CAR_Public/180717.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

             Tuesday, July 17, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 142

                            Headlines


ABM INDUSTRIES: Bid to Stay "Castro" Pending Arbitration Denied
AETNA INC: Seeks Dismissal of Shareholder Derivative Suit
AIRSTREAM INC: Court Conditionally Certifies "Funk" FLSA Class
ALTITUDE MARKETING: GreenSky Can Arbitrate "Terlizzi"
AMCOL SYSTEMS: Third Circuit Appeal Filed in "Magana" Class Suit

AMERICAN FEDERATION: High Court Set to Rule on Union Fees Case
ANALOGIC CORPORATION: Carr Files Securities Class Action in Mass.
ANDEAVOR: Bushansky Alleges Securities Exchange Act Breach
APPLE INC: Court Narrows Claims in "Morgan" MMWA Suit
BAVARIA INN: Can Partly Compel Arbitration in "Mantooth" Suit

BCA FINANCIAL: Court Narrows Claims in "Reyes"
BEAUFORT, SC: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Bairefoot" Suit
BEHR PROCESS: Court Grants Stay Pending Related Case Disposition
BHP: Hunter Valley Casual Coal Miners Join Class Action
BHP: Adero Law Launches Class Action on Behalf Casual Mineworkers

BIG TOP: Must Produce Employees Information in "Pizano"
BRISTOL-MYERS: Bernstein Litowitz to Lead Shareholder Class Suit
BLOOMINGDALE'S INC: Illegally Charged "Rayford" Bag Tax
CALIFORNIA: Magistrate Recommends Dismissal of "Warfield"
CANADA: Civil Trial in BC Foreign Buyers Tax Case Begins

CANADA: RCMP Faces Class Action Over Bullying, Harassment Claims
CHURCH & DWIGHT: Court Narrows Claims in "Chavez" Suit
CIGNA CORP: 4th Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment in "Gordon" Suit
CIPRO CASES: Cal. App. Dismisses Non-Party Appeal
CONDOCERTS.COM: Court Dismisses "Ahrendt" Suit

CORECIVIC INC: Court Narrows Claims in "Owino" Suit
DAIMLER AG: Faces Class Action Over Faulty Truck Parts
DAIMLER AG: Wants Class Action Over Defective HVAC Systems Tossed
DETORONICS CORP: "Stone" Sues Over Unpaid Overtime, Missed Breaks
DIAMOND RESORTS: Discovery in "Dropp" Suit Stayed

DEREK LAM 115: "Guzman" Files Request for Judicial Intervention
EPIC SYSTEMS: McOmber & McOmber Attorney Discusses SCOTUS Ruling
EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Investors Want to Block Merger Vote
EVERETT ASSOCIATION: Thomas Appeals W.D. Wash. Ruling to 9th Cir.
FIELD ASSET: Court Strikes Decertification Bid in "Bowerman" Suit

FLOWERS FOODS: Can Compel Arbitration in "Abugeith" FLSA Suit
FRANKLIN GARCIA-VICTOR: Denial of No Cause of Action Bid Upheld
GOLDEN STATE: $150K Settlement in "Padron" Suit Gets Final OK
GUARD MANAGEMENT: "Sellers" Alleges No Time-keeping, Break Time
HARVARD UNIVERSITY: Low Personality Ratings to Asian-Americans

HEYWOOD CARI: "Veness" FDCA Suit Settlement Has Final Approval
HOMEAWAY INC: Can Compel Arbitration in "Arnold," "Swimsuits
HUON CORP: Litigation Funder Responds to Case Publicity
HYATT HOTELS: Seeks Dismissal of Antitrust Class Action
ILLINOIS: Court Assigns Prisoner's Suit for Screening

INTUIT INC: Court Dismisses 2nd Negligence Claim in "Diaz"
KC CONSULTING: Ct. Denies Default Judgment in "Abarca" FLSA Suit
KLONDEX MINES: Chandra Files Suit Over Sale to Hecla Mining
LABOR READY: 9th Cir. Affirms Final Approval of "Allen" Suit Deal
LASERSHIP INC: Judge Transfers Workers' Class Action to Virginia

LOUISIANA: "Abshire" Class Certification Affirmed
LOUISIANA: La. App. Vacates Class Certification in LPSC Suit
MAGNACHIP SEMICONDUCTOR: "Thomas" Deal w/ Avenue Has Final OK
MDL 2199: Court Lifts Stay of Non-California Claims
MDL 2420: Direct Purchasers' Deal with Samsung SDI Has Final OK

MDL 2420: Direct Purchasers' Deal with LG Chem Has Final Approval
MDL 2420: Direct Purchasers' Deal with TOKIN Has Final Approval
MEDICREDIT INC: $5MM Deal in "Martinez" TCPA Suit Has Final OK
MICROSOFT CORP: Discrimination Suit Can't Proceed as Class Action
MISSOURI: Class Certification Granted in Juvenile Parole Suit

MONTANA: Partial Summary Judgment Ruling in "Duane" Reversed
NES EQUIPMENT: Court Dismisses ICFA Suit
NEWELL BRANDS: Faces Bucks County Securities Suit in New Jersey
NEWELL BRANDS: Faruqi Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
NISSAN NORTH: Court Narrows Claims in "Falk" Suit
NUTRACEUTICAL CORP: SCOTUS to Take Up Decertification Challenge

OCEAN HARBOR: Settles Automobile Accident Insurance Class Action
ORION INT'L: "Ascencio" Class Cert. Denial Partly Affirmed
PARALLON ENTERPRISES: "Buford" Sues Over Unpaid OT Wages
PEOPLES UNITED: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss "Daccache" RICO Suit
PETROBRAS BRASILEIRO: Court Approves Class Action Settlement

PETROBRAS BRASILEIRO: Judge Orders Atty to Cut Legal Fees
RENT-A-CENTER INC: "Beaton" Remanded to Missouri State Court
RENT-A-CENTER: Bid to Stay "Blair" Pending Appeal Nixed
RESTORATION ROBOTICS: Aug. 21 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
RHODE ISLAND: Dismissal of "Rodriguez" Suit Recommended

RURAL METRO: "Calleros" Labor Suit Remanded to State Court
RXBAR: Faces Class Action Over Misleading Protein Bar Labels
S&A UNIFIED: "Stalling" Files Request for Judicial Intervention
SANDIA CORP: Court Dismisses "Kennicott" Suit
SKYWEST INC: "Meek" Parties Directed to Confer on Schedule

SP PLUS: 7th Cir. Vacates Dismissal of "Collier" FACTA Suit
TAMKO BUILDING: Court Denies Certification of "Disher" Class
TARGET CORP: Ct. Rejects Data Breach Class Suit Payout Objection
TD BANK: Added as Defendants in Price-Fixing Class Action
TESLA MOTORS: "Rodriguez" Sues Over Missed Breaks, No Paystubs

TEVA PHARMA: "Baker" SEC Suit Transferred to Conn.
TJX COS: Ct. Grants Final Approval of "Chester" Class Settlement
TRAVELERS HOME: Wins Summary Ruling on Individual Claims
TRANSNATIONAL FOODS: "Lejbman" Suit Dismissed
UNITED COUNTY: Grayson County Considers Joining Tax Class Action

UNITED STATES: Rights Activist Group Sue Over Family Separation
UNITED STATES: Settlement in "Moss" Suit Has Prelim Approval
WALMART STORES: Appeals Court Won't Reconsider Fee Award Ruling
WHOLE FOODS: To Implement GMO Product Labeling Changes After Suit
WINSLOW & SHOOMAKER: "Lee" Claims Vape Product Contain Pesticides

WOLF FIRM: Manos Appeals C.D. Cal. Decision to Ninth Circuit
XEROX HR: Averts Class Action Over ERISA Violation
ZICAM LLC: Court Allows Filing of SAC in "Melgar" Suit
* Experts Divided on Removing Ban on Litigation Contingency Fees
* New Class Action Regime Enforced in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia









                            *********


ABM INDUSTRIES: Bid to Stay "Castro" Pending Arbitration Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California denied Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration of the
non-PAGA claims in the case captioned MARLEY CASTRO, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, v. ABM INDUSTRIES, INC., ET AL., Defendants, Case No.
17-cv-3026-YGR (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs bring this class action complaint against
defendants ABM Industries, Inc. and its wholly owned subsidiaries
under California Labor Code Section 2802 and Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act, Labor Code Section 2698 (PAGA) for alleged
failure to reimburse or indemnify plaintiffs' expenses for use of
their personal cell phones for work-related tasks.

ABM argues that the collective bargaining agreements do not
contain any temporal limitation. ABM asserts that the phrase
"whenever they arise" suggests that the arbitration provisions in
the CBAs "apply to claims regardless of when those claims
accrued, including claims based on conduct occurring before the
effective date of the CBAs."

In support of their argument, ABM points to several cases finding
in favor of retroactivity for arbitration agreements that
contained the words arise or arising. However, in each of these
cases the arbitration clauses at issue use arise or arising to
describe the substance of covered claims, not the timing (or
temporal indication) of the claim.

Here, the Court finds that the phrase "whenever they arise
points" to the timing of covered claims rather than the subject-
matter.  In the context of a phrase describing the timing, rather
than the substance, of covered claims, the CBAs' use of the
present tense arise suggests that the clauses govern present and
future, but not past, conduct. Thus, ABM's authorities to the
contrary are inapposite.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the arbitration clause found in
the CBAs applies only to those claims brought by CBA Plaintiffs
after the effective date of the relevant CBA.

Under Rule 23, an order granting class certification may be
altered or amended prior to final judgment.

In light of the unions' own affirmative actions to begin
arbitration and given that notice has not yet been sent to the
class members, the Court finds that the most appropriate remedy
to address the instant motion is to modify the class definition
to exclude those claims brought by CBA Plaintiffs the facts of
which occurred after the effective date of the relevant CBA.

Accordingly, ABM's request to stay all proceedings as to the CBA
Plaintiffs pending the completion of arbitration is denied as
moot.  The Court denies ABM's motion to compel as framed and
modifies and limits the class definition to exclude all claims
properly subject to arbitration.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 14, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8arrwl6 from Leagle.com.

Marley Castro & Lucia Marmolejo, Plaintiffs, represented by Chad
A. Saunders -- csaunders@ssrplaw.com -- Sundeen Salinas & Pyle,
Genevieve Lise Casey -- genevieve@feinbergjackson.com --
Feinberg, Jackson, Worthman and Wasow -- Hunter Pyle --
hunter@hunterpylelaw.com -- Hunter Pyle Law, Todd F. Jackson --
todd@feinbergjackson.com --  Feinberg, Jackson, Worthman and
Wasow LLP & Catha Alison Worthman -- catha@feinbergjackson.com --
FEINBERG JACKSON WORTHMAN & WASOW.

ABM Industries, Inc., ABM Onsite Services -- West, Inc., ABM
Services, Inc., ABM Janitorial Services -- Northern California,
Inc., ABM Janitorial Services, Inc. & ABM Janitorial Services-
Southwest, Inc., Defendants, represented by Bradley Joseph
Hamburger -- bhamburger@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn and
Crutcher LLP, Theane Evangelis Kapur -- tevangelis@gibsondunn.com
-- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. --
tboutrous@gibsondunn.com -- Attorney at Law Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP & Katherine V.A. Smith --  ksmith@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher LLP.


AETNA INC: Seeks Dismissal of Shareholder Derivative Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Jeannie O'Sullivan, writing for Law360, reports that Aetna Inc.
on June 25 urged a Pennsylvania state judge to toss a $1.7
billion shareholder derivative suit claiming the company misled
investors about its reasons for leaving Affordable Care Act
insurance exchanges last year, arguing that the special committee
that deemed the pull-outs proper was comprised of objective
members with a wealth of executive experience.

The four Aetna directors who investigated the putative class
action by Allegheny County Employees' Retirement Fund have spent
a collective 60 years on the insurer's board. [GN]


AIRSTREAM INC: Court Conditionally Certifies "Funk" FLSA Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SANDRA FUNK, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AIRSTREAM, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-260 (S.D. Ohio), Judge Walter H.
Rice of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, Western Division,

Funk was a production worker at Airstream from June of 2015 until
June of 2017.  As a non-exempt employee, compensated on an hourly
basis, she was entitled to compensation equal to one and one-half
times her regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of
forty hours per week.  The "regular rate" is deemed to include
"all remuneration for employment," including certain
nondiscretionary bonuses.

Airstream paid its employees nondiscretionary attendance bonuses.
It also paid nondiscretionary pool production bonuses for meeting
production goals.  Funk alleges that because Airstream failed to
include these bonuses when calculating her regular rate of pay,
the overtime rate that she was paid fell short of what was
required.  She filed suit on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, alleging violations of federal and state wage
laws.  Her First Amended Collective and Class Action Complaint
alleges violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
("FLSA"), the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act and the Ohio
Prompt Pay Act.

On March 6, 2018, Funk filed a Motion for Conditional Class
Certification and Court-Supervised Notice to Potential Opt-in
Plaintiffs Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).  She asked the
Court to conditionally certify a collective FLSA action
consisting of all current and former hourly, non-exempt employees
of the Defendants, who received any additional form of
remuneration during any workweek that they worked over 40 hours
in any workweek beginning March 1, 2015 and continuing through
the date of final disposition of the case.  She also asked the
Court to approve a Notice to be sent to potential opt-in
Plaintiffs, and to order the Defendants to identify all potential
opt-in Plaintiffs.

After the Defendants filed their Response to Funk's Motion for
Conditional Class Certification, the Plaintiff filed an Emergency
Motion for a Protective Order, Cease and Desist Order, and the
Immediate Granting of Plaintiff's Motion for Issuance of Notice,
Additional Notice, Corrective Actions, Preliminary Injunction,
and Sanctions.  This prompted several conference calls, held on
April 20, 2018, April 26, 2018, and May 4, 2018.

Both motions are now fully briefed.  Although the Court issued
oral rulings on these motions during the May 4, 2018, conference
call, it sets forth its reasoning.

Based on the current record, Judge Rice finds no justification at
this time for restricting Airstream's communications with the
putative class members.  However, as the Court noted during the
May 4, 2018, conference call, the Defendants are cautioned that
conduct aimed at discouraging the putative class members from
participating in the lawsuit will not be tolerated and may be
subject to sanctions.  He also finds that the Plaintiff has
failed to establish that the remedies she requested are
warranted.  As discussed during the conference calls, the Court
has no authority to deem the payments made by Airstream to be
"gifts" instead of back wages.  Accordingly, he overruled the
Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for a Protective Order, Cease and
Desist Order, and the Immediate Granting of Plaintiff's Motion
for Issuance of Notice, Additional Notice, Corrective Actions,
Preliminary Injunction, and Sanctions.

As to the Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Class Certification,
based on the evidence presented at this initial stage of the
proceedings, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff has shown that
the employees to be notified are "similarly situated" in that
Airstream had a company-wide policy of improperly excluding
nondiscretionary bonuses in calculating the regular rate of pay
for purposes of determining employees' overtime compensation.
Moreover, it appears to the Court that a manageable class exists.

For these reasons, the Judge sustained the Plaintiff's Motion for
Conditional Class Certification, and conditionally certified a
collective FLSA class consisting of all current and former
hourly, non-exempt employees of the Defendants, who were paid by
Airstream, and received any additional form of remuneration
during any workweek that they worked over 40 hours in any
workweek beginning March 1, 2015, and continuing through the date
of final disposition of the case.

The Defendants, within 14 days of the date of the Decision and
Entry, will provide to the Plaintiff's counsel a list, in
electronic and importable format, of the names, job titles, last
known addresses, telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, and dates
of employment, of all potential opt-in Plaintiffs who worked for
Defendants at any time from three years preceding the filing of
the Plaintiff's Motion through the present.

The Plaintiff has also asked the Court to approve the form and
method of her proposed Notice of Collective Action Lawsuit.  In
addition, she asks the Court to authorize her to send a "reminder
notice," halfway through the 90-day opt-in period.  The
Defendants have raised several objections to the proposed Notice
of Collective Action Lawsuit.  During the May 4, 2018, conference
call, the Court directed counsel to attempt to resolve their
differences, and to submit a Joint Revised Notice for the Court's
review.  The parties have done so, and it appears that they have
resolved all but one issue, which will be discussed during a
follow-up conference call.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2t9r2cK from Leagle.com.

Sandra Funk, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel I'Anson Bryant --
dbryant@bryantlegalllc.com -- Bryant Legal, LLC & Matthew James
Porter Coffman -- mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com -- Coffman Legal,
LLC.

Mark Satterly, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew James Porter
Coffman, Coffman Legal, LLC.

Airstream, Inc, Defendant, represented by Bryan A. Niemeyer --
bniemeyer@fgks-law.com -- Faulkner, Garmhausen, Keister & Shenk,
Karen S. Hockstad -- karen.hockstad@dinsmore.com -- Dinsmore &
Shohl & Vladimir P. Belo -- vladimir.belo@dinsmore.com --
Dinsmore and Shohl LLP.

Thor Industries, Inc., Defendant, represented by Karen S.
Hockstad, Dinsmore & Shohl & Vladimir P. Belo, Dinsmore and Shohl
LLP.


ALTITUDE MARKETING: GreenSky Can Arbitrate "Terlizzi"
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
granted Defendant GreenSky, LLC's Motion to Compel Arbitration in
the case captioned JASON TERLIZZI and REBECCA TERLIZZI,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. ALTITUDE MARKETING, INC., and GREENSKY, LLC,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-cv-1712-WJM-STV (D. Colo.).

Plaintiffs Jason and Rebecca Terlizzi bring this putative class
action against Defendants Altitude Marketing, Inc., and GreenSky,
LLC, for claims related to the Defendants' allegedly deceptive
marketing and sale of high-interest financing for rooftop solar
power systems.

Accordingly, to the complaint, the Terlizzis agreed on the spot
to purchase the solar power system with GreenSky financing. Jason
Terlizzi signed four documents that day, but none contained in
arbitration provision. One document, the Borrower Payment
Certificate, contained an acknowledgment that the signatory
agrees to be legally bound by the "TERMS AND CONDITIONS"
contained in the GreenSky Installment Loan Agreement.  Those
Terms and Conditions contained an arbitration clause. However,
the Terlizzis claim they had not received the Installment Loan
Agreement when Jason Terlizzi signed the Borrower Payment
Certificate.

The arbitration clause defines Claim to mean,
any claim, dispute or controversy of every kind and nature,
whether based in law or equity, between you and us arising from
or relating to your GreenSky Installment Loan Agreement as well
as the relationship resulting from such Agreement (the
Agreement), including the validity, enforceability or scope of
this Arbitration Provision or the Agreement.

The Terlizzis now have a rooftop solar power system but it has
not produced the amount of power they claim they were promised,
nor the promised savings, and they have not been able to
refinance the GreenSky loan. The Terlizzis have sued Altitude and
GreenSky in a purported class action encompassing themselves and
all other Colorado residents who were allegedly misled by
Altitude or GreenSky into financing a solar power system through
GreenSky.

Whether an Agreement to Arbitrate Exists

GreenSky does not argue that this Court should apply Virginia law
to the question of whether a contract was formed. The Court
presumes this is because the question before the Court is whether
the Terms and Conditions including both the arbitration and
choice-of-law clauses are a part of the parties' contract. On
this matter, the Terlizzis cite Colorado law for the governing
standards.  GreenSky states no objection to the Terlizzis'
approach, and GreenSky itself invokes Colorado law at times.

The Court therefore deems it conceded for present purposes that
Colorado law governs the question of contract formation.

Two of the Terlizzis' cited cases are about whether website
visitors are bound by terms of service that they would never
likely read unless they noticed and clicked on a particular link
so-called browsewrap agreements.  That situation is not relevant
here.

The remaining cases cited by the Terlizzis present fact scenarios
roughly similar to the one at issue, but those cases ultimately
support GreenSky because they affirm that acceptance through
conduct will create a binding agreement so long as the contract-
forming effect of that conduct is known to the party engaging in
it.

Accordingly, there is no genuine, material dispute that the
Terlizzis entered into an agreement containing the Terms and
Conditions, including the arbitration clause, when they drew upon
the GreenSky loan with reason to know that GreenSky would
construe that act as assent to the Terms and Conditions.

GreenSky's motion requests dismissal in favor of arbitration,
rather than a stay. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) directs a
stay: If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts
of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration the
court shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial
of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance
with the terms of the agreement.

Although the Court understands that some decisions nonetheless
order dismissal, the Court is not convinced at least not on the
arguments presented by GreenSky that a regular practice of
dismissing, rather than staying, is appropriate. Thus,
proceedings between the Terlizzis and GreenSky will be stayed
pending arbitration, assuming the Terlizzis demand arbitration.

All proceedings between the Terlizzis and GreenSky are stayed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 14, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7mvzpo4 from Leagle.com.

Jason Terlizzi, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, & Rebecca Terlizzi, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented
by Schuyler R. Ufkes -- sufkes@edelson.com -- Edelson, P.C.-
Chicago -- Sydney M. Janzen -- sjanzen@edelson.com -- Edelson,
P.C.-Chicago & Benjamin H. Richman -- brichman@edelson.com --
Edelson, P.C.-Chicago.

Altitude Marketing, Inc, a Colorado corporation doing business as
1 800 Solar USA, Defendant, pro se.

GreenSky, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company, Defendant,
represented by Barry Goheen  -- bgoheen@kslaw.com -- King &
Spalding, LLP & John Anthony Love -- tlove@kslaw.com -- King &
Spalding, LLP.


AMCOL SYSTEMS: Third Circuit Appeal Filed in "Magana" Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Nicole Magana filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit titled Nicole Magana v. Amcol Systems Inc., Case No.
1-17-cv-11541, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey.

The nature of suit is stated as consumer credit.

The appellate case is captioned as Nicole Magana v. Amcol Systems
Inc., Case No. 18-2267, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant NICOLE MAGANA, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Joseph K. Jones, Esq.
          Benjamin J. Wolf, Esq.
          JONES, WOLF & KAPASI, LLC
          375 Passaic Avenue
          Fairfield, NJ 07004
          Telephone: (973) 227-5900
          E-mail: jkj@legaljones.com
                  bwolf@legaljones.com

Defendant-Appellee AMCOL SYSTEMS INC. is represented by:

          Peter T. Shapiro, Esq.
          LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH
          199 Water Street
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 232-1322
          E-mail: pshapiro@lbbslaw.com


AMERICAN FEDERATION: High Court Set to Rule on Union Fees Case
--------------------------------------------------------------
Bill McMorris, writing for The Washington Free Beacon, reports
that public-sector workers across the country are seeking to
recover back wages they paid to labor organizations in the event
the Supreme Court declares mandatory union fees unconstitutional.

Class action suits have been filed against eight unions in New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Maryland, California,
and the state of Washington, accusing individual unions of
violating workers' rights by collecting mandatory dues payments.
The Supreme Court is expected to rule on a groundbreaking case,
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees, which challenges the constitutionality of forcing
public-sector workers to pay union dues or fees as a condition of
employment.  The suits argue that any public-sector employee who
participated in forced dues systems should receive financial
"redress" from labor organizations.

"The defendants have violated the class members' constitutional
rights by forcing non-union members to pay compulsory
'representation fees' to the Maryland State Education Association
(MSEA) or its affiliates as a condition of their employment," the
Maryland complaint says.  Similar language is featured in all
eight lawsuits.  "The compelled subsidy that [plaintiff Ruth
Akers] and her fellow representation-fee payers must remit to the
MSEA as a condition of their employment violates their
constitutional rights."

Former Texas solicitor general Jonathan Mitchell, who has argued
four Supreme Court cases in the past, filed each of the suits.
Mitchell declined to comment on the suits, instead directing the
Free Beacon to court filings.

Seven of the eight unions named in those suits did not return
requests for comment.

A spokesman for Education Minnesota declined an interview,
referring the Free Beacon to a June 21 press release posted to
its website.  The union decried the suits as part of a
coordinated attack sponsored by "a few immensely wealthy
individuals."  Union president Denise Specht said the union's
dues collection practices were in accord and in compliance with
all state, local, and federal laws and abided by the 1977 Abood
decision, in which the Supreme Court affirmed mandatory dues
payments as constitutional.

"For the past few years, a few immensely wealthy individuals have
paid for a national campaign against the rights of working people
to organize and work in union.  They fund lawsuits, political
campaigns, and think tanks in every state," she said in a
statement.  "Education Minnesota always complies with the law,
and the collection of fair-share fees has been legal and
beneficial for the tens of thousands of educators who worked in
better schools, with smaller classes, and for more pay than they
would have without their union."

A veteran labor lawyer familiar with one of the cases, who
requested anonymity to candidly discuss legal strategy, said the
suits could prove devastating to unions, who are already at risk
of losing hundreds of millions of dollars in dues money if the
justices rule in favor of the plaintiffs in Janus.  He argues
that labor organizations do not enjoy qualified and sovereign
immunity protections that government agencies enjoy.  They could
also be forced to pay legal fees if the class-action plaintiffs
emerge victorious.

"We are seeking to return improperly seized wages for these
workers-it's a terrible situation," the lawyer said.  "There's a
good chance they're going to be hit for refunding all these fees
because it is a constitutional violation."

Similar suits have followed other Supreme Court rulings on the
subject of forced dues payments.  In 2014 the Court declared an
Illinois policy forcing home health aides to pay dues to SEIU
unconstitutional, sparking a Right to Work Foundation lawsuit
seeking to recover back payments.  A lower court dismissed the
suit and an appeal has been filed to the Supreme Court.

Patrick Semmens, a spokesman at the National Right to Work
Foundation, which represented the Janus plaintiffs before the
Supreme Court, said such suits may send a warning to unions
tempted to work around the Supreme Court's decision.  He expects
such cases to spread in other states if the justices rule in
favor of the plaintiffs.

"As we've seen in assisting workers exercise their rights in new
Right to Work states, union bosses will fight tooth and nail
against letting [them] exercise their rights to stop funding a
union they disagree with," Mr. Semmens said.  "So we expect that
a Supreme Court ruling for Mark Janus will likely make necessary
numerous new cases brought by state workers across the country
seeking to enforce their First Amendment rights." [GN]


ANALOGIC CORPORATION: Carr Files Securities Class Action in Mass.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jeanette A. Carr, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Analogic Corporation, Fred B. Parks,
Bernard C. Bailey, Jeffrey P. Black, James J. Judge, Michael T.
Modic, Stephen O. Odland, and Joseph E. Whitters, Case No. 1:18-
cv-11301 (D. Mass., June 21, 2018), seeks to recover damages
resulting from the Defendants' violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

The Plaintiff filed the case in connection with the proposed
acquisition by which Altaris Capital Partners, LLC, through its
wholly-owned affiliates ANLG Holding Company, Inc. and ANLG
Holding's wholly-owned subsidiary AC Merger Sub, Inc., will
acquire all of the outstanding stock of Analogic for a derisory
price, says the complaint.  The Plaintiff alleged that the Proxy
Statement filed by the Defendants misstates and omits certain
material information with respect to the Proposed Transaction,
which renders it false and misleading, in violation of Sections
14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

The Plaintiff is a shareholder of Analogic.

The Defendant Analogic is a Massachusetts corporation
headquartered at 8 Centennial Drive, Peabody, Massachusetts,
01960. Analogic is a healthcare and security technology solutions
company. Its products and services include advanced imaging and
real-time guidance technologies used for disease diagnosis and
treatment as well as for automated threat detection.

The Individual Defendants are officers of Analogic. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jason M. Leviton, Esq.
      BLOCK & LEVITON LLP
      155 Federal Street, Suite 400
      Boston, MA 02110
      Tel: (617) 398-5600
      E-mail: jason@blockesq.com

          - and -

      Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
      MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
      350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4405
      New York, NY 10118
      Tel: (212) 971-1341
      Fax: (212) 202-7880

          - and -

      Guri Ademi, Esq.
      Shpetim Ademi, Esq.
      ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
      3620 East Layton Ave.
      Cudahy, WI 53110
      Tel: (414) 482-8000
      Fax: (414) 482-8001


ANDEAVOR: Bushansky Alleges Securities Exchange Act Breach
----------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Bushansky, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. Andeavor, et al., Case No. 5:18-cv-00642 (W.D. Tex.,
June 26, 2018), is brought against the Defendants for violations
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the vote on a proposed transaction,
pursuant to which Andeavor will be acquired by Marathon Petroleum
Corp. through its wholly owned subsidiaries Mahi Inc. and Mahi
LLC.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' Registration
Statement, which recommends that Andeavor stockholders vote in
favor of the Proposed Transaction, omits or misrepresents
material information concerning, among other things: (i) the
Company's financial projections, utilized by the Company's
financial advisor, Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC in its financial
analyses; and (ii) the valuation analyses prepared by Goldman in
connection with the rendering of its fairness opinion.

The Plaintiff owns Andeavor common stock.

The Defendant Andeavor is a Delaware corporation and maintains
its principal executive offices at 19100 Ridgewood Parkway, San
Antonio, Texas 78259. The Company is a highly integrated crude
oil marketing, logistics and refining company. Andeavor's common
stock is traded on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker
symbol "ANDV."

The Individual Defendants are Andeavor's board of directors. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      William B. Federman, Esq.
      FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
      10205 N. Pennsylvania Avenue
      Oklahoma City, OK 73120
      Tel: (405) 235-1560
      Fax: (405) 239-2112
      E-mail: wbf@federmanlaw.com


APPLE INC: Court Narrows Claims in "Morgan" MMWA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEONN MORGAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. APPLE INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-05277-RS (N.D. Cal.), Judge Richard
Seeborg of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California granted in part and denied in part Apple's Motion to
Dismiss the First Amended Complaint.

Apple acquired Beats Music and Beats Electronics, manufacturers
of high-end headphones, in May 2014.  Two products in the
Apple/Beats line include Powerbeats 2, released in June 2014, and
Powerbeats 3, released in October 2016, both wireless Bluetooth
headphones co-created by athlete LeBron James.

In conjunction with its marketing of the Powerbeats, Apple makes
certain representations about each product.  Both on the Apple
and the Beats website, as well as on product packaging, Apple
represents Powerbeats 2 as having a "6 hour rechargeable battery"
and Powerbeats 3 sporting "up to 12 hours battery life.

Apple also makes a sweat and water resistance claim on the
packaging of both Powerbeats, as well as on both websites.
Likewise, both websites make several references to using
Powerbeats while working out, including that these water
resistant earphones push you further and handle tough training,
sweat and water resistance to handle tough training, and sweat
and water resistance provides the necessary durability for
strenuous workouts and weather.

Despite Apple's advertising and representations, Powerbeats have
generated a virtually unending stream of consumer complaints
because they are neither sweat proof nor do they have the battery
life that is advertised.  Named Plaintiffs Jennifer Zielinski
(Pennsylvania), Kelly Okorocha (Louisiana), Sophia Ivy (Florida),
Lydia Zepeda (California), Deonn Morgan (California), Christopher
Bizzelle (Texas), and Dana Rodenbeck (Illinois) have each
purchased Powerbeats and had similar experiences in which the
headphones began malfunctioning after ordinary use.

Plaintiffs Morgan, Zepeda, Ivy, Okorocha, Zielinksi, Bizzelle,
and DRodenbeck allege that Apple Powerbeats 2 and 3 headphones
malfunction and fail to hold a charge when used while sweating
and exercising.  They bring the suit on behalf of themselves and
putative nationwide and state classes alleging violations of
various state consumer protection statutes, breach of express and
implied warranty, common law fraud, negligence, as well as
violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), seeking
damages and equitable relief including an injunction.

Apple moves to dismiss all claims on numerous grounds.

Among other things, Judge Seeborg finds that the Plaintiffs'
averments regarding battery life are sufficiently specific to put
the Defendants on notice.  The Plaintiffs allege that after a
certain amount of time, the Powerbeats failed to hold a charge.
Such a failure (or the Plaintiffs' averments that the batteries
would not even last for an hour-long workout) obviously fall
short of the products' 6 or 12-hour battery life claims.  While
more specific allegations would only serve to strengthen the
Plaintiffs' claims, their averments are sufficient at least at
this stage.

In addition to the general averments, which identify and quote
each specific misrepresentation at issue, as well as include
specific advertisements by Apple, each Plaintiff explicitly
states what misrepresentations he or she saw either on the
product's packaging, on web advertising, or on commercial
advertising, that induced her to purchase the product.  These
averments, the Judge says, are sufficient to allege reliance and
Counts XII through XVII therefore may proceed.  The Plaintiffs'
factual averments regarding the numerous consumer complaints and
an editorial review are also sufficient to raise a question of
fact regarding Apple's knowledge.  They survive dismissal and
entitle them to proceed to discovery.

Similar to the argument that the alleged statements are not
actionable under a fraud-based theory, Apple also argues the
Plaintiffs' claims based on Apple's statements that Powerbeats
are "sweat & water resistant" and have certain battery lives may
not proceed because they are not specific enough to create
express warranties.  The Judge holds that Apple's argument fails.
Its claim that Powerbeats are "sweat & water resistant" is
specific enough to create an express warranty," as are its
representations regarding battery life.

With respect to the substance of the Song-Beverly claims, the
Judge finds that the Plaintiffs' averments are adequate.  He says
both Plaintiffs Morgan and Zepeda allege ordinary or expected use
of Powerbeats, including while exercising, as explicitly
advertised by Apple.  Both of them aver that the products ceased
functioning within a relatively short amount of time.
Furthermore, Apple's replacement of Morgan's headphones allegedly
failed to cure the issue, as Morgan avers that her replacement
pair stopped working and was therefore unmerchantable.  For these
reasons, their Song-Beverly Act claims survive.

While Apple initially argues that the Plaintiffs' MMWA claims
fail for the separate reason that they lack at least 100 named
Plaintiffs, the MMWA's requirements are satisfied as the
Plaintiffs have invoked jurisdiction under the Class Action
Fairness Act.  Hence, the Judge holds that the Plaintiffs' MMWA
claims thus may proceed consistent with their state law claims.

Finally, the Judge finds that not only have the Plaintiffs
established an inability to rely on Powerbeats' advertising, but
several have actually averred that they replaced and/or purchased
the product multiple times, believing that the defects would be
fixed.  Zielinski alleges that she received "multiple additional
replacement Powerbeats 2 headphones,"  Okorocha purchased a
second pair of Powerbeats 2 headphones, and Bizzelle had "over 5
pairs of Powerbeats 2 headphones" that broke as well as
Powerbeats 3 headphones that were replaced at least twice.
Indeed, he says, it is difficult to imagine what more Apple
expects plaintiffs to allege in order to establish that that they
have lost faith in their ability to rely on Powerbeats'
marketing.  For these reasons, he holds that the Plaintiffs may
seek injunctive relief.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Seeborg granted in part and
denied in part Apple's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended
Complaint.  The Plaintiffs will file any amended complaint
consistent with the Order within 20 days.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2HMtADd from Leagle.com.

Deonn Morgan, Lydia Zepeda, Sophia Ivy, Kelly Okorocha & Jennifer
Zielinski, individually and on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Hassan Ali
Zavareei -- hzavareei@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Adam
A. Edwards, Greg Coleman Law PC, Annick Marie Persinger --
apersinger@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei LLP, E. Powell Miller
-- epm@millerlawpc.com -- The Miller Law Firm, P.C., pro hac
vice, Gregory F. Coleman -- greg@gregcolemanlaw.com -- Greg
Coleman Law PC, pro hac vice, Mahde Abdallah -- mya@miller.law --
The Miller Law Firm, P.C., Mark E. Silvey, Greg Coleman Law PC,
Sharon S. Almonrode -- ssa@millerlawpc.com -- The Miller Law
Firm, P.C., pro hac vice & Sophia Goren Gold --
sgoren@tzlegal.com -- Kaliel PLLC.

Christopher Bizzelle & Dana Rodenbeck, Plaintiffs, represented by
Annick Marie Persinger, Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Sophia Goren Gold,
Kaliel PLLC & Hassan Ali Zavareei, Tycko & Zavareei LLP.

Apple Inc., Defendant, represented by Michelle Carrie Doolin --
mdoolin@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP.


BAVARIA INN: Can Partly Compel Arbitration in "Mantooth" Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHADA MANTOOTH, GALE RAFFAELE, ALEXIS NAGLE, and
NICOLE BUJOK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. BAVARIA INN RESTAURANT, INC., d/b/a
Shotgun Willie's, and DEBRA MATTHEWS, Defendants, Civil Action
No. 17-cv-1150-WJM-MEH (D. Colo.), Judge William J. Martinez of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado granted in
part the Defendants' Renewed Motion to Compel Individual
Arbitration and Dismiss or Stay Proceedings.

The Plaintiffs are four individuals who, on behalf of themselves
and those similarly situated, sued the Defendants for violations
of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA), the Colorado Wage Claim
Act ("CWCA"), and Colorado common law.  In their Complaint, they
allege that the Defendants -- an adult entertainment club and its
owner -- improperly classified them as independent contractors
rather than employees.  Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that,
because they were actually employees and not independent
contractors, the Defendants violated the FLSA and CWCA by failing
to pay a proper minimum wage or overtime, requiring that the
Plaintiffs share tips, charging fees for them to work at Shotgun
Willie's, and charging the Plaintiffs "inappropriate fines."

Though not alleged in the Complaint, both parties acknowledge in
their briefing that the  Plaintiffs signed "Entertainment License
Agreements."  These Agreements disclaim any employer-employee
relationship and classify the Plaintiffs as licensees.  The
Agreements also contain an arbitration provision.  The parties
also agreed to certain terms related to the arbitrator and costs
of the arbitration.

Less than two months after the Plaintiffs filed their Complaint,
in late June 2017, the Defendants moved to compel arbitration.
Before the Court ruled on the motion, the parties agreed to
limited discovery regarding the formation of the Agreements.  The
Court granted an unopposed request to defer briefing and
consideration of the initial motion to compel and denied that
motion without prejudice, subject to later re-filing.  In October
2017, the Defendants renewed their motion to compel.

Based on the plain language of the Agreements, Judge Martinez
finds that the parties clearly and unmistakably intended to
delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator.  Despite the
Plaintiffs' arguments that the Agreements are unconscionable, he
finds that the Plaintiffs do not specifically attack the
delegation clause, and therefore, it is the arbitrator who must
resolve any challenge to the enforceability of the Agreements.
However, he also finds that several provisions of the arbitration
and delegation clauses prevent the Plaintiffs' effective
vindication of their statutory rights in arbitration.  Because
the Agreements contain a severability clause, he finds that the
invalid portions are severable from the arbitration clause.

Accordingly, the Judge strikes from the arbitration clause the
fee-shifting provisions, the cost-sharing requirement for certain
Plaintiffs, and the industry expert arbitrator selection
requirement.  Subject to the severance of these provisions, all
disputes regarding the validity of the contracts,
unconscionability, and the class action waiver are properly
delegated to the arbitrator to decide the arbitrability of the
claim.  Finally, he finds that nonsignatory Defendant Matthews
may compel arbitration.

For these reasons, Judge Martinez granted in part and denied in
part the Defendants' Motion to Compel as follows:

     a. Each Plaintiff, to the extent she wishes to pursue her
claim, must individually arbitrate with both Defendants;

     b. Any portion of any Agreement that any Plaintiff may have
with the Defendants is severed to the extent it (a) establishes a
fee-shifting obligation different from those established in 29
U.S.C. Section 216(b), or (b) allows either party to request an
arbitrator experienced in the adult entertainment industry;

     c. Any portion of any Agreement that Plaintiffs Bujok, Darr,
Nagle, and Rafaele may have with Defendants is severed to the
extent that it establishes a cost-splitting obligation different
from that established in 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b);

     d. The action is stayed pending the conclusion of the
Plaintiffs' individual arbitration proceedings; and

     e. the Defendants' Motion to Compel is otherwise denied.

The Judge denied as moot (i) the Plaintiffs' Expedited Motion to
Proceed as a Conditional Collective Action, Provide Notice, and
Toll All Statutes of Limitations without prejudice to refiling,
subject to the disposition of the arbitration; (ii) the
Defendants' Motion to Continue Proceedings Pursuant to FRCP 6(b)
on Plaintiffs' Expedited Motion to Proceed as a Conditional
Collective Action, Provide Notice, and Toll All Statutes of
Limitations ; and (iii) the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify to the
Colorado Supreme Court.

Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.2, the Clerk will administratively
the case, subject to a motion to reopen for good cause subsequent
to the conclusion of all of the Plaintiffs' individual
arbitration proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2JzzWeR from Leagle.com.

Chada Mantooth, Gale Raffaele, Alexis Nagle & Nicole Bujok,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew Joseph McNulty -- amcnulty@kln-
law.com -- Killmer Lane & Newman, LLP, Darold W. Killmer --
dkillmer@kln-law.com -- Killmer Lane & Newman, LLP, Liana Gerstle
Orshan -- LOrshan@KLN-law.com -- Killmer Lane & Newman, LLP &
Mari Anne Newman -- mnewman@kln-law.com -- Killmer Lane & Newman,
LLP.

Bavaria Inn Restaurant Inc., doing business as Shotgun Willie's &
Deborah Matthews, Defendants, represented by Jason Clayborn Astle
-- jastle@springersteinberg.com -- Springer & Steinberg, P.C.,
Jeffrey Alan Springer -- jspringer@springersteinberg.com --
Springer & Steinberg, P.C. & Matthew Rodney Giacomini --
mgiacomini@springersteinberg.com -- Springer & Steinberg, P.C..


BCA FINANCIAL: Court Narrows Claims in "Reyes"
----------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, Miami Division, granted in part and denied in part
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on an individual
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) claim in the case
captioned ESTRELLITA REYES, Plaintiff, v. BCA FINANCIAL SERVICES,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 16-24077-CIV-GOODMAN (S.D. Fla.).

Plaintiff Estrellita Reyes, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, has sued Defendant BCA Financial Services,
Inc., for allegedly violating the TCPA, which prohibits, among
other things, the use of an automatic telephone dialing system
(ATDS) or an artificial or pre-recorded voice to call a person's
cellphone absent an emergency or prior express consent.

She seeks $1,500 for each of the eight TCPA violations (treble
damages for six autodialed calls and two IVR uses, the latter
constituting separate TCPA violations).

The Court finds that it is undisputed that the Noble dialing
system is a predictive dialer.  And it is also undisputed that,
regardless of how the numbers it dials are teed up, the Noble
predictive dialer, as BCA Financial uses it, automatically dials
telephone numbers without human intervention.  Thus, binding
authority would compel the Court to find that the Noble
predictive dialer is an ATDS.  And the Court would have to reach
that conclusion regardless of whether the Court agree with the
FCC interpretation of the TCPA's statutory language.

Here, BCA Financial has presented no facts or evidence that it
used a manual-clicker application or point-and-click function or
similar human-intermediary utility before placing a call using
the Noble predictive dialer. Quite the opposite, BCA Financial
admits that the Noble dialer, as Defendant uses it, automatically
dials telephone numbers without human intervention.

In sum, the Court grants summary judgment in Reyes' favor on the
ATDS issue, finding that the Noble predictive dialer, as used by
BCA Financial, was an ATDS as a matter of law.

At this point, the evidence does not unequivocally show that BCA
willfully or knowingly violated the TCPA as a matter of law. If
anything, the evidence shows the opposite that the calls were
unintentional. The parties agree that BCA Financial did not
intend to call Reyes but was trying to reach someone else to
collect a debt.

BCA Financial obtained Reyes' cellphone number from one of its
clients, Barnabas, who associated that number with a former
patient (based on what the patient wrote on certain medical
forms. And Barnabas did not inform BCA Financial that the number
belonged to someone other than the patient.

In short, based on the record as it stands, the Court denies
summary judgment in Reyes' favor on the issue of treble damages.

BCA Financial's use of the IVR cannot form a basis for summary
judgment because it is an unpled claim.

Although the Supreme Court has mandated liberal pleading
standards for civil complaints, the standard does not afford
plaintiffs with an opportunity to raise new claims at the summary
judgment stage.  Thus, as opposed to simply raising additional
facts in support of an already pled claim, a plaintiff on summary
judgment cannot raise an additional, separate statutory basis for
relief.

In this case, Reyes' Complaint repeatedly alleged that BCA
Financial violated the TCPA by using an automatic telephone
dialing system. In the one specific allegation within her TCPA
count, she likewise alleged that BCA Financial violated the TCPA
by using an automatic telephone dialing system to place non-
emergency calls to Plaintiff's cellular telephone number, absent
prior express consent. Nowhere does she allege that BCA Financial
called her using an artificial or pre-recorded voice.
In short, the Court denies Reyes' summary judgment motion on the
two claims that seek damages for BCA Financial's use of an
artificial or pre-recorded voice issue.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 14, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yad6xogu from Leagle.com.

Estrellita Reyes, on behalf of herself others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Michael Lewis Greenwald --
mgreenwald@gdrlawfirm.com -, Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC &
Aaron D. Radbil -- aradbil@gdrlawfirm.com -- Greenwald Davidson
Radbil PLLC.

BCA Financial Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by Ernest
Henry Kohlmyer, III  -skohlmyer@shepardfirm.com -- Shepard,
Smith, Kohlmyer & Hand, P.A., Joseph Charles Proulx --
jproulx@gsgfirm.com -- Golden Scaz Gagain, Dale Thomas Golden --
dgolden@gsgfirm.com -- Golden Scaz Gagain, PLLC, Mary Grace
Dyleski -- mdyleski@shepardfirm.com -- Shepard, Smith, Kohlmyer &
Hand, P.A & Rachel Malkowski Ortiz, Shepard Smith Kohlmyer &
Hand, P.A.


BEAUFORT, SC: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss "Bairefoot" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Richard Mark Gergel of the U.S. District Court for the
District of South Carolina, Beaufort Division, denied the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the case, Tina Renee Bairefoot, et
al., Plaintiffs, v. City of Beaufort, South Carolina, et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 9:17-2759-RMG (D. S.C.).

In South Carolina, the municipal courts are optionally created by
municipalities to hear petty criminal cases.  Where there is no
municipal court, such cases are heard by magistrate courts.  The
municipal judges often are lawyers in private practice who serve
in a part time capacity, but they are not required to be lawyers.
They are part of the unified state judicial system under the
supervision of the Chief Justice of South Carolina, but the
municipalities appoint and reappoint the judges for terms of two
to four years and the municipalities set the judges'
compensation.

Before 2009, the Public Defender for the Fourteenth Judicial
Circuit provided representation to indigent defendants in
Beaufort and Bluffton Municipal Courts.  In 2009, the Defendants
ignored requests from the public defender for funding to cover
those services.  Consequently, the public defender notified the
municipal judges that the public defender would no longer provide
representation and the municipalities that they needed to
contract with private attorneys to provide indigent defense they
needed to contract with private attorneys.

Thereafter, in 2015, the state legislature required
municipalities that elect to have a municipal court to provide
adequate funds for representation of indigent defendants.  The
legislature has reenacted that requirement each subsequent fiscal
year.

The Municipal Association of South Carolina's October 2015
newsletter, under the banner headline "Indigent defense costs are
municipal responsibility," informed South Carolina's
municipalities that the law gave them four potential courses of
action:

     1. Negotiate an agreement for indigent defense with the
circuit public defender.  Several cities and towns have already
taken this option.

     2. Contract with an independent attorney for a fee or pro
bono. Before contracting with the attorney, the town should
ensure the attorney has malpractice insurance.

     3. Remove the threat of jail time for indigents, although
this makes it more difficult to collect any fines that might be
imposed on the defendant.

     4. Close the municipal court and negotiate an agreement with
the county to have municipal cases tried in magistrate court.

It also warned that failure to provide indigents with counsel
could expose cities to liability and advocacy groups around the
country are seeking opportunities to sue cities that violate the
indigent defendant's right to counsel.

The Defendants nonetheless failed to provide counsel for indigent
defendants before the Plaintiffs were sentenced to jail in 2017.
At an April 25, 2017, Beaufort City Council meeting, city
operations manager Linda Roper discussed with the city council a
request for $10,000 in fiscal year 2018 to contract with a
private attorney to provide municipal court indigent defense,
which she described as "a mandate from the state."  The Beaufort
Municipal Court annual budget is approximately $500,000 and the
court generates about $220,000 in revenue.

Ms. Roper recommended contracting with a private attorney rather
than the public defender because the public defender has a case
backlog and because Beaufort would get more "bang for the buck"
from a local attorney retained by the council than from the
public defender for the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit, who operates
beyond the control of the City of Beaufort.  Councilman Philip
Cromer asked if Beaufort could simply pay a fine rather than
provide counsel for indigent defendants as required by law.
Councilman Mike Mcfee noted that course of action could result in
litigation brought by the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU").

Around the time of those discussions, at least 50 unrepresented
persons were sentenced to incarceration in Beaufort and Bluffton
municipal courts (period March 21 to June 19, 2017)) and 36% of
the inmates in the Beaufort County Detention Center were
incarcerated on municipal court charges without the assistance of
counsel.  On Sept. 15, 2017, the Chief Justice of South Carolina
issued a memorandum to all municipal court judges instructing
them that all defendants facing criminal charges in their courts
that carry the possibility of imprisonment must be informed of
their right to counsel and, if indigent, their right to court-
appointed counsel prior to proceeding with trial" and that
failure to do so would be a "clear violation" of the United
States Constitution.

The ACLU filed the present putative class action on behalf of
named Plaintiffs Bairefoot, Dae'Quandrea Nelson, Nathan Fox, and
all other persons similarly situated, on Oct. 11, 2017.  The
Plaintiffs assert claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for alleged
violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.  They seek
compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and "any other relief" the
Court deems proper.  The Defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim on Dec. 17, 2017.  The
Court held a hearing on the motion on April 9, 2018.

Among other things, Judge Gergel finds that the Plaintiffs
correctly argue Reed v. Town of Lexington is inapplicable because
state law enacted after Reed was decided makes counsel for
indigent defendants a matter of local concern by requiring
municipalities to providing funding for such counsel in their
municipal courts.  The other case the Defendants cite in support
of their no-duty-to-provide-counsel argument is inapplicable for
the same reason.  South Carolina law clearly makes municipalities
responsible for providing for indigent defense in municipal
courts.

The Defendants also argue that even if the Proviso 61.12 does
require municipalities to provide for indigent defense in
municipal courts (as it indeed does), municipal failure to comply
with a state law is not actionable under Section 1983.  But
Proviso 61.12 merely means the municipalities are the public
authorities designated by state law to provide for indigent
defense in municipal courts -- Proviso 61.12 even prohibits the
South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense from providing
indigent defense in municipal courts unless municipalities agree
to pay for such services.  The Judge says a deliberate decision
to create criminal courts that operate without providing counsel
to indigent defendants is a violation of the Sixth Amendment,
which certainly is actionable under Section 1983. Here, the
Plaintiffs have shown that the constitutional deprivations at
issue here were the direct and predictable result of the
deliberate choices of City officials charged with the
administration of the public defense system.

The Defendants further argue that even if damages are recoverable
"in theory," they cannot show their alleged damages arising from
incarceration were actually caused by the deprivation of counsel,
because the Plaintiffs cannot show that they would have avoided
incarceration but for the absence of counsel.  The Judge finds
that the proper measure of damages in the event the Plaintiffs
are unable to show the alleged constitutional violations caused
prejudice to their defenses in their criminal cases is not an
issue before the Court at this time.

Finally, the Defendants argue the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
prohibits the Plaintiffs' claims because they seek redress for
injuries allegedly caused by a state court decision.  The Judge
finds that the Plaintiffs' claims under Section 1983 are not an
attempt to "sidetrack" the direct appeal process for state
convictions for shoplifting, assault, or motor vehicle
violations, but, rather, are claims independent of the underlying
state criminal judgments.  If Rooker-Feldman does not bar lower
federal court review of the statute governing a state court's
judgment, the Judge finds then that it surely does not bar lower
federal court review of a municipal policy merely because that
policy governs some aspect of a state court's administrative
practices.

For these reasons, Judge Gergel denied the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Order and Opinion is
available at https://bit.ly/2sX64yt from Leagle.com.

Tina Renee Bairefoot, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin Rush
Smith, III -- rush.smith@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins
Riley and Scarborough, Ezekiel Reifler Edwards, American Civil
Liberties Union, pro hac vice, Stuart Murray Andrews, Jr. --
stuart.andrews@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley and
Scarborough, Susan King Dunn -- sdunn@aclusouthcarolina.org --
ACLU SC National Office & Twyla Carter -- tcarter@aclu.org --
American Civil Liberties Union, pro hac vice.

Dae'Quandrea Trevell Nelson & Nathan Lee Fox, individually and on
behalf of a class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Benjamin Rush Smith, III, Nelson Mullins Riley and
Scarborough, Stuart Murray Andrews, Jr., Nelson Mullins Riley and
Scarborough & Susan King Dunn, ACLU SC National Office.

Beaufort South Carolina, City of & Bluffton South Carolina, Town
of, Defendants, represented by Kenneth Paul Woodington --
kwoodington@dml-law.com -- Davidson Morrison and Lindemann &
William Henry Davidson, II -- wdavidson@dml-law.com -- Davidson
and Lindemann PA.


BEHR PROCESS: Court Grants Stay Pending Related Case Disposition
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California stayed the case captioned MICHAEL HAMILTON,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. BEHR PROCESS CORP.; BEHR PAINT CORP.; MASCO CORP.;
THE HOME DEPOT, INC.; and HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., Defendants,
Case No. 2:17-cv-01765-KJM-EFB (E.D. Cal.), pending consideration
of nationwide class settlement filled in a related case captioned
Bishop, et al., v. Behr Process Corporation, et al., Case No.
1:17-cv-04464 (N.D. Ill.), and, if preliminary approval is
granted, through the disposition of any forthcoming motion for
final approval.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 14, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybtnsaug from Leagle.com.

Michael Hamilton, Plaintiff, represented by Charles E. Schaffer -
- cschaffer@lfsblaw.com -- Levin Sedran & Berman, pro hac vice,
Melissa S. Weiner  -- weiner@halunenlaw.com -- Halunen Law, pro
hac vice, Michael McShane -- mmcshane@audetlaw.com -- Audet &
Partners, LLP, Ling Y. Kuang -- lkuang@audetlaw.com -- Audet &
Partners, LLP & Sean Clinton Woods -- cwoods@audetlaw.com --
Audet & Partners, LLC.

Behr Process Corporation, Behr Paint Corporation & Masco
Corporation, Defendants, represented by Kathleen P. Lally --
kathleen.lally@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Mark
S. Mester -- mark.mester@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac
vice & Michael J. Reiss -- michael.reiss@lw.com -- Latham &
Watkins LLP.

Home Depot, Inc. & Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., Defendants,
represented by Jeffrey K. Douglass -- jdouglass@mmmlaw.com --
MORRIS, MANNING & MARTIN, LLP, Robert P. Alpert --
ralpert@mmmlaw.com -- Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP, William Ross
Warne -- wwarne@downeybrand.com -- Downey Brand, LLP & Avalon C.
Johnson Fitzgerald -- afitzgerald@downeybrand.com -- Downey Brand
LLP.


BHP: Hunter Valley Casual Coal Miners Join Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Annabelle Regan, writing for ABC Newcastle, reports that a class
action representing hundreds of Hunter Valley coal workers will
examine what it means to be a casual employee in Australia.

The BHP-owned Mount Arthur coal mine at Muswellbrook is the
largest coal mine in New South Wales with a production workforce
of about 1,900 people, including direct employees and labour hire
contractors.

The law firm leading the class action, Canberra-based Adero Law,
said it would be run on behalf of about 400 casual workers.

The law firm alleges BHP has taken advantage of contract labour-
hire companies Chandler Macleod and Tesa, which engage workers as
casual rather than permanent employees.

Stability 'destroyed'
Former coal miner Simon Turner is the lead claimant.

He has not worked since a workplace injury in 2015 left him with
a total and permanent disability.

The 47-year-old suffered spinal injuries after the truck he was
operating at the Mount Arthur coal mine was hit by a coal
excavator.

But he claims he was refused the industry standard accident
compensation because he was classified as a casual worker.

He said he had worked the same role as a permanent employee for
more than a year, but now had been left with nothing.

"It's very hard because you've got the same qualifications and
work the same roster and you get paid less," Mr Turner said.

"You don't have any job security, you don't have any time to
spend with family to take holidays, you go to work sick.

"Your whole family life and stability is basically destroyed and
taken away from you."

Adero Law principal Rory Markham said the class action would
allege that BHP was involved with Chandler Mcleod and Tesa over a
period of six years to casualise its workforce.

He hoped the class action would change the casualisation of the
Australia mining workforce.

"When you expect someone to show up for 18 months on the same
roster, when you expect them to ask for leave in advance, an
industry where you have to put in a leave certificate but told
you're engaged hour to hour, you are making a mockery of a casual
engagement and you're really calling it a simple sham," Mr
Markham said.

It is not just former casual workers who are taking part in the
class action.

Grahame Beech is a current casual operator at the Mount Arthur
coal mine and was recruited through Tesa.

He has been a casual employee for six years.

"No one should stay casual for six years in any job," he said.

Mr Beech said there was a clear distinction at the worksite
between casual and permanent employees.

"We're just called 'connies' [contractors]. There definitely is a
culture difference."

Mr Turner said casuals were always hopeful they would be offered
a permanent job.

"That's the magical carrot that's dangled in front of everyone,"
he said.

"Turn up to all your shifts, don't have any time off, take all
your breaks, do your work . . . you might have a permanent job
someday."

Claims valued at more than $40 million
Mr Markham said the class action was closed with about 400 people
signing on.

However, when it is officially filed and served it will be deemed
an open action that will cover all workers that fall within the
class definition.

"The claims themselves are in the value of in excess of $40
million," he said.

"We believe it's covering between 800 and 1,500 individuals that
were engaged as casual at the Mount Arthur site in the period of
the last six years."

Adero Law said it was investigating further action against other
mining companies.

BHP said it had not received any formal communications about the
claims being made.

Chandler Macleod said it had not been notified of any action
against it, and in the event of any action it would respond to
the court process.

Another labour hire company, Programmed, which acquired Tesa, has
been contacted for comment. [GN]


BHP: Adero Law Launches Class Action on Behalf Casual Mineworkers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ian Kirkwood, writing for Newcastle Herald, reports that a
Canberra law firm said it's about to lodge the necessary
documents and will kick off a "$50 million" class action against
casual employment in the coal industry at the Beresfield Bowling
Club on June 26.

The Federal Court action launched by Adero Law and backed by UK
litigation funder Augusta Ventures Ltd grew out of a campaign by
a former Mount Arthur casual, Simon Turner, who was badly injured
in a December 2015 truck accident at the mine while employed by
labour hire firm Chandler Macleod.

The Newcastle Herald wrote a series of articles in 2016 about
Mr Turner's efforts to highlight the plight of casual
mineworkers.  He says that while much of the industry --
employers, regulators and the mineworkers' union -- has been
ignoring or disputing what he was saying, the Canberra law firm
has not.

After looking at Mr Turner's claims, lawyer Rory Markham says a
substantial proportion of the NSW and Queensland coalmining
workforce are employed under conditions that are at odds with the
Black Coal Industry Mining Award 2010 and The Fair Work Act 2009.

Although numerous enterprise agreements have been registered
allowing casual employment in the mines, the award says
mineworkers must be employed "full-time" or "part-time", with
staff positions such as supervisors, surveyors, chemists and
technicians the only ones to be employed as "casuals".

"The action we are launching is the first of several in the
pipeline and it will reveal an industry-wide problem," Mr Markham
said.

He said the conditions at Mount Arthur were far from unique in
the coal industry and Adero was looking at legal action against
another big miner, Glencore, and its contractors, Programmed and
Skilled, and at Coal & Allied and its recruitment company
SubZero.

He said some mines had as many as 40 per cent of their workforce
classed as casuals.

"This is yet another chapter in the increasing loss of job
security for Australian workers and the loss of all the benefits
that permanent classification affords," Mr Markham said.

Adero has been advertising throughout the coalfields and holding
public information sessions searching for mineworkers to sign up
to the legal action. Mr Markham says 400 people have said they
wished to join on, and he expected that number could hit 800 or
1500.

The companies Adero says are targeted in the class action have
previously said they had not been formally notified of any legal
proceedings.

The mineworkers' union declined to comment.

BHP is also facing a class action from another specialist law
firm, Phi Finney McDonald, which argues investors were misled
over the 2015 collapse of a dam at the Samarco iron ore mine in
Brazil. [GN]


BIG TOP: Must Produce Employees Information in "Pizano"
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted in part and denied in part
Plaintiffs' Motion for an Order to Authorize Notice in the case
captioned JOSE PIZANO, Plaintiff, v. BIG TOP PARTY RENTALS, LLC
d/b/a BIG TOP TENT & PARTY RENTALS, LLC, and MARLENE LEONARD,
Defendants. Case No. 15-cv-11190. (N.D. Ill.)

The Plaintiff filed a motion for an order to authorize notice to
similarly situated persons pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).

The Plaintiff alleges that he regularly worked in excess of forty
hours a week, but was not paid overtime compensation for all of
this time. Specifically, he was not compensated for work that
includes time loading trucks at the beginning of the day,
unloading trucks and the end of the day, and traveling from job
to job and installing tents. He alleges that he and other workers
would punch in each day before beginning to load Defendant's
trucks and punched out at the end of each day after unloading the
truck and cleaning off tools.

The plaintiffs have the burden of showing that other potential
claimants are similarly situated by making a modest factual
showing sufficient to demonstrate that they and potential
plaintiffs together were victims of a common policy or plan that
violated the law.

If a plaintiff is able to show that other potential plaintiffs
are similarly situated, courts may conditionally certify the case
as a collective action and allow the plaintiff to send notice of
the case to similarly situated employees who may then opt in as
plaintiffs.

Conditional Certification

The Defendants recognize that the Plaintiff need only make a
reasonable factual showing that members of the proposed
collective action are similarly situated, but argue that the
Court should deny the Plaintiff's request to issue a notice in
this case because the requisite factual showing is typically
supported by discovery but discovery has not taken place in this
case due to the de minimus value of the Plaintiff's claim.

This satisfies the Plaintiff's burden of a making a modest
factual showing sufficient to demonstrate that they and potential
plaintiffs together were victims of a common policy or plan that
violated the law. Accordingly, the Plaintiff is permitted to send
notice to similarly situated persons pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
Section 216(b).

Form and Content of Notice

Time Period

The Plaintiff asks that the notice be sent to all persons
employed by the Defendants since December 11, 2012. The three
year-time frame identified stems from the statute of limitations
for claims brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
Specifically, the FLSA requires that an action be commenced
within two years after the cause of action accrued, unless the
violation was willful, in which case the statute of limitations
is three years.

However, an FLSA lawsuit is commenced: on the date when the
complaint is filed; except that in the case of a collective or
class action, it shall be considered to be commenced in the case
of any individual claimant (a) on the date when the complaint is
filed, if he is specifically named as a party plaintiff in the
complaint and his written consent to become a party plaintiff is
filed on such date in the court in which the action is brought;
or (b) if such written consent was not so filed or if his name
did not so appear on the subsequent date on which such written
consent is filed in the court in which the action was commenced.

Potential plaintiffs may be able to invoke equitable tolling as a
result of the Defendants' failure to post the required FLSA
notice. The fact that some potential plaintiffs may need to
invoke equitable tolling to defeat the Defendants' statute of
limitations argument does not negate the fact that they are
similarly situated to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff therefore is
permitted to send notice to all employees who between December
11, 2012 and present have been subjected to Defendants' policy of
classifying any or all hours worked in excess of 40 hours as ride
time.

Transmittal of Notice

The Plaintiff asks for authorization to transmit the approved
Section 216(b) notice (1) by first class U.S. Mail, using an
envelope containing the language "Important: Court-Ordered
Notice. Please Read Immediately" (2) in employee pay envelopes,
and (3) in a posting at the Defendants' office.

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's proposed methods of
transmittal of the notice are prejudicial because they are
duplicative and aimed at harassing Defendants' employees.

In Woods v. New York Life Insurance Company, the Seventh Circuit
held that Section 216(b) notices should not go out on court
letterhead. 686 F.2d 578, 581 (7th Cir. 1982). The Court
reasoned:
[W]e think it improper for the district court to direct that the
notice go out on its letterhead, over the signature of the clerk
of court or other judicial officer. We can think of no good
reason for apparent judicial sponsorship of the notice, at a
stage in the litigation when there has been no determination that
the plaintiff's allegations have any merit; and we can think of a
good reason against it, which is that the judicial imprimatur is
likely to be misunderstood as a representation that the suit
probably has merit.

Even though the notice disclaims that the Court has taken a
position on the case's merits, the language court-ordered notice
indicates that the notice is being sent at the direction of the
Court, not merely with the authorization of the Court. If the
Plaintiff wishes to include alternative language, the parties are
directed to meet and confer regarding other possible language
that would indicate that the contents of the envelope are
important, but that would not indicate that the Court has taken a
position on the merits of the case.

Accordingly, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
The Defendants are ordered to submit the names and addresses of
all employees who between December 11, 2012 and present have been
subjected to the Defendants' policy of classifying any or all
hours worked in excess of 40 hours as ride time.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 14, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybgrn4a8
from Leagle.com.

Jose Pizano, Plaintiff, represented by Alvar Ayala, Workers' Law
Office, P.C., Christopher J. Williams, Workers' Law Office, PC,
Javier Eduardo Castro, Raise The Floor Alliance & Lydia Colunga-
Merchant, Raise the Floor Alliance.

Big top & Party Rentals, LLC d/b/a Big Top Tent & Party Rentals,
LLC & Marlene Leonard, Defendants, represented by James M. Urtis,
Attorney at Law.


BRISTOL-MYERS: Bernstein Litowitz to Lead Shareholder Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JENNIFER TUNG, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BRISTOL-MYERS
SQUIBB COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-1611 (JPO)
(S.D. N.Y.), Judge J. Paul Oetken of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York appointed Arkansas Public
Employees Retirement System and Louisiana Sheriffs Pension &
Relief Fund ("APERS") as the Lead Plaintiffs; and APERS' choice
of Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP as the lead counsel
on behalf of the proposed class.

This is a putative shareholder class action against Bristol-Myers
Squibb and its executives.  The crux of the Plaintiffs'
allegations is that Bristol-Myers Squibb misled investors about
the efficacy of one of its drugs, and that the Plaintiffs' stock
value dropped as a result.

Six movants sought to be appointed the Lead Plaintiff.

Judge Oetken finds that the original Plaintiff, Tung, has not
formally moved to be appointed the Lead Plaintiff, and she has
not made a submission showing the total amount of losses she
allegedly suffered.  In her stead, six movants vied to represent
the class.  One by one, however, all movants except APERS either
withdrew their motions or recognized that APERS has shown that it
suffered the greatest loss.  The Defendants have taken no
position on these motions.

The only major distinction between the movants is the amount of
loss suffered.  Since the competing groups of the Plaintiffs are
nearly identical in all other respects, the amount of loss is
dispositive in favor of APERS.  None of the other movants claim
to have suffered greater losses.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Oetken granted the motion at
Docket Number 24.  The motions at Docket Numbers 7, 9, 13, 16,
and 20 are denied.  He denied as moot the motion at Docket Number
31.  He appointed APERS as the Lead Plaintiffs and approved
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, as the lead counsel
for the class.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2t8t259 from Leagle.com.

Arkansas Public Employees Retirement System & Louisiana Sheriffs
Pension & Relief Fund, Lead Plaintiffs, represented by Jesse Lee
Jensen -- jesse.jensen@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
Grossmann LLP, Lauren Amy Ormsbee -- laurenm@blbglaw.com --
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, Michael Dains
Blatchley -- michaelb@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
Grossmann LLP & Salvatore Jo Graziano -- sgraziano@blbglaw.com --
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP.

Jennifer Tung, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph Alexander Hood, II --
ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy Alan Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Metzler Asset Management GmbH & Erste-Sparinvest
Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH, Plaintiffs, represented by William
H. Narwold -- bnarwold@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice LLC.

Lehigh County Employees' Retirement System, Movant, represented
by Phillip C. Kim -- pkim@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm
P.A.

Western Washington Laborers-Employers Pension Trust, Movant,
represented by Daniel Lawrence Berger -- dberger@gelaw.com --
Grant & Eisenhofer P.A.

Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and Retirement System, Movant,
represented by Christopher J. Keller -- ckeller@labaton.com --
Labaton Sucharow, LLP & Francis Paul McConville --
fmcconville@labaton.com -- Labaton & Sucharow LLP.

Felix Iapichino & Michael Kristensen, Movants, represented by
Jeremy Alan Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, Michael Giordano, Fouad Namouni,
Francis M. Cuss, Giovanni Caforio, Lamberto Andreotti & Charles
A. Bancroft, Defendants, represented by Yosef J. Riemer --
yosef.riemer@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP & Matthew
Osborn Solum -- matthew.solum@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis
LLP.


BLOOMINGDALE'S INC: Illegally Charged "Rayford" Bag Tax
-------------------------------------------------------
Sonya Rayford, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Bloomingdale's, Inc., an Ohio
corporation,, Case No. 2018CH06028 (Ill. Cir., May 10, 2018),
seeks actual damages, attorney's fees and costs, including
interest thereon and all such further and other relief for
violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade
Practices Act.

On November 9, 2017, Reyford purchased a winter coat at the
Bloomingdale's store located at 900 North Michigan Ave, in
Chicago, Illinois. Bloomingdale's improperly imposed the Bag Tax
on a garment bag not subject to such, resulting in an overcharge.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Thomas Zimmerman, Jr., Esq.
      Matthew C. De Re, Esq.
      Nickolas J. Hagman, Esq.
      Maebetty Kirby, Esq.
      Sharon A. Harris, Esq.
      ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES, P .C.
      77 West Washington Street, Suite 1220
      Chicago, IL 60602
      Tel: (312) 440-0020
      Fax: (312) 440-4180
      Email: amy@attorneyzim.com
             matt@attorneyzim.com
             maebetty@attorneyzim.com
             nick@attorneyzim.com
             sharon@attorneyzim.com


CALIFORNIA: Magistrate Recommends Dismissal of "Warfield"
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRODERICK JAMES WARFIELD, Plaintiff, v. BOWERS, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-2467-EFB P (E.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Edmund F. Brennan of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California recommended that the
Plaintiff's amended complaint be dismissed without leave to amend
as frivolous.

The Plaintiff proceeds without counsel in an action brought under
42 U.S.C. Section 1983.  He commenced the action while confined
to a county jail, and has since been transferred to Napa State
Hospital.  In addition to filing two complaints, he has filed his
IFP application under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915.

The Plaintiff claims that this is a class action and that Aladdin
Bail Bonds illegally seized property of FBI # 0155210W6 by an
arbitrary contract.  He does not explain who makes up the
purported class, the nature of the "arbitrary" contract, or
identify the allegedly seized property in any way.  Nevertheless,
he claims that any rejection of the claim by any Defendant
including the Governor of the State of California will be shot on
sight and killed by federal agents that have been stalking them
and wiretapping wireless all electronic devices by satellite
transmission.

Some of the listed Defendants, of which there are 96, are
inanimate objects.  Others are groups of unidentified people.
Other individual Defendants include the "waitress from old
skyline bar who spilled drink," and "Musician Bruno Mars."
According to the Plaintiff, the Governor and other government
officials have engaged in various forms of criminal activity,
including first degree murder, capital case murder, child
molestation, indecent exposure, prostitution, and musical piracy.
As punishment for those crimes, he requests male genital
castration, female reproduction of ovaries removed, lobotomy,
cranial brain removal, and continuation of bankruptcy
proceedings.

The Magistrate Judge finds that the Plaintiff's complaint appears
to be a compilation of disjointed delusional assertions that defy
comprehension and must be dismissed.  None of his allegations
state a cognizable Section 1983 claim (indeed, his allegations
are barely intelligible) and, factually, the allegations can only
be categorized as fanciful.

In addition, the disjointed, unintelligible nature of the
Plaintiff's complaint convinces the Magistrate Judge that further
attempts to refine these allegations would not be fruitful.
There is simply no version of these facts and arguments which can
be shaped into a valid claim.  He will recommend that the amended
complaint be dismissed as frivolous, without leave to amend.

The Magistrate Judge has reviewed the application and trust fund
account statement and finds that it makes the showing required by
28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(1) and (2).  Thus, he will grant the
Plaintiff's IFP application will be granted.

Accordingly, he granted the Plaintiff's application to proceed in
forma pauperis.  The Clerk is directed to randomly assign a
United States District Judge to the case.

Further, Magistrate Judge Brennan recommended that the
Plaintiff's amended complaint be dismissed without leave to amend
as frivolous, and directed the Clerk to close the case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United
States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(l).  Within 14 days after
being served with these findings and recommendations, any party
may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on
all parties.  Such a document should be captioned "Objections to
Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations."  Failure to
file objections within the specified time may waive the right to
appeal the District Court's order.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Order and Findings
and Recommendations is available at https://bit.ly/2MsiB59 from
Leagle.com.

Broderick James Warfield, Plaintiff, pro se.


CANADA: Civil Trial in BC Foreign Buyers Tax Case Begins
--------------------------------------------------------
Jason Proctor, writing for CBC News, reports that a landmark
civil trial kicked off the June 25 testing the legality of a
foreign buyers tax enacted by the province of British Columbia in
response to a housing affordability crisis.

The legal battle pits the government against a proposed class of
foreign nationals who claim they've been discriminated against in
violation of the Canadian Constitution.

A lawyer for the province told B.C. Supreme Court Justice Gregory
Bowden that the volumes of arguments, affidavits and authorities
on display in his courtroom belied the very simple set of
circumstances that gave birth to the law.

"There was an affordability crisis in the Greater Vancouver real
estate market," Karen Horsman said as she laid out the
justification for the tax.

"Local residents were in effect being priced out of the market."

Is the tax legal?
Introduced in July 2016 under the previous Liberal government,
the tax initially required foreign entities (including foreign
nationals) to pay an additional 15 per cent on the purchase of
residential property in Greater Vancouver.

The current NDP government increased the amount to 20 per cent in
February and expanded its reach to include the Fraser Valley,
Capital Regional District, Nanaimo Regional District and the
Central Okanagan.

The province has asked Bowden to determine whether or not the tax
is legal in a summary trial -- as opposed to beginning with a
certification hearing on the class action.

The province will argue that the tax is not in breach of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

And that even if it were, the infringement is the kind of
reasonable limit allowed given the pressing need for political
action in the face of the housing crisis.

'Those are condensed?'
The plaintiff, Jing Li, is a Chinese student who moved to Canada
in 2013 to complete a master's degree in public administration.

Weeks prior to the introduction of the tax, she claims she signed
a contract for the purchase of a $559,000 home in Langley.

She says the foreign buyers tax added an additional $83,850 to
her bill.

Ms. Li wants the tax declared illegal and is looking for the
restitution of hundreds of millions of dollars collected by the
province from foreign nationals in the past two years.

Ms. Li's legal team consists of five lawyers, including Joseph
Arvay, a noted constitutional expert who is currently assisting
the province as external counsel in its battle over the Trans
Mountain pipeline.

Ms. Horsman is one of three lawyers arguing on behalf of the
province.  She began by calling Bowden's attention to the
mountain of "condensed" legal volumes laid out in front of him.

"Those are condensed?" he asked.

'A smokescreen and not a theory'
But Ms. Horsman said the issue at hand was actually fairly
straightforward: "The big picture can tend to get lost when the
court is asked to get down in the weeds."

She said the court should consider the situation preceding the
introduction of the tax.

By July 2016, the benchmark price of a single-family home in
Greater Vancouver had risen to $1.2 million.  The annual rate of
house price inflation had reached nearly 30 per cent, an amount
that far outpaced the growth in local income.

As a result, young families couldn't afford to buy homes. The
future looked uncertain and while there was undeniably more than
one factor, public commentary increasingly pointed to foreign
demand as a significant part of the problem.

"By 2016, Vancouver was not only the most unaffordable real
estate market in Canada," Ms. Horsman said.  "Vancouver had
become one of the most unaffordable real estate markets in the
world."

Ms. Horsman noted that markets around the world -- Sydney,
Melbourne, Hong Kong and London -- saw prices rise as housing
came to be seen more as an investment than a place to live.

She claimed all those factors contributed to the legitimacy of
the government's concern and the need to act.

She accused Ms. Li of clouding the issue by referring to historic
discriminatory acts like the Chinese head tax as a way to suggest
the foreign buyers tax is motivated by racism.

"That . . . is a smokescreen and not a theory," Ms. Horsman told
the judge.  "There is nothing nefarious or racist in a government
enacting measures that apply to all foreign buyers."

Duelling experts
Both sides came armed with affidavits from a slew of economists
and professors to buttress their arguments.

Two of the most widely quoted academics on the subject -- both
attached to the University of B.C.'s Sauder School of Business --
were cited in the day's proceedings.

5 things to watch in Canada's housing market this year
Tsur Somerville was retained by the province and Thomas Davidoff
by Li.

Ms. Horsman sought to use Davidoff's words from media interviews
against him in order to undermine doubts the plaintiffs have
raised about effectiveness of the tax.

Her written arguments include a quote from an interview in July
2016 in which Davidoff called the tax "a win" for the Liberals.

Analysis from one of the province's experts concluded the tax has
had its desired impact, cooling the residential market.

Ms. Horsman will spend the next two days outlining B.C.'s case.
Ms. Li's lawyers were expected to begin their arguments on June
28. [GN]


CANADA: RCMP Faces Class Action Over Bullying, Harassment Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Houlihan and Dave Seglins, writing for CBC News, report
that Canada's national police force is facing a mammoth $1.1-
billion lawsuit -- believed to be the biggest in the force's
history -- over bullying and harassment claims that could
eventually represent thousands of male and female RCMP officers,
civilian staff, and even volunteers dating back decades.

Two veteran male RCMP officers are the lead plaintiffs.  They
recount workplace horror stories and health problems they claim
stem from pervasive and "systematic bullying, intimidation and
harassment" within the force, according to the 44-page suit filed
on June 22 in Federal Court.

In an exclusive interview, Staff Sgt. Geoffrey Greenwood recalled
the fallout he says he endured after reporting allegations of
bribery and corruption against fellow drug officers in 2008.

"It rocked me to my core," said Sgt. Greenwood, who is now with
the RCMP detachment in Red Deer, Alta.

"I was kind of demonized and I was the one that was left to be
the problem, and really all I did was my job."

This lawsuit is expected to eclipse previous harassment cases
against the RCMP, including the $100-million settlement in 2016
for the more than 3,100 female officers who claim discrimination
and sexual harassment on the job.

The new lawsuit seeks compensation for potentially tens of
thousands of people, on a force that has 29,751 employees, not to
mention thousands more dating back decades.

If the court certifies it as a class action, it could cover
anyone who has ever worked for the RCMP and suffered what former
commissioner Bob Paulson acknowledged in 2016 was a "culture of
bullying and intimidation and general harassment."

None of the allegations in the lawsuit has been tested in court.
The Federal Court has only just received the claim and the
government and RCMP have not yet filed a response.

Officer claims he was 'villainized'
Sgt. Greenwood's troubles began in 2007 when he was based in
Yellowknife, N.W.T. He was leading a major drug and money-
laundering investigation across the North.

According to the lawsuit, Greenwood was assigned to look into
allegations from a woman arrested for money-laundering who
alleged some RCMP officers were on the take.

She claimed one officer was paid $60,000 "in exchange for
information about the identity of RCMP undercover agents,
surveillances, and upcoming drug raids," the lawsuit reads.

Sgt. Greenwood also listened to audio surveillance tapes
implicating several more officers.

Bolstered by a second team of RCMP investigators who believed the
woman, Sgt. Greenwood reported it all to his bosses.

According to the lawsuit, Sgt. Greenwood quickly found himself on
the receiving end of reprisals and was ordered to drop his
investigation.

"That manager wanted to bury that issue.  And for me, that is not
in my fibre," Sgt. Greenwood said in an interview.  "I can't
cover up something like that."

The lawsuit alleges he faced trumped-up internal charges that
were an "egregious form of bullying" intended to punish him.

He was eventually transferred out of the North in 2010 after
allegedly being ostracized and ridiculed by his bosses.

"I ended up kind of leaving a shell of a person," Sgt. Greenwood
said.  "Your whole character is torn apart and stripped down and
you're villainized."

'Blacklisted for speaking out'
Sgt. Todd Gray, the lawsuit's second lead plaintiff, had what
appeared to be the postcard-perfect job back in the mid-1990s as
a member of the RCMP Musical Ride.

"This is the image of the RCMP.  That's just the show," Sgt. Gray
said in an interview.  "But the struggles that go on with
travelling, and favouritism, and bullying, and being blacklisted
for speaking out . . . those are the things that don't come out."

Sgt. Gray alleges in this lawsuit that on a number of occasions,
he was forced to ride in the horse trailer on long overnight
trips, resting on a bunk next to the horses without heat,
electricity or access to a washroom.

Sgt. Gray alleges that in 1998, during his final year on the RCMP
Musical Ride, after injuring his back, he was ordered to continue
riding and was intentionally assigned a horse known to buck and
kick.  In one practice the horse reared up, toppled over and
landed on his right leg, injuring him, the lawsuit alleges.

In the early 2000s, Sgt. Gray was assigned to a small detachment
in Nunavut.

Sgt. Gray claims in the court pleading that one of his superiors
"frequently abused the local First Nations populations."

"[The commander] ending up kicking Mr. Gray in the face when he
tried to kick a 16-year-old First Nations boy in the ribs," the
lawsuit reads.

Sgt. Gray says he reported the incident to more senior managers.
He alleges that he soon found himself ostracized, denied
promotion and given a performance review from the detachment
commander that concluded he should be fired.

Now 53 and a sergeant in Airdrie, Alta., Sgt. Gray says he's
considering retirement given the 'cumulative' psychological toll.

"No matter where I go, no matter what province I was in, what
division I was in, the same issues are always there," he said in
an interview.  "It doesn't change across the country."

Nowhere for RCMP staff to complain
In 2016, facing allegations of sexual harassment involving
hundreds of female officers, then RCMP Commissioner Bob Paulson
testified before parliament admitting the force had profound
problems.

"It can't be understood as a sexual harassment problem,"
Mr. Paulson told the Commons public safety committee.  "Sexual
harassment has no place in the organization -- don't get me wrong
-- but it's the culture of bullying, intimidation, and general
harassment that I think needs everybody's focus and attention."

The new $1.1-billion lawsuit seizes on Paulson's statement and
cites a long list of formal reports and studies that also
conclude the RCMP suffers from widespread workplace harassment.

A key argument in the claim is that until 2015, RCMP employees
were precluded from forming a union and so had nowhere to
complain other than to their direct bosses.

"Complaints of any kind were treated as an affront to the chain
of command in the paramilitary structure of the RCMP, leading to
direct and indirect retaliatory conduct," the lawsuit alleges.

The suit seeks $1 billion in damages for loss of income due to
lost promotions, early retirements and losses to pensions.  It
also seeks $100 million in punitive damages and an additional $30
million to compensate family members of RCMP employees adversely
affected. [GN]


CHURCH & DWIGHT: Court Narrows Claims in "Chavez" Suit
------------------------------------------------------
Judge John J. Tharp, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted in part
and denied in part Church's motion to dismiss the case, DAVID
CHAVEZ, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. CHURCH & DWIGHT CO., INC., Defendant, Case No. 17 C
1948 (N.D. Ill.).

Church is a publicly traded Delaware corporation based out of New
Jersey that manufactures and distributes household products,
including dietary supplements.  Vitafusion is one of many dietary
supplements that Church produces and sells.  Church markets
Vitafusion as an excellent source of certain B vitamins,
including folic acid.  It advertises on its website that it
delivers high quality dietary supplements in the gummy vitamin
industry and places the utmost importance on nutritional accuracy
and high product quality.

Testing by Chavez's counsel shows that Vitafusion gummies contain
1232.2 mcg of folic acid -- more than three times the amount
listed on its label.  According to the Office of Dietary
Supplements at the National Institute of Health ("NIH"), the
Upper Tolerable Intake Limit ("UTIL") for folic acid in a
supplement is 1,000 mcg.  Consuming more than this amount may
cause adverse health effects and, in some circumstances, could be
dangerous.

Chavez purchased and consumed Vitafusion on a number of occasions
over the last few years believing that it would provide him with
the amount of B vitamins stated on the bottle and benefit his
health.  He alleges that he would not have done so had he known
that the product contained a level of folic acid above the UTIL.

Chavez brought suit in March 2017 and seeks to represent three
classes of Vitafusion consumers: one nationwide, one multistate,
and one based in Illinois.  Although the amended complaint
comprises six counts, it asserts four claims for relief.  The
first claim is that Church mislabels the amount of folic acid
found in Vitafusion. In Counts I and II, Chavez contends that the
mislabeling violates several state consumer laws, including the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act
("ICFA").  Count III asserts that the label is fraudulent under
Illinois common law, while Counts IV and V contend that the label
breaches several express and implied warranties under the Uniform
Commercial Code in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.
Finally, in Count VI, Chavez seeks to disgorge Church's
Vitafusion revenues under an unjust enrichment theory because the
product is mislabeled.

Chavez's other three claims also relate to Church's alleged
mislabeling of Vitafusion, but are nonetheless distinct.  His
second claim for relief is that the Vitafusion label fails to
disclose that it contains an "unsafe" level of folic acid, while
his third claim is that Church misrepresents on its website the
quality of its dietary supplements and the level of accuracy of
its nutrition labels.  Chavez's legal theory for these claims is
that Church's lack of disclosure and online misrepresentations
violate state consumer protection laws (Counts I and II) and
constitutes fraud (Count III).  His final claim, embodied only in
Count V, is that because Vitafusion contains an unsafe level of
folic acid, the supplement is unfit for consumption.

Church responded to the amended complaint by filing a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Chavez's claims are
preempted by federal nutrition labeling laws.  Alternatively, it
asks the Court to abstain from hearing the case until the Federal
Drug Administrative ("FDA") resolves a technical issue at the
heart of this dispute.  And, as a last resort, Church argues that
Chavez cannot represent a class of consumers outside of Illinois
due to a lack of standing and personal jurisdiction.

Judge Tharp granted in part and denied in part Church's motion to
dismiss.  Chavez's claim that Church misrepresents the quality of
its dietary supplements and labeling on its website is dismissed
without prejudice.  His claims also are dismissed to the extent
they are asserted on behalf of any putative class members who did
not purchase or consume Vitafusion within Illinois.  The Court
lacks personal jurisdiction over Church with respect to claims
asserted by such consumers and, as a result, any claims asserted
on their behalf are denied without prejudice to being reasserted
in a court that can exercise personal jurisdiction over the
Defendant.  In all other respects, the Judge denied Church's
motion.

To be sure, whether the FDA recognizes a 1,000 mcg upper limit
bears on the reasonable excess analysis as well.  But contrary to
Church's contention, the Judge finds that it does not resolve the
issue conclusively.  At bottom then, Chavez plausibly alleges
that Vitafusion is misbranded within the confines of the FDCA and
thus he cannot conclude at this stage that his mislabeling claim
is preempted.

The Judge also finds that Chavez is foreclosed from representing
either a nationwide and multistate class comprising non-Illinois
residents in the suit.  He is unpersuaded by the reliance of some
district courts on the fact that the citizenship of unnamed class
members is disregarded for purposes of determining diversity --
that is, subject-matter jurisdiction.  The focus of the due
process inquiry is on whether the Defendant's contacts with the
state of Illinois give rise to the claims of nonresident
Plaintiffs.  Whether the citizenship of the unnamed class members
should be disregarded for purposes of determining whether
diversity jurisdiction exists simply has no relevance to the
answer to that question.

Because Chavez's mislabeling claim survives, Count VI survives
even if it is tied to that claim under the ICFA.  Church
challenges the viability of Count VI, contending that unjust
enrichment is not an independent cause of action and must be
dismissed because it is predicated on Chavez's claims under the
ICFA.  The Judge holds that Church is wrong on both accounts.
The Illinois Supreme Court on several occasions has described
unjust enrichment as an independent cause of action.  Church's
argument to the contrary is based not on more recent Illinois
Supreme Court authority than Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of
Long Grove, but on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Pirelli
Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Medical Benefits Trust v. Walgreen
Co., a case in which the Court of Appeals held that unjust
enrichment is not a standalone claim under Illinois law.  But
Church fails to realize that the Seventh Circuit altered course
several months later in Cleary v. Phillip Morris Inc.

A status hearing is set for May 31, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://bit.ly/2t2KkSb from Leagle.com.

David Chavez, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel R. Johnson, Waskowski
Johnson Yohalem LLP & Gary Michael Klinger --
gklinger@kozonislaw.com -- Kozonis Law.

Church and Dwight Co., Inc., Defendant, represented by Baldassare
Vinti -- bvinti@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose LLP, pro hac
vice, Bart H. Williams -- bwilliams@proskauer.com --  Proskauer
Rose LLP, pro hac vice, Kristen Leigh Jones --
kljones@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose Llp & Lawrence I.
Weinstein -- lweinstein@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose LLP, pro
hac vice.


CIGNA CORP: 4th Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment in "Gordon" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KIMBERLY P. GORDON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CIGNA
CORPORATION; LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Defendants-
Appellees, and UCG HOLDINGS LP; OIL PRICE INFORMATION SERVICES,
LLC, Defendants, Case No. 17-1188 (4th Cir.), Judge James A. Wynn
Jr. of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of
the CIGNA Defendants.

Steven Gordon worked for Oil Price Information Services, Inc. and
paid premiums on life insurance policies that totaled $300,000 in
coverage.  But when he died in January 2014, his insurer, LINA,
paid his wife and beneficiary, Kimberly Gordon, only $150,000.
The reason, LINA claimed, was because Steven Gordon had only been
approved for $150,000 in coverage -- not for the full $300,000 in
coverage he had been paying for.

Kimberly Gordon filed the lawsuit.  The suit brought claims not
only on behalf of Gordon but also on behalf of a putative class.
The proposed class included all current and former employees of
any company that is or has been a subscriber to the Group Policy,
or any other similar policy issued or administered by the CIGNA
Defendants, who paid premiums for Supplemental Life Insurance
above the Guaranteed Issue Amount, but for whom the CIGNA
Defendants do not have an 'Evidence of Insurability application.'
As Defendants in the suit, Kimberly Gordon listed UCG, LINA, and
CIGNA.

The Complaint claimed the Defendants were liable in two ways.
Count I alleged that all the Defendants were fiduciaries under
ERISA, and that all of them breached their fiduciary duties by
failing to notify Steven Gordon that he needed to submit
additional evidence of insurability -- while simultaneously
collecting premiums for unapproved coverage.  In the alternative,
Count II alleged that if any of the Defendants was not an ERISA
fiduciary, then that Defendant was still liable for knowingly
participating in a breach of trust.

Several months after the Complaint was filed -- and before any
discovery was conducted -- the CIGNA Defendants moved for summary
judgment, and UCG moved to deny class certification.  On July 28,
2016, the district court held a hearing on both motions.  During
the hearing, the counsel for the CIGNA Defendants argued that
summary judgment was warranted because, under the terms of the
Plan and governing law, neither LINA nor CIGNA was an ERISA
fiduciary with respect to the particular conduct at issue, and
neither Defendant was aware of the errors that led to Steven
Gordon paying excess premiums.

In opposition, Kimberly Gordon argued that there was a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether the CIGNA Defendants were
ERISA fiduciaries and that summary judgment was premature because
she had not yet conducted any discovery.

The district court granted the CIGNA Defendants' motion for
summary judgment, and denied UCG's motion to deny class
certification.  First, it concluded that CIGNA was an improper
party because CIGNA was only a "holding company" that licensed
its trademarks to appear on various products issued by its
subsidiaries; in other words, CIGNA "didn't have any role under
the plan documents.  Next, turning to Gordon's breach of
fiduciary duty claim, the district court concluded that LINA had
not breached any such duty. Relying on Plan documents, UCG's
written concessions to Kimberly Gordon, and affidavits submitted
by LINA, the district court reasoned that LINA's role was
indisputably that of claims administration; whereas, the
administrative role for enrollment and getting people set up in
the plan was placed on UCG.

As such, Kimberly Gordon's failure to submit the required
evidence of insurability was "a slipup" by UCG, not by LINA.  The
district court also granted summary judgment on Count II, which
claimed that all non-fiduciaries knowingly participated in a
breach of trust.  It found that such a claim could not stand
because there was no evidence LINA knew of any breach by a
fiduciary; rather, the "unrefuted" evidence showed that the first
time LINA knew about the foul-up in collecting the premiums
inappropriately was when they got a claim from Kimberly Gordon.
Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment to the
CIGNA Defendants on both counts.  It, however, denied UCG's
motion to quash class certification as "premature," which led UCG
to settle with Kimberly Gordon shortly after the motion was
denied.

With UCG removed from the suit, Kimberly Gordon timely appealed
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
CIGNA Defendants.  On appeal, she claims the district court erred
in three ways: (1) granting summary judgment on both counts of
the Complaint; (2) finding that CIGNA was an improper party; and
(3) refusing to allow discovery prior to granting summary
judgment.

Judge Wynn finds that even when viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to Kimberly Gordon, no reasonable jury could find
that either of the CIGNA Defendants had a fiduciary duty toward
the Gordons with respect to soliciting supporting materials for
coverage beyond the guaranteed issue amount or notifying new
employees that they had not completed the evidence of
insurability requirement.  Accordingly, the district court's
grant of summary judgment on Count I of the Complaint was
appropriate.

Even if he assumes, without deciding, that the cause of action
Kimberly Gordon advances is cognizable, the Judge finds that her
claim would still fail, as there is no evidence that the CIGNA
Defendants knowingly participated in any breach.  Therefore, the
district court's grant of summary judgment as to Count II of the
Complaint was appropriate.

Finally, in line with the Court's recent precedent in Hodgin v.
UTC Fire & Sec. Ams. Corp., the Judge finds that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kimberly Gordon's
motion under Rule 56(d).  She was given a reasonable opportunity
to conduct discovery and declined to exercise that opportunity;
additionally, she made no showing that the discovery she sought
would have created a genuine dispute of material fact.

For these reasons, Judge Wynn affirmed the judgment of the
district court.

A full-text copy of the Fourth Circuit's May 15, 2018 Order is
available at https://is.gd/ik2aFi from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Jonathan Tycko -- jtycko@tzlegal.com -- TYCKO & ZAVAREEI
LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.

Christopher Joseph Boran -- christopher.boran@morganlewis.com --
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Anna C. Haac -- ahaac@tzlegal.com -- TYCKO & ZAVAREEI
LLP, Washington, D.C.; Daniel S. Kozma -- dkozlaw@aol.com -- LAW
OFFICE OF DANIEL S. KOZMA, Washington, D.C.; James E. Miller --
jmiller@sfmslaw.com -- Kolin C. Tang -- ktang@sfmslaw.com --
SHEPHERD FINKELMAN MILLER & SHAH, LLP, Chester, Connecticut, for
Appellant.

Jeremy P. Blumenfeld -- jeremy.blumenfeld@morganlewis.com --
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for
Appellees.


CIPRO CASES: Cal. App. Dismisses Non-Party Appeal
-------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division
One, granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Appeal in the case
captioned In re CIPRO CASES I & II, No. D071597 (Cal. App.).

Objectors Sean Hull, Sarah McDonald and Steven Helfand brought
two appeals pertaining to a partial class action settlement
between the plaintiffs and certain defendants in the proceeding
styled IN RE Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation,
1:00-MD-01383 (E.D.N.Y.).

In the action, the plaintiff class challenged settlement
agreements that were reached in a patent infringement case
between the maker of Cipro and companies that sought to market
and sell a generic version of Cipro.  The plaintiffs argued that
the settlement agreements between the pharmaceutical companies
amounted to unlawful restraints of trade in violation of the
Cartwright Act and the Unfair Competition Law. (In re Cipro Cases
I & II (2015) 61 Cal.4th 116.).

The plaintiffs ultimately settled the case in a series of three
settlements with different pharmaceutical defendants. This appeal
concerns a 2016 $100 million settlement between the plaintiffs
and defendants Hoescht Marion Roussel, Inc. (HMR), The Rugby
Group, Inc., and Watson Laboratories, Inc. (the HMR settlement).

During the pendency of the appeals, the Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc. (2018) 4
Cal.5th 260, in which the Court relied on longstanding Supreme
Court precedent to reaffirm that unnamed class members may not
appeal from a class judgment, settlement or attorney fee award
unless those members have become parties to the action by formal
intervention or filing a motion to vacate the judgment.  After
the opinion in Hernandez was filed, the plaintiffs filed a motion
to dismiss the objectors' appeals, on the ground that none of the
objectors had become parties to the action by intervening or
filing a motion to vacate the judgment. The defendants joined in
the plaintiffs' motion.

McDonald and Helfand voluntarily moved to dismiss their appeal,
but Hull filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss.

Code of Civil Procedure section 902 establishes that any party
aggrieved may appeal.

In Eggert v. Pac. States S. & L. Co. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 199, the
Supreme Court held that unnamed class members lack standing to
appeal because they are not parties pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 902. Only a party to the record can appeal.

Hull argues that Hernandez does not require that his appeal be
dismissed. According to Hull, Hernandez is limited to appeals
from judgments after a trial on the merits, and should not apply
to the settlement of a class action, where a formal objection
procedure exists for class members.

The Court finds no merit in these arguments.

First, it is abundantly clear from the language of Hernandez that
the Eggert rule applies not only to class action judgments
entered after a trial, but also to settlements and attorney fee
awards in class actions.

Second, the Court rejects Hull's suggestion that Hernandez should
not be applied retroactively to this case because retroactive
application would be unfair.

Although the HMR settlement agreement contained a provision
pertaining to a requirement that any class member that wishes to
appeal the order and final judgment, which appeal will delay the
distribution under the Settlement Agreement to the Class, post a
bond with the court as a condition of prosecuting such appeal,
the settlement agreement does not set forth the procedures for
initiating an appeal or for obtaining standing to appeal.

The provision regarding the posting of a bond merely provides the
defendants and the named class plaintiffs with some level of
protection against a class member attempting to delay
distribution of the settlement by pursuing an appeal. Neither the
settlement agreement nor the settlement notice purports to set
forth the requirements to file an appeal, and there is no
requirement that they do so.

Neither document misstates or misinforms class members regarding
the requirements for objecting to the settlement or appealing
from the court's overruling of such an objection. Hull's claim
that the notice violated his right to due process by failing to
inform him of the requirement that he become a party of record in
order to have standing to appeal thus fails.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that because Hull never became a
party of record, either by intervening or filing a motion to
vacate the judgment, he has no standing to appeal from the
judgment. His appeal must therefore be dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s May 14, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybz6yjok from Leagle.com.

Bandas Law Firm, Robert W. Clore -- rclore@bandaslawfirm.com --
Lang Hanigan & Carvalho and Timothy R. Hanigan --
trhanigan@gmail.com -- for Objector and Appellant Sean Hull.
C. Benjamin Nutley -- nutley@zenlaw.com -- Law Office of John W.
Davis and John W. Davis -- john@johnwdavis.com -- for Objectors
and Appellants Sarah McDonald and Steven Helfand.

Edleson & Rezzo, Joann F. Rezzo -- jr@edrezlaw.com -- Karcher
Harmes and Kathryn E. Karcher -- kathryn@karcherappeals.com --
for Defendants and Respondents.

Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, Eric B. Fastiff, Richard M.
Heimann, Lin Y. Chan, Michelle A. Lamy; Zwerling, Schachter &
Zwerling, Dan Drachler; Joseph Saveri Law Firm, Joseph R. Saveri,
Joshua P. Davis, Ryan J. McEwan and Kyla J. Gibboney for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.


CONDOCERTS.COM: Court Dismisses "Ahrendt" Suit
----------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned ROBERT AHRENDT, Plaintiff, v. CONDOCERTS.COM,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-8418 (N.D.Cal.).

Plaintiff Robert Ahrendt alleges that Defendant Condocerts.com
violated the Illinois Condominium Property Act (ICPA) and the
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (ICFA) and committed various torts by
charging unreasonable fees to obtain real estate documents
through its database.  The Plaintiff alleges that he could not
have obtained the ICPA documents from any other source, and thus
had no choice but to pay the Defendant's exorbitant fees so the
sale of his condominium could go through. The Plaintiff also
alleges that the Defendant pays kickbacks to property managers
and does not disclose those kickbacks to condominium sellers who
use the Defendant's services.

Count I: ICPA

Count I claims that the Defendant violated the ICPA by charging
unreasonably high fees that lack any connection to the
Defendant's actual costs for providing documents. The Defendant
argues that this claim fails for several reasons, including that
no private right of action for condominium sellers exists under
the ICPA.
The relevant ICPA provision states: "A reasonable fee covering
the direct-out of pocket costs of providing such information and
copying may be charged by the association or its Board of
Managers to the unit seller for providing the ICPA documents."

The Plaintiff was a condominium seller, not a purchaser. He fails
to provide any authority implying a private right of action under
the ICPA for condominium sellers, or finding that the legislature
intended for the ICPA to protect condominium sellers from the
harms at issue here. This Court will not usurp the general
province of Illinois courts by implying a private right of action
for condominium sellers without a clear justification arising
from Illinois law.

This Court dismisses Count I with prejudice.

Count II: ICFA

Count II claims that the Defendant violated the ICFA by charging
"exorbitant fees," knowing that condominium sellers like the
Plaintiff have essentially no alternative source for the ICPA
documents.

To state a claim under the ICFA, the Plaintiff must allege that:
(1) the Defendant used a deceptive or unfair business practice;
(2) the Defendant intended that the Plaintiff rely on the
deceptive or unfair practice; (3) the deceptive or unfair
practice occurred in trade or commerce; (4) the Plaintiff
suffered actual damage; and (5) the Defendant's violation of the
Act proximately caused the Plaintiff's damage.

The Plaintiff argues that he had no choice but to pay the
Defendant's inflated prices or risk the sale of his condominium
falling through, but the complaint tells a different story.

The Plaintiff alleges multiple times that he could have obtained
the ICPA documents from the Cook County Recorder of Deeds for a
more reasonable price, but then somehow draws a legal conclusion
that the ICPA requires the Plaintiff to obtain the ICPA Documents
directly from the association's Board of Managers through
whatever means directed. This Court need not accept the
Plaintiff's legal conclusions as correct. If the Plaintiff could
have obtained the documents elsewhere, then he did not face the
type of oppressiveness and lack of meaningful choice necessary to
establish unfairness.

Thus, this Court dismisses Count II without prejudice.

Count III: Unjust Enrichment

Count III claims that the Defendant unjustly enriched itself by
charging and collecting fees that exceeded its out-of-pocket
expenses for producing ICPA documents.  The Defendant argues that
this claim fails in tandem with Plaintiff's ICFA claim because
they rely upon the same allegations.

To state a claim for unjust enrichment, the Plaintiff must allege
that the Defendant unjustly retained a benefit to the Plaintiff's
detriment, and that the Defendant violated "fundamental
principles of justice, equity, and good conscience" by keeping
that benefit.

Here, the Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim depends upon the
same conduct that forms the basis of his ICFA claim: the
allegedly excessive and improper fees that Defendant charged for
providing ICPA documents.

Thus, this Court dismisses Count III because it dismissed the
Plaintiff's related ICFA claim.

Counts IV-VII assert claims for, respectively: fraud, fraudulent
misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment and omission, and
conspiracy. Each count depends upon a predicate violation of
either the ICPA or the ICFA. Because the Plaintiff fails to
allege those predicate violations, this Court dismisses Counts
IV-VII without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 14, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9ko2ct3
from Leagle.com.

Robert Ahrendt, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated,, Plaintiff, represented by James X. Bormes,
Law Office of James X. Bormes, Catherine P. Sons, Law Office of
James X. Bormes, P.C., Donald J. Pechous, The Khowaja Law Firm
LLC, Elizabeth M. Al-Dajani, Kerkonian Dajani LLC & Kasif
Khowaja, The Khowaja Law, LLC.

Condocerts.com, Inc., A Mutual of Omaha Bank Company,, Defendant,
represented by Eric L. Samore -- esamore@salawus.com --
SmithAmundsen LLC & Ronald David Balfour -- rbalfour@salawus.com
--  Smithamundsen Llc.


CORECIVIC INC: Court Narrows Claims in "Owino" Suit
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss the case captioned SYLVESTER OWINO and JONATHAN GOMEZ,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. CORECIVIC, INC., a Maryland corporation,
Defendant, Case No. 17-CV-1112 JLS (NLS) (S.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs allege that while at Otay Mesa, they and other
detainees performed a variety of tasks for the Defendant ranging
from scrubbing bathrooms, showers, toilets, and windows to
providing barber services to detainees to performing clerical
work for CoreCivic. In return for those services, detainees were
paid $1.00 per day, which the Plaintiffs refer to as Dollar-A-Day
Work. The Detainees could only spend their earnings at the
Defendant's company store or commissary.

The Plaintiffs bring twelve claims, which can be divided as
follows: First, the Plaintiffs allege violations of the federal
Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and the California
Trafficking Victims Protection Act. Next, the Plaintiffs allege
violations of numerous sections of the California Labor Code.
Finally, the Plaintiffs bring a negligence claim, a claim for
violation of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and an
unjust enrichment claim.

Forced Labor Claims

Federal TVPA (First Cause of Action)

The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' first cause of action. The Court dismisses
with prejudice the Plaintiffs' claims to the extent those claims
rely on Section 1595(a)'s financial benefit element and arose
prior to December 23, 2008.

The Court finds that 18 U.S.C. Section 1589's express terms do
not limit who constitutes a victim of forced labor. Section 1589
applies to any person there is no limitation on the type or
status of said person. Similarly, the target of the statute is
broad: "section 1589 criminalizes whoever knowingly provides or
obtains the labor or services. Nor does the statute contain any
language limiting application to those who traffic in persons or
transport persons across national borders."

The Court notes that had Congress intended to limit Section 1589
to trafficking or transnational crime it could have done so;
indeed, other sections of the TVPA contain the limiting language
the Defendant urges the Court read into Section 1589. For
example, section 1591 prohibits sex trafficking of children or by
force, fraud, or coercion" and has an explicit interstate or
foreign commerce requirement. 18 U.S.C. Section 1591.

Section 1584 criminalizes whoever knowingly and willfully holds
to involuntary servitude, any other person for any term, or
brings within the United States any person so held. The lack of
similar language in section 1589 reinforces the conclusion that
there is no limitation on who constitutes a person for purposes
of section 1589.

Civic Duty Exception

The Defendant argues that it would not be logical to allow pre-
trial inmates to perform housekeeping tasks while criminalizing
the Defendant's same conduct under Section 1589. 28 C.F.R.
Section 545.23(b) exempts pre-trial inmates committed to the
Federal Bureau of Prisons from forced labor other than
housekeeping tasks in the inmate's own cell. The Court agrees
with the Defendant that criminalizing housekeeping tasks in one
instance, civil immigration detention and permitting it in
another, pre-trial detention, would not be a logical reading of
Section 1589.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)'s operations manual,
like the Code of Federal Regulations, also requires Plaintiffs to
perform personal housekeeping. However, the Plaintiffs' Complaint
contains factual allegations, which the Court must accept as
true, that go beyond the personal housekeeping tasks listed in
the ICE manual.

Whether Plaintiffs Allege Sufficient Facts to State a Claim

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs did not allege the means with
any factual particularity.  Taking the factual allegations as
true, the Complaint reveals that the Defendant had a policy of
forcing detainees to perform labor or services and if the
detainees refused then they or other detainees would be placed in
solitary confinement.

The remaining question is whether allegations of solitary
confinement within a detention facility are sufficient to state a
claim under TVPA. The Plaintiffs argue that solitary confinement
has long been recognized as an additional punishment above and
beyond day-to-day incarceration. At the very least, solitary
confinement constitutes serious harm, which Congress defined to
include psychological harm.

Here, solitary confinement, or the threat of solitary
confinement, sufficiently alleges the means to achieve forced
labor.

In sum, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently
stated a claim for a TVPA violation.

Whether the 2008 TVPA Amendments Apply Retroactively

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs do not have a private
cause of action prior to Congress's 2008 TVPA amendments.
Congress amended the TVPA to extend the civil remedy provision,
to allow victims to recover against whoever knowingly benefits,
financially or by receiving anything of value from participation
in a venture which that person knew or should have known has
engaged in an act in violation of the TVPA.

The Defendant contends that Congress did not give the amendment
retroactive effect and, therefore, any liability under the
financial benefit prong of Section 1595 can only attach to
conduct after December 23, 2008, the effective date of the
amendment.  The Defendant concludes that the Plaintiffs only
bring a TVPA claim under the financial benefit prong and
therefore the Plaintiffs claims before December 23, 2008 must
fail.

Whether TVPA's Statute of Limitations Bar Plaintiffs' Claims

The Defendant argues that a ten-year statute of limitations
governs TVPA claims and the Plaintiffs filed their Complaint May
31, 2017. Thus, the Plaintiffs cannot bring any TVPA claims for
conduct occurring before May 31, 2007.  The Plaintiffs respond
that dismissal on the basis of statute of limitations is only
proper if the Defendant shows some obvious bar to securing relief
on the face of the Complaint.

The Defendant points out that the Plaintiffs do not state a
factual basis for equitable tolling. The Complaint suggests
otherwise. The Plaintiffs were held in a civil immigration
detention facility and it is plausible that equitable tolling
could apply because the Plaintiffs were physically detained at
the Defendant's facility. At the very least, there is a factual
dispute concerning the Defendant's affirmative defense.

Therefore, the Court declines to impose a statute of limitations
bar at this stage in the proceedings.

California TVPA (Second Cause of Action)

The Court grants in part and denies in part the Defendant's
Motion as to the Plaintiffs' second cause of action and dismisses
with prejudice the Plaintiffs' California TVPA claim to the
extent that it arose prior to January 1, 2006.

The Defendant argues that, like the federal TVPA, the California
legislature did not intend for the California human trafficking
statute to prohibit the Defendant from requiring lawfully-held
immigration detainees to perform housekeeping tasks.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs state a claim under the
California TVPA. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant
threatened to place non-compliant detainees in solitary
confinement if they refused to perform certain labor.  Solitary
confinement, even for those in confinement and whose liberty is
already deprived, constitutes deprivation of personal liberty.
The Plaintiffs also allege that the solitary confinement was a
punishment for refusing to perform work, which demonstrates the
Defendant's intent to obtain labor or services from the
Plaintiffs. Thus, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs state a
claim under the California TVPA.

Though neither party raises the issue, retroactivity is also
relevant here. California Civil Code Section 3 states that Civil
Code provisions are not retroactive unless expressly so declared.
Both sections 52.5 and 236.1 were enacted January 1, 2006 and
neither statute expressly declared to have retroactive effect.
Therefore, the Plaintiffs' claim cannot state a claim for events
that occurred prior to January 1, 2006.

Voluntary Labor Claims (Fourth through Tenth Causes of Action)

In these causes of action, the Plaintiffs allege the following
violations of the California Labor Code: failure to pay minimum
wages; failure to pay overtime wages; failure to provide mandated
meal periods; failure to provide mandated rest periods; failure
to furnish timely and accurate wage statements; failure to pay
compensation upon termination/waiting time penalties; imposition
of unlawful terms and conditions of employment.

Pre-emption

The Defendant raises a threshold objection to the Plaintiffs'
fourth through tenth causes of action: pre-emption.  The
Defendant argues both field and conflict preemption bar
application of California's labor laws to the Plaintiffs' claims.

Field Pre-emption

Here, the Defendant argues that the INA preempts any state
regulation in the field of immigration detention.

Carrying the Defendant's theory to its logical conclusion, if
this Court were to find that Congress pre-empted California law
in the entire field of civil immigration detention then
California could not enforce state and local ordinances,
including building codes, sanitation requirements, and other
licensing strictures.

In fact, ICE's operations manually explicitly requires contract
detention facilities to follow applicable federal, state, and
local law with regard to safety and sanitation law, fire safety
codes, garbage and hazardous waste disposal, drinking and
wastewater compliance, and food service.

The Court finds that the INA does not regulate the entire field
of detention conditions within an immigration detention facility.

The Court next considers whether the IRCA provides the
congressional intent to pre-empt the field of employment and
labor practices in immigration detention facilities.

In 1986 Congress enacted IRCA and made it unlawful for a person
or other entity to hire, or recruit or refer for a fee, for
employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an
unauthorized alien. As the Supreme Court has stated, IRCA
forcefully' made combating the employment of illegal aliens
central to the policy of immigration law.

Yet, the Defendant does not cite any cases for the proposition
that IRCA pre-empts the entire field of immigration employment
such that a state cannot applying its worker protection and
employment regulations to unauthorized aliens.

The Court finds that Congress has not pre-empted state law in the
field of immigration detainee labor and employment.

Whether IRCA Prohibits Defendant from Employing Plaintiffs

The Court agrees with the Defendant's general principal that IRCA
prohibits employers from employing unauthorized aliens and if any
detainees were unauthorized aliens then the Defendant would be
prohibited from employing unauthorized aliens. Civil immigration
detention facilities house persons as their immigration status is
adjudicated. Logic would suggest at least some of the Plaintiffs'
putative class would fall under IRCA creating a legal Gordian
knot for the Defendant. Two considerations allow the Court to cut
the proverbial knot.

First, the Court has no information or allegation concerning the
Plaintiffs' immigration status. The Motion before the Court is
not class certification, but rather whether these particular the
Plaintiffs state a claim. Thus, the Defendant's argument, while
potentially relevant in future motions, is not dispositive here.

Second, as the Plaintiffs point out, California law provides a
remedy for unauthorized aliens. The relevant inquiry is not
whether the Defendant violated IRCA, but whether the Plaintiffs
can recover under California law for past wrongs. Thus, the Court
finds IRCA does not control the issue of whether the Plaintiffs
are employees under California law.

Whether Immigration Detainees Are Analogous to Prisoners

Here, California Penal Code Section 2700 mandates that every
able-bodied prisoner imprisoned in any state prison are required
to carry out as many hours of faithful labor in each day as
prescribed by the Director of Corrections.  Like the Hale v.
Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, court's reasoning, California inmates
cannot freely sell their labor and are exempted from the
Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition on involuntary servitude.  The
Defendant has not directed the Court to any similar statute for
civil immigration detainees other than ICE's regulations.

Yet, the ICE regulation clearly states, the "Detainees shall be
able to volunteer for work assignments but otherwise shall not be
required to work, except to do personal housekeeping." The ICE
regulations are voluntary, not mandatory, excepting certain
housekeeping tasks. The Plaintiffs are not convicted criminals
and are accorded the protections of the Thirteenth Amendment.

Derivative Claims (Third, Eleventh, and Twelfth Causes of Action)

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs remaining causes of
action must fail to the extent the Plaintiffs' substantive claims
are dismissed.  The Defendant argues the Plaintiffs' unjust
enrichment merits special attention and fails regardless of
whether the Plaintiffs' substantive claims succeed or fail.

Unjust Enrichment (Twelfth Cause of Action)

To allege unjust enrichment as an independent cause of action, a
plaintiff must show that the defendant received and unjustly
retained a benefit at the plaintiff's expense.

Here, the Plaintiffs allegations sufficiently state a claim for
unjust enrichment or quasi-contract. The Defendant received the
value of the Plaintiffs' labor and allegedly did not adequately
compensate the Plaintiffs.

The Court denies in part the Defendant's Motion as to the
Plaintiffs' twelfth cause of action; however, the Court qualifies
its holding as follows.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d)(2) allows the Plaintiffs to
plead alternative causes of action, but the Court understands
that the Plaintiffs cannot recover twice for the same injury.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 14, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycmgm6h4 from
Leagle.com.

Sylvester Owino, on behalf of themselves, and all others
similarly situated & Jonathan Gomez, on behalf of themselves, and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Robert
L. Teel, Law Office of Robert L. Teel, Eileen Regina Ridley --
eridley@foley.com -- Foley and Lardner LLP, J. Mark Waxman --
mwaxman@foley.com -- Foley & Lardner LLP & Nicholas J. Fox  --
nfox@foley.com -- Foley & Lardner, LLP.

CoreCivic, Inc., a Maryland corporation, Defendant, represented
by Ashlee Beth Fletcher -- ahesman@strucklove.com -- Struck Love
Bojanowski & Acedo, PLC, pro hac vice, Daniel P. Struck --
dstruck@strucklove.com -- Struck Love Bojanowski & Acedo, PLC,
pro hac vice, Nicholas D. Acedo -- nacedo@strucklove.com --
Struck Love Bojanowski & Acedo, PLC, pro hac vice & Rachel Love -
- rlove@strucklove.com -- Struck Love Bojanowski & Acedo, PLC,
pro hac vice.


DAIMLER AG: Faces Class Action Over Faulty Truck Parts
------------------------------------------------------
Yonhap reports that a group of South Korean customers have filed
a class action lawsuit against Daimler AG and Daimler Trucks
Korea due to faulty parts in trucks they bought from the German
carmaker, industry sources said on June 26.

Forty-eight owners of Daimler trucks have recently made a claim
with a Seoul court for physical and financial damages due to
parts problems, such as a malfunctioning braking system, airbags
and steering wheel, which resulted in accidents in some cases, a
person familiar with the matter told Yonhap News Agency.

A spokesman at the Seoul Central District Court was not
immediately available for confirmation.

Daimler Trucks Korea said it is making efforts to resolve the
problems through after-sales services and extension of its
warranty period.  It will fully cooperate if the authorities
launch an investigation into the reported problems with its
vehicles, the company said. [GN]


DAIMLER AG: Wants Class Action Over Defective HVAC Systems Tossed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dorothy Atkins, writing for Law360, reports that Mercedes-Benz
USA LLC's parent company, Daimler AG, urged a Georgia federal
judge on June 22 to cut it from a putative class action alleging
Mercedes-Benz and Daimler knowingly sold vehicles with defective
HVAC systems, arguing the suit fails to differentiate between
Daimler and its U.S. subsidiary.

In a motion to dismiss, the automaker and its parent company
argued that the plaintiffs' "shotgun-style pleading" doesn't
separate the allegations between Daimler and Mercedes-Benz. [GN]


DETORONICS CORP: "Stone" Sues Over Unpaid Overtime, Missed Breaks
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Joseph L. Stone, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Detoronics Corporation and Does 1
through 100, Defendants, Case No. BC705953 (Cal. Super., May 10,
2018), seeks unpaid overtime and minimum wages, redress for
failure to authorize or permit required meal periods, statutory
penalties for failure to provide accurate wage statements,
waiting time penalties in the form of continuation wages for
failure to timely pay employees all wages due upon separation of
employment, failure to maintain time-keeping records,
reimbursement of business-related expenses, injunctive relief and
other equitable relief, reasonable attorney's fees, costs and
interest under California Labor Code and applicable Industrial
Wage Orders.

Detoronics Corporation provides glass to metal hermetically-
sealed products where Stone worked as a non-exempt employee with
maintenance in their Los Angeles County, California facility.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Nourmand, Esq.
      James A. De Sario, Esq
      THE NOURMAND LAW FIRM, APC
      8822 West Olympic Boulevard
      Beverly Hills, CA 90211
      Tel: (310) 553-3600
      Fax: (310) 553-3603


DIAMOND RESORTS: Discovery in "Dropp" Suit Stayed
-------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge George Foley, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Nevada stayed all discovery in the case, JOSEPH
M. DROPP, MARY E. DROPP, ROBERT LEVINE, SUSAN LEVINE, and KAARINA
PAKKA, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiffs, v. DIAMOND RESORTS INTERNATIONAL, INC.;
DIAMOND RESORTS HOLDINGS, LLC; DIAMOND RESORTS CORPORATION;
DIAMOND RESORTS INTERNATIONAL CLUB, INC., a/k/a THE CLUB
OPERATING COMPANY; DIAMOND RESORTS U.S. COLLECTION DEVELOPMENT,
LLC; DIAMOND RESORTS U.S. COLLECTION MEMBERS ASSOCIATION; APOLLO
MANAGEMENT VIII, L.P., APOLLO GLOBAL MANAGEMENT, LLC, MICHAEL
FLASKEY; and KENNETH SIEGEL, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-00247-
RFB-GWF (D. Nev.), pending a ruling on the Defendants' motions.

The Diamond Defendants and Individual Directors filed a Motion to
Sever Plaintiff Kaarina Pakka's Claims and Transfer Venue.  They
filed a Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration and to Strike
Class Action Allegations as to Plaintiffs Dropps and Levines.

The Apollo Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and Compel
Arbitration and to Strike Class Action Allegations as to
Plaintiffs Dropps and Levines.  It also filed a Motion to Sever
Kaarina Pakka's Claims and Transfer them to the United States
District Court for the District of Hawaii.  It further filed a
Motion to Compel Arbitration of the Dropps' and the Levines'
Claims, Dismiss their Claims in this Action, and Strike their
Class Claims and Require that Arbitration Proceed on an
Individual, Not Consolidated, Basis.

The parties have stipulated and Magistrate Judge Foley approved
that all discovery in the case is stayed pending a ruling from
the Court on the Defendants' motions.  The stay of discovery will
remain in effect until 30 days after the Court issues an order
granting or denying the Defendants' motions or upon stipulation
of the parties to lift the stay.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 15, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/0bPTHt from Leagle.com.

Joseph M. Dropp, Mary E. Dropp, Robert Levine, Susan Levine &
Kaarina Pakka, Plaintiffs, represented by D. Chris Albright,
Albright Stoddard Warnick & Albright, Lawrence P. Kolker --
kolker@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP,
pro hac vice, Lydia Keaney Reynolds -- Reynolds@whafh.com -- pro
hac vice & Mark Albright -- gma@albrightstoddard.com -- Albright
Stoddard Warnick & Albright.

Diamond Resorts International, Inc., Diamond Resorts Holding,
LLC, Diamond Resorts Corporation, Diamond Resorts International
Club, Inc., also known as Club Operating Company, Diamond Resorts
U.S. Collection Development, LLC & Diamond Resorts U.S.
Collection Members Association, Defendants, represented by Aleem
Dhalla -- adhalla@swlaw.com -- Snell & Wilmer & John S.
Delikanakis -- jdelikanakis@swlaw.com -- Snell & Wilmer LLP.

Apollo Management VIII, L.P. & Apollo Global Management, LLC,
Defendants, represented by Andrew J. Ehrlich --
aehrlich@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison LLP, pro hac vice, Kamil Ammari -- kammari@paulweiss.com
-- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, pro hac vice,
Lewis R. Clayton -- lclayton@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, pro hac vice, Robert N. Kravitz
-- rkravitz@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison LLP, pro hac vice & Rosa Solis-Rainey --
rsr@morrislawgroup.com -- Morris Law Group.

Michael Flaskey & Kenneth Siegel, Defendants, represented by John
S. Delikanakis, Snell & Wilmer LLP.


DEREK LAM 115: "Guzman" Files Request for Judicial Intervention
---------------------------------------------------------------
A request for judicial intervention was filed on May 10, 2018, in
the case docketed as Kevin Guzman, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Derek Lam 115 LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 701454/2018, (N.Y. Sup., January 30, 2018),.

Guzman seeks to recover maximum liquidated damages and interest
for being paid overtime wages and non-overtime wages later than
weekly, costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to the New York Labor
Law.

Defendant was engaged in the clothing and apparel business where
Plaintiff was employed by as a manual worker, packing, unpacking,
moving, lifting and handling merchandise and packages throughout
his workday. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Abdul K. Hassan, Esq.
     ABDUL HASSAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
     215-28 Hillside Avenue
     Queens Village, NY 11427
     Tel: (718) 740-1000
     Fax: (718) 355-9668
     Email: abdul@abdulhassan.com


EPIC SYSTEMS: McOmber & McOmber Attorney Discusses SCOTUS Ruling
----------------------------------------------------------------
Christian V. McOmber, Esq., of McOmber & McOmber, P.C., in an
article for Lawyers.com, reports that the U.S. Supreme Court
recently issued a significant decision involving the right of
employees to file class action lawsuits against their employers.
By blocking class action lawsuits by employees who signed
arbitration agreements, the Court ruled in favor of employers and
against the employees disputing the underpayment of their
overtime wages.

Epic Systems Cor v. Lewis
In the matter of Epic Systems Cor. v. Lewis, employees filed suit
to join a federal class action lawsuit based on allegations of
their employer violating the Fair Labor Standards Act by
underpayment of overtime wages.  All the involved employees had
previously signed arbitration contracts prohibiting collective
legal proceedings.  In a 5-to-4 decision in favor of the
employers, the Court held that federal arbitration law took
precedence over a federal labor law protecting workers' rights to
collectively bargain.  The signed arbitration contracts were
legal and enforceable, thereby preventing the employees from
joining a class action lawsuit.

By finding signed arbitration agreements must be enforced as
written, the Court favored the language of the Federal
Arbitration Act over the National Labor Relations Act.  The
Federal Arbitration Act is meant to promote arbitration as an
alternative to filing suit; the National Labor Relations Act is
designed to protect workers.  The Court held that employees
failed to prove the arbitration agreements, which required
employees to file individualized arbitration proceedings rather
than class action lawsuits, violated federal law.

While the conservative majority focused on the interpretation of
the language of the arbitration law, the liberal minority
stressed that the ability of workers to confront employers
collectively has been a priority since the 1930s and the New
Deal.  Highlighting the difficulty some workers face in filing
lawsuits on their own to dispute unfair or unjust wages, the
Court's Minority decision emphasized that federal labor laws
allowing workers to band together offers an important and
necessary protection for workers.

Strength in Numbers
Supporters of employees' rights to collectively bargain believe
employees have strength in numbers and often need combined
financial resources to fight employers in a wage dispute.  The
employees in the Epic Systems case were disputing overtime pay
claims too small to be worth pursuing individually due to the
high costs of litigation.

Justice Ginsburg's Opinion
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion finding
the decision wrong for failing to give employees and employers
equal footing with respect to wage bargaining.  Her opinion
stressed that the National Labor Relations Act was passed to
address workplace power imbalance between vulnerable workers and
employers, which should not be ignored.

She further cautioned this decision would result in a lack of
enforcement of state and federal labor laws and the return to
take it or leave it and yellow dog employment contracts, which
attempt to block employees from joining unions and suppress a
worker's right to seek legal remedies for employment grievances
or wage disputes.  Justice Ginsburg characterized the Majority's
decision as a destructive result that ignored the last 80 years
of federal labor laws. [GN]


EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Investors Want to Block Merger Vote
----------------------------------------------------
Dani Kass, writing for Law360, reports that Express Scripts
Holding Co. investors hit the company with a proposed class
action in Missouri federal court on June 22 aiming to block the
pharmacy benefit manager from holding a vote on its proposed
merger with Cigna Corp., alleging the company has withheld key
financial information from its U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission filings.

Express Scripts' registration statement leaves out material
information, including the financial projections for both
companies, conflicts of interest for one of the PBM's financial
advisers and details of the sale process.

The case is captioned Neufeld v. Express Scripts Holding Company
et al, Case No. 4:18-cv-01017, (E.D. Mo.).  The case was filed
June 22, 2018. [GN]


EVERETT ASSOCIATION: Thomas Appeals W.D. Wash. Ruling to 9th Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Deanna C. Thomas filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit entitled Deanna Thomas v. Everett Association of
Credit, et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-00599-RSM, in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington, Seattle.

The nature of suit is stated as consumer credit.

The appellate case is captioned as Deanna Thomas v. Everett
Association of Credit, et al., Case No. 18-35499, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellant Deanna C. Thomas' opening brief is due on
      August 6, 2018;

   -- Appellees John/Jane Does, Everett Association of Credit Men
      Inc, Royce A. Ferguson, Monica Jones, Branna Wickberg and
      Kristie Youso's answering brief is due on September 5,
      2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant DEANNA C. THOMAS, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Richard L. Pope, Jr., Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD POPE
          15600 NE 8th Street, Suite B1-358
          Bellevue, WA 98008
          Telephone: (425) 829-5305
          Facsimile: (425) 526-5714
          E-mail: rp98007@gmail.com

Defendants-Appellee EVERETT ASSOCIATION OF CREDIT MEN INC. and
MONICA JONES are represented by:

          Jeffrey I. Hasson, Esq.
          HASSON LAW LLC
          9385 SW Locust Street
          Tigard, OR 97223
          Telephone: (503) 255-5352
          Facsimile: (503) 255-6124
          E-mail: hasson@hassonlawllc.com


FIELD ASSET: Court Strikes Decertification Bid in "Bowerman" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FRED BOWERMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FIELD ASSET
SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:13-cv-00057-WHO
(N.D. Cal.), Judge William H. Orrick of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California granted the Plaintiffs'
motion to strike the Defendants' motion for decertification.

The Plaintiffs move to strike the Defendants' motion for
decertification on the grounds that the decertification motion
constitutes a motion for reconsideration, for which they are
required to seek leave prior to filing.  The Defendants respond
that an order that grants or denies class certification may be
altered or amended before final judgment and a district court may
decertify a class at any time.  They also assert that, at least
in the first instance, a motion to decertify a class is not
governed by the standard applied to motions for reconsideration.

The problem with Defendants' argument, Judge Orrick finds, is
that they have already moved to decertify once, and he has
already ruled on it.  Under these circumstances, it seems
appropriate that any subsequent motion to decertify should be
fashioned as a motion for reconsideration.

Only one of the Defendants' cases, Slaven v. BP Am., Inc., dealt
with a second motion to decertify.  The court indicated that the
usual reluctance to entertain motions for reconsideration simply
does not apply in the class certification context, but it also
highlighted a change in governing law in the six years since the
court conditionally certified the class (and five years since
denying the decertification motion that justified the the instant
motion to reconsider. It further noted that a District Court must
supervise a class to ensure that its continued maintenance
satisfies the standards set forth in Rules 23(a) and (b)(3), and
found that the defendants' motion thus serves an important role
in the ongoing life of the class action.

The circumstances here differ from Slaven, and support the
conclusion that FAS' motion to decertify should be presented as a
motion for reconsideration.  Most critically, the Judge already
performed the "rigorous analysis" in the Prior Order, which the
Slaven court cited as justification for considering the motion on
the merits in that case.  In addition, he says the Defendants
explicitly cite new facts elicited at the mini-trials to
purportedly justify their motion to decertify.  This material
difference in fact is one of the enumerated reasons justifying a
motion for reconsideration.

He further finds that none of the remaining cases cited by the
Defendants address circumstances where the court has already
denied a motion for decertification.

As a result, Judge Orrick granted the Plaintiffs' motion to
strike.  However, he will treat the Defendants' motion to
decertify as a motion for leave to file a motion for
reconsideration and will let the parties know if he require
furthers briefing once he has reviewed it.  The hearing on the
motion is vacated.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 15, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/cMWvhH from Leagle.com.

Fred Bowerman, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated & Julia Bowerman, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Thomas E.
Duckworth -- tom@dpolaw.com -- Duckworth Peters LLP, Chiharu Gina
Sekino -- csekino@sfmslaw.com -- Shepherd Finkelman Miller &
Shah, LLP, James Edward Miller -- jmiller@sfmslaw.com -- James C.
Shah, Esq. -- jshah@sfmslaw.com -- Kolin Tang, Esq. --
ktang@sfmslaw.com -- Laurie Rubinow, Esq. -- lrubinow@sfmslaw.com
-- Nathan Curtis Zipperian, Esq. -- nzipperian@sfmslaw.com -- and
-- Ronald Scott Kravitz, Esq. -- rkravitz@sfmslaw.com --
SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP

Field Asset Services, Inc. & Field Asset Services LLC, a
successor in interest, Defendants, Robert G. Hulteng, Esq. --
rhulteng@littler.com -- Alison Jacquelyn Cubre, Esq. --
acubre@littler.com -- Aurelio Jose Perez, Esq. -
aperez@littler.com -- Danton Wai-Ky Liang, Esq. --
dliang@littler.com -- Kevin R. Vozzo, Esq. -- kvozzo@littler.com
-- LITTLER MENDELSON & Matthew J. Hank -- E mhank@littler.com --
pro hac vice.


FLOWERS FOODS: Can Compel Arbitration in "Abugeith" FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MAJDI ABUGEITH and JIMMY BREWER, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. FLOWERS
FOODS, INC. and FLOWERS BAKING CO. OF HOUSTON, LLC, Defendants,
Civil Action No. H-17-2934 (S.D. Tex.), Judge Sim Lake of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston
Division, granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, to Compel Individual Arbitration.

Flowers Foods ships bakery and snack products to warehouses.
Flowers Baking Co. of Houston is a subsidiary of Flowers Foods
that operates one of Flowers Foods' bakeries and several of its
warehouses.  The Defendants market their bakery and snack
products to retailers such as Wal-Mart, Target, Dollar General,
and other grocery stores and merchants.

The Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed class distribute
the Defendants' products to the latter's retail customers and
place, remove, and organize their products on the retailers'
shelves.  The Plaintiffs allege that because they were
misclassified as non-employees, the Plaintiffs and the members of
the proposed Federal Collective Group were denied the rights and
benefits of employment, including, but not limited to overtime
premium wages.

The Plaintiffs executed a distributor agreement and signed
Flowers Baking Co. of Houston, LLC ("Company") Amendment to
Distributor Agreement which contains an arbitration provision.

The Plaintiffs filed the action on Sept. 29, 2017, seeking
overtime wages under the FLSA, liquidated damages, attorney's
fees, and costs on behalf of themselves and a putative class of
distributors.  The Defendants-filed a motion pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(1), 12 (b)(3), and 12 (b)(6)
seeking an order dismissing the lawsuit and requiring the
Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims with them.

The Defendants argue that because the Plaintiffs signed the
Amendment and the Arbitration Agreement -- which require
mandatory, individual arbitration of the claims and delegate the
power to decide questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator --
the Court should dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims and compel
individual arbitration.  The Plaintiffs respond that the
arbitration agreements are illusory and thus invalid, and that
the collective action procedure cannot be waived.

Because the termination provision in the Arbitration Agreement
requires 30 days written notice and because any modifications or
terminations will be prospective only, Judge Lake finds that the
Arbitration Agreement is not illusory under Texas law.  The
Plaintiffs have therefore failed to carry their burden of showing
that the Arbitration Agreement is invalid.  He concludes that the
parties have entered into a binding agreement to arbitrate their
dispute and that no federal statute or policy renders the claim
nonarbitrable.

The Judge also finds that the Arbitration Agreement also
incorporates the American Arbitration Association rules, which
give the arbitrator the power to determine arbitrability.  The
Plaintiffs challenge the Arbitration Agreement as a whole, but do
not specifically challenge the delegation clause.  He concludes
that the Arbitration Agreement and the delegation clause
submitting any issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator --
except the enumerated exceptions -- are valid, and the Plaintiffs
should be compelled to arbitrate.

Finally, because the Arbitration Agreement contains a class-
action waiver and because the Arbitration Agreement and the
class-action waiver are enforceable, he concludes that the
Plaintiffs must submit to individual arbitration.  The Judge
therefore granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and compelled
the Plaintiffs to arbitrate this dispute individually.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 15, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/GfEFN7 from Leagle.com.

Majdi Abugeith & Jimmy Brewer, Individually and on Behalf of all
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Alfonso
Kennard, Jr. -- alfonso.kennard@kennardlaw.com -- KENNARD RICHARD
PC.

Flowers Foods, Inc & Flowers Baking Co. of Houston, LLC,
Defendants, represented by Michael D. Mitchell --
michael.mitchell@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins et al & Stephen
Eric Hart -- stephen.hart@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins et al.


FRANKLIN GARCIA-VICTOR: Denial of No Cause of Action Bid Upheld
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, REGINALD GREEN, ET AL., v. FRANKLIN ELIEZER GARCIA-
VICTOR, ET AL, Case No. 2017-C-0695 (Ky. App.), Judge Terri F.
Love of the Court of Appeal of Louisiana for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the trial court's judgment denying denying the Ubers'
Exception of No Cause of Action.

A group of cab drivers ("Cabbies") filed a Petition Based Upon
Unfair Trade Practices, Request for Class Certification and
Request for Injunctive Relief against a group of Uber drivers
("Ubers") alleging that they were operating in violation of the
Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act ("LUTPA").  The Cabbies
contended that the Ubers' violations of the Louisiana Motor
Vehicle Safety Law, the Louisiana Driver's License Law, and other
municipal ordinances constituted unfair trade practices.

The Ubers filed Exceptions of No Cause of Action and No Right of
Action.  The trial court granted the Exception of No Cause of
Action as to the Cabbies' LUTPA claims, but denied the Exception
of No Right of Action regarding the alleged violations of the
Louisiana Driver's License Law.  The Court and the Louisiana
Supreme Court denied writs on that judgment.

The Cabbies filed a First Supplemental and Amended Petition
asserting additional violations of municipal ordinances to
establish liability pursuant to LUTPA.  They then filed a Second
Amending, Supplemental and Restated Petition alleging that the
Ubers performed the same work as the Cabbies, who have commercial
driver's licenses, but were not subject to the same regulatory
requirements, which resulted in disparate treatment by the City
of New Orleans.

The Cabbies contended that the Ubers: (1) accepted passengers for
cash without the Uber app; (2) staged and used cab stands; (3)
accepted fares to and from the airport without authorization; (4)
failed to notify Uber (Transportation Network Co. "TNC") and its
insurer of accidents; (5) transported passengers without a
chauffeur's license; and (6) prohibited cabs from picking up and
dropping off customers at the Voodoo Experience Music Festival.

The Cabbies further asserted that the Ubers were engaging in
illegally providing transportation services for hire, and that
their non-compliance with state regulatory rules resulted in
unfair competition pursuant to LUTPA.  Moreover, the Cabbies
averred that they suffered an ascertainable loss of money or
movable property, corporeal or incorporeal, as a result of the
use or employment by Defendants of an unfair and unlawful trade
practice in violation of Louisiana Revised Statute Section
51:1405.  They asserted that they suffered harm, injuries, and
damages, including loss of income, relevant market share,
business reputation, goodwill, and attorneys' fees and costs.

The Cabbies also alleged the class of the Defendants, for
purposes of class action: All UberX drivers operating in New
Orleans during the time of April 16, 2015 through the present.

Subsequently, the Ubers filed an Exception of No Cause of Action
regarding the Second Amending, Supplemental and Restated
Petition.  The trial court denied the exception and stated the
petition, as written, sufficiently stated a cause of action.  The
Ubers sought supervisory review from the Court.  The Court denied
writs.  The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs and remanded
the matter for briefing, argument, and full opinion.  The Court
heard the matter en banc on April 18, 2018.

The Ubers contend that the trial court erred because the Cabbies
failed to allege facts establishing that any individual Plaintiff
suffered any damages as a result of any specific act by any
individual Defendant and because alleged actions by the
Defendants do not violate any law.  They also maintain that each
individual defective cause of action is based on a separate
transaction or occurrence and should be dismissed.

Judge Love finds that the Cabbies' petition states a cause of
action.  Firstly, the Cabbies are persons pursuant to La. R.S.
51:1409(A).  Secondly, the Cabbies alleged an ascertainable loss
(loss of income, relevant market share, business reputation,
goodwill, and attorneys' fees and costs), specific amounts to be
determined during discovery/trial.  Thirdly, the Cabbies contend
that the Ubers' alleged practice of working outside the
regulations applicable to TNCs results in unfair trade practices,
i.e. the Ubers now are performing work reserved to the Cabbies.

She says if Ubers are illegally functioning as Cabbies, they
could be subject to the same set of regulations applicable to the
Cabbies.  Unfair trade practices offend established public policy
when the practice is unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or
substantially injurious.

Accepting all of the Cabbies' well-pleaded factual allegations as
true as a whole and resolving all doubt in their favor, she finds
that under the facts and circumstances of the case, the Cabbies
have stated a cause of action pursuant to LUTPA.  The trial court
did not err by denying the Ubers' Exception of No Cause of
Action.

For these reasons, Judge Love finds that the Cabbies have stated
a cause of action and upheld the judgment of the trial court.
She denied the application for supervisory review.  Writ denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2JSoLNC from Leagle.com.

James M. Garner -- jgarner@shergarner.com -- Timothy B. Francis -
- tfrancis@shergarner.com -- Matthew M. Coman --
mcoman@shergarner.com -- Michael R. Dodson --
mdodson@shergarner.com -- SHER GARNER CAHILL RICHTER KLEIN &
HILBERT, L.L.C., 909 Poydras Street, 28th Floor, New Orleans,
Louisiana 70112, Counsel for Defendants/Relators.

Ira J. Middleberg -- imiddleberg@midrid.com -- Yvette A. D'Aunoy
-- ydaunoy@midrid.com -- Marianne Garvey -- mgarvey@midrid.com --
MIDDLEBERG RIDDLE GROUP, 909 Poydras Street, Suite 1400, New
Orleans, Louisiana 70112, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Respondents.


GOLDEN STATE: $150K Settlement in "Padron" Suit Gets Final OK
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ISRAEL PADRON, as an individual and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. GOLDEN STATE PHONE &
WIRELESS, a California Corporation; and Does 2 through 10,
Defendant, Case No. 16-cv-04076-BLF (N.D. Cal.), Judge Beth
Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, granted the
Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement
and the Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and
Incentive Award.

Padron filed the action against Defendant Golden State Phone &
Wireless ("GSP") on July 20, 2016, asserting violations of the
California Labor Code, California Business and Professions Code,
and Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").  He subsequently filed the
operative first amended complaint ("FAC"), adding a claim under
the California Private Attorneys General Act.  According to the
FAC, the Defendant is a business that offers cellular service,
retail sales, and business phone systems.  The Plaintiff alleges
that he worked as an hourly non-exempt employee of the
Defendant's store in San Luis Obispo, California.

In addition to the hourly base rate, the Plaintiff and other
similarly situated employees received sales commissions and other
discretionary incentive pay.  He further alleges that the
Defendant failed to include all commissions when calculating its
employees' regular rate of pay, thereby underpaying the required
overtime wages.  In addition, as a result of this underpayment,
the Defendant allegedly (1) failed to timely pay all final wages
due at the time of employment termination, (2) maintained
inaccurate payroll records, and (3) issued inaccurate wage
statements.

On this basis, the FAC asserts claims for: (1) failure to pay
overtime wages; (2) violation of the FLSA; (3) wage statement
penalties; (4) waiting time penalties; (5) violation of
California's Unfair Competition Law; and (6) violation of the
Private Attorneys General Act.

Prior to the Case Management Conference, the parties notified the
Court that they had reached a class-wide settlement.  Thereafter,
based on the parties' settlement, the Plaintiff moved for a
preliminary approval of class action settlement.

The settlement defines two classes:

     a. California Commission Overtime Subclass: All hourly, non-
exempt employees who worked at any of GSP's locations in
California between July 20, 2012 and Oct. 20, 2016, and who both
worked overtime and earned a nondiscretionary commission in the
same pay period at least once between July 20, 2012 and Oct. 20,
2016.

     b. FLSA Commission Overtime Subclass: All hourly, non-exempt
employees who worked at any of GSP's locations throughout the
United States between July 20, 2013 and Oct. 20, 2016, and who
both worked overtime and earned a nondiscretionary commission in
the same pay period at least once between July 20, 2013 and Oct.
20, 2016.

The Settlement Agreement provides that the Defendant will pay a
non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount ("GSA") of $150,000.  It
further sets forth the following deductions from the GSA: Court-
approved attorneys' fees of $37,500 (25% of the GSA); verified
costs of up to $10,000; Court-approved incentive award of $5,000;
PAGA award allocation to the California Labor and Workforce
Development Agency ("LWDA") of $1,875; and settlement
administration costs of $9,500.

After deductions of the proposed Court-approved Plaintiff's
incentive payment, Court-approved settlement administration
costs, Court-approved attorneys' fees and verified costs, and
PAGA payment to LWDA, the class members would receive their
settlement shares from a Net Settlement Fund of approximately
$86,125.

On Sept. 28, 2017, the Court issued an order which: granted
preliminary approval of the class action settlement;
preliminarily certified the California Commission Overtime
Subclass and the FLSA Commission Overtime Subclass; appointed
Plaintiff Padron as the Class Representative; appointed Hernaldo
J. Baltodano, Erica Flores Baltodano, and Matthew K. Moen of
Baltodano & Baltodano LLP as Class Counsel; appointed CPT Group,
Inc. as the third-party Claims Administrator; approved forms and
content of the Class Notice, Exclusion Form, FLSA Consent Form,
and Individual Form ; set a 60 days deadline from the mailing
date of the Notice Packet for objections; and set a hearing date
of April 19, 2018 for the Plaintiff's motion for final approval
of the class action settlement and for the Plaintiff's motion for
attorneys' fees, costs, and incentive award.

No objections were filed.  On April 19, 2018, the Court heard
Plaintiff's motion for final approval of class action settlement
and motion for attorneys' fees, costs, and incentive award.

Judge Freeman granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval
of Class Action Settlement and the Plaintiff's motion for
attorneys' fees, costs, and incentive award.  The Clerk will
close the file pursuant to this order and the Final Judgment
issued simultaneously.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2latL2k from Leagle.com.

Israel Padron, Plaintiff, represented by Erica Flores Baltodano,
Baltodano and Baltadano LLP, Matthew Kevin Moen --
mkm@bbemploymentlaw.com -- Haines Law Group, APC & Paul Haines --
phaines@haineslawgroup.com -- Haines Law Group, APC.

Golden State Phone & Wireless, Defendant, represented by Glenn J.
Dickinson -- gdickinson@lightgablerlaw.com -- LightGabler LLP.


GUARD MANAGEMENT: "Sellers" Alleges No Time-keeping, Break Time
---------------------------------------------------------------
Janiesha Sellers, an individual, on behalf of himself, and all
other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Guard Management,
Inc. and Does 1 to 10, Defendants, Case No. 37-2018-00023207
(Cal. Super., May 10, 2018), seeks unpaid overtime wages and
interest thereon, redress for failure to authorize or permit
required meal periods, statutory penalties for failure to provide
accurate wage statements, waiting time penalties in the form of
continuation wages for failure to timely pay employees all wages
due upon separation of employment, failure to maintain time-
keeping records, reimbursement for business-related expenses,
injunctive relief and other equitable relief, reasonable
attorney's fees, costs and interest under California Labor Code
and applicable Industrial Wage Orders.

Defendant is in the business of providing security and other
services in the Southern California region where Sellers was
employed by Guard Management as a security guard assigned to work
at job sites located in San Diego, California, including the VA
Center in San Diego from approximately January 2018 until the
present date. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      R. Craig Clark, Esq.
      Paige D. Chretien, Esq.
      Monique R. Rodriguez, Esq.
      CLARK LAW GROUP
      205 West Date Street
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Telephone: (619) 239-1321
      Facsimile: (888) 273-4554
      Email: cclark@clarklawyers.com
             mrodriguez@clarklawyers.com

            - and -

     Walter Haines, Esq.
     UNITED EMPLOYEES LAW GROUP, PC
     5500 Bolsa Avenue, Suite 201
     Huntington Beach, CA 92649
     Tel: (562) 256-1047
     Fax: (562) 256-1006
     Email: walter@whaines.com


HARVARD UNIVERSITY: Low Personality Ratings to Asian-Americans
--------------------------------------------------------------
Wesley Yang, writing for The New York Times, reports that there's
a moving passage contained in a deposition taken in the major
class-action lawsuit accusing Harvard University of racial bias
against Asian-Americans . An attorney for Students for Fair
Admissions, the nonprofit group representing a dozen Asian-
Americans denied admission by Harvard, confronts the assistant
principal of Stuyvesant High School with evidence that white
students applying to Harvard in 2014 from her school were more
than twice as likely to be admitted to the university as were her
Asian-American students.

The assistant principal, Casey Pedrick, starts to cry.

(Witness crying.)

Q. I'm sorry this is upsetting to you. Do you want to take a
break?

A. (Witness shakes her head no.)

Q. You want to keep going? Do you want to tell me why this is so
upsetting to you?

A. Because these numbers make it seem like there's
discrimination, and I love these kids, and I know how hard they
work. So these just look like numbers to all you guys, but I see
their faces.

That last sentence is worth lingering on for a moment.  When
Ms. Pedrick looks in the faces of her Asian students, who
comprise more than 70 percent of the population at Stuyvesant,
she doesn't see any one of them as "yet another textureless math
grind," as M.I.T.'s dean of admissions was brazen enough to call
a Korean-American student to Daniel Golden, the author of "The
Price of Admission." She doesn't see her students as an arrogant,
privileged "ethnic group" who think they "own admission" to these
high-performing schools, as the new chancellor of New York City
Schools, Richard Carranza, recently put it.

Ms. Pedrick knows that her Asian students believe they have to
earn their admission to Stuyvesant in the only way anyone has for
more than four decades: by passing a rigorous entrance exam.
Their parents will often invest a major share of the family
income into test preparation courses to help them pass - this
despite the fact that more Asians live in poverty than any other
group in New York City.

At the time that she was deposed, Ms. Pedrick did not know that
the Harvard admissions office consistently gave Asian-American
applicants low personality ratings -- the lowest assigned
collectively to any racial group.   She did not know that
Harvard's own Office of Institutional Research had found that if
the university selected its students on academic criteria alone,
the Asian share of the Harvard student body would leap from 19
percent to 43 percent.  She did not know that though Asians were
consistently the highest academically performing group among
Harvard applicants, they earned admission at a rate lower than
any other racial group between 2000 and 2019.

All she knew was what she had witnessed as an assistant principal
and the single fact that she was shown by her deposers. But
perhaps she intuited the rest.

Earlier in June, The Times learned that a review of more than
160,000 individual student files contained in six years of
Harvard's admissions data found that Asians outperformed all
other racial groups on every measure of academic achievement:
grades, SAT scores and the most AP exams passed.  They had more
extracurricular activities than their white counterparts.  They
were rated by interviewers who had met them as virtually on par
with their white counterparts in their personal qualities.  Yet
Harvard admissions officers, many of whom had never met these
applicants, scored them collectively as the worst of all groups
in the one area -- personality -- that was subjective enough to
be readily manipulable to serve Harvard's institutional
interests.

The report by the plaintiff's expert witness, the Duke University
economist Peter Arcidiacono, revealed that Harvard evaluated
applicants on the extent to which they possessed the following
traits: likability, helpfulness, courage, kindness, positive
personality, people like to be around them, the person is widely
respected.  Asian-Americans, who had the highest scores in both
the academic and extracurricular ratings, lagged far behind all
other racial groups in the degree to which they received high
ratings on the personality score.

"Asian-American applicants receive a 2 or better on the personal
score more than 20% of the time only in the top academic index
decile.  By contrast, white applicants receive a 2 or better on
the personal score more than 20% of the time in the top six
deciles," wrote Mr. Arcidiacono.  "Hispanics receive such
personal scores more than 20% of the time in the top seven
deciles, and African Americans receive such scores more than 20%
of the time in the top eight deciles."

Even if the very worst stereotypes about Asians were true on
average, it beggars belief that one could arrive at divergences
as dramatic as the ones Mr. Arcidiacono documents by means of
unbiased evaluation.

The Asian-American population has more than doubled over the last
20 years, yet the Asian-American share in the student populations
at Harvard has remained frozen.  Harvard has maintained since the
1980s, when claims of anti-Asian discrimination in Ivy League
admissions first surfaced, that there is no racial bias against
Asian-Americans once you control the preferences offered to
athletes and alumni.

The discovery process in this case has demonstrated that this
claim is no longer supportable.

Mr. Arcidiacono found that an otherwise identical applicant
bearing an Asian-American male identity with a 25 percent chance
of admission would have a 32 percent chance of admission if he
were white, a 77 percent chance of admission if he were Hispanic,
and a 95 percent chance of admission if he were black.  A report
from Harvard's own Office of Institutional Research found that
even after alumni and athletic preferences were factored in,
Asians would be accepted at a rate of 26 percent, versus the 19
percent at which they were actually accepted.  That report,
commissioned back in 2013, was summarily filed away, with no
further investigation or action taken.

No innocuous explanation can account for the extent of these
disparities.  Yet Harvard is insisting that those who call it
what it plainly is -- racial discrimination -- are advancing a
"divisive agenda."

On June 12, Harvard's president, Drew Gilpin Faust, sent an email
to all alumni of the college warning of a forthcoming attempt to
use "misleading, selectively presented data taken out of context"
in order to "question the integrity of the undergraduate
admissions process."  The statement promised to "react swiftly
and thoughtfully to defend diversity as the source of our
strength and our excellence -- and to affirm the integrity of our
admissions process."

As the Harvard law professor Jeannie Suk Gersen pointed out in
The New Yorker, the tortuous and evasive quality of the
discussion of the treatment of Asian-Americans in elite colleges
stems from the way our legal doctrine on affirmative action has
evolved.  The Supreme Court ruled that it was legal to use race
as a criterion in admissions in order to pursue the educational
benefits of "diversity" in the landmark 1978 case Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, but it forbade the imposition
of racial quotas and, by extension, the maintenance of a policy
that consciously aims at "racial balancing."

This imposes a legal condition on Harvard.  Rather than make the
honest claim that it actively pursues racial balance and that
there are good reasons to do so, the school must engage in a
charade that nearly everyone working in the proximity of a highly
competitive college knows to be false.

Harvard has been here before. "To prevent a dangerous increase in
the proportion of Jews, I know at present only one way, which is
at the same time straightforward and effective," wrote A.
Lawrence Lowell, Harvard's president in the 1920s, "and that is a
selection by a personal estimate of character on the part of the
Admission authorities, based upon the probable value to the
candidate, to the College and to the community of his
admissions."  The opacity of its admissions procedure could veil
what Lowell's written correspondence would later disclose to be a
fully intended policy of discrimination.

The same zealously defended discretion to rank applicants on
intangible personality traits would, of course, later come to the
aid of blacks, Hispanics and Asians when Harvard pivoted toward
an embrace of affirmative action in the 1970s.  Affirmative
action and the privileges of legacy and wealthy students, most of
whom are white, both found shelter in the concept of "diversity"
-- a term that refers at once to racial diversity and the mix of
people that make Harvard's student body so varied and so
disproportionately rich.  Alumni preference, so crucial to the
sustenance of Harvard's $37 billion endowment, could provide
cover before the courts for racial bias.  Harvard's commitment to
racial diversity could whitewash its devotion to the preservation
of privilege before liberal public opinion.

There is, in this fragile system, a place for textureless math
grinds.  But only a few.

The conclusion is unavoidable: In order to sustain this system,
Harvard admissions systematically denigrated the highest
achieving group of students in America.  Asian-Americans have
been collateral damage in the university's quest to sustain its
paradoxical mission to grow its $37 billion endowment and remain
the world's most exclusive institution -- all while incessantly
preaching egalitarian doctrines.

Until very recently, Asian-Americans have been politically
quiescent and largely deferential to a status quo that works
against them.  But now, a portion of the Asian-American community
is acting in what it deems to be its own interest.

In the face of this challenge, Harvard has resorted to the
desperate expedient of promulgating racial stereotypes.  In
denying that it has engaged in racial balancing at the expense of
Asian-Americans, Harvard has put itself in the morally untenable
position of affirming a brazen falsehood.

Harvard's lawyers will soon tell the highest court in the land
that Casey Pedrick's Asian students are less respected because
they are less likable, less courageous, and less kind than all
other applicants.  The university has decided that this is
necessary for the greater good.  The reality is that it is a
carefully considered act of slander. [GN]


HEYWOOD CARI: "Veness" FDCA Suit Settlement Has Final Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID W. VENESS and JULIE K. VENESS, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. HEYWOOD,
CARI & ANDERSON, S.C., Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-338-bbc (W.D.
Wis.), Judge James D. Peterson of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement.

On May 5, 2017, David W. Veness and Julie K. Veness filed a class
action complaint against the Defendant in the U.S. District
Court, Western District of Wisconsin, asserting class claims
under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").  The
Defendant has denied any and all liability alleged in the
Lawsuit.

On Nov. 8, 2017, after extensive arms-length negotiations, the
Parties entered into a Class Action Settlement Agreement which is
subject to review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

On Nov. 16, 2017, the Parties filed the Settlement Agreement,
along with the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Action Settlement.  On Dec. 29, 2017, upon
consideration of the Plaintiffs' Preliminary Approval Motion and
the record, the Court entered an Order of Preliminary Approval of
Class Action Settlement, pursuant to which it, among other
things, (i) preliminarily certified a class of the Plaintiffs
with respect to the claims asserted in the Lawsuit; (ii)
preliminarily approved the proposed settlement; (iii) appointed
the Plaintiffs as the Class Representatives; (iv) appointed James
L. Davidson of Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC and Matthew C. Lein
of Lein Law Offices as the Class Counsel; and, (v) set the date
and time of the Settlement Approval Hearing.

On April 4, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed their Final Approval
Motion.  On May 16, 2018, a Final Approval Hearing was held.  The
Parties now request final certification of the settlement class
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(3) and final approval of the
proposed class action settlement.

Judge Peterson granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval
of Class Action Settlement.  Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3), Judge Peterson certified the Lawsuit, for settlement
purposes only, as a class action on behalf of the class of, with
respect to the claims asserted in the Lawsuit, all persons in the
state of Wisconsin on whom, between May 5, 2016 and May 5, 2017,
Heywood, Cari & Anderson, S.C. served a Notice Required by the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 192 as
Amended as part of a lawsuit it filed against such person in
connection with the collection of a consumer debt.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, the Judge certified the
Plaintiffs as the Class Representatives and James L. Davidson of
Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC and Matthew C. Lein of Lein Law
Offices as the Class Counsel.

The Defendant will establish a $3,000 Settlement Fund.  Each
Class Member who has not excluded himself or herself from the
Class with a postmark date no later than 60 days after the
Court's entry of the Order of Preliminary Approval of Class
Action Settlement will receive a pro rata share of the Settlement
Fund.  Each settlement check will be will be void 90 days after
mailing.  To the extent that any funds remain in the Settlement
Fund after the void date (from uncashed checks or otherwise),
these funds will be distributed to Marquette University Law
School Legal Clinic as the cy pres recipient.

The Plaintiffs will receive from the Defendant the sum of $1,000
each.  These payments will be separate and apart from the
Settlement Fund and his pro-rata share of the same.  The
Defendant will pay the Class Counsel $22,500 for attorneys' fees,
costs and expenses, separate and apart from the Settlement Fund,
the Statutory Award to the Plaintiffs and any Settlement
Administration Costs.

Separate from the Settlement Fund, the Statutory Award to the
Plaintiffs and the Attorney's Fees and the Expenses for the Class
Counsel, the Defendant is responsible for paying all costs of
notice and administration of the settlement, which will be
completed by First Class, Inc., Class Action Administration.

Judge Peterson dismissed with prejudice the case.  Any party may
move to reopen the case for good cause.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Final Order and
Judgment is available at https://bit.ly/2JOwE3d from Leagle.com.

David W. Veness, On behalf of himself and others similarly
situated & Julie K. Veness, On behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by James Davidson --
jdavidson@gdrlawfirm.com -- Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC &
Matthew Curtiss Lein -- mlein@leinlawoffices.com -- Lein Law
Offices.

Heywood, Cari & Anderson, S.C., Defendant, represented by Alyssa
A. Johnson -- ajohnson@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP
& David John Hanus -- dhanus@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw &
Culbertson, LLP.


HOMEAWAY INC: Can Compel Arbitration in "Arnold," "Swimsuits
------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, IVAN ARNOLD, an individual, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
HOMEAWAY, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellant, and DEIRDRE SEIM,
Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOMEAWAY, INCORPORATED, A Delaware
Corporation, Defendant-Appellee, Case Nos. 17-50088, 17-50102
(5th Cir.), Judge James L. Dennis of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit (i) reversed the judgment of the district
court in No. 17-50088 denying Homeaway's motion to compel, and
remanded with instructions to grant the motion to compel
arbitration; and (ii) affirmed the judgment of the district court
in No. 17-50102 granting Homeaway's motion to compel, and
remanded with instructions to grant the motion to compel
arbitration.

HomeAway owns and operates several websites that facilitate
short-term "vacation" rentals.  Its sites connect homeowners and
property managers with travelers who book their properties
online.  Arnold and Seim are both HomeAway subscribers who list
properties on HomeAway's websites.

Arnold filed a putative class-action complaint alleging, chiefly,
that HomeAway's February 2016 imposition of service fees for
travelers was contrary to its prior representations and resulted
in a variety of state-law violations.  HomeAway argues that its
April 2016 Terms and Conditions govern Arnold's action. As
relevant here, the April 2016 Terms contain the following
provisions:

HomeAway moved to compel arbitration in reliance on the April
2016 Terms' provisions.  It argued that, pursuant to the April
2016 Terms and the AAA Rules referenced therein, the parties had
agreed to arbitrate threshold questions including the existence,
scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement.

Arnold opposed the motion to compel, arguing that the September
2015 Terms and Conditions, which do not contain arbitration
requirements, governed. He also claimed that, even if the April
2016 Terms applied, HomeAway's authority to modify any terms or
conditions without providing notice rendered the arbitration
provision illusory and unenforceable under Texas law.

The district court denied HomeAway's motion to compel
arbitration.  It found that the April 2016 Terms applied because
Arnold renewed a subscription for one of his HomeAway accounts in
May 2016.  However, the court held that, under Texas law, the
arbitration provision was illusory because HomeAway had reserved
the unilateral right to avoid arbitration at any point without
notice.  The court did not address HomeAway's contention that the
April 2016 Terms contained a delegation clause requiring Arnold
to arbitrate threshold questions regarding the arbitration
provision. HomeAway filed a timely notice of appeal, as is
authorized by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").

Although it resulted in a different outcome, the history of
Seim's case is substantially similar.  Seim also challenges
HomeAway's imposition of traveler fees.  HomeAway moved to compel
arbitration under the February 2016 Terms and Conditions, which
contained the same arbitration provision the April 2016 Terms
did.  As in Arnold's case, the district court did not address
HomeAway's contention that a purported delegation clause required
Seim to arbitrate threshold questions about the arbitration
provision.  However, the district court, applying Kentucky law,
granted HomeAway's motion to compel arbitration.  The court
concluded that when Seim renewed a subscription for one of her
properties and agreed to the February 2016 Terms, she agreed to
arbitrate all claims against HomeAway, including any claims
predating the February 2016 Terms.  The district court entered a
final judgment of dismissal, and Seim timely appealed.

Arnold's contention is that the arbitration provision as a whole
is unenforceable under Texas law.  Because his challenge is not
specific to the delegation clause, Judge Dennis concludes that
Arnold must present it to an arbitrator.  Having concluded that
there is a contract between the parties that contains a putative
arbitration provision, that the parties have agreed to delegate
threshold questions about the arbitration provision to an
arbitrator, and that Arnold does not specifically challenge the
validity of the delegation clause, the Judge needs not reach the
remainder of the issues briefed by the parties.

Under the preceding principles, the resolution of Seim's appeal
is straightforward.  Because the February 2016 Terms contain the
same delegation clause as the April 2016 Terms, they too contain
clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties' intent to
delegate gateway questions like scope to an arbitrator.  Seim's
only argument to the contrary is that the difficulty that the
parties, lawyers and courts have in deciding which 'contract'
even applies shows the lack of clear and unmistakable intent to
arbitrate.  But this argument, at most, according to the Judge,
suggests lack of clarity as to the scope of the arbitration
provision.

Because there is an agreement to arbitrate some set of claims, a
delegation provision, and no specific challenge to that
provision, Seim's additional arguments are for an arbitrator to
resolve.  Thus, in Seim's case, the district court was correct to
order arbitration but should not have assessed threshold
questions itself.  Consistent with the Court's opinion, the
parties may revisit these issues in arbitration.

For these reasons, Judge Dennis reversed the judgment of the
district court in No. 17-50088 and remanded with instructions to
grant the motion to compel arbitration; and affirmed the judgment
of the district court in No. 17-50102 and remanded with
instructions to grant the motion to compel arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 15, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/40tzaO from Leagle.com.

Jane Webre -- jwebre@scottdoug.com -- for Defendant-Appellant.

Daniel Henry Byrne -- dbyrne@fbhf.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Bryan Michael Killian -- bryan.killian@morganlewis.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.

David Dean Shank -- dshank@scottdoug.com -- for Defendant-
Appellant.

Keith Joseph Wesley -- kwesley@bgrfirm.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellee.

Michael Andrew Bowse -- mbowse@bgrfirm.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellee.

Stephanie Beth Schuster -- stephanie.schuster@morganlewis.com --
for Defendant-Appellant.

John Warren Rissier -- warren.rissier@morganlewis.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.


HUON CORP: Litigation Funder Responds to Case Publicity
-------------------------------------------------------
The following is a contributed piece from a Commercial Litigation
Funder in response to recent publicity over the Huon Case.

It is peculiar that reference continues to be made to the Huon
Corporation case in the context of "high-profile class actions"
and the distribution of class action settlements, as this case
was not progressed as a class action or a representative
proceeding.

The funded plaintiffs in this claim were two very experienced
professionals, who were appointed as trustees of certain former
Huon Corporation employees.  In that role, the trustees were
responsible for protecting the interests of the specified
employees, and for progressing the legal proceedings on their
behalf.

Despite the trustees' role and mandate, ultimate outcome in the
Huon Corporation case was a result of the quantum of the claim's
recovery and the legal costs that were incurred in order to
achieve it.

The March 2018 Victorian Law Reform Commission Report on
Litigation Funding and Group Proceedings reported that the costs
in the case totalled $3.26million, against a settlement of
$5.1million.  The Commission further commented that "the cost of
the proceedings was clearly disproportionate to the size of the
claim" and that "according to the trustees, the initial legal
costs estimates were 'hopelessly inadequate' because of the long
trial time and legal process and disputes.  The litigation was
conducted over almost five years and, 'from the beginning, (the
defendant) maintained an obtuse approach in dealing with the
trustees' demands and subsequent litigation'".

The proceedings were aggressively defended.  It has since become
apparent that the insurer defendant had failed to make adequate
provision for its insurance liabilities, which have resulted in
its collapse and an application of the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand for it to be wound up.  This may give some insight into
the unfortunate way that this defendant chose to conduct the
litigation.

Litigation is unpredictable and risky, and the cost of advancing
a claim, particularly against an adversarial defendant, can have
a very significant impact on the action's ultimate proceeds.
Nevertheless, throughout the life of a funded matter (prolonged
as some matters may be) the funder continues to provide funding
of legal costs and disbursements, and continues to bear the full
risk of the action's downside.  This is so despite the fact that
it is not funder's role, nor is it properly the funder's
prerogative, to assume a plaintiff's right and responsibility to
conduct the plaintiff's proceedings, instruct its legal
representatives and, by extension, drive and regulate the quantum
of incurred legal costs or adverse costs.

It is not often dwelled upon by litigation funding critics that
had the Huon Corporation action (and the same can be said for
most funded actions) resolved for less than its ultimate outcome,
or had the defendant been successful at first instance or on
appeal, it is the funder who would have been liable to make
payment of the full sum of the plaintiffs' considerable legal
costs and, in addition, to meet the very significant burden of
adverse costs orders.  It is the services of litigation funders
that allow the rights of a litigant to be enforced with that
litigant facing no risk or cost. [GN]


HYATT HOTELS: Seeks Dismissal of Antitrust Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Joyce Hanson, writing for Law360, reports that Hyatt, Marriott
and other hospitality giants asked an Illinois federal court to
throw out a class action alleging the companies are colluding in
an anti-competitive agreement to not advertise against one
another via Google and other search engines, arguing the suit
jumps to conclusions without adequately supporting its claims.

The hotel companies joined on June 22 in filing a motion to
dismiss lead plaintiff Karen Tichy's latest complaint asserting
violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, saying the suit's
allegations of a conspiracy fail to support an antitrust claim...

The case is captioned Tichy v. Hyatt Hotels Corporation et al,
Case No. 1:18-cv-01959 (N.D. Ill.).  The case is assigned to
Judge Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer.  The case was filed
March 19, 2018. [GN]

ILLINOIS: Court Assigns Prisoner's Suit for Screening
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois assigned the action styled ANTHONY CRAWFORD, GREGORY
GANDY, and HOWARD TESSMAN, Plaintiff, v. SALVADOR GODINEZ, TY J.
BATES, RANDY DAVIS, NORMAN SUITS, BARNHART, KEVIN CONROY, LANCE
MERCHANT, OXFORD, and UNKNOWN AND UNNAMED OFFICERS AT IIP,
Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-1067-MJR (S.D. Ill.), to United States
Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams for disposition of non-
dispositive pre-trial matters and dispositive matters on an R&R
basis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(A) and (B).

The Plaintiffs are bringing a single Eighth Amendment claim
(Count I) for cruel and unusual punishment.  Pursuant to Section
1915A, courts are required to screen prisoner complaints and
dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.

Here, the Complaint does not specify whether each named plaintiff
is a prisoner as defined by 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(h)1 and the
Court's independent research on the matter is not conclusive.
Nevertheless, the Court need not resolve any ambiguity pertaining
to the each named Plaintiff's status as a prisoner at the time of
filing. The Complaint states a viable Eighth Amendment claim
pertaining to conditions of confinement at IIP. Therefore, the
Court finds that, to the extent Section 1915A screening is
required, the Complaint survives preliminary review.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 14, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ydduru2x from
Leagle.com.

Anthony Crawford, Individually and on behalf of all other
similarly situated former inmates at Dixon Springs Impact
Incarceration Program, Gregory Gandy, Individually and on behalf
of all other similarly situated former inmates at Dixon Springs
Impact Incarceration Program & Howard Tessman, Individually and
on behalf of all other similarly situated former inmates at Dixon
Springs Impact Incarceration Program, Plaintiffs, represented by:

     Edward M. Fox, Esq.
     Ed Fox & Associates
     300 W Adams St. #330
     Chicago IL 60606


INTUIT INC: Court Dismisses 2nd Negligence Claim in "Diaz"
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTINE DIAZ, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. INTUIT, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 5:15-cv-01778-EJD (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward
J. Davila of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, granted Intuit's motion to dismiss
the Third Consolidated Amended Complaint's second claim for
negligence brought by Richard Brown, and the third claim for
aiding and abetting fraud brought by Brown and Diaz.

Intuit develops and offers various financial and tax preparation
software and related services, including TurboTax, a tax
preparation software program.  TurboTax can be utilized online or
it can be downloaded and installed on a customer's personal
computer.  Inuit charges persons who file tax returns through
TurboTax a "tax preparation fee" generally between approximately
$50 and $150, in addition to other fees.

The Plaintiffs allege that Intuit has known for years that
fraudsters exploit Intuit's lax security in order to open
fraudulent accounts with Intuit and file numerous fraudulent tax
returns through TurboTax in other peoples' names.  It allegedly
allows the fraud to occur through TurboTax in two ways: (a)
Stolen Identity Refund Fraud ("SIRF"), where a fraudster gathers
data about a taxpayer from outside means (such as the black
market or "phishing"), creates a fraudulent, new TurboTax account
in the victim's name, and files a fraudulent tax return in the
victim's name through TurboTax; and (b) Account Takeover Refund
Fraud ("ATO"), where a fraudster hacks into an existing TurboTax
account and files a fraudulent return in the victim's name
through TurboTax.

Intuit allegedly knew that it was allowing SIRF and ATO fraud to
occur through TurboTax and that its allegedly lax security
protocols were enabling and assisting the fraud.  It allegedly
knew that the risk of fraud perpetrated through TurboTax was
continuing to increase as the number of major external data
breaches increased, exposing the personal identifying information
of millions of Americans to would-be fraudsters.  Despite
knowledge of widely reported data breaches involving identity
theft, and knowledge of SIRF and ATO fraud, Intuit allegedly
maintained lax security policies.

Intuit allegedly chose not to implement basic, fundamental
security measures that were suggested by its own experts and by
others. Moreover, Intuit eliminated one important protection it
previously had in place -- a multi-step authentication -- in
order to make it more convenient to open new accounts and to file
returns (fraudulent and otherwise) through TurboTax and thereby
generate more revenue for Intuit.

Intuit allegedly made a deliberate and knowing decision to
maintain the protocols to generate revenue and market share.  The
Plaintiffs also allege that Intuit's desire to maximize fee
revenue caused it to ignore the recommendations of its own
security experts, Robert Lee and Shane MacDougall.

Plaintiff Brown was never a TurboTax customer; he never used
TurboTax or purchased Turbo Tax software.  Brown alleges that
Intuit allowed fraudulent tax return(s) to be filed in his name
through TurboTax.  The first time he learned that anything was
wrong was when his accountant informed him that he could not e-
file his 2014 federal tax return because a fraudulent 2014 tax
return had already been filed using his Social Security number.
He also received a bill from Intuit.

Plaintiff Diaz purchased the desktop version of TurboTax and used
it to e-file her tax year 2010 Ohio state and federal tax
returns. Since then, she has not used TurboTax.  She alleges that
Intuit allowed fraudulent tax return(s) to be filed in her name
through TurboTax.  Diaz learned about the fraudulent tax returns
when she received a bill from Intuit for e-filings in her name
for Tax Year 2014 for state tax returns in Michigan, Missouri,
Ohio and Oklahoma and for a Tax Year 2014 federal home and
business tax return.  Both Plaintiffs allege that they were the
victims of SIRF fraud.

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., Intuit moves to dismiss
the second claim for negligence brought by Brown and the third
claim for aiding and abetting fraud brought by Brown and Diaz.

Brown does not allege that the fraudsters' use of his personal
identifying information to open an account was in any way
"suspicious" or raised "danger signals."  Instead, he alleges
that Intuit recognized that the account came from a "High Risk
Domain" -- Hushmail.com.

Judge Davila finds that this single indicator of alleged fraud --
use of a "High Risk Domain" -- does not create circumstances
sufficiently suspicious to alert Intuit of fraud.  Brown does not
allege that email accounts issued by Hushmail.com are used for
wholly fraudulent purposes.  Nor does he allege that legitimate
TurboTax customers would never use a Hushmail.com email address.
In the absence of these types of allegations, the Judge says, the
use of Hushmail.com is insufficient to establish Intuit's actual
knowledge of fraud.  To impose a duty of care on the basis of an
email coming from an allegedly "High Risk Domain," in the absence
of other objective indicia of fraud, would stretch the concept of
foreseeability of harm in determining duty beyond recognition.
Because the alleged harm to Brown was not foreseeable, the
negligence claim fails as a matter of law.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiffs have not alleged that
Intuit provided encouragement, direction or technical support
directly to a specific fraudster.  In Benson v. JP Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A., the plaintiffs alleged facts showing that a bank
aided and abetted the primary tortfeasor, who was identified by
name, in a Ponzi scheme by allowing the tortfeasor and his
associates to deposit monies into accounts, permitting them to
commingle funds, allowing them to transfer large amounts of
investment deposits to offshore banking accounts, allowing the
tortfeasor to use investor monies to pay for personal expenses,
and authorizing remote banking platforms that prevented
oversight.  In contrast, the Plaintiffs in this case fail to
allege the identity of any primary tortfeasor, much less that the
Intuit knew that a specific tortfeasor was committing fraud using
their personal identifying information or that Intuit made a
conscious decision to participate in the fraud.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Davila granted Intuit's motion
to dismiss the Plaintiffs' second and third claims.  He set a
case management conference for June 7, 2018 at 10:00 a.m.  The
Parties will file a joint case management statement in accordance
with Local Rule 16-8 no later than May 25, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 15, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/uFvvT0 from Leagle.com.

Christine Diaz, Plaintiff, represented by David Christopher
Wright -- dcw@mccunewright.com -- McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, Jae
Kook Kim -- jkk@mccunewright.com -- McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP,
John A. Yanchunis -- JYanchunis@ForThePeople.com -- Morgan and
Morgan, P.A., pro hac vice, Michael W. Sobol -- msobol@lchb.com -
- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Rachel Lynn Soffin --
RSoffin@ForThePeople.com -- Morgan and Morgan, Roger Norton
Heller -- rheller@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein,
LLP, Jason Louis Lichtman -- jlichtman@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser
Heimann Bernstein LLP, Joel R. Rhine, Rhine Law Firm, pro hac
vice, Joseph Jeremy Siprut, Siprut PC, Melissa Ann Gardner --
mgardner@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann Bernstein, LLP,
Steven William Teppler, Abbott Law Group, P.A. & Richard D.
McCune, Jr. -- rdm@mccunewright.com -- McCune Wright Arevalo,
LLP.

David Stock, Plaintiff, represented by John A. Yanchunis, Morgan
and Morgan, P.A., pro hac vice, Julian Ari Hammond --
jhammond@hammondlawpc.com -- HammondLaw, PC, Melissa Ann
Gardner, Lieff Cabraser Heimann Bernstein, LLP, Roger Norton
Heller, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Steven William
Teppler, Abbott Law Group, P.A. & Michael W. Sobol, Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP.

James Lebinski, Plaintiff, represented by John A. Yanchunis,
Morgan and Morgan, P.A., pro hac vice, Mark S. Goldman --
mgoldman@labaton.com -- Goldman Scarlato & Penny, P.C., Melissa
Ann Gardner, Lieff Cabraser Heimann Bernstein, LLP, Roger Norton
Heller, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Steven William
Teppler, Abbott Law Group, P.A. & Michael W. Sobol, Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP.

Carol Knoch & Richard Brown, Plaintiffs, represented by Ariana J.
Tadler -- atadler@milberg.com -- Milberg Tadler Phillips Grossman
LLP, Henry J. Kelston -- hkelston@milberg.com -- Milberg Tadler
Phillips Grossman LLP, Melissa Ann Gardner, Lieff Cabraser
Heimann Bernstein, LLP, Roger Norton Heller, Lieff Cabraser
Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Steven William Teppler, Abbott Law
Group, P.A. & Michael W. Sobol, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP.

Marilyn Williams, Plaintiff, represented by Melissa Ann Gardner,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann Bernstein, LLP & Roger Norton Heller,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP.

Intuit, Inc., Defendant, represented by Rodger R. Cole --
rcole@fenwick.com -- Fenwick & West LLP, Alexis Caloza --
acaloza@fenwick.com -- Fenwick and West LLP, Chieh Tung --
ctung@fenwick.com -- Fenwick and West LLP & Nair Diana Chang --
dchang@fenwick.com -- Fenwick & West LLP.


KC CONSULTING: Ct. Denies Default Judgment in "Abarca" FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment in the case
captioned CHRISTIAN ABARCA, et al, Plaintiffs, v. KC CONSULTING
GROUP, INC., Defendant, Civil Action No. 16-213 (D.N.J.).

The dispute concerns the Defendant's alleged violation of both
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and the New Jersey State
Wage and Hour Law (NJWHL).

The Defendants did not answer, move, or otherwise respond to the
Complaint. The Court has denied the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion
for default judgment as to KC Consulting without prejudice. The
Court determined that, at the time, other defendants in the case
were actively litigating, and, therefore, entering a default
judgement would risk potentially inconsistent judgments.

The Plaintiffs' attorney sent a letter advising the Court that
they did not intend to pursue claims against Carter Wilson and
requesting to renew the motion for default judgment against KC
Consulting Group. KC Consulting Group was the only Defendant
remaining in the case. The Court reinstated the Plaintiffs'
motion for default judgment as to KC Consulting Group.

The Court finds that service of the summons and complaint was
proper on KC Consulting.  The Court also finds that although the
Plaintiffs allege facts sufficient to sustain a class and
collective action, the Court will deny the Plaintiffs' motion for
default judgment.  Plaintiffs moved for default judgment on
behalf of themselves and other members of the proposed FLSA
collective and NJWHL class action.  Entering judgment gives the
Court pause because in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, class
members must opt-out or they are bound by the final judgment.
Thus, a court typically directs to class members the best notice
that is practicable under the circumstances, which includes
adequate notice of the case and their right to request exclusion.

Here, Plaintiffs have not sent notice to the proposed class
members, and, therefore, the Court is concerned that entering a
default judgment may bind persons whose rights are at issue,
without the protection of their first receiving proper notice.
Similarly, as to the collective action, the Plaintiffs indicate
that several persons have opted-in. Yet, no notice of the
collective action has been sent to potential plaintiffs, so the
Court is equally concerned that others who may wish to opt-in
have not been given the proper opportunity. Indeed, no
conditional certification of the FLSA collective action has been
sought much less final certification.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 14, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9avhodr from Leagle.com.

CHRISTIAN ABARCA, NIXON ARNOLD, SYUAPA ALVAREZ, REINA CALLEJAS &
NORA RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiffs, represented by DAVID ZATUCHNI,
ZATUCHNI & ASSOCIATES, LLC.


KLONDEX MINES: Chandra Files Suit Over Sale to Hecla Mining
-----------------------------------------------------------
Arvind Chandra, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. Klondex Mines Ltd., Richard J. Hall, Paul Huet,
William Matlack, Charles Oliver, Blair Schultz, Rodney Cooper,
Mark Daniel, and James Haggarty, Case No. 3:18-cv-00305 (D. Nev.,
June 25, 2018), seeks to recover damages resulting from the
Defendants' violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934.

The Plaintiff filed the case in connection with the proposed
acquisition of Klondex by Hecla Mining Company, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff alleged that in order to convince Klondex's
stockholders to vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, the
Board authorized the filing of a Proxy Statement which contains
incomplete and materially misleading information regarding (i)
the financial analyses conducted by the Company's financial
advisors, GMP Securities, L.P., INFOR Financial Inc., and Maxit
Capital, in connection with the Proposed Transaction; and (ii)
the financial projections for Klondex, Havilah, Hecla, and the
pro forma combined company.

The Plaintiff is a continuous owner of Klondex common stock.

Headquartered in Reno, Nevada, the Defendant Klondex engages in
the acquisition, exploration, and development of mineral
resources in the United States and Canada.

The Individual Defendants are officers of Klondex. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      G. Mark Albright, Esq.
      Jorge L. Alvarez, Esq.
      ALBRIGHT, STODDARD, WARNICK & ALBRIGHT
      801 S. Rancho Drive, Suite D-4
      Las Vegas, NV 89106
      Tel: (702) 384-7111
      E-mail: gma@albrightstoddard.com
              jalvarez@albrightstoddard.com


LABOR READY: 9th Cir. Affirms Final Approval of "Allen" Suit Deal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARGIE BEDOLLA; et al., Objectors-Appellants, v.
JEFFREY LEE ALLEN, on behalf of himself, all others similarly
situated, the general public and as an "aggrieved employee" under
the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act,
Plaintiff-Appellee, LABOR READY SOUTHWEST, INC., a Washington
corporation doing business in the State of California; DOES, 1-
50, inclusive, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 16-56621 (9th
Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's September 2016 order granting final approval
to a settlement resolving Jeffrey Lee Allen's class-action wage
and hour claims against Labor Ready.

Objecting settlement-class members Bedolla, Anthony Allen, and
Michael Alvarez appeal from the district court's September 2016
order.  On remand, the Appellate Court finds that the district
court conducted a "more searching inquiry" as the Appellate Court
ordered in 2015.  It is true that the 2016 settlement agreement
contains the same three "subtle signs" of collusion as the 2013
settlement agreement. But this time, the district court's final
approval order provides adequate assurance that it verified the
fairness of the settlement agreement notwithstanding those three
red flags.

Altogether, on remand, it says, the district court held a status
conference and four hearings on the fairness of various drafts of
the settlement agreement.  The district court considered the
transient nature of the class, the difficulty of providing
monetary relief to the absent class members, and whether it would
be better for the class to deny approval and allow the remaining
claims to go to trial.  Accordingly, the district court followed
our instruction to conduct a "more searching inquiry" into the
substantive fairness of the settlement agreement, and has shown
it has explored comprehensively all factors, and has given a
reasoned response to all non-frivolous objections.

The Appellate Court concludes holds that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that the settlement is fair,
adequate, and reasonable.  It properly concluded that the
settlement as a whole provides value to the class.  The Objectors
have not argued that the district court applied the wrong law or
relied on an unreasonable finding of fact in granting final
approval to the settlement with Mr. Allen and his counsel as
adequate class representatives.  Particularly considering its six
years of experience with these parties, the Appellate Court holds
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in doing so.
Accordingly, it affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's May 15, 2018 Memorandum
is available at https://is.gd/fYDviW from Leagle.com.


LASERSHIP INC: Judge Transfers Workers' Class Action to Virginia
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alison Noon, writing for Law360, reports that a Massachusetts
deliveryman who claims LaserShip misclassified and underpaid
workers must transfer his class action to Virginia, where the
package distribution company will seek to enforce a mandatory
arbitration clause, a federal judge ruled in an order published
on June 25.

U.S. District Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton recognized a forum
selection clause in the company's independent contractor
agreement, requiring a transfer from Massachusetts to the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.  His order
also recognized mandatory arbitration. [GN]


LOUISIANA: "Abshire" Class Certification Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------
In the case, DONALD W. ABSHIRE AND THE OTHER PETITIONERS NAMED
HEREIN, v. THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF
INSURANCE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA; THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE
OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA; THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH THE
OFFICE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA; THE
OFFICE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA; THE
LOUISIANA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION; AND STANDARD ANALYTICAL
SERVICE, INC. EDWARD J. APPLE AND THE OTHER PETITIONERS NAMED
HEREIN, v. THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF
INSURANCE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA; THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE
OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA; THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH THE
OFFICE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA; THE
OFFICE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA; THE
LOUISIANA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION; AND STANDARD ANALYTICAL
SERVICE, INC. AND ARTHUR A. LEWIS, LEONA LEWIS, LESTER A.
SAUCIER, MARIE S. SAUCIER, FULGENCE PONTHIER, VERDIE F. PONTHIER,
JOSEPH W. GOUDEAU, JR., RODIA L. GOUDEAU, NORRIS J. KIMBALL,
JANET G. KIMBALL, STEWART J. AYMOND, MILDRED L. AYMOND, JOYCE
GREMILLION, CRAIG P. ORTEGO, MARCELLA ORTEGO, LEWARD P. ORTEGO,
ESSIE ORTEGO, HAZEL CHARRIER, ELDRED DESSELLE, SABIA DESSELLE,
CRYSTAL JEANSONNE, WARREN GALLAND, LOUISE GALLAND, ELIA M.
MILLIGAN, JOHN W. CHEEK, JANELL CHEEK, L.J. CHEEK, VERNA M.
CHEEK, DOROTHY M. GUILLORY, GEORGE P. LEMOINE, HAZEL K. LEMOINE,
DONALD L. RACHAL, DIANA DAUZAT RACHAL, SADIE C. FOGLE, GERMAINE
CHATELAIN, HARDY J. LACOUR, JERALDINE D. LACOUR, NORMAN G.
HAYMON, JEAN EVELYN JOHNSON, YVONNE LEWIS WELBORN, HAZEL T.
FIRMIN, AND CHARLES D. LEWIS v. THE STATE OF LOUISIANA THROUGH
THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA; THE
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA; THE STATE OF
LOUISIANA THROUGH THE OFFICE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE
STATE OF LOUISIANA; THE OFFICE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE
STATE OF LOUISIANA; THE LOUISIANA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION;
AND STANDARD ANALYTICAL SERVICE, INC., Case No. 2017 CA 0689,
Consolidated With No. 2017 CA 0690 (La. App.), Judge John
Pettigrew of the Court of Appeal of Louisiana for the First
Circuit affirmed the trial court's judgment granting the
Plaintiffs' motion to certify the class.

The protracted litigation involves approximately 826 to 1,326
Plaintiffs who have filed suit against various agencies of the
State of Louisiana and multiple insurers of the State regarding
companies in which they had previously invested and lost
significant financial assets.  The case originally proceeded as a
consolidated matter with several hundred Plaintiffs joined in the
litigation and represented by the same counsel.  In order to
direct the litigation, the Plaintiffs formed a corporation to
operate as a representative body to legally act on their behalf.
As litigation progressed, numerous Plaintiffs died or became
incapacitated and their heirs or representatives were substituted
as parties.

During settlement negotiations, it became evident that the only
way to obtain authority to settle the case was to convert it to a
class action, based upon a Louisiana State Bar Association Ethics
Advisory Service Committee opinion.

The proposed class is defined as follows:

     i. All persons or entities in the United States who filed
suit against the State of Louisiana and/or its DOI or OFI for
damages caused by the State's conduct in connection with the
failure of PILICO, and whose claim was consolidated into Civil
Action No. 377,713 or No. 412,265 (captioned Donald W. Abshire,
et al. vs. The State of Louisiana, et al.);

     ii. All persons or entities in the United States who filed
suit against the State of Louisiana and/or its DOI or OFI for
damages caused by the State's conduct in connection with the
failure of PICO, and whose claim was consolidated into Civil
Action No. 377,713 or No. 412,265 (captioned Donald W. Abshire,
et al. v. The State of Louisiana, et al.);

     iii. All persons or entities in the United States who filed
suit against the State of Louisiana and/or its DOI or OFI for
damages caused by the State's conduct in connection with the
failure of [Midwest], and whose claim was consolidated into Civil
Action No. 377,713 or No. 412,265 (captioned Donald W. Abshire,
et al. v. The State of Louisiana, et al.);

At the conclusion of the class action certification hearings, the
trial court denied certification on the basis that the Plaintiffs
failed to meet one of the statutory prerequisites for class
certification, namely, La. Code Civ. P. art. 591(A)(1)'s
"numerosity" requirement, which requires the plaintiffs to
demonstrate that the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable.  The trial court reasoned that it could
not ever be said that the joinder of the members was
impracticable because all of the putative plaintiffs were already
parties to the litigation.

The Plaintiffs appealed the denial of class certification.  In
that prior appeal, Abshire v. State ex rel. Dept. of Ins. of
State, 2012-0104 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/18/13), 2013 WL 6712235
(unpublished opinion), writs denied, 2014-0133, 2014-0137, 2014-
0162 (La. 4/4/14), 135 So.3d 642, 643, 643, the Court ruled that
the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard when
analyzing whether the plaintiffs satisfied the numerosity
requirement for class certification.

Utilizing de novo review of the trial court's factual findings,
the Appellate Court found that the Plaintiffs met their burden of
proving the numerosity requirement.  Accordingly, it reversed the
trial court's judgment that the Plaintiffs did not meet the
numerosity requirement for the class certification.  It did not,
however, undertake a review of the trial court's ultimate
decision not to certify the class, and instead, remanded the
matter to the trial court to conduct a full analysis of whether
the Plaintiffs met the remaining prerequisites as well as any
additional requirements imposed by law for class action
certification.

Following remand, the trial court signed a judgment on Sept. 14,
2016, granting the Plaintiffs' motion to certify the class
action.  The Defendants -- the State of Louisiana, through the
Department of Insurance ("DOI"); the Louisiana Office of
Financial Institutions ("OFI"); the State of Louisiana Office of
Risk Management ("ORM"); Admiral Insurance Company ("Admiral");
Lexington Insurance Co. ("Lexington"); National Union Fire
Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA ("National Union"); and,
Westchester Fire Insurance Co. ("Westchester") -- now appeal the
trial court's judgment granting the Plaintiffs' motion to certify
the class.

Judge Pettigrew finds that the Plaintiffs were required to prove
the five prerequisites for the class action certification as set
forth in La. Code Civ. P. art. 591(A), as well as prove that
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over individual issues and that the class action is
superior to any other procedural method for resolving the
controversy fairly and efficiently, as set forth in La. Code Civ.
P. art. 591(B)(3).  Based on his review of the record, he cannot
say that the trial court erred in its factual determination that
the Plaintiffs satisfied the statutory requirements for class
action certification found in La. Code Civ. P. art. 591.

Furthermore, based on the trial court's well-reasoned analysis
regarding the implementation of substantive law, the effectuation
of judicial efficiency, and the promotion of individual fairness,
the Judge concludes that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in ultimately deciding to certify the class.
Therefore, the trial court's Sept. 14, 2016 judgment certifying
the Plaintiffs' class action is affirmed.  He notes, however,
that the trial court can revisit or modify its decision regarding
the class certification if later developments so require.  All
costs of the appeal, in the amount of $3,514.50, are cast to the
Defendants-Appellants.

A full-text copy of the La. App.'s May 16, 2018 Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2HOSORa from Leagle.com.

JOHN GREGORY ODOM -- jodom@odrlaw.com -- STUART E. DES ROCHES --
stuart@odrlaw.com -- AND CHRISTOPHER T. STOW-SERGE --
cstow@odrlaw.com -- ODOM & DES ROCHES, LLC, NEW ORLEANS, LA, and
DAVID P. SMITH -- dsmith@ssrllp.com -- DAVID C. RAPHAEL, JR. --
draphael@ssrllp.com -- AND MITTIE J. BOLTON -- mbolton@ssrllp.com
-- SMITH SEGURA & RAPHAEL, LLP, ALEXANDRIA, LA, and DAN B. McKAY,
JR. -- louisianalaw@outlook.com -- McKAY LAW OFFICE, BUNKIE,
LOUISIANA, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES DONALD W. ABSHIRE, ET
AL.

JEFF LANDRY, ATTORNEY GENERAL LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
BATON ROUGE, LA, and JOHN B. DUNLAP III, JENNIFER A. FIORE, SUSAN
N. ECCLES, AND KATELIN H. VARNADO, DUNLAP FIORE, LLC, BATON
ROUGE, LA, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT
OF INSURANCE AND LOUISIANA OFFICE OF RISK MANAGEMENT.

JEFF LANDRY, ATTORNEY GENERAL LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
BATON ROUGE, LA, and DAVID M. LATHAM, KEARY L. EVERITT, AND MARIE
G. EVERITT, EVERITT & LATHAM, L.L.C., NEW ORLEANS, LA, COUNSEL
FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT LOUISIANA OFFICE OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS.

STUART PONDER -- sponder@hmhlp.com --  AND MICHAEL J. VONDENSTEIN
-- mvondenstein@hmhlp.com -- HAILEY, McNAMARA, HALL, LARMANN &
PAPALE, L.L.P., METAIRIE, LA, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

TIMOTHY G. SCHAFER -- tschafer@schafer-law.com -- AND RACHEL S.
KELLOGG -- rkellogg@schafer-law.com -- SCHAFER & SCHAFER, LLP,
NEW ORLEANS, LA, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT LEXINGTON
INSURANCE COMPANY.

ROBERT I. SIEGEL -- rsiegel@glllaw.com -- AND TARA E. CLEMENT --
tclement@glllaw.com -- GIEGER, LABORDE & LAPEROUSE, LLC, NEW
ORLEANS, LA, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT NATIONAL UNION FIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA.

PAUL D. PALERMO -- ppalermo@bluewilliams.com -- AND CRAIG V.
SWEENEY -- csweeney@bluewilliams.com -- BLUE WILLIAMS, LLP,
METAIRIE, LA, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WESTCHESTER FIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY.


LOUISIANA: La. App. Vacates Class Certification in LPSC Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LOUISIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, AND IN THEIR
CAPACITIES AS COMMISSIONERS LAMBERT C. BOISSIERE, III, JAMES M.
FIELD, FOSTER L. CAMPBELL, ERIC SKRMETTA, AND CLYDE C. HOLLOWAY,
v. LOUISIANA STATE LEGISLATURE, Case No. 2017 CA 0712 (La. App.),
Judge Duke Welch of the Court of Appeal of Louisiana for the
First Circuit vacated the trial court's judgment in favor of
Plaintiffs Field and Campbell in their individual capacities,
which certified the action as a class action and appointed them
in their individual capacities as the class representatives.

Essentially, on July 1, 2010, the LPSC1 and its Commissioners
("Original Plaintiffs") filed suit against the Louisiana State
Legislature, seeking a declaratory judgment that 2009 La. Acts,
No. 266 and 2010 La. Acts, No. 633 were unconstitutional.  Both
Acts 226 and 633 authorized the transfer of money from the three
dedicated funds that fund the LPSC's operations into the state's
general fund.

The Original Plaintiffs claimed that it was unconstitutional for
the Legislature to take special fee monies paid into statutorily
dedicated funds and to apply them to another purpose, i.e., the
state's general fund.  In response, the Legislature filed a
peremptory exception raising the objections of no right of action
and no cause of action and a dilatory exception raising the
objection of vagueness or ambiguity.  Prior to the trial court's
ruling on the exceptions, the Original Plaintiffs supplemented
and amended their petition ("First Amended Petition") to add, as
Plaintiffs, three Commissioners -- James Field, Foster Campbell,
and Clyde Holloway -- in their individual capacities as
ratepayers ("Amended Plaintiffs") and to allege that the
commissioners were ratepayers of one or more common carriers or
public utilities regulated by the LPSC, i.e., jurisdictional
ratepayers.

The Legislature likewise responded by filing an amended
peremptory exception raising the objections of no cause of action
and no right of action.

The trial court subsequently sustained the objection of no cause
of action and the amended objection of no cause of action on the
basis that Acts 226 and 633 were not unconstitutional, decreed
that the other exceptions were moot, and dismissed the claims of
the Plaintiffs (both original and amended).  A judgment in
accordance with the trial court's ruling was signed on Dec. 8,
2011.

The Original Plaintiffs, the LPSC and its Commissioners in their
official capacities, appealed and the Court reversed the judgment
of the trial court.  The Court then remanded the matter for the
trial court to rule on the Legislature's remaining exceptions.

On remand, the trial court set a hearing on the Legislature's
pending objections of no right of action (both original and
amended) and vagueness or ambiguity, as well as the amended
objection of no cause of action as to the Amended Plaintiffs'
claims.  At the hearing, the Legislature withdrew the objections
of vagueness or ambiguity and the amended objection of no cause
of action.

By judgment signed on March 27, 2014, the trial court overruled
the objection of no right of action (both original and amended)
as to all of the Plaintiffs and overruled the objection of res
judicata as to the Amended Plaintiffs.  The Legislature filed a
supervisory writ application with the Court, which was denied.

On Sept. 30, 2015, two of the Amended Plaintiffs (James Field and
Foster Campbell in their individual capacities as jurisdictional
ratepayers) filed a motion for leave to amend and supplement the
petition for declaratory judgment.  Therein, they requested that
they be allowed to amend the petition for declaratory judgment to
include other members of a class and to assert a claim for the
return of the unconstitutionally transferred funds on behalf of a
class of Plaintiffs, i.e., the jurisdictional ratepayers.

The trial court granted the motion for leave and James Field and
Foster Campbell subsequently filed another amended and
supplemental petition ("third amended petition").  In the third
amended petition, Field and Campbell amended the pleadings to
potentially include other members of a class, i.e., other
jurisdictional ratepayers, to allow them to continue as
representative parties, and to appoint Dennis Kelley to be
appointed as another class representative.  The relief sought in
the third amended petition by Field and Campbell, individually as
jurisdictional ratepayers, along with Kelley, and on behalf of
the class, was a return of any and all surplus fees which were
transferred to the state's general fund by virtue of the passage
of Acts 226 and 633 and that any funds found by the Court to have
been improperly or illegally transferred to the state general
fund should be refunded to the jurisdictional ratepayers who paid
these surplus fees.

On June 10, 2016, James Field and Foster Campbell filed a motion
to schedule a class certification hearing, which was heard on
Oct. 17, 2016.  On Dec. 6, 2016,7 the trial court rendered and
signed a judgment certifying the class action as requested by
Field and Campbell to include all persons, natural and/or
juridical, who, between July 1, 2008 and June 30, 2010, were
charged and paid fees.  In addition, the trial court appointed
Field and Campbell as the class representatives in connection
with the I&S Fund, along with the TSR Fund.  The trial court also
granted leave to file a motion to amend the class representation
to allow the appointment of a class representative for the MCR
fund.  From this judgment, the LPSC appeals.

Judge Welch finds that accepting all of the well-pleaded
allegations of fact set forth in the third petition as true, even
if Acts 226 and 633 are declared unconstitutional, the law does
not provide the remedy of returning or refunding the fees levied
to the jurisdictional ratepayers.  If Acts 226 and 633 are
declared unconstitutional and/or it is determined that the
legislature improperly or illegally swept the fees, the remedy,
if any, would be the return of the funds from where they were
taken, i.e., the three dedicated funds that fund the operation of
LPSC or the jurisdictional entities -- the public utilities and
carriers, the motor carriers, and/or the telephonic solicitors --
that actually paid the surplus fees.  The funds that were swept
cannot be directly returned or refunded to the jurisdictional
ratepayers because the jurisdictional ratepayers did not directly
pay any of the levied fees.

Therefore, he concludes that Field and Campbell, individually and
on behalf of a class of the Plaintiffs, have failed to set forth
a cause of action for which the law provides a remedy.  Thus, he
renders judgment sustaining the peremptory exception raising the
objection of no cause of action, properly noticed on our own
motion.  Further, he will vacate the Dec. 6, 2016 judgment of the
trial court and will dismiss the third amended petition with
prejudice.

Accordingly, Judge Welch vacated the trial court's Dec. 6, 2016
judgment, which certified the action as a class action and
appointed Field and Campbell in their individual capacities as
the class representatives.  Additionally, the third supplemental
and amended petition filed by Field and Campbell, in their
individual capacities as jurisdictional ratepayers and on behalf
of the class, fails to state a cause of action for which the law
provides a remedy.  Therefore, he sustained the peremptory
exception raising the objection of no cause of action, properly
noticed on our own motion, and dismissed the third supplemental
and amended petition with prejudice.

All costs of the appeal are assessed against the Appellees Field
and Campbell in their individual capacities.

A full-text copy of the La. App.'s May 16, 2018 Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2t8PbAe from Leagle.com.

Brandon M. Frey, Melanie Verzwyvelt, Lauren M. Temento, Baton
Rouge, LA, Attorneys for Appellants, Plaintiffs - Louisiana
Public Service Commission, Department of Public Service, and in
their Capacities as Commissioners, Lambert C. Boissiere, III,
James M. Field, Foster L. Campbell, Eric F. Skrmetta and Clyde C.
Holloway.

Glen R. Petersen, L.J. Hymel, Michael Reese Davis, Baton Rouge,
LA, Attorneys for Appellees, Amended Plaintiffs - James M. Field
and Foster L. Campbell.


MAGNACHIP SEMICONDUCTOR: "Thomas" Deal w/ Avenue Has Final OK
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEITH THOMAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MAGNACHIP
SEMICONDUCTOR CORP., et al., Defendants, Case No. 14-cv-01160-JST
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Jon S. Tigar of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California granted the Plaintiffs'
unopposed motions for final approval of the class action
settlement with Defendant Avenue Capital Management II, L.P.; and
for attorneys' fees, costs, and incentive awards to the named
class representative.

The class action alleges violations of federal securities laws by
MagnaChip Semiconductor, Inc.; MagnaChip's majority and
controlling shareholder, Avenue Capital Management II, L.P.; and
several individual defendants.  The Court approved the
Plaintiffs' class settlement ("First Settlement") with all the
Defendants except Avenue Capital on Nov. 21, 2016.  The
Plaintiffs continued to litigate their case against Avenue
Capital, including bringing a successful motion for class
certification.

The Court certified the class on Dec. 22, 2016 of all persons who
purchased or otherwise acquired MagnaChip Semiconductor Corp.
common stock between Feb. 1, 2012 and March 11, 2014, inclusive.
It appointed Keith Thomas and Herb Smith as the class
representatives, and Pomerantz, LLP and the Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
as the class counsel.

Following two full-day mediation sessions and facilitated
settlement negotiations over the course of a year, the Plaintiffs
and Avenue Capital reached a settlement ("Second Settlement").
The Court preliminarily approved the Second Settlement on Jan.
22, 2018.  The settlement provides for a common fund of $6.2
million, including: payouts to class members; taxes and tax
expenses; notice and claims administration costs; attorneys' fees
and expenses; and incentive awards to the class representatives.

The Class members were to be given notice and an opportunity to
file a claim.  However, the class members who submitted claims as
part of the First Settlement would not be required to submit
another claim to receive a distribution under the Second
Settlement.  The Class payouts will be based on the time frame
during which class members purchased or sold shares of MagnaChip
stock, as well as on the number of shares purchased or sold.  The
required notice to federal and state attorneys general under the
Class Action Fairness Act was sent on Oct. 25, 2017.  This notice
occurred more than 90 days before the date of the Order.

Before the Court are the Plaintiffs' unopposed motions for final
approval of the class action settlement with Avenue Capital, and
for attorneys' fees, costs, and incentive awards to the named
class representatives.  The Court held a final fairness hearing
on May 10, 2018.

After reviewing all of the required factors, including the
reaction of the class, Judge Tigar continues to find the
settlement fair, reasonable, and adequate.  The Plaintiffs'
motion for final approval of the settlement will be granted.

Although the counsel did not submit detailed billing records or
any support for their claimed hourly rates, they did submit
tables summarizing the amount of work each timekeeper performed
at different stages of the litigation.  The Judge finds the
submitted information to be sufficient for purposes of performing
a lodestar cross-check, particularly when the resulting
multiplier is so low.  Even if the counsel's claimed lodestar
were inflated by 100%, for example, the resulting multiplier
would still be 1.42, which would be well within the range of
reasonableness.  Hence, he will award 25% of the common fund, or
$1,550,000, in attorneys' fees.

Although the claimed costs are high, the Judge finds that they
are less than the $1.1 million maximum identified in the class
notice.  He has reviewed the detailed breakdown submitted by the
counsel and finds the claimed costs to be reasonable.  Prior to
reaching a settlement, the parties engaged in extensive
discovery, including multiple depositions in another country, and
the nature of this case required significant use of experts.  In
addition, no class member objected to the request for costs.  The
class counsel's request for $795,401.42 in expenses will
therefore be granted.

Lastly, Thomas and Smith each met with counsel to prepare for a
deposition and sat for a deposition, produced documents in
response to Avenue Capital's discovery requests, communicated
with counsel about the Action and helped evaluate settlement
proposals.  These contributions, according to the Judge, warrant
incentive awards.  The requested $1,500 awards are below the
presumptively reasonable $5,000.  They are also below the maximum
$2,000 awards described in the class notice, and no class member
objected to those potentially higher awards.  Hence, the request
for $1,500 incentive awards to each named class representative
will be granted.

Judge Tigar granted final approval of the proposed settlement and
also granted the Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees, costs,
and incentive awards.  The Court will separately enter a modified
version of the parties' proposed judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 15, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/MMUPIy from Leagle.com.

Richard Hayes, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Persons
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy A
Lieberman -- jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac
vice, Lionel Z. Glancy -- lglancy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay
& Murray LLP, Joshua B. Silverman -- jbsilverman@pomlaw.com --
Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Laurence M. Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., Lesley F.
Portnoy -- lportnoy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP,
Marc Ian Gross -- migross@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac
vice, Michael J. Wernke -- mjwernke@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP,
pro hac vice, Patrick V. Dahlstrom -- pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com --
Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Phillip C. Kim --
pkim@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., Robert Vincent
Prongay -- rprongay@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP
& Sunny September Sarkis -- ssarkis@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Keith Thomas, (Class Representative), Plaintiff, represented by
Jeremy A Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Lionel Z.
Glancy, Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Marc Ian Gross, Pomerantz
LLP, pro hac vice, Joshua B. Silverman, Pomerantz LLP, pro hac
vice, Michael J. Wernke, Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Patrick V.
Dahlstrom, Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Robert Vincent Prongay,
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP & Sunny September Sarkis, Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Herb Smith, (Class Representative), Plaintiff, represented by
Jeremy A Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Lionel Z.
Glancy, Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Marc Ian Gross, Pomerantz
LLP, pro hac vice, Joshua B. Silverman, Pomerantz LLP, pro hac
vice, Michael J. Wernke, Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Patrick V.
Dahlstrom, Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Robert Vincent Prongay,
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP & Sunny September Sarkis, Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Magnachip Semiconductor Corp., Defendant, represented by Daniel
J. Kramer -- dkramer@paulweiss.com -- Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton
& Garrison LLP, pro hac vice, Robert N Kravitz --
rkravitz@paulweiss.com -- Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison
LLP, pro hac vice, Alex Young K. Oh -- aoh@paulweiss.com -- Paul
Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP, pro hac vice, Jacqueline P.
Rubin -- jrubin@paulweiss.com -- Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton &
Garrison LLP, pro hac vice, John C. Tang -- jctang@jonesday.com -
- Jones Day, Kelsey Israel-Trummel -- kitrummel@jonesday.com --
Jones Day & Meredith A. Arfa -- marfa@paulweiss.com -- Paul Weiss
Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP, pro hac vice.

Margaret Sakai, Defendant, represented by Kimberly Perrotta Cole,
Kobre & Kim LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Sangyun Kim, Kobre & Kim
LLP, pro hac vice & Michael Fang Peng , Kobre & Kim LLP.

R. Douglas Norby & Ilbok Lee, Defendants, represented by Daniel
J. Kramer, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP, Jacqueline
P. Rubin, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP, Meredith A.
Arfa, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robert N
Kravitz, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP & Alex Young
K. Oh, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP.

Nader Tavakoli, Defendant, represented by Daniel J. Fetterman,
Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman LLP, pro hac vice, Jason
Takenouchi, Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman LLP, Brian Choi,
Kasowitz Benson Torres & Friedman LLP, pro hac vice & Trevor
Joseph Welch, Kasowitz Benson Torres & Friedman LLP, pro hac
vice.

Randal Klein, Michael Elkins & Avenue Capital Management II,
L.P., Defendants, represented by Ali R. Rabbani, Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Andrew S. Jick, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer
& Feld LLP, Douglas Maynard, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP,
pro hac vice, John C. Murphy, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer Feld LLP,
pro hac vice, Michael Asaro, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP,
pro hac vice, Neal Ross Marder, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld
LLP, Peter Ian Altman, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP,
Stephen Michael Baldini, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, pro
hac vice & Sydney Spector, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP,
pro hac vice.

Barclays Capital Inc., Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., Citigroup
Global Markets Inc., UBS Securities LLC & Needham & Company, LLC,
Defendants, represented by Matthew Rawlinson, Latham & Watkins
LLP, James E. Brandt, Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice & Jason
C. Hegt, Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice.

Oklahoma Police Pension & Retirement System, Interested Party,
represented by Danielle Suzanne Myers, Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP, Marc Ian Gross, Pomerantz LLP, Dennis J. Herman,
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Joshua B. Silverman, Pomerantz
LLP, pro hac vice, Mary K. Blasy, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP, Michael J. Wernke, Pomerantz LLP,Patrick V. Dahlstrom,
Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Samuel H. Rudman, Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, Shawn A. Williams, Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP & Sunny September Sarkis, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP.


MDL 2199: Court Lifts Stay of Non-California Claims
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs' Motion
to Lift Stay of Non-California Claims in the case captioned IN
RE: POM WONDERFUL LLC MARKETING AND SALES PRACTICES LITIGATION,
Plaintiff, v. ----, Defendants, Case No. ML 10-02199 DDP (RZx),
MDL No. 2199 (C.D. Cal.).

Presently before the court is the question whether, in light of
this Court's order decertifying a nationwide class, the
Plaintiffs may nevertheless proceed with discovery and class
certification motions regarding the Plaintiffs' non-California
claims.

The Master Consolidated Complaint alleged three causes of action
under California law. This Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion
for certification of a nationwide class under California law.
Later, after the close of discovery, the Defendant moved to
decertify the class. The court granted the Defendant's motion and
decertified the class.

The Plaintiffs moved to reopen discovery or, in the alternative,
recommend to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(JPML) that it disband this multidistrict litigation and remand
the non-California cases back to their transferor courts. This
Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion.  The Plaintiffs then moved
the JPML to remand the non-California components of this case
back to their transferor courts. The JPML denied the Plaintiffs'
motion.

The Plaintiffs now seek to lift the stay of non-California claims
not included in the MCC and to set a discovery schedule regarding
those claims.

Rule 16

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs have not been diligent
in seeking to reopen discovery regarding non-California claims
because the instant request is at least three-and-a-half years
(41 months) too late.  The Defendant's argument is predicated on
the assumption that the stay on the Plaintiffs' non-California
claims lifted in March 2014, when this court decertified the
nationwide class under California law.

There appears to be no dispute that, prior to the instant motion,
neither party sought to lift the stay or otherwise address the
non-California claims. The Defendant appears to suggest that the
stay on those claims automatically lifted, pursuant to Pre-trial
Order 2, at the time this Court entered its decertification
order. Pre-trial Order 2 provides that if the proposed nationwide
class is not certified, then the stay will be lifted.

Pretrial Order 2 did not, however, state that the stay would
automatically lift or otherwise specify a particular mechanism
for lifting the stay. Without such language, and absent a request
by any party regarding the stay prior to this juncture, the court
cannot agree with Defendant that the stay has yet lifted, let
alone did so several years ago.

Accordingly, the Rule 16 standard is inapplicable to the instant
motion.

Failure to Prosecute

In determining whether dismiss for failure to prosecute, courts
should consider (1) the public's interest in expeditious
resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its
docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the
public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits and
(5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.

The Plaintiffs now ask the court to lift the stay on the non-
California claims, allow the Plaintiffs to conduct additional
discovery, and permit the Plaintiffs to attempt to certify non-
California statewide classes.  The stay on the Plaintiffs' non-
California claims did not automatically lift upon the issuance of
this Court's decertification order. At the same time, the
Plaintiffs have provided no explanation why they waited until
this point to proceed with their non-California claims. Rather
than dismiss those stayed, but stagnant, claims, this Court could
adopt the less drastic alternative of lifting the stay without
allowing the Plaintiffs additional discovery. It appears to the
court that such would be the best course of action.

Although dismissal of the stayed claims for failure to prosecute
would not be inappropriate, given the balance of the relevant
factors and the Plaintiffs' prior representations to this Court
and to the JPML, this Court concludes that the Plaintiffs should
be allowed to proceed with their non-California claims without
additional discovery. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion is
granted, in part, and denied, in part. The stay on Plaintiffs'
non-California claims is hereby lifted. To the extent Plaintiffs
seek additional discovery on those claims, the motion is denied.

Judicial Estoppel

The Defendant also contends that the Plaintiffs should be
estopped from asserting any claims under the laws of any state
other than California.

The doctrine of judicial estoppel is intended to protect the
integrity of the judicial process, and generally prevents a party
from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then
relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.

Although the Plaintiffs did subsequently argue that the specifics
of the various transferor venues' state laws warrant dissolution
of this MDL proceeding in light of the decertification of a
nationwide class, there is no indication that the Plaintiffs have
abandoned their contention that California law can and should
apply to any such class.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 14, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8qqpbpa from Leagle.com.

John Alexander & Melissa Espinoza, Consol Plaintiffs, represented
by Alan M. Mansfield, The Consumer Law Group, Behram V. Parekh,
Kirtland and Packard LLP, Heather Marie Baker Dobbs, Kirtland and
Packard LLP, Joe R. Whatley, Jr., Whatley Kallas LLP, pro hac
vice, Joshua Adam Fields, Kirtland and Packard LLP & Michael L.
Kelly, Kirtland and Packard LLP.

Pom Wonderful LLC, a Delaware liability company, Defendant,
represented by Johnny Traboulsi, Roll Law Group PC, Bertram
Harris Fields, Greenberg Glusker Fields Claman and Machtinger
LLP, Brooke S. Hammond, Roll Law Group PC, Kristina M. Diaz, Roll
Law Group PC, Matthew David Moran, Roll Law Group PC, Sean A.
Commons, Sidley Austin LLP & Theodore R. Scarborough, Jr., Sidley
Austin LLP, pro hac vice.

Roll International Corporation, Successor, Trustees of Stewart
and Lynda Resnick Revocable Trust, Stewart A. Resnick, Lynda Rae
Resnick, Matthew Tupper & Publix Super Markets, Inc., Consol
Defendants, represented by Kristina M. Diaz, Roll Law Group PC &
Matthew David Moran, Roll Law Group PC.


MDL 2420: Direct Purchasers' Deal with Samsung SDI Has Final OK
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, Oakland Division, finally
approved the settlement between Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs and
Defendants Samsung SDI Co. Ltd. and Samsung SDI America, Inc.,
set forth in the parties' settlement agreement dated Aug. 2,
2017, in the case, IN RE: LITHIUM ION BATTERIES ANTITRUST
LITIGATION, This Document Relates To: ALL DIRECT PURCHASER
ACTIONS, Case No. 13-md-02420-YGR, MDL No. 2420 (N.D. Cal.).

The Judge certified the settlement class, only with respect to
Samsung SDI, of all persons and entities that purchased a Lithium
Ion Battery or Lithium Ion Battery Product from any Defendant, or
any division, subsidiary or affiliate thereof, or any co-
conspirator in the United States during the Class Period, from
Jan. 1, 2000 through May 31, 2011.

She finds that Saveri & Saveri, Inc., Pearson, Simon & Warshaw,
LLP, and Berman Tabacco, previously appointed as the Class
Counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, have and will fairly and competently represent the
interests of the settlement class.

She also granted final approval of the plan of allocation.

The Judge dismissed with prejudice the Action in favor of the
Samsung SDI Defendants, with each party to bear their own costs
and attorneys' fees except as provided in the settlement
agreement.

She finds, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, that there is no just reason for delay in the entry of
Judgment as to the parties to the settlement agreement.
Accordingly, the Clerk is directed to enter Judgment forthwith
for the Samsung SDI Defendants.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2t8rgB1 from Leagle.com.

Kevin Young, Plaintiff, represented by Jeff D. Friedman --
jefff@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Kevin Young, Plaintiff, represented by George W. Sampson, Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Jason Allen Zweig -- jasonz@hbsslaw.com
-- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Shana E. Scarlett --
shanas@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP & Steve W.
Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
pro hac vice.

Bradley Seldin, Plaintiff, represented by Jeff D. Friedman,
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, George W. Sampson, Hagens Berman
Sobol Shapiro LLP, Jason Allen Zweig, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
LLP, Shana E. Scarlett, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP & Steve
W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

Bruce Sterman, Plaintiff, represented by Jeff D. Friedman, Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP & Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

Charles Carte, Plaintiff, represented by Guido Saveri --
guido@saveri.com -- Saveri & Saveri, Inc., Brian P. Murray --
bmurray@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Cadio R.
Zirpoli -- cadio@saveri.com -- Saveri & Saveri, Inc., David Yau-
Tian Hwu -- dhwu@saveri.com -- Saveri and Saveri Inc., Geoffrey
Conrad Rushing -- mheaphy@saveri.com -- Saveri & Saveri Inc.,
Gregory Bradley Linkh -- glinkh@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP, Lee Albert -- lalbert@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay
& Murray LLP, Lisa Maria Saveri -- lisa@saveri.com -- Saveri &
Saveri Inc., Richard Alexander Saveri -- rick@saveri.com --
Saveri and Saveri Inc, Richard Alexander Saveri, Saveri & Saveri,
Inc., Susan Gilah Kupfer -- skupfer@glancylaw.com -- Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP & Todd Anthony Seaver, Berman Tabacco.

Brian Hanlon, Plaintiff, represented by Brent W. Johnson --
bjohnson@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers and Toll
PLLC, Jeff D. Friedman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Kit A.
Pierson -- kpierson@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers
and Toll PLLC & Laura M. Alexander --
lalexander@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers and Toll.

Nichole M. Gray, Plaintiff, represented by Guido Saveri, Saveri &
Saveri, Inc., Aaron James Broussard, Broussard and Hart LLC,
David Yau-Tian Hwu, Saveri and Saveri Inc., Douglas A. Millen --
dmillen@fklmlaw.com -- Freed Kanner London & Millen LLC, Lisa
Maria Saveri, Saveri & Saveri Inc., Richard Alexander Saveri,
Saveri and Saveri Inc, Richard Kirchner, Bonsignore & Brewer,
Richard Alexander Saveri, Saveri & Saveri, Inc., Robert J.
Bonsignore -- rbonsignore@class-actions.us -- Bonsignore Trial
Lawyers, PLLC & Todd Anthony Seaver -- tseaver@bermantabacco.com
-- Berman Tabacco.

Woodrow Clark, II, Plaintiff, represented by Brian Joseph Barry -
- bribarry1@yahoo.com -- Law Offices of Brian Barry, James E.
Cecchi, Carella Byrne, Lindsey H. Taylor --
LTaylor@carellabyrne.com -- Carella Byrne & Todd Anthony Seaver,
Berman Tabacco.

Rebecca Cervenak, Plaintiff, represented by William James Doyle,
II -- bill@doylelowther.com -- Doyle Lowther LLP.

John Russo, Plaintiff, represented by William James Doyle, II --
jim@doylelowther.com -- Doyle Lowther LLP, James Robert Hail,
Doyle Lowther & Katherine S. DiDonato, Shustak Reynolds &
Partners, P.C..

LG Chem Ltd., Defendant, represented by Benjamin Edward Waldin --
bwaldin@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP, Brian Yanlang Chang --
bchang@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP, Jungmin Lee --
jlee@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP, Nathan P. Eimer --
neimer@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP & Vanessa Greenwood
Jacobsen -- vjacobsen@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP.

LG Chem America, Inc, Defendant, represented by Benjamin Edward
Waldin, Eimer Stahl LLP, Brian Yanlang Chang, Eimer Stahl LLP,
Jungmin Lee, Eimer Stahl LLP, Nathan P. Eimer, Eimer Stahl LLP &
Vanessa Greenwood Jacobsen, Eimer Stahl LLP.

Samsung SDI America Inc, Defendant, represented by John Roberti -
- john.roberti@allenovery.com -- Allen & Overy LLP, Bradley
Pensyl -- bradley.pensyl@allenovery.com -- Allen and Overy LLP,
Jacob S. Pultman -- jacob.pultman@allenovery.com -- Allen Overy
LLP, Matthew R. Boucher -- matthew.boucher@allenovery.com --
Allen and Overy LLP, Michael S. Feldberg --
michael.feldberg@allenovery.com -- Allen and Overy LLP & Nneka
Ukpai -- Nneka.Ukpai@AllenOvery.com -- Allen and Overy LLP.

Hitachi Ltd., Defendant, represented by Craig P. Seebald --
cseebald@velaw.com -- Vinson & Elkins LLP, Elliott J. Joh --
elliott.joh@squirepb.com -- Vinson and Elkins LLP & Matthew J.
Jacobs -- mjacobs@velaw.com -- Vinson & Elkins LLP.

Hitachi Maxell, Ltd, Defendant, represented by Christopher Walter
James -- cjames@velaw.com -- Vinson and Elkins LLP, Craig P.
Seebald, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Elliott J. Joh, Vinson and Elkins
LLP, Jason Alan Levine -- jlevine@velaw.com -- Vinson Elkins LLP,
Jeremy C. Keeney -- jkeeney@velaw.com -- Vinson and Elkins
L.L.P., Lindsey Robinson Vaala -- lvaala@velaw.com -- Matthew J.
Jacobs, Vinson & Elkins LLP & Thomas William Bohnett --
tbohnett@velaw.com -- Vinson and Elkins L.L.P..

Maxell Corporation of America, Defendant, represented by
Christopher Walter James, Vinson and Elkins LLP, Craig P.
Seebald, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Elliott J. Joh, Vinson and Elkins
LLP, Jason Alan Levine, Vinson Elkins LLP, Jeremy C. Keeney,
Vinson and Elkins L.L.P., Lindsey Robinson Vaala, Matthew J.
Jacobs, Vinson & Elkins LLP & Thomas William Bohnett, Vinson and
Elkins L.L.P..

Samsung SDI Co Ltd, Defendant, represented by John Roberti, Allen
& Overy LLP, Bradley Pensyl, Allen and Overy LLP, Jacob S.
Pultman, Allen Overy LLP, Matthew R. Boucher, Allen and Overy
LLP, Michael S. Feldberg, Allen and Overy LLP & Nneka Ukpai,
Allen and Overy LLP.

Maxwell Corporation of America, Defendant, represented by Thomas
William Bohnett, Vinson and Elkins L.L.P..

Hitachi Maxell Corporation of America, Defendant, represented by
Lindsey Robinson Vaala.

Toshiba America Electronic Components Inc, Defendant, represented
by Christopher M. Curran -- ccurran@whitecase.com -- White & Case
& J. Frank Hogue -- fhogue@whitecase.com -- White Case LLP.


MDL 2420: Direct Purchasers' Deal with LG Chem Has Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, Oakland Division, finally
approved the settlement between Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs and
Defendants LG Chem, Ltd. and LG Chem America, Inc., set forth in
the parties' settlement agreement dated Oct. 2, 2017, in the
case, IN RE: LITHIUM ION BATTERIES ANTITRUST LITIGATION, This
Document Relates To: ALL DIRECT PURCHASER ACTIONS, Case No. 13-
md-02420-YGR, MDL No. 2420 (N.D. Cal.).

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Judge certified the settlement class, only with respect to LG
Chem, of all persons and entities that purchased a Lithium Ion
Battery or Lithium Ion Battery Product from any Defendant, or any
division, subsidiary or affiliate thereof, or any co-conspirator
in the United States during the Class Period, from Jan. 1, 2000
through May 31, 2011.

She finds that Saveri & Saveri, Inc., Pearson, Simon & Warshaw,
LLP, and Berman Tabacco, previously appointed as the Class
Counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, have and will fairly and competently represent the
interests of the settlement class.

She also granted final approval of the plan of allocation.

The Judge dismissed with prejudice the Action in favor of the LG
Chem Defendants, with each party to bear their own costs and
attorneys' fees, except as provided in the settlement agreement.

She finds, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, that there is no just reason for delay in the entry of
Judgment as to the parties to the settlement agreement.
Accordingly, the Clerk is hereby directed to enter Judgment
forthwith for the LG Chem Defendants.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2lauGj0 from Leagle.com.

Kevin Young, Plaintiff, represented by Jeff D. Friedman --
jefff@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Kevin Young, Plaintiff, represented by George W. Sampson, Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Jason Allen Zweig -- jasonz@hbsslaw.com
-- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Shana E. Scarlett --
shanas@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP & Steve W.
Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
pro hac vice.

Bradley Seldin, Plaintiff, represented by Jeff D. Friedman,
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, George W. Sampson, Hagens Berman
Sobol Shapiro LLP, Jason Allen Zweig, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
LLP, Shana E. Scarlett, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP & Steve
W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

Bruce Sterman, Plaintiff, represented by Jeff D. Friedman, Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP & Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

Charles Carte, Plaintiff, represented by Guido Saveri --
guido@saveri.com -- Saveri & Saveri, Inc., Brian P. Murray --
bmurray@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Cadio R.
Zirpoli -- cadio@saveri.com -- Saveri & Saveri, Inc., David Yau-
Tian Hwu -- dhwu@saveri.com -- Saveri and Saveri Inc., Geoffrey
Conrad Rushing -- mheaphy@saveri.com -- Saveri & Saveri Inc.,
Gregory Bradley Linkh -- glinkh@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP, Lee Albert -- lalbert@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay
& Murray LLP, Lisa Maria Saveri -- lisa@saveri.com -- Saveri &
Saveri Inc., Richard Alexander Saveri -- rick@saveri.com --
Saveri and Saveri Inc, Richard Alexander Saveri, Saveri & Saveri,
Inc., Susan Gilah Kupfer -- skupfer@glancylaw.com -- Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP & Todd Anthony Seaver, Berman Tabacco.

Brian Hanlon, Plaintiff, represented by Brent W. Johnson --
bjohnson@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers and Toll
PLLC, Jeff D. Friedman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Kit A.
Pierson -- kpierson@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers
and Toll PLLC & Laura M. Alexander --
lalexander@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers and Toll.

Nichole M. Gray, Plaintiff, represented by Guido Saveri, Saveri &
Saveri, Inc., Aaron James Broussard, Broussard and Hart LLC,
David Yau-Tian Hwu, Saveri and Saveri Inc., Douglas A. Millen --
dmillen@fklmlaw.com -- Freed Kanner London & Millen LLC, Lisa
Maria Saveri, Saveri & Saveri Inc., Richard Alexander Saveri,
Saveri and Saveri Inc, Richard Kirchner, Bonsignore & Brewer,
Richard Alexander Saveri, Saveri & Saveri, Inc., Robert J.
Bonsignore -- rbonsignore@class-actions.us ---, Bonsignore Trial
Lawyers, PLLC & Todd Anthony Seaver -- tseaver@bermantabacco.com
-- Berman Tabacco.

Woodrow Clark, II, Plaintiff, represented by Brian Joseph Barry -
- bribarry1@yahoo.com -- Law Offices of Brian Barry, James E.
Cecchi, Carella Byrne, Lindsey H. Taylor --
LTaylor@carellabyrne.com -- Carella Byrne & Todd Anthony Seaver,
Berman Tabacco.

Rebecca Cervenak, Plaintiff, represented by William James Doyle,
II -- bill@doylelowther.com -- Doyle Lowther LLP.

John Russo, Plaintiff, represented by William James Doyle, II --
jim@doylelowther.com -- Doyle Lowther LLP, James Robert Hail,
Doyle Lowther & Katherine S. DiDonato, Shustak Reynolds &
Partners, P.C..

LG Chem Ltd., Defendant, represented by Benjamin Edward Waldin --
bwaldin@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP, Brian Yanlang Chang --
bchang@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP, Jungmin Lee --
jlee@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP, Nathan P. Eimer --
neimer@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP & Vanessa Greenwood
Jacobsen -- vjacobsen@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP.

LG Chem America, Inc, Defendant, represented by Benjamin Edward
Waldin, Eimer Stahl LLP, Brian Yanlang Chang, Eimer Stahl LLP,
Jungmin Lee, Eimer Stahl LLP, Nathan P. Eimer, Eimer Stahl LLP &
Vanessa Greenwood Jacobsen, Eimer Stahl LLP.

Samsung SDI America Inc, Defendant, represented by John Roberti -
- john.roberti@allenovery.com -- Allen & Overy LLP, Bradley
Pensyl -- bradley.pensyl@allenovery.com -- Allen and Overy LLP,
Jacob S. Pultman -- jacob.pultman@allenovery.com -- Allen Overy
LLP, Matthew R. Boucher -- matthew.boucher@allenovery.com --
Allen and Overy LLP, Michael S. Feldberg --
michael.feldberg@allenovery.com -- Allen and Overy LLP & Nneka
Ukpai -- Nneka.Ukpai@AllenOvery.com -- Allen and Overy LLP.

Hitachi Ltd., Defendant, represented by Craig P. Seebald --
cseebald@velaw.com -- Vinson & Elkins LLP, Elliott J. Joh --
elliott.joh@squirepb.com -- Vinson and Elkins LLP & Matthew J.
Jacobs -- mjacobs@velaw.com -- Vinson & Elkins LLP.

Hitachi Maxell, Ltd, Defendant, represented by Christopher Walter
James -- cjames@velaw.com -- Vinson and Elkins LLP, Craig P.
Seebald, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Elliott J. Joh, Vinson and Elkins
LLP, Jason Alan Levine -- jlevine@velaw.com -- Vinson Elkins LLP,
Jeremy C. Keeney -- jkeeney@velaw.com -- Vinson and Elkins
L.L.P., Lindsey Robinson Vaala -- lvaala@velaw.com -- Matthew J.
Jacobs, Vinson & Elkins LLP & Thomas William Bohnett --
tbohnett@velaw.com -- Vinson and Elkins L.L.P..

Maxell Corporation of America, Defendant, represented by
Christopher Walter James, Vinson and Elkins LLP, Craig P.
Seebald, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Elliott J. Joh, Vinson and Elkins
LLP, Jason Alan Levine, Vinson Elkins LLP, Jeremy C. Keeney,
Vinson and Elkins L.L.P., Lindsey Robinson Vaala, Matthew J.
Jacobs, Vinson & Elkins LLP & Thomas William Bohnett, Vinson and
Elkins L.L.P..

Samsung SDI Co Ltd, Defendant, represented by John Roberti, Allen
& Overy LLP, Bradley Pensyl, Allen and Overy LLP, Jacob S.
Pultman, Allen Overy LLP, Matthew R. Boucher, Allen and Overy
LLP, Michael S. Feldberg, Allen and Overy LLP & Nneka Ukpai,
Allen and Overy LLP.

Maxwell Corporation of America, Defendant, represented by Thomas
William Bohnett, Vinson and Elkins L.L.P..

Hitachi Maxell Corporation of America, Defendant, represented by
Lindsey Robinson Vaala.

Toshiba America Electronic Components Inc, Defendant, represented
by Christopher M. Curran -- ccurran@whitecase.com -- White & Case
& J. Frank Hogue -- fhogue@whitecase.com -- White Case LLP.


MDL 2420: Direct Purchasers' Deal with TOKIN Has Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, Oakland Division, finally
approved the settlement between Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs and
Defendant TOKIN Corp., formerly known as NEC TOKIN Corp., set
forth in the parties' settlement agreement dated Aug. 30, 2017,
in the case, IN RE: LITHIUM ION BATTERIES ANTITRUST LITIGATION,
This Document Relates To: ALL DIRECT PURCHASER ACTIONS, Case No.
13-md-02420-YGR, MDL No. 2420 (N.D. Cal.).

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Judge certified the settlement class, only with respect to TOKIN,
of all persons and entities that purchased a Lithium Ion Battery
or Lithium Ion Battery Product from any Defendant, or any
division, subsidiary or affiliate thereof, or any co-conspirator
in the United States during the Class Period, from Jan. 1, 2000
through May 31, 2011.

She finds that Saveri & Saveri, Inc., Pearson, Simon & Warshaw,
LLP, and Berman Tabacco, previously appointed as the Class
Counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, have and will fairly and competently represent the
interests of the settlement class.

She also granted final approval of the plan of allocation.

The Judge dismissed with prejudice the Action in favor of
Defendant TOKIN, with each party to bear their own costs and
attorneys' fees, except as provided in the settlement agreement.

She finds, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, that there is no just reason for delay in the entry of
Judgment as to the parties to the settlement agreement.
Accordingly, the Clerk is hereby directed to enter Judgment
forthwith for Defendant TOKIN.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2JALn5L from Leagle.com.

Kevin Young, Plaintiff, represented by Jeff D. Friedman --
jefff@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Kevin Young, Plaintiff, represented by George W. Sampson, Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Jason Allen Zweig -- jasonz@hbsslaw.com
-- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Shana E. Scarlett --
shanas@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP & Steve W.
Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
pro hac vice.

Bradley Seldin, Plaintiff, represented by Jeff D. Friedman,
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, George W. Sampson, Hagens Berman
Sobol Shapiro LLP, Jason Allen Zweig, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
LLP, Shana E. Scarlett, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP & Steve
W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

Bruce Sterman, Plaintiff, represented by Jeff D. Friedman, Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP & Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

Charles Carte, Plaintiff, represented by Guido Saveri --
guido@saveri.com -- Saveri & Saveri, Inc., Brian P. Murray --
bmurray@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Cadio R.
Zirpoli -- cadio@saveri.com -- Saveri & Saveri, Inc., David Yau-
Tian Hwu -- dhwu@saveri.com -- Saveri and Saveri Inc., Geoffrey
Conrad Rushing -- mheaphy@saveri.com -- Saveri & Saveri Inc.,
Gregory Bradley Linkh -- glinkh@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP, Lee Albert -- lalbert@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay
& Murray LLP, Lisa Maria Saveri -- lisa@saveri.com -- Saveri &
Saveri Inc., Richard Alexander Saveri -- rick@saveri.com --
Saveri and Saveri Inc, Richard Alexander Saveri, Saveri & Saveri,
Inc., Susan Gilah Kupfer -- skupfer@glancylaw.com -- Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP & Todd Anthony Seaver, Berman Tabacco.

Brian Hanlon, Plaintiff, represented by Brent W. Johnson --
bjohnson@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers and Toll
PLLC, Jeff D. Friedman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Kit A.
Pierson -- kpierson@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers
and Toll PLLC & Laura M. Alexander --
lalexander@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers and Toll.

Nichole M. Gray, Plaintiff, represented by Guido Saveri, Saveri &
Saveri, Inc., Aaron James Broussard, Broussard and Hart LLC,
David Yau-Tian Hwu, Saveri and Saveri Inc., Douglas A. Millen --
dmillen@fklmlaw.com -- Freed Kanner London & Millen LLC, Lisa
Maria Saveri, Saveri & Saveri Inc., Richard Alexander Saveri,
Saveri and Saveri Inc, Richard Kirchner, Bonsignore & Brewer,
Richard Alexander Saveri, Saveri & Saveri, Inc., Robert J.
Bonsignore -- rbonsignore@class-actions.us -- Bonsignore Trial
Lawyers, PLLC & Todd Anthony Seaver -- tseaver@bermantabacco.com
-- Berman Tabacco.

Woodrow Clark, II, Plaintiff, represented by Brian Joseph Barry -
- bribarry1@yahoo.com -- Law Offices of Brian Barry, James E.
Cecchi, Carella Byrne, Lindsey H. Taylor --
LTaylor@carellabyrne.com -- Carella Byrne & Todd Anthony Seaver,
Berman Tabacco.

Rebecca Cervenak, Plaintiff, represented by William James Doyle,
II -- bill@doylelowther.com -- Doyle Lowther LLP.

John Russo, Plaintiff, represented by William James Doyle, II --
jim@doylelowther.com -- Doyle Lowther LLP, James Robert Hail,
Doyle Lowther & Katherine S. DiDonato, Shustak Reynolds &
Partners, P.C..

LG Chem Ltd., Defendant, represented by Benjamin Edward Waldin --
bwaldin@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP, Brian Yanlang Chang --
bchang@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP, Jungmin Lee --
jlee@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP, Nathan P. Eimer --
neimer@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP & Vanessa Greenwood
Jacobsen -- vjacobsen@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP.

LG Chem America, Inc, Defendant, represented by Benjamin Edward
Waldin, Eimer Stahl LLP, Brian Yanlang Chang, Eimer Stahl LLP,
Jungmin Lee, Eimer Stahl LLP, Nathan P. Eimer, Eimer Stahl LLP &
Vanessa Greenwood Jacobsen, Eimer Stahl LLP.

Samsung SDI America Inc, Defendant, represented by John Roberti -
- john.roberti@allenovery.com -- Allen & Overy LLP, Bradley
Pensyl -- bradley.pensyl@allenovery.com -- Allen and Overy LLP,
Jacob S. Pultman -- jacob.pultman@allenovery.com -- Allen Overy
LLP, Matthew R. Boucher -- matthew.boucher@allenovery.com --
Allen and Overy LLP, Michael S. Feldberg --
michael.feldberg@allenovery.com -- Allen and Overy LLP & Nneka
Ukpai -- Nneka.Ukpai@AllenOvery.com -- Allen and Overy LLP.

Hitachi Ltd., Defendant, represented by Craig P. Seebald --
cseebald@velaw.com -- Vinson & Elkins LLP, Elliott J. Joh --
elliott.joh@squirepb.com -- Vinson and Elkins LLP & Matthew J.
Jacobs -- mjacobs@velaw.com -- Vinson & Elkins LLP.

Hitachi Maxell, Ltd, Defendant, represented by Christopher Walter
James -- cjames@velaw.com -- Vinson and Elkins LLP, Craig P.
Seebald, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Elliott J. Joh, Vinson and Elkins
LLP, Jason Alan Levine -- jlevine@velaw.com -- Vinson Elkins LLP,
Jeremy C. Keeney -- jkeeney@velaw.com -- Vinson and Elkins
L.L.P., Lindsey Robinson Vaala -- lvaala@velaw.com -- Matthew J.
Jacobs, Vinson & Elkins LLP & Thomas William Bohnett --
tbohnett@velaw.com -- Vinson and Elkins L.L.P..

Maxell Corporation of America, Defendant, represented by
Christopher Walter James, Vinson and Elkins LLP, Craig P.
Seebald, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Elliott J. Joh, Vinson and Elkins
LLP, Jason Alan Levine, Vinson Elkins LLP, Jeremy C. Keeney,
Vinson and Elkins L.L.P., Lindsey Robinson Vaala, Matthew J.
Jacobs, Vinson & Elkins LLP & Thomas William Bohnett, Vinson and
Elkins L.L.P..

Samsung SDI Co Ltd, Defendant, represented by John Roberti, Allen
& Overy LLP, Bradley Pensyl, Allen and Overy LLP, Jacob S.
Pultman, Allen Overy LLP, Matthew R. Boucher, Allen and Overy
LLP, Michael S. Feldberg, Allen and Overy LLP & Nneka Ukpai,
Allen and Overy LLP.

Maxwell Corporation of America, Defendant, represented by Thomas
William Bohnett, Vinson and Elkins L.L.P..

Hitachi Maxell Corporation of America, Defendant, represented by
Lindsey Robinson Vaala.

Toshiba America Electronic Components Inc, Defendant, represented
by Christopher M. Curran -- ccurran@whitecase.com -- White & Case
& J. Frank Hogue -- fhogue@whitecase.com -- White Case LLP.


MEDICREDIT INC: $5MM Deal in "Martinez" TCPA Suit Has Final OK
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARILYNN MARTINEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
MEDICREDIT, INC., et al., Defendants. TODD HORNBERGER, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. MEDICREDIT, INC., Defendant. Rajesh Verma,
Plaintiff, v. MEMORIAL HEALTHCARE GROUP, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Consolidated Case No. 4:16CV01138 ERW (E.D. Mo.),
Judge E. Richard Webber of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, granted both the
Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement,
and the Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees and Reimbursement of
Expenses and Incentive Awards.

The case originated as a class action under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").  The Plaintiffs alleged the
Defendants made prerecorded calls to cell phones without the
prior express consent of the class Plaintiffs or the putative
class members.  The case was resolved with a settlement
agreement, which was preliminarily approved by the Court on Dec.
15, 2017.  The Court also set a series of deadlines for notice to
be sent to class members.

The Notice was sent to 498,418 class members and 463,757 class
members received a copy.  Only eight opted out.  The total
settlement amount is $5 million to be divided pro rata among
class members after expenses are deducted.  After attorneys' fees
and litigation expenses, each of the 28,406 class members who
submitted a valid claim will receive approximately $91.25.

The matter comes before the Court on the Plaintiff's Motions.
The Defendants wrote a letter to the Court stating they agree
with all the terms of the underlying proposed final order, except
with respect to the cy pres recipient.  The Plaintiff proposed
the National Consumer Law Center ("NCLC"), which the Plaintiff
argues is closely aligned to the class' interests to be protected
by the TCPA.  The Defendants state the NCLC's primary activity
regarding the TCPA has been to lobby for expanded TCPA
enforcement against organizations like Defendants.  They state
settlement funds should not be improperly used to support one
party's counsel's agenda, citing S.E.C. v. Bear, Stearns & Co.
The Defendants propose the Court designates Legal Services
Corporation ("LSC") as the recipient.  LSC is a nonprofit legal
aid organization, and the Defendants propose the Court directs
funding to telephone services.

On May 15, 2018, Judge Webber held a final approval hearing, and
it largely adopted parties' proposed final settlement order.
However, he withheld resolving the issue as to identifying a cy
pres recipient, should any funds remain for distribution.
  He accordingly concludes the settlement is fair, reasonable,
and adequate.  He likewise concludes the Plaintiff's request for
attorneys' fees and costs is also fair and reasonable.

Accordingly, Judge Webber finally approved the Agreement and
finds that the terms constitute, in all respects, a fair,
reasonable and adequate settlement as to all Settlement Class
Members in accordance with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.  He  finally certified the Settlement Class for
settlement purposes of approximately 627,642 persons whose unique
cellular telephone number has been identified in the call data
produced in the litigation where the call records reflect
Medicredit Inc. codes WN or DNK or NPAS Inc. Smart Codes 11, 13,
15, 42, 584, and 770.  A list of the telephone numbers that
comprise the Settlement Class is attached as Exhibit 6 to the
Agreement and was filed under seal.

The Judge approved the plan of distribution for the Settlement
Fund as set forth in the Agreement.  The Claims Administrator is
ordered to comply with the terms of the Agreement with respect to
distribution of Settlement Awards, the Second Distribution and
disposition of any Remaining Funds thereafter.  Should any
Remaining Funds be distributed, he approved NCLC as the cy pres
recipients who will receive an equal distribution.  He finds the
organization is closely aligned with the class' interests.

The Judge dismissed the Action, with prejudice, without costs to
any party, except as expressly provided for in the Agreement.

In the event that the Settlement fails to become effective for
any reason, the money remaining in the Settlement Fund (including
accrued interest), less expenses and taxes incurred or due and
owing and payable from the Settlement Fund in accordance with the
Agreement, will be returned to the Defendants within 15 days of
the event that causes the Agreement to not become effective.

Judge Webber awarded the Class Counsel $1,666,666 for attorney
fees and $30,323.94 for reimbursed expenses from the balance of
the Settlement Fund, which he finds to be fair and reasonable,
and which amount will be paid to the Class Counsel from the
Settlement Fund in accordance with the terms of the Agreement.
The Class Representatives, as identified in the Preliminary
Approval Order, are compensated in the amount of $7,500 each for
their efforts in the case.

Finally, pursuant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a)(2) and
Local Rule 42-4.03, the actions styled Martinez v. Medicredit,
Inc., No. 4:16-cv-1138-ERW (E.D. Mo.), which was previously
consolidated with Hornberger v. Medicredit, Inc., No. 4:17-cv-
0409-SNLJ (E.D. Mo.), and Verma v. Memorial Healthcare Group,
Inc., et al., No. 4:17-cv-2809-ERW (E.D. Mo.), are formally
consolidated nunc pro tunc as of Dec. 4, 2017.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 15, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/LEpjXs from Leagle.com.

Marilynn Martinez, individually and on behalf of all other
similarly situated,, Plaintiff, represented by Timothy J.
Sostrin, KEOGH LAW, LTD. & Keith J. Keogh, KEOGH LAW, LTD.

Rajesh Verma, Plaintiff, represented by Eric W. Kem, THE LAW
OFFICES OF ERIC W. KEM, P.A., Robert William Murphy, LAW OFFICE
OF ROBERT W. MURPHY & Keith J. Keogh, KEOGH LAW, LTD.

Todd Hornberger & Eric Johnson, Consolidated Filer Plaintiffs,
represented by Anthony E. LaCroix -- tony@lacroixlawkc.com --
LACROIX LAW FIRM, Michael L. Greenwald --
mgreenwald@gdrlawfirm.com -- GREENWALD DAVIDSON PLLC & Keith J.
Keogh, KEOGH LAW, LTD.

Medicredit, Inc., a Missouri corporation, Defendant, represented
by Maura K. Monaghan -- mkmonaghan@debevoise.com -- DEBEVOISE AND
PLIMPTON LLP, Patrick T. McLaughlin --
pmclaughlin@spencerfane.com -- SPENCER FANE LLP, Scott J.
Dickenson -- sdickenson@spencerfane.com -- SPENCER FANE LLP &
Megan D. Meadows, SPENCER FANE LLP.


MICROSOFT CORP: Discrimination Suit Can't Proceed as Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dina Bass and Margaret Cronin Fisk, writing for Bloomberg News,
report that Microsoft Corp. women engineers who claim
discrimination in pay and promotions won't be allowed to pursue
their lawsuit as a class action, in a major blow to the leading
case attacking the male-dominated tech industry.

U.S. District Judge James L. Robart issued a sealed order on
June 25 denying class certification, without elaborating.  The
Seattle judge said the ruling won't be made public until both
sides tell him what needs to be redacted, or kept private.

The denial deals a near-death blow to the lawsuit filed by three
women on behalf of a proposed class of more than 8,630 high-level
technical specialists.  Class-action status would have given the
women more leverage in pursuing their claims at trial or seeking
a settlement.  An appeal is likely.  Similar cases are pending
against Alphabet Inc.'s Google, Twitter Inc. and Oracle Corp.,
while Uber Technologies Inc. settled a class action in April.

Judge Robart said at a June 11 hearing that the lawsuit had a
"fatal" flaw in trying to prove that a uniform Microsoft
corporate policy or action adversely affected women, a
requirement for class actions.  Judge Robart said the women
didn't show enough of a common thread in their workplace
experience.  The standard was set in a 2011 decision by the U.S.
Supreme Court in a gender-bias case against Walmart Inc.

The Walmart decision has become a roadblock for employee class
actions since 2011, with employers citing the ruling and workers'
lawyers seeking loopholes.  Workers have had some success in
asserting more narrowly defined classes than the sprawling,
nationwide proposed group of 1.5 million women in the Walmart
case, but their victories have been limited.

In the bid for group status by the Microsoft women, their lawyers
cited recent decisions involving Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and
Merrill Lynch unit of Bank of America Corp., which have allowed
narrower, more focused classes to be certified.  Microsoft argued
that the plaintiffs couldn't show intentional discrimination or
any company policy that could meet the commonality requirements
of a class action.

"The judge made the right decision," a Microsoft representative
said in an emailed statement.  "This case should not be a class
action."  The company is committed to "increasing diversity and
making sure that Microsoft is a workplace where everyone has an
equal opportunity to succeed," the representative said.

The women's attorneys didn't immediately respond to calls for
comment.

The case was initially filed in September 2015 on behalf of women
engineers and technicians and the proposed class would have
included women in those high-level positions from Sept. 16, 2012,
to the present.  A plaintiffs' expert estimated the pay gap
between men and women for those technical and engineering jobs
as, conservatively, $100 million, to a more expansive $238
million through May 2016.  The plaintiffs also sought damages for
lost compensation caused by lack of promotions.

The company denies having any policies that would lead to lower
pay or prospects for women and insists that it promotes fair
treatment.

The case is Moussouris v. Microsoft Corp., 15-cv-01483, U.S.
District Court, Western District of Washington (Seattle). [GN]


MISSOURI: Class Certification Granted in Juvenile Parole Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Rice, writing for St. Louis Post-Dispatch, reports that a
federal judge has granted class certification to a lawsuit filed
in U.S. District Court in November that alleges the Missouri
Parole Board is ignoring court rulings that determined that
juveniles cannot be sentenced to life without parole.

The lawsuit was filed by the MacArthur Justice Center and Husch
Blackwell LLP on behalf of offenders who were sentenced in
Missouri courts to life without the possibility of parole for
crimes they committed as minors.

Norman Brown, Ralph McElroy, Sidney Roberts, and Theron Roland
have all served for at least 25 years and have applied for
parole, and all were denied, the order to certify the lawsuit
states. The lawsuit also represents 80 prisoners in Missouri who
face similar circumstances.

The order to certify the lawsuit as a class action was signed by
U.S. District Court Judge Nanette Laughrey.

"We applaud the Court's recognition of the systemic issues in
Missouri's parole system as it relates to juvenile offenders,"
said Amy E. Breihan, an attorney with MacArthur's St. Louis
office, in a prepared statement.  "This class represents
individuals who were sentenced to die behind bars for crimes they
allegedly committed as children. Missouri has seemingly denied
them justice at every turn, but this decision is a strong step in
the right direction."

In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, which
disallowed mandatory life without parole prison terms for those
under 18 years old.  Sentencing someone that young to life
without parole violates the 8th Amendment against cruel and
unusual punishment, the Supreme Court ruled in a 5-4 decision.
It was later determined that the Miller ruling applies
retroactively, which would affect dozens of offenders currently
incarcerated in Missouri prisons.

The lawsuit claims cruel and unusual punishment and deprivation
of due process, both in violation of both the U.S. Constitution
and the Missouri Constitution.

The lawsuit seeks a declaration that the board's policies and
procedures fail to comply with Missouri law, and asks for an
injunction ordering the board to change how it conducts parole
reviews for the offenders in question that provides for
"meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated
maturity."

The lawsuit also asks that offenders be allowed to review
information presented to the board, to provide expert testimony,
to have the ability to cross-examine and to submit statements in
writing to the board. [GN]


MONTANA: Partial Summary Judgment Ruling in "Duane" Reversed
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DUANE C. KOHOUTEK, INC., a Montana Corporation,
BUCHER SALES, LLC, a Montana Limited Liability Company, NOBLES,
INC., a Montana Corporation, and SPIRITS PLUS, LLC, a Montana
Limited Liability Company, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. STATE OF
MONTANA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Defendant and Appellant, Case No.
DA 17-0131 (Mont.), Judge Laurie McKinnon of the Supreme Court of
Montana reversed the judgment of the District Court granted in
part the Storeowners' motion for partial summary judgment on
their constitutional claims.

Four liquor store owners, Duane C. Kohoutek, Bucher Sales,
Nobles, and Spirits Plus ("Storeowners") certified as a class
representing similarly situated liquor store owners, sought
declaratory and injunctive relief from actions of the State of
Montana, Department of Revenue ("DOR") in Montana's Eighth
Judicial District Court, Cascade County.

Various statutes govern liquor sales in Montana and are
administered by DOR.  The statute at issue in these proceedings
was effective between 1995 and 2016.  Pursuant to the statutory
scheme, all liquor sales originated in the State-owned, central
liquor warehouse (Liquor Warehouse).  DOR then sold liquor to
certified liquor stores (Agency Liquor Stores).

Agency Liquor Stores could only purchase liquor from the Liquor
Warehouse and the Liquor Warehouse sold only to Agency Liquor
Stores.  DOR provided Agency Liquor Stores with three discounts,
collectively known as the commission rate, on their purchase of
liquor from the Liquor Warehouse.  One of those discounts was the
weighted average discount ratio ("WADR"), codified in Section 16-
2-101(2)(b)(ii)(B), MCA (repealed 2016).  Agency Liquor Stores
then, in turn, sold the liquor to individual retail customers as
well as to licensed taverns and bars (Licensees).  When Agency
Liquor Stores sold whole or unbroken cases of liquor, also known
as case lots, to Licensees, Section 16-2-201(1), MCA, required
them to provide a separate discount (Case Discount).

In February 2014, Storeowners filed a complaint seeking
declaratory, injunctive, and class-wide relief on behalf of
Montana liquor store franchisees who have been programmatically
undercompensated by the State for the sale of case-lots of liquor
to state liquor licensees.  In their complaint, Storeowners
described how DOR reimbursed them for mandated discounts based
not on the actual discounts given, but upon a ratio of case-lot
sales to licensees to overall sales made by each store in fiscal
year 1994 resulting in a significant cumulative loss to certain
agency liquor store franchisees.

The parties jointly moved for class certification.  In its
certification order, the District Court defined the class as
owners of Montana liquor stores which have provided statutorily
required discounts on the sale of unbroken case lots of liquor in
a greater amount than the State has reimbursed or returned to
those store owners.

In October 2014, Storeowners moved for partial summary judgment
on their constitutional claims.  In January 2015, DOR moved to
amend its answer to add the defense of statute of limitations.
The District Court heard oral argument on the issues and ordered
supplemental briefing.

In its April 2015 order on summary judgment, the District Court
first concluded the purpose of the WADR was to fully reimburse
Agency Liquor Stores for the cost of providing the Case Discount
to Licensees.  It stated that from 1995 to 2013, the statutory
scheme remained unchanged and the legislative history evidences a
clear intent by the State to reimburse liquor store owners for
the statutorily-required case lot discount.

The District Court granted Storeowners' motion in part,
concluding that the WADR was once reasonable, but its
contemporary application violates the class members' equal
protection and substantive due process rights under Article II,
sections 4 and 17 of the Montana Constitution.  It denied
Storeowners' motion in part, finding the statute is not an
unconstitutional taking of private property under Article II,
section 29 of the Montana Constitution.  Also in its order on
summary judgment, the District Court concluded Storeowners'
claims were not barred by laches and denied DOR's motion to amend
its answer to add the defense of statute of limitations.

The proceeding then entered its damages phase.  The District
Court concluded that the WADR's reliance on 1994 sales data was
unconstitutional beginning on July 1, 1998, when it could have
been reviewed like the commission rate discount.  The District
Court awarded damages of $14,836,178.22.  The District Court
subsequently concluded DOR was unjustly enriched and added
$8,718,803.88 in attorney fees and $11,320,233.43 in interest to
the $14,836,178.22 judgment.

Both parties appeal.  The Court heard oral argument on Feb. 7,
2018.  Judge McKinnon restates the dispositive issues on appeal
as: (i) whether the District Court erred in determining the WADR
violated Storeowners' rights to substantive due process; and (ii)
whether the District Court erred in determining the WADR violated
Storeowners' rights to equal protection.

She finds that the WADR, set forth in Section 16-2-
101(2)(b)(ii)(B), MCA (repealed 2016), was rationally related to
the legislative purpose of offsetting some or all of the cost
Agency Liquor Stores incurred by providing the Case Discount to
Licensees.  Neither the WADR's language nor its legislative
history support Storeowners' contention that the Legislature
intended the WADR to fully reimburse Agency Liquor Stores for the
cost of providing the Case Discount.

Further, the Judge finds that, whether a store's unbroken case
sales grew, stayed the same, or diminished, is sufficiently
attributable to that Agency Liquor Store's independent business
decisions and renders the classes dissimilar for equal protection
purposes.  The WADR did not violate Storeowners' rights to
substantive due process or equal protection.  It was a
constitutional part of a statutory scheme designed to privatize
liquor stores in Montana.

For these reasons, Judge McKinnon reversed the judgment of the
District Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://bit.ly/2t8GfLl from Leagle.com.

Daniel J. Whyte, Teresa G. Whitney (argued), Dave Burleigh,
Special Assistant Attorneys General, Helena, Montana, for
Appellant.

Jonathan McDonald (argued), McDonald Law Office, PLLC, Helena,
Montana Michael J. George -- mike@georgelaw-mt.com -- Michael J.
George, P.C., Great Falls, Montana, for Appellees.


NES EQUIPMENT: Court Dismisses ICFA Suit
----------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned STATE MECHANICAL SERVICES, LLC, Plaintiff, v.
NES EQUIPMENT SERVICES CORPORATION d/b/a NES RENTALS, NES RENTALS
HOLDINGS, and UNITED RENTALS (NORTH AMERICA), INC., Defendants,
Case No. 17-cv-5950 (N.D. Ill.).

Plaintiff Tartan Construction, LLC, alleges that Defendants NES
Rentals, NES Holdings, and United Rentals charged two
illegitimate fees as part of their standard rental agreements for
heavy equipment. The Plaintiff claims that these fees breached
the rental agreements, unjustly enriched the Defendants, and
violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (ICFA).

The Court grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss.  The Court
grants the motion with prejudice as to the environmental fee
portions of Counts One and Three.  The Court grants the motion
without prejudice as to the other portions of Counts One and
Three, and as to Counts Two and Four. The Plaintiff may replead
the claims dismissed without prejudice if it can do so consistent
with its obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11;
failure to correct the deficiencies identified here may result in
dismissal with prejudice.

Count One: Breach of Contract

The Plaintiff claims that NES Rentals and United Rentals breached
their contracts with the Plaintiff and other proposed class
members by: (1) charging an environmental fee completely
untethered to the actual costs of disposing of waste fluids from
rented equipment; and (2) charging a fee for the LDW when the fee
bears no relation to the risk of loss or damage to the equipment
and the alleged waiver does not offer any value to customers who
pay for it.

To state a breach of contract claim, the Plaintiff must allege
that: (1) the parties have a valid and enforceable contract; (2)
the Plaintiff performed under the contract; (3) the Defendants
failed to comply with a duty imposed by the contract; and (4)
that failure to comply injured the Plaintiff.

Environmental Fee

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's claim fails as to the
environmental fee because the rental agreement does not say that
the fee corresponds to their costs for handling waste fluids.

This Court agrees.

Section 18 of the rental agreement defines the environmental fee,
stating: "Customer acknowledges that it shall be charged a per
item, per invoice environmental fee for the handling and disposal
of waste oil and other fluids used in connection with the
operation and/or cleaning of the Equipment."

Even if the environmental fee has no connection to the
Defendants' environmental costs, the Defendants did not breach
any contractual duty by charging the fee. This Court dismisses
Count One with prejudice as to the environmental fee allegations.

LDW Fee

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's claim fails as to the
LDW fee because the Plaintiff fails to allege any damages
resulting from the alleged breach. This Court agrees that the
claim fails, although for a different reason.

The rental agreement's only mention of the LDW says: "Customer
acknowledges that the Company's LDW policy was explained at the
time of entering into this Agreement. A copy of the policy is
available at all branches of the Company and is available upon
request. Customer acknowledges that it is responsible for the
Equipment and that any LDW entered into is not insurance."

Even if the Defendants breached that duty by not making the
policy available, the Plaintiff does not allege any damages
arising from that specific breach.  Without alleging an injury,
the Plaintiff fails to state a claim for breach of contract. This
Court dismisses Count One without prejudice as to the LDW fee
allegations.

Counts Two and Three: Unjust Enrichment

To state a claim for unjust enrichment, the Plaintiff must allege
that the Defendants unjustly retained a benefit to the
Plaintiff's detriment, and that the Defendants violate
fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience by
keeping the benefit.

Environmental Fee

Under Illinois law, an unjust enrichment claim fails when the
claim rests on the breach of an express contract.

The claim against NES Holdings, NES Rental's parent company fails
because Plaintiff makes no specific allegations of unjust
enrichment against NES Holdings. In other words, the Plaintiff
seeks to make NES Holdings liable as NES Rental's parent
corporation. A parent corporation may be liable for a
subsidiary's actions if the parent exercises enough control and
direction over the subsidiary that a court may properly pierce
the parent's corporate veil. But when the subsidiary has no
liability, the parent also has no liability.

Accordingly, this Court dismisses Count Three with prejudice to
the extent the Plaintiff's theory of liability depends upon the
environmental fee.

LDW Fee

Here, the Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim depends upon the
same conduct that forms the basis of its ICFA claim: the
misrepresentations that allegedly deceived the Plaintiff as to
the true nature of the fees and made it unjust for Defendants to
retain the money they collected for those fees. Considering
Cleary and its progeny, this Court likewise ties the fate of the
Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim to the Plaintiff's ICFA
claim.

Thus, this Court dismisses Count Two, and dismisses Count Three
as to the LDW fee.

Count Four: ICFA

The Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated the ICFA by
deceiving customers as to the true nature of both the
environmental fee and the LDW fee. To state a claim under the
IFCA, the Plaintiff must allege with enough specificity to
satisfy Rule 9(b) that: (1) the defendant carried out deceptive
business practices; (2) the defendant intended that Plaintiff
rely on its deception; (3) the deception occurred in commerce;
(4) the Plaintiff suffered actual damage; and (5) the defendant's
deception proximally caused the Plaintiff's damage.

Here, the Plaintiff's ICFA claim fails because the Plaintiff does
not allege the "who, what, when, where, and how of the fraud"
with the requisite particularity the Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendants made numerous misrepresentations about the
environmental and LDW fees but each allegation implicates the
Defendants as a group. To satisfy Rule 9(b) in this case which
alleges a fraud based upon a misrepresentation theory. The
Plaintiff would need to specifically allege who made the
misrepresentation, the time, place, and content of the
misrepresentation and how a defendant communicated the
misrepresentation.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 14, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y74vzh3j
from Leagle.com.

Tartan Construction, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Robert M.
Foote -- rmf@fmcolaw.com -- Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil LLC,
Glenn Alexander McTavish -- amctavish@fmcolaw.com -- Foote,
Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil & Matthew J. Herman -- mjh@fmcolaw.com --
Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil LLC.

Tartan Construction, LLC, individually and on behalf of a class
of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, represented by
Robert M. Foote, Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil LLC.

NES Equipment Services Corporation, doing business as NES
Rentals, NES Rentals Holdings & United Rentals (North America),
Inc., Defendants, represented by Matthew R. Devine --
mdevine@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP, Abraham Michael
Salander -- asalander@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block, Elizabeth D.
Adler -- eadler@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding Llp, pro hac vice,
Precious Stephanie Jacobs -- pjacobs@jenner.com -- Jenner And
Block LLP & S. Stewart Haskins, II -- shaskins@kslaw.com -- King
& Spalding, pro hac vice.


NEWELL BRANDS: Faces Bucks County Securities Suit in New Jersey
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bucks County Employees Retirement Fund, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Newell Brands Inc.,
Michael B. Polk, Ralph J. Nicoletti, and James L. Cunningham,
III, Case No. 2:18-cv-10878 (D. N.J., June 21, 2018), seeks to
pursue remedies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

This is a federal securities class action on behalf of purchasers
of Newell Brands common shares between February 6, 2017 and
January 24, 2018 inclusive.

The Plaintiff Bucks County Employees Retirement Fund purchased
Newell Brands common stock during the Class Period and has been
damaged by the alleged false and misleading statements issued by
the Defendants, says the complaint.

The Defendant Newell Brands is a global manufacturer and marketer
of name brand consumer products. The Company maintains its
headquarters in Hoboken, New Jersey and its common stock trades
on the NYSE under the symbol NWL.

The Defendant Michael B. Polk served, at all relevant times, as
Chief Executive Officer and a Director of Newell Brands.

The Defendant Ralph J. Nicoletti served, at all relevant times,
as Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Newell
Brands. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      James E. Cecchi, Esq.
      CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI
      OLSTEIN, BRODY & ANGELLO, P.C.
      5 Becker Farm Road
      Roseland, NJ 07068
      Tel: (973) 944-1700

          - and -

      Samuel H. Rudman, Esq.
      ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN
      & DOWD LLP
      58 South Service Road, Suite 200
      Melville, NY 11747
      Tel: (631) 367-7100


NEWELL BRANDS: Faruqi Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, a national securities law firm, reminds
investors in Newell Brands, Inc. ("Newell" or the "Company")
(NYSE:NWL) of the August 20, 2018 deadline to seek the role of
lead plaintiff in a federal securities class action that has been
filed against the Company.

If you invested in Newell stock or options between February 6,
2017 and January 24, 2018 and would like to discuss your legal
rights, click here: www.faruqilaw.com/NWL.  There is no cost or
obligation to you.

You can also contact us by calling Richard Gonnello toll free at
877-247-4292 or at 212-983-9330 or by sending an e-mail to
rgonnello@faruqilaw.com.

CONTACT:

         FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
         685 Third Avenue, 26th Floor
         New York, NY 10017
         Attn: Richard Gonnello, Esq.
         rgonnello@faruqilaw.com
         Telephone: (877) 247-4292 or (212) 983-9330

The lawsuit has been filed in the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey on behalf of all those who purchased
Newell common stock between February 6, 2017 and January 24, 2018
(the "Class Period").  The case, Bucks County Employees
Retirement Fund v. Newell Brands, Inc. et al, No. 18-cv-10878 was
filed on June 21, 2018, and has been assigned to Judge Katharine
Sweeney Hayden.

The lawsuit focuses on whether the Company and its executives
violated federal securities laws by making false and misleading
statements and/or failing to disclose that: (1) the Company's
retail channel was loaded with extremely high levels of unsold
Newell product; (2) contrary to the Company's representations,
the build-up of Newell inventory in the retail channel was due to
Company-specific rather than macroeconomic reasons; (3) as a
result of the unusually high levels of unsold inventory in the
retail channel, Newell was exposed to a heightened risk that it
would experience slower sales growth in future periods; and (4)
undisclosed managerial and cultural differences in the legacy
Newell and Jarden businesses had created significant internal
discord that was having a material adverse effect on the
Company's operating performance.

Specifically, on November 2, 2017, Newell announced disappointing
third quarter 2017 financial results.  During the related
earnings call, Newell executives disclosed that the Company's
materially lower core sales growth were due to "retailers pulling
back on order rates and rebalance inventories" to help clear the
known, but previously undisclosed build-up of Newell inventory in
the retail channel.

On this news, the price of Newell's common stock fell from a
closing price of $41.00 on November 1, 2017 to $30.01 on
November 2, 2017 -- a $10.99 or 26.80% drop.

Then, on January 25, 2018, Newell announced its 2017 financial
results.  The Company stated that it anticipated 2017 core sales
growth of approximately 0.8% versus previous guidance of 1.5% to
2.0% (implying negative 2.0% organic sales growth during the 2017
fourth quarter), due, in part, to continued retailer inventory
destocking.  The Company also announced it was exploring
"strategic options" to significantly restructure its business by
divesting industrial and commercial assets, which was expected to
result in a 50% reduction in both the Company's customer base and
its global factory and warehouse footprint. The same day, Newell
announced that three members of its Board of Directors had
resigned.

On this news, the price of Newell common stock fell from a
closing price of $31.23 on January 24, 2018 to $24.81 on January
25, 2018 -- a $6.42 or 20.66% drop.

The court-appointed lead plaintiff is the investor with the
largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class who
is adequate and typical of class members who directs and oversees
the litigation on behalf of the putative class.  Any member of
the putative class may move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff
through counsel of their choice, or may choose to do nothing and
remain an absent class member.  Your ability to share in any
recovery is not affected by the decision to serve as a lead
plaintiff or not.

Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP -- http://www.faruqilaw.com-- also
encourages anyone with information regarding Newell's conduct to
contact the firm, including whistleblowers, former employees,
shareholders and others. [GN]


NISSAN NORTH: Court Narrows Claims in "Falk" Suit
-------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHELLE FALK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NISSAN NORTH
AMERICA, INC., Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-04871-HSG (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted in part and denied in
part the Defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint.

The Plaintiffs in the action claim that the Defendant's Nissan
Sentras for model years 2013 to present have defective
continuously variable transmissions ("CVT").  They contend that
the CVTs are defective in design, materials, and/or workmanship.
These defective CVTs, the Plaintiffs contend, cause sudden,
unexpected shaking and violent jerking when drivers attempt to
accelerate class vehicles; hesitation before responding to a
driver's input on the accelerator pedal, which prevents the class
vehicles from accelerating as intended by the driver; as well as
complete transmission failure.  The Plaintiffs state that this
transmission defect creates unreasonably dangerous situations
while driving and increases the risk of a crash, and that the
Defendant continues to lease and sell its vehicles, despite
knowing about this defect.

The Plaintiffs allege that, within a year of selling the first
allegedly defective vehicle, the Defendant acknowledged the
defect in its Technical Service Bulletins ("TSB").   The
Defendant proposed that technicians reprogram the Engine Control
Module and the Transmission Control Module.  Despite these
proposed fixes, the Plaintiffs claim that consumers have
continued to submit complaints to both the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration and the Defendant.  The Named
Plaintiffs Falk of California, Indhu Jayavelu of Ohio, Patricia
L. Cruz of New York, Danielle Trotter of Colorado, Cynthia
Garrison of Massachusetts, and Amanda Macri of Illinois asked the
Defendant to repair the defect, but they state that the Defendant
either did not or could not.

In response, the Plaintiffs filed the putative class action on
Aug. 22, 2017, asserting claims on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, for violations of California,
Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio consumer
protection laws, as well as the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.  They
then amended the complaint on Sept. 27, 2017.

They seek to represent a nationwide class of persons who
purchased and/or leased in the United States a model year 2013-
2017 Nissan Sentra equipped with a CVT.  They also intend to seek
certification of subclasses of purchasers in California,
Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio.

The Defendant moves to dismiss the amended complaint, challenging
several of the Plaintiffs' 15 causes of action: (i)Express
Warranty (Count 1); (ii) Implied Warranty (Count 2); (iii)
Magnuson-Moss Act (Count 3); (iv) Statute of Limitations (Counts
1-3, 9); (v) State Consumer Protection Acts (Counts 7-10); and
(vi) Unjust Enrichment and Remedies.

Judge Gilliam granted without leave to amend the Defendant's
motion to dismiss as to (i) Plaintiff Macri's breach of implied
warranty claim; (ii) Plaintiff Jayavelu's breach of implied
warranty claim, to the extent based on the UCC; and (iii) all the
Plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief.

The Judge granted with leave to amend as to the (i) the
Plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment; and (ii) Plaintiff
Jayavelu's Ohio CSPA class action allegations.

He denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss as to all remaining
claims.  He granted the Plaintiff's request for leave to amend
Plaintiff Jayavelu's breach of implied warranty claim to plead a
tort claim.  Any amended complaint must be filed within 21 days
of the date of the Order.  The amended complaint may not add new
causes of action or Plaintiffs, and the scope of leave to amend
extends only to the claims identified.

Judge Gilliam has found, among other things, that because the
Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled claims that provide for
damages, including those for breach of express warranty and
violation of the Magnuson-Moss Act, he finds that the Plaintiffs
have an adequate remedy at law, and consequently are barred from
seeking equitable relief.

Plaintiff Garrison has also sufficiently alleged an injury that
is distinct from the Defendant's alleged deception, due to the
transmission problems that actually manifested in her vehicle.
And because Plaintiff Jayavelu does not satisfy the requirements
of Ohio Rev. Code Section 1345.09(B), he is precluded from
advancing an Ohio CSPA claim on behalf of a class.

With respect to the breach of warranty claims, Plaintiff
Trotter's equitable tolling claim presents sufficient facts to
support a cognizable legal theory.  The Judge cannot find as a
matter of law that Plaintiff Trotter's claim under the Colorado
Consumer Protection Act is barred by the statute of limitations.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2la0rcd from Leagle.com.

Michelle Falk, Plaintiff, represented by Shimon Yiftach --
shimony@bgandg.com -- Bronstein Gewirtz & Grossman, Gary S.
Graifman -- ggraifman@kgglaw.com -- Kantrowitz Goldhamer &
Graifman, P.C., Gary E. Mason -- gmason@wbmllp.com -- Whitfield
Bryson & Mason LLP, Jason Samual Rathod -- jrathod@classlawdc.com
-- Migliaccio and Rathod LLP, Jay I. Brody -- jbrody@kgglaw.com -
- Kantrowitz, Goldhamer and Graifman, P.C., Jeffrey Laurence
Osterwise -- josterwise@bm.net -- Berger and Montague P.C.,
Jennifer Shari Goldstein -- jgoldstein@wbmllp.com -- Whifield
Bryson and Mason, LLP, Lawrence Deutsch -- ldeutsch@bm.net --
Berger and Montague P.C. & Nicholas A. Migliaccio --
nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com -- Migliaccio & Rathod.

Indhu Jayavelu, Patricia L. Cruz, Danielle Trotter, Amanda Macri,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated &
Cynthia Garrison, Plaintiffs, represented by Shimon Yiftach,
Bronstein Gewirtz & Grossman, Gary S. Graifman, Kantrowitz
Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C., Gary E. Mason, Whitfield Bryson &
Mason LLP, Jason Samual Rathod, Migliaccio and Rathod LLP, Jay I.
Brody, Kantrowitz, Goldhamer and Graifman, P.C., Jeffrey Laurence
Osterwise, Berger and Montague P.C., Lawrence Deutsch, Berger and
Montague P.C. & Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Migliaccio & Rathod.

Nissan North America, Inc., Defendant, represented by E. Paul
Cauley, Jr. -- paul.cauley@dbr.com -- Drinker Biddle & Reath,
LLP, Marshall Lee Benjamin Baker -- marshall.baker@dbr.com --
Drinker Biddle Reath LLP & Michael James Stortz --
michael.stortz@dbr.com -- Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP.


NUTRACEUTICAL CORP: SCOTUS to Take Up Decertification Challenge
---------------------------------------------------------------
Emily Field, writing for Law360, reports that the U.S. Supreme
Court on June 25 decided to take up a petition challenging a
Ninth Circuit decision that reversed an order decertifying a
class of buyers alleging that Nutraceutical Corp. falsely
advertised its Cobra Sexual Energy "aphrodisiac" supplement.

As is customary, the high court did not indicate why it chose to
grant the dietary supplement company's February petition for
certiorari.  The company had argued that the Ninth Circuit erred
in reviving the class action because named plaintiff Troy Lambert
missed a 14-day deadline appealing the decertification.

The case is Nutraceutical Corporation, Petitioner v. Troy
Lambert, Case No. 17-1094 (U.S.).  The case was filed February 5,
2018. [GN]


OCEAN HARBOR: Settles Automobile Accident Insurance Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
MSP Recovery, LLC, on June 25 disclosed that a proposed
settlement has been reached in the class action lawsuit MSPA
Claims 1, LLC v. Ocean Harbor Casualty Insurance Company.

If you paid for or were responsible as a full or partial risk
entity for medical expenses of a Medicare Part C enrollee who was
injured in an automobile accident and was insured by Ocean
Harbor, your legal rights may be affected.

For more details on the class action and settlement along with
dates to file a claim form, exclude yourself from the case,
object to the settlement, or attend the next hearing go to
www.MSPRecovery.com/OceanHarbor or call 305-398-0990. [GN]


ORION INT'L: "Ascencio" Class Cert. Denial Partly Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NISSA ASCENCIO AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. ORION INTERNATIONAL CORP.,
Defendant, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, Case No. DA 17-0353
(Mont.), Judge James Jeremiah Shea of the Supreme Court of
Montana affirmed in part the denial of Ascencio's motion for
class certification by the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Missoula County.

Orion was a small, family-owned Montana business that performed
background checks on prospective employees at the request of
employers.  Its principals were Donald and Patricia Whitney.
Their son Kyle Whitney handled daily business operations.

In 2012, Ascencio applied for a job with St. Luke's Hospital in
Polson.  St. Luke's retained Orion to perform a background check
of Ascencio.  The background check Orion provided to St. Luke's
included "obsolete information," the inclusion of which was
prohibited by Section 31-3-112, MCA.  The obsolete information
consisted of Ascencio's criminal history that reflected a 1997
arrest for forgery that resulted in two misdemeanor convictions
in 1998.  St. Luke's hired Ascencio, and she worked there for
approximately two years.

In 2015, Ascencio applied for a job with Missoula Bone and Joint.
On May 20, 2015, Missoula Bone and Joint hired Ascencio, then
retained Orion to perform a background check on her the following
day.  Again, the background check Orion provided to Ascencio's
employer contained prohibited obsolete information, including the
two 1998-misdemeanor forgery convictions as well as a Chapter 7
bankruptcy filing that was discharged in 2000.

Ascencio called Orion to ask why it would be releasing illegal
background checks to a prospective employer in violation of
Section 31-3-112, MCA, that prohibits the disclosure of such
obsolete information by reporting agencies.  Kyle Whitney, the
Orion employee with whom Ascencio spoke, responded that he would
contact Orion's attorney.  On June 9, 2015, Orion issued a
corrected background check of Ascencio to Missoula Bone and
Joint.

Missoula Bone and Joint terminated Ascencio at the conclusion of
her six-month probationary period, noting concerns with her
background check and credit report, as well as requests for time
off, not reporting when she left work early, and personality
conflicts with a co-worker.

On Sept. 23, 2015, Ascencio filed suit against Orion, asserting
claims in her individual capacity, as well as a claim for class
action.  On Oct. 29, 2015, Orion filed a Motion to Dismiss which
the District Court denied on Dec. 13, 2016.

On Jan. 25, 2017, Orion responded to Ascencio's first discovery
requests, which included a list of individuals for whom Orion
prepared background checks or other consumer reports.  Ascencio
identified at least 360 instances on this list in which Orion's
reports contained obsolete information in violation of Section
31-3-112, MCA.

On Feb. 1, 2017, Ascencio moved to certify the class.  Ascencio
attached Orion's list with 360 names circled, defining the class
as all persons in the state of Montana who had background or
consumer reports generated by Orion International which contained
obsolete information as defined under MCA Section 31-3-112, from
Sept. 22, 2013 to present.

Ascencio argued the violations of Title 31, chapter 3, MCA, are
common to all the Plaintiffs and so similar that the illegality
of all these provisions can be decided at one time in one
proceeding rather than burdening the District Court with hundreds
of separate cases.  On March 24, 2017, the District Court denied
Ascencio's motion to certify the class, determining that Ascencio
met all four of the M. R. Civ. P. 23(a) prerequisites but failed
to establish predominance and superiority, as required by M. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(3).  It noted that Ascencio failed to provide
evidence to support factual assertions in her briefing
specifically related to the superiority issue and Orion's status
as a business, which Ascencio claimed had changed and Orion had
ceased operating as a Montana corporation and its principals had
moved to Florida.

On April 19, 2017, Ascencio moved to alter or amend the order
denying class certification, asserting the District Court made a
mistake of fact regarding Orion's status.  She attached as an
exhibit Orion's discovery responses from Orion's Feb. 7, 2017
Defendant's Responses to Ascencio's Second Discovery Requests in
which answers acknowledge Orion ceased business operations and
its principals moved to Florida.  On June 8, 2017, the District
Court denied Ascencio's motion to alter or amend.

Ascencio appeals the District Court's denials of her Motion to
Certify the Class and her Motion to Alter or Amend Order.  Orion
cross-appeals, arguing that the District Court correctly denied
class certification on M. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) grounds, but that
it erred in its determination that Ascencio satisfied the M. R.
Civ. P. 23(a) prerequisites.

Judge Shea finds that Ascencio failed to both support her
allegations with evidence and demonstrate why prosecuting the
case as a class action is superior to individual actions.  The
record before the District Court at the time it ruled on
Ascencio's Motion to Certify Class was devoid of any evidence to
support her superiority argument.  Because certification requires
at least some evidence to satisfy each of M. R. Civ. P. 23's
requirements, the Judge holds that the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in denying class certification based on
Ascencio's failure to prove superiority with at least some
evidence of an assertion she deemed quintessential to her
argument.

Moreover, Ascencio failed to articulate why it would be difficult
for individual claimants to pursue their claims separately and
why this class action is the superior method.  According to the
Judge, Ascencio asserted to the District Court -- without
citation to legal authority or her own attachments -- that, even
if potential "class members wanted to bring claims on their own,
they could not," and that class members have "absolutely no
recourse" alternative to this class action.  He says Ascencio's
argument rests on the implication that the putative class
members' claims would result in only small recoveries that would
preclude bringing individual claims unless their resources are
pooled.  Again, however, Ascencio offers nothing but bald
assertions as to the potential recoveries of the other potential
class members.

Based on the record as it is currently developed, Judge Shea
cannot conclude that the District Court erred by finding that
Ascencio failed to meet the superiority requirement of M. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(3).  The order of the District Court is affirmed and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the
Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 15, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/Uy5LoR from Leagle.com.

Christopher W. Froines, Froines Law Office, Inc., Missoula,
Montana, for Appellants.

Bradley J. Luck, Tessa A. Keller, Garlington, Lohn & Robinson,
PLLP, Missoula, Montana, for Appellee.


PARALLON ENTERPRISES: "Buford" Sues Over Unpaid OT Wages
--------------------------------------------------------
Laura Buford, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Parallon Enterprises and Does 1 to 100, Inclusive,,
Defendants, Case No. RG18904309 (Cal. Super., May 10, 2018),
seeks redress for failure to provide meal periods, rest periods,
minimum wages, overtime, complete and accurate wage statements
and waiting time penalties for unpaid wages due upon termination
and in violation of the California Labor Code, California
Business and Professions Code, including declaratory relief,
damages, penalties, equitable relief, costs and attorneys' fees.

Parallon Enterprises  -- https://www.parallon.com/about-us --
provides business and operational services for the healthcare
industry where Plaintiff worked for Defendants through 2015 as a
traveling healthcare professional in various hospitals in
Northern California. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael R. Crosner, Esq.
      Zachary M. Crosner, Esq.
      Alfredo Nava, Esq.
      CROSNER LEGAL, PC
      433 N. Camden Dr., Ste. 400
      Beverly Hills, CA 90210
      Tel: (310) 496-4818
      Fax: (310)510-6429
      Email: mike@crosnerlegal.com
             zach@crosnerlegal.com
             alfredo@crosnerlegal.com


PEOPLES UNITED: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss "Daccache" RICO Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALEXANDRE DACCACHE, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ARIEL QUIROS; PEOPLE'S
UNITED FINANCIAL, INC.; and PEOPLE'S UNITED BANK, Defendants,
Case No. 16-21575-CIV-MORENO (S.D. Fla.), Judge Federico A.
Moreno of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, Miami Division, granted the Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss the Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiffs are all natural persons, over the age of 21, who
allegedly sustained damage as a result of their investments in
the Ponzi scheme.  Defendant Raymond James & Associates, Inc. is
a corporation organized in Florida, with its principal place of
business in St. Petersburg, Florida.  Defendant People's United
Financial is a financial services company.  People's United
Financial acquired the Chittenden Corp., the bank holding company
for the Chittenden Trust Co., which at the time of the
acquisition, acted as the escrow agent for the investor funds for
the EB-5 projects.  Defendant People's United Bank is a federally
chartered savings bank headquartered in Bridgeport, Connecticut,
and is a subsidiary of People's United Financial.

The Plaintiffs submit that in July 2008, the Board of Directors
of People's United Financial and the Board of Directors of
People's United Bank approved a plan to consolidate the acquired
Chittenden entities into People's United Bank.  Defendant Quiros
is a natural person residing in Florida.  Defendant Stenger is
the Director, President, and CEO of Jay Peak, Inc, and resides in
Vermont.  Finally, Defendant Burstein resides in Florida and is
the Miami Branch Manager and Vice President of Investments for
the Raymond James South Florida Complex

The Plaintiffs' claims stem from their investments in a series of
related projects at the Jay Peak and Q Burke ski resorts in
Vermont.  They allege that Jay Peak was owned and operated by
Mont Saint-Sauveur International, Inc. from 1978 until mid-2008.
Quiros and Stenger allegedly negotiated with Mont Saint-Sauveur
to acquire and further develop Jay Peak in 2007.  They then
raised funds to develop Jay Peak through the EB-5 Immigrant
Investor Program.

The Plaintiffs allege that in 2008, Quiros, Burstein, and Amigo
(Burstein's supervisor), met to discuss a financial structure for
the limited partnerships they planned to implement to raise
capital for the EB-5 projects.  As a result, they submit that
Raymond James agreed that investor funds would be transferred
from escrow accounts at People's Bank to accounts at Raymond
James, over which Quiros would have exclusive authority.

The Plaintiffs allege that despite knowing the investor money
could not be used to purchase Jay Peak, Inc., Quiros -- with the
assistance of Stenger, Burstein, and Raymond James -- through Q
Resorts, used $21.9 million of investor funds ($12.4 million from
Phase I and $9.5 million from Phase II) to fund the vast majority
of the purchase of Jay Peak, Inc.  The Plaintiffs submit that
nothing in the limited partnership agreements permitted Quiros to
use the investor funds to buy Jay Peak, Inc.  They further allege
that Quiros's misuse of investor funds permeated through each of
the EB-5 projects at issue.

The Plaintiffs submit that Stenger violated terms of the
applicable limited partnership agreements and breached his
fiduciary duty as general partner to the investors in the limited
partnerships each time he transferred the funds.  They also
maintain that Quiros's establishment of the margin loans violated
the terms of the limited partnership agreements because the
agreements prohibited general partners from encumbering or
pledging investor funds as collateral without investor approval.
Lastly, they allege that Quiros and Stenger commingled Phase I
investor monies with funds from other limited partnerships.

On Aug. 9, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint
against Defendants Raymond James & Associates, Inc., People's
United Financial, People's United Bank, Quiros, William Stenger,
and Joel Burstein.  The Defendants that remain are Quiros,
People's United Bank, and People's United Financial.

The Amended Complaint includes causes of action for: common law
fraud against Quiros (Count I); aiding and abetting common law
fraud against People's Bank (Count III); aiding and abetting
breach of fiduciary duty against Quiros (Count IV); aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty against People's Bank (Count
VI); civil conspiracy against Quiros and People's Bank (Count
VII); negligence against People's Bank (Count IX); breach of
fiduciary duty against People's Bank (Count X); breach of
contract against People's Bank (Count XI); Florida's Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act against Quiros (Count
XII); conspiracy to violate Florida's Civil Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act against Quiros (Count XIII).

Defendants Quiros, People's United Financial, Inc., and People's
United Bank, N.A. move to dismiss the Amended Complaint.  Quiros
makes 10 arguments in his Motion to Dismiss Counts I, IV, VII,
XII, and XIII of the Amended Complaint: (1) the Plaintiffs do not
allege a Ponzi scheme; (2) they lack standing to bring derivative
claims; (3) the Plaintiffs have not alleged investment injury for
Phases I-V of the alleged Ponzi scheme; (4) they cannot bring
claims on behalf of limited partnerships in which they did not
invest; (5) their claims against Quiros fail because they are
breach of contract claims disguised as tort claims; (6) the
Plaintiffs have not pled falsity of offering documents with
requisite particularity as required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b); (7) Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty
(Count IV) fails because the Plaintiffs do not allege that Quiros
owed a fiduciary duty to investors or that he had knowledge of
the purported fiduciary duties at issue; (8) Civil Conspiracy
(Count VII) fails because the Plaintiffs have not alleged an
actual agreement by the alleged co-conspirators; (9) Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims (Counts XII and
XIII) fail because the Plaintiffs have not adequately pleaded
criminal wrongdoing and they've not sufficiently alleged Quiros's
participation in a pattern of racketeering activity; and (10) the
statutes of limitation bar claims for aiding and abetting breach
of fiduciary duty and civil conspiracy (Counts IV and VII).

Judge Moreno concludes that the Plaintiffs lack standing to sue
Quiros because their claims are derivative under Florida law as
they have not sufficiently alleged an injury separate and
distinct from other investors.  Additionally, the Court lacks
personal jurisdiction over the Peoples' Defendants because the
Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden in rebutting the Peoples'
Defendants affidavits, but even if they had, exercising personal
jurisdiction over them would not comport with the Due Process
Clause.

Accordingly, the Judge granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
and dismissed the Amended Complaint against the remaining
Defendants.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 15, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/pgAOi2 from Leagle.com.

Alexandre Daccache, Plaintiff, represented by Adam E. Polk --
aep@girardgibbs.com -- Girard Gibbs, LLP, pro hac vice, Angelica
M. Ornelas -- amo@girardgibbs.com -- Girard Gibbs LLP, pro hac
vice, Daniel C. Girard -- dcg@girardgibbs.com -- Girard Gibbs
LLP, pro hac vice, Detra Shaw-Wilder -- dps@kttlaw.com -- Kozyak
Tropin & Throckmorton, Dyanne Elyce Feinberg -- def@kttlaw.com --
Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, P.A., Harley Shepard Tropin --
hst@kttlaw.com -- Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, Kathleen M.
Donovan-Maher -- kdonovanmaher@bermantabacco.com -- Berman
DeValerio, pro hac vice, Maia Aron -- ma@kttlaw.com -- Kozyak
Tropin & Throckmorton, P.A., Nathaniel L. Orenstein --
norenstein@bermantabacco.com -- Berman DeValerio, pro hac vice,
Rachel Sullivan -- rs@kttlaw.com -- Kozyak, Tropin &
Throckmorton, P.A., Steven J. Buttacavoli --
sbuttacavoli@bermantabacco.com -- Berman DeValerio, pro hac vice,
Tal J. Lifshitz -- tjl@kttlaw.com -- Kozyak Tropin Throckmorton,
Paul Aiello, Bennett Aiello & Thomas A. Tucker Ronzetti, Kozyak
Tropin & Throckmorton.

Carlos Enrique Hiller Sanchez, Plaintiff, represented by Adam E.
Polk, Girard Gibbs, LLP, pro hac vice, Angelica M. Ornelas,
Girard Gibbs LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel C. Girard, Girard Gibbs
LLP, pro hac vice, Detra Shaw-Wilder , Kozyak Tropin &
Throckmorton, Kathleen M. Donovan-Maher, Berman DeValerio, pro
hac vice, Nathaniel L. Orenstein, Berman DeValerio, pro hac vice,
Rachel Sullivan, Kozyak, Tropin & Throckmorton, P.A., Steven J.
Buttacavoli, Berman DeValerio, pro hac vice, Thomas A. Tucker
Ronzetti, Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, Jeremy Robert Kreines,
Bennett Aiello, Maia Aron, Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, P.A.,
Michael Paul Bennett, Bennett Aiello, Paul Aiello, Bennett Aiello
& Harley Shepard Tropin, Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton.

Lorne Morris, Johannes Eijmberts, Jose R. Casseres-Pinto, Phillip
Calderwood, James B. Shaw, Jose Antonio Pietri & Tongyi Wang,
Plaintiffs, represented by Adam E. Polk, Girard Gibbs, LLP, pro
hac vice, Angelica M. Ornelas, Girard Gibbs LLP, pro hac vice,
Daniel C. Girard, Girard Gibbs LLP, pro hac vice, Detra Shaw-
Wilder , Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, Kathleen M. Donovan-Maher,
Berman DeValerio, pro hac vice, Nathaniel L. Orenstein, Berman
DeValerio, pro hac vice, Rachel Sullivan, Kozyak, Tropin &
Throckmorton, P.A., Steven J. Buttacavoli, Berman DeValerio, pro
hac vice, Thomas A. Tucker Ronzetti, Kozyak Tropin &
Throckmorton, Jeremy Robert Kreines, Bennett Aiello, Maia Aron,
Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, P.A., Michael Paul Bennett, Bennett
Aiello, Paul Aiello, Bennett Aiello & Harley Shepard Tropin,
Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton

Ariel Quiros, Defendant, represented by Melissa Damian Visconti,
Damian & Valori, LLP & Melanie Emmons Damian, Damian & Valori
LLP.

William Stenger, Defendant, pro se.

People's United Financial, Inc., as successor-in-interest to
Chittenden Trust Company & People's United Bank, Defendants,
represented by James J. Stricker -- jstricker@kasowitz.com --
Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP, pro hac vice, Lauren
Tabaksblat -- ltabaksblat@kasowitz.com -- Kasowitz, Benson,
Torres & Friedman LLP, pro hac vice, Jonathan Eric Minsker --
jminsker@kasowitz.com --  Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP & Maria
Helena Ruiz -- mruiz@kasowitz.com -- Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP.


PETROBRAS BRASILEIRO: Court Approves Class Action Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------
Ana Mano, writing for Reuters, report that Brazil's state-run oil
company, Petroleo Brasileiro SA, said on June 25 a New York
federal court approved a deal to settle a U.S. corruption class
action lawsuit.

Petrobras, as the company is known, agreed in January to pay
$2.95 billion to end the U.S. lawsuit in what was said to be one
of the biggest such payouts in the United States by a foreign
entity.

The settlement terms were approved on June 22 by the U.S. court,
the company said in a securities filing.

The court approval may be appealed at a higher court, said
Petrobras, adding the settlement does not constitute admission of
any wrongdoing in connection with a corruption investigation in
Brazil known as "Car Wash."

The settlement is seen an important milestone for company as it
emerges from the scandal, which has entangled two former
Brazilian presidents and dozens of the country's corporate
executives.

The Car Wash investigation began in early 2014 and has led to an
unprecedented fight against entrenched political corruption in
Brazil.

The probe has uncovered billions of dollars in bribes paid by
major construction companies to politicians and executives at
state-run enterprises such Petrobras in return for lucrative
contracts. [GN]


PETROBRAS BRASILEIRO: Judge Orders Atty to Cut Legal Fees
---------------------------------------------------------
Kelly Swanson, writing for Global Investigations Review, reports
that in ordering class action lawyers who sued Petrobras for its
part in a Brazilian bribery scandal to significantly reduce their
legal fees, District Judge Jed Rakoff highlighted some peculiar
billing practices. [GN]


RENT-A-CENTER INC: "Beaton" Remanded to Missouri State Court
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SADE BEATON, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. RENT-A-CENTER, INC.,
Defendant (E.D. Mo.), Judge John A. Ross of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division,
granted the Plaintiffs' Motion To Remand; and denied without
prejudice the Defendant's Motion to Compel Individual Arbitration
and Stay Litigation.

On Dec. 6, 2017, Williams filed a Class Action Petition styled
Myra Williams v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., Case No. 1722-CC11893, in
the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, against Defendant
Rent-A-Center ("RAC").  The petition was later amended to add
Sade Beaton as a named Plaintiff in the case.

RAC is in the business of leasing household goods such as
furniture and appliances; the Plaintiff and the putative class
members are current or former customers of RAC.  According to the
Plaintiffs, RAC regularly uses court process to collect on lease
agreements it asserts are in default.

In Count I of the amended petition, the Plaintiffs allege that
RAC violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act ("MMPA") by
taking default judgments against them in state court without
having obtained personal jurisdiction.  Specifically, they allege
the default judgments were based on returns of service signed by
special process servers who were not appointed by the Court to
serve process in accordance with Missouri law.  In Count II of
the amended petition, the Plaintiffs allege that RAC was unjustly
enriched at the expense of the Plaintiffs and the putative class
members by the default judgments and monies collected after those
judgments were entered.  The Plaintiffs seek damages and an order
declaring RAC's prior judgments against them void as a matter of
law and directing RAC to set the judgments aside.

RAC removed the case to the Court on Jan. 5, 2018 based on
diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C., Sections 1332,
1441, 1446 and 1453, and the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").
The Plaintiffs seek remand on the grounds that the Court lacks
jurisdiction over their claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.  RAC opposes remand and moves to compel individual
arbitration and stay litigation or, in the alternative, to
dismiss the case without prejudice, pending the individual
arbitrations.

Judge Ross finds that the Plaintiff was the losing party in state
court proceedings that resulted in final judgment in favor of
RAC.  This judgment was entered before the current federal
proceeding was commenced by way of removal.  The Plaintiff
challenges the validity of the state court judgments based on
defective service and requests the Court declare the judgments
void and direct that they be set aside.  Granting the Plaintiff
the relief she seeks would require the Court to effectively
reverse the state court decision or void its ruling, exactly what
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits.  The Judge therefore
determines that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests the Court of
subject matter jurisdiction over the action, and that this
provides a basis for remand, as well.

The Plaintiff asks that the Court reviews and rejects a state
court judgment.  Such a request is clearly outside the
jurisdiction of the Court and must be remanded.  Because the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action, RAC's
pending motion to stay and compel arbitration will be denied
without prejudice as moot.

Accordingly, Judge Ross granted the Plaintiffs' Motion To Remand,
and remanded the matter to the Circuit Court of the City of St.
Louis.  He denied the Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Short
Surreply in Further Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion to
Remand.  And finally, he denied without prejudice to refiling in
state court the Defendant's Motion to Compel Individual
Arbitration and Stay Litigation.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 15, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/ocMABL from Leagle.com.

Sade Beaton, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher E. Roberts --
croberts@butschroberts.com -- BUTSCH ROBERTS & ASSOCIATES, LLC &
David T. Butsch -- dbutsch@butschroberts.com -- BUTSCH ROBERTS &
ASSOCIATES, LLC.

Rent-A-Center, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jocelyn A.
Villanueva -- JVILLANUEVA@BERKOWITZOLIVER.COM -- BERKOWITZ
OLIVER, LLP, pro hac vice, Nicholas L. DiVita --
NDIVITA@BERKOWITZOLIVER.COM -- BERKOWITZ OLIVER, LLP & Timothy R.
West -- TWEST@BERKOWITZOLIVER.COM -- BERKOWITZ OLIVER, LLP.


RENT-A-CENTER: Bid to Stay "Blair" Pending Appeal Nixed
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PAULA BLAIR, ANDREA ROBINSON, and FALECHIA HARRIS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. RENT-A-CENTER, INC., a Delaware corporation, RENT-
A-CENTER WEST, INC., a Delaware corporation, and DOES 1-50,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. C 17-02335 WHA (N.D. Cal.), Judge
William Alsup of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California denied the Defendants' motion to stay
proceedings pending appeal of an order denying a motion to compel
arbitration.

The putative class action arises from rent-to-own agreements
which Plaintiffs Blair, Robinson, and Harris contend set prices
in excess of the maximum installment payment rates allowable
under California law.

Defendants Rent-A-Center, Inc. and Rent-A-Center West, Inc.
("RAC") maintain rent-to-own stores throughout California.  These
stores rent household merchandise (e.g., appliances, electronics,
furniture) to consumers for a weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly fee.
After a specified time period, if all the payments have been made
the consumer will own the merchandise.  The terms of these rent-
to-own agreements are set forth in written contracts between the
consumer and RAC which the consumer signs at the point of sale.
RAC also asks the consumer to sign a separate arbitration
agreement when she makes a purchase.

In March 2017, Plaintiff Blair initiated the action in state
court for claims relating to her 2015 and 2016 rental-purchase
agreements with RAC.  She sought relief for violations of (1) the
Karnette Rental-Purchase Act, (2) the California Consumers Legal
Remedies Act, (3) usury, (4) Section 17200 of the California
Business and Professions Code, and (5) unjust enrichment. RAC
removed the action to federal court.

After Blair amended the complaint to drop her unjust enrichment
claim, RAC moved to partially compel Blair's suit to arbitration.
Because Blair opted out of the arbitration agreement contained in
the 2016 rental-purchase agreement, RAC only sought to compel
arbitration of Blair's claims relating to the 2015 agreement.
While the motion to compel arbitration was pending, Blair amended
her complaint a second time to add Plaintiffs Robinson and
Harris.  RAC could not locate signed arbitration agreements for
Robinson or Harris, and so did not seek to compel arbitration of
their claims.

An order dated Oct. 3, 2017, denied most of RAC's motion to
compel arbitration, granted RAC's motion to strike Blair's class
action claims arising out of the 2015 agreement, and denied RAC's
motion to stay pending arbitration.  An October 25 order amended
the October 3 order to remove the language striking Blair's class
action claims.  RAC appealed both orders and now -- five months
later -- moves to stay all proceedings pending that appeal.
Alternatively, RAC requests a temporary stay to allow it time to
move for a stay in the Court of appeals.  The order follows full
briefing and oral argument.

RAC submits that it has raised multiple issues in its appeal,
including (1) whether the case is governed by Ferguson v.
Corinthian Colleges, versus McGill v. Citibank, N.A.; (2) whether
McGill is preempted by the FAA; and (3) whether the language of
the contract exempts the entirety of Blair's Karnette Act, CLRA,
and Section 17200 claims from arbitration.

Judge Alsup finds that only one of these issues raises
substantial questions going to the merits.  He says the first and
third issues raised in RAC's appeal are not substantial.  The
second issue, however, does raise serious questions going to the
merits of the appeal.  The October 25 order rejected RAC's
argument that McGill is preempted by the FAA, explaining that
RAC's authorities were in opposite and that McGill does not
violate the FAA's prohibition on rules specifically disfavoring
arbitration.  Nevertheless, because our court of appeals has not
yet addressed the argument, the oder finds that RAC has raised a
serious question as to whether McGill is preempted by the FAA.

The Judge further finds that the balance of the hardships also
tips in the Plaintiffs' favor.  RAC's appeal could take upwards
of two years to resolve.  Such a substantial delay would
exacerbate the risk that putative class members could not be
located by the time the case finishes.  To be sure, he says the
Plaintiffs' seek to represent a class of individuals who made
purchases from RAC dating back to 2013, and so some putative
class members may already be difficult to find.  Nonetheless,
these location difficulties will extend to the class members with
more-recent purchases should a stay be granted.

Because RAC has failed to show irreparable harm or demonstrate
that the balance of the hardships tips in its favor, the motion
to stay will be denied.  The order needs not reach whether a stay
would serve the public interest.

For these reasons, Judge Alsup denied without prejudice RAC's
motion to stay.  RAC may renew its request for a stay after a
ruling on the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.  He
also denied RAC's request for a temporary stay of the action so
that it may move for a stay with the Court of Appeals.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2HMP96g from Leagle.com.

Paula L. Blair, Andrea Robinson & Harris A. Falechia, Plaintiffs,
represented by James T. Hannink --
Jim.Hannink@sdlaw.com -- Dostart Hannink and Coveney, Zachariah
Paul Dostart -- Paul.Dostart@sdlaw.com -- Dostart Hannink &
Coveney LLP, Eric Prince Brown -- ebrown@altshulerberzon.com --
Altshuler Berzon LLP & Michael Rubin --
mrubin@altshulerberzon.com -- Altshuler Berzon LLP.

Rent-A-Center, Inc., a Delaware corporation & Rent-A-Center West,
Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendants, represented by
Christina Guerola Sarchio, Dechert LLP, H. Joseph Escher, III,
Dechert LLP, Kirsten F. Gallacher --
KGallacher@wilsonturnerkosmo.com -- Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP, Lily
Anna North, Dechert, LLP, Robert Kenneth Dixon --
rdixon@wilsonturnerkosmo.com -- Wilson Turner Kosmo, Robert
Francois Friedman -- rfriedman@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson,
P.C., pro hac vice, Vickie E. Turner --
vturner@wilsonturnerkosmo.com -- Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP &
Gregory G. Iskander -- giskander@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson, P.C..


RESTORATION ROBOTICS: Aug. 21 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
----------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, on June 25
announced the filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of
purchasers of the securities of Restoration Robotics, Inc.
(NASDAQ:HAIR) pursuant and/or traceable to Restoration Robotics'
initial public offering ("IPO") commenced on October 12, 2017 and
closed on October 16, 2017.  The lawsuit seeks to recover damages
for Restoration Robotics investors under the federal securities
laws.

To join the Restoration Robotics class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1367.htmlor call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A
CLASS IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU
RETAIN ONE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO
NOTHING AT THIS POINT. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE.

The complaint alleges that defendants negligently issued untrue
statements of material facts in, and omitted required material
facts from, the Offering Materials issued in connection with the
IPO.  As a result of the materially misleading Offering
Materials, Restoration Robotics' stock price was artificially
inflated.  Since the IPO, Restoration Robotics' stock price has
plummeted over 50% from its IPO price of $7.00 per share.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than
August 21, 2018.  A lead plaintiff is a representative party
acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation.  If you wish to join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1367.htmlto join the class
action.  You may also contact Phillip Kim or Zachary Halper of
Rosen Law Firm toll free at 866-767-3653 or via email at
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. [GN]


RHODE ISLAND: Dismissal of "Rodriguez" Suit Recommended
-------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Lincoln D. Almond of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Rhode Island recommended the dismissal of the
case, JOSE A. RODRIGUEZ, JR. v. COURTNEY E. HAWKINS, in her
official capacity as Director of the Rhode Island Department of
Human Services, C.A. No. 18-00243-WES (D. R.I.).

The Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint alleges that the State of
Rhode Island is failing to process Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program ("SNAP") applications within the time frame
mandated by federal law.  Hispro se handwritten Complaint is
substantially copied from the Class Action Complaint pending
before the Court as Gemmell v. Affigne, C.A. No. 1:16-CV-00650-
WES.  The Gemmell case was filed on Dec. 8, 2016 by experienced
class counsel from the National Center for Law and Economic
Justice.

On Feb. 28, 2017, Chief Judge Smith entered a Stipulation and
Order of Settlement resolving the Gemmell case and obligating the
Defendant to comply with the timely processing requirements for
food stamps and to accurately report this processing to the
Plaintiffs.  Compliance with the Order of Settlement in Gemmell
is currently under the active supervision of a Court-appointed
Special Master.

Pending before the Magistrate Judge for determination is the
Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP").  On
May 4, 2018, the Plaintiff filed the pro se "Class Action"
against Hawkins, in her official capacity as Director of the
Rhode Island Department of Human Services.  His Complaint was
accompanied by an Application to Proceed IFP without being
required to prepay costs or fees, including the $400 civil case
filing fee.

After reviewing the Plaintiff's Application signed under penalty
of perjury, the Magistrate Judge concludes that the Plaintiff is
unable to pay fees and costs in the matter and thus, he granted
the Plaintiff's Application to Proceed IFP.

Having granted IFP status, he is required by statute to further
review the Plaintiff's Complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1915(e)(2) and to dismiss the suit if it is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted
or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief.

The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Plaintiff's Complaint
be summarily dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1915(e)(2)(B) .  He has found that the Plaintiff has cited no
legal grounds to reopen or relitigate the class allegations made
and settled in the Gemmell case in the new litigation.

In addition, he says the Plaintiff's attempted "knock off" class
action lawsuit be dismissed for two reasons.  First, as stated,
it is completely duplicative of the relief sought and the Special
Master's ongoing efforts in the Gemmell case.  Second, the
Plaintiff may not pursue a Class Action Complaint as a pro se
litigant.  Thus, the Plaintiff is not legally authorized to
proceed pro se with the class action litigation.

Any objection to the Report and Recommendation must be specific
and must be filed with the Clerk of the Court within 14 days of
its receipt.  Failure to file specific objections in a timely
manner constitutes waiver of the right to review by the District
Court and the right to appeal the District Court's decision.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Report and
Recommendation is available at https://bit.ly/2teFPTR from
Leagle.com.

Jose A. Rodriguez, Jr., Plaintiff, pro se.


RURAL METRO: "Calleros" Labor Suit Remanded to State Court
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California remanded the case, REUBEN
CALLEROS and RALPH RUBIO, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated in the state of California, Plaintiffs, v.
RURAL METRO OF SAN DIEGO, INC. et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:17-
cv-686-CAB-BLM (S.D. Cal.), to the state court.

Calleros and Rubio filed the lawsuit on Feb. 22, 2017 in San
Diego County Superior Court on behalf of a putative class of
current and former individuals employed by Defendants Rural Metro
of San Diego ("RMSD"), Rural Metro Corp., American Medical
Response, Inc., and Envision Healthcare Corp. as ambulance crew
members in California during the applicable class period.

The complaint asserts one claim under the California labor code
and one claim under California's unfair competition law, both of
which stem from the Defendants' alleged failure to comply with
California's rest period requirements.  On April 5, 2017, the
Defendants removed the complaint to the Court pursuant to Class
Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), alleging that there is sufficient
diversity and that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.

On Feb. 9, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a
class, and that motion is now fully briefed.  Upon review of the
parties' class certification briefs in conjunction with the
complaint, the Court discovered that this suit may be subject to
CAFA's local controversy exception.  Accordingly, it instructed
the parties to be prepared to discuss the applicability of this
exception at the hearing set for the Plaintiff's motion to
certify a class.

At the hearing, the Plaintiffs agreed with the Court that the
local controversy exception applies and argued that the Court
must remand the case.  The Defendants, however, argued that
remand would be improper because there was no evidence that
greater than two-thirds of the proposed Plaintiff classes are
citizens of California and that it would be improper to find that
the first requirement of the local controversy exception was
satisfied based solely on the fact that all class members had
worked in California during the four years preceding the date the
complaint was filed.

Accordingly, to further develop the record, the Court ordered the
Defendants to provide the last known addresses of all the
putative class members to the Plaintiffs' counsel and ordered
further briefing on the matter.  The Defendants have since
provided the Plaintiffs with the class members' last known
addresses and the additional briefing is complete.  Consistent
with the positions they took at the hearing, the Plaintiffs argue
in their brief that the local controversy exception applies and
requires remand, while the Defendants argue that it does not.

Judge Bencivengo finds that there is no dispute that second and
third requirements of the local controversy exception are
satisfied.  Approximately one-third of the potential class
members were or are employed by RMSD and seek an additional hour
of pay from RMSD for each day worked since Jan. 1, 2017.
Accordingly, the complaint seeks significant relief from RMSD,
and RMSD's conduct forms a significant basis for the class's
claims.  Further, because any injuries suffered by the class
members arise out of work they did in California, any injuries
they suffered in the form of missed meal and rest periods
occurred in California.

In addition, he also finds that all of the evidence before the
Court supports a finding that at least two-thirds of the class
members are citizens of California.  Further, when the Plaintiffs
sent opt out notices in the litigation to 1,258 San Diego class
members, at least 1,109 of the California addresses to which the
notices were sent were still valid, and that total did not
include the 32 individuals who opted-out.

The Defendants, for their part, do not offer any evidence to the
contrary, meaning that the only evidence before the Court weighs
in favor of a finding that more than two-thirds of the class are
California citizens.  Thus, the preponderance of the evidence
supports a finding that two-thirds of the class members were
California citizens when the complaint was filed.

Accordingly, because there is no dispute that the other elements
of the local controversy exception apply, Judge Bencivengo
ordered that the case be remanded to the state court.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2JUm8Lh from Leagle.com.

Reuben Calleros, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated in the State of California & Ralph Rubio,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated in
the State of California, Plaintiffs, represented by A. Mark Pope
-- pope@popeberger.com -- Pope, Berger, Williams & Reynolds, LLP,
Harvey C. Berger -- berger@popeberger.com -- Pope, Berger,
Williams & Reynolds, LLP & Sara Jayne Waller, Pope, Berger,
Williams & Reynolds, LLP. 401

Rural Metro of San Diego, Inc., Rural Metro Corporation, American
Medical Response, Inc. & Envision Healthcare Corporation,
Defendants, represented by Michael S. Kun -- mkun@ebglaw.com --
Epstein, Becker & Green, PC.


RXBAR: Faces Class Action Over Misleading Protein Bar Labels
------------------------------------------------------------
Emily Sortor, writing for Top Class Actions, reports that a class
action lawsuit claims that RXBAR protein bars' labels are
misleading and that the product is not as natural as it is
advertised to be.

Plaintiff Michael Pizzirusso says he purchased an RXBAR in New
York state, choosing the bar because the label indicated that the
product contained only natural ingredients and "no bad stuff."

Allegedly, the product's actual ingredients are not whole and
natural as advertised.

The RXBAR class action lawsuit claims that the Chicago Bar
Company, the makers of the RXBAR, intentionally misrepresents the
RXBAR as containing more natural ingredients to entice consumers
into buying the product.

Mr. Pizzirusso says he was financially injured by the Chicago Bar
Company because he would not have purchased the RXBAR, or would
not have paid as much for it, had he known that it was not all
natural as it was advertised.

He seeks damages for himself and for all similarly affected
consumers.

The RXBAR class action lawsuit states that both the RXBAR and the
RXBAR kids protein bars contain a vertical list of ingredients on
the front of the bar, and a statement that the bars contain "no
B.S." and "no bad stuff," respectively.

Mr. Pizziruso claims that based on the ingredient list and the
statement that the products contain no undesirable ingredients,
"the [Chicago Bar Company's] marketing message is built around
the promotion of 'real' ingredients and alludes to other
companies that 'hide' unfavorable or artificial ingredients deep
in their ingredient list on the back of the package."

The RXBAR protein bar class action lawsuit alleges that this
marketing implies that the bars contain no more and no less than
what is listed on the front of the package in the ingredient
list.  However, the RXBAR false advertising class action lawsuit
claims that this is not the case and that the ingredients are not
simply what is listed.

Mr. Pizziruso says that although the label states that the
product contains egg whites, the product only contains some egg
protein powder, not the entire egg white, as is implied by the
label.

He claims that a reasonable consumer would assume that a product
advertised to contain "3 egg whites," as the RXBARs are, would
contain three whole egg whites, not merely components and
proteins of egg whites.

Mr. Pizziruso says the company intentionally did not include the
wording "egg white protein powder" on the label because consumers
would not be attracted to that wording.

The RXBAR label class action lawsuit states that consumers are
more likely to buy "natural" and "wholesome" foods rather than
other foods, and the Chicago Bar Company knows this.

Allegedly, the company knew that consumers would be less likely
to see the wording "egg white protein powder" as compatible with
a "whole and natural" product and would be less likely to buy the
product.

Similarly, the Chicago Bar Company false advertising class action
lawsuit claims that though the bars advertise that they are "made
with real fruit," they contain apple juice concentrate.

Allegedly, the company intentionally omitted including the fact
that the bars are made with fruit juice concentrate because
concentrate is seen as less natural and desirable than fresh-
pressed juice.

Mr. Pizzaruso is represented by Joshua Levin-Epstein of Levin-
Epstein & Associates PC, and Spencer Sheehan of Sheehan &
Associates PC.

The RXBAR Misleading Label Class Action Lawsuit is Michael
Pizzirusso v. Chicago Bar Company LLC, Case 1:18-cv-03529, in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. [GN]


S&A UNIFIED: "Stalling" Files Request for Judicial Intervention
---------------------------------------------------------------
A request for judicial intervention was filed on May 10, 2018 in
the case docketed as Nicole Stallings, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. S & A
Unified Home Care, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 701420/2018 (N.Y.
Sup., January 29, 2018).

Stallings seeks maximum liquidated damages for late overtime
wages and non-overtime wages, spread-of-hours premium, recovery
of compensation for not receiving notices and statements, costs
and attorneys' fees pursuant to the New York Labor Law.

Defendant was engaged in business of providing home care services
where Stallings was employed as a home care worker. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Abdul K. Hassan, Esq.
     ABDUL HASSAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
     215-28 Hillside Avenue
     Queens Village, NY 11427
     Tel: (718) 740-1000
     Fax: (718) 355-9668
     Email: abdul@abdulhassan.com

S&A Unified Home Care, Inc. is represented by:

     COLE SCHOTZ PC
     1325 Avenue of the Americas
     New York, NY 10019
     Tel: (212) 752-8000


SANDIA CORP: Court Dismisses "Kennicott" Suit
---------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss state law claims in the
case captioned LISA A. KENNICOTT; LISA A. GARCIA and SUE C.
PHELPS, on behalf of themselves and a class of those similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. SANDIA CORPORATION, Defendant, No. CIV
17-0188 JB/GJF (D.N.M.).

Sandia Labs is a federally-funded research and development
contractor operating under contract for the Department of Energy.
Kennicott worked for Sandia Labs as a member of Technical Staff.
She returned to Sandia Labs in 1999 as a Senior Member of
Technical Staff, and, in 2005, was promoted to Principal Member
of Technical Staff.  She has a master's degree in computer
science from the University of New Mexico and a master's degree
from Harvard University.

The Plaintiffs allege that Sandia Labs violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2 (Title VII),
under the New Mexico Human Rights Act, N.M. Stat. Ann Section 28-
1-7(A) ("NMHRA"), and the New Mexico Fair Pay for Women Act, N.M.
Stat. Ann. Section 28-23-3(A) ("NMFPWA").  Specifically, they
allege that Sandia Labs discriminates against female employees in
performance evaluations, compensation, and promotions.

In its Motion, Sandia Labs contends that the federal enclave
doctrine bars the Plaintiffs' state-law claims. According to
Sandia Labs, Congress has exclusive authority over federal
enclaves, including Kirtland Air Force Base, where Sandia Labs is
located.  Sandia Labs notes that neither the NMHRA nor the NMFPWA
existed when Kirtland Air Force Base was established in 1954.
Accordingly, Sandia Labs contends, the Court should dismiss the
Plaintiffs' NMHRA and NMFPWA claims, because those statutes do
not apply on the Kirtland Air Force Base.

In the Response, the Plaintiffs assert that Sandia is not a
federal enclave for the class-wide, common policies at issue. The
Plaintiffs contend that federal enclave's application depends on
the locus of relevant decisions-making, where the employment
policies are practices were made.  The Plaintiffs argue that, at
this early stage, Plaintiffs understand that at least some of the
female employees covered by this lawsuit worked outside of
federal land, and that Sandia substantially conducted its common
human resources functions off-base.

The primary issues are: (i) whether the federal enclave doctrine
applies to state-law employment discrimination claims if the
employer makes allegedly discriminatory decisions off the
enclave; (ii) whether the federal enclave doctrine bars the
Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant under the NMHRA and the
NMFPWA; and (iii) whether Sandia Labs made the employment
decisions those claims on the Kirtland Air Force Base.

The Court concludes that: (i) the federal enclave doctrine
applies to state employment discrimination claims when a
plaintiff works on a federal enclave, no matter where the
employer makes the decisions underlying those claims; (ii) the
federal enclave doctrine bars the Plaintiffs' NMHRA and NMFPWA
claims, because the Plaintiffs worked on the Kirtland Air Force
Base, and those state statutes do not apply in that federal
enclave; and (iii) Sandia Labs has not established that it made
the employment decisions underlying the Plaintiffs' claims on
Kirtland Air Force Base, so if the Court were to decide -- which
it does not -- that the federal enclave doctrine applies only
when the challenged employment decisions are made on an enclave,
then the Plaintiffs' NMHRA and NMFPWA would survive the Motion.
Accordingly, the Court grants the Motion and dismisses the
Plaintiffs' NMHRA and NMFPWA claims with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 14, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yc56umm2 from
Leagle.com.

Lisa A. Kennicott, Lisa A. Garcia & Sue C. Phelps, on behalf of
themselves and a class of those similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Michael Ian Levin-Gesundheit -- mlevin@lchb.com --
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Shira J. Tevah --
stevah@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Adam
T. Klein, Outten & Golden LLP, pro hac vice, Anne Brackett Shaver
-- ashaver@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP,
Cheryl-Lyn Bentley, Outten & Golden LLP, pro hac vice, David
Lopez, Outten & Golden LLP, pro hac vice, Kelly Maureen Dermody -
- kdermody@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP,
Lin Yee Chan  -- kdermody@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP & Tiseme Gabriella Zegeye -- tzegeye@lchb.com --
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP.

Sandia Corporation, doing business as Sandia National
Laboratories, Defendant, represented by Scott D. Gordon --
sgordon@rodey.com -- Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.,
Grace E. Speights -- grace.speights@morganlewis.com -- Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey L. Lowry --
jllowry@rodey.com -- Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.,
Krissy A. Katzenstein -- krissy.katzenstein@morganlewis.com --
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, pro hac vice, Michael S. Burkhardt -
- michael.burkhardt@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
LLP, pro hac vice, Paola Viviana Jaime, Rodey, Dickason, Sloan,
Akin & Robb, P.A. & Theresa W. Parrish -- tparrish@rodey.com --
Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A..


SKYWEST INC: "Meek" Parties Directed to Confer on Schedule
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CODY MEEK, Plaintiff, v. SKYWEST, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-01012-JD (N.D. Cal.), Judge James
Donato of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California has entered an order regarding the Defendants' motion
to dismiss.

This is a wage-and-hour employment class action brought by Meek,
a former ramp agent at San Francisco International Airport,
against his former employers, Defendants SkyWest, Inc. and
SkyWest Airlines, Inc.  The Plaintiff's complaint asserts seven
legal claims against the Defendants on behalf of a "California
Frontline Employee Class" and two subclasses.  The Frontline
employees include ramp agents and other non-management employees
in SkyWest's customer service department.

The Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint under Rules
12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
raising 20 separate grounds for dismissal.

To cut through the brush, Judge Donato needs to determine whether
the parties were parties to a collective bargaining agreement
("CBA").  This question is central to most of the pending issues.
The Defendants argue, for example, that six of the Plaintiff's
seven claims are preempted by the Railway Labor Act because
resolution of those claims would require the Court to interpret
the parties' collective bargaining agreement.  Another of the
Defendants' arguments -- that the Plaintiff's shift trade theory
in Claim Three fails because he was exempt from overtime under
Wage Order 9 -- is also dependent on the existence of a
collective bargaining agreement.

The CBA determination turns on questions of fact that are ill-
suited to a motion to dismiss.  The Judge finds that the
Plaintiff's complaint attaches as an exhibit a document the
Plaintiff refers to as the "2014 Customer Service Policy Manual,"
and the complaint includes numerous assertions about why the
"Policy Manual is not a Collective Bargaining Agreement."  The
Defendants for their part simply refer to that same document as a
"CBA" in their motion to dismiss, and argue that the Plaintiff's
challenge to the CBA it has negotiated with SkyWest under the RLA
has already been considered and rejected in Blackwell v. SkyWest
Airlines, Inc.

The Judge finds that Blackwell does not establish that the 2014
Customer Service Policy Manual is a CBA.  That decision was
issued in December 2008, close to 10 years before the amended
complaint in the case was filed in June 2017, and the decision
references a "Standard Practices" document which on its face does
not sound identical to the "Customer Service Policy Manual" at
issue.  That kind of inquiry is not possible or appropriate on a
motion to dismiss brought under FRCP Rule 12.

Consequently, Judge Donato denied the Defendants' dismissal
arguments that are premised on the existence of a CBA between the
parties.  He also denied the remaining arguments that are not so
conditioned, without prejudice to renewal at a later stage, if
appropriate.  He says those arguments were presented in too
cursory a form for meaningful resolution, such as the Defendants'
barely-briefed argument that San Francisco's local minimum wage
ordinance should be struck down as preempted by federal law, or
are otherwise not efficiently addressed at this stage of the
case.

To move forward, the parties are directed by the Judge to meet
and confer on a schedule for summary judgment proceedings on the
existence of a CBA, and agreements on discovery that is targeted
to the CBA issue.  The parties should file a proposed schedule by
June 15, 2018.  The parties are advised that duplicative cross-
motions will not be accepted.  The Court will look to the parties
in the first instance to agree upon an approach that avoids the
problem.  If they can't come up with one, the Court will order an
approach.

As a dual track to the course of action, the Judge referred the
case to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth D. Laporte for a settlement
conference.  Judge Laporte will set the schedule for the
conference.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2t9s7Bk from Leagle.com.

Cody Meek, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Crystal Gayle Foley --
cfoley@simmonsfirm.com -- Simmons Hanly Conroy, Adam A. Edwards -
- adam@gregcolemanlaw.com -- Greg Coleman Law PC, pro hac vice,
Gregory F. Coleman -- greg@gregcolemanlaw.com -- Greg Coleman Law
PC, Lisa A. White -- lisa@gregcolemanlaw.com -- Greg Coleman Law
PC, pro hac vice, Mark E. Silvey, Greg Coleman Law PC, pro hac
vice, Mitchell M. Breit -- mbreit@simmonsfirm.com -- SIMMONS
HANLY CONROY, LLC, pro hac vice & Paul J. Hanly, Jr. --
phanly@simmonsfirm.com -- Simmons Hanly Conry LLC, pro hac vice.

Skywest, Inc. & Skywest Airlines, Inc, Defendants, represented by
Amanda C. Sommerfeld -- asommerfeld@jonesday.com -- Jones Day,
Kelsey Israel-Trummel -- kitrummel@jonesday.com -- Jones Day &
Patricia Task Stambelos -- patricia@patriciastambelos.com --
SkyWest Airlines, Inc..


SP PLUS: 7th Cir. Vacates Dismissal of "Collier" FACTA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, vacated the
judgment granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case
captioned KATHRYN G. COLLIER AND BENJAMIN M. SEITZ, individually
and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-
Appellants, v. SP PLUS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee, No. 17-
2431 (7th Cir.).

SP Plus operates public parking facilities at Dayton
International Airport and is headquartered in Chicago. Collier
and Seitz allege that they used these parking lots in 2015 and
received receipts that included the expiration date of their
credit or debit cards. Printing that information, they say,
violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act (FACTA).

The district court denied the motion to remand because FACTA is a
federal statute, so the case "arises under federal law" and the
court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331. The court
then analyzed the standing question. Collier and Seitz had failed
to allege an actual harm, the court stated, because they did not
support their request for actual damages with factual
allegations.

Relying on Spokeo, Inc., v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540 (2016), and
Meyers v. Nicolet Restaurant of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724 (7th
Cir. 2016), the court determined that Collier and Seitz could not
establish standing by stating only that the defendant had
violated statutory requirements. Thus, the court reasoned,
Collier and Seitz had not established subject matter
jurisdiction.  The court granted Collier and Seitz leave to amend
their complaint. When they did not, the court dismissed the case
with prejudice.

As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, SP Plus had to
establish that all elements of jurisdiction including Article III
standing existed at the time of removal.

Here, it is clear that Collier and Seitz's complaint did not
sufficiently allege an actual injury. A mere reference to actual
damages in the complaint's prayer for relief does not establish
Article III standing. The single reference here falls far short
of an allegation that the plaintiffs suffered a concrete harm or
appreciable risk of harm apart from the statutory violation.
Thus, Section 1447(c) required the district court to remand this
case to state court, because it does not satisfy Article III's
requirements.

Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit vacates the judgment and remands
with instructions to return the action to state court.

A full-text copy of the Seventh Circuit's May 14, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybbl8brq from Leagle.com.

Robert James Pavich, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Steven H. Gistenson -- sgistenson@dykema.com -- for Defendant-
Appellee.

Micah M. Siegal for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Mary E. Lentz -- slentz@goodmanallen.com -- for Plaintiff-
Appellant.


TAMKO BUILDING: Court Denies Certification of "Disher" Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RICHARD DISHER, ERIC KLINE, JOHN O'MALLEY and
DIMITRI MISHUROV, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TAMKO BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 14-CV-740-SMY-SCW (S.D. Ill.), Judge Staci M.
Yandle of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois granted the Defendant's Motion for Order Denying Class
Certification as Moot.

The named Plaintiffs filed the putative class action against
Tamko, alleging product defect, breach of warranty, negligence,
and fraud claims.  They Plaintiffs own homes or other structures
in Illinois, Kentucky, and Colorado on which Tamko's shingles are
or have been installed.

The Plaintiffs alleged that based on Tamko's representations,
they purchased the shingles with the expectation that they would
last for at least 30 years.  They also alleged that the shingles
failed long before 30 years due to certain design flaws that
cause them to crack, curl, blister, de-granulate, deteriorate and
cause damage to the underlying structure.  They asserted that
with knowledge of these design flaws, Tamko sold and continues to
sell the shingles and to make false representations and
warranties with respect to them.

Tamko moved to dismiss each of the Plaintiff's claims, and on
July 31, 2015, the Court granted in part and denied in part
Tamko's motions.  Specifically, it denied Tamko's motion to
dismiss Disher's strict liability, negligence, breach of express
warranty, unjust enrichment, and Illinois Consumer Fraud Act
claims; denied Tamko's motion to dismiss O'Malley's strict
liability, negligence, fraudulent concealment and unjust
enrichment claims; and denied Tamko's motion to dismiss Kline's
strict liability, negligence, fraudulent concealment, Colorado
Products Liability Act and breach of express warranty claims.
Tamko also moved to compel arbitration of Plaintiff Kline's
claims, which the Court granted.

In August 2015 and April 2016, Tamko filed motions for summary
judgment on the Plaintiffs' remaining claims.  The Plaintiffs
moved for class certification in July 2016.  On Feb. 15, 2018,
the Court entered orders granting Tamko's motion for summary
judgment as to Disher in its entirety and granting in part
Tamko's motion for summary judgment as to O'Malley's claims;
leaving only his strict liability and negligence claims.  The
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification remains pending.
Tamko now moves the Court to deny that Motion as moot.

Judge Yandle finds that there is currently no Plaintiff with a
"live claim" who can pursue the litigation.  All claims on which
the Plaintiffs sought class certification have been dismissed,
referred to arbitration or denied as a matter of law.  Given that
Disher, Kline, and O'Malley's class-action claims have been
dismissed, they can no longer be the class representatives.
Thus, the question of class-certification is irrelevant at this
juncture.

For these reasons, the Judge granted Tamko's Motion for Order
Denying Class Certification as Moot.  He denied without prejudice
the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class to the Class Counsel
naming a new proposed class representative by June 18, 2018.  The
pending motions to exclude and/or Daubert motions submitted in
relation to the class certification briefing are denied as moot
and without prejudice.  Said motions may be renewed, if
necessary, if a new class representative moves for the class
certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://bit.ly/2t8zoBE from Leagle.com.

Richard Disher, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Eric Kline, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated & John O'Malley, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Amy E.
Boyle -- boyle@halunenlaw.com -- Halunen Law, John J. Driscoll --
john@thedriscollfirm.com -- Driscoll Firm, P.C., Brendan Thompson
-- brendant@cuneolaw.com -- Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca LLP, Charles
J. LaDuca -- charlesl@cuneolaw.com -- Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca LLP,
Christopher J. Quinn, Driscoll Firm, P.C., Melissa S. Weiner --
weiner@halunenlaw.com -- Halunen Law, Michael J. Flannery --
mflannery@cuneolaw.com -- Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca LLP, Rebecca A.
Peterson -- rapeterson@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen,
PLLP, pro hac vice, Robert K. Shelquist --
rkshelquist@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP, S.
Clinton Woods, Audet & Partners LLP & William M. Audet, Audet &
Partners LLP.

Tamko Building Products, Inc. & Tamko Roofing Products, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by David H. Luce -- dluce@bbdlc.com --
Carmody, MacDonald et al., Jessica Miller --
jessica.miller@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, et al., Richard T
Bernardo -- richard.bernardo@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps et al.,
Adam Tubbs -- adam.tubbs@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps et al.,
David P. Stoeberl -- dps@carmodymacdonald.com -- Carmody
MacDonald PC, John H. Beisner -- john.beisner@skadden.com --
Skadden, Arps, et al., John Daniel McAnnar, Carmody MacDonald PC,
Laura Bailey Brown, Carmody MacDonald PC & Thomas E. Fox --
thomas.fox@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps et al..


TARGET CORP: Ct. Rejects Data Breach Class Suit Payout Objection
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sara E. Teller, writing for Legal Reader, reports that on 2013, a
historic and horrendous data breach at Target left millions of
consumers terrified that their personal information ended up in
the wrong hands.  A multi-state investigation quickly ensued and
found that hackers had accessed the popular retailer's gateway
server through credentials stolen from a third-party.  Target
eventually settled claims issued by 47 states and the District of
Columbia for nearly $17 million, but the terms of the agreement
were met with objection.

In total, Target reported hackers stole data from up to 40
million credit and debit cards of shoppers who had visited its
stores during the 2013 holiday season.  The retailer also
indicated the total cost of the data breach totaled roughly $202
million.

The settlement agreement, which provided for a $10 million fund
for customers and $6.75 million for plaintiffs' attorneys was
approved in November 2016.  Under its terms, Target was required
to adopt advanced safety measures to secure customer information
such as employing an executive to oversee a comprehensive
information security program as well as advise its chief
executive and board.  The company was also required to hire an
independent, qualified third party to conduct a comprehensive
security assessment and encrypt card information in order to make
it useless if stolen.  Class members with documented losses were
scheduled to be compensated from the fund first, and the
remainder of the funds were to be distributed among class members
with undocumented losses.

Objector Lief Olson had argued the named class members should not
have been allowed to represent those like him who suffered no
losses in the matter.  The district court reconsidered his claims
after the Eighth Circuit in February 2017 and ordered it to
conduct a more rigorous analysis of class certification.

"Over 99 percent of the Target data breach class gets nothing in
this multimillion-dollar settlement, so we are glad that the
Eighth Circuit recognizes that the District Court cannot
rubber-stamp settlements where class counsel cuts corners on
procedural fairness, so they can get paid quickly and
generously," objector counsel Melissa Holyoak of the Center for
Class Action Fairness in Washington said.

Ultimately, the court rejected Mr. Olson's challenge that the
named plaintiffs weren't adequate representatives for the whole
class because they received compensation while others didn't.
This time around the Eighth Circuit was satisfied with the
court's conflicts analysis.  It also rejected objector Jim
Sciaroni's argument that 29 percent of the total fund was an
excessive fee award for class counsel.

"All class members had the ability to register for credit
monitoring, and all of the compromised payment cards undoubtedly
were canceled and replaced by the issuing banks," Judge Bobby E.
Shepherd, nominated to this post by former Presidents George W.
Bush, wrote for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
"Any risk of future harm is therefore entirely speculative," the
court added.

Vincent J. Esades of Heins Mills & Olson P.L.C. in Minneapolis
argued for the class.  Melissa Ann Holyoak of the Competitive
Enterprise Institute Center for Class Action Fairness argued for
the objection issuers.

The decision regarding the objection doesn't affect a separate
$39 million class settlement between Target and banks over losses
from the breach, which was approved in May 2016. [GN]


TD BANK: Added as Defendants in Price-Fixing Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
Anita Balakrishnan, writing for Law Times, reports that entities
related to TD Bank and BMO will be added as parties to a class
action suit against major banks, after Ontario's Court of Appeal
overturned a lower court's decision.

The case, Mancinelli v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2018 ONCA 544, is
the latest twist in a series of legal actions across the world
involving secretive chat messages, allegedly between bankers in
the foreign exchange markets.

The appeal decision explored what steps a representative
plaintiff could reasonably take to establish that the Canadian
banks could be co-conspirators in the secretive price-fixing
scheme in the foreign exchange markets.

"I think the takeaway point from this case is that the bar for
showing diligence in terms of adding defendants is pretty low,
and that's particularly the case in conspiracy claims or when the
defendants have taken steps to conceal [their involvement]," says
Simon Bieber -- sbieber@AGBLLP.com -- partner at Adair Goldblatt
Bieber LLP.

In December, Justice Paul Perell of the Superior Court of Justice
acknowledged that there was no evidence of public documents tying
TD and BMO to the alleged conspiracy.  Justice Perell reasoned
that the plaintiff should have taken steps to conduct a
meaningful investigation to identify TD and BMO as co-
conspirators.  The appeals judge, Associate Chief Justice
Alexandra Hoy, found that the motion judge had "too high an
evidentiary threshold."

"The decision of the Court of Appeal restores the proper
balance," says Kirk Baert, partner at Koskie Minsky LLP, which
represented the plaintiffs.

Mr. Baert says the standard set by Justice Perell was "especially
hard to meet in price-fixing cases, which necessarily involve
secret conduct."

The case, which involves more than a dozen financial
institutions, alleges that banks "took active steps to conceal
their participation" in a scheme to fix prices in the foreign
exchange market between Jan. 1, 2003 and Dec. 31, 2013.

A group of entities related to UBS bank had already settled when,
in July 2016, appellant Christopher Staines tried to add more
institutions to the case.

Mr. Staines' grounds were that UBS said that FX traders at TD and
BMO were among participants in a conversation with more than
2,000 "collusive chats," according to the appeal.

In most Ontario cases, including this one, an action must be
started on or before the second anniversary of the day on which
the claim was discovered, said Mr. Hoy, who wrote the appeal
decision.

The claim would have been statute-barred if they discovered it
before July 20, 2014.

The motion judge questioned whether TD and BMO's identities could
have been established if a meaningful investigation had taken
place before time ran out, even with the late additions from UBS.

Nonetheless, the plaintiff's explanations should be given a
"generous reading," Mr. Hoy wrote, citing Wakelin v. Gourley.

Context must be considered when assessing whether a plaintiff did
"reasonable diligence" to find evidence, Mr. Hoy said.

The fundamental issue the court was grappling with in this appeal
was the meaning of "exercising due diligence" to discover a
potential claim, says Margaret Waddell, founding partner of
Waddell Phillips Barristers.

"The error of the motions judge was in holding class counsel to
an unreasonably high standard -- effectively expecting them to
function like a regulatory investigator, and expecting them to
take extraordinary steps," Ms. Waddell says.

Given the appeal decision to add TD and BMO as parties, despite
the time limit, the plaintiffs can go on to conduct discovery and
dig further into the identities of alleged participants in the
conspiracy, said W. Fraser McDonald, partner at Allen McDonald
Swartz LLP.

The entities affected by the appeal will be Toronto Dominion
Bank, TD Securities, TD Bank USA, NA, T.D. Group Holdings, TD
Bank N.A., Bank of Montreal, BMO Financial Corp., BMO Harris Bank
N.A. and BMO Capital Markets Limited.  TD declined to comment,
and BMO did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

"The banks themselves conceded that even reasonable diligence on
the part of the plaintiffs might not have led to the conclusion
that the banks were co-conspirators.

This was a key point in the end as the Court of Appeal held that
the plaintiffs can add TD and BMO to the list of defendants (and
that the plaintiffs be entitled to costs as well)," says
Anita Anand, a professor at the University of Toronto Faculty of
Law.

According to Koskie Minsky, settlements of more than $100 million
have already been reached with UBS, BNP, Bank of America, The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Citigroup Inc.,
Barclays Bank PLC, HSBC Holdings PLC, Royal Bank of Scotland
Group PLC, Standard Chartered PLC, The Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi
UFJ, Ltd. and Societe Generale S.A. Settlements are not an
admission of fault.

Class action proceedings involving foreign and domestic firms
that operate in Canada have been on the rise, particularly in
parallel to U.S. cases.

Lowering the threshold of evidence to add defendants and pushing
diligence later into the process -- as the appeal judge suggested
in this case -- might not be the most just and expeditious way to
resolve class action conflicts given the influx of class action
suits, says competition litigator Nikiforos Iatrou.

"My read on this case is that it aligns with a trend -- with an
unfortunate trend -- of consistently lowering the bar for
plaintiffs' lawyers in these kinds of class actions," Mr. Iatrou
says.

Alyssa Tomkins, partner at Caza Saikaley LLP, acknowledges that
it can be frustrating for practitioners when there's less rigour
early in the process, potentially stretching out the suit and
piling on expenses for clients.

But, she says, in this case, there is context around the
particular appeal decision that extends beyond the trends within
class action law.

"I would say the appeal appears correct.  There is the reality of
a representative plaintiff . . . to impose that level of burden
on them would appear to be excessive," Ms. Tomkins says. [GN]


TESLA MOTORS: "Rodriguez" Sues Over Missed Breaks, No Paystubs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jorge Rodriguez, on behalf of herself, all others similarly
situated, and on behalf of the general public, Plaintiff, v.
Tesla Motors, Inc. and Does 1-100, Case No. RG18904409 (Cal.
Super., May 10, 2018), seeks unpaid wages including overtime,
meal and rest period compensation, final pay, penalties, redress
for failure to maintain required records and furnish accurate
itemized wage statements, injunctive and other equitable relief
and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the
California Labor Code and the applicable Welfare Commission
Orders.

Tesla is an electric car manufacturer --
https://www.tesla.com/about -- operating from its Fremont factory
in California where Rodriguez was employed as a non-exempt
factory staff. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Matthew J. Matern, Esq.
      Joshua D. Boxer, Esq.
      MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
      1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200
      Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
      Telephone: (310) 531-1900
      Facsimile: (310) 531-1901
      Email: mmatern@maternlawgroup.com

             - and -

      Corey B. Bennett, Esq.
      MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
      One Market Street, Suite 3676
      San Francisco, CA 94105
      Telephone: (415) 990-8390
      Facsimile: (310) 531-1901


TEVA PHARMA: "Baker" SEC Suit Transferred to Conn.
--------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Barry Baker, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Teva Pharmaceutical
Industries Ltd., Erez Vigodman, Eyal Desheh and Yitzhak
Peterburg, Defendants., Case No. 17-cv-03902, (E.D. Pa., August
30, 2017), was transferred to the U.S. District Court of
Connecticut on May 10, 2018, under Case No. 18-cv-00798.

Baker seeks damages, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as
well as reasonable attorneys' fees, expert fees and other costs
and such other and further relief under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934.

The complaint says Defendants failed to disclose the negative
impact resulting from the acquisition and integration of Actavis
Generics on Teva's financial results and business prospects. Teva
announced lower than anticipated second quarter results due to
the performance of its US generics business. It recorded a
goodwill impairment charge of $6.1 billion in the second quarter
of 2017 related to the Company's acquisition of Actavis. Teva's
US generics business suffered accelerated price erosion and
delays in product launches. Teva shares dropped from closing
prices of 111.30 per common share and $31.25 per American
Depository Share (ADS) on August 2, 2017 to a new 52-week low
closing price of 71.28 per common share on August 6, 2017 and
$20.60 per ADS on August 4, 2017, on heavy two-day trading
volume.

Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business at 1090 Horsham Road, North Wales,
Pennsylvania 19454. Actavis Elizabeth, LLC is a Delaware limited
liability company with its principal place of business at 200
Elmora Ave., Elizabeth, NJ 07207. Actavis was acquired by Teva in
2016.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Keith R. Lorenze, Esq.
      Jacob A. Goldberg, Esq.
      THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
      101 Greenwood Avenue, Suite 440
      Jenkintown, PA 19046
      Tel: (215) 600-2817
      Fax: (212) 202-3827
      Email: klorenze@rosenlegal.com
             jgoldberg@rosenlegal.com

             - and -

      Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
      BRONSTEIN, GEWIRTZ & GROSSMAN, LLC
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4600
      New York, New York 10165
      Tel: (212) 697-6484


TJX COS: Ct. Grants Final Approval of "Chester" Class Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Class
Action Settlement in the case captioned STACI CHESTER, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. THE TJX COMPANIES, INC., et al., Defendants, No.
EDCV 15-01437 ODW (DTBx) (C.D. Cal.).

The Parties' Settlement Agreement is granted final approval as it
meets the criteria for final settlement approval. The Settlement
falls within the range of possible approval as fair, adequate,
and reasonable, and appears to be the product of arm's-length and
informed negotiation and to treat all Class Members fairly.

Class Counsel is awarded $2,125,000, as attorneys' fees, and
$35,497.97 as costs, pursuant to the terms set forth in the SA.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 14, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yaxqywfv from Leagle.com.

Staci Chester, an individual & Daniel Friedman, an individual;
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher J. Morosoff --
cjmorosoff@morosofflaw.com -- Law Offices of Christopher J
Morosoff, Douglas Caiafa -- dcaiafa@caiafalaw.com -- Douglas
Caiafa APLC, Michael G. Dawson, Law Offices of Herbert Hafif &
Greg K. Hafif -- ghafif@hafif.com -- Law Offices of Herbert
Hafif.
Robin Berkoff & Theresa Metoyer, Consol Plaintiffs, represented
by Christopher J. Morosoff, Law Offices of Christopher J
Morosoff, Douglas Caiafa, Douglas Caiafa APLC, Michael G. Dawson,
Law Offices of Herbert Hafif & Greg K. Hafif, Law Offices of
Herbert Hafif.

Steven Helfand, Objector, Movant, pro se.

The TJX Companies, Inc., a Delaware corporation & TJ Maxx of CA,
LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendants,
represented by Aliki Sofis -- alikisofis@quinnemanuel.com --
Ropes and Gray LLP, pro hac vice, Anne Johnson Palmer
Anne.JohnsonPalmer@ropesgray.com -- Ropes and Gray LLP, Benjamin
O. Aigboboh -- baigboboh@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin
Richter and Hampton LLP, Jay T. Ramsey --
jramsey@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter and Hampton
LLP, John P. Bueker -- John.Bueker@ropesgray.com --  Ropes and
Gray LLP, pro hac vice & P. Craig Cardon --
ccardon@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richier & Hampton
LLP.

Marshalls of CA, LLC & Homegoods, Inc., Consol Defendants,
represented by Aliki Sofis, Ropes and Gray LLP, pro hac vice,
Anne Johnson Palmer, Ropes and Gray LLP, Benjamin O. Aigboboh,
Sheppard Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP, Jay T. Ramsey, Sheppard
Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP & P. Craig Cardon, Sheppard Mullin
Richier & Hampton LLP.

Rhadiante Van de Voorde, Objector, represented by Caroline V.
Tucker -- ctucker@tuckerpollard.com -- Tucker Pollard.
Barbara S. Cochran, Objector, pro se.


TRAVELERS HOME: Wins Summary Ruling on Individual Claims
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KYLE STECHERT and MARIE STECHERT, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, v. THE TRAVELERS
HOME AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, THE TRAVELERS COMPANIES, INC.,
TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANIES and TRAVELERS INDEMNITY
COMPANY, Civil Action No. 17-CV-784 (E.D. Pa.), Judge J. Curtis
Joyner of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
on the individual claims of the Plaintiffs Stecherts.

The instant action has its origins in an automobile accident
which occurred on Jan. 23, 2015 when the 2014 Chevrolet Equinox
which Plaintiff Marie Stechert was driving was struck by another
vehicle when it turned left directly into Mrs. Stechert's path of
travel, pushing her off the road into a utility pole.  As a
result of this accident, Mrs. Stechert and her two small children
were injured and their car had to be towed away.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Stechert contacted his insurance agent at
the Univest Insurance Agency in Lansdale, PA to notify them of
the accident and the agent then turned the matter over to the
Stecherts' automobile insurance carrier, Travelers Home and
Marine Insurance Company.  Under their Travelers policy, the
Plaintiffs had an extended transportation expense ("ETE") benefit
which afforded them the ability to secure a rental vehicle at the
maximum rate of $30 per day up to a total of $900, or for a
period not to exceed 30 days.

After receiving notification of the accident, a Travelers
representative arranged for a five-day rental car reservation for
the Plaintiffs through Enterprise Rent-A-Car.  Thus, following
discharge of Mrs. Stechert and the children from the hospital
emergency room later that afternoon, Mr. and Mrs. Stechert
obtained a rental car from Enterprise.  The Plaintiffs however,
required a larger car than what was available for $30 per day,
and therefore they personally paid the overage of $11.49 daily
for the vehicle they rented.

A few days after the accident, Travelers sent an appraiser to
Souderton Auto Body in Souderton, Pennsylvania to examine the
damaged Equinox.  On Jan. 27, 2015, that appraiser, Brian Killen,
determined the vehicle to have been a total loss.  On that same
date, Mr. Killen sent a form "Rental Reimbursement/Loss of Use
Notice" to Mr. Stechert which, in addition to notifying him that
the vehicle had been deemed a "Total Loss."

Notwithstanding the notice, the Plaintiffs did not return their
rental vehicle within five days.  Rather, it took until Feb. 6,
2015 for Travelers to determine, in consultation with the leasing
company which owned the Equinox, that its value was $19,752.60.
The Plaintiffs disagreed with that assessment and requested an
extension on the rental car.

Travelers granted the extension to Feb. 13, 2015 and told them to
submit comparable values for consideration.  Although Travelers
had been in discussions with Ally Bank (the lienholder on the
Stecherts' vehicle) about Ally sending a letter of guarantee,
this issue was not resolved until after Feb. 13, 2015.

By the action, the Plaintiffs assert that in sending them the
Rental/Reimbursement/Loss of Use Notice with the language
limiting the rental to five days from the date the total loss
determination is made, Travelers breached its contract with them
insofar as their policy did not contain such a limitation.  They
also submit that the policy was further breached by Travelers'
failure to make a determination as to what period of time was
reasonably required to repair or replace their vehicle.  In
addition to seeking monetary damages for breach of contract, the
Plaintiffs also allege that the Defendants acted in bad faith and
in violation of 42 Pa. C. S. Section 8371 thereby entitling them
to further compensatory and punitive damages as well as
declaratory and equitable/injunctive relief.

Further, the Plaintiffs seek to represent a class consisting of
all persons, since at least six years prior to the filing of this
Complaint, who have been policyholders of automobile insurance
policies sold in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by the
Defendants (and/or their subsidiaries, affiliates and/or related
entities) that have provided Extended Transportation Expense
Coverage, who have made a claim to the Defendants for Extended
Transportation Expense Coverage as a result of a total loss of a
vehicle damaged in a covered accident, and as to whom Defendants
have limited the amount of time such coverage is provided to a
period of time less than 30 days.

In the Court's Order of Nov. 8, 2017, it Court granted the
Defendants' Motion to Stay Class Certification or for Protective
Order and prohibited the taking of discovery relative to the
class and the issue of class certification until after such time
as we issued a decision on summary judgment motions on the
Plaintiffs' individual claims.

On Jan. 17, 2018, the Defendants timely filed the motion for
summary judgment.  Their motion is essentially premised on the
argument that since the Plaintiffs received the ETE benefits to
which they were entitled, the Defendants are entitled to the
entry of judgment in their favor as a matter of law and the
Plaintiffs are therefore not the proper class representatives.

Judge Joyner does not find that the Defendants' actions and mis-
communications rose to the level of a breach of contract.
Additionally, he finds that the Plaintiffs have not met their
burden of proving damages.  To be sure, the only evidence on this
point is Mr. Stechert's testimony that: (1) the replacement 2012
Equinox turned out to be a "total lemon" which they wouldn't have
settled for had he received Ms. Hamra's voicemail informing him
that the rental had been extended; and (2) that their monthly
payment increased from the $132/month which they were paying to
lease the 2014 vehicle to $246.91/month to purchase the 2012
vehicle.  Given the dearth of evidence on what other vehicles may
have been available to the Plaintiffs between February 13 and
February 21 and at what cost, the Judge is left to speculate as
to what damages the Plaintiffs may or may not have suffered as a
consequence of turning in the rental on February 13th.  He
therefore finds that summary judgment is properly granted in
favor of the Defendants on Count I of the Plaintiffs' Complaint.

The evidentiary record also does not support the Plaintiffs'
claim that Travelers denied them the ETE benefits to which they
were entitled under their policy.  For this reason, the only
conclusion which the Judge can now reach is that the Defendants
did not act in bad faith within the meaning of Section 8371 and
that judgment is properly entered in their favor as a matter of
law as to Count II in its entirety.

As to Counts III and IV of the Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Judge
cannot find any basis upon which to grant either declaratory or
equitable/injunctive relief.  For one, the Plaintiffs have not
shown actual success on the merits of their claims and as a
consequence, their claim for issuance of a permanent injunction
fails.  As to the issuance of declaratory relief, the Judge
agrees with the Plaintiffs that it logically follows from the
policy language outlining the ETE benefit that a determination of
the amount of time insureds reasonably require to replace their
vehicles must be made prior to terminating and/or limiting ETE
benefits.  This fact notwithstanding, he cannot find that the
Defendants necessarily breached the policy by issuing the Rental
Letter in the absence of a showing that the Plaintiffs were not
afforded the benefits to which they were due under the policy.
For these reasons, he will grant judgment in favor of the
Defendants on Counts III and IV of the Complaint as well.

For these reasons, Judge Joyner granted the Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment on the individual claims of the Plaintiffs
Stecherts.  An Order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 15, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/VLYR63 from Leagle.com.

KYLE STECHERT & MARIE STECHERT, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, represented by ANDREW P.
BELL -- abell@lockslaw.com -- LOCKS LAW FIRM PLLC, RICHARD M.
OCHROCH -- aochroch@ochroch-law.com -- OCHROCH & ASSOC., P.C. &
MARC P. WEINGARTEN -- mweingarten@lockslaw.com -- LOCKS LAW FIRM.

THE TRAVELERS HOME AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, THE TRAVELERS
COMPANIES, INC., TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANIES &
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, Defendants, represented by VLADA
TASICH -- vxtasich@mdwcg.com -- MARSHALL DENNEHEY WARNER COLEMAN
& GOGGIN & BROOKS FOLAND -- BRFoland@mdwcg.com -- Marshall
Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin.


TRANSNATIONAL FOODS: "Lejbman" Suit Dismissed
---------------------------------------------
Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California granted the Defendants' motions
to dismiss the case, VIVIAN LEJBMAN individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TRANSNATIONAL FOODS,
INC., a Florida corporation, et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-
1317-CAB-MDD (S.D. Cal.).

On June 27, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a consumer protection class
action complaint against Transnational and Conservas Cerqueira,
S.A., seeking damages and equitable relief for the alleged false
representations and omissions regarding the Defendants'
marketing, advertising, labeling, packaging, distributing and
selling of the Pampa Octopus products.  The complaint alleged
violations of California's False Advertising Law; the Unfair
Competition Law; California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act;
negligent misrepresentation; and intentional misrepresentation.
The complaint alleged the Court had jurisdiction pursuant to the
Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").

On Dec. 1, 2017, the Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint
("FAC").  The FAC asserted similar claims against the Defendants
concerning the three of the Pampa Octopus Products.  The
Plaintiff sought to represent a nationwide class consisting of
all person in the United States who have purchased the Product
for personal use and not for resale, from the period of four-
years prior to the date of filing this Complaint, up to an
including the date that Notice has been provided to the Class.
In the alternative, she sought to represent all persons in the
State of California who have purchased the product.

On Dec. 15, 2017, the Defendants each moved to dismiss the
Plaintiff's FAC.  On March 12, 2018, the Court granted in part
and denied in part the motions to dismiss.  The Plaintiff was
given leave to amend the claim brought on behalf of the
nationwide class, but was cautioned that if she chose to do so
she would need to demonstrate the threshold requirement that
California had significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts to the claims of each class member.  The Plaintiff was
also ordered to show cause, if she chose not amend to restate the
nationwide class claims, why the action should not be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Specifically, she was
directed to provide the Court with evidence that $5 million is in
controversy based on the remaining California class claims.

On March 19, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of her intention
to file an amended complaint addressing the standing issue
related to the claims brought on behalf of the nationwide class.
On April 2, 2018, she filed the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC").
The SAC asserts the same causes of action as the FAC and seeks to
represent a class consisting of all persons in the State of
California who have purchased the Produce for personal use and
not for resale, from the period extending four-years prior to the
date of filing this Complaint, up to and including the date that
Notice has been provided to the Class.

Noticeably absent from the complaint are any allegations related
to claims being made on behalf of a nationwide class.  Like its
predecessors, the SAC states that the Court has jurisdiction
because it is a class action arising under CAFA and the Plaintiff
has alleged that the total claims of the individual members of
the Plaintiff class in this action are in excess of $5 million,
in the aggregate, exclusive of interests and costs, diversity of
citizenship exists under CAFA because the Plaintiff is a citizen
of the State of California and the Defendants can be considered
citizens of States other than California.

On April 16, 2018, the Defendants each moved to dismiss the
Plaintiff's SAC on jurisdictional grounds under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).  On May 8, 2018, the Plaintiff filed
her response in opposition along with a redline copy of the SAC.
On May 14, 2018, the replies were filed.

Judge Bencivengo finds that the Plaintiff has submitted no
evidence that CAFA's amount in controversy requirement has been
met.  Not only did the Plaintiff fail to produce evidence in
response to the Court's order to show regarding the amount in
controversy, the SAC simply contains the conclusory allegation
that the total claims of the individual members of the Plaintiff
Class in the action are in excess of $5 million.  The Plaintiff's
response in opposition fairs little better.  A passing reference
to unspecified, possible damages that could potentially be
available to an indeterminate number of class members under the
CLRA and UCL is not evidence upon which the Court's determination
can rest.  Similarly, the Plaintiff's suggestion that Mr.
Iribarne's declaration is not helpful or reliable in figuring out
the aggregate amount in controversy and does not represent the
total amount, is unsupported by any evidence and is of little use
to the Court.

Having twice afforded the Plaintiff the opportunity to prove that
the amount in controversy here meets the $5 million CAFA
threshold, and having twice failed, the Judge has determined that
the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
case.

Lacking subject matter jurisdiction over the case, Judge
Bencivengo granted the Defendants' motions to dismiss.
Accordingly, he dismissed without prejudice to re-filing in state
court the Plaintiff's individual claims and the ones she asserts
on behalf of the California class.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 15, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/Du2W13 from Leagle.com.

Vivian Lejbman, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin Michael
Lopatin -- BLopatin@ELPLawyers.com -- Eggnatz, Lopatin &
Pascucci, LLP.

Transnational Foods, Inc., a Florida corporation, Defendant,
represented by Christopher W. Wasson -- wassonc@pepperlaw.com --
Pepper Hamilton LLP, pro hac vice, Katrina M. Long --
longk@pepperlaw.com -- Pepper Hamilton LLP, pro hac vice, Tambry
Lynette Bradford -- bradfordt@pepperlaw.com -- Pepper Hamilton
LLP & Yvonne M. McKenzie -- mckenziey@pepperlaw.com -- Pepper
Hamilton LLP, pro hac vice.

Conservas Cerqueira, S.A., a foreign corporation, Defendant,
represented by Clayton J. Hix -- chix@hillfarrer.com -- Hill,
Farrer & Burrill, LLP & William A. White -- wwhite@hillfarrer.com
-- Hill Farrer and Burrill LLP.


UNITED COUNTY: Grayson County Considers Joining Tax Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
HeraldDemocrat.com reports that Grayson County Commissioners were
scheduled discuss the possibility of the county joining a class
action lawsuit aimed at getting the county money from the federal
government on June 26.  The commissioners' meeting will start at
10 a.m. at the Grayson County Courthouse in Sherman.

The lawsuit to be discussed says the U.S. government underpaid
some states and counties for payment in lieu of tax payments on
federal land for which the county can't collect taxes.  Kane
County in Utah filed a lawsuit in the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims to recover its own underpayments and a judge certified the
case as a class action suit.  A quick look on a federal website
for the U.S. Department of the Interior shows Grayson County was
paid $146,764 on 57,604 acres in 2015, $148,016 on 57,047 in 2016
and $151,290 on 57,059 acres in 2017.  There was nothing in the
court's agenda packet that said how much more the county thinks
it should have been paid. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Rights Activist Group Sue Over Family Separation
---------------------------------------------------------------
Gene Johnson, writing for The Associated Press, reports that
immigrant rights activists in Seattle sued the Trump
administration on June 25, saying it is unnecessarily prolonging
the separation of asylum-seeking immigrants from their children.

The Northwest Immigrant Rights Project filed the lawsuit on
June 25 in U.S. District Court in Seattle on behalf of three
Central American women held in federal custody in Washington
state, thousands of miles from where immigration officials have
transferred their children.  The lawsuit seeks class-action
status on behalf of dozens of other immigrants separated from
their children and detained in Washington state.

The organization says U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
has provided no information about whether or when the detainees'
asylum cases will move forward or when they'll be reunited with
their children.

"Without any assertions of abuse, neglect, or parental unfitness,
and with no hearings of any kind, the government is detaining
these parents on the other side of the country from their young
children, who have been left to face an uncertain future
frightened and alone," the lawsuit said.  "Many of these parents
have been unable to even speak to their children since their
separation."

Washington, California, New Jersey and at least eight other
states have also announced plans to jointly sue the
administration over the separations.

Facing a global uproar, Trump issued an executive order halting
further separations.  But the order did nothing to speed the
reunification of families already separated when they reached the
U.S.-Mexico border.  An administration official told The
Associated Press on June 25 that the administration is divided
about whether the reunifications -- or prosecutions and
deportations -- should take precedence.

The lawsuit accuses the administration of violating the due-
process rights of the mothers, inflicting severe emotional trauma
on them as well as their children.  But in a series of typo-laden
tweets, President Donald Trump continued insisting on June 25
that those apprehended entering the country illegally should not
be entitled to due process, but rather immediately deported
without an appearance before a judge.  Federal law gives such
migrants a right to seek asylum.

The lawsuit asks the court to immediately release the detainees
and reunify them with their children, or at least detain them
together.  It also asks the court to order the government to
conduct interviews with the detainees to determine whether they
have a credible fear of persecution or torture if returned to
their home country; it's the first step in the asylum process,
but no such interviews have been scheduled for the detainees,
further prolonging their detention and separation from their
children.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement spokeswoman Carissa
Cutrell said in an email the agency does not comment on
litigation.

Among the three women suing is Blanca Orantes-Lopez, who fled El
Salvador with her 8-year-old son after the family received an
anonymous threat demanding $5,000 or the boy's life; the boy's
uncle had previously been kidnapped and held for ransom.
Ms. Orantes spoke with The Associated Press in a phone interview
from a federal prison in SeaTac, south of Seattle.  She has since
been transferred to the Northwest Detention Center, a privately
run immigration jail in Tacoma.

Ms. Orantes sobbed throughout the interview, recalling how
officials took her boy more than a month ago.  She hasn't seen
him since, but she has been able to speak with him twice in the
week since the AP's story ran -- for the first time since he was
shipped off to transitional housing in upstate New York.

"They told me, 'Say bye to him because he's being transferred.' I
asked where," she recalled.  "They just told me to say bye to
him.  . . . He just started crying, saying, 'Don't leave me,
Mom.' "

The other plaintiffs are Ibis Guzman, whose 5-year-old son was
taken from her after they fled Honduras, and Yolany Padilla, who
left Honduras with her 6-year-old son.  Ms. Guzman has not spoken
with her son in more than a month, and Ms. Padilla has spoken to
hers once, the lawsuit said. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Settlement in "Moss" Suit Has Prelim Approval
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL MOSS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES
SECRET SERVICE, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:06-cv-03045-CL (D.
Or.), Judge Ann Aiken of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Oregon, Medford Division, adopted Magistrate Judge Clarke's
Findings and Recommendation ("F&R") on Feb. 27, 2018 to grant the
Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement and Related Relief.

The Judge finds that although this relieves her of her obligation
to perform a de novo review, she retains the obligation to make
an informed, final determination.  Following the recommendation
of the Rules Advisory Committee, she reviews the F&R for clear
error on the face of the record.  Having reviewed the file of the
case, she finds no clear error.

Therefore, Judge Aiken adopted Magistrate Judge Clarke's F&R and
granted the Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Action Settlement and Related Relief.  He directed the Class
counsel to contact Courtroom Deputy Cathy Kramer at Cathy
ramer@ord.uscourts.gov or (541) 431-4102 to set a date for a
fairness hearing.  The class counsel will then proceed with the
notice plan as outlined in the motion for preliminary approval of
the settlement.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 15, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/zgwbVo from Leagle.com.

Michael Moss, Lesley Adams, Beth Wilcox, Richard Royer, Lee
Frances Torelle, Mischelle Elkovich, Anna Vine O'Connell &
Jackson County Pacific Green Party, Plaintiffs, represented by
Steven M. Wilker -- steven.wilker@tonkon.com -- Tonkon Torp LLP,
Alexander M. Tinker -- alex.tinker@tonkon.com -- Tonkon Torp LLP
& Arthur B. Spitzer, American Civil Liberties Union of the
National Capital Area, pro hac vice.

United States Secret Service, of the Department of Homeland
Security, Ralph Basham, Former Director of the United States
Secret Service, in his individual capacity, Tim Wood, United
States Secret Service Agent, in his official and individual
capacities & Rob Savage, United States Secret Service Agent, in
his official and individual capacities, Defendants, represented
by Brant S. Levine, U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division,
Torts Branch & Jeremy S. Brumbelow, U.S. Department of Justice,
Civil Division, Torts Branch Constitutional & Specialized Torts
Section.

John Doe 1, United States Secret Service Agent, in his official
and individual capacities, participating in these actions and
known to the Defendant Secret Service, but unknown at this time
to Plaintiffs & Mark Sullivan, Director of United States Secret
Service, in his official capacity, Defendants, represented by
Jeremy S. Brumbelow, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division,
Torts Branch Constitutional & Specialized Torts Section.

David Towe, Chief of Police of Jacksonville, Oregon in his
official and individual capacities & City of Jacksonville, a
municipal corporation of the State of Oregon, Defendants,
represented by Robert E. Franz, Jr., Law Office of Robert E.
Franz, Jr.

Ron Ruecker, Superintendent of the Oregon State Police, in his
official and individual capacities, Eric Rodriquez, former
Captain of the Southwest Regional Headquarters of the Oregon
State Police, in his official and individual capacities, Tim F.
McClain, Superintendent of the Oregon State Police, in his
Official capacity & Randie Martz, Captain of the Southwest
Regional Headquarters of the Oregon State Police, in his official
capacity, Defendants, represented by Christina L. Beatty-Walters,
Oregon Department of Justice & Christopher A. Perdue, Oregon
Department of Justice.

John Does 2-20, that is, the commanding officers of other law
enforcement agencies of public bodies participating in these
actions, in their official and individual capacities, known to
the identified Defendants, but unknown at this time to Plaintiffs
& Corey Falls, Jackson County Sheriff, Defendants, represented by
Michael D. Jewett, Attorney at Law, Devin D. Huseby, Jackson
County Counsel & Joel C. Benton, Jackson County Counsel.

United States Secret Service, of the Department of Homeland
Security, Cross Defendant, represented by Brant S. Levine, U.S.
Department of Justice Civil Division, Torts Branch & Jeremy S.
Brumbelow, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Torts
Branch Constitutional & Specialized Torts Section.


WALMART STORES: Appeals Court Won't Reconsider Fee Award Ruling
---------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Fair, writing for Law360, reports that a Pennsylvania
appeals court will not reconsider its decision to order further
analysis from a trial judge on the reasoning behind what Wal-Mart
Stores Inc. argues was an excessive fee award for attorneys who
secured a $241 million award in a wage-and-hour class action
against the retail giant. [GN]


WHOLE FOODS: To Implement GMO Product Labeling Changes After Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Brian Huges, writing for Entrepreneur, reports that trust is the
cornerstone of a company's brand, but it must be earned.  Today's
consumers are smarter, more demanding and able to access more
information about a product or service.  In fact, Search Engine
Land found that 88 percent of consumers surveyed said they
trusted online reviews as much as personal recommendations.

That's why, to meet buyer expectations, more and more businesses
are working to establish a foundation of trust by increasing
transparency.

Transparency as a means to trust
Transparency requires entrepreneurs to be open about key aspects
of their business, including their operations, supply chains and
performance.  According to a 2016 study by Label Insight, 94
percent of respondents agreed that it was important to them that
the brands and manufacturers they buy from be transparent about
what is in their food and how it is made.

While this study was specific to the food industry, the demand
for product transparency that it documented might be applied to
all industries. The study also found that transparent companies
were rewarded, with 37 percent of the consumers surveys saying
that they would switch brands to those offering this degree of
openness.

Transparency equals trust, the survey implied; and brands that
earn this trust attracted customer loyalty, in return.

Whole Foods' Lesson
Whole Foods Market is known for its healthy offerings of fresh,
prepared and processed food.  However, the brand took a hit when
a class action lawsuit accused the company of mislabeling
products as not being genetically engineered ("non-GMO"), when in
fact they were.

Whole Foods responded with the commitment that all products in
its U.S. and Canadian stores would be labeled by this year, 2018,
as to whether they contain genetically modified organisms (GMOs).
The company thus became the first national grocery chain to set a
deadline for full GMO transparency.

The positive consumer response to Whole Foods Market's GMO
transparency has pushed other stores to some level of commitment
to non-GMO products, too. Kroger and Safeway announced that they
would no longer sell genetically modified salmon. Dannon
Corporation recently made a non-GMO ingredient option and clear-
labels commitment to its consumers.

What started as a pledge by Whole Foods to better label its
products has expanded into a National Mandatory Bioengineered
(BE) Food Disclosure Standard.  The U.S. Department of
Agriculture is currently soliciting comments toward the final
rules.

Patagonia's supply chain
A company's supply chain ensures that it has the needed materials
to produce a product, but today's consumers are questioning the
environmental and social costs of those materials.

As a result, there is a growing movement toward supply chain
transparency, and Patagonia is leading the way.  The company
brings new partners into its supply chain using the "4-Fold"
approach, which evaluates sourcing, quality, social and
environmental factors. The company's commitment to transparency
is found in its Footprint Chronicles, published factory lists and
Cleanest Line blog.

Patagonia has transformed its supply chain into one of its
biggest brand elements through transparency and trust.

Meanwhile, other industries are making moves along the same
lines:

The Estee Lauder Company recently committed to a transparent
supply chain with regard to child labor.

A recent study by Human Rights Watch documented the need to
incorporate human rights into clothing and footwear supply
chains.

The food industry is facing both internal and external pressures
to develop transparent supply chains due to food product recalls.

ClearAid's charitable giving
There is a real need for charitable giving across every topic
from childhood cancer to environmental protections, but the trust
in many nonprofit organizations may be waning.  When charities
like the Red Cross, the Wounded Warrior Project and the Cancer
Fund of America are cited for lost or misappropriated funds, the
honor of all charities is questioned.  A recent MissionBox survey
found that nearly 60 percent of respondents would give less to
charities than they had in the past as a direct result of
nonprofit and charity scandals.

ClearAid seeks to restore public trust and increase charitable
giving to nonprofit organizations through transparency in how
monies are spent and crowdfunding is controlled.  It uses a
blockchain system that records and stores donations made and
combines this technology with smart contracts that can result in
refunds to donors if specific charity goals are not met.

Together, these systems allow potential donors to trust that
their gifts are being spent exactly as they'd intended.
ClearAid's ultimate goal is to create crowd-based governance of
charities that would approve or decline projects, manage
transactions and oversee charitable operations.

In the nonprofit world as well as the commercial one,
transparency equals trust, which ensures that charities that are
honorable can continue to make a difference in our world.

Bottom line
Businesses from grocery store chains to manufacturers rely on
transparency to increase the trust quotient of their brand.  As
consumers appreciate the value this adds to their purchasing and
giving decisions, they will demand this level of transparency
from more businesses and charities.

Whatever your own business, integrate transparency into your
marketing and business model: Then use it to build trust to
increase customer loyalty and gain a competitive edge. [GN]


WINSLOW & SHOOMAKER: "Lee" Claims Vape Product Contain Pesticides
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ignacio Lee, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated; Plaintiff, v. Winslow & Shoomaker, LLC, Alvin Nathaniel
Joiner, SC Laboratories, Inc. and Does 1-50 inclusive, Defendant,
Case No. BC705954, (Cal. Super., May 10, 2018), seeks redress for
breach of express and implied warranty of merchantability,
negligence and violation of the California Business and
Professions Code, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act.

Winslow & Shoomaker operates as Brass Knuckles and sells medical
cannabis products including SC Labs branded vape cartridge.

Lee consistently purchased "Candy Apple" and "Sour Diesel"
variety vape cartridges. However, these concentrate cartridges
are allegedly contaminated with pesticides. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Sara C. Colon, Esq.
      Nathan M. Smith, Esq.
      Nona Yegazarian, Esq.
      BROWN NERI SMITH & KHAN LLP
      11601 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2080
      Los Angeles, CA 90025
      Tel: (310)593-9890
      Fax: (310)593-9980
      Email: sara@bnsklaw.com
             nate@bnsklaw.com
             nona@bnsklaw.com


WOLF FIRM: Manos Appeals C.D. Cal. Decision to Ninth Circuit
------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff John C. Manos filed an appeal from a court ruling in
his lawsuit styled JOHN MANOS, and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals, AKA John C. Manos v. THE WOLF FIRM, A Law
Corporation; RCO LEGAL, P.S.; NORTHWEST TRUSTEE SERVICES, INC.;
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., for itself and as successor by merger
to Chase Home Finance, LLC Erroneously Sued As Chase Home
Finance-TX; WAMU ASSET ACCEPTANCE CORP; SELECT PORTFOLIO
SERVICING, INC.; CHASE HOME FINANCE-TX, Case No. 8:18-cv-00138-
JLS-JDE, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California, Santa Ana.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the proposed
class action lawsuit was filed on January 24, 2018.

The Wolf Firm, A Law Corporation, is a full service law firm.
For over 25 years the Firm has provided a broad array of legal
and related services throughout California and nationally to
businesses in general and to members of certain specific industry
segments.

The appellate case is captioned as JOHN MANOS, and on behalf of
all similarly situated individuals, AKA John C. Manos v. THE WOLF
FIRM, A Law Corporation; RCO LEGAL, P.S.; NORTHWEST TRUSTEE
SERVICES, INC.; JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., for itself and as
successor by merger to Chase Home Finance, LLC Erroneously Sued
As Chase Home Finance-TX; WAMU ASSET ACCEPTANCE CORP; SELECT
PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC.; CHASE HOME FINANCE-TX, Case No. 18-
55729, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- June 15, 2018 -- Mediation Questionnaire due.  If the
      registration for Appellate ECF is confirmed after this
      date, the Mediation Questionnaire is due within one day of
      receiving the e-mail from PACER confirming registration;

   -- July 9, 2018 -- Transcript shall be ordered;

   -- August 6, 2018 -- Transcript shall be filed by court
      reporter;

   -- September 17, 2018 -- Appellant's opening brief and
      excerpts of record shall be served and filed pursuant to
      FRAP 31 and 9th Cir. R. 31-2.1;

   -- October 15, 2018 -- Appellees' answering brief and excerpts
      of record shall be served and filed pursuant to FRAP 31 and
      9th Cir. R. 31-2.1; and

   -- The optional appellant's reply brief shall be filed and
      served within 21 days of service of the appellees' brief,
      pursuant to FRAP 31 and 9th Cir. R. 31-2.1.[BN]


XEROX HR: Averts Class Action Over ERISA Violation
--------------------------------------------------
Adam Lidgett, writing for Law360, reports that a proposed class
of Ford Motor Co. retirement plan participants accusing the
record keeper of their plans of violating the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act over a contract with an advice services
company had the latest edition of their complaint nixed by a
Michigan federal judge on June 25.

U.S. District Judge Robert H. Cleland granted a bid from Xerox HR
Solutions LLC -- which has since been spun from Xerox to Conduent
Inc. -- to dismiss the second amended ERISA complaint relating to
its contract.

The case is Chendes et al v. Xerox HR Solutions, LLC,
Case No. 2:16-cv-13980 (E.D. Mi.). The case is assigned to Judge
Robert H. Cleland.  The case was filed November 9, 2016. [GN]


ZICAM LLC: Court Allows Filing of SAC in "Melgar" Suit
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, YESENIA MELGAR, on Behalf of Herself and all Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. ZICAM LLC and MATRIXX
INITIATIVES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 2:14-cv-00160-MCE-AC
(E.D. Cal.), Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of California granted the parties'
stipulation allowing the filing of the Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint.

Melgar filed the action against the Defendants.  On Feb. 15 and
16, 2018, the parties attended a two-day mediation with renowned
mediator Kenneth Feinberg in New York where the parties executed
a Class Action Settlement Term Sheet.  On May 2, 2018, the
parties reached agreement on a formal Stipulation of Settlement.

The Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary approval of the
settlement on May 3, 2018.  The proposed settlement class
includes purchasers of the Defendants' Soft Chews and Medicated
Fruit Drops in addition to purchasers of the products identified
in the First Amended Complaint.

The Defendants' Soft Chews and Medicated Fruit Drops contain the
same or similar active ingredients as the products identified in
the First Amended Complaint, and contain representations
regarding cold relief.

The Court's May 29, 2014, Scheduling Order provides that no
amendments to the pleadings are permitted without leave of court,
good cause having been shown.  Article 5.1 of the Stipulation of
Settlement requires the filing of a Second Amended Complaint to
include the purchasers of the Defendants' Soft Chews and
Medicated Fruit Drops in the Settlement Class.

The parties through their respective attorney, stipulated, and
Judge England granted that the Plaintiff may file a Second
Amended Complaint.  The Defendants' deadline to respond to the
Second Amended Complaint will be stayed.  In the event that the
parties' settlement is ultimately rejected, either by the Court
or on appeal, the Defendants will file their response to the
Second Amended Complaint within 30 days of such order.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 16, 2018 Order is available
at https://bit.ly/2yb8pLm from Leagle.com.

Yesenia Melgar, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph I. Marchese,
Bursor & Fisher, P.A., pro hac vice, Lawrence Timothy Fisher --
ltfisher@bursor.com -- Bursor and Fisher, PA, Scott A. Bursor --
scott@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher PA & Thomas Andrew Reyda --
treyda@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher, P.A.

Zicam LLC & Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., Defendants, represented by
Alan J. Lazarus  -- alan.lazarus@dbr.com -- Drinker Biddle &
Reath LLP, Ashley Neglia -- ashley.neglia@kirkland.com --
Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Kathryn Michelle Jackson --
katie.jackson@dbr.com -- Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP, Leslie M.
Smith -- leslie.smith@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP, pro
hac vice, Robyn E. Bladow -- rbladow@kirkland.com -- Kirkland &
Ellis LLP, Ryan S. Fife -- ryan.fife@dbr.com -- Drinker Biddle &
Reath LLP & William A. Hanssen -- william.hanssen@dbr.com --
Drinker Biddle and Reath LLP.


* Experts Divided on Removing Ban on Litigation Contingency Fees
----------------------------------------------------------------
Christine Caulfield, writing Lawyerly, reports that regulating
third-party litigation funders gets a resounding yes, but experts
are divided on removing the ban on contingency fees and other
recommendations for reforming the class action regime.  Lawyerly
spoke to defence and plaintiff-side lawyers, as well as funders,
for their take on the recent proposals, and five major talking
points emerged.

Removing the ban on contingency fees

Both the Victorian Law Reform Commission and the Australian Law
Reform Commission propose lifting the current prohibition on
lawyers charging contingency fees as a way to encourage
competition with litigation funders and to spur firms to take on
smaller matters that funders see as unprofitable.

The VLRC suggested any move by the state legislature to remove
the ban be made in conjunction with the Commonwealth to avoid
litigation forum shopping, a recommendation Quinn Emanuel partner
Damian Scattini and IMF Bentham investment manager Matt Kennedy
supported.

"It has to be national otherwise, cynically, you'll find everyone
filing in the Victorian Supreme Court," said Mr. Scattini.

"Without a national approach, greater complexity will arise with
respect to multiplicity of and competing class actions,"
Mr. Kennedy said.

But Slater & Gordon head of class actions Ben Hardwick said the
firm was "somewhat disappointed" the VLRC had suggested the more
cautious approach.

"It's time to take the next step," Mr. Hardwick said.  "Victoria
was the first state to introduce class actions and there is no
reason why it can't be the first state to introduce contingency
fees.  There's no reason other states wouldn't follow and
Victoria could take the lead."

Both reports also suggested the removal be limited to certain
class actions and under the supervision of the court.  Shine
Lawyers special counsel Vicky Antzoulatos questioned the
rationale for excluding personal injury class actions.

Ms. Antzoulatos, whose firm is leading the massive vaginal mesh
class action against Johnson & Johnson on a no-win, no-fee basis,
said litigation funders mostly steer clear of personal injury
claims.

"These class actions are very expensive to bring.  The quantum is
generally lower and there are statutory caps on damages," she
said.

Lifting the ban on contingency fees for cases relating to
defective products would "really ensure access to justice,
especially on a mass scale, where people have been injured by the
one product", she said.

King & Wood Mallesons corporate lawyer Matt Egerton-Warburton --
matt.egerton-warburton@au.kwm.com -- said the proposal would
likely lower the costs to bring a claim, as the costs of
litigation funding would not be included.

"This may make previously 'uncommercial' claims, marginally
commercial" he said.  "The net result will likely be an increase
in claims, but the overall quality of claims may deteriorate
without the vetting that litigation funders provide." For his
ASX-listed clients "this will likely have a detrimental effect as
the increased litigation costs will lower shareholders returns."

Matt Egerton-Warburton said he also worried about conflicts, "At
present, lawyers are obliged to act in the best interests of
their client in service of the court.  With the introduction of
contingency fees, lawyers will be primarily concerned with
protecting their own fee position -- possibly to the detriment of
their client or the court process.  What if a client wants to
settle but their lawyer sees more value in continuing to pursue
an action?"

IMF Bentham's Kennedy said the case for introducing contingency
fees "remains elusive".

"The current model, with lawyers acting for their clients,
funders overseeing the lawyers' costs, and the court overseeing
all, offers the best set of checks and balances," he said.

Increasing transparency and strengthening court oversight

Both reports make proposals to increase transparency with respect
to funding arrangements and legal fees in class actions to
improve accountability, and the lawyers and funders Lawyerly
spoke with say they generally supported the recommendations, with
some conditions.

Ms. Antzoulatos said the proposal to increase oversight of the
lead applicant's legal costs with the appointment of cost
referees, already a power more and more judges are keen to use,
was not something her firm opposed, but that the defendants'
costs should also be scrutinised.

"Oversight could disadvantage applicants if defendants' costs are
also not reviewed," she said.  "Without review, defendants can
put enormous pressure on applicants if they know their costs will
later be looked at".

Quinn Emanuel's Scattini said his firm also welcomed
transparency, but he too said it should be a two-way street.

"When the terms of the funding agreement are shown to the
defence, the defence should have to show their insurance
arrangements to the plaintiffs.  That's a good bit of
transparency."

More transparency and disclosure are fine, Slater's Hardwick
said, provided confidentiality and privilege were protected. And
there was no need to codify or legislate the court's existing
powers to order the release of information, he said.

"Our preference is for courts to continue to exercise its powers.
I think it has to be a case-by-case analysis.  There will be
situations when it is preferable to preserve confidentiality, but
that power rests with the court already."

Strengthening, or codifying, the court's powers to set funding
rates should also be considered with extreme caution,
Ms. Antzoulatos said.

"The courts need to allow market forces to set the funding
rates," she said, adding that judges are not apprised of the
commercial considerations that go into calculating a litigation
funder's commission.

Reviewing continuous disclosure rules

The ALRC proposed a review of continuous disclosure obligations
of listed companies and the propensity for corporate entities to
be the target of funded shareholder class actions.  A review
would also examine the availability and cost of directors and
officers liability cover in Australia, the commission said.

King and Wood Mallesons' Egerton-Warburton said a review was
welcome.

"At present continuous disclosure is operating as a strict
liability offence. There needs to be consideration of reasonable
reforms that protect shareholders while also limiting penalties
on companies for non-material breaches of their continuous
disclosure requirements," he said.

Mr. Egerton-Warburton said the "explosion" in class actions
against listed companies was having unintended consequences, one
of which was a substantial increase in the cost of directors and
officers insurance. In at least one case, he said, a distressed
company facing multiple class actions could not get D&O insurance
at all.

In a recent interview with Lawyerly, VLRC chair Justice Philip
Cummins disputed the idea that there had been an explosion in
class actions in Australia.

IMF Bentham's Kennedy said weakening the continuous disclosure
rules would be a "retrograde step".

"A better approach would be to improve directors' understanding
of their legal obligations, reducing the risk of misconduct in
the first place," he said. "In any event proposals to water down
the impact of the continuous disclosure regime are well outside
the terms of reference and, for that reason alone, should not be
pursued by the Commission."

Continuous disclosure obligations serve as a check and balance,
Shine's Antzoulatos said.

"If we weaken those we could see more of the misconduct we've
been seeing coming out of the Royal Commission," she said.

The heart of the continuous disclosure obligations under the
Corporations Act and ASX's listing rules was that investors have
a right to information on a company's performance, Slater's
Hardwick said.

"It's very surprising that there is consideration of modifying
those laws, particularly given the findings of the Royal
Commission," he said.  "The community would be very concerned if
there were any move to roll back continuous disclosure rules."

Craig Arnott, managing director of global litigation funder
Burford Capital, said weakening the law would be a "great
mistake".

"The evidence about AMP at the Hayne Royal commission
demonstrates that rules for proper corporate governance are
needed now more than ever, and shows the destruction of value in
corporations when they are not followed," Mr. Arnott said.

Establishing a regulatory regime for litigation funders

The ALRC proposed that litigation funders be subject to licensing
requirements and regulation by the Australian Investments and
Securities Commission. The VLRC said the Victorian Government
should advocate for stronger, national regulation of funders.

"Burford welcomes [ALRC chair] Justice Derrington's fair and
considered report.  We strongly agree with the recommendations
that adequate capitalisation and transparency of funds should be
important requirements in a licensing regime," Mr. Arnott said.

IMF Betham's Kennnedy said his ASX-listed firm, which is already
subject to ASIC oversight, welcomed regulation, especially of
overseas funders.  The funder would be making "detailed
submissions" to ALRC before its final report is due in December,
he said.

"Overseas funders often hold very few assets in Australia and,
for those who are private entities, their financial position is
opaque.  They have arguably fuelled the rise of "competing" class
actions, which the courts are addressing," he said.

Slater's Hardwick said a licensing regime "made sense". His firm
would only engage a funder if it had adequate capital behind it,
he said.

Quinn's Scattini said regulation for funders was "long overdue".

Introducing a collective redress scheme

The ALRC proposed a federal collective redress scheme as an
alternative to litigation, saying that in addition to a fine
against a wrongdoing company a redress scheme, "would likely
achieve greater access to justice and at a fraction of the cost
of a class action".

Mr. Egerton-Warburton said a redress scheme was potentially an
efficient tool for companies to avoid the costs and diversion of
litigation.  For aggrieved shareholders, it means not losing a
substantial percentage of any recovery to a third-party funder.

"Collective redress schemes allow the corporate client to be
proactive and to talk to a regulator early," he said. "If
structured properly a scheme could provide companies with an
avenue to offer redress efficiently for errors and aggrieved
persons can be compensated."

Burford's Arnott said the ALRC's discussion paper
"overemphasised" the role a redress scheme could have, and noted
that the UK's Consumer Rights Act, which allows a business to
submit a voluntary redress scheme to the competition regulator,
was a cautionary tale.

"There can certainly be a role for such schemes, but we don't
expect them to substitute for a 'day in court' and judicial
scrutiny of claims," Mr. Arnott said.  "The UK experience shows
that they are slow moving, lead to dissatisfaction and often end
up in litigation anyway."

A redress scheme was a perplexing proposal, Quinn's Scattini
said.

"That seems to be not a solution to anything," he said.  "I don't
understand how that would be a better.  There is a need for
justice to be seen to be done, not just done.  If you make it
like a speeding ticket, if it becomes a transaction costs for
businesses, I don't think that sends a good message at all." [GN]


* New Class Action Regime Enforced in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
-------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Beswetherick, Esq. -- mark.beswetherick@clydeco.com -- and
Shabnam Karim, Esq. -- shabnam.karim@clydeco.com -- of Clyde & Co
LLP, in an article for Lexology, wrote that on December 15, 2017,
new amended regulations came into force in KSA, and a class
action regime is now in force in respect of securities disputes.
In this article, Clyde & Co's Beswetherick and Karim look at the
key features of this new class action regime and what practical
effect this will have on KSA listed companies, management
individuals and other stakeholders.  The provisions refer to
"existing and new suits" which could be suspended and then added
to a class action. It appears therefore that the regulations will
apply retrospectively to ongoing cases.

The background to the introduction of this new regime

In the last update, the Clyde & Co attorneys set out the changes
that were rapidly taking place in KSA with the government
encouraging foreign investment in the KSA economy and into listed
KSA companies.

In order to boost investor confidence, the country has introduced
a wave of changes by regulators and government authorities; from
an anti-corruption drive to a recent spate of enforcements
leading to the suspension of licences by the Saudi Arabian
Monetary Agency.  The Capital Markets Agency (CMA) has been a
particularly active regulator, investigating trading and
accounting irregularities in listed companies and pursuing
misrepresentation issues during IPO listing.

The introduction of a class action regime paves the way for
increased multi-party securities litigation, such as multiple
shareholder or investor claims.  This change also makes it
administratively easier for courts to deal with multi-party
litigation.

A summary of the new regime

The new regime came into force when the existing regulations (The
Resolution of Securities Proceedings Regulations) were amended
and a new chapter (Part 11) with 25 articles in it was added (the
"Amended Regulations"), introducing a new class action regime.

The scope of these new rules relate to securities disputes
progressed as civil claims only.  It is worth noting that the
court also has jurisdiction to pursue criminal actions such as
insider trading and fraud, but the criminal process is not
impacted by this new regime.

For an applicant to become part of a "class", he must demonstrate
that his suit is identical to other suits "in terms of legal
bases, merits and the subject matter of the requests".  Notably,
similarity is not sufficient and the suits must be identical.
There is no clarity as yet on what test the applicant must
satisfy to demonstrate that his case is the same on merits as
other cases as this indicates that an assessment of merits must
take place before the case can be added to the class.  This can
be contrasted with other class action regime across the world,
such as the US where the test is in fact that there are common
questions of law or fact amongst the class rather than whether
the merits are identified.

Under Article 50 of the Amended Regulations, the Committee for
the Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD Committee), which is
a quasi-judicial authority that determines securities disputes,
shall have the discretion to decide whether a class action suit
should be registered.  Factors that will inform the CRSD's
decision include whether individual suits might result in
conflicting decisions or may result in the unfair treatment of
members within the group.  Issues of practicality and efficiency
will also be a factor, pursuant to Article 50.

Once a class action suit is registered, documents relating to it
will be made available to the public.  There will then be an
opportunity for at least 90 days for other members to apply to
join the class.

The decision to approve a class action suit must be made within
90 days of the announcement of the first request.  There should
be at least ten requests that have been filed (in that period)
for the class action suit to be approved.

Under Article 53, any existing suits or new suits identical to
the matters within the class action can be suspended by the CRSD,
so that these suits are joined to the class action suit.
However, if a party has been added to a class action suit as a
Plaintiff, he/she can withdraw from it with needing the
Defendant's approval, without prejudice to his/ her right to
continue litigating the suit individually.  Article 53 refers to
suspending "existing and new suits".  This indicates that if
there are suits ongoing prior to this class action regime coming
into force, which could now be part of a class action; it may be
possible for the committee to suspend existing claims and add
them to a class action, under the new regime.

Each class action shall have a lead plaintiff who shall be
appointed by the members of the group and shall represent the
interests of all the members.

As one of the key reasons behind this change is to improve
efficiency and court administration of handling multiple claims,
Article 62 provides that the committees will have full powers in
managing the suits and in issuing any orders or decisions to
ensure fairness and quick decisions.

There is a provision within Article 64 of the Amended Regulations
for the lead Plaintiff and the Defendant in the class suit to
enter into a settlement agreement to end the class action.  There
are rules in force around settling the class action, such as
ensuring that at least 30% of the group approves the settlement
and that the committee approves the settlement.  Those members
who do not wish to accept the settlement can withdraw from it and
continue to litigate individually.

The impact of these changes

The key reasons for this new regime appear to be: (i) a
recognition that to encourage foreign investment into KSA, there
must be confidence in the expediency of the court/ committee
process connected with securities disputes and the requirement
for consistent decisions and (ii) the need to facilitate
administrative ease for the CRSD so that multiple claims can be
dealt with together.

This change may also signify an expectation that with more
foreign investment in listed Saudi companies and increased
securities activity, there is a higher chance of complex claims
arising, especially multiple investor or shareholder claims.

Some issues remain to be clarified, such as whether the process
of registering class actions will be fair, if a merits test is
conducted at the outset.  There are also further issues to be
resolved over time with regards to the CRSD processes.

Management individuals and insurers of stakeholders (such as
auditors and management individuals) should however take note of
this change which may signify the expectation of increased
regulatory activity and consequent litigation in KSA in the
coming years.

However, notwithstanding the above, Clyde & Co attorneys consider
this new regime to be a welcome change, which will ease the
process of multiple party litigation; and seek to make the
handling of a claim more efficient and consistent. [GN]






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S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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