/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/180703.mbx C L A S S A C T I O N R E P O R T E R Tuesday, July 3, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 132 Headlines 1 PERSON AT A TIME: Wins Final OK of "White" Suit Settlement ABC FINANCIAL: Massey Sues over Unauthorized Text Messages ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE: Leonard Sues over Debt Collection Practices AIR NEW ZEALAND: Sept. 14 Approval Hearing on $49MM Settlement ALDI INC: Faces "Dieter" Suit in W.D. Pennsylvania ALL-WAYS INC: Fails to Pay Minimum & OT Wages, Quezada Says ALPHA TECHNOLOGIES: Martinez Moves to Certify Two FLSA Classes APEX USA: Francis et al. Sue over Exploitable Labor APPLE INC: Court Consolidates "Bartling", "Giraldi" Suits APPLIED UNDERWRITERS: Faces Coyle Suit in District of Nebraska AXON ENTERPRISE: Faces "Richey" Suit in N.D. California BALTIC TRADING: Dismissal of FAC in Stockholders' Suit Affirmed BANK OF AMERICA: Culpepper Seeks to Certify Class of Specialists BANK OF AMERICA: Rivota Seeks Regular & Overtime Pay under FLSA BEST BUY: Court Won't Certify Class in Battery Life Suit BETHLEHEM LANDFILL: Faces "Baptiste" Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania BIRD RIDES: Fails to Pay Minimum & Overtime Wages, Matteo Says BLOOMNATION INC: Faces "Crosson" Suit in E.D. New York BLUESTEM BRANDS: "Morris" Plaintiffs Can File New Class Cert Bid BRAND ENERGY: Fails to Pay Minimum Wages, Swoboda Says BROWNIE BRITTLE: Faces "Crosson" Suit in E.D. New York BURGER KING: Gesten's Motion to Seal Granted; Cert. Bid Stricken C & S OILFIELD: Court Conditionally Certifies "Olivas" Class CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Faces "Bishop" Suit in S.D. New York CHICAGO, IL: Certification of Class Sought in Chicagoans Suit CINTAS CORPORATION: Cassingham's Bid to Certify Tossed as Moot CONSOLIDATED EDISON: Faces "Bishop" Suit in S.D. New York COREPOWER YOGA: Court Enters Final Judgment in "Barnard" Suit CRUNCH LLC: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Eacret & Merritt Say CRYSTAL MORONEY: Faces "Ducreay" Suit in S.D.N.Y. CSC HOLDINGS: Faces "Bishop" Suit in S.D. New York DISCOVER BANK: Faces "Therieau" Suit in M.D. Florida DOCTOR'S ASSOCIATES: Faces "Arnaud" Suit in E.D. New York DR. PEPPER: Ct. Denies Intervention in Canada Dry Ginger Ale Suit DRILFORMANCE LLC: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in "Kitagawa" DUMBO PIZZA: Faces "Tepi" Suit in E.D. New York EDEN CREAMERY: Underfills Ice Cream Pint, Kamal & Neely Claim EDWARD D. JONES: PSLRA Service/Procedures in "Anderson" Entered EMPIRE INT'L: Faces "Fischler" Suit in E.D. New York EOS CCA: Faces "Troyanovsky" Suit in E.D. New York EQUILON ENTERPRISES: Summary Judgment Against "Bowen" Affirmed EXL PETROLEUM: McCoy Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages under FLSA FAMILY FIRST: Ledger Seeks Overtime Compensation under FLSA FARMERS INSURANCE: Certification UM Purchasers Class Affirmed FAYETTE COUNTY: Faces "Arison" Suit in W.D. Pennsylvania FINANCIAL ENGINES: Scarantino Balks at Hellman & Friedman Merger FLOWERS FOODS: Watson Seeks Unpaid Wages under FLSA FLYING LOCKSMITHS: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York FORD MOTOR: Awarded $74K Costs of Bill in "Daniel" FORD MOTOR: Goodroad et al. Sue over Defeat Devices in Trucks GAINESVILLE LODGE: Faces "Quarterman" Suit in N.D. Florida GEO GROUP: Court Won't Dismiss "Chen" Minimum Wage Suit GLOBAL CREDIT: Seeks Approval of Settlement in "Williams" Suit GOLDEN TOUCH: Faces "Fischler" Suit in E.D. New York GREEN ISLAND: Faces "Crosson" Suit in E.D. New York GREENBROOK SPORTS: Rivero Sues over Robocalls HERITAGE ONE: Faces "Solorzano" Suit in California Superior Court HOSPITALITY STAFFING: "Arguelles" Suit Moved to E.D. California IDAHO, USA: Wolf Moves for Certification of IDOC Prisoners Class INTEL CORPORATION: Alvira Sues over Share Price Drop INTERINSURANCE EXCHANGE: Dismissal Ruling in "Foster" Affirmed IT COSMETICS: Faces "Kiler" Suit in E.D. New York JACK BLACK LLC: Faces "Fischler" Suit in E.D. New York JACKSON COUNTY, MO: Prado Moves to Certify Class of Detainees KEITH D. WEINER: Faces "Clark" Suit in E.D. Wisconsin KONG TECHNOLOGIES: Dean's Claims v. Apple in "Opperman" Dismissed KRISHNA ENTERPRISES: Faces "Honeywell" Suit in N.D. Florida KSW OILFIELD: White & Shaw Seek Unpaid OT Wages under FLSA LANDRY'S RESTAURANT: Sustaining Demurrer on Class Claims Reversed LEIKIN INGBER: "Sebestyen" Suit Tossed for Lack of Jurisdiction LOGITECH INC: Court Narrows Claims in "Chernus" Suit LVNV FUNDING: Maisano Balks at Trading of Consumer Debt MASSAGE ENVY: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York MDL 2672: Ct. Denies Class Member's Bid to Opt Out of Settlement MED-SPEC TRANSPORT: Washington's Bid to Certify Cont'd to July 12 MIDLAND CREDIT: Faces "Pilosova" Suit in E.D. New York MURATA MANUFACTURING: Court Consolidates Antitrust Suits MY FL 4051: Faces "Sierra" Suit in S.D. Florida N.J. 52 INC: Faces "Ramirez" Suit in S.D. New York NATIONAL GRID: Faces "Bishop" Suit in S.D. New York NATIONAL RAILROAD: Bid to Certify Class of Black Workers Denied NCH CORPORATION: Fails to Pay Wages, Lanese Says NELNET INC: Olsen Sues over Servicing of Student Loans NIC & ZOE: Faces "Kiler" Suit in E.D. New York NORTH CAROLINA, USA: Buffkin Seeks to Certify Class of Prisoners OCWEN LOAN: Faces "Murdzia" Suit in W.D. Washington OHIO EDUCATION: Faces "Lee" Suit in N.D. Ohio OMEGA INSURANCE: Dismissal of "Ganzemuller" Affirmed PATRICK K WILLIS: Faces "Jones" Suit in California Superior Court PIER 1 IMPORTS: $3.5MM Settlement in "Mathein" Has Final Approval PINOT'S PALETTE: Faces "Matzura" Suit in S.D. New York PIPES & SHAW: Faces "Kiler" Suit in E.D. New York PLANO, TX: Faces "Neil" Suit in Texas State Court PLATINUM RESTAURANT: Green Moves to Certify Class of Servers PROFESSIONAL CLAIMS: Faces "Zazovskaya" Suit in E.D. New York PROGRESSIVE SELECT: Bid to Remand Chiropractors' Suit Denied PROVIDENCE, RI: Ricci Seeks Prelim. Approval of Class Settlement QUALITY RECOVERY: Court Won't Dismiss "Higgins" FDCPA Suit RENT-A-CENTER: Faces "Matzura" Suit in S.D. New York REV-1 SOLUTIONS: Doty Moves for Certification of FDCPA Class ROBERT B. LOCKE: Cal. App. Affirms Striking of "Berry" Suit SALON INC: Phillips Sues over Minimum & OT Pay, Tip Skimming SAM ASH MUSIC: Rule 23 Class Certification Sought in "Lane" Suit SANFORD LP: Spacone's Bid to Certify Class Taken Under Submission SAKS & COMPANY: Failed to Secure Customer Data, Rudolph Says SARBANAND FARMS: Bid to Serve CSI in "Rosas" Granted SCOTT JEWELERS: Faces "Harland" Suit in New York State Court SEASONS HOSPICE: "Rodriguez" Suit Moved to S.D. Florida SERVPRO INDUSTRIES: Delta Dawgs Moves for Class Certification SOUTH CAROLINA: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in "Craft" STEINWAY TOWING: Tow Truck Drivers to Be Notified of "Singh" Suit STONEHENGE MANAGEMENT: Faces "Fischler" Suit in S.D. New York SWISSPORT USA: Fails to Pay Wages, Vinasco Claims TAHOE RESOURCES: "Sanders" Suit Moved to District of Nevada TESLA INC: Interlocutory Appeal in Shareholder Suit Refused THUMBS UP: Fails to Pay Minimum and Overtime Wages, Zhang Says TOMORROW PCS: Blank's Bid to Proceed as Collective Action Denied TRADEMARK CONSTRUCTION: "Garcia" Suit Moved to S.D. California TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Faces "Meyrov" Suit in E.D. New York TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Court Dismisses "Rosenzweig" FDCPA Suit TRI-STATE WINDOW: Faces "Wu" Suit in E.D. New York UNITED COLLECTION: Park Moves for Final Approval of Settlement UNITED STATES: Marshall's Bid to Certify Prisoners Class Denied UNITED STATES: Class of LGUs Entitled to PILT Certified UNITED STATES: Afghan and Iraqi Allies Seeks Class Certification UPS SUPPLY: Class Certification in "Hughes" Wage Suit Vacated USA: Faces "Tippins" Suit in Court of Federal Claims USC TRUSTEES: O'Conner Sues over Sexual Assault USAA GENERAL: Weber Sues over Motor Vehicle Insurance Coverage VAN RU: Faces "Horowitz" Suit in E.D. New York VAN RU CREDIT: Court Won't Dismiss "Al" FDCPA Suit VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Court Dismisses Defective Sunroof Suit WAL-MART STORES: Attorneys' Fees Award in "Braun" Reversed WAL-MART STORES: Bid to Decertify Class of Cashiers Denied WAL-MART STORES: Partly Sanctioned for Exclusion in "Brown" Suit WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN: $6.5MM Deal in "Little" Has Final OK WASTE PRO USA: Thomas Seeks Certification of Class Under FLSA WAUKEGAN, IL: Stewart Seeks to Certify Poe Manor Residents Class WEBSTAURANT STORE: Certification of Class Sought in "Rogers" Suit WINMARK CORP: Faces "Matzura" Suit in S.D. New York XINOS CONSTRUCTION: Leons Seek Unpaid OT Wages under FLSA ********* 1 PERSON AT A TIME: Wins Final OK of "White" Suit Settlement ------------------------------------------------------------ The Honorable Nora Barry Fischer grants the motion for final approval, attorneys' fees and incentive award filed by the Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled MARK WHITE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. 1 PERSON AT A TIME, LLC, Case No. 2:17-cv-01047-NBF (W.D. Pa.). Judge Fischer approves the settlement as a fair, reasonable, and adequate compromise of a bona fide dispute over the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Pennsylvania wage-and-hour law. The Court orders that the settlement fund as set forth in the settlement agreement shall be distributed as follows: $25,000 to the class members; $7,500 to class counsel to cover attorneys' fees; and $1,000 to the named Plaintiff Mark White, as an incentive award. The settlement class is defined as: "All current and former employees who have worked for Defendant as in-home healthcare workers from January 3, 2015 through August 10, 2017." The Court appoints Gary F. Lynch, Esq., Jamisen A. Etzel, Esq., and Kevin Abramowicz, Esq., of Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela & Carpenter LLP as class counsel. The Court approves the attorneys' fees of $7,500. The Court also approves the award of $1,000 as an incentive award to named Plaintiff Mark White. The case is dismissed with prejudice, and the Clerk is directed to close the case and enter judgment. A copy of the Order is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=0SckftCA ABC FINANCIAL: Massey Sues over Unauthorized Text Messages ---------------------------------------------------------- DAVID MASSEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. ABC FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 0:18-cv-61355-BB (S.D. Fla., June 15, 2018), seeks injunctive relief to halt Defendant's illegal conduct, statutory damages on behalf of himself and Class Members, and any other available legal or equitable remedies resulting from the illegal actions of Defendants, under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The Defendant is the nation's largest software and payment processing provider for the health and fitness industry. This case arises from Defendant's unauthorized text messages to cellular subscribers who never provided Defendant with prior express consent, as well as cellular subscribers who expressly requested not to receive Defendant's text messages. As a result, Defendant caused thousands of text messages to be sent to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and Class Members who either never provided Defendant with consent to contact them or who had revoked any prior express consent. The Defendant caused Plaintiff and Class Members injuries, including invasion of their privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq. HIRALDO P.A. 401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 Telephone: (954) 400 4713 E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE: Leonard Sues over Debt Collection Practices ---------------------------------------------------------------- Chelsea Leonard, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Accounts Receivable and John Does 1-25, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-22417-KMW (S.D. Fla., June 15, 2018), seeks to recover damages and declaratory relief under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. According to the complaint, some time prior to September 5, 2017, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Credit Innovations. The Credit Innovations obligation arose out of transactions for credit repair services which involved the transaction of money, property, insurance or services. These credit repair services were incurred primarily for personal purposes. The alleged Credit Innovations obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C. section 1692a(5). Creditor Credit Innovations contracted with the Defendant Accounts Receivable to collect the alleged debt. The Defendant Accounts Receivable collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. On or around September 5, 2017, the Plaintiff received a collection letter from Defendant. The Letter states "Arrangements must be made immediately to avoid credit bureau reporting to the three major credit reporting agencies for up to seven years." This statement is deceptive since the debt can only be reported on a Plaintiff's credit report for seven years from the date of default. The Plaintiff's account was in default well before September 5, 2017, thus it is impossible that Plaintiff's account would be reported for seven years from that date. Defendant's letter is a deceptive tactic to coerce a payment from Plaintiff on the debt by threating her with harm to her credit report for significantly longer than allowable by law. The Plaintiff incurred an informational injury as Defendant falsely advised that her debt could be reported to the credit bureaus for seven years when this was knowingly false information. Consequently, Plaintiff incurred anxiety and emotional turmoil regarding this false threat of damage to her credit. As a result of Defendant's deceptive and misleading statement Plaintiff has been harmed.[BN] Attorneys for Plaintiff Chelsea Leonard: Justin Zeig, Esq. ZEIG LAW FIRM, LLC 3475 Sheridan Street, Suite 310 Hollywood, FL 33021 Telephone: (754) 217 3084 Facsimile: (954) 272 7807 E-mail: justin@zeiglawfirm.com AIR NEW ZEALAND: Sept. 14 Approval Hearing on $49MM Settlement -------------------------------------------------------------- If You Bought an Airline Ticket between the U.S. and Asia, Australia, New Zealand, or the Pacific Islands, You Could Receive Benefits from Class Action Settlements Settlements have been reached with four airlines in class action lawsuits involving the price of airline tickets. The Settling Defendants are: Air New Zealand, China Airlines (Taiwan), EVA Airways, and Philippine Airlines. Settlements were previously reached with 8 Defendants. The lawsuit continues against the remaining Non-Settling Defendant airline: All Nippon Airways ("ANA"). What is the case about? The lawsuits claim that the Defendants agreed to fix prices on tickets for transpacific air travel. As a result, ticket purchasers may have paid more than was necessary. The Settling Defendants deny the allegations and deny that they have any liability. The Defendant airlines also deny liability, although ANA has pled guilty to fixing the prices of certain discounted tickets. Am I included? You are included if: (1) you bought a ticket for air travel from one of 26 airlines; (2) the ticket included at least one flight segment originating in the U.S. to Asia or Oceania; and (3) your purchase was made between January 1, 2000 and December 1, 2016. A more complete description of eligibility requirements is available at the website or by calling the tollfree number. What do the Settlements provide? The Settling Defendants have agreed to pay $49,900,000 (the "Settlement Fund"), plus an additional $750,000 to help pay a portion of the cost of notice and administration of these Settlements. Money will not be distributed yet, and will be distributed pursuant to a Plan of Allocation approved by the Court. However, based on the claims that have already been filed, it is estimated that the average payment could be in the range of $8.50 per eligible ticket claimed. This does not include amounts that will be paid on any future settlement or judgment involving ANA. Claims from the earlier round of settlements have not yet been audited. As a result, the number of claimed tickets that are determined to be eligible may be reduced, and the corresponding amount of compensation to be allocated among the remaining eligible claims will increase. Additional information is available on the website below. Class Counsel will pursue the lawsuit against the Non-Settling Defendant. Class Counsel have not requested attorneys' fees and reimbursement of costs at this time but will do so in connection with the final approval hearing. For the current Settlements, Class Counsel will request up to one-third of the Settlement Fund plus up to $7,500 for one additional class representative. How can I get benefits? You must submit a Claim Form online or by mail. The deadline to submit a Claim Form is December 31, 2018. What are my rights? If you do nothing, you will be bound by the Court's decisions and will get no money. As described above, if you want to get money from the Settlements, you must file a claim. If you want to keep your right to sue the Settling Defendants and get no money, you must exclude yourself from the classes by August 30, 2018. If you stay in the classes, you may object to the Settlements by August 30, 2018. The detailed notice describes how to exclude yourself or object. The Court will hold a hearing on September 14, 2018 to consider whether to approve the Settlements. You or your own lawyer may appear at the hearing at your own expense, but you do not have to attend. For more information: 1-800-439-1781 www.AirlineSettlement.com ALDI INC: Faces "Dieter" Suit in W.D. Pennsylvania -------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Aldi, Inc. The case is styled as Richard Dieter, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Aldi, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-00846-JFC (W.D. Pa., June 26, 2018). ALDI Inc. operates grocery stores in the United States. It offers fresh meats, fresh produce items, wines and beers, and home goods. The company was incorporated in 1975 and is based in Batavia, Illinois. ALDI Inc. operates as a subsidiary of ALDI Einkauf GmbH & Co. oHG.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Benjamin J. Sweet, Esq. Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela & Carpenter, LLP 1133 Penn Avenue 5th Floor Pittsburgh, PA 15222 Tel: (412) 322-9243 Fax: (412) 231-0246 Email: bsweet@carlsonlynch.com ALL-WAYS INC: Fails to Pay Minimum & OT Wages, Quezada Says ----------------------------------------------------------- JUAN C. QUEZADA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. ALL-WAYS, INC., a business entity form unknown; ALL-WAYS PACIFIC LLC, a California limited liability company; PERSONNEL STAFFING GROUP, LLC, a Florida limited liability company; OPPORTUNITY STAFFING, a California corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, Inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. BC708546 (Cal. Super. Ct., June 8, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid overtime and minimum wages under the California Labor Code. According to the complaint, for at least four years prior to the filing of this action and through to the present Defendants have had a consistent policy of failing to pay wages, including overtime wages, to Plaintiff and other non-exempt employees in the State of California in violation of California state wage and hour laws as a result of, including but not limited to, not paying overtime wages when working more than 8 hours in a workday and/or working more than 40 hours in a workweek and unevenly rounding time worked which in the aggregate deprived employees of earned wages.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Michael Nourmand, Esq. James A. De Sario, Esq. THE NOURMAND LAW FIRM, APC 8822 West Olympic Boulevard Beverly Hills, CA 90211 Telephone (310) 553 3600 Facsimile (310) 553 3603 ALPHA TECHNOLOGIES: Martinez Moves to Certify Two FLSA Classes ----------------------------------------------------------------- The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit captioned RODRIGUEZ MARTINEZ, et al. v. ALPHA TECHNOLOGIES SERVICES, INC., et al., Case No. 5:17- cv-00628-FL (E.D.N.C.), moves for "conditional certification" of their claims as two representative Fair Labor Standards Act classes. The Classes are defined as: (1) Overtime Collective Action: all similarly situated individuals employed by Defendant East Carolina Commercial Services individually or jointly with one or more of the other Defendants in the construction of IS46 who were required to work in excess of forty hours per week for a flat hourly rate and who timely file (or have already filed) a written consent to be a party to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b); and (2) PPE Collective Action: all similarly situated individuals employed by Defendant East Carolina Commercial Services individually or jointly with one or more of the other Defendants in the construction of IS46 who were required to purchase and provide their own hard hats, vests, boots, safety glasses and/or gloves and who timely file (or have already filed) a written consent to be a party to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b). Rodriguez Martinez, et al., also move the Court to exercise its discretion to implement FLSA by facilitating and approving their distribution of the proposed notice and consent to sue forms to all putative statutory class members included in the class definitions. They further move the Court to approve distribution of that notice and consent to sue form by U.S. mail, e-mail, and through Facebook. The Plaintiffs further move the Court for an order requiring the Defendants to provide to the Plaintiffs within 14 days of the Court's Order on this Motion, the full names, date(s) of employment, job title(s), last known addresses, e-mail addresses, telephone numbers, and dates of birth of all putative collective action members to allow the Plaintiffs to distribute the approved notice to those putative members of the statutory classes. A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Em8sVCsY The Plaintiffs are represented by: Clermont F. Ripley, Esq. Carol L. Brooke, Esq. North Carolina Justice Center PO Box 28068 Raleigh, NC 27611 Telephone: (919) 856-2154 Facsimile: (919) 856-2175 E-mail: clermont@ncjustice.org carol@ncjustice.org - and - Dhamian A. Blue, Esq. BLUE LLP 205 Fayetteville Street, Suite 300 Raleigh, NC 27601 Telephone: (919) 833-1931 E-mail: dab@bluellp.com APEX USA: Francis et al. Sue over Exploitable Labor --------------------------------------------------- DORRET FRANCIS, ANTHONY KENNEDY, and CHRISTINE PEARCE on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. APEX USA, INC.; HOTELMACHER, LLC, dba HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS; SONTAG, INC. dba HAMPTON INN CLINTON; STEAKMACHER, LLC, dba MONTANA MIKE'S STEAKHOUSE; SCHUMACHER INVESTMENTS, LLC, dba WATER ZOO INDOOR WATER PARK; WALTER SCHUMACHER; and CAROLYN SCHUMACHER, the Defendants, Case No. 5:18-cv-00583-HE (W.D. Okla., June 15, 2018), alleges that Defendants violated the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act. This is an action brought by survivors of human trafficking. Defendants Walter and Carolyn Schumacher own and operate hospitality businesses in Clinton, Oklahoma, including two hotels, a large restaurant, and a waterpark. To obtain cheap and easily exploitable labor for these businesses, Defendants engaged directly in a recruitment scheme overseas whereby they induced foreign nationals to pay hefty fees to work under the J-1 work- and study-based exchange visitor visa program through APEX USA, Inc., the J-1 sponsor agency they controlled and operated. Plaintiffs and putative class members were promised full time work with good pay, affordable housing, food, transportation, and the possibility of obtaining additional jobs from other employers in the area. Allegedly, these promises were never fulfilled: instead, Plaintiffs were forced to work under conditions that bore little resemblance to those to which they had agreed.[BN] Attorney(s) for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class: Brady Henderson, Esq. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION P.O. Box 1626 Oklahoma City, OK 73101 Telephone: (405) 525 3831 Facsimile: (405) 524 2296 E-mail: bhenderson@acluok.org - and - Carole Vigne, Esq. LEGAL AID AT WORK 180 Montgomery Street, Suite 600 San Francisco, CA 94104 Telephone: (415) 864 8848 Facsimile: (415) 593 0096 E-mail: cvigne@legalaidatwork.org - and - Eben Colby, Esq. Catherine Fisher, Esq. Isaac Saidel-Goley, Esq. SKADDEN ARPS SLATE MEAGHER & FLOM LLP 500 Boylston Street Boston, MA 02116 Telephone: (617) 573 4855 Facsimile: (617) 305 4855 E-mail: Eben.Colby@probonolaw.com Catherine.Fisher@probonolaw.com Isaac.Saidel-Goley@probonolaw.com - and - Christopher J. Willett, Esq. Caitlin Boehne, Esq. Rebecca Eisenbrey, Esq. EQUAL JUSTICE CENTER 510 Congress Ave., Ste. 206 Austin, TX 78704 Telephone: (512) 474 0007 Facsimile: (512) 474 0008 Emails: cwillett@equaljusticecenter.org cboehne@equaljusticecenter.org reisenbray@equaljusticecenter.org APPLE INC: Court Consolidates "Bartling", "Giraldi" Suits ------------------------------------------------------------ In the cases, ANTHONY BARTLING, et al., Plaintiffs, v. APPLE INC., Defendant. ROBERT GIRALDI, Plaintiff, v. APPLE INC., Defendant, Case Nos. 5:18-cv-00147-EJD, 5:18-cv-00271-EJD (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose Division, granted the motion to consolidate the cases and to appoint interim class counsel. The Plaintiffs filed separate actions on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated against the Defendant for alleging violations of various consumer protection laws and tort claims arising out of security vulnerabilities in Apple products. Presently before the Court is a joint motion by the Plaintiffs to consolidate the two actions and appoint the three law firms that represent them as the interim lead counsel for the purported class. The Defendant has not filed an opposition to the motion. Upon review of the complaints in each of the actions presented, Judge Davila finds that each case presents substantially similar factual and legal issues. The Plaintiffs in each action allege that they were harmed because they purchased Apple products which contained security vulnerabilities, such as "Meltdown" and "Spectre." Each action includes claims of breach of express and implied warranty, negligence, unjust enrichment, and violations of New York General Business Law Section 349. The actions are in the same procedural stage as the Defendants have not yet filed an answer or responsive motion. In addition, since the claims for each case arise from a similar nucleus of events, discovery issues relating to each action will be parallel. Further, there appears to be no basis to find that consolidation would cause inconvenience, delay or expense, especially since the parties appear to agree with the consolidation request. As such, the Judge finds the consolidation appropriate. The Plaintiffs move to appoint their attorneys, Lowey Dannenberg, P.C., Berman Tabacco, and Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP, as the interim class counsel. Each of these firms are experienced in class action litigation. These firms have conducted a detailed investigation and analysis of the design, manufacture, and operation of the Apple CPUs at issue, including engaging experts or attorneys with technical backgrounds. They appear to have cooperated with one another in the process, and appear to be able and willing to work well together. Having reviewed the papers filed for the motion in the context of Rule 23, the Judge finds that Lowey Dannenberg, Berman Tabacco, and Wolf Haldenstein are qualified to represent the putative class as the co-lead interim class counsel. For these reasons, Judge Davila granted the motion to consolidate the cases and to appoint interim class counsel. He directed the Clerk of the Court to consolidate case numbers 5:18-cv-00147-EJD and 5:18-cv-00271-EJD into one case such that the earliest-filed action, 5:18-cv-00147-EJD, is the lead case. All future filings will be in 5:18-cv-00147-EJD and will bear the caption: "In re Apple Processor Litigation." All future related cases will be automatically consolidated and administratively closed after a judicial determination that such cases are related. Since the later actions are now subsumed by the first-filed action, the Clerk will administratively close case number 5:18-cv-00271-EJD. The Judge appointed Lowey Dannenberg, Berman Tabacco, and Wolf Haldenstein as the interim Co-Lead Counsel for the putative class. The Co-Lead Counsel will have sole authority to communicate with the Defendant's counsel and the Court on behalf of any Plaintiff unless that authority is expressly delegated to other counsel. The Defendant's counsel may rely on all agreements made with Co-Lead Counsel, and such agreements will be binding on all other Plaintiffs' counsel. Within 21 days of the date the order is filed, the Plaintiffs in In re Apple Processor Litigation will file a Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint. A full-text copy of the Court's April 27, 2018 Order is available at https://is.gd/ilqGsv from Leagle.com. Anthony Bartling & Jacqueline N. Olson, Plaintiffs, represented by Gregory Nespole -- gmn@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, Janine Lee Pollack -- pollack@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP, pro hac vice, Marisa C. Livesay -- livesay@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP, Randall Scott Newman -- newman@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP & Rachele R. Rickert -- rickert@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP. Robert Giraldi, Plaintiff, represented by Aidan Chowning Poppler -- cpoppler@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco, Christian Levis, Lowey Dannenberg, P.C., Lee Lefkowitz, Lowey Dannenberg, P.C., Matthew Acocella, Lowey Dannenberg, P.C., Matthew David-Craig Pearson -- mpearson@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco, Sarah Khorasanee McGrath -- skmcgrath@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco, Vincent Briganti, Lowey Dannenberg, P.C. & Todd Anthony Seaver -- tseaver@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco. Apple Inc., Defendant, represented by Matthew Rawlinson -- matt.rawlinson@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Kathleen P. Lally -- kathleen.lally@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Mark S. Mester -- mark.mester@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Michael H. Rubin -- michael.rubin@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP & Reuben J. Stob -- reuben.stob@lw.com -- Latham and Watkins LLP. APPLIED UNDERWRITERS: Faces Coyle Suit in District of Nebraska -------------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Applied Underwriters, Inc. The lawsuit is captioned as Coyle Trucking, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Applied Underwriters, Inc.; Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company, Inc.; Continental Indemnity Company; Applied Risk Services, Inc., the Defendants, Case No. 8:18-cv-00258-JMG-CRZ (D. Neb., June 8, 2018). The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge John M. Gerrard. Coyle Trucking is a licensed and bonded freight shipping and trucking company running freight hauling business.[BN] Attorneys for Plaintiff: Aaron L. Peskin, Esq. FERRARA LAW FIRM 224 West State Street Trenton, NJ 08608 Telephone: (609) 571 3738 Facsimile: (609) 571 7440 E-mail: aaron@ferraralawgp.com - and - Andrew W. Ferich, Esq. Benjamin F. Johns, Esq. CHIMICLES, TIKELLIS LAW FIRM 361 West Lancaster Avenue Haverford, PA 19041 Telephone: (610) 642 8500 Facsimile: (610) 649 3633 E-mail: awf@chimicles.com bfj@chimicles.com - and - Brian T. McKernan, Esq. MCGRATH, NORTH LAW FIRM 1601 Dodge Street Suite 3700, First National Tower Omaha, NE 68102-1627 Telephone: (402) 341 3070 Facsimile: (402) 341 0216 E-mail: bmckernan@mcgrathnorth.com - and - Ralph P. Ferrara, Esq. FERRARA LAW FIRM 224 West State Street Trenton, NJ 08608 Telephone: (609) 571 3738 Facsimile: (609) 571 7440 E-mail: ralph@ferraralawgp.com - and - Zachary P. Beatty, Esq. CHIMICLES, TIKELLIS LAW FIRM 361 West Lancaster Avenue Haverford, PA 19041 Telephone: (610) 642 8500 Facsimile: (610) 649 3633 E-mail: zpb@chimicles.com AXON ENTERPRISE: Faces "Richey" Suit in N.D. California ------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Axon Enterprise, Inc. The case is styled as Douglas Richey, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Axon Enterprise, Inc. formerly d/b/a Taser International, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-03751-KAW (N.D. Cal., June 25, 2018). Axon is a Scottsdale, Arizona-based company which develops technology and weapons products for law enforcement and civilians. Its flagship product and former namesake is Taser, a line of electroshock weapons.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Lori Erin Andrus, Esq. Andrus Anderson LLP 155 Montgomery Street, Suite 900 San Francisco, CA 94104 Tel: (415) 986-1400 Fax: (415) 986-1474 Email: lori@andrusanderson.com BALTIC TRADING: Dismissal of FAC in Stockholders' Suit Affirmed --------------------------------------------------------------- The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department, affirmed the judgment of Supreme Court, New York County, granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss First Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint in the case captioned IN RE BALTIC TRADING STOCKHOLDERS LITIGATION, JUSTIN WILSON, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BALTIC TRADING, LTD. ET AL., Defendants-Respondents, 6398, 651241/15 (N.Y. App. Div.). The Plaintiffs allege that defendant Genco Shipping & Trading Ltd., the controlling shareholder of defendant Baltic Trading Ltd., acquired the minority interest in Baltic (the merger) for inadequate consideration. They assert breach of fiduciary duty against Genco and the Baltic Special Committee formed to consider the merger. The Plaintiffs contend that this merger between a controlling stockholder and its corporate subsidiary should be evaluated under the heightened entire fairness standard rather than the business judgment rule, because the defendants cannot satisfy the requirements laid down in Kahn v M & F Worldwide Corp. (88 A.3d 635, 644-645 [Del 2014])(MFW) for the business judgment rule to apply. One of these requirements is that the controller conditions the procession of the transaction on the approval of both a Special Committee and a majority of the minority stockholders. The second MFW requirement for business judgment review is that the Special Committee is independent. The Plaintiffs' allegation that Special Committee member Edward Terino was not independent due to his business deal with defendant Peter C. Georgiopoulos, the chairman of both Genco and Baltic, seven years before the merger at issue is insufficient. The third MFW requirement for business judgment review is that the Special Committee is empowered to freely select its own advisors and say no definitively. Baltic's Special Committee satisfied this condition. The fourth MFW requirement is that the Special Committee meets its duty of care in negotiating a fair price. To establish that the committee did not meet this duty, the complaint must allege facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that the directors were grossly negligent. The sixth MFW requirement is that there is no coercion of the minority. Plaintiffs contend that the minority (Baltic shareholders other than Genco) was coerced because it included large Baltic shareholders that were also among the largest Genco shareholders, and one of those shareholders had agreed to vote for the merger. This argument is unavailing, voting agreement locking up 27% of the vote in favor of the proposed merger, did not appear impermissibly coercive. Since the MFW requirements have been satisfied, and the plaintiffs have not pleaded a claim of waste the court correctly dismissed the first and second causes of action (breach of fiduciary duty against the Baltic Special Committee and Genco, respectively). The third cause of action (aiding and abetting the Special Committee's alleged breaches of fiduciary duty) was correctly dismissed due to the lack of a breach of fiduciary duty. A full-text copy of the N.Y. App. Div.'s April 26, 2018 Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yamqjbay from Leagle.com. Milberg Tadler Phillips Grossman LLP, New York (Kent A. Bronson - - kbronson@milberg.com -- of counsel), for appellants. Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, New York (Aaron Rubinstein -- aaron.rubinstein@arnoldporter.com -- of counsel), for Baltic Trading Ltd., Basil G. Mavroleon, Harry A. Perrin, Edward Terino and George Wood, respondents. Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP, New York (Alan R. Friedman - - afriedman@kramerlevin.com -- of counsel), for Peter C. Georgiopoulos, respondent. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, New York (Alan J. Stone -- astone@milbank.com -- of counsel), for Genco Shipping & Trading Ltd. and Poseidon Merger Sub Ltd., respondents. BANK OF AMERICA: Culpepper Seeks to Certify Class of Specialists ---------------------------------------------------------------- The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled AILEEN CULPEPPER, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals v. BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Case No. 3:17-cv-00264-VAB (D. Conn.), seek preliminary certification of a collective action and permission to issue notice to: all Inbound Specialists in Connecticut who have worked for Bank of America, N.A. from July 3, 2014 until the date of final judgment in this case. The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to authorize them to send their Proposed Notice and Summary Notice to all individuals who have worked for Defendant as Inbound Specialists during the period from July 3, 2014, to the present ("Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs"). They further seek an order directing the Defendant to produce the Social Security number of any Inbound Specialist if the Plaintiffs' mailings to them are returned to sender as undeliverable. A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=bJ2VsnBl Plaintiffs, Aileen Culpepper, Sarena Salmeri, and Michael Weed, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, are represented by: Thomas J. Durkin, Esq. HAYBER LAW FIRM, LLC 221 Main St., Suite 502 Hartford, CT 06106 Telephone: (860) 522-8888 Facsimile: (860) 218-9555 E-mail: tdurkin@hayberlawfirm.com BANK OF AMERICA: Rivota Seeks Regular & Overtime Pay under FLSA --------------------------------------------------------------- MICHAEL A. RIVOTA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, the Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03843 (N.D. Ill., June 1, 2018), alleges that Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated persons of all earned regular and overtime pay for all time worked pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act. According to the complaint, the Defendant manages, controls and operates customer service call centers within this judicial district and manages and controls the telephone-based workers who are the putative class members in this lawsuit. The Defendant knowingly required and/or permitted Plaintiff, who worked as a telephone-dedicated employee, and other similarly situated telephone-dedicated employees, to perform unpaid work before and after the start and end times of their shifts, including but not limited to booting up computers, initializing several software programs, reading company issued emails and instructions, and completing customer service calls. Bank of America Corporation is an American multinational financial services company headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina. It is ranked 2nd on the list of largest banks in the United States by assets.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: James X. Bormes, Esq. Catherine P. Sons, Esq. LAW OFFICE OF JAMES X. BORMES, P.C 8 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 2600 Chicago, IL 60603 Telephone: (312) 201 0575 E-mail: jxbormes@bormeslaw.com cpsons@bormeslaw.com - and - Thomas M. Ryan, Esq. LAW OFFICE OF THOMAS M. RYAN, P.C. 35 East Wacker Drive, Suite 650 Chicago, IL 60601 Telephone: (312) 726 3400 E-mail: tom@tomryanlaw.com - and - Kasif Khowaja, Esq. THE KHOWAJA LAW FIRM, LLC 70 East Lake Street, Suite 1220 Chicago, IL 60601 Telephone: (312) 356 3200 E-mail: kasif@khowajalaw.com BEST BUY: Court Won't Certify Class in Battery Life Suit -------------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned CHAD HERRON, individually, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BEST BUY STORES, LP, a Virginia limited partnership, Defendant, No. 2:12-cv-02103-TLN-CKD (E.D. Cal.). The Plaintiff went to a Best Buy retail store in Folsom, California, to select and purchase a new laptop computer for his personal, household, or family use. Each laptop on display contained a fact tag which represented, among other features, the battery life for each laptop as being up to a specific number of hours or fraction thereof. The Plaintiff looked at each fact tag and decided to purchase the Toshiba Satellite L505 based substantially on his reliance on the representation that the battery life for that model was up to 3.32 hours. The Defendant argues, inter alia, that the Plaintiff's damage model is not tied to his theory of liability, since it does not properly assess the price premium due to the allegedly misleading battery-life statements. The Defendant explains that the Plaintiff's expert did not use any data for laptops that were sold without battery life representations in calculating his price premium and thus has not studied much less calculated any relationship between the price of MM07 battery life and the price of battery life in the but-for world under another unidentified standard. In response, the Plaintiff argues that restitution should be based on measuring the difference between what consumers were promised and what they actually received, and thus he used the correct but-for scenario. Here, the Plaintiff and class members seek restitution based solely on the overstated battery life. Therefore, the Plaintiff must provide evidence of a damages model that can determine the price premium attributable to the Defendant's use of the allegedly misleading battery-life representations on laptop fact tags. Here, the Plaintiff's damage model is fundamentally flawed because it conflates battery life and battery life representations. The Plaintiff's model assumes that the difference in price between two different laptops with two different battery lives and two different MM07 representations is the same as the difference in price between the same exact laptop, in one instance labeled with an MM07 representation and in another instance labeled according to a more realistic standard. For example, in the Plaintiff's view, the price difference between a four hour laptop and six hour laptop both measured under the MM07 standard is the same as the price difference between the same laptop, which is labeled at four hours under the MM07 standard in one instance and labeled at six hours under a completely different standard in another instance. This is a meaningless comparison, the Court says. The relative price change between different deceptively labeled laptops does not infer an absolute market price drop of all MM07-labeled laptops merely because they are all re-labeled according to a different battery-life standard. Thus, the Plaintiff's proposed damage model provides the Court no insight into whether there are damages because of the representations themselves, and how these damages would be calculated on a classwide basis. As the Defendant correctly points out, the proper way to assess restitution damages is to consider what the economic situation would have been absent the wrongdoing. To determine this, the Plaintiff would need to determine what the price premium would be (if any) as a result of the allegedly deceptive statements themselves. The Plaintiff would need to demonstrate that a change in the Defendant's labeling scheme would cause a uniform decrease in market price for all MM07-labeled laptops. How can the Plaintiff determine this if he has only compared laptops with the exact same deceptive statements? Put simply, he cannot. Therefore, since the Plaintiff has provided no restitution model that demonstrates that a change in the Defendant's laptop labeling scheme would cause a change in market price for MM07- labeled laptops, he has shown no way to determine whether the true market price of the class's laptops was any different from the purchase price. The Plaintiff has failed to present a damages model that is tied to his theory of liability, as required under. Accordingly, individualized issues predominate since the Plaintiff has not demonstrated a class-wide basis for calculating damages. Therefore, the Court declines the Plaintiff's motion to certify a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3). Accordingly, the Court denies the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification with prejudice. The Defendant's Motion to Exclude or Strike is denied as moot. A full-text copy of the District Court's April 26, 2018 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9m2swas from Leagle.com. Chad Herron, Plaintiff, represented by Crystal Lee Matter -- cmatter@stonebargerlaw.com -- Stonebarger Law APC, Gene Joseph Stonebarger -- gstonebarger@stonebargerlaw.com -- Stonebarger Law, Anne Marie Murphy -- amurphy@cpmlegal.com -- Cotchett Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, Elaine Wing Ling Yan -- eyan@stonebargerlaw.com -- Stonebarger Law, APC, Niall P. McCarthy -- nmccarthy@cpmlegal.com -- Cotchett Pitre & McCarthy, LLP & Richard David Lambert -- rlambert@stonebargerlaw.com -- Stonebarger Law. Best Buy Stores, LP, Defendant, represented by Jill S. Casselman -- JCasselman@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan LLP & Michael Aaron Geibelson -- MGeibelson@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan LLP. BETHLEHEM LANDFILL: Faces "Baptiste" Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania -------------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bethlehem Landfill Company. The case is styled as Robin Baptiste and Dexter Baptiste, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Bethlehem Landfill Company doing business as: IESI Pa Bethlehem Landfill, Defendant, Case No. 5:18-cv- 02691-JFL (E.D. Pa., June 26, 2018). Bethlehem Landfill Company provides waste management services.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: KEVIN S. RIECHELSON, Esq. KAMENSKY, COHEN & RIECHELSON 194 SOUTH BROAD STREET TRENTON, NJ 07726 Tel: (609) 394-8585 Email: kriechelson@kcrlawfirm.com BIRD RIDES: Fails to Pay Minimum & Overtime Wages, Matteo Says -------------------------------------------------------------- CAROLYN MATTEO, an individual, for herself and all members of the putative class, the Plaintiff, v. BIRD RIDES, INC., a Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. BC709628 (Cal. Super. Ct., June 8, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid minimum and overtime wages under the California Labor Code. According to the complaint, Bird has willfully misclassified chargers as independent contractors to minimize costs and unduly maximize profits at the expense of their primary workforce. Chargers are under the control and direction of Bird in connection with the performance of their work, perform work that is part of the usual course of Bird's business, and are not customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation for business in the same nature of the work performed for Bird. Through its unlawful misclassification scheme, Bird avoids the costs of providing workers compensation to its chargers, denying them much needed protection in the event of work-related injuries or illnesses. Bird also unlawfully passes on its operation costs, in the form of scooter collection, charging, and drop-off costs to its chargers. Bird is a dockless electric scooter rental company. To rent a scooter, users download BIRD'S smartphone app and open the map to locate a nearby GPS enabled scooter. The user can then unlock the scooter and ride it.[BN] Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class: R. Rex Parris, Esq. Kitty K. Szeto, Esq. John M. Bickford, Esq. Ryan A. Crist, Esq. PARRIS LAW FIRM 43364 10th Street West Lancaster, CA 93534 Telephone: (661) 949 2595 Facsimile: (661) 949 7524 BLOOMNATION INC: Faces "Crosson" Suit in E.D. New York ------------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bloomnation, Inc. The case is styled as Aretha Crosson, individually and as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Bloomnation, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03661 (E.D. N.Y., June 25, 2018). BloomNation is an American online floral marketplace with about 2,000 florists delivering to nearly 3,000 cities across the country.[BN] The Plaintiff appears PRO SE. BLUESTEM BRANDS: "Morris" Plaintiffs Can File New Class Cert Bid ---------------------------------------------------------------- Plaintiffs in the case captioned Tina Norris, Wendy Loepp, Sally File Michalak, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., Blair, LLC, and Does 1-10, Defendants, No. 16-cv-03954 (SRN/TNL)(D. Minn.), filed this class and collective action on behalf of themselves and other similarly-situated current and/or former Telephone Sales Agents, Customer Service Agents, or other call center employees (Call Center Agents or CCAs) who perform similar job duties for Defendants. As the basis of their claims, the Plaintiffs allege that they were regularly required to work a substantial amount of time off-the-clock as part of their jobs as CCAs and were never compensated for this time. The Plaintiffs seek to recover allegedly unpaid overtime compensation and other wages. The Plaintiffs filed a Motion seeking certification of the following class: All current and former Telephone Sales Agents, Customer Service Agents, or other job titles performing similar job duties employed by Bluestem Brands, Inc. and/or Blair, LLC (Defendants), at Defendants' call centers in Pennsylvania, at any time in the last three years, who were not paid for off-the clock work during their preliminary boot-up time and postliminary call completion time. On January 10, 2018, Magistrate Judge Tony Leung granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' Motion, finding that conditional certification was warranted, but only of a more limited class than the one the Plaintiffs proposed. The magistrate judge found that for purposes of conditional certification, the Plaintiffs had shown only that: (1) employees at the Erie call center but not at the Franklin or Warren call centers were similarly situated; and (b) that these employees were subject to a common injury from a common policy with respect to pre-shift but not post shift work. With respect to post-shift work, the magistrate judge found that the Plaintiffs had not shown that the Erie call center employees shared a common injury related to post-shift work. The magistrate judge pointed to an official policy of Blair's, which provides for rounding that ensures post-shift work is paid to the nearest quarter hour. Noting that the Fair Labor Standards Act expressly permits some rounding policies, and that the Defendants had offered evidence that the Plaintiffs were paid for time not worked pursuant to Blair's rounding policy, the magistrate judge concluded that absent sufficient support or allegations that the rounding policy was improperly used to deprive the Plaintiffs of appropriate compensation," post-shift work would not be included in the conditional class. Thus, the magistrate judge certified the following class: All current and former Telephone Sales Agents and Customer Service Agents employed by Bluestem Brands, Inc. and/or Blair, LLC, at the call center in Erie, Pennsylvania, at any time in the last three years, who were not paid for off-the-clock work during their preliminary boot-up time. The Plaintiffs filed an appeal from and an objection to the January 10 Order. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota overruled in part and sustained in part the Plaintiffs' Objection to the magistrate judge's January 10 Order. There is some disagreement between the parties about whether this Court should review the magistrate judge's January 10 Order under a de novo or clear error standard of review. The Plaintiffs argue that the clearly erroneous standard applies, whereas the Defendants contend that while some courts have adopted such deferential standard of review, this Court has held that its review of a magistrate judge's ruling regarding a conditional certification is de novo. A magistrate judge's order on various pre-trial, non-dispositive matters is reviewed under a clearly erroneous or contrary to law standard of review. A finding is clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. To proceed with a collective action, the Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they are similarly situated to their proposed FLSA class. Determining whether the Plaintiffs are similarly situated to the proposed class requires a two-step inquiry. First, the court determines whether the class should be conditionally certified for notification and discovery purposes. In this notice stage, the Plaintiffs need only establish a colorable basis for their claim that the putative class members were the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan. Determination of class status at the notice stage is granted liberally because the court has minimal evidence for analyzing the class. Second, after discovery and typically following a motion to decertify, courts conduct a more searching inquiry to determine if the class should be maintained through trial. Here, the Court agrees with the magistrate judge that the specific opt-in forms filed by the Warren and Franklin opt-in plaintiffs do not provide sufficient information from which this Court could infer that these employees are similarly situated to the Erie employees. To be sure, these forms explicitly state that the opt-in plaintiffs certify that they know of their right to join the instant lawsuit, and that the lawsuit is filed on behalf of individuals who worked off-the-clock work during their preliminary 'boot up' time and/or postliminary 'call completion' time and were not paid overtime premiums. The Court acknowledges that it is plausible to infer that the plaintiffs who decide to opt-in do so because they presumably are or were subject to the same allegedly unlawful compensation practices that are asserted in the lawsuit. Nevertheless, the fact remains that these opt-in forms do not contain any factual information tending to show that the opt-in plaintiffs were also uncompensated for off-the-clock work under circumstances similar to those of the named Plaintiffs. Relying on these specific opt-in forms, standing alone, to conditionally certify a class would come dangerously close to eviscerating the requirement that the plaintiffs offer at least some evidence, however preliminary, to support their contention that members of the putative class are similarly situated. To be clear, this Court is not requiring the Plaintiffs to conduct full-blown discovery at this stage, and does not read the magistrate judge's January 10 Order as imposing an impermissible discovery requirement. Rather, what is required is some affirmative evidence that Warren and Franklin employees were required to perform off-the-clock work that went uncompensated under the same or substantially similar policy as the employees at the Erie call center. In sum, the Court agrees with the magistrate judge that the Plaintiffs' Motion should be denied in part. However, the Court's conclusion is subject to an important caveat: although the Court anticipates, in light of the present record, that the Plaintiffs are unlikely to ultimately present evidence of a company-wide policy sufficient to warrant inclusion of the Warren and Franklin CCAs in the conditionally-certified class, the Court will give the Plaintiffs an opportunity to present such evidence. The Court is not convinced that filing different lawsuits and moving to consolidate the actions is the best path forward. The Plaintiffs will therefore be permitted to file a renewed motion for conditional certification in the event that they obtain and file at least some evidence to sustain their burden of establishing that employees at the Franklin and Warren call centers were subject to the same unwritten policy as that alleged by the Erie employees. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' Objection is overruled in part and sustained in part. The Objection is sustained only to permit the Plaintiffs to file a motion to add the Warren and Franklin call centers to the conditionally-certified class, provided that their new motion addresses the evidentiary deficiencies described in this Order. In all other respects, the Plaintiffs' Objection is overruled. A full-text copy of the District Court's April 26, 2018 Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7nxbm22 from Leagle.com. Tina Norris, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Wendy Loepp, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated & Sally Michalak, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Jacob Robert Rusch -- jrusch@johnsonbecker.com -- Johnson Becker PLLC & Molly E. Nephew, Johnson Becker PLLC. Bluestem Brands, Inc. & Blair, LLC, Defendants, represented by Andrew B. Murphy -- andrew.murphy@FaegreBD.com -- Faegre Baker Daniels LLP & Samantha M. Rollins -- samantha.rollins@FaegreBD.com -- Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, pro hac vice. BRAND ENERGY: Fails to Pay Minimum Wages, Swoboda Says ------------------------------------------------------- LUKE SWOBODA, individually and on behalf of other persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. BRAND ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; BRAND ENERGY SERVICES OF CALIFORNIA, INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1-50, the Defendant, Case No. BC708847 (Cal. Super. Ct., June 8, 2018), seeks unpaid wages and interest for unpaid work time, remedies for missed meal periods, remedies for missed rest periods, waiting time penalties in the form of continuation wages for failure to timely pay employees, equitable relief, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, pursuant to the California Labor Code. Brand Energy provides scaffolding services. The Company offers coatings, insulation, fireproofing, abrasive blasting, refractory, and formwork services.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Ari E. Moss, Esq. Jeremy F. Bollinger, Esq. MOSS BOLLINGER LLP 15300 Ventura Blvd., Ste. 207 Sherman Oaks, CA 91403 Telephone: (310) 982 2984 Facsimile: (310) 861 0389 E-mail: dennis@dennismosslaw.com ari@mossbollinger.com jeremy@mossbollinger.com - and - Ira Spiro, Esq. SPIRO LAW CORP. 10573 West Pico Boulevard Los Angeles, CA 90064 Telephone: (310)235-2350 E-mail: ira@spirolawcorp.com BROWNIE BRITTLE: Faces "Crosson" Suit in E.D. New York ------------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against Brownie Brittle, LLC. The case is styled as Aretha Crosson, individually and as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Brownie Brittle, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv- 03665 (E.D. N.Y., June 25, 2018). Brownie Brittle LLC was founded in 2013. The company's line of business includes the wholesale distribution of groceries and related products.[BN] The Plaintiff appears PRO SE. BURGER KING: Gesten's Motion to Seal Granted; Cert. Bid Stricken ---------------------------------------------------------------- The Hon. Cecilia M. Altonaga entered an order in the lawsuit styled RYAN D. GESTEN v. BURGER KING CORPORATION, Case No. 1:18- cv-20450-CMA (S.D. Fla.): 1. granting in part and denying in part the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion to File Unredacted Version of Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification and Certain Accompanying Documents Under Seal; 2. striking the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification. The Plaintiff had until June 18 to re-file his motion for class certification publicly, only leaving redacted information consistent with this Order; and 3. ruling that this Order shall not be filed under seal. The Court agrees that the Plaintiff's credit card account number is confidential information and is not necessary for a decision on the Motion for Class Certification. The fact credit card account information was disclosed at all, and not the specific numbers, is relevant, Judge Altonaga states. The Plaintiff's credit card information, thus, may remain redacted, Judge Altonaga opines. A copy of the Order is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=PsaxqOKA C & S OILFIELD: Court Conditionally Certifies "Olivas" Class ------------------------------------------------------------ In the case, A.J. OLIVAS, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. C & S OILFIELD SERVICES, LLC; DEWEY COFFMAN AND BRETT COFFMAN, Defendants, Case No. CIV 17-0022 JB\CG (D. N.M.), Judge James O. Browning of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Notice to Potential Plaintiffs and Conditional Certification, filed April 11, 2017. In the Complaint, Olivas alleges that C&S Oilfield did not pay him or other workers overtime pay. He brings a class action under rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for C&S Oilfield's alleged violation of the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act. He also brings a Fair Labor Standards Act collective action against Oilfield Services. In the Defendants' Answer to Collective and Class Action Complaint, filed March 29, 2017, C&S Oilfield asserts several affirmative defenses: (i) Olivas and the putative class have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (ii) it paid its workers what they were owed, and it acted in good faith to comply with and in fact did not violate applicable law; (iii) Olivas' action should not be a collective or class action; (iv) Olivas is not similarly situated with the putative class members; (v) any alleged violation would be subject to the de minimus doctrine; (vi) Olivas and the proposed class did not work more than forty hours during any week; (v) Olivas and the proposed class have failed to mitigate their damages; (vi) it is entitled to set off and/or credit for any amounts earned in mitigation; (vii) it had no knowledge or reason to know that Olivas and the putative class worked in excess of forty hours per week; (viii) the statute of limitations and/or the doctrine of laches bars some or all of the claims against it; (ix) if Olivas and the putative class are entitled to overtime pay, they would be entitled to overtime premium only; and (x) Olivas lacks standing. In the Notice Motion, Olivas asks that the Court permit Olivas to issue a notice to a limited group of the Defendants' current and former employees so that they can decide whether to opt in to Olivas' collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b). Olivas defines the target group as all field personnel employed by the Defendants over the last three years who received pay on a salary basis. This Definition includes, but is not limited to, positions referred to by the Defendants as field hands, lead hands, water transfer technicians, crew leaders, laborers, crewmembers, tank hands, and team leaders. Olivas asserts that, for a court to permit a plaintiff to send out a FLSA collective action notice, a plaintiff needs to make substantial allegations or to provide some factual support that there is a basis for a collective action. Olivas argues he has met that standard by providing six sworn statements from him and other C&S Oilfield employees who aver that they and others performed similar work as Olivas performed and were also not paid for overtime. He also asks the Court to order C&S Oilfield to provide to Olivas the names and contact information for putative class members. C&S Oilfield argues that Olivas' proposed class is too broad, because it disregards the duties and level of responsibility of the various job titles and positions as well as the location where such work was performed. It notes that Olivas' affidavits feature sworn statements from lead hands, a tank hand, a hand, and a water transfer technician, but there are no sworn statements or other evidence showing that crew leaders, laborers, crew members, and team leaders are similarly situated to Olivas. It also argues that Olivas' request for workers' names and contact information is too broad, and that it should only be required to provide that information for workers who performed the same jobs as Olivas and the workers who provided affidavits. Judge Browning concludes that Olivas' allegations and the proposed class members' affidavits establish that he and the proposed class members are similarly situated. Accordingly, he grants the Notice Motion and authorizes Olivas to notify the proposed class of his collective action. The Judge finds that Olivas makes substantial allegations that the proposed class members are each victims of a single employer policy. Olivas also makes substantial allegations that he and other C&S Oilfield workers are employees with similar positions. In light of conditional certification's lenient standard, Olivas' allegations that C&S Oilfield systematically denied overtime pay to its field personnel, and the workers' sworn statements that field personnel performed similar tasks and were denied overtime pay, the Judge concludes that Olivas has provided substantial allegations that his proposed class members are similarly situated. The Judge also finds that the proposed class is not too broad. C&S Oilfield does not give the Court sound reason to conclude that Olivas has failed to meet the lenient standard of providing substantial evidence that field personnel are similarly situated. C&S Oilfield also argues that Olivas' request for a list of names and contact information for potential class members is too broad. It argues that, if the Court conditionally certifies the class and orders C&S Oilfield to provide employee names and contact information, it should do so only for the workers who held the same job titles as the affiants did, but not for Field Hands, Crew Leaders, Laborers, Crewmembers, or Team Leaders. Here, the Judge stated there is no concern that Olivas requests a list of field personnel to find people to solicit, because Olivas has provided evidence that many workers are interested in joining the action. With the Notice Motion, Olivas provides affidavits from five other workers stating that C&S Oilfield did not pay them overtime for similar work. Meanwhile, 26 workers have already consented to be party Plaintiffs in this action. Consequently, Olivas' request for field personnel names and contact information is proper, because he has already identified many party Plaintiffs. For these reasons, Judge Browning granted the the Plaintiffs' Motion for Notice to Potential Plaintiffs and Conditional Certification, filed April 11, 2017; and entered the Order Granting the Plaintiffs' Motion for Notice to Potential Plaintiffs and Conditional Certification, filed Jan. 25, 2018. A full-text copy of the Court's April 27, 2018 Memorandum Opinion is available at https://is.gd/cfjHW7 from Leagle.com. A.J. Olivas, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by J. Derek Braziel -- jdbraziel@l-b-law.com -- Lee & Braziel LLP, Travis Andrew Gasper, Lee & Braziel, LLP & Jack L. Siegel -- Jack@siegellawgroup.biz -- Siegel Law Group PLLC. C & S Oilfield Services, LLC, Dewey Coffman, individually & Brett Coffman, individually, Defendants, represented by Clara B. Burns -- clara.burns@kempsmith.com -- Kemp Smith LLP. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Faces "Bishop" Suit in S.D. New York ------------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Charter Communications, Inc. The case is styled as Cedric Bishop, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Charter Communications, Inc. doing business as: Spectrum, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05814-RWS (S.D. N.Y., June 27, 2018). Charter Communications, Inc. is an American telecommunications company that offers its services to consumers and businesses under the branding of Spectrum.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq. Cohen & Mizrahi LLP 300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor Brooklyn, NY 11201 Tel: (917) 299-6612 Fax: (929) 575-4195 Email: joseph@cml.legal CHICAGO, IL: Certification of Class Sought in Chicagoans Suit ------------------------------------------------------------- The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit entitled CHICAGOANS FOR AN END TO THE GANG DATABASE: BLACK YOUTH PROJECT 100 CHICAGO, BLOCKS TOGETHER, BRIGHTON PARK NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCIL, LATINO UNION, MIJENTE, and ORGANIZED COMMUNITIES AGAINST DEPORTATION, as well as DONTA LUCAS, JONATHAN WARNER, LESTER COOPER, and LUIS PEDROTE- SALINAS, on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated persons v. CITY OF CHICAGO, SUPERINTENDENT EDDIE JOHNSON, and CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS MICHAEL TOMASO (#6404), MICHAEL GOLDEN (#15478), PETER TOLEDO (#2105), JOHN DOES 1-4, and JANE DOES 1-2, Case No. 1:18-cv-04242 (N.D. Ill.), move the Court to enter an order that the case may be maintained as a class action seeking solely equitable relief on behalf of: all persons who currently are or in the future will be included in the Chicago Police Department's Gang Database. The Plaintiffs also seek relief on behalf of a sub-class of the Black and Latinx members of the larger class. If the Defendants oppose class certification, the Plaintiffs will move for class discovery in order to fully develop the facts relating to certification. The Plaintiffs will also move for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of certification at which they anticipate presenting live testimony from experts and other relevant witnesses. The lawsuit is brought for injunctive relief under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Illinois Civil Rights Act based on the Plaintiffs' contention that the City of Chicago and the Chicago Police Department use and maintain a Gang Database of all suspected gang members in the City of Chicago that is arbitrary, discriminatory, over-inclusive, and error-ridden. The claims arise from alleged CPD written and unwritten policies, practices and procedures which are deeply rooted in the Department. The Plaintiffs contend that CPD has maintained a version of the challenged policies, practices and procedures for at least 20 years. A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=IPc0xANd The Plaintiffs are represented by: Sheila A. Bedi, Esq. Vanessa del Valle, Esq. MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER NORTHWESTERN PRITZKER SCHOOL OF LAW 375 E. Chicago Avenue Chicago, IL 60611 Telephone: (312) 503-2492 E-mail: sheila.bedi@law.northwestern.edu vanessa.delvalle@law.northwestern.edu - and - Brendan Shiller, Esq. Chris Bergin, Esq. Tia Haywood, Esq. SHILLER PREYAR LLC 601 S. California Avenue Chicago, IL 60612 Telephone: (312) 226-4590 E-mail: brendan@shillerpreyar.com chris@shillerpreyar.com Thaywood4u@gmail.com - and - Elizabeth A. Homsy, Esq. THE LAW OFFICERS OF ELIZABETH A. HOMSY 2506 N. Clark Street, Suite 286 Chicago, IL 60614 Telephone: (773) 988-3486 - and - Joey L. Mogul, Esq. PEOPLE'S LAW OFFICE 1180 N. Milwaukee Ave. Chicago, IL 60622 Telephone: (773) 235-0070 E-mail: joeymogul@aol.com CINTAS CORPORATION: Cassingham's Bid to Certify Tossed as Moot -------------------------------------------------------------- The Hon. Beth Labson Freeman terminated as moot the Plaintiff's Motion for Pre-Discovery Conditional Class Certification in the lawsuit titled MARK CASSINGHAM, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. CINTAS CORPORATION NO. 2, Case No. 5:17-cv-05014-BLF (N.D. Cal.). Judge Freeman also terminated as moot the Defendant's Motion for Stay. The hearing on the Defendant's Motion for Stay scheduled for July 12, 2018, is vacated and the parties shall file their stipulation on or before June 26, 2018. According to the order, the parties filed a notice stating that they have agreed to arbitrate certain claims and stay the Plaintiff's PAGA claim pending the arbitration. The parties state that they will file a stipulation and proposed order on or before June 26, 2018. In addition, the parties agree that the Plaintiff's Motion for Pre-Discovery Conditional Class Certification and the Defendant's Motion for Stay are moot based on the parties' agreement. A copy of the Order is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ALlDKq3o CONSOLIDATED EDISON: Faces "Bishop" Suit in S.D. New York --------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. The case is styled as Cedric Bishop, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05811 (S.D. N.Y., June 27, 2018). Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. engages in the regulated electric, gas, and steam delivery businesses in the United States. The company offers electric service to approximately 3.4 million customers in New York City and Westchester County; and delivers gas to approximately 1.1 million customers in Manhattan, the Bronx, parts of Queens, and Westchester County. The Plaintiff is represented by: Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq. Cohen & Mizrahi LLP 300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor Brooklyn, NY 11201 Tel: (917) 299-6612 Fax: (929) 575-4195 Email: joseph@cml.legal COREPOWER YOGA: Court Enters Final Judgment in "Barnard" Suit ------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, SHAUNA BARNARD, an individual, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, all other aggrieved employees, and on behalf of the general public, Plaintiff, v. COREPOWER YOGA LLC, a Colorado Limited Liability Company, and DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 4:16-cv-03861 (HSG) (N.D. Cal.), Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, Having reviewed and considered all the briefing filed with respect to the Plaintiff's Motions, along with the oral argument presented during the final fairness hearing held on Feb. 15, 2018, the Judge granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, and granted in part the Plaintiff's Motion for Fees and Costs in an Order entered Feb. 21, 2018. Now, the Judge entered Judgment. He approved the settlement amount of $1.4 million, including payments of attorneys' fees in the amount of $420,000; costs in the amount of $19,864.77; claims administration fees in the amount of $12,878; and an incentive fee for the named Plaintiff in the amount of $8,000. He dismissed with prejudice the Litigation without costs to any Party, other than as specified in the Agreement and Order. In consideration of the Class Settlement Amount, and for other good and valuable consideration, each of the participating Settlement Class Members shall, by operation of the Judgment, have fully, finally, and forever released, relinquished, and discharged all settled claims against CorePower Yoga in accordance with Sections 22, 23 and 53 of the Agreement. The Judgement is the Final Judgment in the suit as to all Settlement Class Members' Released Claims. A full-text copy of the Court's April 27, 2018 Final Judgment is available at https://is.gd/ZXxHdJ from Leagle.com. Shauna Barnard, Plaintiff, represented by David C. Hawkes -- dhawkes@bkflaw.com -- Blanchard Krasner French & Derek John Emge -- derek@emgelawfirm.com -- The Emge Firm LLP. CorePower Yoga LLC, a Colorado Corporation, Defendant, represented by Philippe Alexandre Lebel -- philippe.lebel@dbr.com -- Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Valerie Dutton Kahn -- valerie_kahn@ca9.uscourts.gov -- Drinker Biddle Reath LLP, Ramon Andres Miyar -- ramon.miyar@dbr.xom -- Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP & Cheryl D. Orr -- cheryl.orr@dbr.com -- Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. CRUNCH LLC: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Eacret & Merritt Say ------------------------------------------------------------- DYLAN EACRET and JONATHAN KENT MERRITT, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. CRUNCH, LLC and DOES 1-100, the Defendant, Case No. CGC-18-567322 (Cal. Super. Ct., June 15, 2018), alleges that Defendants forced Plaintiffs and Class members to work off the clock and violated the California overtime wage laws. According to the complaint, Eacret is currently employed by Defendants and throughout his employment with Defendants, was a non-exempt employee working in the position of personal trainer and as such he should have been, and should be, paid for all hours worked. Merritt is no longer employed by Defendant. Merritt was a non-exempt employee working in the position of personal trainer. Merritt was not paid for all hours worked, was told to clock-out from work while he continued to suffer and provide benefits to Defendant.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Ashwin Ladva, Esq. LADVA LAW FIRM 530 Jackson Street, 2nd Floor San Francisco, CA 94133 Telephone: (415) 296 8844 Facsimile: (415) 296 8845 CRYSTAL MORONEY: Faces "Ducreay" Suit in S.D.N.Y. ------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Law Offices of Crystal Moroney, PC. The lawsuit is captioned as Masika Ducreay, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated individuals, the Plaintiff, v. Law Offices of Crystal Moroney, PC, Crystal Moroney, and John Doe, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18- cv-04882-JFK (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 2018). LOCM is an all-woman owned, operated, and managed law firm, comprised of professional attorneys, legal assistants and support professionals.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Abel Luc Pierre, Esq. LAW OFFICE OF ABEL L. PIERRE, PC 140 Broadway, 46th Floor New York, NY 10005 Telephone: (212) 766 3323 E-mail: abel@apierrelaw.com CSC HOLDINGS: Faces "Bishop" Suit in S.D. New York -------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against CSC Holdings, LLC. The case is styled as Cedric Bishop, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CSC Holdings, LLC doing business as: Optimum, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05813 (S.D. N.Y., June 27, 2018). CSC Holdings LLC operates as a holding company. The Company, through its subsidiaries, provides telecommunications and entertainment services. CSC Holdings offers pay-per-view movies and events, video on demand, and high-speed data services throughout the United States.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq. Cohen & Mizrahi LLP 300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor Brooklyn, NY 11201 Tel: (917) 299-6612 Fax: (929) 575-4195 Email: joseph@cml.legal DISCOVER BANK: Faces "Therieau" Suit in M.D. Florida ---------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Discover Bank. The case is styled as Clare B. Therieau o/b/o herself and all others similarly-situated, Plaintiff v. Discover Bank, Defendant, Case No. 8:18-cv-01537-JSM-TGW (M.D. Fla., June 25, 2018). Discover Bank operates an online-only banking service that offers a checking account, savings accounts, money market accounts, and retirement products.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Brian Lucas Shrader, Esq. Dunlap Bennett & Ludwig PLLC 612 W Bay St Tampa, FL 33606-2704 Tel: (813) 360-1529 Fax: (813) 336-0832 Email: bshrader@dbllawyers.com - and - Gus M. Centrone, Esq. Dunlap Bennett & Ludwig PLLC 612 W Bay St Tampa, FL 33606-2704 Tel: (813) 360-1529 Fax: (813) 336-0832 Email: gcentrone@dbllawyers.com - and - Thomas J. Lyons, Jr., Esq. Consumer Justice Center, PA 367 Commerce Ct Vadnais Heights, MN 55127 Tel: (651) 770-9707 Fax: (651) 704-0907 DOCTOR'S ASSOCIATES: Faces "Arnaud" Suit in E.D. New York ---------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Doctor's Associates Inc. The case is styled as Luis Arnaud, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Doctor's Associates Inc. doing business as: Subway, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv- 03703 (E.D. N.Y., June 26, 2018). Doctor's Associates Inc., doing business as SUBWAY, operates a chain of quick service restaurants. The Company offers sandwiches, salads, sides, fresh breads, veggies, toppings, desserts, cookies, drinks, and beverages. SUBWAY serves customers worldwide.[BN] The Plaintiff appears PRO SE. DR. PEPPER: Ct. Denies Intervention in Canada Dry Ginger Ale Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, Western Division, denied the Motion to Intervene and Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Stay or Transfer Pursuant to the First-to-File Rule and suggestions in support filed by Jackie Fitzhenry-Russell and Robin Dale (Proposed Intervenors) in the case captioned ARNOLD E. WEBB, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED; Plaintiff, v. DR. PEPPER SNAPPLE GROUP, INC., DR. PEPPER/SEVEN UP, INC., Defendants, No. 4:17-00624-CV-RK (W.D. Mo.). The Plaintiff filed this putative class action alleging that the Defendants falsely advertised Canada Dry Ginger Ale (Product) as being Made from Real Ginger when the Product does not contain a detectable amount of ginger (Webb action). The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act in addition to common law allegations of breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, fraud, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and quasi contract/unjust enrichment/restitution. The Plaintiff seeks to represent a nationwide class as well as a Missouri subclass. On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact. Courts apply several factors to determine timeliness: (1) the extent the litigation has progressed at the time of the motion to intervene; (2) the prospective intervenor's knowledge of the litigation; (3) the reason for delay in seeking intervention; and (4) whether the delay in seeking intervention may prejudice the existing parties. The Proposed Intervenors argue the Webb action had not progressed substantially when the Motion to Intervene was filed because the Defendants have not yet answered and a motion to dismiss is still pending. The Plaintiff counters that the Webb action had progressed significantly at the time the Motion to Intervene was filed because by that time, a motion to dismiss had been filed, a scheduling order and discovery plan had been filed, parties had exchanged discovery, a protective order had been filed, and the parties had engaged in court-ordered mediation. The Court finds this factor could weigh in favor of either party and is thus, neutral. The Proposed Intervenors argue the notice provided was inadequate because the notice was placed in single lines of text in lengthy discovery documents, and neither the Plaintiff nor the Defendants directed the Proposed Intervenors' attention to the Webb action's existence. The Court finds that the Proposed Intervenors were first given adequate notice of the existence of the Webb action by the Defendants' disclosure in their July 31, 2017 discovery response. The Proposed Intervenors concede that they overlooked the disclosure of the Webb action during the exchange of documents from July 2017 through September 2017 between themselves and the Defendants. The Proposed Intervenors also argue the delay was caused by the failure of the Plaintiffs and the Defendants to adequately notify the Proposed Intervenors of the Webb action. The Court finds this reasoning unpersuasive. The Proposed Intervenors were given adequate notice of the Webb action on July 31, 2017, and this oversight is not sufficient to excuse the delay. After reviewing the parties' arguments addressing prejudice in the permissive intervention analysis, the Court finds the Proposed Intervenors' delay in seeking intervention would prejudice the existing parties. Based on all of the circumstances, and in considering the specific factors, the Court finds the Motion to Intervene is not timely. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B) provides for permissive intervention by a party which has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact. The Proposed Intervenors contend that common questions of law and fact exist because both cases involve the same Defendant. The central issue in both is whether the Defendants engaged in false and misleading business practices with respect to the marketing, labeling, and sale of the Defendants' soft drinks. Finally, although the Fitzhenry-Russell action involves several of the Defendants' products, both the Webb and Fitzhenry-Russell actions involve the Product, Canada Dry Ginger Ale. Accordingly, both actions share common questions of law or fact. The Court finds that, first, the Plaintiff and the Defendants are not prejudiced by the fact that a federal court outside of Missouri would be addressing Missouri state law claims. Both actions contain similar issues; therefore, the Northern District of California can sufficiently address the claims and defenses at issue in the Webb action. Next, the Court is not persuaded by the Plaintiff's argument that a stay would cause witnesses' memories to fade. However, the Court finds the Plaintiff and the Defendants are prejudiced. First, the Court finds merit in the Plaintiff's concern that the Proposed Intervenors do not seek to litigate and only seek intervention to stay, transfer, or dismiss the Webb action. Next, the existing parties may be prejudiced if permissive intervention is granted and the Webb action is transferred to California due the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bristol- Myers where the Supreme Court held the California court did not have specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant with respect to non-resident Plaintiff's claims because the defendant did not have sufficient contacts with California. 137 S. Ct at 1781-1782. While the Fitzhenry-Russell Court has already considered and determined Bristol-Myers did not apply to putative class actions, courts have not interpreted Bristol-Myers uniformly concerning its application to putative class actions. Thus, while it is uncontested that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants, is it unsettled if the Northern District of California would have personal jurisdiction over the Defendants with respect to claims raised in the Webb action. Accordingly, after considering the parties' arguments, the Court finds intervention would prejudice the existing parties. To demonstrate Article III standing, the movant must allege facts showing each of the following elements: (1) an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and either actual or imminent if the Motion to Intervene is denied; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct and (3) a favorable court decision will likely redress the injury. The issue of Article III standing is first raised by the Plaintiff in response to Proposed Intervenors' Motion to Intervene. The Plaintiff argues that the Proposed Intervenors do not have standing because they will not suffer a concrete and particular injury if the Motion to Intervene is denied. In their reply brief, the Proposed Intervenors claim they easily meet the standing requirements because they have standing for the same reasons the Plaintiff has standing. The Proposed Intervenors argue they would be members of the Plaintiff's asserted nationwide class. In their briefing, the Plaintiff confuses what is required for the injury prong of the Article III standing requirement. The Proposed Intervenors do not have to prove they would be injured if the Court would not allow them to intervene. Instead, the Proposed Intervenors only need demonstrate that they meet the elements of Article III standing. Here, Proposed Intervenors' injury, traceability, and redressability aspects are similar to the Plaintiff's. As the Court has already determined in its Order on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, these aspects meet the elements for standing. Because the Court finds that permissive intervention is inappropriate, the Court need not address, and will not grant, the Proposed Intervenors' request to dismiss, transfer, or stay this case. The Court finds that permissive intervention is inappropriate because the Motion to Intervene is untimely and intervention would unduly prejudice the existing parties. The Court will not allow the Proposed Intervenors to permissively intervene for the limited purpose of seeking to dismiss, stay, or transfer this action. Consequently, the Proposed Intervenors' Motion to Intervene and Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Stay or Transfer this Action Pursuant to the First-to-File Rule is denied. A full-text copy of the District Court's April 26, 2018 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8e2oe9s from Leagle.com. Arnold E Webb, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin Heikali, pro hac vice, Timothy J. Peter, pro hac vice & Tim Eugene Dollar, Dollar, Burns & Becker. Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc. & Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc., Defendants, represented by Jessica E. Underwood -- jessica.underwood@bakerbotts.com -- pro hac vice, Jonathan A. Shapiro -- jonathan.shapiro@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Botts, pro hac vice, Monica Hughes Smith -- monica.smith@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Botts, pro hac vice, Stacey R. Gilman -- sgilman@berkowitzoliver.com -- Berkowitz Oliver LLP & Van H. Beckwith -- van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Botts, pro hac vice. Jackie Fitzhenry-Russell & Robin Dale, interested parties, represented by Jeffrey S. Lawrence -- jeff@smithlawrence.com -- Smith Lawrence, LLC & Marie McCrary -- marie@gutridesafier.com -- pro hac vice. DRILFORMANCE LLC: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in "Kitagawa" ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, CASEY KITAGAWA and BRANDON SHELDON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. DRILFORMANCE, LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No. H-17-726 (S.D. Tex.), Judge Lee H. Rosenthal of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, granted Drilformance's motion for summary judgment and denied the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Casey Kitagawa and Sheldon, the named Plaintiffs in the putative class action, work for Drilformance as applications engineers. Drilformance designs, manufactures, and rents drill bits to companies in the oil and gas industry. The Plaintiffs, salaried employees, allege violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), based on a 10% across-the-board salary reduction. Oil prices dropped in 2015, and so did drilling operations throughout the industry. The demand for drill bits also dropped. Drilformance's revenue followed suit, dropping 80 between December 2014 and June 2016. In June 2015, Haley Kitagawa, Drilformance's global-operations director, sent an email to all Drilformance employees announcing changes to Drilformance's human-resources policies based on the market downturn. This policy reduced the Plaintiffs' salaries by 10%. Although the email stated that all employees would receive a furlough day every other week, the Plaintiffs allege that they were not able to take the furlough days, and instead continued to work their regular schedules. They also allege that Drilformance did not ensure that employees refrained from working on the furlough day. The parties agree on the material facts and cross-moved for summary judgment on the effect of the salary reduction. The Plaintiffs argue that the salary reduction removed them from the status of salaried professional employees, exempt from the FLSA's overtime requirements. Drilformance seeks summary judgment that the Plaintiffs remained exempt because the prospective salary reduction based on the economic downturn did not violate the Department of Labor's salary-basis regulation, and did not change the Plaintiffs' exempt status. Because the salary reduction was prospective and based on a downturn in the oil market and the company's finances, Judge Rosenthal finds that Drilformance did not violate Section 541.602's salary-basis requirement. He also finds that even though the Plaintiffs' salaries were reduced without a corresponding reduction in their work schedule, the salary reduction was based on an economic slowdown and did not require a schedule reduction to maintain their overtime exemption. Lastly, the Judge finds there is no record evidence showing that the salary reduction was a sham, or that reductions were so frequent that the salaries were the functional equivalent of an hourly wage or were designed to circumvent the salary-basis requirement. Even though the salary reduction did not correspond with a reduction in the Plaintiffs' work schedules, it was bona fide. For these reasons, Judge Rosenthal granted Drilformance's motion for summary judgment and denied the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. A full-text copy of the Court's April 27, 2018 Memorandum and Order is available at https://is.gd/RBMTJv from Leagle.com. Casey Kitagawa & Brandon Sheldon, Plaintiffs, represented by Warren A. Berlanga -- wberlanga@wylycooklaw.com -- Wyly & Cook, PLLC & Kelly Earl Cook -- kcook@wylycooklaw.com -- Wyly & Cook, PLLC. Drilformance, LLC, Defendant, represented by Michael A. Harvey -- mharvey@munsch.com -- Munsch Hardt Kopf Harr PC. DUMBO PIZZA: Faces "Tepi" Suit in E.D. New York ----------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dumbo Pizza Inc. The case is styled as Celestino Romero Tepi, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Dumbo Pizza Inc. doing business as: Front Street Pizza, Salvatore Leonardi, Larry Leonardi and Valentino Leonardi, Defendants, Case No. 1:18- cv-03664 (E.D. N.Y., June 25, 2018). Dumbo Pizza Inc. is located at 80 Front St in Brooklyn, NY 11201.[BN] The Plaintiff appears PRO SE. EDEN CREAMERY: Underfills Ice Cream Pint, Kamal & Neely Claim ------------------------------------------------------------- YOUSSIF KAMAL, and GILLIAN NEELY, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. EDEN CREAMERY, LLC, dba HALO TOP CREAMERY, the Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-01298-BAS-AGS (S.D. Cal., June 15, 2018), alleges that Halo Top knew it is short-changing its customers by under-filling its pint containers, but refuses to do anything about it. According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs and the Class unknowingly paid for a full pint of Halo Top ice cream but did not receive a full pint of Halo Top ice cream. Purchasers of the premium-priced ice cream simply have no idea how much ice cream they will get each and every time they buy a Halo Top "pint." And Halo Top has been doing this for years. In spite of this practice, Halo Top has become the self-described "best-selling pint of ice cream in America." Halo Top has successfully marketed itself as a "guilt-free" ice cream with extremely low calories and containing other health benefits, such as protein. As one of the important selling points to consumers, the number of calories per pint is prominently displayed on the pint container, generally 280 to 360 calories per pint. As a result of its low-calorie content, claimed health benefits and clever social media marketing campaigns, Halo Top has developed a cult-like following among consumers over the past few years. According to media reports, by the end of 2017 Halo Top accounted for more than 5% of the ice cream market, selling more of its "pints" than Ben & Jerry's and Haagen-Dazs. And like these competitors, Halo Top charges a premium for its "pints" -- as much as $6.99 each.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Andrew J. Brown, Esq. THE LAW OFFICES OF ANDREW J. BROWN 501 West Broadway, Suite 1490 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: (619) 501 6550 E-mail: andrewb@thebrownlawfirm.com EDWARD D. JONES: PSLRA Service/Procedures in "Anderson" Entered --------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, EDWARD ANDERSON, RAYMOND KEITH CORUM, JESSE WORTHINGTON, and COLLEEN WORTHINGTON, each individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EDWARD D. JONES & CO., L.P.; THE JONES FINANCIAL COMPANIES, L.L.L.P.; EDJ HOLDING COMPANY, INC.; JAMES D. WEDDLE; PENELOPE PENNINGTON; DANIEL J. TIMM; KENNETH R. CELLA, JR.; BRETT A. CAMPBELL; KEVIN D. BASTIEN; NORMAN L. EAKER; VINCENT J. FERRARI; TIMOTHY J. KIRLEY; JAMES A. TRICARICO, JR.; OLIVE STREET INVESTMENT ADVISORS, LLC; PASSPORT HOLDINGS, LLC; PASSPORT RESEARCH, LTD; and JOHN DOES 1-100, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-00714-JAM-AC (E.D. Cal.), Judge John A. Mendez of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California entered the parties' stipulated order regarding service and procedures under Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"). On March 30, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed the putative class action complaint in the action, asserting, among other things, claims under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, as well as claims under Sections 12(a)(2) and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933. The action is governed by the PSLRA. Pursuant to Section 21D(a)(3)(B) of the Exchange Act, as amended by the PSLRA, motions for appointment as the Lead Plaintiff in the action and for approval of Lead Counsel are due on May 29, 2018. It is anticipated that following the Court's ruling, the appointed Lead Plaintiff will file an amended complaint that supersedes the pending complaint. The counsel for the parties agree that to avoid duplicative effort, unnecessary motion practice, and waste of judicial resources, there is good cause to provide that the Defendants need not respond to the pending complaint and will instead respond to the anticipated subsequent pleading. The counsel for the Defendants has agreed to accept service of the complaint on behalf of all the Defendants, provided that no responsive pleading to the current complaint is required. The parties stipulated and agreed, and Judge Mendez granted that (i) the Defendants accept service of the complaint; (ii) the Defendants will not be required to answer, move, or otherwise respond to the pending complaint; (iii) the schedule for filing an amended complaint and briefing any motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be as follows: (a) the amended complaint will be filed within 60 days of the Court's Order appointing Lead Plaintiff and approving the selection of Lead Counsel; (b) the motions to dismiss and opening briefs in support thereof will be filed within 60 days of the filing of the amended complaint (c) the opposition will be due within 60 days of the filing of the motion to dismiss; and (d) the replies in support of the motions to dismiss will be due within 45 days of the filing of the opposition briefs; and (iv) the parties expressly reserve all other rights of any kind. A full-text copy of the Court's April 27, 2018 Order is available at https://is.gd/leKYo8 from Leagle.com. Edward Anderson, Raymond Keith Corum, Jesse Worthington & Colleen Worthington, Plaintiffs, represented by Ivy T. Ngo -- ngoi@fdazar.com -- Franklin D. Azar and Associates, P.C. & John Randolph Garner -- jrg@erglaw.net -- Garner Law Office. Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., The Jones Financial Companies, LLLP, EDJ Holding Company, Inc., James D. Weddle, Penelope Pennington, Daniel J. Timm, Kenneth R. Cella, Jr., Brett A. Campbell, Kevin D. Bastien, Norman L. Eaker, Vincent J. Ferrari, Timothy J. Kirley, James A. Tricarico, Jr., Olive Street Investment Advisors, LLC, Passport Holdings, LLC & Passport Research, LTD., Defendants, represented by Meryl Lyn Young -- myoung@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP. EMPIRE INT'L: Faces "Fischler" Suit in E.D. New York ---------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Empire International, Ltd. The case is styled as Brian Fischler, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Empire International, Ltd. doing business as: Empire CLS, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03714 (E.D. N.Y., June 27, 2018). Empire International, Ltd. operates in the ground transportation industry. It provides chauffeured transportation services. The company also provides customer, multi-profile, and corporate online services. It operates in Europe, South America, Australia, Africa, Asia, and Middle Eastern countries. Empire International was founded in 1980 and is headquartered in Norwood, New Jersey. The company has additional offices in London, England; New York, New York; Norwood, New Jersey; Atlanta, Georgia; Los Angeles and San Francisco, California; and a regional sales office in Dallas, Texas.[BN] The Plaintiff appears PRO SE. EOS CCA: Faces "Troyanovsky" Suit in E.D. New York --------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against EOS CCA. The case is styled as Maya Troyanovsky, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. EOS CCA, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03677 (E.D. N.Y., June 25, 2018). EOS CCA, headquartered in Norwell, Massachusetts, is a provider of customer care and receivables management services. It is the U.S. Receivables Management Division of the international EOS Group based in Hamburg, Germany.[BN] The Plaintiff appears PRO SE. EQUILON ENTERPRISES: Summary Judgment Against "Bowen" Affirmed -------------------------------------------------------------- Sadie M. Curry (Plaintiff) brought a class action case against defendant and respondent Equilon Enterprises, LLC, doing business as Shell Oil Products US (Shell). Curry's causes of action included (1) failure to pay overtime compensation; (2) failure to pay for missed break periods; and (3) unfair business practices. Curry contends the trial court erred in its finding and by granting summary judgment. Shell moved for summary judgment asserting that Curry was not employed by Shell and therefore her case against Shell failed. Shell contended it had a business relationship with A.R.S., a limited liability company, while Curry worked for ARS, but ARS alone managed and controlled every aspect of its employment relationship with its gas station employees such as Curry. Curry opposed Shell's motion for summary judgment. Curry asserted there were two independent businesses at the service stations: (1) a convenience store and car wash business owned by ARS, and (2) a fuel business owned by Shell. Curry contended the fuel business was the primary business. Curry asserted Shell, through ARS, exercised control over her wages, hours, and working conditions. The trial court found Shell was not Curry's employer and therefore granted Shell's motion for summary judgment. Curry appealed that decision. The Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court's judgment granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Cal. App. finds that in regard to wages and hours, ARS "was responsible for hiring, firing, disciplining, training, and compensating" Curry. This undisputed fact shows that ARS was responsible for Curry's wage. In regard to Curry's working conditions, ARS maintained the right and ability to assign any employee to perform tasks. In other words, Shell could not direct Curry to perform a particular task, only ARS could do that. Further, ARS maintained control over the daily work of its own employees. Thus, the tasks Curry was made to perform, and the conditions in which she performed them, were not controlled by Shell they were controlled by ARS. Accordingly, Shell has met its burden of establishing there is not a triable issue of fact concerning Shell being Curry's employer under the wages, hours, or conditions definition of employer. The Court concludes Curry's causes of action fail under the "wages, hours, or conditions" definition of employer. The Court also concludes that Curry has failed to meet her burden of establishing there is a triable issue of fact as to Shell being Curry's employer based upon the definition of suffering or permitting Curry to work. Thus, the Court concludes Curry's causes of action fail under the suffering or permitting definition of employer. Curry worked at two gas stations, one at Via Rancho and another at Carmel Mountain. The undisputed facts reflect, that as an ARS station manager, Curry supervised approximately five to seven ARS cashiers. Thus, Curry was engaged in the distinct occupation of an ARS station manager. While employed by ARS, Curry reported to and took direction from ARS employees and at times, from the manager of the ARS HR department. From this evidence it can be inferred that Curry's job was performed under the principal's direction. In this case, the principal was ARS. In regard to Shell providing direction to Curry, Shell required various tasks be performed by ARS; however, there is nothing indicating that Shell required Curry be the person to perform those tasks. It was ARS that required Curry to perform certain tasks. Curry worked directly for Shell from May 2001 to March 2003. From March to July 2003, Curry worked at a gas station. In July, 2003, Curry was contacted by an ARS employee for the purpose of recruiting Curry to become the manager of the Via Rancho Station. It can be inferred from this evidence that skills are needed for managing a gas station. The evidence that Curry was recruited by ARS indicates a particular skill set was desired ARS wanted a person with experience in the field. Because Shell did not have input on the hiring process or Curry's job duties, it can be inferred that Shell did not require a particular skill sets because Shell did not have input on the tasks performed by a particular employee. Curry's job training was provided by ARS. ARS required Curry attend environmental compliance courses taught by Shell. ARS paid for Curry's time at the classes. Curry was required to wear a shirt and a nametag that were purchased by ARS and given to Curry by ARS. Thus, ARS provided Curry with the information and uniform necessary to conduct her work. Therefore, it can be inferred that Curry's job duties involved tasks such as determining the amount of fuel in the storage tanks. As a result, Shell provided some of the equipment for Curry's job, in that Curry performed tasks related to Shell's fueling equipment. The MSO contract authorizes Shell to have ARS remove an ARS employee from a station, but does not permit Shell to terminate any ARS employee's employment. For example, if Shell requested Curry be permanently removed from its stations, then ARS could employ Curry in its offices or assign Curry the off-site task of driving around checking competing station's gas prices. The evidence cited by Curry does not create a triable issue of fact as to whether Shell could terminate Curry's employment because it does not indicate that Shell could terminate Curry's employment. When ARS offered Curry the position of manager of the Via Rancho Station, it offered an annual salary of $32,000. Thus, Curry was a salaried employee of ARS; she was not paid a project. The undisputed facts reflect ARS maintained exclusive control over all payroll for Curry. Thus, Curry was not paid by Shell. ARS operated approximately 15 gas stations San Diego County and employed over 100 people at those stations. Given this undisputed fact, it can reasonably be inferred that Curry's management of two gas stations was part of ARS's regular business because ARS's business involved operating gas stations. Shell owned approximately 365 fueling stations in California. There is nothing indicating Shell employed people at the gas stations. Thus, Curry's work at the fueling station was not part of Shell's business. In other words, Shell was not in the business of operating fueling stations it was in the business of owning real estate and fuel. In conclusion, Curry's three causes of action fail because there is not a triable issue of material fact concerning Shell being Curry's employer under any of the three legal definitions of employer. The trial court properly granted summary judgment. The judgment is affirmed. The appeals case is captioned SADIE M. CURRY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. EQUILON ENTERPRISES, LLC, Defendant and Respondent, No. E065764 (Cal. App.). A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s April 26, 2018 Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yct82nts from Leagle.com. Samuel T. Rees -- STReesESQ@Earthlink.Net -- for Plaintiff and Appellant. Reed Smith, Raymond A. Cardozo -- RCardozo@ReedSmith.com -- and Remy Joseph Kessler -- rkessler@reedsmith.com -- for Defendant and Respondent. EXL PETROLEUM: McCoy Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages under FLSA ----------------------------------------------------------- WILLIAM MCCOY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. EXL PETROLEUM MANAGEMENT, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 7:18-cv-00106 (W.D. Tex., June 15, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages owed to Defendant's workers under the Fair Labor Standards Act. According to the complaint, McCoy and the other company men like him regularly worked for EXL Petroleum for more than 40 hours each week. EXL Petroleum improperly classified McCoy and those similarly situated as independent contractors, paying them a day rate with no overtime compensation. This practice violates the overtime requirements of the FLSA. EXL Petroleum Management, LLC acquires and develops oil and gas properties. The company was founded in 2014 and is based in Midland, Texas.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq. Michael A. Josephson, Esq. Jennifer M. Solak, Esq. JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM 11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050 Houston, TX 77046 Telephone: 713 352 1100 Facsimile: 713 352 3300 E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com adunlap@mybackwages.com jsolak@mybackwages.com - and - Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq. BRUCKNER BURCH, P.L.L.C. 8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500 Houston, TX 77046 Telephone: (713) 877 8788 Facsimile: (713) 877 8065 E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com FAMILY FIRST: Ledger Seeks Overtime Compensation under FLSA ----------------------------------------------------------- JANNIE LEDGER, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. FAMILY FIRST CAREGIVERS, INC. And JIM NOWAK, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-01366-DAP (N.D. Ohio, June 15, 2018), seeks to recover overtime compensation and the Fair Labor Standards Act. According to the complaint, the Plaintiff performed personal care services including bathing, cooking, cleaning, dish washing and other such activities that were customary and usual at each and every home she worked at. These activities took up the better part of her day, on a daily basis. The FLSA and Ohio law required Defendants to pay overtime compensation to its Home Health Aids. Allegedly, the Defendants unlawfully failed to pay overtime compensation to its Home Health Aids. The Defendants knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, the Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class was entitled to overtime pay under state and/or federal law. Family First Caregivers is a family owned, senior home care services business that operates in Ohio's Cuyahoga, Lake, Lorain, Medina and Summit counties.[BN] Counsel for Plaintiff: Shannon M. Draher, Esq. Hans A. Nilges, Esq. NILGES DRAHER, LLC 7266 Portage Street, N.W., Suite D Massillon, OH 44646 Telephone: (330) 470 4428 Facsimile: (330) 754 1430 E-mail: sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com hans@ohlaborlaw.com FARMERS INSURANCE: Certification UM Purchasers Class Affirmed ------------------------------------------------------------- The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County, affirmed the trial court's order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned WILLIAM BOWEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants, No. 105643 (Ohio App.). Defendant-appellant, Farmers Insurance of Columbus, Inc., challenges the trial court's order certifying a class of individuals that purchased uninsured motorist coverage from Farmers between October 1994 and September 1997. The instant matter is premised on the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Martin v. Midwestern Group Ins. Co., 70 Ohio St.3d 478, 639 N.E.2d 438 (1994). In his second amended complaint, Bowen asserted causes of actions for breach of contract and fraud relating to Farmers' practice of assessing multiple Uninsured Motorist (UM) premiums for UM coverage, even after a UM premium was paid on a first vehicle. Bowen sought to certify a class as defined as follows: all persons who purchased automobile insurance from Farmers and paid premiums identified as paying for UM coverage on more than one vehicle in the household at any time during the period October 1994 through September 1997. The trial court granted Bowen's motion for class certification. Farmers filed the instant appeal challenging the trial court's judgment. Farmers assigns three errors for review: I. The trial court erred in certifying an overly broad class consisting entirely of class members whose claims are barred by the statute of limitations. II. The trial court erred by finding that common questions predominated where an injury-in-fact to each class member cannot be proven by common evidence. III. The trial court erred by finding that common questions predominated because, if tolling can apply to the class claims, the trial court failed to consider the highly individualized inquiries necessary to determine whether each class member's claim was timely. Overbroad Class After reviewing the record, the Ohio App. finds that the definition of Bowen's class is unambiguous and sufficiently definite. In order to determine whether an individual is a member of the class, the trial court need only look to the actions or practices of Farmers, rather than the state of mind of any prospective class members. The definition permits identification of class members with reasonable effort. This information, whether an insured paid multiple UM premiums for UM coverage, could be easily obtained by reviewing Farmers' business records. As the trial court recognized in its judgment entry granting Bowen's motion for class certification, a data expert at Farmers testified that he could create a list of insureds that falls within Bowen's proposed class definition from Farmers' records, so the class members are identifiable. The Court finds that the trial court properly found that Bowen met the threshold requirement of establishing an identifiable and unambiguous class. Accordingly, Farmers' first assignment of error is overruled. Civ.R. 23(B)(3) Predominance Requirement Injury-in-Fact Proven By Common Evidence Farmers maintains that all of the prospective class members were not damaged by Farmers' practice of charging UM premiums on a per-vehicle basis post-Martin v. Midwestern Group. In support of its brief in opposition to Bowen's motion for class certification, Farmers submitted an expert report from actuary Paul Anderson. The appellate court rejected Grange Mutual's disparate damages argument, finding that both the named plaintiffs' claims and the class members' claims were predicated upon common evidence relating to Grange Mutual's failure to disclose legal information, thereby allowing Grange Mutual to charge additional premiums for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. In the instant matter, Bowen's and the class members' fraud claim is predicated upon common evidence relating to Farmers' misrepresentations about the nature of the multiple UM premiums and/or the nature and extent of UM coverage, thereby allowing Farmers to charge additional UM premiums. Farmers' damages argument is based on various presumptions of fact, such as the presumption that post-Martin v. Midwestern Group, UM premiums would have been determined by using persons rather than vehicles as the exposure unit. Finally, the record reflects that each class members' damages could be mathematically calculated by determining the multiple UM premiums paid by the individual class members from October 5, 1994, through September 2, 1997. Accordingly, the trial court could easily determine the exact amount due to each class member without requiring each individual class member to present additional evidence. Statute of Limitations In the third assignment of error, Farmers argues that even if the discovery rule can apply to toll the statute of limitations, the trial court erred by finding that Bowen satisfied the predominance requirement because highly individualized inquiries are necessary to determine whether the class members' claims were timely. In support of its argument that the fraud claim is time-barred, Farmers argues that the discovery rule does not apply because (1) knowledge of multiple UM premiums, rather than knowledge of the illegality of these premiums or the Martin v. Midwestern Group decision triggered the statute of limitations, and (2) Bowen and the prospective class members knew or should have known about the multiple UM premiums because they were reflected in the insureds' declaration sheets. The trial court explained that Bowen filed his original complaint well after the four-year statute of limitations had expired. As such, the trial court recognized that a determination must be made as to when [he] actually discovered or should have discovered the fraud. In finding that Bowen satisfied the superiority requirement, the trial court stated, in relevant part: "For Bowen, the evidence shows that he had actual knowledge [of the fraud] only a short while before the complaint was filed. So the issue for Bowen is whether he should have discovered the fraud more than four years before first filing on March 31, 2009. When determining whether, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, a party should have discovered a case of fraud, the relevant inquiry is whether the facts known would lead a fair and prudent man, using ordinary care and thoughtfulness, to make further inquiry. Marks v. KeyBank N.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84691, 2005-Ohio-769." After reviewing the record, the Ohio App. cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Bowen satisfied the predominance requirement under Civ.R. 23(B). In Lynch v. Dial Fin. Co. of Ohio No. 1, Inc., 101 Ohio App.3d 742, 656 N.E.2d 714 (8th Dist.1995), plaintiffs-appellants filed an action in April 1992 alleging that the defendants violated the Second Mortgage Loan Act by charging them for credit accident and health insurance to secure three loans made between 1976 and 1978. The Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing, in relevant part, that appellants' claims for statutory damages were barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and appellants appealed to this court. On appeal, appellants argued that the one-year statute of limitations should be tolled because they did not discover that the statute was violated or that they were injured until their lawyer explained the law to them in December 1991. This court rejected appellants' argument and held that their claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations: "In this case, plaintiffs knew or should have known about the charges for accident and health insurance because they were itemized on the face of the loan documents which they signed in the latter 1970s. What plaintiffs discovered seventeen years later is that their lawyer told them that these charges allegedly violated R.C. 1321.57. That discovery cannot be used to circumvent the statute of limitations or limitations would become meaningless." The Ohio App. finds no basis upon which to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Bowen satisfied the predominance requirement under Civ.R. 23(B). Farmers' third assignment of error is overruled. After thoroughly reviewing the record, the Ohio App. finds that the trial court conducted the requisite rigorous analysis in determining whether Bowen satisfied the prerequisites for class certification pursuant to Civ.R. 23. Furthermore, the Ohio App. cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in certifying the class in this case. Judgment affirmed. A full-text copy of the Ohio App.'s April 26, 2018 Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yb2vjnrz from Leagle.com. Donald S. Scherzer -- dscherzer@ralaw.com -- Stephen W. Funk -- sfunkWralaw.com -- Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A.; Joseph Karnen, Brian M. Robinson, Attorneys for Appellant. Patrick J. Perotti -- pperotti@dworkenlaw.com -- Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A.; Ronald A. Margolis, Bonezzi, Switzer, Polito & Hupp, Co., L.P.A., Attorneys for Appellee. FAYETTE COUNTY: Faces "Arison" Suit in W.D. Pennsylvania -------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Fayette County, Pennsylvania. The case is styled as Miranda Arison, Malcolm Dyer, Dante Ripley and Charles Smith, Jr., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Fayette County, Pennsylvania, Jeremy Myers, Warden of Fayette County Prison, James Custer, Angela Zimmerlink, Dave Lohr, Vincent Vicites, Rich Bower, Scott Abraham and Steve Leskinen in their official capacities as members of the Fayette County Prison Board, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-00845-MPK (W.D. Pa., June 26, 2018). Fayette County is a county of the U.S. state of Pennsylvania. Fayette County is located in southwestern Pennsylvania, adjacent to Maryland and West Virginia. As of the 2010 census, the population was 136,606. Its county seat is Uniontown.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Alexandra T. Morgan-Kurtz, Esq. Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project 100 Fifth Ave, Ste 900 Pittsburgh, Pa 15222 Tel: (412) 434-6175 Email: amorgan-kurtz@pailp.org - and - Dylan T. Cowart, Esq. 247 Fort Pitt Blvd. Pittsburgh, PA 15222 Tel: (972) 834-2152 Email: dcowart@aclupa.org - and - Kevin M. Eddy, Esq. Blank Rome LLP 501 Grant Street, Suite 805 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Tel: (412) 932-2757 Email: keddy@blankrome.com - and - Sara Rose, Esq. ACLU 247 Fort Pitt Boulevard Pittsburgh, PA 15222 Tel: (412) 681-7864 Fax: (412) 681-8707 Email: srose@aclupa.org - and - Witold J. Walczak, Esq. 313 Atwood Street Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Tel: (412) 681-7864 Email: vwalczak@aclupa.org FINANCIAL ENGINES: Scarantino Balks at Hellman & Friedman Merger ---------------------------------------------------------------- RICHARD SCARANTINO, On Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. FINANCIAL ENGINES, INC., BLAKE R. GROSSMAN, JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST, E. OLENA BERG LACY, ROBERT A. HURET, HEIDI KUNZ, MICHAEL E. MARTIN, LAWRENCE M. RAFFONE, JOHN B. SHOVEN, and DAVID B. YOFFIE, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv- 00892-UNA (D. Del., June 15, 2018), seeks to enjoin Defendants and all persons acting in concert with them from proceeding with, consummating, or closing the Proposed Transaction ,and in the event Defendants consummate Proposed Transaction, rescinding it and setting it aside or awarding rescissory damages. This action stems from a proposed transaction announced on April 30, 2018, pursuant to which Financial Engines, Inc. will be acquired by affiliates of Hellman & Friedman, Edelman Financial, L.P. and Flashdance Merger Sub, Inc. On April 29, 2018, Financial Engines' Board of Directors caused the Company to enter into an agreement and plan of merger. Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, if the Proposed Transaction is approved by Financial Engines' shareholders and completed, Financial Engines' shareholders will receive $45.00 in cash for each share of Financial Engines common stock they own. On June 5, 2018, the Defendants filed a proxy statement with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with the Proposed Transaction. The Proxy Statement omits material information with respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders the Proxy Statement false and misleading. Accordingly, plaintiff alleges herein that defendants violated Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the Proxy Statement. Financial Engines, Inc. provides independent technology-enabled financial advisory, discretionary portfolio management, personalized investment advice, financial and retirement income planning, and financial education and guidance services in the United States.[BN] Attorneys for Plaintiff: Brian D. Long, Esq. Gina M. Serra, Esq. RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A. 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220 Wilmington, DE 19801 Telephone: (302) 295 5310 Facsimile: (302) 654 7530 E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com gms@rl-legal.com - and - Richard A. Maniskas, Esq. RM LAW, P.C. 1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300 Berwyn, PA 19312 Telephone: (484) 324 6800 Facsimile: (484) 631 1305 E-mail: rm@maniskas.com FLOWERS FOODS: Watson Seeks Unpaid Wages under FLSA --------------------------------------------------- TIMOTHY WATSON, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated employees, the Plaintiff, v. FLOWERS FOODS, INC., and FLOWERS BAKING CO. OF KNOXVILLE, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-00237 (E.D. Tenn., June 15, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid wages owed to Plaintiff and a class of other similarly situated hourly, non-exempt employees who worked at Defendant Flowers Baking Co. of Knoxville, LLC's facility in Knoxville, Tennessee, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act. According to the complaint, Defendants' policy and practice is to deny straight time pay and overtime pay to employees working at their Knoxville bakery. Defendants' failure to pay employees their earned wages and overtime compensation violates the FLSA and the state laws of Tennessee.[BN] Counsel for Plaintiff and similarly situated current and former employees: Gordon E. Jackson, Esq. James L. Holt, Jr., Esq. J. Russ Bryant, Esq. Paula R. Jackson, Esq. JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER & HOLT 262 German Oak Drive Memphis, TN 38018 Telephone: (901) 754 8001 Facsimile: (901) 754 8524 E-mail: gjackson@jsyc.com jholt@jsyc.com rbryant@jsyc.com pjackson@jsyc.com FLYING LOCKSMITHS: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York ------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Flying Locksmiths, Inc. The case is styled as Luc Burbon, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. The Flying Locksmiths, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05785 (S.D. N.Y., June 26, 2018). The Flying Locksmiths Inc. is an all-inclusive security provider.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq. Cohen & Mizrahi LLP 300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor Brooklyn, NY 11201 Tel: (917) 299-6612 Fax: (929) 575-4195 Email: joseph@cml.legal FORD MOTOR: Awarded $74K Costs of Bill in "Daniel" -------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Cost of Bill in the case captioned MARGIE DANIEL, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Defendant, Civ. No. 2:11-02890 WBS EFB (E.D. Cal.). After judgment was entered in favor of the defendant following a jury trial, the defendant submitted a Bill of Costs totaling $99,406.02 for the costs of subpoenas, transcripts, witness fees, copies, and related expenses. The Plaintiffs have filed numerous objections to the Bill of Costs, arguing that the court should not award any costs, or in the alternative, reduce or disallow costs for many of the items listed on the Bill of Costs. The Plaintiffs' first argument is that the court should exercise its discretion to deny all costs because of (1) the financial disparity between the parties, (2) plaintiff Margie Daniel's limited financial means, (3) the close and difficult questions presented by the case, and (4) the potential chilling effect on future litigation if costs are granted. While the plaintiffs are correct that these are appropriate factors to examine in determining whether to deny costs, at least in the context of civil rights litigation, they do not warrant denial of all costs in this case. Overall, the plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that costs should not be awarded in this case under the factors listed in Association of Mexican-American Educators, 231 F.3d at 593, and the court finds that the reasons for denying costs are not sufficiently persuasive to overcome the presumption in favor of an award. Accordingly, the court will proceed to examine the plaintiffs' specific challenges to certain items on defendant's Bill of Costs. Service of Subpoenas The Plaintiffs challenge defendant's taxation of costs for $2,517.25 in fees for 17 subpoenas served by private process servers, claiming that the costs should be disallowed because the defendant did not state why these subpoenas were necessary and did not provide enough detail to justify the amounts charged. In response, the defendant states that the subpoenas were required to obtain the service records for the plaintiffs' vehicles which were at issue in this case. Here, the defendant has not shown why the amounts billed for each subpoena range from $114 to $175, as there is no itemization of hourly rates or expenses. Rather, the invoices listed for each subpoena list only the total amount billed for each subpoena. Because of the lack of greater detail as to these costs, the court will award $65 in costs per subpoena, equal to the amount charged by the Marshals Service for one hour of work for service of process by one Marshal for each of the 17 subpoenas, for a total of $1,105. Transcripts and Related Costs The Plaintiffs next object to awarding costs for the deposition transcripts of several witnesses who did not testify at trial. Whether a transcript or deposition is necessary' must be determined in light of the facts known at the time the expense was incurred. Here, taking depositions of the former named plaintiffs, the plaintiffs' family members, and Ford employees was reasonable at the time the depositions were taken because they were all potential witnesses at trial, even though these depositions were not ultimately used during trial. Accordingly, the court will award for transcripts and related expenses, including video depositions - Total: $42,704.54. The Plaintiffs next challenge the defendant's request for costs of transcripts for the court's hearings on the defendant's renewed summary judgment ($199.75), the hearing on the plaintiffs' class certification and the defendant's motion for sanctions ($193.60), and two other pre-trial hearings ($85.00 and $218.25), which the defendant states was necessarily used in preparing jury instructions and its trial brief. Upon review of the requested costs and the defendant's supporting materials, the court agrees that these costs were reasonably incurred in preparing the defendant's proposed jury instructions and trial brief, and will award the costs of $696.60 for these hearing transcripts. The Plaintiffs next object to the defendant's request for costs for trial transcripts in the amount of $10,158.80. While the defendant represents that the daily trial transcripts were necessarily used for preparing its motion for judgment as a matter of law, preparing its motion for decertification, and answering jury questions, the court notes that these motions were filed before the jury rendered a verdict, and that the defendant has not explained why any trial transcripts were necessary to answer any questions from the jury. The court therefore declines to award defendant costs for trial transcripts. Witness Fees The Plaintiffs next object to defendant's requested costs for witness fees, which include attendance fees, mileage, tolls, car rental fees, lodging, subsistence (or meals), parking, and airfare at depositions and trial. The Plaintiffs do not argue that costs are not allowed for these types of expenses, with the exception of car rental fees, but contend that the defendant's witness expenses are not properly documented or exceed the amounts permitted under 28 U.S.C. Sections 1821 and 1920(3). The court also finds that the defendant has properly documented its costs for trial attendance of witnesses Paul Taylor, Donald Tandy, Thomas Giapponi, Bruce Strombom, and Robert Pascarella, with the exception of Tandy's subsistence. However, the plaintiffs argue, and the defendant does not dispute, that the applicable GSA hotel rate for Sacramento during trial is $128 per day, and that the daily hotel rates charged for most of these witnesses exceeded $128. Thus, the court will reduce the amounts charged accordingly, and allow trial attendance costs in the amount of $178.30 for Taylor's hotel, $324.10 for Tandy's hotel, $316.60 for Giapponi's hotel, $229.86 for Strombom's hotel and subsistence, and $451.22 for Pascarella's hotel and subsistence. The court will also allow $40 per day for each day each witness testified, and will allow the requested amounts for mileage, tolls, taxis, and parking not included in the hotel expenses above. However, the court declines to allow costs for Tandy's subsistence due to failure to document when he incurred the associated charges for meals. Having reduced the costs for certain requests for witnesses' hotel stays, airfare, car rental, and subsistence, the court will award witness costs for depositions and trial -- in the total amount of $ 6,129.57. Exemplification and Photocopy Costs The Plaintiffs object to the defendant's request for photocopy costs for courtesy copies of the defendant's motions in limine to exclude the testimony of Thomas Lepper and Andrew Webb ($644), the defendant's Reply in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment ($199), and the defendant's Pretrial Statement ($133.50). These copies were necessarily obtained by the defendant given the court's rules requiring courtesy copies, including Local Rule 133(f). Moreover, the plaintiffs have not provided any authority, and the court is unaware of any, providing that costs are not recoverable in connection with a motion where the party seeking costs was a prevailing party under Rule 54(d)(1) but did not prevail on that particular motion. Under the circumstances, the costs billed are reasonable, and the court will award $976.50 for courtesy copies. In total, costs of 74,551.48 will be allowed for the defendant and are taxed against plaintiffs Margie Daniel, Robert McCabe, Mary Hauser, Donna Glass, and Andrea Duarte, calculated as follows: Subpoenas $1,105.00 Deposition and Related Costs $42,704.54 Hearing Transcripts $696.60 Witness Fees $6,129.57 Courtesy Copies $976.50 Models and Animation $16,093.94 Trial Binders $6,845.33 TOTAL AWARD $74,551.48 A full-text copy of the District Court's April 26, 2018 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yc4mzf3p from Leagle.com. Margie Daniel, Robert McCabe, Mary Hauser, Donna Glass & Andrea Duarte, Plaintiffs, represented by John B. Thomas -- jthomas@hicks-thomas.com -- Hicks Thomas, LLP, Joseph Henry Bates, III -- hbates@cbplaw.com -- Carney Bates & Pulliam, PLLC, Kelsey McDowell Machado, Hicks Thomas LLP, pro hac vice, Tiffany W. Oldham -- toldham@cbplaw.com -- Carney Bates & Pulliam, PLLC, pro hac vice & James Allen Carney, Carney Bates & Pulliam, PLLC, pro hac vice. Ford Motor Company, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant, represented by David M. George, Dykema, pro hac vice, Fred J. Fresard -- ffresard@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett, PLLC, pro hac vice, James P. Feeney -- jfeeney@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLC, Tamara A. Bush -- tbush@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett LLP, Brittany J. Mouzourakis -- bmouzourakis@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLC, pro hac vice, Janet L. Conigliaro -- jconigliaro@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett, John Mark Thomas -- jthomas@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLC, Krista L. Lenart -- klenart@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLC, pro hac vice & Norman C. Hile -- nhile@orrick.com -- Orrick Herrington and Sutcliffe LLP. FORD MOTOR: Goodroad et al. Sue over Defeat Devices in Trucks ------------------------------------------------------------- GLENN GOODROAD, JR., RICHARD CASTRO, ALAN FLANDERS, EDWARD HATTEN, MICHAEL KING, WILLIAM MCKNIGHT, LUTHER "ED" PALMER, DON RECKER, IVAN TELLEZ, BRIAN URBAN AND CHRISTINA BOUYEA, VALUE ADDITIVES LLC, AND MICHAEL WILSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, the Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, JAMES HACKETT, MARK FIELDS, ROBERT BOSCH GMBH, ROBERT BOSCH LLC, and VOLKMAR DENNER, the Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv- 11900-BAF-SDD (N.D. Cal., June 15, 2018), seeks to enjoin Defendants from continuing unlawful, deceptive, fraudulent, and unfair business practices involving promotion, sale, and leasing of trucks equipped with 6.7-liter Power Stroke diesel engines. Ford markets and sells these vehicles as fuel-efficient, reliable, with best-in-class performance and significantly reduced emissions -- a cleaner alternative to the high-polluting diesels of old. But these diesels are dirty. Like the well-known Volkswagen "Clean Diesel" vehicles, Ford equips these trucks with an illegal software algorithm -- a "defeat device" -- designed to cheat federal and state emission testing for oxides of nitrogen (NOX), thereby deceptively inducing regulators to certify for sale hundreds of thousands of non-compliant vehicles, and hundreds of thousands of consumers to buy or lease dirty diesels, thinking they are clean and emissions compliant. The Ford Motor Company is an American multinational automaker headquartered in Dearborn, Michigan, a suburb of Detroit. It was founded by Henry Ford and incorporated on June 16, 1903.[BN]. The Plaintiffs are represented by: Lynn Lincoln Sarko, Esq. Juli Farris, Esq. KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P. 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200 Seattle, WA 98101 Telephone: (206) 623 1900 Facsimile: (206) 623 3384 E-mail: lsarko@kellerrohrback.com jfarris@kellerrohrback.com - and - Elizabeth Cabraser, Esq. LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN LLP 275 Battery Street, 29th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111-3339 Telephone: (415) 956 1000 Facsimile: (415) 956 1008 E-mail: ecabraser@lchb.com - and - David S. Stellings, Esq. LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN LLP 250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor New York, NY 10013 Telephone: (212) 355 9500 Facsimile: (212) 355 9592 E-mail: dstellings@lchb.com GAINESVILLE LODGE: Faces "Quarterman" Suit in N.D. Florida ---------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Gainesville Lodge, LLC. The case is styled as Lanie Quarterman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Gainesville Lodge, LLC, a Florida limited liability company, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-00120-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla., June 27, 2018). Gainesville Lodge, LLC is a 2-star hotel.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: JESSICA LYNN KERR, Esq. 200 SE 6TH STREET, SUITE 504 FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 33301 Tel: (954) 282-1858 Fax: (844) 786-3694 Email: service@advocacypa.com GEO GROUP: Court Won't Dismiss "Chen" Minimum Wage Suit ------------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Tacoma, denied Defendant The GEO Group Inc.'s Motion for Order of Dismissal Based on Plaintiff's Failure to Join Required Government Parties in the case captioned CHAO CHEN, Plaintiff, v. THE GEO GROUP INC., Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv- 05769-RJB (W.D. Wash.). GEO operates the Northwest Detention Center (NWDC), a 1,500-bed detention facility, since 2005, based on a contract with ICE (GEO-ICE Contract). GEO takes care of immigration detainees awaiting resolution of immigration matters and relies on detainees for a wide range of services under the Voluntary Work Program (VWP) required by the contract. GEO compensates detainees at $1 per day. The Plaintiff initiated this action under the theory that the GEO-ICE Contract at least allows for, if not requires, GEO to compensate detainees working in the VWP at least the minimum wage required by with the State Minimum Wage Act (MWA). Joinder is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, a rule that imposes a three-step inquiry: 1. Is the absent party necessary under Rule 19(a)? 2. If so, is it feasible to order joinder of the absent party? 3. If joinder is not feasible, is the party indispensable under Rule 19(b) such that in equity and good conscience the suit can proceed short of dismissal? Is ICE a necessary party under Rule 19(a)? Rule 19(a)(1) provides: "(1) Required Party. A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if: (A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or (B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person's absence may:(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest; or(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest." The Defendant argues that complete relief cannot be obtained among existing parties because the day rate of $1 is fixed by ICE and cannot be adjusted without ICE's consent. To bolster its conclusion, the Defendant cites two provisions of the GEO-ICE Contract, an opinion letter by the Department of Defense, and 8 U.S.C. Section 1555(d). Next, the Defendant relies on a 1992 opinion letter issued by the General Counsel to the Department of Defense on the issue of whether aliens may perform general labor at the Naval Air Facility, so long as performance is voluntary not unduly hazardous, and the aliens remain in DHS custody. Finally, the Defendant cites 8 U.S.C. Section 1555(d), which provides that congressional appropriations for immigration service expenses shall be available for payment of payment of allowances (at such a rate as may be specified from time to time in the appropriation Act involved) to aliens, while held in custody for work performed. In this case, at least arguably, no such 'rock and a hard place' exists, because the Plaintiff's theory points to the likelihood of harmony between GEO's contractual obligation and complying with the MWA, the Court notes. Under the Plaintiff's theory, the plausibility of which the Court previously addressed, whether detainees are employees is a fact-driven question informed by whether GEO acts like an employer under the MWA. For the same reason Dawavendewa can be distinguished, GEO's reliance on E.E.O.C. v. Peabody Western Coal Co., 400 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2005), fails. In this case, at least arguably, no such impossible predicament precludes complete relief among existing parties exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i) and (ii) The Court finds that ICE does not have a legally protected interest in this case. At least as of March 7, 2018, when members of Congress sent a letter to ICE, ICE has had general knowledge of the litigation. Furthermore, by contract, GEO is apparently required to notify ICE of this case within five days of its filing. It is undisputed that ICE has not appeared in this case, the related class action case, or any similar cases. ICE has not asserted any interest in the case. Defendant has speculated that an increase in detainee wages could result in a contract modification regarding reimbursement from ICE to GEO. Because ICE does not have an interest in the case, it is not a necessary party under either subsection (i) or (ii) of Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B). In sum, the Court finds that ICE is not a necessary party under Rule 19(a). Is it feasible to join ICE? Federal agencies are protected from suit, except where Congress has spoken. According to the Defendant, Congress has not waived the federal agency's sovereign immunity and ICE has not itself consented to be sued. The Plaintiff has not made any showing to the contrary, where it argues, by incorporating a footnote, only that the doctrine of sovereign immunity would not preclude GEO from impleading DHS/ICE as a third party for purposes of "declaratory and injunctive relief" when challenging a final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act. The footnote does not address the feasibility of joinder as to all claims here. The Court assumes that it is not feasible to join ICE. Is ICE an indispensable party under Rule 19(b)? A party is indispensable for Rule 19(b) purposes if the action should proceed in equity and good conscience, considering the following non-exhaustive factors: "The extent to which a judgment rendered in the person's absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties. The extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by: (A) protective provisions in the judgment; (B) shaping the relief; or (C) other measures." Whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence would be adequate; and Whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder. The first factor, prejudice, weighs heavily in favor of the Plaintiff. ICE suffers no more prejudice as an absent party than if it participates. The Plaintiff does not seek relief from ICE, and, assuming an outcome in favor of the Plaintiff, the GEO-ICE Contract will remain intact. ICE is fully capable of protecting itself. The prejudice to the Defendant is no more than if ICE participates. The next factor, lessening prejudice with mitigating measures, favors neither party because there is no prejudice to ICE, and, as GEO acknowledges, there are no mitigating measures available. The final two factors favor the Plaintiff. Again, assuming the Plaintiff's theory of the case prevails, the Plaintiff will have obtained its remedy with the GEO-ICE Contract unchanged and without prejudice to ICE. On the other hand, if the case were dismissed for the failure to join ICE, the Plaintiff would be left without a legal remedy. Equity and good conscience, in light of these four factors, weigh in favor of the case proceeding, rather than its dismissal. ICE is not an indispensable party under Rule 19(b). ICE is not a necessary or an indispensable party under Rule 19. Dismissal for non-joinder is not warranted. Accordingly, the Defendant's motion should be denied. A full-text copy of the District Court's April 26, 2018 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybgqx4ax from Leagle.com. Chao Chen, individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adam J. Berger -- berger@sgb- law.com -- SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER, Devin T. Theriot-Orr, SUNBIRD LAW PLLC, Jamal N. Whitehead, SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER, Lindsay Halm, SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER, & R. Andrew Free -- andrew@immigrantcivilrights.com -- LAW OFFICE OF R. ANDREW FREE, pro hac vice. The GEO Group Inc, a Florida corporation, Defendant, represented by Joan K. Mell, III BRANCHES LAW PLLC, Andrea D'Ambra -- andrea.dambra@nortonrosefulbright.com -- NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP, pro hac vice, Charles A. Deacon -- charlie.deacon@nortonrosefulbright.com -- NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP, pro hac vice & Mark Emery -- mark.emery@nortonrosefulbright.com -- NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP, pro hac vice. The GEO Group Inc, a Florida corporation, Counter Claimant, represented by Joan K. Mell, III BRANCHES LAW PLLC, Andrea D'Ambra, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP, pro hac vice,Charles A. Deacon, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP, pro hac vice & Mark Emery, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP, pro hac vice. GLOBAL CREDIT: Seeks Approval of Settlement in "Williams" Suit -------------------------------------------------------------- The parties in the lawsuit captioned SAMUEL WILLIAMS, pleading on his own behalf and on behalf of all other similarly situated consumers v. GLOBAL CREDIT & COLLECTIONS; VELOCITY INVESTMENTS, LLC, Case No. 1:17-cv-03323 (N.D. Ill.), file with the Court their renewed joint motion for an order conditionally certifying class and granting preliminary approval of class settlement agreement. The class consists of: All persons in the State of Pennsylvania who were sent collection letters and/or notices from GCC on a debt owed to Velocity that was beyond the statute of limitations, wherein Defendant made a settlement offer on said debt without disclosing the debt was beyond the statute of limitations, during a period beginning May 2, 2016 through June 9, 2017. The Plaintiff filed this class action lawsuit pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, which alleges GCC violated the FDCPA by sending consumers written collection communications which offered settlements of debts without disclosing the debt was beyond the statute of limitations and thereby implying that the debt was legally enforceable. A copy of the Renewed Joint Motion is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=Rs2KBXkG The Plaintiff is represented by: Daniel Zemel, Esq. Elizabeth Apostola, Esq. ZEMEL LAW, LLC 1373 Broad St., Suite 203-C Clifton, NJ 07013 Telephone: (862) 227-3106 E-mail: dz@zemellawllc.com ea@zemellawllc.com - and - Brian W. Ledebuhr, Esq. VEDDER PRICE 222 North LaSalle Street, Suite 2300 Chicago, IL 60601 Telephone: (312) 609-7845 E-mail: bledebuhr@vedderprice.com GOLDEN TOUCH: Faces "Fischler" Suit in E.D. New York ---------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Golden Touch Transportation of NY, Inc. The case is styled as Brian Fischler, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Golden Touch Transportation of NY, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03731 (E.D. N.Y., June 27, 2018). Golden Touch Transportation of NY, Inc. offers ground transportation services in the metropolitan New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut areas.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq. Lipsky Lowe LLP 630 Third Avenue New York, NY 10017 Tel: (212) 392-4772 Fax: (212) 444-1030 Email: chris@lipskylowe.com GREEN ISLAND: Faces "Crosson" Suit in E.D. New York --------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Green Island Associates. The case is styled as Aretha Crosson, individually and as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Green Island Associates doing business as: The Sagamore and Ocean Properties, Ltd., Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-03689 (E.D. N.Y., June 26, 2018). Ocean Properties Hotels Resorts & Affiliates is one of North America's largest hotel management and development companies.[BN] The Plaintiff appears PRO SE. GREENBROOK SPORTS: Rivero Sues over Robocalls --------------------------------------------- MARIO RIVERO, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. GREENBROOK SPORTS & FITNESS, LLC d/b/a CRUNCH FITNESS f/k/a ECLIPSE FITNESS, a New Jersey corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-10329-BRM-LHG (D.N.J., June 8, 2018), seeks to recover damages, injunctive relief, and any other available legal or equitable remedies, resulting from the illegal action of Defendant, in negligently and/or willfully using an automatic telephone dialing system to call Plaintiff on Plaintiff's cellular telephone, without Plaintiff's express consent, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Greenbrook is in the physical fitness clubs with training equipment business.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Ross H. Schmierer, Esq. DeNITTIS OSEFCHEN PRINCE, P.C. 525 Route 73 North, Suite 410 Marlton, NJ 08053 Telephone: (856) 797 9951 E-mail: rschmierer@denittislaw.com - and - Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq. HIRALDO P.A. 401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1400 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Telephone: (954) 400 4713 E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com HERITAGE ONE: Faces "Solorzano" Suit in California Superior Court ----------------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Heritage One Door and Carpentry LLC. The lawsuit is captioned as JR Solorzano, on behalf of himself all others similarly situated and on behalf of the general public, the Plaintiff, v. Does 1-100 and Heritage One Door and Carpentry LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 34-2018- 00234479-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct., June 8, 2018).[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: William Turley, Esq. THE TURLEY & MARA LAW FIRM, APLC 7428 Trade St. San Diego, CA 92121 Telephone: (619) 234 2833 E-mail: bturley@turleylawfirm.com HOSPITALITY STAFFING: "Arguelles" Suit Moved to E.D. California --------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit titled Brenda Arguelles, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated current and former employees of Defendants, the Plaintiff, v. Hospitality Staffing Solutions, LLC, and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-01885, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California - (Sacramento) on June 15, 2018. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:18-cv-01729-WBS-EFB to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge William B. Shubb. Hospitality Staffing Solutions is the largest staffing agency focused on hospitality staffing nationwide.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Douglas Walter Perlman, Esq. Farzad Rastegar, Esq. RASTEGAR LAW GROUP, APC 22760 Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 200 Torrance, CA 90505 Telephone: (310) 961 9600 E-mail: douglas@rastegarlawgroup.com farzad@rastegarlawgroup.com Attorneys for Hospitality Staffing Solutions, LLC: Lisa Mireille Bowman, Esq. OGLETREE DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C. Steuart Tower, One Market Plaza, Suite 1300 San Francisco, CA 94105 Telephone: (415) 369 3555 Facsimile: (415) 442 4870 E-mail: lisa.bowman@ogletreedeakins.com IDAHO, USA: Wolf Moves for Certification of IDOC Prisoners Class ---------------------------------------------------------------- The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled ANDREW J.J. WOLF, and those similarly situated v. IDAHO STATE BOARD OF CORRECTION, et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-00264-DCN (D. Idaho), moves for certification of class of all IDOC Prisoners. Mr. Wolf has brought before the Court a Verified Class Action Civil Rights Complaint setting for violations under the Religious Land Use Institutionalized Persons Act and civil rights concerning the Defendants' alleged actions of denying him and the class their right to use open flame, such as incense and candles, indoors at their religious services. The Plaintiff, of Boise, Idaho, appears pro se. A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=hxrdyqzi INTEL CORPORATION: Alvira Sues over Share Price Drop ---------------------------------------------------- ELVIS ALVIRA, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. INTEL CORPORATION, BRIAN M. KRZANICH, and ROBERT H. SWAN, the Defendants, Case No. 4:18-cv-03416-YGR (C.D. Cal., June 8, 2018), seeks to recover compensable damages caused by Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The case is a federal securities class action on behalf of a class consisting of all persons and entities other than Defendants who purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly traded securities of Intel between July 27, 2017 and January 4, 2018, both dates inclusive. According to the complaint, on January 3, 2018, Reuters published an article titled, "Security flaws put virtually all phones, computers at risk." On this news, shares of Intel fell $1.59 per share, or over 3.5%, from its previous closing price to close at $45.26 per share on January 3, 2018, damaging investors. Then, on January 4, 2018, news outlets reported that Intel's CEO, the Defendant Krzanich, sold millions of dollars worth of shares after Intel was informed of vulnerabilities in its semiconductors but before it was publicly disclosed. Defendant Krzanich sold about half his stock months after he learned about critical flaws in billions of Intel's microchips, but before it was publicly disclosed, and now holds only the minimum number of shares he's required to own. On this news, shares of Intel fell $0.83 per share from its previous closing price to close at $44.43 per share on January 4, 2018, damaging investors. As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered significant losses and damages. Intel Corporation is an American multinational corporation and technology company headquartered in Santa Clara, California, in the Silicon Valley.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Laurence M. Rosen, Esq. THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A. 355 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 2450 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Telephone: (213) 785 2610 Facsimile: (213) 226 4684 E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com INTERINSURANCE EXCHANGE: Dismissal Ruling in "Foster" Affirmed -------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, MARGARET CAROL FOSTER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. INTERINSURANCE EXCHANGE OF THE AUTOMOBILE CLUB, Defendant and Respondent, Case No. B278723 (Cal. App.), Judge Helen I. Bendix of the Court of Appeals of California for the Second District, Division One, affirmed the judgment of dismissal after the trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend to Foster's causes of action against the Defendant. On Oct. 21, 2011, the Plaintiff was driving her 2006 BMW 750Li on the 405 freeway. While completely stopped in traffic, her car was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by Austin B., then a minor. The Plaintiff's vehicle was thrust forward into the vehicle ahead of her, which in turn was pushed into the vehicle ahead of it. The Plaintiff's car sustained substantial damage. The Plaintiff's car was insured under a policy issued by defendant. Part III of the policy covered physical damage, including comprehensive and collision coverage. The Plaintiff filed a claim with the Defendant requesting the full cash value of her car at the time of the accident, which was $31,342. The Defendant represented that it would not declare the car a total loss and would instead repair it. The car was repaired at a cost of $22,602.81. The Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, Austin B. and his parents. In her third amended complaint ("TAC"), the operative complaint in the appeal, she asserted combined individual and class action claims challenging the Defendant's option to repair damaged vehicles rather than pay for the loss of their preaccident value. She claimed that it was Defendant's policy, practice and procedure to refuse to declare vehicles total losses when it was not to the Defendant's economic advantage to do so, without regard to the interests of its policyholders or the terms of its insurance contracts. The Plaintiff's first cause of action was against Austin B. and his parents for negligence. Her second cause of action, asserted both individually and on behalf of a putative class, was against the Defendant for breach of contract, damages, and declaratory relief based on its wrongfully refusing to replace vehicles. His third cause of action was brought on behalf of a putative class seeking declarative and injunctive relief against defendant based on illegal policy provisions and related practices in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 through 17210. His fourth cause of action, asserted both individually and on behalf of a putative class, was against the Defendant for entering into a purportedly unlawful subrogation agreement with Austin B.'s parents' insurer. He claimed damages of $31,969, as well as taxes, registration, interest, attorney fees, and costs, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Defendant demurred to the second, third, and fourth causes of action. As to the second cause of action for breach of contract, it argued that appellate courts have enforced contract language allowing insurers to choose to repair rather than replace a vehicle, and have rejected the argument that this choice breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As to the third cause of action for violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., the Defendant argued that prior cases have held that excluding coverage for diminution in value was neither unlawful nor unfair, and the Plaintiff failed to allege fraud sufficiently. As to the fourth cause of action concerning the subrogation agreement, it argued that the Plaintiff did not have standing to assert it. Following the filing of the demurrer, the Plaintiff filed a fourth amended complaint, which the trial court struck for failure to seek leave to file. She then filed her opposition to the demurrer, arguing application of the coverage exclusion for diminution of value was both a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and an unfair business practice given Defendant's (1) advertising and the language in the policy; (2) its alleged knowledge that cars cannot be fully repaired if severely damaged; and (3) the Defendant's unilateral decision making as to whether to repair or replace a damaged vehicle. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, ruling that an insurer's decision to repair rather than replace a vehicle did not breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing citing Baldwin and Carson v. Mercury Insurance Co. The court sustained the demurrer to the fourth cause of action based on the Plaintiff's lack of standing and failure to address that cause in her opposition to the demurrer. It denied leave to amend, finding as to the second and fourth causes of action that the Plaintiff had failed to state in her opposition how she would cure the defects in the TAC. The court also denied leave to amend the third cause of action, but did not expressly state its reasons for the denial. The court entered judgment in favor of the Defendant. The Plaintiff timely appealed. On appeal, the Plaintiff challenges the court's order sustaining the demurrer as to the second and third causes of action only. Judge Bendix holds that the demurrer was properly sustained. She finds that the insurance policy expressly excluded coverage for diminution of value, and the Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to support damages on another basis. The Plaintiff does not explain how CACI No. 3903J applies other than to say the damages claim for loss of value of automobiles are conceptually the same under tort and contract. The Plaintiff also states that the Defendant promised "full coverage," but this does not appear to be alleged in the TAC, and she does not identify where in the policy or any other document this language appears. The Judge state that the Defendant's exercise of discretion as alleged did not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because it was permitted under the contract and within the parties' reasonable expectations. The Judge disagrees with the Plaintiff's claims that she adequately stated a claim that the Defendant's insurance policies and related practices violated the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"). She stated that the Plaintiff has failed to establish that the Defendant's insurance policy and related practices violated the Insurance Code or public policy. The Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to state a claim for fraud or false advertising under the UC. Given the Plaintiff's lack of showing how she might amend the TAC to properly state a cause of action after several rounds of pleading, the Judge cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend. For these reasons, Judge Bendix affirmed the judgment. The Defendant is awarded its costs on appeal. A full-text copy of the Court's April 27, 2018 Opinion is available at https://is.gd/QK37Ul from Leagle.com. Derek G. Howard Law Firm, Derek G. Howard -- derek@derekhowardlaw.com; Jenkins Mulligan & Gabriel, Daniel J. Mulligan -- dan@jmglawoffices.com; and Day Law Offices, Montie S. Day -- msdayesq@aol.com -- for Plaintiff and Appellant. Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Raul L. Martinez -- Raul.Martinez@lewisbrisbois.com -- Jon P. Kardassakis -- Jon.Kardassakis@lewisbrisbois.com -- and Celia Moutes-Lee -- elia.Moutes-Lee@lewisbrisbois.com -- for Defendant and Respondent. IT COSMETICS: Faces "Kiler" Suit in E.D. New York ------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against IT Cosmetics, LLC. The case is styled as Marion Kiler, individually and as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. IT Cosmetics, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03663 (E.D. N.Y., June 25, 2018). IT Cosmetics, LLC manufactures skincare and makeup products. It offers its products online, as well as through its stores in the United States. The company was founded in 2008 and is based in Jersey City, New Jersey. As of August 31, 2016, It Cosmetics, LLC operates as a subsidiary of L'Oreal SA.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Dan Shaked, Esq. Shaked Law Group, P.C. 44 Court Street, Suite 1217 Brooklyn, NY 11217 Tel: (917) 373-9128 Fax: (718) 504-7555 Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com JACK BLACK LLC: Faces "Fischler" Suit in E.D. New York ------------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against Jack Black, L.L.C. The case is styled as Brian Fischler, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Jack Black, L.L.C., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03657 (E.D. N.Y., June 25, 2018). Jack Black, L.L.C. manufactures men skin care products. The Company offers shaving creams, moisturizers, deodorant, shampoos, conditioner, cleansers, and anti-aging products. Jack Black serves clients in the State of Texas.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq. Lipsky Lowe LLP 630 Third Avenue New York, NY 10017 Tel: (212) 392-4772 Fax: (212) 444-1030 Email: chris@lipskylowe.com JACKSON COUNTY, MO: Prado Moves to Certify Class of Detainees ------------------------------------------------------------- The Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order certifying the action titled Saili Prado, et al. v. Jackson County, Missouri, Case No. 4:17-cv-00506-BP (W.D. Mo.), as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The case concerns the alleged unconstitutional conditions that pretrial detainees and inmates were subjected to during their time in custody at the Jackson County Detention Center. The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint them as class representatives and to appoint their counsel as class counsel. The Plaintiffs further ask the Court to order class notice be proposed, approved and distributed to class members. A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=yc5Yt7PH The Plaintiffs are represented by: John F. Edgar, Esq. Dylan M. Long, Esq. EDGAR LAW FIRM LLC 1032 Pennsylvania Ave. Kansas City, MO 64105 Telephone: (816) 531-0033 Facsimile: (816) 531-3322 E-mail: jfe@edgarlawfirm.com dml@edgarlawfirm.com - and - David R. Smith, Esq. SMITH LAWRENCE One Park Place 700 W. 31st Street, Suite 408 Kansas City, MO 64108 Telephone: (816) 753-9393 Facsimile: (816) 778-0957 E-mail: david@smithlawrence.com - and - Michael T. Yonke, Esq. YONKE LAW, LLC The Harzfeld Building 1111 Main Street, Suite 700 Kansas City, MO 64105 Telephone: (816) 221-6400 Facsimile: (816) 888-5188 E-mail: myonke@yonke-law.com KEITH D. WEINER: Faces "Clark" Suit in E.D. Wisconsin ----------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Keith D. Weiner & Associates, CO., L.P.A. The case is styled as Kevin A. Clark, individually on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Keith D. Weiner & Associates, CO., L.P.A., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-00973-WCG (E.D. Wis., June 26, 2018). Keith D. Weiner & Associates, CO., L.P.A. is a Bankruptcy attorney in Cleveland, Ohio.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Philip D Stern, Esq. Stern Thomasson LLP 150 Morris Ave-2nd Fl Springfield, NJ 07081 Tel: (973) 379-7500 Fax: (973) 532-5868 Email: philip@sternthomasson.com - and - Andrew T Thomasson, Esq. Stern Thomasson LLP 150 Morris Ave-2nd Fl Springfield, NJ 07081 Tel: (973) 379-7500 Fax: (973) 532-5868 Email: andrew@sternthomasson.com KONG TECHNOLOGIES: Dean's Claims v. Apple in "Opperman" Dismissed ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, MARC OPPERMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. KONG TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 13-CV-00453-JST (N.D. Cal.), Judge Jon S. Tigar of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, entered Plaintiff Stephen Dean and Apple, Inc.'s stipulated order dismissing with prejudice specified claims against Apple. Dean and Apple stipulated that the Plaintiff's claims against Apple, excepting only those claims for aiding and abetting invasion of privacy that were the subject of the Class Action Settlement Agreement and that were released by operation of that Class Action Settlement Agreement upon its final approval and entry of judgment by the Court, will be dismissed with prejudice, each side to bear its own costs and attorneys' fees, pursuant to FRCP 41. Without limitation of the foregoing and for the avoidance of doubt, the dismissal includes Counts Three, Four, Five and Six of the Second Consolidated Amended Complaint. A full-text copy of the Court's April 27, 2018 Order is available at https://is.gd/gZVjs2 from Leagle.com. Marc Opperman, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Given -- dmg@phillaw.com -- Phillips Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP, Jeffrey Scott Edwards, Edwards Law, pro hac vice, Nicholas A. Carlin -- nac@phillaw.com -- Phillips Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP, Brian Samuel Clayton Conlon -- bsc@phillaw.com -- Phillips, Erlewine, Given & Carlin LLP, Carl F. Schwenker, Law Offices of Carl F. Schwenker, pro hac vice, Dirk M. Jordan -- dirk@dirkjordan.com -- Frank H. Busch -- busch@kerrwagstaffe.com -- Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, Ivo Michael Labar -- labar@kerrwagstaffe.com -- Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, James Matthew Wagstaffe -- wagstaffe@kerrwagstaffe.com -- Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP & Michael John von Loewenfeldt -- mvl@kerrwagstaffe.com -- Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP. Judy Long, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Given, Phillips Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP, Jeffrey Scott Edwards, Edwards Law, pro hac vice, Nicholas A. Carlin, Phillips Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP, Brian Samuel Clayton Conlon, Phillips, Erlewine, Given & Carlin LLP, Carl F. Schwenker, Law Offices of Carl F. Schwenker, pro hac vice, Dirk M. Jordan, Frank H. Busch, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP & Michael John von Loewenfeldt, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP. Claire Moses, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Given, Phillips Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP, Jeffrey Scott Edwards, Edwards Law, pro hac vice, Nicholas A. Carlin, Phillips Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP, Brian Samuel Clayton Conlon, Phillips, Erlewine, Given & Carlin LLP, Carl F. Schwenker, Law Offices of Carl F. Schwenker, pro hac vice, Daniel Jack Veroff, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, Dirk M. Jordan, Frank H. Busch, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, Ivo Michael Labar, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, James Matthew Wagstaffe, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP & Michael John von Loewenfeldt, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP. Gentry Hoffman, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Given, Phillips Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP, Jeffrey Scott Edwards, Edwards Law, pro hac vice, Nicholas A. Carlin, Phillips Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP, Brian Samuel Clayton Conlon, Phillips, Erlewine, Given & Carlin LLP, Carl F. Schwenker, Law Offices of Carl F. Schwenker, pro hac vice, Daniel Jack Veroff, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, Dirk M. Jordan, Frank H. Busch, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, Ivo Michael Labar, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, James Matthew Wagstaffe, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP & Michael John von Loewenfeldt, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP. Steve Dean, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Given, Phillips Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP, Jeffrey Scott Edwards, Edwards Law, pro hac vice, Nicholas A. Carlin, Phillips Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP, Brian Samuel Clayton Conlon, Phillips, Erlewine, Given & Carlin LLP, Carl F. Schwenker, Law Offices of Carl F. Schwenker, pro hac vice, Daniel Jack Veroff, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, Dirk M. Jordan, Frank H. Busch, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, Ivo Michael Labar, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, James Matthew Wagstaffe, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP & Michael John von Loewenfeldt, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP. Alicia Medlock, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Given, Phillips Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP, Jeffrey Scott Edwards, Edwards Law, pro hac vice, Nicholas A. Carlin, Phillips Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP, Brian Samuel Clayton Conlon, Phillips, Erlewine, Given & Carlin LLP, Carl F. Schwenker, Law Offices of Carl F. Schwenker, pro hac vice, Dirk M. Jordan, Frank H. Busch, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP & Michael John von Loewenfeldt, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP. Alan Beueshasen, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Given, Phillips Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP, Jeffrey Scott Edwards, Edwards Law, pro hac vice, Nicholas A. Carlin, Phillips Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP, Brian Samuel Clayton Conlon, Phillips, Erlewine, Given & Carlin LLP, Carl F. Schwenker, Law Offices of Carl F. Schwenker, pro hac vice, Daniel Jack Veroff, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, Dirk M. Jordan, Frank H. Busch, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, Ivo Michael Labar, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, James Matthew Wagstaffe, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP & Michael John von Loewenfeldt, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP. Scott Medlock, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Given, Phillips Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP, Jeffrey Scott Edwards, Edwards Law, pro hac vice, Nicholas A. Carlin, Phillips Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP, Brian Samuel Clayton Conlon, Phillips, Erlewine, Given & Carlin LLP, Carl F. Schwenker, Law Offices of Carl F. Schwenker, pro hac vice, Dirk M. Jordan, Frank H. Busch, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP & Michael John von Loewenfeldt, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP. Greg Varner, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Given, Phillips Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP, Jeffrey Scott Edwards, Edwards Law, pro hac vice, Nicholas A. Carlin, Phillips Erlewine Given & Carlin LLP, Brian Samuel Clayton Conlon, Phillips, Erlewine, Given & Carlin LLP, Carl F. Schwenker, Law Offices of Carl F. Schwenker, pro hac vice, Daniel Jack Veroff, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, Dirk M. Jordan, Frank H. Busch, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, Ivo Michael Labar, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, James Matthew Wagstaffe, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP & Michael John von Loewenfeldt, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP. Kong Technologies, Inc., Defendant, represented by Gregory J. Casas -- casasg@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Jedediah Wakefield, Fenwick & West LLP, Claudia Maria Vetesi -- cvetesi@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP, Harmeet K. Dhillon - - harmeet@dhillonlaw.com -- Dhillon Law Group Inc., James G. Snell, Perkins Coie LLP, Mazda Kersey Antia, Cooley LLP, Michael Henry Page -- mpage@durietangri.com -- Durie Tangri LLP & Tyler Griffin Newby -- tnewby@fenwick.com -- Fenwick & West LLP. Twitter, Inc., Defendant, represented by James G. Snell, Perkins Coie LLP, Lauren Beth Cohen, Perkins Coie LLP, Timothy L. Alger, Greenberg Traurig LLP, Claudia Maria Vetesi, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Harmeet K. Dhillon, Dhillon Law Group Inc., John Randall Tyler, Perkins Coie LLP, Julie Erin Schwartz, Perkins Coie LLP, Mazda Kersey Antia, Cooley LLP, Michael Henry Page, Durie Tangri LLP, Ryan T. Mrazik, Perkins Coie LLP, pro hac vice & Tyler Griffin Newby, Fenwick & West LLP. Apple Inc, Defendant, represented by Alan D. Albright -- alan.albright@bracewell.com -- Gray Cary Ware & Freidenrich LLP, Clayton Cole James -- clay.james@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP, Jessica Adler Black Livingston -- jessica.livingston@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice, Jessica S. Ou, Gibson Dunn, Robert B. Hawk -- robert.hawk@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP & Stacy R. Hovan -- stacy.hovan@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP. Yelp! Inc., Defendant, represented by Michael Henry Page, Durie Tangri LLP, Peter D. Kennedy, George & Donaldson, L.L.P., Claudia Maria Vetesi, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Harmeet K. Dhillon, Dhillon Law Group Inc., James G. Snell, Perkins Coie LLP, Mazda Kersey Antia, Cooley LLP & Tyler Griffin Newby, Fenwick & West LLP. Instagram, Inc., Defendant, represented by Lori R. Mason, Cooley LLP, Mazda Kersey Antia, Cooley LLP & Michael G. Rhodes, Cooley LLP. Foursquare Labs, Inc., Defendant, represented by David Frank McDowell -- dmcdowell@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster LLP, Claudia Maria Vetesi, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Harmeet K. Dhillon, Dhillon Law Group Inc., James G. Snell, Perkins Coie LLP, Mazda Kersey Antia, Cooley LLP, Michael Henry Page, Durie Tangri LLP, Molly A. Smolen, Morrison & Foerster LLP & Tyler Griffin Newby, Fenwick & West LLP. Gowalla Incorporated, Defendant, represented by Harmeet K. Dhillon, Dhillon Law Group Inc., Claudia Maria Vetesi, Morrison & Foerster LLP, James G. Snell, Perkins Coie LLP, Krista Lee Baughman, Dhillon Law Group Inc., Mazda Kersey Antia, Cooley LLP, Micah R. Jacobs, Dhillon Law Group, Inc., Michael Henry Page, Durie Tangri LLP, Rachel Kung-Lan Loh, Dhillon Law Group, Inc. & Tyler Griffin Newby, Fenwick & West LLP. Foodspotting, Inc., Defendant, represented by Michael Henry Page, Durie Tangri LLP, Peter D. Kennedy, George & Donaldson, L.L.P., Claudia Maria Vetesi, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Harmeet K. Dhillon, Dhillon Law Group Inc., James G. Snell, Perkins Coie LLP, Mazda Kersey Antia, Cooley LLP & Tyler Griffin Newby, Fenwick & West LLP. Kik Interactive, Inc., Defendant, represented by Lori R. Mason, Cooley LLP, Mazda Kersey Antia, Cooley LLP, Michael G. Rhodes, Cooley LLP, Christopher Brian Durbin, Cooley LLP, Claudia Maria Vetesi, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Erin Elisa Goodsell, Cooley LLP, Harmeet K. Dhillon, Dhillon Law Group Inc., James G. Snell, Perkins Coie LLP, Michael Henry Page, Durie Tangri LLP & Tyler Griffin Newby, Fenwick & West LLP. Instagram, LLC, Defendant, represented by Matthew Dean Brown, Cooley LLP, Mazda Kersey Antia, Cooley LLP, Claudia Maria Vetesi, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Erin Elisa Goodsell, Cooley LLP, Harmeet K. Dhillon, Dhillon Law Group Inc., James G. Snell, Perkins Coie LLP, Michael Henry Page, Durie Tangri LLP & Tyler Griffin Newby, Fenwick & West LLP. KRISHNA ENTERPRISES: Faces "Honeywell" Suit in N.D. Florida ------------------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against Krishna Enterprises of Alachua, Inc. The case is styled as Cheri Honeywell, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Krishna Enterprises of Alachua, Inc., a Florida Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-00119-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla., June 27, 2018). Krishna Enterprises, Inc. was founded in 1991. The Company's line of business includes the wholesale distribution of cutlery and general hardware.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: JESSICA LYNN KERR, Esq. 200 SE 6TH STREET, SUITE 504 FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 33301 Tel: (954) 282-1858 Fax: (844) 786-3694 Email: service@advocacypa.com KSW OILFIELD: White & Shaw Seek Unpaid OT Wages under FLSA ---------------------------------------------------------- PAUL A. WHITE and JAMES SHAW individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. KSW OILFIELD RENTAL, LLC; AND DUPRE ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 4:18-cv-01983 (S.D. Tex., June 15, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages and other damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Plaintiffs worked for Defendants as Solids Control Consultants. Plaintiffs and the other workers like them regularly worked for Defendants in excess of 40 hours each week, but these workers never received overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek. Instead of paying overtime as required by the FLSA, Defendants paid Plaintiffs and those similarly situated workers only a day rate. The Plaintiffs and those similarly situated workers were treated as independent contractors by Defendants. KSW Oilfield Rental, LLC is the energy industry's leader in Fluid Management Equipment and Solids Control.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq. Michael A. Josephson, Esq. JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM 11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050 Houston, TX 77046 Telephone: (713) 352 1100 Facsimile: (713) 352 3300 E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com adunlap@mybackwages.com - and - Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq. BRUCKNER BURCH, P.L.L.C. 8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500 Houston, TX 77046 Telephone: (713) 877 8788 Facsimile: (713) 877 8065 E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com LANDRY'S RESTAURANT: Sustaining Demurrer on Class Claims Reversed ----------------------------------------------------------------- The Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division One, reversed in part the trial court's judgment sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend in the case captioned JORGE FIERRO, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. LANDRY'S RESTAURANT INC., Defendants and Respondents, No. D071904 (Cal. App.). Plaintiff Jorge Fierro filed the action against Landry's Restaurant Inc., seeking remedies for what Fierro alleges to be Landry's' violations of specified California labor laws and wage orders. Fierro asserts claims on behalf of himself and on behalf of a class of individuals that he alleges is similarly situated. Landry's demurred to the complaint on the basis that each of the causes of action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. As to Fierro's individual claims, the trial court overruled the demurrer, concluding that the statute of limitations defense did not appear affirmatively on the face of the complaint. As to the class claims, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on the basis that a prior class action with identical class claims against Landry's had been dismissed for failure to bring the case to trial in five years as required by Code of Civil Procedure sections 583.310 and 583.360. In September 2007, Roberto Martinez filed the Martinez action, seeking to represent a class of salaried managerial employees who worked at Joe's Crab Shack restaurants in California. In three causes of action, Martinez alleged claims for overtime pay on the basis that class members had been misclassified as exempt employees; and violations of law or regulations related to meal and rest periods and to wage statements. Martinez identified the original defendant as Joe's Crab Shack, Inc., and in a March 2008 amendment substituted Landry's Restaurant, Inc., for Doe 2. By judgment filed in August 2016, the Martinez court dismissed with prejudice all of the claims in the Martinez action and awarded costs to the three named defendants. The Court does not know what, if anything, happened to the class claims in Martinez prior to the dismissal. The Martinez plaintiffs, Martinez, Saldana, Eriksen, and Rankin-Stephens, appealed from the judgment of dismissal in October 2016. Fierro says this appeal is still pending. Under the death knell doctrine, Fierro appeals from that portion of the order sustaining without leave to amend the demurrer to the class claims. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in sustaining without leave to amend the class claims in the complaint. The Court rules that dismissal of the Martinez Action is not a basis on which to have dismissed the Class Claims in the Fierro Action. First, a judgment dismissing the prior action for want of prosecution is not one upon the merits and it does not bar a subsequent action upon the same cause. That is because under California law, a dismissal for failure to prosecute is not a final judgment on the merits. More to the point, a judgment of dismissal based on the failure to prosecute is not a final judgment for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Here, because the Court is proceeding under the assumption that the Martinez judgment of dismissal was based on a failure to prosecute, the judgment does not bar Fierro's class claims. Second, a judgment that is on appeal is not final for purposes of applying the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Here, because the Martinez judgment was on appeal at the time the court in the present action sustained Landry's' demurrer to the class claims, the judgment did not bar Fierro's claims. For these reasons, the Court finds that the trial court erred in ruling that, based on the dismissal of the Martinez action, section 583.310 et seq. bar the class claims in the present action. The Court also rules that application of American Pipe Tolling is not a basis on which to dismiss the Class Claims in the Fierro Action. Because the Court reviews the ruling of the trial court, not the reasons therefore, the Court next consider Landry's' argument on appeal that, upon proper application of American Pipe tolling, the pertinent statutes of limitation bar Fierro's class claims. In the complaint, Fierro alleges that the filing of the Martinez action on September 7, 2007, has tolled the statute of limitations as to Fierro and the class he seeks to represent. The class period covered by this Complaint based on the tolling of the statute by Martinez is September 7, 2003, to the present. Without tolling, according to Landry's, the applicable statutes of limitation bar each of the class claims Fierro alleges in his complaint. Under the specific facts of this case, namely, where the trial court denied a motion to certify a plaintiff class on the basis that the named plaintiff was not an adequate class representative and, instead of appealing the order, the named plaintiff amended the complaint in an effort to provide an adequate class representative, American Pipe tolling recommences upon the filing of the amended complaint. Under La Sala v. American Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 864, if the trial court finds the named plaintiffs to be inadequate class representatives, the court should at least afford plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaint to add new individual plaintiffs in order to establish a suitable representative. Unless American Pipe tolling applies upon the filing of an amended complaint in which new class representatives are presented, once the court rules that that the originally named plaintiff is not an adequate class representative, the plaintiff will have no incentive to attempt to efficiently and economically replace the inadequate representative. Instead, the inadequate plaintiff class representative would be forced to appeal or to abandon the class claims. Finally, based on these legal rulings, the Court will apply American Pipe tolling to the class claims in the present case. The only time during which the class claims were not tolled is between August 24, 2016 (dismissal of the Martinez action), and August 29, 2016 (filing of the present action). Needless to say, during those three days, none of the one- to four-year statutes of limitation ran on the class claims. The Court's application of American Pipe tolling is based on and necessarily limited to the record on appeal and the standard of review of an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend. That portion of the trial court's order sustaining Landry's' demurrer without leave to amend as to Fierro's class claims is reversed, and on remand the court is instructed to enter an order overruling that portion of Landry's' demurrer directed to the class claims. A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s April 26, 2018 Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9qthlys from Leagle.com. Righetti Glugoski, Matthew Righetti -- matt@righettilaw.com -- and John J. Glugoski -- jglugoski@righettilaw.com -- for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Law Offices of Mary E. Lynch, Mary E. Lynch -- mary@marylynchlaw.com -- Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Ryan D. McCortney -- rmccortney@sheppardmullin.com -- and Jason M. Guyser -- jguyser@sheppardmullin.com -- for Defendants and Respondents. LEIKIN INGBER: "Sebestyen" Suit Tossed for Lack of Jurisdiction --------------------------------------------------------------- The Hon. Stephen J. Murphy, III, granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the case titled CAROLYN SEBESTYEN v. LEIKIN, INGBER, & WINTERS, P.C., and PAUL M. INGBER, Case No. 2:13-cv-15182-SJM-RSW (E.D. Mich.). Judge Murphy also ruled that the Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class is moot, and that the case is dismissed without prejudice. Five years ago, Plaintiff Carolyn Sebestyen received a letter that she claims violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The Defendants moved to dismiss and Ms. Sebestyen moved to certify a class. The Court, Judge Patrick Duggan, resolved the motions and after a trip to and from the Sixth Circuit, Ms. Sebestyen and the Defendants are back with the same motions -- but different arguments. In the order, Judge Murphy stated that the Court will dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Murphy opined that Ms. Sebestyen has failed to carry her burden in establishing the court's jurisdiction because she has failed to plead an injury in fact. A copy of the Order is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=tkGblFvF LOGITECH INC: Court Narrows Claims in "Chernus" Suit ---------------------------------------------------- Judge Freda L. Wolfson of the District Court for the District of New Jersey granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss the case, STEVEN CHERNUS and ED SHAPIRO, individually and on Behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. LOGITECH, INC., Defendant, Civil Action No. 17- 673(FLW)(D. N.J.). In August 2010, Logitech began selling and distributing high- definition digital video security systems under the "Alert" brand name. The Alert System is a complete home video security system that would allow customers to "Be There When You're Not." The Plaintiffs allege that Logitech aggressively marketed and sold its Alert System to consumers directly through its website and retail affiliates by promising to deliver "peace of mind in a box." They further allege that Logitech emphasized that its Alert System is the comprehensive solution to home security, and that the System would provide consumers with safety and security features, such as motion detection alerts, plus live and recorded video feeds available from any internet connected computer, smartphone or table, which would allow users to monitor their home remotely. According to them, Logitech advertised these benefits and features, and charged consumers premium prices accordingly. Logitech provided an express warranty with the Alert System that its Logitech hardware product will be free from defects in material and workmanship. In addition, Logitech warranted that the Alert System would be merchantable for its ordinary purpose of providing reliable digital home security for the duration of the one-year express warranty. In that regard, the Plaintiffs claim that Logitech represented that purchasers whose Alert Systems failed could either choose Logitech to (1) repair or replace the products, or (2) provide a refund. Both the Plaintiffs purchased a Logitech Alert System. They allege that soon after they installed their Systems, they began experiencing camera failures, issues with the products staying powered up, large gaps in recorded videos, connectivity issues, malfunction of SD (memory) cards, as well as false and/or failed security alerts. As a result, according to the Plaintiffs, they complained of these problems to Logitech, but were not provided any relief under the warranty. Indeed, Plaintiffs allege that numerous other consumers have experienced the same reliability and performance issues with their Alert Systems, and Logitech has similarly ignored the consumers' requests to honor the company's warranties. The Plaintiffs aver that in the last quarter of 2012, Logitech decided to discontinue entirely the manufacture and sale of the Alert Systems by 2014. They Plaintiffs allege, however, Logitech knew internally for nearly two full years that it had given up on the defective Alert Systems but continued to sell its remaining stock to unsuspecting customers who would eventually be stuck with significant investments in defective products that Logitech was unable to repair or replace. They Plaintiffs further claim that this fraudulent omission led customers to continue to purchase the Alert Systems without knowledge of Logitech's concealments. The Plaintiffs brought the action alleging that Logitech's conduct violated consumer protection and warranty laws by, inter alia: 1) deceptively marketing and selling Alert Systems that Logitech knew were defective because the cameras experienced a high rate of failure; (2) deceptively marketing and selling Alert Systems that were never merchantable for the purposes of providing continuous, reliable digital home security; (3) refusing to honor express and implied warranty obligations; and 4) concealing from purchasers that Logitech was discontinuing the sales of Alert Systems, which left consumers without replacement parts when their Systems became inoperable. Based on these allegations of wrongful conduct, the Plaintiffs assert claims against Logitech, a California corporation, under i) California's Unfair Competition Law; ii) the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act; iii) the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act ("NJCFA"); and iv) the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, as well as New Jersey and Pennsylvania common law claims of breach of express and implied warranty and unjust enrichment. The Plaintiffs brought the action on behalf of themselves and a proposed nationwide class defined as all purchasers of Logitech Alert Systems in the United States (except California). In addition, Plaintiff Chernus, a resident of Pennsylvania, and Plaintiff Shapiro, a resident of New Jersey, seek to represent sub-classes of consumers in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, respectively, under their respective state's laws. In the instant matter, the Defendant moves to dismiss Chernus as a Plaintiff on the basis that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Logitech with regards to Chernus' claims. In addition, it argues that the Court also lacks personal jurisdiction over the non-New Jersey nationwide-class claims pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court; in that regard, the Defendant moves that Chernus' claims be dismissed and that the Pennsylvania and nationwide-class allegations be struck. Moreover, it moves to dismiss Shapiro's New Jersey based claims for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. Judge Wolfon granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss. He dismissed Plaintiff Chernus from the suit as the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over his claims. As such, he dismissed all Pennsylvania state law claims asserted in the Complaint. The Judge also dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff Shapiro's NJCFA claim. Plaintiff Shapiro is given leave to amend the Complaint to cure the deficiencies with regard to that claim within 15 days from the date of the Order accompanying the Opinion. In addition, the Judge dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment and declaratory relief causes of action. He denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing, as well as its motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' breach of express and implied warranty claims. Finally, he denied without prejudice the Defendant's request to dismiss the nationwide class. A full-text copy of the Court's April 27, 2018 Opinion is available at https://is.gd/RMNBia from Leagle.com. EDWARD SHAPIRO, individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by WILLIAM J. PINILIS -- wpinilis@consumerfraudlawyer.com -- PINILIS HALPERN. LOGITECH, INC., Defendant, represented by SUNA LEE -- suna.lee@wilsonelser.com -- WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ, EDELMAN & DICKER, LLP. LVNV FUNDING: Maisano Balks at Trading of Consumer Debt ------------------------------------------------------- VINCENT C. MAISANO, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. LVNV FUNDING LLC and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, the Defendants, Case No. HUD-L-002258-18 (N.J. Sup. Ct., June 8, 2018), is a putative class action arising from Defendant's unlawful purchase and enforcement of alleged consumer debts without first obtaining a license to engage in business as a consumer lender or sales finance company, as required by the New Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act. As a result of Defendant's unlicensed status, the credit account contracts became void and unenforceable as of the date the Defendant took assignment of them, pursuant to the CFLA. The Plaintiff and the putative class members are New Jersey consumers against whom Defendant has unlawfully enforced consumer debts after unlawfully taking assignment of them without a sales finance company or consumer lending license. Thus, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and a class of other Jersey consumers whose consumer debts were purchased and/or enforced by Defendant without first obtaining a license to engage in business as a sales finance company or consumer lender.[BN] Attorneys for Plaintiff and those similarly situated: Yongmoon Kim, Esq. KIM LAW FIRM LLC 411 Hackensack Avenue, Suite 701 Hackensack, NJ 07601 Telephone: (201) 273 7117 MASSAGE ENVY: Faces "Burbon" Suit in S.D. New York -------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Massage Envy Franchising, LLC. The case is styled as Luc Burbon, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05740 (S.D. N.Y., June 25, 2018). Massage Envy Franchising, LLC provides therapeutic massage and spa services in the United States. It also owns and operates franchise locations in the United States. The company was founded in 2002 and is based in Scottsdale, Arizona. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC is a former subsidiary of Natural Wellness USA, Inc.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq. Cohen & Mizrahi LLP 300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor Brooklyn, NY 11201 Tel: (917) 299-6612 Fax: (929) 575-4195 Email: joseph@cml.legal MDL 2672: Ct. Denies Class Member's Bid to Opt Out of Settlement ---------------------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Matthew G. Hoffer's Motions to Op Out of Class Action Settlement and for Summary Judgment in the case captioned IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN "CLEAN DIESEL" MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION This Order Relates To: MDL Dkt. Nos. 4948, 4949. Hoffer v. Audi of America, LLC, Case No. 16-cv- 2620-CRB, Dkt. Nos. 19, 20. (N.D. Cal.) MDL No. 2672 CRB (JSC). (N.D. Cal.). In two pro se motions, Matthew Hoffer, the owner of a 2011 Audi A3 TDI vehicle, seeks to opt out of the settlement and to obtain summary judgment on claims that he filed against Audi prior to the settlement. Mr. Hoffer is a member of the nationwide 2.0- liter TDI settlement class. The Court holds that a class member who seeks to opt out of a class action settlement after the applicable deadline has passed must show that excusable neglect or good cause excuses the delay. The Court has reviewed Mr. Hoffer's opt-out motion and his reply brief and concludes that he has not made such a showing. The Court therefore denies his opt-out motion. Under the settlement, Mr. Hoffer and the other class members agreed to release those claims. Because Mr. Hoffer has released his claims against Audi, the Court denies his motion for summary judgment and dismisses his individual suit with prejudice. A full-text copy of the District Court's April 26, 2018 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7lv7omj from Leagle.com. Nicholas Benipayo, Plaintiff, represented by Robert B. Carey -- rob@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice, Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas Eric Loeser -- toml@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice. Nadine Bonda, Plaintiff, represented by Adam M. Stewart -- astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP & Thomas G. Shapiro -- tshapiro@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP. Brian Connelly, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas G. Shapiro, Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation, Defendant, represented by Amie Adelia Vague -- avague@lightfootlaw.com -- Lightfoot Franklin & White, Casey Erin Lucier -- clucier@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, Charles J. Baker, III -- chuck.baker@wbd-us.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Colin Hampton Tucker -- chtucker@rhodesokla.com -- Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable, Dana Woodrum Lang -- dana.lang@wbd-us.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, David M. Eisenberg -- eisenberg@bscr- law.com -- Baker, Sterchi, Cowden & Rice, LLC, Henry Buist Smythe, Jr. -- henry.smythe@wbd-us.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Howard Feller -- hfeller@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, Hugh J. Bode -- hbode@reminger.com -- Reminger & Reminger Co LPA, J. Randolph Bibb, Jr. -- rbibb@lewisthomason.com -- Lewis, Thomason, King, Krieg & Waldrop, P.C., James K. Toohey -- tooheyj@jbltd.com -- Johns & Bell LTD., Jeffrey Lance Chase, Chase Kurshan Herzfeld & Rufin LLC, Jeffrey S. Rugg, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, Jennifer Marino Thibodaux, Gibbons PC, John W. Cowden -- cowden@bscr-law.com -- Baker, Sterchi, Cowden & Ric, LLC. MED-SPEC TRANSPORT: Washington's Bid to Certify Cont'd to July 12 ----------------------------------------------------------------- The Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois made a docket entry on June 14, 2018, in the case titled Sandra Washington, et al. v. Med-Spec. Transport, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-03334 (N.D. Ill.), relating to a hearing held before the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman. The minute entry states that the Plaintiffs' motion for conditional class certification as to the Fair Labor Standards Act and Equal Pay Act claims, and for class certification of Illinois Minimum Wage Act claims is entered and continued to July 12, 2018, at 9:00 a.m. A copy of the Notification of Docket Entry is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=xanNNTpD MIDLAND CREDIT: Faces "Pilosova" Suit in E.D. New York ------------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against Midland Credit Management, Inc. The case is styled as Yelena Pilosova, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03710 (E.D. N.Y., June 26, 2018). Midland Credit Management, Inc., a licensed debt collector, assists customers in resolving past-due financial obligations through various education and payment plans. The company was founded in 1953 and is based in San Diego, California. Midland Credit Management, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Encore Capital Group, Inc.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Daniel A. Louro, Esq. Cohen & Mizrahi LLP 300 Cadman Plaza W 12th Floor Brooklyn, NY 11201 Tel: (929) 575-4175 Fax: (929) 575-4195 Email: dlouro@cml.legal MURATA MANUFACTURING: Court Consolidates Antitrust Suits -------------------------------------------------------- In the case, DEPENDABLE COMPONENT SUPPLY CORP., et al., Plaintiffs, v. MURATA MANUFACTURING CO., LTD., et al., Defendants. And all related actions, Case No. 5:18-cv-00198-EJD (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose Division, (i) granted the motions to consolidate; (ii) granted the motion to appoint BFA and Hausfeld as co-lead interim counsel; and (iii) denied the competing motions. The Plaintiffs in the cases have sued the Defendants for antitrust violations relating to alleged price-fixing in the inductor market. Presently before the Court are two matters. The first are several motions to consolidate the currently-related cases against the Defendants. The second are several motions to appoint various Plaintiffs' counsel as lead or co-lead interim class counsel. The Court held a hearing on April 26, 2018 hearing. Upon review of the complaints in each of the actions presented, Judge Davila finds that each case presents substantially similar factual and legal issues. The Plaintiffs in each action allege that the Defendants conspired to fix prices in the inductors market and that they suffered injuries in their purchases from Defendants. The actions are in the same procedural stage as the Defendants have not yet filed an answer or responsive motion. Moreover, since the claims for each case arise from the same or similar set of circumstances, discovery issues relating to each action will be parallel. In addition, there appears to be no basis to find that consolidation would cause inconvenience, delay or expense, especially since the parties appear to agree with the consolidation request. As such, he finds consolidation appropriate. Accordingly, the Judge granted the motions to consolidate. Plaintiffs Dependable Component Supply, Powerweb Inc. and Powerweb Energy Inc., and Arch Electronics Inc. move to appoint their attorneys, Bleichmar Fonti & Auld LLP ("BFA") and Hausfeld LLP, as the co-lead interim class counsel. Plaintiff Cambridge Capital Corp. moves to appoint its attorneys, Berman Tabacco ("BT"), as either the sole lead counsel or the co-lead counsel with any other firm which the Court appoints as the lead. Plaintiff Five Rivers Electronics Innovations, LLC moves to appoint its attorneys, Joseph Saveri Law Firm, Inc. ("JSLF"), as the sole lead counsel. Plaintiff Inductors, Inc. has filed a "response" which states that it supports the appointment as JSLF as the lead counsel or requests that, if the Court prefers a co- lead structure, that the Court appoints its attorneys, Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP ("SSH"), as the co-lead counsel with JSLF. Upon careful consideration of the parties' submissions and counsel's arguments at the April 26, 2018 hearing, the Judge finds that the most appropriate choice is to appoint BFA and Hausfeld as the co-lead counsel. While he commends all firms on their impressive resumes and litigation experience, the efforts expended by BFA and Hausfeld to promptly identify and investigate the claims, coupled with the extensive amount of resources which they have available to expend on this case, renders them superior to represent the putative class. Accordingly, he appointed BFA and Hausfeld as the co-lead interim counsel. Based on the foregoing, Judge Davila granted the motions to consolidate. He granted the motion to appoint BFA and Hausfeld as the co-lead interim counsel, and denied the competing motions. In light of the proposed Case Management Order, the Judge ordered the Clerk of the Court to consolidate case numbers 5:18-cv-00198- EJD, 5:18-cv-00349-EJD, 5:18-cv-00511-EJD, 5:18-cv-00686-EJD, 5:18-cv-00851-EJD, 5:18-cv-01128-EJD, and 5:18-cv-02175-EJD into one case such that the earliest-field action, 5:18-cv-00198-EJD, is the lead case. Once consolidated, the Clerk will close 5:18- cv-00349-EJD, 5:18-cv-00511-EJD, 5:18-cv-00686-EJD, 5:18-cv- 00851-EJD, 5:18-cv-01128-EJD, and 5:18-cv-02175-EJD. A full-text copy of the Court's April 27, 2018 Order is available at https://is.gd/jWYqfQ from Leagle.com. Cambridge Capital Corporation, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Todd Anthony Seaver -- tseaver@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco, Jessica Moy -- jmoy@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco, Joseph J. Tabacco, Jr. -- jtabacco@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco, Matthew David- Craig Pearson -- mpearson@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco & Sarah Khorasanee McGrath -- skmcgrath@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco. MY FL 4051: Faces "Sierra" Suit in S.D. Florida ----------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against MY FL 4051, LLC. The case is styled as Luis Sierra, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MY FL 4051, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company, Defendant, Case No. 0:18-cv- 61454-BB (S.D. Fla., June 27, 2018). My Fl 4051, LLC is a Florida Corporation based in Sunny Isles Beach.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Jessica Lynn Kerr, Esq. Jessica L. Kerr, P.A. dba The Advocacy Group 200 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 504 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Tel: (954) 282-1858 Fax: (844) 786-3694 Email: service@advocacypa.com N.J. 52 INC: Faces "Ramirez" Suit in S.D. New York --------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against N.J. 52 INC. d/b/a Toasties. The case is styled as Pablo Ramirez and Christian Vizhnay, on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. N.J. 52 INC. d/b/a Toasties et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:18- cv-05818 (S.D. N.Y., June 27, 2018). N.J. 52 INC. d/b/a Toasties is a restaurant in New York, NY 10017.[BN] The Plaintiff appears PRO SE. NATIONAL GRID: Faces "Bishop" Suit in S.D. New York --------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Grid USA Service Company, Inc. The case is styled as Cedric Bishop, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. National Grid USA Service Company, Inc, Defendant, Case No. 1:18- cv-05815 (S.D. N.Y., June 27, 2018). National Grid USA Service Company, Inc. provides utility services. The Company distributes electricity and gas energy. National Grid supplies energy to customers throughout the northeastern United States and the United Kingdom.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq. Cohen & Mizrahi LLP 300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor Brooklyn, NY 11201 Tel: (917) 299-6612 Fax: (929) 575-4195 Email: joseph@cml.legal NATIONAL RAILROAD: Bid to Certify Class of Black Workers Denied --------------------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court, District of Columbia, denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned KENNETH CAMPBELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, Defendant. LORETTA K. BETHEA, Plaintiff, v. AMTRAK POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant, Civil Action Nos. 99-2979 (EGS), 01-1513 (EGS) (D.D.C.). Plaintiffs, seventy-one African-American current or former employees or applicants for employment at defendant National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), allege that Amtrak engaged in racial discrimination in its hiring, promotion, and disciplinary practices and created a hostile work environment. The named plaintiffs in this case are seventy-one African- American Amtrak employees, former Amtrak employees, or applicants for employment at Amtrak. Plaintiffs move to certify the following classes or, in the alternative, subclasses: (1) All Black employees of Amtrak who are represented for purposes of collective bargaining by any labor union (except those who have worked only in the Northeast Corridor and are represented for purposes of collective bargaining by the Pennsylvania Federation of the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees) (Black CBA employees) who, since April 4, 1996, have been discriminated against because of their race or color in regard to competitive promotion selections; and/or in the alternative, (a) a subclass of all Black CBA employees who, since April 4, 1996, have worked for Amtrak in any of the Shop Crafts who raise such promotion selection claims; (b) a subclass of all Black CBA employees who, since April 4, 1996, have worked for Amtrak in any of the Engineering Crafts who raise such promotion selection claims; (c) a subclass of all Black CBA employees who, since April 4, 1996, have worked for Amtrak in any of the Operating and Police Crafts who raise such promotion selection claims; (d) a subclass of all Black CBA employees who, since April 4, 1996, have worked for Amtrak in any of the Clerical and On-Board Services Crafts who raise such promotion selection claims; (2) All Black CBA employees of Amtrak who, since April 4, 1996, have been exposed to a racially hostile work environment, as embodied in racial harassment and/or racial discrimination in regard to training, job assignments, work assignments, non- competitive transfers, scheduling, and other terms and conditions of employment; and/or in the alternative, (a) a subclass of all Black CBA employees who, since April 4, 1996, have worked for Amtrak in any of the Shop Crafts and have been exposed to such a racially hostile work environment; (b) a subclass of all Black CBA employees who, since April 4, 1996, have worked for Amtrak in any of the Engineering Crafts and have been exposed to such a racially hostile work environment; (c) a subclass of all Black CBA employees who, since April 4, 1996, have worked for Amtrak in any of the Operating and Police Crafts and have been exposed to such a racially hostile work environment; (d) a subclass of all Black CBA employees who, since April 4, 1996, have worked for Amtrak in any of the Clerical and On-Board Services Crafts and have been exposed to such a racially hostile work environment; (3) All Black CBA employees of Amtrak who, since April 4, 1996, have been discriminated against in regard to discipline or termination; and/or in the alternative, (a) a subclass of all Black CBA employees who, since April 4, 1996, have worked for Amtrak in any of the Shop Crafts and have been discriminated against in regard to discipline or termination; (b) a subclass of all Black CBA employees who, since April 4, 1996, have worked for Amtrak in any of the Engineering Crafts and have been discriminated against in regard to discipline or termination; (c) a subclass of all Black CBA employees who, since April 4, 1996, have worked for Amtrak in any of the Operating and Police Crafts and have been discriminated against in regard to discipline or termination; (d) a subclass of all Black CBA employees who, since April 4, 1996, have worked for Amtrak in any of the Clerical and On-Board Services Crafts and have been discriminated against in regard to discipline or termination; and (4) All Black CBA who have applied to work for Amtrak for any position(s) that would be represented for purposes of collective bargaining by any labor union since April 4, 1996, and been denied employment because of their race. The Court finds that each of these proposed class definitions makes membership in the class contingent on individualized merits determinations as to whether the individual suffered discrimination because of his race, was exposed to racial harassment and/or racial discrimination, or was denied employment because of his race. In other words, to determine whether any individual is a member of one of these putative classes, the Court would be required to answer a critical question that goes directly to the merits of the litigation: did the individual suffer racial discrimination at the hands of Amtrak? The parties have failed to address these problems with the plaintiffs' class definition, perhaps because the problems are repairable. The Plaintiffs could, for example, redefine their classes so that membership is not contingent on whether the individual suffered racial discrimination. Accordingly, in the interest of judicial economy, the Court will address the parties' arguments regarding the requirements of Rule 23. A plaintiff seeking class certification must establish that there are questions of law or fact common to the class. The Plaintiffs suggest that they provide such glue because Amtrak's common and uniform employment policies, as set out in corporate policies governing promotions and transfers and through various collective-bargaining provisions, unite the individual acts of discretion of lower-level employees. Thus, to establish commonality under such a theory, the plaintiffs must show how Amtrak's uniform policies resulted in a common mode of exercising discretion that pervaded the entire company and led to the discrimination about which plaintiffs complain. The Plaintiffs try to make such a showing by pointing to (1) the testimony of their expert that Amtrak's uniform employment policies were vulnerable to bias; (2) statistical evidence that shows disparities in selection and discipline rates between African-American and non-African-American individuals; (3) anecdotal evidence from members of the putative class describing instances of racial discrimination; and (4) the testimony of a former Amtrak employee discussing the inadequacies in Amtrak's handling of discrimination complaints. The Court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to put forward significant proof that any alleged disparate outcomes in Amtrak's hiring, promoting, and disciplinary decisions are the result of a common mode of exercising discretion. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have not satisfied Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirements, and the plaintiffs' proposed classes cannot be certified. In short, the plaintiffs have not identified a specific employment practice applicable to all putative class members that purportedly caused the alleged discrimination about which plaintiffs complain. Moreover, the plaintiffs' evidence makes clear that many putative class members suffered discrimination in a variety of ways through the decisions of different individuals in a wide range of contexts. Such potential breadth of experiences and claims among the putative class members is not the mark of a class that meets the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a). A full-text copy of the District Court's April 26, 2018 Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9fb8f9x from Leagle.com. LORETTA K. BETHEA, Plaintiff, pro se. LORETTA K. BETHEA, Plaintiff, represented by Timothy B. Fleming - - tfleming@wigginschilds.com -- WIGGINS, CHILDS, QUINN & PANTAZIS, PLLC & Russell W. Adams, WIGGINS, CHILDS, QUINN & PANTAZIS, LLC, pro hac vice. AMTRAK POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant, represented by Grace E. Speights -- grace.speights@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP & Melissa Barbara Rogers, NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION. NCH CORPORATION: Fails to Pay Wages, Lanese Says ------------------------------------------------ JOE LANESE, in his individual and representative capacities, the Plaintiff, v. NCH CORPORATION a Florida Corporation; DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. BC709629 (Cal. Super. Ct., June 8, 2018), alleges that Defendants failed to indemnify or reimburse Lanese and the Class members for necessary expenditures incurred by them as a direct consequence of discharging their duties, including, but not limited to, all costs associated with the operation and use of their personal vehicles, including, depreciation, fuel, maintenance, insurance and registration costs. NCH Corporation's website touts that it has multiple divisions and brands including: Chemsearch, Chem-Aqua, LSP, NCH Partsmaster among others. NCH Corporation and its divisions concentrate on developing, manufacturing and distributing cleaning, maintenance, water treatment and remediation, plumbing, pet care and special industrial products. NCH operates worldwide employing thousands of employees.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Matthew A. Berliner, Esq. FORTIS LLP 650 Town Center Dr., Ste. 1530 Costa Mesa, CA 92626 Telephone: (714) 839 3800 E-mail: mberliner@fortislaw.com - and - Corbett H. Williams, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF CORBETT H. WILLIAMS 24422 Avenida de la Carlota, Suite 370 Laguna Hills, CA 92653 Telephone: (949) 679 9909 E-mail: cwilliams@chwilliamslaw.com NELNET INC: Olsen Sues over Servicing of Student Loans ------------------------------------------------------ JESSICA OLSEN, on behalf of herself and the class members, Plaintiffs, v. NELNET, INC., a Nebraska Corporation, NELNET DIVERSIFIED SOLUTIONS, LLC, a Nebraska limited liability company, and NELNET SERVICING LLC, a Nebraska limited liability company, the Defendants, Case No. 4:18-cv-03081-RGK-MDN (D. Neb., June 8, 2018), alleges that Defendants breached their servicing contract with the federal government, of which Plaintiff was an intended third party beneficiary; breached and/or tortuously interfered with written agreements between the federal government and student loan borrowers, namely Plaintiff; and violated state and federal laws in connection with the servicing of Plaintiffs' federal student loans. According to the complaint, the Defendants -- in connection with their servicing of federal student loans -- failed to promptly process borrowers' requests to renew their Income-Driven Repayment plans, unlawfully cancelled borrowers' income-driven payments due to processing errors, unlawfully capitalized interest that accrued on borrowers' accounts, and unlawfully applied forbearances to borrowers' accounts during processing delays. These abusive practices caused borrowers to suffer measurable financial harm when (a) the duration of their loans was extended; (b) interest accrued on the principal balance of loans during unnecessary periods of deferment or forbearance; and (c) they were charged additional fees and higher monthly payments due to the delay in processing their applications for IDR programs. As a result, Plaintiffs and the Class have also lost out on months or years of qualifying loan payments that would have brought them closer to loan forgiveness under the various IDR programs; been overcharged; or otherwise disadvantaged when they were unable to utilize federal programs designed to make their education more affordable. Nelnet is a United States-based conglomerate that deals in the administration and repayment of student loans and education financial services. The company is headquartered in Lincoln, Nebraska.[BN] Attorney for Plaintiff and the Classes: David A. Domina, Esq. DOMINA LAW GROUP PC LLC 2425 S. 144th St. Omaha, NE 68144 Telephone: (402) 493 4100 Facsimile: (402) 493 9782 E-mail: DAD@dominalaw.com - and - Daniel A. Edelman, Esq. Cathleen M. Combs, Esq. James O. Latturner, Esq. Tara L. Goodwin, Esq. Frances R. Green, Esq. Cassandra P. Miller, Esq. EDELMAN, COMBS, LATTURNER, & GOODWIN, LLC 20 South Clark Street, Suite 1500 Chicago, IL 60603 Telephone: (312) 739 4200 Facsimile: (312) 419 0379 E-mail: dedelman@edcombs.com - and - Anthony Fiorentino, Esq. FIORENTINO LAW OFFICES, LTD. 180 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 2440 Chicago, IL 60602 Telephone: (312) 853 0050 Facsimile: (312) 853 3254 E-mail: anthony@fiorentinolaw.com NIC & ZOE: Faces "Kiler" Suit in E.D. New York ---------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nic & Zoe Company. The case is styled as Marion Kiler, individually and as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Nic & Zoe Company doing business as: Nic + Zoe, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03669 (E.D. N.Y., June 25, 2018). Nic & Zoe Co designs and delivers women apparel. The company was founded in 2005 and is based in Natick, Massachusetts.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Dan Shaked, Esq. Shaked Law Group, P.C. 44 Court Street, Suite 1217 Brooklyn, NY 11217 Tel: (917) 373-9128 Fax: (718) 504-7555 Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com NORTH CAROLINA, USA: Buffkin Seeks to Certify Class of Prisoners ---------------------------------------------------------------- The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit entitled LLOYD BUFFKIN, et al. v. ERIK HOOKS, et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-00502-WO-JLW (M.D.N.C.), ask the Court to certify a class defined as: all current and future prisoners in DPS custody who have or will have chronic hepatitis C virus, at least twelve weeks remaining on their sentences, and have not been treated with direct-acting antiviral drugs. Erik Hooks is the Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety. The Plaintiffs, who have been diagnosed with hepatitis C and are incarcerated in North Carolina state prisons under the custody of the state Department of Public Safety), bring the action alleging that the Defendants have acted and continue to act with deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, and have discriminated and continue to discriminate against them based on their disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint them as class representatives, and to appoint their counsel of record as class counsel. A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=I39zL8ZJ The Plaintiffs are represented by: Michele Luecking-Sunman, Esq. Daniel K. Siegel, Esq. NORTH CAROLINA PRISONER LEGAL SERVICES, INC. P.O. Box 25397 Raleigh, NC 27611 Telephone: (919) 856-2220 Facsimile: (919) 856-2223 E-mail: mlueckingsunman@ncpls.org dsiegel@ncpls.org - and - Christopher A. Brook, Esq. Emily E. Seawell, Esq. ACLU OF NORTH CAROLINA P.O. Box 28004 Raleigh, NC 27611 Telephone: (919) 834-3466 E-mail: cbrook@acluofnc.org eseawell@acluofnc.org OCWEN LOAN: Faces "Murdzia" Suit in W.D. Washington --------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC. The lawsuit is captioned as Donald Murdzia and Susan Embree, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-00804-RSM (W.D. Wash., June 1, 2018). The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Ricardo S Martinez. Ocwen Loan offers and services residential mortgage loans.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Abbas Kazerounian, Esq. KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP APC 2633 E Indian School Road, Suite 460 Phoenix, AZ 85016 Telephone: (800) 400 6808 Facsimile: (800) 520 5523 E-mail: ak@kazlg.com - and - Joshua Swigart, Esq. HYDE & SWIGART (CA) 2221 Camino Del Rio South No. 101 San Diego, CA 92108 Telephone: (619) 233 7770 Facsimile: (619) 297 1022 E-mail: josh@westcoastlitigation.com - and - Ryan Lee McBride, Esq. KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP APC 2633 E Indian School Road, Suite 460 Phoenix, AZ 85016 Telephone: (602) 900 1288 E-mail: ryan@kazlg.com OHIO EDUCATION: Faces "Lee" Suit in N.D. Ohio --------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ohio Education Association. The case is styled as Sarah R. Lee, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Ohio Education Association, Avon Lake Education Association as representative of the class of all chapters and affiliates of the Ohio Education Association, National Education Association, Avon Lake City School District as representative of the class of all school districts in Ohio, Governor of Ohio John R. Kasich, Michael DeWine, W. CriagZimpher, Aaron A. Schmidt and J. Richard Lumpe, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-01420 (N.D. Ohio, June 25, 2018). Ohio Education Association (OEA) is a teachers union which serves as the largest such organization for educators in the American state of Ohio.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Sean T. Logue, Esq. 27 West Main Street Carnegie, PA 15106 Tel: (412) 389-0805 Fax: (412) 253-6520 Email: pittbankruptcy@gmail.com OMEGA INSURANCE: Dismissal of "Ganzemuller" Affirmed ---------------------------------------------------- Judge Laurence Silberman of the District Court of Appeal of Florida for the Second District affirmed the trial court's final order dismissing with prejudice the case, ALBERT C. GANZEMULLER and JANICE R. GANZEMULLER, Appellants, v. OMEGA INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee, Case No. 2D17-1284 (Fla. Dist. App.). The Ganzemullers purchased homeowner's insurance from Omega that covered a one-year period beginning Nov. 24, 2015. They selected a $1000 deductible, applicable to all perils except hurricane and sinkhole claims. Based on that selection, they received a $100 credit against their policy premium. It is not necessary to detail the contents of the policy other than to note that it includes provisions addressing loss settlement, the insurer's option to repair, and the deductible. In March 2016, the Ganzemullers' property suffered hail damage, and they filed a claim with Omega. Omega acknowledged coverage, and there is no dispute that the loss was a partial loss. Omega invoked its option under the policy to repair the damage and hired a contractor. The repair costs totaled $16,611.90, and the Ganzemullers were required to pay their $1,000 deductible to the contractor. The Ganzemullers then filed their class action suit, contending that Florida law precludes the insurer from requiring payment of the deductible when the insurer elects to repair the damage. Omega moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the Ganzemullers did not have a viable claim. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action with prejudice, determining that neither the policy nor Florida law supported the Ganzemullers' cause of action. The issue on appeal is whether subsections 627.7011(5)(e) and 627.702(7) relieve the Ganzemullers and potential class members from the obligation to pay deductibles when Omega invokes its option to repair partial losses. The Ganzemullers contended in the trial court that Omega improperly required them to pay a deductible when Omega invoked its right to repair the property. They argue that subsection 627.7011(5)(e), Florida Statutes (2015), which references subsection 627.702(7), prohibits an insurer from requiring that the insured pay a deductible when the insurer invokes its right to repair property damage, regardless of whether the damage is a partial or total loss. The trial court entered its final order of dismissal, concluding that the Ganzemullers failed to state a cause of action and, under the applicable law, would not be able to state a viable cause of action. Judge Silberman explains that subsection 627.702(1) specifically deals with total losses, and subsection (7) addresses the insurer's right to repair without contribution by the insured in lieu of any liability created by subsection (1). Thus, these subsections preclude the insurer from requiring the insured to make any contribution when the insurer elects to make repairs in total loss situations. The parties do not dispute that deductibles are covered by the "without contribution" language. Section 627.7011 specifies those things that an insurer must offer prior to issuing a homeowner's policy. Subsection (5)(e) makes clear that section 627.7011 does not prohibit an insurer from exercising its right to repair damaged property in compliance with its policy and s. 627.702(7). He says nothing in this language suggests a statutory intent to eliminate policy deductibles for partial losses as well as total losses where the insurer elects to make repairs. His is buttressed by the fact that subsection 627.702(7) provides that the insurer's repair or replacement of damaged property is in lieu of liability under subsection 627.702(1), which deals with the insurer's liability under the policy for a covered total loss. In summary, the pertinent statutory sections relied on by the Ganzemullers do not eliminate an insured's obligation to pay the required deductible under the policy when the insured suffers a partial loss that the insurer elects to repair. Accordingly, Judge Silberman affirmed the order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. A full-text copy of the Court's April 27, 2018 Order is available at https://is.gd/789fu4 from Leagle.com. Sean Estes of James Hoyer, P.A., Tampa; Donna Stockham of Stockham Law Group, P.A., Tampa; and John Marc Tamayo -- j.tamayo@cttalaw.com -- of Valenti, Campbell, Trohn, Tamayo & Aranda, P.A., Lakeland, for Appellants. David B. Shelton -- dshelton@rumberger.com -- of Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee. PATRICK K WILLIS: Faces "Jones" Suit in California Superior Court ----------------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Patrick K Willis Company Inc. The lawsuit is captioned as Cassandra Jones, on behalf of herself and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Does 1-50 and Patrick K Willis Company Inc., the Defendants, Case No. 34-2018-00234487-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Sup. Ct., June 8, 2018).[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Norman B Blumenthal, Esq. BLUMENTHAL, NORDREHAUG & BHOWMIK 2255 Calle Clara La Jolla, CA 92037-3107 Telephone: (858) 551 1223 Facsimile: (858) 551 1232 E-mail: norm@bamlawca.com PIER 1 IMPORTS: $3.5MM Settlement in "Mathein" Has Final Approval ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, LAUREN MATHEIN and CHRISTINE SABAS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PIER 1 IMPORTS (U.S.), INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:16-cv-00087-DAD-SAB (E.D. Cal.), Judge Dale A. Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California granted the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for attorneys' fees, costs, and enhancement awards, and final approval of a class action settlement. On Jan. 20, 2016, Mathein filed the original class action complaint against the Defendants. The action now proceeds on Plaintiffs Mathein and Sabas' First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), filed on Sept. 8, 2016. The primary issue in the case revolves around whether the Defendant's "Flex Shift" policy -- shifts in which associates were scheduled to work, required to report for work, but not guaranteed the opportunity to do so -- violated various provisions of the applicable California wage order. As part of the "Flex Shift" policy, associates would report to work, either by phone or in person, before learning if they would actually be able to work the flex shift and earn wages. The Plaintiffs alleged the following causes of action: (i) failure to pay reporting time pay; (ii) failure to pay minimum wage; (iii) failure to maintain required business records; (iv) failure to furnish proper wage statement stubs; (v) failure to pay all wages earned at termination; (vi) failure to reimburse business expenses; (vii) failure to pay split shift premiums; (viii) violations of California Business and Professions Code Section 17200; and (ix) violations of the California Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"). On Feb. 17, 2017, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Plaintiffs opposed. The Defendants' motion for summary judgment came before the Court for a hearing on March 21, 2017. On April 20, 2017, the Court agreed to defer ruling on the motion for summary judgment and suspended all deadlines established by the scheduling order in the action pending the parties' participation in private mediation. On May 17, 2017, the parties filed a stipulation informing the Court of a scheduled mediation with David Rotman, Esq. on Aug. 9, 2017. On Aug. 15, 2018, the parties informed the court that they had reached a settlement. On Sept. 20, 2017, the parties submitted a stipulation to dismiss Pier 1 Imports, Inc. from the action with prejudice, which the court granted on Sept. 21, 2017, resulting in the action then proceeding only against Defendant Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc. The proposed class for this settlement is defined as all current and former non-managerial associates who are/were working in Defendant's stores in California from Jan. 20, 2012 up through March 26, 2016. There is also a subclass of retail sales associates whose employment terminated during that time period. Under the settlement agreement, the Defendant will pay a maximum settlement amount ("MSA") of $3.5 million. The settlement agreement proposes that the following deductions be made from the MSA: (i) administration costs not to exceed $70,000; (ii) attorneys' fees in the amount of one-third of the MSA ($1,166,666) paid to the class counsel, plus reimbursement of reasonable and actual expenses, not to exceed $31,500; (iii) enhancement payment of $12,500 to each class representative in addition to their distribution amount as a class member; (iv) employers' payroll taxes; (v) $15,000 allocated to settle the portion of the case brought under the PAGA, with 75% of the PAGA payment ($11,250) paid to the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency, and 25% of the PAGA payment ($3,750) included in the class fund. The remaining funds make up the Net Settlement Amount ("NSA"), which is estimated to be $2,203,200. The NSA will be distributed to settlement class members on a proportional basis based on the number of weeks that each class member worked. On Sept. 15, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the class action settlement. At the Court's request, the Plaintiffs filed supplementary briefing in support of the motion on Oct. 24, 2017. The Plaintiffs sought an order: (i) preliminarily approving the settlement agreement; (ii) conditionally certifying the case for settlement purposes; (iii) directing that the notice packet be mailed to class members; and (iv) scheduling a hearing to determine final approval of the settlement agreement. On Dec. 12, 2017, the Court granted plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of the class action settlement and for conditional certification for settlement purposes. On Feb. 16, 2018, the Plaintiffs' counsel filed a motion for attorneys' fees, costs, and enhancement awards in conjunction with final approval of class action settlement. On March 20, 2018, the Plaintiffs' counsel filed a motion for final approval of the class action settlement. Judge Drozd granted the Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of the settlement, certified the settlement class, and approved the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate. The Judge granted the Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees, costs, and incentive awards, and awarded the following sums: (i) the Class counsel will receive $1,166,666.66 in attorneys' fees, and $28,275 in expenses; (ii) Named Plaintiffs Mathein and Sabas will each receive $12,500 as incentive payments; and (iii) the parties will direct payment of 75% of the settlement allocated to the PAGA payment, or $11,250, to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency, as required by California law, and the remainder of the PAGA payment, or $3,750, will be included in the class fund. A full-text copy of the Court's April 27, 2018 Order is available at https://is.gd/Zl25g9 from Leagle.com. Lauren Mathein & Christine Sabas, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by William Anthony Baird -- tbaird@marlinsaltzman.com -- Marlin & Saltzman, LLP & Stanley D. Saltzman -- ssaltzman@marlinsaltzman.com -- Marlin & Saltzman, LLP. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., Defendant, represented by Gregory William Knopp -- gknopp@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer and Feld LLP & Galit Avitan Knotz -- gknotz@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP. PINOT'S PALETTE: Faces "Matzura" Suit in S.D. New York ------------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pinot's Palette Franchise LLC. The case is styled as Steven Matzura, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Pinot's Palette Franchise LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05784 (S.D. N.Y., June 26, 2018). Pinot's Palette is an American national paint and sip franchise headquartered in Houston, Texas. Founded in 2009, Pinot's Palette offers step-by-step group art lessons accompanied by wine or cocktails.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq. Cohen & Mizrahi LLP 300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor Brooklyn, NY 11201 Tel: (917) 299-6612 Fax: (929) 575-4195 Email: joseph@cml.legal PIPES & SHAW: Faces "Kiler" Suit in E.D. New York ------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pipes & Shaw, LLC. The case is styled as Marion Kiler, individually and as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Pipes & Shaw, LLC doing business as: Veronica Beard, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03671 (E.D. N.Y., June 25, 2018). Pipes & Shaw, LLC (trade name Veronica Beard) is in the Designers, Apparel business.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Dan Shaked, Esq. Shaked Law Group, P.C. 44 Court Street, Suite 1217 Brooklyn, NY 11217 Tel: (917) 373-9128 Fax: (718) 504-7555 Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com PLANO, TX: Faces "Neil" Suit in Texas State Court ------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against City of Plano. The lawsuit is captioned as Jon Neill, Ashley Nicole Hill, On behalf of themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. City of Plano and Gregory C. Rushin, Chief of Police for The City of Plano, the Defendant, Case No. 417-02665-2018 (Texas Dist. Ct., Collin Cty., June 1, 2018). Plano is a city in north Texas. The Heritage Farmstead Museum is a restored 19th-century farm with original tools and furniture, plus a replica 1895 schoolroom.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Russell J. Bowman, Esq. 800 Airport Fwy No. 860 Irving, TX 75062 Telephone: (214) 922 0220 PLATINUM RESTAURANT: Green Moves to Certify Class of Servers ------------------------------------------------------------ The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit captioned LAUREN GREEN, et al. v. PLATINUM RESTAURANTS MID-AMERICA, LLC d/b/a EDDIE MERLOT'S PRIME AGED BEEF AND SEAFOOD, Case No. 3:14-cv-00439-RGJ-DW (W.D. Ky.), ask the Court to certify their Kentucky Wage and Hours Act claims as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendant required certain employees in its Louisville restaurant to participate in a tip pool scheme, which was required as a condition of employment and so violated the KWHA. The Plaintiffs seek to certify a class, which consists of: all Servers, Cocktail Servers and Bartenders employed by the defendant in its Louisville restaurant since it opened on January 6, 2011. A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=E6R7x4Pa The Plaintiffs are represented by: H. Wallace Blizzard, Esq. WIGGINS, CHILDS, PANTAZIS, FISHER & GOLDFARB, LLC The Kress Building 301 19th Street North Birmingham, AL 35203 Telephone: (205) 314-0500 Facsimile: (205) 314-0793 E-mail: wblizzard@wigginschilds.com - and - Garry R. Adams, Esq. CLAY DANIEL WALTON & ADAMS PLC 462 South Fourth Street, Suite 101 Louisville, KY 40202 Telephone: (502) 561-2005 E-mail: garry@justiceky.com The Defendant is represented by: John T. Lovett, Esq. Kyle D. Johnson, Esq. FROST BROWN TODD LLC 400 West Market Street, 32nd Floor Louisville, KY 40202-3363 Telephone: (502) 589-5400 E-mail: jlovett@fbtlaw.com kjohnson@fbtlaw.com PROFESSIONAL CLAIMS: Faces "Zazovskaya" Suit in E.D. New York ------------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Professional Claims Bureau, Inc. The case is styled as Svetlana Zazovskaya, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Professional Claims Bureau, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv- 03711 (E.D. N.Y., June 26, 2018). Professional Claims Bureau, Inc. provides receivable collection and management services. The Company offers insurance follow-up, credentialing, skip tracing, zero balance claim review, and practice management services.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Daniel A. Louro, Esq. Cohen & Mizrahi LLP 300 Cadman Plaza W 12th Floor Brooklyn, NY 11201 Tel: (929) 575-4175 Fax: (929) 575-4195 Email: dlouro@cml.legal PROGRESSIVE SELECT: Bid to Remand Chiropractors' Suit Denied ------------------------------------------------------------ Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division, denied Plaintiff's Motion for Remand the case, HANDS ON CHIROPRACTIC PL, Plaintiff, v. PROGRESSIVE SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 6:18-cv-192-Orl-37DCI (M.D. Fla.). In the instant action, the Plaintiff filed an amended complaint asserting a class action claim against the Defendant for declaratory relief and damages in state court. The Defendant then filed a notice of removal, invoking diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act. The Plaintiff then moved to remand the action back to state court, contending that the Defendant's allegations concerning the amount-in-controversy ("AIC") were deficient. On referral, U.S. Magistrate Judge Daniel C. Irick finds that the Defendant met its burden of proving the AIC by a preponderance of the evidence, and he recommends denying the Motion. No party objected to the R&R, and the time for doing so has now passed. Absent objections, Judge Dalton has examined the R&R only for clear error. On review, he agrees with Magistrate Judge Irick's recommendation and finds that the Defendant has met the AIC, so the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, the Motion is due to be denied. Accordingly, Judge Dalton adopted and confirmed Magistrate Judge Irick's Report and Recommendation, and made a part of his Order. He denied the Plaintiff's Motion for Remand. A full-text copy of the Court's April 27, 2018 Order is available at https://is.gd/4nrZ7C from Leagle.com. Hands On Chiropractic PL, A/A/O Samantha Schurr, Plaintiff, represented by Alyson M. Laderman -- aladerman@theorlandolawgroup.com -- The Orlando Law Group & Lawrence M. Kopelman, Lawrence M. Kopelman, Esq. Progressive Select Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Allison Paige Gallagher -- allison.gallagher@akerman.com -- Akerman LLP, Marcy Levine Aldrich -- marcy.aldrich@akerman.com -- Akerman LLP & Megan Costa DeVault -- megan.devault@akerman.com -- Akerman LLP. PROVIDENCE, RI: Ricci Seeks Prelim. Approval of Class Settlement ---------------------------------------------------------------- The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit captioned ROBERTA RICCI, DACHELLE L. THREATS, VINCENT PIZZI, DIANE DINOBILE, ABIGAIL TORRES, JOHN BORDEN, and NORTH AMERICAN AUTO LEASING, LLC, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. CITY OF PROVIDENCE, by and through its Treasurer, James J. Lombardi, III, Case No. 1:18-cv-00171-JJM-PAS (D.R.I.), ask the Court to enter a preliminary approval order granting the parties' class action settlement. The Plaintiffs ask that the Court grant their Unopposed Motion and enter the Preliminary Approval Order, that for settlement purposes only, provides for: (1) conditional certification of the Class as defined in the Settlement Agreement; (2) conditional appointment of Named Plaintiffs to serve as Class representatives; (3) conditional appointment of Plaintiffs' counsel, Peter N. Wasylyk, Esq., of the Law Offices of Peter N. Wasylyk and Peter J. Petrarca, Esq., of Petrarca & Petrarca Law Offices to serve as Class counsel; (4) approval of the proposed notice, in the form and manner provided for in the Settlement Agreement, which proposed notice will inform Class Members of the terms of the Settlement and their rights, including the proposed Class definition, conditional certification of the Class, conditional appointment of Named Plaintiffs as Class representatives, conditional appointment of Named Plaintiffs' counsel as Class counsel, deadline for Class Members to exclude themselves from the Class, object to the Settlement, and determine whether they wish to challenge their speeding citations at a new hearing before the City of Providence Municipal Court by completing and timely submitting a simple, easy to understand hearing request form; and (5) scheduling a date and time for a fairness hearing to consider final approval of the Settlement. A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=LqHnjnyL The Plaintiffs are represented by: Peter N. Wasylyk, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF PETER N. WASYLYK 1307 Chalkstone Avenue Providence, RI 02908 Telephone: (401) 831-7730 Facsimile: (401) 861-6064 E-mail: pnwlaw@aol.com - and - Peter J. Petrarca, Esq. PETRARCA & PETRARCA LAW OFFICES 330 Silver Spring Street Providence, RI 02904 Telephone: (401) 273-1111 Facsimile: (401) 621-2225 E-mail: Peter330350@gmail.com QUALITY RECOVERY: Court Won't Dismiss "Higgins" FDCPA Suit ---------------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned TABETHA-JENNIE HIGGINS, Plaintiff, v. QUALITY RECOVERY SERVICES, INC., and John Does 1-25, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Defendants, No. 1:17-cv- 2581-WSD-JSA (N.D. Ga.). The Defendant sent a letter to Plaintiff Tabetha-Jennie Higgins to collect an alleged debt owed to Windrush Apartments, which contracted the Defendant to collect the amount allegedly owed. The Collection Letter was the first communication between the Defendant and the Plaintiff regarding the amount owed to Windrush Apartments. The Collection Letter stated that the Plaintiff owed $3,473.36 to Windrush. This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Justin S. Anand's Non-Final Report and Recommendation (Non-Final R&R). The Non-Final R&R recommends that the Court deny the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Count I of the Plaintiff's Complaint raises the issue of whether the Collection Letter improperly states that the Plaintiff must notify Defendant in writing to dispute the validity of the debt. Count II raises the issue of whether the Collection Letter violates Section 1692e(10) by falsely stating that a dispute of her debt had to be in writing. Section 1692e of the FDCPA provides, in relevant part: "A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: (10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer." The Magistrate Judge agrees with the Plaintiff and the Ninth, Second, and Fourth Circuits have held that the plain language of Section 1692g(a)(3) does not contain a requirement to dispute the debt in writing, and that, under the Supreme Court's approach to statutory interpretation, when the plain language of a statute does not render the statute absurd, it must be enforced. After analyzing each of the circuit opinions and considering the weight of the authority, the Magistrate Judge determined that the Plaintiff may state a claim for violations of Section 1692g(a)(3) and Section 1692e(10) on the basis of her allegations that the Defendant's Collection Letter required her to dispute her debt in writing, and that she was misled into believing that only a written dispute would be valid. The Court finds no plain error in these findings. The Magistrate Judge also disagreed with the Defendant's argument that the Plaintiff failed to plead that the Collection Letter was confusing to the least sophisticated consumer. The Magistrate Judge found that the Plaintiff specifically pleaded that because of the Collection Letter, she, 'as would any least sophisticated consumer,' believed that she could only dispute her debt in writing. Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Justin S. Anand's Non-Final Report and Recommendation is adopted, and the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied. A full-text copy of the District Court's April 26, 2018 Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybdr4xgs from Leagle.com. Tabetha-Jennie Higgins, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Misty Ann Oaks, The Oaks Firm, & Yitzchak Zelman -- Yzelman@MarcusZelman.com -- Marcus Zelman, LLC. Quality Recovery Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by Brenton Sewell Bean -- bbean@fmglaw.com -- Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP. RENT-A-CENTER: Faces "Matzura" Suit in S.D. New York ----------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Rent-A-Center, Inc. The case is styled as Steven Matzura, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05742 (S.D. N.Y., June 25, 2018). Rent-A-Center is an American public furniture and electronics rent-to-own company based in Plano, Texas.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq. Cohen & Mizrahi LLP 300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor Brooklyn, NY 11201 Tel: (917) 299-6612 Fax: (929) 575-4195 Email: joseph@cml.legal REV-1 SOLUTIONS: Doty Moves for Certification of FDCPA Class ------------------------------------------------------------ The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit captioned AMANDA C. DOTY, et al. v. REV-1 SOLUTIONS, LLC, an Indiana Limited Liability Corporation, et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-01723-WCG (E.D. Wisc.), seeks to certify a class defined as: All persons with addresses in the State of Wisconsin to whom REV-1 Solutions, LLC mailed an initial written communication between December 21, 2017 and January 1, 2018, which lists "Client: MINISTRY HEALTH CARE" and states "This account has been listed with our office for collections." Amanda C. Doty, Catherine A. Kreger, Thomas L. Riehle, Paul R. Neubert, Kelly B. Betow, Bruce M. Long, George J. Zettler, Karen K. Zettler, Michael J. Rosenberg and Brenda J. Chambers assert claims against REV-1 under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint them to represent the putative class members and to appoint their attorneys as counsel for the class. A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=r0qtlT7U The Plaintiffs are represented by: Andrew T. Thomasson, Esq. Philip D. Stern, Esq. STERN THOMASSON LLP 150 Morris Avenue, 2nd Floor Springfield, NJ 07081-1315 Telephone: (973) 379-7500 Facsimile: (973) 532-5868 E-mail: andrew@sternthomasson.com philip@sternthomasson.com ROBERT B. LOCKE: Cal. App. Affirms Striking of "Berry" Suit ----------------------------------------------------------- The Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division Six issued an Opinion affirming the trial court's judgment granting Defendant's Motion to Strike Appellants' Lawsuit as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) in the case captioned DANA BERRY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. ROBERT B. LOCKE et al., Defendants and Respondents. 2d Civil No. B284410. (Cal. App.) The trial court granted Locke's motion. Robert B. Locke served Dana and Patricia Berry with three-day notices to pay rent and quit their space at Rivergate RV Park in Santa Maria. Rivergate is a client of Locke and his law firm. Dana and Patricia Berry filed a putative class action against Locke, alleging that the notices violated the federal and California Fair Debt Collection Practices (FDCP) Acts and the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA). Locke moved to strike appellants' lawsuit as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP). The anti-SLAPP law directs courts to strike causes of action arising from a defendant's exercise of First Amendment rights to petition or to free speech, unless the plaintiff shows a likelihood of prevailing on the claim. The trial court granted Locke's motion to strike the entire complaint. The Appellants sought reconsideration of the ruling and opposed Locke's request for an award of attorney fees and sanctions. The court denied the appellants' untimely motion for reconsideration and ordered them to pay Locke $16,240 in attorney fees and $602 in costs. This appeal followed. The Cal. App. finds that the activity underlying appellants' claim, Locke's legal representation of Rivergate in efforts to evict holdover tenants and collect unpaid rent, is constitutionally protected. All communicative acts performed by attorneys as part of their representation of a client in a judicial proceeding or other petitioning context are per se protected as petitioning activity by the anti-SLAPP statute. To show that an attorney is a debt collector, the plaintiff in a FDCP action must prove that that the attorney's debt collection practice is steady, usual, and customary, encompassing a pattern of collection activity and personnel dedicated to it. This showing is not made if the attorney handled six to eight debt collection cases in 10 years. The Appellants did not make a prima facie showing that Locke is a debt collector. Sending five eviction notices in four years does not make Locke a debt collector, when there is no evidence that collecting debts is a steady, customary part of his practice. The Appellants unavailingly rely on a factually distinguishable case in which an attorney's dunning letter stated that he is acting as a debt collector; this admission showed that the attorney fell within the FDCP Acts. The Appellants' cause of action based on the CLRA lacks merit. The law proscribes unfair competition and deceptive acts in a transaction intended to result or that results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer. Locke did not sell or lease goods or services to appellants, nor did he provide the well known package of goods and services, heat, ventilation, plumbing, windows, doors, etc., that constitutes residential housing, contrary to appellants' argument. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed and Locke is entitled to recover his costs and attorney fees on appeal from the appellants. A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s April 26, 2018 Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yanork2p from Leagle.com. Law Offices of Ron Bochner and Ron Bochner -- robolaw@justice.com -- for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Sumalpong & Sumalpong and Joanne S. Sumalpong -- joannesumalpong@sumalponglaw.com -- for Defendant and Respondent. SALON INC: Phillips Sues over Minimum & OT Pay, Tip Skimming ------------------------------------------------------------ MEGAN PHILLIPS, on behalf of herself and similarly situated employees, the Plaintiff, v. @THE SALON INC d/b/a @THESALON and JAMES FONG, the Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05154 (S.D.N.Y., June 8, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law. According to the complaint, Defendants did not provide notice to Plaintiff that Defendants would be taking tip-credit for tips received by Plaintiff. During the course of Plaintiff's employment, Plaintiff's wages and salary fell far below the minimum wage rate for the New York State.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Lawrence Spasojevich, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF JAMES F. SULLIVAN, P.C. 52 Duane Street, 7th Floor New York, NY 10007 Telephone: (212) 374 0009 Facsimile: (212) 374 9931 SAM ASH MUSIC: Rule 23 Class Certification Sought in "Lane" Suit ---------------------------------------------------------------- Carl Lane asks the Court to certify the action styled CARL LANE v. SAM ASH MUSIC CORPORATION, Case No. 2:18-cv-00403-LPL (W.D. Pa.), to proceed as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiff also seeks appointment as class representative and for the appointment of a class counsel. The Plaintiff, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, appears pro se. A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ULI96ZU7 The Defendant is represented by: Thomas Lucchesi, Esq. STRADLEY RONON STEVEN & YOUNG 1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: (202) 507-6401 E-mail: tlucchesi@stradley.com SANFORD LP: Spacone's Bid to Certify Class Taken Under Submission ----------------------------------------------------------------- The Hon. Andre Birotte, Jr., has taken under submission the motion for class certification filed by the Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled David Spacone v. Sanford, LP, et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-02419-AB-MRW (C.D. Cal.). "The Court having carefully considered the papers and the evidence submitted by the parties, and having heard the oral arguments of counsel, hereby takes the motion under submission," according to the Order. A copy of the Order is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=KZLNjeSz The Plaintiff is represented by: Bevin Elaine Allen Pike, Esq. Jordan L. Lurie, Esq. Trisha Kathleen Monesi, Esq. CAPSTONE LAW APC 1875 Century Park East, Suite 1000 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 556-4811 Facsimile: (310) 943-0396 E-mail: Bevin.Pike@CapstoneLawyers.com Jordan.Lurie@CapstoneLawyers.com Trisha.Monesi@CapstoneLawyers.com Defendant Sanford, LP, is represented by: Jean-Paul P. Cart, Esq. SCHIFF HARDIN LLP One Market Street Spear Street Tower, Suite 3100 San Francisco, CA 94105 Telephone: (415) 901-8700 Facsimile: (415) 901-8701 E-mail: jcart@schiffhardin.com SAKS & COMPANY: Failed to Secure Customer Data, Rudolph Says ------------------------------------------------------------ ALEXANDRIA RUDOLPH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. SAKS & COMPANY LLC d/b/a SAKS OFF 5TH, a Delaware limited liability company, the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-05107-JFW-SS (C.D. Cal., June 8, 2018), alleges that Saks failed to secure and safeguard its customers' credit and debit card numbers, which Saks collected at the time Plaintiff and other Class members made purchases at Defendant's Saks OFF 5TH stores, and failed to provide timely, accurate and adequate notice to Plaintiff and Class members that their customer data had been stolen, as well as precisely what types of information were stolen. According to the complaint, on March 28, 2018, the notorious hacking group known as Fin7 announced the successful data breach of an unnamed major corporation, resulting in the unauthorized release of over five million stolen credit and debit cards. Subsequently, on April 1, 2018, the cyber-threat research group Gemini Advisory, working with several large financial institutions, confirmed that the stolen Customer Data belonged to Hudson's Bay Company. HBC is Defendant's parent company, owning the Saks Fifth Avenue, Saks OFF 5TH, and Lord & Taylor stores.[BN] Attorneys for Plaintiff Alexandria Rudolph: Benjamin Heikali, Esq. Joshua Nassir, Esq. FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP 10866 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1470 Los Angeles, CA 90024 Telephone: (424) 256 2884 Facsimile: (424) 256 2885 E-mail: bheikali@faruqilaw.com jnassir@faruqilaw.com SARBANAND FARMS: Bid to Serve CSI in "Rosas" Granted ---------------------------------------------------- In the case, BARBARO ROSAS and GUADALUPE TAPIA, as individuals and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. SARBANAND FARMS, LLC, MUNGERBROS., LLC., NIDIA PEREZ, and CSI VISA PROCESSING S.C., Defendants, Case No. C18- 0112-JCC (W.D. Wash.), Judge John C. Coughenour of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, Seattle, granted the Plaintiffs' motion to serve Defendant CSI S.C. pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). The Plaintiffs bring a putative class action on behalf of approximately 600 Mexican farm workers for alleged labor law violations during the 2017 blueberry harvest in Sumas, Washington. They have personally served both grower Defendants and seek Court leave to serve Defendant CSI S.C., a Mexican farm labor contractor, by mail to CSI S.C.'s employee based in Olympia, Washington and by service on U.S. counsel. The Plaintiffs assert that the alternative option -- service through the Hague Convention -- would involve a year's delay and approximately $3,000 in costs. No Defendant opposed or otherwise responded to the Plaintiffs' present motion. Judge Coughenour finds that the particularities of the case require alternate service under Rule 4(f)(3). The Plaintiffs' initial complaint named CSI USA, a company with the same personnel as CSI, S.C., but registered in the state of Washington. The Plaintiffs made repeated attempts to serve CSI USA at its Washington address before CSI USA's counsel, Adam Belzberg, agreed to accept service. Upon consulting with Mr. Belzberg, the Plaintiffs amended their complaint to substitute CSI S.C. for CSI USA. Mr. Belzberg declined to accept or waive service on behalf of CSI S.C., stating that he represented only CSI USA. The Plaintiffs represent that effecting service of process on CSI S.C. in Mexico will take approximately one year and cost approximately $3,000. Given Plaintiffs' attempts to effect service in the U.S., the close relationship between CSI S.C. and CSI USA, and the Court's interest in efficiently advancing the class action litigation, the Judge finds alternative service under Rule 4(f)(3) necessary. This result is not precluded by the Hague Convention, which does not come into force where valid service can occur in the United States. The Plaintiffs' proposed means of alternative service are reasonably calculated to provide notice to CSI S.C. and to it provide an opportunity to present objections. They propose service on Mr. Belzberg, attorney for CSI USA, and Roxana Macias, employee of CSI USA and CSI S.C. Service on Mr. Belzberg and Ms. Macias is reasonably certain to inform CSI S.C. of the pending lawsuit. Mr. Belzberg has stated that he represents only CSI, USA, which has never been used for anything. However, he has communicated with CSI S.C. about the pending lawsuit, he knows CSI's legal position regarding waiver or authorization of service, and he has provided CSI S.C. with a copy of the amended complaint. Mr. Belzberg has further represented that CSI S.C. and CSI USA are "the same owners; the same people." This is reflected in the Ms. Macias paperwork filed to form CSI Visa Processing, USA, LLC. The filing lists Guillermo Mathus and Tania de la Fuente as the two other executors of the company. Mr. Mathus is also the president of CSI S.C. and de la Fuente is the general manager for the company, which has been active in Washington since at least 2012. the Judge finds that service on Mr. Belzberg and Ms. Macias is reasonably calculated under these circumstances, to apprise CSI S.C. of the pendency of the action and to afford a full and fair opportunity to respond. For the foregoing reasons, Judge Coughenour granted the Plaintiffs' motion for alternative service. The Plaintiffs may serve CSI S.C.'s Washington-based employee, Roxana Macias, by first-class U.S. mail at her address in Olympia and attorney Adam Belzberg at his law office in Seattle. A full-text copy of the Court's April 27, 2018 Order is available at https://is.gd/SjAGEb from Leagle.com. Barbaro Rosas & Guadalupe Tapia, Plaintiffs, represented by Adam J. Berger -- berger@sgb-law.com -- SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER, Joachim Morrison -- joe.morrison@columbialegal.org -- COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES, Bernardo Rafael Cruz -- bernardo.cruz@columbialegal.org -- COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES, Lindsay Halm -- halm@sgb-law.com -- SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER, Lori Isley -- lori.isley@columbialegal.org -- COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES & Tony Gonzalez -- tony.gonzalez@columbialegal.org -- COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES. Sarbanand Farms LLC, Munger Bros LLC & Nidia Perez, Defendants, represented by Coby Cohen -- ccohen@sbwllp.com -- SAVITT BRUCE & WILLEY LLP, David Nelson Bruce -- dbruce@sbwllp.com -- SAVITT BRUCE & WILLEY LLP & Miles Aaron Yanick -- myanick@sbwllp.com -- SAVITT BRUCE & WILLEY LLP. SCOTT JEWELERS: Faces "Harland" Suit in New York State Court ------------------------------------------------------------ A class action lawsuit has been filed against Scott Jewelers, Ltd. The lawsuit is captioned as HARLAND, JACK AND ON BEHALF OF OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, the Plaintiff, v. SCOTT JEWELERS, LTD., MARK UDELL JEWELERS, LTD. AND UDELL JEWELERS, INC., the Defendants, Case No. 604944/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., June 8, 2018).[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C. One Old Country Road, Ste.347 Carle Place, NY 11514 Telephone: (516) 873 9550 The Defendant is represented by: Michael J. Robinson, Esq. HARPER GREY LLP Telephone: (604) 895 2902 E-mail: mrobinson@harpergrey.com SEASONS HOSPICE: "Rodriguez" Suit Moved to S.D. Florida ------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit titled Anthony Rodriguez and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. Seasons Hospice & Palliative Care of Southern Florida, Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 18-013298-CA-01, was removed from the 11th Judicial Circuit, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida (Miami) on June 8, 2018. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:18-cv-22299-KMW to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Kathleen M. Williams. Seasons Hospice offers skilled nursing, assisted living, rehabilitation and pain management services.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Jason Saul Remer, Esq. REMER & GEORGES-PIERRE, PLLC Court House Tower 44 West Flagler Street, Suite 2200 Miami, FL 33130 Telephone: (305) 416 5000 Facsimile: (305) 416 5005 E-mail: jremer@rgpattorneys.com The Defendant is represented by: Kevin M. Young, Esq. SEYFARTH SHAW LLP 1075 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 2500 Atlanta, GA 30328 Telephone: (404) 885 6697 Facsimile: (404) 724 1697 E-mail: kyoung@seyfarth.com SERVPRO INDUSTRIES: Delta Dawgs Moves for Class Certification ------------------------------------------------------------- The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit styled DELTA DAWGS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, a California corporation, TAMMY WOLOSKI, an individual; PAUL WOLOSKI, an individual v. SERVPRO INDUSTRIES, INC., a Nevada corporation; RICHARD CONNER, aka RICKY CONNER, an individual, Case No. 2:18-cv-02907-JAK-JC (C.D. Cal.), move the Court for an order granting class certification and declaring that the Third Claim for Relief of the First Amended Complaint be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class consists of: All persons and entities who have entered into an Franchise License Agreement (FLA) with SERVPRO Industries, Inc. for the operation of a SERVPRO franchise in the State of California, and who as of the date of the filing of this action up to and including the rendition of judgment herein operate a SERVPRO franchise in the State of California, which FLA contains a forum selection/venue clause that provides for litigation of disputes between franchisees and SERVPRO in the State of Tennessee in violation of California Business & Professions Code section 20020.5 The Plaintiffs also seek the appointment of Ernest J. Franceschi, Jr., Esq., of Franceschi Law Corporation as class counsel, in light of his substantial class action experience, competency and capability of effectively representing the interests of the Class. The Court will commence a hearing on July 23, 2018, at 8:30 a.m., to consider the Motion. A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=1NC53l9W The Plaintiffs are represented by: Ernest J. Franceschi, Jr., Esq. FRANCESCHI LAW CORPORATION 800 Wilshire Boulevard, 12th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 Telephone: (213) 622-0835 Facsimile: (213) 622-0837 E-mail: ejf@franceschilaw.com SOUTH CAROLINA: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in "Craft" --------------------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Beaufort Division, denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned Jacqueline L. Craft, Trustee of the Jacqueline L. Craft Trust U/T/D June 30 1998, and Jacqueline L. Craft, Individually, Plaintiffs, v. South Carolina State Plastering, LLC, Peter Conley, Del Webb Communities, Inc., and Pulte Homes, Inc., Defendants, C.A. No. 9:15-cv-5080-PMD (D. S. C.). The action arises out of construction defects related to the stucco applied to the homes in Sun City Hilton Head. They propose that the Court certify the class under the following definition: All individuals, corporations, unincorporated associations, or other entities who purchased stucco-clad homes in Sun City Hilton Head from anyone other than Del Webb Communities, Inc., and/or Pulte Homes, Inc. to which South Carolina State Plastering applied the exterior stucco in-whole or in-part prior to July 31, 2007 which exhibits any one of the following: (a) The lack of through-wall head flashing above doors and/or windows; (b) The lack of stucco control joints at the corners of windows and/or doors; and/or (c) The lack of an appropriate gap between the stucco exterior and the structure slab. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs class actions. It states: (a) One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Here, the relevant sub-part is Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that: questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The Plaintiffs allege three defects: lack of through wall head flashing above doors and windows, lack of stucco control joints at the corners of doors and windows, and lack of an appropriate gap between the stucco exterior and the structure slab. The Defendants contend that there is no connection between these alleged defects, and that the repairs necessary for each alleged defect would be completely different. On the other hand, the Plaintiffs state that they need only allege common defects and provide some evidence that those defects exist in order to warrant class certification. They contend that they have provided such evidence in the form of expert testimony from the Defendants' subcontractors that the defects do exist. Here, the Court believes that the predominance inquiry is fatal to the Plaintiffs' attempt to certify a class. Predominance is an even more stringent inquiry than commonality and the Court must conclude that the individual determinations in this case far outweigh the common. The first, and best, example of this is Defendants' statute of limitations argument.2 In support of their contention that individualized determinations predominate, the Defendants cite Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 342 (4th Cir. 1998). In Broussard, the Fourth Circuit stated that when the defendant's affirmative defenses (such as the statute of limitations) may depend on facts peculiar to each plaintiff's case, class certification is erroneous. Rather than attempting to distinguish or even address Broussard, the Plaintiffs contend that any statute of limitations issues could be dealt with in post-verdict proceedings. The Plaintiffs offer no further explanation of what those proceedings would entail, and fail to cite any authority supporting that concept. Moreover, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs fail to explain why the Defendants should be required to undergo a trial before being able to adjudicate an affirmative defense that might otherwise bar a trial. As the Plaintiffs have the burden at this stage, the Court concludes that they have failed to show that the individualized statute of limitations issues here can be resolved on a class-wide basis and that those questions do not predominate. The Plaintiffs requested that the Court remand this case in the event that it denied their motion for class certification. The Court declines to do so. Every circuit that has addressed the question has held that post-removal events do not oust Class Action Fairness Act jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion to certify a class is denied, and the Plaintiffs' request that the Court remand this case is also denied. A full-text copy of the District Court's April 26, 2018 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ydxvtudf from Leagle.com. Jacqueline L Craft, Trustee of the Jacqueline L. Craft Trust u/t/d June 30, 1998 and individually, Plaintiff, represented by John T. Chakeris -- john@chakerislawfirm.com -- Chakeris Law Firm, Michael S. Seekings -- mseekings@leathbouchlaw.com -- Leath Bouch and Seekings, Phillip W. Segui, Jr., Segui Law Firm, & William Jefferson Leath, Jr., Leath Bouch and Seekings. South Carolina State Plastering LLC & Peter Conley, Defendants, represented by Christy E. Mahon -- cem@swblaw.com -- Sweeny Wingate and Barrow & Everett Augustus Kendall, II -- eak@swblaw.com -- Sweeny Wingate and Barrow. Del Webb Communities Inc & Pulte Homes Inc, Defendants, represented by A. Victor Rawl Jr -- vrawl@grsm.com -- Gordon and Rees LLP, Celeste Tiller Jones -- cjones@mcnair.com -- McNair Law Firm-Cola & Henry Wilkins Frampton, IV -- hframpton@grsm.com -- Gordon and Rees LLP. STEINWAY TOWING: Tow Truck Drivers to Be Notified of "Singh" Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- The Hon. Steven Tiscione entered an order in the lawsuit entitled DEVON SINGH v. STEINWAY TOWING, INC. a/k/a 1-2-3 Towing, and VINCENT D'AMATO, Individually, Case No. 1:18-cv-01387-MKB-ST (E.D.N.Y.), ruling that on or before 45 days after entry of the Order, the Plaintiffs or their designated representatives shall cause a copy of the Notice of Lawsuit and Consent to Join Form in English to be mailed by first class mail to: All current and former employees of the Defendants who worked in the capacity of tow truck drivers and performed all work incidental thereto, from May 20, 2015, through the present. Corporate officers, shareholders, directors, administrative employees shall not be part of the proposed collective. Within 10 days from the entry of this Order, the Defendants shall post the Notice of Lawsuit in a conspicuous location at its primary place of business, which is believed to be located in Astoria, County of Queens, New York. The Court approves the form of the Notice of Lawsuit and Consent to Join Lawsuit form, and finds that the mailing of such Notice and Consent to Join Lawsuit form will constitute the best notice practicable under the circumstances to members of the collective. Within 10 days after entry of this Order, the Defendants shall furnish to the Plaintiffs' counsel a list containing the full name and other information for each of the current and former tow truck drivers, however titled, who provided services for one or more weeks in furtherance of the business of the Defendants at any time from May 20, 2015, to the present. A copy of the Order is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=M5yrpr5G STONEHENGE MANAGEMENT: Faces "Fischler" Suit in S.D. New York ------------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Stonehenge Management LLC. The case is styled as Brian Fischler, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Stonehenge Management LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05794 (S.D. N.Y., June 27, 2018). Stonehenge Management LLC provides investment management, property management, development, design, construction, and leasing services. The company, together with its investment partners, owns a portfolio of properties that include apartments in Mahattan. Stonehenge Management LLC is based in New York, New York.[BN] The Plaintiff appears PRO SE. SWISSPORT USA: Fails to Pay Wages, Vinasco Claims ------------------------------------------------- INGRID L. VINASCO, Individually and on behalf of similarly situated individuals, the Plaintiffs, v. SWISSPORT USA, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01902 (S.D. Tex., June 8, 2018), alleges that Defendant did not pay its employees, including the Plaintiff, wages for work performed by its employees, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act. According to the complaint, the Defendant automatically deducted 30 minutes from each shift worked by its employees for meal breaks regardless of whether the employee actually had an uninterrupted meal break. The Defendant did not pay its employees, including the Plaintiff, for their overtime work at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay. As such, Defendant denied wages to Plaintiff and Defendant's employees, failed to pay overtime and failed to pay overtime at a rate of one and one half of regular rate. Swissport International is a Swiss aviation services company providing airport ground and cargo handling services, headquartered in Opfikon, Switzerland.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Trang Q. Tran, Esq. TRAN LAW FIRM 2537 South Gessner Road, Suite 104 Houston, TX 77063 Telephone: (713) 223 8855 Facsimile: (713) 623 6399 E-mail: ttran@tranlawllp.com service@tranlawllp.com TAHOE RESOURCES: "Sanders" Suit Moved to District of Nevada ----------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit titled TYLER SANDERS, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. TAHOE RESOURCES INC., C. KEVIN MCARTHUR, RONALD W. CLAYTON, MARK SADLER, and ELIZABETH MCGREGOR, the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv- 04052, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, to the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada (Las Vegas) on June 8, 2018. The Nevada District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:18-cv-01041-RFB-GWF to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard F. Boulware, II. The case is a federal securities class action on behalf of a class consisting of all persons and entities other than Defendants who purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly traded securities of Tahoe from March 12, 2015 through July 5, 2017, both dates inclusive. The Plaintiff seeks to recover compensable damages caused by Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. Tahoe Resources is a mining company and intermediate precious metals producer with silver and gold mines in Canada, Guatemala and Peru. It was founded in Vancouver, BC by Kevin McArthur, former CEO of Glamis Gold and Goldcorp.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Phillip Kim, Esq. Laurence M. Rosen, Esq. THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A. 275 Madison Ave, 34th Floor New York, NY 10016 Telephone: (212) 686 1060 Facsimile: (212) 202 3827 E-mail: pkim@rosenlegal.com lrosen@rosenlegal.com - and - Johnston de Forest Whitman, Jr., Esq. KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP 280 King Of Prussia Road Wayne, PA 19087 Telephone: (610) 667 7706 Facsimile: (610) 667 7056 - and - Richard W. Gonnello, Esq. Megan Marie Sullivan, Esq. Sherief Morsy, Esq. FARUQI & FARUQI 685 Third Avenue, 26th Floor New York, NY 10017 Telephone: (212) 983 9330 Facsimile: (212) 983 9331 E-mail: smorsy@faruqilaw.com - and - Jeremy Alan Lieberman, Esq. POMERANTZ LLP 1201 Third Ave., 20th Flr. New York, NY 10016 Telephone: (212) 661 1100 Facsimile: (212) 661 8665 E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com - and - Arthur G. Jakoby, Esq. HERRICK, FEINSTEIN, L.L.P. 2 Park Avenue New York, NY 10016 Telephone: (212) 592 1438 Facsimile: (212) 545 3340 TESLA INC: Interlocutory Appeal in Shareholder Suit Refused ----------------------------------------------------------- In the case, ELON MUSK, BRAD W. BUSS, ROBYN M. DENHOLM, IRA EHRENPREIS, ANTONIO J. GRACIAS, STEPHEN T. JURVETSON, and KIMBAL MUSK, Defendants Below, Appellants, and TESLA, INC., Nominal Defendant Below, Appellant, v. ARKANSAS TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM, BOSTON RETIREMENT SYSTEM, ROOFERS LOCAL 149 PENSION FUND, OKLAHOMA FIREFIGHTERS PENSION AND RETIREMENT SYSTEM, KBC ASSET MANAGEMENT NV, ERSTE-SPARINVEST KAPITALANLAGEGESELLSCHAFT M.B.H., STICHTING BLUE SKY ACTIVE LARGE CAP EQUITY FUND USA, and AARON ROCKE, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees, Case No. 221, 2018, Consolidated C.A. No. 12711 (Del.), Judge James T. Vaughn, Jr. of the Supreme Court of Delaware refused the Defendants-Appellants' appeal from Court of Chancery March 28, 2018 interlocutory order. The Defendants-Appellants seek interlocutory review of the Court of Chancery's opinion of March 28, 2018, denying their motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs-Appellees' second amended verified class action and derivative complaint under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). The Court of Chancery refused the application for certification in a detailed order dated April 27, 2018, explaining why interlocutory review was not warranted under the principles and criteria of Supreme Court Rule 42(b). Interlocutory review is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. In the exercise of his discretion, Judge Vaughn concludes that the application for interlocutory review does not meet the strict standards for certification under Rule 42(b). Accordingly, he refused the interlocutory appeal. A full-text copy of the Court's April 27, 2018 Order is available at https://is.gd/TbF35N from Leagle.com. THUMBS UP: Fails to Pay Minimum and Overtime Wages, Zhang Says -------------------------------------------------------------- JIAN ZHANG, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CHONGQING LIUYISHOU GOURMET NJ INC d/b/a Thumbs Up Chinese Restaurant, WEIBAINIAN GOURMET INC d/b/a Thumbs Up Chinese Restaurant, YUE MA, and MENG DOE, the Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-10359 (D.N.J., June 8, 2018), alleges that Defendants willfully and intentionally committed widespread violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and New Jersey State Wage and Hour Law by engaging in a pattern and practice of failing to pay their employees, including Plaintiff, the statutory minimum wage and overtime compensation for all hours worked over 40 each workweek. The Thumbs Up restaurant in New Jersey offers Chinese cuisine.[BN] Attorneys for the Plaintiff, proposed FLSA Collective and potential Rule 23 Class Plaintiffs: Aaron Schweitzer, Esq. TROY LAW, PLLC 41-25 Kissena Blvd., Suite 119 Flushing, NY 11355 Telephone: (718) 762 1324 E-mail: johntroy@troypllc.com TOMORROW PCS: Blank's Bid to Proceed as Collective Action Denied ---------------------------------------------------------------- The Hon. Mary Ann Vial Lemmon entered an order in the lawsuit styled LYNDSAY BLANK v. TOMORROW PCS, LLC AND JONG PARK, Case No. 2:16-cv-11092-MVL-DEK (E.D. La.): -- denying the Plaintiffs' Motion to Proceed as a Collective Action and for Judicial Notice to Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs; -- denying the Plaintiffs' Motion to Modify the United States Magistrate Judge's April 20, 2018, Order Pursuant to Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; -- denying the Defendants' Motion to Strike Declarations; and -- denying the Plaintiffs' Motion to Continue Trial and Discovery Deadline. On June 21, 2016, the Plaintiff filed the action alleging that TPCS violated the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to pay her and other similarly situated employees one-and-one-half times of their regular rate for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. The Plaintiffs' complaint stated that she sought to proceed as a collective action under Section 216(b) the FLSA. Judge Lemmon opines, among other things, that general fairness and procedural considerations weigh against certification. After the original class was certified and notice provided to potential plaintiffs, there are currently only three opt-in plaintiffs. A copy of the Order is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=al17coXO TRADEMARK CONSTRUCTION: "Garcia" Suit Moved to S.D. California -------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit titled Jose Garcia, an individual, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Trademark Construction Co., Inc., an Arizona Corporation; Trademark Construction Co., Inc., an Arizona Corporation; which will do Business in California as J.M.W. Truss and Components; and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 37- 02018-00016180-CU-OE-CTL, was removed from the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California (San Diego) on June 8, 2018. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:18-cv-01214-JLS-WVG to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Janis L. Sammartino. Trademark Construction Co, Inc. was founded in 1978. The Company's line of business includes manufacturing engine electrical equipment.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: David Harmik Yeremian, Esq. DAVID YEREMIAN & ASSOCIATES, INC. 535 N Brand Blvd Ste 705 Glendale, CA 91203 Telephone: (818) 230 8380 Facsimile: (818) 230 0308 E-mail: david@yeremianlaw.com The Defendants are represented by: Spencer C Skeen, Esq. OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C. 4370 La Jolla Drive, Suite 990 San Diego, CA 92122 Telephone: (858) 652 3100 Facsimile: (858) 652 3101 E-mail: spencer.skeen@ogletreedeakins.com TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Faces "Meyrov" Suit in E.D. New York --------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Transworld Systems Inc. The case is styled as Yoseph Meyrov, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Transworld Systems Inc., Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-03709 (E.D. N.Y., June 26, 2018). Transworld Systems Inc. provides accounts receivable, debt recovery, and past due accounts services for businesses, medical companies, dental companies, education facilities, Fortune 500 companies, and small businesses in the United States and internationally. It offers accelerator, profit recovery, messenger, dental collection, demand/direct deposit account recovery plus, outsourcing, medical collection, education collection, and commercial/business-to-business collections services.[BN] The Plaintiff appears PRO SE. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Court Dismisses "Rosenzweig" FDCPA Suit ----------------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in the case captioned ARON ROSENZWEIG, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS INC., Defendant, Civil Action No. 16-227 (JMV)(MF) (D.N.J.). The Plaintiff alleges that on a date better known to the Defendant, he drove through a toll plaza but the toll was not paid. Afterward, the Defendant sent the Plaintiff a collection letter, requesting a total of $55.00: $5.00 for the unpaid toll and $50.00 for an administrative fee. The collection letter did not specify the date of the violation. The Defendant's collection letter indicated the Plaintiff's Current Balance Due as $55.00, and further stated that "your account balance may be periodically increased due to the addition of accrued interest or other changes as provided in the agreement with the original creditor or as otherwise provided for state law." The Plaintiff claims these two statements are false, deceptive, and misleading. To succeed on an claim pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant's challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a debt as the Act defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt. The Court discussed the Plaintiff's allegations with regard to the FDCPA in great detail in its July 14, 2017 Opinion, and ultimately dismissed the FDCPA claim because it determined the delinquent toll and fee are not debts. The analysis in that Opinion relied heavily on a case out of this District, which held that an obligation arising from non-payment of a toll does not constitute a debt under the FDCPA. In sum, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to remedy the deficiencies the Court addressed in its July 14, 2017 Opinion. The Plaintiff, in essence, repeats the same legal arguments with which the Court has already disagreed. The Plaintiff also now attaches the E-ZPass Individual Agreement Terms and Conditions as Exhibit A to the SAC. As the Court noted in its original Opinion, the Terms and Conditions directly contradict the Plaintiff's allegation that the E-ZPass contract extended him a line of credit. The Plaintiff's attorney nevertheless states in his declaration that he called MTA Bridges and Tunnels E-ZPass regarding the policies and procedures, and during that call a representative from E-ZPass told him that although it is not written in the contract, it is E-ZPass's policy to extend credit to consumers. The written document, however, controls, the Court says. Moreover, even if the Court were to credit the declaration (which would essentially mean that the Plaintiff's attorney is acting as a fact witness in a case that he is litigating), it does not indicate that E-ZPass extended credit to users during the time alleged in the SAC. The collection letter was sent on June 29, 2015, meaning that the Plaintiff's alleged violation had to occur before that date. Regardless of the contract between the Plaintiff and E-ZPass, the Plaintiff has failed to show that the delinquent toll and the administrative fee are debts under the FDCPA instead he has rehashed arguments he made in opposition to the first motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated in the Court's July 14, 2017 Opinion, the Court disagrees with the Plaintiff's arguments. Thus, the Court has no legal basis to deny this second motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Defendant's motion is granted. A full-text copy of the District Court's April 26, 2018 Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycsrwh87 from Leagle.com. ARON ROSENZWEIG, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff, represented by DANIEL ZEMEL, Zemel Law LLC & FRED M. ZEMEL, THE ZEMEL LAW FIRM. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS INC., Defendant, represented by AARON RAPHAEL EASLEY -- aeasley@sessions.legal.com -- SESSIONS, FISHMAN, NATHAN & ISRAEL, LLC. TRI-STATE WINDOW: Faces "Wu" Suit in E.D. New York --------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Tri-State Window Factory Corp. The case is styled as Kathy Wu, on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Tri-State Window Factory Corp., Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-03655-SJF-ARL (E.D. N.Y., June 25, 2018). Tri-State Window Factory Corp. manufactures plastics products. The Company offers injection molding, tooling, product development, and secondary operations services. Tri-State Window Factory serves automotive, medical, electronics, and packaging industries worldwide.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Dana Lauren Gottlieb, Esq. Gottlieb & Associates 150 East 18th Street, Suite Phr New York, NY 10003 Tel: (212) 879-0240 Fax: (212) 982-6284 Email: danalgottlieb@aol.com - and - Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq. Gottlieb & Associates 150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR New York, NY 10003 Tel: (212) 879-0240 Fax: (212) 982-6284 Email: nyjg@aol.com UNITED COLLECTION: Park Moves for Final Approval of Settlement -------------------------------------------------------------- Sungsoo Park, Tremaine K. Watkins, Elizabeth E. Jun and Georgina Sandoval, Plaintiffs in the consolidated lawsuit styled IN RE UNITED COLLECTION BUREAU, INC., Case No. 2:15-cv-01306-CLW (D.N.J.), moves for final approval of class action settlement. The Plaintiffs move the Court for an order certifying the case to proceed as a class action and granting Final Approval of the Parties' class settlement agreement. A copy of the Notice of Motion is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=1BW3c3Mr The Plaintiffs are represented by: Bharati Sharma Patel, Esq. THE WOLF LAW FIRM, LLC 1520 U.S. Hwy 130 - Suite 101 North Brunswick, NJ 08902 Telephone: (732) 545-7900 Facsimile: (732) 545-1030 E-mail: bpatel@wolflawfirm.net - and - Yongmoon Kim, Esq. KIM LAW FIRM LLC 411 Hackensack Ave., Suite 701 Hackensack, NJ 07601 Telephone: (201) 273-7117 Facsimile: (201) 273-7117 E-mail: ykim@kimlf.com Defendant United Collection Bureau, Inc., is represented by: Amanda L. Genovese, Esq. TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 Telephone: (212) 704-6227 E-mail: amanda.genovese@troutmansanders.com - and - Ethan G. Ostroff, Esq. TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 222 Central Park Avenue, Suite 2000 Virginia Beach, VA 23462 Telephone: (757) 687-7541 Facsimile: (757) 687-1541 E-mail: ethan.ostroff@troutmansanders.com - and - David N. Anthony, Esq. TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 1001 Haxall Point Richmond, VA 23219 Telephone: (804) 697-5410 Facsimile: (804) 698-5118 E-mail: david.anthony@troutman.com UNITED STATES: Marshall's Bid to Certify Prisoners Class Denied --------------------------------------------------------------- The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied without prejudice the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Action Certification, request for appointment of counsel to represent the class, and Motion to Expedite the Proceedings filed in the lawsuit captioned MICHELLE RENEE MARSHALL v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-01258-UNA (D.D.C.). The Plaintiff is a federal prisoner challenging Federal Bureau of Prisons policies, which allow "male inmates who allege they are women" to be housed in facilities "with natural born, biological females[.]" She purports to bring this action on behalf of "All Similarly Situated Federal Female Prisoners[,] to include heterosexual, lesbian, Christian, Jewish, [and] Muslim women currently in federal prisons nationwide." The Court opines that it does not appear that the Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, has had legal training, and, therefore, she cannot represent adequately the interests of the proposed class of inmates. The Court also adds that the case can proceed no further at this time because the Plaintiff has not yet paid the filing fee or been granted in forma pauperis status. A copy of the Order is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=0AvRxmJG UNITED STATES: Class of LGUs Entitled to PILT Certified ------------------------------------------------------- The United States Court of Federal Claims granted Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned KANE COUNTY, UTAH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant, Nos. 17-739C; 17-1991C (Consolidated) (Fed. Cl.). Kane County, Utah, is one of a number of units of local government entitled to certain payments from the federal government known as Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT). Kane County then brought these consolidated cases, alleging that the federal government's failure to pay the full formula amounts was a breach of the statute's money-mandating obligation. It moved for summary judgment as to liability in both cases and the Court granted its motions. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (RCFC), the Court may certify a class action if: (1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) There are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Additionally, the Court must find that the United States has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. Numerosity It is clear in this case that the numerosity requirement is met. RCFC 23(a)(1) requires that the potential class be so numerous that joinder is impractical. Here, the potential class includes approximately 1,900 local government entities across the United States. These entities include counties in all fifty states, as well as governmental units in the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The Court finds that this nationwide potential class of nearly 2,000 plaintiffs renders joinder impractical and satisfies RCFC 23's numerosity requirement. Commonality The second requirement for class certification, commonality, is also met in this case. RCFC 23(a)(2) requires that there be questions of law or fact common to the class. Here, a single, common question of law predominates over all other issues in this case: whether the federal government was required to pay each eligible unit of local government its full formula amount in FYs 2015 through 2017, notwithstanding Congress' insufficient appropriations. Moreover, the government acted uniformly as to all eligible units of local government in each of those fiscal years by proportionally reducing each unit's formula amount based on the insufficient appropriations. Accordingly, commonality is satisfied in this case. Typicality Kane County's claims in these cases also satisfy the typicality requirement. For this factor, RCFC 23(a)(3) requires that the claims or defenses of the representative parties be typical of the claims or defenses of the class. Kane County's claims share the same essential characteristics of the class at large. It asserts that the federal government failed to pay it the full amounts it was owed under the PILT formulas in FYs 2015, 2016, and 2017. Each potential class member's claim is identical, other than the specific dollar amount involved, as the government proportionally reduced every eligible unit of local government's PILT payment in FYs 2015, 2016, and 2017 based on insufficient appropriations. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Kane County's claims demonstrate sufficient typicality. Adequacy The fourth factor for class certification requires a finding that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Here, the parties do not appear to have any antagonistic interests and the government does not point to any. Each eligible unit of local government has the same legal claim, unaffected by the claims of other potential class members. And as to class counsel, Kane County asserts that Smith, Currie & Hancock LLP have experience in handling class actions and litigating before this court. The government does not dispute these assertions. Moreover, Kane County's lead attorney, Mr. Saltman, has been handling PILT litigation since at least 2005. Therefore, the Court finds adequate representation of the interests of the class. Superiority Finally, the rules require that a class action be superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy in order to certify a class. Here, a common question of law predominates over all other questions in this case, reducing the remainder to essentially mathematical calculations. Therefore, a class action would certainly achieve economies of time, effort and expenses while promoting uniformity. In the absence of class action certification, the Court of Federal Claims could be inundated with nearly 2,000 separate cases presenting the same question of law. No party points to any particular difficulties in managing this class action, and the Court does not foresee any, particularly as all that remains in the case is for the parties to make mathematical calculations with respect to damages. Accordingly, because of the predominance of the legal question, the number of potential plaintiffs, and the relatively small amounts involved with respect to each potential class member, the Court concludes that a class action is a superior method of adjudication here. Based on this, Kane County's motion for class certification in these consolidated cases is granted. The Court certifies a class for the consolidated cases. That class is defined as follows: All 'unit[s] of general local government, as defined in 31 U.S.C. Section 6901(2), that received payment under 31 U.S.C. Section 6902(a) of the Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act in fiscal years 2015, 2016 and/or 2017. The class claim is for the amounts the federal government owes to each class member for the underpayment of their PILT entitlements. Pursuant to RCFC 23(g), and the Court appoints Alan I. Saltman, of Smith, Currie & Hancock LLP as class counsel. A full-text copy of the Court of Federal Claims' April 26, 2018 Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7tj9qkl from Leagle.com. KANE COUNTY, UTAH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alan I. Saltman -- aisaltman@smithcurrie.com -- Smith, Currie & Hancock LLP. USA, Defendant, represented by Mark Edward Porada, U.S. Department of Justice-Civil Division. UNITED STATES: Afghan and Iraqi Allies Seeks Class Certification ---------------------------------------------------------------- John/Jane Does Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, and Echo, Plaintiffs in the lawsuit styled AFGHAN AND IRAQI ALLIES UNDER SERIOUS THREAT BECAUSE OF THEIR FAITHFUL SERVICE TO THE UNITED STATES, ON THEIR OWN AND ON BEHALF OF OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. MICHAEL R. POMPEO, et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-01388-TSC (D.D.C.), ask the Court to issue an order: (1) certifying a class of all people who have applied for an Afghan or Iraqi SIV pursuant to the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009, Pub. 1. 111-8, 123 Stat. 807, or the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2007, Pub. 1. 110-181, 122 Stat. 395, by submitting an application for COM Approval and whose applications have been in government- controlled steps for longer than nine months (Plaintiff Class); (2) appointing Plaintiffs John/Jane Does Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, and Echo as class representatives for the Plaintiff Class; and (3) appointing Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer US LLP and the International Refugee Assistance Project as Counsel for the Plaintiff Class Michael R. Pompeo is the U.S. Secretary of State. A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=E88VZA9A The Plaintiffs are represented by: Linda H. Martin, Esq. David Y. Livshiz, Esq. Shannon M. Leitner, Esq. Rebecca L. Curwin, Esq. Allison C. Wilson, Esq. FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER US LLP 601 Lexington Avenue, 31st Floor New York, NY 10022 Telephone: (212) 277-4000 Facsimile: (212) 277-4001 E-mail: linda.martin@freshfields.com david.livshiz@freshfields.com shannon.leitner@freshfields.com rebecca.curwin@freshfields.com allie.wilson@freshfields.com - and - Deepa Alagesan, Esq. Mariko Hirose, Esq. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT 40 Rector Street, 9th Floor New York, NY 10006 Telephone: (646) 602-5639 E-mail: dalagesan@refugeerights.org mhirose@refugeerights.org UPS SUPPLY: Class Certification in "Hughes" Wage Suit Vacated ------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, UPS SUPPLY CHAIN SOLUTIONS, INC.; UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.; and JOHN DOE 1-10, Appellants, v. MARION E. HUGHES; RAYMOND S. BATTS; JAMES A. CRUME; TERRI A. ROGERS; and PHILLIP L. WESTERN, individually, and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Appellees, Case No. 2014-CA-001496-ME (Ky. App.), Judge Sara Walter Combs of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky vacated the order and opinion of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered on Aug. 26, 2014 denying its motion for judgment on the pleadings and granting the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Kentucky's Wages and Hours Act, Kentucky Revised Statutes ("KRS") Chapter 337, allows a plaintiff who is not compensated by his or her employer for performing tasks which are compensable to recover payment for the time spent performing such tasks -- along with liquidated damages and attorney's fees. In 2007, the Appellees filed a putative class action against UPS. In their complaint, they alleged that they and other employees of UPS were required to enter workplace facilities through mandatory security checkpoints before clocking in and to exit through the security checkpoints after clocking out each day. They alleged that they were not paid wages for time spent at the security checkpoints and that UPS violated Kentucky's Wages and Hours Act by failing to compensate employees for work time. The Appellees filed a motion for class certification. The proposed class was defined as consisting of all nonexempt UPS employees employed in the Commonwealth during the applicable limitations period. By order entered July 27, 2012, the circuit court denied the purported class representatives' motion for class certification. They filed a notice of appeal. Thereafter, the purported class representatives filed a motion to amend, seeking to certify a more limited class. The new putative class was defined as all nonexempt UPS employees who worked at the following locations: Elizabethtown, Louisville, Technical & Logistics Center, and Worldport during the applicable limitations period. By opinion and order entered Oct. 9, 2012, the circuit court concluded that the more limited class also failed to meet the prerequisites and conditions of the rules of procedure governing class actions. Consequently, the court declined to certify the limited class. A second notice of appeal was filed. The appeals were consolidated by an order of the Court entered on Nov. 27, 2012. In an unpublished opinion rendered on Sept. 6, 2013, the Court held that the circuit court had not erred by denying class certification in its order concerning the more broadly defined class and concluded that class certification was improper. It affirmed the circuit court's opinion and order with respect to that appeal. With respect to the more limited putative class, the Court concluded that the circuit court had erred by concluding that two prerequisites of CR 23.01 (commonality and typicality) of class certification had not been met. From the Court's review of the record, it rejected the circuit court's conclusions that the putative class failed to meet the commonality prerequisite of class certification, and that the more limited putative class failed to meet the typicality prerequisite for class action certification. Upon remand, UPS filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, contending that the unpaid wages claims of the proposed class members could not be pursued through a class action because the provisions of Kentucky's Wages and Hours law did not permit such actions. Following a hearing conducted on Aug. 15, 2014, the Jefferson Circuit Court denied the motion of UPS for judgment on the pleadings. Pursuant to the Court's instructions, the circuit court proceeded to consider whether the proposed limited class satisfied the numerosity and adequacy of representation prerequisites for class certification. With respect to the numerosity requirement, the circuit court concluded that the proposed class plainly met the numerosity prerequisite of CR 23.01. With respect to whether the adequacy of representation requirement was met, it concluded that the adequacy of representation prerequisite of CR 23.01 had been satisfied. The circuit court next considered whether the proposed limited class fulfilled any one of three conditions established by the provisions of CR 23.02. Having determined that the proposed limited class satisfied one of the three conditions provided by CR 23.02, the circuit court certified the putative class. The appeal followed. On Nov. 17, 2015, UPS filed a motion to hold the appeal in abeyance pending the decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky in McCann v. Sullivan Univ. Systems Inc. In an order entered on Feb. 10, 2016, the Court granted the motion of UPS to hold the matter in abeyance. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Kentucky in McCann was rendered on Aug. 24, 2017. The abatement was lifted, and this appeal has now proceeded to the merits panel. The issue on appeal is whether the circuit court properly granted the motion for class certification. Judge Combs explains that several months after the opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court were entered after the Court's remand, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc, v. Busk. Because the Court interpretes its wages and hours law consistently with the federal Fair Labor Standard Act and its amendments, it is persuaded that the Court's decision in Integrity Staffing now requires the Jefferson Circuit Court to revisit its findings certifying the putative class. Consequently, the Court is compelled to remand the matter once more. On appeal, UPS contends that the holding of Integrity Staffing means that the representative members of the putative class have not suffered a compensable injury. Thus, it argues that the purported class cannot be certified upon the same bases as announced by the circuit court following the Court's remand. Accordingly, the Judge vacated and remanded the order of the circuit court. On remand, the trial court will apply the decision of the Supreme Court in Integrity Staffing as it analyzes the requirements of CR 23 in conjunction with the claims asserted by the putative claims representatives arising under our Wages and Hours Act. A full-text copy of the Court's April 27, 2018 Opinion is available at https://is.gd/NIn0fE from Leagle.com. C. Laurence Woods III -- lwoods@fbtlaw.com -- Tony C. Coleman -- tcoleman@fbtlaw.com -- Griffin Terry Sumner -- gsumner@fbtlaw.com -- Kyle D. Johnson -- kjohnson@fbtlaw.com -- Louisville, Kentucky, Brief for Appellants. Griffin Terry Sumner, Louisville, Kentucky, Oral Argument for Appellants. Michael D. Grabhorn, Kevin C. Burke, Andrew J. Horne -- ahorne@msapc.net -- Louisville, Kentucky, Brief for Appellees. Kevin Burke, Louisville, Kentucky, Oral Argument for Appellees. USA: Faces "Tippins" Suit in Court of Federal Claims ---------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against the USA in the Court of Federal Claims on June 27, 2018. The case is styled as Tonia Tippins, Derrik Magnuson and George Holloway for themselves and as Representatives of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons, Plaintiffs v. USA, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-00923-LAS. The U.S. is a country of 50 states covering a vast swath of North America, with Alaska in the northwest and Hawaii extending the nation's presence into the Pacific Ocean. Major Atlantic Coast cities are New York, a global finance and culture center, and capital Washington, DC. Midwestern metropolis Chicago is known for influential architecture and on the west coast, Los Angeles' Hollywood is famed for filmmaking.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Nathan Scott Mammen, Esq. Kirkland & Ellis LLP (DC) 655 Fifteenth Street, NW Washington, DC 20005 Tel: (202) 879-5949 Email: nathan.mammen@kirkland.com USC TRUSTEES: O'Conner Sues over Sexual Assault ----------------------------------------------- SHANNON LEE O'CONNER on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, and GEORGE TYNDALL, M.D., the Defendants, the Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-05125 (C.D. Cal., June 8, 2018), alleges that Dr. Tyndall caused lasting damage to Plaintiff and other women who sought medical services while attending USC, through conduct that included sexually assaulting them while conducting gynecological examinations, requiring them to disrobe unnecessarily, and making lewd, sexually offensive remarks during the examinations. Shannon O'Conner is one of many women who visited Dr. Tyndall for a gynecological examination at USC's student health center. USC breached its duties to Ms. O'Conner and other female students by keeping Tyndall on staff from 1989 to 2016 despite receiving repeated and continuous complaints about his conduct towards patients. USC nurses and medical assistants attended Tyndall's examinations and observed his predatory behavior, but did nothing to stop it. USC supervisors and administrators learned of Tyndall's misconduct, including from numerous student complaints, yet took no action to protect its female students from him. A recent USC investigation concluded that "[s]everal of the complaints were concerning enough that it is not clear today why the former health center director permitted Tyndall to remain in his position." On May 25, 2018, USC's president resigned, and its Board of Trustees acknowledged that "something is broken" in regard to the University's response to Tyndall's wrongdoing. USC is a private research university in Los Angeles, California. Founded in 1880, it is the oldest private research university in California.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Daniel C. Girard, Esq. Jordan Elias, Esq. Adam E. Polk, Esq. Elizabeth A. Kramer, Esq. GIRARD GIBBS LLP 601 California Street, Suite 1400 San Francisco, CA 94108 Telephone: (415) 981-4800 Facsimile: (415) 981-4846 E-mail: dcg@girardgibbs.com je@girardgibbs.com aep@girardgibbs.com eak@girardgibbs.com USAA GENERAL: Weber Sues over Motor Vehicle Insurance Coverage -------------------------------------------------------------- STUART WEBER, an individual, on his own behalf, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. USAA GENERAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 72947246 (Fla. Cir. Ct. of the 13th Jud. Cir in and for Hillsborough Cty., June 1, 2018), seeks contractual and declaratory relief against USAA, seeking redress for their routine and systematic violations of Florida Statute 627.7288 and USAA's motor vehicle insurance contracts. According to the complaint, USAA routinely and systematically fails to pay for the cost of repairing or replacing damaged windshields without application of their insureds' deductible pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Florida Statutes and the terms of their own automobile policies, including circumstances where other property damage to the vehicle does not exceed the deductible amount. This improper and illegal conduct has resulted in USAA shifting some or all of the cost of windshield repairs and replacements to its insureds in direct contradiction of its insuring agreements and the Florida Statutes. In turn, this conduct forms the basis of declaratory and injunctive relief claims. USAA General Indemnity Co operates as a subsidiary of United Services Automobile Association.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Christa L. Collins, Esq. HARMON PARKER, P.A. 110 North 11th Street, 2nd Floor Tampa, FL 33602 Telephone: (813) 864 1762 Facsimile: (813) 222 3616 E-mail: service.clc@harmonparkerlaw.com clc@harmonparkerlaw.com - and - Howard W. Weber, Esq. DANAHY & MURRAY, P.A. 901 West Swann Avenue Tampa, FL 33606 Telephone: (813) 258 3600 Facsimile: (813) 258 3321 E-mail: firm@danahyandmurray.com VAN RU: Faces "Horowitz" Suit in E.D. New York ---------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Van Ru Credit Corporation. The case is styled as Usher Horowitz, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Van Ru Credit Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03707 (E.D. N.Y., June 26, 2018). Van Ru Credit Corporation provides accounts receivable management solutions for education, energy, financial services, government, healthcare, and telecommunications industries. It offers collection and call center solutions.[BN] The Plaintiff appears PRO SE. VAN RU CREDIT: Court Won't Dismiss "Al" FDCPA Suit -------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned DEBORAH AL, Plaintiff, v. VAN RU CREDIT CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 17-CV-1738-JPS (E.D. Wis.). The Plaintiff sued the Defendant for sending her, and members of the putative class, allegedly misleading debt collection letters. The Plaintiff brings claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA). The Defendant has moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6). That Rule provides for dismissal of complaints which fail to state a viable claim for relief. In reviewing the Plaintiff's Complaint, the Court is required to accept as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. The Defendant asserts that the request to act promptly does not impose a settlement deadline but is instead mere puffery. In the Defendant's view, phrases which urge payment but do not set a payment deadline cannot mislead a consumer. The Defendant claims that the only rational interpretation of the letter is that the Plaintiff had a reasonable amount of time to accept the offer contained in the letter. The Defendant's contentions lack merit, the Court says. The cases it cites regarding puffery relate to alleged violations of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g, which prohibits collectors from overshadowing a consumer's right to dispute a debt for a statutorily prescribed validation period. The Defendant cites no precedent addressing whether language pressing for speedy payment, but which does not set a firm payment deadline, may be excused from Section 1692e liability as puffery. Further, the Defendant's claim that the Plaintiff had a reasonable time to accept the settlement offer relies on the default time for acceptance as provided by Wisconsin contract law. The Court cannot assume that the average consumer, much less an unsophisticated one, would have any familiarity with the principles of contract law. Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied. A full-text copy of the District Court's April 26, 2018 Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8dunxst from Leagle.com. Deborah Al, Plaintiff, represented by Ben J. Slatky -- bslatky@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, Jesse Fruchter -- jfruchter@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, John D. Blythin - - jblythin@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP & Mark A. Eldridge -- meldridge@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP. Van Ru Credit Corporation, Defendant, represented by Nicole M. Strickler -- nstrickler@messerstrickler.com -- Messer Strickler Ltd & Stephanie A. Strickler -- sstrickler@messerstrickler.com -- Messer Strickler Ltd. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Court Dismisses Defective Sunroof Suit -------------------------------------------------------- The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned JONATHAN DAVID, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., a New Jersey Corporation, VOLKSWAGEN AG, a foreign corporation, Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-11301-SDW-CLW (D.N.J.). The Plaintiff was driving the car, its panoramic sunroof shattered. The Plaintiff filed a five-count class action complaint against VolkswagenGOA and its parent company, Volkswagen AG, alleging that Volkswagen's panoramic sunroofs are defective across a variety of Volkswagen models and asserting claims for: (1) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA); (2) unjust enrichment; (3) violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA); (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; and (5) breach of express warranty. In the context of putative class actions arising out of products liability actions, this Court has previously held that a plaintiff has standing only for claims related to products he purchased or used. Consequently, this Court will only consider the Plaintiff's allegations pertaining to the 2014 Volkswagen Touareg. Claims relating to other Volkswagen models or model years are dismissed. Counts I & V -- Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and Express Warranty To state a claim for express warranty under Colorado law, a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a warranty, (2) breach of the warranty, (3) the breach proximately caused the losses claim[ed] as damages, and (4) defendant received timely notice of the breach. Under Colorado law, the statute of limitations for a breach of express warranty claim is three years. The Plaintiff discovered the alleged defect in January, 2016, giving him over a year to file suit before the three-year period ran. To invoke a claim for equitable tolling, the Plaintiff must show that defendant's wrongful conduct prevented him from asserting his claims in a timely manner or that circumstances made his timely filing impossible. The Court finds that the Plaintiff does not plead that the Defendants concealed facts from him that prevented him from filing his claim, nor does he plead extraordinary circumstances that made it impossible for him to timely file. Therefore, this Court finds no basis upon which to toll the three-year statute of limitations for the Plaintiff's breach of express warranty claim. The Plaintiff purchased his car in February, 2014, but did not bring suit until November, 2017. Consequently, his claim is time-barred and Count Five must be dismissed. The Plaintiff's Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) claim must also be dismissed. To state a claim under the MMWA, the Plaintiff must first adequately plead a claim for breach of express warranty. Since Plaintiff's express warranty claim fails, so too must his MMWA claim. Therefore, Count One will be dismissed. Count IV -- Implied Warranty of Merchantability Count Four of the Plaintiff's Complaint asserts a claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. This claim is subject to the same three-year statute of limitations as Plaintiff's express warranty claim, and must be dismissed. Count II -- Unjust Enrichment To successfully plead a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant received a benefit (2) at the plaintiff's expense (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without commensurate compensation. Here, the Plaintiff seeks to hold the Defendant liable for the costs associated with repairing and replacing the allegedly defective sunroofs, and claims that by refusing to pay for those costs, the Defendant obtained monies that rightfully belong to Plaintiff and Class Members. However, the NVLW is a valid enforceable contract between the parties that establishes the warranty on the sunroofs and also serves as the basis for Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim. Therefore, Count Two will be dismissed. Count III -- Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA) To bring an action under the CCPA, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive trade practice; (2) that the challenged practice occurred in the course of defendant's business, vocation, or occupation; (3) that it significantly impacts the public as actual or potential consumers of the defendant's goods, services, or property; (4) that the plaintiff suffered injury in fact to a legally protected interest; and (5) that the challenged practice caused the plaintiff's injury. The Court finds that the Plaintiff's Complaint does not provide this level of specificity. First, the Plaintiff does not plead facts that show that any action taken by the Defendant affected his decision to purchase his car. Although the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants intentionally and knowingly misrepresented material facts regarding the Class Vehicles with intent to mislead the Plaintiff and the Colorado Class, he does not include any specific statements made to him prior to February 2014. Nor does the Plaintiff sufficiently plead that the Defendant had knowledge of any alleged defect in the panoramic sunroofs installed in Volkswagen vehicles on or before February, 2014. The Plaintiff's allegations that the Defendant was on notice of defects because of consumer complaints, a letter to the National Highway and Transportation and Safety Administration, and a recall of the Volkswagen Beetle, fail to support his claim because these events do not involve the 2014 Touareg and/or occurred after Plaintiff made his purchase. As a result, Count Three of the Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed. For these reasons, Defendant VolkswagenGOA's Motion to Dismiss is granted. A full-text copy of the District Court's April 26, 2018 Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybb84noz from Leagle.com. JONATHAN DAVID, Plaintiff, represented by MITCHELL MARK BREIT -- mbreit@simmonsfirm.com -- SIMMONS HANLY CONROY, LLC. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., Defendant, represented by JEFFREY L. CHASE, CHASE KURSHAN HERZFELD & RUBIN LLC & HOMER B. RAMSEY, HERZFELD & RUBIN, LLC. VOLKSWAGEN AG, Defendant, represented by JEFFREY L. CHASE, CHASE KURSHAN HERZFELD & RUBIN LLC. WAL-MART STORES: Attorneys' Fees Award in "Braun" Reversed ---------------------------------------------------------- In the cases, MICHELLE BRAUN, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, AND SAM'S CLUB, AN OPERATING SEGMENT OF WAL-MART STORES, INC. Appellants, DOLORES HUMMEL, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, AND SAM'S CLUB, AN OPERATING SEGMENT OF WAL-MART STORES, INC. Appellants. MICHELLE BRAUN, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED Appellant, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION AND SAM'S CLUB, AN OPERATING SEGMENT OF WAL-MART STORES, INC. DOLORES HUMMEL, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED Appellant, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, AND SAM'S CLUB, AN OPERATING SEGMENT OF WAL-MART STORES, INC., Case Nos. 3361 EDA 2016, 3633 EDA 2016 (Pa. Super.), Judge Paula Francisco Ott of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County's award of attorneys' fees. The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County's order was a product of a 2011 remand ordered by a prior panel of the Court. That remand directed the trial court to explain its reasoning in awarding both the lodestar and a 3.7 contingency multiplier. In this timely appeal, the Plaintiffs' Class Counsel argues the trial court erred in failing to apply a 33% contingency fee rather than the lodestar method. Wal-Mart raises two issues. First, it claims the Class Counsel's argument regarding use of a contingency award was not before the trial court on remand, and is therefore waived. Second, it argues that the trial court failed to explain its reasoning in applying a 3.7 contingency multiplier, and that no multiplier is required under the facts of the case. After a thorough review of the certified record, relevant law and the submissions by the parties, Judge Ott finds agrees with Wal- Mart that the Class Counsel is not entitled to a contingency fee. She also agrees with Wal-Mart that the trial court did not follow the instructions issued on remand, and failed to explain its reasoning for applying a 3.7 contingency multiplier. The Judge holds that the trial court must explain its actions and decision making process. Regarding the application of a multiplier, the trial court is to consider the factors mentioned, including those found in Rule 1717. Additionally, the trial court is directed to consider the application of a contingency multiplier in light of the Polselli decision. While the Judge regrets the inevitable delay the second remand produces, without the proper and thorough explanation, she cannot provide a reasoned analysis of the issues. Accordingly, Judge Ott reversed the award of counsel fees and remanded for a detailed explanation regarding the application of the contingency multiplier. A full-text copy of the Court's April 27, 2018 Order is available at https://is.gd/QAVeCv from Leagle.com. Maureen Murphy McBride -- mmcbride@lambmcerlane.com -- William H. Lamb -- wlamb@lambmcerlane.com -- James C. Sargent, Jr. -- jsargent@lambmcerlane.com -- John J. Cunningham, IV -- jcunningham@lambmcerlane.com -- Lamb McErlane, P.C., Daniel Segal -- dsegal@hangley.com -- Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller, Theane Evangelis -- tevangelis@gibsondunn.com -- Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. -- tboutrous@gibsondunn.com -- Alexander K. Mircheff -- amircheff@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, for Appellant, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Sam's Club. Michael D. Donovan, Donovan Litigation Group, LLC, Judith L. Spanier -- jspanier@abbeyspanier.com -- Abbey Spanier Rodd Abrams & Paradis, LLP, for Designated Appellant, Michelle Braun, et al. WAL-MART STORES: Bid to Decertify Class of Cashiers Denied ---------------------------------------------------------- In the case, NISHA BROWN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WAL-MART STORE, INC., Defendant, Case No. 09-cv-03339-EJD (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose Division, denied Wal-Mart's motion to decertify. In July 2009, Wal-Mart removed to federal court the class action brought by Williamson and Brown, an action which alleges that Wal-Mart has violated Section 14 of California Wage Order 7-2001 by failing to provide seats for its cashier employees. In August 2012, the Court certified a class of all persons who, during the applicable statute of limitations, were employed by Wal-Mart in the State of California in the position of Cashier. Invoking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), Wal-Mart sought to appeal the order granting certification to the Ninth Circuit. In mid-November 2012, the Court stayed the proceedings pending resolution of the Rule 23(f) proceeding, and, later that month, the Ninth Circuit granted Wal-Mart's petition for permission to appeal the certification order. Two other appeals pending before the Ninth Circuit presented similar issues to those presented in Wal-Mart's appeal. In those appeals, the Ninth Circuit certified questions to the California Supreme Court about the appropriate construction of the Wage Order. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit sat tight on Wal-Mart's appeal until the California Supreme Court acted. The California Supreme Court accepted the certified questions and rendered a decision on April 4, 2016 in Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. With Kilby in hand, the Ninth Circuit resubmitted Wal- Mart's appeal and issued a decision affirming this Court's certification order in June 2016. Importantly, the Ninth Circuit held that even if the California Supreme Court's decision in Kilby changed the law, it did not undermine the district court's class certification decision, because the California Supreme Court's interpretation of the Wage Order appears to be more beneficial for the plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by certifying the class. After the Ninth Circuit issued its mandate in August 2016, the proceedings resumed in the Court. Fact discovery closed at the end of 2017. Then, on Jan. 4, 2018, Wal-Mart filed its motion to decertify the class. The Plaintiffs filed an opposition on Feb. 16, 2018, and Wal-Mart filed a reply on Feb. 26, 2018. In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, to establish standing, a plaintiff must show a concrete injury in fact that can be traced to the defendant's conduct and redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Wal-Mart asserts that neither Williamson nor the class has suffered an injury in fact based on the U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncement in Spokeo that a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, does not satisfy the injury-in- fact requirement of Article III. But, Judge Davila finds that Wal-Mart fails to note the Ninth Circuit's post-Spokeo recognition of the difference between a violation of a procedural requirement, which does not necessarily affect the plaintiff's concrete interest, and a violation of a substantive provision, which does. The Wage Order at issue here clearly sits in the latter group. As the California Supreme Court explained in Kilby, the Wage Order is a descendant of orders promulgated to provide a minimum level of protection for workers. Specifically, the California labor commission decided that humane consideration for the welfare of employees requires that they be allowed to sit at their work or between operations when it is feasible for them to do so. In other words, as with a range of other labor protections, the Wage Order does not prescribe a procedure that businesses must follow but instead protects an employee's concrete interest in her own well-being. In this way, Wal-Mart's failure to provide a seat causes the precise concrete harm sought to be remedied by the Wage Order. Accordingly, he concludes, neither Williamson nor the class need demonstrate any further harm to have standing. For these reasons, Judge Davila denied Wal-Mart's motion to decertify. A full-text copy of the Court's April 27, 2018 Order is available at https://is.gd/aFkgNS from Leagle.com. Nisha Brown & Kathy Williamson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Charles Aubrey Jones -- cosmo-89511@yahoo.com -- Jones Law Firm, James F. Clapp -- jclapp@clapplegal.com -- Clapp Legal APC, Kevin J. McInerney -- kevin@mcinerneylaw.net -- McInerney & Jones, Matthew Righetti -- matt@righettilaw.com -- Righetti Glugoski, P.C. Wal-Mart Store, Inc., Defendant, represented by Alexander Humphrey Hu -- alex.hu@ltlattorneys.com -- LTL ATTORNEYS LLP, Anthony David Sbardellati -- anthony.sbardellati@ltlattorneys.com -- LTL Attorneys LLP, Jesse A. Cripps, Jr. -- jcripps@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Lisa Yumi Mitchell, LTL ATTORNEYS LLP, Patricia Anne Kinaga -- patricia.kinaga@ltlattorneys.com -- LTL Attorneys LLP, Steven Christoper Gonzalez -- steven.gonzalez@ltlattorneys.com -- LTL Attorneys LLP, Amber Jene Sayle, GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP, Brian Lee Duffy, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, pro hac vice, James Milton Nelson -- nelsonj@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig LLP & Naomi Beer -- beern@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, LLP, pro hac vice. WAL-MART STORES: Partly Sanctioned for Exclusion in "Brown" Suit ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, NISHA BROWN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WAL-MART STORE, INC., Defendant, Case No. 09-cv-03339-EJD (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose Division, granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion for exclusion sanctions against Wal-Mart. The class action was originally filed in California Superior Court in June 2009 and removed to federal court by Wal-Mart in July 2009. The Plaintiffs contend that Wal-Mart has violated Section 14 of California Wage Order 7-2001 by failing to provide seats for its cashier employees. In August 2012, the Court certified a class of all persons who, during the applicable statute of limitations, were employed by Wal-Mart in the State of California in the position of Cashier. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the certification order. Thereafter, proceedings continued before the Court. Of particular relevance here is the timing of discovery. With the case back in full swing, the Court set a fact discovery cutoff of Dec. 31, 2017 and an expert discovery cutoff of March 30, 2018, with opening expert reports due on Feb. 28, 2018 and rebuttal expert reports due on March 14, 2018. On June 23, 2017, the Plaintiffs served Wal-Mart with document requests, which sought, among other things, all documents supporting its contention that the nature of cashiers' work at the front-end checkout lanes does not reasonably permit the use of a seat. By the end of fact discovery, Wal-Mart produced just over 87 hours' worth of video footage of California and non- California cashiers. Additionally, on Oct. 31, 2017, the Plaintiffs served another document request asking Wal-Mart to produce daily productivity reports (known as SWAS reports) for all cashier class members. By the close of fact discovery on Dec. 31, 2017, Wal-Mart produced approximately 600 SWAS reports to the Plaintiffs. In reliance on Wal-Mart's disclosures, the Plaintiffs filed their motion for summary judgment on Jan. 2, 2018. The parties also fully briefed the issue whether the Court should decertify the class in January and February 2018. Then, on March 1, 2018 (one day after the February 28, 2018 deadline), Wal-Mart uploaded three expert reports to its file-sharing site. When the Plaintiffs began reviewing the reports, they noticed that Wal- Mart's experts had relied on a large amount of information that had never been disclosed or otherwise made available to the Plaintiffs. During the ensuing phone call, Wal-Mart's counsel confirmed that Wal-Mart had provided information to its experts that had not been produced to the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs sought to remedy the situation quickly in light of the upcoming March 14, 2018 deadline to file rebuttal expert reports and the March 30, 2018 close of expert discovery. But Wal-Mart had difficulty transmitting all of the data to the Plaintiffs. On March 8, 2018, the Plaintiffs received a large chunk of the evidence from Wal-Mart. However, information continued to trickle in throughout the month of March, with the last of the information becoming fully available to the Plaintiffs on March 28, 2018. The volume of information that had not been produced was staggering. In the midst of these revelations, the Plaintiffs filed their motion for sanctions on March 9, 2018. To facilitate ongoing expert discovery, the Court moved the deadline for rebuttal reports to May 14, 2018 and the close of expert discovery to May 18, 2018. The Court also set a briefing schedule for the sanctions motion. Wal-Mart filed its opposition on March 30, 2018, Dkt. No. 224 ("Opp."), and Plaintiffs filed their reply on April 6, 2018. The Court held a hearing on April 26, 2018. The Plaintiffs move for sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1) on the basis that Wal-Mart provided certain information to three experts -- Dr. Jeffrey Fernandez, Dr. Deborah Foster, and Dr. Yoram Wind -- but did not disclose the information to the Plaintiffs until months after the close of fact discovery. They request that the Court prohibits Wal-Mart from using the information, strike the three expert reports that rely in large part on that information, and order Wal-Mart to pay $65,275 in expenses incurred because of Wal-Mart's untimely production. Judge Davila finds that Wal-Mart withheld a substantial amount of information that bears on the Plaintiffs' case while simultaneously providing that same information to its own expert, Dr. Fernandez. A lesser sanction would not be appropriate. By producing the videos and register pull data after the close of fact discovery, Wal-Mart has prevented the Plaintiffs from conducting further fact discovery related to that information and from incorporating those findings into their opening expert report. The only way to restore both parties to equal footing with respect to the videos and register pull data is to exclude them. The Judge also notes that exclusion of this evidence (and striking of the related expert report) does not eviscerate Wal- Mart's case, as Wal-Mart still has other evidence and arguments that it may proceed with. Accordingly, he precludes Wal-Mart from using the videos and register pull data and strikes Dr. Fernandez's expert report to the extent that it relies on the excluded videos and register pull data. As with Dr. Fernandez, the Judge finds it appropriate to follow the usual course that violations of Rule 26 may warrant evidence preclusion. Wal-Mart's actions are particularly egregious because the Plaintiffs expressly requested the SWAS reports, but Wal-Mart produced a very small fraction without informing the Plaintiffs that production was incomplete. Then, Wal-Mart turned around and retrieved the SWAS reports for itself, giving them to its own expert, Dr. Foster, but still holding them back from the Plaintiffs. Wal-Mart thus stripped Plaintiffs of the opportunity to engage in further fact discovery and have their expert consider this evidence in his opening expert report. Exclusion is commensurate with the harm caused by Wal-Mart's failure to timely disclose and has been endorsed in previous cases presenting similar circumstances. Because Dr. Foster's report relies almost exclusively on the SWAS reports, the Court also strikes her expert report in its entirety. The Judge reiterates that this sanction does not actually or practically eliminate Wal-Mart's ability to defend against the suit. As with Dr. Wind, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have until May 14, 2018 to file a rebuttal to Dr. Wind's report and until May 18, 2018 to conduct expert discovery. Those dates provide ample time and opportunity for Plaintiffs to poke and prod Dr. Wind's survey methodology for weaknesses and flaws. The Plaintiffs are not at a disadvantage for not having the video footage before the opening expert report deadline because the footage does not form part of the underlying factual landscape. Instead, the footage was created specifically for Dr. Wind's survey, which seeks to reach broad conclusions about consumers' preferences for seated or standing cashiers. Courts commonly find that the ability to take expert discovery and respond to an expert's testimony is sufficient to cure an expert-specific deficiency. Thus, the Judge denies the Plaintiffs' request for exclusion of Dr. Wind's opening expert report and the underlying video footage. For these reasons, Judge Davila granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions. Wal-Mart is precluded from using the videos and register pull data provided to Dr. Fernandez, and Dr. Fernandez's report is stricken to the extent that it relies on that information. Wal-Mart is precluded from using the additional 356,850 SWAS reports provided to Dr. Foster, and Dr. Foster's report is stricken in its entirety because it relies almost exclusively on the SWAS reports. Wal-Mart may use the video footage provided to Dr. Wind, and Dr. Wind's report is not stricken. The Judge also denied as excessive the Plaintiffs' further request for expenses incurred because of Wal-Mart's untimely disclosure of evidence. A full-text copy of the Court's April 27, 2018 Order is available at https://is.gd/suweSV from Leagle.com. Nisha Brown & Kathy Williamson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Charles Aubrey Jones -- cosmo-89511@yahoo.com -- Jones Law Firm, James F. Clapp -- jclapp@clapplegal.com -- Clapp Legal APC, Kevin J. McInerney -- kevin@mcinerneylaw.net -- McInerney & Jones, Matthew Righetti -- matt@righettilaw.com -- Righetti Glugoski, P.C. Wal-Mart Store, Inc., Defendant, represented by Alexander Humphrey Hu -- alex.hu@ltlattorneys.com -- LTL ATTORNEYS LLP, Anthony David Sbardellati -- anthony.sbardellati@ltlattorneys.com -- LTL Attorneys LLP, Jesse A. Cripps, Jr. -- jcripps@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Lisa Yumi Mitchell, LTL ATTORNEYS LLP, Patricia Anne Kinaga -- patricia.kinaga@ltlattorneys.com -- LTL Attorneys LLP, Steven Christoper Gonzalez -- steven.gonzalez@ltlattorneys.com -- LTL Attorneys LLP, Amber Jene Sayle, GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP, Brian Lee Duffy, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, pro hac vice, James Milton Nelson -- nelsonj@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig LLP & Naomi Beer -- beern@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, LLP, pro hac vice. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN: $6.5MM Deal in "Little" Has Final OK ------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, ERICK LITTLE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants, Civil No. 14-1289 (RMC), Consolidated with No. 15-98, No. 15-114., 15- 1298, 17-16 (D. D.C.), Judge Rosemary M. Collyer of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted both the Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Proposed Class Action Settlement, and Motion for Approval of Service Payments. The Plaintiffs brought a class-action suit on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated individuals under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq. and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, alleging that a criminal background check used by WMATA to screen candidates and employees, was facially neutral but had a disparate impact on African Americans. WMATA's Policy 7.2.3 governed how and when individuals with criminal convictions could obtain or continue employment with WMATA and its contractors and subcontractors. WMATA at all points has argued that it adopted Policy 7.2.3 as a business necessity and that it did not have a discriminatory impact on African Americans. Policy 7.2.3 included four appendices which specified the background check criteria for different types of positions. The Plaintiffs moved for class certification and on March 31, 2017, the Court certified three classes under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2): Appendix A Class, Appendix C Class, and Appendix F Class/MetroAccess Class. The Court did not certify a damages class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Following class certification the parties began merits discovery and also engaged in extensive settlement negotiations. On Nov. 22, 2017, the parties memorialized the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement provides that WMATA will pay $6.5 million into a Class Settlement Fund to be distributed to the Class Counsel for payment of fees and costs, a Claims Administrator for its work in administering the Fund, eligible class members that submit short or long claims forms, and the Class Representatives for their assistance in the litigation. Additionally, WMATA agreed to maintain a new policy (2017 Policy), adopted in 2017, which provides for individualized assessments after an applicant fails the background check rather than presumptive disqualification, for at least one year after the date of the Court's final order approving the Settlement Agreement. On Dec. 7, 2017, the Court granted preliminary approval of the proposed class-action Settlement between the Class Representatives and WMATA. The Preliminary Approval Order ordered that notice of the proposed Settlement to a Settlement Class consisting of individuals, determined by Class Counsel from records provided by third party First Choice Background Screening, Inc. who: (i) failed a criminal background screening under the Background Screening Policy since Feb. 23, 2012; (ii) were denied employment, terminated, or otherwise permanently separated from their position, suspended from employment with or without pay, and/or denied employment with WMATA or a contractor or subcontractor of WMATA as a result of the Background Screening Policy; and (iii) either were identified in the First Choice records as African American or had not been identified in the First Choice records as having a particular race. The notice was sent in this manner to ensure that all members of the Settlement Class were notified. On April 6, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Final Approval of the Proposed Class Action Settlement and a Motion for Approval of Service Payments. WMATA also filed a Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Class Lawsuit Settlement Agreement. The Court also received objections from six individuals and reviewed and considered each objection despite some untimely filing. On April 18, 2018, the Court held a formal fairness hearing to consider whether to grant final approval of the Settlement. It heard and considered argument from the parties and the following individuals who elected to appear to voice their support for, or objection to, the Settlement: Galen Pendergrass, Bernhard Levi, Thomas Hall, Tiffany Burke, Kaye Lawton, and Sterling Pickett. The Class Counsel request an award of 25% of the Class Settlement Fund, or $1.625 million, to cover attorneys' fees and costs. Of this amount, $950,000 will go toward covering the costs paid by Class Counsel to litigate the case, including fees paid to experts during class certification. The remaining $675,000 (11% of the Class Settlement Fund) will be awarded as attorneys' fees. A "percentage of the fund" methodology is preferred in this Circuit because it discourages attorneys from inflating hours and promotes The Plaintiffs move to award $70,000 in service payments to the eight Class Representatives -- Erick Little, Timothy McClough, Gerald Tucker, Leroy Quarles, Fitzgerald Stoney, Marcello Virgil, Leon McKenzie, and Louia McKenzie -- and Sidney Davis and Joyce Short. Each of the Class Representatives would receive $7,500 and Mr. Davis and D.W., through Ms. Short, would receive $5,000. Having read, reviewed, and considered the papers filed with the Court in support of final approval of the Settlement, including any declarations submitted, oral arguments of counsel, the Settlement Agreement, and the pleadings filed in the action; having conducted a fairness hearing with regard to the Settlement and approval thereof; being fully informed regarding the facts surrounding the proposed Settlement; and based upon this information and the record as a whole; Judge Collyer granted final approval of the $6.5 million Settlement, attorneys' fees, and service awards. A full-text copy of the Court's April 27, 2018 Memorandum Opinion is available at https://is.gd/qJWCnN from Leagle.com. ERNEST FORD, Non-Party Respondent, pro se. ERICK LITTLE, TIMOTHY MCCLOUGH, GERALD TUCKER, LEROY QUARLES, FITZGERALD STONEY, MARCELLO VIRGIL, LEON MCKENZIE & LOUIA MCKENZIE, On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Ajmel A. Quereshi, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., Brett E. Marston , ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, Dennis A. Corkery -- dennis_corkery@washlaw.org -- WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & URBAN AFFAIRS, Matthew K. Handley -- matthew_handley@washlaw.org -- WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & URBAN AFFAIRS, Peter Thomas Grossi, Jr. -- peter.grossi@arnoldporter.com -- ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, Whitney Allyn Moore -- whitney.moore@arnoldporter.com -- ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, Brittany Erin McClure -- brittany.mcclure@arnoldporter.com - - ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, Coty R. Montag, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., Katherine E. Clemons -- katherine.clemons@arnoldporter.com -- ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, Kristian L. Hinson -- khinson@willkie.com -- WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER, LLP, Michael Duane Harris -- mharris@nasonyeager.com - - ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, Rachel M. Kleinman, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., pro hac vice & John Arak Freedman -- john.freedman@aporter.com -- ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP. SIDNEY DAVIS, Plaintiff, represented by Ajmel A. Quereshi, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., Brett E. Marston, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, Dennis A. Corkery, WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & URBAN AFFAIRS, John Arak Freedman, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, Peter Thomas Grossi, Jr., ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, Whitney Allyn Moore, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, Brittany Erin McClure, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, Coty R. Montag, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., Katherine E. Clemons, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, Kristian L. Hinson, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER, LLP & Michael Duane Harris, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP. D. W., a minor child, as successors to the claims of Lawrence Whitted, Plaintiff, represented by John Arak Freedman, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, Peter Thomas Grossi, Jr., ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP & Kristian L. Hinson, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER, LLP. JOYCE SHORT, next friend to her son D.W., as successors to the claims of Lawrence Whitted, Plaintiff, represented by John Arak Freedman, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, Peter Thomas Grossi, Jr., ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, Kristian L. Hinson, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER, LLP & Whitney Allyn Moore, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP. BERNARD S. LEVI, Plaintiff, pro se. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant, represented by Kathleen E. Kraft -- kkraft@thompsoncoburn.com -- THOMPSON COBURN, LLP, Charles M. Poplstein -- cpoplstein@thompsoncoburn.com -- THOMPSON COBURN LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Kelly Guss, WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY Office of General Counsel, Robert J. Wagner -- rwagner@thompsoncoburn.com -- THOMPSON COBURN LLP & Tabitha G. Davisson -- tdavisson@thompsoncoburn.com -- THOMPSON COBURN LLP, pro hac vice. DIAMOND TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, INC., Defendant, represented by Michael Nicholas Petkovich -- Michael.Petkovich@jacksonlewis.com -- JACKSON LEWIS P.C. & Amanda Leigh Scott Vaccaro, JACKSON LEWIS P.C. EXECUTIVE PERSONNEL SERVICES, INC., Defendant, represented by Melissa E. Hoppmeyer, CARR MALONEY PC, Nat Peter Calamis -- npc@carrmaloney.com -- CARR MALONEY, P.C., Bernard G. Dennis, III -- bgd@carrmaloney.com -- CARR MALONEY, P.C. & Matthew D. Berkowitz -- mb@carrmaloney.com -- CARR MALONEY, P.C. FIRST TRANSIT, Defendant, represented by Richard William Black -- rblack@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. & William Simmons - - wsimmons@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C., pro hac vice. WASTE PRO USA: Thomas Seeks Certification of Class Under FLSA ------------------------------------------------------------- The Plaintiff and the Opt-In Plaintiffs in the lawsuit entitled ALFRED W. THOMAS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. WASTE PRO USA, INC., and WASTE PRO OF FLORIDA, INC., Case No. 8:17-cv-02254-CEH-CPT (M.D. Fla.), seek entry of an order conditionally certifying a Fair Labor Standards Act collective of and permitting Court-supervised notice to: all Helpers nationwide who work or worked for Defendants Waste Pro USA, Inc. ("WP USA") and Waste Pro of Florida, Inc. (collectively, "Waste Pro") at any time since September 27, 2014 (the date of filing of the Complaint) to the present (the "FLSA Collective Period") who are or were paid via the day rate method for at least one workweek during the FLSA Collective Period (the "Proposed FLSA Collective") and also worked at a location that had a policy or practice to either pay a half-day rate or pay non-discretionary bonuses. The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to enter an order: (a) requiring Waste Pro to produce in an electronic or computer- readable format the full name, address(es), telephone numbers, e- mail address(es), and dates and locations of employment for each of the collective members; (b) authorizing notice to the members of the Proposed FLSA Collective; and (c) approving their proposed reminder notice. A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=ERbm23VN The Plaintiffs are represented by: Gregg I. Shavitz, Esq. Alan L. Quiles, Esq. Logan A. Pardell, Esq. SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A. 1515 South Federal Highway, Suite 404 Boca Raton, FL 33432 Telephone: (561) 447-8888 Facsimile: (561) 447-8831 E-mail: gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com aquiles@shavitzlaw.com lpardell@shavitzlaw.com - and - Michael Palitz, Esq. SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A. 830 Third Avenue, 5th Floor New York, NY 10022 Telephone: (800) 616-4000 Facsimile: (561) 447-8831 E-mail: mpalitz@shavitzlaw.com - and - Richard E. Hayber, Esq. HAYBER LAW FIRM, LLC 221 Main Street, Suite 502 Hartford, CT 06106 Telephone: (860) 522-8888 E-mail: rhayber@hayberlawfirm.com - and - Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq. Jason S. Rathod, Esq. MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP 412 H St., NE, Suite 302 Washington, DC 20002 Telephone: (202) 470-3520 Facsimile: (202) 800-2730 E-mail: nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com jrathod@classlawdc.com - and - D. Aaron Rihn, Esq. ROBERT PEIRCE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 2500 Gulf Tower 707 Grant Street Pittsburgh, PA 15219-1918 Telephone: (412) 281-7229 E-mail: arihn@peircelaw.com The Defendants are represented by: Amy S. Tingley, Esq. Matthew J. Pearce, Esq. STOVASH, CASE & TINGLEY, P.A. The VUE at Lake Eola 220 North Rosalind Avenue Orlando, FL 32801 Telephone: (407) 316-0393 E-mail: atingley@sctlaw.com mpearce@sctlaw.com WAUKEGAN, IL: Stewart Seeks to Certify Poe Manor Residents Class ---------------------------------------------------------------- The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit styled JOHN STEWART, TIMOTHY PHILLIPS, GILBERTO COLON, GUSSIE M. DOSSIE, CHANDRA THOMAS, KEVIN DUTY, JAMES HOWARD, CARLTON STEWART, TROY THOMPSON, DENNIS HALTER, PEARLINE WRIGHT, SHONDIS ADAMS, MARITA SMITH, DENNIS TINDALL, JAMES BUTLER, SHIMON MERRIWEATHER, CEDRIC REAMS, JOHN HARVEY, TY BROWN, LANIQUA KUYKENDALL, CHARLOTTE A. DAVIS, WILLIE C. BANKS, JR., ALICIA ROSS, CARYN E. PRICE, LATASHA GATLIN, JARVIS LEFLORE, CHRISTOPHER SEALS, STARR NUTALL, RONALD ANDERSON, JANIE E. WILLIAMS, BERNELL FORD, FELECIA BROWN, BLANCHE FERGUSON BROWN, AL HUTCHENS, TONYA ESKILSON, VINCENT DAVIS, UNIQUEKA SCOTT, ALVIN ARREAGA, WALTER ORI, and CAROL WILL, individually and on behalf of the class of all persons who currently reside in Harry Poe Manor or formerly resided therein at any time from January 2011 to date v. WAUKEGAN HOUSING AUTHORITY, a body politic and corporate; CHARLES CHAMBERS, individually and as Executive Director of WAUKEGAN HOUSING AUTHORITY; RENWICK CORNELIOUS, individually and as Property Manager of Harry Poe Manor; and TARA DANIEL, individually and as Property Manager of Harry Poe Manor, Case No. 1:13-cv-08444 (N.D. Ill.), ask the Court to certify this class: All persons who currently reside in Harry Poe Manor ("Poe Manor") or formerly resided therein at any time from January 2011 to date. Poe Manor is a ten-story multifamily apartment building in Waukegan, Illinois, which is funded in part via the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, and is owned and managed by the Defendants, a public housing authority and its officers. The former and current residents are low-income, elderly and/or physically or mentally disabled individuals, all with limited economic means. The action arises out of an alleged severe bedbug infestation at Poe Manor and the Defendants' failure to use the best practices and most effective methods to eradicate the infestation. The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint them as representatives of the Class and to appoint their as counsel for the Class. A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=PNVov9eU The Plaintiffs are represented by: Amy Lynn Lonergan, Esq. FINN & FINN, LTD. 128 N. West Street Waukegan, IL 60085 Telephone: (847) 599-0202 E-mail: LonerganAmy@waukegan.com - and - Jed H. Stone, Esq. STONE & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 415 West Washington Street, Suite 107 Waukegan, IL 60085 Telephone: (847) 336-7888 E-mail: jstone@jedstone.com - and - Steven P. Wandro, Esq. WANDRO & ASSOCIATES P.C. 2501 Grand Avenue, Suite B Des Moines, IA 50312 Telephone: (515) 281-1475 Facsimile: (515) 281-1474 E-mail: swandro@2501grand.com - and - Jeffrey M. Lipman, Esq. LIPMAN LAW FIRM P.C. 1454 30th Street, Suite 205 West Des Moines, IA 50266 Telephone: (515) 276-3411 E-mail: jeff@lipmanlawfirm.com WEBSTAURANT STORE: Certification of Class Sought in "Rogers" Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- The Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled BRITTANY ROGERS, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly-situated v. THE WEBSTAURANT STORE, INC., Case No. 4:18-cv-00074-JHM-HBB (W.D. Ky.), moves the Court to conditionally certify a class composed of: all current and former employees of The WEBstaurant Store, Inc. who were employed at any time in the three years preceding the notice to be approved by the Court as (A) a Customer Solutions Specialist or (B) a Logistics Liaison or (C) in any other non-exempt position, if in such non-exempt position such employee was scheduled to work shifts totaling forty hours per workweek but during said workweek(s) did not use a time clock to track actual hours worked. Ms. Rogers also asks the Court to require the Defendant to produce to her counsel an Excel spreadsheet containing the full names, last known addresses, last known e-mail addresses, last known phone numbers (including cell phone numbers), and dates of employment of all employees, who are covered by the scope of the proposed class within 10 days of the Court's Order. She also seeks approval of her proposed Notice of Right to Join Lawsuit. A copy of the Motion is available at no charge at http://d.classactionreporternewsletter.com/u?f=2m0QFMoZ The Plaintiff is represented by: Mark N. Foster, Esq. MARK N. FOSTER - ATTORNEY AT LAW P.O. Box 869 Madisonville, KY 42431 Telephone: (270) 213-1303 E-mail: MFoster@MarkNFoster.com WINMARK CORP: Faces "Matzura" Suit in S.D. New York --------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Winmark Corporation. The case is styled as Steven Matzura, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Winmark Corporation doing business as: Play It Again Sports, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05744 (S.D. N.Y., June 25, 2018). Winmark Corporation is an American franchisor of five retail businesses that specialize in buying and selling used goods. The company is based in Minneapolis, Minnesota.[BN] The Plaintiff appears PRO SE. XINOS CONSTRUCTION: Leons Seek Unpaid OT Wages under FLSA --------------------------------------------------------- JAIME LEON and JOSE ARTURO LEON, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. XINOS CONSTRUCTION CORP. d/b/a XINOS CONSTRUCTION and ANTHONY KSINOS, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-03376-LDH-JO (E.D.N.Y., June 8, 2018), seeks to unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, statutory damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, and attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New York Labor Law, and the Wage Theft Prevention Act. The Leons are former painters, wall and fixture installers, and demolition workers at Xinos. According to the complaint, they regularly worked over 40 hours per workweek but were always paid a per-shift wage rate. Defendants failed to furnish the Leons with wage notices and with accurate wage statements at the end of every pay period.[BN] Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Putative FLSA Collective: Lillian M. Marquez, Esq. PECHMAN LAW GROUP PLLC 488 Madison Avenue, 17th Floor New York, NY 10022 Telephone: (212) 583 9500 E-mail: pechman@pechmanlaw.com marquez@pechmanlaw.com ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA. Marion Alcestis A. Castillon, Jessenius Pulido, Noemi Irene A. Adala, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche Maricon Castillon-Lopez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2018. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are $25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000. * * * End of Transmission * * *