CAR_Public/180723.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, July 23, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 146

                            Headlines

3M CO: CAP Set Up to Advocate for PFAS-Affected Communities
ALLSCRIPTS HEALTHCARE: Seeks Dismissal of Ransomware Class Action
AMAZON.COM LLC: Court Enters Discovery Order in "Ortiz" Suit
ASSOCIATED CREDIT: Court Grants Summary in "Fuqua" FDCPA Suit
AUBURN, NY: Residents File Lawsuit Over Falls Landfill Stench

BANK OF AMERICA: Court Denies Bid to Amend "Jackson" Suit
BAR 20: Aug. 9 Mandatory Scheduling Conference in "Maciel"
BOFI HOLDING: Ballard Spahr Attorney Discusses Class Action
CAPITEC BANK: Summit Financial Abandons Case Over Payday Loans
CERNER CORP: Judge Approves $4.5MM Class Action Settlement

CHICAGO BRIDGE: Court Dismisses "Kinra" ERISA Suit
CHICAGO BRIDGE: Loses Bid to Dismiss Securities Fraud Suit
COMCAST: Faces Class Action Over Xfinity Mobile Fraud
COMMONWEALTH BANK: Faces Shareholder Class Action
CREDIT UNION: Put Under Liquidation, Class Action Pending

CRST EXPEDITED: Court Certifies Truck Drivers Class
CSK AUTO: Supplemental Brief for "Melgar" Settlement Bid Ordered
CVS CAREMARK: Mailing May Have Disclosed HIV Status, Says Suit
DEARBORN MOTORS: Court Dismisses Class Claims in "Williams"
DR PEPPER: Wins Summary Judgment in Stockholders Suit

DYNAMIC LEDGER: Injunction Bid in Tezos Securities Suit Denied
EPIC SYSTEMS: Ruling Raises Statutory Interpretation Issues
FCA US: African-American Workers' Discrimination Suit Can Proceed
FLEX LTD: Kaskela Law Files Shareholder Class Action Lawsuit
FIAT CHRYSLER: Faces Suit Over Software Flaw

FLEX LTD: Kaskela Law Files Shareholder Class Action Lawsuit
FORD MOTOR: Court OKs Filing of TAC in "Baranco"
GOGO INC: Kaskela Law Files Shareholder Class Action
GOGO INC: Wolf Haldenstein Files Securities Class Action
GOGO INC: Federman & Sherwood Files Securities Class Action

GOOD TIMES: TanaCon Attendees Mull Class Action
GRAMERCY PROPERTY: Monteverde & Associates Files Class Action
GREAT AMERICA: "Soto" FCRA Suit Remanded to State Court
GRIMALDI INC: Employees File Wage Class Action in New York
HANNIBAL, MO: Prelim. Settlement Reached in Water Quality Suit

HORIZON BLUE CROSS: Pays NJ Surgery Centers $160MM to Settle Suit
HORIZON HEALTHCARE: Fails to Comply with Discovery Orders
IESI BETHLEHEM: Faces Class Action Over Landfill Odors
ILLINOIS: Court Enters Prelim Injunction in "Rasho" Suit
INNERWORKINGS INC: Faruqi & Faruqi Files Class Action Lawsuit

IQOR HOLDINGS: Loses Interlocutory Appeal Bid in "Shoots" Suit
JP MORGAN: Judge Approves $4.6MM Class Action Settlement
KANSAS: Court Enters Show Cause Order in "McCorkendale" Suit
MASSACHUSETTS: Settlement w/ Prisoners Prompts New HepC Protocol
MATTRESS FIRM: State's Highest Court Asked to Weigh in on Case

MCDONALD'S CORP: Seeks Dismissal of Quarter Pounder Class Action
MDL 2029: Bid to Intervene in DVD Rental Antitrust Suit Denied
MDL 2353: Court Won't Review Class Certification Denial
MEDCARE INVESTMENT: "Collier" Wage & Hour Suit Moved to E.D. La.
MERICO FINANCIAL: 4th Cir. Remands "Hancock" to Allow Amendment

MONSANTO CO: Settlement in "Rawa" Suit Has Final Approval
NAT'L COLLEGIATE: Points to 9th Cir. Decision on Transfer Rule
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Settlement in "Garcia" Has Prelim Approval
NEW MEXICO: Ct. Denies Pro Se Class Certification Bid in "Amaro"
NEW YORK: Court Denies Certification of "Sanchez" Class

NEWELL BRANDS: Robbins Arroyo Files Securities Class Suit
NIAGARA BOTTLING: Court Narrows Claims in Mislabeling Suit
NIGERIA: Police Faces Class Action Over SARS-Related Abuses
NUCOR CORP: Racial Bias Class Action Settlement Hearing Set
PACIFIC GAS: Court Won't Certify Interlocutory Appeal in "Greer"

POLARITYTE INC: Klein Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
POMONA VALLEY: Denial of "Doster" Class Certification Affirmed
PRICELINE.COM INC: Fort Smith A&P Joins Class-Action Lawsuit
PULSE BIOSCIENCES: Kaskela Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
PENNSYLVANIA: Court Certifies Inmates Class in HCV Suit

QUALCOMM INC: Klein Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
QUEBEC: School Boards Ready to Pay Out $153.5MM in Settlement
RAYMOURS FURNITURE: Judge OKs Class Action Over Text Messages
RENZENBERGER INC: Court Issues Protective Order in "Wright"
RHODE ISLAND: Settlement in Retirement Benefits' Suits Affirmed

SAN DIEGO, CA: Cal. App. Affirms Demurrer Ruling in "Reid" Suit
SEATTLE GENETICS: Court Dismisses "Patel" Securities Suit
SBE ENTERTAINMENT: Court Denies Summary Judgment in "Walintukan"
SEIU: Riffey Ruling May Have Implications for Union Class Action
SERENITY SPA: Court Dismisses "Benavides" FLSA Suit

SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA: Faces Class Action Over Reimbursements
SQUAW VALLEY: Court Extends Time to Respond to "Pinto" FAC
STATE FARM: Court Dismisses Amended MAO-MSO Suit
TORRANCE REFINING: Faces Suit Over Water Contamination
SUN LIFE: Court Denies Bid to Amend "Robertson" RICO Suit

SUPER MICRO: Robbins Geller to Lead in Securities Fraud Suit
TEZOS FOUNDATION: Launches Platform Amid ICO Class Actions
TONOGA INC: Begins Probe Into PFOA Contamination Amid Suit
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Stinson Leonard Attorney Discusses Ruling
UNITED STATES: Faces Class Action Over ACA Program

UNITED STATES: Class Action Mulled on Behalf of Asylum Seekers
UNITED STATES: FEMA Ordered to Extend Temporary Housing Vouchers
UNITED STATES: FEMA to Continue Post-Hurricane Housing
UNITED STATES: Sued in Calif. for Detaining Immigrant Children
UNITED STATES: Osage County Commissioners to Discuss Class Action

UNITED STATES: Court Issues Protective Order in "Banos"
VOLKSWAGEN AG: Sanford Heisler Files Age Discrimination Action
WALMART: Faces Class Action Over Shoplifting Extortion Scheme
WELLS FARGO: Sued Over Jewelry-Financing Program Hidden Fees
WH ADMINISTRATORS: Bid to Stay "Young" Denied

WHIRLPOOL CORP: "Bodley" Suit Transferred to W.D. Mich.
WIDEOPENWEST INC: Faces Class Action Over May 2017 IPO

* Justice Kennedy's Departure Likely Favorable for Businesses
* Most Retailers Face Title III Litigation Threat
* State Privacy Laws' Unintended Consequences Can Be Far-Reaching
* Supreme Court Empowers Corporations Over Individuals
* TCPA Filings Down 17.7% to 1,696 Cases in May 2018

* Truck Purchasers in UK Seek to Certify First Class Action


                            *********


3M CO: CAP Set Up to Advocate for PFAS-Affected Communities
-----------------------------------------------------------
Carrie Fellner, writing for Sydney Morning Herald, reports that a
nationwide coalition will be launched to advocate on behalf of
dozens of communities in Australia grappling with the devastating
fallout of toxic firefighting contamination.

The Coalition Against PFAS (CAP) will work to link residents in
at least 90 contaminated areas across the country, with its
foundation members a group of residents involved in class action
lawsuits at Williamtown in New South Wales, Katherine in the
Northern Territory and Oakey in Queensland.

In all three towns, land and drinking water has been tainted with
toxic per- and poly-fluoroalkyl chemicals (PFAS), manufactured
historically by chemical giant 3M and used for decades in fire
retardants at Australian military bases and fire stations.

The coalition's president, Lindsay Clout, is from one of about
750 households caught in a plume of toxic contamination
enveloping the Williamtown RAAF base, near Newcastle.

The aim, he said, was to create a unified national voice that
could force the government to clean up contaminated sites and
compensate people for depressed property values and business
losses.

"While the United States has declared cleaning up PFAS
contamination a 'national priority' and European countries move
towards stating there is no safe level of exposure, our
government has sat on its hands," Mr Clout said.

Communities that were newly discovering the contamination were
often isolated and needed clear information amid a mass of
contradictory messages, he said.

"Because of the difficulty and complexity people are not getting
the information they want . . . that's the real issue here," he
said.

"Often we are the first point of contact for young mothers, the
elderly and other community members seeking advice on how to
protect their homes and families."

It's understood the coalition is in talks with a similar
grassroots organisation in the United States about opportunities
for international co-operation.

Australia is one of the only countries in the world not to have
banned PFOS, arguably the most toxic chemical in the PFAS family,
and the Department of Defence is aggressively defending several
class action lawsuits for pollution stemming from its bases.

The coalition's launch comes after a Fairfax Media investigation
exposed a wave of cancers at a United States high school where
the drinking water was contaminated with PFAS, and an alleged
campaign over decades by 3M to hide the health dangers of the
toxins.

The series highlighted at least 90 sites across Australia where
PFAS contamination is being investigated, including 25 in NSW and
10 in Sydney.

The chemicals have been linked to suppression of the immune
system, hormonal disruption and some forms of cancer, but the
Department of Health maintains there is no conclusive evidence
they cause "important" health effects.

Among the coalition's representatives are Dianne Priddle and
David Jefferis, who run a cattle stud near the town of Oakey in
the Darling Downs.

The contamination has been a "terribly heavy" burden for the
couple, in their 60s.  They have lost their asset base and have
been forced to abandon the groundwater bores they used for
irrigation.

"We feel it as producers ourselves, and then we feel it again as
it's our business and then because it's our home. So we feel it
three times over," Ms Priddle said

"Every year this has gone on, the financial impact is greater and
greater.

"The human cost has not come to the front of this, they're
worrying about everything else except human lives . . . it seems
to have been lost by all sides of politics."

Litigation funder IMF Bentham, which has contributed funds
towards the new coalition's website, is bankrolling the class
actions at Williamtown, Oakey and Katherine.

Multinational firm Dentons is running the Williamtown lawsuit,
while personal injury specialists Shine Lawyers are prosecuting
the action in Oakey.

Fairfax Media understands Shine will file its suit in Katherine
in the coming weeks, and is canvassing potential actions in
Wodonga and Darwin.

Shine Lawyers special counsel Joshua Aylward said hundreds of
people from towns and cities around Australia had registered
interest in pursuing legal action over the chemicals.

"Just as with asbestos in 2003, the Commonwealth should ban the
importation and manufacturing of this chemical, and place tighter
controls around remediation of sites contaminated with PFAS," he
said.

"The evidence around 3M's conduct and cover up is only just
beginning to come to light.  The real concern in Australia is
what science the Commonwealth is relying on, and the veracity
with which they are reviewing the scientific literature.

"What we see [is] that the 'acceptable' levels of PFAS in
Australia are at odds with the rest of the western world, despite
the plethora of science now available." [GN]


ALLSCRIPTS HEALTHCARE: Seeks Dismissal of Ransomware Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Evan Sweeney, writing for Fierce Healthcare, reports that
Allscripts has asked an Illinois district judge to dismiss a
class-action lawsuit filed after a ransomware attack took down
the EHR vendor's servers for a week, adding that the dispute
belongs in arbitration.

The lawsuit revolves around a January cyber attack involving a
new variant of the SamSam virus.  The attack brought down the
company's servers in North Carolina and knocked out access for
nearly 1,500 physician practices.  Several of those providers
reverted to paper records and reported lost revenue and canceled
procedures due to the disruption.

In a court filing, Allscripts argued that Surfside Non-Surgical
Orthopedics, the specialty practice that filed the lawsuit,
intentionally sued the parent company of Allscripts Healthcare,
LLC known as Allscripts Healthcare Solutions Inc. to avoid the
arbitration clause outlined in its contract with the vendor.

Allscripts Healthcare Solutions Inc. is a "non-operating holding
company with only eight officers, no employees, and no products
or customers," according to the filing.

"Plaintiff apparently hopes that, by suing a party with which it
has no contractual or other business relationship, it can avoid
the contract that governs the provision of the services it
received from LLC," Allscripts attorneys wrote in a court filing.

The company added that even if Surfside sued the right company,
the injury was caused by a criminal act rather than Allscripts'
negligence.  The company added that it explicitly warns about the
inability to prevent all cyberattacks in its annual financial
filings.

"A criminal attack executed using a brand-new malware variant is
precisely the kind of unforeseeable intervening act that breaks
the chain of proximate causation," the court filing stated.

In a subsequent filing, Surfside's attorneys maintained the
parent company was to blame, adding that the company's "acts
and/or admissions affected the circumstances that gave rise to
the attack and its fall-out."

Surfside originally argued that SamSam has been a known
vulnerability since March 2016, and the company's "wanton,
willful, and reckless disregard" led to service disruption.

In response, Allscripts apparently couldn't resist a dig at
Surfside, and any other providers that encountered disruptions
from the attack.

"Customers who had appropriate contingency plans in place--the
existence of which practices may certify annually to the federal
government in exchange for certain financial incentives--were
minimally impacted by the attack," the company wrote in a
footnote in its motion to dismiss. [GN]


AMAZON.COM LLC: Court Enters Discovery Order in "Ortiz" Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California has entered a discovery order
the case, MICHAEL ORTIZ, Plaintiff, v. AMAZON.COM LLC, et al.,
Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-03820-JSW (MEJ) (N.D. Cal.).

Ortiz and Defendant Golden State FC, LLC filed two joint
discovery dispute letters.

On March 7, 2018, the Court ordered the Plaintiff to produce his
cell phone records to Golden State no later than April 6, 2018.
As of May 23, 2018, the Plaintiff has not done so.  He states
these records are not in his possession or control, as he is not
the account holder for the phone records.  Rather, the account is
in his non-party wife's name.  He has attempted to obtain the
phone records by requesting them from the carrier, but was unable
to do so because he is not authorized to obtain such records from
the carrier.  The Plaintiff also sought to obtain the records
through his wife, but has been unable to do so.  The Plaintiff
does not explain why this is.

Golden State represents, and the Plaintiff does not dispute, that
the Plaintiff did not inform Golden State that the cell phone
records were in his wife's name and thus unobtainable until April
27, 2018 -- three weeks after the Court-ordered deadline for
production.  Indeed, the parties' prior discovery letter on this
matter was silent as to this fact.  The Plaintiff has also
refused to provide his wife's name and address to allow Golden
State to subpoena the records from her, despite the Plaintiff's
representations that he would do so by May 8 and 16.

The Plaintiff has known as early as September 18, 2017, and at
the very latest, as of March 7, 2018, that he had to produce his
phone records.  He nevertheless waited three weeks past the
Court-ordered deadline to inform Golden State that he could not
obtain the records and the reason therefor.

On Jan. 25, 2018, Golden State requested the Plaintiff's
availability for deposition.  Over a month later, on March 1,
2018, the Plaintiff confirmed his deposition would take place on
April 23, 2018.  On March 7, 2018, Golden State served a Notice
of Deposition that Plaintiff's deposition would take place at the
defense counsel's San Francisco office.  On April 19, 2018, the
Plaintiff cancelled the deposition because he moved to Los
Angeles.  Moreover, Plaintiff makes little effort to demonstrate
undue hardship or exceptional or compelling circumstances.

Golden State also requests an order that the Plaintiff appear at
his deposition before he can compel or proceed with depositions
of Golden State's witnesses.

Magistrate Judge James ordered the Plaintiff to provide Golden
State with his cell phone account holder's name and address so
Golden State may subpoena the cell phone records from her.  The
Plaintiff will appear for a deposition in San Francisco,
California.  Within seven days of receiving the cell phone
records, the parties will meet and confer, telephonically or in
person, to schedule a date for the Plaintiff's deposition and any
other depositions thereafter.

The Magistrate Judge holds that the Plaintiff's discovery conduct
is more appropriate to a party appearing in pro se than to a
party represented by five attorneys licensed to practice before
the Court.  She admonishes the Plaintiff's attorneys to conduct
themselves in a more professional manner going forward.  She also
reminds the Plaintiff and his attorneys that they have a
responsibility to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.

She ordered that the Plaintiff cannot wait until the eleventh
hour -- let alone three weeks past a Court-ordered deadline -- to
inform Golden State that he is unable to comply with his
discovery obligations.  These delays could have been avoided or
reduced, had the Plaintiff promptly informed Golden State of his
changes in circumstance that affected his ability to observe the
Court's Order or to be deposed.

The Court reserves the right to impose sanctions against the
Plaintiff for violations of the Order and any future Court order,
as well as any future discovery violations.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Discovery Order is
available at https://is.gd/x6d392 from Leagle.com.

Michael Ortiz, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Corey Benjamin Bennett, Scott
Cole & Associates, Scott Edward Cole, Scott Cole & Associates,
APC & Cesar A. Alvarado, Law offices of Scott Cole.

Amazon.com LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company & Golden
State FC LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Defendants,
represented by Eric Meckley -- eric.meckley@morganlewis.com --
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP & Nancy Villarreal --
nancy.villarreal@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP.


ASSOCIATED CREDIT: Court Grants Summary in "Fuqua" FDCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington granted in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim in the case captioned JESSICA FUQUA,
Plaintiff, v. ASSOCIATED CREDIT SERVICE, INC., a Washington
corporation, and PAUL J WASSON and JANE DOE WASSON, Defendants,
No. 2:17-CV-00324-SMJ (E.D. Wash.).

The Plaintiffs alleges that the Defendants committed unfair and
deceptive acts in violation of state and federal consumer
protection laws in connection with its Associated's attempts to
collect on debt owed by Fuqua.  Fuqua alleges that Associated's
actions under both claims violated the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Washington Consumer Protection Act
(CPA).

In support of their motion, the Defendants have asked the Court
to consider documents and declarations not attached to Fuqua's
complaint.  In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court
generally looks only to the face of the complaint and the
documents attached thereto. A court must normally convert a Rule
12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment if it
considers evidence outside the pleadings. The Court therefore
considers the Defendants' motion as a motion for summary
judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Once a party has moved
for summary judgment, the opposing party must point to specific
facts establishing that there is a genuine dispute for trial.

The Court rules that the Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Fuqua's garnishment claim because Fuqua cannot show
that the Defendants lacked reason to believe her account
contained garnishable funds.

Fuqua alleges that Associated violated the FDCPA by falsely
asserting it had reason to believe Fuqua's bank account contained
non-exempt funds in its application for writ of garnishment. It
is not entirely clear from Fuqua's complaint or her response to
Defendant's motion for summary judgment which sections of the
FDCPA Fuqua believes the Defendants violated.

Here, Associated has established that it had reason to believe
Fuqua's checking account contained nonexempt funds. Before
seeking the writ of garnishment, Associated ran a credit inquiry
on Fuqua. The inquiry showed that Fuqua had a checking account, a
credit card, and a loan with Spokane Teacher's Credit Union.
Associated asserts that, because Fuqua had multiple lines of
credit from the same institution, it inferred that Fuqua was
likely employed. Associated did not have any notice that Fuqua
had applied to exempt the funds in the account or that the
account contained exclusively exempt funds. Associated therefore
had reason to believe the account contained nonexempt funds.

Fuqua cannot show that the Defendants' representations to the
Spokane County District Court constituted a violation of the
FDCPA.

Fuqua next argues that Associated violated 15 U.S.C. Sections
1692e and 1692f, which prohibit the use of false or misleading
statements when collecting a debt by attempting to recover an
unnecessary notary fee. Washington law allows a judgment creditor
to recover from the judgment debtor taxable court costs and fees.
In Kirk v. Gobel, 622 F.Supp.2d 1039 (E.D. Wash. 2009), held that
a debt collector's claim to recover unregistered process server
fees was unfair and misleading in violation of the FDCPA.

Fuqua attempts to characterize Associated's misrepresentation as
an effort to collect an illegal notary fee. If this were the
case, Associated's actions would more closely resemble those in
Kirk, where the judgment creditor attempted to seek reimbursement
for fees to which he was under no circumstances entitled.
However, Fuqua's characterization finds no support in the facts.
Associated has produced the undisputed declarations of David
Solberg, Chad Solberg, and Cynthia Henderson, which establish
that Associated never incurred, nor attempted to seek
reimbursement for, a notary fee.

Even taken in the light most favorable to Fuqua's claim, the
undisputed facts show that Associated presented the court with an
accurate, though embellished, statement of the costs to which it
was legally entitled. While the Court certainly does not condone
Associated's misrepresentations to the judiciary, the
misrepresentation was not misleading for the purposes of the
FDCPA.

The Court finds that Associated's statement regarding the $5
Notary fee is not a material misrepresentation within the meaning
of the FDCPA. Associated is therefore entitled to summary
judgment on this claim.

Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion and Memorandum to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim, or, Alternatively Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted in part.  The Court enters summary judgment
in favor of Defendants on Fuqua's FDCPA claims and dismissed
Fuqua's remaining state law claims without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycum5o5h from Leagle.com.

Jessica Fuqua, and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
represented by Kirk D. Miller, Kirk D Miller PS.

Associated Credit Service Inc, a Washington corporation, Paul J
Wasson, husband & Jane Doe Wasson, wife, Defendants, represented
by John Gregory Lockwood, Law Office of J Gregory Lockwood PLLC.


AUBURN, NY: Residents File Lawsuit Over Falls Landfill Stench
-------------------------------------------------------------
Philip Gambini, writing for Niagara Gazette, reports that with a
law firm partially based in the City of Auburn, a local resident
has filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of at least 300
individuals plagued by a rotting stench emitted from the Allied
Waste Landfill on Niagara Falls Boulevard.
Emily Hickey is the named plaintiff in the suit, filed by
attorney Jan Smolak, Esq. -- smolak@michaels-smolak.com -- in
late June, which alleges the 385-acre dump operator has failed to
install adequate systems to neutralize odors created by the
emission of hydrogen sulfide.
"Resident complainants describe the sickening odors as obnoxious,
foul and nauseating," the suit said, characterizing the stench as
"similar in smell to that of wet paper pulp, rotten eggs or
decomposing flesh."
The plaintiffs claim the stench forces them indoors, precludes
them from hosting company in their houses, and "virtually renders
them entrapped in their own homes."
Smolak did not return a request for comment.
Late last year, three area residents spoke to the Niagara Gazette
regarding their experience near the landfill. Ron Licht was among
them and described a drive down Military Road that made his
stomach heave, causing him to pull over the car and vomit on the
roadside.
It happened again when Licht was on his way to a department store
with his 4-year-old daughter in the back seat. The smell had her
"almost gagging a little bit it was so bad," he said.
The Department of Environmental Conservation fined the facility
$75,000 last year after filing a "Notice of Violation" against
the company for odor concerns. Agency investigators have
previously confirmed the site as a "primary source" of "sulfur
and garbage-type" stench complaints.
The consent order also came with a set "of requirements to
address the numerous odor complaints from the public that DEC has
tracked related to this facility."
The order called for: the installation of a gas control system;
implementation of a controlled burn protocol for certain gas
emissions; initiation of a pilot program for odor remediation of
landfill leachate associated with a sulfur-like smell; and a
consideration to restrict certain odor-causing materials the
landfill presently accepts.
In addition, the facility was told to study and "identify all
potential air contaminant emissions to determine what additional
controls should be installed."
The lawsuit alleges those precautions were not taken, but a
spokesperson said that is not the case.
"Allied is currently in compliance with New York State Department
of Environmental Conservation's Order on Consent," the
spokesperson said in an email, adding the agency would not
comment further because the matter concerned "private
litigation."
A public relations representative with Allied was not immediately
available for comment on June 28.[GN]


BANK OF AMERICA: Court Denies Bid to Amend "Jackson" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Hugh B. Scott of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of New York denied the Jacksons' motion to amend
the case, Bobbi Jackson and Matthew Jackson, Decision and Order
Plaintiffs, v. Bank of America, N.A., Defendant, Case No. 16-CV-
787G (W.D. N.Y.).

Bobbi and Matthew Jackson took out a mortgage loan to buy a house
but fell behind in their payments when Matthew lost his job.
Once their finances improved, the Jacksons applied for loss
mitigation to help them make up for payments that were past due
and avoid foreclosure.  The lender, Defendant Bank of America,
allegedly mishandled the application process in a way that ran
afoul of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974
("RESPA"), and one related regulation.

The Jacksons commenced the litigation by filing a potential
class-action complaint on Sept. 30, 2016.  They now have filed a
non-dispositive motion to amend the complaint to add another set
of lead Plaintiffs, McKinley and Angel Moses from Illinois.  The
Jacksons believe that adding the Moses Plaintiffs will promote
judicial economy by avoiding the filing of an identical case in
Illinois.  At the same time, they argue that amendment will not
cause any delay or prejudice to the Bank.

The Bank opposes amendment because, in their view, the Court
lacks personal jurisdiction over the Moses plaintiffs.  The Bank
raises additional objections about delay and prejudice that would
result.

Chief Judge Frank P. Geraci has referred the case to the Court
under 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b).  The Court heard oral argument on
May 3, 2018.

Magistrate Judge Scott finds that the Bank is not incorporated in
New York and does not have its principal place of business there.
The Jacksons have indicated, and the Bank does not contest, that
the Bank has some physical presence in New York and conducts some
business there.  They've not shown that the Bank's activities or
presence in New York constitute a majority or at least a
substantial plurality of its overall activities.  Discovery to
that end will not help; the Bank is a publicly traded
corporation, and if most of its overall activities occurred in
New York then the Jacksons should have been able by now to use
publicly available information to make at least a prima facie
demonstration to that effect.  Under these circumstances, the
Magistrate Judge holds that the Bank does not qualify as an
"exceptional case" that would support a finding of general
jurisdiction.

Turning to specific jurisdiction, the Magistrate Judge finds that
the Jacksons have not set forth any information indicating that
the Bank did anything with or to the Moses Plaintiffs in New York
that would lead to specific jurisdiction.  The Jacksons have not
shown that the Moses Plaintiffs applied for or received a
mortgage loan in New York.  The Moses Plaintiffs do not live in
New York, did not fall behind in their payments in New York, and
did not apply for loan modification in New York.

With neither general nor specific jurisdiction present, the
Magistrate Judge holds that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction
over the Moses Plaintiffs.  Without personal jurisdiction, any
amendment to the complaint to add claims by the Moses Plaintiffs
would be futile.  Accordingly, he will deny the pending motion
without the need to consider any of the other arguments from the
parties.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Scott denied
the Jacksons' motion to amend the complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Decision and Order
is available at https://is.gd/Jyo8fF from Leagle.com.

Bobbi Jackson & Matthew Jackson, Plaintiffs, represented by
Catherine Creighton -- ccreighton@cpjglaborlaw.com -- Creighton
Johnsen & Giroux, Ian H. Hayes -- ihayes@cpjglaborlaw.com --
Creighton Johnsen & Giroux, Katherine Aizpuru --
kaizpuru@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei LLP, pro hac vice,
Annick Persinger -- apersinger@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei
LLP, pro hac vice, Geoffrey G. Bestor -- gbesq@bestorlaw.com --
The Bestor Law Firm & Jonathan K. Tycko -- jtycko@tzlegal.com --
Tycko & Zavareei LLP.

Bank of America, N.A., Defendant, represented by Keith E.
Levenberg -- klevenberg@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin Procter LLP,
Courtney L. Hayden -- chayden@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin Procter
LLP & James W. McGarry -- jmcgarry@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin
Procter LLP.


BAR 20: Aug. 9 Mandatory Scheduling Conference in "Maciel"
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order on Second Stipulation to Continue
Mandatory Scheduling Conference in the case captioned JOSE MACIEL
and ELVIS BONILLA, on behalf of themselves, and all others
similarly situated, and as an "aggrieved employee" on behalf of
other "aggrieved employees" under the Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004, Plaintiff(s), v. BAR 20 DAIRY,
LLC, a California limited liability company; and DOES 1 through
50, inclusive, Defendant(s), Case No. 1:17-cv-00902-DAD-SKO (E.D.
Cal.).

The Mandatory Scheduling Conference is continued to August 9,
2018 at 10:15 A.M.  The parties are directed to file their joint
scheduling report no later than August 2, 2018.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ydcahkdu from Leagle.com.

Jose Maciel, on behalf of himself, and all others similarly
situated, and as an "aggrieved employee" on behalf of other
"aggrieved employees" under the Labor Code Private Attorney
General Act of 2004, Plaintiff, represented by Caroline
Tahmassian Zarneh -- caroline@spivaklaw.com -- The Spivak Law
Firm & David Glenn Spivak -- david@spivaklaw.com --  The Spivak
Law Firm.

Elvis Bonilla, on behalf of himself, and all others similarly
situated, and as an "aggrieved employee" on behalf of other
"aggrieved employees" under the Labor Code Private Attorney
General Act of 2004, Plaintiff, represented by Eric Bryce
Kingsley -- eric@kingsleykingsley.com -- Kingsley & Kingsley APC
& Kelsey M. Peterson-More -- kelsey@kingsleykingsley.com --
Kingsley & Kingsley.

Bar 20 Dairy, LLC, a California limited liability company,
Defendant, represented by Jared Hague -- jared@suttonhague.com --
Sutton Hague Law Corporation, PC, Joseph Vidal Macias --
joseph.macias@maximintegrated.com -- Sutton Hague Law
Corporation, PC, S. Brett Sutton -- brett@suttonhague.com --
Sutton Hague Law Corporation, PC & Wesley Lawrence Carlson,
Sutton Hague Law Corporation.


BOFI HOLDING: Ballard Spahr Attorney Discusses Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Evan W. Krick, Esq. -- kricke@ballardspahr.com -- of Ballard
Spahr LLP, in an article for The National Law Review, wrote that
in February 2017, "we blogged about a whistleblower complaint
filed against Bank of the Internet ('BofI') by its former
internal auditor. The blog post addressed what the whistleblower
believed was BofI's wrongdoing in relation to responding to a
subpoena from the Securities and Exchange Commission ('SEC'), and
when dealing with a certain loan customer in potential violation
of the Anti-Money Laundering ("AML") rules of the Bank Secrecy
Act ('BSA')."

"Less than two months after our blog post, three BofI
stockholders brought a putative class action complaint against
BofI seeking to represent a class of individuals who purchased
BofI stock, in a case captioned Mandalevey v. BofI Holding, Inc.
These plaintiffs alleged BofI violated the Securities Exchange
Act through, among other alleged misrepresentations, falsely
denying the company was under investigation for money laundering
violations.  A federal court recently dismissed all claims
against BofI.

"This post focuses on that decision, the allegations relating to
the federal investigation of BofI, and the Court's interesting
reasoning in dismissing these plaintiffs' claims.  Although the
bank won this latest round, the saga involving BofI underscores
how financial institutions face an increasing risk that alleged
AML and Counter-Terrorism Financing ("CTF") violations will lead
to follow-on allegations of securities law violations --
allegations brought not only by the government, but also by
investor class action suits. "

Background
On March 31, 2017, the New York Post published an article
entitled "Feds Probe [BofI] for Possible Money Laundering." The
article stated the Department of Justice was leading an
investigation into "possible money laundering" at BofI.  In
addition to detailing allegations against the company, the
article provided the response of BofI's Chief Legal Counsel.
According to the article, he initially refused to answer
questions about any possible criminal probe.  However, he then
provided a written statement to the Post, which read, "There are
no material investigations that would require public disclosure
and BofI remains in good regulatory standing."  BofI also issued
a press release the same day.  The press release addressed
certain of the allegations in the Post article, and added, "the
Company has received no indication of, and has no knowledge
regarding, such purported money laundering investigation."  By
the end of March 31, BofI stock dropped 5.26%.

Interestingly, during earnings conference calls in 2016 and in a
Form 8-K filed in March 2016, BofI had represented that a major
law firm had performed an internal investigation into the
whistleblower's allegations and found no support for the
conclusion that the bank or management had engaged in wrongdoing.

On October 25, 2017, the New York Post published another article
about BofI, this one entitled, "Bank of Internet Was Under 16-
Month SEC Investigation." As the title suggests, the article
stated the SEC had investigated BofI for 16 months, but the
investigation ended several months earlier without the SEC taking
any action.  Notably, the article's information was based upon
"government documents" obtained "through the Freedom of
Information Act."  On October 26, BofI stock fell 4.57%.

The Plaintiffs' Allegations and the Court's Analysis
Referencing these two articles, the plaintiffs in Mandalevey v.
BofI Holding, Inc. alleged BoFi's statements from March 31, 2017
must have been false.  To support their claim, the plaintiffs
also provided a statement from a "confidential witness" who
stated there was "no way" BofI officials could not have known
about the investigation.

The Court agreed with the plaintiffs, stating they "sufficiently
demonstrated" the March 31 statements must have been false for
the purposes of a motion to dismiss (in which a court reviews a
complaint only to determine if it contains sufficient facts
which, if accepted as true, state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face).  Another step, however, still was
necessary to sufficiently allege a claim under the Securities
Exchange Act: the plaintiffs were required to allege adequately
"loss causation."

"Loss Causation"
To plead "loss causation," a plaintiff must allege plausibly that
the defendant's fraud was revealed to the market and caused the
resulting losses.  For this element, the Court focused on the
plaintiff's ability to identify a "corrective disclosure."  The
plaintiffs alleged the October 25 article was the relevant
"corrective disclosure" for the March 31 misrepresentation.

BofI countered by arguing that the October 25 article did not
disclose any previously non-public information.  That is, BofI
pointed to the fact the October 25 article relied on documents
obtained through FOIA.  This argument raised the novel question:
Is information available from a federal agency through FOIA
"publicly available"?

Ultimately, the Court determined information obtained by FOIA is
"publicly available" and therefore the information is deemed to
be incorporated into the stock's market price.  The Court
reasoned that, "in the nearly seven months between BofI's denial
and the October 25 article, a market participant would have made
the sensible step of asking the SEC whether BofI's denial was
accurate."  Recognizing a market participant "would have had to
jump through a bureaucratic hoop" to obtain this information,
that information is nevertheless considered "public" for the
purpose of the plaintiff's claims because market participants are
always presumed to be "information-hungry."

For a company facing a securities class action case, the
Mandalevey decision provides a potential new defense -- that
information is publicly available via a FOIA (or other public
records) request, and therefore not actionable.  Perhaps more
important is the public relations takeaway for a company under
investigation by law enforcement.  BofI's initial response in its
call with the Post reporter was to say nothing.  Only later did
it make the statements that the Court determined could be found
to be demonstrably false.  And despite BofI stating it was
unaware of an investigation, BofI's stock dropped significantly
in the wake of the Post's article.

Needless to say, a company faces a difficult balance when
responding to a public report of an ongoing investigation,
whether it involve allegations of money laundering or otherwise.
Although BofI's defense to date has been successful, the effects
of an alleged false statement regarding an ongoing investigation
are often felt well into the future.   Moreover, and regardless
of the actual merits of the complaint against BofI or other
banks, the mere existence of such shareholder lawsuits reflects
that financial institutions must concern themselves not only with
FinCEN, the Department of Justice, and the relevant examiner, but
also with putative investor plaintiffs and the SEC -- thereby
increasing the stakes regarding decisions over the disclosure in
SEC filings of possible violations of AML/BSA requirements.
[GN]


CAPITEC BANK: Summit Financial Abandons Case Over Payday Loans
--------------------------------------------------------------
Hanna Ziady, writing for Business Day, reports that Summit
Financial Partners has abandoned all legal cases against Capitec
Bank, patching up a relationship that turned sour nearly three
years ago when the consumer lobby group took the bank on over its
payday loans, which have since been discontinued.

Summit said at the time the loans were reckless because they
failed to verify the financial standing of borrowers.

The news will come as a blow to short-selling outfit Viceroy
Research.  In a February report that torpedoed Capitec's share
price, Viceroy said Summit's cases could trigger a class-action
lawsuit that would require Capitec to refund a minimum R12.7bn in
initiation fees associated with the lending product, known as a
multi-loan.

But that is unlikely after Summit and Capitec said on June 29
they had reached an out-of-court settlement.

Capitec and Summit had agreed to work together on consumer
financial literacy programmes and debt relief solutions, Capitec
chief financial officer Andre du Plessis said.

"The only party who is benefiting is the consumer," Summit CEO
Clark Gardner said.

Consumers remain heavily indebted following an unsecured lending
boom that began in 2010 and peaked in March 2014, when
outstanding unsecured loans in SA hit a record high of R172.97bn.

The number of consumers with impaired credit records, indicating
three outstanding payments, adverse listings or judgments,
reached a high of 10.53-million in June 2015.  At the end of
March 2018, this figure had fallen to 9.7-million, according to
figures from the National Credit Regulator.

Meanwhile, after falling for a number of years, outstanding
unsecured loans have crept up to R172.56bn.  Despite high
unemployment, the country has about 25.46-million consumers with
credit.

Mr. Gardner admitted the decision to settle had been difficult,
but Summit could not compete with Capitec's legal team.

The consumers whose cases Summit was fighting were in a
"significantly better position" and Summit was not "handcuffed to
the deal", said Mr. Gardner.  "If we disagree with them we'll be
back in court."

Capitec's multi-loan product allowed a consumer who had qualified
in-branch for a loan to take out multiple loans thereafter by
answering three questions at an ATM.  Summit said these loans
caused consumers to be overindebted and were therefore reckless.

Summit also argued that charging an initiation fee on each new
loan was unfair but the regulator upheld that.

Capitec discontinued the multi-loan product in February 2016,
after amendments to the National Credit Act put stricter
affordability assessment rules. [GN]


CERNER CORP: Judge Approves $4.5MM Class Action Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------
Elise Reuter, writing for Kansas City Business Journal, reports
that Cerner Corp. recently settled another long-running class-
action lawsuit, to the tune of $4.5 million.  U.S. District Judge
Fernando Gaitan Jr. approved the terms of the settlement on June
11, which includes $4.5 million for class members and up to $2
million in attorneys' fees.

The three-year-old lawsuit filed in U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Missouri was based on overtime complaints by
two former Cerner employees who worked as salaried service center
analysts.  According to Healthcare IT News, they alleged that
Cerner's payroll processing system resulted in overtime wages
being miscalculated and that overtime wages were received a full
pay period late.

More than 1,400 class members elected to participate in the
lawsuit, according to court documents.  Cerner has asked the
court to seal the terms of the settlement.

The case is similar to another class-action suit Cerner recently
settled, brought forth by a former delivery consultant for the
company.  The lawsuit alleged Cerner misclassified its employees,
and that they should not be exempt from overtime pay.

Cerner is seeking to seal the terms of that settlement. [GN]


CHICAGO BRIDGE: Court Dismisses "Kinra" ERISA Suit
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Class
Action Complaint in the case captioned RAMESH C. KINRA, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON CO., et al., Defendants, No.
17 Civ. 4251 (LGS)(S.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiff brings this action against the Defendants and
others pursuant to the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), for breach of a fiduciary's duty of prudence and duty of
loyalty, and for failure to monitor. The Plaintiff alleges that
the Defendants breached their duties to the Plans for continuing
to offer the common stock of CB&I (Company Stock) as an
investment option in the Plans when the Defendants knew or should
have known that the price of the stock was improperly inflated.

Effect of Rule 17 on Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)(3) states that the court
may not dismiss an action for failure to prosecute in the name of
the real party in interest until, after an objection, a
reasonable time has been allowed for the real party in interest
to ratify, join, or be substituted into the action.

Rule 17 and This Case

In this case, the Complaint is dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because the original plaintiff did not have
Article III standing and that defect cannot be cured with a Rule
17 substitution of a new plaintiff. Standing is to be determined
as of the commencement of suit.

The Initial Complaint was filed on June 7, 2017, in the name of
John J. Giantonio as the named Plaintiff on behalf of a putative
class. On August 22, 2017, apparently because Mr. Giantonio could
not substantiate that he was a participant in the Plans and
therefore a class member, the Plaintiff amended the Initial
Complaint to substitute Plaintiff Kinra for Plaintiff Giantonio.
But because Giantonio was not a participant in the Plans, he had
no standing to bring claims against the Defendants either
individually or on behalf of a class. For these reasons, a Rule
17 substitution of plaintiffs cannot rectify Giantonio's lack of
standing. The initial action was a nullity from the outset, and
there was no action into which Plaintiff Kinra can be
substituted.
Accordingly, the 12(b)(1) motion is granted.

Breach of the Duties of Prudence and Loyalty

In the alternative, and to the extent that the Court does have
subject matter jurisdiction over this action, the Complaint is
dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rules 12(b)(6) and
12(c).

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9b6yl9q from
Leagle.com.

John J. Giantonio, on behalf of the Chicago Bridge & Iron Savings
Plan, The Shaw Group Inc. 401(k) Plan, himself and a class
consisting of similarly situated participants of the Plans &
Ramesh C. Kinra, Plaintiffs, represented by Michael Jason Klein -
- ONVI@ssbny.com -- Stull Stull & Brody.

Chicago Bridge & Iron Company, Investment Committee, Plan
Administrator, Stephen H. Dimlich, Jr., Westley S. Stockton &
Sheila Feldman, Defendants, represented by Darren E. Nadel --
dnadel@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, PC, David Charles
Gartenberg -- dgartenberg@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, PC &
Pamela S. Reynolds -- preynolds@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson,
P.C.

Luciano Reyes, Travis Stricker, Brian Mims, Dennis Fox, Scott
Waguespack, Misty Palmer, Lance Bowling & Joe Christaldi,
Defendants, represented by David Charles Gartenberg, Littler
Mendelson, PC.


CHICAGO BRIDGE: Loses Bid to Dismiss Securities Fraud Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned IN
RE CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON COMPANY N.V. SECURITIES LITIGATION, No.
17 Civ. 1580 (LGS)(S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire
Retirement System, individually and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated, bring this putative class action
against the Defendants, alleging violation of Section 10(b) and
Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act). The case arises from the Defendants' alleged
misrepresentations and omissions in CBI's financial statements
and elsewhere regarding losses in CBI's construction of two
nuclear plants.

The Complaint's allegations of material omissions and
misstatements principally fall into three categories. The first
category is that CBI recorded unapproved change orders as assets
and revenue in the financial statements contained in its 10-Ks
and 10-Qs in violation of GAAP (Change Order Statements).

The second category of alleged misstatements involved the
overstatement of goodwill in CBI's financial statements contained
its Forms 10-Q and 10-K (Goodwill Statements). The overstatement
resulted in part from CBI's improper recording of purchase price
adjustments in the year following the Shaw acquisition.

The third category of alleged misstatements concerns the status
of the Nuclear Projects and CBI's failure to disclose mounting
problems and their impact on profitability during conference
calls with investors and analysts (Progress Statements).

Scienter

The Complaint alleges scienter.  In addition, the Complaint
relies on confidential witnesses (CWs). At least three CWs, who
worked at the Vogtle and V.C. Summer Plants, including CW 2 who
worked as a mechanical engineer, reported that engineering teams
filed weekly reports in a company system called Sharepoint, where
Defendants could and did access them.

Reliance and Loss Causation

The Plaintiffs purchased CBI stock during the Class Period.
Following unfavorable media reports about safety code violations
at the Vogtle and V.C. Summer Plants, cost overruns and
unapproved work orders, CBI's stock price decreased from $83.30
to $76.72 per share. Prescience Point Report, CBI's stock price
dropped from $74.46 to $68.26 per share.

Statute of Limitations

A private right of action under Section 10(b) and 10b-5 may be
brought not later than the earlier of two years after the
discovery of the facts constituting the violation or five years
after the violation.

Section 10(b) Violation

Material Omissions and Misrepresentations

A statement or omission is materially misleading when there is a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the total mix of information made available
to the market.

In Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Const. Indus., 135
S.Ct. 1318 (2015), the Supreme Court held that an opinion
statement is actionable if (1) the speaker did not hold the
belief she professed, (2) the supporting facts she supplied were
untrue, or (3) the stated opinion, though sincerely held and
otherwise true as a matter of fact, omitted information whose
omission made the stated opinion misleading to a reasonable
investor.

In its Forms 10-K and 10-Q filed during the Class Period, CBI
reported significant amounts of unapproved change orders as
assets and revenues, by recording them as contract price
adjustments. CBI thus implicitly represented that collecting on
these change orders was probable, and CBI explicitly stated that
recorded unapproved change orders and claims reflect our best
estimate of recovery amounts.

The Court finds that the Complaint adequately alleges that these
statements of opinion were false and that the Defendants knew
that they were false. The Complaint alleges that CBI knew that
its claim for the unapproved change orders was disputed and the
subject of litigation, and that CBI lacked a legal basis for the
claims, which were the result of deficiencies in CBI's
performance.

The EPC Agreements provided that CBI was not entitled to recover
if the change orders were a result of CBI's failure to comply
with NRC standards or failure to produce requisite manufacturing
parts. The Nuclear Projects' cost overruns and delays allegedly
were due to the Lake Charles facility's failure to produce
necessary parts, CBI's Stop Work Order and CBI's inability to
properly track and store the manufactured parts.

The Goodwill Statements

Under SFAS No. 141, goodwill is an asset representing the future
economic benefits arising from other assets acquired in a
business combination that are not individually identified and
separately recognized.

Here, the Complaint includes factual allegations that raise an
inference that the Defendants intentionally or recklessly failed
to write down their goodwill accounting. GAAP requires a company
to assess goodwill at least annually and whenever an event occurs
or circumstances change that would more likely than not reduce
the fair value of a reporting unit below its carrying amount.

The Complaint alleges that goodwill was not written down until
the sale to Westinghouse, despite known delays, cost overruns,
growing liability disputes and CBI's contemplation and eventual
execution of a quitclaim deed to relieve itself of liabilities
associated with Shaw. These allegations are sufficient to survive
a motion to dismiss.

Scienter

The Complaint sufficiently pleads scienter as to each Defendant.
A plaintiff may satisfy the scienter requirement by alleging
facts (1) showing that the defendants had both motive and
opportunity to commit the fraud or (2) constituting strong
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.

The Individual Defendants' Scienter

The Court finds that the Complaint's allegations of recklessness
are sufficient to support an inference of scienter that is at
least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from
the facts alleged.

First, the CEO, CFO and Chief Accounting Officer not only had
access to the facts underlying the Company's financial reporting,
they were responsible for it and attested to its accuracy by
signing or certifying the Company's Forms 10-K and 10-Q.

Second, the CWs stated that the Individual Defendants had access
to and accessed monthly reports that contained details on (1)
cost overruns that dated back to 2009 and that continued growing
through 2015; (2) overruns and delays caused by the Lake Charles
facility's failure to produce conforming materials for the
Nuclear Projects; (3) overruns and delays caused by CBI's
inability to properly track and ship materials; (4) overruns and
delays caused by CBI's inability to properly store materials; and
(5) delays caused by the Stop Work Order on the Lake Charles
facility.

Third, the monthly reports on Sharepoint, the Stop Work Order,
the NRC investigations, and the unapproved change orders in
dispute with the Vogtle and V.C. Summers Plants' owners put the
Individual Defendants on notice that many of the unapproved
change orders should not have been accounted for as additional
income or assets.

Corporate Scienter

Because the Complaint adequately alleges scienter as to the
Individual Defendants, CBI's scienter is inferred from theirs.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9pxec6h from
Leagle.com.

ALSAR Ltd. Partnership, Lead Plaintiff, represented by Kim Elaine
Miller, Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC.

City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Retirement System,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Samuel Howard Rudman --
Srudman@rgrdlaw.com --  Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.
Thomas Hubbell, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Shannon Lee Hopkins
-- shopkins@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP.

Chicago Bridge & Iron Company N.V., Philip K. Asherman & Westley
S. Stockton, Defendants, represented by David D. Sterling --
david.sterling@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Botts, L.L.P., Douglas W.
Henkin -- douglas.henkin@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Botts LLP &
Rebeca Aizpuru Huddle -- rebeca.huddle@bakerbotts.com -- Baker
Botts LLP.

Ronald A. Ballschmiede, Defendant, represented by Douglas W.
Henkin, Baker Botts LLP, Robert Allen Horowitz --
horowitzr@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, LLP, David D. Sterling,
Baker Botts, L.L.P., James Russell Leahy -- leahyj@gtlaw.com --
Greenberg Traurig & Nicole Shirley Bakare -bakaren@gtlaw.com --
Greenberg Traurig.

John J. Giantonio, Interested Party, represented by Michael Jason
Klein -- ONVI@ssbny.com -- Stull Stull & Brody.


COMCAST: Faces Class Action Over Xfinity Mobile Fraud
-----------------------------------------------------
Chris Mills, writing for BGR, reports that Comcast has grown its
wireless reseller Xfinity Mobile at speed by leveraging its
existing cable and internet customer base, but a class-action
lawsuit spotted by DSL Reports alleges that the company may have
been so keen to sign up new customers, it didn't fully protect
their data or verify new accounts and phone purchases.

According to the class-action suit, unauthorized users (read:
scammers) were able to open Xfinity Mobile postpaid accounts for
existing Comcast customers online, using easily-available
information.  A postpaid wireless account fraudulently opened in
your name is bad news, as it can affect your credit score, and
according to the lawsuit, Comcast didn't do enough to prevent
fraud.

"In an apparent effort to grow its fledgling mobile business
segment, Comcast leveraged the personal account information of
its existing cable and internet customers to allow the opening of
XFINITY Mobile accounts through its online customer portal," the
lawsuit says."  Unauthorized users infiltrated Comcast's XFINITY
Mobile accounts, enabling them to purchase cell phones through
the website using already established personal account
information from customers' cable and internet accounts."

In a statement to DSL Reports, Comcast said that "We are aware of
the lawsuit that was filed in the Northern District of Illinois
and we are in the process of investigating the claims.  Fraud is
an issue across the wireless industry, and there is no indication
of a breach of our systems.  We are prepared to vigorously defend
against this action.  However, given the pending nature of the
litigation, we cannot comment further at this time." [GN]


COMMONWEALTH BANK: Faces Shareholder Class Action
-------------------------------------------------
Ambar Warrick, writing for Reuters, reports that Commonwealth
Bank of Australia said on July 2 it had been served with a class
action lawsuit filed by Phi Finney McDonald on behalf of certain
shareholders.

The class action was filed on behalf of certain shareholders who
acquired an interest in CBA's shares between June 16, 2014 and
Aug. 3, 2017, the bank said in a statement.

The bank added that the proceeding involved similar claims to the
shareholder class action commenced by Maurice Blackburn against
the bank in October 2017, and that it intended to "vigorously"
defend the claim.

Maurice Blackburn had filed a class action against CBA on behalf
of shareholders, accusing the lender of failing to disclose
widespread breaches of anti-money-laundering rules. [GN]


CREDIT UNION: Put Under Liquidation, Class Action Pending
---------------------------------------------------------
Jim DuPlessis, writing for Credit Union Times, reports that
Kentucky regulators liquidated the Louisville Metro Police
Officers Credit Union on June 29 after it had burned through $5.4
million in losses in its last two reported quarters as state and
federal agents investigated allegations of internal theft.

The Kentucky Department of Financial Institutions on June 29
appointed the NCUA as liquidating agent for the federally insured
credit union, and it allowed Commonwealth Credit Union of
Frankfort, Ky. ($1.2 billion in assets, 98,376 members) to
acquire the Louisville credit union's 3,349 members, shares and
$20 million in assets for terms that were not disclosed.
In the six months that ended March 31, the assets of Louisville
Metro Police Officers CU fell nearly $7.7 million, or more than a
quarter of their total.  The decline included about $4.4 million
in loans.

Its delinquencies rose from a reported 1.75% in September 2017 to
9% by Dec. 31. The delinquency rate had fallen to 4.1% by
March 31.

No charges have yet been reported from the investigation started
by state authorities and first revealed in December 2017.
Members filed a class-action lawsuit in March alleging fake loans
had been taken out in their names.

The NCUA conserved Louisville Metro Police Officers Credit Union
in December just 10 days after the Kentucky Department of
Financial Institutions disclosed that it had turned over to the
FBI an investigation of internal theft.

"The decision to liquidate Louisville Metro Police Officers
Credit Union and discontinue its operations was made after
determining the credit union was insolvent and had no prospect
for restoring viable operations," the NCUA said in a news release
emailed at 5 p.m.

In its September 2017 call report -- the last before it was
conserved -- the credit union's situation seemed rosy, with a
modest profit and a net worth ratio over 11%. By the end of
December, its "well capitalized" status had dissolved into
"critically undercapitalized" with a ratio approaching -2%. By
March it was nearly -11%.

Louisville generated a $3.7 million loss in the last three months
of 2017 aided by a $218,897 spike in loan loss provisions and a
$3.5 million charge under the NCUA account called "miscellaneous
operating expenses," a category that was just over $12,000 for
the first nine months of the year.

In the first quarter, the main contributors to the credit union's
$1.7 million loss were a $171,854 loan loss provision and $1.4
million in miscellaneous operating expenses. [GN]


CRST EXPEDITED: Court Certifies Truck Drivers Class
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Collective
Action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in the case
captioned JUAN CARLOS MONTOYA, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CRST EXPEDITED, INC.,
and CRST INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-
10095-PBS (D. Mass.).

Plaintiff Juan Carlos Montoya alleges that Defendants CRST
Expedited, Inc., and CRST International, Inc. (CRST), underpaid
their long-haul truck drivers, misled them regarding the costs of
driver training, and imposed excessive charges to recoup those
costs in violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
and Iowa law.

Montoya's Phase 1 training took place in Marine City, Michigan.
He signed a Training Agreement that bound him, upon breach or
termination, to pay CRST $3,950, plus advances for training
expenses, plus interest. On the same day, he signed an Assignment
of Wages and Payroll Deduction Agreement, permitting CRST to
recover its advances by deducting $40 per week from his future
earnings.  Montoya then traveled to Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for Phase
2 orientation. Montoya signed an Employment Contract requiring
him, upon breach or termination, to pay CRST $6,500, plus the
other amounts discussed above. Montoya was not paid wages during
Phases 1 and 2.

The key collective-action question, then, is whether the
potential members of the group have shown that they are similarly
situated for purposes of the FLSA.

The standard policies and practices include:

   -- The terms of the Training Agreement and Employment
Contract, which bind drivers to work for CRST for eight or 10
months while repaying certain expenses advanced by CRST, or else
owe CRST thousands of dollars for tuition and training expenses,
plus interest.

   -- The practice of treating Phase 1 and Phase 2 drivers as
unpaid trainees.

   -- The practice of paying team drivers in Phase 3 and Phase 4
according to a split mileage pay scale starting at 25 cents per
mile.

   -- The company's position that sleeper-berth time is never
compensable.

   -- The practice of deducting costs for training, drug tests,
physical examinations, transportation, and lodging from drivers'
wages.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has made a substantial showing
that these legal issues are likely to be shared between Montoya
and the proposed group of opt-in plaintiffs. Accordingly, the
proposed opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated for purposes of
an FLSA collective action.

The Defendants' arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Their
most compelling point is that even if CRST drivers sometimes were
not paid minimum wage, an individualized inquiry would be
required to identify those instances. But claimants are similarly
situated in challenging the standardized policies and practices
governing the Driver Training Program.

This is true even if their individual damages must be separately
calculated. Such calculations do not necessarily defeat a
similarly situated finding.

The Defendants describe a variety of fact-specific scenarios
(such as experience-based pay, per-diem pay, and payroll
advances) that may determine how much a driver was paid during a
particular pay period. However, they do not suggest that these
intricacies could not be accounted for via existing payroll
records should the case reach the damages phase. Further, based
on the record currently before the Court, it does not appear that
the complexity of CRST's compensation system makes it any less
uniformly applied.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion to certify a collective
action under the FLSA is allowed.

Class Certification on State Law Claims

In this case, the Defendants do not dispute numerosity,
commonality, or ascertainability.

Typicality requires that the class representative's injuries
arise from the same events or course of conduct as do the
injuries of the class, but his claims need not be identical to
those of absent class members.  Adequacy occasions a two-part
inquiry. First, the Court must determine whether any potential
conflicts exist between the named plaintiffs and the prospective
class members. Second, it must ask whether the named plaintiffs
and their counsel will prosecute their case vigorously.

In this case, the Plaintiff also must meet the two additional
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3): predominance and superiority.
Predominance requires the Plaintiff to demonstrate that the
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members. If predominance
is initially satisfied, but individual issues later threaten to
overwhelm the case, the Court has management tools at its
disposal, such as decertification or the appointment of a special
master to deal with that scenario.

Superiority means that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.

Where, as here, the parties contest certain legal and factual
premises relevant to the Rule 23 inquiry, it may be appropriate
for the Court to probe behind the pleadings to formulate some
prediction as to how specific issues will play out in order to
assess whether the proposed class meets the legal requirements
for certification. In performing this predictive function and
exercising its broad discretion over class certification, the
Court must appraise the plaintiff's evidence critically, while
taking care not to allow the defendant to turn the class-
certification proceeding into an unwieldy trial on the merits.
Often the Rule 23 analysis will overlap with some critical
assessment regarding the merits of the case.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion to certify a collective
action under the FLSA is allowed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7qpgyog from
Leagle.com.

Juan Carlos Montoya, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Hillary A. Schwab,
Fair Work, P.C., Andrew Schmidt, Andrew Schmidt Law, PLLC, pro
hac vice, Peter G. Mancuso, Andrew Schmidt Law PLLC,, pro hac
vice & Rachel J. Smit, Fair Work, P.C.

CRST Expedited, Inc., Defendant, represented by Elizabeth A.
Olivier -- eolivier@preti.com -- Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau &
Pachios, PLLP., pro hac vice, Gregory P. Hansel --
ghansel@preti.com -- Preti Flaherty Beliveau & Pachios, pro hac
vice, Wesley S. Chused -- wchused@preti.com -- Preti Flaherty
Beliveau & Pachios LLP, Daniel R. Sonneborn --
dsonneborn@preti.com -- Preti Flaherty & Randall B. Weill --
rweill@preti.com -- Preti Flaherty Beliveau & Pachios, LLP, pro
hac vice.

CRST International, Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel R.
Sonneborn, Preti Flaherty & Randall B. Weill, Preti Flaherty
Beliveau & Pachios, LLP, pro hac vice.


CSK AUTO: Supplemental Brief for "Melgar" Settlement Bid Ordered
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, OSMIN MELGAR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CSK AUTO, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 13-cv-03769-EMC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward M.
Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California ordered the parties to provide a joint supplemental
brief for the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of a
class action settlement.

Having reviewed the motion and supporting documents, the Judge
ordered that the parties provide a joint supplemental brief
addressing the following:

     a. Maximum Value of the Plaintiffs' Claims:  The Plaintiffs
claim that the maximum value of their Section 2802 and Section
17200 claims is $1,275,723.83.  They will explain how they
arrived at this figure.  To the extent they arrived at this
figure based on certain assumptions (e.g., 1,193,694 bank days
and 2,338,672.9 miles), they will explain how they arrived at
these supporting assumptions.  It will also be helpful for the
Court to be given information about how many California stores
are at issue and, in general, how close the relevant banks were
to the stores.  In addition, they will identify what the maximum
value of their PAGA claim is and how they arrived at that figure.

     b. Litigation Risks: Both parties will address the
significance of the litigation risks identified in the
Plaintiffs' motion.  The Court underscores that the significance
of the litigation risks is an important factor in assessing
whether it was reasonable for Plaintiffs to settle the case for
(allegedly) 30% of the maximum value of the case.

     c. PAGA Claim: The parties will address the adequacy of the
settlement with respect to the PAGA claim.

     d. Plan of Distribution: The Plaintiffs will address whether
and how the potential conflict and risk with respect to Store
Managers were taken into account in the plan of distribution.

     e. Attorney's Fees: The Plaintiffs will provide information
about the lodestar in the case -- e.g., the hourly rates, the
total number of hours, and an estimate as to how much time was
spent on each major litigation task (e.g., investigating and
preparing the complaint, working on the class certification
motion, working on the appeal).

     f. Incentive Awards: The Plaintiffs will address why the
incentive awards are reasonable, taking into account, inter alia,
that they no longer work for OR, whether they plausibly have
other claims against OR that are being released, and how many
actual hours Plaintiffs actually spent on the case.

     g. Cy Pres Beneficiaries: The Plaintiffs will address why
United Way and Legal Aid at Work are appropriate cy pres
beneficiaries.

     h. Reminder Postcard: The parties will address whether a
reminder postcard should be issued by a date certain if no
response to the class notice has been received from a given class
member.

     i. Time to Cash Check: The parties will address whether
class members should be given longer than 120 days to cash
checks.

     j. Proposed Class Notice:

          i. Page 1: The first paragraph should include in bold
the estimated average payout per class member.

          ii. Page 1: The chart explaining a class member's
options should be modified.  In particular, the object option
should clarify that an objecting class member remains part of the
class and should still file a claim form in order to receive
payment from the settlement.

          iiii. Pages 4-6: In Questions 10, 14, and 15, should a
class member be given more than 45 days to file a claim, request
for exclusion, or objection?

          iv. Page 6: In Question 15, the text should clarify
that an objecting class member remains part of the class and
should still file a claim form in order to receive payment from
the settlement.

          v. Page 6: In Question 16, will there be a website
maintained by the settlement administrator?

The Judge directed the parties to file the supplemental brief
within one week of the date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/cMW6Sc from Leagle.com.

Osmin Melgar, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Karo Khatchadoorian, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Michael
Malk -- mm@malklawfirm.com -- Michael Malk, ESQ, APC.

CSK Auto, Inc., an Arizona Corporation, Defendant, represented by
James Michael Peterson, Esq. -- peterson@higgslaw.com -- Higgs
Fletcher and Mack LLP, Edwin Mendelson Boniske, Esq. --
boniske@higgslaw.com -- Higgs Fletcher and Mack LLP & Jason
Conroy Ross, Esq. -- rossj@higgslaw.com -- at Higgs Fletcher
Mack.


CVS CAREMARK: Mailing May Have Disclosed HIV Status, Says Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
NBC4 Staff of NBC4i.com, reports that a class-action lawsuit has
been filed with the Ohio Court of Claims against CVS Caremark and
the state Health Department over a mailing that might have
publicly disclosed the identity of 6,000 HIV patients.

The Columbus Dispatch reports the lawsuit filed by a Cleveland-
area attorney says the state shared private medical information
with CVS last summer without patients' authorization, allowing
CVS to make a marketing pitch to non-customers about its pharmacy
services.

The lawsuit says the designation "PM 6402 HIV" was visible above
the name and address of recipients.

A federal lawsuit was filed against CVS in March over the
mailing.
A CVS spokesman says the company takes patient information
seriously and will handle future mailings differently.

A Health Department spokesman says the agency doesn't comment on
pending litigation.[GN]


DEARBORN MOTORS: Court Dismisses Class Claims in "Williams"
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, granting Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Class Claims in the case captioned BRIAN P. WILLIAMS and
JAY HOWARD, Plaintiffs, v. DEARBORN MOTORS 1, LLC, d/b/a ALL PRO
NISSAN OF DEARBORN, Defendant, Case No. 17-12724 (E.D. Mich.).

The Plaintiffs' class claims allege that the arbitration
agreement contains provisions that violate federal law and render
the arbitration agreement unenforceable. The named Plaintiffs
also allege individual claims of retaliation and discrimination
in violation of several statutes.  In addition to the class
claims of discrimination, Williams brings individual claims of
retaliation in violation of Title VII (Count IV), retaliation in
violation of the ADEA (Count V), and retaliation in violation of
the ADA (Count VI). Howard brings individual claims of
retaliation in violation of Title VII (Count IV), race
discrimination in violation of Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil
rights Act (ELCRA) (Count VII), and retaliation in violation of
ELCRA (Count VIII).

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that
written arbitration agreements involving commerce shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. In other
words, the FAA ensures that arbitration agreements are as
enforceable as any other contract, but it does not make
arbitration agreements more enforceable than other contracts.

Delegation Provision

Because arbitration is a matter of contract, a party cannot be
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not
agreed to submit to arbitration. The question of whether the
parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration is one
for the court unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide
otherwise.

The Defendant relies exclusively on Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 561
U.S. 63 (2010). The Court notes that that case is distinguishable
because the delegation provision at issue in Rent-A-Center was
clearer and broader than the one at issue in this case.

The Court concludes that question of the enforceability of the
class waiver provision in this case is for the Court, not the
arbitrator, to decide.

Whether the Class Action Waiver is Enforceable

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' class claims should be
dismissed because the Plaintiffs' contention that the class
action waiver contained in the arbitration agreement subjects
employees to an unlawful employment practice by limiting access
to legal rights fails to raise a cognizable claim. The Defendant
notes that courts have enforced class waivers in many contexts,
including in an employment discrimination claim under the ADEA.

The Plaintiffs respond that the class waiver provision violates
federal law and renders the arbitration agreement unenforceable
under the FAA. The Plaintiffs argue that, therefore, Howard and
the Plaintiff class can pursue their claims in court.

The Plaintiffs in this case, like the employees in Epic Systems,
attack only the individualized nature of the arbitration
proceedings that they agreed to. Thus, they too seek to interfere
with a fundamental attribute of arbitration. As was the case in
Epic Systems, illegality in this case is not a generally
applicable contract defense. Instead, it is an argument that a
contract is unenforceable just because it requires bilateral
arbitration, which is not permissible and inconsistent with the
FAA and its saving clause.

In short, Epic Systems teaches that Congress has instructed in
the FAA that courts must enforce arbitration agreements providing
for individualized proceedings like the one at issue in this
case, and neither the FAA's saving clause nor the NLRA suggests
otherwise. Accordingly, the class action waiver is enforceable in
this case, and the Plaintiffs' first argument must fail.

The Court, accordingly, grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the Plaintiffs' Class Claims and to Compel Arbitration of
Plaintiff Howard's Individual Claims.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yag4wvxm from Leagle.com.

BRIAN P WILLIAMS & Jay Howard, Plaintiffs, represented by Shereef
H. Akeel, Akeel & Valentine.

DEARBORN MOTORS 1, LLC, Defendant, represented by Susan D. Koval
-- skoval@nemethlawpc.com -- Nemeth Law, P.C.


DR PEPPER: Wins Summary Judgment in Stockholders Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, CITY OF NORTH MIAMI BEACH GENERAL EMPLOYEES'
RETIREMENT PLAN and MAITLAND POLICE OFFICERS AND FIREFIGHTERS
RETIREMENT TRUST, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly
situated stockholders of Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc.,
Plaintiffs, v. DR PEPPER SNAPPLE GROUP, INC., MAPLE PARENT
HOLDINGS CORP., SALT MERGER SUB, INC., LARRY YOUNG, DAVID E.
ALEXANDER, ANTONIO CARRILLO, JOSê M. GUTIêRREZ, PAMELA H.
PATSLEY, RONALD G. ROGERS, WAYNE R. SANDERS, DUNIA A. SHIVE, and
M. ANNE SZOSTAK, Defendants, C.A. No. 2018-0227-AGB (Del. Ch.),
Judge Andre G. Bouchard of the Court of Chancery of Delaware
granted the Defendants' motions for summary judgment, and denied
the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

Earlier this year, Dr Pepper and Keurig Green Mountain, Inc.
announced an agreement to combine their businesses to create a
more diversified beverage company.  The transaction is structured
so that Keurig will become an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of
Dr Pepper through a reverse triangular merger.  Dr Pepper
stockholders will receive $103.75 per share in a special cash
dividend and will retain their shares of Dr Pepper, which will
account for 13% of the shares of the combined company.  The
indirect owners of Keurig will receive shares of Dr Pepper and
will hold the remaining 87% of the equity of the combined
company.

Dr Pepper stockholders are not being asked to approve the merger,
which combines a merger subsidiary of Dr Pepper with the parent
of Keurig.  But they are being asked to approve two proposals
necessary to effectuate the transaction at a stockholders meeting
scheduled for June 29, 2018.

On March 8, 2018, Dr Pepper issued a preliminary proxy statement
for the stockholders meeting.  It states that Dr Pepper
stockholders will not have appraisal rights under Section 262 of
the Delaware General Corporation Law in connection with the
proposed transaction.  That filing prompted two stockholder
Plaintiffs to file the action in which they assert that Dr Pepper
stockholders "ought" to be afforded appraisal rights in
connection with the proposed transaction.

The Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on March 28, 2018, asserting
two claims.  Count I asserts that the individual Defendants
breached their fiduciary duties by failing to inform Dr Pepper's
stockholders that they have appraisal rights in connection with
the Merger.  Count II asserts that 8 Del. C. Section 262(d)(1)
was violated because the Preliminary Proxy did not inform
stockholders of the availability of appraisal rights.

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to enjoin the Proposed Transaction
until the Plaintiffs and the Class are provided their rights
under 8 Del. C. Section 262, or alternatively permit the class
members to demand and petition the Court for appraisal.

On April 30, 2018, Maple Parent and Dr Pepper each filed a motion
for summary judgment under Court of Chancery Rule 56.  On May 1,
2018, the Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.
The parties request a decision before the upcoming stockholders
meeting.  They agree that the action concerns a purely legal
question concerning the availability of appraisal rights under
Section 262.  The briefing was completed on May 18, 2018, and the
Court heard argument on the motions on May 25, 2018.

Judge Bouchard explains that Section 262 affords stockholders of
Delaware corporations a statutory remedy for appraisal of their
shares in certain defined circumstances.  Relevant in the action,
Section 262(b) expressly provides that appraisal rights will be
available only for the shares of stock of a "constituent
corporation" in a merger or consolidation to be effected pursuant
to certain provisions of the General Corporation Law.  The three-
step process for determining a stockholder's entitlement to
appraisal under Section 262(b) also contemplates that the
stockholder will relinquish its shares in the merger or
consolidation.

The Judge holds that the term "constituent corporation" as used
in Section 262 means an entity actually being merged or combined
and not the parent of such an entity.  Based on that
construction, he concludes that Dr Pepper's stockholders do not
have a statutory right to appraisal under Section 262(b) because
Dr Pepper is not a constituent corporation.  Instead, Dr Pepper
is simply the parent of one of the two corporations that will be
merged in connection with the proposed transaction.

As a second ground for his decision, the Judge concludes that Dr
Pepper stockholders are not entitled to appraisal because they
are retaining their shares in connection with the proposed
transaction.  This type of transaction does not fit the statutory
scheme of Section 262(b), which contemplates that the shares for
which appraisal is sought will be relinquished in a merger or
consolidation.

Based on these conclusions, Judge Bouchard granted the
Defendants' motions for summary judgment, and denied the
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/O2RO6q from Leagle.com.

Michael J. Barry -- mbarry@gelaw.com -- Jeff A. Almeida --
jalmeida@gelaw.com -- and Laina M. Herbert -- lherbert@gelaw.com
-- of GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Mark
Lebovitch -- markl@blbglaw.com -- and John Vielandi --
john.vielandi@blbglaw.com -- of BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER &
GROSSMAN LLP, New York, New York; Counsel for Plaintiffs.

S. Mark Hurd -- shurd@mnat.com -- Melissa A. DiVincenzo --
mdivincenzo@mnat.com -- Eric S. Klinger-Wilensky --
ekwilensky@mnat.com -- and Alexandra Cumings -- acumings@mnat.com
-- of MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware;
Brian A. Herman -- brian.herman@morganlewis.com -- of MORGAN,
LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, New York, New York; Jason H. Wilson --
jason.wilson@morganlewis.com -- of MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Counsel for Defendants Dr Pepper
Snapple Group, Inc., Salt Merger Sub, Inc., Larry Young, David E.
Alexander, Antonio Carrillo, JosÇ M. GutiÇrrez, Pamela H.
Patsley, Ronald G. Rogers, Wayne R. Sanders, Dunia A. Shive, and
M. Anne Szostak.

Paul J. Lockwood -- paul.lockwood@skadden.com -- Joseph O. Larkin
-- joseph.larkin@skadden.com -- Sarah R. Martin --
sarah.martin@skadden.com -- Alyssa S. O'Connell --
alyssa.schwartz@skadden.com -- and Michelle L. Davis --
michelle.davis@skadden.com -- of SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER &
FLOM LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Counsel for Defendant Maple
Parent Holdings Corp.


DYNAMIC LEDGER: Injunction Bid in Tezos Securities Suit Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE TEZOS SECURITIES LITIGATION. This Document
Relates to: ALL ACTIONS, Case No. 17-cv-06779-RS (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Richard Seeborg of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California denied without prejudice Lead Plaintiff
Arman Anvari's motion to enjoin a parallel state court proceeding
brought by Plaintiff Andrew Baker.

The consolidated class action arises from alleged securities law
violations by Dynamic Ledger Solutions ("DLS") and various other
Defendants involved with the Tezos Initial Coin Offering ("ICO").
While the case is relatively young and has not yet progressed
past the motion to dismiss stage, no reasonable observer would
claim its short life has suffered from a lack of motions
practice.  The instant motion is merely the latest skirmish over
where and how the case should be litigated.

Four putative class actions were filed in federal court last fall
on behalf of individuals who contributed money to the Tezos ICO.
A fifth action filed in state court was removed to federal court
by the Defendants.  Baker, the state court Plaintiff, moved for
remand.  At the time, an already argued Supreme Court case
appeared poised to provide potentially dispositive guidance,
within a matter of months, as to whether remand was appropriate.
Accordingly, Baker's motion was denied without prejudice and his
case stayed, pending issuance of the Supreme Court's decision.

While the Baker action was stayed, the four federal actions were
consolidated and Anvari was appointed the Lead plaintiff.
Shortly thereafter, the anticipated Supreme Court decision
issued, and Baker renewed his motion for remand.  Finding that
Cyan had largely vindicated Baker's position, the Court granted
the motion.  Before that order even issued, however, Lead
Plaintiff Anvari, who opposed the motion to remand, also filed
the instant motion requesting, in the event of remand, that the
Baker action be enjoined from proceeding in state court.

Anvari argues the PSLRA expressly authorizes district courts to
enjoin state proceedings by providing a mechanism for appointing
a lead plaintiff in federal securities class actions.  The power
which that mechanism vests in the lead plaintiff to control the
litigation, Anvari contends, is a uniquely federal right that
cannot be given its intended meaning or scope if a state court
can give control of duplicative litigation to another class
member.

Anvari's motion raises two key issues.  The first is whether
there are any circumstances under which a federal court can
enjoin a state court proceeding based upon the PSLRA.  The second
is whether, assuming an injunction might be justified under
certain circumstances, such circumstances exist in the case.

Judge Seeborg finds that Anvari's allegations of bad faith ring
hollow and permitting Baker to proceed in state court does not
appear to so threaten the integrity of the PSLRA that failing to
enjoin it would amount to an abrogation of a Congressional
mandate.  As in In re LendingClub Securities Litigation, this
does not foreclose the possibility that an injunction or stay of
either the state or federal action may at some point be justified
by future developments.  Nor does it necessarily preclude the
enjoining of state proceedings other than Baker related to the
Tezos ICO.

As an alternative to enjoining Baker in its entirety, Anvari asks
the Court to enjoin the Defendants from engaging in any
settlement negotiations with any Plaintiff purporting to
represent the class (or part of the class) other than Lead
Plaintiff Anvari without: (a) notifying the Court and Anvari; and
(b) obtaining the Court's approval.

As an initial matter, the Judge finds that Anvari raised this
request for the first time in his reply and, in doing so, did not
provide the Defendants with a fair opportunity to respond.  The
prejudice to the Defendants has been somewhat mitigated by Tezos
Stiftung ("Foundation") seeking and being granted leave to file a
response.  In the end, however, the procedural impropriety of
Anvari's request is less damning than its lack of substantive
merit.

As the Foundation's response points out, the Ninth Circuit has
previously disapproved of providing the relief Anvari seeks.  In
Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Amer., a District Court
issued an order barring the defendant from engaging in settlement
negotiations in parallel litigation in state and other federal
courts.  Even though the order was not styled as an injunction,
the Ninth Circuit found the order was still an injunction "in
practical effect" as it precluded Allianz from proceeding in
other actions brought against it in other courts.  As such, it
was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act unless it fell within one
of the three exceptions: (i) where the federal litigation was
advanced, (ii) where a class settlement was imminent, and/or
(iii) where there was evidence of collusive procedures such as a
reverse auction.

The Judge finds that Anvari has not satisfactorily demonstrated
that any such circumstances are present.  The litigation is not
advanced.  There is no indication that Baker, or any other state
litigant, has initiated negotiations with the Defendants or is
anywhere near reaching a settlement that threatens to dispose of
all or even some of the claims of the putative class members.
Finally, he says there is slim to no evidence that Baker, his
counsel, or any of the Defendants have at any point acted in bad
faith.

For the reasons stated, Judge Seeborg denied without prejudice
Lead Plaintiff Anvari's motion for an injunction.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/GYwQt7 from Leagle.com.

GGCC, LLC, an Illinois Limited Liability Company, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
represented by William Richard Restis -- support@restislaw.com --
The Restis Law Firm, P.C., Bruce Daniel Greenberg --
bgreenberg@litedepalma.com -- Lite Depalma Greenberg LLC, Jeremy
Nash -- jnash@litedepalma.com -- Lite DePalma Greenberg, LLC &
Joseph J. DePalma -- jdepalma@litedepalma.com -- Lite DePalma
Greenberg, LLC.

Andrew Okusko, (C 17-6829); individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Rosemary M.
Rivas -- rrivas@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky LLP, Donald J.
Enright -- denright@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP & Eduard
Korsinsky -- ek@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky LLP.

Arman Anvari, Lead Plaintiff, Plaintiff, represented by Enoch H.
Liang -- enoch.liang@ltlattorneys.com -- LTL Attorneys LLP, Caleb
H. Liang -- caleb.liang@ltlattorneys.com -- LTL Attorneys LLP,
Hung G. Ta -- hta@hgtlaw.com -- Hung G. Ta, Esq. PLLC, pro hac
vice & James Mitchell Lee -- james.lee@ltlattorneys.com -- LTL
Attorneys LLP.

Dynamic Ledger Solutions, Inc., a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Brian E. Klein -- bklein@
bakermarquart.com -- Baker Marquart LLP, Patrick Edward Gibbs --
pgibbs@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Daniel Louis Sachs, Cooley LLP,
Donald Ross Pepperman -- dpepperman@ bakermarquart.com -- Baker
Marquart LLP, Jeffrey Michael Kaban -- jkaban@cooley.com --
Cooley LLP, Samantha Anne Kirby -- skirby@cooley.com -- Cooley
LLP & Scott Matthew Malzahn -- smalzahn@ bakermarquart.com --
Baker Marquart LLP.

Tezos Stiftung, A Swiss Foundation, Defendant, represented by
Andrew S. Gehring -- andrew.gehring@davispolk.com -- Davis Polk
and Wardwell LLP, Edmund Polubinski, III --
edmund.polubinski@davispolk.com -- Davis Polk and Wardwell LLP,
Neal Alan Potischman -- neal.potischman@davispolk.com -- Davis
Polk & Wardwell & Serge Alexander Voronov --
serge.voronov@davispolk.com -- Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP.

Kathleen Breitman, an Individual & Arthur Breitman, an
Individual, Defendants, represented by Brian E. Klein, Baker
Marquart LLP, Donald Ross Pepperman, Baker Marquart LLP & Scott
Matthew Malzahn, Baker Marquart LLP.

Timothy Draper & Draper Associates, Defendants, represented by
Christopher L. Wanger -- cwanger@manatt.com -- Manatt Phelps &
Phillips, LLP & Ana G. Guardado -- aguardado@manatt.com --
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP.

Johann Gevers, Defendant, represented by Edward W. Swanson --
ed@smllp.law -- Swanson & McNamara LLP, Britt H. Evangelist --
britt@smllp.law -- Swanson & McNamara LLP & Mary Geraldine
McNamara -- mary@smllp.law -- Swanson & McNamara LLP.

Guido Schmitz-Krummacher, Defendant, represented by Rees Ferriter
Morgan -- rmorgan@coblentzlaw.com -- Coblentz, Patch, Duffy &
Bass LLP & David Carter Beach -- dbeach@coblentzlaw.com --
Coblentz Patch Duffy & Bass LLP.

Bitcoin Suisse AG, Defendant, represented by Leo J. Presiado --
lpresiado@brownrudnick.com -- Brown Rudnick LLP & Jessica N.
Meyers -- jmeyers@brownrudnick.com -- Brown Rudnick.

Niklas Nikolajsen, Defendant, represented by Leo J. Presiado,
Brown Rudnick LLP, Jessica N. Meyers, Brown Rudnick & Sigmund S.
Wissner-Gross -- swissner-gross@brownrudnick.com -- Brown Rudnick
LLP.

Andrew Baker, Intervenor, represented by James Quinn Taylor-
Copeland -- JAMES@TAYLORCOPELANDLAW.COM -- Taylor-Copeland Law.


EPIC SYSTEMS: Ruling Raises Statutory Interpretation Issues
-----------------------------------------------------------
According to Law Journal Editorial Board, "Much has been written
about why the U.S. Supreme Court's recent  5-4 decision in Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis, __ S. Ct. __, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 3086, was a
victory for arbitration in yet another battle in the war between
management and labor. Given the court's recent pro-arbitration
jurisprudence, the decision might be seen as inevitable -- at
least until Congress steps in to provide greater regulation of
consumer or employee arbitrations as it did in Dodd-Frank for a
limited number of financial transactions.  We suggest a different
take on the case, one that does not bode well for even-handed
decision making by an aggressive Supreme Court conservative
majority."

"First, though, some background. In 2012, the National Labor
Relations Board ruled that the 1935 National Labor Relations Act
protected employees generally -- not only those subject to
collective bargaining agreements negotiated between a union and
management -- from being required to agree to waivers of the
right to pursue federal statutory and other claims in a class
action.  Typically, these waivers were contained within a clause
also mandating that all disputes be resolved through arbitration
and not through the courts.  The board held that the right of
"concerted activities for the purpose of  . . .  mutual aid or
protection" under section 7 of the NLRA overrode the mandates of
the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act, section 2 of which declared
arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
on such grounds as exist at law or equity for the revocation of
any contract."  According to the NLRB, this "savings clause"
meant that an employee could bring a class action to prosecute
alleged violations of overtime, minimum wage and other federal
labor laws despite a class-action waiver in an arbitration clause
in their employment contract, pointing to the right of concerted
action in section 7 of the NLRA as a defense to enforcement of
the class-action waiver.

"In three cases consolidated before the Supreme Court, employees
had sued for improper classification and violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), asserting in each case that they were
pursuing these claims for themselves and others similarly
situated. The individual plaintiff-employees may have had small-
dollar wage claims, not financially worth pursuing individually,
but by joining together the potential claims of other employees
against the same company in a class action, the employees would
be able (it is said) to retain experienced counsel and bear the
costs of discovery and vigorous litigation.  In that way, a class
action is said to further the goals of the federal labor laws and
prevent employers from taking advantage of employees.  In the
Epic Systems case, the Seventh Circuit permitted the plaintiff to
pursue the claims as a class action, separate from arbitration.
In the other consolidated cases, Morris v. Ernst & Young LLP
(finding section 7 violation), and Murphy Oil, Inc v. NLRB
(permitting waivers), the Ninth and Fifth Circuits took different
paths.

"In the Supreme Court, the majority (in an opinion by Justice
Gorsuch) held that because section 7 of the NLRA was focussed on
union and collective bargaining-related claims, rather than these
non-union, albeit statutory cases, the FAA savings clause did not
apply, and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC did not warrant court
deference to the NLRB's interpretation of its authorizing
statute. A vigorous dissent, read in part from the bench by
Justice Ginsburg, called the majority "egregiously wrong."

"One difference between the majority and the dissent was the
extent to which the former repeatedly characterized the NLRB's
finding as a recent about-face.  The majority focused on a non-
binding opinion of its general counsel rather than on the board's
actual decision. More important, the majority seemed to ignore
cases cited by the dissent to show a long history of non-union
"concerted activities" suits.  For example, in cases starting in
1942, the board had held that FLSA claims could be brought
jointly by several employees or as a class action.  We therefore
think it is incorrect for the majority to say that the board's
current position regarding class action waivers is a startling
development (as it says "for the first time in 77 years") without
acknowledging the dramatic shift in the Supreme Court's
arbitration jurisprudence in the last decade.

"We are particularly concerned that statutes intended to protect
labor were read narrowly. For example, a discussion of the broad
coverage of the NLRA beyond typical union and collective
bargaining in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978), 437 U.S.
at 565, was said to be dictum, even though circuit courts had
understood it as otherwise -- even in non-union cases.

"The majority opinion also raises problems regarding the proper
protocol for statutory interpretation.  It is nonsensical to say,
as did the majority, that Congress in 1935 should have
anticipated that arbitration contracts would become commonplace
in non-union employment contracts or that class litigation was
not intended because section 7 did not include specific class
procedures.  Cases before Gilmer had held that arbitration was
not appropriate for statutory claims if arbitration was contrary
to the statutory scheme.  It was not until much later that the
court found new vigor in the FAA outside of the commercial arena.
As the dissent in Epic pointed out, those few cases that touched
on non-labor union issues under section 7 of the NLRA had read it
broadly. Saying that Congress 'knew how' to include language
forbidding class action waivers does not take this history into
account.  Nor does that 'rule' consider that Congress had no
reason to amend the NLRA when the concerted activity language had
been read broadly until recently.

"This misunderstanding of the legislative process may be a
function of the absence of legislators and governors -- such as
Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Warren -- on the court.  A
court composed entirely of former appellate judges may lack the
practical experience to reject unrealistic statutory
interpretation guidelines."

"We are familiar with the now-trite phrase that one can have his
or her own opinion, but one cannot lay claim to different facts.
The epitome of ideological decision-making is the lens through
which one reads precedent.  Merely saying that you are not making
policy decisions does not mean that you are approaching the
problem using neutral principles.  We fear that Epic Systems
opens the way to just that." [GN]


FCA US: African-American Workers' Discrimination Suit Can Proceed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
and to Strike the Class Allegations in the case captioned MARLIN
WILLIAMS, PAMELA WILLIAMS CARTHENS, JEROME THOMSON, PhD, BRENDA
DEFORREST, LEVEN WEISS, J.D., MICHAEL D. BROWN, J.D., CORA
WILLIAMS, and ANTHONY HILL, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. FCA US LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 17-10097 (E.D. Mich.).

The Plaintiffs are current and former employees of Fiat Chrysler
Automobiles (FCA). They challenge, for themselves and others
similarly situated, an employee-evaluation policy they say has a
disparate impact on African-American employees. The Plaintiffs
allege that as a result of this policy, they received lower
evaluation scores which resulted in missed career advancements,
bonuses, and other employment opportunities. Two plaintiffs
additionally bring individual claims of retaliation and
discrimination.

The Defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the
plausibility standard articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009), governs. Under that standard, a court first culls legal
conclusions from the complaint, leaving only factual allegations
to be accepted as true. The inquiry then becomes whether the
remaining assertions of fact allow the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable.

Here, M. Williams' EEOC charge reads, in part: "I and similarly
situated other African-Americans, have routinely been subjected
to unwarranted lower PLM/Performance Ratings. Subsequently, due
to these lower performance rating scores we have been subjected
to different terms and conditions of employment including but not
limited to: loss of promotional opportunities, loss of merit,
bonus increases, and more favorable job assignments. We have also
been subjected to disciplinary action and discharge."

Thus, the Court finds, M. Williams properly raises class claims
regarding the disparate impact of the PLM process on African-
American employees.

FCA does not seem to contest that. They do argue, however, that
the charge is not timely. They point out that M. Williams did not
file her charge until March 2, 2017, which is more than 300 days
after she likely received her 2015 PLM rating. Because she began
her employment in 2015, the 2015 PLM rating was the first rating
she received. And because she was terminated in January 2017, the
2015 PLM rating was likely the only rating she received. The
Court is aware, however, that the Plaintiffs' briefing references
additional EEOC charges that were filed by other Plaintiffs and
potential plaintiffs after the filing of the second amended
complaint. The Court will leave it to the Plaintiffs to address
in their final amended complaint whether any of these EEOC
charges satisfy the exhaustion requirement.

The Court therefore denies the remainder of FCA's motion to
dismiss and strike without prejudice to refiling.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ydgrzgpw from
Leagle.com.

MARLIN WILLIAMS, PAMELA WILLIAMS CARTHENS, JEROME THOMPSON, PhD,
BRENDA DEFORREST, LEVEN WEISS, J.D., MICHAEL D. BROWN, J.D., CORA
WILLIAMS & ANTHONY HILL, Plaintiffs, represented by Beth M.
Rivers, Pitt, Dowty, Cary S. McGehee, Pitt, McGehee, Hasan
Kaakarli, Akeel & Valentine, PLC, Megan Bonanni, Pitt, McGehee,
Michael L. Pitt, Pitt, McGehee, Robert W. Palmer, Pitt, McGehee,
Palmer & Rivers, & Shereef H. Akeel, Akeel & Valentine.

FCA US LLC, Defendant, represented by Daniel E. Turner --
dturner@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C., Jacqueline Phipps
Polito -- jpolito@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson P.C., Jerome
R. Watson -- Watson@millercanfield.com -- Miller, Canfield,
Muhammad Misbah Shahid -- shahid@millercenfield.com -- Miller
Canfield Paddock & Stone & Tasha Inegbenebor --
tinegbenebor@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson P.C.


FLEX LTD: Kaskela Law Files Shareholder Class Action Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------------
A shareholder class action lawsuit has been filed against Flex,
Ltd. (NASDAQ: FLEX) ("Flex" or the "Company") on behalf of
investors who purchased the Company's common stock between
January 26, 2017 and April 26, 2018, inclusive (the "Class
Period").

FINAL DEADLINE ALERT: Investors who purchased Flex's common stock
during the Class Period may, no later than July 9, 2018, seek to
be appointed as a lead plaintiff of the investor class.

Flex investors are encouraged to contact Kaskela Law LLC (David
Seamus Kaskela, Esq.) at (484) 258-1585 or (888) 715-1740 to
discuss their important legal rights and options with respect to
this action prior to July 9, 2018. Investors may also go to
http://kaskelalaw.com/case/flex-ltd/to submit their information
to the firm online.

On April 26, 2018, Flex disclosed that "the Audit Committee of
the Company's Board of Directors, with the assistance of
independent outside counsel, is undertaking an independent
investigation of allegations made by an employee including that
the Company improperly accounted for obligations in a customer
contract and certain related reserves." Following this news,
shares of the Company's stock declined $3.61 per share, or over
21%, to close at $13.03 on April 27, 2018, on heavy trading
volume.

The shareholder class action complaint alleges that Flex made
false and misleading statements and/or failed to disclose to
investors that: (i) the Company's internal controls over
financial reporting were materially weak and deficient; and (ii)
the Company had improperly accounted for obligations in a
customer contract and certain related reserves. The complaint
further alleges that, as a result of the foregoing, investors
purchased Flex's stock at artificially inflated prices during the
Class Period and suffered significant investment losses following
the Company's April 26, 2018 disclosures.

Flex investors are encouraged to contact
http://kaskelalaw.com/case/flex-ltd/,to discuss their legal
rights and options prior to July 9, 2018.

         David Seamus Kaskela, Esq.
         KASKELA LAW LLC
         201 King of Prussia Road
         Suite 650
         Radnor, PA 19087
         Telephone: (484) 258 - 1585
                    (888) 715 - 1740
         Email: skaskela@kaskelalaw.com [GN]


FIAT CHRYSLER: Faces Suit Over Software Flaw
--------------------------------------------
Robert N. Charette, writing for IEEE Spectrum, reports that a
California judge decided to allow a class action lawsuit filed in
December 2017 against Fiat Chrysler to proceed. The lawsuit,
which could have major ramifications for car makers, was filed in
response to stalling issues with 2017 Chrysler Pacifica minivans
that the plaintiffs allege were caused by known software defects.

The plaintiffs allege that Fiat Chrysler, despite numerous owner
complaints about the Pacifica stalling out, concealed knowledge
of defects in Pacifica's powertrain control module (PCM) to keep
customers from having concerns about buying the vehicle.

Fiat Chrysler attempted to get the lawsuit dismissed, arguing
that consumer complaints don't prove that a vehicle defect
exists, or demonstrate that the company knew about the alleged
defect a priori and concealed it.

The judge agreed with Fiat Chrysler on those points, ruling that
the plaintiffs could not use consumer complaints alone as
evidence of a defect. However, he pointed out that Fiat Chrysler
had issued two technical service bulletins relating to Pacifica's
PCM software before the plaintiffs had purchased their vehicle,
and two more following their purchase.

The judge ruled that there was sufficient evidence to believe it
was "at least plausible" that Fiat Chrysler knew that there was a
stalling problem with the vehicles before the plaintiffs bought
them.

About a month before the lawsuit was filed, the Center for Auto
Safety filed a petition with the National Highway Transportation
Safety Administration calling for an investigation (pdf) into the
Pacifica stalling problem. The Center said it had fielded
complaints from more than 50 owners of 2017 Pacificas who had
"lost motive power at varying speeds," ranging from sitting idle
to traveling at 60 miles per hour. The petition asked the agency
to rule that the stalling defect required a vehicle recall.

Interestingly, within a few weeks of the lawsuit and petition
filings, Fiat Chrysler did announce a recall (pdf) of 154,000
U.S. non-hybrid 2017 Pacifica minivans because of potential
engine stalling which could "increase the risk of a crash." The
automaker stated in its recall notice that, under a rare set of
conditions, the powertrain control module software "may cause an
engine stall without warning, without lighting the Malfunction
Indicator Lamp or setting any Diagnostic Trouble Codes."

Fiat Chrysler went on to state that most cases of stalling occur
at low speeds, while at idle, or while negotiating a turn.
Dealers, it said, will install a new software flash update to
Pacifica powertrain control modules for free.

The automaker's admission that the error didn't trigger any
diagnostic trouble codes or a malfunction light vindicated those
Pacifica owners who experienced stalling and brought their vans
into their dealers to be fixed, only to be told that there was
nothing wrong.

According to Fiat Chrysler's own chronology (pdf) of its efforts,
the automaker opened an investigation into the Pacifica stalling
issue on 23 October 2017. It determined the root cause of the
problem--a loss of crankshaft position sensor synchronization for
roughly 150 milliseconds that was not being managed by the
vehicle's engine control software--in December 2017. The update to
the control software will make it "less susceptible" to the
problem, the company stated, implying that it may still occur in
certain circumstances.

Intriguingly, the Fiat Chrysler chronology indicates the
investigation was caused by a letter from a customer complaining
about a stalling vehicle, but the automaker didn't indicate why
this particular letter caused the investigation to be launched,
even though dealers received numerous customer complaints well
before October. It may be that the letter came from a Pacifica
owner who was also a lawyer and was involved in the filing of the
Center for Auto Safety's petition with federal regulators.

Perhaps the class action lawsuit will provide more specifics on
what actually triggered the four previous technical service
bulletins to update the Pacifica's powertrain control software.
Those updates are at the crux of the legal questions regarding
what Fiat Chrysler knew about the stalling defect and when it
knew it. It will be interesting to see how these four bulletins
are connected to the current PCM software update, especially if,
as the lawsuit alleges, the previous engine control software
updates were used by Fiat Chrysler to merely "mask" the Pacifica
stalling problem.

If the plaintiffs win, the lawsuit could have serious
implications for all automobile manufacturers. As of 2016,
software-related recalls were responsible for some 15 percent of
all vehicle recalls, and a number that has been climbing rapidly
over the past decade. The question that this lawsuit may help
clarify is how soon automakers must disclose potential safety
issues created by software bugs.

This is especially important in the case of transient software
bugs like those responsible for the Pacificas' stalling, which
are extremely difficult to find and may not show up in the
vehicles' diagnostic systems. As software use in vehicles
increases, further hard-to-replicate software-induced problems
will occur, many potentially creating a crash risk. It may be
time for the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration to revisit its recall process, which was developed
with hardware defects in mind to take into account the unique
automotive safety challenges that software errors pose.[GN]


FLEX LTD: Kaskela Law Files Shareholder Class Action Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------------
A shareholder class action lawsuit has been filed against Flex,
Ltd. (NASDAQ: FLEX) ("Flex" or the "Company") on behalf of
investors who purchased the Company's common stock between
January 26, 2017 and April 26, 2018, inclusive (the "Class
Period").

FINAL DEADLINE ALERT: Investors who purchased Flex's common stock
during the Class Period may, no later than July 9, 2018, seek to
be appointed as a lead plaintiff of the investor class.

Flex investors are encouraged to contact Kaskela Law LLC (David
Seamus Kaskela, Esq.) at (484) 258-1585 or (888) 715-1740 to
discuss their important legal rights and options with respect to
this action prior to July 9, 2018. Investors may also go to
http://kaskelalaw.com/case/flex-ltd/to submit their information
to the firm online.

On April 26, 2018, Flex disclosed that "the Audit Committee of
the Company's Board of Directors, with the assistance of
independent outside counsel, is undertaking an independent
investigation of allegations made by an employee including that
the Company improperly accounted for obligations in a customer
contract and certain related reserves." Following this news,
shares of the Company's stock declined $3.61 per share, or over
21%, to close at $13.03 on April 27, 2018, on heavy trading
volume.

The shareholder class action complaint alleges that Flex made
false and misleading statements and/or failed to disclose to
investors that: (i) the Company's internal controls over
financial reporting were materially weak and deficient; and (ii)
the Company had improperly accounted for obligations in a
customer contract and certain related reserves. The complaint
further alleges that, as a result of the foregoing, investors
purchased Flex's stock at artificially inflated prices during the
Class Period and suffered significant investment losses following
the Company's April 26, 2018 disclosures.

Flex investors are encouraged to contact
http://kaskelalaw.com/case/flex-ltd/,to discuss their legal
rights and options prior to July 9, 2018.

         David Seamus Kaskela, Esq.
         KASKELA LAW LLC
         201 King of Prussia Road
         Suite 650
         Radnor, PA 19087
         Telephone: (484) 258 - 1585
                    (888) 715 - 1740
         Email: skaskela@kaskelalaw.com [GN]


FORD MOTOR: Court OKs Filing of TAC in "Baranco"
------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Francisco Division, issued an Order approving the
stipulation allowing the Plaintiffs to file a Third Amended Class
Action Complaint in the case captioned DAVID BARANCO, JAMES
ABBITT, HARRIET ABRUSCATO, DONALD BROWN, DANIEL CARON, ANITA
Assigned to FARRELL, JOHN FURNO, JAMES JENKIN, GARY KUBBER and
MALISA NICOLAU, APRIL NICOLO, CLASS individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation, Defendants, Case No. 3:17-CV-03580-EMC
(N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs' request to file a Third Amended Class Action
Complaint to add three named plaintiffs.

As part of the parties' agreement that the Plaintiffs may file a
Third Amended Class Action Complaint to add three named
plaintiffs, Plaintiffs agreed to (1) allege, for all named
Plaintiffs, the Vehicle Identification Number for each
plaintiff's vehicle and the date each plaintiff purchased his or
her vehicle; and (2) waive all arguments that the filing date of
the new plaintiffs relates back to the date of the filing of the
original complaint (i.e., the filing date of the new plaintiffs'
claims shall be the date the Third Amended Complaint is filed).

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybtpgdot from Leagle.com.

David Baranco, Plaintiff, represented by Ben Barnow, Barnow and
Associates, P.C., pro hac vice,Erich Paul Schork, Barnow and
Associates, P.C., pro hac vice, Courtney L. Davenport --
courtney@thedavenportlawfirm.com -- The Davenport Law Firm LLC,
pro hac vice, David Christopher Wright -- dcw@mccunewright.com -,
McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, Leslie E. Hurst -- lhurst@bholaw.com
-- Blood Hurst & O'Reardon LLP, Matthew David Schelkopf --
mds@mccunewright.com -- McCuneWright LLP, pro hac vice, Richard
Lyle Coffman -- rcoffman@coffmanlawfirm.com -- The Coffman Law
Firm, pro hac vice & Timothy G. Blood -- tblood@bholaw.com --
Blood Hurst & O'Rearden, LLC.

Ford Motor Company, Defendant, represented by Tamara Alicia Bush
-- tbush@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett LLP, David Matthew George -
- dgeorge@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLC, John Mark Thomas --
jthomas@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLC & Sherry Ann Rozell,
McAfee and Taft, pro hac vice.


GOGO INC: Kaskela Law Files Shareholder Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
Kaskela Law LLC disclosed that a shareholder class action lawsuit
has been filed against Gogo Inc. (NASDAQ: GOGO) ("Gogo" or the
"Company") on behalf investors who purchased or acquired the
Company's common stock between February 27, 2017 and May 7, 2018,
inclusive (the "Class Period").

IMPORTANT DEADLINE:  Investors who purchased or acquired Gogo's
common stock during the Class Period may, no later than August
27, 2018, seek to be appointed as a lead plaintiff representative
of the class.  Gogo investors are encouraged to contact Kaskela
Law LLC (David Seamus Kaskela, Esq.) at (484) 258-1585 or (888)
715-1740 for additional information or to discuss their important
legal rights and options. Gogo investors may also visit
http://kaskelalaw.com/case/gogo/to submit their information to
the firm.

On May 4, 2018, Gogo disclosed that it was "withdrawing its
previously provided 2018 guidance for Adjusted EBITDA, airborne
Cash CAPEX, and airborne equipment inventory purchases related to
airline-directed installations, as well as Free Cash Flow
guidance."  During a conference call that same , Gogo's CEO
disclosed quarterly problems regarding product availability and
coverage, with "the major cause [being] deicing fluid getting
into the antenna raceways in which the antenna discs spin," but
that "while deicing was the biggest issue there are also some
manufacturing issues and software issues."

On this news, shares of the Company's common stock declined $1.73
per share over the following two trading s, or over 18%, to close
at $7.86 per share on May 7, 2018.

Subsequently, after Moody's downgraded Gogo's credit rating to
reflect "the company's weakening credit metrics, operational
difficulties and deteriorating liquidity," shares of Gogo's
common stock declined an additional $2.80 per share, or over 35%,
to close at $5.06 per share on May 8, 2018.

The shareholder class action complaint alleges that Gogo and
certain other defendants made false and misleading statements
during the Class Period and failed to disclose to investors that:
(i) Gogo's 2Ku antenna had more reliability issues than the
public was led to believe; (ii) Gogo's 2Ku antennas required
costly installation and remediation challenges or required
replacement due to deicing fluids from planes infiltrating the
2Ku system as well as manufacturing and software issues; and
(iii) Gogo would not be able to meet its previously issued 2018
guidance.  The complaint further alleges that, as a result of the
foregoing, investors purchased Gogo's common stock at
artificially inflated prices during the Class Period and suffered
significant investment losses following the Company's
disclosures.

Investors may also visit http://kaskelalaw.com/case/gogo/to
submit their information to the firm.

         David Seamus Kaskela, Esq.
         KASKELA LAW LLC
         201 King of Prussia Road
         Suite 650
         Radnor, PA 19087
         Telephone:(484) 258 - 1585
                   (888) 715 - 1740
         Email: skaskela@kaskelalaw.com [GN]


GOGO INC: Wolf Haldenstein Files Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP on July 2 disclosed
that it has filed a federal securities class action lawsuit in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois on behalf of all persons or entities that acquired
securities of  Gogo Inc. (NASDAQ:GOGO) from February 27, 2017
through May 7, 2018, both dates inclusive ("Class Period").

Investors who have incurred losses in shares of Gogo Inc. are
urged to contact the firm immediately at classmember@whafh.com or
(800) 575-0735 or (212) 545-4774.  You may obtain additional
information concerning the action on our website, www.whafh.com.

If you have incurred losses in the shares of Gogo Inc. you may,
no later than August 27, 2018, request that the Court appoint you
lead plaintiff of the proposed class.  Please contact Wolf
Haldenstein to learn more about your rights as an investor in
Gogo Inc.

According to the filed complaint, throughout the Class Period
defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed
to disclose that:

   -- Gogo's 2Ku antenna had more reliability issues than the
public was led to believe;

   -- Gogo's 2Ku antennas required costly installation and
remediation challenges or required replacement due to deicing
fluids from planes infiltrating the 2Ku system as well as
manufacturing and software issues;

   -- consequently, Gogo would not be able to meet its previously
issued 2018 guidance; and

   -- as a result, the company's financial statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

On May 4, 2018, Gogo revealed its quarterly earnings results and
said that it would not meet its earlier EBITDA profit guidance of
$75M-$100M.  Gogo then withdrew "its previously provided 2018
guidance for Adjusted EBITDA, airborne Cash CAPEX, and airborne
equipment inventory purchases related to airline-directed
installations, as well as Free Cash Flow guidance."

Following this news, Gogo stock dropped 13% to close at $8.33 per
share on May 4, 2018.

Subsequently, on May 8, 2018, Moody's lowered Gogo's credit
ratings.  Following this downgrade to Caa1, Gogo stock dropped
36%, to close at $5.06 per share on May 8, 2018.

Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP  has extensive
experience in the prosecution of securities class actions and
derivative litigation in state and federal trial and appellate
courts across the country.  The firm has attorneys in various
practice areas; and offices in New York, Chicago and San Diego.
The reputation and expertise of this firm in shareholder and
other class litigation has been repeatedly recognized by the
courts, which have appointed it to major positions in complex
securities multi-district and consolidated litigation.

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions
regarding your rights and interests in this case, please
immediately contact Wolf Haldenstein by telephone at
(800) 575-0735, via e-mail at classmember@whafh.com, or visit our
website at www.whafh.com. [GN]


GOGO INC: Federman & Sherwood Files Securities Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Federman & Sherwood on July 1 disclosed that on June 27, 2018, a
class action lawsuit was filed in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Gogo, Inc.
(NASDAQ:GOGO).  The complaint alleges violations of federal
securities laws, Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, including allegations of
issuing a series of material or false misrepresentations to the
market which had the effect of artificially inflating the market
price during the Class Period, which is February 27, 2017 through
May 7, 2018.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on behalf of all Gogo, Inc.
shareholders who purchased common stock during the Class Period
and are therefore a member of the Class as described above.  You
may move the Court no later than Monday, August 27, 2018 to serve
as a lead plaintiff for the entire Class.  However, in order to
do so, you must meet certain legal requirements pursuant to the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

If you wish to discuss this action, obtain further information
and participate in this or any other securities litigation, or
should you have any questions or concerns regarding this notice
or preservation of your rights, please contact:

          Robin Hester
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 North Pennsylvania Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120
          Email to: rkh@federmanlaw.com

Or, visit the firm's website at www.federmanlaw.com [GN]


GOOD TIMES: TanaCon Attendees Mull Class Action
-----------------------------------------------
Erica Steiner, writing for Blast, reports that YouTube star Tana
Mongeau's TanaCon was slated to be the next big event in digital
influencer gatherings, but was instead dubbed the "Fyre Festival
of YouTube Conventions." Attendees claim they were scammed and
are discussing a class-action lawsuit against the organizer of
the event.

Ms. Mongeau has millions of followers, and promoted her
convention in Anaheim which would take place in June during the
same time as the popular VidCon.  Unfortunately, the event was a
gigantic flop, and even left thousands of TanaCon attendees
waiting for hours in the hot sun.  The event was shut down after
less than one day, and everyone who bought tickets was S.O.L.

YouTuber Anamarie Olson is spearheading a movement to gather
defendants for a class action suit against the promoter of the
event, Good Times.  She believes ticket holders should be given
complete refunds, as well as compensation for "mistreatment
during the event."

Ms. Olson tells The Blast, "I started feeling less and less
excited about the event because I had a feeling it would be very
unorganized, but I hoped for the best," adding "After waiting for
about 5 hours in the sun, with no shade or water or food, a
representative of Good Times made an announcement that the event
was cancelled for the day but would resume as scheduled Saturday
with an additional location."

Ms. Olson says the next morning it was announced that the
convention had shut down for good without any further
explanation.  She now says she's planning on going after Good
Times for "refunds on our tickets and travel, and also
compensation for our mistreatment during the event" and is
currently in talks with the same firms involved in class action
lawsuits against Fyre Festival.

She is not the only influencer upset, popular personality
Shane Dawson said his participation and promotion of the event
was the "worst decision I ever made."

Ms. Olson claims to have around 200 people interested in joining
her class-action lawsuit.

Good Times addressed the situation after the convention wrapped,
citing "over fifteen thousand unregistered guests" as the root of
the problem.  The company CEO also accused Tana of making
promises to fans that they were unable to fulfill. [GN]


GRAMERCY PROPERTY: Monteverde & Associates Files Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Monteverde & Associates PC on July 2 disclosed that it has filed
a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, Case No 1:18-cv-05335, on
behalf of shareholders of Gramercy Property Trust ("Gramercy" or
the "Company")(NYSE: GPT)  who held Gramercy shares and have been
harmed by Gramercy's and its board of directors' (the "Board")
alleged violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") in connection with the
sale of the Company to affiliates of Blackstone Real Estate
Partners VIII (the "Proposed Transaction").

In connection with the Proposed Transaction, Gramercy
shareholders are only expected to receive $27.50 in cash for each
share of Gramercy they own.  The complaint questions the fairness
of the consideration offered to the Company's shareholders, and
alleges that the proxy statement regarding the Proposed
Transaction (the "Proxy") fails to disclose material information
that is necessary for shareholders to properly assess the
fairness of the Proposed Transaction, thereby rendering certain
statements in the Proxy incomplete and misleading.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the court
no later than 60 days from the date of this notice.  Any member
of the putative class may move the court to serve as lead
plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may choose to do
nothing and remain an absent class member.  If you wish to
discuss this action, or have any questions concerning this notice
or your rights or interests, please contact:

Click here for more information:
https://monteverdelaw.com/case/gramercy-property-trust. It is
free and there is no cost or obligation to you.

Monteverde & Associates PC is a national class action securities
and consumer litigation law firm that has recovered millions of
dollars and is committed to protecting shareholders and consumers
from corporate wrongdoing.  Monteverde & Associates PC lawyers
have significant experience litigating Mergers & Acquisitions and
Securities Class Actions, whereby they protect investors by
recovering money and remedying corporate misconduct. Mr.
Monteverde, who leads the legal team at the firm, was recognized
by Super Lawyers as a Rising Star in Securities Litigation in
2013 and 2017, an award given to less than 2.5% of attorneys in a
particular field.  He has also been selected by Martindale-
Hubbell as a 2017 Top Rated Lawyer.

Contact:

          Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
          MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
          The Empire State Building
          350 Fifth Ave, Suite 4405
          New York, NY 10118
          United States of America
          jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com
          Tel: (212) 971-1341 [GN]


GREAT AMERICA: "Soto" FCRA Suit Remanded to State Court
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand
to State Court the case captioned HUGO SOTO and SHARON SOTO,
individually and on behalf of similarly situated persons,
Plaintiffs, v. GREAT AMERICA LLC, d/b/a SIX FLAGS GREAT AMERICA
and SIX FLAGS HURRICANE HARBOR, and DOES 1 to 20, Defendants,
Case No. 17-cv-6902 (N.D. Ill.).

Plaintiffs Hugo and Sharon Soto each used their debit cards to
purchase food five separate times at Defendant's Six Flags theme
park. For each of these transactions, the Plaintiffs were
provided an electronically printed receipt that included the
first eight digits of their debit card numbers in addition to the
last four digits. Several days later, the Plaintiffs filed a
putative class action in Illinois state court alleging that the
Defendant's provision of these receipts constitutes a willful
violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1681c(g)(1), a provision of the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), as amended by the Fair and
Accurate Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA).

The Defendant also argues that dismissal, not remand, is
appropriate here because remand to state court would be futile as
the Plaintiffs lack standing.

Plaintiffs' Standing

Standing is a threshold question in every federal case because if
the litigants do not have standing to raise their claims the
court is without authority to consider the merits of the action.
The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant violated FACTA's
truncation requirements on the point-of-sale receipts provided to
its customers, including the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs do not
argue that their allegations regarding lost time and increased
risk of identity theft are otherwise sufficient to invoke this
Court's jurisdiction. The Defendant likewise does not argue that
anything about the Plaintiffs' FACTA or Class Action Fairness Act
allegations creates Article III standing.

A removing defendant has the burden to demonstrate a reasonable
probability that subject-matter jurisdiction exists. The
Defendant has not attempted to refute the Plaintiffs' concession
and thus has not met this burden.

Therefore, the Court agrees with the parties that the Plaintiffs
lack Article III standing to bring their claims in federal court.

Futility of Remand

The Defendant argues, however, that the case should be dismissed
rather than remanded to state court for two reasons.

First, the Defendant argues that remand would be futile because
Illinois imposes the same injury-in-fact requirement that federal
courts do, and thus Plaintiffs have no more claim to standing in
state court than they do in federal court.  Second, the Defendant
argues that remand would be futile because the Plaintiffs have
failed to sufficiently state a claim for a willful FACTA
violation.

The Plaintiffs rightly acknowledge, the fact that both Illinois
courts and federal courts impose an injury-in-fact standing
requirement on litigants does not necessarily mean that both
forums define that requirement in the same way. None of the
Illinois cases that the Defendant identifies definitively state
that the Illinois requirement for injury-in-fact is identical,
rather than merely similar, to the federal requirement for
injury-in-fact. The Plaintiffs also have pointed to a state trial
court decision refusing to dismiss a procedural FACTA violation
case on standing grounds, indicating that the substance of
injury-in-fact differs between Illinois state and federal courts.
This in turn indicates that dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims
in state court is not necessarily a foregone conclusion, as the
Defendant contends. An Illinois court could conclude that the
Plaintiffs' procedural FACTA violation allegations are sufficient
to confer standing in state court, even if they are not
sufficient to confer standing in federal court.

Because the Court cannot say definitively what an Illinois state
court would decide, remand rather than dismissal is appropriate.
Although this means that a state court potentially has
jurisdiction over a federal statutory violation in an instance
where a federal court does not, this is in fact a notable quirk
of the United States federalist system. The parties agree that
federal subject matter jurisdiction does not exist here, and the
Defendant has not demonstrated that Illinois state courts will
undeniably dismiss this case on the basis of federal law.

As such, remand is the appropriate course of action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7bhjocp
from Leagle.com.

Hugo Soto & Sharon Soto, Plaintiffs, represented by Cathleen M.
Combs, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC, Curtis Charles
Warner, Warner Law Firm, LLC, Daniel A. Edelman --
courtecl@edcombs.com -- Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC,
Francis Richard Greene -- fgreen@edcombs.com -- Edelman, Combs,
Latturner & Goodwin LLC, James O. Latturner --
jlatturner@edcombs.com, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC &
Michelle A. Alyea -- malyea@edcombs.com -- Edelman, Combs,
Latturner & Goodwin, LLC.

Great America LLC, administrator, Defendant, represented by Bevin
Megan Brennan -- bbreman@pedersenhoupt.com -- Pedersen & Houpt,
P.C. & Spencer S. Persson --
spencer.persson@nortonrosefulbright.com -- Norton Rose Fulbright
US LLP, pro hac vice.


GRIMALDI INC: Employees File Wage Class Action in New York
----------------------------------------------------------
Anne Cullen, writing for Law360, reports that a proposed class of
employees for the well-known New York City pizzeria chain
Grimaldi's on June 29 asked a federal court for certification in
their putative class action suit claiming the chain's five
locations, including its famous original outpost under the
Brooklyn Bridge, didn't give them accurate wage notices and
sometimes failed to pay front of the house employees any wages
whatsoever.

The motion seeks to certify a class of cooks, pizza makers, food
prep employees, dishwashers, wait staff, busboys and counter
employees.

The case is captioned Omar et al v. 1 Front Street Grimaldi, Inc.
et al, Case No. 1:16-cv-05824 (E.D.N.Y.).  The case is assigned
to Judge LaShann DeArcy Hall.  The case was filed October 18,
2016. [GN]


HANNIBAL, MO: Prelim. Settlement Reached in Water Quality Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ashley Szatala, writing for Herald-Whig, reports that a more than
2-year-old class-action lawsuit against the city of Hannibal and
the Hannibal Board of Public Works over alleged water quality
violations will come to a close after a preliminary agreement was
reached in the case.

The BPW and the city have agreed to jointly commit a minimum of
$5 million to investigate and implement water quality
improvements, and a minimum $205,000 settlement fund has been
established to reimburse ratepayers who submit a valid claim for
out-of-pocket costs for medical testing designed to aid in the
early detection of certain medical conditions associated with the
ingestion of disinfection byproducts created when disinfecting
drinking water with chloramine.

Hannibal residents Crystal Stephens, O.C. Latta, Christine Stolte
and Vickie Brooks filed the lawsuit in Marion County Circuit
Court in March 2016 and have been seeking punitive and
compensatory damages for Hannibal residents who have paid for and
used water supplied by the BPW for at least three years between
September 2011 and February 2016.  The case was moved to the St.
Louis County 22nd Judicial Circuit Court in May 2016.

The suit did not specifically address the BPW's use of
chloramines to disinfect drinking water, but the group alleged
that the BPW was negligent for supplying water "unfit for human
use" because of elevated levels of total trihalomethanes, a
disinfection byproduct, during that time.

Missouri's web-based reporting system Case.net shows that a joint
motion for preliminary approval of a class-action settlement on
behalf of all parties was filed June 6, and the preliminary
settlement was certified by Judge Michael Jamison on June 13.

On June 20, the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the Missouri
Department of Natural Resources as a defendant without prejudice
was granted, and the claims against defendants Latta, Stephens,
Stolte and Brooks were dismissed without prejudice.

Court documents from the Circuit Court detail specifics of "this
complex environmental class action" and the settlement.

"The litigation was hard fought. . . .  Defendants have denied
any wrongdoing concerning the allegations in these cases. The
Hannibal Defendants further dispute any allegation of causation
and damages," the document says.

It continues by saying several issues in the suit would need to
be tried before a jury, including the ability of total
trihalomethanes to cause harm to people who ingest them, the type
of harm the chemicals can cause to a person, and the amount of
damages associated with the ingestion of total trihalomethanes.
But what a judge or jury would do with the facts in this case
would be difficult to predict.

"If this case was to continue, it would likely involve . . .
ongoing voluminous discovery, depositions and other preparations
with a likelihood of prolonged litigation of several more years
to resolve," the document says.  "This settlement avoids the
delay and the uncertainties of further litigation."

The document says counsel for the city and the BPW confirmed
there is no insurance providing indemnity for the claims being
asserted in the case, and the risk of having to pay a judgment in
this litigation could potentially cause great financial harm and
would leave the plaintiffs with no viable remedy.  The only
additional money available would be those generated by raising
rates on the very class members represented by the plaintiffs.

"The class . . . receives an opportunity to seek and receive
potentially full reimbursement, but at a minimum partial
compensation, for early detection of latent disease.  However, by
compromise, defendants avoid the potential of being faced with a
large verdict against them," the document says.  "This case
offers relief to thousands of class members who drank and would
otherwise continue to drink water with excessive levels of
TTHMs."

The BPW has already made headway on one of the two settlement
agreements.  In April, the board of the BPW approved a granulated
activated carbon water filtration system that will cost $14.35
million to install.  It's scheduled to be operating by March
2020.  Hannibal voters are being asked to approve a $17.5 million
bond issue Aug. 7 to pay for the new filtration system.

Notices about the proposed settlement are being sent in the mail
to people who were BPW customers from September 2011 through
February 2016.  Those who want to submit a claim for
reimbursement must provide a receipt or invoice for a urinalysis
for blood and urine cytology for the detection and early
treatment of urinary, bladder or kidney disease.

The test or tests must be administered before a certain period,
the document says.  Case.net says a final hearing regarding the
settlement will be at 1:30 p.m. Aug. 24 at the St. Louis County
Court building in Clayton, Mo. [GN]


HORIZON BLUE CROSS: Pays NJ Surgery Centers $160MM to Settle Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Susan K. Livio, writing for NJ.com, reports that a 13-year-old
class-action lawsuit accusing New Jersey's largest insurance
carrier of short-changing surgery centers across the state ended
on June 29, resulting in a settlement of at least $160 million,
federal court records and the lead attorney in the case said.

Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey denies the "material
factual allegations and legal claims" contained in the lawsuit,
but both sides agreed to settle and avoid further protracted and
expensive litigation, according to the settlement.

The settlement is an important win for the 180 same- surgery
centers who make up the class, and for the people who use them,
said Bruce Nagel, Esq. -- bnagel@nagelrice.com -- of Nagel Rice
of Roseland, the lead attorney representing the plaintiffs.

The surgery centers have already received all but $4 million of
the settlement money, which Horizon is expected to submit within
30 s, Nagel said.

"What it means is if the surgery centers get a higher
reimbursement, the co-pay for individuals is less. It helps the
public, and helps the surgery centers who should be paid for
their work they do. And through this lawsuit, we have ensured
that they will."

He described it as the largest settlement of a case in New Jersey
seeking reimbursement for out-of-network services, and estimated
the total amount could be closer to $200 million.

The lawsuit, filed in federal court in 2005, sought the money
surgery center operators said Horizon shortchanged them when the
nonprofit health insurance company altered its payment formula in
2004, Nagel said.

Horizon changed its formula back in 2008, according to the
settlement, and began making reimbursements based on the proper
"prevailing healthcare charges system."

Horizon spokesman Tom Vincz said the settlement "represents final
closure of the matter."

"This was a long and protracted settlement in which the
plaintiffs initially demanded many multiples of the final
settlement amount," Vincz said. "Over the years, litigants
dropped out of the case and or settled on their own."

The terms of the settlement were reached in January, but it took
six months to notify all of the surgery centers. The final court
appearance was before U.S. District Court Judge Kevin McNulty in
Newark.

Collectively, Horizon has paid out $20 million more in
reimbursement to the centers every year since 2008, Nagel said.
It's a whopping figure he said Horizon refused to release until
only recently.

"For many of these centers, they did not know they were under-
reimbursed. This is found money they never realized we created
for them,' Nagel said.

"It benefits virtually every single one" of the surgery centers
in New Jersey," with the exception of two that opted-out of the
settlement, Nagel said.[GN]


HORIZON HEALTHCARE: Fails to Comply with Discovery Orders
---------------------------------------------------------
Bill Wichert, writing for Law360, reports that consumers have
told a New Jersey federal court that Horizon Healthcare Services
Inc. has refused to comply with discovery orders in a putative
consolidated class action over a data breach involving
information on roughly 839,000 consumers that was stored on
stolen laptops, with the insurer responding its adversaries are
seeking unnecessary materials.

The case is styled IN RE HORIZON HEALTHCARE SERVICES INC. DATA
BREACH LITIGATION, Case No. 2:13-cv-07418 (D.N.J.).  The case is
assigned to Judge Claire C. Cecchi.  The case was filed
December 11, 2013. [GN]


IESI BETHLEHEM: Faces Class Action Over Landfill Odors
------------------------------------------------------
Michelle Merlin, writing for Of The Morning Call, reports that a
federal lawsuit has been filed against a Lower Saucon Township
landfill, alleging its pollutants, air contaminants and noxious
odors are harming surrounding properties.

The complaint, filed against IESI Bethlehem Landfill in U.S.
District Court, alleges the facility's "sickening odors" reduce
property values, keep them indoors and and at times permeate the
walls of their homes, requiring them to keep windows and doors
shut.

The plaintiffs, Robin and Dexter Baptiste, of Freemansburg, are
asking a judge to allow any willing residents within a 2.5 mile
radius of the landfill to join the legal action. The area has
more than 8,400 households, according to their complaint

About 85 households already have contacted the plaintiff's
attorneys, documenting odors they attribute to the landfill,
according to the complaint.  Kevin Riechelson, their attorney,
could not be reached for comment.

Don Hallock, the district general manager for Waste Connections,
said on June 29 he didn't know about the lawsuit until The
Morning Call told him about it.  Waste Connections owns the
landfill operator.

"We don't have any off-site odors, so how could anybody do
something like that?" he said.

The Baptistes allege in the complaint that the landfill on
Applebutter Road is a public and private nuisance and that its
operators were negligent and improperly ran it so that odors,
pollutants and air contaminants reached the property "on
occasions too numerous to recount."

The state Department of Environmental Protection found eight
permit and code violations at the landfill in April.

DEP said it found six waste management violations for failing to
maintain a uniform, intermediate cover to prevent odors, litter
and other nuisances, as well as for failing to fully implement a
gas control and monitoring plan and to fix deficiencies found
during other inspections and other issues, according to the waste
management inspection report.

Two air quality violations were based on the landfill failing to
report visible gas on April 1 to the DEP within four hours of the
incident, and for not fully implementing a gas collection and
control system design plan, according to the air quality report.

The violations were the landfill's first since 2015.

The Baptiste's lawsuit lists violations going as far back as
2012, and notes that residents have made complaints to the DEP
about odors in the past.

A health impact study the state Department of Health released in
January 2017 was inconclusive because of "limited monitoring
information."  Monitoring did not detect three odor-causing
chemicals typically associated with landfills: hydrogen sulfide,
acetaldehyde and carbon disulfide.  However, the instrument's
minimum detection limits were higher than the odor threshold
values for the chemicals, the report stated.

The landfill in September 2017 received a state permit to expand,
extending its life by five and a half years. [GN]


ILLINOIS: Court Enters Prelim Injunction in "Rasho" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ASHOOR RASHO, et al., Plaintiff, v. ROGER E. WALKER,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 07-1298 (C.D. Ill.), Judge Michael
M. Mihm of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
Illinois, Peoria Division, granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Enforcement of the Settlement Agreement and their Motion to Amend
Request for Relief and Memorandum on the Enforcement Process.

The case is a class action brought under 42 U.S.C Section 1983
alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the
Rehabilitation Act.  The Plaintiffs challenge the adequacy of the
delivery of mental health services to mentally ill prisoners in
the physical custody and control of the Illinois Department of
Corrections ("IDOC").

On Aug. 14, 2015, the Court certified the class in the case for
purposes of litigation, and pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:  Persons now or in
the future in the custody of the IDOC who are identified or
should have been identified by the IDOC's mental health
professionals as in need of mental health treatment as defined in
the current edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association.  A
diagnosis of alcoholism or drug addition, developmental disorder,
or any form of sexual disorder will not, by itself, render an
individual mentally ill for the purpose of this class definition.

Often referenced by both Parties, the case involves inmates who
are seriously mentally ill.  There are approximately 44,000
inmates in the custody of the IDOC, of whom more than 12,000 are
believed to be mentally ill.  Approximately 4,800 of these
inmates are considered seriously mentally ill.

Rasho, Patrice Daniels, Gerrodo Forrest, Keith Walker, Otis
Arrington, Donald Collins, Joseph Herman, Henry Hersman, Rasheed
McGee, Fredricka Lyles, Clara Plair, Desiree Hollis, and Crystal
Stoneburner serve as the class representatives.  The Defendants
are John Baldwin, the Acting Director of the IDOC and Dr. Hinton,
the Department's Chief of Mental Health Services and Addiction
Recovery Services.

The Parties entered into a comprehensive settlement agreement
resolving the action set forth in the Plaintiffs' Third Amended
Complaint, the operative complaint in the matter.  A fairness
hearing was held on May 13, 2016.  During the hearing, the Court
found the agreement to be fair and reasonable, over the
voluminous objections that were filed by various inmates.  The
instant Motions are brought alleging violations of the Settlement
Agreement and the Constitution.

Judge Mihm finds that a preliminary injunctive hearing is the
appropriate mechanism.  The Defendants have objected to this
mechanism arguing the Plaintiffs will never have the obligation
of actually proving there is a violation of federal law.  He
disagrees as the Plaintiffs will have to seek permanent relief at
some point in this proceeding.  He finds the procedure utilized
is consistent with the terms of the Settlement Agreement and the
PLRA.

The Judge further finds that the Plaintiffs have established all
of the necessary requirements for a preliminary injunction to be
issued.  He finds that the Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable
harm before the final resolution of the claims.  In the end, the
Judge holds that there is little harm in requiring the Defendants
to do what they agreed to do, budgeted to do, and, based on this
record, are constitutionally required to do.

Accordingly, in order to bring the Defendants into compliance
with constitutional law and to prevent further harm to the
Plaintiffs Class Members, Judge Mihm orders as follows:

     1. For any class member placed on a mental health crisis
watch:

          a. IDOC will provide appropriate mental health
treatment to stabilize the symptoms and protect against
decompensation.

          b. Reevaluations of treatment and medication will occur
as needed and mental health treatment will be determined and any
necessary interventions to stabilize individuals will occur.

          c. Daily assessment in a confidential setting of
patient's progress to determine if the patient is moving towards
stability, whether other or additional treatments are indicated,
or if transfer to a higher level of care is required.

          d. Prior to discharge from crisis watch
multidisciplinary team with the patient will review and update
the treatment plan.

          e. Prior to discharge from crisis watch an appropriate
mental health professional with the patient will review and
update the treatment plan which will apply after discharge from
crisis watch.  The updated treatment plan will address causes
which led to the deterioration and the plan for risk management
to prevent relapse.

          f. For anyone who does not stabilize sufficiently to be
discharged from crisis watch, the treatment team must establish a
plan to provide a higher level of care, which may include
transfer to a higher level of care facility, or explain in
writing why establishing such a plan is not appropriate.

     2. As to the class members housed in Control Units:

          a. Mental Health Professionals will assess any class
member promptly after initial placement in administrative
detention, disciplinary segregation, or other similar restrictive
status (collectively referred to as Control Unit).  Such review
will be documented in the patient's progress notes.  The purpose
of the assessment will be at a minimum to determine whether the
patient has decompensated and should be removed from the Control
Unit and to provide a baseline against which any future
decompensation or deterioration of the patient's mental status
can be measured

          b. The class members who are in a Control Unit for
periods of sixteen days or more will receive care that includes
at a minimum:

               i. Continuation of their mental health treatment
plan with such treatment as necessary to protect from any
decompensation.

               ii. Rounds in every section of each Control Unit
at least every seven days by appropriate mental health staff.

               iii. Pharmacological treatment (if applicable).

               iv. Participation in multidisciplinary team
meetings to the extent clinically appropriate.

               v. MHP or mental health treatment team
recommendations to post-segregation housing.

          c. The class members in any Control Unit for periods
longer than 60 days will be provided with structured and
unstructured out of cell time sufficient to protect against
decompensation.

          d. Mental health staff will assess class members in
Control Units to determine if a higher level of care is necessary
and if so, to make proper recommendations to facility authority.

Within 90 days of the order, the Defendants will provide
sufficient staff to address constitutional violations in the five
areas identified in the order.  Within 60 days of the order, the
Defendants will evaluate whether their current staffing plan is
sufficient to provide mental health treatment consist with
constitutional law in the areas of treatment planning, medication
management, mental health care on crisis watches, mental health
care in segregation, and mental health evaluations.

The Defendant will report on their findings and submit a proposed
amended staffing plan, if necessary, to the monitor and the
Plaintiffs' counsel.  The class members who are prescribed
psychotropic medication will be evaluated by a psychiatric
provider at regular intervals consistent with constitutional
standards.

The IDOC will accomplish the following in psychiatric services:

     a. Administer medications to all class members in a manner
that provides reasonable assurance that prescribed psychotropic
medications are actually being delivered to and taken by the
offenders as prescribed.

     b. The regular charting of medication efficacy and side
effects, including both subjective side effects reported by the
patient, such as agitation, sleeplessness, and suicidal ideation,
and objective side effects, such as tardive dyskenesia, high
blood pressure, and liver function decline.

     c. Take necessary steps to ascertain side effects including
client interviews, blood tests, blood pressure monitoring, AIMs
review, and neurological evaluation.

     d. The timely performance of lab work for these side effects
and timely reporting on results.

     e. The class members for whom psychotropic drugs are
prescribed receive timely explanations from appropriate medical
staff about what the medication is expected to do, what
alternative treatments are available, and what in general are the
side effects of the medication; and have an opportunity to ask
questions about this information before they begin taking the
medication.

     f. That the class members, including offenders in a Control
Unit who experience medication noncompliance, as defined, are
visited by an MHP.  If, after discussing the reasons for the
offender's medication noncompliance said noncompliance remains
unresolved, the MHP will refer the offender to a psychiatric
provider.

All class members will have a treatment plan that is
individualized and particularized based on the patient's specific
needs, including long and short term objectives, updated and
reviewed with the collaboration of the patient to the fullest
extent possible.  The treatment plans will be reviewed and
updated at regular intervals as clinically necessary to assess
the progress of the documented treatment goal and update the plan
accordingly.  A quarterly report created by IDOC will certify
each facility's compliance with the requirements.

Nothing in the order relieves the Defendants of their obligations
under the Settlement Agreement.  The preliminary injunction will
expire 90 days after its entry, unless the Court enters a final
order for prospective relief before then.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/HfZn2O from Leagle.com.

Ashoor Rasho, Otis Arrington, Donald Collins, Joseph Herman,
Henry Hersman, Rasheed McGee, Fredricka Lyles, Clara Plair,
Desiree Hollis & Crystal Stoneburner, Plaintiffs, represented by
Alan Mills, UPTOWN PEOPLE'S LAW CENTER, Amanda C. Antholt --
amanda@equipforequality.org -- EQUIP FOR EQUALITY INC, Barry C.
Taylor -- barryt@equipforequality.org -- EQUIP FOR EQUALITY INC,
Harold C. Hirshman -- harold.hirshman@dentons.com -- DENTONS US
LLP, Laura J. Miller -- laura@equipforequality.org -- EQUIP FOR
EQUALITY INC, Marc R. Kadish -- mkadish@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER
BROWN LLP, Matthew V. Wargin -- mwargin@mayerbrown.com -- MAYER
BROWN LLP & Nicole Rae Schult, UPTOWN PEOPLE'S LAW CENTER.

Patrice Daniels, Gerrodo Forrest & Keith Walker, Plaintiffs,
represented by Alan Mills, UPTOWN PEOPLE'S LAW CENTER, Amanda C.
Antholt, EQUIP FOR EQUALITY INC, Barry C. Taylor, EQUIP FOR
EQUALITY INC, Harold C. Hirshman, DENTONS US LLP, Laura J.
Miller, EQUIP FOR EQUALITY INC, Marc R. Kadish, MAYER BROWN LLP &
Nicole Rae Schult, UPTOWN PEOPLE'S LAW CENTER.

Frederick Walker, Plaintiff, represented by Nicole Rae Schult,
UPTOWN PEOPLE'S LAW CENTER.

Eddie Jones, Dr Willard Elyea, Medical Director & Dr Wendy Blank,
Chief of Medical Health Services of IDOC, Defendants, represented
by Heidi Hildebrand, ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL, Desiree K. Kumar,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, R. Douglas Rees, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL & Terence J. Corrigan, ILLINOIS ATTORNEY
GENERAL.

Dr. John Garlic, Pontiac Supervising Clinical Psychologist,
Melody Ford, Chairperson Administrative Review Board I.D.O.C. &
Roberta Fews, Deputy Director, Defendants, represented by Heidi
Hildebrand, ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL & R. Douglas Rees, OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

John R Baldwin, Director, Defendant, represented by Desiree K.
Kumar, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, R. Douglas Rees, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL & Terence J. Corrigan , ILLINOIS ATTORNEY
GENERAL.


INNERWORKINGS INC: Faruqi & Faruqi Files Class Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, a leading national securities law firm,
reminds investors in InnerWorkings, Inc. ("InnerWorkings" or the
"Company") (NASDAQ:INWK) of the July 9, 2018 deadline to seek the
role of lead plaintiff in a federal securities class action that
has been filed against the Company.

The lawsuit has been filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California on behalf of all those who
purchased InnerWorkings securities between August 11, 2015
through May 7, 2018 (the "Class Period").  The case, Errol Brown
v. InnerWorkings, Inc. et al, No. 2:18-cv-03914 was filed on May
10, 2018.

The lawsuit focuses on whether the Company and its executives
violated federal securities laws by making false and/or
misleading statements and/or failing to disclose that: (1)
InnerWorkings' financial statements for the fiscal years ending
December 31, 2017, 2016, and 2015 as well as all interim periods
contained errors that required restating; and (2) InnerWorkings'
financial statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.

Aftermarket on May 7, 2018, InnerWorkings issued a press release
disclosing that many of the Company's historical financial
statements contained errors and that it "will be restating its
financial statements for the years ended December 31, 2017, 2016,
and 2015, and all interim periods within those years."

On this news, InnerWorkings's share price fell from $9.68 per
share on May 7, 2018 to a closing price of $9.06 on May 8, 2018--
a $0.62 or a 6.4% drop.

The court-appointed lead plaintiff is the investor with the
largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class who
is adequate and typical of class members who directs and oversees
the litigation on behalf of the putative class. Any member of the
putative class may move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff
through counsel of their choice, or may choose to do nothing and
remain an absent class member. Your ability to share in any
recovery is not affected by the decision to serve as a lead
plaintiff or not.

Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP also encourages anyone with information
regarding InnerWorkings's conduct to contact the firm, including
whistleblowers, former employees, shareholders and others.

If you invested in InnerWorkings stock or options between August
11, 2015 and May 7, 2018 and would like to discuss your legal
rights, click here: www.faruqilaw.com/INWK.  There is no cost or
obligation to you.

         Richard Gonnello, Esq
         FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
         685 Third Avenue, 26th Floor
         New York, NY 10017
         Telephone: (877) 247-4292
                    (212) 983-9330
         Email: rgonnello@faruqilaw.com[GN]


IQOR HOLDINGS: Loses Interlocutory Appeal Bid in "Shoots" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Paris Shoots, Jonathan Bell, Maxwell Turner, Tammy
Hope, Phillipp Ostrovsky, Brenda Brandt, Anissa Sanders, Najai
McCutcheon, and Michael Chavez, on behalf of themselves, the
Proposed Rule 23 Classes, and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. iQor Holdings US Inc., Defendant, Case No. 15-cv-
563 (SRN/SER) (D. Minn.), Judge Susan Richard Nelson of the U.S.
District Court, D. Minnesota denied the Defendant's Motion to
Certify Interlocutory Appeal.

The Plaintiffs are all current or former employees of iQor, for
which they worked as call center workers, or contact center
agents ("CCAs").  They filed the putative collective action/class
action alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") and several states' laws stemming from iQor's use of a
timekeeping system called TimeQey.  They assert that the TimeQey
system underreported their hours by taking them off the clock
after two minutes of computer inactivity, not compensating them
for log-in time, and creating time gaps.  The Defendant denies
any violations.

In October 2015, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
conditional FLSA certification.  Specifically, it certified a
collective action for current or former iQor CCAs who used
TimeQey for timekeeping purposes during the three years prior to
the commencement of the action, and who worked more than 40 hours
during any workweek in that period.  Approximately 3,500 people
opted into the FLSA collective action.

In August 2017, iQor moved to decertify the FLSA collective and
the Plaintiffs moved for class certification under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23.  On March 27, 2018, the Court granted in
part, and denied in part, iQor's FLSA decertification motion, and
denied Plaintiffs' Rule 23 motion.  Specifically, the Court
denied iQor's motion as it related to claims for unpaid breaks of
20 minutes or less.

Shortly after the Court issued its ruling, the Plaintiffs sought
a 60-day stay of the Order's effective date.  They explained that
a stay would give the FLSA opt-in Plaintiffs and putative Rule 23
class members an opportunity to evaluate their respective legal
options in light of the Court's ruling.  The Court granted the
request and proceedings are currently stayed for 60 days from the
date of the Court's March 27 Order.

On April 11, 2018, iQor filed the instant motion.  It asks the
Court to certify the following question to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals on an interlocutory basis: Whether the employee
rest breaks of 20 minutes or less are governed by: (1) the
predominantly-for-the-benefit-of-the-employer test, which looks
at the purpose of the break to determine compensability; or (2)
the bright-line rule in Department of Labor regulation 29 C.F.R.
Section 785.18, which presumes compensability for such breaks.

The Defendant argues that an interlocutory appeal is appropriate
because the applicable standard for the payment of short rest
breaks is a controlling question of law, there are substantial
grounds for a difference of opinion on the issue, and an appeal
would materially advance the ultimate termination of this
litigation.  They argue that this is not one of the rare
circumstances warranting an interlocutory appeal and that an an
immediate appeal would instead unnecessarily delay the
litigation.

As Judge Nelson observed in the March 27, 2018 Order, the
Department of Labor ("DOL") regulations address the
compensability of various types of employee breaks under the
FLSA, including rest periods of short duration that are
compensable, as they promote the efficiency of the employee.  The
Court noted that a bright-line rule either applies to the short
breaks, in which case the FLSA Plaintiffs are similarly situated,
or it does not, making the employees less likely to be similarly
situated, as individual issues may inform liability.  It applied
the bright-line test, but had it ruled to the contrary and
applied the predominant-benefit test, such a ruling would have
been "quite likely" to influence the course of the litigation.
Accordingly, the Judge finds that the March 27, 2018 Order
addresses a controlling question of law.

With respect to the instant motion, the Judge does not find that
substantial grounds for a difference of opinion are present.  It
is true that in the March 27, 2018 Order, the Court recognized
that district courts within the Circuit have reached differing
results with respect to Section 785.18.  But those different
results largely turned on different questions of fact, as the
Court's ruling made clear.

Nor is the Judge persuaded that a lack of Eighth Circuit
precedent warrants certification for interlocutory review.  She
says she has no reason to believe that the Eighth Circuit would
rule differently now, given the applicability of one of the very
same regulations here.  In sum, she finds that iQor has not met
its burden of establishing the existence of substantial grounds
for difference of opinion.

More importantly, the Judge finds that the considerable delay and
expense for all parties and courts created by an interlocutory
appeal weighs heavily against granting certification.  If the
Court's rulings are upheld, he says the litigation in the matter
will have been dramatically and unnecessarily prolonged, at
significant expense to both parties, by an interlocutory appeal.
The fact that the Plaintiffs requested a 60-day stay primarily
for administrative purposes does not in any way lessen the
significant impact of delay were this Court to certify an
interlocutory appeal.  For all of these reasons, the Judge finds
that certification of an interlocutory appeal would not
materially advance the litigation.

Judge Nelson concludes that iQor fails to meet its heavy burden
of demonstrating that the issue it seeks to certify is so
extraordinary that an interlocutory appeal is warranted.  It will
have the opportunity to challenge the Court's rulings on appeal
after final judgment is rendered.  However, an interlocutory
appeal on these issues would only serve to delay the proceedings
and presents the risk of creating piecemeal, incomplete, and
potentially unnecessary appeals.  Therefore, she denied the
Defendant's Motion to Certify Interlocutory Appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/QThCsg from Leagle.com.

Paris Shoots, on behalf of themselves, the Proposed Rule 23
Classes, and others similarly situated, Jonathan Bell, on behalf
of themselves, the Proposed Rule 23 Classes, and others similarly
situated, Maxwell Turner, on behalf of themselves, the Proposed
Rule 23 Classes, and others similarly situated, Tammy Hope, on
behalf of themselves, the Proposed Rule 23 Classes, and others
similarly situated, Phillipp Ostrovsky, on behalf of themselves,
the Proposed Rule 23 Classes, and others similarly situated,
Brenda Brandt, on behalf of themselves, the Proposed Rule 23
Classes, and others similarly situated, Anissa Sanders, on behalf
of themselves, the Proposed Rule 23 Classes, and others similarly
situated, Najai McCutcheon, on behalf of themselves, the Proposed
Rule 23 Classes, and others similarly situated & Michael Chavez,
on behalf of themselves, the Proposed Rule 23 Classes, and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Brian T. Rochel --
rochel@teskemicko.com -- Teske Micko Katz Kitzer & Rochel, PLLP,
Carl F. Engstrom -- cengstrom@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP,
Douglas L. Micko -- micko@teskemicko.com -- Teske, Micko, Katz,
Kitzer & Rochel, PLLP, Rachhana T. Srey -- srey@nka.com --
Nichols Kaster, PLLP, Robert L. Schug -- schug@nka.com -- Nichols
Kaster PLLP, Timothy C. Selander -- selander@nka.com -- Nichols
Kaster, PLLP & Vildan A. Teske -- teske@teskemicko.com -- Teske,
Micko, Katz, Kitzer & Rochel, PLLP.

iQor Holdings US, Inc., Defendant, represented by Brian T.
Benkstein -- brian.benkstein@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis
P.C., Gina K. Janeiro -- janeirog@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson
Lewis P.C., Robert James Lee -- roblee@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, pro hac vice, Shon Morgan --
shonmorgan@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan,
LLP, pro hac vice & Viola Trebicka --
violatrebicka@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan, LLP, pro hac vice.


JP MORGAN: Judge Approves $4.6MM Class Action Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------
Raychel Lean, writing for Law.com, reports that Coral Gables
attorney Tal J. Lifshitz -- tjl@kttlaw.com -- of Kozyak Tropin
Throckmorton received approval from the District Court of
Massachusetts for a $4.6 million settlement to resolve a class
action suit with JPMorgan Chase & Co. after five years of
litigation.

The lawsuit was brought on behalf of almost 200 investors who
claimed they were cheated in a Ponzi scheme led by convicted
fraudster William Wise.

Mr. Lifshitz worked on the case with Harley S. Tropin, a founding
partner of Kozyak Tropin Throckmorton, along with Boston lawyer
Keith Miller of the Law Offices of Keith L. Miller, who served as
co-counsel.

The suit accused JPMorgan of aiding and abetting Mr. Wise, who
ran his scheme from Millennium Bank in St. Vincent and
Grenadines, a Caribbean island.  Mr. Wise allegedly used bogus
certificates of deposit promising high returns to fool investors
into parting with their money, which he then diverted to his
personal accounts at Washington Mutual and later JPMorgan.

"Fairly often in these types of fraud cases, there is at least
some sort of legitimate business going on," Mr. Lifshitz said.
"This was just a total sham."

The 2012 complaint claimed investors purchased "or otherwise
acquired" bogus certificates of deposit from promoters of the
Millennium Ponzi scheme from Sept. 25, 2008, to March 9, 2009.

Wise, along with co-defendants Jacqueline and Kristi Hoegel,
allegedly used various personal accounts in the U.S. to siphon
away millions of dollars.  The U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission dropped its conspiracy, mail fraud and wire fraud
charges against Jacqueline Hoegel in 2013 and settled with her
daughter, Kristi.

Investigators said Wise used WaMu branches in Napa Valley,
California, and Las Vegas before the bank's 2009 rebranding as
Chase.

In this case, the plaintiffs alleged Chase employees,
specifically Napa branch manager Tamara Ressler, were
facilitators of the scheme.

"Ressler observed a high volume of checks being deposited into
the Millennium accounts, including memos describing the terms and
interest of the Millennium CDs, observed that Wise and the
Hoegels were not placing any money in legitimate enterprises,
received calls from investors regarding the nature of the
Millennium business, established a remote wiring interface to
reduce Millennium's visibility at branch offices, and assisted
Wise and the Hoegels in having restraints removed from personal
and Millennium accounts," the motion for settlement approval
said.

Mr. Wise "was getting money in, then he was using it to fund his
travel and his rock-star lifestyle.  Then when investors
complained about where their money was, he would use other
investors' money to keep them quiet and prolong his scheme,"
Mr. Lifshitz said.

In 2009, the SEC moved to shut down the operation.  Its complaint
said investors were promised "return rates up to 321 percent
higher than legitimate bank-issued certificates of deposit."

"It was all very appealing," Mr. Lifshitz said.  "He tried to
dress it up by telling investors that he had a connection in
Geneva, Switzerland, and that he was using a foreign private bank
so he was able to get them these tremendous returns."

The ploy had all the common threads of a typical Ponzi scheme, he
said.

"It's impossible for a Ponzi schemer to make these types of
things happen on their own without help," Mr. Lifshitz said.

The key to handling a case like this, according to Mr. Lifshitz,
is to keep the argument as straightforward and streamlined as
possible, avoiding all possible tangents and conspiracy theories,
to focus solely on the facts.

"Our theory was that the bank had knowledge about unlawful
activity that was going on with William Wise and his bank
account, and that by allowing the scheme to continue they allowed
the scheme to survive longer than it otherwise would have,"
Mr. Lifshitz said.

For a case involving more than 30,000 pages of documents, the
front-end investigation was paramount to its success. Co-counsel
Miller took the lead, interviewing more than 200 witnesses,
including Wise, his attorneys, the Hoegels, WaMu and Chase
employees, as well as investors.

Also key to the investigation was Richard B. Roper of Texas law
firm Thompson & Knight, who was appointed by the court to act as
receiver for Millennium Bank in efforts to shut down Wise's
operation.

"The receiver can often provide us expert testimony in this case
because the receiver knows the ins and outs of the fraud better
than anybody, other than the fraudster themselves," Mr. Lifshitz
said.

As a court-appointed receiver, it was Roper's obligation to go in
and absorb everything he could about Wise's business.

Mr. Lifshitz said his team worked with Roper as part of the
settlement process because they shared a common goal of maximum
recovery.

Opposing counsel, Beth I.Z. Boland -- bboland@foley.com -- and
Michael Thompson -- mxthompson@foley.com -- of Foley & Lardner's
Boston office, posed challenges along the way.  They did not
respond to requests for comment by deadline.

"There was an appeal at one point on an evidentiary issue,"
Mr. Lifshitz said.  "And there were a lot of challenges that the
case lawyers brought in terms of whether the case was appropriate
as a class action or not."

In the defendant's consent order, there was no admission of
wrongdoing by JPMorgan.

When U.S. Magistrate Judge Judith G. Dein issued preliminary
approval for the settlement, Mr. Lifshitz couldn't wait to tell
the name plaintiffs.

"They were so appreciative of everything we did at every step,
without ever expecting anything," he said.  "When we were able to
tell them that we were able to reach an agreement, they were
extraordinarily grateful."

Mr. Lifshitz has been with Kozyak Tropin for almost five years
working on a host of cases involving fraud, contract disputes and
antitrust.  Most notably, he represented victims of the billion-
dollar Ponzi scheme run by disbarred Fort Lauderdale lawyer Scott
Rothstein.

What Mr. Lifshitz values most about his job is having the
opportunity to win back what clients have lost.

"We do this because every once in a while you're able to get good
results," he said.  "You're able to speak to investors who've
been defrauded in a case like this, and . . . able to tell them
that you're able to recover, even if it's just a portion of their
money."

The case is styled Mansor vs. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Case No.
12-cv-10544 (D. Mass.).  The case was filed on March 23, 2012.
The case was settled on June 22, 2018.  The judge overseeing the
case is assigned to Judge U.S. Magistrate Judge Judith Dein.
The Plaintiffs' attorneys are Harley Tropin and Tal Lifshitz,
Kozyak Tropin Throckmorton, Coral Gables; Keith Miller, Law
Offices of Keith L. Miller, Boston.  The defense attorneys are
Beth Boland and Michael Thompson, Foley & Lardner, Boston. [GN]


KANSAS: Court Enters Show Cause Order in "McCorkendale" Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Sam A. Crow of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Kansas has entered a memorandum and order to show cause requiring
the Plaintiff to show good cause why the case, SCOTT
McCORKENDALE, Plaintiff, v. JOE NORWOOD., et al., Defendants,
Case No. 17-3225-SAC (D. Kan.), should not be dismissed due to
the deficiencies in his Complaint.

The Plaintiff purports to bring the action on behalf of himself
and other similarly-situated individuals.  He filed the civil
rights action alleging the "mistreatment" of him and similarly-
situated inmates at the Oswego Correctional Facility (the El
Dorado Correctional Facility-Oswego in Oswego, Kansas).  He
claims that Defendants are falsifying disciplinary reports,
physically injuring inmates without justification, and committing
other unlawful acts against him and others, and have no adequate
Grievance procedure in place to resolve inmate complaints about
their unlawful actions.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants regularly: deprive him
and other similarly-situated inmates of property without due
process; discriminate against inmates on the basis of race by
subjecting non-white inmates to disciplinary segregation,
forfeiture of good time credits, deprivation of property, and
deprivation of privileges and custody classification, at a rate
greatly disproportionate to white inmates; unjustly deny parole
or good time credits; subject inmates to emotional, psychological
and physical abuse; fail to answer grievances and retaliate
against inmates filing complaints.

He alleges in Count I violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.  The Plaintiff alleges as Count II, violations of the
Kansas Tort Claims Act.  As Count III, he alleges a First
Amendment violation for the Defendants' failure to provide an
adequate and effective grievance procedure.  The Plaintiff also
alleges a conspiracy.

The Plaintiff names as the Defendants: Joe Norwood, Secretary of
Corrections of the State of Kansas; (fnu) Miller, Deputy Warden;
(fnu) Rion, Security Supervisory Staff; (fnu) Philbrick, Security
Supervisory Staff; (fnu) Henley, Captain; (fnu) Zenk, Lt.; (fnu)
Spencer, Lt.; (fnu) Harris, Staff Sgt.; (fnu) Snyder, Staff Sgt.;
(fnu) Pettit, Staff Sgt.; (fnu) Kepner, Guard; (fnu) Brenner,
Guard; and John and Jane Does.

The Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, a preliminary and
permanent injunction, compensatory damages of $10,000 from each
Defendant, and punitive damages against each Defendant in the
amount of $10,000.  He also seeks to have the employment of
Defendants Brenner and Kepner terminated.

Among other things, Judge Crow finds that (i) the Plaintiff has
failed to allege how any of the Defendants, other than Defendant
Brenner, personally participated in the deprivation of his
constitutional rights; (ii) the Plaintiff fails to allege which
Defendants retaliated against him and his allegations regarding
retaliation are generally conclusory, lacking facts to
demonstrate any improper retaliatory motive; (iii) the Plaintiff
has failed to allege any facts regarding an alleged deprivation
of property, or that an adequate post-deprivation remedy was
unavailable; (iv) the Plaintiff's conclusory allegation of a
conspiracy is insufficient to state a claim; (v) the Plaintiff's
request for compensatory damages is barred by 42 U.S.C. Section
1997e(e), because he has failed to allege a physical injury; and
(vi) the Plaintiff, appearing pro se, cannot adequately represent
a class.

For these reasons, the Judge required the Plaintiff until June
25, 2018 to show good cause why his Complaint should not be
dismissed for the reasons stated.  The Plaintiff is also given
the opportunity to file a complete and proper Amended Complaint
upon court-approved forms that cures all the deficiencies.

The Plaintiff is given time to file a complete and proper Amended
Complaint in which he (1) shows he has exhausted administrative
remedies for all claims alleged; (2) raises only properly joined
claims and defendants; (3) alleges sufficient facts to state a
claim for a federal constitutional violation and show a cause of
action in federal court; and (4) alleges sufficient facts to show
personal participation by each named Defendant.  If the Plaintiff
does not file an Amended Complaint within the prescribed time
that cures all the deficiencies, the matter will be decided based
upon the current deficient Complaint.  The clerk is directed to
send Section 1983 forms and instructions to the Plaintiff.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/04hAs8 from Leagle.com.

Scott McCorkendale, Plaintiff, pro se


MASSACHUSETTS: Settlement w/ Prisoners Prompts New HepC Protocol
----------------------------------------------------------------
Danny McDonald, writing for Boston Globe, reports that a federal
judge has approved a settlement between state prisoners who have
Hepatitis C and the state's Department of Correction that
overhauls the agency's protocol for identifying and treating
inmates with the disease.

Under the terms of the settlement, new DOC prisoners will be
offered Hepatitis C tests, and a new process for evaluating
Hepatitis C patients "will ensure a timely assessment of the
severity of their illness," according to a statement from the
attorneys representing the prisoners.

A class-action lawsuit was filed on behalf of more than 1,000
prisoners with chronic Hepatitis C in 2015.

The introduction of new "direct acting antiviral medications,"
known as DAAs, to the market in 2013 prompted Prisoners' Legal
Services and the Massachusetts Chapter of the National Lawyers
Guild to file the suit, arguing that denial of the new medication
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, said Joel Thompson,Esq.
an attorney representing the plaintiffs.

"That was the whole claim," said Thompson during a phone
interview on June 29 night.

Jason Dobson, a spokesman for the DOC, addressed the settlement
in a June 30 e-mail.

"The DOC worked closely with plaintiffs' counsel to better
address Hepatitis C in our inmate population through the use of
direct acting anti-viral medications," said Dobson.

The DAAs, according to a statement from the attorneys
representing the plaintiffs, have a high cure rate.

"It works for almost everyone," said Thompson.

When the suit was filed, though, only three prisoners had been
treated with those medications out of more than 1,800 who had
Hepatitis C, according to their lawyers.

A federal judge in Boston approved the settlement on June 29.

According to the terms, by September 2019, the DOC will treat 280
prisoners with the most advanced disease with the DAAs. After
September 2019, the agency will treat prisoners with moderate or
advanced Hepatitis C on a new timeline, which will range from
three months to 12 months, said Thompson.

The DOC began implementation of the new protocol in March,
according to the agency.

Under the settlement, the DOC's new policy will not allow for
prisoners to be denied treatment because of imminent release or
alleged misbehavior.

A third-party monitor will ensure new Hepatitis C treatment
policy is being followed for the next two and a half years,
according to the statement of the attorneys representing the
prisoners. Those attorneys said they would also monitor the DOC's
compliance, through reports and communication with prisoners.[GN]


MATTRESS FIRM: State's Highest Court Asked to Weigh in on Case
--------------------------------------------------------------
Greg Ryan, writing for Boston Business Journal, reports that the
state's highest court has been asked to wade into a recent wave
of lawsuits in Massachusetts accusing businesses of failing to
pay overtime to employees who are paid entirely on a commission
basis.

The Supreme Judicial Court's decision will have implications for
The Herb Chambers Cos., Mattress Firm and other businesses in
Massachusetts that are facing class action lawsuits from sales
representatives.

Companies have been slapped with the suits following a change in
Massachusetts employment regulations in January 2015, during the
final days of Gov. Deval Patrick's administration.  According to
the rule change, payments made for work done on "an hourly, piece
work, salary or any other basis" should not offset any overtime
pay owed to an employee.  The plaintiffs say that commission work
falls under the "any other basis" language, but businesses have
disputed that interpretation.  They have also argued that a
separate state statute holds that workers who rely exclusively on
commissions are not owed separate overtime pay, and that workers'
commissions cover their overtime.

In early June, a federal judge in Boston asked for the SJC's
opinion on the issue.  U.S. District Judge Richard Stearns is
overseeing a class action accusing Mattress Firm of skimping on
overtime pay.  If a federal judge believes the SJC has yet to
rule on an issue, he or she can ask the court to take a stance,
though such a request is relatively rare.

The SJC's decision will apply to not just the Mattress Firm case,
but all similar cases in Massachusetts.  Briefs in the case are
due July 30, though there is no clear timetable for a ruling.

Many of the cases have targeted auto dealers such as Prime Motor
Group and Colonial Automotive Group, though other industries with
salespeople who work on commission have also faced lawsuits.

The state's high court has been tasked with deciding whether
employees paid on a 100 percent commission basis should receive
wages beyond their commissions if they work more than 40 hours in
a given week.  The federal judge has also asked the SJC to rule
whether employees should have been paid time-and-a-half for
working Sundays. (Time-and-a-half pay on Sundays will be phased
out under a bill signed by Gov. Charlie Baker, but the lawsuits
concern work performed before that law takes effect.)

Some of the best-known labor law firms in Boston are representing
workers in the cases, including Fair Work PC, the Law Office of
Nicholas F. Ortiz PC and The Employee Rights Group LLC.

Fair Work's Brook Lane, who is representing workers suing a host
of car dealerships, said that overtime pay helps sales
representatives make up for slow weeks during the winter, when
commissions can be hard to come by.  "You spend a lot of weeks
during the winter just shoveling the lot for a draw. You're not
selling cars," Lane said.

Attorneys for some of the businesses facing the lawsuits declined
to comment because the litigation is ongoing. [GN]


MCDONALD'S CORP: Seeks Dismissal of Quarter Pounder Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Carolina Bolado, writing for Law360, reports that McDonald's
Corp. asked a Florida federal court on June 29 to dismiss a
putative class suit complaining that its restaurants don't reduce
the price of Quarter Pounders when customers ask for them without
cheese, arguing that the allegations are "nonsense" and run
counter to common sense.

The fast food giant said the suit, filed in May by lead
plaintiffs Cynthia Kissner and Leonard Werner, is based on
"fundamentally mistaken assumptions of fact and law."

The case is Kissner et al v. McDonald's Corporation, Case No.
0:18-cv-61026 (S.D. Fla.).  The case is assigned to Judge William
P. Dimitrouleas.  The case was filed May 8, 2018. [GN]


MDL 2029: Bid to Intervene in DVD Rental Antitrust Suit Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE ONLINE DVD RENTAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Case
No. 09-md-02029-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
denied as moot Theodore Frank's motion to intervene and denied
his motion for disclosure.

Frank's motions concern an antitrust action filed in 2009 in
which the Plaintiff class alleged that Netflix and Wal-Mart
violated antitrust laws by entering into an illegal agreement in
the online DVD rental market.  On July 1, 2011, the Plaintiff
class and Wal-Mart entered into a settlement agreement that
allowed class members to choose between a Wal-Mart gift card with
no expiration date or cash (of equal amount).  He Frank now seeks
to intervene in the action in order to request that the court
order Wal-Mart to compile and disclose statistics about how many
class members have used their gift cards.

Frank is the founder and director of the Competitive Enterprise
Institute's Center for Class Action Fairness, which litigates
against what it sees as unfair class-action procedures and
settlements.  He is also a member of the settling class, and on
Feb. 14, 2012, he objected to the settlement.  Frank argued then
that the settlement was a coupon settlement subject to the
heightened judicial scrutiny and fee limitations of the Class
Action Fairness Act and that the attorneys' fees were based on an
inflated settlement fund that did not consider the number of e-
gift cards redeemed.

On March 29, 2012, the Court approved the settlement, and on Feb.
27, 2015, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Court's approval of the
settlement and attorneys' fee award as fair, reasonable, and
adequate.

Frank states that on Nov. 5, 2015, all e-gift cards were issued
to the class members by email.  In addition, the settlement
administrator was unable to distribute 76,008 e-gift cards with a
face value of $936,418.56.  On Aug. 31, 2016, the Court ordered a
second round of distribution of e-gift cards of $3.62 each to
account for most of the undistributed funds.  That order was
later modified to require gift cards of $3.66 each to issue to
fewer class members, because fewer class members had valid email
addresses than originally anticipated.  Any remaining amounts
available after that distribution were to be distributed to two
cy pres recipients, the Corporation For Public Broadcasting and
the International Center for Law and Economics.

On Dec. 14, 2017, Frank requested the current e-gift card
redemption rate from Wal-Mart.  Wal-Mart declined to provide the
requested information, maintaining that it would be meaningless
and incomplete, and stated that Wal-Mart has never itself
inquired into the redemption rate.  The parties met and
conferred, and Wal-Mart refused to provide Frank with the
information he seeks.

Frank now moves for leave to intervene and moves the Court to
require Wal-Mart to compile and disclose the redemption rate for
the Wal-Mart e-gift cards, i.e., how many, and what percentage,
of the e-gift cards distributed to class members under the
settlement agreement have been used by class members, and whether
Wal-Mart has realized any income from unredeemed e-gift cards.

Judge Hamilton finds that Frank is a member of the Plaintiff
class.  As such, the Judge assumes without deciding that Frank
may bring his substantive motion without first intervening in the
action.  Frank's motion to intervene is therefore denied as moot.

Turning to Frank's motion for disclosure, the Judge finds that
Frank does not have standing to bring his motion for disclosure
because he has not suffered injury in fact, as he has not
identified an invasion of any legally protected interest that is
concrete and particularized.  As such, Frank's motion for
disclosure is denied.

Although he finds that Frank does not have standing to bring his
motion for disclosure and it must be denied for that reason, the
Judge rules in the alternative that, if Frank does have standing
to bring the motion, it is denied on the merits.

Judge Hamilton concludes that Frank seeks an order from the Court
without stating either an obligation Wal-Mart has failed to meet
or a legally protected interest being denied to Frank.  Because
Frank must meet standing requirements to bring his motion, and
because he fails to allege an invasion of a legally protected
interest, Frank has failed to allege the standing necessary to
bring this motion.  Therefore, Frank's motion for disclosure is
denied.  In the alternative, if Frank has standing to bring his
motion for disclosure, the motion is denied on the merits.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/SfIZFE from Leagle.com.

Gary Bunker, John Haley, Eric Roslansky & Kevin Simpson,
Plaintiffs, represented by Robert G. Abrams --
rabrams@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler LLP, Eric David Freed -
- efreed@cozen.com -- Complex Litigation Group, Jason Allen Zweig
-- jasonz@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Mark
Punzalan, Chan Punzalan LLP, Michael Glenn McLellan --
mmclellan@finkelsteinthompson.com -- Finkelstein Thompson LLP,
Sarah Rebecca Schalman-Bergen -- sschalman-bergen@bm.net --
Berger and Montague, P.C., Stephen E. Connolly, Faruqi & Faruqi,
LLP, Terry Gross -- terry@gba-law.com -- Gross & Belsky P.C. &
Timothy D. Battin -- tbattin@straus-boies.com -- Straus & Boies
LLP.

Andrea Resnick, Plaintiff, represented by Robert G. Abrams, Baker
& Hostetler LLP, Eric David Freed, Complex Litigation Group,
Gilbert S. Keteltas, Baker & Hostetler, pro hac vice, Gregory L.
Baker -- gbaker@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler LLP, pro hac
vice, Guido Saveri -- guido@saveri.com -- Saveri & Saveri, Inc.,
Jason Allen Zweig, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Joseph Mario
Patane, Trump, Alioto, Trump & Prescott, LLP, Lauren Clare
Capurro, Trump, Alioto, Trump & Prescott, LLP, Mario Nunzio
Alioto, Trump Alioto Trump & Prescott LLP, Mark Punzalan, Chan
Punzalan LLP, Matthew W. Ruan -- mruan@cohenmilstein.com --
Berman DeValerio, Melissa Conwell Shapiro -- mshapiro@saveri.com
-- Saveri & Saveri, Inc., Michael Glenn McLellan, Finkelstein
Thompson LLP, Sarah Rebecca Schalman-Bergen, Berger and Montague,
P.C., Stephen E. Connolly, Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, Terry Gross --
terry@gba-law.com -- Gross & Belsky P.C., Timothy D. Battin,
Straus & Boies LLP, Todd Anthony Seaver --
tseaver@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco & William G. Caldes -
- bcaldes@srkattorneys.com -- SPECTOR ROSEMAN & KODROFF, P.C.

Katherine M. Anthony & Paul D. Gottfried, Plaintiffs, represented
by Robert G. Abrams, Baker & Hostetler LLP, Eric David Freed,
Complex Litigation Group, Jason Allen Zweig, Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, Mark Punzalan, Chan Punzalan LLP, Michael Glenn
McLellan, Finkelstein Thompson LLP, Sarah Rebecca Schalman-
Bergen, Berger and Montague, P.C., Stephen E. Connolly, Faruqi &
Faruqi, LLP & Terry Gross, Gross & Belsky P.C.

Nicole Johnson, Plaintiff, represented by Eugene A. Spector --
espector@srkattorneys.com -- Spector Roseman & Kodroff, PC,
Garrett D. Blanchfield, Jr. -- g.blanchfield@rwblawfirm.com --
Reinhardt Wendorf & Blanchfield, Jay S. Cohen, Spector, Roseman
Kodroff & Willis, P.C., Jeffrey J. Corrigan --
jcorrigan@srkattorneys.com -- SPECTOR ROSEMAN & KODROFF, P.C.,
Jonathan Marc Jagher -- jjagher@srkattorneys.com -- SPECTOR
ROSEMAN & KODROFF, P.C., Robert G. Abrams, Baker & Hostetler LLP,
William G. Caldes, SPECTOR ROSEMAN & KODROFF, P.C., Eric David
Freed, Complex Litigation Group, Jason Allen Zweig, Hagens Berman
Sobol Shapiro LLP, Mark Punzalan, Chan Punzalan LLP, Michael
Glenn McLellan, Finkelstein Thompson LLP, Sarah Rebecca Schalman-
Bergen, Berger and Montague, P.C., Stephen E. Connolly, Faruqi &
Faruqi, LLP, Terry Gross, Gross & Belsky P.C. & Timothy D.
Battin, Straus & Boies LLP.

Jonathan Groce & Susan Horowitz, Plaintiffs, represented by Bryan
L. Clobes -- bclobes@caffertyclobes.com -- Cafferty Clobes
Meriwether & Sprengel LLP, Eric David Freed, Complex Litigation
Group, Jason Allen Zweig, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Mark
Punzalan, Chan Punzalan LLP, Michael Glenn McLellan, Finkelstein
Thompson LLP, Sarah Rebecca Schalman-Bergen, Berger and Montague,
P.C., Stephen E. Connolly, Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, Terry Gross,
Gross & Belsky P.C. & Timothy D. Battin, Straus & Boies LLP.

Armond Faris & Melanie Polk-Stamps, Plaintiffs, represented by
Daniel C. Girard -- dcg@girardgibbs.com -- Girard Gibbs LLP, Eric
David Freed, Complex Litigation Group, Jason Allen Zweig, Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Mark Punzalan, Chan Punzalan LLP,
Michael Glenn McLellan, Finkelstein Thompson LLP, Sarah Rebecca
Schalman-Bergen, Berger and Montague, P.C., Stephen E. Connolly,
Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, Terry Gross, Gross & Belsky P.C. & Timothy
D. Battin, Straus & Boies LLP.

Tobias L. Millrood, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey B.
Gittleman , Barrack Rodos & Bacine, Eric David Freed, Complex
Litigation Group, Jason Allen Zweig, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
LLP, Mark Punzalan, Chan Punzalan LLP, Michael Glenn McLellan,
Finkelstein Thompson LLP, Sarah Rebecca Schalman-Bergen, Berger
and Montague, P.C., Stephen E. Connolly, Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP,
Terry Gross, Gross & Belsky P.C., Timothy D. Battin, Straus &
Boies LLP & Jeff D Friedman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Stan Magee, Plaintiff, represented by Mark A. Griffin --
mgriffin@KellerRohrback.com -- Keller Rohback LLP, Eric David
Freed, Complex Litigation Group, Jason Allen Zweig, Hagens Berman
Sobol Shapiro LLP, Mark Punzalan, Chan Punzalan LLP, Michael
Glenn McLellan, Finkelstein Thompson LLP, Sarah Rebecca Schalman-
Bergen, Berger and Montague, P.C., Stephen E. Connolly, Faruqi &
Faruqi, LLP, Terry Gross, Gross & Belsky P.C. & Timothy D.
Battin, Straus & Boies LLP.

Christopher P. Schmitz, Plaintiff, represented by Kendall S.
Zylstra, Faruqi and Faruqi, LLP, pro hac vice, Peter Russell Kohn
-- pkohn@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi and Faruqi LLP, Richard D.
Schwartz, Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, pro hac vice, Eric David Freed,
Complex Litigation Group, Jason Allen Zweig, Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, Mark Punzalan, Chan Punzalan LLP, Michael Glenn
McLellan, Finkelstein Thompson LLP, Sarah Rebecca Schalman-
Bergen, Berger and Montague, P.C., Stephen E. Connolly, Faruqi &
Faruqi, LLP, Terry Gross, Gross & Belsky P.C. & Timothy D.
Battin, Straus & Boies LLP.

Liza Sivek, Plaintiff, represented by Peter Russell Kohn, Faruqi
and Faruqi LLP, Eric David Freed, Complex Litigation Group, Jason
Allen Zweig, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Mark Punzalan, Chan
Punzalan LLP, Michael Glenn McLellan, Finkelstein Thompson LLP,
Sarah Rebecca Schalman-Bergen, Berger and Montague, P.C., Stephen
E. Connolly, Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, Terry Gross, Gross & Belsky
P.C. & Timothy D. Battin, Straus & Boies LLP.

Suzanne Slobodin, Linda Landels, Antonia Landels, Melanie
Miscioscia & James Chatelain, Plaintiffs, represented by Robert
C. Schubert --  rschubert@sjk.law -- Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe
LLP, Eric David Freed, Complex Litigation Group, Jason Allen
Zweig, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Mark Punzalan, Chan
Punzalan LLP, Michael Glenn McLellan, Finkelstein Thompson LLP,
Sarah Rebecca Schalman-Bergen, Berger and Montague, P.C., Stephen
E. Connolly, Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, Terry Gross, Gross & Belsky
P.C. & Timothy D. Battin, Straus & Boies LLP.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. & Walmart.com USA LLC, Defendants,
represented by Genevieve Vose Wallace --
gwallace@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey LLP, pro hac vice,
Kathryn Parsons Hoek -- khoek@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey
LLP, Marc M. Seltzer -- mseltzer@SusmanGodfrey.com -- Susman
Godfrey LLP, Neal Stuart Manne -- nmanne@SusmanGodfrey.com --
Susman Godfrey LLP, Richard Wolf Hess -- rhess@SusmanGodfrey.com
-- Susman Godfrey LLP, pro hac vice, Stephen Edward Morrissey --
smorrissey@SusmanGodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey L.L.P., Ellinor R.
Coder, Arnold & Porter LLP, Lawrence C. DiNardo --
lcdinardo@jonesday.com -- JONES, DAY, REAVIS 7 POGUE, pro hac
vice, Paula Wilson Render, Bell, Boyd & Lloyd LLC & Peter Nels
Larson, Jones Day.

Yahoo! Inc., Interested Party, represented by Christopher
Theodore Varas -- cvaras@kilpatricktownsend.com -- Keats
McFarland & Wilson LLP.

Stephen C. Griffis & Jill Bishop, Objectors, represented by Steve
A. Miller -- sampc01@gmail.com -- Steve A. Miller, P.C.

Theodore H Frank, Objector, pro se.

Theodore H Frank, Objector, represented by Daniel Greenberg --
dan@greenberglawgroup.com -- Greenberg Legal Services.

Maria Cope, Individual, Objector, represented by Joseph Darrell
Palmer -- darrell.palmer@gmail.com.

Tracey Klinge Cox, Objector, represented by Gary Sibley .

Edmund F. Bandas, Objector, pro se.

Blockbuster Inc., Miscellaneous, represented by Gerald Edward
Hawxhurst -- jerry@cronehawxhurst.com -- Crone Hawxhurst LLP.


MDL 2353: Court Won't Review Class Certification Denial
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration in the case
captioned IN RE: TROPICANA ORANGE JUICE MARKETING AND SALES
PRACTICES LITIGATION, MDL 2353. This Document Relates To: ALL
CASES, Civ. No. 2:11-07382 (D.N.J.).

This matter comes before the Court on the Plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration of the Court's January 2018 opinion and order
denying class certification.

The Plaintiffs bring this class action against Defendant
Tropicana Products, Inc. (Defendant), alleging numerous
violations of common law and state consumer protection laws, in
connection with the Defendant's sale of orange juice.

The Plaintiffs move under the clear error of law or manifest
injustice rationale. The Court briefly addresses each of the
Plaintiffs' arguments, but ultimately finds that the Plaintiffs
do not raise any clear errors of law that warrant
reconsideration.

The Plaintiffs exhaustively alleged that TPP contains added
flavoring, which violates the standard of identity for
pasteurized orange juice, and the Defendant, therefore,
misbranded TPP and illegally sold it. Clearly, whether TPP
conforms to the FDA's standard of identity for pasteurized orange
juice lies at the heart of the Plaintiffs' theory of liability as
articulated by the Plaintiffs' own words.

Contrary to the Plaintiffs' unsupported claims, the Court never
focused on whether TPP was heat treated, whatever that means.
Instead, the Court focused on the Plaintiffs' own submission and
the evidence before it. The Court, therefore, finds no cause for
reconsideration as to whether the Class Opinion conformed to the
Court's previous findings or whether the Court misconstrued the
Plaintiffs' theory of liability.

The Plaintiffs next claim that the Court implicitly afforded more
weight to the Defendant's expert opinions over the Plaintiffs'
expert opinions despite Plaintiffs' Daubert challenges.

The Court also did not overlook evidence of class-wide injury. To
the contrary, the Court carefully considered every piece of
evidence put before it by the parties. The fact that the Court
did not directly reference every piece of evidence that the
Plaintiffs deem relevant does not mean that the Court did not
consider it. The Court, therefore, finds no cause for
reconsideration because it overlooked evidence or gave undue
weight to the Defendant's experts.

The Plaintiffs submit that the Court should have certified
California and New York sub-classes of individuals who purchased
TPP at Members Only Club stores as an alternative to the
Plaintiffs' proposed class. The Plaintiffs did not ask the Court
to consider such an alternative in their original motion and
cannot do so now on reconsideration. Motions for reconsideration
"are not an opportunity to argue what could have been, but was
not, argued in the original set of moving and responsive papers."
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs do not raise any
clear legal or factual errors or issues of manifest injustice
that warrant reconsideration.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9gk7arq from Leagle.com.

MICHAEL MARTINUCCI & ANGELENA LEWIS, on Behalf of Themselves and
all Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, represented by ANTONIO
VOZZOLO :- avozzolo@vozzolo.com -- VOZZOLO LLC, DONALD A.
ECKLUND, CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.,
LINDSEY H. TAYLOR, CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY &
AGNELLO, YITZCHAK KOPEL, BURSOR & FISHER PA & JAMES E. CECCHI,
CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.

Bernadette Salerno, Aleksander Simic, Yxia Olivares & Dezzi Rae
Marshall, Plaintiffs, represented by DONALD A. ECKLUND, CARELLA,
BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C., YITZCHAK KOPEL,
BURSOR & FISHER PA & JAMES E. CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI
OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.

John Albert Veal, Jr, Plaintiff, represented by ANDREW S.
HERRING, COUNSEL NOT ADMITTED TO USDC-NJ BAR & YITZCHAK KOPEL --
ykopel@bursor.com -- BURSOR & FISHER PA.

TROPICANA PRODUCTS, INC., a division of PepsiCo, Inc.,,
Defendant, represented by LIZA M. WALSH -- lwalsh@walsh.law --
WALSH PIZZI O'REILLY FALANGA LLP, CHRISTINE INTROMASSO GANNON --
cgannon@walsh.law -- WALSH PIZZI O'REILLY FALANGA LLP, JOSEPH L.
LINARES -- jlinares@walsh.law -- WALSH PIZZI O'REILLY FALANGA LLP
&LUCAS CODY TOWNSEND -- ltownsend@gibsondunn.com -- GIBSON DUNN &
CRUTCHER LLP.

PEPSICO, INC., Defendant, represented by LIZA M. WALSH, WALSH
PIZZI O'REILLY FALANGA LLP.


MEDCARE INVESTMENT: "Collier" Wage & Hour Suit Moved to E.D. La.
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee, Nashville Division, granted Defendants' Motion to
Transfer Venue in the case captioned COLLENE COLLIER, KAREN GROCE
and BARRY KUSNICK, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MEDCARE INVESTMENT CORPORATION
d/b/a MEDCARE INVESTMENT FUNDS, CARDIOVASCULAR CARE GROUP, INC.,
and CCG OF LOUISIANA, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-00331
(M.D. Tenn.) to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana.

Plaintiffs Collene Collier, Karen Groce, and Barry Kusnick,
represented by local counsel and by attorneys Jack Raisner and
Rene S. Roupinian of the New York firm of Outten & Golden LLP,
filed their Class Action Complaint in this court on April 2,
2018, asserting claims for relief under the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, against MedCare and CCG, the
parent entities of the Louisiana Medical Center and Heart
Hospital, LLC, a/k/a Louisiana Heart Hospital, LLC (LHH) and
LMCHH PCP, LLC (LMCHH)  that formerly employed the plaintiffs in
Lacombe, Louisiana.

The plaintiffs vigorously dispute that the Section 1404(a)
factors weigh in favor of transfer and further argue that
application of the first-to-file doctrine in this case would be
inequitable. The plaintiffs object that the defendants
mischaracterize the record and have introduced evidence that was
not incorporated into their original motion documents.

The rule provides that when actions involving nearly identical
parties and issues have been filed in two different district
courts, the court in which the first suit was filed should
generally proceed to judgment.

The Sixth Circuit has instructed that the dates to compare for
chronology purposes of the first-to-file rule are when the
relevant complaints are filed.

On January 30, 2017, the two entities that make up the hospital,
LMCHH and LHH (Debtors) commenced voluntary cases for relief
under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.
These cases were consolidated for joint administration on
February 3, 2017 and transferred to the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana (Bankruptcy Court")
on February 14, 2017.

On February 5, 2017, plaintiffs Barbara Kusnick and Rose Delaney
(the "Kusnick plaintiffs"), represented by Outten & Golden, on
their own behalf and on behalf of all other similarly situated
former employees of the Debtors, filed an adversary proceeding
against the Debtors in the Bankruptcy Court (Kusnick Adversary
Proceeding). Kusnick v. LMCHH PCP LLC, Adv. Pro. No. 2:17-ap-
01021 (Bankr. E.D. La. Feb. 15, 2017) (Class Action Adv. Pro.
Compl. for Violation of WARN ACT 29 U.S.C. Section 2101) Just
days later, the Kusnick plaintiffs filed an Amended Class Action
Adversary Proceeding Complaint also naming MedCare, CCG, Inc.,
and CCG, LLC, the defendants in this case, as defendants.

It is the Kusnick Adversary Proceeding that constitutes the
first-filed action whose parties and issues are to be compared to
those of the Tennessee case for purposes of the first-to-file
rule. In that case, the Kusnick plaintiffs assert WARN Act claims
under a single-employer theory, as well as state law claims for
breach of contract for severance pay and unpaid wages, including
accrued holiday pay, vacation pay and other benefits, and seeking
allowance of all their claims as first priority administrative
expenses or, alternatively, wage priority status. To be clear,
the Kusnick plaintiffs sought recovery on behalf of a class for
WARN Act liability from the Debtors, CCG, and MedCare, and
severance and paid time-off liability from the Debtors alone.

On February 24, 2017, another set of former employees purporting
to bring claims on their own behalf and on behalf of a putative
class of similarly situated former employees of the Debtors,
represented by other counsel, filed an adversary proceeding
likewise asserting WARN Act and state law claims for severance
pay and paid time off/paid days off (PTO/PDO) and seeking
priority status. King v. LMCHH PCP, LLC, Adv. Pro. No. 2:17-ap-
01024 (Bankr. E.D. La. Feb. 27, 2017) (King Adversary
Proceeding).

The court must consider the similarity of the parties involved.
The first-to-file rule applies when the parties in the two
actions 'substantially overlap,' even if they are not perfectly
identical.
The named plaintiffs in the Kusnick Adversary Proceeding are not
plaintiffs in this action, but the named plaintiffs in this case
and all the putative class members are also plaintiffs in the
Kusnick Adversary Proceeding, having filed proofs of claim in
that action seeking recovery against the Debtors. The Bankruptcy
Court consolidated the Omnibus Objection to the Opt-Out
Employees' proofs of claim with the Kusnick Adversary Proceeding
for all purposes. While the putative class members are not
parties to this case merely by virtue of being within the
putative class for purposes of identity of the parties when
applying the first-to-file rule, courts have looked at whether
there is substantial overlap with the putative class even though
the class has not yet been certified.

Thus, it is clear that there is substantial overlap between the
plaintiffs in the two cases, even if the sets are not identical.
This factor too weighs in favor of transfer.

The plaintiffs also argue that the first-to-file rule only
applies between courts of equal rank, that a bankruptcy court is
not equal in rank to a district court, and that any ruling by the
bankruptcy court will be subject to review by a district court.
In fact, as the defendants point out, precedent exists for
transfer from a district court to a bankruptcy court.

The plaintiffs point out that class certification was denied in
Louisiana and that the Opt-Out Employees affirmatively chose to
bring their WARN Act claims against MedCare and CCG here rather
than to intervene to bring them in Louisiana.

The concerns raised by the plaintiffs do not weigh strongly
against transfer. Generally speaking, courts consider inequitable
actions by the parties in the first-filed action to determine
whether transfer should be denied, even if the relevant factors
are otherwise met. Other than the defendants' refusal to
stipulate to class certification in the Louisiana case, which was
certainly within their legal right, the plaintiffs here point to
no inequitable action on the defendants' part -- or that of the
Kusnick plaintiffs -- that would justify not transferring.
Rather, the concerns the plaintiffs raise are all matters that
the plaintiffs knew might pose a risk when they chose not to
intervene in the Kusnick Adversary Proceeding and instead sought
to bring a class action in this forum.

In short, the relevant factors all weigh in favor of transfer
under the first-to-file rule, and the equities do not militate
against transfer. The court finds that judicial consistency,
economy, and comity support the transfer.

The court will grant the defendants' motion to transfer to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ya6njor6 from Leagle.com.

Collene Collier, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Karen Groce, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated & Barry Kusnick, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher
L. Williams -- Chris@williamslitigation.com --  Williams
Litigation, LLC, David W. Garrison --
dgarrison@barrettjohnston.com -- Barrett Johnston Martin &
Garrison, LLC, Jack A. Raisner, Outten & Golden, LLP, Rene S.
Roupinian, Outten & Golden, LLP, 3 Park Avenue, 29th Floor. New
York, New York 10016 & Seth Marcus Hyatt --
shyatt@barrettjohnston.com -- Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison,
LLC.

MedCare Investment Corporation, doing business as MedCare
Investment Funds, Cardiovascular Care Group, Inc. & CCG of
Louisiana, LLC, Defendants, represented by Samuel P. Funk --
sfunk@simsfunk.com -- Sims Funk, PLC, Brett P. Furr, Taylor,
Porter, Brooks & Phillips, LLP, Jonathan A. Moore, Taylor,
Porter, Brooks & Phillips LLP, Michael A. Crawford, Taylor,
Porter, Brooks & Phillips, LLP,Michael R. O'Neill, Sims Funk, PLC
& Thomas R. Peak, Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips LLP, 450
Laurel St. 8th Floor. Baton Rouge LA, 70801-1700


MERICO FINANCIAL: 4th Cir. Remands "Hancock" to Allow Amendment
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM T. HANCOCK, SR., Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
AMERICO FINANCIAL LIFE AND ANNUITY INSURANCE COMPANY; INVESTORS
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA; AMERICO LIFE, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 17-1976 (4th Cir.), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed Hancock's appeal from
the district court's order dismissing his putative class action
complaint without prejudice, and remanded the case to the
district court with instructions to allow Hancock to amend his
complaint.

Hancock brought breach of contract, fraud, state RICO, and unfair
and deceptive trade practices claims against the Defendants,
arising out of a life insurance policy Hancock purchased in 1985.

The district court dismissed Hancock's complaint without
prejudice, specifically stating that several of his claims failed
to plead sufficient facts, including his breach of contract claim
for excessive insurance charges, breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and unfair and deceptive
trade practices.  Hancock appeals.

While the court added that the Plaintiff's tort allegations also
fail because they are indistinguishable from his breach of
contract action, the Appellate Court sees no reason why an
amendment could not cure this defect.  As such, the district
court's order is not a final order appealable under Section 1291,
and the Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal.

It therefore dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the
district court with instructions to allow Hancock to amend his
complaint.  The Appellate Court dispensed with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before it and argument would not aid the
decisional process.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Unpublished Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/JRIkas from Leagle.com.

John Alan Jones, H. Forest Horne, Jr., Karl J. Amelchenko --
email@m-j.com -- MARTIN & JONES, PLLC, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellant.

Debbie W. Harden -- debbie.harden@wbd-us.com -- Jackson R. Price
-- jackson.price@wbd-us.com -- WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE,
PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina; Roger B. Cowie --
rcowie@lockelord.com -- Carl C. Scherz -- cscherz@lockelord.com -
- Taylor F. Brinkman -- tbrinkman@lockelord.com -- LOCKE LORD
LLP, Dallas, Texas, for Appellee.


MONSANTO CO: Settlement in "Rawa" Suit Has Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSHUA RAWA, ELISABETH MARTIN, ROBERT RAVENCAMP, AMY
WARD, CYNTHIA DAVIES, CHRISTOPHER ABBOTT, OWEN OLSON, JEANNIE A.
GILCHRIST, ZACHARY SHOLAR, MATTHEW MYERS, JOHN W. BEARD, JR., and
MICHAEL OVERSTREET on behalf of themselves, all others similarly
situated, and the general public, Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 4:17CV02300 AGF (E.D. Mo.), Judge
Audrey G. Fleissig of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Final
Approval of the Class Action Settlement; and granted in part the
Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs, and Service Awards.

In Rawa v Monsanto Co., 4:17CV01252 AGF, filed on April 5, 2017,
the Plaintiffs claimed that Monsanto engaged in misleading
practices by overstating on several of its Roundup Concentrate
products' labels, the number of gallons of spray solution the
concentrates would make, in violation of the Missouri
Merchandising Practices Act ("MMPA").  The Plaintiffs, who were
purchasers of the products, sought damages and asserted
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act.

On Oct. 13, 2016, approximately six months before the case was
filed here, another putative class action challenging the same
practices as to the same products, Martin v. Monsanto, 4:17CV2300
AGF, was filed in the Central District of California.  Martin was
brought under the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), on behalf
of a nationwide class; and under various California consumer
protection laws, on behalf of a California subclass.  The
district court in California denied Monsanto's motion to dismiss
the state law claims for failure to state a claim, and on March
24, 2017, certified a statewide California class with respect to
the state law claims.

The Martin plaintiffs did not seek certification of a class with
respect to their MMWA claim.  They initially estimated that
damages for the California class were $22 million, but then
corrected the amount to approximately $15.5 million, based on
information from Monsanto that a certain product that was
included in the damages estimate did not have an offending label.

The plaintiffs' counsel in Martin and Rawa were the same.  On
Aug. 22, 2017, in light of a tentative nationwide settlement, the
parties in Martin jointly requested that Martin be transferred to
the Court, and on August 23, the California district court
granted the motion.

Upon transfer to the Court, Martin was provisionally consolidated
with Rawa and on Sept. 22, 2017, an Amended Consolidated Class
Action Complaint was filed.  Meanwhile, according to the
Plaintiffs' counsel's declaration dated Oct. 4, 2017, nine
related actions were filed in other states.  After the nationwide
settlement agreement was reached, the Plaintiff's counsel reached
out to each of the plaintiffs in the nine related actions.  All
agreed that the nationwide settlement was strong, and worth
supporting.  Thus, each of these plaintiffs was referred to the
Plaintiffs' counsel, to be added to the consolidated complaint,
and their original actions were dismissed.

The consolidated complaint proposes the nationwide class of all
persons in the United States, who, during the Class Period,
purchased in the United States, for personal or household use
certain Roundup Concentrate products whose neck or shoulder label
stated that the product makes up to a specified number of
gallons.

The consolidated complaint alleges that the class members would
have paid from 40% to 50% less for the concentrate products had
they paid the market price for the number of gallons of spray
solution actually received.  The 12 representative Plaintiffs are
from ten states: Missouri, California, Illinois, Kentucky,
Colorado, North Carolina, Indiana, Georgia, Tennessee, and
Pennsylvania.  They include the Plaintiffs in Rawa, Martin, and
the other related cases.

Two causes of action are asserted in the consolidated complaint -
- one under the MMPA and one under the MMWA.

On Oct. 4, 2017, the Plaintiffs, with Monsanto's consent, moved
for preliminary approval of a proposed nationwide class
settlement, pursuant to a Settlement Agreement signed that day,
providing for a common fund of $21.5 million.  By Order dated
Dec. 6, 2017, the Court granted the motion.  The Court
conditionally certified the proposed class for settlement
purposes only.  It also approved the parties' selection of a
Claims Administrator, approved the form and content of the
proposed Class Notice and the proposed method of its
dissemination, and set a schedule for the notice period, the opt
out and objection periods, and a final approval hearing.  The
proposed cy pres recipients were disclosed on the settlement
website.

By declaration dated March 23, 2018, the Claims Administrator
stated that it had received approximately 94,000 claims.  The
Claims Administrator excluded any claims for over 18 bottles for
Super Concentrate 53.7 oz., over 16 bottles for Super Concentrate
64 oz., and over 14 bottles for Super Concentrate 128 oz.

According to the Plaintiffs' counsel's April 14, 2018 sworn
declaration, as of April 13, 2018, this resulted in 70,628
validated claims, valued at $10,774,061, which represents a
claims rate of approximately 13%.  As of March 31, 2018, notice
and administration costs were $630,944.  By separate motion, the
Plaintiffs seek attorney's fees of one-third of the common fund,
which would result in fees of $7,166,666; notice and
administration costs which would be approximately the amount
noted above; litigation expenses of approximately $97,614; and
service awards to the representative Plaintiffs totaling $42,500,
including a $10,000 award for the representative Plaintiff in
Martin.

If the Court were to award the full amount of attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, notice and administration costs, and service
awards that the Plaintiffs have requested, approximately
(depending on final amounts of costs and expenses) $2,788,218 of
the common fund would remain.  The parties have suggested that
this remainder be distributed cy pres to four recipients: 30% to
the National Consumer Law Center ("NCLC"); 30% to the Better
Business Bureau's National Advertising Division; 20% to Gateway
Greening (a nonprofit that educates and empowers people to
strengthen their communities through gardening and urban
agriculture in the St. Louis, Missouri, area); and 20% to Kids
Gardening (a nonprofit that seeks to improve nutritional
attitudes and educational outcomes through garden-based learning,
nationally).  This suggestion was posted on the settlement
website.

Monsanto consents to the motion for final approval of the
settlement in all respects except attorney's fees.  It agrees
that the class counsel is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees
from the common fund, but argues for an award of no more than the
"standard" 25% of the class fund, which would amount to
$5,375,000 in attorney's fees.

Two individuals have filed objections to the Settlement
Agreement: James Migliaccio and Patrick Sweeney.  Migliaccio, a
member of the class from California, argues that the nationwide
Settlement Class should not be certified because the
approximately 51,000 California class members are positioned for
a greater recovery than class members from other states, because,
he contends, California has stronger consumer protection laws.
He also objects to payment of more than $7 million in attorney's
fees for less than a year's work.

Prior to the hearing, the Court required Plaintiffs' counsel to
submit detailed billing statements and hourly rates.  The counsel
submitted unredacted billing records for in camera review, as
well as redacted records for the parties.  The records show a
lodestar amount of $1,136,390.

The consumer class action came before the Court for a hearing on
April 17, 2918, on the Plaintiffs' motion for approval of a
nationwide class settlement, and on the Plaintiffs' separate
motion for attorney's fees, litigation costs, and service awards
for class representatives.

Judge Fleissig concludes that the settlement is fair, reasonable,
and adequate.  And Upon careful consideration of all relevant
factors, the parties' arguments, the Plaintiff's counsel's
billing records, and the case law, specifically in the Eighth
Circuit, on attorney's fees in class action settlements, he
concludes that a fee award of 28% of the common fund is just and
reasonable in the case.  This results in an award of $6,020,000.

The Judge also finds that the administration costs, litigation
costs, and service awards are reasonable.  Thus, in addition to
attorney's fees of $6,020,000, the following amounts will be paid
from the common fund: notice and administration costs of
$630,944, litigation costs of $97,614, and $42,500 in service
awards to the representative Plaintiffs.  He recognizes that the
administration and litigation costs will increase slightly,
depending on remaining tasks for the Claims Administrator and the
Plaintiffs' counsel.

In light of these rulings, approximately $3,934,881 million will
remain in the common fund.  In sum, the Judge concludes that a cy
pres distribution of approximately $3.9 million is reasonable.
Accordingly, he will order that 50% of the funds available for cy
pres distribution be paid to the National Consumer Law Center,
and 50% paid to the Better Business Bureau's National Advertising
Division.

Finally, at the hearing, Monsanto recognized that a reserve could
be established to cover any previously disallowed claims that
might thereafter be allowed by the Claims Administrator based on
appropriate proof of purchase.  The Judge directed the parties to
confer with the Claims Administrator with respect to an
appropriate reserve amount, and within 14 days of the date of the
Order, advise the Court of the proposed reserve amount and
proposed procedure and language to notify claimants how they
could substantiate disallowed claims.  Once a proposal by the
parties is approved by the Court, the Court will dismiss the case
and enter judgment.

Accordingly, Judge Fleissig granted the Plaintiff's Motion for
Final Approval of the Class Action Settlement, granted in part
the Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs, and Service
Awards; and directed the parties and the Claims Administrator to
implement the Settlement Agreement in accordance with its terms
and the Court's rulings.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/YDu0PN from Leagle.com.

Joshua Rawa, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by John Joseph Fitzgerald, IV --
jack@jackfitzgeraldlaw.com -- The Law Office of Jack Fitzgerald,
PC, Kevin J. Dolley -- kevin@dolleylaw.com -- LAW OFFICES OF
KEVIN J. DOLLEY, LLC, Sidney Warren Jackson, III --
sid@jacksonfosterlaw.com -- JACKSON AND FOSTER LLC, pro hac vice
& Thomas A. Canova -- tom@jackfitzgeraldlaw.com -- THE LAW OFFICE
OF JACK FITZGERALD, PC, pro hac vice.

Elisabeth Martin, Robert Ravencamp, Amy Ward, Cynthia Davies,
Christopher Abbott, Owen Olson, Jeannie A Gilchrist, Zachary
Sholar, Matthew Myers, John W Beard, Jr & Michael Overstreet,
Plaintiffs, represented by John Joseph Fitzgerald, IV, The Law
Office of Jack Fitzgerald, PC & Kevin J. Dolley, LAW OFFICES OF
KEVIN J. DOLLEY, LLC.

Monsanto Company, Defendant, represented by Erik L. Hansell --
erik.hansell@huschblackwell.com -- HUSCH BLACKWELL, LLP & John J.
Rosenthal - jrosenthal@winston.com - WINSTON AND STRAWN, LLP, pro
hac vice.

James Migliaccio, Objector, represented by Peter C. Woods --
petewoods@haar-woods.com -- HAAR AND WOODS, LLP.

Patrick Sweeney, Objector, pro se.


NAT'L COLLEGIATE: Points to 9th Cir. Decision on Transfer Rule
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ryan Boysen, writing for Law360, reports that the NCAA is already
pointing to a decision by the Seventh Circuit upholding its
transfer restriction rule to argue that the Ninth Circuit should
not revive a separate proposed wage-and-hour class action, saying
the Seventh Circuit's decision proves its athletes are amateurs
and not employees.

In a June 29 letter to the Ninth Circuit, the NCAA pointed to the
Seventh Circuit's decision that rejected a challenge by former
Northern Illinois University punter Peter Deppe to the so-called
year-in-residence rule.

The case is styled Lamar Dawson v. NCAA, et al Case No. 17-15973
(9th Cir.).  The case was filed May 12, 2017. [GN]


NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Settlement in "Garcia" Has Prelim Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JUANITA GARCIA, individually and on behalf of all
others similar situated, Plaintiff, v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company, Defendant, Case No. C15-1808
TSZ (W.D. Wash.), Judge Thomas S. Zilly of the U.S. District
Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle, granted the Plaintiff's Motion
for Preliminary Approval of Class Certification and Class Action
Settlement.

Based on his preliminary evaluation, the Judge finds that the
Settlement Agreement meets all applicable requirements of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23 for settlement purposes only.  Therefore, he granted
preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), and for settlement purposes
only, Judge Zilly certified the proposed "Settlement Class"
consisting of: (1) all individuals in the United States who, from
Nov. 17, 2014 to the date of preliminary approval of the
settlement, made a payment to Nationstar on a residential
mortgage debt over the phone or online that included a fee
charged by Nationstar for using the phone or internet, and whose
debt had not been current for 30 or more consecutive days at the
time Nationstar began servicing it ("FDCPA Settlement Class");
and (2) all individuals in Washington state who, from Nov. 17,
2011 to the date of preliminary approval of the settlement made a
payment to Nationstar on a residential mortgage debt over the
phone or online that included a fee charged by Nationstar for
using the phone or internet, and whose debt had not been current
for 30 or more consecutive days at the time Nationstar began
servicing it ("CPA Settlement Class").

For settlement purposes only, he approved the appointment of (i)
Plaintiff Garcia as the representative of the Settlement Class;
(ii) Rafey S. Balabanian of Edelson PC and D. Frank Davis of
Davis & Norris, LLP as the Class Counsel; and (iii) Heffler
Claims Group as the Settlement Administrator.

A hearing regarding final approval of the Settlement will be held
at 10:00 a.m. on Sept. 19, 2018.  No later than Sept. 6, 2018,
the Plaintiffs must file their papers in support of the Class
Counsel's application for attorneys' fees and expenses.  No later
than Sept. 5, 2018, the Plaintiffs must file their papers in
support of final approval of the Settlement Agreement and in
response to any objections.

Judge Zilly approved the Class Notice in the Settlement
Agreement, including the manner and content of Direct Notice
attached as Exhibits D-E to the Settlement Agreement and the
creation of the Settlement Website, as more fully described in
the Settlement Agreement.

Any Settlement Class Member who wishes to be excluded from the
Settlement Class must send a written Request for Exclusion to the
Settlement Administrator no later than 45 days after the Direct
Notice is transmitted, which will be no later than 90 days after
the entry of the Order, or Aug. 23, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/qxzk1h from Leagle.com.

Juanita Garcia, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin H. Richman
-- brichman@edelson.com -- EDELSON PC, pro hac vice, D. Frank
Davis -- fdavis@davisnorris.com -- DAVIS & NORRIS LLP, pro hac
vice, Rafey S. Balabanian -- rbalabanian@edelson.com -- EDELSON
PC, pro hac vice, Wesley W. Barnett -- wbarnett@davisnorris.com -
- DAVIS & NORRIS LLP, pro hac vice & Clifford A. Cantor .

Nationstar Mortgage LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
Defendant, represented by Erik Kemp -- ek@severson.com --
SEVERSON & WERSON, pro hac vice, Kalama M. Lui-Kwan --
kml@severson.com -- SEVERSON & WERSON, pro hac vice, Mary Kate
Kamka -- kk@severson.com -- SEVERSON & WERSON, pro hac vice &
John Alan Knox -- jknox@williamskastner.com -- WILLIAMS KASTNER &
GIBBS.


NEW MEXICO: Ct. Denies Pro Se Class Certification Bid in "Amaro"
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case
captioned PEDRO J. "PETE" AMARO, Petitioner, v. R.C. SMITH,
Warden, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Respondents, No. 1:17-cv-00898 MCA/LF (D.N.M.).

Amaro's Motion for Class Certification which seeks to certify a
class of federal habeas petitioners.

The Petition seeks to vacate all criminal judgments entered in
New Mexico's Ninth Judicial District Court between 1979 and
2012/2013. It also appears to challenge his State Court
convictions based on, inter alia, judicial misconduct,
prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

Having carefully reviewed each Motion, the Court finds that
dismissal of the Sections 2254 Petition as untimely renders the
requests moot. All pending motions will therefore be denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7hkmrbb
from Leagle.com.

Pedro J. Amaro, "Pete", Petitioner, pro se.


NEW YORK: Court Denies Certification of "Sanchez" Class
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification in
the case captioned WALTER NEIRA SANCHEZ, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK
KIMCHI CATERING, CORP., et al., Defendants, No. 16 Civ. 7784
(LGS) (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Walter Neira Sanchez brings this action under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New York Labor Law (NYLL)
against his alleged former employers, Defendants New York Kimchi
Catering, Corp. (NYKCC); Gum Gang Inc. (Gum Gang).  The Plaintiff
previously moved for Rule 23 class certification on the NYLL
claims on behalf of all non-exempt employees employed by the
Defendants at New York Kimchi' located at 16 West 48th Street, in
New York, on or after the date that is six (6) years before the
filing of the initial Complaint.

Numerosity and Superiority

The Plaintiff cannot show that the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable or that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy. This is not a case where putative
class members with limited resources can seek redress on their
small claims only through a class action.

Plaintiff's Adequacy as Class Representative

The Plaintiff also has not established that he is an adequate
class representative of non-managerial employees at the
Defendants' restaurant.  The parties' dispute whether the
Plaintiff ever worked for the restaurant and, therefore, even has
standing to bring this case. The Defendants' argument creates a
unique defense that threatens to become the focus of the
litigation. The Plaintiff's only evidence of his employment is
his own conclusory declaration that he worked as a delivery
person for the Defendants between February 2014 and November
2014. The Plaintiff has not submitted his own pay stubs or
payroll records, tax documentation or testimony from former co-
workers stating that they worked together at the Defendants'
restaurant; nor has he provided any details about his employment
or the restaurant that would lend credibility to his claim.

The Plaintiff's conclusory declaration is controverted by the
Defendants' evidence. Defendant Kim's declaration states, "Based
upon my own personal knowledge and an exhaustive search of the
business records, Plaintiff Walter Neira Sanchez has never worked
for Gum Gang, Inc. We have no employment or other records
relating to him whatsoever."  The Defendants have submitted four
lists of employees, including other delivery persons, but not the
Plaintiff. Based on this record, the Plaintiff has not sustained
his burden of showing that he is an adequate representative of
any class.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's renewed motion for class
certification is denied with prejudice and the previously
certified class is decertified.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycydh242 from
Leagle.com.

Walter Neira Sanchez, on behalf of himself, FLSA Collective
Plaintiffs and the Class, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Melissa
Seelig, Lee Litigation Group, PLLC, Taimur Alamgir, Lee
Litigation Group, PLLC & C.K. Lee, Lee Litigation Group, PLLC.

New York Kimchi Catering, Corp., Gum Gang Inc. & Un Cha Kim,
Defendants, represented by Kenneth Foard McCallion --
kfin@mccallionlaw.com -- McCallion & Associates, LLP & Kristian
Karl Larsen -- Klarsen@larsenadvocates.com -- Larsen Advocates.
Sandra Yoo, Defendant, represented by Kenneth Foard McCallion,
McCallion & Associates, LLP.


NEWELL BRANDS: Robbins Arroyo Files Securities Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Robbins Arroyo LLP on July 2
disclosed that purchasers of Newell Brands Inc. (NYSE: NWL) have
filed a class action complaint against the company's officers and
directors for alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 between February 6, 2017 and January 24, 2018. Newell
designs, manufactures, sources, and distributes consumer and
commercial products worldwide.

View this information on the law firm's Shareholder Rights Blog:
www.robbinsarroyo.com/newell-brands-inc

Newell Accused of Hiding Truth Behind Bloated Retail Inventory
Levels

According to the complaint, Newell failed to disclose that the
company's retail channel was loaded with extremely high levels of
unsold product, which made it more likely that the company would
experience slower sales growth.  In addition, Newell's business
fundamentals were not improving as Newell officials claimed and
internal discord was contributing to the adverse effect on the
company's operating performance.  Newell's troubles began to
emerge on November 2, 2017, when the company announced that net
sales declined by 7%, admitting that 2017 third quarter results
were below expectations due to weak "late-quarter sales" related
to retail inventory rebalancing.  Then, on January 25, 2018,
Newell announced that the company was considering a divestiture
that would result in a 50% reduction in both Newell's customer
base and its global factory and warehouse footprint.  On this
news, Newell's stock fell nearly 21% to close at $24.81 per share
on January 25, 2018, and has yet to recover from this decline.

Newell Shareholders Have Legal Options

Concerned shareholders who would like more information about
their rights and potential remedies can contact attorney Leonid
Kandinov at (800) 350-6003, LKandinov@robbinsarroyo.com, or via
the shareholder information form on the firm's website.

Robbins Arroyo LLP is a nationally recognized leader in
shareholder rights law.  The firm represents individual and
institutional investors in shareholder derivative and securities
class action lawsuits, and has helped its clients realize more
than $1 billion of value for themselves and the companies in
which they have invested. [GN]


NIAGARA BOTTLING: Court Narrows Claims in Mislabeling Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted in part and denied in part Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss the case captioned STANLEY F. FROMPOVICZ,
Plaintiff, v. NIAGARA BOTTLING, LLC, ICE RIVER SPRINGS WATER CO,
INC., CROSSROADS BEVERAGE GROUP AND JAMES J. LAND, JR.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-54 (E.D. Pa.).

The Plaintiff, a spring water extractor, alleges that the
Defendants have violated the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. Section
1125(a), and Pennsylvania's unfair competition law by mislabeling
their water as spring water.  One of the Defendants extracts
water and three of them bottle, sell, and label the extracted
water as spring water. The Plaintiff, who is in the spring water
business, possessed a license from the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) to operate a spring water
extraction site.

He alleges that the Defendants' labeling of their water as spring
water has damaged his business because the labels are designed to
entice purchasers to buy the Defendants' products under the false
belief that their spring water is at least equal, if not
superior, to Plaintiff's true spring water.

The Defendants seek to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint on the
grounds that: (1) he lacks standing under Article III of the
United States Constitution; and (2) because he does not have a
right to sue under the Lanham Act. Defendants also contend that
Plaintiff's Lanham Act claims are precluded, by the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetics Act.

Article III standing

Turning, first to the Defendants' challenge to Article III
standing: A plaintiff has Article III standing if he has (1)
suffered an injury-in-fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.

The Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that the Defendants' marketing
and sale of their deceptively marketed 'spring water' is damaging
to the reputation and goodwill of the Plaintiff, and that the
Defendants' actions hindered his sales. Thus, the Plaintiff has
sufficiently alleged a legally protected interest, and, thus, an
injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing.

In this case, Defendant Land allegedly extracts well water and
Defendants Niagara, Crossroads, and Ice River allegedly bottle
such water with labels that indicate that it is spring water.
Since consumers prefer spring water, it is reasonable to infer
under the analytical rubric of a motion to dismiss that Defendant
Land's sales siphoned sales away from the Plaintiff. In fact, the
Plaintiff alleges that the misleading labels depressed his own
sales by falsely equating his product with Defendant Land's.
Taking these allegations as true, the Plaintiff has sufficiently
alleged that his injuries are traceable to the Defendants'
conduct.

Right to Sue Under the Statute

Whether the Plaintiff has a right to sue under the Lanham Act is
an entirely different question. That question is resolved by
determining whether the Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that:
(1) he comes within the zone of interest implicated by the
statute; and, (2) that the Defendants' conduct proximately caused
his damages.

The Plaintiff's allegations that his spring water sales were
depressed as a result of the Defendants' misleading labels come
within the zone of interests invoked by the Lanham Act. These
allegations have sufficient factual support in order to withstand
a challenge under Rule 12(b)(6). Accepting those facts as true
and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff,
it is plausible that the Bottler Defendants would have purchased
more spring water from the Plaintiff than water from Defendant
Land had the labels indicated that Land's water was other than
spring water.

Proximate Cause Test

As to the proximate cause test, the Plaintiff must demonstrate
that his injuries are not too remote from the Defendants'
violations of the Lanham Act.

Here, the Plaintiff's alleged economic and reputational injury
flows directly from the activities of Defendant Land. All parties
concede that the Plaintiff was, until recently, actively
sourcing, extracting, and selling spring water to bottlers.
Defendant Land is in the exact same business. He is thus a direct
competitor. The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Land
fraudulently and deceptively markets and sells the raw water
extracted at Pine Valley Farms Springs as spring water. There is
no intervening causal agent between Defendant Land's conduct the
deceptive sale to bottlers and the Plaintiff's diminished sales
to bottlers; both are selling what they call spring water to
bottlers.

Thus, the Plaintiff has alleged a viable theory of proximate harm
from Defendant Land's actions.

The question is more complicated when it comes to the Bottler
Defendants who are not in direct competition with the Plaintiff:
He sells his product to bottlers and then the bottlers sell to
consumers. The question is whether this extra step in the chain
of causation takes the Plaintiff's Lanham Act claim one step
beyond viability.

In this case, the Plaintiff's Complaint has a paucity of
allegations connecting his own lost sales with the Bottler
Defendants' actions. Absent such allegations, the Plaintiff's
Lanham Act claim will be dismissed against the Bottler Defendants
without prejudice to amend.

FDCA and Lanham Act Preclusion

The FDCA provides that a food shall be misbranded if it purports
to be or is represented as a food for which a definition and
standard of identity has been prescribed by regulations . . .
unless (1) it conforms to such definition and standard, and (2)
its label bears the name of the food specified in the definition
and standard. Pursuant to its rulemaking authority under the
FDCA, the FDA has defined spring water explicitly.

The Defendants argue that these regulations preempt the Lanham
Act with respect to spring water labeling. The Supreme Court's
recent decision in POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co. is to the
contrary. 134 S.Ct. 2228 (2014). The Supreme Court clarified that
the FDCA generally does not preclude Lanham Act claims based on
false labeling.

In that case, the plaintiff claimed that although the defendant's
pomegranate juice comported with FDCA labeling requirements
concerning juices, it was still misleading because the juice was
only .3% pomegranate. The Court held that the FDCA and the Lanham
Act complement each other with respect to labeling. While
enforcement of the FDCA and the detailed prescription of its
implementing regulations is largely committed to the FDA, the FDA
does not have the same perspective or expertise in assessing
market dynamics that day-to-day competitors possess. The Second
Circuit summarized the holding of POM Wonderful succinctly:
"Compliance with FDA regulation does not create a ceiling that
bars still better protections against the capacity of the
representations to mislead. Therefore, compliance with the FDCA
does not preclude liability under the Lanham Act."

The Complaint here contains no allegation that the FDA has made
an affirmative judgment as to whether Land's water falls within
its definition of spring water. Indeed, it specifically alleges
that Land's water is not spring water. Accepting that allegation
as true, the Plaintiff's Lanham Act claim is not precluded by the
FDCA.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9seplb7 from Leagle.com.

STANLEY F. FROMPOVICZ, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by DAVID J. STANOCH,
GOLOMB & HONIK, P.C.

NIAGARA BOTTLING, LLC, Defendant, represented by MATTHEW A. WHITE
-- WHITEMA@BALLARDSPAHR.COM -- BALLARD SPAHR LLP, EMILIA L. MCKEE
VASSALLO -- MCKEEVASSALLOE@BALLARDSPAHR.COM -- BALLARD SPAHR LLP
& LESLIE E. JOHN -- JOHN@BALLARDSPAHR -- BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS &
INGERSOLL LLP.

ICE RIVER SPRINGS WATER CO. INC., CROSSROADS BEVERAGE GROUP &
JAMES J. LAND, JR., doing business as PINE VALLEY FARMS SPRINGS,
Defendants, represented by BRETT A. DATTO --
brett.datto@weirpartners.com -- WEIR & PARTNERS LLP & LAUREN
SCHWIMMER -- lschwimmer@weirpartners.com -- WEIR & PARTNERS LLP.


NIGERIA: Police Faces Class Action Over SARS-Related Abuses
-----------------------------------------------------------
Chidirim Ndeche and Tonye Bakare, writing for Guardian, report
that James Ademuyiwa, a social media marketer, does not believe
the police is a friend.  After two nasty experiences with men of
the Special Anti-Robbery Squad in Abeokuta and Lagos, his
disposition is more than justified. The first time he was
arrested for committing no crime, he was walking down a street in
the Ogun State capital.

Immediately tagged a Yahoo boy -- the Nigerian label for an
internet fraudster -- without evidence or justification,
his phone was confiscated.

Without asking any questions, knowing he would be saving himself
from wounds or bloody harassment, he handed them his phone.
Nothing incriminating was found on it.  Yet, he was told he had
to pay to 'bail' himself.

James' encounters with the now dreaded police squad mirror
thousands of others by young Nigerians, with some ending in
fatalities.

"No police officer should violate the rights of even criminals,"
says Segun Awosanya, a convener of the #EndSARS #ReformPoliceNG
Movement.

"But here, we have people who break the law under the guise of
upholding the law; people who take the laws into their hands
under substance abuse to do whatever they want. And they believe
nothing will happen."

Awosanya and others like him are spearheading a nationwide
campaign aimed at the abolition of the anti-robbery squad and
reformation of the entire police force.

The #EndSARS campaign began on social media to protest the
activities of the police unit which have been accused of
extortion, harassment, robbery, intimidation and extra-judicial
killings.  There have also been public demonstrations for and
against the continued existence of the dreaded anti-crime unit of
the Nigeria Police Force.

To achieve its aim, the movement, which has found relevance with
a band of Nigerian youths, is hoping Nigeria's parliament will
act on the Police Act amendment bill before it and also institute
a public hearing on the "on human rights abuses by Police/SARS in
collaboration with National Human Rights Commission."

"On the civil side, we are filing a class action suit of N100
billion against the Nigeria Police and also a lawsuit at [the]
International Criminal Court on Terrorism on the defenseless
youth of Nigeria by the Police as guaranteed by Article 15 of the
ICC Statute which allows citizens to refer cases to the ICC,
where the state is UNWILLING or UNABLE to take action," Awosanya
says in a post on his Medium page.

The vexatious issue has taken the front burner in national
discourse, resulting in the big question about how SARS came to
be.

The origin of the special squad
In the 1980s, Nigeria saw a plethora of robbery attack on homes,
bank premises and on highways.  Many lost their lives and
property.  This led to a public outcry, forcing the police to set
up a special squad of policemen to answer to the menace of
robbers in the country.  Mr Mike Okiro, the Former Inspector-
General of Police and Chairman of the Police Service Commission,
in an interview with Daily Trust in December 2017, said, "the
idea was that they would be in mufti and armed, simply for the
very important element of surprise.  They would take cover and,
communicate with walkie-talkies, hit the armed robbers.  They did
that and the robbery attacks went down drastically and, at a
point, stopped altogether."

The former police boss, however, said the squad later became
errant and its different formations across the country started
acting in ways that negated the spirit of their creation.  "I'd
say the original idea of SARS has been bastardised," Okiro said.

"The squad was feared before, and I mean by criminals.  But by
the time it spread to other states, it seemed like anyone would
be carrying arms, dressed in mufti, with a T-shirt with SARS
emblazoned on it. Anybody can wear such an outfit."

The campaign against SARS reached its peak in late 2017, causing
#EndSARS to trend for weeks on social media.  The outrage
expressed in the digital space, which had resonated with
celebrities, quickly morphed into street protests in different
parts of the country.  The leadership of the Nigerian Police
responded by reorganising the squad which was fast becoming a
blight on its already less-than-sterling public image.

But it insisted that the squad was doing what it was established
to do. " Undoubtedly, the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) have
been doing very well in fighting violent crimes such as armed
robbery, kidnappings and cattle rustling in the country in the
recent time and this has resulted in drastic reduction of
incidents of the mentioned violent crimes nationwide," Nigerian
police spokesman Jimoh Moshood said in a statement last December.

Weighing the odds
People like Awosanya and rap artist Michael Ugochukwu Stephens,
popularly known as Ruggedman, think SARS has become more of a
menace to the Nigerian society than a deterrent to criminals.

"They are now bullies," says Ruggedman, whose younger brother was
arrested by SARS unjustly.

A 2016 report by Amnesty International indicates that persons
detained by SARS, both men and women, "are subjected to various
methods of torture and ill-treatment in order to extract
information and 'confessions'.  Such methods include severe
beating, hanging, starvation, shooting in the legs, mock
executions and threats of execution."

The reason for this barefaced brutality, according to Awosanya,
is not farfetched. He describes how police personnel are drafted
into the anti-robbery squad as corrupt in itself.  He says that
the officials are made members of the squad after they have paid
a certain amount of money to their superiors.  Allegations of the
Nigerian police being enmeshed in corruption are not unfounded.

A report published by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in
partnership with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) shows that the Nigerian judiciary is the second most
corrupt public institution in the country after the Nigerian
police.

Abayomi Shogunle, who heads Nigerian Police's Public Complaint
Rapid Response Unit, says SARS may be a victim of unjust
accusations.  He tells Guardian Life that it is important for
members of the public to lodge complaints with the Nigerian
police through appropriate channels.  Perhaps this is his way of
ensuring that proper evidence is provided for accusations against
the questionable actions of the unit.

In fact, the police, in recent past, acted quickly against men
and officers who have been found wanting of crimes. It has also
intensified its anti-corruption campaign too.

In a separate interview with Channels TV earlier this month,
Shogunle insists that the bulk of accusations against the squad
are unfounded.

"Why are people not going to the courts? Because they don't have
evidence or the facts they will use to pursue their cases,"
Shogunle says.  He claims most of the complaints against SARS are
localised in Lagos State because of better "access to internet
facilities".

"Maybe it's because more people in Lagos have more access to
internet facilities than other people in Nigeria or maybe because
of the high commercial activities in Lagos or maybe because most
of the online media platforms are based in Lagos."

But Israel Oladipupo 'Ladi Speaks' Ogunseye, whose mother was a
member of SARS between 2014 and 2015, is of the belief that the
narrations seen on social media are telling of what SARS has
become.  He is aware of the possibility of people lying
outrightly or exaggerate their encounters with the SARS.

He says, "most of the stories being reported on social media to
have been known to be true. Only proper investigations into these
matters and cases can show us which is true and which is not
true."

Like Ogunseye, Awosanya believes that a lot of the cases of SARS
criminality mentioned on social media have [a] basis in reality.

With data miners, dedicated website and professionals spread
across Nigeria, the US and the UK, the credibility of the cases
#EndSARS #ReformPoliceNG Movement handles are ascertained.  He
tells Guardian Life that his organisation verified about 350,000
cases of SARS brutality in 2017 alone.  The number, in spite of
the uptick in activism against police brutality, has risen to
about 450,000.

To end or to reform?
With the #EndSARS campaign still gaining fervency, Awosanya says
it is imperative for the Nigerian police to see the wholesome
reorganisation and reformation of the whole force as important.

One of the things the Inspector-General of Police did after the
anti-SARS got to a head last year was to order an immediate
reorganisation of the squad formations across the country.

But a reorganisation without reformation and reorientation of the
personnel may achieve little or nothing.

Awosanya is pessimistic about reforming the squad.  An outright
proscription, he says will be deterrent enough.  But Tomiwa
Talabi, founder of LagosLife, UnilagGist and TheGistNG, who
himself has been at the receiving end of SARS brutality says
reforming the squad is better.

"SWAT is an awesome benchmark for what SARS should look like," he
says.

Rapper Ruggedman notes that whichever option the police hierarchy
chooses, the current squad must be taken off the street "because
they belong there in the first place." [GN]


NUCOR CORP: Racial Bias Class Action Settlement Hearing Set
-----------------------------------------------------------
David Wren, writing for The Postal and Courier, reports that a
federal judge in Charleston was set to hear arguments Friday,
July 6, in a class-action settlement dispute involving Nucor
Corp. and workers who say they suffered racial discrimination at
the steelmaker's plant in Berkeley County.

The workers say Charlotte-based Nucor is wrongfully trying to
deduct taxes that employers typically pay from some payments
under a settlement reached in February.  Nucor says the $22.5
million settlement represents all of the money it's obligated to
pay, and that having to pay taxes on top of that amount would
violate the agreement.

The issue affects workers who say they were denied promotions
because they are black.

The initial allegations of hostile working conditions at Nucor
date to 2002, with black workers alleging in court documents that
their white counterparts used racial slurs when talking to them,
displayed Confederate flags, nooses and other racist symbols, and
denied them promotions and other benefits because of their race.

The settlement ended a nearly 15-year court battle. [GN]


PACIFIC GAS: Court Won't Certify Interlocutory Appeal in "Greer"
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California denied Defendant IBEW Local 1245 (IBEW)'s Motion to
Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal in the case captioned
BECKY GREER, TIMOTHY C. BUDNIK, ROSARIO SAENZ, IAN CARTY, HALEY
MARKWITH, and MARCIA GARCIA PESINA, individually and as class
representatives, Plaintiffs, v. PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY,
IBEW LOCAL 1245, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 1:15-cv-01066-EPG (E.D. Cal.).

IBEW argues that this Court should stay the case and permit an
interlocutory appeal of the Court's order requiring that the
notice to purported class members include the amounts that will
be paid by each defendant, IBEW, who is the class members' own
Union, and PG&E, who is the class members' employer that
allegedly underpaid class members' wages.

Regarding whether the Court's order concerns a controlling
question of law, IBEW argues that: "The Court's Order requiring
Defendants to disclose in the settlement notices the specific
contributions that each Defendant will make toward the settlement
fund involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion insofar as the Order
purports to grant preliminary approval to the settlement while
ordering the parties to modify substantive and material terms of
their agreement without their consent and over Local 1245's
previously stated objection to the modifications required by the
Court, notwithstanding that the Court's authority is limited to
approving or denying the settlement as a whole; and therefore,
'an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation.'"

In support of its argument, IBEW cites to case law indicating
that the Court cannot modify the terms of the settlement. In
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998),
neither the district court nor this court have the ability to
delete, modify or substitute certain provisions. The settlement
must stand or fall in its entirety.

It is equally clear, however, that the Court may modify the
proposed Notice to the class members of the settlement terms.
Rule 23(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that
the court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class
members who would be bound by the proposal.

As to the first claim, the fact that the settlement terms put on
the record are silent about whether or not the allocation will be
disclosed in the notice just confirms that it is not a term of
the settlement agreement. As to the second claim, as the Court
already explained in its order, the Court is not dictating the
allocation of the settlement payment between defendants. It is
only requiring notice of whatever allocation is decided between
IBEW and PG&E before the settlement is finalized and class
members release IBEW of claims against it.

In any event, this supposed term that IBEW not be required to
disclose its allocation before settlement is finalized is not set
forth in any statement of terms. Moreover, the Plaintiff strongly
disputes that there was any such agreement.

Thus, as to the first factor, there is no controlling question of
law. The law is clear that the Court cannot modify the settlement
terms, but can modify the notice. Moreover, the Court's order at
issue here permissibly modified the Notice and not the settlement
terms.

For these reasons, there are not substantial grounds for a
difference of opinion regarding the legal issue. IBEW frames that
issue as the Order purports to grant preliminary approval to the
settlement while ordering the parties to modify substantive and
material terms of their agreement without their consent and over
Local 1245's previously stated objection to the modifications
required by the Court, notwithstanding that the Court's authority
is limited to approving or denying the settlement as a whole.
Again, there is not substantial grounds for difference of opinion
regarding the applicable law.

While these cases may show a difference of opinion regarding
whether and when allocation of defendants should be required in a
notice to class members, they do not show substantial ground for
difference of opinion regarding the legal issue here, which is
whether the Court exceeded its legal authority when it required
changes in the notice to class members of that agreement.

Regarding the final factor of whether resolution of the legal
issue would materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation, IBEW states that clarification regarding the Court's
authority to order modifications while also purporting to approve
the entire settlement will therefore likely affect whether the
pending settlement is enforceable, or whether the parties must
determine among themselves where there is some other settlement
they could reach that is acceptable to all parties that can be
approved. This appears to be a thinly veiled threat that IBEW
will attempt to withdraw from the settlement agreement if
required to disclose its allocation before settlement is
approved.

The Court does not see any legitimate basis for IBEW to withdraw
from the settlement agreement. Clearly, staying the case for the
significant time it would take to obtain an order from the Ninth
Circuit on this issue would not advance the ultimate termination
of this litigation.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8n27grx from Leagle.com.

Becky Greer, Individually and as Class Representatives, Timothy
C. Budnik, Individually and as Class Representatives, Rosario
Saenz, Individually and as Class Representatives, Ian Carty,
Individually and as Class Representatives & Haley Markwith,
Plaintiffs, represented by Charles Swanston, Fitzpatrick, Spini &
Swanston, Erin Tsitidis Huntington --
ehuntington@wjhattorneys.com -- Wanger Jones Helsley PC, Lawrence
J.H. Liu -- lliu@wjhattorneys.com -- Wanger Jones Helsley PC,
Michael S. Helsley --  mhelsley@wjhattorneys.com -- Wanger Jones
Helsley PC & Patrick D. Toole -- ptoole@wjhattorneys.com --
Wanger Jones Helsley PC.

Maria Garcia Pesina, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Swanston,
Fitzpatrick, Spini & Swanston,Erin Tsitidis Huntington, Wanger
Jones Helsley PC, Michael S. Helsley, Wanger Jones Helsley PC &
Patrick D. Toole, Wanger Jones Helsley PC.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Defendant, represented by
Robert G. Hulteng -- rhulteng@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson,
Aurelio J. Perez -- aperez@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C.
& Joshua D. Kienitz -- jkienitz@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson.


POLARITYTE INC: Klein Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
The Klein Law Firm disclosed that class action complaints have
been filed on behalf of shareholders of the following companies.
If you suffered a loss you have until the lead plaintiff deadline
to request that the court appoint you as lead plaintiff.

PolarityTE, Inc. (NASDAQ:COOL)
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: August 27, 2018
Class Period: March 31, 2017 - June 22, 2018

Allegations: the Company failed to disclose the true status of
Patent #14/954,335 at the time it was acquired by the Company on
April 7, 2017 and the months following; the updated status of
Patent #14/954,335 after its June 4, 2018 final rejection by the
United States Patent Office; and as a result of the foregoing,
PolarityTE's publicly disseminated financial statements were
materially false and misleading.

Get additional information: http://www.kleinstocklaw.com/pslra-
c/polarityte-inc?wire=3 [GN]


POMONA VALLEY: Denial of "Doster" Class Certification Affirmed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TERRI DOSTER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. POMONA
VALLEY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant and Respondent, Case
No. B280005 (Cal. App.), Judge James Edward Rogan of the Court of
Appeals of California for the Second District, Division Eight,
affirmed the trial court's order denying Doster's motion for
class certification.

On June 17, 2014, Doster received emergency medical services at
the Hospital.  She signed an agreement which included a payment
provision that she agrees to promptly pay all hospital bills in
accordance with the regular rates and terms of the hospital; that
she understands that all physicians and surgeons will bill
separately for their services; should any account be referred to
an attorney or collection agency for collection, she'll pay
actual attorneys' fees and collection expenses; and all
delinquent accounts will bear interest at the legal rate, unless
prohibited by law.

On Jan. 23, 2015, Doster sued the Hospital.  Her operative
complaint includes causes of action for unfair competition law,
violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and declaratory
relief.  Doster seeks to represent a class only with respect to
her declaratory relief cause of action.

She sought a declaration that the Defendant's standard contracts
for emergency room care only permit billing for, and collection
of, amounts constituting the reasonable value of the treatment
the Defendant provides.  According to Doster this declaration is
necessary to prevent the Hospital from relying on its
"chargemaster," or master list of itemized charge rates.  She
acknowledges that no 'reasonable value' determinations are sought
in her declaratory judgment claim.

In her declaration in support of her motion for class
certification, Doster averred that she received bills for $1,288
from the Hospital.  She believes this amount is greater than the
reasonable value of the services she received.  She does not
identify the services she received.

At a hearing on her motion for class certification, Doster's
counsel acknowledged that Doster was not asking the Court to
determine reasonable value.  The Counsel argued that with the
declaration she requested, putative class members would be
empowered to pursue individual actions or to negotiate with the
Hospital.

In its written order, the trial court explained that in the
present case, it is unclear how a declaration would actually
benefit the proposed Class.  The declaration requested merely
limits the Defendant to collect reasonable value of services
without determining what is meant by 'reasonable value' and what
the reasonable value would be for each type of service.  The term
'reasonable value' is at best vague and amorphous and, therefore,
the significance of such a ruling would be called into question.
The benefit of a declaration to provide guidance for future
conduct of the parties is unclear and undetermined.  The benefit
from certification does not appear to be substantial.  And any
benefit is outweighed by the burdens of individualized proof.

The appeal followed.  On appeal, Doster's primary argument is
that the court erred in applying state rather than federal
standards, and according to her, federal standards support
granting class certification.  She also argues that a class
action would be a superior method of resolving the parties'
controversy because patients in collection would be able to use a
favorable Contract interpretation ruling to defend against
Hospital's improper collections attempts based on Chargemaster
rates and the Hospital would be required to show that its rates
were reasonable.

Judge Rogan holds that as the trial court correctly concluded, by
curtailing her proposed class action, even if Doster obtained
declaratory relief, neither she nor any putative class member
would receive effective relief.  The court would not determine
whether Doster or any putative class member was billed more than
the reasonable value of services.  An individual determination as
to the "reasonable value" of services rendered to each patient
would remain necessary.  It follows, as the trial court
thoughtfully concluded, that a class action is not a superior
method of resolving Doster's dispute with the hospital.

In addition, the Judge finds that Doster's principal argument on
appeal that the court should have applied federal law instead of
state law has already been rejected.

For these reasons, Judge Rogan affirmed the order denying
Doster's motion for class action certification.  The Respondent
is entitled to costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/7pSzWS from Leagle.com.

Carpenter Law, Gretchen Carpenter -- gretchen@gcarpenterlaw.com;
Law Office of Barry Kramer and Barry L. Kramer for Plaintiff and
Appellant.

Hooper, Lundy & Bookman, Amanda L. Hayes-Kibreab -- ahayes-
kibreab@health-law.com -- Sansan Lin -- slin@health-law.com --
and Glenn E. Solomon -- gsolomon@health-law.com -- for Defendant
and Respondent.


PRICELINE.COM INC: Fort Smith A&P Joins Class-Action Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------------
John Lovett, writing for Times Record, reports that the Fort
Smith Advertising & Promotion Commission recently agreed to
become part of a class action lawsuit against online travel
companies to obtain transaction data on hotel rooms.

Companies that operate sites like Priceline.com and
Travelocity.com would have to produce A&P commissions listed in
the suit the data within 30 s of a transaction if the plaintiffs
win the lawsuit.

Fort Smith joins A&P commissions in Pine Bluff and North Little
Rock as plaintiffs in the class action, which seeks recovery of
potentially unpaid tax receipts. The Thrash Law Firm and Williams
& Anderson PLC in Little Rock are representing the plaintiffs.

Revenues gained in April by Fort Smith's 3 percent lodging tax
were up by about $9,800 with a total of $75,233. Total revenue
for the Fort Smith Convention and Visitors Bureau as of April 30
is $272,192, which is about $10,300 under projections.

Monthly expenses for the Visitors Bureau by the end of April were
$73,769, or about $8,800 under budget and about $7,600 under
budget for the year. The A&P fund balance for the Convention and
Visitors Bureau as of April 30 is $427,286, according to the
latest financial report.

The Fort Smith Convention Center, also under the operation of the
Fort Smith A&P, also had an increase in revenue for May of about
$9,800, a 23 percent jump from the same time last year. The
Convention Center's revenue for May was $52,151 compared to
$42,325 in May 2017, and year-to-date revenue as of May 30 was
$316,894, or 17.6 percent higher than the same time last year.

With $36,492 from concessions, catering, vending and beverage
sales, revenue in this sector is up by about $15,000 this year,
according to the Convention Center's financial report.

Expenses for the Convention Center in May were $139,933, a 45.8
percent increase, with year-to-date expenses at $645,468 and a
fund balance of $519,0648. The city of Fort Smith subsidizes the
Convention Center out of its general fund. The A&P has noted the
center has a multi-million-dollar annual economic impact on the
city.

The top-five invoiced revenue events in May at the Convention
Center were the Arkansas Master Gardener Conference ($8,592), the
CarMart meeting ($5,275), the Chamber of Commerce Business Expo
($4,965), the Fort Smith Public Schools Celebration ($3,111) and
the Fort Smith Symphony's "Home Grown Greatness" event
($3,765).[GN]


PULSE BIOSCIENCES: Kaskela Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------
Kaskela Law LLC is investigating Pulse Biosciences, Inc. on
behalf of the Company's stockholders. The investigation seeks to
determine whether Pulse's executive officers and/or directors
have breached their fiduciary duties to the Company and its
stockholders.

Pulse stockholders are encouraged to contact Kaskela Law LLC
(David Seamus Kaskela, Esq.) at (484) 258-1585 or (888) 715-1740,
or via email at skaskela@kaskelalaw.com, to discuss this
investigation and their legal rights and options. Stockholders
may also visit http://kaskelalaw.com/pulse-biosciences-inc/for
additional information.

         David Seamus Kaskela, Esq.
         Kaskela Law LLC
         201 King of Prussia Road, Suite 650
         Radnor, PA 19087
         Telephone: (484) 258-1585
                    (888) 715-1740
         Email: skaskela@kaskelalaw.com[GN]


PENNSYLVANIA: Court Certifies Inmates Class in HCV Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granting Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned SALVATORE CHIMENTI, ET AL.,
v. JOHN WETZEL, ET AL., Civil Action No. 15-3333 (E.D. Pa.).

The Plaintiffs have brought this lawsuit against the Defendants
asserting claims regarding the medical care provided to
Department of Correction (DOC) inmates who have been diagnosed
with Hepatitis C viral infections (HCV). Specifically, the
Plaintiffs contend that the DOC Defendants have violated their
rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Pennsylvania
Constitution by adopting a policy for the treatment of inmates
with chronic HCV that fails to provide them with appropriate
medical care.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent the following Class: all persons
who are currently incarcerated in a Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections (DOC) facility with a diagnosed condition of chronic
Hepatitis C, and who have at least twelve (12) weeks or more
remaining to serve on their sentences, and who have a life
expectancy of over one year.

Numerosity

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
stated that there is no minimum number of plaintiffs required to
maintain a suit as a class action.  The DOC Defendants argue that
the class is not sufficiently numerous to support certification
because only seven current DOC inmates had satisfied the Prison
Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) exhaustion requirement with
respect to the claims asserted in this action prior to the filing
of the Complaint.

Chimenti, Leyva, and Maldonado all filed grievances with respect
to the DOC's refusal to treat them with DAAs. The DOC contends
that Leyva did not fully exhaust his administrative remedies in
accordance with the PLRA before this suit was filed. However, the
DOC Defendants do not suggest that either Chimenti or Maldonado
has failed to satisfy the PLRA's exhaustion requirement.
Consequently, the Court concludes that the PLRA's exhaustion
requirement is satisfied through vicarious exhaustion and that
the class is not limited to the seven prisoners with HCV who have
personally exhausted their administrative remedies with respect
to treatment with DAAs.

The DOC Defendants have submitted evidence that, the DOC held
4968 inmates who have chronic HCV and had not been treated with
DAAs. The COurt conclude that a class of 4968 inmates is
sufficiently numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable and that the proposed class thus satisfies the
numerosity requirement

Commonality

Commonality requires a plaintiff to show that 'there are
questions of law or fact common to the class.  The Plaintiffs
assert that the following two questions of fact are both central
to their claims and common to all of the members of the proposed
class:

   1. Whether the treatment regimens utilizing the DAA drugs are
the proper, necessary, and standard course of treatment in the
medical community; and

   2. Whether denial of treatment regimens utilizing the DAA
drugs to the Proposed Class will cause injury to the class
members, including unnecessary pain and suffering, chronic
illness, and death.

In connection with their Eighth Amendment and Pennsylvania
constitution claims, all class members share the common question
of whether the DOC Defendants' policy or custom of withholding
treatment with DAA drugs from individuals who have been or will
be diagnosed with chronic HCV constitutes deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need. Moreover, the relief the Plaintiffs
seek on behalf of the putative class is an injunction changing
the DOC's Hepatitis C Protocol in a manner that will affect all
DOC inmates with HCV. The Court concludes, accordingly, that the
commonality requirement is met in this case.

Typicality

In order to determine whether a plaintiff is markedly different
from the class as a whole, we consider the attributes of the
plaintiff, the class as a whole, and the similarity between the
plaintiff and the class. In making our determination, the Court
considers the following three factors: (1) the claims of the
class representative must be generally the same as those of the
class in terms of both (a) the legal theory advanced and (b) the
factual circumstances underlying that theory; (2) the class
representative must not be subject to a defense that is both
inapplicable to many members of the class and likely to become a
major focus of the litigation; and (3) the interests and
incentives of the representative must be sufficiently aligned
with those of the class.

Chimenti

Chimenti has already received treatment with DAAs and,
accordingly, no longer personally needs the second of the three
items in the requested injunction.  However, there is no basis on
the record before us upon which the Court could determine that
Chimenti has no interest in requiring the DOC Defendants to
formulate and implement a policy for the treatment of Hepatitis C
that meets community standards of care or that he no longer needs
monitoring and medical care for Cirrhosis or liver fibrosis.
Defendants' failure to develop a policy to treat all inmates who
have chronic HCV in accordance with community standards, which
involves the use of DAAs.  The Court further conclude,
accordingly, that Plaintiffs have satisfied the typicality
requirement as to Chimenti.

Leyva

The DOC Defendants contend that Leyva is not typical because he
is subject to the defense that he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies in accordance with the PLRA prior to
filing the instant lawsuit.

Leyva is subject to the defense that he did not exhaust his
administrative remedies prior to bringing suit. This defense,
however, is not unique to Leyva, as the DOC Defendants have
asserted that it applies to nearly all members of the putative
class. Moreover, we have determined that vicarious exhaustion
applies in this case.   Since there is no question that Chimenti
and Maldonado have properly exhausted their administrative
remedies pursuant to the PLRA, the defense of failure to exhaust
is not likely to become a major focus of this litigation.

Consequently, the Court conclude that Leyva's failure to fully
exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his second
grievance prior to filing suit does not destroy his typicality in
this case.

Maldonado

The DOC Defendants argue that Maldonado is not a typical
plaintiff because he has been released from the custody of the
DOC and his claim is now moot.

The Court concludes that this relation back doctrine applies to
Maldonado even though he was paroled prior to the filing of
Plaintiffs' Renewed Class Certification Motion because the first
Motion for Class Certification was not decided on the merits, but
was withdrawn by agreement of the parties. Since Maldonado was in
the custody of the DOC at the time the original Motion for Class
Certification was filed, the Court conclude that, notwithstanding
his subsequent parole, he has a personal stake in obtaining class
certification sufficient to assure that Art. III values are not
undermined and his claim for class certification is not moot.
Plaintiffs have, therefore, satisfied the typicality requirement
as to Maldonado.

The Court concludes that the typicality requirement is met as to
all three named Plaintiffs in this case.

Adequacy of representation

Rule 23(a)(4) requires class representatives to fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.

The Court have reviewed the biographies of the Plaintiffs'
counsel that were submitted in connection with the instant Motion
and we conclude that class counsel possess more than adequate
experience in both representing prisoners and prosecuting class
actions. Moreover, class counsel's representation of the
Plaintiffs over the more than two years that this case has been
ongoing shows that they will vigorously prosecute this action and
act at arm's length from the Defendants.

The Court further concludes that the Plaintiffs' counsel are
clearly qualified to represent the putative class in this action.
With respect to the class representatives, the linchpin of the
adequacy requirement is the alignment of interests and incentives
between the representative plaintiffs and the rest of the class.
The Court concludes that the interests of the named Plaintiffs
are sufficiently aligned with the interests of the putative class
that the named Plaintiffs will be adequate representatives.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7jgahht from Leagle.com.

SALVATORE CHIMENTI, DANIEL LEYVA & DAVID MALDONADO, AND ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, represented by ANGUS R.
LOVE, PA INSTITUTIONAL LAW PROJECT, DAVID RUDOVSKY --
drudovsky@krlawphila.com -- KAIRYS RUDOVSKY MESSING FEINBERG &
LIN, LLP, STEPHEN D. BROWN -- steven.bizar@dechert.com -DECHERT
LLP, SU MING YEH, PA Institutional Law Project, CHRISTINE C.
LEVIN -- christine.levine@dechert.com -- DECHERT LLP, ETHAN
SOLOVE -- esolove@structurelaw.com --  STRUCTURE LAW GROUP, LLP &
ROSE MARIE WONG -- rosie.wong@dechert.com -- DECHERT LLP.

JOHN WETZEL, SECRETARY OF THE (DOC) & PAUL NOEL, CHIEF MEDICAL
DIRECTOR, PENNSYLVANIA DOC, Defendants, represented by VINCENT R.
MAZESKI, CHIEF COUNSEL'S OFFICE PENNSYLVANIA DEPT OF CORRECTIONS.
CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC. & DR. JOHN
KEPHART, MEDICAL DIRECTOR (FORMER), SCI SMITHFIELD, Defendants,
represented by CAITLIN J. GOODRICH -- cgoodrich@wglaw.com --
WEBER GALLAGHER, NOAH EVAN KATZ -- nkatz@wglaw.com -- WEBER
GALLAGHER & SAMUEL H. FOREMAN -- sforeman@wglaw.com -- WEBER
GALLAGHER SIMPSON STAPLETON FIRES & NEWBY, LLP.

DR. JAY COWAN, MEDICAL DIRECTOR, CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS. & DR.
JAMES FROMMER, MEDICAL DIRECTOR, SCI SMITHFIELD, Defendants,
represented by CAITLIN J. GOODRICH, WEBER GALLAGHER & SAMUEL H.
FOREMAN, WEBER GALLAGHER SIMPSON STAPLETON FIRES & NEWBY, LLP.


QUALCOMM INC: Klein Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
The Klein Law Firm disclosed that class action complaints have
been filed on behalf of shareholders of the following companies.
If you suffered a loss you have until the lead plaintiff deadline
to request that the court appoint you as lead plaintiff.

QUALCOMM Incorporated (NASDAQ:QCOM)
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: August 7, 2018
Class Period: January 31, 2018 - March 12, 2018

Allegations: Qualcomm made materially false and/or misleading
statements or failed to disclose that: Qualcomm had secretly
filed a unilateral notice with CFIUS in order to frustrate
Broadcom's attempt to acquire the Company; and investors suffered
damages as a result of defendants' wrongful acts and omissions.

Get additional information: http://www.kleinstocklaw.com/pslra-
c/qualcomm-incorporated?wire=3.

Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require that you
serve as a lead plaintiff. There is no cost or obligation to you.
If you suffered a loss during the class period and wish to obtain
additional information, please contact Joseph Klein, Esq. by
telephone at 212-616-4899 or visit the webpages provided. [GN]


QUEBEC: School Boards Ready to Pay Out $153.5MM in Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------
Presse Canadienne, writing for Montreal Gazette, reports that a
class-action lawsuit brought against 68 school boards across
Quebec by parents who argue they paid illegal school fees is
close to being settled out of court.

Without admitting responsibility, the school boards agreed to pay
$153,507,134 in capital, interest, fees and additional
compensation according to a press release issued on June 30
morning.

According to notices on the school boards' websites, each parent
could receive $28.49 per student per year covered by the class
action.

The period of time included in the class action varies among
school boards between the 2008-2009 and 2016-2017 school years.

The settlement must still be approved by a tribunal scheduled to
take place July 18 in Chicoutimi.

A mother of a family from Saguenay, Daisye Marcil, started the
class action. The initial demand was submitted in September 2016
and was authorized by the court in December of that year.

The lawsuit denounces illegal school fees that violate articles
of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.

The mother of two estimated that school boards were violating the
Education Act that says that elementary and high school must be
free.

The complainants' lawyers did not respond to a request for
comment.[GN]


RAYMOURS FURNITURE: Judge OKs Class Action Over Text Messages
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Wichert, writing for Law360, reports that a New Jersey
federal judge has approved Raymours Furniture Co. Inc.'s bid to
move a putative class action over allegedly unsolicited text
messages to New York federal court based on the forum selection
clause in a sweepstakes agreement to which a consumer consented
when she provided her phone number to the retailer.

U.S. District Judge Brian R. Martinotti on June 29 granted the
company's motion to transfer Evelyn Manopla's lawsuit to the
Northern District of New York.

The case is styled MANOPLA v. RAYMOURS FURNITURE COMPANY, INC.
Case No. 3:17-cv-07649 (D.N.J.).  The case is assigned to Judge
Brian R. Martinotti.  The case was filed September 29, 2017. [GN]


RENZENBERGER INC: Court Issues Protective Order in "Wright"
-----------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Alicia G. Rosenberg of the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California, Western Division, has
issued a Stipulated Protective Order in the case, RODERICK
WRIGHT, FERNANDO OLIVAREZ, and MARCUS HAYNES, JR., and MICHAEL
WATSON, individuals on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. RENZENBERGER, INC., a Kansas
corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendant, Case
No. 2:13-cv-06642-FMO-AGR (C.D. Cal.).

The Parties jointly request the Court to enter their Stipulated
Confidentiality Agreement as an order for the conduct of
discovery in the case.  They agree to be bound by the terms set
forth therein with regard to any Confidential Materials that have
been produced before the Court signs the Stipulation and
Protective Order.

All Confidential Documents and Confidential Information in the
Action must be used by the Receiving Party solely for purposes of
the prosecution, defense or settlement of the Action, including,
without limitation, discovery, motions, briefs and preparation
for the trial, appeals, and for no other purpose, except as
otherwise stated in the Protective Order.

Unless and until otherwise ordered by the Court or otherwise
agreed by the Parties, all documents designated as "Confidential"
or "Confidential - Attorneys Eyes Only" must be treated
accordingly under the Protective Order.

Following the receipt of documents marked "Confidential" or
"Confidential - Attorneys Eyes Only," any Party to the Action may
object to the designation of the document and seek a modification
of the designation.

The termination of proceedings in the Action will not relieve any
Receiving Party from the obligation of maintaining the
confidentiality of all Confidential Documents and Confidential
Information produced and designated pursuant to the Protective
Order, unless all of the Parties to the Action agree otherwise or
unless the Court rules otherwise.

Upon the final disposition of the Action including any appeals,
the Parties will, upon request of the Designating Party, return
any Confidential Documents and documents containing Confidential
Information (including, in each case, all copies and summaries)
to the Designating Party from whom/which Confidential Documents
or documents containing Confidential Information were obtained,
or may provide to the counsel for the Designating Party
certification in writing that all Confidential Documents and
documents containing Confidential Information have been destroyed
and that this information has been purged from all machine-
readable media on which it resides.  However, the Parties will be
entitled to keep any court filings, attorney work product,
deposition transcripts or hearing transcripts, all of which will
continue to be governed by the Protective Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/MJrG02 from Leagle.com.

Roderick Wright, Fernando Olivarez & Marcus Haynes, Jr.,
individuals on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Kye Douglas Pawlenko --
kpawlenko@helpcounsel.com -- Hayes Pawlenko LLP & Matthew B.
Hayes -- mhayes@helpcounsel.com -- Hayes Pawlenko LLP.

Renzenberger, Inc., a Kansas corporation, Defendant, represented
by Leah S. Strickland -- lstrickland@swsslaw.com
-- Solomon Ward Seidenwurm and Smith LLP & William V. Whelan --
wwhelan@swsslaw.com -- Solomon Ward Seidenwurm & Smith LLP.




RHODE ISLAND: Settlement in Retirement Benefits' Suits Affirmed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Joseph Clifford et al., v. Gina Raimondo, in her
capacity as Governor of the State of Rhode Island, et al. Rhode
Island Public Employees' Retiree Coalition et al., v. Gina
Raimondo, in her capacity as Governor of the State of Rhode
Island, et al, Case Nos. 2015-379-Appeal, 2016-24-Appeal, 2016-
25-Appeal, 2016-26-Appeal, 2016-28-Appeal, 2016-49-Appeal (R.I.),
Judge Gilbert V. Indeglia of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
affirmed the class-action settlement that was approved by a
Superior Court trial justice in 2015.

Rhode Island's problems all came to a breaking point in 2009, at
the depth of the recession, at which time government officials
realized they needed to address the depletion of funding in the
state and municipal employee retirement systems.  As a result, in
2009 and 2010, the General Assembly amended the statutes
governing the pension system, changing the retirement age and
reducing the cost-of-living adjustment ("COLA").  In 2011, the
General Assembly took more drastic action and passed the Rhode
Island Retirement Security Act of 2011 ("RIRSA"), which abridged
the retirement benefits of state and municipal employees even
further.  In response, a number of lawsuits were filed by various
state and municipal unions on behalf of their affected members.

The first lawsuit was filed in 2010 by a number of unions
representing state employees and teachers, alleging that the 2009
and 2010 amendments violated the Contract, Takings, and Due
Process Clauses of the Rhode Island Constitution.  Then, in 2012,
five lawsuits were brought on behalf of various unions and
retirement associations challenging RIRSA, alleging the same
constitutional claims as alleged in the 2010 lawsuit.

In 2013, all parties involved in both the 2010 and 2012 cases
were ordered to attend mediation.  After months of mediation, the
parties reached a proposed settlement in February 2014, subject
to approval by all members of the unions.

On April 16, 2015, after hearing argument on the motions, the
trial justice issued a written decision granting the Union
plaintiffs' motion for class certification in accordance with
Rule 23(b)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure,
designating the class representatives and appointing class
counsel for the Plaintiffs and Defendants.

The Plaintiff class was defined as all persons (and/or their
beneficiaries) who, on or before July 1, 2015, are receiving
benefits or are participating in the State Employees, Teachers,
or Municipal Employees' retirement systems administered by ERSRI
and all future employees, excepting only those individuals who on
July 1, 2015, are participating in a municipal retirement system
administered by ERSRI for municipal police officers in any
municipality and/or for fire personnel of the City of Cranston.

Additionally, the trial justice certified a number of Plaintiff
subclasses, described as follows:

     a. State Employees and Teachers: Participants in the
Teachers and State Employees Retirement System ("ERS") who are
employed on or before July 1, 2015, but who have not retired as
of June 30, 2015 and all future employees;

     b. Participants in the Municipal Employees Retirement System
("MERS"), other than police or fire units: Participants in MERS,
other than police or fire units, employed on or before July 1,
2015, but who have not retired as of June 30, 2015 and all future
employees;

     c. Participants in all fire MERS units, except for fire
personnel of Cranston: Participants in all fire MERS units,
except for fire personnel of Cranston, employed on or before July
1, 2015, but who have not retired as of June 30, 2015 and all
future employees;

     d. Retirees: All retired members and beneficiaries of
retired members who retired on or before June 30, 2015, who are
receiving a retirement benefit under ERS or any MERS unit.

The trial justice also certified the Defendant class of all
municipal entities that participate in MERS and all municipal
entities that employ teachers who participate in the state
employees and teachers' ERS.

The trial justice granted the parties' joint motion for
preliminary approval of the class settlement.  Additionally, the
trial justice scheduled a fairness hearing for May 20, 2015, for
the purpose of final approval of the settlement.

As part of her decision, the trial justice summarized the terms
of the proposed settlement as follows:

     a. A one-time COLA payment of 2% applied to the first
$25,000 of the pension benefit and that amount added to the base
benefit will be paid to retirees (or their beneficiaries) who
participate in a COLA program and who retired on or before June
30, 2012 as soon as administratively reasonable following the
passage of the legislation based on the amount of benefit payable
on the effective date of the legislation.

     b. For funds that are not already funded, the settlement
shortens the time intervals between suspended COLA payments from
once every five years to once every four years.  The settlement
also improves the COLA limitation for current retirees whose COLA
is suspended.  The settlement also requires a more favorable
indexing of COLA Cap for all current and future retirees.  The
settlement also changes the COLA calculation to one more likely
to produce a positive number and dictates that the COLA formula
will be calculated annually, regardless of funding level, and
when paid, the COLA will be compounded for all receiving a COLA.

     c. Current retirees (or their beneficiaries) who have or
will have retired on or before June 30, 2015 will receive two
payments: (1) a one-time $500 stipend (not added to the COLA
base) within sixty days of the enactment of the legislation
approving the terms of the settlement and (2) a one-time $500
stipend payable one year later.

     d. For State Workers, Teachers, and General MERS, the
settlement (1) adds another calculation to reduce the minimum
retirement age; (2) improves the available accrual rate for
employees with twenty years or more of service as of June 30,
2012; (3) requires increased contributions by the employer to the
Defined Contribution Plan for employees with ten or more years of
service (but less than twenty) as of June 30, 2012; (4) waives
the administration fee for any employees participating in the
Defined Contribution Plan who make $35,000 or less; and (5) adds
another calculation designed to limit the impact of the 'anti-
spiking' rule imposed by the RIRSA on part-time employees.

     e. For MERS Firefighters (excluding Cranston Firefighters),
the settlement (1) lowers the age and service requirements for
retirement; (2) increases the accrual rate for Firefighters who
retire at age fifty-seven with thirty years of service.

     f. For State Correctional Officers, the settlement increases
the accrual rate for correctional officers with fewer than
twenty-five years of service as of June 30, 2012.

     g. The settlement reduces the impact of an early retirement.

     h. The settlement allows Municipalities to 're-amortize';
that is, partially refinance, to be able to pay for the increased
cost of the settlement.

     i. Otherwise, the terms of the RIRSA remain the same.

In response to the notices that were mailed and published for the
benefit of class members, the Superior Court received
approximately 400 objections to the settlement agreement, which
raised a number of procedural and substantive concerns.  Sixty-
nine class members requested an opportunity to be heard at the
fairness hearing.

In her written decision, the trial justice reaffirmed her
certification of the settlement classes in accordance with Rule
23(b)(2), consistent with her April 16, 2015 decision.  Finally,
in reviewing the terms of the settlement, the trial justice found
that it was both procedurally and substantively fair.

After the trial justice's decision, the legislature enacted the
2015 amendments to RIRSA, implementing the terms of the
settlement.  Both the Clifford plaintiffs and the Retiree
plaintiffs appealed the trial justice's decision in the class
action.  On appeal, the Union Plaintiffs joined the state
Defendants as the Appellees.

Although both the Clifford Plaintiffs and the Retiree Plaintiffs
astutely attempt to diversify their arguments before the Court,
Judge Indeglia finds only two arguments squarely remaining in the
Plaintiffs' portfolio: whether the trial justice's certification
of the class was appropriate, and whether the settlement was
fair, reasonable, and adequate.

The Judge concluded that the trial justice did not err in finding
that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) were met; that the relief
sought fits squarely within those claims contemplated by Rule
23(b)(2), and, thus, because any money damages would be
incidental to the declaratory and equitable relief sought, the
trial justice did not abuse her discretion in certifying the
class pursuant to that subsection; and that the subclass of
retirees had differing interests from active employees.

Turning to the terms of the settlement agreement, the Judge is
satisfied that the trial justice did not overlook any of the
concerns raised by the various objectors to the settlement;
conducted an exhaustive review of the factors necessary to
determine whether the settlement was fair, reasonable, and
adequate; and properly balanced the benefits and drawbacks of the
settlement.  He concludes that she did not abuse her discretion
in concluding that the settlement was fair, reasonable, and
adequate.

For these reasons, Judge Indeglia denied and dismissed the
Clifford Plaintiffs' and the Retiree Plaintiffs' appeals; and
affirmed the judgments.  The papers in the case are remanded to
the Superior Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/P8aYGm from Leagle.com.

Thomas M. Dickinson, Esq. -- tmd@appealri.com -- Edward C. Roy,
Jr., Esq., Lynette J. Labinger, Esq., Michael B. Forte, Jr., Esq.
Carly Beauvais Iafrate, Esq. Joseph F. Penza, Jr., Esq. Thomas R.
Landry, Esq. Douglas L. Steele -- info@wmlaborlaw.com -- Pro Hac
Vice, for Plaintiffs.

John A. Tarantino, Esq. -- jtarantino@apslaw.com -- Nicole J.
Benjamin, Esq. -- nbenjamin@apslaw.com --  Joseph Avanzato, Esq.
-- javanzato@apslaw.com -- Patricia K. Rocha, Esq. --
procha@apslaw.com -- Rebecca T. Partington, Esq. --
rtarantino@apslaw.com -- Michael W. Field, Esq., for Defendants.


SAN DIEGO, CA: Cal. App. Affirms Demurrer Ruling in "Reid" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, YVONNE REID et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.
CITY OF SAN DIEGO et al., Defendants and Respondents, Case No.
D072493 (Cal. App.), Judge Gilbert Nares of the Court of Appeals
of California for the Fourth District, Division One, affirmed the
trial court's order sustaining the Defendants' demurrer without
leave to amend on statute of limitations and other grounds.

Plaintiffs Reid and Serena Wong sued the City of San Diego and
the San Diego Tourism Marketing District ("TMD") in a putative
class action complaint, challenging what they allege is an
illegal hotel tax.

In November 2010 California voters approved Proposition 26.
Proposition 26 sought to tighten existing restrictions on local
revenue-generating measures by defining "tax" broadly to mean any
levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local
government" that did not fall within one of seven enumerated
exceptions.  It also required the electorate to approve laws
increasing taxes, and shifted to the government the burden of
demonstrating that any charge, levy, or assessment is not a tax.

In 2012 San Diego hotel operators petitioned the City to renew
the TMD for another 39.5 years.  On Nov. 26, 2012, the City
Council adopted a resolution (R-307843) approving a renewed TMD
Plan and levied assessments for 39.5 years.  Under the renewal
assessment, the City assessed all hotels in the district, not
just those with 70 or more rooms.

On Dec. 19, 2012, San Diegans for Open Government ("SDOG") filed
an action challenging the renewal assessment as being an
unconstitutional tax in violation of Proposition 26, San Diegans
for Open Government v. City of San Diego (Super. Ct. San Diego
County, 2017, No. 37-2012-00088065-CU-MC-CTL).  SDOG alleged it
is a "non-profit taxpayer and voter organization and asserted
that one of its members owned a single unit subject to the
renewal assessment.

After SDOG voluntarily dismissed one cause of action and another
was summarily adjudicated in the City's favor, by 2016 the
gravamen of SDOG's claim was that the TMD assessment is an
illegal tax that was euphemistically labeled an "assessment" to
get around the voter-approval requirements in Proposition 26.

In August 2016, while the SDOG litigation was pending, the City
Council adopted a resolution (R-310664) eliminating hotels with
fewer than 70 rooms from the TMD assessment.  After the 2016
amendment, the defendants in the SDOG litigation moved for
judgment on the pleadings, asserting (1) SDOG lost standing
because it claimed only one owner of one rental property as a
member, which was no longer subject to the assessment; and (2)
the action was moot because the 2012 renewal assessment was
superseded by the 2016 amendment.

On Sept. 30, 2016, the trial court entered judgment for the
defendants in the SDOG litigation, ruling the action was "moot."

Approximately two months after the SDOG judgment, Reid filed the
instant action. The following month, Plaintiffs filed a first
amended complaint (complaint) "individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated and the general public." The class
period is January 1, 2013 to August 31, 2016. Unlike the SDOG
litigation, Plaintiffs are alleged to be hotel guests who paid
the assessment as part of their hotel bill.

The gravamen of the Plaintiffs' claim is that the 2012 renewal
assessment is a disguised tax that violates Proposition 26
because it was never submitted to the electorate for a vote.  The
Plaintiffs allege that the City uses the TMD as a ruse to raise
revenue for the general fund without having to seek voter
approval to impose a new tax.

The complaint alleges that the Plaintiffs and the class members
paid this illegal hidden hotel tax that the Defendants have
disguised as a Tourism Marketing District Assessment by staying
at one or more of the assessed hotels during the period between
Jan. 1, 2013 and Aug. 31, 2016.  It alleges the TMD assessment is
really a tax within the meaning of article XIII C, section 1,
subdivision (e) of the California Constitution and, because the
TMD was formed without voter approval as required by law, the
City's imposition of the TMD assessment is unlawful.  The
complaint challenges the legality of the TMD Procedural Ordinance
and seeks a declaration of the parties' rights with respect to
the TMD Operating Agreement dated Nov. 26, 2012 and the TMD
Management Plan dated Sept. 11, 2012.

The complaint contains five causes of action: (1) declaratory
relief that the TMD Plan and TMD Agreement are invalid because
the City lacked the legal capacity to authorize the levy of the
TMD assessment without first obtaining voter approval as required
by Proposition 26; (2) declaratory relief challenging the TMD
Procedural Ordinance as unconstitutional because it has imposed
an illegal tax; (3) declaratory relief challenging the TMD
Procedural Ordinance as unconstitutional because it denies equal
protection by making classifications between business owners with
respect to the fundamental right to vote; (4) waste of taxpayer
funds; and (5) a petition for a writ of mandate seeking a
constructive trust and restitution of the amounts in which the
City has been unjustly enriched through its unlawful imposition
of the TMD Assessment.

The Defendants demurred to the complaint, asserting the first
(declaratory relief Proposition 26 violation), fourth (taxpayer
waste), and fifth causes of action (writ of mandate) were barred
by (1) the res judicata effect of the judgment of dismissal in
the SDOG litigation and (2) either the 30-day statute of
limitations in Municipal Code sections 61.2517 and 62.2526,
subdivision (b) or the 60-day period for bringing a reverse
validation proceeding under Municipal Code section 61.2526,
subdivision (a) and Code of Civil Procedure section 860 et seq.
They also asserted that the first cause of action was moot
because the 2012 renewal assessment had been superseded by the
August 2016 amendment.

The court sustained the demurrer to the first, fourth, and fifth
causes of action on the grounds the claims are barred by the 60-
day statute of limitations in Municipal Code section 61.2526,
subdivision (a) and Code of Civil Procedure section 860.  It also
held such claims were precluded by the SDOG judgment.  The court
sustained the demurrer to the second cause of action on the
grounds the Procedural Ordinance does not impose or assess tax.
Citing Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist.
(1973) 410 U.S. 719, the court sustained the demurrer to the
third cause of action (equal protection) on the grounds a public
entity may limit approval of an assessment to those entities that
pay it.

The Plaintiffs timely appealed from the judgment of dismissal.
The Defendants contend the appeal is completely devoid of merit
because all challenges to the validity of the renewal assessment
are barred by the 60-day statute of limitations under the
validation statutes.  They seek $25,149 in appellate sanctions
against the Plaintiffs' lawyers for pursuing what they contend is
a frivolous appeal.

Judge Nares finds two apparent problems with the Defendants'
assertion that the complaint is subject to the 60-day validation
statute of limitations under Municipal Code section 61.2526,
subdivision (a).  The first problem is that the Defendants'
argument creates an internal inconsistency in Municipal Code
section 61.2526.  He says the relevant point is that under
Municipal Code sections 61.2517 and 61.2526, a reasonable
argument can be made that the Plaintiffs' action is not subject
to validation procedures and, therefore, their appellate
arguments challenging the order sustaining the demurrer on that
ground are not frivolous.

The second potential problem with the Defendants' argument, he
says, is that it is an open question whether a charter city may
self-trigger its actions to be validation proceedings under Code
of Civil Procedure section 860.  Even after a request for
supplemental briefing, the Defendants are unable to cite any case
where the validation statutes have been triggered by a municipal
ordinance, as distinguished from a state statute.  Indeed, the
Defendants concede that no case squarely holds a charter city may
establish a cause of action in validation and restrict claims to
that form of action.

The Defendants also contend the appeal is frivolous because the
SDOG litigation was a reverse validation action, and the judgment
there carries "res judicata" effects barring the complaint.
However, he finds that although the entire SDOG litigation record
is not before the Court, from the record, it is fairly debatable
whether the SDOG litigation was a reverse validation action.

Finally, there is one additional reason the appeal is not
frivolous.  The Judge finds that although the Plaintiffs'
attempts to overcome the 30-day statute of limitations was weak,
the Defendants demurred only to the first, fourth, and fifth
causes of action on statute of limitations grounds.  As a result,
to obtain a judgment of dismissal, the Defendants were required
to prevail on the equal protection issue.  The Plaintiffs' equal
protection argument was unpersuasive, but certainly not
frivolous.

For these reasons, Judge Nares affirmed the judgment and denied
the motion for sanctions.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/9bEGT4 from Leagle.com.

Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron, Ronald A. Marron --
ron@consumersadvocates.com -- and Michael T. Houchin --
admin@consumersadvocates.com -- for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Mara W. Elliott, City Attorney, and Carmen A. Brock--
cbrock@sandiego.gov -- Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and
Respondent City of San Diego.

Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, Michael G. Colantuono --
mcolantuono@chwlaw.us -- and Ryan Thomas Dunn -- rdunn@chwlaw.us
-- for Defendant and Respondent San Diego Tourism Marketing
District Corporation.


SEATTLE GENETICS: Court Dismisses "Patel" Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Consolidated Second Amended Complaint (CSAC) in the case
captioned SAMIT PATEL, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SEATTLE GENETICS, INC., CLAY B.
SIEGALL, TODD E. SIMPSON, and JONATHAN DRACHMAN, Defendants, Case
No. C17-41 RSM (W.D. Wash.).

The CSAC sought remedies, under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for the Plaintiff and all
persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Seattle
Genetics, Inc.'s common stock.

The Defendants now seek dismissal of Plaintiff's CSAC, arguing
that the Plaintiff failed to cure the deficiencies identified by
the Court and that the CSAC still fails to adequately state a
claim.

Securities fraud claims are subject to heightened pleading
standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).

The Plaintiff must show: (1) a material misrepresentation or
omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between
the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission;
(5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation. The Defendants argue
that the Plaintiff has not adequately alleged scienter.

Scienter Allegations

Confidential Witness Allegations

Confidential Witness 1 (CW1) does not sufficiently establish that
the Individual Defendants ever learned of CW1's concerns,
environmental or otherwise. CW1's allegation that information
relating to the toxicity of 33A was available on Seattle
Genetics' intranet does not establish that the Individual
Defendants were required to review it, had reason to access it,
or ever viewed the information. The allegations require a
speculative jump as opposed to an inference.

CW2's allegations suffer the same defects as CW1's. CW2 does not
allege a factual basis that would have allowed CW2 to know that
the Individual Defendants knew the most intimate details about
Mylotarg. Nor does CW2 indicate what deep concerns were shared at
the company-wide meetings attended by the Individual Defendants
or when the meetings took place. CW2's general allegations are
not sufficiently particularized to demonstrate personal knowledge
that individuals within Seattle Genetics were aware of the risks
of hepatotoxicity associated with 33A's clinical trials.

Timing of Clinical Holds

The Plaintiff's allegations must be more particularized to
demonstrate scienter. The CSAC includes no allegations as to when
the events actually occurred or which clinical trial they
occurred in. And while the Plaintiff's allegations may make it
more plausible that the events occurred before the December 3 and
5 press releases, they do not bear on when the Individual
Defendants learned of the events.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybmnsjjp from Leagle.com.

Samit Patel, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joshua Silverman --
jbsilverman@pomlaw.com -- POMERANTZ LLP, pro hac vice, Omar Jafri
-- ojafri@pomlaw.com -- POMERANTZ LLP, pro hac vice & Clifford A.
Cantor.

Carl Johnson, Plaintiff, represented by Clifford A. Cantor,
Joshua Silverman, POMERANTZ LLP, pro hac vice, Omar Jafri,
POMERANTZ LLP, pro hac vice & Patrick V. Dahlstrom, POMERANTZ
LLP, pro hac vice.

Seattle Genetics, Inc, Clay B. Siegall & Todd E. Simpson,
Defendants, represented by Gregory Lewis Watts -- Gwatts@wsgr.com
-- WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI & Barry M. Kaplan --
bkaplan@wsgr.com -- WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI.


SBE ENTERTAINMENT: Court Denies Summary Judgment in "Walintukan"
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California denied Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in the
case captioned DERIC WALINTUKAN, Plaintiff, v. SBE ENTERTAINMENT
GROUP, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-01311-JST (N.D.
Cal.).

Walintukan received, at the phone number he provided, a text
message promoting an unrelated event at the Create Nightclub.
Five days later, he received a second text message promoting
another unrelated event at Create. He successfully opted out of
receiving any further text messages.

Walintukan asserts that the Defendants violated his rights under
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The three elements
of a TCPA claim are: (1) the defendant called a cellular
telephone number; (2) using an automatic telephone dialing
system; (3) without the recipient's prior express consent.

The Defendants argue that the text messages involved in this case
fall squarely within the scope of consent test articulated by the
Court of Appeals in Van Patten both from a temporal and a subject
matter standpoint.

Here, the Defendants' text messages concerned different events by
different artists at the Create Nightclub. The only connection to
the transaction in which Walintukan provided his phone number was
that the events were occurring at the same venue. The Defendants'
statement that there is simply no difference between a gym asking
a customer to come back to the gym and a club asking a customer
to come back to the club is incorrect.  Unlike the gym membership
in Van Patten, which contemplates an ongoing relationship by the
very nature of a monthly membership system, purchasing an event
ticket is much more discrete in nature.

Just as the Trenz court found that the transactional context in
which the plaintiffs gave their contact information to the
defendant dealerships was limited to those particular service
appointments and did not include future servicing of their
vehicles, this Court concludes that the transactional context in
which Walintukan provided his contact information was limited to
the particular event for which he was purchasing a ticket. It
does not include any and all future events at the same venue.

The Defendants have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating
that Walintukan provided prior express consent to receive the two
text messages at issue in this case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8aq6kmn from Leagle.com.

Deric Walintukan, as an individual and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Lionel Z. Glancy --
lglancy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Abigail
Ameri Zelenski -- abigail@jlglawyers.com -- Jaurigue Law Group,
David Zelenski -- david@jlglawyers.com -- Jaurigue Law Group,
Marc L. Godino -- mgodino@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Binkow &
Goldberg LLP, Mark Samuel Greenstone -- mgreenstone@glancylaw.com
-- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Michael Joe Jaurigue --
michael@jlglawyers.com -- Jaurigue Law Group & Ryan A. Stubbe -
ryan@jlglawyers.com --  Jaurigue Law Group.

SBE Entertainment Group, LLC, a California limited liability
company, 6021 Hollywood Investor, LLC, a California limited
liability company & 6021 Hollywood Operating Company, LLC, a
California limited liability company, Defendants, represented by
Kimberly Irene Culp -- kculp@venable.com -- Venable LLP, Witt W.
Chang -- wchang@venable.com -- Venable LLP & Ari N. Rothman --
anrothman@venable.com -- Venable LLP.

Spoonful Management LLC, a California limited liability company,
Defendant, represented byAri N. Rothman, Venable LLP & Kimberly
Irene Culp, Venable LLP.


SEIU: Riffey Ruling May Have Implications for Union Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sean Higgins, writing for Washington Examiner, reports that
organized labor, already reeling from a potentially major
financial hit thanks to a Supreme Court ruling that could result
in millions of public-sector workers cutting off funding, could
be subject to another blow from the justices: class-action suits
from those workers seeking to get paid back from the unions.

In a little-noticed action, the Supreme Court invalidated a
ruling by the 7th Circuit Court denying class-action
certification in a case called Riffey v. Rauner. The case
involved nonunion state-subsidized Illinois home healthcare
workers seeking to be repaid the funds that for years they were
forced to give to the union that ostensibly represented them.

The justices in effect told the lower court to do it again in
light of their ruling in the case Janus v. American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees. Janus found that coerced
dues from nonunion public-sector workers were unconstitutional.

The lower court could simply reaffirm its earlier ruling in
Riffey, but the Supreme Court's move indicates it could be open
to an appeal of that.  A win for the plaintiffs in either
scenario could be a huge blow to public-sector union finances.
The Riffey case alone covers 80,000 state-subsidized homecare
workers and seeks $32 million in funds from the union involved,
Service Employees International Union Healthcare Illinois &
Indiana.

"The Riffey case is big even on its own terms. But it has
implications for other cases.  If individuals sue on behalf of
employees to recover back money taken from them under Janus,
they'll run into the same class-certification issues that Riffey
has encountered. So how the court resolves Riffey could have
implications for any number of future cases," said Bill
Messenger, attorney for the National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation. Messenger represented the clients in both Janus and
Riffey.

Scott Kronland, attorney for the SEIU chapter, said there was no
reason to think the 7th Circuit would rule any differently this
time and little reason to think the Supreme Court would take up
an appeal.  "The Riffey case just involves the question of class
certification and it was denied for multiple reasons.  What
happened in Janus isn't going to change the determination that
class action was properly denied," Kronland said.

Riffey v. Rauner was originally titled Harris v. Quinn and was
itself a major Supreme Court ruling in 2014.  The case involved
whether the subsidized home healthcare workers were in fact state
employees eligible for unionization, a policy change first
implemented in 2004 by then-Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojevich, a
Democrat and staunch union ally.  SEIU Healthcare initially
organized the homecare workers without a formal vote after
Blagojevich accepted the union's claim to have majority support
among them. In the decade following that, numerous Democrat-
leaning states accepted union bids to represent their subsidized
homecare workers, automatically deducting union dues from the
homecare worker's subsidy checks.  In many cases, the workers,
most of whom simply took care of invalid family members, were
never even aware that they had been unionized.

The Supreme Court ruled in Harris v. Quinn that the Illinois
healthcare workers were never state employees in the first place
and therefore couldn't be organized.  Following that, the
plaintiffs in Harris v. Quinn sued to be paid back the fees the
union had gotten from them.  The name of the case was later
changed to reflect that Republican Bruce Rauner was now Illinois
governor and that lead plaintiff Pamela Harris had dropped out.
Harris had been under a branch of the Illinois subsidy program
that hadn't been unionized and therefore she wasn't eligible to
be part of a class action.

The 7th Circuit rejected the class-certification request, saying
there was insufficient evidence to believe that most of the
Illinois healthcare workers did not support a union and that the
plaintiffs couldn't show that a class-action suit was better than
letting individual homecare workers sue the union if they chose.
The Supreme Court invalidated that ruling and told the lower
court to reconsider it in light of Janus.

"The union argued, and the 7th Circuit agreed, that you couldn't
prove that the individuals didn't want the union to take their
money. In other words, that an objection was required. That
brought up the opt-in/opt-out issue that Janus resolved. Janus
said, 'No, you need affirmative consent from somebody before you
can take their money,'" Messenger said.

Exactly what defines affirmative consent is unclear. Unions have
argued that workers signing documents should count like any other
contract.  Maliee Smith, staff attorney for the conservative
Illinois Policy Institute, argues that Janus set the bar much
higher and it invalidated such signatures.  "Those who chose to
be members were not presented with constitutional options,
meaning that consent was not fully informed," she said in an
analysis of the Janus ruling.

Both sides in Riffey v. Rauner will present new arguments by this
fall.  It is unclear when the appeals court will issue a new
ruling.

A spokesperson for SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana could not
be reached for comment. [GN]


SERENITY SPA: Court Dismisses "Benavides" FLSA Suit
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, GLORIA BENAVIDES and FANNY YIN-FANG LIN, on behalf
of themselves, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and the Class,
Plaintiffs, v. SERENITY SPA NY INC., et ano., Defendants, Case
No. 15-CV-9189 (JLC) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge James L. Cott of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the
parties' requests for (1) decertification of the Rule 23 class;
(2) approval of the parties' settlement, as embodied by the offer
of judgment and its acceptance; (3) dismissal of individual
Defendant Yu Qun Dai from the proceeding; and (4) entry of
judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and dismissal of the case
with prejudice.

Benavides filed her complaint against Defendants Serenity Spa and
Yu Qun Dai on Nov. 20, 2015, alleging violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), and
New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws.  On May 11,
2016, Benavides filed her first amended complaint, and the
Defendants filed their answer on May 25, 2016 .

On May 31, 2016, Benavides moved for conditional collective
action certification of her FLSA claims.  The Defendants opposed
the motion.  By memorandum order dated Aug. 3, 2016, the Court
granted Benavides' motion for conditional collective
certification and directed that notice of the certification, as
well as a consent to sue form, be sent out to potential class
members.  Thereafter, the parties engaged in discovery, during
which the Defendants produced a list of names of 52 non-exempted
employees who worked at Serenity Spa during the relevant period.

On Aug. 31, 2016, Benavides filed motions seeking (1) class
certification of her NYLL claims under Rule 23, and (2) summary
judgment on her FLSA and NYLL claims.  The Defendants opposed
both motions.  In the interim, on Nov. 28, 2016, Plaintiff Fanny
Yin-Fang Lin joined the action by filing a notice of consent to
become a plaintiff.  By memorandum opinion and order dated Sept.
1, 2017, the Court granted Benavides and Lin's motion for class
certification under Rule 23 but denied their motion for summary
judgment without prejudice.

By letter dated Jan. 30, 2018, the Defendants' counsel reported
that Dai had filed a petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy.  That
same day the Court issued an order staying the case as to Dai as
required by the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. Section 362(a).
On Feb. 22, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a notice of acceptance of
a Rule 68 offer of judgment made by Serenity Spa.  Under the
terms of the offer of judgment, Serenity Spa would allow Judgment
to be entered against it in this action in the amount of
$175,000.

On March 9, 2018, the Court held a status conference with the
parties during which they reported that they were negotiating a
revised offer of judgment.  On April 13, 2018, the Plaintiffs
filed a notice of acceptance of a revised offer of judgment from
Serenity Spa.  Under the terms of the Revised Offer of Judgment,
Serenity Spa would allow judgment to be entered against it in
favor of the named Plaintiffs, Benavides and Lin, in a total
amount of $20,000, inclusive of attorneys' fees and costs, to be
paid in four installments of $5,000.

Also on April 13, 2018, the parties filed a joint letter
requesting (1) decertification of the Rule 23 class, (2) approval
of the parties' settlement (as embodied by the Revised Offer of
Judgment), (3) dismissal of Dai from this case due to her ongoing
bankruptcy proceeding, and (4) entry of judgment, based on the
terms of the Revised Offer of Judgment, against Serenity Spa, and
dismissal of this case with prejudice.

Judge Cott finds that the parties have provided sufficiently
compelling reasons to justify decertification of the Rule 23
class.  The notice of the Rule 23 certification could be reliably
sent at the present time to, at best, 34 potential class members,
which falls below the "numerosity" threshold in Rule 23 class
actions.  Furthermore, the parties are still in an early phase of
litigating the Rule 23 class action claims.  In addition, the
potential class members are unlikely to be prejudiced by
decertification because their class claims have been tolled
through the date of the Opinion and Order.  For these reasons,
the Rule 23 class is decertified.

Having carefully reviewed the parties' joint letter and the
proposed settlement terms, the Judge finds that all of the terms
of the proposed settlement (including the allocation of
attorneys' fees and costs) appear to be fair and reasonable under
the totality of the circumstances.  Accordingly, the settlement
is approved.

Dai has filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and the Plaintiffs' case
against her is currently stayed.  The parties are in agreement,
and have jointly requested, that Dai should be dismissed from the
case.  Given that Dai's participation is not necessary for the
parties to effectuate their settlement, their request is granted.

In light of the approval of the settlement between the Plaintiffs
and Serenity Spa, as well as the dismissal of Dai, the Judge
granted the parties' request that judgment be entered against
Serenity Spa in accordance with the terms of the Revised Offer of
Judgment and that the case be dismissed with prejudice.

In sum, for the foregoing reasons, (1) the Rule 23 class is
decertified; (2) the parties' settlement, as embodied by the
Revised Offer of Judgment and its acceptance, is approved; (3)
Dai is dismissed from the case; and (4) the Clerk is directed to
enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and against Serenity
Spa in accordance with the terms of the Revised Offer of Judgment
and dismiss the case with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/WLIROK from Leagle.com.

Gloria Benavides, on behalf of herself, FLSA Collective
Plaintiffs and the Class & Fanny Yin-Fang Lin, on behalf of
herself, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and the Class, Plaintiffs,
represented by Anne Melissa Seelig -- info@leelitigation.com --
Lee Litigation Group, PLLC, Taimur Alamgir, Lee Litigation Group,
PLLC & C.K. Lee, Lee Litigation Group, PLLC.

Serenity Spa NY Inc. & Yu Qun Dai, Defendants, represented by
Lawrence Figowe Morrison -- info@m-t-law.com -- Morris Tenebaum,
PLLC & Marisol Santos -- msantos@faillacelaw.com -- Michael
Faillace & Associates, P.C..


SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA: Faces Class Action Over Reimbursements
-----------------------------------------------------------------
John Petrick, writing for Law360, reports that a doctor has filed
a class action in Pennsylvania state court alleging that the
self-insured Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
has a tradition of reimbursing medical benefits to doctors months
and years late and without interest for treating patients injured
in auto crashes involving the transit authority.

Dr. Frederick Hawkin Jr. notes in the suit filed on June 27 in
the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas that a similar
class action was filed back in 1999 that eventually settled, but
alleges SEPTA didn't make good on its promise. [GN]


SQUAW VALLEY: Court Extends Time to Respond to "Pinto" FAC
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted Parties' Stipulation extending the deadline
for defendant Squaw Valley Resort, LLC, to file a responsive
pleading to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in the case
captioned JOAO GABRIEL PINTO, an individual, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SQUAW VALLEY
RESORT, LLC, a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-02281-MCE-CKD (E.D.
Cal.).

The Plaintiff filed this action against defendant Squaw Valley
and defendant KSL Resorts alleging the following eight causes of
action as class-wide claims, inter alia: (1) Failure to Pay
Minimum Wages; (2) Failure to Pay Wages and Overtime Under Labor
Code Section 510.  Squaw Valley contends that the Plaintiff
entered into an arbitration agreement that precludes him from
pursuing claims in this forum.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ya5suzny from Leagle.com.

Joao Gabriel Pinto, Plaintiff, represented by Alvin B. Lindsay --
david@yeremianlaw.com -- David Yeremian & Associates, Inc. &
David Harmik Yeremian -- david@yeremianlaw.com -- David Yeremian
& Associates, Inc.

Squaw Valley Resort, LLC, Defendant, represented by Alexander M.
Chemers -- Alexander.chemers@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins,
Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Lori A. Bowman --
lori.bowman@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and
Stewart PC (LA) & Kelsey A. Webber -- Kelsey.webber@ogletree.com
-- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, PC.


STATE FARM: Court Dismisses Amended MAO-MSO Suit
------------------------------------------------
In the case, MAO-MSO RECOVERY II, LLC, MSP RECOVERY LLC, MSPA
CLAIMS 1, LLC, and MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS, SERIES, LLC, Plaintiffs,
v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant,
Case No. 1:17-cv-01541-JBM-JEH (C.D. Ill.), Judge Joe Billy
McDade of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
Illinois, Peoria Division, granted the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the Amended Complaint.

The putative class action is one of several filed around the
country by the Plaintiffs.  The Plaintiffs also have a separate
but related case pending before the Court -- another putative
class action with slightly different facts, but consisting of
virtually identical allegations under the law, MAO-MSO Recovery
II, LLC et al. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., No. 17-
cv-1537 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 23. 2017).

The lawsuit arises under the Medicare Secondary Payer ("MSP")
provisions of the Medicare Act.  Part C of the Medicare Act
allows Medicare enrollees to obtain their Medicare benefits
through private insurers, called Medicare Advantage Organizations
("MAOs"), instead of receiving direct benefits from the
government under Parts A and B.

The MSP makes Medicare insurance secondary to any 'primary plan'
obligated to pay a Medicare recipient's medical expenses,
including a third-party tortfeasor's automobile insurance.
Section 1395y(b)(3)(A) of the MSP provisions provides for a
private cause of action against primary payers who do not
reimburse secondary payers for conditional payments made to
Medicare beneficiaries.

Despite originally being filed on March 28, 2017, the case has
not advanced passed preliminary stages because the parties have
litigated the issue of Article-III standing for months.  The
matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the Amended Complaint.

Judge McDade finds that the Plaintiffs are not MAOs.  The
Plaintiffs provided the Court with a document titled
"Assignment," which is dated June 12, 2017, wherein Plaintiff MSP
Recovery, LLC assigns all of its rights from HFAP to Series 16-
05-456 LLC, a series of MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC.

As such, he says there is no question that Plaintiffs MAO-MSO
Recovery II and MSPA Claims 1 have no bearing on the issue of
Article-III standing, as those entities are not even mentioned in
the relevant documentation in the case.  Furthermore, any rights
that Plaintiff MSP Recovery, LLC obtained from HFAP by way of the
Recovery Agreement were later assigned to a series LLC of
Plaintiff MSP Recovery Claims, Series, LLC.  Thus, MSP Recovery
Claims, Series, LLC is the only Plaintiff that has any alleged
"rights" to vindicate to support standing in the case.

The Judge also finds that the Amended Complaint makes clear that
any reference to "Health First" refers to HFAP.  No matter how
the Plaintiffs twist it, their Amended Complaint is not accurate.
HFAP did not pay the representative beneficiary's medical
expenses; HFHP did.  Therefore, if anybody is to be reimbursed
under the MSP provisions, it is HFHP, not HFAP.  It is not a
"minor" clarification to say that an entirely separate
corporation incurred injury.  The crux of the case surrounds
State Farm's alleged failure to reimburse MAOs for conditional
payments they made, and the Plaintiffs' case rises and falls with
exactly what MAO assigned rights to them.

The aforementioned analysis leads to the inevitable result that
HFAP had no rights to assign to the Plaintiffs in the first
place.  Therefore, the Judge holds that because HFAP has not been
assigned any rights from HFHP to pursue claims under Section
1395y(b)(3)(A), Plaintiff MSP Recovery Claims, Series, LLC also
has no rights to pursue claims under Section 1395y(b)(3)(A).  The
Plaintiffs therefore lack Article-III standing.

Finally, because the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint was knowingly
inaccurate, there is absolutely no basis in law to support the
argument that HFAP is a MAO; and the Plaintiffs only attempted to
"clarify" their allegations after being outed by the Defendant
that the Amended Complaint was inaccurate, the Judge will order
the Plaintiffs to show cause within 14 days of the Order why they
should not be sanctioned under Rule 11.

For these reasons, Judge McDade granted State Farm's Motion to
Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  He dismissed
the case with prejudice.  He denied as moot the Defendant's
remaining Motion to Strike or Deny Class Allegations and Motion
for Leave to File.  The Judge directed the Plaintiffs to show
cause within seven days of the Order why they should not be
sanctioned under Rule 11.  The Defendant is also allowed seven
days to file a memorandum concerning whether it believes
sanctions are appropriate in the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Order and Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/aTteXn from Leagle.com.

MSP Recovery, LLC, a Florida entity, MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC, a
Delaware entity & MSPA Claims 1, LLC, a Florida entity,
Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher L. Coffin --
ccoffin@pbclawfirm.com -- PENDLEY BAUDIN & COFFIN LLP, pro hac
vice, Adam M. Foster -- AFoster@BaumHedlundLaw.com -- BAUM
HEDLUND ARISTEI & GOLDMAN, Courtney L. Stidham --
cstidham@pbclawfirm.com -- PENDLEY BAUDIN & COFFIN LLP, Pedram
Esfandiary -- pesfandiary@baumhedlundlaw.com -- Baum, Hedlund,
Aristei & Goldman, PC, Robert Brent Wisner --
rbwisner@baumhedlundlaw.com -- BAUM HEDLUND ARISTEI & GOLDMAN &
David M. Hundley -- dhundley@pbclawfirm.com -- HUNDLEY LAW GROUP,
P.C.

MSP Recovery Claims, Series, LLC, a Delaware entity, Plaintiff,
represented by Christopher L. Coffin, PENDLEY BAUDIN & COFFIN LLP
& David M. Hundley, HUNDLEY LAW GROUP, P.C.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, an Illinois
Company, Defendant, represented by Benjamine Reid --
breid@carltonfields.com -- CARLTON FIELDS JORDEN BURT P.A., James
P. Gaughan -- jgaughan@rshc-law.com -- RILEY SAFER HOLMES &
CANCILA LLP, Joseph Anthony Cancila, Jr. -- jcancila@rshc-law.com
-- RILEY SAFER HOLMES & CANCILA LLP, Patrick D. Cloud --
pcloud@heylroyster.com -- HEYL ROYSTER VOELKER & ALLEN & David
Matthew Allen -- mallen@carltonfields.com -- CARLTON FIELDS
JORDEN BURT P.A..


TORRANCE REFINING: Faces Suit Over Water Contamination
------------------------------------------------------
Nick  Green, writing for Daily Breeze, reports that the Torrance
refinery has allowed contaminated groundwater beneath surrounding
residential properties to "store toxic chemicals" emanating from
the plant for years, a hydrologist and Cal State Fullerton
professor testified in a Los Angeles Superior Court lawsuit.

The legal action, first filed in early 2017, seeks to have the
refinery declared a public nuisance, citing fires, leaks and
other issues at the plant since a February 2015 explosion.

In June the refinery was fined $150,000 by the state for not
meeting a timetable for removing hazardous waste from the site.

Filed on behalf of a trio of Torrance residents, the plaintiff's
lawyers are seeking class-action status for the lawsuit.

PBF Energy, which owns the plant under the name of its subsidiary
Torrance Refining Co., declined comment Fri, June 29.

"As a matter of long-standing policy, Torrance Refining Company
does not comment on any active litigation," spokeswoman Gesuina
Paras emailed.

PBF inherited the issue from ExxonMobil when it purchased the
plant in July 2016.

In a court filing in April, Professor Richard Layton, a paid
expert witness for the plaintiffs, said the water is contaminated
by levels of methyl tert-butyl ether or MTBE that are 40 times
higher than the maximum contaminant level allowed by the state.
MTBE was a gasoline additive used to improve vehicle performance
that was banned in California in 2002 and also phased out
nationwide.

Layton said the groundwater is also contaminated by high levels
of benzene, which is used in gasoline, that is more than 2,000
times the state's maximum contaminant level.

One plume of contaminated water extends 4,000 feet beyond the
refinery's southern property line, meaning homes along Del Amo
Boulevard next to the refinery are at risk for indoor air
contamination as vapors percolate up through the soil, Layton
said.

"The contamination extends beyond the property boundary of the
Torrance Refinery, meaning in effect, that the Torrance Refinery
is using the surrounding properties as storage for toxic
materials originating from the refinery," Layton testified in the
court filing.

The decades-old contamination has long been under a clean-up and
abatement order from the Los Angeles Regional Water Quality
Control Board and is on-going. Layton reviewed years of
accumulated data to reach his conclusions.

About a dozen homes near the intersection of Del Amo Boulevard
and Van Ness Avenue were evacuated, purchased by ExxonMobil and
razed in 2008 after air sampling found high levels of benzene
inside homes.

ExxonMobil installed a soil-vapor extraction system in the
southeastern corner of the refinery in an effort to reduce those
high levels of residential air contamination, Layton said.

"No additional indoor air sampling in the neighboring properties
has taken place since this time to evaluate the potential impacts
from the refinery activities," he said. "This would be prudent
based upon the previous sampling results and time frame (of) over
10 years. Such an analysis should include whether or not the
plume has migrated further into the neighborhood and what impacts
if any the remediation system has had on the contamination
plume."

Air samples taken by a consulting firm paid for by the
plaintiff's legal team showed higher levels of chemical
contamination in some homes compared to ambient levels outside,
the lawsuit said.

For example, testing at one home on Del Amo Boulevard found
levels of benzene and other chemicals were between 100 percent
and 631 percent higher compared to ambient air levels, testified
James Clark, principal toxicologist at a Los Angeles
environmental consulting firm and another paid expert consultant
for the plaintiffs.

The levels of chemicals found inside homes "will likely present
significant health risks to the occupants," he testified. Those
long-term health effects likely include "respiratory diseases and
cancer," Clark said, citing EPA data.

About 26,000-acre-feet of contaminated groundwater has been
extracted over the years, Clark testified after reviewing
regional water quality control board data.[GN]


SUN LIFE: Court Denies Bid to Amend "Robertson" RICO Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEVI E. ROBERTSON, on behalf of himself and all
other similarly situated, v. SUN LIFE FINANCIAL, ET AL., Civil
Action No. 17-2148 (E.D. La.), Judge Sarah S. Vance of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied both
Robertson's motion to amend his complaint and to set a class
certification schedule.

The case arises out of allegedly fraudulent withdrawals from
Robertson's annuity account with Defendant Sun Life Assurance Co.
of Canada.  On Oct. 9, 2008, Robertson filed suit in state court
against Sun Life, Matthew Pizzolato, and other Defendants.  In
his original petition, Robertson alleged that Pizzolato forged a
check for $99,999.99 in Robertson's name, and Sun Life
negligently permitted a withdrawal in this amount from
Robertson's annuity account without contacting him to verify the
transaction.  Robertson's negligence claims against Sun Life were
later dismissed with prejudice in state court.

In March 2012, Robertson filed a third amended petition in state
court asserting a breach of contract claim against Sun Life.  He
alleges that he entered into a ten-year annuity contract with Sun
Life in July 2005, and that Sun Life breached this contract by
failing to secure his investment through the use of normal
industry standards.  On Feb. 27, 2017, Robertson filed a fourth
amended petition asserting state and federal racketeering claims
against Sun Life, and requesting that the case proceed as a class
action.

On March 15, 2017, Sun Life removed the matter to federal court
on the basis of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1331 and class action jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1332(d).  On Sept. 22, 2017, the Court dismissed with
prejudice Robertson's state and federal racketeering claims as
time-barred.  On Jan. 22, 2018, the Court denied the Plaintiff's
motion to remand to state court.

Robertson now moves to amend his complaint.  He requests leave to
file a fifth amended complaint to include additional class action
allegations.  He also moves to establish a class certification
schedule.  Sun Life opposes both motions.

Judge Vance finds that she considers multiple factors before
granting leave to amend, including undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to
cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
amendment, and futility of amendment.  These factors weigh
heavily against granting leave to amend.

Robertson seeks to add new class action allegations nearly 10
years after filing suit, and six years after first asserting a
breach of contract claim in his third amended petition.
Robertson fails to explain this prolonged delay.  Moreover, the
deadline to file amended pleadings set out in the Court's
scheduling order was Dec. 4, 2017.  The Plaintiff has not shown
good cause for failing to meet this deadline.

Further, Robertson has already amended his complaint four times,
and thus had numerous opportunities to assert a breach of
contract claim on a class basis.  Permitting him to bring new
class claims at this stage of the litigation will unduly
prejudice Sun Life.  Lastly, neither Robertson's complaint, nor
his proposed allegations, indicate that the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable.

Because the factors set out in Foman v. Davis strongly counsel
against permitting amendment, the Judge will deny leave to amend.

Because Robertson fails to identify any class claim remaining in
the case, the Judge perceives no good cause to extend the class
certification deadline.  Moreover, Robertson fails to explain his
delay in timely requesting an extension of the deadline to move
for class certification.  Robertson notes that Sun Life
previously agreed to set a class certification schedule.  But the
parties may not extend a deadline imposed by the local rules
without permission of the Court.  Accordingly, he will deny
Robertson's motion to set a class certification schedule.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Vance denied the motion for
leave to amend and the motion to set a class certification
schedule.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/fyy92u from Leagle.com.

Levi E. Robertson, on behalf of himself and all other similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Eric R. Nowak --
info@hnjustice.com -- Harrell & Nowak, LLC & Byard Edwards, Jr.,
Edwards & Knight, LLC.

Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Defendant, represented by
Kelly Juneau Rookard -- kjuneau@irwinllc.com -- Irwin Fritchie
Urquhart & Moore, LLC.

Delaware Life Insurance Company, formerly known as Sun Life
Assurance Company of Canada U.S., Defendant, represented by
Edward Winter Trapolin -- etrapolin@irwinllc.com -- Irwin
Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, LLC, Andrea J. Robinson --
ANDREA.ROBINSON@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale
& Dorr, LLP, pro hac vice, Ian David Coghill --
IAN.COGHILL@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale &
Dorr, LLP, pro hac vice & Kelly Juneau Rookard, Irwin Fritchie
Urquhart & Moore, LLC.

Delaware Life Insurance Company, formerly known as un Life
Assurance Company of Canada U.S., Defendant, represented by Tim
J. Perla -- TIMOTHY.PERLA@WILMERHALE.COM -- WilmerHale, pro hac
vice.


SUPER MICRO: Robbins Geller to Lead in Securities Fraud Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, LOGAN HESSEFORT, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. SUPER MICRO COMPUTER,
INC., et al., Defendants. UNITED UNION OF ROOFERS, WATERPROOFERS
& ALLIED WORKERS LOCAL UNION NO. 8 WBPA FUND, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. SUPER
MICRO COMPUTER, INC., et al., Defendants, Case Nos. 18-cv-00838-
JST, 3:18-cv-00850-JST (N.D. Cal.), Judge Jon S. Tigar of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (i)
granted New York Hotel Trades Council & Hotel Association of New
York City, Inc. Pension Fund ("NYHTC")'s motion for appointment
as the Lead Plaintiff and approval of the selected counsel for a
securities class action; and (ii) (ii) consolidated these two
related actions.

These are federal securities class actions on behalf of persons
who purchased or otherwise acquired shares of Defendant Super
Micro's securities between Aug. 5, 2016 and Jan. 30, 2018.  Super
Micro designs, develops, manufactures, and sells servers,
motherboards and other computer parts and accessories.  The
complaints allege that Super Micro made false and misleading
statements and failed to disclose adverse information regarding
the company.

Originally, four parties filed motions seeking appointment as the
Lead Plaintiff and approval of their selection of counsel.  Two
of the parties subsequently withdrew or chose not to oppose,
leaving NYHTC and the Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement
System as the remaining competing Plaintiffs.

In these securities class actions, the Court now considers
motions for consolidation and for appointment as the Lead
Plaintiff and approval of selected counsel for a securities class
action.  NYHTC filed one motion and Oklahoma Pension filed the
second.

Judge Tigar finds that these related cases address nearly
identical factual issues and legal claims.  Given this factual
and legal overlap, judicial convenience and a just resolution of
the parties' claims would be best served through consolidation.
He will grant the motions for consolidation.

The Judge concludes that, at least at this preliminary stage,
NYHTC has demonstrated adequacy and typicality.  Even as compared
to the few cases which have concluded that post-disclosure
purchases defeated typicality, NYHTC purchased a much smaller
percentage -- less than 5% of its total shares -- after the
disclosure than did other Plaintiffs who were disqualified.

Finally, so long as the Lead Plaintiff has made a reasonable
choice of counsel, the district court should generally defer to
that choice.  NYHTC selected Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP to
serve as lead counsel, and this designation will be approved.
The Judge finds that Robbins Geller has experience as lead
counsel in securities class action lawsuits, including lawsuits
in the district.  Hence, he will approve the Lead Plaintiff's
choice of counsel.

Judge Tigar granted the motions to consolidate the cases.  He
also granted NYHTC's motion for appointment as the Lead Plaintiff
and approval of selection of the counsel.  He denied the Oklahoma
Pension's motion for appointment as the Lead Plaintiff and
approval of selection of counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/jVCyu3 from Leagle.com.

Logan Hessefort, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jennifer Pafiti --
jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, J. Alexander Hood, II --
ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice & Jeremy A.
Lieberman -- jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac
vice.

New York Hotel Trades Council & Hotel Association of New York
City, Inc. Pension Fund, Movant, represented by Tricia Lynn
McCormick -- TriciaM@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP, Daniel Jacob Pfefferbaum -- dpfefferbaum@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Shawn A. Williams --
shawnw@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Bristol County Retirement System, Movant, represented by K.C.
Maxwell -- kmaxwell@bgrfirm.com -- Maxwell Law PC.

Qiong Shen, Movant, represented by Laurence M. Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement System, Movant,
represented by Richard Martin Heimann -- rheimann@lchb.com --
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, Katherine Collinge Lubin --
klubin@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP &
Lester Rene Hooker -- lhooker@saxenawhite.com -- Saxena White
P.A..


TEZOS FOUNDATION: Launches Platform Amid ICO Class Actions
----------------------------------------------------------
CCN reports that in an official blog post, the Tezos Foundation
announced that the betanet is live.

Tezos is a smart contract platform which raised $232 million in
its initial coin offering (ICO) in July 2017, making it the
largest token sale at that time.  The platform boasts an on-chain
governance model and formal verification for smart contracts.
After a year of active development, several class action
lawsuits, and multiple delays Tezos has finally launched
successfully.

"The future of Tezos rests in the hands of its community. This
moment marks an inflection point for the project, and we are
excited to support community developers, scientists, validators
("bakers"), and enthusiasts from all over the world as they drive
the success of this innovative, decentralized network."

In an exclusive statement to CCN, Ryan Jesperson, president of
the Tezos Foundation stated:

"From the outset, the code base underpinning the Tezos protocol
has been engineered with security in mind.  Although no system
can be completely secure, every system can be continuously
improved towards that goal -- fixing bugs, maintaining and
adjusting the code base, and integrating additional functionality
are several actions that may be taken while the betanet is live."

"Unscheduled downtime and/or hard forks may occur as upgrades are
implemented.  It is anticipated that all transactions that take
place on the betanet will persist into the mainnet, which will
launch after the betanet has sufficiently matured," he further
added.

The foundation has also announced that they would be sponsoring
HackerOne, a San Francisco-based cybersecurity company, to manage
their bug bounty program. They also commissioned independent
security audit and code review headed by Least Authority and
security researchers at Inria respectively.

On-chain Governance

Tezos has a built-in on-chain governance model where users can
propose protocol upgrades, and if the network reaches a consensus
to implement it, changes are automatically made without a need
for any manual intervention.  The proposer is compensated with
the network tokens.  Tezos hopes that this mechanism would
incentivize everyone to work on improving the network and also
help to decentralize the project to the maximum extent.

In an email sent out to investors, the Tezos Foundation stated
that although they had considered retaining a veto power with
regards to network proposal for a year, they have since decided
not to.

"Adopting amendments to the protocol is a central element of
Tezos and no single entity should have the power to alter
decisions agreed upon by community members.  The option of a
temporary veto had been considered solely as a security measure,
but the Foundation is committed to decentralization from day one.
We think that this decision reflects that priority,"
Mr. Jesperson stated.

Baking and Wallets
The Tezos Protocol utilizes a Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS)
consensus algorithm. Tezos refers to its network validators as
"bakers" and users can get involved in the block validation
process by staking 10,000 tezzies.  Users are encouraged to
participate in the network, even if they do not own 10,000, by
delegating their stake to a baking service.  The currency has an
inflationary supply model, with an annual increase of 5.5% that
is paid out to bakers.

The Tezos Foundation has issued a grant to Cryptonomic, a New
York City-based company, to build an open source wallet.  Several
open source projects such as tezbox are also being worked on.

When asked about the future role of the project's non-profit
foundation, Mr. Jesperson stated:

"The role of the Foundation is to deploy resources that support
the advancement of the Tezos protocol.  After launch, the
Foundation intends to focus primarily on grantmaking -- providing
support to community members such as educational and research
institutions, open-source developers, non-profit organizations,
and businesses from all over the world developing technologies
and applications that relate to Tezos and other open-source
projects."

Tezos is currently only trading on HitBTC and Gate.io IOU
markets.  There haven't been any announcements pertaining to
exchange listing efforts so far. [GN]


TONOGA INC: Begins Probe Into PFOA Contamination Amid Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Lauren Stanforth, writing for timesunion, reports that Taconic
plastics plant is beginning an in-depth investigation into the
extent of PFOA contamination around its Route 22 plant -- more
than two years after the company first alerted the state to
renewed concerns about contamination around its property.

The company, whose official name is Tonoga Inc., will begin doing
soil borings and installing groundwater wells to determine the
true extent of contamination of PFOA, or perfluorooctanoic acid,
a chemical used to make heat-resistant coatings.

In Jan. 2016, Taconic reached out to the state Department of
Environmental Conservation and Health Department about previous
PFOA contamination at its manufacturing facility in the wake of
revelations about the nearby Village of Hoosick Falls public
water supply being contaminated with PFOA since at least 2014.

The contamination that came from the Saint-Gobain Performance
Plastics plant in Hoosick Falls, and subsequently the Taconic
plant, lead to a massive outcry about how PFOA might impact
residents' health in the years to come.

Taconic responded by signing a consent order with the state in
November 2016 that required a filtration system be placed on
Petersburgh's small municipal water plant, as well as testing and
filtration systems installed for private wells in the area.

But as part of the consent order, Taconic was also required to
investigate how much of the surrounding environs are
contaminated, and if there is a way to clean it up beyond just
providing water filtration systems to residents.

The state DEC announced that the investigation's findings will be
released in a report sometime in 2019, followed by a study
suggesting ways to clean up the contamination. However, "the
information collected during the site investigation may also
support the conclusion that no action, or no further action, is
needed to address site-related contamination," according to the
DEC's investigation update.

Taconic had found PFOA contamination at its plant more than a
decade ago.  But the state said at the time PFOA was not a
regulated contaminant. In 2005, the company installed a carbon-
filter system on its plant wells along the Little Hoosic River
after it said low levels of the chemical were discovered.
Alternative water treatment systems were also installed for
nearby residents.

Taconic's plant makes specialty products including silicone-
coated fabrics and tapes.  The site has made
polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) coated fabrics there since about
1961. PTFE previously contained PFOA.

A class-action lawsuit has been filed by property owners and
water users in Petersburgh against Taconic. [GN]


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Stinson Leonard Attorney Discusses Ruling
------------------------------------------------------------
Liz Kramer, Esq. -- liz.kramer@stinson.com -- of Stinson Leonard
Street, in an article for JD Supra, wrote that almost a year ago,
the Second Circuit praised the clean, readable design of Uber's
app.  Because the reference to Uber's terms of service was not
cluttered and hyperlinked to the actual terms, the Second Circuit
held Uber could enforce its arbitration agreement and the class
action waiver within it.  But, just recently, the First Circuit
disagreed.  In Cullinane v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2018 WL
3099388 (1st Cir. June 25, 2018), it refused to enforce an
arbitration clause in Uber's terms of service and allowed a
putative class action to proceed.  The First Circuit found
customers were not reasonably notified of Uber's terms and
conditions, because the hyperlink to those terms was not
conspicuous.

The Cullinane opinion was applying Massachusetts law on contract
formation.  Massachusetts has not specifically addressed online
agreements (or smart phone apps), but in analogous contexts has
held that forum selection clauses should be enforced if they are
"reasonably communicated and accepted."  In particular, there
must be "reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of
contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent."  The
Meyer opinion was applying California law on contract formation.
But the test was identical, because both states had borrowed it
from a Second Circuit decision about Netscape.  So, the state law
at issue does not explain the different outcome.

The one thing that might explain the different outcome is that
the two federal appellate courts appear to have analyzed slightly
different versions of Uber's app.  In Cullinane, the lead
plaintiffs had signed up between Dec. 31, 2012 and January 10,
2014.  (The court reproduced the actual screen shots early in its
opinion.)  In Meyer, the lead plaintiff had signed up in October,
2014, and Uber had altered the design of its sign-up screens.
(There, the screen shot is an addendum to its opinion.)  For
example, the background was now white in late 2014, instead of
black, and the "Terms of Service & Privacy Policy" were in teal,
instead of white text.

And, those are some of the aspects of the design that the First
Circuit pointed to as critical.  It noted that hyperlinked terms
are usually in blue text and underlined, but that the Cullinane
plaintiffs' were faced with hyperlinked "Terms of Service" that
were not blue or underlined.  Instead, they were in white text in
a gray box, no different than other non-hyperlinked text like
"scan your card" on the same screen.   In addition, the First
Circuit found the text stating "by creating an Uber account you
agree to the [Terms]" was insufficiently conspicuous for similar
reasons.  For those reasons, the Cullinane opinion found "the
Plaintiffs were not reasonably notified of the terms of the
Agreement, they did not provide their unambiguous assent to those
terms."

This is another example of how unsettled some aspects of
arbitration law are (and maybe consumer contracting in general).
In Meyer, the district court had denied Uber's motion to compel
arbitration, and the appellate court reversed, granting the
motion to compel arbitration.  And in Cullinane, the district
court had granted Uber's motion to compel arbitration, and the
appellate court reversed, denying the motion to compel
arbitration.  Those four courts were applying the exact same
legal standard of conspicuousness, and reached opposite
conclusions in the span of less than a year.

The lesson here is two-fold.  First, there is no clear standard
for when terms on a website (or on a receipt, or in a box) are
sufficiently conspicuous, so judges are left to their own devices
(pun intended) to answer that question.  Second, unless an on-
line provider wants judges -- who are likely untrained in the
psychology of consumer design related to five inch screens (and
may not even have any apps) -- to keep on getting to whatever
result they please, the only solution is to require a consumer to
actually click "I agree" after viewing a screen of the terms and
conditions.  Unless, of course, SCOTUS grants certiorari of this
new "circuit split" and issues guidance. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Faces Class Action Over ACA Program
--------------------------------------------------
Guy Boulton, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, reports that Common
Ground Healthcare Cooperative expected to receive $45 million in
2015 through a program in the Affordable Care Act to help offset
the risk health insurers faced in a new market.

The Wisconsin cooperative instead received $5.7 million.

Common Ground Healthcare, based in Brookfield, now is among more
than 100 health insurers who contend that the federal government
owes them billions of dollars for reneging on commitments made as
part of the Affordable Care Act.

"Where else do you enter into an agreement with another entity
and then break that agreement midstream and not have any
recourse?" said Cathy Mahaffey, chief executive officer of Common
Ground Healthcare.  "And this has happened to us time and time
again with the Affordable Care Act."

The cooperative is the lead plaintiff in a class-action lawsuit
involving the payments.  The lawsuit -- one of several stemming
from the issue -- includes 116 health insurers.

The plaintiffs include affiliates of some of the country's
largest insurers, such as UnitedHealthcare, as well as Wisconsin
insurers, such as Dean Health Plan, Security Health Plan and
Network Health Plan.

The steps taken by the federal government -- in one case, by
Congress; in another, by the Trump administration -- after the
Affordable Care Act was passed partially explain why health
insurers abandoned the market for selling health insurance to
individuals and families who don't receive health benefits
through an employer.

They also partially explain why premiums for those health plans
have soared and made health insurance unaffordable for most
middle-class people who are not eligible for federal subsidies
through the law.

The health insurers were dealt a setback this month when an
appellate court overturned a ruling in favor of a health insurer
who had filed a similar lawsuit.

The insurer is almost certain to appeal the ruling.

Ongoing litigation
The lawsuits are just one example of how the battles over the
Affordable Care Act continue to be fought in the courts more than
eight years after it became law.

Wisconsin is among the 20 states, for instance, that have filed a
lawsuit in Texas to have the law declared unconstitutional.

The lawsuits filed by Common Ground Healthcare and other health
insurers stem from one of the provisions in the Affordable Care
Act designed to lessen the initial risk that insurers would take
on by selling health plans on the new marketplaces.

The law remade the market for health insurance sold to people who
don't get coverage through an employer or a government health
plan.

It barred health insurers from denying coverage if someone had a
pre-existing health condition or charging him or her higher
rates. It also limited how much premiums could vary based on age.
And it prevented insurers from charging women more than men for
the same coverage.

The changes forced insurers essentially to guess how to price
their health plans.

The insurers had no experience in insuring people with pre-
existing health problems.  Nor did they know how many people
would sign up for coverage or what their medical bills would be.

To lessen the uncertainty and encourage insurers to participate
in the new market, the Affordable Care Act set up three programs
to help get insurers through the rocky first years until they
knew more about the market and how to price their health plans.

One of the programs -- known as the risk corridor program --
required the federal government to partially offset insurers'
losses by health insurers if the people who bought health plans
required more care than projected.

The program would run from 2014 through 2016, and the payments
would come from two funds for the Medicare program.

Health insurers also would be required to pay the federal
government a percentage of any profits if their medical claims
were less than projected.

The first payments were due in 2015.

But in December 2014, almost a full year after health insurers
had been selling health plans on the marketplaces, Congress
passed an appropriations rider that prohibited the federal
government from paying out more in the risk corridor program than
it collected.

The rider also prohibited the federal government from using money
from other programs for the payments, Katie Keith, an expert on
the Affordable Care Act, wrote in a blog post on the website of
Health Affairs, a policy journal.

Identical riders were included in appropriations legislation and
continuing resolutions for 2016 and 2017.

Health insurers incurred $12.6 billion in losses from 2014
through 2016 that were eligible for payments through the risk
corridor program, but more than $12 billion of those payments
were not paid, according to the lawsuit in which Common Ground
Healthcare is the lead plaintiff.

The cooperative, for instance, estimates that it is owed more
than $100 million in risk corridor payments.

"It would have significantly changed our financial picture," said
Mahaffey.

The key issue in the lawsuit is whether an obligation of the
government in a statute later can be eliminated through an
appropriations bill, said Stephen Swedlow, a managing partner
with Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan and the lead attorney in
two of the class action lawsuits filed by the health insurers.

"What the case will ultimately affirm is that when Congress
passes a statute, it can't change its mind through appropriations
bills," Mr. Swedlow said.  "If the government wants to change the
government program, it has to change the government program."

Appellate ruling
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Washington, D.C.,
by a 2-1 majority, disagreed, overturning a decision by the Court
of Federal Claims in favor of an insurer.

The court agreed that the provision in the Affordable Care Act
obligated the government to make the full risk corridor payments,
Keith wrote in a blog on the ruling.  But it concluded that the
obligation was suspended by the subsequent appropriation riders.

The insurer -- Moda Health Plan, which sold plans in Oregon,
Alaska and Washington -- can ask for a rehearing by the entire
Federal Circuit or appeal to the Supreme Court.

"Given the stakes, Moda is likely to persevere, setting up
another potential blockbuster Supreme Court ruling on the ACA,"
Ms. Keith wrote.

By then, the makeup of the court will be different with the
retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy.

Common Ground Healthcare's lawsuit and another class action
lawsuit have been on hold until the appellate court ruled.

But the appellate court's ruling could strengthen an additional
claim in the lawsuit in which the cooperative is the lead
plaintiff.

The lawsuit was amended in November to include so-called cost-
sharing reduction subsidies that the federal government stopped
paying that month.

The cost-sharing reduction subsidies reduce deductibles and other
out-of-pocket expenses for people with low incomes who buy health
plans on the marketplaces set up by the Affordable Care Act.

Health insurers are required by law to provide the additional
coverage.  But the Trump administration stopped making the
payments late last year.

"It was just money lost," Ms. Mahaffey said.

Common Ground Healthcare, which couldn't change its rates,
estimates that it is owed $12 million to $13 million in cost-
sharing reduction subsidies for last year.

"Otherwise, we would have had a break-even year," Ms. Mahaffey
said.

The cooperative estimates that it could be owed $60 million for
this year.

Other insurers now have until Aug. 13 to opt-in to the class-
action lawsuit for the additional claim.

Mr. Swedlow estimates that the claim involving the cost-sharing
reduction subsidies could total more than $3 billion.

The amount also increases each month.

The appellate court's ruling strengthens the lawsuit, Mr. Swedlow
said, because Congress never cut off funding for the subsidies in
an appropriation bill.

"A decision was made simply to stop making the payments," he
said.

The lawsuits will take years to resolve.  But they make clear the
challenges that health insurers have faced and how the changes
have raised the cost of health plans sold to individuals and
families.

"It makes participating in this market more risky, because we can
never count on what the rules will be, and therefore have to
price that into our product," said Marty Anderson, chief
marketing officer at Security Health Plan, an affiliate of
Marshfield Clinic Health System.

The changes that led to the lawsuits -- as well as other changes
since the Affordable Care Act -- also have been more than a
little frustrating for health insurers.

"No one," Ms. Mahaffey said, "does business this way." [GN]


UNITED STATES: Class Action Mulled on Behalf of Asylum Seekers
--------------------------------------------------------------
Amy Powell, writing for KABC, reports that A mother and daughter
separated at the border under the Trump administration's zero
tolerance policy have been reunited in Los Angeles.

Perla Alemengor de Velasquez and her 12-year old daughter had not
seen each other in more than a month, since entering the United
States from Guatemala seeking asylum.

Attorney Mario Williams said he is planning to file a class-
action lawsuit on behalf of many families like theirs to stop the
administration from blocking legitimate asylum seekers from
entering the United States.

"The Trump administration continues to double and triple down on
a policy that is blatantly unconstitutional," Mr. Williams said.
[GN]


UNITED STATES: FEMA Ordered to Extend Temporary Housing Vouchers
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sarah Betancourt and Kelli Kennedy, writing for Associated Press,
report that a judge ordered federal emergency officials to extend
vouchers for temporary hotel housing for nearly 1,700 Puerto
Rican hurricane evacuees, saying ending the program could cause
irreparable harm.

The June 30 decision came shortly after civil rights group
LatinoJustice PRLDEF filed a lawsuit seeking relief for the
Puerto Ricans, whose federal housing assistance vouchers were set
to expire at midnight Sunday, July 1, meaning the evacuees could
have been evicted from the hotels.

The order says the agency cannot end its Transitional Sheltering
Assistance program until at least midnight Tuesday, July 3.  The
organization is pushing to let families stay for six more months.

U.S. District Judge Leo Sorokin of Massachusetts wrote that
ending the program would drain other public resources.  He also
said the evidence showed problems with the Federal Emergency
Management Agency's efforts to notify and provide transitional
help for the hurricane refugees.

"The irreparable harm to the plaintiffs is obvious and
overwhelming; tomorrow morning they will be evicted and homeless
since by definition each plaintiff's home was rendered
uninhabitable by the hurricane in Puerto Rico," he wrote.

Eight plaintiffs filed a class-action lawsuit alleging unlawful
action by FEMA in Massachusetts, which has the highest number of
evacuee families seeking federal help after Florida and Puerto
Rico.

Many of the plaintiffs tell stories of wiped out residences on
the island, and ongoing medical conditions.

Forty-eight-year-old Denise Nieves resides in a hotel under the
TSA program in West Springfield, Massachusetts, with her son.
Her home in Toa Baja, Puerto Rico was flooded and is
uninhabitable. Her son suffers from neurological dysfunctions
while she has pulmonary hypertension.  She has not been able to
find permanent housing.  The complaint says "they will be left
homeless" in the event of eviction from the hotel.

FEMA declined to comment on the lawsuit, but the Orlando Sentinel
reports the agency confirmed it was working to notify hotels to
extend the aid until July 5 to comply with the order.  A
spokeswoman also said the agency was extending transportation aid
until August 30 to cover travel costs for families who wish to
return to the island.

Keith Turi, a FEMA administrator for the program, said in a video
news release that the agency is working with state and local
officials and volunteer organizations to find assistance for the
evacuees and will help pay for a flight home.

Craig J. de Recat -- cderecat@manatt.com -- is a partner with
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, the law firm working pro bono with
LatinoJustice on the suit.

He said evacuees had not been informed properly of the end of the
program, with many finding out about the news from watching
television.

He said a hearing was planned for Monday, July 2, to see if the
restraining order should be extended.

The Puerto Ricans arrived after last year's Hurricane Maria, a
Category 4 storm that devastated the U.S. island.  It caused more
than $100 billion in damage when it hit Puerto Rico on Sept. 20,
and the island is still struggling to recover.  Tens of thousands
of businesses closed after people fled.

Florida Democratic Sen. Bill Nelson said on June 30 that FEMA
could extend the program under current law.  He said a similar
extension occurred more than a decade ago after Hurricane Katrina
caused thousands from Louisiana to flee to Texas.

Nelson and Democratic members of the Florida Legislature said
officials have told them the island remains too devastated to
take back evacuees who remain on the mainland. There are few
jobs, they said.

At a Super 8 in Orlando, there were up to 33 families staying at
the motel in mid-May.

One of its occupants, 49-year-old Lizbeth Cruz, told the Orlando
Sentinel that she's not going back to Puerto Rico, saying she
doesn't trust the government to deal with another disaster.

She carries around a small notebook filled with pages of
hand-written addresses in nearby counties with leasing office
phone numbers, price ranges and annotations: Call back. Visit in
person.  Not available. [GN]


UNITED STATES: FEMA to Continue Post-Hurricane Housing
------------------------------------------------------
Christine Stuart, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that on the verge of forcing thousands of Puerto Ricans into
homelessness, the Federal Emergency Management Agency said it
will follow court orders to continue post-hurricane housing
through the U.S. Independence Day.

FEMA has been providing the housing funds through the
Transitional Shelter Assistance program since Hurricane Maria hit
the Caribbean island on Sept. 20, 2017.  Though the agency has
twice renewed the program, its refusal to issue another extension
prompted a class led by Alian Asencio to file a federal class
action on June 30 -- the date the program was set to expire.

Filing suit in the District of Massachusetts, Mr. Asencio and the
other plaintiffs are represented by the Los Angeles law firm
Manatt, Phelps and Phillips; the Hector E. Pineiro Law Offices of
Worcester, Massachusetts; and LatinaJustice PRLDEF in New York.

Shortly after the suit was filed, U.S. District Judge Timothy
Hillman noted that "irreparable harm to the plaintiffs is obvious
and overwhelming."

"Tomorrow morning they will be evicted and homeless since by
definition each plaintiffs home was rendered uninhabitable by the
hurricane in Puerto Rico, a determination previously made by the
defendants," a June 30 docket entry from Hillman states.  "The
public interest on balance favors the plaintiffs both in terms of
their personal interests and considering the specter of many sick
individuals without homes of their own being rendered homeless
with the resulting drain on other public resources in addition to
the possible human consequences."

Though the judge conceded that the record is limited at this
point, he said the pleadings are enough to make FEMA continue
paying hotel bills for the class "until checkout time on July 4,
2018."

Judge Hillman also held a telephone hearing with the attorneys on
July 2, 2018, at 12:45 p.m.

Reacting to the ruling on July 1, FEMA declined to comment beyond
saying that it would notify hotels about the extension.

The class action covers all Hurricane Maria evacuees, many of
whom fled to New York, Florida and Massachusetts.

Though FEMA has promoted a program that the travel by evacuees
back to the island, Manatt Phelps attorney Craig J. de Recat --
cderecat@manatt.com -- noted it would be a one-way ticket to
nowhere.

"Their homes were destroyed," Mr. de Recat said in an interview.

"With nowhere to go," Mr. de Recat added, "they're going to
become homeless, and create a different crisis."

In their June 30 suit, the plaintiffs argue the federal
government "should be compelled to continue [temporary shelter
assistance] until FEMA provides eligible evacuees sufficient
Temporary Housing Assistance and implements an adequate
replacement solution, or until plaintiffs and class members have
each been relocated into alternate housing."

Recalling how FEMA worked with the Department of Housing and
Urban Development after Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy to create
the Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP), the class alleges
that abruptly ending the program here is arbitrary.

"FEMA's stated purpose for terminating this support for the class
members is that the agency does not think DHAP is needed," the
complaint states.  "This is contrary to the stark facts and the
reality faced by the Puerto Rican victims of Hurricane Maria
currently relying on FEMA assistance to survive and avoid
homelessness.  The stated purpose of terminating the program is
not borne out by the facts, and is pretext for other unstated and
ulterior purposes."

Through the declaratory judgment action the plaintiffs seek to
retain their shelter and win additional assistance under the
Stafford Act.  They are also seeking access to more long-term
shelter options. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Sued in Calif. for Detaining Immigrant Children
--------------------------------------------------------------
Graham Kates and Julia Dahl, writing for CBS News, report that
five immigrant children filed a federal complaint in U.S.
District Court in Los Angeles on June 29 alleging that the
government is "causing grave harm to children" by detaining them
for long periods of time in overly restrictive conditions and
forcing them to take psychotropic medication, in violation of the
law.

The lawsuit seeks class action status, and asks the court to
block the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) from placing
children in detention.  The five children say they have endured
physical and emotional abuse while detained.

The children are represented by the National Center for Youth Law
(NCYL) and the Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law,
the organizations that worked on Flores v Reno, the 1997 Supreme
Court case which created national standards for holding immigrant
children in custody.

"The children named in the lawsuit have been in federal custody
for up to a year and a half, been administered psychotropic
medications without consent, and been denied release to family
members for manufactured reasons or without any reason provided
at all, and with no opportunity to even review, much less appeal,
the government's decisions," read a statement by the NCYL.

Among the children who are plaintiffs is a 16-year-old girl from
Honduras who has been detained for 11 months.  The Office of
Refugee Resettlement allegedly refuses to release her to her
sister unless she can pay $500 a month for the girl's medication
and move to a home with a separate room for the girl.  Another
plaintiff is a 12-year-old boy who has also allegedly been forced
to take psychotropic drugs and has no legal counsel to assist him
with regard to the drugs or his detention.  Like the girl, the
boy also has a sister in the U.S. who can care for him.

A 17-year-old plaintiff who has been detained for more than a
year claims he has been repeatedly assaulted by ORR staff.

"One time he had to wash pepper spray out of his eyes with toilet
water," National Center for Youth Law spokesperson Lewis Cohen
said on a conference call with reporters on June 29.

Another 17-year-old says she has been placed on numerous
psychotropic medications for which ORR has not received the
consent of her grandfather, who is her closest U.S. relative.  A
13-year-old plaintiff says he has suffered physical abuse at the
hands of older youths in the facility where he's held.

The statement continues: "The complaint charges the government
with inappropriately detaining children in unnecessarily
restrictive detention centers without fair process, unlawfully
medicating children without parental or other appropriate
authorization, and failing to promptly release children to family
members in the United States.  It also alleges that the
government is violating the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution by obstructing detained children from accessing
lawyers and failing to provide due process."

In response to CBS News' questions about the lawsuit, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services' Administration for
Children and Families said they had a policy against commenting
on pending litigation. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Osage County Commissioners to Discuss Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Lynch, writing for Bartlesville Radio, reports that the
July 2 was the first meeting of the new fiscal year for the Osage
County Board of County Commissioners.  During which, the
Commissioners signed new contracts, approved Professional Service
agreements, and lease agreements.  The Commissioners also
discussed the possibility of opting in a class action lawsuit
against the federal government, and discussed the implications of
voters passing of State Question 788.

Following the signing of several new and existing contracts for
the fiscal year, the Commissioners discussed the possibility of
opting in to a class action lawsuit against the federal
government.  The lawsuit is Kane County, Utah V. United States,
and comes following a Supreme Court decision that the federal
government is required to fulfill obligations regarding payments
owed to counties across the country after withholding funds due
to budgetary reasons.  However, District #3 Commissioner
Darren McKinney felt the matter should be tabled in order to do
more research.  Mr. McKinney was concerned that action against
the federal government rarely comes without ramifications.

Finally, Heather Barkley from the Osage County Health Department
discuss during citizens input that the local Health departments
will have no control, or authority, of issuing or approving
medicinal marijuana licenses.  The license issuing authority will
remain at the state level.  The Commissioners also stated, since
the County is the recipient of federal funds, drug testing will
be performed on all County employees, and if an employee fails a
drug test they will be terminated, zero tolerance.

The Osage County Board of County Commissioners meets each Monday
at 10am at the Osage County Courthouse in Pawhuska. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Court Issues Protective Order in "Banos"
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, issued a Protective Order Governing Items
Disclosed by Respondents in the case captioned ARTURO MARTINEZ
BANOS, et al., Plaintiffs-Petitioners, v. ELIZABETH GODFREY, et
al., Defendants-Respondents, Case No. C16-1454-JLR-BAT (W.D.
Wash.).

No discovery took place during the pendency of this case.
However, on April 4, 2018, this Court issued a final order in
this case imposing compliance requirements on Defendants-
Respondents.  Therefore, the parties seek a limited protective
order regarding compliance with the Final Order.  The Court,
here, ordered Respondents to grant bond hearings to class members
who had reached 180 days of detention as of the date of this
order and to grant bond hearings to class members at every 180-
day mark of their detention thereafter; to provide a one-time
report to the Court regarding Respondents' compliance with the
Court's Order; and to provide notice to class members and class
counsel of the custody hearings. The Final Order also provides
that this Court may "enter further orders as may be necessary or
appropriate to implement and enforce the provisions of this Order
and Judgment." Compliance with the Final Order in this case,
specifically the requirements to file information with the Court
and share information with opposing counsel, will involve
disclosure of sensitive, confidential, and/or private information
for which special protection is warranted.

Accordingly, the parties seek a limited protective order
regarding compliance with the Final Order.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yad5utl7 from Leagle.com.

Edwin Flores Tejada & German Ventura Hernandez, on behalf of
themselves as individuals and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Petitioners, represented by Matt Adams, NORTHWEST
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT, Glenda Melinda Aldana Madrid, NORTHWEST
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT & Leila Kang, NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
PROJECT.

Nathalie Asher, Field Office Director, Thomas D Homan, Acting
Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, John F
Kelly, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security;, Lowell
Clark, Warden, James McHenry, Director of Executive Office for
Immigration Review & Jefferson B. Sessions, Acting Attorney
General of the United States, Respondents, represented by Gladys
M. Steffens Guzman, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CIVIL DIVISION & Sairah
G. Saeed, US DEPT. OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION.


VOLKSWAGEN AG: Sanford Heisler Files Age Discrimination Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Attorneys from Sanford Heisler Sharp LLP filed a collective
action Complaint against Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft
(Volkswagen AG) and two of its wholly owned United States
subsidiaries in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee. It alleges Volkswagen AG, Volkswagen Group of America,
Inc., and Volkswagen Chattanooga Operations LLC are engaged in a
company-wide policy of age discrimination against employees 50
years and older.

Named plaintiff Jonathan Manlove, 60, a resident of Oolltewah,
Hamilton County, TN, and a former Supervisor in VW's Chattanooga
auto manufacturing facility, is bringing the suit on behalf of
himself and similarly situated U.S. employees of Volkswagen AG
and its subsidiaries.

The Plaintiffs' legal team includes Sanford Heisler Sharp's
Nashville Office Managing Partner Kevin Sharp, who was a judge on
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee from
May 2011 through April 2017, serving from 2014 to 2017 as the
Court's Chief Judge, and Leigh Anne St. Charles, an associate in
the firm's Nashville office.

"In the wake of the economically devastating 'Dieselgate'
emissions scandal that destroyed VW's reputation worldwide, the
German automaker is now attempting to re-boot by rebranding
Volkswagen as a younger, sleeker company," said Sharp.
"Apparently flouting U.S. environmental laws was not enough. The
company is now attempting to purge older workers from its
management ranks by implementing illegal age discrimination
policies. Mr. Manlove is determined that VW's impermissible
employment practices will not go unnoticed or unchallenged."

Dr. Herbert Diess, U.S. Brand Chief of the Volkswagen Group
announced the company's strategic rebranding campaign aptly named
"TRANSFORM 2025+" in November 2016 in an effort to distract
attention from the Dieselgate debacle.  The plan focuses on
replacing the old diesel-centric image of VW for a corporate
persona emphasizing electric vehicles, e-mobility and
connectivity, and "significant improvements in efficiency and
productivity."

In a June 26, 2017 press release, Volkswagen AG announced, "We
are expecting our management levels to become younger and
slimmer," and elaborating: "We are becoming slimmer, leaner and
younger. This will make Volkswagen faster and more efficient at
the same time as providing new motivation for junior managers."
Among the reforms of TRANSFORM 2025+ is "Pact for the Future" --
a global policy of swapping older VW workers for much younger
ones -- with the goal of eliminating 30,000 global jobs.

The company intends to shed some 7,000 of these jobs in North and
South America currently held by workers born between 1955 and
1960 who are in their mid- to late-60s through an early
retirement scheme it euphemistically refers to as "natural
fluctuations."

Three s after the company issued its "younger, slimmer" press
release, Manlove was demoted and transferred to a position in a
different department, his first position when he joined VW in
2011. VW informed him the June 2017 demotion "was in recognition
of his hard work," and gave him one year to find a new position
in the company, or the demotion would become permanent.

In the year since, Manlove has applied for other positions in the
company, but VW management has prevented him from securing them.

"The clock is ticking for Jonathan, and his efforts to undo his
discriminatory demotion have not been successful," said St.
Charles. "No monetary compensation is at stake for him or members
of the class.  He is a talented American auto worker who simply
wants to continue performing the work at VW he is most capable of
doing at a salary commensurate with his considerable training,
skills, and experience.  He and others facing age discrimination
at the company have many years of work productivity remaining.
Demoting them and eliminating their positions to embellish VW's
tarnished reputation is simply wrong."

The Complaint describes the plight of additional U.S. employees
at VW older than 50 who have experienced similar recent
discrimination as part of the Pact for the Future initiative.

To's action seeks injunctive relief for Manlove and other class
members, including preventing VW from making his demotion
permanent, requiring the company to restore his former title and
work responsibilities, and preventing VW from discriminating
against other older workers in the future.

The Complaint also asks the court to certify a collective action
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967,
which protects employees 40 years of age and older from
discrimination on the basis of age in hiring, promotion,
discharge, compensation, or terms, conditions or privileges of
employment. A jury trial is requested.

         Jamie Moss
         NewsPRos
         Telephone:  201-788-0142
         Email: jamie@newspros.com[GN]


WALMART: Faces Class Action Over Shoplifting Extortion Scheme
-------------------------------------------------------------
John Woolfolk, writing for Mercury News, reports that  call it
revenge of the shoplifters: Some of the country's biggest
retailers, from Walmart to Bloomingdale's to Abercrombie & Fitch,
are being accused of extorting shoppers caught swiping
merchandise.

The bizarre twist is spelled out in a class-action lawsuit filed
in federal court in San Jose that begins when a mother shopping
for a birthday barbecue with her kids was stopped while leaving
the self-checkout at Walmart.  The retailer's loss-prevention
officers took her aside and accused her of not paying for hot dog
buns and a water bottle.

They gave her a choice: Cop to shoplifting and agree to pay $500
for an online class aimed at setting her on the straight and
narrow -- or else they'd call the police.

The Utah company that provides the class, Corrective Education
Company, called it a win for everyone.  The accused shoplifter
avoided an arrest, jail and criminal record while learning crime
doesn't pay.  The retailer got justice.  The cops stay focused on
more pressing needs.

But the lawsuit against Corrective Education officials and their
retail clients called it an extortion racket that would make Al
Capone blush.

"Despite their glittering credentials," the complaint says, the
program's producers "are all participants in a long-running,
highly profitable extortion scheme that has extracted millions of
dollars from thousands of poor, desperate people across the
country."

Not quite, said Scott Gant, a lawyer with the Boies Schiller
Flexner firm representing the accused CEC officials.  He said the
complaint alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act is based on "a novel but incorrect
legal theory."

"This simply isn't extortion," Mr. Gant said.  "The program is
voluntary.  People don't have to participate when they sign up.
They're given an opportunity to change their minds.  And they get
benefits for participating -- they get the actual service of the
education program."

The lawsuit claims the company had initially paid some retailers
up to $40 per person enrolled in the class.  That wasn't the case
with Walmart, whose spokesman Ragan Dickens said the retailer did
nothing wrong and has since dropped the program.

"We began evaluating this program last year and ultimately
suspended it last December," Mr. Dickens said.  "We deny the
allegations made against us and plan to defend ourselves."

Other retailers named in the complaint, filed April 9, declined
or did not respond to requests for comment. The court has not set
a hearing date.

Corrective Education Company was co-founded in 2010 by Glenn
Bingham, Darrell Huntsman and Brian Ashton, all graduates of
Brigham Young University and Harvard Business School.  All are
named in the lawsuit, along with six other company officials.

The company pitch is straightforward: "CEC understands the
challenges facing retailers, courts, prosecutors and law
enforcement agencies due to retail theft" and offers "a
successful, equitable and more efficient alternative to judicial
prosecution." Shoplifting cost retailers more than $17 billion in
2016, according to Loss Prevention Media.

The program is aimed at first-time shoplifters who, after being
detained by retail personnel, are shown a video explaining the
deal.

The video notes that it is not legal advice, that the
"Restorative Justice Option" being offered is entirely voluntary
and that they are free to consult a lawyer.

To successfully complete the program, the accused must stay out
of trouble, complete the course of up to eight hours to "help you
to lead a more constructive life," and pay for it.  Participants
could pay either $400 up-front or installments up to $500, the
lawsuit claimed, but If they fail to complete the course, they
are referred to police.

The lawsuit cites three plaintiffs by pseudonyms, including the
Georgia mother referred to as "Jane Doe," and "Mary Moe" of
Florida, who was accused of stealing snack foods and hygiene
products at a Walmart in November and paid $400 for the course.
"John Roe," a Texan accused of lifting a ball hitch in January
2017, failed to pay for his course and was referred to a
collection agency.

CEC has drawn growing scrutiny and legal trouble.  A 2015 Slate
article said the company in its first four years had served
20,000 accused shoplifters but also quoted critics including a
New York legal aid lawyer who said the operation was "flirting
with the crime of coercion."

The San Francisco City Attorney sued CEC in 2015 and won a
Superior Court injunction last year that called the program
"textbook extortion under California law." The company and
retailers, the ruling said, were "jointly liable for the
extortionate conduct" of "asking for money in exchange for
forbearance in calling police."

The Indiana attorney general concluded in April that the program
"potentially violates a number of legal and ethical provisions."

CEC on its website called the San Francisco ruling "a sad day for
Californians," arguing its program has kept 10,000 people out of
the criminal justice system and that fewer than 2 percent of
those who complete its program repeat the crime. It called the
Indiana opinion a "flawed analysis."

But the company has a noteworthy ally: G. Robert Blakey, primary
drafter of the RICO Act, told the Bay Area News Group the case
against the company seemed a "misuse of the statute."

"If a person was physically restrained from leaving and
reasonably afraid of unlawful physical violence, you might make
out an extortion," Mr. Blakey said.  "But that has not been pled
in this complaint." [GN]


WELLS FARGO: Sued Over Jewelry-Financing Program Hidden Fees
------------------------------------------------------------
Rob Bates, writing for JCK, reports that J. Edwards Jewelry
Distributing and its president John Silverman have been listed as
plaintiffs in an attempted class-action lawsuit that targets
Wells Fargo's alleged use of hidden fees in its jewelry-financing
program.

According to a complaint filed June 28 in San Francisco federal
court, El Paso, Texas-based J. Edwards Jewelry Distributing was a
participant in Wells Fargo's Jewelry Advantage program.  Similar
Wells Fargo products exist for other industries, including for
cars and home care, it says.

The complaint alleges that while retailers were not allowed to
charge customers additional finance fees, they were encouraged to
build the program's fees into the cost of their products. This,
it says, violates the 1968 Truth in Lending Act, as customers are
told that their purchases are being financed for 60 months at 0
percent interest.  "In reality, Wells Fargo's financing scheme
results in the creation of illegal hidden finance charges, and
the imposition of double-digit interest rates on consumers,"
charges the complaint.

The suit asserts that in many cases, retailers gave customers the
option of "saving" money by paying in cash rather than signing up
for the Wells Fargo credit card--as that means the store saves the
money it would ordinarily pay to Wells Fargo.

It adds that, since the finance charge is typically built into
the cost of the item, retailers often charge customers sales tax
on the entire item, including their finance fees, even though
stores are typically not allowed to charge sales tax on finance
charges.

The suit, which seeks class-action status, charges that Wells
Fargo might make as much as $800 million a year on what it calls
"hidden finance charges."  It says that class members could
number 5,000 merchants.

J. Edwards Jewelry Distributing and Wells Fargo could not be
reached for comment.  However, the San Francisco-based bank told
Reuters that it does not comment on pending litigation. [GN]


WH ADMINISTRATORS: Bid to Stay "Young" Denied
---------------------------------------------
In the case, KERRY YOUNG, on behalf of himself and all similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff, v. WH ADMINISTRATORS, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-02829-STA-egb (W.D. Tenn.), Judge S.
Thomas Anderson of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee, Eastern Division, denied without prejudice
the Defendant's Motion to Stay.

On Nov. 10, 2017, Tennessee Tractor, LLC, and Young, on behalf of
himself and all similarly situated persons, filed a class-action
Complaint under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
against the Defendant.

On Nov. 27, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a still-pending Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.  On Dec. 4, 2017, Defendant filed a
Motion to Compel Arbitration. Then on Dec. 11, 2017, the
Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, resulting in the
Defendants' re-filed Motion to Compel Arbitration.

After the parties filed a Response, a Reply, and a Sur-Reply, the
Court granted the Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in
Part and compelled Tennessee Tractor to take its claims against
the Defendant to arbitration.  The Defendant sought
reconsideration of its Motion as to Young and the other class
Plaintiffs, which the Court denied in its April 13, 2018 Order.

On May 4, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to
Supplement the Motion for Preliminary Injunction with information
concerning the filing of a lawsuit by the U.S. Department of
Labor against WHA in the U.S. District Court of Maryland on May
2, 2018.  The Court granted that Motion.  The parties seem to be
in agreement that the Department of Labor makes allegations
against the Defendant that are substantially similar to those
made by the Plaintiff.

In addition to the Plaintiff's pending Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, the Defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss, the
instant Motion to Stay, and a Motion to Quash.  The Order is
solely concerned with the Motion to Stay.

Upon the consultation of the counsel for the Motion, the
Plaintiff indicated his opposition but has not yet filed a
memorandum.  The time for the Plaintiff to file has not yet
expired, but since the Court agrees with the Plaintiff's
position, the Plaintiff will suffer no prejudice in not being
afforded an opportunity to respond.

The Defendant argues that (1) a stay would not be prejudicial to
the Plaintiff, (2) failure to stay the matter would be
prejudicial to the Defendant, and (3) a stay would serve the
interests of judicial efficiency and economy.

To the first point, the Defendant asserts that there is no risk
of dissipation of assets, such as the Plaintiff is concerned
about, because the relevant plan trust account only has $263.44,
and the Defendant does not have control over those funds.  To the
second point, it submits that it will suffer prejudice by being
forced to defend itself in two different courts over the same
subject matter.  Finally, it offers that a stay will serve
judicial economy because, depending upon the outcome of the case
involving the Department of Labor, the Court may have no need to
review the pending Motions or the underlying merits of the case.

Judge Anderson is not convinced.  He finds that at this early
stage of the proceedings, the Court is forced to give substantial
weight to the harm that the Plaintiff alleges it will suffer if
its Motion for Preliminary Injunction is not granted.  The Sixth
Circuit and Supreme Court have made clear that it is a heavy
burden that must be met for a party's rights to be resolved
without his participation.  And he is not satisfied that the
burden has been met in this instance.

The Judge is not persuaded that either the fact that the
Defendant must participate in two lawsuits or that judicial
efforts may be duplicated to some extent outweighs the potential
prejudice to the Plaintiff if the action is stayed.  Therefore,
he denied the instant Motion without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 25, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/JRIkas from Leagle.com.

Tennessee Tractor, LLC, on behalf of itself and the Tennessee
Tractor, LLC Health and Welfare Benefit Plan & Kerry Young, on
behalf of himself and all similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs,
represented by John I. Houseal, Jr. -- jhouseal@glankler.com --
GLANKLER BROWN, PLLC & Don Lester Hearn, Jr. --
dhearn@glankler.com -- GLANKLER BROWN, PLLC.

WH Administrators, Inc., Defendant, represented by James Allison
Holifield, Jr., HOLIFIELD JANICH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC & Ronald
Scott Kravitz -- rkravitz@sfmslaw.com -- SHEPARD FINKELMAN MILLER
& SHAH, LLP.


WHIRLPOOL CORP: "Bodley" Suit Transferred to W.D. Mich.
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted Defendant's Motion to Transfer the case
captioned JAMES BODLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WHIRLPOOL
CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-05436-JST (N.D. Cal.) to
the Western District of Michigan.

This case involves two overlapping prospective class action
lawsuits against Whirlpool: the first-filed case in the Western
District of Michigan and the instant case filed in the Northern
District of California.

In his First Amended Complaint, Burch seeks to represent a
proposed class of nationwide and Virginia consumers who bought
and use Whirlpool residential dishwashers. He alleges that
Whirlpool's dishwashers are defective in that their upper rack
adjusters are made of brittle plastic that routinely break during
normal use.

Roughly nine months after Burch filed his complaint, Plaintiffs
James Bodley and Kyle Matson filed the instant action. The
Plaintiffs seek to represent nationwide and California consumers
who bought a KitchenAid dishwasher or a home with a KitchenAid
dishwasher already installed. They allege that the upper rack
assemblies are defective and fail as the heat generated by the
dishwasher causes the plastic components to become brittle and
break.

District courts have diversity jurisdiction over class action
lawsuits when the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000
exclusive of interest and costs, there are more than 100 members
in the proposed class, and any member of the proposed class is a
citizen of a State different from any defendant.

The first-to-file rule allows a district court to transfer, stay,
or dismiss an action when a similar complaint has already been
filed in another federal court.

The first factor, chronology, weighs in favor of applying the
first-to-file rule because the Burch lawsuit was filed first.
The second factor, similarity of parties, also weighs in favor of
applying the rule. The parties need only be substantially
similar, not identical. Additionally, in assessing the similarity
of parties in a class action, courts compare the classes, not the
class representatives.  The Plaintiffs argue that the parties are
different because Burch seeks to represent owners of any
dishwasher manufactured by Whirlpool while the Plaintiffs in this
case seek to represent owners of KitchenAid dishwashers
manufactured by Whirlpool. The Court also notes that the
Plaintiffs seek to represent a subclass of homebuyers with
KitchenAid dishwashers already installed. While the parties in
the two lawsuits are not identical, they are substantially
similar.
Because these cases satisfy all three factors, the first-to-file
rule applies.

The Court finds that the modest inconvenience to the Plaintiffs
is greatly outweighed by the importance of conservation of
judicial resources and the comprehensive disposition of
litigation.  Accordingly, because the Court finds that the
balance of convenience is neutral or at most only slightly more
favorable to the California forum, it declines to exercise its
discretion to depart from the first to file rule here.

After determining that the first-to-file rule applies, the Court
must decide whether to dismiss, stay, or transfer the case.
District courts have broad discretion in making this decision. A
transfer is the most appropriate option in this case because it
is inefficient and impractical to have two overlapping class
actions proceed individually in two separate courts.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 24, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybl2bqzq from Leagle.com.

James Bodley & Kyle Matson, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by David
Michael Birka-White dbw@birka-white.com -- Birka-White Law
Offices, Mindy Monhai Wong -- mwong@birka-white.com -- Birka-
White Law Offices, N. Scott Carpenter --
scarpenter@cstriallaw.com -- Carpenter & Schumacher, P.C., pro
hac vice & Rebecca Elizabeth Bell-Stanton --
rstanton@cstriallaw.com -- Carpenter & Schumacher, P.C., pro hac
vice.

Whirlpool Corporation, Defendant, represented by Galen Driscoll
Bellamy -- bellamy@wtotrial.com -- Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell LLP,
Eric L. Robertson -- robertson@wtotrial.com -- Wheeler Trigg
O'Donnell LLP, pro hac vice, James M. Hanlon, Jr. --
jhanlon@glynnfinley.com -, Glynn & Finley, LLP & Jonathan A.
Eldredge -- jeldredge@glynnfinley.com -- Glynn & Finley, LLP.


WIDEOPENWEST INC: Faces Class Action Over May 2017 IPO
------------------------------------------------------
RM LAW, P.C. on July 2 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed on behalf of all persons or entities that purchased
WideOpenWest, Inc. ("WideOpenWest" or the "Company") (NYSE: WOW)
publicly traded securities pursuant to the Company's initial
public offering ("IPO") in May 2017.

If you purchased shares of WideOpenWest and would like to learn
more about these claims or if you wish to discuss these matters
and have any questions concerning this announcement or your
rights, contact Richard A. Maniskas, Esquire toll-free at (844)
291-9299.

Between May 25 and May 30, 2017, WideOpenWest conducted its IPO,
offering 320,970,589 shares priced at $17.00 per share, raising
$356 million in gross proceeds.  However, the Company -- who
claimed its Chicago fiber project was a driver of future growth
for the Company -- failed to disclose that it was planning to
sell this valuable project just months after the IPO.  The
Company also failed to disclose that its customer service and
user experience had deteriorated such that WideOpenWest was
losing customers and would be forced to invest additional funds
to curtail the losses.  On March 14, 2018, the Company issued its
financial results for the fourth quarter and fiscal year 2017,
announcing a full year decline in total revenue of approximately
4%, and revealing that WideOpenWest "had not lived up to [its]
long-held reputation of providing exceptional customer
experiences," and that the Company required "investments of
between $20 million and $25 million . . ." In response to these
and other disclosures, WideOpenWest's stock plunged more than 23%
on March 15, 2018, to close nearly 59% below the IPO price.

For more information regarding this, please contact RM LAW, P.C.
(Richard A. Maniskas, Esquire) toll-free at (844) 291-9299 or by
email at rm@maniskas.com   For more information about class
action cases in general or to learn more about RM LAW, P.C.
please visit our website.

RM LAW, P.C. is a national shareholder litigation firm.  RM LAW,
P.C. is devoted to protecting the interests of individual and
institutional investors in shareholder actions in state and
federal courts nationwide. [GN]


* Justice Kennedy's Departure Likely Favorable for Businesses
-------------------------------------------------------------
Lawrence Hurley, writing for Reuters, reports that in a hotly
contested case before the U.S. Supreme Court three years ago,
Justice Anthony Kennedy cast the deciding vote to uphold the
broad scope of race discrimination claims that can be brought
under the Fair Housing Act.

While Justice Kennedy's legal decisions were often friendly to
corporate interests, his rulings -- as in the Fair Housing case -
- sometimes went against them, especially in cases involving
civil rights and environmental regulation.

Now, his impending departure from the court, announced on June
27, has raised hopes among some business interests that his
replacement will be more consistently in their corner.

"Kennedy was not doctrinaire and was sometimes unpredictable.
The outcomes of his decisions weren't consistently pro-business
or consistently anti-business.  He took every case as it came to
him," said John Elwood, a Washington lawyer who previously served
as a law clerk to Kennedy.

Justice Kennedy will be replaced with a justice selected by
President Donald Trump, who has said he will make his choice from
a shortlist of conservative judges.

One area in which that could lead to more business-friendly
decisions is in "disparate impact" litigation, a concept at the
core of the Fair Housing Act fight.

Under the principle, lawsuits can be won when an action has an
outsized negative effect on a specific ethnic, racial, gender or
other group, even if there is no evidence of discriminatory
intent.

The court's jurisprudence is unlikely to change radically on some
other business matters, since Justice Kennedy was generally a
reliable vote for corporate interests on issues such as curbing
class action lawsuits by consumers and employees and endorsing
the increasing use of arbitration agreements.

The disparate impact question, however, could return to the court
in various forms.  There is currently litigation in lower courts,
for example, over whether such claims can be brought against
companies that insure homeowners.

"The banking and insurance industries have set their sights on
attacking the disparate impact standard," said Kristen Clarke,
president of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law.
She urged senators to grill Trump's nominee on the issue during
the Senate confirmation process expected later this summer.

MUDDIED WATERS

Another area where business interests could benefit from
Kennedy's departure is on the scope of federal regulatory
authority over bodies of water.  Construction companies,
including homebuilders, have long sought to limit the
circumstances in which they are required to obtain federal
permits under the Clean Water Act for their projects.

Justice Kennedy wrote a key opinion in a 2006 case in which the
court sought to define the limits of federal jurisdiction in such
matters, but the decision had no clear majority and left the law
unsettled.

Four justices joined an opinion by conservative Justice Antonin
Scalia limiting the circumstances in which the Clean Water Act
applies.  The crucial fifth vote was provided by Justice Kennedy,
but he wrote a separate opinion setting out a less stringent test
than Scalia's.  Because his vote was decisive to the outcome,
most courts have deferred to Justice Kennedy's view.

The issue is still being litigated, and a new justice who agreed
more fully with the other four conservative justices could change
that.

"Should the issue reach the court, Justice Scalia's restrictive
view of Clean Water Act jurisdiction . . . will become the law of
the land," said Andrew Grossman, a lawyer who represents
corporate interests.

Another long-time goal of businesses has been to limit the power
of federal agencies, a sentiment the Trump administration shares.
Although Kennedy had recently suggested his thinking was heading
in that direction, his rulings were mixed, and business groups
hope Trump will appoint a justice who sees the issue as the
administration does.

Court watchers caution, however, that a judge's decisions aren't
always predictable in advance.

"Generally one would think if you have a conservative justice,
probably they would be of like mind but that's not a 100 percent
guarantee," said Pratik Shah, a Washington lawyer who argues
cases at the Supreme Court. [GN]


* Most Retailers Face Title III Litigation Threat
-------------------------------------------------
Edward F. Harold, Esq., of Fisher Phillips, in an article for
Lexology, reports that most retailers have by now faced a Title
III lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
contending that a store is not accessible to disabled
individuals.  There remains a plethora of attorneys who make a
living finding non-compliant facilities and bringing suit to have
the facility brought into compliance -- while, of course, seeking
recovery of their attorneys' fees.  The vast majority of these
cases involve matters that can easily be and are fixed, which
means the stakes and settlements are relatively small. However,
when grouped together, the numbers can add up.

Class Action Complaints: Often Illogical, Always Expensive

Recently, some enterprising plaintiffs' attorneys have come up
with a theory that allows them to seek to bring these claims as a
class action directed at all of a company's locations.  The
theory that is that a company's ADA overall compliance policies
should be scrutinized if they are insufficient to identify,
correct, and prevent barriers to accessibility, justifying class
litigation. They claim the policy itself must be ineffective if
individual Title III violations exist at several locations.

These plaintiffs' attorneys will argue that the ADA requires a
business to maintain an active program of inspecting facilities
and correcting problems as they arise.  For example, a parking
lot can be built to be in compliance with the ADA, but over time,
natural causes can change the slope of the lot to cause it to be
no longer compliant.  Attorneys will contend that the company's
failure to identify these changes and proactively correct them is
an ADA violation.  In fact, as a result of such allegations, a
national restaurant and retail chain was recently forced to
defend a case where the court certified an expansive class of
potential litigants.  The court approved a group of class
plaintiffs to include all persons "with qualified mobility
disabilities who were denied the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or
accommodations" of any store location in the United States on the
basis of disability because such persons encountered
accessibility barriers due to that chain's "failure to comply
with the ADA's accessible parking and path of travel
requirements."

On its face, permitting this lawsuit to proceed seems to
contravene some of the basic principles established in individual
lawsuits.  For example, an individual must typically visit the
location at issue to have standing to bring a lawsuit.  These
class actions, however, are based on investigators hired by the
attorneys or the attorneys themselves visiting many stores and
not on any of the plaintiffs actually visiting all the stores at
issue.

Likewise, since the ADA provides only for injunctive relief and
not for damages, it is hard to understand why a class of
plaintiffs would even be necessary.  While an injunction
requiring a business to come into Title III compliance would
certainly benefit all class members, they do not need to be a
party to a lawsuit to enjoy that reward.  But courts have
nevertheless been ignoring these practical concerns and
certifying national class actions.

This automatically brings with it the need for businesses to do
significant additional legal and administrative work, which
drives up the fees that the attorneys can claim at the end of the
day.  It also allows for the potential cost of compliance with
the lawsuit to go from what is often a few hundred or thousand
dollars to millions.

The settlement agreement filed in the above action shows just how
costly and burdensome these types of actions can be.  To resolve
the case, the national restaurant and retail chain agreed to
create a parking lot ADA compliance assessment form, approved by
the plaintiffs' counsel.  This form will be used to train
facility managers in ADA parking lot compliance assessments and
conduct assessments of parking lots for ADA compliance on a
periodic basis of all its stores nationwide.  It will also be
used by plaintiffs' counsel to monitor these compliance efforts,
and to remediate any parking lots found to be out of compliance.
In addition, it agreed to pay class counsel fees of $830,000.

Conclusion

The contention that the ADA requires a company to adopt a policy
to identify, correct, and prevent accessibility barriers is
controversial.  But the expense of defending class actions based
on the theory has prevented many of the suits from getting to the
point where the issue would be decided by a court.  So it makes
good sense to assess your facility maintenance program to be
ready to defend against a claim.

In the case discussed above, the restaurant and retail chain had
no formal program to monitor ADA compliance of its facilities,
and its facilities inspectors had little in the way of formal
training in ADA compliance.  Considering that the judge writing
the opinion led off his analysis with this information suggests
that the complete absence of such a policy was a significant
factor in the class certification stage.

To avoid the same fate, retailers should first adopt a policy
that states the company intends to comply with Title III of the
ADA.  The policy should then be put into action by incorporating
ADA compliance checklists into the regular work of the
individuals responsible for facility maintenance.  Carrying out
these efforts will not only help defend against a class claim
based on the lack of an effective policy, but hopefully also
correct issues in a way that leads to fewer individual claims.
[GN]


* State Privacy Laws' Unintended Consequences Can Be Far-Reaching
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Castro, writing for Government Technology, reports that
in January, Google launched a new feature in its Google Arts &
Culture app that allowed users to take a selfie and find out
whether their face matched any of those in historical paintings.
The new search tool was nothing more than a momentary amusement
for most people, albeit one that was wildly popular.  However,
people in two states -- Texas and Illinois -- were left out of
the fun because of state privacy laws restricting the use of
facial recognition technology.  Unfortunately, laws like these
may ultimately cost consumers and businesses much more than just
access to the latest trending apps.

Biometrics -- quantifiable measurements about a person's physical
or behavioral characteristics, such as how someone looks, speaks
or walks -- are useful for many different types of applications.
For example, they are used to increase efficiency, such as by
automatically identifying individuals, and to increase security,
such as by adding an additional layer of verification to a multi-
factor authentication system. One company has even pioneered a
wearable device that provides a new type of "always on"
biometric, allowing users to authenticate themselves by their
unique heartbeat.

Unfortunately, some privacy activists have vigorously opposed the
growing ubiquity of biometrics since its earliest days.  This
opposition has led to the passage of laws like the Biometric
Information Privacy Act (BIPA), the state law that kept
Illinoisans out of the recent Google app.  This law, which was
the first of its kind when the state passed it in 2008, requires
companies to obtain prior written consent from individuals before
using biometrics, as well as to provide written notification
detailing the specifics of how they will collect, use and store
that information.

Drawing Outside the District Lines
Now a decade old, the law shows the unintended consequences of
heavy-handed privacy regulations. Originally, proponents of the
law were concerned about widespread identity theft and government
surveillance.  While these problems have not materialized in any
state, BIPA has become a roadblock to even some rudimentary uses
of biometrics in Illinois.

One problem is that even minor violations of the law can subject
companies to steep penalties of up to $5,000 per infraction, even
if there is no actual consumer harm.  And since BIPA allows
individuals to file private lawsuits for violations, it has
opened the door to more than 30 class-action lawsuits against
companies operating in Illinois in 2017 alone.

A number of tech companies have faced significant class-action
lawsuits for potential violations.  Facebook, for example, faces
massive potential fines because of a feature on the social
network that used facial recognition technology to automatically
tag photos of friends.  Shutterfly, a popular online photo
publishing service, has already settled a BIPA class-action
lawsuit for an undisclosed amount.  The problem for these
companies is that obtaining prior consent is impractical for
certain applications, such as analyzing photos uploaded by users.

But it is not just tech companies who are caught in the
crosshairs of this law.  Many businesses are running afoul of the
notification requirements as well.  For example, some companies
are upgrading their antiquated time and attendance systems to
improve their employees' work hours and replacing them with more
advanced biometric systems.  These biometric systems avoid
problems such as "buddy punching" where one employee clocks in or
out for their absent coworker.  But implementing these systems
successfully under BIPA has proven difficult, and a number of
companies in Illinois now face lawsuits for using these time
clocks for their employees.

While state privacy laws are often well-intentioned, as BIPA
shows, their unintended consequences can be far-reaching.  The
Illinois legislator who originally introduced BIPA has tried to
amend the law because he says he never intended to restrict many
of these activities, but fixing legislation is never easy.
Surprisingly, a number of states are considering copycat
legislation that would similarly limit biometrics.  This would be
a mistake.  Rather than imposing new restrictions on biometrics,
states would better serve local residents and businesses by
encouraging greater use of this technology to increase
productivity and improve security. [GN]


* Supreme Court Empowers Corporations Over Individuals
------------------------------------------------------
Richard North Patterson, writing for Boston Globe, reports that
Justice Kennedy's resignation will worsen a Supreme Court already
in thrall to the right.  In rapid succession, a 5-4 conservative
majority on the Supreme Court has upheld Trump's Muslim ban and
curbed the political power of labor unions.  But among its less-
noted malignancies is empowering corporations over individuals.
The latest victims are employees whose rights are dependent on
class-action lawsuits.

The stakes are seismic.  Class actions are brought by individual
plaintiffs on behalf of a much larger group of people allegedly
damaged by the same wrong, inflicted by the same defendant.  They
are indispensable to people of modest means whose injury is
significant to them but who, as individuals, cannot afford to sue
a well-funded corporation.

Banishing class actions tops the corporate legal agenda.
Corporations loathe the expense of defending them, and fear the
prospect of large verdicts compensating thousands of individuals
for the same dereliction.  Their goal is simple: compelling the
individual victims of alleged wrongdoing to battle corporations
alone. [GN]


* TCPA Filings Down 17.7% to 1,696 Cases in May 2018
----------------------------------------------------
Eric J. Troutman, writing for TCPAland, reports that TCPA filings
are down significantly YTD for the second year in a row. So why
doesn't it feel that way? Read on to learn our theory below.

First, the numbers. According to data available from
Webrecon.com-which notably departs quite a bit from our daily
counts --  TCPA filings through the end of May, 2018 are down a
whopping 17.7% with 1,696 cases filed so far this year compared
to 2,062 cases through May 2017.  That sounds pretty good.

Zooming in on May, 2018 alone, however, matters are even more
stark with filings at 410 cases, down 19% from May, 2017 when
there were 506 cases filed.  Wow, that sounds like real relief.

But wait a second.  For some reason class action TCPA filings are
not declining at the same pace.  Indeed, TCPA class action
filings are actually up this year over last.  There were 113 TCPA
class actions filed in May, 2018 compared to only 68 class
actions in May, 2017-that's a huge 66% increase from May last
year.

Looking at a single month of filings isn't necessarily
informative of the overall picture, so let's zoom out a bit.
Looking at 2018 YTD vs 2017 YTD we still see a meaningful
INCREASE in TCPA class action filings -- 390 class actions have
been filed YTD 2018 compared to 364 through May, 2017.  That is
an increase of 7% over last year. Zooming out even further, we
see that TCPA class action filings through May have been pretty
steady over the last 3 years after exploding following the FCC's
TCPA Omnibus ruling in July, 2015:

What do we make of these numbers? Well obviously the large
increase in class action filings from 2015 to 2016 is due to the
FCC's TCPA Omnibus ruling.

But what about the large decrease in individual TCPA filings this
year vs. the stable or increasing number of class actions?

While the prevailing theory is that filings are lower owing to
uncertainty following ACA, Int'l and perhaps even a sense that
the TCPA is going out of vogue that doesn't explain why class
action filings would increase while individual filings are
decreasing.  Indeed, if that theory were true we'd expect to see
a bigger reduction in class filings since they require more
investment and resources and would, therefore, be less appealing
to consumer counsel in an era of increasing uncertainty or blase.

The fact that class action filings are increasing while
individual filings are decreasing suggests that something else is
likely at work here -- efficiency.  Owing to the increasing
experience of practitioners on both sides of the "v" large number
of TCPA claims are now being resolved via pre-suit demand
letters.  Plus most consumer lawyers have given up fighting
arbitration in these cases-although Gamble may change that-
resulting in a large number of arbitrations being directly
initiated in AAA rather than starting out in federal court as
would have occurred in years past.  These two phenomenon-coupled
with the successful efforts of this firm and others in
challenging manufactured lawsuits and scam app manufacturers-
likely account for the steady decline in individual federal court
TCPA filings over the last two years.  Yet class actions can not
be resolved via informal demand letter (usually) and will never
be directly initiated in AAA.  So those numbers increase while
overall individual filings decrease.  But the total number of
TCPA claims being pursued-whether through informal demand
letters, arbitration, or federal court-is likely higher today
than ever before. Viola!-the mystery is solved. Maybe.

Whatever is behind the "decline" in TCPA filings, however, the
TCPA class action -- and its threat of billions in potential
exposure against American businesses doing nothing more than
contacting their customers -- certainly remains alive and well.
Blame the Godfather. [GN]


* Truck Purchasers in UK Seek to Certify First Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Charley Connor, writing for Global Competition Review, reports
that truck purchasers are seeking to certify the first class
action in the UK's Competition Appeal Tribunal, in an attempt to
claim damages following on from the European Commission's 2016
truck cartel decision. [GN]







                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marion Alcestis A. Castillon, Jessenius Pulido, Noemi Irene A.
Adala, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche
Maricon Castillon-Lopez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Christopher G.
Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1525-2272.

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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
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