CAR_Public/180730.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, July 30, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 151

                            Headlines

21ST CENTURY: Faces Class Action Over Disney Asset Acquisition
A10 NETWORKS: Kaskela Law Files Securities Class Suit
A10 NETWORKS: Kirby Mcinerney Files Class Action Lawsuit
ABBVIE INC: Value Drug Alleges Monopoly of AndroGel
ACT FAST: Omnicare Appeals Ruling in "Young" Suit to 4th Circuit

ADIR INTERNATIONAL: Appeals Decision in "Flores" Suit to 9th Cir.
ADMIRAL THEATRE: Dancers File Wage Class Action in Illinois
ADT INC: 3rd Cir. Remands Class Action to NJ State Court
ADVANCED CALL: Loses Bid to Dismiss "Untershine" FDCPA Suit
ADVANCED MICRO: Rosen Law Firm to Lead in Securities Suit

AFNI INC: Court Grants Judgment on Pleadings in "Espinal" Suit
AHMC HEALTHCARE: Wins Writ of Mandate in Wage & Hour Suit
ALABAMA: Denial of Class Certification in "Yeager" Suit Recommended
ALL WEB: Class Action Over Insurance Leads Can Proceed
ALL WEB: Court Certifies Class in "Karpilovsky" TCPA Suit

ALLERGAN INC: Averts Employees' Class Action Over Stock Drop
ALLIANCE MMA: Court Grants Preliminary Approval of "Shapiro" Deal
ALTA DENA: Ruling in Delivery Drivers' Class Action Overturned
AMERI-FORCE: Cal. App Affirms Denial of "Solis" Class Certification
AMERICAN AIRLINES: "Hoefert" Suit Transferred to N.D. Tex.

AMERICAN CAMPUS: Student Housing Class Action Settlement Okayed
AMERICAN HONDA: Faces CR-V Deceptive Advertising Class Action
AMERICAN HONDA: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Floyd" Class Suit
AMERICAN TRAFFIC: Federal Judge Dismisses Class Action
AMERIGAS PARTNERS: Overcharges Customers for Propane, Suit Says

AMR CORP: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bids in TWA Pilots Case
APPLE INC: Sued in California for Violating Hacking Laws
APPLIED UNDERWRITERS: Can Compel Response to 3rd-Party Subpoena
AREEN AIDEN: "Ghauri" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
ASHBURN CORP: Court Won't Review Denial of "Cannon" Deal Approval

ATLANTA SUPERSOURCE: "Eaton" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
ATRIUM CORP: Complaints Pile Up Over Hernia Mesh Products
AVINGER INC: Settlement in "Banerjee" Suit Has Prelim Approval
BARLEANS ORGANIC: Faces "Brannon" Suit in S.D. California
BELLPORT CATERERS: Faces "Sypert" Suit in S.D. New York

BIG LOTS: Oct. 30 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
BILTMORE HOTEL: Hernandez Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
C&L TOWING: Court Certifies Tow Truck Drivers Class
CATALINA HOTEL: Faces "Sierra" Suit in S.D. Florida
CH ROBINSON: Fails to Pay Overtime Under FLSA, "Dietrich" Claims

CHAMPION PETFOODS: Court Narrows Claims in Leob" Dog Food Suit
CHESTERFIELD HOTEL: Faces "Sierra" Suit in S.D. Florida
CHILDREN'S MERCY: "K.A." Suit Removed to W.D. Mo.
CIPRIANI USA: Faces "Sypert" Suit in S.D. New York
COCA-COLA CO: 3rd Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in "Enslin"

COLLECTO INC: 9th Cir. Affirms Sanctions Against Counsel in "Diaz"
CONAGRA FOODS: Allen Seeks to Certify Class & Subclasses
CONCORDE INC: Faces "Gross" Suit in M.D. Florida
CREDIT SUISSE: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Laver" Class Suit
CREST HOLLOW: Faces "Sypert" Suit in S.D. New York

DERRICK J FRANKLIN: Faces "Jones" Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
DGS CONSTRUCTION: Court Certifies Class in Amaya et al. Action
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Appeals Order in "Saint-Jean" Suit
DRIFTWOOD BAY: Grittani Seeks to Recoup Minimum Wages for Servers
EDISON INT'L: Tibble Appeals C.D. Calif. Decision to 9th Circuit

EDUCAP INC: Court Dismisses "Quick" RICO Suit
EL POLLO LOCO: Seeks Ninth Circuit Review of Ruling in "Turocy"
ERIKSON LIVING: Sued by Horton Over Unpaid Overtime Under FLSA
ESTERO HOTEL: Faces "Honeywell" Suit in M.D. Florida
EVEREST REAL: "Delgado" Suit Seeks to Recoup Wages Under WARN Act

FIELD ASSET: Seeks 9th Cir. Review of Ruling in "Bowerman" Suit
FINANCIAL CORP: Encarnacion Seeks to Certify Consumers Class
FIRSTCOLLECT INC: Foerster Seeks to Certify Settlement Class
FLORIDA: Writ of Prohibition in Students' Suit Partially OK'd
FORSTER & GARBUS: Faces "Manashirova" Suit in E.D. New York

FORSTER & GARBUS: Rueda Sues over Debt Collection Practices
FRISBID SERVICES: Halawani Sues Over Unsolicited SMS Ads
GC SERVICES: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
GEICO GENERAL: 9th Cir. Affirms Remand Denial in "Stone"
GEORGIA POWER: Consumers Not Required to Exhaust Admin Remedies

GONG HEY FAT: Faces "Figueroa" Suit in M.D. Florida
HIGHLANDS COUNTRY: Faces "Sypert" Suit in S.D. New York
HITACHI: Oct. 18 Capacitor Settlement Approval Hearing Set
HUI YANG NAILS: Faces "Li" Suit in S.D. New York
JING FU HOUSE: Faces "Wei" Suit in E.D. New York

KIEWIT INFRASTRUCTURE: Removes "Reginald" Suit to C.D. California
KOHL'S CORP: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Securities Fraud Suit
KT HEALTH: Sweeney Appeals Order in "Vuckovic" Suit to 1st Cir.
LAKEWOOD CAMPING: Pryor Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages under FLSA
LONG BEACH, CA: Oct. 29 Final Settlement Hearing Set

MAPLEWOOD, MO: Loses Sup. Ct. Bid to Stay Mandate in "Webb"
MAR PIZZA: "Compton" Suit Seeks Minimum Wages, Damages Under FLSA
MAXIMO GARCIA: Garcia Sues Over Denied Overtime Pay, Paystubs
MDL 2785: MedImpact Partly Compelled to Comply With Subpoena
METAL TECHNOLOGIES: $116K Attys' Fees Awarded in "Weil" FLSA Suit

MISSOURI: Class in Juvenile Detainees' Parole Review Suit Certified
MIZUHO BANK: Court Denies Certification of Mt. Gox Deposit Subclass
NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON: Faces "Grant" Suit in M.D. Tennessee
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL: Sends Junk Faxes, Uber Suit Claims
NEW JERSEY: Court Dismisses "Hennes" Civil Rights Suit

NEW JERSEY: Denial of Bid to Enjoin Reform Act Bail Feature Upheld
NEW YORK GOLF: Faces "Sypert" Suit in S.D. New York
NEW YORK: "Bouidia" Inmate Suit Consolidated with "Butler"
OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY: Former Student Files Sexual Harassment Suit
PARAMOUNT COUNTRY: Faces "Sypert" Suit in S.D. New York

PELHAM COUNTRY: Faces "Sypert" Suit in S.D. New York
POWER HOME: Defranza Sues Over Unsolicited Telemarketing Calls
PROGRESSIVE SPECIALTY: Court Certifies "Boyle" Class
QUECHAN TRIBE: Court Narrows Claims in "Aguilar" Rico Suit
R.V. CAREY'S: Pipefitters' Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages, Damages

REXALL SUNDOWN: Bid to Dismiss FAC in "Seegert" Suit Denied
RYZE CLAIM: "Billings" Venue Transferred to S.D. Ind.
SEASIDE APARTMENT: Face "Sierra" Suit in S.D. Florida
SIBANYE GOLD: Heuschen Sues Over Share Price Drop
STARBUCKS CORP: Naimi Appeals C.D. Calif. Ruling to Ninth Circuit

SYNERGIES3 TEC: Jones Seeks to Recover OT Pay Under FLSA, MMWL
T-MOBILE USA: Subway Files Petitions w/ Supreme Court in "Rahmany"
TACO HUT BROADWAY: Faces "Alvarez" Suit in S.D. New York
TENNECO INC: Faces "Cryar" Suit Over Acquisition of Federal-Mogul
TINDER INC: Kim Appeals C.D. Calif. Decision to Ninth Circuit

TOTAL HEALTHCARE: Underpays Nursing Assistants, Roberts Alleges
TRUEACCORD: Faces "Zuniga" Suit in D. New Mexico
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: Cohen Files Suit Over Sale to Disney
UNITED STATES: 3rd Cir. Grants TRO Against Removal of Children
UNITED STATES: Court Certifies Class of VA Nurses

UTZ QUALITY: Misrepresents Vegetable Content, Feldman Claims
VALLOUREC STAR: "Debozy" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
WEIBO CORP: Court Dismisses "Goldsmith" Securities Suit
WELLS FARGO: Piazza Appeals Ruling in "Jabbari" Suit to 9th Cir.

                            *********

21ST CENTURY: Faces Class Action Over Disney Asset Acquisition
--------------------------------------------------------------
Eriq Gardner, writing for Hollywood Reporter, reports that the sale
of 21st Century Fox's studio assets to Disney has triggered the
first lawsuit from a shareholder, who complains about what was
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The putative
class action seeks to enjoin the transaction.

Robert Weiss, leading other shareholders, filed his lawsuit on July
6 in Delaware federal court.

The lawsuit alleges that a proxy statement filed on June 28 omits
or misrepresents the company's financial projections and the data
underlying financial valuation analyses from Goldman Sachs and
Centerview Partners. The complaint further contends that Goldman's
potential conflicts of interest have not been adequately
disclosed.

"In short, unless remedied, 21CF's public stockholders will be
forced to make a voting or appraisal decision on the Proposed
Transaction without full disclosure of all material information
concerning the Proposed Transaction being provided to them," states
the complaint.

In the midst of a bidding war with Comcast, Disney has proposed $38
per share in cash and stock for Fox's assets. The proposed deal has
already won approval from the Justice Department with the condition
that Fox's regional sports networks are divested. Disney has agreed
to this condition.

Regarding alleged material omissions in the proxy statement, the
shareholder lawsuit complains about the absence of projections or
forecasts for Hulu as well as earnings estimates for European
broadcaster Sky in future years.

The objecting shareholder also wants more information about debt
and raises concerns about how a Goldman affiliate was asked to act
as an underwriter, placement agent and bookrunner in connection
with Fox's possible incurrence of permanent debt financing. This is
presented as a potential conflict given the investment bank's role
in issuing its fairness opinion.

Fox and its board are accused of various securities violation, and
if the Fox-Disney transaction isn't enjoined on a preliminary
basis, the shareholder would like the deal later rescinded with an
award of rescissory damages. The plaintiffs are represented by
attorneys at Weisslaw and O'Kelly Earnst & Joyce.

Fox declined comment about the lawsuit. [GN]

A10 NETWORKS: Kaskela Law Files Securities Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
A shareholder class action complaint has been filed against A10
Networks, Inc. (NYSE: ATEN) ("A10" or the "Company") on behalf of
certain purchasers of the Company's common stock between
February 9, 2016 and January 30, 2018, inclusive (the "Class
Period").

The complaint alleges that A10 made a series of false and
misleading statements to investors about the Company's financial
statements and internal controls during the Class Period, which
caused investors to purchase A10's common stock at artificially
inflated prices during the Class Period.

IMPORTANT NEW DEADLINE: Investors who purchased A10's common stock
during the Class Period may, no later than July 27, 2018, seek to
be appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class.
Investors are encouraged to contact Kaskela Law LLC (David Seamus
Kaskela, Esq.) at (484) 258???1585 or (888) 715???1740 for
additional information about this action or to discuss their
important legal rights and options. A10 investors may also visit
http://kaskelalaw.com/case/a10-networks/to submit their
information to the firm online.

As detailed in the complaint, on January 16, 2018, the Company
disclosed that it only expected "total revenue in the fourth
quarter 2017 to be between $55.5 million and $56.0 million, below
its prior guidance of $64.0 million to $67.0 million." Following
this news, shares of A10's common stock fell $0.99 per share, or
over 13%, to close on January 17, 2018 at $6.32.

Then, on January 30, 2018, A10 disclosed that its Audit Committee
was investigating certain of the Company's accounting practices,
with the investigation "principally focused on certain revenue
recognition matters from the fourth quarter of 2015 through the
fourth quarter of 2017." Following this news, shares of A10's
common stock fell $0.86 per share, or over 12%, to close on January
31, 2018 at $6.13.

A10 investors are encouraged to contact Kaskela Law LLC to discuss
this action or visit http://kaskelalaw.com/case/a10-networks/to
submit their contact information to the firm online. Kaskela Law
LLC exclusively represents investors in state and federal courts
throughout the country.

Contacts:

         Kaskela Law LLC
         David Seamus Kaskela, Esq.
         201 King of Prussia Road
         Suite 650
         Radnor, PA 19087
         Telephone: 484-258-1585
                    888-715-1740
         E-mail: skaskela@kaskelalaw.com
         Website: http://www.kaskelalaw.com[GN]

A10 NETWORKS: Kirby Mcinerney Files Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kirby McInerney LLP reminds investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California on behalf of all persons or
entities who purchased or otherwise acquired A10 Networks, Inc.
("A10 Networks") (NYSE:ATEN) securities between February 9, 2016
and January 30, 2018 (the "Class Period"). Investors have until
July 27, 2018 to apply to the Court to be appointed as lead
plaintiff in the lawsuit.

The complaint alleges that defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) A10 Networks had
issues with its internal controls that required an Audit Committee
investigation; (2) A10 Networks' revenues since the fourth quarter
of 2015 were false due to improper revenue recognition, which
prompted an investigation by the Company's Audit Committee; and (3)
as a result, Defendants' public statements were materially false
and misleading at all relevant times.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired A10 Networks securities,
have information, or would like to learn more about these claims,
please;

         Thomas W. Elrod, Esq.
         Kirby McInerney LLP
         Telephone: (212) 371-6600
         Website: https://www.kmllp.com
         Email: telrod@kmllp.com [GN]

ABBVIE INC: Value Drug Alleges Monopoly of AndroGel
---------------------------------------------------
VALUE DRUG COMPANY; and ROCHESTER DRUG CO-OPERATIVE, INC.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. ABBVIE INC.; ABBOTT LABORATORIES; UNIMED
PHARMACEUTICALS LLC; and BESINS HEALTHCARE, INC., Defendants, Case
No. 2:18-cv-02804-HB (E.D. Pa., July 2, 2018) is an action against
the Defendants arising out of their unlawful scheme to monopolize
the market in the U.S. for branded and generic versions of
AndroGel.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants maintained their market
and monopoly power in the U.S. with respect to AndroGel by filing
sham lawsuits against potential competitors.  The Plaintiffs also
allege that the Defendants paid artificially inflated prices for
their AndroGel 1%, generic AndroGel 1%, and AndroGel 1.62%
purchases, and the Plaintiffs were deprived of the benefits of
competition from a less-expensive generic equivalent of AndroGel 1%
as a result of the Defendants' anticompetitive conduct.

AbbVie Inc. discovers, develops, manufactures, and sells
pharmaceutical products worldwide.  AbbVie has a collaboration with
Alector, Inc.; C2N Diagnostics; Voyager Therapeutics, Inc.; Janssen
Biotech, Inc.; International Myeloma Foundation; Calibr and Scripps
Research; The Institute for Research in Immunology and Cancer ???
Commercialization of Research; and the Universite de Montreal. The
company was incorporated in 2012 and is based in North Chicago,
Illinois. [BN]

The Plaintiff Value Drug Company is represented by:

          David F. Sorensen, Esq.
          Ellen T. Noteware, Esq.
          Nicholas Urban, Esq.
          BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C.
          1622 Locust Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 875-4683
          E-mail: dsorensen@bm.net
                  enoteware@bm.net
                  nurban@bm.net

               - and -

          Peter Kohn, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          101 Greenwood Avenue, Ste. 600
          Jenkintown, PA 19046
          E-mail: pkohn@faruquilaw.com

The Plaintiff Rochester Drug Co-Operative, Inc. is represented by:

          Bruce E. Gerstein, Esq.
          Joseph Opper, Esq.
          Elena K. Chan, Esq.
          GARWIN GERSTEIN & FISHER LLP
          88 Pine Street, 10th Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 398-0055
          E-mail: bgerstein@garwingerstein.com
                  jopper@garwingerstein.com
                  echan@garwingerstein.com

               - and ???

          Susan Segura, Esq.
          SMITH SEGURA & RAPHAEL, LLP
          3600 Jackson St., Ste. 111
          Alexandria, LA 71303
          Telephone: (318) 445-4480
          E-mail: sseggura@ssrllp.com

               - and -

          John Gregory Odom, Esq.
          Stuart Des Roches, Esq.
          Andrew Kelly, Esq.
          Dan Chiorean, Esq.
          ODOM & DES ROCHES
          650 Poydras Street, Suite 2020
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 522-0077
          E-mail: jodom@odrlaw.com
                  stuart@odrlaw.com
                  akelly@odrlaw.com
                  dchiorean@odrlaw.com

               - and ???

          Rusell A. Chorush, Esq.
          HEIM PAYNE & CHORUSH LLP
          1111 Bagby, Suite 2100
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (713) 221-2000
          E-mail: rcorush@hpcllp.com
                  mjones@hpcllp.com


ACT FAST: Omnicare Appeals Ruling in "Young" Suit to 4th Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Home Care Pharmacy, LLC, Compass Health Services, LLC,
and Omnicare, Inc., filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit titled Eric Young v. Act Fast Delivery of West Virginia,
Inc., et al., Case No. 5:16-cv-09788, in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia at Beckley.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Eric Young
brought this purported class action against Defendants Act Fast
Delivery of West Virginia, Inc.; Act Fast Delivery, Inc.; Home Care
Pharmacy, LLC, doing business as a variety of entities including
but not limited to Omnicare of Nitro and/or Omnicare of Nitro, West
Virginia; Compass Health Services, LLC doing business as a variety
of entities including but not limited to Omnicare of Morgantown
and/or Omnicare of Morgantown, West Virginia; Omnicare, Inc.; and
other John Doe Defendants.  The Plaintiff seeks to bring a
collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The appellate case is captioned as Eric Young v. Omnicare, LLC,
Case No. 18-1739, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees ERIC YOUNG, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, et al., are represented by:

          Carrie Goodwin Fenwick, Esq.
          Thomas R. Goodwin, Esq.
          James A. Kirby, III, Esq.
          Richard D. Owen, Esq.
          Lucas Russell White, Esq.
          Susan C. Wittemeier, Esq.
          GOODWIN & GOODWIN, LLP
          300 Summers Street
          Charleston, WV 25301
          Telephone: (304) 346-7000
          E-mail: cgf@goodwingoodwin.com
                  trg@goodwingoodwin.com
                  jak@goodwingoodwin.com
                  rdo@goodwingoodwin.com
                  lucas@goodwingoodwin.com
                  scw@goodwingoodwin.com

Defendants-Appellants HOME CARE PHARMACY, LLC, d/b/a Omnicare of
Nitro, d/b/a Omnicare of Nitro, West Virginia, d/b/a a variety of
entities including but not limited to; COMPASS HEALTH SERVICES,
LLC, d/b/a Omnicare of Morgantown, d/b/a Omnicare of Morgantown,
West Virginia, d/b/a a variety of entities including but not
limited to; and OMNICARE, INC., and other, are represented by:

          Mariah Haller McGrogan, Esq.
          Marla N. Presley, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS PC
          1001 Liberty Avenue
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 232-0404
          E-mail: Mariah.McGrogan@jacksonlewis.com
                  Marla.Presley@jacksonlewis.com

               - and -

          David Kirsten Montgomery, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS PC
          201 East Fifth Street
          Cincinnati, OH 45202
          Telephone: (513) 898-0050
          E-mail: David.Montgomery@jacksonlewis.com

               - and -

          Joseph Moore Price, Esq.
          David Steven Russo, Esq.
          W. Bradley Sorrells, Esq.
          ROBINSON & MCELWEE, PLLC
          400 5th 3rd Center
          700 Virginia Street, East
          P. O. Box 1791
          Charleston, WV 25326-1791
          Telephone: (304) 344-5800
          E-mail: jmp@ramlaw.com
                  dsr@ramlaw.com
                  wbs@ramlaw.com


ADIR INTERNATIONAL: Appeals Decision in "Flores" Suit to 9th Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Adir International, LLC, filed an appeal from a court
ruling in the lawsuit styled Ned Flores v. Adir International, LLC,
Case No. 2:15-cv-00076-AB-PLA, in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Los Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit is
brought against the Defendant for negligently, knowingly, and
willfully contacting the Plaintiff on the cellular telephone in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Adir is in the business of buying and collecting consumer debts.

The appellate case is captioned as Ned Flores v. Adir
International, LLC, Case No. 18-55959, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by August 13, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on September 11, 2018;

   -- Appellant Adir International, LLC's opening brief is due on
      October 22, 2018;

   -- Appellee Ned Flores' answering brief is due on November 23,
      2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee NED FLORES, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN
          324 S. Beverly Drive
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          E-mail: tfriedman@attorneysforconsumers.com

               - and -

          Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          245 Fischer Avenue
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: (800) 400-6808
          E-mail: ak@kazlg.com

               - and -

          Joshua Swigart, Esq.
          HYDE & SWIGART
          2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Telephone: (619) 233-7770
          E-mail: josh@westcoastlitigation.com

Defendant-Appellant ADIR INTERNATIONAL, LLC, is represented by:

          Elizabeth Van Horn, Esq.
          ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL
          ADIR INTERNATIONAL LLC
          1605 West Olympic Boulevard
          Los Angeles, CA 90015
          Telephone: (213) 427-2624
          E-mail: elizabeth@icuracao.com


ADMIRAL THEATRE: Dancers File Wage Class Action in Illinois
-----------------------------------------------------------
Diana Novak Jones, writing for Law360, reports well-known Chicago
strip club Admiral Theatre was hit with a proposed class action in
Illinois federal court on July 11 by dancers who say the venue
failed to pay them minimum wage and forced them to kick back a
portion of their tips after every shift.

Lead plaintiff Paulina Wisniewska claims the Admiral and its owner,
Sam Cecola, controlled every aspect of the dancers' work lives,
dictating everything from what they wear to when they can leave the
club.

The case is captioned to Wisniewska v. Admiral Theatre Inc et al.,
Case No. 1:18-cv-04749 (N.D. Ill.).  The case is assigned to Judge
Robert W. Gettleman.  The case was filed July 11, 2018. [GN]

ADT INC: 3rd Cir. Remands Class Action to NJ State Court
--------------------------------------------------------
Emma Cueto, writing for Law360, reports that the Third Circuit on
July 9 declined to keep a proposed class action involving an ADT
Inc. unit in federal court, ruling that the contract dispute had an
exception to the usual jurisdiction rules that allowed it to go
back to New Jersey state court.

The court found that Norman Walsh, who claimed that ADT's
termination fees violated New Jersey consumer protection laws, had
demonstrated that ADT SSI-Tyco, an entity based in New Jersey, was
centrally involved in the dispute.

The case is captioned Norman Walsh v. Defenders Inc, et al., Case
No. 18-2156 (3rd Cir.).  The case was filed May 23, 2018. [GN]

ADVANCED CALL: Loses Bid to Dismiss "Untershine" FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or to Stay and
Compel Arbitration, or Alternatively to Strike the Class Action
Allegations from the Complaint in the case captioned WENDY
UNTERSHINE, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. ADVANCED CALL CENTER TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 18-CV-77 (E.D. Wis.).

Wendy Untershine filed a class action complaint against Advanced
Call Center Technologies, LLC (ACCT), alleging violations of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Wisconsin
Consumer Act (WCA) based on actions taken by ACCT in the course of
collecting a debt allegedly owed to Synchrony Bank for purchases
and other charged incurred as a result of the use of her Walmart
branded credit card.

The Federal Arbitration Act generally requires a court to order
arbitration when it finds: (1) a written agreement to arbitrate;
(2) a dispute within the scope of the arbitration agreement; and
(3) a refusal by the opposing party to proceed to arbitration.
Untershine argues, however, that under Utah law, ACCT cannot
enforce the arbitration and class waiver provisions for its own
benefit, even if ACCT is Synchrony's agent.

ACCT argues that because Untershine's claims arise out of the
credit card agreement and ACCT was acting as Synchrony's agent and
assignee when it was attempting to collect the debt, it may invoke
the arbitration provision to compel Untershine to arbitrate.

Agency Theory

ACCT argues that as Synchrony's agent and assignee, it is permitted
to enforce the arbitration agreement against Untershine.
Untershine argues that even if ACCT is Synchrony's agent, Utah law
does not permit an agent to invoke a provision of a contract
between the agent's principal and a third party for the agent's own
benefit, relying on Belnap v. Iasis Healthcare, 844 F.3d 1272(10th
Cir. 2017).

The District of Utah recently considered this same issue and
seemingly conflicted with Belnap. In Inception Mining, Inc. v.
Danzig, Ltd., No. 17-CV-944, 2018 WL 1940883, at *1 (D. Utah Apr.
23, 2018), the plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action
relating to an arbitration proceeding pending in Salt Lake City,
Utah and Boston, Massachusetts. The plaintiffs argued that two
individual plaintiffs were not proper parties to the arbitrations
because they did not execute the agreement that contained the
arbitration clause. The defendants agreed that the individual
plaintiffs were not signatories to the agreement, but argued they
were nonetheless bound by the agreement based on agency and
estoppel theories. Thus, this was a situation where the signatory
defendants were attempting to compel arbitration on the
non-signatory plaintiffs.

The court determined that Utah law applied to the question of
whether the individual plaintiffs were bound by the agreement's
arbitration clause through agency. However, the court then cited
Fifth Circuit law and found that under agency theory, it matters
whether the party resisting arbitration is a signatory or not. The
court noted that there is a distinction between situations in which
a non-signatory is resisting, rather than seeking to enforce
arbitration. The court found that non-signatory agents may compel,
but may not be compelled. They may adopt the protection contracted
by their principal, but may not be forced to arbitrate against
their will.

Thus, ACCT, a nonsignatory to the arbitration agreement, cannot
compel Untershine to arbitrate under agency theory.

Estoppel Theory

ACCT also argues that it seeks to enforce the arbitration agreement
under the doctrine of estoppel.

In this case, ACCT, as the non-signatory defendant, is attempting
to compel Untershine (as the signatory plaintiff) to arbitrate her
FDCPA and WCA claims. Untershine seeks to avoid arbitration by
relying on the fact that ACCT is a non-signatory. Thus, only the
third category is potentially applicable in this case. In Belnap,
although the court acknowledged that the only conceivable category
implicated by the facts was this third category, the defendants did
not seek relief under that theory of non-signatory estoppel. Thus,
the court did not address it. Untershine seems to acknowledge that
the third category of equitable estoppel could apply in this case;
however, she argues that she is not suing the defendant "on the
contract. Rather, the FDCPA and WCA claims arise from the debt
collector's conduct, not the terms of the original agreement.

The Court is more persuaded by the courts that have found that the
plaintiff's FDCPA claim does not fall under the terms of the
arbitration agreement. The FDCPA serves the specific purpose of
prohibiting certain conduct by debt collectors, expressly excluding
creditors collecting debts on their own behalf.  Untershine's FDCPA
and WCA claims arise from ACCT's conduct as a non-signatory debt
collector not from the terms of the credit card agreement. Thus,
because Untershine did not sue ACCT on the contract, ACCT cannot
use equitable estoppel to compel Untershine to arbitrate. For these
reasons, ACCT's motion to compel arbitration is denied.

ACCT also moves to strike Untershine's class action allegations in
her complaint pursuant to the class action waiver contained in the
credit card agreement. However, for the same reasons ACCT cannot
invoke the agreement's arbitration provision, it cannot invoke the
class waiver provision.

ACCT, a nonsignatory to a credit card agreement entered into
between Untershine and Synchrony, seeks to compel Untershine to
arbitrate her FDCPA and WCA claims against it pursuant to an
arbitration clause contained in the agreement. Utah law applies,
and ACCT argues that under either principles of agency or equitable
estoppel, it can compel arbitration. The Court is not persuaded
that ACCT can compel arbitration under either theory.

Thus, ACCT's motion to compel arbitration is denied. ACCT further
moves to strike the class action allegations from Untershine's
complaint. However, for the same reasons ACCT cannot invoke the
agreement's arbitration provision, it cannot invoke the class
waiver provision.

That the defendant's motion to dismiss or stay and compel
arbitration, or alternatively to strike the class action
allegations from the complaint is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court June 18, 2018 Decision and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9e8hjxg from
Leagle.com.

Wendy Untershine, Plaintiff, represented by Ben J. Slatky --
bslatky@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, Jesse Fruchter --
jfruchter@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, John D. Blythin --
jblythin@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP & Mark A. Eldridge --
meldridge@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP.

Advanced Call Center Technologies LLC, Defendant, represented by
Bruce A. Schultz -- bschultz@cnsbb.com -- Coyne Schultz Becker &
Bauer SC & Vincent James Scipior -- vscipior@cnsbb.com -- Coyne
Schultz Becker & Bauer SC.

ADVANCED MICRO: Rosen Law Firm to Lead in Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, granted Lead Plaintiffs' Motion to
Appoint Lead Counsel in the case captioned DOYUN KIM, Plaintiff, v.
ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No.
5:18-cv-00321-EJD (N.D. Cal.).

In this securities fraud class action Darrel Dagdigian and Howard
Clark (Movants) move for appointment as lead plaintiffs and
approval of their selection of The Rosen Law Firm, P.A. as lead
counsel.  The Defendants Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD)
allegedly made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (i) a fundamental security flaw in AMD's processor
chips renders them susceptible to hacking; and (ii) as a result,
AMD's public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.
The Plaintiffs allege that an AMD spokesperson advised investors
that AMD's chips were vulnerable to one variant of the Spectre
security flaw, but that there was near zero risk that AMD chips
were vulnerable to a second Spectre variant.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) requires the
district court to determine who among the movants for lead
plaintiff status is the most adequate plaintiff and establishes a
rebuttable presumption that the most adequate plaintiff to serve as
lead plaintiff is the person or group of persons that: (a) has
either filed the complaint or made a motion in response to a
notice; (b) in the determination of the court, has the largest
financial interest in the relief sought by the class; and (c)
otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court finds that the Movants in this case satisfy the foregoing
criteria for appointment as lead plaintiffs. First, the Movants
timely filed the instant motion and submitted the requisite sworn
certifications.  Second, the Movants allege that they purchased
152,781 net shares during the Class Period and lost $177,526.65.
The Movants have the largest financial interest in this litigation.
Third, the Movants satisfy the requirements of Rule 23, Fed. R.
Civ. P.

When ruling on a motion for appointment as lead plaintiff, the main
focus is on the typicality and adequacy requirements of Rule 23.
The Movants represent that their claims are typical of the members
of the class and their interests are aligned with the proposed
class.  Accordingly, the Movants have made the preliminary showing
necessary under the PSLRA.

A court generally should accept the lead plaintiff's choice of
counsel unless it appears necessary to appoint different counsel to
protect the interests of the class. Here, the Movants have selected
The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., to represent them. The Rosen Law Firm,
P.A. has significant experience securities fraud litigation and
class actions and therefore there is no reason to appoint different
counsel to protect the proposed class.

Accordingly, Darrel Dagdigian and Howard Clark are appointed as
Lead Plaintiffs and The Rosen Law Firm, P.A. is appointed as Lead
Counsel.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 11, 2018 Order is
available https://tinyurl.com/ycexgfl5 from Leagle.com.

Doyun Kim, Plaintiff, represented by J. Alexander Hood, II --
ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jennifer Pafiti --
pafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., Lisa T. Su & Devinder Kumar,
Defendants, represented by Matthew William Close, O'Melveny & Myers
LLP & Brittany Allison Rogers, O'Melveny and Myers.

Thomas Eric Underwood, Pramela Dojoy & Henry Pua Ang, Movants,
represented by Jennifer Pafiti Pomerantz LLP.

Darrel Dagdigian & Howard Clark, Movants, represented by Laurence
M. Rosen -- lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

Theodore Anderson, Movant, represented by Adam Christopher McCall
-- amccall@zlk.com -- Levi Korsinsky, LLP.

AFNI INC: Court Grants Judgment on Pleadings in "Espinal" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in
the case captioned YANNSI ESPINAL, Plaintiff, v. AFNI, INC.,
Defendant, No. 17 Civ. 3439 (KPF)(S.D.N.Y.).

The parties to this putative class action dispute the legality of
Defendant AFNI, Inc.'s efforts to collect a debt arising from
Plaintiff Yannsi Espinal's unpaid cellular telephone bill. In
particular, the Plaintiff objects to a letter the Defendant sent,
seeking to settle that debt. The Plaintiff asserts that the
Defendant's sending of that letter violated various provisions of
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).

It is undisputed that the Defendant is a debt collector and that
the Plaintiff is a consumer for purposes of the FDCPA. The question
is whether the Defendant committed an FDCPA violation by mailing a
collection letter that failed to inform the Plaintiff that her debt
was time-barred.

Field Pre-emption Does Not Apply

The Plaintiff herself does not argue as she must to support a field
pre-emption claim that the FCA evinces a Congressional intent to
occupy the entire relevant field. Although the Plaintiff asserts
that Congress originally intended to occupy the field, she states
that after the adoption of the 1996 Telecommunications Act and the
ensuing detariffing, Congress intended to maintain at least some
degree of control over the field. An intent to maintain some degree
of control is plainly insufficient to establish field pre-emption.
Instead, the Plaintiff must show that federal law occupies an
entire field of regulation and leaves no room for state law. The
Plaintiff does not and cannot show that the FCA leaves no room for
state regulation.

Accordingly, the Court rejects the Plaintiff's argument that the
FCA has field-preemptive effect over state law.

Conflict Pre-emption Does Not Apply

The CPLR Limitation Period Is Not an Obstacle to Congress's
Purposes and Objectives

The question, then, is whether Congress's failure to amend the term
lawful charges in Section 415 is sufficient evidence of Congress's
intent to give pre-emptive effect to the FCA's statute of
limitations. This Court cannot find that it is. Congress's failure
to amend Section 415 does not evince an intent to expand the
historical meaning of the phrase lawful charges to include
non-tariff charges, much less to have the FCA's statute of
limitations pre-empt state-law limitations periods. The Plaintiff
bears a heavy burden in attempting to show a conflict between the
federal and state laws so direct and positive that the two cannot
be reconciled or consistently stand together. The Plaintiff has not
met that burden, and Congress's failure to amend Section 415 is
insufficient evidence of Congressional intent to permit a finding
to the contrary.

The Court is similarly unconvinced by the Plaintiff's argument that
to read lawful charges as tariffed charges would render the
statutory text moot. Although the FCC has released some carriers
from tariff-filing requirements, other carriers including
competitive local exchange carriers are still subject to that
requirement and, by extension, to Section 415.
  
Accordingly, the Court cannot find that conflict pre-emption
applies.

The CPLR Does Not Directly Conflict With the FCA

The Plaintiff has not shown that the FCA and the CPLR directly
conflict or that it would be impossible to comply with both. The
Court's analysis of conflict pre-emption and, in particular, of the
plausible reading of lawful charges as applying only to tariffed
charges suggests that there is no direct conflict between the FCA
and the CPLR. As the Second Circuit has stated, obstacle
pre-emption appears to be only an intermediate step down the road
to impossibility pre-emption. Having already found that the CPLR
does not present an obstacle, because Section 415 does not apply to
the the Defendant's efforts to collect the Plaintiff's debt, this
Court easily finds that the two statutes do not directly conflict.

Accordingly, the Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings
is granted, and the Plaintiff's cross-motion for judgment on the
pleadings is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 7, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7h6rsge from
Leagle.com.

Yannsi Espinal, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by David Michael Barshay, Baker
Sanders, LLC, Jonathan Mark Cader, Sanders Law, PLLC & Craig B.
Sanders, Sanders Law, PLLC.

AFNI, Inc., Defendant, represented by Aaron R. Easley --
aeasley@sessions.legal -- Sessions, Fishman, & Nathan & Israel LLc
& Spencer M. Schulz -- sschulz@sessions.legal -- Sessions, Fishman,
Nathan & Israel, L.L.P..

AHMC HEALTHCARE: Wins Writ of Mandate in Wage & Hour Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division Four,
granted Petitioners' Writ of Mandate in the case captioned AHMC
HEALTHCARE, INC. et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS
ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; EMILIO LETONA et al., Real Parties in
Interest, No. B285655 (Cal. App.).

Real parties Emilio Letona and Jacquelyn Abeyta, acting on behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated, brought suit against
petitioners for failure to pay wages, failure to provide meal
periods, failure to provide rest periods, failure to furnish timely
and accurate wage statements, failure to pay wages to discharged
employees, and unfair business practices.  The operative complaint
also sought penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act.

Both employers and employees moved for summary adjudication on the
issue, and the trial court denied both motions.

The Petitioners sought a writ of mandate directing the trial court
to grant its motion, contending they had established as a matter of
undisputed fact that their system was neutral on its face and as
applied.

The issue in this case is whether an employer's use of a payroll
system that automatically rounds employee time up or down to the
nearest quarter hour, and thus provides a less than exact measure
of employee work time, violates California law.

Section 785.48 of title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(section 785.48), promulgated many decades ago, allows employers to
compute employee work-time by rounding to the nearest 5 minutes, or
to the nearest one-tenth or quarter of an hour, provided that the
rounding system adopted by the employer is used in such a manner
that it will not result, over a period of time, in failure to
compensate the employees properly for all the time they have
actually worked.

Federal district courts interpreting the provision have almost
universally concluded that a rounding system is valid if it
averages out sufficiently, rejecting claims that minor
discrepancies in individual employee's wage calculations establish
that the employee is entitled to assert a claim for underpayment of
wages.

In Corbin v. Time Warner Entm't-Advance/Newhouse P'ship. (9th Cir.
2016) 821 F.3d 1069, the first federal appellate court to interpret
the regulation joined the consensus of district courts that have
analyzed this issue. The plaintiff there had lost $15.02 in total
compensation over a one-year period, and contended that if an
employee loses any compensation due to the operation of a company's
rounding policy, that policy should be found to violate the federal
rounding regulation. In other words, unless every employee gains or
breaks even over every pay period or set of pay periods analyzed,
an employer's rounding policy violates the federal rounding
regulation.

The Ninth Circuit rejected that contention for multiple reasons.
First, the court observed, the plaintiff's interpretation read into
the federal rounding regulation an individual employee' requirement
that does not exist. The regulation instead explicitly notes that
it applies to employees' and contemplates wages for the time they'
actually work. If the rounding policy was meant to be applied
individually to each employee to ensure that no employee ever lost
a single cent over a pay period, the regulation would have said as
much

Here, the rounding system is neutral on its face. It rounds all
employee time punches to the nearest quarter-hour without an eye
towards whether the employer or the employee is benefitting from
the rounding. It also proved neutral in practice. At San Gabriel, a
minority of employees lost time, the remainder either gained time
or broke even, and overall it caused the employer to compensate
employees for 1,378 hours not worked. At Anaheim, although a slight
majority of employees (52.1 percent) lost time, overall, employees
were compensated for 3,875 more hours than they worked. Because
petitioners presented undisputed evidence that the rounding system
was neutral on its face, and that employees as a whole were
significantly overcompensated, the evidence established that
petitioners' rounding system did not systematically
under-compensate employees over time.

The fact that a bare majority at one hospital lost minor sums
during a discrete period did not create an issue of fact as to the
validity of the system. The Court agrees with the court in Corbin
that the regulation does not require that every employee gain or
break even over every pay period or set of pay periods analyzed;
fluctuations from pay period to pay period are to be expected under
a neutral system.  The Court further agree with the court in See's
I and See's II that a system is fair and neutral and does not
systematically under-compensate employees where it results in a net
surplus of compensated hours and a net economic benefit to
employees viewed as a whole.

Nothing in the Court's analysis precludes a trial court from
looking at multiple datapoints to determine whether the rounding
system at issue is neutral as applied. Such analysis could uncover
bias in the system that unfairly singles out certain employees. For
example, as the trial court discussed, a system that in practice
overcompensates lower paid employees at the expense of higher paid
employees could unfairly benefit the employer.

However, the real parties presented no evidence of a bias in the
system or that the policy was applied differently to different
employees. Dr. Foster analyzed the data on an overall basis, a per
shift basis and a per employee basis. Her analysis established that
overall, at both hospitals, the rounding policy benefitted
employees and caused petitioners to overcompensate them. Her per
shift analysis established that for the majority of shifts, the
employees at both facilities gained compensable time.

Moreover, at San Gabriel, the majority of employees gained time and
compensation or broke even during the approximately four years of
the study. The sole discrepancy was at Anaheim where a slight
majority (52.1%) lost an average of 2.33 minutes per employee
shift. But where the system is neutral on its face and
overcompensates employees overall by a significant amount to the
detriment of the employer, the plaintiff must do more to establish
systematic under-compensation than show that a bare majority of
employees lost minor amounts of time over a particular period.

Because the petitioners' employees benefited overall from the
rounding policy, the fact that a bare majority lost a minimal
amount of time was not sufficient to create a triable issue of a
fact.

The Court says the Petitioners' motion for summary adjudication
should have been granted.

Accordingly, the Court grants the petition and held that a
peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent superior
court to set aside that portion of its order of September 26, 2017
denying the petitioners' motion for summary adjudication of issues,
and issue a new order granting such motion.

A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s June 25, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yavpdpbx from Leagle.com.

Ballard Rosenberg Golper & Savitt, Jeffrey P. Fuchsman --
jfuchsman@brgslaw.com -- and Zareh A. Jaltorossian --
Zjaltorossianbrgslaw.com -- for Petitioners.

Law Offices of Kevin T. Barnes, Kevin T. Barnes, and Gregg Lander;
Davtyan Professional Law Corporation and Emil Davtyan; Blumenthal,
Nordrehaug & Bhowmik, Norman B. Blumenthal, Kyle R. Nordrehaug and
Aparajit Bhowmik, for Real Parties in Interest.


ALABAMA: Denial of Class Certification in "Yeager" Suit Recommended
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RICHARD ALLEN YEAGER, #264 071, Plaintiff, v. HENRY
BUTCH BINFORD, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 1:18-CV-526-WKW
(M.D. Ala.), Magistrate Judge Susan Russ Walker of the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, Southern
Division, recommended the denial of the Plaintiff's request for
class certification.

In this 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action, the pro se inmate Plaintiff,
who states that he is a disabled veteran, challenges alleged
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the Equal Protection Clause by the named
Defendants regarding rehabilitation services, treatment,
accommodations, and programs offered to veterans by the Department
of Veterans Affairs and U.S. Department of Justice.  The Plaintiff
seeks to represent the interests of other disabled veterans and
military service members.

Magistrate Judge Walker finds that while a pro se litigant may
"plead and conduct" his own claims in federal court, he has no
concomitant right to litigate the claims of other individuals.  The
competence of a layman is clearly too limited to allow him to risk
the rights of others.

She also finds the prosecution of separate civil actions will not
create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications regarding
any general claims for relief.  She further finds that the
questions of fact affecting the individual who seeks to represent
the class should be tried on their own merits and the questions of
fact common to the proposed class members -- all disabled veterans
and military service members -- do not predominate over such
questions.

Accordingly, it is the recommendation Magistrate Judge Walker that
the Plaintiff's motion to certify case as a class action be denied.
The case be referred to the undersigned for further proceedings.

On June 22, 2018, the Plaintiff may file an objection to the
Recommendation.  The Plaintiff is advised the Recommendation is not
a final order of the Court and, therefore, it is not appealable.
Failure to file a written objection to the proposed findings and
recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's report will bar a party
from a de novo determination by the District Court of factual
findings and legal issues covered in the report, and will waive the
right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions except upon grounds of
plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 8, 2018 Recommendation Order
is available at https://is.gd/Xa1H5V from Leagle.com.

Richard Allen Yeager, Plaintiff, pro se.

ALL WEB: Class Action Over Insurance Leads Can Proceed
------------------------------------------------------
John Breslin, writing for Cook County Record, reports that a
federal judge has given the nod to allow a group of plaintiffs to
move forward with a class action lawsuit, potentially involving 2
million additional plaintiffs, claiming a web company that
generates "leads" for the insurance industry used deceptive
practices to lure customers.

On June 25, U.S. District Judge Harry Leinenweber ruled plaintiffs
in the case have satisfied the conditions for a class action
against All Web Leads Inc. (AWL), which the order said acts as a
middle man between insurance agents and others in the industry and
customers.

The lawsuit alleges AWL violated the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act in connection with the collection of personal information when
users access a number of sites run by the company that offer
insurance quotes.

Lead plaintiffs John Karpilovsky and Jimmie Criollo claim the sites
include a field that directs users to input their telephone number,
resulting in them allegedly receiving calls from AWL for which they
did not grant consent.

In addition, Messrs. Karpilovsky and Criollo claim the requried
TCPA disclosure was buried in fine print on the AWL sites.

The plaintiffs said they requested class certification to represent
all those individuals contacted by AWL.

"Beyond simply setting forth a method of identifying the class
members, as is required, the plaintiffs have actually identified,
using call data provided by AWL, the approximately two million
individuals who comprise the class," Judge Leinenweber said in his
opinion.

AWL argued that many of the individuals they contacted might have
consented to the calls and therefore do not have standing to
participate in a class action.

Judge Leinenweber ruled that certification should be granted
because there are enough individuals affected, they had similar
experiences and a class action is the best way to resolve the
dispute.

The judge also dismissed a motion by AWL asking that the expert
testimony of an individual employed by the plaintiffs be excluded
from the proceedings.

Plaintiffs are represented in the action by attorneys Gary M.
Klinger -- gklinger@kozonislaw.com -- of the firm of Kozonis &
Klinger Ltd., of Chicago, and Jonathan D. Selbin and John Tate
Spragens, of the firm of Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein LLP,
of New York and Nashville.

AWL is represented by attorneys Saskia N. Bryan --
sbryan@llflegal.com -- and Jeffrey H. Bunn, of Latimer LeVay Fyock
LLC, of Chicago, and Kellie M. Bubeck -- kmitchell@cckc-law.com --
and William E. Raney --
braney@cckc-law.com -- of Copilevitz & Canter LLC, of Kansas City.
[GN]

ALL WEB: Court Certifies Class in "Karpilovsky" TCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned JOHN KARPILOVSKY and JIMMIE
CRIOLLO, JR., Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiffs, v. ALL WEB LEADS, INC., a Delaware
Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 17 C 1307 (N.D. Ill.).

Plaintiff William Sullivan originally brought this lawsuit under
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,  (TCPA), alleging deceptive
marketing practices by Defendant All Web Leads, Inc. (AWL).
Plaintiffs John Karpilovsky and Jimmie Criollo, Jr., have since
stepped into Sullivan's shoes and they now move for certification
of the proposed class of all individuals defined as:

     All persons within the United States who filled out and
submitted an insurance quote form on Defendant's website
www.affordable-health-insurance-plans.org and then received a
non-emergency telephone call from All Web Leads, or any party
acting on its behalf, to a cellular telephone through the use of an
automated telephone dialing system or an artificial or pre-recorded
voice.

Numerosity

The proposed class contains approximately two million members.
Likely recognizing that a class of this size is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, AWL wisely does not
contest numerosity. Clearly, the class is sufficiently numerous.

Commonality

There cannot be a common method of proof here, says AWL, because
consent will turn upon whether any given user had to scroll down on
her particular screen to reveal the consent disclosure and, if so,
whether that user actually scrolled down. AWL is correct to say
that courts "determine whether issues of individual consent defeat
commonality . . . in TCPA cases on a case-by-case basis after
evaluating the specific evidence available to prove consent."  But
where, as here, the defendant does not produce any specific
evidence of consent, the Court has no basis to evaluate whether
that unavailable evidence undermines commonality. Absent any such
evidence, all that remains are the common contentions shared among
class members that after each of them completed the same submit
procedure on AWL's website, they each received unsolicited calls
from AWL's autodialers. Thus, each Plaintiff's claim presents a
common question: whether AWL's call violated the TCPA. Perhaps AWL
has a consent defense to those claims, but without specific
evidence now demonstrating the merit of that proposed defense, its
adjudication will have to wait. The proposed class satisfies the
commonality requirement.

Typicality

Once again, AWL contends that because many of the class members
consented to receive AWL's call, the class is chock-full of people
without valid TCPA claims and no class should be certified if it is
apparent that it contains a great many persons who have suffered no
injury at the hands of the defendant.
But typicality should be determined with reference to the
defendant's actions, not with respect to particularized defenses
the defendant might have against certain class members. The named
Plaintiffs allegedly engaged in the same conduct as the proposed
class members and then received substantially similar calls from
AWL; this clears the typicality hurdle.

Adequacy

AWL marshals two other arguments against the adequacy of the named
representatives: (1) named Plaintiff Criollo is not seeking
damages, so he is presumptively inadequate; and (2) Criollo does
not understand the nuances of his case. These contentions are
meritless. First, the Defendants cite Criollo's deposition as
evidence that he is not seeking damages, but they wholly ignore the
very next lines in the transcript, where Criollo confirms that he
actually is.

Second, nowhere in Rule 23 or the case law applying it is there a
requirement that named plaintiffs have a firm grasp of the legal
intricacies of their cases. That is what adequate counsel is for.
Criollo will not be faulted nor the proposed class penalized
because the named Plaintiff does not happen to have a law degree.
The named Plaintiffs do not have any interests antagonistic to the
proposed class and there is no reason proposed by AWL or suggested
anywhere else in the record to suspect that the Plaintiffs' counsel
are at odds with the proposed class's best interests.

As to the adequacy of counsel, the Plaintiffs represent that their
present counsel, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP (LCHB) and
Kozonis & Associates Ltd. (Kozonis), are experienced class-action
practitioners who have litigated dozens of TCPA cases, including
several large settlements, and have been appointed to lead many
such cases in this District. AWL does not contest any of these
assertions nor suggest a reason why LCHB and Kozonis fall short of
being "qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the
proposed litigation, as required. The Court agrees that these
counsel are capable and that the requirements for adequacy are met
in this case.

Predominance

Because AWL produced zero specific evidence showing that some
proposed members consented, AWL's ability "to invoke consent as an
affirmative defense to each class member is uniform and that
defense will likely prove meritorious or ineffective against the
class in full." The key question in this case is whether the
proposed class members consented by submitting their information on
AWL's website. Despite AWL's inventive characterizations to the
contrary, that question may be resolved in one stroke.
  
Superiority

Class certification is usually considered a superior method of
adjudicating claims involving standardized conduct, and that is
exactly what is at play here. The proposed class represents two
million basically identical lawsuits. Knocking them all out via a
single, representative class would be an efficient use of judicial
and party resources. Class certification is a superior vehicle for
advancing the claims at bar, and Rule 23(b)(3) is accordingly
satisfied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 25, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yavpdpbx from
Leagle.com.

John Karpilovsky & Jimmie Criollo, Jr., individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel
M. Hutchinson -- dhutchinson@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein Llp, John Tate Spragens, Lieff Cabraser Heimann &
Bernstein, Llp, Jonathan D. Selbin -- jselbin@lchb.com -- Lieff,
Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, Llp & Gary Michael Klinger --
gklinger@kozonislaw.com -- Kozonis Law.

All Web Leads, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented
by Kellie Mitchell Bubeck -- kmitchell@cckc-law.com -- Copilevitz &
Canter, Llc, pro hac vice, Saskia Nora Bryan -- sbryan@llflegal.com
-- Latimer LeVay Fyock LLC, William E. Raney -- braney@cckc-law.com
-- Copilevitz & Canter, Llc, pro hac vice.


ALLERGAN INC: Averts Employees' Class Action Over Stock Drop
------------------------------------------------------------
John Manganaro, writing for Planadviser, reports that the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey has ruled
strongly against plaintiffs in a stock drop lawsuit filed by
employees of Allergan in the wake of the firm's acquisition by
Actavis.

Plaintiffs had filed their class action challenge more than a year
ago against the Allergan, Inc. Savings and Investment Plan and the
Actavis, Inc. 401(k) Plan, claiming breaches pursuant to Sections
404, 405, 409 and 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA). According to the initial complaint, the defendants
"permitted the plans to continue to offer Allergan Stock as an
investment option to participants even after the defendants knew or
should have known that Allergan Stock was artificially inflated
during the proposed class period," which ran February 25, 2014, to
November 2, 2016.

Ruling in favor of a detailed motion to dismiss filed by
defendants, the court cites a long list of precedent-setting cases,
including the U.S. Supreme Court's 2014 decision in Fifth Third v.
Dudenhoeffer. While SCOTUS in that ruling made clear that there
should be no special presumption of prudence for employee stock
ownership plan (ESOP) fiduciaries, the court also determined that
"allegations that a fiduciary should have recognized from publicly
available information alone that the market was over- or
under-valuing stock are implausible as a general rule, at least in
the absence of special circumstances." In addition, for claims
alleging a fiduciary breach based on non-public information, the
Supreme Court held that plaintiffs must "plausibly allege an
alternative action fiduciaries could have taken and would not have
viewed as more harmful to the plan than helpful."

As in other stock drop cases argued post Fifth Third v.
Dudenhoeffer, the plaintiffs here have flatly failed to meet this
high bar for proving standing. For example, on the matter of
proving that plan fiduciaries should have known that the employer
stock price was inflated, the court concludes bluntly that the
plaintiffs' examples, standing alone, do not rise above the
speculative level of misconduct.

"As pled, plaintiffs have not set forth sufficient facts to
establish or even infer that defendants engaged in collusive and/or
fraudulent activity during the class period such that they could
have insider information to that effect," the decision explains.
"Even if defendants had inside information of fraud or collusion,
plaintiffs have not met the heightened pleading standard
articulated in Fifth Third to maintain a cause of action for breach
of the duty of prudence."

In one interesting section of the ruling, the district court
considers plaintiffs' fourth suggestion for an "alternative action
fiduciaries could have taken and would not have viewed as more
harmful to the plan than helpful."

"Plaintiffs propose that at the time of the Actavis-Allergan
merger, instead of causing the plan to purchase significant amounts
of Allergan stock, defendants could have directed cash assets from
the acquisition be placed into the plan's default investment fund
or allocated based upon participant's instructions," the decision
states. "This alternative action lacks sufficient detail to
establish that a prudent fiduciary could not have found that
reducing or redirecting purchases of Allergan stock would cause
more harm than good, especially at the time of a merger.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Fifth Third explained that 'ESOP
fiduciaries, unlike ERISA fiduciaries generally, are not liable for
losses that result from a failure to diversify.' Thus, this would
not a viable alternative to the extent that it required the
fiduciaries to diversify the plan." [GN]

ALLIANCE MMA: Court Grants Preliminary Approval of "Shapiro" Deal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Order Preliminarily
Approving Settlement in the case captioned Eric SHAPIRO, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. ALLIANCE MMA, INC., et al., Defendants, Civil No.
17-2583 (RBK/AMD)(D.N.J.).

Lead Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on behalf of all
persons who had acquired the common stock of Alliance MMA, Inc.
(Alliance) in Alliance's Initial Public Offering (IPO), or who had
acquired stock thereafter pursuant to Alliance's Registration
Statement and Prospectus, issued in connection with the IPO. The
amended complaint stated claims under sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15
of the Securities Act of 1933.

The agreement proposes to relinquish all settlement class members,
or their assigns, of any claims in connection with the settlement.
In exchange, the Defendants agree to pay $1,550,000 into an escrow
account within 14 days of the issue of an order granting
preliminary approval. Of this sum, $1,520,000 will be paid by
Alliance, Mr. Danner, and Mr. Price, and $30,000 will be paid by
Network 1. The 14 days will not begin to run, however, until the
Lead Plaintiffs' counsel provides funding and tax information
agreed to by the parties.

The Court finds that the proposed settlement appears to be the
result of an arm's-length negotiation between experienced counsel
for the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The parties negotiated their
respective positions and reached an agreement based upon their
interests and the relative risks of prolonged litigation. The
parties participated in a mediation conference on March 8, 2017
before the Honorable Faith Hochberg, retired U.S. District Judge.
The participation of an independent mediator in settlement
negotiations virtually ensures that the negotiations were conducted
at arm's length and without collusion between the parties.

The Court also finds that the Girsh factors weigh in favor of
preliminary approval. First, securities actions are inherently
complex matters that may become prohibitively expensive as they
proceed into discovery. With respect to the second factor the
reaction of the class to the settlement it is too early to say with
any certainty how the class would react to the settlement.

The third factor, too, is largely a wash here. Discovery has been
stayed pursuant to the PSLRA, and the full extent of damages is as
yet unclear, but Lead Plaintiffs have obtained an expert damages
estimation that provides some basis for understanding the interests
of the class. The parties also appear to have relatively clear
views of the strengths and weaknesses of their cases.

The Court agrees with Lead Plaintiffs that the fourth, fifth, and
sixth Girsh factors support preliminary approval. Risk attends to
all litigation, and Lead Plaintiffs are refreshingly
straightforward with the potential shortcomings of their case,
particularly the potential difficulties in ascertaining some
damages.

The Court also finds that the seventh, eight, and ninth Girsh
factors support preliminary approval. Alliance is a relatively new
company that operated at a loss during the time of its IPO (Br. at
8) and its ability to withstand a greater judgment is unclear. Lead
Plaintiffs represent that this $1.55 million settlement is 29.8% of
maximum statutory damages, which they aver compares extremely
favorably to the average of other securities fraud settlements.  

In sum, preliminary evaluation of the Girsh factors indicates
settlement is appropriate. The proposed settlement does not appear
to unfavorably benefit the class representative or any segment of
the class. The Court therefore finds, as a preliminary matter, that
the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 28, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yasjra6f from Leagle.com.

Derek Riddick, Movant, represented by LAURENCE M. ROSEN --
prosen@rosenlegal.com -- THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, PA.

ERIC SHAPIRO, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by LAURENCE M. ROSEN , THE ROSEN
LAW FIRM, PA.

Daniel Ciccarelli, Michael Desantis, Michael Malcolm, Thomas
Bendheim & Anthony Shenk, Plaintiffs, represented by ERICA L.
STONE, THE ROSEN LAW FIRM PA & LAURENCE M. ROSEN, THE ROSEN LAW
FIRM, PA.
ALLIANCE MMA, INC., PAUL K. DANNER, III & JOHN PRICE, Defendants,
represented by ISRAEL DAHAN -- idahan@kslaw.com -- KING & SPALDING
LLP.

NETWORK 1 FINANCIAL SECURITIES, INC., Defendant, represented by
JEFFREY P. VALACER -- jvalacer@grsm.com -- GORDON AND REES LLP &
PETER GEORGE SIACHOS -- psiachos@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees, LLP.

ALTA DENA: Ruling in Delivery Drivers' Class Action Overturned
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judy Greenwald, writing for Business Insurance, reports that a
federal appeals court has overturned a lower court ruling and said
the district court incorrectly analyzed whether a proposed class
action by dairy delivery drivers should be certified.

Juan Perez was a delivery driver for Industry, California-based
Alta Dena Certified Dairy L.L.C. from about 2005 to 2013, according
to the July 9 ruling by the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in
San Francisco in Juan Perez, on behalf of himself and those
similarly situated v. Alta Dena Certified Dairy L.L.C.

He alleged in his putative class action that from 2008 to 2011 the
dairy violated state wage and hour laws by subjecting him and a
putative class to route-restriction and noncompliant meal and rest
break policy/practices and a policy/practice of "auto-deducting"
for meal breaks whether drivers took those breaks.

The U.S. District Court in Pasadena denied Mr. Perez's motion to
certify a class and later granted the dairy summary judgment on his
individual claims.

On appeal, a three-judge appeals court panel unanimously held that
the district court had incorrectly analyzed whether under the rules
of civil procedure there was a predominance of common class issues
over individual ones, thus entitling the litigation to be
considered a class action.

On the issue of meal breaks, for instance, the appeals court said,
"at least three common issues predominate over individual issues;
(1) whether Alta-Dena's written policy was unlawful on its face;
(2) whether supervisors permitted timely breaks; and (3) whether
Alta-Dena's route scheduling made timely breaks unavailable in
practice.

"The district court erred by focusing on the drivers' actions and
preferences because the critical questions turn on what Alta-Dena
did nor did not do," said the ruling.

"We express no view on whether any of Perez's proposed subclasses
ultimately should be certified; we hold only that the district
(court) erred in its assessment of predominance," the ruling said,
in remanding the case for further proceedings.

Insurers may be more willing to cover wage and hour employment
risks following a U.S. Supreme Court decision in May that allows
companies to require employees to sign away their ability to bring
class action claims against management, an employment law attorney
said. [GN]

AMERI-FORCE: Cal. App Affirms Denial of "Solis" Class Certification
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division One,
affirmed the judgment of the District Court denying Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned ADRIAN SOLIS,
Plaintiff and Appellant, v. AMERI-FORCE MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.,
et al., Defendants and Respondents, No. D071649 (Cal. App.).

Adrian Solis appeals from an order denying class certification in
his lawsuit against Ameri-Force Management Services, Inc.
(Ameri-Force) and International Marine and Industrial Applicators,
LLC (International Marine) for wage and hour law violations.

Solis sued International Marine and Ameri-Force for various wage
and hour law violations. International Marine performs marine
vessel preservation and auxiliary tasks at three shipyards and two
Naval bases in San Diego under contracts with the government or
subcontracts with other government contractors. International
Marine staffs its contracts with permanent and temporary employees.
Ameri-Force provides temporary employees to International Marine in
San Diego.

Solis moved for an order certifying six classes of International
Marine's and Ameri-Force's hourly or non-exempt employees employed
at shipyards in San Diego.

The classes were:

   (1) a security check class including all such employees from
April 29, 2010 to present;

   (2) a donning and doffing class including all such employees
from April 29, 2010 to present who had to don and doff protective
gear before and after working;

   (3) a meal break class including all such employees from April
29, 2010 to present who worked a shift of five hours or more;

   (4) a rest break class including all such employees from April
29, 2010 to present who worked a shift of three and a half hours or
more;

   (5) a wage statement penalties class including all such
employees from April 29, 2013 to present who were members of one or
more of the preceding classes; and

   (6) a waiting time penalties class including all such employees
who were members of one or more of the preceding classes and who
separated from their employment with the defendants on or after
April 29, 2011.

Solis contends the court abused its discretion in denying class
certification because he met his burden of establishing common
issues predominated over individual issues and a class action was
the superior means of adjudicating the class claims.

In this case, the court found Solis had not demonstrated that
common questions of law or fact predominated and that class
treatment was the superior means of adjudicating the class claims.

The Court reviews the trial court's ruling for abuse of discretion
and generally will not disturb it unless (1) it is unsupported by
substantial evidence, (2) it rests on improper criteria, or (3) it
rests on erroneous legal assumptions.

Applying these standards in this case, the court had to first
consider whether International Marine's practices and procedures
for employee security checks, donning and doffing protective gear
for rest and meal breaks, and second meal breaks were sufficiently
uniform to permit class-wide assessment. In other words, was there
a common way to show whether International Marine's practices and
procedures in these areas violated applicable state wage and hour
laws? The court determined there was not sufficient uniformity to
permit class-wide assessment or common proof, and there is
substantial evidence to support the court's determination.

Indeed, International Marine's evidence, which the Court previously
described and the court implicitly credited, shows significant
disparities in International Marine's practices and procedures in
these areas depending on employees' positions, shifts, project
assignments, and work locations. Consequently, Solis has not
established the court abused its discretion in declining to certify
the proposed classes because common questions did not predominate.


A full-text copy of the Cal. App.'s June 7, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yczp4ab3 from Leagle.com.

Setareh Law Group, Shaun Setareh -- shaun@setarehlaw.com -- H.
Scott Leviant -- scott@setarehlaw.com -- and Thomas Segal --
thomas@setarehlaw.com -- for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Dillon Gerardi Hershberger Miller & Ahuja, Timothy P. Dillon --
tdillon@dghmalaw.com -- and Sunjina K. Ahuja -- sahuja@dghmalaw.com
-- for Defendant and Respondent Ameri-Force Management Services,
Inc.

Paul, Plevin, Sullivan & Connaughton, Michael C. Sullivan --
msullivan@paulplevin.com -- Aaron A. Buckley -- and Kara Siegel --
ksiegel@paulplevin.com -- for Defendant and Respondent
International Marine and Industrial Applicators, LLC.

AMERICAN AIRLINES: "Hoefert" Suit Transferred to N.D. Tex.
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona
granted Defendant's Motion to Transfer to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas venue of the case
captioned John E. Hoefert, Plaintiff, v. American Airlines Inc.,
Defendant, No. CV-17-02996-PHX-SPL (D. Ariz.).

Plaintiff John E. Hoefert filed this lawsuit against Defendant
American Airlines, Inc., as an individual and on behalf of all
other similarly situated plaintiffs pursuant to the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C.
4301, et. seq.  The Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of all
current and former pilots employed by the Defendant who have taken
military leave since July 1, 2012.

The Court finds there are several factors to support a finding that
transfer of this case to the Northern District of Texas is
warranted. One factor that weighs in favor of keeping the case in
the District of Arizona is that the Plaintiff does not appear to
have any contacts with the proposed forum. The Plaintiff resides in
the District of Arizona although this fact is disputed by the
Defendant, and the Defendant transacts business in the District of
Arizona. While the Defendant is headquartered in the Northern
District of Texas, the record does not reflect that the Plaintiff
has any direct contacts with Texas.
The Court also finds that the Northern District of Texas will be a
more efficient and inexpensive forum for the case. The majority of
the events giving rise to this litigation were based in operations
and actions that took place in Fort Worth, Texas. While Plaintiff
argues that most of the exhibits or documents necessary to this
case can be easily transmitted to the District of Arizona with
minimal expense, the Court finds it will be less expensive to
produce the relevant documents in the Northern District of Texas.
The fact that the Defendant's headquarters are located in the
Northern District of Texas and that the majority of the witnesses
that are likely to be material to this action are also primarily
located in the same district results in this factor weighing
heavily in favor of transferring the case to the Northern District
of Texas.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 7, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y888nhzy from Leagle.com.

John E Hoefert, an individual, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brian J. Lawler --
blawler@pilotlawcorp.com -- Pilot Law PC, Charles Michael Billy,
Law Offices of Charles M Billy PC, Crystal Lee Matter, Stonebarger
Law APC, Gene Joseph Stonebarger -- gstonebarger@stonebargerlaw.com
-- Stonebarger Law APC & Richard David Lambert --
rlambert@stonebargerlaw.com -- Stonebarger Law APC.

American Airlines Incorporated, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Mark W. Robertson -- mrobertson@omm.com -- OMelveny
& Myers LLP & Sloane Ackerman -- sackerman@omm.com -- O'Melveny &
Myers LLP.

AMERICAN CAMPUS: Student Housing Class Action Settlement Okayed
---------------------------------------------------------------
Cary Littlejohn, writing for Missourian, reports that American
Campus Communities Services will pay $444,775 to plaintiffs who
said in a federal class action lawsuit that they were deceived by
the student housing company's marketing practices.

Judge John A. Ross of the U.S. District Court for Eastern Missouri
approved the settlement June 20. Of the money American Campus
Communities agreed to pay, $275,000 is considered the "class
benefit fund" that will be divided evenly among the claimants. Each
of the 852 shares will equal $322.77.

The company also will pay about $40,000 to cover the administrative
costs, $125,000 in attorneys' fees and $5,000 to the named
plaintiff, Brian Fellows, for his service as a representative of
the class.

Fellows represented residents who claimed they entered leases based
on advertised "monthly" rental rates "even though the lease itself
only lasted eleven and a half months," according to the settlement.
The plaintiffs alleged that the lease structure resulted in tenants
paying twice what they should have for the last two weeks of their
leases.

After the lawsuit was filed, American Campus Communities changed
its advertising by deleting the "monthly" language and replacing it
with "installment" payments, according to the settlement.

To be eligible to join the class action suit, tenants must have
signed a new lease between Nov. 1, 2012, and Nov. 15, 2016, with
American Campus Communities at either The Cottages of Columbia,
Grindstone Canyon or Forest Village and Woodlake. [GN]

AMERICAN HONDA: Faces CR-V Deceptive Advertising Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
federal class action claims American Honda deceptively advertises
its CR-V as having three-point seat belts for all of its capacity
of five seats, though only two backseat belts can be fastened at a
time.

Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Kolin Tang, Esq.
     SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP
     11755 Wilshire Blvd., 15th Floor
     Los Angeles, CA 90025
     Telephone: (323) 510-4060
     Facsimile: (866) 300-7367
     Email: ktang@sfmslaw.com

AMERICAN HONDA: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Floyd" Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Heather Floyd, Jody Schutte and Kate Zaiger filed an
appeal from a court ruling in their lawsuit titled Heather Floyd,
et al. v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., et al., Case No.
2:17-cv-08744-SVW-AS, in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, Los Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was filed on December 4, 2017, and assigned to the Hon. Judge
Stephen V. Wilson.

The Plaintiffs allege that Honda Civic 2016-18 models with CVT
transmissions may not be in "park" when so indicated, making them
dangerous.

The appellate case is captioned as Heather Floyd, et al. v.
American Honda Motor Co., Inc., et al., Case No. 18-55957, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellants Heather Floyd, Jody Schutte and Kate Zaiger's
      opening brief is due on September 10, 2018;

   -- Appellees American Honda Motor Co., Inc. and Honda North
      America, Inc.'s answering brief is due on October 10, 2018;
      and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants HEATHER FLOYD, JODY SCHUTTE and KATE ZAIGER,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Robert Rafael Ahdoot, Esq.
          Theodore Walter Maya, Esq.
          AHDOOT & WOLFSON, P.C.
          10728 Lindbrook Drive
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 474-9111
          E-mail: rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com
                  tmaya@ahdootwolfson.com

Defendants-Appellees AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., a California
Corporation, and HONDA NORTH AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation,
are represented by:

          Eric Y. Kizirian, Esq.
          Dyanne Cho, Esq.
          LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP
          633 W. 5th Street, Suite 4000
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 580-3981
          E-mail: eric.kizirian@lewisbrisbois.com
                  dyanne.cho@lewisbrisbois.com


AMERICAN TRAFFIC: Federal Judge Dismisses Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Zach Schlein, writing for Daily Business Review, reports that a
federal judge has dismissed class actions against more than 70
Florida municipalities by plaintiffs seeking refunds for red-light
traffic violations.

U.S. District Judge Federico Moreno on July 11 threw out Parker v.
American Traffic Solutions, a suit against local government
agencies by motorists who had been ticketed after cameras
photographed them running red lights.

The litigation had a potential value of more than $200 million,
according to attorneys involved in the litigation.

Moreno's ruling follows the Florida Supreme Court's May ruling in
Jimenez v. State, a case testing the constitutionality of using
third-party contractors to track traffic violations. Defense
attorneys say it likely puts an end to the litigation, and leaves
little room for further legal action against the use of traffic
cameras.

"Knowing that Moreno is a proactive judge, [his dismissal]
shouldn't be too surprising," said Edward Guedes, Esq. --
eguedes@wsh-law.com -- the Weiss Serota Helfman Cole & Bierman
member who served as lead appellate attorney representing more than
40 of the Florida governments and agencies named as defendants.

Plaintiffs, who were represented by more than a dozen attorneys
across Florida, wanted to be compensated if courts found the public
agencies' use of red-light cameras by private vendors
unconstitutional.

The state Supreme Court instead ruled in favor of Florida law
enforcement agencies, finding that local governments are within
their rights "to contract with a private third-party vendor to
review and sort information from red light cameras ??? before
sending that information to a trained traffic enforcement officer,
who determines whether probable cause exists and a citation should
be issued."

"If I had to make an educated guess, I don't believe any of the
plaintiffs will appeal the dismissal order," Guedes said. "That's
my gut feeling, given how comprehensive the Jimenez decision was."

The Jimenez case had charged that the city of Aventura had ceded
too much of its authority in policing red-light traffic infractions
to a private company that specialized in the matter. The Supreme
Court ultimately affirmed the decision by the Third District Court
of Appeal, which had held that private businesses can oversee
images of traffic violations as long as city officials were the
ones ultimately issuing citations or fines.

Guedes' opposing counsel, Stephen F. Rosenthal, Esq. --
srosenthal@PODHURST.com -- said the plaintiffs had been gearing to
move for dismissal, just as Moreno ruled in the municipalities'
favor.

"Judge Moreno's order was the natural consequence of the Florida
Supreme Court's recent ruling, which foreclosed our challenge to
the way red-light-camera enforcement has been done," said
Rosenthal, a partner at Podhurst Orseck in Miami. "Judge Moreno is
highly efficient."[GN]

AMERIGAS PARTNERS: Overcharges Customers for Propane, Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that Michigan Attorney General
Bill Schuette claims in state court that AmeriGas has continued to
overcharge customers for propane, even after settling a 2014
lawsuit based on the same allegations.


AMR CORP: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bids in TWA Pilots Case
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re: Chapter 11 AMR CORPORATION, et al., Chapter 11,
Reorganized Debtors. JOHN KRAKOWSKI, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 11-15463
(SHL), Adv. No. 13-01283 (SHL) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Sean H. Lane of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (i)
granted the Defendants' motions for summary judgment, and (ii)
denied the Plaintiffs' related motion to amend the Complaint.

Before the Court are the Defendants' motions for summary judgment
with respect to the Plaintiffs' modified supplemental class action
complaint filed on behalf of the Plaintiffs and all persons
similarly situated.  Plaintiffs Krakowski, Kevin Horner, and M.
Alicia Sikes are former Trans World Airlines ("TWA") pilots that
are now employed by American Airlines, Inc.  The Complaint alleges
that the Allied Pilots Association ("APA") -- the pilots' union at
American -- breached its duty of fair representation to the
Plaintiffs and that American colluded in that breach.

As part of American's bankruptcy restructuring, the company sought
and received authority to reject its then-existing collective
bargaining agreement with APA ("Old CBA").  American subsequently
negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement with APA ("New
CBA") that eliminated certain job protections that legacy TWA
pilots like the Plaintiffs had held under the Old CBA.  At the same
time, American and APA entered into a letter agreement that
contemplated an arbitration proceeding to create new job
protections for these legacy TWA pilots as an alternative to those
lost under the New CBA.

The Court has issued two prior decisions in the adversary
proceeding granting dismissal of many of the claims asserted by the
Plaintiffs against the Defendants.  The Plaintiffs' remaining
claims allege breaches of APA's duty of fair representation with
respect to the procedures used to conduct the arbitration, and
assert that American colluded in those breaches.

Judge Lane granted the Defendants' motions for summary judgment,
and denied the Plaintiffs' motion to amend the Complaint.  The
Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to present an issue for
trial with respect to APA because, considering to all the evidence
in the Plaintiffs' favor, a reasonable juror could not find a
breach of APA's duty of fair representation.  The Plaintiffs have
also failed to present an issue for trial with respect to their
collusion claim against American given the failure of their breach
of fiduciary duty against APA and because there is not affirmative
action that would constitute collusion by American under applicable
law.

The Defendants should settle an order on three days' notice.  The
proposed order must be submitted by filing a notice of the proposed
order on the Case Management/Electronic Case Filing docket, with a
copy of the proposed order attached as an exhibit to the notice.  A
copy of the notice and proposed order shall also be served upon
counsel to the Plaintiffs.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 12, 2018 Memorandum of
Decision is available at https://is.gd/LaJM5A from Leagle.com.

John Krakowski, Kevin Horner & M. Alicia Sikes, individually, and
on behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Allen P. Press -- press@archcitylawyers.com -- Jacobson Press &
Fields, P.C.

American Airlines, Inc., Defendant, represented by Sloane Ackerman
-- sackerman@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Jennifer Baldocchi
-- jenniferbaldocchi@paulhastings.com -- Todd C. Duffield --
todd.duffield@ogletree.com -- Paul Hastings, Stephen Karotkin --
stephen.karotkin@weil.com -- Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, David H.
Luce -- dluce@bbdlc.com -- Carmody MacDonald P.C., Neal D. Mollen
-- nealmollen@paulhastings.com -- Paul Hastings LLP, Mark
Robertson, O'Melveny & Myers LLP & Robert A. Siegel --
rsiegel@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP.

Allied Pilots Association, Defendant, represented by Darin M.
Dalmat -- dmdalmat@jamhoff.com -- JAMES & HOFFMAN, P.C., Steven K.
Hoffman -- skhoffman@jamhoff.com -- James & Hoffman, P.C., Edgar N.
James -- ejames@jamhoff.com  -- James & Hoffman, P.C, Daniel M.
Rosenthal -- dmrosenthal@jamhoff.com -- James & Hoffman, P.C.,
George O. Suggs, Schuchat, Cook & Werner & Joshua R. Taylor --
jrtaylor@steptoe.com -- Steptoe & Johnson LLP.

Garden City Group, Inc, Claims and Noticing Agent, represented by
Angela Ferrante -- angela.ferrante@choosegcg.com -- Garden City
Group, LLC & Jeffrey S. Stein, GCG, Inc..

APPLE INC: Sued in California for Violating Hacking Laws
--------------------------------------------------------
Shaun Nichols, writing for theregister.co.uk, reports that the saga
of class-action lawsuits looming over Apple's iOS battery
management took a new turn -- as the Cupertino giant was accused of
violating American hacking laws.

A complaint filed in the US federal district court of northern
California lists a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
among the charges filed against Cook and Co.

The lawsuit, submitted on behalf of everyone in America who bought
an iPhone or iPad that had been subject to performance throttling
on devices that suffered from diminished battery capacity, accuses
Apple of illegally tampering with devices, amongst other things.

The suit argues that the iOS update slowed down a device in order
to preserve battery life. In doing so Apple intentionally "damaged"
its hardware without user knowledge or permission, violation of the
CFAA, the plaintiffs -- Alex Rodriguez, of Alaska, and scores of
pals -- claim.

"Apple violated [the CFAA] by knowingly causing the transmission of
iOS software Updates to Plaintiff and class members' devices to
access, collect, and transmit information to devices, which are
protected computers as defined in [the CFAA] because they are used
in interstate commerce and/or communication," the complaint
reasons.

"By transmitting information to class members' devices, Apple
intentionally caused damage without authorization to class members'
devices by impairing the ability of those devices to operate as
warranted, represented, and advertised."

Apple has been facing a parade of class-action lawsuits in recent
months as lawyers look to cash in on the throttling controversy.
But that Cupertino would be accused of violating the CFAA, a law
commonly used to prosecute criminal hackers, is something new.

"Apple partially 'cured' one defect by making another defect more
aggressive??? accomplished by violating federal computer fraud laws
and a host of various state laws," the complaint alleges.

"For eleven months, the secret remained uncovered as Apple
continued to hide the whole truth."

In addition to running afoul of the CFAA, the suit accuses Apple of
violating the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, the California Unfair
Competition Law, California False and Misleading Advertising Law,
California Data Access and Fraud Act, as well as the crimes of
trespass to chattels, breach of contract and good faith, fraud and
unjust enrichment.

Apple did not respond to a request for comment on the suit. [GN]

APPLIED UNDERWRITERS: Can Compel Response to 3rd-Party Subpoena
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted Defendant Motion to Compel Responses to
Third-Party Subpoena in the cases captioned SHASTA LINEN SUPPLY,
INC., Plaintiff, v. APPLIED UNDERWRITERS INC., et al., Defendants.
PET FOOD EXPRESS LTD., et al., Plaintiffs, v. APPLIED UNDERWRITERS,
INC., et al., Defendants, Nos. 2:16-cv-00158 WBS AC, 2:16-cv-01211
WBS AC (E.D. Cal.).

Two related putative class actions, Pet Food Express Ltd. v.
Applied Underwriters Inc., et al, 16-cv-01211 WBS AC (Pet Food) and
Shasta Linen Supply, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters, et al.,
16-cv-00158-WBS-AC (Shasta) were consolidated for pre-trial
purposes and set to the same pre-trial schedule.

The Shasta Linen case was filed as a putative class action seeking
restitution/disgorgement for the Plaintiff and the putative class
as a result of the Defendants' unlawful business practices,
including the use of an unfiled, void and illegal collateral
agreement in the collection of excessive fees and expenses for the
workers' compensation insurance arrangements between the Defendants
and the Plaintiffs. The Pet Food case, also filed as a putative
class action and making similar allegations, was removed to this
court from Alameda Superior Court on March 29, 2016.

Applied Underwriters and third-party Relation Insurance Services,
Inc. ("Relation") participated in a hearing on June 13, 2018. The
Plaintiffs have no part in this motion.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 allows a party to a lawsuit to
serve a subpoena that commands a non-party to produce documents,
electronically stored information, or tangible things. A court must
modify or quash such a subpoena that fails to allow a reasonable
time to comply, requires a person to travel more than 100 miles
except for trial within the state, requires disclosure of
privileged or other protected materials, or subjects a person to
undue burden.

The Court finds that Relation has not demonstrated that disclosure
of the requested information in this case will place it at a
competitive disadvantage. Relation is correct that a subpoena is
subject to being quashed or modified if, among other things, it
requires 'disclosing a trade secret or other confidential,
research, development, or commercial information.

In Cohen v. City of New York, 255 F.R.D. 110, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 2008),
a case which Reliance cites to support its position, the court
identified sets of circumstances in which the privacy of sensitive
business information is of concern in response to a subpoena. The
Cohen court stated: "the most common situation is that in which the
producing party is able to demonstrate that the dissemination of
confidential information will place it at a competitive
disadvantage. In such cases, the information can generally be
protected by a protective order limiting the purposes for which the
information can be used and the extent to which it can be
disseminated."

Relation admits that it falls into this category, and provides no
argument as to why it falls outside the general rule that a
protective order resolves its confidentiality concern. The
protective order in this case appears to contemplate protection for
non-party productions. To the extent Relation feels that the
existing protective order does not adequately protect its
interests, the parties are free to negotiate a separate or
supplemental protective order. In any case, a protective order can
adequately address Relation's privacy concerns.

Here, Applied Underwriters sought discovery from the plaintiffs in
this case, and found that their productions had gaps which Applied
Underwriters believes would be filled by the production from
Relation. Relation cites no law that indicates Applied
Underwriters' attempts were insufficient, or that party discovery
must be somehow final before it can be required to produce
documents. Applied Underwriters also argued at hearing that
metadata associated with Relation's copy of documents may be
important to its arguments; the court finds this reasoning
persuasive.

Because Applied Underwriters has attempted to get responsive
documents from the plaintiffs and retains a belief that Relation
has additional responsive documents in its possession, and because
Relation's copy of documents may include discoverable metadata
unique to their version of the document, Applied Underwrites has
demonstrated a need to obtain the documents from Relation and the
third-party subpoenas are not premature.

Additionally, while Relation may not have a personal interest in
the outcome of the plaintiffs' cases, Relation did have an interest
in the transactions at issue in those cases by operating as the
plaintiffs' agent, and could reasonably have expected litigation
expenses to arise from those transactions.

In fact, Relation stated at the hearing that it is involved in
other disputes based on its work selling Applied Underwriters
policies. Fee shifting is not appropriate here because Relation,
while a third party, had a business relationship with the parties
that renders it interested for the purposes of determining
production cost allocation.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 14, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ya2usoz3 from Leagle.com.

Shasta Linen Supply, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Craig E.
Farmer -- cfarmer@farmersmithlaw.com -- Farmer Smith & Lane Llp &
John L. Hall -- jhall@farmersmithlaw.com -- Farmer Smith & Lane
Llp.

Applied Underwriters, Inc., a Nebraska Corporation, Applied
Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Company, Inc., a British Virgin
Islands Company, California Insurance Company, a Registered
California Insurance Company & Applied Risk Services, Inc., a
Nebraska Corporation, Defendants, represented by Spencer Y. Kook --
skook@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Shand Scott
Stephens -- shand.stephens@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper Llp & Travis
R. Wall -- twall@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.

Applied Underwriters, Inc., a Nebraska Corporation, Counter
Claimant, represented by Shand Scott Stephens, Dla Piper Llp &
Travis R. Wall, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.

Shasta Linen Supply, Inc., Counter Defendant, represented by Craig
E. Farmer, Farmer Smith & Lane Llp, John Douglas Moore --
jmoore@recyclelaw.com -- Law Office of John Douglas Moore & John L.
Hall, Farmer Smith & Lane Llp.

AREEN AIDEN: "Ghauri" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------
Bilal Ahmad Ghauri and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. Areen Aiden, Inc., Momesara, Inc., Speedway Enterprises, Inc.,
Petroleum Electric Charge, Inc., Abms Enterprise, Inc., Saddiq
Sunesara, Zeeshan Ali and Mehboob Q. Ali, Defendants, Case No.
18-cv-02339 (S.D. Tex., July 6, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid
overtime wages, equitable relief, compensatory and liquidated
damages, attorney's fees, all costs of the action and post-judgment
interest under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Defendants operate gas stations and convenience stores all over
Texas where Plaintiff worked as an hourly worker at some time. He
claims to be denied overtime compensation in any given workweek.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Syed Izfar, Esq.
      SYED N. IZFAR
      11111 Katy Freeway, #1010
      Houston, TX 77079
      Phone: (713) 467-0786
      Tel: (713) 467-2424
      Email: syedizfar@sbcglobal.net

ASHBURN CORP: Court Won't Review Denial of "Cannon" Deal Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration in the case captioned
KYLE CANNON, LEWIS LYONS, and DIANE LYONS, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ASHBURN
CORPORATION, WINES 'TIL SOLD OUT (WTSO.COM), and JONATHAN H.
NEWMAN, Defendants, Civil No. 16-1452 (RMB/AMD)(D.N.J.).

The Plaintiffs filed the Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's
opinion and order denying final settlement approval of this
putative class action suit.

The Plaintiffs assert that the Court made numerous clear errors of
law. Notably, the Plaintiffs do not assert that the Court
overlooked facts.

First, the Plaintiffs aver that in lieu of the proper Girsh
factors, Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975), the
Court erroneously adopted a novel standard applied in unpublished,
out-of-circuit district court decisions.

In the entirety of its 59-page opinion, the Court cites two
out-of-circuit district court opinions. They appear in a footnote
in support of the sentence, at this stage of the case, the Court
cannot adequately quantify either the strength of the putative
class' claims or the value of what class members will receive in
exchange for release of those claims.
The two cases cited are simply examples of other proposed class
action settlements that were rejected for lack of sufficient
information; they illustrate the challenges presented in valuing
settlements which include a non-cash component. The Court did not
rely on the two cases for the applicable legal standard, and in any
event, the Court does not agree with Plaintiffs' assertion that
those cases applied a novel legal standard.

Second, contrary to the Plaintiffs' argument, the Court did
consider all of the Girsh factors.

Specifically, the Plaintiffs assert that the Court failed to
consider Girsh factors 1, complexity, expense and likely duration
of the litigation; 4, the risks of establishing liability; 5, the
risks of establishing damages; 6, the risks of maintaining the
class action through trial; 8, the range of reasonableness of the
settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; and 9 the
range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible
recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation.

Girsh factor 6 was explicitly identified and discussed at Cannon,
2018 WL 1806046,  Girsh factors 8 and 9 were also explicitly
identified, and the Court explained why it could not determine the
settlement fund's reasonableness.

Additionally, while factors 1, 4 and 5 were not specifically
identified as Girsh factor, the Court's substantive discussion
addressed these factors. Just as the Court explained how the
parties failed to provide the Court sufficient evidence as to the
value of the settlement, the Court discussed at length its
unanswered questions and concerns with regard to the C wines and
their place in this litigation. Without such answers, the Court was
unable (and remains unable) to ascertain the complexity, expense
and likely duration of the litigation, the risks of establishing
liability, or the risks of establishing damages. As the Court
stated, the parties have not informed the Court how the addition of
the C wines has affected the size and make-up of the class. Without
such information, the Court cannot predict the likely complexity of
the litigation, nor the risks of establishing liability and
damages.

Thus, the Court did not apply an incorrect legal standard, nor did
it incompletely apply the correct legal standard.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 7, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9gphjdg from Leagle.com.

KEITH BROWN, Objector, pro se.

KENDALL M. COX, Objector, pro se.

WILLIAM B. JAMES, Objector, pro se.

STEVEN D. MAYER, Objector, pro se.

Derek Hansen, Vytauras Sasnauskas & Ryan Russell, Objectors,
represented by RICHARD J. PERR -- rperr@finemanlawfirm.com --
FINEMAN KREKSTEIN & HARRIS, PC & MONICA M. LITTMAN --
mlittman@finemanlawfirm.com -- FINEMAN, KREKSTEIN & HARRIS, PC.

Ryan Radia, Objector, represented by JOSHUA DAVID WOLSON --
jabed@dilworthlaw.com -- DILWORTH PAXSON LLP.

PATRICK DEAN TAYLOR, Objector, pro se.

EDWARD TAHIR DUCKETT, Objector, pro se.

KYLE CANNON, LEWIS LYONS & DIANNE LYONS, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by JAMES
E. CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C. &
LINDSEY H. TAYLOR, CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY &
AGNELLO.

ASHBURN CORPORATION & WINES TIL SOLD OUT, Defendants, represented
by GREGORY STEPHEN MORTENSON -- gregory.mortenson@lw.com -- LATHAM
& WATKINS LLP, JAMES M. MCCLAMMER -- JmcClammer@mankogold.com --
MANKO GOLD KATCHER & FOX LLP, NICOLE R. MOSHANG --
nmoshang@mankogold.com -- MANKO GOLD KATCHER & FOX LLP & SUZANNE
ILENE SCHILLER -- sschiller@mankogold.com -- Manko, Gold, Katcher &
Fox, LLP.

Mark Brnovich, Amicus, represented by SCOTT B GALLA --
sgalla@clarkhill.com -- CLARK HILL PC.

United States of America, Interested Party, represented by GUSTAV
EYLER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CONSUMER PROTECTION BRANCH &
JOSHUA DAVID ROTHMAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CONSUMER
PROTECTION BRANCH.

ATLANTA SUPERSOURCE: "Eaton" Suit Seeks to Certify Class
--------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JAMES COREY EATON, STEVEN PAUL SMITH, and
SCOTT THOMAS TIBBETTS, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. ATLANTA SUPERSOURCE, INC.
and TIM MARTIN, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-01791-AT (N.D.
Ga.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order:

   A. conditionally certifying a class of:

      "current and former Service Technicians and
      Installers who work(ed) for Defendants between April
      25, 2015 and the present without overtime pay for
      all hours worked over 40 during any given workweek";

   B. directing Defendants to produce, in an electronic
      readable format, to the Plaintiffs' counsel within
      14 days of the Order granting this Motion, a list of
      the full names, job titles, last known addresses,
      personal e-mail addresses, telephone numbers, dates
      of birth, and dates of employment for all putative
      collective class members who work(ed) for Defendants
      between April 25, 2015 and the present;

   C. prohibiting Defendants' contact with any individual
      disclosed as a putative class member for reasons
      related to this litigation;

   D. authorizing the Plaintiffs' counsel to send initial
      Notice and a Consent Form, to all individuals
      identified as part of the putative class; and

   E. providing all putative collective class members who
      are sent notice a total of 90 days from the date the
      notices are initially mailed to file a Consent to
      Become Opt-In Plaintiff form.

A copy of the Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/P6dGu6 at no charge.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          M. Travis Foust, Esq.
          J. Daniel Cole, Esq.
          PARKS, CHESIN & WALBERT, P.C.
          75 Fourteenth Street, 26th Floor
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404)873 8000
          Facsimile: (404)873 8050
          E-mail: tfoust@pcwlawfirm.com
                  dcole@pcwlawfirm.com

Attorneys for Defendant:

          H. Michael Dever, Esq.
          Hayes M. Dever, Jr., Esq.
          FRIEDMAN DEVER & MERLIN, LLC
          5555 Glenridge Connector, N.E., Suite 925
          Atlanta, GA 30342-4728


ATRIUM CORP: Complaints Pile Up Over Hernia Mesh Products
---------------------------------------------------------
Bob Sanders, writing for NH Business Review, reports that
complaints are being added at an increasing rate in U.S. District
Court class action litigation against Atrium Medical Corp, a
medical device firm that employs 600 people in Merrimack.

At midyear, 784 plaintiffs were involved in 621 federal cases from
around the country, all alleging that Atrium's hernia mesh products
had painful and sometimes fatal complications.

The suits, which began being filed in August 2016, were
consolidated at the end of that year in U.S. District Court in
Concord. Over the last six months, they were filed at a rate of 39
a month, compared to 24 per month previously. That doesn't count
over 100 cases filed in New Hampshire Superior Court.

Few of the federal plaintiffs are from New Hampshire, even those
filed directly in Concord. The last half dozen were from Kansas,
Texas and Mississippi.

All of the lawsuits blame Atrium's C-QUR hernia mesh products,
which are coated with fish oil derivative (an Omega 3 product
similar to the nutritional supplement), the company's unique
solution to adverse reactions.

But plaintiffs' attorneys allege that the fish oil is a large part
of the problem, along with the plastic mesh itself, the way it is
manufactured and the Federal Drug Administration's medical device
approval process.

Attorneys for Atrium -- which was acquired by Getinge Group, a
publicly traded Swedish firm, for $680 million in November 2011
-- contended in court that the product is safe, that complications
are often due to improper implantation by physicians, and that
patients are more susceptible to infections because they tend to be
obese and smoke too much.

Hernia meshes are a small part of Atrium's business, and the
lawsuits it is facing are a small fraction of the number facing the
entire medical mesh industry. There are tens of thousands suits
filed against much larger companies, including Johnson & Johnson,
and settlements have been reached for multiple hundreds of millions
of dollars.

But the number of the suits filed pale in comparison to over 1
million medical surgeries performed each year.

Both sides have been bickering for months during the discovery
phase, with litigants charging Getinge with "discovery abuse" by
withholding documents, stalling or hiding behind Swedish privacy
protections. Getinge has countered that the requests for
information are overly broad, once using the word "harassment."

In particular, the plaintiffs are seeking information on corporate
merger documents to dispute Getinge's contention that it wasn't
liable for Atrium's actions.

And that's just the general phase of discovery. The net,
"specific," phase won't begin until March 2019, with the goal of a
trial beginning Feb. 20, 2020, if a settlement is not reached
beforehand. [GN]

AVINGER INC: Settlement in "Banerjee" Suit Has Prelim Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ARINDAM BANERJEE and JOGESH HARJAI, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. AVINGER,
INC., JEFFREY M. SOINSKI, MATTHEW B. FERGUSON, DONALD A. LUCAS,
JOHN B. SIMPSON, JAMES B. McELWEE, JAMES G. CULLEN, THOMAS J.
FOGARTY, CANACCORD GENUITY, INC., COWEN AND COMPANY, LLC,
OPPENHEIMER & CO., BTIG LLC, and STEPHENS, INC., Defendants, Case
No. 17-cv-3400-CW (N.D. Cal.), Judge Claudia Wilken of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, Oakland
Division, preliminarily approved the Stipulation of Settlement
dated May 9, 2018 and the Settlement.

The Settlement Hearing will be held before the Court on Oct. 23,
2018, at 2:30 p.m.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge
Wilken preliminarily certified, solely for the purposes of
effectuating the Settlement, a Class consisting of all Persons who
purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly traded common stock of
Avinger between Jan. 29, 2015 and April 10, 2017, inclusive, and
were damaged thereby.

The Defendants are required to serve upon the appropriate state
official of each state in which a Class Member resides and the
Attorney General of the United States a notice of the proposed
Settlement in compliance with the requirements of the Class Action
Fairness Act ("CAFA") no later than 10 calendar days following the
entry of the Order.  They're solely responsible for the costs of
the CAFA notice and administering the CAFA notice.  At least seven
calendar days before the Settlement Hearing, the Defendants will
cause to be served on the Lead Counsel and filed with the Court
proof, by affidavit or declaration, regarding compliance with the
CAFA notice.

The Judge approved, as to form and content: (a) the Notice of
Proposed Settlement of Class Action, Motion for Attorneys' Fees and
Settlement Fairness Hearing; (b) the Proof of Claim and Release
form; and (c), the Summary Notice, respectively, which are annexed
as Exhibit A-1 to the Order and Exhibits A-2 and A-3 to the
Stipulation, respectively.

The Judge appointed KCC Class Action Services as the Claims
Administrator.  Within 10 days of the date of entry of the Order,
Avinger shall, at its own cost, provide to the Claims
Administrator, in an electronic format acceptable to the Claims
Administrator, its shareholder lists of the holders of Avinger
common stock during the Class Period.  Not later than 20 days after
the date of entry of the Order, the Claims Administrator will cause
a copy of the Notice and the Proof of Claim and Release, to all the
Class Members who can be identified with reasonable effort.

Contemporaneously with the mailing of the Notice Packet, the Claims
Administrator will cause the Stipulation and its Exhibits and a
copy of the Notice to be posted on a website to be developed for
the Settlement, from which copies of the Notice Packet can be
downloaded.  Not later than 10 days after the Notice Date, the
Claims Administrator will cause the Summary Notice, to be published
once in Investors Business Daily, and to be transmitted once over
the PR Newswire.  Not later than seven days before the Settlement
Hearing, the Lead Counsel will cause to be filed with the Court
proof, by affidavit or declaration, of such mailing, publishing and
posting.

The Judge directed the Nominees who purchased or acquired Avinger's
common stock between Jan. 29, 2015 and April 10, 2017, inclusive,
to send the Notice and the Proof of Claim and Release to all
beneficial owners of such common stock within 20 days after receipt
thereof, or to send a list of the names and addresses of such
beneficial owners to the Claims Administrator within 20 days of
receipt thereof, in which event the Claims Administrator will
promptly mail the Notice and the Proof of Claim and Release to such
beneficial owners.  

The Lead Counsel shall, if requested, reimburse out of the
Settlement Fund banks, brokerage houses, or other nominees solely
for their reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred in providing
the Notice to beneficial owners who are Class Members, which
expenses would not have been incurred except for the sending of
such Notice, subject to further order of this Court with respect to
any dispute concerning such reimbursement.

Unless the Court orders otherwise, all Proof of Claim and Release
forms must be postmarked no later than 120 calendar days after the
Notice Date.

A Class Member or other Person who wishes to object to the approval
of the terms and conditions of the proposed Settlement, the
proposed Plan of Allocation, or any aspect of the Plaintiffs' or
the Plaintiffs' Counsel's Fee and Expense Application must file no
later than 21 calendar days before the Settlement Hearing.

All reasonable expenses incurred in identifying and notifying the
Class Members, as well as administering the Settlement Fund, will
be paid as set forth in the Stipulation in an amount up to $300,000
without further order of the Court.  In the event the Settlement is
not approved by the Court, or otherwise fails to become effective,
neither the Plaintiffs nor Lead Counsel will have any obligation to
repay any amounts actually and properly disbursed from the
Settlement Fund.

All funds held by the Escrow Agent will be deemed and considered to
be in custodia legis of the Court, and will remain subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court, until such time as such funds will be
distributed pursuant to the Stipulation or further order(s) of the
Court.

The Lead Counsel is authorized and directed to prepare any tax
returns and any other tax reporting form for or in respect to the
Settlement Fund, to pay from the Settlement Fund any Taxes owed
with respect to the Settlement Fund, and to otherwise perform all
obligations with respect to Taxes and any reporting or filings in
respect thereof without further order of the Court in a manner
consistent with the provisions of the Settlement.

All papers in support of the settlement, the proposed Plan of
Allocation, the Plaintiffs' Counsel's Fee and Expense Application,
and the Class Representatives' application for an award for their
time and expenses incurred in representing the Class will be filed
and served not later than 42 calendar days prior to the Settlement
Hearing; and reply papers, if any, in further support of the
Settlement, the proposed Plan of Allocation, the Fee and Expense
Application and any application for an award to the Class
Representatives will be filed and served no later than seven
calendar days prior to the Settlement Hearing.

The Defendants are responsible for funding the Settlement Amount as
set forth in the Stipulation; however, neither the Defendants nor
any of the Released Defendants' Parties will have any
responsibility for or liability with respect to any Plan of
Allocation, Plaintiffs' Counsel's Fee and Expense Application, or
the Class Representatives' application for an award for their time
and expenses incurred in representing the Class, and such matters
will be considered separately from the fairness, reasonableness and
adequacy of the Settlement.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 13, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/oPHCOM from Leagle.com.

Lindsay Grotewiel, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Albert Y. Chang --
achang@bottinilaw.com -- Bottini and Bottini, Inc., Francis A.
Bottini, Jr. -- fbottini@bottinilaw.com -- Bottini & Bottini, Inc.,
Yury A. Kolesnikov -- ykolesnikov@bottinilaw.com -- Bottini and
Bottini, Inc., Rhiana Swartz, Scott and Scott, Attorneys at Law,
LLP & Thomas L. Laughlin, IV, ScottScott, Attorneys at Law, LLP.

Arindam Banerjee, Lead Plaintiff & Jogesh Harjai, Lead Plaintiff,
Plaintiffs, represented by John T. Jasnoch --
JJASNOCH@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- Scott+Scott Attorneys at Law LLP, Ex
Kano S. Sams, II -- esams@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray
LLP, Rhiana Swartz -- RSWARTZ@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- Scott and Scott,
Attorneys at Law, LLP, Thomas L. Laughlin, IV --
TLAUGHLIN@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- ScottScott, Attorneys at Law, LLP &
William C. Fredericks -- WFREDERICKS@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- Scott and
Scott Attorneys At Law.

Avinger, Inc., Jeffrey M. Soinski, Matthew B. Ferguson, Donald A.
Lucas, John B. Simpson, James B. McElwee, James G. Cullen & Thomas
J. Fogarty, Defendants, represented by Benjamin Jon Tolman --
btolman@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich Rosati, Doru Gavril --
dgavril@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich and Rosati & Ignacio
Evaristo Salceda -- salceda@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &
Rosati A Professional Corporation.

Canaccord Genuity, Inc., Cowen and Company, LLC, Oppenheimer & Co.,
BTIG & Stephens, Inc., Defendants, represented by Michael A. Mugmon
-- MICHAEL.MUGMON@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale &
Dorr LLP, Harry Hanson -- harry.hanson@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer
Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, John F. Batter, III --
john.batter@wilmerhale.com -- Attorney at Law & Rebecca Denise
Kline -- BECCA.KLINE@WILMERHALE.COM -- WilmerHale.

Michael Dolan, Movant, represented by Laurence M. Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

Todd Vogel, Movant, represented by Francis A. Bottini, Jr., Bottini
& Bottini, Inc..

BARLEANS ORGANIC: Faces "Brannon" Suit in S.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Barlean's Organic
Oils, LLC. The case is styled as Cory Brannon, individually, and on
behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Barlean's Organic
Oils, LLC, a Washington Limited Liability Company, Defendant, Case
No. 3:18-cv-01619-BTM-MDD (S.D. Cal., July 17, 2018).

Barlean's Organic Oils, L.L.C. operates farm, fishery, and organic
seed mills. It offers flax oils, flax oil blends, greens,
forti-flax, fish oils, omega swirl, specialty oils, organic chia
seeds, olive leaves, and other products. The company was founded in
1989 and is based in Ferndale, Washington.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Naomi B. Spector, Esq.
   Kamber Law LLP
   9404 Genesee Avenue, Suite 340
   La Jolla, CA 92037
   Tel: (310) 400-1051
   Fax: (858) 800-4277
   Email: nspector@kamberlaw.com

BELLPORT CATERERS: Faces "Sypert" Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bellport Caterers,
LTD. The case is styled as Kathleen Sypert, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Bellport Caterers,
LTD doing business as: Bellport Country Club, Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-06492 (S.D. N.Y., July 18, 2018).

Bellport Caterers, LTD is a Wedding Venue in Bellport, NY.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


BIG LOTS: Oct. 30 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
-------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP and Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP regarding the Big Lots
Securities Settlement:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

ALAN WILLIS, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.       
BIG LOTS, INC., et al.,         
Defendants.

No. 2:12-cv-00604-MHW-KAJ

CLASS ACTION

SUMMARY NOTICE
      
TO:

ALL PERSONS WHO PURCHASED THE COMMON STOCK OF BIG LOTS, INC. ("BIG
LOTS") BETWEEN MARCH 2, 2012 AND AUGUST 23, 2012, INCLUSIVE

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to an Order of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division,
that a hearing will be held on Tuesday, October 30, 2018, at 2:00
p.m., before the Honorable Michael H. Watson, United States
District Judge, at the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, Joseph P. Kinneary
U.S. Courthouse, 85 Marconi Boulevard, Columbus, Ohio 43215, for
the purpose of determining: (1) whether the proposed Settlement of
the Litigation for $38 million should be approved by the Court as
fair, reasonable, and adequate; (2) whether a Final Judgment and
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice should be entered by the Court;
(3) whether the Plan of Allocation for the Net Settlement Fund is
fair, reasonable, and adequate and should be approved; and (4)
whether the application of Class Counsel for the payment of
attorneys' fees and expenses and Class Representatives' awards
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. ??78u-4(a)(4) should be approved.

IF YOU PURCHASED THE COMMON STOCK OF BIG LOTS DURING THE TIME
PERIOD COMMENCING ON MARCH 2, 2012, AND ENDING ON AUGUST 23, 2012,
INCLUSIVE (THE "CLASS PERIOD"), YOUR RIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED BY THE
SETTLEMENT OF THIS LITIGATION, INCLUDING THE RELEASE OF CLAIMS YOU
MAY POSSESS RELATING TO YOUR PURCHASE OF THE COMMON STOCK OF BIG
LOTS DURING THE CLASS PERIOD. If you have not received a detailed
Notice of Pendency and Proposed Settlement of Class Action
("Notice") and a copy of the Proof of Claim and Release form, you
may obtain copies by writing to Big Lots Securities Settlement, c/o
Gilardi & Co. LLC, Claims Administrator, P.O. Box 404066,
Louisville, KY 40233-4066, or on the Internet at
www.BigLotsSecuritiesSettlement.com.  If you are a Class Member, in
order to share in the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, you
must submit a Proof of Claim and Release by mail (postmarked no
later than October 8, 2018) or online (no later than October 8,
2018), establishing that you are entitled to recovery.

If you purchased Big Lots common stock during the Class Period and
you desire to be excluded from the Class, you must submit a request
for exclusion so that it is postmarked no later than October 9,
2018, in the manner and form explained in the detailed Notice
referred to above.  All members of the Class who do not timely and
validly request exclusion from the Class in the manner set forth in
the Notice will be bound by any judgment entered in the Litigation
pursuant to the Stipulation of Settlement.

Any objection to the Settlement, the Plan of Allocation, Class
Counsel's request for attorneys' fees and expenses, and Class
Representatives' request for their time and expenses must be
received by each of the following recipients no later than October
9, 2018:

CLERK OF THE COURT    

         UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
         SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
         EASTERN DIVISION
         Joseph P. Kinneary U.S. Courthouse
         85 Marconi Boulevard  
         Columbus, Ohio 43215        
Class Counsel:
     
         ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
         DAVID W. MITCHEL    
         655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
         San Diego, CA 92101

Counsel for Defendants:

         CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP
         MICHAEL A. PASKIN
         825 Eighth Avenue
         New York, NY 10019

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT OR THE CLERK'S OFFICE REGARDING
THIS NOTICE. If you have any questions about the Settlement, you
may contact Class Counsel at the address listed above or visit the
website listed above.
       
DATED: June 25, 2018        

BY ORDER OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

BILTMORE HOTEL: Hernandez Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------
EDUARDO HERNANDEZ, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. THE BILTMORE HOTEL LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
a Florida Limited Partnership, and SEAWAY BILTMORE, INC., a
Delaware Corporation, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-22870-MGC
(S.D. Fla., July 17, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages,
liquidated damages, and the costs and reasonable attorneys' fees
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, between approximately May 2016 and
March 2018, Plaintiff regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per
week for several weeks as "Food & Beverage Manager." Likewise, the
other employees of THE BILTMORE who are similarly situated to
Plaintiff have regularly worked as non-exempt "Food & Beverage
Managers," however, variously titled, in excess of 40 hours in one
or more work weeks during their employment with Defendants within
the three-year statute of limitations period between July 2015 and
the present. However, Biltmore has failed to pay time and one-half
wages for all of the actual overtime hours worked by the Food &
Beverage Managers. Defendants instead paid them salaried wages for
40 hours per week without time and one-half compensation for the
overtime hours.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Keith M. Stern, Esq.
          Hazel Solis Rojas, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF KEITH M. STERN, P.A.
          One Flagler
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 800
          Miami, Florida 33132
          Telephone: (305) 901 1379
          Facsimile: (561) 288 9031
          E-mail: employlaw@keithstern.com
                  hsolis@workingforyou.com



C&L TOWING: Court Certifies Tow Truck Drivers Class
---------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled KEITH E. TAYLOR, TERRENCE MCGLOTHLIN and
JAMES SIMPSON, the Plaintiffs, v. C&L TOWING AND TRANSPORT, L.L.C.
and CARL CHASE, the Defendant, Case No. 6:17-cv-01929-PGB-TBS (M.D.
Fla.), the Hon. Judge Thomas Smith entered an order:

   1. partly granting Plaintiffs' Motion for conditional
      certification and permitting Court Supervised Notice
      to Employees of their Opt-In Rights;

   2. conditionally certifying this case as a collective
      action for the following class:

      "all tow truck drivers currently or formerly
      employed by C & L Towing and Transport, LLC within
      the three-year period immediately preceding the
      filing of this case to the present";

   3. directing Parties be directed to confer regarding
      the language of the Notice of lawsuit and
      consent/opt-in form to include a provision regarding
      potential liability for defense costs, and file the
      amended Notice and form within seven days of the
      date of the rendition of the district court Order;

   4. directing Defendant to deliver to Plaintiff's
      counsel a list containing the full names and last
      known addresses of putative class members, within
      five days from the filing of the Notice and form;

   5. directing Plaintiff's counsel to give notice to the
      individuals in the conditionally certified class 21
      days of receiving the names and addresses from
      Defendant, with the following limitations:

      - Plaintiff shall not give Notice to any person who
        currently has on file a consent to join in this
        action; and

      - The Notice and Consent to Join shall be in the
        stipulated form and shall be mailed on the same
        day via first class U.S. Mail to all individuals
        disclosed by Defendants (other than those persons
        who currently are opt-in Plaintiffs in this
        action) at the sole cost and expense
        of Plaintiffs, dated with the date of mailing, and
        shall  allow each individual up to 60 days from
        the date of mailing in which to return a Consent
        to Join form to Plaintiffs' counsel; and

   6. directing that individuals who timely opt into this
      action be deemed parties for all purposes under the
      Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pending further
      Order of this Court, and may be represented at any
      settlement or mediation by the named Plaintiffs.

A copy of the Order is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/4eJSN9 at no charge.


CATALINA HOTEL: Faces "Sierra" Suit in S.D. Florida
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Catalina Hotel, LLC.
The case is styled as Luis Sierra, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Catalina Hotel, LLC, a
Florida limited liability company, Defendant, Case No.
0:18-cv-61649-CMA (S.D. Fla., July 18, 2018).

Catalina Hotel, LLC is engaged in the hotel business in Miami
Beach, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jessica Lynn Kerr, Esq.
   Jessica L. Kerr, P.A. dba The Advocacy Group
   200 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 504
   Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
   Tel: (954) 282-1858
   Fax: (844) 786-3694
   Email: service@advocacypa.com


CH ROBINSON: Fails to Pay Overtime Under FLSA, "Dietrich" Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
TARYN DIETRICH, on behalf of herself and a class of all those
similarly situated v. C.H. ROBINSON WORLDWIDE, INC., Case No.
1:18-cv-04871 (N.D. Ill., July 17, 2018), alleges that the
Defendant did not pay the Plaintiff and the putative class members
overtime or any other additional compensation for the hours they
worked in excess of 40 per week, in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law.

C. H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., is a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Minnesota.  C. H. Robinson does
business throughout the state of Illinois.

C. H. Robinson is a global provider of transportation services and
logistics solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jamie S. Franklin, Esq.
          THE FRANKLIN LAW FIRM LLC
          53 W. Jackson Blvd., Suite 803
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 662-1008
          Facsimile: (312) 662-1015
          E-mail: jsf@thefranklinlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Robin Potter, Esq.
          M. Nieves Bolanos, Esq.
          Patrick Cowlin, Esq.
          POTTER BOLANOS LLC
          111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 2600
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 861-1800
          E-mail: robin@potterlaw.org
                  patrick@potterlaw.org
                  nieves@potterlaw.org


CHAMPION PETFOODS: Court Narrows Claims in Leob" Dog Food Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the case captioned KELLIE LOEB, Plaintiff, v. CHAMPION
PETFOODS USA INC. and CHAMPION PETFOODS LP, Defendants, Case No.
18-CV-494-JPS (E.D. Wis.).

The Plaintiffs alleges that she and her fellow class members
purchased the Defendants' dog foods because the Defendants
advertise them as high-quality products which contain ingredients
fit for human consumption.  The Plaintiff maintains that the
Defendants' representations of quality are false, because the dog
food contains high levels of poisonous heavy metals.

The Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint for
failure to state any viable claims for relief and lack of
constitutional standing on Plaintiff's part.

The Plaintiff generally alleges that the Defendants' marketing is
both false and misleading, and that she and the class members acted
in reliance on the Defendants' representations in paying a premium
for the dog food. She brings specific claims in five counts.

Count One is for violation of the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (WDTPA).  As the name implies, the WDTPA prohibits
untrue or deceptive advertisements.

Count Two is nearly identical, contending that the Defendants'
false statements violate Wisconsin Administrative Code Section ATCP
90.02, which governs consumer product packaging. If true, this
would entitle the Plaintiff to damages under the Wisconsin Unfair
Trade Practices Act (WUTPA).

Counts Three and Four are for breach of express and implied
warranties. Count Five asserts that the Defendants have been
unjustly enriched by their deceptive marketing scheme.

The Defendants' overarching position is that the Plaintiff has not
adequately alleged that its advertisements are false or deceptive,
despite the concentrations of heavy metals cited in the complaint.
This is presented as both a generic FRCP 12(b)(6) argument, as well
as one relating to the Plaintiff's standing to sue. The Defendants
then offer specific reasons why each individual count of the
complaint should be dismissed. The Court will address the
Defendants' arguments in turn.

The Plaintiff pleads that the Defendants' product packaging
contains material misstatements upon which she and the putative
class members relied on in paying a premium price for the goods.
Whether these allegations are factually correct is for another
time.
Put differently, the Defendants have not established that it is
beyond doubt that the Plaintiff could prove no set of facts in
support of her claim that would entitle her to the relief
requested.

The Defendants' standing argument fails for similar reasons. A
litigant has standing to sue in federal court only when (1) she
suffered an injury in fact, (2) the injury is causally connected to
the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. The
Plaintiff's allegations easily satisfy these elements. She pleads
that she paid too much for unsafe dog food that this was caused by
the Defendants' deceptive and false advertisements, and she seeks
money damages as compensation.

Count One - WDTPA

To state a WDTPA claim, the Plaintiff must allege that (1) the
defendant made a representation to the public with the intent to
induce an obligation, (2) the representation was untrue, deceptive
or misleading, and (3) the representation materially induced
(caused) a pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.

FRCP 9(b) requires that allegations of fraud must state the
circumstances of the fraud with particularity. This means alleging
the identity of the person making the misrepresentation, the time,
place, and content of the misrepresentation, and the method by
which the misrepresentation was communicated to the plaintiff.  The
Plaintiff satisfies this standard. She states that she bought the
Defendants' dog food many times from various stores in Waukesha
County.

The Plaintiff further alleges that the packaging prominently
displayed the purported misrepresentations. She directly quotes the
packaging's statements in her complaint. The Defendants contend
that the Plaintiff does not specifically allege seeing the
statements on the packaging before purchasing the products, but
this is a ready implication from her other allegations. Indeed, it
is a necessary one, as the Plaintiff claims that she would not have
bought the products had she known the statements were false. In
ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must allow this inference
in the Plaintiff's favor.

Count Two - WUTPA

Wisconsin Administrative Code Section ATCP 90.02 is entitled
declaration of product identity. Its first subsection requires
sellers of consumer commodities to state the common or usual name
of the commodity on its packaging. The second subsection describes
the necessary location and prominence of that identification. The
final subsection provides that the declaration of identity under
sub. (1) may not be false, deceptive, or misleading.

The Plaintiff contends that Orijen and Acana violate this rule
because they are labeled as biologically appropriate dog food when
they are in fact contaminated with heavy metals. The Defendant
argues, and the Court agrees, that this is not the purpose of
Section ATCP 90.02. It is meant to ensure that products are
identified by their common name. Dog food must be labeled as dog
food, and not cat or human food.

This reading is bolstered by reference to the second subsection,
which focuses on the styling and position of the label, not its
content. Biologically appropriate, whether or not the Plaintiff
disputes the statement, is not part of the declaration of product
identity contemplated by Section ATCP 90.02. The Plaintiff does not
dispute that the Defendants' products are indeed labeled as dog
food. Count Two will be dismissed.

Count Three - Express Warranties

In St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. The Viking Corp., 539 F.3d 623, 628
(7th Cir. 2008) St. Paul claims that Wisconsin law is evolving
toward eliminating the privity requirement for remote purchasers of
products. Whether fair or not, the most recent pronouncement by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court on this issue suggests that privity of
contract still applies for warranty claims like the one here.

The Plaintiff does not contest that she lacks privity of contract
with Defendants; she bought their products from various pet stores,
not the Defendants directly. While it may indeed seem unfair to
prohibit an express warranty claim in these circumstances, this
Court is in no position to disagree with the Seventh Circuit or the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.

Count Three will be dismissed.

Count Four - Implied Warranties

In her response brief, the Plaintiff agreed to voluntarily dismiss
her implied warranty claim.  The Defendants did not object to this
in their reply and offered no further analysis of the claim. Count
Four will stand dismissed.

Count Five - Unjust Enrichment

In Wisconsin, an unjust enrichment claim requires (1) a benefit
conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation or
knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and (3) acceptance or
retention of the benefit by the defendant under circumstances
making it inequitable to do so.

The Plaintiff has put the Defendants on notice of her claim. She
does not, as the Defendants suggest, need to plead specific facts
regarding how the products' ingredients were rendered unfit for
human consumption, or how they did not contain high quality
ingredients generally, beyond the heavy metal allegations already
pleaded. The Defendants' belief in the quality of their products is
a matter of proof not suitable for disposition on a motion to
dismiss. The Defendants also claim that the White Paper proves that
they thought their products were safe and of good quality. Assuming
the White Paper could be considered, the Plaintiff's allegations
imply that it was a ruse, and that the Defendants knew the
conclusions stated therein were false.

The Defendant's motion to dismiss be and the same is granted in
part and denied in part in accordance with the terms of this Order:
Counts Two, Three, and Four of the Plaintiff's complaint be and the
same are dismissed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 7, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9bvde5x from Leagle.com.

Kellie Loeb, Plaintiff, represented by Erich P. Schork --
e.schork@barnowlaw.com -- Barnow and Associates PC, John D. Blythin
-- jblythin@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, Mark A. Eldridge
-- meldridge@ademilaw.com --  Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, Shpetim Ademi
-sademi@ademilaw.com --  Ademi & O'Reilly LLP & Ben Barnow --
b.barnow@barnowlaw.com -- Barnow and Associates PC.

Champion Petfoods USA Inc & Champion Petfoods LP, Defendants,
represented by Mark E. Schmidt -- mschmidt@vonbriesen.com -- von
Briesen & Roper SC, David A. Coulson -- coulsond@gtlaw.com --
Greenberg Traurig LLP & Susan E. Lovern -- slovern@vonbriesen.com
-- von Briesen & Roper SC.

CHESTERFIELD HOTEL: Faces "Sierra" Suit in S.D. Florida
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Chesterfield Hotel
and Suites LLC. The case is styled as Luis Sierra, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Chesterfield Hotel and Suites LLC, a Florida Limited Liability
Company, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-22902-KMM (S.D. Fla., July 18,
2018).

Chesterfield Hotel and Suites LLC is a 3-star hotel in Miami Beach,
Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jessica Lynn Kerr, Esq.
   Jessica L. Kerr, P.A. dba The Advocacy Group
   200 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 504
   Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
   Tel: (954) 282-1858
   Fax: (844) 786-3694
   Email: service@advocacypa.com


CHILDREN'S MERCY: "K.A." Suit Removed to W.D. Mo.
-------------------------------------------------
The case captioned K.A., by and through her next friend B.W.
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. Children's Mercy Hospital (CMH), Defendant, Case No.
1816-CV13521, was removed from the Circuit Court of Jackson County,
Missouri County, to the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri on July 6, 2018, and assigned Case No.
18-cv-00516.

Plaintiff seeks punitive damages, together with pre-trial and
post-trial interest, restitution, disgorgement, or other equitable
relief, including corrective notice, reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs of suit, including expert witness fees. Plaintiff alleges
that a locked container of CMH patient records was stolen from a
CMH employee's vehicle trunk.

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Maureen M. Brady, Esq.
      Lucy McShane, Esq.
      MCSHANE & BRADY, LLC
      1656 Washington, Suite 120
      Kansas City, MO 64108
      Telephone: (816) 888-8010
      Facsimile: (816) 332-6295
      Email: mbrady@mcshanebradylaw.com
             lmcshane@mcshanebradylaw.com

             - and -

      Anne Schiavone, Esq.
      HOLMAN SCHIAVONE LLC
      4600 Madison, Suite 810
      Kansas City, MO 64111
      Telephone: (816) 283-8738
      Facsimile: (816) 283-8739
      Email: aschiavone@hslawllc.com

Defendant is represented by:

      Martin M. Loring, Esq.
      Michael T. Raupp, Esq.
      Michael R. Owens, Esq.
      HUSCH BLACKWELL LLP
      4801 Main Street, Suite 1000
      Kansas City, MO 64112
      Telephone (816) 983-8000
      Facsimile (816) 983-8080
      Email: martin.loring@huschblackwell.com
             michael.raupp@huschblackwell.com
             michael.owens@huschblackwell.com

             - and -

      Casie D. Collignon, Esq.
      Matthew C. Baisley, Esq.
      BAKER &HOSTETLER LLP
      1801 California Street, Suite 4400
      Denver, CO 80202-2662
      Telephone (303) 861-0600
      Facsimile (303) 861-7805
      Email: ccollignon@bakerlaw.com
             mbaisley@bakerlaw.com

CIPRIANI USA: Faces "Sypert" Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Cipriani USA, Inc.
The case is styled as Kathleen Sypert, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Cipriani USA, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-06490-PAE (S.D. N.Y., July 18, 2018).

Cipriani USA, Inc. owns and operates restaurants. The company was
founded in 1931 and is based in New York, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


COCA-COLA CO: 3rd Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in "Enslin"
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, SHANE E. ENSLIN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, v. THE COCA-COLA COMPANY; COCA COLA
REFRESHMENTS USA, INC.; COCA-COLA ENTERPRISES, INC.; KEYSTONE
COCA-COLA AND BOTTLING AND DISTRIBUTION CORPORATION; KEYSTONE
COCA-COLA BOTTLING CO.; KEYSTONE COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY, INC.;
KEYSTONE COCA-COLA BOTTLING CORPORATION; THOMAS WILLIAM ROGERS,
III; DOE DEFENDANTS 1-50; ABC CORPORATIONS 1-50; XYZ PARTNERSHIPS
AND ASSOCIATIONS, Shane E. Enslin, Appellant in No. 17-3153 The
Coca-Cola Company; Coca Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., Coca-Cola
Enterprises, Inc., Keystone Coca-Cola and Bottling and Distribution
Corporation; Keystone Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Keystone
Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc., Keystone Coca-Cola Bottling
Corporation, Appellants in No. 17-3256, Case Nos. 17-3153, 17-3256
(3d Cir.), Judge Thomas Hardiman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit (a) affirmed both the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania's (i) summary judgment for
Coca-Cola, and (ii) denial of Enslin's motion for class
certification notwithstanding a default judgment in his favor
against Defendant Rogers; and (b) dismissed as moot Coca-Cola's
cross-appeal.

Enslin began his career as a Coca-Cola service technician in 1996
when he went to work for Keystone Coca-Cola, which was then an
independent bottler and distributor of Coca-Cola products.  In
2001, Keystone was acquired by Coca-Cola Enterprises, so Enslin and
others had to complete new employment paperwork.  Those forms asked
for each employee's address, telephone number, social security
number, and driver's license number.  Enslin worked for Coca-Cola
Enterprises for several years after the Keystone acquisition, but
left the company in 2007.

In 2013, Coca-Cola discovered that Thomas Rogers had been stealing
older laptop computers and taking them home.  Some of those laptops
had been used by Coca-Cola's human resources department and
contained former employees' personal information, including
Enslin's name and driver's license number.  Coca-Cola alerted
Enslin and the other affected employees of the breach.  The company
attempted to recover the stolen computers, but Rogers had given
some of the laptops away, and Coca-Cola cannot definitively say it
found them all.  Sometime after Enslin learned of the breach, his
accounts with several internet retailers were compromised and used
to make unauthorized purchases.  Enslin does not know who accessed
his accounts or how they did so.  He did not have to pay any of the
fraudulent charges.

After the compromise of his retail accounts, Enslin filed the
putative class action against Coca-Cola and Rogers in the District
Court.  He asserted claims under Pennsylvania law for breach of
contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, unjust
enrichment, bailment, and conspiracy, as well as a claim under the
federal Drivers Privacy Protection Act ("DDPA").  Rogers  did not
appear, but Coca-Cola did and moved to dismiss Enslin's complaint
for failure to state a claim.  The District Court held that Enslin
had adequately pleaded claims for breach of contract and unjust
enrichment, but otherwise granted Coca-Cola's motion and dismissed
the rest of Enslin's complaint.

Following discovery, Coca-Cola and Enslin filed cross-motions for
summary judgment.  Enslin also moved to certify a class and to
amend his complaint.  Coca-Cola sought judgment with respect to
Enslin's contract claims on the theory that they were preempted by
federal labor law.  Although the Court rejected that preemption
argument, it nevertheless granted summary judgment for Coca-Cola on
other grounds, denied Enslin's motion to amend, and denied his
motion for class certification as moot.  Enslin moved for
reconsideration with respect to the District Court's summary
judgment, which the Court denied in a comprehensive opinion.

Meanwhile, over the course of nearly three years of litigation,
Rogers never appeared to defend against Enslin's claims.  So
shortly after entering summary judgment in favor of Coca-Cola, the
District Court entered a default judgment against Rogers for $17
(the amount it cost Enslin to buy checks for the new checking
account he opened after his retail accounts were compromised).
That judgment ran in Enslin's favor only, since the District Court
had previously rejected Enslin's request to enter judgment against
Rogers on a classwide basis.  Enslin and Coca-Cola filed timely
notices of appeal.

Enslin's appeal presents four issues.  He challenges: (1) the
summary judgment on his contract claims; (2) the dismissal of his
negligence claim; (3) the denial of his motion to amend his
complaint to replead a claim under the DDPA; and (4) the dismissal
of his motion for class certification as moot with respect to
Rogers.

Judge Handiman finds that Enslin rovides no evidence from which a
reasonable jury could conclude that his accounts were compromised
because information was gleaned from the stolen laptops. So breach
or no breach, Enslin's contract claims fail because he cannot show
he was damaged as a result of Coca-Cola's conduct.  The Judge will
affirm the District Court's summary judgment as well as its order
denying Enslin's motion for reconsideration for that reason.

Turning next to Enslin's negligence claim, the Judge finds that,
where Pennsylvania law was clear and Enslin did not -- and still
does not -- propose any amendment that would overcome his failure
to plead a non-economic loss, he cannot say the Court abused its
discretion in dismissing his negligence claim with prejudice.  He
will accordingly affirm.

As to the DDPA claim, the Judge explains that according to the
proposed amended complaint, the last such transfer was between The
Coca-Cola Co. and a wholly owned subsidiary called Coca-Cola
Refreshments USA, Inc. on Oct. 2, 2010.  He says even assuming that
this was an unlawful disclosure for purposes of the DPPA, it still
occurred more than four years before Enslin filed this suit on Nov.
12, 2014.

Finally, the Judge disagrees with Enslin's claim that the District
Court erred when it denied his belated request to certify a class
based on an entirely new theory of liability.  Enslin had never in
"nearly three years of litigation" pleaded that Coca-Cola could be
held vicariously liable.  The Court did not abuse its discretion by
refusing to entertain Enslin's "request to, in effect, reboot this
case after summary judgment had already been granted.

Judge Handiman affirmed the orders of the District Court, denied
Enslin's motion to certify a question of law to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, and he dismissed as moot Coca-Cola's cross-appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 12, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/Yt354W from Leagle.com.

COLLECTO INC: 9th Cir. Affirms Sanctions Against Counsel in "Diaz"
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WALTER DIAZ, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES MESSER, Attorney
for Defendant Collecto, Inc.; et al., Appellants, v. COLLECTO,
INC., DBA EOS CCA, Defendant, Case No. 17-15402 (9th Cir.), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the sanctions
the district court imposed against the Appellants under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1927.

At the outset, the Court notes that sanctions are inappropriate
where their imposition would "chill zealous advocacy."
Specifically, sanctions should not be applied simply because
attorneys advance a novel argument that the Ninth Circuit has not
yet considered or perhaps even asserts arguments challenging
already existing precedent.  But those were not the bases for the
Section 1927 sanctions the district court imposed in the case.
Instead, the district court sanctioned the Appellants primarily
because of the slipshod and misleading manner in which they argued
in support of their Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion by relying on
clearly inapposite authority.

Section 1927 provides that a court "may" require "any attorney" who
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and exatiously
to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys'
fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.  The Ninth
Circuit has recognized that, among other circumstances, bad faith
is present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a
frivolous argument.  In the case, the district court found that
Collecto's attorneys made a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion that was
both frivolous and filed recklessly.  Hence, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in deeming Collecto's Rule 12(c) arguments
to be frivolous.

In the ongoing class action underlying the appeal, Diaz alleges
that Collecto, a debt collection agency, violated California's
Invasion of Privacy Act ("IPA") -- specifically California Penal
Code Sections 632 and 632.7 -- by recording its telephone calls
with Diaz without first obtaining his consent.

Among its frivolous Rule 12(c) contentions, Collecto challenged
Diaz's claim under California Penal Code Section 632 by arguing
that Collecto's employees' telephone conversations with Diaz about
his debt were not private or confidential.  The district court did
not abuse its discretion in deeming this argument to be contrary to
California case law addressing what is a "confidential
communication" under Section 632.  In addition, that argument
contradicted Diaz's well-pled factual allegations, which must be
accepted as true at the Rule 12(c) stage of litigation.

As to its challenges to Diaz's claims implicating both California
Penal Code Sections 632 and 632.7, Collecto relied on Illinois case
law to contend, frivolously, that California's IPA was overbroad as
applied to Collecto.  In asserting its overbreadth argument,
Collecto specifically eschewed any facial challenge to the
California statutes, expressly asserting only an as-applied
overbreadth challenge to the California statute.  But, the Court
finds that a litigant cannot make an as-applied overbreadth
argument; an overbreadth challenge must be addressed to the facial
validity of a statute.  Understandably, then, the Illinois cases on
which Collecto based its as-applied argument addressed instead a
facial overbreadth challenge to an Illinois statute.

Furthermore, in support of its as-applied overbreadth argument,
Collecto asserted that because its debt collectors could take
written notes of their conversation with Diaz, the IPA's
prohibition against recording those conversations violated
Collecto's First Amendment rights. But the Illinois cases which
Collecto used to support this argument did not hold that, because
one can take written notes of a private conversation, a state
legislature cannot constitutionally preclude recording that
conversation.  The district court, thus, did not abuse its
discretion in deeming Collecto's Rule 12(c) arguments to be
frivolous.

Such frivolous arguments alone will not support Section 1927
sanctions, however.  The attorneys making those frivolous arguments
must have also acted with subjective bad faith.  The Ninth Circuit
has recognized that such bad faith is present when an attorney
"recklessly raises a frivolous argument."  Here, the district court
did not clearly err in finding that Collecto's attorneys acted
recklessly when they asserted these frivolous Rule 12(c) arguments.
The quality of these arguments was a gross deviation from the
standard of legal arguments one would expect under these
circumstances.  That is particularly so because the case law on
which Appellants based their arguments was so clearly inapposite.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 13, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/QfZIbH from Leagle.com.

CONAGRA FOODS: Allen Seeks to Certify Class & Subclasses
--------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned ERIN ALLEN on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. CONAGRA FOODS INC. a
Delaware corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 3:13-cv-01279-WHO
(N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff will moved the Court on November 7,
2018, for an order certifying these classes:

Class:

   "all natural persons who purchased Parkay Spray in the
   United States, at any time from January 1, 2008 to the
   present and subject to the applicable statutes of
   limitations. The Class will pursue common law unjust
   enrichment claims";

Multi-State Subclass 1:

   "class members who purchased Parkay Spray in the
   following states, subject to the state???s statute of
   limitations: California, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts,
   Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North
   Carolina, South Carolina, Washington. Multi-State
   Subclass 1 (the "Broad Claims  Subclass") will pursue
   unfair and deceptive act claims under the Unfair
   Competition Law";

Multi-State Subclass 2:

   "class members who purchased Parkay Spray in the
   following states, subject to the state???s statute of
   limitations: Alaska, California, District of Columbia,
   Hawaii, Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New
   Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon,  Rhode Island. Multi-State
   Subclass 2 (the "Enumerated Claims Subclass") will
   pursue unfair and deceptive act claims under
   the California Legal Remedies Act";

Multi-State Subclass 3:

   "class members who purchased Parkay Spray in the
   following states, subject to the state???s statute of
   limitations: Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota,
   Wisconsin, and North Dakota. Multi-State Subclass 3
   (the "Intent Subclass") will pursue unfair and
   deceptive act claims under laws of the states within
   the Class that are similar to the Broad Claims
   Subclass, but have additional intent requirements";

Multi-State Subclass 4:

   "class members who purchased Parkay Spray in the
   following states, subject to the state???s statute of
   limitations: Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana,
   Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah. Multi-State
   Subclass 4 (the "Knowledge Subclass") will pursue
   unfair and deceptive act claims under the laws of the
   states within the Class that are similar to
   the Enumerated Claims Subclass"; and

California Sub-Subclass:

   "unfair and False Claims Subclass members who purchased
   Parkay Spray in California during the Class Period. The
   California Sub-subclass will include fraud, breach of
   express warranty, and misrepresentation claims under
   California law.

In addition to the California Sub-Subclass, if the Court denies any
Multi-State Subclass, Plaintiff proposes additional subclasses for
those states within each subclass for which a plaintiff intervenes
(i.e., Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court appoint Plaintiff Erin
Allen as class representative on all claims, and Gutride Safier LLP
and The Eureka Law Firm as lead class counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/X0l4nS at no charge.

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class:

          Adam J. Gutride, Esq.
          Seth A. Safier, Esq.
          Anthony Patek, Esq.
          Kristen Simplicio, Esq.
          GUTRIDE SAFIER LLP
          100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 639 9090
          Facsimile: (415) 449 6469
          E-mail: adam@gutridesafier.com
          seth@gutridesafier.com
          anthony@gutridesafier.com

               - and -

          Ureka E. Idstrom, Esq.
          THE EUREKA LAW FIRM
          5605 Belinder Road
          Fairway, KS 66205
          Telephone: (816) 665 3515
          E-mail: uidstrom@eurekalaw.com


CONCORDE INC: Faces "Gross" Suit in M.D. Florida
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Concorde, Inc. The
case is styled as Thomas Gross, on his own behalf and on behalf of
all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff v. Concorde, Inc, a
Foreign For-Profit Corporation, Defendant, Case No.
8:18-cv-01755-MSS-CPT (M.D. Fla., July 18, 2018).

Concorde, Inc. offers drug testing services in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Andrew Ross Frisch, Esq.
   Morgan & Morgan, PA
   600 N Pine Island Rd, Suite 400
   Plantation, FL 33324
   Tel: (954) 318-0268
   Fax: (954) 333-3515
   Email: afrisch@forthepeople.com

      - and -

   C. Ryan Morgan, Esq.
   Morgan & Morgan, PA
   20 N Orange Ave Ste 1600
   Orlando, FL 32801-4624
   Tel: (407) 420-1414
   Fax: (407) 245-3401
   Email: rmorgan@forthepeople.com

      - and -

   Marc Reed Edelman, Esq.
   Morgan & Morgan, PA
   One Tampa City Center Ste 700
   201 N Franklin Street
   Tampa, FL 33602-5157
   Tel: (813) 223-5505
   Fax: (813) 257-0572
   Email: MEdelman@forthepeople.com


CREDIT SUISSE: Ninth Circuit Appeal Filed in "Laver" Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Christopher M. Laver filed an appeal from a court ruling
in the lawsuit styled Christopher Laver v. Credit Suisse Securities
(USA), LLC, Case No. 3:18-cv-00828-WHO, in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California, San Francisco.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
seeks to recover damages, restitution, disgorgement, specific
performance, and other appropriate equitable and injunctive relief
caused by Credit Suisse's refusal to pay many millions of dollars
in owed "deferred compensation" to its financial adviser employees
following Credit Suisse's decision to shutter its financial
advisory operations in late 2015.

According to the complaint, for many years, Credit Suisse provided
financial advisory services to clients throughout the United
States, providing these services through a team of financial
advisers in Credit Suisse's "Private Banking Division."

The appellate case is captioned as Christopher Laver v. Credit
Suisse Securities (USA), LLC, Case No. 18-16328, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by August 16, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on September 17, 2018;

   -- Appellant Christopher M. Laver's opening brief is due on
      October 25, 2018;

   -- Appellee Credit Suisse Securities (USA), LLC's answering
      brief is due on November 26, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant CHRISTOPHER M. LAVER, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Roger N. Heller, Esq.
          Robert J. Nelson, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          275 Battery Street, 29th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 956-1000
          Facsimile: (415) 956-1008
          E-mail: rheller@lchb.com
                  rnelson@lchb.com

               - and -

          Taras Kick, Esq.
          THE KICK LAW FIRM
          815 Moraga Drive
          Los Angeles, CA 90049
          Telephone: (310) 395-2988
          E-mail: taras@kicklawfirm.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey Riffer, Esq.
          ELKINS KALT WEINTRAUB REUBEN GARTSIDE, LLP
          2049 Century Park East
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 746-4400
          E-mail: jriffer@elkinskalt.com

Defendant-Appellee CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA), LLC, is
represented by:

          David Jacobs, Esq.
          Deanna L. Ballesteros, Esq.
          EPSTEIN BECKER & GREEN, PC
          1925 Century Park East
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 556-8861
          E-mail: djacobs@ebglaw.com
                  dballesteros@ebglaw.com



CREST HOLLOW: Faces "Sypert" Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Crest Hollow Country
Club at Woodbury, Inc. The case is styled as Kathleen Sypert, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Crest Hollow Country Club at Woodbury, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-06497 (S.D. N.Y., July 18, 2018).

Crest Hollow Country Club at Woodbury, Inc. is a Wedding venue in
Woodbury, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


DERRICK J FRANKLIN: Faces "Jones" Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Derrick J. Franklin.
The case is styled as Isiah A. Jones, III for himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Derrick J. Franklin, Alyssa
Franklin, Reno Keoni Franklin, Dino Franklin, Jr. and Brandon
Wilder, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-02982-JS (E.D. Penn., July 17,
2018).[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   ROBERT F. SALVIN, Esq.
   PHILA DEBT CLINIC & CONSUMER LAW CENTER
   TWO BALA PLAZA SUITE 300
   BALA CYNWYD, PA 19004-1573
   Tel: (215) 300-2388
   Email: rfsalvin@hotmail.com


DGS CONSTRUCTION: Court Certifies Class in Amaya et al. Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned MARIO ERNESTO AMAYA, JOSE NORLAND GONZALEZ
and JOSE AMADEO CASTILLO, the Plaintiffs, v. DGS CONSTRUCTION, LLC
and THE WHITING-TURNER CONTRACTING COMPANY, the Defendants, Case
No. 8:16-cv-03350-TDC (D. Md.), the Hon. Judge Theodore D. Chuang
entered an order July 10, 2018:

   1. granting Plaintiffs' motion for class certification;

   2. granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend the
      Complaint; and

   3. pursuant to the Court's amended scheduling order,
      permitting parties an additional 60 days from the
      date of this Order to complete discovery and submit
      a Post-Discovery Joint Status Report.

The Court said, "Any notice of intent to file a pretrial
dispositive motion is due within seven days of the deadline for
requests for admission. The Plaintiffs shall file an Amended
Complaint within seven days of the date of this Order. Defendants'
Answers to the Amended Complaint must be filed within 14 days of
the filing of the Amended Complaint. Requests for admission are due
within seven days of the date of the completion of discovery."

A copy of the Order is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/3HtPNx at no charge.


DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Appeals Order in "Saint-Jean" Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Defendant District of Columbia filed an appeal from a court ruling
in the lawsuit entitled Mica Saint-Jean, et al. v. District of
Columbia, Case 1:08-cv-01769-ABJ, in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Mica
Saint-Jean, Guerline Bourciquot and Marie Dorlus brought the class
action alleging they were barred from working overtime hours at a
D.C. school bus terminal unless they paid illegal kickbacks to
their former supervisor, Michelle Smith.

Plaintiffs Saint-Jean and Dorlus said they each paid Smith $75 to
$150 per pay period to obtain overtime assignments.  When they
stopped paying Smith in September 2007, she refused to assign them
overtime hours, selectively enforced Division of Transportation
policies against them, and issued "repeated and unnecessary
warnings," according to the complaint.  Smith even suspended
Bourciquot without pay, the complaint states.

The complaint alleges violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act, Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
local statutory and common law.

The appellate case is captioned as Mica Saint-Jean, et al. v. DC,
Case No. 18-7120, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit.

Plaintiff-Appellee Guerline Bourciquot, of Rockville, Maryland,
appears pro se.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Mica Saint-Jean is represented by:

          Richard Chaifetz, Esq.
          CHAIFETZ & COYLE, PC
          7164 Columbia Gateway Drive, Suite 205
          Columbia, MD 21046
          Telephone: (443) 546-4608
          E-mail: riclaw@algxmail.com

Plaintiff-Appellee Marie Dorlus, on behalf of themselves and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Michael Kator, Esq.
          KATOR PARKS & WEISER, PLLC
          1200 18th Street, NW, Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20012
          Telephone: (202) 898-4800
          E-mail: mkator@katorparks.com

Defendant-Appellant District of Columbia is represented by:

          Loren L. AliKhan, Esq.
          OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
          441 4th Street, NW
          One Judiciary Square, Sixth Floor
          Washington, DC 20001-2714
          Telephone: (202) 727-3400
          E-mail: loren.alikhan@dc.gov


DRIFTWOOD BAY: Grittani Seeks to Recoup Minimum Wages for Servers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ALLISON GRITTANI on her own behalf and all similarly situated
individuals v. DRIFTWOOD BAY CONCEPTS INC. d/b/a SEA HAGS BAR AND
GRILL, a Florida profit corporation, and DAVID MIZE, individually,
Case No. 8:18-cv-01700-SDM-AAS (M.D. Fla., July 13, 2018), alleges
that the Plaintiff and other servers are entitled to minimum wages
from the Defendants pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Driftwood Bay is a Florida Profit Corporation with a principal
place of business in Pinellas County, Florida.  David Mize owned
and operated the Company.

The Defendants, doing business as Sea Hags Bar and Grill, operate
for a common business service -- to serve food and beverages to the
general public in a sit-down restaurant setting.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Marc R. Edelman, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          201 N. Franklin Street, Suite 700
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 223-5502
          Facsimile: (813) 223-5402
          E-mail: MEdelman@forthepeople.com



EDISON INT'L: Tibble Appeals C.D. Calif. Decision to 9th Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs William Bauer, William Izral, Henry Runowiecki,
Schlichter Bogard & Denton LLP, Frederick Suhadolc and Glenn Tibble
filed an appeal from a court ruling in their lawsuit titled Glenn
Tibble, et al. v. Edison International, et al., Case No.
2:07-cv-05359-SVW-AGR, in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, Los Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, former
employees of Midwest Generation LLC, a subsidiary of Southern
California Edison Company (SCE), filed a lawsuit against SCE,
parent company Edison International, Edison International Trust
Investment Committee, SCE Benefits Committee, SCE's vice president
of human resources and others involved in overseeing the funds,
alleging these parties breached their fiduciary duties.  Led by
former employee Glenn Tibble, the Plaintiffs claimed the management
of their 401(k) plans were mishandled, costing them more than $7
million.  They pursued recourse under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) in a class action lawsuit.

In the initial lawsuit, the Plaintiffs alleged plan administrators
bought retail shares in March 1999 instead of institutional shares,
which would have incurred lower fees.  They also claimed SCE used
monies from the retail shares to offset plan management costs
charged by its record-keeper, Hewitt Associates, LLC.

The appellate case is captioned as Glenn Tibble, et al. v. Edison
International, et al., Case No. 18-55974, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by August 20, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on September 18, 2018;

   -- Appellants William Bauer, William Izral, Henry Runowiecki,
      Schlichter Bogard & Denton LLP, Frederick Suhadolc and
      Glenn Tibble's opening brief is due on October 29, 2018;

   -- Appellees Edison International, Edison International
      Benefits Committee, Edison International Trust Investment
      Committee, Manager of Southern California Edison's HR
      Service Center, Secretary of the Edison International
      Benefits Committee and Southern California Edison's Vice
      President of Human Resources' answering brief is due on
      November 29, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants GLENN TIBBLE, as representative of a class of
similarly situated persons, and on behalf of the Plan; WILLIAM
BAUER, as representative of a class of similarly situated persons,
and on behalf of the Plan; WILLIAM IZRAL, as representative of a
class of similarly situated persons, and on behalf of the Plan;
HENRY RUNOWIECKI, as representative of a class of similarly
situated persons, and on behalf of the Plan; and FREDERICK
SUHADOLC, as representative of a class of similarly situated
persons, and on behalf of the Plan, are represented by:

          Jerome Joseph Schlichter, Esq.
          Michael A. Wolff, Esq.
          Nelson G. Wolff, Esq.
          SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, LLP
          100 S. 4th Street, Suite 1200
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 621-6115
          E-mail: jschlichter@uselaws.com
                  mwolff@uselaws.com
                  nwolff@uselaws.com

               - and -

          William A. White, Esq.
          HILL, FARRER & BURRILL, LLP
          300 South Grand Avenue
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-3147
          Telephone: (213) 620-0460
          E-mail: wwhite@hillfarrer.com

Defendants-Appellees EDISON INTERNATIONAL, EDISON INTERNATIONAL
BENEFITS COMMITTEE, FKA Southern California Edison Benefits
Committee, EDISON INTERNATIONAL TRUST INVESTMENT COMMITTEE,
SECRETARY OF THE EDISON INTERNATIONAL BENEFITS COMMITTEE, SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA EDISON'S VICE PRESIDENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES and MANAGER
OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON'S HR SERVICE CENTER are represented
by:

          Brian D. Boyle, Esq.
          O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
          1625 Eye Street, N.W.
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 383-5327
          E-mail: bboyle@omm.com

               - and -

          Catalina Joos Vergara, Esq.
          O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
          400 South Hope Street, 18th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 430-6000
          E-mail: cvergara@omm.com




EDUCAP INC: Court Dismisses "Quick" RICO Suit
---------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, District of Columbia, granted
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned DEWAINE QUICK, et
al., Plaintiffs, v. EDUCAP, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No.
17-cv-01242 (APM)(D.D.C.).

This case is born out of two student loans issued by Defendant HSBC
Bank, one to Plaintiff Dewaine Quick and the other to Plaintiff
Lynn Davis, as co-signer for her niece. Although the two loans are
unrelated, the Plaintiffs' stories are much the same.
Approximately two years later, the Plaintiffs filed this case as a
class action, alleging that EduCap, Weinstock, and HSBC violated
state and federal law through their joint debt-collection
activities. The Plaintiffs' suit centers on a single alleged
transgression: that EduCap falsely misrepresented in the collection
actions that EduCap, as opposed to HSBC, had entered into the loan
agreements with the Plaintiffs.

The Defendants argue that this suit must be dismissed for two
primary reasons: (1) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests the court
of subject-matter jurisdiction; and (2) the doctrine of res
judicata precludes the Plaintiffs' claims.

Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(1)

The court begins with three jurisdictional issues: (1) whether the
court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' claims
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) whether both the Plaintiffs
lack standing to sue HSBC; and (3) whether Plaintiff Quick
possesses standing to assert any claims. Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction.

The court finds that: (1) it lacks jurisdiction under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine to hear the Plaintiffs' RICO, unjust
enrichment, and abuse of process claims, but has jurisdiction as to
their federal and District of Columbia unfair debt collection
statutory claims; (2) the Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue claims
against HSBC; and (3) Plaintiff Quick has standing to pursue some
but not all of his claims against EduCap and Weinstock.

Rooker-Feldman

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine hails from the only two Supreme Court
cases in which the Court has applied it: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).  The doctrine is rooted in 28
U.S.C. Section 1257, a statute that vests sole authority in the
Supreme Court to review state court judgments.  In both Rooker and
Feldman, the plaintiffs asked the District Court to overturn the
injurious state-court judgment and in both cases the Court held
that District Courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over such
claims.

The court's conclusion turns on the showings that the Plaintiffs
must make to prove each claim and the relief sought. Take the
Plaintiffs' RICO claims, Counts I and II. They allege that the
Defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity that
included obtaining unlawful judgments and receiving, investing and
reinvesting income derived from unlawful L2L debt collection
lawsuits. The Plaintiffs also allege that the Defendants' unlawful
acts, including securing the allegedly unlawful judgments,
proximately caused them harm. They seek judgment in their favor for
treble damages suffered by them as a result of the Defendants'
predicate acts and violations.

If the Plaintiffs' RICO allegations are proven true, it would mean
that the state court judgments against the Plaintiffs are unlawful
and would result in an award of damages that would be tied directly
to payments made to satisfy the judgments, e.g., the $5 monthly
paid by Davis to Weinstock. Therefore, as pleaded, the Plaintiffs'
RICO claims invite district court review and rejection of the
Superior Court judgments, a consequence barred by Rooker-Feldman.

The same outcome would result if the Plaintiffs were to prevail on
their claims for unjust enrichment, Count III, and abuse of
process, Count VI. In those claims, the Plaintiffs assert,
respectively, that it would be inequitable for the Defendants to
retain any amounts obtained from the Plaintiffs without returning
the value thereof in that such amounts are not owed to the
Defendants and that Defendants' ulterior motive in misusing the
legal process was to, among other things, obtain unlawful judgments
and secure payments for unlawful amounts.

Thus, like the Plaintiffs' RICO claims, their common law tort
claims allege that their harms flow from the D.C. Superior Court
judgments and seek review and rejection of those judgments.
Rooker-Feldman bars jurisdiction as to those causes of action.

The court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine to hear the Plaintiffs' RICO, unjust
enrichment, and abuse-of-process claims. Accordingly, those claims
are dismissed.

Article III Standing

The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the three elements
of constitutional standing: (1) that the plaintiff suffered an
injury in fact (2) that there exists a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of and (3) that it is likely,
as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision.

Plaintiffs' Standing to Assert Claims Against HSBC

HSBC argues that the Plaintiffs have not made out a plausible claim
of standing against it, because the complaint fails to allege
injury that is fairly traceable to HSBC's alleged misconduct.

The Plaintiffs defend their pleading as to HSBC's standing
primarily by pointing to the fact that, in Quick's and Davis's debt
collection cases, Weinstock moved more than once to substitute HSBC
as the plaintiff. These allegations, the Plaintiffs insist,
establish that HSBC's actions are directly related to the
Plaintiffs' injuries, as HSBC gave tacit approval of approval of
Weinstock and EduCap's unlawful conduct on behalf of HSBC, as
evidenced by the Defendants carpet-bombing thousands of L2L
borrowers in HSBC's name for more than a decade without
renunciation. The Plaintiffs, however, fail to include any tacit
approval theory in their Second Amended Complaint, either as a
factual matter or as a basis for liability, which is fatal.   

Moreover, the complaint's allegations concerning substituting HSBC
as debt-collection plaintiffs do not implicate HSBC, as they relate
only to conduct by EduCap and Weinstock. The contention that
Weinstock had no relationship with HSBC only underscores the
implausibility of the Plaintiffs' insistence that HSBC caused it
harm. The Second Amended Complaint, although often invoking HSBC's
name, does not allege any conduct by HSBC that is fairly traceable
to Plaintiffs' claimed injuries.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed against HSBC for
lack of standing.

Quick's Standing

Quick lacks standing to advance RICO claims. A RICO plaintiff only
has standing if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has
been injured in his business or property by reason of the conduct
constituting the violation. Quick does not claim any injury to
business or property: He has not paid a cent to any Defendant as a
result of the debt collection action. And the attorney's fees and
costs that he has incurred in bringing this action are not an
adequate injury, as the mere fact that continued adjudication would
provide a remedy for an injury that is only the by product of the
suit itself does not mean that an injury is cognizable under
Article III.

Accordingly, Quick lacks standing to bring a RICO claim.

The same is true for the unjust enrichment claim. By failing to
allege that he has paid or otherwise conferred a benefit on any
Defendant, Quick has failed to allege an injury-in-fact as to that
claim.   Accordingly, Quick's unjust enrichment claim must be
dismissed.

Quick, however, has alleged a sufficient injury with respect to his
statutory unfair debt collection practice claims and abuse of
process claim. For purposes of the FDCPA, a plaintiff is not
required to show actual damages; an attempt to collect money in
violation of the FDCPA will suffice.   The District of Columbia
Debt Collection Law (DCDCL) likewise makes it unlawful to use
fraudulent acts to attempt to collect claims. Additionally,
emotional distress damages are recoverable for an abuse-of-process
claim, which Quick claims to have suffered.  

Quick therefore has standing to assert claims under the FDCPA, the
DCDCL, and for abuse of process.

Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)

The Defendants also argue that dismissal of all claims is warranted
under Rule 12(b)(6) for multiple reasons: (1) the doctrine of res
judicata precludes the Plaintiffs from bringing these claims; (2)
the Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts to support their
claims against HSBC; (3) the Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts
sufficient to make out each of their claims; and (4) the FDCPA
claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

Res Judicata

When evaluating whether claim preclusion operates to bar a
subsequent lawsuit, courts look to whether the prior litigation (1)
involv[ed] the same claims or cause of action, (2) between the same
parties or their privies, and (3) there has been a final, valid
judgment on the merits, (4) by a court of competent jurisdiction.

The Plaintiffs offer additional arguments for why res judicata does
not apply, but none are persuasive. The Plaintiffs assert that res
judicata cannot apply here because, as courts have consistently
held, FDCPA lawsuits are not compulsory counterclaims. There are
two problems with this line of argument. First, as noted
previously, the focus of claim preclusion is not on a particular
legal theory or claim, but rather on facts of the transaction or
occurrence at issue.

Thus, the fact that an FDCPA claim may not be a compulsory
counterclaim is not dispositive.

Second, under District of Columbia law, claim preclusion reaches
more than compulsory counterclaims. It also reaches permissible
counterclaims when the relationship between the counterclaim and
the plaintiff's claim is such that the successful prosecution of
the second action would nullify the initial judgment or impair the
rights established in the initial action.

Here, if the Plaintiffs were to prove that EduCap obtained standing
in the D.C. Superior Court matters through fraud, that would
effectively prevent EduCap, and perhaps others, from enforcing
those D.C. Superior Court judgments. No court would allow EduCap to
collect on a judgment determined to have been unlawfully obtained.
So, even if the Plaintiffs' claims are permissible counterclaims,
they are barred by res judicata.

Failure to State Any Claim Against HSBC

For the same reasons the Plaintiffs have failed to allege that
their claimed injuries are fairly traceable to HSBC, they have
failed to allege sufficient factual matter to support a plausible
claim against HSBC. Once more, the Second Amended Complaint
contains no facts connecting HSBC to the alleged scheme to defraud
defaulted borrowers by misrepresenting EduCap's standing to bring
collection actions.

Accordingly, the court also dismisses all claims against HSBC for
failure to state a claim.

Failure to State Cognizable Claims

Substantive civil RICO claims

The Plaintiffs' RICO claims fail because Plaintiffs do not plead
two essential elements: (1) a pattern of racketeering activity,
which is demonstrated by the commission of at least two predicate
offenses, and (2) an enterprise.

The Plaintiffs implicitly acknowledge as much, alleging that the
affidavit was sent to network attorneys across the United States to
attach to EduCap's debt collection lawsuits. As the Plaintiffs'
RICO claim is premised entirely on mailings done for the purpose of
litigation activity, they have failed to state a claim.

The Plaintiffs also fail to allege the existence of a RICO
enterprise. A RICO enterprise is defined as any. partnership
association or group of individuals associated in fact although not
a legal entity. An association-in-fact must have three structural
features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the
enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to
pursue the enterprise's purpose. Individuals who act independently
and without coordination, however, cannot constitute a RICO
enterprise.

Civil RICO conspiracy claim

In addition, the Plaintiffs allege that the trio of defendants
conspired to commit violations of the RICO statute.   The RICO
conspiracy provision makes it unlawful for any person to conspire
to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of
[18 U.S.C. The pleading deficiencies in Plaintiffs' substantive
RICO allegations mean that its conspiracy claim also fails.

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

The Plaintiffs' FDCPA claim is against EduCap and Weinstock only,
and those defendants seek dismissal of the claim on two grounds:
(1) it is time-barred under the FDCPA's one-year statute of
limitations; and (2) it fails to allege that EduCap and Weinstock
handled Plaintiffs' loans only after they defaulted, as is required
to be subject to the FDCPA

In cases such as this one, where the FDCPA claim is premised on the
wrongful filing of a debt collection action, federal appellate
courts generally have held that the claim accrues when the debtor
is served with the complaint, as that is the date when the debtor
receives notice of the action. Applying this approach, the
Plaintiffs' FDCPA claim would be time barred: They did not file
this action within one year of service, and they do not contend
otherwise.

The Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead fraudulent
concealment. For starters, the Plaintiffs have not pleaded any
affirmative misrepresentation by EduCap or Weinstock that prevented
them from discovering the falsity of the Maiorca Affidavit.
Although the Maiorca Affidavit itself purportedly contains a false
and misleading statement, neither EduCap nor Weinstock is alleged
to have done anything to conceal its falsity. Moreover, the loan
documents attached to the complaints contained ample information
that should have alerted the Plaintiffs if they did not know
already that HSBC had issued their now-defaulted loans, not EduCap.
On the facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, the
Plaintiffs cannot plausibly maintain that their claims are timely
by operation of equitable tolling.

A full-text copy of the District Court???s July 12, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7qq5s6h from
Leagle.com.

DEWAINE QUICK & LYNN DAVIS, Plaintiffs, represented by Dean
Gregory, LAW OFFICES OF DEAN GREGORY.

EDUCAP INC., Defendant, represented by Jack David Lapidus, MACLEAY,
LYNCH, & LAPIDUS, P.C.

WEINSTOCK, FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, P.A., Defendant, represented by
David M. Ross -- david.ross@wilsonelser.com -- WILSON ELSER
MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER, LLP & Kevin Patrick Farrell --
kevin.farrell@wilsonelser.com -- WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN &
DICKER, LLP.

HSBC BANK USA, N.A., Defendant, represented by Tara Sky Woodward --
swoodward@babc -- BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP, Edward S.
Sledge, IV -- esledge@bradley.com -- BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS
LLP, pro hac vice & Zachary Allen Madonia -- zmadonia@bradley.com
-- BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP, pro hac vice.

EL POLLO LOCO: Seeks Ninth Circuit Review of Ruling in "Turocy"
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants El Pollo Loco Holdings, Inc., Freeman Spogli & Co.,
Laurance Roberts, Stephen J. Sather, Trimaran Capital Partners,
Trimaran Pollo Partners, L.L.C. and Edward J. Valle filed an appeal
from a court ruling in the lawsuit titled Daniel Turocy v. El Pollo
Loco Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No. 8:15-cv-01343-DOC-KES, in the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Santa
Ana.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Turocy
Case and a related lawsuit, Ron Huston, et al. v. El Pollo Loco
Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No. 8:15-cv-01710, have been
consolidated.  A consolidated complaint was filed on January 29,
2016, on behalf of co-lead plaintiffs and others similarly
situated, alleging violations of federal securities laws in
connection with Holdings common stock purchased or otherwise
acquired and the purchase of call options or the sale of put
options, between May 1, 2015 and August 13, 2015.

Among other things, the Plaintiffs allege that, in 2014 and early
2015, Holdings suffered losses due to rising labor costs in
California and, in an attempt to mitigate the effects of such
rising costs, removed a US$5 value option from the Company's menu,
which resulted in a decrease in traffic from value-conscious
consumers.  The Plaintiffs further allege that during the Class
Period, Holdings and the Individual Defendants made a series of
materially false and misleading statements that concealed the
effect that these factors were having on store sales growth,
resulting in Holdings stock continuing to be traded at artificially
inflated prices.

The appellate case is captioned as Daniel Turocy v. El Pollo Loco
Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No. 18-80082, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Respondent DANIEL TUROCY, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Mary K. Blasy, Esq.
          SCOTT & SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          600 W. Broadway, Suite 3300
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 233-4565

               - and -

          Amber Eck, Esq.
          HAEGGQUIST & ECK, LLP
          225 Broadway, Suite 2050
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 342-8000
          E-mail: ambere@haelaw.com

               - and -

          Darren Jay Robbins, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058
          E-mail: darrenr@rgrdlaw.com

Defendants-Petitioners EL POLLO LOCO HOLDINGS, INC., TRIMARAN
CAPITAL PARTNERS, TRIMARAN POLLO PARTNERS, L.L.C., FREEMAN SPOGLI &
CO., STEPHEN J. SATHER, LAURANCE ROBERTS and EDWARD J. VALLE are
represented by:

          Jason D. Russell, Esq.
          SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
          300 South Grand Avenue
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 687-5328
          E-mail: Jason.Russell@skadden.com


ERIKSON LIVING: Sued by Horton Over Unpaid Overtime Under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
JANNIE HORTON v. ERIKSON LIVING, Case No. DC-18-09140 (Tex. Dist.,
Dallas Cty., July 13, 2018), is brought as a collective action on
behalf of the Plaintiff and all others similarly situated alleging
that they were not paid overtime hours as required under the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

Erikson Living is a Maryland corporation headquartered in
Catonsville, Maryland, that is authorized to do and does business
in Dallas County, Texas.

Erickson Living is an operator and developer of retirement
communities.  The Company primarily develops and operates
campus-style retirement communities for adults age 62 or
older.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Vincent J. Bhatti, Esq.
          Ditty S. Bhatti, Esq.
          THE BHATTI LAW FIRM, PLLC
          14785 Preston Road, Suite 550
          Dallas, TX 75254
          Telephone: (214) 253-2533
          Facsimile: (214) 279-0033
          E-mail: Vincent.bhatti@bhattilawfirm.com
                  Ditty.bhatti@bhattilawfirm.com


ESTERO HOTEL: Faces "Honeywell" Suit in M.D. Florida
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Estero Hotel
Associates, LLC. The case is styled as Cheri Honeywell,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Estero Hotel Associates, LLC doing business as:
Towneplace Suites by Marriott Fort Myers Estero a Florida limited
liability company, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-00509-JES-CM (M.D.
Fla., July 18, 2018).

Estero Hotel Associates, LLC is a 3-star hotel in Estero,
Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jessica Lynn Kerr, Esq.
   The Advocacy Group, LLC
   200 SE 6th St Ste 504
   Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301-3424
   Tel: (954) 282-1858
   Fax: (844) 786-3694
   Email: jkerr@advocacypa.com


EVEREST REAL: "Delgado" Suit Seeks to Recoup Wages Under WARN Act
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sylvia Delgado, Ramona Cruz, and Theresa King, et al., on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. EVEREST REAL ESTATE
INVESTMENTS, L.L.P. d/b/a/ ICON HOSPITAL, Case No. 4:18-cv-02471
(S.D. Tex., July 17, 2018), seeks to collect alleged unpaid wages
and benefits for 60 calendar days pursuant to the Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act of 1988.

The Defendant ordered a "mass layoff" and/or "plant closing" at the
Facility commencing in or about April 2018-June 2018.  The
Plaintiffs were employees of the Defendant until they were
terminated as part of, or as a result of a mass layoff and/or plant
closing ordered by the Defendant.

Everest Real Estate Investments, L.L.P., doing business as Icon
Hospital, was a Texas corporation, which maintained a facility at
19211 McKay Drive, in Humble, Texas.  The Company is a healthcare
provider in Humble.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Martin A. Arguello, II, Esq.
          ARGUELLO LAW FIRM
          1110 Nasa Parkway, Suite 620
          Houston, TX 77058
          Telephone: (281) 884-3960
          Facsimile: (281) 884-3961
          E-mail: arguello@defyoppression.com

               - and -

          Mary E. Olsen, Esq.
          M. Vance McCrary, Esq.
          THE GARDNER FIRM, PC
          182 St. Francis Street; Suite 103
          Mobile, AL 36602
          Telephone: (251) 433-8100
          Facsimile: (251) 433-8181
          E-mail: molsen@thegardnerfirm.com

               - and -

          Stuart J. Miller, Esq.
          LANKENAU & MILLER, LLP
          132 Nassau Street, Suite 1100
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 581-5005
          Facsimile: (212) 581-2122
          E-mail: stuart@lankmill.com


FIELD ASSET: Seeks 9th Cir. Review of Ruling in "Bowerman" Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Field Asset Services, Inc., and Field Asset Services,
LLC, filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit styled Fred
Bowerman, et al. v. Field Asset Services, Inc., et al., Case No.
3:13-cv-00057-WHO, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Francisco.

The appellate case is captioned as Fred Bowerman, et al. v. Field
Asset Services, Inc., et al., Case No. 18-16303, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on July 17, 2018, Judge
William H. Orrick granted the Plaintiffs' motion to strike the
Defendants' motion for decertification.

The Plaintiffs moved to strike the Defendants' motion for
decertification on the grounds that the decertification motion
constitutes a motion for reconsideration, for which they are
required to seek leave prior to filing.  The Defendants responded
that an order that grants or denies class certification may be
altered or amended before final judgment and a district court may
decertify a class at any time.  They also asserted that, at least
in the first instance, a motion to decertify a class is not
governed by the standard applied to motions for reconsideration.

The problem with Defendants' argument, Judge Orrick finds, is that
they have already moved to decertify once, and he has already ruled
on it.  Under these circumstances, it seems appropriate that any
subsequent motion to decertify should be fashioned as a motion for
reconsideration.

As a result, Judge Orrick granted the Plaintiffs' motion to strike.
However, he will treat the Defendants' motion to decertify as a
motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration and will let
the parties know if he require furthers briefing once he has
reviewed it.  The hearing on the motion is vacated.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by August 13, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on September 12, 2018;

   -- Appellants Field Asset Services, Inc. and Field Asset
      Services, LLC's opening brief is due on October 23, 2018;

   -- Appellees Fred Bowerman and Julia Bowerman's answering
      brief is due on November 23, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellee FRED BOWERMAN and JULIA BOWERMAN, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Jon Erik Heath, Esq.
          J. ERIK HEATH, ATTORNEY AT LAW
          369 Pine Street, Suite 410
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (404) 426-7840
          E-mail: erik@heathlegal.com

               - and -

          Ronald Scott Kravitz, Esq.
          SHEPHERD FINKELMAN MILLER & SHAH LLP
          201 Filbert Street, Suite 201
          San Francisco, CA 94133
          Telephone: (415) 429-5272
          E-mail: rkravitz@sfmslaw.com

               - and -

          James E. Miller, Esq.
          Laurie Rubinow, Esq.
          SHEPHERD FINKELMAN MILLER & SHAH LLC
          65 Main Street
          Chester, CT 06412
          Telephone: (860) 526-1100
          E-mail: jmiller@sfmslaw.com
                  lrubinow@sfmslaw.com

               - and -

          James C. Shah, Esq.
          SHEPHERD FINKELMAN MILLER & SHAH, LLC
          35 E. State St.
          Media, PA 19063
          Telephone: (610) 891-9880
          E-mail: jshah@sfmslaw.com

               - and -

          Nathan C. Zipperian, Esq.
          SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLC
          1640 Town Center Circle
          Weston, PA 19063
          Telephone: (610) 891-9880
          E-mail: nzipperian@sfmslaw.com

               - and -

          Monique Olivier, Esq.
          OLIVIER SCHREIBER & CHAO LLP
          201 Filbert Street, Suite 201
          San Francisco, CA 94133
          Telephone: (415) 484-0980
          E-mail: monique@dplolaw.com

Defendants-Appellants FIELD ASSET SERVICES, INC., and FIELD ASSET
SERVICES, LLC, are represented by:

          Barrett Green, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          2049 Century Park East
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 553-0308
          E-mail: bgreen@littler.com

               - and -

          Robert G. Hulteng, Esq.
          Aurelio J. Perez, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          333 Bush Street, 34th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 433-1940
          E-mail: rhulteng@littler.com
                  aperez@littler.com



FINANCIAL CORP: Encarnacion Seeks to Certify Consumers Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled OMAR ENCARNACION, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v.
FINANCIAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA, the Defendant, Case No.
2:17-cv-00566-SPC-CM (M.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for
an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all consumers in the State of Florida who were sent
      a L2N Collection Letter from the Defendant, during
      the time period of October 16, 2016 to the present,
      attempting to collect an obligation owed to or
      allegedly owed to Lehigh Regional Medical Center";
      and

   2. appointing Class Counsel Yitzchak Zelman, Esq., of
      Marcus & Zelman, LLC.

A copy of the Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/OHvepJ at in charge.


FIRSTCOLLECT INC: Foerster Seeks to Certify Settlement Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled TAMRA FOERSTER, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. FIRSTCOLLECT,
INC., the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-01337-JEJ (D. Del.), the
Parties ask the Court for an order:

   a. approving the terms of a Settlement Agreement as
      fair, reasonable, and adequate;

   b. providing for the implementation of its terms and
      provisions;

   c. certifying a Settlement Class;

   d. finding that the notice given to the Settlement
      Class satisfies the requirements of due process
      pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
      including Rule 23, the  United States Constitution,
      and any other applicable laws;

   e. dismissing the claims of Plaintiff and the
      Settlement Class alleged in the Complaint without
      prejudice and without costs;

   f. retaining exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the
      terms and provisions of this Agreement;

   g. directing FCI, after all money has been distributed
      from the Class Recovery and no later than 30 days
      after the Void Date, to file a notice apprising the
      Court that the terms of the Agreement have been
      complied with and providing the Court with an
      accounting of how the money in the Class Recovery
      was distributed; and

   h. directing that 10 days after the filing of the
      notice, the dismissal of the claims of Plaintiff
      and the Settlement Class will be with prejudice
      and without costs, absent a timely motion by
      either Plaintiff or FCI.

A copy of the Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/gNKo26 at no charge.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Ari Marcus, Esq.
          Marcus & Zelman LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, New Jersey 07712

Attorneys for Defendant:

          Josiah Wolcott, Esq.
          CONNOLLY GALLAGHER LLP
          267 East Main Street
          Newark, Delaware


FLORIDA: Writ of Prohibition in Students' Suit Partially OK'd
-------------------------------------------------------------
The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, granted in
part and denied in part Plaintiffs' Petition for Writ of
Prohibition in the case captioned RICHARD CORCORAN, in his official
capacity as Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, and
JOE NEGRON, in his official capacity as President of the Florida
Senate, Petitioners, v. ALEXIS F. GEFFIN; RYAN J. GEFFIN; THOMAS A.
WARREN; KATHLEEN VILLACORTA; GOVERNOR RICK SCOTT, in his official
capacity as Chief Executive Officer and Chair of the Board Of
Education; FLORIDA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION; FLORIDA BOARD OF
GOVERNORS OF THE STATE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM; and PAM STEWART, in her
official capacity as Florida Commission of Education, Respondents,
No. 1D18-0500(Fla. App.).

The petitioners in these consolidated cases, the President of the
Florida Senate and the Speaker of the Florida House of
Representatives (the Legislature), seek a writ of prohibition
finding that the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate two
class action complaints filed against them by several of the
respondents, who are university students and donors, that alleged
the Legislature has failed to match donations made to universities
as required by statute. The remaining defendants to that complaint,
Governor Rick Scott, Florida State Board of Education, Florida
State Board of Governors of the State University System, and the
Commissioner on Education, filed a response agreeing this court
should issue the writ of prohibition for the reasons stated in the
petition.

The Fla. App. grants the petition in part. The circuit court does
not have jurisdiction to declare that the Legislature's failure to
appropriate funds constitutes a violation of the single subject
requirement pursuant to article III, section 12 of the Florida
Constitution, as alleged in Count 1 of the complaint. The court
also lacks the jurisdiction to grant one of the remedies sought in
the complaint -- an injunction prohibiting the Legislature from
adopting future appropriations bills that do not contain specific
appropriations for matching donations -- because doing so would
violate the separation of powers doctrine as set forth in article
II, section 3 and article V, section 14(d) of the Florida
Constitution. Thus, the Fla. App. grants the petition as to Count 1
and the injunctive relief sought by respondents.

The Fla. App. denies the petition as to Count 2, which alleges
breach of contract, and Count 4, which seeks declaratory relief.
The Fla. App. says that while it shares many of the misgivings
raised by counsel for the Legislature regarding the sufficiency of
the allegations as to these counts and whether the circuit court
will ultimately be able to fashion a remedy that is not violative
of separation of powers principles, the Fla. App. cannot determine
at this stage of the litigation that the circuit court lacks
jurisdiction to adjudicate these claims.

A full-text copy of the Fla. App.'s June 28, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yaospwfd from Leagle.com.

George N. Meros, Jr. -- George.Meros@hklaw.com -- of Holland &
Knight LLP, Tallahassee; Andy Bardos --
andy.bardos@gray-robinson.com -- and Ashley Lukis --
ashley.lukis@gray-robinson.com -- of GrayRobinson, P.A.,
Tallahassee, for Petitioners.

Eugene E. Stearns -- estearns@stearnsweaver.com -- Grace L. Mead --
gmead@stearnsweaver.com -- and Morgan Q. McDonough --
mmcdonough@stearnsweaver.com -- of Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler
Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., Miami; Glenn Burhans, Jr. --
gburhans@stearhweaver.com -- and Kelly O'Keefe of Stearns Weaver
Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., Tallahassee, for
Respondents.

FORSTER & GARBUS: Faces "Manashirova" Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Forster & Garbus LLP.
The case is styled as Lyubov Manashirova, on behalf of themselves
and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff v. Dzhavail
Manashirova and Forster & Garbus LLP, Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-04090 (E.D. N.Y., July 17, 2018).

Forster & Garbus LLP provides legal services. The Company
specializes in collecting debts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Adam Jon Fishbein, Esq.
   Adam J. Fishbein, P.C.
   735 Central Avenue
   Woodmere, NY 11598
   Tel: (516) 668-6945
   Email: fishbeinadamj@gmail.com


FORSTER & GARBUS: Rueda Sues over Debt Collection Practices
-----------------------------------------------------------
MELISSA RUEDA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. FORSTER & GARBUS LLP, Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-04586 (N.D. Ill., July 2, 2018) seeks to stop the
Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt. The
case is assigned to the Honorable Ronald A. Guzman.

Forster & Garbus LLP provides legal services. The Company
specializes in collecting debts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Celetha Chatman, Esq.
          Michael Jacob Wood, Esq.
          COMMUNITY LAWYERS GROUP, LTD.
          73 W. Monroe Street, Suite 502
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 757-1880
          E-mail: cchatman@communitylawyersgroup.com
                  mwood@communitylawyersgroup.com


FRISBID SERVICES: Halawani Sues Over Unsolicited SMS Ads
--------------------------------------------------------
Shlomy Halawani, individually and on behalf of a class of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Frisbid Services, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 18-cv-61540 (S.D. Fla., July 8, 2018), seeks statutory
damages along with an injunction prohibiting Defendant from making
impermissible, violative calls in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

The complaint says on or about July 6, 2018, Plaintiff began
receiving unsolicited text message solicitations on his cellular
telephone placed by or on behalf of Frisbid Services offering a
$12.50 oil change service. Halawani's numbers are registered with
the national do-not-call registry.

Plaintiff is represented by:

       Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
       THE LAW OFFICE OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI, PLLC
       110 SE 6th Street
       Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
       Telephone: (954) 907-1136
       Facsimile: (855) 529-9540
       Email: jibrael@jibraellaw.com

GC SERVICES: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned ROBERT FLEENOR and MARIA WOLF,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the
Plaintiffs, v. GC SERVICES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, the Defendant, Case
No. 2:18-cv-01055-PP (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for
an order certifying classes, appointing the Plaintiffs as class
representatives, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiffs further ask that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class.

A copy of the Motion is available from PalerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/NNfWgG at no charge.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
          meldridge@ademilaw.com
          jfruchter@ademilaw.com
          bslatky@ademilaw.com


GEICO GENERAL: 9th Cir. Affirms Remand Denial in "Stone"
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed the
District Court's judgment denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand the
case captioned MEGAN STONE; CHRISTINE CAROSI, individually and as
the representatives of all persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE CO., Appellee,
No. 18-35502 (9th Cir.).

Megan Stone and Christine Carosi appeal the district court's denial
of their renewed motion to remand this action to state court and
their motion for reconsideration.

The amount of damages that the plaintiffs' proposed class could
potentially recover inherently depends on who is insured, a
coverage issue.  Moreover, unlike other litigation where coverage
questions and damages questions are litigated in distinct phases
here they have been litigated together.

While it is possible that, prior to the end of litigation, the
district court could easily dispose of any coverage issue"
favorably to the plaintiffs through summary judgment, it is also
possible that coverage issues will continue to be litigated through
trial. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit finds that the district court
did not err by including all potential attorney's fees in the
amount in controversy.

Nor did the district court clearly err in finding, based on the
amount of attorney's fees at stake in a similar case involving the
same attorneys and the same defendant, that the fees here could
exceed the difference between the damages at issue and the Class
Action Fairness Act's $5 million threshold.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's July 9, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycgyfhuo from Leagle.com.

GEORGIA POWER: Consumers Not Required to Exhaust Admin Remedies
---------------------------------------------------------------
In Cazier v. Georgia Power Company, 339 Ga.App. 506 (793 S.E.2d
668) (2016), the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs were not
required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing their
putative class action.

Amy Cazier and four other consumers of retail electrical service
brought this putative class action against Georgia Power Company,
asserting that Georgia Power for several years has collected
municipal franchise fees from customers in amounts exceeding those
approved by the Public Service Commission, and seeking to recover
the excess fees for themselves and a class of Georgia Power
customers.

Following discovery, the plaintiffs moved for certification of a
class, and Georgia Power moved for summary judgment upon several
grounds, including that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies. Upon hearing these motions, the trial
court dismissed the lawsuit.

The court then concluded: "But the body that determines the
Commission's mandate is the Commission and not this court. There is
a mechanism in place for obtaining the Commission's determination
in evaluation of what its orders and rules mean. This court is not
authorized to substitute its judgment for that of the Commission as
to what the Commission meant in its various orders establishing the
methodology for collecting the municipal franchise fee.  Because
the plaintiffs had failed to have the Commission resolve the
ambiguities in its own orders, the trial court found, the
plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and the
trial court was, therefore, without jurisdiction of the subject
matter."

The plaintiffs appealed, and in Cazier, the Court of Appeals
vacated the dismissal of the putative class action.

The Court of Appeals then reasoned that the putative class action
did not seek judicial review under the APA, and the plaintiffs did
not seek to challenge the applicable orders of the Commission.

The Supreme Court of Georgia points out that in contrast,
petitioners do not claim to be aggrieved by any action of the
Commission, nor do they object to any decision or order of the
Commission. Instead, they contend that Georgia Power has violated
the relevant orders of the Commission by failing to use the basis
prescribed by the Commission to calculate municipal franchise fees.
There is no challenge to the validity or reasonableness of any
utility rate set by the Commission, and instead there is simply a
challenge to the method of calculating and collecting the said
fee."

Here, however, the plaintiffs do not seek judicial relief of any
kind from the orders of the Commission. They do not dispute that
the Commission may authorize the collection of municipal franchise
fees, nor do they dispute the propriety or reasonableness of the
particular methodology that the Commission has approved for the
calculation of municipal franchise fees at issue in this case.
Rather, the plaintiffs simply seek to recover damages for the
collection of fees allegedly in excess of the amounts authorized by
the orders of the Commission. To be sure, the plaintiffs and
Georgia Power disagree about what the applicable orders require.
That does not mean, however, that anyone is challenging the orders.
If Georgia Power is right about what the orders require, then
Georgia Power will win this case on the merits. But the case cannot
properly be characterized as one in which the plaintiffs seek
judicial relief from the orders of the Commission.

Nor is this case one in which the merits are committed by law to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. The Commission has
exclusive power to determine what are just. Even so, the Commission
already exercised its exclusive jurisdiction to set just and
reasonable rates when it entered the orders authorizing Georgia
Power to collect municipal franchise fees, and the plaintiffs do
not dispute or seek relief from those orders. The Court fail to
understand how a proper resolution of this putative class action
would infringe upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission to
make just and reasonable rates for electrical service. Georgia
Power points to no statute that squarely requires a plaintiff to
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a lawsuit like this
one, and the Court find no principle of Georgia law that demands
exhaustion here.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's June 18, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y77zqxz7 from Leagle.com.

GONG HEY FAT: Faces "Figueroa" Suit in M.D. Florida
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Gong Hey Fat Choi,
LLC. The case is styled as Gustavo Figueroa, on behalf of himself
and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Gong Hey Fat Choi, LLC
d/b/a/ Cata Restaurant, Christopher Chesnutt and Ewa Olsen,
Defendants, Case No. 8:18-cv-01755-MSS-CPT (M.D. Fla., July 18,
2018).

Cata is a Spanish tapas bar and restaurant located in the Lower
East Side of NYC.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


HIGHLANDS COUNTRY: Faces "Sypert" Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Highlands Country
Club, Inc. The case is styled as Kathleen Sypert, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Highlands
Country Club, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-06494 (S.D. N.Y.,
July 18, 2018).

Founded in 1928, Highlands Country Club is a premier,
family-oriented private club in the North Carolina mountains. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


HITACHI: Oct. 18 Capacitor Settlement Approval Hearing Set
----------------------------------------------------------
If You Bought an Electrolytic or Film Capacitor From Distributors
Since 2002 You Could Get Money From Settlements Totaling
Approximately $35 Million in Class Action Settlements Announced by
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP

Class action settlements totaling approximately $35 million
announced by Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP have been agreed to by
Hitachi, Soshin Electronics, Rubycon, Holy Stone and Nippon/United
Chemi-Con (collectively "Settling Defendants") resolving claims
that they allegedly fixed the prices of certain Capacitors.  This
may have caused individuals and businesses to pay more for
Capacitors.  Capacitors are electronic components that store
electric charges between one or more pairs of conductors separated
by an insulator.

Am I Included?

You may be included if, from January 1, 2002, through February 28,
2014, you purchased one or more Capacitors from a distributor (or
from an entity other than a Defendant) that a Defendant or alleged
co-conspirator manufactured. "Indirect," as that term is used
below, means that you bought the product from someone other than
the manufacturer, for example, from a distributor. A more detailed
notice, including the exact Class definitions and exceptions to
Class membership, is available at www.capacitorsindirectcase.com.

What do the Settlements provide?

The Settlements provide for the combined payment of $34,590,000 in
cash to the Classes.  The Settling Defendants have also agreed to
cooperate in the pursuit of claims against the other non-Settling
Defendants.

How can I get a payment?

Money will not be distributed to the Classes at this time.  The
lawyers for the Classes will pursue the lawsuit against the other
Defendants to see if any future settlements or judgments can be
obtained in the case and then all of the settlement funds obtained
in the case will be distributed together at the end of the case to
reduce expenses.  When the settlement proceeds are disbursed to the
Classes, it will be done on a pro rata basis to each Class Member
in a state that permits indirect purchaser antitrust claims based
upon the number of approved purchases of Capacitors during the
Settlement class period.  A list of the states that permit indirect
purchaser class claims is set forth on the website
www.capacitorsindirectcase.com.

If you want to receive notice about the claims process or future
settlements, you should register at
www.capacitorsindirectcase.com.

What are my rights?

Even if you do nothing, you will be bound by the Court's decisions
concerning these Settlements.  If you want to keep your right to
sue one or more of the Settling Defendants regarding Capacitor
purchases, you must exclude yourself in writing from the Classes by
August 28, 2018.  If you stay in the Classes, you may object in
writing to the Settlements by August 28, 2018.  The Settlement
Agreements, along with details on how to exclude yourself or
object, are available at www.capacitorsindirectcase.com. The U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California will hold a
hearing on
October 18, 2018, at 10:00 a.m., at 450 Golden Gate Avenue, 19th
Floor, Courtroom 11, and San Francisco, CA 94102 to consider
whether to finally approve the Settlements.  Class Counsel may also
request attorneys' fees of up to 30% of the Settlement Funds
($10,377,000), plus reimbursement of costs and expenses, for
investigating the facts, litigating the case, negotiating the
Settlements, providing notice to the Classes, and/or claims
administration.  The total amount of these costs shall be no more
than $4,750,000.00.  You or your own lawyer may appear and speak at
the hearing at your own expense, but you don't have to.  The
hearing may be moved to a different date or time without additional
notice, so it is a good idea to check the above-noted website for
additional information.  Please do not contact the Court about this
case.

If the case against the other Defendants is not dismissed or
settled, Class Counsel will have to prove their claims against the
other Defendants at trial.  Dates for the trial have not yet been
set.  The Court has appointed the law firm of Cotchett, Pitre &
McCarthy, LLP to represent Indirect Purchaser Class members.

For More Information:
1-866-217-4245/www.capacitorsindirectcase.com

HUI YANG NAILS: Faces "Li" Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hui Yang Nails &
Beauty Spa Inc. The case is styled as Weidong Li, on his own behalf
and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Hui Yang
Nails & Beauty Spa Inc doing business as: Complete Nail doing
business as: NY Nail & Spa, Hui Yang, Yun Yang and Anna Yang,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-06430 (S.D. N.Y., July 17, 2018).

Hui Yang Nails & Beauty Spa Inc. is engaged in the salon
business.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


JING FU HOUSE: Faces "Wei" Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Jing Fu House, Inc.
The case is styled as Jia Ren Wei, on his own behalf and on behalf
of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Jing Fu House, Inc.
doing business as: Jing Fu House, Kong Fu Chen and Li Na Chen,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-04085 (E.D. N.Y., July 17, 2018).

Jing Fu House, Inc. is a Chinese Restaurant.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


KIEWIT INFRASTRUCTURE: Removes "Reginald" Suit to C.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendants in the case of KELLY REGINALD, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. KIEWIT
INFRASTRUCTURE WEST COMPANY and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants,
filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from the Superior Court of the
State of California, County of Los Angeles (Case No. BC707674) to
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on
July 2, 2018, and assigned Case No. 2:18-cv-05807-MWF-AGR (C.D.
Cal., July 2, 2018). The case was assigned to Judge Michael W.
Fitzgerald and referred to Magistrate Judge Alicia G. Rosenberg.

Kiewit Infrastructure West Co. operates as a heavy civil
construction contractor.  It constructs marine and port facilities,
highways and bridges, dams and reservoirs, concrete tanks and hydro
plants.  It was formerly known as Kiewit Pacific Co. and presently
operates as a subsidiary of Kiewit Corporation.  The company was
founded in 1982 and is based in Omaha, Nebraska.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kevin A Lipeles, Esq.
          Thomas Henry Schelly, Esq.
          LIPELES LAW GROUP APC
          880 Apollo Street Suite 336
          El Segundo, CA 90245
          Telephone: (310) 322-2211
          Facsimile: (310) 322-2252
          E-mail: kevin@kallaw.com
                  thomas@kallaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Michael David Hidalgo, Esq.
          BAKER AND MCKENZIE LLP
          1901 Avenue of the Stars Suite 950
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-4751
          Facsimile: (310) 201-4721
          E-mail: michael.hidalgo@bakermckenzie.com


KOHL'S CORP: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Securities Fraud Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, affirmed the
District Court's judgment granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned PENSION TRUST FUND FOR OPERATING ENGINEERS, et
al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. KOHL'S CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees, No. 17-2697 (7th Cir.).

The plaintiffs, led by the Pension Trust Fund for Operating
Engineers, allege that Kohl's and two of its executives defrauded
investors by publishing false and misleading information in the
lead-up to the corrections.  The Pension Fund took the position
that one can infer that the defendants knew that these statements
were false or recklessly disregarded that possibility at the time
they were made, because Kohl's recently had made similar lease
accounting errors.

The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to meet the
enhanced pleading requirements for scienter imposed by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).  The Pension Fund now
appeals both the dismissal of the complaint and the district
court's decision to enter it with prejudice.

The Pension Fund advanced two theories of liability in the district
court: securities fraud in violation of section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
Section 240.10b-5, against all the defendants, and controlling
person liability under section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 78t(a), against Mansell and McDonald.  The
Court can limit the discussion to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
because a violation of those provisions is necessary to support a
violation of section 20(a).

To state a claim under section 10(b), a plaintiff must plead (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2)
scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or
omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon
the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss
causation.

The complaint supplements this chronology of accounting mistakes
and corrections with some additional allegations supporting
scienter.

First, it alleges that Kohl's leasing strategies should have put
its executives on alert for potential lease accounting issues. By
aggressively renovating and constructing stores, Kohl's should have
known that capital lease treatment was appropriate earlier on.

Second, the Pension Fund finds highly suspicious a number of stock
sales by Mansell, McDonald, and other company insiders. Mansell
sold 138,000 shares for $7,676,400 in September 2009. McDonald sold
7,000 shares for $412,000 in September and October 2009, and 2,000
shares for $112,500 in November 2010. Seven other insiders also
sold significant numbers of shares during the class period.

The Pension Fund argues that these sales underscore that Mansell
and McDonald knew that Kohl's financial statements were false or
misleading when they were published.

Taking these facts together, the Pension Fund has made a strong
case that many of Kohl's disclosures regarding its lease accounting
practices turned out to be false. But that is not enough. The facts
must also give rise to a strong inference of scienter. The
complaint fails in this regard if it is more likely that the errors
resulted from "careless mistakes at the management level than from
an intent to deceive or a reckless indifference to whether the
statements were misleading.

In contrast with the complaint's exhaustive account of the facts of
Kohl's accounting mishaps, the Pension Fund gives us very few facts
that would point either toward or away from scienter. This lack of
connective tissue is determinative in this case.

The Pension Fund argues that its strongest evidence of scienter is
that Kohl's made similar and significant accounting errors in 2005,
2010, and 2011 related to a core part of its business. But these
errors are not as similar as the Pension Fund suggests. True, one
error from 2005 recurred in 2010 misstating the start date of the
lease, but that error led to a relatively minor restatement. The
errors leading to major restatements in 2011 were wholly unrelated
to the problems of 2005.

The classification of leases and the length of lease terms
implicate different lease accounting rules and affect firms'
financial statements in very different ways. Shifting start or end
dates moves expenses from one period to another, affecting net
income across periods. The classification of leases, meanwhile, has
its primary effect on the balance sheet. The impact and
considerations are quite different, even if both involve leases.

The district court justified dismissal with prejudice because it
thought that the court's prior rulings put the plaintiffs on notice
of weaknesses in the amended complaint. The district court was
right that its prior rulings, which were issued by a different
presiding judge, identified weaknesses with the complaint, but
those weaknesses were unrelated to the reasons for which the
complaint was later dismissed.

In its order denying the defendants' first motion to dismiss
without prejudice for relying too heavily on exhibits, the district
court noted ongoing concerns about the prolixity of the Amended
Complaint, sixty-one pages, with 173 numbered paragraphs. Whatever
the merits of the district court's criticism, concerns about the
complaint's length could not possibly alert the plaintiffs to
problems with their scienter allegations.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Seventh Circuit's July 12, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ydaukdja from Leagle.com.

Howard A. Pollack, for Defendant-Appellee.

John L. Kirtley -- jkirtley@gklaw.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Joseph D. Daley -- joeld@rgrdlaw.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Joseph Russello -- jrussello@rgrdlaw.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Matthew Alexander Schwartz -- schwartzmatthew@sullcrom.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Robert J. Giuffra, Jr. -- giuffrar@sullcrom.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Maya Krugman -- krugmanm@sullcrom.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

KT HEALTH: Sweeney Appeals Order in "Vuckovic" Suit to 1st Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Movant Pamela Sweeney filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit styled Alexander Vuckovic, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. KT Health Holdings,
Inc. d/b/a KT Health, Inc., KT Holdings, LLC and KT Health, LLC,
Case No. 1:15-cv-13696-GAO, in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, Boston.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
seeks (i) to recover damages resulting from the Defendants'
mislabeling of their athletic tapes in violation of G. L. c. 93A,
and (ii) injunctive relief directing KT Health to cease its false
and misleading labeling and advertising, retrieve existing false
and misleading labeling, advertising and promotional materials and
publish corrective advertising.

KT Health has been alleged of deceptively imparting that by simply
applying their athletic strips onto the skin above an injured area,
consumers can obtain relief from pain, recover faster and receive
treatment from a myriad of common injuries such as Achilles
tendonitis, tennis elbow, plantar fasciitis, rib pain, runner's
knee and shin splints.

The appellate case is captioned as Vuckovic, et al. v. Sweeney,
Case No. 18-1659, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript Report/Order form is due on July 30, 2018; and

   -- Fee is due on July 30, 2018.

Movant-Appellant PAMELA SWEENEY, of Madison, Wisconsin, appears pro
se.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee ALEXANDER VUCKOVIC, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Preston W. Leonard, Esq.
          LEONARD LAW OFFICE, P.C.
          63 Atlantic Ave.
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 329-1291
          E-mail: pleonard@theleonardlawoffice.com

               - and -

          David Pastor, Esq.
          PASTOR LAW OFFICE, LLP
          63 Atlantic Ave., 3rd Floor
          Boston, MA 02110-0000
          Telephone: (617) 742-9700
          Facsimile: (617) 742-9701
          E-mail: dpastor@pastorlawoffice.com

               - and -

          Nathan C. Zipperian, Esq.
          SHEPHERD FINKELMAN MILLER & SHAH LLP
          1640 Town Center Cir., Suite 216
          Weston, FL 33326
          Telephone: (954) 515-0123
          Facsimile: (866) 300-7367
          E-mail: nzipperian@sfmslaw.com

Defendants-Appellees KT HEALTH HOLDINGS INC., d/b/a KT Health,
Inc.; KT HOLDINGS, LLC; and KT HEALTH, LLC, are represented by:

          William G. Cosmas, Jr., Esq.
          Stephen Clark Reilly, Esq.
          FITCH LAW PARTNERS LLP
          1 Beacon St., 16th Floor
          Boston, MA 02108-0000
          Telephone: (617) 542-5542
          E-mail: wgc@fitchlp.com
                  scr@fitchlp.com

               - and -

          Tyson K. Hottinger, Esq.
          MASCHOFF BRENNAN LAYCOCK GILMORE ISRAELSEN
          & WRIGHT, PLLC
          201 S Main St., Suite 600
          Salt Lake City, UT 84111
          Telephone: (801) 297-1850
          E-mail: thottinger@mabr.com

Defendants-Appellees KT HOLDINGS, LLC, and KT HEALTH, LLC, are
represented by:

          Larry R. Laycock, Esq.
          MASCHOFF BRENNAN LAYCOCK GILMORE ISRAELSEN
          & WRIGHT, PLLC
          201 S Main Street, Suite 600
          Salt Lake City, UT 84111
          Telephone: (435) 575-1388
          E-mail: llaycock@mabr.com


LAKEWOOD CAMPING: Pryor Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
AUBREY PRYOR, On behalf of himself and other similarly situated
employees, the Plaintiff, v. LAKEWOOD CAMPING RESORT, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01964-RBH (D. S.C., July 17, 2018),
seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has a policy of paying
all of its hourly employees "straight" time for all hours that the
hourly employees worked over 40 in a week. The Defendant did not
pay their hourly employees for their hours of work in excess of 40
hours at one and a half (1.5) times their regular rate as required
under the FLSA.

Lakewood Camping owns and operates camping resort. The Company
offers accommodation, swimming pool, playground, and recreational
activities.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William J. Luse, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF WILLIAM J. LUSE
          917 Broadway Street
          Myrtle Beach, SC 29577
          Telephone: (843) 839 4795
          Facsimile: (843) 839 4815




LONG BEACH, CA: Oct. 29 Final Settlement Hearing Set
----------------------------------------------------
NOTICE OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT - SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES INDIVIDUALS AND BUSINESSES MAY CLAIM REFUNDS
OF TELEPHONE TAXES PAID TO THE CITY OF LONG BEACH BETWEEN AUGUST
11, 2005 AND DECEMBER 19, 2008

McWilliams v. City of Long Beach, Los Angeles Superior Court Case
No. BC361469

Judge Maren E. Nelson authorized this notice.

WHAT IS THIS LAWSUIT ABOUT?
The lawsuit, called McWilliams v. City of Long Beach, case number
BC361469, was filed by a Long Beach resident, John W. McWilliams,
who believed that the City improperly required telephone service
providers to collect tax on telephone services that were not
legally taxable. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that prior to
December 19, 2008, the Long Beach UUT should have been collected
only on local telephone service and long distance service where
charges for calls varied by both time and distance. The plaintiff
filed the lawsuit on behalf of himself and all other similarly
situated taxpayers.

Mr. McWilliams created the John W. McWilliams Telephone Tax Claim
Living Trust on June 5, 2014, and appointed as Trustee Joseph
Henchman of Tax Foundation, a non-profit tax policy research
organization based in Washington, D.C., to preserve the claims in
the event of his death.  The City denied and continues to deny that
the UUT was improperly collected.

WHY WAS THIS NOTICE ISSUED?
The Court issued this notice because you have a right to know about
the proposed class action settlement which the Court has
preliminarily approved and your rights and deadlines to act.  If
the Court grants final approval, and the settlement becomes final
pursuant to its terms, valuable cash benefits will be distributed
to Class Members who submit approved Claim Forms on or before
September 15, 2018.

AM I A CLASS MEMBER?
The Settlement Class includes:

All persons, including corporate and non-corporate entities
wherever organized and existing, who paid telephone utility user
taxes to the City of Long Beach for residential landline service,
business landline service and mobile telephone service utilized
between August 11, 2005 and December 19, 2008, other than purely
local service, teletypewriter exchange service, or long distance
telephone service where the charge varied by both time and distance
(the "Settlement Class").  The Settlement Class does not include
prepaid mobile customers (which includes customers who purchased
plans described as "pay as you go," "pay as you talk," "pay and go
wireless," "prepay or burner phone service" and "no contract
service") but does include prepaid mobile service providers, i.e.,
those that provide the above services to customers who prepay for
wireless service.  "Purely local service" means local telephone
service provided under a calling plan that does not include long
distance telephone service or local telephone service where the
charges for that service are separately stated on the bill to
customers.  The Settlement Class does not include any person,
including corporate and non-corporate entities wherever organized
and existing, to whom the City has already paid a full refund of
UUT paid for services utilized during the Class Period.

WHAT IF I'M NOT SURE WHETHER I'M INCLUDED IN THE SETTLEMENT?
The UUT was typically collected on residential and commercial
landlines if the service address of the phone number was within
City limits.  For mobile service, the UUT was typically collected
if the billing address was located within City limits.  Mobile
service with no billing address (i.e., prepaid mobile service) does
not qualify.  If you are not sure whether you or your business is
included in the Class, you may call the toll-free number (833)
380-5573.  You may also write with questions to the lawyers
appointed to represent the members of the class whose contact
information is on page 4 of this notice. DO NOT CALL THE COURT.

WHAT DO I HAVE TO DO TO RECEIVE A CASH PAYMENT FROM THE SETTLEMENT
FUND?

The person who paid the phone bill must submit a valid claim
postmarked by September 15, 2018 and the claim must be approved by
the Claims Administrator.  Claims can be completed online at the
settlement website, www.LBTaxRefund.com, or by printing a Claim
Form from the settlement website or requesting one from the Claims
Administrator and submitting it via U.S. Mail.  You can claim a
standard refund amount, and you may also provide proof of the tax
paid to claim an actual refund amount.

You cannot claim an actual refund amount and a standard refund
amount for the same kind of service (e.g., you cannot claim a
standard mobile refund and also submit mobile bills for an actual
refund amount claim).  You may, however, claim the standard refund
amount for one kind of service and claim the actual amount for
another kind of service (e.g., e a standard refund claim for mobile
and an actual refund claim for landline).  For the standard refund
claims, one standard refund will be issued for each account
regardless of the number of phones affiliated with that account.

A. Standard Refund Claims: You may claim the following standard
refund amounts by checking the boxes on the claim form for UUT you
paid for each kind of service that you utilized during the time
period August 2005 to December 2008. No additional documentation is
required to claim these amounts:

$46.00 - Mobile Telephone Service1
$27.50 - Residential Landline Service
$46.00 - Business Landline Service

You can check more than one box if you paid for more than one kind
of telephone service (e.g., you can claim mobile and residential
landline).  For business claimants, only a business that was
registered with the City of Long Beach during the August 2005 to
December 2008 time period is eligible to claim the business
landline service amount.

B. Actual Amount Refund Claims: You may also claim a refund based
on the actual amount of UUT that you paid to the City of Long Beach
for telephone services utilized during the August 2005 to December
2008 time period by submitting copies of telephone bills or other
carrier-provided proof.  There are several options for submitting
the required documentary evidence.

   * Submit At Least 10 Phone Bills from August 2005 to December
2008 -- To claim a refund for the full period under this option,
submit at least one bill (or other carrier-provided document
showing the UUT paid) from August 2005 to December 2005; at least
three bills from 2006; at least three bills from 2007; and at least
three bills from 2008; OR

   * Submit 10 Recent Phone Bills -- If you paid the City UUT
during the August 2005 to December 2008 time period, but you do not
have copies of your phone bills from that time period and you are
unable to obtain them from your carrier, you can submit 10 copies
of recent telephone bills (or other carrier-provided documents)
showing payment of the UUT to the City of Long Beach. In order to
claim a refund for the full Class Period using this option you must
submit 3 bills from each of three different calendar years, plus
one bill from a fourth calendar year (e.g., three bills from 2013,
three bills from 2014, three bills from 2015, and one bill from
2016); OR

   * Verizon and Sprint Customers -- If you had phone service with
Verizon or Sprint during the August 2005-December 2008 time period,
and if you provide consent, the carriers will search for your UUT
payment data and provide it to the claims administrator.

   * T-Mobile Customers -- If you had phone service with T-Mobile
during the August 2005 to December 2008 time period, T-Mobile will
search for and send directly to you whatever UUT payment records
they can locate. Email UUTclaimLongBeach@T-Mobile.com for details,
or call 1-877-453-1304, ask for "Representative", then request
historical tax information as described in T-Mobile's C2 document
#440883.

You must submit bills or other proof of the amount paid for
services utilized during the period August 2005 to December 2008
and your Recognized Claim Amount will be based solely on the amount
reflected on the proof submitted.  For landline service, the
Recognized Claim Amount will be 70% of the amount of the UUT paid
to the City of Long Beach.  For mobile service the Recognized Claim
Amount will be 100% of the amount of the UUT paid to the City of
Long Beach.

HOW MUCH CAN I GET FROM THIS SETTLEMENT?
The actual amount paid or donated will depend on the number of
claims submitted and other factors.  Please see the Settlement
Agreement available on the Settlement website, www.LBTaxRefund.com,
for additional information.

WHEN WILL I RECEIVE MY CASH PAYMENT?
Payments cannot be made until the settlement is approved by the
Court, becomes final pursuant to its terms, and the claims process
and administration process is complete.  Please be patient.  Status
updates will be posted on the settlement website at
www.LBTaxRefund.com.

IF YOU MOVE
If your claim is approved, your payment will be sent to the address
you provide. If you change addresses, you must contact the Claims
Administrator at (833) 380-5573 to report any change of your
address.  Failure to report a change of address may result in you
not receiving the monetary benefits of the settlement.

EXCLUDING YOURSELF FROM THE SETTLEMENT
The deadline to exclude yourself from this settlement is October
15, 2018.  If you don't want a payment from this settlement, and
you want to keep the right to sue or continue to sue the City of
Long Beach about the taxes at issue in this lawsuit on your own,
then you must exclude yourself by submitting online or by U.S. Mail
postmarked no later than October 15, 2018 a letter saying that you
want to be excluded from the settlement to: McWilliams v. City of
Long Beach, c/o JND Legal Administration, P.O. Box 91304, Seattle,
WA 98111.  Be sure to include your name, address, telephone number,
and signature. You must also verify that you are a Class Member by
providing your telephone number(s) and address(es) during the Class
Period.

THE LAWYERS REPRESENTING YOU
The Court has appointed the following Class Counsel to represent
the Class:

         Daniel Krasner
         Rachele R. Rickert
         Marisa C. Livesay
         WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
         750 B Street, Suite 2770
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Nicholas E. Chimicles
         Timothy N. Mathews
         CHIMICLES & TIKELLIS, LLP
         One Haverford Centre
         361 West Lancaster Avenue
         Haverford, PA 19041

         Jonathan W. Cuneo
         CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP
         4725 Wisconsin Ave, Ste 200
         Washington, DC 20016

         Jon Tostrud
         TOSTRUD LAW GROUP PC
         1925 Century Park East, Suite 2125
         Los Angeles, CA 90067

ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES, ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES, AND
PLAINTIFF INCENTIVE AWARD
The Court-appointed lawyers for the Class ("Class Counsel") will
ask the Court to approve payment of administrative expenses to be
paid from the settlement amount to cover the costs of claims
processing and administration of the settlement, as well as any
notice costs.  Class Counsel will also ask the Court to award up to
25% of the settlement amount (or $4.15 million) for attorneys' fees
and will also request reimbursement of their expenses, not to
exceed $125,000.00.  Class Counsel undertook the investigation and
litigation of this action on a contingent basis.  They have
litigated this case for over ten years, including successfully
overturning a lower court decision on appeal to the Supreme Court
of California.  They have received no compensation to date, and
they have incurred significant out-of-pocket costs that have not
been reimbursed.  The named plaintiff will also ask the Court for
$6,000 to compensate him for the time and effort he devoted to this
case as a Class Representative.

OBJECTING TO THE SETTLEMENT
You may only object if you are a Class member and you do not
exclude yourself from the settlement.  You can object on your own
or you may hire a lawyer.  You can tell the Court that you don't
agree with the settlement or some part of it by sending a letter to
the Claims Administrator so that it is received on or before
September 28, 2018, saying that you object to the settlement.  Your
objection must contain all of the following: (1) a heading
referring to: McWilliams v. City of Long Beach, Case No. BC361469;
(2) a statement of the legal and factual bases for your objection;
(3) your name, address, telephone number, and email address; (4)
copies of telephone bills dated during the Class Period or other
evidence of membership in the Class; and (5) your signature and the
signature of your counsel (if you are represented by counsel).  The
Court will consider your objection. If your objection is mailed in
time, you do not have to attend the Final Settlement Hearing
described below.

Any objection to the Settlement must be served by first class mail,
or email, or otherwise delivered to the Claims Administrator so
that it is received by September 28, 2018.  The Claims
Administrator is: McWilliams v. City of Long Beach, c/o JND Legal
Administration, P.O. Box 91304, Seattle, WA 98111.

THE COURT'S FINAL APPROVAL HEARING
The Court will hold a hearing at 9:00 a.m. on October 29, 2018, at
312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California 90012 in
Department 17, to decide whether the proposed settlement is fair
and reasonable.  You may attend at your own expense, and you may
ask to speak, but you are not required to do so.  If the Final
Settlement Hearing is rescheduled, a notice of the new date or time
will be posted on the settlement website, www.LBTaxRefund.com.
After the hearing, the Court will decide whether to approve the
settlement.  We do not know how long the decision will take.
Please be patient.

GETTING MORE INFORMATION
This notice summarizes the proposed settlement.  More details are
in the Settlement Agreement.  All court records in this litigation,
including complete copies of the Settlement Agreement, may be
examined during regular court hours at the office of the Clerk of
the Court, prior to April 15, 2018 at 600 South Commonwealth
Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90005, and thereafter at 111 North Hill
Street, Room 212, Los Angeles, CA 90012, or at any public kiosk in
the Los Angeles Superior Court buildings.  You can also get a copy
of the Settlement Agreement and other important information as well
as answers to frequently asked
questions by visiting the settlement website at www.LBTaxRefund.com
or by calling the Claims Administrator at (833) 380-5573 toll free.


DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT DIRECTLY WITH ANY QUESTIONS

MAPLEWOOD, MO: Loses Sup. Ct. Bid to Stay Mandate in "Webb"
-----------------------------------------------------------
Justice Neil Gorsuch denied the City of Maplewood's application to
recall and stay mandate filed in the matter entitled City of
Maplewood, Missouri, Applicant v. Cecelia Roberts Webb, et al.,
Case No. 18A27, in the Supreme Court of United States.

The City filed on June 29, 2018, an application to recall and stay
mandate pending the filing and disposition of a petition for a writ
of certiorari.

The Lower Court Case is styled Cecelia Roberts Webb; Darron Yates;
Robert Eutz; Anthony Lemicy; Krystal Banks; Frank Williams,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellees v. City of Maplewood, Defendant-Appellant,
Case No. 17-2381, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment denying the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case.

Cecelia Webb and five other motorists have filed a putative class
action against the City of Maplewood, Missouri, under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983, claiming its policy or custom violates their
constitutional rights.  They assert the City automatically issues
an arrest warrant whenever someone ticketed for violating its
traffic and vehicle laws fails to pay a fine or appear in court.

The City appeals from the order denying it immunity.[BN]

The Plaintiffs-Respondents are represented by:

          Thomas B. Harvey, Esq.
          Michael-John Voss, Esq.
          Blake A. Strode, Esq.
          Nathaniel Carroll, Esq.
          Edward J. Hall, Esq.
          ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, INC.
          1210 Locust Street
          Saint Louis, MO 63103
          Telephone: (855) 724-2489
          Facsimile: (314) 925-1307
          E-mail: tharvey@archcitydefenders.org
                  mjvoss@archcitydefenders.org
                  bstrode@archcitydefenders.org
                  ncarroll@archcitydefenders.org
                  ehall@archcitydefenders.org

               - and -

          Jeffrey D. Kaliel, Esq.
          Martin D. Quinones, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          1828 L Street, NW - Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 973-0900
          Facsimile: (202) 973-0950
          E-mail: jkaliel@tzlegal.com
                  mquinones@tzlegal.com

Defendant-Petitioner The City of Maplewood is represented by:

          John Michael Reeves Jr., Esq.
          BRINKER & DOYEN, LLP
          34 N. Meramec, Fifth Floor
          Clayton, MO 63105
          Telephone: (314) 754-6005
          Facsimile: (314) 863-8197
          E-mail: jreeves@brinkerdoyen.com


MAR PIZZA: "Compton" Suit Seeks Minimum Wages, Damages Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Derek Compton, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Mar Pizza, Inc. and Lake Keowee
Pizza, Inc. d/b/a, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-01862, (D.S.C., July
8, 2018), seeks to recover minimum wages, liquidated damages,
prejudgment and post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs of this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Defendants operate Domino's Pizza franchise stores in Simpsonville,
Greenville and Mauldin, South Carolina. Compton was employed by
Defendants as a delivery driver from approximately February 2017 to
January 2018. Compton used his own vehicle to deliver pizzas and
claims that the reimbursement rates were unreasonably low thus
causing their net wages to fall below the federal minimum wage.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Mark Potashnick, Esq.
      WEINHAUS & POTASHNICK
      11500 Olive Blvd., Suite 133
      St. Louis, MO 63141
      Telephone: (314) 997-9150 ext. 2
      Facsimile: (314) 997-9170
      Email: markp@wp-attorneys.com

             - and -

      Richard M. Paul III, Esq.
      PAUL LLP
      601 Walnut Street, Suite 300
      Kansas City, MO 64106
      Phone: (816) 984-8100
      Fax: (816) 984-8101
      Email: Rick@PaulLLP.com

            - and -

      John P. Mann, Jr.
      MANN LAW FIRM, P.A.
      512 East North Street
      Greenville, SC 29601
      Telephone: (864) 243-8358
      Email: jpm@mannlaw.org

MAXIMO GARCIA: Garcia Sues Over Denied Overtime Pay, Paystubs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Marxlenin Galindo Garcia, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. John Doe Corp. (d/b/a Italian
Pizza Great Burrito) and Maximo Garcia, Case No. 18-cv-06165, (E.D.
N.Y., June 30, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid minimum, overtime and
spread-of-hours wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 and New York Labor Law, including applicable liquidated
damages, interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

Defendants own, operate, or control a Mexican restaurant, located
at 100 West 23rd Street, New York, New York 10011 under the name
"Italian Pizza Great Burrito" where Garcia was employed as a food
preparer at the restaurant located at 100 West 23rd Street, New
York, New York 10011. He claims to have worked in excess of 40
hours per week, without appropriate overtime compensation.
Moreover, Defendants failed to maintain accurate recordkeeping of
the hours worked, failed to pay Plaintiff Garcia appropriately for
any hours worked, either at the straight rate of pay or for any
additional overtime premium and the required "spread of hours" pay
for any day in which he had to work over 10 hours a day, says the
complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Faillace, Esq.
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Tel: (212) 317-1200
      Email: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com


MDL 2785: MedImpact Partly Compelled to Comply With Subpoena
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Marketing,
Sales Practices and Antitrust Litigation. (This Document Applies to
All Cases), MDL No. 2785, Case No. 17-md-2785-DDC-TJJ (D. Kan.),
Magistrate Judge Teresa J. James of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Kansas granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Compliance with the Subpoena Directed
to Non-Party MedImpact Healthcare Systems, Inc.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and 45, the Plaintiffs seek an order
requiring non-party MedImpact to search for and produce documents
responsive to their subpoena served on Dec. 11, 2017.  MedImpact
opposes the motion.

On Dec. 11, 2017, the Plaintiffs served a Rule 45 subpoena on
MedImpact.  Under Rule 45(d)(2)(b), MedImpact's deadline for
objections was 14 days after service of the subpoena.  On Jan. 9,
2018, the counsel for MedImpact served responses and objections to
the subpoena, and 22 days later MedImpact served its first rolling
production of documents.

The counsel held two meet and confer telephone sessions on Jan. 23
and Feb. 20, 2018.  In addition to the January 31 production,
MedImpact agreed to provide the Plaintiffs a reasonable timeline in
which it would complete production, and to produce remaining
Committee Minutes no later than Feb. 27, 2018.  With a February 23
deadline to file a motion to compel, the Plaintiffs and MedImpact
discussed a possible agreement to extend the date.  MedImpact
agreed not to oppose an extension of time for the Plaintiffs to
challenge MedImpact's actual production, but would not agree to an
extension of the Plaintiffs' deadline regarding MedImpact's
objections.

In their motion, the Plaintiffs state their hope that MedImpact's
forthcoming production would resolve the parties' disputes.
MedImpact takes the position that the instant motion is not ripe
because they have continued to produce documents, yet they stand by
their objections.  Since the time briefing on this motion
concluded, MedImpact and the Plaintiffs have not resolved their
differences, as evidenced by the Plaintiffs' repeated unopposed
motions to extend their deadline to seek to compel MedImpact's
production.

Because the motion is limited to challenges to MedImpact's
objections, the Plaintiffs' argument focuses only on MedImpact's
response to the subpoena.  They assert MedImpact's objections
contain boilerplate and overly broad objections.  MedImpact
contends the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide the motion.
Regarding the merits, MedImpact stands by its objections, arguing
that collectively they demonstrate the subpoena imposes undue
burden and expense on MedImpact.

Magistrate Judge James is not persuaded by MedImpact's objections
on grounds that the Plaintiffs' requests are overly broad, unduly
burdensome, vague, and ambiguous.  She agrees that MedImpact's
objections on those grounds are boilerplate; they state an
objection without offering an explanation.

Although the affidavit does not provide any cost information, the
Magistrate Judge can infer that identifying and collecting the data
would impose additional costs on MedImpact.  She finds the burden
on MedImpact can be ameliorated by requiring the Plaintiffs to
share in the cost of production.

The Magistrate Judge rejects MedImpact's argument that the relevant
period designated by the Plaintiffs of Jan. 1, 2007 to the present
has been recognized by courts as unacceptable, as the time period
covered by requests is fact-specific to each case.  MedImpact
provides no basis for assessing what length of time would be
reasonable, nor does it provide a reason why the period the
Plaintiffs chose is unreasonable.  She finds the relevant time
period to be reasonable, as it is coextensive with when Mylan
acquired and continues to hold the rights to EpiPen.  

Based on the foregoing, she overruled MedImpact's objections with
the exception of the overbroad definitions described.

The Magistrate Judge has reviewed the individual requests to
determine relevancy based on the claims and defenses to the action,
and to assess whether the Plaintiffs have taken reasonable steps to
avoid imposing undue burden or expense as required by Rule
45(d)(1).  While she recognizes the discovery tool at issue is a
Rule 45 subpoena with document requests directed to a nonparty,
there is no apparent reason to treat conditional objections any
more favorably than when they are made in response to
interrogatories or document requests between parties.  She already
ruled on MedImpact's objections, so while she notes her rejection
of conditional objections, it is not the basis of her holding.
With the exception of the Plaintiffs' definitions of "you" and
"your," and of "Amedra," "Mylan," "Pfizer," "Sanofi," and
"Shionogi," the Magistrate Judge finds no deficiency in each of the
fourteen individual requests as written and will enforce the
subpoena.

Finally, she finds it appropriate for the Class Plaintiffs to share
in the cost of production and will require the Class Plaintiffs to
bear 50% of the costs MedImpact has incurred and will incur in
timely producing documents responsive to the subpoena.

For these reasons, Magistrate Judge James granted in part and
denied in par the Class Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Compliance
with the Subpoena Directed to Non-Party MedImpact.  The motion is
granted with the exception of MedImpact's objection to the
definitions of "you" and "your," and of "Amedra," "Mylan,"
"Pfizer," "Sanofi," and "Shionogi."  MedImpact will produce all
documents, not previously produced, that are responsive to the
subpoena within 21 days of the date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 13, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/0PHfaN from Leagle.com.

All Plaintiffs, Plaintiff, represented by Lynn Lincoln Sarko --
lsarko@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback, pro hac vice, Paul J.
Geller -- PGeller@rgrdlaw.com -- Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP,
pro hac vice, Rex A. Sharp -- rsharp@midwest-law.com -- Rex A.
Sharp, PA, Ryan C. Hudson -- rhudson@midwest-law.com -- Rex A.
Sharp, PA & Warren T. Burns  -- wburns@burnscharest.com -- Burns
Charest LLP, pro hac vice.

Consumer Class Cases Plaintiffs, (For Filings as to All Consumer
Class Cases Plaintiffs), Plaintiff, represented by Alison Elizabeth
Chase, Keller Rohrback LLP, Arthur L. Shingler, III, Robins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, Brian O. O'Mara, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP, Daniel E. Gustafson , Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Daniel C. Hedlund,
Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Eric Fierro, Keller Rohrback LLP, Joseph C.
Bourne, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Lynn Lincoln Sarko, Keller Rohrback,
Mahde Youssef Abdallah , The Miller Law Firm, PC, Rex A. Sharp ,
Rex A. Sharp, PA, Ryan C. Hudson, Rex A. Sharp, PA, Sharon S.
Almonrode, The Miller Law Firm, PC & Stuart A. Davidson, Robins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

All Defendants, Defendant, represented by Philip A. Sechler,
Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber, pro hac
vice.

Rosetta Serrano, on behalf of themselves, Shannon Clements, on
behalf of themselves and all other similiarly situated & Annette
Sutorik, on behalf of themselves and all other similiarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Arthur R. Miller, The Lanier Law Firm,
PC, pro hac vice, Cristina R. Delise, The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro
hac vice, Dennis Lienhardt, Jr. -- dal@miller.law -- The Miller Law
Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Derek William Loeser --
dloeser@KellerRohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback, pro hac vice, E.
Powell Miller -- epm@miller.law -- The Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac
vice, Elizabeth C. Pritzker -- ecp@pritzkerlevine.com -- Pritzker
Levine LLP, pro hac vice, Gretchen Freeman Cappio --
gcappio@KellerRohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback, pro hac vice,
Jonathan K. Levine -- jkl@pritzkerlevine.com -- Pritzker Levine
LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph G. Sauder -- jgs@mccunewright.com --
McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, pro hac vice, Lynn Lincoln Sarko,
Keller Rohrback, pro hac vice, Michael W. Meredith --
mmeredith@KellerRohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback, pro hac vice, Paul
J. Geller, Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Reagan E.
Bradford, The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Rex A. Sharp, Rex
A. Sharp, PA, Ryan C. Hudson, Rex A. Sharp, PA, Scott B. Goodger --
sgoodger@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA, Sharon S. Almonrode
-- ssa@miller.law -- The Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Spencer
Cox -- scox@burnscharest.com -- Burns Charest LLP, pro hac vice,
Stephen J. Fearon, Jr. -- stephen@sfclasslaw.com -- Squitieri &
Fearon, LLP, pro hac vice, Steven N. Williams, Cotchett, Pitre &
McCarthy, LLP, pro hac vice, W. Mark Lanier, The Lanier Law Firm,
PC, pro hac vice & Warren T. Burns, Burns Charest LLP, pro hac
vice.

Lesley Huston, Plaintiff, represented by Arthur R. Miller , The
Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Charles T. Schimmel, Wright
Schimmel LLC, Cristina R. Delise, The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac
vice, Dennis Lienhardt, Jr., The Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice,
E. Powell Miller, The Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Elizabeth
C. Pritzker, Pritzker Levine LLP, pro hac vice, Isaac L. Diel ,
Sharp McQueen PA, Jonathan K. Levine, Pritzker Levine LLP, pro hac
vice, Joseph G. Sauder, McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, pro hac vice,
Paul J. Geller, Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice,
Reagan E. Bradford, The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Rex A.
Sharp, Rex A. Sharp, PA, Ryan C. Hudson, Rex A. Sharp, PA, Scott B.
Goodger, Rex A. Sharp, PA, Sharon S. Almonrode, The Miller Law
Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Steven N. Williams, Cotchett, Pitre &
McCarthy, LLP, pro hac vice, W. Mark Lanier, The Lanier Law Firm,
PC, pro hac vice & W. Greg Wright, Wright Schimmel LLC.

Chris Rippy, Lauren Coale, Raymond C. Buchta, III, Lee Seltzer,
Kimberly Dollander, Erin Korte-Lamparter, Joy Shepard, Alene
McDaniel, Lorraine Wight, Teia Amell, Todd Beaulieu, Heather
DeStefano, Sonya North, Amie Vialet De Montbel, Elizabeth Huelsman,
Nikitia Marshall, Stacee Svites, Linda Wagner, Mark Kovarik,
Suzanne Harwood, Donna Wemple, Meredith Krimmel, Connie Stafford,
Francis Meyers & Kimberly Corcoran, Plaintiffs, represented by
Arthur R. Miller , The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Cristina
R. Delise , The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Dennis
Lienhardt, Jr. , The Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, E. Powell
Miller , The Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Elizabeth C.
Pritzker , Pritzker Levine LLP, pro hac vice, Jonathan K. Levine ,
Pritzker Levine LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph G. Sauder , McCune Wright
Arevalo, LLP, pro hac vice, Paul J. Geller , Robins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Reagan E. Bradford , The Lanier Law Firm,
PC, pro hac vice, Rex A. Sharp , Rex A. Sharp, PA, Ryan C. Hudson ,
Rex A. Sharp, PA, Scott B. Goodger , Rex A. Sharp, PA, Sharon S.
Almonrode , The Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Steven N.
Williams , Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, pro hac vice & W. Mark
Lanier , The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice.

Laura Chapin, Anastasia Johnston, Elizabeth Williamson & Jennifer
Walton, Plaintiffs, represented by Arthur R. Miller, The Lanier Law
Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Cristina R. Delise, The Lanier Law Firm,
PC, pro hac vice, Dennis Lienhardt, Jr., The Miller Law Firm, PC,
pro hac vice, E. Powell Miller, The Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac
vice, Elizabeth C. Pritzker, Pritzker Levine LLP, pro hac vice,
Emily Hughes , Miller Law Firm PC, Jonathan K. Levine, Pritzker
Levine LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph G. Sauder, McCune Wright Arevalo,
LLP, pro hac vice, Paul J. Geller, Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP,
pro hac vice, Reagan E. Bradford, The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac
vice, Rex A. Sharp, Rex A. Sharp, PA, Ryan C. Hudson, Rex A. Sharp,
PA, Scott B. Goodger, Rex A. Sharp, PA, Sharon S. Almonrode, The
Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Steven N. Williams, Cotchett,
Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, pro hac vice & W. Mark Lanier, The Lanier
Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice.

Vishal Aggarwal, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ben Barnow --
b.barnow@barnowlaw.com -- Barnow and Associates, PC, pro hac vice,
Camille S. Bass -- cbass@bholaw.com -- Blood Hurst & O'Reardon,
LLP, pro hac vice, Erich Paul Schork, Barnow and Associates, PC,
pro hac vice, Paul J. Geller, Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro
hac vice, Rex A. Sharp, Rex A. Sharp, PA & Timothy Gordon Blood,
Blood Hurst & O'Reardon, LLP, pro hac vice.

Angie Nordstrum, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated & Carly Bowersock, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Brian D.
Penny, Goldman Scarlato & Penny, PC, pro hac vice, Damien J.
Marshall -- dmarshall@bsfllp.com -- Boies, Schiller & Flexner, LLP,
pro hac vice, Donald A. Ecklund -- DEcklund@carellabyrne.com --
Carella, Byrne, Cecchi, Olstein, Brody & Agnello, PC, pro hac vice,
Duane L. Loft -- dloft@bsfllp.com -- Boies, Schiller & Flexner,
LLP, pro hac vice, James E. Cecchi -- JCecchi@carellabyrne.com --
Carella, Byrne, Cecchi, Olstein, Brody & Agnello, PC, pro hac vice,
Joseph Alm -- jalm@bsfllp.com -- Boies, Schiller & Flexner, LLP,
Paul J. Geller, Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Rex
A.
Sharp, Rex A. Sharp, PA & Stuart A. Davidson --
SDavidson@rgrdlaw.com -- Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice.

Sanofi-Aventis US, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Scott Tolin
-- adam.hemlock@weil.com -- Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, pro hac
vice, Diane P. Sullivan -- diane.sullivan@weil.com -- Weil, Gotshal
& Manges, LLP, pro hac vice, Eric Shaun Hochstadt --
eric.hochstadt@weil.com -- Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, pro hac
vice, Paul J. Geller, Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice
& Yehudah L. Buchweitz -- yehudah.buchweitz@weil.com -- Weil,
Gotshal & Manges, LLP, pro hac vice.

Kenneth Evans, as an individual and as representative of the class,
Plaintiff, represented by Archie Grubb, II, Beasley Allen
Crow Methvin Portis & Miles, PC, pro hac vice, Brian Murphy,
Braswell Murphy, LLC, Kasie M. Braswell, Braswell Murphy, LLC, pro
hac vice, Paul J. Geller, Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice, Rex A. Sharp, Rex A. Sharp, PA & W. Daniel Miles, III,
Beasley Allen Crow Methvin Portis & Miles, PC, pro hac vice.

Local 282 Welfare Trust Fund, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Arthur L.
Shingler, III, Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Brian O. O'Mara,
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, James E. Cecchi, Carella, Byrne,
Cecchi, Olstein, Brody & Agnello, PC, pro hac vice, Lea Bays,
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, Paul J. Geller, Robins Geller Rudman
& Dowd LLP, pro hac vice & Rex A. Sharp, Rex A. Sharp, PA.

Donna Anne Dvorak, Michael Gill, April Sumner & Landon Ipson,
Plaintiffs, represented by Lynn Lincoln Sarko, Keller Rohrback, pro
hac vice, Paul J. Geller, Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice, Rex A. Sharp, Rex A. Sharp, PA & Warren T. Burns, Burns
Charest LLP, pro hac vice.

Kenneth Steinhauser, Plaintiff, represented by Cristina R. Delise,
The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Dennis Lienhardt, Jr., The
Miller Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, E. Powell Miller, The Miller Law
Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Elizabeth C. Pritzker, Pritzker Levine LLP,
pro hac vice, Jonathan K. Levine, Pritzker Levine LLP, pro hac
vice, Joseph G. Sauder, McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, pro hac vice,
Reagan E. Bradford, The Lanier Law Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Rex A.
Sharp, Rex A. Sharp, PA, Ryan C. Hudson, Rex A. Sharp, PA, Scott B.
Goodger, Rex A. Sharp, PA, Sharon S. Almonrode, The Miller Law
Firm, PC, pro hac vice & W. Mark Lanier, The Lanier Law Firm, PC,
pro hac vice.

Mylan N.V., Defendant, represented by Adam K. Levin --
adam.levin@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice,
Benjamin Frederick Holt -- benjamin.holt@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan
Lovells US LLP, Brian C. Fries -- bfries@lathropgage.com -- Lathrop
Gage LLP, Carolyn Anne DeLone -- carrie.delone@hoganlovells.com --
Hogan Lovells US LLP, Daniel Thomas Graham -- dgraham@clarkhill.com
-- Clark Hill, PLC, pro hac vice, David M. Foster --
david.foster@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac
vice, James Moloney -- jmoloney@lathropgage.com -- Lathrop Gage
LLP, John Robert Robertson -- robby.robertson@hoganlovells.com --
Hogan Lovells US
LLP, Jon Myer Talotta  -- jon.talotta@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan
Lovells US LLP, Justin Bernick -- justin.bernick@hoganlovells.com
-- Kathryn M. Ali  -- kathryn.ali@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells
US LLP, pro hac vice & Timothy Robert Herman --
therman@clarkhill.com -- Clark Hill, PLC, pro hac vice.

Mylan Specialty, LP, a Delaware limited partnership, Defendant,
represented by Adam K. Levin, Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice,
Arnold B. Calmann -- abc@saiber.com -- Saiber, LLC, pro hac vice,
Brian C. Fries, Lathrop Gage LLP, Daniel Thomas Graham, Clark Hill,
PLC, pro hac vice, David M. Foster, Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac
vice, David A. Perez, Perkins Coie, LLP, pro hac vice, James
Moloney, Lathrop Gage LLP, Jeffrey S. Soos -- jsoos@saiber.com --
Saiber, LLC, pro hac vice, Kathryn M. Ali, Hogan Lovells US LLP,
pro hac vice, Mitchell E. Zamoff, Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac
vice, Susan E. Foster, Yarmuth Wilsdon Calfo, PLLC, pro hac vice,
Thomas L. Boeder, Perkins Coie, LLP, pro hac vice & Timothy Robert
Herman, Clark Hill, PLC, pro hac vice.

Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Defendant, represented by Adam K.
Levin, Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice, Brian C. Fries, Lathrop
Gage LLP, Daniel Thomas Graham, Clark Hill, PLC, pro hac vice,
David M. Foster, Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice, Kathryn M.
Ali, Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice, Mitchell E. Zamoff, Hogan
Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice & Timothy Robert Herman, Clark Hill,
PLC, pro hac vice & Yuri Fuchs , Hogan Lovells US, LLP.

Heather Bresch, Defendant, represented by Benjamin Frederick Holt,
Hogan Lovells US LLP, Brian C. Fries, Lathrop Gage LLP, Brian R.
Richichi, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Carolyn Anne DeLone, Hogan Lovells
US LLP, Chad E. Blomberg, Lathrop Gage, LLP, Christopher D.
Edelman, Hogan Lovells US LLP, David M. Foster, Hogan Lovells US
LLP, pro hac vice, Jon Myer Talotta, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Justin
Bernick, Sue Lin , Hogan Lovells US LLP & Yuri Fuchs, Hogan Lovells
US, LLP.

King Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Defendant, represented by Angela
(Angel) D. Mitchell -- amitchell@shb.com -- Shook, Hardy & Bacon
LLP, Brendan Woodard -- bwoodard@whitecase.com -- White & Case LLP,
pro hac vice, Dimitrios Drivas -- ddrivas@whitecase.com -- White &
Case LLP, pro hac vice, Edward Thrasher -- ethrasher@whitecase.com
-- White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph M. Rebein --
jrebein@shb.com -- Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, Kathryn Swisher --
kathryn.swisher@whitecase.com -- White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Raj Gandesha -- rgandesha@whitecase.com -- White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Robert Milne -- rmilne@whitecase.com -- White & Case LLP,
pro hac vice & Sheryn George -- sheryn.george@whitecase.com --
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice.

Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Angela (Angel) D. Mitchell, Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, Brendan
Woodard, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, David E. Delorenzi,
Gibbons, PC, pro hac vice, Dimitrios Drivas, White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice, Edward Thrasher, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph
M. Rebein, Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, Kathryn Swisher, White & Case
LLP, pro hac vice, Raj Gandesha, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice,
Robert Milne, White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Sheryn George, White
& Case LLP, pro hac vice & Silvia M. Medina, White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice.

Mylan, Inc., Defendant, represented by Arnold B. Calmann, Saiber,
LLC, pro hac vice, Benjamin Frederick Holt, Hogan Lovells US LLP,
Brian C. Fries, Lathrop Gage LLP, Carolyn Anne DeLone, Hogan
Lovells US LLP, Chad E. Blomberg, Lathrop Gage, LLP, Jeffrey S.
Soos, Saiber, LLC, pro hac vice, Jessica Arden Ettinger, Robbins,
Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, Jon Myer Talotta
, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Justin Bernick, Kathryn Zecca, Robbins,
Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber, Lee Turner Friedman
, Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber & Philip
A. Sechler, Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber,
pro hac vice.

Pfizer, Inc., Defendant, represented by David E. Delorenzi,
Gibbons, PC, pro hac vice, Joseph M. Rebein, Shook, Hardy & Bacon
LLP/Grand, Paul J. Geller, Robins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice & Silvia M. Medina , White & Case LLP, pro hac vice.

King Pharmaceuticals, LLC, Defendant, represented by David E.
Delorenzi, Gibbons, PC, pro hac vice, Joseph M. Rebein, Shook,
Hardy & Bacon LLP/Grand & Silvia M. Medina, White & Case LLP, pro
hac vice.

METAL TECHNOLOGIES: $116K Attys' Fees Awarded in "Weil" FLSA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRIAN A. WEIL, MELISSA D. FULK, Plaintiffs, v. METAL
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 2:15-cv-00016-JMS-MPB (S.D.
Ind.), Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division, (a) granted in
part and denied in part both the Plaintiffs' (i) Motion for
Service/Incentive Awards, and (ii) Motion for Attorneys' Fees; and
(b) concluded that each party will bear its own costs.

The Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint in the matter in
January 2015 as a putative class and collective action, and filed
their operative First Amended Complaint in October 2015.  They
raised the following claims against Metal Technologies in that
Complaint: (1) class and individual claims for failure to pay
minimum and overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA"); (2) class and individual claims for unlawful wage
deductions in violation of the FLSA; (3) class and individual
claims for unpaid wages and illegally deducted wages (with Ms. Fulk
as the class representative) in violation of the Indiana Wage
Payment Statute ("IWPS"); (4) class and individual claims for
unpaid wages and illegally deducted wages (with Mr. Weil as the
class representative) in violation of the Indiana Wage Claims
Statute ("IWCA"); and (5) class claims for breach of contract for
all individuals in the IWCA plaintiff class.

The Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Certify a Class/Collective Action
on Sept. 1, 2015, and that motion was granted in part and denied in
part on Jan. 25, 2016.  

The Court conditionally certified an FLSA collective action
sub-class of present and former Metal Technologies employees who
worked at any time from Jan. 20, 2012 to the present and who were
not timely paid regular wages or overtime compensation on one or
more occasion for time worked.  

It denied collective action certification to (i) an FLSA sub-class
of the Plaintiffs who were not timely paid regular wages or
overtime compensation on one or more occasions for time worked,
because the employee took a lunch break of twenty minutes or less;
(ii) an FLSA sub-class of the Plaintiffs challenging wage
deductions for uniforms as being kickbacks; (iii) a sub-class of
involuntarily terminated plaintiffs raising state-law
breach-of-contract claims for unpaid wages under all theories; and
(iv) an IWPS sub-class of the Plaintiffs who were not timely paid
regular wages on one or more occasions for time worked, because the
employee took a lunch break of 20 minutes or less.

The Court certified an IWPS sub-class of the Plaintiffs who
presently worked at Metal Technologies or who voluntarily
terminated their employment, who worked at any time from Jan. 20,
2013 to the present, and who were not timely paid regular wages on
one or more occasions for time worked.

It certified an IWPS sub-class of the Plaintiffs who presently
worked at Metal Technologies or voluntarily terminated their
employment, who worked at any time from Jan. 20, 2013 to the
present, and who were not timely paid regular wages on one or more
occasions based upon wage deductions taken by Metal Technologies to
cover costs for work uniforms.

On Nov. 1, 2016, the Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment,
seeking judgment as a matter of law on the following claims: (i)
liability as to the class claim for uniform-rental wage deductions
under the IWPS; and (ii) liability as to the class claim for
time-rounding under the FLSA and IWPS.

Metal Technologies filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, largely opposing the Plaintiffs' Motion and seeking
partial summary judgment on several claims and damages issues.  A
few days after filing its Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, it also filed a Motion to Decertify the sub-classes
related to the Plaintiffs' time-rounding claims under the FLSA and
IWPS.

On May 26, 2017, the Court issued an Order addressing both the
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment and the Motion for
Decertification.  It resolved those motions by (i) granting the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary judgment as to liability on the
(conceded) uniform wage-deduction claim under the IWPS brought by
the Plaintiff class, but only as to the period from Jan. 20, 2013
through April 10, 2016; (ii) denying the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment as to the remainder of the uniform-deduction class
claim; (iii) denying the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as
to liability on the Plaintiffs' time-rounding claims under the FLSA
and IWPS; (iv) granting Metal Technologies' Motion to Decertify the
time-rounding classes; and (v) denying as moot Metal Technologies'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, in light of the
decertification.

Prior to trial, the parties filed stipulations as to the uniform
wage-deduction damages incurred by the Plaintiff class, including
both those incurred from Jan. 20, 2013 through April 10, 2016, for
which liability had already been determined, and for those damages
that accrued after April 10, 2016, in the event that the Court
found Metal Technologies liable.

Following a Jan. 30, 2018 bench trial, the Court issued its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.  As to the Plaintiff
class' uniform deductions taken between Jan. 20, 2013 and April 10,
2016, the Court concluded that the deductions amounted to
$31,050.85, which, trebled, amounted to $93,152.58 in damages.  As
to uniform wage deductions taken from April 11, 2016 forward, the
Court found in favor of the Plaintiff class in the amount of
$8,102.04.  And it found in favor of Mr. Weil on the "OF" deduction
claim in the amount of $63, which it declined to treble based on
recent developments in Indiana law.

As to the time-rounding claims raised individually by Ms. Fulk and
Mr. Weil regarding pre- and post-shift and meal-break clock-ins,
the Court concluded that the Plaintiffs did not establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that they were performing work during
those periods, or that if they were, that Metal Technologies should
have known about it.  The Court did conclude, however, that Ms.
Fulk and Mr. Weil had some unpaid work time.  Ms. Fulk's unpaid
wages amounted to $42.99 under the FLSA and IWPS, which, trebled,
amounted to $128.97 in damages.  Mr. Weil's unpaid wages amounted
to $.77 under the IWCA, which, trebled, amounted to $2.31 in
damages.

So, in total, the Court awarded the following damages: (i)
$93,152.58 (stipulated) to the Plaintiff class, arising from the
improper deduction of wages for clothing rental taken between Jan.
20, 2013 and April 10, 2016; (ii) $8,102.04 (stipulated) to the
Plaintiff class, arising from the improper deduction of wages for
clothing rental taken from April 11, 2016 onward; (iii) $129.30 to
Mr. Weil, arising from the improper deduction of wages for clothing
rental; (iv) $63 to Mr. Weil, arising from the improper OF
deduction; (v) $128.97 to Ms. Fulk, resulting from Metal
Technologies' failure to pay wages earned, in violation of the FLSA
and IWPS; (vi) $2.31 to Mr. Weil, resulting from Metal
Technologies' failure to pay wages earned, in violation of the
IWCA.

Presently pending before the Court are several motions that
constitute the final chapter in the litigation saga.  Following a
bench trial in the case, the Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for
Service/Incentive Awards, a Bill of Costs, and a Motion for
Attorneys' Fees.  The Plaintiffs move the Court for an order
providing incentive/service awards to several Plaintiffs involved
in the class-action uniform deduction claim litigation, as follows:
(i) Mr. Weil: $7,500, (ii) Ms. Fulk: $7,500, and (iii) Shadric
Jones, Fannie Kolish, Kevin Graves, Janelle Myers: $1,000 each.
The Defendant has also filed a Bill of Costs.

Because of the time and efforts Ms. Fulk expended on the
litigation, Judge Magnus-Stinson is satisfied that an incentive
award would be appropriate.  However, the award requested by the
Class Counsel amounts to just over 8% of the overall recovery that
was awarded to the class.  The Class Counsel has provided no
additional justification for an award that high, and the Judge is
mindful that the amount it grants will ultimately reduce the
recovery received by the other Plaintiffs.  Therefore, he
determines that an award of $2,500 is appropriate, given the
specific tasks that the Class Counsel attests were performed by Ms.
Fulk.

The Judge concludes that an incentive award would not be
appropriate for Mr. Weil.  Quite simply, Mr. Weil is not a
Plaintiff in the uniform deduction class: his employment was
involuntarily terminated, and the class only included those
individuals who were employed by Metal Technologies or who
voluntarily terminated their employment.  Mr. Weil was a Lead
Plaintiff, but only as to claims that were ultimately decertified,
and never as to this claim.

In support of an award for non-named Plaintiffs Shadric Jones,
Fannie Kolish, Kevin Graves, and Janelle Myers, the Class Counsel
attests that they attended depositions and communicated with Class
Counsel in preparation for those depositions.  The Judge must point
out, however, that settlement agreements present an entirely
different procedural posture than the current case.  Absent some
other authority justifying reducing other class members' recovery
in favor these Plaintiffs, the Judge determines that service awards
are not appropriate here.  Indeed, at a post-trial status
conference, he requested that the class counsel provide authority
for recovery of incentive fees by the class members who were not
class representatives, and none has been provided.

Accordingly, Judge Magnus-Stinson granted the Plaintiffs' motion
for incentive/services awards, to the extent that he granted Ms.
Fulk an incentive award in the amount of $2,500.  The Motion is in
all other respects denied.

While the Class Counsel cites a number of cases to support an award
of attorneys' fees that are six or more times greater than the
amount of recovery, the Judge finds a different case to be most
closely analogous to the circumstances here.  The Coan v.
Nightingale Home Healthcare court noted that while the plaintiffs
correctly cited Hensley for the proposition that the lodestar is
the starting point in determining a reasonable fee, their motion
ignores what the Supreme Court actually decided in Hensley: that
the district court had erred by failing to reduce the lodestar
amount to account for the prevailing plaintiff's limited success.
As to the time-rounding claims, 85% of the $661,530.50 in requested
fees amounts to $562,300.93.  Three percent of that amount is
$16,869.03.  Combined with the $99,229.58 awarded for attorneys'
fees related to the wage-deduction claims, the Judge awarded the
Plaintiffs $116,098.61 as a reasonable attorneys' fee.

Finally, the Plaintiffs acknowledge Gavoni v. Dobbs House, Inc.,
and Testa v. Village of Mundelein, Ill., but conclusorily state
that while Metal Technologies argues this is a "mixed result" case,
it is no such thing.  The Judge disagrees.  He finds this case
analogous to Gavoni and Testa.  This is certainly a "mixed result"
case, and the Judge exercises his discretion to deny both parties'
petitions for costs in this instance.  The parties' petitions for
costs are therefore denied, and each party will bear its own
costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 13, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/re1ASB from Leagle.com.

BRIAN A. WEIL & MELISSA D. FULK, Plaintiffs, represented by Jacob
H. Miller, HUNT HASSLER LORENZ KONDRAS LLP, Robert F. Hunt, HUNT
HASSLER LORENZ & KONDRAS LLP & Robert Peter Kondras, Jr., HUNT
HASSLER KONDRAS & MILLER LLP.

METAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant, represented by Melissa K. Taft
-- Melissa.Taft@jacksonlewis.com -- JACKSON LEWIS P.C. & Michael W.
Padgett -- PadgettM@jacksonlewis.com -- JACKSON LEWIS P.C.

MISSOURI: Class in Juvenile Detainees' Parole Review Suit Certified
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in NORMAN BROWN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ANNE L.
PRECYTHE, et al., Defendants, No. 2:17-cv-04082-NKL (W.D. Mo.), sue
the Director of the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC) and
members of the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole (Board),
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Plaintiffs allege
that Missouri's parole policies and practices violate their rights
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and their rights to
due process under the Constitutions of both the United States and
Missouri and also fail to satisfy Missouri Revised Statutes
Sections 558.047.5 and 565.033.2.

The Plaintiffs seek certification of a class of similarly situated
individuals in the custody of the MDOC, defined as:

     Individuals in the custody of the Missouri Department of
Corrections who were sentenced to life without parole under a
mandatory sentencing scheme and who were under 18 years of age at
the time of the offense.

The United States District Court for Western District of Missouri,
Central Division, granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification.

Numerosity

The Plaintiffs have provided evidence that the Proposed Class
consists of 95 individuals. The Plaintiffs are incarcerated at
various institutions throughout the state of Missouri. The putative
class members have been incarcerated for their entire adult lives
and thus often are indigent and without the financial resources
required to retain counsel to address their claims individually.
Given these considerations and the nature of the suit, the Court
finds that the numerosity requirement has been satisfied.

Commonality

Commonality is satisfied here because the Plaintiffs' claims
present common questions of law and fact regarding the Defendants'
policies, practices, and customs related to parole consideration
for the Proposed Class Members. The Plaintiffs do not challenge the
fact or duration of their confinement.  Instead, they challenge the
policies, practices, and customs that govern parole consideration
for them and others similarly situated and how they must be applied
in light of the Supreme Court's mandate in Miller and Montgomery.

Whether the Defendants maintain a policy or custom of conducting
parole review hearings for the Proposed Class in a manner that
prevents the Plaintiffs from obtaining a realistic and meaningful
opportunity for release based on demonstrated rehabilitation, in
violation of state and federal due process requirements and
prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment is a question of law
and fact common to all members of the proposed class.

Typicality

The Plaintiffs' claims and the claims of the Proposed Class arise
from the same course of conduct: The Defendants' policies,
practices, and customs surrounding their parole review for juvenile
offenders serving mandatory LWOP sentences and who are eligible for
a review of their sentence under Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 558.047 and
565.033. The Plaintiffs claim that these policies, practices, and
customs deny them a meaningful opportunity for release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation, and systematically
violate their due process rights. They also claim that Defendants'
policies, practices, and customs do not satisfy the requirements of
Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 558.047 and 565.033. These claims are the
same as those that could be raised by any member of the Proposed
Class, and all class members share the common alleged injury of
being subjected to the policies.

Adequacy

The Defendants do not dispute that the Plaintiffs' counsel can
adequately represent the Proposed Class Members. The Plaintiffs'
counsel have extensive experience with complex litigation. One of
the Plaintiffs' attorneys has significant experience in class
action litigation and the issues involved with class notice, class
administration, and other relevant issues. The Court therefore
finds that proposed class counsel is equipped to vigorously
represent the plaintiffs in this action. The adequacy requirement
is satisfied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 25, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9ssypox from Leagle.com.

Office Of The Prosecuting Attorney For St. Louis County, Movant,
represented by Michael E. Hughes, St. Louis County Counselor's
Office.

Norman Brown, Ralph McElroy, Sidney Roberts & Theron Roland, also
known as Theron "Pete" Roland, Plaintiffs, represented by Amy
Elizabeth Breihan -- Amy.Breihan@MacArthurJustice.org -- MacArthur
Justice Center at St. Louis, Carlota Hopinks-Baul --
coty.hopinks-baul@huschblackwell.com -- Husch Blackwell LLP, pro
hac vice, Denyse L. Jones -- Jones@huschblackwell.com -- Husch
Blackwell LLP, pro hac vice, Jordan T. Ault --
jordan.ault@huschblackwell.com -- Husch Blackwell LLP, Matthew D.
Knepper -- matt.knepper@huschblackwell.com -- Husch Blackwell LLP &
Sarah L. Zimmerman -- sarah.zimmerman@huschblackwell.com -- Husch
Blackwell LLP.

Anne L. Precythe, in her official capacity, Director of Missouri
Department of Corrections, Kenneth Jones, in his official capacity,
Chairman of the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, Jim Wells,
in his official capacity, Member of the Missouri Board of Probation
and Parole, Martin Rucker, in his official capacity, Member of the
Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, Ellis McSwain, Jr, in his
official capacity, Member of the Missouri Board of Probation and
Parole, Don Ruzicka, in his official capacity, Member of the
Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, Jennifer Zamkus, in her
official capacity, Member of the Missouri Board of Probation and
Parole & Gary Dusenberg, in his official capacity, Member of the
Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, Defendants, represented by
Michael Joseph Spillane , Missouri Attorney General's Office
&Andrew J. Crane , Missouri Attorney General's Office.

MIZUHO BANK: Court Denies Certification of Mt. Gox Deposit Subclass
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned GREGORY GREENE and ANTHONY
MOTTO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. MIZUHO BANK, LTD. and MARK KARPELES, Defendants, No.
14 C 1437 (N.D. Ill.).

This putative class action brought by Gregory Greene and Anthony
Motto seeks to hold Mizuho Bank, Ltd. and Mark Karpeles liable for
financial losses arising from the demise of the Mt. Gox Bitcoin
exchange.  

The evidence would give Mizuho a strong basis to assert that,
unlike the funds of those Deposit Subclass members who invested in
Mt. Gox through Mizuho before it instituted the notification
policy, Motto's investment was not trapped at all. The SWIFT
messages reflect that Mizuho provided, or at least attempted to
provide, Motto the chance to unwind his investment and incur only
Mizuho's transaction fee.

As to Motto, then, Mizuho would be subject to a mini-trial on a
theory of liability entirely distinct from the principal liability
theory that Motto and the Deposit Subclass has pursued from the
outset: whether Mizuho violated Illinois law by taking brief
custody of Motto's funds and subjecting him to a small fee for the
privilege, even as it tried through Chase to notify him of Mt.
Gox's difficulties and to give him the opportunity to unwind the
transaction.

The key evidence for this theory would overlap only minimally with
the evidence relevant to the primary liability issue for the
subclass as a whole showing whether Mizuho deliberately sought to
conceal its decision to stop processing outbound wire transfers of
fiat currency so as not to jeopardize the fee revenue those
transactions generated, while at the same time enabling the bank to
distance itself from Mt. Gox. Specifically, the factfinder would
have to assess whether Mizuho acted appropriately in failing to
undertake additional efforts to contact Motto (that is, in addition
to notifying Chase through the SWIFT system) and to offer him a
refund inclusive of its service charges.

All that has little to do with Mizuho's allegedly unilateral and
unpublicized decision to stop processing outbound wire transfers.
Because this theory of liability would be relevant to only the
likely small subset of Deposit Subclass members who, like Motto,
invested in Mt. Gox after Mizuho instituted its notification
policy, Motto's claims lack the requisite "congruence" with those
of the Deposit Subclass as a whole to justify allowing him to
litigate on behalf of the group," and thus are not typical of those
of the subclass he seeks to represent.

Moreover, given Motto's testimony that he would have worked another
way to get funds into the Mt. Gox exchange even had he known about
Mizuho's decision to stop processing outbound wire transfers of
fiat currency, Mizuho would be able to raise an additional defense
unique to him. Because Motto would have lost his money when Mt. Gox
went dark even had he invested his fiat currency through another
bank or payment processor, Mizuho could argue that his injury was
limited to the difference, if any, between Mizuho's service fees
and the counterfactual service or transaction fees that an
alternative bank or payment processor would have charged.

Accordingly, depending on what the evidence showed as to the
relative magnitude of those counterfactual service or transaction
fees, Motto might have suffered only minimal losses, or he might
have suffered no loss or even gained by investing through Mizuho
rather than through one of its competitors, leading to a defense
verdict given the lack of injury. And for that reason, too, Motto
is not an adequate class representative.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Motto's motion for class
certification is denied for failure to comply with Rules 23(a)(3)
and (a)(4). Given this disposition, there is no need to address
whether Motto satisfies the other Rule 23 requirements,
requirements that might ultimately be addressed in the Central
District of California, where Lack seeks to represent the Deposit
Subclass in his newly filed suit.

A full-text copy of the District Court June 7, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7xy5vat from
Leagle.com.

Gregory Greene, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ari Jonathan Scharg --
ascharg@edelson.com -- Edelson P.C., Christopher Lillard Dore --
cdore@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Jay Edelson --
jedelson@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Robert A. Clifford, Clifford
Law Offices, P.C., Steven Lezell Woodrow, Woodrow & Peluso, LLC,
Benjamin Scott Thomassen -- bthomassen@edelson.com -- Edelson P.C.,
Eve-Lynn J. Rapp -- erapp@edelson.com -- Edelson P.C., John Aaron
Lawson -- alawson@edelson.com -- Edelson Pc, Scott Bennett Kitei,
Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP, & Shannon Marie McNulty,
Clifford Law Offices.

Anthony Motto, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin Scott Thomassen,
Edelson P.C. & Eve-Lynn J. Rapp, Edelson P.C.

Mark Karpeles, an individual, Defendant, pro se.

Mizuho Bank, Ltd., a Japanese financial institution, Defendant,
represented by Jason A. Frye -- jfrye@nge.com -- Neal, Gerber &
Eisenberg, Jeffrey Resetarits -- jeffrey.resetarits@shearman.com --
Shearman & Sterling Llp, Jerome Steven Fortinsky --
jfortinsky@shearman.com -- Shearman & Sterling, Llp, John A.
Nathanson -- john.nathanson@shearman.com -- Shearman & Sterling LLP
& Jonathan Stuart Quinn --
jquinn@nge.com -- Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg.

Mizuho Bank, Ltd., a Japanese financial institution, Cross
Claimant, represented by Jason A. Frye, Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg,
Jeffrey Resetarits, Shearman & Sterling Llp, Jerome Steven
Fortinsky, Shearman & Sterling, Llp, John A. Nathanson, Shearman &
Sterling LLP & Jonathan Stuart Quinn, Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg.

NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON: Faces "Grant" Suit in M.D. Tennessee
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Metropolitan
Government of Nashville & Davidson County. The case is styled as
Claude Grant, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson County, Tennessee, Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-00666 (M.D.
Tenn., July 18, 2018).

Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County is a
consolidation of two governments rather than the county taking over
the city or the city taking over the county government. It is, in
reality, a third form of local government with a range of options
and flexibility to provide for population shifts to the suburbs.
The Metropolitan Charter provides a mechanism for changes to be
made, particularly relating to improving education, mass transit,
public education, and economic development.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Martin D. Holmes, Esq.
   Dickinson Wright PLLC (Nashville Office)
   424 Church Street, Suite 800
   Nashville, TN 37219
   Tel: (615) 244-6538
   Email: mdholmes@dickinsonwright.com


NATIONWIDE MUTUAL: Sends Junk Faxes, Uber Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------
Uber, Inc., a New York corporation, individually and as
representative of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, d/b/a Nationwide, Defendant,
Case No. 2:18-cv-00648-EAS-EPD (S.D. Ohio., July 2, 2018) seeks to
stops the Defendant's practice of sending unsolicited junk faxes,
including the facsimile transmission of an advertisement to the
Plaintiff's telephone facsimile without its prior express written
consent.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, together with its
subsidiaries, provides insurance and financial services for private
clients and businesses across the United States. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Company was formerly known as Farm Bureau Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company and changed its name to Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Company in September 1955. The company was founded
in 1925 and is headquartered in Columbus, Ohio. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Company was formerly a subsidiary of Nationwide Mutual
Fire Insurance Company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert E. DeRose II, Esq.
          BARKAN MEIZLISH HANDELMAN
          GOODIN DEROSE WENTZ, LLP
          250 East Broad Street, 10th Floor
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 221-4221
          Facsimile: (614) 744-2300
          E-mail: bderose@barkanmeizlish.com

               - and -

          C. Darryl Cordero, Esq.
          Damon Rubin, Esq.
          PAYNE & FEARS LLP
          400 Continental Blvd., Suite 600
          El Segundo, CA 90245
          Telephone: (310) 689-1750
          Facsimile: (310) 689-1755
          E-mail: cdc@paynefears.com
                  dr@paynefears.com

               - and -

          Frank F. Owen, Esq.
          FRANK OWEN & ASSOCIATES PA
          1091 Ibis Avenue
          Miami Springs, FL 33166
          Telephone: (954) 964-8000
          E-mail: FFO@CastlePalms.com


NEW JERSEY: Court Dismisses "Hennes" Civil Rights Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
dismissed the Pro Se complaint in the case captioned FRANK
HENNESSEY, Plaintiff, v. ATLANTIC OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER and
ROBERT MORAN, Defendants, No. 17-cv-11763 (NLH) (AMD)(D.N.J.).

Plaintiff Frank Hennessey, an inmate presently incarcerated at the
Atlantic County Justice Facility in Mays Landing, New Jersey, seeks
to bring a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
against the Atlantic Office of the Public Defender. The Complaint
also references public defenders Robert Moran, Kevin Moses, Holly
Bitters, and Kimberly Schultz (Individual Defendants). It is
unclear whether the Plaintiff seeks to assert claims against them
but the Court will liberally construe the Complaint as seeking to
assert claims against them individually.  The Plaintiff also
appears to assert a class action claim on behalf of "all enjoining
(class status) parties" as to the mode by which discovery is
disclosed to defendants in Atlantic County, some of whom are not
literate or computer literate.

The Court holds that the Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In
order to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, the
plaintiff must show that (1) the conduct complained of was
committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that
the conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

The Plaintiff fails to state a claim as to the Individual
Defendants because a public defender acts outside the color of
state law when he or she is performing a lawyer's traditional
functions as counsel to a defendant.  The Plaintiff makes no
allegation that the Individual Defendants were acting in any way
other than performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel
to him. As such, the Individual Defendants must be dismissed. Such
dismissal, however, will be without prejudice and leave to amend.

Here, the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and apparently is without
formal training in the law. Thus, the Plaintiff would not be able
to represent the interests of any putative class and maintain this
suit as a class action.  Therefore, to the extent that the
Plaintiff wishes to bring a class action claim, such a claim is
denied.

The Plaintiff's claim that he would like to collaterally attack the
manner by which the State of New Jersey Superior Court, the State
of New Jersey Office of the Prosecutor, unnamed Criminal Case
Managers, and the unnamed administrators of the Atlantic County
Jail have prevented the Plaintiff's ability to review discovery,
the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. This allegation is conclusory in nature and fails to
provide the requisite details and elements to sustain a cause of
action against any of the named entities. For example, the
Plaintiff fails to specify what actions each entity took and how
those actions deprived the Plaintiff of an established legal right.
To the extent that the Plaintiff wishes to assert a legal claim
against these entities, he has failed to state a claim.

The Complaint is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court June 18, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ya74dvyh from Leagle.com.

FRANK T. HENNESSEY, Plaintiff, pro se.

NEW JERSEY: Denial of Bid to Enjoin Reform Act Bail Feature Upheld
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, affirmed the
District Court's judgment denying Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction in the case captioned BRITTAN HOLLAND,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated;
LEXINGTON NATIONAL INSURANCE CORPORATION, Appellants, v. KELLY
ROSEN, Pretrial Services Team Leader; MARY COLALILLO, Camden County
Prosecutor; CHRISTOPHER S. PORRINO, Attorney General of New Jersey,
No. 17-3104 (3rd Cir.).

New Jersey's system of pre-trial release has long relied on
monetary bail to ensure the presence of an accused person at trial.
But in 2017, following an amendment to its Constitution, the New
Jersey Criminal Justice Reform Act took effect.  It replaced New
Jersey's former monetary bail system with a new framework that
prioritizes the use of non-monetary conditions of release over
monetary bail to secure a criminal defendant's pretrial liberty.

Brittan Holland and Lexington National Insurance Corporation
challenge this feature of the Reform Act as a violation of the
Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. They seek a preliminary injunction enjoining Kelly
Rosen, the Team Leader for Pre-trial Services in the Criminal
Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Mary E. Colalillo,
the Camden County Prosecutor, and Christopher S. Porrino, the
Attorney General of New Jersey, and their agents from taking any
actions to enforce statutory provisions of the Reform Act that
allow imposition of severe restrictions on the pre-trial liberty of
presumptively innocent criminal defendants without offering the
option of monetary bail.

The State argues the District Court erred in holding Holland has
first-party standing because he did not suffer an injury-in-fact
and because his alleged injury is not redressable by a court.  For
Holland to have standing, he must have (1) suffered an injury in
fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.  Lexington asserts the Court also erred in
holding it lacks third-party standing because it has a common
interest with criminal defendants and they face obstacles to
appealing their pre-trial release decisions.

Each of the State's arguments fails.

First, the State reads Holland's Complaint too narrowly. His prayer
for relief a preliminary injunction against imposing severe
restrictions on  pre-trial liberty without offering the option of
non-excessive monetary bail could fairly be read to mean the State
court must offer or have the option to offer monetary bail when
setting release conditions.

Second, even assuming the Act's process is unconstitutional, the
District Court correctly determined that if monetary bail were
required to be considered on equal footing with non-monetary
release conditions, Holland's injury, the unconstitutional process
would be redressed regardless what release conditions would be
imposed.

Third, if the Act's process deprived Holland of a constitutional
right, his injury would be both concrete and particularized even
though he opted out of the hearing. Holland contends he did not
have access to a constitutionally compliant process.

The State does not challenge that Lexington has sufficiently
alleged injury due to its loss of business by the Act's shift away
from monetary bail. Even assuming this factor is met, Lexington
fails to satisfy the second and third conditions required for
third-party standing, it has no relationship, let alone a close
relationship, with potential criminal defendant-customers.

Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution provides in part that
excessive bail shall not be required. It applies to the State of
New Jersey through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Holland also claims the Reform Act violates the Excessive Bail
Clause because it imposes severe restrictions on all defendants'
pre-trial liberty except those who can be released on their own
recognizance. This statement and Holland's claim that the Reform
Act authorizes severe liberty restrictions of non-dangerous
defendants misconstrue the Act's statutory requirements. The
conditions of release imposed on Holland may only be applied if
they are the least restrictive conditions that the court determines
will reasonably assure his appearance in court when required [and]
the protection of the safety of any other person or the community.


In practice this has resulted in pretrial monitoring level 3+ home
detention and electronic monitoring being ordered for 8.3% of
eligible defendants, far from all defendants. And if a court sought
to impose home detention and electronic monitoring on a
non-dangerous defendant who presents little risk of flight, it
would have to contend with the Act's command that only the least
restrictive conditions reasonably assuring the Act's goals may be
imposed. If those conditions were excessive in light of the State's
legitimate interests, it would also come up against the Eighth
Amendment's proscription of excessive bail. This hypothetical
scenario, the Court points out, does not concern Holland, who has
not challenged his classification as a potentially dangerous
defendant.

Finally, though he waived his statutory right to a pre-trial
detention hearing, Holland still has an opportunity to argue for a
change in his release conditions and potentially request that
monetary bail be set. This requires a material change in
circumstances justifying a modification.  

In this context, Holland has not demonstrated a likelihood of
success on the merits of his argument that the Excessive Bail
Clause guarantees a right to monetary bail. Regardless whether the
Clause incorporates a right to bail, the latter is not limited to
cash bail or corporate surety bonds; it is, to repeat, release
before trial conditioned upon the accused's giving adequate
assurances. The Clause does not dictate whether those assurances
must be based on monetary or non-monetary conditions. Hence the
Eighth Amendment does not require a New Jersey court to consider
monetary bail with the same priority as non-monetary bail for a
criminal defendant.

Fourteenth Amendment

The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution forbids states from
depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.

Holland claims the Reform Act's subordination of monetary bail
violates both.

Substantive Due Process

Substantive due process limits what the government may do
regardless of the fairness of the procedures that it employs to
guarantee protection against government power arbitrarily and
oppressively exercised.

To show a violation, Holland must first demonstrate that he has
been deprived of a particular interest that is protected by
substantive due process.

Holland, however, claims substantive due process protects his right
to have the option to deposit money or obtain a corporate surety
bond to secure his future appearance before he may be subjected to
severe deprivations of pre-trial liberty. So the Court begins, as
the Court do in all due process cases, by examining our Nation's
history, legal traditions, and practices.

Holland has not pointed to any evidence of cash bail or corporate
surety bonds in early bail practice in the United States, nor did
our search reveal any. Rather, both modern forms of bail appear to
have emerged in the mid-to-late Nineteenth Century, largely as a
product of the expansive frontier and urban areas in America
diluting the personal relationships necessary for a personal surety
system.   

With respect to cash bail, some jurisdictions deemed the practice
illegal because it would not secure the government's interest in
the accused appearing at trial. But by the Twentieth Century many
jurisdictions, even if not yet states enacted statutes to allow it
in certain circumstances and others followed in the early and
mid-Twentieth Century including some jurisdictions that had
previously barred it. Outside the statutes' circumscribed scope,
however, numerous jurisdictions made clear that cash bail was not
available in common law as an alternative to obtaining a personal
surety. Even through the 1950s a few jurisdictions had no statutory
provision for cash bail, and we see no evidence its practice was
accepted based on prior decisions not overturned.

Procedural Due Process

Pre-trial release and detention decisions implicate a liberty
interest conditional pre-trial liberty that is entitled to
procedural due process protections. But not every potential loss of
liberty requires the full panoply of procedural guarantees
available at a criminal trial. Due process is flexible and calls
for such procedural protection as the particular situation
demands.

Procedural due process requires us to balance three factors:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Holland argues the Reform Act violates procedural due process
because it enables the State court to impose on criminal defendants
home detention and electronic monitoring without having the option
to impose monetary bail together with or in place of these
non-monetary conditions.

The Court holds the Reform Act's subordination of monetary bail to
non-monetary bail conditions does not violate either component of
the Due Process Clause. Substantive due process does not provide a
right to monetary bail. It is neither historically rooted to the
time of our Bill of Rights nor implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, and the Reform Act's subordination of it to non-monetary
release conditions is rationally related to the State's legitimate
interests in assuring defendants appear at trial, the safety of the
community and other persons, and the integrity of the criminal
justice process.

As for procedural due process, the extensive safeguards provided by
the Reform Act are not made inadequate by its subordination of
monetary bail. Moreover, Holland still may move the State court to
modify his bail based on a change of circumstances, wherein he may
be able to argue he no longer presents a danger and thus the
conditions of release imposed on him should be less restrictive.

Holland has standing to bring his claims that the Reform Act
violates the Eighth, Fourteenth, and Fourth Amendments of the
United States Constitution, but Lexington does not. He has not,
however, made a threshold showing of the first two factors required
to prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction. He has not
demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of
his argument that the Reform Act violates a constitutional right to
cash bail or corporate surety bonds.

The Court finds no right to these forms of monetary bail in the
Eighth Amendment's proscription of excessive bail nor in the
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive and procedural due process
components. The Court also reject Holland's less intrusive means"
theory of a Fourth Amendment violation, and so the Court hold he
has not made a sufficient showing of a violation of that
constitutional amendment. Without a constitutional right violated,
and with reconsideration of current release conditions an option if
circumstances suggest and a request made, irreparable harm does not
exist.

Thus, the Third Circuit affirms the District Court's denial of
Holland's motion for a preliminary injunction.

A full-text copy of the Third Circuit's July 9, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yakq77uf from Leagle.com.

Paul D. Clement, Esquire (Argued), Robert M. Bernstein, Esquire,
Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Esquire, Andrew C. Lawrence, Esquire,
Michael F. Williams, Esquire, Kirkland & Ellis, 655 15th Street,
N.W., Washington, DC 20005.

Justin T. Quinn, Esquire, Robinson Miller, One Newark Center, 19th
Floor, Newark, NJ 07102, Counsel for Appellants.

Christopher S. Porrino , Attorney General of New Jersey, Stuart M.
Feinblatt, Esquire (Argued), Christopher J. Riggs, Esquire , Office
of Attorney General of New Jersey, 25 Market Street, Richard J.
Hughes Justice Complex, Trenton, NJ 08625, Counsel for Appellees.

Alexander R. Shalom, Esquire (Argued), Tess Borden, Esquire ,
Edward Barocas, Esquire , Jeanne LoCicero, Esquire , American Civil
Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, 89 Market Street, P.O.
Box 32159, Newark, NJ 07102.

Alan E. Schoenfeld, Esquire, Ryan M. Chabot, Esquire, WilmerHale, 7
World Trade Center, 250 Greenwich Street, New York, NY 10007.

Seth P. Waxman, Esquire, David M. Lehn, Esquire, Tiffany R. Wright,
Esquire, WilmerHale, 1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC
20006, Counsel for Amici Appellees.

NEW YORK GOLF: Faces "Sypert" Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against New York Golf
Enterprises, Inc. The case is styled as Kathleen Sypert, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. New York
Golf Enterprises, Inc. doing business as: New York Country Club,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-06491 (S.D. N.Y., July 18, 2018).

New York Golf Enterprises, Inc. is a Country club in New Hempstead,
New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


NEW YORK: "Bouidia" Inmate Suit Consolidated with "Butler"
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York consolidated the case captioned MOHAMED BOUIDIA, Plaintiff, v.
RIVERHEAD SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL, and SUFFOLK COUNTY SHERIFF DEPT.
COMMISSARY, Defendants, No. 18-CV-2392(JS)(GRB)(E.D. N.Y.), with
the case captioned Butler, et al. v. DeMarco, et al., No.
11-CV-2602 (JS)(GRB) (Consolidated Action), and any claims in the
Bouidia Complaint that are not included in the Consolidated Amended
Complaint in Butler will be severed.  The Bouidia Plaintiff, as a
member of the class, will be represented by pro bono counsel,
Shearman & Sterling LLP.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 7, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7cx4r9o from Leagle.com.

Mohamed Bouidia, Plaintiff, pro se.

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY: Former Student Files Sexual Harassment Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN DOE 1, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, and DOES 1-100, Case No.
1:18-cv-00483-TSB (S.D. Ohio, July 17, 2018), is brought on behalf
of individuals, who were sexually abused, harassed and molested by
serial sexual predator, Dr. Richard Strauss while they were
students at The Ohio State University.

John Doe 1 currently resides in South Carolina.  He was a student
and wrestler at OSU from 1982 to 1984 where he received care from
Dr. Strauss on at least 20 occasions in connection with Dr.
Strauss' role as the wrestling team's doctor.  The Plaintiff
alleges that he was subjected to sexual harassment and
inappropriate touching during those examinations.

OSU is an Ohio corporation having its principal place of business
in Ohio and doing business in Ohio.  OSU is a large, primarily
residential, public university in Columbus, Ohio.  The true names
and capacities of the Doe Defendants are unknown to the
Plaintiff.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel R. Karon, Esq.
          KARON LLC
          700 W. St. Clair Ave., Suite 200
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Telephone: (216) 622-1851
          E-mail: dkaron@karonllc.com

               - and -

          Joseph G. Sauder, Esq.
          Matthew D. Schelkopf, Esq.
          Joseph B. Kenney, Esq.
          SAUDER SCHELKOPF LLC
          555 Lancaster Avenue
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (888) 711-9975
          E-mail: jgs@sstriallawyers.com
                  mds@sstriallawyers.com
                  jbk@sstriallawyers.com



PARAMOUNT COUNTRY: Faces "Sypert" Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Paramount Country
Club, LLC. The case is styled as Kathleen Sypert, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Paramount
Country Club, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-06495 (S.D. N.Y.,
July 18, 2018).

Paramount Country Club offers golf, tennis, swimming, wedding
receptions, catering, and a banquet hall venue in New City,
NY.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


PELHAM COUNTRY: Faces "Sypert" Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pelham Country Club.
The case is styled as Kathleen Sypert, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Pelham Country Club,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-06496 (S.D. N.Y., July 18, 2018).

Pelham Country Club is a country club located on the border of
Pelham Manor and New Rochelle in Westchester County, New York. The
club hosted the PGA Championship in 1923, which Gene Sarazen
won.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
   Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
   300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
   Brooklyn, NY 11201
   Tel: (917) 299-6612
   Fax: (929) 575-4195
   Email: joseph@cml.legal


POWER HOME: Defranza Sues Over Unsolicited Telemarketing Calls
--------------------------------------------------------------
John Defranza, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Power Home Remodeling Group, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-11446, (D.N.J., July 8, 2018), seeks
damages, restitution, declaratory and injunctive relief, and
attorneys' fees and costs under the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.

Power Home is a re-roofer and home remodeler. It utilizes
telemarketing and acquires leads through lead generating services.
Power Home made more than 10 unsolicited, autodialed calls to
Defranza's cellular phone, despite his phone number registered with
the National Do Not Call registry to prevent such calls, says the
complaint. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Stefan Coleman, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF STEFAN COLEMAN, P.A.
      201 s. Biscayne Blvd., 28th floor
      Miami, FL 33131
      Tel: (877) 333-9427
      Fax: (888) 498.8946
      Email: law@stefancoleman.com

             - and -

      Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
      KAUFMAN P.A.
      400 NW 26TH Street
      Miami, FL 33127
      Tel: (305) 469-5881
      Email: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com

PROGRESSIVE SPECIALTY: Court Certifies "Boyle" Class
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in
the case captioned JAMES BOYLE, SR., on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated v. PROGRESSIVE SPECIALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY, Civil Action No. 09-5515 (E.D. Pa.).

Plaintiff, James Boyle, Sr., moves to certify this putative class
action filed on behalf of all Pennsylvania policyholders of the
defendant automobile insurer Progressive Specialty Insurance
Company whose cars were equipped with passive antitheft devices and
did not receive the statutorily mandated ten percent discount on
their premium for comprehensive coverage.  He alleges that
Progressive violated the passive antitheft device discount
provision of Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility
Law (MVFRL). He also contends that Progressive breached the implied
terms of its insurance contracts when it failed to give the
antitheft device discount as promised in its rate filings with the
Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner.

The plaintiff's proposed amended class definition limits qualifying
vehicles to those equipped with one of the five types of passive
antitheft devices that the Court identified in its summary judgment
opinion as qualifying for the discount under the statute.

It provides as follows:

     All policyholders of Progressive who, within the six years
before the commencement of this case November 19, 2009 through the
date of the class certification order, had automobile insurance
that included comprehensive insurance coverage on a vehicle
registered in Pennsylvania, but did not receive at least a 10
percent antitheft discount on the premiums for that comprehensive
insurance coverage, and:
(a) who insured a make, model and year vehicle that has as standard
equipment a Pass-Key or PassLock system, SecuriLock/PATS system,
Sentry Key Immobilizer System, Nissan Vehicle Immobilizer System,
or Mercedes Immobilizer system, as identified on the list of
qualifying vehicles attached to the Goldstein Declaration; and (b)
antitheft data available to Progressive from Polk, as supplemented
by HLDI antitheft data if Polk codes the vehicle's antitheft device
as Unknown or as having an unspecified Antitheft Device, identifies
the vehicle as having an engine immobilizer as standard equipment;
and (c) Progressive's records show that it has given an antitheft
discount in Pennsylvania to the same make, model, and year of
vehicle.

Numerosity

Numerosity is not an issue. During the class period, Progressive
insured hundreds of thousands of vehicles in Pennsylvania for
comprehensive loss that did not receive the antitheft device
discount.

Commonality

In this case, there are several common legal and factual questions.
The Court have decided controlling common legal issues. The Court
answered the question whether Section 1799.1 mandates that
Progressive give a ten percent discount on the premium for
comprehensive coverage to all of its insureds whose vehicles are
equipped with qualifying antitheft devices, even if they did not
request it.  All class members have these dispositive issues in
common. Each had insured a vehicle equipped with a qualifying
device for comprehensive coverage and did not receive the discount.
Therefore, the commonality requirement has been met.

Typicality

Boyle, like the class members, claims he insured a vehicle for
comprehensive insurance coverage and Progressive did not give him
an antitheft device discount even though he qualified for one.
Boyle insured two vehicles with Progressive, a 2001 Ford Taurus and
a 1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee Limited. Both vehicles came equipped
with a qualifying device. Boyle's 2001 Ford Taurus had a SecuriLock
passive antitheft system and his 1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee had a
Vehicle Theft Security System with security alarm and Sentry Key
Engine Immobilizer as standard equipment.  Thus, Boyle's claim is
typical of the putative class.

Adequacy of Representation

There are no conflicts or divergent interests between Boyle and the
class members. Nothing will impair his ability to adequately
protect the interests of the absent class members. Their interests
are the same. Protecting his interest necessarily protects their
interests. Therefore, Boyle has satisfied this part of the adequacy
requirement.

Counsel is qualified to represent the class. They are experienced
in handling class actions. The Court has observed their expertise
and comprehensive knowledge of the law and the facts in the
handling of this case and the related cases through class
certification and settlement. They have already spent a significant
amount of time working on this case and the related cases. They
have conducted extensive investigation, drafting of pleadings,
discovery, litigation of motions for summary judgment and motions
for class certification, settlement negotiations, and mediations.
They are knowledgeable of the applicable law. Counsel successfully
negotiated settlement agreements with ten of the insurance
companies in the related cases. They achieved court approval of
pre-certification settlements in nine of those cases. Therefore,
the adequacy of representation requirement is satisfied.

Predominance

Boyle's claim is that the class members were entitled to the
passive antitheft device discount under 75 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann.
Section 1799.1 and Progressive did not give it to them. The
elements of the claim are: (1) the plaintiff insured a vehicle
equipped with a passive antitheft device for comprehensive loss;
(2) the device qualified under the statute for a discount; and (3)
Progressive did not give him the discount. Each of these elements
can be established by common proof. The evidence entitling him to
relief is the same evidence applicable to the class members.

Superiority

Class certification is the superior method to adjudicate this case
fairly and efficiently. Class members are not likely to file
individual actions, the cost of litigation would dwarf any
potential recovery. The amount each class member would receive is
less than one hundred dollars. Certainly, no class member would
consider bringing an individual action in light of the cost
benefit.

The Court finds that the plaintiff has satisfied the requirements
of Rule 23(a), and has met the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) by
showing that common questions of law and fact predominate over
individual questions, and a class action is superior to other
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the issues. The
plaintiff's proposed class definition also satisfies the
ascertainability standard because class members can be reliably and
readily identified based on an administratively feasible method
using objective criteria.
Therefore, the Court will grant the motion for class
certification.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 7, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7c872zt from
Leagle.com.

JAMES BOYLE, SR, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by IRA NEIL RICHARDS --
irichards@schnader.com -- SCHNADER HARRISON SEGAL & LEWIS LLP,
ARLEIGH PRITCHARD HELFER -- ahelfer@schnader.com -- SCHNADER
HARRISON SEGAL & LEWIS LLP, CHRISTOPHER P. CAPUTO, CAPUTO &
MARIOTTI, GARY M. GOLDSTEIN, SCHNADER HARRISON SEGAL & LEWIS LLP,
JENNIFER E. AGNEW, JOSEPH E. MARIOTTI, CAPUTO & MARIOTTI PC,
KENNETH I. TRUJILLO -- ktrujillo@chamberlainlaw.com -- CHAMBERLAIN
HRDLICKA WHITE WILLIAMS AND AUGHTRY & SAMUEL W. SILVER, SCHNADER
HARRISON SEGAL & LEWIS LLP.

PROGRESSIVE SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, represented by
DEBORAH J. KRABBENDAM -- dkrabbendam@conradobrien.com -- CONRAD
O'BRIEN, PC & ROBERT N. FELTOON -- rfeltoon@conradobrien.com --
CONRAD O'BRIEN.

INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, INC., Movant, represented by JOANN M.
LYTLE,
- jlytle@mccarter.com -- MCCARTER & ENGLISH, LLP.

QUECHAN TRIBE: Court Narrows Claims in "Aguilar" Rico Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the case captioned WILLIAMS & COCHRANE, LLP; and FRANCISCO
AGUILAR, MILO BARLEY, GLORIA COSTA, GEORGE DECORSE, SALLY DECORSE,
et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. QUECHAN TRIBE OF THE FORT YUMA INDIAN RESERVATION;
ROBERT ROSETTE; ROSETTE & ASSOCIATES, PC; ROSETTE, LLP; RICHARD
ARMSTRONG; KEENY ESCALANTI, SR.; MARK WILLIAM WHITE II, a/k/a
WILLIE WHITE; and DOES 1 THROUGH 100, Defendants, Case No.
3:17-cv-01436-GPC-MDD (S.D. Cal.).

According to the Plaintiffs, Rosette's business strategy consists
of charging clients bargain-basement of even nominal sums to
perform legal tasks, but making up for the lost revenue by
convincing tribes to engage in additional business transactions
such as internet-based payday lending schemes. Rosette's strategy
often includes removing any legal oversight that may try to curb
the operations of the forthcoming payday loan business such as
removing tribal officeholders, firing the tribe's counsel, and
setting up an ineffective regulatory and oversight framework.

The Plaintiffs assert the following claims: (1) breach of contract,
by W&C against Quechan; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, by W&C against Quechan; (3) promissory
estoppel, by W&C against Quechan; (4) two violations of the Lanham
Act, by W&C against the Rosette Defendants; (5) violation of RICO,
by W&C against the Rosette Defendants; (6) conspiracy to violate
RICO, by W&C against the Rosette Defendants, Escalanti, and White;
and (7) negligence/breach of fiduciary duty, by the Member
Plaintiffs against the Rosette Defendants.

Defendants Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation
(Quechan), Escalanti, and White (Quechan Defendants) have filed a
motion to dismiss the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC).

Breach of Contract Claim (Count One)

The Quechan Defendants move to dismiss W&C's breach of contract
claim to the extent that W&C seeks payment under Section 5 of the
fee agreement. They contend that Section 11, not Section 5, governs
what payment is owed to W&C in light of Quechan having discharged
W&C prior to the conclusion of the compact negotiations.

The Court cannot agree with W&C that at the time Quechan discharged
W&C, Quechan was entitled under any understanding of that term to
any of the net recovery it obtained as a result of the compact it
signed with California. To be entitled to something is to hold a
legal right it. Under the allegations in the FAC, there is no
question that, at the time Quechan discharged W&C as its counsel,
Quechan had no legal right to any of the benefits that California
had offered during the negotiations with W&C.

Because Quechan was not entitled to any of the concessions
California had offered during the negotiations, Quechan's failure
to pay W&C the contingency fee envisioned in Section 5 of the fee
agreement was not a breach of contract. To the extent that Count
One is premised on a violation of Section 5, that claim is
dismissed with prejudice.

Sovereign Immunity - Claims Against the Tribe (Counts Two and
Three)

The Quechan Defendants argue that this Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over Counts Two and Three, which assert a breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and promissory
estoppel. Quechan argues it has not waived its sovereign immunity
to allow such claims.

Section 13 of the fee agreement between Quechan and W&C states:
Client hereby expressly and irrevocably waives its sovereign
immunity and any defense based thereon from any suit, action or
proceeding or from any legal process with respect to any claims the
Firm may bring seeking payment under the terms of this agreement.

Contrary to the Quechan Defendants' assertion, Quechan waived its
sovereign immunity with respect to W&C's claim that Quechan
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The
waiver permits the Court to exercise jurisdiction over claims
seeking payment under the terms of the fee agreement. The implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an implied term in every
contract.

Because Quechan clearly waived its immunity as to claims for
payment under the terms of the fee agreement, and the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a term of the fee
agreement, the Court may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over
W&C's claim of breach of that term.

Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
(Count Two)

The Quechan Defendants argue that even if Quechan waived its
sovereign immunity on the claim of breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, the FAC fails to state such a claim
because it is duplicative of W&C's breach of contract claim.

In light of the Court's ruling that the FAC does not state a claim
for relief that W&C is entitled to the contingency fee in Section 5
of the fee agreement. W&C's breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing claim does not seek the same damages or
other relief already claimed as W&C's breach of contract claim. The
breach of contract claim, if successful, entitles W&C to a
reasonable fee under Section 11 of the fee agreement, which is
determined by the interaction of 10 enumerated factors.  

By contrast, by asserting a breach of the implied covenant, W&C
seeks to put itself in the position it would have been had Quechan
never discharged W&C. That is, rather than seeking what it should
be paid under Section 11 of the fee agreement, in this claim W&C
seeks what it would have been paid under Section 5 had Quechan
never discharged W&C in bad faith.
Because the Court concludes that the implied covenant claim is not
duplicative of the breach of contract claim, the Quechan Defendants
have offered no persuasive argument in support of dismissing the
implied covenant claim.

Promissory Estoppel (Count Three)

The Quechan Defendants argue that W&C's promissory estoppel claim
fails because all relevant promises discussed in the FAC were the
result of bargained compromise.

The Court agrees.

To succeed in a promissory estoppel claim under California law, one
must show: (1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms (2)
reliance by the party to whom the promise is made (3) the reliance
was both reasonable and foreseeable and (4) the party asserting the
estoppel was injured by his reliance.

Here, it is clear that the work W&C performed on behalf of Quechan
was done in exchange for Quechan's promise to pay W&C under the
terms of the fee agreement. In other words, the only thing at issue
here is under which provision of the contract W&C will be paid for
its services, not whether there was a contract for services at all
or whether the promises contained in the contract were supported by
consideration.

In sum, the fee agreement between Quechan and W&C determines the
money W&C is entitled to as a result of its work negotiating
Quechan's compact with California. As stated above, W&C has pled a
claim that Quechan breached that contract by failing to pay W&C the
reasonable fee" envisioned in Section 11 of the fee agreement. That
breach of contract claim covers all of the conduct at issue in
W&C's promissory estoppel claim. Any action W&C took in response to
the promises alleged in the FAC were the result of the bargain
memorialized in the fee agreement. W&C therefore fails to state a
claim for promissory estoppel.

Lanham Act Claims (Counts Four and Five)

The Rosette Defendants argue that W&C's Lanham Act claims should be
dismissed because (1) the statements at issue are not actionable,
and (2) the FAC does not allege any injury incurred by W&C that was
caused by those statements.  

The relevant portion of the Lanham Act states: "Any person who, on
or in connection with any goods or services uses in commerce any
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which in commercial advertising or
promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods,
services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil
action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to
be damaged by such act."

Based on the facts alleged in the FAC, nothing about the statements
above are false or misleading. There is no dispute that Quechan and
California agreed to a new compact that saved Quechan that amount
of money and increased Quechan's amount of permitted devices. In
their opposition memorandum, W&C's only argument to the contrary is
that the contact information at the bottom of the press release
necessarily conveys the false message that Rosette single-handedly
represented the Tribe in connection with the compact.The Court
cannot agree. The contact information statement suggests nothing
more than Rosette is Quechan's counsel, which is true.

Because Count Five does not allege a false or misleading statement,
it fails to state a violation of the Lanham Act.

RICO Claim (Count Six)

The Rosette Defendants contend that Count Six which asserts a RICO
violation by the Rosette Defendants through a series of violations
of the mail and/or wire fraud statutes???fails because the FAC does
not allege: (1) a RICO enterprise, (2) a sufficient pattern of
racketeering activity, or (3) causation.

W&C alleges thirteen instances of conduct that it alleges
constitutes a violation of the wire and/or mail fraud statutes,
inter alia: (1) interfering with W&C's contract with Pauma by
suggesting the tribe's then-Chairman demand that the firm write a
legal opinion freeing up the monies saved by the injunction in
Pauma's suit against the State of California; (2) interfering with
W&C's contract with Pauma by instructing the tribe's then-Chairman
to not pay any of the firm's invoices and to communicate to the
firm that he would 'ruin [its] reputation in Indian Count[r]y' if
it simply did not walk away; (3) interfering with W&C's contract
with La Pena Law by telling La Pena that W&C stole Rosette's
clients and would invariably steal her clients as well.

These allegations fail to state with particularity the
circumstances constituting the fraud and fail to provide the
specific content of the false representations. In addition, the
allegations merely lump the named defendants together and fail to
identify each defendant's role. At best, only one of these
allegations suggests that the lumped-together Rosette Defendants
have violated the federal wire or mail fraud statutes.

As a result, the claim is dismissed without prejudice.

RICO Conspiracy Claim (Count Seven)

The Defendants next challenge the RICO conspiracy claim in Count
Seven. This conspiracy claim is asserted against the Rosette
Defendants, Escalanti, and White, and is supported by allegations
of conduct that differ from those listed in Count Six.

Here, W&C's RICO conspiracy claim against Escalanti and White,
discussed in greater detail below, is clearly a personal-capacity
suit. It alleges that Escalanti and White have joined forces with
the Rosette Defendants to create a fraudulent payday lending
scheme. If Escalanti and White are found liable, they will have to
pay damages to W&C, not Quechan. In other words, a finding of
liability against Escalanti and White on this count will not
require action by Quechan or disturb Quechan's property.

Negligence/Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count Eight)

Count Eight of the FAC asserts a putative class action legal
malpractice claim by the Member Plaintiffs against the Rosette
Defendants, stemming from Rosette's completion of Quechan's
negotiations with California.

Considering the facts alleged in the FAC, the policy considerations
discussed above lead to the conclusion that the Member Plaintiffs
may pursue a malpractice claim against the Rosette Defendants. The
purpose of the transaction for which the Rosette Defendants were
responsible the compact negotiations with California was to
increase Quechan's wealth, which is distributed to its members in
the form of per capita payments.  

Accordingly, the Quechan Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted
in part and denied in part.

The Court dismisses Counts Three, Five, Six, Seven, and Eight.
Because this is the first time the Court has addressed these
deficiencies in Plaintiffs' pleadings, and for the additional
reasons listed above, the Court dismisses these claims without
prejudice. However, because the fee agreement between W&C and
Quechan makes clear that W&C is not entitled to a "contingency fee"
under Section 5, any amendment in an effort to save that aspect of
the breach of contract claim would be futile. The Court therefore
dismisses with prejudice Count One to the extent that it alleges a
breach of Section 5 of the fee agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 7, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y974l424 from Leagle.com.

Williams & Cochrane, LLP, Plaintiff, represented by Cheryl A.
Williams -- caw@williamscochrane.com -- Williams & Cochrane LLP &
Kevin Michael Cochrane -- kmc@williamscochrane.com -- Williams &
Cochrane, LLP.

Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation, a
federally-recognized Indian tribe, Keeny Escalanti, Sr. & Mark
William White II, also known as Willie White, Defendants,
represented by Christopher T. Casamassima  --
chris.casamassima@wilmerhale.com -- WilmerHale & Rebecca A.
Girolamo -- BECKY.GIROLAMO@WILMERHALE.COM -- WilmerHale.

R.V. CAREY'S: Pipefitters' Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages, Damages
-----------------------------------------------------------
Miguel Garcia, Jesus Acosta, Luis Acosta, Francisco Aguilar, Julian
Flores, Edwin Garcia, Jose Lopez, Manuel Lopez, Jose Salmeron and
Eric Vasquez, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated
Plaintiff, v. R.V. Carey's Plumbing and Heating, Inc., C&M
Contractors, LLC, Alexis Mejia Perez, and The Clark Construction
Group, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-00841, (E.D. Va., July 6,
2018), seeks unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime, liquidated
damages, and attorneys' fees and costs for violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938.

Plaintiffs were hired by Perez through C&M to work on an R.V. Carey
worksite to install plumbing in a new construction apartment
complex located at 1000 S. Frederick Street, Arlington, Virginia as
pipefitters. Plaintiffs worked more than 40 hours per week but did
not get paid overtime, notes the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Craig Juraj Curwood, Esq.
      Philip Justus Dean, Esq.
      CURWOOD LAW FIRM, PLC
      530 E. Main Street, Suite 710
      Richmond, VA 23219
      Telephone: (804) 788-0808
      Fax: (804) 767-6777
      Email: ccurwood@curwoodlaw.com
             pdean@curwoodlaw.com

REXALL SUNDOWN: Bid to Dismiss FAC in "Seegert" Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge John A. Houston of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
case, SANDRA SEEGERT, individually and on behalf of all other
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. REXALL SUNDOWN, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 3:17-cv-1243-JAH-JLB (S.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff brings the class action complaint on behalf of
herself, and all others similarly situated, alleging that the
Defendant violated two California statutes: (1) California's Unfair
Competition Law ("UCL"); and (2) California's Consumers Legal
Remedies Act ("CLRA").

The Defendant distributes and sells a line of "joint health"
supplements marketed by the product name "Osteo Bi-Flex."  It
offers four different types of Osteo Bi-Flex products: (1) Osteo
Bi-Flex One Per Day, (2) Osteo Bi-Flex Triple Strength, (3) Osteo
Bi-Flex Triple Strength MSM formula, and (4) Osteo Bi-Flex Triple
Strength with Vitamin D.

The Plaintiff alleges that on Feb. 20, 2017 she purchased the
Defendant's Osteo Bi-Flex Triple Strength product while shopping at
a Walgreens store in San Diego, California.  She further alleges
that she purchased the Defendant's product believing it would
provide the joint health benefits that it advertised, including
relief from joint pain and increased joint mobility.

The Defendant advertises and markets its four Osteo Bi-Flex
products as having the ability to provide meaningful joint health
benefits.  The Plaintiff asserts that these claims constitute false
and misleading advertising because the Osteo Bi-Flex products are
incapable of supporting or benefitting the health of human joints.
In support, she cites to numerous clinical trials and studies which
demonstrate that the main ingredients in Osteo Bi-Flex are
ineffective and unable to produce "joint health benefits."

The Plaintiff filed her initial complaint on June 19, 2017.  On
Aug. 14, 2017, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and motion
to strike the Plaintiff's complaint.  On Dec. 1, 2017, the Court
granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss and motion to strike,
dismissing the Plaintiff's claims without prejudice.

On Dec. 29, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, to
which the Defendant filed the pending Motion to Dismiss.  The Court
has received an opposition from the Plaintiff and a reply from the
Defendant.

The Defendant makes several arguments in support of its Motion to
Dismiss.  First, it argues that because the Plaintiff only
purchased Osteo Bi-Flex Triple Strength, she lacks standing to
assert claims for the remaining Osteo Bi-Flex products.  Next, it
argues that the Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed in its
entirety because she has not plausibly alleged that the
representations made by the Defendant concerning its Osteo Bi-Flex
products are false.  Finally, the Defendant contends that the
Plaintiff failed to remedy any of the Rule 9(b) deficiencies
discussed by this Court in dismissing her original complaint.

Judge Houston finds that the Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged
substantial similarities between the Osteo Bi-Flex products, and
thus has standing to pursue claims for the products she did not
purchase.  While a different result may be obtained in a motion for
class certification, the Defendant's motion to dismiss on such a
basis must be denied.

Because the studies cited by the Plaintiff examine products with
similar active ingredients as Osteo Bi-Flex, the Judge finds the
Plaintiff's claims facially plausible.  Whether the remaining
ingredients in Osteo Bi-Flex distinguish it from the proffered
studies is a factual inquiry, not ripe for review in a motion to
dismiss.  Thus, the Jduge finds the Plaintiff has plausibly alleged
that the Defendant's representations of Osteo Bi-Flex are false or
misleading, and the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on 12(b)(6)
grounds is denied.

Finally, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff's claims are clear: The
representations made on Osteo Bi-Flex's packaging and advertising
is false and misleading because Osteo Bi-Flex is unable to provide
any joint health benefits.  This level of specificity is sufficient
to provide the Defendant with adequate notice of the particular
conduct so that it may properly defend against the charge and not
just deny that they have done anything wrong.  Accordingly, the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for failure to plead with sufficient
particularity as required by Rule 9(b) is denied.

Based on this, Judge Houston denied the Defendant's Request for
Judicial Notice, and denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's FAC.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 13, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/QXxzIq from Leagle.com.

Sandra Seegert, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas Joseph O'Reardon, II --
toreardon@bholaw.com -- Blood Hurst & O'Reardon, LLP, Timothy G.
Blood -- tblood@bholaw.com -- Blood Hurst & O'Reardon, LLP & Todd
D. Carpenter -- tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch Sweet
Kilpela & Carpenter, LLP.

Rexall Sundown, Inc., Defendant, represented by Adriane K. Peralta
-- ADRIANE.PERALTA@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP & Amy Pesapane
Lally -- ALALLY@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP.

RYZE CLAIM: "Billings" Venue Transferred to S.D. Ind.
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue in the case
captioned LESLIE BILLINGS, Plaintiff, v. RYZE CLAIM SOLUTIONS, LLC
f/k/a Eagle Adjusting Services, Inc., an Indiana Limited Liability
Company, and DOES 1-10 inclusive Defendants, Case No. 1:17-CV-1600
AWI JLT(E.D. Cal.), to the Southern District of Indiana -
Indianapolis Division ("SDI").

This case was removed from the Kern County Superior Court and is an
employment dispute between Plaintiff Leslie Billings and his former
employer, Ryze Claim Solutions, Inc.  In the operative complaint,
which is the First Amended Complaint, Billings alleges claims under
the California Labor Code (relating to minimum wages, premium
wages, meal periods, rest periods, separation pay, reimbursement,
and unlawful wage deductions), California Business & Professions
Code Section 17200, and violation of the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act.  Billings attempts to bring collective and class
actions claims on behalf of a California class and a nationwide
class.

Billings argues that the Agreement's choice of law clause works in
tandem with the forum selection clause to produce a waiver of his
non-waivable California statutory rights/protections.  The Court
finds that Billings has not shown that Allen v. Great Am. Reserve
Ins. Co., 766 N.E.2d 1157, 1162 (Ind. 2002), leads to a waiver of
any rights in fact, the analysis in Allen indicates that the
opposite is true, and the rationale of Huddleston shows that
Billings's Labor Code claims exist apart from the Agreement.
Therefore, Billings has not sufficiently demonstrated that
enforcement of the forum selection clause would violate California
public policy.

Ryze has demonstrated that forum selection clause designates the
SDI as the proper federal forum for all claims alleged by Billings.
Billings has not sufficiently demonstrated that the Agreement as a
whole is invalid, has not demonstrated that the forum selection
clause in particular is invalid, and has not demonstrated that
public interest factors sufficiently outweigh the effect of the
forum selection clause. Therefore, the Court will enforce the forum
selection clause and transfer this case to the SDI.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 7, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y92seur5 from Leagle.com.

LESLIE BILLINGS, an individual, Plaintiff, represented by Ann
Hendrix, The Myers Law Group, A.P.C., Jason Thomas Hatcher --
jhatcher@myerslawgroup.com -- The Myers Law Group, APC & Robert M.
Kitson, The Myers Law Group, APC.

RYZE CLAIM SOLUTIONS, LLC, an Indiana Limited Liability Company,
Defendant, represented by Alis M. Moon -- alis.moon@ogletree.com --
Ogletree Deakins & Christopher J. Archibald-  Ogletree Deakins Nash
Smoak & Stewart, P.C..

SEASIDE APARTMENT: Face "Sierra" Suit in S.D. Florida
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Seaside Apartment
Hotel LLC. The case is styled as Luis Sierra, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Seaside
Apartment Hotel LLC, a Florida limited liability company,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-22904-MGC (S.D. Fla., July 18, 2018).

Seaside Apartment Hotel LLC is a 3-star hotel in Miami Beach,
FL.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jessica Lynn Kerr, Esq.
   Jessica L. Kerr, P.A. dba The Advocacy Group
   200 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 504
   Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
   Tel: (954) 282-1858
   Fax: (844) 786-3694
   Email: service@advocacypa.com


SIBANYE GOLD: Heuschen Sues Over Share Price Drop
-------------------------------------------------
Lester Heuschen, Jr., on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Sibanye Gold Limited, Neal Froneman and
Charl Keyter, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-03902 (E.D. N.Y., July 6,
2018), seeks to recover damages caused by violations of the federal
securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Sibanye operates as a precious metals mining company in South
Africa, Zimbabwe and the United States. Sibanye is incorporated and
has its principal executive offices in the Republic of South
Africa. Its American depositary receipts (ADR) trade on the New
York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol "SBGL."

The complaint says the Defendants failed to disclose that Sibanye's
safety protocols were inadequate to prevent a high rate of worker
death and its mining supervisors routinely forced Company employees
to work in unsafe and unlawful conditions. Said issues subjected
Sibanye to heightened regulatory oversight.

On this news, Sibanye's share price fell $0.26, or 10.36%, to close
at $2.25 on June 27, 2018. Heuschen acquired Sibanye securities at
artificially inflated prices and lost substantially upon the
revelation of the alleged corrective disclosures. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
      J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
      POMERANTZ LLP
      600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
      New York, NY 10016
      Telephone: (212) 661-1100
      Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
      Email: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
             ahood@pomlaw.com

             - and -

      Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
      POMERANTZ LLP
      10 South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
      Chicago, IL 60603
      Telephone: (312) 377-1181
      Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
      Email: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

             - and -

      Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
      BRONSTEIN, GEWIRTZ & GROSSMAN, LLC
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4600
      New York, NY 10165
      Telephone: (212) 697-6484
      Facsimile (212) 697-7296
      Email: peretz@bgandg.com

STARBUCKS CORP: Naimi Appeals C.D. Calif. Ruling to Ninth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Oliver Naimi and Thomas Wessel filed an appeal from a
court ruling in their lawsuit styled Oliver Naimi, et al. v.
Starbucks Corporation, et al., Case No. 2:17-cv-06484-VAP-GJS, in
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Los
Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was brought on September 1, 2017.

Starbucks owns and operates approximately 12,000 coffee shops under
the trade name "Starbucks" within the United States with 317 in New
York City.

The appellate case is captioned as Oliver Naimi, et al. v.
Starbucks Corporation, et al., Case No. 18-55975, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by August 16, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on September 17, 2018;

   -- Appellants Oliver Naimi and Thomas Wessel's opening brief
      is due on October 25, 2018;

   -- Appellees North American Coffee Partnership, PepsiCo, Inc.,
      Starbucks Corporation and Starbucks New Venture Company's
      answering brief is due on November 26, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants OLIVER NAIMI and THOMAS WESSEL, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, are represented
by:

          Benjamin Heikali, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          10866 Wilshire Boulevard
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (424) 256-2884
          Facsimile: (424) 256-2885
          E-mail: bheikali@faruqilaw.com

Defendants-Appellees STARBUCKS CORPORATION, PEPSICO, INC.,
STARBUCKS NEW VENTURE COMPANY and NORTH AMERICAN COFFEE PARTNERSHIP
are represented by:

          Kevin S. Asfour, Esq.
          Paul W. Sweeney, Jr., Esq.
          K&L GATES LLP
          10100 Santa Monica Boulevard
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 552-5000
          E-mail: kevin.asfour@klgates.com
                  paul.sweeney@klgates.com



SYNERGIES3 TEC: Jones Seeks to Recover OT Pay Under FLSA, MMWL
--------------------------------------------------------------
STEPHEN JONES, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated
employees v. SYNERGIES3 TEC SERVICES, LLC, BENTON ODOM and ERIC
ATCHLEY, Case No. 4:18-cv-01161 (E.D. Mo., July 15, 2018), seeks to
pursue overtime claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Missouri Minimum Wage Law on behalf of technicians.

Synergies3 is a Texas limited liability company, registered in
Missouri, which has conducted a satellite television installation
business in Missouri, Illinois and Nebraska.  Throughout the
relevant period, the Individual Defendants exercised operational
control over Synergies3.

The Defendants own and operate a satellite television installation
business, including facilities in Missouri, Illinois and
Nebraska.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Potashnick, Esq.
          WEINHAUS & POTASHNICK
          11500 Olive Blvd., Suite 133
          St. Louis, MO 63141
          Telephone: (314) 997-9150
          Facsimile: (314) 984-810
          E-mail: markp@wp-attorneys.com

               - and -

          Eli Karsh, Esq.
          LIBERMAN, GOLDSTEIN & KARSH
          230 South Bemiston Ave., Suite 1200
          Clayton, MO 63141
          Telephone: (314) 862-3333
          Facsimile: (314) 863-0605
          E-mail: elikarsh@aol.com

               - and -

          Richard T. Grossman, Esq.
          GROSSMAN LAW FIRM
          230 S. Bemiston Ave., Suite 1200
          St. Louis, MO 63105
          Telephone: (314) 261-7323
          E-mail: Rick@grossmanlawfirm.com


T-MOBILE USA: Subway Files Petitions w/ Supreme Court in "Rahmany"
------------------------------------------------------------------
Subway Sandwich Shops, Inc., filed with the Supreme Court of United
States petitions for writ of certiorari in the matter titled Subway
Sandwich Shops, Inc., Petitioner v. David Moshe Rahmany, et al.,
Case No. 18-33.

Responses are due on August 6, 2018.

The Lower Court Case is entitled DAVID MOSHE RAHMANY, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated and YEHUDA RAHMANY,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants v. T-MOBILE USA INC., Defendant, and SUBWAY
SANDWICH SHOPS, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 17-35094, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The District Court case is styled DAVID MOSHE RAHMANY, et al. v.
T-MOBILE USA INC., et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-01416-JCC, in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the case was
filed on September 6, 2016, and assigned to Judge John C
Coughenour.  The Plaintiffs accuse T-Mobile, a major wireless
network operator in the United States, of violating the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents David Rahmany, et al., are represented by:

          Seyed Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP APC
          245 Fischer Ave., Suite D-1
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: (800) 400-6808
          Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
          E-mail: ak@kazlg.com

Defendant-Petitioner Subway Sandwich Shops, Inc., is represented
by:

          Kristine McAlister Brown, Esq.
          ALSTON & BIRD
          1201 West Peachtree Street
          Atlanta, GA 30309-3424
          Telephone: (404) 881-7000
          E-mail: kristy.brown@alston.com


TACO HUT BROADWAY: Faces "Alvarez" Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Taco Hut Broadway
Inc. The case is styled as Fidel Martinez Alvarez, on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Taco Hut Broadway Inc.
doing business as: Taco Hut, Sue Hong, Raul Hong, Sue Doe and Raul
Doe, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-06429 (S.D. N.Y., July 17,
2018).

Taco Hut is a Mexican food restaurant, located at 125th Street and
Broadway, Manhatten, NY.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.


TENNECO INC: Faces "Cryar" Suit Over Acquisition of Federal-Mogul
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH CRYAR, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. TENNECO INC., GREGG M. SHERRILL, BRIAN J. KESSELER,
THOMAS C. FREYMAN, DENNIS J. LETHAM, JAMES S. METCALF, ROGER B.
PORTER, DAVID B. PRICE, JR., PAUL T. STECKO JANE L. WARNER, and
ROGER J. WOOD, Case No. 1:18-cv-01052-UNA (D. Del., July 17, 2018),
accuses the Defendants of violating the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 in connection with the proposed merger between Tenneco and
Federal-Mogul LLC.

On April 10, 2018, the Board of Directors caused the Company to
enter into an agreement and plan of merger with Federal-Mogul,
American Entertainment Properties Corp. ("AEP"), and Icahn
Enterprises L.P. ("IEP"), pursuant to which, Tenneco agreed to
acquire Federal-Mogul in exchange for paying AEP $800 million in
cash and issuing AEP 29,444,846 shares of Tenneco stock.

The complaint says Defendants failed to disclose material
information that is necessary for stockholders to properly assess
the fairness of the Proposed Merger, thereby rendering certain
statements in the Proxy incomplete and misleading. Specifically,
the Proxy contains materially incomplete and misleading information
concerning: (i) the Company's financial projections; and (ii) the
valuation analyses performed by the Company's financial advisor,
Barclays Capital Inc., in support of its fairness opinion.

Plaintiff is, and has been at all relevant times, the owner of
Tenneco common stock.

Tenneco is a Delaware Corporation with its principal executive
offices located in Lake Forest, Illinois.  Tenneco designs,
manufactures, and sells clean air and ride performance systems and
products for light vehicle, commercial truck, off-highway, and
other applications.  The Individual Defendants are directors and
officers of the Company.

Headquartered in Southfield, Michigan, Federal-Mogul manufactures
and distributes automotive parts.  Federal-Mogul offers original
equipment powertrain products.  Federal-Mogul serves automotive
light vehicle, and medium and heavy-duty commercial vehicle
manufacturers, as well as agricultural, off-highway, marine,
railroad, aerospace, high-performance, power generation, and
industrial application manufacturers.

AEP is a wholly owned corporate subsidiary of IEP and Icahn
Enterprises Holdings L.P. engaged in the following business
segments: Automotive, Energy, Railcar, Metals, Gaming, Home Fashion
and Real Estate.  IEP is a holding company, whose segments include
Investment, Automotive, Energy, Metals, Railcar, Gaming, Food
Packaging, Mining, Real Estate, and Home Fashion.  IEP owns a
limited partner interest in Icahn Enterprises Holdings L.P.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Blake A. Bennett, Esq.
          COOCH AND TAYLOR, P.A.
          The Brandywine Building
          1000 West Street, 10th Floor
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 984-3800
          E-mail: bbennett@coochtaylor.com

               - and -

          Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
          MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
          The Empire State Building
          350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4405
          New York, NY 10118
          Telephone: (212) 971-1341
          Facsimile: (212) 202-7880
          E-mail: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com

TINDER INC: Kim Appeals C.D. Calif. Decision to Ninth Circuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Lisa Kim filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit entitled Lisa Kim v. Tinder, Inc., et al., Case No.
2:18-cv-03093-JFW-AS, in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, Los Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
arises out of Tinder's alleged misleading and illegal business
practices, specifically the age discrimination in its pricing plans
in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

The Defendants operate a location-based social search mobile
application.

The appellate case is captioned as Lisa Kim v. Tinder, Inc., et
al., Case No. 18-55960, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellant Lisa Kim's opening brief is due on September 12,
      2018;

   -- Appellees Match Group, Inc., Match Group, LLC and Tinder,
      Inc.'s answering brief is due on October 12, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant LISA KIM, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Adrian Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN PC
          21550 Oxnard Street, Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          E-mail: abacon@attorneysforconsumers.com

               - and -

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN PC
          324 S. Beverly Drive
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          E-mail: tfriedman@attorneysforconsumers.com

Defendants-Appellees TINDER, INC., a Delaware corporation; MATCH
GROUP, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; and MATCH GROUP,
INC., a Delaware corporation, are represented by:

          Donald R. Brown, Esq.
          Robert H. Platt, Esq.
          MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP
          11355 West Olympic Boulevard
          Los Angeles, CA 90064
          Telephone: (310) 312-4318
          E-mail: dbrown@manatt.com
                  rplatt@manatt.com



TOTAL HEALTHCARE: Underpays Nursing Assistants, Roberts Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
TANYA ROBERTS, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TOTAL HEALTHCARE STAFFINGOF L.I., INC. and
KATHRYN FARRAND, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-03837-JFB-AYS
(E.D.N.Y., July 2, 2018) is an action against the Defendants
alleging unpaid overtime wages, failure to provide accurate wage
statements or paystubs, and unjust enrichment.

Ms. Roberts was employed by the Defendants as nursing assistant
from 2015.

Total Healthcare Staffing of L.I., Inc. is a New York corporation
with a principal place of business at 2527 Merrick Road, Bellmore,
New York 11710.  Total Healthcare Staffing provides medical and
support staffing for hospitals, nursing homes, individual
residences and other locations. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian A. Bodansky, Esq.
          ELL LAW GROUP, PLLC
          100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Suite 208
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 280-3008
          Facsimile: (212) 656-1845
          E-mail: bb@belllg.com


TRUEACCORD: Faces "Zuniga" Suit in D. New Mexico
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against TrueAccord. The case
is styled as Marisa Zuniga, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TrueAccord, Defendant, Case
No. 2:18-cv-00683-GJF-KRS (D. N.M., July 17, 2018).

TrueAccord is a Software company in San Francisco, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
   Marcus & Zelman, LLC
   701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
   Asbury Park, NJ 07712
   Tel: (732) 695-3282
   Fax: 732-28-6256
   Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: Cohen Files Suit Over Sale to Disney
----------------------------------------------------------
BELLE COHEN, Individually and On Behalf All Others Similarly
Situated v. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FOX, INC., RUPERT MURDOCH, LACHLAN
K. MURDOCH, CHASE CAREY, SIR RODERICK I. EDDINOTON, DELPHINE
ARNAULT, JAMES W. BREYER, DAVID DEVOE, VIET DTNH, JAMES MURDOCH,
JACQUES NASSER, ROBERT SILBERMAN and TIDJANE THIAM, Case No.
1:18-cv-06462 (S.D.N.Y., July 17, 2018), seeks to enjoin the 21CF
shareholders' vote on a proposed transaction, pursuant to which,
after spinning off certain of its businesses into a newly listed
company, 21CF will be acquired by the The Walt Disney Company
through TWDC Holdco 613 Corp., WDC Merger Enterprises I, Inc. and
WDC Merger Enterprises II, Inc.

On June 20, 2018, 21CF and Disney issued a joint press release
announcing they had entered into an Amended and Restated Agreement
and Plan of Merger.  Under the terms of the Merger Agreement,
stockholders of 21CF will receive $38 per share, with the election
to receive their consideration, on a value equalized basis, in the
form of cash or stock, subject to proration and adjustment for
certain tax liabilities.  The Proposed Transaction is valued at
$71.3 billion.

Following the completion of the Proposed Transaction, assuming the
tax adjustment amount is zero, 21CF stockholders will own
approximately 17-20% and Disney stockholders will own approximately
80-83% of the combined company.

21CF, a Delaware corporation, is a diversified global media and
entertainment company.  The Company operates through five segments:
cable network programming, television, filmed entertainment, direct
broadcast satellite television, and other, corporate and
eliminations.  The Individual Defendants are directors and officers
of the Company.

The Company has a portfolio of cable, broadcast, film, pay
television and satellite assets spanning six continents across the
globe.  The Company is home to a global portfolio of cable and
broadcasting networks and properties, including FOX, FX, FXX, FS 1,
Fox News Channel, Fox Business Network, Fox Sports, Fox Sports
Network, National Geographic Channels, Fox Pan American Sports,
MundoFox, STAR and 28 local television stations; film studio
Twentieth Century Fox Film, and television production studios
Twentieth Century Fox Television and Shine Group.

Disney, together with its subsidiaries, is a diversified worldwide
entertainment company with operations in four business segments:
Media Networks, Parks and Resorts, Studio Entertainment, and
Consumer Products & Interactive Media.  Disney is a Dow 30 company
and had annual revenues of $55.1 billion in its fiscal year
2017.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gloria K. Melwani, Esq.
          WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
          270 Madison Aye, 10th floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 545 4626
          Facsimile: (212) 686 0114
          E-mail: melwani@whafh.com


UNITED STATES: 3rd Cir. Grants TRO Against Removal of Children
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, reversed the
District Court's judgment denying Plaintiffs' Application for
Temporary Restraining Order in the case captioned WENDY AMPARO
OSORIO-MARTINEZ Individually and on behalf of her minor child,
D.S.R.-O., and all others similarly situated; CARMEN ALEYDA LOBO
MEJIA, Individually and on behalf of her minor child, A.D.M.-L.,
and all other similarly situated; MARIA DELMI MARTINEZ NOLASCO,
Individually, and on behalf of her minor child, J.E.L.-M., and all
others similarly situated; JETHZABEL MARITZA AGUILAR MANCIA,
Individually, and on behalf of her minor child, V.G.R.-A., and all
others similarly situated, Appellants, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA; SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; ACTING DIRECTOR UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVICES PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT OFFICE; FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR BUREAU
OF IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; DIRECTOR BERKS COUNTY
RESIDENTIAL CENTER; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. No. 17-2159. (3rd Cir.)

Petitioners, four children of Salvadoran and Honduran origin and
their mothers, appear before the Third Circuit for a second time to
challenge their expedited orders of removal.

In Castro v. United States Department of Homeland Security, 835
F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1581 (2017), the
Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review their claims under
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and that, while the
Suspension Clause of the Constitution would allow an aggrieved
party with sufficient ties to the United States to challenge that
lack of jurisdiction, the petitioners' ties were inadequate because
their relationship to the United States amounted only to presence
in the country for a few hours before their apprehension by
immigration officers.  Thus, the Court affirmed the District
Court's dismissal of their petition.

Now, two years after their initial detention, Petitioners raise
what, at first glance, appear to be the same claims.

THe Petitioners argue, for certain aliens present in the country,
including SIJ designees, Congress has provided for special
immigrant classifications, affording them a status and statutory
protections that may not be revoked without specified process,
including judicial review.  Because the children have now attained
this status, they contend they are exempted from the application of
Section 1252(e)(2) and the courts retain statutory jurisdiction to
review their expedited removal orders.

Expedited Removal of Inadmissible Aliens

When an immigration officer determines that an alien is not clearly
and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted to the United States,
the INA requires that the alien be placed in standard removal
proceedings.

Congress has also provided for a separate form of removal, known as
expedited removal, which permits the accelerated removal of aliens
who, according to immigration officers, meet a set of statutorily
determined criteria. Those requirements include: (1) that the alien
be arriving in the United States" or not have been continuously
present in the United States for two years; (2) that the alien has
not been admitted or paroled into the United States; and (3) that
the alien either lack valid immigration documentation or have made
a misrepresentation in an attempt to attain immigration status.

Special Immigrant Juvenile Classification

Congress established SIJ status in 1990 in order to protect abused,
neglected or abandoned children who, with their families, illegally
entered the United States and it entrusted the review of SIJ
petitions to USCIS, a component of DHS.  

Alien children may receive SIJ status only after satisfying a set
of rigorous, congressionally defined eligibility criteria,
including that a juvenile court find it would not be in the child's
best interest to return to her country of last habitual residence
and that the child is dependent on the court or placed in the
custody of the state or someone appointed by the state.

Statutory Jurisdiction over Petitioners' Claims

The Petitioners argue that their SIJ status qualifies them for the
second exception to Section 1252(e)(2)'s general bar on judicial
review: review of whether the alien was ordered removed under the
expedited removal provisions. Therefore, according to Petitioners,
their expedited orders of removal are unenforceable; they can no
longer be considered ordered removed and there is no statutory bar
under Section 1252(e)(2) to judicial review and invalidation of the
expedited removal orders.

Castro forecloses this line of argument. There, the petitioners
likewise argued that we retained jurisdiction to review whether
they had been ordered removed because they took issue with the
validity of the order, in that case because they claimed the asylum
officer and the IJ conducted their credible fear interviews in a
manner that violated their constitutional and statutory rights.  

The Court held that jurisdiction was precluded by Section
1252(e)(5), which provides:
In determining whether an alien has been ordered removed under
section 1225(b)(1) of this title the expedited removal provision,
the court's inquiry shall be limited to whether such an order in
fact was issued and whether it relates to the petitioner. There
shall be no review of whether the alien is actually inadmissible or
entitled to any relief from removal.

The Petitioners seek a judgment holding that the orders are
unenforceable, but as Castro and the plain language of Section 1252
make clear, these claims fall within the ambit of the
jurisdiction-stripping provision.

Constitutional Basis for Jurisdiction

Because the Third Circuit concludes that the INA strips the federal
courts of jurisdiction to review Petitioners' challenge to their
expedited removal orders, we must confront a second question, this
one of constitutional dimension: Does the stripping of federal
court jurisdiction to hear the claims of these children violate the
Suspension Clause? In view of their SIJ status and the significant
connections to the United States that it entails, the Court holds
today that it does.

The Suspension Clause forbids suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.  

Eligibility Criteria

This understanding of SIJ status is reflected in the very
definition of a Special Immigrant Juvenile, i.e., a child who has
been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United
States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed
under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an
individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located
in the United States, and whose reunification with 1 or both of the
immigrant's parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect,
abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law.

Legal Relationship with the United States

SIJ status also reflects the determination of Congress to accord
those abused, neglected, and abandoned children a legal
relationship with the United States and to ensure they are not
stripped of the opportunity to retain and deepen that relationship
without due process.

That is, with the protections it afforded those with SIJ status,
Congress provided opportunities for this class of aliens to
strengthen their connections to the United States, pending a
determination on their applications for adjustment of status. Not
only are SIJ designees "deemed, for purposes of [adjustment of
status to lawful permanent resident under Section 1255(a), to have
been paroled into the United States but Congress also enlarged the
chance that Petitioners would be successful in their applications
for adjustment by exempting them from a host of grounds that would
otherwise render them inadmissible including being found to be a
public charge, lacking a valid entry document or having
"misrepresented a material fact while seeking admission into the
United States."

Relationship to Lawful Permanent Resident Status

Because of the rights and benefits they have been accorded, SIJ
designees stand much closer to lawful permanent residents than to
aliens present in the United States for a few hours before their
apprehension. Indeed, Petitioners are a hair's breadth from being
able to adjust their status, pending only the availability of
immigrant visas and the approval of the Attorney General.

Here, Petitioners have exercised the rights accorded them as SIJ
designees and have had their LPR applications pending for close to
two years. Assuming, as the Government asserted at the time of
briefing, that the waiting list was then about two years long,
Petitioners' receipt of visas is imminent. The consider these
circumstances, including Petitioners' proximity to LPR status with
its even fuller range of rights, as further evidence of their
meaningful and substantial connection with the United States.

Temporary Injunctive Relief

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show: (1)
a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a likelihood that the
moving party will suffer irreparable harm, (3) that the balance of
equities weighs in the moving party's favor, and (4) that
injunctive relief is in the public interest.

Considering these factors here, the Court concludes the District
Court erred in dissolving the TRO and denying Petitioners' motion
for injunctive relief.

The first factor, likelihood of success on the merits of their
underlying habeas petition, is easily established given the
incompatibility of expedited orders of removal with the statutory
and constitutional rights of SIJ designees.

The second factor, irreparable harm, is also satisfied given the
finding in this case by a juvenile court that reunification with
one or more of the child's parents was not viable due to abuse,
neglect, or abandonment, and that it would not be in the child's
best interest to be returned to his or her country of origin.

The third and fourth factors also weigh in favor of Petitioners.
The Court is aware of the public interest in prompt execution of
removal orders and the Supreme Court's admonition against
characterizing the Government harm in removal cases as nothing more
than one alien being permitted to remain while an appeal is
decided. But the fact that the Government has not until now sought
to remove SIJ applicants, much less designees, undermines any
urgency surrounding Petitioners' removal.

Accordingly, the Court will reverse the District Court's denial of
Petitioners' request for injunctive relief and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A full-text copy of the Third Circuit's June 18, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8nq9hck from Leagle.com.

Bridget Cambria, Jacquelyn M. Kline, Cambria & Kline.

Carol A. Donohoe, Jessica Rickabaugh [ARGUED], Tucker Law Group.

Anthony C. Vale, Pepper Hamilton LLP, Counsel for Appellants.

Nancy Winkelman, Bruce P. Merenstein, Arleigh P. Helfer III,
Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis, Counsel for Amicus Appellant.

Chad A. Readler, Assistant Attorney General, William C. Preachey,
Director Office of Immigration Litigation, Erez Reuveni, Senior
Litigation Counsel, Vinita Adrapalliyal, Joseph A. Darrow [ARGUED],
United States Department of Justice, Office of Immigration
Litigation, Counsel for Appellees.

UNITED STATES: Court Certifies Class of VA Nurses
-------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Federal Claims granted Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned STEPHANIE
MERCIER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant, No. 12-920C (Fed. Cl.).

Plaintiffs have now moved to certify an opt-in class pursuant to
Rule 23 of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (RCFC).  

The Plaintiffs in this case are Advanced Practice Registered Nurses
(APRNs) and Physician Assistants (PAs) who are or were employed by
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). They claim that as a
result of the VA's nationwide policies, they were induced to work
overtime to update patients' electronic health records and monitor
and respond to certain patient-related notifications.

The Plaintiffs propose the following class definition:

     All advanced practice registered nurses (APRNs) and physician
assistants (PAs):

     -- who have been, are, or will be employed by the Defendant
during at least any one pay period beginning after December 28,
2006;

     -- who have performed, are performing, or will perform
compensable patient care and clinical duties managing View Alerts
and electronic patient health records in the VA's Computerized
Patient Records System (CPRS);

     -- who used, are using, or will use VA, non-VA, or personal
home computers or laptops to manage view alerts and electronic
health records; who on a recurring and involuntary basis worked,
work, or will work additional hours, significantly in excess of
fifteen (15) minutes duration in a calendar day, and in excess of
forty (40) hours in an administrative workweek, in excess of eight
(8) consecutive hours in a workday, or in excess of their daily
work requirement managing view alerts and electronic health
records;

     -- who did not, do not, or will not receive overtime pay at
one and one-half times their hourly rate of pay, premium pay, or
compensatory time off in lieu of overtime pay for all additional
hours worked; and

     -- who work, have worked, or will work at VA facilities where
at least one opt-in plaintiff also works, or has worked, as of
November 30, 2017.

Numerosity

It is clear that the numerosity requirement is met in this case.
According to the Plaintiffs, more than three hundred APRNs and PAs
from across the country have already opted in to this lawsuit.
Further, the Plaintiffs assert that the entire class could consist
of several thousand current and former employees. Because it would
be impractical to join such a large number of plaintiffs, the Court
concludes that the numerosity requirement has been met.

Commonality

The Court concludes that these requirements are met here. First,
the case involves a number of questions of law and fact that are
common to the class. For example, as the Plaintiffs point out, the
Court must determine whether, based on the VA's policies regarding
APRNs' and PAs' duties, the processing of view alerts constitutes
the performance of patient care.

Second, the requirement that the United States have acted on
grounds generally applicable to the class is met by the VA's
centralized issuance and implementation of the policies regarding
patient care and remote and/or after-hours access, and its alleged
policy under which PAs and APRNs who perform view alert reviews
outside of duty hours cannot claim an entitlement to overtime
compensation absent explicit supervisory approval.

Typicality

The government argues that the Plaintiffs have failed to show
typicality because the facts necessary to establish inducement
fundamentally differ" for each class member, given that they worked
at many different facilities and under a number of different
supervisors. However, the Plaintiffs' claim is that the VA's
nationwide policies establish inducement or approval of overtime as
to each APRN and PA who was granted after-hours access to the VA's
electronic health records management system and who performed
patient care outside their regular tours of duty.

Accordingly, the government's identification of possible variations
in the circumstances under which class members may have managed
their view alerts during off-duty hours does not demonstrate that
the named Plaintiffs' claims are not typical of the class members'
claims as a whole.

Adequacy

The fourth factor for class certification requires a finding that
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class. This includes consideration of whether
class counsel will fairly and adequately represent the class and
whether the class members have interests that conflict.  Here, the
parties do not appear to have any antagonistic interests and the
government does not point to any. Further, the Court finds that
class counsel have experience litigating similarly complex class
actions and will devote time and energy to the litigation indeed,
they have already pursued a successful appeal of the Court's
opinion granting the government's motion to dismiss.

Accordingly, this requirement is met.

Superiority

Further, contrary to the government's suggestions, the Court does
not believe that there are likely to be significant difficulties in
determining individual class members' entitlements to recover
should the Plaintiffs prevail.  Rather, if the Plaintiffs' theory
of inducement proves meritorious, calculating the class members'
damage awards will involve an assessment of the time they spent
logged in to the VA's electronic records system performing patient
care outside of their regular tours of duty and in excess of forty
hours per work week. The case thus differs from Fisher, where the
question of whether individual class members would have been
entitled to tax refunds depended on potential offsets specific to
each class member's individual tax situation.
  
The Plaintiffs have thus shown that the superiority requirement is
met.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion to certify a class action under
RCFC 23(c)(1) is granted.

A full-text copy of the Court of Federal Claims June 7, 2018
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycv6wjfx from
Leagle.com.

STEPHANIE MERCIER & AUDRICIA BROOKS, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by David M.
Cook, Cook & Logothetis, LLC.

USA, Defendant, represented by Alexis J. Echols, U.S. Department of
Justice -- Commercial Lit. Civil Division.

UTZ QUALITY: Misrepresents Vegetable Content, Feldman Claims
------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID FELDMAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. UTZ QUALITY FOODS, LLC; GOOD HEALTH NATURAL
PRODUCTS, INC.; GOOD HEALTH NATURAL PRODUCTS, LLC; PAT POSTS 1-10,
and ABC CORPS. 1-10, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-06004-RA
(S.D.N.Y., July 3, 2018) is an action against the Defendants'
unconscionable and deceptive consumer practices in misrepresenting
the vegetable content, and the nutritional and health qualities of
Good Health's "Extra Goodness!" products.

According to the complaint, on January 1, 2017 to the present, the
Defendants have engaged in a deceptive marketing campaign to
convince consumers that the Products contain significant amounts of
the actual vegetables shown in the marketing and on the labeling of
the Products, are nutritious and healthful to consume, and are more
healthful than similar products.

Prior to January 1, 2017, the Defendants purchased the NF-416
Vegetable from Nutrifusion, LLC, which utilized a propriety
processing method to create a nutrient blend derived from
vegetables.

The Defendants ceased purchasing the Nutrifusion Blend in December
2016 but have continued to use the same ingredient list,
nutritional values, and vegetable-derived nutrient claims.
Specifically, the Defendants' Products no longer contain these
ingredients still listed on their ingredients list: "Nutrients From
A Proprietary Blend Of Vegetables (Spinach, Broccoli, Carrot,
Tomato, Beet, Shiitake Mushroom).

The vitamins now contained in the Products are from a synthetic
source and are not vegetable-derived. This false and misleading
labelling violates federal labeling law.

UTZ Quality Foods, Inc. manufactures and markets snack foods in the
United States and internationally. It offers potato chips,
pretzels, cheese snacks, corn products, and popcorn.  UTZ Quality
Foods, Inc. was formerly known as Hanover Home Brand Potato Chips.
The company was founded in 1921 and is based in Hanover,
Pennsylvania. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua S. Bauchner, Esq.
          Michael H. Ansell, Esq.
          365 Rifle Camp Road
          ANSELL GRIMM & AARON, P.C.
          Woodland Park, New Jersey 07424
          Telephone: (973) 247-9000
          Facsimile: (973) 247-9199
          E-mail: jb@ansellgrimm.com
                  mha@ansellgrimm.com


VALLOUREC STAR: "Debozy" Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Debozy, individually and on behalf of other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Vallourec Star, LP, Defendants,
Case No. 18-cv-01539, (N.D. Ohio, July 6, 2018), seeks to recover
minimum and overtime wages, redress for failure to provide meal
periods and rest breaks, accurate itemized wage statements and all
wages due upon separation of employment pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act.

Defendant is a producer of oil country tubular goods and has
operations in Youngstown, Ohio, Muskogee, Oklahoma, and Houston,
Texas. Debozy worked as an operator at their Youngstown, Ohio
manufacturing facility. He claims not being paid for the work
performed before and after their scheduled start and stop times
including changing into and out of their uniform and personal
protective equipment, paperwork necessary to perform their
manufacturing work and walking to and from their assigned area of
the manufacturing floor. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Chastity L. Christy, Esq.
      Lori M. Griffin, Esq.
      Anthony J. Lazzaro, Esq.
      THE LAZZARO LAW FIRM, LLC
      920 Rockefeller Building
      614 W. Superior Avenue
      Cleveland, OH 44113
      Phone: (216) 696-5000
      Facsimile: (216) 696-7005
      Email: anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com
             chastity@lazzarolawfirm.com
             lori@lazzarolawfirm.com

WEIBO CORP: Court Dismisses "Goldsmith" Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned ANDREW
GOLDSMITH, Plaintiff, v. WEIBO CORPORATION, GAOFEI WANG, and HERMAN
YU, Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-4728 (SRC)(D.N.J.).

This is a securities fraud class action filed on behalf of
individuals and entities who bought NASDAQ-traded shares in the
Chinese social media company known as Weibo.  The Plaintiff and the
putative class members purchased Weibo securities during the Class
Period at prices they claim were artificially inflated as a result
of allegedly misleading statements and omissions made by Weibo,
Wang and Yu in public filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). The Plaintiff claims that the Defendants
knowingly misled investors to believe that Weibo was operating in
compliance with Chinese laws and regulations concerning a licensing
requirement for companies engaged in internet transmissions.

The gravamen of the instant action is that Weibo misled investors
regarding its compliance with Chinese regulations which required a
license to engage in the transmission of online audio-video
material.
The alleged fraud, however, does not arise from any false
representations to the public that Weibo in fact possessed the
required license or that Defendants concealed Weibo's lack thereof.
Indeed, the Complaint acknowledges that Weibo consistently stated
throughout the Class Period that it did not hold an audio/video
program transmission license.

Rather, the Plaintiff alleges that Weibo deceived investors by
telling them that it used the websites of license-holding third
parties to deliver content posted to the Weibo platform, which had
the effect of falsely assuring the public that Weibo's internet
transmission operations were lawful under PRC regulations. Weibo,
the Complaint avers, opted to circumvent the license requirement of
Circular 56 knowing that is third-party delivery solution was not
permissible under Chinese Law.

In short, neither the Complaint nor the Plaintiff's brief in
opposition to the motion to dismiss, directs the Court's attention
to any part of the SEC filings which make any affirmative
representations as to the legality or propriety of Weibo's
regulatory compliance concerning the AVPT License. Allegations that
charge a defendant spoke in an untrue or misleading manner but do
not allege that the defendant actually made those statements or
omissions fail to show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief and
therefore do not satisfy Rule 8(a)'s pleading standard, much less
the heightened requirement of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA).
   
A securities fraud claim based on purported statements that a
defendant did not actually make fails, necessarily, to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. To the extent the
Plaintiff's Rule 10b-5 claim is based on alleged statements that
the Defendants did not make, it is clearly deficient under the
pleading standards of both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the PSLRA.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff's claim for violation of Rule
10b-5 does not sufficiently plead the first element of that claim.
Moreover, it does not appear that the Plaintiff could amend the
Complaint to add allegations that would cure this deficiency. The
parties have supplied the Court with the pertinent sections of the
SEC filings on which the securities fraud claim is based, and the
Plaintiff does not identify other documents or sources that give
rise to alleged misrepresentations and omissions by Weibo.

For these reasons, the Court has already found that, when read in
context, the SEC filings containing the purportedly false and
misleading statements identified by the Complaint fail to plausibly
support the Plaintiff's claim. Accordingly, the securities fraud
claim under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act will be dismissed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and leave to
amend will not be granted, as it appears that amendment would be
futile.

The Court will grant the Defendants' motion to dismiss. The
Complaint will be dismissed in its entirety pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 7, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycuhpg3c from Leagle.com.

Chen Qiwei, Movant, represented by EDUARD KORSINSKY -- ek@zlk.com
-- LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP.

Christopher Park & Dharmesh Patel, Movants, represented by LAURENCE
M. ROSEN -- lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, PA.

ANDREW GOLDSMITH, Plaintiff, represented by LAURENCE M. ROSEN, THE
ROSEN LAW FIRM, PA.

FENG CHEN, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff Consolidated, represented by EDUARD KORSINSKY,
LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP.

WEIBO CORPORATION & HERMAN YU, Defendants, represented by SCOTT
DAVID MUSOFF -- scott.musoff@skadden.com -- SKADDEN ARPS SLATE
MEAGHER & FLOM LLP.

WELLS FARGO: Piazza Appeals Ruling in "Jabbari" Suit to 9th Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Objector Jill Piazza filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit styled Shahriar Jabbari, et al. v. Wells Fargo & Company,
et al., Case No. 3:15-cv-02159-VC, in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California, San Francisco.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Wells Fargo
will pay $142 million to settle class action claims that it
secretly opened credit cards and unauthorized accounts in
customers' names going back to 2002.

The bank was hit hard by the discovery that its staff opened
millions of bank accounts and credit cards for customers without
their consent in an effort to meet internal sales goals.

Lead Plaintiff Shahriar Jabbari sued Wells Fargo in May 2015,
claiming it encouraged employees to use fraudulent and deceptive
tactics to persuade customers to open fee-generating accounts by
misrepresenting them or not informing them at all.

The appellate case is captioned as Shahriar Jabbari, et al. v.
Wells Fargo & Company, et al., Case No. 18-16315, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by August 13, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on September 12, 2018;

   -- Appellant Jill Piazza's opening brief is due on October 22,
      2018;

   -- Appellees Kaylee Heffelfinger, Shahriar Jabbari, Wells
      Fargo & Company and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s answering
      brief is due on November 23, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Objector-Appellant JILL PIAZZA is represented by:

          Steve A. Miller, Esq.
          STEVE A. MILLER, P.C.
          1625 Larimer Street
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 892-9933
          E-mail: sampc01@gmail.com

Plaintiffs-Appellees SHAHRIAR JABBARI and KAYLEE HEFFELFINGER, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Gretchen Freeman Cappio, Esq.
          Benjamin Gould, Esq.
          Derek W. Loeser, Esq.
          Daniel Parke Mensher, Esq.
          Lynn Lincoln Sarko, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK LLP
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-1900
          E-mail: gcappio@kellerrohrback.com
                  bgould@kellerrohrback.com
                  dloeser@kellerrohrback.com
                  dmensher@kellerrohrback.com
                  lsarko@kellerrohrback.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey Greg Lewis, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK LLP
          300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 463-3900
          E-mail: jlewis@kellerrohrback.com

               - and -

          Matthew J. Preusch, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK LLP
          1129 State Street, Suite 8
          Santa Barbara, CA 93101
          Telephone: (805) 456-1496
          Facsimile: (805) 456-1497
          E-mail: mpreusch@kellerrohrback.com

Defendants-Appellees WELLS FARGO & COMPANY and WELLS FARGO BANK,
N.A., are represented by:

          Manuel Francisco Cachan, Esq.
          Bart H. Williams, Esq.
          PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
          2049 Century Park East
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-3206
          Telephone: (310) 284-4568
          E-mail: manuel.cachan@mto.com
                  bart.williams@mto.com

               - and -

          Erin J. Cox, Esq.
          Eric P. Tuttle, Esq.
          MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
          350 South Grand Avenue, 50th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 683-9575
          E-mail: erin.cox@mto.com
                  Eric.Tuttle@mto.com

               - and -

          Jeslyn A. Everitt, Esq.
          David H. Fry, Esq.
          MUNGER TOLLES & OLSON, LLP
          560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 512-4040
          E-mail: jeslyn.everitt@mto.com
                  david.fry@mto.com




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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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