/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/180615.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R


              Friday, June 15, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 120



                            Headlines


2953 BROADWAY: Faces "Ye" Suit in S.D. New York
A1 PROTECTIVE: Faces "Hellum" Suit in Calif. Super. Ct.
ACCOUNT CONTROL: Faces "Bazile" Suit in W.D. Wisconsin
ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Faces "Blake" Suit in E.D. New York
ALPHA RECOVERY: Faces "Kravtsova" Suit in E.D. New York

ARCADIA RECOVERY: Faces "Casler" Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
ARCADIA MANAGEMENT: Faces "Mendez" Suit in S.D. New York
ASSET RECOVERY: Faces "Fulop" Suit in E.D. New York
AVANTE USA: Faces "Washington" Suit in South Carolina
BLAZE PIZZA: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York

BNSF RAILWAY: Court Enters Judgment of Dismissal in "Sumlin"
BOUCHERIE PAS: "Gaspari" Suit Brought Before NY Supreme Court
CAINE & WEINER: Faces "Garcia" Suit in N.D. Georgia
CARLO'S BAKERY: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
CBS MEDICAL: Faces Davis Neurology Suit in South Carolina

CENTRAL CREDIT: Faces "Alenkin" Suit in E.D. New York
CHAPTER 4: Faces "Olsen" Suit in S.D. New York
CLIENT SERVICES: Faces "Abayeva" Suit in E.D. New York
CLIENT SERVICES: Faces "Mohamed" Suit in E.D. New York
COX COMMUNICATIONS: Faces "Siu" Suit in S.D. California

DAVIDS FINANCIAL: Faces "Fischler" Suit in S.D. New York
DIVERSIFIED CONSULTANTS: Faces "Mohamed" Suit in E.D. New York
DYNAMIC RECOVERY: Faces "Tillman" Suit in W.D. Arkansas
DYNAMIC RECOVERY: Faces "Ruffin" Suit in W.D. Texas
ENGEL BURMAN GROUP: Faces "Mendez" Suit in S.D. New York

ENHANCED RECOVERY: Faces "Jose" Suit in S.D. Indiana
EQUINOX HOLDINGS: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
EXTENDED LIFE: "Hawkins" Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
FACEBOOK INC: "King" Suit Alleges Breach of Contract
FACEBOOK INC: Ct. Certifies Class in Biometric Info Privacy Suit

FINANCIAL CREDIT: Faces "King" Suit in W.D. Texas
FIREHOUSE RESTAURANT: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
FIRSTSOURCE ADVANTAGE: Faces "Alenkin" Suit in E.D. New York
FRONTLINE ASSET: Faces "Raja" Suit in E.D. New York
GC SERVICES: Court Won't Review Discovery Ruling in "Cahill"

GENPACT SERVICES: Faces "Alenkin" Suit in E.D. New York
GLENAIR INC: Cal. App. Affirms Summary Judgment in "Castillo"
GRAND SLAM: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
HALLMARK LICENSING: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
HARBOR FITNESS: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York

HIGUERA FARMS: Faces "Garcia" Suit in C.D. California
HILTI INC: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
HOMEOWNERS: Faces "Robinson" Suit in Texas Supreme Court
K B INTERNATIONAL: "Jui" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime
KENDAL ON HUDSON: Faces "Mendez" Suit in S.D. New York

LA FONDA RESTAURANT: Faces "Herrera" Suit in S.D. New York
LAW OFFICES HOWARD: Faces "Bashir" Suit in S.D. New York
LEFKOFF RUBIN: Faces "Gluckman" Suit in N.D. Georgia
LEFKOFF RUBIN: "Gluckman" Files Suit in N.D. Georgia
MADISON YORK: Faces "Mendez" Suit in S.D. New York

MAHONING COUNTY, OH: Ct. Won't Junk Cronyism in Appointments Suit
MARS INC: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
MDL 2672: Court Finds 2 Counties' Tampering Claims Pre-Empted
MERLE NORMAN: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
METROPOLITAN TRANSPO: Faces Self Initiated Suit in S.D. New York

MICHIGAN: Remand of Water Crisis Suit to Court of Claims Affirmed
MICRO ELECTRONICS: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
MCPEAK'S ADULT: Faces "Mendez" Suit in S.D. New York
MIDTOWN AUTO: Faces "Campos" Suit in S.D. New York
MIDWAY A.L.: Faces "Mendez" Suit in S.D. New York

MOHAN'S CUSTOM: Faces "Camacho" Suit in S.D. New York
NATIONS RECOVERY: Faces "Mitchell" Suit in E.D. Virginia
NATIONS RECOVERY: Faces "Madar" Suit in E.D. New York
NEIMAN MARCUS: Cal. App. Affirms Dismissal of "Tanguilig"
NEVADA: Wins Partial Termination of Injunction in Prisons Case

NEW YORK, NY: Faces "Gailego" Suit in S.D. New York
NORTHSTAR LOCATION: Faces "Ungar" Suit in S.D. New York
P&B CAPITAL: Faces "Giordano" Suit in E.D. New York
PASSIONS NETWORK: Faces "Dephillips" Suit in S.D. New York
PAZ MANAGEMENT: Faces "Mendez" Suit in S.D. New York

PET SUPPLIES: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
PETER UNDERGROUND: Faces "Perez" Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
PLS CHECK CASHERS: Faces "Fischler" Suit in S.D. New York
POSTMATES INC: Faces "Lee" Suit in N.D. California
PROCOLLECT INC: Faces "Young" Suit in N.D. Texas

PROCOLLECT INC: Faces "Clark" Suit in W.D. Tennessee
PROCTER & GAMBLE PAPER: Faces "Marsh" Suit in C.D. California
PROGRESSIONS BEHAVIORAL: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Charles"
PROGRESSIONS BEHAVIORAL: Court Narrows Claims in "Thompson"
RLAWSON INC: Faces "Karpathios" Suit in E.D. New York

RUDY'S MUSIC: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
SANTANDER CONSUMER: Faces "Blakely" Suit in E.D. California
SCENIC ROUTE: Faces "Cervera" Suit in S.D. New York
SELECT COMFORT: NJ High Ct. Issues Opinion in Delivery Suit
SMURFIT KAPPA: Faces "Chavez" Suit in C.D. California

SOULCYCLE INC: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
SOUTHERN GLAZER'S: Court Amends April 9 Order in Fraud Suit
STANDARD DRYWALL: Denial of Arbitration in "Perez" Upheld
SUNRISE SENIOR: Faces "Mendez" Suit in S.D. New York
SUREFOOT LLC: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York

TIMEPAYMENT CORP: Faces "Taylor" Suit in E.D. Virginia
TIMEPAYMENT CORP: Faces "Cruz" Suit in S.D. New York
THOMAS GEORGE: Faces "Mor" Suit in E.D. New York
TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Faces "Banayan" Suit in E.D. New York
TTT BROOKLYN: Faces "Gonzalez" Suit in E.D. New York

TULSA COUNTY, OK: Faces "Parga" Suit in N.D. Oklahoma
TWELFTH STREET: Faces "Smith" Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
UNITED COLLECTION: Faces "Shevchuk" Suit in E.D. New York
UNITED STATES: "R.F.M." Files Suit in S.D. New York
WAKEFIELD AND ASSOCIATES: Faces "Milner" Suit in M.D. Alabama

WINGSTOP RESTAURANTS: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
ZWICKER & ASSOCIATES: Faces "Aminov" Suit in E.D. New York


                         Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: AMERISAFE Had $1.7MM Reserves for Loss, LAE
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Tenneco Faces Less Than 500 Cases at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Univar Faces Less Than 255 Claims at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Flowserve Still Defends PI Lawsuits at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 9,000 Claims vs. FMC Corp. Pending at Dec. 31

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Old Republic Has $86.7MM Reserve at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: OfficeMax Still Responsible for Cases at Dec.31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Quaker Chemical Unit Still Had Claims at Dec.31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Albany Int'l Defending 3,730 Claims at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Brandon Drying Had 7,707 Claims at Dec. 31

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Albany Int'l. Still Defends Mount Vernon Suits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Warren Pumps Can't Get Pre-Judgment Interest
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Underwriters Not Barred by Res Judicata
ASBESTOS UPDATE: PI Claims vs. IMO Industries Junked in "Airey"
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ct. App. Affirms Dismissal of Claims vs. Brand

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Kinseth Litigation Remanded for New Trial
ASBESTOS UPDATE: New Hampshire Law Governs Turcotte PI Suit
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crane Co. Wins Summary Judgment in "MacQueen"
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Goodyear Loses Summary Judgment in Appeals Ct.
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Judge Denies Further Amendment to Bell Complaint

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Jury Delivers $25MM Verdict in Talc Case
ASBESTOS UPDATE: City OKs Plan for Dana College Asbestos Removal
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rehmsmeyer Couple Sues Deere Over Asbestos PI
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Payment Scheme Hope for Asbestos Sufferers
ASBESTOS UPDATE: NZ Landlords Welcome Asbestos Clarification

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Campaigners Hit Scot Gov't on School Asbestos
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Halts Wayland Apartment Project
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cambridge Gave Economist Asbestos Cancer
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Tons of Asbestos Left Dumped in Southampton St.
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Feared After Power Plant Demolition

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Contamination Scare Affected 24 Firefighters
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Halts Work in Former Kamloops Theatre
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos in Wellington Train Buried at City Dump
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Trains Sent to Bendigo for Asbestos Testing
ASBESTOS UPDATE: More Asbestos Found in Dunedin Mud-Tanks

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Serial Asbestos Dumper Jailed in NSW






                            *********


2953 BROADWAY: Faces "Ye" Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against 2953 Broadway LLC.
The case is styled as Xing Ye, on his own behalf and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. 2953 Broadway LLC and Cho
Kam Sze, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-04941 (S.D. N.Y., June 4,
2018).

2953 Broadway LLC d/b/a Vine Sushi is a Japanese restaurant in
New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


A1 PROTECTIVE: Faces "Hellum" Suit in Calif. Super. Ct.
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against A1 Protective
Services LLC. The case is styled as Lars Hellum, on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. A1 Protective Services
LLC and Does 1-100, Defendants, Case No. 34-2018-00234449-CU-OE-
GDS (Cal. Super. Ct., June 7, 2018).

A1 Protective Service Inc. is a privately held company in San
Diego, CA, categorized under Guard and Protection Services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Galen T. Shimoda, Esq.
   9401 East Stockton Boulevard
   Suite 200, Elk Grove,
   CA 95624
   Tel: 916-525-0716


ACCOUNT CONTROL: Faces "Bazile" Suit in W.D. Wisconsin
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Account Control
Systems, Inc. The case is styled as Sandra Bazile, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Account
Control Systems, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation, Defendant, Case
No. 1:18-cv-00864 (W.D. Wis., June 6, 2018).

Account Control Systems, Inc. is a debt collection agency in
Montvale, New Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Andrew T Thomasson, Esq.
   Stern Thomasson LLP
   150 Morris Ave-2nd Fl
   Springfield, NJ 07081
   Tel: (973) 379-7500
   Fax: (973) 532-5868
   Email: andrew@sternthomasson.com


ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Faces "Blake" Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Alltran Financial,
LP. The case is styled as Christophe Blake, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Alltran
Financial, LP, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03256 (E.D. N.Y., June
4, 2018).

Alltran Financial, LP specializes in revenue cycle, accounts
receivable, and contact center solutions within healthcare,
financial services, higher education, and government industries
in the Unites States.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


ALPHA RECOVERY: Faces "Kravtsova" Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Alpha Recovery
Corp. The case is styled as Sofia Kravtsova, on behalf of herself
and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Alpha Recovery Corp.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03338 (E.D. N.Y., June 7, 2018).

Alpha Recovery Corp. is a financial institution in Greenwood
Village, Colorado.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Daniel A. Louro, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza W
   12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (929) 575-4175
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: dlouro@cml.legal


ARCADIA RECOVERY: Faces "Casler" Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Arcadia Recovery
Bureau, LLC. The case is styled as Brian Casler, Jr., on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Arcadia Recovery Bureau, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 5:18-cv-02337-
JFL (E.D. Penn., June 4, 2018).

Arcadia Recovery Bureau, LLC provides accounts receivable
management solutions to organizations. It offers first party or
early stage collection services for the billing, re-billing, and
follow-up of commercial insurance, managed care insurance,
Medicaid, Medicare, self-pay, self-pay residual, automobile
injuries, and worker's compensation in the healthcare sector.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   SERGEI LEMBERG, Esq.
   LEMBERG LAW LLC
   43 DANBURY ROAD
   WILTON, CT 06897
   Tel: (203) 653-2250
   Email: slemberg@lemberglaw.com


ARCADIA MANAGEMENT: Faces "Mendez" Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Arcadia Management,
Inc. doing business as: The Arbors. The case is styled as Himelda
Mendez, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Arcadia Management, Inc. doing business as: The
Arbors, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04950 (S.D. N.Y., June 4,
2018).

Arcadia Management, Inc. operates assisted living communities for
residents in Islandia West, Islandia East, Hauppauge, Bohemia,
and Westbury.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


ASSET RECOVERY: Faces "Fulop" Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Asset Recovery
Solutions, LLC. The case is styled as Chany Fulop, on behalf of
herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Asset
Recovery Solutions, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03351 (E.D.
N.Y., June 7, 2018).

Asset Recovery Solutions, LLC is engaged in data recovery service
in Des Plaines, Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Daniel A. Louro, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza W
   12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (929) 575-4175
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: dlouro@cml.legal


AVANTE USA: Faces "Washington" Suit in South Carolina
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Avante USA. The
case is styled as Ashur Washington, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Avante USA,
Defendant, Case No. 9:18-cv-01542-DCN (D. S.C., June 6, 2018).

Avante USA is a privately held company in Houston, TX.
Categorized under Billing Services, current estimates show this
company has an annual revenue of $5 to 10 million and employs a
staff of approximately 50 to 99.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Kenneth Edward Norsworthy, Jr., Esq.
   Norsworthy Law Ltd Co
   505 Pettigru Street
   Greenville, SC 29601
   Tel: (864) 804-0581
   Fax: (864) 756-1153
   Email: kenorsworthy@me.com


BLAZE PIZZA: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Blaze Pizza, LLC.
The case is styled as Luc Burbon, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Blaze Pizza, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05236 (S.D. N.Y., June 11, 2018).

Blaze Pizza LLC is a Pasadena, California-based chain within the
fast-casual dining restaurants category.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


BNSF RAILWAY: Court Enters Judgment of Dismissal in "Sumlin"
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Eastern Division, in the case captioned HENRY SUMLIN
and BRIAN LEE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, a Delaware
Corporation; and DOES 1-50, Defendants, Case No. 5:17-CV-02364-
JFW (KKx)(C.D. Cal.), issued an Order granting Defendant BNSF
Railway Company's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and
dismissing Plaintiffs Henry Sumlin and Brian Lee's claims in
their entirety, with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 16, 2018 Judgment
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybnm4wdq from Leagle.com.

Henry Sumlin, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated & Brian Lee, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Craig J.
Ackermann, Ackermann and Tilajef PC, David S. Winston --
david@employmentlitigators.com -- Winston Law Group, P.C.,
Jonathan Melmed -- jm@melmedlaw.com -- Melmed Law Group PC & Sam
Vahedi -- sv@ackermanntilajef.com -- Ackermann and Tilajef PC.

BNSF Railway Company, Defendant, represented by Amanda Pade
Ellison -- apellison@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Amanda C.
Sommerfeld -- asommerfeld@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Charles W.
Shewmake -- Charles.Shewmake@tklaw.com -- Thompson and Knight
LLP, Donald J. Munro -- dmunro@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, pro hac
vice & Koree Blyleven -- kblyleven@jonesday.com -- Jones Day.


BOUCHERIE PAS: "Gaspari" Suit Brought Before NY Supreme Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as Henry Gaspari on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Boucherie Pas
LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 155370/2018, was brought before
the New York Supreme Court on June 7, 2018.

Boucherie Pas LLC is a traditional FRENCH restaurant, celebrating
Joie de Vivre in the heart of West Village.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


CAINE & WEINER: Faces "Garcia" Suit in N.D. Georgia
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Caine & Weiner
Company, Inc. The case is styled as Deserae Garcia, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Caine &
Weiner Company, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-02776-MHC-AJB
(N.D. Ga., June 6, 2018).

Caine & Weiner Company, Inc. is a call center in Los Angeles,
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by;

   Jonathan Braxton Mason, Esq.
   Mason Law Group, LLC - GA
   1100 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 200
   Atlanta, GA 30309
   Tel: (404) 920-8040
   Fax: (404) 920-8039
   Email: jmason@atlshowbizlaw.com


CARLO'S BAKERY: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Carlo's Bakery
Hoboken LLC. The case is styled as Henry Tucker, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Carlo's
Bakery Hoboken LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05135 (S.D. N.Y.,
June 8, 2018).

Carlo's Bakery Hoboken LLC is a bakery in Hoboken, New
Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


CBS MEDICAL: Faces Davis Neurology Suit in South Carolina
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CBS Medical Inc.
The case is styled as Davis Neurology PA, on behalf of itself and
all other entities similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Andrew Chmiel
and Do-Delivery LLC doing business as: Do-Delivery Plus and
Holding Company Movants/Defendants, CBS Medical Inc and John Does
1-10 Defendants, Case No. 2:18-mc-00211-DCN (D. S.C., June 11,
2018).

Cbs Medical Inc is a medical equipment and medical supplies
supplier in Lincoln, Nebraska.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Edward Bart Daniel, Esq.
   PO Box 856
   Charleston, SC 29402
   Tel: (843) 722-2000
   Fax: (843) 722-6254
   Email: bart.daniel@nelsonmullins.com


CENTRAL CREDIT: Faces "Alenkin" Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Central Credit
Services LLC. The case is styled as Stanislav Alenkin, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v.
Central Credit Services LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03271
(E.D. N.Y., June 4, 2018).

Central Credit Services LLC is a Credit reporting agency in
Jacksonville, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


CHAPTER 4: Faces "Olsen" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Chapter 4 Corp. The
case is styled as Thomas J. Olsen, individually and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Chapter 4
Corp. doing business as: Supreme NY, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-
05127 (S.D. N.Y., June 8, 2018).

Chapter 4 Corp., doing business as Supreme New York, retails
apparels and other accessories. The Company offers jackets,
shirts, sweatshirts, pants, shorts, hats, bags, and other related
accessories. Supreme New York serves customers in the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


CLIENT SERVICES: Faces "Abayeva" Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Client Services,
Inc. The case is styled as Khana Abayeva, on behalf of herself
and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Client Services,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03393 (E.D. N.Y., June 11,
2018).

Client Services, Inc. operates as a customer relationship
management company that offers a suite of accounts receivable
management, business processing outsourcing (BPO), and healthcare
solutions. It provides customer care, technical support, customer
acquisition, cross sell/up-sell, customer retention,
product/account activation, appointment setting/reminders,
disaster support, first notice of loss, market research, customer
satisfaction surveys, and multi-channel interaction management
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Daniel A. Louro, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza W
   12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (929) 575-4175
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: dlouro@cml.legal


CLIENT SERVICES: Faces "Mohamed" Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Client Services
Inc. The case is styled as Hamdy Mohamed, Sr., on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Client
Services Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03252 (E.D. N.Y., June
4, 2018).

Client Services, Inc. operates as a customer relationship
management company that offers a suite of accounts receivable
management, business processing outsourcing (BPO), and healthcare
solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


COX COMMUNICATIONS: Faces "Siu" Suit in S.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Cox Communications,
Inc. The case is styled as Gordon Siu, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Cox Communications,
Inc. and Does 1 Through 10 inclusive, and each of them,
Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-01227-L-BLM (S.D. Cal., June 11,
2018).

Cox Communications is an American privately owned subsidiary of
Cox Enterprises providing digital cable television,
telecommunications and Home Automation services in the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Todd M. Friedman, Esq,
   Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C.
   21550 Oxnard Street, Suite 780
   Woodland Hills, CA 91367
   Tel: (877) 206-4741
   Fax: (866) 633-0228
   Email: tfriedman@toddflaw.com


DAVIDS FINANCIAL: Faces "Fischler" Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Davids Financial
Corp. The case is styled as Brian Fischler, individually and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Davids Financial Corp., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05257 (S.D.
N.Y., June 11, 2018).

David's Financial Corporation is a privately held company in
Bronx, NY, and is a Single Location business, categorized under
financial advisory services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


DIVERSIFIED CONSULTANTS: Faces "Mohamed" Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Diversified
Consultants, Inc. The case is styled as Hamdy Mohamed, Sr., on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs
v. Diversified Consultants, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-
03254 (E.D. N.Y., June 4, 2018).

Diversified Consultants, Inc., a telecom-specific collection
company, specializes in the bad debt recovery of wireless,
landline, cable, satellite, utilities, and security arenas. It
offers third party collection and pre-collection services; and
resolves customers' delinquency and dispute issues. The company
was founded in 1992 and is headquartered in Jacksonville,
Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Daniel A. Louro, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza W
   12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (929) 575-4175
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: dlouro@cml.legal


DYNAMIC RECOVERY: Faces "Tillman" Suit in W.D. Arkansas
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dynamic Recovery
Solutions, LLC. The case is styled as Devonna Tillman also known
as: Devonna Fricks, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Dynamic Recovery Solutions, LLC,
Calvary SPV I, LLC and John Does, 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
4:18-cv-04090-SOH (W.D. Ark., June 6, 2018).

Dynamic Recovery Solutions, LLC collects debt for other
companies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Yaakov Saks, Esq.
   Stein Saks, PLLC
   285 Passaic Street
   Hackensack, NJ 07601
   Tel: (201) 282-6500
   Email: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


DYNAMIC RECOVERY: Faces "Ruffin" Suit in W.D. Texas
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dynamic Recovery
Solutions, LLC. The case is styled as Deidre Ruffin, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Dynamic Recovery Solutions, LLC and Cavalry SPV I, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00492-LY (W.D. Tex., June 8, 2018).

Dynamic Recovery Solutions, LLC is a collection agency in
Greenville, SC.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Amichai Eitan Zukowsky, Esq.
   23811 Chagrin Blvd., Ste. 160
   Beachwood, OH 44122
   Tel: (216) 800-5529
   Fax: (216) 514-4987
   Email: ami@zukowskylaw.com


ENGEL BURMAN GROUP: Faces "Mendez" Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Engel Burman
Group, LLC. The case is styled as Himelda Mendez, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. The Engel
Burman Group, LLC doing business as: The Bristal Assisted Living,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04951 (S.D. N.Y., June 4, 2018).

The Bristal Assisted Living offers an exceptional senior assisted
living solution.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


ENHANCED RECOVERY: Faces "Jose" Suit in S.D. Indiana
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Enhanced Recovery
Company, LLC. The case is styled as Kristin Ibarra Jose,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-01680-TWP-DML (S.D. Ind., June 4, 2018).

Enhanced Recovery Company LLC provides business process
outsourcing services that include recovery, outsourcing, and
market research primarily for Fortune 500 companies in the United
States and internationally.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   John Thomas Steinkamp, Esq.
   JOHN T. STEINKAMP AND ASSOCIATES
   5214 S. East Street, Suite D-1
   Indianapolis, IN 46227
   Tel: (317) 780-8300
   Fax: (317) 217-1320
   Email: steinkamplaw@yahoo.com


EQUINOX HOLDINGS: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Equinox Holdings,
Inc. The case is styled as Henry Tucker, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Equinox Holdings,
Inc. doing business as: Pure Yoga, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-
05064 (S.D. N.Y., June 6, 2018).

Equinox Holdings, Inc. operates full-service fitness clubs that
offer an integrated selection of programs, services, and
products. The company provides its members personal training, spa
services and products, apparel, food/juice bars, locker rentals,
and laundry services. It also offers group fitness classes,
including cardio and dance, yoga, spinning, body sculpting, core
training, kickboxing, aquatics, strength training and
conditioning, sports training, boxing, and martial arts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


EXTENDED LIFE: "Hawkins" Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
-----------------------------------------------------
Anthony Hawkins, individually and on behalf of other members of
the general public similarly situated v. Extended Life Home Care,
Ltd., Jannon Lampley, and Kenneth Lampley, Case No.  2:18-cv-
00344 (S.D. Ohio, April 16, 2018), is brought against the
Defendants for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, and the Ohio Prompt Pay
Act.

The Plaintiff worked as a caregiver or home health aide for the
Defendants from December 2016 until December 2017.

The Defendant Extended Life Home Care, Ltd. is a home care
staffing agency of direct care workers and provider of in home
rehabilitation and health care services.

The Individual Defendants are founders and owners of Extended
Life. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Matthew J.P. Coffman, Esq.
      COFFMAN LEGAL, LLC
      1457 S. High St.
      Columbus, OH 43207
      Tel: (614) 949-1181
      Fax: (614) 386-9964
      E-mail: mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com

          - and -

      Peter A. Contreras, Esq.
      CONTRERAS LAW, LLC
      P.O. Box 215
      Amlin, OH 43002
      Tel: (614) 787-4878
      Fax: (614) 923-7369
      E-mail: peter.contreras@contrerasfirm.com


FACEBOOK INC: "King" Suit Alleges Breach of Contract
----------------------------------------------------
Patricia King, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. Facebook, Inc., and Cambridge Analytica LLC, Case No.
3:18-cv-02276 (N.D. Calif., April 16, 2018), seeks to change
Facebook's business practices, for breach of contract, and for
violations of federal and state law.

The Plaintiff alleged that Facebook is a social networking
platform that engages in surveillance capitalism: It monetizes
personal and behavioral data which it acquires through real-time
surveillance of Facebook users.

Patricia King is a resident and citizen of South Carolina.

The Defendant Facebook, Inc., is incorporated in Delaware, and
its principal place of business is in Menlo Park, California.
Facebook has operated www.facebook.com since at least 2004. This
social networking platform allows users to create online profiles
with personalized content such as their name, photos, videos,
messages, comments, names of other users they consider to be
"friends," and interest groups. Users can interact with each
other or the platform in a variety of ways, including by posting
comments, sharing photos or video, chatting, using apps, playing
online games, taking personality quizzes, or "liking" content by
pressing a thumbs-up icon.

The Defendant Cambridge Analytica LLC is a Delaware limited
liability company with headquarters in New York, New York.  [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Eric H. Gibbs, Esq.
      Andre Mura, Esq.
      Aaron Blumenthal, Esq.
      GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP
      505 14th Street, Suite 1110
      Oakland, CA 94612
      Tel: (510) 350-9700
      Fax: (510) 350-9701
      E-mail: ehg@classlawgroup.com
              amm@classlawgroup.com
              ab@classlawgroup.com


FACEBOOK INC: Ct. Certifies Class in Biometric Info Privacy Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in
the case captioned IN RE FACEBOOK BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY
LITIGATION. THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: ALL ACTIONS, Case No. 3:15-
cv-03747-JD (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs are Facebook users who challenge its Tag
Suggestions program, which scans for and identifies people in
uploaded photographs to promote user tagging.  The Plaintiffs
allege that Facebook collects and stores their biometric data
without prior notice or consent in violation of their privacy
rights and Sections 15(a) and 15(b) of the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act, 740 (BIPA).

The Plaintiffs seek certification under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3) and propose a class of all Facebook users
living in Illinois whose face appeared in a photo uploaded to
Facebook from Illinois between June 7, 2011, and the final
disposition of this action.  The Plaintiffs also propose an
alternative class of all people living in Illinois for whom
Facebook has a stored face template that was created between June
7, 2011, and final disposition of this action.

Numerosity, Adequacy, and Typicality

The numerosity, adequacy, and typicality requirements in Rule
23(a) are readily satisfied for a template-based class of
Illinois users. The Plaintiffs reasonably estimate that millions
of Illinois residents are Facebook users, many of whom have been
tagged in enough photographs to have face templates. The
Plaintiffs' arguments are uncontested by Facebook, and numerosity
is established.

Adequacy is also not an issue. Neither the named plaintiffs nor
their counsel have an apparent conflict of interest with other
class members, and the hard-fought proceedings in this case amply
establish that they will prosecute the action vigorously on
behalf of the class.

There is no serious doubt that typicality is satisfied, too. The
named plaintiffs are Illinois Facebook users with face templates
suing under Illinois law on behalf of fellow users in Illinois.
That is enough to assure that the interest of the named
representative aligns with the interests of the class.

Commonality and Predominance.

There is no genuine dispute that this case is deeply rooted in
Illinois. The named plaintiffs are located in Illinois along with
all of the proposed class members, and the claims are based on
the application of Illinois law to use of Facebook mainly in
Illinois. As the Court found in a prior order, the case is
properly governed by Illinois law pursuant to California choice
of law principles, and Facebook does not contest the application
of Illinois law in opposing class certification.

None of the class members are non-residents suing under Illinois
law, which is the paradigmatic situation for the presumption
against the extraterritorial application of local law. Facebook
has not tendered any evidence to indicate that the circumstances
relating to the challenged conduct did not occur primarily and
substantially within Illinois. Class members do not need to show
more in order to sue under BIPA, particularly in light of BIPA's
express concerns about data collection by major national
corporations, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 14/5(b).

Contrary to Facebook's suggestion, the geographic location of its
data servers is not a dispositive factor. Server location may be
one factor in the territoriality inquiry, but it is not the
exclusive one. Correlatively, a single-minded focus on server
location would also potentially nationalize the consumer
protection laws of states that host servers, which in this case
includes California. Both outcomes are fraught with unintended
and undesirable consequences.

Facebook also suggests that the claims of some class members may
only be peripherally related to Illinois. It says for example
that some class members might have just moved to Illinois with
face templates created elsewhere. Maybe so, but Facebook does not
offer anything other than its own conjecture on this point, and
mere speculation about class variability does not meet
defendant's burden of demonstrating that individual issues
predominate.

As a final contention, Facebook says that predominance cannot be
found because individualized inquiries may be necessary to
determine which users' face templates were derived from scans of
paper photographs. This too is unavailing. Assuming for
discussion purposes only that a class member's claim could turn
on whether an uploaded photograph was taken by a digital versus
film camera, Facebook simply asserts with no accompanying
evidence that many photos uploaded to Facebook fit that
description. Conclusory allegations with no support in the record
will not defeat commonality and predominance.

Superiority

A class action is clearly superior to individual proceedings
here. While not trivial, BIPA's statutory damages are not enough
to incentivize individual plaintiffs given the high costs of
pursuing discovery on Facebook's software and code base and
Facebook's willingness to litigate the case. The class will be
manageable because members can be identified in a straightforward
way. Facebook has collected a wealth of data on its users,
including self-reported residency and IP addresses.  Facebook
does not argue that determining the location of Facebook users
with face templates would be unduly difficult or subject to
significant uncertainty.

Accordingly, the Court certifies a class of Facebook users
located in Illinois for whom Facebook created and stored a face
template after June 7, 2011.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 16, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc7wlzoh from Leagle.com.

Nimesh Patel, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Paul Jeffrey Geller --
Pgeller@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice, Alexander Nguyenn -- anguyen@edelson.com -- Edelson P.C.,
Amanda M. Frame, Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, Christopher
Chagas Gold -- cgold@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman Dowd
LLP, Frank Anthony Richter -- fritcher@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd, John Hamilton George -- jgeorge@rgrdlaw.com
-- Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, Mark J. Dearman --
mdearman@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, pro
hac vice, Rafey Sarkis Balabanian -- rbalabanian@edelson.com --
Edelson PC, pro hac vice, Shawn A. Williams -- shawnw@rgrdlaw.com
-- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Stuart Andrew Davidson --
Sdavidson@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro
hac vice & James E. Barz -- jbarz@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Facebook Inc., Defendant, represented by Vincent J. Connelly --
vconnelly@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, Archis Ashok
Parasharami -- aparasharami@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP,
pro hac vice, Archis Ashok Parasharami, Mayer Brown LLP, John
Nadolenco -- jnadolenco@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, Lauren
R. Goldman -- lrgoldman@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown Llp, pro
hac vice, Matthew David Provance -- mprovance@mayerbrown.com --
Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice, Michael E. Rayfield --
mrayfield@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice &
Vincent Connelly, Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice.


FINANCIAL CREDIT: Faces "King" Suit in W.D. Texas
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Financial Credit
Services, Inc. The case is styled as Kimberly King and Daknesia
Beard, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. Financial Credit Services, Inc. doing
business as: ARA, Inc. doing business as: Asset Recovery
Associates, Bruce Cohen, Mario Bianchi and SureTec Insurance
Company, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00492-LY (W.D. Tex., June
8, 2018).

Financial Credit Service (FCS) is one of the largest and most
well respected debt resolution companies in the country.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey D. Wood, Esq.
   The Wood Firm, PLLC
   11610 Pleasant Ridge Rd.
   Suite 103, Box 208
   Little Rock, AR 72223
   Tel: (682) 651-7599
   Fax: (888) 598-9022
   Email: jeff@jeffwoodlaw.com


FIREHOUSE RESTAURANT: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Firehouse
Restaurant Group, Inc. The case is styled as Luc Burbon, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Firehouse Restaurant Group, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-
05240 (S.D. N.Y., June 11, 2018).

Firehouse Subs is a U.S.-based, fast casual restaurant chain
founded in 1994 in Jacksonville, Florida by former firefighter
brothers Robin and Chris Sorensen.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


FIRSTSOURCE ADVANTAGE: Faces "Alenkin" Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Firstsource
Advantage, LLC. The case is styled as Stanislav Alenkin, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Firstsource Advantage, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03355
(E.D. N.Y., June 7, 2018).

Firstsource Advantage, LLC offers collections and recovery
solutions. It provides debt recovery services for credit card
issuers, retail banking and mortgage. Firstsource Advantage, LLC
was formerly known as Firstsource LLC and changed its name in
February 2007.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


FRONTLINE ASSET: Faces "Raja" Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Frontline Asset
Strategies, LLC. The case is styled as Afsar Raja, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Frontline
Asset Strategies, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03263 (E.D.
N.Y., June 4, 2018).

Frontline Asset Strategies is a debt collection agency out of
Minnesota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Daniel A. Louro, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza W
   12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (929) 575-4175
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: dlouro@cml.legal


GC SERVICES: Court Won't Review Discovery Ruling in "Cahill"
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California denied parties' joint motion asking the Court to
reconsider a ruling issued by Magistrate Judge regarding a
discovery dispute in the case captioned TIFFANY CAHILL,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. GC SERVICES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Defendant, Case
No. 3:17-cv-01308-GPC-MDD (S.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant negligently and
knowingly violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)
by using an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) with an
artificial or pre-recorded voice to call the Plaintiff's cell
phone without the Plaintiff's consent and not for emergency
purposes.

In several interrogatories and requests for production (RFPs),
Magistrate Judge Dembin overruled the Defendants' objections,
holding, among other things, that the Defendant did not offer any
explanation of what burden would be imposed on the Defendant were
it required to respond to these discovery requests.

The Defendant contends that it need not respond to the
Plaintiff's discovery requests because the Plaintiff was not
contacted by the Defendant using an ATDS, and, thus, the
Plaintiff cannot be the lead plaintiff of the putative class.

Here, the Plaintiff has not conceded that the Defendant did not
contact her using an ATDS. Instead, the only ground on which the
Court could conclude at this point that the Plaintiff is not a
typical member of the putative class is to accept as true the
Defendant's own assertion that it did not engage in the conduct
alleged against it. If the Defendant is confident that it did not
violate the Plaintiff's rights under the TCPA, it should file a
dispositive motion asking the Court to make such a finding as a
matter of law. A discovery dispute, however, is not the vehicle
to litigate the merits of the Plaintiff's personal claims against
the Defendant, the Court concluded.

As a result, the Court found that Magistrate Judge Dembin
properly rejected the Defendant's argument that the Plaintiff's
discovery requests are improper because she is not a member of
the putative class.

The Defendant argues in its motion for reconsideration that the
Plaintiff is attempting to obtain such lists for the purpose of
creating a client list, which is not only improper but also
threatens the privacy of the individuals on those lists in a
manner contrary to the purposes of the TCPA.

Here, those circumstances do not exist, or at least the Defendant
has not suggested that they do. In raising its objection to the
RFPs, the Defendant did not offer any indication to Magistrate
Judge Dembin about the size of the requested lists, nor did it
suggest that it has offered any smaller outbound call list that
could satisfy the Plaintiff's pre-certification discovery needs.
Other courts have also found that outbound call lists in run-of-
the-mill TCPA putative class actions are relevant to the issue of
commonality, or that it was not clearly erroneous for a
magistrate judge to overrule objections that such lists are
irrelevant to commonality.

In sum, even if the Court were to consider the Defendant's
procedurally improper relevancy arguments, the Court would reject
them.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Magistrate Judge Dembin's order
overruling Defendant's objections to Interrogatories 6, 21, 22,
23, and 24, and RFPs 10, 11, 12, 13, and 18, was not clearly
erroneous or contrary to law.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 16, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybjhyht5 from Leagle.com.

Tiffany Cahill, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Abbas Kazerounian -
- ak@kazlg.com -- Kazerounian Law Group, APC, Joshua B. Swigart -
- josh@westcoastlitigation.com -- Hyde & Swigart, Yana A. Hart  -
- yana@westcoastlitigation.com -- Hyde & Swigart, Clark Robert
Conforti -- clark@kazlg.com -- Kazerouni Law Group APC & Daniel
G. Shay -- danielshay@tcpafdcpa.com -- Law Offices of Daniel G.
Shay.

GC Services Limited Partnership, Defendant, represented by Eric
Y. Kizirian -- eric.kizirian@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois
Bisgaard & Smith LLP.


GENPACT SERVICES: Faces "Alenkin" Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Genpact Services
LLC. The case is styled as Stanislav Alenkin, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Genpact
Services LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03270 (E.D. N.Y., June
4, 2018).

Genpact, LLC provides collections and business services, and
technology solutions in the United States. Its finance and
accounting services include procure to pay, accounts payable and
receivables, fixed assets accounting, record to report, audits
and projects, books closure, accounts reconciliation, and
planning and performance management.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


GLENAIR INC: Cal. App. Affirms Summary Judgment in "Castillo"
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division
Two, affirmed the District Court's judgment granting Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned ANDREW CASTILLO
et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GLENAIR, INC., Defendant
and Respondent, No. B278239 (Cal. App.).

In a joint employer arrangement, can a class of workers bring a
lawsuit against a staffing company, settle that lawsuit, and then
bring identical claims against the company where they had been
placed to work.  The Cal. App. answers no.

This wage and hour putative class action involves the
relationship between a temporary staffing company (GCA Services
Group, Inc. (GCA)), its employees (appellants Andrew and David
Castillo), and its client company (respondent Glenair, Inc.). The
Castillos were employed and paid by GCA to perform work on site
at Glenair. Glenair was authorized to and did record, review, and
report the Castillos' time records to GCA so that the Castillos
could be paid. The Castillos characterize GCA and Glenair as
joint employers. The undisputed facts of this case demonstrate
both that Glenair and GCA are in privity with one another for
purposes of the Castillos' wage and hour claims, and that Glenair
is an agent of GCA with respect to GCA's payment of wages to its
employees who performed services at Glenair.

These findings of privity and agency are significant. While this
case was pending, a separate class action brought against, among
others, GCA resulted in a final, court-approved settlement
agreement. (Gomez v. GCA Production Services, Inc. (Super. Ct.
San Bernardino County, 2014, No. CIVRS1205657 (Gomez).) The Gomez
settlement agreement contains a broad release barring settlement
class members from asserting wage and hour claims such as those
alleged here against GCA and its agents. The Castillos are
members of the Gomez settlement class and did not opt out of that
settlement.

The Castillos present claims against Glenair involve the same
wage and hour claims, for the same work done, covering the same
time period as the claims asserted in Gomez. Thus, because
Glenair is in privity with GCA (a defendant in Gomez) and is an
agent of GCA, the Gomez settlement bars the Castillos' claims
against Glenair as a matter of law.

The Castillos appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
However, the Cal. App. concludes summary judgment was proper.

The doctrine of res judicata is applicable if (1) the decision in
the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; (2) the present
proceeding is on the same cause of action as the prior
proceeding; and (3) the parties in the present proceeding or
parties in privity with them were parties to the prior
proceeding.

An agent is one who represents another, called the principal, in
dealings with third persons. A representative is one who stands
for or acts on behalf of another.

Glenair is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because res
judicata applies and bars the Castillos' claims against Glenair
The parties do not dispute the following, inter alia: (i) GCA is
a staffing company that supplies employees, such as the
Castillos, to the operations of third party companies, such as
Glenair, (ii) the work the Castillos performed for Glenair was
performed through GCA, (iii) Glenair employees generally directed
and oversaw the services the Castillos performed for Glenair,
(iv) there was no GCA supervisor on site at the Glenair facility
during the relevant time.

The dispute then centers on the third and final element of res
judicata, namely whether the undisputed material facts
demonstrate Glenair was either a party or in privity with a party
in Gomez. As discussed below, we conclude based on the undisputed
facts that Glenair was both in privity with GCA (a party in
Gomez) with respect to the subject matter of this litigation, as
well as itself a released party in Gomez.

Glenair is in privity with GCA with respect to the subject matter
of the litigation.

It is clear Glenair and GCA are in privity for present purposes.
The subject matter of this litigation is the same as the subject
matter of the Gomez litigation namely, both cases involve the
same wage and hour causes of action arising from the same work
performed by the same GCA employees (the Castillos) at GCA's
client company Glenair. Based on the undisputed facts, it is
apparent Glenair and GCA share the same relationship to the
Castillos' claims here. Both Glenair and GCA were involved in and
responsible for payment of the Castillos' wages.

Glenair was authorized by GCA and responsible for recording,
reviewing and transmitting the Castillos' time records to GCA.
GCA paid the Castillos based on those time records. And, by
virtue of the Gomez settlement, the Castillos were compensated
for any errors made in the payment of their wages. Thus, with
respect to the Castillos' wage and hour causes of action, the
interests of Glenair and GCA are so intertwined as to put Glenair
and GCA in the same relationship to the litigation here.

Accordingly, the Court concludes they are in privity for purposes
of the instant litigation.

Glenair was an agent of GCA and, therefore, a released party.
The Castillos argue there can be no finding of agency because
there is no evidence that GCA possessed the requisite control
over Glenair. This Court disagree. The undisputed evidence
demonstrates GCA had the requisite control over Glenair.

Here, GCA authorized Glenair to perform certain timekeeping-
related tasks on behalf of GCA and the only reasonable inference
is that GCA required Glenair to perform those tasks. Had Glenair
failed to perform those timekeeping tasks, GCA would not have
been able to pay its employees.

Thus, because the undisputed facts demonstrate Glenair was an
agent of GCA, specifically an agent with respect to GCA's payment
of wages to its employees, Glenair was a released party under the
Gomez settlement agreement. Accordingly, the Castillos' complaint
against Glenair is barred and summary judgment was proper.
The judgment is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s April 16, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yamyecnh from Leagle.com.

Matern Law Group, Matthew J. Matern  MMatern@maternlawgroup.com -
- Tagore Subramaniam -- tagore@maternlawgroup.com -- and Andrew
Sokolowski -- asokolowski@maternlawgroup.com -- for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Jesse A. Cripps --
jcripps@gibsondunn.com -- Sarah Zenewicz and Elizabeth A. Dooley
-- edooley@gibsondunn.com -- for Defendant and Respondent.


GRAND SLAM: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Grand Slam New York
LLC. The case is styled as Henry Tucker, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Grand Slam New York
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05127 (S.D. N.Y., June 8, 2018).

Grand Slam New York LLC is a souvenir store in New York City, New
York.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


HALLMARK LICENSING: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hallmark Licensing,
LLC. The case is styled as Henry Tucker, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Hallmark Licensing,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05055 (S.D. N.Y., June 6, 2018).

Founded in 1910 by Joyce Hall, Hallmark is the largest
manufacturer of greeting cards in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


HARBOR FITNESS: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Harbor Fitness
Center, Inc. The case is styled as Henry Tucker, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Harbor
Fitness Center, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05242 (S.D.
N.Y., June 11, 2018).

Harbor Fitness Center, Inc. is a fitness gym in Brooklyn.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


HIGUERA FARMS: Faces "Garcia" Suit in C.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Higuera Farms, Inc.
The case is styled as Luis Morales-Garcia, Benito Perez-Reyez,
Cesar Jimenez-Mendoza and Gabriela Rendon-Vasquez, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v.
Higuera Farms, Inc., La Cuesta Farming Company, Inc. and Does
1 through 10 inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-05118-SVW-
JPR (C.D. Cal., June 8, 2018).

Higuera Farms Inc. is in the general farms, primarily crop
industry in Santa Maria, CA.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   Randall R Renick, Esq.
   Hadsell Stormer and Renick LLP
   128 North Fair Oaks Avenue Suite 204
   Pasadena, CA 91103
   Tel: (626) 585-9600
   Fax: (626) 577-7079
   Email: rrr@hadsellstormer.com

      - and -


   Alexandra Thompson Revelas, Esq.
   California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation
   2210 K Street Suite 201
   Sacramento, CA 95816
   Tel: (916) 538-0877
   Fax: (916) 446-3057
   Email: arevelas@crlaf.org

      - and -

   Cornelia Ho-Chin Dai, Esq.
   Hadsell Stormer and Renick LLP
   128 North Fair Oaks Avenue Suite 204
   Pasadena, CA 91103
   Tel: (626) 585-9600
   Fax: (626) 577-7079
   Email: cdai@hadsellstormer.com

      - and -

   Dawson Morton, Esq.
   California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation
   2210 K Street Suite 201
   Sacramento, CA 95816
   Tel: (916) 446-7904

      - and -

   Rosa Erandi Zamora Gutierrez, Esq.
   California Rual Legal Assistance Foundation
   2210 K Street Suite 201
   Sacramento, CA 95816
   Tel: (916) 446-7905
   Fax: (916) 446-3057
   Email: ezamora@crlaf.org

      - and -

   Springsong Cooper, Esq.
   Hadsell Stormer and Renick LLP
   128 North Fair Oaks Avenue Suite 204
   Pasadena, CA 91103
   Tel: (626) 585-9600
   Fax: (626) 577-7079
   Email: scooper@hadsellstormer.com


HILTI INC: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hilti, Inc. The
case is styled as Henry Tucker, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Hilti, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 1:18-cv-05132 (S.D. N.Y., June 8, 2018).

Hilti provides technology-leading products, systems and services
to the worldwide construction industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


HOMEOWNERS: Faces "Robinson" Suit in Texas Supreme Court
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Home Owners
Management Enterprises, Inc. The case is styled as Nathan
Robinson and Misti Robinson, individually and as representatives
of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Home Owners
Management Enterprises, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 18-0504 (Tex.,
June 4, 2018).

Home Owners Management Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Home of Texas
(HOME) is a provider of insured new home warranties to Builders &
Remodelers across the state of Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   Evan 'Van' L. Shaw, Esq.
   LAW OFFICES OF VAN SHAW
   2723 FAIRMOUNT
   DALLAS, TX 75201
   Tel: (214) 754-7110
   FAX NO. (214) 754-7115
   Email: www.shawlawoffice.com

      - and -

   JENNIFER W. JOHNSON, Esq.
   Dallas, TX
   Tel: 214-219-4220
        800-963-3378 (Toll Free)
   Fax: 214-219-4218

      - and -

   Mark A. Ticer, Esq.
   Law Office of Mark A. Ticer
   10440 N. Central Expressway, Ste. 600
   Dallas, TX 75231
   Tel: 214-219-4220
   Fax: 214-219-4218


K B INTERNATIONAL: "Jui" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lidisbet Jui, and others similarly-situated v. K B International
Trading Corp., Paradigm Distribution, Inc. dba Global Trading
Partners, and Kenneth Bulhack, Case No. 18-cv-60832 (S.D. Fla.,
April 16, 2018), seeks to recover money damages for unpaid
overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as an hourly paid
employee from approximately September 2015 through September
2017. The Plaintiff was responsible for putting labels on
products.

The Defendant corporations are in the business of wholesale
distribution of general line groceries. The Individual Defendant
has operational control over the Defendant corporations. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Edilberto Marban, Esq.
      THE LAW OFFICES OF EDDY MARBAN
      2655 S. LeJeune Road, Suite 804
      Coral Gables, FL 33134
      Tel: (305) 448-9292
      Fax: (786) 309-9978
      E-mail: em@eddymarbanlaw.com

KENDAL ON HUDSON: Faces "Mendez" Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Kendal On Hudson,
Inc. The case is styled as Himelda Mendez, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Kendal On Hudson,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04948 (S.D. N.Y., June 4,
2018).

Kendal on Hudson, a not for profit organization, operates a
continuing care retirement community. The company's community
provides various amenities, including apartments, a resident care
center, a garden, and a library with reading, audio, and visual
materials and access to area library systems, as well as offers
residential services, and on-site health care for life. It also
provides access to suburban and urban events, activities, and
services, as well as sponsors on-site courses. The company was
founded in 1997 and is based in Sleepy Hollow, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


LA FONDA RESTAURANT: Faces "Herrera" Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against La Fonda Restaurant
and Tapas Bar Inc. The case is styled as Raquel Herrera Isidoro,
on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. La Fonda
Restaurant and Tapas Bar Inc. doing business as: La Fonda
Boricua, Denisse Ayala Garcia doing business as: Denise Ayala and
Jorge Ayala, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-05066 (S.D. N.Y., June
6, 2018).

La Fonda Restaurant and Tapas Bar Inc. is a Puerto Rican
Restaurant.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


LAW OFFICES HOWARD: Faces "Bashir" Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Law Offices Howard
Lee Schiff, P.C. The case is styled as Francine Bashir,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff, P.C., Defendant, Case
No. 3:18-cv-00975 (S.D. N.Y., June 11, 2018).

Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff, P.C. operates as a legal firm. The
Company offers attorneys, collections, litigation, and client
services. Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff serves clients in the
United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
   Marcus & Zelman, LLC
   701 Cookman Avenue
   Asbury Park, NJ 07712
   Tel: (845) 367-7146
   Fax: (732) 298-6256
   Email: yzelman@MarcusZelman.com


LEFKOFF RUBIN: Faces "Gluckman" Suit in N.D. Georgia
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Lefkoff, Rubin,
Gleason & Russo, P.C. The case is styled as Brian J. Gluckman, on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Lefkoff, Rubin, Gleason & Russo, P.C., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-
cv-02829-MLB-JCF (N.D. Ga., June 11, 2018).

Lefkoff, Rubin, Gleason & Russo, P.C. is a firm serving Atlanta
in bankruptcy, creditors' rights and collections cases.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   James Davidson, Esq.
   Greenwald Davidson & Radbil, PLLC
   5550 Glades Road, Suite 500
   Boca Raton, FL 33431
   Tel: (561) 826-5477
   Email: jdavidson@gdrlawfirm.com

      - and -

   Shireen Hormozdi, Esq.
   Hormozdi Law Firm, LLC
   1770 Indian Trail Lilburn Road, Suite 175
   Norcross, GA 30093
   Tel: (678) 395-7795
   Fax: (866) 929-2434
   Email: shireen@norcrosslawfirm.com


LEFKOFF RUBIN: "Gluckman" Files Suit in N.D. Georgia
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Lefkoff, Rubin,
Gleason & Russo, P.C. The case is styled as Brian J. Gluckman, on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Lefkoff, Rubin, Gleason & Russo, P.C., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-
cv-02829-MLB-JCF (N.D. Ga., June 11, 2018).

Lefkoff, Rubin, Gleason & Russo, P.C. is a firm serving Atlanta
in bankruptcy, creditors' rights and collections cases.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   James Davidson, Esq.
   Greenwald Davidson & Radbil, PLLC
   5550 Glades Road, Suite 500
   Boca Raton, FL 33431
   Tel: (561) 826-5477
   Email: jdavidson@gdrlawfirm.com

      - and -

   Shireen Hormozdi, Esq.
   Hormozdi Law Firm, LLC
   1770 Indian Trail Lilburn Road, Suite 175
   Norcross, GA 30093
   Tel: (678) 395-7795
   Fax: (866) 929-2434
   Email: shireen@norcrosslawfirm.com


MADISON YORK: Faces "Mendez" Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Madison York
Assisted Living Community, LLC. The case is styled as Himelda
Mendez, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Madison York Assisted Living Community, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04947 (S.D. N.Y., June 4, 2018).

Madison York Assisted Living Community, LLC is an Assisted living
facility in New York City, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


MAHONING COUNTY, OH: Ct. Won't Junk Cronyism in Appointments Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio, Eastern Division, denied without prejudice Defendants'
motion to dismiss the case captioned HELEN YOUNGBLOOD, Plaintiff,
v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF MAHONING COUNTY, OHIO, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 4:17-cv-1744 (N.D. Ohio).

Plaintiff Helen Youngblood filed the action in federal court,
alleging that the defendants have made a series of promotional
appointments without prior posting but instead rely on cronyism
and patronage.  She seeks to certify this matter as a class
action, and defines the proposed class as "All persons eligible
for employment advancement employed at the Mahoning County
Department of Jobs & Family Service on January 1, 2014 and
thereafter."

Youngblood subsequently moved for leave to amend her complaint,
instanter and filed the proposed amended complaint on the docket.
The Defendants oppose the motion to amend.

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend its
pleading once as a matter of course within 21 days after serving
it, or if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is
required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21
days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f),
whichever is earlier.

In this case, Youngblood moved to amend her complaint within 21
days after service of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, Youngblood was entitled to amend as a matter of
right. Youngblood's motion for leave to amend is granted, and
defendants' motion to dismiss and Youngblood's motion to certify
the class based on the original complaint are denied without
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 16, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yd6y3j9g from Leagle.com.

Helen Youngblood, Plaintiff, represented by Percy Squire.

Board of Commissioners of Mahoning County, Ohio, David C Ditzler,
Carol Rimedio-Righetti, Anthony Traficanti & Mahoning County
Department of Jobs and Family Services, Defendants, represented
by Gina DeGenova Zawrotuk, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney.


MARS INC: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mars, Incorporated
doing business as: MMS World. The case is styled as Henry Tucker,
on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff
v. Mars, Incorporated doing business as: MMS World, Defendant,
Case No. 1:18-cv-05059 (S.D. N.Y., June 6, 2018).

Mars is an American global manufacturer of confectionery, pet
food, and other food products and a provider of animal care
services, with US$33 billion in annual sales in 2015, and is
ranked as the 6th largest privately held company in the United
States by Forbes. Headquartered in McLean, Virginia, United
States, the company is entirely owned by the Mars family.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


MDL 2672: Court Finds 2 Counties' Tampering Claims Pre-Empted
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaints of two counties, Hillsborough County, Florida and Salt
Lake County, Utah, in the case captioned IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN "CLEAN
DIESEL" MDL MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION. This Order Relates To: MDL Dkt. Nos. 4583, 4584.
Environmental Protection Commission of Hillsborough County v.
Volkswagen, No. 16-cv-2210 (N.D. Cal.). Salt Lake County v.
Volkswagen, No. 16-cv-5649 (N.D. Cal.) MDL Dkt. No. 2672 CRB
(JSC). (N.D. Cal.).

The central question addressed in this Order is whether these new
allegations save the Counties' tampering claims from pre-emption.

The two counties filed tampering claims against Volkswagen that
are similar to Wyoming's, except the Counties also allege that
Volkswagen modified its defeat device to operate more
effectively, and perhaps even added new defeat devices, through
software updates during vehicle maintenance and post-sale
recalls.

Before considering the pre-emption questions, the Court first
addresses the Defendants' statutory arguments that their conduct
does not come within the terms of the Counties' tampering rules.

Salt Lake alleges that Volkswagen installed emission controls in
the affected vehicles that, during emissions testing, were able
to satisfy the Environmental Protection Agency's standards.  The
defeat device then rendered the vehicles' otherwise compliant
emission controls noncompliant when the vehicles were driven on
the road. The defeat device, then, made inoperable a system or
device that was installed or incorporated for the control of
exhaust emissions in compliance with the Federal motor vehicle
rules.  Volkswagen's alleged conduct comes within the terms of
Salt Lake's tampering rule, the Court ruled.

Volkswagen and Bosch also contend that their conduct does not
come within the bounds of the tampering rules invoked by
Hillsborough County.  As alleged, the Defendants equipped the
affected vehicles with emission controls that could and did meet
EPA's emission standards during testing. The Defendants also
equipped the affected vehicles with a defeat device, which
reduced the effectiveness of the vehicles' emission controls
during normal on-road driving.

Whether the defeat device was installed at the exact same time as
the emission controls, or was installed sometime later during the
manufacturing process, the defeat device reduced the
effectiveness of the vehicles' emission controls during normal
vehicle use and therefore modified and rendered inoperable
certain devices and mechanisms installed as original equipment at
the time of manufacture for the purpose of reducing or aiding in
the control of emissions.

The Court accordingly concludes that the Defendants' alleged
conduct comes within the bounds of Hillsborough's tampering
rules.

Turning to the pre-emption analysis, the Court starts on familiar
ground. Like the Counties, Wyoming previously asserted that
Volkswagen violated a local tampering law by manufacturing and
installing a defeat device in its vehicles. The Court held that
Wyoming's tampering claim was expressly pre-empted by Section
209(a) of the Clean Air Act.

The Counties allege that Volkswagen and Bosch made the post-sale
software changes at issue on a model-wide basis in thousands of
vehicles nationwide. As a consequence, the congressional
objective that the Court must identify is how Congress intended
for model-wide tampering by vehicle manufacturers and parts
suppliers to be regulated. The Counties view Section 209 of the
Clean Air Act as answering that question: When vehicles are
tampered with when they are new, they contend that Section 209(a)
prohibits states and local governments from attempting to
regulate that conduct; but when vehicles are tampered with when
they are in use, they contend that Section 209(d) allows states
and local governments to regulate that conduct, regardless of the
magnitude of the tampering offense or the identity of the
offender, without interfering with the federal regulatory scheme.

The Clean Air Act does not draw such a clear line. For one thing,
the Act requires vehicles to meet EPA's emission standards during
their useful life. The federal regulation of vehicle emissions
therefore does not stop after vehicles are sold to end users. And
although Congress has looked to both EPA and the states and local
governments to enforce these useful life standards, the
enforcement roles of these entities do not entirely overlap.
Instead, it is evident from the statutory scheme and legislative
history that Congress intended for EPA and the states and local
governments to serve specific and separate functions in
regulating emissions from in-use vehicles.

States and local governments, in contrast, are in a better
position than EPA to enforce emission standards at the individual
user level. Although Congress could theoretically task EPA with
overseeing nationwide vehicle inspection programs with the agency
running testing centers and requiring vehicle owners to have
their vehicles checked on a regular basis states and local
governments can more efficiently do so because they already
oversee vehicle registration and drivers' licensing, and can use
state police power to aid enforcement. Indeed, when Congress
first sought to motivate states to create vehicle inspection
programs, it did so based on the belief that states would adopt
such programs as an integral part of safety inspection programs.

This is not to say that there is no conceivable scenario,
consistent with the Clean Air Act, in which states and local
governments could regulate a vehicle manufacturer's compliance
with emission standards. If, for example, a manufacturer were to
tamper with a single in-use vehicle during vehicle maintenance,
the Clean Air Act would not bar a state or local government from
bringing a tampering claim against the manufacturer if the
tampering occurred within its borders.

In such a scenario, the manufacturer is not acting on a model-
wide basis, and therefore the enforcement advantages that EPA has
over the states and local governments are not implicated. But
when a manufacturer's actions affect vehicles model wide, the
Clean Air Act manifests Congress' intent that EPA, not the states
or local governments, will regulate that conduct.

The model-wide nature of the post-sale software changes alleged
here makes them the type of conduct that Congress intended EPA to
regulate. And indeed, EPA has regulated this conduct. EPA was
instrumental in bringing Volkswagen's emissions fraud to light,
as it began an investigation in 2014 to determine why on-road
emissions from the affected vehicles significantly exceeded
emissions during testing. And it was only after EPA threatened
not to certify certain model-year 2016 vehicles that Volkswagen
finally admitted that it had equipped the affected vehicles with
a defeat device.

Section 209(d), then, was viewed as providing states and local
governments with the authority to control the movement of
vehicles so that they could reduce commuter traffic and thereby
decrease automobile-related air pollution. These are not the
types of measures that affect vehicle manufacturers and parts
suppliers. To the contrary, the legislative history reveals that
the intent of Section 209(d) was to give states and local
governments a tool to lessen the burden on vehicle manufacturers,
as manufacturers are ultimately the ones that must develop and
implement the technology capable of meeting federal vehicle
emission standards.

Interpreting Section 209(d) in the manner suggested by the
Counties would have just such a destabilizing effect. When the
Clean Air Act is considered as a whole, it is clear that Congress
intended for EPA to regulate vehicle emission standards on a
model-wide basis, while states and local governments would
regulate compliance with these standards at the individual
vehicle level. Section 209(d) does not modify that framework.

Having concluded that the Counties' claims are preempted, the
Court grants the Defendants' motions to dismiss the Counties'
complaints.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 16, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9qd48v8 from Leagle.com.

Nicholas Benipayo, James Babiak, Jonathon Horacek & Alfred Howe,
Plaintiffs, represented by Robert B. Carey -- rob@hbsslaw.com --
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice & Steve W. Berman -
- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice.

Nicholas Benipayo, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas Eric Loeser -
- toml@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice.
Nadine Bonda, Plaintiff, represented by Adam M. Stewart --
astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP & Thomas G.
Shapiro -- tshapiro@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.
Brian Connelly, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas G. Shapiro,
Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation
Defendant, represented by Amie Adelia Vague --
avague@lightfootlaw.com -- Lightfoot Franklin & White, Casey Erin
Lucier -- clucier@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, Charles
J. Baker, III -- chuck.baker@wbd-us.com -- Womble Carlyle
Sandridge and Rice, Colin Hampton Tucker --
ctucker@rhodesokla.com -- Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable,
Dana Woodrum Lang -dana.lang@wbd-us.com -- Womble Carlyle
Sandridge and Rice, David M. Eisenberg -- eisenberg@bscr-law.com
-- Baker, Sterchi, Cowden & Rice, LLC, Henry Buist Smythe, Jr. --
henry.smythe@wbd-us.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice,
Howard Feller -- hfeller@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP,
Hugh J. Bode -- hbode@reminger.com -- Reminger & Reminger Co LPA,
J Randolph Bibb, Jr. -- rbibb@lewisthomason.com -- Lewis,
Thomason, King, Krieg & Waldrop, P.C.


MERLE NORMAN: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Merle Norman
Cosmetics, Inc. The case is styled as Luc Burbon, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Merle
Norman Cosmetics, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05241 (S.D.
N.Y., June 11, 2018).

Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc. engages in the research,
development, manufacture, and distribution of skin care and color
cosmetic products for women. It offers makeup products, such as
foundations, powders, concealers and bases, and cheek colors; eye
shadows, eyeliners, mascaras, false lashes, and brow care
products; lipsticks, lip glosses, and lip liners; and makeup
brushes and brush cleaners.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


METROPOLITAN TRANSPO: Faces Self Initiated Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Metropolitan
Transportation Authority. The case is styled as Self Initiated
Living Options, Inc., Gina Barbara and Raymond Harewood,
individually and on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority,
Andy Byford, In his official capacity as chairman and CEO of the
Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Philip Eng, in his
official capacity as president of the Long Island Rail Road,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-05200 (S.D. N.Y., June 10, 2018).

The Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) is a public
benefit corporation responsible for public transportation in the
U.S. state of New York, serving 12 counties in Downstate New
York, along with two counties in southwestern Connecticut under
contract to the Connecticut Department of Transportation,
carrying over 11 million passengers on an average weekday
systemwide, and over 850,000 vehicles on its seven toll bridges
and two tunnels per weekday. MTA is the largest public transit
authority in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   James E. Bahamonde, Esq.
   Law Offices of James E. Bahamonde, PC
   2501 Jody Court
   North Bellmore, NY 11710
   Tel: (516) 783-9662
   Fax: (646) 435-4376
   Email: James@CivilRightsNY.com


MICHIGAN: Remand of Water Crisis Suit to Court of Claims Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, affirmed the
District Court's judgment remanding to the Michigan Court of
Claims the case captioned TAMARA NAPPIER, as mother and next
friend of T.N., a minor child, on behalf of T.N. and a class of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD
SNYDER, et al., Defendants-Appellees, DANIEL WYANT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants, No. 17-1401 (6th Cir.).

This case arises from the water crisis in Flint, Michigan.
Plaintiff Nappier and minor T.N. are residents of Flint.  Seeking
to represent a class of all individuals who, from April 25, 2014
through the date of trial, are or were minor children (age 17
years and younger) who are or were residing in the City of Flint,
Michigan, and who have been brain damaged as a result of the
ingestion of lead poisoned water from pipes and service lines
that supplied water from the Flint River without the use of any
corrosion control, the plaintiff filed her class-action complaint
in the Michigan Court of Claims on March 23, 2016, alleging that
the Defendants breached various duties relating to the Flint
water supply.

Defendants-Appellants employees of the Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality (MDEQ Defendants) appeal the district
court's order remanding the case to the Michigan Court of Claims
on the basis that it was improperly removed.

In Mays v. City of Flint, No. 5:16-cv-11519-JCO-MKM (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 6, 2016), the Plaintiffs, purporting to represent a class of
thousands of Flint water users, sued numerous defendants,
including MDEQ defendants, alleging gross negligence, fraud,
assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The MDEQ defendants removed the case to federal court,
invoking the same bases for federal jurisdiction as invoked here.
The district court found that removal was improper because the
MDEQ defendants had not shown that they were acting under federal
officers or were being sued for acts performed under color of
federal office, and because the plaintiffs' claims did not raise
a federal question.

The MDEQ Defendants argue that, inter alia: (1) the district
court erroneously resolved doubts about the propriety of removal
in favor of remand rather than in favor of broad federal-officer
removal; (2) although they were implementing Michigan's Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA), they were acting under federal
officers at the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(USEPA) because (a) they were performing tasks that the USEPA
otherwise would have been required to undertake, (b) the USEPA
retained authority to control MDEQ's actions and MDEQ was subject
to USEPA supervision, and (c) the USEPA provided federal funding
for MDEQ to administer and enforce the federal SDWA.

In Mays, this court held that the relationship between the MDEQ
and the USEPA is a model of cooperative federalism, not an agency
relationship and MDEQ Defendants were not acting under the EPA
and thus are not eligible for federal-officer removal.

The Court affirms the district court's ruling that federal-
officer removal was improper.

The MDEQ Defendants argue that the district court erred by
finding that the Plaintiff's garden-variety' state-law tort claim
does not raise a federal question at the level of importance"
required by Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g &
Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313-14 (2005), because violations of the SDWA
and the Lead Copper Rule will underpin state tort claims in
jurisdictions across the country. They also assert that federal
jurisdiction would not upset the balance of federal and state
responsibilities.
But Mays resolved this issue as well, finding that the
plaintiffs' claims did not raise a substantial federal question.
Again, because Mays is legally indistinguishable on this issue,
the Court affirm the district court's determination that Section
1441 removal was improper.

A full-text copy of the Sixth Circuit's April 16, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y85no2mf from Leagle.com.


MICRO ELECTRONICS: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Micro Electronics,
Inc. The case is styled as Henry Tucker, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Micro Electronics,
Inc. doing business as: Micro Center, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-
cv-05047 (S.D. N.Y., June 6, 2018).

Micro Electronics, Inc. (MEI) is a privately owned corporation
headquartered in Hilliard, Ohio. Founded in 1979 by John Baker,
it serves as the parent company of the computer retailer Micro
Center, its online division Micro Center Online, and its brands
PowerSpec PC, WinBook, and IPSG.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


MCPEAK'S ADULT: Faces "Mendez" Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against McPeak's Adult
Home, Inc. The case is styled as Himelda Mendez, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. McPeak's
Adult Home, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04943 (S.D. N.Y.,
June 4, 2018).

McPeak's Adult Home, Inc. is an Assisted living facility in
Patchogue, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


MIDTOWN AUTO: Faces "Campos" Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Midtown Auto Care
Service Inc. The case is styled as Guillermo Campos and German
Escobar, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Midtown Auto Care Service Inc.,
S.T.A. Parking Corp., Michael Zacharias and Kathleen McLeod,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-04936 (S.D. N.Y., June 4, 2018).

Midtown Auto Care Service Center Inc is a privately held company
in New York, NY and is a single location business, categorized
under Indoor Parking Services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear PRO SE.[BN]


MIDWAY A.L.: Faces "Mendez" Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Midway A.L. LLC
doing business as: Castle Senior Living. The case is styled as
Himelda Mendez, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Midway A.L. LLC doing business as: Castle
Senior Living, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04946 (S.D. N.Y., June
4, 2018).

Midway A.L. LLC is an Assisted living facility in New York City,
New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


MOHAN'S CUSTOM: Faces "Camacho" Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mohan's Custom
Tailors, Inc. The case is styled as Jason Camacho, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Mohan's
Custom Tailors, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04960 (S.D.
N.Y., June 4, 2018).

Mohan's Custom Tailors, Inc. offers tailoring services in
Manhattan.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


NATIONS RECOVERY: Faces "Mitchell" Suit in E.D. Virginia
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nations Recovery
Center, Inc. The case is styled as Billy Mitchell, for himself
and on behalf others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Nations
Recovery Center, Inc. and Resurgent Capital Services, L.P.,
Defendants, Case No. 4:18-cv-00068-AWA-DEM (E.D. Va., June 4,
2018).

Nations Recovery Center Inc or NRC is a debt collection
agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Leonard Anthony Bennett, Esq.
   Consumer Litigation Associates
   763 J Clyde Morris Boulevard, Suite 1A
   Newport News, VA 23601
   Tel: (757) 930-3660
   Fax: (757) 930-3662
   Email: lenbennett@clalegal.com

      - and -

   Susan Mary Rotkis, Esq.
   Consumer Litigation Associates
   763 J Clyde Morris Boulevard, Suite 1A
   Newport News, VA 23601
   Tel: (757) 930-3660
   Fax: (757) 930-3662
   Email: srotkis@clalegal.com


NATIONS RECOVERY: Faces "Madar" Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nations Recovery
Center, Inc. The case is styled as Itschak Madar, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Nations
Recovery Center, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03257-ENV-SJB
(E.D. N.Y., June 4, 2018).

Nations Recovery Center Inc or NRC is a debt collection
agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Daniel A. Louro, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza W
   12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (929) 575-4175
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: dlouro@cml.legal


NEIMAN MARCUS: Cal. App. Affirms Dismissal of "Tanguilig"
---------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, First District, Division
Four, affirmed a Trial Court's judgment granting Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss the case captioned BERNADETTE TANGUILIG,
Plaintiff and Appellant, v. NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP, INC., Defendant
and Respondent, No. A141383 (Cal. App.).

Bernadette Tanguilig brought suit against her former employer,
Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., alleging a combination of individual
and class claims for wrongful termination in violation of public
policy and multiple violations of the California Labor Code.
Early in the trial court proceedings, NMG successfully demurred
to Tanguilig's wrongful termination and related claims, and
several years later, moved to dismiss the remaining claims
pursuant to California's five-year dismissal statute, Code of
Civil Procedure section 583.310.

On appeal, Tanguilig urges the Cal. App. to overturn the five-
year dismissal order, arguing primarily that the trial court
erred in failing to toll the five-year clock under section
583.340, subdivision (c), for the period during which an order
compelling co-plaintiff Juan Carlos Pinela to arbitration was in
effect.

Tanguilig contends the five-year period for bringing this action
to trial under section 583.310 was tolled by a total of 842 days.
In support of her tolling argument, Tanguilig claims three
discrete periods should be excluded from the five-year period
under section 583.340, subdivision (c):  (1) the 351 days during
which Judge Kramer's Arbitration Order was in effect (i.e., from
November 2011 to November 2012); (2) the 99-day period beginning
in June 2008 when she sought writ review from this court
following the dismissal of her FAC; and (3) the 392-day period
from November 2012 to December 2013 following her request to set
her PAGA claim for trial.

To avoid dismissal under the section 583.340, subdivision (c)
exception, a plaintiff must prove (1) a circumstance establishing
impossibility, impracticability, or futility, (2) a causal
connection between the circumstance and the failure to move the
case to trial within the five-year period, and (3) that she was
reasonably diligent in prosecuting her case at all stages in the
proceedings.

Case law under section 583.310 has long held that for the tolling
provision of section 583.340, subdivision (c) to apply, there
must be a period of impossibility, impracticability or futility,
over which plaintiff had no control, because the statute is
designed to prevent avoidable delay. The fact is Tanguilig chose,
apparently as tactical matter, to include within the scope of her
PAGA claim and within the putative class she sought to represent,
employees who had signed an arbitration agreement. Surely she
knew at the least she should have known the inevitable
consequence: Pleading claims that encompassed signatories to an
arbitration agreement was bound to draw a motion to compel
arbitration and potentially entangle the rest of the case in
delays arising out of that motion, which is exactly what
happened.

Bearing in mind the employment litigation setting before Cal.
App., this Court view any procedural complexities and delays
occasioned by the Arbitration Order as not only predictable, but
more importantly, invited. If entry of the Arbitration Order
staying Pinela's claims had some collateral delaying effect on
the pursuit of Tanguilig's claims, the Court view it as avoidable
delay and thus conclude it cannot justify tolling.

Upon close review of the record, the Cal. App. this NMG has the
better of the argument concerning whether Tanguilig preserved a
claim to tolling during the 392-day period. She did ask for the
setting of a trial date within days of Judge Kramer's vacatur of
his Arbitration Order in November of 2012, but when faced with
NMG's motion to dismiss on five-year grounds, the only tolling
argument she asserted in her brief opposing the motion was a
contention the five-year statute was tolled during the 351-day
period the Arbitration Order had been in effect.

Nowhere in that opposition did she argue that the 392 days she
spent waiting for a ruling on her request for trial setting
should be excluded from the five-year calculation. If she had
squarely presented the 392-day tolling issue at that point, as
she does now on appeal, Judge Karnow could have made the
inherently fact-bound assessment of impossibility,
impracticability, or futility for this specific period. He did
not mention the issue in his February 4, 2014 order of dismissal.
And as the Cal. App. reads read the record, he was silent on it
for a reason: He was not asked to address it.

It seems clear that Judge Karnow treated the supplemental
briefing following his February 4 order as nothing more than an
opportunity for the parties to provide argument on Tanguilig's
claim that he had misinterpreted Judge Kramer's Arbitration
Order, an issue that was only relevant because, as the tolling
issue was framed in his order of dismissal which tracked how the
parties framed it in the briefs on the motion to dismiss his
tolling analysis turned on the 351-day period during which the
Arbitration Order was in effect.

After considering the supplemental briefs, and holding an
additional hearing on February 26, 2014, Judge Karnow issued an
Order Clarifying Order of February 4, 2014 addressing only the
interpretive issue Tanguilig had raised, and nothing more. In a
footnote, Judge Karnow noted the broader scope of argument
offered by Tanguilig in her supplemental brief, but said that he
was treating Tanguilig's submission as a request for
clarification of his February 4 order.

To the extent her supplemental brief presented new arguments for
tolling (the claimed 392-day tolling period), the Court views it
as an untimely motion for reconsideration. Among other problems
with raising a new issue in that fashion, it deprived NMG of a
fair opportunity to respond, particularly since Judge Karnow was
proceeding upon simultaneously-filed briefs.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Judge Karnow did not
address the claimed 392-day period because Tanguilig failed to
raise the issue properly. It is too late to ask the Cal. App. to
address the issue now on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s April 16, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8b454q9 from Leagle.com.

Cornerstone Law Group, Gordon W. Renneisen --
grenneisen@cornerlaw.com -- Harry G. Lewis --
hlewis@cornerlaw.com -- and Kenneth A. Frost III ; Law Offices of
Douglas A. Kahn and Douglas A. Kahn -- doug@kahnemploymentlaw.com
-- for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Jackson Lewis, David S. Bradshaw --
David.Bradshaw@jacksonlewis.com -- Patrick C. Mullin --
Patrick.Mullin@jacksonlewis.com -- Jones Day and Matthew J.
Silveira -- msilveira@jonesday.com -- for Defendant and
Respondent.


NEVADA: Wins Partial Termination of Injunction in Prisons Case
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada
granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion to
Terminate the permanent injunction in the case captioned ROBERT
L. STICKNEY, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT LIST et al., Defendants, No.
3:79-cv-00011-RCJ(D. Nev).

In 1979, Plaintiff Robert Stickney filed this action, arguing
that various conditions at Northern Nevada Correction Center
(NNCC) violated the Eighth Amendment. Judge Reed certified the
case as a class action in 1981 and entered judgment in 1982 after
a bench trial. The Plaintiff argued, inter alia, that
overcrowding at NNCC had resulted in frequent assaults and other
unconstitutional conditions.

Judge Reed found that violence in Units 1, 2, and 3 at NNCC
exceeded constitutional standards and was due essentially to
understaffing, ordering the following injunctive relief:

     "No fewer than two correctional officers shall be on duty at
all times in Units 1, 2 and 3 at NNCC. In the event that the
number of inmates housed in any of Units 1, 2 and 3 shall exceed
172, a minimum of three correctional officers must be assigned to
duty on a 24-hour basis in such unit. If all three of said units
exceed an inmate population of 172, then said minimum staffing
must also include an additional two roving officers who may move
about said three units."

The Defendants have asked the Court to terminate the injunction
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA). In a
prison conditions case where prospective relief was ordered
before the date of enactment of the PLRA, as here, any party may
request termination of such relief two years after the date of
enactment.

The Defendants are entitled to the immediate termination of any
prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the
absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly
drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation
of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary
to correct the violation of the Federal right.

The Court cannot, of course, re-litigate the constitutional
question, and the Defendants do not alternatively ask the Court
to relieve it from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), i.e., due to
changed conditions. A court's task under Section 3626(b) is to
determine first not whether the remedy previously imposed was in
fact the least intrusive necessary, but whether the court issuing
the injunction so found. Only if the answer to that first
question is no does a court proceed to examine whether the remedy
previously imposed remains the least intrusive necessary to
correct an ongoing violation.

The Court cannot say that Judge Reed failed to make the required
findings with respect to the two-guard requirement in each of
Units 1, 2, and 3. However, he did not make explicit findings
with respect to the three-guard requirement when any of the units
exceed 172 inmates or the two-roving-guard requirement when all
three of the units exceed 172 inmates.

In summary, the Defendants are not entitled to termination of the
injunction as to the two-guard requirement. In most circuits, the
Defendants would be entitled to immediate termination of the
three-guard and two-roving-guard requirements unless the
Plaintiff showed that they were the least restrictive necessary
to remedy an ongoing violation under current conditions, but in
this Circuit the Court may not so rule unless the record before
Judge Reed would not have supported such a finding, regardless of
whether Judge Reed made explicit findings to that effect.

Judge Reed required two guards per unit at all times (which was
already in place, according to the Report), and three guards per
unit at all times only when a unit exceeded 120% of design
capacity. The Court therefore cannot say that the record does not
support the requirement of three guards per unit when any unit
exceeds 172 inmates, because it would in fact have supported a
requirement of three guards per unit at all times regardless of
inmate population. In another way, however, Judge Reed imposed a
remedy stricter than that supported by the record.

The Report indicates that three guards per unit is advisable so
that two may rove the wings of the unit while one guard remains
in the central rotunda. But the Report includes no recommendation
for any number of additional guards to rove between the units
themselves. The record simply does not support this aspect of the
injunction, and Defendants are entitled to its immediate
termination unless Plaintiff can show that the remedy is the
least intrusive necessary to correct an ongoing constitutional
violation.

The Court notes that the Defendants claim the conditions leading
to the injunction no longer exist. The Defendants remain free to
file a motion under Rule 60(b)(6). The Court cannot reexamine the
constitutional issues in the absence of such a motion. The
Court's power to terminate the injunction under the present PLRA
motion are more limited.

Accordingly, the Motion to Terminate Prospective Relief is
granted in part and denied in part. The requirements of two
guards per unit at all times in Units 1, 2, and 3 at Northern
Nevada Correctional Center and three guards per unit when the
inmate population of the unit exceeds 172 shall remain in force.
The requirement of two additional roving guards when all three
units exceed 172 inmates is terminated.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 16, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y98fcpn7 from Leagle.com

Robert L. Stickney, Plaintiff, pro se.

Robert L. List, Defendant, pro se.

Director James E. Dzurenda, Defendant, represented by Ian E.
Carr, Nevada Attorney General.


NEW YORK, NY: Faces "Gailego" Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The City of New
York. The case is styled as Harold Gailego and Nicholas
Ferrandino, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. The City of New York,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05234 (S.D. N.Y., June 11, 2018).

New York City comprises 5 boroughs sitting where the Hudson River
meets the Atlantic Ocean. At its core is Manhattan, a densely
populated borough that's among the world's major commercial,
financial and cultural centers. Its iconic sites include
skyscrapers such as the Empire State Building and sprawling
Central Park. Broadway theater is staged in neon-lit Times
Square.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear PRO SE.


NORTHSTAR LOCATION: Faces "Ungar" Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Northstar Location
Services, LLC. The case is styled as Myra Ungar agent of,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Northstar Location Services, LLC and John Does 1-25,
Defendants, Case No. 7:18-cv-05251 (S.D. N.Y., June 11, 2018).

Northstar Location Services, LLC, doing business as The Northstar
Companies, provides receivables debt collection services to
customers in the United States, Canada, and internationally. Its
services include first and third-party debt collections, customer
care programs, and location services. The company was founded in
2000 and is based in Cheektowaga, New York with an additional
office in Canada.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


P&B CAPITAL: Faces "Giordano" Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against P&B Capital Group,
LLC. The case is styled as Nicholas Giordano, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. P&B
Capital Group, LLC and Crown Asset Management, LLC, Defendants,
Case No. 2:18-cv-03340-SJF-SIL (E.D. N.Y., June 7, 2018).

P&b Capital Group, LLC was founded in 2004. The company's line of
business includes collection and adjustment services on claims
and other insurance related issues.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Mitchell L. Pashkin, Esq.
   775 Park Avenue, Ste. 255
   Huntington, NY 11743
   Tel: (631) 335-1107
   Email: mpash@verizon.net


PASSIONS NETWORK: Faces "Dephillips" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Passions Network,
Inc. The case is styled as Joseph Dephillips, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Passions
Network, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05217 (S.D. N.Y., June
11, 2018).

Passions Network is a dating and social networking website,
consisting of over 200 niche sites focused on varying areas of
interest.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


PAZ MANAGEMENT: Faces "Mendez" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against PAZ Management Inc.
The case is styled as Himelda Mendez, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PAZ Management Inc.
doing business as: Avalon Assisted Living, Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-04950 (S.D. N.Y., June 4, 2018).

PAZ Management Inc. is an Assisted living facility in Fitchburg,
Wisconsin.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


PET SUPPLIES: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pet Supplies Plus,
LLC. The case is styled as Henry Tucker, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Pet Supplies Plus,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05131 (S.D. N.Y., June 8, 2018).

Pet Supplies Plus/U.S.A., Inc. operates franchised and corporate
pet stores in Midwest and Eastern states. The company offers pet
food, supplies, and toys. It also provides grooming, self-service
pet wash, and adoption services. The company offers its products
and services for dogs, cats, birds, fishes, small animals, and
reptiles and amphibians. It also provides franchise
opportunities. The company was founded in 1988 and is based in
Livonia, Michigan.[BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


PETER UNDERGROUND: Faces "Perez" Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Peter Underground
Utility LLC. The case is styled as Jose Perez, on behalf of
himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff
v. Peter Underground Utility LLC, Nelu Cable Inc., Danella Line
Services Company, Inc., Peter Serban, Valentin Serban and James
Danella, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-mc-00124-UJ (E.D. Penn., June
8, 2018).

Peter Underground Utility LLC is a privately held company in
Philadelphia, PA and is a Single Location business, categorized
under Underground Wire and Cable Laying Contrs.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


PLS CHECK CASHERS: Faces "Fischler" Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against PLS Check Cashers
of New York, Inc. The case is styled as Brian Fischler,
individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. PLS Check Cashers of New York, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05255 (S.D. N.Y., June 11, 2018).

PLS Check Cashers of New York, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of
PLS Group, Inc., is licensed as a Check Casher by the New York
State Department of Financial Services and by the superintendent
of banks pursuant to Article 9-A of the banking law.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


POSTMATES INC: Faces "Lee" Suit in N.D. California
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Postmates Inc. The
case is styled as Dora Lee, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Postmates Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 3:18-cv-03421 (N.D. Cal., June 8, 2018).

Postmates Inc. operates a logistics and on-demand delivery
platform that connects customers with local couriers, who
purchase and deliver goods from any restaurant or store in a city
in the United States. The company's services are available for
iPhone, Android, and on the web. It also serves customers in
Honolulu, Hawaii. The company was founded in 2011 and is based in
San Francisco, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


PROCOLLECT INC: Faces "Young" Suit in N.D. Texas
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against ProCollect, Inc.
The case is styled as Ronnie Young, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ProCollect, Inc. and
John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 4:18-cv-00475-A (N.D. Tex.,
June 11, 2018).

ProCollect, Inc. is a financial consultant in Dallas, Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan David Kandelshein, Esq.
   The Law Offices of Jonathan Kandelshein
   18208 Preston Rd
   Suite D-9 #256
   Dallas, TX 75252
   Tel: (469) 677-7863
   Fax: (972) 380-8118
   Email: Jonathan.kandelshein@gmail.com


PROCOLLECT INC: Faces "Clark" Suit in W.D. Tennessee
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Procollect
Incorporated. The case is styled as Melissa Clark, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Procollect Incorporated, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-02379-JPM-
dkv (W.D. Tenn., June 6, 2018).

Procollect Incorporated is a financial consultant in Dallas,
Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
   MARCUS & ZELMAN, LLC
   701 Cookman Avenue
   Asbury Park, NJ 07712
   Tel: (845) 367-7146
   Fax: (732) 298-6256
   Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


PROCTER & GAMBLE PAPER: Faces "Marsh" Suit in C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Procter &
Gamble Paper Products Company. The case is styled as Cassidy
Marsh, on behalf of himself, and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. The Procter & Gamble Paper Products Company, an Ohio
Corporation, The Procter & Gamble U.S. Business Services Company,
an Ohio Corporation, Procter & Gamble Productions, Inc., an Ohio
Corporation, Procter & Gamble RHD, Inc., an Ohio Corporation, The
Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Company, an Ohio Corporation,
Procter & Gamble Distributing LLC., a Delaware Limited Liability
Company, Procter & Gamble Hair Care LLC., Delaware Limited
Liability Company and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 2:18-cv-04944 (C.D. Cal., June 4, 2018).

The Procter & Gamble Paper Products Company manufactures paper,
health care, and hygiene products including toilet tissue, paper
toweling, and facial tissue. The company produces Bounty paper
towels and Charmin toilet tissues. It also operates paper mills.
The company was formerly known as The Charmin Paper Products
Company and changed its name to The Procter & Gamble Paper
Products Company in July 1976. The Procter & Gamble Paper
Products Company was founded in 1956 and is based in Jackson,
Missouri. The Procter & Gamble Paper Products Company operates as
a subsidiary of The Procter & Gamble Company.

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


PROGRESSIONS BEHAVIORAL: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Charles"
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case
captioned TRACY CHARLES, ET AL., v. PROGRESSIONS BEHAVIORAL
HEALTH SERVICES, INC., Civil Action No. 17-2439 (E.D. Pa.).

Plaintiffs Tracy Charles, Shanna Griffin, and Antonio Simon filed
a Collective and Class Action Complaint against their employer,
Defendant Progressions Behavioral Health Services, Inc.,
asserting claims for unpaid wages under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA), the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (PMWA) and the
Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law (WPCL).

During their employment, the Plaintiffs have regularly worked
more than forty hours per week, but have not been paid overtime
wages of 1.5 times their regular rate of pay for those hours in
excess of forty.

The Defendant has moved to dismiss the FLSA claim and WPCL claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The Defendant argues that we should dismiss the FLSA claim in its
entirety because the Complaint seeks to assert a claim on behalf
of Behavioral Health Workers and/or Therapeutic Staff Workers but
only alleges facts to support a claim concerning individuals who
worked as both Behavioral Health Workers and Therapeutic Staff
Workers during the same time period.

The Complaint alleges that the three named Plaintiffs in this
action are individuals who worked simultaneously for Defendant as
Behavioral Health Workers and Therapeutic Staff Workers. All
three allege that they were denied overtime because Defendant
both failed to aggregate their hours in their dual roles and
failed to pay them for hours it deemed non-billable.

The Court dismiss the Plaintiffs' FLSA claim for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted based solely on an
assertion that the Complaint's description of the class of
employees that the Plaintiffs seek to include in their collective
action is overinclusive. Rather, whether the Plaintiffs may file
an action on behalf of others who are not identically-situated to
them is a question that the Court will address in connection with
Plaintiffs' pending Motion to Proceed as a Collective Action.
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court concludes only that
the three named Plaintiffs have stated an FLSA claim upon which
relief may be granted, which Defendant concedes. Accordingly, the
Court denies the Defendant's Motion insofar as it seeks dismissal
of Plaintiffs' FLSA claim.

The Defendant also argues that the Court should dismiss the
Plaintiffs' WPCL claim because the Complaint fails to plausibly
allege that it and the Plaintiffs were parties to an employment
contract, much less an employment contract that obligated them to
pay the Plaintiff wages for all hours worked, overtime and paid
time off.

Here, the Complaint alleges that the Plaintiffs and the Defendant
entered into an agreement that all non-exempt, hourly employees
of the Defendant would be paid their regular rate for all regular
hours that they work, and paid time and one-half for any overtime
hours they work over forty in a week. The Complaint refers to the
Employee Handbook, and alleges that the Handbook reflects that
full-time employees are entitled to these same specified wages
and benefits.

The Complaint alleges that the parties entered into an agreement
that was memorialized in the Handbook and required the Defendant
to pay the Plaintiffs wages for all hours worked and overtime,
and to afford them paid time off. While the Defendant argues that
the Complaint does not state a plausible WPCL claim, at least in
part because it does not allege whether or not the Handbook
contains a disclaimer announcing that the Handbook is not a
contract, the Court concludes that the lack of this allegation in
the face of no assertion that the Handbook actually contains such
a disclaimer simply does not render the WPCL claim implausible.

The Court therefore denies the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
insofar as it seeks dismissal of the WPCL claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 16, 2018
Memorandum is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybmk98sy from
Leagle.com.

TRACY CHARLES, SHANNA GRIFFIN & ANTONIO SIMON, Plaintiffs,
represented by MICHAEL PATRICK MURPHY, JR., MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC
& MICHAEL GROH, MURPHY LAW GROUP, LLC.

PROGRESSIONS BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., Defendant,
represented by LEAH A. LEWIS -- llewis@rmh-law.com -- REILLY
JANICZEK & MCDEVITT, MOLLY C. REILLY -- mreilly@rmh-law.com --
REILLY JANICZEK & MCDEVITT, PC & SUSAN M. VALINIS --
svalinis@rmh-law.com -- REILLY JANICZEK & MCDEVITT P.C..


PROGRESSIONS BEHAVIORAL: Court Narrows Claims in "Thompson"
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted in part and denied in part Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss the case captioned MAJUANA THOMPSON, v.
PROGRESSIONS BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., ET AL., Civil
Action No. 18-58 (E.D. Pa.).

The Defendants have moved to dismiss certain aspects of the
Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Plaintiff Majuana Thompson filed a Collective and Class Action
Complaint against Defendants Progressions Behavioral Health
Services, Inc. ("Progressions Health") and Progressions
Companies, Inc. ("Progressions Co."), asserting claims under the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 201 et seq.,
the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act ("PMWA"), 43 Pa. Stat. Ann.
Section 333.101 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and
Collection Law ("WPCL"), 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. Section 260.1 et seq.

The Defendants have moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint,
arguing that it fails to plausibly allege (1) a timely claim
under the FLSA based on a theory that she was misclassified as an
independent contractor and, thus, unlawfully denied overtime pay
during that period; (2) that Progressions Co. is a joint employer
with Progressions Health, such that Progressions Co. can be
liable on any of the Plaintiff's claims, and (3) that the
Plaintiff and the Defendants were parties to a contract that
could give rise to the Plaintiff's WPCL claim.

The Court reads the Plaintiff's FLSA claim as having two
components: First, it asserts that the Defendants violated the
FLSA by denying the Plaintiff overtime during a time period in
which she was classified as an independent contractor.
Specifically, it asserts that the Defendants misclassified the
Plaintiff as an independent contractor during that time period
and then used her independent contractor status as the
justification for finding that she was not entitled to the FLSA's
overtime protections.

Second, it asserts that the Defendants violated the FLSA by
denying the Plaintiff overtime during the subsequent time period
in which she was classified as an employee of Defendants.
Specifically, it asserts that the Defendants violated the FLSA
during that time period by failing to pay the Plaintiff overtime
for billable hours over 40 hours, as well as hours they deemed
non-billable, which should have qualified as overtime hours. The
Plaintiff's claims in these two respects are similar, but
nevertheless distinct, as the claim concerning the earlier time
period rests on an essential factual premise that the Plaintiff
was, in fact, misclassified as an independent contractor and,
thus, was entitled to the FLSA's protections.

Accordingly, the Court reads the Complaint to allege that the
Defendants had remedied the Plaintiff's alleged misclassification
no later than December 6, 2014. The Plaintiff filed the Complaint
in this case on January 8, 2018, more than three years after the
Plaintiff had been reclassified. Thus, even assuming arguendo
that the Complaint alleges a willful violation of the FLSA and is
therefore subject to the extended three-year statute of
limitations for willful violations, the Court concludes that the
Plaintiff's FLSA claim, insofar as it is based on her
misclassification, is barred by the statute of limitations.

In other words, the Plaintiff is time-barred from claiming that
she was entitled to the FLSA's protections during the time that
she was classified as independent contractor. Consequently, the
Court grants the Defendants' Motion to the extent that it seeks
dismissal of that aspect of the FLSA claim that seeks overtime
compensation for the time period in which the Plaintiff was
allegedly misclassified as an independent contractor, and the
Court dismisses that aspect of the claim as untimely. The Court
does not, however, dismiss the remainder of the Plaintiff's FLSA
claim, which is based on the Defendants' failure to pay the
Plaintiff overtime wages following her reclassification as an
employee of the company, as her claim in that regard clearly
falls within the FLSA and its three-year statute of limitations.

The Defendants also argue that the Court should dismiss all
claims against Progressions Co. because the Plaintiff rests her
claims against Progressions Co. on the theory that it is a joint
employer with her actual employer, Progressions Health, but the
Complaint does not plausibly allege the joint employment
relationship.
Here, the Complaint alleges that Progressions Health and
Progressions Co. are a joint, single, and/or integrated employer
with respect to the employees of Progressions Health.

In support of this assertion, it alleges that the two companies:
share employees (including, but not limited to providers of
behavioral health services as well as administrative staff),
office space (including, but not limited to the same registered
corporate address and treatment locations), equipment, management
(including, upon information and belief, shared corporate
officers such as Director of Human Resources and President), and
collectively assert control over their employees for purposes of
hiring, firing, discipline, assigning, directing, and setting and
enforcing payroll and other administrative policies.

In addition, the Complaint alleges that Progression Co.'s
Employee Handbook was and is distributed to all employees of
Progressions Health.

Based on these allegations, the Court concludes that the
Complaint plausibly alleges a joint employer relationship between
Progressions Co. and Progressions Health. The Court therefore
denies Defendants' Motion insofar as it seeks dismissal of the
claims against Progressions Co. based on an argument that the
Complaint fails to allege facts to support the assertion of a
joint employer relationship.

The Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the
Plaintiff's WPCL claim because the Complaint fails to plausibly
allege that they and the Plaintiff were parties to an employment
contract, much less an employment contract that obligated them to
pay Plaintiff overtime, holiday pay, and paid time off.

To state a claim for breach of contract under Pennsylvania law, a
complaint must allege: (1) the existence of a contract, including
its essential terms, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the
contract and (3) resultant damages. The Complaint alleges that
the parties entered into an agreement that was memorialized in
the Handbook and required Defendants to pay the Plaintiff
overtime wages, holiday pay, and paid time off.

It further alleges that the Defendants breached that agreement by
failing to pay the Plaintiff overtime wages, holiday pay and paid
time off, and that the Plaintiff was therefore denied pay to
which she was entitled. The Court therefore concludes that the
Complaint alleges the existence of a contractual breach for which
a claim can be asserted under the WPCL.

The Court denies the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss insofar as it
seeks dismissal of the WPCL claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 16, 2018
Memorandum is available at https://tinyurl.com/ya5496s5 from
Leagle.com.

MAJUANA THOMPSON, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL PATRICK
MURPHY, JR., MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC & MICHAEL GROH, MURPHY LAW
GROUP, LLC.

PROGRESSIONS BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., Defendant,
represented by MOLLY C. REILLY -- mreilly@rmh-law.com -- REILLY
JANICZEK & MCDEVITT, PC & SUSAN M. VALINIS svalinis@rmh-law.com,
REILLY JANICZEK & MCDEVITT P.C..


RLAWSON INC: Faces "Karpathios" Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Rlawson, Inc. The
case is styled as Konstantinos Karpathios and Greg Murphy, on
behalf of themselves and similarly situated employees, Plaintiffs
v. Robert Lawson and Rlawson, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-
03328 (E.D. N.Y., June 6, 2018).

Rlawson, Inc. was founded in 1979. The company's line of business
includes providing trucking transportation services.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


RUDY'S MUSIC: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Rudy's Music Stop,
Inc. The case is styled as Henry Tucker, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Rudy's Music Stop,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05128 (S.D. N.Y., June 8,
2018).

Rudy's Music Stop, Inc. is a musical instrument store in New York
City, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


SANTANDER CONSUMER: Faces "Blakely" Suit in E.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Santander Consumer
USA, Inc. The case is styled as Vicki Blakely, Steven Lawson,
Christy Mitchell, Leslie Williams, James Rolland, Jaynellis
Salinas, Kathleen Jones, Annie Bluitt, Samuel Carter and Kevin
Greif, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
2:18-cv-01647-WBS-EFB (E.D. Cal., June 6, 2018).

Santander Consumer USA Inc., a consumer finance company, provides
vehicle finance and unsecured consumer lending products. The
company offers new and used car loans, and auto and cash-back
refinance services. It provides products through dealers in the
United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Benjamin P. Tryk, Esq.
   Tryk Law, PC
   7050 N. Fresno Street, Suite 210
   Fresno, CA 93720
   Tel: (559) 840-3240
   Fax: (888) 528-5570
   Email: ben@tryklaw.com


SCENIC ROUTE: Faces "Cervera" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Scenic Route 66
Cafe Inc. The case is styled as Johnny Arellano Cervera, on
behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Scenic Route 66
Cafe Inc. doing business as: Route 66 Cafe, Katarzyna Banas and
Richard Katehis, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-05084 (S.D. N.Y.,
June 7, 2018).

Scenic Route 66 Cafe Inc. is engaged in the restaurant industry
in New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


SELECT COMFORT: NJ High Ct. Issues Opinion in Delivery Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of New Jersey issued an Opinion answering in
both affirmative and negative two questions of law certified by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the case
captioned DAVID SPADE and KATINA SPADE, H/W, individually and as
a class representative on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SELECT COMFORT CORP., d/b/a SLEEP
NUMBER, LEGGETT & PLATT INC., Defendants-Respondents. CHRISTOPHER
D. WENGER and EILEEN MULLER, on behalf of themselves and those
similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOB'S DISCOUNT
FURNITURE, LLC, Defendant-Respondent, Nos. A-57 September Term
2016, 078611 (N.J.).

The plaintiffs in both actions premise their Truth-in-Consumer
Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA) claims on the
defendants' alleged violations of N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.2 and-5.3.

The certified questions are:

   1. Does a violation of the Furniture Delivery Regulations
alone constitute a violation of a clearly established right or
responsibility of the seller under the TCCWNA and thus provides a
basis for relief under the TCCWNA?

   2. Is a consumer who receives a contract that does not comply
with the Furniture Delivery Regulations, but has not suffered any
adverse consequences from the noncompliance, an aggrieved
consumer under the TCCWNA?

The Court answers the first certified question in the affirmative
and the second certified question in the negative.

Two of the regulations prescribe specific language that must
appear in contract forms or sales documents in ten-point bold
face type with information specific to the transaction to be
added by the seller.

First, contract forms or sales documents for furniture sales must
include the following statement: "The merchandise you have
ordered is promised for delivery to you on or before (insert date
or length of time agreed upon)."

Second, these forms or documents shall conspicuously disclose the
seller's obligations in the case of delayed delivery in
compliance with N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1 and shall contain, on the
first page of the contract form or sales document the following
notice: "If the merchandise ordered by you is not delivered by
the promised delivery date, (insert name of seller) must offer
you the choice of (1) canceling your order with a prompt, full
refund of any payments you have made, or (2) accepting delivery
at a specific later date."

In these appeals, all the plaintiffs allege that the defendants
included in their sales documents language constituting an
affirmative misrepresentation, contrary to N.J.A.C. 13:45A-
5.3(c), a regulation that prohibits potentially misleading
language concerning the availability of a refund. Because those
allegations are present in both appeals, the Court need not reach
the question of whether a seller's omission of a provision
required by N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.2 or-5.3 would give rise to a
TCCWNA claim.

Nothing in either the TCCWNA's plain language or its legislative
history suggests that the inclusion of language in a contract or
other writing that violates a regulation cannot be the basis for
a claim under N.J.S.A. 56:12-15. In the TCCWNA, the Legislature
did not limit the term State or Federal law to statutes, as it
could have done with a minor revision of the TCCWNA's text.

N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c) is plainly the source of a clearly
established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a
seller within the meaning of N.J.S.A 56:12-15. The regulation
carries the force of law; indeed, a violation shall be subject to
the sanctions contained in the CFA. N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.4.
Moreover, N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c)'s prohibition on misleading
refund terms in furniture-sales contracts provides unambiguous
direction to furniture sellers. The regulation generally bars
terms in furniture sales contracts or sales agreements which
violate or are contrary to the rights and responsibilities set
forth in the regulations, and provides specific examples of
prohibited language: all sales final, no cancellations' or no
refunds.
N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c). The regulation is simple and clear.
Accordingly, we conclude that a furniture seller's inclusion in a
consumer sales contract or agreement of language prohibited by
N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c) may alone constitute a violation of a
clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility
of a seller under N.J.S.A. 56:12-15, and thus may provide a basis
for relief under the TCCWNA.

The Third Circuit's second certified question requires that the
Court determine whether a consumer who receives a contract
containing provisions that violate one of the regulations at
issue, but who has suffered no adverse consequences as a result
of the contract's noncompliance with the regulation, constitutes
an aggrieved consumer, as that term is used in N.J.S.A. 56:12-17.

A consumer may be aggrieved for purposes of N.J.S.A. 56:12-17 if
he or she has suffered harm as a result of the defendant's
inclusion of prohibited language in a contract or other writing
even if that harm is not a basis for a damages award. If, for
example, a furniture seller fails to timely deliver a consumer's
furniture, and the consumer would have sought a refund had he or
she not been deterred by the no refunds language prohibited by
N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3, that consumer may be an aggrieved consumer
entitled to a civil penalty under N.J.S.A. 56:12-17.

If an untimely delivery and misleading no refunds language leave
a consumer without furniture needed for a family gathering, the
consumer may be an aggrieved consumer for purposes of N.J.S.A.
56:12-17. Proof of harm resulting from contract language
prohibited by N.J.S.A. 56:12-15 may warrant a civil penalty under
N.J.S.A. 56:12-17, even if the harm is not compensable by
damages.

In the absence of evidence that the consumer suffered adverse
consequences as a result of the defendant's regulatory violation,
a consumer is not an aggrieved consumer for purposes of the
TCCWNA. In the setting of these appeals, if a consumer has
entered into a sales contract containing a provision that
violated N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3, but his or her furniture was
delivered conforming and on schedule, and he or she has incurred
no monetary damages or adverse consequences, that consumer has
suffered no harm. Such a consumer is not an aggrieved consumer
under N.J.S.A. 56:12-17.

In sum, the Court construes the TCCWNA to recognize an
affirmative violation of N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.3(c), by virtue of the
inclusion of language prohibited by that regulation in a contract
of sale or sale order for the delivery of household furniture, to
constitute a violation of a clearly established legal right of a
consumer or responsibility of a seller.

The Court interprets N.J.S.A. 56:12-17 to require a consumer to
show that he or she has suffered harm, even if that harm does not
warrant an award of damages, as a result of a violation of
N.J.S.A. 56:12-15, in order for that consumer to constitute an
aggrieved consumer for purposes of the TCCWNA. N.J.S.A. 56:12-17.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's April 16, 2018
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yav53av9 from
Leagle.com.

Lewis G. Adler argued the cause for appellants David Spade and
Katina Spade (Lewis G. Adler and Law Office of Paul DePetris,
attorneys; Lewis G. Adler and Paul DePetris, on the briefs).

Andrew R. Wolf argued the cause for appellants Christopher D.
Wenger and Eileen Muller (The Wolf Law Firm, attorneys; Andrew R.
Wolf -- awolf@wolflawfirm.net -- and Henry P. Wolfe --
hwolfe@wolflawfirm.net -- on the briefs).

Andrew S. Hansen of the Minnesota bar, admitted pro hac vice,
argued the cause for respondent Select Comfort Corp. (Fox
Rothschild, attorneys; Karen A. Confoy --
kconfoy@foxrothschild.com -- on the brief, and Heidi A.O. Fisher
-- hfisher@foxrothschild.com -- of the Minnesota bar, admitted
pro hac vice, and Andrew S. Hansen -- ahansen@foxrothschild.com -
- of the Minnesota bar, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel and on
the briefs).

Brett D. Carroll of the Florida and Massachusetts bars, admitted
pro hac vice, argued the cause for respondent Bob's Discount
Furniture, LLC (Holland & Knight, attorneys; Brett D. Carroll -
brett.carroll@hklaw.com- Sean C. Sheely  -- sean.sheely@hklaw.com
-- and Duvol M. Thompson -- Duvol.Thompson@hklaw.com -- on the
briefs).

James A. Barry argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey
Association for Justice (Locks Law Firm and Law Offices of
Charles N. Riley, attorneys; James A. Barry --
jbarry@lockslaw.com -- Michael A. Galpern --
mgalpern@lockslaw.com -- Andrew P. Bell -- abell@lockslaw.com --
and Charles N. Riley, on the brief).

David R. Kott argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey
Business & Industry Association (McCarter & English, attorneys;
David R. Kott -- dkott@mccarter.com -- Edward J. Fanning --
efanning@mccarter.com -- and Zane C. Riester --
zriester@mccarter.com -- of counsel and on the brief).


SMURFIT KAPPA: Faces "Chavez" Suit in C.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Smurfit Kappa
Orange County LLC. The case is styled as Eduardo Chavez,
individually, and on behalf of other members of the general
public similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Smurfit Kappa Orange
County LLC, an unknown business entity, Smurfit Kappa North
America LLC, an unknown business entity and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-05106 (C.D. Cal., June 8,
2018).

Smurfit Kappa Orange County LLC is an integrated packaging
manufacturer operating in Northern Mexico and the Southern United
State.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


SOULCYCLE INC: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against SoulCycle Inc. The
case is styled as Henry Tucker, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SoulCycle Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05061 (S.D. N.Y., June 6, 2018).

SoulCycle is a New York City-based fitness company with studios
in 13 U.S. states and 3 studio locations in Canada. Founded in
2006, it offers indoor cycling workout classes.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


SOUTHERN GLAZER'S: Court Amends April 9 Order in Fraud Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, amended its April 9 Order in the
case captioned ARENA RESTAURANT AND LOUNGE LLC, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. SOUTHERN GLAZER'S WINE AND SPIRITS, LLC, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-03805-LHK (N.D. Cal.), to correct one
sentence on page 23 of the April 9 Order that misstates the
requirements for stating a claim under the fraudulent prong of
California's Unfair Competition Law.  The Court said this change
does not affect the substance of the April 9 Order, which in all
other respects remains the same.

As previously reported by The Class Action Reporter, the Court
granted the Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint.

Plaintiffs Arena Restaurant and Lounge LLC, Pacifica Restaurants,
LLC, Vine and Barrel LLC, and Daniel Flores filed this putative
class action against Southern Glazer's Wine and Spirits, LLC and
Southern Glazer Wine & Spirits of America, Inc.  The  Plaintiffs
are California-based businesses that had accounts with Southern
Glazer, wherein they and authorized agents thereof were permitted
to purchase liquor from Southern Glazer using the Plaintiffs'
respective liquor licenses (issued by the California Department
of Alcoholic Beverage Control and/or their Southern Glazer-issued
account numbers.

The Court ordered as follows:

   -- the Defendants' motion to dismiss the eleventh claim as
duplicative of the breach of contract claim with prejudice is
granted;

   -- the first claim for promissory fraud is dismissed with
leave to amend;

   -- the second claim for below-cost sales is dismissed with
leave to amend;

   -- the third claim for loss-leader sales is dismissed with
leave to amend;

   -- the fourth claim for secret rebates is dismissed with leave
to amend;

   -- the fifth claim for unlawful threats and intimidation is
dismissed with leave to amend;

   -- the sixth claim for constructive trust is dismissed with
prejudice;

   -- the seventh claim for breach of fiduciary duty is dismissed
with prejudice;

   -- the eighth claim for common law fraud is dismissed with
leave to amend;

   -- the ninth claim for unfair business practices is dismissed
with leave to amend;

   -- the tenth claim for breach of contract is dismissed with
leave to amend; and

   -- the eleventh claim for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing is dismissed with prejudice.

The Court found that the Plaintiffs' promissory fraud and common
law fraud claims are barred by the economic loss doctrine unless
an exception applies.  The Plaintiffs' promissory fraud and
common law fraud claims fall far short of Rule 9(b)'s requirement
to plead fraud with specificity. The theory of falsity underlying
both claims is that the Defendants promised to keep the
Plaintiffs' account information confidential, but despite this
promise the Defendants allegedly used the Plaintiffs' account
information to make sales to third parties.  However, the
Plaintiffs fail to plead any specific facts about these alleged
third-party sales. The only facts in the SAC are the conclusory
allegations that the Defendants used the Plaintiffs' liquor
license numbers and/or their Southern Glazer account numbers to
sell liquor to bars/restaurants/clubs that do not possess liquor
licenses.

The Plaintiffs do not allege who made the alleged third-party
sales, when the sales were made, or what was sold. Nor do the
Plaintiffs identify the third parties. The Plaintiffs argue that
they will require discovery to specifically plead the facts of
such fraudulent behavior. However, the Plaintiffs do not even
allege any specific details about information that would already
be under the Plaintiffs' control, such as alleging that they had
been billed or had paid for products that they did not order or
receive.

Because the SAC fails to allege with specificity the conduct
underlying the Plaintiffs' theory of falsity, the Plaintiffs'
claim for promissory fraud fails because the Plaintiffs have not
adequately alleged that the Defendants failed to perform the
promise to keep the Plaintiffs' account information confidential.
Similarly, the Plaintiffs' common law fraud claim fails because
Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged a misrepresentation.

Accordingly, the Court granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss
the first and eighth claims for promissory fraud and common law
fraud. Moreover, because the Plaintiffs have not adequately pled
their promissory fraud claim, the Plaintiffs do not qualify for
the fraudulent inducement exception to the economic loss rule.
Thus, the Court also dismisses the Plaintiffs' first and eighth
claims because they are barred by the economic loss rule.
However, because the Court finds that the Plaintiffs may be able
to amend their complaint to adequately plead these claims and,
relatedly, to establish that they qualify for the fraudulent
inducement exception to the economic loss rule, the Court grants
the Plaintiffs leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 9, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybtpytx4 from Leagle.com.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 16, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc9lmux5 from Leagle.com.


STANDARD DRYWALL: Denial of Arbitration in "Perez" Upheld
---------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, First District, Division
Three, affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned
SERVANDO PEREZ, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STANDARD DRYWALL,
INC., Defendant and Appellant, No. A146819 (Cal. App.).

SDI is a union construction contractor performing carpentry work
in California and throughout the western United States. SDI's
employees in California work under three collective bargaining
agreements entered into on their behalf by the Carpenters 46
Northern California Counties Conference Board of the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (Northern
California Conference Board), and the Southwest Regional Council
of Carpenters and its affiliated unions (Southwest Regional
Council).

SDI contends that the trial court erred in denying its petition
for arbitration because: (1) Perez's opposition to the petition
was untimely, and therefore the allegations of the petition
should have been deemed admitted; (2) Perez's statutory claims
under the Labor Code were encompassed within the arbitration
provisions of SDI's three CBAs but the trial court erroneously
limited its analysis to only one of the CBA's; and (3) the
arbitration provisions do not violate the ruling in Iskanian v.
CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348
(Iskanian) because Perez may still bring his claim under the
Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA).

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, unless the
petitioner has waived arbitration, grounds exist for revocation
of the agreement, or a party to the arbitration agreement is also
a party to a pending matter with a third party and there is a
possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue, the trial
court shall order' the parties to arbitrate the controversy if it
determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists.

SDI argues it was error for the trial court to accept Perez's
untimely opposition and refuse to deem the allegations of the
petition admitted. "The allegations of a petition [to compel
arbitration] are deemed to be admitted by a respondent duly
served therewith unless a response is duly served and filed.

The trial court's consideration of Perez's untimely opposition
brief was a reasonable exercise of its discretion. Perez's
counsel demonstrated good cause in that he treated the petition
as a motion and filed and served his opposition on August 26,
2015, nine court days before the then-scheduled September 8, 2015
hearing, which would have been timely if the petition were a
motion.

SDI argues the trial court erred in refusing to compel
arbitration of Perez's Labor Code claims because the three CBA's
and their arbitration provisions cover all aspects of wage
payments to SDI's employees, including payment of wages upon
termination and the content of wage statements.

SDI further contends that the Southwest Drywall/Lathing Master
Agreement should apply to Perez because he seeks to represent a
class of employees state-wide and cannot cherry-pick one regional
CBA for the purpose of avoiding arbitration. In support, SDI
cites Basurto v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th
866 (Basurto), a case that had nothing to do with putative class
actions, CBA's, or arbitration. As the trial court correctly
noted, the fact that members of the putative class may be subject
to arbitration agreements in other agreements is not relevant to
this petition, but will be relevant at the class certification
stage. This statement echoes the holding in Lee v. Southern
California University for Professional Studies(2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 782 (Lee).

In that case, a former student of a private postsecondary
institution brought a putative class action against the school
for violating consumer protection laws. In seeking to compel
arbitration, the school argued the plaintiff was required to
arbitrate her claims because some members of the potential class
signed arbitration agreements. The court held that no grounds
existed for compelling arbitration because the plaintiff could
not be bound by someone else's consent. At the moment, the only
plaintiff before the court is Lee, who did not sign an
arbitration agreement. The school's arguments are premised on the
notion that a class will eventually be certified as to the
Consumer Legal Remedies Act claim, and that class will include
all students, regardless of whether or not they signed
arbitration agreements. That has not yet happened, and Lee
represents nobody but herself until a class is certified.

The Court agrees with the analysis of the Lee court. Since SDI
has not adequately demonstrated that the Southern California
Master Labor Agreement or the Southwest Drywall/Lathing Master
Agreement apply to Perez, he cannot be presently bound by their
arbitration provisions simply because he seeks to represent a
putative class of employees who might be subject to them.

The order denying SDI's petition to compel arbitration is
affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s April 16, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybj48c76 from Leagle.com


SUNRISE SENIOR: Faces "Mendez" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sunrise Senior
Living LLC. The case is styled as Himelda Mendez, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Sunrise
Senior Living LLC, SZR New York LH, Inc., GWC-West Babylon, Inc.,
GWC-Crestwood, Inc., GWC-Dix Hills, Inc., GWC-East Meadows, Inc.,
GWC-East Setauket, Inc., GWC-Glen Cove, Inc., GWC-Holbrook, Inc.,
GWC-Mill Basin, Inc., GWC-Plainview, Inc. and GWC-Sheepshead Bay,
Inc., Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-04952 (S.D. N.Y., June 4,
2018).

Sunrise Senior Living, Inc. provides senior living services. The
Company offers senior living services, independent and assisted
living, nursing, and rehabilitative care services. Sunrise Senior
Living serves clients in the State of Virginia.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


SUREFOOT LLC: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Surefoot, LLC. The
case is styled as Henry Tucker, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Surefoot, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 1:18-cv-05133 (S.D. N.Y., June 8, 2018).

Surefoot, L C produces custom ski boots and liners, orthotic
boots, and children boots. It also offers standard ski boots,
boot heaters, ski helmets, gloves, and goggles for men and
ladies. In addition, the company provides shoes for skiing,
running, golfing, biking, and general use.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


TIMEPAYMENT CORP: Faces "Taylor" Suit in E.D. Virginia
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Timepayment
Corporation. The case is styled as John Taylor, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Timepayment
Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-00378-MHL (E.D. Va.,
June 4, 2018).

TimePayment Corporation offers equipment finance leasing
services. The company was founded in 2003 and is based in
Burlington, Massachusetts. TimePayment Corporation operates as a
subsidiary of MicroFinancial Inc.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joshua Harry Erlich, Esq.
   The Erlich Law Office PLLC
   2111 Wilson Blvd, Suite 700
   Arlington, VA 22201
   Tel: (703) 791-9087
   Email: jerlich@erlichlawoffice.com


TIMEPAYMENT CORP: Faces "Cruz" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Timepayment
Corporation. The case is styled as Alfredo Serapio Cruz and
Guillermo Victoriano Angel, on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. Wimpy's Restaurant Inc., Wimpy's
Restaurant V Inc. and Feliciano Verdejo, jointly and severally,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-04940 (S.D. N.Y., June 4, 2018).

TimePayment Corporation offers equipment finance leasing
services. The company was founded in 2003 and is based in
Burlington, Massachusetts. TimePayment Corporation operates as a
subsidiary of MicroFinancial Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear PRO SE.


THOMAS GEORGE: Faces "Mor" Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Thomas George
Associates, Ltd. The case is styled as Eviatar Mor, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Thomas
George Associates, Ltd., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03258 (E.D.
N.Y., June 4, 2018).

Thomas George Associates, Ltd. provides insurance recovery
services. It offers subrogation services in the areas of property
and casualty, workers compensation, pip/med-pay, and liens;
arbitration outsourcing services, such as filing as applicant and
handling counter claims; and file review services, including
analysis of closed files for missed opportunities, and
identification of subrogation on new claims.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Daniel A. Louro, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza W
   12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (929) 575-4175
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: dlouro@cml.legal


TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Faces "Banayan" Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Transworld Systems,
Inc. The case is styled as Brocha Banayan, on behalf of herself
and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff v.
Transworld Systems, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03408 (E.D.
N.Y., June 11, 2018).

Transworld Systems Inc. provides accounts receivable, debt
recovery, and past due accounts services for businesses, medical
companies, dental companies, education facilities, Fortune 500
companies, and small businesses in the United States and
internationally.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


TTT BROOKLYN: Faces "Gonzalez" Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against TTT Brooklyn Inc.
d/b/a Jolie Cantina. The case is styled as Alejandro Gonzalez, on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TTT
Brooklyn Inc. d/b/a Jolie Cantina and Benjamin Tretout,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-03391 (E.D. N.Y., June 11, 2018).

TTT Brooklyn Inc is a Funky cafe with tin ceilings & metal decor
elements serving eclectic menu of French & Mexican fare.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


TULSA COUNTY, OK: Faces "Parga" Suit in N.D. Oklahoma
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Tulsa County. The
case is styled as Michael Parga, Richard Feltz, Tara O'Donley and
Christopher Wood, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Tulsa County, Vic Regalado
Tulsa County Sheriff, in his official capacity, Terry H Bitting,
in his capacity as Tulsa County Special Judge, Tammy Bruce, in
her capacity as Tulsa County Special Judge, Martha Rupp Carter
in her capacity as Tulsa County Special Judge, Stephen R Clark,
in his capacity as Tulsa County Special Judge, Theresa Dreiling
in her capacity as Tulsa County Special Judge, Owen Evens, in his
capacity as Tulsa County Special Judge, James W Keeley, in his
capacity as Tulsa County Special Judge, Deborah Ludi Leitch in
her capacity as Tulsa County Special Judge, J Anthony Miller in
his capacity as Tulsa County Special Judge, Dawn Moody, in her
capacity as Tulsa County Special Judge, Millie Otey, in her
capacity as Tulsa County Special Judge, Kirsten Pace, in her
capacity as Tulsa County Special Judge, April Seibert, in her
capacity as Tulsa County Special Judge, Clifford Smith, in his
capacity as Tulsa County Special Judge, Sarah Smith, in her
capacity as Tulsa County Special Judge and William Musseman, in
his capacity as Tulsa County District Court Judge, Defendants,
Case No. 4:18-cv-00298-CVE-JFJ (N.D. Okla., June 6, 2018).

Tulsa County is a county located in the U.S. state of
Oklahoma.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   Akeeb Dami Animashaun, Esq.
   Civil Rights Corps
   910 17TH ST NW STE 200
   WASHINGTON, DC 20006
   Tel: (202) 670-9541
   Email: Ddami@civilrights.org

      - and -

   Alexander Karakatsanis, Esq.
   Civil Rights Corps
   910 17TH ST NW STE 200
   WASHINGTON, DC 20006
   Tel: (202) 681-2409
   Fax: (202) 609-8030
   Email: alec@civilrightscorps.org

      - and -

   Charles Lewis Gerstein, Esq.
   Civil Rights Corps
   910 17TH ST NW STE 200
   WASHINGTON, DC 20006
   Tel: (202) 670-9541
   Email: charlie@civilrightscorps.org

      - and -

   Hayley Horowitz, Esq.
   Still She Rises
   567 E 36TH ST N
   TULSA, OK 74106
   Tel: (918) 392-0874

      - and -

   Ruth Ellen Lando Hamilton, Esq.
   Still She Rises
   567 E 36TH ST N
   TULSA, OK 74106
   Tel: (918) 392-0867
   Fax: (918) 392-0865
   Email: ruthh@stillsherises.org


TWELFTH STREET: Faces "Smith" Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Twelfth Street
Hotel Associates. The case is styled as Walter Smith, on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Twelfth Street
Hotel Associates doing business as: Loews Philadelphia Hotel,
Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-02398-TJS (E.D. Penn., June 7, 2018).

The Company's line of business includes operating public hotels
and motels.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   MICHAEL PATRICK MURPHY, JR., Esq.
   MURPHY LAW GROUP LLC
   EIGHT PENN CENTER SUITE 2000
   1628 JOHN F KENNEDY BLVD
   PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103
   Tel: (215) 375-0961
   Email: murphy@phillyemploymentlawyer.com


UNITED COLLECTION: Faces "Shevchuk" Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against United Collection
Bureau, Inc. The case is styled as Tatiyana Shevchuk, on behalf
of herself and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff
v. United Collection Bureau, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-
03398 (E.D. N.Y., June 11, 2018).

United Collection Bureau, Inc. provides debt collection services
for companies (government, healthcare, utility, financial
service, communication, and student markets) and individuals in
the United States. United Collection Bureau, Inc. was formerly
known as UCB, Inc. and changed its name to United Collection
Bureau, Inc. in August 1979. The company was founded in 1959 and
is based in Toledo, Ohio.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


UNITED STATES: "R.F.M." Files Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Kirstjen Nielsen.
The case is styled as R. F. M., T. D., S. W. and D. A. F.A., on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. Kirstjen Nielsen, in her capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security, Lee Francis Cissna, in his
capacity as Director of United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services, Barbara Velarde, in her capacity as Chief of the
Administrative Appeals Office of United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services, Robert M. Cowan, in his capacity as
Director of the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services National Benefits Center, Thomas Cioppa, in his capacity
as Director of the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services New York City District Office, Edward Newman, in his
capacity as Director of the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services Buffalo District Office, Daniel Renaud, in
his capacity as Associate Director of United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services Field Operations Directorate, Gwynne
Dinolfo, in her capacity as United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services Albany Field Office Director, Gina Pastore,
in her capacity as United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services Brooklyn Field Office Director, Carmen Whaling, in her
capacity as United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
Buffalo and Syracuse Field Office Director, Elizabeth Miller, in
her capacity as United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services Long Island Field Office Director, William Bierman, in
his capacity as United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services New York Field Office Director and Brian Meier, in his
capacity as United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
Queens Field Office Director, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-05068
(S.D. N.Y., June 7, 2018).

The Defendants are government employees.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear PRO SE.


WAKEFIELD AND ASSOCIATES: Faces "Milner" Suit in M.D. Alabama
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wakefield and
Associates, Inc. The case is styled as Christopher Milner,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Wakefield and Associates, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
2:18-cv-00551-GMB (M.D. Ala., June 4, 2018).

Wakefield and Associates, Inc. is a debt collection agency in
Aurora, Colorado, USA.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David I. Schoen, Esq.
   2800 Zelda Rd-Ste 100-6
   Montgomery, AL 36106
   Tel: (334) 395-6611
   Fax: (917) 591-7586
   Email: DSchoen593@aol.com

      - and -

   Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
   Marcus & Zelman LLC
   701 Cookman Avenue; Suite 300
   Asbury Park, NJ 07712
   Tel: (732) 695-3282


WINGSTOP RESTAURANTS: Faces "Tucker" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wingstop
Restaurants, Inc. The case is styled as Henry Tucker, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Wingstop Restaurants, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05136
(S.D. N.Y., June 8, 2018).

Wingstop Restaurants, Inc. is a chain of nostalgic, aviation-
themed restaurants where the sole focus is on chicken wings.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.

The Defendant is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


ZWICKER & ASSOCIATES: Faces "Aminov" Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Zwicker &
Associates, P.C. The case is styled as Anatoliy Aminov, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v.
Zwicker & Associates, P.C., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03255
(E.D. N.Y., June 4, 2018).

Zwicker & Associates, P.C. is a law firm in Andover,
Massachusetts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Daniel A. Louro, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza W
   12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (929) 575-4175
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: dlouro@cml.legal




                        Asbestos Litigation


ASBESTOS UPDATE: AMERISAFE Had $1.7MM Reserves for Loss, LAE
------------------------------------------------------------
AMERISAFE, Inc. had US$1,748,000 reserves for loss and loss
adjustment expenses (LAE) at year ended December 31, 2017,
according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2017.

The Company states, "Reserves established for workers'
compensation insurance have included the exposure to occupational
disease or accidents related to asbestos or environmental claims.
The exposure to asbestos claims emanate from the direct sale of
workers' compensation insurance.  These claims resulted from
industry workers who were exposed to tremolite asbestos dust and
electricians and carpenters who were exposed to products that
contained asbestos.  There has been no known exposure to asbestos
claims arising from assumed business.  The emergence of these
claims is slow and highly unpredictable.  The Company estimates
full impact of the asbestos exposure by establishing full case
basis reserves on all known losses.  Reserves for losses incurred
but not reported (IBNR) include a provision for development of
reserves on reported losses.  Reserves are established for loss
adjustment expenses (LAE) associated with these case and IBNR
loss reserves."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://is.gd/GmMw7O


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Tenneco Faces Less Than 500 Cases at Dec. 31
-------------------------------------------------------------
Tenneco Inc. continues to face less than 500 active and inactive
cases by claimants alleging health problems as a result of
exposure to asbestos, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal
year ended December 31, 2017.

The Company states, "For many years we have been and continue to
be subject to lawsuits initiated by claimants alleging health
problems as a result of exposure to asbestos.  Our current docket
of active and inactive cases is less than 500 cases nationwide.
A small number of claims have been asserted against one of our
subsidiaries by railroad workers alleging exposure to asbestos
products in railroad cars.  The substantial majority of the
remaining claims are related to alleged exposure to asbestos in
our automotive products although a significant number of those
claims appear also to involve occupational exposures sustained in
industries other than automotive.

"We believe, based on scientific and other evidence, it is
unlikely that claimants were exposed to asbestos by our former
products and that, in any event, they would not be at increased
risk of asbestos-related disease based on their work with these
products.  Further, many of these cases involve numerous
defendants, with the number in some cases exceeding 100
defendants from a variety of industries.  Additionally, in many
cases the plaintiffs either do not specify any, or specify the
jurisdictional minimum, dollar amount for damages.

"As major asbestos manufacturers and/or users continue to go out
of business or file for bankruptcy, we may experience an
increased number of these claims.  We vigorously defend ourselves
against these claims as part of our ordinary course of business.

"In future periods, we could be subject to cash costs or charges
to earnings if any of these matters are resolved unfavorably to
us.  To date, with respect to claims that have proceeded
sufficiently through the judicial process, we have regularly
achieved favorable resolutions.  Accordingly, we presently
believe that these asbestos-related claims will not have a
material adverse impact on our future consolidated financial
position, results of operations or liquidity."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://is.gd/NVeQLX


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Univar Faces Less Than 255 Claims at Dec. 31
-------------------------------------------------------------
Univar Inc. had fewer than 255 asbestos-related claims as of
December 31, 2017, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal
year ended December 31, 2017.

Univar states, "The Company is subject to liabilities from claims
alleging personal injury from exposure to asbestos.  The claims
result primarily from an indemnification obligation related to
Univar USA Inc.'s ("Univar") 1986 purchase of McKesson Chemical
Company from McKesson Corporation ("McKesson").  Univar's
obligation to indemnify McKesson for settlements and judgments
arising from asbestos claims is the amount which is in excess of
applicable insurance coverage, if any, which may be available
under McKesson's historical insurance coverage.  Univar is also a
defendant in a small number of asbestos claims.  As of December
31, 2017, there were fewer than 255 asbestos-related claims for
which the Company has liability for defense and indemnity
pursuant to the indemnification obligation.  Historically, the
vast majority of the claims against both McKesson and Univar have
been dismissed without payment.  While the Company is unable to
predict the outcome of these matters, it does not believe, based
upon current available facts, that the ultimate resolution of any
of these matters will have a material effect on its overall
financial position, results of operations, or cash flows.
However, the Company cannot predict the outcome of any present or
future claims or litigation and adverse developments could
negatively impact earnings or cash flows in a particular future
period."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://is.gd/fDg8Ya


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Flowserve Still Defends PI Lawsuits at Dec. 31
---------------------------------------------------------------
Flowserve Corporation disclosed in its Form 10-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2017, that it remains a defendant in various
asbestos-related personal injury lawsuits.

The Company states, "We are a defendant in a substantial number
of lawsuits that seek to recover damages for personal injury
allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos-containing products
manufactured and/or distributed by our heritage companies in the
past.  While the overall number of asbestos-related claims has
generally declined in recent years, there can be no assurance
that this trend will continue, or that the average cost per claim
will not further increase.  Asbestos-containing materials
incorporated into any such products were encapsulated and used as
internal components of process equipment, and we do not believe
that any significant emission of asbestos fibers occurred during
the use of this equipment.

"Our practice is to vigorously contest and resolve these claims,
and we have been successful in resolving a majority of claims
with little or no payment.  Historically, a high percentage of
resolved claims have been covered by applicable insurance or
indemnities from other companies, and we believe that a
substantial majority of existing claims should continue to be
covered by insurance or indemnities.  Accordingly, we have
recorded a liability for our estimate of the most likely
settlement of asserted claims and a related receivable from
insurers or other companies for our estimated recovery, to the
extent we believe that the amounts of recovery are probable and
not otherwise in dispute.  While unfavorable rulings, judgments
or settlement terms regarding these claims could have a material
adverse impact on our business, financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows, we currently believe the likelihood is
remote.

"Additionally, we have claims pending against certain insurers
that, if resolved more favorably than reflected in the recorded
receivables, would result in discrete gains in the applicable
quarter.  We are currently unable to estimate the impact, if any,
of unasserted asbestos-related claims, although future claims
would also be subject to then existing indemnities and insurance
coverage."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://is.gd/XoiOG4


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 9,000 Claims vs. FMC Corp. Pending at Dec. 31
--------------------------------------------------------------
FMC Corporation had approximately 9,000 premises and product
asbestos claims pending in several jurisdictions as of December
31, 2017, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2017.

The Company states, "Like hundreds of other industrial companies,
we have been named as one of many defendants in asbestos-related
personal injury litigation.  Most of these cases allege personal
injury or death resulting from exposure to asbestos in premises
of FMC or to asbestos-containing components installed in
machinery or equipment manufactured or sold by discontinued
operations.  The machinery and equipment businesses we owned or
operated did not fabricate the asbestos-containing component
parts at issue in the litigation, and to this day, neither the
U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration nor the
Environmental Protection Agency has banned the use of these
components.  Further, the asbestos-containing parts for this
machinery and equipment were accessible only at the time of
infrequent repair and maintenance.  A few jurisdictions have
permitted claims to proceed against equipment manufacturers
relating to insulation installed by other companies on such
machinery and equipment.  We believe that, overall, the claims
against FMC are without merit.

"As of December 31, 2017, there were approximately 9,000 premises
and product asbestos claims pending against FMC in several
jurisdictions.  Since the 1980s, approximately 114,000 asbestos
claims against FMC have been discharged, the overwhelming
majority of which have been dismissed without any payment to the
claimant.  Since the 1980s, settlements with claimants have
totaled approximately US$89 million.

"We intend to continue managing these asbestos-related cases in
accordance with our historical experience.  We have established a
reserve for this litigation within our discontinued operations
and believe that any exposure of a loss in excess of the
established reserve cannot be reasonably estimated.  Our
experience has been that the overall trends in asbestos
litigation have changed over time.  Over the last several years,
we have seen changes in the jurisdictions where claims against
FMC are being filed and changes in the mix of products named in
the various claims.  Because these claim trends have yet to form
a predictable pattern, we are presently unable to reasonably
estimate our asbestos liability with respect to claims that may
be filed in the future."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://is.gd/3RVWek


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Old Republic Has $86.7MM Reserve at Dec. 31
------------------------------------------------------------
Old Republic International Corporation had gross reserve of
US$86.7 million (net reserve of US$75.8 million) for asbestos
claims at December 31, 2017, according to the Company's Form 10-K
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2017.

The Company states, "Old Republic's reserve estimates also
include provisions for indemnity and settlement costs for various
asbestosis and environmental impairment ("A&E") claims that have
been filed in the normal course of business against a number of
its insurance subsidiaries.  Many such claims relate to policies
incepting prior to 1985, including many issued during a short
period between 1981 and 1982 pursuant to an agency agreement
canceled in 1982.

"Over the years, the Company's property and liability insurance
subsidiaries have typically issued general liability insurance
policies with face amounts ranging between US$1.0 million and
US$2.0 million and rarely exceeding US$10.0 million.  Such
policies have, in turn, been subject to reinsurance cessions
which have typically reduced the subsidiaries' net retentions to
US$.5 million or less as to each claim.

"Old Republic's exposure to A&E claims cannot, however, be
calculated by conventional insurance reserving methods for a
variety of reasons, including: a) the absence of statistically
valid data inasmuch as such claims typically involve long
reporting delays and very often uncertainty as to the number and
identity of insureds against whom such claims have arisen or will
arise; and b) the litigation history of such or similar claims
for insurance industry members which has produced inconsistent
court decisions with regard to such questions as to when an
alleged loss occurred, which policies provide coverage, how a
loss is to be allocated among potentially responsible insureds
and/or their insurance carriers, how policy coverage exclusions
are to be interpreted, what types of environmental impairment or
toxic tort claims are covered, when the insurer's duty to defend
is triggered, how policy limits are to be calculated, and whether
clean-up costs constitute property damage.

"Over time, the Executive Branch and/or the Congress of the
United States have proposed or considered changes in the
legislation and rules affecting the determination of liability
for environmental and asbestosis claims.  As of December 31,
2017, however, there is no solid evidence to suggest that
possible future changes might mitigate or reduce some or all of
these claim exposures.

"Because of the issues and uncertainties, estimation of reserves
for losses and allocated loss adjustment expenses for A&E claims
in particular is much more difficult or impossible to quantify
with a high degree of precision.  Accordingly, no representation
can be made that the Company's reserves for such claims and
related costs will not prove to be overstated or understated in
the future.

"At December 31, 2017 and 2016, Old Republic's aggregate
indemnity and loss adjustment expense reserves specifically
identified with A&E exposures amounted to approximately US$117.4
million and US$121.2 million gross, respectively, and US$96.4
million and US$97.1 million net of reinsurance, respectively.
Based on average annual claims payments during the five most
recent calendar years, such reserves represented a paid loss
survival ratio of 4.6 years (gross) and 6.3 years (net of
reinsurance) as of December 31, 2017 and 4.3 years (gross) and
6.3 years (net of reinsurance) as of December 31, 2016.

"Fluctuations in this ratio between years can be caused by the
inconsistent pay out patterns associated with these types of
claims.  For the five years ended December 31, 2017, incurred A&E
claim and related loss settlement costs have averaged .5% of
average annual General Insurance Group claims and related
settlement costs."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://is.gd/YyCo6f


ASBESTOS UPDATE: OfficeMax Still Responsible for Cases at Dec.31
----------------------------------------------------------------
OfficeMax remains responsible for all pending and future
asbestos-related proceedings related to a former operation,
according to Office Depot, Inc.'s Form 10-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 30, 2017.

On November 5, 2013, Office Depot completed its merger with
OfficeMax Incorporated in an all-stock transaction.

The Company states, "OfficeMax is named a defendant in a number
of lawsuits, claims, and proceedings arising out of the operation
of certain paper and forest products assets prior to those assets
being sold in 2004, for which OfficeMax agreed to retain
responsibility.  Also, as part of that sale, OfficeMax agreed to
retain responsibility for all pending or threatened proceedings
and future proceedings alleging asbestos-related injuries arising
out of the operation of the paper and forest products assets
prior to the closing of the sale.  The Company has made provision
for losses with respect to the pending proceedings.
Additionally, as of December 30, 2017, the Company has made
provision for environmental liabilities with respect to certain
sites where hazardous substances or other contaminants are or may
be located.  For these environmental liabilities, our estimated
range of reasonably possible losses was approximately US$10
million to US$25 million.  The Company regularly monitors its
estimated exposure to these liabilities.  As additional
information becomes known, these estimates may change, however,
the Company does not believe any of these OfficeMax retained
proceedings are material to the Company's financial position,
results of operations or cash flows."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://is.gd/NVIx49


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Quaker Chemical Unit Still Had Claims at Dec.31
----------------------------------------------------------------
Asbestos-related claims against an inactive subsidiary of Quaker
Chemical Corporation are still pending, according to the
Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017.

The Company states, "An inactive subsidiary of the Company that
was acquired in 1978 sold certain products containing asbestos,
primarily on an installed basis, and is among the defendants in
numerous lawsuits alleging injury due to exposure to asbestos.
The subsidiary discontinued operations in 1991 and has no
remaining assets other than proceeds received from insurance
settlements.

"The overwhelming majority of these claims have been disposed of
without payment and there have been no adverse judgments against
the subsidiary.  Based on a continued analysis of the existing
and anticipated future claims against this subsidiary, it is
currently projected that the subsidiary's total liability over
the next 50 years for these claims is approximately US$1.9
million (excluding costs of defense).

"Although the Company has also been named as a defendant in
certain of these cases, no claims have been actively pursued
against the Company, and the Company has not contributed to the
defense or settlement of any of these cases pursued against the
subsidiary.  These cases were handled by the subsidiary's primary
and excess insurers who had agreed in 1997 to pay all defense
costs and be responsible for all damages assessed against the
subsidiary arising out of existing and future asbestos claims up
to the aggregate limits of their policies.

"A significant portion of this primary insurance coverage was
provided by an insurer that is insolvent, and the other primary
insurers asserted that the aggregate limits of their policies
have been exhausted.  The subsidiary challenged the applicability
of these limits to the claims being brought against the
subsidiary.

"In response, two of the three carriers entered into separate
settlement and release agreements with the subsidiary in 2005 and
2007 for US$15.0 million and US$20.0 million, respectively.  The
proceeds of both settlements are restricted and can only be used
to pay claims and costs of defense associated with the
subsidiary's asbestos litigation.

"In 2007, the subsidiary and the remaining primary insurance
carrier entered into a Claim Handling and Funding Agreement,
under which the carrier is paying 27% of defense and indemnity
costs incurred by or on behalf of the subsidiary in connection
with asbestos bodily injury claims.  The agreement continues
until terminated and can only be terminated by either party by
providing a minimum of two years prior written notice.

"As of December 31, 2017, no notice of termination has been given
under this agreement.  At the end of the term of the agreement,
the subsidiary may choose to again pursue its claim against this
insurer regarding the application of the policy limits.  The
Company believes that, if the coverage issues under the primary
policies with the remaining carrier are resolved adversely to the
subsidiary and all settlement proceeds were used, the subsidiary
may have limited additional coverage from a state guarantee fund
established following the insolvency of one of the subsidiary's
primary insurers.  Nevertheless, liabilities in respect of claims
may exceed the assets and coverage available to the subsidiary."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://is.gd/MBrdlc


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Albany Int'l Defending 3,730 Claims at Dec. 31
---------------------------------------------------------------
Albany International Corp. is defending 3,730 asbestos-related
claims as of December 31, 2017, according to the Company's Form
10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017.

The Company states, "Albany International Corp. is a defendant in
suits brought in various courts in the United States by
plaintiffs who allege that they have suffered personal injury as
a result of exposure to asbestos-containing paper machine
clothing synthetic dryer fabrics marketed during the period from
1967 to 1976 and used in certain paper mills.

"We were defending 3,730 claims as of December 31, 2017.

"We anticipate that additional claims will be filed against the
Company and related companies in the future, but are unable to
predict the number and timing of such future claims.  Due to the
fact that information sufficient to meaningfully estimate a range
of possible loss of a particular claim is typically not available
until late in the discovery process, we do not believe a
meaningful estimate can be made regarding the range of possible
loss with respect to pending or future claims and therefore are
unable to estimate a range of reasonably possible loss in excess
of amounts already accrued for pending or future claims.

"While we believe we have meritorious defenses to these claims,
we have settled certain claims for amounts we consider reasonable
given the facts and circumstances of each case.  Our insurance
carrier has defended each case and funded settlements under a
standard reservation of rights.  As of December 31, 2017, we had
resolved, by means of settlement or dismissal, 37,594 claims.
The total cost of resolving all claims was US$10.2 million.  Of
this amount, almost 100 percent was paid by our insurance
carrier, who has confirmed that we have approximately US$140
million of remaining coverage under primary and excess policies
that should be available with respect to current and future
asbestos claims."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://is.gd/FuXeG8


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Brandon Drying Had 7,707 Claims at Dec. 31
-----------------------------------------------------------
Albany International Corp.'s subsidiary, Brandon Drying Fabrics,
Inc., had 7,707 asbestos-related claims as of December 31, 2017,
according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2017.

Albany International states, "The Company's subsidiary, Brandon
Drying Fabrics, Inc.  ("Brandon"), is also a separate defendant
in many of the asbestos cases in which Albany is named as a
defendant, despite never having manufactured any fabrics
containing asbestos.  While Brandon was defending against 7,707
claims as of December 31, 2017, only nine claims have been filed
against Brandon since January 1, 2012, and no settlement costs
have been incurred since 2001.

"Brandon was acquired by the Company in 1999, and has its own
insurance policies covering periods prior to 1999.  Since 2004,
Brandon's insurance carriers have covered 100 percent of
indemnification and defense costs, subject to policy limits and a
standard reservation of rights."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://is.gd/FuXeG8


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Albany Int'l. Still Defends Mount Vernon Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Albany International Corp. disclosed in its Form 10-K filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2017, that it is named both as a direct
defendant and as the "successor in interest" to Mount Vernon
Mills in some asbestos lawsuits.

The Company states, "We acquired certain assets from Mount Vernon
in 1993.  Certain plaintiffs allege injury caused by asbestos-
containing products alleged to have been sold by Mount Vernon
many years prior to this acquisition.  Mount Vernon is
contractually obligated to indemnify the Company against any
liability arising out of such products.  We deny any liability
for products sold by Mount Vernon prior to the acquisition of the
Mount Vernon assets.  Pursuant to its contractual indemnification
obligations, Mount Vernon has assumed the defense of these
claims.  On this basis, we have successfully moved for dismissal
in a number of actions."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://is.gd/FuXeG8


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Warren Pumps Can't Get Pre-Judgment Interest
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Paul R. Wallace of the Superior Court of Delaware has
denied Warren Pumps LLC's Motion to set monetary judgments
against the Excess Insurance for the purposes of granting pre-
judgment interest on such contrivances.

Plaintiffs Warren and Viking Pump are industrial pump
manufacturers whose products contained asbestos, and who were
owned, between 1968 and 1988, by Houdaille Industries. Houdaille
maintained commercial comprehensive general liability insurance
consisting of primary, umbrella, and layers of excess insurance.
Plaintiffs each obtained their own commercial comprehensive
general liability insurance policies as well.

Houdaille divested itself in 1985, rendering Viking Pump and
Warren separate, independent entities. Asbestos liability claims
were made by Plaintiffs against their own respective policies
until 2005 when Liberty Mutual informed Warren that the last
Warren-only policy had exhausted. To shield against the
possibility of Warren draining the entirety of their shared
liability insurance, Viking Pump brought suit against Liberty
Mutual seeking injunctive relief and coverage under Houdaille's
policies.

On June 30, 2005, Viking Pump filed its complaint against Liberty
Mutual in the Court of Chancery, and Warren joined the action. In
its 2007 decision, the Court of Chancery held that Houdaille's
primary and umbrella policies extended to Plaintiffs.
Subsequently, in 2008, Liberty Mutual and Plaintiffs "settled
several outstanding claims," resulting in Liberty Mutual's
dismissal from the case.

Warren originally brought suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery
seeking coverage under primary and excess insurance policies on
underlying asbestos-related personal injury claims. In its
complaint, Warren sought declaratory relief against several
excess insurers, requesting the Excess Insurers pay Warren's
indemnification and defense costs for the underlying tort claims.
Following a three-week trial in the Superior Court, the jury
returned a verdict largely in Warren's favor.4 The Court entered
a Final Judgment Order in 2014 confirming the jury verdict. All
parties appealed, and in the consolidated appeal from the
separate judgments by the Court of Chancery and the Superior
Court, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, in part, and
reversed, in part.

Warren now returns to the Superior Court and brings a "Motion to
Set Judgment Amounts and Prejudgment Interest," a novel
application, against the remaining Excess Insurers. Warren asks
the Court to set the purported or settlement value of its
outstanding claims against the Excess Insurers as "a judgment."
Warren additionally seeks prejudgment interest pursuant to New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules section 5001(a).

Based on the Supreme Court's ruling, Warren allocated its non-
reimbursed costs to the Excess Insurers as follows: Excess
Insurer Allocation of Unreimbursed Costs as of August 31, 2016
International Insurance Company $3,937,819 Century Indemnity
Company $321,295 International Surplus Lines Insurance Company
("ISLIC") $10,000,000 Westport Insurance Corporation $1,392,506
Lamorak Insurance Company $420,592 London/Lexington $69,146,773.

In October 2016, Warren sent letters to the Excess Insurers
requesting payment of the amounts. Warren contends it included
necessary evidence supporting the costs. The tenor of Warren's
briefing indicated that it expected immediate payment. ISLIC
settled with Warren and Viking Pump. Westport paid Warren
immediately upon receiving notification that ISLIC's policy,
which sat immediately beneath Westport, exhausted. Lamorak first
received Warren's tender of defense costs and settlements
associated with its policies on October 12, 2016. Lamorak paid
Warren, in full, on or about November 29, 2016. International
fully paid out Warren's claims at some point after the Supreme
Court's ruling, as well.

Two other Excess Insurers, Lexington and London, sent Warren's
tender of 800 claims to an Insurance Consulting practice, Mazars
LLP, for review. On December 29, 2016, London and Lexington paid
$9,860,605 associated with 34 of Warren's claims. Further, on
February 3, 2017, London confirmed that approximately $14,863,450
in additional settlement costs and $4,710,041 in associated
defense costs for 275 claims comported with the Supreme Court's
decision, and that London and Lexington would make their best
efforts to pay those amounts by February 28, 2017.

Warren informed the Court that four of the six remaining Excess
Insurers had paid out their outstanding claims. Nonetheless,
Warren argued that prejudgment interest was warranted pursuant to
Section 5001 on all sums, paid or outstanding, due to the Excess
Insurers' alleged delay of payments. Warren posits that "an award
of . . . prejudgment interest is mandatory" due to the Excess
Insurers' alleged breach of their obligations to Warren by
delaying payment. And even if the Excess Insurers had not been
intentionally dilatory, Warren argues, it is entitled to
prejudgment interest as a matter of right.

The Excess Insurers counter that Section 5001's plain language
only permits prejudgment interest in claims where a breach of
contract is alleged; but here only a declaratory judgment was
sought. When no damages are awarded on which to impose
prejudgment interest, the Excess Insurers contend, Section 5001
cannot apply. Further, the Excess Insurers argue, Warren's
request to set a judgment amount after trial is merely an attempt
to circumvent Warren's earlier failure when it tried to amend its
complaint to include a breach-of-contract claim.

Warren first requests the Court set judgment pursuant to 10 Del.
C. Section 6508. Warren argues that under 10 Del. C. section
6508, the Court has the discretion to set a judgment in this
action in the amount Warren believes it is entitled from the
Excess Insurers -- even though no court or jury has rendered a
verdict or other judgment in that amount.

The Court holds that 10 Del. C. Section 6508 does not permit the
award of damages without a fact finder's determination. Warren's
cited case law does not support its argument that section 6508
grants the Court the authority to set damages without a fact
finder's determination of the appropriate amount. Here, the Court
is left with merely identifying the Excess Insurers' obligations
to pay under the policies and suggested that the parties could
seek post-judgment relief "(i) in the form of pre- and post-
judgment interest and (ii) to determine amounts owed by any
party, based on the declarations set forth in this Final Judgment
Order."

But the Court notes that Warren does not seek any determination
here on the amount owed, rather, Warren asks the Court to adopt
the amount of the claims it has tendered to the Excess Insurers
many of which were paid expeditiously upon tender. The Court
determines that none of the authorities Warren cites support the
notion that a court may just "set a judgment amount" absent a
judge or jury's specific finding on damages. Instead, Warren's
citations affirm that some determination of damages is necessary
-- not merely a finding of an obligation to pay -- for the Court
to deem it a monetary judgment.

The Court concludes that absent an award of monetary breach-of-
contract damages, Warren cannot recover prejudgment interest
under New York law, and no court has awarded Section 5001
prejudgment interest under similar circumstances. The Court
explains that New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Section 5001
hold that "interest shall be recovered upon a sum awarded because
of a breach of performance of a contract." By requesting the
Court to set judgment under 10 Del. C. Section 6508, Warren hopes
to meet Section 5001's threshold of a "sum awarded" for "breach
of performance" and recover prejudgment interest. The Excess
Insurers contend that Warren's proposed application of Section
5001 contradicts the plain language of the statute and finds no
support in New York law.

New York's Court of Appeals has stated that Section 5001 "is
intended to indemnify successful plaintiffs 'for the nonpayment
of what is due to them,' and is not meant to punish defendants
for delaying the final resolution of the litigation." The Court
has further defined prejudgment interest as "the cost of having
the use of another person's money for a specified period."

But here, Warren did not seek monetary damages in its complaint.
Warren sought declaratory relief, i.e., a declaration of the
contours of the Excess Insurers' obligation to pay. Warren's
additional cited cases suffer the same defect: it cannot cite to
a single instance where a court premised its prejudgment award on
a similar action for declaratory relief without proving specific
monetary damages at trial. The Court holds that Awarding
prejudgment interest without an underlying breach of contract
damages award would run contrary to the plain language of Section
5001: an award of interest requires the award of a sum "because
of a breach of performance of a contract."

The Court finds that Warren sought and received declaratory
relief in its action against the Excess Insurers, and now asks
the Court to set the amount of those just-tendered and resolved
insurance claims, unverified by any fact finder, as a "judgment"
in this case for the purpose of recovering prejudgment interest.
Since case law does not support, nor can the Court divine from
its plain language, Warren's peculiar interpretation of Section
5001, the Court denies Warren's Motion for prejudgment interest.

The case is Viking Pump, Inc. and Warren Pumps LLC, Plaintiffs,
v. Century Indemnity Company, et al., Defendants, C.A. No. N10C-
06-141 PRW CCLD, (Del. Super. Ct.).

A full-text copy of the Memorandum Opinion and Order dated May
23, 2018 is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybolavc6 from
Leagle.com

David J. Baldwin, Esquire -- dbaldwin@potteranderson.com --
Jennifer C. Wasson, Esquire -- jwasson@potteranderson.com --
Carla M. Jones, Esquire -- cjones@potteranderson.com -- Potter
Anderson & Corroon LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Robin L. Cohen,
Esquire (pro hac vice) (argued) -- rcohen@mckoolsmith.com --
Keith McKenna, Esquire (pro hac vice) -- kmckenna@mckoolsmith.com
-- McKool Smith, P.C., New York, New York, Attorneys for Warren
Pumps LLC.

Kenneth J. Nachbar, Esquire -- knachbar@mnat.com -- Morris,
Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Garrett B.
Moritz, Esquire -- gmoritz@ramllp.com -- Nicholas D. Mozal,
Esquire -- nmozal@ramllp.com -- Ross Aronstam & Moritz LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware, Tancred Schiavoni, Esquire (pro hac vice) -
- tschiavoni@omm.com -- and Gary Svirsky, Esquire (pro hac vice)
(argued) -- gsvirsky@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP, New York,
New York; AND John D. Balaguer, Esquire --
balaguerj@whiteandwilliams.com -- White and Williams LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware. Of Counsel: Brian G. Fox, Esquire (pro hac
vice) and Lawrence A. Nathanson, Esquire (pro hac vice), Siegal &
Park, Mount Laurel, New Jersey, Attorneys for Defendants TIG
Insurance Company, f/k/a International Insurance Company, with
respect to policies numbered 5220113076 and 5220282357, and
Westchester Fire Insurance Company, with respect to policy
numbered 5220489339, by operation of novation; ACE Property &
Casualty Insurance Company (f/k/a CIGNA Property & Casualty
Insurance Company), as successor-in-interest to Central National
Insurance Company of Omaha, but only as respects policies issued
through Cravens, Dargan & Company, Pacific Coast (improperly
named as The Central National Insurance Company of Omaha); and
Century Indemnity Company, as successor to CCI Insurance Company,
as successor to Insurance Company of North America and Century
Indemnity Company as successor to CIGNA Specialty Insurance
Company (f/k/a California Union Insurance Company).

Anthony G. Flynn, Esquire -- aflynn@ycst.com -- Timothy Jay
Houseal, Esquire -- thouseal@ycst.com -- Jennifer M. Kinkus,
Esquire -- jkinkus@ycst.com -- Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor
LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Laura S. McKay, Esquire (pro hac vice)
(argued) -- lmckay@hww-law.com -- Hinkhouse Williams Walsh LLP,
Chicago, Illinois; AND, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London and Certain London Market
Insurance Companies.

Thaddeus J. Weaver, Esquire -- tweaver@dilworthlaw.com --
Dilworth Paxson LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Laura S. McKay,
Esquire (pro hac vice) (argued) -- lmckay@hww-law.com --
Hinkhouse Williams Walsh LLP, Chicago, Illinois, Attorneys for
OneBeacon America Insurance Company as successor to Commercial
Union Insurance Company, XL Insurance America, Inc., as successor
to Vanguard Insurance Company, and Republic Insurance Company,
n/k/a Starr Indemnity & Liability Company.

James W. Semple, Esquire -- jsemple@coochtaylor.com -- C. Scott
Reese, Esquire -- sreese@coochtaylor.com -- Cooch & Taylor P.A.,
Wilmington, Delaware, Kristin Suga Heres, Esquire (pro hac vice)
(argued) -- kheres@zelle.com -- Zelle LLP, Framingham,
Massachusetts, Attorneys for Defendant Westport Insurance
Corporation.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Underwriters Not Barred by Res Judicata
--------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Van H. Kyzar of the Court of Appeals of Louisiana for
the Third Circuit has reversed the decisions of the trial court
granting peremptory exceptions of res judicata and dismissing
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London third-party demands
against the Appellees.

The Appellees in this case are: ConocoPhillips Company, PPG
Industries, Inc., Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company as the
alleged insurer of ConocoPhillips and PPG, Century Indemnity
Company as the alleged insurer of PPG and certain PPG Industries,
Inc. executive officers, Travelers Casualty and Surety Company
and Travelers Indemnity Company as the alleged insurer of PPG and
certain PPG Industries, Inc. executive officers, and Crown, Cork
& Seal Company, Inc.

On January 9, 2015, Plaintiffs, Robert Palermo and his wife
Roberta Palermo, initiated a personal injury action against
CanadianOxy Offshore Production Company and its insurers,
including Appellant, Certain Underwriters, seeking damages for
injuries allegedly sustained by Robert Palermo resulting from his
purported occupational exposure to asbestos-containing materials.
Certain Underwriters thereafter filed an Answer and Affirmative
Defenses to Plaintiffs' Original Petition and filed Third-Party
Demands, asserting incidental actions seeking contribution
against several entities, including ConocoPhillips, PPG, Hartford
as the alleged insurer of ConocoPhillips and PPG, Century as the
alleged insurer of PPG and certain PPG officers, CCS, and
Travelers as the alleged insurer of PPG and certain PPG officers.

ConocoPhillips and Hartford filed exceptions of improper service
of process, insufficiency of citation, and lack of jurisdiction.
The trial court sustained the exceptions and set a deadline for
Certain Underwriters to re-cite and re-serve the third-party
defendants. After Certain Underwriters failed to re-serve the
parties within the time specified by the trial court's order, it
ordered the dismissal of the Third-Party Demands without
prejudice, pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. Art. 932(B), on March 30,
2016. The trial court executed a written judgment to that effect
on April 21, 2016.

Meanwhile, on April 14, 2016, Certain Underwriters filed a Motion
and Order for Leave to File First Supplemental Third-Party
Demand. Leave was granted by the trial court on April 18, 2016,
though Certain Underwriters' third-party demand had been
dismissed. On June 30, 2016, the trial court held a hearing and
found that no third-party action was pending in light of the
April 21, 2016 judgment of dismissal, thereby maintaining the
exceptions. On August 30, 2016, the trial court executed a
written judgment submitted by the parties, dismissing without
prejudice the re-cited and re-served third-party actions.

On September 22, 2016, Certain Underwriters filed another third-
party demand naming Appellees, among others. On February 3, 2017,
the trial court held a hearing on the various Peremptory,
Declinatory and Dilatory Exceptions to the September 22, 2016
Third-Party Demand filed by ConocoPhillips, Hartford, and PPG,
including an Exception of Res Judicata. All other Appellees
joined in the exceptions, except Travelers who filed separate
exceptions to the demand but did not assert res judicata at that
time.

The trial court maintained Appellees' Peremptory Exception of Res
Judicata, finding that La.R.S. 13:4231, et seq., barred Certain
Underwriters from filing another third-party demand in the same
proceeding, as the court had previously entered a final judgment
dismissing Certain Underwriters' third-party action without
prejudice. Thereafter, on April 11, 2017, the trial court entered
a written judgment dismissing Certain Underwriters' September 22,
2016 third-party demands against Appellees, not including
Travelers, without prejudice. Certain Underwriters appealed the
granting of the exception to the Court in docket number 17-825.

Following this decree from the trial court, Travelers filed a
separate exception of res judicata, which was heard on June 22,
2017. On July 28, 2017, the trial court signed a written judgment
granting Travelers' exception of res judicata, predicated on the
same grounds as its April 11, 2017 ruling, and dismissing Certain
Underwriters' third-party demands without prejudice. Certain
Underwriters appealed the trial court's judgment, maintaining
Travelers' res judicata exception, in docket number 17-1182. This
court then consolidated 17-825 and 17-1182 on January 22, 2018,
pursuant to an unopposed motion filed by Certain Underwriters.

On appeal, Certain Underwriters asserts that the trial court
erred in granting Appellees' exceptions of res judicata as to the
re-filed September 22, 2016 Third-Party Demand. The issue before
the Court now is whether the trial court erred when it maintained
the exceptions of res judicata filed by Appellees,
ConocoPhillips, PPG, Hartford, Century, Travelers, and CCS, in
response to Certain Underwriters' September 22, 2016 third-party
demand.

The Court points out that the purpose of the exception of res
judicata is to bar the re-litigation of a subject matter arising
from the same transaction or occurrence as that of a previous
suit. With the 1990 amendment to the res judicata statute,
however, the chief inquiry is whether the second action asserts a
cause of action which arises out of the transaction or occurrence
that was the subject matter of the first action. While this is
the central inquiry under the current statute, it is not the only
inquiry. A reading of La.R.S. 13:4231 reveals that a second
action is precluded when all of the following are satisfied: (1)
the judgment is valid; (2) the judgment is final; (3) the parties
are the same; (4) the cause or causes of action asserted in the
second suit existed at the time of final judgment in the first
litigation; and (5) the cause or causes of action asserted in the
second suit arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was
the subject matter of the first litigation.

The Court finds that the initial attempt at the filing of the
incidental third-party demands was dismissed, but the dismissal
was without prejudice, based on procedural grounds as opposed to
substantive ones. Clearly, as acknowledged by the third-party
defendants and Appellees herein, Certain Underwriters could file
its claims in a separate, new lawsuit. "It is elementary,
however, that an exception of Res Judicata (the authority of the
thing adjudged) must be predicated upon a final judgment." The
main demand of the plaintiff was not dismissed as a final
judgment in these suits. The judgment of dismissal of the third-
party demands did not even begin to determine the merits of the
claims set forth in the third-party demands. The dismissal was
based solely on procedural grounds. It is clear Certain
Underwriters' substantive rights were not addressed. The
incidental third-party demands are still viable, are not
prescribed, and have not otherwise been substantively resolved.
That being the case, there is no legal impediment to the re-
filing of the third-party demands in the still pending main
demand of the plaintiffs herein.

Appellees assert that because the judgment dismissing the
original third-party demands was designated a "final judgment,"
the subsequent re-filing of the third-party demands within the
instant suit should not be allowed. This designation is not,
however, the sine qua non.

The Court discusses that a final judgment is appealable in all
cases in which appeals are given by law, whether rendered after
hearing, by default, or by reformation under Article 1814, but no
appeal may be taken from a partial final judgment under Article
1915(B) until the judgment has been designated a final judgment
under Article 1915(B). A judgment of dismissal with prejudice
will have the effect of a final judgment of absolute dismissal
after trial" while "a judgment of dismissal without prejudice
will not constitute a bar to another suit on the same cause of
action." The relevance of a dismissal with prejudice, as opposed
to without prejudice, is that the dismissal with prejudice has
res judicata effect on the parties to the suit dismissed, whereas
the dismissal without prejudice allows the re-filing of the
matter at hand. In the instant case, the dismissal of the third-
party demands was without prejudice. Thus, there is no res
judicata effect from the original dismissal. Where the main
demand in the suit is still pending, a judgment of dismissal
without prejudice does not preclude the re-filing of the
dismissed claims in the original suit.

Thus, the Court finds no prejudice to the rights of the other
parties in allowing plaintiffs to amend their original petition
to join additional defendants who have been dismissed without
prejudice when a viable defendant remains in an existing lawsuit.
Likewise, the Court holds that it would likewise constitute an
"unnecessary and useless act" to require Certain Underwriters to
file a new, separate suit to assert its still viable third-party
demands. Accordingly, the Court reverses the judgments of the
trial court granting the exceptions of res judicata in both 17-
825 and 17-1182. The cases are remanded for proceedings
consistent with the Opinion of the Court.

The appealed case is Robert Frank Palermo, v. Century Indemnity
Company, et al., No. 17-825, C/W No. 17-1182, (La. App. 3rd
Cir.).

A full-text copy of the Opinion dated May 23, 2018 is available
at https://tinyurl.com/ya4roaua from Leagle.com

Paul J. Politz, Paula M. Wellons, D. Ashbrooke Tullis, Taylor,
Wellons, Politz & Duhe, APLC, 1515 Poydras Street, Suite 1900,
New Orleans, LA 70112, (504) 525-9888, Counsel For
Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff/Appellant, Certain Underwriters
at Lloyd's, London.

Tyson B. Shofstahl -- tyson.shofstahl@arlaw.com -- Leslie M.
Henry -- leslie.henry@arlaw.com -- Louis P. LaCour --
louis.lacour@arlaw.com -- Adams & Reese, LLP, 701 Poydras Street,
Suite 4500, New Orleans, LA 70139, (504) 581-3234, Counsel For
Defendants/Appellees, ConocoPhillips Company, Hartford Accident
and Indemnity Company.

Benjamin J. Guilbeau -- bjguilbeau@ssvcs.com -- John J. Simpson -
- jjsimpson@ssvcs.com -- Stockwell, Sievert, Viccellio, Clements,
& Shaddock, L.L.P., P.O. Box 2900, Lake Charles, LA 70602, (337)
436-9491, Counsel For Defendants/Appellees, PPG Industries, Inc.,
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company.

James M. Garner, Martha Y. Curtis, Amanda R. Schenck, Sher,
Garner, Cahill, Richter, Klein & Hilbert, LLC, 909 Poydras
Street, Suite 2800, New Orleans, LA 70112, (504) 299-2100,
Counsel For Defendant/Appellee, Century Indemnity Company.

Michael D. Lonegrass -- mlonegrass@gallowaylawfirm.com -- Rodger
G. Green, Jr. -- rgreenjr@gallowaylawfirm.com -- Galloway,
Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith, 701 Poydras Street, Suite 4040,
New Orleans, LA 70139, (504) 525-6802, Counsel For
Defendant/Appellee, Crown, Cork & Seal Company.

Jeffrey T. Gaughan -- jgaughan@baggettmccall.com -- Wells T.
Watson -- wwatson@baggettmccall.com -- Baggett, McCall, Burgess,
Watson & Gaughan, P.O. Drawer 7820, Lake Charles, LA 70605-7820,
(337) 478-8888, Counsel For Plaintiffs/Appellees, Robert Frank
Palermo, Roberta Palermo.

Lauren D. Brossette, Kenneth R. Spears -- kspears@law-sg.com --
Claudia Gary -- cgary@law-sg.com -- Spears & Gary, LLC, One
Lakeshore Drive, Suite 900, Lake Charles, LA 70629, (337) 513-
4333, Counsel For Defendant/Appellee, CanadianOxy Offshore
Production Company.

Katherine O'Hannan -- khannan@lawla.com -- Joseph P. Guichet --
jguichet@lawla.com -- Lugenbuhl, Wheaton, Peck, Rankin & Hubbard,
601 Poydras Street, Suite 2775, New Orleans, LA 70130, (504) 568-
1990, Counsel For Defendant/Appellee, Travelers Indemnity
Company.

Mary Arthur -- mimi.arthur@formanwatkins.com -- Forman Watkins
Krutz, 701 Poydras Street, Suite 4350, New Orleans, La 70139-
6001, (504) 799-4383, Counsel For Defendant/Appellee, Owens-
Illinois, Inc.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: PI Claims vs. IMO Industries Junked in "Airey"
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Louis Guirola, Jr. of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi, after due consideration
of an ore tenus motion and having been advised that the parties
are in agreement as to this matter, has ordered for the dismissal
of IMO Industries, Inc. from the case styled Beatrice H. Airey,
Individually and on Behalf of the Estate and Wrongful Death
Beneficiaries of ALBERT J. AIREY, Deceased, Plaintiffs, v. A.O.
Smith Water Products Co., et al., Defendants, Cause No. 1:16-cv-
00317-LG-RHW, (S.D. Miss.).

A full-text copy of the Order dated May 29, 2018 is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y9tlwfsd from Leagle.com

Beatrice H. Airey, Individually and on behalf of the Estate and
Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Albert J. Airey, Deceased,
Plaintiff, represented by James L. Farragut, III, Farragut Law
Firm, PLLC.

Foster Wheeler, LLC, Defendant, represented by Thomas E. Vaughn,
Vaughn & Bowden, PA.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ct. App. Affirms Dismissal of Claims vs. Brand
---------------------------------------------------------------
Division One of the Court of Appeals of Washington (a) affirms
the trial court's decision in dismissing the claims against Brand
Insulations Inc., and (b) reverses and remands for reinstatement
of the actions against CBS Corporation and Parsons Government
Services.

Barbara Brandes was diagnosed with mesothelioma on June 16, 2014,
at the age of 79. In August 2014, she filed a complaint for
personal injuries against multiple defendants, including Brand
Insulations Inc. (Brand) and other entities. Barbara alleged that
Brand negligently sold and installed asbestos thermal insulation
products at the Atlantic Richfield Cherry Point refinery where
her husband worked, causing her to sustain "take home" exposure
to asbestos fibers in Brand's product. Barbara's 2014 complaint
did not name CBS, Parsons, or Saberhagen.

A trial began on April 6, 2015. By the second day of trial,
Barbara had settled with all defendants except Brand for a total
of $1,965,710.76. In each settlement, Barbara specifically
released the defendant from all claims arising out of her present
personal injury claim as well as any future wrongful death
claims. Thirteen days into the trial, Barbara died. The next day
was to be the final day of trial, including the final
presentation of Brand's evidence and closing arguments.

The parties agreed to inform the jurors of Barbara's death, and
to eliminate any instructions for Barbara's future damages.
Barbara's action against Brand was converted to a survivorship
action after she died during her trial. The trial court granted
plaintiff's motion to substitute Barbara's daughter, Ramona
Brandes, as personal representative of her mother's estate, and
authorized continuation of the trial as a survivorship action for
Barbara's personal injury claims.

On July 22, 2015, Ramona Brandes, acting as personal
representative of Barbara's estate, filed a complaint for
wrongful death against Brand, CBS, Parsons, and Saberhagen on
behalf of Barbara's eight children. The estate sought economic
damages for lost financial support and non-economic damages for
the loss of their parental relationship and consortium with their
mother. The estate confirmed that it was not seeking to add any
new claims or evidence, confirming it was not pursuing any
potential wrongful death claims at that time.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the estate. After a
judgment was entered, the estate brought the present wrongful
death action against Brand, CBS Corporation (CBS), Parsons
Government Services (Parsons), and Saberhagen Holdings, Inc. The
trial court dismissed the wrongful death action against all the
defendants after concluding the claims were extinguished by the
prior judgment in the survivorship action.

On November 3, 2015, Brand filed a motion to dismiss, and
defendants Parsons and Saberhagen joined. Brand argued that the
wrongful death claims were extinguished by the judgment entered
in Barbara's personal injury action against Brand. The trial
court granted the motion to dismiss on December 16, 2015. The
estate filed a "corrected order" requesting that the order be
amended to explicitly state it applied to all defendants. CBS
filed a notice of non-opposition to the proposed corrected order.
On January 6, 2016, the court entered the corrected order stating
that the action was dismissed against all defendants.

The estate appealed arguing that under the plain language of the
statute, a wrongful death action is a new and distinct cause of
action solely for the benefit of a decedent's heirs, thus it is
unaffected by the prior judgment on the estate's survivorship
action based on Barbara's personal injury claim. While the Court
agrees that the language of the wrongful death act creates a
separate cause of action on behalf of the statutory
beneficiaries, the Court cannot agree that the judgment in the
estate's survival action against Brandes had no effect on the
estate's wrongful death claim.

While the wrongful death statute exists for the benefit of the
deceased's family, it is not completely separate from actions the
deceased could have brought during life. These two types of
actions are intertwined with each other and have consequences on
each other. The Court explains that a wrongful death action
accrues "at the time the decedent's personal representative
discovered, or should have discovered, the cause of action."
Thus, unlike a survival action that accrues when the deceased is
first injured, a wrongful death action does not ordinarily accrue
until their death. However, since the wrongful death statute was
enacted in 1875, our Supreme Court has substantially limited the
availability of wrongful death actions where the deceased took
action post injury, but prior to their death.

The estate argues that because the statute of limitations on her
claim against Brand had not expired prior to her death, because
she had not settled or released claims against Brand, she had a
subsisting cause of action at the time of her death and the
estate is not foreclosed from an action for wrongful death. While
the Court agrees that Barbara had a subsisting cause of action at
the time of her death, because Barbara engaged in post injury
prior litigation against Brand, our Supreme Court's equitable
exception applies and forecloses the estate's wrongful death
action against Brand.

Because Barbara successfully pursued "prior litigation" against
Brand, dismissal of the estate's wrongful death action against
Brand was appropriate.

Unlike with Brand, however, none of the post injury equitable
limitations are present to preclude the estate's wrongful death
claims against CBS and Parsons. Barbara's claims against CBS and
Parsons were not barred by the statute of limitations. Nor had
she settled, released, or brought previous litigation against CBS
and Parsons. Because Barbara had a subsisting cause of action
against CBS and Parson at the time of her death, the estate is
not barred from its wrongful death claims.

CBS argues that the estate's claims should be barred by the rule
against claim splitting or res judicata. Under the doctrine of
res judicata, a plaintiff is barred from litigating claims that
either were, or should have been, litigated in a former action.
"Dismissal on the basis of res judicata is appropriate where the
subsequent action is identical with a prior action in four
respects: (1) persons and parties; (2) cause of action; (3)
subject matter; and (4) the quality of the persons for or against
whom the claim is made." The parties do not have to be identical
in both suits, although "there must be at least privity between a
party to the first suit and the party to the second suit."
Because there is no evidence that CBS or Parsons were in privity
with Brand or any other entity involved in Barbara's personal
injury action res judicata does not apply.

CBS and Parsons also argue that allowing the estate's wrongful
death claims to go forward creates the potential risk of "double
recovery" and "inconsistent results." Both arguments fail. The
Court explains that the risk of double recovery as one reason for
barring a wrongful death claim when the party has already
received a prior judgment, that policy is intended to protect a
specific defendant that had already been sued. Because the
estate's wrongful death damages are distinct from those in
Barbara's personal injury action, the risk of double recovery
does not exist. Allowing the parties to pursue a wrongful death
claim also would not risk inconsistent results. As Parsons and
CBS are not in privity with Brand, Barbara's heirs will have to
prove their negligence separately, thus there is no prior result
with which to be inconsistent.

The Court concludes that the recognized limitations to wrongful
death claims bar the estate's claim against Brand, and the trial
court did not err in dismissing this claim. However, because
Barbara has a "subsisting cause of action" against both Parsons
and CBS, the trial court erred in dismissing these claims.
Accordingly, the Court reverses and remands for reinstatement of
the actions against CBS and Parsons.

The appealed case is Ramona C. Brandes, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Barbara J. Brandes, Appellant, v.
Brand Insulations, Inc., Cbs Corporation, a Delaware corporation,
f/k/a Viacom, Inc., successor by merger to CBS Corporation, a
Pennsylvania Corporation, f/k/a Westinghouse Electric
Corporation; Parsons Government Services, Inc.; and Saberhagen
Holdings, Inc., Respondents, No. 74554-9-I, (Wash. Ct. App. 1d).

A full-text copy of the Order dated May 29, 2018 is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yb99vku5 from Leagle.com

Glenn S Draper -- glenn@bergmanlegal.com -- Bergman Draper
Oslund, PLLC, 821 2nd Ave Ste 2100, Seattle, WA, 98104-1516,
Kaitlin Tess Wright, Bergman Draper Oslund, PLLC, 821 2nd Ave Ste
2100, Seattle, WA, 98104-1516, Matthew Phineas Bergman --
matt@bergmanlegal.com -- Bergman Draper Oslund, PLLC, 821 2nd Ave
Ste 2100, Seattle, WA, 98104-1516, Counsel for Appellants.

David Albert Shaw -- dshaw@williamskastner.com -- Williams
Kastner & Gibbs, 601 Union St Ste 4100, Seattle, WA, 98101-2380,
Timothy Kost Thorson -- thorson@carneylaw.com -- Carney Badley &
Spellman, 701 5th Ave Ste 3600, Seattle, WA, 98104-7010, Malika
Johnson -- mjohnson@tktrial.com -- Tanenbaum Keale LLP, 701 Pike
St Ste 1575, Seattle, WA, 98101-3931, Christopher S Marks --
cmarks@tktrial.com -- Tanenbaum Keale LLP, 701 Pike St Ste 1575,
Seattle, WA, 98101-3931, Erin Fraser -- efraser@tktrial.com --
Tanenbaum Keale LLP, 701 Pike St Ste 1575, Seattle, WA, 98101-
3931, Michael Barr King -- king@carneylaw.com -- Carney Badley
Spellman PS, 701 5th Ave Ste 3600, Seattle, WA, 98104-7010,
Counsel for Respondents.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Kinseth Litigation Remanded for New Trial
----------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of Iowa grants Kinseth's application for
further review numerous issues that arose during litigation
between the estate of Larry Kinseth, who passed away from
mesothelioma, and Weil-McLain, a boiler manufacturer whose
products exposed Kinseth to asbestos, in the appealed case Shari
Kinseth and Ricky Kinseth, Coexecutors of the Estate of Larry
Kinseth, Deceased, and Shari Kinseth, Individually, Appellees, v.
Weil-McLain, Appellant, and State of Iowa ex rel. Civil
Reparations Trust Fund, Intervenor-Appellee, No. 15-0943, [Iowa].

After several pretrial rulings and a nearly four-week trial, the
jury awarded the estate $4 million in compensatory damages and
$2.5 million in punitive damages. The jury concluded Weil-McLain
was twenty-five percent at fault for Kinseth's harm and further
concluded that punitive damages were warranted. Following the
second closing arguments, defense counsel again moved for a
mistrial based on alleged in-limine violations by plaintiff's
counsel during her second closing. The court denied the motion,
and the jury ordered Weil-McLain to pay $2.5 million in punitive
damages. Because the jury concluded Weil-McLain's conduct was not
directed specifically at Kinseth, his estate was awarded 25% of
the punitive damages award, and the Iowa Civil Reparations Trust
Fund was awarded the remainder.

Weil-McLain also sought to include a number of responsible third
parties on the special allocation-of-fault verdict form. Because
Kinseth was exposed to asbestos while working with many different
products, which were manufactured by many different companies,
the district court ultimately permitted twelve other sources of
exposure to be submitted to the jury. However, the district court
determined there was insufficient evidence to include McDonnell &
Miller valves, Peerless pumps, Bell & Gossett pumps, Hoffman
steam traps, and DAP caulk on the allocation-of-fault form. The
district court concluded Kinseth does not have a viable claim
against manufacturers whose products exposed him to asbestos
during the removal process, as boiler tear-outs constitute an
improvement to real property.

During his career, Kinseth sometimes worked with valves
manufactured by McDonnell & Miller. When working with new
McDonnell & Miller valves, Kinseth testified the valves did not
always come with gaskets on the flanges, and Kinseth would
sometimes need to place a gasket on the flanges.

The district court found that once a component part, such as a
valve, becomes part of an improvement to real property, it does
not lose its status as an improvement once it is detached and
refurbished. Any exposure to asbestos during the refurbishment
process is therefore not compensable under the statute of repose
and cannot give rise to a viable claim.

In Weil-McLain's motion to include responsible third parties on
the verdict form, it specified between the manufacturer and type
of product that exposed Kinseth to asbestos. Accordingly, the
Court determines that the district court properly excluded the
valves from the allocation-of-fault verdict form, as Weil-McLain
failed to adduce substantial evidence that McDonnell & Miller
valves exposed Kinseth to asbestos.

During trial, Kinseth objected to including two bankrupt
entities, Hercules and Johns-Manville, on the allocation-of-fault
verdict form, as the estate could not meaningfully recover from
the entities. The district court denied the motion and the jury
allocated ten percent fault, or $400,000 in damages, to Hercules
and fifteen percent fault, or $600,000 in damages, to Johns-
Manville. Kinseth had previously settled with both companies and,
through the bankruptcy trust system, received $4690 from Hercules
and $26,250 from Johns-Manville. Kinseth maintains the
substantial disparity in assigned fault and recoverable damages
is fundamentally unfair and contrary to the policy of Chapter
668.

The Court explains that, in general, the purpose of section 668.3
is to make defendants pay in proportion to their fault. Here, the
estate availed itself of the procedure by which it could settle
with the parties and thereby received compensation from both
entities in exchange for a release from liability. Accordingly,
both Hercules and Johns-Manville are "released parties" as
contemplated by section 668.3 and are properly subject to
inclusion on the allocation-of-fault form.

After the jury returned the punitive damages verdict, Weil-McLain
moved for a new trial on several grounds, including the erroneous
exclusion of certain responsible third parties on the allocation-
of-fault special verdict form. In response, Kinseth argued that
Weil-McLain is estopped from challenging the compensatory damages
verdict, as its statement that it is "going to compensate these
folks based on what you said" committed the company to paying the
full compensatory damages judgment. Although the district court
did not expressly rule on the estoppel issue, it impliedly
rejected the argument by reaching the question of whether certain
companies were erroneously excluded from the special verdict
form.

Weil-McLain appealed the district court's posttrial order.
Kinseth cross-appealed, alleging Weil-McLain was estopped from
challenging the compensatory damages judgment, defense counsel
failed to make a timely motion for mistrial following closing
arguments, and the district court erred in allowing the jury to
apportion fault to bankrupt entities.

The court of appeals reversed, finding that defense counsel's
mistrial motion was timely, plaintiff counsel's closing arguments
were sufficiently inflammatory to warrant a new trial, and the
district court erroneously excluded McDonnell & Miller valves
from the special verdict form. The court of appeals also
concluded that OSHA evidence was properly considered, the jury
was properly instructed on the proper use of evidence barred by
the statute of repose, and the district court did not err in
including two bankrupt entities on the allocation-of-fault form.
The court, however, did not reach the issue of whether punitive
damages were appropriate.

On appeal, the court of appeals held that judicial estoppel was
inapplicable in this case, as the doctrine only applies to
statements made in successive proceedings. Here, there was no
judicial acceptance of defense counsel's statement to the jury
that Weil-McLain is "going to compensate these folks based on
what the jury said." It was not material to any ruling, and at
the time it was made, the jury had already returned its
compensatory damages amount and decided punitive damages were
justified. Thus, applying estoppel in this circumstance "does not
advance the policy goal of avoiding inconsistent, misleading
results."

Because Weil-McLain is not estopped from challenging the
compensatory damages judgment, the Supreme Court now considers
whether McDonnell & Miller valves were erroneously excluded from
the allocation-of-fault special verdict form. In asbestos cases,
proximate causation requires showing more than the sheer
possibility of exposure, but rather proof that the plaintiff
"inhaled asbestos fibers as a result of being exposed to an
asbestos-containing product manufactured and/or sold by a
defendant." The Court has clarified that "a reasonable inference
of exposure to a defendant's asbestos-containing product, coupled
with expert testimony regarding asbestos fiber drift and the
cumulative effects of exposure to asbestos, is enough to prove
proximate cause."

In 1974, two years after OSHA promulgated asbestos regulations,
OSHA cited Weil-McLain for a number of violations in its plant.
One such citation was for failing to place warning labels on its
asbestos products, including asbestos rope and cement. Indeed,
despite having knowledge of the hazardous health risks of
asbestos, Weil-McLain only began placing warnings on its asbestos
products after the company was cited by OSHA.

In its motion in limine, Weil-McLain sought to wholesale prohibit
any use of Weil-McLain's OSHA violations at trial, alleging that
Kinseth stopped installing boilers in 1972, and thus any actions
after 1972 are immaterial to this case. Further, Weil-McLain
argues that even if Kinseth continued to work beyond 1972, the
OSHA citation does not speak to the reasons behind the company's
failure to warn and thus is not relevant to punitive damages. The
district court denied the motion, finding the citation for
failing to place warnings on asbestos products was relevant to
Kinseth's punitive damages claim. The court informed the parties
it would "tightly circumscribe" the use of the evidence and
prevent any discussion of the violations beyond failure to warn.

Kinseth testified that, while he primarily worked in the office
in 1972, and indeed had completed the vast majority of his
installation work by 1972, he occasionally performed "hands-on"
work in the field in a supervisory capacity until he retired in
1987. Thus, the Court determines that Weil-McLain's actions, or
lack of actions, in 1974 are relevant to Kinseth's case.
Moreover, evidence is relevant if it "has any tendency to make a
fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence"
and "the fact is of consequence in determining the action." The
Court holds that evidence that Weil-McLain did not place warnings
on its asbestos products until OSHA issued a citation, despite
having knowledge of asbestos' risks, clearly has a tendency to
make it more or less probable that Weil-McLain acted with a
"willful and wanton disregard for the rights or safety of
another." Thus, the Court concludes that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion in limine because
the evidence is relevant.

Prior to trial, the district court determined that any exposure
to asbestos arising from the removal process was non-compensable
under the statute of repose. Weil-McLain contends the jury was
erroneously permitted to hear evidence of Kinseth's exposure to
asbestos while removing Weil-McLain's boilers, despite such
exposure being non-compensable and therefore irrelevant. The
district court declined categorically to exclude this evidence
because it determined that it was important for the jury to
understand Kinseth's total exposure to asbestos, from all
manufacturers, in order to determine causation. Indeed, the court
found that in order for the jury to determine which manufacturers
contributed to Kinseth's mesothelioma, and to what degree, the
jury must be permitted to consider activities that were not
compensable but nevertheless contributed to the Kinseth's cancer.

The Court agrees with the district court's determination that
evidence of exposure during the removal process, while non-
compensable, was nevertheless relevant to the question of
causation. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in permitting the jury to hear evidence of Kinseth's exposure
during the removal process and instructing the jury on the proper
use of such evidence.

Finally, Weil-McLain alleges that Kinseth introduced insufficient
evidence to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury.
Specifically, Weil-McLain asserts that in order for punitive
damages to be warranted, Kinseth must prove that Weil-McLain's
conduct deviated from that of others in its industry. To receive
punitive damages, the Court points out that a plaintiff must
demonstrate "by a preponderance of clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence that the defendant's conduct amounted to a
willful and wanton disregard for the rights or safety of
another."

Accordingly, the Court remands the case for a new trial.

A full-text copy of the Order dated June 1, 2018 is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y8dre3a8 from Leagle.com

Richard C. Godfrey, P.C. -- richard.godfrey@kirkland.com -- Scott
W. Fowkes, P.C. -- scott.fowkes@kirkland.com -- Howard M. Kaplan
-- howard.kaplan@kirkland.com -- and Ryan J. Moorman --
ryan.moorman@kirkland.com -- of Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Chicago,
Illinois; William R. Hughes Jr. and Robert M. Livingston of
Stuart Tinley Law Firm, LLP, Council Bluffs; and Edward J.
McCambridge -- emccambridge@smsm.com -- and Jason P. Eckerly --
jeckerly@smsm.com -- of Segal McCambridge Singer & Mahoney,
Chicago, Illinois, for appellant.

Misty A. Farris -- mfarris@sgptrial.com -- Lisa W. Shirley, David
C. Greenstone -- dgreenstone@sgptrial.com -- Jay E. Stuemke --
jstuemke@sgptrial.com -- and Kevin W. Paul of Simon Greenstone
Panatier Bartlett, PC, Dallas, Texas; and James H. Cook --
cookj@wloolaw.com -- of Dutton, Braun, Staack & Hellman, P.L.C.,
Waterloo, for appellees.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Richard E. Mull,
Assistant Attorney General, for intervenor-appellee.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: New Hampshire Law Governs Turcotte PI Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case styled Gerard Turcotte and Alicia Turcotte,
Plaintiffs, v. 3M Company, et al., Defendants, C.A. No. PC-2016-
3557, (R.I. Super.), the Superior Court of Rhode Island is called
upon to address several motions to apply foreign law: (a) the
motions of Defendants CBS Corporation/Westinghouse Electric
Corporation and General Electric Company to apply the substantive
laws of New Hampshire as to liability and Florida as to damages;
(b) the motions of the remaining Defendants to apply Florida law;
and (c) the motion of the Plaintiffs Gerard Turcotte and Alicia
Turcotte to apply New Hampshire law.

In their motions, the majority of the Defendants contend that the
Court should apply Florida substantive law to this claim because
the law of Florida bears the most significant relationship to the
parties and to the event under Rhode Island's interest-weighing
approach. However, Defendants Westinghouse and GE contend that
New Hampshire law should apply as to liability and Florida law as
to damages in the Plaintiffs' claims against them and cite the
doctrine of depecage.

The Plaintiffs object to the Defendants' motions and move for an
application of New Hampshire law. The Plaintiffs allege that
Gerard Turcotte was exposed to asbestos-containing products
predominantly through his career as an electrician and through
improvements to property, including his family's motel, which
caused and/or contributed to his development of mesothelioma. The
majority of the alleged exposure to the toxin occurred when Mr.
Turcotte worked in New Hampshire, although the additional
exposure occurred when Mr. Turcotte briefly worked on projects in
other states. One such additional exposure was during a three-
month construction project in Florida in 1973.

The Court explains that the doctrine of depecage doctrine allows
courts to resolve different issues in a single case through the
application of laws of other states when the choices influencing
the conflicts-of-law determination differ by issue. However, the
doctrine of depecage cannot be invoked to apply one state's laws
on the issue of liability and another's on the issue of damages
as to Defendants Westinghouse and GE only because the doctrine
focuses on issues and not defendants. Further, this is a multi-
defendant lawsuit in which all of the Defendants are joint
tortfeasors accused of causing Mr. Turcotte's mesothelioma, a
single injury. The issues of liability and damages pertain to the
same significant contacts relating to that single injury, and
therefore, the Court needs not conduct a separate interest-
weighing analysis for each issue.

The Court further explains that depecage could be used to apply
different laws to the various defendants in a multi-defendant
asbestos suit involving a single injury (mesothelioma) and
emphasizing that "the entire litigation must be considered in
assessing which forum has the more significant contacts with the
litigation." However, the instant cause does not deal with
different legal issues which are easily separable, such as a case
involving a tort issue and a contract issue. Rather, it deals
with multiple defendants all alleged by plaintiff to have done
the same thing . . ."

Mr. Turcotte lived in New Hampshire from his birth in 1947 until
1996, when he and his wife moved to Florida during retirement.
They purchased a house in 1997 and a second house in 2000. During
that time, Mr. Turcotte and his wife continued to own property in
Shelburne, New Hampshire. In February 2016, while living in
Florida, Mr. Turcotte began to experience symptoms commonly
associated with mesothelioma.

Mr. Turcotte's symptoms, diagnosis, and resulting treatment
occurred in different states. Mr. Turcotte's first symptoms
surfaced while he lived in Florida. While Dr. Smith of Fawcett
Memorial Hospital in Florida completed a pathology report about
Mr. Turcotte's symptoms, the report repeatedly uses the words
"preliminary" to discuss the diagnosis and specifically states
that Dr. Smith deferred to the diagnosis of Dr. Myers of the
University of Michigan Pathology Department in rendering a final
diagnosis. Dr. Myers of the University of Michigan then diagnosed
Mr. Turcotte with mesothelioma in Michigan. Mr. Turcotte then
received initial treatment in Florida, surgery at Duke University
Medical Center in North Carolina, and further treatment at
Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center in New Hampshire. Mr. Turcotte
currently undergoes treatment at that facility in New Hampshire.

The asbestos-containing products in question were manufactured
throughout the country. However, the Defendants placed the
products in the stream of commerce and/or availed themselves to
New Hampshire, the state in which the majority of Mr. Turcotte's
exposure occurred. Accordingly, the Court finds that New
Hampshire is the place of the conduct causing injury.

The Defendants contend that Mr. Turcotte's injury occurred in
Florida because he was given the preliminary diagnosis of
mesothelioma in that state. They also argue that Mr. Turcotte was
exposed to asbestos in many different states, including Florida,
New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine. Plaintiffs contend, however,
that the injuries occurred in New Hampshire because the majority
of Mr. Turcotte's exposure to asbestos occurred in that state.

The Court also finds that New Hampshire is the place of injury.
The vast majority of Mr. Turcotte's exposure occurred in New
Hampshire. Moreover, the place of injury is the state in which
the plaintiff was diagnosed and treated. Because the state in
which Mr. Turcotte was diagnosed bears no substantial
relationship to this matter, and the parties do not request the
application of its laws, the Court looks to the state in which
Mr. Turcotte was treated. While Mr. Turcotte received treatment
to some extent in Florida, North Carolina, and New Hampshire, his
recurring treatments took place in New Hampshire, including his
current treatment. This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of
applying New Hampshire law. The place of injury is but one factor
in the choice-of-law analysis, however.

As with the place of injury factor, the matter of Mr. Turcotte's
domicile and residence is more complicated than in other cases.
The Defendants argue that Mr. Turcotte's domicile and residence
are in Florida. The Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Turcotte resides
in both New Hampshire and Florida. The question comes down to
whether Mr. Turcotte was domiciled in Florida and came back to
New Hampshire periodically or whether he was domiciled in New
Hampshire and spent time in Florida.

The record shows Mr. Turcotte was a lifelong resident of New
Hampshire, where he was born, raised, attended and graduated
college, and employed for approximately forty-eight years. Mr.
Turcotte then moved to Florida with his wife during retirement in
1996 and resided there for approximately twenty-one years. Mr.
Turcotte and his wife own two houses in Florida and lived in one
of his homes in Florida at the time of his deposition. During his
deposition, Mr. Turcotte was asked whether he had any plans to
move from his home in Florida, and he responded, "Um, prior to
what's happened here with my physical condition, I didn't plan on
it. . ." Mr. Turcotte registered two cars, renewed his license,
and filed taxes in the state of Florida. At some point after his
diagnosis and deposition, Mr. Turcotte moved to New Hampshire,
where he owns a home and continues to receive treatment in that
state.

The importance of Mr. Turcotte's return to his native New
Hampshire following his diagnosis and his decision to receive
treatment in New Hampshire is not lost on the Court, especially
considering the known grave consequences of a mesothelioma
diagnosis. However, at the time the Plaintiffs' Complaint was
filed, Mr. Turcotte was living in Florida, the state in which he
and his wife moved to for their retirement. There is no
indication that Mr. Turcotte viewed his move to Florida as
temporary or that he did not intend to live there permanently,
and his decision to register cars, file taxes, and renew his
license in Florida supports the opposite conclusion. Further, the
record repeatedly shows Mr. Turcotte representing his address as
in Florida. Accordingly, although Mr. Turcotte is a resident of
New Hampshire and Florida, his domicile is Florida.

Defendants Westinghouse and GE argue that the Court should apply
New Hampshire law as to liability and Florida law to the rest of
the case, including the issue of damages. The crux of
Westinghouse and GE's argument is that the laws of different
states should be used to govern the specific claims against
different Defendants. Specifically, they argue that New Hampshire
law should apply to Mr. Turcotte's claims against them because
the alleged exposure that was attributable to Westinghouse and GE
occurred in New Hampshire. In essence, Westinghouse and GE seek
to separate out for review Mr. Turcotte's claims against them
from the multitude of Defendants against who Plaintiffs filed
suit.

The Court finds that New Hampshire has the most significant
interest in this matter. Accordingly, the Court concludes that
the application of New Hampshire's laws as to all issues is most
appropriate given the specific facts in this case.

A full-text copy of the Order dated June 5, 2018 is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y6w22j3j from Leagle.com

John E. Deaton, Esq., for Plaintiff.

Andrew R. McConville, Esq.; Jason Caron, Esq.; Brian D. Gross,
Esq.; Kenneth R. Costa, Esq.; Carolyn E. Riggs, Esq.; Stephanie
M. Batchelder, Esq.; Jonathan F. Tabasky, Esq.; Shannon M.
O'Neil, Esq.; Nancy Kelly, Esq.; David A. Goldman, Esq.; Jennifer
A. Whelan, Esq.; Michael F. McVinney, Esq.; Matthew T. Giardina,
Jr., Esq.; Timothy M. Zabbo, Esq.; Stephen M. Prignano, Esq.;
Robert S. Parker, Esq.; Craig Waksler, Esq.; Ryan M. Murphy,
Esq.; Jeffrey M. Thomen, Esq.; James R. Oswald, Esq.; Kendra A.
Bergeron, Esq.; Eric J. Robbie, Esq.; Margreta Vellucci, Esq.;
Mark O. Denehy, Esq.; Lawrence G. Cetrulo, Esq.; Stephen T.
Armato, Esq.; Kelly Kincaid, Esq.; Kathryn T. O'Brien, Esq.;
Jennifer E. Wheelock, Esq.; Wayne E. George, Esq.; Audrey L.
Bradley, Esq.; Alex A. Romano, Esq.; Theodorus Urbanski, Esq.;
Mark J. Claflin, Esq.; Philip Newbury, Jr., Esq.; Alan Wong,
Esq.; Anthony J. Sbarra, Esq.; John R. Felice, Esq.; Marisa K.
Roman, Esq.; James A. Ruggieri, Esq.; Stephen P. Cooney, Esq.;
Crystal L. Cooke, Esq.; Mitchell Edwards, Esq.; John A. Caletri,
Esq.; Matthew C. Oleyer, Esq.; Monica R. Nelson, Esq.; Cullen W.
Guilmartin, Esq., for Defendant.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crane Co. Wins Summary Judgment in "MacQueen"
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Christopher J. Burke of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Delaware recommends that: (a) Crane Co.'s motion for
summary judgment be granted, (b) the sole remaining count against
Crane be dismissed, and (c) the case styled Marguerite Macqueen,
Individually and as the Surviving Spouse of David MacQueen,
Deceased, Plaintiff, v. Union Carbide Corporation, et al.,
Defendants be closed.

On March 28, 2013, Plaintiff Marguerite MacQueen filed this
lawsuit in the Superior Court of Delaware, in and for New Castle
County. In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserted state law causes of
action against 54 different Defendants based on her husband David
MacQueen's alleged exposure to asbestos and asbestos-containing
products while Mr. MacQueen was employed: (1) by the United
States Navy aboard the U.S.S. Randolph and the U.S.S.
Independence from 1956 to 1960; and (2) as a salesman by Union
Carbide Corporation from approximately 1963 to 1980.

On May 10, 2013, Crane and Defendant Elliott Company filed
separate notices of removal in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Delaware.

On February 8, 2017, the Court issued a Report and Recommendation
on product identification/nexus summary judgment motions filed by
Crane, Defendant Warren Pumps LLC and Defendant Air & Liquid
Systems Corporation. The Court ultimately recommended that
Warren's motion be granted in its entirety (such that Warren
should be dismissed as a Defendant in the case), and that Crane's
and Buffalo's respective motions be granted-in-part and denied-
in-part.

More specifically, the Court ruled that the three Defendants had
demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as
to the issue of causation -- that is, that Plaintiff could not
show that there was a nexus between: (1) Mr. MacQueen's prior
work on the two United States Navy ships, and (2) any exposure to
an asbestos-containing product for which the remaining Defendants
could be held responsible. From there, the Court determined that
this finding necessitated a grant of summary judgment as to four
of the five currently operative counts of the operative Fourth
Amended Complaint. As to the remaining count -- Count VII's
allegation that Defendants participated in a civil conspiracy in
order to suppress and misrepresent the hazards of exposure to
asbestos -- Plaintiff did not contest that the count should be
dismissed as to Warren. But Plaintiff argued that the Court's
recommendation, if adopted, would not eliminate any possibility
of liability as to Buffalo and Crane regarding Count VII. The
Court ultimately found that it could not recommend dismissal of
Count VII as to Buffalo and Crane, largely because Buffalo and
Crane had not addressed Count VII in their briefing on the
product identification/nexus summary judgment motions.

Plaintiff subsequently agreed to the dismissal of Buffalo from
the case. This left Crane as the only remaining Defendant. After
Judge Robinson affirmed the Feb. 8, 2017 R&R, Plaintiff indicated
that it wished to proceed as to its conspiracy claim against
Crane.

On October 18, 2017, Crane also filed the instant Motion for
Summary Judgment. Crane's first winning argument relates to what
Plaintiff did (and did not) plead in Count VII. On its face,
then, Count VII addresses an alleged conspiracy between
Metropolitan and some or all of the other 53 listed Defendants,
as well as, perhaps, "other miners, manufacturers, sellers,
distributors, and installers of asbestos-containing products"
and/or "other members of the asbestos industry." The purpose of
the conspiracy was said to be to suppress and misrepresent the
hazards of exposure to asbestos to persons, including people like
Mr. MacQueen.

A plaintiff cannot raise a claim for the first time at the
summary judgment stage if it was not included in the complaint.
If a plaintiff does assert such a claim (i.e., one not included
in the operative complaint) for the first time in her summary
judgment briefing, a district court will not consider it.

Thus, the Court concludes that Count VII's allegations do not
fairly encompass the conspiracy that Plaintiff now seeks to
litigate, because:

     (a) Any fair reading of Count VII indicates that it was
describing a conspiracy that in some way involves Metropolitan
and the first two substantive paragraphs of the Count explain
that the conspiracy described in the Count involves
Metropolitan's efforts to conspire with others (including certain
Defendants). Yet now, Plaintiff asserts that the conspiracy at
issue does not involve Metropolitan at all, and that Crane is
mistaken to presume otherwise.

     (b) The United States Navy is never mentioned by name in any
of Count VII's allegations. And the Court cannot see how it is
reasonable to infer that a branch of the armed forces like the
Navy was one of the "miners, manufacturers, sellers,
distributors, and installers of asbestos-containing products" or
"members of the asbestos industry" that were possibly being
referred to in that Count.

Plaintiff asserts that to the extent that "Crane did not include
warnings to end-users about the potential hazards of asbestos
regarding its products [i.e., valve or pump products] installed
on the relevant Navy ships [the U.S.S. Randolph and the U.S.S.
Independence] it has presented evidence that . . . could
establish that the absence of asbestos-related warnings was
accomplished at the Navy's direction." The problem for Plaintiff,
as Crane notes, is that such a conspiracy is nowhere alleged in
Count VII.

Plaintiff contends that the Navy and Crane had an "affirmative
and active agreement . . . to decline to warn end users about the
hazards of human asbestos exposure." But Plaintiff has not
identified sufficient record evidence to create a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether such a mutual agreement or
understanding actually existed. Plaintiff, in now opposing
Crane's Motion for Summary Judgment, cites for support to
portions of the motion to remand Report and Recommendation.

Specifically, Plaintiff cites to excerpts from the motion to
remand Report and Recommendation where the Court found that there
was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Crane could satisfy
one of the elements of the government contractor defense (the
element requiring that "the United States exercised its
discretion and approved the warnings, if any"). In those portions
of the motion to remand Report and Recommendation, the Court, in
turn, was primarily citing to an affidavit that Crane submitted
from retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral David P. Sargent, Jr.

The Court found that the contents of the Sargent Affidavit, when
viewed in the light most favorable to Crane, demonstrated that
"the Navy was intimately involved in determining what warnings
would be (or would not be) provided as to products located on
Navy ships, including asbestos-containing products." The Court
also found that the Sargent Affidavit could be used to show that
"to the extent. . . that Crane did not include warnings to end-
users about the potential hazards of asbestos regarding its
products installed on the relevant Navy ships. . . [this was]
accomplished at the Navy's discretion." The Court ultimately
issued a Report and Recommendation regarding the removal issue,
in which the Court denied Plaintiffs motion to remand the case
back to state court. In doing so, the Court determined that Crane
had sufficiently raised a colorable federal defense.

In citing to both of these conclusions in the motion to remand
Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff is now suggesting that the
portions of the Sargent Affidavit relied upon by the Court could
also sufficiently support her claim that a wrongful conspiracy
existed between, inter alia, Crane and the Navy.

What can be gleaned from the Sargent Affidavit is that: (1) the
Navy provided detailed specifications to equipment manufacturers
and suppliers that included what warnings could and could not be
put on their products or in related instruction books and
manuals; (2) those manufacturers and suppliers could not deviate
from the specifications; and (3) asbestos exposure was considered
a shipboard health issue, such that the Navy did not consider
warnings concerning asbestos exposure to be appropriate for
inclusion in individual equipment technical manuals. But what is
not present is any statement that suggests evidence of a
conspiracy between Crane and the Navy to suppress information on
the hazards of asbestos. The Sargent Affidavit fails to provide
any evidence specific to Crane as there is nothing in the
affidavit about Crane's particular actions or inactions, or about
what Crane did and did not do in mutual agreement or
understanding with the Navy.

At oral argument, the Court pressed Plaintiffs counsel as to
whether there is any other document of record that would support
the existence of the claimed conspiracy. There, Plaintiffs
counsel responded by citing to paragraph 9 of Crane's Notice of
Removal. But that citation too is not helpful to Plaintiff. But
nothing in paragraph 9 provides evidence of the proffered
conspiracy between the Navy and Crane. Rather, at most, the
paragraph generally shows that: (1) companies like Crane were
given a list of specifications from the Navy, and they were
required to comply with those specifications if they wanted the
Navy to buy their equipment; and (2) the Navy could review, edit,
and approve warnings on products it was purchasing from companies
like Crane, or decide to exclude warnings from those products
entirely. From this evidence, the Court maintains that it is not
reasonable to infer that Crane agreed with the Navy to
intentionally misrepresent the dangers of asbestos or had the
intent to do so.

A full-text copy of the Report and Recommendation dated June 6,
2018 is available at https://tinyurl.com/ya582bb4 from Leagle.com

Marguerite MacQueen, Individually and as the Surviving Spouse of
David MacQueen, deceased, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas C.
Crumplar -- tom@jcdelaw.com -- Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A., Elizabeth
Barnes Lewis -- liz@jcdelaw.com -- Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A. &
Raeann Warner -- raeann@jcdelaw.com -- Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A.

Marguerite MacQueen, Plaintiff, pro se.

Crane Co., Defendant, represented by Nicholas E. Skiles --
nskiles@swartzcampbell.com -- Swartz Campbell LLC, Allison L.
Texter-- atexter@swartzcampbell.com -- Swartz Campbell LLC &
Shawn Edward Martyniak.

Warren Pumps LLC, Defendant, represented by Jessica Lee Tyler --
JLTyler@mdwcg.com -- Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman &
Goggin.

Crane Co., Cross Defendant, represented by Nicholas E. Skiles --
nskiles@swartzcampbell.com -- Swartz Campbell LLC, Allison L.
Texter -- atexter@swartzcampbell.com -- Swartz Campbell LLC &
Shawn Edward Martyniak .

Marguerite MacQueen, Individually and as the Surviving Spouse of
David MacQueen, deceased, Cross Defendant, represented by Thomas
C. Crumplar-- tom@jcdelaw.com -- Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A. & Raeann
Warner -- raeann@jcdelaw.com -- Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A.

Warren Pumps LLC, Cross Claimant, represented by Jessica Lee
Tyler -- JLTyler@mdwcg.com -- Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman
& Goggin.

Warren Pumps LLC, Cross Defendant, represented by Jessica Lee
Tyler -- JLTyler@mdwcg.com -- Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman
& Goggin.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Goodyear Loses Summary Judgment in Appeals Ct.
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Ohio for the Ninth District reversed the
summary judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas
granted in favor of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. on Margie Taylor's
claim for products liability.

The appealed case is Margie Taylor, Appellant, v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., et al., Appellee, C.A. No. 28620, (Ohio Ct. App.),
which involves an asbestos case that originated in the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas. In that case, Margie Taylor brought
several claims against Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., including
claims for premises liability, negligent undertaking, and
intentional tort. Ms. Taylor's claims were based upon Mr. Young's
(her late father) exposure to asbestos while working on aircraft
brake linings during his employment with Goodyear Aerospace
Corporation.

Relevantly, Goodyear filed motions for partial summary judgment
on Ms. Taylor's claims for premises liability, negligent
undertaking, and intentional tort. The trial court granted
Goodyear's motions in an entry on the File & Serve docket, which
is a separate electronic docket used for asbestos cases. The
trial court then journalized those entries with the Clerk of
Courts, and included language indicating that "there is no just
reason for delay pursuant to Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 54(B)."
Ms. Taylor subsequently moved the trial court to vacate or modify
the "no just reason for delay" language. The trial court granted
Ms. Taylor's motion in an entry on the File & Serve docket. That
entry, however, was never journalized with the Clerk of Courts.
The trial court subsequently dismissed the case pursuant to Rule
41(A).

Due to the dismissal of certain defendants in the Cuyahoga County
case, Ms. Taylor re-filed her action in the Summit County Court
of Common Pleas. In her re-filed action, Ms. Taylor brought
claims for negligence, premises liability, negligent undertaking,
and employer intentional tort against Goodyear. She also brought
an additional claim for products liability against Goodyear.
Goodyear moved for summary judgment on Ms. Taylor's claims for
premises liability, negligent undertaking, and employer
intentional tort on the basis of res judicata. Goodyear also
moved for summary judgment on Ms. Taylor's claim for products
liability. The trial court granted both motions.

In granting summary judgment in favor of Goodyear, the trial
court determined that, since the Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas included Rule 54(B) language in its summary-judgment
orders, Ms. Taylor was required to appeal those orders, which she
failed to do. As a result, the trial court held that Goodyear was
entitled to summary judgment on the basis of res judicata.

Margie Taylor, executor of the estate of Russell Young, now
appeals from the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common
Pleas, raising two assignments of error for review.

On appeal, Ms. Taylor argues that the trial court erred by
determining that the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas added
Rule 54(B) language to the summary-judgment orders. She argues
that Goodyear's counsel, not the trial court, prepared those
orders and, therefore, the trial court itself did not add any
Rule 54(B) language. She also argues that Goodyear did not
consult her when composing the proposed orders, which violated
local rules, and that Goodyear's counsel appears to have had ex-
parte communications with the trial court. She further argues
that she did not receive notice of the summary-judgment orders
(journalized with the Clerk of Courts on October 1, 2009 and
October 2, 2009) until she received notification from the File &
Serve docket on October 28, 2009. Ms. Taylor, however, did not
raise these arguments in her brief in opposition to Goodyear's
motion for summary judgment at the trial court, and cannot do so
for the first time on appeal.

Despite Ms. Taylor's attempts on appeal, the Court finds her
arguments unpersuasive, and determine that the trial court's
entry on the File & Serve docket granting her motion to vacate
had no effect on Ms. Taylor's obligation to timely appeal the
trial court's final, journalized orders. The Court notes the
record reflects that the trial court journalized its summary-
judgment orders containing Rule 54(B) language on October 1, 2009
and October 2, 2009. Per Appellate Rule 4(A), she had 30 days to
appeal those orders, which she did not do. Instead, she moved to
vacate the Rule 54(B) language from those orders on October 29,
2009. A motion to vacate, however, does not toll the time
requirements for filing an appeal. While the trial court did
grant Ms. Taylor's motion to vacate via an entry on the File &
Serve docket during the 30-day period, the Eighth District's
precedent dictates that an entry on an asbestos docket is not
equivalent to a journalized entry, and that a trial court speaks
only through its journalized entries. Accordingly, the Court,
therefore, cannot say that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment on the basis of res judicata.

Ms. Taylor argues that the trial court erred by granting
Goodyear's motion for summary judgment on her claim for products
liability.

There is no dispute that Mr. Young worked for Aerospace in Plant
B, which housed the manufacturing of asbestos containing brake
linings during the relevant time period. Plant B consisted of two
divisions: the Vinyl Division and the Wheel & Brake Division. Per
Ms. Taylor's complaint, Mr. Young worked in both divisions, and
was "exposed to raw asbestos and asbestos containing products."
While there is no dispute that the asbestos containing brake
linings were manufactured in Plant B, the parties dispute whether
the manufacturing process, which began in the Vinyl Division,
continued once the brake linings were transferred to the Wheel &
Brake Division for additional work. Further, the parties dispute
whether Goodyear or Aerospace manufactured the brake linings, and
whether Goodyear had control over the Wheel & Brake Division.

In its motion, Goodyear claimed that Aerospace manufactured the
asbestos containing brake linings. Goodyear acknowledged that Ms.
Taylor claimed that Goodyear, not Aerospace, manufactured the
brake linings. It argued, however, that whether Goodyear or
Aerospace manufactured the brake linings was irrelevant for
purposes of determining whether Ms. Taylor's products-liability
claim failed as a matter of law. In this regard, Goodyear argued
that the Ohio Products Liability Act requires a plaintiff to show
that the product in question was defective. Goodyear argued that
the plain language of the statute provides that the product must
have been defective when it left the control of the manufacturer
and not while the product remained in the manufacturing process.

In response, Ms. Taylor argued that Mr. Young was exposed to
asbestos while working in the Wheel & Brake Division. She argued
that Goodyear, not Aerospace, manufactured the asbestos
containing brake linings in its Vinyl Division and that, by the
time they were transferred to the Wheel & Brake Division for
assembly, they were finished products that had left the control
of the manufacturer (i.e., Goodyear).

The Court holds that the trial court erred by granting summary
judgment in favor of Goodyear on Ms. Taylor's claim for products
liability, without any explanation or analysis. The trial court
has determined that Goodyear manufactured the brake linings, and
that Goodyear controlled the Wheel & Brake Division. Relying upon
those facts, the trial court determines that "there is no
evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the brake
linings ever left the control of Goodyear at any time during Mr.
Young's alleged exposure." The Court, however, rules that a trial
court cannot weigh the evidence and determine issues of fact when
ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court
sustains Ms. Taylor's second assignment of error.

A full-text copy of the Decision and Journal Entry dated June 6,
2018 is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8xm6ado from Leagle.com

Jessica M. Bacon, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

Richard D. Schuster and Damien C. Kitte, Attorneys at Law, for
Appellee.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Judge Denies Further Amendment to Bell Complaint
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. William L. Osteen, Jr. of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of North Carolina denied Lloyd
Bell's request to amend his Complaint to cure his civil
conspiracy claim against American International Industries.

Plaintiff Lloyd Bell is the executor of the estate of his wife,
Betty Whitley Bell. Decedent was exposed to asbestos by way of
her personal use of talcum power products, her beauty school
education, and her employment as a hairdresser. Decedent was
diagnosed with mesothelioma on or about June 18, 2015, and died
on June 3, 2017. The proximate cause of decedent's death was
mesothelioma.

Defendants manufactured, designed, distributed, sold, and
supplied asbestos-containing products. Bell alleges six causes of
action against Defendants in the operative Complaint: (1)
negligence; (2) product liability; (3) breach of implied
warranty; (4) willful and wanton conduct; (5) failure to warn;
and (6) wrongful death. Bell seeks recovery for (1) loss of
consortium and (2) compensatory and punitive damages.

Defendant American International Industries now moves to dismiss
Plaintiff's claims for willful and wanton conduct, malice,
conspiracy, and punitive damages. Defendant AII first argues that
that Bell has failed to state a claim for punitive damages, and
that Bell has failed to state a claim for civil conspiracy.

In response, Bell contends that Defendant AII's Motion to Dismiss
is untimely as Bell's original complaint was filed in late 2015
in New Jersey State Court and Defendant did not raise 12(b)(6)
arguments at that time. Bell contends that because Defendant AII
did not raise 12(b)(6) arguments during prior litigation before
the New Jersey state court, and because the present action should
be considered an amended complaint of the previously filed state
action, the present 12(b)(6) motion should be disregarded as
untimely.

Bell's earlier complaint filed in New Jersey state court was
dismissed with prejudice based on "forum non conveniens and was
conditioned upon accepting in personam jurisdiction in the
alternate forum."  Bell then filed a Complaint in this Court,
which Defendant AII timely moved to dismiss. Bell then filed an
Amended Complaint, to which Defendant AII likewise moved to
dismiss.

The Court notes that the operative Complaint before the Court
stands as a separate case from the prior action in New Jersey
state court, not merely an amendment of the complaint previously
before the state court. This case was neither removed from state
court nor transferred from another federal district court.
Instead, the New Jersey action was dismissed with prejudice,
meaning the prior action ceased and is properly considered a
separate proceeding from the case presently before this court.

Thus, Bell's filing of his Complaint in this Court marked the
beginning of this case. Defendant AII filed the present Motion to
Dismiss, as to the currently operative Complaint, and has not
filed a responsive pleading. Thus, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the
defenses raised in Defendant AII's motion are timely and have not
been waived.

Bell seeks punitive damages from all Defendants in this case.
Defendant AII contends that Bell has failed to state a claim for
punitive damages under North Carolina law. In order for punitive
damages to be awarded under North Carolina law, the defendant
must be found liable for compensatory damages and an aggravating
factor of fraud, malice, or willful or wanton conduct must be
present and related to the relevant injury. When punitive damages
are sought from corporate defendants, "the officers, directors,
or managers of the corporation" must have "participated in or
condoned the conduct constituting the aggravating factor giving
rise to punitive damages."

Bell contends primarily that Defendants "have known or should
have known since at least 1929 of medical and scientific data
which clearly indicates that Defendants' asbestos-containing
products were hazardous to the health and safety" of consumers,
and that Defendants "ignored and failed to act upon said medical
and scientific data."

Defendant AII contends that Bell's Complaint amounts to generic
allegations which inappropriately refer to "all Defendants." It
is not clear from Plaintiff's complaint how any officer, director
or manager of Defendant AII took part in or condoned in the
alleged willful or wanton conduct. Given the number of Defendants
and the breadth of the allegations, Plaintiff's claims that
vaguely refer to all Defendants do not suffice.

In contrast, the Court finds that the present Complaint makes
clear how Bell intends to support a claim for punitive damages,
alleging that top management rejected the advice of corporate
officials to warn of the hazards of Defendants' asbestos-
containing products. Nonetheless, Defendant AII contends that
Plaintiff does not allege when such conduct may have occurred,
the identity or position of top managers or corporate officials
involved in the decision-making process, or any of the
circumstances surrounding the allegation. Nor is there any time
frame on when or where this occurred, or how the advice of
corporate officials or rejection by top management was
communicated. Thus, Defendant AII's Motion to Dismiss will be
denied as to Bell's punitive damages claim.

Defendant AII also claims that Bell has failed to state a claim
for civil conspiracy. Defendant AII contends that Plaintiff fails
to identify which defendants purportedly acted in concert and
fails to allege that there was an agreement with Defendant AII.
Thus, Defendant AII contends that Bell has failed to plead the
first element of civil conspiracy -- an agreement.

Bell asserts that, while the Complaint does not use the word
"agreement" specifically, it asserts that Defendants: (a) acted
through their duly authorized agents, servants and employees, who
were then and there acting in the course and scope of their
employment and in furtherance of business of said Defendants, (b)
individually and collectively, ignored and failed to act upon
said medical and scientific data and conspired to deprive the
public and particularly the users of said medical and scientific
data, depriving them therefore of the opportunity of free choice
as to whether or not to expose themselves to Defendants'
asbestos-containing products, (c) acted willfully and wantonly in
their rejection by top management of advice of corporate
officials to warn of the hazards of Defendants' asbestos-
containing products -- such rejection being motivated by the
possibility of adverse effects on profits, and (d) intentionally
continued to conceal the dangers of asbestos exposure from 1929
through at least the 1970's.

The Court grants Defendant AII's Motion to Dismiss with respect
to Bell's civil conspiracy claim. While Bell alleges that
Defendants "individually and collectively, ignored and failed to
act upon said medical and scientific data and conspired to
deprive the public and particularly the users of said medical and
scientific data," the Court finds that the Complaint does not
contain any allegation that an agreement to do wrongful acts
existed between Defendants. Nor do the other portions of the
Complaint to which Bell points support a liberally construed
civil conspiracy claim.

Bell, in his response, seeks in the alternative an opportunity to
amend his Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(a)(2) should the Court find any of the claims subject to
dismissal. To the contrary, Defendant AII asserts that, during
the pendency of the litigation in New Jersey state court
"Plaintiff engaged in significant discovery. . . Nevertheless,
almost two years after Plaintiff first brought suit against AII
and after ample discovery, Plaintiff has yet to allege a single
fact to support a plausible claim for malice, willful and wanton
conduct, conspiracy, or punitive damages."

The Court finds that permitting Bell to amend his Complaint,
especially in light of the lengthy history of this case, would
both be futile and prejudice Defendants. Plaintiff's motion to
amend, presumably to cure the civil conspiracy claim which has
been found by the Court to be deficient, is not proper. Other
than a conclusory statement that Plaintiff's claims are
recognized under North Carolina law, Plaintiff fails to proffer
or suggest any new or additional facts which would cure the
defects found by this court as to the civil conspiracy claim.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to allege any agreement
between the alleged co-conspirators and Plaintiff's request to
amend fails to allege or suggest any facts that Plaintiff might
include to plausibly state a claim. Thus, the Court denies Bell's
request to amend his Complaint considering that Bell has already
enjoyed ample opportunity to amend his Complaint. The Court holds
that allowing further amendment to Bell's Complaint would
prejudice Defendants.

The case is Lloyd Bell, individually and as Executor of the
Estate of Betty Whitley Bell, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. American
International Industries, et al., Defendants, No. 1:17CV111,
(M.D.N.C.).

A full-text copy of the Memorandum Opinion and Order dated June
7, 2018 is available at from https://tinyurl.com/yco6w3sa
Leagle.com

Lloyd Bell, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Betty
Whitley Bell, deceased, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin W. Paul,
Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett, PC, William Marc Graham,
Wallace and Graham, P.A. & Eric Przybysz --
eprzybysz@sgptrial.com -- Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett.

American International Industries Inc., Sued Individually and as
Successor to Pinaud, Inc., Barbara Alice, Inc., Ed. Pinaud, Inc.
d/b/a Ed. Pinaud, and Nestle-Le Mur Company, All for the Clubman
Line of Products, Defendant, represented by Douglas A. Rubel --
drubel@hptylaw.com -- Hawkins Parnell Thackston & Young, LLP &
Eric T. Hawkins -- ehawkins@hptylaw.com -- Hawkins Parnell
Thackston & Young, LLP.

Brenntag Specialties, Inc., formerly known as & Whittaker Clark &
Daniels, Inc., Defendants, represented by Tracy E. Tomlin --
tracy.tomlin@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough LLP & William Michael Starr --
bill.starr@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough LLP.

Colgate-Palmolive Company, Defendant, represented by Curtis J.
Shipley -- curtis.shipley@elliswinters.com -- Ellis & Winters,
LLP, Jonathan Arthur Berkelhammer --
jon.berkelhammer@elliswinters.com -- Ellis & Winters, LLP, Joseph
D. Hammond -- joe.hammond@elliswinters.com -- Ellis & Winters,
LLP & Joshua S. Lichtenstein -- jsl@oslaw.com -- O'Toole Scrivo
Fernandez Weiner Van Lieu.

Cyprus Amax Minerals Company, Sued Individually, Doing Business
As, and As Successor To Metropolitan Talc Co., Inc. and Charles
Mathieu Inc. and Sierra Talc Company and United Talc Company,
Defendant, Represented By Timothy Peck --
tim.peck@smithmoorelaw.com -- Smith Moore Leatherwood LLP &
Stephanie G. Flynn -- stephanie.flynn@smithmoorelaw.com -- Smith
Moore Leatherwood LLP.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Jury Delivers $25MM Verdict in Talc Case
---------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Uria of UPI.com reported that a California jury delivered
a $25.75 million verdict against Johnson & Johnson, ruling the
company didn't warn consumers about health risks related to
asbestos in its baby powder.

Joanne Anderson and Gary Anderson brought the case against the
company after she developed pleural mesothelioma -- a type of
cancer caused by asbestos exposure.

"Instead of pulling the powder from the market or going with a
safer alternative such as corn starch, they engaged in a multi-
decade campaign wherein they hid testing data from the [Food and
Drug Administration], altered reports to make them more favorable
and lied to consumers. This jury saw Johnson & Johnson documents
that were never given to the public or the FDA," Chris Panatier,
an attorney for the Andersons, said.

Joanne Anderson said she was an avid bowler and regularly used
Johnson's Baby Powder on her hands and shoes for years and also
used it to help with diaper rash when her children were younger.
Experts estimated she used the product more than 10,000 times in
total.

Jurors issued the verdict including $21.75 million in
compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages, and
found Johnson & Johnson liable for two-thirds of the verdict
amount and the entirety of the punitive amount.

The remainder of the fault was spread among other companies named
in the lawsuit related to exposure to asbestos Anderson
experienced while watching her husband work on his car.

"Our clients are hopeful that this verdict can further bring
light to this unbelievable example of corporate misconduct.
Johnsons Baby Powder has contained asbestos for decades,"
attorney David Greenstone said in a statement.

Johnson & Johnson has denied its talc contains asbestos and said
it will continue to fight similar cases in court.

"We are disappointed with the verdict and we will begin the
appeals process. We will continue to defend the safety of our
product because it does not contain asbestos or cause
mesothelioma," spokeswoman Carol Goodrich said.

"Over the past 50 years, multiple independent, non-litigation
driven scientific evaluations have been conducted by respected
academic institutions and government bodies, including the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration, and none have found that the talc
in Johnson's Baby Powder contains asbestos."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: City OKs Plan for Dana College Asbestos Removal
----------------------------------------------------------------
Teresa Hoffman of Blair Enterprise Publishing reported that
efforts to redevelop the former Dana College campus continue to
move forward, with two additional actions taken by the Blair City
Council and Community Development Agency (CDA).

During the city council meeting, members approved the plans and
specifications and authorized city staff to take bids for
hazardous materials abatement for five buildings on the former
campus now known as Transformation Hill Addition.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Rehmsmeyer Couple Sues Deere Over Asbestos PI
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lhalie Castillo of St. Louis Record reported that a Missouri
couple alleges the husband's mesothelioma diagnosis is a result
of his exposure to asbestos during his career.

Virgil H. Rehmsmeyer and Deanna K. Rehmsmeyer filed a complaint
on May 15 in the St. Louis 22nd Judicial Circuit Court against
Allied Paint & Wallpaper Co. Inc., Deere & Co., Paccar Inc., et
al. alleging negligence and other counts.

According to the complaint, Virgil Rehmsmeyer was employed as a
mechanic and laborer at various locations, including in Missouri,
beginning in 1950. The plaintiffs allege during his career, he
was exposed to and inhaled or ingested asbestos fibers emanating
from certain products manufactured, sold, distributed or
installed by defendants. The suit states that on or about March
30, he became aware that he developed mesothelioma, an asbestos-
induced disease, and that the disease was wrongfully caused.

The plaintiffs hold Allied Paint & Wallpaper Co. Inc., Deere &
Co., Paccar Inc., et al. responsible because the defendants
allegedly intentionally included asbestos fibers in their
products when they knew that it had toxic, poisonous and highly
deleterious effect to human health and failed to provide adequate
warnings and instructions concerning the dangers of working with
or around products containing asbestos fibers.

The plaintiffs request a trial by jury and seek compensatory
damages of more than $25,000, plus interest, costs and any
further relief as the court may deem appropriate. They are
represented by Paul M. Dix, Todd A. Nelson and Courtney Gregory
of Simmons Hanly Conroy in Alton.

St. Louis 22nd Judicial Circuit Court case number 1822-CC101606


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Payment Scheme Hope for Asbestos Sufferers
-----------------------------------------------------------
Tom Seaward of Swindon Advertiser reported that a Falklands
veteran hit by asbestos cancer mesothelioma will have his
treatment funded under a new payment scheme that could help
others in Swindon.

The retired sailor served on RFA Sir Galahad, sunk during the
1983 Falklands campaign. In a 40 year career with the Royal Fleet
Auxiliary, the navy's transport service, he was exposed to
asbestos.

The Swindon man, who lawyers did not want identified, began
feeling breathless and in 2016 was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a
type of cancer.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: NZ Landlords Welcome Asbestos Clarification
------------------------------------------------------------
newsie.co.nz reported that this year new rules came into force
under the Health and Safety at Work (asbestos) Regulations which
means that if you own or occupy a building which contains
asbestos you needed to have a management plan in place.

Bindi Norwell, Chief Executive at REINZ says: "REINZ has been
seeking clarification from Worksafe NZ regarding asbestos
management plans and rental properties for a number of months
now. Clarity was needed because the wording of the legislation
suggested that every residential rental property built before the
year 2000 would require a comprehensive asbestos management plan.

If this was the case, it would be a prohibitive cost for most
landlords.

"The Guidance clarifies that asbestos management plans are
required when there is a risk that asbestos fibres will be
released into the air, for example, when renovations or other
building work occurs. This means that asbestos management plans
are not automatically required for all rental properties," she
continues.

"As asbestos management plans can cost thousands of dollars, the
news will be a welcome relief to landlords and property managers.
No doubt tenants will be relieved too, as this could have seen
landlords seeking to offset some of the cost through rental
increases," she concludes.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Campaigners Hit Scot Gov't on School Asbestos
--------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Whitaker of HeraldScotland reported that Scotland is
lagging behind the rest of the EU on stripping out asbestos from
school buildings, campaigners say.

The Scottish Government was accused of failing to adopt an
eradication plan for asbestos in schools.

Clydeside Action on Asbestos and the GMB union say there is a
much stricter regime in England and other EU nations.

Schools in England have a "future asbestos removal policy" --
where dangerous fibres are ripped out en masse of school
buildings, CAA and the GMB say.

However, they said that in Scotland there are only periodic
inspections for discrepancies.

The campaigners say there are more than 1600 hundred primary and
secondary schools in Scotland that contain asbestos.

Scotland has no "future asbestos removal policy in place and is
therefore lagging behind England and even further behind the rest
of Europe in tackling the threat of asbestos in our schools,"
Phyllis Craig of CAA said.

She said: "If we compare the lack of commitment in Scotland to
how the issue is treated in England there are stark differences.

"The Education Funding Agency in England published two crucial
reports in 2017.

"One was the findings of a voluntary data collection exercise
that asked schools to provide information about the presence of
asbestos in their school, how they managed the asbestos whether
they complied with legislation and guidance about managing
asbestos, and staff training.

"Undertaking a similar exercise in Scotland would be an important
first step in identifying the extent of risk to our school
children.

"If there are schools in Scotland that are not effectively
managing asbestos, this needs to be urgently addressed."

GMB Scotland Organiser Kirsty Nimmo added: "It has been well
documented that any building built before the year 2000 may
contain asbestos and our schools are no exception to this.

"We know that there are more than 1600 hundred primary and
secondary schools in Scotland that contain asbestos.

"It's shameful and unacceptable that Scotland has no future
asbestos removal policy in place and is therefore lagging behind
England and even further behind the rest of Europe in tackling
the threat of asbestos in our schools."

However, a Scottish Government spokesman said the condition of
school buildings had improved.

The spokesman said: "We are clear that local authorities must
ensure they are providing safe and clean environments for all
school users.

"In the last ten years, there has been a reduction of almost two
thirds in the proportion of pupils educated in "poor" or "bad"
condition schools.

"We take the issue of the handling of asbestos within school
buildings very seriously and expect local authorities to strictly
follow Health and Safety Executive recommendations."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Halts Wayland Apartment Project
---------------------------------------------------------
Henry Schwan of MetroWest Daily News reported that asbestos found
on the site of a future 188-unit apartment project on Boston Post
Road brought the development to a halt until it is cleaned up.

The finding could jeopardize Wayland's ability to meet a state
law that 10 percent of a community's housing stock must be
classified as affordable. Wayland is below the mark, according to
Lea Anderson, chairperson of the Wayland Board of Selectmen. The
town is counting on the 188 units to help meet the state
requirement.
Wayland must hit the 10 percent mark when the next U.S. Census is
taken in 2020. If not, a developer could bypass local zoning
regulations and build a project larger than Wayland wants under
the state's Chapter 40B law.

Town officials are working with the state Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) to clean up the asbestos. The DEP
wrote an email to the Daily News stating there is no timeline for
testing and analyzing the soil.

Asbestos is a multi-fiber material commonly used in insulation
and fireproofing. Life-threatening diseases including cancer of
the lungs, abdomen and heart are possible when people are exposed
to asbestos fibers released into the air, according to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

'Very small' amount

Town Engineer Paul Brinkman said a "very small" amount of
asbestos was found in a large dirt pile in the middle of the
property, known as River's Edge. The property is at 484-490
Boston Post Road.

The pile contains road construction debris dumped through the
years by town employees -- and possibly unauthorized materials
that were dumped illegally, according to Police Chief Patrick
Swanick. Wood Partners halted the project after it found
asbestos.
Wood Partners contacted the town, and said it was the town's
responsibility to clean up the asbestos, Brinkman said. He
confirmed cleanup is the town's responsibility, but he doesn't
know how much it's going to cost.

Several calls and emails to Wood Partners seeking comment were
not answered.

Land Disposition Agreement

Wayland and Wood Partners signed a Land Disposition Agreement in
June. It spelled out terms of the sale, including that all 188
apartment units would be counted toward the town's affordable-
housing stock.

Wood Partners agreed to pay $8 million for the 8-acre site, minus
various site-work expenses, which dropped the net sales price to
$1.5 million.

Site-work expenses include demolition of a septage facility and
soil cleanup.

Wayland and Sudbury built the septage facility. It was shut down
about 10 years ago, Brinkman said. The facility treated sludge
pumped out of septic tanks in the two towns.

Asbestos cleanup

Wayland officials have worked with the DEP since August to
determine how to clean up the asbestos. Cleanup will involve
taking the contaminated soil off site, Brinkman said.

Wayland officials submitted a plan to test the soil for asbestos,
according to an email to the Daily News from the DEP. There is no
time frame for the length of time the process could take.

Selectmen extended the Land Disposition Agreement from May 29 to
Aug. 31, after the discovery of asbestos. Anderson said the hope
is to have the asbestos cleaned up by the end of August.

More than asbestos

Besides asbestos, town officials have to figure out what to do
with materials the Public Works Department stores at the
property. Materials include crushed stone for building roads,
Brinkman said. A new location for the materials must be found,
and Brinkman said a former landfill across the street from
River's Edge could be an option.

Wayland school buses are also parked at River's Edge, and a new
spot must be found because of the apartment project.

There are several possible options, including leasing land;
relocating to a Massachusetts Department of Transportation
facility in Sudbury; and the former landfill across the street
from River's Edge, Brinkman said.

However, nothing will move ahead at River's Edge until the
asbestos is cleaned up.

"My hope is all the issues will be taken care of, so Wood
Partners can get back to work," Brinkman said.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cambridge Gave Economist Asbestos Cancer
---------------------------------------------------------
Jara Narain of Daily Mail reported that a senior academic is
suing Cambridge University, claiming a 'dusty corridor' left him
suffering from incurable lung cancer.

Economist Dr Michael Anyadike-Danes, 66, has been diagnosed with
the asbestos-related form, mesothelioma.

The father-of-three says the illness was caused by a 'crumbling'
asbestos-lined corridor he was forced to walk through every day
when he worked as a researcher at the university in the 1980s.

Lawyers warned there could be hundreds of similar claims against
the university from former staff and students who used the same
corridor in the basement of the Austin Robinson building, a
1960s-built block housing the Faculty of Economics.

Dr Anyadike-Danes said: 'It was the only way to get to a terminal
linked to the university's mainframe computer.

We would put the statistics into the computer and go back later
in the day to get the results.

'I remember the exposed piping and crumbling asbestos that lined
the ceiling of the corridor, though it wasn't until later I found
that the boiler room was adjacent to the corridor which was why
it was insulated with asbestos.'

Dr Anyadike-Danes first felt the effects of the mesothelioma last
year when he struggled to get rid of a persistent cough.

He went for tests and had to have three litres of liquid drained
from his left lung. Doctors diagnosed the cancer shortly
afterwards.

He said: 'It is shocking because the dangers of asbestos were
very
well known by the mid-1980s and yet the university did nothing to
remove it and ensure the safety of those people who used the
corridor.'

Cambridge University has undertaken a programme to identify and
safely remove asbestos within its buildings.

Its website states: 'It is known that a number of buildings
within the University of Cambridge estate have asbestos-
containing materials used historically in their construction.'

Dr Anyadike-Danes, now a senior research fellow at Aston
University in Birmingham, said: 'They have identified there was a
problem and are dealing with it, but it is far too late.'

His lawyer Steven Dickens, of Leigh Day, said he was now trying
to trace 'anyone who may have regularly used the Austin Robinson
building during the 1980s'.

He added: 'We know many students and staff were based there and
it is those people I would really like to speak to as witnesses
to the condition of the building.'

A Cambridge spokesman said the university 'has received a formal
notification of these allegations and the matter is being dealt
with by their insurers'.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Tons of Asbestos Left Dumped in Southampton St.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Adams of Daily Echo reported that authorities are taking
action against the owner of a truck which has been left piled
with rubbish on a Southampton street.

Residents say they are "livid" about the vehicle, which has been
abandoned on Peach Road in Coxford since the middle of March.
And one resident claims bags left on it contain four tonnes of
asbestos.

But more than five weeks after residents first reported the
vehicle the DVLA say they are now "taking action" against the
owner.

One resident, who did not want to be named, says the truck
appeared on the road in March. And he says it's not only an
eyesore, but is causing a hazard for pedestrians and drivers
alike.

He said: "I told the council from day one its asbestos. Every now
and then at about 1am a van turns up and dumps more rubbish onto
it.

"My gardener hit his head on it so now I'm livid. He came in here
swearing at me -- I said it's not my fault!

"My concern is for a pushbike comes down it will ride right into
it. We got up on Saturday morning and the sofa had been dumped on
it.

"For the best part of six weeks we have had to pick stuff off the
ground -- but I've told the council I'm not doing it any more.
The council are saying it's not dangerous -- but it's parked near
the corner of the road. If a motorbike comes round the corner too
fast they could hit it."

Another neighbour called the truck "horrendous" while another
said they had reported it to both the council and the DVLA.

A spokesperson for the city council said: "If there are no health
or hazard concerns re asbestos then it'll be a case of us going
through due process for vehicles reported as abandoned as there
are no parking restrictions on that road."

The DVLA said: "We are taking action against the owner. If we
find that a vehicle is untaxed we issue an GBP80 Late Licensing
Penalty to the keeper (reduced to GBP40 if paid within 33 days)
and the keeper would need to pay the back duty in tax.

"If the untaxed vehicle is seen on the road we can also send an
Out of Court Settlement letter. The amount of the settlement is
based on the amount of arrears owed and whether the vehicle was
declared off the road with DVLA.

"Also, as part of their day-to-day enforcement DVLA's national
wheel clamping partner, NSL, goes to different areas of the
country and can clamp or impound any untaxed vehicles seen on the
road."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Feared After Power Plant Demolition
-------------------------------------------------------------
Benjamin Preiss of The Age reported that a former power station
on Victoria's Surf Coast will be demolished with explosives but
anyone hoping to catch a glimpse of the spectacle has been warned
to stay away.

The six-storey-high decommissioned Alcoa power station in
Anglesea is set to be imploded on Wednesday morning, weather
conditions permitting.

According to a notice of demolition, the implosion will sound
akin to claps of thunder that will last for 10 to 20 seconds and
will create some "localised dust".

But some townsfolk fear that the dust could include asbestos,
despite assurances that the building had been renderd harmless by
a pre-demolition safety program.

A 400-metre exclusion zone will be set up around the power
station at the holiday hotspot to prevent people from getting too
close to the demolition.

Alcoa says it is working with the Environment Protection
Authority, Worksafe and emergency services to ensure safety and
environmental standards are met.

Surf Coast Shire mayor David Bell urged anyone interested in the
implosion to steer clear. "We don't want people turning up hoping
to see something spectacular," he said.

Cr Bell said asbestos had been removed from the site under
supervision.

"They've taken that building and gutted it," he said. "What's
left is the shell."

Cr Bell said the demolition was a long time coming. "It's been a
considered process over two years to get rid of it."

However, there are community concerns about the potential
presence of residual asbestos at the site.

Andrew Laird from Surf Coast Air Action said he was not satisfied
that a structure which was once full of asbestos could be safely
demolished with explosives.

"Everything I've read over the years suggests to me there's
absolutely no safe level of exposure," he said.

Mr Laird, a barrister, described the decision to implode the site
as "absolutely extraordinary".

Alcoa owns about 143 hectares of freehold land in Anglesea where
its former mine and power station were based.

The power station and coal mine closed in 2015 after operating
for 46 years.

The former power plant supplied electricity to Alcoa's Point
Henry aluminium smelter, which itself closed in 2014.

A statement from Alcoa said the power station would be felled
"using controlled explosives". It said preparations had been
underway for "some time" and included a 12-month asbestos removal
program.

"The remaining structure is predominantly steel which will be
recycled," it said.

The power station is located on private property, which is not
open to the public. Security officers will carry out patrols of
the area.

EPA executive director of assessments, Tim Eaton, said every
precaution had been taken to eliminate asbestos risk.

He said the demolition did not pose a risk to Anglesea Primary
School, which is about a kilometre away from the site.

"That's a big distance for a dust cloud to be travelling from a
relatively straightforward explosion," he said.

The site and its surroundings will be repurposed, with Alcoa
pushing for substantial tracts of land to be used for residential
and tourism developments.

Residents are also fighting to save a popular bike park, which
may be relocated if Alcoa is successful in carrying out its
vision for the site, which has been opened up for community
consultation.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Contamination Scare Affected 24 Firefighters
-------------------------------------------------------------
David Barer and  Kyle McGivern of KXAN.com reported that a KXAN
investigation has discovered another asbestos scare in a city of
Austin building. This time, a dislodged ceiling tile spurred 24
firefighters at a Mueller-area fire station to file worker injury
affidavits in January.

It took three days for fire officials to report the issue to the
city's asbestos experts, according to a city spokesperson.

The incident is one in a string of asbestos contaminations,
potential exposures and scares KXAN has found at multiple city
departments over the past two-and-a-half years. City officials
said firefighters were not exposed to asbestos in this most
recent occurrence, but the episode highlights Austin's struggle
to manage hundreds of occupied buildings peppered with asbestos
and in need of repair.

"We have a crumbling infrastructure. We have a lot of repairs
that need to be done in our buildings," said AFD Division Chief
Craig Walker. "So we know that there is asbestos in the
buildings. But we have policies in place where you don't make any
modifications, you don't drive a nail without contacting Building
Service and making sure that you're not disturbing any asbestos."

There have been at least five incidents at separate city
departments, including Austin-Bergstrom International Airport,
the Water Utility, Fire Department, Municipal Court and Parks and
Recreation Department, that have potentially affected more than
200 city employees.

In response to KXAN's investigation, the city initiated its own
internal review of asbestos procedures last October. That review
found failures and deficiencies in handling asbestos, including
lack of personnel to manage the program, lack of training in city
departments on asbestos procedures, failure to review procedures
and unauthorized renovations, among other issues.

In this latest incident, a ceiling tile dislodged inside Station
14 located on Airport Boulevard near the Mueller development.

Workers said they were concerned by glue that could contain
asbestos that cracked off behind the tile. No one knew for sure.

City spokesman David Green said the tile broke off and landed on
a desk Jan. 20. The issue was reported on Jan. 23 to Building
Services, which monitors and responds to asbestos issues. Experts
from Building Services determined there was not an exposure, but
they shut down the office area for five days to remediate the
asbestos "to prevent a potential future exposure," according to a
spokesperson.

KXAN pressed Walker on the fact it took three days to notify
Building Services, which handles any potential asbestos exposure.
"We take the safety of our firefighters very seriously. It's not
okay. To not know as quickly as we can," he said. "Not being able
to get a hold of Building Services, I could see them not having
24/7 getting somebody in there."

But Building Services confirmed with KXAN -- they do. The
department has on-call personnel, trained to identify when a crew
needs to come in for an emergency situation.

"The biggest thing that I want to take away from this is that we
need to start earlier in getting the right information to our
crews, making them understand truly what's going on," Walker
said, reiterating he believes the firefighters did an appropriate
job in reporting the issue, even with the delay.

"I think the crews that were there took appropriate actions in
covering the area and minimizing anything else that could be
disturbed. It was a very limited area where the dust from the
ceiling tile fell," Walker said. "I think that given the time
that it happened, appropriate actions were taken."

Worker injury affidavits filled out by 24 firefighters paint a
picture of concern, delay and neglect by the chain of command.

"Another ceiling tile fell from its attachment point above the
captain's desk in [Fire Station 14]. This is at least the second
time a tile has fallen from this location," said multiple
firefighters in narratives included in their worker injury forms.

"Looking back on that now, we wish we would have been properly
advised the precautions that should have been taken."

Walker said concerns in the affidavits stem from
miscommunications, and the firefighters weren't in danger of
asbestos exposure.

Outside of the fire department, city officials have struggled to
oversee more than 10 million square feet of city building space.
Many of the buildings have asbestos-containing materials ranging
from floor tile glue, to insulation, to window glazing -- which
if left undisturbed do not pose a hazard.

President of the Austin Firefighters Association Bob Nicks says
the firefighters involved are no longer concerned after they held
a meeting to clarify what happened, but said he'd like to see
some changes moving forward, to assure worker safety.

"It'd be really good if we had a published manual on that, on
every station, so firefighters knew where the risks are," Nicks
said of asbestos in the buildings. "So if something happens to
that wall, they know if there's an exposure or not."

City and state rules set strict guidelines for renovations and
construction on public buildings. In Austin, all buildings must
have an asbestos survey to identify materials that may contain
asbestos, and departments must submit an asbestos work requests
prior to starting renovations. Only properly licensed employees
are allowed to identify asbestos, remove it and approve requests
for work that could disturb it.

KXAN has found those guidelines have not always been followed.
A series of problems

KXAN's investigations into asbestos exposures began at ABIA. In
February, June and July of 2016, Aviation Department carpenters
ripped up carpet in the ABIA Maintenance Complex, which is not
connected to passenger terminals. In the process, they pulled out
tiles and disturbed black mastic glue containing asbestos. In
February, at the beginning of renovations, a supervisor warned
management of the potential for an asbestos exposure, but work
continued.

There is no record of an asbestos work request being filled out,
and up to 150 employees, including police officers and Aviation
Department administrators, were possibly exposed.

In December of 2016, Parks and Recreation Department employees
moved forward with preparing renovations on an east Austin sound
studio called Notes for Notes, despite a work request form being
denied. One worker, who spoke with KXAN and asked to remain
anonymous, said workers were doing construction on walls, floors
and ceilings that may have exposed asbestos.

The Parks and Recreation Department has not acknowledged to KXAN
that any city employees may have been exposed to asbestos.

In the summer of 2017, nearly two dozen Austin Water Utility
employees were potentially exposed to asbestos while renovating a
south Austin building that had already been contaminated with
asbestos by a contractor, according to a follow up report. City
records show a work request to begin renovations was denied, yet
work moved forward in the structure.

In a separate AFD incident in June of 2016, workers began
unauthorized renovations on carpet at a training facility on 517
S. Pleasant Valley Rd. More than 30 people were working in that
AFD facility at the time.

In November of 2017, the city shut down the Municipal Court after
maintenance workers dislodged ceiling tiles and sent possible
asbestos into a workspace. That turned out to be a false alarm,
but emails obtained by KXAN show court officials calling the
general state of the courthouse a "disaster" in dire need of
repair.

Green previously said the repeated asbestos issues were
"abnormal."

Wade Mullin, the Building Services asbestos program director,
said the asbestos exposures found by KXAN are "outliers," and
"not consistent with what happens in the city on a regular
basis."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Halts Work in Former Kamloops Theatre
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jessica Wallace of Kamloops This Week reported that WorkSafe BC
has issued a stop-worke order to Kaktus Flats Development LTD.
for removing asbestos from a longtime vacant property in downtown
Kamloops without an exposure plan, among other violations.

KTW has obtained a WorkSafe BC inspection report for the former
Downtown Cineplex Odeon building, which has been vacant on
Victoria Street for the better part of two decades. The 13,500-
square-foot-property was purchased for $1 million last fall.

"Based upon the violation(s) cited in this inspection report, the
board has reasonable grounds to believe there is a high risk of
serious injury, serious illness or death to a worker at this
workplace," the report states.

The report details two visits by occupational hygiene officers to
the site, which is undergoing asbestos abatement.

On May 22, an officer discovered the back entrance open, with a
truck (door also open) and trailer parked outside. The door opens
into a dirt floor theatre, which was identified in a hazardous
materials survey to be contaminated with asbestos.

The officer found "no sign of workers and no signage warning
persons of the asbestos hazard," the report states.

A Kaktus Flats representative emailed WorkSafe the following
morning indicating the "upper floor has been completely sealed
off and vinyl tile has been removed and double bagged" as per
WorkSafe standards. Cleanup of vermiculite in cinder block in
four former theatre spaces had yet to be completed. The email to
WorkSafe BC detailed shipping the hazardous waste to Mission
Flats via Diamond Lil Trucking.

A second visit to the site by WorkSafe, which was conducted on
May 23, confirmed vinyl flooring containing asbestos had been
removed without written procedures and without an exposure
control plan.

"It was confirmed that an assessment was not performed by a
qualified person to identify asbestos abatement tasks as low,
moderate or high risk and associated written procedures were not
available in advance of the work being performed," the report
states.

Occupational Health and Safety Regulations hold employers
accountable for safely removing hazardous materials.

The stop-work order went into effect on May 23 at 10:15 a.m. for
72 hours. It remained in effect as of Monday night (May 28).

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos in Wellington Train Buried at City Dump
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Stewart of The Dominion Post reported that fifty old
Wellington commuter train carriages contaminated with asbestos
are being buried at the city's dump because it is the cheapest
disposal option.

The move to scrap the Ganz Mavag trains comes after a deal struck
to sell the carriages to a South African buyer fell through last
year.

Six of the units sitting at railway sidings north of Upper Hutt
Station were moved earlier this year after attracting
trespassers, vandalism and graffiti.

One of fifty old Wellington commuter train carriages with
asbestos in its walls makes its way up Taranaki Street on its way
to the city dump for burial.

Contractors began transporting the carriages by truck to
Wellington's Southern Landfill where they will be scrapped.

Metlink rail operations manager Angus Gabara said the bogies,
motors and other recoverable scrap would be separated from the
units, but there was asbestos in anti-drum coatings inside the
walls of the trains.

Each carriage is about 20 metres long and weighs about 25 tonnes.

"The cost of removing the coatings to salvage the scrap is too
expensive. Asbestos is contained in the anti-drum coating and
will remain undisturbed during the dismantling and transport to
the Southern Landfill," Gabara said.

The carriages will then be crushed and buried. "Burying the
carriages is the least expensive and safest way to dispose of the
carriages because of the asbestos issue."

Wellington City Council (WCC) infrastructure and sustainability
portfolio leader Iona Pannett voiced concerns about putting the
"enormous amount" of scrap in the ground, especially given the
council was trying to stop the dump's expansion.

"I'm not very happy about 50 trains going in to our landfill and
we have to be very careful about the asbestos," Pannett said.

Council spokesman Richard MacLean said excavators with
'demolition jaws' were making quick work of the carriages.

"The cut-up materials are being buried in a specially-designed
and isolated part of the landfill that is set aside for the
disposal of asbestos."

MacLean said there would be no problems with leaching because not
much rainwater could get in under the landfill cap.

Gabara said Metlink had been trying to sell the old carriages for
reuse for years. Initially they were sold to a South African
buyer, who took a first lot of 16 units (32 cars) to be reused in
service in Africa.

But the deal for the remaining 26 units officially fell through
in late 2017.

Greater Wellington Regional Council spokesman Stephen Heath said
the South African firm knew the carriages contained asbestos, but
believed the deal failed because it could not cover the
"substantial shipping costs".

The operation is expected to take a month, while one carriage has
been gifted to Christchurch's National Railway Museum.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Trains Sent to Bendigo for Asbestos Testing
------------------------------------------------------------
Adam Holmes of Bendigo Advertiser reported that three old Hitachi
train carriages have been transported to Bendigo to test for the
presence of asbestos and other hazardous materials before their
possible dismantling.

The carriages arrived at Southern Shorthaul Railroad's workshop
in North Bendigo after being transported from a facility in
Newport.

There are concerns they contain asbestos around the windows.

The carriages are among dozens kept in storage at Newport. Metro
Trains, which is responsible for the carriages, is searching for
solutions to remove them.

Metro Trains spokesperson Andrew Nelson said all precautions had
been taken to remove the risk to the public.

"We always make sure that our retired trains and carriages are
handled safely, taking into consideration environmental
concerns," he said.

"A team of experts is currently carrying out a hazardous
materials inspection on these carriages, ensuring there are no
risks to the local community."

The inspection in Bendigo will investigate the presence of other
hazardous materials in addition to asbestos.

They were assessed by a hygienist before they were transported to
Bendigo to ensure they were safe for transportation.

The Bendigo site was chosen as Metro Trains believes it has the
necessary "space, expertise and equipment" to carry out the
inspection.

Once the inspection works are complete, a decision will be made
about their future which could include dismantling the carriages
-- and further carriages -- in Bendigo.

A spokesperson for WorkSafe said they would ensure the works were
being carried out safely.

"WorkSafe is making inquiries to ensure any asbestos removal work
is carried out appropriately," she said.

The Hitachi trains were introduced to the Melbourne network in
1972 and were replaced progressively from 2002. The last train
was withdrawn in 2014.

They were the last trains to have windows that could be opened.
Asbestos was believed to play a role in allowing the windows to
open.

A six-carriage set was intended to be given to preservation group
Elecrail, but that plan was cancelled.

Southern Shorthaul Railroads was contacted for comment.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: More Asbestos Found in Dunedin Mud-Tanks
---------------------------------------------------------
ODT.com reported that the Dunedin City Council has been testing
mud-tank waste after test results in April showed low-risk levels
of asbestos at the Green Island Landfill.

Since then, contractors have been wearing protective equipment
when cleaning the city's mud-tanks, as a precaution.

Council transport group manager Richard Saunders said further
random sampling of waste in seven mud-tanks found low levels of
asbestos in at least two more tanks.

The council was working with an independent laboratory and
consultant to review the results and advise on precautions when
working with mud-tank waste, Mr Saunders said.

As the asbestos was confined to mud-tank waste there was no risk
to the public, he said.

Safety controls were in place for workers when they cleaned the
tanks.

"The initial report has been presented to our maintenance
contractor and we are working with them to develop safe work
practices using the report's recommendations and in accordance
with WorkSafe guidelines."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Serial Asbestos Dumper Jailed in NSW
-----------------------------------------------------
9news.com.au reported that a serial Sydney waste dumper has been
sent to jail and ordered by a court to take out newspaper and
magazine ads to publicise his punishment.

Dib Hanna was sentenced in the NSW Land and Environment Court on
Thursday to at least two years and three months in prison after
he pleaded guilty to multiple charges of illegally transporting
and dumping waste -- including asbestos -- in 2015 and 2016.

Justice Brian Preston also ordered Hanna to remove the illegally
dumped waste within 90 days, pay the Environment Protection
Agency's legal costs, and publish advertisements about his crimes
to deter other would-be offenders.

He is the first person to be jailed as a "repeat waste offender"
under tough anti-dumping legislation introduced by the NSW
government in 2014.

Hanna had advertised free clean top soil, clay, crushed bitumen,
shale and the use of an excavation machine to various Sydney
residents via a letterbox drop.

Several people responded and made arrangements to have the
material delivered to properties in East Kurrajong, Llandilo, and
Wallacia.

But it was discovered the material also contained pipe, rubble,
terracotta, plastic, ash, wood, fibre cement sheeting and
asbestos.

In total, Hanna instructed the dumping of 461 tonnes of waste,
including asbestos, at the residential properties, the court
heard.

Justice Preston found each residential property was degraded by
the dumping and exposed residents to harms to their health.

Environment Minister Gabrielle Upton said the penalty was
"appropriate", adding that Hanna took advantage of innocent
people for financial benefit.

"The sentencing of convicted repeat waste transporter Dib Hanna
sends a strong message that illegal dumping of waste will not be
tolerated," she said.

He will be eligible for parole in July 2020.





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S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

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