CAR_Public/171005.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


            Thursday, October 5, 2017, Vol. 19, No. 197



                            Headlines

321 HENDERSON: Accused by "Dockery" Suit of Violating RICO Act
AL'S PIZZA: Faces "Tzompaxtle" Suit Over Failure to Pay Overtime
ALBUQUERQUE, NM: Court Issues Prelim Injunction in "Torres"
ALL-DRY INC: "Edwards" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
ALLEGHENY COUNTY: "Nelson" Suit Alleges Discrimination

ALLIED UNIVERSAL: "Pabualan" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
AMEDISYS INC: December 13 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
APIO INC: Court Approves $5.9 Million Class Action Settlement
AUDI AG: Autohaus Acquisitions Suit Alleges Antitrust Violations
BANK MUTUAL: "Paquin" Suit Removed to E.D. Wis.

BCB BANCORP: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Insurance Suit
BEDROCK PETROLEUM: "Hebert" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
BEHR: Faces CA Over Quick Deterioration of DeckOver Product
BILL GRAHAM: Sued by Kihn for Broadcasting Copyrighted Music
C CARAMANICO & SONS: "Correa" Suit Alleges FLSA Violations

CCS CREDIT: Illegally Collects Debt, "Gonzalez" Action Claims
CHESAPEAKE ENERGY: Court Denies Partial Summary Judgment Bid
CHILDTIME CHILDCARE: "Morgan" Suit Transferred to C.D. Calif.
DIVERSIFIED CONSULTANTS: Illegally Collects Debt, Suit Claims
DONNA KARAN: 2nd Cir. Dismisses FACTA Class Action Under Spokeo

EQUIFAX INC: "Highfield" Claims Damages Over Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: NJ Residents File CA Lawsuits After Data Breach
EQUIFAX INC: Faces Class Action in West Virginia
EQUIFAX INC: Small Business Owners File Class-Action Suit
EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Podalsky" Class Suit Over FCRA Violation

EQUIFAX INC: Fails to Secure Customers' Info, "Jorge" Suit Says
EQUIFAX INC: Sued Over Fair Credit Reporting Act Violation
EQUIFAX INC: "Seymore" Sues Over Data Breach, Claims Damages
EQUIFAX INFO: "Mann" Suit Hits Personal Data Breach
EQUIFAX INFO: Sued Over Fair Credit Reporting Act Violation

EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Faces "Kilgore" Suit in N.M. Over Breach
EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Fails to Secure Info Under FCRA, Gray Claims
EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Jakob Brings Consumer Class Suit Under FCRA
EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Faces "Minka" Class Suit Over FCRA Violation
EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Faces "Melo" Class Suit Over FCRA Violation

FEDEX CORP: 2nd Cir. Affirms Dismissal of ICCTA Suit
GENERAL MOTORS: Faces "Hindsman" Suit Over Oil Consumption Defect
GEORGE W LONG: Sued Over Americans with Disabilities Act Breach
GUIDANCE SOFTWARE: Monteverde & Associates Files Class Action Suit
INSIGHT GLOBAL: "Buffa" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages

JEFFERSON COUNTY: Court Grants Class Certification in "Beckhart"
KOCH MEAT: Court OKs Move for Conditional Class Certification
LIFEVANTAGE CORP: "Zhang" Plaintiffs Can't Amend Complaint
LONGHORN EMERGENCY: "Jordan" Seek Wages for Off-the-Clock Work
LOST DOG PIZZA: Refuses to Pay Overtime Wages, "Diaz" Suit Claims

MONTEREY FINANCIAL: Accused of Illegal Debt Collection Practices
NEAR DIRECT: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, "Sloatman" Suit Claims
NESTLE WATERS: Faces Copycat CA Lawsuit Over Poland Spring
NORTHSTAR LOCATION: Sued Over Illegal Debt Collection Practices
NOVO NORDISK: Hagens Berman, Carella Byrne Named Lead Atty

OPTUMRX INC: Transferred "Johnson" Suit to District New Jersey
PATRIOT NATIONAL: Faces "Kayce" Class Suit in S.D. New York
PHARMERICA CORP: "Martin" to Halt Merger deal, Seeks Projections
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY: Loses Bid to Dismiss ERISA Suit
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY: Retirement Plan Class Action Moves Forward

RBC CAPITAL: Court Denies Move to Dismiss Class Suit
RETRIEVAL-MASTERS: Illegally Collects Debt, "Rafferty" Suit Says
REVENUE FRONTIER: "Clough" Sues Over Illegal SMS Ads
SAGE GROUP: Faces "Sellers" Suit Over Failure to Pay Overtime
SCRIPPS NETWORKS: "Berg" Suit Alleges Securities Act Violation

SHUTTERFLY INC: Lawsuit Tags Illinois as Battleground in Fight
SOUTHGOBI RESOURCES: Appeals Court Clarifies Leave Requirements
SPIRIT AIRLINES: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss $9 Fare Club Suit
STATES RECOVERY: Illegally Collects Debt, "Caldera" Suit Claims
TGI FRIDAY'S: Agrees to Settle Wage Suit for More Than $19MM

TINTRI INC: Faces "Tuller" Suit Over Misleading Fin'l Reports
TORRANCE MEMORIAL: Faces "Balaceanu" Suit Over Alleged Data Beach
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: 9th Cir. May Wait for SCOTUS Ruling on Waivers
UNITED AIR: BC Court Affirms Denial of Fuel Surcharge Class Suit
UNITED STATES: Dingles Files Suit Over Civil Rights Act Violation

WASHINGTON: Court Denies Prisoners' Class Certification Move
WELLS FARGO: Hightower Sues Over Employment Discrimination
WEMAKEPRICE INC: "Hueng" Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime
WEST VIRGINIA: Judge Gives Water Crisis Settlement Prelim Approval
WORLD ACCEPTANCE: December 18 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set

* Top 5 Trends in Class Action Litigation




                            *********


321 HENDERSON: Accused by "Dockery" Suit of Violating RICO Act
--------------------------------------------------------------
LARRY G. DOCKERY, On behalf of himself and All others similarly
situated v. STEPHEN E. HERETICK, 321 HENDERSON RECEIVABLES LLC,
J.G. WENTWORTH ORIGINATIONS LLC, SENECA ONE FINANCE, INC.,
STRUCTURED SETTLEMENT INVESTMENTS, LP, STRUCTURED SETTLEMENT
PURCHASER, JOHN DOE INC. PURCHASER DEFENDANTS 1-100, and JOHN DOE
INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS 1-100, and NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, SYMMETRA LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, and JOHN DOE INC. INSURORS 1-50, Nominal Defendants, Case
No. 2:17-cv-04114-MMB (E.D. Pa., September 14, 2017), alleges
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act.

The case is brought to end and to remedy an alleged scheme
pursuant to which Defendant funding entities, a lawyer, and
cooperative state court judges have joined together to frustrate
and evade the requirements of state and federal laws, Mr. Dockery
contends.  He asserts that those laws protect the beneficiaries of
Structured Settlement Annuities ("SSAs") from exploitation at the
hands of predatory factoring companies.  He alleges that the
scheme to exploit resulted in the transfer of the right to receive
income from the SSAs here at issue, from the Plaintiffs -- SSA
beneficiaries -- to the Purchaser Defendants, with the active
assistance of the Attorney Defendant and certain persons, not
named as Defendants.

Stephen E. Heretick, Esq., is an attorney licensed to practice in
the Commonwealth of Virginia, was a member of the Portsmouth,
Virginia City Council and is a member of the Virginia House of
Delegates.  He has served as counsel for each of the Purchasing
Defendants, in each instance in which a stream of payments was
purchased by one of these Purchasing Defendants.

321 Henderson Receivables LLC is a limited liability corporation
in the business of, among other things, purchasing payment streams
from SSAs.  J.G. Wentworth Originations LLC is a limited liability
corporation in the business of, among other things, purchasing
payment streams from SSAs.  Structured Settlement Investments LP
is a limited liability corporation in the business of, among other
things, purchasing payment streams from SSAs.  Each of Defendants
Structured Settlement Purchaser John Doe Inc. 1-100 is a purchaser
of streams of payments from SSAs.

Nominal Defendant New York Life Insurance Company is a
corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the state of
Delaware, with its principal place of business in New York City.
New York Life issued, and is currently making payments on,
annuities, which are the subject of this case.

Nominal Defendant MetLife Insurance Company is a corporation,
organized and existing under the laws of the state of Delaware,
with its principal place of business in New York City.  MetLife
issued, and is currently making payments on, annuities which are
the subject of this case.  Nominal Defendant Symmetra Life
Insurance Company, f/k/a SAFECO Life Insurance Company, issued,
and is currently making payments on, annuities which are the
subject of this case.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan Auerbach, Esq.
          Jerome M. Marcus, Esq.
          MARCUS & AUERBACH LLC
          1121 N. Bethlehem Pike, Suite 60-242
          Spring House, PA 19477
          Telephone: (215) 884-2250
          Facsimile: (888) 875-0469
          E-mail: auerbach@marcusauerbach.com
                  jmarcus@marcusauerbach.com

               - and -

          Thomas E. L. Dewey, Esq.
          David S. Pegno, Esq.
          L. Lars Hulsebus, Esq.
          DEWEY PEGNO & KRAMARSKY LLP
          777 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 943-9000
          Facsimile: (212) 943-4325
          E-mail: tdewey@dpklaw.com
                  dpegno@dpklaw.com
                  lhulsebus@dpklaw.com


AL'S PIZZA: Faces "Tzompaxtle" Suit Over Failure to Pay Overtime
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jesus Tzompaxtle, individually and on behalf of other similarly
situated employees v. Al's Pizza II, Inc. d/b/a Al's Pizza Chicago
and Adele L. Karalis, Case No. 1:17-cv-06699 (N.D. Ill., September
18, 2017), is brought against the Defendants for failure to pay
overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Defendants own and operate Al's Pizza restaurant located at
6344 W. Irving Park Rd, Chicago, IL 60634. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Valentin T. Narvaez, Esq.
      CONSUMER LAW GROUP, LLC
      6232 N. Pulaski, Suite 200
      Chicago, IL 60646
      Telephone: (312) 878-1302
      E-mail: vnarvaez@yourclg.com


ALBUQUERQUE, NM: Court Issues Prelim Injunction in "Torres"
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Plaintiff's Motion
for Preliminary Injunction in the case captioned JOSEPH DION
TORRES, on his behalf and on behalf of similarly situated persons,
Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, et al., Defendants, No. 1:17-
cv-00754-MV-SCY (D.N.M.).

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order, or in the Alternative, An Expedited
Hearing for Preliminary Injunction.

Plaintiff Joseph Dion Torres is a resident of Albuquerque and has
owned his home for several years. Defendant Ricardo Vialpando, a
Code Enforcement Inspector for the City of Albuquerque, inspected
Mr. Torres' property and discovered that the utility services had
been shut off.  Mr. Vialpando made a determination that the home
was a substandard building, in violation of city ordinances
pertaining to utilities, and he posted a Notice and Order on the
home stating that Mr. Torres had four days to vacate.

The Notice and Order provided for an appeal, but stated that such
appeal "must be in writing and filed with the Mayor's office."
Because he has nowhere else to go, Mr. Torres did not vacate his
home.  The City put a lien on the property for the alleged costs
of boarding up and cleaning the property but nobody boarded up or
cleaned the property.  Mr. Torres was arrested for criminally
trespassing in his own home.

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and
accordingly, the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal.
To obtain a preliminary injunction, Rule 65 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure requires the moving party to establish that
four equitable factors weigh in favor of the injunction: (1)
irreparable injury in the absence of the injunction, (2) the
threatened injury to the moving party outweighs the harm to the
opposing party resulting from the injunction, (3) the injunction
is not adverse to the public interest, and (4) the moving party
has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.

Before turning to the requirements for a preliminary injunction
under Rule 65, the Court notes that Mr. Torres' request does not
fall under any of the three types specifically disfavored by the
Tenth Circuit.

First, the request does not alter the "last uncontested status
between the parties which preceded the controversy," because Mr.
Torres had access to his home before the present controversy
concerning the City's enforcement of certain local ordinances.

Second, the requests at issue call for discrete actions by both
the City and Mr. Torres, and do not put the Court in a position
where it may have to provide ongoing supervision to assure the
non-movant is abiding by the injunction.

Third, Mr. Torres is not asking for "all the relief that it could
recover at the conclusion of a full trial on the merits."

The Court considers first Mr. Torres' risk of irreparable injury,
the balance of harms, and the public interest. These three factors
weigh overwhelmingly in favor of granting Mr. Torres' preliminary
injunction request, but also in favor of ordering Mr. Torres to
comply with the three conditions set out by the City in order for
living conditions at the home to be safe and sanitary.

With respect to Mr. Torres' likelihood of success on the merits,
the Court finds that "there are questions going to the merits so
serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful as to make the issue
ripe for litigation and deserving of more deliberate
investigation."

The Court therefore grants Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction.

Mr. Torres' Risk of Irreparable Injury

Irreparable harm means that the injury must be both "certain and
great" and that it must not be merely serious or substantial
irreparable harm is often suffered when the injury cannot be
adequately atoned for in money, or when the district court cannot
remedy the injury following a final determination on the merits.

It is clear to the Court that having to live outside, without
one's possessions, takes an irreparable physical and emotional
toll on a person. Monetary damages to compensate for this
traumatic experience would be difficult to ascertain and
ineffective in ameliorating the trauma. While the Court
understands the City's position that Mr. Torres could avoid this
situation by restoring his utilities, repairing the back door and
cleaning up feces in the home, the Court is concerned that Mr.
Torres and his counsel apparently did not have sufficient notice
of this path to ameliorate the problem. Under the current
circumstances of Mr. Torres perceiving that he is being forced
into homelessness, the Court is inclined to find that Mr. Torres
will suffer irreparable injury by being homeless due to government
action.

Balance of Harms

Defendants' position focuses on the dangerous and unsanitary
conditions of the home, arguing that it is in the interest of Mr.
Torres' health and safety to not be allowed to live there. Mr.
Torres' position focuses on the dangerousness and the trauma of
homelessness.

Both are very legitimate concerns. In considering these concerns
as a whole, the Court is inclined to order that the City allow Mr.
Torres to re-occupy his home and that Mr. Torres arrange for
restoring his utilities, repairing the back door, and cleaning up
the feces in the home.

Public Interest

Defendants argue that lack of utilities is a danger to the public.
In particular, Defendants point out that without running water,
one would be unable to put out a fire, and that without gas, one
has no access to hot water or lighting and may resort to unsafe
alternatives such as a gas generator.

While these are legitimate public interest concerns, the Court
remains steadfast in its instance that Mr. Torres' homelessness is
not an acceptable resolution to these concerns. In light of the
risks and harms to both the public and Mr. Torres, the Court is
inclined to order the aforementioned actions from both parties.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot succeed on the merits
because Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Defendants argued both in their Response and at the hearing that
although the Notice and Order had seemingly preclusive language
regarding right to appeal, reasonable inquiry would have revealed
to Plaintiff his right to an appeal pursuant to the Uniform
Housing Code. As attested to by Defendants Vialpando and Wall, the
Housing Advisory and Appeals Committee (HAAC), to their knowledge,
has never denied an appeal due to the deadline expiring.

The Court does not agree that consulting the Uniform Housing Code
would have been a reasonable inquiry for Mr. Torres and others who
receive a notice containing preclusive language. The factual
dispute regarding Mr. Torres procedural due process rights
suggests that Defendants may not be entitled to qualified
immunity. In light of the other three factors weighing in favor of
injunctive relief, the Court finds that the merits of Plaintiffs'
claims pose substantial questions deserving of further
investigation.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 18, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/ycj7fv9zfrom Leagle.com.

Joseph Dion Torres, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph P. Kennedy,
Kennedy Kennedy & Ives, LLC, 1000 Second Street NW, Albuquerque,
NM 87102

Joseph Dion Torres, Plaintiff, represented by Adam C. Flores,
Kennedy, Kennedy & Ives, 1000 Second Street NW, Albuquerque, NM
87102

City of Albuquerque, Defendant, represented by Michael E. Fondino,
City of Albuquerque & Kristin J. Dalton, Assistant City Attorney.

Michelle Wall, Defendant, represented by Michael E. Fondino, City
of Albuquerque & Kristin J. Dalton, Assistant City Attorney.

Ricardo Vialpando, Defendant, represented by Michael E. Fondino,
City of Albuquerque & Kristin J. Dalton, Assistant City Attorney.

Stephanie Garcia, Defendant, represented by Michael E. Fondino,
City of Albuquerque & Kristin J. Dalton, Assistant City Attorney.

Randy Hanes, Defendant, represented by Michael E. Fondino, City of
Albuquerque & Kristin J. Dalton, Assistant City Attorney.

Adam Barela, Defendant, represented by Michael E. Fondino, City of
Albuquerque & Kristin J. Dalton, Assistant City Attorney.


ALL-DRY INC: "Edwards" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
---------------------------------------------------------
Richard Edwards, and all others similarly-situated v. All-Dry,
Inc., and Alan Chandler and Nick Chandler, Case No. 3:17-cv-01313
(M.D. Tenn., September 27, 2017), seeks to recover unpaid hourly
and overtime compensation pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

The Plaintiff was an employee of the Defendants who perform
basement waterproofing, among others.  Mr. Edwards currently
resides in Nashville Tennessee.

Defendant All-Dry, Inc. is a privately owned company which
provides basement waterproofing, foundation repair, mold
remediation, crawlspace encapsulation, and attic insulation
services to owners of residential property in Tennessee, Kentucky
and elsewhere. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Martin D. Holmes, Esq.
      R. Cameron Caldwell, Esq.
      DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC
      Fifth Third Center
      424 Church Street, Suite 800
      Nashville, TN 37219-2392
      Tel: (615) 244-6538
      E-mail: mdholmes@dickinsonwright.com
              ccaldwell@dickinsonwright.com


ALLEGHENY COUNTY: "Nelson" Suit Alleges Discrimination
------------------------------------------------------
Debra Nelson, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Allegheny County and Orlando Harper,
Warden of Allegheny County Jail, Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-
01202, (W.D. Pa., September 13, 2017), seeks declaratory relief
under the Family Medical and Leave Act and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 including damages for discrimination
and retaliation directed against her.

Nelson is a corrections officer at the Allegheny County Jail. Her
physician has restricted her from working more than an eight-hour
workday as a result of a chronic pilonidal cyst, sleep apnea and
asthma. Defendants approved Plaintiff's application for
intermittent leave based upon substantial medical impairment.
Since then, Nelson has utilized FMLA leave in lieu of fulfilling
overtime assignments in order to comply with her medical
restrictions. However, Defendants allegedly allocated the overtime
hours in such a way that those enjoying intermittent medical leave
consume their allotted leaves first. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Edward J. Feinstein, Esq.
     Deborah K. Marcuse, Esq.
     Gregory A. Murray, Esq.
     FEINSTEIN DOYLE PAYNE & KRAVEC, LLC
     429 Fourth Avenue
     Law and Finance Building, Suite 1300
     Pittsburgh, PA 15219
     Telephone: (412) 281-8400
     Facsimile: (412) 281-1007
     Email: efeinstein@fdpklaw.com
            dmarcuse@fdpklaw.com
            gmurray@fdpklaw.com


ALLIED UNIVERSAL: "Pabualan" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fernan Pabualan, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Allied Universal Security Systems, and Does
1 through 100, inclusive, Case No. RG17875713 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
September 18, 2017), seeks to recover unpaid compensation for meal
and rest period violations, interest thereon, reimbursement of
business expenses, liquidated damages and other penalties,
injunctive and other equitable relief, and reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs under the California Labor Code.

Allied Universal Security Systems operates a security service
company within California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Scott Edward Cole, Esq.
      Teresa D. Allen, Esq.
      SCOTT COLE & ASSOCIATES, APC
      1970 Broadway, Ninth Floor
      Oakland, CA 94612
      Telephone: (510) 891-9800
      Facsimile: (510) 891-7030
      E-mail: scole@scalaw.com
              tallen@scalaw.com


AMEDISYS INC: December 13 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
---------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ROBERT F. BACH, et al.,
Consolidated Securities Class Action

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 10-00395-BAJ-RB

          v.

Consolidated With:

AMEDISYS, INC., et al.,

     No. 10-464-BAJ-RB
     No. 10-470-BAJ-RB
     No. 10-497-BAJ-RB

     Defendants.

SUMMARY NOTICE OF (I) PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION AND
CERTIFICATION OF SETTLEMENT CLASS; (II) PROPOSED SETTLEMENT;
(III) SETTLEMENT HEARING; AND (IV) MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES

TO:

All persons and entities who or which purchased the publicly
traded common stock of Amedisys, Inc. during the period from
August 2, 2005 through September 30, 2011, inclusive (the
"Settlement Class Period"), and were damaged thereby (the
"Settlement Class"):

PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY. YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY
A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT PENDING IN THIS COURT.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, that the above-
captioned litigation (the "Action") has been certified as a class
action on behalf of the Settlement Class, except for certain
persons and entities who are excluded from the Settlement Class by
definition as set forth in the full printed Notice of (I) Pendency
of Class Action and Certification of Settlement Class; (II)
Proposed Settlement; (III) Settlement Hearing; and (IV) Motion for
an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Litigation
Expenses (the "Notice").

YOU ARE ALSO NOTIFIED that the Lead Plaintiffs in the Action, the
Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi and Puerto Rico
Teachers' Retirement System ("Lead Plaintiffs"), on behalf of
themselves and the other members of the Settlement Class, have
reached a proposed settlement of the Action with Defendants
Amedisys, Inc. ("Amedisys"), Wendy Stabiler Borne as Independent
Executrix of the Succession of Wiliam F. Borne, Jeffrey D. Jeter,
Dale E. Redman, Larry R. Graham, Alice Ann Schwartz, Gregory
Browne, and John F. Giblin (the "Defendants") for $43,750,000.00
in cash (the "Settlement").  If the Settlement is approved by the
Court, it will resolve all claims in the Action.

A hearing will be held on December 13, 2017 at 11:00 a.m., before
the Honorable Chief Judge Brian A. Jackson at the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, United States
Court House, Courtroom 2, 777 Florida Street, Baton Rouge, LA
70801, to determine (i) whether the proposed Settlement should be
approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate; (ii) whether the
Action should be dismissed with prejudice against Defendants, and
the Releases specified and described in the Stipulation and
Agreement of Settlement dated August 4, 2017 (and in the Notice)
should be granted; (iii) whether the proposed Plan of Allocation
should be approved as fair and reasonable; and (iv) whether Lead
Counsel's application for an award of attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of Litigation Expenses should be approved.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, your rights will be
affected by the pending Action and the Settlement, and you may be
entitled to share in the Settlement Fund.  If you have not yet
received the Notice and Claim Form, you may obtain copies of these
documents by contacting the Claims Administrator at Amedisys
Securities Litigation, c/o A.B. Data, Ltd., P.O. Box 173042,
Milwaukee, WI 53217, by toll-free phone at 877-207-7560, or by
email at info@AmedisysSecuritiesLitigation.com.  Copies of the
Notice and Claim Form can also be downloaded from the website
maintained by the Claims Administrator,
www.AmedisysSecuritiesLitigation.com.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, in order to be
eligible to receive a payment under the proposed Settlement, you
must submit a Claim Form postmarked no later than January 16,
2018.  If you are a member of the Settlement Class and do not
submit a proper Claim Form, you will not be eligible to share in
the distribution of the net proceeds of the Settlement, but you
will nevertheless be bound by any judgments or orders entered by
the Court in the Action.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class and wish to exclude
yourself from the Settlement Class, you must submit a request for
exclusion such that it is received no later than November 22,
2017, in accordance with the instructions set forth in the Notice.
If you properly exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you
will not be bound by any judgments or orders entered by the Court
in the Action and you will not be eligible to share in the
proceeds of the Settlement.

Any objections to the proposed Settlement, the proposed Plan of
Allocation, or Lead Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of Litigation Expenses, must be filed with the Court
and delivered to Lead Counsel and Defendants' Counsel such that
they are received no later than November 22, 2017, in accordance
with the instructions set forth in the Notice.

Please do not contact the Court, the Clerk's office, Amedisys, or
Defendants' Counsel regarding this notice.  All questions about
this notice, the proposed Settlement, or your eligibility to
participate in the Settlement should be directed to Lead Counsel
or the Claims Administrator.

Requests for the Notice and Claim Form should be made to:

Amedisys Securities Litigation
c/o A.B. Data, Ltd.
P.O. Box 173042
Milwaukee, WI 53217
877-207-7560

Inquiries, other than requests for the Notice and Claim Form,
should be made to Lead Counsel:

BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP
John C. Browne, Esq.
1251 Avenue of the Americas, 44th Floor
New York, NY 10020
(800) 380-8496

or

WOLF POPPER LLP
Robert C. Finkel, Esq.
845 Third Avenue, 12th Floor
New York, NY 10022
(212) 759-4600

By Order of the Court


APIO INC: Court Approves $5.9 Million Class Action Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------
Gina Kim, writing for Santa Maria Times, reports the $5.9 million
settlement reached in August in a class action labor dispute case
involving a Guadalupe packing company and its employees has been
approved by Santa Barbara County Superior Court.

Apio Inc. was accused of failing to pay its employees fair wages
and compensate them for rest breaks and vacation time.

In 2014, workers rallied to unionize and began to protest the
company's working conditions, claiming they lost benefits,
seniority and vacation time after being forced to switch
subcontractors.

Yet, workers voted against union representation in late 2014,
which was then certified in February 2015.

The class action lawsuit filed in 2015 raised concerns about
whether Apio Inc. had properly paid minimum and overtime wages,
kept accurate time records, provided adequate meal/rest breaks and
compensated all vacation pay, according to the plaintiffs'
attorney Hector Martinez, of Oakland-based law firm Mallison and
Martinez.

Apio's spokesperson John Segale insisted the class-action lawsuit
is just "the latest in a string of settlements involving employers
in California who utilize piece-rate compensation following the
passage of Assembly Bill 1513 in 2015."

The law clarifies how nonproductive time was to be calculated and
paid to employees.

Under the terms of AB 1513, employers are directed to establish
rules for paying piece-rate employees for breaks and other
nonproductive time. Piece-rate pay differs from hourly rate in
that workers are paid for the amount of crops they pick.

The company paid each piece-rate employee an amount equal to 4
percent of the employees' gross earnings in pay periods in which
any work was performed on a piece-rate basis from July 1, 2012, to
December 31, 2015, minus any money already paid to the employee
for nonproductive time, according to Segale.

Now that the court has approved the settlement, more than 1,600
current and former employees will divide approximately $600,000
for wages and $2.4 million for the nonwage portion of the claim,
Segale added.

The remainder of the settlement, approximately $2.9 million, will
go to plaintiffs' attorneys, the plaintiffs themselves and
administrators for fees and expenses, while $100,000 will go to
the California Labor Workforce Development Agency. [GN]


AUDI AG: Autohaus Acquisitions Suit Alleges Antitrust Violations
----------------------------------------------------------------
Autohaus Acquisitions, Inc., and all others similarly-situated v.
Audi AG, Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. dba Volkswagen of
America, Inc. and dba Audi of America, Inc., BMW AG, BMW of North
America, LLC, Daimler AG, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, Dr. Ing. h.c.F.
Porsche AG, Porsche Cars North America, Inc. and Volkswagen AG,
Case No. 2:17-cv-07536 (D.N.J., September 27, 2017), seeks to
recover treble damages, costs of suit, including attorneys' fees,
as well as injunctive relief for Defendants' violations of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants entered into a secret
Cartel Agreement in or around 1996 to suppress competition among
Defendants.

Autohaus was a licensed and authorized dealer for the sales and
service of Volkswagen-branded vehicles.  From 2000-2008, Autohaus
was a licensed and authorized dealer for the sales and service of
Audi-branded vehicles.  Following the sale of its Audi and VW
franchises, Autohaus relocated its corporate offices to Florida.
During the relevant time period, Autohaus purchased German Cars
directly from Defendants.

The Defendants design, develop, manufacture and sell German cars
that were purchased throughout the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jonathan R. MacBride, Esq.
      ZELLE LLP
      401 Plymouth Road, Suite 120
      Plymouth Meeting, PA 19462
      Tel: (484) 532-5330
      E-mail: jmacbride@zelle.com

          - and -

      Dennis George, Esq.
      Jeffrey Scafaria, Esq.
      ARANGIO GEORGE, LLP
      2000 Market Street Suite 1440
      Philadelphia, PA 19103
      Tel: (215) 567-1999
      E-mail: dgeorge@arangiogeorge.com
              Jeff@ScafariaLaw.com


BANK MUTUAL: "Paquin" Suit Removed to E.D. Wis.
-----------------------------------------------
The case captioned Thomas L. Paquin, Todd Bestul and David
Birkholz, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Bank Mutual Corporation, Michael T.
Crowley, Jr., David A. Baumgarten, Richard A. Brown, Mark C. Herr,
Mike I. Shafir, David C. Boerke, Lisa A. Mauer, Robert B. Olson,
Thomas H. Buestrin, William J. Mielke and Associated Banc-Corp,
Defendants, Case No. 2017-cv-006202, filed in Milwaukee County
Circuit Court on July 27, 2017, was removed to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
Division under Case No. 2:17-cv-01241.

The complaint stems from merger consideration under which a Bank
Mutual common stock will be converted into the right to receive
0.422 shares of Associated common stock. The complaint alleges
that the merger consideration is inadequate and undervalues Bank
Mutual. Plaintiffs claim to be Bank Mutual shareholders. [BN]

Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Christopher Tillotson, Esq.
      Michael J. Palestina, Esq.
      KAHN SWICK & FOTI LLC
      206 Covington St.
      Madisonville, LA 70447
      Tel: (504) 455-1400
      Fax: (504) 455-1498

             - and -

      Guri Ademi, Esq.
      John D. Blythin, Esq.
      Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
      Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
      ADEMI & O'REILLY LLP
      3620 E Layton Ave
      Cudahy, WI 53110
      Tel: (414) 482-8000
      Fax: (414) 482-8001
      Email: gademi@ademilaw.com
             jblythin@ademilaw.com
             meldridge@ademilaw.com
             sademi@ademilaw.com

             - and -

      Juan Monteverde, Esq.
      Miles Schreiner, Esq.
      MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
      The Empire State Building
      350 5th Ave - 59th Floor
      New York, NY 10118
      Tel: (212) 971-1341

Defendant is represented by:

      Howard A. Pollack, Esq.
      Michael B. Apfeld, Esq.
      John L. Kirtley, Esq.
      GODFREY & KAHN, S.C.
      833 East Michigan Street, Suite 1800
      Milwaukee, WI 53202-5615
      Phone: (414) 273-3500
      Fax: (414) 273-5198
      Email: hpollack@gklaw.com
             mbapfeld@gklaw.com
             jkirtley@gklaw.com

             - and -

      Rachelle Silverberg, Esq.
      WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ
      51 West 52nd Street
      New York, NY 10019
      Phone: (212) 403-1299
      Fax: (212) 403-2299
      Email: RSilverberg@wlrk.com


BCB BANCORP: Wins Bid for Summary Judgment in Insurance Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an opinion granting Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
judgment in the case captioned BCB BANCORP, INC., et al,
Plaintiffs, v. PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE CO., et al,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 13-1261 (D.N.J.), and denying
Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment.

This insurance dispute stems from a corporate merger between two
banks, BCB and Pamrapo Bancorp, Inc. (Pamrapo), who is not a
party.  Plaintiffs were all named as defendants in a New Jersey
state court shareholder class action that led to the insurance
coverage litigation.

The Insurance Policy

The provision provided as follows:

     "This Policy shall not be subject to the terms of any other
insurance. All Loss, including Defense Costs, payable under this
Policy shall be excess to:(1) any other existing insurance
regardless of whether collectable, including but not limited to,
any insurance under there is a duty to defend, unless such other
insurance is written only as specific excess insurance over the
Limits of Liability providing by this Policy; And (2)
indemnification to which an Insured is entitled from any entity
other than the Company."

The Merger

The Merger Agreement provided that BCB will indemnify and hold
harmless Pamrapo's employees, including its officers and
directors, as to defined claims to the fullest extent that the
employees would have been entitled to under Pamrapo's Certificate
of Incorporation, bylaws, or certain disclosed agreements.

Pamrapo's Certificate of Incorporation, in turn, provided that
Pamrapo would indemnify its officers and directors to the fullest
extent authorized by the NJBCA.

Specifically, the Certificate of Incorporation stated as follows:

     "Each person who was or is made a party or is threatened to
be a made a party to or is otherwise involved in any action, suit
or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative or
investigative (hereinafter a proceeding), by reason of the fact
that he or she is or was a director or an officer shall be
indemnified and held harmless by the Corporation to the fullest
extent authorized by the New Jersey Business Corporation Act."

The Class Action Litigation

Shortly after the merger was announced, two Pamrapo shareholders
filed separate shareholder derivative class action suits in New
Jersey state court against Pamrapo, the Individual Directors, and
BCB. The suits sought to enjoin the merger and sought other
relief.

The Coverage Dispute

Pamrapo notified Progressive of the shareholder class action by
letter seeking coverage for defense costs for the individual
directors and the bank. Progressive acknowledged coverage for the
shareholder action and reserved its rights under the Policy.
Progressive recognized that the class action qualified as a claim
made within the Policy Period and that the Individual Directors
and Pamrapo may be entitled to coverage. Progressive agreed to
advance defense costs incurred on behalf of Pamrapo and its
directors, subject to its reservation of rights, and after Pamrapo
exhausted its $125,000 retention.

Summary Judgment Standard

A moving party is entitled to summary judgment where the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A fact in dispute is material when it might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law and is genuine if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the non-moving party.

According to the Court, Progressive ignores this clear statutory
construct by arguing that it is not required to reimburse the
Individual Directors post-merger because BCB is not the Company as
defined by the Policy. But the fact that BCB is not encompassed by
the definition of Company under the Policy is overcome by the
legal effect of the NJBCA. Pamrapo's Policy required Progressive
to reimburse Pamrapo for defense costs that its Individual
Directors incurred in the shareholder litigation.

Through the statutory merger, the Policy and the rights under the
Policy transferred to BCB such that BCB is now effectively the
insured.  At a minimum, BCB is entitled to the same coverage that
Pamrapo was entitled to under the Policy. Therefore, as was the
case before the merger, Progressive, after the merger, was
obligated to cover defense costs for the Individual Directors.
Progressive, for the most part, does not address the NJBCA or its
legal effect. Instead, it discusses many of the Policy's
provisions, including the anti-assignment provision. As noted, the
anti-assignment provision concerned assignments during the Policy
Period and was silent as to those that occurred later.

While not binding on this Court, Progressive also claims that the
Other Insurance or Indemnification provision in the Policy
entitles it to relief. Progressive relies on the Policy language
that indicates loss and defense costs payable under the Policy
shall be excess to indemnification to which an Insured is entitled
from any entity other than the Company. Progressive asserts that
because BCB is contractually bound to provide indemnification
pursuant the Merger Agreement, the provision controls. Progressive
makes several arguments in support of its position. The Court
finds none of them persuasive.

Progressive's asserts that Pamrapo could have negotiated different
indemnification terms in the Merger Agreement so that it would not
have had to indemnify the Individual Directors.  This argument
misses the mark because it ignores the effect of the NJBCA. As
discussed, BCB assumed all of Pamrapo's rights and liabilities
pursuant to the statutory merger. One such liability was Pamrapo's
obligation to indemnify its officers and directors, as set forth
in Pamrapo's Certificate of Incorporation.  Thus, even if the
Merger Agreement did not contain an indemnification provision, BCB
was nevertheless bound to indemnify the Individual Directors due
to the statutory merger.

More fundamentally, Progressive's position ignores the effect of
the statutory merger. Progressive's argument concerning the
Company in the Other Insurance or Indemnification provision is
essentially the same as Progressive's earlier assertion concerning
the Company and coverage in the first instance. The Court has
already rejected this argument for the reasons stated. It would
certainly be an untenable result if the definition of  Company did
not prevent BCB from obtaining Pamrapo's rights under the Policy
but nevertheless precluded BCB from recovery pursuant to the Other
Insurance or Indemnification provision.

Progressive also takes issue with Plaintiffs' argument that in
making payment to BCB for pre-merger defense costs, Progressive
conceded that BCB is now Pamrapo for purposes of the Policy.
Following the merger, Progressive sent BCB a payment due to
Pamrapo under the Policy. Progressive provides no legal authority
to support its position that the partial payment should not be
construed as a concession or admission. Instead, Progressive's
payment reflects the reality of the statutory merger -- it could
only send the payment to BCB as BCB had acquired all the rights
and liabilities of Pamrapo through the merger and Pamrapo
thereafter ceased to exist.

In sum, BCB is entitled to Pamrapo's rights under the Policy by
operation of law.  Consequently, Plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment is granted.  As a result, Progressive's cross-motion for
summary judgment must necessarily be denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 18, 2017
Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/y7a4qnfqfrom
Leagle.com.

MARK B. EPSTEIN, Mediator, represented by MARK B. EPSTEIN --
mepstein@hoaglandlongo.com -- HOAGLAND LONG MORAN DUNST & DOUKAS
LLP.

BCB BANCORP, INC., Plaintiff, represented by JENNINE DISOMMA --
jdisomma@saiber.com -- SAIBER LLC & RYAN E. SAN GEORGE --
rsangeorge@saiber.com -- SAIBER LLC.

KENNETH D. WALTER, Plaintiff, represented by JENNINE DISOMMA,
SAIBER LLC & RYAN E. SAN GEORGE, SAIBER LLC.

KENNETH POESL, Plaintiff, represented by JENNINE DISOMMA, SAIBER
LLC & RYAN E. SAN GEORGE, SAIBER LLC.

MAYOR ROBERT DORIA, Plaintiff, represented by JENNINE DISOMMA,
SAIBER LLC & RYAN E. SAN GEORGE, SAIBER LLC.

DANIEL MASSARELLI, Plaintiff, represented by JENNINE DISOMMA,
SAIBER LLC & RYAN E. SAN GEORGE, SAIBER LLC.

PATRICK CONAGHAN, Plaintiff, represented by JENNINE DISOMMA,
SAIBER LLC & RYAN E. SAN GEORGE, SAIBER LLC.

HERMAN BROCKMAN, Plaintiff, represented by JENNINE DISOMMA, SAIBER
LLC & RYAN E. SAN GEORGE, SAIBER LLC.

THE ESTATE OF JOHN MORECRAFT, Plaintiff, represented by JENNINE
DISOMMA, SAIBER LLC & RYAN E. SAN GEORGE, SAIBER LLC.

PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, represented by
JOHN P. CAMPBELL -- JPC@SPSK.COM -- SCHENCK PRICE SMITH & KING,
LLP.

COLONIAL AMERICAN CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, Defendant,
represented by ERIC COREY WEISSMAN -- eric.weissman@rmkb.com --
ROPERS MAJESKI KOHN & BENTLEY & KIRSTEN LEE MOLLOY --
kirsten.molloy@rmkb.com -- ROPERS, MAJESKI, KOHN & BENTLEY.


BEDROCK PETROLEUM: "Hebert" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
JIMMY HEBERT on Behalf of Himself and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. BEDROCK PETROLEUM CONSULTANTS, LLC, Case No.
6:17-cv-01165 (W.D. La., September 14, 2017), seeks to recover all
unpaid wages and other damages owed under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Bedrock Petroleum Consultants, LLC, is a limited liability company
organized under the law of Texas and is headquartered in
Lafayette, Louisiana.  Bedrock Petroleum is an oilfield services
company that provides staffing services, whereby the Company
places its employees to work with its customers on their
projects.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John Neuman, Esq.
          Beatriz-Sosa Morris, Esq.
          SOSA-MORRIS NEUMAN ATTORNEYS AT LAW
          5612 Chaucer Drive
          Houston, TX 77005
          Telephone: (281) 885-8844
          Facsimile: (281) 885-8813
          E-mail: JNeuman@smnlawfirm.com
                  BSosaMorris@smnlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Robert B. Landry, III, Esq.
          ROBERT B. LANDRY III PLC
          5420 Corporate Boulevard, Suite 204
          Baton Rouge, LA 70808
          Telephone: (225) 349-7460
          Facsimile: (225) 349-7466
          E-mail: rlandry@landryfirm.com


BEHR: Faces CA Over Quick Deterioration of DeckOver Product
-----------------------------------------------------------
Chris Coffey, writing for NBC Chicago, reports that homeowners who
were hoping to extend the lives of their decks with a brand-name
resurfacing product say they may need new decks altogether after
applying the product to their backyard investments.

At least two class action lawsuits have been filed against Behr
and Home Depot, alleging Behr's DeckOver deteriorates quickly and
causes damage. DeckOver, a more expensive alternative to
traditional paints and stains, is marketed as a long-lasting
product that brings new life to old wood and concrete.
Several Chicago-area homeowners have already contacted law firms
which have filed the lawsuits.

"I loved it for the first couple of years we had it until this
year when it started to rot through," said Terry Zitt of suburban
Plainfield.

Zitt said he applied DeckOver to his older, upper deck in 2013 and
said it worked great. The next year he applied DeckOver to his
newer, lower deck. But several months ago, Zitt said he noticed
his decks were chipping and trapping moisture.

"I've been out there on Sunday's tearing the boards off and
replacing boards because it's rotting away," Zitt said.
Mike Ammirata of Connecticut said he applied eight gallons of
DeckOver in 2015, but has spent much of this summer scraping it
off.

"I think we've been in the pool twice this year. You know why? We
scraped and got sweated up and then jumped in the pool," Ammirata
said.

Behr offered Ammirrata eight more gallons of DeckOver or a refund
for his purchase, which is in line with the product's limited
warranty. But he said that's not good enough because he wants Behr
to pay for someone to remove the paint.

Attorney Eric Gibbs, Esq. -- ehg@classlawgroup.com -- of the Gibbs
Law Group, which filed one of the lawsuits, said his firm has
received inquiries from hundreds of disappointed consumers.

"Our lawsuit intends to cover all affected consumers nationwide,
which means generally people are covered whether or not they
contact us," Gibbs said.

A spokesperson for Home Depot said the company was unable to
comment due to pending litigation. Behr, too, said it was unable
to provide further comment due to pending litigation.

But in court documents, attorneys for Home Depot and Behr deny
that DeckOver does not live up to promises. And lawyers for Behr
argue any issues with the product may be a result of improper
preparation or maintenance.

However, Gibbs said the numbers don't lie.

"We allege that the problem isn't the people applying it, but
rather that the product isn't living up to the promises that
justify the premium price people pay when they purchase it," Gibbs
said.

Zitt said he followed the application instructions. But he said he
has yet to contact Behr and Home Depot with his concerns because
he said he would not accept a refund for the product.

"I want them to get (the product) off because I don't want to keep
going out there every year and finding holes somewhere," Zitt
said.

Gibbs said concerned consumers who have used DeckOver should make
sure water doesn't get trapped in or around places where they've
signs of peeling, cracking, bubbling, chipping or degrading. He
also said consumers should document everything related to their
DeckOver purchase, including receipts and "before and after"
photos of their decks. [GN]


BILL GRAHAM: Sued by Kihn for Broadcasting Copyrighted Music
------------------------------------------------------------
GREG KIHN, an individual; and RYE BOY MUSIC, LLC, a California
Limited Liability Company v. BILL GRAHAM ARCHIVES, LLC, dba
WOLFGANG'S VAULT, a Delaware Limited Liability Company; NORTON,
LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; and WILLIAM SAGAN, an
individual, Case No. 4:17-cv-05343-KAW (N.D. Cal., September 14,
2017), is brought on behalf of the Plaintiffs and other similarly-
situated holders of mechanical rights, synchronization rights, and
copyrights to copyrighted music and musical performances for
alleged copyright infringement under the Copyright Act of the
United States.

The Plaintiffs and the Class are the copyright owners, or owners
of the exclusive rights, in numerous copyrighted musical
compositions, live musical performance recordings, and/or concert
footage in the United States.  The Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendants' Web sites broadcasted, and continue to broadcast, or
otherwise made available to the public, copyrighted material
without proper licenses, as required under the Copyright Act.

The Defendants operate two Web sites,
http://www.wolfgangsvault.com/and http://www.concertvault.com/

Wolfgang's Vault is a website that streams thousands of live
recordings from rock concerts from the 1950s through 1999 from
over 900 musical artists.  The Defendants' Web sites stream sound
and video recordings from live concerts from 1965 to 1999 sourced
from several sources, including the King Biscuit Flower Hour radio
show broadcasts, the 1984 Capitol Theater performance recording,
and other recordings from the Bill Graham collection including the
1976 Winterland performance.  The Web sites are subscription based
websites where consumers can listen to thousands of music titles
for a monthly or annual fee.  William Sagan is the owner of Bill
Graham Archives, LLC, doing business as Wolfgang's Vault and
Norton, LLC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Neville L. Johnson, Esq.
          Douglas L. Johnson, Esq.
          Aviel Dahan, Esq.
          JOHNSON & JOHNSON LLP
          439 N. Canon Drive, Suite 200
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 975-1080
          Facsimile: (310) 975-1095
          E-mail: njohnson@jjllplaw.com
                  djohnson@jjllplaw.com
                  adahan@jjllplaw.com

               - and -

          Daniel L. Warshaw, Esq.
          Bobby Pouya, Esq.
          Matthew A. Pearson, Esq.
          PEARSON, SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP
          15165 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 400
          Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
          Telephone: (818) 788-8300
          Facsimile: (818) 788-8104
          E-mail: dwarshaw@pswlaw.com
                  bpouya@pswlaw.com
                  mapearson@pswlaw.com


C CARAMANICO & SONS: "Correa" Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
----------------------------------------------------------
Kelvin Correa, and all others similarly-situated v. C. Caramanico
& Sons, Inc., Case No. 2:17-cv-04305 (E.D. Pa., September 27,
2017), seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages,
interest, attorney's fees and costs, and such other relief
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Pennsylvania Minimum
Wage Act, the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law, and
for unjust enrichment.

The Plaintiff worked as a landscape maintenance crew member for
Caramanico from about September 29, 2014 through June 2015 and a
foreman/crew leader from about June 2015 through November 2, 2016.
Mr. Correa resides in Haverford, PA.

Defendant Caramanico is based in Upland, Delaware County, PA.
Caramanico is a multimillion dollar, full service commercial
landscaping company offering a wide range of services including
landscaping, hardscaping and organic lawn care. Caramanico has
about 55 employees. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Scott M. Pollins, Esq.
      800 Westdale Avenue
      Swarthmore, PA 19081-2311
      Tel: (610) 896-9909
      Fax: (610) 896-9910
      E-mail: scott@pollinslaw.com

          - and -

      Jeffrey Campolongo, Esq.
      50 Monument Rd., Ste. 101
      Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004
      Tel: (484) 434-8930
      Fax: (484) 434-8931
      E-mail: jcamp@jcamplaw.com


CCS CREDIT: Illegally Collects Debt, "Gonzalez" Action Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
Evelyn Gonzalez, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. CCS Credit Collection Services, Case No.
2:17-cv-05496 (E.D.N.Y., September 19, 2017), seeks to stop the
Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

CCS Credit Collection Services is a professional full service debt
recovery, law firm and investigations company. [BN]

Evelyn Gonzalez is a pro se plaintiff.

CHESAPEAKE ENERGY: Court Denies Partial Summary Judgment Bid
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, Dallas Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in the
case captioned ARBUCKLE MOUNTAIN RANCH OF TEXAS, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORPORATION, et al., Defendants,
Case No. 3:14-CV-04584-M. (N.D. Tex.).

This is a putative class action brought by four individuals
against several related oil and gas companies that operate
producing wells in Tarrant County and Johnson County, Texas.
Plaintiffs allege Defendants acquired oil and gas leases on
various commercial and residential properties in Tarrant and
Johnson counties. Plaintiffs further allege that numerous owners
of the properties burdened by Defendants' leases defaulted on
prior mortgages affecting their properties and thereafter lost
title to their properties through foreclosure sales.

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants' after-acquired leases were
terminated when the properties were sold at foreclosure because
Defendants had not obtained subordination agreements of the prior
mortgages to the leases. Plaintiffs claim to be the post-
foreclosure owners of multiple properties previously burdened by
Defendants' leases. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants continued to
produce oil and gas from the wells affecting their properties
after the corresponding leases had been extinguished by
foreclosure and that such production constitutes trespass and
conversion.

Summary judgment is warranted if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. A dispute as to a material fact is
genuine, if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable
fact-finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party.

Plaintiffs' evidence pertaining to the remaining three properties
is insufficient to establish the other Plaintiffs received their
mineral interests free and clear of Defendants' leases, the Court
said.

The Court also finds that is no evidence in the record to
demonstrate that AMR of Texas, Inc., is the same entity as
Arbuckle Mountain Ranch of Texas, Inc., the named Plaintiff in
this litigation.  There also is no evidence in the record to
explain the gap in title between the original mortgagee, American
Home Loans, and Well Fargo Bank, N.A., the alleged beneficiary of
the deed of trust that foreclosed on the Arbuckle Property.

When a party not named in the original mortgage or deed of trust
seeks to foreclose, it must be able to trace its rights under the
security instrument back to the original holder.  The unexplained
gap in the chain of assignments of the mortgage interest affecting
the Arbuckle Property presents a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether Wells Fargo had the right to foreclose.

The record also fails to demonstrate that summary judgment is
appropriate with respect to the property allegedly owned by
Plaintiff Michelle Cammack, Lot 33, Block 4, Summer Crest
Addition, in Johnson County, Texas (Cammack Property). The Special
Warranty Deed included in the record shows that the Cammack
Property was conveyed to William Cammack. There is no evidence in
the record that Michelle Cammack has an ownership interest in the
Cammack Property.

The record also reveals a gap in the chain of title between the
beneficiary of the original deed of trust Mortgage Electronic
Registration, as nominee for Network Funding, L.P. and the
beneficiary that allegedly conducted the foreclosure sale, Wells
Fargo. As was the case with the Arbuckle Property, the unexplained
gap in the chain of title affecting the Cammack Property presents
a fact issue as to whether Wells Fargo had the right to foreclose.

Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion with respect to
the Cammack Property.

The evidence fails to establish Plaintiffs are entitled to summary
judgment with respect to the property owned by Charles Nutt, Lot 4
of the Oran Addition, City of Cleburne, Johnson County, Texas
(Nutt Property). Plaintiffs argue that the Nutt Property was
previously owned by Luis Araiza and Francisca Y. Pancheco, who
executed (1) a deed of trust on the Nutt Property  in favor of
Banco Popular North America. and (2) an oil and gas lease on the
property. Defendants obtained an interest in the lease by virtue
of an assignment executed. Plaintiffs assert that the lease was
extinguished when the Nutt Property was sold at a foreclosure
sale.

However, the Substitute Trustee's Deed forecloses a deed of trust
that was executed on  in favor of Ameriquest Mortgage Company.
The 2004 deed of trust is missing from the summary judgment record
and there is no evidence to show that Luis Araiza and Francisca Y.
Pancheco properly conveyed the equitable title in the Nutt
Property to the trustee for Ameriquest Mortgage Company.

In view of the lack of evidence on this issue, the Court denies
Plaintiffs' Motion as to the Nutt Property.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 18, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y9e7gsnefrom Leagle.com.

Arbuckle Mountain Ranch of Texas Inc, Plaintiff, represented by
Daniel Wesley McDonald, McDonald Law Firm, 3100 W 7th St
Ste 230, Fort Worth, TX 76107-2791

Arbuckle Mountain Ranch of Texas Inc, Plaintiff, represented by
Connie Sue Ditto, McDonald Law Firm PC, 3100 W 7th St, Ste 230,
Fort Worth, TX 76107-2791,  George Parker Young, Circelli Walter &
Young PLLC, Kelli Larsen Walter, Cercelli Walter & Young PLLC &
Vincent Paul Circelli, Circelli Walter & Young PLLC,  500 E 4th St
Ste 250. Fort Worth, TX 76102-4078

Charles Nutt, Plaintiff, represented by George Parker Young,
Circelli Walter & Young PLLC, Kelli Larsen Walter, Cercelli Walter
& Young PLLC & Vincent Paul Circelli, Circelli Walter & Young
PLLC.

Kuruvilla Chemmachel, Plaintiff, represented by George Parker
Young, Circelli Walter & Young PLLC, Kelli Larsen Walter, Cercelli
Walter & Young PLLC & Vincent Paul Circelli, Circelli Walter &
Young PLLC.

Michele Cammack, Plaintiff, represented by George Parker Young,
Circelli Walter & Young PLLC, Kelli Larsen Walter, Cercelli Walter
& Young PLLC & Vincent Paul Circelli, Circelli Walter & Young
PLLC.

Chesapeake Energy Corporation, Defendant, represented by
Christopher Donald Sileo -- csileo@scottdoug.com -- Scott Douglass
& McConnico LLP, D. Davin McGinnis -- dmcginnis@scottdoug.com --
Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP, John K. Hicks --
jhicks@scottdoug.com -- Scott Douglass & McConnico & Santosh
Aravind -- saravind@scottdoug.com -- Scott Douglass & McConnico.

Chesapeake Operating LLC, Defendant, represented by Christopher
Donald Sileo, Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP, D. Davin McGinnis,
Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP, John K. Hicks, Scott Douglass &
McConnico & Santosh Aravind, Scott Douglass & McConnico.

Chesapeake Exploration LLC, Defendant, represented by Christopher
Donald Sileo, Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP, D. Davin McGinnis,
Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP, John K. Hicks, Scott Douglass &
McConnico & Santosh Aravind, Scott Douglass & McConnico.

Total E&P USA Inc, Defendant, represented by Christopher Donald
Sileo, Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP, Charles R. Eskridge, III,
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, D. Davin McGinnis, Scott
Douglass & McConnico LLP, John K. Hicks, Scott Douglass &
McConnico & Santosh Aravind, Scott Douglass & McConnico.

Chesapeake Energy Marketing LLC, Defendant, represented by Santosh
Aravind, Scott Douglass & McConnico.

Chesapeake Energy Marketing Inc, Counter Claimant, represented by
Christopher Donald Sileo, Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP, D. Davin
McGinnis, Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP, John K. Hicks, Scott
Douglass & McConnico & Santosh Aravind, Scott Douglass &
McConnico.

Chesapeake Operating Inc, Counter Claimant, represented by
Christopher Donald Sileo, Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP, D. Davin
McGinnis, Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP, John K. Hicks, Scott
Douglass & McConnico & Santosh Aravind, Scott Douglass &
McConnico.

Total E&P USA Inc, Counter Claimant, represented by Christopher
Donald Sileo, Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP, Charles R. Eskridge,
III, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, D. Davin McGinnis, Scott
Douglass & McConnico LLP, John K. Hicks, Scott Douglass &
McConnico & Santosh Aravind, Scott Douglass & McConnico.

Chesapeake Energy Corporation, Counter Claimant, represented by
Christopher Donald Sileo, Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP, D. Davin
McGinnis, Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP, John K. Hicks, Scott
Douglass & McConnico & Santosh Aravind, Scott Douglass &
McConnico.

Chesapeake Operating LLC, Counter Claimant, represented by
Christopher Donald Sileo, Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP, D. Davin
McGinnis, Scott Douglass & McConnico LLP, John K. Hicks, Scott
Douglass & McConnico & Santosh Aravind, Scott Douglass &
McConnico.


CHILDTIME CHILDCARE: "Morgan" Suit Transferred to C.D. Calif.
-------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned Karen Morgan, individually and
on behalf of other members of the general public similarly
situated v. Childtime Childcare, Inc. and Learning Care Group,
Case No. 30-02017-00938444, was transferred on September 20, 2017,
from the Orange County Superior Court to the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California. The District Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 8:17-cv-01641 to the proceeding.

The Defendants own and operate child day care centers & preschools
in California. [BN]

Karen Morgan is a pro se plaintiff.


DIVERSIFIED CONSULTANTS: Illegally Collects Debt, Suit Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
Nataliya Pinyuk, on behalf of herself and all other similarly
situated consumers v. Diversified Consultants, Inc.  d/b/a
Diversified Consultants International, Case No. 1:17-cv-05504
(E.D.N.Y., September 19, 2017), seeks to stop the Defendant's
unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Diversified Consultants, Inc. operates a business specializing in
accounts receivable management functions primarily for telecom and
cable providers. [BN]

Nataliya Pinyuk is a pro se plaintiff.

DONNA KARAN: 2nd Cir. Dismisses FACTA Class Action Under Spokeo
---------------------------------------------------------------
Patrick Lewis, Esq. -- plewis@bakerlaw.com -- at Baker Hostetler,
in an article for JD Supra, wrote that the Second Circuit's Sept.
19, 2017 decision in Katz v. The Donna Karan Company, LLC, et al.,
Dkt. No. 15-464, has potentially provided a new road map to
defeating class actions alleging statutory damages for bare
procedural violations. The case arose under the Fair and Accurate
Credit Transactions Act (FACTA). Passed in 2003, FACTA prohibits
merchants from showing certain personally identifying information,
including more than five digits of the customer's payment card
number, on a printed receipt. Here, the plaintiff purchased items
from the defendants' retail stores and received receipts allegedly
displaying the first six digits of his card number. He sued,
individually and on behalf of a national class, claiming this
alleged act "raised a material risk of the harm of identity theft
and thus constitutes a concrete injury sufficient to establish
Article III standing" under Spokeo.

In a case decided earlier this year, Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris
Baguette Am. Inc., 861 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017), the Second Circuit
held that the standard for whether a plaintiff has standing to
pursue a claim for a bare procedural violation of FACTA is whether
the violation increased "the risk of material harm of identity
theft" to the plaintiff. Id. at 81. In that case, the court held
that printing a plaintiff's credit card expiration date on her
receipt did not increase her risk.

In Katz, the defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1),
arguing that the plaintiff lacked standing because he had alleged
nothing more than a bare procedural violation of FACTA that did
not raise a material risk of identity theft. The defendants based
this challenge on an argument that the first six digits of the
card number -- called the issuer identification number (IIN) --
identified only the account issuer and not the plaintiff's
account, and therefore did not raise a material risk of identity
theft. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint.

The Second Circuit affirmed. Addressing a matter of apparent first
impression in the Second Circuit, the court held that at the Rule
12(b)(1) motion-to-dismiss stage, the question of whether a
procedural violation presents a material risk of harm to a
concrete interest is a mixed question of law and fact. If a
defendant raises a fact-based challenge (i.e., proffers evidence
outside the pleadings), the plaintiff must either produce evidence
showing jurisdiction or rest on the complaint if the defendant's
evidence is immaterial. When the district court rules, it must
make findings of fact (which are reviewed under a clear-error
standard).

Here, the court found that the district court did not clearly err
in finding that printing the IIN on the plaintiff's receipt did
not materially increase the plaintiff's risk of identity theft.
The district court, relying on other district court findings and
publicly available information on the internet, concluded that
printing the IIN was no different than printing the name of the
issuing institution -- information that FACTA does not require be
omitted from receipts. The Second Circuit commented that in
resolving factual disputes under Rule 12(b)(1), district courts
are permitted to consider affidavits and allow limited
jurisdictional discovery and may hold a "fact-finding hearing with
expert witness testimony" in appropriate cases.

Katz may provide a useful road map to practitioners confronted
with jurisdictional defenses that rely on material outside the
complaint. The defendants raised their Spokeo challenge via a Rule
12(b)(1) motion rather than through class certification briefing.
The motion afforded the defendants a vehicle to allow the district
court to decide a key issue -- whether the first six digits of the
card number identified only the card issuer and therefore did not
materially increase the risk of identity theft -- without the
expense and time associated with class certification discovery and
briefing. [GN]


EQUIFAX INC: "Highfield" Claims Damages Over Data Breach
--------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Highfield, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Equifax, Inc. and Equifax
Information Solutions, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 5:17-cv-01567,
(N.D. Ala., September 13, 2017), seeks statutory damages under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act and state consumer protection statutes,
reimbursement of out-of-pocket losses, other compensatory damages,
further and more robust credit monitoring services with
accompanying identity theft insurance, injunctive relief including
an order requiring Equifax to implement improved data security
measures.

Equifax allegedly failed to protect and secure consumers' personal
identifying information, including full names, social security
numbers, dates of birth, addresses and some driver's license
numbers of some 143 million individuals during a data breach on
July 29, 2017.

Equifax is one of three consumer reporting agencies that compiles
and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis. As such,
Equifax also tracks and rates the financial history of U.S.
consumers. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Chris T. Hellums, Esq.
     Jonathan S. Mann, Esq.
     Michael C. Bradley, Esq.
     Austin B. Whitten, Esq.
     PITTMAN, DUTTON & HELLUMS, P.C.
     2001 Park Place North, Suite 1100
     Birmingham, AL 35203
     Tel: (205) 322-8880
     Fax: (205) 328-2711
     Email: PDH-efiling@pittmandutton.com

            - and -

     N. Kirkland Pope, Esq.
     POPE, McGLAMRY, KILPATRICK, MORRISON & NORWOOD, LLP
     3455 Peachtree Road, N.E., Suite 925
     Atlanta, GA 30326-3256
     Tel: (404) 523-7706
     Fax: (404) 524-1648
     Email: efile@pmkm.com


EQUIFAX INC: NJ Residents File CA Lawsuits After Data Breach
------------------------------------------------------------
Jeff Goldman, writing for NJ.com, reports that at least four New
Jersey residents have filed federal class-action lawsuits against
the consumer credit reporting firm Equifax following a major data
beach in early September.

Nationally, dozens of class-action suits have been filed against
Equifax after the company disclosed that data from at 143 million
people was stolen following a cyber-attack earlier this year.

The hackers were able to access Social Security numbers, credit
card numbers, home addresses, and drivers license numbers, the
suits allege.

The lawsuits say Equifax failed to protect their clients'
information and that while the breach began as early mid-May, the
company didn't notify its customers until September.

In the meantime, company executives sold more than $1.8 million in
stock before disclosing that Equifax's security had been
compromised.

Robert and Susan Kohn, of Freehold Township, are part of a suit
with New York resident Dr. Mark Isacoff. All three are Equifax
clients, each having paid more than a $109 a year for the company
to monitor their credit and ensure the safety of their identity
and finances.

Alana M. Bradley of Cherry Hill filed a separate suit as did
Michelle O'Neill of Medford. All three lawsuits were filed in
federal court and seek class action status.

The Equifax breach isn't the biggest cyber heist in history. That
indignity still belongs to Yahoo, which was targeted in at least
two separate digital burglaries that affected more than 1 billion
of its users' accounts throughout the world.

But no Social Security numbers or drivers' licenses were taken in
the Yahoo break-in.

After the enormous hack on credit bureau Equifax, consumers need
to be extra careful.

The suits say also Equifax violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act
and exhibited negligence in their "gross mismanagement" of person
identifying information.

To see if your personal information was potentially impacted,
visit Equifax's dedicated help page. Toward the bottom of that
page, you will see a red box that says "Check Potential Impact."
Click that. Then, provide your last name and the last six digits
of you Social Security number.

After you submit that information, you will receive a message
telling you whether your personal information may have been
exposed in the data breach. [GN]


EQUIFAX INC: Faces Class Action in West Virginia
------------------------------------------------
Kyla Asbury, writing for West Virginia Record, reports that a
class action lawsuit has been filed against Equifax Inc. after the
plaintiffs claim it failed to adequately protect credit
information and personal information.

Cynthia Rice, David H. Yoder, Vera Standish, Parry Petroplus and
Christopher Chaffin filed the lawsuit on behalf of 500,000
consumers across West Virginia that were harmed by the company's
failure to protect information, according to a complaint filed
Sept. 8 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
West Virginia.

The plaintiffs claim throughout the past year, Equifax collected
and stored personal and credit information from them, including
their social security numbers, birth dates, home addresses,
driver's license information and credit card numbers.

Equifax owed a legal duty to consumers like the plaintiffs and the
proposed class they seek to represent to use reasonable care to
protect their credit and personal information from unauthorized
access by third parties, according to the suit.

The plaintiffs claim Equifax knew that its failure to protect the
plaintiffs and the class members' credit and personal information
from unauthorized access would cause serious risks of credit harm
and identify theft for years to come.

On Sept. 7, Equifax announced that from May to July, its database
storing the plaintiffs and class members' information had been
improperly accessed by unauthorized third parties, subjecting them
to credit harm and identity theft, according to the suit.

The plaintiffs claim Equifax negligently failed to maintain
adequate technological safeguards to protect the plaintiffs and
the class members from unauthorized access by hackers.

Equifax knew or should have known that failure to maintain
adequate technological safeguards would eventually result in a
massive data breach, according to the suit.

The plaintiffs claim Equifax was negligent and fell below the
standard of care in the technological industry.

The plaintiffs are seeking an order to preserve all documents and
information pertaining to the case, an order certifying the matter
as a class action and judgment against Equifax for fair
compensation in an amount to be decided by a jury. They are being
represented by R. Dean Hartley and Mark R. Staun of Hartley Law
Group.

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia
case number: 1:17-cv-00156 [GN]


EQUIFAX INC: Small Business Owners File Class-Action Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Ellie Hensley, writing for Atlanta Business Chronicle, reports
that an Atlanta firm filed the first-class action suit brought
against Equifax on behalf of 28 million American small businesses.
The suit, filed on Sept. 19 by the Atlanta division of The Doss
Firm LLC, claims that small business owners were disproportionally
affected by the breach, as the availability of small business
credit is often directly linked to its owners' creditworthiness.

The suit notes that "about 60 percent of small businesses use
loans to finance their operations . . . from maintaining cash flow
to purchasing equipment," making the loss of credit of particular
concern to these individuals and their businesses.

Business loans are critical for small businesses to survive,
because most lack the scale to access public institutional debt
and equity capital markets like larger firms can. Unlike
consumers, small businesses are required to pay for credit
reports, making monitoring more difficult, the suit states.

The class-action lawsuit seeks to recover damages, including time
spent monitoring financial accounts for signs of ID theft or other
criminal activities, and legal costs. [GN]


EQUIFAX INC: Faces "Podalsky" Class Suit Over FCRA Violation
------------------------------------------------------------
Gregg Podalsky and Eileen Sue Samilow, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Equifax, Inc., Case No. 1:17-
cv-23465-CMA (S.D. Fla., September 20, 2017), is brought against
the Defendants for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
Equifax, Inc. operates a consumer credit reporting agency in
Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Rebecca Newman Casamayor, Esq.
      Roger Slade, Esq.
      HABER SLADE, P.A.
      201 S. Biscayne Blvd. Suite 1205
      Miami, FL 33131
      Telephone: (305) 379-2400
      Facsimile: (305) 379-1106
      E-mail: rcasamayor@dhaberlaw.com
              rslade@dhaberlaw.com

           - and -

      Steven Frederick Samilow, Esq.
      THE LAW OFFICE OF STEVEN F. SAMILOW, P. A.
      7777 Glades Road, Suite 100
      Boca Raton, FL 33434
      Telephone: (561) 245-4633
      Facsimile: (561) 290-0272
      E-mail: Samilow@aol.com


EQUIFAX INC: Fails to Secure Customers' Info, "Jorge" Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
Christine Jorge and Joanne Durrang, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated v. EQUIFAX INC., Case No. 2:17-cv-
05404-SJF-ARL (E.D.N.Y., September 14, 2017), accuses the
Defendant of failing to secure and safeguard the personal and
private information of approximately 143 million Americans.

On July 29, 2017, Equifax discovered unauthorized access to its
databases storing the confidential and private information of
millions of individuals throughout the United States.  On
September 7, 2017, Equifax publicly announced that due to
vulnerability in its systems, its files were accessed by criminals
for at least the period of mid-May through July of 2017 (the
"Security Breach").

Equifax is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the state
of Georgia authorized to do business in the state of New York.
Equifax is a nationwide consumer reporting agency and purveyor of
credit monitoring and identity theft protection services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Ryan Gentile, Esq.
          Gus Michael Farinella, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF GUS MICHAEL FARINELLA PC
          110 Jericho Turnpike, Suite 100
          Floral Park, NY 11001
          Telephone: (212) 675-6161
          Facsimile: (212) 675-4367
          E-mail: rlg@lawgmf.com
                  gmf@lawgmf.com


EQUIFAX INC: Sued Over Fair Credit Reporting Act Violation
----------------------------------------------------------
Steve Klein, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Joseph Gershon Blieberg and Equifax Inc., Case No.
1:17-cv-05489-RRM-ST (E.D.N.Y., September 17, 2017), is brought
against the Defendants for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act.

Equifax Inc. operates a consumer credit reporting agency in New
York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jeremy Alan Lieberman, Esq.
      POMERANTZ LLP
      600 Third Avenue
      New York, NY 10016
      Telephone: (212) 661-1100
      Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
      E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com


EQUIFAX INC: "Seymore" Sues Over Data Breach, Claims Damages
------------------------------------------------------------
Omar Seymore and Angela Seymore, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Equifax, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-01871, (S.D. Cal., September 13,
2017), seeks appropriate injunctive relief designed to ensure
against the recurrence of a data breach by adopting and
implementing the best security data practices to safeguard
customers' financial and personal information and that would
include, without limitation, an order and judgment directing
Equifax to (1) encrypt and protect all data and (2) directing
Equifax to provide to Plaintiffs and Class members extended credit
monitoring services; pre judgment and post-judgment interest;
costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees and such other
and further relief resulting from negligence under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, Unfair and Deceptive Business Practices provision
of the California Business & Professions Code and the Consumers
Legal Remedies Act.

Equifax is a credit-reporting company that track and rates the
financial history of U.S. consumers. The companies are supplied
with data about loans, loan payments and credit cards, as well as
information on everything from child support payments, credit
limits, missed rent and utilities payments, addresses and employer
history. Equifax experienced a cybersecurity incident impacting
approximately 143 million U.S. consumers exposing their names,
Social Security numbers, birth dates, addresses, driver's license
numbers and credit card numbers.

Plaintiffs' personal and confidential information, was included in
the massive data breach of Defendant's systems. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jeffrey L. Hogue, Esq.
      Tyler J. Belong, Esq.
      Erik A. Dos Santos, Esq.
      HOGUE & BELONG
      170 Laurel Street
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Tel: (619) 238-4720
      Fax: (619) 270-9856


EQUIFAX INFO: "Mann" Suit Hits Personal Data Breach
---------------------------------------------------
Daniel J. Mann, individually, and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals v. Equifax Information Services, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-04100 (E.D. Pa., September 13, 2017),
seeks actual, statutory and punitive damages, reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting
Act.

Equifax Information Services is a consumer reporting agency
located at 1550 Peachtree Street NE, Atlanta, GA. On July 29,
2017, Equifax discovered that one or more of its servers had been
breached. It contained Plaintiffs' sensitive personal information
including their names, full Social Security numbers, birth dates,
addresses, driver's license numbers and possibly credit cards.

Plaintiff suffered actual injury in the form of damages to and
diminution in the value of her personal information entrusted to
Equifax. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      James A. Francis, Esq.
      John Soumilas, Esq.
      FRANCIS & MAILMAN, P.C.
      Land Title Building
      100 South Broad Street, 19th Floor
      Philadelphia, PA 19110
      Tel: (215) 735-8600
      Fax: (215) 940-8000
      Email: jfrancis@consumerlawfirm.com
             jsoumilas@consumerlawfirm.com

             - and -

      Joseph C. Kohn, Esq.
      Denis F. Sheils, Esq.
      Jonathan Shub, Esq.
      Kevin Laukaitis, Esq.
      KOHN, SWIFT & GRAF, P.C.
      One South Broad Street, Suite 2100
      Philadelphia, PA 19107-3304
      Tel: (215) 238-1700
      Email: jkohn@kohnswift.com
             jshub@kohnswift.com
             dsheils@kohnswift.com
             klaukaitis@kohnswift.com


EQUIFAX INFO: Sued Over Fair Credit Reporting Act Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Peters, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. Equifax Information Services, LLC and Does 1 through
10, inclusive, Case No. 8:17-cv-01634 (C.D. Cal., September 19,
2017), is brought against the Defendants for violation of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act.

Equifax Information Services, LLC operates a consumer credit
reporting agency in California.

Christopher Peters is a pro se plaintiff.


EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Faces "Kilgore" Suit in N.M. Over Breach
-------------------------------------------------------------
Shelbi Kilgore, Michael Schaber, and John Howard, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. Equifax
Information Services, LLC, Case No. 1:17-cv-00942-LF-KBM (D.N.M.,
September 14, 2017), alleges that Equifax allowed hackers to make
off with sensitive private personal information of the Plaintiffs
and millions of others across the nation.

The Plaintiffs bring this suit on behalf of themselves and those
in similar circumstances in the state of New Mexico seeking
redress for the various wrongs committed by Equifax.

Equifax Information Services, LLC, is organized under the laws of
Georgia, has a principal place of business in Georgia, and is
licensed to conduct business in the state of New Mexico.  As one
of the three major credit reporting agencies, Equifax collects and
maintains sensitive private personal information of nearly half
the population of the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Geoffrey R. Romero, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF GEOFFREY R. ROMERO
          4801 All Saints Rd. NW
          Albuquerque, NM 87120
          Telephone: (505) 247-3338
          E-mail: Geoff26@hotmail.com

               - and -

          Paul Zebrowski, Esq.
          Thomas A. Biscup, Esq.
          ZEBROWSKI LAW
          4801 All Saints Rd. NW
          Albuquerque, NM 87120
          Telephone: (505) 715-5161
          E-mail: paul@zebrowskilaw.com
                  tom@zebrowskilaw.com


EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Fails to Secure Info Under FCRA, Gray Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DENISE CARTER GRAY and BLAIR GARTHRIGHT, individually and on
behalf of those similarly situated v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION
SERVICES, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company, Case No. 6:17-
cv-06095-SOH (W.D. Ark., September 14, 2017), accuses the
Defendant of failing to properly safeguard the information of the
Plaintiffs and Class members, as required under Fair Credit
Reporting Act.

On July 29, 2017, Equifax discovered that one or more of its
servers, which contained the Plaintiffs' sensitive personal
information, including Plaintiffs' names, full Social
Security number, birth dates, addresses, and, upon belief, their
driver's license numbers and possibly one or more of their credit
cards, had been breached or "hacked" by a still unknown third
party.

Equifax Information Services, LLC, is a limited liability company
incorporated under the laws of the state of Georgia with its
principal place of business located in Atlanta, Georgia, and doing
business in the state of Ohio.  Equifax is a "Consumer Reporting
Agency" as that term is defined by the FCRA.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Annabelle Lee Patterson, Esq.
          ANNABELLE LEE PATTERSON, PLC
          646 Quapaw Ave.
          Hot Springs, AR 71901
          Telephone: (501) 701-0027
          Facsimile: (972) 559-3956
          E-mail: ab@apattersonlaw.com

               - and -

          Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr., Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          77 W. Washington Street, Suite 1220
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 440-0020
          Facsimile: (312) 440-4180
          E-mail: tom@attorneyzim.com

               - and -

          Robert A. Clifford, Esq.
          Shannon M. McNulty, Esq.
          CLIFFORD LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          120 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 3100
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 899-9090
          Facsimile: (312) 899-9090
          E-mail: rac@cliffordlaw.com
                  smm@cliffordlaw.com

               - and -

          Marc E. Dann, Esq.
          Brian D. Flick, Esq.
          DANNLAW
          P.O. Box 6031040
          Cleveland, OH 44103
          Telephone: (216) 373-0539
          Facsimile: (216) 373-0536
          E-mail: mdann@dannlaw.com
                  bflick@dannlaw.com

               - and -

          David H. Krieger, Esq.
          HAINES & KRIEGER, LLC
          8985 S. Eastern Avenue, Suite 350
          Henderson, NV 89123
          Telephone: (702) 880-5554
          Facsimile: (702) 385-5518
          E-mail: dkrieger@hainesandkrieger.com

               - and -

          Matthew I. Knepper, Esq.
          Miles N. Clark, Esq.
          KNEPPER & CLARK LLC
          10040 W. Cheyenne Ave., Suite 170-109
          Las Vegas, NV 89129
          Telephone: (702) 825-6060
          Facsimile: (702) 447-8048
          E-mail: matthew.knepper@knepperclark.com
                  miles.clark@knepperclark.com

               - and -

          Sean N. Payne, Esq.
          PAYNE LAW FIRM LLC
          9550 S. Eastern Ave., Suite 253-A213
          Las Vegas, NV 89123
          Telephone: (702) 952-2733
          Facsimile: (702) 462-7227
          E-mail: seanpayne@spaynelaw.com


EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Jakob Brings Consumer Class Suit Under FCRA
----------------------------------------------------------------
BRIGITTE A. JAKOB, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC, Case No. 2:17-cv-
01244-JPS (E.D. Wisc., September 14, 2017), is a consumer class
action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

In violation of the FCRA, Ms. Jakob alleges, Equifax prepares and
delivers consumer reports that include information about civil
judgments that: (a) the FCRA prohibits Equifax from reporting and
(b) have been paid in full, satisfied, or released, but are not
reported by Equifax as paid, satisfied, or released.

Equifax is authorized to do business in the state of Wisconsin,
has substantial contacts in this District, and is headquartered in
Atlanta, Georgia.  Equifax is a national consumer reporting
agency.  Equifax sells consumer reports (commonly called "credit
reports") about millions of consumers annually, including
consumers in Wisconsin.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James A. Francis, Esq.
          John Soumilas, Esq.
          FRANCIS & MAILMAN, P.C.
          100 S. Broad Street, Suite 1902
          Philadelphia, PA 19110
          Telephone: (215) 735-8600
          E-mail: jfrancis@consumerlawfirm.com
                  jsoumilas@consumerlawfirm.com


EQUIFAX INFORMATION: Faces "Minka" Class Suit Over FCRA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jacqueline Minka, Bryan Minka, Shayna Spivak, and Charles Derr,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Equifax Information Services, Inc., Case No. 2:17-cv-04205-JCJ
(E.D. Penn., September 20, 2017), is brought against the
Defendants for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Experian Information Solutions, Inc. operates an information
services company that provides information, analytical, and
marketing services to organizations and consumers. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Simon Bahne Paris, Esq.
      SALTZ MONGELUZZI BARRETT & BENDESKY, P.C.
      One Liberty Place
      52nd Floor, 1650 Market Street
      Philadelphia, PA 19103
      Telephone: (215) 575-3986
      E-mail: sparis@smbb.com


EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Faces "Melo" Class Suit Over FCRA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ernest Melo, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., Case No. 3:17-
cv-00642-REP (E.D. Va., September 20, 2017), is brought against
the Defendants for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Experian Information Solutions, Inc. operates an information
services company that provides information, analytical, and
marketing services to organizations and consumers. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Leonard Anthony Bennett, Esq.
      CONSUMER LITIGATION ASSOCIATES
      763 J Clyde Morris Boulevard, Suite 1A
      Newport News, VA 23601
      Telephone: (757) 930-3660
      Facsimile: (757) 930-3662
      E-mail: lenbennett@clalegal.com

           - and -

      Matthew James Erausquin, Esq.
      CONSUMER LITGATION ASSOCIATES PC
      1800 Diagonal Rd, Suite 600
      Alexandria, VA 22314
      Telephone: (703) 273-7770
      Facsimile: (888) 892-3513
      E-mail: matt@clalegal.com


FEDEX CORP: 2nd Cir. Affirms Dismissal of ICCTA Suit
----------------------------------------------------
U1IT4Less, Inc., d/b/a NYBikerGear (BikerGear), an internet
retailer of motorcycle gear, both individually and on behalf of a
putative class of shipping customers, accuses FedEx Corporation
and its subsidiaries FedEx Corporate Services, Inc. and FedEx
Ground Package System, Inc., of fraudulently marking up the
weights of packages shipped by BikerGear and overcharging
BikerGear for Canadian customs.  In doing so, BikerGear claims,
FedEx violated the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act
of 1995 (ICCTA) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c).

Following discovery, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted FedEx's summary judgment
motion and dismissed BikerGear's substantive RICO claims because
BikerGear failed to adduce evidence that FedEx Corp. and FedEx
Services, the alleged RICO "persons," are distinct from FedEx
Ground, the alleged RICO enterprise.

The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in the appeals
case captioned U1IT4LESS, INC., d/b/a NYBIKERGEAR, Plaintiff-
Appellant, v. FEDEX CORPORATION, FEDEX CORPORATE SERVICES, INC.,
FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM, INC., Defendants-Appellees, Docket
No. 16-533-cv (2nd Cir.), addresses the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of
BikerGear's claim under the ICCTA, followed by the grant of
summary judgment dismissing the RICO claims.

49 U.S.C. Section 13708

Billing and collection obligations of motor carriers are set forth
in 49 U.S.C. Section 13708.  Section 13708(b), entitled false or
misleading information, provides as follows: "No person may cause
a motor carrier to present false or misleading information on a
document about the actual rate, charge, or allowance to any party
to the transaction."

BikerGear claims that FedEx violated the statute by perpetrating
the Upweighting Scheme and the Canadian Customs Scheme and by
failing to apply certain discounts to which BikerGear was
allegedly entitled under its shipping contracts with FedEx.  But
in the same breath BikerGear expressly disclaims that FedEx used
rates other than their published tariff rates in computing
charges.

In 1995 Congress repealed the requirement that the ICC issue
regulations banning off-bill discounting and instead placed the
disclosure and false information provisions in the statute itself.
The STB explained that although the statute no longer bans off-
bill discounting, it does affirmatively require carriers to
disclose certain information when they engage in the practice.  It
shows that Congress intended to require disclosure of and prohibit
false information about off-bill discounting or similar conduct,
so that charges stated on disclosed documents match the charges
the motor carrier assesses in fact.

But not all disputes about payments due for motor carrier
transportation fall within the scope of Section 13708. Here,
although it disputes payment, BikerGear does not allege that FedEx
stated one charge on an invoice but actually assessed a different
charge.  To the contrary, according to the complaint, FedEx's
invoices accurately reflected previously stated rates and FedEx
assessed the charges stated on its invoices a situation that falls
squarely outside the scope of the statute, alleging that FedEx
represented to BikerGear's bank and credit card companies that
BikerGear owed the stated amounts and that those stated amounts
were transmitted to FedEx.

For these reasons, the Second Circuit affirms the District Court's
dismissal of BikerGear's claim under 49 U.S.C. Section 13708(b).

RICO

BikerGear's appeal is an effort to revive its RICO claims, which
the District Court dismissed after granting summary judgment to
FedEx on the ground that BikerGear failed to satisfy RICO's
distinctness requirement under 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c).

Section 1962(c) makes it, unlawful for any person employed by or
associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt.

BikerGear insists that the mere fact of separate legal
incorporation satisfies the distinctness requirement under Section
1962(c).

The Second Circuit disagrees. The plain language and purpose of
the statute contemplate that a person violates the statute by
conducting an enterprise through a pattern of criminality, so a
corporate person cannot violate the statute by corrupting itself.
A corporation can act only through its employees, subsidiaries, or
agents. So if a corporate defendant can be liable for
participating in an enterprise comprised only of its agents even
if those agents are separately incorporated legal entities then
RICO liability will attach to any act of corporate wrong-doing and
the statute's distinctness requirement will be rendered
meaningless.

Accordingly, a plaintiff may not circumvent the distinctness
requirement by alleging a RICO enterprise that consists merely of
a corporate defendant associated with its own employees or agents
carrying on the regular affairs of the defendant.

To summarize: (1) Section 13708 of the ICCTA requires shipping
documents to truthfully disclose the charges that a motor carrier
in fact assesses, and prohibits a motor carrier from stating it
will charge one amount when in reality it charges another; and (2)
where, as here, the RICO persons and the RICO enterprise are
corporate parents and wholly-owned subsidiaries that "operate
within a unified corporate structure" and are "guided by a single
corporate consciousness," the mere fact of separate incorporation,
without more, does not satisfy RICO's distinctness requirement
under Section 1962(c).

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's September 18, 2017
Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/ycztor2vfrom
Leagle.com.

JAY L.T. BREAKSTONE, (Amanda C. Broadwell -- abroadwell@gadlaw.com
-- Jessica L. Richman, on the brief), Parker Waichman LLP, 6
Harbor Park Drive, Port Washington, NY 11050, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

AARON T. CASSAT, 119 S Main St, Ste 800, Memphis, TN 38103-3685,
Federal Express Corporation, Memphis, TN, for Defendants-Appellees
FedEx Corporation & FedEx Corporate Services, Inc.

Benjamin J. Ferron, One Gateway Center 420 Fort Duquesne
Boulevard, Pittsburgh, PA 15222 & Jason W. Norris -- FedEx Ground
Package System, Inc., Moon Township, PA, for Defendant-Appellee
FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.


GENERAL MOTORS: Faces "Hindsman" Suit Over Oil Consumption Defect
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RYAN HINDSMAN and JAMES ANDREWS, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company, Case No. 3:17-cv-05337-JSC (N.D. Cal.,
September 14, 2017), arises from an alleged design and
manufacturing defect, including the Oil Consumption Defect, in
GM's Model Year 2010-2017 Chevrolet Equinox vehicles with 2.4-
liter engines.

Prior to 2010, GM knew that the Class Vehicles contained one or
more design and/or manufacturing defects, including defects
contained in the Class Vehicles' engines that cause them to be
unable to properly utilize the engine oil and, in fact, to
improperly burn off and/or consume abnormally high amounts of oil
(the "Oil Consumption Defect"), according to the complaint.

GM, through its various entities, including Chevrolet, designs,
manufactures, markets, distributes, and sells its vehicles in this
District and multiple other locations in the United States and
worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert Ahdoot, Esq.
          AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
          1016 Palm Avenue
          West Hollywood, CA 90069
          Telephone: (310) 474-9111
          Facsimile: (310) 474-8585
          E-mail: rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com

               - and -

          Greg F. Coleman, Esq.
          GREG COLEMAN LAW PC
          First Tennessee Plaza
          800 S. Gay Street, Suite 1100
          Knoxville, TN 37929
          Telephone: (865)247-0080
          Facsimile: (865) 522-0049
          E-mail: greg@gregcolemanlaw.com

               - and -

          Daniel K. Bryson, Esq.
          J. Hunter Bryson, Esq.
          WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON LLP
          900 W. Morgan St.
          Raleigh, NC 27603
          Telephone: (919) 600-5000
          Facsimile: (919) 600-5035
          E-mail: Dan@wbmllp.com
                  Hunter@wbmllp.com


GEORGE W LONG: Sued Over Americans with Disabilities Act Breach
---------------------------------------------------------------
Derrick Anderson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. George W. Long, Inc. d/b/a Seabreeze Amusement Park,
Case No. 1:17-cv-05501 (E.D.N.Y., September 19, 2017), is brought
against the Defendants for violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

George W. Long, Inc. operates Seabreeze Amusement Park in
Rochester, New York. [BN]

Derrick Anderson is a pro se plaintiff.


GUIDANCE SOFTWARE: Monteverde & Associates Files Class Action Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Notice is hereby given that Monteverde & Associates PC has filed a
class action lawsuit in the United States Central District Court
of California, case no. 2:17-cv-06469-CAS-JEM, on behalf of
stockholders of Guidance Software, Inc. ("Guidance " or the
"Company") (NASDAQ: GUID) who held Guidance securities and have
been harmed by Guidance and its board of directors' (the "Board")
for alleged violations of Sections 14(d)(4), 14(e), and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") in
connection with the tender offer of Company common stock to be
purchased by Open Text Corporation ("Open Text").

Under the terms of the agreement, Guidance stockholders are only
anticipated to receive $7.10 per share in cash in exchange for
each share of Guidance.  The complaint alleges that this offer is
inadequate and alleges that the Schedule 14D-9
Solicitation/Recommendation Statement (the "Recommendation
Statement") provides materially incomplete and misleading
information about the Company's financials and the transaction, in
violation of Sections 14(d)(4), 14(e), and 20(a) of the Exchange
Act.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than 60 days from today.  Any member of the putative class
may move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of
their choice, or may choose to do nothing and remain an absent
class member.  If you wish to discuss this action, or have any
questions concerning this notice or your rights or interests,
please contact:

Monteverde & Associates PC is a boutique class action securities
and consumer litigation law firm committed that has recovered
millions of dollars and is committed to protecting shareholders
and consumers from corporate wrongdoing.  Monteverde & Associates
PC lawyers have significant experience litigating Mergers &
Acquisitions and Securities Class Actions, whereby they protect
investors by recovering money and remedying corporate misconduct.

         Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
         MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
         The Empire State Building
         350 Fifth Ave, Suite 4405
         New York, NY 10118
         United States of America
         Tel: (212) 971-1341
         E-mail: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com [GN]


INSIGHT GLOBAL: "Buffa" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
----------------------------------------------------------
Christina Buffa, and all others similarly-situated v. Insight
Global, LLC, Case No. 2:17-cv-02568 (D. Kan., September 27, 2017),
seeks to recover unpaid wages, including overtime compensation and
related penalties and damages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

The Plaintiff resides in Clay County, Missouri and worked for the
Defendant at a business located in Kansas.

Defendant Insight Global is a staffing firm headquartered in
Atlanta, Georgia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Matthew E. Osman, Esq.
      Kathryn S. Rickley, Esq.
      OSMAN & SMAY LLP
      8500 W. 110th Street, Suite 330
      Overland Park, KS 66204
      Tel: (913) 667-9243
      Fax: (866) 470-9243
      E-mail: mosman@workerwagerights.com
              krickley@workerwagerights.com


JEFFERSON COUNTY: Court Grants Class Certification in "Beckhart"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Western District of
Kentucky, Louisville Division issued a Memorandum Opinion and
Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification in the
case captioned CHERRI BECKHART et al., Plaintiffs, v. JEFFERSON
COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants, Civil
Action No. 3:15-CV-00751-GNS-CHL (W.D. Ky.).

The Jefferson County Board of Education and the Jefferson County
Association of Educational Support Personnel American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees on behalf of Local 4011
entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA).  Under the
CBA, Defendants American Federal of State, County and Municipal
Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME), AFSCME Indiana-Kentucky Organizing
Committee 962 (Council 962) and Jefferson County Association of
Educational Support Personnel, AFSCME, Local 4011 (Local 4011) can
collect a fair share fee" from non-members employed in the
Jefferson County Public Schools.

Plaintiffs who are fair-share-paying non-members of the union
filed the action on behalf of themselves and others alleging the
CBA and its enforcement are violations of their rights to free
speech and association protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments which give rise to claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

Plaintiffs have defined the class as follows:

     "The class consists of all union non-member employees who are
or were employed in the Job Family 1A job classification and
salary schedule for Jefferson County Public Schools and are, were
or will be required to pay a compulsory fee to Defendants Local
4011, Council 962, and/or AFSCME pursuant to a compulsory unionism
agreement between the Unions and the Board."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)

One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all members only if:

   "(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class;
and(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class."

Numerosity

Court may also consider the following factors in determining
numerosity: (1) judicial economy arising from the avoidance of a
multiplicity of actions; (2) the geographic dispersion of class
members; (3) the financial resources of class members; (4) the
ability of claimants to institute individual lawsuits; (5) the
amount of each member's individual claim; (6) knowledge of the
names and existence of the potential class members; and (7)
whether potential class members have already joined other actions.
In their motion, Plaintiffs estimate that the proposed class
includes approximately 900 non-members, and Defendants have
previously admitted that the number of persons in the class
exceeds 700 persons for the 2014-15 and subsequent school years.
After considering all of the factors, the Court concludes that the
class of putative plaintiffs would meet the numerosity requirement
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). While the proposed class members are in
close geographical proximity, the sheer number of potential class
members would make joinder impractical.

Commonality

Plaintiffs have stated the common issues of fact are:

   "Whether, at some period of time: (1) all are or were union
non-members; (2) all are or were employed as Job Family 1A
employees for JCPS; (3) all had and/or continue to have union
monies seized from their wages; (4) none of them received all of
the constitutionally required minimum notice and procedural
safeguards from Defendants; and (5) all of them had compulsory
union monies seized from their wages for AFSCME's and Council
962's activities not constitutionally chargeable to Non-members.
The Court finds that the commonality requirement is met among the
potential class members. Each potential class member asserts he or
she was employed by the JCPS, had and/or will continue to have
union fees deducted from his or her wages, and that Defendants
failed to comply with the constitutional requirements relating to
the withholding of funds."

Typicality

Here, typicality exists because all of the claims of the proposed
class members are virtually the same. These claims derive from the
same fee deducted from each class member's paycheck during the
relevant time period and involve the same notice provided by
Defendants.

Adequacy of Representation

The final requirement is that Plaintiffs show that the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.

Plaintiffs maintain that they have satisfied the common interests
requisite because they, like the proposed class, are non-members
in Defendant Unions. Plaintiffs also argue that they have been the
victims of the same wrongs as the proposed class: improper
notices, improper withholding of fees, and improper charging of
fees to them.

Defendants have challenged whether Plaintiffs can satisfy this
requirement. Defendants assert: (i) the class representatives have
contractually agreed to a course of conduct that would require
them, in the event of settlement discussions, to place the
institutional interests of the organization that is funding the
lawsuit ahead of the interests of the class they seek to
represent"; and (ii) the class representatives interests are
antagonistic to or in conflict with the objectives of those being
represented.

Institutional Conflict

The Court finds the decision in George v. Baltimore City Public
Schools to be analogous to the present case. In George, like the
case sub judice, public school teachers sued to stop the deduction
of union representation fees from the wages of nonunion members.
NRWLDF also represented the plaintiffs in that case, and the
defendants raised a similar challenge to the disclosure agreement
signed by the plaintiffs.

In rejecting arguments similar to Defendants', that court stated:
"Defendants also cite the NRWLDF's Disclosure Agreement to
demonstrate how this organization controls plaintiffs' case. The
writing does not give the NRWLDF or its attorney unfettered
control over plaintiffs' litigation. The Disclosure Agreement
insures that plaintiff will not forfeit in settlement the right to
disclose the case history and settlement terms. This enables the
[NRWLDF] to publicize its recent legal aid advances. The document
does not allow the [NRWLDF] to control plaintiffs' case."

This Court agrees with the George court's conclusion that the
disclosure agreement does not improperly remove control from
Plaintiffs and does not preclude a finding of adequacy to certify
the proposed class.

For these reasons, Attorney Chappell and Attorney Masters satisfy
the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)-(2) to be appointed
co-class counsel in this case. Defendants have failed to show that
there is an institutional conflict that would preclude these
attorneys--including one employed by NRWLDF from representing the
proposed class members in this case.

Antagonistic Interests

Defendants also oppose certification of the class because they
maintain that the class representatives are inadequate to serve
the interests of entire class.

The existence of minor conflicts alone will not defeat a party's
claim to class certification: the conflict must be a 'fundamental'
one going to the specific issues in controversy." Valley Drug. Co.
v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1189 (8th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiffs argue that this case is about redressing violations of
the class members' constitutional rights, rather than weakening or
destroying unions.  Clearly, the parties are antagonistic to each
other, but the Court is not going to second-guess the class
representatives' stated motive. Moreover, the relief sought by
Plaintiffs appears tailored to redress harm caused by the alleged
improper notices rather than punish Defendants.

For these reasons, the Plaintiffs' views are not antagonistic to
the proposed class and do not preclude certification of the
proposed class in this matter. Based on the claims asserted by
Plaintiffs and the facts outlined in the Complaint, Plaintiffs
have satisfied the requirements for class certification pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)

After determining that requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) have
been met, the Court must determine whether to certify the proposed
class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). In particular, Plaintiffs seek
certification of the proposed class of plaintiffs under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (2), and (3).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)

Rule 23(b) provides that a court may permit a class action if:
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class
members would create a risk of:(A) inconsistent or varying
adjudications with respect to individual class members that would
establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing
the class; or(B) adjudications with respect to individual class
members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the individual
adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests.

Given the number of separate lawsuits that could be filed if the
proposed class were not certified, there is serious risk that
courts could impose different and inconsistent duties upon
Defendants. Sister courts have certified the proposed classes of
nonunion members in similar challenges to the sufficiency of the
Hudson notice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).

Accordingly, the Court will certify the proposed class pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)

The Court believes that the present dispute clearly falls under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). While Plaintiffs do seek recovery of the
fees paid under allegedly deficient Hudson notices, the main
thrust of this action is a determination of whether the notices
provided by the JCPS complied with Hudson. It is also noteworthy
that sister courts have certified proposed classes pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) in similar cases.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)

Lastly, Plaintiffs request certification under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3), which is appropriate in cases where "questions of law or
fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.

The Sixth Circuit has explained that Rule 23(b)(3) is best suited
for certain types of cases: "In complex, mass, toxic tort
accidents, where no one set of operative facts establishes
liability, no single proximate cause equally applies to each
potential class member and each defendant, and individual issues
outnumber common issues, the district court should properly
question the appropriateness of a class action for resolving the
controversy. However, where the defendant's liability can be
determined on a class-wide basis because the cause of the disaster
is a single course of conduct which is identical for each of the
plaintiffs, a class action may be the best suited vehicle to
resolve such a controversy." Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855
F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir. 1998).

In light of advisory committee's note and the Sterling decision,
the Court believes that the present case is not appropriate for
certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). A basic set of
operative facts applies to all claims for the potential class
members. Thus, the Court will not certify the proposed class under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

While the facts of this case lend themselves to certification
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) and (2), this is not a mass-tort
type of case where certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is
appropriate. Accordingly, the Court declines to certify the
proposed class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

Motion for Oral Argument

Plaintiffs have also moved for oral argument on their motion to
certify. Because the Court finds that oral argument is unnecessary
to address the issues raised by the parties, the motion will be
denied.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Appointment of
Class Counsel is granted, and Counts II and III of this action
shall be maintained as a plaintiff class action under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(1)(A) and 23(b)(2) by Plaintiff Class Representatives on
behalf of the class, defined as:

     "All union non-member employees who, at any time since
September 23, 2014, (and while this action is pending), are or
were employed in the Job Family 1A classification and salary
schedule for Jefferson County Public Schools and are, were or will
be required to pay a compulsory fee to Defendants Jefferson County
Association of Educational Support Personnel, American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees Local 4011 (Local 4011),
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,
Indiana-Kentucky Organizing Committee 962 (Council 962), and/or
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-
CIO pursuant to a compulsory unionism agreement between Local
4011, Council 962, Jefferson County Public Schools Board of
Education, and Donna M. Hargens, Superintendent."

Attorneys Milton L. Chappell and Richard L. Masters are appointed
as co-class counsel for Plaintiffs as they meet all of the
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23(g) for class counsel.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Oral Argument is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 18, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y84wj4zqfrom Leagle.com.

Cherri Beckhart, Plaintiff, represented by Milton L. Chappell,
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., 8001
Braddock RoadSpringfield, VA 22160

Cherri Beckhart, Plaintiff, represented by Richard L. Masters,
Masters, Mullins & Arrington, 1012 South Fourth Street
Louisville, KY 40203-3208

Melinda Diemer, Plaintiff, represented by Milton L. Chappell,
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc. & Richard L.
Masters, Masters, Mullins & Arrington.

Melissa Shina, Plaintiff, represented by Milton L. Chappell,
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc. & Richard L.
Masters, Masters, Mullins & Arrington.

Kelli Thomas, Plaintiff, represented by Milton L. Chappell,
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc. & Richard L.
Masters, Masters, Mullins & Arrington.

Wendy Yates, Plaintiff, represented by Milton L. Chappell,
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc. & Richard L.
Masters, Masters, Mullins & Arrington.

Yolanda Yancey, Plaintiff, represented by Milton L. Chappell,
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc. & Richard L.
Masters, Masters, Mullins & Arrington.

Jefferson County Public Schools Board of Education, Defendant,
represented by C. Tyson Gorman -- tgorman@wyattfirm.com -- Wyatt,
Tarrant & Combs LLP & Jordan M. White -- jwhite@wyattfirm.com --
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs LLP.

Donna M. Hargens, Defendant, represented by C. Tyson Gorman,
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs LLP & Jordan M. White, Wyatt, Tarrant &
Combs LLP.

American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,
Indiana-Kentucky Organizing Committee 962, Defendant, represented
by Caitlin Kekacs, Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC   & John M. West,
Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC, 805 15th St NW Ste 1000, Washington, DC,
20005-2286

American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-
CIO, Defendant, represented by Caitlin Kekacs, Bredhoff & Kaiser,
PLLC & John M. West, Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC.

Jefferson County Association of Educational Support Personnel,
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Local
4011, Defendant, represented by David O'Brien Suetholz --
dave@unionsidelawyers.com -- Kircher Suetholz & Associates, PSC &
Devon N.R. Oser -- devon@unionsidelawyers.com -- Kircher Suetholz
& Associates, PSC.


KOCH MEAT: Court OKs Move for Conditional Class Certification
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Class Certification in
the case captioned JIMMY R. NICKS and JAMES EARL PATRICK,
individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. KOCH MEAT CO., INC., d/b/a KOCH FOODS, KOCH FOODS
OF MISSISSIPPI, LLC, and JET POULTRY SERVICES, INC., Defendants,
No. 16-cv-6446 ( N.D. Ill.).

Plaintiffs initially filed a collective action against on behalf
of all individuals employed by Defendants as members of live-haul,
chicken catching crews in the United States.

Plaintiffs were previously employed to catch and cage Koch's
chickens as member[s] of a live-haul chicken catching crew.
According to Plaintiffs, Koch Foods has a policy and practice of
failing to pay overtime premiums and minimum wage to the
individuals, like Plaintiffs, who catch chickens at Koch's
subsidiary farms in Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee.

Here, the parties' discovery thus far has primarily focused on
jurisdictional and venue issues in large part because the Court
initially limited discovery to jurisdictional issues pending the
resolution of Defendants' motion to dismiss.  Like in Girolamo v.
Cmty. Physical Therapy & Assocs., Ltd., No. 15 C 2361, 2016 WL
3693426, Defendants have not produced a list of potential
claimants, and the parties have not yet engaged in discovery with
the potential class members or in extensive discovery explicitly
focused on the similarly situated issue.

Accordingly, like the Girolamo court and several other courts in
this District, here, since discovery is not complete and the
parties have not engaged in targeted discovery on the conditional
certification issue, the Court will apply the more lenient "modest
factual showing standard in assessing whether Plaintiffs have
demonstrated that they and the other proposed claimants are
similarly situated.

Plaintiffs argue that they have made a modest factual showing that
they and the other potential plaintiffs are similarly situated
because they all work for Koch Foods through independent
contracting companies, they all perform similar chicken-catching
work scheduled and planned by Koch employees without receiving
overtime pay, and all the contractors were subject to the
identical service agreements whereby Koch paid the contractors per
1,000 chickens caught and the contractors passed those payments on
to the chicken-catchers.

Defendants counter that the Court should deny Plaintiffs' motion
for conditional certification because (1) Plaintiffs have not
identified a common policy that violates the FLSA; (2) Plaintiffs
and other potential claimants were not similarly situated because
they worked in different locations for different third-party
contractors and supervisors; and (3) procedural and fairness
concerns dictate that the Court should not grant certification.

Common Policy or Practice

Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs have failed to provide
sufficient evidence that Defendants have a common policy or
practice that violates the FLSA.

Here, Plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence, at this
preliminary stage, to make a modest factual showing that
Defendants had a common policy or practice that caused chicken-
catchers at their various Complexes to work unpaid overtime.
Plaintiffs here have submitted multiple declarations from workers
who worked at multiple locations in which they averred that they
were regularly required to work more than 40 hours per week
without being paid overtime. Plaintiffs need not identify a
specific, written policy requiring them to work overtime. It is
sufficient that they have provided multiple declarations
indicating that Defendants had a de facto practice at more than
one Complex of not paying for overtime hours.

Defendants' arguments that Plaintiffs failed to show that
Defendants decided to utilize independent contractors to
intentionally subvert the FLSA and that Defendants' decision to
pay the third-party contractors on a piece-rate basis was not a
per se violation of the FLSA are both unavailing. First,
Plaintiffs do not argue that Defendants' decision to pay on a
piece-rate basis violates the FLSA. They argue, with the support
of declarations from five employees and deposition testimony from
Defendants' employees, that Defendants' implementation of this
decision has caused the chicken-catchers to work unpaid overtime,
which is a violation of the FLSA. Second, the Court need not at
this stage determine whether Defendants used the independent
contractors to avoid FLSA liability. At the conditional
certification stage, it is sufficient that Plaintiffs have shown
that Defendants and the independent contractors had a de facto
policy and practice of not paying the chicken-catchers for
overtime work.

Accordingly, at this stage, Plaintiffs have provided sufficient
evidence to make a modest factual showing that Defendants had a
common policy or practice that violated the FLSA.

Evidence That Putative Notice Recipients are Similarly Situated

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs have provided insufficient
evidence that they were similarly situated to the other potential
plaintiffs because the other potential plaintiffs worked at
different Complexes for different independent contractors and had
different supervisors.

Here, Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated, at this
preliminary certification stage, that the chicken-catchers at the
various Complexes perform similar job functions and have similar
duties such that they are similarly situated for purposes of the
FLSA. Plaintiffs have provided affidavits from five individuals
who worked at Koch Complexes in both Alabama and Mississippi as
chicken-catchers.

In the affidavits, the individuals declared that they performed
functionally the same work at each Complex catching Koch chickens
and loading them onto Koch cages for transport to Koch processing
plants. As a Koch representative testified, t]ere is only one way
to catch a chicken. Additionally, all the chicken-catchers work
for third-party contractors that provide similar functions for
Defendants and have similar service contracts with Defendants,
whereby Defendants set the daily catch schedules and determine
"when and how many chickens to put in each cage on each load.
These facts demonstrate, for purposes of conditional
certification, that Plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence
to make a modest factual showing that the potential class members
are similarly situated.

Plaintiffs have preliminarily demonstrated that the chicken-
catchers at Defendants' various complexes performed similar duties
under the immediate direction of similar independent contractors
with Defendants' ultimate oversight. This showing establishes, at
this stage, a colorable basis for their claim that a collective of
similarly situated individuals exists.

Procedural and Fairness Concerns

Defendants also argue, applying factors they concede are relevant
only to the intermediate standard of review, that certifying the
proposed class of plaintiffs would result in procedural unfairness
and judicial inefficiencies because the class members as well as
their supervisors worked at different locations in different
states, and requiring them all to attend one trial in Chicago
would be inefficient and costly. This argument is unavailing.

First, the intermediate standard of review is not applicable here,
and as such, Plaintiffs only need to make a moderate factual
showing that the potential class members are similarly situated
and do not need to show that certification will result in judicial
efficiency and procedural fairness.

Second, even if these factors were relevant at this stage, they
would favor conditional certification of the class. As discussed
above, Plaintiffs have made the required moderate showing that the
potential claimants in this case performed similar jobs and were
subject to similar working conditions and Koch business practices,
thus litigating their claims collectively is likely to produce
judicial efficiencies.

Scope of Conditional Certification

Defendants seek to limit notice to chicken-catchers who worked at
the Mississippi Complex arguing that no plaintiffs from other
Complexes have opted in to this lawsuit and that Plaintiffs have
failed to present evidence that the failure to pay chicken-
catchers overtime wages was a company-wide practice.

Plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence, through affidavits
from chicken-catchers at multiple complexes in multiple states,
that Defendants had a widespread policy or practice of not paying
chicken-catchers, who all performed the same duties, for overtime
work at their various Complexes. To the extent Defendants believe
there are dissimilarities between the employees at the different
Complexes and policies or practices for the different contractors,
those arguments are "more appropriately decided at step two, after
it is known who the class will consist of, and after some of the
factual issues can be fleshed out in discovery. The mere potential
that individual issues may predominate after further discovery
does not preclude conditional certification of the class.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs may send notice to potential claimants at
all Defendants' Complexes.

Notice and Opt-In Consent Form

Plaintiffs argue that the Court should allow Plaintiffs to issue
notice to Crew Members who worked at Koch facilities at any time
three years prior to the filing of the FAC and have submitted a
proposed notice form and opt-in consent form.

Given the disputes between the parties regarding Plaintiffs'
proposed notice and in light of the Court's detailed Opinion, in
the interest of judicial efficiency, the parties shall meet and
confer regarding the content of the proposed notice. The parties
must file a joint proposed notice form.

Equitable Tolling

Plaintiffs also request that the Court equitably toll the running
of statute of limitations as to the individuals who potentially
will opt in to this case, but have not yet done so. Equitable
tolling is a rare remedy, which should be granted only when
claimants have exercised due diligence in preserving their legal
rights.

Plaintiffs have failed to show that equitable tolling is warranted
because they have failed to show that some extraordinary
circumstance prevented the potential claimants from filing a
lawsuit against Defendants. Plaintiffs have not identified any
extraordinary circumstance delaying timely filing.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion for equitable tolling of the
statute of limitations based on the delay necessary to rule on the
conditional certification motion is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 18, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/yachth2ofrom Leagle.com.

Jimmy R. Nicks, Plaintiff, represented by Sarah Rebecca Schalman-
Bergen, Berger & Montague, P.C., 1622 LOCUST STREET, Philadelphia,
PA 19103

Jimmy R. Nicks, Plaintiff, represented by Alexandra Koropey Piazz
-- apiazza@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.c., Camille Fundora --
cfundora@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.c., David Alan Hughes,
Hardin & Hughes, LLP,  2121 14th St, Tuscaloosa, AL 35401, Ismael
Tariq Salam -- isalam@litedepalma.com -- Lite DePalma Greenberg
LLC, Katrina Carroll -- kcarroll@litedepalma.com -- Lite DePalma
Greenberg LLC, Kyle Alan Shamberg -- kshamberg@litedepalma.com --
Lite DePalma Greenberg, LLC & Shanon J. Carson -- scarson@bm.net -
Berger & Montague, P.C.

James Earl Patrick, Plaintiff, represented by Sarah Rebecca
Schalman-Bergen, Berger & Montague, P.c., Alexandra Koropey
Piazza, Berger & Montague, P.c., Camille Fundora, Berger &
Montague, P.c., David Alan Hughes, Hardin & Hughes, LLP, Ismael
Tariq Salam, Lite DePalma Greenberg LLC, Katrina Carroll, Lite
DePalma Greenberg LLC, Kyle Alan Shamberg, Lite DePalma Greenberg,
LLC & Shanon J. Carson, Berger & Montague, P.C.

Koch Meat Co., Inc., Defendant, represented by Stephen Novack --
snovak@novackmacey.com -- Novack and Macey LLP, Andrew P. Shelby--
ashelby@novackmacey.com --  Novack and Macey, LLP, Courtney D.
Tedrowe -- cdt@novackmacey.com -- Novack and Macey LLP, Jennifer
G. Hall -- jhall@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker, Donelson, Bearman,
Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., pro hac vice, Russell W. Gray --
rgrauy@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell, &
Berowitz, P.C., pro hac vice & Scott W. Pedigo --
spedigo@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell &
Berkowitz, P.C., pro hac vice.

Koch Foods of Mississippi, LLC, Defendant, represented by Stephen
Novack, Novack and Macey LLP, Andrew P. Shelby, Novack and Macey,
LLP, Courtney D. Tedrowe, Novack and Macey LLP, Russell W. Gray,
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell, & Berowitz, P.C., pro hac vice
& Scott W. Pedigo, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz,
P.C., pro hac vice.

Koch Foods, Inc., Defendant, represented by Andrew P. Shelby,
Novack and Macey, LLP & Stephen Novack, Novack and Macey LLP.
Koch Farms of Mississippi, LLC, Defendant, represented by Andrew
P. Shelby, Novack and Macey, LLP & Stephen Novack, Novack and
Macey LLP.

Koch Foods of Alabama, LLC, Defendant, represented by Andrew P.
Shelby, Novack and Macey, LLP & Stephen Novack, Novack and Macey
LLP.

Koch Farms of Alabama, LLC, Defendant, represented by Andrew P.
Shelby, Novack and Macey, LLP & Stephen Novack, Novack and Macey
LLP.

Koch Foods of Ashland, LLC, Defendant, represented by Andrew P.
Shelby, Novack and Macey, LLP & Stephen Novack, Novack and Macey
LLP.

Koch Farms of Ashland, LLC, Defendant, represented by Andrew P.
Shelby, Novack and Macey, LLP & Stephen Novack, Novack and Macey
LLP.

Koch Foods, LLC, Defendant, represented by Andrew P. Shelby,
Novack and Macey, LLP & Stephen Novack, Novack and Macey LLP.


LIFEVANTAGE CORP: "Zhang" Plaintiffs Can't Amend Complaint
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Utah issued a
Memorandum Decision and Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for Leave
to Amend Complaint in the case JUN ZHANG, Individually and On
behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v.
LIFEVANTAGE CORPORATION, DARREN JAY JENSEN and MARK R. JAGGI,
Defendants, Case No. 2:16-CV-965 TS (D. Utah).

LifeVantage Corporation is a network marketing company
incorporated in Colorado and headquartered in Utah. LifeVantage
sells dietary supplements, skin care products, energy drink mixes,
pet supplements, and other products. LifeVantage sells products in
the United States, Japan, Hong Kong, Australia, Canada,
Philippines, Mexico, and Thailand.

LifeVantage employees raised concerns about LifeVantage's
international policies, and an employee submitted a formal
Sarbanes-Oxley ("SOX") complaint. In June 2016, the company
initiated an independent audit and discovered several improper
sales practices dating as far back as mid-2015. In connection with
this news, the investigation, and subsequent remedial efforts, the
market value of LifeVantage securities fell precipitously.

Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (FAC) against
Jensen, CFO Mark Jaggi, and LifeVantage, claiming that Defendants
violated sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
by making representations regarding the adequacy of LifeVantage's
internal controls that were allegedly false and made recklessly or
with the intent to mislead investors.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) dictates that a party may
amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent
or the court's leave.

The Court may refuse to grant leave to amend where it finds
evidence of undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part
of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by
virtue of allowance of the amendment, or futility of amendment.

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits the use or
employ[ment], in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security of any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe.

SEC Rule 10b-5 implements Section 10(b) by making it unlawful to
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made not
misleading  in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.

Section 10(b) affords a right of action to purchasers or sellers
of securities injured by its violation.

A plaintiff suing under section 10(b) bears a heavy burden at the
pleading stage. To properly state a claim for securities fraud, a
complaint must allege facts supporting the following: (1) the
defendant made an untrue or misleading statement of material fact,
or failed to state a material fact necessary to make statements
not misleading; (2) the statement complained of was made in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities; (3) the
defendant acted with scienter, that is, with intent to defraud or
recklessness; (4) the plaintiff relied on the misleading
statements; and (5) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of
his reliance.

Standard of Ordinary Care

In the FAC, Plaintiffs failed to provide the standard of ordinary
care Defendants were held to and instead relied on statements from
former LifeVantage employees to allege Defendants' deviating acts.
These statements alleged that distributors purchased product
ostensibly for personal use, but in quantities too large to be
used by a single person. Plaintiffs concluded that Defendants'
failure to more closely monitor product purchased for personal use
and failure to enact adequate internal controls was an extreme
departure from the standards of ordinary care.

The Court found, however, that the FAC did not set out a standard
of ordinary care for the situation. Moreover, there were few
allegations concerning what Defendants knew about the improper
sales and material weaknesses in LifeVantage's internal controls.
Therefore, the mere fact that Jensen worked in the industry before
and did not strengthen controls at LifeVantage was not enough to
show scienter.

Plaintiffs allege that Jensen, as CEO, was responsible for
following these standards, but failed because (1) LifeVantage did
not have documented, country-specific policies for distributor
enrollment requirements, distributor payment and collection
policies, and shipping, order fulfillment, and customs import
policies; (2) there were inadequate controls over certain
international practices, including a lack of training monitoring
and oversight of personnel who were involved in or managed its
international business operations; and (3) Jensen instituted bonus
pools and other incentives which encouraged purchasing of
inventory beyond what an individual could sell or use.

The allegations do suggest that Jensen, at some level, deviated
from the standards of ordinary care by providing incentives that
encouraged inventory loading, failing to make sure LifeVantage's
internal controls were adequate for the international expansion
the company was attempting to accomplish, and assuring investors
that controls were in place.

These allegations provide some support for an inference of
scienter. However, the Thailand scheme began before Jensen
announced the initiatives that allegedly encouraged inventory
loading. This, combined with the mere fact that Jensen did not
strengthen controls within his first few months as CEO, is not
enough to show extreme deviation from the standard of ordinary
care. Further, when Jensen allegedly discovered the improper sales
practices, he followed the standard of care and initiated an
internal investigation into the complaints.

Therefore, Plaintiffs' allegations may support a finding that
Jensen deviated from the standard of ordinary care, but the Court
finds that any deviations that occurred did not rise to the level
of extreme deviations and are insufficient to independently
support a strong inference of scienter.

Former Employees

The FAC included statements from former LifeVantage employees
which Plaintiffs used to support allegations that Jensen put
policies in place that encouraged inventory loading and improper
sales practices. The Court found that, while some upper management
may have known about improper sales practices, the former
employees' statements did not include any allegation that
supported an inference that Jensen was made aware of improper
distributor enrollments or sales during the class period. Without
this link, the FAC did little to support a strong inference of
scienter.

The SAC contains the same statements from the first four former
employees and adds statements from two other former employees,
Former Employee 5 (FE5) and Former Employee 6 (FE6), detailing an
illegal sales scheme that allegedly occurred in Thailand.

In this case, the only statement alleging CFO Jaggi's knowledge is
that Robert Urban told FE5 that Micheal Seeley told CFO Jaggi.
Even then, in order to close the gap between the discovery of the
illegal sales scheme by FE5 and Jensen's knowledge of the scheme,
another inferential step must be made; a step which Plaintiffs
attempt to make with the statement: probably Jensen as well.

The number of inferential steps and the amount of speculation
required to connect Jensen's knowledge to the illegal sales scheme
and inherent internal control problems makes this case more
similar to Wolfe than to Adams. Plaintiffs' allegations require a
series of inferences that were unnecessary in Adams and the Court
must stack inference upon inference. While FE5's statement is not
so vague and global as to be unhelpful as a benchmark for
scienter,59 the amount of inference required to close the gap
weakens the inference of scienter.

The Court finds, therefore, that the statements from LifeVantage's
former employees are not enough to establish a strong inference of
scienter.

Totality of the Pleadings

Regardless of whether Jensen did find out about the improper sales
practices as FE5 alleges, Plaintiffs provided only one valid
challenged statement made by Jensen. This statement, from a
conference call stated that LifeVantage had proactively taken
steps" to ensure full compliance with a changing regulatory
landscape Plaintiffs also provide LifeVantage's 2016 10-K in which
Jensen disclosed that there were internal control deficiencies
that rose to the level of a material weakness in our internal
controls over financial reporting, and that LifeVantage uncovered
several improper sales practices. Jensen also detailed in the 2016
10-K the steps the company was taking to remedy the issues.

These statements and facts create the innocent inference that
Jensen took over as CEO at a time when the problems with internal
controls, illegal sales schemes, high turnover among senior
management, and falling stock prices already existed. Jensen did
not know about the internal control problems or improper sales
practices at first, but when he was informed of these issues, he
took steps to investigate and correct the problems and he informed
LifeVantage's investors.

For these reasons, the Court finds that the innocent inference
remains more compelling than any competing inference and the SAC
fails to meet the heightened pleadings requirements of the PSLRA.
Therefore, since the SAC would be subject to dismissal if filed,
granting a motion to amend the SAC would be futile.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 18, 2017
Memorandum Decision and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/y76uqsydfrom Leagle.com.

Jun Zhang, Plaintiff, represented by J. Alexander Hood, II,
POMERANTZ LLP, pro hac vice.

Jun Zhang, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy A. Lieberman,
POMERANTZ LLP,  pro hac vice, Patrick V. Dahlstrom, POMERANTZ LLP,
600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10016, pro hac vice,
Zane L. Christensen, CHRISTENSEN YOUNG & ASSOCIATES & Steven A.
Christensen, CHRISTENSEN YOUNG & ASSOCIATES PLLC, 9980 S 300 W Ste
200 Sandy, UT, 84070-3654

Dale Blanch, Plaintiff, represented by Zane L. Christensen,
CHRISTENSEN YOUNG & ASSOCIATES.

Yvonne Cohen, Plaintiff, represented by Zane L. Christensen,
CHRISTENSEN YOUNG & ASSOCIATES.

Zhang Lead Plaintiffs, Plaintiff, represented by Aatif Iqbal,
POMERANTZ LLP, J. Alexander Hood, II, POMERANTZ LLP, pro hac vice,
Jeremy A. Lieberman, POMERANTZ LLP, pro hac vice, Patrick V.
Dahlstrom, POMERANTZ LLP, 600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor, New York,
NY 10016, pro hac vice, Zane L. Christensen, CHRISTENSEN YOUNG &
ASSOCIATES, Murielle J. Steven Walsh, POMERANTZ LLP & Steven A.
Christensen, CHRISTENSEN YOUNG & ASSOCIATES PLLC.

Lifevantage, Defendant, represented by John P. Stigi, III --
jstigi@sheppardmullin.com -- SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON
LLP, pro hac vice & Milo Steven Marsden --
marsden.steve@dorsey.com -- DORSEY & WHITNEY.

Darren Jay Jensen, Defendant, represented by John P. Stigi, III,
SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP, pro hac vice & Milo Steven
Marsden, DORSEY & WHITNEY.

Mark R. Jaggi, Defendant, represented by John P. Stigi, III,
SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP, pro hac vice & Milo Steven
Marsden, DORSEY & WHITNEY.

Francesco Crosara, Movant, represented by Joel M. Ban, BAN LAW
OFFICES, 234 E 2100 S Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

Chris Sayer, Movant, represented by Mitchell A. Stephens, HATCH
JAMES & DODGE, 10 W. Broadway, Suite 400Salt Lake City, UT 84101-
2065.


LONGHORN EMERGENCY: "Jordan" Seek Wages for Off-the-Clock Work
--------------------------------------------------------------
Diana Jordan, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Longhorn Emergency Medical Associates,
P.A., Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-00648, (E.D. Tex., September 13,
2017), seeks unpaid back wages due with liquidated damages, costs
of this action, attorney's fees, post-judgment interest and such
other and further relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Longhorn Emergency provide care to Longview Regional's emergency
room patients. Jordan worked for Longhorn as an emergency room
nurse practitioners. Plaintiff was required, as part of her job,
to perform various tasks prior to beginning their shift and
clocking in and after concluding their shift and clocking out, all
without proper compensation. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     William S. Hommel, Jr., Esq.
     HOMMEL LAW FIRM
     1404 Rice Road, Suite 200
     Tyler, TX 75701
     Tel: (903) 596-7100
     Fax: (469) 533-1618
     Email: bhommel@hommelfirm.com


LOST DOG PIZZA: Refuses to Pay Overtime Wages, "Diaz" Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
VICTOR DIAZ on his own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. LOST DOG PIZZA, LLC, DANIEL WARREN LYNCH and
JEFF SMOKEVITCH, Case No. 1:17-cv-02228 (D. Colo., September 14,
2017), alleges that the Defendants refused to pay the Plaintiff
and other hourly employees overtime wages for hours worked beyond
40 each workweek and for hours worked beyond 12 each workday, in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Colorado Wage Claim
Act and the Colorado Minimum Wage Act.

Lost Dog Pizza, LLC, is a registered Colorado company, which
operates the Brown Dog Pizza restaurant and which has a principal
street address of 110 East Colorado Ave., in Telluride, Colorado.
The Individual Defendants are owners and managers of the Brown Dog
Pizza restaurant.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brandt Milstein, Esq.
          MILSTEIN LAW OFFICE
          1123 Spruce Street, Suite 200
          Boulder, CO 80302
          Telephone: (303) 440-8780
          Facsimile: (303) 957-5754
          E-mail: brandt@milsteinlawoffice.com


MONTEREY FINANCIAL: Accused of Illegal Debt Collection Practices
----------------------------------------------------------------
David L. Robinson and Gayle Robinson, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated v. Monterey Financial Services, LLC
d/b/a Monterey Collections d/b/a Monterey Loan Servicing, Case No.
2:17-cv-00520-UA-MRM (M.D. Fla., September 21, 2017), seeks to
stop the Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a
debt.

Monterey Financial Services, LLC operates a service receivables
management and finance company in Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Robert W. Murphy, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT W. MURPHY
      1212 SE 2nd Ave
      Ft Lauderdale, FL 33316
      Telephone: (954) 763-8660
      Facsimile: (954) 763-8607
      E-mail: rphyu@aol.com


NEAR DIRECT: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, "Sloatman" Suit Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
John Sloatman, Kathryn Thyne, and Vanessa Garcia, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Near Direct and Does
1 through 10, inclusive, and each of them, Case No. 2:17-cv-06880
(C.D. Cal., September 18, 2017), seeks to stop the Defendant's
practice of placing daily calls to the Plaintiffs seeking to sell
or solicit its business services using an automatic telephone
dialing system without prior express consent.

Near Direct operates a marketing company in California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
      Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
      21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
      Woodland Hills, CA 91367
      Telephone: (877) 206-4741
      Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
      E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
              abacon@toddflaw.com


NESTLE WATERS: Faces Copycat CA Lawsuit Over Poland Spring
----------------------------------------------------------
Robert Storace, writing for The Connecticut Law Tribune, reports
that five weeks after a federal lawsuit was filed against Nestle
Waters North America, a copycat suit has been filed detailing the
same alleged claims: Poland Spring bottled water doesn't come from
a spring.

The prospective class action filed on behalf of a Los Angeles
woman in U.S. District Court on September 19 claims the water is
actually bottled ground water. The lawsuit, which seeks $5 million
in damages, was filed in the same Connecticut court that 11
consumers filed their suit in August.

The most recent lawsuit claims the company misled consumers into
believing Poland Spring water comes from several springs in Maine.
"This [marketing effort] is solely to trick consumers into
believing that the bottled water is sourced from naturally
occurring springs," the lawsuit says. "The reality, however, is
that Poland Spring Water is bottled ground water."

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration says spring water must come
from an underground source and flow naturally to the earth's
surface. Spring water, according to the government, doesn't have
to literally be collected from a spring. It can also be pumped out
from a hole in the ground.

Ground water, on the other hand, is water found underground in the
cracks and spaces in soil, sand and rock. It is stored in and
moves slowly through geologic formations of soil, sand and rocks
called aquifers.

The lawsuit notes Poland Spring's websites lists eight springs
located throughout Maine where its water comes from.
"There is no proof that any of these eight 'natural springs'
qualify as a spring within the meaning of the applicable FDA
regulations," according to the lawsuit.

The lawsuit was filed on behalf of Aleta Lilly, who purchased 15-
20 Poland Spring bottles in August.  Had Lilly known the water was
ground water, the lawsuit claims she would not have purchased the
more expensive Poland Spring brand.

The prospective class covers purchasers of Poland Spring from Nov.
6, 2003, to the present. It's not clear how big the class could
be, but the lawsuit claims Nestle Waters North America was the
largest producer of bottled water in 2014. In addition to Poland
Spring, Nestle markets other brands of water, including Arrowhead,
Deer Park, Ice Mountain, Ozarka, Zephyr-hills and Nestle Pure
Life.

The lawsuit includes two counts for fraud and breach of express
warranty.

The lawsuit seeks certification as a class action and punitive and
statutory damages.

In addition to the two lawsuits filed within the past five weeks,
the company was also sued in 2003 by a group of plaintiffs
alleging similar false-marketing claims. In that case, Nestle
Waters North America settled for $10 million in discounts and
charitable contributions.

The Aug. 15 lawsuit has different plaintiffs and different
attorneys from the one filed on September 19. The lawsuit filed in
August called Poland Spring's bottled water a "colossal fraud."
That lawsuit claims that "not one drop" of the water complies with
the FDA's definition of what constitutes spring water. That suit
seeks at least $5 million in damages for false advertising,
deceptive labeling and breach of contract.

Alexander Schmidt, a solo practitioner from Colts Neck, New
Jersey, is one of 10 attorneys representing the plaintiffs in the
August class action.

While Schmidt said the lawsuit filed shouldn't negatively impact
the plaintiff's chances of winning the first suit, he added,
"Subsequent cases, or copycat cases, create administrative
inconveniences moving forward."

Schmidt anticipates the cases will be consolidated. He said that
means "you will have to deal with new counsels and consider new
plaintiffs who want to get involved. You also have to reconcile
any differences between the complaints. The court will ultimately
appoint new lead counsel in consolidated cases. The lead counsel
then has the discretion to make decisions and file a consolidated
amended complaint."

Lilly is represented by Shannon Hopkins and Rosemary Rivas,
partners at Levi & Korsinsky. Neither attorney was available for
comment on September 21.

In a statement emailed on September 21 to the Connecticut Law
Tribune, Alix Dunn, director of corporate affairs for Nestle
Waters North America's headquarters in Stamford, wrote: "We
understand that a copycat of the original baseless lawsuit against
Poland Spring has been filed in Connecticut, although we have not
yet been served. While we have not seen the specific claims, we
assume that they are based on the same set of meritless claims in
the original suit." [GN]


NORTHSTAR LOCATION: Sued Over Illegal Debt Collection Practices
---------------------------------------------------------------
Alyxx Morgen, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. NorthStar Location Services, LLC, Case No. 2:17-cv-
05480 (E.D.N.Y., September 19, 2017), seeks to stop the
Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

NorthStar Location Services, LLC operates a debt collection agency
located at 4285 Genesee St, Buffalo, NY 14225. [BN]

Alyxx Morgen is a pro se plaintiff.


NOVO NORDISK: Hagens Berman, Carella Byrne Named Lead Atty
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an opinion appointing interim lead counsel in the case
captioned IN RE INSULIN PRICING LITIGATION. FRANK BARNETT, ALTHEA
BENTELE, DIANNA GILMORE, MARK GOLDSMITH, RITCH HOARD, and TREMAYNE
SIMONS, Plaintiffs, v. NOVO NORDISK INC., et al., Defendants.
JULIA BOSS, RUTH A. HART, RUTH JOHNSON, LEANN RICE, and TYPE 1
DIABETES DEFENSE FOUNDATION, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CVS HEALTH CORPORATION,
et al., Defendants. SCOTT CHRISTENSEN, GAY DEPUTEE, MARY ANN
DEVINS, MILDRED FORD, EMMA JENSEN, EDWARD JOHNSON, ANGELA
KRITSELIS, SUSAN LANDIS, RUSSELL SCOTT PALMER, WILLIE PHILLIPS,
JON UGLAND, ANDREW VAN HOUZEN, Plaintiffs, v. NOVO NORDISK INC.,
et al., Defendants, Civil Action Nos. 3:17-cv-0699-BRM-LHG, 3:17-
cv-1580-BRM-LHG, 3:17-cv-1823-BRM-LHG, 3:17-cv-2678-BRM-LHG
(D.N.J.).

Before this Court are letter applications of (1) Steve W. Berman
of Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP (HB) and James E. Cecchi of
Carella, Byrne, Cecchi, Olstein, Brody & Agnello, P.C. Zelman, LLC
(CB)l (2) Lynn Lincoln Sarko, Derek W. Loeser, and Gretchen S.
Obrist of Keller Rohrback L.L.P. (Rohrback); and (3) Ellen Relkin
of Weitz and Luxenberg and Todd A. Seaver of Berman DeValerio
(WL/BD).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g)(3) provides the "court may
designate interim class counsel to act on behalf of the putative
class before determining whether to certify the action as a class
action. Further: "Although neither the federal rules nor the
Advisory Committee Notes expressly so state, it appears to be
generally accepted that the considerations set out in Rule
23(g)(1)(C), which govern the appointment of class counsel once a
class is certified, apply equally to the designation of interim
class counsel before certification."

The Conflict

The WL/BD applicants argue HB/CB have a conflict of interest that
should preclude the firms from serving as interim class counsel.
WL/BD applicants note Hagens Berman represents a drug wholesaler,
FWK Holdings, Inc., in FWK Holdings, LLC v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S.
LLC, Case No. 16-cv-12656 (D. Mass), in which a putative class of
wholesale purchasers alleges Sanofi, the defendant manufacturer,
overcharged them for the medication "Lantus."

The Court finds Hagens Berman's efforts to prove anticompetitive
behavior in FWK Holdings are distinct from its efforts to prove
fraud in this case. HB/CB further argues the distinct legal bases
for the claims in each case preclude any overlap in damages
between the two cases. The Court agrees. HB/CB cite figures
demonstrating Sanofi's net sales and profits are such that it has]
the capacity to pay out multiple classes to the maximum extent.
The Court is satisfied there is no conflict.

Appointment

The Court finds all counsel are highly regarded, well known
throughout the legal community and have appeared before the Court.
The Court, further enhanced and magnified by the submissions of
Linda P. Nussbaum of the Nussbaum Law Group, P.C., Natalie
Finkelman Bennett of Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP, and
Roberta D. Liebenberg of Fine, Kaplan and Black, R.P.C., in
support of the HB/CB application, concludes that all parties will
be well served by the appointment of Steve W. Berman of Hagens
Berman and James E. Cecchi of Carella Byrne as interim lead
counsel.

Accordingly, the Court appoints Steve W. Berman of Hagens Berman
and James E. Cecchi of Carella Byrne as interim lead counsel.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 18, 2017
Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/yb673o3pfrom
Leagle.com.

DONALD CHAIRES, Plaintiff, represented by LINDSEY H. TAYLOR,
CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, 5 Becker Farm
Road, Roseland, NJ 07068

DONALD CHAIRES, Plaintiff, represented by NATALIE FINKELMAN
BENNETT, SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP 35 East State
Street, Media, PA 19063 & JAMES E. CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI
OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C., 5 Becker Farm, Road Roseland, NJ
07068

GEORGE DENAULT, Plaintiff, represented by LINDSEY H. TAYLOR,
CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, NATALIE
FINKELMAN BENNETT, SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP & JAMES
E. CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C..
JANE DOE, Plaintiff, represented by LINDSEY H. TAYLOR, CARELLA,
BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, NATALIE FINKELMAN
BENNETT, SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP & JAMES E.
CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C..
JOHN DOE, Plaintiff, represented by LINDSEY H. TAYLOR, CARELLA,
BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, NATALIE FINKELMAN
BENNETT, SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP & JAMES E.
CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C..
BRITTANY GILLELAND, Plaintiff, represented by LINDSEY H. TAYLOR,
CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, NATALIE
FINKELMAN BENNETT, SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP & JAMES
E. CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C..
GERALD GIRARD, Plaintiff, represented by LINDSEY H. TAYLOR,
CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, NATALIE
FINKELMAN BENNETT, SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP & JAMES
E. CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C..
SARA HASSELBACH, Plaintiff, represented by LINDSEY H. TAYLOR,
CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, NATALIE
FINKELMAN BENNETT, SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP & JAMES
E. CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C..
LINDSEY KINHAN, Plaintiff, represented by LINDSEY H. TAYLOR,
CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO & JAMES E.
CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C..
JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, Plaintiff, represented by LINDSEY H. TAYLOR,
CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, NATALIE
FINKELMAN BENNETT, SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP & JAMES
E. CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C..
MARILYN PERSON, Plaintiff, represented by LINDSEY H. TAYLOR,
CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO & JAMES E.
CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C..
NOVO NORDISK INC., Defendant, represented by MICHAEL R. GRIFFINGER
-- mgriffinger@gibbonslaw.com -- GIBBONS, PC, CALVIN KUSHNIR MAY -
- cmay@gibbonslaw.com -- GIBBONS PC & CHRISTOPHER T. WALSH --
cwalsh@gibbonslaw.com -- GIBBONS P.C.

ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, Defendant, represented by MELISSA A. GEIST
-- mgeist@reedsmith.com -- REED SMITH LLP & SHANKAR DURAISWAMY --
sduraiswamy@cov.com -- COVINGTON & BURLING LLP.

SANOFI-AVENTIS U.S. LLC, Defendant, represented by LIZA M. WALSH -
- lwalsh@walsh.law.com -- WALSH PIZZI O'REILLY FALANGA LLP,
KATELYN O'REILLY -- koreilly@walsh.law.com -- WALSH PIZZI O'REILLY
FALANGA LLP & KATHERINE MARIE ROMANO -- kromano@walsh.law.com --
WALSH PIZZI O'REILLY & FALANGA LLP.

Karyn Wofford, Defendant, represented by JAMES E. CECCHI, CARELLA
BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.


OPTUMRX INC: Transferred "Johnson" Suit to District New Jersey
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit filed on May 23, 2017, captioned Ruth
Johnson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. OptumRX Inc. and Novo Nordisk Inc., Case No. 8:17-cv-
00900, was transferred on September 18, 2017, from the District of
Central California to the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:17-cv-
07198-BRM-LHG to the proceeding.

The Class seeks to redress injuries they suffered due to an
illegal pricing scheme in which Novo Nordisk, a drug manufacturer,
artificially inflated the price of Victoza -- an injectable
prescription medicine use to treat Type 2 diabetes -- to subsidize
the payment of illegal kickbacks to OptumRx, a pharmacy benefit
manager ("PBM") that negotiates drug prices on behalf of insurers,
health plans, and their participants.

Headquartered at 2300 Main St., Irvine, California, 92614, OptumRX
Inc. is one of the largest pharmacy benefit management companies
in the United States.

Novo Nordisk Inc. operates a pharmaceutical company in Plainsboro,
New Jersey. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Derek W. Loeser, Esq.
      Gretchen S. Obrist, Esq.
      KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.
      1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200
      Seattle, WA 98101-3052
      Telephone: (206) 623-1900
      Facsimile: (206) 623-3384
      E-mail: dloeser@kellerrohrback.com
              gobrist@kellerrorhback.com

         - and -

      Juli E. Farris, Esq.
      KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.
      801 Garden Street, Suite 301
      Santa Barbara, CA 93101
      Telephone: (805) 456-1496
      Facsimile: (805) 456-1497
      E-mail: jfarris@kellerrohrback.com


PATRIOT NATIONAL: Faces "Kayce" Class Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been commenced against Patriot
National, Inc. and Steven Mariano.

The case is captioned Adam Kayce, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Patriot National, Inc. and Steven
Mariano, Case No. 1:17-cv-07164-DLC (S.D.N.Y., September 20,
2017).

Patriot National, Inc. is a national provider of comprehensive
technology and outsourcing solutions that help insurance
companies. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Peter George Safirstein, Esq.
      SAFIRSTEIN METCALF LLP
      1250 Broadway, 27th Floor
      New York, NY 10001
      Telephone: (212) 201-2845
      Facsimile: (212) 201-2858
      E-mail: psafirstein@safirsteinmetcalf.com


PHARMERICA CORP: "Martin" to Halt Merger deal, Seeks Projections
----------------------------------------------------------------
Rodney Martin, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. Pharmerica Corporation, Frank E. Collins,
W. Robert Dahl, Jr., Marjorie W. Dorr, Patrick G. Lepore, Geoffrey
G. Meyers, Robert A. Oakley and Gregory S. Weishar, Defendants,
Case No. 1:17-cv-01301, (D. Del., September 13, 2017), seeks to
enjoin defendants and all persons acting in concert with them from
proceeding with, consummating, or closing the acquisition of
PharMerica by affiliates of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P.,
rescinding it and setting it aside or awarding rescissory damages
in the event defendants consummate the merger, costs of this
action, including reasonable allowance for attorneys' and experts'
fees and such other and further relief under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

PharMerica shareholders stand to receive $29.25 in cash for each
share of PharMerica stock they own. However, the merger documents
omitted the company's financial projections and the analyses
critical from UBS Securities LLC in evaluating the company's offer
price, says the complaint.

PharMerica is an institutional pharmacy services company that
services healthcare facilities, provides pharmacy management
services to hospitals and specialty infusion services to patients
outside a hospital setting, and offers national oncology pharmacy
services. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Nadeem Faruqi, Esq.
      James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq.
      FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
      685 Third Ave., 26th Fl.
      New Yor006B, NY 10017
      Telephone: (212) 983-9330
      Email: nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
             jwilson@faruqilaw.com

             - and -

      Michael Van Gorder, Esq.
      FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
      20 Montchanin Road, Suite 145
      Wilmington, DE 19807
      Tel: (302) 482-3182
      Email: mvangorder@faruqilaw.com


PRINCETON UNIVERSITY: Loses Bid to Dismiss ERISA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
in the case captioned ELYSEE NICOLAS, individually and as
representative of a class of participants and beneficiaries on
behalf of the Princeton University 403(b) Plan Plaintiff, v. THE
TRUSTEES OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, Defendant, Civ. No. 17-3695
(D.N.J.).

Plaintiff brings this putative class action alleging breaches of
fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA).  Plaintiff, like other faculty and staff at Princeton
University, is a participant in the Princeton University
Retirement Plan and the Princeton University Savings Plan (Plans).
Defendant is the governing body of Princeton University, a
private, nonprofit institution of higher learning, and
administrator of the Plans.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's actions caused participants in
the Plans to pay excessive administrative and recordkeeping fees.
In particular, Plaintiff cites Defendant's failure to use its
bargaining power to negotiate lower fees or conduct competitive
bidding for record keepers contracting with two record keepers
instead of one.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim
of fiduciary breach under ERISA on all three counts alleged in the
Complaint, warranting dismissal.  Defendant argues alternatively
that Plaintiff's Complaint is time-barred under ERISA's statute of
limitations, warranting summary judgment in favor of Defendant.

Motion to Dismiss: Fiduciary Breaches

Although the fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence are distinct
under ERISA, all three counts of Plaintiff's Complaint seem to
collapse the duties by supplying the same factual underpinnings
for the alleged breaches of each duty. The Court will attempt to
disaggregate these claims.

Breaches of the Duty of Loyalty

The duty of loyalty requires a plan fiduciary to discharge his
duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries and
defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.

Plaintiff pleads no facts suggesting Defendant benefitted,
financially or otherwise, from any decisions related to the Plans
or engaged in disloyal conduct in order to benefit itself or
someone other than the Plans' beneficiaries; rather, Plaintiffs
loyalty claims are merely characterizations that piggyback off of
the prudence claims, without any independent factual predicate.
The Court does not find that it would be inequitable or futile to
grant Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint. The Court will
dismiss Counts I-III of the Complaint without prejudice to the
extent they pertain to breaches of the duty of loyalty, and grant
Plaintiff leave to amend.

Breaches of the Duty of Prudence

Reasonableness of Administrative Fees and Investment Management
Fees

In Counts I and II, Plaintiff alleges two claims related to
excessive fees: (1) that Defendant, despite its substantial
bargaining power, included investment options in the Plans
carrying far higher administrative fees and expenses relative to
the size and complexity of the Plans, which charged an asset-based
fee for recordkeeping" that was excessive and unreasonable and (2)
that Defendant failed to remove two specific funds, the CREF Stock
Account and TIAA Real Estate Account, that carried unreasonably
excessive fees. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant failed to
solicit competitive bids for recordkeeping and imprudently
contracted with two record-keepers, creating an inefficient and
costly structure.

Plaintiff has alleged specific breaching conduct: failing to
conduct a competitive bidding process; failing to use significant
bargaining power to negotiate lower fees; retaining two record-
keepers; and failing to remove two particularly unreasonable
funds. Other courts to have considered substantially similar
complaints have found them to survive motions to dismiss for
similar reasons.

Accepting as true the facts alleged in the Complaint and giving
Plaintiff every favorable inference therefrom, Plaintiff's
Complaint states a claim for relief. Defendant's motion to dismiss
is denied with respect to the alleged breaches of the duty of
prudence regarding administrative and investment management fees
in Counts I and II.

Performance Losses: Failure to Monitor and Remove Imprudent
Investments

In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant imprudently retained
the CREF Stock Account and TIAA Real Estate Account, despite their
poor performance as compared to similar available options and
recognized benchmarks.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to state a viable claim of
poor performance because Plaintiff refers to a benchmark that is
not proper and funds that are not suitable comparators. However,
Defendant's own exhibit lists the exact benchmark Plaintiff
identifies under the heading Benchmark(s) And Indices for one of
the specified annuities.

Defendant raises factual questions about whether the alternative
funds Plaintiff suggests are apt comparisons and, therefore,
whether the underperformance Plaintiff depicts is an accurate
portrait. Such questions do not warrant dismissal -- to the
contrary, they suggest the need for further information from both
parties. Plaintiff's allegations support a claim of imprudence
sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss.

Defendant's motion is denied with regard to the alleged breaches
of the duty of prudence in Count II.

Failure to Monitor Fiduciaries and Service Providers

In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached its
fiduciary duties by failing to monitor its appointees, ensure that
monitored fiduciaries prudently managed administrative fees,
ensure that monitored fiduciaries considered alternative
investment options, and remove appointees who performed
inadequately.  This Count of Plaintiff's Complaint reads like
legal conclusions as opposed to factual allegations; Plaintiff
does not allege facts about Defendant's actual monitoring process
and its specific shortcomings.

Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted with respect
to Count III, but, in keeping with Third Circuit guidance.
Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint.

Motion for Summary Judgment: Statute of Limitations

Defendant argues in the alternative that Plaintiffs entire
Complaint is time-barred under the statute of limitations
provision of ERISA, warranting summary judgment.

While Defendant argues that all relevant facts were "made known to
the plaintiff more than three years before the complaint was
filed, that may only conclusively establish that Plaintiff had
constructive knowledge of the underlying facts by May 2014.

Defendant's assertion that Plaintiff had access to various
websites linking to the annuities' prospectuses for more than
three years does not prove that Plaintiff both knew of the facts
and that those facts constituted a breach.

Defendant's additional argument that Plaintiff's Complaint
references information reflected in the May 1, 2014 prospectus for
CREF variable annuities and therefore that Plaintiff could have,
and, indeed, must have filed his Complaint prior to May 1, 2017,
is similarly unavailing.  The mere allegation by Plaintiff that an
event took place on a certain date does not establish that
Plaintiff had knowledge of the event on that same date.

Consequently, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiffs claims as
time-barred at the pleading stage.

Furthermore, some of Plaintiff's allegations specifically relate
to the post-2014 period, after Defendant negotiated a credit to
the Plans for some recordkeeping expenses and others to
deficiencies in Defendant's reporting materials, of which
Plaintiff may not have had knowledge until sometime after those
materials were made available. Examining these facts in favor of
the non-moving party, the Court finds that there is a genuine
dispute of material fact as to when Plaintiff developed actual
knowledge of the alleged breach.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court of Appeals' September 18, 2017
Opinion is available at http://tinyurl.com/ybhysvadfrom
Leagle.com.

ELYSEE NICOLAS, Plaintiff, represented by JOSEPH J. DEPALMA --
jdepalma@litedepalma.com -- LITE, DEPALMA, GREENBERG, LLC.

THE TRUSTEES OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, Defendant, represented by
NEIL V. SHAH -- rshah@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose LLP.


PRINCETON UNIVERSITY: Retirement Plan Class Action Moves Forward
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jacklyn Wille, writing for BNA, reports that a proposed class
action accusing Princeton University of running retirement plans
with high fees and bad investments is moving forward (Nicolas v.
Trs. of Princeton Univ., 2017 BL 330642, D.N.J., No. 3:17-cv-
03695, 9/19/17).

A federal judge Sept. 19 refused to dismiss key portions of the
lawsuit, which alleges Princeton acted imprudently and disloyally
by keeping bad investment options in its retirement plans, using
multiple plan record keepers, and failing to negotiate lower fees.
The Princeton employee who sued the school sufficiently showed
that the Princeton behaved imprudently, the judge said. However,
the judge dismissed the employee's claim of disloyalty, finding no
indication that Princeton acted to benefit itself or another party
at the expense of its workers' retirement savings.

In the past year, 16 prominent colleges have been targeted by
class actions challenging the fees and investment lineups of their
retirement plans. Cases against NYU, Columbia, Duke, Emory, and
MIT have seen varying degrees of early success. Other lawsuits are
pending against Yale, Vanderbilt, Johns Hopkins, Cornell, and
others.

With courts refusing to grant quick dismissals in these lawsuits,
other private colleges could become targets for retirement plan
litigation. As of the 2017 school year, more than 1,900 private,
four-year colleges were operating in the U.S., according to data
from the National Center for Education Statistics. Public colleges
may be less vulnerable to these lawsuits because their retirement
plans typically aren't subject to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act.

In this case, the parties will continue to litigate claims
challenging Princeton's decision to use multiple plan record
keepers -- a practice that critics say leads to higher costs and
participant confusion -- and its alleged failure to use its
substantial bargaining power to negotiate for lower plan fees.

The plan participant is also moving forward with her challenge to
two specific plan investment options: the CREF Stock Account and
the TIAA Real Estate Account. Most of the university lawsuits have
singled out these investment options as poor performers, and
several judges have found these claims to be viable.

Judge Anne E. Thompson of the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey wrote the decision.

The Princeton employee is represented by Lite DePalma Greenberg
LLC, Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky Wotkyns LLP, and Berger &
Montague P.C. Princeton is represented by Proskauer Rose LLP. [GN]


RBC CAPITAL: Court Denies Move to Dismiss Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss the Amended Complaint in the case captioned GARY and
CARYL LUIS, GARY A. Case MENTZ, MICHAEL J. and MERRI L. ITSE,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. RBC CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC, Defendant, No. 0:16-cv-
03873 (SRN/DTS) (D. Minn.).

In a related previous action, a similar set of plaintiffs, which
included current plaintiffs Gary and Caryl Luis, filed a class-
action Complaint pleading seven claims based in Minnesota state
law, including common law negligence, breach of fiduciary duty,
and breach of contract.  These plaintiffs alleged that RBC engaged
in a series of actions designed to hide the true risk of these
products from investors, while pushing them on individuals who had
expressly indicated an unwillingness to partake in options
trading.

Plaintiffs in this matter are five individuals who opened
investment accounts with RBC.  They commenced this action on
behalf of themselves and the following putative class:

     "All persons and entities to whom Defendant sold RCNs whose
written instructions to RBC did not authorize selling put
options."

Plaintiffs estimate that the putative class may ultimately consist
of several thousand individuals.

Defendant RBC is a Minnesota limited liability company and a
registered broker-dealer, which acted as the agent for the sale of
the RCNs underlying this dispute. RBC is a subsidiary of non-party
Royal Bank of Canada, which issued the RCNs.

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint makes a single claim for breach of
contract. Plaintiffs allege that each member of the putative class
contracted with RBC to give limited authority for trading in put
options, which excluded uncovered or naked put options like those
embedded in RCNs. When the price of the reference assets for the
RCNs fell below the predetermined value, Plaintiffs were forced to
purchase the reference stocks and lose the value of their original
notes. Plaintiffs allege that they collectively lost nearly
$280,000 on their $327,126.49 investment in RCNs.

In its Motion to Dismiss, RBC argues that Plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint fails as a matter of law because it is precluded by
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA"). In
the alternative, RBC asserts that Plaintiffs do not plead
sufficient facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
dismissal is warranted where a plaintiff fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. When evaluating a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court assumes the facts in the
complaint to be true and construes all reasonable inferences from
those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

SLUSA

RBC argues that Plaintiffs' claim triggers SLUSA preclusion and
therefore must be dismissed.

RBC argues that the gravamen of Plaintiffs' claim is
misrepresentation, because RBC is alleged to have falsely
represented in an Options Client Agreement and Approval Form that,
if so instructed, RBC would not cause' Plaintiffs to invest funds
in RCNs. But RBC's forced reading of Plaintiffs' claim collapses
the distinction between breach of contract and fraud.

Under RBC's reasoning, any breach of contract claim would contain
a misrepresentation, namely, that one party was misled to believe
that the breaching party would actually perform the terms of the
contract. Such a characterization improperly reads an intent to
defraud into a cause of action that does not require it.
Plaintiffs do not allege that RBC secretly intended to breach the
contract when it was formed, and nothing about their allegations
suggests that misrepresentation hides in the substance of the
claim. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claim is not based on "a
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact."

RBC asserts that Plaintiffs characterize RCNs as deceptive
devices, by alleging that they are typically tied to a volatile
stock, which here exposed Plaintiffs to "'substantial risk'" while
RBC was guaranteed to make a profit. But Plaintiffs do not dispute
that RBC disclosed the risks associated with the RCNs, and their
Amended Complaint does not allege otherwise. Further, investment
companies are paid to facilitate investments with varying degrees
of risk. The mere fact that RBC was paid commissions for the sales
of the high-risk RCNs does not make its practices inherently
deceptive.

In sum, Plaintiffs' claim is distinct from those that have been
precluded under SLUSA.  Plaintiffs allege a contract with a
specific obligation on the part of RBC, and they allege that RBC
violated that obligation, breaching the contract.  Crucially, this
obligation is not an amorphous duty to be honest like the one that
doomed the claims in Kutten and Dudek. Kutten, 530 F.3d at 671.
Rather, Plaintiffs allege a specific obligation that RBC not sell
or purchase options without Plaintiffs' written authorization.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the third factor of the SLUSA
test for preemption has not been met.

For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' breach of
contract claim is not precluded by SLUSA.

Adequacy of Pleading

RBC asserts that Plaintiffs' allegations sound in fraud, and that
Plaintiffs must therefore meet the heightened pleading standards
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

RBC argues that Plaintiffs fail to meet either the 9(b) or the
8(a)(2) pleading standard, because the Amended Complaint does not
identify the RCNs they purchased, specify any recommendations made
(or the circumstances in which RBC 'caused' Plaintiffs to purchase
RCNs), instructions given, or the dates thereof.

RBC further argues that Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege the
elements of a breach of contract claim. In order to state a claim
for breach of contract, the plaintiff must show (1) formation of a
contract, (2) performance by plaintiff of any conditions precedent
to his right to demand performance by the defendant, and (3)
breach of the contract by defendant.

The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that: (1) they
formed contracts with RBC that indicated the instructions and
authorizations necessary for RBC to buy or sell options in
Plaintiffs' accounts; (2) Plaintiffs fully performed their
contractual obligations by paying RBC commissions or management
fees; (3) RBC breached the parties' contracts by issuing naked put
options without acquiring Plaintiffs' written authorizations, as
required by the contracts; and (4) RBC's actions caused Plaintiffs
to suffer damages.

Certainly, RBC construes the parties' agreements differently, but
Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the elements of a breach of
contract claim under Minnesota laws. To the extent that RBC
contends that Plaintiffs fail to plead the performance all
conditions precedent, Plaintiffs' allegations sufficiently
acknowledge their performance and RBC is free to assert in its
Answer any alleged deficiencies in this regard.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 18, 2017
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
http://tinyurl.com/yb673o3pfrom Leagle.com.

Gary Luis, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel E. Gustafson,
Gustafson Gluek PLLC.

Gary Luis, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel C. Hedlund --
dhedlund@gustafsongluek.com -- Gustafson Gluek PLLC, David A.
Goodwin, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Eric S. Taubel, Gustafson Gluek
PLLC, 120 South 6th Street, Suite 2600, Minneapolis, MN 55402,
Gregg Martin Fishbein -- gmfishbein@locklaw.com -- Lockridge
Grindal Nauen PLLP, Scott D. Hirsch, Scarlett & Hirsch, P.A., 7777
Glades Rd Ste 200, Boca Raton, FL, 33434-4150 pro hac vice &
Vernon J. Vander Weide -- vjvanderweide@locklaw.com -- Lockridge
Grindal Nauen PLLP.

Caryl Luis, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel E. Gustafson,
Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Daniel C. Hedlund, Gustafson Gluek PLLC,
David A. Goodwin, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Eric S. Taubel, Gustafson
Gluek PLLC, Gregg Martin Fishbein, Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP,
Scott D. Hirsch, Scarlett & Hirsch, P.A., pro hac vice & Vernon J.
Vander Weide, Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP.

Gary A. Mentz, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel E. Gustafson,
Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Daniel C. Hedlund, Gustafson Gluek PLLC,
David A. Goodwin, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Eric S. Taubel, Gustafson
Gluek PLLC, Gregg Martin Fishbein, Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP,
Scott D. Hirsch, Scarlett & Hirsch, P.A., pro hac vice & Vernon J.
Vander Weide, Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP.

Michael J. Vitse, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel E. Gustafson,
Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Daniel C. Hedlund, Gustafson Gluek PLLC,
David A. Goodwin, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Eric S. Taubel, Gustafson
Gluek PLLC, Gregg Martin Fishbein, Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP,
Scott D. Hirsch, Scarlett & Hirsch, P.A., pro hac vice & Vernon J.
Vander Weide, Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP.

Merri L. Vitse, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel E. Gustafson,
Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Daniel C. Hedlund, Gustafson Gluek PLLC,
David A. Goodwin, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Eric S. Taubel, Gustafson
Gluek PLLC, Gregg Martin Fishbein, Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP,
Scott D. Hirsch, Scarlett & Hirsch, P.A., pro hac vice & Vernon J.
Vander Weide, Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP.

RBC Capital Markets, LLC, Defendant, represented by Alex J. Kaplan
-- AJKAPLAN@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice, Andrew
W. Stern -- ASTERN@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice,
Clifford M. Greene -- cgreene@greeneespel.com -Greene Espel PLLP &
Sybil L. Dunlop -- sdunlop@greeneespel.com -- Greene Espel PLLP.


RETRIEVAL-MASTERS: Illegally Collects Debt, "Rafferty" Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
Cheryl Rafferty, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc. d/b/a RMCB
Collection Agency and John Does 1-25, Case No. 5:17-cv-00426-PGB-
PRL (M.D. Fla., September 20, 2017), seeks to stop the Defendant's
unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc. operates a medical
collection agency in Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael O. Massey, Esq.
      MASSEY & DUFFY, PLLC
      855 E University Ave
      Gainesville, FL 32601
      Telephone: (352) 505-8900
      Facsimile: (352) 414-5488
      E-mail: masseylaw@gmail.com


REVENUE FRONTIER: "Clough" Sues Over Illegal SMS Ads
----------------------------------------------------
Robert W. Clough, II on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Revenue Frontier, LLC and National Tax
Experts Inc., Defendants., Case No. 1:17-cv-00411 (D.N.H.,
September 13, 2017), seeks to enjoin Defendants and/or its
affiliates, agents, and/or other related entities, from violations
of the consumer-privacy provisions of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act. The suit further seeks damages and such other and
further relief.

National Tax Experts is a company that provides tax relief
services and relies on telemarketing to generate new clients.
Clough placed his cellular telephone number on the National Do Not
Call Registry in February of 2008, yet still received an automated
text message from the Defendants. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Roger B. Phillips, Esq.
     PHILLIPS LAW OFFICE, PLLC
     104 Pleasant Street
     Concord, NH 03301
     Tel: (603) 225-2767
     Fax: (603) 226-3581
     Email: roger@phillipslawoffice.com

            - and -

     Edward A. Broderick, Esq.
     Anthony I. Paronich, Esq.
     BRODERICK & PARONICH, P.C.
     99 High St., Suite 304
     Boston, MA 02110
     Tel: (508) 221-1510
     Email: anthony@broderick-law.com

            - and -

     Alex M. Washkowitz, Esq.
     Jeremy Cohen, Esq.
     CW LAW GROUP, P.C.
     188 Oaks Road
     Framingham, MA 01701
     Email: alex@cwlawgrouppc.com

            - and -

     Matthew P. McCue, Esq.
     THE LAW OFFICE OF MATTHEW P. MCCUE
     1 South A venue, Suite 3
     Natick, MA 01760
     Tel: (508) 655-1415
     Email: mmccue@massattorneys.net


SAGE GROUP: Faces "Sellers" Suit Over Failure to Pay Overtime
-------------------------------------------------------------
Torion Sellers and Renee Bell, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Sage Group PLC; Sage Software, Inc.;
and Sage Payment Solutions, Inc. d/b/a Sage North America, Case
No. 1:17-cv-03614-ODE (N.D. Ga., September 18, 2017), is brought
against the Defendants for failure to pay sales representatives'
overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Defendants sell software and cloud applications for
managing:  people and payroll, payment solutions, business
management and ERP through various products such as Sage one,
Sage x3, Sage 50, Sage 500, Sage Intacct, Sage People etc.,
as well as Timeslips. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Mitchell L. Feldman, Esq.
      MITCHELL L. FELDMAN ESQ. PA
      1201 N. Peachtree Street, NE
      400 Colony Square, #200
      Atlanta, GA 30361
      Telephone: (877) 946-8293
      Facsimile: (813) 639-9376
      E-mail: mlf@feldmanlegal.us
              mail@feldmanlegal.us


SCRIPPS NETWORKS: "Berg" Suit Alleges Securities Act Violation
--------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Berg, and all others similarly-situated v. Scripps Networks
Interactive, Inc., Gina L. Bianchini, Michael R. Costa, Philip I.
Kent, Kenneth W. Lowe, Donald E. Meihaus, Jarl Mohn, Richelle P.
Parham, Nicholas B. Paumgarten, Mary M. Peirce, Jeffrey Sagansky,
Wesley W. Scripps, Ronald W. Tysoe, Discovery Communications,
Inc., and Skylight Merger Sub Inc., Case No. 2:17-cv-00848 (S.D.
Ohio, September 27, 2017), is brought against the Defendants for
violations of Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On July 30, 2017, Scripps Networks Interactive, Inc.'s Board of
Directors caused the Company to enter into an agreement and plan
of merger with Discovery Communications, Inc. and Skylight Merger
Sub Inc.  Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement,
shareholders of Scripps will receive $90 per share, comprised of
$63 per share in cash and $27 per share in Class C common shares
of Discovery stock, for each share of Scripps common stock.  On
September 14, 2017, Defendants filed a Form S-4 Registration
Statement with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission in connection with the Proposed Transaction.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Registration Statement omits
material information with respect to the Proposed Transaction,
which renders the Registration Statement false and misleading.

The Plaintiff is an owner of Scripps common stock.

Defendant Scripps Networks is a developer of engaging lifestyle
content in the home, food, and travel categories for television,
the Internet, and emerging platforms.  The Company's lifestyle
media portfolio includes leading TV and entertainment brands HGTV,
Food Network, Travel Channel, DIY Network, Cooking Channel, and
Great American Country.

The Individual Defendants served as directors of Scripps.

Defendant Discovery Communications is an American mass media
company based in Silver Spring, Maryland. Skylight Merger is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Discovery. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      John C. Camillus, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF JOHN C.
      CAMILLUS, LLC
      P.O. Box 141410
      Columbus, OH 43214
      Tel: (614) 558-7254
      Fax: (614) 559-6731
      E-mail: jcamillus@camilluslaw.com

          - and -

      Brian D. Long, Esq.
      Gina M. Serra, Esq.
      RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
      2 Righter Parkway, Suite 120
      Wilmington, DE 19803
      Tel: (302) 295-5310


SHUTTERFLY INC: Lawsuit Tags Illinois as Battleground in Fight
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ally Marotti, writing for Chicago Tribune, reports that just as
Apple is pushing iPhone users to become more comfortable with
facial recognition software, a lawsuit highlighting privacy
concerns surrounding the burgeoning technology is moving forward
in federal court in Chicago.

The lawsuit against photo-sharing site Shutterfly, which seeks
class-action status, joins a string of suits here from consumers
around the country who have accused companies of mishandling their
biometric information, which includes facial, fingerprint and iris
scans.

As a result, Illinois has become a hotbed of legal activity
surrounding uses of the increasingly popular technology. The
state's Biometric Information Privacy Act is considered the
strictest law of its kind in the nation. The 2008 law mandates
that companies collecting such information obtain prior consent
from consumers, detailing how they'll use it and how long it will
be kept. It also allows private citizens to sue.

Companies of varying sizes have faced allegations involving
biometrics, from tech giants such as Facebook, Google and Snapchat
to grocery company Roundy's and InterContinental Hotels' Kimpton
chain. For Shutterfly, this isn't the first go-round.

The California-based company settled a lawsuit last year with an
Illinois man who alleged that his face ended up in Shutterfly's
database after a friend tagged him in an uploaded photo.
Settlement terms were not disclosed. The current suit that
Shutterfly sought to dismiss strikes a similar chord.

Alejandro Monroy, of Naples, Fla., has never used Shutterfly's
services, according to the lawsuit he filed late last year. But a
friend in Chicago uploaded a picture and tagged him in it.

When that happens, the lawsuit alleges, Shutterfly creates a map
of the person's face and stores that data. Since Monroy was not
informed this was happening, Shutterfly violated Illinois'
biometrics law, the suit alleges.

Biometric data include biological or physical characteristics, and
that's concerning to people because those are permanent, said
Christopher Dore, a partner at Chicago law firm Edelson who is not
involved in the Shutterfly lawsuit. If your identity is stolen,
you can get a new credit card, but if biometric data is hacked,
"you can't get a new face," Dore said. "You're stuck with it."

People are also concerned -- and rightfully so, Dore said -- about
what companies amassing databases of biometric information will do
with it.

With data mapping people's faces, companies could track customers
or employees using facial recognition, Dore said. For example,
security cameras could be outfitted with technology to be used for
marketing or criminal monitoring. Streaming apps could let people
scan passers-by on the street and find out details about them.
Those abilities could easily turn nefarious, he said.

"Once this info is loose, the possibilities are kind of endless,"
he said. "Technology for facial recognition being built into
cameras is not that hard to get your hands on. . . . It's going to
start showing up in more aspects of our lives."

Instead of the Touch ID that unlocks iPhone models with a user's
fingerprint, Apple said the iPhone X will use what it calls Face
ID. The phone's camera will deploy facial recognition technology
so "your face is now your password," according to Apple's website.

It recognizes changes in user appearance, like the addition of a
beard, glasses or hat. It's also "attention aware," according to
Apple, meaning it only unlocks the phone when a user looks toward
the device with eyes open.

To keep things secure, the maps of users' faces are encrypted. And
authentication happens on the device, not in the cloud.

Once Apple users get used to the new feature, facial recognition
software will seem more normal, Dore said.

"(People) are going to let their guard down in other consumer
situations," he said.

Dore's firm represents the plaintiffs in a similar case against
Facebook, which was condensed from multiple lawsuits filed in
Illinois in 2015 and moved to federal court in California. That
case is pending and seeking class-action status.

That has been one of the most-watched suits taking on the
biometrics issue. Three Illinois men allege Facebook was
collecting, storing and using biometric data without consent.
Facebook's attempt to get the lawsuit dismissed was denied. Some
say these types of lawsuits allege damage without evidence of
actual harm.

These cases will likely keep coming, at least until there is a
binding precedent, said Matthew Kugler, an assistant professor at
Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, who has published
work on privacy policies related to biometrics.

Additionally, as biometrics integrate further into daily life,
there is a fear of the unknown, Kugler said. "When you watch all
the dystopian sci-fi movies and as you step off the train you see
the ad tailor to you because the camera knows it's you, that isn't
crazy," he said. "That's what's happening when you open websites."

Companies are deploying biometrics outside of facial recognition
software as well. Employers are using biometric timekeeping
devices for accuracy and touting the scanning of certain body
parts as an additional security measure.

Unlike Illinois, other states have laws that let only the attorney
general bring a suit.

Vast sums of money are at stake in these cases, Kugler said.

In the Shutterfly case, the plaintiff asks the court to award
statutory damages of $5,000 for each violation of the biometrics
law, such as tagging someone in a photo, or $1,000 for each
negligent violation.

Shutterfly sought to have the case dismissed, claiming that
Illinois' biometric law does not apply to data gleaned from
photographs, according to court documents. It's a sensible
argument "at first blush," Judge Joan Gottschall wrote in her
ruling, one she noted that Google and Facebook also made in
attempts to have lawsuits against them dismissed. But in each of
those cases, the argument was rejected.

Representatives from Shutterfly and attorneys representing Monroy
did not respond to requests for comment.

This case could help decide whether companies need consent from
people before subjecting their photos to facial recognition, said
Adam Schwartz, a senior lawyer at San Francisco-based Electronic
Frontier Foundation. The digital rights group supports laws like
the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act.

"We're playing a long game," he said. "I think companies will find
the sky is not going to fall. They'll be able to provide the
services they provide and get consent." [GN]


SOUTHGOBI RESOURCES: Appeals Court Clarifies Leave Requirements
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ontario's highest court has ruled a lower court justice erred in
not denying leave to proceed with a class action against
representatives of a mining company, in a decision the lawyer for
the plaintiff called important for securities law.

In Rahimi v. SouthGobi Resources Ltd., 2017 ONCA 719, the Ontario
Court of Appeal overruled an earlier decision by Justice Edward P.
Belobaba of the Superior Court of Justice (Rahimi v. SouthGobi
Resources Ltd., 2015 ONSC 5948) which allowed a class action
lawsuit to proceed against SouthGobi Resources but not several
company representatives.

SouthGobi Resources (SGR) is a publicly-traded energy firm that
had coal-mining interests in Mongolia. In 2013, the company made a
change to its accounting standards which led to a restatement of
its earnings, resulting in a significant change to its reported
gross revenue and an 18 per cent drop in stock prices. At the
time, the company said there was "a material weakness in the
company's internal controls over the financial reporting" and "the
previous financial information provided by the company in respect
of the periods to be covered by the restated financials are no
longer accurate and should not be relied upon."

The putative class action, led by shareholder Paiman Rahimi, was
for all purchasers of SGR shares between Mar. 30, 2011 and Nov.
17, 2013. Rahimi sought leave under s. 138.8(1) of the Securities
Act to proceed with a misrepresentation claim against both
SouthGobi Resources and the individual respondents.

On the motion for leave, SGR and the individual respondents took
what the Court of Appeal described as a "very unusual position,"
relying on the defence of reasonable investigative efforts
afforded to them by s. 138.4(6)(a) of the Securities Act, which
says "a person or company is not liable in an action . . . in
relation to a misrepresentation if that person or company proves
that before the release of the document or the making of the
public oral statement containing the misrepresentation, the person
or company conducted or caused to be conducted a reasonable
investigation, and at the time of the release of the document or
the making of the public oral statement, the person or company had
no reasonable grounds to believe that the document or public oral
statement contained the misrepresentation."

SGR said at this point the financial statements during the class
period did not need to be restated and that SGR had no material
weaknesses in its internal financial reporting controls. They said
the restatement was undertaken not because of any securities law
requirement, but due to pressure from external sources.

Justice Belobaba said the misrepresentation claim should proceed
because it had a reasonable possibility of success. He then turned
to the reasonable investigation defence, and did not grant leave
against the individual respondents because he held there was no
reasonable possibility that they would not be able to establish a
reasonable investigation defence at trial under the Securities
Act.

Rahimi then appealed the decision, with SGR bringing a separate
appeal against the ruling granting leave.

The Court of Appeal noted the appeals raise two issues for
determination: one, did the motion judge err in denying leave
against the individual respondents; and two, did the motion judge
err in granting leave against SGR.

"I answer the first issue in the affirmative and the second issue
in the negative," the court said.

Justice C. William Hourigan, who authored the unanimous decision,
said the "primary error made by the motion judge was treating the
leave motion as if it were a trial in which he had to finally
resolve significant credibility issues on the record before him."
Justice Hourigan was joined by Justices Gloria Epstein and David
M. Paciocco in his decision.

"The motion judge failed to give meaningful consideration to gaps
in the evidentiary record and the significant credibility issues
apparent from that record," the court said. "In particular, he
failed to consider compelling evidence that contradicted the
defence narrative offered by SGR and the individual respondents."

The appeal court said a motion judge's duty to scrutinize the
entire record is "not restricted to a review of the evidence filed
on the motion."

"The motion judge is also obligated to consider what evidence is
not before her," the court said. "She must be cognizant of the
fact that, at the leave stage, full production has not been made
and the defendant may have relevant documentation that has not
been produced or relevant evidence that has not been tendered.
Consideration of these evidential limitations of the leave stage
is important because they can work to the prejudice of plaintiffs
who have potentially meritorious claims."

Justice Hourigan said the motion judge also erred by treating the
motion as a "mini-trial in which his function was to determine
contentious issues of credibility."

"In the face of the limited record and significant credibility
issues, the proper course for the motion judge was not to do the
best he could on the available record, treating the motion as if
it were a mini-trial," the court said. "Rather, the lack of a
clear record makes evident that the leave must be granted because
there is no certainty that the reasonable investigation defence
will succeed. He compounded that error by conducting a review of
the credibility issues that failed to properly consider the gaps
in the evidence and the evidence that conflicts with the contents
of the affidavits filed on the leave motion."

The court said "when a corporation says in its continuous
disclosure that its financial statements cannot be relied upon and
that there is a material weakness in its internal financial
reporting controls, this is powerful evidence that strongly
contradicts a defence of reasonable investigation."

"I agree with Rahimi's submission that the factors relied upon by
the motion judge as militating in favour of granting leave to
proceed against SGR -- a failure to use or the misuse of reliable
available information, the admission of compromised internal
financial reporting controls and the lack of explanation from
management about the restatement -- are equally applicable on the
issue of leave to proceed as against the individual respondents,"
Justice Hourigan said.

But Justice Hourigan then pointed out what he called a "further,
and more troubling flaw in the motion judge's reasons," which he
said arises from the unusual facts of the case.

"The decision to deny leave . . . is inconsistent with the
fundamental policies underlying securities regulation, including
protection of the investing public and maintaining the integrity
of capital markets," he said. "At the heart of the submissions
made by SGR and the individual respondents is the rather
remarkable proposition that they should be permitted to evade a
potentially meritorious action at the leave stage because they
previously made material misrepresentations during a restatement
process about their company but they are now telling the truth
about the same issue."

Justice Hourigan said there was "no room for prevarication or
double-talk" when it comes to securities regulation.

"Continuous disclosure obligations are not a shell game where
investors are left to guess where the truth lies," he wrote.
"Investors have a right to know a corporation's true state of
affairs. In my view, the motion judge failed to consider this
policy imperative and rendered a decision with respect to the
individual respondents that is inconsistent with basic notions of
securities regulation."

Michael Robb of Siskinds LLP, who represented the plaintiff in the
case, called the decision "important because it clarifies an
important test for leave for plaintiffs in securities cases."

"These motions aren't a trial," he said. "It isn't just about
deciding on the issue in the case before you, it's about in part
deciding whether there is a reasonable possibility of success
given what hasn't been put forward."

Robb said an important part of the argument he made was "there was
a lot of material missing which was necessary for the defendants
to establish their reasonable investigation defence."

"That's a burden that rests on the defendants rather than the
plaintiffs," he said. "There's a lot of material the court needs
before it in order to adequately determine the defence to a level
of certainty required at this stage."

Robb noted the court used some "fairly strong language" in the
decision.

"They made a restatement in which any sort of typical reader of
the company's disclosure would say they made an error and they
made a restatement in order to correct the error. And in response
to litigation they said no, there was never an error and that was
not the purpose for which we made the restatement," he said. "And
so Justice Hourigan called them on the carpet for that and said
well, this case is about disclosure and you're saying the
disclosure that the plaintiffs have sued on is fine but your other
disclosure is not accurate."

John Campion of Gardiner Roberts LLP, who represented SouthGobi
Resources, declined to comment for this article. [GN]


SPIRIT AIRLINES: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss $9 Fare Club Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida issued an Opinion granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned SPIRIT AIRLINES, INC., Plaintiff, v. STEVEN
MAIZES, et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-61086-BLOOM/Valle (S.D.
Fla.), and denying as moot the Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction to Stay Class Arbitration Proceedings.

Defendants filed an arbitration claim against Spirit Airlines with
the American Arbitration Association in Broward County, Florida,
purporting to represent a class of consumers who paid a fee to
join Spirit Airlines' $9 Fare Club.  The $9 Fare Club is a
discount program allowing Spirit Airlines passengers to pay a fee
for access to reduced air fares and other discounted items.  In
the arbitration action, which is currently pending, Defendants
each of whom enrolled in the $9 Fare Club allege
misrepresentations in the $9 Fare Club Terms and Conditions that
is posted on Spirit Airlines' website.

Spirit Airlines initiated the action by filing a Complaint against
Defendants seeking injunctive and declaratory relief -- namely, a
stay of the arbitration action and a declaration that (i) the
Agreement's arbitration clause does not authorize class action
arbitration claims against Spirit Airlines, and (ii) the
arbitration action is pre-empted by federal law.

The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Section 1, et seq., which
applies to contracts that evidence transactions involving
interstate commerce, provides that contractual arbitration
agreements will be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.  The FAA's primary purpose is to ensure that private
agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.

With respect to class arbitration, a party may not be compelled
under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a
contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.
In finding that the Agreement does establish the parties' clear
and unmistakable delegation to the arbitrator the question of
whether the Agreement allows for class arbitration, the Court
finds most persuasive the approach taken by the Fifth Circuit in
Reed v. Florida Metropolitan University, Inc., 681 F.3d 630 (5th
Cir. 2012).

In Reed, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether the district court
erred in allowing an arbitrator to determine whether the parties
had agreed to class arbitration pursuant to their arbitration
agreement, which explicitly adopted the AAA's Commercial Rules.
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by observing that the AAA's
Commercial Rules do not contain class arbitration procedures.
Rather, the collective AAA Rules which explicitly govern the
Agreement in this case include various rules governing specific
actions Rules) and separate Supplementary Rules for Class
Arbitration (Supplementary Rules), which were enacted after the
Supreme Court's decision in Bazzle. Reed, 681 F.3d at 634.  By
their plain terms, these Supplementary Rules apply to any dispute
arising out of an agreement that provides for arbitration pursuant
to any of the rules of the  AAA where a party submits a dispute to
arbitration on behalf of or against a class or purported class,
and shall supplement any other applicable AAA rules.

Observing that commentators and AAA arbitral tribunals have
consistently concluded that consent to any of the AAA's
substantive rules also constitutes consent to the Supplementary
Rules, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the parties agreement to
the AAA's Commercial Rules also constitutes consent to the
Supplementary Rules.

The Court finds highly persuasive the Fifth Circuit's view in Reed
that inclusion of any of the AAA Rules in an arbitration agreement
necessarily incorporates the Supplementary Rules, which in turn
specifically delegate the class arbitrability issue to the
arbitrator.  Furthermore, as alluded to by the Third Circuit in
Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746
(3d Cir. 2016), the Court believes that the Eleventh Circuit, if
squarely confronted with the issue, would follow suit with the
Fifth Circuit's Reed decision to the extent that it has not
already done so.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the parties Agreement, through
its adoption of the AAA Rules, clearly and unmistakably delegated
to the arbitrator the question of whether the Agreement allows for
class arbitration.  And because the parties have contracted around
the default rule that the Court rule on the class arbitrability
issue, it is unnecessary for the Court to reach the secondary
issue of whether Defendants may, pursuant to the Agreement, pursue
their claims against Spirit Airlines through class arbitration.
Indeed, it would be improper for the Court to do so.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 18, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/ycztor2vfrom Leagle.com.

Spirit Airlines, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Cristopher
Stephen Rapp -- csrapp@kklaw.com -- Kelley Kronenberg

Spirit Airlines, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Jimmy Wayne Mintz
-- jmintz@kklaw.com -- Kelley Kronenberg & Irwin R. Gilbert --
igilbert@kklaw.com -- Irwin R. Gilbert, P.A..

Steven Maizes, Defendant, represented by David Rosenberg-Wohl --
david@hrw-law.com  --  Hershenson Rosenberg-Wohl, P.C., pro hac
vice, Patrick C. Cooper, Ward & Wilson, LLC, 2100 Southbridge
Parkway, Suite 580, Birmingham, Alabama 35209, pro hac vice &
Victor Manuel Diaz, Jr., VM Diaz and Partners, LLC.

Vincent Anzalone, Defendant, represented by David Rosenberg-Wohl,
Hershenson Rosenberg-Wohl, P.C., pro hac vice, Patrick C. Cooper,
Ward & Wilson, LLC, pro hac vice & Victor Manuel Diaz, Jr., VM
Diaz and Partners, LLC.

Lee Traylor, Defendant, represented by David Rosenberg-Wohl,
Hershenson Rosenberg-Wohl, P.C., pro hac vice, Patrick C. Cooper,
Ward & Wilson, LLC, pro hac vice & Victor Manuel Diaz, Jr., VM
Diaz and Partners, LLC.

Howard Madenberg, Defendant, represented by David Rosenberg-Wohl,
Hershenson Rosenberg-Wohl, P.C., pro hac vice, Patrick C. Cooper,
Ward & Wilson, LLC, pro hac vice & Victor Manuel Diaz, Jr., VM
Diaz and Partners, LLC.


STATES RECOVERY: Illegally Collects Debt, "Caldera" Suit Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
Armando Caldera, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. States Recovery Systems, Inc. and Does 1-10,
inclusive, Case No. BC676244 (Cal. Super. Ct., September 18,
2017), arises as a result of false, deceptive, and unfair debt-
collection practice promulgated by the Defendants in their
collection letter campaign wherein the Defendants misrepresents
consumer and debtor rights.

States Recovery Systems, Inc. is a company that uses any
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in its
business, the principal purpose of which is the collection of any
debts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
      Meghan E. George, Esq.
      Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
      Thomas E. Wheeler, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
      324 S. Beverly Dr., #725
      Beverly Hills, CA 90212
      Telephone: (877) 206-4741
      Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
      E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
              abacon@toddflaw.com
              mgeorge@toddflaw.com
              twheeler@toddflaw.com


TGI FRIDAY'S: Agrees to Settle Wage Suit for More Than $19MM
------------------------------------------------------------
Lisa Fickenscher, writing for New York Post, reports that TGI
Friday's is finally ready to pay up.

The 52-year-old restaurant chain has agreed to pay a whopping
$19.1 million to settle accusations that it chronically underpaid
its servers, bussers, runners and bartenders for years, according
to a court filing.

The proposed settlement -- which would result in the largest wage
and hour payout ever, according to industry experts -- is the
culmination of more than three years of class-action litigation in
the US Southern District of New York.

Alleged violations at TGI Friday's included skimping on overtime
wages, forcing tipped workers to share their earnings with non-
tipped workers and not keeping proper wage records.

Some 28,000 former workers are entitled to get a piece of the
payout in the settlement with Carlson Restaurants Inc., which
owned TGI Friday's at the time of the alleged violations,
according to court documents filed Tuesday.

The total value of the unpaid wages, court papers show, was
allegedly as high as $91 million.

"The settlement, if approved, will eliminate the risk and delay of
years of further litigation and put money in the hands of the low-
wage workers who earned it," the plaintiffs wrote in a court
document that was unopposed by Carlson.

Carlson, a privately held company which owns some 1,300 hotels
including the Radisson chain, was sued in 2014 over the TGI
Friday's wage flap by a dozen employees in nine states. It sold
TGI Friday's in 2014 to Sentinel Capital partners and TriArtisan
Capital Partners.

As reported by The Post, Carlson for years tried to dodge a
massive settlement by paying off potential plaintiffs who tried to
join the lawsuit. As of January 2015, Friday's had paid out
$416,000 in settlement money to 19 workers, according to a
plaintiffs' attorney at the time.

Some workers took as little as $2,500 to go away, although one
received an $82,000 payment, plaintiffs' attorney Justin Swartz
said at the time, likening the payoffs to "a game of Whac-A-Mole."

There are 900 TGI Friday's restaurants in 60 countries, according
the company's web site.

"This case highlights the extraordinary scope of wage theft in the
restaurant industry," said Louis Pechman, a restaurant labor
attorney who wasn't involved in the case.

The settlement, subject to court approval, was revealed on
September 21 after being reached late last week, court papers
show.

Plaintiffs' attorneys declined to comment, and TGI Friday's did
not immediately respond for comment. Reps for Sentinel Capital and
TriArtisan also didn't respond to requests for comment. [GN]


TINTRI INC: Faces "Tuller" Suit Over Misleading Fin'l Reports
-------------------------------------------------------------
Lance Tuller, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Tintri, Inc., Ken Klein, and Ian Halifax, Case No.
2:17-cv-06857 (C.D. Cal., September 18, 2017), alleges that the
Defendants made false and misleading statements, as well as failed
to disclose material adverse facts about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects. Specifically, the Defendants made false
and misleading statements and failed to disclose that: (1) the
Company experienced distraction, disruption, and sales attrition
during its IPO; and (2) as a result, the Defendants' statements
about the Company's business, operations, and prospects were
materially false and misleading and lacked a reasonable basis at
all relevant times.
Tintri, Inc. develops and markets an enterprise cloud platform
combining cloud management software technology and a range of all-
flash storage systems for virtualized and cloud environments in
the United States and internationally. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
      THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
      355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2450
      Los Angeles, CA 90071
      Telephone: (213) 785-2610
      Facsimile: (213) 226-4684
      E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com


TORRANCE MEMORIAL: Faces "Balaceanu" Suit Over Alleged Data Beach
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ecaterina Balaceanu, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. Torrance Memorial Medical Center and Does 1-10,
inclusive, Case No. BC676226 (Cal. Super. Ct., September 18,
2017), arises out of the data breach that allowed unauthorized
access to two email accounts containing sensitive personal
information including names, dates of birth, address information,
telephone numbers, medical record numbers, Social Security
numbers, health insurance information, and other
clinical/diagnostic information of thousands of patients at
Torrance Memorial Medical Center.

Torrance Memorial Medical Center owns and manages 44 healthcare
facilities in California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Scott B. Cooper, Esq.
      Samantha A. Smith, Esq.
      THE COOPER LAW FIRM, P.C.
      4000 Barranca Parkway, Suite 250
      Irvine, CA 92604
      Telephone: (949) 724-9200
      Facsimile: (949) 724-9255
      E-mail: scott@cooper-finn.com
              samantha@cooper-firm.com


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: 9th Cir. May Wait for SCOTUS Ruling on Waivers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Weissner, writing for Reuters, reports that a federal
appeals court on September 20 suggested it may wait for the U.S.
Supreme Court to decide if class action waivers in employment
agreements are unlawful before it rules on Uber Technologies
Inc.'s claim that arbitration agreements signed by its drivers are
valid because they had the choice to opt out.

At an hour-long oral argument, three judges on the 9th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco asked lawyers for Uber,
drivers who filed four separate lawsuits against the ride-hailing
giant, and the National Labor Relations Board to explain why the
court should resolve the opt-out question now, since it could be
mooted if the Supreme Court says class action waivers are lawful.
[GN]


UNITED AIR: BC Court Affirms Denial of Fuel Surcharge Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Robin Reinertson, Esq. -- robin.reinertson@blakes.com -- and
Joshua Hutchinson, Esq. -- joshua.hutchinson@blakes.com -- of
Blake Cassels & Graydon LLP, in an article for Lexology, wrote
that on September 12, 2017, the British Columbia Court of Appeal
(Court) affirmed the refusal to certify a class proceeding against
various airlines regarding the description of fuel surcharges in
Simsek v. United Airlines, Inc. (also referred to as Unlu v. Air
Canada) (Unlu). The plaintiffs alleged that the airlines
improperly characterized fuel surcharges as "taxes" or "taxes and
fees" on ticket receipts and sought restitution for unjust
enrichment by the defendant airlines. The Court of Appeal upheld
the B.C. Supreme Court's decision that the plaintiffs had not
shown that the requirements for certification under section 4(1)
of the Class Proceedings Act (CPA) were met, because the proposed
common issues could not be resolved without individualized
inquiries.

CERTIFICATION DECISION

On the certification application, the plaintiffs in Unlu alleged
that collecting fuel surcharges under a code on the ticket receipt
described as "taxes" or "taxes and fees" was a deceptive act or
practice contrary to the Business Practices and Consumer
Protection Act (BPCPA). They also alleged that their contracts
with the airlines did not entitle the airlines to retain any
amounts described as "taxes" or "taxes and fees", giving rise to
the plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment relating to the fuel
surcharges. The airlines argued, among other things, that the
processes for purchasing airline tickets are diverse. Notably,
none of the plaintiffs' tickets were purchased directly from the
airlines and none of the ticket receipts with allegedly deceptive
statements were airline documents. Instead, these tickets were
purchased from travel agencies and the airlines asserted that they
had no control over the ticket receipt practices at the travel
agency level.

The application judge dismissed the application for certification,
holding that the requirements of section 4(1) of the CPA had not
been met. In particular, Justice Adair found that the plaintiffs
had not adequately pleaded claims for damages under section 171 of
the BPCPA, for a restoration order under section 172(3)(a) of the
BPCPA, or for restitution arising from unjust enrichment. She also
concluded that sections 4(1)(c) and (d) of the CPA -- requiring
that there be common issues and that a class proceeding be the
preferable procedure -- were not met. For more information, see
our August 2015 Blakes Bulletin: Takeoff Denied for Airline Fuel
Surcharge Class Action.

                              Appeal

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's decision. On
appeal, the plaintiffs abandoned their claims under the BPCPA and
pursued only their claims for unjust enrichment. Hence, the only
issue before the Court was whether the unjust enrichment claims
ought to be certified as class proceedings.

While the Court agreed that the claims in unjust enrichment had
not been properly pleaded, it did not affirm the certification
decision on that basis. The Court stated that the plaintiffs had
not adequately articulated their theory that the contracts between
them and the airlines did not authorize fuel surcharges. However,
the Court declined to conclude that causes of action in unjust
enrichment could not be properly set out in amended pleadings.

Instead, the Court relied upon, and agreed with, the finding by
the application judge that the plaintiffs failed to show that
there were common issues meriting certification. The proposed
common issue that was the "linchpin" of the plaintiffs' unjust
enrichment claims -- whether the airlines charged fuel surcharges
under the guise of taxes payable to a third party when in fact the
airlines retained those amounts for their own use -- could not be
dealt with commonly without individual enquiries. The Court found
that it would need to be determined whether the sellers acted as
authorized agents for the airlines when the class members
purchased their tickets, which would require individualized
investigation. Further, because the evidence showed that the forms
of receipt differed (some receipts labelled the disputed charge
codes as "taxes", some as "taxes and fees", and some referenced
"charges" in addition to taxes), individualized inquiry would be
necessary to determine the form of receipt that each class member
received. The proposed common issues were either pointless or
riddled with individual issues, meaning section 4(1)(c) of the CPA
was not satisfied.

The Court's decision in Unlu affirms that common issues must truly
be common. Where the proposed common issues are incapable of being
resolved unless they are preceded by individualized inquiry, class
certification will be inappropriate. There must be sufficient
commonalities among the class members before common issues will be
recognized and class certification granted. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Dingles Files Suit Over Civil Rights Act Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Dingler and Ashton Dingler, on behalf of themselves and all
persons similarly situated v. James N. Hatten, Judge Justin S.
Anand, Judge Amy Totenberg, Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch, Judge
Jerome Farris, The United States, Inc., The United States, United
States, Inc., United States, and D.C. Organic Act of 1871 or Any
pseudo name of 28 USC 3002(15)(A), Case No. 1:17-cv-03632-AT (N.D.
Ga., September 20, 2017), is brought against the Defendants for
violation of the Civil Rights Act.

Joseph Dingler and Ashton Dingler are pro se plaintiffs.


WASHINGTON: Court Denies Prisoners' Class Certification Move
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, issued an Order denying Plaintiff's Motion
for Class Certification in the case captioned DANIEL HALDANE,
WENDEL JOHNSON, TIMOTHY MARTIN, and LEESHAWN REDIC, Plaintiffs, v.
G. STEVEN HAMMOND, M.D., Chief Medical Officer of the Washington
State Department of Corrections, and DAN PACHOLKE, Secretary of
the Washington State Department of Corrections, in their official
capacities, Defendants, No. 15-CV-1810 (W.D. Wash.).

Plaintiffs are prisoners in the custody of the Washington
Department of Corrections  (Complaint). DOC's healthcare services
are subject to the Offender Health Plan (OHP). Plaintiffs each
have ailments for which their providers submitted requests to the
CRC for specific treatment.  The CRC denied treatment, and
Plaintiffs claim that the refusals lead to their continued
suffering from severe pain and limitations on daily living.
Plaintiffs argue that the CRC is unreasonably denying care not
just to the named plaintiffs but to an entire class of inmates.

Plaintiffs propose that the Court certify the following class:

     All current and future prisoners, incarcerated under the
jurisdiction of the Washington Department of Corrections, whose
access to necessary medical care has been denied, or will be
subject to denial, under the Department's policies and practices
governing access to health care requiring prior approval.

Commonality

Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule
23(a). Plaintiffs rely on Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir.
2014), to show that their allegations satisfy Rule 23 and to urge
this Court to grant class certification. Though the Court agrees
that Parsons is on point in this matter, the Court disagrees that
Parsons aids the Plaintiffs in their arguments.

Plaintiffs in this case attempt to bring what they believe are
similar claims against DOC. Like in Parsons, Plaintiffs' claims
are grounded in the Eighth Amendment. Though the Court does not
expressly analyze the merits of the claims at this stage in
litigation, it must briefly consider the nature of the underlying
claims to properly analyze whether the claims meet Rule 23(a)'s
commonality requirement. Accordingly, the Court reiterates that
Plaintiffs' carry the burden to prove that Defendants were
"deliberately indifferent to policies and practices that expose
inmates to a substantial risk of serious harm.

In contrast to the plaintiffs in Parsons, Plaintiffs in this case
have not adequately identified common policies and practices to
show that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to inmates'
needs. Without proving a common set of policies and practices
exist, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden under Rule
23(a)(2). Plaintiffs specifically identify four questions of law
and fact that they claim are common to the class. These questions
have their own common theme: whether the CRC systematically and
unreasonably denies Level 2 claims.

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs outline the CRC meetings in which
members spend one to two hours reviewing dozens of cases.
Plaintiffs explain that many CRC members are not as familiar with
the areas of medicine as the patients' treating physicians and on
many occasions have not had the opportunity to physically examine
the patient. Plaintiffs claim that these faults are evidence of
deliberate indifference.

To support their motion, Plaintiffs include various declarations,
deposition excerpts, and an expert report attempting to illustrate
that the care afforded to DOC prisoners is subpar. By way of
example, Plaintiffs include an exchange between DOC physicians in
which one physician remarks that DOC physicians walk a fine line
between medical necessity in the OHP and what would be a charge of
medical malpractice on the outside.

Plaintiffs' expert, Todd Wilcox, opined on the inadequacy of the
CRC to make educated judgments as to medical necessity for many of
the treatment regimens proposed by prisoners' treating physicians.
Dr. Wilcox targeted the CRC's lack of specialized care and failure
to defer to treating physicians as a deviation from the standard
of care in healthcare.

The Plaintiffs specifically request that the Court certify a class
action based upon the policies and procedures of the CRC, but they
have failed to meet their burden under Rule 23(a)'s commonality
requirement. Accordingly, the Court need not analyze Rule 23(a)'s
other requirements.

Based on these, the Court denies Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification. This Order renders Mr. Wilton's motion to intervene
moot. The Court further denies Defendants' motion to strike
portions of Plaintiffs' reply.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 18, 2017 Order
is available at http://tinyurl.com/y92ml8ygfrom Leagle.com.

Daniel Haldane, Plaintiff, represented by David J. Whedbee --
davidw@mhb.com -- MACDONALD HOAGUE & BAYLESS.

Daniel Haldane, Plaintiff, represented by Hank L. Balson, PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW GROUP, 705 2nd Avenue Suite 1000, Seattle, WA 98104,
Jesse Andrew Wing, MACDONALD HOAGUE & BAYLESS, 1500 Hoge Building
705 Second Avenue Seattle, Washington 98104,  Nicholas Brian
Allen, COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES, Nicholas Broten Straley, COLUMBIA
LEGAL SERVICES & Rhona Taylor, COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES, 101 Yesler
Way Ste 300, Seattle, WA, 98104-2528

Wendel Johnson, Plaintiff, represented by David J. Whedbee,
MACDONALD HOAGUE & BAYLESS, Hank L. Balson, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
GROUP, Jesse Andrew Wing, MACDONALD HOAGUE & BAYLESS, Nicholas
Brian Allen, COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES & Nicholas Broten Straley,
COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES.

Timothy Martin, Plaintiff, represented by David J. Whedbee,
MACDONALD HOAGUE & BAYLESS, Hank L. Balson, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
GROUP, Jesse Andrew Wing, MACDONALD HOAGUE & BAYLESS, Nicholas
Brian Allen, COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES & Nicholas Broten Straley,
COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES.

Leeshawn Redic, Plaintiff, represented by David J. Whedbee,
MACDONALD HOAGUE & BAYLESS, Hank L. Balson, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
GROUP, Jesse Andrew Wing, MACDONALD HOAGUE & BAYLESS, Nicholas
Brian Allen, COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES & Nicholas Broten Straley,
COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES.

G Steven Hammond, MD, Defendant, represented by Aaron Michael
Williams, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Candie M. Dibble, ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF WASHINGTON & Timothy Norman Lang, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
OFFICE.

Dan Pacholke, Defendant, represented by Aaron Michael Williams,
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Candie M. Dibble, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
WASHINGTON & Timothy Norman Lang, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.
Reginald Wayne Wilton, Intervenor, Pro Se.


WELLS FARGO: Hightower Sues Over Employment Discrimination
----------------------------------------------------------
FRANK HIGHTOWER On behalf of himself and all other similarly
situated persons v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Case No. 2:17-cv-
04119-GAM (E.D. Pa., September 14, 2017), alleges that Wells Fargo
has engaged in a company-wide pattern and practice of employment
discrimination on the basis of race and retaliation against the
Plaintiff and a class of similarly situated Black/African
Americans employees and former employees.

Wells Fargo's discriminatory practices include discrimination in
recruitment, hiring, promotion, transfer, job assignment, and
compensation, Mr. Hightower alleges.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., is an American international banking and
financial services institution headquartered in San Francisco,
California.  Wells Fargo is the third largest banking institution
in the United States by total assets of $1,930 trillion.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zakia E. Moore, Esq.
          J. Edward McCain III, Esq.
          McCAIN LAW, P.C.
          1515 Market Street, Suite 1200
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (215) 236-1086
          E-mail: zmoore@mccain-law.com
                  jmccain@mccain-law.com


WEMAKEPRICE INC: "Hueng" Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime
---------------------------------------------------------
Heung Joo Han, Jong Min Koh, in behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated Plaintiffs, v. WEMAKEPRICE INC., Shoplog
Holdings Inc., I-Shoplog LLC Eun-Sang Park, Heo Min, Joon Ahn,
Kwan Suk Moon, John Doe and Jane Doe 1-10 and ABC Corp. 1-10,
Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-07077, (D.N.J., September 13, 2017),
seeks compensation for all unpaid overtime wages, emotional
distress, loss of wages, restitution, declaratory and injunctive
relief, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs
and any other relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act, New
Jersey Wage and Hour Law and the New Jersey Wage Payment Law.

Defendants operate an e-commerce site under the name "Wemap,"
where plaintiffs worked at their warehouse in East Rutherford NJ.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael S. Kimm, Esq.
      KIMM LAW FIRM
      333 Sylvan Avenue, Suite 106
      Englewood Cliffs, NJ 07632
      Tel: (201) 569-2880

             - and -

      Seang Han (Aaron) Shin, Esq.
      SHIN & JUNG LLP
      2400 Lemoine Ave, Suite 204
      Fort Lee, NJ 07024
      Tel: (201) 482-8095


WEST VIRGINIA: Judge Gives Water Crisis Settlement Prelim Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
Ken Ward Jr., writing for Charleston Gazette Mail, reports that
Kanawha Valley residents, businesses and workers will soon be able
to file claims to seek their share of the $151 million settlement
of the class-action lawsuit over the January 2014 water crisis,
under an order issued on September 21 afternoon by the federal
judge overseeing the case.

U.S. District Judge John T. Copenhaver Jr. issued a 17-page order
in which he gave preliminary approval to the deal with West
Virginia American Water Co. and Eastman Chemical Co. Copenhaver
said that the settlement is "sufficiently fair, reasonable and
adequate."

The judge's preliminary approval starts the process for a formal
public notice of the settlement terms, for members of the lawsuit
class to have their say about those terms or even "opt out" of the
deal, and for formal claims to be filed and eventually paid.

Electronic filing of claims will start within a few weeks, and the
formal public notice, including a simple claim form, will be
mailed to class members starting on Oct. 11, according to lawyers
in the case.

"I think this is an extraordinarily beneficial result for the
community," said Stuart Calwell, one of the lawyers for the
plaintiff class. "It's going to put dollars in people's pockets."

Residents, businesses and workers can get more information about
the settlement by visiting the website
http://wvwaterlitigation.comor by calling the settlement
administrator at (855) 829-8121.

Anthony Majestro, another lawyer for the residents, said that
distribution of the settlement funds will not start until the
settlement received final approval, following a hearing that
Copenhaver scheduled for Jan. 11, and after the deadline for
claims to be filed, which the judge's order set for Feb. 21.

"We're very pleased that the judge entered the order preliminarily
approving the settlement, and we look forward to receiving and
processing claims so that the class members can receive
compensation for their losses," Majestro said.

Under the settlement, residential households will be able to file
a simple claim form and obtain $550 for the first resident and
$180 for each additional resident. Residents can also file more
detailed information about their losses -- for things such as
bottled water or replacement of appliances -- if they provide some
proof of those expenditures.

Businesses can likewise obtain flat payments, based on their size,
or can submit documentation of specific losses to have those
recouped. The settlement also provides additional payments to
women who were pregnant at the time of the spill, residents who
had medical expenses, and hourly-wage earners who lost money when
businesses they worked in closed during the water crisis.

The amended settlement comes 11 months after the parties agreed,
on the eve of trial, to general terms of a deal to resolve the
complicated case over the region's ability to use its tap water
during the "do not use" order period that followed the
contamination of the Elk River supply by a spill of Crude MCHM and
other chemicals from the Freedom Industries facility just 1.5
miles upstream from the water company intake. In August, the
lawyers filed an amended version of the settlement, in an effort
to address a variety of concerns raised by Copenhaver about the
initial deal.

In the case, lawyers for residents and businesses had alleged that
West Virginia American did not adequately prepare for or respond
to the spill and that MCHM-maker Eastman did not properly warn
Freedom of the dangers of its chemical or take any action when
Eastman officials learned that the Freedom facility was in
disrepair. West Virginia American and Eastman continue to deny any
liability, and say the blame for the crisis rests with Freedom
Industries, which admitted to criminal pollution violations
related to the spill.

The class covered by the case includes 224,000 residents and about
8,000 businesses. It includes basically any business or resident
who received tap water from the Elk River intake plant and any
hourly wage earner whose employer closed because of the spill and
resulting water system contamination.

Copenhaver's order issued on September 21 outlined the following
key dates in settlement process:

Oct. 11 -- Class notice program commences.

Nov. 8 -- Initial class notice program complete.

Dec. 8 -- Objection and opt-out deadline.

Dec. 18 -- Deadline for settlement administrator to tabulate and
identify opt-outs.

Dec. 29 -- Filing of motion and supporting papers for final
approval and any supplement to motion for attorneys' fees and
litigation expenses.

Jan. 2 -- Deadline for defendants to exercise right to terminate
the settlement based on number of opt-outs.

Jan. 9 -- Final fairness hearing/approval hearing, at 10 a.m.

Feb. 21 -- Deadline for claims submission. [GN]


WORLD ACCEPTANCE: December 18 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
-------------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP in regard to a proposed class action settlement.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

WORLD ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 6:14-cv-01606-MGL
CLASS ACTION
SUMMARY NOTICE

TO: ALL PERSONS WHO PURCHASED OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRED WORLD
ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION ("WORLD ACCEPTANCE") COMMON STOCK DURING
THE PERIOD FROM JANUARY 30, 2013, THROUGH AND INCLUDING AUGUST 10,
2015 (THE "SETTLEMENT CLASS")

PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY. YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY
A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT PENDING IN THIS COURT.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina, that the above-
captioned action (the "Litigation") has been certified as a class
action on behalf of the Settlement Class, except for certain
persons and entities who are excluded from the Settlement Class by
definition as set forth in the full printed Notice of Proposed
Settlement of Class Action (the "Notice").

YOU ARE ALSO NOTIFIED that Lead Plaintiff in the Litigation,
Operating Engineers Construction Industry and Miscellaneous
Pension Fund, on behalf of itself and the other Members of the
Settlement Class, has reached a proposed settlement of the
Litigation with defendants World Acceptance, A. Alexander McLean,
III, John L. Calmes, Jr., Kelly M. Malson, and Mark C. Roland
(collectively, "Defendants") for the sum of $16,000,000 in cash
(the "Settlement"). If the Settlement is approved, it will resolve
all claims in the Litigation.

A hearing will be held on December 18, 2017, at 11:00 a.m. ET,
before the Honorable Mary Geiger Lewis at the Matthew J. Perry,
Jr. Courthouse, 901 Richland Street, Columbia, SC 29201, for the
purpose of determining: (1) whether the proposed Settlement should
be approved by the Court as fair, reasonable and adequate; (2)
whether, thereafter, this Litigation should be dismissed with
prejudice against the Defendants as set forth in the Stipulation
of Settlement dated August 24, 2017; (3) whether the Plan of
Allocation of Settlement proceeds is fair, reasonable and adequate
and therefore should be approved; and (4) the reasonableness of
the application of Lead Counsel for the payment of attorneys' fees
and expenses incurred in connection with this Litigation, together
with interest thereon (which request may include a request for
reimbursement of Lead Plaintiff's reasonable costs and expenses
pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995).

IF YOU PURCHASED OR ACQUIRED WORLD ACCEPTANCE COMMON STOCK DURING
THE PERIOD FROM JANUARY 30, 2013, THROUGH AND INCLUDING AUGUST 10,
2015 (THE "CLASS PERIOD"), YOUR RIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED BY THIS
LITIGATION AND THE SETTLEMENT THEREOF.  If you have not received a
detailed Notice as referred to above and a copy of the Proof of
Claim and Release form, you may obtain copies by writing to World
Acceptance Securities Settlement, Claims Administrator, c/o Epiq
Systems, Inc., P.O. Box 5110, Portland, OR 97208-5110, or by
downloading this information at
www.WorldAcceptanceSecuritiesSettlement.com.  If you are a
Settlement Class Member, in order to share in the distribution of
the Net Settlement Fund, you must submit a Proof of Claim and
Release online at www.WorldAcceptanceSecuritiesSettlement.com by
January 17, 2018, or by mail postmarked no later than January 17,
2018, establishing that you are entitled to a recovery. You will
be bound by any judgment rendered in the Litigation unless you
request to be excluded, in writing, postmarked by November 20,
2017.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired World Acceptance common
stock during the Class Period and you desire to be excluded from
the Settlement Class, you must submit a request for exclusion such
that it is postmarked no later than November 20, 2017, in the
manner and form explained in the detailed Notice referred to
above.  All Members of the Settlement Class who do not validly
request exclusion from the Settlement Class will be bound by any
judgments or orders entered in the Litigation pursuant to the
Stipulation of Settlement.

Any objection to any aspect of the Settlement must be filed with
the Clerk of the Court and also delivered by hand or First-Class
Mail to each of the following addresses such that it is received
no later than November 20, 2017:

Court:
CLERK OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
MATTHEW J. PERRY, JR. COURTHOUSE
901 Richland Street
Columbia, SC 29201

Lead Counsel:
ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
ELLEN GUSIKOFF STEWART
655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
San Diego, CA 92101

Defendants' Counsel:
KING & SPALDING LLP
B. WARREN POPE
1180 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30309

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT OR THE CLERK'S OFFICE REGARDING
THIS NOTICE.

DATED: August 31, 2017
BY ORDER OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA


* Top 5 Trends in Class Action Litigation
-----------------------------------------
John Freund, writing for Litigation Finance Journal, reports class
action litigation is a staple of the litigation finance industry,
as numerous class actions every year are financed by third party
funders. With that in mind, let's take a look at the top-5 trends
for class action litigation. . .

JD Supra outlines 5 forward-looking trends for class action
litigation:

1. Standing to Pursue Statutory Claims

Defendants -- particularly in class actions -- have attacked the
standing of plaintiffs pursuing claims under federal statutes,
such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), Fair and Accurate
Credit Transactions Act (FACTA), Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA) and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). These
challenges have resulted in hundreds of judicial decisions by
federal courts around the country.

And some trends have emerged. While a growing majority of courts
have found standing in TCPA and FDCPA cases, courts are about
evenly split in FCRA cases, and a majority of courts have found no
standing in FACTA cases. It may take years for the law to
crystallize on these issues as the judicial decisions work their
way up through circuit courts and perhaps back to the Supreme
Court.

2. Ascertainability Requirement

"Ascertainability" means that the class definition must provide
objective criteria for determining whether a particular individual
is a member of the proposed class. Courts currently differ as to
what a plaintiff must show at the class certification stage to
satisfy the ascertainability requirement, but look for the Supreme
Court to address this issue in the near future.

3. Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017

A House Bill currently gaining traction in the Senate is the
Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017, which would
impose additional requirements and risks for class counsel,
ultimately benefitting defendants. Such requirements include
mandating that each member of the proposed class must have
suffered the same "type and scope" of injury (which would
effectively eliminate classes containing uninjured members), and
imposing an "administrative feasibility" requirement.

4. CFPB's Prohibition of Consumer Arbitration Agreements

On July 10, 2017, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)
issued a new rule prohibiting banks and credit card companies from
including class action waivers in their arbitration agreements
with consumers. That means that consumers are now able to
consolidate their cases into class actions, provided that they are
able to meet other legal requirements for filing class actions.

The new rule has received widespread criticism, with opponents
arguing that the rule is anti-consumer and anti-business, and
promotes frivolous litigation, so look for Congress to take action
on the bill, potentially nullifying it.

5. Mooting Class Actions Through Unaccepted Offers of Judgment

The Supreme Court recently held that an unaccepted offer of
judgment in full satisfaction of the named plaintiff's claims
(prior to certification of a class) does not moot the case.
However, the Court expressly left open the possibility that the
result may differ when a defendant deposits the full amount of the
plaintiff's claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, followed
by entry of judgment for the plaintiff.

However, in Chen v. Allstate Inc. Co., 819 F. 3d 1136 (9th Cir.
2016), the 9th Circuit held such action was ineffective to moot
the case. The court reasoned that placing the funds in an escrow
account is not the same as actual receipt of funds by the
plaintiff, and that it would be inappropriate to enter judgment
before the plaintiff had a fair opportunity to move for class
certification.

There will likely be further developments in this area, so stay
tuned. [GN]


                             *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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