CAR_Public/180809.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, August 9, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 159

                            Headlines

1706 THOMAS: Lembcke Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
ACACIA COMMUNICATIONS: Court Dismisses S. Tharp's Suit
ACCIDENT FUND: Must Face Workers' Compensation Class Action
ACS ENTERPRISES: Arbitration Ruling in I. Garcia's Wage Suit Upheld
ADIDAS AMERICA: Fails to Protect Members' Data, Christian Duke Say

AGRI STATS: Ferraro Foods Suit Alleges Antitrust Violation
AIR EVAC: Court Narrows Claims in Breach of Contract Suit
AIRBNB INC: Greene Sues Over Illegally-recorded Phone Calls
ALLSTATE FIRE: Bloomgarden Sues Over Reduced Insurance Payments
AMERICAN WEB: RICO Suit Moved to Newport News Division

ANADARKO PETROLEUM: R. Edgar's Securities Suit Dismissed
ARANATA THERAPEUTICS: Court Dismisses R. Daniel's Securities Suit
ASC INC: Leonardo Class Certification Bid Underway
ASSET RECOVERY: Cruz Suit Seeks Damages under FDCPA
AT&T CORP: Faces Class Action Over Early Retirement Benefits

ATH HOLDING: M. Bell's Suit Transferred to S.D. Indiana
AUTO INSURANCE: Humphreys Seeks to Certify Class
BADCOCK HOME: Wilson Seeks to Certify Class
BAGEL WAY: Conrey Suit Seeks to Recover Wages under FLSA
BAYLOR HEALTH: Court Denies Bid to Certify Solis Action

BEHR DAYTON: Issue-Class Certification in Contamination Suit Upheld
BITCONNECT: Ponzi Scheme Class Actions Merged
BOFI HOLDING: B. Mandalevy's Securities Suit Dismissed
BOSS WINGS: Davis Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
BYD COACH: Underpays Mechanics, Garner & Jarmon Allege

CAMDEN, GA: Agnone et al. Seek to Certify Settlement Class
CATHERINE BAUMAN: Peoples Seeks Class Certification
CENTRAL MAINE: 200+ Customers Join Overbilling Class Action
CHARTER COMM: Jimenez Class Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
CHEVRON CORP: Groundwater Contamination Class Action Can Proceed

CHICAGO BRIDGE: Seeks 2nd Cir. Review of Ruling in Giantonio Suit
CHICKPEA AT 14TH STREET: Pacheco Seeks to Certify Class
CITIBANK NA: Wilson Sues Over Autodialed Collection Calls
COMMUNITY PROBATION: McNeil et al. Seek to Certify 2 Classes
CONSUMERS WAREHOUSE: Underpays Designers, Vecchione et al. Claim

CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: William Woodward Sues over Debt Collection
COOPER AEROBICS: S. Cardona Class Cond. Certification Bid Denied
COTY INC: Bowden and Bowens Seek to Certify Class
DANELL CUSTOM: Billing Records Must be Filed in Public Record
DELTAURA USA: Fails to Pay Minimum Wages, Munoz Suit Alleges

DEUTSCHE BANK: Lima et al. Seek to Certify Class & SubClasses
DIRECTV GROUP: Getz Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
DONA MARIA: Ledo et al. Seek Class Action Settlement Approval
EGS FINANCIAL: Luna Files Placeholder Bid for Class Certification
ENDO INT'L: Bleichmar Fonti to Lead in Securities Fraud Suit

EQUIFAX INC: Securities Suit Discovery Stay Revision Bid Partly OKd
FACEBOOK INC: Helms Files Suit Over Share Price Drop
FACEBOOK INC: Kacouris Files Securities Class Action
FANNIE MAE & FREDDIE MAC: Highfields' New & Novel Contract Claim
FARMERS CAPITAL: Faces Class Action Over Acquisition Deal

FCA US: Bid to Dismiss Suit Over Stalling Defect Denied
FCA US: Court Certifies Michigan Class in Flynn et al. Suit
FLAGSHIP CREDIT: Robert Ward Seeks to Certify Settlement Class
FORD MOTOR: Loses Bid to Dismiss Exhaust Fume Defect Suit
FORD MOTOR: Provides Loaner Cars to Consumers Under Settlement

FORTY NINERS FOOTBALL: Court Certifies 3 Classes in Nevarez Suit
FRANKLIN RESOURCES: Court Certifies Class in Fernandez Suit
GANNETT CO: Quatrone Seeks to Certify 401(k) Savings Plan Class
GENPACT SERVICES: Luna Files Placeholder Class Certification Bid
GERALD REIBEL: Defendant Seeks to Certify Class in Mary Kay Suit

GETSWIFT: Says Squire Patton Boggs $300MM Claim Misleading
GROSS POLOWY: Tagney Sues over Debt Collection Practices
H & K HVAC: Underpays AC Technicians, Remache Suit Claims
ICHIRO ASIAN: Wang et al. Seek to Certify FLSA Collective
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Faces Jessica Taylor Suit in N.D. Ohio

JUDICIAL CORRECTION: G. Ray Can File 5th Amended Complaint
JUDICIAL CRISIS: Faces TCPA Suit Over Unsolicited Text Messages
JUI LI: API Loses Bid to Aside Default Judgment in Antitrust Suit
KENTUCKY: Bid to Dissolve State Court Order in Inmates' Suit Denied
KOHL'S CORP: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Pension Fund's Suit

KOHL'S CORP: Shearman & Sterling Comments on 7th Cir. Ruling
KRISPY KREME: Materiality of Merger Disclosures Nil
LENNOX INT'L: Settles Class Suit Over Defective AC Evaporator Coils
LOEWS CHICAGO: Bryant Sues Over Retained Biometrics Data
LTD FINANCIAL: Saroza Seeks Class Certification

MACY'S WEST: Court Dismisses M. Straughter's Action
MATHERNE HOLDINGS: Gerstenhaber Seeks to Certify Class
MATRIX 2K9 CORP: Underpays Security Guards, Caceres Claims
MAZUMA CREDIT: Bowens Seeks to Certify Settlement Class
MDL 2084: Court Denies Bid to Certify Direct Purchaser Class

MEDICREDIT INC: Appeals Ruling in Flecha Suit to 5th Cir.
MGM: Settles Class Action Over James Bond Anniversary DVD Box
MICROSOFT CORP: Moussouris Appeals Denial of Class Certification
MID ATLANTIC PROFESSIONALS: Rahimi & Hakim Suit Ongoing in Maryland
MONSANTO CO: Boelter Sues Over Herbicide Exposure

MONSANTO CO: Czaplicki Files Suit Over Roundup (R) Exposure
MONSANTO CO: Faces "Manes" PI Suit Alleging Roundup (R) Exposure
MONSANTO CO: Farm Owner Sues Over Exposure to Herbicide Roundup(R)
MONSANTO CO: Hyman Files PI Suit Over Herbicide Exposure
MONSANTO CO: Mullins Sues Over Roundup (R) Exposure

MRS BPO: Fetai Files Placeholder Bid for Class Certification
NATIONAL BEVERAGE: Sept. 17 Class Action Lead Plaintiff Deadline
NATIONAL FREIGHT: Court Grants Declaratory Relief in Truckers' Suit
NESTLE USA: Misleads Consumers With "No GMO" Seal, Latiff Alleges
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY: Basso et al. Seek to Certify Students Class

NHL: Class Action Denial to Spur Individual Lawsuits
NHL: Concussion Suits to Push Through Despite Ruling
OHIO STATE: Faces Class Action Over Student Athletes' Abuse
OKLAHOMA BLOOD: Lenore Seeks to Certify Employees Class
OVASCIENCE INC: Court Denies Freedman Family's Bid to Intervene

PETROBRAS: Bishop Appeals Settlement Approval in Securities Suit
PLAZA BEACH: Faces Luis Sierra Suit in S.D. Florida
PNC BANK: Pfendler Appeals W.D. Penn. Decision to 3rd Cir.
PROTHENA CORP: Labaton Sucharow Files Securities Class Action
PVH RETAIL: Heun Suit Alleges FLSA Violation

QUALITY SYSTEMS: Settles Securities Class Action for $19MM
RALPH LAUREN: Removes Patrick Hudson Suit to N.D. Illinois
REMEX INC: Harnik Suit Seeks Damages Under FDCPA
RESPOND POWER: Court Dismisses Breach of Contract Suit
RETAIN SERVICES: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Perez et al. Allege

REV GROUP: Robbins Arroyo Files Class Action Over 2017 IPO
RIPPLE LABS: Faces Avner Greenwald Suit over Sale of Tokens
RITE AID: Shearman & Sterling Comments on Securities Suit Dismissal
SCI DIRECT: Removes James Doyle Suit to C.D. California
SEARS ROEBUCK: J. Harvey Labor Suit Arbitrated on Individual Basis

SELECT COMFORT: Judgment on Pleadings in TCCWNA Suit Vacated
SELECT SPECIALTY: White Seeks Last Pay and Benefits Under WARN Act
SERVICEMASTER GLOBAL: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Flagg et al. Say
SINCLAIR BROADCAST: Faces Peter Miller Antitrust Suit in Maryland
STEWART INFORMATION: Rigrodsky & Long Files Class Action

SUIT-KOTE CORP: Denial of Class Certification in "Vandee" Modified
SUNOCO PIPELINE: Sued Over Unsafe Drilling Practices
SWEETHEARTS CANDY: Laid Off Employees Seek Unpaid Wages, Benefits
TARGET CORP: Court Dismisses A. Dormani's Suit
TD BANK: Customers Short-Changed by "Penny Arcade" Settlement

TENNESSEE: Court Certifies Statewide Class in Drivers' License Suit
TOYOTA MOTOR: Stockinger et al. Suit Moved to C.D. California
TRACTOR SUPPLY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, "Sweeney" Suit Claims
TRUE RENEWABLE: Naiman Hits Autodialed Telemarketing Calls
UNITED STATES: 9th Circuit Appeal Filed in Goldstein Suit

UNITED STATES: Idaho County Joins Class Action Over PILT Payments
UNITED STATES: Texas County Joins Class Action Over PILT Payments
UNITED STATES: Writ of Habeas Corpus OK'd in Illegal Detention Suit
UNIVERSAL FIDELITY: O'Boyle Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections
UNIVERSITY OF THE PACIFIC: Faces Meadows Suit in Sacramento

WALTERS MANAGEMENT: Fails to Pay OT, Medina Suit Alleges
WELLS FARGO: Sweeney Appeals Ruling in Jabbari Suit to 9th Cir.
WISCONSIN: 7th Circuit Appeal Filed in Tatum Suit
XPO LOGISTICS: 9th Circuit Appeal Filed in Alvarez Class Suit
YUZU KAITEN: Fox Suit Alleges FLSA, Fla. Min. Wage Act Violations


                            *********

1706 THOMAS: Lembcke Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------
Maria A. Lembcke, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. 1706 Thomas St., LLC, Simon Nemni, Michel
Chouraqui, J. Christian Marc, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-23054 (S.D.
Fla.), requests double damages and reasonable attorney fees
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act for all overtime wages
still owing along with court costs, interest and any other relief.

Plaintiff worked for Defendants as an apartment building cleaner
and landscaper from June 7, 2015 through
July 7, 2018. Lembcke worked an average of 56 hours a week for
Defendants but was not paid for any hours worked over 40 hours in a
week, says the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      J.H. Zidell, Esq.
      J.H. ZIDELL, P.A.
      300 71st Street, Suite 605
      Miami Beach, FL 33141
      Tel: (305) 865-6766
      Fax: (305) 865-7167
      Email: zabogado@aol.com

ACACIA COMMUNICATIONS: Court Dismisses S. Tharp's Suit
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEVEN THARP, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ACACIA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.;
MURUGESAN SHANMUGARAJ; and JOHN F. GAVIN, Defendants, Civil Action
No. 17-11504-WGY (D. Mass.), Judge William G. Young of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts (i) denied the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend the Consolidated Amended
Complaint; (ii) granted the the Acacia Defendants', the Selling
Defendants', and the Underwriter Defendants' motions to dismiss the
complaint; and (iii) denied as moot OFS Fitel, LLC's motion to
dismiss the complaint.

This is a securities class action on behalf of persons and entities
who purchased Acacia common stock.  The Plaintiffs purchased the
stock between Aug. 11, 2016 and July 13, 2017.  They bring the
class action against Acacia; individual Defendants Shanmugaraj,
Gavin, Francis J. Murphy, Benny P. Mikkelsen, Eric A. Swanson,
Peter Y. Chung, Stan J. Reiss, John Ritchie, Vincent T. Roche
("Individual Defendants"); the Selling Defendants Matrix Partners
VIII, L.P., Summit Partners Venture Capital Fund III-A, Summit
Partners Venture Capital Fund III-B, Summit Investors I, LLC, and
Summit Investors I (UK), L.P., Commonwealth Capital Ventures IV
L.P. the Malini Shanmugaraj 2016 QTIP Trust, Mehrdad Givehchi,
Givehchi LLC, John LoMedico, Bhupendra C. Shah, Bhupendra Shah 1999
Trust U/A DTD 10/06/1999, Christian Rasmussen, OFS, Egan Managed
Capital III, L.P., Weston & Co. VIII, LLC; and the Underwriter
Defendants Goldman Sachs & Co., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Inc., Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC
("Morgan Stanley"), Needham & Company, LLC, Cowen and Co., LLC,
William Blair & Co., LLC and Northland Securities, Inc.

Tharp and Zhang, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated, each filed a class action complaint against Acacia,
Shanmugaraj, and Gavin on Aug. 14, 2017 and Aug. 16, 2017,
respectively, alleging violations of the Securities Act and the
Securities Exchange Act.  Other Plaintiffs filed similar actions
against Acacia soon after.

On Oct. 13, 2017, class member Ronald Sobala filed a motion to
consolidate any related actions filed pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and appoint Sobala as lead
counsel.  That same day, WKW Partners, Zhang, and class member
David A. Klopfenstein filed similar motions to consolidated related
cases.

On Nov. 1, 2017, the Court ordered that the related cases be
consolidated under the oldest case number, 17-cv-11504.  The
Plaintiffs then filed a consolidated amended complaint on Jan. 8,
2018, alleging violations by all the Defendants of Section 11 of
the Securities Act (count I) and Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities
Act (count II); violations of Section 15 of the Securities Act by
the Individual Defendants and the Selling Defendants (count III);
violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act by Acacia and the Individual Defendants (count IV);
and violations of Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act by
the Individual Defendants (count V).

A subset of the Selling Defendants -- Commonwealth, Egan, Matrix,
Summit, and Weston -- moved to dismiss counts I, II, and III of the
amended complaint on Feb. 9, 2018.  The same day, the Underwriter
Defendants moved to dismiss counts I and II of the amended
complaint.  OFS also moved to dismiss all claims asserted against
it.  Finally, Acacia, the Individual Defendants, Shah Trust,
Givehchi, Givehchi LLC, Lomedico, Rasmussen, Shah, and Shanmugaraj
Trust ("Acacia Defendants") moved to dismiss all counts of the
amended complaint.

The Shareholder Defendants and the Acacia Defendants argue that
counts I-III ought be dismissed because the Plaintiffs fail to
allege in their consolidated Proposed Amended Complaint that (1)
the Shareholder Defendants or the Acacia Defendants fall into any
category of permissible defendants enumerated under Section 11 of
the Securities Act, (2) the Shareholder Defendants or the Acacia
Defendants either sold or offered securities as statutory sellers
within the meaning of Section 12(a)(2); and (3) the Shareholder
Defendants and the Acacia Defendants had a level of actual control
necessary to impose control-person liability under Section 15.

The Underwriter Defendants argue that counts I and II ought be
dismissed because the Plaintiffs did not allege in their Proposed
Amended Complaint (1) a misrepresentation of material fact, (2) a
material omission in contravention of an affirmative legal
disclosure obligation, and (3) a material omission of information
necessary to prevent existing disclosures from being misleading.

The Acacia Defendants in addition argue that counts IV and V ought
be dismissed because the Proposed Amended Complaint fails
sufficiently to allege that any challenged statement was false or
misleading, and because the Proposed Amended Complaint does not
raise the strong inference of scienter required by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA").  The Acacia Defendants
also claim that Acacia disclosed all information required by Item
303 of Regulation S-K under the Securities Act.

The Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the above motions on March
9, 2018.  The Shareholder Defendants, OFS, the Underwriter
Defendants, and the Acacia Defendants filed replies to the
Plaintiffs' opposition briefs on March 23, 2018.

On March 29, 2018, the Court heard oral argument on the motions.
The Court took the matter under advisement but granted the
Plaintiffs 30 days to file a motion for leave to amend the
complaint.  It informed the Defendants that they could file a
response to the motion for leave to amend within 14 days.  The
Court cautioned the parties that were it to decide to dismiss the
complaint on what it understands is the factual record, it would
dismiss with prejudice because it gave the Plaintiffs "every
chance" to file a proper complaint.

On April 30, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the
consolidated amended class action complaint along with their
Proposed Amended Complaint.  On May 14, 2018, the Defendants
opposed the motion.

As to Shareholder Defendants' and the Acacia Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss, Judge Young finds that (i) the Plaintiffs have adequately
alleged facts from which a jury could infer that the Individual
Defendants are directly liable, and Acacia, Matrix, Weston, and
Summit vicariously liable, under Section 11; (ii) the Plaintiffs'
allegations are sufficient to infer that these Acacia Defendants
solicited the sale of Acacia stock; and (iii) Count II may not be
dismissed against Acacia, Shanmugaraj, or Gavin upon Section
12(a)(2); (iv) Count III may not be dismissed upon Section 15 due
to the fact that the Plaintiffs alleged proper violators of
sections 11 and 12, and that Matrix, Summit, and Weston controlled
the violators, i.e. Ritchie.

Turning to Underwriter Defendants' and Acacia Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss, the Judge finds that (i) the proposed Amended Complaint
fails properly to allege any misstatements of slowing demand from
Acacia's customers or that Acacia knew of the quality issues with
its product; (ii) the Plaintiffs thus properly allege that Acacia
and the Underwriter Defendants knew of the uncertainties and their
effects on the stock prices, but do not allege sufficient facts to
show that the offering documents failed to disclose the known
uncertainties; and (iii) the Defendants did not include any
misleading statements or omit any pertinent information from the
prospectus and counts I and II are dismissed.

As to Acacia Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts IV and V, the
Judge agrees with the Acacia Defendants that the amended complaint
fails sufficiently to allege that any challenged statements were
false or misleading, because Acacia disclosed all information
required by Item 303, and because the amended complaint does not
raise the strong inference of scienter required by the PSLRA.  He
dismisses these counts.

The Judge will dismiss the Plaintiffs' Proposed Amended Complaint
in its entirety with prejudice because they have not cured the
deficiencies in their claims.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Young (i) denied the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Leave to Amend the Consolidated Amended Complaint as
futile.  He granted the Acacia Defendants', the Selling
Defendants', and the Underwriter Defendants' motions to dismiss the
complaint.  He denied OFS' motion to dismiss the complaint as moot
because the Plaintiffs no longer allege any indiscretions by it in
their Proposed Amended Complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 15, 2018 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://is.gd/P6TLLt from Leagle.com.

Hui Zhang, Individually and on behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Consolidated Plaintiff, represented by Jason M. Leviton
-- jason@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey
C. Block -- jeff@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP & Joshua L.
Crowell -- jcrowell@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP,
pro hac vice.

Chris Kebler, Individually and on behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Consolidated Plaintiff, represented by Alan L. Kovacs --
akovacs@kovacslaw.com -- Law Office of Alan L. Kovacs, David A.
Rosenfeld -- DRosenfeld@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Ira Fistel, Jr. --
MichaelF@JohnsonFistel.com -- Johnson Fistel, LLP, pro hac vice &
Jason M. Leviton, Block & Leviton LLP.

Rina Rollhaus, Individually and on behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Consolidated Plaintiff, represented by Adam M. Stewart --
astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP, Edward F. Haber --
ehaber@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP & Jason M. Leviton,
Block & Leviton LLP.

Karen Colgan, Derivatively on Behalf of Acacia Communications,
Inc., Consolidated Plaintiff, represented by Felipe J. Arroyo --
farroyo@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP, pro hac vice,
Geoffrey M. Johnson -- GJOHNSON@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- Scott & Scott
LLC, Peter C. Horstmann -- pete@horstmannlaw.com -- Law Offices of
Peter Charles Horstmann & Steven R. Wedeking --
swedeking@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP, pro hac vice.

Jonathan Wong, Derivatively on behalf of Acacia Communications,
Inc., Consolidated Plaintiff, represented by Joshua Baker --
jbaker@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., Matthew H. Lee,
The Brown Law Firm, P.C., Phillip C. Kim -- pkim@rosenlegal.com --
The Rosen Law Firm P.A., pro hac vice & Steven R. Wedeking, Robbins
Arroyo LLP.

Sarah Farah-Franco, Derivatively and on behalf of the Nominal
Defendant Acacia Communications, Inc. & Russell Gourley,
Derivatively and on behalf of the Nominal Defendant Acacia
Communications, Inc., Consolidated Plaintiffs, represented by
Geoffrey M. Johnson -- GJOHNSON@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- Scott & Scott
LLC, pro hac vice & Amanda F. Lawrence -- ALAWRENCE@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM
-- Scott & Scott Attoneys at Law, LLP.

Steven Tharp, Individually and on behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph
Alexander Hood, II -- ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac
vice, Joseph F. Russello -- jrussello@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, Theodore M. Hess-Mahan --
thess-mahan@hutchingsbarsamian.com -- Hutchings, Barsamian, Cross
and Mandelcorn, LLP, Vincent M. Serra -- vserra@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins GellerRudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice & Jason M. Leviton,
Block & Leviton LLP.

Ronald Sobala, Individually and on behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Mitchell J. Matorin , Matorin
Law Office LLC.

Francis J. Murphy, Eric A. Swanson, Peter Y. Chung, Benny P.
Mikkelsen, Stan J. Reiss, John Ritchie, Vincent T. Roche, The
Malini Shanmugaraj 2016 QTIP Trust, Mehrdad Givehchi, Givehchi LLC,
John Lomedico, Bhupendra C. Shah, Bhupendra Shah 1999 Trust U/A &
Christian Rasmussen, Consolidated Defendants, represented by Daniel
W. Halston -- DANIEL.HALSTON@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Hale LLP,
Erika M. Schutzman -- ERIKA.SCHUTZMAN@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Hale
LLP, Harriet Hoder -- HARRIET.HODER@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Peter J. Kolovos --
PETER.KOLOVOS@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Hale LLP & Ian D. Coghill --
IAN.COGHILL@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr
LLP.

Matrix Partners VIII, L.P., Summit Partners Venture Captial Fund
III-A, L.P., Summit Partners Venture Capital Fund III-B, L.P.,
Summit Investors I, LLC, Summit Investors I (UK), L.P.,
Commonwealth Capital Ventures IV L.P., Egan Managed Capital III,
L.P. & Weston & Co. VIII, LLC, Consolidated Defendants, represented
by Adam L. Sisitsky -- ALSisitsky@mintz.com -- Mintz, Levin, Cohn,
Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, PC, John F. Sylvia -- JSylvia@mintz.com --
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, PC & Lavinia Weizel --
MWeizel@mintz.com -- Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo,
PC.

OFS Fitel, LLC, Consolidated Defendant, represented by David
Gouzoules , Alston & Bird LLP, pro hac vice, Lisa R. Bugni, Alston
& Bird LLP, pro hac vice, Robert Long -- robert.long@alston.com --
Alston & Bird LLP, pro hac vice, Terence P. McCourt --
mccourtt@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig LLP & Gustavo Ribeiro,
Greenberg Traurig LLP.

Goldman, Sachs & Co., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.,
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, Needham &
Company, LLC, Cowen and Company, LLC, William Blair & Company
L.C.C. & Northland Securities, Inc., Consolidated Defendants,
represented by David B. Hennes -- David.Hennes@ropesgray.com --
Ropes & Gray LLP, pro hac vice, John D. Donovan, Jr. --
John.Donovan@ropesgray.com -- Ropes & Gray LLP & Erin R. Macgowan
-- Erin.Macgowan@ropesgray.com -- Ropes & Gray LLP.

Acacia Communications, Inc., Murugesan Shanmugaraj & John F. Gavin,
Defendants, represented by Daniel W. Halston
--daniel.halston@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Hale LLP, Erika M.
Schutzman -- erika.schutzman@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Hale LLP,
Harriet Hoder -- harriet.hoder@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Ian D. Coghill --
ian.coghill@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr
LLP & Peter J. Kolovos -- peter.kolovos@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer
Hale LLP.

ACCIDENT FUND: Must Face Workers' Compensation Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
John Breslin, writing for Madison Record, reports that a federal
judge refused to dismiss a class-action lawsuit alleging insurance
companies unlawfully withheld interest on payments for services
provided through workers' compensation.

U.S. District Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel of the Southern District
of Illinois released her ruling on July 2.  

Dr. Michael Beatty of Edwardsville leads the class action against
the various insurance companies, alleging violations of the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act
(ICFA).

Beatty, a plastic surgeon, claims the insurance companies routinely
failed to pay the interest due under the Illinois Workers'
Compensation Act (IWCA). In addition, he alleges the companies give
doctors inaccurate information in an effort to wait out the statute
of limitations.

The defendants, including Accident Fund General Insurance Company
and Tristar Insurance Group, asked Judge Rosenstengel to dismiss
the action for failure to state a claim. The insurance companies
argued they do not have to pay interest under the state's workers'
compensation law.

Judge Rosenstengel disagreed.

Although state laws on the issue seemed "ambiguous," Judge
Rosenstengel wrote, the IWCA intended to timely compensate
employees for injuries on the job.

"An insurance company that believes only the employer is
responsible for paying interest has no motivation to pay on time,
thereby defeating the purpose of the IWCA and rendering the
interest provision inconsequential," she wrote in the 32-page
ruling.

Judge Rosenstengel also granted Beatty's request for injunctive
relief and declined to throw out all claims outside the three-year
statute of limitations.

"Requiring insurance companies pay on time -- or else pay the
interest mandated by statute -- will encourage physicians to
continue treating injured Illinois workers, ensuring consumers
across Illinois have access to quality healthcare, by doctors who
choose to participate in the workers' compensation system, at
uninflated prices," she wrote.

However, Judge Rosenstengel did take issue with Beatty's claims of
fraud against all the defendants and gave him time to amend the
original complaint. [GN]

ACS ENTERPRISES: Arbitration Ruling in I. Garcia's Wage Suit Upheld
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IRMA GARCIA et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. ACS
ENTERPRISES, INC., Defendant and Appellant, Case No. B268814 (Cal.
App.), Judge Gail Ruderman Feuer of the Court of Appeals of
California for the Second District, Division Seven, affirmed the
trial court's order denying ACS' motion to compel arbitration
pursuant to an arbitration clause in its subcontract with nonparty
Fast & Neat Cleaning Service.

On Dec. 17, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed the case as a class action
against ACS, alleging that ACS as their employer committed
violations of the Labor Code and California's unfair competition
law.

In their first amended class action complaint, the Plaintiffs
alleged causes of action for failure to pay minimum wage for all
hours worked, failure to pay overtime compensation, failure to pay
all wages owed following separation from employment, failure to
provide off-duty meal and rest periods, failure to furnish timely
and accurate wage statements, and unfair and unlawful business
practices.  They alleged that ACS, which provides janitorial
services for movie theaters, employed the class members to do the
janitorial work, but used Fast & Neat as a straw man in an attempt
to shield itself from liability for wage and hour violations under
California law.

ACS filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint and
asserting numerous affirmative defenses, including in its 27th
affirmative defense that the Plaintiffs were not employed by ACS.
It also filed a cross-complaint against Fast & Neat for express and
implied indemnification, breach of contract, equitable indemnity,
and declaratory relief.  ACS alleged it did not directly provide
janitorial services, and instead entered into subcontracts with
independently owned companies, including Fast & Neat, whose
employees performed the janitorial services for the movie theaters.
It alleged it did not employ the janitorial employees; instead,
the subcontractors were responsible for the hiring and firing,
supervision, work hours, and payment of wages of the employees.

On July 7, 2015, ACS filed a motion to compel arbitration based on
an arbitration clause in its subcontract with Fast & Neat.  It
argued that the Plaintiffs should be bound by the arbitration
clause even though they were not signatories to the subcontract
based on principles of equitable estoppel and agency, as well as
asserted benefits they derived from the subcontract.  In support of
its motion, ACS filed a declaration of Raul Alvarado, the owner of
ACS, and a copy of the subcontract.

In their opposition, the Plaintiffs asserted they worked for ACS,
not Fast & Neat, were not involved in the negotiation of the
subcontract, and did not benefit from the subcontract.  The
Plaintiffs filed a declaration from Garcia in support of their
opposition.

On Aug. 28, 2015 the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to
resolve factual disputes raised by the parties' declarations.

In denying the motion to compel arbitration, the trial court stated
that in general in order to be bound by an arbitration agreement, a
party must have signed that agreement.  The court noted that ACS
presented no evidence that any of the named Plaintiffs signed the
subcontract containing the arbitration clause.  However, it noted
that exceptions are made to the 'non-signatory' rule in limited
circumstances, such as where a non-signatory is a third party
beneficiary of the agreement, or where there is a preexisting
relationship between a signatory and a non-signatory such that
equity compels the third party to be bound.  ACS had argued the
Plaintiffs knowingly exploited and benefitted from the agreement
and were agents of Fast & Neat.  The court concluded neither
exception applied to the case.

On appeal, ACS contends the Plaintiffs are bound by the
subcontract's arbitration clause as the employees of Fast & Neat
or, as to Garcia, as its agent, relying on theories of third party
beneficiary, agency, and equitable estoppel.

Judge Feuer finds that there is substantial evidence to support the
trial court's findings that Garcia was present for the signing of
the subcontract, Garcia helped Mata run Fast & Neat, and the
Plaintiffs were employees of and paid by Fast & Neat.  It is
undisputed that the Plaintiffs did not sign the subcontract.  The
Judge independently review whether on these facts the Plaintiffs
were bound by the arbitration clause in the subcontract they did
not sign.

He finds that there would have been no basis for the Plaintiffs to
force ACS to arbitrate their claims.  The Plaintiffs were paid by
Fast & Neat, but only benefitted to the extent Fast & Neat obtained
additional clients through ACS.  This benefit is insufficient to
bind the Plaintiffs.  The subcontract was in no way intended to
protect the Plaintiffs.

In addition, the Plaintiffs' claims for Labor Code violations are
not in any manner founded in the subcontract.  In the context of
ACS's third party beneficiary argument, the subcontract makes clear
ACS is not responsible for compliance with applicable labor and
employment laws with respect to Fast & Neat's employees.  Thus,
having not derived any benefit from the subcontract, equity does
not support compelling the Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims
pursuant to the subcontract.

For these reasons, Judge Feuer affirmed the judgment.  He awarded
the Plaintiffs their costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 19, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/WWjDma from Leagle.com.

Law Offices of Santiago & Jones, David G. Jones --
djones@santiagojoneslaw.com -- and Alex Vo --
avo@santiagojoneslaw.com -- for Defendant and Appellant.

Law Offices of Stephen Glick, Stephen Glick --
sglick@glicklegal.com -- and M. Anthony Jenkins --
ajenkins@glicklegal.com -- for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

ADIDAS AMERICA: Fails to Protect Members' Data, Christian Duke Say
------------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTIAN DUKE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ADIDAS AMERICA, INC., Defendants, Case No.
37-2018-00033037-CU-BT-CTL (Cal. Super., San Diego Cty., July 3,
2018) seeks damages, restitution, and injunctive relief requiring
the Defendant to implement and maintain reasonable and effective
security practices and procedures.

According to the complaint, by June 26, 2018, the Defendant
announced that hackers had breached its network and obtained
certain personal information of individuals that had purchased
Adidas Sportswear through the Defendant's website. The information
obtained by hackers included, at the least, the full names, contact
information, user names, and encrypted passwords.

Although the Defendant has received periodic warnings from
enforcement sources and cybersecurity experts, the Defendant
entrusted its members' personal information within a process that
failed to maintain reasonable security procedures or implement
basic safeguards to protect personal information.

adidas America Inc. manufactures and supplies sport shoes, apparel,
and accessories for men, women, boys, girls, and infants and
toddlers. The company was formerly known as adidas Sales, Inc. and
changed its name to adidas America Inc. in December 2009. The
company is based in Portland, Oregon. adidas America Inc. operates
as a subsidiary of Adidas North America, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey R. Krinsk, Esq.
          Trenton R. Kashima, Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN & KRINSK LLP
          550 West C Street, Suite 1760
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 238-1333
          Facsimile: (619) 238-5425
          E-mail: jrk@classactionlaw.com
                  trk@classactionlaw.com


AGRI STATS: Ferraro Foods Suit Alleges Antitrust Violation
----------------------------------------------------------
Ferraro Foods, Inc., and Ferraro Foods of North Carolina, LLC,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Agri
Stats, Inc., Clemens Food Group, LLC, Hormel Foods Corporation,
Indiana Packers Corporation, JBS USA, Seaboard Foods, LLC,
Smithfield Foods, Inc., Triumph Foods, LLC, Tyson Foods, Inc.,
Tyson Prepared Foods, Inc., and Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., Case No.
18-cv-01946 (D. Minn., July 12, 2018), seek injunctive relief, and
to recover treble damages under the Clayton Act and the Sherman
Act.

The Plaintiffs relates that starting in at least 2009 and
continuing to the present, the Defendants coordinated to fix,
raise, maintain and stabilize pork prices. To effectuate and ensure
the stability of their anticompetitive agreement, the Defendants
relied on a unique industry data sharing service known as Agri
Stats. Agri Stats provided a means for the Defendants to obtain and
monitor critical and competitively sensitive business information
regarding each other’s production metrics, thereby serving as a
central and critical part of the Defendants' price-fixing scheme,
resulting in a stable and successful anticompetitive cartel.

The Plaintiff Ferraro Foods, Inc. is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the State of New Jersey, with its
principal place of business in Piscataway, New Jersey. It purchased
pork directly from one or more Defendants.

The Plaintiff Ferraro Foods of North Carolina, LLC, is a limited
liability company organized under the laws of the State of North
Carolina. It purchased pork directly from one or more Defendants.

The pork integrator-Defendants are the leading suppliers of pork in
an industry with approximately $20 billion in annual commerce. The
pork industry is highly concentrated, with a small number of large
producers in the United States controlling supply. Defendants and
their co-conspirators collectively control over 80 percent of the
wholesale pork market. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Vincent J. Esades, Esq.
      Renae D. Steiner, Esq.
      James W. Anderson, Esq.
      HEINS MILLS & OLSON, P.L.C.
      310 Clifton Avenue
      Minneapolis, MN 55403
      Tel: (612) 338-4605
      Fax: (612) 338-4692
      E-mail: vesades@heinsmills.com
              rsteiner@heinsmills.com
              janderson@heinsmills.com

          - and -

      Robert G. Eisler, Esq.
      Deborah A. Elman, Esq.
      GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A.
      485 Lexington Avenue, 29th Floor
      New York, NY
      Tel: (646) 722-8500
      Fax: (646) 722-8501
      E-mail: reisler@gelaw.com
              delman@gelaw.com

AIR EVAC: Court Narrows Claims in Breach of Contract Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court, Western District of Missouri,
Southern Division, granted in part and denied in part Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned DORIS ERGLE
LINDSEY PRATT, Individually and on behalf of all other Similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff, v. AIR EVAC LIFETEAM and AIR EVAC EMS,
INC., Defendants, Case No. 6:17-cv-03097-MDH (W.D. Mo.).

This action arises from a dispute concerning the right of an air
ambulance service to seek repayment for its services from certain
insurance benefits following an automobile crash in which the
Plaintiff required the use of the air ambulance services.

Air Evac EMS, Inc., advertises and sells memberships related to its
services. The Plaintiff purchased a membership with Air Evac. In
November 2008, she renewed that membership and signed a contract
setting out the terms and conditions of her membership.

The only issue before this Court is whether Air Evac is entitled to
summary judgment on the Plaintiff's claims for breach of contract.

A breach of contract action includes the following essential
elements: (1) the existence and terms of a contract; (2) that
plaintiff performed or tendered performance pursuant to the
contract; (3) breach of the contract by the defendant; and (4)
damages suffered by the plaintiff.

Breach

The Plaintiff has also suggested that Air Evac breached the
contract by seeking payment for air ambulance costs that were not
covered by any insurance or benefits available to the Plaintiff.

Contract Interpretation

When interpreting a contract, a court must ascertain the intent of
the parties by looking at the words of the contract and giving
those words their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning.

The Court concludes that the membership contract at issue in this
case is ambiguous due to the conflicting and confusing usage of
terms related to the benefits from which Air Evac can collect.

The opening paragraph of the contract indicates that Air Evac will
treat as prepaid any costs not covered by a member's insurance or
medical benefits. Paragraph three of the contract refers at one
point to members who have insurance or other benefits, any
insurance or benefits available to the member, the appropriate
insurance or benefits provider, that members authorize their
insurer or benefits provider and any payment received from
insurance or benefits providers. The acknowledgement paragraph at
the end of the contract states that the member agrees to authorize
my insurer or benefits provider to pay any covered amounts to AEL
directly.

Air Evac's Actions

Undisputed deposition testimony indicates that the Plaintiff and
Alfa settled that claim and Alfa paid to the Plaintiff the benefits
of that claim. It is also true that Air Evac has not zeroed out or
waived the Plaintiff's balance within its own records, but it is
further undisputed that Air Evac has undertaken absolutely no
effort to collect on the Plaintiff's balance since the exchange
between Air Evac and Roger Bedford. The question the Court must
first ask is this: Do any of these actions constitute a breach of
the membership contract between Plaintiff and Air Evac? The Court
finds that there is a factual question, and summary judgment is not
appropriate.

On the matter of the request for an assignment of benefits, the
Court concludes that such a request could not constitute a breach
of the contract. Simply asking for payment of benefits associated
with a contract is not a breach of the agreement, even if it is
ultimately determined that the asker is not entitled to the
payment. This scenario could be likened to an insurance company
suing its insured for breach of contract because an insured sought
payment of benefits for which the insurance company determined the
insured was not covered. The proper course of action in those
circumstances, if the insurance company wishes to take legal
action, is to seek declaratory judgment and a determination that
the insurance company is not obligated to pay.

The insurance company would have no cause of action for breach of
contract simply because the insured asked or otherwise filed a
claim for benefits. Air Evac's actions in contacting the
Plaintiff's counsel, Roger Bedford, were no different than an
insured asking for payment of benefits under a policy: it thought
it was entitled to payment, it asked for payment, and payment was
refused. On this point, the Plaintiff does not even allege that Air
Evac actively pursued or actively persisted in its effort to
collect payment from her after Roger Bedford turned down Air Evac's
request for an assignment of benefits. Thus, the Court will grant
summary judgment on the theory that Air Evac breached the contract
by requesting an assignment of benefits.

The only remaining possible theory for a breach of contract claim
is that Air Evac breached the contract by failing to zero out the
Plaintiff's balance within its record after being turned down for
payment. The Court will not grant summary judgment on this issue,
as there is a question of fact as to whether Air Evac had an
obligation to do so under the membership contract.

The Court grants summary judgment to Defendant Air Evac Lifeteam on
all counts based on the Plaintiff's withdrawal of all claims
directed to that Defendant.

The Court grants summary judgment to Defendant Air Evac EMS, Inc.,
on Counts I, II, IV, V, VI, and VII based on the Plaintiff's
withdrawal of those claims.

The Court grants in part and denies in part summary judgment to
Defendant Air Evac EMS, Inc., on Count III. Summary judgment is
granted on the Plaintiff's theory that the Defendant breached the
contract by seeking an assignment of benefits from the Plaintiff
concerning her lawsuit against Alfa Insurance and on her theories
for actual damages arising from the alleged breach of the contract.
Summary judgment is denied on the Plaintiff's theory that Air
Evac's lien and failure to zero out the Plaintiff's account balance
constituted a breach of the membership contract. Furthermore,
summary judgment is denied on the issue of nominal damages.

The Court denies summary judgment to Defendant Air Evac EMS, Inc.,
on Count VIII.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 16, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yaxwj7fx from Leagle.com.

Doris Ergle Lindsey Pratt, Plaintiff, represented by Courtney C.
Gipson -- cgipson@mmlaw.net -- pro hac vice, James Michael Terrell
-- jterrell@mmlaw.net -- The Highland Building, pro hac vice,
Melody Dickson -- MDICKSON@WCLLP.COM -- Wagstaff & Cartmell & Eric
D. Barton -- EBARTON@WCLLP.COM -- Wagstaff & Cartmell.

Air Evac EMS, Inc., Defendant, represented by Bryan O. Wade --
bryan.wade@huschblackwell.com -- Husch Blackwell LLP, Elizabeth A.
Bozicevic -- elizabeth.bozicevic@huschblackwell.com -- Husch
Blackwell LLP, Kyle P. Seelbach -- kyle.seelbach@huschblackwell.com
-- Husch Blackwell LLP & Sarah L. Zimmerman --
sarah.zimmerman@huschblackwell.com -- Husch Blackwell LLP.

AIRBNB INC: Greene Sues Over Illegally-recorded Phone Calls
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ashley Miller Greene, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AirBnB, Inc. and, Does 1-20,
Defendant, Case No. BC 707653 (Cal. Super., May 24, 2018), seeks
damages and any other available legal or equitable remedies
resulting from violations of California's Invasion of Privacy Act.

AirBnB operates a business wherein "hosts" may open up their
homes/apartments/condominiums to "guests" for a price using their
website: https://www.airbnb.com to make reservations.

Prior to 2017, Greene became a host for Defendant, regularly
maintaining contact with Defendant via phone calls. Greene alleges
that these calls were being illegally recorded considering that
these calls often involves private financial information. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joshua Swigart, Esq.
      HYDE AND SWIGART
      2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101
      San Diego, CA 92108
      Telephone: (619) 233-7770
      Facsimile: (619) 297-1022 to 26
      Email: Josh@westcoastlitigation.com

             - and -

      Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
      Matthew M. Loker, Esq.
      Elizabeth A. Wagner, Esq.
      KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
      245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
      Costa Mesa, CA 92626
      Telephone: (800) 400-6808
      Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
      Email: ak@kazlg.com
             ml@kazlg.com
             elizabeth@kazlg.com


ALLSTATE FIRE: Bloomgarden Sues Over Reduced Insurance Payments
---------------------------------------------------------------
David Bloomgarden, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance
Company, Defendant, Case No. 18-017836 (July 26, 2018) filed in the
Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for
Broward County, Florida, seeks declaratory relief, injunctive
relief, compensatory damages and reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs resulting from breach of contract.

According to the complaint, Plaintiffs are insured under
standardized insurance policies covering damage to motor vehicles.
Their vehicles have sustained significant property damage and are
covered under their policy. However, Allstate has improperly
reduced the actual cash value payments to Plaintiff and Class
Members because it based them on an invalid method and algorithm
for determining value of insured vehicles. [BN]

Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Edward H. Zeberski, Esq.
     Mark S. Fistos, Esq.
     ZEBERSKY PAYNE, LLP
     110 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 2150
     Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Telephone: (954) 989-6333
     Facsimile: (954) 989-7781
     Email: ezeberski@zpllp.com
            mfistos@zplIp.com

AMERICAN WEB: RICO Suit Moved to Newport News Division
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GEORGE HENGLE and LULA WILLIAMS, on behalf of
themselves and all individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
MARK CURRY, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 3:18-cv-100 (E.D.
Va.), Judge Robert E. Payne of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, granted both (i)
AWL, Inc. American Web Loan, Inc. and Red Stone, Inc.'s Motion to
Transfer to the Newport News Division; and (ii) Nationwide AWL
Class Plaintiffs' Motion for Limited Intervention.

AWL, Inc., American Web Loan, Inc. and Red Stone, Inc. ("AWL
Defendants") move to transfer the action to the Newport News
Division, where an action brought by the putative intervenor
Plaintiffs -- Royce Solomon, et al. v. American Web Loan, Inc., et
al., No. 4:17-cv-145 -- is currently pending.

On Feb. 13, 2018, the Plaintiffs brought suit against Curry, the
AWL Defendants, Medley Fund, and Medley Capital.  They asserted six
class claims: (1) Count One, Violations of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), against Medley Fund and
Medley Capital; (2) Count Two, Violations of RICO, against all the
Defendants; (3) Count Three, Violations of RICO, against Curry and
the AWL Defendants; (4) Count Four, Violations of RICO, against all
the Defendants; (5) Count Five, Violations of Virginia Usury Laws,
against all the Defendants; and (6) Count Six, Unjust Enrichment,
against all the Defendants.

In the Civil Cover Sheet attached to the Complaint, the Plaintiffs
indicated that this case was related to another action pending
before the Court, Lula Williams, et al. v. Big Picture Loans, LLC,
et al., No. 3:17-cv-461.

The AWL Defendants moved to transfer the action to the Newport News
Division on Feb. 21, 2018.  Shortly thereafter, the Court requested
statements from the Plaintiffs and the AWL Defendants about why the
case is related to Williams and Solomon, respectively.  After the
parties had given their positions, the Court found that the case
was related to Williams, but did not express any conclusion about
its relation to Solomon.

The next day, Royce Solomon, Jodi Belleci, Michael Littlejohn, and
Giulianna Lomaglio ("Solomon Plaintiffs") moved to intervene in
support of the AWL Defendants' motion to transfer.  The Court then
granted the Plaintiffs' request for jurisdictional discovery
because some Defendants had moved to dismiss the Complaint on
grounds that implicated the Court's subject matter jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, given the AWL Defendants' and Curry's subsequent
motions to stay jurisdictional discovery, it is unclear how much
progress has been made in that regard.  Finally, the Plaintiffs
recently moved to have their attorneys appointed as interim class
counsel, which the AWL Defendants have responded to but not
formally opposed.

The Solomon Plaintiffs filed suit against AWL, Curry, the
MacFarlane Group, Medley Fund, Medley Capital, and eight other
entities in the Newport News Division on Dec. 15, 2017.  They filed
an amended complaint against AWL, Curry, the MacFarlane Group,
Medley Fund, Medley Capital and eight other entities and
individuals on March 9, 2018.

The only significant factual contrast between the Solomon Amended
Complaint and the Complaint in the case is the composition of the
proposed classes.  Like the Plaintiffs, the Solomon Plaintiffs
obtained loans from AWL and made payments in connection with those
loans.  Solomon also resides in Virginia, albeit in the Newport
News Division, and the interest rate on his loan was 726.13%, well
in excess of the maximum 12% APR permitted by Virginia law.  As a
result, the Solomon Plaintiffs allege their class claims on behalf
of a putative nationwide class, instead of the limited Virginia
classes claimed by the Plaintiffs.

The number and type of claims in Solomon are also different.  The
Solomon Plaintiffs assert nine class claims: (1) Count One,
Violations of RICO, against American Web Loan, Curry, the
MacFarlane Group, SOL, the Medley Defendants, and the Taubes; (2)
Count Two, Violations of RICO,against American Web Loan, Curry, the
MacFarlane Group, SOL, the Medley Defendants, the Taubes,
GOLDPoint, and Middlemarch; (3) Count Three, Violations of the
Electronic Funds Transfer Act ("EFTA"), against American Web Loan,
Curry, the MacFarlane Group, SOL, the Medley Defendants, the
Taubes, and GOLDPoint; (4) Count Four, Violations of the Truth in
Lending Act ("TILA"), Failure to Disclose Finance Charge, against
AWL, Inc.; (5) Count Five, Violations of TILA, Failure to Disclose
Finance Charge Expressed as an Annual Percentage Rate, against AWL,
Inc.; (6) Count  Six, Violations of TILA,Failure to Disclose the
Total of Payments, against AWL, Inc.; (7) Count Seven, Violations
of TILA, Failure to Disclose Number, Amount, and Due Dates or
Period Payment Scheduled to Repay the Total of Payments, against
AWL, Inc.; (8) Count Eight, Violations of TILA,Failure to Disclose
the Identity of the Creditor, against AWL, Inc.; and (9) Count
Nine, Unjust Enrichment, against all the Defendants.

After the filing of the Solomon Amended Complaint on March 9,
responsive motions were filed on April 8 and 9, and the Solomon
Plaintiffs' responses are not due until June 8.  No jurisdictional
discovery has been conducted or, apparently, even requested.
However, like the Plaintiffs in the case, the Solomon Plaintiffs
recently moved for the appointment of their attorneys as interim
class counsel.

Judge Payne finds that the Solomon Plaintiffs have met the test for
permissive intervention.  Their motion will be granted, and they
are allowed to intervene for the sole purpose of joining in the AWL
Defendants' motion to transfer.  Accordingly, both the AWL
Defendants' and the Solomon Plaintiffs' briefs may be considered in
connection with the transfer motion.

As to AWL Defendants' Motion to Transfer, the Judge finds that (i)
the AWL Defendants have demonstrated that a substantial part of the
events giving rise to the Plaintiffs' claims occurred in the
Newport News Division, such that venue there would be proper; (ii)
the AWL Defendants have not met their burden to show that transfer
is permissible under Section 1404(a); and (iii) considering all the
Section 1404(a) factors, although the Plaintiffs' choice of forum
and the convenience of the witnesses and parties weigh against
transfer or are neutral, the interest of justice clearly tilts the
balance towards transfer.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Payne granted the motions to
transfer to Newport News Division.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 15, 2018 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/7m0UX8 from Leagle.com.

George Hengle, on behalf of themselves and all individuals
similarly situated & Lula Williams, on behalf of themselves and all
individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Craig
Carley Marchiando -- craig@clalegal.com -- Consumer Litigation
Associates, Elizabeth W. Hanes -- elizabeth@clalegal.com --
Consumer Litigation Associates, Kristi Cahoon Kelly --
kkelly@kellyandcrandall.com -- Kelly & Crandall PLC, Leonard
Anthony Bennett -- lenbennett@clalegal.com -- Consumer Litigation
Associates, Andrew Joseph Guzzo -- aguzzo@kellyandcrandall.com --
Kelly & Crandall PLC, Casey Shannon Nash --
casey@kellyandcrandall.com -- Kelly & Crandall PLC & James Wilson
Speer -- jay@vplc.org -- Virginia Proverty Law Center.

Mark Curry, Defendant, represented by Robert Madison Cary --
rcary@wc.com -- Williams & Connolly LLP & Simon Andrew Latcovich --
slatcovich@wc.com -- Williams & Connolly LLP.

American Web Loan, Inc., AWL, Inc. & Red Stone, Defendants,
represented by Charles Kalman Seyfarth -- cseyfarth@ohaganmeyer.com
-- O'Hagan Meyer PLLC, Saba Bazzazieh -- sbazzazieh@rosettelaw.com
-- Rosette LLP, pro hac vice, Elizabeth Scott Turner --
eturner@ohaganmeyer.com -- O'Hagan Meyer PLLC, Jonathan E. Palkin,
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, pro hac vice, Molly
Jennings -- molly.jennings@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, pro hac vice, Robert Allen Rosette --
rosette@rosettelaw.com -- Rosette, LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas L.
Strickland -- thomas.strickland@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, pro hac vice.

Medley Opportunity Fund II LP & Medley Capital Corporation,
Defendants, represented by Christopher E. Ondeck --
condeck@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose LLP, Michael Richard
Hackett -- mhackett@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose LLP, pro hac
vice, Timothy William Mungovan -- tmungovan@proskauer.c om --
Proskauer Rose LLP, pro hac vice & William David Dalsen --
wdalsen@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose LLP, pro hac vice.

Royce Solomon, Jody Belleci, Michael Littlejohn & Giulianna
Lomaglio, Intervenor Plaintiffs, represented by David W. Thomas --
DThomas@michiehamlett.com -- MichieHamlett.

ANADARKO PETROLEUM: R. Edgar's Securities Suit Dismissed
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT EDGAR, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORPORATION,
et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-1372 (S.D. Tex.), Judge Lee
H. Rosenthal of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Texas, Houston Division, granted without prejudice and with
leave to amend by Aug. 3, 2018 the Defendants' motion to dismiss.

The Plaintiffs, a class of investors who purchased or acquired
Anadarko common stock between Feb. 8, 2016 and May 2, 2017, brought
the securities class action against Defendants, Anadarko and
several of its executives.  They assert that Anadarko violated
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 78j(b) and the
Security Exchange Commission's Rule 10b-5.  They assert that the
executive committee Defendants, Bradley Holly, Craig Walters, and
John Christiansen, violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. Section 78t(a).

Anadarko is a publicly traded oil and gas exploration and
production company headquartered in the Woodlands.  It focuses its
operations on the Gulf of Mexico, the Delaware Basin in Texas, and
the Denver-Julesburg Basin in Colorado.  Approximately one quarter
of Anadarko's employees work out of its Colorado offices.  The
Plaintiffs allege that Anadarko's disregard for safety regulations
led to the endangerment and death of Colorado residents.  They
contend that this, and Anadarko's failure to be honest, harmed
investors and violated securities laws.

On April 17, 2017, a home in Firestone, Colorado exploded, killing
two people and critically injuring another.  The home was 200 feet
away from the Anadarko-operated Firestone Well.  The well was one
of the several hundred acquired in the land swap but was never
remediated.  On May 2, 2017, the Firestone-Frederick Fire
Department confirmed the link between Anadarko's well and the
Firestone explosion.

On May 24, 2017, a new methane cloud was discovered west of the
Firestone explosion site, with even higher levels of methane.  The
following day, a fire at an Anadarko oil container in Weld County,
Colorado killed one worker and injured three others.

In February 2016 and 2017, Anadarko published its 2016 and 2017
Health, Safety, and Environment Fact Sheets.  The documents stated
that they work to ensure that all of our activities are conducted
to meet or surpass applicable health, safety, and environmental
laws, regulations, and international standards.  The 2016 Fact
Sheet additionally stated their health, safety, and environment
team works seamlessly with operations and facilities to ensure
compliance with all applicable laws and regulations.

The Plaintiffs argue that these statements were false because (a)
Anadarko intentionally violated Colorado law and regulations as a
matter of course, including Rule 1103; and (b) Anadarko knew that
hundreds of the wells it had acquired in the Land Swap did not
comply with a variety of Colorado laws and regulations, including
those violations leading to the Firestone Well explosion.

The Defendants moved to dismiss.  Anadarko argues that the
Plaintiffs have not pleaded with specificity why or how any of the
alleged statements were materially false and misleading.  The
Plaintiffs responded, and the Defendants replied.  The parties
appeared at a hearing on June 15 and presented oral argument.

Judge Rosenthal concludes that the Plaintiffs have what at first
looks like a narrative that would counsel against dismissal.  The
Plaintiffs allege that Anadarko got bad wells in a land swap, said
they were going to remediate them, failed to remediate because of
costs and external financial pressures, failed to prevent
explosions, and then announced that it had violated Colorado laws.
The biggest hurdle for the Plaintiffs is the timing of the facts
alleged as the basis for this theory of liability.  

The Judge holds that the Plaintiffs clearly allege that at least by
June 30, 2017, Anadarko knew that more than 2,400 of its abandoned
flowlines were violating Rule 1103.  But the only statement that is
an actionable misrepresentation -- that Anadarko operates its
global onshore and offshore operations in compliance with the
applicable laws and associated regulations -- predated the
explosion.  He finds that what the Plaintiffs did not allege is
that the individuals who stated that Anadarko operates its global
onshore and offshore operations in compliance with the applicable
laws and associated regulations knew, or should have known, before
the explosion that Anadarko was violating at least some laws.  The
Plaintiffs' present complaint is insufficient.

For these reasons, the Judge granted the motion to dismiss, but
without prejudice and with leave to amend.  The record does not
permit him to conclude that amendment would be futile.  He granted
the Plaintiffs leave to amend by Aug. 3, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 19, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/K5Qxwt from Leagle.com.

Robert Edgar, Plaintiff, represented by R. Dean Gresham, Steckler
Gresham Cochran PLLC & Willie C. Briscoe --
wbriscoe@thebriscoelawfirm.com -- The Briscoe Law Firm, PLLC.

Iron Workers Benefit and Pension FundIron Workers District Counsel
Philadelphia & Vicinity, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan Horne
-- jhorne@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, PA, Laurence M.
Rosen -- lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., pro hac
vice, Phillip Kim -- pkim@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm,
P.A. & R. Dean Gresham, Steckler Gresham Cochran PLLC.

Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, R. A. Walker & Robert G. Gwin,
Defendants, represented by Noelle M. Reed --
noelle.reed@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP, Jay B. Kasner -- jay.kasner@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, pro hac vice & Susan Leslie Saltzstein
-- susan.saltzstein@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom LLP, pro hac vice.

Robert K. Reeves & Darrell Hollek, Defendants, represented by
Noelle M. Reed, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.

Employees' Retirement System of the State of Rhode Island, Movant,
represented by Meredith Bracey Weatherby --
mweatherby@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice LLC.

Semir Ghamar & Vikram Sheth, Movants, represented by Joe Kendall --
jkendall@kendalllawgroup.com -- Kendall Law Group, PLLC & Jamie J.
McKey -- jmckey@kendalllawgroup.com -- Kendall Law Group PLLC.

ARANATA THERAPEUTICS: Court Dismisses R. Daniel's Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs in the case captioned ROY A. DANIEL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. J. PATRICIA WILSON SMOOT, et al., Defendants, Case No.
10-cv-00862(APM)(D.D.C.), claim that animal pharmaceutical company
Aratana Therapeutics, Inc., and two of its officers, Steven St.
Peter and Craig A. Tooman, made false and misleading statements or
omissions regarding the future commercial availability of ENTYCE,
an appetite stimulant for dogs.  The Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit
on behalf of all persons defendants who purchased Aratana
securities between March 16, 2015 and March 13, 2017 (Class
Period).  They allege violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and the
corresponding rule of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 17
C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5 (Rule 10b-5).

Aratana filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Class Action
Complaint (AC) for failure to state a claim under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b).

The United States District Court, District of Columbia issued an
Opinion and Order granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in the
case captioned

Elements of Plaintiffs' Claims

The Plaintiffs assert claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5.  

Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful to use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe. The
SEC's implementing rule, Rule 10b-5, provides that it is unlawful
to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading.

To state a claim under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, a
plaintiff must adequately plead (1) a material misrepresentation or
omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between
the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5)
economic loss; and (6) loss causation.

To state a claim under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, a
plaintiff must show (1) a primary violation by the controlled
person, (2) control of the primary violator by the defendant, and
(3) that the defendant was, in some meaningful sense, a culpable
participant in the controlled person's fraud. If a plaintiff has
not adequately alleged a primary violation, a viable claim under
another provision of the Exchange Act, then the Section 20(a)
claims must be dismissed.

False or Misleading Statements or Omissions

In addition, to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must
adequately plead that the defendant made a statement that was
misleading as to a material fact. An omission of information not
affirmatively required to be disclosed is, instead, actionable only
when disclosure of such information is necessary to make statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading.

The AC fails to state a claim for two independent reasons.  First,
it fails to adequately allege falsity.  Second, it fails to raise a
strong inference of scienter.

Falsity

The Plaintiffs synthesize the AC's theory of falsity as follows:
the Defendants repeatedly represented that the Company was on the
cusp of achieving and then had achieved the approvals necessary for
commercialization of ENTYCE on the stated timeline, but these
statements were misleading because Aratana had not yet secured an
FDA-approved third-party manufacturer, making the approval of the
NADA a mere placeholder that required further amendments and
approvals to produce commercial quantities of the drug. The vast
majority of the challenged statements, however, constitute puffery,
statements of opinion, and/or forward-looking statements that
cannot serve as the basis of a federal securities claim. As to the
few remaining statements that did purport to relate historical
information, plaintiffs either do not premise liability on these
statements or have not adequately alleged that, in context, they
were false or misleading.

Puffery

Statements are mere puffery, and hence non-actionable, when they
are too general to cause a reasonable investor to rely upon them.

Several broad assertions by Aratana fall under this doctrine and
hence are not actionable. These include that Aratana had made
remarkable progress towards our stated goal of advancing our
expanding pipeline towards commercialization, that the company was
confident about and prepared for what lays ahead, that Aratana was
proud to be on track to have these products reach the market in
2016 and that it was confident in these products and our overall
commercialization strategy. Such statements do no more than place a
positive spin on developments in the FDA approval process.

Opinion Statements and Forward-Looking Statements

Statements of opinion include subjective statements that reflect
judgments as to values that [are] not objectively determinable.
Statements that express expectations about the future rather than
presently existing, objective facts are also statements of opinion.
Such statements, often marked by phrases such as "I believe," are
inactionable so long as the speaker actually held the belief
professed, did not supply an untrue supporting fact, and did not
omit information rendering the statement misleading.
Forward-looking statements, meanwhile, include plans and objectives
of management for future operations. A forward-looking statement is
not actionable if it is identified and accompanied by meaningful
cautionary language or is immaterial or the plaintiff fails to
prove that it was made with actual knowledge that it was false or
misleading.

The Defendants cannot be said to have concealed a risk that had
already metastasized into reality. First, the AC does not allege
that, before February 2, 2017, the CVM had already requested
additional information from Aratana. And second, to the extent
plaintiffs allege that the risk that had already materialized was
Aratana's lack of a suitable manufacturer, defendants disclosed
that fact as early as May 8, 2015, when St. Peter explained that
Aratana was working to secure a commercial supply of ENTYCE.

Given that Aratana had already notified investors that a transfer
of manufacturing could require CVM approval, see 2014 10-K at 39,
the company's statements satisfactorily armed investors with all
the information necessary to evaluate the risks associated with the
anticipated timeline.  

In short, because defendants amply disclosed both the need for a
new commercial-scale manufacturer and the fact that such a transfer
of manufacturing responsibility might require additional regulatory
approval, it is clear from the face of the AC and materials
cognizable thereunder that defendants did not misrepresent or
conceal from stockholders the possibility or necessity of a new
manufacturer, of additional CVM inquiries, or of any concomitant
delays in commercialization.

The Defendants' opinion and forward-looking statements are not
actionable for a second reason. Even if these statements had
contained embedded misleading statements, plaintiffs do not
adequately allege that defendants at the start of the Class Period
knew the facts that made them so: to wit, that the projected
timelines for ENTYCE's commercial release were overly optimistic,
or that the CVM eventually would request more information regarding
Aratana's commercial manufacturer.

In other words, plaintiffs have failed to allege adequately that
defendants' opinion statements did not fairly align with the
information in their possession at the time or that their
forward-looking statements were knowingly false.

Scienter

To plead scienter, plaintiffs must adequately allege facts showing
either that defendants (1) had motive and opportunity to make false
or misleading statements or (2) engaged in conscious misbehavior or
recklessness" when they made such statement.

Motive

The Plaintiffs offer three theories of motive: that defendants (1)
enriched themselves through suspicious securities transactions; (2)
sought to avoid principal payments under Aratana's loan agreement;
and (3) sought to ensure the success of a round of public offerings
in Aratana stock. None of these theories can sustain the AC's claim
of scienter.
Securities Transactions

The Plaintiffs first allege that the individual defendants,
corporate insiders privy to information on ENTYCE's prospects for
success, profited from suspiciously timed securities transactions.


It is undisputed that the individual defendants transacted in
Aratana securities during the Class Period, pursuant to Rule 10b5-1
trading plans. SEC filings indicate that during the Class Period,
St. Peter acquired 237,400 shares of common stock and 345,000
options, and sold 300,000 shares, and that Tooman acquired 65,850
shares of common stock and 102,500 options, and sold 39,676 shares.


In any event, the overall circumstances surrounding the individual
defendants' sales so clearly do not plausibly support inferring
scienter that the choice among these methodologies is ultimately
academic. Even assuming that the Court were to disregard all
options held by the individual defendants (vested as well as
unvested) in calculating the extent of insider sales during the
class period, the individual defendants' trading still would not
establish motive. That is so for three reasons. First, even on
plaintiffs' methodology, St. Peter's holdings declined by a bare
9%, while Tooman's holdings increased by approximately 34%.
Second, contrary to plaintiffs' claim, the timing of defendants'
sales, fairly analyzed, is not suspicious. It does not give rise to
an inference of insider knowledge, at the time of the sales, of
material undisclosed bad news. For instance, plaintiffs contend
that St. Peter sold 150,000 shares in late 2016, just before the
end of the period, late 2016, when the Defendants had professed
that ENTYCE would have a commercial launch.

Third, as a general matter, trades made pursuant to a Rule 10b5-1
trading plan do not give rise to a strong inference of scienter. It
is true, as plaintiffs suggest, that the mere existence of a
trading plan will not defeat an otherwise strong inference of
scienter where, as here, the plans were entered into during the
Class Period.

Conscious Misbehavior or Recklessness

Because plaintiffs have failed to establish motive, they bear a
correspondingly greater burden in alleging conscious misbehavior or
recklessness.  

First, the AC lacks non-conclusory allegations to support the
inference that defendants knowingly withheld or misrepresented
information in their possession.

Second, plaintiffs argue that defendants' repeated delays of
ENTYCE's commercial release disguised the fact there was no
adequate facility to launch ENTYCE.

Here, for much the same reasons that it fails to plead falsity with
respect to defendants' projections about FDA approval, see supra
Part III.A.2, the AC also fails to adequately plead scienter. As
explained, the AC's allegations as to defendants' knowledge are
utterly conclusory and premised entirely on defendants' own public
disclosures.

In the end, although the facts alleged in the AC do not preclude an
inference of fraudulent intent, the far more compelling inference
from the facts pled is that defendants believed in good faith that
they would obtain regulatory approval and commercialize on the
anticipated timelines, but, upon encountering setbacks and changes
in marketing strategy, timely updated the market. For that reason,
plaintiffs have failed to raise a strong inference of scienter.

The Court dismisses the AC in its entirety, with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 11, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycdkydqu from
Leagle.com.

ABDUS-SHAHID ALI, Plaintiff, represented by Elliot M. Mincberg ,
PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY FOUNDATION, Kenneth John Pfaehler --
kenneth.pfaehler@dentons.com -- DENTONS US LLP, Daniel G. Morris ,
DENTONS US LLP & Jason Drew Wallach -- jwallach@blankrome.com --
Blank Rome LLP.

STANLEY GRAYSON & KELVIN SMITH, Plaintiffs, represented by Elliot
M. Mincberg , PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY FOUNDATION, Daniel G.
Morris , DENTONS US LLP & Jason Drew Wallach , Blank Rome LLP.

CRANSTON J. MITCHELL, Commissioner of the United States Parole
Commission, PATRICIA K. CUSHWA, Commissioner of the United States
Parole Commission, J. PATRICIA WILSON SMOOT & CHARLES MASSARONE,
Defendants, represented by Kenneth A. Adebonojo , U.S. ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE & Peter C. Pfaffenroth , U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE.

ASC INC: Leonardo Class Certification Bid Underway
--------------------------------------------------
A second amended class action lawsuit was filed August 6 in the
lawsuit styled SEFERINO LEONARDO, on behalf of himself, FLSA
Collective Plaintiffs, and Class Members, the Plaintiff, v. ASC,
INC. d/b/a LA NONNA, et al., the Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-03657-VEC (S.D.N.Y.).

The defendants in the SAC are 151 Mulberry St. Corp., 164 Mulberry
St. Corp., ASC, Inc., Nicholas Criscitelli, Perry Criscitelli,
Estate of Annette Sabatino, P.J.'s of Little Italy, Inc.  The
lawsuit seeks jury demand.

On July 24, 2018, Judge Valerie E. Caproni signed a Stipulation and
Order of Dismissal, which drops 7324 Amboy Road LLC and Danico of
Mulberry Street from the lawsuit.  The stipulation provides that
all claims, crossclaims, in the First Amended Complaint against
only Defendants, 7324 AMBOY ROAD, LLC d/b/a DANICO OF MULBERRY
STREET, and ANNETTE SABATINO and NICHOLAS CRISCITELLI ONLY in their
capacity as past owners of 7324 AMBOY ROAD, LLC d/b/a DANICO OF
MULBERRY STREET, are dismissed and/or discontinued without
prejudice and without costs to either party.

The Plaintiff has sought class certification of his lawsuit.  The
Defendants have a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Motion to
Certify.  The Motion remains pending.

Attorneys for Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the
Class:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          Taimur Alamgir, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          30 East 39th Street, Second Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 465 1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465 1181


ASSET RECOVERY: Cruz Suit Seeks Damages under FDCPA
---------------------------------------------------
Milena Cruz, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Asset Recovery Solutions, LLC and John Does 1-25, Case
No. 1:18-cv-06343 (S.D. N.Y., July 12, 2018), seeks damages and
declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Fair Debt
Collections Practices Act.

The Plaintiff is a resident of the State of New York, County of New
York, residing at 224 East 28th Street, Apt. 2H, New York, NY
10016.

The Defendant Asset Recovery Solutions LLC is a debt collector with
an address at 2200 E. Devon Avenue, Suite 200, Des Plaines, IL
60018. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Daniel Kohn, Esq.
      STEIN SAKS, PLLC
      285 Passaic Street
      Hackensack, NJ 07601
      Tel: (201) 282-6500
      Fax: (201) 282-6501
      E-mail: dkohn@steinsakslegal.com


AT&T CORP: Faces Class Action Over Early Retirement Benefits
------------------------------------------------------------
Carmen Castro-Pagan, writing for Bloomberg BNA, reports that AT&T
Inc.'s pension plan is accused of violating federal benefits law by
refusing to pay retroactive, unreduced early retirement benefits to
former employees.

Two former employees allege AT&T owes them about $316,490 combined
in early retirement benefits they should have received between
their attainment of age 55 and the date they filed their pension
application in 2017, according to their lawsuit, filed July 17 in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

They seek to represent between 40 and hundreds of individuals who
may be entitled to retroactive, unreduced benefits under a 1997
plan amendment.

The lawsuit comes five years after the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit ruled that a former AT&T employee, under similar
circumstances as the workers who filed the new lawsuit, was
entitled to recover unreduced early retirement benefits at age 55.
The Fourth Circuit upheld a district court ruling that the worker
was entitled to $120,000 in retroactive benefits after finding that
the administrator failed to notify her of changes to the plan that
made her eligible for early retirement.

The workers in the new lawsuit base their claim on the 1997 plan
amendment that allowed employees to receive unreduced early
retirement benefits at age 55, instead of having to wait to age 65
to receive the same monthly benefits.

They allege they had been unfamiliar with the amendment, and
applied for the benefits as soon as they became aware of it. AT&T
and its plan administrator, Fidelity, allegedly awarded them
benefits only prospectively, but denied the retroactive pay, the
lawsuit said. Fidelity cited a 2016 amendment, which AT&T allegedly
adopted just days before the former employees applied for benefits,
to deny them the retroactive pay, the lawsuit said.

AT&T is evaluating the matter, a company spokesman told Bloomberg
Law July 18.

Edgar Pauk and Robert L. Liebross represent the retirees.

The case is Grosso v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan, S.D.N.Y., No.
1:18-cv-06448, complaint filed 7/17/18. [GN]

ATH HOLDING: M. Bell's Suit Transferred to S.D. Indiana
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania transferred to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana the case captioned MARY BELL, v. ATH
HOLDING COMPANY, LLC, Miscellaneous Action No. 18-148 (E.D. Pa.).

Participants allege ATH Holding, its pension committee, and its
board of directors, breached fiduciary duties of loyalty and
prudence owed to the Participants by: (1) paying excessive
investment management and administrative fees to Vanguard; (2)
failing to properly investigate an investment option offered to
Participants; and (3) failing to monitor the Plan fiduciaries.  The
Participants sued ATH Holding Company, LLC, its board, and its
pension committee in December 2015 in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana.

The class representative asks the Court to compel third party
witness Vanguard Group, Inc., to reappear for a deposition held in
Pennsylvania for convenience reasons under a subpoena issued from
the Southern District of Indiana for a deposition scheduled to
occur in Indianapolis.

The entered a rule to show cause asking the Participants, the named
Defendants, and nonparty Vanguard why the Court should not (1) lift
the unilateral seal consistent with our court of appeals' guidance
beginning with Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg and (2) transfer the
motion to the Southern District of Indiana which issued the
subpoena at issue for a deposition in its District or summarily
deny the motion to compel as the attorney moving to compel is not
licensed to practice in our District.

The Participants show exceptional circumstances under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 45(f) requiring the Court to transfer its motion to compel to
the Southern District of Indiana.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(f), when the court where
compliance is required did not issue the subpoena, it may transfer
a motion under this rule to the issuing court if the person subject
to the subpoena consents or if the court finds exceptional
circumstances.

At worst, Vanguard faces a slight burden litigating this motion to
compel in the Southern District.  The Participants argue Vanguard
is not prejudiced or burdened by litigating this discovery dispute
in the Southern District because it is a sophisticated entity
represented by national counsel.  Vanguard responds it already
faces a heavy burden and cost of litigating discovery disputes in
districts across the country and transfer of this motion out of its
home District only increases this burden.

Vanguard faces a slight burden at worst in litigating this motion
in the Southern District which issued the subpoena. Vanguard's
admission it already litigates discovery disputes in districts
across the nation weighs in favour of finding only a slight burden
against it in litigating this discovery dispute in the Southern
District. Further, Vanguard's discovery disputes arising out of
litigation different from the underlying Southern District
litigation have no bearing on whether transfer is proper under Rule
45(f). The Court appreciates Rule 45 seeks to minimize burdens on
local parties, but Vanguard already faces an insignificant burden
in litigating this motion to compel arising from a subpoena issued
and served in the Southern District arising out of litigation
pending in the Southern District.

Transfer to the Southern District of Indiana is necessary to avoid
disrupting Judge Walton Pratt's trial management of this complex
litigation given the imminent deadlines.

The Participants argue transfer is necessary to avoid disruption in
Judge Walton Pratt's management of the underlying litigation.  

Vanguard argues the Participants cannot show a disruption to the
underlying litigation because Rule 45 requires a movant show the
issuing court has addressed the same discovery issue or will likely
face the same discovery issue in multiple districts.

The fact discovery deadline set by Judge Walton Pratt passed on May
8, 2018. The deadline for Participants to move to compel discovery
passed on April 30, 2018. The parties face an upcoming summary
judgment motion deadline recently extended. If Participants' motion
to compel is granted, the Court would be allowing fact discovery
beyond Judge Walton Pratt's ordered deadline. Allowing fact
discovery to continue beyond Judge Walton Pratt's deadline in light
of the parties' imminent dispositive motion deadline and of Judge
Walton Pratt's busy trial schedule could seriously risk Judge
Walton Pratt's management of the case. Between now and the parties'
scheduled February 2019 bench trial date, Judge Walton Pratt
scheduled at least nine pre-trial deadlines. Judge Pratt must also
rule on the motion to certify a class.

To avoid risk of disrupting Judge Walton Pratt's pre-trial schedule
and management of the case, transfer to the Southern District of
Indiana is necessary. Judge Walton Pratt is in the best position to
determine whether or how long to extend fact discovery in light of
the parties' pre-trial deadlines. Judge Walton Pratt is also best
positioned to determine whether Participants may seek to compel
discovery beyond her April 30 deadline.

This factor weighs in favor of transfer.

The complexity of the underlying litigation weighs in favor of
transfer to Judge Walton Pratt
Participants argue transfer to the`southern District is proper
because of the complexity of the underlying litigation.  

Vanguard argues the underlying litigation does not present
complexities our District is incapable of addressing.

The Participants argue in light of the witness' testimony that
record-kept clients of Vanguard, like Anthem were not generally
eligible for institutional shares pursuant to some purposed
unwritten preference, but certain unarticulated exceptions were
negotiated pursuant to vaguely described practice, the Plaintiffs
were entitled to explore Vanguard's practices in offering lower
cost options to similar plans. The Southern District, having
presided over the underlying litigation for the past two-and-a-half
years, is best suited to assessing the merits of these highly
specific and nuanced discovery requests.

This factor weighs in favor of transfer.

Rule 45 does not require the Court's District become Vanguard's
clearinghouse for its discovery disputes pending throughout the
country.

Vanguard argues we should not transfer to the Southern District of
Indiana because it is at home here and the District could provide a
single forum for resolving discovery disputes involving Vanguard,
in its role as recordkeeper for retirement plans, in unrelated
actions pending across the country. Vanguard cites to a
miscellaneous action it recently filed in the District where
Vanguard moved to quash a subpoena in a litigation surrounding its
management fees.

The Court states that it is not its role to serve as a
clearinghouse for Vanguard's discovery disputes pending in
districts across the country just because similar issues are
presented. The transfer analysis under Rule 45(f) is a fact
specific case-by-case analysis. The Court appreciates Vanguard
faces litigation potentially across the nation through its national
profile. But the Court only assess whether this miscellaneous
action is best addressed in its District or before Judge Walton
Pratt in the Southern District of Indiana. The Court have no basis
to conclude the District is the appropriate forum in every
discovery dispute between retirement plan participants and
non-party Vanguard.

The insignificant burden imposed on Vanguard in litigating this
motion to compel in the Southern District of Indiana is outweighed
by the risk of interrupting Judge Walton Pratt's management of this
complex ERISA class action litigation.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 16, 2018 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8hap5g2 from Leagle.com.

MARY BELL, ET. AL., Plaintiff, represented by AARON E. SCHWARTZ ,
SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON LLP & DAVID M. PROMISLOFF --
david@prolawpa.com -- PROMISLOFF LAW, P.C.

THE VANGUARD GROUP, INC., Movant, represented by JOHN GRACIE MACKAY
COIT , MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS & LAURA HUGHES MCNALLY --
laura.mcnally@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP.

AUTO INSURANCE: Humphreys Seeks to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned MELISSA HUMPHREYS, Individually and On
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. AUTO
INSURANCE SPECIALISTS, LLC, the Defendant, Case No.
3:17-cv-01498-DMS-JMA (S.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff will move the
Court on August 24, 2018, for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all persons within the United States who had or have a
      number assigned to a cellular telephone service, who
      received at least one text message using an ATDS, from Auto
      Insurance Specialists, LLC, or its agents calling on behalf
      of Auto Insurance Specialists, LLC, between the date of
      filing this action and the four years preceding, where such
      text messages were sent for marketing purposes, to non-
      customers of Auto Insurance Specialists, LLC, at the time
      of the text messages"; and

   2. appointing Plaintiff as Class Representative, and
      appointing Plaintiff's attorneys as Class Counsel.

A copy of the Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/Imq62H at no charge.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
          Mona Amini, Esq.
          Veronica Cruz, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: (800) 400 6808
          Facsimile: (800) 520 5523
          E-mail: ak@kazlg.com
                  mona@kazlg.com
                  veronica@kazlg.com

               - and -

          Joshua B. Swigart, Esq.
          HYDE & SWIGART
          2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Telephone: (619) 233 7770
          Facsimile: (619) 297 1022
          E-mail: josh@westcoastlitigation.com


BADCOCK HOME: Wilson Seeks to Certify Class
-------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled VICTORIA WILSON, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. BADCOCK HOME
FURNITURE, the Defendant, Case No. 8:17-cv-02739-VMC-AAS (M.D.
Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order certifying a class
of:

   "all persons in the United States (2) to whose cellular
   telephone number (3) Defendant placed a non-emergency
   telephone call (4) using substantially the same system(s) that
   were used to telephone Plaintiff (5) from March 6, 2014
   through the present and (6) where Defendant’s call records
   report a wrong number associated with said cellular telephone
   number."

A copy of the Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/rHTG4P at no charge.

Attorneys for Plaintiff Victoria Wilson:

          Geoffrey E. Parmer, Esq.
          William Peerce Howard, Esq.
          THE CONSUMER PROTECTION FIRM
          4030 Henderson Blvd.
          Tampa, FL 33629
          Telephone: (813) 500 1500
          E-mail: Billy@TheConsumerProtectionFirm.com
                  Geoff@TheConsumerProtectionFirm.com

               - and -

          Keith J. Keogh, Esq.
          KEOGH LAW LTD
          55 W. Monroe Ste. 3390
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 726 1092
          E-mail: Keith@keoghlaw.com


BAGEL WAY: Conrey Suit Seeks to Recover Wages under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------
Magdalena Conrey, and all others similarly situated v. Bagel Way
Kosher Way, Inc. dba Bagel Way, and Aurelia Ben Tov, Case No.
1:18-cv-22795 (S.D. Fla., July 12, 2018), seeks to recover all
wages owed under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was a resident of Broward County, Florida and worked
as a waitress for the Defendants.

The Defendant Bagel Way is a modern American diner and restaurant
that has been operating in Miami-Dade County, Florida, since at
least 2016.

The Defendant Ben Tov was a resident of the Southern District of
Florida, and was President and operator of the Defendant company
within Miami-Dade County, Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jordan Richards, Esq.
      JORDAN RICHARDS, PLLC
      401 East Las Olas Blvd., Ste. 1400
      Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
      Tel: (954) 871-0050
      E-mail: jordan@jordanrichardspllc.com

BAYLOR HEALTH: Court Denies Bid to Certify Solis Action
-------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned Dawn Solis, Individually and On Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. Baylor Scott &
White Health Care, North Texas Division, the Defendant, Case No.
3:17-cv-00637-S (N.D. Tex.), the Hon. Judge Karen Gren Scholer
denied Solis' motion to conditionally certify the collective action
and to authorize notice on behalf of:

   "all Baylor hourly-paid nurses subject to the same
   professional and corporate structures requiring the
   prioritization of patient care and services excellence over
   uninterrupted meal breaks, the same duty of patient care
   throughout their shifts, the same centrally-administered time-
   tracking and payroll system, and the same automatic pay
   deduction for meal breaks, whether taken or not."

A copy of the Order is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/sZvbMw at no charge.


BEHR DAYTON: Issue-Class Certification in Contamination Suit Upheld
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, affirmed the
District Court's judgment denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned TERRY MARTIN; LINDA RUSSEL, aka
Linda Russell; NANCY SMITH; DEBORAH NEEDHAM, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. BEHR DAYTON THERMAL PRODUCTS LLC; BEHR AMERICA, INC.; CHRYSLER
MOTORS LLC, nka Old Carco LLC; ARAMARK UNIFORM & CAREER APPAREL
INC., Defendants-Appellants, No. 17-3663 (6th Cir.).

This toxic tort class action case arises from the Defendants'
alleged contamination of the groundwater in the McCook Field
neighborhood of Dayton, Ohio.  The Plaintiffs own properties in
McCook Field, which is a low-income area surrounding a Superfund
site. They allege that the Defendants released volatile organic
compounds and other hazardous substances into the groundwater on
their properties and were deliberately indifferent to the resultant
harm.

The district court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), but
certified seven issues for class treatment under Rule 23(c)(4). The
Defendants filed a Rule 23(f) petition to appeal the district
court's issue-class certification order, and this court granted
review.

Rule 23(b)(3) and Rule 23(c)(4)

As the district court and the parties point out, other circuits
have disagreed about how Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirements interact with
Rule 23(c)(4). Rule 23(b)(3) permits class certification where the
court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.
Rule 23(c)(4) provides that, when appropriate, an action may be
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular
issues.

In sum, Rule 23(c)(4) contemplates using issue certification to
retain a case's class character where common questions predominate
within certain issues and where class treatment of those issues is
the superior method of resolution. A requirement that predominance
must first be satisfied for the entire cause of action would
undercut the purpose of Rule 23(c)(4) and nullify its intended
benefits. The broad approach is the proper reading of Rule 23, in
light of the goals of that rule.

Predominance

Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance inquiry asks whether the questions of
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members.

Here, the district court certified only issues capable of
resolution with generalized, class-wide proof. All seven of these
issues are questions that need only be answered once because the
answers apply in the same way to each property owner within the
plumes. Expert evidence will be central to resolving these seven
issues, especially Issues 1, 4, and 5. Such evidence will bear on
all of the property owners within each plume in the same way. In
addition, Issues 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 turn on each Defendant's
knowledge and conduct, which need only be established once for each
plume.

The district court's determination that individualized inquiries
predominate over the elements of actual injury and causation does
not mean that the same individualized inquiries taint the certified
issues. To the contrary, the certified issues do not overlap with
actual injury or causation. Issue 6, to be sure, includes the word
caused, but whether Defendants created the risk of vapor intrusion
is distinct from the ultimate question of whether they caused an
actual injury to property owners. That distinction insulates Issue
6 from overlapping with the liability elements that the district
court found incompatible with class treatment.

The Defendants are correct that resolution of the certified issues
will not resolve the question of the Defendants' liability either
to the class as a whole or to any individual therein. But resolving
the certified issues will go a long way toward doing so, and this
is the most efficient way of resolving the seven issues that the
district court has certified. The Defendants' suggestion about
discovery devices and stipulations rings hollow given that this
case is ten years old and the Defendants have yet to agree to such
mechanisms.

Although not explicitly engaging in a superiority analysis, the
district court correctly noted that issue certification will ensure
that property owners in the McCook Field neighborhood have an
opportunity to litigate their claims. By trying these common
questions to a single jury, this procedure also saves time and
scarce judicial resources. Indeed, the record indicates that the
properties are in a low-income neighborhood, meaning that class
members might not otherwise be able to pursue their claims. Even if
the class members brought suit individually, the seven certified
issues would need to be addressed in each of their cases. Resolving
the issues in one fell swoop would conserve the resources of both
the court and the parties. Class treatment of the seven certified
issues will not resolve Defendants' liability entirely, but it will
materially advance the litigation.

The issue classes therefore satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority
requirement.

Because the issue classes satisfy predominance and superiority, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by certifying them
under Rule 23(c)(4).

The Sixth Circuit therefore affirms the district court's
issue-class certification decision and return this case to the
district court with the expectation that it be moved expeditiously
toward resolution.

A full-text copy of the Sixth Circuit's July 16, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yazznotp from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Edward A. Cohen -- ecohen@thompsoncoburn.com -- THOMPSON
COBURN, LLP, St. Louis, Missouri, for Appellants.

Ned Miltenberg , NATIONAL LEGAL SCHOLARS LAW FIRM, P.C., 5410
Mohican Road, Suite 200. Bethesda, MD 20816, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Edward A. Cohen , THOMPSON COBURN, LLP, St. Louis,
Missouri, Patrick Morales-Doyle -- pmoralesdoyle@thompsoncoburn.com
-- THOMPSON COBURN LLP, Chicago, Illinois, Nicholas B. Gorga --
ngorga@honigman.com -- Khalilah V. Spencer -- kspencer@honigman.com
-- HONIGMAN MILLER SCHWARTZ AND COHN LLP, Detroit, Michigan,
Michael D. Lichtenstein -- mlichtenstein@lowenstein.com -- Nikki
Adame Winningham -- nadame@lowenstein.com -- LOWENSTEIN SANDLER
LLP, Roseland, New Jersey, for Appellants.

Ned Miltenberg -- NedMiltenberg@gmail.com -- NATIONAL LEGAL
SCHOLARS LAW FIRM, P.C., Bethesda, Maryland, Patrick A. Thronson ,
JANET, JENNER & SUGGS, LLC, Douglas D. Brannon , BRANNON &
ASSOCIATES.

BITCONNECT: Ponzi Scheme Class Actions Merged
---------------------------------------------
Bitcoin Exchange Guide reports that a lot of online publications
covered the addition of YouTube being added to the list of
defendants in the class-action lawsuit filed in Florida.

Included in this article however, is the July update on the
BitConnect cases that have been filed across the United States.

The main case to follow along with YouTube as of now, has been that
of Charles Wildes Lawsuit w/BitConnect, which has become the
primary case many are watching.

On the 19th of June, an order was filed and later approved for the
appointment of one of the BitConnect Investor's Group's Lead
Plaintiffs. It also involved some of their attorneys, primarily a
co-lead counsel in the group, and the start of an executive
committee to see the trial through until the end.

The newly developed executive committee has been created with
people from three separate law firms assisting the litigation on
behalf of the company, with the co-lead counsel at supervising the
entire process.

Three others of the BitConnect cases have sprung and included in
the case of Paige, so there is to no longer be any separate
coverage from here on out.

To stop any confusion, from here on out – the case will be label
the Wildes et al. Lawsuit to BitConnet Class-Action.

The most recent of the BitConnect class-action lawsuits is summons
that was held on the 9th of July, issued to YouTube.

The Google owned media monster was placed on the list of plaintiffs
by the way of a Third Amended Complaint filed on the 3rd July.

YouTube has still not made a filing of the case as of the time of
this writing.

In regard to other lawsuits filed with BitConnect;

   -- Kline et al v. Bitconnect and Long et al v. BitConnect were
merged into the BitConnect class-action as per separate June 19th
orders

   -- Mengesha v. BitConnect International PLC et al was merged
into the BitConnect class-action on June 21st
   -- no additional filings have been made in Paige v. BitConnect
International PLC et al

  -- One remark on the Mengesha v. BitConnect case, the
international case is still open even though the Kline and Long
lawsuits have been closed.

The case will likely be terminated as well at some point, but there
is no real need to follow it from now on. Lastly, the merger of the
case remaining means you'll still be able to follow the case here
on the latest info around the class action lawsuit involving
BitConnect. [GN]

BOFI HOLDING: B. Mandalevy's Securities Suit Dismissed
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BAR MANDALEVY; DAVID GRIGSBY; and JOSEPH SHEPARD,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. BofI HOLDING, INC.; GREGORY GARRABRANTS; ANDREW J.
MICHELETTI; ESHEL BAR-ADON; and PAUL J. GRINBERG, Defendants, Case
No. 3:17-cv-00667-GPC-KSC (S.D. Cal.), Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California
granted, with leave to amend, the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
operative Class Action Complaint ("CAC").

BofI is the holding company for BofI Federal Bank.  It is a
nationwide bank that provides consumer and business banking
products through "multiple brands."  Garrabrants is the CEO and
President of BofI.  Micheletti is BofI's Executive Vice President
and CFO.  Bar-Adon is BofI's Chief Legal Officer and Executive Vice
President, Specialty Finance.  Grinberg sits on BofI's Board of
Directors, has served as the Chairman of that board since Feb. 16,
2017, and served as Chairman of BofI's Audit Committee until
February 2017.  Grinberg also serves as Chairman of the
Compensation Committee and, as of February 2017, BofI's Nominating
Committee.

Seeking to represent a class of individuals who purchased BofI
stock between March 14, 2016, and Oct. 24, 2017, the Plaintiffs
assert two claims against the Defendants: (1) violation of Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act by way of violation of the
SEC's Rule 10b-5; and (2) violation of Section 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act.  The Plaintiffs contend that the
Defendants violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) by making, or causing
BofI to make, misrepresentations about (1) whether federal
regulators were investigating BofI in connection with money
laundering, related party transactions, and other improper
activity, and (2) whether BofI engaged in lending, directly or
indirectly, to criminals.

In October 2015, a former BofI auditor named Charles Matthew Erhart
filed a whistleblower protection suit against BofI.  In the
complaint, Erhart alleges that he observed BofI lending to
criminals and politically exposed persons in potential violation of
the Bank Secrecy Act's Anti-Money Laundering Rule.

On May 28, 2015, the SEC opened an informal inquiry, or a Matter
Under Inquiry ("MUI"), into BofI.  On Feb. 11, 2016, the SEC closed
the MUI and began a formal investigation.  The SEC issued a
subpoena to BofI on Feb. 22, 2016, which inquired into BofI's
related party transactions, potential conflicts of interest, and
loans made to Encore Capital Group, Inc. and Propel Financial
Services, LLC.  The SEC was also interested in seeking information
about a March 2012 loan made to Johnathan Ball, BofI's Chief
Internal Auditor, who was responsible for auditing all
related-party transactions.  BofI did not disclose the existence of
the SEC's February 22 subpoena.

On Oct. 19, 2016, the SEC issued a second subpoena seeking numerous
documents related to single-family residential loans extended to a
non-resident alien.  BofI never disclosed the existence of this
subpoena.

The CAC alleges that during the class period, the Defendants made
several materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational and compliance policies, including:
(i) that BofI stated that it must comply with federal anti-money
laundering, tax withholding and reporting, and consumer protection
statutes and regulations; (ii) that BofI, like other banks, is
regularly examined by its federal regulators, and that the absence
of public enforcement actions highlight how disconnected Erhart's
allegations are from the reality of BofI's highly compliant and
top-performing business; (iii) that BofI is in a strong regulatory
standing, with no enforcement actions, has not been fined a single
dollar by any regulatory agency and has not been required to modify
its products or business practices; (iv) that there were no
material investigations that would require public disclosure and
BofI remains in good regulatory standing; and (v) that BofI had
received confirmation from the SEC that no investigation is ongoing
and no enforcement actions is contemplated against BofI.

The CAC alleges that the Defendants' statements constituted
material misrepresentations because (1) they failed to disclose
that there were ongoing SEC, DOJ, and FDIC investigations into BofI
and Garrabrants; (2) they failed to disclose that there was "a
second whistleblower," presumably referring to Veronica Golub, a
former Assistant Vice President, from using BofI information to
assist in government investigations; (3) they failed to disclose
that a material portion of the Company's earnings were derived from
loans made directly or indirectly to criminals, and (4) the failure
to disclose the ongoing regulatory investigations amounted to a
breach of the code of ethics, which itself must have been
disclosed.

The Defendants move to dismiss the operative CAC.

Judge Curiel looks first to the statement in BofI's March 14, 2016
Form 8-K, which asserted that the Audit Committee engaged Dentons
to investigate Erhart's accusations against BofI, and that Dentons
concluded that those accusations lacked merit.  He finds that
nothing in the CAC suggests that this statement is misleading:
there are no allegations in the CAC suggesting that Dentons did not
investigate Erhart's claims, or that Dentons did not reach the
conclusion suggested in the statement.  The Plaintiffs also offer
no reason to believe that the contents of BofI's financial and
operating results gave the impression that it was not lending to
"criminals."

Most of the statements made in BofI's conference calls and press
releases are also not actionable.  Some, however, might meet the
applicable pleading standard for falsity.  Because the CAC fails to
plead adequate loss causation for those closer statements, for the
purposes of the ruling, the Judge assumes that those statements are
actionable.

He finds that nothing in the CAC suggests that BofI's April 18,
2016 press release that there was an "absence of public enforcement
actions" was misleading.  There may have been ongoing regulatory
investigations, and BofI officials may have known about those
investigations; but no allegations suggest that there was any
public enforcement action against BofI at the time of this
statement.  There are no allegations that BofI was the subject of
any enforcement action, had been fined, or had been required by
regulators to alter any of the bank's practices.

The Plaintiffs also fail to allege that Garrabrants's assertion
during the August 2 conference call that "one of the world's
largest law firms" conducted an investigation into Erhart's
allegations and found no wrongdoing was misleading.  They have not
offered -- either in the CAC or their memorandum -- any reason why
that was the case.  Garrabrants's statements during the Jan. 31,
2017 conference call repeated many of the assertions already
discussed and determined not to be actionable.

In light of the analysis, the remaining statements to consider are
(1) the April 18, 2016 statement that Erhart's allegations were
"disconnected from reality"; (2) the Oct. 27, 2016 statement that
BofI had not made any loans to Galanis; and (3) the March 31, 2017
statement that there were no investigations into BofI regarding
potential money laundering.  The Judge finds that the CAC fails to
state a claim as to these statements because there are insufficient
allegations of loss causation.

The Plaintiffs concede that their Section 20(a) claims are
derivative of their Section 10(b) claims.  Because the Judge has
concluded that the CAC fails to state a claim for violation of
Section 10(b), it also fails to state a claim for violation of
Section 20(a).

The Defendants ask the Court to enter sanctions against the
Plaintiffs because the suit is a "copy-cat" case based on the
earlier-filed securities fraud case against BofI that was recently
dismissed.  The Judge holds that sanctions are not appropriate in
the case.  The CAC alleges claims based on facts that differ from
those alleged in the earlier-filed securities fraud case.
Moreover, the CAC's claims are far from frivolous.  Amendment to
the CAC may cure the deficiencies discussed in the ruling.  He
therefore denied the Defendants' motion for sanctions.

For the reasons he explained, Judge Curiel concludes that the CAC
fails to state a claim for violation of Section 10(b) or Section
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.  He therefore granted that
Defendants' motion to dismiss.  It is possible that further
amendment, however, may cure the deficiencies discussed. As a
result, he dismissed the CAC without prejudice.  The Plaintiffs may
file an amended complaint within 21 days of the date the order is
filed.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 19, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/cngOdE from Leagle.com.

Bar Mandalevy, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jennifer Pafiti --
jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy A. Lieberman ,
Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice.

David Grigsby, Plaintiff, represented by Brenda Szydlo --
bszydlo@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Jennifer Pafiti,
Pomerantz LLP, Jeremy A. Lieberman -- jalieberman@pomlaw.com --
Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice & Adam C. McCall -- amccall@zlk.com --
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP.

Joseph Shepard, Plaintiff, represented by Brenda Szydlo , Pomerantz
LLP, pro hac vice, Jennifer Pafiti, Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy A.
Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice.

BofI Holding, Inc., Gregory Garrabrants, Andrew J. Micheletti,
Eshel Bar-Adon & Paul J. Grinberg, Defendants, represented by John
P. Stigi, III -- jstigi@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin
Richter & Hampton.

BOFI Investors Group, Larry Dooley, Linda Ostermann & Philip
Ricciardi, Movants, represented by Robert J. Gralewski, Jr. --
bgralewski@kmllp.com -- Kirby McInerney LLP.

Vickie Siebert & Chao Wang, Movants, represented by Jennifer
Pafiti, Pomerantz LLP.

BOSS WINGS: Davis Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
---------------------------------------------
Shavon Davis and Jaqueline Gilmore, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated v. Boss Wings Enterprises, LLC, et al.,
Case No. 1:18-cv-00134 (N.D. Miss., July 12, 2018), is brought
against the Defendants for violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

The Plaintiff Shavon Davis is a resident of the First Judicial
District of Chickasaw County, Mississippi, and worked as a cook at
the Defendants' Wingstop restaurant in Tupelo, Mississippi.

The Plaintiff Jaqueline Gilmore is a resident of Itawamba County,
Mississippi and worked as a shift leader and cook at the
Defendants' Wingstop restaurant in Tupelo, Mississippi.

The Defendant Boss Wings Enterprises, LLC is a Mississippi
Corporation, with its principal place of business in Southhaven,
Desoto County, Mississippi. The Defendants' business is to cook and
sell chicken wings and other food and beverage items at its
Southhaven, Mississippi, restaurant as well as other locations in
the State of Mississippi. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      W. Howard Gunn, Esq.
      310 South Hickory Street
      P.O. Box 157
      Aberdeen, MS 39730
      Tel: (662) 369-8533
      E-mail: whgunn@bellsouth.net

BYD COACH: Underpays Mechanics, Garner & Jarmon Allege
------------------------------------------------------
RANDALL GARNER, and DARREN JARMON, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BYD COACH AND BUS LLC,
and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants, Case No. BC712856 (Cal. Super.,
July 3, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid
regular hours, overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal
and rest periods.

The Plaintiff Garner was employed by the Defendants as mechanic
lead from November 2015 to April 19, 2018.

The Plaintiff Jarmon was employed by the Defendants as mobile
mechanic from July 2016 to April 18, 2018.

BYD Co Ltd is a Chinese manufacturer of automobiles,
battery-powered bicycles, buses, forklifts, rechargeable batteries,
trucks, etc., with its corporate headquarters in Shenzhen, China.
It has two major subsidiaries, BYD Automobile and BYD Electronic
and was founded in February 1995.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott M. Lidman, Esq.
          Elizabeth Nguyen, Esq.
          Milan Moore, Esq.
          LIDMAN LAW, APC
          222 N. Sepulveda Blvd., Suite 1550
          El Segundo, CA 90245
          Telephone: (424) 322-4772
          Facsimile: (424) 322-4775
          E-mail: slidman@lidmanlaw.com
                  enguyen@lidmanlaw.com
                  mmoore@lidmanlaw.com

               - and –

          Paul K. Haines, Esq.
          HAINES LAW GROUP, APC
          222 N. Sepulveday Blvd., Suite 1550
          El Segundo, CA 90245
          Telephone: (424) 292-2350
          Facsimile: (424) 292-2355
          E-mail: phaines@haineslawgroup.com


CAMDEN, GA: Agnone et al. Seek to Certify Settlement Class
----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled STEPHEN AGNONE & ENZO AGNONE; DOUGLAS &
CYNTHIA PORCELLI; BRIDGE POINTE AT JEKYLL SOUND COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., the Plaintiffs, v. CAMDEN COUNTY,
GEORGIA; WILLIS R. KEENE, JR., JIMMY STARLINE; CHUCK CLARK; TONY
SHEPPARD GARY BLOUNT; DAVID L. RAINER; KATHERINE NISI ZELL;
CHARLENE SEARS; STEPHEN L. BERRY; STEPHEN L. HOWARD; O. BRENT
GREEN; JOHN MCDILL; DAVID KEATING; and SCOTT BRAZELL, LEXON
INSURANCE COMPANY, THOMAS A. DIERUF, DAVID E. CAMPBELL, JEKYLL
SOUND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC, AND CAMDEN COUNTY DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
the Defendants, the Defendant, Case No. 2:14-cv-00024-LGW-BKE (S.D.
Ga.), the Plaintiff and the Proposed Class Counsel ask the Court
for an order:

   1. granting preliminary approval of a Settlement;

   2. certifying for settlement purposes a Settlement Class of:

      "all persons or entities who hold legal or equitable title
      as of the date of preliminary approval of the Class Action
      Settlement to any Unit or Parcel in the Bridge Pointe at
      Jekyll Sound Subdivision and any transferees of any Unit or
      Parcel following preliminary approval of the Class Action
      Settlement, except for BPJS Investments, LLC; Robert Steven
      Williams, Sr.; Robert Steven Williams, Jr.; and any related
      entities or persons, as these entities are obligated to
      release any and all claims against Lexon Insurance Company
      and any related entities or persons."

      Excluded from the class are: Lexon and its affiliates and
      its officers and directors, BPJS Investments, LLC, Robert
      Steven Williams Sr., Robert Steven Williams Jr., and any
      related entities or persons, and the Judge assigned to
      evaluate the fairness of this settlement.

   3. approving notice procedure in the Agreement and approving
      form and content of the notice;

   4. approving set deadlines for, and order the objection
      procedures set forth in this motion;

   5. appointing as class representatives the Representative
      Plaintiffs identified;

   6. appointing as Class Counsel John T. Sparks of Austin &
      Sparks, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia, and Robert G. Aitkens of
      Aitkens & Aitkens, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia;

   7. staying action and the Camden County Action against the
      Lexon Defendants pending Final Approval of the Settlement;

   8. enjoining Representative Plaintiffs and all persons or
      entities in the Settlement Class, and persons purporting to
      act on their behalf, from pursuing any action or proceedings

      against any of the Lexon Defendants or related persons or
      entities relating to the Subdivision or the Bonds; and

   9. scheduling a final fairness hearing.

A copy of the Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/SUFVlO at no charge.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          John T. Sparks, Sr., Esq.
          John B. Austin, Esq.
          AUSTIN & SPARKS, P.C.
          2974 Lookout Place, N.E., Suite 200
          Atlanta, GA 30305
          E-mail: jaustin@austinsparks.com
                  jsparks@austinsparks.com

Attorneys for Lexon Insurance Company:

          W. Joseph McCorkle, Jr., Esq.
          John W. Naramore, Esq.
          Hugh B. McNatt, Esq.
          841 Prudential Drive, Suite 1400
          Jacksonville, FL 32207
          Telephone: (904) 393 9000
          Facsimile: (904) 396 9001
          BALCH & BINGHAM LLP
          30 Ivan Allen Jr. Blvd., N.W., Suite 700
          Atlanta, GA 30308
          Telephone: (404) 261 6020
          Facsimile: (404) 261 3656
          E-mail: ggregory@balch.com
                  jmccorkle@balch.com
                  hmcnatt@balch.com

Attorneys for Camden County, Georgia:

          Garret W. Meader
          Lisa N. Higgins
          Drew, Eckl & Farnham, LLP
          777 Gloucester Street, Suite 350
          Brunswick, GA 31520
          Email: gmeader@deflaw.com
          wlay@deflaw.com


CATHERINE BAUMAN: Peoples Seeks Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned EDISON ALEXANDER PEOPLES, the Plaintiff,
v. CATHERINE BAUMAN, et al., the Defendants, Case No.
2:14-cv-00106-GJQ-TPG (W.D. Mich.), the Plaintiff asks the Court
for an order certifying the case as a class action.

A copy of the Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/D3zEuQ at no charge.

Plaintiff Edison Alexander Peoples, a state prisoner confined at
the Alger Correctional Facility (LMF), filed this civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 against Defendants Warden
Catherine Bauman, Deputy Warden Scott Sprader, Deputy Warden Dan
Lesatz, Resident Unit Manager T. Lindemuth, Assistant Resident Unit
Manager Victoria Hood, Captain Unknown Taskila, Captain Unknown
Smith, Captain Unknown Immel, Lieutenant Unknown Hursh, Lieutenant
Unknown O'Dell, Sergeant Unknown Lee, Sergeant Unknown Rankin,
Sergeant Unknown Rondeau, sft Unknown Kienitz, Sergeant Unknown
Johnson, Corrections Officer Unknown Curtis, Corrections Officer
Unknown Sadak, Corrections Officer Unknown Tennyson, Corrections
Officer Unknown Wickstrom, Corrections Officer Unknown McDonald,
Corrections Officer Unknown Branus, Unknown Parties #1-#11, and
R.N. Charles D. Scott.  Plaintiff alleges that on May 30, 2011, he
was placed in segregation in physical restraints for threatening
behavior.  Plaintiff claims that Defendants' conduct violated his
rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as under
state law.  Among other things, his bedding and mattress were
removed, and, at one point, he was left in restraints for 31-1/2
hours without bedding or drinkable water, and even soiled himself.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as
declaratory and injunctive relief.

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


CENTRAL MAINE: 200+ Customers Join Overbilling Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Dennis Hoey, writing for Press Herald, reports that more than 200
Central Maine Power Co. customers who believe they have been
overcharged on their electricity bills have joined a class-action
lawsuit against the company.

Lipman & Katz, an Augusta-based law firm, issued a statement on
July 17 announcing that it plans to file the lawsuit on July 12 in
Cumberland County Superior Court. Napoli Shkolnik, a New York City
law firm, and Trafton, Matzen, Belleau and Frenette of Auburn will
join Lipman & Katz in the class-action case.

CMP Ratepayers United, which has demanded that the state conduct a
more thorough investigation into customers' complaints of inflated
CMP bills, also has been invited to join the lawsuit, said Sumner
Lipman -- slipman@lipmankatz.com -- the founding partner of Lipman
and Katz.

CMP Ratepayers United has more than 4,800 members.

About 97,000 Central Maine Power customers' monthly bills increased
50 percent or more in December, January or February over the same
month a year earlier, according to information the company provided
to the Public Utilities Commission in April. The law firms contend
that another 200,000 customers have been overcharged by up to 50
percent.

"In order to bring relief for these customers and compensation for
their overpayment, the law firms have joined resources to bring a
class action on behalf of customers of Central Maine Power Company,
who have been overcharged," said Lipman & Katz in a news release.

Gail Rice, a spokeswoman for CMP in Maine, was aware of the lawsuit
on July 17 but said the company had not seen the complaint and
could not comment on the matter.

"CMP values its customers and is committed to fair and accurate
metering and billing," Rice said.

Mr. Lipman said in an interview on July 17 night that several
aggrieved ratepayers would be present when the lawsuit is filed in
court on July 19 at 1 p.m. Mark Levesque of Scarborough will serve
as the lead representative. He was out of state and could not be
reached on July 17.

"I've had more than 200 people come to me seeking help," Mr. Lipman
said on July 17. Mr. Lipman said that a class-action lawsuit makes
it affordable for CMP customers who might otherwise not be able to
pay the cost of hiring lawyers to represent their interests.

"If you are a customer of CMP who has been overcharged, you deserve
relief. Many persons have been burdened with bills in excess of
$500 per month while others, some on fixed incomes, have suffered
hardships trying to pay these bad bills," the release says. "There
are people that did not receive bills for months only then to
receive a disconnect notice."

Mr. Lipman said many CMP customers have told his staff that when
they contact CMP about a disputed bill they must speak to someone
from Texas.

CMP has nearly 550,000 customers in Maine.

Earlier in July, the Maine PUC authorized Liberty Consulting Group
of Pennsylvania to expand its audit of CMP's customer service and
communications as well as its billing and metering systems.

Auditors will examine whether CMP adequately responded to customer
calls within a reasonable time frame as well as its reaction to
complaints about high bills. The PUC is also conducting its own
investigation of CMP's metering, billing and customer service
performance.

CMP is a subsidiary of Avangrid, a multinational utility company
headquartered in Spain. [GN]

CHARTER COMM: Jimenez Class Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
-----------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Carla Jimenez, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Charter Communications,
Inc. and Spectrum Management Holding Company, LLC and Does 1-10,
Defendants, Case No. BC709676, (Cal. Super., June 19, 2018), was
removed to the US District Court for the Central District of
California on July 27, 2018, under Case No. 18-cv-06480.

Jimenez alleges that the broadband company promises residential
internet service at speeds it cannot reliably deliver. She paid for
the company's internet package for her and her family on the
premise that the "blazing fast" internet speeds were just the thing
needed for work and play. However, Charter fails to say that only
customers plugging their devices directly into the modem can expect
to get that service.

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

The Defendants are represented by:

      Daniel Scott Schecter, Esq.
      LATHAM AND WATKINS LLP
      10250 Constellation Boulevard, Suite 1100
      Los Angeles, CA 90067
      Tel: (424) 653-5500
      Fax: (424) 653-5501
      Email: daniel.schecter@lw.com


CHEVRON CORP: Groundwater Contamination Class Action Can Proceed
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alison Frankel, writing for Reuters, reports that the 6th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on July 16 (2018 WL 3421711) that
hundreds of Ohio homeowners with groundwater contamination claims
against Chevron, Aramark, Behr America and Behr Dayton can litigate
as a class to determine seven key issues in the case, including
each defendant's responsibility for the alleged contamination.

That may sound straightforward. Appellate courts have long allowed
so-called liability class actions, in which a single proceeding
tests class members' theory of defense's wrongdoing, with
subsequent individual damages hearings if plaintiffs win. You may
recall, for instance, the notorious "moldy washer" cases from a few
years back, in which both the 6th and 7th Circuits certified
liability classes despite defense arguments that consumer claims
were too varied to meet class action requirements. (Whirlpool, in
an ironic twist, went on to win the liability trial in Ohio!)

But the 6th Circuit's ruling on July 16 is not just another
affirmation of a liability class. In fact, as the appellate panel
-- Judges Ronald Gilman, John Rogers and Jane Stranch -- pointed
out, the trial judge in the Behr case specifically rejected
certification of a liability class. The trial judge found the
proposed class could not meet the class action predominance
requirement spelled out in Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Under that rule, as you surely know, class actions
can only be certified when "questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members."

Instead, the 6th Circuit upheld limited class certification in the
Behr case under a different Rule 23 provision, 23(c)(4). (I
apologize for the gobbledygook but it is, alas, unavoidable.) The
"limited issues" clause says that "when appropriate, an action may
be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to
particular issues."

The 6th Circuit said it was joining the 2nd, 4th, 7th and 9th
Circuits to hold courts can certify classwide resolution of certain
common issues even in cases in which the entire class action can't
be certified because it does not meet the predominance requirement.
The key question, the Behr court said, is whether the predominance
requirement completely trumps the limited issue provision – or
whether that provision allows courts to consider predominance on an
issue-by-issue basis. The 6th Circuit said it was adopting the
"broad view" articulated by its sister circuits.

"The broad view retains the predominance factor, but instructs
courts to engage in the predominance inquiry after identifying
issues suitable for class treatment," wrote Judge Stranch in the
July 16 opinion. "Accordingly, the broad view does not risk
undermining the predominance requirement."

The 6th Circuit decision undoubtedly empowers class action
plaintiffs, said Ned Miltenberg of the National Legal Scholars Law
Firm, who argued for the homeowners at the 6th Circuit. It bolsters
the prevailing appellate wisdom that under 23(c)(4), class
plaintiffs can obtain classwide resolution of common issues --
including all-important liability questions -- when they'd
otherwise be tripped up by the predominance requirement in
23(b)(3).

"Predominance remains a factor, but not decisive," said
Mr. Miltenberg.

The 6th Circuit arguably weakened the predominance inquiry more in
the Behr case than other appellate courts have in previous
decisions allowing certification of limited issues. In the Behr
defendants' opening appellate brief, Thompson Coburn argued that
even circuits that have taken a broad approach to limited issue
certification have not allowed certification under 23(c)(4) after
rejecting a liability class under 23(b)(3). Yet that's what
happened in this case. Defendants called the outcome an
"evisceration" of the predominance requirement.

"Allowing a court to refine the certifiable issues more narrowly
and more narrowly until predominance can be manufactured upends the
balance between efficiency and fairness which stands at the heart
of the predominance requirement and the class-action procedure as a
whole," defendants said.

Will the 6th Circuit ruling hold up? As defendants pointed out in
their brief and the 6th Circuit noted in its opinion, not every
appellate court agrees with the "broad view" of considering
predominance on an issue-by-issue basis when classes seek
certification under 23(c)(4). In a footnote in 1996's Castano v.
American Tobacco (84 F.3d 734), the 5th Circuit said the limited
issue clause doesn't allow class plaintiffs to sidestep the
predominance requirement. "A district court cannot manufacture
predominance through the nimble use of subdivision (c)(4)," the
Castano court said. "The proper interpretation of the interaction
between subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(4) is that a cause of action,
as a whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement of (b)(3) and
that (c)(4) is a housekeeping rule that allows courts to sever the
common issues for a class trial."

The 11th Circuit has offered "tenuous" support for the 5th
Circuit's interpretation of the interaction between the two Rule 23
provisions, the 6th Circuit said. But it said Castano seems more
and more like an outlier. Its "issue-class footnote has not been
adopted by any other circuit," the 6th Circuit said, "and
subsequent caselaw from within the 5th Circuit itself indicates
that any potency the narrow view once held there has dwindled."

The plaintiffs in the Behr case argued in their brief to the 6th
Circuit that Laura Hines, the leading scholar on issues of class
certification -- a former defense attorney who was on the winning
side in the Castano case and remains a proponent of the 5th
Circuit's reasoning -- nevertheless concluded in a 2014 paper that
the Castano court stands alone. In 2015, the brief said, the
Federal Advisory Committee on Civil Rules said there was no need to
address tension between Rule 23's predominance requirement and
provision permitting issues certification because "the various
circuits seem to be in accord about the propriety of such
treatment."

Circuit by circuit, plaintiffs are winning the right to seek
classwide resolution of critical questions through the limited
issue provision. If four justices of the Supreme Court are worried
about that, even a sliver of division among the appellate courts
would justify taking up the issue. That's got to be a bit worrisome
for plaintiffs, especially with President Trump's new Supreme Court
nominee, D.C. Circuit Judge Brett Kavanaugh, waiting for
confirmation hearings.

Ms. Frankel emailed Ed Cohen -- ecohen@thompsoncoburn.com -- of
Thompson Coburn, who argued at the 6th Circuit for Behr defendants,
for comment but didn't hear back. [GN]

CHICAGO BRIDGE: Seeks 2nd Cir. Review of Ruling in Giantonio Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Chicago Bridge & Iron Company, et al., filed an appeal
from the District Court's opinion and order dated May 24, 2018, in
the lawsuit titled Giantonio v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Company, et
al., Case No. 17-cv-4251, in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York (New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, John J.
Giantonio, on behalf of the Chicago Bridge & Iron Savings Plan, The
Shaw Group Inc. 401(k) Plan, himself and a class consisting of
similarly situated participants of the Plans, brought the lawsuit
against the Defendants pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974.

According to the complaint, effective January 1, 2016, the Plan was
amended and restated to merge the Plan with The Shaw Group Inc.
401(k) Plan (the "Shaw Plan" and together with the Shaw Plan the
"Plans").  The action is also brought derivatively on behalf of the
Shaw Plan and its assets.  The Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendants, who are fiduciaries of the Plans, failed to protect the
interests of the Plans' Participants in violation of the
Defendants' legal obligations under the ERISA.

The Defendants-Appellants are Lance Bowling, Chicago Bridge & Iron
Company, Joe Christaldi, Stephen H. Dimlich, Jr., Sheila Feldman,
Dennis Fox, Investment Committee, Brian Mims, Misty Palmer, Plan
Administrator, Luciano Reyes, Westley S. Stockton, Travis Stricker
and Scott Waguespack.

The appellate case is captioned as Giantonio v. Chicago Bridge &
Iron Company, et al., Case No. 18-2034, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Ramesh C. Kinra is represented by:

          Michael J. Klein, Esq.
          STULL, STULL & BRODY
          6 East 45th Street
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 687-7230
          E-mail: ONVI@ssbny.com

Defendants-Appellants Chicago Bridge & Iron Company, Investment
Committee, Plan Administrator, Stephen H. Dimlich, Jr., Westley S.
Stockton, Sheila Feldman, Luciano Reyes, Travis Stricker, Brian
Mims, Dennis Fox, Scott Waguespack, Misty Palmer, Lance Bowling and
Joe Christaldi are represented by:

          Darren E. Nadel, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          1900 16th Street
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 629-6200
          E-mail: dnadel@littler.com


CHICKPEA AT 14TH STREET: Pacheco Seeks to Certify Class
-------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JORGE PACHECO, on behalf of himself, FLSA
Collective Plaintiffs, and Class Members, the Plaintiff, v.
CHICKPEA AT 14TH STREET INC., et al., the Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-00251-JMF-GWG (S.D.N.Y.), the Plaintiff moves the Court to
grant conditional certification of the FLSA claim as a
representative collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. sec. 216(b)
on behalf of all non-exempt employees (including, but not limited
to servers, delivery persons, food preparers, cooks, line-cooks,
dishwashers, cleaning persons, counter persons, stock persons,
cashiers, and grill persons) employed by Defendants at:

     (a) 1413 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10029 ("Chickpea
Mount Sinai");

     (b) 42-09 28th Street, Long Island City, New York, 11101
("Chickpea Gotham Center");

     (c) 210 East 14th Street, New York, New York 10003 ("Chickpea
Union Square");

     (d) AMTRAK Concourse Level, Penn Station 34th Street, New
York, New York 10001 ("Chickpea Penn Station AMTRAK");

     (e) LIRR Concourse Level, Penn Station 34th Street, New York,
New York 10001 ("Chickpea Penn Station LIRR");

     (f) Lower Level at Penn Station, 34th Street, New York, New
York 10001 ("Chickpea Penn Station Lower Level");

     (g) 110 William Street, New York, New York 10038 ("Chickpea
Lower Manhattan"); and

     (h) 45 East 45th Street, New York, New York 10017 ("Chickpea
Midtown Manhattan").

A copy of the Motion and Proposed Order is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://is.gd/ezKfVV and https://is.gd/NC9Mym
at no charge.

Attorneys for Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the
Class:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          Taimur Alamgir, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          30 East 39th Street, Second Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 465 1124
          Facsimile: (212) 465 1181


CITIBANK NA: Wilson Sues Over Autodialed Collection Calls
---------------------------------------------------------
Terrance Wilson, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Citibank, N.A.; and Does 1 through 10,
inclusive, and each of them, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-01105 (C.D.
Cal., May 24, 2018), seeks damages and any other available legal or
equitable remedies resulting from Defendant's contacting Plaintiff
on his cellular telephone in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

Citibank, N.A. is a banking service who contacted Wilson in an
attempt to collect an alleged debt using an "automatic telephone
dialing system" thereby incurring a charge for incoming calls.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
     Meghan E. George, Esq.
     Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
     Thomas E. Wheeler, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
     21550 Oxnard St. Suite 780,
     Woodland Hills, CA 91367
     Phone: (877) 206-4741
     Fax: (866) 633-0228
     Email: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
            mgeorge@toddflaw.com
            abacon@toddflaw.com
            twheeler@toddflaw.com


COMMUNITY PROBATION: McNeil et al. Seek to Certify 2 Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned KAREN MCNEIL, LESLEY JOHNSON, TANYA
MITCHELL, INDYA HILFORT, and SONYA BEARD, On behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. COMMUNITY
PROBATION SERVICES, LLC; COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES, L.L.C.;
COMMUNITY PROBATION SERVICES; PROGRESSIVE SENTENCING, INC.;
PSI-PROBATION II, LLC; PSI-PROBATION, L.L.C.; TENNESSEE
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, LLC; TIMOTHY COOK; GILES COUNTY, TENNESSEE;
PATRICIA MCNAIR; MARKEYTA BLEDSOE; HARRIET THOMPSON; KYLE HELTON,
the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00033 (M.D. Tenn.), the Plaintiffs
ask the Court for an order certifying these classes:

   Class for Equitable Relief:

   "all persons who, at any time since April 23, 2014, (1) have
   incurred, or will incur, court-imposed financial obligations
   rising from a traffic or misdemeanor case in Giles County
   eneral Sessions or Circuit Court; and (2) are currently being
   supervised, or will be supervised, on probation in that case
   by Community Probation Services, LLC, Community Probation
   Services, L.L.C., Community Probation Services, Progressive
   Sentencing, Inc., PSIProbation II, LLC, PSI-Probation, L.L.C.,
   or Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC".

   Damages Class:

   "all persons who, at any time since April 23, 2014, (1) have
   incurred court-imposed financial obligations arising from a
   traffic or misdemeanor case in Giles County General Sessions
   or Circuit Court; and (2) have been assigned to be supervised
   on probation in that case by Community Probation Services,
   LLC, Community Probation Services, L.L.C., Community Probation
   Services, Progressive Sentencing, Inc., PSI-Probation II, LLC,
   PSIProbation, L.L.C., or Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC"

A copy of the Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/zAtysg at no charge.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Elizabeth Rossi, Esq.
          Jonas Wang, Esq.
          Eric Halperin, Esq.
          CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS
          910 17th Street NW, Suite 200
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 599 0953
          Facsimile: (202) 609 8030
          E-mail: elizabeth@civilrightscorps.org
                  jonas@civilrightscorps.org
                  eric@civilrightscorps.org

               - and -

          Kyle Mothershead, Esq.
          MOTHERSHEAD LAW
          414 Union Street, Suite 900
          Nashville, TN 37219
          Telephone: (615) 982 8002
          Facsimile: (615) 229 6387
          E-mail: kyle@mothersheadlaw.com

               - and -

          Matthew J. Piers, Esq.
          Chirag G. Badlani, Esq.
          Kate E. Schwartz, Esq.
          HUGHES SOCOL PIERS RESNICK & DYM, LTD.
          70 W. Madison St., Suite 4000
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 580 0100
          Facsimile: (312) 580 1994
          E-mail: mpiers@hsplegal.com
                  cbadlani@hsplegal.com
                  kschwartz@hsplegal.com

               - and -

          David W. Garrison, BPR 24968
          Scott P. Tift, BPR 27592
          BARRETT JOHNSTON MARTIN & GARRISON, LLC
          Bank of America Plaza
          414 Union Street, Suite 900
          Nashville, TN 37219
          Telephone: (615) 244 2202
          Facsimile: (615) 252 3798
          E-mail: dgarrison@barrettjohnston.com
                  stift@barrettjohnston.com


CONSUMERS WAREHOUSE: Underpays Designers, Vecchione et al. Claim
----------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID VECCHIONE, and ROBIN GUADALUPI, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. CONSUMERS WAREHOUSE
CENTER, INC. d/b/a CONSUMERS KITCHEN & BATH; and JAMES S. BALOGA,
JR.; JAMES S. BALOGA, SR, Defendants, Case No. 606019/2017 (N.Y.
Sup., June 23, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for
failure to pay overtime wages, and minimum wages.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as designers. Mr.
Vecchione was employed from July 2014, and Mr. Guadalupi from
August 2014 to April 2015.

Consumers Warehouse Center Inc. provides household products. The
Company offers retail sale of electric and gas refrigerators,
stoves, and other household appliances. Consumers Warehouse Center
serves customers in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Troy L. Kessler, Esq.
          Garrett Kaske, Esq.
          SHULMAN KESSLER LLP
          534 Broadhollow Road, Suite 275
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: (631) 499-9100


CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: William Woodward Sues over Debt Collection
------------------------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM WOODWARD, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-01015-WED (July 3, 2018) seeks to stop
the Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. offers business process outsourcing,
revenue cycle, and receivables management services. Convergent
Outsourcing, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Convergent Resources
Holdings, LLC. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


COOPER AEROBICS: S. Cardona Class Cond. Certification Bid Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SOCORRO CARDONA, Plaintiff, v. COOPER AEROBICS
ENTERPRISES INC.; METROPLEX BANQUET STAFFING, LLC; STAFF PRO, LLC;
DAVID BRYAN CARPENTER, SR.; JUAN MENA; and MIRIAM GALLARDO, et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 3:16-CV-0954-S-BH (N.D. Tex.),
Magistrate Judge Irma Carrillo Ramirez of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, denied the
Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification Pursuant to 29
U.S.C. Section 216(b) and Request for Specific Briefing Schedule,
filed Nov. 16, 2017.

Cardona brings the collective action under the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA") to recover unpaid overtime compensation against
several Defendants by whom she was allegedly employed and their
owners/managers, including Cooper Aerobics Enterprises, Inc.,
Carpenter, Allstar Hospitality Services of Texas, LLC, Staff Pro,
LLC, formerly known as SP Workforce Solutions, LLC, Richard Booth,
Reginald G. Walker, Jose Rodriguez, Juan Pablo Silva, Nilda
Ramirez, Troy Sloppy, and David Little.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants violated 29 U.S.C.
Section 207(a)(1) by failing to pay her, and others like her, the
overtime and minimum wages required under the FLSA for work
performed in excess of 40 hours per week.  She alleges that Cooper
used Allstar and Staff Pro as "intermediate staffing services" to
employ the hourly housekeeping workers at its hotel from April 6,
2013, to April 1, 2016, where each entity was her joint employer
while she was working at the hotel operated by Cooper.

From Dec. 15, 2006, to "about" April 1, 2016, the Plaintiff claims
to have worked an average of 52.5 hours per week, Monday through
Friday, where she was paid an average of $13 per hour for the first
40 hours worked Monday through Friday, but she was not compensated
for any hours worked above 40 hours in a week as required by the
FLSA.  She seeks the "time-and-a-half overtime rate" for an average
of 12.5 hours of unpaid overtime worked above 40 hours in a work
week, as well as "double damages" and attorney's fees as provided
by the FLSA.

The Plaintiff now moves under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) of the FLSA
for conditional certification of a collective action class
comprised of employees including housekeeping employees who worked
at Cooper Hotel & Conference Center from April 7, 2013, to the
present and ongoing.

She provides Cooper's interrogatory answer that identifies Ramirez
as one of the managers of housekeeping operations at its hotel.
She also claims that discovery responses and documents produced by
the Defendants, including time sheets for her work at Cooper's
hotel, support a finding that the practice of not paying wages in
accordance with the FLSA to the housekeeping staff at the hotel
operated by Cooper was a company-wide practice.  The Plaintiff has
not submitted any of these discovery responses or documents,
however, because certain Defendants have "indicated" that they may
propose the entry of a protective order in the case.

She moves for a "specific briefing schedule" requiring the
Defendants to move for entry of a protective order pursuant to
which the documents may be filed with the Court under seal, or
submit a notice to the Court affirmatively stating that the
documents produced so far should not be subject to a protective
order.  No motion for protective order has been filed by any of the
parties in the suit, and Cooper attached a redacted version of the
discovery documents at issue, including Plaintiff's time sheets, to
its respons.

Magistrate Judge Ramirez finds that the Plaintiff has not met her
burden for conditional certification.  Other than the conclusory
and unverified allegations made in her complaint, the only evidence
that the Plaintiff attaches to her motion as support that a class
should be conditionally certified is the interrogatory response
from Cooper.

This interrogatory response, however, does not address the hours,
payment provisions, overtime wages, or anything about the
approximate number of employees, including housekeeping employees,
who worked at Cooper Hotel & Conference Center from April 7, 2013,
to the present and ongoing that the Plaintiff wishes to
conditionally certify as a class.  There is also no explanation or
differentiation between the "housekeeping employees" and other
"employees" that she includes in the proposed class.  None of the
evidence or pleadings identifies any other employee, and no other
employee submitted a declaration or joined this suit.  The evidence
currently before the Court may offer support of the Plaintiff's
individual claim for failure to pay overtime compensation, but it
does not suffice to meet her burden to show a reasonable basis for
the existence of other aggrieved individuals who are similarly
situated to her and the victims of a single decision, policy, or
plan.  

Without more evidence or information, any determination about
whether other "employees, including housekeeping employees," were
subject to the same overtime compensation policy would be based on
speculation.  Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge denied the
Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification.

As noted, the Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that
she could not have filed certain evidence with her motion simply
based on a statement by the Defendants that they would likely seek
a protective order to assist in discovery and document production,
and she could have moved for leave to file the evidence under seal.
There is no basis for setting a deadline by which Defendants must
either move for a protective order or file a statement indicating
that they will not be filing a motion for protective order.
Magistrate Juedge also denied the Plaintiff's Request for Specific
Briefing Schedule.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 15, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/kTDS2W from Leagle.com.

Socorro Cardona, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Lee Manteuffel --
rlmanteuffel@sbcglobal.net -- J H Zidell PC, Jamie Harrison Zidell
-- zabogado@aol.com -- J.H. Zidell PC & Joshua Aaron Petersen --
josh.a.petersen@gmail.com -- J.H. Zidell PC.

Cooper Aerobics Enterprises Inc, Defendant, represented by Monte K.
Hurst --  monte.hurst@hallettperrin.com -- Hallett & Perrin, P.C.,
Elizabeth Ann Fitch --  efitch@hallettperrin.com -- Hallett &
Perrin, P.C. & Kristen Ann Laster, Hallett & Perrin P.C.

Staff Pro LLC, also known as SP Workforce Solutions LLC, Defendant,
represented by Eric R. Miller -- em@kullmanlaw.com -- The Kullman
Firm, Jessica L. Marrero -- jlm@kullmanlaw.com -- The Kullman Firm,
pro hac vice & Stephen Mark Klyza -- smk@kullmanlaw.com -- The
Kullman Firm.

David Bryan Carpenter, Sr, Defendant, represented by Steven E.
Clark , Clark Firm PLLC.

Reginald G Walker, Jose Rodriguez & Juan Pablo Silva, Defendants,
represented by Eric R. Miller, The Kullman Firm.

Nilda Ramirez, Defendant, represented by Robert E. Luxen --
rluxen@hallettperrin.com -- Hallett & Perrin.

Troy Sloppy, Defendant, represented by Monte K. Hurst, Hallett &
Perrin, P.C. & Kristen Ann Laster, Hallett & Perrin P.C..

COTY INC: Bowden and Bowens Seek to Certify Class
-------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned DIANE BOWDEN, and CARRIE BOWENS
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, v. COTY, INC., a Delaware Corporation, et al., the
Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-00622-WS-B (S.D. Ala.), the Plaintiff
asks the Court for an order granting their motion for class
certification and motion to appoint class counsel as unopposed.

A copy of the Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/4OGWAI at no charge.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          W. Lewis Garrison, Jr., Esq.
          Brandy Lee Robertson, Esq.
          Honza J. Prchal, Esq.
          William L. Bross, Esq.
          HENINGER GARRISON DAVIS, LLC
          2224 First Avenue North
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 326 3336
          Facsimile: (205) 380 8072
          E-mail: wlgarrison@hgdlawfirm.com
                  william@ghdlawfirm.com
                  brandy@hgdlawfirm.com
                  honza@hgdlawfirm.com

               - and -

          K. Stephen Jackson, Esq.
          William L. Bross Joseph L. "Josh" Tucker
          JACKSON & TUCKER, P.C.
          2229 First Avenue North
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: 205 252 3535
          Facsimile: 205 252 3536
          E-mail: steve@jacksonandtucker.com
                  josh@jacksonandtucker.com

Attorneys for Defendant:

          Joseph L. Tucker, Esq.
          JACKSON & TUCKER, P.C.
          2229 First Avenue North
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: 205 252 3535
          Facsimile: 205 252 3536
          E-mail: josh@jacksonandtucker.com


DANELL CUSTOM: Billing Records Must be Filed in Public Record
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order requiring Plaintiffs to File Billing
Records in Public Record or File Request to Seal in the case
captioned FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DANELL CUSTOM
HARVESTING, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-01848-SAB
(E.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs filed a motion for final approval of class action
settlement.

The Plaintiffs have included supplemental declarations of Enrique
Martinez and Jocelyn Sperling to support their request for attorney
fees. The exhibits attached to these supplemental declarations are
billing records submitted for in camera review.

However, in camera review is not the proper mechanism for the Court
to review a document in support of a motion for final approval of a
class action settlement when a party believes the document should
remain out of the public record.

Courts have long recognized a general right to inspect and copy
public records and documents, including judicial records and
documents. The Court starts from the strong presumption in favor of
access to public records and then considers whether the party
seeking to have the record sealed has demonstrated a compelling
reason to have the record sealed. This requires the Court to
conscientiously balance the competing interests of the public in
accessing the records and the party who seeks to keep the records
secret.

Accordingly, the Court directs the Plaintiffs to either:

   a. Submit a request to seal the billing records that is in
compliance with Local Rule 141; or

   b. File the billing records in the public record.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 11, 2018 Order is
available  https://tinyurl.com/yauychkp from Leagle.com.

Francisco Rodriguez, Jesus Hernandez Infante, Marco Garcia, Juan
Manuel Bravo, Estela Patino, Jose F. Orozco & Antonio Ortiz,
Plaintiffs, represented by Enrique Martinez , Law Offices of John
E. Hill.

Danell Custom Harvesting, LLC, a California Company, Rance Danell,
Eric Danell, David Danell & Justin Danell, Defendants, represented
by Howard A. Sagaser -- has@sw2law.com -- Sagaser, Watkins &
Wieland, PC, Ian Blade Wieland -- ian@sw2law.com -- Sagaser,
Watkins & Wieland, PC & William M. Woolman -- bill@sw2law.com --
Sagaser, Watkins & Wieland PC.

DELTAURA USA: Fails to Pay Minimum Wages, Munoz Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
JASON R. MUNOZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. DELTAURA USA, INC., and DAVID PARAMSOTHY,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-04599 (N.D. Ill., July 3, 2018) seeks
to recover minimum wages, overtime compensation, liquidated
damages, attorneys' fees and costs.

Mr. Munoz was employed by the Defendants performing customer
service/dispatch services.

Deltaura USA, Inc. provides transportation services to industry.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John William Billhorn, Esq.
          BILLHORN LAW FIRM
          53 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 840
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 853-1450


DEUTSCHE BANK: Lima et al. Seek to Certify Class & SubClasses
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled LIONEL LIMA, JR., and BARBARA-ANN
DELIZO-LIMA; and CALVIN JON KIRBY II individually and on behalf of
those similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL
TRUST COMPANY; THE LAW OFFICE OF DAVID B. ROSEN, A LAW CORPORATION;
DAVID B. ROSEN, and Doe DEFENDANTS 1-50, the Defendants, Case No.
1:12-cv-00509-SOM-RLP (D. Haw.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for
an order:

   1. granting class certification of:

      "all consumers within the meaning of H.R.S. Chapter 480 who
      owned real property in Hawaii (and all person holding the
      claims of such consumers by assignment or operation of law)
      and who were subjected to a notice of BANK claiming the
      rights of a mortgage with a power of sale wherein the
      notice of sale was published on or about after June 4,
      2008, and with respect to said notice of sale DEUTSCHE
      BANK:

      (a) advertised the sale as being the sale of a quitclaim
          deed or equivalent; and

      (b) sold the property at a non-judicial auction sale; and

   2. certifying these subclasses:

      Subclass A:

      "all members of the Class whose non-judicial auction sale
      was not held on both the date and location specified in the
      original published notice (i.e., either or both the date
      and/or location were changed), without one or more of the
      following conditions being satisfied (a) publication of the
      notice of the changed date or location in three successive
      weeks; (b) publication of a notice stating the new date and
      time for the sale at least 29 days after the first
      publication of such notice";

      Subclass B:

      "all members of the class whose notice of Sale was
      published or posted for less time before the proposed
      auction date than required for such publishing or posting
      by HRS Chapter 667, Part 1";

      Subclass C:

      "all members of the class whose notice of Sale contained no
      "description" of the property within the meaning of HRS
      Section 667-7(a)(1) or only a "metes and bounds"
      description of the land"; and

      Subclass D:

      "all members of the Class who received a notice of
      acceleration that did not inform them of their
      unconditional right to bring a separate court action to
      stop the sale".

A copy of the Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/d6RRgQ at no charge.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          John F. Perkin, Esq.
          700 Bishop Street Suite 1111
          Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
          Telephone: (808) 523 2300

               - and -

          James J. Bickerton, Esq.
          Bridget G. Morgan, Esq.
          BICKERTON DANG, LLP
          745 Fort Street, Suite 801
          Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
          Telephone: (808) 599 3811

               - and -

          Van-Alan H. Shima, Esq.
          AFFINITY LAW GROUP
          1188 Bishop Street, Suite 3408
          Honolulu, Hawaii 96813
          Telephone: (808) 545 4600


DIRECTV GROUP: Getz Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
-----------------------------------------------
Daniel Getz, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. The Directv Group, Inc., and Viasat, Inc. dba Exede
Internet, Case No. 1:18-cv-22802 (S.D. Fla., July 12, 2018), is
brought against the Defendants for violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff is a natural person who, at all times relevant to
this action, was a resident of Miami Dade County, Florida.

The Defendant DIRECTV provides television services to commercial
and residential consumers. The Defendant's principal office is
located at 2230 East Imperial Highway El Segundo, CA 90245.

The Defendant Exede provides internet and telephone services to
commercial and residential consumers. The Defendant's principal
office is 6155 El Camino Real Carlsbad, CA 92009. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
      SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
      14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 400
      Miami, FL 33132
      Tel: (305) 479-2299
      E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

DONA MARIA: Ledo et al. Seek Class Action Settlement Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned CESAR LEDO, an individual, MIGUEL LEDO,
and individual, RICARDO CHOY MOREY, and individual, THE PLAINTIFFS
AND PUTATIVE PLAINTIFFS, v. GUILLERMO PRADO, INDIVIDUALLY AND DBA
DONA MARIA PRADO INDIVIDUALLY AND DBA DONA MARIA, the Defendants,
Case No. 5:17-cv-02393-LHK (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs will move
the Court on August 16, 2018, for an order preliminarily approving
a class action settlement.

The case is a wage-and-hour lawsuit filed on behalf of non-exempt
employees against the owners of Dona Maria, a small chain of
Mexican food restaurants.

The Parties agreed to settle the case for $275,000 to be paid by
Defendants Guillermo Prado and Maria Prado.  The Settlement
Administration costs are estimated to be between $8500 - $20,000.
Subject to Court Approval, Class Representatives Cesar Ledo, and
Rberto Choy Morey shall receive Service Awards of $2,500 each.
Subject to Court Approval, Class Counsel will be paid up to $75,000
for attorneys' fees, and an additional amount for reasonable
litigation costs not to exceed $5000.00.

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com
at https://is.gd/hoOpXn at no charge.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          James Dal Bon, Esq.
          606 North 1st Street
          San Jose, CA 95112
          Telephone: (650) 630 2447
          Facsimile: (408) 286 7111
          E-mail: jdb@wagedefenders.net


EGS FINANCIAL: Luna Files Placeholder Bid for Class Certification
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned MODESTA LUNA, Individually and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. EGS FINANCIAL
CARE, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-01073-NJ (E.D. Wisc.),
the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order certifying proposed
classes, appointing the Plaintiff as class representative, and
appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such
other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further requests that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").  While the
Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative’s claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class.

A copy of the Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/RzujUn at no charge.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


ENDO INT'L: Bleichmar Fonti to Lead in Securities Fraud Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALEXANDRE PELLETIER, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, v. ENDO INTERNATIONAL PLC, RAJIV
KANISHKA LIYANAARCHIE DE SILVA, SUKETU P. UPADHYAY and PAUL V.
CAMPANELLI, Civil Action No. 17-5114 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Timothy J.
Savage of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania appointed Park Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of
Chicago as the Lead Plaintiff and its attorneys, Bleichmar Fonti &
Auld LLP, as the Lead Counsel.

In this private securities fraud action, Judge Savage must appoint
the Lead Plaintiffs and the Lead Counsel.  In doing so, he is
confronted with two competing principles for determining the Lead
Plaintiffs -- the presumptive lead plaintiff rule and the
preference for appointing institutional investors.  He must also
choose the appropriate method for calculating who has the larger
financial interest.

Even if he uses the measure proposed by the two individuals seeking
appointment, their aggregate financial interest is only minimally
greater than the institutional investor.  Under these
circumstances, he concludes the institutional investor preference
outweighs the presumptive lead plaintiff rule.

On Nov. 14, 2017, Pelletier filed a class action complaint
asserting that the Defendants, Endo, its former and present CEOs,
and its CFO violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act,
and Rule 10b-5.  The complaint alleges that Par Pharmaceutical
Holdings, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Endo, conspired with
several other pharmaceutical companies to fix generic drug prices
in violation of the federal antitrust laws.  It alleges that Endo
and its officers made false or misleading public statements and
failed to disclose or actively concealed material adverse facts
about Endo's business, operations, prospects and revenue,
artificially inflating Endo's share prices.  The complaint asserts
a fraud-on-the-market theory of loss causation, alleging that each
of three corrective disclosures made on Nov. 3, 2016, March 1,
2017,2 and Oct. 31, 20173 caused the market value of Endo's
securities to drop.

Contemporaneously with filing his complaint, Pelletier caused
notice of the pending class action to be published on PR Newswire.
On Jan. 16, 2018, two motions for appointment of the Lead
Plaintiffs and the Lead Counsel were filed.  Wayne A. Wingard and
Nathan Joseph Dole moved for appointment as the Lead Plaintiffs,
and the appointment of Pomerantz LLP as the Lead Counsel, and
Pribanic and Pribanic LLC as the Liaison Counsel.  The Fund moved
for appointment as the Lead Plaintiff and the appointment of
Bleichmar Fonti & Auld LLP as the Lead Counsel.

Whether he accepts the Wingard-Dole calculation of loss as
resulting in its having an approximately greater loss of $6,000 or
the Fund's calculation that it has a greater loss of $55,000, Judge
Savage concludes that the Fund's status as an institutional
investor favors it over the two individual investors whose apparent
aggregate loss, by their own calculations, is slightly greater than
the Fund's.  The Fund is more capable of representing the interests
of the loss members.

In addition, the Judge finds that even if the financial interest of
the Wingard-Dole group, as calculated by the group, is a mere
$6,000 greater than the Fund's, he factors in the preference for
appointing institutional investors as the Lead Plaintiffs.  Where
there is a slight variance in the respective losses, the Court
balances the difference between the respective losses against the
preference for institutional investors.  In this case, the Fund is
a sophisticated investor who has an ongoing relationship with its
proposed lead counsel, a law firm that is engaged in monitoring the
Fund's securities.  The Wingard-Dole group had no prior contact,
nor relationship with each other, and had no prior attorney-client
relationship with its proposed lead counsel.  

Under these circumstances, the scale tips in favor of the Fund.
Therefore, Judge Savage appointed the Fund as the Lead Plaintiff
and its attorneys as the Lead Counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 19, 2018 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/sp8x5q from Leagle.com.

ALEXANDRE PELLETIER, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by VINCENT A. COPPOLA --
vcoppola@pribanic.com -- PRIBANIC & PRIBANIC, PATRICK V. DAHLSTROM
-- pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com -- POMERANTZ LLP & PETER H. LEVAN, Jr. --
plevan@levanlawgroup.com -- LEVAN LAW GROUP, LLC.

ENDO INTERNATIONAL PLC, RAJIV KANISHKA LIYANAARCHIE DE SILVA,
SUKETU P. UPADHYAY & PAUL V. CAMPANELLI, Defendants, represented by
J. GORDON COONEY, Jr. -- gordon.cooney@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN,
LEWIS,& BOCKIUS LLP, JAMES E. BRANDT -- james.brandt@lw.com --
LATHAM & WATKINS, JEFF G. HAMMEL -- jeff.hammel@lw.com -- LATHAM &
WATKINS LLP, LAURA HUGHES MCNALLY -- laura.mcnally@morganlewis.com
-- MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, MILES N. RUTHBERG --
miles.ruthberg@lw.com -- LATHAM & WATKINS LLP & THOMAS J. GIBLIN,
Jr. -- thomas.giblin@lw.com -- LATHAN & WATKINS.

WAYNE A. WINGARD & NATHAN JOSEPH DOLE, Movants, represented by
VINCENT A. COPPOLA , PRIBANIC & PRIBANIC, JEREMY A. LIEBERMAN --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- POMERANTZ LLP & JOSEPH ALEXANDER HOOD, II
-- ahood@pomlaw.com -- POMERANTZ LLP.

PARK EMPLOYEES' ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Movant,
represented by TIMOTHY T. MYERS -- ttm@elliottgreenleaf.com --
ELLIOTT GREENLEAF PC, JAMES C. CRUMLISH, III, ELLIOTT GREENLEAF,
P.C., JAVIER BLEICHMAR -- Javier  Bleichmar --
jbleichmar@bfalaw.com -- BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD LLP, JOHN M.
ELLIOTT -- jme@elliottgreenleaf.com -- ELLIOTT GREENLEAF, P.C.,
JOSEPH A. FONTI -- jfonti@bfalaw.com -- BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD LLP,
THOMAS JOSEPH ELLIOTT, ELLIOTT GREENLEAF, P.C. & WILSON MEEKS, III
-- wmeeks@bfalaw.com -- BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD LLP.

EQUIFAX INC: Securities Suit Discovery Stay Revision Bid Partly OKd
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE EQUIFAX INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, Civil Action
No. 1:17-CV-3463-TWT (N.D. Ga.), Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta
Division, granted in part and denied in part the Lead Plaintiff's
Motion for Limited Modification of the PSLRA Discovery Stay.

The securities fraud class action arises out of a massive data
breach incident.  On Sept. 7, 2017, the Equifax announced that it
was the subject of a data breach affecting approximately 140
million consumers.  The Lead Plaintiff Union Asset Management
Holding AG seeks to represent a putative class of investors that
purchased the securities of Equifax from Feb. 25, 2016 through
Sept. 15, 2017.

The Lead Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants committed fraud in
connection with the data breach incident that caused a loss to the
value of the class's investments.  It now moves for a limited
modification of the PSLRA's automatic stay of discovery in the
case.  It asks that the Court modifies the discovery stay to allow
the parties to engage in case management and discovery planning
activities similar to those that are currently ongoing in the
parallel multidistrict litigation arising out of the data breach.

Judge Thrash agrees that the Lead Plaintiff will suffer undue
prejudice absent a modification of the discovery stay.  Allowing
the Lead Plaintiff to coordinate discovery planning with Equifax
will help keep the case apace with the MDL proceedings without
subjecting Equifax to the burdens of actual document production.
If the case were to proceed past the motion to dismiss stage, the
parties would be able to efficiently begin the discovery process
and minimize the disparity in timelines between the case and the
related MDL proceedings.

However, the Judge concludes that the Lead Plaintiff will not be
unduly prejudiced if the discovery stay remains in place as to the
Individual Defendants.  Presumably, the vast majority of documents
are in the custody of Equifax, and not the Individual Defendants.
Additionally, the bulk of discovery preparation efforts will
involve the Lead Plaintiff and Equifax, and not the Individual
Defendants.  Excluding the Individual Defendants from these
discovery and case management preparations will not result in the
Lead Plaintiff falling far behind the plaintiffs in the parallel
actions.  Thus, the Lead Plaintiff has failed to show that it would
be unduly prejudiced if the discovery stay remains in place as to
the Individual Defendants.

After assessing all of the factors, the Judge concludes that the
limited modification of the PSLRA stay is justified in the case as
to Equifax.  This particularized modification would be in the best
interests of the litigation and would prevent undue prejudice to
the Lead Plaintiff.  He concludes that the Lead Plaintiff's
requested modification is warranted in the case.

However, he concludes that the Lead Plaintiff should be permitted
to serve any necessary third-party preservation subpoenas.  But,
the Lead Plaintiff will be limited to serving subpoenas only to
those third parties that have not already been served with
preservation subpoenas in the MDL proceedings.  Thus, any concerns
as to duplicativeness will be addressed because the Lead Plaintiff
will only be permitted to supplement the subpoenas that have
already been served.  This discovery would also be particularized.

Under this limited modification, the Lead Plaintiff will only serve
necessary subpoenas to parties who have not previously been served
preservation subpoenas in the MDL.  This is sufficiently narrow to
be particularized when considering the entire context of the case.
Consequently, the Judge concludes that the Lead Plaintiff should be
able to serve these necessary preservation subpoenas.  In fact,
such a decision is consistent with the PSLRA because in it Congress
expressed a desire to make sure that relevant evidence is preserved
without being subjected to production.

Therefore, Judge Thrash ordered that the Lead Plaintiff and
Equifax:

     (a) Meet and confer, and, within 30 days of this Order, seek
entry of orders governing the treatment of confidential material
and the production of Electronically Stored Information (ESI);

     (b) Meet and confer, and, within 30 days of this Order, seek
entry of a proposed discovery schedule and Case Management Order;

     (c) May serve initial requests for the production of
documents;

     (d) Meet and confer regarding the custodians whose ESI will be
searched and what search terms should be used to search for ESI in
response to any initial requests for the production of documents,
and report to the Court within 75 days of this Order on any
disagreements or issues with respect to that process; and

     (e) May serve necessary document preservation subpoenas on
Third Parties that have not been served in the MDL.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Thrash granted in part and denied
in part the Lead Plaintiff's Motion for Limited Modification of the
PSLRA Discovery Stay.  He granted the Lead Plaintiff's requested
modification as to Equifax, but denied as to the Individual
Defendants.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 15, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/uaDJry from Leagle.com.

Hampden Kuhns, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by David Andrew Bain -- Send Email
-- Law Offices of David A. Bain, LLC & Eduard Korsinsky --
ek@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, pro hac vice.

Patrick Groover, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz, LLP & Joseph Alexander Hood,
II -- ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz, LLP.

Equifax Inc. & John W. Gamble, Jr., Defendants, represented by
Israel Dahan -- idahan@kslaw.com -- Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft,
LLP, pro hac vice, Alexandra Spear Peurach --
alexandra.peurach@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders, LLP, B. Warren
Pope , King & Spalding, LLP, Benjamin Lee -- blee@kslaw.com -- King
& Spalding, LLP & Michael R. Smith -- mrsmith@kslaw.com -- King &
Spalding, LLP.

Richard F. Smith, Defendant, represented by David M. Chaiken --
david.chaiken@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders, LLP, Meghan A.
McCaffrey , Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Michael E.
Liftik , Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP & Steven G. Madison
-- stevemadison@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan, LLP.

Rodolfo O. Ploder & Jeffrey L. Dodge, Defendants, represented by
Michael R. Smith -- mrsmith@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding, LLP.

Robert Brock, Movant, represented by Marshall P. Dees --
mdees@holzerlaw.com -- Holzer & Holzer, LLC.

FRANKFURT-TRUST Investment GmbH, Movant, represented by David
Andrew Bain, Law Offices of David A. Bain, LLC.

Union Asset Management Holding AG, Movant, represented by Abraham
Alexander , Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, Brenna D.
Nelinson -- brenna.nelinson@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz
Berger & Grossmann, LLP, James Harrod -- jim.harrod@blbglaw.com --
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann, LLP, pro hac vice, Amanda
Kay Seals Bersinger -- bersinger@bmelaw.com -- Bondurant Mixson &
Elmore, LLP & Homer Lamar Mixson -- mixson@bmelaw.com -- Bondurant
Mixson & Elmore.

FACEBOOK INC: Helms Files Suit Over Share Price Drop
----------------------------------------------------
Fern Helms, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Facebook, Inc., Mark E. Zuckerberg, David M. Wehner,
and Sheryl K. Sandberg, Case No. 1:18-cv-06774 (S.D.N.Y., July 27,
2018), is a federal securities class action brought on behalf of a
class consisting of all persons and entities who purchased, or
otherwise acquired, the publicly traded securities of Facebook from
October 1, 2017, through July 26, 2018.

On July 25, 2018, Facebook released its Second Quarter 2018
Results, which details its financial results for the quarter ending
in June 30, 2018.  Facebook reported that it had missed many of its
key financial metrics, including its projected revenue, earnings
per share, and global daily active users ("DAUs") and monthly
active users ("MAUs").  Facebook also reported its slowest ever
quarterly growth in revenue, DAUs, and MAUs.

These revelations had a devastating effect on Facebook's stock
price, the Plaintiff says.  The stock dropped about 7% almost
immediately after the Quarter 2018 Results were released and during
the conference call involving the Individual Defendants, the stock
plummeted to a loss of more than 20%.  By the days end, the
Plaintiff notes, Facebook's stock price declined from a class
period high of $218.62 per share to $176.26 per share.  This drop
caused a loss of approximately $120 billion in market
capitalization, causing substantial losses to investors, says the
complaint.

Facebook, Inc., is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal
executive offices in Menlo Park, California.  Mark E. Zuckerberg is
Facebook's founder and Chief Executive Officer.  David M. Wehner is
Chief Financial Officer.  Sheryl K. Sandberg is Facebook's Chief
Operating Officer.

Facebook operates a social networking platform that allows people
to communicate with their family, friends, and coworkers.  Facebook
develops technologies that facilitate the sharing of information,
photographs, Web site links, and videos.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David L. Hecht, Esq.
          Yi Wen Wu, Esq.
          PIERCE BAINBRIDGE BECK PRICE & HECHT LLP
          20 West 23rd Street, Fifth Floor
          New York, NY 10010
          Telephone: (213) 262-9333
          E-mail: dhecht@piercebainbridge.com


FACEBOOK INC: Kacouris Files Securities Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
JAMES KACOURIS, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. FACEBOOK, INC., MARK E. ZUCKERBERG and DAVID M. WEHNER,
Case No. 1:18-cv-06765 (S.D.N.Y., July 27, 2018), seeks to recover
compensable damages caused by the Defendants' alleged violations of
the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Throughout the Class Period, the Defendants made materially false
and misleading statements regarding the Company's business,
operational and compliance policies, the Plaintiff alleges.  
Specifically, the Defendants failed to disclose that: (i) the
number of daily and monthly active Facebook users was declining;
(ii) due to unfavorable currency conditions and plans to promote
and grow features of Facebook's social media platform with
historically lower levels of monetization, such as Stories,
Facebook anticipated its revenue growth to slow and its operating
margins to fall; and (iii) as a result, Facebook's public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times.

Facebook, Inc., is incorporated in Delaware, and the Company's
principal executive offices are located in Menlo Park, California.
Mark E. Zuckerberg has served at all relevant times as the
Company's Chief Executive Officer and Chairman.  David M. Wehner
has served at all relevant times as the Company's CFO.

Facebook operates a social networking website that allows people to
communicate with their family, friends, and coworkers.  Facebook
develops technologies that facilitate the sharing of information,
photographs, Web site links, and videos.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          J. Alexander Hood II
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          Ten South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 377-1181
          Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
          E-mail: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
          BRONSTEIN, GEWIRTZ & GROSSMAN, LLC
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4600
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 697-6484
          E-mail: peretz@bgandg.com


FANNIE MAE & FREDDIE MAC: Highfields' New & Novel Contract Claim
----------------------------------------------------------------
Highfields Capital I LP, Highfields Capital II LP, and Highfields
Capital III L.P., filed a lawsuit (Case No. 18-1150) in the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims this week challenging the Net Worth Sweep
that requires mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to remit
all of their earnings to the U.S. Treasury in perpetuity.  

Here's how Highfields explains its cause of action for a breach of
an implied-in-fact contract between the United States and the GSEs
to Judge Margaret Sweeney:

     Prior to appointing itself conservator on September 6, 2008,
FHFA unambiguously offered to place the Enterprises by consent,
under 12 U.S.C. sec. 4617(a)(3)(I), with certain conditions
described below, and the boards of directors of the Enterprises
accepted this offer. FHFA made no finding of insolvency,
undercapitalization, or any other ground to impose conservatorship
under 12 U.S.C. sec. 4617(a)(3)(A)-(H) or (J)-(L).

     FHFA offered, and the boards of the Enterprises accepted, a
conservatorship that would aim to "preserve and conserve the
[Enterprises'] assets and property" and restore the Enterprises to
a "sound and solvent condition."  See 12 U.S.C. sec. 4617(b)(2)(D).
The offer was also of a conservatorship that would end when that
goal was achieved. Neither of these conditions was ambiguous, and
both would benefit the known and distinct class of stockholders of
the Enterprises, on whose behalf the boards of directors of the
Enterprises had a fiduciary duty to act. In fact, FHFA obtained the
boards' consent on the ground, in part, that conservatorship would
serve the interests of the Enterprises' stockholders.

     Underlying FHFA's offer was its promise that FHFA would not,
as conservator, wind down or liquidate the Enterprises. FHFA stated
contemporaneously with its offer that it could not, as conservator,
place the Enterprises into liquidation. FHFA stated at the time,
and for several years into the conservatorship, that its goal was
instead to restore the Enterprises' assets and property to a sound
and solvent condition, which continued course of performance
constitutes evidence of the offer's original terms.

     When consenting to the conservatorship, the boards of the
Enterprises furnished good and valuable consideration to FHFA by
agreeing to forbear from a judicial or legislative challenge that
the United States feared.  See 12 U.S.C. sec. 4617(a)(5).  This
forbearance was unambiguously furnished in exchange for FHFA's
promises to act to restore the Enterprises to a safe and solvent
condition.

     The United States and the Enterprises, through the acts
described above, entered into an implied-in-fact contract. The
terms of that contract were, as relevant here, that FHFA, if made
conservator, would preserve and conserve the Enterprises' assets
and property, that its conservatorship would continue only until
the Enterprises were placed in a safe and solvent condition, and
that, in exchange, the boards of the Enterprises would consent to,
and not challenge or litigate, such a course of action. Both FHFA
and the Enterprises intended that an implied contract would exist.
That contract required FHFA to preserve the Enterprises' assets and
property, and forbade it from diminishing or expropriating the
Enterprises' assets and property.  This intent was demonstrated
through the offer and acceptance detailed above. FHFA's offer was
not ambiguous in its terms, and the boards' acceptance was
manifested in FHFA's subsequent imposition of conservatorship based
on the boards' consent.

     Under these terms of the implied-in-fact contract, and given
the known fiduciary duty of the boards of directors of the
Enterprises, the stockholders of the Enterprises were intended
beneficiaries of the contract.

     FHFA had actual authority, as an agency of the Government, to
bind the United States.

     The Third Amendment breached the contract by rendering it
impossible for the Enterprises to build and retain the capital
necessary to exit conservatorship and return to normal business
operations.

     Each subsequent Net Worth Sweep payment independently breaches
that contract by depleting the Enterprises of capital (rather than
preserving and conserving it), in a manner that FHFA has expressly
recognized undermines the goals of conservatorship.

     Had the United States adhered to the contract, it would have
protected the rights of holders of stock (other than itself) in the
Enterprises.  Through the Third Amendment, however, the United
States instead engaged in self-dealing, benefitting itself while
harming the stockholders other than itself.

     The Third Amendment, therefore, directly harmed Plaintiffs, by
preventing the termination of the conservatorship; stripping the
Enterprises of their ability to generate and retain funds to ever
distribute as dividends to holders of the Enterprises' stock; and
nullifying Plaintiffs' contractual right, as holders of the
Enterprises' stock, to ever receive a liquidation preference upon
the dissolution, liquidation, or winding up of the Enterprises.
Plaintiffs are accordingly entitled to damages.

Highfields Capital is represented by:

          Mark T. Stancil, Esq.
          Joshua S. Bolian, Esq.
          ROBBINS, RUSSELL, ENGLERT, ORSECK,
            UNTEREINER & SAUBER LLP
          1801 K Street, N.W., Suite 411-L
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 775-4500
          E-mail: mstancil@robbinsrussell.com

A full-text copy of Highfields' complaint is available from
GSElinks.com at https://goo.gl/bHbjfM at no charge.

FARMERS CAPITAL: Faces Class Action Over Acquisition Deal
---------------------------------------------------------
Alfred Miller, writing for The State Journal, reports that filed in
the same week that federal regulators blessed a West Virginia
bank's acquisition of Frankfort-based Farmers Capital Bank Corp., a
class-action lawsuit seeks to block the deal.

The complaint in Franklin Circuit Court alleges that Farmers
Capital, the holding company of United Bank, and WesBanco were
"materially misleading" in their disclosures to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and seeks an injunction to halt the
approximately $378.2 million deal.

In particular, the complaint filed by Florida resident and Farmers
shareholder Paul Parshall says the banks did not disclose the price
offered by another potential acquirer in January or important
details of a valuation conducted by financial adviser Keefe,
Bruyette & Woods.

Mr. Parshall has been described as a "serial plaintiff" in such
cases. In October, the Napa Valley (Calif.) Register reported that
Mr. Parshall has filed or been involved with more than 40 such
complaints against banks in California, New York, Florida, Arizona,
Indiana, Colorado and Utah.

"I've got a lot of them pending," Mr. Parshall told the Napa Valley
Register. "That's what I do."

He told the newspaper that he files class-action complaints to
advocate for other shareholders and sometimes challenges the value
of the stock the shareholders are scheduled to receive in the
transaction.

The most recent suit was filed in Franklin Circuit Court on July
10, a day before the banks announced in a news release that they
had received all necessary regulatory approvals to go forward with
the proposed acquisition.

A special meeting of the shareholders of Farmers Capital was
scheduled for July 23, during which they were expected to consider
and vote upon the deal, the news release said. WesBanco and Farmers
have said they anticipate closing the deal in the third quarter of
2018.

In an SEC filing disclosing the pending lawsuit, the banks said
they "believe the allegations in the Complaint are without merit
and intend to defend vigorously against those allegations."

Calls requesting comment to Farmers Chief Executive Officer Lloyd
Hillard as well as to lawyers representing Mr. Parshall were not
returned by press time.

Under the terms of the proposed deal, Farmers shareholders would
receive $5 in cash and 1.053 shares of WesBanco common stock for
each share of Farmers Capital common stock they own.

As of March 31, WesBanco had consolidated assets of about $10.2
billion, deposits of $7.2 billion, loans of $6.3 billion and
shareholders' equity of $1.4 billion, while Farmers had
consolidated assets of approximately $1.7 billion, deposits of $1.4
billion, loans of $1.0 billion and shareholders' equity of $200
million, the banks said in a prior news release.

The deal would expand WesBanco's reach by 34 offices located
throughout the Cincinnati, Elizabethtown, Frankfort, Lexington and
Louisville markets, the banks said previously. [GN]

FCA US: Bid to Dismiss Suit Over Stalling Defect Denied
-------------------------------------------------------
Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California denied FCA's motion to dismiss the case,
RYAN and SARAH WILDIN, individually, and on behalf of a class of
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. FCA US LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company, Defendant, Case No.
3:17cv-02594-GPC-MDD (S.D. Cal.).

The Wildins assert a putative class action based on an alleged
defect in the 2017-2018 Chrysler Pacifica.  They assert that since
at least March 2016, when the Defendant released the Class Vehicle,
it knew or should have known that the Class Vehicles and the PCM
software contained this defect.  They point to the fact that the
Defendant, routinely monitors "multiple data streams" for
information regarding the performance of its vehicles, such as
consumer complaints posted publicly online, reported to the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, or reported to its
authorized dealerships.

FCA designs, manufactures, markets, distributes, services, repairs,
sells, and leases the Class Vehicle.  The alleged defect at issue
in the case, which results from an error in the Class Vehicle's
Powertain Control Module ("PCM") software, causes a loss of engine
timing and leads to the Class Vehicle shutting off or stalling
without warning.  This causes unexpected and complete shutdowns or
stalling and a loss of power steering, preventing acceleration,
deceleration, and steering.

The operative First Amended Complaint ("FAC") alleges that the
Defendant also knowingly concealed the Stalling Defect by failing
to disclose it at times of sale, lease, and repair.  Instead of
repairing the Stalling Defect when customers came to its
dealerships for repair, the Defendant's agents refused to
acknowledge the existence of the defect, informed the customers
that their vehicles were functioning properly, or performed only
ineffective "masking" repairs.  According to the FAC, the
Defendants also falsely stated that the U01 Recall would "resolve"
the defect, when in reality it was no different from the T23
update, which did not eliminate the defect.

As a result of the Defendant's failure to disclose the defect to
customers, the Wildins and the Class Members have suffered an
ascertainable loss of money, property, and/or value of their Class
Vehicles.  The Plaintiffs also allege that due to the Defendant's
failure to disclose the Stalling Defect, as well as its active
concealment of the defect, the Plaintiffs and the Class Members
have been required to incur high-cost repairs that have conferred
an unjust substantial benefit upon the Defendant.

As a result of these allegations, the FAC asserts the following
claims: (1) violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies
Act ("CLRA"); (2) violation of California's Unfair Competition Law
("UCL"); (3) breach of an implied warranty under the California
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; (4) breach of an implied
warranty under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; and (5)
unjust enrichment.

Before the Court is the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint.  The Defendant seeks dismissal of: (1) the CLRA and UCL
claims, because they do not adequately allege that Defendant knew
about the Stalling Defect prior to the Wildins' purchase of their
vehicle; (2) the CLRA and UCL claims, because they fail to meet the
specificity requirements of Rule 9(b); (3) the UCL claim, because
adequate remedies at law are available; and (4) the unjust
enrichment claim, because there was an enforceable express contract
between the Wildins and Defendant.

The Plaintiffs filed an opposition on May 11, 2018.  A reply was
filed on May 24, 2018.

Judge Curiel finds that while the single pre-purchase consumer
complaint on pacificaforums.com does not itself create a plausible
claim that the Defendant knew of the Stalling Defect at the time of
the Wildins' purchase, it could possibly combine with other indicia
of knowledge to sufficiently allege the Defendant's pre-purchase
knowledge.  Also, the fact that all of the actions by the Defendant
involved altering the PCM software gives rise to a reasonable
inference that it knew of the Stalling Defect at the time it issued
its first or second TSB.

The Judge disagrees with the Defendant's argument that the FAC
fails to meet the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b)
because it does not allege where or how the omitted information
should have been revealed.  While it is true that Rule 9(b)
requires a plaintiff to describe where the omitted information
should or could have been revealed, the FAC satisfies this
requirement.  It indicates that prior to purchasing their vehicle
the Wildins reviewed FCA's corporate website, and also that had
they known about the Stalling Defect they would not have purchased
their Class Vehicle, or would have paid less for it.  Thus, the FAC
indicates that FCA could have notified potential customers of the
Stalling Defect through its website.

The Judge is not persuaded by those that have found it appropriate
to dismiss UCL claims on the sole ground that the remedy provided
by that claim may end up being unavailable to the Plaintiff.  In
the absence of controlling authority compelling dismissal under
these circumstances, he follows the normal rule that the
appropriate form of relief is not to be decided upon a motion to
dismiss.

Finally, even if the unjust enrichment claim was duplicative of the
breach of warranty claim, for the same reasons he discussed, the
Judge is not persuaded that it is appropriate to resolve this
remedy issue at the pleadings stage.  The unjust enrichment claim,
to the extent it relies on the Defendant's actively concealment of
the defect while performing ineffective repairs on the Wildins'
vehicle, is not coextensive with their warranty claims.

For these reason, Judge Curiel denied the Defendant's motion to
dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 19, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/3YWL4I from Leagle.com.

Ryan Wildin, individually, and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated individuals & Sarah Wildin, individually, and on behalf of
a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, represented
by Jordan L. Lurie -- jordan.lurie@capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone
Law, APC & Tarek H. Zohdy -- Tarek.Zohdy@CapstoneLawyers.com --
Capstone Law APC.

FCA US LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendant,
represented by Abirami Gnanadesigan -- agnanadesigan@dykema.com --
Dykema Gossett, Dommond Edward Lonnie -- dlonnie@dykema.com --
Dykema Gossett LLP & James Powell Feeney -- jfeeney@dykema.com --
Dykema Gossett PLLC.

FCA US: Court Certifies Michigan Class in Flynn et al. Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled BRIAN FLYNN, GEORGE BROWN, KELLY BROWN, and
MICHAEL KEITH, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. FCA US LLC doing business as CHRYSLER
GROUP LLC, and HARMAN INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES, INC., the
Defendants, Case No. 3:15-cv-00855-MJR-DGW (S.D. Ill.), the Hon.
Judge Michael J. Reagan entered an order:

   1. certifying a Michigan Class of:

      "all persons who purchased or leased vehicles in Michigan
      on or before July 5, 2018, that were manufactured by FCA
      and that are equipped with the Uconnect 8.4A or Uconnect
      8.4AN systems that were subject to the July 23, 2015 NHTSA
      Safety Recall campaign number 15V461"; and

   2. appointing Michael Keith as class representative.

A copy of the Order is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/3FX9a6 at no charge.


FLAGSHIP CREDIT: Robert Ward Seeks to Certify Settlement Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned Robert Ward, on his own behalf and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Flagship
Credit Acceptance LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-02069-MMB
(E.D. Pa.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order:

   1. granting preliminary approval of class action settlement;

   2. certifying Settlement Class for settlement purposes;

   3. approving form and content of the Notice to be sent to the
     members of the Settlement Class pursuant to the plan
     detailed in the Settlement Agreement;

   4. appointing Class Counsel and Class Representative to
     represent the Settlement Class; and

   5. scheduling a final fairness hearing.

A copy of the Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/bvMvU8 at no charge.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Sergei Lemberg, Esq.
          Stephen Taylor, Esq.
          Lemberg Law LLC
          43 Danbury Road
          Wilton, CT 06897
          Telephone: (203) 653 2250
          Facsimile: (203) 653 3424

Attorneys for Defendant:

          Gerald E. Arth, Esq.
          Steven J. Daroci, II, Esq.
          Fox Rothschild LLP
          2000 Market Street, 20th Floor
          Philadelphia, PA 19103


FORD MOTOR: Loses Bid to Dismiss Exhaust Fume Defect Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned SURESH PERSAD, DANIEL WRIGHT, and ROBERT
DRUMMOND, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant. Case No.
17-12599. (E.D. Mich.)

This is a putative class action, concerning 2016 and 2017 model
year Ford Explorers. The crux of the Plaintiffs' Complaint is that
these vehicles have an exhaust fume defect. In other words, that
when they are driven these cars allow dangerous gases including
carbon monoxide to enter the passenger compartment, sickening the
driver and passengers.

The Plaintiffs specific legal claims are: fraudulent concealment
(Count I), negligent misrepresentation (Count II), breach of
express warranty (Count III), breach of implied warranty (Count
IV), violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (Count V), unjust
enrichment (Count VI), violations of the Georgia Fair Business
Practices Act (Count VII), and violations of the Pennsylvania
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protections Act (Count VIII).

Fraudulent Concealment

The Plaintiffs bring claims of common-law fraudulent concealment
under the laws of Pennsylvania and Georgia. The Defendant contends
that these claims should be dismissed because: (1) the Plaintiffs
have not pled the circumstances of the fraud with particularity
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b); and (2) the
Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that the Defendant had a duty
to disclose the alleged defect.

The Plaintiffs allege that Ford had exclusive and superior
knowledge of the defect by virtue of pre-production testing,
preproduction design failure mode analysis, production design
failure mode analysis, early consumer complaints made to the
Defendant's network of exclusive dealers, aggregate warranty data
compiled from those dealers, repair order and parts data received
from the dealers, consumer complaints to dealers and NHTSA, and
testing performed in response to consumer complaints.

Moreover, the Plaintiffs allege the presence of multiple Technical
Service Bulletins (TSBs) issued as early as 2012 that concern
earlier model year Ford Explorers and apparently address the same
defect as suffered by the Class Vehicles. Lastly, the Plaintiffs
allege numerous consumer complaints concerning the Exhaust Fume
Defect.

Furthermore, the publicly available information underpinning the
Defendant's argument concerned prior model year Ford Explorers. The
Plaintiffs' have plausibly alleged that consumers would have no way
of knowing the same defect was present in the newer 2016-2017
models. Indeed, a plausible inference could be drawn in the
opposite direction that because older Ford Explorers suffered from
well-publicized exhaust fume defects, a reasonably prudent consumer
might expect that Ford had rectified this issue in the newer
models. In any event, the Plaintiffs have stated a viable claim for
fraudulent concealment.

Negligent Misrepresentation

Ford attacks the Plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claims
using the same argument that it made against the Plaintiffs'
fraudulent concealment claim. These arguments fail for the same
reasons. The Plaintiffs adequately plead all of the elements of
negligent misrepresentation.

Breach of Express Warranty

Ford contends that the Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for
breach of express warranty because they do not allege that they
experienced a problem within the warranty period.

Ford argues that the Plaintiffs allege only a design defect, which
is exempt from Ford's express warranty. However, the Plaintiffs
point out that while they do allege that the Class Vehicles are
defectively designed, they also allege that the presence of exhaust
odor and gases, including carbon monoxide, in the passenger
compartment could be caused by defects in materials, workmanship,
or manufacture. Discovery is needed to determine whether the fumes
are also entering the compartment due to defects in the
manufacturing process or particular materials that were used in the
exhaust or HVAC systems. At this stage of the litigation, the
Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to sustain that the Exhaust
Fume Defect is covered by the applicable warranties.

Breach of Implied Warranty

The Defendant contends that the Plaintiffs' implied warranty claims
fail because they do not plead that the defect manifested during
the applicable warranty period, i.e., 3 years/36,000 miles.

Here, despite the Defendant's assertion that the Class Vehicles
were merchantable, the Plaintiffs have successfully pled a prima
facie claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.
The First Amended Complaint alleges that the Class Vehicles, by
allowing exhaust odor and gases, including carbon monoxide, into
the passenger compartment, are not in a safe condition and are not
fit for their ordinary purpose. The Defendant attacks the
Plaintiffs' labeling the exhaust fume defect as a safety hazard but
at this stage of the case, the Plaintiffs need only plausibly
allege that the defect at issue impacts the safe operation of the
car. Quite clearly, the Plaintiffs have done so. Indeed, in class
litigation involving prior model year Explorers, a court sustained
a breach of implied warranty claim against Ford for a similar
exhaust fume defect.

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

The Plaintiffs also bring claims under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act (MMWA). The Defendant argues that the ability to sustain an
MMWA cause of action is dependent on the existence of an underlying
viable state warranty claim.  

The Defendant also argues that the Plaintiffs' MMWA claims should
be dismissed, because the Plaintiffs did not comply with the MMWA's
informal dispute resolution process. However, the Plaintiffs have
alleged that any informal dispute settlement procedure would be
futile. For instance, the Plaintiffs allege that Defendant
steadfastly denies the existence of the Exhaust Fume Defect. The
Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant's attempts to address exhaust
fume issues have been ineffective. The Plaintiffs' allegations that
any informal dispute resolution process would be futile are enough
to sustain the MMWA claims at this stage of the case.

The Plaintiffs have stated a viable MMWA claim at this stage of the
litigation.

Unjust Enrichment

The Defendant next argues that the Plaintiffs may not assert a
claim for unjust enrichment where there is an express warranty. The
Plaintiffs, however, properly plead their claim for unjust
enrichment in the alternative. This is especially true since the
Defendant denies the applicability of any warranty in its motion to
dismiss, and presumably will continue to do so as this litigation
progresses. Rule 8(a)(3) specifically allows a party to plead in
the alternative, and the Plaintiffs have properly done so here.  

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim will not be
dismissed at this stage of the proceedings.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 16, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7gwcums from
Leagle.com.

Suresh Persad, Daniel G Wright & Robert S Drummond, Plaintiffs,
represented by Dennis A. Lienhardt -- dal@miller.law -- The Miller
Law Firm, P.C., Ethan Barlieb -- ebarlieb@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, LLP, Joseph H. Meltzer -- jmeltzer@ktmc.com --
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Peter A. Muhic --
pmuhic@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Sharon S.
Almonrode -- ssa@miller.law -- The Miller Law Firm, P.C., Tyler S.
Graden -- tgraden@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP &
E. Powell Miller -- epm@millerlawpc.com -- The Miller Law Firm.

Ford Motor Company, Defendant, represented by David M. George --
dgeorge@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett, Jeffrey M. Yeatman --
jeffrey.yeatman@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP & Joel A. Dewey --
joel.dewey@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP.

FORD MOTOR: Provides Loaner Cars to Consumers Under Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
According to Consumer Reports' Jeff Plungis, Ford's class-action
settlement agreement over Takata airbags promises to give consumers
some relief as the massive recalls -- affecting 37 million vehicles
and 50 million airbags -- drag into the fourth year.

It's the seventh such deal cut by the class-action attorneys
handling claims against the 19 car companies involved in the
largest and most complex automotive recall in U.S. history.

The owners of Ford vehicles who agree to the deal that got
preliminary court approval on July 16 will receive free loaner cars
while waiting for their Takata repairs, as well as small cash
payments for their out-of-pocket expenses. And they won't have to
give up their right to sue separately if they're involved in a
crash where an airbag caused an injury or property damage.

"These settlements are proving to be vital in protecting consumers
from dangerous Takata airbags, and this latest agreement with Ford
is an important expansion of this effort," said Peter Prieto of the
law firm Podhurst Orseck. "All consumers deserve to drive without
fear of injury, and the outreach, support, and compensation
programs in this settlement will undoubtedly make Ford drivers and
passengers safer."

Of the 15 people who have died in Takata-related incidents, two
were in 2006 Ford Ranger pickup trucks. There are nearly 31,000
Rangers that are the subject of government "do not drive" warnings.
In May Consumers Union, the advocacy division of Consumer Reports,
urged consumers with an affected truck to get the vehicle fixed as
quickly as possible and stop driving it until it is repaired.

The Takata airbags can explode because the ammonium nitrate that's
used in them can become unstable over time, especially after
exposure to temperature fluctuations and periods of constant high
humidity. That can lead to inflators exploding with an unexpectedly
violent force and spraying metal shrapnel. Drivers and passengers
in the U.S. have died from blunt force trauma, from injuries to the
head and neck, and from massive bleeding from lacerations caused by
the flying metal.

Mr. Prieto is the lead counsel for the plaintiffs appointed by the
court hearing the consolidated cases against the automakers. The
agreement still must gain final court approval, which is expected
to happen in November, according to Meghan Keane, a spokeswoman for
the Plaintiffs' Committee for Takata Litigation.

The $299 million agreement with Ford includes a program to
reimburse consumers who have incurred out-of-pocket expenses for
such things as the expense of cars they've rented while waiting for
repairs. Even consumers who can't document their expenses may be
eligible for payments of up to $500.

The agreement calls for Ford to "significantly" increase recall
repairs by adopting non-traditional ways to reach customers,
including phone calls, social media, email, texts, and in-person
canvassing.

In a statement to Consumer Reports, a Ford spokeswoman, Elizabeth
Weigandt, said the company is already providing loaner vehicles
when replacement parts aren't available for the Takata recalls.
Ford owners can contact their dealers or call 866-436-7332. Parts
are available for the Ford vehicles in the highest priority groups
as specified by National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Mr.
Weigandt said.

"Safety is our priority," Mr. Weigandt said. "We remain focused on
working with our customers to get their vehicles repaired."

Other automakers who have reached similar deals include BMW, Honda,
Mazda, Nissan, Subaru, and Toyota, which have already been approved
by the court.

"It is frustrating and disappointing that consumers have to sue
these car companies to get them to do what they should have done on
their own years ago," said David Friedman, director of cars and
product policy and analysis for Consumers Union, the advocacy
division of Consumer Reports. "Automakers should do right by their
customers—and shouldn't forget about them after they walk out of
the showroom as the owner of a new car."

Consumers have expressed frustration when they've been forced to
wait for repairs. NHTSA gave priority at the beginning of the
process to hot and humid parts of the country, such as Gulf Coast
states, where the danger from Takata airbags was considered to be
the most severe. It also put older cars at the front of the line
because the risks of an airbag explosion increase dramatically with
cars that are more than a decade old. When NHTSA first took over
management of the multi-automaker recall in 2015, its top official,
Mark Rosekind, said the agency lacked the authority to force
automakers to provide loaner cars.

NHTSA called for automakers to make public their plans for
replacing all defective airbags in their vehicles, reflecting
concern that recall repairs aren't happening as fast as they need
to be. In congressional hearings, lawmakers, especially Sen. Bill
Nelson (D-Fla.), expressed concern about the pace of the recalls.
After those hearings, NHTSA held a series of meetings with
manufacturers to press them to do more.

"It is imperative that manufacturers take every available step to
reach each and every owner of a vehicle with deadly airbags, and
take action to ensure that those dangerous air bags are replaced as
soon as is safely possible," NHTSA's deputy administrator, Heidi
King, said in a statement July 13.

The Center for Auto Safety, a Washington-based watchdog group, says
the real problem is that manufacturers aren't living up to the
terms of NHTSA's legal agreement with them, and that the agency
isn't pushing the industry hard enough to comply.

"Pleading with industry to put information on their websites about
how they might choose to comply at some point in the future doesn't
add up to a single airbag being replaced any faster," said Jason
Levine, executive director of the CAS. "Arguably, the failure to
enforce the consent orders only encourages the delays in replacing
these ticking time bombs in consumer's dashboards."

It has been nearly 10 years since automakers began recalling
vehicles for exploding Takata airbags and four years since
regulators began to investigate the defect. [GN]

FORTY NINERS FOOTBALL: Court Certifies 3 Classes in Nevarez Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned ABDUL NEVAREZ, et al., the Plaintiffs, v.
FORTY NINERS FOOTBALL COMPANY, LLC, et al., the Defendants, Case
No. 5:16-cv-07013-LHK (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Lucy H. Koh
entered an order:

   1. granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs' motion for
      class certification;

   2. appointing Abdul Nevarez as representative of the first and
      third classes, and appointing Priscilla Nevarez as
      representatives of the second class; and

   3. as Defendants do not challenge the adequacy of proposed
      class counsel, appointing Guy Wallace of Schneider Wallace
      Cottrell Konecky Wotkyns LLP, Adam Wolf of Peiffer Rosca
      Wolf Abdullah Carr & Kane, and Linda Dardarian of Goldstein
      Borgen Dardarian & Ho as class counsel.

The Court certifies the following three classes.  The first two
classes seek declaratory and injunctive relief under Title II and
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act pursuant to Rule
23(b)(2), and the third class seeks statutory minimum damages under
California's Unruh Act pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3):

   Injunctive Relief Class:

   "all persons with mobility disabilities who use wheelchairs,
   scooters, or other mobility aids who will attempt to purchase
   accessible seating for a public event at Levi's Stadium and
   who will be denied equal access to the Stadium's facilities,
   services, accessible seating, parking, amenities, and
   privileges, including ticketing, during the three years prior
   to the filing of the Complaint herein through the conclusion
   of this action."

   Companion Injunctive Relief Class:

   "all persons who are companions of persons with mobility
   disabilities who use wheelchairs, scooters or other mobility
   aids and who have used or will use companion seating for
   public events located at Levi's Stadium during the three years
   prior to the filing of the Complaint herein through the
   conclusion of this action."

   Damages Class:

   "all persons with mobility disabilities who use wheelchairs,
   scooters or other mobility aids who have purchased, attempted
   to purchase, or for whom third parties purchased accessible
   seating and who have been denied equal access to Levi's
   Stadium’s facilities, services, accessible seating, parking,
   amenities, and privileges at an event controlled by the Forty
   Niners Football Company, LLC, Forty Niners SC Stadium Company,
   LLC, or Forty Niners Stadium Management Company, LLC, during
   the two years prior to the filing of the Complaint herein
   through the conclusion of this action."

A copy of the Order is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/BgcQou at no charge.


FRANKLIN RESOURCES: Court Certifies Class in Fernandez Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Judge Claudia Wilken entered an order granting plaintiff's
motion to certify a putative class in the case, NELLY F. FERNANDEZ,
individually and on behalf of a class of all other persons
similarly situated, and on behalf of the Franklin Templeton 401(k)
Retirement Plan, Plaintiff, v. FRANKLIN RESOURCES, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-06409-CW (N.D. Cal.).

The Court said, "The parties acknowledge that much of the Court's
analysis in its order certifying the class in Cryer v. Franklin
Resources, et al. (Cryer), applies to the present motion. Cryer,
Case No. 16-4265, Docket No. 67. Indeed, as the Court noted in its
order consolidating the two cases, the two cases involve nearly
identical class definitions2 and similar factual allegations.
Docket No. 52 at 12-13. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the
Cryer certification order, the Court grants certification here as
well. The requirements of Rule 23(a) are all satisfied and
certification under Rule 23(b)(1) is appropriate. The Court
designates Fernandez as co-plaintiff and the law firms Bailey &
Glasser LLP and Izard Kindall & Raabe LLP as co-lead counsel, and
Creitz & Serebin LLP as local and liaison counsel pursuant to Rule
23(g)."

The Fernandez case is consolidated with the lawsuit entitled MARLON
H. CRYER, individually and on behalf of a class of all other
persons similarly situated, and on behalf of the Franklin Templeton
401(k) Retirement Plan, the Plaintiff, v. FRANKLIN RESOURCES, INC.,
and THE FRANKLIN TEMPLETON 401(k) RETIREMENT PLAN INVESTMENT
COMMITTEE, the Defendant, Case No. 4:16-cv-04265-CW (N.D. Cal.).

A copy of the Order is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/ldWnZe at no charge.


GANNETT CO: Quatrone Seeks to Certify 401(k) Savings Plan Class
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JEFFREY QUATRONE on behalf of the GANNETT
CO., INC. 401(k) SAVINGS PLAN and all others similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, v. GANNETT CO., INC., THE GANNETT BENEFIT PLANS
COMMITTEE, and JOHN/JANE DOES 1-10, the Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-00325-AJT-JFA (E.D. Va.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for
an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all persons, except Defendants and their immediate family
      members, who were participants in or beneficiaries of the
      Gannett Co., Inc. 401(k) Savings Plan at any time from June
      29, 2015, inclusive, and whose Plan accounts included
      investments in the TEGNA Stock Fund"; and

   2. appointing Bailey & Glasser LLP and Izard, Kindall & Raabe
      LLP as Counsel for the Class.

A copy of the Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/88wC5P at no charge.

Attorneys for Jeffery Quatrone, Christina Stegemann and the
Putative Class:

          Gregory Y. Porter, Esq.
          Ryan T. Jenny, Esq.
          Mark G. Boyko, Esq.
          BAILEY & GLASSER LLP
          1054 31st Street, NW, Suite 230
          Washington, DC 20007
          Telephone: (202) 463 2101
          Facsimile: (202) 463 2103
          E-mail: gporter@baileyglasser.com
                  rjenny@baileyglasser.com
                  mboyko@baileyglasser.com

               - and -

          Robert A. Izard, Esq.
          Mark P. Kindall, Esq.
          Douglas P. Needham, Esq.
          IZARD, KINDALL & RAABE, LLP
          29 South Main Street, Suite 305
          West Hartford, CT 06107
          Telephone: (860) 493 6292
          Facsimile: (860) 493 6290
          E-mail: rizard@ikrlaw.com
                  mkindall@ikrlaw.com
                  dneedham@ikrlaw.com


GENPACT SERVICES: Luna Files Placeholder Class Certification Bid
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned MODESTA LUNA, Individually and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. GENPACT
SERVICES, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-01074-DEJ (E.D.
Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order certifying
proposed classes, appointing the Plaintiff as class representative,
and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such
other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.
Plaintiff further requests that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative’s claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir. 2017).

A copy of the Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/DPVXQf at no charge.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


GERALD REIBEL: Defendant Seeks to Certify Class in Mary Kay Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned MARY KAY INC., the Plaintiff, v. GERALD
MATTHEW REIBEL, the Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-02634-D (N.D.
Tex.), Reibel, as defendant and counter-plaintiff, moves the Court
for an order:

   1. certifying the instant case as a class action under Federal
      Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(c)(1)(A) so that this
      proceeding may be maintained as a class action, with
      Defendant Gerald Matthew Reibel, as the class
      representative, acting on behalf of all class Defendants
      and all other persons similarly situated, namely, all who
      have been contacted by Plaintiff Mary Kay, Inc. with
      respect to claims against it for dishonest trademark
      infringement, tortuous interference, and anti-trust claims;

   2. appointing Warren V. Norred as class counsel;

   3. authorizing "appropriate" notice of the maintenance of this
      class action be given to class members pursuant to Rule
      23(c)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and

   4. authorizing such notice to be by means of mail to last
      known address or to known email addresses when approved by
      the individual class members who have authorized such
      communications.

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com
at https://is.gd/rLDodH at no charge.

Attorneys for Defendant:

          Warren V. Norred, Esq.
          WARREN V. NORRED, TX
          Norred Law, PLLC
          515 E. Border Street
          Arlington, TX 76010
          Telephone: 817 704 3984
          Facsimile: 817 524 6686
          E-mail: wnorred@norredlaw.com


GETSWIFT: Says Squire Patton Boggs $300MM Claim Misleading
----------------------------------------------------------
Misa Han, writing for Australian Financial Review, reports that
GetSwift should pay less damages to investors because law firm
Squire Patton Boggs falsely claimed the logistics company was
facing a $300 million claim when it was only about $75 million,
GetSwift says.

In defence to the class action filed against GetSwift on July 16 in
the Federal Court, GetSwift says it should not be liable to pay
damages to investors but if it is liable, it should pay less
damages because Amanda Banton and other Australian partners of
Squire Patton Boggs are "concurrent wrongdoers".

GetSwift is facing a class action after The Australian Financial
Review probed into the company's market announcements and failure
to disclose contract losses, which saw its share price plummet.

Squire Patton Boggs was one of the three law firms that were
fighting to represent investors in the GetSwift class action.

The law firm was ultimately unsuccessful in its attempt and
boutique Melbourne law firm Phi Finney McDonald was chosen to lead
the class action. Quinn Emanuel is defending GetSwift.

But earlier in February, the law firm announced it had filed a
class action against GetSwift and it "estimates that the total
claim size may exceed $300 million".

The claims were repeated in various media outlets, including the
Financial Review, which stated Ms Banton estimated measurable
damages could be about $300 million and there might be "more to
play out".

The law firm has not changed or withdrawn its announcement since.

However, during a case management hearing in April, Squire Patton
Boggs' class action barrister William Edwards said the claim was
estimated to be about $75 million, with 100 people signed up to the
action.

Mr Edwards said there was "no evidence" about whether or not the
newspaper articles reporting the $300 million figure was "in fact
an accurate record" and blamed the media for inflating the figure.

'Press likes to exaggerate'
"The press likes to exaggerate these things," he said. "So I'm not
standing here today and saying there is a $300 million claim".

Subsequently, Ms Banton gave evidence that "realistic" damages for
the GetSwift class action was $75 million, based on expert
evidence.

GetSwift claims the total size of Squire Patton Boggs' class action
did not and could not exceed $300 million and Ms Banton and the
firm had no reasonable grounds for saying the claim size may exceed
$300 million.

By making the representation, the law firm made a misleading and
deceptive representation in breach of the Corporations Act, the
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act and the
Australian Consumer Law, GetSwift says.

GetSwift also says by making the announcement, GetSwift shares
declined in price and value and investors suffered because of the
announcement.

On the day of the Squire Patton Boggs' announcement in February the
GetSwift share price fell 27 per cent in one day alone.

On July 17 GetSwift shares were trading at 35¢, compared to 95¢
in February and $4.60 in December.

Squire Patton Boggs spokeswoman said: "Squire Patton Boggs is not
party to the proceedings the subject of the defence. We are
reviewing the allegations made in the defence and will respond at
an appropriate time."

Correction: An earlier version of the article incorrectly stated
GetSwift argues Squire Patton Boggs should pay part of any damages
to GetSwift investors. In fact, GetSwift argues any liability
should be reduced because of Squire Patton Boggs' alleged
misrepresentation to the market. [GN]

GROSS POLOWY: Tagney Sues over Debt Collection Practices
--------------------------------------------------------
Thomas Tagney, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Gross Polowy, LLC; Caliber Home Loans; and
John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-03859 (E.D.N.Y., July
3, 2018) seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and unconscionable
means to collect a debt.

Gross Polowy, LLC is a legal services company specializing in
residential mortgage services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph Karl Jones, Esq.
          JONES, WOLF &KAPASI, LLC
          60 East 42nd Street, 46th Floor
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (646) 459-7971
          Facsimile: (646) 459-7973
          E-mail: jkj@legaljones.com


H & K HVAC: Underpays AC Technicians, Remache Suit Claims
---------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTIAN REMACHE, individually and on behalf all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. H & K HVAC, Inc.; Jae Ho Lee a/k/a "Mr.
Lee", and Richard (First name unknown) Lee, Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-03856-AMD-ST (E.D.N.Y., July 3, 2018) seeks to recover from
the Defendants unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages,
prejudgment and post-judgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

Mr. Remache was employed by the Defendants as air conditioning
technician from January 2010 to May 21, 2018.

H & K HVAC, Inc. is a corporation organization and existing under
the laws of the State of New York and maintains its principal place
of business at College Point, NY 11356. The Company is engaged in
the sale of air conditioning equipment and parts that are purchased
out of state. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lorena P. Duarte, Esq.
          HANG & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
          136-20 38th Ave., Suite #10G
          Flushing, NY 11354
          Telephone: (718) 353-8588
          Facsimile: (718) 353-6288
          E-mail: lduarte@hanglaw.com


ICHIRO ASIAN: Wang et al. Seek to Certify FLSA Collective
---------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled Chen Wang, Zhilin Wang and Shaoyu Wang,
individually and on behalf all other employees similarly situated
Plaintiffs, v. Ichiro Asian Fusion Inc. d/b/a Ichiro Modern
Japanese & Bar, Danny "Doe", Ben "Doe" and Jian Ping Chen, the
Defendants, Case No. 7:17-cv-09869-CS (S.D.N.Y.), the Plaintiffs
ask the Court for the following relief in this Fair Labor Standards
Act collective action:

   1. conditional certification of the FLSA claim as a
      representative collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
      section 216(b);

   2. approval of court-facilitated notice of this FLSA action
      to covered Employees, including a consent form (or
      opt-in form) as authorized by the FLSA;

   3. approval of the proposed FLSA notice of this action and the
      consent form;

   4. production of names, job titles, addresses, e-mail
      addresses, telephone numbers, and dates of employment of
      all Covered Employees; and

   5. posting of the Notice, along with consent forms, in a
      conspicuous location in the places of business of
      Defendants at 80 Mamaroneck Ave., White Plains, NY 10601.

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com
at https://is.gd/LBh7cN at no charge.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Keli Liu, Esq.
          HANG & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
          Flushing, New York
          136-20 38th Avenue, Suite 10G
          Flushing, NY 11354
          Telephone: (718) 353 8588
          Facsimile: (718) 353 6288


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Faces Jessica Taylor Suit in N.D. Ohio
---------------------------------------------------------
A product liability class action lawsuit has been filed against
Johnson & Johnson. The case is captioned as Jessica Taylor,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Johnson & Johnson; Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.;
Johnson & Johnson Consumer, Inc.; McNeil-PPC, Inc.; and McNeil
Consumer Healthcare, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-01516-CAB (N.D.
Ohio, July 3, 2018). The case is assigned to Judge Christopher A.
Boyko.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. Johnson & Johnson was founded in 1885 and is
based in New Brunswick, New Jersey. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eric W. Henry, Esq.
          HENRY LAW FIRM
          529 East Washington Street, Ste. 240
          Chagrin Falls, OH 44022
          Telephone: (440) 337-0083
          Facsimile: (440) 337-0084
          E-mail: eric@erichenrylaw.com


JUDICIAL CORRECTION: G. Ray Can File 5th Amended Complaint
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GINA KAY RAY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JUDICIAL
CORRECTION SERVICES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 2:12-cv-02819-RDP
(N.D. Ala.), Judge R. David Proctor of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division, granted in
part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File
Fifth Amended Complaint.

The Court held oral argument on the Motion on June 14, 2018.  The
Plaintiffs seek leave to add factual allegations in support of
their Section 1983 conspiracy claims to the factual section of
their proposed Fifth Amended Complaint and the relevant Section
1983 claims.

The Plaintiffs' proposed complaint describes the agreement entered
into between JCS and officials of the City's municipal court.  It
alleges that the City's municipal-court judge recommended JCS,
worked with other courts that used JCS' services, and consistently
placed Defendants appearing before him on probation when they could
not immediately pay the fines and fees imposed by the Court.  It
also alleges that the conspiratorial agreement is evidenced by the
judge's failures to make indigency determinations, his failures to
appoint counsel, and his routine issuances of arrest warrants on
failure to appear or failure to pay court order charges.  In
conclusion, the proposed complaint alleges that concerted efforts
between the city court and JCS, including the city judge and the
other employees of the court, show an agreement and understanding
that warrants would be issued if money was not paid by the person
sent to JCS for collection.

The Plaintiffs request to amend their complaint (i) to add short
paragraphs to each of the constitutional counts clarifying the
alleged constitutional violations; (ii) to expressly seek
restitution of fees levied by JCS as a form of relief; (iii) to
raise a separate declaratory and injunctive claim to assert why the
contract between JCS and the City for probation services was void
ab initio; (iv)  to clarify their due process claim concerning
probation imposed without a valid adjudication order; (v) to amend
the class definitions provided in the Fourth Amended Complaint; and
(vi) to amend factual allegations that have not been borne out by
discovery, fix typos in the complaint, and improve the complaint's
grammar.

In its opposition brief, the City argues that the Plaintiffs should
be required to strike all claims against it from the new complaint
because the Court already has granted the City summary judgment,
and any amendment to the claims against the City would be futile.
Defendant JCS responds that the conspiracy allegations included in
the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint extend beyond the conspiracy
addressed in the court's summary judgment opinion because the
alleged conspiracy in the proposed complaint includes other Alabama
courts.  

The Plaintiffs reply that they have sought to represent a
state-wide class throughout the case.  And, there is substantial
evidence that JCS conspired with court officials outside of the
City of Childersburg to violate municipal-court defendants'
constitutional rights.

After careful review of the proposed complaint, Judge Proctor
agrees with Defendant JCS that the Section 1983 conspiracy claims
are futile insofar as they allege a conspiracy between JCS and
court officials outside the City.  None of the facts alleged in the
proposed complaint support the existence of a conspiracy between
JCS and officials working for any other municipal court.

He explains that Section 1983 conspiracy claims rest on parties
reaching an understanding to deny a plaintiff his or her
constitutional rights.  Unlike Section 1983 claims predicated on
JCS' customs and policies, which could have been applied
state-wide, the Judge finds it implausible to allege that facts
supporting a conspiracy between JCS and officials in one municipal
court can be expanded to assert a conspiracy claim concerning JCS
and over a hundred municipal courts in Alabama.

Therefore, Judge Proctor denied the Plaintiffs leave to amend the
complaint insofar as they seek to allege a conspiracy claim
regarding municipal courts other than the City's municipal court.
In all other respects, though, they're granted leave to add the
conspiracy claims asserted in the proposed complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 15, 2018 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/TpmdmR from Leagle.com.

Gina Kay Ray, individually and for a class of similarly situated
persons or entities, Deuante T Jews, individually and for a class
of similarly situated persons or entities & Timothy Fugatt,
Plaintiffs, represented by Maurine C. Evans, THE EVANS LAW FIRM PC,
Alexandria Parrish -- ap@evanslawpc.com -- THE EVANS LAW FIRM,
Daniel P. Evans, THE EVANS LAW FIRM PC, Erwin Chemerinsky ----
echemerinsky@law.berkeley.edu -- G. Daniel Evans --
gdevans@evanslawpc.com -- THE EVANS LAW FIRM, P.C. & Robert L.
Wiggins, Jr. -- rwiggins@wigginschilds.com -- WIGGINS CHILDS QUINN
& PANTAZIS LLC.

Kristy Fugatt, Plaintiff, represented by Brian Hardingham , PUBLIC
JUSTICE, Leslie A. Bailey, PUBLIC JUSTICE, Maurine C. Evans, THE
EVANS LAW FIRM PC, Alexandria Parrish, THE EVANS LAW FIRM, Daniel
P. Evans , THE EVANS LAW FIRM PC, Erwin Chemerinsky, Robert L.
Wiggins, Jr., WIGGINS CHILDS QUINN & PANTAZIS LLC & G. Daniel
Evans, THE EVANS LAW FIRM, P.C.

Judicial Corrections Services Inc, a corporation, Defendant,
represented by Larry S Logsdon -- llogsdon@wallacejordan.com --
WALLACE JORDAN RATLIFF & BRANDT, LLC, Michael L. Jackson --
mjackson@wallacejordan.com -- WALLACE JORDAN RATLIFF & BRANDT, LLC,
Wesley Kyle Winborn -- wwinborn@wallacejordan.com -- WALLACE JORDAN
RATLIFF & BRANDT & Wilson F. Green -- wgreen@fleenorgreen.com --
FLEENOR & GREEN LLP.

Correctional Healthcare Companies Inc, a corporation, Defendant,
represented by Larry S Logsdon, WALLACE JORDAN RATLIFF & BRANDT,
LLC, Michael L. Jackson, WALLACE JORDAN RATLIFF & BRANDT, LLC &
Wesley Kyle Winborn, WALLACE JORDAN RATLIFF & BRANDT.

The City of Childersburg, Counter Claimant, represented by Will
Hill Tankersley -- WHT@balch.com -- BALCH & BINGHAM LLP, Chase
Tristian Espy -- espy@balch.com -- BALCH & BINGHAM LLP, Edgar R.
Haden -- ehaden@balch.com -- BALCH & BINGHAM LLP, Ginny Willcox
Leavens -- gwillcox@balch.com -- BALCH & BINGHAM LLP, Gregory C.
Cook -- gcook@balch.com -- BALCH & BINGHAM LLP, L. Conrad Anderson
-- canderson@balch.com -- IV, BALCH & BINGHAM LLP & Timothy P.
Donahue -- timdonahue@donahue-associates.com -- DONAHUE &
ASSOCIATES LLC.

Gina Kay Ray & Deuante T Jews, Counter Defendants, represented by
Alexandria Parrish, THE EVANS LAW FIRM, Erwin Chemerinsky, Robert
L. Wiggins, Jr., WIGGINS CHILDS QUINN & PANTAZIS LLC & G. Daniel
Evans  THE EVANS LAW FIRM, P.C.

Timothy Fugatt & Kristy Fugatt, Counter Defendants, represented by
Erwin Chemerinsky, Robert L. Wiggins, Jr. , WIGGINS CHILDS QUINN &
PANTAZIS LLC & G. Daniel Evans, THE EVANS LAW FIRM, P.C..

JUDICIAL CRISIS: Faces TCPA Suit Over Unsolicited Text Messages
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARLO KATZ and MATTHEW DOUBLESTEIN, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. JUDICIAL CRISIS NETWORK, Case No.
1:18-cv-02297-TWP-MPB (S.D. Ind., July 27, 2018), is brought
against the Defendant for sending alleged unsolicited text messages
in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and the
Indiana Truth in Caller ID Act.

Judicial Crisis Network, Inc., is a Virginia corporation with its
principal office in the District of Columbia.  Judicial Crisis
Network is an American conservative political campaign
organization.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Irwin B. Levin, Esq.
          Richard E. Shevitz, Esq.
          Vess A. Miller, Esq.
          Lynn A. Toops, Esq.
          COHEN & MALAD, LLP
          One Indiana Square, Suite 1400
          Indianapolis, IN 46204
          Telephone: (317) 636-6481
          Facsimile: (317) 636-2593
          E-mail: ilevin@cohenandmalad.com
                  rshevitz@cohenandmalad.com
                  vmiller@cohenandmalad.com
                  ltoops@cohenandmalad.com


JUI LI: API Loses Bid to Aside Default Judgment in Antitrust Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin denied Defendant Auto Parts Industrial Ltd.'s Motion for
Set Aside the Entry of Default in the cases captioned FOND DU LAC
BUMPER EXCHANGE INC. et al., Plaintiffs, v. JUI LI ENTERPRISE
COMPANY LTD., et al., Defendants; PATRICK TORREY, Plaintiff, v.
AUTO PARTS INDUSTRIAL LTD et al., Defendants; FIREMAN'S FUND
INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. JUI LI ENTERPRISE COMPANY LTD et
al., Defendants; NATIONAL TRUCKING FINANCIAL RECLAMATION SERVICES
LLC, Plaintiff, v. JUI LI ENTERPRISE COMPANY LTD et al.,
Defendants, Case Nos. 09-C-0852, 11-C-0162, 13-C-0987, 14-C-1061
(E.D. Wis.).

The direct-purchaser and indirect-purchaser plaintiffs (DPPs and
IPPs) bring these class action proceedings against various
manufacturers of aftermarket sheet metal parts used in automotive
repair alleging an anticompetitive conspiracy in violation of
federal and state antitrust laws.

API is currently in default for failing to appear by counsel for
most of 2017.

Ordinarily, to establish good cause to set aside an entry of
default, a defendant must show good cause for its inaction, prompt
steps to correct the default, and an arguably meritorious defense
to the lawsuit.

According to Hsieh, an executor was appointed to run API, but the
executor was only able to engage in transactions, and authorize
expenditures, in the regular course of business, meaning that he
could not, for example, authorize any discretionary legal activity,
pay invoices of U.S. counsel, or approve any settlement except on
terms approved by the prior board.  Hsieh says that, because it
could not pay for or authorize any legal work, API agreed to
terminate Buchanan as its counsel of record in this case, prompting
Buchanan's January 2017 motion to withdraw.  That motion led to the
Court's order that API appear by new counsel, and API's failure to
comply with that order resulted in the entry of default against
it.

Here, though, there is no good reason to set aside the entry of
default. First, API's gap in representation again, the result of
its owners' choices lasted for nearly a year. During that time, API
missed deadlines and failed to obey my orders, including my order
that it designate and make available for a deposition a
representative able to testify about the authenticity and
business-records status of documents it produced in discovery, a
matter first brought before me more than three years ago that, to
my knowledge, still has not been meaningfully resolved.

Moreover, while API sat idly by, the other remaining parties took
up and settled their outstanding issues and claims, thereby
effectively ending this litigation. Given the schedule and the
active parties' diligent efforts to settle, this litigation likely
would have ended months ago but for API's default. Thus, at the
least, the legitimate interests of the parties and the court not to
mention the public, in the finality of these proceedings would be
prejudiced were the Court set aside the entry of default.

API fails to show good cause for its default or for judicial action
to set aside the entry of default. That is reason enough to deny
its Rule 55(c) motion. Still, the Court will also discuss the steps
that API took to correct its default, as courts commonly consider a
party's post-default conduct alongside the misconduct that
precipitated the entry of default when considering whether to set
aside an entry of default.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 16, 2018 Decision and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8mpxbpo from
Leagle.com.

Fond du Lac Bumper Exchange Inc, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin
D. Brown -- bbrown@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Hausfeld &
Toll, Christopher M. Burke -- CBURKE@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- Scott +
Scott LLP, David W. Mitchell -- davidm@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Dean M. Harvey -- dharvey@lchb.com --
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, Douglas A. Millen --
dmillen@fklmlaw.com -- Freed Kanner London & Millen LLC, Eric B.
Fastiff -- efastiff@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein
LLP, Jason S. Hartley -- hartley@stuevesiegel.com -- Stueve Siegel
Hanson LLP, Jason A. Zweig -- jasonz@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman
Sobal Shapiro LLP, Jeffrey A. Leon -- jeff@qulegal.com -- Quantum
Legal LLC, Jessica N. Servais , Heins Mills & Olson PLC, Jon T.
King , The Furth Firm LLP, Joseph M. Barton -- joe@joebartonlaw.com
-- Law Offices of Joseph M Barton, Joseph R. Saveri --
jsaveri@saverilawfirm.com -- Joseph Saveri Law Firm, K. Scott
Wagner -- swagner@kwdlaw.com -- Kerkman Wagner & Dunn, Kevin E.
Rayhill -- krayhill@saverilawfirm.com -- Joseph Saveri Law Firm,
Michael P. Lehmann -- mlehmann@hausfeld.com -- Hausfeld LLP, Robert
G. Eisler -- reisler@gelaw.com -- Grant & Eisenhofer PA, Susan G.
Kupfer -- skupfer@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Binkow & Goldberg LLP &
Vincent J. Esades, Heins Mills & Olson PLC.

Jui Li Enterprise Company Ltd, Defendant, represented by Alfredo A.
Bismonte -- abismonte@beckllp.com -- Beck Bismonte & Finley LLP,
Justin T. Beck -- jbeck@beckllp.com -- Beck Bismonte & Finley LLP,
Remington A. Lenton-Young -- rlenton-young@beckllp.com -- Beck
Bismonte & Finley LLP & Ronald C. Finley -- rfinley@beckllp.com --
Beck Bismonte & Finley LLP.

Tong Yang Industry Co Ltd, Successor in Interest to Defendant
Taiwan Kai Yih Industrial Company Ltd, Defendant, represented by Yi
Chin Ho -- yichin.ho@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP.

Gordon Auto Body Parts, Defendant, represented by Howard B. Iwrey
-- hiwrey@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLC, J. Ric Gass --
gass@gwmlaw.com -- Gass Weber Mullins LLC & Yi Chin Ho --
yichin.ho@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP.

KENTUCKY: Bid to Dissolve State Court Order in Inmates' Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANTONIO ARRIOLA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COMMONWEALTH
OF KENTUCKY, et al., Defendants, Civil No. 3:17-cv-00100-GFVT (E.D.
Ky.), Judge Gregory F. Van Tatenhove of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Kentucky, Central Division, Frankfort,
denied both the Defendants' (i) Motion to Dissolve or Modify State
Court Order and Motion to Amend Class Action Notice.

After five years of litigation, the matter was removed from
Franklin Circuit Court to the Court on Dec. 6, 2017.  The
Plaintiffs are a certified class of current and former inmates in
the care and custody of Defendants Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Kentucky Department of Corrections ("KDOC"), and Kentucky Justice
and Public Safety Cabinet.  In addition, they have named,
individually, Defendant J. Michael Brown, former Secretary of the
Cabinet; Defendant John Tilley, current Secretary of the Cabinet;
Defendant LaDonna Thompson, former Commissioner of the KDOC;
Defendant Rodney Ballard, current Commissioner of the KDOC;
Defendant James Erwin, Deputy Commissioner of Adult Institutions;
and Defendant Chris E. Cropp is employed in KDOC's Education
Branch.

The Plaintiffs claim the Defendants did not attribute proper
sentence credit for their completion of educational and behavioral
programs, as mandated in Section 197.045.  According to their
complaint, the mismanagement of these sentence credits not only
violates Kentucky law, but also violates their rights to due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Sections Two and Three of the Kentucky
Constitution.

The matter was initially filed on Sept. 11, 2012, in Franklin
Circuit Court in Franklin County, Kentucky.  After years of
discovery and failed mediation attempts, Judge Phillip J. Shepherd
of Franklin Circuit Court certified the Plaintiffs' class action on
June 3, 2015.  Judge Shepherd concluded that the inmates were
entitled to Educational Good Time ("EGT") credit earned since July
15, 2011, and denial of such credit was a deprivation of their due
process rights under the Kentucky Constitution and the United
States Constitution.

Additionally, Judge Shepherd found that KDOC's administration of
the EGT program was arbitrary and capricious, and granted
declaratory and injunctive relief to the Plaintiff class.  However,
he reserved ruling on the appropriate remedies.  The Plaintiffs
requested an independent audit of the Defendants' records, but
Judge Shepherd held that request in abeyance while parties
participated in mediation under Hon. C. Cleveland Gambill.

The Defendants then agreed to produce a list of class members who
had participated in EGT courses, including information such as
which courses the inmates took, when they took these courses,
whether KDOC awarded credit after course completion, and how much
EGT credit was awarded.  Judge Gambill oversaw discovery, and,
although the Defendants produced numerous documents, no List was
ever disclosed.  Judge Shepherd held hearings to discuss discovery
and a potential independent audit on May 8, 2017, and July 17,
2017.

Because keeping accurate accounts was the responsibility of the
Defendants, and because the Defendants had not been able to provide
the requested List, Judge Shepherd directed the Defendants to
facilitate an independent audit to produce a comprehensive list of
all class members who have taken correctional education and
behavioral programming courses since 2007.  This list would
indicate which inmates took which courses, when inmates took such
courses, whether KDOC awarded sentence credits to appropriate class
members for completing these courses, and how much credit was
awarded to each inmate.

Furthermore, Judge Shepherd required the Defendants to provide
individual notice of the class action to all class members.  He
also prohibited the Defendants from communication with class
members concerning this litigation without prior approval of the
Franklin Circuit Court, except in the case of routine
communications of teachers and administrative staff with inmates in
the normal course of business.

Judge Shepherd also granted the Plaintiffs' request to file a Sixth
Amended Complaint on Nov. 7, 2017.  In their Sixth Amended
Complaint, the Plaintiffs added Defendant John Tilley, which made
removal to the Court proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1441.
Several motions regarding Judge Shepherd's Order from Nov. 7, 2017,
are now pending before the Court.

Pursuant to a status conference held by the Court on Jan. 8, 2018,
the Defendants have filed a Motion to Dissolve or Modify Judge
Shepherd's Nov. 7 Order.  They raise two issues with the November 7
Order: the time period parameters of the audit and the solicitation
of an independent auditing firm.

Judge Van Tatenhove finds that while the current amendments are
only retroactive through July 15, 2011, the requirement for KDOC to
provide EGT credits for educational programs dates back at least to
1996.  Accordingly, he sees no legal reason to limit the audit to
begin in 2011, excluding inmates who may be a part of the class and
participated in EGT programs between 2007 and 2011.  The Defendants
argue the time frame should be limited, but have consistently
failed to provide any usable list or transcript for any year after
2007.  Nor do they provide a single legal reason to limit the audit
to records after 2010 or 2011, or before 2014.  The Judge says the
cost to the Defendants is not a legal reason to limit the
Plaintiffs' ability to recover for violations of their due process
rights.

The Judge also finds the Defendants' claim that compliance with
Judge Shepherd's November 7 Order would violate state law without
merit.  Kentucky law requires budget units of any branch of
government, including KDOC, to request an audit from the Auditor of
Public Accounts.  Nothing in Judge Shepherd's opinion prohibits the
Defendants from first requesting an audit from the Auditor of
Public Accounts, and thus, he will deny the Defendants' Motion to
Dissolve or Modify the State Court Order.

Finally, as to the Defendants' Motion to Amend their Class Action
Notice, the Judge finds it unnecessary to modify the class action
notice, as that would cause confusion among the class members, and
thus will deny the Defendants' motion.  Even so, he does find the
Defendants should be allowed a pre-approved response to the
inmates' request.  The Defendants should prepare a generic reply to
the inmates' Corrections Policy and Procedure 17.4 requests for the
Court to review.

Judge Van Tatenhove concludes that a case that initiated in state
court proceeds in federal court as though everything done at the
state court level was in fact done by the federal court.  Today, he
finds no reason to modify or dissolve the orders previously entered
by Franklin Circuit Judge Phillip Shepherd.  Accordingly, he denied
the Defendants' Motion to Dissolve or Modify State Court Order, and
denied the Defendants' Motion to Amend Class Action Notice.

Within 14 days of the entry of th3 Order, the Defendants will
prepare a proposed response to inmates' Corrections Policy and
Procedure 17.4 inquiries, informing inmates of the ongoing
litigation.  Within seven days of the Defendants' filing their
proposed response, the Plaintiffs will file any objections to that
proposed response.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 15, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/kMXKVy from Leagle.com.

Antonio Arriola, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Keath Bramblett, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Christopher Hopper, Individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Walter A. Noland, Individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Donald Roberts,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated & David
Voyles, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Gregory Allen Belzley --
gbelzley@aol.com -- Belzley Bathurst, Attorneys.

Commonwealth of Kentucky, Commonwealth of Kentucky Cabinet for
Justice and Public Safety, Commonwealth of Kentucky Corrections
Department, J. Michael Brown, Individually, LaDonna Thompson,
Individually, Chris E. Cropp, Individually & John Tilley,
Individually, Defendants, represented by Angela T. Dunham, Office
of Legal Services Justice & Public Safety Cabinet.

KOHL'S CORP: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Pension Fund's Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, affirmed the
District Court's judgment granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned PENSION TRUST FUND FOR OPERATING ENGINEERS, et
al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. KOHL'S CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees, No. 17-2697 (7th Cir.).

Kohl's Corporation announced that it was correcting several years
of its financial filings because of multiple lease accounting
errors. Hard on the heels of that announcement came a putative
class action complaint. The plaintiffs, led by the Pension Trust
Fund for Operating Engineers, allege that Kohl's and two of its
executives defrauded investors by publishing false and misleading
information in the lead-up to the corrections.

The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to meet the
enhanced pleading requirements for scienter imposed by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). The court entered that
dismissal with prejudice, declining to give the Pension Fund even
one opportunity to amend to cure the defects.

The Pension Fund now appeals both the dismissal of the complaint
and the district court's decision to enter it with prejudice.

To state a claim under section 10(b), a plaintiff must plead (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2)
scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or
omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon
the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss
causation.

Scienter pleadings in securities fraud class actions must satisfy a
heightened standard of plausibility.  

Taking these facts together, the Pension Fund has made a strong
case that many of Kohl's disclosures regarding its lease accounting
practices turned out to be false. But that is not enough. The facts
must also give rise to a strong inference of scienter. The
complaint fails in this regard if it is more likely that the errors
resulted from careless mistakes at the management level than from
an intent to deceive or a reckless indifference to whether the
statements were misleading. In contrast with the complaint's
exhaustive account of the facts of Kohl's accounting mishaps, the
Pension Fund gives us very few facts that would point either toward
or away from scienter. This lack of connective tissue is
determinative in this case.

Each allegation in the complaint is advanced without any sense of
how the dots connect. Tellabs requires that a complaint give rise
to a cogent and compelling inference of scienter. The Pension Fund
tells us that Kohl's made similar, but not identical, lease
accounting errors, that it did so while management was pursuing an
aggressive store-improvement strategy; and that insiders sold stock
during the same period. This could suggest wrongdoing, but it more
plausibly suggests negligent oversight of overzealous accounting
staff or some other breakdown lower in the corporate hierarchy. The
Pension Fund has not taken the extra step to show why these
allegations give rise to a strong inference of scienter, even
considered collectively.

The district court justified dismissal with prejudice because it
thought that the court's prior rulings put the plaintiffs on notice
of weaknesses in the amended complaint. The district court was
right that its prior rulings which were issued by a different
presiding judge identified weaknesses with the complaint, but those
weaknesses were unrelated to the reasons for which the complaint
was later dismissed.

In its order denying the defendants' first motion to dismiss
without prejudice for relying too heavily on exhibits, the district
court noted ongoing concerns about the prolixity of the Amended
Complaint sixty-one pages, with 173 numbered paragraphs. Whatever
the merits of the district court's criticism, concerns about the
complaint's length could not possibly alert the plaintiffs to
problems with their scienter allegations. If anything, they
reasonably might have thought that more length was necessary to
meet the PSLRA's demanding standards for pleading scienter. The
district court's earlier criticism thus does not help support the
abrupt end of the case.

The defendants argue that the Pension Fund could not have been
taken by surprise, because defendants had alerted the plaintiffs to
the weaknesses of the complaint. This argument is a non-starter. If
briefing in opposition to a motion to dismiss were sufficient basis
to deny leave to amend after that motion were granted, there would
be little left to the general rule we have just discussed. The only
case the defendants cite to the contrary involved denial of leave
to amend for the fifth time, when the defects had been identified
by the motion to dismiss the second amended complaint.  

The Pension Fund made no such showing in the district court or on
appeal and is not entitled to another chance to do so.

A full-text copy of the Seventh Circuit's July 16, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ydaukdja from Leagle.com.

Howard A. Pollack -- pollack@fr.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

John L. Kirtley -- jkirtley@gklaw.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Joseph D. Daley -- joed@rgrdlaw.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Joseph Russello, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Matthew Alexander Schwartz -- schwartzmatthew@sullcrom.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Robert J. Giuffra, Jr. -- giuffrar@sullcrom.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Maya Krugman -- krugmanm@sullcrom.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

KOHL'S CORP: Shearman & Sterling Comments on 7th Cir. Ruling
------------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP, in an article for Lexology, reports that
on July 12, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a putative class action
brought against Kohl's Corporation and certain of its executives
asserting claims pursuant to Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act. Pension Tr. Fund for Operating Eng'rs v.
Kohl's Corp., -- F.3d --, 2018 WL 3385278 (7th Cir. July 12, 2018).
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants made false and misleading
statements prior to an announcement that Kohl's would be correcting
several years of financial statements due to lease accounting
errors. The Court, affirming the district court's dismissal with
prejudice, held that plaintiffs' complaint failed to adequately
allege scienter under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA) and that plaintiffs were not entitled to an opportunity to
replead because they had not provided any basis to infer they could
plead a viable claim.

In 2011, Kohl's restated its financials to account for its large
book of store leases as capital leases, rather than operating
leases. Plaintiffs' suit followed, alleging that Kohl's accounting
errors were purposeful or reckless primarily because (i) Kohl's had
made earlier adjustments to its lease accounting practices in 2005
and 2010, and (ii) certain executives had sold company stock during
the class period.

The Court found plaintiffs' allegations unavailing. While the
complaint contained an "exhaustive account of the facts of Kohl's
accounting mishaps," it contained very few factual allegations
pointing either toward or away from scienter -- a "lack of
connective tissue" that the Court found determinative. Id. at *4.
Importantly, the Court found that although the accounting errors
identified in 2005 and 2011 were both significant, they were not as
similar as plaintiffs argued. Specifically, the adjustments in 2005
related to how Kohl's calculated the start and end date of lease
terms, whereas the 2011 adjustments related to the classification
of leases as operating or capital leases. Id. Further, although one
error from 2005 recurred in 2010, the 2010 corrections led to a
relatively minor restatement affecting only a single quarter. Id.
The Court therefore found no allegations in the complaint
supporting a theory of recklessness, but instead found that the
complaint itself provided an "innocent explanation" that was more
likely -- that the 2011 errors were discovered as part of a
comprehensive review of Kohl's financial statements in connection
with a credit agreement Kohl's had just secured. Id.

The Court also rejected the argument that executives' stock sales
supported a compelling inference of scienter. Plaintiffs alleged
the date of sale, number of shares, and sale price for each trade,
and argued that stock sales in 2009 and 2010 were suspicious given
that the executives made no sales in 2008 or 2011. The Court found
these allegations insufficient, particularly in light of the
information not contained in the complaint: whether the sales were
a high percentage of each individual's holdings, whether each
individual sold more shares than typical, whether they bought more
shares to offset their sales, what the total typical trading volume
was of Kohl's shares, and how much Kohl's stock price fluctuated
around the time of these sales. Id. at *5. Moreover, the Court
emphasized that the "probative value of stock sales depends greatly
on timing," and the alleged sales occurring 14 months before the
2010 corrections and 23 months before the 2011 corrections were
"more than long enough" in advance of the corrections for "any
inference of suspicion to dissipate, at least in the absence of
concrete facts suggesting otherwise." Id.

With respect to the lower court's dismissal with prejudice, the
Court emphasized that plaintiffs should be given "at least one
opportunity to try to amend," particularly in securities fraud
cases where "the drafting of a cognizable complaint can be a matter
of trial and error." Id. While questioning the lower court's
reasoning for denying leave to amend, the Court nevertheless found
reversal inappropriate. In this regard, the Court noted that
although plaintiffs did not have an opportunity to show what they
could add before the district court dismissed with prejudice, they
had had several opportunities since, including moving under FRCP
59(e) or 60(b) for another opportunity in the district court, or
telling the Court in their appellate briefing what more they would
plead. Indeed, despite being asked during oral argument, plaintiffs
failed to identify how they could cure the defects in the complaint
on amendment. The Court therefore affirmed the dismissal with
prejudice. Id. at *6.

This decision illustrates that even seriatim accounting errors,
standing alone, may not support a cogent and compelling inference
of scienter.

Pension Trust Fund for Operating Engineers v Kohls Corp [GN]

KRISPY KREME: Materiality of Merger Disclosures Nil
---------------------------------------------------
Teresa Bruno, writing for North Carolina Lawyer Weekly, reports
plaintiffs' class action lawsuits challenging a merger between
Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc., and JAB Beech, Inc., resulted in
supplemental disclosures to shareholders, and the court finds the
materiality of those disclosures to be somewhere between nil and
obvious. The court awards plaintiffs' counsel $150,000 in fees,
yielding an implied rate of $300 per hour. [GN]



LENNOX INT'L: Settles Class Suit Over Defective AC Evaporator Coils
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Rebecca Collett, writing for Counton, reports that it was  supposed
to be a no hassle home buy.

"It's a new build," Jeremy Tumblin explained. "You're not supposed
to have any issues, right?"

But 15 months after closing on their Johns Island Mungo Home,
Mackenzie and Jeremy Tumblin say the air conditioner stopped
working.

Fixing it cost the couple $450 initially. The technician who fixed
the unit warned them about issues with defective evaporator coils.
Turns out, the family is part of a class action settlement with
Lennox, the maker of their air conditioner, over the design.
According to court records, nearly a million people qualify for the
settlement over units bought between 2007 and 2015.

"I called you because a ton of people have this problem," Mackenzie
explained. "People aren't speaking up. They are just paying out of
pocket."

The Tumblins spent more than $8,600 within the first three years in
their new home.  They opted to buy a new unit when theirs stopped
working a second time. The cost of labor and repairs would have
been roughly half that, but there's no guarantee the old unit would
ever work right, they said.  

Homeowners, like the Tumblins trying to collect on the settlement,
say it's a feat.   

"This particular settlement is extremely complicated," Jay Ward,
attorney with McGowan, Hood & Felder, explained.

Ward is a class action attorney whom consulted with News 2 on this
story. He points out several problems with the settlement,
including a difficult filing process; a lack of staffing to process
claims; and issues with the contact numbers for homeowners to use
to ask questions.   

The Tumblin's unit was initially repaired in June 2016.  They filed
their claim in August of 2016. They received a $75 rebate in April
of 2018.  The rebate is for use on a future service.  But since the
family replaced their unit when it stopped working a second time,
it's not likely they will be able to use the rebate.        

"I'm the angriest with Mungo builders," Mackenzie explained.

The family is frustrated that Mungo Homes installed the unit amid
the federal court battle, which started in 2013. The family closed
on their home in February 2015.

"This was not a recall. No manufacturer -- include Lennox -- had
failures across the board, in every unit," Kim O'Quinn, Corporate
VP of Marketing, explained via email.

"The coil corrosion issue is an HVAC industry issue, not just a
Lennox issue, but we have full confidence in how the manufacturer
has chosen to work on a resolution with homeowners. We're happy to
pass along information on how to contact Lennox, or direct them to
Quality Builders Warranty Corporation who covers the warranty on
all Mungo Homes," O'Quinn wrote in a formal statement to News 2.

It took the Tumblins nearly two years to receive their first
payout, the $75 rebate. They are still waiting to see if they are
eligible for the second payout of $550.

Lennox denies the design is flawed, but settled to avoid the cost
and risk of a legal battle.

"Multiple replacements still does not mean that formicary corrosion
was actually the cause," a spokesperson told News 2.  "At least two
replacements are required to be eligible for reimbursement." There
isn't a timeline on when homeowners will receive payouts.

"Because of the nature of the settlement, the time to submit claims
for some class members can extend for several more years, depending
on each claimant's particular circumstances," according to Lennox.


There is no live support for this case.  Attorneys recommend
contacting the judge in the case directly to complain if there are
issues with the processing of claims.

The settlement won't extend to future homebuyers who purchase homes
with these units. The settlement covers units between October 29,
2007 through July 9, 2015 that have at least one uncoated copper
tube Lennox brand, Aire-Flo brand, Armstrong Air brand, AirEase
brand, Concord brand, or Ducane brand evaporator coil.

The Settlement provides an Expanded Warranty and Reimbursement
Program. The Expanded Warranty and Reimbursement Program includes:
(1) a one-time $75 service rebate; (2) an aluminum tube or coated
copper tube Replacement Coil after the first coil replacement; (3)
up to $550 as a retroactive reimbursement for labor and refrigerant
charges for the replacement of the Original Coil in the event there
is more than one coil replacement; and (4) up to $550 as
reimbursement for labor and refrigerant charges for each uncoated
copper tube coil replacement after the first replacement. Expanded
Warranty and Reimbursement Program benefits require replacement of
an Original Coil due to a coil leak within five years after
installation. [GN]

LOEWS CHICAGO: Bryant Sues Over Retained Biometrics Data
--------------------------------------------------------
Tekita Bryant, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Loews Chicago Hotel, Inc., Loews
Corporation and ADP LLC, Defendants, Case No. 2018CH09477 (July 26,
2018) filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois County
Department, Chancery Division, seeks an injunction requiring
Defendants to destroy her biometrics in its possession, to cease
all unlawful activity related to the capture, collection, storage
and use of biometrics, and statutory damages together with costs
and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act.

Loews is a luxury hospitality company that owns and operates two
hotels in Illinois. It employs ADP to manage its employee database.
Loews' employees are required to have their fingerprints scanned by
a biometric timekeeping device. Bryant alleges that the Defendants
implemented a timekeeping system that relied on the collection,
storage, and usage of employees' fingerprints and biometric
information without informed consent in violation of the Illinois
Biometric Information Privacy Act. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
      James B. Zouras, Esq.
      Haley R. Jenkins, Esq.
      Andrew C. Ficzko, Esq.
      STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
      205 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 2560
      Chicago, IL 60601
      Tel: (312) 233 1550
      Email: rstephan@stephanzouras.com
             jzouras@stephanzouras.com
             hjenkins@stephanzouras.com

LTD FINANCIAL: Saroza Seeks Class Certification
-----------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled NESTOR SAROZA, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. LTD FINANCIAL
SERVICES, L.P., the Defendant, Case No. 2:16-cv-06259-JLL-JAD
(D.N.J.), the Plaintiff will move the Court for an order granting
class certification.

LTD Financial has filed a Memorandum in Opposition of the Motion.

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com
at https://is.gd/6AbJNA at no charge.

Attorney for Plaintiff and all others similarly situated:

          Lawrence C. Hersh, Esq.
          17 Sylvan Street, Suite 102B
          Rutherford, NJ 07070
          Telephone: (201) 507-6300

Attorneys for Defendant:

          Monica M. Littman, Esq.
          FINEMAN KREKSTEIN & HARRIS
          Ten Penn Center
          1801 Market Street; Suite 1100
          Philadelphia, PA 19103


MACY'S WEST: Court Dismisses M. Straughter's Action
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order for the Action Dismissal in the case
captioned MIQUISHA STRAUGHTER, individually and on behalf of all
other similarly situated current and former non-exempt employees of
Defendants in California, Plaintiff, v. MACY'S WEST STORES, INC.,
and DOES 1 through 100, Inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-01143
NC (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff filed her Complaint for Declaratory Relief and
Petition to Compel Class Arbitration as a class action pursuant to
Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(1)-(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
on behalf of all similarly-situated current and former non-exempt
employees of the Defendant who worked within the State of
California at any point from March 6, 2013 to the present, and who
entered into arbitration agreements that contain class action
waivers that preclude them from filing joint, class, or collective
claims addressing their wages, hours, or other working conditions
against the Defendant in any forum, arbitral or judicial.

The parties, by and through their counsel of record, stipulate that
this action be dismissed with each party to bear their own
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this action, notwithstanding
the provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d).

The Court, accordingly, orders that the Plaintiff's Complaint be
dismissed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 11, 2018 Order is
available   https://tinyurl.com/y94dzd3n from Leagle.com.

Miquisha Straughter, Plaintiff, represented by Vilmarie Cordero --
vcordero@grahamhollis.com -- GrahamHollis APC, David Roger Markham
-- dmarkham@markham-law.com -- The Markham Law Firm, Graham Stephen
Paul Hollis -- dmarkham@markham-law.com -- GrahamHollis A.P.C.,
Maggie K. Realin -- mrealin@markham-law.com -- The Markham Law Firm
& Walter Lewis Haines -- walter@whaines.com -- United Employees Law
Group, P.C.

Macy's West Stores, Inc., Defendant, represented by David S.
Bradshaw , Jackson Lewis LLP & David E. Martin , Macys, Inc. Macys
Law Department, pro hac vice.

MATHERNE HOLDINGS: Gerstenhaber Seeks to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned SHARONE GERSTENHABER individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. MATHERNE
HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware corporation, the Defendant, Case No.
0:18-cv-61213-WPD (S.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order certifying a Class of:

   "all persons within the United States who, within the four
   years prior to the filing of this Complaint; were sent a text
   message; from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf; to
   said person’s cellular telephone number; using the same
   equipment, or type of equipment, used to text Plaintiff’s
   cellular telephone; without the recipient’s prior express
   consent."

   Excluded from the Class is Matherne, Matherne's directors and
   officers, Matherne's employees, immediate families of
   Matherne's directors and officers, or the legal
   representatives, agents, affiliates, heirs, successors-in-
   interests or assignees of any such excluded person, and the
   Judge presiding over this action, including the Judge’s
staff,
   clerk, and family members.

A copy of the Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/3dWFlU at no charge.

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Class:

          Ignacio J. Hiraldo, Esq.
          IJH LAW
          1200 Brickell Ave Suite 1950
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (786) 496 4469
          E-mail: ijhiraldo@ijhlaw.com

               - and -

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301
          Telephone: (954) 400 4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com


MATRIX 2K9 CORP: Underpays Security Guards, Caceres Claims
----------------------------------------------------------
ROBERTO DANILO CACERES, individually and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MATRIX 2K9 CORP.; and IRIS I. RODRIGUEZ,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-22688-JLK (S.D. Fla., July 3, 2018) is
an action against the Defendants for failure to pay overtime and
minimum wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Mr. Caceres was employed by the Defendants as security guard from
January 10, 2017 to June 2, 2018.

Matrix 2k9 Corp. is a company that regularly transacts business
within Miami-Dade County. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J.H. Zidell, Esq.
          J.H. ZIDELL, P.A.
          300 71 st Street, Suite 605
          Miami Beach, FL 33141
          Tel: (305) 865-6766
          Fax: (305) 865-7167
          E-mail: ZABOGADO@AOL.COM


MAZUMA CREDIT: Bowens Seeks to Certify Settlement Class
-------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled JOY L. BOWENS, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. MAZUMA CREDIT
UNION, and DOES 1-10, the Defendant, Case No. 4:15-cv-00758-DW
(W.D. Mo.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order:

   1. approving Settlement Agreement reached between Plaintiff
      and Defendants;

   2. certifying a settlement class of:

      "any member of MCU who, between the implementation of
      Defendant's automated overdraft program on April 1, 2011
      and September 30, 2015, was assessed an overdraft fee when
      the member had sufficient money in his or her ledger
      balance, but insufficient money in his or her available
      balance to complete the transaction that caused the fee";

   3. awarding attorneys' fees in the amount of $453,333.33;

   4. approving claims administrator costs of $34,375; and

   5. finally approving the class representative service award.

A copy of the Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/VxDDue at no charge.

Counsel for Joy L. Bowens and Putative Class:

          Taras Kick, Esq.
          Robert Dart, Esq.
          THE KICK LAW FIRM, APC
          815 Moraga Drive
          Los Angeles, CA 90049
          Telephone: (310) 395 2988
          Facsimile: (310) 395-2088
          E-mail: taras@kicklawfirm.com
                  robert@kicklawfirm.com

               - and -

          Matthew Lee Dameron, Esq.
          WILLIAMS DIRKS DAMERON LLC
          1100 Main Street, Suite 2600
          Kansas City, MO 64105
          Telephone: (816) 876 2600
          Facsimile: (816) 221 8763
          E-mail: matt@williamsdirks.com

               - and -

          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          Jae (Eddie) K. Kim, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          3281 East Guasti Road, Suite 100
          Ontario, CA 91761
          Telephone: (909) 557 1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557 1275
          E-mail: rdm@mccunewright.com
                  jkk@mccunewright.com


MDL 2084: Court Denies Bid to Certify Direct Purchaser Class
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia, Atlanta Division, denied the Direct Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification in the cases captioned IN RE: ANDROGEL
ANTITRUST LITIGATION (NO. II), ROCHESTER DRUG CO-OPERATIVE INC., on
behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
UNIMED PHARMACEUTICALS INC., et al., Defendants; LOUISIANA
WHOLESALE DRUG CO. INC. on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UNIMED PHARMACEUTICALS INC., et
al., Defendants; MEIJER INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNIMED
PHARMACEUTICALS INC., et al., Defendants, MDL No. 2084. ALL CASES,
No. 1:09-MD-2084-TWT, Civil Action No. 1:09-CV-956-TWT.,
1:09-CV-957-TWT, 1:09-CV-958-TWT (N.D. Ga.).

The Defendant Solvay is the distributor of brand-name AndroGel, a
testosterone replacement drug. Solvay previously settled patent
litigation with the Defendants Actavis and Par/Paddock. As part of
those settlements, the Private Plaintiffs and the FTC allege that
Solvay agreed to pay Actavis and Par/Paddock substantial amounts of
money in exchange for Actavis and Par/Paddock agreeing to drop
their challenges to Solvay's AndroGel patent and delay entry of
their generic versions of AndroGel until 2015.

Rule 23(a) sets forth the four prerequisites to maintain any claim
as a class action:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

The Plaintiffs assert that many of their proposed class members
would have negative claims, they fail to provide any evidence to
support that assertion. The Plaintiffs argue that antitrust
litigation is expensive, often requiring millions of dollars in
costs and they point to the costs of retaining experts in this
case, which have now exceeded $4.6 million. They then include the
following table to suggest that if a class member's claim is below
$1 million or $4.6 million, their claim is therefore negative.

The $1 million standard is pulled out of thin air. The Plaintiffs
provide no answer or argument as to why $1 million should be the
standard by which a claim is determined as being economically
worthwhile or not. And on the other, the $4.6 million standard
based on the cost of experts is a red herring. Numerosity rule does
not envision the alternative of individual suits; it considers only
the alternative of joinder. As joined parties, no individual
plaintiff will bear the costs of those experts completely on their
own.

Here, the class plaintiffs would very likely sign joint litigation
agreements and hire joint experts, just as the other Plaintiffs in
this case have done for years. It is not clear that there would be
a need for that to change merely because absent Plaintiffs would be
joined as individual parties instead of moving forward as a class.


A full-text copy of the District Court's July 16, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yadxck9j from
Leagle.com.

Androgel Antitrust Litigation, In Re, represented by Kenneth S.
Canfield -- kcanfield@dsckd.com -- Doffermyre Shields Canfield &
Knowles, LLC.

Rochester Drug Co-Operative Inc, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew C. Curley --
acurley@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.C., pro hac vice, Daniel C.
Simons -- dsimon@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.C., David Balto --
david.balto@dcantitrustlaw.com -- Law Offices of David Balto, David
F. Sorensen -- dsorensen@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, pro hac vice,
Eric Cramer -- ecramer@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.C., Kenneth
S. Canfield , Doffermyre Shields Canfield & Knowles, LLC, Nicholas
Urban -- nurban@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.C, Ellen T. Noteware
-- enoteware@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.C., Joshua P. Davis --
jpdavis@reedsmith.com -- Law Offices of Joshua P. Davis, Neill W.
Clark -- nclark@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP & Peter R.
Kohn -- pkohn@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, pro hac vice.

Unimed Pharmaceuticals Inc, Defendant, represented by Kelly A.
Welchans , Arnold & Porter, LLP, Matthew David Kent --
matthew.kent@alston.com -- Alston & Bird, LLP, Teresa Thebaut
Bonder -- teresa.bonder@alston.com -- Alston & Bird, LLP,Adam R.
Lawton -- Adam.Lawton@mto.com -- Munger Tolles & Olson, Jeffrey Ira
Weinberger -- Jeffrey.Weinberger@mto.com -- Munger Tolles & Olson,
Joshua S. Meltzer -- Joshua.Melzer@mto.com -- Munger, Tolles &
Olson, LLP & Rohit K. Singla -- Rohit.Singla@mto.com -- Munger,
Tolles & Olson, LLP.

Solvay Pharmaceuticals Inc, Defendant, represented by Joshua S.
Meltzer , Munger, Tolles & Olson, LLP, Justin P. Raphael --
Adam.Barry@mto.com -- Munger, Tolles & Olson, LLP, Matthew David
Kent -- matthew.kent@alston.com -- Alston & Bird, LLP, Teresa
Thebaut Bonder , Alston & Bird, LLP, Adam R. Lawton , Munger Tolles
& Olson &Rohit K. Singla , Munger, Tolles & Olson, LLP.

MEDICREDIT INC: Appeals Ruling in Flecha Suit to 5th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Fidelity and Deposit Insurance Company of Maryland and
Medicredit, Incorporated, filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit titled Nina Flecha v. Medicredit, Incorporated, et al.,
Case No. 1:16-CV-792, in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Texas, Austin.

The appellate case is captioned as Nina Flecha v. Medicredit,
Incorporated, et al., Case No. 18-50551, in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on July 16, 2018, the
Defendants also filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit.
That appellate case is entitled Nina Flecha v. Medicredit,
Incorporated, et al., Case No. 18-90027.

The Hon. Judge Lee Yeakel previously certified a class of:

     "all persons in Texas from whom Medicredit attempted to
      collect and who received a form collection letter from
      Medicredit containing these statements: Your seriously
      delinquent Seton Medical Center Hays account remains unpaid
      despite past requests for payment."[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee NINA FLECHA, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, is represented by:

          Robert Zimmer, Esq.
          707 W. 10th Street
          Austin, TX 78701
          Telephone: (512) 434-0306
          E-mail: zimmerlawtx@gmail.com

               - and -

          Michael Jacob Wood, Esq.
          COMMUNITY LAWYERS GROUP, LIMITED
          73 W. Monroe Street
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 757-1880
          E-mail: mwood@communitylawyersgroup.com

Defendants-Appellants MEDICREDIT, INCORPORATED, and FIDELITY AND
DEPOSIT INSURANCE COMPANY OF MARYLAND are represented by:

          Tara Moriarty Kumpf, Esq.
          OLGETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
          301 Congress Avenue
          Austin, TX 78701
          Telephone: (512) 344-4715
          E-mail: tara.kumpf@ogletreedeakins.com

               - and -

          Jacob Ward Sparks, Esq.
          SPENCER FANE, L.L.P.
          5800 Granite Parkway
          Plano, TX 75204
          Telephone: (214) 750-3624
          E-mail: jsparks@spencerfane.com

Defendant-Appellant MEDICREDIT, INCORPORATED, is represented by:

          Maura Kathleen Monaghan, Esq.
          Jacob W. Stahl, Esq.
          Harold W. Williford, Esq.
          DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON, L.L.P.
          919 3rd Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 909-6000
          E-mail: mkmonaghan@debevoise.com
                  jwstahl@debevoise.com
                  hwwillif@debevoise.com


MGM: Settles Class Action Over James Bond Anniversary DVD Box
-------------------------------------------------------------
Eriq Gardner, writing for Hollywood Reporter, reports that assuming
all die-hards who purchased the 50th anniversary James Bond DVD box
set wish to get their hands on the 007 movie in which David Niven
played the British spy, MGM and 20th Century Fox Home Entertainment
will now be providing it at no extra charge. A motion for final
approval of a class action settlement was filed in Washington
federal court that could mean $8.7 million worth of digital copies
of Casino Royale and Never Say Never Again are made available to
consumers.

A little more than a year ago, Mary Johnson sued on behalf of
herself and others who bought the Bond 50 box set upon packaging
that stated, "All the Bond films gathered together for the first
time," only to be disappointed by the absence of the
above-mentioned two films. The lawsuit claimed a violation of
Washington's Consumer Protection Act.

Neither Casino Royale nor Never Say Never Again were associated
with MGM. The first was a Columbia Pictures spoof starring Niven,
Woody Allen, Peter Sellers and Orson Welles. The latter was a film
from Kevin McClory, the screenwriter who worked with Bond author
Ian Fleming in creating Thunderball and who at one point claimed
co-ownership in the character. Sean Connery reprised the role that
made him famous.

"Despite representing that the Sets contain EVERY charismatic star,
David Niven, the 'charismatic star' of Casino Royale is missing
from the Sets," stated the complaint, which added for extra
context, "David Niven was James Bond creator Ian Fleming's first
choice to play James Bond in the James Bond movies."

Pffft, responded the defendants.

"[N]o reasonable purchaser would expect that a box set would
contain films that are not included on the list of titles clearly
printed on its packaging," argued MGM in a motion to dismiss.

U.S. District Court judge Ricardo Martinez had some fun in the
subsequent decision to allow the case to move forward.

"At this time, the Court will Live and Let Die," he wrote in a
pun-laden decision allowing some claims to survive and others to
fall by the wayside. "The Court finds the questions of how a
reasonable person would interpret 'all' and 'every' and what
qualifies as a James Bond film remain for the trier of fact to
decide. These terms are not unequivocally puffery as a matter of
law."

Disappointingly, there will be no trial because the parties have
seemingly done the math and figured out the cost of litigation
wasn't worth fussing over popular understanding of the Bond
franchise.

According to court papers, class members who don't opt out of the
settlement and timely file a valid claim form will receive digital
copies of the two "non-franchise" films. An attorney for the
plaintiffs estimates this is worth approximately $8,694,000,
although that figure obviously assumes opt-ins and is calculated
from the $13.99 cost on Amazon for Never Say Never Again and the
$14.99 cost on Amazon for Casino Royale.

The $8.7 million figure is also probably presented with an eye on
getting the judge to approve $350,000 in fees and costs for the
attorneys at Eisenhower Carlson.

As for Johnson, she not only gets the two Bond films to complete
her set, but also an "incentive payment award" of $5,000. But maybe
she deserves it as she states in a declaration that the case
exposed her to substantial publicity while adding, that "at times
this publicity was very hostile."

Oh, and one more settlement term . . .

According to the motion for approval, "The Settlement Agreement
also ensures that packaging of future Sets will describe the
contents of the Sets so that it is clear that any collection does
not include these non-franchise movies." [GN]

MICROSOFT CORP: Moussouris Appeals Denial of Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------
Katherine Moussouris, Holly Muenchow and Dana Piermarini seek
review of the District Court's order entered on June 25, 2018, in
their lawsuit styled KATHERINE MOUSSOURIS, HOLLY MUENCHOW, and DANA
PIERMARINI, on behalf of themselves and a class of those similarly
situated v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION, Case No. 2:15-cv-01483-JLR, in
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington.

The Order denied certification of a class of female technical
workers at Microsoft Corporation, who bring disparate impact and
treatment pay and promotion claims under Title VII and Washington
State law.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
asserts discrimination claims of more than 8,600 former and current
female employees.  The Plaintiffs argue that the Company's systemic
practices across its office created a disparity for advancement and
equal pay for women in engineering and technical roles compared to
men in comparable positions.

The appellate case is captioned as KATHERINE MOUSSOURIS, HOLLY
MUENCHOW, and DANA PIERMARINI, on behalf of themselves and a class
of those similarly situated v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION, Case No.
18-80080, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.

The Plaintiffs presented these questions to the Ninth Circuit:

   A. Does any exercise of manager discretion prevent a finding
      of commonality under Dukes, even when that discretion is
      directed by Microsoft pursuant to a company-wide policy or
      practice using common evaluation criteria?

   B. Where common evidence of gender bias and refusal to remedy
      gender disparities exists alongside statistical evidence of
      discrimination, must plaintiffs also identify a uniform
      employment practice to certify a disparate treatment claim?

   C. What type and quantity of evidence of bias is required for
      a disparate treatment claim at class certification? and

   D. Can low-level managers who must follow discriminatory
      policies, but did not create or institute the policies, be
      adequate representatives for non-managerial class
      members?[BN]

The Plaintiffs-Petitioners are represented by:

          Adam T. Klein, Esq.
          Ossai Miazad, Esq.
          Rachel Bien, Esq.
          OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 245-1000
          E-mail: ATK@outtengolden.com
                  OM@outtengolden.com
                  RMB@outtengolden.com

               - and -

          Kelly M. Dermody, Esq.
          Anne B. Shaver, Esq.
          LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          275 Battery Street, 29th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111-3339
          Telephone: (415) 956-1000
          Facsimile: (415) 956-1008
          E-mail: kdermody@lchb.com
                  ashaver@lchb.com

               - and -

          Sharon M. Lee, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          2101 Fourth Avenue, Suite 1900
          Seattle, WA 98121
          Telephone: (206) 739-9059
          Facsimile: (415) 956-1008
          E-mail: slee@lchb.com

               - and -

          Rachel J. Geman, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10013-1413
          Telephone: (202) 355-9500
          Facsimile: (202) 355-9592
          E-Mail: rgeman@lchb.com

               - and -

          Michael Subit, Esq.
          FRANK FREED SUBIT & THOMAS LLP
          705 Second Avenue, Suite 1200
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (206) 682-6711
          Facsimile: (206) 682-0401
          E-mail: msubit@frankfreed.com

The Defendant-Respondent is represented by:

          Allison Riechert Giese, Esq.
          Jessica R. Perry, Esq.
          Joseph Liburt, Esq.
          Lynne C Hermle, Esq.
          Megan M. Lawson, Esq.
          ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
          1000 Marsh Road
          Menlo Park, CA 94025-1014
          Telephone: (650) 614-7400
          E-mail: agiese@orrick.com
                  jperry@orrick.com
                  jliburt@orrick.com
                  lchermle@orrick.com
                  megan.lawson@orrick.com

               - and -

          Jill L. Rosenberg, Esq.
          Marc R Shapiro, Esq.
          ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
          51 W. 52nd Street
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 506-5000
          E-mail: jrosenberg@orrick.com
                  mrshapiro@orrick.com

               - and -

          Kathryn Grzenczyk Mantoan, Esq.
          ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
          1120 NW Couch Street, Suite 200
          Portland, OR 97209
          Telephone: (503) 943-4870
          E-mail: kmantoan@orrick.com

               - and -

          Wendy Butler Curtis, Esq.
          ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
          Columbia Center
          1152 15th Street NW
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 339-8400
          E-mail: wcurtis@orrick.com

               - and -

          Mark Steven Parris, Esq.
          ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
          701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5600
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (206) 839-4300
          Facsimile: (206) 839-4301
          E-mail: mparris@orrick.com


MID ATLANTIC PROFESSIONALS: Rahimi & Hakim Suit Ongoing in Maryland
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The case, WARIS RAHIMI, and MIRWAIS HAKIM, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. MID ATLANTIC
PROFESSIONALS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 8:18-cv-02036-TDC (S.D.
Cal., Feb. 6, 2018), has been transferred to the District of
Maryland and assigned case caption, Rahimi et al v. Mid Atlantic
Professionals, Inc., Case No. 8:18-cv-02036 (D. Md.).  The case has
been referred to Maryland Magistrate Judge Charles B. Day for all
proceedings.

The lawsuit seeks to recover unpaid overtime compensation,
liquidated damages, interest, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendant as non-exempt
employees on as-needed basis for missions at Camp Pendleton,
California, Fort Bliss, Texas, and Yakima, Washington.

Defendant moved to transfer venue to the District Court for the
District of Maryland.

Defendant is a Maryland corporation with its principle place of
business in Germantown, Maryland.

Mid Atlantic Professionals, Inc. was founded in 2002. The company's
line of business includes providing employment services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alexei Kuchinsky, Esq.
          William P. Klein, Esq.
          KLEIN LAW GROUP LLP
          50 California Street, Suite 1500
          San Francisco, CA 9411
          Tel: (415) 693-9107
          Fax: (415) 693-9222
          E-mail: alexei@sfbizlaw.com

               - and

          Trey Dayes, Esq.
          PHILLIPS DAYES LAW FIRM
          3101 North Central Avenue, Suite 1100
          Phoenix, AZ 85012
          Tel: (800) 917-4000
          Fax:602-288-1664
          E-mail: docket@phillipsdayeslaw.com


MONSANTO CO: Boelter Sues Over Herbicide Exposure
-------------------------------------------------
Norman L. Boelter, Plaintiff, v. Monsanto Company, Defendant, Case
No. 18-cv-01244 (E.D. Mo., July 27, 2018), seeks compensatory and
punitive damages, costs, expert fees, disbursements and attorneys'
fees incurred in prosecuting this action, disgorgement of profits,
pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the maximum rate and
such other relief resulting from negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (R), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

Boelter claims he was exposed to glyphosate and surfactant POEA
working as a grounds keeper for First Housing Corporation, mixing
and spraying Roundup in a landscaping application for the purpose
of maintaining property adjacent to apartment and housing
complexes. He developed Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia and Small
Lymphocytic Lymphoma, a subtype of non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma,
specifically diffuse large B-cell lymphoma of the cervical lymph
nodes. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

       Eric D. Holland, Esq.
       HOLLAND LAW FIRM
       300 North Tucker, Suite 801
       St. Louis, MO 63101
       Tel. (314) 241-8111
       Fax. (314) 241-5554
       Email: eholland@allfela.com

              - and -

       Jessica L. Richman, Esq.
       PARKER WAICHMAN LLP
       6 Harbor Park Drive
       Port Washington, NY 11050
       Tel. (516) 723-4627
       Fax (516) 723-4727
       Email: jrichman@yourlawyer.com


MONSANTO CO: Czaplicki Files Suit Over Roundup (R) Exposure
-----------------------------------------------------------
Stanley Czaplicki, Plaintiff, v. Monsanto Company and John Does
1-15, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-01245 (E.D. Mo., July 27, 2018),
seeks compensatory and punitive damages, costs, expert fees,
disbursements and attorneys' fees incurred in prosecuting this
action, disgorgement of profits, pre-judgment and post-judgment
interest at the maximum rate and such other relief resulting from
negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design,
development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing,
advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide
Roundup (R), containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

Czaplicki was exposed to glyphosate and surfactant POEA while
working for Four Seasons Landscaping, mixing and spraying Roundup
in a landscaping application within the scope of his employment. As
a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup,
Plaintiff developed non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma, specifically B-cell
follicular lymphoma. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

       Eric D. Holland, Esq.
       HOLLAND LAW FIRM
       300 North Tucker, Suite 801
       St. Louis, MO 63101
       Tel. (314) 241-8111
       Fax. (314) 241-5554
       Email: eholland@allfela.com

              - and -

       Jessica L. Richman, Esq.
       PARKER WAICHMAN LLP
       6 Harbor Park Drive
       Port Washington, NY 11050
       Tel. (516) 723-4627
       Fax (516) 723-4727
       Email: jrichman@yourlawyer.com

MONSANTO CO: Faces "Manes" PI Suit Alleging Roundup (R) Exposure
----------------------------------------------------------------
Frankie R. Manes, Plaintiff, v. Monsanto Company and John Does
1-50, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-01251 (E.D. Mo., July 27, 2018),
seeks compensatory and punitive damages, costs, expert fees,
disbursements and attorneys' fees incurred in prosecuting this
action, disgorgement of profits, pre-judgment and post-judgment
interest at the maximum rate and such other relief resulting from
negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design,
development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing,
advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide
Roundup (R), containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup to which she was exposed for more than
twenty-seven years while working as a farmer, mixing and spraying
Roundup in the regular course of farming operations over 10 acres
of corn fields and additional farmland. Manes developed
non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma, specifically follicular lymphoma, which was
diagnosed on or about December 5, 2012. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

       Eric D. Holland, Esq.
       HOLLAND LAW FIRM
       300 North Tucker, Suite 801
       St. Louis, MO 63101
       Tel. (314) 241-8111
       Fax. (314) 241-5554
       Email: eholland@allfela.com

              - and -

       Jessica L. Richman, Esq.
       PARKER WAICHMAN LLP
       6 Harbor Park Drive
       Port Washington, NY 11050
       Tel. (516) 723-4627
       Fax (516) 723-4727
       Email: jrichman@yourlawyer.com


MONSANTO CO: Farm Owner Sues Over Exposure to Herbicide Roundup(R)
------------------------------------------------------------------
John Edwards and Lynda Edwards, Plaintiffs, v. Monsanto Company and
John Does 1-50, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-01248 (E.D. Mo., July
27, 2018), seeks compensatory and punitive damages, costs, expert
fees, disbursements and attorneys' fees incurred in prosecuting
this action, disgorgement of profits, pre-judgment and
post-judgment interest at the maximum rate and such other relief
resulting from negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with
the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (R), containing the active ingredient
glyphosate.

Edwards was regularly exposed to glyphosate and surfactant POEA for
at least twenty-years, mixing and spraying Roundup in large volume
while maintaining his 1600-acre cotton farm. As a direct and
proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, Plaintiff developed
non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma, specifically diffuse large B-cell lymphoma.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

       Eric D. Holland, Esq.
       HOLLAND LAW FIRM
       300 North Tucker, Suite 801
       St. Louis, MO 63101
       Tel. (314) 241-8111
       Fax. (314) 241-5554
       Email: eholland@allfela.com

              - and -

       Jessica L. Richman, Esq.
       PARKER WAICHMAN LLP
       6 Harbor Park Drive
       Port Washington, NY 11050
       Tel. (516) 723-4627
       Fax (516) 723-4727
       Email: jrichman@yourlawyer.com

MONSANTO CO: Hyman Files PI Suit Over Herbicide Exposure
--------------------------------------------------------
Larry E. Hyman and Mary C. Hyman, Plaintiffs, v. Monsanto Company
and John Does 1-50, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-01249 (E.D. Mo.,
July 27, 2018), seeks compensatory and punitive damages, costs,
expert fees, disbursements and attorneys' fees incurred in
prosecuting this action, disgorgement of profits, pre-judgment and
post-judgment interest at the maximum rate and such other relief
resulting from negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with
the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (R), containing the active ingredient
glyphosate.

Hyman claims personal injuries sustained by exposure to Roundup
containing the active ingredient glyphosate and surfactant POEA, to
which he was regularly exposed for more than thirty-years, between
1980 and approximately August of 2017, while working as a corn and
soybean farmer, mixing and spraying Roundup concentrate (granule
and liquid forms) in farming operations with Roundup Ready(R) corn
and soybeans, as well as in landscaping applications around the
perimeter buildings adjacent to his farm, including his personal
residence. Plaintiff developed non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma, specifically
small, non-cleaved, non-Burkitt's malignant lymphoma, which was
diagnosed for the first time in or around October, 1996. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

       Eric D. Holland, Esq.
       HOLLAND LAW FIRM
       300 North Tucker, Suite 801
       St. Louis, MO 63101
       Tel. (314) 241-8111
       Fax. (314) 241-5554
       Email: eholland@allfela.com

              - and -

       Jessica L. Richman, Esq.
       PARKER WAICHMAN LLP
       6 Harbor Park Drive
       Port Washington, NY 11050
       Tel. (516) 723-4627
       Fax (516) 723-4727
       Email: jrichman@yourlawyer.com


MONSANTO CO: Mullins Sues Over Roundup (R) Exposure
---------------------------------------------------
Chad A. Mullins and Lora D. Mullins, Plaintiffs, v. Monsanto
Company and John Does 1-50, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-01252 (E.D.
Mo., July 27, 2018), seeks compensatory and punitive damages,
costs, expert fees, disbursements and attorneys' fees incurred in
prosecuting this action, disgorgement of profits, pre-judgment and
post-judgment interest at the maximum rate and such other relief
resulting from negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with
the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (R), containing the active ingredient
glyphosate.

Chad Mullins was exposed for more than twenty-seven years, mixing
and spraying Roundup in a landscaping application within the scope
of his duties as co-owner of Morristown Tree Service, as well as in
the regular course of operations on his fourteen-acre farm in
Hamblen County, Tennessee. Mullins developed non-Hodgkin's
Lymphoma, specifically large B-cell lymphoma. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

       Eric D. Holland, Esq.
       HOLLAND LAW FIRM
       300 North Tucker, Suite 801
       St. Louis, MO 63101
       Tel. (314) 241-8111
       Fax. (314) 241-5554
       Email: eholland@allfela.com

              - and -

       Jessica L. Richman, Esq.
       PARKER WAICHMAN LLP
       6 Harbor Park Drive
       Port Washington, NY 11050
       Tel. (516) 723-4627
       Fax (516) 723-4727
       Email: jrichman@yourlawyer.com

MRS BPO: Fetai Files Placeholder Bid for Class Certification
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned EMIR FETAI, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. MRS BPO LLC and
CLIENT SERVICES INC., the Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-01071-DEJ
(E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order certifying
proposed classes, appointing the Plaintiff as class representative,
and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such
other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further requests that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.

Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011),
overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d
783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of that motion [for class
certification] protects a putative class from attempts to buy off
the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh Circuit has held that
the specific procedure described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the
individual settlement of a class representative’s claims, the
same decision cautions that other methods may prevent a plaintiff
from representing a class.

A copy of the Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/8FWzti at no charge.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


NATIONAL BEVERAGE: Sept. 17 Class Action Lead Plaintiff Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP on July 17 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against National Beverage Corp. ("National Beverage" or
the "Company") (NYSE:FIZZ) and certain of its officers.   The class
action, filed in United States District Court, Southern District of
Florida, and docketed under 18-cv-61631, is on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons other than Defendants who purchased or
otherwise acquired National Beverage securities between July 17,
2014 and July 3, 2018, both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"),
seeking to recover damages caused by Defendants' violations of the
federal securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act") and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, against the Company
and certain of its top officials.

If you are a shareholder who purchased National Beverage securities
between July 17, 2014, and July 3, 2018, both dates inclusive, you
have until September 17, 2018, to ask the Court to appoint you as
Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the Complaint can be
obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.  To discuss this action, contact
Robert S. Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or
888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who inquire by e-mail
are encouraged to include their mailing address, telephone number,
and the number of shares purchased.

National Beverage, through its subsidiaries, develops, produces,
markets, and sells a portfolio of flavored beverage products in
North America and internationally. The Company offers beverages to
the active and health-conscious consumers, including sparkling
waters under the LaCroix, LaCroix Cúrate, LaCroix NiCola, and
Shasta Sparkling Water brand names.  It serves retailers, as well
as various up-and-down-the-street accounts through the take-home,
convenience, and food-service distribution channels.  The Company
sells and markets its products through an internal sales force, as
well as specialized broker networks.

On May 4, 2017, National Beverage issued a press release stating
that it "employs methods that no other company does in this
area—VPO (velocity per outlet) and VPC (velocity per capita)."
National Beverage asserted that it "utilize[s] two proprietary
techniques to magnify these measures and this creates growth never
before thought possible."  On May 5, 2017, National Beverage issued
a second press release, stating that "[o]ur impressive VPO
calculator . . . is flashing solid green numbers as we bring FY2017
to a close."

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) National Beverage's sales
claims and the supposed underlying "proprietary techniques" lacked
a verifiable basis; (ii) National Beverage's Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer ("CEO"), Defendant Nick A. Caporella
("Caporella"), engaged in a pattern of sexual misconduct between
2014 and 2016; and (iii) as a result, National Beverage's public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times.

On December 8, 2017, National Beverage issued a press release
announcing its financial and operating results for the period ended
October 28, 2017.  Notwithstanding the Company's representations in
its May 2017 press releases with respect to "creat[ing] growth
never before thought possible," analyst Laurent Grandet of Credit
Suisse assigned an "underperform" rating to the Company's stock.
Grandet noted that National Beverage's business was driven "almost
entirely" by the success of its LaCroix sparkling water brand, the
growth trajectory of which was in fact slowing.  That same day,
Maxim analyst Anthony Vendetti reiterated a "sell" recommendation
for National Beverage stock, noting that its "numerous weak brands
and opaque financial reporting" made its sale "highly unlikely."

On this news, National Beverage's share price fell $11.91, or
10.56%, to close at $100.84 on December 8, 2017.

On June 26, 2018, the Wall Street Journal published an article
entitled "The SEC Has Had Its Own Questions About LaCroix",
reporting that National Beverage had "declined to provide" the SEC
"with requested sales figures to clarify [National Beverage's]
sales claims", following a letter request from the SEC in January
2018.

On this news, National Beverage's share price fell $9.75, or 8.87%,
to close at $100.19 on June 27, 2018.

Then, on July 3, 2018, the Wall Street Journal published an article
entitled "Billionaire Behind LaCroix Accused of Improper Touching
by Two Pilots."  The article reported, in part, that "[t]wo pilots
have filed lawsuits alleging sexual harassment . . . claiming
82-year-old Nick A. Caporella inappropriately touched them on
multiple trips while they were flying with him in the cockpit of
his business jet" and that "[t]he suits claim the unwanted touching
occurred on more than 30 trips from 2014 to 2016."

On this news, National Beverage's share price fell $2.90, or 2.64%,
over the following two trading days, closing at $107.04 on July 6,
2018.

With offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Paris, The
Pomerantz Firm -- http://www.pomerantzlaw.com-- is acknowledged as
one of the premier firms in the areas of corporate, securities, and
antitrust class litigation.  Founded by the late Abraham L.
Pomerantz, known as the dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz
Firm pioneered the field of securities class actions.  Today, more
than 80 years later, the Pomerantz Firm continues in the tradition
he established, fighting for the rights of the victims of
securities fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate
misconduct.  The Firm has recovered numerous multimillion-dollar
damages awards on behalf of class members. [GN]

NATIONAL FREIGHT: Court Grants Declaratory Relief in Truckers' Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment in the case
captioned JOHN F. PORTILLO, et al., individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL FREIGHT,
INC., et al., Defendants, Civil Action. No.
15-7908(JBS/KMW)(D.N.J.).

The Plaintiffs are truckers from Pennsylvania and Rhode Island who
claim that they performed deliveries to Trader Joe's stores
throughout many East Coast states on behalf of the Defendants, but
the Defendants erroneously classified them as independent
contractors rather than employees, thereby taking unlawful
deductions from their wages.  The Plaintiffs claim the Defendants
are liable for violations of the Massachusetts Wage Act (Count I),
unjust enrichment and in quantum meruit, but they seek to amend
their pleadings to assert that New Jersey law should govern this
dispute.

Contractual Choice-of-Law Provision

The Plaintiffs argue that New Jersey law applies because the
choice-of-law provisions in their contracts designate New Jersey
law as the relevant and applicable body of law.
Ordinarily, when parties to a contract have agreed to be governed
by the laws of a particular state, New Jersey courts will uphold
the contractual choice if it does not violate New Jersey's public
policy. New Jersey applies Section 187 of the Restatement (Second)
of Conflicts of Laws, which provides that the law of the state
chosen by the parties will apply, unless either:(a) the chosen
state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties'
choice, or(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the
particular issue and which would be the state of the applicable law
in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.

The Plaintiffs claim that the interpretation of the agreement will
be intrinsic to the employment status analysis since a central
factor in determining employment status is the employer's right to
direct the work of the workers. Determining whether NFI has
retained the right to control the Plaintiffs' work will necessarily
require the analysis of the terms and effects of the Independent
Contractor Operating Agreements (ICOA). While the Court agrees that
the terms of the Agreements will be relevant to this analysis, it
is not persuaded that the terms will be intrinsic, inextricable, or
otherwise indispensably intertwined with the employee/independent
contractor analysis.

In other words, the statutory wage claims comprising the gravamen
of the Plaintiffs' suit may certainly involve the relationship of
the parties but require neither interpretation of, nor governance
by, the ICOA or the Lessor and Lease Operating Agreement (LLOA).
Accordingly, the Court cannot afford the choice-of-law provisions
regarding interpretation or performance of the agreement the broad
and conclusive construction urged by the Plaintiffs extending to
statutory wage claims not addressed in or connected to the
agreement.

The Court is mindful of the Plaintiffs' argument that, in these
other cases, courts have found the statutory or tort claims to fall
outside the coverage of contractual choice-of-law provisions where
it was the defendant, as drafter of the contract, who was seeking
to enforce the choice-of-law provision against a plaintiff who
sought to press alternative state law claims.  The Plaintiffs
submit that, in this more unusual circumstance, where they are
simply acquiescing to a broad construction of the choice-of-law
provision that was drafted by employers and presented to them for
their acceptance, that choice (and the desired breadth thereof by
the Plaintiffs as the non-drafters) should simply be respected by
this Court.  

The intended breadth of the parties' contractual choice-of-law
provisions presents a close question. Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs'
analysis does not seem to be in keeping with principles of
contractual interpretation under New Jersey law this Court is
obliged to apply to determine the scope of the choice-of-law
provision; nor is such an approach how other courts have, in the
main, analytically addressed this issue.

Again, the Court notes the relatively unusual posture of this
motion, where the Plaintiffs, despite being non-drafters, advocate
for a broad construction of the choice-of-law provision, and it is
the Defendant-drafters who would have it applied only narrowly. But
this posture is not dispositive, and the Court is persuaded that
the Third Circuit, as well as New Jersey courts, would deem the
ICOA Provision to be narrow and not apply to wage-and-hour claims
premised on misclassification, as they do not directly arise out
of, nor are inextricably intertwined with the agreement containing
the choice-of-law provision.

While the LLOA Provision dictates that the Agreement shall be
governed by New Jersey law not only as to interpretation but also
as to performance, the Court also finds that it cannot fairly be
said, for the reasons discussed above, that the statutory claims
premised on the alleged misclassification arise from questions of
the performance of the Lessor and Lease Operating Agreement.  

Accordingly, though the question is close, the Court finds that the
parties' contractual choice-of-law provision is not phrased
sufficiently broadly to apply to the non-contractual claims
asserted here.

Statutory Wage Claims and Quasi-Contract Claims

Here, the Court finds that the relationship between the Plaintiffs
and the Defendants is of two faces: the contractual relationship is
centered in New Jersey and the physical interface of work
performance is in Pennsylvania. While the Plaintiffs made
deliveries throughout several states, interacted with the
Defendants while the Defendants held their primary place of
business in New Jersey, and felt the effects of their work within
their own domicils, they all reported to work for the Defendants in
Pennsylvania and had their primary face-to-face interactions with
the Defendants through the Defendants' Pennsylvania place of
business and Pennsylvania-based employees.

On the other hand, the parties' legal, contractual relationship was
centered in New Jersey, as the Plaintiffs (who knowingly took on
the highly mobile work of truck-driving) chose to enter into
contracts with a New Jersey corporation, with its principal place
of business in New Jersey, and understood the Defendants to wish to
apply New Jersey law to contractual disputes regardless of their
own states of residence.

The Court is persuaded that New Jersey has the most significant
relationship to the parties, the working relationships, and the
claims at issue in this case. While the question is a close one,
the Court is mindful of the following factors. First, the
Defendants are the more sophisticated party and the drafters of the
contract; they elected to be bound (with regard to contract claims)
by New Jersey law and to bind the drivers to New Jersey law with
regard to such claims, and the Plaintiffs also seek to apply New
Jersey law.

This is the unusual case where the Plaintiffs seek to bind the
drafters of the contract to the choice-of-law stated therein. While
the Court, does not find that the scope of that provision
encompasses the Plaintiffs' claims literally and directly, the
Court does note that giving effect to the reasonable expectations
of the parties to a contract is one of the important factors in a
choice-of-law analysis under the Restatement. Here, it appears fair
to presume that Plaintiffs and Defendants reasonably expected New
Jersey law to apply to the bulk of their disputes and contracted
for that outcome.

Second, the nature of the Plaintiffs' work was highly mobile and
not based in any other state more significantly so as to grant that
state the most significant interest under the Restatement's
analysis. While the Plaintiffs' states of residence have an
interest in the proper payment of wages to their citizens, it
appears to be without question that the Plaintiffs knowingly took
on a business opportunity that was inherently of an interstate
nature, with the Rhode Island Plaintiffs traveling, e.g., to
Pennsylvania to pick up their shipments and deliver them all over
the Eastern Seaboard. No Plaintiff's work was primarily performed
in his own state of residence.

Third, while the center of the relationship between the parties in
physical terms appears to be in Pennsylvania at the warehouse
interface, as that is where the Plaintiffs interacted with the
Defendants on the most regular basis, that does not lead to the
conclusion that Pennsylvania has the most significant interest in
light of all other factors. This would seem to bind the Defendants
to abiding by the wage laws of any state in which it has,
effectively, a satellite office that serves as a home-base to
drivers, when the Defendants' operations are primarily in New
Jersey and the Plaintiffs and the Defendants reasonably sought to
apply New Jersey law to their contractual claims.

Finally, the Court notes that the Plaintiffs did perform a
significant portion of their work in New Jersey. This is not the
case where the Plaintiffs seek the protection of New Jersey state
wage and employment laws for people who avowedly never worked in
New Jersey.

While this case presents complex issues, the Court is persuaded
that New Jersey has the most significant interest in these
particular circumstances. Accordingly, the Court finds, pursuant to
a choice-of-law analysis under the Restatement and Camp Jaycee,
that New Jersey law applies to the Plaintiffs' claims.

The Court will grant Plaintiffs' motion for a declaratory judgment
that New Jersey law applies.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 11, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yam2u5qk from Leagle.com.

JOHN F. PORTILLO, RAFAEL SUAREZ, MARTIN DURAN, GERMAN BENCOSME,
EDIN VARGAS, LUIS A. HERNANDEZ, JOSUE PAZ & ALAVARO CASTANEDA,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by ALEXANDRA KOROPEY PIAZZA --
apiazza@bm.net -- BERGER & MONTAGUE PC & CAMILLE FUNDORA --
cfundora@bm.net -- BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C.

NATIONAL FREIGHT, INC. & NFI INTERACTIVE LOGISTICS, INC.,
Defendants, represented by ROBERT H. BERNSTEIN --
bernsteinrob@gtlaw.com -- GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP & CHRISTIANA LYNN
SIGNS -- signsc@gtlaw.com -- GREENBERG TRAURIG.

NESTLE USA: Misleads Consumers With "No GMO" Seal, Latiff Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JENNIFER LATIFF, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. NESTLE USA, INC., Case No. 2:18-cv-06503 (C.D. Cal.,
July 27, 2018), is a proposed class action against Nestle for
allegedly misleading consumers about its products that bear a "No
GMO Ingredients(TM)" certificate of approval on the packaging, that
appears to be that of an independent third-party, when, it in fact,
is not.

The Defendant made material misrepresentations and omissions by
affixing the No GMO Ingredients(TM) seal of approval in order to
lead consumers to believe that the products have been certified as
not having GMO ingredients by a third party rather than the
Defendant itself, Ms. Latiff contends.

Nestle USA, Inc., is a Delaware corporation with its corporate
headquarters located in Virginia.  Nestle produces and distributes
food and beverage products.  The Company offers bakery, chocolates,
confectionery, snacks, coffee, fruit and vegetable juices, ice
creams, and frozen food products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael R. Reese, Esq.
          George V. Granade, Esq.
          REESE LLP
          100 West 93rd Street, 16th Floor
          New York, NY 10025
          Telephone: (212) 643-0500
          Facsimile: (212) 253-4272
          E-mail: mreese@reesellp.com
                  ggranade@reesellp.com

               - and -

          Daniel L. Warshaw, Esq.
          Bobby Pouya, Esq.
          PEARSON, SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP
          15165 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 400
          Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
          Telephone: (818) 788-8300
          Facsimile: (818) 788-8104
          E-mail: dwarshaw@pswlaw.com
                  bpouya@pswlaw.com


NEW YORK UNIVERSITY: Basso et al. Seek to Certify Students Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled ANNA BASSO, AMY HARTMAN, and JAIME VILLA
RUIZ, the Plaintiffs v. NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, the Defendant, Case
No. 1:16-cv-07295-VM-KNF (S.D.N.Y.), the Plaintiff asks the Court
for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all students who attended New York University Tisch School
      of the Arts, Asia"; and

   2. appointing Giskan, Solotaroff & Anderson LLP, and Schwartz&
      Ponterio, PLLC as counsel for the class pursuant to Rule
      23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A copy of the Notice of Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com
at https://is.gd/rN0OfY at no charge.

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class:

          Oren Giskan, Esq.
          GISKAN, SOLOTAROFF & ANDERSON, LLP
          217 Centre Street, 6th Fl.
          New York, NY 10013
          Telephone: (212) 847 8315
          Facsimile: (212) 473 8096
          E-mail: ogiskan@gslawny.com

               - and -

          Matthew Francis Schwartz, Esq.
          SCHWARTZ & PONTERIO, PLLC
          New York, NY 10001-5304
          Telephone: (212) 714 1200
          Facsimile: (212) 714 1264
          E-mail: mschawrtz@splaw.us


NHL: Class Action Denial to Spur Individual Lawsuits
----------------------------------------------------
Ken Campbell, writing for The Hockey News, reports that the
concussion-related lawsuit filed by former players against the NHL
was denied class-action status, but that can open the floodgates
for individual cases to be heard, like that of former NHL
defenseman Steve Montador, who died at 35.

When a Minnesota judge denied class-action status for a lawsuit by
former players accusing the NHL of failing to protect them from
head injuries and concealing information about the long-term
effects of concussions, it closed the book on one legal chapter of
this saga, but opened the door to another one to begin.

The NHL scored a victory on July 13 when U.S. District Judge Susan
Nelson came down with her ruling regarding the class-action
lawsuit, but what that likely has done is open the floodgates to
about 100 individual lawsuits that have been filed against the NHL.
Typically in cases like these, individual cases are put on the
backburner while the class-action is handled. Now that there has
been a ruling, the NHL's legal headaches might just be beginning.

There are those in the legal community who believe the first case
on the docket is the one the NHL would likely be least interested
in defending off the top, which is the one leveled against the
league by the estate of former NHLer Steve Montador in 2015. The
lawsuit, which was filed about eight months after Mr. Montador died
at the age of 35, alleges the NHL, "failed to keep Steven R.
Montador reasonably safe during his career and utterly failed to
provide him with crucial medical information on the permanent
ramifications of brain trauma."

"Now his case will go forward," Stuart Davidson, one of the lead
lawyers in the class-action lawsuit, said of the Montador case. "It
would not surprise me if the first test case for all the plaintiffs
were not Mr. Montador's case. I know his lawyers are ready, willing
and able and they will do whatever they can to push that case
forward as soon as possible because Mr. Montador (Steve's father,
Paul) is anxious to have his case heard."

William Gibbs -- WTG@CorboyDemetrio.com -- of Corboy and Demetrio,
the Chicago-based firm representing Mr. Montador's estates said,
"the Montador family looks forward to its day in court," saying
that case-specific discovery in the case could be done within nine
months, six months if both sides were aggressive. "There is
definitely some work to do," Mr. Gibbs said. The only problem is
that it's likely the NHL would not want the Montador case tried
first because of the tragic outcome, the fact that it is so
high-profile and that studies of Montador's brain after he died
revealed it was rife with Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE).
Dr. Charles Tator, who examined Montador's brain after his death,
said it was the youngest brain he had seen to have CTE and was
surprised to see how widespread it was. "It wasn't just a little
bit," Dr. Tator said at the time. "It was in spades." Since his
death,
Mr. Montador's story and the effects of blows to the head have been
the subject of a book by Hall of Famer Ken Dryden titled, Game
Change: The Life and Death of Steve Montador and the Future of
Hockey.

In reality, there was actually very little chance the NHL
concussion lawsuit would have gone ahead as a class-action
procedure. That's because this lawsuit was not quite like the
class-action lawsuit that saw thousands of former NFL players
awarded $1 billion in damages in 2017. In that lawsuit, there were
two distinct classes, a litigation class and a settlement class.
It's important to make that distinction because for purposes of
litigation, there really was no class-action lawsuit. The group was
made up of thousands of players who were suing the NFL
individually. When a settlement became a possibility, the
settlement class was created, which would allow the NFL to pay out
one lump sum in exchange for not having to deal with any future
lawsuits. The NHL players, for litigation purposes, created a
class-action group and its case was denied largely because the
medical monitoring of the players, had they won the lawsuit, would
have been subject to each state and province's legal jurisdiction.

It's too early to tell whether the NHL might be willing to do the
same thing to avoid the prospect of being dragged into court for
more than 100 individual cases, a number that will undoubtedly grow
now that the class-action lawsuit has been dismissed. The league
declined comment on the situation when approached by THN.com. But
one thing is certain. Things did not get any less complicated or
potentially any less contentious because of the decision that came
down in a courtroom in St. Paul on July 13. [GN]

NHL: Concussion Suits to Push Through Despite Ruling
----------------------------------------------------
Ken Campbell, writing for The Hockey News, reports that a Minnesota
judge denied class-action status to a lawsuit brought by former
players against the NHL that accuses the league failing to protect
them from head injuries and concealing information about the
long-term effects of concussions, but walking away isn't an option
for players and their lawyers.

There is no denying the NHL scored a major victory  when a
Minnesota judge denied class-action status for a lawsuit by former
players accusing the NHL of failing to protect them from head
injuries and concealing information about the long-term effects of
concussions, but a lead lawyer for the 138 plaintiffs said that
does not change the core issue and that this action is far from
dead.

Stuart Davidson of Robbins, Geller, Rudman and Dowd, one of the
firms representing the former players, said the plaintiffs have
until July 27 to appeal the ruling, but said the lawsuits will go
ahead with or without a class action. "I suspect that no matter
what we do on the appeal front, we will move forward with
individual trials," Mr. Davidson said. "At this point, we lawyers
have been living with this case for four years now. We care deeply
about this case, we care deeply about our clients, we care deeply
about the moral issues and we're not just going to walk away.
That's just not an option for us."

But when U.S. District Judge Susan Nelson came down with her
ruling, it struck a major blow to the former players who, along
with their lawyers, are now faced with the prospect of pursuing
cases individually and bearing the costs associated with each one.
That means the NHL will likely be looking at the insides of
courtrooms all over North America for the next few years instead of
facing one trial, but the lawyers representing the former players
will have to decide whether each case is worth the expense of
pursuing.

"It made and continues to make literally no sense to us or our
clients why every retired player would have to prove the exact same
thing over and over and over again, and that's essentially what
this ruling says to do," Mr. Davidson said. "Each player is now
required to file his own individual lawsuit and…that is,
unfortunately, a very expensive proposition. You have to have
epidemiologists and neurosurgeons and neurologists and
neuropsychologists and the world's most renowned experts. You can
imagine how much they charge on an hourly basis."

In her ruling the judge said, "widespread differences in applicable
state laws" that govern the kind of medical monitoring sought by
the players as a remedy, saying such disparities would pose
"significant case management difficulties." But Mr. Davidson
disagreed with that assessment, saying that their side argued that
in terms of whether or not the league was negligent, New York State
law should apply since the league has been based there since 1977.
Then, if they had been able to prove their allegations, the medical
monitoring remedies should be applied according to Minnesota laws
because that's where the jury would have been empanelled. He also
said there is obviously no one venue where the injuries took
place.

"No single elbow to the head that took place in Quebec or Hartford
or Buffalo is at issue in this case," Mr. Davidson said. "The issue
is what were (the players) told and whose responsibility was it? We
argued that there is no specific location of the injury. In this
case, there is no one, single injury. The injuries took place over
the course of multiple years, multiple seasons, multiple locations.
The issue isn't the injury as much as it is what the NHL did or did
not say. She is now looking at it from a manageability standpoint.
How manageable will this trial be? And if she's saying 'I need to
figure out what the law is on medical monitoring and negligence is
for all 50 states, plus the provinces in Canada . . . that is
unmanageable for me and, therefore, class action is not the best
way to handle this.' "

Mr. Davidson vehemently disagreed with the judge's ruling and said
the plaintiffs will now decide whether or not they have a case to
appeal it. One thing that is certain is that the ruling in
Minnesota does nothing to address what is at the heart of the case
and that is whether or not the league had a duty to inform the
players of the potential dangers of repeated head trauma and
whether they were negligent in not doing so.

"The more I think about it and the more I read her decision, the
more it irks me and angers me because to now require individual
plaintiffs to spend millions of dollars to prove the exact same
thing…that makes zero sense to me," Mr. Davidson said. With all
due respect to the judge whom I think so highly of, she is
brilliant, she should be at an appeals court at some point because
she is just that good of a judge, but not every judge gets it
right. And we're allowed to have respectful disagreements with
judges just like they're allowed to respectfully disagree with the
lawyers." [GN]

OHIO STATE: Faces Class Action Over Student Athletes' Abuse
-----------------------------------------------------------
ABC 6/FOX 28 reports that a class-action lawsuit was filed against
The Ohio State University due to the "molestation of countless
athletes."

The lawsuit, filed by four law firms across the country claims the
university took no steps to protect students from the alleged
illegal sexual misconduct committed by Dr. Richard Strauss.

A representative of the law firms says Strauss' behavior affected
hundreds of student-athletes across 14 sports. The lawsuit alleges
that athletes were repeatedly forced to undergo abusive physical
examinations administered by Strauss to be allowed to compete for
the university.

Strauss is accused of fondling, touching, groping of the testicles
and penis, and even penetration of the anus in his examinations.

Since accusations have come out about Strauss, independent
investigators have been investigating those claims.

"Our investigation has conclusively demonstrated that Ohio State
turned a blind eye to Dr. Strauss while he freely used his position
of trust and authority to regularly sexually assault, batter,
molest, and harass male athletes over the entire course of his
career at Ohio State," said Robert Allard of San Jose, CA, one of
the lawyers behind the class-action suit.

The lawsuit says the former Athletic Director Andy Geiger, and
others, failed to take appropriate action to prevent Strauss from
performing those alleged acts.

"These officials turned their backs on the students, choosing
instead to continue fund-raising and treating athletes as
commodities to be exploited for commercial gain," said Steve Estey
of San Diego, CA, another lawyer behind the lawsuit.

The class-action suit seeks damages along with injunctive relief
that would require Ohio State to put in place and fund a program to
stop the sexual abuse, exploitation, and trafficking of Ohio
State's student-athletes.

"The university must take immediate responsibility for the alleged
deliberate indifference to the suffering of hundreds of its male
athletes across at least 14 sports who endured flagrant and
repeated sexual abuse," said Rex Sharp of Kansas City, MO, a third
lawyer behind the suit.

A fourth lawyer, Jon Little of Indianapolis, IN is also behind the
class-action lawsuit.

The law firms have asked sexually abused athletes or witnesses to
contact their firms at 1-800-474-5201 or athleteabuse.com.

ABC 6/FOX 28 is reaching out to the university for comment. [GN]

OKLAHOMA BLOOD: Lenore Seeks to Certify Employees Class
-------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled LEILA LENORE, Individually and on behalf of
other similarly situated employees and former employees, the
Plaintiff, v. OKLAHOMA BLOOD INSTITUTE, An Oklahoma not for profit
corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 5:17-cv-01326-M (W.D. Okla.),
the Parties jointly ask the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all current and former employees of Oklahoma Blood
      Institute who, at any time from June 1, 2015 to present,
      worked for Oklahoma Blood Institute in the Oklahoma, Texas,
      and/or Arkansas service areas1 in one or more of the
      following positions as a recruiter of businesses/places for
      mobile blood drives and/or as a recruiter of blood
      donations for mobile blood drives:

      (a) Account Consultant I;
      (b) Account Consultant II;
      (c) Manager I, Account, Senior (Donor Recruitment);
      (d) Manager I, Donor Recruitment (Donor Recruitment);
      (e) Manager II, Account Senior (Blood Program Consultants);
      (f) Manager II, Donor Recruitment (Donor Recruitment);
      (g) Manager II, Account, Senior (Donor Recruitment); and
      (h) Manager II, Donor Recruitment (Blood Program
          Consultants

   2. directing Defendant to supply the Plaintiff with the names,
      positions, dates of employment, last known mailing
      addresses, last known phone numbers, and last known email
      addresses for the putative class members in an
      electronically readable format within twenty-one (21) days
      of this Court's Conditional Certification Order;

   3. directing Plaintiff to send notices via one first-class
      mailing and one standard emailing, within 21 days of
      receipt of the information identified in Section II, above.
      The first-class mailing and emailing of notices shall take
      place on the same calendar day; and

   4. giving putative class members 60 days from the date notice
      to opt-in to this action.

A copy of the Motion is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://is.gd/UWNWKe at no charge.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Rand C. Eddy, Esq.
          Riley W. Mulinix, Esq.
          Joshua K. Hefner, Esq.
          MULINIX GEORKE & MEYER, PLLC
          210 Park Avenue, Suite 3030
          Oklahoma City, OK 73102
          Telephone: (405) 232 3800
          Facsimile: (405) 232 8999
          E-mail: rand@lawokc.com
                  riley@lawokc.com
                  jhefner@lawokc.com

               - and -

          Nathan L. Whatley, Esq.
          Kristin M. Simpsen, Esq.
          MCAFEE & TAFT, PC
          Tenth Floor, Two Leadership Square
          211 North Robinson Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73102-7103
          Telephone: (405) 235 9621
          Facsimile: (405) 235 0439
          E-mail: nathan.whatley@mcafeetaft.com
          kristin.simpsen@mcafeetaft.com


OVASCIENCE INC: Court Denies Freedman Family's Bid to Intervene
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
denied Lead Plaintiff's Motion to Intervene and to Strike Notice in
the cases captioned FADI DAHHAN, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. OVASCIENCE, INC., et al,
Defendants, and WESTMORELAND COUNTY EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM, on
Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff,
v. OVASCIENCE, INC., et al, Defendants, Civil Action Nos.
1:17-cv-10511-IT, 1:17-cv-12312-IT (D. Mass.).

Fadi Dahhan filed a class action against OvaScience, Inc., and
others, asserting claims for violations of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, on
behalf of purchasers of OvaScience common stock.

The Lead plaintiff in the first action seeks to intervene in the
second action, to strike notice regarding appointment of lead
plaintiff in the second action.

Freedman Family asserts that it may intervene in the Westmoreland
action as a matter of Westmoreland. A party may intervene as of
right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) if that party
meets four requirements: First, the application must be timely.
Second, the applicant must claim an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action. Third,
the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede her ability to
protect that interest. Fourth, the applicant must show that her
interest will not be adequately represented by existing parties.

Freedman Family nonetheless asserts that because it was appointed
as lead plaintiff in Dahhan, and because the public offering
occurred within the class period claimed in the Dahhan complaint,
it is authorized to prosecute the claims" at issue in Westmoreland.
  

Freedman Family misses the mark, the Court says.  The authority it
offers supports the notion that a lead plaintiff does not itself
need to have standing to sue on every claim, but it does not
undermine the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
(as well as constitutional standing requirements) that there must
at least be a named plaintiff with standing to sue on such claims
before the lead plaintiff may assert them.  

Here, the only plaintiffs identified in the Dahhan Amended
Complaint is Freedman Family. Dahhan, which purchased shares in
March 2015, and not in the Secondary offering in January 2015,
Kovacs Decl.  

Accordingly, there is no named plaintiff in Dahhan with standing to
bring the claims raised in Westmoreland.

Freedman Family argues finally that its interests and the interests
of the Class it was appointed to represent are threatened by
Westmoreland' notice of a new Lead Plaintiff deadline.

Westmoreland. Although Freedman Family was appointed lead counsel,
no class has yet been certified,3 and Freedman Family's papers
raise the question as to whether the broad class Freedman Family
seeks to represent would be appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, where Freedman Family's claims may not be typical of
those investors who purchased securities in OvaScience's January 8,
2015, Secondary Offering of securities. In any event, the court
finds no threat posed by Westmoreland's notice to the interests of
the potential class members.

Freedman Family does not have an interest in the Securities Act
claims which are the subject of the Westmoreland action, and the
motion to intervene is DENIED. The court further DENIES Freedman
Family's request to strike the notice of the Westmoreland action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 16, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y928ub2l from
Leagle.com.

Westmoreland County Employee Retirement System, On Behalf of
Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff,
represented by Amanda F. Lawrence -- ALAWRENCE@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM --
Scott & Scott Attoneys at Law, LLP, Theodore M. Hess-Mahan ,
Hutchings, Barsamian, Cross and Mandelcorn, LLP & Thomas L.
Laughlin, IV -- TLAUGHLIN@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- Scott Scott, Attorneys
at Law, LLP, pro hac vice.

OvaScience, Inc., Michelle Dipp, Jeffrey E. Young, Richard H.
Aldrich, Jeffrey D. Capello, Mary Fisher, Marc Kozin, Stephen
Krauss, Thomas Malley & Harald F. Stock, Defendants, represented by
John F. Sylvia -- Jsilva@mintz.com -- Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris,
Glovsky & Popeo, PC & Matthew D. Levitt -- MDLevitt@mintz.com --
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, PC.

J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC &
Leerink Partners LLC, Defendants, represented by Aaron T. Morris --
aaron.morris@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP, James R. Carroll -- james.carroll@skadden.com -- Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & Peter J. Simshauser --
peter.simshauser@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom LLP.

Freedman Family Investments LLC, Intervenor, represented by Alan L.
Kovacs , Law Office of Alan L. Kovacs.

PETROBRAS: Bishop Appeals Settlement Approval in Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Objectors Catherine O. Bishop and Mathis B. Bishop filed an appeal
from a judgment that approved the settlement agreement and awarded
attorney's fees in the consolidated litigation titled In re:
Petrobras Securities Litigation, Case No. 1:14-cv-09662-JSR, in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on July 18, 2018, Jeremy
Lieberman, Esq., and his partners at the securities class action
firm Pomerantz are about $171 million richer, after U.S. District
Judge Jed Rakoff of Manhattan issued a decision on June 25 granting
final approval of a $3 billion securities class action settlement
against the Brazilian energy company Petrobras and one of its
auditors.

Pomerantz, one of three lead firms in the case, did the bulk of the
work, so it's receiving the lion's share of the total $186.5
million Judge Rakoff awarded class counsel for obtaining an
"exceptional" result in a risky case without a foreordained
outcome.

The appellate case is captioned as In re: Petrobras Securities
Litigation, Case No. 18-2120, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.

The Bishops, of San Antonio, Texas, appears pro se.[BN]

Lead Plaintiff Universities Superannuation Scheme Limited is
represented by:

          Emma Gilmore, Esq.
          Jeremy Alan Lieberman, Esq.
          Marc Ian Gross, Esq.
          Adam G. Kurtz, Esq.
          Brenda F. Szydlo, Esq.
          Jennifer Banner Sobers, Esq.
          John Anthony Kehoe, Esq.
          Justin Solomon Nematzadeh, Esq.
          Marc Christian Gorrie, Esq.
          Susan Jessica Weiswasser, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Ave, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661−1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661−8665
          E-mail: egilmore@pomlaw.com
                  jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  migross@pomlaw.com
                  agkurtz@pomlaw.com
                  bszydlo@pomlaw.com
                  jbsobers@pomlaw.com
                  jkehoe@pomlaw.com
                  jnematzadeh@pomlaw.com
                  mgorrie@pomlaw.com
                  sjweiswasser@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Jennifer Pafiti, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          468 North Camden Drive
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 285−5330
          E-mail: jpafiti@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Patrick Vincent Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          10 South LaSalle Street, Suite 3505
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (212) 661−1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661−8665
          E-mail: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

Consolidated Plaintiff Louis Kennedy, Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Brian Philip Murray, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          230 Park Avenue, Suite 530
          New York, NY 10169
          Telephone: (212) 682−5340
          Facsimile: (212) 884−0988
          E-mail: bmurray@glancylaw.com

               - and -

          Gregory Bradley Linkh, Esq.
          GLANCY BINKOW & GOLDBERG LLP (NYC2)
          77 Water Street, 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (646) 722−4180
          E-mail: glinkh@glancylaw.com

               - and -

          Casey Edwards Sadler, Esq.
          Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
          Michael Goldberg, Esq.
          Robert Vincent Prongay, Esq.
          GLANCY BINKOW & GOLDBERG LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201−9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201−9160
          E-mail: csadler@glancylaw.com
                  lglancy@glancylaw.com
                  mgoldberg@glancylaw.com
                  rprongay@glancylaw.com

Consolidated Plaintiff Ken Ngo, Individually and On Behalf of all
others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Erica Lauren Stone, Esq.
          Laurence Matthew Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 686−1060
          Facsimile: (212) 202−3827
          E-mail: estone@rosenlegal.com
                  lrosen@rosenlegal.com

Consolidated Plaintiff Jonathan Messing, Individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Francis Paul McConville, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP (NYC)
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661−1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661−8665
          E-mail: fmcconville@labaton.com

               - and -

          Jeremy Alan Lieberman, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Ave, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661−1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661−8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com

Movant Petrobras Plaintiff Group is represented by:

          Alexis L. Collins, Esq.
          Anna Karass, Esq.
          William Thomas, Esq.
          CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP
          2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 974−1519
          Facsimile: (202) 974−1999
          E-mail: alcollins@cgsh.com
                  akarass@cgsh.com
                  wthomas@cgsh.com

               - and -

          Jason Robert D'Agnenica, Esq.
          STULL STULL & BRODY
          6 East 45th Street, 5th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 687−7230
          Facsimile: (212) 490−2022
          E-mail: jasondag@ssbny.com

Defendant Petroleo Brasileiro S.A.- Petrobras is represented by:

          Mitchell A. Lowenthal, Esq.
          Roger Allen Cooper, Esq.
          Lewis J. Liman, Esq.
          CLEARY GOTTLIEB
          One Liberty Plaza
          New York, NY 10006
          Telephone: (212) 225−2000
          Facsimile: (212) 225−3499
          E-mail: mlowenthal@cgsh.com
                  racooper@cgsh.com
                  lliman@cgsh.com

               - and -

          David L. Schwarz, Esq.
          Joshua D. Branson, Esq.
          KELLOGG, HANSEN, TODD, FIGEL & FREDERICK PLLC
          1615 M Street, N.W., Suite 400
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 326−7900
          Facsimile: (202) 326−7999
          E-mail: dschwarz@kellogghansen.com
                  jbranson@kellogghansen.com

Defendant Jose Sergio Gabrielli is represented by:

          Roger Allen Cooper, Esq.
          Elizabeth Vicens, Esq.
          CLEARY GOTTLIEB
          One Liberty Plaza
          New York, NY 10006
          Telephone: (212) 225−2000
          Facsimile: (212) 225−3499
          E-mail: racooper@cgsh.com
                  evicens@cgsh.com

               - and -

          Edward M. Spiro, Esq.
          Elkan Abramowitz, Esq.
          Howard Adam Locker, Esq.
          Jasmine Marie Juteau, Esq.
          MORVILLO, ABRAMOWITZ, GRAND, IASON, & ANELLO P.C.
          565 5th Avenue
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 880−9460
          Facsimile: (212) 856−9494
          E-mail: espiro@magislaw.com
                  eabramowitz@maglaw.com
                  hlocker@maglaw.com
                  jjuteau@maglaw.com

Defendant PrivewaterhouseCoopers Auditores Independentes is
represented by:

          Israel Dahan, Esq.
          James J. Capra, Jr., Esq.
          Lauren Webb Mitchell, Esq.
          KING & SPALDING LLP
          1185 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 556−2100
          Facsimile: (212) 556−2222
          E-mail: idahan@kslaw.com
                  jcapra@kslaw.com
                  lmitchell@kslaw.com

               - and -

          Kenneth Yeatts Turnbull, Esq.
          Michael Pauze, Esq.
          KING & SPALDING LLP
          1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
          Washington, DC 20006−4706
          Telephone: (202) 626−2644
          Facsimile: (202) 626−2644
          E-mail: kturnbull@kslaw.com
                  mpauze@kslaw.com

Defendant BB Securities Ltd. is represented by:

          Albert L. Hogan, III, Esq.
          SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM, LLP
          155 North Wacker Drive, Suite 2700
          Chicago, IL 60606−1720
          Telephone: (312) 407−0700
          Facsimile: (312) 407−0411
          E-mail: al.hogan@skadden.com

               - and -

          Jeremy A. Berman, Esq.
          SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
          Four Times Square
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 735−2032
          Facsimile: (917) 777−2032
          E-mail: jberman@skadden.com

               - and -

          Michael Scott Bailey, Esq.
          SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
          1440 New York Ave., NW
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 371−7000
          Facsimile: (202) 661−2391
          E-mail: michael.bailey@skadden.com

Defendants BB Securities Ltd., Theodore Marshall Helms, Petrobras
Global Finance, B.V., Petroleo Brasileiro S.A.-Petrobras and
Petrobras America Inc. are represented by:

          Mitchell A. Lowenthal, Esq.
          CLEARY GOTTLIEB
          One Liberty Plaza
          New York, NY 10006
          Telephone: (212) 225−2000
          Facsimile: (212) 225−3499
          E-mail: mlowenthal@cgsh.com

Defendant Theodore Marshall Helms is represented by:

          Andrew Edward Goldsmith, Esq.
          KELLOGG, HANSEN, TODD, FIGEL & FREDERICK PLLC
          1615 M Street, N.W., Suite 400
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 326−7945
          Facsimile: (202) 326−7999
          E-mail: agoldsmith@kellogghansen.com

               - and -

          Erica Klipper, Esq.
          Jared Mitchell Gerber, Esq.
          Luke Ashe Barefoot, Esq.
          CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP
          One Liberty Plaza
          New York, NY 10006
          Telephone: (212) 225−2766
          Facsimile: (212) 225−3999
          E-mail: eklipper@cgsh.com
                  jgerber@cgsh.com
                  lbarefoot@cgsh.com

Defendants Petrobras Global Finance, B.V., Petroleo Brasileiro
S.A.-Petrobras and Petrobras America Inc. are represented by:

          Andrew Chun−Yang Shen, Esq.
          Joseph Solomon Hall, Esq.
          Kevin J. Miller, Esq.
          Rebecca A. Beynon, Esq.
          Reid Mason Figel, Esq.
          KELLOGG, HANSEN, TODD, FIGEL & FREDERICK PLLC
          1615 M Street, N.W., Suite 400
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 326−7900
          Facsimile: (202) 326−7999
          E-mail: ashen@kellogghansen.com
                  jhall@kellogghansen.com
                  kmiller@kellogghansen.com
                  rbeynon@kellogghansen.com
                  rfigel@kellogghansen.com

               - and -

          William Evans, Esq.
          CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP
          2000 Pennsylvania Avenue Nw
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 974−1567
          Facsimile: (202) 974−1999
          E-mail: wevans@cgsh.com

Consolidated Defendant Maria Das Gracas Silva Foster is represented
by:

          Richard Mark Strassberg, Esq.
          Daniel Prugh Roeser, Esq.
          GOODWIN PROCTER, LLP
          The New York Times Building
          620 Eighth Avenue
          New York, NY 10018−1405
          Telephone: (212) 813-8859
          Facsimile: (212) 355-3333
          E-mail: rstrassberg@goodwinprocter.com
                  droeser@goodwinlaw.com

               - and -

          John Owen Farley, Esq.
          William Breslin Brady, Esq.
          GOODWIN PROCTER, LLP
          53 State Street, Exchange Place
          Boston, MA 02109
          Telephone: (617) 570−1983
          Facsimile: (617)−523−1231
          E-mail: jfarley@goodwinprocter.com
                  wbrady@goodwinprocter.com

Consolidated Defendant Josue Christiano Gomes Da Silva is
represented by:

          Howard L. Vickery, II, Esq.
          BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP
          575 Lexington Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 446−2300
          Facsimile: (212) 446−2350
          E-mail: hvickery@bsfllp.com

Consolidated Defendants BB Securities Ltd., Citigroup Global
Markets Inc., ITAU BBA USA Securities, Inc., Mitsubishi UFJ
Securities (USA), Inc., Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Incorporated, Standard Chartered Bank, Bank of China (Hong Kong)
Limited, Banco Bradesco BBI S.A., Banca IMI S.P.A. and Scotia
Capital (USA) Inc. are represented by:

          Jay B. Kasner, Esq.
          Scott D. Musoff, Esq.
          SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
          Four Times Square
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 735-3000
          Facsimile: (212) 735-2000
          E-mail: jkasner@skadden.com
                  smusoff@skadden.com

               - and -

          Amy L. Van Gelder, Esq.
          SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
          155 North Wacker Drive, Suite 2700
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 407−0700
          Facsimile: (312) 407−0411
          E-mail: amy.vangelder@skadden.com

               - and -

          David Emmett Carney, Esq.
          Jennifer Lynn Spaziano, Esq.
          William John O'Brien, III, Esq.
          SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
          1440 New York Avenue N.W.
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 371−7000
          Facsimile: (202) 661−8327
          E-mail: david.carney@skadden.com
                  jen.spaziano@skadden.com
                  wobrien@skadden.com

               - and -

          Peter Simshauser, Esq.
          SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
          500 Boylston Street
          Boston, MA 02116
          Telephone: (617) 573−4880
          E-mail: peter.simshauser@skadden.com



PLAZA BEACH: Faces Luis Sierra Suit in S.D. Florida
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Plaza Beach, L.L.C.
The case is captioned as Luis Sierra, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Plaza Beach, L.L.C.,
Defendant, Case No. 0:18-cv-61511-DPG (S.D. Fla., July 3, 2018).
The lawsuit alleges violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act.  The case is assigned to Judge Darrin P. Gayles.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jessica Lynn Kerr, Esq.
          JESSICA L. KERR, P.A.
            DBA THE ADVOCACY GROUP
          200 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 504
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 282-1858
          Facsimile: (844) 786-3694
          E-mail: service@advocacypa.com


PNC BANK: Pfendler Appeals W.D. Penn. Decision to 3rd Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Jacqueline Pfendler filed an appeal from a court ruling
in her lawsuit entitled Jacqueline Pfendler v. PNC Bank NA, Case
No. 2-18-cv-00361, in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
seeks injunctive relief and damages on behalf of the Plaintiff and
the hundreds of thousands or millions of borrowers, who have been
allegedly victimized by PNC's uniform practice of charging for
unreasonable and inappropriate property inspection fees.

According to the complaint, taking advantage of the economic
downturn and the increasing number of loans in default, PNC
services home loans according to uniform practices designed to
maximize fees assessed on borrowers' accounts when they are behind
on their payments.  Consistent with these practices, PNC uses
automated mortgage loan management systems to engage in a deceptive
and unfair scheme to collect fees for unnecessary, unreasonably,
and inappropriate property inspections, a default-related service,
cheating borrowers who can least afford them.

The appellate case is captioned as Jacqueline Pfendler v. PNC Bank
NA, Case No. 18-2501, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant JACQUELINE PFENDLER, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Douglas G. Blankinship, Esq.
          Todd S. Garber, Esq.
          Bradley Silverman, Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN BLANKINSHIP FREI-PEARSON & GARBER LLP
          445 Hamilton Avenue
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Telephone: (914) 298-3290
          Facsimile: (914) 908-6709
          E-mail: gblankinship@fbfglaw.com
                  tgarber@fbfglaw.com
                  bsilverman@fbfglaw.com

               - and -

          Edwin J. Kilpela, Jr., Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP
          1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor Suite 210
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 322-9243
          Facsimile: (412) 231-0246
          E-mail: ekilpela@carlsonlynch.com

Defendant-Appellee PNC BANK NA is represented by:

          Nellie E. Hestin, Esq.
          REED SMITH LLP
          225 Fifth Avenue, Suite 1200
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 288-3627
          E-mail: nhestin@reedsmith.com

               - and -

          Jarrod D. Shaw, Esq.
          MCGUIREWOODS LLP
          260 Forbes Avenue, Suite 1800
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 667-6000
          E-mail: jshaw@mcguirewoods.com


PROTHENA CORP: Labaton Sucharow Files Securities Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Labaton Sucharow LLP ("Labaton Sucharow") disclosed that on July
16, 2018, it filed a securities class action lawsuit on behalf of
its client Granite Point Capital ("Granite Point") against Prothena
Corporation plc ("Prothena" or the "Company") (NASDAQ:PRTA), and
certain of its senior executives (collectively, "Defendants").  The
action, which is captioned Granite Point Capital v. Prothena Corp.
PLC, No. 18-cv-06425 (S.D.N.Y.), asserts claims under Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Exchange Act"), and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, on behalf of all persons
or entities that purchased Prothena's publicly traded common stock
between October 15, 2015 and April 20, 2018, inclusive (the "Class
Period").

Prothena is a development-stage biotechnology company.  During the
Class Period, Prothena's principal asset was NEOD001, a monoclonal
antibody designed to treat amyloid light chain amyloidosis ("AL
amyloidosis"), a debilitating disease that can lead to organ
failure and death.

The Complaint alleges that defendants misleadingly cited the
results of Prothena's ongoing Phase 1/2 clinical study of NEOD001
as evidence that the drug was effective and provided a strong basis
for late-stage Phase 2b and Phase 3 studies of NEOD001.  In truth,
NEOD001 was not an effective treatment for AL amyloidosis and did
not provide an adequate basis for the late-stage Phase 2b and Phase
3 studies.  When the truth regarding NEOD001's prospects was
finally revealed, the price of the Company's stock declined by over
69 percent.

If you purchased or acquired Prothena common stock during the Class
Period, you are a member of the "Class" and may be able to seek
appointment as Lead Plaintiff.  Lead Plaintiff motion papers must
be filed with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York no later than September 17, 2018.  The Lead Plaintiff is a
court-appointed representative for absent members of the Class.
You do not need to seek appointment as Lead Plaintiff to share in
any Class recovery in this action.  If you are a Class member and
there is a recovery for the Class, you can share in that recovery
as an absent Class member.  You may retain counsel of your choice
to represent you in this action.

If you would like to consider serving as Lead Plaintiff or have any
questions about this lawsuit, you may contact Francis P.
McConville, Esq. of Labaton Sucharow, at (800) 321-0476, or via
email at fmcconville@labaton.com. You can view a copy of the
complaint online here:
https://www.labaton.com/en/cases/upload/Demand-for-Jury-Trial.pdf.

Granite Point Capital is represented by Labaton Sucharow, which
represents many of the largest pension funds in the United States
and internationally with combined assets under management of more
than $2 trillion.  Labaton Sucharow's litigation reputation is
built on its half-century of securities litigation experience, more
than 60 full-time attorneys, and in-house team of investigators,
financial analysts, and forensic accountants.  Labaton Sucharow has
been recognized for its excellence by the courts and peers, and it
is consistently ranked in leading industry publications.  Offices
are located in New York, NY, Wilmington, DE, and Washington, D.C.
More information about Labaton Sucharow is available at
www.labaton.com. [GN]

PVH RETAIL: Heun Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
--------------------------------------------
Tiffany Heun, on behalf of herself and all other plaintiffs
similarly situated v. PVH Retail Stores LLC, dba Tommy Hilfiger,
Case No. 1:18-cv-04762 (N.D. Ill., July 11, 2018), is brought
against the Defendant for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law.

The Plaintiff worked as an assistant manager for the Defendant.

The Defendant PVH owns and operates retail stores under assumed
names such as Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger. The Defendant is a
New York entity headquartered at 200 Madison Avenue, New York, New
York 10016. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      David J. Fish, Esq.
      Kimberly Hilton, Esq.
      John Kunze, Esq.
      THE FISH LAW FIRM P.C.
      200 E 5th Ave Suite 123
      Naperville, IL 60563
      Tel: (630) 355-7590
      Fax: (630) 778-0400


QUALITY SYSTEMS: Settles Securities Class Action for $19MM
----------------------------------------------------------
Kat Greene, writing for Law360, reports that Quality Systems Inc.
agreed to pay $19 million to settle a proposed securities class
action alleging the health technology company misled investors
about its projected sales and financial performance in 2011 and
2012, ending the suit on July 16 after five years of fighting in
California federal court.

The Irvine, California-based electronic health records company
agreed to pay the sum to end claims by retirement funds and other
investors that the company had violated the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 with a series of alleged material misrepresentations.

The case is In re Quality Systems, Inc. Securities Litigation Case
No. 8:13-cv-01818, (C.D. Calif.).  The case is assigned to Judge
Cormac J. Carney.  The case was filed November 19, 2013. [GN]


RALPH LAUREN: Removes Patrick Hudson Suit to N.D. Illinois
----------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of PATRICK HUDSON, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. RALPH LAUREN
CORPORATION; RALPH LAUREN RETAIL, INC.; and VIBES MEDIA, LLC,
Defendants, filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from the Circuit
Court of the State of Illinois, County of Cook, (Case No.
2018-CH-06906) to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois on July 3, 2018 and assigned Case No. Case No.
1:18-cv-04620 (N.D. Ill., July 3, 2018).

Ralph Lauren Corporation designs, markets, and distributes
lifestyle products in North America, Europe, Asia, and
internationally. Ralph Lauren Corporation was founded in 1967 and
is headquartered in New York, New York. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          George J. Tzanetopoulos, Esq.
          Suzanne Alton de Eraso, Esq.
          BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP
          191 North Wacker Drive, Suite 3100
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 416-6200
          Facsimile: (312) 416-6201
          E-mail: gtzanetopoulos@bakerlaw.com
                  saltondeeraso@bakerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jennifer Bagg, Esq.
          Amy E. Richardson, Esq.
          HARRIS, WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP
          1919 M Street, NW, 8th Floor
          Washington, D.C. 20037
          Telephone: (202) 730-1322
          Facsimile: (202) 730-1301
          E-mail: jbagg@hwglaw.com
                  arichardson@hwglaw.com


REMEX INC: Harnik Suit Seeks Damages Under FDCPA
------------------------------------------------
Israel Harnik, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Remex, Inc. dba Remex Revenue Management Excellence,
and John Does 1-25, Case No. 3:18-cv-11551 (D. N.J., July 11,
2018), seeks damages and declaratory and injunctive relief under
the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act.

The Plaintiff is a resident of the State of New Jersey, County of
Ocean, residing at 468 Ridge Avenue, Lakewood, NJ 08701.

The Defendant Remex, Inc. dba Remex Revenue Management Excellence
is a debt collector with an address at 307 Wall Street, Princeton,
NJ 08540. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Yaakov Saks, Esq.
      STEIN SAKS, PLLC
      285 Passaic Street
      Hackensack, NJ 07601
      Tel: (201) 282-6500
      Fax: (201) 282-6501
      E-mail: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


RESPOND POWER: Court Dismisses Breach of Contract Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case
captioned BARBARA GILLIS; THOMAS GILLIS; SCOTT McCLELLAND; KIMBERLY
McCLELLAND; INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiffs, v. RESPOND POWER, LLC, Defendant, Civil
Action No. 14-3856 (E.D. Pa.).

The Plaintiffs are consumers who purchased electricity from
Defendant, Respond Power LLC, under a variable rate agreement. The
Plaintiffs allege that, in order to induce them to switch from
their local utility company, the Defendant misrepresented the rates
that it would charge. The Plaintiffs further allege that the
Defendant breached the variable rate agreement by charging them a
higher rate for electricity than their local utility company would
have charged them during the same time period.

The Defendant has moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim
regarding both of the Plaintiffs' two class claims, one for breach
of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and the other for a declaratory judgment regarding the
variable rate agreement's meaning.

Breach of Contract Based on the Explicit Language of the Variable
Rate Provision

To make out a claim for breach of contract under Pennsylvania law,
the Plaintiffs must show: (1) the existence of a contract,
including its essential terms, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by
the contract, and (3) resultant damages.

In alleging that the Defendant breached the Variable Rate
Provision, the Plaintiffs point to the italicized language, which
provides that the Defendant's goal each and every month is to
charge a rate that is less than what the Plaintiffs would have paid
their local utility company for electricity. The Plaintiffs contend
that this language when combined with the subsequent language that
the Defendant cannot always guarantee that every month you will see
savings constitutes a promise that the Defendant would, at worst,
charge the Plaintiffs just as much as if the Plaintiffs had never
switched from their local utility company.

The Defendant contends that the Plaintiffs' reading of the Variable
Rate Provision is implausible, noting: (1) that a goal is not a
promise; and (2) that the language the Plaintiffs rely on expressly
disclaims any guarantee of savings, and never states or intimates
that the Defendant's rates would reflect let alone be based or
dependent upon, in whole or in part local utility rates.

In light of this language, the court held that a consumer stated a
breach of contract claim, where he alleged that the rates the
supplier charged him were, on average, roughly 100% higher than the
local utility company's, noting that while it might not be clear
what affordable' and saving money mean, no reasonable construction
of those terms could mean paying double.

By contrast, the Variable Rate Provision at issue here expressly
disclaims any guarantee of savings over the local utility company's
rate, providing, rather, that savings would be Defendant's goal.

In sum, Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim rests on a reading of
the Variable Rate Provision that is implausible in light of its
clear and unambiguous language. That provision sets out the factors
on which the variable rate will be based and while noting that
savings over the local utility company's rate would be Defendant's
goal does not suggest that the rate would be capped at the local
utility company's rate. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' breach of contract
claim fails to the extent that it is premised on the explicit
language of the Variable Rate Provision.
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Under Pennsylvania law, every contract imposes a duty of good faith
and fair dealing on the parties in the performance and enforcement
of the contract. While there is no one-size-fits-all definition of
good faith, the covenant generally requires that the parties bring
about a condition or exercise discretion in a reasonable way.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in four ways: (1) by
charging a monthly rate in excess of the rate charged by the
Plaintiffs' local utility company; (2) by representing that each
and every month it would deliver power at a price that is less than
what the consumer would have paid had he or she purchased the power
from the local utility while stating that it could not always
guarantee that every month the consumer will see savings; (3) by
mis-portraying its variable rate power as a "no-risk rate" without
disclosing its hidden contractual interpretation that it could and
would charge a rate exponentially higher than the rate charged by
the consumer's local utility company and (4) by failing to employ
the means of a reasonably prudent energy trader to achieve the goal
of rate savings or, at worst, a rate equal to the local utility
rate.

The Defendant maintains that none of these allegations state a
claim. As to the Plaintiffs' first allegation regarding the
charging of rates in excess of the local utility company's rate
Defendant maintains that an implied duty to set a rate no higher
than the local utility company's rate would be inconsistent with
the explicit language of the Variable Rate Provision. As to the
Plaintiffs' second and third allegations regarding alleged
misrepresentations Defendant submits that the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing does not apply to pre-contractual
marketing, negotiations, or representations but, rather, applies
only to contract performance. And as to the Plaintiffs' fourth
allegation -- regarding the Defendant's alleged failure to employ
the means of a reasonably prudent energy trader to achieve savings
the Defendant urges that such a duty would be at odds with the
terms of the Variable Rate Provision, which otherwise explicitly
set forth the factors involved in the rate calculus.

The Court agrees with the Defendant that each of these four
allegations fails to make out a claim.

The Plaintiffs' first alleged breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing relates to the same conduct that the
Plaintiffs contend violates the explicit terms of the Variable Rate
Provision the Defendant's charging of a higher rate than that of
the local utility company. However, the clear and unambiguous
language of that provision sets out the factors on which the
variable rate was to be based, and does not list the local utility
company's rate among those factors.

Accordingly, an implied duty to refrain from charging a higher rate
would be inconsistent with the parties' express agreement.

As to the Plaintiffs' second and third alleged breaches based on
the Defendant's alleged pre-contractual misrepresentations these
allegations do not support a claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as the covenant only
applies to the performance of the contract, not to pre-contractual
representations.  Accordingly, while the Plaintiffs' allegations
that the Defendant made pre-contractual misrepresentations may
support a claim for fraud, they cannot support a claim for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 16, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yc6wx6vs from
Leagle.com.

BARBARA GILLIS, THOMAS GILLIS, SCOTT R. & KIMBERLY A. MCCLELLAND,
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiffs, represented by CHARLES J. KOCHER -- SALTZ MONGELUZZI
BARRETT & BENDESKY PC, MICHAEL D. DONOVAN , DONOVAN LITIGATION
GROUP, LLC, PATRICK HOWARD -- SALTZ MONGELUZZI BARRETT & BENDESKY &
SIMON BAHNE PARIS -- SALTZ MONGELUZZI BARRETT & BENDESKY, P.C.

RESPOND POWER, LLC, Defendant, represented by DAVID R. KING --
dking@herrick.com -- HERRICK FEINSTEIN LLP,KATHLEEN H. ROBINSON --
hrobinson@herrick.com -- HERRICK FEINSTEIN LLP & RONALD J. LEVINE
-- rlevine@herrick.com -- HERRICK FEINSTEIN LLP.

RETAIN SERVICES: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Perez et al. Allege
---------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTINA CELIA PEREZ, and STEPHANIE STUDEBAKER, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. RETAIN
SERVICES WIS CORPORATION, and DOES 1-5-, inclusive, Case No.
37-2018-00033181-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super., July 3, 2018) is an action
against the Defendants for unpaid regular hours, overtime hours,
minimum wages, wages for missed meal and rest periods.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as hourly paid
employees at the store locations in Modesto and Stockton
California.

Retain Services Wis Corporation is a California Corporation,
headquartered in San Diego, California, which own and operate
inventory and data collection services companies, to provide
inventory counting, merchandising and space optimization services
to various retail stores such as Lowes, Walmart, The Home Depot,
Macy's, OfficeMax, Petsmart, and many other businesses, in
California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James R. Hawkins, Esq.
          Gregory Mauro, Esq.
          JAMES HAWKINS APLC
          9880 Research Drive, Suite 200
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Telephone: (949) 387-7200
          Facsimile: (949) 387-6676
          E-mail: James@jamesshawkinsaplc.com
                  Greg@jamesshawkinsaplc.com


REV GROUP: Robbins Arroyo Files Class Action Over 2017 IPO
----------------------------------------------------------
Molly Dill, writing for BizTimes, reports that San Diego-based
Robbins Arroyo LLP is the latest law firm to file a class action
lawsuit against Milwaukee-based Rev Group Inc., alleging the
company misled shareholders in its initial public offering.

The specialty vehicle manufacturer made its IPO in January 2017 at
$22 per share, and saw its stock price rise 26 percent by June 30,
2017, but it has since fallen. Rev Group's stock on July 17 opened
at $15.73

REV Group makes 28 brands of specialty vehicles at 15 locations,
many of which are in the Midwest. The company has more than 6,000
employees. The company has made several acquisitions in recent
months. It acquired Lance Camper in January, Midwest Automotive
Designs LLC and Ferrara Fire and Apparatus in 2017, and Renegade RV
in 2016.

According to Robbins Arroyo, "REV touted that it had achieved
sustained growth across its operating metrics and that its ability
to control costs and its unique visibility into future revenue
streams were key competitive advantages that would allow it to grow
margins and provide investors with predictable financial results."

But Robbins Arroyo alleges Rev's acquisitions made its operational
structure inefficient and did not allow it to control costs.

Several other law firms have also filed class action suits against
Rev in recent weeks related to its financial statements ahead of
the IPO.

"REV did not have leverage over its suppliers, subjecting it to
sudden and substantial costs increases on critical parts and
materials," according to Robbins Arroyo.

In June, the company announced a $1.9 million restructuring effort,
expected to generate $20 million in annualized savings.

Rev Group chief executive officer Tim Sullivan could not be reached
for comment. [GN]

RIPPLE LABS: Faces Avner Greenwald Suit over Sale of Tokens
-----------------------------------------------------------
AVNER GREENWALD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. RIPPLE LABS, INC.; XRP II, LLC; BRADLEY
GARLINGHOUSE; CHRISTIAN LARSEN; RON WILL; ANTOINETTE O'GORMAN; ERIC
VAN MILTENBURG; SUSAN ATHEY; ZOE CROUA; KEN KURSON; BEN LAWSKY;
ANJA MANUEL; and TAKASHI OKITA, Defendants, Case No. 18CIV03461
(Cal. Super., July 3, 2018) alleges that the Defendants sold
unregistered securities to investors in violation of the Securities
Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and the member class
purchased Ripple tokens ("XRP")on July 3, 2015 from the Defendants.
In order to increase demand for XRP, and thereby increase the
profits derived by selling XRP, the Defendants portray the XRP as a
good investment, solicit sales, express optimistic price
predictions, and conflate the Defendants' enterprise customer
programs with usage and value of the XRP. The Defendants greatly
increased these efforts to push XRP on the general public in recent
years.

The Defendants have then earned massive profits by selling the XRP
to the public, without complying with federal securities laws, in
what is essentially an ongoing initial coin offering ("ICO").  No
registration statements have been filed by the Defendants with the
SEC or have been in effect with respect to the XRP offerings.

Ripple Labs, Inc. operates a global payments network deploying
blockchain technology. Ripple Labs, Inc. was formerly known as
OpenCoin, Inc. and changed its name to Ripple Labs, Inc. in
September 2013. The company was founded in 2012 and is based in San
Francisco, California with offices in New York, London, Sydney,
India, Singapore, and Luxembourg. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John T. Jasnoch, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT
          ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          600 W. Broadway, Suite 3300
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 233-4565
          Facsimile: (619) 233-0508
          E-mail: jjasnoch@scott-scott.com

               - and –

          Thomas L. Laughlin, IV, Esq.
          Rhiana Swartz, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT
          ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10169
          Telephone: (212) 223-6444
          Facsimile: (212) 223-6334
          E-mail: tlaughlin@scott-scott.com
                  rswartz@scott-scott.com


RITE AID: Shearman & Sterling Comments on Securities Suit Dismissal
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP, in an article for JDSupra, reports that on
July 11, 2018, Judge John E. Jones III of the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed
certain claims in a putative securities fraud class action against
Rite Aid Corporation and Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc.  Plaintiff
brought claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act, alleging that Rite Aid, Walgreens, and certain
executives at each company made various misstatements over the
course of the failed merger between the two companies, which was
announced in October 2015 and ultimately terminated in June 2017.
Hering v. Rite Aid Corp., F. Supp. 3d, 2018 WL 3373033 (M.D. Pa.
July 11, 2018).  The Court held that the majority of the alleged
misstatements were optimistic forward-looking statements that were
immaterial and/or protected by the safe harbor provided by the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, but that certain
statements by the Walgreens defendants expressing confidence that
the transaction would close based on purported inside information,
made in response to negative reports in the press, were
sufficiently pleaded with respect to falsity and scienter to state
a claim for fraud.

Examples of non-fraudulent statements included statements regarding
the expected value or timing of the merger or potential regulatory
concerns, which the Court held to be forward-looking and
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements.  Id. at
*7—8.  In one instance, the Court held that it could not evaluate
whether statements that the merger would provide "significant
value" and that the companies expected to close the transaction "in
the second half of calendar year 2016" were accompanied by
meaningful cautionary language because neither party had put the
relevant press release in the record; however, the Court held that
plaintiff had failed to allege facts suggesting intent or
recklessness as to the truth of the statements.  Id. at *8—9.
The Court also held that numerous statements of optimism or opinion
could not have created a false impression in the mind of a
reasonable investor.  Id. at *11.  For example, the Court held that
statements regarding store divestitures or the closing timeframe
would have been understood by reasonable investors to be estimates
based on evolving information, and general statements regarding the
general progress of the FTC review were not concrete enough for a
reasonable investor to rely on.

The Court also held, however, that plaintiff had adequately alleged
that statements Walgreens made expressing confidence that the deal
would be completed and questioning media accounts to the contrary,
were fraudulent.  Id. at *11.   In particular, the Court focused on
the facts that the speakers had expressly alluded to "inside
knowledge" of the FTC review and close collaboration with the FTC
as a basis for dismissing newspaper reports of regulatory
turbulence.  Id.  The Court held that a reasonable investor could
have been misled into thinking that the review process was going
better than it in fact was based on such statements by Walgreens.
The Court also held that Walgreens's decision to "openly
contradict[] news reports of regulatory trouble by alluding to
their non-public 'inside' knowledge of the FTC's review" to be
"reckless" and therefore supported an inference of scienter.  Id.

The Court's decision is a reminder of the importance of providing
significant cautionary language when making forward-looking
statements and the dangers of referring to undisclosed "inside"
information as support for public statements. [GN]

SCI DIRECT: Removes James Doyle Suit to C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of James Doyle, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SCI Direct,
Inc., and Does 1 to 10, inclusive, Defendants, filed a notice to
remove the lawsuit from the Superior Court of the State of
California, County of Los Angeles, (Case No. BC705666) to the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California on July 3,
2018, and assigned Case No. 2:18-cv-05859-ODW-JEM (C.D. Cal., July
3, 2018). The case is assigned to Judge Otis D. Wright, II an
referred to Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott.

SCI Direct, Inc. provides cremation services for families in the
United States. SCI Direct, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of SCI
Capital Holdings, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian Robert Bacon, Esq.
          Thomas Edward Wheeler, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M FRIEDMAN PC
          21550 Oxnard Street Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Tel: (877) 206-4741
          Fax: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com
                  twheeler@toddflaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Christopher P Leyel, Esq.
          YOKA & SMITH LLP
          445 South Figueroa Street, 38th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 427-2300
          Facsimile: (213) 427-2330
          E-mail: cleyel@yokasmith.com

               - and -

          Carrie M Francis, Esq.
          STINSON LEONARD STREET LLP
          1850 North Central Avenue Suite 2100
          Phoenix, AZ 85004
          Telephone: (602) 212-8535
          Facsimile: (602) 586-5214
          E-mail: carrie.francis@stinson.com


SEARS ROEBUCK: J. Harvey Labor Suit Arbitrated on Individual Basis
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JONATHAN HARVEY, an individual, on behalf of himself,
and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO., a Corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-00614-MCE-CKD (E.D. Cal.),
Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division, has entered
Harvey's stipulation and order to submit action to individual
arbitration and stay the action.

On Sept. 29, 2014, the Plaintiff accepted Sears' Arbitration
Agreement and did not timely opt out.  

On Feb. 6, 2017, Harvey, individually and purportedly on behalf of
all others similarly situated, filed a Complaint against Sears in
the Superior Court of California for the County of Sacramento,
entitled "Jonathan Harvey, individually and on behalf of all other
aggrieved employees and others similarly situated, v. Sears,
Roebuck and Co., a Corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive",
Case No. 34-2017-00207556.  

The Complaint asserts causes of action on a class-wide basis for:
(1) unfair competition in violation of California Business and
Professions Code sections 17200, et seq.; (2) failure to pay
overtime compensation in violation of California Labor Code
sections 510, 1194, and 1198 et seq.; and (3) failure to provide
wages when due in violation of California Labor Code sections 201,
202, and 203.

On March 23, 2017, Sears timely removed the Action to the Court.
On April 3, 2017, it filed a Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel
Arbitration and Dismiss or Stay Action, requesting that the Court
compels individual arbitration of the entire action.

The Plaintiff filed his opposition to the Motion on May 4, 2017,
and Sears filed its reply brief in support of the Motion on May 11,
2017.

On Aug. 23, 2017, the Court issued a minute order staying the
Action pending the Supreme Court's ruling in NLRB v. Murphy Oil
USA, Inc., No. 16-307 (consolidated with Epic Systems Corp. v.
Lewis, No. 16-285 and Ernst & Young v. Morris, No. 16-300), and
permitting Sears to renew its Motion once the stay had been lifted.
On May 21, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its ruling in
Murphy Oil, affirming the validity and enforceability of class
action waivers in employment arbitration agreements.

The Plaintiff has now stipulated to submit his Complaint and all of
his causes of action in the Complaint to binding individual
arbitration before the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services
("JAMS").  The parties have stipulated and agreed, and Judge
England granted that (i) the Plaintiff will submit the Action to
binding individual arbitration before a mutually agreed upon
arbitrator at JAMS, in accordance with the parties' Arbitration
Agreement; and (ii) his individual claims will be stayed pending
the outcome of arbitration, so that either party may confirm an
individual arbitration award in accordance with applicable laws.

Judge ordered that the Action be arbitrated on an individual basis,
and stayed the Plaintiff's individual claims in the Action pending
the outcome of arbitration.  The parties are ordered to file a
Joint Status Report every 60 days, beginning with the date of
electronic filing of the Order, addressing the status of
arbitration proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 15, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/zJzWWr from Leagle.com.

Jonathan Harvey, Plaintiff, represented by Aparajit Bhowmik --
j@bamlawlj.com -- Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik, Norman
Blumenthal -- norm@bamlawca.com -- Blumenthal Nordrehaug & Bhowmik,
Kyle R. Nordrehaug -- kyle@bamlawca.com -- Blumenthal Nordrehaug
and Bhowmik, Ruchira Piya Mukherjee -- piya@bamlawlj.com --
Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik & Victoria Bree Rivapalacio --
victoria@bamlawca.com -- Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik.

Sears, Roebuck and Co., Defendant, represented by Katie Elizabeth
Briscoe -- kbriscoe@orrick.com -- Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe.

SELECT COMFORT: Judgment on Pleadings in TCCWNA Suit Vacated
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated
the District Court's judgment granting Defendant's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings in the case captioned DAVID SPADE and
KATINA SPADE, h/w, individually and as a class representative on
behalf of others similarly situated, Appellants, v. SELECT COMFORT
CORP., d/b/a Sleep Number; LEGGETT & PLATT INC.; JOHN DOE
INDIVIDUALS AND BUSINESSES 1-20, No. 16-1558 (3rd Cir.).

Plaintiffs David and Katina Spade brought a putative class action
against Select Comfort Corporation, alleging that its sales
contract violates the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and
Notice Act (TCCWNA).  The District Court granted Select Comfort's
motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court's panel petitioned the New
Jersey Supreme Court, pursuant to N.J. Ct. R. 2:12A-1, to answer
the following questions:

   (1) Is a consumer who receives a contract that does not comply
with the Furniture Delivery Regulations, but has not suffered any
adverse consequences from the noncompliance, an aggrieved consumer
under the TCCWNA?

   (2) Does a violation of the Furniture Delivery Regulations alone
constitute a violation of a clearly established right or
responsibility of the seller under the TCCWNA and thus provide a
basis for relief under the TCCWNA?

The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the petition and answered the
questions, holding that inclusion of language prohibited by N.J.
Admin. Code Section 13:45A-5.3(c) in contracts of sale or sale
orders for the delivery of household furniture may alone give rise
to a violation of a clearly established legal right of a consumer
or responsibility of a seller' for purposes of the TCCWNA and a
consumer who receives a contract that includes language prohibited
by Section 13:45A-5.3(c), but who suffers no monetary or other harm
as a result of that noncompliance, is not an aggrieved consumer
entitled to a remedy under the TCCWNA.

Because the New Jersey Supreme Court had not previously provided
such guidance, and thus the Plaintiffs did not have an opportunity
to consider it when they drafted their complaint, the Third Circuit
will remand so that the Plaintiffs review may their proof and, if
appropriate, file an amended complaint that comports with the
Supreme Court's directives. Nothing herein precludes Select Comfort
from engaging in motion practice directed toward the complaint or
the District Court from conducting any proceedings that it deems
warranted.

The Court will vacate the order granting Select Comfort's motion
for judgment on the pleadings and remand for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Third Circuit's June 11, 2018 Opinion is
available https://tinyurl.com/y7czce3h from Leagle.com.

SELECT SPECIALTY: White Seeks Last Pay and Benefits Under WARN Act
------------------------------------------------------------------
Tommy White, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Select Specialty Hospital-Kansas City, Inc.
(d/b/a Select Specialty Hospital-Western Missouri) and Select
Medical Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-0405 (W.D. Mo., May
24, 2018), seeks damages in the amount of 60 days' pay and benefits
for violation of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act of 1988.

Select Medical Corporation closed on or about May 18, 2018
resulting in a mass layoff. It failed to give the Plaintiff at
least 60 days' advance written notice of termination, says the
complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Brian M. Holland, Esq.
      Benjamin C. Struby, Esq.
      LATHROP GAGE LLP
      2345 Grand Boulevard, Suite 2200
      Kansas City, MO 64108-2618
      Tel: (816) 292-2000
      Fax: (816) 292-2001
      Email: bholland@lathropgage.com
             bstruby@lathropgage.com

             - and -

      Stuart J. Miller, Esq.
      LANKENAU & MILLER, LLP
      132 Nassau Street, Suite 1100
      New York, NY 10038
      Tel: (212) 581-5005
      Fax: (212) 581-2122
      Email: stuart@lankmill.com

             - and -

      Mary E. Olsen, Esq.
      M. Vance McCrary, Esq.
      THE GARDNER FIRM
      210 S. Washington Avenue
      Mobile, AL 36602
      Tel: (251) 433-8100
      Fax: (251) 433-8181
      Email: molsen@thegardnerfirm.com

            - and -

      THE NLG MAURICE AND JANE SUGAR LAW CENTER FOR ECONOMIC
      AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
      4605 Cass Ave.
      Detroit, Michigan 48201
      Tel: (313) 993-4505


SERVICEMASTER GLOBAL: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Flagg et al. Say
-----------------------------------------------------------------
TRENT FLAGG; STEPHEN KINDLE; BRIAN BRANDNER; JAMES OBED; KEITH
GRIZZLE; and JOHN NANCE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. SERVICEMASTER GLOBAL HOLDINGS,
INC.; THE SERVICEMASTER COMPANY, INC.; TERMINIX INTERNATIONAL,
INC.; TERMINIZ INTERNATIONAL COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; GLEN
FOSTER; ANDREW FLEMING; ROBERT DAVIS; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. BC712002 (Cal. Super., July 3,
2018) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid regular hours,
overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal and rest
periods.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as non-exempt,
hourly paid employees.

ServiceMaster Global Holdings, Inc. provides residential and
commercial services in the United States. The company was founded
in 1929 and is headquartered in Memphis, Tennessee. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Farzad Rastegar, Esq.
          Candace Kwon, Esq.
          RASTEGAR LAW GROUP, A.P.C.
          22760 Hawthorne Boulevard, Suite 200
          Torrance, CA 90505
          Telephone: (310) 961-9600
          Facsimile: (310) 961-9094
          E-mail: farzad@rastegarlawgroup.com
                  candace@rastegarlawgroup.com


SINCLAIR BROADCAST: Faces Peter Miller Antitrust Suit in Maryland
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LAW OFFICES OF PETER MILLER, P.A., 1601 South Broadway Little Rock,
AR 72206, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. SINCLAIR BROADCAST GROUP, INC., TRIBUNE MEDIA COMPANY,
TRIBUNE BROADCASTING COMPANY, LLC, and DOES 1-20, Case No.
1:18-cv-02316-ELH (D. Md., July 27, 2018), seeks injunctive relief
and damages for injuries caused by the Defendants' alleged
collusive, manipulative, and anticompetitive restraint of
competition in the market for television advertising in the United
States.

The antitrust class action arises from a conspiracy among the
Defendants and their coconspirators to fix prices for commercials
to be aired on broadcast television stations throughout the United
States -- in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act -- by
sharing competitively sensitive information through their
advertising sales teams, according to the complaint.

Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc., a Maryland corporation
headquartered in Hunt Valley, Maryland, is a diversified television
broadcasting company.  The Plaintiff is presently unaware of the
true names and identities of the Doe Defendants.

Tribune Media Company, a Delaware corporation headquartered in
Chicago, Illinois, is a diversified media and entertainment
business.  Tribune Broadcasting Company, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, is a
television broadcasting company that operates as a subsidiary of
Tribune Media Company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Asher Alavi, Esq.
          Joseph H. Meltzer, Esq.
          Kimberly A. Justice, Esq.
          Melissa L. Troutner, Esq.
          Christopher A. Reese, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          Facsimile: (610) 667-7056
          E-mail: aalavi@ktmc.com
                  jmeltzer@ktmc.com
                  kjustice@ktmc.com
                  mtroutner@ktmc.com
                  creese@ktmc.com

               - and -

          John C. Goodson, Esq.
          Matt Keil, Esq.
          KEIL & GOODSON P.A.
          406 Walnut Street
          Texarkana, AR 71854
          Telephone: (870) 772-4113
          Facsimile: (870) 773-2967
          E-mail: jgoodson@kglawfirm.com
                  mkeil@kglawfirm.com

               - and -

          James E. Cecchi, Esq.
          Caroline F. Bartlett
          CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.
          5 Becker Farm Road
          Roseland, NJ 07068
          Telephone: (973) 994-1700
          Facsimile: (973) 994-1744
          E-mail: jcecchi@carellabyrne.com
                  cbartlett@carellabyrne.com


STEWART INFORMATION: Rigrodsky & Long Files Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A. on July 17 disclosed that it has filed a
class action complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware on behalf of holders of Stewart Information
Services Corporation ("Stewart Information") (NYSE:STC) common
stock in connection with the proposed acquisition of Stewart
Information by Fidelity National Financial, Inc. and its affiliates
("Fidelity") announced on March 19, 2018 (the "Complaint").  The
Complaint, which alleges violations of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 against Stewart Information, its Board of Directors (the
"Board"), and Fidelity, is captioned Franchi v. Stewart Information
Services Corp., Case No. 1:18-cv-00951 (D. Del.).

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions concerning
this notice or your rights or interests, please contact plaintiff's
counsel, Seth D. Rigrodsky or Gina M. Serra at Rigrodsky & Long,
P.A., 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220, Wilmington, DE 19801, by
telephone at (888) 969-4242, by e-mail at info@rl-legal.com, or at
http://rigrodskylong.com/contact-us/.

On March 18, 2018, Stewart Information entered into an agreement
and plan of merger (the "Merger Agreement") with Fidelity.
Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, shareholders of
Stewart Information will receive either $50.00 in cash, 1.2850
shares of Fidelity common stock, or $25.00 in cash and 0.6425
shares of Fidelity common stock (the "Proposed Transaction").

Among other things, the Complaint alleges that, in an attempt to
secure shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction, defendants
issued materially incomplete disclosures in a registration
statement (the "Registration Statement") filed with the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission.  The Complaint alleges
that the Registration Statement omits material information with
respect to, among other things, Stewart Information's financial
projections, the analyses performed by Stewart Information's
financial advisor, and the background of the Proposed Transaction.
The Complaint seeks injunctive and equitable relief and damages on
behalf of holders of Stewart Information common stock.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than September 17, 2018.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  Any member of the proposed class may
move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their
choice, or may choose to do nothing and remain an absent class
member.

With offices in Wilmington, Delaware, Garden City, New York, and
San Francisco, California, Rigrodsky & Long, P.A.
--http://www.rigrodskylong.com-- has recovered hundreds of
millions of dollars on behalf of investors and achieved substantial
corporate governance reforms in numerous cases nationwide,
including federal securities fraud actions, shareholder class
actions, and shareholder derivative actions. [GN]

SUIT-KOTE CORP: Denial of Class Certification in "Vandee" Modified
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANDREW G. VANDEE, JERRY PHALEN, JAMES LYNCH, ROGER
SLATER, RICHARD THOMAS, ELIJAH CLOSSON, WILLIAM PRINDLE AND SHAWN
KIRK, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Respondents, v. SUIT-KOTE CORPORATION,
Defendant-Respondent-Appellant, Case No. 521 CA 17-02093 (N.Y. App.
Div.), the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York,
Fourth Department, vacated and modified the Feb. 10, 2017 order
denying the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification pursuant to
CPLR article 9 and denying the Defendant's cross motion for, in
effect, summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint.

The Plaintiffs are members of a putative class of employees who
allege that the Defendant failed to pay them the prevailing wages
required by article I, Section 17 of the New York Constitution and
section 220 (3) of the Labor Law.  They appeal and the Defendant
cross-appeals from the Feb. 10, 2017 order by Judge James P. Murphy
of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County, that denied the Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification pursuant to CPLR article 9 and that
denied the Defendant's cross motion for, in effect, summary
judgment dismissing the amended complaint.

The Appellate Division agrees with the Plaintiffs on their appeal
that the Supreme Court erred in denying their motion, and it
therefore modifies the order accordingly.  It explains that the
court erred in determining that the Plaintiffs failed to establish
the first and second CPLR 901 prerequisites, numerosity and
commonality.

The Plaintiffs established the numerosity prerequisite by
submitting evidence of approximately 350 class members at a
minimum.  They established the commonality prerequisite because one
common legal issue dominates the claims of all putative class
members, i.e., whether similarly situated employees who worked on
public projects were deprived of the prevailing wages to which they
were entitled.  Contrary to the Defendant's contention, the fact
that the amount of damages will vary among the putative class
members does not prevent the lawsuit from going forward as a class
action.

It rejects the Defendant's alternative ground for denying the
motion for class certification, namely, that the Plaintiffs failed
to establish the remaining CPLR 901 prerequisites.  Contrary to the
Defendant's further contention, it finds that the non-exclusive
CPLR 902 factors weigh in favor of class certification.

The Appellate Division also rejects the Defendant's contention on
its cross appeal that the court erred in denying its cross motion
inasmuch as triable issues of fact exist with respect to whether
the Defendant's payroll practices complied with Labor Law Section
220 (3) and the corresponding regulations.  Contrary to the
Defendant's contention, its alleged failure to comply with 12 NYCRR
220.2 (d) is relevant to whether its payroll practices complied
with section 220 (3).  Finally, contrary to the Defendant's further
contention, the amended complaint is not preempted by the federal
Employee Retirement Income Security Act.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division ordered the the order so
appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by vacating the
first and second ordering paragraphs and granting the motion and as
modified the order is affirmed without costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 15, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/BXsiv7 from Leagle.com.

E. STEWART JONES HACKER MURPHY, LLP, TROY (RYAN M. FINN --
rfinn@joneshacker.com -- OF COUNSEL), FOR
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS-RESPONDENTS.

BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC, SYRACUSE ( BRIAN J. BUTLER --
bbutler@bsk.com -- OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

SUNOCO PIPELINE: Sued Over Unsafe Drilling Practices
----------------------------------------------------
Noddy A. Fernandez, writing for PennRecord, reports that three West
Chester residents filed a class-action lawsuit against Sunoco
Pipeline LP and Sunoco Logistics Partners LP, alleging negligence
and creating a public nuisance.

Lead plaintiffs Mary March, Russell March and Jared Savitski filed
a complaint July 2, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common
Pleas, alleging that the defendants violated numerous environmental
laws and statutes by using unsafe practices while drilling an
underground pipeline.

According to the complaint, the plaintiffs have suffered and
continue to suffer physical damage to their property, exposure to
health hazards a loss of the use and quiet enjoyment of their
property allegedly because the defendants are employing horizontal
directional drilling (HDD) to install an underground pipeline. The
plaintiffs said this method is dangerous compared to hand digging.


The plaintiffs claim Sunoco's chose method of drilling is unsafe to
the underground structures and will likely impact the existing
pipeline and water and sewer lines and cause risk of explosion.

The plaintiffs request a trial by jury and seek a judgment in an
amount in excess of $50,000, together with costs, punitive damages
and any other relief the court deems appropriate. They are
represented by Andrew Neuwirth of Neuwirth Law Office LLC in King
of Prussia, Pennsylvania, and Edward Robson of Robson & Robson PC
in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas case number
2:18-cv-02774-PD [GN]

SWEETHEARTS CANDY: Laid Off Employees Seek Unpaid Wages, Benefits
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dexter Main and Francesco D'Amelio, individually and on behalf of
those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Sweethearts Candy Co. LLC
and Round Hill Investments LLC, as the owner and operator of all of
the assets and production of New England Confectionary Company
(NECCO), Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-11586 (D. Mass., July 27,
2018), seeks collection of unpaid wages and benefits for sixty
calendar days pursuant to the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act of 1988.

NECCO produced various iconic candies and confections. On April 3,
2018, certain creditors of NECCO filed an involuntary petition for
bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code for the
District of Massachusetts. On the afternoon of July 24, 2018,
Defendants announced that they were ceasing production immediately
and the employees were informed that their employment was
terminated effective immediately. Round Hill and SCCLLC failed to
provide any advance notice of the Shutdown, notes the complaint.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Nicholas J. Rosenberg, Esq.
      Josh Gardner, Esq.
      GARDNER & ROSENBERG P.C.
      1 State Street, 4th Floor
      Boston, MA 02100
      Tel: (617) 390-7570
      Fax: (617) 972-7983
      Email: nick@gardnerrosenberg.com

TARGET CORP: Court Dismisses A. Dormani's Suit
----------------------------------------------
Judge Joan N. Ericksen of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Minnesota dismissed without prejudice the case, ANN DORMANI,
MITCHELL W. KNOLL, DAVID RIGOL, and DOROTHEA SIMMONS, on behalf of
the Target Corporation 401(k) Plan, themselves, and a class
consisting of similarly situated participants of the Plan,
Plaintiffs, v. TARGET CORPORATION, SCOTT KENNEDY, MICHAEL FIDDELKE,
PLAN INVESTMENT COMMITTEE, JOHN MULLIGAN, COREY HAALAND, JODEE
KOZLAK, BETH JACOB, JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10, and GREGG STEINHAFEL,
Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-4049 (JNE/SER) (D. Minn.).

Dormani and three other Plaintiffs brought the action against
Target's 401(k) Plan Investment Committee ("PIC") and the related
Defendants, alleging violations of the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") stemming from Target's ill-fated
venture into Canada in 2013 and 2014.  The Plaintiffs contend that
the Defendants had inside information that Target's stock was
artificially inflated but failed to take appropriate measures to
protect the plan's participants.  They allege breaches of the
duties of prudence and loyalty, and of the duty to monitor other
ERISA fiduciaries.

The Plaintiffs allege three causes of action: breach of the duty of
prudence in violation of ERISA Sections 404(a)(1)(B) and 405; (2)
breach of the duty of loyalty in violation of ERISA Sections
404(a)(1)(A) and 405; and (3) failure to adequately monitor other
fiduciaries and provide them with accurate information, in
violation of ERISA.

The Defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that all three claims
are time-barred and, even if the limitations period has not run,
the Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim for relief.
They contend that the Plaintiffs' claims are barred under 29 U.S.C.
Section 1113(2) because they had actual knowledge of all of the
facts necessary to bring their claims as of Aug. 6, 2014, but did
not file their complaint until Aug. 30, 2017.

Judge Ericksen finds that the Plaintiffs' claims are not
time-barred.  Although the limitations period was not tolled during
the pendency of Target ERISA, the Plaintiffs did not have actual
knowledge of the breach or violation before Aug. 30, 2014.

As to duty of prudence claim, the Judge finds that (i) even if the
Plaintiffs are correct that the 2017 freeze did not harm Target
stock, this is outside the scope of what a reasonable fiduciary
during the Class Period would have known; (ii) a reasonable
fiduciary could have believed that disclosing negative information
about Target stock would do more harm than good (e.g., via market
overcorrection); (iii) a reasonable fiduciary faced with that
rock-and-a-hard-place dilemma could easily conclude that opting for
a cash buffer diversion would create more harm than good; and (iv)
the shortcomings that the Court identified previously as to the
Plaintiffs' three remaining alternative actions -- sending letters
to participants encouraging them to diversify their investments,
resigning as fiduciaries, and seeking guidance from government
regulators and outside experts -- remain shortcomings now.

With respect to the Defendants' breach of duty of loyalty under
Section 404(a)(1), the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs still have
not identified a single specific instance where Defendants
affirmatively misled Plan participants.  They merely contend that
to the extent that the Defendants knew or should have known that
the filings included inaccuracies, they breached the duty of
loyalty.

Finally, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs' current monitoring
claims replicate their previous monitoring claims, and fail for the
reasons outlined in the Court's prior order.

Judge Ericksen concludes that the Plaintiffs' claims cannot
withstand the motion to dismiss.  Although they are not
time-barred, none of the claims are sufficiently plausible to
survive a challenge under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Accordingly,
based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings
therein, and for the reasons he stated, he granted the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss and dismissed the Plaintiffs' Complaint without
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 15, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/J7AMtC from Leagle.com.

Ann Dormani, on behalf of the Target Corporation 401(k) Plan,
themselves, and a class consisting of similarly situated
participants of the Plan, David Rigol, on behalf of the Target
Corporation 401(k) Plan, themselves, and a class consisting of
similarly situated participants of the Plan & Dorothea Simmons, on
behalf of the Target Corporation 401(k) Plan, themselves, and a
class consisting of similarly situated participants of the Plan,
Plaintiffs, represented by David E. Krause --
dkrause@davidkrauselaw.com -- David E. Krause Law Office, Chtd.,
Gregory Mark Potrepka -- gpotrepka@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky,
LLP, pro hac vice & Michael Jason Klein -- mklein@ssbny.com --
Stull, Stull & Brody.

Mitchell W. Knoll, on behalf of the Target Corporation 401(k) Plan,
themselves, and a class consisting of similarly situated
participants of the Plan, Plaintiff, represented by David E.
Krause, David E. Krause Law Office, Chtd. & Michael Jason Klein,
Stull, Stull & Brody, pro hac vice.

Target Corporation, Scott Kennedy, Michael Fiddelke, Plan
Investment Committee, John Mulligan, Corey Haaland, Jodee Kozlak,
Beth Jacob & Gregg Steinhafel, Defendants, represented by Jeffrey
P. Justman -- jeff.justman@FaegreBD.com -- Faegre Baker Daniels
LLP, Steven L. Severson -- steven.severson@FaegreBD.com -- Faegre
Baker Daniels LLP & Wendy Jo Wildung -- wendy.wildung@FaegreBD.com
-- Faegre Baker Daniels LLP.

TD BANK: Customers Short-Changed by "Penny Arcade" Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------
Christian Hetrick, writing for Philly.com, reports that Anthony
Parisi Sanchez dumped socks full of change into TD Bank's Penny
Arcade coin-counting machine every week for six years, turning
hundreds of dollars' worth of pennies, nickels and dimes into what
he assumed would be the same amount in cash.

But media reports found the bank was undercounting the change. And
this year TD Bank settled a class action case alleging that the
machines had shorted consumers across the country.

Mr. Parisi Sanchez, a 50-year-old Vineland, N.J., resident, said he
got just two additional bucks in the settlement. And he thinks he
got robbed.

"This was a major deceit on the part of TD Bank, and I know I lost
more than $2," he said.

Sanchez is one of roughly 5.1 million Penny Arcade users whom TD
Bank is paying this year as part of the $7.5 million settlement to
resolve eight class action complaints. Like Mr. Parisi Sanchez,
many consumers are getting single-digit payments. This reporter
received $3.10.

That's because class members are getting 26 cents for every $100
they made in Penny Arcade transactions under a formula used to
distribute the settlement money. Individual payments are calculated
by multiplying 0.26 percent to the total amount a customer
collected from the machines between April 11, 2010, and July 12,
2017, according to a notice of the settlement, which was approved
in January.

Attorneys from eight firms representing class members, meanwhile,
earned $1.9 million in legal fees from the case, money paid
separately by TD Bank that did not reduce class members' recovery.
In addition, 13 named plaintiffs in the case shared $65,000 that
was also not included in the $7.5 million figure. Stephen DeNittis,
an attorney who represented class members, said the plaintiffs got
$5,000 each to "encourage people to come forward in a case like
this."

The class action claims stemmed from an April 2016 NBC "Today"
report that found TD Bank's machines repeatedly undercounted coins.
In one instance, a Penny Arcade counted $300 worth of coins as
$256.90 -- a nearly 15 percent error. "Today" tested five Penny
Arcade machines in total, with the other four units under-counting
coins by substantially smaller rates, ranging from 0.0167 percent
to 1.24 percent.

TD account holders got their change counted free but outsiders paid
an 8 percent fee for the service.

The bank yanked the machines out of its branches after the report
was published and agreed to no longer use them as part of the
settlement.

Coin-counting machines can still be found at Republic Bank, and
Coinstar has kiosks in grocery and retail stores. The "Today"
report said Coinstar's machines delivered accurate counts.

The 0.26 percent multiplier used to calculate class members'
payments is based on machine error rates found during tests
conducted by experts.

According to court filings, TD Bank hired Deloitte Transactions &
Business Analytics to test its Penny Arcade machines. The bank
tested more than 1,000 machines representing 90 percent of all
units, and the machines net undercounted by 0.117 percent and 0.09
percent, respectively, in two separate trials. Net undercount rates
include overcounts, in which the machines count more coins than are
actually deposited.

A TD Bank spokesperson declined comment, citing pending
litigation.

Attorneys representing class members said their own experts
reviewed Deloitte's data and methodology and concluded it was
reliable to use as a basis for the settlement, according to court
filings.

Mr. DeNittis acknowledged there were some outliers during machine
testing, but said their own experts' tests on 19 machines found an
average undercount rate of about 0.28 percent. He said that margin
of error did not factor in overcounts.

The $7.5 million settlement figure was calculated by applying the
0.26 percent rate to the total amount of coins counted during the
seven-year class period, DeNittis said.

Mr. DeNittis, a managing partner at the law firm DeNittis Osefchen
Prince PC, based in Marlton, described the settlement as the best
possible outcome given that it's impossible to pinpoint how much
each person lost.

"The class received at a minimum 100 cents of the calculated losses
through statistical sampling and testing," he said, adding that
overcounts were not considered in the rate used for the
settlement.

But Mr. Parisi Sanchez isn't satisfied with his two dollars.
"There's no way they could tell how much people lost," he said,
calling the methodology used for the settlement "gorilla math."

"I'll use it on stamps to sue them," he said of his plans to spend
the $2.

By receiving those two bucks, however, he waived the right to take
legal action against TD Bank, according to a notice of the
settlement. [GN]

TENNESSEE: Court Certifies Statewide Class in Drivers' License Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee, Nashville Division, granted in part and denied in part
the Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned FRED
ROBINSON; ASHLEY SPRAGUE; JOHNNY GIBBS; and BRIANNA BOOHER, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. DAVID W. PURKEY, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of
Safety and Homeland Security, in his official capacity; DEBBIE
MOSS, Circuit Court Clerk of Wilson County, Tennessee, in her
official capacity; MELISSA HARRELL, Circuit Court Clerk of
Rutherford County, Tennessee, in her official capacity; COREY
LINVILLE, Court Clerk of the Municipal Court of Lebanon, Tennessee,
in his official capacity; SUSAN GASKILL, Court Clerk of Mt. Juliet,
Tennessee, in her official capacity; WILSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE;
RUTHERFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE; LEBANON, TENNESSEE; and MT. JULIET,
TENNESSEE, Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-01263 (M.D. Tenn.).

Sprague, Gibbs, and Robinson filed the initial Class Action
Complaint in this matter, naming the following defendants: Purkey,
in his official capacity as TDSHS Commissioner; Moss, in her
official capacity as Circuit Court Clerk of Wilson County; Harrell,
in her official capacity as Circuit Court Clerk of Rutherford
County; Linville, in his official capacity as Court Clerk of the
Municipal Court of Lebanon; Gaskill, in her official capacity as
Court Clerk of the City Court of Mt. Juliet; Wilson County;
Rutherford County; the City of Lebanon; and the City of Mt.
Juliet.
  
The plaintiffs filed a Motion to Certify Class. They seek
certification of a Statewide Class defined as all persons whose
Tennessee driver's licenses have been or will be suspended under
Tenn. Code Ann. Section 55-50-502(a)(1)(H) or (I) for non-payment
of traffic debt and who cannot now and could not at the time of
suspension afford to pay such debt.

They also seek the certification of three subclasses:

   1. The Wilson County Subclass.  All members of the Statewide
Class whose driver's licenses have been or will be suspended at the
instance of Wilson County and/or its Clerks.

   2. The Rutherford County Subclass. All members of the Statewide
Class whose driver's licenses have been or will be suspended at the
instance of Rutherford County and/or its Clerks.

   3. The Multi-Barrier Subclass.  All members of the Statewide
Class who, as of the date of judgment in this action, also had
outstanding driver's license revocations under Tenn. Code Ann.
Section 40-24-105(b) for non-payment of fines, fees, costs and
restitution arising from criminal proceedings (Court Debt).

The State of Tennessee generally prohibits drivers from using its
streets and highways without a driver's license. Tenn. Code Ann.
Section 55-50-301(a)(1). An applicant for a Tennessee driver's
license must furnish certain required information and submit to an
examination, including an actual demonstration of ability to
exercise ordinary and reasonable control in the operation of a
motor vehicle. Upon fulfilling the necessary requirements, a
qualifying applicant will be granted a Tennessee driver's license.

Traffic Violations and the Accumulation of Traffic Debt

Not every violation of a traffic law, of course, results in an
enforcement action. Indeed, it does not go beyond the bounds of
ordinary judicial notice to observe that some prohibitions, such as
the laws against speeding or following too closely, are violated
routinely on the state's roads by ordinary drivers and that, often,
those drivers simply go on with the rest of their day without
facing any legal consequences for their violations. Sometimes,
though, a violation does result in enforcement—often, because the
violation was witnessed by a law enforcement officer who elected to
perform a traffic stop.

Fines

Generally speaking, a Class C misdemeanor is punishable by not
greater than thirty (30) days imprisonment or a fine not to exceed
fifty dollars ($50.00), or both.

The court imposing a fine is permitted to choose from a number of
options regarding the timeline for payment.

When any court of this state, including municipal courts for
violation of municipal ordinances, imposes a fine upon an
individual, the court may direct as follows:

   (1) That the defendant pay the entire amount at the time
sentence is pronounced;

   (2) That the defendant pay the entire amount at some later
date;

   (3) That the defendant pay the fine in specified portions or
installments at designated periodic intervals and that the portions
be remitted to a designated official, who shall report to the court
in the event of any failure to comply with the order; or

   (4) Where the defendant is sentenced to a period of probation as
well as a fine, that payment of the fine be a condition of the
sentence.

Purkey argues that the plaintiffs are not entitled to certification
of their class for five reasons:

   (1) they have failed to produce appropriate evidence sufficient
to meet their burden under Rule 23;

   (2) they cannot satisfy the numerosity requirement because they
have not demonstrated what portion of people with suspended
licenses are indigent;

   (3) they cannot satisfy the commonality requirement because the
population of drivers with suspended licenses involves substantial
variation in the issues and postures presented by each individual
case;

   (4) they similarly cannot satisfy the typicality requirement
because the plaintiffs' proving their own right to relief would not
necessarily establish the right to relief of others.

Numerosity

Purkey argues next that the plaintiffs cannot establish that their
proposed class is sufficiently numerous to warrant certification
under Rule 23.

Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the class be so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable. Although there is no strict
numerical test, substantial numbers usually satisfy the numerosity
requirement.

Purkey is correct that the plaintiffs have not put forth evidence
that would allow the court to know precisely how many of the people
whose driver's licenses were suspended are indigent. However, the
exact number of class members need not be pleaded or proved for a
class to be certified, as long as the class representatives can
show that joinder would be impracticable. Facts, common sense, and
the basic features of the statutes at issue all dictate that there
is little doubt that that is the case here. The nature of
Tennessee's scheme is that every person who cannot pay her traffic
debt will face suspension unless she happens to receive some form
of discretionary relief from a court.

To deny that there are a substantial number of indigent debtors
facing suspension, then, is essentially to deny that indigent
debtors exist at all or, at the very least, to assume, based on no
evidence, that all or virtually all of those debtors have received
relief that is, by its own terms, wholly discretionary. Such a
possibility is decidedly implausible.
The plaintiffs' state-wide class would be sufficiently numerous,
even if only a small percentage of the people whose licenses have
been suspended turned out to be indigent. Even if one relies on the
lowest provided number for failure-to-pay suspensions and assumes
that merely 2% of those drivers with outstanding suspensions are
indigent, then the statewide class would still number more than
1,600 people, a number easily too high to make joinder practicable.


The court will not deny certification for failure to satisfy Rule
23(a)(1).

Commonality and Typicality

Purkey's latter two objections under Rule 23(a) raise the same
issue from different angles. Although the plaintiffs have all faced
suspensions for nonpayment of traffic debt and all claim that they
are willing, but unable, to pay what they owe, their particular
circumstances do differ, both with regard to the details of the
cases from which their traffic debt arose and with regard to their
current barriers to reinstatement.

Purkey argues that the plaintiffs cannot show commonality, because
the various members of the class will face various cumulative
barriers to regaining their driving privileges. As the court has
already held, however, this case is not merely about the binary
question of whether each class member has or does not have a
driver's license, but also the question of what barriers they must
overcome to get those driver's licenses back. Commonality with
regard to the barrier at issue in this case is not defeated by a
lack of commonality with regard to the unrelated obstacles that the
various class members face.

Typicality

The typicality requirement is met if the class members' claims are
fairly encompassed by the named plaintiffs' claims. This
requirement ensures that the class representatives' interests are
aligned with the interests of the represented class members so
that, by pursuing her own interests, the class representative also
advocates the interests of the class members. Thus, a plaintiff's
claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or
course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class
members and if her claims are based on the same legal theory.
Commonality and typicality tend to merge because both of them serve
as guideposts for determining whether, under the particular
circumstances, maintenance of a class action is economical, and
whether the plaintiff's claims and the class claims are so
interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly
and adequately protected in their absence.  

In this instance, with commonality established, typicality readily
follows. The plaintiffs' underlying economic situations and the
details of their cases may be unique to them, but, with regard to
the issues central to their claims, the plaintiffs are as typical
as any member of the class. Because they have faced and received
suspensions for non-payment of traffic debt that they are unable to
pay, they are typical.

Propriety of Certification

Purkey identifies no other grounds for denying class certification
here, and the court finds that all of the remaining requirements
for certification of the state-wide class are met. Rule 23(a)(4)
requires the court only to certify the class if the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class. That requirement considers both general commonality of
interests and whether the putative representative will vigorously
prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel.
Purkey has conceded that he does not dispute that requirement, and
the record provides ample basis for concluding that the plaintiffs'
representation will be adequate. The plaintiffs have also satisfied
Rule 23(a)(1), (2), and (3) by showing numerosity, commonality, and
typicality, and they have demonstrated that their case falls within
the boundaries of Rule 23(b)(2). Rule 23(c)(1) directs this court
to determine whether to certify a class at an early practicable
time after a person sues or is sued as a class representative and
there appear to be no more substantive questions remaining
regarding whether certification is appropriate here.

The court, accordingly, will certify the proposed state-wide
class.

The plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class will be granted with regard
to the state-wide class and otherwise denied, without prejudice, as
moot.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 11, 2018 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yd9zvm4z from Leagle.com.

Fred Robinson, Ashley Sprague & Johnny Gibbs, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,, Plaintiffs,
represented by Claudia Wilner , National Center for Law and
Econimic Justice, Edward P. Krugman -- krugman@nclej.org -- Civil
Rights Corps, Jonas Wang , Civil Rights Corps, Jonathan Jacob Cole
-- jcole@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell &
Berkowitz, PC, Josh Spickler -- josh@justcity.org -- Just City,
Matthew G. White -- mwhite@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker, Donelson,
Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC,  Premal Dharia --
premal@civilrightscorps.org -- Civil Rights Corps & Theresa Lau ,
National Center for Law and Econimic Justice.

Brianna Booher, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew G. White , Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC.

David W. Purkey, Commisssioner of the Tennessee Department of
Safety and Homeland Security, in his official capacity, Defendant,
represented by Alexander Stuart Rieger , Tennessee Attorney
General's Office, Andrew B. Campbell , Tennessee Attorney General's
Office & Scott C. Sutherland , Tennessee Attorney General's
Office.

Debby Moss, Circuit Court Clerk of Wilson County, Tennessee, in her
official capacity, & Wilson County, Tennessee, Defendants,
represented by Kristin Ellis Berexa , Farrar & Bates, Mark Ennis
McGrady , Farrar & Bates & Michael Ray Jennings.

TOYOTA MOTOR: Stockinger et al. Suit Moved to C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Paul Stockinger, Elizabeth
Stockinger, Gailyn Kennedy, Basudeb Dey, Eliezer Casper, and Yvette
Alley, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., and Timothy Barabe,
Defendants, Case No. 3:18-mc-80102, was removed from the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, to the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California on July 5,
2018. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:18-mc-00087-CBM-JC to the proceeding. The Case is assigned to the
Hon. Consuelo B. Marshall and referred to Magistrate Judge
Jacqueline Chooljian.

Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. manufactures and sells vehicles.
The company was founded in 1957 and is based in Torrance,
California with design, research, and development facilities, as
well as regional offices in the United States. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Toyota Motor Corporation.
[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Jennifer L Joost, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER AND CHECK LLP
          One Sansome Street Suite 1850
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 400-3000
          Facsimile: (415) 400-3001
          E-mail: jjoost@ktmc.com

               - and -

          Natalie Lesser, Esq.
          Peter A Muhic, Esq.
          Tyler S Graden, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER AND CHECK LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Randor, PA 19087
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          Facsimile: (610) 667-7056
          E-mail: nlesser@ktmc.com
                  pmuhic@ktmc.com
                  tgraden@ktmc.com

               - and –

          David L Schrader, Esq.
          Esther Kyungmin Ro, Esq.
          Jahmy Stanford Graham, Esq.
          MORGAN LEWIS AND BOCKIUS LLP
          300 South Grand Avenue 22nd Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-3132
          Telephone: (213) 612-2500
          Facsimile: (213) 612-2501
          E-mail: david.schrader@morganlewis.com
                  esther.ro@morganlewis.com
                  jahmy.graham@morganlewis.com


TRACTOR SUPPLY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, "Sweeney" Suit Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
DEBRA SWEENEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TRACTOR SUPPLY COMPANY, and DOES 1 through
50, inclusive, Case No. 18CV330995 (Cal. Super., Santa Clara Cty.,
July 3, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for failure to
pay overtime wages at the correct rate, provide proper wage
statements, and pay wages in a timely manner.

Sweeney was employed by the Defendants as an hourly non-exempt
employee from April 1, 2017 to June 22, 2018.

Tractor Supply Company operates rural lifestyle retail stores in
the United States. The Company was founded in 1938 and is
headquartered in Brentwood, Tennessee. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Larry  W.  Lee, Esq.
          Kristen M. Agnew, Esq.
          Nicholas Rosenthal, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554

               - and -

          William  L. Marder, Esq.
          POLARIS LAW GROUP LLP
          501 San Benito Street, Suite 200
          Hollister, CA 95023
          Telephone: (831) 531-4214
          Facsimile: (831) 634-0333


TRUE RENEWABLE: Naiman Hits Autodialed Telemarketing Calls
----------------------------------------------------------
Sidney Naiman, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. True Renewable Energy, Incorporated and
Does 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of them, Defendants, Case
No. 18-cv-04540 (N.D. Cal., July 27, 2018), seeks damages and any
other available legal or equitable remedies resulting from
contacting Plaintiff on his cellular telephone in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

True Renewable Energy, Inc. is a solar energy company, who
contacted Naiman in an attempt solicit their services using an
"automatic telephone dialing system" thereby incurring a charge for
incoming calls. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
     Meghan E. George, Esq.
     Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
     Thomas E. Wheeler, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
     21550 Oxnard St. Suite 780,
     Woodland Hills, CA 91367
     Phone: (877) 206-4741
     Fax: (866) 633-0228
     Email: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
            mgeorge@toddflaw.com
            abacon@toddflaw.com
            twheeler@toddflaw.com

UNITED STATES: 9th Circuit Appeal Filed in Goldstein Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Steven Michael Goldstein filed an appeal from a court
ruling in the lawsuit styled Steven Goldstein v. Nancy Berryhill,
Case No. 5:13-cv-03504-HRL, in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Jose.

The appellate case is captioned as Steven Goldstein v. Nancy
Berryhill, Case No. 18-16260, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellant Steven Michael Goldstein's opening brief is due
      on September 7, 2018;

   -- Appellee Nancy A. Berryhill's answering brief is due on
      October 9, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.

Plaintiff-Appellant STEVEN MICHAEL GOLDSTEIN, and all others
similarly situated, of Mountain View, California, appears pro
se.[BN]

Defendant-Appellee NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Commissioner of Social
Security Administration, is represented by:

          Lynn M. Harada, Esq.
          ASSISTANT REGIONAL COUNSEL
          SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
          160 Spear Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105

               - and -

          Sara Winslow, Esq.
          ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY
          DOJ-USAO
          450 Golden Gate Avenue
          San Francisco, CA 94102
          Telephone: (415) 436-7200
          Facsimile: (415) 436-7234


UNITED STATES: Idaho County Joins Class Action Over PILT Payments
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Kathy Hedberg, writing for The Lewiston Tribune, reports that the
Idaho County Commissioners voted unanimously on July 17 to opt into
a class-action lawsuit against the federal government for failing
to fully fund its Payment In Lieu of Taxes program.

Several counties, including some in Utah and Montana, have already
joined in the lawsuit that maintains the federal government
underfunded the payments from 2015 to 2017.

"I don't see any drawbacks," said Idaho County Prosecutor Kirk A.
MacGregor, who presented the commissioners with the proposal at the
board's regular meeting. "Even if we lose, we don't have to pay
anything. And if we win, we could get more money from the federal
government."

The PILT program supplies federal payments to local governments to
help offset losses in property taxes because of non-taxable federal
lands within their boundaries.

Last year Idaho County received about $1.7 million from the
program. About 85 percent of the county is under the auspices of
the U.S. Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management. Idaho
County Commission Chairman Skip Brandt said Idaho County could
recover about $60,000 in underpayments from the lawsuit

The class-action lawsuit is based on litigation filed in June 2017
by Kane County, Utah, in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.

In 2008 Congress repealed the original statute language that made
PILT payments discretionary by mandating full funding through
2014.

But from 2015 to 2017 the counties did not receive the full amount
to which they were entitled because of insufficient appropriations,
according to the National Association of Counties.

Kane County's lawsuit sought to recover its underpayments and those
of all other eligible recipients for those years. In December the
court ruled in Kane County's favor for fiscal year 2015 and 2016
and issued a similar ruling in March for fiscal year 2017. It is
not yet clear if the federal government plans to appeal those
decisions.

Last year more than $552 million was paid to 1,957 counties. The
lawsuit was filed by the Atlanta firm of Smith, Currie and Hancock,
which represents Kane County.

Counties have until Sept. 14 to opt into the lawsuit. [GN]

UNITED STATES: Texas County Joins Class Action Over PILT Payments
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Houston Herald reports that on July 3, the Texas County Commission
approved joining a class action lawsuit related to funds owed by
the federal government in lieu of taxes.

Commissioners reviewed correspondence from the "Federal Claims for
a Class Action for Counties."

The lawsuit, originally filed by Kane County, Utah, contends that
the U.S. government violated the law by not appropriating the full
amount guaranteed to counties through the Payments in Lieu of Taxes
(PILT) program.

The PILT statute sets out specific formulas to calculate payment
due each local government. But in fiscal years 2015 and 2016,
Congress didn't appropriate enough money to make full PILT
payments. As a result, the secretary of the interior proportionally
reduced each payment.

Texas County will attempt to recover about $3,503. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Writ of Habeas Corpus OK'd in Illegal Detention Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
granted Plaintiffs' Writ of Habeas Corpus in the cases captioned
LILIAN PAHOLA CALDERON JIMENEZ AND LUCIMAR DE SOUZA, ET AL.
Petitioner-Plaintiffs, v. CHRISTOPHER CRONEN, ET AL,
Respondent-Defendants, EDUARDO RALPH JUNQUEIRA, Petitioner, v.
STEVEN SOUZA, ET AL, Respondents, C.A. Nos. 18-10225-MLW,
18-10307-MLW (D. Mass.).

Lucimar De Souza, a Brazilian national, entered the United States
unlawfully in 2002. She alleges that she did not receive notice of
the hearing to determine whether she should be deported from the
United States. In any event, in June 2002, De Souza was ordered to
leave the country and did not.

Eduardo Junqueira, who was also born in Brazil, entered the United
States unlawfully in 2004. He was apprehended and deported later
that year. Junqueira soon reentered the United States unlawfully.

In 2006, De Souza married a United States citizen. They have an
11-year old son who is a United States citizen. Junqueira also
married a United States citizen. They have two children, ages 10
and 12, who are United States citizens. Neither De Souza nor
Junqueira has ever violated any law other than by entering and
remaining in the United States illegally.

De Souza is also attempting to represent a putative class in
challenging the authority of ICE to arrest aliens at CIS offices
and, wherever they are arrested, to deport them before CIS decides
whether to grant them provisional waivers that would allow them to
seek to remain in the United States with their families.

De Souza and Junquiera each filed petitions for habeas corpus
asserting they are being detained by ICE in violation of the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and seeking an order
directing ICE to release them.

28 U.S.C. Section 2241(c)(3) authorizes a district court to issue a
writ of habeas corpus to a person in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.The writ of
habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to
demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to 'the erroneous
application or interpretation' of relevant law and to obtain
relief, including release, if he is being unlawfully detained.  
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act and
Real ID Act, codified in 8 U.S.C. Section 1252, places certain
limits on judicial review in immigration cases.   However, Section
2241 habeas corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for
statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period
detention.

De Souza and Junqueira have each been previously ordered removed
from the United States. Each claims, among other things, that ICE
violated 8 U.S.C. Section 1231(a)(6) and the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment by detaining him or her for more than three
months without the opportunity to be heard required by DHS
regulations. These are statutory and constitutional challenges to
post-removal-period detention, for which Section 2241 gives the
court jurisdiction.

Federal law also creates a process for determining whether aliens
like De Souza and Junqueira, who have been ordered removed, should
be detained while the government attempts to effectuate their
removal. A federal statute requires that an alien ordered removed
from the United States be detained for up to 90 days, ordinarily
starting on the date the order becomes final. These 90 days are
defined by the statute as the removal period. ICE must give an
alien notice and an opportunity to be heard before detaining him or
her for longer than 90 days. At the time of the May 8, 2018 hearing
in these cases, ICE had detained De Souza and Junqueira for more
than 90 days without following the process prescribed by its
regulations.
ICE initially argued that the regulations do not apply to De Souza,
and that they had not been violated with respect to Junqueira. ICE
subsequently acknowledged that the regulations do apply and, even
on its interpretation, which may be incorrect, the regulations were
violated in each case. However, ICE contends that the court does
not have the power to provide a remedy for the unlawful detention
of an alien who has not been in custody for at least six months.
ICE relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Zadvydas in making
this claim.

ICE'S argument is unmeritorious. The Fifth Amendment guarantee of
due process has two components. The substantive component prohibits
restrictions on liberty that are not narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest, no matter what process is employed in
deciding to impose them. In addition, a person who is detained has
a right to procedural due process, meaning a right to a fair
process for challenging the reasons for detention. Fundamental
features of procedural due process are fair notice of the reasons
for the possible loss of liberty and a meaningful opportunity to
address them. Zadvydas addressed the substantive due process
component of the Fifth Amendment.

The Supreme Court held, in effect, that an alien's right to
substantive due process could be violated by prolonged detention
even if the alien's right to procedural due process had been
satisfied. Implicitly assuming that the alien had been afforded
procedural due process, the Court found that detention of an alien
for up to six months is presumptively reasonable for the purpose of
the substantive due process analysis.

Junqueira was arrested on February 1, 2018 and, therefore, was
entitled to a custody review no later than about May 1, 2018.
Neither Junqueira nor his attorney received notice that any such
review had been scheduled. Again, evidently alerted to ICE's
unlawful conduct by the litigation in these cases, on May 3, 2018,
the Acting and Deputy Field Office Directors decided that Junqueira
would be released that day. However, after being contacted by an
ICE lawyer, the Acting Field Office Director reversed that
decision. ICE subsequently issued a notice that Junqueira would
receive a custody review on about June 3, 2018, which would have
deprived him too of his liberty at least until that review was
conducted.

With regard to both De Souza and Junqueira, ICE argues that this
court lacks the authority to order a remedy for its unlawful
conduct. However, as the Supreme Court held in Zadvydas, Section
2241 habeas corpus proceedings provide a forum for statutory and
constitutional challenges to post-removal detention. The
presumption created by Zadvydas, that up to six months of detention
is reasonable, is based on the assumption that ICE followed the
process prescribed by its regulations to ensure that continued
detention was justified. This assumption is not true for either De
Souza or Junqueira. As of May 8, 2018, ICE was detaining each of
them in violation of its regulations and without the due process of
law required by the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, each is entitled to
judicial relief.

Habeas corpus is an equitable remedy. The court has the discretion
to fashion relief that is fair in the circumstances, including to
order an alien's release. In view of ICE's repeated violations of
its regulations and its indifference to its duty to obey the law
it would not now be fair to keep De Souza or Junqueira incarcerated
for another 30 days. Therefore, the court will promptly decide if
either or both should be released pending possible deportation.

ICE's illegal actions concerning De Souza and Junqueira have had
profound human consequences that would continue without the court's
intervention. It appears likely that De Souza and Junqueira will
each be able to prove that if released, they will not be dangerous
or flee and, therefore, that each will be entitled to release. Each
will nevertheless still face the threat of being deported and
separated from their families. Each day with their families is now
particularly precious. Any unjustified loss of liberty for even
another day would be a painful form of irreparable harm to them and
to the United States citizens who love them.
If accepted, ICE's argument that the court lacks the power to grant
petitioners relief in these cases would deeply damage the
Constitution's system of checks and balances that, as intended by
the nation's Founders, has been fundamental to protecting the
rights of every person, citizens as well as aliens. As the Supreme
Court reminded in the case of a prisoner detained at Guantanamo,
the writ of habeas corpus gives the Judiciary a time-tested device
to maintain the delicate balance of governance that is itself the
surest safeguard of liberty and protects the rights of the detained
by conferring the duty and authority on the Judiciary to call the
jailor to account.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 11, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9tnqoem from
Leagle.com.

Lilian Pahola Calderon Jimenez, Petitioner, represented by Adriana
Lafaille -- alafaille@aclum.org -- American Civil Liberties Union,
Colleen M. McCullough -- colleen.mccullough@wilmerhale.com --
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, LLP, pro hac vice, Jonathan
A. Cox -- JONATHAN.COX@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering
Hale and Dorr LLP, Kathleen M. Gillespie , Attorney at Law, Kevin
S. Prussia -- KEVIN.PRUSSIA@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Hale LLP,
Matthew Segal , American Civil Liberties Union, Michaela P. Sewall
, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP & Stephen Nicholas
Provazza -- STEPHEN.PROVAZZA@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Hale LLP.

Luis Gordillo, Sandro De Souza, Carmen Sanchez, Oscar Rivas, Celina
Rivera Rivas, Lucimar De Souza, Sergio Francisco, Deng Gao & Amy
Chen, Petitioners, represented by Adriana Lafaille , American Civil
Liberties Union, Colleen M. McCullough , Wilmer Cutler Pickering
Hale and Dorr, LLP, pro hac vice, Jonathan A. Cox , Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Kathleen M. Gillespie , Attorney at
Law, Kevin S. Prussia , Wilmer Hale LLP, Michaela P. Sewall ,
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP & Stephen Nicholas
Provazza , Wilmer Hale LLP.

Christopher Cronen, Boston Field Office Director, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Kirstjen M NIELSEN, Secretary of Homeland
Security, Yolanda Smith, Superintendent of Suffolk County
Correctional Facility & STEVEN W TOMPKINS, Sherrif of Suffolk
County, Respondents, represented by Eve A. Piemonte , U.S.
Attorney's Office, Mary Larakers , U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Immigration Litigation & J. Max Weintraub , U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation.

Thomas Homan, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Thomas Brophy, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Enforcement and
Removal Office, Boston Field Office Director & Donald J. Trump,
President of the United States, Respondents, represented by J. Max
Weintraub , U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration
Litigation.

UNIVERSAL FIDELITY: O'Boyle Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections
-------------------------------------------------------------
ANNE O'BOYLE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. UNIVERSAL FIDELITY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-01016-JPS (E.D. Wis., July 3, 2018)
seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to
collect a debt.

Universal Fidelity LP, also known as UFLP, provides billing,
collection, and call center services for companies; and federal,
state, and local governments. The company was founded in 1991 and
is based in Houston, Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


UNIVERSITY OF THE PACIFIC: Faces Meadows Suit in Sacramento
-----------------------------------------------------------
An employment-related class action lawsuit has been filed against
University of the Pacific. The case is captioned as Craig Meadows,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. University of the Pacific; and Does 1-100, Defendants,
Case No. 34-2018-00236147-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., Sacramento Cty.,
July 3, 2018).

University of the Pacific is an education institution offering
bachelors, masters, and doctoral degrees. The university was
founded in 1851 and is based in Stockton, California. It has
endowment assets worth $187.7 million. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by Galen T. Shimoda, Esq.


WALTERS MANAGEMENT: Fails to Pay OT, Medina Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------
VALERIE J. MEDINA, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. THE WALTERS MANAGEMENT COMPANY
d/b/a WALTERS MANAGEMENT; THE WALTERS HOME MANAGEMENT COMPANY d/b/a
WALTERS MANAGEMENT; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Case No.
37-2018-00033171-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super., July 3, 2018) is an action
against the Defendants for unpaid regular hours, overtime hours,
minimum wages, wages for missed meal and rest periods.

Medina was employed by the Defendants as community association
administrator from September 2014 to March 2017.

The Walters Management Company was founded in 1981. The company's
line of business includes renting, buying, selling and appraising
real estate. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Isam C. Khoury, Esq.
          Marta Manus, Esq.
          COHELAN KHOURY & SINGER
          605 C Street, Suite 200
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 595-3001
          Facsimile: (619) 595-3000
          E-mail: jkhoury@ckslaw.com
                  mmanus@ckslaw.com


WELLS FARGO: Sweeney Appeals Ruling in Jabbari Suit to 9th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Objector Kerry Ann Sweeney filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit styled Shahriar Jabbari, et al. v. Wells Fargo &
Company, et al., Case No. 3:15-cv-02159-VC, in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Wells Fargo
will pay $142 million to settle class action claims that it
secretly opened credit cards and unauthorized accounts in
customers' names going back to 2002.

The bank was hit hard by the discovery that its staff opened
millions of bank accounts and credit cards for customers without
their consent in an effort to meet internal sales goals.

Lead Plaintiff Shahriar Jabbari sued Wells Fargo in May 2015,
claiming it encouraged employees to use fraudulent and deceptive
tactics to persuade customers to open fee-generating accounts by
misrepresenting them or not informing them at all.

The appellate case is captioned as Shahriar Jabbari, et al. v.
Wells Fargo & Company, et al., Case No. 18-16268, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by August 2, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on September 4, 2018;

   -- Appellant Kerry Ann Sweeney's opening brief is due on
      October 11, 2018;

   -- Appellees Kaylee Heffelfinger, Shahriar Jabbari, Wells
      Fargo & Company and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s answering
      brief is due on November 13, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.

Objector-Appellant KERRY ANN SWEENEY, of Santa Monica, California,
appears pro se.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees SHAHRIAR JABBARI and KAYLEE HEFFELFINGER, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, are
represented by:


          Gretchen Freeman Cappio, Esq.
          Benjamin Gould, Esq.
          Derek W. Loeser, Esq.
          Daniel Parke Mensher, Esq.
          Lynn Lincoln Sarko, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK LLP
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-1900
          E-mail: gcappio@kellerrohrback.com
                  bgould@kellerrohrback.com
                  dloeser@kellerrohrback.com
                  dmensher@kellerrohrback.com
                  lsarko@kellerrohrback.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey Greg Lewis, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK LLP
          300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 463-3900
          E-mail: jlewis@kellerrohrback.com

               - and -

          Matthew J. Preusch, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK LLP
          1129 State Street, Suite 8
          Santa Barbara, CA 93101
          Telephone: (805) 456-1496
          Facsimile: (805) 456-1497
          E-mail: mpreusch@kellerrohrback.com

Defendants-Appellees WELLS FARGO & COMPANY and WELLS FARGO BANK,
N.A., are represented by:

          Manuel Francisco Cachan, Esq.
          Bart H. Williams, Esq.
          PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
          2049 Century Park East
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-3206
          Telephone: (310) 284-4568
          E-mail: manuel.cachan@mto.com
                  bart.williams@mto.com

               - and -

          Erin J. Cox, Esq.
          Eric P. Tuttle, Esq.
          MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
          350 South Grand Avenue, 50th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 683-9575
          E-mail: erin.cox@mto.com
                  Eric.Tuttle@mto.com

               - and -

          Jeslyn A. Everitt, Esq.
          David H. Fry, Esq.
          MUNGER TOLLES & OLSON, LLP
          560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 512-4040
          E-mail: jeslyn.everitt@mto.com
                  david.fry@mto.com


WISCONSIN: 7th Circuit Appeal Filed in Tatum Suit
-------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Robert L. Tatum filed an appeal from a court ruling in
his lawsuit styled Robert Tatum v. Michael Meisner, et al., Case
No. 3:13-cv-00044-wmc, in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Robert L.
Tatum was an inmate incarcerated at the Wisconsin Secure Program
Facility and previously incarcerated at Columbia Correctional
Institution.  He filed the action on January 18, 2013, with motions
following in early February for class certification and preliminary
injunction or TRO.  At the end of September 2013, the District
Court denied those motions as well as a separate motion for
recruitment of counsel, and directed him to advise which of as many
as five possible causes of action he wished to pursue in his
lawsuit.

At the same time, the District Court granted Mr. Tatum leave to
proceed with claims under the First Amendment and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C.
Sections 2000cc-2(b), against the warden of the Columbia
Correctional Institution, Michael Meisner, and the DOC
Administrator for the Division of Adult Institutions, Cathy Jess,
concerning the nutritional adequacy of Ramadan meals.

The appellate case is captioned as Robert Tatum v. Michael Meisner,
et al., Case No. 18-2489, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.

Plaintiff-Appellant ROBERT L. TATUM, and All Similarly Situated
DOC/CCI Inmates, at Green Bay Correctional Institution, in Green
Bay, Wisconsin, appear pro se.[BN]

Defendants-Appellees MICHAEL MEISNER CATHY JESS, DAI Administrator,
and MICHAEL A. DITTMANN are represented by:

          Rebecca Ann Paulson, Esq.
          OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
          17 W. Main Street
          P.O. Box 7857
          Madison, WI 53707-7857
          Telephone: (608) 266-0278
          E-mail: paulsonra@doj.state.wi.us


XPO LOGISTICS: 9th Circuit Appeal Filed in Alvarez Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Angel Alvarez, et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling in their lawsuit styled Angel Alvarez, et al. v. XPO
Logistics Cartage, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-03736-SJO-E, in
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Los
Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the class
action lawsuit alleges that XPO Logistics used a deliberate scheme
to misclassify their truck drivers as independent contractors,
thus, denying them the protections available to employees under
California law.

"This class action seeks to enjoin the defendants' unlawful
conduct, to obtain restitution of unpaid wages and unlawful
deductions made from truck drivers' pay, and to prosecute a private
enforcement action to collect civil penalties under the Labor Code
Private Attorney General Act," the lawsuit said.

The appellate case is captioned as Angel Alvarez, et al. v. XPO
Logistics Cartage, LLC, et al., Case No. 18-80079, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioners ANGEL OMAR ALVAREZ, ALBERTO RIVERA, FERNANDO
RAMIREZ, JUAN ROMERO and JOSE PAZ, on behalf of themselves and
other similarly situated drivers, are represented by:

          Kiel Ireland, Esq.
          Julie Gutman Dickinson, Esq.
          Ira L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Katherine M. Traverso, Esq.
          BUSH GOTTLIEB, A LAW CORPORATION
          801 N. Brand Boulevard, Suite 950
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 973-3230
          Facsimile: (818) 973-3201
          E-mail: kireland@bushgottlieb.com
                  jgutmandickinson@bushgottlieb.com
                  IGottlieb@bushgottlieb.com
                  ktraverso@bushgottlieb.com

Defendants-Respondents XPO LOGISTICS CARTAGE, LLC, DBA XPO
Logistics, a Delaware limited Liability Company, and JEFFREY
TRAUNER, an individual, are represented by:

          Mary Catherine Dollarhide, Esq.
          DLA PIPER US, LLP
          4365 Executive Drive
          San Diego, CA 92121-2133
          Telephone: (858) 677-1400
          E-mail: mary.dollarhide@dlapiper.com

               - and -

          Kathryn Bridget Riley, Esq.
          DLA PIPER LLP (US)
          401 B Street
          San Diego, CA 92101-4297
          Telephone: (619) 699-2700
          E-mail: kathryn.riley@dlapiper.com


YUZU KAITEN: Fox Suit Alleges FLSA, Fla. Min. Wage Act Violations
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Kayla Fox, on her own behalf and others similarly situated v. Yuzu
Kaiten Sushi, LLC, and Xuemin Li, Case No. 18-cv-61582 (S.D. Fla.,
July 11, 2018), is brought against the Defendants for violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Florida Minimum Wage Act.

The Plaintiff Kayla Fox worked for the Defendants as a server
between April 1, 2018 and June 13, 2018. The Plaintiff is an
individual residing in Broward County, Florida.

The Defendants have owned and operated a restaurant since its
opening for at least five years prior to the filing of this
Complaint, in Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida within the
jurisdiction of this Court. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Robert S. Norell, Esq.
      ROBERT S. NORELL, P.A.
      300 N.W. 70th Avenue, Suite 305
      Plantation, FL 33317
      Tel: (954) 617-6017
      Fax: (954) 617-6018
      E-mail: rob@floridawagelaw.com


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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