CAR_Public/180724.mbx              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, July 24, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 147

                            Headlines

2898 BAGEL: "Cazares" Suit Alleges FLSA and NYLL Violations
AARGON COLLECTION: Ramos Sues over Debt Collection Practices
AARP INC: Court Enters Protective Order in "Friedman" Suit
AFFILIATED MONITORING: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Hidenrick Says
AIR METHODS: "Cox" Stayed Pending "Scarlett" Dismissal Bid Ruling

ALLSTATE INSURANCE: $6.5MM Settlement in "Etter" Has Prelim OK
AMERICAN HOME: 6th Cir. Affirms Freeze of Chesley Assets
AUDIBLE INC: "McKee" Case Transferred to North Carolina
AUTO SHOWCASE: Md. Spec. App. Affirms "Hewitt" Arbitration Ruling
BAY AREA TOLL: Faces "Montgomery" Suit in California Super. Ct.

BAYER HEALTHCARE: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss "Curran" Suit
BEHR PROCESS: "Rose" Stayed Pending "Bishop" Deal Bid Approval
BP WEST: Or. App. Affirms $409M in Statutory Damages in UTPA Suit
BRAKE MASTERS: Faces "Durgin" Suit in Sacramento California
BRITISH AIRWAYS: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Blengino Suit Says

CASTLEROM HOLDING: Plaintiffs Directed to Turn Over Lab Reports
CHARMING CHARLIE: Removes "Brinkman" Suit to E.D. Louisiana
CHSPSC LLC: "Mounce" ADTPA Suit Settlement Has Prelim Approval
CITIZENS INC: Court Dismisses "Gamboa" Suit
CONVERGYS CORPORATION: "Abner" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation

CREDIT CONTROL: Aronne Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections
CREDIT CONTROL: Kendrick Sues over Debt Collection Practices
CROWDERGULF LLC: Bil-Jim Defendants in "Palmisano" Suit Dismissed
CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD: Doesn't Pay OT to Appraisers, Setz Says
DEVILLE ASSET: "Begay" Suit Alleges FDCPA Violation

DOORDASH INC: "Ontiveros" Suit Alleges Violation of FCRA
DR. PEPPER SNAPPLE: Fisher Sues over Ginger Ale Label
ECO CHIC LLC: Faces "Olsen" Suit in E.D. New York
ENAGIC USA: Has Made Solicited Calls, "Higgins" Suit Alleges
ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Court Dismisses Direct Billing Suit

EQUINOR TEXAS: Faces "Gillespie" Suit in S.D. Texas
EQUITY RESIDENTIAL: Faces "Fischler" Suit in E.D. New York
EXPERIAN INFORMATION: 9th Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in "Shaw"
EXPERIAN INFO: Espinoza Bid to Subpoena LexisNexis Underway
FACEBOOK INC: Bid to Stay Biometric Info Privacy Suit Denied

FAIRMOUNT SANTROL: Fitzgibbon Sues Over Unimin Merger Deal
FEDERAL EMERGENCY: Asencio Sues over Temporary Housing Programs
FINANCIAL ASSET: Faces "Morgan" Suit in D. New Jersey
FIRST CREDIT SERVICES: Gigiolia Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections
FORBES ASSOCIATES: Faces "Bieler" Suit in M.D. Tennessee

GEICO INSURANCE: Johnson Sues Over Insurance Benefit Reduction
GENERATIONS FEDERAL: 4th Cir. Affirms Sanctions Against Attorneys
GLOBAL CREDIT: Young Sues over Debt Collection Practices
GOLUB CORPORATION: "Austin" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
GREEN APPLE: Faces "Martinez" Suit in S.D. New York

GREYSTAR REAL: Faces "Fischler" Suit in E.D. New York
GROSS POLOWY: "Bayer" Suit Seeks Damages under FDCPA
HOME DEPOT: Court Narrows Claims in Mahogany Board Fraud Suit
HUMAN CARE LLC: Removes "Tokhtaman" Suit to S.D. New York
HYUNDAI MOTOR: "Brown" Suit Alleges Warranty Violations

INTEL CORP: PC Users Sue Over Processor Defect
INTEL CORP: 2 Securities Fraud Suits Consolidated
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: "Bishop" Suit Alleges ADA Violation
INTERNATIONAL PAPER: Court Narrows Claims in "Arroyo" Suit
JEFFERSON CAPITAL: Faces "Autry" Suit in E.D. Wisconsin

KANONI INC: Faces "Tiquiram" Suit in E.D. New York
KRS BIOTECHNOLOGY: Class Certification in "Sawyer" Denied
LAUNDRY LAND: Escobar Sues Over Unpaid OT, Spread-of-Hours Pay
MACFARLANE GROUP: Faces Williams-Stermel Suit in E.D. Pa.
MATRIX TRUST: Youngblood and Steinbach Sue over Retirement Plans

MDL 1446: Petition for Certiorari Filed in Giancarlo Suit
MDL 2418: Court Dismisses SAC of Qui Tam Plaintiff
METHODIST HOSPITALS: Discrimination Suit Class Cert. Bid Tossed
MILGARD MANUFACTURING: Faces "Bowen" Suit over Defective Windows
MONETA ENTERPRISES: Faces State Auto's Suit in S.D. Illinois

MONTGOMERY COUNTY, NY: Court Partly Allows "Hill" Suit Amendment
N.Y. TILE CORPORATION: Underpays Finishers, "Bucsit" Suit Claims
NATIONAL RIFLE: Bid to Compel Reply to RFPs in "Kalmbach" Denied
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Rakestraw Alleges Violation of RESPA
NATIONWIDE CREDIT: Gross Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections

NELSEN & FEITELSON: Simmons Sues over Debt Collection Practices
NEW YORK: COBA's Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
NISSAN NORTH AMERICA: Faces "Norman" Suit over Defective Parts
NORTH JERSEY PROPERTY: Bautista Sues Over Denied Breaks, OT Pay
NORTON OUTDOOR: Removes Shipps' Suit to S.D. Ohio

OHANA MILITARY: Court Narrows Claims in "Lake"
PETORE ASSOCIATES: Faces CCC Custom Carpentry's Suit in New York
PNC BANK: Underpays Loan Mortgage Officers, Kazi Suit Says
POPEYES LOUISIANA: "Edge" Suit Seeks Damages under FLSA
RANGER ENERGY: Doesn't Pay OT to Operators, Bryant Alleges

RAY KLEIN: "Antoine" Suit Alleges FDCPA Violations
RECCO HOME CARE: Underpays Home Health Aide, "Liranzo" Suit Says
RMB INC: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss "Kowaleski" FDCPA Suit
ROADRUNNER INTERMODAL: $9.25MM "Singh" Settlement Has Prelim OK
ROANOKE, VA: Policemen File Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages

ROOFRX INC: Doesn't Pay Wages to Rooferes, "Gorman" Suit Claims
RUSSELL P. GOLDMAN: Court Certifies Class in "Carney" FDCA Suit
SLACK TECHNOLOGIES: "D'Ottavio" Sues Over Unsolicited SMS Ads
SPEEDWAY LLC: Court Denies Certification Bid in "Teggerdine"
SPEEDWAY LLC: "Howe" BIPA Suit Remanded to Ill. State Court

STANLEY STEEMER: "Arensdorff" Remanded to Los Angeles Super. Ct.
STEPHEN EINSTEIN: Powlett Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections
STEWARD HEALTH: "Adkins" Suit Alleges ADA Violation
STREAM ENERGY: "Basile" Settlement Has Prelim Court Approval
SUEZ WATER: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, "Rivera" Suit Alleges

SZNW HOSPITALITY: Underpays Room Attendants, "Molina" Suit Says
THOM BROWNE: Faces "Olsen" Suit in S.D. New York
TREESAP FARM: Faces "Aguilar" Suit in Sacramento California
U.S. EXPRESS ENTERPRISES: Underpays Truck Drivers, Nunez Claims
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Antitrust Claims in "MacCausland" Dismissed

UNITED ROAD: "Taylor" Suit Remanded to Kern County Superior Court
UNITED SATES: HHS Secretary Faces Suit in C.D. California
UNITED STATES: Bid to Monitor Review in "Pigford" Denied
UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER: D'Amore Sues Over Fund Mismanagement
VITAMIN SHOPPE: Ct. Strikes Nationwide Class Claims in "Walters"

VMOC LLC: "Fernandes" Labor Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime
WALGREEN CO: Removes "Ramirez" Suit to N.D. California
WASHINGTON AND JANE: Court Narrows Claims in "Dixon" Suit
WESTERN REFINING: Removes "Dilworth" Suit to C.D. California
WIDEOPENWEST INC: Faces "Kirkland" Suit over IPO Disclosures

WILLIAMS-SONOMA INC: Cal. App. Affirms Dismissal of "Shine" Suit
XPO LOGISTICS: $7MM Deal in "Leung" TCPA Suit Has Final Approval
YONKERS, NY: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss "Fumarelli" Suit
ZODIAC US: $952K "Cuzick" Settlement Has Partial Final Approval


                            *********


2898 BAGEL: "Cazares" Suit Alleges FLSA and NYLL Violations
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ascencion Cazares, Benjamin F. Delacruz, Fanny Jisselle Lizardo
Fabre, Gabino Romano Hernandez, Hermenejildo Angel Prudente, Idor
Jean Luckner, Jose Cedano, Jose G. Reyes, Luis Alberto Salas
Umana, Wendy Patricia Damas, Poco J. Ouedraogo, and Susana E.
Robles Martinez, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. 2898 Bagel & Bakery Corp. dba Nussbaum & Wu, Sholomo
Nussbaum and Natalie Doe, Case No. 1:18-cv-05953 (S.D. N.Y., June
30, 2018), is brought against the Defendants for violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendants. The Plaintiffs
were employed as sandwich makers, smoothie makers, delivery
workers, cooks, cook assistants, and cashiers at the bagel shop
located at 2897 Broadway, New York, New York 10025.

The Defendants owned, operated, or controlled a bagel shop,
located at 2897 Broadway, New York, New York 10025 under the name
"Nussbaum & Wu". [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Michael Faillace, Esq.
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Tel: (212) 317-1200
      Fax: (212) 317-1620


AARGON COLLECTION: Ramos Sues over Debt Collection Practices
------------------------------------------------------------
Chanele Ramos, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Aargon Collection Agency, Defendant, Case
No. 3:18-cv-01157-PK (D. Or., June 29, 2018) seeks to stop the
Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt.
The case is assigned to Magistrate Judge Paul Papak.

Established in 1996, Aargon Agency Inc., has become a national
leader in debt recovery with vast experience providing collection
services to major utility companies and healthcare providers
nationwide. The Company is a nationally licensed debt collection
agency headquartered in Las Vegas, Nevada with four offices in
Hawaii, Colorado, Florida and Missouri. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bret A. Knewtson, Esq.
          3000 N.E. Stucki Ave., Suite 230 M
          Hillsboro, OR 97124
          Telephone: (503) 846-1160
          Facsimile: (503) 922-3181
          E-mail: bknewtson@yahoo.com


AARP INC: Court Enters Protective Order in "Friedman" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Paul l. Abrams of the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California, Western Division, entered the
parties' Stipulated Protective Order in the case, JERALD
FRIEDMAN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, v. AARP, INC., AARP SERVICES INC., AARP
INSURANCE PLAN, UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, INC. and UNITEDHEALTHCARE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants, Case No. 2:14-cv-00034-DDP-PLAx
(C.D. Cal.).

A full-text copy of the Court's May 30, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/0I9F3S from Leagle.com.

Jerald Friedman, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Collins
-- chrisc@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP,
Frank J. Janecek, Jr. -- frankj@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman and Dowd LLP, Michael F. Ghozland --
Michael@ghozlandlawfirm.com -- Ghozland Law Firm, Sean Kennedy
Collins -- sean@neinsurancelaw.com -- Sean K. Collins, Attorney
at Law, Christopher C. Gold -- cgold@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Dorothy P. Antullis --
dantullis@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, pro
hac vice, Mark J. Dearman -- mdearman@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, pro hac vice & Stuart A. Davidson --
SDavidson@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, pro
hac vice.

AARP Inc, AARP Services Inc & AARP Insurance Plan, Defendants,
represented by John W. Amberg -- jwamberg@bclplaw.com -- Bryan
Cave LLP, Alec W. Farr -- awfarr@bclplaw.com -- Bryan Cave LLP,
pro hac vice, Darci F. Madden -- dfMadden@bclplaw.com -- Bryan
Cave LLP, pro hac vice, Gregory J. Sachnik --
gregory.sachnik@bclplaw.com -- Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP,
pro hac vice, Heather S. Goldman -- heather.goldman@bclplaw.com -
- Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey S.
Russell -- jsrussell@bclplaw.com -- Bryan Cave LLP, pro hac vice
& Sarah Beth Burwick -- sarah.burwick@bclplaw.com -- Bryan Cave
Leighton Paisner LLP.

UnitedHealthGroup Inc & UnitedHealthCare Insurance Company,
Defendants, represented by Brian David Boyle -- bboyle@omm.com --
O'Melveny and Myers LLP & Meaghan VerGow -- mvergow@omm.com --
O'Melveny and Myers LLP, pro hac vice.


AFFILIATED MONITORING: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Hidenrick Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SANDRA HIDENRICK, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. AFFILIATED MONITORING, INC., and
LIFESTATION, INC., Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-11214-ES-MAH
(D.N.J., July 1, 2018) seeks to stop the Defendants' practice of
using an automatic telephone dialing system to place calls to the
cellular telephone numbers of the Plaintiff and the consumers
nationwide without their prior express written consent.

Affiliated Monitoring, Inc. is a New York corporation
headquartered in Union, NJ. The Company conducts business
throughout the State of New Jersey, and the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stefan Coleman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF STEFAN COLEMAN, P.A.
          1072 Madison Ave. Suite 1
          Lakewood, NJ 08701
          Telephone: (877) 333-9427
          Facsimile: (888) 498-8946
          E-mail: law@stefancoleman.com

               - and -

          Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          400 NW 26 th Street
          Miami, FL 33127
          Telephone: (305) 469-5881
          E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com


AIR METHODS: "Cox" Stayed Pending "Scarlett" Dismissal Bid Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL AND TABITHA COX, individually and on behalf
of their minor child, W.C., Plaintiffs, v. AIR METHODS
CORPORATION and ROCKY MOUNTAIN HOLDINGS, LLC, Defendants, Civil
Action No. 1:17-04610 (S.D. W.V.), Judge David A. Faber of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia,
Bluefield, denied the Plaintiffs' motion to remand and stayed the
matter pending the dispositive motion to dismiss currently before
the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado in Scarlett
v. Air Methods Corporation, et al.

On Aug. 18, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a putative class action
against the Defendants.  The Defendants provide air ambulance
services in West Virginia and other states.  The Plaintiffs'
child W.C. was hospitalized at Princeton Community Hospital in
Princeton, West Virginia and required air transportation to CAMC
Women's and Children's Hospital in Charleston, West Virginia.
The Defendants transported W.C. the necessary 76 rotor miles.  No
written contract or verbal agreement memorialized these services.

The Plaintiffs received a bill for $52,634.76 from the
Defendants.  The Plaintiffs' insurer, West Virginia Public
Employee Insurance Agency ("PEIA") paid Defendants $6,704.14.
PEIA also concluded that plaintiffs would be responsible to pay
$586.79.  Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs received a bill from
Defendants for $45,930.62, the amount unpaid by PEIA.

When the Defendants requested additional payment from PEIA, the
insurer refused, stating in a May 6, 2016 letter that the
additional $45,930.62 is clearly excessive.  These excessive
charges form the foundation for the Plaintiffs' claims: that the
Defendants' actions constitute a breach of West Virginia implied
contract law.

The Plaintiffs' claims are on behalf of themselves and other
similarly situated West Virginians who have used the Defendants'
transportation services.

The Plaintiffs define the proposed class as all patients who,
without entering a written agreement with Defendants for medical
transport prior to the transport, received medical transport by
Defendants from a location in West Virginia to a healthcare
facility during the period of five years prior to the
commencement of the action.  The Complaint alleges upon
information, the proposed class would include hundreds, if not
thousands of class members."

The action seeks damages for any overpayments collected by the
Defendants.  In the alternative, the Plaintiffs request that the
Court enjoin the Defendants from charging and collecting
unreasonable rates.

The Plaintiffs originally filed their action in the Circuit Court
of Mercer County, West Virginia.  The Defendants removed the
action to federal court on Dec. 22, 2017, citing the removal
requirements under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA")
and traditional diversity jurisdiction.

Soon thereafter, the Defendants filed a Motion to Transfer or
Stay, seeking to either transfer the action to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Colorado or stay the action until that
court makes a ruling on a pending motion to dismiss.

On Jan. 22, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the
action to the Circuit Court of Mercer County.  On the same date,
they filed the operative Amended Motion to Remand.  The
Plaintiffs' amended motion to remand claims the Defendants have
offered insufficient evidence to establish that the action meets
CAFA's jurisdictional threshold of at least 100 class members and
$5 million amount in controversy.

Judge Faber disagrees.  While the Court is prone to believe that
the Defendants' notice of removal meets its obligation under
Dart, he finds that the Defendants' Response removes all doubt.
The Response attaches the affidavit of Paul Webster, Vice
President of Policy and Health Economics for Air Methods.  The
Webster affidavit asserts in the previous five years from the
Aug. 18, 2017 date of suit, the Defendants have provided
emergency ambulance transport from locations in West Virginia to
healthcare facilities for more than 1,600 patients without
entering in a written agreement for the transport.  The total
charged for these 1,600 transportations exceeds $70 million.

The Webster affidavit puts to rest any question as to whether the
Plaintiffs' defined class meets the numerosity and amount in
controversy thresholds of CAFA.  While the Plaintiffs could argue
that the affidavit is over-inclusive as to the amount in
controversy (they do not), $70 million far surpasses $5 million.
Accordingly, he concludes that the Defendants' removal is proper
under CAFA, and the Plaintiffs' motion to remand will be denied.

The Judge also finds that a review of the Plaintiffs' factual and
legal claims demonstrates that not only is there substantial
overlap between the issues and claims in this action and the
Colorado Action but that each complaint is almost a verbatim
recitation.  The only difference involves who is included in the
different proposed classes.

The Plaintiffs argue (as did the Plaintiffs in the Ohio Action),
that sufficient similarity does not exist because their claims
rely on the implied contract law of West Virginia.  The Judge
finds little merit in this assertion because the legal issues and
underlying factual claims are exactly the same.  Accordingly, he
finds that each factor favors the Defendants and that the first-
to-file rule is applicable.

Akin to the Ohio Action, the Judge finds that a temporary stay,
rather than transfer or dismissal, is appropriate.  While
duplicitous briefing on the issue of federal law would prove
unnecessary and could result in a lack of uniformity if the
Plaintiffs survive this challenge, the case is grounded in West
Virginia contract law and would require the testimony of West
Virginia witnesses.  Accordingly, the Judge believes that the
proper disposition for this case is to defer to the Colorado
Action and proceed after a ruling on the motion to dismiss
pending in Colorado.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Faber denied the Plaintiffs'
Amended Motion to Remand, and granted the Defendants' motion to
transfer or stay as to their motion to stay and denied as to
their motion to transfer.  The parties will file a joint status
report regarding the status of the Colorado Action within 60 days
of the entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order and will do so
every 60 days thereafter.  The Clerk is further directed to send
a copy of the Memorandum Opinion and Order to all counsel of
record.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 30, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/7iomvx from Leagle.com.

Michael Cox, Tabitha Cox, individually and on behalf of their
minor child, & W. C., Plaintiffs, represented by Eric J. Buckner,
KATZ KANTOR & PERKINS, James G. Bordas, Jr., BORDAS & BORDAS &
Jason E. Causey, BORDAS & BORDAS.

Air Methods Corporation & Rocky Mountain Holdings LLC,
Defendants, represented by Clifford F. Kinney, Jr. --
ckinney@spilmanlaw.com --  SPILMAN THOMAS & BATTLE, Joseph V.
Schaeffer -- jschaeffer@spilmanlaw.com -- SPILMAN THOMAS & BATTLE
& Michael A. Cottone -- michael.cottone@bassberry.com -- BASS
BERRY & SIMS.


ALLSTATE INSURANCE: $6.5MM Settlement in "Etter" Has Prelim OK
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN C. ETTER, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE
COMPANY, et al., Defendant, Case No. C 17-00184 WHA (N.D. Cal.),
Judge William Alsup of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted the Plaintiff's motion for
preliminary approval of a proposed settlement agreement.

This is a class action by Etter against Defendants Allstate
Insurance, Allstate Indemnity Co., Allstate Property and Casualty
Insurance Co., Allstate Northbrook Indemnity Co., Allstate
Insurance Co. of California, and Louis Odiase, an Allstate
insurance agent.  Etter asserted a single claim for violation of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, as amended by the
Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, based on allegations that the
Defendants sent a single unsolicited facsimile advertisement to
Etter on Oct. 11, 2016, without his prior invitation or
permission and without the legally-required opt-out notice
language. Odiase works as an independent contractor for Allstate
and sent fax advertisements using fax broadcasters.

On Dec. 26, 2017, the Court certified the following class
relating to the Oct. 11, 2016 fax (Dkt. No. 73):

     Class B: All persons or entities successfully sent a
facsimile on or about Oct. 11, 2016, stating, potentially save
40-60% off your Commercial auto insurance, fill out the form
below and FAX YOUR REQUEST TO: 510-234-0518, TEL 510-234-0516, OR
EMAIL: A026315@ALLSTATE.COM, and If you wish to be removed from
our Fax list, please call 888-828-3086.

The Plaintiff has now filed an unopposed motion for preliminary
approval of a proposed class settlement.

The proposed settlement agreement establishes a gross settlement
fund of $6,533,250.  The Lead counsel intend to seek up to 30% of
the gross settlement fund ($1,959,975) for attorney's fees plus
reasonable out-of-pocket expenses, as well as an incentive award
of $7,500 for the lead Plaintiff -- all to be paid, to the extent
approved, from the gross settlement fund .  Additionally, the
requested third-party settlement administrator estimates
administrative costs will amount to $52,940, which would also be
paid from the gross settlement fund.  The net settlement fund
remaining after these deductions (where one-half of the fee award
will be paid only at the wrap-up of the fund administration) will
then be distributed on a pro rata basis to class members, who
will each receive a check in the mail.

Any balance remaining after the initial distribution will be
redistributed to other class members on a pro rata basis.  If the
amount is less than $10 per class member, however, and thus not
economically feasible to redistribute, the remainder will be paid
as cy pres award to either the National Consumer Law Center (the
Plaintiff's preference) or the Consumer Federation of America
(the Defendants' preference), whichever non-profit organization
the Court approves of.

Under the proposed settlement agreement, the Plaintiff will
recover a settlement fund based on gross recovery of $375 per
fax, with each class member receiving their pro rata share.
Since TCPA provides for statutory damages at $500 per fax (or
recovery of the actual monetary loss, whichever is greater), the
Plaintiff's gross recovery represents 75% of the best possible
outcome the class could have obtained through litigation.

Judge Alsup granted the Plaintiff's unopposed motion for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement.  He
appointed the Class-settlement.com as the settlement
administrator.  The Court will retain jurisdiction over the
litigation and the parties until Dec. 31, 2019.

By June 6, 2018 at noon, the Judge directed the counsel to
resubmit the proposed notice for Court approval with the
following modifications.  First, the proposed notice must
include, plainly and conspicuously, the estimated amount of
attorney's fees, expenses, and incentive award class counsel
expect to request.  The estimated amount must be expressed as
both a percentage and dollar amount.  Second, in addition to
making clear how the requested attorney's fees, expenses,
incentive award, and administration costs will impact the
settlement fund, the notice must provide clear estimates (also
expressed in dollar amounts) of the net amounts that will be
ultimately distributed to class members.  All of the foregoing
must be explained in plain English in the notice.  The notice
should also state in Spanish that a Spanish-language version of
the notice is available at class counsel's website.  Both sides
will agree on the form of translation.

If the counsel submits a revised version of the proposed notice
with the foregoing revisions by May 31, 2018 at 5:00 p.m., then
the undersigned judge will try to respond by the following day.
In all events, the counsel will submit, along with the proposed
notice, a revised proposed timeline for administering the
settlement that takes into account the delay in obtaining Court
approval for said notice.

The Judge vacated the final pretrial conference and trial dates,
as well as other pending deadlines in the action, and will be
reset if final approval is not granted.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 30, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/1GptIM from Leagle.com.

John C. Etter, individually and as the representative of a class
of similarly-situated persons, Plaintiff, represented by Brian
John Wanca -- bwanca@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson Wanca, pro hac
vice, Willem F. Jonckheer -- wjonckheer@schubertlawfirm.com --
Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP, Robert C. Schubert --
rschubert@schubertlawfirm.com -- Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP &
Ryan Michael Kelly -- rkelley@andersonwanca.com -- Anderson
Wanca, pro hac vice.

Allstate Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Vickie E.
Turner -- vturner@wilsonturnerkosmo.com -- Wilson Turner Kosmo
LLP, Daniel Lee Delnero -- DELNERODBALLARDSPAHR.COM -- Ballard
Spahr LLP, pro hac vice, Kirsten F. Gallacher --
KGallacher@wilsonturnerkosmo.com -- Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP,
Kirsten F. Gallacher -- KGallacher@wilsonturnerkosmo.com --
Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP, Meryl Colle Maneker --
mmaneker@wilsonturnerkosmo.com -- Wilson Turner Kosmo & Robert
Kenneth Dixon, Wilson Turner Kosmo.& Robert Kenneth Dixon --
rdixon@wilsonturnerkosmo.com -- Wilson Turner Kosmo.

Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company, Defendant,
represented by Vickie E. Turner, Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP, Daniel
Lee Delnero, Ballard Spahr LLP, pro hac vice, Kirsten F.
Gallacher, Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP, Meryl Colle Maneker, Wilson
Turner Kosmo & Robert Kenneth Dixon, Wilson Turner Kosmo.

Allstate Northbrook Indemnity Company, Allstate Insurance Company
of California & Allstate Indemnity Company, Defendants,
represented by Vickie E. Turner, Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP, Daniel
Lee Delnero, Ballard Spahr LLP, pro hac vice, Kirsten F.
Gallacher, Wilson Turner Kosmo LLP, Meryl Colle Maneker, Wilson
Turner Kosmo & Robert Kenneth Dixon, Wilson Turner Kosmo.

Louis Odaise, Defendant, represented by Elizabeth Williams, Esq.
-- ewilliams@kdvlaw.com -- Kaufman, Dolowich Voluck & Gonzo, John
D. Dalton -- jdalton@kdvlaw.com -- Kaufman Dolowich and Voluck,
LLP, Ian Edward Anderson -- ianderson@kdvlaw.com -- Kaufman
Dolowich Voluck, Richard Bradford Wilbur, Williams Pinelli et al
LLP & Sinjan Bose -- sbose@kdvlaw.com -- Kaufman, Dolowich and
Voluck, LLP.


AMERICAN HOME: 6th Cir. Affirms Freeze of Chesley Assets
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, affirmed the
District Court's judgment granting Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction in the case captioned CONNIE MCGIRR, et
al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THOMAS F. REHME; WAITE, SCHNEIDER,
BAYLESS & CHESLEY CO., L.P.A., Defendants-Appellants. No. 17-
3519. (6th Cir.)

In 1998, three now-disbarred attorneys named Gallion, Cunningham,
and Mills gathered a class of plaintiffs to sue American Home
Products, manufacturer of the popular diet drug
fenfluramine/phentermine (or "fen-phen"), for injuries sustained
as a result of the drug's side effects.  Stanley Chesley, seeing
the profit-wielding potential of such a lawsuit, started his own
class action against American Home Products.  He then convinced
the other attorneys to merge their case with his.  That case
moved forward under the caption of Darla Guard, et al. v. A.H.
Robins Company et al., No. 98-CI-795 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1998) (the
"Guard case").

In 2001, the parties negotiated a settlement for over $200
million and the case was dismissed, all unbeknownst to and
without the approval of the class-action plaintiffs.  American
Home Products left it to Chesley and the other lawyers to divvy
up the settlement among the class members as they saw fit.

Once the scheme became clear to the class plaintiffs, they filed
another lawsuit -- this time against their lawyers. In December
2004, they brought suit alleging misconduct and mismanagement of
the Guard case funds. The lawsuit, styled Abbott v. Chesley, was
brought in the Boone County Circuit Court in Kentucky. In March
2006, that court granted summary judgment against Chesley's
accomplices, but not yet against Chesley. It then entered a $42
million judgment against those lawyers on August 1, 2007,
representing the amount that the plaintiffs had been deprived of.

Meanwhile, the Kentucky Bar Association investigated Chesley for
his role in the Guard case settlement. That investigation led the
Kentucky Bar to issue a complaint against Chesley, which was then
presented to a state Trial Commissioner. The Commissioner held
that Chesley had violated eight separate rules of professional
conduct and recommended his permanent disbarment. In June 2011,
the Board of Governors unanimously agreed, and in 2013 the
Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed that decision.

Chesley was required to report his Kentucky disbarment to the
Ohio Bar Association too, which would likely impose reciprocal
discipline and disbar him from Ohio.  Instead, Chesley retired
from practicing law in Ohio on April 16, 2013.

At the time of his disbarment and subsequent retirement, Chesley
was the sole shareholder of an Ohio-based law firm, Waite,
Schneider, Bayless, & Chesley, L.P.A. ("WSBC"). Trouble was, in
Ohio, Chesley could no longer own and operate a law firm because
he was not an admitted attorney.  So Chesley got together with a
fellow WSBC lawyer -- Thomas Rehme -- and executed a so-called
"wind-up agreement" on April 15, 2013. Ostensibly, the
agreement's purpose was to help wind up WSBC's business en route
to dissolving the firm. It also served as a vessel through which
Chesley could move his assets.

Through the wind-up agreement, Chesley conveyed all of his WSBC
shares to Rehme for no consideration. Meanwhile, both before and
after executing that agreement, Chesley funneled $59 million of
his personal funds into the firm. This left Chesley with empty
pockets to show his judgment creditors when they inevitably came
knocking.

On August 1, 2014, the Kentucky court that had entered judgment
against Chesley's co-conspirators entered the same judgment
against him, making him jointly and severally liable for the $42
million.  Rather than paying the plaintiffs, Chesley sued them to
enjoin them from domesticating and executing their Kentucky
judgment against him in Ohio.

The Ohio state court judge, Judge Ruehlman, acquiesced in this
unusual request and issued an ex parte temporary restraining
order forbidding the plaintiffs from domesticating their Kentucky
judgment in Ohio. The plaintiffs returned to the Kentucky court
with that news. On June 25, 2015, the Kentucky state court judge,
Judge Schrand, responded, ordering Chesley to transfer any WSBC
distributions to the plaintiffs. Two months later, Chesley
returned to Judge Ruehlman and, again inexplicably, managed to
receive an order directing him to disregard Judge Schrand's
order. The plaintiffs once again returned to Judge Schrand, this
time receiving an order that Chesley must immediately transfer
his entire ownership interest in WSBC to the plaintiffs. In that
order, Judge Schrand declared the wind-up agreement between
Chesley and Rehme a sham transaction and ordered that it be
disregarded. Yet again, Chesley refused to pay.

Judge Schrand then scheduled a show-cause hearing to find out why
Chesley was ignoring his orders. He informed Chesley that he must
show up for that hearing, scheduled for October 29, 2015. Chesley
did not show up. So Judge Schrand issued a warrant for his
arrest. Undeterred, Chesley returned to the Ohio courts, and this
time sued the local Cincinnati Sheriff--seeking an injunction
that would prevent the Sheriff from executing the arrest warrant.
That case was also assigned to Judge Ruehlman, who granted the
injunction, thereby preventing Chesley's arrest.

The plaintiffs were running out of options. An Ohio court blocked
them each time they tried to collect on their judgment; but, even
if it hadn't, Chesley had already shuttled most of his funds to
Rehme. Saddled with this deficit, the plaintiffs finally turned
to the federal courts. On April 12, 2016, the plaintiffs sued
Chesley for fraudulent conveyances in the Southern District of
Ohio. Their goal was simple -- to get an order recognizing
Chesley's recent transfers (including the wind-up agreement) as
fraudulent and to unwind those transfers. This would return the
assets from Rehme to Chesley, thereby allowing the plaintiffs to
finally collect their money.

The plaintiffs also asked the district court for a preliminary
injunction that would freeze Chesley's assets to prevent him from
moving those assets outside the court's jurisdictional reach. The
district court received evidence and held full-day hearings on
this issue on May 26, 2016 and again on July 26, 2016. After
those hearings, but before the district court had ruled on the
injunction, Chesley's assets were transferred yet again. On
August 30, 2016, Rehme, who held all of WSBC's assets (and thus
virtually all of Chesley's assets) by virtue of the wind-up
agreement, created and incorporated a trust -- "Thomas F. Rehme,
Trustee, Inc." He then transferred all of WSBC's assets into that
trust on September 1, 2016.6 On September 9, 2016, the trust
transferred all of the assets to a third party, Eric Goering, for
the purpose of instituting an assignment for the benefit of
creditors action (the "ABC action") in an Ohio state probate
court. Chesley claims that action was justified -- the firm
needed to satisfy WSBC's creditors as part of the winding-up
process. But the plaintiffs were Chesley's creditors, not WSBC's,
so they likely had no place in that proceeding. On September 13,
2016, immediately after the ABC action was filed, Chesley
informed the district court that Rehme no longer had the assets
and thus, he argued, the federal district court could not grant
relief that would affect those assets.

The district court found the timing of the ABC action suspect and
entered the temporary restraining order. That order effectively
enjoined the ABC action.  On April 21, 2017, the district court
converted its order into a preliminary injunction. Rehme and WSBC
pursued an interlocutory appeal, and we are now tasked with
reviewing the district court's decision to grant injunctive
relief.

On October 5, 2017, the Ohio Supreme Court validated the district
court's suspicions. It found the ABC action to be an abuse of
process and an attempt to fraudulently evade the plaintiffs'
judgment.  Shortly thereafter, the ABC action was dismissed.
Despite that dismissal, the preliminary injunction freezing
Chesley's assets is still in place and subject to the Sixth
Circuit's review. The fraudulent conveyance action remains
pending.

A district court considers four factors when deciding whether to
grant a preliminary injunction: (1) the movant's chances of
succeeding on the merits; (2) if the movant would likely be
permanently harmed absent the injunction; (3) whether the
injunction would cause substantial harm to third parties; and (4)
whether the injunction would serve the public interest.

The concealment and dissipation of assets' likely obtained
through fraud constitutes irreparable harm for the purposes of
issuing a preliminary injunction.

The recently-dismissed ABC action presented an obvious threat of
dissipating Chesley's assets. It amounted to a judicially-
sanctioned tool that Chesley could use to ship off all of his
assets held in WSBC. With that action's dismissal, the most
immediate threat has dissolved. However, an entirely new threat
has emerged. Without the pending ABC action, Chesley's assets
whether they are held by Goering or Rehme are free to move. In
that sense, the risk that Chesley will continue to hide his
assets away is even greater now that the ABC action has been
dismissed.
For that reason, and based on much of the evidence already
discussed, it is clear that the plaintiffs still face a
substantial chance of irreparable harm absent this preliminary
injunction. Chesley's actions up to this point have been part of
the shell game. The ABC action was just another move in that
game. The plaintiffs certainly have reason to believe that he
will pick up where he left off were we to lift this injunction.
Thus this factor also weighs heavily in favor of affirming the
injunction.

A full-text copy of the Sixth Circuit's May 31, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yd9n5sar from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Donald J. Rafferty -- drafferty@ctks.com -- COHEN, TODD,
KITE & STANFORD, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellants.

Angela M. Ford,  836 Euclid Ave, Lexington, Kentucky, for
Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Donald J. Rafferty, COHEN, TODD, KITE & STANFORD,
Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellants.

Angela M. Ford, Lexington, Kentucky, Brian S. Sullivan --
brian.sullivan@dinsmore.com -- DINSMORE & SHOHL, LLP, Cincinnati,
Ohio, for Appellees.


AUDIBLE INC: "McKee" Case Transferred to North Carolina
-------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Grant McKee, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Audible, Inc. and
Amazon.Com, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-01941, (C.D. Cal.,
March 10, 2017), was transferred to the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina on May 11, 2018, under
Case No. 18-cv-00211.

McKee seeks damages, restitution, and all other relief resulting
from unjust enrichment and in violation of the Lanham Act, False
Advertising Law, Unfair Competition Law and Automatic Purchase
Renewals Law of the California Business and Professions Code,
Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act, the
federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act, Gift Certificate Law and
Consumers Legal Remedies Act under the California Civil Code.

Plaintiff signed up for an audiobook purchasing plan with
Audible, an Amazon.com company, in which prepaid credits could be
redeemed with them for an equivalent number of audiobooks.
However, once members accrue a certain number of prepaid credits,
their credits begin to expire to make room for new credits, but
were still charged, forfeiting all previously purchased credits.
Defendants also failed to disclose to consumers of the required
"automatic renewal" payment and cancellation terms at the point
of sale. As a result, Plaintiff and Class members have been
charged regularly and automatically without being fully informed
of the consequences and related cancellation policy as required
by law. Also, the terms imposed on Audible members authorize
Audible to charge any credit card linked to a member's separate
Amazon account if the credit card given directly to Audible is
declined for any reason.

Defendants have made these misleading representations on their
websites and among other places in violation of the federal
Lanham Act.

Mr. McKee signed up an Audible "Gold Monthly" membership plan.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jamin S. Soderstrom, Esq.
      SODERSTROM LAW PC
      3 Park Plaza, Suite 100
      Irvine, CA 92614
      Tel: (949) 667-4700
      Fax: (949) 424-8091
      Email: jamin@soderstromlawfirm.com

Audible, Inc. is represented by:

      Jedediah Wakefield, Esq.
      Armen Nercess Nercessian, Esq.
      Matthew B. Becker, Esq.
      FENWICK AND WEST LLP
      555 California Street 12th Floor
      San Francisco, CA 94104
      Tel: (415) 875-2300
      Fax: (415) 281-1350

             - and -

      Annasara G. Purcell, Esq.
      FENWICK AND WEST LLP
      11911 Second Avenue 10th Floor
      Seattle, WA 98101
      Tel: (206) 389-4510
      Fax: (206) 389-4511


AUTO SHOWCASE: Md. Spec. App. Affirms "Hewitt" Arbitration Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARK S. HEWITT, v. AUTO SHOWCASE OF BEL AIR, Case
No. 0217, September Term, 2017 (Md. Spec. App.), Judge Glenn T.
Harrell, Jr. of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed
the judgment of the Circuit Court for Harford County granting
Auto Showcase's petition to compel arbitration.

On March 9, 2016, Hewitt purchased conditionally from Auto
Showcase a previously-owned 2013 Volkswagen CC Sport.  Hewitt
paid a down-payment of $1,000, a $290.00 dealer processing
charge, a $155 registration fee, and a $120 certificate of title
fee.  As part of the transaction, Auto Showcase offered dealer-
arranged financing to Hewitt.  He agreed to this structure of the
deal.

Hewitt signed a Retail Installment Sales Contract and a Retail
Purchase Agreement (both governing the financing terms of the
Vehicle) ("RISC"), and a separate Agreement to Arbitrate. The
RISC indicated that Sierra Auto Finance, LLC, would provide (if
it approved Hewitt's application) the financing for his purchase
of the Vehicle.  Maryland Code (2015, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2017
Suppl.) of the Transportation Article, governs the terms of this
transaction.  The RISC here contained, in addition to the
contemporaneously executed separate Arbitration Agreement, a
broad arbitration provision, to which Hewitt agreed.  He executed
the documents and took possession of the Vehicle the same day.

On April 6, 2016, Sierra Auto Finance, LLC, informed Auto
Showcase that it declined to finance Hewitt's purchase of the
Vehicle.  The parties did not renegotiate a new financing
arrangement.  Auto Showcase canceled the RISC.  It also
repossessed the Vehicle.5

On May 17, 2016, Hewitt filed a putative class action suit in the
Circuit Court for Harford County against Auto Showcase alleging
that it failed to comply with Transp. Section 15.311(d)(2)(ii),
which mandated certain fees be refunded to purchasers in the
event of the cancellation of a sales agreement.  Auto Showcase,
in response, filed a petition to compel arbitration and a motion
to stay the class action suit pending adjudication of its
petition.

Hewitt moved for summary judgment, contending that the
arbitration provisions in the RISC and the stand-alone
Arbitration Agreement were unenforceable because Auto Showcase
canceled the RISC pursuant to Section 15.311.3(d)(2), thus
rendering void both agreements to arbitrate.  Auto Showcase
responded that the agreements to arbitrate were severable and
enforceable under Maryland law, notwithstanding its cancellation
of the RISC.

The circuit court denied Hewitt's motion and granted Auto
Showcase's petition, holding that a valid contract to arbitrate
exists and that it was the intent of the parties to arbitrate all
issues that arose if the contract for any reason was breached or
faulty.

Hewitt, challenges a judgment of the circuit court.  He contends
that the circuit court erred in reasoning that a stand-alone,
contemporaneously-executed, arbitration agreement and a nested
arbitration provision in the underlying contract of sale of a
previously-owned automobile were not rendered void ab initio by,
but rather survived, Auto Showcase's cancellation of the sales
contract and repossession of the vehicle after a third-party
lender declined to approve financing.

Hewitt frames one question for the Court's consideration:
Whether, on the uncontroverted facts of the case, Auto Showcase
can compel Hewitt to arbitrate a claim he brought against it
under Md. Code (2015, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2017 Suppl.) of the
Transportation Article ("State's Spot Delivery Law"), when it
canceled the Retail Installment Sales Contract underlying the
parties' agreements to arbitrate.

In the instant case, Judge Harrell finds that a mutually agreed
upon (and enforceable) arbitration provision exists in the RISC,
which contains also plain language indicating that it will
survive any termination of the contract.  Moreover, the parties
executed an additional, stand-alone Agreement to Arbitrate
(containing language paralleling that in the RISC arbitration
provision), calling-out as it does specifically, inter alia, the
financing of Hewitt's purchase of the Vehicle.

The Judge also finds that the April 13, 2015 Fiscal and Policy
note to the Spot Delivery Law provides that a violation of the
bill is an unfair and deceptive trade practice under the Maryland
Consumer Protection Act ("MCPA"), subject to MCPA's civil and
criminal penalty provisions.  The parties agreed, in the
separately executed Arbitration Agreement, that they would settle
by binding arbitration any dispute between them regarding any
alleged unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable acts or practices as
it relates to the financing of Hewitt's purchase of the Vehicle.

He holds that Hewitt's claim against Auto Showcase for a
violation of Transp. Section 15-311.3(d)(2)(ii) is, in fact, an
unfair and deceptive trade practice claim -- one which the
parties agreed to arbitrate.  Thus, Hewitt's claim for a Transp.
Section 15-311.3 violation by Auto Showcase is not the escape
mechanism he imagines.  In fact, the Spot Delivery Law and what
disputes the parties intend to arbitrate are consistent.
Hewitt's allegations against Auto Showcase fall within the scope
of the arbitration agreements.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 30, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/VqUUm4 from Leagle.com.


BAY AREA TOLL: Faces "Montgomery" Suit in California Super. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bay Area Toll
Authority. The case is styled as William Montgomery, individually
and on behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Bay Area
Toll Authority, Golden Gate Bridge, Highway And Transportation
District and Xerox State and Local Solutions Inc., Defendant,
Case No. CGC18568084 (Cal. Super. Ct., July 13, 2018).

The Bay Area Toll Authority was created by the California State
Legislature in 1997 to administer the auto tolls on the San
Francisco Bay Area's seven state-owned toll bridges.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Helen I Zeldes, Esq.
   Coast Law Group, LLP
   1140 South Coast Highway
   101 Encinitas, CA 92024
   Tel: 760-942-8505
   Email: helen@coastlaw.com


BAYER HEALTHCARE: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss "Curran" Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEVIN CURRAN, Plaintiff, v. BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 17 C 7930 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Jorge L. Alonso
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, denied the Defendants' motion to transfer, and
granted their motion to dismiss.

The Plaintiff alleges that he purchased Coppertone Sport High
Performance SPF 30 sunscreen.  Although the bottle says "SPF 30,"
he alleges that the sunscreen, in fact, had a lower SPF.
Specifically, he alleges that Consumer Reports magazine reported
in July 2017 that "its own testing" of Coppertone High
Performance SPF reflected an SPF lower than 30.

In addition, the Plaintiff alleges that he conducted his own
independent testing of Coppertone Sport High Performance SPF 30
sunscreen spray, utilizing the methodology for SPF testing
mandated by the FDA.  He alleges that his testing was conducted
in compliance with all FDA testing methods" and concluded that
the sunscreen had an average SPF of 13.9.

Based on these allegations, the Plaintiff sets out five counts,
including breach of warranty (Count I), breach of implied
contract (Count II), declaratory and injunctive relief (Count
III), unjust enrichment (Count IV) and violation of the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Count V).  He
seeks to bring these claims on behalf of a class of persons who
purchased Coppertone Sport High Performance SPF 30 in the United
States, except for New Jersey citizens who purchased sunscreen in
New Jersey.

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the Plaintiff's
counsel filed in state court in New Jersey, on behalf of a
different plaintiff and against the Defendant, a similar case
which purports to be a class action on behalf of citizens of New
Jersey.  Although the Defendant removed that case to the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey, that court
remanded the case for lack of jurisdiction.

The Defendants have filed a motion to transfer the case or, in
the alternative, to dismiss.

Judge Alonso finds that the Plaintiff has counsel in Chicago and
New Jersey, and the Defendants have counsel in Chicago and
Washington D.C.  It is clear that this litigation will be
inconvenient to some people in either court.  He also finds that
the Plaintiff's claims are based on Illinois law, which the
Court, as well as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, considers
regularly.  Given that the interests of justice favor keeping the
case here and given that the case will be inconvenient for one
party in either court, the Judge concludes that the Defendant has
not made a sufficient showing to upset the Plaintiff's choice of
forum.  The Defendant's motion to transfer is denied.

The Defendant next argues that the Plaintiff has not stated a
claim, because he has not sufficiently alleged that his testing
was identical.  It argues that the Plaintiff has included mere
conclusions that the testing was performed "utilizing the
methodology for SPF testing mandated by the FDA.  Although not
every district court would agree, the Judge Court agrees with the
Defendant for two reasons.

First, the Supreme Court has said not only that conclusory
allegations are not entitled to be assumed true, but also that
the notice-pleading rule does not unlock the doors of discovery
for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.  Here,
the Plaintiff offers nothing more than his conclusion that his
testing was the same as is required by the FDA.  That is not
enough, especially where, as here, the Plaintiff is essentially
alleging fraud.  Thus, to state a claim, the Plaintiff needs to
include some facts about his testing procedure in order to make
it plausible that the Defendant's label was not in compliance
with the requirements of 21 C.F.R. Section 201.327.  Thus, the
Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

For these reasons, Judge Alonso denied the Defendant's motion to
transfer, and granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss.  The
Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice.  The
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint by June
25, 2018.  Status hearing remains set for June 28, 2018 at 9:30
a.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 30, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/qzdNM5 from Leagle.com.

Kevin Curran, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Carl V. Malmstrom --
malmstrom@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLC,
Janine L. Pollack -- pollack@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler
Freeman & Herz Llp, Stephen DeNittis -- sdenittis@denittislaw.com
-- DeNittis Osefchen Prince, P.C. & Theodore Beloyeannis Bell --
tbell@whafh.com -- Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLC.

Bayer Healthcare LLC, Defendant, represented by Eugene A. Schoon
-- ESCHOON@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, Katherine L. Olson --
KATHERINE.OLSON@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice,
Jacquelyn Erin Fradette -- JFRADETTE@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin
LLP, pro hac vice, Jonathan F. Cohn -- JFCOHN@SIDLEY.COM --
Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice & Joshua J. Fougere --
JFOUGERE@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice.


BEHR PROCESS: "Rose" Stayed Pending "Bishop" Deal Bid Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LINNE ROSE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BEHR PROCESS CORP., BEHR PAINT
CORP., MASCO CORP., THE HOME DEPOT, INC., and HOME DEPOT U.S.A.,
INC., Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-01754-MJP (W.D. Wash.), Judge
Marsh J. Pechman of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Seattle, granted the Parties' stipulation
to stay the matter pending a decision on the motion for
preliminary and final approval of a class action settlement
involving three related actions before other district courts
(Anderson v. Behr Process Corp., Case No. 1:17-cv-08735 (N.D.
Ill.); Bishop v. Behr Process Corp., Case No. 1:17-cv-04464 (N.D.
Ill.); and In re Behr, Case No. 8:17-cv-01016 (C.D. Cal.).

On May 1, 2018, the Plaintiffs in Bishop filed an amended
complaint that incorporated the named plaintiffs in In re Behr
and Anderson.  Shortly thereafter, on May 3, 2018, plaintiffs in
Bishop filed a motion for preliminary approval of a class action
settlement.

If the settlement agreement in Bishop is granted preliminarily
approval, it would resolve all claims against all the Defendants
in the action.  The Defendants expect that the court in Bishop
will consider the motion for preliminary approval on June 27,
2018.

If the case is stayed pending consideration of the Bishop
Settlement, no Party will suffer any hardship.  The Plaintiff and
all members of the proposed class in the case have the right to
participate in the settlement or opt out of it to pursue his or
her own litigation.  And, any stay would be limited for any
Plaintiff or any member of the proposed class who opts out of the
Bishop Settlement.

In contrast, if this litigation continues, all Parties would face
the prospect of incurring substantial and unnecessary litigation
costs.  The Parties also acknowledge that the settlement will
help resolve this litigation.  Thus, the Parties agree that a
stay of the action is appropriate, pending a decision on the
motion for preliminary approval in Bishop, and, a decision on any
forthcoming motion for final approval.

The Parties agree to keep the Court informed regarding the status
of the settlement of the Bishop case by having Behr file a Status
Report by July 13, 2018, and every 60 days thereafter, reporting
on the progress of preliminary approval, notice, and final
approval of the settlement.

Based on this, the Parties stipulated, agreed and moved, and
Judge Pechman granted, that the case should be stayed pending a
decision on the motion for preliminary approval in Bishop, et
al., v. Behr Process Corporation, et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-04464
(N.D. Ill.), and, if preliminary approval is granted, through a
decision on any forthcoming motion for final approval.  Behr will
file a Status Report by July 13, 2018, and every 60 days
thereafter, reporting on the progress of preliminary approval,
notice, and final approval.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 30, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/4ZByfe from Leagle.com.

Linne Rose, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel K. Bryson --
dan@wbmllp.com -- WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON LLP, pro hac vice,
Patrick M. Wallace -- pat@wbmllp.com -- WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON
LLP, pro hac vice, Scott C. Harris -- scott@wbmllp.com --
WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON LLP, pro hac vice, Eric Riley Nusser --
eric@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC &
Beth E. Terrell -- bterrell@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL
MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC.

Behr Process Corp., Behr Paint Corp. & Masco Corp., Defendants,
represented by Elliot C. Copenhaver -- copenhaver@carneylaw.com -
- CARNEY BADLEY SPELLMAN, Emilia L. Sweeney -- Sweeney@carney.com
-- CARNEY BADLEY SPELLMAN, Kathleen P. Lally --
kathleen.lally@lw.com -- LATHAM & WATKINS, pro hac vice & Jason
M. Kettrick -- kettrick@carney.com -- CARNEY BADLEY SPELLMAN.

Home Depot Inc. & Home Depot USA Inc., Defendants, represented by
Jeffrey Douglass -- jdouglass@mmmlaw.com -- MORRIS MANNING &
MARTIN, pro hac vice, John T. Fetters -- jfetters@millsmeyers.com
-- MILLS MEYERS SWARTLING, Robert Alpert -- ralpert@mmmlaw.com --
MORRIS MANNING & MARTIN, pro hac vice & Caryn Geraghty Jorgensen
-- cjorgensen@millsmeyers.com -- MILLS MEYERS SWARTLING.


BP WEST: Or. App. Affirms $409M in Statutory Damages in UTPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Oregon affirmed the judgment of the trial
court awarding attorney's fees, cost and statutory damages in the
cases captioned STEVEN SCHARFSTEIN, individually and on behalf of
all other similarly situated persons, Plaintiff-Respondent, and
OREGON STATE BAR and Oregon Community Foundation, Respondents, v.
BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company, Defendant-Appellant, Nos. 111217046; A162289 (Or. App.).

Plaintiff, Steven Scharfstein, alleged that defendant, BP West
Coast Products, LLC (BP), violated the Unlawful Trade Practices
Act (UTPA) and the Gasoline Price Advertising Rule by illegally
assessing and collecting debit card fees from millions of Oregon
consumers. Plaintiff alleged that BP engaged in unfair or
deceptive gasoline price advertising when it failed to disclose
that it charged a 35-cent fee for the use of a debit card to
purchase gasoline at ARCO and am/pm service stations as required
by the rule.  A jury found that BP violated the UTPA when it
charged a debit card fee because BP failed to disclose the debit
card fee on its street signs and, alternatively, because BP
charged more than the total amount registered on the gas pump.
The trial court certified the class, which ultimately consisted
of 2,046,500 individuals who, between January 1, 2011 and August
30, 2013, bought gasoline at Oregon ARCO or am/pm service
stations with a debit card and were charged a 35-cent debit card
fee.  The trial court entered an amended general judgment that
awarded plaintiff and the class attorney fees, costs, and
$409,300,000 in statutory damages. BP appeals that judgment,
raising 10 assignments of error.

The Ore. App. concludes that the trial court did not commit
reversible error and, accordingly, affirms.

Challenges to OAR 137-020-0150

In its first, second, and third assignments of error, BP
challenges various provisions of OAR 137-020-0150, also known as
the Gasoline Price Advertising Rule.  In BP's second and third
assignments, the essence of BP's argument is that the rule does
not apply to any flat fee that is not part of the price per
gallon of fuel.

The regulatory framework of OAR 137-020-0150.  ORS 646.930(1)(a)
provides that a person operating a service station, business, or
other place for the purpose of retailing and delivering gasoline,
diesel or other fuel may display on a ign visible from the street
the lowest cash prices charged for the sale of the lowest grades
of gasoline, diesel or other fuel.  The Attorney General has
adopted a rule in OAR chapter 137, division 20, declaring unfair
or deceptive gasoline price advertising an unlawful trade
practice.

Is the Attorney General's definition of condition under OAR 137-
020-0150(1)(b) invalid?

In BP West Coast Products, LLP v. Dept. of Justice, 284 Or.App.
723, 725, 396 P.3d 244, rev den, 361 Or. 800 (2017), the Court
concluded that the legislature had granted the Attorney General
broad rulemaking authority under the UTPA to protect consumers by
regulating the display of fuel prices including the authority to
define condition.  In reaching that conclusion, the Court
observed that the primary purpose of ORS 646.930 was to protect
consumers by enacting fuel station signage requirements, during
the 1980's to address situations where some fuel stations were
placing signs advertising a low but misleading price for fuel on
the street sign that did not match the higher prices they were
charging at the pump.  After the Court acknowledged the Attorney
General's broad grant of rulemaking authority under the UTPA, the
Court also concluded that the Attorney General had the statutory
authority to define condition to ensure the disclosure of added
fees to use credit or debit cards.

Is a 35-cent debit card fee a condition that must be disclosed on
a service station's street sign under OAR 137-020-0150(3)(d)(A)?

BP asserted at trial that the rule defines a condition as one
that affects the price per unit of measurement of motor vehicle
fuel from the lowest cash price and argued because there is no
evidence that the debit fee affects the price per unit of
measurement, directed verdict should be granted for BP on the
issue of condition.

Here, the 35-cent fee that BP charged for the use of a debit card
actually made a difference to the price per unit of measurement
of motor vehicle fuel from the lowest cash price.  If one adds
the 35-cent fee to the total cash price of the fuel dispensed,
and divides that by the number of gallons dispensed, the result
is an increase in the price per unit of measurement of motor
vehicle fuel from the lowest cash price. For example, if a
customer buys $5.00 of gas in cash and receives two gallons, the
cash price per unit is $2.50 per gallon.  However, if a customer
buys $5.00 of gas and uses a debit card the customer pays $5.35
for two gallons of gas, which results in a debit card price per
unit of $2.67 per gallon .  In that example, the debit card fee
increases the price per gallon by 17 cents. Thus, the 35-cent
debit card fee makes an actual difference on the price per unit
of measurement of motor vehicle fuel from the lowest cash price.

In light of the text of the rule and its context, the other
portions of the rule and related laws, and the rule's adoption
history, we conclude that the 35-cent debit card fee is a
"condition" that affects the price of fuel under OAR 137-020-
0150(1)(b). It is undisputed that BP charged a debit card fee and
that BP did not disclose that condition" on its street sign as
required by OAR 137-020-0150(3)(d)(A).

Thus, the trial court did not err in denying BP's motion for
directed verdict.

Does OAR 137-020-0150(4)(e) require a debit card fee to be
registered on the dispensing device?

The Plaintiff's alternative theory of liability was that BP had
violated OAR 137-020-0150(4)(e), which requires retailers of
motor vehicle fuel to charge the customer only the total amount
registered on the dispensing device at the selected unit price.
Both theories of liability in this case were based on the same
evidence of plaintiff's purchase of gasoline with a debit card,
and the evidence of BP's culpable mental state applied to both
theories of liability. BP has not shown how sending the theory of
liability under OAR 137-020-0150(4)(e) to the jury substantially
affected its rights. Therefore, the Court need not resolve
whether it was proper to send the question of whether BP violated
OAR 137-020-0150(4)(e) to the jury because, even if it was error,
it would be harmless.

With respect to BP's second assignment, the Court conclude that a
35-cent debit card fee is a condition under OAR 137-020-
0150(1)(b) and, therefore, the trial court did not err in denying
BP's motion for directed verdict because there is evidence that
BP did not post that condition on its street sign as required by
OAR 137-020-0150(3)(d)(A).

Ascertainable Loss Resulting From UTPA Violation

In a combined argument on BP's fourth and fifth assignments of
error, BP relies on Pearson, 358 Or. 88, to urge that plaintiff
did not, and could not, prove an ascertainable loss resulting
from the alleged UTPA violation on a class-wide basis. BP argues
that, under Pearson, the plaintiff was required to prove that he
would not have paid the fee if it had been posted on the street
sign and included in the amount registered on the dispenser -- in
the parlance of Pearson,he was required to prove reliance.

In this case, the plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant
violated gasoline price disclosure rules and illegally assessed
and collected debit card fees in violation of the rules. More
specifically, according to the complaint, BP engaged in a
prohibited transaction by charging gasoline purchase debit fees
without first properly disclosing the fees as required by OAR
137-020-0150 and in violation of ORS 646.608(1)(u).

In other words, the plaintiff's theory of ascertainable loss was
that BP illegally charged class members an unlawful 35-cent debit
card fee and, therefore, the plaintiff and the class are entitled
to recover statutory damages of $200 per class member. Thus, the
plaintiff claimed that the illegal overcharge of 35-cents is the
ascertainable loss.

Unlike the plaintiffs in Pearson, the plaintiff did not allege
that BP made misrepresentations or half-truths about the quality
or characteristics of the gasoline in violation of ORS
646.608(1)(e) or seek a refund of the purchase price.
Nevertheless, BP argues that the plaintiffs were required to
prove that they would have relied on a disclosure that BP failed
to provide, but was legally required to provide before charging
the 35-cent debit card fee. As the Court have noted, proof that a
party justifiably relied on a representation is not necessary
when the representation involves a matter about which the party
making it is legally required to inform the other.

In sum, on the issue of causation, BP was not entitled to a
verdict as a matter of law and, therefore, the trial court did
not err in denying its motion for directed verdict. Likewise, the
trial court did not err in denying BP's motion to decertify the
class on BP's related theory that, because reliance was an
element of plaintiff's UTPA claim, reliance could not be proved
on a class-wide basis.

Due Process Challenge to Statutory Damages

In BP's tenth assignment of error, BP argues that the trial court
erred in denying defendant's alternative motions to strike the
statutory damages or to decertify the class because ORS
646.638(8)(a), as applied, violates due process.

BP could have raised its constitutional challenge to the
statutory damages either through a motion for directed verdict or
a motion to strike the statutory damages made before the jury's
discharge, or both. BP, however, did neither. Instead, it waited
until the jury was discharged and then, months later, raised its
objection for the first time. As a result, BP's motion to strike
the statutory damages was untimely.

The Court agrees with the plaintiff that BP's delay prejudiced
the plaintiff because he made the decision not to seek actual
damages and only seek UPTA statutory damages, a decision that was
impossible to alter once the verdict had been returned and the
jury had been discharged. Likewise, if BP had argued that the
standard articulated in Gore, 517 US at 574-75, applied before
the jury returned its verdict, the plaintiff could have presented
different evidence in the statutory damage case if the court had
been given the opportunity to instruct the parties and jury that
a higher standard for statutory damages applied.

For those reasons, the Court rules that the trial court did not
err when it rejected BP's untimely motion to strike the request
for statutory damages.  BP's sixth assignment of error is not
preserved and, therefore, the Court declined to address it. The
Court also rejected BP's seventh, eighth, and ninth assignments
of error without discussion.

A full-text copy of the Or. App.'s May 31, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yd2etg36 from Leagle.com.

William F. Gary -- william.f.gary@harrang.com -- argued the cause
for appellant. With him on the briefs were Sharon A. Rudnick --
sharon.rudnick@harrang.com -- Susan Marmaduke --
susan.marmaduke@harrang.com -- Nathan R. Morales, and Harrang
Long Gary Rudnick P.C.

W. Eugene Hallman -- office@Hallman.pro -- argued the cause for
respondent Steven Scharfstein. With him on the brief were David
F. Sugerman -- david@davidsugerman.com -- Tim Alan Quenelle --
tim.quenelle@gmail.com -- Amy Johnson, Joshua Ross  --
jross@stollberne.com --  and Hallman Law Office.

No appearance for respondents Oregon State Bar and Oregon
Community Foundation.

Jill Gibson -- jill@gibsonlawfirm.org -- and Gibson Law Firm,
LLC; Doug Kantor, Kate Jensen, and Steptoe & Johnson LLP, filed
the brief amicus curiae for National Association of Convenience
Stores.

Janet M. Schroer -- jms@hartwagner.com -- and Hart Wagner LLP
filed the brief amicus curiae for Associated Oregon Industries.

Robert M. McKenna -- rmckenna@orrick.com -- Washington, Daniel J.
Dunne -- ddunne@orrick.com -- and Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe
LLP filed the brief amicus curiae for The Chamber of Commerce of
the United States of America and National Association of
Manufacturers.


BRAKE MASTERS: Faces "Durgin" Suit in Sacramento California
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Brake Masters of
Sacramento LLC. The case is captioned as Mike Durgin,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Brake Masters of Sacramento LLC, and Does 1-50,
Defendants, Case No. 34-2018-00235816-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super.,
Sacramento Cty., June 29, 2018)

Brake Masters of Sacramento LLC operates as a car repair and
maintenance center. The Company offers express lube, filter, oil
change, alignment, fluid and cooling system flush, brake
inspection, air conditioning, batteries, as well as electrical
repairs. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by Darren M Cohen, Esq.


BRITISH AIRWAYS: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Blengino Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
CHARLENE S. BLENGINO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Case No. 18910992 (Cal. Super., Alameda
Cty., June 28, 2018) seeks to stops the Defendant's practice of
sending unsolicited prerecorded messages to the cellular
telephones of the Plaintiff without the her prior express written
consent.

British Airways PLC provides air transportation services. The
Company offers scheduled air services for passengers, freight,
and mail, airline marketing, aircraft financing, maintenance,
holiday packages, and insurance. British Airways serves customers
worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eric A. Grover, Esq.
          Alexander S. Vahdat, Esq.
          KELLER GROVER LLP
          1965 Market Street
          San Francisco, CA 94103
          Telephone: (415) 543-1305
          Facsimile: (415) 543-7861
          E-mail: eagrover@kellergrover.com
                  rspencer@kellergrover.com

               - and -

          Scot Bernstein, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF SCOT D. BERNSTEIN,
          A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
          101 Parkshore Drive, Suite 100
          Folsom, CA 95630
          Telephone: (916) 447-0100
          Facsimile: (916) 933-5533
          E-mail: swampadero@sbernsteinlaw.com


CASTLEROM HOLDING: Plaintiffs Directed to Turn Over Lab Reports
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BMW GROUP, 2055 CRUGER, LLC, SKIVJANI REALTY CORP.,
GLENHILL ASSOCIATES, LLC & 498 SEVENTH, LLC, on behalf of
themselves and all Others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
CASTLEROM HOLDING CORP., f/k/a, CASTLE OIL CORPORATION,
Defendant, Docket No. 650910/2013 (N.Y. Sup.), Judge Shirley
Werner Kornreich of the Supreme Court, New York County, (i)
granted the Defendant's motion to compel the Plaintiffs to turn
over documents to the extent of directing the Plaintiffs to turn
over all laboratory reports that tested the oil, Marjorie J.
Clarke's communications regarding the testing, and the underlying
facts of Anthony P. Valenti's investigation and his
communications regarding that investigation; and (ii) denied the
Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order.

The Plaintiffs own commercial buildings in New York City, which
use heating systems designed to burn No. 4 and No. 6 grades of
fuel oil.  The Defendant supplied fuel oil to the Plaintiffs'
buildings.  The Plaintiffs allege that, although they paid for
No. 4 and No. 6 grade fuel oil, they were supplied a blended oil
product that did not meet the requisite standards for the
purchased fuel oil.

They bring the action as a putative class action on behalf of all
persons or entities in the Service Area who ordered and paid for
No. 4 Fuel Oil and No. 6 Fuel Oil from Castle, and who instead
received Adulterated Oil.  The Second Amended Complaint alleges
causes of action for Breach of Express Warranty under the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC"), Breach of Implied Warranty (warranty of
merchantability) under the UCC, and breach of contract.

The Plaintiffs filed their original summons and complaint on
March 15, 2013.  The class representatives then were BMW Group,
LLC, Glenhill Associates, LLC, and 498 Seventh, LLC.  That
complaint alleged causes of action for fraud, violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, breaches of express and implied
warranties under the UCC, a violation of New York General
Business Law Section 349 ("GBL"), breach of contract, and unjust
enrichment.

The Plaintiffs contended that Castle purchased reprocessed "Waste
Oil", blended it with heating oil to create "Adulterated Oil" and
sold 3,000 gallons of this Adulterated Oil to BMW on Nov. 12,
2012.  They asserted that laboratory testing of the oil delivered
to BMW on Nov. 12, 2012 confirmed that it had properties
significantly outside the legal specifications for No. 4 oil.

Based on these pleadings, the Plaintiffs contended that they were
overcharged and the Adulterated Oil provided less heat and harmed
their heating equipment and the environment.  Further, they
claimed that they were not aware of Castle's breaches of warranty
at any time during which they were purchasing the oil.  They also
contended that the oil was not merchantable because it would not
have passed without objection in the trade, was not of fair
average quality, suitable or fit for use as heating oil.

A few days later, on March 18, 2013, the Plaintiffs brought an
Order to Show Cause seeking preliminary and temporary injunctions
enjoining Castle from selling any fuel oil purporting to be 'No.
4 Fuel Oil' or 'No. 6 Fuel Oil' which is adulterated with waste
oil or fails to conform to New York code standards.  Annexed to
the application was an affidavit from a licensed private
investigator, Valenti, who worked for Stroz Friedberg, LLC.

Valenti averred that he had investigated the allegations of the
Plaintiffs and had determined that Castle had been delivering
adulterated Oil; that Castle received deliveries of waste oil by
the truckload from County Oil and its sister companies; that
Castle received waste oil by barge; that Castle blended the waste
oil and delivered this adulterated product to its customers; that
Valenti arranged to test a shipment of fuel oil delivered to a
Castle customer on Nov. 12, 2012; that the results of the testing
confirmed that the fuel oil sold as No. 4 fuel oil did not
conform to the specifications for such oil; that the oil sold
created substantial risk to heating systems; and that, among
other things, "the results of the testing" informed his belief
that Castle sold adulterated fuel oil.

In its brief supporting the injunction requests, the Plaintiffs
relied on the laboratory tests of the Nov. 12, 2012 delivery.
Based on these assertions, the Court partially granted the
request for a temporary injunction.

The Plaintiffs submitted supplemental documentation in support of
their preliminary injunction on April 8, 2013, from both their
counsel and Valenti.

Also annexed to the April 8, 2013 documentation was an affidavit
from Clarke, an environmental scientist.  She based her affidavit
on her expertise in the field of waste-to-energy/incinerator
emissions control and on her review of documentation provided to
her by the Plaintiffs.  She stated that she reviewed a 'Safety-
Kleen Laboratory Analytical Report' dated Aug. 20, 2012
concerning a shipment of processed waste oil  which was
reportedly blending into fuel oil by Castle Oil.  She averred
that the tested oil had a lower heat content than No. 4 and No. 6
oil; that the oil interfered with the efficient operation of the
heating system and led to increased fuel use; that the amount of
water and sediment in the tested oil was higher than acceptable
levels in New York, that it increased pollution and decreased
burner efficiency; that it corroded burners and facilitated
bacterial growth; and that its flash point was "substantially
above the minimum threshold for fuel oil," including for No. 4
and No. 6 oil.

Ultimately, the Court denied a preliminary injunction.  The
Plaintiffs subsequently filed an Amended Complaint on May 21,
2013.  The Plaintiffs' allegations were similar to those in the
original complaint; they asserted causes of action for fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, breaches of express and implied
warranties, breach of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, breach of
GBL Section 349 and unjust enrichment.

On Oct. 17, 2013, the Court dismissed the causes of action
asserting negligent misrepresentation, breach of the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act, breach of GBL Section 349 and unjust
enrichment.  The SAC was filed on Nov. 1, 2013.  The Court
granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the putative class
actions on Sept. 5, 2014.  That decision was reversed by the
Appellate Division on March 15, 2016.  The Appellate Court relied
in its decision on the Valenti affidavit, the laboratories'
testing, and the parade of horribles alleged by plaintiffs which
supposedly showed the oil sold was adulterated.

Castle brings the motion to compel the Plaintiffs to turn over
documents.  The Plaintiffs cross-move for protection of the
subject documents from disclosure on the grounds of attorney-
client privilege, of work product privilege and that the
documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation.  The
issues before the Court are whether the documents are merely
factual and not privileged, whether there is a special need to
turn over documents regarding investigations conducted by
plaintiffs prior to litigation, at issue waiver, and selective
disclosure of the documents.

Judge Kornreich finds that the documents and materials prepared
by the testing laboratories must be turned over.  These clearly
are facts and not privileged.  Likewise, the underlying facts of
Valenti's investigation should be turned over.  In addition, even
if the testing and underlying facts of Valenti's investigation
were privileged, it is trial preparation and necessity dictates
that it be turned over.  The tests occurred upon oil that no
longer exists and cannot be replicated.  The Defendant cannot
obtain the substantial equivalent of the results, which may prove
exculpatory, and, therefore, necessity requires their disclosure.

Finally, the Judge finds that the test materials, Valenti's
investigation, and Clarke's findings were waived both because of
at issue waiver and selective disclosure.  The Plaintiffs
affirmatively placed the subject matter of these materials at
issue in litigation when they used them to seek an injunction and
to create the original and first amended complaints.

Indeed, the Court and the Appellate Division relied on the tests
and Valenti's and Clarke's findings in making determinations in
the case.  She says the invasion of the privilege, if it exists,
is required to determine the validity of the Plaintiffs' claims
and to fashion a defense; assertion of the privilege would
deprive the Defendant of vital information.  Then too, the
Plaintiffs disclosed only portions of the tests and Valente's and
Clarke's communications in their court papers.  They cannot use
excerpts of privileged communications and documents to make out
their case and then assert the privilege to shield the remainder
of the material.

For these reasons, Judge Kornreich granted the Defendant's motion
to the extent of directing the Plaintiffs to turn over all
laboratory reports that tested the oil, Clarke's communications
regarding the testing, and the underlying facts of Valenti's
investigation and his communications regarding that
investigation.  By June 14, 2018, the Plaintiffs are to submit a
specific and detailed privilege log regarding the remainder of
the demanded documents.  The Judge denied the Plaintiffs' motion
for a protective order.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 30, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/9D0XUI from Leagle.com.


CHARMING CHARLIE: Removes "Brinkman" Suit to E.D. Louisiana
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of April Brinkman, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Charming
Charlie LLC, filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from the Civil
District Court of the State of Louisiana, County of New Orleans
(Case No. 2018-4467 "J-15") to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana on July 29, 2018, and assigned Case
No. 2:18-cv-06377-SM-JVM (E.D. La., July 29, 2018). The case is
assigned to Judge Susie Morgan and referred to Magistrate Judge
Janis Van Meerveld.

Charming Charlie LLC operates fashion accessory stores for women
in the United States. Charming Charlie LLC operates as a
subsidiary of Charming Charlie Holdings Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roberto L. Costales, Esq.
          COSTALES LAW OFFICE
          3801 Canal Street, Suite 207
          New Orleans, LA 70119
          Telephone: (504) 534-5005
          E-mail: rlc@beaumontcostales.com

               - and -

          Jonathan Mille Kirkland, Esq.
          BEAUMONT COSTALES LLC
          3801 Canal St, Ste 207
          New Orleans, LA 70119
          Telephone: (504) 534-5005
          E-mail: jmk@beaumontcostales.com

               - and -

          William Henry Beaumont, Esq.
          WILLIAM H. BEAUMONT LAW
          3801 Canal Street, Suite 207
          New Orleans, LA 70119
          Telephone: (504) 534-5005
          E-mail: whb@beaumontcostales.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Raymond C. Lewis, Esq.
          DEUTSCH KERRIGAN LLP
          755 Magazine Street
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 581-5141
          Facsimile: (504) 566-4077
          rlewis@deutschkerrigan.com

               - and -

          Victor M. Jones, Esq.
          DEUTSCH KERRIGAN LLP
          755 Magazine Street
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 581-5141
          E-mail: vjones@deutschkerrigan.com


CHSPSC LLC: "Mounce" ADTPA Suit Settlement Has Prelim Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JESSICA MOUNCE, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. CHSPSC, LLC; NORTHWEST
ARKANSAS HOSPITALS, LLC d/b/a NORTHWEST MEDICAL CENTER; and
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNT SERVICES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 5:15-
CV-05197 (W.D. Ark.), Judge Timothy L. Brooks of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Division, granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval
of Class Action Settlement.

Currently before the Court are the Plaintiff's Motion and
Suggestions in Support of Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement, to which she has attached a Settlement Agreement
signed by the parties and certain documents to be sent to the
class members.  The parties executed their Settlement Agreement
on April 26, 2018.  They now ask the Court to preliminarily
approve their settlement, appoint a representative Plaintiff,
appoint the settlement class counsel, and permit the class
counsel, by and through a designated claims administrator, to
mail the proposed Notice documents and Claim Form to the 925
class members.

After reviewing the Settlement Agreement and attached forms
shortly after they were filed, the Court entered an Order on May
10, 2018, directing the parties to file a joint supplement to the
Motion that answered specific questions the Court had about the
settlement.  The parties filed their Joint Supplement on May 16,
2018.  Thereafter, the Court suggested to the parties that they
make certain amendments to the Notice documents and Claim Form,
to more accurately reflect the possible dollar amounts that each
class member could expect to receive by participating in the
settlement.  The parties agreed to the Court's suggestion, and on
May 25, 2018, the parties jointly submitted revised Notice
documents and a revised Claim Form via email.

Upon reviewing the revised documents, the Motion, and the
Settlement Agreement, Judge Brooks is now well satisfied that the
proposed settlement merits preliminary approval.  Accordingly, he
granted the Plaintiff's Motion and Suggestions in Support of
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the Settlement
Class is defined as all Arkansas residents who since April 30,
2010 through Oct. 31, 2017, received any type of healthcare
treatment from any entity located in Arkansas that is owned,
controlled, managed and/or affiliated with the Defendants, and:
(i) such treatment was covered by valid, in network, commercial
health coverage; (ii) the billing charges regarding such
treatment were not timely submitted to the commercial health
carrier; and (iii) the Defendants obtained payments for such
treatment as a result of asserting third-party medical liens,
submitting claims for medical payments coverage, and/or seeking
payment directly from the patients.

The Judge appointed Mounce as the Class Representative; attorneys
Ralph K. Phalen, Mitchell L. Burgess, Shawn Daniels, and Sarah
Jewell as the Class Counsel; and Dahl, Inc. as the Claims
Administrator.

The Court will hold the final approval hearing on Sept. 21, 2018
at 3:00 p.m.

In accordance with the provisions of the Settlement Agreement,
the Claims Administrator is directed to mail the Court-approved
Notice and Claim Forms to the Settlement Class on or before 30
days from the date of the Order.  No later than 10 days prior to
the Final Approval Hearing, Dah will file with the Court and
serve on the Class Counsel an affidavit or declaration stating
that the mailing of the Notice and Claim Forms has been
completed.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/qHupJX from Leagle.com.

Jessica Mounce, Individually, and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated Plaintiffs, Plaintiff, represented by Jason W.
Earley, Hare, Wynn, Newell & Newton, LLP, Mitchell Burgess --
mitch@burgesslawkc.com -- Burgess Green P.C., Ralph Phalen --
phalenlaw@yahoo.com -- Attorney at Law, Shawn B. Daniels, Hare,
Wynn, Newell & Newton, L.L.P. & Sarah Coppola Jewell, Hare Wynn
Newell Newton LLP.

CHSPSC, LLC, A Delaware Corporation, Northwest Arkansas
Hospitals, LLC., a Delaware Limited Liability Company &
Professional Account Services, Inc., a Tennessee Corporation,
Defendants, represented by Eric Berger -- eberger@wlj.com --
Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, LLP, Gary D. Marts, Jr. --
gmarts@wlj.com -- Wright, Lindsey & Jennings & Gordon S. Rather,
Jr.- grather@wlj.com -- Wright, Lindsey & Jennings LLP.


CITIZENS INC: Court Dismisses "Gamboa" Suit
-------------------------------------------
Judge Robert Pitman of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Texas, Austin Division, granted the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss the case, JUAN GAMBOA, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CITIZENS,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:17-CV-241-RP (W.D. Tex.).

Lead Plaintiffs Gamboa and Correy Hemingway filed the putative
class action on March 16, 2017.  Defendants Citizens, Inc.;
Harold Riley; Rick Riley; Kay Osbourn; Geoffrey Kolander; and
David Jorgensen subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was
referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge Andrew Austin for a report and
recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b) and Rule 1(d)
of Appendix C of the Local Rules.  Magistrate Judge Austin
subsequently entered a report and recommendation recommending
that Judge Pitman grants the motion in full and dismisses the
Plaintiffs' case with prejudice.

Because the report and recommendation was entered on May 7, 2018,
the Plaintiffs' objections were due by May 21, 2018.  No
objections were received.

Where no party has objected to the magistrate judge's findings,
the Judge reviews the report and recommendation for clear error.
After careful consideration, he adopts the magistrate judge's
report and recommendation.  He finds that the magistrate judge's
conclusion and recommendation are neither clearly erroneous nor
contrary to law.

For the reasons given, Judge Pitman adopted the magistrate
judge's report and recommendation as the opinion of the Court.
He granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and dismissed with
prejudice the Plaintiffs' claims against all the Defendants.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/n3PGn5 from Leagle.com.

Juan Gamboa, Individually, And On Behalf Of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Laurence Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., Phillip Kim --
pkim@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., pro hac vice &
Yusuf Ahmad Bajwa -- ybajwa@sandersbajwa.com -- Sanders Bajwa
LLP.

Citizens, Inc., Harold E. Riley, David S. Jorgensen, Geoffrey M.
Kolander, Kay E. Osbourn & Rick D. Riley, Defendants, represented
by Gerard G. Pecht -- gerard.pecht@nortonrosefulbright.com --
Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP, Mark T. Oakes --
mark.oakes@nortonrosefulbright.com -- Norton Rose Fulbright US
LLP & Peter Andrew Stokes -- peter.stokes@nortonrosefulbright.com
-- Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP.


CONVERGYS CORPORATION: "Abner" Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
----------------------------------------------------------
Shawn Abner, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Convergys Corporation, Case No. 1:18-cv-00442 (S.D.
Ohio, June 28, 2018), seeks to recover compensation, liquidated
damages, and attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 and the Kentucky Wage and Hour Act.

The Plaintiff Abner was employed by Convergys as Tech Support
from approximately 2017 until February 2018.

The Defendant Convergys is a customer management outsourcing
business, that is they operate call centers to provide customer
support on behalf of their clients. Convergys is a publicly
traded, global customer management firm operating throughout the
United States, including Cincinnati, Ohio. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Robert E. DeRose, Esq.
      Trent R. Taylor, Esq.
      BARKAN MEIZLISH HANDELMAN
      GOODIN DEROSE WENTZ, LLP
      250 E. Broad St., 10th Floor
      Columbus, OH 43215
      Tel: (614) 221-4221
      Fax: (614) 744-2300
      E-mail: bderose@barkanmeizlish.com
              ttaylor@barkanmeizlish.com


CREDIT CONTROL: Aronne Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections
--------------------------------------------------------
LARA ARONNE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CREDIT CONTROL, LLC, and JANE AND JANE
DOES NUMBERS 1 THROUGH 10, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-03744
(E.D.N.Y., June 28, 2018) seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair
and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Credit Control, LLC provides financial services. The Company
provides early out solutions, collections, and debt settlement
services. Credit Control serves customers in the State of
Missouri. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Abraham Kleinman, Esq.
          KLEINMAN LLC
          626 RXR Plaza
          Uniondale, NY 11556-0626
          Telephone: (516) 522-2621
          Facsimile: (888) 522-1692
          E-mail: akleinman@kleinmanllc.com


CREDIT CONTROL: Kendrick Sues over Debt Collection Practices
------------------------------------------------------------
Stephania Kendrick, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Credit Control, LLC, and John
Does 1-25, Case No. 1:18-cv-03770 (E.D.N.Y., June 28, 2018) seeks
to stop the Defendants' unfair and unconscionable means to
collect a debt. The case is assigned to Chief Judge Dora Lizette
Irizarry and referred to Magistrate Judge Steven M. Gold.

Credit Control, LLC provides financial services. The Company
provides early out solutions, collections, and debt settlement
services. Credit Control serves customers in the State of
Missouri. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Benjamin J. Wolf, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JOSEPH K. JONES, LLC
          555 Fifth Avenue, Suite 1700
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (646) 459-7971
          Facsimile: (646) 459-7973
          E-mail: bwolf@legaljones.com

               - and -

          Joseph Karl Jones, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF JOSEPH K. JONES, LLC
          375 Passaic Avenue, Suite 100
          Fairfield, NJ 07004
          Telephone: (973) 461-0002
          Facsimile: (974) 244-0019
          E-mail: jkj@legaljones.com


CROWDERGULF LLC: Bil-Jim Defendants in "Palmisano" Suit Dismissed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSEPH PALMISANO, et al., Plaintiff, v. CROWDERGULF,
LLC, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-cv-9371 (PGS)(TJB)
(D. N.J.), Judge Peter G. Sheridan of the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey granted Defendants James R. Johnson,
David L. Johnson, and Carolyn J. Hordichuk ("Bil-Jim
Defendants")'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint, as it
relates to the Bil-Jim Defendants.

This is a putative class action based on alleged violations of
the New Jersey Prevailing Wage Act ("PWA").  Plaintiffs
Palmisano, Jay Hajeski, Sean Wall, and Walter Everett filed the
complaint, individually and behalf of others similarly situated,
based on Defendants CrowderGulf; Bil-Jim Construction Co., Inc.;
Maple Lake, Inc.; R. Kremer and Son Marine Contractors, LLC; John
C. Ramsay; Lyman W. Ramsay, Jr.; James R. Johnson, Jr.; David L.
Johnson; and Hordichuk failure to properly pay the Plaintiffs
their prevailing wage for work they performed on public work
projects.

In January 2013, CrowderGulf entered into contracts with the
State of New Jersey to perform waterway debris removal services,
from the damage caused by Hurricane Sandy. On Feb. 28, 2013,
CrowderGulf subcontracted its work with the State to Bil-Jim,
which then subcontracted with other entities, including Kremer
Marine, to perform various services under the Sandy Project.

Plaintiffs Palmisano and Hajeski were both employees with Kremer
Marine and worked as, among other things, tug boat operators and
operator engineers on the Sandy Project.  According to the
Complaint, from May 2013 to September 2013, both worked in excess
of 40 hours per week, over 8 hours per day, more than a single
shift in a day, on weekends, and on holidays.  Similarly,
Plaintiffs Wall and Everett worked for Bil-Jim as, among other
things, mechanics and engineers on the Sandy Project. From
November 2012 to March 2013, both claimed to have worked in
excess of 40 hours per week, over 8 hours per day, more than a
single shift in a day, on weekends and on holidays.

According to the Complaint, the Sandy Project was paid entirely
out of the funds of a "public body" and involved work performed
exclusively on land owned by a public body, as within the meaning
of N.J.S.A.  Moreover, the Plaintiffs claim they did not receive
prevailing wages for the work they performed on the Sandy
Project, including but not limited to full prevailing wages,
'Shift Differentials,' PWA-defined 'Overtime,' 'Double Time' for
work performed on Sundays and Holidays, and/or other PWA benefits
-- as delineated in the PW Rate Sheets.

In addition to bringing suit against Bil-Jim, the Plaintiffs have
named as Defendants Bil-Jim's officers: President, James Johnson;
VP, David Johnson; and Secretary/Treasurer Hordichuk.  The
Plaintiffs claim that, as officers, principals, directors,
supervisors, or managers, they were responsible for Bil-Jim's
failure to comply with the PWA -- to their employees and to the
employees of their subcontractors and sub-subcontractors.

As such, Plaintiffs claim, the Defendants violated the PWA by
failing to pay Plaintiffs for the subject public work, at
prevailing wage rates ('Base' plus 'Fringe' rate), 'Shift
Differentials,' 'Overtime,' 'Double Time' for work performed on
Sundays and Holidays, and/or other PWA benefits -- all as defined
in the applicable PW Rate Sheets; and therefore the Defendants
are liable to the Plaintiffs.

The Court was presented with essentially the same factual
allegations in a related matter, Wall, et al. v. Bil-Jim
Construction Co., Inc., et al., 15-cv-8982 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2016).
In that case, the Court granted the Bil-Jim Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss for failure to state a claim.  In a written order, the
Court granted the Plaintiffs 30 days to file an amended complaint
to address these deficiencies, which they did not do.

The Bil-Jim Defendants again seek dismissal of the Plaintiffs'
Complaint, since individual liability is not permissible under
the PWA.

Judge Sheridan holds that because the Bil-Jim Defendants cannot
be held individually liable under the PWA, the Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss is granted.  Moreover, because the Court in Wall gave
the Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint, which
they failed to do so, and since the present matter has the same
deficiencies that plagued the prior cause of action, further
opportunity to amend would be futile.  Therefore, he dismisses
the Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.

The Judge briefly notes that the Plaintiffs' collateral estoppel
argument is misplaced.  The Plaintiffs seek to invoke the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to deny the Defendants' motion to
dismiss, since this issue was previously adjudicated in the Wall
case.  He says fatal to the Plaintiffs' use of the doctrine is
the fact that the Defendants prevailed in the earlier proceeding;
as such, offensive estoppel is inapplicable.  Therefore, the
Plaintiffs' equitable estoppel argument is without merit.

Having carefully reviewed and taken into consideration the
submissions of the parties, as well as the arguments and exhibits
therein presented, and for good cause shown, and for all of the
foregoing reasons, Judge Sheridan granted with prejudice the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/00p1tY from Leagle.com.

JOSEPH PALMISANO, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, JAY HAJESKI, Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, SEAN WALL, Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated & WALTER EVERETT,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by JESSICA STEIN ALLEN, KEEFE LAW FIRM &
PAUL A. DIGIORGIO, KEEFE LAW FIRM.

CROWDERGULF, LLC, JOHN C RAMSAY & LYMAN W RAMSAY JR., Defendants,
represented by JOHN F. CASEY -- jcasey@csglaw.com -- Chiesa
Shahinian & Giantomasi PC.

BIL-JIM CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. & MAPLE LAKE, INC., Defendants,
represented by GAVIN J. ROONEY -- grooney@lowenstein.com --
LOWENSTEIN SANDLER, PC, ILANA SARAH LEVIN -- ilevin@csglaw.com --
CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC, NAOMI DELEEUW BARROWCLOUGH --
nbarrowclough@lowenstein.com -- LOWENSTEIN SANDLER PC, RONALD L.
TOBIA -- rtobia@csglaw.com -- CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC &
RYAN PATRICK O'CONNOR -- roconnor@csglaw.com -- CHIESA SHAHINIAN
& GIANTOMASI PC.

R. KREMER AND SON MARINE CONTRACTORS, LLC, Defendant, represented
by RAYMOND D. BOGAN -- rbogan@lawyernjshore.com -- SINN,
FITZSIMMONS, CANTOLI, BOGAN & WEST.

R. KREMER AND SON MARINE CONTRACTORS, LLC, Cross Claimant,
represented by RAYMOND D. BOGAN, SINN, FITZSIMMONS, CANTOLI,
BOGAN & WEST.

R. KREMER AND SON MARINE CONTRACTORS, LLC, Cross Defendant,
represented by RAYMOND D. BOGAN, SINN, FITZSIMMONS, CANTOLI,
BOGAN & WEST.

BIL-JIM CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. & MAPLE LAKE, INC., Cross
Defendants, represented by GAVIN J. ROONEY, LOWENSTEIN SANDLER,
PC, ILANA SARAH LEVIN, CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC, NAOMI
DELEEUW BARROWCLOUGH, LOWENSTEIN SANDLER PC, RONALD L. TOBIA,
CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC & RYAN PATRICK O'CONNOR, CHIESA
SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC.

CROWDERGULF, LLC, JOHN C RAMSAY & LYMAN W RAMSAY JR., Cross
Defendants, represented by JOHN F. CASEY, Chiesa Shahinian &
Giantomasi PC.


CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD: Doesn't Pay OT to Appraisers, Setz Says
------------------------------------------------------------
RYAN SETZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, INC., Defendant, Case
No. ______ (D.C. Sup., June 29, 2018) is brought against the
Defendant for failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

Mr. Setz was employed by the Defendant as an appraiser from May
2017 to October 2017.

Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. provides real estate services for
owners, tenants, and investors. The company was formerly known as
DTZ Holdings plc and changed its name to Cushman & Wakefield,
Inc. in September 2015. The company was founded in 1784 and is
based in New York, New York with additional offices in the United
States and internationally. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sally J. Abrahamson, Esq.
          OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
          601 Massachusetts Avenue NW
          Washington, D.C. 20001
          Telephone: (202) 847-4400
          Facsimile: (202) 847-4410
          E-mail: sabrahamson@outtengolden.com

               - and -

          Justin M. Swartz, Esq.
          Deirde Aaron, Esq.
          OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 245-1000
          Facsimile: (646) 509-2060
          E-mail: daaron@outtengolden.com
                  jms@outtengolden.com

               - and -

          Gregg I. Shavitz, Esq.
          SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
          951 Yamato Rd., Suite 285
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (561) 447-8888
          E-mail: gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com


DEVILLE ASSET: "Begay" Suit Alleges FDCPA Violation
---------------------------------------------------
Patricia Begay, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. DeVille Asset Management, Ltd., Case No. 1:18-cv-
00615 (D. N.M., June 29, 2018), is brought against the Defendant
for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The Plaintiff is a resident in the State of New Mexico, County of
McKinley, and City of Navajo. The Plaintiff is a natural person
allegedly obligated to pay a debt.

The Defendant is an entity who at all relevant times was engaged,
by use of the mails and telephone, in the business of attempting
to collect a "debt" from the Plaintiff. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Russell S. Thompson, IV, Esq.
      Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC
      5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618
      Mesa, AZ 85206
      Tel: (602) 388-8898
      Fax: (866) 317-2674
      E-mail: rthompson@ThompsonConsumerLaw.com


DOORDASH INC: "Ontiveros" Suit Alleges Violation of FCRA
--------------------------------------------------------
DONNA ONTIVEROS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. DOORDASH, INC.; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. CGC-18-567688 (Cal.
Super., San Francisco Cty., June 27, 2018) alleges violations of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Doordash, Inc. is a Delaware corporation doing business in San
Francisco, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anthony J. Orshansky, Esq.
          Alexandria R. Kachadoorian, Esq.
          Justin Kachadoorian, Esq.
          COUNSELONE, P.C.
          9301 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 650
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 277-9945
          Facsimile: (424) 277-3727
          E-mail: anthony@counselonegroup.com
                  alexandria@counselonegroup.com
                  justin@counselonegroup.com


DR. PEPPER SNAPPLE: Fisher Sues over Ginger Ale Label
-----------------------------------------------------
SAMUEL FISHER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. DR. PEPPER SNAPPLE GROUP, INC., and DR
PEPPER/SEVEN UP, INC., Defendants, 1:18-cv-11381-MLW (D. Mass.,
June 30, 2018) alleges that the Defendants made false and
deceptive labeling in their soft drink Canada Dry Ginger Ale.

According to the complaint, the Defendants labeled the soft drink
Canada Dry Ginger Ale, as "MADE FROM REAL GINGER." This
representation leads consumers to reasonably believe that the
Defendants' soft drink is made using real ginger root -- i.e.,
the spice made by chopping or powdering the root of the ginger
plant, and that consumers who drink the soft drink will receive
the health benefits associated with consuming real ginger.

As of July 9, 2018, Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc. was acquired by
Maple Parent Holdings Corp., in a reverse merger transaction. Dr
Pepper Snapple Group, Inc. manufactures and distributes non-
alcoholic beverages in the United States, Mexico and the
Caribbean, and Canada. Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc. was
incorporated in 2007 and is headquartered in Plano, Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew T. McCrary, Esq.
          GUTRIDE SAFIER LLP
          265 Franklin St, Suite 1702
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (214) 502-2171

               - and -

          Marie A. McCrary, Esq.
          100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94114
          Telephone: (415) 639-9090


ECO CHIC LLC: Faces "Olsen" Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Eco-Chic LLC. The
case is styled as Thomas J. Olsen, individually and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Eco-Chic LLC
doing business as: Credo, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04054 (E.D.
N.Y., July 15, 2018).

Eco Chic LLC provides eco-friendly and organic cosmetics through
its website and retail stores. The company offers skincare,
makeup, hair, bath and body, fragrances, and travel products of
multiple brands. The company was founded in 2014 and is based in
San Francisco, California.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


ENAGIC USA: Has Made Solicited Calls, "Higgins" Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
VALENTINA HIGGINS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff vs. ENAGIC USA, INC., and DOES 1
through 10, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-05691-RGK-MAA (C.D.
Cal., June 27, 2018) is an action against the Defendants in
contacting the Plaintiff as well as knowingly, and willfully
contacting the Plaintiff repeatedly on her cellular telephone
without her consent in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

Enagic USA, Inc. distributes water filtration systems and
ionizers to hospitals, restaurants, and homes in the United
States. Enagic USA, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Enagic Co.,
Ltd. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John P. Kristensen, Esq.
          David L. Weisberg, Esq.
          Christina M. Le, Esq.
          K RISTENSEN  W EISBERG , LLP
          12540 Beatrice Street, Suite 200
          Los Angeles, California 90066
          Telephone: (310) 507-7924
          Facsimile: (310) 507-7906
          E-mail: john@kristensenlaw.com
                  david@kristensenlaw.com
                  christina@kristensenlaw.com


ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Court Dismisses Direct Billing Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Tampa Division, granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned STEPHEN M. QUILTY, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ENVISION HEALTHCARE
CORP., EMCARE HOLDINGS INC., EMCARE INC., and BAXLEY EMERGENCY
PHYSICIANS, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 8:18-cv-341-T-33CPT (M.D.
Fla.).

The Defendants have engaged in a corporate scheme to directly
bill insured patients for out-of-network emergency department
services, even though Florida law prohibits such conduct. The
purpose of the Defendants' actions was to raise corporate revenue
and profits at the expense of consumers who are ultimately held
accountable by Defendants for the remainder of any unpaid,
inflated bills. The Defendants and their employees do not
disclose to patients in the emergency room that the physician is
out-of-network for the patient's insurance.

Quilty initiated this putative class action against the
Defendants, asserting claims for violation of Florida's HMO and
PPO balance-billing statutes, Fla. Stat. Sections 627.64194,
641.3154, and 641.513, and Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act (FDUTPA).

The Court agrees with Defendants. Quilty was not injured by a
violation of the PPO balance-billing statute, as he did not have
a PPO plan when he was allegedly balance-billed and the PPO
balance-billing statute was not even in existence at that time.
True, in the context of putative class actions, the standing
burden is lower at the motion to dismiss stage than the class
certification stage.

Nevertheless, it is clear from the pleadings that Quilty does not
have individual standing to bring a claim based on the violation
of the PPO balance-billing statute. Quilty's attempt to cast his
injury as the same suffered by PPO-insured putative class members
is unavailing.

Therefore, Quilty does not have individual standing to bring a
claim under the PPO balance-billing statute, which precludes him
from representing class members who were allegedly billed in
violation of the PPO balance-billing statute. All Quilty's claims
are dismissed to the extent they are brought under Fla. Stat.
Section 627.64194.

Private Right of Action and Presumptive Collectability

The Defendants argue that Quilty cannot bring Count I for
violation of Florida's balance-billing statutes because these
sections do not create private rights of action.

Nowhere does Section 641.513 mention that subscribers to HMO
plans, like Quilty, may bring a claim for violation of this
section. And it is axiomatic that under Florida law, the
judiciary cannot provide a remedy for a violation of the
Insurance Code when the legislature has failed to do so.

True, one case cited by Quilty involved a Florida court finding
an implied cause of action for a healthcare provider against an
insurer for violation of Section 641.513(5). But that case is
easily distinguished. Merkle involved a healthcare provider
seeking reimbursement from an HMO for emergency medical services
it provided to the HMO's subscribers. Here, Quilty is not a
healthcare provider seeking reimbursement from an insurer. He is
a subscriber. And nothing in the language of Section 641.513
makes a healthcare provider's balance-billing a subscriber
unlawful only Section 641.3154, infra, does that.

Therefore, the language of Section 641.513 does not evince an
intent by the legislature to allow a subscriber to bring a claim
under that section against a provider for balance-billing.

Count I is dismissed in its entirety.

FDUTPA Claim

Count II for violation of FDUTPA fails because the balance-
billing statutes are exempted from FDUTPA and the Complaint's
allegations fail to state a FDUTPA claim or satisfy Rule 9(b).

The Defendants state that FDUTPA "does not apply to any person or
activity regulated under the laws administered by Florida's
Office of Insurance Regulation of the Financial Services
Commission."

Here, Quilty alleges the Defendants balance-billed him in
violation of Florida's balance-billing statutes, which are part
of Florida's Insurance Code (Chapters 624-651). The OIR has the
power to investigate and enforce the provisions of the Insurance
Code.   And the HMO Act, within the Insurance Code, specifically
addresses unfair or deceptive acts and practices to be
investigated by the OIR.

Section 641.3901 states: "No person, entity, or health
maintenance organization shall engage in this state in any trade
practice which is defined in this part as, or determined pursuant
to s. 641.3905 to be, an unfair method of competition or an
unfair or deceptive act or practice involving the business of
health maintenance organizations."

The Court agrees with the Defendants that the OIR regulates the
activity of balance-billing as it is tasked with investigating
violations of the Insurance Code, which contains the balance-
billing statutes. The fact that the Defendants are not HMOs
themselves is irrelevant. By the statutory language, the OIR is
able to investigate not only HMOs, but also other entities
including health care providers like the Defendants in order to
ensure compliance with the HMO Act. And, indeed, Section 641.3154
within the HMO Act contemplates that providers like Defendants
would be the ones balance-billing patients. Therefore, Quilty's
claim cannot be enforced through FDUTPA, as improper balance-
billing is an activity regulated by the OIR.

Because the Court finds that improper balance-billing is conduct
exempt from FDUTPA, the FDUTPA claim is dismissed.

Unjust Enrichment

The Defendants contend that Count III, for unjust enrichment,
should be dismissed because statutory violations cannot give rise
to a common law unjust enrichment claim" and the Complaint's
"allegations establish that Defendants were not unjustly
enriched."

The elements of a cause of action for unjust enrichment under
Florida law are: (1) plaintiff has conferred a benefit on the
defendant, who has knowledge thereof; (2) defendant voluntarily
accepts and retains the benefit conferred; and (3) the
circumstances are such that it would be inequitable for the
defendant to retain the benefit without paying the value thereof
to the plaintiff.

The Court agrees with the Defendants that Quilty cannot establish
an unjust enrichment claim based on violations of the HMO
balance-billing statutes, Sections 641.3154 and 641.513. The
Court has already determined that the legislature did not provide
private rights of action for violations of these sections. And a
plaintiff may not evade the Florida legislature's decision to
withhold a statutory cause of action' for a violation of the
insurance code `by asserting common law claims based on such
violations.

In short, Quilty cannot assert the common law claim of unjust
enrichment for violation of the HMO balance-billing statutes.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 31, 2017 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ychcrpnv from Leagle.com.

Stephen M. Quilty, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron Schwartz --
ASchwartz@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Voekler Cunningham & Frank, pro
hac vice, Donald R. Hall, Jr.-dhall@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox &
Kilsheimer LLP, pro hac vice, Frederic Scott Fox --
ffox@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP, pro hac vice,
Laurence D. King -- lking@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox &
Kilsheimer LLP, Marc A. Wites -- MWites@wklawyers.com -- Wites &
Kapetan, PA, Matthew George -- mgeorge@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan
Fox & Kilsheimer LLP & Thomas Bowen Rogers --
trogers@wklawyers.com -- Wites & Kapetan, PA.

Envision Healthcare Corp., Emcare Holdings Inc., Emcare Inc. &
Baxley Emergency Physicians, LLC, Defendants, represented by
David Jacobs djacobs@ebglaw.com, Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.,
pro hac vice, David M. Prager -- dprager@ebglaw.com -- Epstein
Becker & Green, P.C., pro hac vice, Jack E. Fernandez, Jr. --
jfernandez@zuckerman.com -- Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP, Jonathan M.
Brenner -- jbrenner@ebglaw.com -- Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.,
pro hac vice & Mamie Wise -- mwise@zuckerman.com -- Zuckerman
Spaeder, LLP.


EQUINOR TEXAS: Faces "Gillespie" Suit in S.D. Texas
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Equinor Texas
Onshore Properties LLC. The case is captioned as DAVID GILLESPIE,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. EQUINOR TEXAS ONSHORE PROPERTIES LLC; EQUINOR
PIPELINES LLC; EQUINOR USA ONSHORE PROPERTIES INC.; and EQUINOR
US OPERATIONS LLC, Defendants, Case No. 5:18-cv-00092 (S.D. Tex.,
June 29, 2018). The case is assigned to Judge Diana Saldana and
referred to Magistrate Judge John A Kazen.

Equinor Texas Onshore Properties LLC, a subsidiary of Equinor
ASA, is an energy company, explores for, produces, transports,
refines, and markets petroleum and petroleum-derived products,
and other forms of energy in Norway and internationally. The
parent company was formerly known as Statoil ASA and changed its
name to Equinor ASA in May 2018. Equinor ASA was founded in 1972
and is headquartered in Stavanger, Norway. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jane Swearingen Leger, Esq.
          THE FERGUSON LAW FIRM
          350 Pine St, Ste 1440
          Beaumont, TX 77701
          Telephone: (409) 832-9700

               - and -

          Layne William Walker, Esq.
          PROVOST AND UMPHREY
          490 Park
          Beaumont, TX 77701
          Telephone: (409) 835-6000
          E-mail: lwalker@pulf.com

               - and -

          Mark Sparks, Esq.
          Paul Franklin Ferguson, Jr., Esq.
          THE FERGUSON LAW FIRM
          350 Pine Street, Suite 1440
          Beaumont, TX 77701
          Telephone: (409) 832-9700
          Facsimile: (409) 832-9708
          E-mail: mark@thefergusonlawfirm.com
                  cferguson@thefergusonlawfirm.com


EQUITY RESIDENTIAL: Faces "Fischler" Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Equity Residential
Properties Management Corp. The case is styled as Brian Fischler,
individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Equity Residential Properties Management
Corp., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04032 (E.D. N.Y., July 13,
2018).

Equity Residential is a publicly traded real estate investment
trust that invests in apartments.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue
   Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


EXPERIAN INFORMATION: 9th Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in "Shaw"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN T. SHAW, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated; KENNETH COKE; RAYMOND RYDMAN, Plaintiffs-
Appellants, v. EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant-
Appellee, Case No. 16-56587 (9th Cir.), Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of
Experian on all claims.

Between 2010 and 2011, each Appellant executed a short sale on
real property that he owned.  The Appellants brought the action
against Experian because of the manner in which Experian reported
those short sales.

After receiving Experian's responses to their disputes,
Plaintiffs-Appellants Shaw, Kenneth Coke, and Raymond Rydman
filed the putative class action in June 2013 against Wells Fargo,
CitiMortgage, and Experian for violations of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act ("FCRA").

Following the stipulated dismissal of Wells Fargo and
CitiMortgage, the Appellants filed a second amended complaint
alleging three claims against Experian: (1) a reasonable
procedures claim pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 1681e; (2) a
reasonable reinvestigation claim pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section
1681i; and (3) a file disclosure claim pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
Section 1681g.  They requested damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
Section 1681n.  The case was stayed pending the Supreme Court's
resolution of Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 135 S.Ct. 1892 (2015).
After the Court issued its decision in Spokeo, and the stay was
lifted, Experian moved for summary judgment.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Experian,
and held: First, the Appellants' reasonable procedures and
reasonable reinvestigation claims failed because they had not
shown that their credit reports were inaccurate.  Second, their
file disclosure claim failed because they did not articulate what
information Experian failed to disclose to them.  Third, the
Appellants failed to establish that Experian willfully violated
the FCRA pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Section 1681n.  The Appellants
timely appealed.

Judge Smith finds that the Appellants fail to point to any
inaccuracies on their credit reports.  Because they fail to meet
this threshold burden, he needs not consider whether Experian had
reasonable procedures or conducted reasonable reinvestigations
when Appellants disputed their credit information.  He therefore
affirms the district court's grant of summary judgment with
regard to the Appellants' reasonable procedures and reasonable
reinvestigation claims.

The Judge also finds that the Appellants' failure to disclose
claim fails because Experian clearly and accurately disclosed to
the Appellants all information that Experian recorded and
retained that might be reflected in a consumer report.  The
Appellants received complete copies of their consumer reports.
They are not entitled by the FCRA to information that is not in
their report, and they fail to identify what information Experian
improperly excluded from its disclosures.  He therefore affirms
the district court's grant of summary judgment with regard to the
Appellants' failure to disclose claim.

The Appellants similarly fail to show willfulness as to their
failure to disclose claim.  Even if Experian had violated Section
1681g, the Judge cannot say that Experian acted in an objectively
unreasonable manner.  Experian's decision not to list code 9 in
its consumer disclosures was not objectively unreasonable because
the only relevant guidance dictated that consumers are entitled
to complete copies of their consumer reports, not their entire
files in whatever form maintained by the CRA.  Nor have the
Appellants pointed to any authority indicating that it was
objectively unreasonable for Experian to include the same
information in credit reports and consumer disclosures but in
different fields or locations.  The Judge does not so conclude
now.  Therefore, the Appellants have failed to show willfulness
by Experian as required by 15 U.S.C. Section 1681n.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Smith affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Experian.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's May 29, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/cMEqzD from Leagle.com.

Guerino John Cento -- cento@centolaw.com -- (argued), Cento Law
LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana; Matthew J. Zevin -- mzevin@aol.com --
Stanley Law Group, San Diego, California; for Plaintiffs-
Appellants.

Adam Wiers -- awwiers@jonesday.com -- (argued), Jones Day,
Chicago, Illinois; Kelly V. O'Donnell -- kodonnell@jonesday.com -
- Jones Day, San Diego, California; for Defendant-Appellee.


EXPERIAN INFO: Espinoza Bid to Subpoena LexisNexis Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------
Wendy Espinoza, plaintiff in a class action lawsuit against
Experian Information Solutions, Inc., has asked the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia to grant her Motion To
Compel And To Enforce Subpoena Against Non-Party LexisNexis Risk
Data Management, Inc.

The Motion is pending before Magistrate Judge Linda T. Walker.

On June 29, LexisNexis filed its response in opposition to the
Motion.  On July 9, 2018, Espinoza filed a Reply Brief in support
of the Motion.

Espinoza is asking the Court in Atlanta, Georgia, to issue an
order:

     1. overruling Non-Party LexisNexis Risk Data Management,
        Inc.'s objections to Plaintiff's Subpoena to Produce
        Documents;

     2. directing LexisNexis to comply with Plaintiff's Subpoena
        to Produce Documents, and produce all documents sought
        therein; and

     3. directing LexisNexis to comply with the Plaintiff's
        Subpoena for a Deposition and produce a witness on a date
        and time certain at the convenience of the Plaintiff.

The class action lawsuit is captioned as, ESPINOZA v. EXPERIAN
INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC., No. CV-17-01977-PHX-DLR (D. Ariz.).

The Subpoena proceeding is captioned as, IN RE: MOTION TO COMPEL
LEXISNEXIS RISK DATA MANAGEMENT INC., PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND
DESIGNATION OF A CORPORATE WITNESS PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P.
45, Case No. 1:18-mi-00068-RWS-LTW (N.D. Ga., June 15, 2018).

The case is assigned to Judge Richard W. Story and referred to
Magistrate Judge Linda T. Walker.

Experian Information Solutions, Inc., an information services
company, provides information, analytical, and marketing services
to organizations and consumers to manage risk and reward of
commercial and financial decisions. Experian Information
Solutions, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Experian plc. [BN]

Espinoza is represented by:

     Craig Edward Bertschi, Esq.
     McRAE BERTSCHI & COLE, LLC
     Suite 200 1350 Center Drive
     Dunwoody, GA 30338
     Tel: (678) 999-1102
     E-mail: ceb@mcraebertschi.com

LexisNexis is represented by:

     Timothy Allen Butler, Esq.
     TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP
     600 Peachtree St., NE
     Atlanta, GA 30308-2216
     Tel: (450) 656-3300
     E-mail: timothy.butler@troutmansanders.com


FACEBOOK INC: Bid to Stay Biometric Info Privacy Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge James Donato of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California denied Facebook's motion to stay the case,
IN RE FACEBOOK BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY LITIGATION. THIS
DOCUMENT RELATES TO: ALL ACTIONS, Case No. 3:15-cv-03747-JD (N.D.
Cal.).

Defendant Facebook has requested a complete stay of the case
pending the Ninth Circuit's decision on whether to accept
interlocutory review of the Court's order certifying a class for
trial.  Facebook filed it on May 7, 2018, and noticed a hearing
on it for June 14, 2018 under the usual 35-day notice period
provided for in Civil Local Rule 7-2(a).

The Plaintiffs filed an opposition under that timeline on May 21,
2018.  Facebook then filed a short reply on May 22, 2018, along
with a request to advance the stay hearing to May 24, 2018.  It
appears Facebook filed a stay request directly with the Ninth
Circuit, too, without the benefit of the Court's disposition of
the request.

As an initial matter, Judge Donato finds that Facebook
misapprehends the governing standards for a stay.  The Court's
analysis is controlled by Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009),
and Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2011).  He says
Facebook departs from these standards by focusing almost
exclusively on the merits of the Court's class certification
decision and making virtually no showing at all on the critical
element of irreparable harm.  Its main arguments about harm are
that a trial might be expensive, and sending notice to the class
in advance of the trial will embarrass it and inflict
"reputational" injury. Neither point comes close to warranting a
stay.

Facebook's concerns about the expense of trial are particularly
thin.  The sum total of this argument is the unadorned statement
that a trial could cost a lot of money and might result in a
substantial award of damages.  Facebook has not identified
anything that would make this case stand out in terms of trial
duration or costs.  More broadly, Facebook's trial expense
argument is based on a faulty proposition.  Every party going to
trial faces the same cost issue Facebook raises, albeit typically
without Facebook's deep financial resources, and Facebook offers
no reason why it should be treated differently and afforded a
stay.  The risk of a large judgment does not change that
conclusion.

Facebook's concern about reputational injury is equally
unpersuasive.  It is hardly a secret that Facebook is being sued
for alleged violations of the Biometric Information Privacy Act
and that a jury trial has been set.  Facebook also appears to
believe that notifying the class members via two of its user
notification channels would cause untoward embarrassment. That
goes too far.  Facebook is an online business that routinely
communicates with users through online notifications about a
myriad of topics.  It ill suits Facebook to complain about
sticking with that routine communication protocol to give class
notice and opt-out information.

Facebook's concern that notifying the class members now might
cause confusion later is also overblown.  Facebook has not
proffered any evidence indicating that class members would be
left in a state of disarray and befuddlement, as it suggests, if
developments during trial or post-trial appellate review resulted
in a change to or decertification of the class.  Common sense
strongly advises to the contrary.  The Judge holds that it is
highly doubtful any class member would be unable to understand
subsequent changes in the case, or be thrown into confusion by
such an event.

He says these points are the only things Facebook offers as
possible irreparable harm, and their insufficiency necessitates
the denial of their stay request.  In addition, the Court
expressed its concern in the order denying summary judgment that
Facebook's challenge to the certification order is based upon a
misrepresentation of the Court's reasoning and analysis.  The
merits discussion in the stay request makes the same mistake.

The case has been pending since 2015 and is one of the Court's
oldest open matters.  The parties have litigated it heavily, and
the Court has heard and decided two motions to dismiss, three
motions for summary judgment, a class certification motion,
multiple discovery disputes, and other matters.  Discovery closed
many months ago and the expert witness work is done.  The case is
ripe for trial, and Judge Donato denied Facebook's last-minute
request to derail that.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/pweC6X from Leagle.com.

Nimesh Patel, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Paul Jeffrey Geller --
Pgeller@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice, Alexander Nguyenn -- anguyen@edelson.com -- Edelson P.C.,
Amanda M. Frame, Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, Christopher
Chagas Gold -- cgold@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman Dowd
LLP, Frank Anthony Richter -- fritcher@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd, John Hamilton George -- jgeorge@rgrdlaw.com
-- Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, Mark J. Dearman --
mdearman@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, pro
hac vice, Rafey Sarkis Balabanian -- rbalabanian@edelson.com --
Edelson PC, pro hac vice, Shawn A. Williams -- shawnw@rgrdlaw.com
-- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Stuart Andrew Davidson --
Sdavidson@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro
hac vice & James E. Barz -- jbarz@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP.

ADAM PEZEN, Plaintiff, represented by Corban S. Rhodes --
crhodes@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow LLP, pro hac vice, Joel
H. Bernstein -- jbernstein@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow LLP,
pro hac vice, Lawrence A. Sucharow -- lsucharow@labaton.com --
Labaton Sucharow LLP, pro hac vice, Ross M. Kamhi --
rkamhi@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow Llp, pro hac vice, Shawn
A. Williams, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Alexander Nguyen ,
Edelson P.C., Amanda M. Frame, Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd
LLP, Ellen Anne Gusikoff-Stewart, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP, Lucas F. Olts, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Mark R.
Winston, Labaton Sucharow LLP, pro hac vice, Michael P. Canty,
Labaton Sucharow LLP, pro hac vice, Patrick J. Coughlin, Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Rafey Sarkis Balabania , Edelson PC,
Randi D. Bandman, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Stuart
Andrew Davidson, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Carlo Licata, Plaintiff, represented by Jay Edelson --
jedelson@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Shawn A. Williams, Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Alexander Nguyen , Edelson P.C., Amanda
M. Frame, Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, Ellen Anne
Gusikoff-Stewart, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Lucas F.
Olts, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Mark R. Winston, Labaton
Sucharow LLP, pro hac vice, Michael P. Canty, Labaton Sucharow
LLP, pro hac vice, Patrick J. Coughlin, Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP, Rafey Sarkis Balabania, Edelson PC, Randi D. Bandman,
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Stuart Andrew Davidson,
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Facebook Inc., Defendant, represented by Vincent J. Connelly --
vconnelly@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, Archis Ashok
Parasharami -- aparasharami@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP,
pro hac vice, Archis Ashok Parasharami, Mayer Brown LLP, John
Nadolenco -- jnadolenco@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, Lauren
R. Goldman -- lrgoldman@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown Llp, pro
hac vice, Matthew David Provance -- mprovance@mayerbrown.com --
Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice, Michael E. Rayfield --
mrayfield@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice &
Vincent Connelly, Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice.

Frederick William Gullen, Interested Party, represented by David
Philip Milian -- dmilian@careyrodriguez.com -- Carey Rodriguez
Milian Gonya LLP & Frank S. Hedin, Hedin Hall LLP.

Clayton P. Zellmer, Interested Party, represented by Albert Y.
Chang -- mail@bottinilaw.com -- Bottini and Bottini, Inc..


FAIRMOUNT SANTROL: Fitzgibbon Sues Over Unimin Merger Deal
----------------------------------------------------------
Jeffrey Fitzgibbon, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Fairmount Santrol Holdings
Inc., Jenniffer D. Deckard, Matthew F. Lebaron, William E.
Conway, Michael G. Fisch, Charles D. Fowler, Stephen J. Hadden,
Michael C. Kearney, William P. Kelly, Michael E. Sand and
Lawrence N. Schultz, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-01095 (N.D. Ohio,
May 11, 2018), seeks to enjoin defendants and all persons acting
in concert with them from proceeding with, consummating or
closing the merger between Fairmount and Unimin Corporation, a
subsidiary of SCR-Sibelco NV; and rescinding it in the event
defendants consummate the merger.  The lawsuit also seeks
rescissory damages, costs of this action, including reasonable
allowance for plaintiff's attorneys' and experts' fees and such
other and further relief under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.

Each share of Fairmount's common stock will be converted into the
right to receive the number of shares of Unimin common stock that
will result in the holders of Fairmount Common Stock, together
with the holders of certain Fairmount equity awards, owning 35%
of the Unimin Common Stock and an amount in cash equal to
$170,000,000 divided by the fully diluted Fairmount Share Number,
without interest.

Fairmount provides high-performance sand and sand-based product
solutions used by oil and gas exploration and production
companies to enhance the productivity of their wells. Fairmount
common shares are listed and traded on the NYSE under the ticker
symbol "SXE."

Unimin produces non-metallic industrial minerals for industrial,
manufacturing, and commercial applications in North America.

According to the complaint, the proxy statement failed to provide
a tangible value for the merger consideration that Fairmount
shareholders could use to serve as a cognizable comparison. It is
instead presented in terms of the Exchange Ratio, plus cash and
does not adequately quantify to shareholders what they will be
receiving in exchange for their shares of stock -- which was
trading around $5 per share prior the deal announcement. The
Proxy also failed to provide Total Enterprise Value projections
for both Fairmount and Unimin, says the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Daniel R. Karon, Esq.
      Beau D. Hollowell, Esq.
      KARON LLC
      700 W. St. Clair Ave., Suite 200
      Cleveland, OH 44113
      Tel: (216) 622-1851
      Fax: (216) 241-8175
      Email: dkaron@karonllc.com
             bhollowell@karonllc.com

             - and -

      Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
      MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
      The Empire State Building
      350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4405
      New York, NY 10118
      Tel: (212) 971-1341
      Fax: (212) 202-7880
      Email: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com


FEDERAL EMERGENCY: Asencio Sues over Temporary Housing Programs
---------------------------------------------------------------
ALIAN ASENCIO, ARACELIS VELEZ, DENISE NIEVES, YARITZA DE JESUS
LOPEZ, ROSA RIVERA, ZOR ANGEL MOJICA, ANGEL LAURIANO MU•OZ DE
JESUS, BETHZAIDA CRESPO VICENTE, and IRIS OTERO, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. FEDERAL
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, WILLIAM BROCK LONG, THOMAS VAN
ESSEN, AND ALEJANDRO DE LA CAMPA, ET AL., Defendants, Case No.
4:18-cv-40111-TSH (D. Mass., June 30, 2018) seeks to enjoin the
Defendants from terminating the TSA Program pending further order
from the Court; require the Defendants to notify all hotels,
motels or other facilities subject to the TSA program which have
been providing housing for Hurricane Maria evacuees, that any
prior notice of termination has been immediately withdrawn and
revoked; require the Defendants to continue to extend the TSA
program and provide housing and shelter to Hurricane Maria
evacuees pending further order from the Court; require the
Defendants to continue to accept and process all applications for
Temporary Housing Assistance from Temporary Housing Assistance
evacuees pending further order from the Court; and require the
Defendants to notify applicants and class members concerning all
forms of THA available to them and the criteria and conditions
applicable to such assistance.

Federal Emergency Management Agency is a government organization.
The organization is based in Washington, District Of Columbia.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Hector E. Pineiro, Esq.
          Robert A. Scott, Esq.
          HECTOR E. PINEIRO LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          807 Main Street
          Worcester, MA 01610
          Telephone: (508) 770-0600
          E-mail: hector@pineirolegal.com
                  robin@pineirolegal.com

               - and -

          Craig J. de Recat, Esq.
          Justin Jones Rodriguez, Esq.
          Eve L. Torres, Esq.
          MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP
          11355 West Olympic Boulevard
          Los Angeles, CA 90064
          Telephone: (310) 312-4000

               - and -

          Brett Natarelli, Esq.
          20 N. Clark Street, Suite 3300
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 626-1813

               - and -

          Jose Perez, Esq.
          Natasha Bannan, Esq.
          LATINOJUSTICE PRLDEF
          99 Hudson Street, 14th Floor
          New York, NY 10013
          Telephone: (212) 219-3360

               - and -

          Kira Romero-Craft, Esq.
          523 West Colonial Drive
          Orlando, FL 32804
          Telephone: (321) 418-6354


FINANCIAL ASSET: Faces "Morgan" Suit in D. New Jersey
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Financial Asset
Management Systems, Inc. The case is styled as Raven Morgan, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Financial Asset Management Systems, Inc, Defendant, Case No.
3:18-cv-11597 (D. N.J., July 13, 2018).

Financial Asset Management Systems, Inc. provides customized
receivables management services primarily in the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


FIRST CREDIT SERVICES: Gigiolia Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections
-----------------------------------------------------------------
NICOLAS GIGIOLIO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. FIRST CREDIT SERVICES, INC.
D/B/A ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE TECHNOLOGIES, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-
cv-04518 (N.D. Ill., June 28, 2018) seeks to stop the Defendant's
unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt. The case is
assigned to the Honorable Judge Jorge L. Alonso.

First Credit Services, Inc., doing business as Accounts
Receivable Technologies, provides accounts receivable and revenue
cycle management services. The company was founded in 1993 and is
based in Woodbridge, New Jersey. First Credit Services, Inc.
operates as a subsidiary of Spiegel Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Celetha Chatman, Esq.
          COMMUNITY LAWYERS GROUP, LTD.
          73 W. Monroe Street, Suite 502
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 757-1880
          E-mail: cchatman@communitylawyersgroup.com


FORBES ASSOCIATES: Faces "Bieler" Suit in M.D. Tennessee
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Forbes Associates,
Inc. The case is styled as Laurel Bieler, individually and on
behalf of similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff v. Forbes
Associates, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-00642 (M.D. Tenn.,
July 13, 2018).

Forbes Associates Corporation is a privately held company in
Garden Grove, CA and is a Single Location business. Categorized
under Financial Consultants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Susan S. Lafferty, Esq.
   Lafferty Law Firm, P.C.
   555 Marriott Dr., Suite 315
   Nashville, TN 37214
   Tel: (615) 492-1199
   Email: susanl@laffertylawonline.com


GEICO INSURANCE: Johnson Sues Over Insurance Benefit Reduction
--------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Johnson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. GEICO Insurance Company and GEICO Choice
Insurance Company, Defendants, Case No. CV-18-897594 (Ohio Comm.
Pleas, May 11, 2018), seeks injunctive and other equitable
relief, as well as an award of appropriate damages, compensatory
damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees and such
other and further relief resulting from breach of contract.

Geico is in the business of selling automobiles insurance to
consumers. Johnson purchased automobile insurance from Geico
Insurance.

On August 30, 2017, Johnson was involved in a motor vehicle
accident and sought treatment at the Cleveland Clinic emergency
room. Geico deducted $665 from his treatment dues based upon the
allegation that the charges exceeded an amount that is reasonable
when compared to the charges of other providers in the same
geographic area despite nothing in his policy that allows for
such a reduction. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      James S. Wertheim, Esq.
      JAMES S. WERTHEIM LLC
      24700 Chagrin Blvd., Suite 309
      Beachwood, OH 44122
      Tel: (216) 902-1719
      Email: wertheimjim@gmail.com


GENERATIONS FEDERAL: 4th Cir. Affirms Sanctions Against Attorneys
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the
sanctions against three attorneys and their law firm in the case
captioned  STEPHEN SIX; DARREN T. KAPLAN; J. AUSTIN MOORE; STUEVE
SIEGEL HANSON LLP; DARREN KAPLAN LAW FIRM, P.C., Appellants, and
JAMES DILLON, Plaintiff, v. GENERATIONS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,
Defendant-Appellee, and BMO HARRIS BANK, N.A.; FOUR OAKS BANK &
TRUST COMPANY; BAY CITIES BANK, Defendants. LAW PROFESSORS,
Amicus Supporting Appellants, No. 17-1548. (4th Cir.).

Dillon filed a putative class action on behalf of a class and
sub-class of borrowers against several non-lender banks whose
only roles were processing loan-related transactions through the
Automatic Clearing House network. Dillon sought to impose
liability on these non-lender banks, who were not parties to the
loan agreements, for providing aid to online lenders in violation
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act as well
as several state laws. Generations Community Federal Credit Union
(Generations) processed debit transactions from Dillon's bank
account under the Western Sky loan agreement. Dillon alleged that
Generations derived a benefit through the receipt of fees" from
the allegedly usurious loans by processing these debit
transactions.

Attorneys Stephen Six, J. Austin Moore, and Darren T. Kaplan,
among others, represented Dillon in his suit. Six and Moore are a
partner and associate attorney, respectively, at the Steuve
Siegel Hanson LLP law firm. Kaplan is the principal shareholder
of Darren Kaplan Law Firm, P.C.

Generations promptly moved to dismiss Dillon's complaint, arguing
that the Western Sky loan agreement's arbitration, forum-
selection, and choice-of-law clauses each justified dismissal.
Generations attached a copy of the Western Sky loan agreement as
an exhibit to its motion.

Dillon opposed Generations's motion to dismiss on grounds that
can most charitably be described as ambiguous. Of relevance to
the dispute that would follow, Dillon challenged Generations's
reliance on the Western Sky loan agreement because it originated
online and does not bear Plaintiff's signature or any signature
and Defendant fails to offer any explanation as to how it came
into possession of the Loan Agreement or whether it is authentic.

At this stage, Generations knew that (1) Dillon and his attorneys
no longer challenged the authenticity of the loan agreement, and
that (2) a copy of the agreement had been in Dillon's possession
for some time. However, Generations did not know that Dillon's
attorneys had also possessed the same document since before
filing the complaint. A forensic investigation of Dillon's laptop
computer revealed that Dillon had provided his copy of the
Western Sky loan agreement to his attorneys on October 1, 2013
one week before the original complaint in the suit was filed.
Moore later confirmed that Dillon had faxed the document to
Moore's attention on October 1, 2013.

Generations moved for sanctions under the district court's
inherent authority and 28 U.S.C. Section 1927. Generations argued
that the existence of the Dillon copy rendered Dillon's
attorneys' authenticity arguments disingenuous and in bad faith,
misleading to the court, and calculated to obstruct and multiply
the proceedings. Generations sought compensation for the
attorney's fees and costs incurred because of the added years of
litigation stemming from Dillon's attorneys' bad-faith challenges
to the authenticity of the Western Sky loan agreement.

The district court granted Generations's motion for sanctions,
finding that Six, Kaplan, and Moore acted in bad faith and
vexatiously and violated their duty of candor by hiding a
relevant and potentially dispositive document from the Court in
connection with a long-running dispute over arbitrability.

The Fourth Circuit reviews for abuse of discretion a district
court's award of sanctions, both pursuant to its inherent
authority, and under 28 U.S.C. Section 1927. The Court will not
find an abuse of discretion unless on the entire evidence the
Court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.

Here, the court invoked its inherent authority to create a remedy
to address bad-faith behavior that abused the judicial process.
As the court explained: "Counsel raised a dispute over the
authenticity of a written contract proffered by Generations
without disclosing that their client, the plaintiff, possessed an
identical copy. The Dillon Copy was material to and potentially
dispositive of the authenticity issue. During oral argument, Mr.
Six implied to the Court that Counsel had no such copy and that
no such copy existed. Mr. Six deliberately misled the Court in an
effort to avoid the consequences of an arbitration clause in the
contract, and none of his co-counsel corrected this misleading
argument."

The sanctioned attorneys argue that neither the rules of ethics
nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposed an affirmative
duty to disclose the Dillon copy of the Western Sky loan
agreement before discovery commenced. These arguments miss the
point.  Counsel are not being sanctioned for their failure to
disclose the Dillon copy of the Western Sky loan agreement.
Rather, counsel are being sanctioned for raising objections in
bad faith simultaneously questioning and encouraging the district
court to question the authenticity of a loan agreement without
disclosing that the Plaintiff provided them a copy of that loan
agreement before the complaint was filed.

The Fourth Circuit finds that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in imposing sanctions on Dillon's attorneys. The
Court therefore affirms.

A full-text copy of the Fourth Circuit's May 31, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybhnr6o7 from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Kannon K. Shanmugam -- kshanmugam@wc.com -- WILLIAMS &
CONNOLLY, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants.

Leslie Sara Hyman -- LHyman@pulmanlaw.com -- PULMAN, CAPPUCCIO,
PULLEN, BENSON & JONES, LLP, San Antonio, Texas, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:  -- jwilliams@wc.com -- William T. Marks --
wmarks@wc.com -- WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY, LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Appellants.

Eric A. Pullen, PULMAN, CAPPUCCIO, PULLEN, BENSON & JONES, LLP,
Reid C. Adams, Jr.  -- cal.adams@wbd-us.com -- Jonathan R. Reich-
jonathan.reich@wbd-us.com -- WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE,
LLP, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.

David C. Frederick -- dfrederick@kellogghansesn.com -, Minsuk Han
-- mhan@kellogghansen.com -- Jacob E. Hartman --
jhartman@kellogghansen.com -KELLOGG, HANSEN, TODD, FIGEL &
FREDERICK, P.L.L.C., Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae.


GLOBAL CREDIT: Young Sues over Debt Collection Practices
--------------------------------------------------------
GEOFFREY YOUNG, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GLOBAL CREDIT & COLLECTION
CORP., and PYOD, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-04494 (N.D.,
Ill., June 27, 2018) seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and
unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Global Credit & Collection Inc. provides customer and account
receivable management services. Global Credit & Collection Inc.
was founded in 1999 and is based in Markham, Canada with
locations in Canada, Latin America, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Russell S. Thompson IV, Esq.
          Joseph Panvini, Esq.
          THOMPSON CONSUMER LAW GROUP, PLLC
          5235 E. Southern Ave D106-618
          Mesa, AZ 85206
          Telephone: (602) 388-8898
          Facsimile: (866) 317-2674
          E-mail: rthompson@ThompsonConsumerLaw.com
                  jpanvini@ThompsonConsumerLaw.com


GOLUB CORPORATION: "Austin" Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Maria Austin, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. The Golub Corporation, Case No. 1:18-cv-00778 (N.D.
N.Y., June 29, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid wages, unpaid
overtime, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs, and all other appropriate legal and equitable relief under
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York State Labor Law.

The Plaintiff resides in the County of Ulster, in the State of
New York.  The Plaintiff was hired in 1992 as a "Loss Prevention
Officer" by the Defendant and then her job title was changed
around January 2014 to "Loss Prevention Manager" by the
Defendant.  Her job duties remained the same.  The Plaintiff is a
current employee of Defendant.

The Defendant, The Golub Corporation is a Delaware corporation.
The Golub Corporation, through its subsidiaries, operates
discount supermarkets under the Price Chopper, Market 32 and
Market Bistro banners.  It offers products in the areas of
pharmaceuticals, meat, flowers, cheeses, seafood, and deli
products.  The company is based in Schenectady, New York and has
locations in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Vermont. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Brian J. LaClair, Esq.
      BLITMAN & KING LLP
      Franklin Center, Suite 300
      443 North Franklin Street
      Syracuse, NY 13204-5412
      Tel: (315) 422-7111
      Fax: (315) 471-2623
      E-mail: bjlaclair@bklawyers.com


GREEN APPLE: Faces "Martinez" Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Green Apple Gourmet
Inc. The case is styled as Fernando Velasquez-Martinez and Miguel
Rueda Sanchez, on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs
v. Green Apple Gourmet Inc. doing business as: Green Apple
Gourmet Food formerly doing business as EZ Deli, Eric King, Min J
Cho, Hector Perez and Popy Doe, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-
06366 (S.D. N.Y., July 13, 2018).

Green Apple Gourmet Inc is a grocery store with a deli prepping
breakfast, homestyle sandwiches & Lebanese salads.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear PRO SE.


GREYSTAR REAL: Faces "Fischler" Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Greystar Real
Estate Partners, LLC. The case is styled as Brian Fischler,
individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC and
Greystar Management Services, L.P., Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-
04049 (E.D. N.Y., July 13, 2018).

Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC provides real estate services.
The Company offers property management, financial services,
investment advisory, capital renovation, asset management,
development, and construction services. Greystar Real Estate
Partners serves customers worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue
   Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


GROSS POLOWY: "Bayer" Suit Seeks Damages under FDCPA
----------------------------------------------------
Benzion Bayer, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Gross Polowy, LLC, Ditech Financial, LLC, and John
Does 1-25, Case No. 7:18-cv-05874 (S.D. N.Y., June 28, 2018),
seeks damages and declaratory and injunctive relief under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The Plaintiff is a resident of the State of New York, County of
Rockland, residing at 304 Wilson Avenue, Spring Valley, NY,
10977.

The Defendant Gross Polowy LLC is a "debt collector" with an
address for service in New York at Corporation Service Company,
80 State Street Albany, NY, 12207.

The Defendant Ditech Financial LLC is a "debt collector" with an
address for service in New York at CT Corporation System, 111 8th
Ave, New York, NY, 10011.  [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Daniel Kohn, Esq.
      STEIN SAKS, PLLC
      285 Passaic Street
      Hackensack, NJ 07601
      Tel: (201) 282-6500
      Fax: (201) 282-6501


HOME DEPOT: Court Narrows Claims in Mahogany Board Fraud Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss the case captioned CLYDE GOLDEN, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HOME
DEPOT, U.S.A, INC., Defendant, No. 1:18-cv-00033-LJO-JLT (E.D.
Cal.).

The Plaintiff purchased several strips of wood from a Home Depot
location on Ming Road in Bakersfield, California. The wood was
sold as mahogany board, and the Plaintiff paid $3.52 per strip,
plus a state lumber fee and tax. Unnamed employees of Home Depot
told the Plaintiff that he was purchasing authentic, genuine
mahogany. The Plaintiff later tested the wood strips and learned
that they were made of Swamp mahogany. Swamp mahogany is less
valuable than genuine, authentic mahogany.

The Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: (1)
declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. Section 2201; (2) breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3)
violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA);
(4) violations of California's Unfair Competition Laws (UCL)
prohibiting unfair, (5) unlawful, and (6) fraudulent business
practices; (7) violation of California's false advertising laws
(FAL); (8) negligent misrepresentation; (9) unjust enrichment;
and (10) breach of express warranty.

The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff has not alleged why he
believes the wood sold by and purchased from Home Depot was
falsely represented to be mahogany.  The Defendant argues that
the Plaintiff did not justifiably rely on any representation by
Home Depot that the wood sold was of a superior grade than what
he purchased because Home Depot marketed the lumber as Swamp
mahogany and priced it well below what the Plaintiff would have
expected to pay for authentic mahogany.

Falseness

The Defendant argues that all of the Plaintiff's claims fail
because he has not alleged facts establish that Home Depot's
marketing of non-Meliaceae woods as mahogany was a false
representation.

A plaintiff alleging fraud must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged
generally.

The Defendant's argument that the Plaintiff has not alleged
sufficiently that Home Depot falsely represented its lumber
products as mahogany fails. The Court finds that Complaint
contains sufficiently detailed allegations regarding the
characteristics of wood from trees in the Meliaceae family and
those of wood from other species sold as Swamp, Santos, and Red
mahogany to conclude that genuine mahogany is a different product
in important ways from Swamp, Santos, and Red mahogany.

The Complaint also alleges that only wood from Meliaceae family
trees can truly be called mahogany and that wood derived from
other species and sold by Home Depot is not mahogany. Plaintiff
has alleged sufficient facts to support his claim that only wood
from certain species in the Meliaceae family is genuine mahogany.
Assuming the Plaintiff's allegations to be true, as the Court
must at the motion to dismiss stage, it follows from the
assertion that non-Meliaceae woods are not genuine mahogany, and
that advertising such lumber as mahogany is a false statement.

Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to
allege falseness and failure to meet the Rule 9(b) pleading
standard is denied.

Justifiable Reliance

The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff did not justifiably
rely on any misrepresentation because he should have investigated
the label Swamp mahogany and should have been alerted by the low
price of Home Depot's lumber that he was not purchasing genuine
mahogany.

The Plaintiff has not advanced any claim for common law fraud in
this matter. Justifiable reliance simply is not an element that
must be pled in all claims sounding in fraud under Rule 9(b).
Certain claims which sound in fraud may have justifiable reliance
as an element, and all fraud claims when brought in this Circuit
must meet Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement but Rule 9(b)
functions independently of the specific elements which must be
pled to state a given claim. Defendant has not specified which,
if any, of the Plaintiff's particular claims have justifiable
reliance as an element in this matter.

Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis that
Plaintiff has not pled justifiable reliance is denied.

Reasonable Consumer

The Defendant challenges the Plaintiff's claims under the CLRA,
UCL, and FAL, arguing that Plaintiff has not alleged facts
showing that a reasonable consumer would likely be deceived by
the term "mahogany" as used by Home Depot in its labeling.

The Plaintiff argues in response that Home Depot's advertising
statements are not puffery and are actionable because they are
specific detailed factual assertions.

The descriptor premium may be, in at least some contexts, puffery
that does not convey a specific, measurable promise about the
goods advertised. The Plaintiff's claims are not premised,
however, only on the usage of vague adjectives to describe the
general quality of Home Depot's lumber. The thrust of the
Plaintiff's complaint is that Home Depot's use of the word
mahogany was itself misleading, and that, in the context that
they were used, the words premium and finest grade supported
consumers' impressions that they were purchasing a more valuable
or useful type of wood than they actually did.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Home Depot's representations,
as alleged by the Plaintiff, could have misled a reasonable
consumer, and the Defendant's motion to dismiss on this ground is
denied.

Factual Challenges to Particular Claims

Claim 2: Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff has not alleged facts
supporting his contention that Home Depot knew or deliberately
disregarded the fact that it sold false mahoganies and that the
Plaintiff's expectations regarding the species of the mahogany
purchased were unreasonable, and the Plaintiff has therefore
failed to state a claim for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.

The Plaintiff's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is premised on the allegation that Home Depot
knew or deliberately disregarded the fact that the lumber
products it sold to the Plaintiff was a false mahogany. The
Plaintiff has not alleged, however, that the Defendant took any
action to frustrate the Plaintiff's ability to enjoy the benefits
of the contract, that is, use of the wood he purchased, but
rather alleges that the Defendant misrepresented the type and
quality of the wood and so induced Plaintiff to pay more than he
otherwise would have. This type of conduct is not actionable as a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing

The Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's claim for
breach of good faith and fair dealing is therefore granted.

Claims 3 and 5: CLRA and UCL Unlawfulness

The Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff failed to allege either
that an issue of product safety required Home Depot to disclose
the species of the wood it sold as mahogany, or that Home Depot
made an affirmative misrepresentation of the species, and
therefore has not pled all the required elements for a CLRA and
UCL unlawfulness claim.

The Plaintiff argues that he has alleged a material
misrepresentation, and that his UCL and CLRA claims do not
require any showing of intent.

The Plaintiff has alleged that the Defendant represented that its
lumber products were mahogany and failed to disclose that the
actual species of the wood sold was not mahogany. Taking the
Plaintiff's allegations regarding the species of tree that are
considered to be genuine mahogany as true, this allegation is
sufficient to state a claim under the CLRA that there was an
omission which was contrary to a representation made by Defendant
and which was likely to mislead a consumer.

The Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's CLRA and UCL
unlawfulness claims is denied.

Claim 8: Negligent Misrepresentation

The Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff has not alleged a viable
negligent misrepresentation claim because California's economic
loss rule bars such a claim when premised on a breach of
contract.
The Plaintiff has not advanced any argument why the economic loss
doctrine does not bar his claim for negligent misrepresentation.
He has also not identified any injury not purely economic in
nature, or any other special relationship or situation which
would warrant an exception to the economic loss rule.  The Court
finds that the economic loss rule bars the Plaintiff's negligent
misrepresentation claim, and the Defendant's motion to dismiss
that claim is granted.

Claim 9: Unjust Enrichment

The Defendant argues that, under California law, unjust
enrichment does not constitute a freestanding cause of action,
and is instead a remedy. The Plaintiff does not contend that
unjust enrichment is anything but a remedy available to make a
plaintiff whole from, among other things, fraud. California
courts have concluded that unjust enrichment is not a cause of
action, just a restitution claim. The Defendant's motion to
dismiss the Plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment is therefore
granted with leave to amend.

Claim 10: Express Warranty

The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff's complaint does not
set forth a claim for breach of express warranty because the
Plaintiff has not alleged that he relied on a written statement
by Home Depot, but rather on oral statements from Home Depot
employees.

To maintain a breach of express warranty claim, a plaintiff must
allege that the seller (1) made an affirmation of fact or promise
or provided a description of its goods; (2) the promise or
description formed part of the basis of the bargain; (3) the
express warranty was breached; and (4) the breach caused injury
to the plaintiff.

The Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Home Depot made
representations about the quality of its mahogany products within
its brick and mortar stores, and that the Plaintiff relied on
representations made by Home Depot orally, through in-store
labels, tags and signage and online. The Plaintiff has alleged
facts showing that he relied on written statements by Home Depot
to state a claim for breach of express warranty.

The Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's claim for
breach of express warranty is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 31, 2017 Memorandum
Decision and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycdck92f
from Leagle.com.

Clyde Golden, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Keith L. Altman --
kaltman@lawampmmt.com -- Keith Altman, Excolo Law PLLC.

Home Depot U.S.A, Inc., Defendant, represented by John R. Lawless
-- jlawless@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP, Marisa C. Maleck --
mmaleck@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP, pro hac vice & Sidney
Stewart Haskins -- shaskins@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding, pro hac
vice.

HUMAN CARE LLC: Removes "Tokhtaman" Suit to S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of Nina Tokhtaman, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Human Care,
LLC, Defendant, filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York (Case
No. 151268/2016) to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York on June 29, 2018, and assigned Case No.
1:18-cv-05907-VEC (S.D.N.Y., June 29, 2018). The case is assigned
to Judge Valerie E. Caproni.

Human Care LLC imports, markets, and installs patient lifting
systems. Human Care LLC formerly was known as US Medical LLC and
changed its name to Human Care LLC in 2006. The company is based
in Tulsa, Oklahoma. As of February 08, 2006, Human Care LLC is a
subsidiary of Human Care HC AB. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel Sergio Gomez-Sanchez, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          290 Broadhollow Road Suite 305
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: (631) 247-4700
          Facsimile: (631) 824-9249
          E-mail: dsgomez@littler.com


HYUNDAI MOTOR: "Brown" Suit Alleges Warranty Violations
-------------------------------------------------------
Elizabeth Brown, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Hyundai Motor America, and Hyundai Motor
Company, Ltd., Case No. 2:18-cv-11249 (D. N.J., June 29, 2018),
is brought against the Defendants for breach of express and
implied warranty, breach of written warranty under the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act, violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud
Act, common law fraud and unjust enrichment.

This consumer class action arises from a latent defect found in
model year 2011 through 2016 Hyundai Elantra cars with "Nu" 1.8-
liter engines (the "Class Vehicles").  First unveiled with MY
2011 Hyundai Elantras, defects in the piston assemblies of the Nu
1.8L engines within the Class Vehicles cause total and
irreparable engine failures, the symptoms of which include a
knocking noise from the engine while the car is warming up after
being started and/or while driving (the "Piston Defect"). Once
the fateful engine knock sound begins, the Class Vehicle's engine
will inevitably fail completely, causing a loss of engine power,
power steering and brake assistance which can lead to stalling
while the Class Vehicle is in motion and place the operator of
the Class Vehicle, and those that share the road with them, at
risk of accident, injury, or death. Once the Piston Defect has
manifested, the engine block has been damaged beyond repair.
Therefore, the only fix is replacement of the engine, which can
cost upwards of $10,000.

The Plaintiff Liz Brown is a citizen of the State of New Jersey
and resides in Avenel, New Jersey.  In August 2013, Plaintiff Liz
Brown purchased a new 2013 Hyundai Elantra Limited, containing a
"Nu" 1.8 liter engine, from Avenel Sansone Auto Group, an
authorized Hyundai dealer and repair center located in Avenel,
New Jersey.

The Defendants are automobile design, manufacturing,
distribution, and/or service corporations doing business within
the United States.  The Defendant Hyundai Motor Company, Ltd. is
a South Korean corporation.  HMC is the parent corporation of
Hyundai Motor America, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Matthew D. Schelkopf, Esq.
      Joseph B. Kenney, Esq.
      SAUDER SCHELKOPF LLC
      555 Lancaster Avenue
      Berwyn, PA 19312
      Tel: (610) 200-0581
      E-mail: mds@sstriallawyers.com
              jbk@sstriallawyers.com


INTEL CORP: PC Users Sue Over Processor Defect
----------------------------------------------
Joshua Blau, Christopher Gulley, Hosea Williams III, Debora
Greene, Barbara Clabaugh, Ralph Morton, Claude Vogel, Margarite
Sampson, Marvin Feiges, Yvette Norris, Katharn Waterman, Kierston
Pierce, Tami Riecke, Lee Booth, Karem Horne, Alma Jennings, J.P.
Richards Jr., James Bradshaw, Carl Demonbrun, Michael Straub, Ron
Moreno, Matthew Kleinmann, Clarence Feldner, Deborah Knapp,
Sandra Lessner, Joseph Anderson, Donald Cougle, Arthur J. Hoffman
III, Jill Levin, Gregory Sadler, Virginia Cardoza, Debra Austin,
Jamal Elakrah, Troy Mowery, Steven Fowler, Jack Mezzel, Carol
Marziale, Darcy Hackel, and James Heise, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Intel
Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-00820, (D. Or., May 11,
2018), seeks all proper measures of monetary relief and damages,
plus interest, equitable, injunctive and declaratory relief
including restitution and disgorgement, costs of suit, including
reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses and such further relief
resulting from fraudulent concealment, negligence, unjust
enrichment and breach of implied warranty and violation of
various state consumer protection laws.

Intel manufactures the central processing units (CPU) that power
most servers, laptops, desktop computers, tablets, smartphones,
and other computing devices. According to the Plaintiffs, said
CPUs suffer from several defects that allow hackers to access to
what was supposed to be secure data. These defects cannot be
fixed remotely via a software update while any mitigation efforts
would seriously affect CPU performance.

Plaintiffs are computer owners who claim that their units
manifest the said defects. [BN]

Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Richard S. Yugler, Esq.
      Christine N. Moore, Esq.
      LANDYE BENNETT BLUMSTEIN LLP
      1300 SW 5th Avenue, Suite 3600
      Portland, OR 97201
      Tel: (503) 224-4100
      Fax: (503) 244-4133
      Email: ryugler@lbblawyers.com
      Email: cmoore@lbblawyers.com

             - and -

      Gary S. Graifivan, Esq.
      Jay Brody, Esq.
      KANTROWITZ GOLDHAMER & GRAIFMAN, P.C.
      747 Chestnut Ridge Rd.
      Chestnut Ridge, NY 10977
      Tel: (845) 356-2570
      Fax: (845) 356-4335
      Email: ggraifman@kgglaw.com
      Email: jbrody@kgglaw.com

             - and -

      Melissa R. Emert, Esq.
      STULL, STULL & BRODY
      6 East 45th Street
      New York, NY 10017
      Tel: (212) 687-7230
      Fax: (212) 490-2022
      Email: memert@ssbny.com

             - and -

      Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq.
      Jason S. Rathod, Esq.
      MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP
      412 H Street NE, Ste. 302
      Washington, DC 20002
      Tel: (202) 470-3520
      Email: nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com
             jrathos@classlawdc.com

             - and -

      Patrice L. Bishop, Esq.
      STULL, STULL & BRODY
      9430 W. Olympic Blvd., Suite 400
      Beverly Hills, CA 90212
      Email: service@ssbla.com
      Tel: (310) 209-2468
      Fax: (310) 209-2087


INTEL CORP: 2 Securities Fraud Suits Consolidated
-------------------------------------------------
Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted Louisiana Sheriffs'
motion to consolidate the related cases, MEERAIN ALI, Plaintiff,
v. INTEL CORPORATION, ET AL., Defendants. LOUISIANA SHERIFFS'
PENSION & RELIEF FUND, Plaintiff, v. INTEL CORPORATION, ET AL.,
Defendants, Case Nos. 18-cv-00507-YGR, 18-cv-01460-YGR (N.D.
Cal.), for appointment of the lead Plaintiff, and for approval of
selection of the lead counsel.

Intel investors Meerain Ali and Daniel E. Tavares ("Individual
Investor Group") oppose the motion with respect to appointment of
the lead Plaintiff and approval of the lead counsel, but do not
dispute that consolidation is warranted.

Judge Rogers concludes that consolidation is warranted.  Ali and
Louisiana Sheriffs bring claims against substantially similar
defendants, and both allege violations of Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, based upon the same types of
misstatements by Intel and certain of its senior officers
regarding the security and performance of Intel's processors.
Though the class period in the two actions have different start
dates -- July 27, 2017 for Ali and Oct. 27, 2017 for Louisiana
Sheriffs -- both class periods end on Jan. 4, 2018, and both
putative classes involve, at a minimum, all persons who purchased
Intel stocks during the relevant class periods.  The Related
Actions thus present questions of law and fact that overlap
almost completely.  Accordingly, the Related Actions should be
consolidated.

The Judge next finds that Louisiana Sheriffs' submitted
declaration certifies that it suffered losses of approximately
$67,658 on its investments in Intel stock during the period of
July 27, 2017 through Jan. 4, 2018 on both a last-in, first-out
("LIFO") and a first-in, first-out ("FIFO") basis.  The
Individual Investor Group's asserted loss is $1,232.  Louisiana
Sheriffs also appears to have made a prima facie showing of
typicality and adequacy under Rule 23(a).  Accordingly, the Judge
finds that Louisiana Sheriffs is the appropriate lead Plaintiff.

Louisiana Sheriffs represents that Bernstein Litowitz is among
the preeminent securities class action law firms in the country
and served as the lead counsel in a case involving one of the
largest recoveries in securities class action history.  Because
Louisiana Sheriffs has made a reasonable choice of counsel, the
Judge will defer to that choice.

In sum, for these reasons, Judge Rogers granted Louisiana
Sheriffs' motion to consolidate the Ali and Louisiana Sheriffs
actions, for appointment as the lead Plaintiff, and for approval
of selection of the lead counsel; and denied the Individual
Investor Group's competing request.

She consolidated two Related Actions for all purposes, appointed
Louisiana Sheriffs as the lead Plaintiff of the Consolidated
Action, and appointed Bernstein Litowitz as the lead counsel to
represent the putative class in the Consolidated Action.  A
consolidated complaint will be filed within 21 days of the Order,
and any responsive pleadings will be filed within 35 days
thereafter.

The Clerk is directed to consolidate Meerain Ali v. Intel
Corporation, et al., 18-cv-00507-YGR, and Louisiana Sheriffs'
Pension & Relief Fund v. Intel Corporation, et al., 18-cv-01460-
YGR, for all purposes.  The consolidated action will be captioned
"In re Intel Corporation Securities Litigation," 18-cv-00507-YGR.
All files will now be kept in one "lead case" or "master case"
file.

The Clerk will also close 18-cv-01460-YGR, and all future filings
will be lodged in 18-cv-00507-YGR.  The caption in 18-cv-00507-
YGR will be updated to reflect all the parties who have appeared
in both actions.  To the extent future cases are filed that may
be related, the parties will follow the procedures outlined in
Civil Local Rule 3-12.  The parties may also file stipulations or
motions to consolidate if appropriate.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/498Hp3 from Leagle.com.

Meerain Ali, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by J. Alexander Hood, II --
ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, Patrick V. Dahlstrom --
pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jennifer Pafiti --
jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Intel Corporation, Defendant, represented by Margaret Ann Keeley
-- mkeeley@wc.com -- Williams and Connolly, John Michael
Gildersleeve -- John.Gildersleeve@mto.com -- Munger, Tolles,
Olson LLP & Xiao Wang -- xwang@wc.com -- Williams and Connolly
LLP.

Brian M. Krzanich & Robert H. Swan, Defendants, represented by
Margaret Ann Keeley, Williams and Connolly & Xiao Wang, Williams
and Connolly LLP.

Louisiana Sheriffs' Pension & Relief Fund, Movant, represented by
David Ronald Stickney -- davids@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein,
Litowitz, Berger & Grossmann & David Reuven Lev Kaplan --
davidk@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger and Grossmann
LLP.

Daniel E. Tavares & Meerain Ali, Movants, represented by Jennifer
Pafiti, Pomerantz LLP & Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Pomerantz LLP.


INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: "Bishop" Suit Alleges ADA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------
Cedric Bishop, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. International Business Machines Corporation dba IBM,
Case No. 1:18-cv-05854 (S.D. N.Y., June 28, 2018), is brought
against the Defendant for violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and New
York City Human Rights Law.

The Plaintiff brings this civil rights action against the
Defendant for its failure to design, construct, maintain, and
operate its website to be fully accessible to and independently
usable by Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired people.

The Plaintiff is a resident of New York and is a visually-
impaired and legally blind person who requires screen reading
software to read website content using his computer

The Defendant operates IBM Centers as well as the IBM website,
and offers it to the public and offers features that should allow
all consumers to access the facilities and services that
Defendant offers regarding its Centers. The Defendant operates
IBM Centers across the United States, with at least one of its
Centers located in New York City at 51 Astor Place, New York, NY
10003. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
      COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
      300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Fl.
      Brooklyn, NY 11201
      Tel: (929) 575-4175
      Fax: (929) 575-4195
      E-mail: Joseph@cml.legal

          - and -

      Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
      Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
      GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
      150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
      New York, NY 10003-2461
      Tel: (212) 228-9795
      E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
              danalgottlieb@aol.com


INTERNATIONAL PAPER: Court Narrows Claims in "Arroyo" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ELISA ARROYO, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-06211-BLF (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, granted in part and
denied in part, with leave to amend in part and without leave to
amend in part, the Defendant's motion to dismiss.

Arroyo brings the putative class action against Defendant IPC,
asserting wage and hour and unfair competition claims based on
IPC's alleged practices of failing to pay employees for time
spent donning and doffing protective gear and failing to
reimburse employees for monies expended on uniforms.

Arroyo was a class member in a prior wage and hour class action
against IPC, Letuligasenoa v. International Paper Company, et
al., which resulted in a settlement and release of all claims
which were or could have been brought in that action for the
class period Oct. 4, 2009 through Jan. 27, 2017.

IPC asserts that all of the claims asserted in the present action
were or could have been brought in Letuligasenoa and thus that
Arroyo is barred from asserting those claims for time periods
which overlap the Letuligasenoa class period. IPC moves to
dismiss Arroyo's first amended complaint ("FAC"), and
specifically Claims 4 and 5, to the extent that Arroyo seeks
damages and penalties for time periods prior to Jan. 27, 2017.
IPC also seeks dismissal of the entire FAC for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.

Having determined that the motion is appropriate for disposition
without oral argument, Judge Freeman vacated the hearing set for
June 7, 2018.

IPC moves to dismiss Claim 4, alleging violations of California
Labor Code Section 226, and Claim 5, brought under California's
Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA"), to the extent they seek
damages and penalties for time periods prior to Jan. 27, 2017.
It argues that dismissal is appropriate under both Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for
failure to state a claim.

Judge Freeman agrees that to the extent Claims 4 and 5 were
released in Letuligasenoa, dismissal is appropriate under Rule
12(b)(1) on the basis that no case or controversy exists, and
under Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis that Letuligasenoa raises a
collateral estoppel bar to and extinguishes the claims.

She concludes that the Letuligasenoa settlement and release bars
Claim 4, asserting violations of Section 226, to the extent it
seeks damages and penalties for time periods prior to Jan. 27,
2017.  Arroyo's current claims under Sections 226(a)(2) and
(a)(9) could have been raised in the Letuligasenoa action based
on the facts, conduct, and/or omissions alleged in the
Letuligasenoa complaint.  Accordingly, the Judge granted without
leave to amend the motion to dismiss as to Claim 4 to the extent
it seeks damages and penalties for time periods prior to Jan. 27,
2017.

The Judge also concludes that the Letuligasenoa settlement and
release bars the bulk of Claim 5, asserted under PAGA, to the
extent it seeks damages and penalties for time periods prior to
Jan. 27, 2017.  The Letuligasenoa complaint asserted a PAGA claim
based on most of the same California Labor Code sections, and the
same facts, which give rise to the PAGA claim asserted by Arroyo
in Claim 5 of the FAC.  The bar does not extend, however, to the
portions of Claim 5 based on IPC's alleged practice of failing to
reimburse employees for monies expended on uniforms.
Accordingly, the Judge granted without leave to amend the motion
to dismiss as to Claim 5 to the extent it seeks damages and
penalties for time periods prior to Jan. 27, 2017, except as to
those portions of Claim 5 based on IPC's alleged practice of
failing to reimburse employees for monies expended on uniforms,
as to which the motion is denied.

IPC also moves to dismiss all claims of the FAC for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  The Judge finds
that all of Arroyo's claims are framed in generic terms.  The
Court previously has held that an employee's generic and
conclusory allegations are insufficient to plausibly state claims
for a "wide swath of Labor Code violations."

The Judge notes that Arroyo mischaracterizes IPC's motion as
seeking an improper determination regarding her fitness as a
class representative and/or seeking a more definite statement
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e).  IPC seeks
neither of those things, but rather seeks dismissal of Arroyo's
claims under Rules 12(b)(1) and (b)(6).

Accordingly, the Judge needs not and does not address Arroyo's
arguments regarding class certification and more definite
statement.  The motion to dismiss is granted with leave to amend
as to all claims on the basis that Arroyo has failed to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 30, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/C4s1lE from Leagle.com.

Elisa Arroyo, Plaintiff, represented by Dennis Sangwon Hyun --
dhyun@hyunlegal.com -- Hyun Legal APC, Kristen Michelle Agnew --
kagnew@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group, APC, Larry
W. Lee -- lwlee@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group, P.C.,
Nicholas Rosenthal -- nrosenthal@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity
Law Group & William Lucas Marder -- bill@polarislawgroup.com --
Polaris Law Group, LLP.

International Paper Company, a New York corporation, Defendant,
represented by Megan Emily Walker -- mewalker@fisherphillips.com
-- Fisher Phillips, LLP & Aaron Franklin Olsen --
aolsen@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher & Phillips, LLP.


JEFFERSON CAPITAL: Faces "Autry" Suit in E.D. Wisconsin
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Jefferson Capital
Systems LLC. The case is styled as Jennifer Autry and Derek
Volkman, individually on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. Jefferson Capital Systems LLC and Rausch Sturm
Israel Enerson & Hornik LLC, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-01078
(E.D. Wis., July 13, 2018).

Jefferson Capital Systems LLC is a debt collection agency in St.
Cloud, Minnesota.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Andrew T Thomasson, Esq.
   Stern Thomasson LLP
   150 Morris Ave-2nd Fl
   Springfield, NJ 07081
   Tel: (973) 379-7500
   Fax: (973) 532-5868
   Email: andrew@sternthomasson.com


KANONI INC: Faces "Tiquiram" Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Kanoni, Inc. The
case is styled as Mateo Utuy Tiquiram, Bulmaro Miguel Hernandez
and Enrique Carlos Viveros, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Kanoni, Inc. d/b/a Arch
Diner, Dimitrios Kaloidis and John Does #1-4 jointly and
severally, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04044 (E.D. N.Y., July 13,
2018).

Kanoni, Inc. is a retro diner dating back to the '70s known for a
wide range of American fare served morning to night.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


KRS BIOTECHNOLOGY: Class Certification in "Sawyer" Denied
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM P. SAWYER d/b/a SHARONVILLE FAMILY MEDICINE,
Plaintiff, v. KRS BIOTECHNOLOGY, INC., et al., Defendants, Case
No. 1:16-cv-550 (S.D. Ohio), Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Brown
of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
Western Division, recommended the denial of the Plaintiff's
motion for class certification.

The Plaintiff filed the case against KRS as a putative class
action under the "junk fax" provision of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991 ("TCPA").  Sawyer, is a primary care
practice located in Sharonville, Ohio.  The Plaintiff has a
telephone number that is used to receive faxes.  KRS is a Florida
compounding pharmacy with nearly 90 employees and a principal
place of business in Boca Raton, Florida.

KRS sent an unsolicited one-page advertisement to Sharonville
Family Medicine on Oct. 9, 2015.  The fax promoted KRS's IV
infusion sets and/or other products and services.  The Defendant
admits that KRS and Sawyer had no prior business relationship,
and that KRS did not seek or obtain permission from Sharonville
Family Medicine to send the Infusion Kit Fax prior to doing so.

Although the Defendant admits TCPA liability with regard to
Plaintiff Sawyer, it maintains that the fax sent to Sawyer was in
violation of KRS' established business practices, and vigorously
disputes the allegation that it sent any unsolicited faxes to
anyone other than Sawyer.

KRS' telecommunications services provider in October 2015 was
called RingCentral.  In response to a subpoena, RingCentral
produced KRS' call and fax log data in the form of an excel
spreadsheet.  The fax log contains information concerning the
number of fax transmissions, the phone numbers dialed, and
whether the transmissions were successful.  On most days, the fax
log reflects the transmission of only about a dozen faxes.
However, on a few days in 2015, KRS transmitted tens of thousands
of faxes.  KRS was able to transmit such a large number of faxes,
a practice referred to as "fax blasting," by using one or more
employee's computer(s) to send an image to a database of fax
numbers through RingCentral.

Based upon the fax log, the largest number of outgoing fax
transmissions occurred on Oct. 8 and Oct. 9, 2015 when KRS
allegedly transmitted a total of 34,773 outbound faxes, 99.4% of
which originated from the same number as the number used to send
the Plaintiff the Infusion Kit Fax.  KRS disputes that it faxed
34,773 copies of the Infusion Kit Fax, but admits it transmitted
between 1,000 and 10,000 of that advertisement.  It maintains
that the remainder of the 34,773 faxes were business
communications.  The fax log reflects only that a fax was
transmitted, not the content of the fax.  The Plaintiff's
complaint also alleges that the Infusion Kit Fax did not display
a proper opt-out notice.

Refining the definition of the putative class in its motion for
class certification, the Plaintiff seeks to represent 34,773
recipients of faxes transmitted by KRS, defined as all
subscribers of accounts (or other persons/entities) associated
with the (1) fax numbers listed in the RingCentral spreadsheet
(2) that were successfully sent a fax from KRS (3) from the phone
number (888) 502-2050; (4) with a start time of Oct. 8 or Oct. 9,
2015.  In addition to the Plaintiff's claims under the TCPA, the
Plaintiff seeks relief under the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices
Act based upon a portion of the content of the Infusion Kit Fax.

Magistrate Judge Brown held a hearing on May 14, 2018.  She
agrees that the fax log evidence is insufficient to carry the
Plaintiff's affirmative burden to show predominance because: (a)
the Defendant has offered testimony that its practice was to send
faxes only to those who "solicited" or gave permission/consent to
the receipt of faxes, and neither the fax log nor any other
evidence rebuts that evidence; and (b) the fax log does not
reflect precisely what was faxed to each of the 34,773 numbers.

The Magistrate Judge also finds that the fax logs confirm the
primary fax number used by the Defendant, and that the 34,773
faxes were sent on Oct. 8 and 9, 2015.  However, the fax logs do
not reveal the content of the faxes that were transmitted,
whether the Infusion Kit Fax that the Plaintiff received, some
other type of marketing flyer (the Defendant produced
approximately 10), or some form of business communication.

Based on the failure of the Plaintiff to show predominance, she
also finds no need to reach KRS' alternative argument that the
fax logs show only that faxes were sent, not what was sent.

With respect to the Plaintiff's Rule 23(a) showing, she finds
that (i) the Plaintiff would be able to satisfy numerosity, based
on the Defendant's admission that it sent the same fax to more
than one thousand recipients; (ii) it is not clear that the mere
fact that each of the 34,773 recipients received some form of fax
is enough, given the Plaintiff's failure to demonstrate even one
other instance of a recipient in the proposed class who received
the same "unsolicited" fax; (iii) because the Plaintiff has not
made any showing to suggest that each class member received the
same fax or that each class member received an "unsolicited" ad,
it does not appear that the Plaintiff has demonstrated
typicality; and (iv) the Plaintiff fails to show evidence that
he'd an adequate class representative.

For these reasons, Magistrate Judge Brown denied the Plaintiff's
motion for class certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 30, 2018 Report &
Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/XkI6y0 from
Leagle.com.

William P. Sawyer, individually and as the representative of a
class of similarly-situated persons, Plaintiff, represented by
George Demetrios Jonson -- GJonson@mrjlaw.com -- Montgomery,
Rennie & Johnson & Matthew E. Stubbs -- MStubbs@mrjlaw.com --
Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson.

KRS Global Biotechnology, Inc., Defendant, represented by Paula
Milsom Brown -- pbrown@kravitzllc.com -- Kravitz, Brown & Dortch,
LLC, Richard R. Parsons -- rparsons@kravitzllc.com -- Kravitz
Brown & Dortch LLC, Eric Bravin -- info@ellslaw.com -- Ellsworth
Law Firm, P.A., pro hac vice & Sean M. Ellsworth, Ellsworth Law
Firm, P. A., pro hac vice.


LAUNDRY LAND: Escobar Sues Over Unpaid OT, Spread-of-Hours Pay
--------------------------------------------------------------
Gricelda Escobar, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Laundry Land, Inc. and Anthony Y.
Giuliano, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-04246 (S.D. N.Y., May 11,
2018), seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages, spread-of-hours
wages, earned wages and overtime compensation together with
liquidated damages, compensatory damages, pre-judgment and post-
judgment interest and attorneys' fees and costs under the Fair
Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law.

Escobar worked as a laundry attendant at Laundryland, a
laundromat located in Yonkers, New York and owned by Anthony Y.
Giuliano. Plaintiff was scheduled to work more than forty hours
per week but was never paid overtime for her hours worked in
excess of forty hours per week despite occasionally required to
work double shifts. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jacob Aronauer, Esq.
      THE LAW OFFICES OF JACOB ARONAUER
      225 Broadway, Suite 307
      New York, NY 10007
      Telephone: (212) 323-6980
      Facsimile: (212) 233-9238
      Email: jaronauer@aronauerlaw.com


MACFARLANE GROUP: Faces Williams-Stermel Suit in E.D. Pa.
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against MacFarlane Group,
Inc. The case is captioned as CHRISTINA WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL
STERMEL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. MACFARLANE GROUP, INC.; MEDLEY
OPPORTUNITY FUND II, LP; MARK CURRY; BRIAN MCGOWAN; VINCENT NEY;
and JOHN DOE, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-02747-MSG (E.D. Pa.,
June 29, 2018). The Case is assigned to Honorable Mitchell S.
Goldberg.

MacFarlane Group, Inc. offers business and marketing consulting,
develops customized software and offers call center support
services. The company was founded in 2010 and is based in
Mission, Kansas. As of October 13, 2016, MacFarlane Group, Inc.
operates as a subsidiary of Otoe-Missouria Tribe Of Indians. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael J. Quirk, Esq.
          BEREZOFSKY LAW GROUP, LLC
          40 West Evergreen Avenue, Suite 104
          Philadelphia, PA 19118-3324
          Telephone: (856) 667-0500
          Facsimile: (267) 273-7769
          E-mail: mquirk@eblawllc.com

               - and -

          Sarah Hansel, Esq.
          BEREZOFSKY LAW GROUP, LLC
          210 Lake Drive East, Suite 101
          Cherry Hill, NJ 08002
          Telephone: (856) 667-0500
          Facsimile: (856) 667-5133
          E-mail: shansel@eblawllc.com


MATRIX TRUST: Youngblood and Steinbach Sue over Retirement Plans
----------------------------------------------------------------
DAVE YOUNGBLOOD and DON STEINBACH, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. MATRIX TRUST
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-01625-CMA-NYW (D. Colo.,
June 27, 2018) is a class action on behalf of the Plaintiffs and
other retirement plan accountholders whose investments were
mismanaged by the Defendants.

The Plaintiffs alleges in the complaint that from May to October
2017, the Defendants made several substantial transfers of plan
assets directly to Vantage Benefits Administrators, per Vantage's
directions for same, without direction or authorization from the
plan administrators or accountholders. Pursuant to Vantage's
instructions communicated through a third party-administrator
online portal, the Defendant fraudulently transferred at least
$3,000,000 from the plan accounts in its custody, resulting in
the substantial diminution of the plan accounts.

Matrix Trust Company operates as a subsidiary of Matrix Financial
Solutions, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Patrick D. Vellone, Esq.
          Rachel A. Sternlieb, Esq.
          ALLEN VELLONE WOLF HELFRICH &
          FACTOR P.C.
          1600 Stout Street, Suite 1100
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 534-4499
          Facsimile: (303) 893-8332
          E-mail: pvellone@allen-vellone.com
                  rsternlieb@allen-vellone.com

               - and -

          Bruce Steckler, Esq.
          Katherine R. Grosskopf, Esq.
          STECKLER GRESHAM COCHRAN PLLC
          12720 Hillcrest Rd. Suite 1045
          Dallas, TX 75230
          Telephone: (972) 387-4040
          Facsimile: (972) 387-4041
          E-mail: bruce@stecklerlaw.com
                  katie@stecklerlaw.com

               - and -

          John T. Palter, Esq.
          PALTER STOKLEY SIMS, PLLC
          Preston Commons East
          8115 Preston Road, Suite 600
          Dallas, TX 75225
          Telephone: (214) 888-3111
          Facsimile: (214) 888-3109
          E-mail: jpalter@palterlaw.com


MDL 1446: Petition for Certiorari Filed in Giancarlo Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The petitioners in the case of SAMUEL GIANCARLO, CARLOS ALSINA,
M.D., individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Petitioners v. UBS FINANCIAL SERVICES, INCORPORATED;
UBS SECURITIES, L.L.C.; UBS AG; UBS O'CONNOR, L.L.C.,
Respondents, (Case No. 4:2003cv04359, S.D. Tex.) have filed a
petition for writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The "Giancarlo" suit
is a member case in the multi-district litigation proceeding, In
Re Enron Corporation Securities, Derivative & "ERISA Litigation,
MDL No. 1446.

UBS Financial Services Inc. provides financial advisory services
to high net worth individuals in the United States. It was
formerly known as UBS PaineWebber Inc. and changed its name to
UBS Financial Services Inc. in June 2003. The company was founded
in 1879 and is based in Weehawken, New Jersey. As of November 3,
2000, UBS Financial Services Inc. operates as a subsidiary of UBS
Americas, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dawn R. Meade, Esq.
          David Augustus, Esq.
          Bonnie E. Spencer, Esq.
          THE SPENCER LAW FIRM
          4635 Southwest Freeway, Suite 900
          Houston, TX 77027
          Telephone: (713) 961-7770
          E-mail: dawnmeade@spencer-law.com
                  davidaugustus@spencer-law.com
                  bonniespencer@spencer-law.com


MDL 2418: Court Dismisses SAC of Qui Tam Plaintiff
--------------------------------------------------
IN RE: PLAVIX MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION (NO. II). This Document Relates to: UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, et al., ex rel. JKJ Partnership 2011, LLP, Plaintiffs,
v. SANOFI AVENTIS, U.S., LLC, et al., Defendants, Civil Action
No. 11-6476 (FLW), MDL No. 2418 (D. N.J.), Judge Freda L. Wolfson
of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey (i)
granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint of qui tam Plaintiff and relator JKJ Partnership 2011,
LLP; and (ii) denied JKJ's cross motion for leave to amend.

On Oct. 26, 2011, two doctors and a Sanofi sales representative
formed JKJ, a Delaware Limited Partnership.  JKJ was formed for
the purpose of bringing the present litigation.  On Nov. 4, 2011
-- nine days after it was formed -- JKJ filed the Original qui
tam Complaint, identifying its partners anonymously as "Partner
A," "Partner B," and "Partner C."

In the Original Complaint, JKJ alleged, inter alia, that the
Sanofi Defendants failed to disclose material adverse efficacy
data regarding Plavix(R), as required by 21 C.F.R. Section 314.80
(governing post-marketing reporting of adverse drug experiences),
causing physicians to prescribe, and Government Programs to
reimburse, Plavix(R) for millions of patients who were
genetically predisposed to experience diminished or no
responsiveness to Plavix(R), rendering it little more than a
placebo and placing the patients at significant risk.

On Feb. 22, 2017, JKJ filed a Second Amended Complaint, further
developing its claim of Plavix's ineffectiveness for certain
patients based on their genetic makeup.  In the Second Amended
Complaint, JKJ alleges that the Defendants promoted Plavix as the
standard of care for all antiplatelet and antithrombotic patients
-- including patients who received stents -- notwithstanding
their knowledge that the drug had little or no effect, and was
therefore medically contraindicated, for over 30% of patients.
The Defendants knew, but concealed the fact that their
blockbuster drug Plavix had no demonstrable pharmacodynamics
effect for many patients who had been prescribed the drug.  They
also knew that these non-responders or low responders were not
entirely genetically random.  Individuals whose ethnic background
was African-American or Asian-American had a much higher risk of
non-response to Plavix than other ethnicities.  The Defendants
referred to this as the Plavix Variability of Response ("VOR")
issue.

In that respect, JKJ claims that the Defendants made affirmative
misrepresentations by systematically and deliberately promoting
Plavix through false and misleading advertising and other
marketing materials that overstated efficacy, and minimized
critical adverse event and risk information.  The Defendants
would brand this their 'Expand and Protect' strategy.  Indeed,
JKJ avers that the Defendants created a logo used on Sales and
Marketing material to stress and reflect this strategy.
According to JKJ, based upon such a strategy, the Defendants
"protected" Plavix by selling the drug's safety and efficacy in
all patients in spite the fact that the Defendants knew it was
false.

At some point between the filing of the Original Complaint in
November 2011, and the filing of the Second Amended Complaint in
February 2017, Partner B left the JKJ partnership, and Dr. Paul
A. Gurbel joined the JKJ partnership to replace him or her.
After the substitution in membership came to light, the Court, at
an Aug. 9, 2017 status conference, asked the parties to brief
whether JKJ was a proper relator capable of continuing the
litigation.

In response to the Court's inquiry, on Oct. 11, 2017, the
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  In their motion, they
argue that, (i) if JKJ is construed as the relator in its own
right, the FCA's public disclosure bar precludes JKJ's claims;
(ii) if JKJ is construed as a pass-through entity for its
members, who are the real relators in the action, then JKJ lacks
Article III associational standing to proceed as the Plaintiff in
the case; (iii) JKJ's continuation as the plaintiff after the
substitution of Dr. Gurbel for Partner B is prohibited by the
FCA's first-to-file bar; and (iv) any curative amendment to add
JKJ's members as Plaintiff relators is also prohibited by the
first-to-file bar.

Also, on Oct. 11, 2017, JKJ opposed the Defendants' motion and
cross-moved, in the alternative, for leave to amend in order to
name its current members, as well as JKJ, as the relator
Plaintiffs in the action.

Judge Wolfson finds that because the allegations in JKJ's Second
Amended Complaint are not based on prior public disclosures
regarding alleged misrepresentations (the X), the public
disclosure bar does not apply to bar JKJ's claims.

Turning next to the FCA's first-to-file bar, the Judge finds that
it is clear that the current JKJ partnership of Partner A, Dr.
Gurbel, and Partner C, as a non-party to the Original Complaint -
- having not yet come into existence -- cannot, pursuant to the
FCA's first-to-file bar, intervene in the action by being joined
as a Plaintiff in the Second Amended Complaint.  The Supreme
Court clarified that a non-party can become a party to litigation
only through intervention even where the nonparty is a real party
in interest under Rule 17.

Finally, she finds that at the filing of the Original Complaint
in the action, the only party Plaintiff was the JKJ partnership
of A, B, and C, not Partner A, B, or C as individuals, and
certainly not Dr. Gurbel, who was a stranger to the litigation.
The joinder of Partner A, Partner B, Partner C, or Dr. Gurbel
through any procedural device at this juncture would constitute a
party intervention under U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New
York, New York.  Because the FCA's first to file bar
unambiguously bars all such intervention, it applies in the case
to prevent any further amendment to add the individual partners
as Plaintiffs.  JKJ's cross motion for leave to file a Third
Amended Complaint will therefore be denied.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Wolfson concludes that the
public disclosure bar does not apply to JKJ's claims, the first-
to-file bar prevents JKJ from proceeding as the Plaintiff in the
action after its change in membership, and the first-to-file bar
prevents the joinder of JKJ's members as additional Plaintiffs in
the action, rendering JKJ's amendment to add additional parties
futile.  Accordingly, she dismissed the Second Amended Complaint,
and denied JKJ's cross motion for leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 30, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/HRPB2r from Leagle.com.

Kenneth Petit, Plaintiff, represented by GERARD RYAN, III, PARKER
WAICHMAN LLP, HUNTER J. SHKOLNIK -- hunter@napolilaw.com --
NAPOLI SHKOLNIK PLLC, MICHAEL S. WERNER & SHAYNA E. SACKS --
SSacks@napolilaw.com -- Napoli Shkolnik PLLC.

Marcella Chesney, STATE OF ILLINOIS, Elisa Dickson, COMMONWEALTH
OF MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
STATE OF DELAWARE, STATE OF CONNECTICUT, STATE OF COLORADO, STATE
OF FLORIDA, STATE OF GEORGIA, STATE OF INDIANA, STATE OF
MICHIGAN, STATE OF MONTANA, STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, STATE OF NEW
MEXICO, STATE OF NEW YORK, STATE OF NEVADA, STATE OF TENNESSEE,
STATE OF TEXAS, State of New Jersey, STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, STATE
OF OKLAHOMA, STATE OF WISCONSIN, STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, STATE
OF MINNESOTA, CITY OF CHICAGO, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA & FLORENCE
BOYCE, Plaintiffs, represented by HUNTER J. SHKOLNIK, NAPOLI
SHKOLNIK PLLC & SHAYNA E. SACKS, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC.

Raymond Snyder & Darlene Snyder, Plaintiffs, represented by
HUNTER J. SHKOLNIK, NAPOLI SHKOLNIK PLLC, SHAYNA E. SACKS, Napoli
Shkolnik PLLC & STEVEN D. HAMILTON, HAMILTON LAW FIRM PC.

United States of America, Plaintiff, represented by Gerald M.
Burke, Assistant U.S. Attorney, HUNTER J. SHKOLNIK, NAPOLI
SHKOLNIK PLLC & SHAYNA E. SACKS, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC.

STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff, represented by DANIEL ALBERTSTONE --
dalberstone@baronbudd.com -- HUNTER J. SHKOLNIK, NAPOLI SHKOLNIK
PLLC & SHAYNA E. SACKS, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC.

ANNA MARTIN & Betty Tarver, Plaintiffs, represented by DOUGLAS
ROBERT PLYMALE, THE DUGAN LAW FIRM, HUNTER J. SHKOLNIK, NAPOLI
SHKOLNIK PLLC, ROBERT BRENT CUERIA, CUERIA LAW FIRM LLC & SHAYNA
E. SACKS, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC.

Eugene Thomas, Sr, Plaintiff, represented by ANITA TERRY TYE, H L
PENICK & ASSOCIATES PC, HUNTER J. SHKOLNIK, NAPOLI SHKOLNIK PLLC,
Henry L. Penick, PENICK & ASSOCIATES PC & SHAYNA E. SACKS, Napoli
Shkolnik PLLC.

Robert J Budz, Plaintiff, represented by HUNTER J. SHKOLNIK,
NAPOLI SHKOLNIK PLLC, SCOTT J. SCHAUB, KULLA RONNAU SCHAUB &
CHAMBERS PC & SHAYNA E. SACKS, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC.

Bill H. Thomas, Plaintiff, represented by BRENT J. MCINTOSH --
info@bilbolaw.com -- BILBO LAW OFFICE PC, DANIEL C. CLANTON,
BILBO LAW OFFICE PC, pro hac vice, HUNTER J. SHKOLNIK, NAPOLI
SHKOLNIK PLLC, JIMMY W. BILBO, BILBO LAW OFFICES & SHAYNA E.
SACKS, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC.

Barbara J. Thomas, Deceased - Plaintiff, represented by BRENT J.
MCINTOSH, BILBO LAW OFFICE PC, DANIEL C. CLANTON, BILBO LAW
OFFICE PC, pro hac vice, HUNTER J. SHKOLNIK, NAPOLI SHKOLNIK
PLLC, JIMMY W. BILBO, BILBO LAW OFFICES & SHAYNA E. SACKS, Napoli
Shkolnik PLLC.

BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY, SANOFI-AVENTIS U.S. LLC, SANOFI US
SERVICES INC. & SANOFI-SYNTHELABO INC., Defendants, represented
by DANIEL S. PARISER -- daniel.pariser@arnoldporter.com -- ARNOLD
& PORTER, LLP, DAVID D. FAUVRE -- david.fauvre@arnoldporter.com -
- ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, DAVID L. HARRIS --
dharris@lowenstein.com -- LOWENSTEIN SANDLER PC, GAVIN J. ROONEY
-- grooney@lowenstein.com -- LOWENSTEIN SANDLER, PC & KEVIN CLINE
-- kevin.cline@arnoldporter.com -- ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER
LLP.

NEZZAR BYRD, CHARLES COLE & MARCUS SHULTZ, individually,
Defendants, represented by BARRETT BEASLEY, SALIM-BEASLEY LLC.

SUSIE FARMER & ALVIN V. SKINNER, SR., Defendants, represented by
TAYJES MATTHEW SHAH, THE MILLER FIRM LLC.

NANCY BEDFORD, 17- Defendant, represented by MATTHEW B. MORELAND,
BECNEL LAW FIRM LLC.

ANITA ROY, Civil Case No. 3:15-cv-07526, individually and as
Executor of the Estate of MAURICE ROY, deceased, Defendant, pro
se.


METHODIST HOSPITALS: Discrimination Suit Class Cert. Bid Tossed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WHITE GLOVE STAFFING, INC., CAROLYN CLAY, LINDEY
DANCEY, LEA REED, and KAMARIO SIMPSON, Individually, and on
Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Individuals, Plaintiffs,
v. METHODIST HOSPITALS OF DALLAS, and DALLAS METHODIST HOSPITALS
FOUNDATION, Defendants, Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-1158-K (N.D.
Tex.), Judge Ed Kinkeade of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, denied the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Notice to
Potential Plaintiff.

White Glove, a staffing agency, entered contract negotiations to
provide for the Defendants' staffing needs.  During these initial
negotiations,  Defendants Methodist Hospitals of Dallas and
Dallas Methodist Hospitals Foundation allegedly informed White
Glove that the head chef preferred Hispanic employees.  Before
entering a contract, Methodist asked White Glove to provide
Methodist with a prep cook. White Glove sent Plaintiff Carolyn
Clay.

Clay is African American.  Allegedly, Clay worked for Methodist
for only a few days before Methodist told White Glove that Clay
was not working out and asked White Glove to send someone else.
The next day, White Glove sent Clay back to Methodist because
White Glove could not find another prep cook on short notice.
Methodist allegedly asked Clay to leave.  Methodist contacted
White Glove and allegedly stated the head chef only wanted
Hispanic employees.  Later that day, Methodist ended contract
negotiations and informed White Glove that it would not enter a
staffing contract with White Glove.

White Glove and Clay filed suit against Methodist for employment
discrimination and retaliation.  Plaintiffs Dancey, Reed, and
Simpson joined the suit as African American individuals White
Glove allegedly would have supplied to work for Methodist had
Methodist entered the staffing contract.

The Plaintiffs now seek class certification to include 40 to 75
other individuals who were allegedly discriminated against.  The
proposed class is defined as all employees of White Glove
Staffing who would have been supplied to the Defendants to be
banquet servers, prep cooks, dishwashers, and set-up crews.

In its response, Methodist argues that the Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification is untimely under Local Civil Rule 23.2,
which requires a plaintiff to move for certification within 90
days of filing its class action complaint or as ordered by the
court.  The Plaintiffs argue they filed the motion after the 90-
day deadline because some discovery needed to be completed to
support the motion for class certification.

Because some discovery was needed, Judge Kinkeade finds the
motion for class certification is timely.  However, he finds that
the proposed class relies on multiple assumptions that cannot be
readily verified.  The proposed class assumes: (1) Methodist
would have entered a staffing contract with White Glove; (2)
Methodist would have asked White Glove to provide banquet
servers, prep cooks, dishwashers, and set-up crews despite no
evidence that the proposed contract included such a requirement;
(3) White Glove would have sent each of the proposed class
members in response to Methodist's hypothetical request; and (4)
the proposed class members would be qualified, available, and
agreeable to work at Methodist.

The Judge holds these assumptions make the proposed class too
vague and speculative.  No additional discovery or time could
clearly and objectively determine who would fall within this
highly speculative class.  Thus, the proposed class is too vague
to be clearly ascertainable, as implicitly required under Rule
23.

Because White Glove's proposed class is too speculative to meet
the implicit ascertainability requirement, the Judge denied White
Glove's motion for class certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/IUcCXm from Leagle.com.

White Glove Staffing Inc, Carolyn Clay, Kamario Simpson, Lindey
Dancey & Lea Reed, Plaintiffs, represented by Matthew R. Scott --
matt.scott@cottperezlaw.com -- Scott Perez LLP, Carson Bridges,
Scott & Perez LLP, Javier Perez, Scott Perez LLP, Royce West --
royce.w@westllp.com -- West & Associates LLP & Veretta L. Frazier
-- veretta.f@westllp.com -- West & Associates LLP.

Methodist Hospitals of Dallas & Dallas Methodist Hospitals
Foundation Inc, Defendants, represented by Simon D. Whiting --
swhiting@brlaw.com -- Burford & Ryburn, L.L.P. & Nicole L. Tong -
- ntong@brlaw.com -- Burford & Ryburn LLP.


MILGARD MANUFACTURING: Faces "Bowen" Suit over Defective Windows
----------------------------------------------------------------
CARMELA BOWEN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MILGARD MANUFACTURING, INCORPORATED; DOES
1 through 1,000, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 37-2018-
00032140-CU-CD-CTL (Cal. Super., San Diego Cty., June 27, 2018)
alleges that the Defendants manufacture, market, and sell
defective windows.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff purchased windows that
are designed, manufactured, constructed and sold by the
Defendants which had defects. Due to the defects of the windows,
water leaked inside the Plaintiff's home causing damages.

Milgard Manufacturing, Inc., doing business as Milgard Windows,
manufactures windows and doors. Milgard Manufacturing
Incorporated operates as a subsidiary of Masco Corporation. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James R. Kristy, Esq.
          THE KRISTY LAW FIRM
          18377 Beach Blvd., Suite 331
          Huntington Beach, CA 92648
          Telephone: (714) 841-7400
          Facsimile: (800) 229-7601

               - and -

          Ronald A. Hartmann, Esq.
          HARTMANN & KANANEN
          5743 Corsa Avenue, Suite 119
          Westlake Village, CA 91362
          Telephone: (818) 710-0151
          Facsimile: (818) 710-0191


MONETA ENTERPRISES: Faces State Auto's Suit in S.D. Illinois
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Moneta Enterprises,
LLC. The case is captioned as State Auto Property & Casualty
Insurance Company, Plaintiff v. Moneta Enterprises, LLC, and Tina
Stodghill, Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-01337-MJR-SCW (S.D. Ill.,
June 29, 2018). The case is assigned to Chief Judge Michael J.
Reagan and referred to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams.

Moneta Enterprises LLC is a privately held company in Lake
Oswego, Oregon. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert M. Chemers, Esq.
          Pretzel & Stouffer, Esq.
          One South Wacker Drive, Suite 2500
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 346-1973
          E-mail: rchemers@pretzel-stouffer.com


MONTGOMERY COUNTY, NY: Court Partly Allows "Hill" Suit Amendment
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PERRY HILL, both individually and on behalf of a
class of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF
MONTGOMERY, MICHAEL AMATO, and MICHAEL FRANKO, Defendants, Case
No. 9:14-cv-00933 (BKS/DJS) (N.D. N.Y.), Judge Brenda K. Sannes
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York
(i) granted in part and denied in part Hill's motion for leave to
amend the Complaint under Rule 15; and (ii) granted in part and
denied in part proposed intervenor James Rogers' motion for leave
to intervene, under Rule 24, as a named Plaintiff and the class
representative.

On July 25, 2014, Hill filed the Complaint in the action.  Hill
brings the proposed class action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
against Defendants County of Montgomery, Michael Amato, and
Michael Franko.  In the Complaint, Hill advances a conditions of
confinement claim, alleging that the Defendants failed to provide
adequate food and nutrition in violation of the Eighth Amendment
while he was detained at the Montgomery County Jail ("MCJ") in
Fultonville, New York.

On Feb. 27, 2017, after conducting significant discovery, Hill
moved for class certification.  It was unclear from his papers,
however, whether Hill, who was held at MCJ in connection with a
probation violation, was a pretrial detainee or a convicted
prisoner.  The Plaintiff's status governs whether his conditions
of confinement claim is analyzed under the Eighth Amendment's
cruel and unusual punishment clause or the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process clause, which require slightly different showings.
Further, the Court found that, because Hill had been released
from MCJ before filing the action, his claim for injunctive
relief was in all likelihood moot and he did not have standing to
seek such relief on behalf of the purported class.  The Court
therefore denied his motion for class certification without
prejudice to renewal upon briefing these issues.

Presently before the Court are: (1) Hill's supplemental briefing
concerning whether he was a pretrial detainee or convicted
prisoner at MCJ; (2) Hill's supplemental briefing concerning
whether he has standing to bring a claim for declaratory and
injunctive relief; (3) Hill's motion for leave to amend the
Complaint under Rule 15; and (4) proposed intervenor James
Rogers' motion for leave to intervene, under Rule 24, as a named
Plaintiff and class representative.  The Defendants oppose these
motions.

The proposed amended complaint adds the allegation from June 2014
until February 2015, Mr. Rogers was detained at the Montgomery
County Jail.  Mr. Rogers spent approximately four months as a
pre-trial detainee and four months as a convicted detainee.  It
further alleges that Rogers was approximately 195 pounds upon his
admission to the jail.  Mr. Rogers lost approximately 15 pounds
during his eight-month admission to the jail.  Mr. Rogers weight
loss was also substantial given he is 6'1, and is an extremely
thin man.

The proposed amended complaint defines a primary class and two
subclasses.

     i. The primary class consists of all detainees who have been
or will be placed into the custody of the Montgomery County Jail
and were detained for at least two consecutive weeks.  The class
period commences on July 24, 2011, and extends to the date on
which Montgomery County is enjoined from, or otherwise ceases,
enforcing its policy, practice and custom of refusing to provide
an appropriate amount of nutritional sustenance to all detainees
admitted to the Montgomery County Jail.

     ii. The Pre-Trial Detainee Sub-Class is defined as all
members of the Primary Class but who were housed as a Pre-Trial
Detainee, in that they had not yet been convicted of their
charges.

     iii. The Post-Trial Detainee Sub-Class is defined as all
members of the Primary Class, but who were housed as a Post-Trial
Detainee, in that they had been convicted of their charges,
either by a plea or jury trial.

Addressing Hill's briefing on the first two issues before turning
to the motion to amend and intervene, Judge Sannes finds that
given Hill's assertion that the alleged probation violation
occurred after his term of probation expired, and thus was not
actionable or based on a conviction or sentence, his claims are
governed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Moreover, even if Hill's
probation had not expired prior to the alleged violation, because
he had not yet had a hearing or been found guilty of the
violation, his status is more akin to that of a pretrial
detainee.  And because Hill filed the Complaint on July 25, 2014
and he was released from MCJ in March 2014, several months prior
to filing the Complaint, the Court lacks Article III jurisdiction
over Hill's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, and
they are dismissed as moot.

Rogers seeks to intervene as a class representative and the named
Plaintiff in order to advance a claim for injunctive and
declaratory relief.  Although Rogers is no longer incarcerated at
MCJ, he argues that because he was incarcerated at the time the
Complaint was filed, the relation-back doctrine preserves his
(otherwise moot) claim for injunctive relief.

The Judge finds that because Rogers was no longer incarcerated at
MCJ as of Nov. 21, 2017, the date he moved to intervene, any
claim for injunctive or declaratory relief is moot and he lacks
standing to pursue these claims.  Accordingly, she will deny
Rogers' motion to intervene to seek declaratory and injunctive
relief.  She will grant Rogers' motion to intervene to the extent
he seeks to assert conditions of confinement claim for damages.
She concludes that it is the date Rogers becomes a party to the
action that dictates when he filed suit for PLRA purposes.

The Judge will deny the motion to amend to the extent it contains
a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief.  It will be,
however, granted for purposes of: (1) adding Rogers as a
Plaintiff with a Fourteenth Amendment and Eighth Amendment
conditions of confinement claim, reflecting his status as both a
pretrial detainee and convicted prisoner at MCJ; and (2)
clarifying Hill's status as a pretrial detainee; and (3)
clarifying that Plaintiffs seek certification under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4).  The Plaintiffs will revise the
proposed amended complaint accordingly and file it within 14 days
of the date of the Order.

Hill has indicated that he may seek to intervene a putative class
member who is presently incarcerated and who also exhausted . . .
administrative remedies if given a modest period of time.  The
Defendants object to any further delay in the action, which has
been pending for nearly 4 years.

Indeed, the Judge shares the Defendants' concern regarding the
extensive time and expense that has gone into the litigation of
the action.  However, as the intervention of a presently
incarcerated putative class member as a named Plaintiff may
enable Hill to pursue a claim for declaratory and injunctive
relief, she will provide Hill a short period of time, until June
12, 2018, to file a motion to amend and intervene.

For these reasons, Judge Sannes dismissed without prejudice the
claim for injunctive and declaratory relief.  She granted Hill's
motion for leave to file an amended complaint and Rogers' motion
to intervene as a named Plaintiff for purposes of: (1) adding
Rogers as a Plaintiff with a Fourteenth Amendment and Eighth
Amendment conditions of confinement damages claim, reflecting his
status as both a pretrial detainee and convicted prisoner at MCJ;
and (2) clarifying Hill's status as a pretrial detainee; and (3)
clarifying that the Plaintiffs seek certification under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4).

The Judge denied Hill's motion for leave to file an amended
complaint and Rogers' motion to intervene.  Hill may, by June 12,
2018, file: either (1) an amended complaint, as discussed supra;
or (2) a second motion to amend and to intervene for purposes of
adding a Plaintiff with standing to pursue a claim for injunctive
and declaratory relief.  If such a motion is filed, the Judge
will consider it, along with any response by the Defendants,
which must be filed by June 19, 2018, together with the pending
motion for class certification.  If Hill elects not to file such
a motion, the Court will consider the motion for class
certification based on the amended complaint and any further
briefing.

If the Plaintiffs seek certification under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4), they must file a letter brief addressing
the requirements in Rule 23(b)(3), by June 19, 2018, and the
Defendants may file a letter brief in response by June 26, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2018 Memorandum Decision
and Order is available at https://is.gd/HT0r5b from Leagle.com.

Perry Hill, both individually and on behalf of a class of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Elmer R. Keach, III
-- bobkeach@keachlawfirm.com -- Law Offices of Elmer Robert
Keach, III, P.C., Jason S. Rathod -- jrathod@classlawdc.com --
Migliaccio & Rathod LLP, pro hac vice, Maria K. Dyson --
mariadyson@keachlawfirm.com -- Law Offices of Elmer Robert Keach,
III, P.C. & Nicholas A. Migliaccio --  nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com
-- Migliaccio & Rathod LLP.

County of Montgomery, Michael Amato, Sheriff, Montgomery County &
Michael Franko, Jail Administrator, Montgomery County Jail,
Defendants, represented by Chelsea E. Manocchi --
cmanocchi@goldbergsegalla.com -- Goldberg Segalla, LLP - Albany
Office & Jonathan M. Bernstein -- jbernstein@goldbergsegalla.com
-- Goldberg, Segalla Law Firm - Albany Office.


N.Y. TILE CORPORATION: Underpays Finishers, "Bucsit" Suit Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
VACHARY BUCSIT, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. N.Y. TILE CORPORATION, and DOES
1 through 25, Defendants, Case No. 37-2018-00032724-CU-WT-CTL
(Cal. Sup., San Diego Cty., June 29, 2018) is an action against
the Defendants for unpaid regular hours, overtime hours, minimum
wages, wages for missed meal and rest periods.

The Plaintiff Bucsit was employed by the Defendants as a finisher
from year 2016 to 2018.

N.Y. Tile Corporation is a corporation doing business in the
County of San Diego, State of California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Gould, Esq.
          Aarin A. Zeif, Esq.
          GOULD & ASSOCIATES
          A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION
          17822 E. 17th Street, Suite 106
          Tustin, CA 92780
          Telephone: (714) 669-2850
          Facsimile: (714)544-0800
          E-mail: Michael@wageandhourlaw.com
                  Aarin@wageandhourlaw.com


NATIONAL RIFLE: Bid to Compel Reply to RFPs in "Kalmbach" Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KATHARYN KALMBACH, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL RIFLE
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, a New York corporation, and INFOCISION,
INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendants, Case No. C17-399-RSM
(W.D. Wash.), Judge Ricardo S. Martinez of the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington, Seattle, denied the
Defendants' Motion to Compel Responses to their Requests for
Production ("RFPs") Nos. 20, 21, 23, and 25-29 from Kalmbach.

These RFPs seek documents concerning Kalmbach's service as
executor, the lawsuit filed against her, her bankruptcy, a
company called WellsDelta, and her business Kathryn's Kreations.
The Defendants assert that, during her deposition, Ms. Kalmbach
revealed that she was sued for fraud related to her
administration of an estate, and that this suit claimed she had
looted over $500,000 from the estate and used a company called
WellsDelta to wrongfully take real property from the estate.
They assert that Ms. Kalmbach's bankruptcy filings reveal she
owned a business called Kathryn's Kreations through at least
March 2013, but that she had previously testified that she had
not owned a business since 2000.  They argue these issues bear on
Ms. Kalmbach's fitness to represent a class.

Ms. Kalmbach responded to each of these RFPs arguing that the
Request is vague, overbroad and beyond the scope of discoverable
evidence set forth in FRCP 26(b)(1), as the Request seeks
irrelevant information in no way related to the claims and
allegations at issue in this case. This request also seeks
documents that are disproportionate to the needs of the case.

For RFP No. 23, seeking documents relating to her legally
changing her first name from Claudia to Katharyn, Ms. Kalmbach
also notes furthermore, this request seeks discovery of documents
that are public records and are available to the Defendants.  For
RFP No. 25 through 29, Ms. Kalmbach also notes that the
Defendants are seeking information already in the Defendant's
custody and control and that are public records.  For one RFP at
issue, Ms. Kalmbach objects based on the attorney client
privilege.

The Defendants argue that Ms. Kalmbach's objections are
boilerplate and run afoul of Rule 26(b)(1) and Rule 34(b)(2).  In
Response to this Motion, Ms. Kalmbach argues that these discovery
requests concerning Ms. Kalmbach's administration of an estate of
a deceased relative from 2003-ORDER 2009, appear to be made
solely to harass her and to force her to re-hash irrelevant
events that happened over a decade ago.

As an initial matter, Judge Martinez notes that the Defendants
already moved to deny class certification on Feb. 2, 2018, based
on Ms. Kalmbach's fitness.  The motion is still pending.  It is
unclear to the Judge how the Defendants can argue that the
requested discovery, related to her fitness, is proportional to
the needs of this case given that the Defendants felt they
already had enough information to move for relief based on her
fitness.  This question, raised in the Response brief, is left
unanswered by the Defendants.

Turning to relevancy, the Judge finds that Ms. Kalmbach has met
her burden to show why the discovery requests should be denied.
Although the fitness of a class representative is a relevant
topic of discovery, the cases cited by Ms. Kalmbach indicate that
there is a limit.  The key questions for fitness are conflicts of
interest with other class members and vigorousness of potential
representation.  Ms. Kalmbach has adequately demonstrated that
the discovery requests at issue cannot lead to relevant
information as to these questions.  The fact that she settled a
lawsuit with accusation of fraud 10 years ago has little bearing
on her fitness in the case with these issues.

The Judge further finds that Ms. Kalmbach's objections, although
thin on details initially, were supplemented by further
information by her counsel.  In any event, he believes the
Defendants already knew the bases for these objections given the
deposition and prior briefing before the Court.

Considering all of the foregoing, Judge Martinez finds that the
requested discovery seeks irrelevant information not proportional
to the needs of the case under Rule 26(b)(1).  Accordingly, and
after having reviewed the relevant briefing and the remainder of
the record, he denied the Defendants' Motion to Compel.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/Yrg9ht from Leagle.com.

Katharyn Kalmbach, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kim D. Stephens --
kstephens@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS, Patrick Peluso -
- ppeluso@woodrowpeluso.com -- WOODROW & PELUSO LLC, pro hac
vice, Stefan Coleman, LAW OFFICE OF STEFAN COLEMAN, pro hac vice,
Steven L. Woodrow -- swoodrow@woodrowpeluso.com -- WOODROW &
PELUSO LLC, pro hac vice & Chase Christian Alvord --
calvord@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS.

National Rifle Association of America, a New York corporation &
InfoCision, Inc, a Delaware corporation, Defendants, represented
by Brett A. Wall  -- bwall@bakerlaw.com -- BAKER HOSTETLER LLP,
pro hac vice, James Raymond Morrison -- jmorrison@bakerlaw.com --
BAKER HOSTETLER LLP, Michael D. Meuti -- mmeuti@bakerlaw.com --
BAKER HOSTETLER LLP, pro hac vice, Terry M. Brennan --
tbrennan@bakerlaw.com -- BAKER HOSTETLER, pro hac vice & Curt Roy
Hineline -- chineline@bakerlaw.com -- BAKER HOSTETLER LLP.


NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Rakestraw Alleges Violation of RESPA
---------------------------------------------------------
PAULETTE E. RAKESTRAW, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-03144-ELR-LTW (N.D. Ga., June 29,
2018) alleges violation of the Real Estate Settlement Practices
Act.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC, doing business as Mr. Cooper, provides
mortgage services. It offers various solutions to meet the
reverse mortgage needs of its customers. The company provides its
services through its representatives. Nationstar Mortgage LLC was
formerly known as Centex Credit Corporation and changed its name
to Nationstar Mortgage LLC in 2006. The company was founded in
1994 and is based in Coppell, Texas. Nationstar Mortgage LLC
operates as a subsidiary of Nationstar Mortgage Holdings Inc.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Wayne Charles, Esq.
          WAYNE CHARLES, PC
          395 Highgrove Dr.
          Fayetteville, GA 30215
          Telephone: (770) 241-8936
          Facsimile: (770) 460-0412


NATIONWIDE CREDIT: Gross Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections
----------------------------------------------------------
CYNTHIA GROSS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. NATIONWIDE CREDIT & COLLECTION INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-970 (E.D. Wis., June 26, 2018) seeks to
stop the Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a
debt.

Nationwide Credit & Collection Inc. is a foreign business
corporation with its principal place of business located at 815
Commerce Drive Ste 270, Oak Brook, Illinois 60523. The Company is
engaged in the business of a collection agency, using the mails
and telephone to collect consumer debts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


NELSEN & FEITELSON: Simmons Sues over Debt Collection Practices
---------------------------------------------------------------
KELLI SIMMONS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. NELSEN & FEITELSON LAW GROUP PLC; BROOK
RUN VILLAGE OWNER'S ASSOCIATION INC. D/B/A BROOK RUN HOME OWNERS'
ASSOCIATION; and JEREMY FEITELSON, Defendants, Case No. 4:18-cv-
00206 (S.D. Iowa, June 26, 2018) seeks to stop the Defendant's
unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt. The case is
assigned to Chief Judge John A. Jarvey and referred to Magistrate
Judge Celeste F. Bremer.

Nelsen & Feitelson Law Group PLC is a general practice law firm
established in 2004 and committed to providing professional,
dependable, and effective service. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Samuel Z Marks, Esq.
          MARKS LAW FIRM
          4225 University Avenue
          Des Moines, IA 50311
          Telephone: (515) 276-7211
          Facsimile: (515) 276-6280
          E-mail: office@markslawdm.com


NEW YORK: COBA's Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------
Judge Laura Taylor Swain of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the case, CORRECTION OFFICERS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION,
INC., TIFFANI DUBLIN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, ANTHONY ROMANO, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, MATTHEW HINES, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, FRANCIS CASTRO,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, JOHN
AND JANE DOES 1-2,000, Plaintiffs, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MAYOR
BILL DE BLASIO, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, and
COMMISSIONER CYNTHIA BRANN, Defendants, Case No. 17 CV 2899-LTS
(S.D. N.Y.).

Plaintiff Correction Officers' Benevolent Association, Inc.
("COBA"), the exclusive bargaining representative for all
employees of the New York City Department of Correction ("DOC")
holding the title of "Correction Officer" ("CO"), and COs Tiffani
Dublin, Anthony Romano, Matthew Hines, and Francis Castro bring
the action, in the case of the named COs, both individually and
on behalf of others similarly situated, against the Defendants.
The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants have violated 42 U.S.C.
section 1983 by subjecting them to a state-created danger in
derogation of their substantive due process rights guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.

In March 2015, the City announced a "14 Point Plan" and a series
of initiatives, policies, practices, and customs to reduce
violence against inmates within city jails.  The Plaintiffs
allege that these reforms prioritized the safety of inmates at
the expense of the safety of the COs and other staff members.

The Plaintiffs allege that violence in city jails increased 18%,
as reported in May 2017, and injuries to DOC staff increased to
approximately 1,337, in the period between November 2015 and
December 2016.  They proffer graphic allegations detailing inmate
violence against and abuse of DOC staff.

The Plaintiffs also allege that these specific incidents and the
alleged increase in the rate of violence against DOC staff are
attributable to the Defendants' aforementioned policies and
practices.  According to them, DOC's alleged underreporting and
mischaracterizations of violent encounters between inmates and
staff present a misleading impression of the safety at DOC
facilities and give a false sense of security to the thousands of
Correction Officers in the Jails.  COBA has notified DOC that its
punitive segregation policies are dangerous and caused harm to
Correction Officers on several occasions and that its training
facilities are inadequate.

The Defendants move pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure
12(b)(6) to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Judge Swain finds that the Plaintiffs fail to state claims upon
which relief may be granted with respect to the first eight
challenged policies or practices.  The Defendants' remaining
claim, that the alleged practice of deliberately underreporting
and misreporting violence in their jails is shocking to the
contemporary conscience, fails to state a claim because the
Plaintiffs allege no facts showing how such false reporting
increases the COs' exposure to physical harm.

Although the Plaintiffs argue that these misrepresentations are
intended to make the DOC facilities appear safer than they
actually are, they provide no factual allegations tying the
allegedly false reports of violence against COs or among inmates
to any of the alleged injuries to a CO.  The claim must therefore
be dismissed, and the Judge says he needs not consider whether
the Defendants' alleged behavior in this regard could be
actionable as conscience-shocking under the Due Process Clause.

For these reasons, Judge Swain granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the Complaint in its entirety.  The dismissal is without
prejudice to the filing of a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(a) for leave to amend the Complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 30, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/a0l1UW from Leagle.com.

Tiffani Dublin, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Correction Officers' Benevolent Association,
Inc., Anthony Romano, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Matthew Hines, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Francis Castro, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated & John and Jane Does
1-2000, Plaintiffs, represented by Cynthia Devasia --
cdevasia@koehler-isaacs.com -- Koehler & Isaacs, LLP.

City of New York, Mayor Bill De Blasio, New York City Department
of Correction & Commissioner Joseph Ponte, Defendants,
represented by Alan Maer Schlesinger, Corporation Counsel Office
City of New York.


NISSAN NORTH AMERICA: Faces "Norman" Suit over Defective Parts
--------------------------------------------------------------
CHEYNE NORMAN; PATRICIA WECKWERTH; and SOPHIA WESCOTT,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.; and NISSAN MOTOR
COMPANY, LTD., Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-00588 (M.D. Tenn.,
June 26, 2018) alleges that the Defendants marketed and sold the
2013-2017 Nissan Versa, 2013-2017 Nissan Versa Note or 2013-2017
Nissan Juke without disclosing that the vehicles' Xtronic
Continuously Variable Transmission were defective.

The complaint alleges that the 2013-2017 Nissan Versa, 2013-2017
Nissan Versa Note or 2013-2017 Nissan Juke equipped with an
Xtronic Continuously Variable Transmission contains one or more
design and/or manufacturing defects. The Continuously Variable
Transmission is defective in the following ways: it causes
sudden, unexpected shaking and violent jerking when drivers
attempt to accelerate their vehicles; it causes the vehicle to
lag or delay when the driver tries to accelerate, causing an
unsafe, unpredictable acceleration; it exhibits a hard
deceleration or clunk when drivers either slow down or accelerate
at low speeds; it causes complete transmission failure in the
middle of roadways and it suffers catastrophic failure,
necessitating replacement.

Nissan North America, Inc. designs, develops, manufactures, and
markets Nissan and Infiniti vehicles in the United States,
Canada, and Mexico. Nissan North America, Inc. was formerly known
as Nissan Motor Corporation USA, Inc. and changed its name to
Nissan North America, Inc. in January 1999. The company was
founded in 1960 and is headquartered in Franklin, Tennessee with
subsidiaries in Mississauga, Canada; San Diego, California; and
Mexico. It has production plants in Smyrna and Decherd,
Tennessee; and Canton, Mississippi. Nissan North America, Inc.
operates as a subsidiary of Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Caroline Ramsey Taylor, Esq.
          John C. Whitfield, Esq.
          WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON, LLP
          518 Monroe Street
          Nashville, TN 37208
          Telephone: (615) 921-6500
          Facsimile: (615) 921-6501
          E-mail: caroline@wbmllp.com
                  john@wbmllp.com

               - and -

          Russell D. Paul, Esq.
          Lawrence Deutsch, Esq.
          Jeffrey L. Osterwise, Esq.
          BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C
          1622 Locust Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103-6305
          Telephone: (215) 875-3000
          Facsimile: (215) 875-4604
          E-mail: rpaul@bm.net
                  ldeutsch@bm.net
                  josterwise@bm.net

               - and -

          Jordan L. Lurie, Esq.
          Tarek H. Zohdy, Esq.
          Cody R. Padgett, Esq.
          Robert K. Friedl, Esq.
          Trisha K. Monesi, Esq.
          CAPSTONE LAW APC
          1875 Century Park East, Suite 1000
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 556-4811
          Facsimile: (310) 943-0396
          E-mail: Jordan.Lurie@capstonelawyers.com
                  Tarek.Zohdy@capstonelawyers.com
                  Cody.Padgett@capstonelawyers.com
                  Trisha.Monesi@capstonelawyers.com
                  Robert.Friedl@capstonelawyers.com

               - and -

          Gary E. Mason, Esq.
          Jennifer Goldstein, Esq.
          WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON, LLP
          5101 Wisconsin Ave. NW Suite 305
          Washington, D.C. 20016
          Telephone: (202) 429-2290
          Facsimile: (202) 429-2294
          E-mail: gmason@wbmllp.com
                  Jgoldstein@wbmllp.com


NORTH JERSEY PROPERTY: Bautista Sues Over Denied Breaks, OT Pay
---------------------------------------------------------------
Cesar Bautista, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. North Jersey Property
Maintenance, LLC and Brian Spellman, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-
09127, (D. N.J., May 11, 2018), seeks equitable and legal relief
for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the New
Jersey Wage and Hour Law and the New Jersey Wage Payment Act.

Defendants employed Bautista as a driver and maintenance worker
from in or around 1991 until on or around April 21, 2018. He
regularly worked Mondays through Saturdays, from approximately
9:30 p.m. until 9:30 a.m., for a total of approximately seventy-
two hours per week and was not afforded meal or rest breaks
during his employment with Defendants, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Adam Sackowitz, Esq.
      KATZ MELINGER PLLC
      280 Madison Avenue, Suite 600
      New York, NY 10016
      Tel: (212) 460-0047
      Email: ajsackowitz@katzmelinger.com


NORTON OUTDOOR: Removes Shipps' Suit to S.D. Ohio
-------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Jerry L. Shipp, and Cynthia A.
Shipp, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc., LAL
Properties, LLC, Flora Byrnes, Leesman Lighting, LLC, Village of
St. Bernard, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-635, was removed from
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Ohio
Division, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, Western Division, on July 2, 2018. The District Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 1:18-cv-00444 to the proceeding. The case is
assigned to Judge Susan J. Dlott and referred to Magistrate Judge
Stephanie K. Bowman.

Norton Outdoor Advertising Inc is a privately held company in
Cincinnati, Ohio. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John Henry Phillips, Esq.
          Anthony Brendan Holman, Esq.
          Kyle Edward Hackett, Esq.
          PHILLIPS LAW FIRM
          9521 Montgomery Road
          Cincinnati, OH 45242
          Telephone: (513) 985-2500
          Facsimile: (513) 985-2503
          E-mail: JHP@phillipslawfirm.com
                  abh@phillipslawfirm.com
                  keh@phillipslawfirm.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Michael Alan Galasso, Esq.
          Robbins Kelly Patterson & Tucker
          7 W 7th Street, Suite 1400
          Cincinnati, OH 45202-2424
          Telephone: (513) 721-3330
          Facsimile: (513) 721-5001
          E-mail: mgalasso@rkpt.com

               - and -

          Michael Leis Gay, Esq.
          CORS & BASSETT LLC
          201 E. Fifth Street, Suite 900
          Cincinnati, OH 45202
          Telephone: (513) 852-8200
          E-mail: mlg@corsbassett.com

               - and -

          Michael S Loughry, Esq.
          MAZANEC, RASKIN& RYDER CO., LPA
          175 South Third Street, Suite 1000
          Columbus, OH 43215-7619
          Telephone: (614) 228-5931
          Facsimile: (614) 228-5934
          E-mail: mloughry@mrrlaw.com


OHANA MILITARY: Court Narrows Claims in "Lake"
----------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii
granted in part and denied in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned KENNETH LAKE, CRYSTAL LAKE, HAROLD BEAN,
MELINDA BEAN, KYLE PAHONA, ESTEL PAHONA, TIMOTHY MOSELEY, ASHLEY
MOSELEY, RYAN WILSON, and HEATHER WILSON Plaintiffs, v. OHANA
MILITARY COMMUNITIES, LLC, FOREST CITY RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT,
INC.; and DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10, Defendants, Civil No. 16-00555
LEK-KJM (D. Haw.).

The Plaintiffs' claim that the Defendant breached the landlord
tenant code by failing to comply with the applicable building
codes and housing laws is dismissed with prejudice.

The Complaint alleged the following claims: breach of contract
against Ohana ("Count I"); breach of the implied warranty of
habitability against Ohana ("Count II"); a claim against the
Defendants for violation of the Landlord Tenant Code, Haw. Rev.
Stat. Chapter 521 ("Chapter 521" and "Count III"); an unfair and
deceptive trade practices ("UDAP") claim against Defendants
pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. Section 480-2 ("Count IV"); a
negligent failure to warn claim against Defendants ("Count V"); a
claim against Defendants for negligent infliction of emotional
distress ("NIED") and intentional infliction of emotional
distress ("IIED" and "Count VI"); a fraud claim against
Defendants ("Count VII"); a negligent misrepresentation claim
against Defendants ("Count VIII"); an unfair competition claim
("UMOC") against Defendants pursuant to Section 480-2(a) ("Count
IX"); a trespass claim against Defendants ("Count X"); and a
nuisance claim against Defendants ("Count XI").

The Defendants argue the additional factual allegations in the
First Amended Complaint are insufficient to cure: the standing
defect identified in the 8/1/17 Order; and the defects in the
Plaintiffs' claims that the Defendants identified in the Original
Motion to Dismiss but were not addressed in the 8/1/17 Order.

Standing

The First Amended Complaint alleges all the Plaintiffs
experienced construction dust at MCBH settling on their rental
homes, their persons, and/or their personal property, including
during the Plaintiffs' routine travels and visits to parts of
MCBH beyond the immediate areas of their rental homes. This dust
allegedly caused the Plaintiffs to spend additional time cleaning
their homes and personal property; caused them to spend
additional resources on cleaning and air filtration supplies; and
prevented them from using and enjoying their homes and the MCBH
community as they would have without the dust.

To the extent the Motion argues the Plaintiffs failed to plead
sufficient standing allegations, the Motion is denied.

Amended Count I -- Breach of Contract

The Defendants argue Amended Count I fails because the First
Amended Complaint does not identify the specific contractual
provision Ohana allegedly violated.

The elements of a breach of contract claim are (1) the contract
at issue; (2) the parties to the contract; (3) whether plaintiff
performed under the contract; (4) the particular provision of the
contract allegedly violated by defendants; and (5) when and how
defendants allegedly breached the contract. The First Amended
Complaint alleges sufficient facts to support each element, and
therefore Amended Count I states a plausible breach of contract
claim. Defendants' Motion is denied as to Amended Count I.

Amended Count II -- Breach of the Implied Warranty of
Habitability

The First Amended Complaint alleges sufficient facts to support
each of the required elements. This Court concludes that Amended
Count II states a plausible claim for breach of the implied
warranty of habitability and therefore denies Defendants' Motion
as to Amended Count II.

Amended Count III -- Violation of Chapter 521

Amended Count III alleges Defendants violated Haw. Rev. Stat.
Sections 521-10 and 521-42(a)(1).

In the Original Motion to Dismiss, the Defendants argued the
Plaintiffs did not allege a violation of applicable building or
housing laws materially affecting health and safety. Although
this issue was not addressed in the 8/1/17 Order because the
standing issue was dispositive, the Plaintiffs had notice of this
defect in their Section 521-42(a)(1) claim, and they failed to
cure it when they filed their First Amended Complaint. Further,
the Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to the instant Motion
does not identify how the Plaintiffs would amend this claim, if
given the opportunity to do so. These facts give a strong
indication that the plaintiffs have no additional facts to plead.

This Court therefore concludes the Plaintiff would not be able to
cure the defect in their Section 521-42(a)(1) claim by amendment.
The Defendants' Motion is granted insofar as the portion of
Amended Count III based on Section 521-42(a)(1) is dismissed with
prejudice.

Amended Count V -- Negligent Failure to Warn

The Defendants argue Amended Count V fails because the Plaintiffs
do not sufficiently allege how they were impacted by contaminated
construction dust. Based on the same allegations discussed
regarding the Plaintiffs' standing, this Court concludes the
Plaintiffs have pled sufficient factual allegations to support a
plausible claim for negligent failure to warn. The Defendants'
Motion is denied as to Amended Count V.

Amended Count VI -- IIED and NIED

The Defendants argue Amended Count VI fails because the
Plaintiffs have not pled sufficiently outrageous conduct to
support an IIED claim, and they have not pled the physical
manifestation of harm required to support an NIED claim based on
injury to property.

IIED

Barber also involved an IIED claim. The district court identified
the elements of an IIED claim as, inter alia: (1) that the act
allegedly causing the harm was intentional or reckless, (2) that
the act was outrageous, and (3) that the act caused (4) extreme
emotional distress to another.

This Court agrees with the district court in Barber. Based on the
factual allegations of the First Amended Complaint, reasonable
people may differ on the issue of whether Defendants' conduct was
sufficiently outrageous to support an IIED claim. Because the
issue of outrageousness cannot be determined in a motion to
dismiss, Defendant's Motion is denied as to the portion of
Amended Count VI alleging an IIED claim.

NIED

The district court in Barber stated the elements of an NIED claim
are, inter alia: (1) that the defendant engaged in negligent
conduct; (2) that the plaintiff suffered serious emotional
distress; and (3) that such negligent conduct of the defendant
was a legal cause of the serious emotional distress.

This Court agrees with the district court in Barber. The factual
allegations of the First Amended Complaint are sufficient to
plead a plausible NIED claim based on exposure to significant
health risks. Defendants' Motion is denied as to the portion of
Amended Count VI alleging an NIED claim.

Amended Counts VII and VIII -- Fraud and Negligent
Misrepresentation

The Defendants argue Amended Counts VII and VIII fail because the
Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged detrimental reliance.
Reliance is a required element of a claim for
intentional/fraudulent misrepresentation and a claim for
negligent misrepresentation.

Based on the same allegations discussed previously regarding the
Plaintiffs' standing, this Court concludes the Plaintiffs have
pled sufficient factual allegations regarding their reliance to
support plausible claims for intentional/fraudulent
misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation. The
Defendants' Motion is denied as to Amended Counts VII and VIII.

Amended Count XI -- Nuisance

The Defendants argue Amended Count XI fails because the
Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient factual allegations to
support the claim; the Beans' and the Moseleys' nuisance claims
are time-barred; and the Plaintiffs do not allege the Pahonas and
Plaintiffs Kenneth Lake and Crystal Lake (Lakes) have been
impacted by construction dust.

The Beans and the Moseleys

The Plaintiffs argue the Beans' and the Moseleys' nuisance claims
are timely because the statute of limitations was tolled while
Barber was pending because it was filed as a class action, and
the Plaintiffs were all members of the putative class.

Because there was no nuisance claim at issue in Barber, the
Beans' and the Moseleys' nuisance claims were not tolled while
Barber was pending. Further, the Plaintiffs have not presented
any other ground that would support tolling of the statute of
limitations on the Beans' and the Moseleys' nuisance claims.

The Beans' and the Moseleys' nuisance claims are therefore time-
barred and must be dismissed. The Defendants' Motion is granted
insofar as the Beans' and the Moseleys' nuisance claims are
dismissed with prejudice.

Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss First Amended
Complaint is granted in part and denied in part. The Motion is
granted insofar as: the Plaintiffs' UDAP and UMOC claims are
stricken; the Plaintiffs' Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 521 claim
alleging a violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. Section 521-42(a)(1) is
dismissed with prejudice; the Beans' nuisance claim is dismissed
with prejudice; and the Moseleys' nuisance claim is dismissed
with prejudice. The Motion is denied in all other respects.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 31, 2017 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8zqb947 from Leagle.com.

Kenneth Lake, Crystal Lake, Harold Bean, Melinda Bean, Kyle
Pahona, Estel Pahona, Timothy Moseley, Ashley Moseley, Ryan
Wilson & Heather Wilson, Plaintiffs, represented by Patrick Kyle
Smith, Smith Law, & Terrance M. Revere --
main@revereandassociates.com -- Revere & Associates, LLC.

Ohana Military Communities, LLC & Forest City Residential
Management, Inc., Defendants, represented by Christine A. Terada
-- cterada@goodsill.com -- Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel LLLP,
Joachim P. Cox -- jcox@cfhawaii.com -- Cox Fricke A Limited
Liability Law Partnership LLP, Kamala S. Haake  --
khaake@cfhawaii.com -- Cox Fricke LLP, Lisa W. Munger --
lmunger@goodsill.com -- Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel LLLP &
Randall C. Whattoff  -- rwhattoff@cfhawaii.com -- Cox Fricke LLP.

PETORE ASSOCIATES: Faces CCC Custom Carpentry's Suit in New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against PETORE ASSOCIATES,
INC. D/B/A PETORE CONSTRUCTION. The case is captioned as CCC
CUSTOM CARPENTRY CORP., Plaintiff v. PETORE ASSOCIATES, INC.
D/B/A PETORE CONSTRUCTION ET AL, Defendants, Case No. 513181/2018
(N.Y. Sup., Kings Cty., June 26, 2018).

Petore Associates, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the State of New Jersey. [BN]


PNC BANK: Underpays Loan Mortgage Officers, Kazi Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------
TANSEER KAZI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. PNC BANK, N.A., and DOES 1-100 inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. RG18910955 (Cal. Super., Alameda Cty., June
28, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid regular
hours, overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal and
rest periods.

The Plaintiff Kazi was employed by the Defendants as a loan
mortgage officer.

PNC Bank, National Association operates as a bank. The Bank
offers saving and current account, investment and financial
services, online banking, mortgage and non-mortgage loan
facilities, as well as issues credit card and business loans. PNC
Bank serves clients in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James M. Sitkin, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF JAMES M. SITKIN
          255 California Street, 10th floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 318-1048
          Facsimile: (415) 362-3268
          E-mail: jsitkin@sitkinlegal.com

               - and -

          Robert D. Soloff, Esq.
          ROBERT D. SOLOFF, P.A.
          7805 SW 6th Court
          Plantation, FL 33324
          Telephone: (954) 472-0002
          Facsimile: (954) 472-0052
          E-mail: robert@solofflaw.com


POPEYES LOUISIANA: "Edge" Suit Seeks Damages under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------
Amber Edge, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. Popeyes Louisiana Kitchen, Inc., Case No. 4:18-cv-
00425 (E.D. Ark., June 28, 2018), seeks declaratory judgment,
monetary damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, civil
penalties and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, and
the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act.

The Plaintiff was employed at Defendant's South University Avenue
location in Little Rock and its West Main Street location in
Jacksonville, between 2015 and March of 2018. The Plaintiff is a
resident and citizen of Faulkner County.

The Defendant Popeyes Louisiana Kitchen is a fast food eatery
company with restaurants throughout Arkansas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Chris Burks, Esq.
      Joss Sanford, Esq.
      SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLC
      One Financial Center
      650 South Shackleford, Ste 411
      Little Rock, AR 72211
      Tel: (501) 221-0088
      Fax: (888) 787-2040
      E-mail: chris@sanfordlawfirm.com
              josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


RANGER ENERGY: Doesn't Pay OT to Operators, Bryant Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------
ADRIAN BRYANT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. RANGER ENERGY SERVICES, INC.; and RANGER
ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 7:18-cv-00112 (W.D.
Tex., June 26, 2018) seeks declaratory judgment, monetary
damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, civil
penalties and costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees as a
result of the Defendants' failure to pay the Plaintiff lawful
overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per
week.

Mr. Bryant was employed by the Defendants as lead operator from
December 2017 to June 2018.

Ranger Energy Services, Inc. provides well site services and
associated equipment. The Company offers well rigs, water
transfer, plug and abandonment, wireline, fluid management and
handling, snubbing, transportation, and equipment renting
services. Ranger Energy Services operates in the States of Texas,
Colorado, Wyoming, and North Dakota. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          650 South Shackleford Road, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


RAY KLEIN: "Antoine" Suit Alleges FDCPA Violations
--------------------------------------------------
Angela Antoine, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated v. Ray Klein, Inc., dba Professional Credit Service,
Case No. 3:18-cv-01158 (D. Ore., June 29, 2018), is brought
against the Defendant for violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

The Plaintiff Angela Antoine brings this action to challenge the
actions of Ray Klein, Inc. with regard to attempts by the
Defendant to unlawfully and abusively collect a debt allegedly
owed by Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff resides in the State of Oregon, City of Portland.

The Defendant is a Washington corporation that regularly does
business within the County of Multnomah. The Defendant is a
person who uses an instrumentality of interstate commerce or the
mails in a business the principal purpose of which is the
collection of debts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      David J. McGlothlin, Esq.
      HYDE & SWIGART
      2633 E. Indian School Road, Suite 460
      Phoenix, AZ 85016
      Tel: (602) 265-3332
      Fax: (602) 230-4482
      E-mail: david@westcoastlitigation.com


RECCO HOME CARE: Underpays Home Health Aide, "Liranzo" Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
AMBAR LIRANZO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. RECCO HOME CARE SERVICE, INC., and FRANK
J. RECCO, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-03688 (E.D.N.Y., June 26,
2018) seeks to recover overtime compensation for all hours worked
in excess of 40 hours per week, interest on all compensation the
Defendant withheld, injunctive and declaratory relief, damages,
attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Family and Medical
Leave Act and Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Liranzo was employed by the Defendants as a home
health aide from January 2016 to May 24, 2018.

Recco Home Care Service, Inc. provides healthcare services. The
Company offers inpatient nursing, companion services, injury
recovery, and rehabilitative services to patients who require
continuous health care. Recco Home Care Service serves patients
throughout the State of New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter A. Romero, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF PETER A. ROMERO PLLC
          825 Veterans Highway, Suite B
          Hauppauge, NY 11788
          Telephone: (631) 257-5588
          E-mail: promero@romerolawny.com


RMB INC: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss "Kowaleski" FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Anne E. Thompson of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey granted Defendant RMB's motion to dismiss
the case, ALISON KOWALESKI, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff(s), v. RMB, INC. and JOHN DOES 1-
25, Defendant(s), Civ. No. 18-4149 (D. N.J.).

This is a consumer debt collection action.  The Plaintiff is a
natural person and resident of Somerset County, New Jersey, who
received a letter or notice from the Defendant concerning a debt
owed to Raritan Bay Medical Center, and who brings this lawsuit
on behalf of a putative class of all New Jersey consumers who
were sent similar debt collection letters or notices.  The
Defendant is a corporation which maintains a location at 409
Bearden Park Circle, Knoxville, TN.

On June 21, 2017, the Plaintiff allegedly incurred a financial
obligation to Raritan Bay Medical Center.  On Nov. 9, 2017,
Raritan Bay Medical Center referred this obligation to the
Defendant for the purpose of collection.  At that time, the
obligation was past due and in default.  In connection with this
obligation, the Defendant sent and the Plaintiff received a
letter dated Nov. 9, 2017 seeking a balance of around $150.  This
letter was the first communication the Plaintiff received
regarding this alleged debt.

At the top right corner of the Nov. 9, 2017 letter, incorporated
by reference in the Plaintiff's Complaint, the Defendant provided
the following information regarding the Raritan Bay Medical
Center obligation: Responsible Party: Alison Kowaleski, Patient
Name: Alison B. Kowaleski, Total of Accounts Listed Below:
$177.37, Date: 11/09/17.  The Nov. 9, 2017 letter, entitled
"Collection Notice, also included the following bolded text:
"This communication is from a debt collector. This is an attempt
to collect a debt and any information obtained will be used for
that purpose." The document also listed the "Creditor" as
"Raritan Bay Medical Center," giving a service date, reference
numbers, and the amount due of $177.37.

The Plaintiff filed her proposed class action Complaint on March
23, 2018, bringing one Count alleging violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").  Broadly, she asserts that
the Nov. 9, 2017 letter overshadows and/or contradicts the
protections provided by 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g(a)(3), and
further, would cause the least sophisticated consumer to be
confused about what rights he or she had and how to exercise
those rights.  In particular, the Plaintiff argues that the
Defendant's use of the phrase "Responsible Party" would lead the
least sophisticated consumer to believe that the debt described
was already validated.

After receiving an automatic extension of time to respond, the
Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on April 27, 2018.
On May 7, 2018, the Plaintiff submitted a letter pursuant to
Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(5), adjourning the Motion by one cycle to
June 4, 2018.  The Plaintiff timely filed opposition on May 21,
2018.  The Defendant replied on May 25, 2018.

Judge Thompson finds that the "Responsible Party" designation
makes no demand or threat; neither creates a timetable that
differs from the statutory prescription nor proposes an
inappropriate method of disputing the debt, and does not obscure
the relevant warnings with erroneous narrative text that muddies
the validation notice.  As such, the Judge does not hesitate to
find that these words, as displayed on RMB's notice, are not
misleading or contradictory.  As required under the FDCPA, the
validation notice created a clear and obvious disclaimer, and the
"Responsible Party" header cannot fairly be said to create
uncertainty about even the least sophisticated debtor's rights.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiff appears to attempt to
amend her Complaint in her opposition brief to the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, noting for the first time a purported
violation of 15 U.S.C.  She says it is axiomatic that a plaintiff
cannot amend its pleading in an opposition brief on a motion to
dismiss.  Section 1692e is not cited anywhere in the Plaintiff's
Complaint, and the Plaintiff's inclusion of the phrase "Section
1692 et seq." cannot be fairly read to put the Defendant on
notice of an alleged violation of Section 1692e(10).

Further, she says, leave to amend in order to plead this
statutory section would be futile, as when allegations under 15
U.S.C. Section 1692e(10) are based on the same language or
theories as allegations under 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g, the
analysis of the Section 1692g claim is usually dispositive.

For the reasons she stated, Judge Thompson granted the
Defendant's Motion.  An appropriate order will follow.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 30, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/YsuhPi from Leagle.com.

ALISON KOWALESKI, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by JOSEPH K. JONES, Jones, Wolf
& Kapasi, LLC & BENJAMIN JARRET WOLF, Jones, Wolf & Kapasi, LLC.

RMB, INC., Defendant, represented by ANDREW JOSHUA BLADY --
ablady@sessions.legal -- SESSIONS, FISHMAN, NATHAN & ISRAEL.


ROADRUNNER INTERMODAL: $9.25MM "Singh" Settlement Has Prelim OK
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JABIR SINGH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ROADRUNNER
INTERMODAL SERVICES, LLC; CENTRAL CAL TRANSPORTATION; and MORGAN
SOUTHERN, INC., Defendants, Case No. 1:15-cv-01497-DAD-BAM (E.D.
Cal.), Judge Dale A. Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California granted the Plaintiff's motion for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement.

On Feb. 9, 2015, Plaintiffs Singh, Bany Lopez, Julio Vidrio,
James Sliger, Derrick Lewis, Jerry Leininger, Kristopher Spring,
Jerry Wood, Cappelli Burless, Robert Haskins, and Douglas Luis
("Singh plaintiffs") filed a class action entitled Singh et al.
v. Roadrunner Intermodal Services, LLC et al., Case No. CGC-15-
544563 on behalf of all similarly situated current and former
truck drivers employed by the Defendants in the San Francisco
County Superior Court.

On April 15, 2015, the Defendants removed the action to the U.S.
District Court of the Northern District of California.  On Oct.
2, 2015, the action was transferred to the Sacramento Division of
the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of California.
On Feb. 18, 2016, the action was reassigned to Judge Drozd,
sitting in the Fresno Division of the Court.

On Sept. 18, 2015, Plaintiffs Paul Bonner, Christopher Cross, Leo
Lewis, Richard Love, Wilfred McGirt, and Nicholas Rich ("Rich
Plaintiffs") filed a class action entitled Rich v. Roadrunner
Intermodal Services, LLC et al, Case No. 2:15-cv-07330-DMG-JPR.on
behalf of all similarly situated current and former truck drivers
employed by the Defendants in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California.

On Jan. 8, 2016, Plaintiff Latrina Phillips filed the class
action entitled Latrina Phillips v. Roadrunner Intermodal
Services, LLC et al, Case No. 2:16-CV-01072-SVW-MRWx on behalf of
all similarly situated current and former truck drivers employed
by Defendants in the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California.

On Dec. 16, 2016, the Rich Plaintiffs filed their motion for
class certification.  On Dec. 22, 2016, before that motion was
fully briefed, District Judge Dolly M. Gee transferred the Rich
action to the Eastern District California under the first-to-file
rule.  On Feb. 9, 2017, Judge Drozd issued an order relating the
Singh, Rich, and Phillips actions.  On March 28, 2017, the Judge
consolidated the Singh and Rich actions, and on June 15, 2017,
consolidated the Phillips action with the two previously
consolidated actions.

In their operative complaints, the Plaintiffs in Singh, Rich, and
Phillips, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated and similarly aggrieved, seek damages, restitution,
penalties, pre- and post-judgment interest, costs, attorneys'
fees, and any other relief deemed appropriate by the court based
on their claims for: (1) misclassification of employees in
violation of Labor Code Section 226(a)(1); (2) failure to provide
meal periods; (3) failure to provide rest breaks; (4) failure to
pay overtime wages; (5) failure to pay minimum wages; (6) failure
to pay all wages upon separation; (7) failure to furnish timely
and accurate wage statements; (8) failure to pay all wages owed
every pay period; (9) failure to reimburse business expenses;
(10) unlawful deductions from wages; (11) penalties under
California's Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"); and (12)
violation of California's Unfair Competition Law under California
Business & Professions Code Section 17200, premised on their
wage-and-hour claims.

Following three mediation sessions, the parties reached a
settlement.  The first two mediation sessions occurred on July
12, 2016 and Sept. 14, 2016 before the Hon. Peter D. Lichtman
(Ret.) and did not result in a settlement.  Following those
mediation sessions, both parties proceeded with depositions of
the Plaintiffs, witnesses, defendants' current and former
employees, and persons most knowledgeable ("PMK") in California
and Georgia.  The third mediation session involved the co-class
counsel in the Singh, Rich, and Phillips actions, defendants and
their counsel, and mediator Mark S. Ruby and resulted in a
mediator's proposal, which the parties accepted.

Under the settlement agreement, teh Defendants have agreed to pay
$9,250,000, which includes (i) the total value of all individual
settlement payments; (ii) attorneys' fees ($3,083,333.33) and
costs ($90,000) that class counsel will request the court to
award; (iii) settlement administration costs ($12,000); (iv)
$7,500 enhancement payments awarded by the Court to each of the
18 named Plaintiffs, totaling $135,000; and (v) civil penalties
of $100,000 recoverable under PAGA, of which 75% ($75,000) will
be paid to the Labor Workforce and Development Agency ("LWDA")
and 25% ($25,000) will be paid to class members.

On April 13, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed the pending motion for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement.  The
Plaintiffs seek an order: (i) preliminarily approving the
proposed class action settlement; (ii) confirming CPT Group Inc.
as the settlement administrator; (iii) approving and directing
distribution of the class notice packet to be mailed to class
members; (iv) approving the proposed class representatives and
co-class counsel; and (v) scheduling a final fairness hearing
with respect to the settlement agreement.

Recognizing these risks faced by the Plaintiffs, Judge Drozd
finds that the amount offered in settlement of these actions
weighs in favor of preliminary approval.  He also finds that they
satisfied the Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements.
Finally, he finds that finds that the notice and the manner of
notice proposed by the Plaintiff meets the requirements of
Federal Civil Procedure Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and that the proposed
mail delivery is also appropriate.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Drozd denied the Plaintiffs'
request to modify the settlement agreement.  The preliminary
class certification is approved for the settlement class defined
as all current and former California residents who worked for the
defendants in the position of owner-operator and/or independent
contractor truck driver at any time from Feb. 9, 2011 through
April 15, 2018.

The Judge designated named Plaintiffs Jasbir Singh, Bany Lopez,
Julio Vidrio, James Sliger, Derrick Lewis, Jerry Leininger,
Kristopher Spring, Jerry Wood, Cappelli Burless, Robert Haskins,
Douglas Luis, Paul Bonner, Christopher Cross, Leo Lewis, Richard
Love, Wilfred Mcgirt, Nicholas Rich, and Latrina Phillips as the
class representatives; the law firms of Kabateck Brown Kellner
LLP and Wagner Jones Kopfman & Artenian LLP as the co-class
counsel; and CPT Group, Inc. is approved as the settlement
administrator.

He approved the proposed form of notice and and approved the
proposed settlement on a preliminary.  The hearing for final
approval of the proposed settlement is set for Oct. 16, 2018 at
9:30 a.m.

The Judge adopted the proposed settlement implementation
schedule, and the Plaintiff's counsel is directed to submit a
motion for final approval of the settlement agreement, including
an estimate of the PAGA claims, and a response to any objections
in accordance with the schedule set forth in the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/Am2hdA from Leagle.com.

Jabir Singh, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Butler Jones, Esq.,
Wagner, Jones, Kopfman, & Artenia LLP, Brian S. Kabateck --
bsk@kbklawyers.com -- Kabateck Brown Kellner, LLP, Cheryl Ann
Kenner, Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP, Daniel Myers Kopfman, Wagner,
Jones, Kopfman, & Artenian LLP, Shant Arthur Karnikian --
sk@kbklawyers.com -- Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP, Angela Elizabeth
Martinez, Wagner, Jones, Kopfman & Artenian LLP, Lawrence Mark
Artenian, Wagner, Jones, Kopfman & Artenian LLP & Nicholas John
Paul Wagner, Wagner, Jones, Kopfman, & Artenia LLP.

Bany Lopez, Julio Vidrio, James Sliger, Derrick Lewis, Jerry
Leininger, Kristopher Spring & Jerry Wood, Plaintiffs,
represented by Brian S. Kabateck, Kabateck Brown Kellner, LLP,
Daniel Myers Kopfman, Wagner, Jones, Kopfman, & Artenian LLP,
Shant Arthur Karnikian , Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP, Andrew
Butler Jones, Wagner and Jones, Angela Elizabeth Martinez,
Wagner, Jones, Kopfman & Artenian LLP, Cheryl Ann Kenner,
Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP, Lawrence Mark Artenian, Wagner,
Jones, Kopfman & Artenian LLP & Nicholas John Paul Wagner,
Wagner, Jones, Kopfman, & Artenia LLP.

Nicholas E Rich, an individual on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew
Butler Jones, Wagner and Jones, Brian S. Kabateck, Kabateck Brown
Kellner, LLP, Daniel Myers Kopfman, Wagner, Jones, Kopfman, &
Artenian LLP, Joshua H. Haffner, Haffner Law, PC, Kevin Shawn
Conlogue , Law Offices of Kevin S. Conlogue, Shant Arthur
Karnikian , Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP, Cheryl Ann Kenner,
Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP & Nicholas John Paul Wagner, Wagner,
Jones, Kopfman, & Artenia LLP.

Roadrunner Intermodal Services, LLC, Central Cal Transportation,
LLC & Morgan Southern, Inc., Defendants, represented by A. Jack
Finklea -- JFINKLEA@SCOPELITIS.COM -- Scopelitis Garvin Light
Hanson & Feary, P.C., pro hac vice, Adam C. Smedstad --
asmedstad@scopelitis.com -- Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson &
Feary, Christopher Chad McNatt, Jr. -- CMCNATT@SCOPELITIS.COM --
Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson & Feary, LLP, James H. Hanson --
JHANSON@SCOPELITIS.COM -- Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson & Feary,
P.C., pro hac vice, Megan E. Ross, Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson
& Feary & Alaina Cathrine Hawley -- AHAWLEY@SCOPELITIS.COM --
Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson & Feary, P.C.

Latrina Phillips, Defendant, represented by Andrew Butler Jones,
Wagner and Jones, Brian S. Kabateck, Kabateck Brown Kellner, LLP,
Daniel Myers Kopfman, Wagner, Jones, Kopfman, & Artenian LLP,
Joshua H. Haffner, Haffner Law, PC, Kevin Shawn Conlogue , Law
Offices of Kevin S. Conlogue, Shant Arthur Karnikian , Kabateck
Brown Kellner LLP, Cheryl Ann Kenner, Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP
& Nicholas John Paul Wagner, Wagner, Jones, Kopfman, & Artenia
LLP.


ROANOKE, VA: Policemen File Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dawn Renee Wright and Maurice Pendelton on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. City Of
Roanoke, Virginia, Case No. 18-cv-00210, (W.D. Va., May 11,
2018), seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and to
recover unpaid overtime compensation and liquidated damages under
the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Defendant is a political subdivision of the State of Virginia and
manages the primary law enforcement agency comprising police
officers and various clerical, administrative and management
personnel. Wright and Pendelton are police officers. Throughout
their employment as police officers, they were not paid overtime
compensation, says the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Thomas E. Strelka, Esq.
      L. Leigh R. Strelka, Esq.
      N. Winston West, IV, Esq.
      STRELKA LAW OFFICE, PC
      Warehouse Row
      119 Norfolk Avenue, S.W., Suite 330
      Roanoke, VA 24011
      Tel: (540) 283-0802
      Email: thomas@strelkalaw.com
             leigh@strelkalaw.com
             winston@strelkalaw.com

             - and -

      Harris D. Butler, III, Esq.
      Zev H. Antell, Esq.
      Paul M. Falabella, Esq.
      BUTLER ROYALS, PLC
      140 Virginia Street, Ste. 302
      Richmond, VA 23219
      Telephone: (804) 648-4848
      Facsimile: (804) 237-0413
      Email: harris.butler@butlerroyals.com
             zev.antell@butlerroyals.com
             paul.falabella@butlerroyals.com


ROOFRX INC: Doesn't Pay Wages to Rooferes, "Gorman" Suit Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
JOHNNIE EDWIN GORMAN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ROOFRX, INC., and DOES 1 through
30, inclusive, Case No. BC711978 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty.,
June 27, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for failure to
pay wages, provide meal and rest periods, reimburse employees for
business expenses, and provide itemized wage statements.

Mr. Gorman was employed by the Defendants as roofer.

Roof Rx, Inc. provides roof repair and maintenance services for
homeowners, property managers, real estate professionals, and
commercial building owners. Roof Rx, Inc. was founded in 1998 and
is based in Los Angeles, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alvin M. Gomez, Esq.
          Stephen N. Ilg, Esq.
          GOMEZ LAW GROUP
          2725 Jefferson Street, Suite 7
          Carlsbad, CA 92008
          Telephone: (858) 552-0000
          Facsimile: (760) 720-5217
          E-mail: alvingomez@thegomezlawgroup.com


RUSSELL P. GOLDMAN: Court Certifies Class in "Carney" FDCA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRIAN P. CARNEY and WILLIAM C. GUMPPER, JR.,
Plaintiffs, v. RUSSELL P. GOLDMAN, P.C. and JOHN DOES 1-25,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 15-00260-BRM-DEA (D. N.J.), Judge
Brian R. Martinotti of the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey (i) denied Goldman's Motion for Summary Judgment,
and (ii) granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class.

From 2007 to 2010, Carney borrowed $92,000 from the New Jersey
Higher Education Student Assistance Authority ("HESAA").
Gumpper, Carney's stepfather, cosigned three of those loans; the
total principal amount of his cosign is $69,000.  In connection
with these loans, Carney and Gumpper each signed promissory notes
in favor of HESAA which state, in pertinent part, that he will
pay all charges, collection costs and all other costs that are
permitted under the Note for the collection of the loan, which
the lender or subsequent holder of the Promissory Note incurs in
collecting the loan.

At some point, the Plaintiffs stopped making payments on the
loans and HESAA retained Goldman as its attorney for the purpose
of collection of those debts.  On June 27, 2014, Goldman sent the
Plaintiffs demand letters stating the "amount due" as $130,757.52
for Carney and $110, 251.01 for Gumpper.  The letters further
stated that there remains due a balance, which includes interest
and collection costs.  The collection costs represent the
contingency fee agreement between Goldman and HESAA.

On July 20, 2014, Carney disputed the validity of his debt.
Therefore, on July 23, 2014, Goldman sent him a letter providing
him with copies of the promissory notes on all four loans.  That
letter also itemized the "amount due," by breaking down the
amount by principal, interest, and collection costs. Because
neither Carney nor Gumpper paid their debts, Goldman filed a
Complaint against them, on behalf of HESAA, in the Superior Court
of New Jersey.  That action sought collection costs and
attorneys' fees in the amount of $21, 211.03 against Carney and
$16,689.05 against Gumpper.  Carney and Gumpper represented
themselves pro se in the State Court action.

In Carney and Gumpper's State Court Answer to HESAA's Complaint,
they denied attorneys' fees were due because it is the
Defendant's understanding that the Plaintiff's customary retainer
agreement provides for a fee only when an amount is actually
collected and is contingent on the amount collected.  Carney and
Gumpper's State Court Answer was eventually stricken for their
failure to answer interrogatories.

Thereafter, HESAA sought a default judgment against the
Plaintiffs', which was entered on Sept. 28, 2015.  The Judgment
was entered in favor of HESAA and against Carney for $149,122.91,
plus costs, and against Gumpper for $117,415.45, plus costs.
Included in the judgment amounts were attorney's fees as asserted
in HESAA's certification to the State Court.

On Jan. 13, 2015, the Plaintiffs filed their initial class action
complaint against Goldman.  On Feb. 19, 2015, Goldman filed its
Answer, and the parties began to engage in discovery.  On June
17, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint alleging
Goldman violated several provisions of the FDCPA by attempting to
collect collection costs when such costs had not been incurred at
the time the June 27 Letters were sent.

On Aug. 15, 2016, Goldman moved to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction.  On Dec. 22, 2016, the Court denied the Motion.  On
Jan. 2, 2017, Goldman filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint.
On Dec. 13, 2017, Goldman filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and
the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Certify Class.  Both motions are
opposed.

Goldman argues that the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the
entire controversy doctrine because the latter raised their FDCPA
claims before the State Court, but never sought to join Goldman
as a party.  The Plaintiffs argue Goldman's entire controversy
claim is time barred, or alternatively that it does not apply
because the FDCPA claims in the matter are not related to the
claims in the State Court Action.

Assuming arguendo, Goldman's entire controversy defense is not
time barred, Judge Martinotti finds that Goldman has failed to
carry its burden of demonstrating that it is entitled to the
entire controversy defense.  It has failed to demonstrate
Plaintiffs engaged in inexcusable conduct or that it was
prejudiced.  Goldman's argument is that the Plaintiffs raised
their FDCPA issues before the Superior Court in their State Court
Answer, but never sought to join Goldman as a party.  This is not
inexcusable conduct.

The Judge also finds that Goldman has failed to demonstrate it
will suffer substantial prejudice from its nonjoinder in the
State Court Action.  Indeed, Goldman points to no evidence of
harm in the Plaintiffs' bringing the litigation.  He does not
find that increased costs of litigation are sufficient grounds,
particularly where Goldman incurred no expenses in the State
Court Action because it was not a party.  Accordingly, he will
deny Goldman's Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of the
entire controversy doctrine.

The Plaintiffs argue the June 27 Letters violated the FDCPA
because it sought to collect attorneys' fees that were not
incurred when the debt letter was sent, considering Goldman's
attorneys' fees were based on contingency.  The Judge finds that
because the terms of the promissory notes only required the
Plaintiffs to pay fees "incurred" and no such fees were incurred,
Goldman violated Section 1692e(2)(A), (10) and Section 1692f,
(f)(1) by stating in the June 27 Letters, that there remains due
a balance, which includes interest and collection costs.

Accordingly, the Judge will deny Goldman's Motion for Summary
Judgement.  However, the only claim that will proceed is that
Goldman's June 27 Letters violated the FDCPA because it attempted
to collect collection costs when such costs had not been incurred
at the time the debt collection letters were sent.

Finally, as to the class certification motion, the Judge finds
that the class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule
23(b)(3).  Accordingly, he will grant the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Certify Class.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Martinotti (1) denied Goldman's
Motion for Summary Judgment, and (2) granted the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Certify class.  The counsel will confer regarding the
approval form of class notice, and shall, within 30 days of entry
of the accompanying Order, submit an appropriate motion for
approval of the class notification for the Court's approval.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 30, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/l324sz from Leagle.com.

BRIAN P. CARNEY, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated & WILLIAM C. GUMPPER, JR., on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by JOSEPH K.
JONES -- jkj@legaljones.com -- Jones, Wolf & Kapasi, LLC &
BENJAMIN JARRET WOLF, Jones, Wolf & Kapasi, LLC.

RUSSELL P. GOLDMAN, P.C., Defendant, represented by ANN FRANCES
KIERNAN.


SLACK TECHNOLOGIES: "D'Ottavio" Sues Over Unsolicited SMS Ads
-------------------------------------------------------------
Gino D'Ottavio, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Slack Technologies, Defendant,
Case No. 18-cv-09082 (D. N.J., May 11, 2018), seeks damages,
injunctive relief and any other available legal or equitable
remedies resulting from the illegally transmitting unsolicited
commercial text messages in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

Defendant maintains an application that in part allows users to
connect with each other. Sometime after signing up at Slack.com,
Plaintiff began receiving unsolicited text messages from
Slack.com with an invitation to install Slack. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Ari Marcus, Esq.
     MARCUS & ZELMAN, LLC
     1500 Allaire Avenue, Suite 101
     Ocean, NJ 07712
     Tel: (732) 695-3282
     Fax: (732) 298-6256
     Email: Ari@MarcusZelman.com


SPEEDWAY LLC: Court Denies Certification Bid in "Teggerdine"
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Middle District of Florida,
Tampa Division, denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification
in the case captioned KARA TEGGERDINE, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SPEEDWAY, LLC and
WORLDPAY US INC., Defendants, Case No: 8:16-cv-03280-T-27TGW
(M.D. Fla.).

This purported class action arises from the implementation of a
payment processing program, the Real Time Clearing program (RTC),
at Speedway's retail gasoline convenience stores and the pre-
authorization requests and holds placed on customers' accounts
who purchased gasoline at the pump. The Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint included claims of negligence, breach of implied
contract, unjust enrichment, and violations of the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.

The Plaintiff moves for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3)
for this class:

     All persons residing in the United States who made a
gasoline purchase with a Visa payment card at a Speedway station
from November 16, 2016 through and including December 31, 2016,
and had a $125 authorization hold placed on their personal
financial account.

The Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which
requires her to demonstrate (1) that questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over questions affecting only
individual members, and (2) that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating
the controversy.

Numerosity

The requirement of numerosity is met when the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The
Plaintiff submits evidence that over 400,000 transactions were
processed on November 16 and 17. And, approximately 56,000 were
processed when RTC was not operating as intended. The numerosity
requirement is therefore met.

Commonality

In attempting to meet the commonality requirement, the Plaintiff
focuses on the Defendants' conduct in requesting the
preauthorization hold, contending that the conduct is common to
and effected all class members, and that the following issues are
common to all class members and therefore susceptible to class
wide proof, inter alia:

   -- Whether Speedway was negligent in failing to inform its
customers that it requires a pre-authorization request of $125
for every payment card transaction at a self-pay gasoline pump,
which will result in a temporary hold on funds; and

   -- Whether the pre-authorization request of $125 was
reasonable in light of the average consumer transaction amounts
at Speedway, in accordance with Visa policy.

These issues are common to the Class on the theory of negligence.
The Plaintiff has therefore met her relatively light burden of
establishing commonality under Rule 23.

Typicality

Likewise, the Plaintiff's claim is typical of the class because
the claims or defenses of the class and the class representative
arise from the same event or pattern or practice and are based on
the same legal theory. The Plaintiff's claim arises out of the
same course of conduct, the implementation of RTC, that is
typical of the class claim. She therefore meets the typicality
requirement.

Adequacy of Representation

Rule 23(a) requires that the Plaintiff fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class which encompasses two separate
inquiries: (1) whether any substantial conflicts of interest
exist between the representatives and the class; and (2) whether
the representatives will adequately prosecute the action. No
substantial conflicts have been identified. The Plaintiff has
dutifully prosecuted this action with qualified and competent
counsel.

The Plaintiff meets the adequacy of representation requirement.

Rule 23(b)(3)

Class certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3) if the
Plaintiff demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that
the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly
and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

THe Plaintiff argued that by certifying the class for liability
purposes only, common issues would predominate over individual
issues. Pointing out that the Plaintiff's negligence claim is a
matter of state common law, the Defendants countered that the law
of negligence varies among the twenty-one states in which the
transactions occurred and therefore individual issues regarding
liability for negligence predominate.

While the Plaintiff is correct that the Defendants'
implementation of RTC and the pre-authorization hold requests is
common to all purported class members, she is wrong to suggest
that no individual inquiry will be required to establish any of
the Plaintiff's claims because the factual and legal issues
surrounding the Defendants' liability are common among Class
members. While the factual issue may be common, the liability
issue under the various state laws of negligence has not been
shown to be common among class members.

It follows that she also fails to demonstrate that a class action
is a superior method for managing the litigation of the various
state law negligence claims.  The difficulty likely to be
encountered in managing the proposed class based on various
iterations of the law of negligence among twenty-one states is
self evident.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion to certify the class under
Rule 23(b)(3) is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 31, 2017 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybxaknkv from Leagle.com.

Kara Teggerdine, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jean Sutton Martin,
Office of Jean Sutton Martin PLLC, pro hac vice, John Allen
Yanchunis, Sr., Morgan & Morgan, PA, Marcio William Valladares,
Morgan & Morgan, PA,Patrick A. Barthle, Morgan & Morgan, PA &
Ryan Joseph McGee, Morgan & Morgan, PA.

Speedway, LLC, Defendant, represented by Daniel Brandon Rogers --
drogers@shb.com -- Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, Edward A. Marshall
-- edward.marshall@agg.com -- Arnall Golden & Gregory, LLP, pro
hac vice, Jennifer A. McLoone -- jmcloone@shb.com -- Shook, Hardy
& Bacon, LLP & Theresa Ann Yelich Kananen  --
theresa.kananen@agg.com -- Arnall Golden & Gregory, LLP, pro hac
vice.

WorldPay US, Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel Brandon
Rogers, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, Edward A. Marshall, Arnall
Golden & Gregory, LLP & Jennifer A. McLoone, Shook, Hardy &
Bacon, LLP.


SPEEDWAY LLC: "Howe" BIPA Suit Remanded to Ill. State Court
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand
the case captioned CHRISTOPHER HOWE, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SPEEDWAY LLC, et
al., Defendants, No. 17-cv-07303 (N.D. Ill.).

At the beginning of his employment at a Speedway gas station,
Plaintiff Christopher Howe was required to scan his fingerprint,
which his employer used to authenticate his identity and track
his time. Howe initially brought this putative class action in
Illinois state court against Defendants Speedway LLC (Speedway)
and Marathon Petroleum Co. (Marathon), arguing that Defendants
collected and stored his and similarly-situated individuals'
fingerprints in violation of Illinois's Biometric Information
Privacy Act (BIPA).

This class action was originally filed in the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Illinois, however the Defendants removed the action
to this Court, claiming jurisdiction on the basis of the Class
Action Fairness Act (CAFA).

Howe moved to remand the action back to state court, claiming
that the Defendants' motion to dismiss demonstrated that Howe did
not have Article III standing to bring this action in federal
court.

The facts in this case are analogous to those in the cases
finding no injury-in-fact from a private entity's failure to
provide disclosures. In McCullough v. Smarte Carte, Inc., 2016 WL
4077108, the plaintiff had to scan her fingerprint before renting
a locker. When she returned to the locker she unlocked it by
again scanning her fingerprint. The court observed that the
plaintiff undoubtedly understood when she first used the system
that her fingerprint data would have to be retained until she
retrieved her belongings from the locker. The court then held
that, while the defendant's failure to obtain advance consent and
make the required disclosures was a technical violation of BIPA,
there was no injury-in-fact because the plaintiff did not allege
that her biometric information was disclosed or at risk of
disclosure.

In Vigil v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 235 F.Supp.3d
499, a basketball videogame allowed players to create a digital
player in their likeness by holding their face to a camera and
allowing the game to scan their faces and map it onto an avatar.
While the videogame developer did provide limited disclosures
before collecting the biometric data, the plaintiffs argued that
the disclosures were deficient.

Finding that these procedural violations did not implicate BIPA's
data protection interest, the court observed that the plaintiffs,
at the very least, understood that the videogame developer had to
collect data based upon their faces in order to create the
personalized basketball avatars, and that a derivative of the
data would be stored in the resulting digital faces of those
avatars so long as those avatars existed.

The question here then is whether the Defendants' alleged
disclosure failures constitute a concrete harm to this interest
in data protection. Put another way: Is the injury that Howe
suffered as a result of his failure to receive disclosures the
type of injury the statute seeks to guard against? Absent any
additional harm caused by the failure to provide the required
disclosures, that question must be answered in the negative.

The Court finds that the Defendants undoubtedly violated BIPA if
they failed to provide Howe disclosures and obtain his written
authorization prior to collecting and storing his fingerprints
and did not create or make publicly available a biometric data
retention and destruction policy. However, those procedural
violations did not cause him an injury-in-fact. Consequently,
Howe does not have standing to have his claim heard in federal
court and the action must be remanded to state court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 31, 2017 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8u8kw6b
from Leagle.com.

Christopher Howe, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew C. Ficzko --
aficzko@stephanzouras.com -- Stephan Zouras, Llp, Alexander Glenn
Tievsky -- atievsky@edelson.com -, Edelson Pc, Ari Jonathan
Scharg -- ascharg@edelson -- Edelson P.C., Benjamin Harris
Richman -- brichman@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Christopher
Lillard Dore -- cdore@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, J. Eli Wade
Scott -- ewadescott@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, James B. Zouras --
jzouras@stephanzouras.com -- Stephan Zouras, LLP, Ryan F. Stephan
-- rstephan@stephanzouras.com -- Stephan, Zouras, LLP & Sydney M.
Janzen, Edelson PC.

Speedway LLC & Marathon Petroleum Company, Defendants,
represented by Gary M. Miller -- gmiller@shb.com --  Shook, Hardy
& Bacon LLP, Alfred Saikali -- asaikali@shb.com -- SHOOK, HARDY &
BACON L.L.P., pro hac vice, Anna S. Knight -- asknight@shb.com --
Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, Patrick J. Castle -- pcastle@shb.com --
Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP & Tristan L. Duncan -- tlduncan@shb.com
-- SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P., pro hac vice.


STANLEY STEEMER: "Arensdorff" Remanded to Los Angeles Super. Ct.
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NICHOLAS ARENSDORFF, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. STANLEY STEEMER
INTERNATIONAL, INC., an Ohio corporation; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-08645-MWF-KLSx (C.D. Cal.),
Judge Michael W. Fitzgerald of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Western Division, granted the
parties' Stipulation to Remand the Case to Los Angeles Superior
Court, and remanded the case to Los Angeles Superior Court,
Complex Division.  The parties will bear their own attorneys'
fees and costs associated with the remand.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/yooz1a from Leagle.com.

Nicholas Arensdorff, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by David D. Bibiyan --
david@tomorrowlaw.com -- Bibiyan Law Group PC, Mehrdad Bokhour --
mehrdad@tomorrowlaw.com -- Bibiyan and Bokhour APC, James
Alexander De Sario, Nourmand Law Firm APC & Michael Nourmand,
Nourmand Law Firm APC.

Stanley Steemer International Inc, an Ohio corporation,
Defendant, represented by Brittany Maraya Hernandez --
Brittany.Hernandez@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard
and Smith LLP, John L. Barber -- John.Barber@lewisbrisbois.com --
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith LLP & Rachel J. Lee --
Rachel.Lee@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith
LLP.


STEPHEN EINSTEIN: Powlett Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections
-----------------------------------------------------------
Antonnia Powlett, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Stephen Einstein & Associates,
P.C., Anthony S. Poulin, and Pinpoint Technologies, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-05805-ALC (S.D.N.Y., June 27, 2018)
seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to
collect a debt. The case is assigned to Judge Andrew L. Carter,
Jr.

Stephen Einstein & Associates is a debt collection firm located
in New York City. The Company works on behalf of banks, credit
unions, landlords, contractors, and more to collect unpaid debt
from consumers. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mitchell L. Pashkin, Esq.
          25 Harriet Lane
          Huntington, NY 11743
          Telephone: (631) 335-1107
          Facsimile: (631) 824-9328
          E-mail: mpash@verizon.net


STEWARD HEALTH: "Adkins" Suit Alleges ADA Violation
---------------------------------------------------
Samantha Adkins, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Steward Health Care System, LLC, Case No.
2:18-cv-00841 (W.D. Pa., June 28, 2018), is brought against the
Defendant for alleged violations of Title III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act and its implementing regulations, in
connection with accessibility barriers in the parking lots and
paths of travel at various public accommodations owned, operated,
controlled and/or leased by the Defendant.

The Plaintiff has a mobility disability and is limited in the
major life activity of walking, which has caused her to be
dependent upon a wheelchair for mobility. The Plaintiff has
visited Defendant's facilities and was denied full and equal
access as a result of Defendant's inaccessible parking lots and
paths of travel.

The Plaintiff Samantha Adkins is, and at all times relevant
hereto was, a resident of Pennsylvania. As described above, as a
result of her disability, the Plaintiff relies upon a wheelchair
for mobility. She is therefore a member of a protected class
under the ADA.

The Defendant Steward Health Care System, LLC is the largest
private, for-profit hospital operator in the United States, and
operates community hospitals, urgent care centers, and skilled
nursing facilities, with a projected 3 million in-network
patients in 2018. The Defendant is a limited liability company
organized under Delaware law and headquartered at 111 Huntington
Avenue, Suite 1800, Boston, MA 02199. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      R. Bruce Carlson, Esq.
      Kelly Iverson, Esq.
      CARLSON LYNCH SWEET
      KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP
      1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
      Pittsburgh, PA 15222
      Tel: (412) 322-9243
      Fax: (412) 231-0246


STREAM ENERGY: "Basile" Settlement Has Prelim Court Approval
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania granted Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case captioned STEVEN
BASILE, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. STREAM ENERGY PENNSYLVANIA, LLC, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:15-cv-01518 (M.D. Pa.).

The Plaintiff filed a putative class action complaint against
Defendants Stream Energy Pennsylvania, LLC, Stream Energy
Pennsylvania, LLC d/b/a Stream Energy, and Stream Energy d/b/a
Stream Energy Pennsylvania LLC (Defendants), alleging that his
deregulated electricity provider did not abide by the terms of
his service contract, resulting in higher-than-expected rates.

The proposed Settlement Class is defined as all persons in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania who were enrolled as a customer of
Defendants and were on Defendants' Variable Rate Electricity Plan
at any time during the Class Period.

Numerosity

The numerosity requirement is satisfied if "the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Here, the
Plaintiff represents that the proposed Settlement Class would
include the Defendants' current and former customers, which the
records of the Defendants indicate could be greater than 70,000
accounts. Therefore, the Court finds that, for purposes of
preliminary certification, Rule 23(a)'s numerosity requirement is
met.

Commonality

The second Rule 23(a) prerequisite requires that there are
questions of law or fact common to the class.

The Plaintiff argues that there are many common issues of fact
and law, including whether Defendants breached the price terms in
their agreements with the Plaintiff and the Settlement Class by
utilizing factors not contained in the agreements to set their
prices. For purposes of preliminary certification, the Court
finds that Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement is satisfied.

Typicality

Here, the Plaintiff contends that his claims and those of the
members of the Settlement Class arise from the same conduct, as
the Defendants' Disclosure Statement provides specific factors
that the Defendants are required to rely upon in setting their
rates and there are no unique facts or circumstances that would
render the Plaintiff as atypical. For purposes of preliminary
certification, the Court finds that Rule 23(a)'s typicality
requirement is satisfied.

Adequacy of representation

The fourth Rule 23(a) prerequisite provides that representative
parties must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class. Upon review of the record, the Court is persuaded that
there is no conflict of interest existing between Plaintiff and
members of the Settlement Class, and that the competence and
experience evidenced by Plaintiff's counsel satisfies Rule
23(a)'s adequacy of representation requirement.

The proposed Settlement Agreement provides the following benefits
to Settlement Class Members:

   (1) each Class Member who was a customer on Defendants'
Variable Rate Plan at any time between June 1, 2011 and February
29, 2015 (Time Period 1) will receive payment in the amount of 5%
of all amounts paid to Defendants for services provided under the
Variable Rate Plan during Time Period 1; and

   (2) each Class Member who was a customer on Defendants'
Variable Rate Plan at any time between March 1, 2015 and the date
of preliminary approval (Time Period 2), will receive payment in
the amount of 2% of all amounts paid to Defendants for services
provided under the Variable Rate Plane during Time Period 2.

Subject to the Court's final approval, the Defendants have also
agreed that the Plaintiff can seek a service award reflecting the
amount of time and effort expended in acting as representative of
the Settlement Class, and that they will not oppose payment of an
amount not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000.00). The
Defendants also agree to pay the costs of notice to the
Settlement Class and the cost of settlement and claims
administration. Further, subject to the Court's final approval,
the Defendants agree that appointed Class Counsel will be
entitled to seek an award of attorneys' fees and costs in an
amount up to one million fifty thousand dollars ($1,050,000.00).

In light of the risks faced by the Plaintiff and the Defendants
in continuing litigation and the benefits provided under the
proposed Settlement Agreement, the Court finds that the proposed
Settlement Agreement falls within the range of possible approval
for purposes of preliminary approval. The proposed payment of
$1,050,000.00 in attorneys' fees and costs is separate from and
in addition to the payment of the Settlement amounts available to
the eligible members of the Settlement Class. Furthermore, the
proposed monetary award to the Plaintiff is permissible in class
action litigation and appears reasonable at this stage.

Accordingly, the Court will preliminarily approve the proposed
Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 31, 2017 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycdd5yrc from Leagle.com.

Steven Basile, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan Shub  --
jshub@kohnswift.com -- Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C., Bryan S.
Neiderhiser, Marcus & Mack, P.C., D. Aaron Rihn, Robert Peirce &
Associates, P.C., & Troy M. Frederick, Marcus & Mack, P.C.

Stream Energy Pennsylvania, LLC, Stream Energy Pennsylvania, LLC,
doing business as Stream Energy & Stream Energy, doing business
as Stream Energy Pennsylvania, LLC, Defendants, represented by
Robert C. Walters --  rwalters@gibsondunn.com, GIBSON DUNN &
CRUTCHER LLP, pro hac vice, Andrew P. LeGrand --
alegrand@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Austin V.
Schwing -- aschwing@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
LLP,Gregory S. Voshell -- gsv@elliottgreenleaf.com -- Elliott
Greenleaf, P.C., John P. Elliott  -- jpe@elliottgreenleaf.com --
Elliott Greenleaf & Siedzikowski, P.C. & Olivia A. Adendorff --
oadendorff@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP.


SUEZ WATER: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, "Rivera" Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
PEDRO RIVERA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SUEZ WATER ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC.;
SUEZ WATER LONG ISLAND, INC.; SUEZ WATER WESTCHESTER, INC.; SUEZ
WATER, NEW YORK, INC.; SUEZ WATER SOUTH COUNTY, INC.; and SUEZ
WATER OWEGO-NICHOLS, INC., Defendants, Case No. 605034/2018 (N.Y.
Sup., Nassau Cty., Apr. 17, 2018) seeks to recover wages and
benefits against the Defendants.

Mr. Rivera performed construction related work for the
Defendants.

Suez Water Environmental Services Inc. f/k/a United Water
Environmental Services Inc. provides drinking water and
wastewater treatment services. The Company delivers drinking
water, recycles wastewater for irrigation and industrial use, and
conserves drinking water services. The Company serves customers
in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lloyd R. Ambinder, Esq.
          James E. Murphy, Esq.
          VIRGINIA & AMBINDER, LLP
          40 Broad, 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 943-9080
          E-mail: lambinder@vandallp.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey K. Brown, Esq.
          Sean O'Hara, Esq.
          LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
          One Old Country Road, Suite 347
          Carle Place, NY 11514
          Telephone: (516)873-9550
          E-mail: jbrown@leedsbrownlaw.com


SZNW HOSPITALITY: Underpays Room Attendants, "Molina" Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
ROSA MOLINA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SZNW HOSPITALITY LLC, and DOES 1-20,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. BC711658 (Cal. Sup., Los Angeles
Cty., June 26, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for
unpaid regular hours, overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for
missed meal and rest periods.

Ms. Molina was employed by the Defendants as a room attendant at
the Sheraton Universal Hotel in Los Angeles County, California.

SZNW Hospitality LLC operates the Sheraton Universal Hotel
located in Universal City, California. The Company is engaged in
the hotel business. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Vache A. Thomassian, Esq.
          Caspar Jivalagian, Esq.
          KJT LAW GROUP LLP
          230 N. Maryland Ave., Suite 306
          Glendale, CA 91206
          Telephone: (818) 507-8525
          E-mail: caspar@kjtlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Christopher A. Adams, Esq.
          ADAMS EMPLOYMENT COUNSEL
          4740 Calle Carga
          Camarillo, CA 93012
          Telephone: (818) 425-1437
          E-mail: ca@AdamsEmploymentCounsel.com


THOM BROWNE: Faces "Olsen" Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Thom Browne, Inc.
The case is styled as Thomas J. Olsen, individually and on behalf
of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Thom
Browne, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-06395 (S.D. N.Y., July
15, 2018).

Thom Browne, Inc. desgins and markets apparel for men. The
company is based in New York, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.

The Defendant is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


TREESAP FARM: Faces "Aguilar" Suit in Sacramento California
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Treesap Farm LLC.
The case is captioned as Bryan Aguilar and Jessie Rivera,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. Treesap Farm LLC; Tree Town USA; Mark Marriott;
Does 1 through 100; and Village Nurseries Wholesale LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 34-2018-00235992-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super.,
Sacramento Cty., June 30, 2018).

Treesap Farms, LLC was founded in 2015. The company's line of
business includes operating timber tracts or tree farms. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by R Parker White, Esq., and
Jeffrey D Fulton, Esq.


U.S. EXPRESS ENTERPRISES: Underpays Truck Drivers, Nunez Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
GABRIEL NUNEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. U.S. EXPRESS ENTERPRISES, INC.; U.S.
EXPRESS, INC.; and DOES 1-100, Defendants, Case No. BC711661
(Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., June 26, 2018) is an action
against the Defendants for unpaid regular hours, overtime hours,
minimum wages, wages for missed meal and rest periods.

Mr. Nunez was employed by the Defendants as a truck driver.

U.S. Xpress Enterprises, Inc. operates as an asset-based
truckload carrier providing services primarily in the United
States. The company was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in
Chattanooga, Tennessee. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David Borgen, Esq.
          Raymond A. Wendell, Esq.
          GOLDSTEIN BORGEN DARDARIAN & HO
          300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 763-9800
          Facsimile: (510) 835-1417

               - and -

          Justin Swidler, Esq.
          Richard S. Swartz, Esq.
          SWARTZ SWIDLER, LLC
          1101 Kings Hwy. N., Suite 402
          Cherry Hill, NJ 08034
          Telephone: (856) 685-7420
          Facsimile: (856) 685-7417

               - and -

          James M. Sitkin, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF JAMES M. SITKIN
          One Kaiser Plaza, Suite 505
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (415) 318-1048
          Facsimile: (415) 362-3268


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Antitrust Claims in "MacCausland" Dismissed
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts granted the Defendant's partial motion
to dismiss the Plaintiff's antitrust claims in the case, Raymond
P MacCausland, Individually and on Behalf of All Persons
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. Uber Technologies, Inc. and
Rasier, LLC, Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-10253-NMG (D.
Mass.).

This is a putative class action brought by MacCausland on behalf
of taxi drivers in the Greater Boston area.  The Plaintiff
alleges that Uber competed unlawfully in the on-demand, ride-hail
ground transportation market in and around Boston, Massachusetts.
He alleges that Uber competed unfairly and deceptively in
violation of the common law and of the Massachusetts Consumer
Protection Act, that Uber violated state and federal antitrust
law and that Uber engaged in a civil conspiracy and aided and
abetted unfair competition.

Uber entered the Boston market for private transportation
services in 2011 and launched its UberX service in 2013.  The
company provides a digital tool for potential riders to request
private vehicles-for-hire by using Uber's free "smart phone
application."  Users who open the Uber app on their mobile phones
are shown a map of their location or a nearby designated pick-up
point and the available Uber-affiliated vehicles in that
vicinity.

According to MacCausland, the City of Boston has issued
approximately 1,825 taxi licenses, referred to as taxi
medallions, subject to a strict and extensive city regulatory
regime.  In contrast, there are over 20,000 cars-for-hire that
currently provide Uber's ride-hailing service in the Boston area.

In February, 2017, MacCausland, a Boston taxi driver, filed this
complaint against Uber.  At the same time, taxi medallion holders
sued Uber under the same legal theories that the Plaintiff
alleges.  That related action involves seven different groups of
plaintiffs who represent over 800 plaintiff taxi companies in the
Greater Boston area.  Originally, seven separate complaints were
filed in the district between December 2016, and April 2017.  The
Court consolidated the cases pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(2)
in October 2017.

In December, 2017, this session ruled on Uber's motion to dismiss
the consolidated action.  The Court held that the so-called
Malden Plaintiffs stated a claim for unfair competition under the
common law and M.G.L. c. 93A and that the Plaintiffs stated a
claim for aiding and abetting unfair competition and civil
conspiracy to commit unfair competition.  It allowed the
Defendants' motion to dismiss claims against two of Uber's
founders for want of personal jurisdiction.  It also allowed
Uber's motion to dismiss with respect to the Plaintiffs'
antitrust claims, tortious interference claims and failed
theories of civil conspiracy.

After the issuance of that memorandum and order, the Plaintiffs
in the Malden cases as well as the Plaintiff in the case
(MacCausland) amended their complaints.  MacCausland's second
amended complaint mimics the amended complaints in Malden.  He
asserts counts of unfair and deceptive trade practices under the
common law and Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, as well as
aiding and abetting and unfair competition.  He has also added
factual allegations to his complaint which bear upon his claims
of violation of state and federal antitrust law.  In May, 2018,
the parties in the case filed a stipulation of dismissal against
the individual Defendants.

Before the Court is Uber's motion to dismiss MacCausland's
antitrust claims.

Judge Gorton finds that MacCausland fails to allege facts
supporting a predatory pricing claim.  His new allegations do not
cure the deficiencies that doomed the Malden Plaintiffs.  Basic
facts such as what an average or median "ride" in the Boston area
costs Uber, or costs a taxi, are absent.  Uber's global
performance does not constitute a relevant allegation as to
Uber's costs in the "ride-hailing market in the City of Boston.
Furthermore, the Judge finds that although the Plaintiff
correctly notes that Uber is a privately-held company that does
not disclose relevant financial and market information, that fact
does not absolve the Plaintiff from meeting the required pleading
standard.

In a similar vein, MacCausland fails to allege facts
demonstrating Uber's intent to monopolize.  Equally important, he
says the Plaintiff fails to show an injury to Boston consumers.
That omission is dispositive, because antitrust plaintiffs must
show that the defendants' actions caused an injury to
competition, as distinguished from impact on themselves.

Finally, the Judge finds the analysis in Philadelphia Taxi Ass'n,
Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 886 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 2018),
applicable and persuasive.  In that case, Philadelphia taxicab
drivers and taxicab companies alleged that Uber's entry into the
Philadelphia taxicab market violated the Sherman Act.  Just as
the Plaintiff does, the Philadelphia plaintiffs argued that
Uber's actions were illegal, predatory and led to a sharp drop in
the value of taxicab medallions as well as a loss of profits.
MacCausland's complaint and legal theories are substantially
indistinguishable from those dismissed in Philadelphia Taxi and
the Judge sees no reason to diverge from the well-reasoned
opinion in that case.

For these reasons, Judge Gorton allowed the Defendants' partial
motion to dismiss the antitrust claims in the second amended
complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 30, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/KQijxK from Leagle.com.

Raymond P MacCausland, Individually and on Behalf of all Persons
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Darin M. Colucci --
darin@coluccilaw.com -- Colucci, Colucci & Marcus, P.C., Brendan
R. Pitts -- bpitts@coluccilaw.com -- Colucci, Colucci, Marcus &
Flavin, P.C. & Paul K. Flavin -- pflavin@coluccilaw.com --
Colucci, Colucci, Marcus & Flavin, P.C.

Uber Technologies, Inc., Defendant, represented by Michael Sheetz
-- msheetz@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Adam S. Gershenson --
agershenson@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Beatriz Mejia --
mejiab@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, pro hac vice, Michael E. Welsh -
- mwelsh@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP & Timothy W. Cook --
tcook@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP.

Rasier, LLC, Defendant, represented by Timothy W. Cook, Cooley
LLP.


UNITED ROAD: "Taylor" Suit Remanded to Kern County Superior Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CEDRIC TAYLOR on behalf of himself, all others
similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public,
Plaintiff, v. UNITED ROAD SERVICES, INC., and DOES 1-100,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00330-LJO-JLT (E.D. Cal.), Judge
Lawrence J. O'Neill of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California granted the Plaintiff's motion to remand
and denied his motion for an order awarding attorneys' fees and
costs.

This is a wage-and-hour class action arising out of the
Plaintiff's purported employment with URS.  On Feb. 1, 2017, the
Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California,
County of Kern.  That complaint defined the putative class to be
all persons who are employed or have been employed by Defendants
in the State of California as hourly, Non-Exempt truck workers,
industrial truck workers, industrial truck drivers, industrial
vehicle drivers, industrial workers, and/or other similar job
designations and titles during the period of the relevant statute
of limitations.

The Defendant filed its answer on June 6, 2017.  Pending at the
time that the Plaintiff filed his case was Brent Hooper, et al.
v. URS Midwest, Inc. d/b/a United Road Services, Inc., Lead Case
No. CIVDS1607489, Superior Court for the State of California,
County of San Bernardino.  On July 10, 2017, the court granted
final approval of the class settlement in Hooper.  The settlement
class was defined to be all individuals who were employed by URS
in the position of California-domiciled Car Hauler employee in
any pay period during the period from May 13, 2012 through Jan.
30, 2017.

The Plaintiff served discovery in mid-June, including requests
for production of documents, interrogatories, and deposition
notices.  The Defendant resisted, arguing that the Plaintiff and
the putative class were not employees of the Defendant and that
their claims were covered by the class settlement in Hooper.  It
was at this time, in mid-July, that the Plaintiff first learned
of the Hooper action.  Because the Defendant did not consider him
to be an employee, he did not receive notice or opt-out rights.
The counsel for the Plaintiff and the Defendant engaged in a
number of communications that Plaintiff now claims served to put
the Defendant on notice of the class that the Plaintiff sought to
represent.

On Nov. 6, 2017, the Defendant moved for judgment on the
pleadings, arguing that the Plaintiff's claims were covered by
the Hooper settlement.  The court granted the Defendant's motion
on Dec. 5, 2017, and permitted the Plaintiff to file an amended
complaint, which he did on Feb. 5, 2018.

The Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of drivers who were not
directly employed by URS but drove for third-party entities that
made pickups or deliveries for URS customers, defined as all
persons who are employed or have been employed by the Defendant
in the State of California as all non-exempt drivers, car-
haulers, fleet drivers, co-drivers or similar job designations
who did not contract directly with but were dispatched by URS to
perform pickup and delivery services for its customers or any
related entity during the time period of Feb. 1, 2013, to the
present.

Before the Court is the Plaintiff's motion to remand and for an
order awarding attorneys' fees and costs.  On March 7, 2018, URS
removed the case to the Court pursuant to the Class Action
Fairness Act ("CAFA").  On April 6, 2018, the Plaintiff moved to
remand the case to state court.  The Defendant opposed, and the
Plaintiff filed a reply.

Judge O'Neill does not find it reasonable to assume that every
driver worked every possible week during the entirety of the
class period.  Without any information about why this is a
reasonable assumption, he is not persuaded that it is proper to
assume that any class member worked every possible week during
the period at issue and cannot accept for purposes of calculating
the amount in controversy that this is a reasonable assumption
for every class member.

The Judge further finds that the Defendant has offered little to
support the rate it has chosen to serve as the anchor of its
calculations supporting its contention that the amount in
controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.  A good-faith
estimate relying on supported, reasonable assumptions can serve
to meet the burden for removal.  However, a defendant must set
forth the underlying facts supporting its assertion that the
amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum.  He finds
that the Defendant has not done so here.

Because the Judge finds that the Defendant has not established by
a preponderance of the evidence that the underlying amount in
controversy on which any 25% fee would be based is at least $4
million, he says he needs not determine (1) whether unaccrued
attorneys' fees may be considered for jurisdictional purposes or
(2) whether the Defendant's estimate of the potential attorneys'
fees here is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

Finally, the Judge finds that the Defendant had an objectively
reasonable basis for removal.  He agrees that none of the seven
triggering events that the Plaintiff cites did in fact start the
30-day clock to remove.  In addition, the Defendant is correct
that if it can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that more than $5 million is in controversy, then it could
establish federal jurisdiction under CAFA, and it did put forward
appropriate evidence in support of removal.  That the Defendant
failed to carry its burden here does not mean that it lacked an
objectively reasonable basis to remove.  He finds that even
though it did not meet its burden, the Defendant's removal was
not objectively unreasonable and that the parties therefore
should bear their own costs and fees.  Accordingly, the
Plaintiff's request for costs and fees will be denied.

For these reasons, Judge O'Neill granted the Plaintiff's motion
to remand and denied the Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees
and costs.  He directed the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of
the order on the Kern County Superior Court; and to close the
case, as the matter has been remanded and is returned to the
jurisdiction of the Kern County Superior Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2018 Memorandum Decision
and Order is available at https://is.gd/kh4CZC from Leagle.com.

Cedric Taylor, on behalf of himself, all others similarly
situated, and on behalf of the general public, Plaintiff,
represented by David Thomas Mara -- dmara@turleylawfirm.com --
The Turley & Mara Law Firm, APLC, Jamie Kathryn Serb --
jserb@turleylawfirm.com -- Turley & Mara Law Firm, APLC, Tony
Roberts -- troberts@turleylawfirm.com -- Turley & Mara Law Firm,
APLC & William Turley -- bturley@turleylawfirm.com -- Turley &
Mara Law Firm, APLC.

United Road Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by David M.
Krueger -- dkrueger@beneschlaw.com -- Benesch Friedlander Coplan
& Aronoff, LLP, pro hac vice, Michael A. Kaia --
mkaia@youngwooldridge.com -- Young Wooldridge & Jerry Wayne
Pearson, Jr. -- jpearson@youngwooldridge.com -- Young Wooldridge.


UNITED SATES: HHS Secretary Faces Suit in C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Alex Azar,
Secretary of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The
case is captioned as LUCAS R., by his next friend MADELYN R.;
DANIELA MARISOL T., by her next friend KATHERINE  L.; MIGUEL
ANGEL S., by his next friend GERARDO S.; GABRIELA  N., by her
next friend ISAAC N.; JAIME D., by his next friend REYNA D.; SAN
FERNANDO VALLEY REFUGEE CHILDREN CENTER, INC.; UNACCOMPANIED
CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEE EMPOWERMENT, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. ALEX AZAR,
Secretary of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; E.
SCOTT LLOYD, Director, Office of Refugee Resettlement of the U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-
cv-05741-DMG-PLA (C.D. Cal., June 29, 2018).

According to the complaint, the action against the Defendants is
for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and nominal damages,
challenging certain unlawful policies and practices of Defendant
Office of Refugee Resettlement ("ORR"), a subordinate entity
within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS").
These policies and practices are causing grave harm to children
detained for alleged civil violations of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. The Plaintiffs alleged that the ORR is
responsible for the placement, care, custody and release of
"unaccompanied alien children." The Plaintiffs are immigrant and
asylum-seeking children detained for alleged civil violations of
the Immigration and Nationality Act and are members of the class
protected under the settlement in Flores, v. Sessions, No. 85-cv-
4544-DMG (AGRx) (C.D. Cal.).

The United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
also known as the Health Department, is a cabinet-level
department of the U.S. federal government with the goal of
protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential
human services. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Carlos Holguin, Esq.
          CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
          256 South Occidental Blvd.
          Los Angeles, CA 90057
          Telephone: (213) 388-8693, ext. 309
          Facsimile: (213) 386-9484
          E-mail: email: crholguin@centerforhumanrights.org


UNITED STATES: Bid to Monitor Review in "Pigford" Denied
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Columbia, granted
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the petition for monitor review of
Maurice McGinnis's claim in the cases captioned TIMOTHY PIGFORD,
et al., Plaintiffs, v. SONNY PERDUE, Secretary, United States
Department of Agriculture, Defendant; and CECIL BREWINGTON, et
al., Plaintiffs, v. SONNY PERDUE, Secretary, United States
Department of Agriculture, Defendant, Civil Action Nos. 97-1978
(PLF), 98-1693 (PLF) (D.D.C.).

African-American farmers filed a class action lawsuit against the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) alleging that they
had been denied access to federal farm credit programs
administered by the Department because of their race. The parties
settled, and the Court entered a consent decree setting forth the
parties' settlement agreement.

For class members who chose Track A, a third-party neutral
adjudicator determined whether they had met a minimal burden of
proof and, if so, awarded them $50,000 in monetary damages.
For class members who instead opted for Track B, a third-party
neutral arbitrator determined whether they had proven their
claims by the more demanding preponderance of the evidence
standard in a one-day mini-trial and, if so, awarded actual
damages without a cap.

The Initial Proceedings Under Track A

Mr. McGinnis completed his initial claim form in August 1999 and
opted to pursue his claim under Track A, although his claim form
suggested that he harbored some confusion or indecision about
that choice. Shortly thereafter, Mr. McGinnis sought to move his
claim from Track A to Track B. After a long-running series of
errors and miscommunications, his requests were ignored or denied
for over a decade and his claim proceeded under Track A. Mr.
McGinnis eventually prevailed under Track A, but never cashed the
$50,000 award check.

The Proceedings Under Track B

On May 29, 2015, after the D.C. Circuit had issued its mandate,
the arbitrator, Michael Lewis, issued a formal hearing notice
adopting the Track B schedule by which the parties had agreed to
proceed. In accordance with the arbitrator's formal hearing
notice, both Mr. McGinnis and the government, through their
counsel, timely submitted their lists of witnesses and exhibits.
On December 13, 2016, the arbitrator issued his decision granting
the government's motion for judgment as a matter of law and
dismissing Mr. McGinnis's Track B claim. The arbitrator explained
that Mr. McGinnis had not timely introduced any evidence in
support of his claim aside from the June 30, 2015, filing of his
witness and exhibit lists. And because Mr. McGinnis had submitted
so little evidence in support of his claim, the arbitrator
determined that Mr. McGinnis had neither demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that the USDA had discriminated
against him, nor established any damages.

The Petition for Monitor Review of the Track B Proceedings and
Subsequent Motion to Dismiss

The petition requests that the monitor review the Track B
arbitration of Mr. McGinnis's claim and, based on a clear and
manifest error resulting in a fundamental miscarriage of justice,
direct the arbitrator to re-examine his decision granting the
government's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The petition
does not dispute that Mr. McGinnis repeatedly failed to meet
deadlines and, as a result, did not submit sufficient evidence to
prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, the
petition asserts that these failures resulted from Mr. McGinnis's
diminished mental capacity and deteriorating ability to assist
his counsel, issues which assertedly arose due to the stressful
and long-running nature of the case.

The government filed the instant motion to dismiss the petition
for monitor review on July 28, 2017. In the motion, the
government argues that the Court should dismiss the petition
because the monitor lacks authority to grant the requested
relief. The government also emphasizes that Mr. McGinnis did not
proceed pro se, but was represented by counsel for the duration
of the Track B process. Yet counsel did not raise the issue of
Mr. McGinnis's competence at any time prior to submitting the
petition for monitor review.

The opposition to the motion to dismiss largely restates the
arguments advanced in the petition for monitor review, at times
even doing so verbatim. The opposition argues that Mr. McGinnis's
diminished capacity was evident to all involved in the process,
explaining that Mr. McGinnis's May 10, 2016, letter made obvious
that Mr. McGinnis had no grasp on the process and a
misapprehension that his prior victories in the case had brought
him to the award stage at which he should have been paid.

Interpretation and Enforcement Authority

The plain language of the consent decree makes clear that
decisions of the arbitrator are final and monitor review is
appropriate only in limited circumstances.  In turn, the monitor
may only direct the arbitrator to re-examine a claim where the
Monitor determines that a clear and manifest error has occurred
in the arbitration of the claim and has resulted or is likely to
result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Here, monitor review of the petition would be futile because it
cannot be demonstrated that a clear and manifest error has
resulted or is likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice. This is because the consent decree and order of
reference explicitly limit the monitor, in determining whether
this standard has been met, to the record before the arbitrator.
Were the Court to direct the monitor to review the petition, she
would not be permitted to consider any of the new evidence now
presented in support of Mr. McGinnis's incompetence claim.

Admittedly, counsel has identified some evidence which was before
the arbitrator namely, Mr. McGinnis's letter dated May 10, 2016,
and his general unwillingness to release the expert report and
prosecute his claim that would have indicated to the arbitrator
that Mr. McGinnis was both frustrated with the handling of his
claim and possibly confused about its status. But this would not
necessarily lead one to infer that Mr. McGinnis was mentally
incompetent. More importantly, it does not explain why his
counsel did not raise the issue of competence with Mr. Lewis at
any point during the arbitration process. To the contrary, Mr.
Shoreman has not proffered any credible reason why he could not
have presented and preserved the issue of Mr. McGinnis's mental
deterioration or incompetence in the record before the
arbitrator.

As a result of Mr. Shoreman's failures to do so, there is simply
insufficient evidence in the relevant record of Mr. McGinnis's
alleged mental incapacity to support a finding by the monitor
that clear and manifest error has resulted or is likely to result
in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. And the briefings do not
identify any other clear and manifest error that undermined the
Track B proceeding. In light of the numerous continuances and
extensions consented to by the government and granted by the
arbitrator, it certainly does not appear that the deadlines were
strictly applied to Mr. McGinnis or that the arbitrator was
anything other than appropriately accommodating under the
circumstances presented.

Because Mr. McGinnis is unable to demonstrate a clear and
manifest error" in the arbitration record and because the consent
decree explicitly bars any re-set of the Track B deadlines,
monitor review of the petition would be futile. Thus, the Court
declines to exercise its discretion under the wind-down
stipulation to direct the monitor to review the petition.

Rule 60(b)(5) Modification Authority

Although the parties did not brief the matter, the Court further
notes that Mr. McGinnis is not entitled to modification of the
consent decree under Rule 60(b)(5), despite the questionable
conduct of his counsel.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court notes its discomfort in
applying this standard where, from the record now before the
Court, it appears Mr. McGinnis may be mentally incompetent and
may not have had or currently have the capacity to supervise his
agent. In fact, as of April 4, 2017, the state of Mississippi
determined that Mr. McGinnis is no longer competent to manage his
financial affairs because of mental infirmity and appointed a
conservator as a result.

Yet Mr. Shoreman failed to raise the issue of mental competency
or otherwise advocate for his client's interests during the Track
B proceeding, despite his ongoing professional and ethical
obligations as counsel to do so. Indeed, after January 8, 2016,
it does not appear that Mr. Shoreman ever again even attempted to
advocate for his client as filing deadline after filing deadline
passed. Nor did Mr. Shoreman ever raise the issue of his client's
competency. And although Mr. McGinnis apparently refused to
authorize Mr. Shoreman to release the prepared expert report, Mr.
Shoreman has never explained why he failed to proffer any direct
testimony, take any discovery, or submit any pretrial brief on
his client's behalf.

In fact, Mr. Shoreman does not appear to have done anything to
advance his client's interests in this case from the time the
arbitrator issued the formal revised hearing notice on January
21, 2016, until Mr. Shoreman submitted a haphazard collection of
documents to the arbitrator on June 30, 2016, in lieu of the
legal brief that was due that day.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 31, 2017 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yavpmpoa from Leagle.com.

TIMOTHY C. PIGFORD, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony Herman --
aherman@cov.com -- COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, Charles Jerome Ware -
- charlesjeromeware@msn.com -- CHARLES JEROME WARE, P.A., David
A. Branch -- info@dbranchlaw.com -- LAW OFFICES OF DAVID A.
BRANCH & ASSOCIATES, PLLC, Faya R. Toure -- fayarose@gmail.com --
Jacob A. Stein -- jstein@steinmitchell.com -- STEIN, MITCHELL &
MUSE, L.L.P., Richard Talbot Seymour -- rick@rickseymourlaw.net -
- LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD T. SEYMOUR, P.L.L.C., Barbara Kim Kagan -
- bkagan@steptoe.com --  STEPTOE & JOHNSON, LLP & Joshua A. Doan,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Natural Resources Section.

SONNY PERDUE, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture,
Defendant, represented by Andrew Marshall Bernie, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE Civil Division & Elbert Lin, OFFICE OF THE WEST
VIRGINIA ATTORNEY GENERAL.


UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER: D'Amore Sues Over Fund Mismanagement
-------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher D'Amore, individually and on behalf a class of
participants in the University of Rochester Retirement Program,
Plaintiff, v. University of Rochester, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-
06357 (W.D. N.Y., May 11, 2018), seeks to recover their
retirement plan losses, accounting of missed out incomes,
attorneys' fees and costs under the common fund doctrine, payment
of interest and other equitable or remedial relief resulting from
breach of fiduciary duties and in violation of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.

Christopher D'Amore was a participant in the University of
Rochester Retirement Program from November 1996 to January 2017
with a substantial portion of his life savings in his Plan
account. Plan participants have allegedly paid an estimated $72
million in recordkeeping, distribution and mortality risk fees
that are grossly excessive. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Benjamin J. Sweet, Esq.
     Edwin J. Kilpela, Jr., Esq.
     Kevin Abramowicz, Esq.
     CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP
     1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
     Pittsburgh, PA 15222
     Telephone: (412) 322-9243
     Facsimile: (412) 231-0246
     Email: bsweet@carlsonlynch.com
            ekilpela@carlsonlynch.com
            kabramowicz@carlsonlynch.com


VITAMIN SHOPPE: Ct. Strikes Nationwide Class Claims in "Walters"
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEE WALTERS, M.D., Plaintiff, v. VITAMIN SHOPPE
INDUSTRIES, INC. Defendant, Case No. 3:14-CV-01173-PK (D. Or.),
Judge Anna J. Brown of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Oregon adopted Magistrate Judge Paul Papak's Findings and
Recommendation, and, accordingly, granted in part and denied in
part the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Strike Nationwide
Class Claims and Allegations.

Magistrate Judge Papak issued Findings and Recommendation on May
8, 2018, in which he recommends the Court grants in part and
denies in part the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Strike.  The
matter is now before the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
636(b)(1)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b).

Because no objections to the Magistrate Judge's Findings and
Recommendation were timely filed, Judge Brown is relieved of her
obligation to review the record de novo.  Having reviewed the
legal principles de novo, she does not find any error.

She adopted the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation,
and, accordingly, granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's Motion as follows: She granted without prejudice the
Defendant's Motion to Strike the Plaintiff's nationwide class-
action allegations, and denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the Plaintiff's claim for prospective injunctive relief.  The
Judge returned the matter to the Magistrate Judge for further
handling.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/M17hjE from Leagle.com.

Lee Walters, MD, an Oregon resident, Plaintiff, represented by
Brady H. Mertz -- brady@bradymertz.com -- Brady Mertz, PC, Justin
P. Karczag -- Justin@KarczagandAssociates.com -- Karczag and
Associates PC, pro hac vice, Robert A. Curtis, Foley Bezek Behle
& Curtis, LLP, pro hac vice & Rick Klingbeil -- rick@klingbeil-
law.com -- Rick Klingbeil, PC.

Vitamin Shoppe Industries, Inc., a Delaware corporation,
Defendant, represented by Robert L. Meyerhoff, Venable LLP, pro
hac vice, Angel A. Garganta -- aagarganta@Venable.com -- Venable
LLP & Chad M. Colton -- ChadColton@MarkowitzHerbold.com --
Markowitz Herbold PC.


VMOC LLC: "Fernandes" Labor Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime
-----------------------------------------------------------
Stanley J. Fernandes, and All Others Similarly Situated
Plaintiffs, v. VMOC LLC, VMLH LLC, Jan Ahmed Ahmad and Barkat
Ali, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-01544 (S.D. Tex., May 13, 2018),
seeks equitable relief, compensatory and liquidated damages,
attorney's fees, all costs of the action and post-judgment
interest for willful failure to pay overtime wages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

Fernandes was an employee who worked as a clerk at a Valero-
branded gas station and convenience store doing business as "B&J
Food Mart" located at 12672 Veterans Memorial Drive, Houston,
Texas 77014 owned and operated by the Defendants. Fernandes
typically worked from 12:00 p.m. until 12:00 a.m., seven days a
week, without overtime pay, the complaint asserts. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Salar Ali Ahmed, Esq.
      ALI S. AHMED, P.C.
      One Arena Place
      7322 Southwest Frwy., Suite 1920
      Houston, TX 77074
      Telephone: (713) 223-1300
      Facsimile: (713) 255-0013
      Email: aahmedlaw@gmail.com


WALGREEN CO: Removes "Ramirez" Suit to N.D. California
------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of Johnny Ramirez, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Walgreen
Co., Defendant, filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from the
Superior Court of the State of California, County of Monterey
(Case No. 18CV001963) to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California on June 29, 2018, and assigned Case No.
5:18-cv-03921-NC (N.D. Cal., June 29, 2018). The case is assigned
to Judge Nathanael M. Cousins.

Walgreen Co. owns and operates drugstores in the United States.
Walgreen Co. was formerly known as C. R. Walgreen and Co. and
changed its name to Walgreen Co. in April 1916. The company was
founded in 1901 and is based in Deerfield, Illinois. Walgreen Co.
operates as a subsidiary of Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Larry W Lee, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554
          E-mail: lwlee@diversitylaw.com

               - and -

          Dennis Sangwon Hyun, Esq.
          HYUN LEGAL APC
          515 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554
          E-mail: dhyun@hyunlegal.com

               - and -

          William Lucas Marder, Esq.
          POLARIS LAW GROUP, LLP
          501 San Benito Street, Suite 200
          Hollister, CA 95023
          Telephone: (831) 531-4214
          Facsimile: (831) 634-0333
          E-mail: bill@polarislawgroup.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Michael Edward Olsen, Jr., Esq.
          Allison Clare Eckstrom, Esq.
          BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER LLP
          3161 Michelson Drive, Suite 1500
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (949) 223-7000
          Facsimile: (949) 223-7100
          E-mail: michael.olsen@bclplaw.com
                  Allison.Eckstrom@bclplaw.com


WASHINGTON AND JANE: Court Narrows Claims in "Dixon" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, denied the Smith Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss the case captioned CYNTHIA DIXON, Plaintiff, v. THE
WASHINGTON AND JANE SMITH COMMUNITY -- BEVERLY d/b/a SMITH SENIOR
LIVING, SMITH CROSSING, and SMITH VILLAGE, KEVIN McGEE, MARTI
JATIS, and KRONOS, INC., Defendants, Case No. 17 C 8033 (N.D.
Ill.).

Dixon asserts claims for negligence and violation of Illinois's
Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) arising from Smith's
requirement that its employees clock in and out of work by
scanning their fingerprints onto a biometric timekeeping device
(Kronos is the third-party supplier of the fingerprint scanners
used by Smith). Dixon also has brought claims against Smith and
two individuals for violating the Illinois Minimum Wage Law
(IMWL) and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA)
and for retaliatory discharge.

The Smith defendants have moved to dismiss Smith Village and
Smith Crossing as defendants on the ground that Dixon has pled
insufficient facts to support any finding of liability against
either entity.

Dixon has not alleged that she ever worked for Smith Village or
Smith Crossing, nor has she alleged other facts that would
support a finding of joint liability against either entity on any
of her claims.

BIPA claim (count 1)

Smith argue that Dixon has not alleged an actual injury
sufficient to confer a right of action under BIPA. They argue
that because BIPA's right of action provision limits the right to
sue to persons aggrieved by a violation of Act, the statute
requires plaintiffs to establish some sort of actual harm beyond
a bare procedural violation or a purely technical statutory
violation.
In this particular case, the question of whether Dixon has
alleged an injury sufficient to render her a "person aggrieved"
under BIPA overlaps significantly with the Article III
standing/injury in fact question, so the Court will be brief. In
addition to alleging procedural violations related to BIPA's
notice and consent provisions, Dixon has alleged that the
defendants violated her right to privacy in and control over her
personal biometric data. Dixon also has specifically alleged that
Smith fails to inform its employees that it discloses employees'
fingerprint data to an out-of-state third-party vendor, Kronos.
It is reasonable to infer from the allegations in the complaint
that Kronos obtained Dixon's biometric data without her knowledge
or consent.

The Court has already concluded that BIPA established a right to
privacy in such information and that obtaining or disclosing a
person's biometric data without her consent or knowledge
necessarily infringes on the right to privacy in that data. Even
though this may not be a tangible or pecuniary harm, it is an
actual and concrete harm that stems directly from the defendants'
alleged violations of BIPA. That makes it sufficient not only for
standing purposes, but also for purposes of asserting a claim
under BIPA.

Because Dixon has alleged an actual and concrete injury to her
right to privacy in her biometric data stemming from the
defendants' alleged BIPA violations, the Court concludes that she
is a person aggrieved with a right of action under the statute.
Accordingly, the Court denies the defendants' motion to dismiss
Dixon's BIPA claim and declines to strike Dixon's request for
liquidated damages under BIPA at this early stage in the
proceedings.

Negligence claim (count 2)

The Defendants contend that Dixon also failed to plead any breach
of a legal duty or an actual injury proximately caused by such a
breach, both of which are necessary elements of a negligence
claim.

Under Illinois law, to succeed in a claim for negligence, a
plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty, a breach of the
duty, and an injury to the plaintiff that was proximately caused
by the breach.

In addition to alleging that the defendants either disclosed her
biometric data without consent, Dixon also has alleged that the
defendants breached their duty under BIPA to exercise reasonable
care in the collection and use of her biometric data by failing
to implement reasonable procedural safeguards around the
collection and use of her biometric identifiers and biometric
information. She has alleged that this breach proximately caused
a violation of her privacy rights.

The Court has already concluded that the privacy injury stemming
from the alleged BIPA violations is a concrete and actual
injury.7 Dixon therefore has alleged all the elements of a common
law negligence claim: the existence of a statutorily-created
duty, a breach of that duty, and an actual injury that was
proximately caused by that breach. She need not do more than that
to survive a motion to dismiss.

Employment claims (counts 3-6)

The Smith defendants also have moved for the dismissal of all of
Dixon's employment-related claims.

Claims against individual defendants

The Smith defendants contend that Dixon's claims against the
individual defendants, Kevin McGee and Marti Jatis, should be
dismissed because Dixon has not alleged facts sufficient to state
a plausible claim against them.

Dixon's complaint makes no specific factual allegations with
respect to McGee. Aside from referring to Jatis as one of her
supervisors and alleging that Jatis was one of the individuals
she questioned about the classification of the Environmental
Services Manager position as exempt from overtime requirements,
Dixon does not allege facts from which Jatis's role in the
alleged violations may be determined.

Because the Court finds that Dixon's conclusory allegations that
McGee and Jatis are employers within the meaning of the IMWL and
the IWPCA are insufficient to support a plausible claim to relief
against them and because Dixon has not made any substantive
argument regarding why this Court should not dismiss her claims
against McGee and Jatis the Court grants the motion to dismiss
counts 3 through 5 of the complaint as against McGee and Jatis,
without prejudice to filing of an amended complaint.

IMWL claims (counts 3 and 4)

Dixon's complaint states that while she worked for Smith, she was
an hourly employee earning approximately $16.44 per hour.
Although Dixon alleges that she was charged with Environmental
Services Manager duties beginning around April 2017, she
specifically states twice that her title and pay did not change
as a result of these additional duties.

It is more than reasonable to infer from these allegations that
Smith continued to pay Dixon by the hour, rather than on a salary
basis, from April 2017 until her termination in September of the
same year. Because Smith makes no other argument in support of
its motion to dismiss Dixon's IMWL claims, the Court denies the
motion with respect to counts 3 and 4 against Smith.

IWPCA claim (count 5)

Smith further contends that Dixon has failed to state a claim for
relief under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act because
she has not sufficiently alleged an employment contract or
agreement to pay her ongoing, work-related cell phone expenses.

Dixon has alleged that Smith's failure to reimburse her for these
charges pursuant to the terms of their agreement constitutes a
violation of the IWPCA. These allegations are sufficient to state
a plausible claim to relief under the IWPCA. Smith cites no
authority for the proposition that Dixon's failure to
specifically allege that Castro and August had authority to enter
into an employment agreement on Smith's behalf or that the
agreement was to reimburse her for future cell phone expenses
warrants dismissal of her claim. The Court therefore denies the
motion to dismiss Dixon's IWPCA claim against Smith.

Retaliatory discharge claim (count 6)

To prevail on a claim for retaliatory discharge, the plaintiff
must show (1) that she was discharged; (2) in retaliation for her
activities; and (3) that the discharge violates a clear mandate
of public policy.

Dixon has alleged only that, when offered the Environmental
Services Manager position, she sent an e-mail to her supervisors,
Castro and Jatis, challenging whether the offered salary complied
with the salary threshold established by the federal government
to properly classify employees as exempt. The Court does not
believe that this e-mail, without more, could be considered
whistleblowing activity.

In light of Illinois courts' narrow interpretation of the
retaliatory discharge tort and Dixon's failure to respond to
Smith's motion to dismiss this claim, the Court agrees that
Dixon's retaliatory discharge claim should be dismissed.

The Court grants the Smith defendants' motion to dismiss in part
and denies it in part.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 31, 2017 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9wwr492
from Leagle.com.

Cynthia Dixon, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated,, Plaintiff, represented by Ryan F. Stephan --
rstephan@stephanzouras.com -- Stephan, Zouras, LLP, Haley Renee
Jenkins --  hjenkins@stephanzouras.com -- Stephan Zouras, Llp &
James B. Zouras -- jzouras@stephanzouras.com -- Stephan Zouras,
LLP.

The Washington and Jane Smith Community-Beverly, an Illinois Not-
For-Profit Corporation, Kevin McGee & Marti Jatis, Defendants,
represented by Kevin Michael O'Hagan -- kohagan@ohaganmeyer.com -
- O'Hagan Meyer, LLC, Jamie L. Filipovic --
jfilipovic@ohaganmeyer.com -- O'Hagan Meyer, LLC & Kristen Ann
Cemate -- kcemate@ohaganmeyer.com -- O'Hagan Meyer, LLC.


WESTERN REFINING: Removes "Dilworth" Suit to C.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendants in the case of AMIA DILWORTH, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. WESTERN
REFINING RETAIL, LLC; ANDEAVOR; CONICO BUELLTON, LLC; CONICO
HARBOR, LLC; CONICO LOMITA, LLC; CONICO MACVALLEY, LLC; CONICO
ROSE, LLC ; CONICO SANTA MONICA, LLC; CONICO STATE LLC; CONICO
VICTORY, LLC; CONICO WESTLAKE, LLC; CONICO WHOLESALE, LLC; CONICO
YOSEMITE, LLC; CONICO CORO, INC.; CONICO RORO, INC.; CONICO TORO,
INC.; PETER HONG; DOES 1-50, INCLUSIVE, Defendants, filed a
notice to remove the lawsuit from the Superior Court of the State
of California, County of Los Angeles (Case No. BC702261) to the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on
June 29, 2018, and assigned Case No. 2:18-cv-05768-VAP-SK (C.D.
Cal., June 29, 2018). The case is assigned to Judge Virginia A.
Phillips and referred to Magistrate Judge Steve Kim.

Western Refining, Inc. operates as an independent crude oil
refiner and marketer of refined products. Western Refining, Inc.
was founded in 1993 and is headquartered in El Paso, Texas. As of
June 1, 2017, Western Refining, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of
Andeavor. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David G Spivak, Esq.
          Sehyung Park, Esq.
          SPIVAK LAW FIRM
          16530 Ventura Boulevard Suite 312
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (818) 582-3086
          Facsimile: (818) 582-2561
          E-mail: david@spivaklaw.com
                  logan@spivaklaw.com

               - and -

          Walter L Haines, Esq.
          UNITED EMPLOYEES LAW GROUP PC
          5500 Bolsa Avenue Suite 201
          Huntington Beach, CA 92649
          Telephone: (562) 256-1047
          Facsimile: (562) 256-1006
          E-mail: walter@whaines.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Duwayne Andre Carr, Esq.
          Mary D Manesis, Esq.
          Timothy M Rusche, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
          601 South Figueroa Street Suite 3300
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 270-9600
          Facsimile: (213) 270-9601
          E-mail: dacarr@seyfarth.com
                  mmanesis@seyfarth.com
                  trusche@seyfarth.com

               - and -

          Michael W Kopp, Esq.
          Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Esq.
          400 Capitol Mall Ste 2350
          Sacramento, CA 95814-4428
          Telephone: (916) 448-0159
          Facsimile: (916) 558-4839
          E-mail: mkopp@seyfarth.com

               - and -

          William J Dritsas, Esq.
          Seyfarth Shaw LLP
          560 Mission Street 31st Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 397-2823
          Facsimile: (415) 397-8549
          E-mail: wdritsas@seyfarth.com


WIDEOPENWEST INC: Faces "Kirkland" Suit over IPO Disclosures
------------------------------------------------------------
JEFF KIRKLAND, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. WIDEOPENWEST, INC.; STEVEN COCHRAN;
RICHARD E. FISH, JR.; DAVID BURGSTAHLER; BRIAN CASSIDY; DANIEL
KILPATRICK; JEFFREY MARCUS PHIL SESKIN; JOSHUA TAMAROFF; AVISTA
CAPITAL PARTNERS; CRESTVIEW PARTNERS; UBS SECURITIES LLC; CREDIT
SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC; RBC CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC; SUNTRUST
ROBINSON HUMPHREY, INC.; EVERCORE GROUP L.L.C.; MACQUARIE CAPITAL
(USA) INC.; LIONTREE ADVISORS LLC; AND RAYMOND JAMES &
ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 653248/2018 (N.Y. Sup.,
New York Cty., June 27, 2018) is an action against the
Defendants' Initial Public Offering commencing May 25, 2017 and
closed May 31, 2017, where the Defendants negligently issued
untrue statements of material facts and omitted material facts
from the Registration Statement and incorporated Prospectus that
the Defendants filed with the SEC in support of the Offering, in
violation of the Securities Act of 1933.

According to the complaint, between May 25, 2017 and May 31,
2017, WideOpenWest conduct its IPO in which it offered 20,970,589
shares for sale at a price of $17 per share, totaling more than
$356 million before deductions for the Underwriters' discount,
commissions and estimated expenses. The shares of 18,235,295 were
initially offered plus an additional option held by the
Underwriters for an over-allotment of 2,735,294 which was fully
exercised.

On May 31, 2017, WideOpenWest announced the closing of the IPO.
Upon the close of the Offering and accounting for the underwriter
discount commission of $0.8925 per share, WideOpenWest raised
proceeds of $337.8 millioin.

On August 1, 2017, WideOpenWest announced its plan to sell its
Chicago fiber network to a subsidiary of Verizon for $225 million
in cash. The transaction was completed in December 2017. On March
14, 2018, WideOpenWest issued its financial results for the
fourth quarter and fiscal year 2017, each ended December 31,
2017, announcing a full year decline in total revenue of 4%.
WideOpenWest also announced that it was required to record a
$147.4 million impairment to indefinite-lived intangible assets
and goodwill, purportedly primarily to WideOpenWest's stock price
decline. On May 11, 2018, WideOpenWest announced that for the
quarter ending March 31, 2018, it recorded a non-cash impairment
charge of $256.4 million.

In response to these disclosures, WideOpenWest's stock plunged
more than 23% on March 15, 2018 to a closing price of $7.04,
nearly 59% below the IPO price.

WideOpenWest's common stock continues to trade at depressed
levels, trading at a closing price of $9.44 as of the date of the
complaint, representing a loss of 44% from the IPO price.

As a result of the materially misleading Offering Materials, the
price of WideOpenWest's common stock was artificially inflated at
the time of the Offering.

WideOpenWest, Inc. (WOW) operates as a cable service provider.
The Company offers Internet, cloud and cable television, and
voice over IP-based telephony services. WOW serves customers in
the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shannon L. Hopkins, Esq.
          Sebastiano Tornatore, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP
          30 Broad Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 363-7500
          Facsimile: (212) 363-7171
          E-mail: shopkins@zlk.com
                  stornatore@zlk.com


WILLIAMS-SONOMA INC: Cal. App. Affirms Dismissal of "Shine" Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Norman L. Epstein of the Court of Appeals of California for
the Second District, Division Four, affirmed the trial court's
order of dismissal of the case, HARLEY SHINE, Plaintiff and
Appellant, v. WILLIAMS-SONOMA, INC., et al., Defendants and
Respondents, Case No. B277513 (Cal. App.), following the
sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend.

In a previous wage and hour class action lawsuit, Morales v.
Williams-Sonoma, Inc. et al. (Super. Ct. S.F. County, 2015, No.
CGC532344), plaintiff Elizabeth Morales sued the same Defendants
on behalf of all current and former California-based hourly-paid
or non-exempt individuals employed by Williams-Sonoma Stores,
Inc. at a Pottery Barn, Pottery Barn Kids, Williams-Sonoma, or
West Elm store in California since June 24, 2009.

The operative first amended complaint in Morales alleged causes
of action for overtime pay, meal period premiums, rest period
premiums , minimum wages, final wages, payment of all wages
earned, failure to provide proper wage statements, failure to
keep proper payroll records, failure to reimburse business
expenses, relief under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General
Act of 2004, and relief under the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL").

The Morales class action was resolved by a settlement agreement.
The superior court approved the agreement and entered a
stipulated order of dismissal on Sept. 23, 2015.  Mr. Shine, who
worked at a Pottery Barn retail store in Beverly Hills from
January to March 2013, was a member of the Morales settlement
class and received a share of the settlement proceeds.

A short while later, Mr. Shine filed the present putative class
action complaint against Williams-Sonoma.  He brought the action
on behalf of himself and all non-exempt employees of Williams-
Sonoma who worked at Williams-Sonoma, Pottery Barn, Pottery Barn
Kids, West Elm, and or/Rejuvenation retail stores in California
at any time from Oct. 21, 2011 up to and continuing until the
time that judgment is entered in the case.

The allegations in the case are based on the purported failure by
Williams-Sonoma to pay the prospective class members reporting-
time pay as required under Wage Order 7-2001 of the Industrial
Welfare Commission.  This wage order, which applies to mercantile
companies, provides that for each workday an employee is required
to report for work and does report, but is not put to work or is
furnished less than half of said employee's usual or scheduled
day's work, the employee will be paid for half the usual or
scheduled day's work, but in no event less than two hours nor
more than four hours, at the employee's regular rate of pay,
which will not be less than the minimum wage.

Based on this alleged violation, which was the first cause of
action in the complaint, Mr. Shine also alleged related claims
for failure to pay all wages earned at termination (second cause
of action), failure to provide accurate wage statements (third
cause of action), and violation of the UCL (fourth cause of
action).

Williams-Sonoma demurred to the entire complaint, arguing that
all the claims were based on the same theory: that Wage Order 7-
2001 requires an employer in the mercantile industry to provide
reporting-time pay, a type of wage, when it asks an employee to
remain available for a so-called 'on-call' shift, but then
ultimately tells the employee that he or she does not need to
work the shift.  It raised three independent grounds to sustain
the demurrer.

First, by participating in the Morales settlement agreement and
receiving damages for failure to pay wages due, Mr. Shine is
barred under the doctrine of res judicata from bringing a second
suit against the same defendants for failure to pay reporting-
time pay, which also is a form of wages.  Second, Williams-Sonoma
requested that the court take judicial notice of employment
records, which allegedly showed that Mr. Shine was not told that
his on-call shift had been canceled, and because he did not
suffer the injury alleged in the complaint he lacks standing to
bring this action.  Third, Williams-Sonoma contended the plain
language of Wage Order 7-2001 requires reporting-time pay only
where an employee physically reports to the job site, ready to
work.  It claimed that Mr. Shine's attempt to extend reporting-
time pay to situations where an employee does not physically
report to work exceeds what is required by law for on-call
shifts.

The trial court sustained the demurrer solely on res judicata
grounds, and did not decide the other issues raised in the
demurrer.  Based on the order sustaining the demurrer without
leave to amend, the court entered a judgment of dismissal with
prejudice.  The timely appeal followed.

Mr. Shine argues the present claims are not covered by the
previous settlement agreement and release because there was no
bona fide dispute in Morales over reporting-time pay.  Judge
Epstein finds that it is undisputed that there was a bona fide
disagreement on the right to reporting-time pay.  Williams-Sonoma
denies that reporting-time pay is owed when on-call shifts are
canceled by the employer.  Because the right to reporting-time
pay is in dispute, reporting-time pay was not "due" within the
meaning of section 206 when the Morales settlement agreement was
signed.  Accordingly, the limitation imposed by section 206.5
does not apply to invalidate the release.  The Morales settlement
agreement broadly releases any claim that could have been brought
under the enumerated provisions, which necessarily includes Wage
Order 7-2001.

Mr. Shine alternatively argues the Morales settlement agreement
includes a waiver by Williams-Sonoma of the right to assert a res
judicata defense to wage claims which, like the present claim for
reporting-time pay, are dependent on facts not mentioned in the
Morales complaint.  The Judge disagrees.

He finds that the last antecedent rule provides the more accurate
and natural construction of the release.  The interpretation
advanced by Mr. Shine contradicts the plain language of the
agreement and fails to give effect to the general release
contained in the opening clause of the paragraph. His assertion
that application of the last antecedent rule would erroneously
release even non-wage and hour claims is incorrect. The final
passage limits the release to claims related to a wage and hour
action.  Moreover, in construing the agreement, it is assumed
that the parties incorporated all applicable laws including res
judicata and collateral estoppel.  Because collateral estoppel
applies only to claims that are related by subject matter and
could have been pleaded in the first action, there is no danger
that application of the last antecedent rule would release claims
completely unrelated to employment claims.

The Judge concludes that the demurrer was properly sustained
without leave to amend on grounds of res judicata.  Because he
concludes that the release is clear and unambiguous, further
amendment of the complaint would be pointless.  He does not reach
the other issues briefed by the parties, and expresses no opinion
as to the merits of the complaint or Mr. Shine's standing to
pursue the action.

For these reasons, Judge Epstein affirmed the judgment (order of
dismissal).  Williams-Sonoma is entitled to its costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/npiQkD from Leagle.com.

McNicholas & McNicholas, Patrick McNicholas and Michael J. Kent;
Bridgford, Gleason & Artinian and Michael H. Artinian --
Mike.Artinian@bridgfordlaw.com; Frank Sims & Stolper and Scott H.
Sims -- ssims@lawfss.com; Esner, Chang & Boyer and Holly N. Boyer
-- hboyer@ecbappeal.com -- for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, Melanie L. Bostwick --
mbostwick@orrick.com -- Randall C. Smith --
randall.smith@orrick.com -- Jessica R. Perry -- jperry@orrick.com
-- and Allison Riechert Giese -- agiese@orrick.com -- for
Defendants and Respondents.


XPO LOGISTICS: $7MM Deal in "Leung" TCPA Suit Has Final Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VINCENT LEUNG, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. XPO LOGISTICS, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 15 C 03877 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Edmond E. Chang of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division,

In April 2015, Leung, the named Plaintiff in the case, bought two
mirrors from the IKEA store in Schaumburg, Illinois.  In a rush
and with two small children in tow, Leung opted to have the
mirrors delivered by IKEA's next-day delivery service.  Leung's
wife wrote down Leung's cell phone number on a form while he
watched; Leung signed and initialed the form.  The next day,
Leung received an automated voice message and a text message
notifying him that the delivery was imminent.  These messages
came from Defendant XPO Logistics.  The mirrors were delivered
without issue.

After the delivery, Leung received another call from XPO
Logistics.  This call used a pre-recorded or artificial voice,
and asked Leung to complete a survey regarding the delivery
service.  Irked by the post-delivery call, Leung complained to a
friend, who referred Leung to the Keogh Law firm.

Keogh Law filed a lawsuit on behalf of Leung, and sought to
certify a class of similarly situated consumers.  The complaint
alleged that XPO Logistics violated the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act ("TCPA") by making calls to cell phones using an
automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or
prerecorded voice without express consent.

The parties engaged in extensive and, at times, intensely
disputed discovery.  They also engaged in three mediation
sessions in front of, separately, two former federal judges
(Judge Wayne Andersen and Judge James Holderman), both of
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc.  The mediation
sessions involved detailed argument and briefing.  After the
third mediation session, the parties were able to reach an
agreement.

The proposed settlement agreement defines the settlement class as
the parties whose cellular telephone numbers are identified in
the call data produced in the litigation where XPO or its
subsidiary placed a pre-recorded post-delivery survey call after
May 1, 2011 relating to an IKEA delivery.

The Settlement Agreement requires XPO to create a non-
reversionary settlement fund of $7 million.  The class members
who file valid claims will receive cash payments from the fund.
The Settlement provides for a robust notice plan and a
streamlined claim process.  Any funds that cannot be feasibly
distributed to class members will be donated to a cy pres
recipient, the National Consumer Law Center.

The settlement agreement (with minor adjustments agreed to by the
parties) is now before the Court for final approval.  Leung,
through his counsel, also filed a motion for attorneys' fees,
costs, and a service award.  The motion seeks an incentive
payment of $10,000 to Leung.  Leung's counsel, Keogh Law, Ltd.,
requests attorneys' fees of $2,333,334 (equal to one-third of the
total settlement fund), plus compensation of $52,458.90 for the
counsel's out-of-pocket litigation costs.  The fees, costs, and
incentive award would be taken out of the settlement fund.

The Court held a fairness hearing on March 7, 2018.

Judge Chang finds that (i) the requirements of Rule 23 are met,
so the Judge certified the class for settlement purposes; (ii)
the case is at a stage where the parties can appropriately value
the litigation, and arrive at a fair settlement; (iii) one-third
of the net fund is the appropriate fee award in the case; (iv)
the requested $10,000 incentive award is also in line with the
awards generally handed out in TCPA cases; and (v) the selection
of NCLC as cy pres recipient is reasonable, and will tend to
further the goals of the TCPA.

For these reasons, Judge Chang granted the Plaintiff's motion for
attorneys' fees in the amount of $2,230,559.67, plus litigation
expenses of $52,458.90.  He also granted the motion for a $10,000
incentive award to Leung.  The Settlement Agreement is approved
in its entirety, including the modifications outlined in the
parties' Joint Stipulation to Modify Certain Settlement Terms.
The status hearing of June 6, 2018 is reset to July 26, 2018, at
9:45 a.m., for a status on distribution of payments.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 30, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/dNapYE from Leagle.com.

Vincent Leung, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Keith James Keogh, Keogh Law,
Ltd., Amy L. Wells, Keogh Law, Ltd, Michael S. Hilicki, Keogh
Law, LTD & Timothy J. Sostrin, Keogh Law, LTD.

XPO Logistics, Inc., Defendant, represented by Edmundo Clay
Marquez -- cmarquez@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac
vice, Guadalupe Raymond Laguna -- llaguna@omm.com -- O''Melveny &
Myers LLP, pro hac vice, Randall Edwards -- redwards@omm.com --
O'Melveny & Myers, Scott Michael Voelz -- svoelz@omm.com --
O'melveny & Myers Llp, pro hac vice, David Patterson Gloor --
gloorp@jbltd.com --Johnson & Bell, Ltd. & Steven Michael Shear --
shears@jbltd.com -- Johnson & Bell, Ltd.


YONKERS, NY: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss "Fumarelli" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted the City's motion to
dismiss the case, ROBERT FUMARELLI, WILLIAM PARKER, ARTHUR
RIVERA, STEPHEN RONAN, THOMAS SPAUN, and all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF YONKERS, Defendant,
Case No. 17 CV 6922 (VB) (S.D. N.Y.).

The named Plaintiffs bring the putative class action against the
City for breach of contract and violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), Rehabilitation Act, and New York State
Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL").

Section 207-a(1) of the New York General Municipal Law ("GML")
requires municipalities to pay a firefighter who is injured in
the performance of his duties his "regular salary or wages" until
his disability has ceased.  However, when a firefighter is
granted a New York State and Local Retirement System/New York
State and Local Police and Fire Retirement System ("NYSLRS")
disability retirement allowance, the municipality need only pay
the difference between the NYSLRS retirement allowance and the
amount of the firefighter's "regular salary or wages" ("207-a(2)
payments").

The Plaintiffs are permanently disabled retired City firefighters
who suffered line-of-duty injuries.  They were certified as
disabled under the NYSLRS, and were granted NYSLRS retirement
allowances.  As such, the City need only pay them 207-a(2)
payments.

Since at least 1982, the City included certain additional
benefits known as check-in pay, night differential pay, and
holiday pay (what the Plaintiffs describe as "full pay
components") in the calculation of "regular salary and wages"
when making 207-a(2) payments.  But on Dec. 9, 2015, the City
notified the Plaintiffs and the putative class members that it
had overpaid them by including the full pay components in its
calculation of "regular salary and wages."  The City stated it
intended to adjust future 207-a(2) payments to exclude the full
pay components and to recoup any past overpayments.

The City then held due process hearings at which the Plaintiffs
and the putative class members objected to the adjustment and
recoupment.  The hearing officers recommended to the City
Commissioner of Human Resources that the Plaintiffs' and the
putative class members' objections be denied.  The Commissioner
adopted the recommendations and notified the Plaintiffs and the
putative class members that it would reduce future 207-a(2)
payments and recoup past overpayments to permanently disabled
retired firefighters.  However, the City continued to include the
full pay components in the calculation of "regular salary or
wages" for temporarily disabled firefighters and non-disabled
retired firefighters.

On March 17, 2016, Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-
CIO, submitted an arbitration demand with the American
Arbitration Association, alleging the City's decision to reduce
207-a(2) payments violated their collective bargaining agreement
with the City.  The City moved in Supreme Court, Westchester
County, for an order permanently staying arbitration.  The state
court initially denied the City's motion, but on Oct. 17, 2016,
it granted the stay after the City moved to reargue.  An appeal
of the state court's decision is currently pending before the
Appellate Division, Second Department.

Separately, on June 30, 2016, the Plaintiffs sued the City in an
Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, Westchester County.
Their Article 78 petition included eight causes of action.  One
of the causes of action, titled, "The City's Singling Out
Permanently Disabled Retirees," alleged that the City's decision
to single out permanently disabled retirees receiving benefits
under GML 207-a(2) while continuing a higher benefit for injured
Fire Fighters and Officers receiving benefits under GML 207-a(1)
is arbitrary, illegal and constitutes an error of law.

On March 10, 2017, the state court held that the City's decision
to reduce the Plaintiffs' future 207-a(2) payments by deducting
the full pay components was not arbitrary or capricious, but the
decision to recoup past overpaid 207-a(2) payments was arbitrary
and capricious, and lacked a rational basis.  The court thus
dismissed the Plaintiffs' petition except to the extent it found
the City's decision to recoup overpaid 207-a(2) payments was
arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion, and enjoined
the City from recouping those payments.

On April 4, 2017, the Plaintiffs appealed the March 10, 2017,
state court decision.  That appeal also is pending before the
Appellate Division, Second Department.  On Aug. 1, 2017, the
lower court denied the Plaintiffs' motions to reargue and renew.

The Plaintiffs commenced the action on Sept. 12, 2017.  The City
moved to dismiss on Nov. 7, 2017, after which the Court sua
sponte granted the Plaintiffs an opportunity to file an amended
complaint.  The Plaintiffs declined to do so.

Judge Briccetti agrees with the Plaintiffs that collateral
estoppel does not apply to their claims insofar as they rely on
the City's decision to recoup past 207-a(2) payments.  However,
the Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from asserting claims
based on the City's decision to reduce future 207-a(2) payments.

As the Plaintiffs specifically argued the City's decision was
arbitrary and illegal because the City singled out permanently
disabled retirees, the state court's holding that the City's
decision to reduce the Plaintiffs' future 207-a(2) payments was
not arbitrary or capricious necessarily implies rejection of the
claim that that aspect of the decision was discriminatory.
However, the Judge finds that the state court's holding that the
City's decision to recoup past 207-a(2) payments was arbitrary
and capricious and lacked a rational basis was not decided
against the Plaintiffs, and therefore does not imply a rejection
of their discrimination claim with regard to that aspect of the
City's decision.

The Plaintiffs argue collateral estoppel does not apply at all
because the Plaintiffs may prove a mixed-motive disability
discrimination claim.  The Judge is not persuaded.  He says, even
if ADA mixed-motive discrimination claims are still viable after
the Supreme Court's decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services,
Inc., the state court's decision necessarily rejected the
Plaintiffs' argument that the City's decision to reduce their
future 207-a(2) payments was discriminatory.

The City argues the Plaintiffs fail to state discrimination
claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the NYSHRL.
Judge Breccetti agrees.  Because the scope of the disability
discrimination provisions of NYSHRL is similar to those of the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act, he analyzes the claims together.  He
finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to allege a materially
adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.  The
state court enjoined the City from recouping past 207-a(2)
payments, thereby preventing the City from taking adverse action.
Moreover, the Plaintiffs are estopped from asserting claims based
on the City's decision to reduce their future 207-a(2) payments.
Thus, they fail to allege an adverse employment action.
Accordingly, they fail to state discrimination claims under the
ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the NYSHRL.

Finally, the Plaintiffs also bring a state law claim for breach
of contract, alleging the City deprived them of their contractual
right to 207-a(2) payments with full pay components.  Having
dismissed all of the Plaintiffs' federal claims, there are no
longer any claims remaining over which the Court has original
jurisdiction.  The Judge declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' remaining state law claim.

For these reasons, Judge Breccetti granted the motion to dismiss.
The Clerk is instructed to terminate the motion and close the
case.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 30, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/UHufmb from Leagle.com.

Robert Fumarelli, Lead Plaintiff, represented by Herbert
Eisenberg, Eisenberg & Schnell LLP & Julian R. Birnbaum,
Eisenberg & Schnell LLP.

William Parker, Arthur Rivera, Stephen Ronan & Thomas Spaun,
Plaintiffs, represented by Herbert Eisenberg, Eisenberg & Schnell
LLP & Julian R. Birnbaum, Eisenberg & Schnell LLP.

City of Yonkers, Defendant, represented by Paul Jude Sweeney --
PSweeney@cglawoffices.com -- Coughlin & Gerhart, LLP.


ZODIAC US: $952K "Cuzick" Settlement Has Partial Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KYLE CUZICK, Plaintiff, v. ZODIAC U.S. SEAT SHELLS,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 16-cv-03793-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Haywod S. Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted in part the Plaintiffs'
(i) motion for final approval of the class action settlement and
(ii) the motion for attorneys' fees and costs.

On May 25, 2016, the Plaintiff filed this action in Alameda
Superior Court, alleging that the Defendant's pay, meal, and rest
break practices violated the California Labor Code, California
Unfair Competition Law, and the Fair Labor Standards Act.  The
Plaintiff then filed the operative First Amended Complaint on
June 22, 2016.

The Plaintiff asserts eight causes of action: (1) failure to
provide meal periods; (2) failure to provide rest breaks; (3)
failure to pay hourly and overtime wages; (4) failure to provide
accurate written wage statements; (5) failure to timely pay all
final wages; (6) unfair and unlawful business practices; (7)
failure to compensate for all hours worked; and (8) statutory
penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendant in an hourly wage position
as a non-exempt employee from approximately November 2015 to
March 2016.  During this time, the Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendant had a policy of requiring its employees to return to
their work stations on or before the thirtieth minute of their
30-minute meal break and on or before the tenth minute of their
10-minute rest period.  Moreover, the Plaintiff states that the
Defendant would deduct meal break and rest periods from his and
other non-exempt employees' timecards, regardless of whether the
Defendant actually provided them.  On the basis of these facts,
the Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, statutory penalties,
restitution, attorneys' fees and costs, as well as whatever
relief the Court deems just and proper.

Following extensive formal discovery and with the assistance of a
private mediator, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement.

The key terms are as:

     i. Class Definition: All individuals who were employed by
the Defendant in California as non-exempt employees between May
25, 2012, and Oct. 11, 2017.  The parties have represented that
there are approximately 1,292 class members.

     ii. Monetary Relief: The Defendants will pay a maximum of
$952,000, inclusive of: (a) payments to the participating class
members; (b) the class counsel's attorneys' fees; (c) the class
counsel's and the class representative's litigation costs and
associated expenses, which are capped at $10,000; (d) the payment
to the settlement administrator for claims administration costs;
(e) enhancement payments to be made by the Defendant to Kyle
Cuzick (f) payment to the California Labor Workforce Development
Agency as part of the consideration for the release of all
released claims; and (g) all payroll taxes.  The parties have
estimated that individual class members' gross recovery, before
deductions for taxes, fees, and other costs, will be
approximately $737.

     iii. Release: The class, including the Plaintiff, will
release the Defendant from all claims, whether known or unknown,
that were asserted or could have been asserted arising from or
related to allegations set forth in the complaint.

     iv. Incentive Award: The Plaintiff requests a Class
Representative enhancement award of $10,000.  The Defendant does
not oppose this request.

     v. Attorneys' Fees and Costs: The Plaintiff has filed an
application for attorneys' fees not to exceed $317,333.33.  The
Defendant does not oppose this request.

Judge Gilliam finds that the proposed settlement amount is fair,
adequate, and reasonable, and that class members received
adequate notice.  He also finds that the Plaintiffs' counsel has
not justified the discrepancy between a $10,000 incentive award
and the estimated payout to the class members of less than
$1,000.  He will therefore authorizes payment of an enhancement
award of $5,000 to the named Plaintiff.

Upon review of the counsel's filings, the Judge finds that a
lodestar multiplier is warranted, based most heavily on the
described litigation risks and the quality of the result obtained
for the class (i.e., a substantial cash payment of over $700 to
each class member). He therefore finds that a multiplier of 1.2
is appropriate, and sets the class counsel's attorneys' fees at
just over 30 of the total settlement amount, or $288,495.

Judge Gilliam granted in part the Plaintiff's Motion for Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement and the Plaintiff's Motion
for Attorneys' fees.  He approved the settlement amount of
$952,000, including payments of attorneys' fees in the amount of
$288,495; costs of $10,000; and an incentive fee for the named
Plaintiff in the amount of $5,000.

The parties and settlement administrator are directed to
implement the Final Order and the settlement agreement in
accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement.  The
parties are directed to submit a joint proposed judgment for
approval by June 1, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 29, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/S8WDjk from Leagle.com.

Kyle Cuzick, Plaintiff, represented by Chaim Shaun Setareh --
shaun@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group, Howard Scott Leviant -
- scott@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group & Thomas Alistair
Segal -- thomas@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group.

Zodiac U.S. Seat Shells, LLC, Defendant, represented by Caryn F.
Horner, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, Greg Stephen
Labate -- glabate@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin & Stephen
Luther Taeusch -- staeusch@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin
Richter & Hampton LLP.







                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N  I N F O R M A T I O N

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