12,229 of
their shares for approximately $1.78 million.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David A. Bain
          Law Offices of David A. Bain, LLC
          1230 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 1050
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 724 9990
          Facsimile: (404) 724-9986
          E-mail: dbain@bain-law.com

                - and -

          Eduard Korsinsky, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
          30 Broad Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 363 7500
          Facsimile: (212) 363 7171
          E-mail: ek@zlk.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Manaher" Suit over Data Breach
--------------------------------------------------
ALISON MANAHER, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX INC., a Georgia Corporation,
the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-03447-WSD (N.D. Ga., Sep. 8,
2017), seeks declaration that Equifax's existing data security
measures do not comply with the required duties of care, and in
order to comply with the required duties of care, Equifax must
implement and maintain reasonable security measures.

This action arises from the massive data breach of Equifax's
computer systems, which exposed the personal information,
including names, social security numbers, birth dates, addresses,
and driver's licenses, of as many as 143 million Americans. The
Plaintiff brings this lawsuit on behalf of herself and a proposed
class of persons or entities in the United States who: (a) had
personal or credit data collected and stored by Equifax in the
past year; and (b) were subject to risk of data loss and credit
harm and identity theft or had to pay for third-party credit
monitoring services as a result of Equifax's negligent data breach
from May to July 2017.

According to the complaint, On September 7, 2017, Equifax
announced that between May and July 2017, its databases had been
hacked by unauthorized third parties. Equifax receives its data
from credit card companies, banks, retailers, and lenders who
report on the credit activity of individuals to credit reporting
agencies such as Equifax. Equifax then stores that data
internally, compiles it, and furnishes it when requested.
Approximately 143 million consumers across the United States were
harmed by the massive data breach and Equifax's failure to
adequately protect their credit and personally identifiable
information ("PII"). Equifax has collected and stored personal and
credit information from Ms. Manaher, including her social security
number, birth date, home address, driver's license information,
and credit card numbers. Equifax owed a legal duty to consumers to
use reasonable care to protect their credit and personal
information from unauthorized access by third parties. Equifax
knew that its failure to protect PII from unauthorized access
would cause serious risks of credit harm and identify theft for
years to come.

Although Defendant announced the data breach publicly on September
7, 2017, it first became aware of the breach on or about July 29,
2017. Equifax negligently failed to maintain adequate
technological safeguards to protect Ms. Manaher's information from
unauthorized access by hackers. Equifax knew and should have known
that failure to maintain adequate technological safeguards would
eventually result in a massive data breach.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          G. Franklin Lemond, Jr.
          E. Adam Webb
          G. Franklin Lemond, Jr.
          WEBB, KLASE & LEMOND, LLC
          1900 The Exchange, S.E., Suite 480
          Atlanta, Georgia 30339
          Telephone: (770) 444 9594
          E-mail: Adam@WebbLLC.com
                  Franklin@WebbLLC.com

               - and -

          Joseph G. Sauder, Esq.
          Matthew D. Schelkopf, Esq.
          Joseph B. Kenney, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          555 Lancaster Avenue
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (610) 200 0580
          E-mail: jgs@mccunewright.com
          mds@mccunewright.com
          jbk@mccunewright.com

               - and -

          Thomas Malone, Esq.
          THE MALONE FIRM, LLC
          1650 Arch Street Suite 2501
          Philadelphia, PA 19103


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Smart" Suit over Consumer Data Breach
---------------------------------------------------------
Valorie Anne Smart, David Waterstram Miller, and Angela Lynn
Miller, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. Equifax Inc.; Equifax Information
Services LLC; and Does 1-10, the Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-
01872-KJM-EFB (E.D. Cal., Sep. 8, 2017), seeks to recover damages
as a result of Defendants' breached of their legal duty by failing
to maintain adequate safeguards of consumer data.

According to the complaint, Defendants harvest massive amounts of
consumer data for sale and use by its partners and customers.
While obtaining, exploiting, and selling sensitive consumer data
is Defendants' business, Defendants admitted in September of 2017
that hackers were able to penetrate Defendants' computer systems
to steal consumer information belonging to over 140 million
Americans. Outrageously, Defendants only warned the public of this
unprecedented breach two months after the theft was allegedly
discovered. During this time, consumers' data was unnecessarily
exposed. In fact, Defendants left consumers in the dark regarding
potential risks and steps that they could take to protect
themselves from Defendants' negligence. For two whole months,
Defendants willfully disregarded the risk to consumers that their
data was in the hands of nefarious actors. Defendants' negligence
has, and will cause, harm to countless California consumers, some
of which likely already suffered harm from the theft. Consumers
have had enough of large businesses carelessly handling
confidential personal information and profiting from that same
data.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Richard Morin, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF RICK MORIN, PC
          555 Capitol Mall, Suite 750
          Sacramento, CA 95814-4508
          Telephone: (916) 333 2222
          Facsimile: (916) 273 8956
          E-mail: legal@rickmorin.net


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Myers" Suit over Data Breach Incident
---------------------------------------------------------
TERRY MYERS, SR., CHARLES O'NEAL, and those similarly situated,
the Plaintiffs, v. EQUIFAX INC., and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
the Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-01878-JAM-DB (E.D. Cal, Sep. 8,
2017), seeks to enjoin Defendants from engaging in further
negligent, unfair, and unlawful business practices.

On or about July 29, 2017, the Defendant became aware of a data
breach incident in which the personal data of some 143 Million
people in the United States was improperly accessed and copied by
persons outside the Equifax Inc. enterprise. Equifax Inc. admitted
that the subject data breach occurred in or about mid-May of 2017
and July of 2017, Defendants disclosed the subject data breach on
or about September 8, 2017. In the subject data breach, an
unauthorized person, group, or entity outside the Equifax Inc.
enterprise took sensitive personal information of consumers from
Defendants by intruding into Defendants' computer system. The
intrusion was accomplished by exploiting a website application
operated by and/or on behalf of Defendants. That such a large
breach of so much especially sensitive information took place in
this manner demonstrates substantial negligence on the part of
Defendants since web applications are known to require substantial
security measures since they are accessible to the entire
internet. Web applications operate as a "stack" of technologies
and programs which interface with one another in order to produce
what appears to be a singular application on the web.

Despite having knowledge of the subject data breach since at least
July of 2017, Defendants waited months before disclosing it.
During that time, Defendants held corporate meetings, purchased
one or more identity theft consulting/monitoring/ protection
firms, and operated their business in such fashion as to optimize
their position with respect to the subject data breach -- all
without giving appropriate and timely notice to affected consumers
so that consumers could protect their interests and identities. As
a result, identity thieves had, during this time, unfettered
access to the PII before Defendants even notified victims that
their PII had been compromised.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Joshua H. Watson, Esq.
          Gina M. Bowden, Esq.
          CLAYEO C. ARNOLD, APC
          865 Howe Avenue
          Sacramento, CA 95825
          Telephone: (916) 777-7777
          Facsimile: (916) 924-1829
          E-mail: jwatson@justice4you.com
                  gbowden@justice4you.com

               - and -

          John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
          Marcio W. Valladares, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
          201 North Franklin Street, 7th Floor
          Tampa, FL 33602-3644
          Telephone: (813) 223 5505
          Facsimile: (813) 222 4733
          E-mail: jyanchunis@forthepeople.com
                  mvalladares@forthepeople.com


EQUIFAX INC: "Neilan" Suit Moved to Northern District of Georgia
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Sean Neilan, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Equifax
Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-06508, was transferred on
Sep. 18, 2017 from the U.S. District Court for Northern District
of Illinois (Chicago) to the U.S. District Court for Northern
District of Georgia (17-cv-_____). The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Sara L. Ellis.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ben Barnow, Esq.
          BARNOW AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          One North LaSalle Street, Suite 4600
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 621 2000
          E-mail: b.barnow@barnowlaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Santomauro" Suit in District of Columbia
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Equifax Inc. The
case is captioned as RODD SANTOMAURO, BRENDA BIRKETT, and DEBRA
LEE, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
the Plaintiffs, v. EQUIFAX INC., the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-
01852-RC (D.C., Sep. 8, 2017). The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge Rudolph Contreras.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Troy Nino Alexander Giatras, Esq.
          GIATRAS LAW FIRM, PLLC
          118 Capitol Street, 4th Floor
          Charleston, WV 25301
          Telephone: (304) 343 2900
          Facsimile: (304) 343 2942
          E-mail: troy@thewvlawfirm.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Spicer" Suit in Northern Dist. of California
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Equifax, Inc. The
case is captioned as Richard Spicer, Julia Gutierrez, Kerri
Murphy, Ashley Cashon, Jade Haileselassie, Roy Bishop, Bruce
Mattock, Reesa Ali, Tom W. Hannon, and Nancy Gauger, the
Plaintiffs, v. Equifax Inc. and TrustedID Inc., the Defendants,
and Dan Alexander, Interested Party, Case No. 5:17-cv-05228-BLF
(N.D. Cal., Sep. 8, 2017). The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge
Beth Labson Freeman.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Aaron Blumenthal, Esq.
          Eric H. Gibbs, Esq.
          Amy Marie Zeman, Esq.
          David Michael Berger, Esq.
          GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP
          505 14th Street, Suite 1110
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 350 9700
          E-mail: ab@classlawgroup.com
                  ehg@classlawgroup.com
                  amz@classlawgroup.com
                  davidberger@classlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Adam E. Polk, Esq.
          GIRARD GIBBS LLP
          601 California Street, 14th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 981 4800
          Facsimile: (415) 981 4846
          E-mail: aep@girardgibbs.com

               - and -

          Matthew J. Preusch, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK, L.L.P.
          801 Garden Street, Suite 301
          Santa Barbara, CA 93101
          Telephone: (805) 456 1496
          Facsimile: (805) 456 1497
          E-mail: mpreusch@kellerrohrback.com

               - and -

          Daniel L. Warshaw, Esq.
          PEARSON, SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP
          15165 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 400
          Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
          Telephone: (818) 788 8300
          Facsimile: (818) 788 8104
          E-mail: dwarshaw@pswlaw.com

Attorney for Dan Alexander:

          Nicholas A. Carlin, Esq.
          PHILLIPS ERLEWINE GIVEN & CARLIN LLP
          39 Mesa Street, Suite 201
          The Presidio
          San Francisco, CA 94129
          Telephone: (415) 398 0900
          Facsimile: (415) 398 0911
          E-mail: nac@phillaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Abraham" Suit over Consumer Data Theft
----------------------------------------------------------
JAMES ABRAHAM, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
1:17-cv-03453-TWT (N.D. Ga., Sep. 8, 2017), seeks declaration that
Equifax's existing data security measures do not comply with its
contractual obligations and duties of care, and in order to comply
with its contractual obligations and duties of care, Equifax must
implement and maintain reasonable security measures.

The Plaintiff brings this class action case against Defendant
Equifax for its massive failures to secure and safeguard
consumers' personally identifiable information ("PII") which
Equifax collected from various sources in connection with the
operation of its business as a consumer credit reporting agency,
and for failing to provide timely, accurate and adequate notice to
Plaintiff and other Class members that their PII had been stolen
and precisely what types of information were stolen.

According to the complaint, Equifax has acknowledged that a
cybersecurity incident ("Data Breach") potentially impacting
approximately 143 million U.S. consumers occurred. It has also
acknowledged that unauthorized persons exploited a U.S. website
application vulnerability to gain access to certain files. Equifax
claims that based on its investigation, the unauthorized access
occurred from mid-May through July 2017. The information accessed
primarily includes names, Social Security numbers, birth dates,
addresses and, in some instances, driver's license numbers. In
addition, Equifax has admitted that credit card numbers for
approximately 209,000 U.S. consumers, and certain dispute
documents with personal identifying information for approximately
182,000 U.S. consumers, were accessed. Equifax has acknowledged
that it discovered the unauthorized access on July 29, 2017, but
has failed to inform the public why it delayed notification of the
Data Breach to consumers for nearly six weeks. Instead, Equifax
executives were focused on themselves and their own self-
interests, and sold at least $1.8 million worth of shares before
the public disclosure of the breach. It has been reported that its
Chief Financial Officer John Gamble sold shares worth $946,374,
its president of U.S. information solutions, Joseph Loughran,
exercised options to dispose of stock worth $584,099, and its
president of workforce solutions, Rodolfo Ploder, sold $250,458 of
stock on August 2, 2017. The PII for Plaintiff and the class of
consumers he seeks to represent was compromised due to Equifax's
acts and omissions and their failure to properly protect the PII.
Equifax could have prevented this Data Breach. Data breaches at
other companies, including one of its major competitors, Experian
have occurred.

The Data Breach was the inevitable result of Equifax's inadequate
approach to data security and the protection of the PII that it
collected during the course of its business. Equifax disregarded
the rights of Plaintiff and Class members by intentionally,
willfully, recklessly, or negligently failing to take adequate and
reasonable measures to ensure its data systems were protected,
failing to disclose to its customers the material fact that it did
not have adequate computer systems and security practices to
safeguard PII, failing to take available steps to prevent and stop
the breach from ever happening, and failing to monitor and detect
the breach on a timely basis. As a result of the Equifax Data
Breach, the PII of the Plaintiff and Class members has been
exposed to criminals for misuse.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James M. Evangelista, Esq.
          David J. Worley, Esq.
          Kristi Stahnke McGregor, Esq.
          EVANGELISTA WORLEY, LLC
          8100 A. Roswell Road, Suite 100
          Atlanta, GA 30350
          Telephone: (404) 205 8400
          Facsimile: (404) 205 8395
          E-mail: david@ewlawllc.com
                  jim@ewlawllc.com
                  kristi@ewlawllc.com

               - and -

          William B. Federman, Esq.
          Carin L. Marcussen, Esq.
          Joshua D. Wells, Esq.
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 N. Pennsylvania Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120
          Telephone: (405) 235 1560
          Facsimile: (405) 239 2112
          E-mail: wbf@federmanlaw.com
                  clm@federmanlaw.com
                  jdw@federmanlaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Brandon Sues over Massive Data Breach
--------------------------------------------------
JUDY DIANE BRANDON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-03454-WSD (N.D. Ga., Sep. 8, 2017),
seeks declaration that Equifax's existing data security measures
do not comply with its contractual obligations and duties of care,
and in order to comply with its contractual obligations and duties
of care, Equifax must implement and maintain reasonable security
measures.

The Plaintiff brings this class action case against Defendant
Equifax for its massive failures to secure and safeguard
consumers' personally identifiable information ("PII") which
Equifax collected from various sources in connection with the
operation of its business as a consumer credit reporting agency,
and for failing to provide timely, accurate and adequate notice to
Plaintiff and other Class members that their PII had been stolen
and precisely what types of information were stolen.

According to the complaint, Equifax has acknowledged that a
cybersecurity incident ("Data Breach") potentially impacting
approximately 143 million U.S. consumers occurred. It has also
acknowledged that unauthorized persons exploited a U.S. website
application vulnerability to gain access to certain files. Equifax
claims that based on its investigation, the unauthorized access
occurred from mid-May through July 2017. The information accessed
primarily includes names, Social Security numbers, birth dates,
addresses and, in some instances, driver's license numbers. In
addition, Equifax has admitted that credit card numbers for
approximately 209,000 U.S. consumers, and certain dispute
documents with personal identifying information for approximately
182,000 U.S. consumers, were accessed. Equifax has acknowledged
that it discovered the unauthorized access on July 29, 2017, but
has failed to inform the public why it delayed notification of the
Data Breach to consumers for nearly six weeks. Instead, Equifax
executives were focused on themselves and their own self-
interests, and sold at least $1.8 million worth of shares before
the public disclosure of the breach. It has been reported that its
Chief Financial Officer John Gamble sold shares worth $946,374,
its president of U.S. information solutions, Joseph Loughran,
exercised options to dispose of stock worth $584,099, and its
president of workforce solutions, Rodolfo Ploder, sold $250,458 of
stock on August 2, 2017. The PII for Plaintiff and the class of
consumers he seeks to represent was compromised due to Equifax's
acts and omissions and their failure to properly protect the PII.
Equifax could have prevented this Data Breach. Data breaches at
other companies, including one of its major competitors, Experian
have occurred.

The Data Breach was the inevitable result of Equifax's inadequate
approach to data security and the protection of the PII that it
collected during the course of its business. Equifax disregarded
the rights of Plaintiff and Class members by intentionally,
willfully, recklessly, or negligently failing to take adequate and
reasonable measures to ensure its data systems were protected,
failing to disclose to its customers the material fact that it did
not have adequate computer systems and security practices to
safeguard PII, failing to take available steps to prevent and stop
the breach from ever happening, and failing to monitor and detect
the breach on a timely basis. As a result of the Equifax Data
Breach, the PII of the Plaintiff and Class members has been
exposed to criminals for misuse.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James M. Evangelista, Esq.
          David J. Worley, Esq.
          Kristi Stahnke McGregor, Esq.
          EVANGELISTA WORLEY, LLC
          8100 A. Roswell Road, Suite 100
          Atlanta, GA 30350
          Telephone: (404) 205 8400
          Facsimile: (404) 205 8395
          E-mail: david@ewlawllc.com
                  jim@ewlawllc.com
                  kristi@ewlawllc.com

               - and -

          William B. Federman, Esq.
          Carin L. Marcussen, Esq.
          Joshua D. Wells, Esq.
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 N. Pennsylvania Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120
          Telephone: (405) 235 1560
          Facsimile: (405) 239 2112
          E-mail: wbf@federmanlaw.com
                  clm@federmanlaw.com
                  jdw@federmanlaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Brown" Suit in Northern Dist. of Georgia
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Equifax, Inc. The
case is captioned as Chris Brown, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Equifax, Inc.,
the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-03449-SCJ (N.D. Ga., Sep. 8,
2017).  The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Steve C Jones.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David James Worley, Esq.
          James M. Evangelista, Esq.
          Kristi Stahnke McGregor, Esq.
          EVANGELISTA WORLEY, LLC
          8100 A Roswell Road, Suite 100
          Atlanta, GA 30350
          Telephone: (404) 205 8400
          Facsimile: (404) 205 8395
          E-mail: david@ewlawllc.com
                  jim@ewlawllc.com
                  kristi@ewlawllc.com

               - and -

          Ben Barnow, Esq.
          Erich Paul Schork, Esq.
          BARNOW & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          One North LaSalle
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 621 2000
          E-mail: b.barnow@barnowlaw.com
                  e.schork@barnowlaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Cary Sues over Consumer Data Theft
-----------------------------------------------
RANDOLPH JEFFERSON CARY III, WILLIAM R. PORTER, and ROBIN D.
PORTER, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. EQUIFAX, INC., the Defendant, Case
No. 1:17-cv-03433-AT (N.D. Ga., Sep. 8, 2017), seeks remedy from
harms suffered by the Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all
similarly situated individuals whose Personal Information was
compromised in a Data Breach.

The Plaintiffs seek the following remedies, among others:
statutory damages under the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") and
state consumer protection statutes, reimbursement of out-of-pocket
losses, other compensatory damages, further and more robust credit
monitoring services with accompanying identity theft insurance
beyond Equifax's one-year current offer, and injunctive relief
including an order requiring Equifax to implement improved data
security measures.

According to the complaint, On September 7, 2017, Equifax
announced a nationwide data breach affecting an estimated 143
million Americans (the "Data Breach"). According to Equifax's
statement, unauthorized parties accessed consumers' sensitive,
personal information was exploited through a "website application
vulnerability" on Equifax's servers. The information included
names, birth dates, Social Security numbers, addresses and some
driver's license numbers, 209,000 U.S. credit card numbers, and
"certain dispute documents with personal identifying information
for approximately 182,000 U.S. consumers" (collectively "Personal
Information"). The Data Breach occurred because Equifax failed to
implement adequate security measures to safeguard consumers'
Personal Information and willfully ignored known weaknesses in its
data security, including prior hacks into its information systems.
Unauthorized parties routinely attempt to gain access to and steal
personal information from networks and information systems-
especially from entities such as Equifax, which are known to
possess a large number of individuals' valuable personal and
financial information.  As a result of Equifax's willful failure
to prevent the breach, Plaintiffs and Class members have been
exposed to fraud, identity theft, and financial harm, as detailed
below, and to a heightened, imminent risk of such harm in the
future. Plaintiff and Class members have to monitor their
financial accounts and credit histories more closely and
frequently to guard against identity theft. Class members also
have incurred, and will continue to incur, additional out-of-
pocket costs for obtaining credit reports, credit freezes, credit
monitoring services, and other protective measures in order to
detect, protect, and repair the Data Breach's impact on their
Personal Information for the remainder of their lives. Plaintiffs
and Class members anticipate spending considerable time and money
for the rest of their lives in order to detect and respond to the
impact of the Data Breach.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Roy E. Barnes, Esq.
          John R. Bevis, Esq.
          J. Cameron Tribble, Esq.
          THE BARNES LAW GROUP, LLC
          31 Atlanta Street
          Marietta, GA 30060
          Telephone: (770) 419 8505
          Facsimile: (770) 590 8958
          E-mail: roy@barneslawgroup.com
                  bevis@barneslawgroup.com
                  ctribble@barneslawgroup.com

               - and -

          Norman E. Siegel, Esq.
          Barrett J. Vahle, Esq.
          J. Austin Moore, Esq.
          STUEVE SIEGEL HANSON LLP
          460 Nichols Road, Suite 200
          Kansas City, MO 64112
          Telephone: (816) 714 7100
          Facsimile: (816) 714 7101
          E-mail: siegel@stuevesiegel.com
                  vahle@stuevesiegel.com
                  moore@stuevesiegel.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Derby" Suit over Data Breach
------------------------------------------------
MELISSA DERBY, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX, INC., a Georgia corporation,
the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-01186-JFC (W.D. Pa., Sep. 8,
2017), seeks remedies including but not limited to statutory
damages under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, reimbursement of out-
of-pocket losses, further credit monitoring services with
accompanying identity theft insurance, and improved data security.

This is a data breach class action on behalf of some 143 million
consumers whose personal identifying information ("PII") including
dates of birth, names, addresses, Social Security numbers
("SSNs"), driver's license numbers, and other personal information
was taken in a cyber-attack from Equifax.

According to the complaint, Equifax failed to adequately safeguard
consumers' PII because it lacked proper safeguards to maintain
security of Plaintiff's and Class Members' personal information.
Equifax's lack of reasonable security provided a means for
unauthorized intruders to access Equifax's computer network and
steal consumers' sensitive PII. According to Equifax's September
7, 2017 announcement of the data breach, the breach occurred "from
mid-May through July 2017" and compromised data included "names,
Social Security numbers, birth dates, addresses and, in some
instances, driver's license numbers. In addition, credit card
numbers for approximately 209,000 U.S. consumers, and certain
dispute documents with personal identifying information for
approximately 182,000 U.S. consumers, were accessed." Despite the
fact that around 143 million customers had PII that was accessed
as a result of the breach, according to their September 7, 2017
announcement, Equifax is only planning to "send direct mail
notices to consumers whose credit card numbers or dispute
documents with personal identifying information were impacted."
This constitutes less than 3% of those affected by the breach.

In its September 7, 2017 announcement, Equifax indicated it had
"established a dedicated website, www.equifaxsecurity2017.com, to
help consumers determine if their information has been potentially
impacted and to sign up for credit file monitoring and identity
theft protection." Plaintiff visited Equifax's website on
September 8, 2017 and was informed that "we believe that your
personal information may have been impacted by this incident."
Armed with the sensitive information obtained through the breach,
data thieves can incur fraudulent debts; open new financial or
utility accounts in a victim's name; use the victim's information
to obtain government benefits; file fraudulent tax return using
the victim's information to obtain a tax refund; obtain a driver's
license or identification card in the victim's name but with
another person's picture; and give false information to police
during an arrest, amongst other things. As a result of the breach,
Plaintiff and members of the Class are exposed to a heightened and
imminent risk of fraud and identity theft and must now closely
monitor their financial accounts to guard against identity theft
well into the future. As a result, Plaintiff and Class Members may
be faced with fraudulent debt, incur out of pocket costs for,
among other things, obtaining credit reports, credit freezes, or
other protective measures to deter and detect identity theft.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph N. Kravec, Jr., Esq.
          Wyatt A. Lison, Esq.
          FEINSTEIN DOYLE PAYNE & KRAVEC, LLC
          Law & Finance Building, Suite 1300
          429 Fourth Avenue
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219-1639
          Telephone: (412) 281 8400
          Facsimile: (412) 281 1007
          E-mail: jkravec@fdpklaw.com
                  wlison@fdpklaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Durham" Suit in Northern Dist. of Georgia
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Equifax, Inc. The
case is captioned as Timothy Durham, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Equifax, Inc. and
Does 1-50, the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-03452-ELR (N.D. Ga.,
Sep. 8, 2017). The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Eleanor L.
Ross.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Tina Wolfson, Esq.
          Theodore Walter Maya, Esq.
          AHDOOT AND WOLFSON, APC
          1016 Palm Avenue
          West Hollywood, CA 90069
          Telephone: (310) 474 9111
          Facsimile: (310) 474 8585
          E-mail: twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com
                  tmaya@ahdootwolfson.com

               - and -

          Ranse M. Partin, Esq.
          CONLEY GRIGGS PARTIN, LLP - GA
          4200 Northside Parkway, NW
          Atlanta, GA 30327
          Telephone: (404) 467 1155
          Facsimile: (404) 467 1166
          E-mail: ranse@conleygriggs.co

Equifax is represented by:

          David Lewis Balser, Esq.
          Elizabeth Dees Adler, Esq.
          John Christopher Toro, Esq.
          Phyllis Buchen Sumner, Esq.
          Sidney Stewart Haskins, II, Esq.
          KING & SPALDING, LLP-ATL 40
          1180 Peachtree Street, NE, 40th Floor
          Atlanta, GA 30309-3521
          Telephone: (404) 572 4600
          Facsimile: (404) 572 5100
          E-mail: dbalser@kslaw.com
                  eadler@kslaw.com
                  jtoro@kslaw.com
                  psumner@kslaw.com
                  shaskins@kslaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Fiore Sues over Cybersecurity Incident
---------------------------------------------------
JUSTIN FIORE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
1:17-cv-03456-AT (N.D. Ga., Sep. 8, 2017), seeks to remedy the
harms the Plaintiff has suffered on behalf of himself and
similarly situated consumers whose personally identifiable
information was stolen as a result of the Equifax Data Breach.

The Plaintiff brings this class action case against Defendant
Equifax for its massive failures to secure and safeguard
consumers' PII which Equifax collected from various sources in
connection with the operation of its business as a consumer credit
reporting agency, and for failing to provide timely, accurate and
adequate notice to Plaintiff and other Class members that their
PII had been stolen and precisely what types of information were
stolen.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James M. Evangelista, Esq.
          David J. Worley, Esq.
          Kristi Stahnke McGregor, Esq.
          EVANGELISTA WORLEY, LLC
          8100 A. Roswell Road, Suite 100
          Atlanta, GA 30350
          Telephone: (404) 205 8400
          Facsimile: (404) 205 8395
          E-mail: david@ewlawllc.com
                  jim@ewlawllc.com
                  kristi@ewlawllc.com

               - and -

          William B. Federman, Esq.
          Carin L. Marcussen, Esq.
          Joshua D. Wells, Esq.
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 N. Pennsylvania Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120
          Telephone: (405) 235 1560
          Facsimile: (405) 239 2112
          E-mail: wbf@federmanlaw.com
                  clm@federmanlaw.com
                  jdw@federmanlaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Kealy" Suit over Data Breach
------------------------------------------------
VICTORIA KEALY, DEVENN TRIOLA, and DONNA ABBOTT, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v.
EQUIFAX, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-03443-LMM (N.D.
Ga., Sep. 8, 2017), seeks to remedy the harms the Plaintiff has
suffered on behalf of himself and similarly situated consumers
whose PII was stolen as a result of the Equifax Data Breach.

The Plaintiff brings this class action case against Defendant
Equifax for its massive failures to secure and safeguard
consumers' personally identifiable information ("PII") which
Equifax collected from various sources in connection with the
operation of its business as a consumer credit reporting agency,
and for failing to provide timely, accurate and adequate notice to
Plaintiff and other Class members that their PII had been stolen
and precisely what types of information were stolen.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James M. Evangelista, Esq.
          David J. Worley, Esq.
          Kristi Stahnke McGregor, Esq.
          EVANGELISTA WORLEY, LLC
          8100 A. Roswell Road, Suite 100
          Atlanta, GA 30350
          Telephone: (404) 205 8400
          Facsimile: (404) 205 8395
          E-mail: david@ewlawllc.com
                  jim@ewlawllc.com
                  kristi@ewlawllc.com

               - and -

          William B. Federman, Esq.
          Carin L. Marcussen, Esq.
          Joshua D. Wells, Esq.
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 N. Pennsylvania Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120
          Telephone: (405) 235 1560
          Facsimile: (405) 239 2112
          E-mail: wbf@federmanlaw.com
                  clm@federmanlaw.com
                  jdw@federmanlaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Kuss" Suit over Massive Security Breach
-----------------------------------------------------------
Joseph M. Kuss, the Plaintiff, v. Equifax, Inc., the Defendant,
Case No. 1:17-cv-03436-CAP (N.D. Ga., Sep. 8, 2017), seeks
injunctive relief designed to ensure against the recurrence of a
data breach by adopting and implementing best security data
practices to safeguard customers' financial and personal
information and extend credit monitoring services and services to
protect against all types of identity theft, especially including
card theft, credit reports, and fraudulent card charges, and to
provide elevated credit monitoring services to minor and elderly
Class members.

The Plaintiffs bring this action, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated whose personal and non-public
information-including names, Social Security numbers, birth dates,
addresses, driver's license numbers, and credit report histories -
- was compromised in a massive security breach of Equifax computer
servers beginning in May 2017 and lasting through July 2017. As
alleged, the injuries to Plaintiffs and the Class were directly
and proximately caused by Defendant's failure to implement or
maintain adequate data security measures for consumers'
information including Confidential Information. Defendant failed
to take reasonable steps to employ adequate security measures or
to properly protect Confidential Information despite two similar
cyber security breaches to its own system within the last two
years.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David J. Maher, Esq.
          Rodney K. Strong r, Esq.
          GRIFFIN & STRONG, P.C.
          235 Peachtree Street N.E., Suite 400
          Atlanta, GA 30303
          Telephone: (404) 584 9777
          Facsimile: (404) 584 9730


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Lapter" Suit over Data Breach
-------------------------------------------------
ALAIN LAPTER, ANA LAPTER, STACEY J. P. ULLMAN, MICHAEL SLYNE,
JENNIFER PASCUCCI DEMARCO, DANIEL DEMARCO, JR. and PAMELA KLEIN,
Individually and on Behalf of all Others Similarly Situated, the
Plaintiffs, v. EQUIFAX, INC, the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-
03445-CAP (N.D. Ga., Sep. 8, 2017), seeks to recover damages
caused to Plaintiff and the Class and Subclasses caused by
Equifax's violations of law, injunctive relief requiring Equifax
to properly safeguard the Class's personal information on its
computer system or alternatively, remove such personal information
from its computer system.

The Plaintiffs bring this class action pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3), on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated in the United States, who, as a
result of the Breach, had their personal information stolen from
Equifax computer systems, and were damaged.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James M. Evangelista, Esq.
          David J. Worley, Esq.
          Kristi Stahnke McGregor, Esq.
          EVANGELISTAWORLEY, LLC
          8100 A. Roswell Road
          Suite 100 Atlanta, GA 30350
          Telephone: (404) 205 8400
          E-mail: jim@ewlawllc.com
                  david@ewlawllc.com
                  kristi@ewlawllc.com

               - and -

          Howard T. Longman, Esq.
          Michael Klein, Esq.
          Melissa Emert, Esq.
          STULL, STULL & BRODY
          6 East 45th Street
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 687 7230
          Facsimile: (212) 490 2022
          E-mail: hlongman@ssbny.com
                  memert@ssbny.com
                  mklein@ssbny.com


EQUIFAX INC: Lipchitz Sues over Consumer Data Theft
---------------------------------------------------
BRYAN LIPCHITZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
1:17-cv-03457-WSD (N.D. Ga., Sep. 8, 2017), seeks declaration that
Equifax's existing data security measures do not comply with its
contractual obligations and duties of care, and in order to comply
with its contractual obligations and duties of care, Equifax must
implement and maintain reasonable security measures.

The Plaintiff brings this class action case against Defendant
Equifax for its massive failures to secure and safeguard
consumers' personally identifiable information ("PII") which
Equifax collected from various sources in connection with the
operation of its business as a consumer credit reporting agency,
and for failing to provide timely, accurate and adequate notice to
Plaintiff and other Class members that their PII had been stolen
and precisely what types of information were stolen.

The Data Breach was the inevitable result of Equifax's inadequate
approach to data security and the protection of the PII that it
collected during the course of its business. Equifax disregarded
the rights of Plaintiff and Class members by intentionally,
willfully, recklessly, or negligently failing to take adequate and
reasonable measures to ensure its data systems were protected,
failing to disclose to its customers the material fact that it did
not have adequate computer systems and security practices to
safeguard PII, failing to take available steps to prevent and stop
the breach from ever happening, and failing to monitor and detect
the breach on a timely basis. As a result of the Equifax Data
Breach, the PII of the Plaintiff and Class members has been
exposed to criminals for misuse.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James M. Evangelista, Esq.
          David J. Worley, Esq.
          Kristi Stahnke McGregor, Esq.
          EVANGELISTA WORLEY, LLC
          8100 A. Roswell Road, Suite 100
          Atlanta, GA 30350
          Telephone: (404) 205 8400
          Facsimile: (404) 205 8395
          E-mail: david@ewlawllc.com
                  jim@ewlawllc.com
                  kristi@ewlawllc.com

               - and -

          William B. Federman, Esq.
          Carin L. Marcussen, Esq.
          Joshua D. Wells, Esq.
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 N. Pennsylvania Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120
          Telephone: (405) 235 1560
          Facsimile: (405) 239 2112
          E-mail: wbf@federmanlaw.com
                  clm@federmanlaw.com
                  jdw@federmanlaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Martin" Suit over Consumer Data Breach
----------------------------------------------------------
Brian Thompson James Martin, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-03458-LMM (N.D. Ga., Sep. 8, 2017),
seeks declaration that Equifax's existing data security measures
do not comply with its contractual obligations and duties of care,
and in order to comply with its contractual obligations and duties
of care, Equifax must implement and maintain reasonable security
measures.

The Plaintiff brings this class action case against Defendant
Equifax for its massive failures to secure and safeguard
consumers' personally identifiable information ("PII") which
Equifax collected from various sources in connection with the
operation of its business as a consumer credit reporting agency,
and for failing to provide timely, accurate and adequate notice to
Plaintiff and other Class members that their PII had been stolen
and precisely what types of information were stolen.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James M. Evangelista, Esq.
          David J. Worley, Esq.
          Kristi Stahnke McGregor, Esq.
          EVANGELISTA WORLEY, LLC
          8100 A. Roswell Road, Suite 100
          Atlanta, GA 30350
          Telephone: (404) 205 8400
          Facsimile: (404) 205 8395
          E-mail: david@ewlawllc.com
                  jim@ewlawllc.com
                  kristi@ewlawllc.com

               - and -

          William B. Federman, Esq.
          Carin L. Marcussen, Esq.
          Joshua D. Wells, Esq.
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 N. Pennsylvania Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120
          Telephone: (405) 235 1560
          Facsimile: (405) 239 2112
          E-mail: wbf@federmanlaw.com
                  clm@federmanlaw.com
                  jdw@federmanlaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Menzer" Suit over Data Breach
-------------------------------------------------
ALLAN MENZER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
1:17-cv-03459-MHC (N.D. Ga., Sep. 8, 2017), seeks declaration that
Equifax's existing data security measures do not comply with its
contractual obligations and duties of care, and in order to comply
with its contractual obligations and duties of care, Equifax must
implement and maintain reasonable security measures.

The Plaintiff brings this class action case against Defendant
Equifax for its massive failures to secure and safeguard
consumers' personally identifiable information ("PII") which
Equifax collected from various sources in connection with the
operation of its business as a consumer credit reporting agency,
and for failing to provide timely, accurate and adequate notice to
Plaintiff and other Class members that their PII had been stolen
and precisely what types of information were stolen.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James M. Evangelista, Esq.
          David J. Worley, Esq.
          Kristi Stahnke McGregor, Esq.
          EVANGELISTA WORLEY, LLC
          8100 A. Roswell Road, Suite 100
          Atlanta, GA 30350
          Telephone: (404) 205 8400
          Facsimile: (404) 205 8395
          E-mail: david@ewlawllc.com
                  jim@ewlawllc.com
                  kristi@ewlawllc.com

               - and -

          William B. Federman, Esq.
          Carin L. Marcussen, Esq.
          Joshua D. Wells, Esq.
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 N. Pennsylvania Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120
          Telephone: (405) 235 1560
          Facsimile: (405) 239 2112
          E-mail: wbf@federmanlaw.com
                  clm@federmanlaw.com
                  jdw@federmanlaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Pagliarulo" Suit over Data Breach
-----------------------------------------------------
JOHN J. PAGLIARULO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-03460-ELR (N.D. Ga., Sep. 8, 2017),
seeks declaration that Equifax's existing data security measures
do not comply with its contractual obligations and duties of care,
and in order to comply with its contractual obligations and duties
of care, Equifax must implement and maintain reasonable security
measures.

The Plaintiff brings this class action case against Defendant
Equifax for its massive failures to secure and safeguard
consumers' personally identifiable information ("PII") which
Equifax collected from various sources in connection with the
operation of its business as a consumer credit reporting agency,
and for failing to provide timely, accurate and adequate notice to
Plaintiff and other Class members that their PII had been stolen
and precisely what types of information were stolen.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James M. Evangelista, Esq.
          David J. Worley, Esq.
          Kristi Stahnke McGregor, Esq.
          EVANGELISTA WORLEY, LLC
          8100 A. Roswell Road, Suite 100
          Atlanta, GA 30350
          Telephone: (404) 205 8400
          Facsimile: (404) 205 8395
          E-mail: david@ewlawllc.com
                  jim@ewlawllc.com
                  kristi@ewlawllc.com

               - and -

          William B. Federman, Esq.
          Carin L. Marcussen, Esq.
          Joshua D. Wells, Esq.
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 N. Pennsylvania Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120
          Telephone: (405) 235 1560
          Facsimile: (405) 239 2112
          E-mail: wbf@federmanlaw.com
                  clm@federmanlaw.com
                  jdw@federmanlaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Barker" Suit in Northern Dist. of California
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Equifax, Inc. The
case is captioned as Patrick Barker, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, the Equifax, Inc. and Does 1 to 10,
inclusive, the Defendant, Case No. 8:17-cv-01560-JAK-KS (N.D.
Cal., Sep. 8, 2017). The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge John
A. Kronstadt.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jerusalem F Beligan, Esq.
          Brian D Chase, Esq.
          BISNAR CHASE LLP
          1301 Dove Street Suite 120
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 752 2999
          Facsimile: (949) 752 2777
          E-mail: jbeligan@bisnarchase.com
                  bchase@bisnarchase.com


EQUIFAX INC: Pugliese Sues over Consumer Data Breach
----------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH PUGLIESE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-03461-CAP (N.D. Ga., Sep. 8, 2017),
seeks declaration that Equifax's existing data security measures
do not comply with its contractual obligations and duties of care,
and in order to comply with its contractual obligations and duties
of care, Equifax must implement and maintain reasonable security
measures.

The Plaintiff brings this class action case against Defendant
Equifax for its massive failures to secure and safeguard
consumers' personally identifiable information ("PII") which
Equifax collected from various sources in connection with the
operation of its business as a consumer credit reporting agency,
and for failing to provide timely, accurate and adequate notice to
Plaintiff and other Class members that their PII had been stolen
and precisely what types of information were stolen.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James M. Evangelista, Esq.
          David J. Worley, Esq.
          Kristi Stahnke McGregor, Esq.
          EVANGELISTA WORLEY, LLC
          8100 A. Roswell Road, Suite 100
          Atlanta, GA 30350
          Telephone: (404) 205 8400
          Facsimile: (404) 205 8395
          E-mail: david@ewlawllc.com
                  jim@ewlawllc.com
                  kristi@ewlawllc.com

               - and -

          William B. Federman, Esq.
          Carin L. Marcussen, Esq.
          Joshua D. Wells, Esq.
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 N. Pennsylvania Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120
          Telephone: (405) 235 1560
          Facsimile: (405) 239 2112
          E-mail: wbf@federmanlaw.com
                  clm@federmanlaw.com
                  jdw@federmanlaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: Ruscitto Sues over Massive Data Breach
---------------------------------------------------
ALBERT RUSCITTO, on behalf of himself, and others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
1:17-cv-03444-MHC (N.D. Ga., Sep. 8, 2017), seeks equitable relief
and damages as a result from Defendant's substandard security
practices leading to data breach.

According to the complaint, because it failed to adequately
safeguard Plaintiff's and the Class Members' personal information,
Equifax was recently hacked by cyber criminals. The breach
occurred between mid-May and July 2017. Equifax has stated that it
discovered the hack on July 29, 2017. As many as 143 million
Americans' personal information has been compromised as a direct
result of Equifax's failure to properly safeguard this valuable
information. Plaintiff is a customer harmed by Equifax's
substandard security practices which led to the Breach.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph Coomes, Esq.
          MCCONNELL & SNEED, LLC
          990 Hammond Drive, Suite 840
          Atlanta, GA 30328
          Telephone: (404) 220 9994
          Facsimile: (404) 665 3090

               - and -

          Jeffrey S. Goldenberg, Esq.
          GOLDENBERG SCHNEIDER, LPA
          One West Fourth Street, 18th Floor
          Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
          Telephone: (513) 345 8291
          Facsimile: (513) 345 8294

               - and -

          Gary E. Mason, Esq.
          Jennifer S. Goldstein, Esq.
          WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON LLP
          5101 Wisconsin Ave. NW, Ste. 305
          Washington, D.C. 20001
          Telephone: (202) 429 2290
          Facsimile: (202) 640 1164

               - and -

          Christian A. Jenkins, Esq.
          MINNILO & JENKINS CO., LPA
          2712 Observatory Avenue
          Cincinnati, Ohio 45208
          Telephone: (513) 723 1600
          Facsimile: (513) 723 1620


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Samson" Suit over Cybersecurity Breach
----------------------------------------------------------
NIDA SAMSON, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
1:17-cv-03448-AT (N.D. Ga., Sep. 8, 2017), seeks remedies
including but not limited to reimbursement of out-of-pocket
losses, further credit monitoring services with accompanying
identity theft insurance, and improved data security.

This case is a class action on behalf of the 143 million
individuals whose sensitive personal identifying information was
compromised in a cybersecurity breach of Equifax, which was
announced on September 7, 2017. According to Equifa's public
announcement of the Equifax Breach, the compromised information
includes Social Security numbers, birth dates, addresses and, in
some instances, driver's license numbers. Also, hackers accessed
credit card numbers and certain dispute documents with personal
identifying information for some consumers. Equifax failed to
adequately protect consumers' sensitive personal identifying
information.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lisa L. Heller, Esq.
          ROBBINS ROSS ALLOY BELINFANTE LITTLEFIELD LLC
          999 Peachtree Street, N.E. Suite 1120
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (678) 701 9381
          Facsimile: (404) 856 3250

               - and -

          Naumon A. Amjed, Esq.
          Joshua D'Ancona, Esq.
          Ethan J. Barlieb, Esq.
          Meredith L. Lambert, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ
          MELTZER & CHECK LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087
          Telephone: (610) 667 7706
          Facsimile: (610) 667 7056

               - and -

          David H. Thompson, Esq.
          Davis Cooper, Esq.
          COOPER & KIRK, PLLC
          1523 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
          Washington, D.C. 20036
          Telephone: (202) 220 9600
          Facsimile: (202) 220 9601


EQUIFAX INC: Washburn Sues over Cybersecurity Data Breach
---------------------------------------------------------
John WASHBURN, Avery ASH, and Cassandra POWERS, James FINDLAY,
AmySue TAYLOR, and Evelyn GUALANDI, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. EQUIFAX,
INC., the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-03451-MHC (N.D. Ga., Sep. 8,
2017), seeks to recover monetary damages, injunctive relief, and
other remedies for violations of state statutes and the common
law.

This action arises out of the massive failure by Equifax, a
leading credit-reporting company, to safeguard some of the most
sensitive financial and personal information of over 143 million
individuals across the U.S., including Plaintiffs. On September 7,
2017, Equifax announced that a giant cybersecurity data breach had
occurred in its data systems from mid-May through July 2017.


Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kenneth S. Canfield, Esq.
          DOFFERMYRE SHIELDS CANFIELD & KNOWLES, LLC
          1355 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 1900
          Atlanta, Georgia 30309
          Telephone: (404) 881 8900
          E-mail: kcanfield@dsckd.com

               - and -

          James Pizzirusso, Esq.
          Richard Lewis, Esq.
          HAUSFELD
          1700 K St. NW, Suite 650
          Washington, D.C. 20006
          Telephpone: (202) 540 7200
          E-mail: jpizzirusso@hausfeld.com
                  rlewis@hausfeld.com

               - and -

          Pat A. Cipollone, P.C., Esq.
          Robert B. Gilmore, Esq.
          STEIN MITCHELL MUSE
          CIPOLLONE & BEATO LLP
          1100 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
          Washington, D.C. 20036
          Telephone: 202 737 7777
          E-mail: pcipollone@steinmitchell.com
                  rgilmore@steinmitchell.com

               - and -

          Andrew N. Friedman, Esq.
          Douglas J. McNamara, Esq.
          Sally Handmaker, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN, SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
          1100 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 500
          Washington, D.C. 20005
          Telephone (202) 408 4600
          E-mail: afriedman@cohenmilstein.com
                  dmcnamara@cohenmilstein.com
                  shandmaker@cohenmilstein.com

               - and -

          Adam J. Levitt, Esq.
          Amy E. Keller, Esq.
          Daniel R. Ferri, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT & CASEY LLC
          Ten North Dearborn Street, Eleventh Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 214 7900
          E-mail: alevitt@dlcfirm.com
                  akeller@dlcfirm.com
                  dferri@dlcfirm.com


EQUIFAX INC: Wolf Sues over Data Security Breach
------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL WOLF, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
1:17-cv-03450-LMM (N.D. Ga., Sep. 8, 2017), seeks monetary and
nonmonetary relief on behalf of over 140 million individuals
across the country who were harmed by Equifax, Inc.'s failure to
adequately protect credit reports and personal information.

According to the complaint, unidentified hackers exploited a
security vulnerability in the web site for Equifax. As a result of
the breach, unauthorized persons gained access to personal
information belonging to more than 140 million individuals in the
United States. According to Equifax, the data exposed in the
breach includes highly sensitive information, including names,
birthdates, addresses, social security numbers, and driver's
license numbers.

Equifax is a global provider of information solutions and human
resources business process outsourcing services for businesses,
governments and consumers. Equifax maintains databases of consumer
and business information derived from numerous sources including
credit, financial assets, telecommunications and utility payments,
employment, income, demographic and marketing data. The Company
uses statistical techniques and proprietary software tools to
analyze all data to create solutions and services for its
clients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          G. Franklin Lemond, Jr., Esq.
          E. Adam Webb, Esq.
          WEBB, KLASE & LEMOND, LLC
          1900 The Exchange, S.E., Suite 480
          Atlanta, GA 30339
          Telephone: (770) 444 9325
          Facsimile: (770) 217 950
          E-mail: Adam@WebbLLC.com
                  Franklin@WebbLLC.com

                - and -

          David H. Fink, Esq.
          Darryl Bressack, Esq.
          Nathan J. Fink, Esq.
          FINK & ASSOCIATES LAW
          38500 Woodward Ave., Suite 350
          Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304
          Telephone: (248) 971 2500
          Facsimile: (248) 971 2600
          E-mail: dfink@finkandassociateslaw.com
                  dbressack@finkandassociateslaw.com
                  nfink@finkandassociateslaw.com


EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Accused by "Lang" Suit of Violating FCRA
-------------------------------------------------------------
DAN LANG and RUSSELL PANTEK, individually and on behalf of those
similarly situated v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC, a Georgia
limited liability company, Case No. 1:17-cv-06519 (N.D. Ill.,
September 10, 2017), accuses the Defendant of violating the Fair
Credit Reporting Act by failing to properly safeguard the
information of the Plaintiffs and Class members.

On July 29, 2017, Equifax discovered that one or more of its
servers, which contained the Plaintiffs' sensitive personal
information had been breached or "hacked" by a still unknown third
party.

Equifax Information Services, LLC is a limited liability company
incorporated under the laws of the state of Georgia with its
principal place of business located in Atlanta, Georgia, and doing
business in the state of Ohio.  Equifax is a "Consumer Reporting
Agency."[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr.
          Nickolas J. Hagman, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          77 W. Washington Street, Suite 1220
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 440-0020
          Facsimile: (312) 440-4180
          E-mail: tom@attorneyzim.com
                  nick@attorneyzim.com

               - and -

          Robert A. Clifford, Esq.
          Shannon M. McNulty, Esq.
          CLIFFORD LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          120 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 3100
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 899-9090
          Facsimile: (312) 899-9090
          E-mail: rac@cliffordlaw.com
                  smm@cliffordlaw.com

               - and -

          Marc E. Dann, Esq.
          Brian D. Flick, Esq.
          DANNLAW
          P.O. Box 6031040
          Cleveland, OH 44103
          Telephone: (216) 373-0539
          Facsimile: (216) 373-0536
          E-mail: mdann@dannlaw.com
                  bflick@dannlaw.com

               - and -

          Rusty Payton, Esq.
          PAYTONDANN ATTORNEYS
          115 S. LaSalle Street, Suite 2600
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 702-1000
          E-mail: payton@paytondann.com

               - and -

          David H. Krieger, Esq.
          HAINES & KRIEGER, LLC
          8985 S. Eastern Avenue, Suite 350
          Henderson, NV 89123
          Telephone: (702) 880-5554
          Facsimile: (702) 385-5518
          E-mail: dkrieger@hainesandkrieger.com

               - and -

          Matthew I. Knepper, Esq.
          Miles N. Clark, Esq.
          KNEPPER & CLARK LLC
          10040 W. Cheyenne Ave., Suite 170-109
          Las Vegas, NV 89129
          Telephone: (702) 825-6060
          Facsimile: (702) 447-8048
          E-mail: matthew.knepper@knepperclark.com
                  miles.clark@knepperclark.com

               - and -

          Sean N. Payne, Esq.
          PAYNE LAW FIRM LLC
          9550 S. Eastern Ave., Suite 253-A213
          Las Vegas, NV 89123
          Telephone: (702) 952-2733
          Facsimile: (702) 462-7227
          E-mail: seanpayne@spaynelaw.com


EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Faces "Knepper" Class Suit Over Data Breach
----------------------------------------------------------------
TERRANCE KNEPPER, individually, and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC, Case
No. 2:17-cv-02368 (D. Nev., September 10, 2017), arises out of the
Defendant's alleged violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act in
connection with a data breach.

On July 29, 2017, Equifax discovered that one or more of its
servers, which contained the Plaintiff's and Class members'
sensitive personal information had been breached or "hacked" by a
still unknown third party.

Equifax Information Services, LLC, is a limited liability company
incorporated under the laws of the state of Georgia with its
principal place of business located in Atlanta, Georgia and doing
business in the state of Nevada.  Equifax regularly assembles and
evaluates consumer credit information for the purpose of
furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and uses interstate
commerce to prepare and furnish the reports.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David H. Krieger, Esq.
          George Haines, Esq.
          HAINES & KRIEGER, LLC
          8985 S. Eastern Ave., Suite 350
          Henderson, NV 89123
          Telephone: (702) 880-5554
          Facsimile: (702) 385-5518
          E-mail: dkrieger@hainesandkrieger.com
                  ghaines@hainesandkrieger.com

               - and -

          Matthew I. Knepper, Esq.
          Miles N. Clark, Esq.
          KNEPPER & CLARK LLC
          10040 W. Cheyenne Ave., 170-109
          Las Vegas, NV 89129
          Telephone: (702) 825-6060
          Facsimile: (702) 447-8048
          E-mail: matthew.knepper@knepperclark.com
                  miles.clark@knepperclark.com

               - and -

          Sean N. Payne, Esq.
          PAYNE LAW FIRM LLC
          9550 S. Eastern Ave., Suite 253-A213
          Las Vegas, NV 89123
          Telephone: (702) 952-2733
          Facsimile: (702) 462-7227
          E-mail: seanpayne@spaynelaw.com

               - and -

          Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr., Esq.
          Nickolas J. Hagman, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          77 W. Washington Street, Suite 1220
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 440-0020
          Facsimile: (312) 440-4180
          E-mail: tom@attorneyzim.com
                  nick@attorneyzim.com

               - and -

          Robert A. Clifford, Esq.
          Shannon M. McNulty, Esq.
          CLIFFORD LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          120 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 3100
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 899-9090
          E-mail: rac@cliffordlaw.com
                  smm@cliffordlaw.com

               - and -

          Marc E. Dann, Esq.
          Brian D Flick, Esq.
          DANNLAW
          P.O. Box 6031040
          Cleveland, OH 44103
          Telephone: (216) 373-0539
          Facsimile: (216) 373-0536
          E-mail: mdann@dannlaw.com
                  bflick@dannlaw.com


EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Fails to Safeguard Info, "Kendall" Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER JOHN KENDALL, individually and on behalf of those
similarly situated v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC, Case No.
1:17-cv-06922 (D.N.J., September 8, 2017), challenges the actions
of the Defendant in the protection and safekeeping of the
Plaintiff's and Class members' personal information.

On July 29, 2017, Equifax discovered that one or more of its
servers, which contained the Plaintiff's sensitive personal
information had been breached or "hacked" by a still unknown third
party.

Mr. Kendall alleges that the Defendant failed to properly
safeguard his and Class members' information.

Equifax Information Services, LLC is a limited liability
corporation incorporated under the laws of the state of Georgia
with its principal place of business located in Atlanta, Georgia.
Equifax is a "Consumer Reporting Agency."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Javier L. Merino, Esq.
          DANNLAW
          1 Meadowlands Plaza, Suite 200
          East Rutherford, NJ 07073
          Telephone: (216) 373-0539
          Facsimile: (216) 373-0536
          E-mail: jmerino@dannlaw.com

               - and -

          Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr.
          ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          77 W. Washington Street, Suite 1220
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 440-0020
          Facsimile: (312) 440-4180
          E-mail: tom@attorneyzim.com

               - and -

          Robert A. Clifford, Esq.
          Shannon M. McNulty, Esq.
          CLIFFORD LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          120 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 3100
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 899-9090
          Facsimile: (312) 899-9090
          E-mail: rac@cliffordlaw.com
                  smm@cliffordlaw.com

               - and -

          David H. Krieger, Esq.
          George Haines, Esq.
          HAINES & KRIEGER, LLC
          8985 S. Eastern Avenue, Suite 350
          Henderson, NV 89123
          Telephone: (702) 880-5554
          Facsimile: (702) 385-5518
          E-mail: dkrieger@hainesandkrieger.com
                  ghaines@hainesandkrieger.com

               - and -

          Matthew I. Knepper, Esq.
          Miles N. Clark, Esq.
          KNEPPER & CLARK LLC
          10040 W. Cheyenne Ave., Suite 170-109
          Las Vegas, NV 89129
          Telephone: (702) 825-6060
          Facsimile: (702) 447-8048
          E-mail: matthew.knepper@knepperclark.com
                  miles.clark@knepperclark.com

               - and -

          Sean N. Payne, Esq.
          PAYNE LAW FIRM LLC
          9550 S. Eastern Ave., Suite 253-A213
          Las Vegas, NV 89123
          Telephone: (702) 952-2733
          Facsimile: (702) 462-7227
          E-mail: seanpayne@spaynelaw.com


EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Fails to Safeguard Info, "McCall" Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
RICHARD MCCALL, individually, and of behalf of all similarly
situated individuals v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC, Case
No. 2:17-cv-02367 (D. Nev., September 10, 2017), arises from the
Defendant's alleged violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act in
connection with its failure to properly safeguard the information
of the Plaintiff and Class members.

On July 29, 2017, Equifax discovered that one or more of its
servers, which contained the Plaintiff's and Class members'
sensitive personal information had been breached or "hacked" by a
still unknown third party.  According to Equifax, the PII
implicated in the Data Breach had potentially impacted
approximately 143 million U.S. consumers.

Equifax Information Services, LLC, is a limited liability company
incorporated under the laws of the State of Georgia with its
principal place of business located in Atlanta, and doing business
in the state of Nevada.  Equifax regularly assembles and evaluates
consumer credit information for the purpose of furnishing consumer
reports to third parties, and uses interstate commerce to prepare
and furnish the reports.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David H. Krieger, Esq.
          George Haines, Esq.
          HAINES & KRIEGER, LLC
          8985 S. Eastern Ave., Suite 350
          Henderson, NV 89123
          Telephone: (702) 880-5554
          Facsimile: (702) 385-5518
          E-mail: dkrieger@hainesandkrieger.com
                  ghaines@hainesandkrieger.com

               - and -

          Matthew I. Knepper, Esq.
          Miles N. Clark, Esq.
          KNEPPER & CLARK LLC
          10040 W. Cheyenne Ave., 170-109
          Las Vegas, NV 89129
          Telephone: (702) 825-6060
          Facsimile: (702) 447-8048
          E-mail: matthew.knepper@knepperclark.com
                  miles.clark@knepperclark.com

               - and -

          Sean N. Payne, Esq.
          PAYNE LAW FIRM LLC
          9550 S. Eastern Ave., Suite 253-A213
          Las Vegas, NV 89123
          Telephone: (702) 952-2733
          Facsimile: (702) 462-7227
          E-mail: seanpayne@spaynelaw.com

               - and -

          Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr., Esq.
          Nickolas J. Hagman, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          77 W. Washington Street, Suite 1220
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 440-0020
          Facsimile: (312) 440-4180
          E-mail: tom@attorneyzim.com
                  nick@attorneyzim.com

               - and -

          Robert A. Clifford, Esq.
          Shannon M. McNulty, Esq.
          CLIFFORD LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          120 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 3100
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 899-9090
          Facsimile: (312) 899-9090
          E-mail: rac@cliffordlaw.com
                  smm@cliffordlaw.com

               - and -

          Marc E. Dann, Esq.
          Brian D Flick, Esq.
          DANNLAW
          P.O. Box 6031040
          Cleveland, OH 44103
          Telephone: (216) 373-0539
          Facsimile: (216) 373-0536
          E-mail: mdann@dannlaw.com
                  bflick@dannlaw.com


FCA US: Amended "Spratley" Defective TPMS Suit Partly Dismissed
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Mae A. D'Agostino of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of New York granted in part and denied in part
Chrysler's motion to dismiss the amended complaint in the case
captioned STEVEN SPRATLEY, TIMOTHY CANFIELD, ANDREW CATTANO, JAMES
LETT, DENNIS PECK, SUSAN STEBBINS, YVETTE TAYLOR THOMAS HROMOWYK,
Plaintiffs, v. FCA US LLC, formerly known as Chrysler Group LLC,
Defendant, No. 3:17-CV-0062 (MAD/DEP) (N.D. N.Y.).

The Plaintiffs are eight different individuals, each of whom
separately purchased an allegedly defective vehicle made by
Chrysler.  They allege that Chrysler concealed a known safety
defect in the tire pressure monitoring systems of some of
Chrysler's most popular vehicles, including the Chrysler Town and
Country Minivan, the Dodge Grand Caravan Minivan, the Jeep
Liberty, and the Dodge Journey SUVs.  They allege that Chrysler
has known since 2008 that the valve stems in the vehicles in
question were not sufficiently resistant to corrosion.  Despite
the significant safety risk posed by the defective valve stems in
certain models, Chrysler has failed to warn owners, replace the
unsafe valve stems, or reimburse owners for repairs.

Only two of the Plaintiffs -- Spratley and Hromowyk -- are New
York residents, and Hromowyk is the only Plaintiff who purchased a
car in New York.  Subject matter jurisdiction in this case is
based on the Class Action Fairness Act.  The Plaintiffs assert
four different classes: a New York class, a New Jersey class, an
Ohio class, and a Michigan class.  Each class brings one or more
claims against Chrysler based on applicable state law.

On Feb. 17, 2017, Chrysler filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12 (b)(2).  As Chrysler is a Delaware limited liability company
with its principal place of business in Michigan, Chrysler argued
that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over Chrysler and that
the original complaint should be dismissed in its entirety.  In
response, the Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add Hromowyk -
- the only Plaintiff to both reside in New York and purchase his
car in New York -- as a Plaintiff.  Chrysler then submitted a
supplemental memorandum addressing the Plaintiffs' amended
complaint.  The Plaintiffs responded to the motion to dismiss, and
Chrysler submitted a reply.

Judge D'Agostino agrees with the majority of district courts that
have considered this issue: after Daimler AG v. Bauman,
registration to do business in New York does not amount to consent
to general jurisdiction.  In Daimler, the Supreme Court rejected
the idea that corporations are subject to general jurisdiction in
every state where they conduct substantial business as
"unacceptably grasping."  Since every state in the union has a
business registration statute, treating the registration to do
business in a state as an implicit consent to general jurisdiction
must also be "unacceptably grasping."  Therefore, the Court does
not have general jurisdiction over the Defendant.

Because neither New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Sections
302(a)(1) nor 302(a)(3) apply to Spratley's claims, the Court does
not have personal jurisdiction over Chrysler with regard to
Spratley's claims.  The Court does, however, have personal
jurisdiction over Chrysler with regard to Hromowyk's claims.  As
for the six remaining Plaintiffs who are not New York residents,
Judge D'Agostino says other district courts have recently rejected
similar arguments for the application of pendent personal
jurisdiction.  Furthermore, the exercise of pendent personal
jurisdiction is discretionary, and even if the Court were to have
the authority to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over the
out-of-state Plaintiffs' claims, he declines to do so.

At this time, the Judge declines to apply the first-filed rule to
dismiss this action.  Additionally, for the time being, she will
not consolidate this case with Tomassini v. FCA US LLC because the
two cases are at very different stages of the litigation process.
Instead, the interests of judicial administration and conservation
of resources are best served by staying this case pending the
outcome of the class certification motion in Tomassini, which is
set to be filed in the very near future.

For the stated reasons, Judge D'Agostino granted in part the
Defendant's motion to dismiss as to Plaintiffs Spratley, Canfield,
Cattano, Lett, Peck, Stebbins, and Taylor; and denied in part the
motion as to Plaintiff Hromowyk.  She stayed the case pending the
outcome of the forthcoming class certification motion in
Tomassini, a related case currently pending before the Court.  The
Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of the Memorandum-
Decision and Order on all parties in accordance with the Local
Rules.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 12, 2017 Memorandum-Decision
and Order is available at https://is.gd/9Py3mx from Leagle.com.

Thomas Hromowyk, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel C. Calvert,
Parker Waichman LLP, pro hac vice.

Thomas Hromowyk, Plaintiff, represented by Elmer R. Keach, III,
Law Offices of Elmer Robert Keach, III, P.C., Gary S. Graifman --
mail@kgglaw.com -- Kantrowitz, Goldhammer & Graifman, P.C., Gary
E. Mason -- gmason@wbmllp.com -- Whitfield, Bryson Law Firm, Jason
S. Rathod -- jrathod@classlawdc.com -- pro hac vice, Jay I. Brody,
Jennifer S. Goldstein --  jgoldstein@wbmllp.com -- Whitfield
Bryson & Mason, LLP, pro hac vice & Nicholas A. Migliaccio,
Migliaccio & Rathod LLP.

FCA US LLC, Defendant, represented by Kathy A. Wisniewski --
kwisniewski@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson, Coburn Law Firm, pro
hac vice, Stephen A. D'Aunoy -- sdaunoy@thompsoncoburn.com --
Thompson, Coburn Law Firm, pro hac vice & Alan J. Pope --
mfoltyn@psplawfirm.com -- Pope, Schrader Law Firm.


GLASSDOOR INC: Can Compel Arbitration in Data Breach Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edgardo Ramos of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted Glassdoor's motion to compel
arbitration in the case captioned PAULO PINCARO, MELISSA NAU, and
TIMOTHY L. KEISER, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. GLASSDOOR, INC., Defendant, No.
16 Civ. 6870 (ER) (S.D. N.Y.).

Glassdoor operates a website that provides a database of company
reviews, ratings, salary and benefits information, and job
listings.  The Plaintiffs were website users who registered for
Glassdoor accounts.  Before submitting content, Glassdoor users
must create a free account by registering with a valid email
address, or linking a social media account.  Registrants are
notified that, by creating an account, they agree to be bound the
company's Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.  During the
registration process, registrants are provided with a hyperlink to
the policies.

The Plaintiffs are suing Glassdoor on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated for violations of the Stored
Communications Act, as well as violations of New York State law.
They allege that Glassdoor publically exposed the email addresses
of at least 600,000 of its members, violating their privacy rights
and its own policies.  They contend that confidentiality is
essential to Glassdoor's members, who share negative opinions of
their current or former employers and would be susceptible to
possible retaliation.  Glassdoor moves to compel arbitration and
stay the case pending completion of arbitration, contending that
the Plaintiffs agreed to a mandatory arbitration provision in the
company's terms of use.

Judge Ramos held that the 2016 Terms of Use has broad language
that commits to arbitration any and all disputes arising under or
related in any way to the agreement.  And, as noted, the 2016
Terms of Use incorporates by reference the American Arbitration
Association Rules, which commit questions of arbitrability to the
arbitrator.  Therefore, it is for the arbitrator -- and not the
Court -- to decide the issue of whether the parties entered into a
valid and enforceable arbitration agreement.

With respect to Glassdoor's request that the case be stayed while
the parties proceed to arbitration, Judge Ramos noted that the
Second Circuit has held that a district court must stay an action
-- rather than dismiss it -- if a party so requests, even if all
the claims are sent to arbitration.  Accordingly, the Court will
retain jurisdiction and stay the proceedings in this matter
pending arbitration.

For these reasons, Judge Ramos granted Glassdoor's motion to
compel arbitration.  The parties are instructed to advise the
Court of the outcome of the arbitration.  The Clerk of the Court
is directed to stay the action pending arbitration and terminate
the motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 12, 2017 Opinion and Order
is available at https://is.gd/zRNJwi from Leagle.com.

Paulo Pincaro, Plaintiff, represented by Sergei Lemberg, Lemberg
Law, LLC.

Melissa Nau, Plaintiff, represented by Sergei Lemberg, Lemberg
Law, LLC.

Timothy L. Keiser, Plaintiff, represented by Sergei Lemberg,
Lemberg Law, LLC.

Glassdoor, Inc., Defendant, represented by Stephen L. Saxl --
saxls@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, LLP & Ian Charles Ballon --
Ballon@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, LLP.


                         *     *     *


Adam Klasfeld, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
sending 600,000 job hunters to arbitration, a federal judge in
Manhattan said his court is the wrong venue for claims that
Glassdoor exposed its users' personal information.

With a name suggesting transparency and opportunity, Glassdoor
lets users post reviews of their employers and browse through
reports about the salary and benefits available at companies where
they might seek future jobs.

Confidentiality is essential to the billion-dollar business -- a
point three Glassdoor users led by Pablo Pincaro emphasized when
they brought a federal class action last year to make the company
pay for breaching theirs.

In July 2016, one month before the users filed suit in New York,
they received a notice about changes to Glassdoor's terms of use
that allegedly exposed the email addresses of at least 600,000
members.

Right around this time, however, other Silicon Valley giants like
Uber and Airbnb invoked mandatory arbitration clauses to try to
swat away their own legal headaches.

U.S. District Judge Edgardo Ramos ruled that Glassdoor enjoys the
same privilege.

"If the court determines that a valid agreement to arbitrate
exists, the court must then determine whether the particular
dispute falls within the scope of arbitration agreement," Ramos
wrote.

"Here, plaintiffs do not assert that any of their claims fall
outside the Glassdoor's arbitration provision," the 21-page
opinion continues.

Ramos stayed the class action pending the outcome of arbitration.

While class counsel Sergei Lemberg, of Wilton, Conn., did not
respond to a request for comment, Glassdoor applauded the ruling.

"We are pleased that the court agreed with us that our terms of
use govern any disputes between our users and the company," a
spokesman for the company said in an email.

Glassdoor was represented by Stephen Saxl with Greenberg Traurig,
but the attorney was not available to comment.

The ruling fell shortly after the Atlanta-based credit monitoring
company Equifax announced that hackers compromised the sensitive
information of 143 million Americans between mid-May and July of
this year.  Sparking a cascade of litigation, Equifax's belated
announcement of the breach also put it in the crosshairs of New
York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman, whose office opened an
investigation early this month.  Schneiderman's office reached a
deal forcing Equifax to abandon its mandatory arbitration clauses.


GODADDY.COM LLC: Schellenbach Appeals Decision to Ninth Circuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Mark Schellenbach and William Ryder filed an appeal
from a court ruling in their lawsuit styled Mark Schellenbach, et
al. v. GoDaddy.com, LLC, Case No. 2:16-cv-00746-DGC, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Arizona, Phoenix.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sept. 11,
2017, Judge David G. Campbell denied the Plaintiff's request to
reconsider the District Court's order denying their motion for
class certification.

The appellate case is captioned as Mark Schellenbach, et al. v.
GoDaddy.com, LLC, Case No. 17-80189, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioners MARK SCHELLENBACH, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated; and WILLIAM RYDER, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Katie Honecker, Esq.
          ROSE LAW GROUP, P.C.
          7144 E Stetson Drive, Suite 300
          Scottsdale, AZ 85251
          Telephone: (480) 505-3936
          E-mail: khonecker@roselawgroup.com

               - and -

          Christopher D. Jennings, Esq.
          David G. Scott, Esq.
          EMERSON POYNTER LLP
          1301 Scott street
          Little Rock, AR 72202
          Telephone: (501) 907-2555
          E-mail: gdougherty@emersonpoynter.com
                  david@davidgscott.com

               - and -

          John Givens Emerson, Esq.
          EMERSON POYNTER LLP
          830 Apollo Lane
          Houston, TX 77058
          Telephone: (281) 488-8854
          E-mail: jemerson@emersonpoynter.com

Defendant-Respondent GODADDY.COM, LLC, is represented by:

          Aaron M. McKown, Esq.
          COZEN O'CONNOR
          200 S. Biscayne Boulevard
          Miami, FL 33131-2303
          Telephone: (305) 424-9020
          E-mail: amckown@cozen.com

               - and -

          Paula Lynn Zecchini, Esq.
          COZEN O'CONNOR
          999 Third Avenue, Suite 1900
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (206) 373-7213
          E-mail: pzecchini@cozen.com


GOOGLE INC: Faces Gender-Bias Class Action in San Francisco
-----------------------------------------------------------
Matthew Renda, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
three women filed a gender-bias class action in San Francisco,
against Google on September 14, claiming the technology titan pays
them substantially less than men for performing similar work.

Kelly Ellis, Holly Pease and Kelly Wasuri sued in San Francisco
County Superior Court, claiming Google violates California's Equal
Pay Act and other state labor laws by systematically paying them
lower wages for doing the same jobs as their male counterparts.

"Google has discriminated and continues to discriminate against
its female employees by systematically paying them lower
compensation than Google pays to male employees performing
substantially similar work under similar working conditions," the
three plaintiffs say.

Additionally, they claim Google keeps women partitioned in
compensation levels with lower ceilings and routinely thwart
advancement opportunities for female employees by promoting fewer
women and more slowly than males in the company.

Google denies the allegations.

"In relation to this particular lawsuit, we'll review it in
detail, but we disagree with the central allegations," Gina
Scigliano, senior manager of corporate communications at Google,
said in a statement.

The lawsuit comes on the heels of other allegations the company
does not treat male and female employees equally, as the U.S.
Department of Labor is investigating the company for gender
discrimination in its hiring practices.

In April, the Labor Department's regional director Janette Wipper
testified in federal court that Google engaged in "systemic
compensation disparities against women pretty much across the
entire workforce."

Google also vehemently denied the content of Wipper's testimony,
saying it performs annual audits related to pay equity and found
no pay gap.

The issue first came to light during a statistical regression
analysis performed by the Labor Department Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs. Because Google is a federal
contractor, it is required to submit to such audits.

"The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Program's analysis
found six to seven standard deviations between pay for men and
women in nearly every job classification in 2015," the suit says.
"Two standard deviations is considered statistically significant;
six or seven standard deviations means there is a one in a million
chance that the disparity is occurring randomly or by chance."

Plaintiff Ellis was hired by Google in 2010 as a software engineer
on the Google Photos team. Despite four years of experience, she
was hired as a Level 3 engineer -- a level reserved for recent
college graduates.

That same year, a male counterpart was hired for a similar
position on the same team. Having graduated the same year as Ellis
and with similar work experience he was hired as a Level 4
engineer, according to the complaint.

"Google also placed and promoted other male software engineers
with qualifications equal to or less than Ms. Ellis's
qualification into Level 4 and higher on Ms. Ellis's team and on
other similar engineering teams," the suit says.

Furthermore, despite excellent performance reviews, Ellis says
Google denied a promotion she applied for about a year after her
hire date, with the company telling her she wasn't tenured long
enough.

Meanwhile, the men who were already making more than Ellis were
busy getting promoted and moving ahead from their initial salary
points that were already ahead of Ellis, according to the lawsuit.

Ellis resigned in 2015, citing a sexist work culture.

Pease was hired as a corporate network manager in 2005, according
to the complaint.  She arrived at the company with 10 years of
experience as a network engineer, and became data warehouse
manager shortly after being hired.

Despite managing engineering teams that developed software
applications, data warehouses, services and data analytics, Pease
says she was kept on a nontechnical job ladder, meaning lower
salary compensation and less room for upward mobility throughout
the company.

Pease says she actually coached a male counterpart on how to
transition between the nontechnical and technical career ladders
within the company, something he managed to do despite performing
poorly on the technical tests.

But Pease says she was denied the same opportunity, leading her to
resign in 2016 when it became clear Google would not abet her
progress to higher salaries and responsibilities.

Wisuri joined Google in 2012 in the sales division after tech
giant acquired the company she worked for.

At the time of the acquisition, Google placed Wisuri at a Level 2
sales position despite her 2 1/2 years of experience in the sales
department, the lawsuit says. Furthermore, the company added men
with equivalent and less experience to Level 3.

Also, Wisuri says Google kept her in the Sales Enabler career
ladder instead of the Sales ladder, limiting her ability to move
upward through the company and receive just compensation for her
skills and output.

"Almost all of the employees on the Sales teams Ms. Misuri worked
with were men," the complaint says. "About 50% of the employees
she encountered with Sales Enablement jobs, however, were women."

Wisuri also resigned from Google in 2015, citing a lack of
advancement opportunities for women at the company.

Google said on September 14, that it employs several levels of
committees and individuals when determining job levels and
ladders.

"Job levels and promotions are determined through rigorous hiring
and promotion committees, and must pass multiple levels of review,
including checks to make sure there is no gender bias in these
decisions," Scigliano said.

The women seek class certification, all wages due under California
Labor Code plus 10% interest, restitution and damages.

They are represented by James Finberg --
jfinberg@altshulerberzon.com -- of Altshuler Berzon in San
Francisco.


HEADWATERS GROUP: Uncompensated "Elkins" for Overtime Hours
-----------------------------------------------------------
Charles Elkins, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated Plaintiff, v. Headwaters Group Inc. and Gerren Ware,
Defendants, Case No. 5:17-cv-00866, (W.D. Tex., September 7,
2017), seeks minimum wage and overtime compensation for all unpaid
hours worked in excess of forty hours in any workweek, liquidated
damages, reasonable attorney's fees, expert fees, costs and
expenses of this action, prejudgment and post-judgment interest
and such other relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

HGI is a trucking company located at 3506 CR44 Robstown, TX 78380
where Elkins performed construction/maintenance duties at its
dispatch yard. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Chris R. Miltenberger, Esq.
      THE LAW OFFICE OF CHRIS R. MILTENBERGER, PLLC
      1340 N. White Chapel, Suite 100
      Southlake, TX 76092-4322
      Tel: (817) 416-5060
      Fax: (817) 416-5062
      Email: chris@crmlawpractice.com


HSN INC: "McClure" Sues Over Proposed Sale to Liberty Interactive
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Richard McClure, individually on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. HSN, Inc., Courtnee Chun Ulrich, William
Costello, Fiona P. Dias, James M. Follo, Stephanie Anne Kugelman,
Arthur C. Martinez, Thomas J. Mcinerney, Matthew E. Rubel and Ann
M. Sarnoff, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-01279 (D. Del., September
7, 2017), seeks to enjoin, preliminarily and permanently, the sale
of HSN to Liberty Interactive Corporation, rescinding or awarding
Plaintiff rescissory damages in the event that the transaction is
consummated, all damages for breach of fiduciary duties, costs of
this action, including a reasonable allowance for the fees and
expenses of Plaintiff's attorneys and experts and such further
relief for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

HSN shareholders stand to receive 1.650 shares of Liberty's Series
A QVC Group common stock for each share of HSN stock they own
representing approximately $2.1 billion in total value. However,
the merger statement lacks the financial projections for the
company by HSN's financial advisors, Centerview Partners LLC and
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC in conducting the valuation analyses that
support their respective fairness opinions, says the complaint.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Nadeem Faruqi, Esq.
      James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq.
      FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
      685 Third Ave., 26th Fl.
      New Yor006B, NY 10017
      Telephone: (212) 983-9330
      Email: nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
             jwilson@faruqilaw.com

             - and -

      Michael Van Gorder, Esq.
      FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
      20 Montchanin Road, Suite 145
      Wilmington, DE 19807
      Tel: (302) 482-3182
      Email: mvangorder@faruqilaw.com


KITE PHARMA: Shareholders Challenge $10.3 Billion Merger
--------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
Kite Pharma is selling itself too cheaply through an unfair
process to Gilead Sciences, for $180 a share or $10.3 billion,
shareholders say in a federal class action.

The case is captioned, ROBERT BERG, Individually and On Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. KITE PHARMA, INC.,
ARIE BELLDEGRUM, M.D., FACS, DAVID BONDERMAN, FARAH CHAMPSI, IAN
CLARK, ROY DOUMANI, FRANZ HUMER, JOSHUA A. KAZAM, RANNUSSBAUM, JON
PEACOCK, STEVEN B. RUCHEFSKY, OWEN N. WITTE, GILEAD SCIENCES,
INC., and DODGERS MERGER SUB, INC., Defendants, Case 2:17-cv-
06583-RSWL-E (C.D. Cal., September 9, 2017).

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

     Joel E. Elkins Esq.
     WEISSLAW LLP
     9107 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 450
     Beverly Hills, CA 90210
     Telephone: 310/208-2800
     Facsimile: 310/209-2348
     E-mail: jelkins@weisslawllp.com

          - and -

     Brian D. Long, Esq.
     RIGRODSKY & LONG Esq.
     2 Righter Parkway, Suite 120
     Wilmington, DE 19803
     Telephone: 302/295-5310
     Facsimile: 302/654-7530


KITE PHARMA: "Gordon" Suit Seeks to Block Gilead Merger
-------------------------------------------------------
Simon Gordon, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Kite Pharma, Inc., Arie S. Belldegrun,
David Bonderman, Joshua A. Kazam, Owen N. Witte, Farah H. Champsi,
Ian T. Clark, Roy Doumani, Franz Humer, Ran Nussbaum, Jonathan
Peacock, And Steven Ruchefsky, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-01281,
(D. Del., September 7, 2017), seeks to enjoin defendants and all
persons acting in concert with them from proceeding with,
consummating, or closing the acquisition of Kite Pharma by Dodgers
Merger Sub, Inc., a direct and wholly-owned subsidiary of Gilead
Sciences, Inc., rescinding it and setting it aside or awarding
rescissory damages in the event defendants consummate the merger,
costs of this action, including reasonable allowance for
attorneys' and experts' fees and such other and further relief
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Gilead will acquire all of the outstanding shares of Kite Pharma
common stock through an all-cash tender offer at a purchase price
of $180.00 per share. The merger documents omitted the company's
financial projections and the analyses critical in evaluating the
company's offer price, says the complaint. Defendants also agreed
to certain deal protection provisions in the merger agreement that
operate conjunctively to deter other prospects from submitting a
superior offer for Kite. Also, said tender offer represents less
than a 1% premium on the Company's 52-week high of $179.68 per
share.

Kite Pharma, Inc. is a clinical-stage biopharmaceutical company
focused on the development and commercialization of cancer
immunotherapy products to target and kill cancer cells. Kite
Pharma offers engineered autologous cell therapy, which is an
approach to the treatment of cancer. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Nadeem Faruqi, Esq.
      James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq.
      FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
      685 Third Ave., 26th Fl.
      New Yor006B, NY 10017
      Telephone: (212) 983-9330
      Email: nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
             jwilson@faruqilaw.com

             - and -

      Michael Van Gorder, Esq.
      FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
      20 Montchanin Road, Suite 145
      Wilmington, DE 19807
      Tel: (302) 482-3182
      Email: mvangorder@faruqilaw.com


KROGER CO: Court Narrows Claims in "Perez" Consumer Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned SONIA PEREZ,
individually, and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiff, v. THE KROGER CO.; and DOES 1-10,
Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-02448-ODW (AGR) (C.D. Cal.).

Pending before the Court is Defendant The Kroger Co.'s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff Sonia Perez's First Amended Class Action
Complaint (FAC).

This is a consumer product class action. Plaintiff Perez alleges
that Kroger's use of the statement "No Sugar Added" on Kroger 100%
Apple Juice, Kroger 100% "Kroger Apple Juice"), does not comply
with the applicable Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
regulations, specifically 21 C.F.R. Section 101.60(c)(2). Perez
further alleges that Kroger's failure to comply with FDA
regulations violates various California consumer protection
statutes the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
sections 17200, the False Advertising Law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code Sections 17500, and the Consumer's Legal Remedies Act (CLRA).

A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
The determination whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility
standard is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. A court
is generally limited to the pleadings and must construe all
factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Requests for Judicial Notice

The Court first addresses the pending requests for judicial notice
submitted by the parties.

The Court also finds Kroger's Exhibits D-F appropriate for
judicial notice. The FAC already contains an image of the front
label for Kroger Apple Juice but omits the nutrition labeling on
the side of the packaging. A district court ruling on a motion to
dismiss may consider documents whose contents are alleged in a
complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are
not physically attached to the plaintiff's pleading.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Kroger's and Perez's requests for
judicial notice.

Unlawful Prong of UCL

California's UCL prohibits any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act or practice.  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200.
By proscribing any unlawful business practice, 'section 17200
borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful
practices' that the unfair competition law makes independently
actionable.
Kroger argues that Perez's UCL claim should be dismissed for
failure to allege facts that would satisfy the reasonable consumer
test and because the "No Sugar Added" label is not false or
misleading because it is factually true. (Mot. at 7-11.) However,
the reasonable consumer test does not apply to claims brought
under the unlawful prong of the UCL.

Perez alleges that Kroger Apple Juice fails to comply with Section
101.60(c)(2)(iv) because Kroger Apple Juice does not resemble and
substitute for foods that normally contain added sugar. According
to Perez, the food that Kroger Apple Juice resembles and for which
it substitutes is other brands of 100% apple juice from
concentrate, which does not normally contain added sugar. These
allegations in addition to the allegations regarding Perez's
economic injuries discussed further below are sufficient to state
a claim under the unlawful prong of the UCL.

Reasonable Consumer Standard

False advertising claims under the FAL, the CLRA, and the
fraudulent and unfair prongs of the UCL are governed by the
reasonable consumer standard.  Under the reasonable consumer
standard, a plaintiff must show that members of the public are
likely to be deceived by the defendant's representations.
Kroger contends that Perez's claims fail the reasonable consumer
test because the No Sugar Added claim is truthful in that Kroger
Apple Juice does not actually contain added sugar. But Perez's
theory of liability is that Kroger's labeling is misleading
because Kroger Apple Juice is labeled No Sugar Added in violation
of FDA regulation and competitors' juice is not.

Perez has not sufficiently alleged which of the three varieties of
Kroger Apple Juice she actually purchased. Perez merely states
that she purchased one or more containers of Kroger Apple Juice,
which she defines as three separate products.  To satisfy Rule
9(b), Perez must allege which specific product she purchased as a
result of Kroger's purported misrepresentations. Dismissing
complaint when it did not clearly and unambiguously state which
particular food products were purchased. Accordingly, the Court
dismisses Perez's claims under the FAL, the CLRA, and the fraud
and unfair prongs of the UCL.

Standing

Kroger next argues that Perez has failed to establish that she has
statutory standing to bring her claims. The UCL, FAL, and CLRA all
require plaintiffs to demonstrate standing. To have standing under
the UCL, FAL, and CLRA, a plaintiff must allege that she relied on
the defendant's alleged misrepresentation and that she suffered
economic injury as a result.

A plaintiff can satisfy the economic injury requirement by
alleging that he or she would not have bought the product but for
the misrepresentation. Kwikset, 51 Cal. at 329. This is what Perez
has done. Perez alleges that if Kroger Apple Juice had not
included the No Sugar Added claim on the label, she would not have
purchased it or would have paid less for it.

Perez has also sufficiently pleaded reliance. Perez alleges that
she observed the No Sugar Added label on Kroger Apple Juice and
relied on the label in deciding to purchase the Kroger Apple
Juice.  These allegations are sufficient under Kwikset.
The Court finds that Perez has standing to assert her claims.

Primary Jurisdiction

Kroger argues that the Court should dismiss this action under the
primary jurisdiction doctrine because the FAC raises labeling
claims that fall within the scope of ongoing FDA rulemaking
proceedings.

In response, Perez argues that the rulemaking proceedings Kroger
references are unrelated to the claims in the FAC.

Kroger argues that the primary jurisdiction doctrine applies here
because the FDA is actively regulating in this area.  In support,
Kroger points to a final rule published in the Federal Register,
entitled Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement
Facts Panel which provides authority on how "added sugars" should
be listed on the Nutrition Facts Panel.

In response, Perez argues that these regulations are unrelated to
the permitted use of the No Sugar Added claim on a product's front
label.

The Court agrees. Perez's claims concern the lawfulness of the
nutrient claims on the front label, not how added sugars are noted
on the Nutrition Facts Panel.  Reaching a similar conclusion with
regard to the proposed version of this rule.  Because Kroger has
not shown that the FDA is actively engaged in revising the
regulations at issue in this case, or issuing guidance thereon,
the Court declines to dismiss or stay the action pursuant to the
primary jurisdiction doctrine.

Pre-emption

Kroger contends that Perez's state law claims are expressly pre-
empted by federal law, namely the FDCA and the Nutrition Labeling
and Education Act (NLEA), which impose requirements specifically
governing food nutritional content labeling.

Pre-emption is an affirmative defense, so it is Kroger's burden to
establish that it applies.

First, Kroger cites an FDA Inspection Guide for its argument that
the substitute for Kroger Apple Juice is broader than other 100%
apple juice from concentrate products, as Perez alleges. However,
the Inspection Guide provides only a description of general
product categories, not a conclusive list of what constitutes
substitutes for apple juice.  The Court finds the FDA Inspection
guide, which describes general product categories and their
corresponding products, is insufficient to establish that the FDA
views comparison juice products broadly, for the purposes of the
regulation at issue.

Second, Kroger relies on an FDA guidance document entitled Changes
to the Final Nutrition Facts Label: Questions and Answers for its
proposition that the substitutes for Kroger Apple Juice normally
contain sugar. The statement Kroger cites in that document,
however, is a mere passing reference to the percentage of total
calories the average American gets from added sugar, with major
sources being sugar-sweetened beverages. This is not sufficient to
establish that the product category as a whole, as defined by
Kroger, normally contains added sugars.

At this preliminary stage, the Court cannot conclude that Kroger
Apple Juice is in compliance with 21 C.F.R. Section
101.60(c)(2)(iv).

Therefore, the Court declines to dismiss the FAC on express pre-
emption grounds.

Safe Harbor

Kroger also argues that Perez's claims must be dismissed because
the FDCA provides a safe harbor for the conduct Perez alleges
violates the UCL, FAL, and CLRA. In Cel-Tech Communications, Inc.
v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co., the California Supreme
Court held that unfair competition laws cannot be used to attack
certain conduct when specific legislation provides a safe harbor
for that conduct. 20 Cal.4th 163, 182 (1999).

The Court cannot find at this time that Kroger's conduct is in
compliance with the applicable regulations. Thus, the Court
rejects Kroger's arguments for dismissal based on the safe harbor
doctrine.

Accordingly, the Court grants in part and denies in part Kroger's
Motion to Dismiss the FAC and grants Perez leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 18, 2017 Order is
available at http://tinyurl.com/y7ca4pc9from Leagle.com.

Sonia Perez, Plaintiff, represented by Robert K. Friedl --
Robert.Friedl@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Capstone Law APC.

Sonia Perez, Plaintiff, represented by Trisha Kathleen Monesi --
trisha.monesi@capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone Law APC & Bevin
Allen Pike -- Bevin.Pike@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Capstone Law APC.
The Kroger Co., Defendant, represented by Kelsey Marie Stricker --
kstricker@mofo.com -- Morrison and Foerster LLP & Purvi G. Patel -
- ppatel@mofo.com -- Morrison and Foerster LLP.


LAZ PARKING: Faces Class Action for Failing to Pay Overtime
-----------------------------------------------------------
Robert Storace, writing for The Connecticut Law Tribune, reports
that a Georgia man has filed a prospective collective action
lawsuit claiming Connecticut-based LAZ Parking company violated
federal labor laws when it failed to pay for overtime.

The federal lawsuit filed on September 13 in U.S. district court
claims Hartford-based LAZ Parking regularly does not pay assistant
managers overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Unlike a class action suit, employees who want to be part of a
collective action must "opt" in.

Terrell Day, 27, claims in his complaint that he worked more than
40 hours on numerous occasions. It's not clear how much unpaid
overtime Day claims he's owed.

Day worked as an assistant manager and transitioned to a valet
supervisor while working at several locations in Georgia between
January 2016 and March 2017. Day's primary responsibilities
included parking customers' cars.

The lawsuit would cover employees who worked in various assistant
manager positions between Sept. 13, 2014, to the day of judgment
in the current suit.

LAZ leases or owns parking spaces throughout the country and has
around 10,700 employees. It's not clear how many of the employees
are assistant managers.

The lawsuit also states there is a companywide "pattern and
practice of attempting to minimize labor costs by not paying
overtime premiums" to assistant managers.

The lawsuit claims the company should pay assistant managers at
least 1.5 times their base pay rate for work exceeding 40 hours a
week.

Day is represented by Fran Rudich, a partner with Klafter Olsen &
Lesser in Rye Brook, New York.

"Corporations have long sought to unlawfully shield themselves
from paying required wages to workers by intentionally
misclassifying assistant manager positions as exempt from the
overtime laws," Rudich said via email. "Wage theft is wrong, and
this lawsuit seeks to help these assistant managers recover what
they are owed."

The suit seeks designation as an FLSA collective action, unpaid
wages for all hours worked by assistant managers in excess of 40
hours a week, a declaratory judgment that LAZ's practices are
unlawful per the FLSA, and other financial remedies including
attorney fees.

The company has been the target of several lawsuits including at
least one class action.

Most recently, LAZ agreed to pay $5.6 million to settle a lawsuit
with the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority. LAZ was
accused of failing to detect and stop the theft of millions of
dollars in cash belonging to the MBTA.

Separately, the parking company agreed to pay $1.1 million to
Massachusetts to settle allegations it failed to implement
contractually-required revenue controls and auditing tools at 13
MBTA parking lots.

LAZ is also a defendant in a February 2017 class action claiming
the ParkChicago app resulted in false parking tickets. That suit
is still pending.

And, in 2010, LAZ paid $46,000 to settle a U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission religious discrimination lawsuit. In that
case, a Muslim woman who worked for the company in Atlanta said
she was discriminated against for being Muslim when she was fired
for refusing to remove her hijab, a head covering.
Company officials did not respond to a request for comment by
press time.

In addition to Rudich, Day is represented by C. Andrew Head, Esq.
and Donna Johnson, Esq. of Head Law Firm.

The case will be heard by U.S. District Judge Vanessa Bryant in
Hartford. [GN]


LOW COUNTRY LAUNDRY: Faces "McNeil" Suit over Unpaid Wages
----------------------------------------------------------
Veronica R. McNeil, On Behalf of Herself and Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, v. Low Country Laundry & Dry Cleaning
LLC, and Courtney Friedman., individually, the Defendants, Case
No. 2:17-cv-02429-DCN (D.S.C., Sep. 8, 2017), seeks to recover
unpaid wages under the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act and the
Fair Labor Standards Act

The Plaintiff was hired as counter clerk. Plaintiff was later
given the title of manager however she had no actual management
responsibilities. The Plaintiff and similarly situated employees
regularly worked over 40 hours in a work week and were not
compensated at time and half of their hourly rate.

The Plaintiff brings this action as a collective action pursuant
on behalf of herself and other similarly situated employees of the
Defendants who suffered damages as a result of Defendants'
violations of the FLSA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Marybeth Mullaney, Esq.
          MULLANEY LAW
          1037 Chuck Dawley Blvd
          Building D, Suite 104
          Mount Pleasant, SC 29464
          Telephone: (800) 385 8160
          E-mail: marybeth@mullaneylaw.net


MARYLAND: Court Dismisses Claims Against Medical Defendants
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States for the District of Maryland issued a Memorandum
Opinion granting Medical Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case
captioned KEVIN JOHNATHAN SORRICK, Plaintiff, v. DOCTOR LAWRENCE
MANNING, DOCTOR JASON CLEM, DOCTOR PAUL MATERA, SARA JENKINS,
Medical Dept. Manager/Supervisor Registered Nurse, REGISTERED
NURSE JENNIFER PATTERSON, REGISTERED NURSE NANCY BEALER,
PHYSICIANS ASSISTANT PETER STANFORD, SECRETARY STEPHEN MOYER, LT.
GENESIS COPELAND, LT. EVAN WARD, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER SHANIKA
GUSTUS, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER BERNARDO HANDY, TWO UNKNOWN
TRANSPORTATION OFFICERS, WEXFORD UTILIZATION REVIEW MANAGEMENT
COLLEGIAL, WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC. and CORIZON MEDICAL
SERVICES, Defendants, Civil Action No. TDC-16-0709 (D. Md.).

Defendants Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Dr. Lawrence Manning, Dr.
Jason Clem, Dr. Paul Matera, Sara Jenkins, R.N., Jennifer
Patterson, R.N., Nancy Bealer, R.N., and Peter Stanford, P.A.,
Defendants) have filed a Motion to Dismiss, or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment.

Self-represented Plaintiff Kevin Johnathan Sorrick, who is
currently incarcerated at Eastern Correctional Institution in
Westover, Maryland, has brought this civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. Section 1983 against various prison officials and medical
providers in connection with medical care he received for a
shoulder injury sustained while in custody.

Sorrick filed a number of administrative grievances about the
failure to receive a second orthopedic consultation and other
complaints about prison and medical staff. These grievances, and
the manner in which they were handled, form the basis of his claim
against the State Defendants that prison staff interfered with his
medical treatment.

The Amended Complaint generally alleges that the medical and
prison staff were deliberately indifferent to Sorrick's medical
needs relating to his shoulder injury in violation of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Sorrick claims that
the Medical Defendants were careless and disorganized with respect
to his medical treatment. He alleges that the medical staff
repeatedly lost track of his medical records, such as x-rays and
referrals for consultations, which impeded his access to timely
care. He further asserts that on several occasions, appointments
that were ordered by a physician were never made.

Sorrick claims that the Medical Defendants caused unnecessary
delays in providing medical and administrative assistance, leading
to pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He
also alleges that the State Defendants unnecessarily delayed the
processing of the informal complaint and ARPs about the medical
staff's failure to provide an orthopedic consultation and
otherwise to treat his shoulder injury, such that they, too, were
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.

He also seeks damages for pain and suffering.

Currently pending before the Court are several non-dispositive
motions filed by Sorrick and the Medical Defendants.  The Motions
filed by Sorrick are his "Motion for Physical Examination from
Outside Orthopedic Doctor/Surgeon;" "Motion for Complaint to be
Changed/Classified as a Class Action;" Motion for Appointment of
Counsel; Motion for Entry of Default; "First Motion for Production
of Documentation;" "Motion to Deny Defendants' Opposition to
Motion for Class Certification and/or In the Alternative; Motion
to Reconsider Plaintiffs Motion for Complaint to be
Changed/Classified as a Class Action;" "Motion to Deny Defendants'
Motion for Protective Order;" "Motion to Reconsider and Deny
Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time Nunc Pro Tunc to Respond
to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint;" "Motion to Deny Defendants'
Opposition to Motion for Default Judgment;" and "Motion for
Supplemental Facts and Exhaustion of Legal Remedies and
Responses."

Accordingly, the Court finds that the claims against the State
Defendants are subject to dismissal because they were not
administratively exhausted.

The Motion for Physical Examination from Outside Orthopedic
Doctor/Surgeon is denied.

The Motion for Complaint to be Changed/Classified as a Class
Action is denied.

The Motion for Appointment of Counsel is denied.

The Motion for Entry of Default is Denied

The First Motion for Production of Documentation is denied.

The Motion for Protective Order is granted.

The Medical Defendants' Amended Motion to Dismiss, or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment is granted.

The Motion to Seal is granted.

The Motion to Deny Defendants' Opposition to Motion for Class
Certification and/or in the Alternative; Motion to Reconsider
Plaintiffs Motion for Complaint to be Changed/Classified as a
Class Action is denied.

The Motion to Deny Defendants' Motion for Protective Order is
denied.

The Motion to Reconsider and Deny Defendants' Motion for Extension
of Time Nunc Pro Tunc to Respond to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint
is denied.

The Motion to Deny Defendants' Opposition to Motion for Default
Judgment is denied.

The State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint or,
III the Alternative, for Summary Judgment is granted.

The Motion for Supplemental Facts and Exhaustions of Legal
Remedies is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 22, 2017
Memorandum Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/y9lgppql
from Leagle.com.

Kevin Johnathan Sorrick, Plaintiff, Pro Se.

Doctor Lawrence Manning, Defendant, represented by Gina Marie
Smith GSmith@mrrlaw.com -- Meyers Rodbell and Rosenbaum PA &
Joseph B. Chazen -- Jchazen@mrrlaw.com -- Meyers Rodbell and
Rosenbaum PA.

Doctor Jason Clem, Defendant, represented by Gina Marie Smith,
Meyers Rodbell and Rosenbaum PA.

Doctor Paul Matera, Defendant, represented by Gina Marie Smith,
Meyers Rodbell and Rosenbaum PA & Joseph B. Chazen, Meyers Rodbell
and Rosenbaum PA.

Sara Jenkins, Defendant, represented by Gina Marie Smith, Meyers
Rodbell and Rosenbaum PA.

Registered Nurse Jennifer Patterson, Defendant, represented by
Gina Marie Smith, Meyers Rodbell and Rosenbaum PA, Christopher
Michael Balaban, Meyers Rodbell and Rosenbaum PASte 400 6801
Kenilwo, Riverdale, MD, 20737 & Joseph B. Chazen, Meyers Rodbell
and Rosenbaum PA.

Registered Nurse Nancy Bealer, Defendant, represented by Gina
Marie Smith, Meyers Rodbell and Rosenbaum PA, Christopher Michael
Balaban, Meyers Rodbell and Rosenbaum PA & Joseph B. Chazen,
Meyers Rodbell and Rosenbaum PA.

Physicians Assistant Peter Stanford, Defendant, represented by
Gina Marie Smith, Meyers Rodbell and Rosenbaum PA & Joseph B.
Chazen, Meyers Rodbell and Rosenbaum PA.

Secretary Stephen Moyer, Defendant, represented by Thomas E.
Dernoga, Office of the Attorney General.

Warden Kathleen Green, Defendant, represented by Thomas E.
Dernoga, Office of the Attorney General.

Lieutenant Genesis Copeland, Defendant, represented by Thomas E.
Dernoga, Office of the Attorney General.

Lieutenant Evan Ward, Defendant, represented by Thomas E. Dernoga,
Office of the Attorney General.

Correctional Officer Shanika Gustus, Defendant, represented by
Thomas E. Dernoga, Office of the Attorney General.

Correctional Officer Bernardo Handy, Defendant, represented by
Thomas E. Dernoga, Office of the Attorney General.

Wexford Health Sources Inc., Defendant, represented by Gina Marie
Smith, Meyers Rodbell and Rosenbaum PA, Christopher Michael
Balaban, Meyers Rodbell and Rosenbaum PA & Joseph B. Chazen,
Meyers Rodbell and Rosenbaum PA.


NATIONAL OILWELL: Unpaid Overtime Premium Claimed by "Gammill"
--------------------------------------------------------------
Richard Albert Gammill, III, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. National Oilwell Varco, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 4:17-cv-02695, (S.D. Tex., August 7, 2017),
seeks to recover overtime compensation, liquidated damages, post-
judgment interest and attorney's fees and costs under the
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

National Oilwell Varco, Inc. is a nationally-based oil and gas
service company that provides services across every area of
drilling and production throughout every region of the world,
including to clients in the United States. Gammill was employed by
Defendant from 2012 through December 15, 2014 as a solids control
engineer. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      John David Hart, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF JOHN DAVID HART
      Wells Fargo Tower
      201 Main Street, Suite 1260
      Fort Worth, TX 76102
      Tel: (817) 870-2102
      Fax: (817) 332-5858
      Email: johnhart@hartlaw.com


NEW ORLEANS REGIONAL: Jones Seeks to Recover Minimum and OT Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BILL JONES, JENNIFER BRANCH, AND LAURA ROMERO On behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. NEW ORLEANS
REGIONAL PHYSICIAN HOSPITAL ORGANIZATION, INC., DBA PEOPLES HEALTH
NETWORK, Case No. 2:17-cv-08817 (E.D. La., September 8, 2017),
seeks to recover unpaid wages, unpaid minimum wages, unpaid
overtime wages and statutorily authorized liquidated and penalty
damages as well as reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant
to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

New Orleans Regional Physician Hospital Organization, Inc., is a
Louisiana Corporation with its headquarters in Metairie,
Louisiana.  Peoples Health Network is the trade name under which
New Orleans Regional Physician Hospital Organization, Inc.
operates.  Peoples Health is a Medicare Advantage Organization
with a Medicare contract to offer Health Maintenance Organization
plans.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Chad A. Danenhower, Esq.
          DANENHOWER LAW FIRM, LLC
          212 Park Place
          Covington, LA 70433
          Telephone: (985) 590-5026
          Facsimile: (985) 605-0525
          E-mail: chad.danenhower@danenhowerlaw.com

               - and -

          Dale E. Williams, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DALE EDWARD WILLIAMS
          212 Park Place
          Covington, LA 70433
          Telephone: (985) 898-6368
          Facsimile: (985) 892-2640
          E-mail: dale@daleslaw.com


NHCASH.COM LLC: Court Narrows Claims in "Hunter" FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Henry E. Hudson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, Richmond Division, granted Defendant LTD
Financial Services, L.P.'s Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
TINA HUNTER, et al., Plaintiff, v. NHCASH.COM, LLC, et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 3:17cv348-HEH (E.D. VA.).

The Plaintiffs filed the instant Class Action Complaint
("Complaint"), alleging, inter alia, that LTD Financial violated
certain provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA").  They Plaintiffs generally allege that Defendant, a
debt-collection agency, worked systematically to collect or
attempt to collect illegal loans.  The Defendant allegedly sent
the Plaintiffs collection letter in an attempt to collect on their
debts.  Upon information and belief, the Plaintiffs assert that
the Defendant used form letters in its debt collection efforts.

Based on these collection practices, the Plaintiffs allege that
the Defendant violated the FDCPA by: (i) sending letters
containing validation notices that "falsely" stated that they owed
money for an usurious -- and therefore illegal -- debt, in
violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g(a)(1); (ii) sending letters
that misstated the legal status of the Plaintiffs' debts, i.e.,
that the debts were legal and enforceable, in violation of 15
U.S.C. Section 1692e; and (iii) attempting to and actually
collecting debts that were void and unenforceable under Virginia
law, in violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692f.  The Complaint
asserts that the Plaintiffs accordingly seek actual damages,
statutory damages, and reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

In the instant Motion, the Defendant seeks dismissal of the
Plaintiffs' FDCPA claims (Counts IV, V, and VI of the Complaint)
on two separate grounds.  First, the Defendant incorporates the
arguments set forth in the Brief in Support of NHCash Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss to assert that the Agreements preclude the
Plaintiffs from filing suit in the Court, based on the forum
selection and arbitration provisions contained therein.  Second,
the Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' FDCPA claims because the
Plaintiffs have failed to assert a concrete injury necessary to
give them standing in the case.

Judge Hudson finds that the entirety of the Plaintiffs' Complaint
with regard to the Defendant distills to an allegation that
Defendant violated various provisions of the FDCPA by representing
that their debts to the NHCash Defendants were enforceable and by
attempting to collect those debts.  However, it appears undisputed
that the Complaint is devoid of any reference to the Plaintiff
suffering any actual harm as a result of these alleged violations.

Because the Defendants have raised a facial challenge to the
Plaintiffs' standing, the Judge cannot look beyond the face of the
Complaint in its 12(b)(1) analysis.  Therefore, Judge Hudson
concludes that the Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts to
support an assertion that they suffered any harm other than the
bare statutory violation.  This does not mean that the Plaintiffs
could never have standing to bring an action to recover for the
FDCPA violations presently alleged; they must simply plead some
concrete harm in order to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement
of Article III.

Based on these, Judge Hudson dismissed without prejudice Counts
IV, V, and VI of the Complaint.  He directed the clerk to send a
copy of his Memorandum Opinion and the accompanying Order to all
counsel of record.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 12, 2017 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/P9RZab from Leagle.com.

Tina Hunter, Plaintiff, represented by Kristi Cahoon Kelly --
kkelly@kellyandcrandall.com -- Kelly & Crandall PLC.

Tina Hunter, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Joseph Guzzo --
aguzzo@kellyandcrandall.com -- Kelly & Crandall PLC & James Wilson
Speer -- jay@vplc.org -- Virginia Proverty Law Center.

Steven Pike, Plaintiff, represented by Kristi Cahoon Kelly, Kelly
& Crandall PLC, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Kelly & Crandall PLC & James
Wilson Speer, Virginia Proverty Law Center.

Dawn Mays-Johnson, Plaintiff, represented by Kristi Cahoon Kelly,
Kelly & Crandall PLC, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Kelly & Crandall PLC &
James Wilson Speer, Virginia Proverty Law Center.

Julie Johnson, Plaintiff, represented by Kristi Cahoon Kelly,
Kelly & Crandall PLC, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Kelly & Crandall PLC &
James Wilson Speer, Virginia Proverty Law Center.

Dianne Turner, Plaintiff, represented by Kristi Cahoon Kelly,
Kelly & Crandall PLC, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Kelly & Crandall PLC &
James Wilson Speer, Virginia Proverty Law Center.

NHCash.com, LLC, Defendant, represented by Michael Randolph
Shebelskie -- mshebelskie@hunton.com -- Hunton & Williams LLP &
William Howell Wright, Jr. -- cwright@hunton.com -- Hunton &
Williams LLP.

NHCash SPV, LLC, Defendant, represented by Michael Randolph
Shebelskie, Hunton & Williams LLP & William Howell Wright, Jr.,
Hunton & Williams LLP.

NHCash Holdings, Inc., Defendant, represented by Michael Randolph
Shebelskie, Hunton & Williams LLP & William Howell Wright, Jr.,
Hunton & Williams LLP.

Steven Mello, Defendant, represented by Michael Randolph
Shebelskie, Hunton & Williams LLP & William Howell Wright, Jr.,
Hunton & Williams LLP.

LTD Financial Services, L.P., Defendant, represented by John
Connell Altmiller, Jr. -- jaltmiller@pesnerkawamoto.com -- Pesner
Kawamoto Conway PLC.

NHCash.com, LLC, Counter Claimant, represented by Michael Randolph
Shebelskie, Hunton & Williams LLP & William Howell Wright, Jr.,
Hunton & Williams LLP.

NHCash SPV, LLC, Counter Claimant, represented by Michael Randolph
Shebelskie, Hunton & Williams LLP & William Howell Wright, Jr.,
Hunton & Williams LLP.

Steven Mello, Counter Claimant, represented by Michael Randolph
Shebelskie, Hunton & Williams LLP & William Howell Wright, Jr.,
Hunton & Williams LLP.

NHCash Holdings, Inc., Counter Claimant, represented by Michael
Randolph Shebelskie, Hunton & Williams LLP & William Howell
Wright, Jr., Hunton & Williams LLP.

Tina Hunter, Counter Defendant, represented by Kristi Cahoon
Kelly, Kelly & Crandall PLC, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Kelly & Crandall
PLC & James Wilson Speer, Virginia Proverty Law Center.

Julie Johnson, Counter Defendant, represented by Kristi Cahoon
Kelly, Kelly & Crandall PLC, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Kelly & Crandall
PLC & James Wilson Speer, Virginia Proverty Law Center.

Dawn Mays-Johnson, Counter Defendant, represented by Kristi Cahoon
Kelly, Kelly & Crandall PLC, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Kelly & Crandall
PLC & James Wilson Speer, Virginia Proverty Law Center.

Steven Pike, Counter Defendant, represented by Kristi Cahoon
Kelly, Kelly & Crandall PLC, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Kelly & Crandall
PLC & James Wilson Speer, Virginia Proverty Law Center.

Dianne Turner, Counter Defendant, represented by Kristi Cahoon
Kelly, Kelly & Crandall PLC, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Kelly & Crandall
PLC & James Wilson Speer, Virginia Proverty Law Center.


NHCASH.COM LLC: Court Stays "Hunter" Suit Pending Arbitration
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Henry E. Hudson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, Richmond Division, grant in part and denied
in part the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case captioned TINA
HUNTER, et al., Plaintiff, v. NHCASH.COM, LLC, et al., Defendants,
Civil Action No. 3:17cv348-HEH (E.D. VA.).

The Defendants constitute a joint enterprise involved in the
origination and funding of short term loans. NHCash operates a
website through which borrowers apply for loans.

On May 5, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint,
alleging, inter alia, that the Defendants violated the RICO Act,
and Virginia's anti-usury statute.  At the center of the dispute
are the Agreements that the Plaintiffs executed with NHCash when
taking out their respective loans.  The Plaintiffs, as borrowers,
each filled out and electronically signed a form Agreement over
the Internet.

The Agreements set the interest rate for their loans at or around
36%.  The Agreements all contained a provision entitled
"Arbitration," which primarily provided that any claim or dispute
arising from or in any way related to the Agreement must be
resolved by binding arbitration.  The arbitration provision also
established that nothing in the agreement to arbitrate is intended
to prevent either of them from filing a lawsuit in an appropriate
small claims court for an amount that does not exceed that courts
jurisdictional limit; however all other disputes must be
arbitrated.

The Defendants seek to dismiss the Complaint on two grounds, both
stemming from the Open-end Credit Account Agreement each of the
Plaintiff executed with NHCash.  First, the Defendants argue that
venue is improper because the Plaintiffs waived their right to
bring suit in any forum other than small claims court.  Second,
they contend that, to the extent the Plaintiffs seek to bring
claims inappropriate for the jurisdictional limit of small claims
court, the Plaintiffs agreed to resolve any such claims through
individualized and binding arbitration.

Judge Hudson finds that the forum selection clause in the
Agreements is unreasonable in this case because, among other
things, its enforcement would deprive the Plaintiffs of the
remedies available under the RICO Act.  Pursuant to that Act, any
person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court and will recover
threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit.  In
contrast, the forum selection clause in the Agreements limits
signatories to filing a lawsuit in an appropriate small claims
court for an amount that does not exceed that courts
jurisdictional limit.

Because the Plaintiffs can only file suit in a United States
district court to obtain the remedies created by the RICO Act, the
Judge finds that the forum selection clause in this case deprives
the Plaintiffs of remedies that they are entitled by law to
pursue.  As a result, the forum selection clause is unreasonable
and therefore unenforceable.  Accordingly, to the extent that the
Defendants seek dismissal of the Amended Complaint on the basis of
the forum selection clause, the Motion to Dismiss will be denied.

Judge Hudson also finds that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is
indeed applicable in this case.  He additionally finds that the
scope of the arbitration provision encompasses the Plaintiffs'
claims against all the Defendants, not just those against NHCash.
Therefore, even if NHCash were the only Defendant capable of
enforcing the arbitration provision, arbitration would still be
appropriate for all of the Plaintiffs' claims against all of the
Defendants.  The Judge will accordingly stay the case and order
the parties to engage in arbitration.

Based on these, Judge Hudson denied the Defendants' Motion insofar
as it seeks dismissal of the Amended Complaint, but he granted the
Motion to the extent that the Defendants seek to compel
arbitration.  Accordingly, Judge Hudson stayed the action pending
arbitration.  The clerk is directed to send a copy of the
Memorandum and the accompanying Order to all counsel of record.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 12, 2017 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/DllG0U from Leagle.com.

Tina Hunter, Plaintiff, represented by Kristi Cahoon Kelly --
kkelly@kellyandcrandall.com -- Kelly & Crandall PLC.

Tina Hunter, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Joseph Guzzo --
aguzzo@kellyandcrandall.com -- Kelly & Crandall PLC & James Wilson
Speer -- jay@vplc.org -- Virginia Proverty Law Center.

Steven Pike, Plaintiff, represented by Kristi Cahoon Kelly, Kelly
& Crandall PLC, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Kelly & Crandall PLC & James
Wilson Speer, Virginia Proverty Law Center.

Dawn Mays-Johnson, Plaintiff, represented by Kristi Cahoon Kelly,
Kelly & Crandall PLC, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Kelly & Crandall PLC &
James Wilson Speer, Virginia Proverty Law Center.

Julie Johnson, Plaintiff, represented by Kristi Cahoon Kelly,
Kelly & Crandall PLC, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Kelly & Crandall PLC &
James Wilson Speer, Virginia Proverty Law Center.

Dianne Turner, Plaintiff, represented by Kristi Cahoon Kelly,
Kelly & Crandall PLC, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Kelly & Crandall PLC &
James Wilson Speer, Virginia Proverty Law Center.

NHCash.com, LLC, Defendant, represented by Michael Randolph
Shebelskie -- mshebelskie@hunton.com -- Hunton & Williams LLP &
William Howell Wright, Jr. -- cwright@hunton.com -- Hunton &
Williams LLP.

NHCash SPV, LLC, Defendant, represented by Michael Randolph
Shebelskie, Hunton & Williams LLP & William Howell Wright, Jr.,
Hunton & Williams LLP.

NHCash Holdings, Inc., Defendant, represented by Michael Randolph
Shebelskie, Hunton & Williams LLP & William Howell Wright, Jr.,
Hunton & Williams LLP.

Steven Mello, Defendant, represented by Michael Randolph
Shebelskie, Hunton & Williams LLP & William Howell Wright, Jr.,
Hunton & Williams LLP.

LTD Financial Services, L.P., Defendant, represented by John
Connell Altmiller, Jr. -- jaltmiller@pesnerkawamoto.com -- Pesner
Kawamoto Conway PLC.

NHCash.com, LLC, Counter Claimant, represented by Michael Randolph
Shebelskie, Hunton & Williams LLP & William Howell Wright, Jr.,
Hunton & Williams LLP.

NHCash SPV, LLC, Counter Claimant, represented by Michael Randolph
Shebelskie, Hunton & Williams LLP & William Howell Wright, Jr.,
Hunton & Williams LLP.

Steven Mello, Counter Claimant, represented by Michael Randolph
Shebelskie, Hunton & Williams LLP & William Howell Wright, Jr.,
Hunton & Williams LLP.

NHCash Holdings, Inc., Counter Claimant, represented by Michael
Randolph Shebelskie, Hunton & Williams LLP & William Howell
Wright, Jr., Hunton & Williams LLP.

Tina Hunter, Counter Defendant, represented by Kristi Cahoon
Kelly, Kelly & Crandall PLC, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Kelly & Crandall
PLC & James Wilson Speer, Virginia Proverty Law Center.

Julie Johnson, Counter Defendant, represented by Kristi Cahoon
Kelly, Kelly & Crandall PLC, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Kelly & Crandall
PLC & James Wilson Speer, Virginia Proverty Law Center.

Dawn Mays-Johnson, Counter Defendant, represented by Kristi Cahoon
Kelly, Kelly & Crandall PLC, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Kelly & Crandall
PLC & James Wilson Speer, Virginia Proverty Law Center.

Steven Pike, Counter Defendant, represented by Kristi Cahoon
Kelly, Kelly & Crandall PLC, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Kelly & Crandall
PLC & James Wilson Speer, Virginia Proverty Law Center.

Dianne Turner, Counter Defendant, represented by Kristi Cahoon
Kelly, Kelly & Crandall PLC, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Kelly & Crandall
PLC & James Wilson Speer, Virginia Proverty Law Center.


NUTRACEUTICAL CORP: 9th Cir. Eases Time for Appeal of Rulings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for The Recorder, reports that in a case
over a purported aphrodisiac dietary supplement that promised
"animal magnetism," the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, splitting with nearly half the country's federal
appellate courts on a matter of first impression, decided that an
appeal of class decertification was timely even though a
reconsideration motion went beyond a deadline set in the federal
rules.

The Sept. 15 ruling reversed decertification of a class action
brought over the labeling of "Cobra Sexual Energy" pills, which
promised "animal magnetism" and "potency wood." Lead plaintiff
Troy Lambert claimed such statements were misleading, particularly
as to the ingredients. But it was the Ninth Circuit's decision to
take up Lambert's petition in the first place that parted with
rulings in other courts.

At issue is whether Lambert had failed to timely petition the
Ninth Circuit to take up an appeal of the decertification order.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(f) allows appeals courts
to take up such interlocutory petitions within 14 days. Lambert
filed his petition 14 days after filing a motion for
reconsideration of the decertification order--which most courts
have held is allowed--but he waited 20 days to file that
reconsideration motion at the outset.

While other courts would have found that violated Rule 23(f)'s 14-
day window, the Ninth Circuit tolled that deadline.

"We recognize that other circuits would likely not toll the Rule
23(f) deadline in Lambert's case," wrote Judge Richard Paez for a
unanimous panel. "To the extent other circuits limit Rule 23(f)
tolling only to the circumstance where a motion for
reconsideration is filed within 14 days of the certification
order, we part ways with them."

Steven Feldman, Esq. counsel at Hueston Hennigan in Los Angeles
who represented defendant Nutraceutical Corp., said he planned to
petition an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit to reverse the
decision.

"The panel's decision here placed the Ninth Circuit at odds with
every other circuit to consider this issue, including the D.C.,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits," he wrote in an
email. "Equitable tolling should not and cannot excuse a
plaintiff's blatant failure to comply with the federal rules,
particularly in a case wholly lacking merit."

Plaintiffs attorney Gregory Weston, of The Weston Firm in San
Diego, did not respond to a request for comment.

Interlocutory appeals of class certification orders, while allowed
under Rule 23(f), aren't mandatory. Lawyers in both sides of class
actions have fought for appeals courts to take up more appeals for
certification orders. A tort reform bill passed earlier this year
would make such petitions mandatory.

The timeline is essential in understanding the Cobra Sexual Energy
case. U.S. District Judge Andre Birotte of the Central District of
California granted Nutraceutical's motion for decertification on
Feb. 20, 2015. He found Lambert had failed to provide enough
evidence to support his damages model, which was to offer full
refunds to class members. On March 12, 2015, Lambert filed his
motion for reconsideration, which Birotte denied on June 24, 2015.
Lambert petitioned the Ninth Circuit on July 8, 2015.

But the Ninth Circuit found that Lambert's petition was timely
given that he gave the judge a head's up within 14 days after the
decertification order that he planned to file a reconsideration
motion. He also was complying with Birotte's deadline when he
filed that motion 20 days later, the panel concluded. The opinion,
while unique to the specifics of the case, also addressed the
general view of other circuits that class certification appeals
tend to be disruptive and drag out the litigation.

"The premise that Rule 23(f) petitions are disruptive and slow is
not universally true and we decline to adopt any hard-and-fast
rule on the basis of such an idea," Paez wrote.

The Ninth Circuit also reversed the decertification order in the
case. The panel found that the uncertainties in Lambert's damages
model should be worked out at trial. "We have repeatedly
emphasized that uncertain damages calculations should not defeat
certification," Paez wrote. "At this stage, the question is only
whether Lambert has presented a workable method. We conclude that
he has."

Steven Feldman, in his email, stood by Birotte's finding.
"Regardless, Nutraceutical provided multiple, independently
sufficient grounds for decertification, which if necessary he will
consider on remand," he wrote. [GN]


NY THRUWAY AUTHORITY: Appeals Decision in Employees Local 72 Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants John F. Barry, E. Virgil Conway, Jose Holguin-Veras,
Donna J. Luh, Howard P. Milstein, New York State Thruway
Authority, J. Donald Rice, Jr., Thomas Ryan, Brandon R. Sall and
Richard N. Simberg filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit titled New York State Thruway Employees Local 72, et al.
v. New York State Thruway Authority, et al., Case No. 14-cv-1043,
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York
(Syracuse).

The nature of suit is stated as civil rights-jobs.

The appellate case is captioned as New York State Thruway
Employees Local 72, et al. v. New York State Thruway Authority, et
al., Case No. 17-2834, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
Defendants filed an appeal from a previous court ruling in the
lawsuit.  That appellate case is captioned as New York State
Thruway Employees Local 72, et al. v. New York State Thruway
Authority, et al., Case No. 17-2416.[BN]

The Defendants-Appellants are New York State Thruway Authority;
Howard P. Milstein, individually and in his official capacity as
Chairman of the New York State Thruway Authority; Thomas Ryan, in
his official capacity; E. Virgil Conway, in his official capacity
as Board Member of the New York State Thruway Authority; Brandon
R. Sall, in his official capacity as Board Member of the New York
State Thruway Authority; John F. Barry, in his official capacity
as Director of Administrative Services of the New York State
Thruway Authority; Donna J. Luh, in her official capacity as Vice-
Chair of the New York State Thruway Authority Board of Directors;
Richard N. Simberg, in his official capacity as Board Member of
the New York State Thruway Authority; J. Donald Rice, Jr., in his
official capacity as Board Member of the New York State Thruway
Authority; and Jose Holguin-Veras, in his official capacity as
Board Member of the New York State Thruway Authority.

The other Defendants are Joseph Bress, individually and in his
official capacity as Chief Negotiator of the New York State
Thruway Authority; Howard Glaser, individually and in his official
capacity as Director of State Operations and Senior Policy Advisor
to the Governor of New York; Donald R. Bell, individually and in
his official capacity as Director of Maintenance and Operations of
the New York State Thruway Authority; Thomas J. Madison, Jr.,
individually and in his official capacity as Executive Director of
the New York State Thruway Authority; and John M. Bryan, in his
official capacity as Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of the
New York State Thruway Authority.

Plaintiffs-Appellees New York State Thruway Employees Local 72,
Joseph E. Colombo, George Savoie and David M. Mazzeo, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, are represented
by:

          Gregg David Adler, Esq.
          Nicole Marie Rothgeb, Esq.
          LIVINGSTON, ADLER, PULDA, MEIKLEJOHN & KELLY, P.C.
          557 Prospect Avenue
          Hartford, CT 06105
          Telephone: (860) 233-9821
          Facsimile: (860) 232-7818
          E-mail: gdadler@lapm.org
                  nmrothgeb@lapm.org

The Defendants-Appellants are represented by:

          Beth A. Bourassa, Esq.
          Norma Grace Meacham, Esq.
          Christopher William Meyer, Esq.
          Monica Rose Skanes, Esq.
          WHITEMAN OSTERMAN & HANNA LLP
          1 Commerce Plaza
          Albany, NY 12260
          Telephone: (518) 487-7617
          Facsimile: (518) 487-7777
          E-mail: bbourassa@woh.com
                  nmeacham@woh.com
                  cmeyer@woh.com
                  mskanes@woh.com


NY THRUWAY AUTHORITY: Appeals Order in "Donohue" Suit to 2nd Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants New York State Thruway Authority, E. Virgil Conway,
Jose Holguin-Veras, Donna J. Luh, Carlos Millan, Howard P.
Milstein, J. Donald Rice, Jr., Brandon R. Sall and Richard N.
Simberg filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit
entitled Donohue, et al. v. Madison, et al., Case No. 13-cv-920,
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York
(Syracuse).

The appellate case is captioned as Donohue, et al. v. Madison, et
al., Case No. 17-2832, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
Defendants have appealed a ruling in the lawsuit.  That appellate
case is captioned as Donohue v. Madison, Case No. 17-2415.

The nature of suit is stated as civil rights-jobs.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees Danny Donohue, as President of the Civil
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO;
Civil Service Employees Association, Local 1000 AFSCME, AFL-CIO;
John Dellio, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly-
situated; Michael Bouleris, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly-situated; Maureen Alonzo, Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly-situated; and Marcos Diamantatos,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly-situated, are
represented by:

          Aaron E. Kaplan, Esq.
          Daren John Rylewicz, Esq.
          Jennifer C. Zegarelli, Esq.
          CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,
          LOCAL 1000 AFSCME, AFL-CIO
          143 Washington Avenue
          P.O. Box 7125
          Albany, NY 12210
          Telephone: (518) 257-1443
          Facsimile: (518) 449-1525
          E-mail: aaron.kaplan@cseainc.org
                  daren.rylewicz@cseainc.org
                  jennifer.zegarelli@cseainc.org

Defendant Thomas J. Madison, Jr., Individually and in his official
capacity as Executive Director of the New York State Thruway
Authority and the New York State Canal Corporation, is represented
by:

          Beth A. Bourassa, Esq.
          WHITEMAN OSTERMAN & HANNA LLP
          1 Commerce Plaza
          Albany, NY 12260
          Telephone: (518) 487-7617
          Facsimile: (518) 487-7777
          E-mail: bbourassa@woh.com

Defendants-Appellants Carlos Millan, in his official capacity as
Director of Employee Relations and Employee Safety, New York State
Thruway Authority and New York State Canal Corporation; Howard P.
Milstein, Individually and in his official capacity as Chairman of
New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board of Directors; Donna
J. Luh, Individually; E. Virgil Conway, in his official capacity
as Board Member of New York State Thruway/Canal Corporation Board
of Directors; Richard N. Simberg, Individually; Brandon R. Sall,
Individually; J. Donald Rice, Jr., Individually; Jose Holguin-
Veras, Individually; and New York State Thruway Authority are
represented by:

          Beth A. Bourassa, Esq.
          Norma Grace Meacham, Esq.
          Christopher William Meyer, Esq.
          Monica Rose Skanes, Esq.
          WHITEMAN OSTERMAN & HANNA LLP
          1 Commerce Plaza
          Albany, NY 12260
          Telephone: (518) 487-7617
          Facsimile: (518) 487-7777
          E-mail: bbourassa@woh.com
                  nmeacham@woh.com
                  cmeyer@woh.com
                  mskanes@woh.com


O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE: "Weishaar" Suit Moved to E.D. Missouri
-----------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Paul Weishaar, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
O'Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 1722-
CC10830, was removed on Sep. 8, 2017 from the Circuit Court of the
City of St. Louis, Missouri, to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri (St. Louis). The District Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 4:17-cv-02384-AGF to the proceeding. The case is
assigned to the Hon. District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan P. Horace, Esq.
          SWMW LAW, LLC
          701 Market St., Suite 1000
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: (314) 480 5180
          E-mail: ryan@swmklaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Charles N. Insler, Esq.
          HEPLER BROOM
          211 North Broadway, Suite 2700
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 241 6160
          Facsimile: (314) 241 6116
          E-mail: cni@heplerbroom.com

               - and -

          W. Jason Rankin, Esq.
          HEPLER BROOM
          211 North Broadway, Suite 2700
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 241 6160
          Facsimile: (314) 241 6116
          E-mail: wjr@heplerbroom.com


PEOPLE'S UNITED: Hit With CA for Wrongfully Charging Fees
---------------------------------------------------------
Hugh Bailey, writing for CT Post, reports that a suit filed
against Bridgeport-based People's United Bank accuses the bank of
wrongfully charging overdraft fees, one of a spate of cases around
the country on an issue that is attracting new attention from
regulators.

The class-action suit filed earlier this year by a Bridgeport
resident accuses the bank of reordering pending transactions in a
way that led to overdraft fees that customers were not expecting.
An overdraft occurs when there's not enough money to cover a
transaction; it usually results in a fee that can be much larger
than the missing amount.

"The artificial balance created by (People's) . . . is not the
customer's actual money in the account," the lawsuit reads.
"Rather, it is the balance in a customer's account minus
anticipated future debits (debits that may or may not occur) and
minus deposit holds."

In a statement, the bank denied the allegations. "People's United
Bank has filed a motion to dismiss this case and intends
vigorously to defend against the allegations made," its statement
reads. "In keeping with its policy with respect to ongoing
litigation matters, the bank has no further comment."
Insufficient funds

In one instance, the plaintiff says she had $22.11 in her account
when she made a purchase for $4.76, which should have left her
with more than $17. Instead, she was charged a $37 overdraft fee.
The problems in overdraft cases nationwide have tended to stem
from confusion over pending transactions, and how banks process
them.

With customers' increasing comfort with online banking, many
people schedule bill payments days or weeks in advance. Banks,
however, can take those scheduled payments and hold them as
pending deductions, reducing the amount of money available in an
account even though the bill has yet to actually be paid, critics
say.

Banks are required to obtain consent from customers before being
allowed to charge overdraft fees -- without one, a pending
transaction would simply be denied. According to the suit against
People's, the bank did not properly stipulate that money from
pending transactions would not be available.

                     Increasing Scrutiny

According to a study from The Pew Charitable Trusts, overdraft
fees have become increasingly important to banks' balance sheets.
"Most consumers do not learn of an overdraft for two or more days,
and more than two-thirds of overdrafters say they would rather
have a transaction declined than incur a $35 fee," according to
the 2016 report.

Overdraft fees also disproportionately affect poorer customers,
according to Pew. For "heavy overdrafters," or consumers who pay
more than $100 of those fees in a year, "overdraft fees consumed
nearly a full week's worth of their household incomes on average
during the past year."

Most people surveyed said they weren't aware their bank offered
overdraft coverage until they incurred a penalty, according to
Pew.

The issue has drawn increasing government attention. At the
federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, created in the wake
of the last recession, a study found that frequent overdrafters
account for 9 percent of all accounts studied even as they pay 79
percent of all overdraft fees.

Last month, the bureau unveiled its Know Before You Owe program,
designed to provide better information from banks to customers
about overdraft coverage. "Our study shows that financially
vulnerable consumers who opt in to overdraft risk incurring a rash
of fees when using their debit card or an ATM," said CFPB Director
Richard Cordray in a statement.

In seeking to dismiss the suit, People's says sample forms offered
by the bureau, which the bank says are "intended to help people
make more informed choices as to whether they wish to be subject
to debit card and ATM overdraft fees," use nearly identical
wording to the forms People's had used, undercutting any claims of
false pretenses.

Other banks and credit unions around the country have also been
hit with suits on overdraft charges, including Bank of America,
Citibank, Chase and Wells Fargo, with the institutions in some
cases forced to pay millions of dollars in penalties. [GN]


PHILADELPHIA SCHOOL DISTRICT: Black Lacrosse Player Files Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lowell Neumann Nickey, writing for Courthouse News Service,
reported that accusing the Philadelphia School District of
slamming the door on opportunity no sooner than it opened, a black
student athlete brought a federal class action in Philadelphia, on
September 12, over the short-lived girls' field hockey and
lacrosse teams at Strawberry Mansion High School.

Lead plaintiff Nadirah McRae says the introduction of field hockey
and lacrosse in the 2015-16 school year drew strong interest at
Strawberry Mansion. McRae "fell in love with these new sports,
experienced much improved grades and, for the first time in her
life, she saw a path to college," the complaint states.

That path grew firmer this past June, according to the complaint,
when McRae was offered a scholarship worth $250,000 to play
Division I lacrosse at the University of Hartford.

McRae says she has been unable to claim the scholarship, however,
because of the Philadelphia School District's efforts to keep
girls of color out of the traditionally "white" sports of field
hockey and lacrosse.

The school district allegedly put the black players at Strawberry
Mansion and other mostly black schools at a disadvantage from the
get-go, refusing to let them play against so-called white teams.

Compared with the 98% black student body at Strawberry Mansion,
the makeup of Northeast High School, whose Vikings team have been
champions of the Philadelphia Public League for the past three
years, was 30.3% black in the 2015-16 school year. Asians and
Latinos are the second- and third-most populous races at
Northeast, which is 18.5% white and 6.8% other.

McRae says the Philadelphia School District wants to reserve field
hockey and lacrosse "for its magnet schools and more privileged
high schools, which are not predominately lower-income and
African-American."

They did so, according to the complaint, by taking a concept from
segregation-era baseball and creating a modern-day "negro league."

In addition to barring "negro league" teams from playing the
established "white" teams in the Public League, McRae says the
district denied requests for uniform funds, canceled their game
buses, and refused to act on complaints of racial hostility.

Such actions "not only violated Title VI and Title IX," according
to the complaint, "but robbed the girls of opportunities to
improve their skills and to be seen by college scouts and
recruiters."

McRae says the district kept her team and others like it out of
the Public League Championship by telling "referees that the teams
in the 'Negro League' were not varsity athletes but were in a
developmental league."

The complaint also accuses Philadelphia Schools of firing McRae's
coach because she complained about the district's efforts to keep
her players at a disadvantage. Girls' field hockey and lacrosse
are no longer offered at Strawberry Mansion, according to the
complaint.

McRae notes that it is no coincidence that the school counselor
who could have helped her claim the lacrosse scholarship at
University of Hartford is white.

The NCAA's website notes that students must maintain at least a
2.0 GPA in 16 core high school courses to qualify for a
scholarship.

McRae's attorneys said they do not know if she graduated with a
2.0 or above.

The complaint notes that McRae's "final grades and SAT scores were
significantly lower than anticipated due to her freshman and
sophomore years before she began working with" her lacrosse coach
at Strawberry Mansion, Jazmine Smith.

NCAA waivers are "commonly awarded to players like the plaintiff,"
however, according to the complaint. McRae notes that Smith and
the coach at Hartford, Meg Decker, tried to get her one, but that
the college never received the necessary paperwork from Strawberry
Mansion.

"When asked about the missing paperwork, [the counselor] responded
by disbelieving that the plaintiff had managed to get into a
school like the University of Hartford and continuously advised
her to set sights on less prestigious schools," the complaint
states.

McRae wants to represent a class of similarly situated students.
The 18-year-old is represented by Glenn Ellis --
gae@freiwaldlaw.com -- with Freiwald Law.

The University of Hartford's admissions and athletics departments
have not returned calls requesting comment on the probationary
acceptance McRae describes in the complaint. Attorneys for McRae
say they have documentation of their client's acceptance letters.

Decker became the head coach of the Hartford Hawk's inaugural
women's lacrosse team in August 2016. Decker was also a player on
the inaugural women's lacrosse team at the U.S. Naval Academy and
helped build Virginia Commonwealth University's first women's
program as an assistant coach.

Neither coach is a party to the complaint, which names as
defendants the Philadelphia School District and the School Reform
Commission, which oversees employment procedures.

The district refuses to respond to any request for comment unless
it is submitted in the form of a handwritten letter to their legal
affairs department, which would not be possible by the time of
publication.

Just four days ago, the Philadelphia School District had its
credit rating on over $3 billion in bonds boosted by Moody's
Investor Service, from a Ba3 to a Ba2, with their analysts
praising Superintendent William R Hite Jr.'s "detailed
understanding not only of the district's finances, but also of
charter pressures and the complexities of managing a highly
dynamic, large, urban school district."

McRae's attorneys said that regardless of the district's intent,
there are clear systemic problems in terms of girls' sports in the
district and the recruiting process in general that amount to
widespread discrimination that this lawsuit hopes to address. They
are seeking $250,000 in restitution from the district, as well as
injunction against them preventing further discrimination.


PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Lindenbaum Wants to Stop Calls to Consumers
---------------------------------------------------------------
SHARI LINDENBAUM, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company, Case No. 1:17-cv-01895-DAP
(N.D. Ohio, September 8, 2017), is brought against the Defendant
to:

   (1) stop its practice of placing calls using an "automatic
       telephone dialing system" ("ATDS") and/or using "an
       artificial or prerecorded voice" to the cellular
       telephones of consumers nationwide without their prior
       express consent;

   (2) stop Defendant from calling consumers who are
       registered on the National Do Not Call Registry; and

   (3) obtain redress for all persons injured by its conduct.

Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, is a Delaware limited
liability company, with its principal offices located in Norfolk,
Virginia.  PRA is a debt collector, using the mails and telephone
to collect consumer debts originally owed to others.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam T. Savett, Esq.
          SAVETT LAW OFFICES LLC
          2764 Carole Lane
          Allentown, PA 18104
          Telephone: (610) 621-4550
          Facsimile: (610) 978-2970
          E-mail: adam@savettlaw.com


POTESTIVO & ASSOCIATES: Court Narrows Claims in FDCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, issued an Opinion and Order granting
in part and denying in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint in the case captioned TIMOTHY A. THEBERT, Plaintiff, v.
POTESTIVO & ASSOCIATES, P.C., and BRIAN A. POTESTIVO, Defendants,
Case No. 2:16-cv-14341 (E.D. Mich.).

Thebert has thus filed the lawsuit alleging that Potestivo
violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Michigan's
analog in numerous ways.  Potestivo responds that none of
Thebert's claims are plausible and asks the Court to dismiss
Thebert's (amended) complaint.

Defendant Potestivo & Associates, P.C. is a law firm that, among
other things, collects debts. Potestivo sent Plaintiff Timothy
Thebert a letter stating that it would be commencing foreclosure
proceedings on his house. Because the letter did not break down
the total amount owed, Thebert believes the letter violated the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. After Thebert disputed the
debt, Potestivo sent a verification letter. Because the
verification letter also did not adequately break down the amount
owed, Thebert believes that this letter also violated the FDCPA.
Potestivo proceeded to foreclose and, as Michigan law requires,
published a foreclosure notice in a county newspaper. But
foreclosure is debt collection, and so Thebert believes that this
too violated the FDCPA.

Thebert alleges that in posting and publishing the Foreclosure
Notice, Potestivo communicated with the public in connection with
debt collection and thus violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692c(b).
Section 1692c(b) provides, Except as provided in section 1692b of
this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given
directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a
court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to
effectuate a post-judgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may
not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt,
with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer
reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the
attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.
Potestivo makes a number of arguments for why a foreclosure notice
is not a communication in connection with debt collection.
Potestivo also points to the purpose of the FDCPA to prevent
abusive debt-collection practices.  Publishing a Foreclosure
Notice, says Potestivo, is not such a practice. But the specific
purpose of Section 1692c(b), at least according to the senate
report introducing the FDCPA, is different:  it prohibits
disclosing the consumer's personal affairs to third persons. Other
than to obtain location information, a debt collector may not
contact third persons such as a consumer's friends, neighbors,
relatives, or employer. Such contacts are not legitimate
collection practices and result in serious invasions of privacy,
as well as the loss of jobs.

Potestivo also argues that in signing the mortgage, Thebert
consented to foreclosure by advertisement. It follows, says
Potestivo, that Thebert consented to the necessary steps to
foreclose by advertisement, including the posting and publishing
of the Foreclosure Notice.

Potestivo, however, raised this argument for the first time in its
reply brief, depriving Thebert of a chance to say anything about
it. Courts generally do not address such arguments.

And even if Thebert had directly given Potestivo consent to
foreclose by advertisement, the Foreclosure Notice arguably
includes some information not required by Michigan's foreclosure-
by-advertisement statute, so it is not clear that Thebert
consented to the communication of that information. Given at least
these two issues, the Court prefers to address Potestivo's consent
argument on full briefing.

In short, Potestivo has not shown that it is implausible that it
violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692c(b) by posting and publishing the
Foreclosure Notice.

Thebert apparently asserts that Potestivo violated Section 1692e,
Section 1692e(2)(A), and Section 1692f by failing to provide an
itemized breakdown of the debt or by providing him with different
amounts of the debt.

Under Section 1692e, a debt collector may not use any false,
deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection
with the collection of any debt, including the false
representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any
debt, 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e(2)(A). For its part, Section 1692f
prohibits unfair debt collection: A debt collector may not use
unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect
any debt.

The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion to
dismiss. The Court understands the remaining claims in the case to
be as follows:

   (1) In posting and publishing the Foreclosure Notice, Potestivo
communicated with persons other than those listed in 15 U.S.C.
Section 1692c(b) and thus violated that provision of the FDCPA and
the analogous provision, if any, of the MRCPA;

   (2) By sending the Foreclosure Commencement Letter without
itemizing the total amount of the debt, or otherwise providing
adequate insight into how that total is comprised, Potestivo
violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e and Section 1692f and the
analogous provision, if any, of the MRCPA;

   (3) By sending the Debt Verification Letter without mentioning
the $115,267 debt (let alone providing insight into how it came to
be), and instead mentioning two other amounts in the same
numerical range, Potestivo violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e and
the analogous provision, if any, of the MRCPA;

   (4) By attempting to collect $115,267, without providing
adequate insight into how that amount is comprised in the Debt
Verification Letter, Potestivo violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692f
and the analogous provision, if any, of the MRCPA;

   (5) By publishing the Foreclosure Notice in the county
newspaper after Thebert disputed the debt but before Potestivo
mailed the Debt Verification Letter, Potestivo violated 15 U.S.C.
Section 1692g(b) and the analogous provision, if any, of the
MRCPA.

All other claims in the case are dismissed.
A full-text copy of the District Court's August 18, 2017 Opinion
and Order is available at http://tinyurl.com/y7ng2bumfrom
Leagle.com.

TIMOTHY A. THEBERT, Plaintiff, represented by Brian P. Parker --
brianparker@collectionstopper.com -- Law Offices of Brian P.
Parker, P.C..

Potestivo & Associates, P.C., Defendant, represented by Chantelle
R. Neumann, Potestivo & Associates, P.C. & David G. Marowske,
Potsetivo & Associates, P.C., 811 South BoulevardSuite
100Rochester Hills, MI 48307

Brian A. Potestivo, Defendant, represented by Chantelle R.
Neumann, Potestivo & Associates, P.C.


PTZ INSURANCE: Court Denies Certification Bid in TCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Defendant's Motion to Strike and denying Plaintiff's
Motion to Certify in the case captioned CHRISTOPHER LEGG and PAGE
LOZANO, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. PTZ INSURANCE AGENCY, LTD., an Illinois
corporation, and PETHEALTH, INC., a Canadian corporation, and
FAIRFAX FINANCIAL HOLDINGS, LTD., a Canadian corporation,
Defendants, Case No. 14 C 10043 (N.D. Ill.).

Defendants have moved to strike the class allegations in the
second amended complaint, and plaintiffs have cross-moved.

Plaintiffs Christopher Legg and Page Lozano have brought a three
count second amended putative class action complaint against
defendants PTZ Insurance Agency, Ltd., Pethealth Inc. and Fairfax
Financial Holdings, Ltd., alleging that defendants violated the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)
by: (1) placing unsolicited advertising robocalls to plaintiffs'
cellular phones; (2) placing unsolicited telemarketing calls to
plaintiffs' cellular phones; and (3) placing robocalls to
plaintiffs' cellular phones.

Rule 23(a) Requirements

Numerosity

Under Rule 23(a)(1) plaintiffs must show that the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact
number of class members need not be shown, but impracticability of
joinder must.

In the instant case, discovery has revealed that the pre-recorded
messages were sent to at least 341,288 unique cellular telephone
numbers. This is a sufficiently large number to demonstrate
impracticability of joinder, and defendants have not challenged
the numerosity requirement.

Commonality

Rule 23(a)(2) required the presence of questions of law or fact
common to the class. The Rule does not mandate absolute
commonality; a common nucleus of operative facts is usually
sufficient to satisfy the requirement.

In the instant case, each potential class member received the same
pre-recorded calls. Thus, at least with respect to the specifics
of the call and how defendants received the class members'
telephone numbers, the case presents common questions of fact.
Additionally, whether defendants' calls violate the TCPA, and
whether they constitute advertising are common questions of law.
Thus, plaintiffs have established the commonality requirement of
Rule 23(a)(2).

Typicality

Rule 23(a)(3) requires plaintiffs to establish that the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class. Typicality is closely related to
commonality. A plaintiff's claim is typical if it arises from the
same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the
claims of other class members and is based on the same legal
theory.

In the instant case, each class member's claim arises from
defendants' use of pre-recorded phone calls to their cellular
phones. The claims are all based on the same set of facts and
legal theories.

Consequently, plaintiffs have satisfied the typicality requirement
of Rule 23(a)(3).

Adequacy of Representation

Rule 23(a)(4) requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.

Defendants have not challenged the adequacy of representation, and
the court concludes that plaintiffs have established this
requirement.

Rule 23(b)(3)

Under Rule 23(b)(3) the questions of law or fact common to the
class must predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and a class action must be superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy.

In the instant case, defendants argue that adopters have expressly
agreed to receive the calls, that they just did not do so in
writing. The lack of a writing does not make the calls
unsolicited. If the class members agreed to receive the calls,
they lack a genuine controversy.

In the instant case, there is nothing vague about defendants'
assertions of consent. They have supplied affidavits from a number
of adopters who state that they agreed to and expected to receive
calls on their cellular phones from defendants about the offered
pet insurance. In addition, defendants have submitted affidavits
from shelter employees who conducted the adoption processes.
Those employees state that after taking the adopters' cell phone
numbers, the employees told the adopters to expect to receive
communications from defendants. Whether such communications
included cell phone calls as well as e-mail messages would depend
on the nature of the conversations between the shelter employees
and the adopters, and the adopters' expectations resulting from
the conversations.

This evidence convinces the court that the trial in this case will
be consumed and overwhelmed by testimony from each individual
class member, and the shelter employee who assisted that member in
the adoption process, to determine whether the class member
consented to receive the calls in question.

In short, the trial will involve hundreds, if not thousands, of
mini-trials on the issue of consent alone. Given the evidence
presented by defendants, there is simply no way for plaintiff to
establish a lack of consent with generalized evidence.
Consequently, certification is denied.

For these reasons, defendants' motion to strike class allegations
is granted. Plaintiffs' motion to certify a class is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 15, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y9au89dwfrom Leagle.com.

Christopher Legg, Plaintiff, represented by Keith James Keogh,
Keogh Law, Ltd., 55 W. Monroe, Ste. 3390, Chicago, IL, 60603
Christopher Legg, Plaintiff, represented by Amy L. Wells, Keogh
Law, Ltd, Michael S. Hilicki, Keogh Law, LTD, Michael R. Karnuth,
Keogh Law, LTD, ., 55 W. Monroe, Ste. 3390, Chicago, IL, 60603,
Patrick Christopher Crotty, Scott D. Owens, Pa, pro hac vice,
Scott D. Owens, Scott D. Owens, P.A., 3800 S Ocean Dr Ste 235,
Hollywood, FL, 33019-2930 pro hac vice & Timothy J. Sostrin, Keogh
Law, LTD.., 55 W. Monroe, Ste. 3390, Chicago, IL, 60603

Page Lozano, Plaintiff, represented by Keith James Keogh, Keogh
Law, Ltd., Amy L. Wells, Keogh Law, Ltd & Michael R. Karnuth,
Keogh Law, LTD.

PTZ Insurance Agency, LTD, Defendant, represented by Eric L.
Samore -- esamore@salawus.com -- SmithAmundsen LLC, John C. Ochoa
-- jochoa@salawus.com --  SmithAmundsen LLC, Molly Anne Arranz --
marranz@salawus.com --  Smith Amundsen, LLC, Ronald David Balfour
-- rbalfour@salawus.com -- Smithamundsen Llc & Yesha Sutaria
Hoeppner, Smithamundsen LLC.

PetHealth, Inc., Defendant, represented by Eric L. Samore,
SmithAmundsen LLC, John C. Ochoa, SmithAmundsen LLC, Molly Anne
Arranz, Smith Amundsen, LLC, Ronald David Balfour, Smithamundsen
LLC & Yesha Sutaria Hoeppner, Smithamundsen LLC.


REPUBLIC SCHOOLS: Settles Lawsuit Over 'Spam' Text Messages
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jason Gonzales, writing for Tennessean, reports that a Nashville-
based charter school network has agreed to pay $2.2 million to
settle a class-action lawsuit filed by parents who objected to a
series of mass text messages they received from the charter
organization promoting enrollment at its schools.

RePublic Schools Nashville announced the settlement agreement in a
statement late September 15 that made clear they are not accepting
fault. The school's insurance policy would cover the full amount
as well as RePublic's attorney fees, the school said, and no tax
dollars would go toward the settlement.

The settlement -- which would deliver financial relief to 5,319
Metro school parents -- comes amid an ongoing debate over the
district's sharing of student data and contact information with
publicly-financed, privately-led charters.

RePublic has agreed to stop sending text messages to Metro school
parents without permission.

"We are pleased to announce this settlement and to put this issue
behind us," RePublic CEO Jon Rybka said in a statement. "The
lawsuit was as a distraction from our mission of providing the
best possible education for all of Nashville's children, no matter
their socioeconomic background or ZIP code.

"This settlement allows us to now refocus our resources on what
matters most: our schools and our students. RePublic remains
dedicated to reimagining public education in the South, and we
look forward to another year of transformative results for our
students."

The lawsuit against RePublic, originally filed in January 2016,
alleged that RePublic violated the federal Telephone Consumer
Protection Act by sending messages through a commercial auto-
dialing service without the consent of recipients. It claimed
parents received the first set of mass text messages on phones on
Nov. 16, 2015, and that three additional installments were made
through January 2015.

One text message read: "4th-grade parents, your child is eligible
to attend Nashville Academy of Computer Science next year. Please
call us at 615-873-0484 to tour our facility!"

The lawsuit, which referred to the text messages as "spam," took a
significant turn in March when U.S. District Court Judge Waverly
Crenshaw granted class-action status to the plaintiffs.

The law firm representing the parents, Nashville-based
Branstetter, Stranch & Jennings, had sought up to $12 million in
relief, $500 per text, or $1,500 per person.

"The plaintiffs are very pleased with the settlement, which if
approved by the court will result in one of the largest recoveries
on a per-class member basis ever in a spam text messaging
lawsuit," attorney Gerard Stranch said in an emailed statement.
"It is also significant in that RePublic Schools Nashville has
agreed to cease sending text messages to MNPS parents and
guardians without first obtaining their express consent."

In recent weeks, the school boards of Metro Nashville and Memphis
have each been resistant to give up data to the state-run
Achievement School District, which operates charter schools in
both cities. But Tennessee Attorney General Herbert Slatery issued
an opinion saying the local school districts must hand over the
data to the ASD.

The local boards have argued that federal education records law
allows for handing over such records, but doesn't require it.

Metro Nashville Public Schools does not have a policy that limits
the sharing of student contact information to charter schools that
the local board authorizes.

"The RePublic lawsuit underscores, in real time, the reason why
MNPS needs to get a long overdue handle on student and family data
security," said school board member Will Pinkston, a charter
school critic who has been vocal on the data issue. "As the source
of the data, we could have very easily ended up as defendants in
this case. I'm glad the plaintiffs chose to focus their litigation
on the chief offender, but that doesn't alleviate our obligation
to do better in the future."

RePublic was founded in 2011 by Ravi Gupta, who left the charter
organization to return to his hometown of New York in 2017.

RePublic operates four schools in Nashville: Nashville Prep,
Liberty Collegiate, Nashville Academy of Computer Science and
RePublic High School. The charter group also runs two schools in
Jackson, Miss. [GN]


RESURGENT CAPITAL: Loses Bid to Dismiss FDCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion denying Defendant Resurgent's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned IRINA CHERNYAKHOVSKAYA, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. RESURGENT CAPITAL
SERVICES L.P., AND LVNV FUNDING LLC, Defendants, Civil Action No.
2:16-cv-1235 (JLL) (D.N.J.), but granting Defendant LVNV's Motion
to Dismiss.

Plaintiff Irma Chernyakhovskaya (Chernyakhovskaya)'s putative
class action Complaint  alleging Defendants violated the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1692 (FDCPA).

Plaintiff opened a Checking Plus account with Citibank (South
Dakota), N.A. (Citibank) Plaintiff's payment obligations on the
account became past due and the principal amount incurred on the
debt totaled $4,959.61 (Debt).  Plaintiff contends that Citibank
charged-off the Debt in the amount of $4,959.61. LVNV ultimately
acquired the Debt, which was sold more than once prior and, by
this time, delinquent and in default.  Plaintiff alleges that
thereafter LVNV referred the Debt to Resurgent for collection.

The Amended Complaint

The one count Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants violated
the following provisions of the FDCPA:

   -- 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e, by using a false, deceptive or
misleading representation of means in connection with the
collection of any debt;

   -- 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e(2)(A), by falsely representing the
character, amount, or legal status of any debt;

   -- 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e(2)(B), by falsely representing any
services rendered or compensation which may lawfully be received
by a debt collector for the collection of a debt;

   -- 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e(10), by using false representation
or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect a debt from
Plaintiff;

   -- 15 U.S.C. Section 1692f, by using unfair or unconscionable
means to collect or attempt to collect any debt; and

   -- 15 U.S.C. Section 1692(f)(1), by collecting or attempting to
collect any amount not expressly authorized by the agreement
creating the debt or permitted by law.

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subiect Matter Jurisdiction

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a court must grant
a motion to dismiss if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
hear a claim. Standing is a jurisdictional matter thus a motion to
dismiss for want of standing is also properly brought pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1).

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), "after the pleadings
are closed  but early enough not to delay trial  a party may move
for judgment on the pleadings. A court must view the facts in the
pleadings and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and the motion should not be
granted unless the moving party has established that there is no
material issue of fact to resolve, and that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

Standing

Defendants challenge Plaintiff's standing claiming that Plaintiff
has failed to allege any concrete harm sufficient to establish an
injury-in-fact that is redressable by this Court and that the
Amended Complaint's added claims that Defendants violated 15
U.S.C. Sec. 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(2)(B), 1692e(10) and 15
U.S.C. Sec. 1692f and 1692f(1) due to the fact that they are not
licensed under the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act
(NJCFLA)3 and therefore are not permitted to purchase, manage and
collect interest on the Plaintiff's Debt.

In its recent decision, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540,
1547, 194 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2016), the Supreme Court discussed the
particularization and concreteness components integral to a
plaintiff's showing of the existence of an injury-in-fact.  The
Supreme Court in Spokeo reiterated that it has made clear time and
time again that an injury in fact must be concrete and
particularized" and that though injury in fact requires
particularity, this prerequisite does not suffice on its own; a
showing that the injury is concrete is also necessary.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs injury falls within the meaning of
an injury as defined in Spokeo. Thus, the Court determines that
Defendants' argument is without merit and finds that Plaintiff has
Article III standing to bring this claim. Though a plaintiff may
not allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete
harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III",
the possible risk of harm associated with receiving misinformation
as a debt owed constitutes an injury in fact sufficient to confer
Article III standing.

Plaintiff has adequately plead the injury in fact requirement
sufficient to confer standing to bring her cause of action.
Claim under the FDCPA

In support of their motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails
to plead a violation of the FDCPA Section 1692f because the
Agreement authorizes Defendants to charge interest and further
that charging-off', as referred to in the Amended Complaint and
Account Summary Report does not constitute a cancellation of the
Debt or forgiveness of the Plaintiffs obligation to pay interest
on the Debt.

The FDCPA functions to protect consumers from a host of unfair,
harassing, and deceptive collection practices without imposing
unnecessary restrictions on ethical debt collectors and to
eliminate abusive debt collection practices which contribute to
the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to
the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.
In order to succeed on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must establish
that (1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector,
(3) the defendant's challenged practice involves an attempt to
collect a debt' as the Act defines it, and (4) the defendant has
violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the
debt.

The Court finds that under Third Circuit precedent, the
communication to Plaintiff from Defendant Resurgent may provide a
basis for relief as the information provided by Defendant
Resurgent, when viewed from the prospective of the least
sophisticated debtor has the potential to affect said consumer's
decision-making in that a demand for additional interest of which
Defendant Resurgent allegedly did not have authorization to demand
would most likely mislead the least sophisticated consumer.
In light of the foregoing, at this juncture in the parties'
litigation, the Court denies Defendant Resurgent's motion as the
Court finds that Plaintiff has established that the FDCPA applies
to Resurgent and therefore Plaintiff has stated a claim sufficient
to survive Defendants' motion as to Resurgent. As discussed below,
however, in consideration of Henson, the Court dismisses the
action as to LVNV.

Henson v. Santander

In light of the recent Supreme Court decision, Henson v.
Santander, the Court dismisses the action as to LVNV because the
FDCPA does not apply; thus, LVNV cannot be held liable under the
FDCPA. In Henson, the Supreme Court faced a question about who
exactly qualifies as a debt collector subject to the Act's rigors.
More specifically, the Supreme Court posed the question what if
you purchase a debt and then try to collect it for yourself  does
that make you a debt collector' too? That's the nub of the dispute
before the Court in Henson.

The facts in Henson are as follows: CitiFinancial Auto loaned
money to petitioners seeking to buy cars, petitioners then
defaulted on those loans, Santander subsequently purchased the
defaulted loans from CitiFinancial, and Santander sought to
collect in a manner petitioners believed to be troublesome under
the FDCPA.  Both parties agreed that in deciding whether
Santander's conduct falls within the meaning of the Act, it is
necessary to look to the statutory language defining the term debt
collector to embrace anyone who 'regularly collects or attempts to
collect debts owed or due.

To prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that,
among other things, the defendant is a debt collector.  The law is
clear that FDCPA only applies to debt collectors as the term is
defined by the Act.

Per Henson, an entity that purchases a debt for its own account
does not constitute a debt collector under the FDCPA and because
the Amended Complaint includes one count that hinges on the
assertion that the Defendants are debt collectors within the
meaning of the FDCPA and LVNV does not fall within the meaning of
debt collector as set forth by the Supreme Court in Henson, the
Court dismisses Plaintiffs action against Defendant LVNV.

To the extent Plaintiff may cure any deficiencies as to the
allegations against LVNV, the Court will allow Plaintiff to file a
second Amended Complaint.

In light of these, the Court denies Defendants' motion as to
Defendant Resurgent and grants Defendants' motion as to Defendant
LVNV.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 18, 2017 Opinion
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y8thpz3bfrom Leagle.com.

IRINA CHERNYAKHOVSKAYA, Plaintiff, represented by LAWRENCE C.
HERSH -- lh@hershlegal.com

RESURGENT CAPITAL SERVICES L.P., Defendant, represented by PETER
GEORGE SIACHOS -- psiachos@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees, LLP &
YEVGENY ROYMISHER -- yroymisher.com -- GORDON & REES, LLP.

LVNV FUNDING LLC, Defendant, represented by PETER GEORGE SIACHOS,
Gordon & Rees, LLP & YEVGENY ROYMISHER, GORDON & REES, LLP.


SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Pushes to Arbitrate Overheating Phone Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
P.J. D'Annunzio, writing for The Legal Intelligencer, reports that
Samsung has asked the federal judge overseeing the putative class
action litigation against it related to overheating phones to toss
the claims out of court and send them to be resolved in
arbitration.

In court papers responding to the plaintiff's motion against
arbitration, Samsung argued against the plaintiff's assertion that
the arbitration clause contained in the Galaxy S3's product
packaging didn't clearly indicate purchasers were roped into a
binding arbitration agreement.

Class representative Brittany Jones did not dispute that the
arbitration disclaimer was in the package, Samsung said in court
papers.

"Instead, she argues that inside-the-box agreements are
unenforceable unless the outside of the package alerts consumers
that 'terms will be found inside,' and unless use of the product
is prohibited absent 'some affirmative step [by the consumer] to
manifest assent' to arbitration. Both arguments are incorrect,"
the company said in its filing.

The case is before U.S. District Chief Judge Joy Flowers Conti of
the Western District of Pennsylvania. As of press time, Jones had
not responded to the filing.

D. Aaron Rihn, Esq., an attorney with Robert Peirce & Associates
in Pittsburgh representing Jones, did not respond to a request for
comment.

The company argued it did not need to provide notification on the
outside of the S3 package, but did so anyway.

"It is well-established that inside-the-box provisions are
enforceable regardless of whether the outside of the packaging
contains a notice," Samsung said. "In any event, the outside of
the Samsung S3 box did contain sufficient notice."

The notice Samsung referred to is bold text on the box, which
reads, "Important Information for the Samsung SPH-L710," the
technical name for the S3.

In Jones' motion opposing arbitration, the plaintiff claimed
buyers of the phone did not have pre-sale notice of the
arbitration provision.

"Courts throughout the country have consistently held that whether
offering contract terms on paper, in a so-called 'shrinkwrap'
agreement where the terms appear inside product packaging, or
increasingly frequently on a website or mobile application, the
offeror must provide sufficiently conspicuous notice of the terms
and the means of assent so that a reasonably prudent consumer
would be on notice that contract terms are at issue and of what
action on the consumer's part will constitute assent to those
terms," Jones' court papers said.

She continued, "If the circumstances under which contractual terms
are presented are clear and conspicuous enough to put the
reasonable consumer on notice that such terms exist, she will be
treated as if she assented to the terms under the concept of
inquiry notice. Here, however, no such circumstances existed and
plaintiff was not on notice that the box contained buried terms of
an offer and that she would be bound by such terms regardless of
whether she read them." [GN]


SCOTTS MIRACLE-GRO: Seeks Return of Docs in Tainted Seed Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Emily Field, writing for Law360, reports that Scotts Miracle-Gro
Co. on September 14 asked a California federal judge to compel
consumers in a class action over pesticide-laced bird seed to
return several documents that were accidentally disclosed in
discovery, saying they're protected by attorney-client privilege.
Out of the tens of thousands of documents produced in the
litigation, Scotts said that it inadvertently produced four draft
employee corrective action forms. This happened because, on their
face, there was little to indicate these documents were privileged
-- they don't bear any privilege warning, the author listed in the
metadata is a form template creator, not the attorney who wrote
them and there's nothing that shows that the documents were drafts
that were never finalized, Scotts said.

"As a result, counsel reviewing the documents mistakenly believed
the documents were not privileged," Scotts said. "It was not until
early August 2017, in pre0paration for and during the deposition
of former employee, Lisa Zierten, that Scotts' in-house counsel --
David Faure -- realized that a draft form related to Ms. Zierten
might have been part of his own, privileged files."

Scotts is asking the court to compel the consumers to return the
documents and strike the parts of Zierten's testimony discussing
them, according to the motion.

The documents contain privileged information received by Faure in
his role as a legal adviser, as well as his mental impressions and
interpretations of facts, Scotts said.

"As drafts, the purpose of the documents was not to address any
potential problems with the employees' conduct; rather, the forms
were created to facilitate Scotts' in-house counsel's and
management's consideration of legal issues," Scotts said.

Therefore, the documents are protected by both attorney-client
privilege and work product privilege, Scotts said.

In April, U.S. District Judge John A. Houston granted class
certification to consumers suing Scotts and its chief executive
officer over an alleged scheme to sell pesticide-laced bird seed.

The class is defined as "all persons who, prior to May 1, 2008,
purchased and have not yet received a full refund for, a Scotts
Miracle-Gro wild bird food product containing Storcide II,
Actellic 5E, or their active ingredients, chlorpyrifos-methyl or
pirimiphos-methyl, respectively" and to subclasses for claims in
California, Missouri and Minnesota.

The operative consolidated class action complaint, filed in 2015,
asserts claims including violations of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act, California Consumer Remedies Act,
Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act, Missouri Merchandising Practices
Act, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of the
common law implied warranty of fitness for consumption by animals,
intentional misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation.

Scotts pled guilty in 2012 to selling more than 70 million bags of
bird seed containing the pesticides and agreed later that year to
pay $12.5 million in criminal fines and civil penalties for
violating federal pesticide laws.

Representatives for the parties didn't immediately respond to
requests for comment on September 15.

The plaintiffs are represented by Jason A. Forge, Esq. --
jforge@rgrdlaw.com -- Rachel L. Jensen, Esq. --
rjensen@rgrdlaw.com -- Regis C. Worley Jr., Esq. --
rworley@rgrdlaw.com --  Brian E. Cochran, Esq. --
bcochran@rgrdlaw.com -- and Michael Albert, Esq. --
malbert@rgrdlaw.com --  of Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP,
Douglas P. Dowd, Esq. -- doug@dowdlaw.net --  and Alex R. Lumaghi,
Esq. -- alex@dowdlaw.net --  of Dowd & Dowd PC, and John J.
Driscoll, Esq., Christopher Quinn, Esq.  Gregory Pals, Esq.  and
John A. Simon, Esq.  of the Driscoll Firm PC.

Scotts Miracle-Gro is represented by Edward Patrick Swan Jr., Esq.
-- pswan@jonesday.com -- Jeffrey J. Jones, Esq. --
jjones@jonesday.com -- Casteel Borsay, Esq. --
cborsay@jonesday.com -- and Marjorie P. Duffy, Esq. --
mpduffy@jonesday.com -- of Jones Day.

Hagedorn is represented by Mark Filip, Esq. --
mark.filip@kirkland.com -- Mark C. Holscher, Esq. --
mark.holscher@kirkland.com -- and Sierra Elizabeth, Esq. --
sierra.elizabeth@kirkland.com -- of Kirkland & Ellis LLP.

The case is In re: Morning Song Bird Food Litigation, case number
3:12-cv-01592, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California. [GN]


SEDGWICK CLAIMS: $2.5MM Overtime Settlement Granted Prelim OK
-------------------------------------------------------------
Gordon Gibb, writing for Lawyers and Settlement, reports that an
overtime pay class action launched against an insurance claims
administrator achieved preliminary approval earlier this month,
when a non-revisionary cash settlement worth $2.5 million was
given the nod by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Carolyn B. Kuhl.
The unpaid overtime lawsuit alleged that various policies observed
by the defendant forced claims adjusters into situations where
they had to work off the clock, foregoing overtime pay, meal and
rest breaks.

The case is Antoinette Salazar v. Sedgwick Claims Management
Services Inc., Case No. BC556145, in the Superior Court of
California for the County of Los Angeles.

The class comprises some 600 current and former employees of
Sedgwick who worked for the firm as claims adjusters from August,
2010 to present day. Lead plaintiff Antoinette Salazar was herself
employed as a claims adjuster at Sedgwick across a five-year
period from April, 2007 until May, 2012. She claims in her
California overtime law class action that Sedgwick maintains an
overtime pre-approval policy as well as an alternative four-day
work week schedule that forces employees into a position where
they have to work off the clock in order to meet work quotas
established by Sedgwick.

As a result, according to the overtime pay laws class action, rest
breaks and meal periods were often missed, and combined with work
performed off the clock overtime pay for the extra work performed,
was not provided. Salazar asserted that that Sedgwick reserved the
availability of overtime pay for special projects only, and only
if it was preapproved.

"Sedgwick's policy and corporate culture of restricting overtime,
coupled with heavy caseloads imposed on class members, forced
employees to work off the clock, outside of their recorded time,"
the memorandum to the court in support of preliminary approval
states. "Plaintiff and class members allege they only reported
their scheduled hours, and not the hours actually worked. If
plaintiff and class members reported unauthorized overtime, they
faced disciplinary action, including termination."

Sedgwick countered that it duly provided for overtime and complied
with California law by providing meal breaks and paying premiums
for missed meals. The defendant provides insurance claims
administration to major employers in the US, including workers'
compensation claims, disability, general, auto and professional
liability coverage, according to Court documents.

Judge Kuhl was happy with almost all aspects of the preliminary
settlement, with the only caveat that she suggested language that
might give a class participant more time to either file an
objection to the overtime pay laws class action -- or opt out
entirely -- if a hiccup such as an address change might serve to
delay notification.

As class representative, Salazar is to receive $6,000 in
additional compensation. [GN]


SEPTIC 2010: "Sok" Suit Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------
SOTHA SOK, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. SEPTIC 2010 LLC, a Florida Limited Liability
Company, and JOHN THAU, individually, the Defendants, Case No.
0:17-cv-61781-FAM (S.D. Fla., Sep. 8, 2017), seeks to recover
overtime wages, liquidated damages, and the costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees of this action under the provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, During the three year statute of
limitations period between approximately September 2014 and June
2017, Plaintiff's primary duties for Defendants were non-exempt
telephone sales to customers for re-orders and/or orders of septic
treatment products. During numerous work weeks within the three
(3) year statute of limitations period between approximately
September 2014 and June 2017, Plaintiff worked in excess of 40
hours per week for Defendants but was not paid time and one-half
of his regular rate of pay inclusive of both his hourly and
commission wages for all of Plaintiff's overtime hours worked for
Defendants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Keith M. Stern, Esq.
          Hazel Solis Rojas, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF KEITH M. STERN, P.A.
          One Flagler
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 800
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 901-1379
          Facsimile: (561) 288-9031
          E-mail: employlaw@keithstern.com
                  hsolis@workingforyou.com


SERVICE FINANCE: "Sparks" Remanded to New Jersey State Court
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned KANDACE SPARKS, on behalf of herself and
those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SERVICE FINANCE COMPANY,
LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No. 17-3899 (JLL)(D.N.J.), the
plaintiff, Kandace Sparks, brought the action in New Jersey state
court to recover damages under the New Jersey Truth-in-Consumer
Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA) against the defendant,
Service Finance Company, LLC (SFC).  The complaint contains only
one count, which seeks relief under the TCCWNA on behalf of Sparks
and for a putative class action.

Sparks alleges that SFC violated the TCCWNA by issuing privacy
policy notices that: (1) were related to her "purchase and
financing of home improvements goods and/or services; and (2)
included disclaimers that certain provisions were only applicable
'as permitted by law', as otherwise provided by law and 'as
required by law' without specifying whether any of them are or are
not void, unenforceable or inapplicable within the State of New
Jersey.

The TCCWNA provides that: "No consumer contract, notice or sign
shall state that any of its provisions is or may be void,
unenforceable or inapplicable in some jurisdictions without
specifying which provisions are or are not void, unenforceable or
inapplicable within the State of New Jersey."

The TCCWNA also provides that: "Any person who violates the
provisions of this act shall be liable to the aggrieved consumer
for a civil penalty of not less than $100.00 or for actual
damages, or both at the election of the consumer, together with
reasonable attorney's fees and court costs."

Sparks argues that her claim will not exceed the jurisdictional
threshold amount of $75,000, and thus she moves pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1447(c) (1) to remand the action for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction; and (2) for an award of costs and
attorney fees.

To establish diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section
1332(a), the party asserting jurisdiction must show that there is
complete diversity of citizenship among the parties and an amount
in controversy exceeding $75,000.

In a putative class action wherein a party asserts that a district
court has subject matter jurisdiction under Section 1332(a) only,
in a non-CAFA case, there is a "rule against aggregating claims,
which requires that each plaintiff individually seek at least the
jurisdictional amount in controversy.

Only the claims, whether related or unrelated, asserted by a
single plaintiff against a single defendant may be aggregated.

In determining whether the amount in controversy has been met in a
putative non-CAFA class action, the recoverable amount of attorney
fees must be distributed across all class members on a pro rata
basis.

Thus, the amount of recoverable attorney fees in a putative class
action may not be assigned to the named plaintiff in order to
demonstrate that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction.

Sparks repeatedly affirms that her potential recovery will not
exceed the jurisdictional threshold of $75,000, because she is
seeking the mandatory minimum penalty under the TCCWNA of $100
only.

In response, SFC argues that Sparks could feasibly seek the
maximum civil penalty under the TCCWNA, and that "there is nothing
to suggest that the TCCWNA's civil penalty should be
conservatively construed as a de Ininimis civil penalty of $100.
However, contrary to SFC's arguments, Sparks has repeatedly
affirmed to the point of conceding that she is only seeking the
minimum penalty amount under the TCCWNA, i.e., $100. Furthermore,
the alleged value of the Contract, i.e., $25,209.33, is
significantly less than the jurisdictional threshold of $75,000.
In addition, SFC's argument that the potential recovery for
attorney fees should be attributed to Sparks at this juncture in
the litigation is contrary to the afore-cited holdings of the
district courts in the District of New Jersey.

Thus, the Court finds that SFC's arguments are without merit, and
that SFC has failed to demonstrate that the jurisdictional
threshold has been met in order to give rise to diversity
jurisdiction under Section 1332(a).

The part of the motion filed by Sparks to remand the action is
granted.

Sparks also argues that the notice of removal was "improvidently
filed," and thus she seeks an award for the costs and attorney
fees that she has incurred in opposing the removal.

However, the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey finds that SFC's basis for removal, while ultimately not
meritorious, was objectively reasonable and raised in good faith.

Under the circumstances presented in this case, the Court will
exercise the broad discretion to deny the part of the motion
seeking an award of costs and attorney fees.

The Court grants only the part of the motion filed by Sparks
wherein she seeks a remand of the action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 18, 2017 Opinion
is available at http://tinyurl.com/yb9vx7unfrom Leagle.com.

KANDACE SPARKS, Plaintiff, represented by MATTHEW SCOTT OORBEEK --
moorbeek@wolflawfirm.net -- THE WOLF LAW FIRM LLC.

SERVICE FINANCE COMPANY, LLC, Defendant, represented by WADE
DONALD KOENECKE -- wdk@stevenslee.com -- STEVENS & LEE PC &
BRADLEY L. MITCHELL -- blm@stevenslee.com -- STEVENS & LEE, PC.


SOUTHEAST ALABAMA: "Carrigan" Suit Remanded to State Court
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge W. Keith Watkins of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama, Northern Division, remanded the case
captioned DAWN COBB CARRIGAN AND JANET GATES, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SOUTHEAST
ALABAMA RURAL HEALTH ASSOCIATES; GREENWAY ASSOCIATES, LLC;
GREENWAY EHS, INC.; SUNRISE TECHNOLOGY CONSULTANTS; LEE INVESTMENT
CONSULTANTS, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-CV-114-WKW (M.D. Ala.)
to the Circuit Court of Pike County, Alabama.

In their class action complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that
Defendant SARHA failed to maintain patient medical records between
November 2011 and August 2016 because of the other Defendants'
failure to maintain properly the database that housed the medical
records.  Specifically, they allege that Greenway, EHS, Sunrise,
and Lee represented to SARHA that they maintained a backup
database to secure the medical records when those Defendants knew
that no such backup existed.  As a result, the Plaintiffs argue,
SARHA violated its duty to secure properly its patients' medical
records, resulting in damages to Plaintiffs and the class they
represent.

The Plaintiffs seek relief for themselves and all others similarly
situated for Defendants' failure to maintain medical records.  The
proposed class is defined as including all persons in the State of
Alabama who received treatment at SARHA medical facilities from
November of 2011 through Aug. 26, 2016 who were entitled under
Alabama and Federal law to have their medical records properly
preserved.

Specifically, the Plaintiffs make two claims: (i) for a violation
of Alabama Administrative Code Chapter 545-x-4-.08 and -.09; and
(ii) for negligence and wantonness.  On each count, the Plaintiffs
do not make a specific demand for damages; instead, they demand
any and all available fines, penalties, damages, compensatory
damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees, interest and costs.

The case began in the Circuit Court of Pike County, and the
Greenway Defendants removed it to the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama within 30 days of being served with a
summons and copy of the complaint.  In their notice of removal,
the Greenway Defendants contend that jurisdiction of this Class
Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") action is proper because the minimal
diversity requirements are satisfied, there are more than 100
plaintiffs, and the monetary claims exceed $5 million in the
aggregate.

Specifically, they argue that, based on certain provisions of the
Alabama Code that empower a commission to fine medical
practitioners up to $10,000 per violation, the amount in
controversy is satisfied, given that the class allegedly numbers
70,000.

The Plaintiffs responded by filing a motion to remand to state
court.  They challenge the Greenway Defendants' ability to prove
that the mount in controversy and minimal diversity requirements
under CAFA are satisfied.  Alternatively, the Plaintiffs argue
that CAFA's local controversy exception applies to preclude
jurisdiction.

Judge Watkins held that the Defendants do not offer any evidence
whatsoever about the Plaintiffs' damages.  Instead, they claim
that unrelated provisions of the Alabama Code are the only way to
prove that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied.  If
that is so, then the Defendants cannot prove that the amount is
satisfied in this case.

Even though the Defendant may have no actual knowledge of the
value of the claims, it is not excused from the duty to show by
fact, and not mere conclusory allegation, that federal
jurisdiction exists.  The Defendants have offered little more than
conclusory allegations that the claims exceed $5,000,000.  They
must do more to come within federal subject-matter jurisdiction.

Because the removing Defendants have failed to meet their burden
of proving federal jurisdiction under CAFA, Judge Watkins granted
the Plaintiffs' motion to remand; and accordingly remanded the
action to the Circuit Court of Pike County, Alabama.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 12, 2017 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/TpuwGW from Leagle.com.

Dawn Cobb Carrigan, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Davenport
Hudson -- charlie@pennandseaborn.com -- Penn & Seaborn, LLC.

Dawn Cobb Carrigan, Plaintiff, represented by Christina Diane Crow
-- ccrow@jinkslaw.com -- Jinks Crow & Dickson, PC, Grady Andrew
Reeves -- troylaw@troycable.net -- Cervera, Ralph Reeves Baker &
Hastings, LLC, Larry Shane Seaborn -- shane@pennandseaborn.com --
Penn and Seaborn, LLC, Lynn Wilson Jinks, III --
ljinks@jinkslaw.com -- Jinks Crow & Dickson, PC, Matthew Michael
Baker -- mbaker@troycable.net -- Cervera Ralph Reeves Baker &
Hastings, LLC, Myron Cordell Penn -- myron@pennandseaborn.com --
Penn & Seaborn LLC & Nicholas Joseph Cervera --
ncervera@troycable.net -- Cervera Ralph Reeves Baker & Hastings,
LLC.

Janet Gates, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Davenport Hudson,
Penn & Seaborn, LLC, Christina Diane Crow, Jinks Crow & Dickson,
PC, Grady Andrew Reeves, Cervera, Ralph Reeves Baker & Hastings,
LLC, Larry Shane Seaborn, Penn and Seaborn, LLC, Lynn Wilson
Jinks, III, Jinks Crow & Dickson, PC, Matthew Michael Baker,
Cervera Ralph Reeves Baker & Hastings, LLC, Myron Cordell Penn,
Penn & Seaborn LLC & Nicholas Joseph Cervera, Cervera Ralph Reeves
Baker & Hastings, LLC.

Southeast Alabama Rural Health Associates, Defendant, represented
by David A. Cole -- dcole@fmglaw.com -- Freeman Mathis & Gary LLP,
pro hac vice, Joseph Lamar Cowan, II -- jcowan@handarendall.com --
Hand Arendall & Roger Lee Bates -- rbates@handarendall.com -- Hand
Arendall, LLC.

Greenway Health, LLC, Defendant, represented by Donald H.
Crawford, II -- dcrawford@czcfirm.com -- Cope Zebro & Crawford,
Robert D. Zebro -- RZebro@czcfirm.com -- Cope Zebro & Crawford PL,
Sara Elizabeth C. Matthews, Matthews Law Firm & William B.
Matthews, Jr., Matthews Law Firm.

Greenway EHS, Inc., Defendant, represented by Donald H. Crawford,
II, Cope Zebro & Crawford, Robert D. Zebro, Cope Zebro & Crawford
PL, Sara Elizabeth C. Matthews, Matthews Law Firm & William B.
Matthews, Jr., Matthews Law Firm.

Sunrise Technology Consultants LLC, Defendant, represented by
Elbert Allen Dodd, Jr. -- eadscruggs@farmerstel.com -- Scruggs,
Dodd & Brisendine, Attorneys, P.A..

Lee Investment Consultants LLC, Defendant, represented by Elbert
Allen Dodd, Jr., Scruggs, Dodd & Brisendine, Attorneys, P.A..


SPAN-AMERICA MEDICAL: Court Closes and Terminates "Berg" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Mary Geiger Lewis of the U.S. District Court for the
District of South Carolina, Greenville Division, entered a
stipulated order terminating and administratively closing the case
captioned ROBERT BERG, On Behalf of Himself and All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. SPAN-AMERICA MEDICAL SYSTEMS,
INC., JAMES D. FERGUSON, RICHARD C. COGGINS, THOMAS F. GRADY, JR.,
DAN R. LEE, THOMAS J. SULLIVAN, THOMAS D. HENRION, LINDA D.
NORMAN, ROBERT H. DICK, TERRY ALLISON RAPPUHN, SAVARIA
CORPORATION, and SAVARIA (SC) INC., Defendants, Case No. 6:17-cv-
01399-MGL (D. S.C.).

On July 11, 2017, the Court entered an Order dismissing without
prejudice the complaint in the action and retaining jurisdiction
solely for considering any application for an award of attorneys'
fees and expenses.

The parties have reached agreement with respect to payment of
attorneys' fees and expenses, in full satisfaction of any claims
for attorneys' fees or expenses in the above captioned action or
in any of the following related actions: Porter v. Span-America
Medical Systems, Inc. et al., C.A. No. 6:17-cv-01357-MGL (D.S.C.)
or Pill v. Span-America Medical Systems, Inc., et al., C.A. No.
6:17-cv-01375-MGL (D.S.C.).

There being no further issue for the Court to consider, Judge
Lewis, at the request of the parties, terminated and
administratively closed the action, with the Court no longer
retaining jurisdiction to consider any application for an award of
attorneys' fees and expenses.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 12, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/mOJUL5 from Leagle.com.

Robert Berg, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Addison Mathias --
amathias@nexsenpruet.com -- Nexsen Pruet.

Robert Berg, Plaintiff, represented by Sima Bhakta Patel --
spatel@nexsenpruet.com -- Nexsen Pruet.

Span-America Medical Systems Inc, Defendant, represented by
Wallace K. Lightsey -- wlightsey@wyche.com -- Wyche PA.

James D Ferguson, Defendant, represented by Wallace K. Lightsey,
Wyche PA.

Richard C Coggins, Defendant, represented by Wallace K. Lightsey,
Wyche PA.

Thomas F Grady, Jr, Defendant, represented by Wallace K. Lightsey,
Wyche PA.

Dan R Lee, Defendant, represented by Wallace K. Lightsey, Wyche
PA.

Thomas J Sullivan, Defendant, represented by Wallace K. Lightsey,
Wyche PA.

Thomas D Henrion, Defendant, represented by Wallace K. Lightsey,
Wyche PA.

Linda D Norman, Defendant, represented by Wallace K. Lightsey,
Wyche PA.

Robert H Dick, Defendant, represented by Wallace K. Lightsey,
Wyche PA.

Terry Allison Rappuhn, Defendant, represented by Wallace K.
Lightsey, Wyche PA.

Savaria Corporation, Defendant, represented by Wallace K.
Lightsey, Wyche PA.

Savaria Inc, Defendant, represented by Wallace K. Lightsey, Wyche
PA.


SYNCHRONY BANK: Fails to Properly Pay Workers, "Mason" Suit Claims
------------------------------------------------------------------
MARY MASON and YAHAIRA DIAZ-REYES and KARETTA PARTRIDGE, On behalf
of themselves and all others similarly-situated v. SYNCHRONY BANK,
Case No. 3:17-cv-00314-WHR (S.D. Ohio, September 8, 2017), is a
"collective action" instituted by the Plaintiffs as a result of
the Defendant's alleged practices and policies of not paying its
hourly, non-exempt employees for all hours worked, in violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage
Standards Act.

Synchrony Bank is a foreign corporation, licensed to business in
the state of Ohio, having its principal place of business in
Kettering, Ohio.  Synchrony Bank is organized and existing under
the laws of the state of Connecticut, conducting business
throughout the United States.

Synchrony Bank is a national bank that provides financial products
and services to its customers and owns and operates a number of
call centers that provide customer support services to its
customers.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Lori M. Griffin, Esq.
          Chastity L. Christy, Esq.
          Anthony J. Lazzaro, Esq.
          THE LAZZARO LAW FIRM, LLC
          920 Rockefeller Building
          614 W. Superior Avenue
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Telephone: (216) 696-5000
          Facsimile: (216) 696-7005
          E-mail: lori@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  chastity@lazzarolawfirm.com
                  anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com


TANGOE INC: Jardin Files Suit Over Sale to Marlin Equity
--------------------------------------------------------
Mark Jardin, on behalf of himself and other similarly situated
stockholders of Tangoe, Inc., Plaintiff, v. James D. Foy, Gerald
G. Kokos, David Coit, Gary Golding, Ronald Kaiser, Jackie Kimzey,
Richard Pontin and Noah Walley, Defendants, Case No. 0:17-cv-61717
(D. Ch., September 7, 2017), seeks to enjoin, preliminarily and
permanently, the sale of Tangoe to Marlin Equity Partners,
rescinding or awarding rescissory damages in the event that the
transaction is consummated, all damages in breach of their
fiduciary duties, costs of this action, including a reasonable
allowance for the fees and expenses of Plaintiff's attorneys and
experts and such further relief for violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

Defendants solicit the tendering of stockholder shares in
connection with the sale of the company to Marlin Equity Partners
through a recommendation statement that fails to disclose the
timing and nature of all communications regarding future
employment of Tangoe's management as a potential conflict of
interest and that it had to restate its financial statements for
the years 2013 and 2014 and the first three quarters of 2015 due
to errors in recognizing revenue, primarily relating to non-
recurring revenue.

Tangoe is a global telecom expense management solutions company
that enable companies to reduce telecommunications expenses by
managing their mobile and wireline communications lifecycles. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Randall J. Baron, Esq.
     David A. Knotts, Esq.
     Maxwell R. Huffman, Esq.
     ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
     655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
     San Diego, CA 92101
     Tel: (619) 231-1058

            - and -

     Peter B. Andrews, Esq.
     Craig J. Springer, Esq.
     David Sborz, Esq.
     ANDREWS & SPRINGER LLC
     3801 Kennett Pike
     Building C, Suite 305
     Wilmington, DE 19807
     Tel: (302) 504-4957


TEXAS STANDARD: Accused by Munguia of Abusing OT Pay Standards
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE MUNGUIA and GUSTAVO HERNANDEZ, individually, and on behalf of
all persons similarly situated v. TEXAS STANDARD CONSTRUCTION,
LTD., a Texas Limited Partnership, and RONALD H. DALTON, an
individual, Case No. 3:17-cv-02397-C (N.D. Tex., September 8,
2017), seeks redress for the Defendants' alleged abuse of the
federal overtime compensation standards.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants unlawfully deprived the
Plaintiffs and others similarly situated of the overtime wages to
which they were entitled under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Texas Standard Construction, Ltd., is a Texas limited partnership
with its principal place of business in Dallas, Texas.  TSC does
business throughout the state of Texas operating a construction
company.  Ronald H. Dalton is TSC's President.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John H. Allen, III, Esq.
          Jennifer Williams, Esq.
          JACKSON ALLEN & WILLIAMS, LLP
          3838 Oak Lawn Ave., Suite 1100
          Dallas, TX 75219
          Telephone: (214) 521-2300
          Facsimile: (214) 452-5637
          E-mail: tallen@jacksonallenfirm.com
                  jwilliams@jacksonallenfirm.com


TIME WARNER: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of FCRA Suits
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the Judgment of the District Court granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned CORY GROSHEK,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TIME WARNER CABLE, INC., Defendant-
Appellee. CORY GROSHEK, and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREAT LAKES HIGHER EDUCATION CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee, Nos. 16-3355, 16-3711 (7th Cir.).

Appellees moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, arguing that Groshek lacked Article III standing
because he did not suffer a concrete injury. The district court
granted Appellees' motion. This appeal followed.

Appellant Cory Groshek submitted 562 job applications to various
employers, including Appellees Time Warner Cable, Inc., and Great
Lakes Higher Education Corporation.  The job application, which
Appellees provided to Groshek, included a disclosure and
authorization form informing him that a consumer report may be
procured in making the employment decision; the form also
contained other information, such as a liability release. After
Groshek submitted the job application, along with the signed
disclosure and authorization form, Appellees requested and
obtained a consumer report on him from a third party.

Shortly thereafter, Groshek filed a class-action suit against
Appellees under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. Section
1681, seeking statutory and punitive damages for alleged
violations of 15 U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(2)(A).

To establish injury in fact, Groshek must show that he suffered an
invasion of a legally protected interest' that is concrete and
particularized' and 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.  To be concrete, an injury must actually exist; it
must be real, not abstract, but not necessarily tangible.

Here, Groshek did not allege that Appellees failed to provide him
with a disclosure that informed him that a consumer report may be
obtained for employment purposes, the Seventh Circuit.  His
complaint contained no allegation that any of the additional
information caused him to not understand the consent he was
giving; no allegation that he would not have provided consent but
for the extraneous information on the form; no allegation that
additional information caused him to be confused; and, no
allegation that he was unaware that a consumer report would be
procured.

Instead, he simply alleged that Appellees' disclosure form
contained extraneous information.  The Seventh Circuit concluded
that Groshek has alleged a statutory violation completely removed
from any concrete harm or appreciable risk of harm.

First, Groshek argues that he suffered a concrete informational
injury as a result of Appellees' failure to provide a disclosure
compliant with Section 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). As support, he relies on
the general rule arising out of Federal Election Commission v.
Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) and Public Citizen v. Department of
Justice, 491 U.S. 440.

Groshek's reliance on Akins and Public Citizen is misplaced for
two reasons:

   (1) First, unlike the plaintiffs in Akins and Public Citizen,
Groshek is not seeking to compel Appellees to provide him with
information. Groshek has not alleged that, after realizing he was
provided with a non-compliant disclosure, he requested that
Appellees provide him with a compliant disclosure and was denied.
Because Groshek has not failed to obtain information, he has not
suffered an informational injury as illustrated in Akins and
Public Citizen.

   (2) Second, unlike the statutes at issue in Akins and Public
Citizen, the statute here does not seek to protect Groshek from
the kind of harm he claims he has suffered. Akins, 524 U.S. at 21-
253 Congress did not enact Second 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) to protect job
applicants from disclosures that do not satisfy the requirements
of that section; it did so to decrease the risk that a job
applicant would unknowingly consent to allowing a prospective
employer to procure a consumer report.

Under the circumstances in this case, Akins and Public Citizen are
inapposite. Groshek has failed to demonstrate that he has suffered
a concrete informational injury.

The Seventh Circuit concluded that Groshek has not alleged facts
demonstrating a real, concrete appreciable risk of harm. Because
he has failed to demonstrate that he suffered a concrete injury,
he lacks Article III standing. Accordingly, the judgments of the
district courts are affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Seventh Circuit's August 1, 2017 Opinion
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y9ktcsdxfrom Leagle.com.

Robert J. Gingras -- gingras@gcwlawyers.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

Michael J. Modl -- mmodl@axley.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Heath Paul Straka -- straka@gcwlawyers.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

Anthony E. Giardino, 999 Peachtree Street NorthEast26th Floor,
Atlanta, GA 30309 for Defendant-Appellee.

Joseph W. Ozmer, II, 171 17th Street NW, Suite 1550, Atlanta, GA
30363 for Defendant-Appellee.

Abigail Stecker Romero, 171 17th Street NW, Suite 1550, Atlanta,
GA 30363 for Defendant-Appellee.


TOYOTA MOTOR: Dismissal of MCPA Claim in "Rosenbaum" Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned RICHARD ROSENBAUM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC., Defendant-Appellee, No. 16-2769
(6th Cir.), Judge Alice M. Batchelder of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
district court's orders (i) dismissing her breach of contract and
violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act ("MCPA") claims;
and (ii) denying his motion for relief.

Appellant Rosenbaum purchased a Prius Plug-In Hybrid Electric
vehicle, manufactured by Toyota.  Rosenbaum was not satisfied with
the hybrid vehicle because he could not complete his daily commute
in electric-only mode, and the vehicle would not run in electric-
only mode when the outside temperature fell below 55 degrees
Fahrenheit.

Rosenbaum filed a purported class action suit against Toyota in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
alleging three claims: (i) breach of contract; (ii) breach of
express and implied warranties of merchantability; and (iii)
violation of the MCPA claims.

The district court dismissed the action pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The district court concluded that
Rosenbaum failed to state a claim for breach of contract or breach
of express warranty because Rosenbaum failed to allege that he was
in privity with Toyota.  The district court also found that
Rosenbaum had failed to state a claim that Toyota had breached the
implied warranty of merchantability, because he did not allege
facts showing that the Prius Plug-In was unfit for its ordinary
purpose.  Finally, the district court determined that Toyota's
alleged conduct was exempt from the MCPA because federal and state
law "specifically authorized" and governed Toyota's
advertisements.

Rosenbaum then filed a motion for relief from judgment under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) on his claim for breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability, raising new arguments
directed, not toward merchantability, but toward the hybrid
vehicle's unique purpose and the circumstances of his purchase of
the vehicle.  The district court denied Rosenbaum's motion for
relief, explaining that these new arguments were irrelevant to his
implied warranty-of-merchantability claim.  Rosenbaum timely
appealed the district court's dismissal order and order denying
the motion for relief.

On appeal, Rosenbaum repeats the arguments regarding the hybrid
vehicle's unique purpose and the circumstances of his purchase
that he raised in his Rule 60(b)(1) motion.  Rosenbaum, however,
has neither argued nor demonstrated any basis on which Judge
Batchelder could conclude that the district court erred in its
determination that Rosenbaum's new arguments did not support a
merchantability claim and that Rosenbaum had never pled a fitness-
for-particular-purpose claim.  Nor has he provided any other basis
for a conclusion that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his Rule 60(b)(1) motion.  The Judge therefore consider
Rosenbaum's appeal of the order denying his motion for relief
waived.

Moreover, on the merits of Rosenbaum's Rule 60(b)(1) arguments,
the district court did not err.  The implied warranty of
merchantability is distinct from the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose under Michigan law.  Rosenbaum did not
allege a claim for breach of the warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose.  Accordingly, Judge Batchelder finds that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting
Rosenbaum's arguments.

To the extent that Rosenbaum has properly presented other
arguments, those arguments are meritless, the Judge concludes.
After carefully reviewing the record, the applicable law, and the
parties' briefs, she is convinced that the district court did not
err in its conclusions.  The district court's orders carefully and
correctly set out the law governing the issues raised and clearly
articulate the reasons underlying its decisions.  Thus, issuance
of her full written opinion would serve no useful purpose.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the district court's
orders, Judge Batchelder affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 12, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/HCEriN from Leagle.com.


U.S. AVIATION: March 5 Deadline to File Class Certification Bid
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned JAMES HARALSON, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. U.S. AVIATION SERVICES
CORP., a Nevada corporation; UNITED AIRLINES, INC., a Delaware
corporation; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 3:16-
cv-05207 (N.D. Cal.), Judge Jon S. Tigar of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California granted the parties
stipulation to continue the mediation completion date and
certification briefing schedule.

On Aug. 9, 2016, the Plaintiff filed the original Complaint in
this matter in the Superior Court of California, County of
Alameda.  He filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") on Sept. 8,
2016.  The Defendants removed the FAC to this Court on Sept. 8 and
9, 2016 respectively.

After the Court ruled on United's motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff
filed a Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") on Jan. 20, 2017.

On Feb. 22, 2017, the Court issued a Scheduling Order, setting
Oct. 2, 2017 as the date by which the Plaintiff must file his
Motion for Class Certification.  Oct. 2, 2017, is also the current
deadline by which the Parties are required to have completed
private mediation in this matter.

On April 7, 2017, the Parties informed the Court of the discovery
dispute concerning whether U.S. Aviation was required to produce
contact information for putative class members.  The Court ordered
Plaintiff and U.S. Aviation to submit a Joint Letter Brief
regarding this issue.  On April 28, 2017, they filed a Joint
Letter Brief informing the Court that they agreed to submit a
stipulation ordering U.S. Aviation to produce the contact
information.  They also agreed that a Belaire notice was not
required.

On June 15, 2017, the Plaintiff and U.S. Aviation filed a Joint
Stipulation.  The Court entered the Order on the Stipulation on
June 20, 2017.

The Parties along with United conferred multiple times in June,
July and August about possible mediators and mediation dates.
While attempting to agree to a mediation date the parties also
negotiated over the possible dismissal of United from the action.
A stipulated request for dismissal of United was filed on Sept. 5,
2017.  On Sept. 7, 2017, the Court entered its order dismissing
United without prejudice.

With United's resistance to utilizing Mr. Mark Rudy's mediation
services no longer being an issue, the Plaintiff and U.S. Aviation
agreed to again contact Mr. Rudy.  Feb. 7, 2018 was the earliest
mutually agreeable date the Parties could reserve for a mediation.

Taking into consideration the holidays and previously set
schedule, the Parties, though their Stipulation, request that the
mediation deadline be extended to Feb. 7, 2018 and certification
briefing dates be respectively continued appropriately.

The Parties are continuing to pursue discovery in this matter.
The Plaintiff's deposition will be scheduled for sometime in
October.  The depositions of the Defendants will be scheduled for
November or December.  Their Stipulation is intended only to (i)
limit the expenditure of time and resources in an inefficient
manner, and (ii) accommodate the schedules of the Parties, their
counsel, and third parties.

In view of the foregoing, the Parties stipulated and agreed to
continue the mediation completion date and certification briefing
schedule.  Having received and reviewed the Parties' Stipulation,
Judge Tigar granted the stipulated schedule as follows:

      a. The mediation completion deadline, which is current set
for Oct. 2, 2017, is continued to March 5, 2018.

      b. The class certification motion filing deadline, which is
current set for Oct. 2, 2017, is continued to March 5, 2018.

      c. The class certification opposition brief filing deadline,
which is current set for Dec. 1, 2017, is continued to May 4,
2018.

      d. The class certification reply brief filing deadline,
which is current set for Feb. 2, 2018, is continued to June 29,
2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 12, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/OL59Nz from Leagle.com.

James Haralson, Plaintiff, represented by Chaim Shaun Setareh --
haun@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group.

James Haralson, Plaintiff, represented by Howard Scott Leviant --
scott@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group & Thomas Alistair Segal
-- thomas@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group.

U.S. Aviation Services Corp., Defendant, represented by Brendan
Dolan -- bdolan@vedderprice.com -- Vedder Price (CA) LLP, Brittany
A. Sachs -- bsachs@vedderprice.com -- Vedder Price (CA), LLP &
Christopher Anthony Braham -- cbraham@vedderprice.com -- Vedder
Price (CA), LLP.


VIGO COUNTY: Remains Under Legal Pressure Over Jail
---------------------------------------------------
Howard Greninger, writing for Tribune-Star, reports while no judge
has yet ordered Vigo County to build a new jail nor set a certain
date, the county is under considerable legal pressure.

After a 2000 lawsuit filed by the American Civil Liberties Union
of Indiana claiming overcrowding, Vigo County officials entered
into an 2002 agreement that set the jail capacity at 268 inmates.

In August 2013, the ACLU of Indiana said that binding contract was
breached and filed a lawsuit in Vigo County Superior Court
Division 1 on behalf of Aaron Hos and other jail inmates in Vigo
County Superior Court Division 1.

That suit claims the jail is unsanitary and that the inmates are
not allowed at least three hours of recreation per week. In an
update on that lawsuit, ACLU attorney Ken Faulk, Esq.  on Sept. 11
filed for an extension on a summary judgment. The motion is
pending.

In response to the lawsuit, Vigo County Sheriff Greg Ewing began
moving inmates over the 268 cap at the Vigo County Jail to other
county jails, such as in Knox and Sullivan counties. Vigo County
Commissioners later sought new jail design proposals and selected
DLZ, an Indianapolis engineering and architectural firm.

Representatives from DLZ conducted a jail facility assessment and
feasibility study in August 2015. Commissioners then held a public
informational meeting April 11, 2016, at Terre Haute South Vigo
High School to discuss the need for a new jail. Faulk attended
that meeting to view the county's progress.

2016 federal lawsuit

On Oct. 13, 2016, Indianapolis attorney Michael Sutherlin filed a
federal lawsuit against  Vigo County commissioners, the Vigo
County Council and the county sheriff, on behalf of inmate Jauston
Huerta. Five other inmates, plus any future inmates, were added to
the lawsuit in November, 2016 as Sutherlin sought class action
status.

A special meeting of the Vigo County Council was held in December
2016 at Terre Haute City Hall, also with DLZ presenting a proposed
design, however, only a few council members attended, as the
council does not usually meet in December.

In March 2017, Vigo County officials announced a stipulation or
agreement was being sought with Sutherlin to have a new jail
completed by Oct. 1, 2019. That stirred public concern, as
residents began questioning the location and costs of a new jail.

In March, the Vigo County Council approved $3 million for design
of a new jail.

However, the agreed federal court order was not completed.

In May, Chief U.S. District Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson ordered
attorneys back to work, after denying to approve the joint
stipulation, which included a time line for construction of the
jail.

The judge said the document was too ambiguous. She also declined
to set attorney fees at this point in the case. The judge did keep
the stipulation on file as a matter of record, as Vigo County had
stipulated its jail does not meet constitutional standards.
Magnus-Stinson granted class certification in an order filed May
19.

On Aug. 18, Sutherlin filed a motion asking that a preliminary
injunction hearing be held after the Vigo County Council has voted
on an ordinance to raise the local income tax.

The motion says should the Vigo County Council fail to approve the
ordinance by Sept. 30, Sutherlin requests the federal court set a
hearing for January 2018 or sooner.

On Aug. 29, the court approved public notice to class members of
the lawsuit, which opens the lawsuit to all inmates in the custody
of the county from Oct. 13, 2016, to the present.

In a Sept. 8 order, U.S. Magistrate Judge Mark Dinsmore
consolidated Sutherlin's motion for preliminary injunction hearing
in with a class action trial of inmates at the jail.

Dinsmore ordered that Sutherlin file a brief in support of his
motion for a preliminary injunction by Oct. 13, with Vigo County
attorneys to respond by Nov. 13.

All parties are to have counter responses by Dec. 8. Dinsmore said
he anticipates the amended motion for preliminary injunction and
consolidated trial on all issues of the case be ready for a
hearing on or after Jan. 8, 2018.

Dinsmore also issued a case management order that outlines dates
on class action inmate issues to "be ready for trail in or after
January, 2019."

That order sets out a series of dates for court actions, including
a settlement demand be filed by Oct. 13. The order lays out other
court dates through August 2018. [GN]


VOLKSWAGEN: Judge Bars States from Suing Over Emissions Scandal
---------------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Iovino, a federal judge in San Francisco, earlier this
month dashed the hopes of states and local governments seeking to
pile on more fines against Volkswagen for its emissions-cheating
scandal.

Dismissing Wyoming's lawsuit against Volkswagen, U.S. District
Judge Charles Breyer found states can't punish automakers for
cheating emissions tests because only the Environmental Protection
Agency wields such power.

"Because Volkswagen's conduct took place during manufacturing,
Congress determined that EPA, not the 50 states, was best situated
to regulate it," Breyer wrote in his 24-page ruling.

Volkswagen installed software that cheated emissions tests in
nearly 600,000 "clean diesel" vehicles sold in the United States.
It has paid more than $20 billion in U.S. penalties and civil
settlements thus far, including a $2.8 billion criminal fine.

Seven states and Harris County, Texas, had filed amicus briefs
opposing Volkswagen's motion to dismiss Wyoming's complaint.

Wyoming argued that it was not looking to enforce federal emission
standards, but rather to hold Volkswagen accountable for violating
two state laws that forbid concealing a defeat device or tampering
with an anti-pollution device.

But Breyer found Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act explicitly
bars states from attempting to enforce "any standard relating to
the control of emissions from new motor vehicles."

States can regulate conduct that occurs after a car is
manufactured and once it is licensed by the state or driven on its
roads, the judge said. But allowing Wyoming to sue for conduct
that occurred when vehicles were coming off the assembly line in
Germany would create "an anarchic patchwork of federal and state
regulatory programs" and "a multiplicity of redundant
investigations and enforcement actions," he wrote.

Breyer noted in his ruling that just because states cannot enforce
federal emission standards, that doesn't mean Volkswagen can evade
responsibility for its deceptive conduct.

"As is readily apparent from this [multi-district litigation],
Volkswagen has indeed been held responsible," Breyer wrote,
referring to more than $20 billion in fines and settlements paid
out by the company.

Under prior settlements, Wyoming residents will receive more than
$9 million in consumer relief and the state will get $8 million
for environmental mitigation, according to Volkswagen's motion to
dismiss.

Wyoming was seeking penalties of up to $37,500 per vehicle per
day, or $13.6 million per vehicle per year, a fine Volkswagen
described as "Draconian" in its motion to dismiss.

Approximately 1,196 of the falsely marketed "clean diesel"
vehicles were registered in Wyoming as of Nov. 1, 2015, according
to Breyer's ruling.

The judge said allowing states to usurp the EPA's exclusive
authority to regulate new-vehicle emission standards would place
an undue burden on automakers because they'd have to comply with
federal regulations "in the shadow of 50 states' regimes."

"Wyoming's claims (and those of other states) threaten to
interfere with interstate commerce, because they are predicated on
conduct that occurred during the manufacture of hundreds of
thousands of vehicles intended for distribution throughout the
United States," Breyer wrote. (Parentheses in original.)

In an emailed statement, Volkswagen said it was pleased with the
judge's decision, "which makes clear that the federal Clean Air
Act bars Wyoming and other so-called non-177 states from seeking
to bring environmental claims against Volkswagen" for the same
issues it resolved with the EPA and 15 states that have adopted
California's stricter emissions standards under Section 177 of the
Clean Air Act.

Volkswagen said it plans to seek dismissal of nine similar
lawsuits filed by states and localities, "including filing
dismissal motions against Illinois, Minnesota and Ohio today."

Wyoming Attorney General Peter Michael did not immediately respond
Thursday to a request for comment.


WAL-MART STORES: Wants California Wage Suit to Stay Federal
-----------------------------------------------------------
Melissa Daniels, writing for Law360, reports that Walmart urged a
California federal judge on September 15 to reject an ex-worker's
effort to push her putative wage-and-hour class action back to
state court, saying the alleged damages exceed the $5 million
minimum for federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness
Act.

At the start of September 15's hearing, U.S. District Judge Andre
Birotte Jr. issued a tentative decision to send Chelsea Hamilton's
case back down to the San Bernardino Superior Court, where she
first brought overtime, minimum wage and other labor law claims
against Wal-Mart Stores Inc. But Walmart's attorney Patrick M.
Madden of K&L Gates LLP pressed the judge to reconsider, saying
the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million based on
"conservative" estimates of how much the workers are paid.

Madden argued that the case is likely to come back up to federal
court once more facts about the workers' actual conditions emerge.

"If you remand, once we do discovery in state court, we're going
to be right back here," he said.

Judge Birotte said he would take the matter under consideration
and research relevant cases before issuing a final decision.

Named plaintiff Chelsea Hamilton initially filed her suit in San
Bernardino Superior Court. She seeks to represent Walmart
associates who worked at a Chino, California, location who
allegedly failed to receive overtime pay and minimum wages, didn't
receive proper pay stubs, and missed meal periods. She also
proposed a subclass for terminated employees who didn't receive
all paid wages within 72 hours of their firing.

After Walmart removed the suit to federal court in mid-July,
Hamilton filed a motion to remand that said the calculations the
company used to come up with the liability exceeding $5 million
use fuzzy math and aren't specific enough.

Though the company relied upon a signed declaration from a human
resources manager to determine the number of former and current
employees who could be affected by the action, Hamilton says the
calculations failed to address their hourly rates of pay, the
average number of hours worked in a day, and the number of pay
periods during their employment.

"Defendants' speculative assumptions not only pervade the notice
of removal, thereby calling into question the accuracy of each
estimate, but also serve no purpose other than to artificially
inflate the amount in controversy for jurisdictional purposes,"
the motion said.

But Walmart argued in its opposition that it could easily surpass
the $5 million benchmark for federal jurisdiction. Wait time
penalties alone would yield more than $2.44 million, Walmart
argued, while potential wage statement penalties would exceed $4
million based on the number of statements issued in the relevant
class period, the number of employees, and the lawful per-
violation penalties.

Walmart also pushed back against the assertion that more specific
numbers are required. The Class Action Fairness Act only requires
the defendant to establish the amount in controversy by a
preponderance of the evidence, the company argued.

Madden echoed this point in court at a hearing on the remand
motion on September 15, saying court precedent only requires a
defendant to show a reasonable extrapolation of possible
penalties.

"A defendant doesn't have to establish actual liability," Madden
said.

Judge Birotte floated the possibility of a discovery period to
determine proper calculations. If the plaintiffs are correct in
their calculations that the amount in controversy is under $5
million, the case can be shipped back to San Bernardino, he said.

"Why not just go through a discovery period to flesh all this
out?" he said. "Why do we need to have this pingpong match?"

But Stephanie Yasuda of Yoon Law Firm, who represents Hamilton,
said allowing discovery at this juncture would place an unfair
burden on the plaintiffs.

"The law doesn't allow for [Walmart] to have a third bite at the
apple with discovery in federal court," she said.

She told the court they believe the amount in controversy is
around $4 million.

Attorneys for the parties declined to comment on September 15. A
spokesperson for Walmart didn't immediately return a request for
comment.

Plaintiff Chelsea Hamilton is represented by Stephanie E. Yasuda,
Esq. -- syasuda@yoonlaw.com -- Kenneth H. Yoon, Esq. --
kyoon@yoonlaw.com --  and Brian G. Lee, Esq. -- blee@yoonlaw.com -
- of Yoon Law APC and G. Samuel Cleaver, Esq. --
sam@losangelesdisabilitydiscriminationattorney.com -- of the Law
Offices of G. Samuel Cleaver.

Walmart is represented by Patrick M. Madden, Esq. --
Patrick.madden@klgates.com -- Roman D. Hernandez, Esq. --
roman.hernandez@klgates.com -- and Paul W. Sweeney Jr., Esq. --
paul.sweeney@klgates.com -- of K&L Gates LLP.

The case is Hamilton v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., case number 5:17-cv-
01415 in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California. [GN]


WALMART STORES: Truck Drivers' Counsel Awarded $15.2MM in Fees
--------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that the federal judge in San
Francisco who awarded $60 million to Walmart truck drivers in a
wage dispute handed the drivers' attorneys $15.2 million in fees
and the class leaders $15,000 each in incentive awards -- less
than their requests of $20 million and $50,000, respectively.

The case is captioned, CHARLES RIDGE WAY, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
WAL-MART STORES INC., Defendant. Case 3:08-cv-05221-SI (N.D.
Cal.).


WAYNE COUNTY, MI: 6th Cir. Affirms Ruling in Strip Searches Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the judgment of the District Court granting
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned
AMANDA SUMPTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WAYNE COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees, No. 16-2102 (6th Cir.).

The issue before the Sixth Circuit is whether periodically
conducting group strip searches when the number of jail inmates
waiting to be processed makes individual searches imprudent
constitutes a violation of clearly established Fourth Amendment
law.

Plaintiff Amanda Sumpter spent a month in the Wayne County Jail in
Detroit, Michigan.  During her incarceration, Sumpter underwent
four strip searches that she alleges violated her Fourth Amendment
rights.

Defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment.  First,
Graham argued that she was entitled to qualified immunity on the
Registry-searches claim. Relying on Graham's affidavit and
deposition testimony that she conducted group strip searches only
when the volume of inmates waiting to be processed required it,
defendant Graham argued that no case clearly established that her
conduct constituted a Fourth Amendment violation.

Second, defendants Wayne County and the Wayne County Sheriff moved
for summary judgment on plaintiff's cellblock-search claim on the
grounds that plaintiff merely alleged an isolated incident without
submitting any evidence showing it was the product of an official
policy or custom.

Finally, defendants argued that plaintiff's requests for
injunctive and declaratory relief were moot because Sumpter did
not reside at the jail at the time she sued.

The district court agreed with defendants on all three fronts. In
the same order, it also denied without prejudice the pending
motion for class certification, as well as plaintiff's motion to
strike an errata sheet that defendants filed as part of their
summary judgment motion.

Following the entry of a final judgment, plaintiff appeals.

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.  To prevail, the non-movant must
show sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material
fact, which is to say, there must be evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the non-movant.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Graham on
the basis of qualified immunity. That doctrine shields
governmental officials from monetary damages as long as their
actions did not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.

To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity, the Sixth Circuit performed a two-part inquiry it may
conduct in either order.  The Sixth Circuit asked whether the
facts alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional
right and whether the right at issue was 'clearly established' at
the time of the incident.

The Sixth Circuit said it has decided several cases involving
strip searches. Two of these decisions are argued at length in
this appeal.

The first is Stoudemire v. Michigan Department of Corrections, 705
F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2013). In that case, a prison guard subjected
the plaintiff to an impromptu strip search while she was standing
in a common area of the prison.  When the plaintiff asked why she
was being searched, the defendant responded, "because I can." The
defendant then escorted the plaintiff to her cell, which was
adjacent to a busy hallway. Inside, with the window to the hallway
open, the defendant conducted a strip search with a smirk on her
face. During the search, the plaintiff could hear people in the
hallway and realized that they could see her.

This court found the alleged search to be unreasonable. A strip
search is a particularly extreme invasion, we said, and the
location of the strip search made it more invasive, as did the
manner in which the defendant conducted it. As for any legitimate
penological justification for conducting the search, we concluded
that no special circumstances such as an emergency or time or
resource constraints justified strip searching Stoudemire where
others could see her naked.

Taking the facts as Stoudemire alleged them, and balancing the
significant intrusion against the non-existent penological
justifications, we held that the plaintiff has established a
constitutional violation.

The second case is Williams v. City of Cleveland, 771 F.3d 945
(6th Cir. 2014). The issue in Williams was whether a complaint
states a constitutional claim when it alleges that defendant's
jail, instead of using less invasive procedures, compelled
pretrial detainees who were being processed into the facility to
undress in the presence of other detainees and to have their naked
genitals sprayed with delousing solution from a pressurized metal
canister.

The Sixth Circuit held such allegations stated a plausible Fourth
Amendment claim. Starting from the premise that visual strip
searches conducted in private are themselves an offense to the
dignity of the individual, we concluded that intentionally
touching a naked detainee (as the defendants did with the
delousing agent) and doing so in the presence of other detainees
only exacerbates the humiliation and injury to personal privacy
that naturally attends strip searches.

In weighing the significant incursion into plaintiffs' privacy
rights against the facility's need to conduct the searches, the
Sixth Circuit cautioned, at this juncture in the analysis, the
procedural posture of this case is important. Because the case
came to this court at the motion-to-dismiss stage, plaintiffs were
required only to plausibly allege rather than demonstrate that the
jail acted unreasonably.

The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' proposed complaint
which alleged that jail administrators could have allowed
detainees to self-apply the delousing agent privately accomplished
that.  Because the plaintiffs alleged the availability of easily
implemented and significantly less-invasive alternatives to the
significantly intrusive searches that were actually conducted, we
held that plaintiffs plausibly alleged a Fourth Amendment claim.

The constitutionality of the searches at issue in this case
involves a three-step analysis:

   (1) First, the Sixth Circuit determines the nature of
intrusion, examining the scope, manner, and location of the
search. Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 572.

   (2) Second, the Sixth Circuit evaluates the need for the
search, giving due deference to the correctional officer's
exercise of her discretionary functions.

   (3) Third, the Sixth Circuit determines whether the search was
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests by weighing
the need against the invasion.

Nature of the Intrusion.

A strip search, by its very nature, constitutes an extreme
intrusion upon personal privacy. The act of a stranger examining
the most private areas of one's body is an offense to the dignity
of the individual that is 'undoubtedly humiliating and deeply
offensive to many.  Intrusive under ideal circumstances, strip
searches are especially humiliating when they are conducted in
front of other inmates: The wider an audience for a strip search,
the more humiliating it becomes, especially when the stripped
individual is exposed to bystanders who do not share the searching
officers' institutional need to view her unclothed.

Nevertheless, the nature of the intrusion is only part one of the
inquiry. An intrusive search is not necessarily an unreasonable
one, especially in the corrections setting, where an inmate's
interest in being free from privacy invasions must yield to the
realities of operating a safe and effective corrections system.
In every case, corrections officials and reviewing courts must
balance the intrusion against the need for the particular search
at issue to determine whether the search is constitutionally
tolerable.

Penological Justification.

The relevant question is whether Graham had a legitimate
penological justification for deviating from the general rule.
Graham testified that she conducted group strip searches of up to
five inmates when the high volume of inmates demanded it.  She
explained that when there is a line of twenty or more women
waiting to be processed, conducting one-on-one searches for every
inmate takes a long time, which in turn causes a ripple effect on
the rest of the registration process.

For example, when the bottleneck peaks during the afternoon shift,
sometimes inmates get left over to midnight shift, causing
additional delays for inmates waiting to see the psychologist who
only works the day shift. Conducting individual searches in those
circumstances not only impeded the facility's interest in
expeditiously processing incoming inmates, it compromised the
health and safety of those inmates caught up in the delay.

To summarize, on one hand, the group strip searches plaintiff
endured in the Registry were especially intrusive; on the other
hand, defendants have asserted a legitimate penological
justification for periodically conducting the searches. Typically,
the Sixth Circuit would proceed to balance the nature of the
intrusion against the penological justification to determine
whether the searches were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
However, we need not go that far in order to determine that Graham
is entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity protects a constitutional tortfeasor from
personal liability unless the contours of the constitutional right
she violated were sufficiently definite that any reasonable
official in the defendant's shoes would have understood that he
was violating it.

Strip searches, even when conducted in the most private
circumstances, are intrusive. But in the absence of bright lines
and per se prohibitions, whether and when to subject inmates to
increasingly intrusive searches depends on the facts confronting
the corrections official in each particular case.

For these reasons, the Sixth Circuit says it need not conduct the
Fourth Amendment analysis to its completion in order to conclude
that Graham is entitled to qualified immunity. Neither Stoudemire,
nor Williams, nor any other case, would have put Graham on notice
that conducting group strip searches when the volume of inmates
made individual searches imprudent was unreasonable. Thus,
regardless of whether Graham, in fact, violated the Fourth
Amendment, no reasonable officer would have known that at the
time. The Sixth Circuit therefore holds, as the district court
did, that defendant Graham is entitled to qualified immunity.

Plaintiff argues that the district court mistakenly held that her
cellblock search was a single incident. She contends that the
record contains hundreds of affidavits from former inmates
recounting similar incidents, evidence she contends demonstrates
that Wayne County had a policy of permitting this unconstitutional
conduct. Only by turning a blind eye toward this record evidence,
plaintiff argues, could the district court hold that hers was an
isolated incident.

The record shows that plaintiff failed to marshal the collection
of affidavits in an effort to establish that the cellblock search
was not an isolated incident. Plaintiff insists she did so by
dropping a footnote in response to defendant's motion and stating
that she relies on, and incorporates herein, the affidavits in
opposition to summary judgment. But this is the summary judgment
equivalent of hiding elephants in mouseholes.

In short, because plaintiff failed to bring the affidavits to the
district court's attention in connection with the cellblock claim,
it had no occasion to consider them in that context. The opposing
party 'has an affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to
those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely
to create a genuine issue of material fact. Nor will we fault the
district court for failing to do so. The Sixth Circuit has said
time and again, district courts cannot be expected to dig through
the record to find the seeds of a party's cause of action.

Plaintiff must mark each site, identifying the genuine disputes of
fact that preclude summary judgment on a particular claim.  The
district court had no obligation to do plaintiff's work for her,
nor does the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit therefore affirms
the decision granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on
the cellblock search claim.

This leaves plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory
relief. The district court held that these claims were moot
because plaintiff was no longer housed at the Wayne County Jail
and the Wayne County Jail formally changed its policy to prohibit
group strip searches. The Sixth Circuit affirms the decision to
grant summary judgment on these claims, though the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the doctrine of standing, as opposed to mootness,
is the correct rationale.

The Sixth Circuit says it does not underestimate the severity of
the intrusions plaintiff endured during her incarceration in the
Wayne County Jail. The practice of strip searches "instinctively
gives us the most pause. However, the Sixth Circuit says its task
is to determine whether the particularized right implicated by
defendant's actions was clearly established at the time plaintiff
was searched. For the reasons stated, the Sixth Circuit holds that
it was not. The Sixth Circuit further concludes that the district
court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on
plaintiff's cellblock claim and claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief.

Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirms the judgment of the
district court.

A full-text copy of the Sixth Circuit's August 18, 2017 Opinion is
available at http://tinyurl.com/yd78wpk6from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Michael R. Dezsi -- mdezsi@dezsilaw.com -- LAW OFFICE OF
MICHAEL R. DEZSI, PLLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant.
Davidde A. Stella, WAYNE COUNTY CORPORATION COUNSEL, Detroit
CenterSuite 2500500 Woodward Avenue Detroit, MI 48226-3427, for
Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Michael R. Dezsi, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL R. DEZSI, PLLC,
Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant.
Davidde A. Stella, WAYNE COUNTY CORPORATION COUNSEL, Detroit,
Michigan, for Appellees.


WELLS FARGO: Faces Class Action Over Biased Employment Practices
----------------------------------------------------------------
Compton Herald reports that a Black former bank teller at Wells
Fargo claims in a federal class action that his short-lived
promotion to manager was marked by discrimination and unequal pay.

Filing suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, lead
plaintiff Frank Hightower says he had been working at a Wells
Fargo in Chichester, Pa., for nearly four years when he was
promoted in April 2014 as part of the bank's "plan to increase
diversity among its store managers."

Indeed, Wells Fargo "maintains a diversity scorecard which it uses
to control hiring demographics via a quota system," the complaint
states.

Hightower says his eventual termination last year is the direct
result of a complaint he made in July 2014 about another manager's
discriminatory treatment of Black employees with regard to
monetary raises.

"The retaliatory actions were in the form of continued harassment,
static salary, six (6) disciplinary write-ups, despite excellent
performance, and other unsubstantiated attempts at discipline and
corrective action," the complaint states.

Hightower says one area manager even apologized for the
discriminatory and retaliatory treatment he faced in 2015, and
that he "received numerous awards for performance that year."

"Additionally, despite his performance, he was still the lowest
paid store manager in his region," the complaint states.

Hightower claims to have applied for numerous transfers and
promotions in the Philadelphia area "but was rejected each and
every time."

"Suspecting that he was indeed being 'flagged' within his region,
plaintiff applied for manager opportunities outside of the
region," the complaint states.

Though Hightower allegedly was approved in April 2016 for a
lateral transfer to a Wells Fargo branch in Atlanta, Ga., he says
the trouble from Philadelphia followed him to his new branch.

The first corrective action that the bank issued to Hightower in
Georgia was a "final warning," according to the complaint.

Hightower says the bank attributed his termination on his failure
to complete training as stipulated in the corrective action, but
that the bank made compliance impossible: requiring him to
complete the training by Aug. 31, 2016, though it was not
available until 2017.

The class seeks punitive damages and an injunction, alleging
violations of federal civil rights laws, Title VII, the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.

They are represented by attorney Zakia Moore, Esq. of McCain Law.
U.S. District Judge Gerald McHugh is presiding.

Also in Philadelphia, Wells Fargo is battling claims of lending
discrimination from the city. Philadelphia claims that loans in
majority-non-White neighborhoods are 4.7 times as likely to be
foreclosed on as loans in predominantly White neighborhoods. The
cities of Los Angeles, Oakland, Miami, Baltimore, and Memphis
filed similar suits against the bank at the time. [GN]


WELLS FARGO: Faces Suit over Discriminatory Employment Practices
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lowell Neumann Nickey, writing for Courthouse News Service,
reported that a black former bank teller at Wells Fargo claims in
a federal class action in Philadelphia that his short-lived
promotion to manager was marked by discrimination and unequal pay.

Filing suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, lead
plaintiff Frank Hightower says he had been working at a Wells
Fargo in Chichester, Pa., for nearly four years when he was
promoted in April 2014 as part of the bank's "plan to increase
diversity among its store managers."

Indeed, Wells Fargo "maintains a diversity scorecard which it uses
to control hiring demographics via a quota system," the complaint
states.

Hightower says his eventual termination last year is the direct
result of a complaint he made in July 2014 about another manager's
discriminatory treatment of black employees with regard to
monetary raises.

"The retaliatory actions were in the form of continued harassment,
static salary, six (6) disciplinary write-ups, despite excellent
performance, and other unsubstantiated attempts at discipline and
corrective action," the complaint states.

Hightower says one area manager even apologized for the
discriminatory and retaliatory treatment he faced in 2015, and
that he "received numerous awards for performance that year."

"Additionally, despite his performance, he was still the lowest
paid store manager in his region," the complaint states.

Hightower claims to have applied for numerous transfers and
promotions in the Philadelphia area "but was rejected each and
every time."

"Suspecting that he was indeed being 'flagged' within his region,
plaintiff applied for manager opportunities outside of the
region," the complaint states.

Though Hightower allegedly was approved in April 2016 for a
lateral transfer to a Wells Fargo branch in Atlanta, Ga., he says
the trouble from Philadelphia followed him to his new branch.

The first corrective action that the bank issued to Hightower in
Georgia was a "final warning," according to the complaint.

Hightower says the bank attributed his termination on his failure
to complete training as stipulated in the corrective action, but
that the bank made compliance impossible: requiring him to
complete the trainings by Aug. 31, 2016, though they were not
available until 2017.

The class seeks punitive damages and an injunction, alleging
violations of federal civil rights laws, Title VII, the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.

They are represented by attorney Zakia Moore of McCain Law.

U.S. District Judge Gerald McHugh is presiding.

Also in Philadelphia, Wells Fargo is battling claims of lending
discrimination from the city. Philadelphia claims that loans in
majority-non-white neighborhoods are 4.7 times as likely to be
foreclosed on as loans in predominantly white neighborhoods. The
cities of Los Angeles, Oakland, Miami, Baltimore and Memphis filed
similar suits against the bank at the time.

Wells Fargo spokesman Jim Baum balked at the charge.

"While we are still reviewing the lawsuit, Wells Fargo denies that
we have a company-wide pattern and practice of discrimination,"
Baum said in an email. "Wells Fargo is committed to advancing
diversity and social inclusion by helping ensure that all people
across our workforce feel valued and respected, and have equal
access to opportunities to succeed."


YUMMY EARTH: "Sandoval" Suit Moved to Central Dist. of California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Summer Sandoval, individually, and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
Yummy Earth Inc. and DOES 1- 25, inclusive, the Defendant, Case
No. CIVDS 1709943, was removed on Sep. 8, 2017 from the Superior
Court of the State of CA, San Bernardino, to the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California (Eastern Division -
Riverside). The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:17-cv-
01832-TJH-KK to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge Terry J. Hatter, Jr.

Yummy Earth produces organic candies in Europe and Asia. It offers
lollipops, gummy bears, licorice, fruit snacks, sours, hard
candies, and vitamin C candies.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan M Ferrell, Esq.
          Thomas Wolfe Kohler, Esq.
          APEX TRIAL LAW APC
          4100 Newport Place Suite 800
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 438 0033
          E-mail: rferrell@apextrial.com
                  tkohler@apextrial.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Amit Rana, Esq.
          Matthew B Borden, Esq.
          BRAUNHAGEY AND BORDEN LLP
          220 Sansome Street 2nd Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 599 0210
          Facsimile: (415) 599 0210
          E-mail: rana@braunhagey.com
                  borden@braunhagey.com


ZB N.A.: Court Withdraws Referral Bid in "Evans" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned RONALD C. EVANS, an individual; JOAN M.
EVANS, an individual; DENNIS TREADAWAY, an individual; and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ZB, N.A., a national
banking association, dba California Bank & Trust, Defendant, Case
No. 2:17-cv-01123-WBS-DB (E.D. Cal.), Judge William B. Shubb of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California,
Sacramento Division, withdrew without prejudice CB&T's Referral
Motion to any of the Parties.

On July 24, 2017, CB&T filed a Motion to Refer this Class Action
Complaint to the Honorable Robert S. Bardwil in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. Section 157(a) and the Court's General Orders 182,
223, and 330.  The Referral Motion is currently scheduled to be
heard on Oct. 2, 2017 at 1:30 p.m.

The Parties have met and conferred regarding the Referral Motion.
Based on their discussions, CB&T agrees to withdraw the Referral
Motion without prejudice to the rights of to any of the Parties.
The Parties previously agreed that the deadline to file an answer
or otherwise respond to the Complaint would be 20 calendar days
after notice to the Parties of the Court's entry of its written
order ruling on the Referral Motion.  Given CB&T's withdrawal of
the Referral Motion, it is agreed by the Parties that CB&T will
have until Oct. 5, 2017 to file and serve its answer or other
response to the Complaint.

Based on the Parties' Stipulation, and good cause appearing, Judge
Shubb withdrew without prejudice CB&T's Referral Motion to any of
the Parties and gave CB&T until Oct. 5, 2017 to file and serve its
answer or other response to the Complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 12, 2017 Order is available
at https://is.gd/vFoPhO from Leagle.com.

Ronald C. Evans, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Curtis --
rcurtis@foleybezek.com -- Foley Bezek Behle Curtis LLP.

Ronald C. Evans, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin D. Gamarnik --
kgamarnik@foleybezek.com -- Foley Bezek Behle and Curtis LLP &
Aaron Lee Arndt -- aarnt@foleybezek.com -- Foley Bezek Behle &
Curtis, LLP.

Joan M. Evans, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin D. Gamarnik, Foley
Bezek Behle and Curtis LLP & Aaron Lee Arndt, Foley Bezek Behle &
Curtis, LLP.

Dennis Treadaway, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin D. Gamarnik,
Foley Bezek Behle and Curtis LLP & Aaron Lee Arndt, Foley Bezek
Behle & Curtis, LLP.

ZB, N.A., Defendant, represented by Robert Scott McWhorter --
robert.mcwhorter@leclairryan.com -- Buchalter, A Professional
Corporation.



                             *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Marion
Alcestis A. Castillon, Ma. Cristina Canson, Noemi Irene A. Adala,
Joy A. Agravantefor, Valerie Udtuhan, Julie Anne L. Toledo,
Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Joseph Cardillo at 856-381-
8268.



                 * * *  End of Transmission  * * *