CAR_Public/180820.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, August 20, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 166

                            Headlines

AARON'S INC: Continues to Defend Byrd Class Action
AGRI STATS: Bear's Restaurant Group Sues over Price-Fixing of Pork
AKER BIOSCIENCES: Faces "Gleason" Class Action Suit in New Jersey
AKERS BIOSCIENCES: Faces "Faulkner" Class Action Suit in New Jersey
AMERICAN GOLF: Faces Sypert Suit over Inaccessible Website

ARKANSAS: Denial of Dismissal of ADVA Employees' Suit Reversed
AVCORP COMPOSITE: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Archuleta Suit Says
BP WEST: Loses Bid to Dismiss Gasoline Market Manipulation Suit
BRIGANTINE INC: Court Approves $550K Class Settlement
BRIUS MANAGEMENT: Nursing Services Below Standard, Roundy Claims

BROADLEAF MARKETING: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Becker Alleges
BUYER HERO: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Becker Suit Alleges
CBOE EXCHANGE: Breakwater Trading Alleges VIX Price Manipulations
CITIFINANCIAL INC: Denial of Bid to Intervene in Class Suit Upheld
CITRUS WORLD: Faces Axon Suit over Natural Orange Juice Label

COTTER CORP: Court Stays Bid to Dismiss T. Bank's Suit
CREDIT SUISSE: Cohen Millstein to Lead in Inverse VIX Suit
CREDIT SUISSE: Wins Bid to Dismiss Fin'l Advisers' Wage & Hour Suit
CSX CORP: Oral Argument in Fuel Surcharge Suit Set on Sept. 28
DETROIT, MI: MS Rentals Seeks to Certify 2 Classes

DSW RESTAURANT: Bryant Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
ECHELON CORPORATION: Aducci Balks at Adesto Tech Merger Deal
EES SILVER: Underpays Home Care Aides, Barros Suit Alleges
EGS FINANCIAL: Court Dismisses M. Taubenfliegel's FDCPA Suit
EQUIFAX INC: Still Defends Cybersecurity Related Suits

ESSERMAN NISSAN: Casey Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Court Amends Class Settlement Judgment
EXPO CONVENTION: Chedebeau Suit Seeks Damages Under FLSA
FARMERS CAPITAL: Parties in "Parshall" Suit Reach Settlement Pact
FATHOM EVENTS: Court Extends Class Certification Deadline

FCA US: Court Refuses to Alter Aug. 2017 Judgment in D. Beck's Suit
FRED MEYER: Court Dismisses D. Walker's FCRA Suit
H&M HENNES: Ser Lao Bid to Certify Classes Granted in Part
HANSEN MEDICAL: Court Narrows Claims in Minority Stockholders' Suit
HARTFORD FIRE: Court Certifies Merit-Only Class of Analysts

HARVARD RISK: LC Technology Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
HISTORIC OLD: Monaco Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
HORIZONTAL WELL: Court Narrows Claims in W. Glover's ADA Suit
HUB GROUP: Defendants Seek Supreme Court Review of Adame Suit
HYUNDAI MOTOR: Damico Sues over Defective 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: Appeal in NY ERISA Class Suit Ongoing
JM ROMICH: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss C. Wallace's FLSA Suit
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Ct. Narrows Claims in Hypoallergenic Label Suit
KAHALA HOLDINGS: Court Approves $75K Class Settlement in FLSA Suit
KENNETH LASSITER: Seelig Seeks to Certify Case as Class Action

KNORR-BREMSE AG: Faces John Brand Suit over No-Poach Agreements
KNORR-BREMSE AG: Lara Suit Alleges Sherman Act Violations
KOHL'S DEPARTMENT: Summary Ruling Against W. Chowning Affirmed
KY MEDS: Nashville Pharma Suit Alleges Junk Fax Act Breach
LIBERY MUTUAL: Court Awards $345K Atty's Fees in Class Settlement

LIONBRIDGE TECH: Union Seeks to Certify Stockholders Class
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Vazquez Bid for Class Certification Okayed
MASSACHUSETTS FINANCIAL: Court Narrows Claims in ERISA Suit
MDL 2048: Klodzinski vs. Purdue over Opiate Drugs Consolidated
MDL 2516: Court Grants Final Approval of $54MM Settlement

MDL 2672: Show Cause Order on Injunction Entered
MDL 2804: Chu vs. Purdue over Opiate Drugs Consolidated
MDL 2804: Grace vs. Purdue over Opiate Drugs Consolidated
MEDIMETRIKS PHARMA: Made Unsolicited Calls, Cooper Suit Says
MODERN USA: 911 Dry Solutions Suit Moved to Florida State Court

MONDELEZ INTERNATIONAL: Suit over Trading of Wheat Futures Pending
MONSANTO CO: Johnson Sues Over Defective Crop System
MONSANTO COMPANY: Ruiz Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Stump Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MUNICIPIO DE SAN JUAN: Fails to Pay Wages, Rosa et al. Say

NAGLE & ZALLER: Court Dismisses S. Archie's FDCPA Suit
NATIONAL ENTERPRISE: Bower Files Placeholder Bid to Certify Class
NATIONAL ENTERPRISE: Faces Mehmeti Suit in E.D. New York
NETSHOES LIMITED: 1199SEIU Sues over 83% Share Price Drop
NETSHOES LIMITED: Williams Sues over Plunge in Stock Price

NORTH CAROLINA DMV: Johnson et al. Seek to Certify Classes
OASIS MEDIA: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Terri Alves Alleges
OMNI MANAGEMENT: Brown Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
OXY USA: Cooper Suit Moved to District of Kansas
PATHWAY LEASING: Ct. Denies Reconsideration Bid in FLSA Suit

PERSONAL TOUCH: Julie Bridges Seeks to Certify Caregivers Class
PINNACLE FOODS: Paquette Balks at Merger Deal with Conagra
PIONEER CREDIT: Faces Stirpe Suit in Western District of New York
PIZZA HUT: Richard Cook Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
PONZIOS RD: Court Won't Reconsider Class Certification in FLSA Suit

PROCTER & GAMBLE: Foronda Suit Transferred to C.D. California
PROFESSIONAL ADJUSTMENT: Faces Rodriguez Suit in M.D. Florida
PROMOLOGICS INC: Courts Allows Amendment to Class Definition
PROOPTICS LLC: Retina Associates Sues over Unwanted Fax Messages
RASH CURTIS: Court Won't Review Summary Judgment in TCPA Suit

RD LEGAL: Court Won't Dismiss CFPB's Suit Over Cash Advances
REEDLEY COMMUNITY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Ridgeway Suit Says
RENT RECOVER: Hearing Tuesday on Bid to Dismiss Pilarksi Suit
REV GROUP INC: Leah Bitar Sues over 19% Drop in Share Price
RIGHT CHOICE: Court Won't Vacate Arbitration Award in FLSA Suit

ROANOKE, VA: Wright and Pendelton Seek to Certify Class
ROOTER-MAN CORP: Faces Burbon Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
SANTANDER CONSUMER: Initial Approval of Parmlee Case Accord Sought
SERENITY SQUARE: Solomon Seeks Overtime Wage under FLSA
SPRINGFIELD, MA: Court Dismisses ADA Suit

ST. LOUIS, MO: Ct. Won't Consolidate M. Faulk's Claim with "Ahmad"
SURNAIK HOLDINGS: Personal Injury Suit Remanded to State Court
TAYLOR & TYLER: Underpays AirCon Technicians, Archon Suit Alleges
TBC RETAIL: Court Dismisses Ouachita Residents' ADTPA Suit
TRI-STATE CAREFLIGHT: Move to Strike W. Payne's Wage Suit Denied

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: Faces "Weiss" and "Lowinger" Suits
UNITED STATES: Court Certifies Class of Somalian Deportees
USCB INC: Aparicio Sues over Debt Collection Practices
VALLEY COLLECTION: Court Dismisses C. Lester's Class Claims
VENATOR MATERIALS: Sees Final  Settlement Approval Hearing in Q4

VITAJUWEL USA: Removes Ashkinazi Suit to N.D. Illinois
VITALE'S PIZZERIA: Collier Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
WELLS FARGO: Minnesota Court Grants Dismissal of ERISA Suit
XPO LOGISTICS: 170 Intermodal Drayage Claims Pending at June 30
XPO LOGISTICS: Last Mile Logistics Classification Claims Ongoing

XPO LOGISTICS: Settlement of Last Mile TCPA Claims Has Final OK

                            *********

AARON'S INC: Continues to Defend Byrd Class Action
--------------------------------------------------
Aaron's Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 26, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018, that the company continues to defend itself in
the case entitled, Crystal and Brian Byrd v. Aaron's, Inc., Aspen
Way Enterprises, Inc., John Does (1-100) Aaron's Franchisees and
Designerware, LLC.

In Crystal and Brian Byrd v. Aaron's, Inc., Aspen Way Enterprises,
Inc., John Does (1-100) Aaron's Franchisees and Designerware, LLC,
filed on May 16, 2011, in the United States District Court, Western
District of Pennsylvania, plaintiffs allege the Company and its
independently owned and operated franchisee Aspen Way Enterprises
("Aspen Way") knowingly violated plaintiffs' privacy in violation
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") and the
Computer Fraud Abuse Act and sought certification of a putative
nationwide class.

Plaintiffs based these claims on Aspen Way's use of a software
program called "PC Rental Agent." Plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint, asserting claims under the ECPA, common law invasion of
privacy, seeking an injunction, and naming additional independently
owned and operated Company franchisees as defendants. Plaintiffs
seek monetary damages as well as injunctive relief.

In March 2014, the United States District Court dismissed all
claims against all franchisees other than Aspen Way Enterprises,
LLC, dismissed claims for invasion of privacy, aiding and abetting,
and conspiracy against all defendants, and denied plaintiffs'
motion to certify a class action, but denied the Company's motion
to dismiss the claims alleging ECPA violations.

In April 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed the denial of class certification on the grounds
stated by the District Court, and remanded the case back to the
District Court for further consideration of that and the other
elements necessary for class certification.

On September 26, 2017, the District Court again denied plaintiffs'
motion for class certification. Plaintiffs have filed a petition
with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for
permission to appeal the denial of class certification. The Company
is opposing this petition, and a decision remains pending.

In March 2018, the District Court granted plaintiff's motion to
reconsider the prior dismissal of the Wyoming invasion of privacy
claim.

That claim is now under evaluation for class certification. The
Court also denied the Company's pending motion for summary judgment
as moot, but the Company is free to re-file the motion at a future
date.

Aaron's, Inc. operates as an omnichannel provider of lease-purchase
solutions. It operates through three segments: Progressive Leasing,
Aaron’s Business, and DAMI. The company engages in the sale,
lease ownership, and specialty retailing of furniture, consumer
electronics, home appliances, and accessories. Aaron's, Inc. was
founded in 1955 and is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.


AGRI STATS: Bear's Restaurant Group Sues over Price-Fixing of Pork
------------------------------------------------------------------
BEAR'S RESTAURANT GROUP; and GONDOLIER PIZZA INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs
v. AGRI STATS, INC.; CLEMENS FOOD GROUP, LLC; HORMEL FOODS
CORPORATION; INDIANA PACKERS CORPORATION; JBS USA FOOD COMPANY;
SEABOARD FOODS, LLC; SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC.; TRIUMPH FOODS, LLC;
and TYSON FOODS, INC. Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-02113 (D. Minn.,
July 23, 2018) alleges violation of the Sherman Act, and seeks for
treble damages under the antitrust laws, unfair competition laws,
deceptive trade practice and consumer protection laws.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants entered into a conspiracy
from at least 2009 to the present to fix, raise, maintain and
stabilize the price of pork. The principal, but not exclusive,
method by which the Defendants implemented and executed their
conspiracy was by coordinating their output and limiting production
with the intent and expected result of increasing pork prices in
the United States. In furtherance of their conspiracy, the
Defendants exchanged detailed, competitively sensitive, and closely
guarded non-public information about prices, capacity, sales volume
and demand through each other. As a result of the Defendants'
unlawful conduct, the Plaintiffs and the classes paid artificially
inflated prices for pork during the class period. Such prices
exceeded the amount they would have paid if the price for pork had
been determined by a competitive market. Thus, the Plaintiffs and
class members were injured by the Defendants' conduct.

Agri Stats, Inc. was founded in 1985. The company's line of
business includes providing accounting, bookkeeping, and related
auditing services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

            David M. Cialkowski, Esq.
            J. Gordon Rudd, Jr., Esq.
            David M. Cialkowski, Esq.
            Behdad C. Sadeghi, Esq.
            ZIMMERMAN REED LLP
            1100 IDS Center, 80 South 8th Street
            Minneapolis, MN 55402
            Telephone: (612)341-0400
            E-mail: gordon.rudd@zimmreed.com
                    david.cialkowski@zimmreed.com
                    behdad.sadeghi@zimmreed.com

               - and -

            Robert J. Pavich, Esq.
            John J. Pavich, Esq.
            PAVICH LAW GROUP, P.C.
            30 West Monroe Street, Suite 1310
            Chicago, IL 60603
            Telephone: (312) 690-8400
            E-mail: rpavich@pavichlawgroup.com
                    jpavich@pavichlawgroup.com


AKER BIOSCIENCES: Faces "Gleason" Class Action Suit in New Jersey
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Akers Biosciences, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 13, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2018, that the company faces a
class action suit entitled, Gleason v. Akers Biosciences, Inc., No.
2:18-cv-10805 (D.N.J.)

On June 20, 2018, Plaintiff David Gleason filed a class action
complaint alleging securities violations against Akers Biosciences,
Inc. ("Akers"), John J. Gormally, and Gary M. Rauch ("Individual
Defendants") (together with Akers, "Defendants") on behalf of all
persons and entities who purchased publicly traded Akers securities
from May 15, 2017 through June 5, 2018.

The complaint alleges violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and Rule 10b-5 against all Defendants, and violations of
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against the Individual
Defendants. In particular, the complaint alleges that Defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
in its first, second, and third quarter 2017 10-Qs and its 2017
10-K that: (1) Akers was improperly recognizing revenue for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2017; and, (2) Akers had downplayed
weaknesses in its internal controls over financial reporting and
failed to disclose the true extent of those weaknesses.

No Defendant has been served yet, and no response is due at this
time.

Akers Bio develops, manufactures, and supplies rapid, point-of-care
screening and testing products designed to bring health-related
information directly to the patient or clinician in a timely and
cost-efficient manner. The company is based in Thorofare, New
Jersey.



AKERS BIOSCIENCES: Faces "Faulkner" Class Action Suit in New Jersey
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Akers Biosciences, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 13, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2018, that the company faces a
class action suit entitled, Faulkner v. Akers Biosciences, Inc.,
No. 2:18-cv-10521 (D.N.J.)

On June 13, 2018, Plaintiff Tim Faulkner filed a class action
complaint alleging securities violations against Akers Biosciences,
Inc. ("Akers"), John J. Gormally, and Gary M. Rauch ("Individual
Defendants") (together with Akers, "Defendants") on behalf of all
persons and entities who purchased publicly traded Akers securities
from May 15, 2017 through June 5, 2018.

The complaint alleges violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and Rule 10b-5 against all Defendants, and violations of
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against the Individual
Defendants. In particular, the complaint alleges that Defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
in its first, second, and third quarter 2017 10-Qs and its 2017
10-K that: (1) Akers was improperly recognizing revenue for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2017; and, (2) Akers had downplayed
weaknesses in its internal controls over financial reporting and
failed to disclose the true extent of those weaknesses.

On July 10, 2018, Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a
stipulation that Defendants are not required to respond to the
complaint until the court appoints a lead plaintiff and lead
counsel for the class, and then after the lead plaintiff chooses
whether to file an amended complaint or whether to designate the
complaint as the operative complaint.

Akers Bio develops, manufactures, and supplies rapid, point-of-care
screening and testing products designed to bring health-related
information directly to the patient or clinician in a timely and
cost-efficient manner. The company is based in Thorofare, New
Jersey.


AMERICAN GOLF: Faces Sypert Suit over Inaccessible Website
----------------------------------------------------------
KATHLEEN SYPERT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. AMERICAN GOLF CORPORATION, d/b/a DYKER
BEACH GOLF COURSE, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-06517-RJS (S.D.N.Y.,
July 19, 2018) alleges violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

According to the complaint, during the Plaintiff's visits to the
Defendant's website, www.dykerbeachgc.com, the Plaintiff
encountered multiple access barriers that denied her full and equal
access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public
and made available to the public; and that denied the  Plaintiff
the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the
website, as well as to the facilities, goods and services of
Defendant's physical locations in New York by being unable to learn
more information about Club locations and hours, access to
extensive event calendars, including information related to its
golf and recreational sports, as well as information pertaining to
booking its wedding hall and catering services, and related goods
and services. The website is not equally accessible to blind and
visually-impaired consumers violating the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

American Golf Corporation is a California corporation operating a
club. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12 Fl.
          Brooklyn, N.Y. 11201
          Telephone: (929) 575-4175
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: Joseph@cml.legal

               - and -

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, N.Y. 10003-2461
          Telephone: (212) 228-9795
          E-mail: Nyjg@aol.com
                  Danalgottlieb@aol.com


ARKANSAS: Denial of Dismissal of ADVA Employees' Suit Reversed
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the Circuit Court's judgment
denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case filed by two former
employees of the Arkansas Department of Veterans Affairs (ADVA).

Appellant Arkansas Department of Veterans Affairs (ADVA) appeals
the circuit court's denial of its motion to dismiss based on
sovereign immunity.

The Appellees are two former employees of ADVA. Mallett, Fabits,
and several others filed a class-action complaint alleging that
ADVA failed to compensate them for working overtime in violation of
the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (AMWA). They allege they frequently
worked through their lunch breaks and had to work off-the-clock to
complete their job duties; and therefore, they are entitled to
overtime wages.

In Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, 535
S.W.3d 616. As in Andrews, the circuit court denied the motion to
dismiss. ADVA now argues Andrews controls.

The Court agrees.

In Andrews, the Court held that the provision of the AMWA that
allows the State to be named as a defendant is repugnant to article
5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution. While the parties ask
us to further analyze Walther v. FLIS Enterprises, Inc. 2018 Ark.
64, 540 S.W.3d 264, this is not the case for us to do so. In
Andrews, the Court struck the provision of the AMWA that provided
that this action could be brought against the state. The therefore
reverse the circuit court's denial of ADVA's motion to dismiss on
sovereign immunity. As the Court stated in Andrews, the avenue for
financial redress is through the Claims Commission.  

The appeals case is ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Appellant, v. DIANE MALLETT AND JOSEPH FABITS, Appellees, No.
CV-17-1020 (Ark.).

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's June 21, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7hfwr3e from
Leagle.com.

Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Patricia Van Ausdell , Ass't Att'y
Gen., and Monty Vaughan Baugh , Deputy Att'y Gen., for appellant.

Holleman & Associates, P.A. by: John Holleman , Timothy A. Steadman
, and Jerry Garner, for appellees.

AVCORP COMPOSITE: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Archuleta Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL ARCHULETA, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. AVCORP COMPOSITE FABRICATION INC.;
HITCO CARBON COMPOSITES, INC.; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Case No. BC 714171 (Cal. Super., July 19, 2018) is an action
against the Defendants for unpaid regular hours, overtime hours,
minimum wages, wages for missed meal and rest periods.

Mr. Archuleta was employed by the Defendants as a non-exempt
employee in California.

Avcorp Composite Fabrication Inc. was founded in 2015. The
company's line of business includes the manufacturing of aircraft
parts and equipment. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Nourmand, Esq.
          James A. De Sario, Esq.
          THE NOURMAND LAW FIRM, APC
          8822 West Olympic Boulevard
          Beverly Hills, CA 90211
          Telephone: (310) 553-3600
          Facsimile: (310) 553-3603


BP WEST: Loses Bid to Dismiss Gasoline Market Manipulation Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
PERSIAN GULF INC., Plaintiff, v. BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 3:15-cv-01749-L-BGS (S.D. Cal.).

Pending before the Court in this putative class action alleging
violation of antitrust laws is Defendants' motion to dismiss the
first amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).

The Plaintiff contends the Defendants conspired to manipulate the
wholesale gasoline market in California, causing historically high
wholesale prices in 2012 and 2015. It filed a complaint alleging
violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act), the
Cartwright Act, (Cartwright Act), and the Unfair Competition Law
(UCL).

Dismissal is warranted where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal
theory. Alternatively, a complaint may be dismissed where it
presents a cognizable legal theory, yet fails to plead essential
facts under that theory.

Sherman Act

The antitrust laws of the United States aim to protect consumers by
maintaining competitive mark.  To this end, the Sherman Act
provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal."

California Market

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants conspired to manipulate
the market. One mechanism the Plaintiff suggests is the Defendants'
uniform practice of keeping to themselves the data concerning their
industry and operations, including refinery shutdowns and planned
output, while spreading misleading information to the public. Lack
of reliable information renders a concentrated market more
susceptible to manipulation. On the other hand, Defendants shared
much of real operational information among themselves through
exchange agreements, which allowed them to trade petroleum products
at an agreed rate when they were short on supply. An exchange
agreement signals to the other party the amount of time a refinery
is expected to be offline.

Price Spikes in 2012

The Plaintiff's theory of the case is that the Defendants conspired
to create a false impression of reduced supply, when in fact they
possessed the inventory and production capacity to supply the
California market. In a normally operating market, competitors use
their existing inventory and production capacity to increase their
individual market shares and/or to profit from any price increases
caused by decreased supply from other competitors. A competitor who
reduces supply to the market, for example, by withholding inventory
or reducing production is exposed to the risk that others will
capture its market share. The Defendants' actions did not follow
this pattern.

They announced to the public that supply disruptions had occurred
or were coming due to refinery fires and maintenance, and held back
some of their inventory and/or did not produce as much as they
could. THe Plaintiff posits that the Defendants' actions make sense
only if an agreement assured that the Defendants who had reduced
their supply to the market would not be exploited by the Defendants
who did not. Only then could they collectively reap windfall
profits from the price increase occasioned by the artificial supply
disruption. The Plaintiff argues that the allegations of the
Defendants' coordinated action in spreading misinformation and
creating a false shortage supports the inference that they
conspired with intent to manipulate gasoline prices in California.

The Plaintiff's theory is that the prices shot up because
Defendants intentionally and jointly created a false impression of
shortage.

Price Spikes in 2015

California gasoline prices spiked three times in 2015. The first
spike occurred in mid-May, the prices culminated in mid-July, and
rose again at the end of the year, although not as sharply as
before. According to the Plaintiff, the price increase in
California was much greater than the moderate increase in the rest
of the United States. Although gas prices in California are usually
higher than in other states, the price differential in early 2015
was two to three times greater than usual. This was despite the
simultaneous decline in crude oil prices and the other major cost
components remaining largely unchanged. In comparison to March
2014, as of March 2015, the Defendants' margins increased by more
than 400%. In 2015, the average refiner margins were more than
double the prior 16-year average, resulting in historically
unprecedented profits.

In 2015, within a 30-day window between April 17 and May 19,
Tesoro, Chevron and Phillips reduced or shut down production at six
separate refineries. Chevron and Phillips even advanced their
scheduled maintenance to coincide with other shutdowns. The
shutdowns occurred while the prices were headed to their peak in
mid-May. The close timing of multiple shutdowns in combination with
advancing of scheduled maintenance to bring additional shutdowns
within the same time window, and the resulting price increase,
support a reasonable inference that this activity was deliberately
coordinated to manipulate the market.

In February 2016, Tesoro, Chevron, Valero and Phillips
simultaneously raised prices at their branded stations by nearly
the same amount. Because these Defendants control nearly 80% of
California gasoline production and 75% of the retail gas stations,
their simultaneous action was sure to manipulate the market. The
close timing and the close amount of the increase support a
reasonable inference of an agreement. The Plaintiff's allegation of
several examples of simultaneous action taken for no other
discernible reason than to manipulate the market independently
supports a reasonable inference of agreement.

The Plaintiff alleged other factors which further support the
inference, when considered in the light of multiple instances of
extreme action against self-interest and multiple instances of
closely coordinated action aimed at market manipulation. For
example, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants possessed a
common motive to manipulate the market to increase their profits.
They belonged to numerous trade and lobbying associations. The
Plaintiff specifically alleged how WSPA was used to spread
misinformation to the public and roil the market in furtherance of
the common motive.

Moreover, the price spikes which allegedly resulted from the
Defendants' actions were inconsistent with economic fundamentals in
the California market. In 2012 they were inconsistent with the
abundant available supply, decreased demand, and reduced prices in
the rest of the United States. In 2015 they were inconsistent with
the historically low crude oil prices, available production
capacity, and prices in the rest of the United States.
The gasoline prices and the Defendants' profits in 2012 and 2015
reached historically unprecedented highs. The magnitude and length
of supply disruptions and the price differential between California
and the rest of the United States in 2015 were also unprecedented.
Finally, the Defendants' conduct and its consequences were
sufficiently extreme to prompt government investigation into
deliberate manipulation of the California market.

The Plaintiff's extensive and detailed factual allegations of the
Defendants' activities, taken as true, support a plausible
inference of agreement for purposes of a Sherman Act violation. To
the extent Defendants seek dismissal of the Sherman Act claim,
their motion is denied.

Cartwright Act

The Cartwright Act is California's equivalent to the Sherman Act
and the analysis under the Cartwright Act is identical to that
under the Sherman Act. Defendants have provided no arguments
specific to the Cartwright Act claim. Their motion to dismiss it is
denied for the same reasons as with respect to the Sherman Act
claim.

Unfair Competition Law

The UCL claim is entirely derivative of the Cartwright Act claim,
and Defendants do not attack it on any independent grounds.
Accordingly, the Defendants' motion is denied with respect to the
UCL claim as well.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 18, 2018 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/ybmqud85 from Leagle.com.

Persian Gulf Inc., individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alexandra S. Bernay
-- xanb@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, Armen
Zohrabian -- azohrabian@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP, Carissa J. Dolan -- cdolan@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd, LLP, Carmen A. Medici -- cmedici@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, David William Mitchell --
davidm@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Jennifer N.
Caringal -- jcarningal@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and
Dowd LLP & Patrick J. Coughlin -- patc@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

BP West Coast Products LLC, Defendant, represented by Robert Andrew
Sacks -- sacksr@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan & Cromwell LLP & Diane Lee
McGimsey -- mcgimseyd@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan and Cromwell LLP.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel G. Swanson --
dswanson@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher, David S. Han
-- shan@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP & Steven
Eugene Sletten -- ssletten@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and
Crutcher.

BRIGANTINE INC: Court Approves $550K Class Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Settlement in the case captioned NEAL PATAKY, JESSICA CLEEK, and
LAUREN MICHELSON, individually, and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE BRIGANTINE, INC., a California
corporation, Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-00352-GPC-AGS(S.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs Neal Pataky, Jessica Cleek, and Lauren Michelson filed a
Complaint alleging that they and other servers were paid tips from
Brigantine's customers, but that Brigantine imposed a mandatory tip
pooling policy in all restaurants dating back a decade, requiring
servers to tip out to other employees, including those that did not
provide direct table service in violation of Federal and California
law. Reynolds.

The Plaintiffs and Defendants negotiated a proposed settlement that
will benefit approximately 800 Settlement Class members with
monetary payments wherein the Defendant will pay $550,000 without
refund or reversion to the Settlement Class.

The Settlement Agreement contemplates that the Defendant will pay
certain compensation to settle the claims of Plaintiffs and all
other servers within the class period and includes (1) all members
of the FLSA Collective Action who have filed Consent to Join forms
and (2) all other servers within the scope of the potential Rule 23
Class Action defined as:

     All current or former employees of The Brigantine, Inc. who
have worked anytime between February 22, 2013 and April 30, 2017 as
servers, including but not limited to under job titles of food
servers, cocktail lounge servers, dining room servers, and
bartenders. The Monetary Compensation consists of $550,000 without
refund or reversion.

Result of Non-Collusive Negotiations

Here, the settlement resulted after the Defendant produced
discovery responses and class data relating to wage and hour
issues. The parties reached a settlement after extensive
negotiations with the assistance of the Honorable Magistrate Judge
Schopler's mediator's proposal. In particular, the Court takes note
that the parties entered into the agreement only after a second
Early Neutral Evaluation. Consequently, this factor weighs strongly
in favor of approval.

No Obvious Deficiencies

The Court concludes that there are no obvious deficiencies to the
settlement finding that the settlement appears to offer Settlement
Class members a substantial portion of the tip income they were
deprived of during their employment. The settlement appears to be a
compromise between the strengths and weaknesses of the plaintiff's
case. The Plaintiffs alleged that Brigantine faced possible
liability between $500,000 to $520,000 in the case, as well as
Attorneys' fees and costs that are recoverable under the FLSA.
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs' also assert that the issue of whether
the plaintiffs' claims must be subject to arbitration remains
unsettled.  These uncertainties create risk for the plaintiffs
which weighs in favor of preliminary approval of this settlement.

Fairness to All Class Members

The proposed settlement does not appear to provide preferential
treatment to the Plaintiffs or any segment of the Settlement Class.
The Defendant has provided the Plaintiffs' counsel with a
spreadsheet that it contends shows all tips its managers collected
from servers and re-distributed to kitchen staff from January 1,
2013 through April 30, 2017 totaling $529,956.34.  The Defendant
has also provided the Plaintiffs' counsel with spreadsheet data
that includes all tip money reported by each individual server
within the class period. With this information which includes each
individual server's reported tip total and the fact that servers'
tips to kitchen staff were similar in percentage across Brigantine
restaurants, each server can be assigned a pro rata claim share of
the settlement fund. The Plaintiff asserts that this is the fairest
method to determine claim shares because it is based on actual tip
income reported and tip data available from the Defendant.

The Court concludes that the Settlement would be fair to all
proposed class members.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 18, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y86tb66h from Leagle.com.

Neal Pataky, individually, and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Jessica Cleek, individually, and on behalf of others
similarly situated & Lauren Michelson, individually, and on behalf
of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Stephanie
Reynolds -- Reynolds@popeberger.com -- Pope Berger, Williams &
Reynolds, LLP & Timothy Garr Williams -- williams@popeberger.com --
Pope Berger, Williams & Reynolds, LLP.

Carlos Soto, Samantha Brennan, Grace Snow, Jade Martin, Kendall
Straessle, Stanford J. Mikels, Maricela Garcia Huerta, Jesse
Goodsell, Sara Stockwell, Juan Carlos Carrillo, Shawna Erwin, Clark
Wilhelmina, Mercedes Zoffel, Maria de la Paz Hagen, Mathias
Hummelberger, Brooke Preece, Lauren Wood, Ashley Porter, Amanda M.
Stevens, Hooman Sadjadi, Madelyn Taylor, Mollie Meddleton, Ryan
Mitch, Jessical Haynsworth, Clare Erickson, Sara Role, Chelsea
Geyer, Mami Vilardi, Katherine J. Kelleher, Melissa Green, Valerie
Conklin, Michael I. Penter, Jonathan A. Gruca, Cecilia Bedolla,
Lairin Bargon, Devin M. Laskowski, Bryan Stark, Noelani Aipa, Cory
Baraoidan, Rena Sagman Chandler, Craig Myers, Kianna Rae Fahey,
Trey Douglas Jacobson, Tiffany Siaweleski, Karimah Mendez, Sara I.
Schaldach, Daniel R. Bolyarde, Brian Cantor, Kevin Crowell, Rhami
Hasenin, Nicole Schaefer, Christopher Upton, Christina Jones,
Mallory Thysell, Susana Hunt-Bootorabi, Erin Antrim, Bryer
Bidegain, Brittney Anthony, Katherine Julie Dickens, Madisen
Castello Boone, Fernando A. Forero, Trevor Lee Hinkey, Margaret
Heikes, Gregory Field, Julia Freda, Jasmine LaBeau, Paola Najera,
Colleen Nitchman, Anne Delgado, Jorge I. Lopez Rivera, Alison
Sterner, Michael Thoman, Jessica A. Barros de Souza, William Erwin,
Ubaldo Galicia, Emily Horta, Kaitlyn McNutt, Heather Merrill,
Jordan Soper, Mark Tarantino, Michael A. Carnevale & Marisa Taylor,
Plaintiffs, represented by Timothy Garr Williams , Pope Berger,
Williams & Reynolds, LLP.

The Brigantine, Inc., a California corporation, Defendant,
represented by James Charles Fessenden -- jfessenden@fisherphillips
-- Fisher Phillips LLP.

BRIUS MANAGEMENT: Nursing Services Below Standard, Roundy Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
GLENN ROUNDY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SHLOMO RECHNITZ; BRIUS MANAGEMENT CO., INC.;
B-SPRING VALLEY, LLC; ROCKPORT ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, LLC; and
DOES 1 through 250 inclusive, Defendants, Case No. BC714162 (Cal.
Super., July 17, 2018) alleges violations of the Consumer Legal
Remedies Act, and the California Health and Safety Code.

The complaint alleges that the Defendants misrepresented that the
nursing services they have provided to the Plaintiff and the class,
would meet the particularized standards of the California health
laws. Further, it is also not true that the Defendants were to
provide the Plaintiff and the class of the nursing facility
services consistent with the mandatory requirements of California
Health and Safety Code. These representations by the Defendants
were intended to induce and lure elderly and infirm consumers into
agreeing to be admitted to the Defendants' nursing facility based
on false and misleading representations without disclosing that the
Defendants cannot and do not provide the represented level and
quantity of care to consumers. These misrepresentations of the
Defendants violated the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and the
California Health and Safety Code.

Brius Management Co., Inc. is the managing member of B-Spring
Valley, LLC, with address at Los Angeles, California. The Company
is a nursing facility in California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stephen M. Garcia, Esq.
          GARCIA ARTIGLIERE & MEDBY
          One World Trade Center, Suite 1950
          Long Beach, CA 90831
          Telephone: (562) 216-5270
          Facsimile: (562) 216-5271
          E-mail: edocs@lawgarcia.com

               - and –

          Robert S. Arns, Esq.
          Julie C. Erickson, Esq.
          THE ARNS LAW FIRM
          515 Folsom Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 495-7800
          Facsimile: (415) 495-7888


BROADLEAF MARKETING: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Becker Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
CODY BECKER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BROADLEAF MARKETING & SEO, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 0:18-cv-61695-BB (S.D. Fla., July 23, 2018) seeks to stop
the Defendant's unlawful conduct of sending prerecorded messages to
the Plaintiff and the class to solicit the purchase of the
Defendant's services.

Broadleaf Marketing & SEO, LLC directs, markets, and provides
business activities throughout the State of Florida. The Company is
a Florida limited liability company located in Boca Raton, Florida.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954)400-4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com


BUYER HERO: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Becker Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------
CODY BECKER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BUYER HERO, LLC d/b/a OFFRS.COM, Defendant,
Case No. 0:18-cv-61656-UU (S.D. Fla., July 19, 2018) seeks to stop
the Defendants' practice of sending text messages to the
Plaintiff's cellular telephone soliciting business, goods, and
services, without the Plaintiff's prior express written consent.

Buyer Hero, LLC is a Florida limited liability company with address
at Sarasota, Florida. The Company markets and provides business
activities in the State of Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 400-4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com


CBOE EXCHANGE: Breakwater Trading Alleges VIX Price Manipulations
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BREAKWATER TRADING LLC, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CBOE EXCHANGE, INC.; CBOE GLOBAL
MARKETS, INC.; CBOE FUTURES EXCHANGE, LLC; and JOHN DOES,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-05023 (N.D. Ill., July 23, 2018)
alleges violation of the Sherman Act and the Commodity Exchange
Act.

The Volatility Index, known under its ticker symbol "VIX," is a
benchmark index created by the Defendant CBOE Exchange, Inc., a
wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant CBOE Global Markets, Inc.
Introduced in 1993, the VIX purports to measure the implied
volatility of large cap U.S. stocks over 30 days in the future.

According to the complaint, the Defendants injured the Plaintiff
and Class members by manipulating the prices of VIX Instruments.
The Defendants' combination, conspiracy, and agreement to
manipulate the prices of VIX Instruments harms competition in the
market for VIX Instruments in the United States. Absent the
Defendants' collusion with each other, which allowed the
manipulation to continue, and failed to take steps to prevent it or
stop it once it was apparent that it was occurring, those
transacting in VIX Instruments would have transacted at competitive
prices and reaped the benefits of competitive VIX settlement
calculations.

The Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendants' collusion caused
VIX Instruments to trade at artificial prices. The Defendants'
unlawful conduct deprives the Plaintiff and Class members who
transact in VIX Instruments of a competitive marketplace and
exposes them to artificial volatility.

CBOE Exchange, Inc. is a Delaware corporation located in Chicago,
Illinois. The Company is an affiliate of Cboe Global Markets, Inc.
which operates as an exchange company. The Company, through its
subsidiaries, operates a financial options trading platform that
provides cutting-edge trading and investment solutions includes
equities, foreign exchange, indices, data and analytics, and trade
reporting solutions. Cboe Global Markets serves customers
worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          George A. Zelcs, Esq.
          Robert E. Litan, Esq.
          Randall P. Ewing, Jr., Esq.
          Chad E. Bell, Esq.
          Ryan Z. Cortazar, Esq.
          KOREIN TILLERY LLC
          205 North Michigan Plaza, Suite 1950
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 641-9750
          Facsimile: (3120 641-9751
          E-mail: gzelcs@koreintillery.com

               - and -

          Stephen M. Tillery, Esq.
          Michael E. Klenov, Esq.
          Carol O'Keefe, Esq.
          KOREIN TILLERY LLC
          One U.S. Bank Plaza
          505 North 7th Street, Suite 3600
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: (314) 241-4844
          Facsimile: (314) 241-3525
          E-mail: stillery@koreintillery.com

               - and -

          Christopher M. Burke, Esq.
          Kate Lv, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          600 W. Broadway, Suite 3300
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 233-4565
          Facsimile: (619) 233-0508
          E-mail: cburke@scott-scott.com
                  klv@scott-scott.com

               - and -

          Kristen M. Anderson, Esq.
          Amanda F. Lawrence, Esq.
          J. Alex Vargas, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10169
          Telephone: (212) 233-6444
          Facsimile: (212) 223-6334
          E-mail: kanderson@scott-scott.com
                  alawrence@scott-scott.com
                  avargas@scott-scott.com

               - and -

          Graeme W. Bush, Esq.
          ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP
          1800 M Street, NW, Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202)778-1800
          Facsimile: (202) 822-8106

               - and -

          Louis F. Burke, Esq.
          LOUIS F. BURKE PC
          460 Park Avenue, 21st Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 682-1700
          Facsimile: (212) 808-4280

               - and -

          Michael E. Criden, Esq.
          Kevin B. Love, Esq.
          Lindsey C. Grossman, Esq.
          CRIDEN & LOVE, P.A.
          7301 SW 57th Court, Suite 515
          South Miami, FL 33143
          Telephone: (305) 357-9000
          Facsimile: (305) 357-9050
          E-mail: mcriden@cridenlove.com
                  klove@cridenlove.com
                  lgrossman@cridenlove.com


CITIFINANCIAL INC: Denial of Bid to Intervene in Class Suit Upheld
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County,
affirmed the trial court's judgment denying Intervenors-Appellants'
Motion to Intervene in the case captioned KAREN RIMMER, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITIFINANCIAL, INC., Defendant-Appellee,
No. 106337. (8th Cir.)

Proposed intervenors-appellants, Ruth Brown, Herman Holden,
Jacqueline Rainge, and Martha Tubbs, appeal from the trial court's
denial of their separate motions to intervene in a class action
lawsuit filed against defendant-appellee, Citifinancial, Inc,
(Citi).

Karen Rimmer executed a note and security agreement with Bank of
Yorba Linda for $5,000. Her loan was subsequently assigned to
Associates Financial Services, Inc. which was merged with Citi
several months later, and Citi became the holder of Rimmer's
mortgage. Rimmer paid off her loan in full. On August 16, 2001, the
satisfaction of the subject mortgage was recorded with the Cuyahoga
County Recorder. On June 6, 2005, Rimmer filed a class action
complaint against Citi, alleging Citi failed to file an entry of
satisfaction of mortgage with the county recorder within 90 days of
full payment of the mortgage, in violation of R.C. 5301.36. Rimmer
sought automatic damages ($250), interest, and costs as allowed
under R.C. 5301.36(C).

The Appellants separately filed identical motions to intervene in
the class action pursuant to Civ.R. 24(A)(2). Appellants argued, in
relevant part: "Intervention is necessary because they have an
interest relating to the transactions which are the subject matter
of this lawsuit and are situated in a way that the disposition of
this action will as a practical matter impair and impede [their]
ability to protect that interest, especially because their interest
is not adequately represented by existing parties. Intervention is
also proper because [their] claim in this matter (recovery under
R.C. 5301.36 for a release not timely filed as required by that
statute) is the same matter being determined in this underlying
action."

The trial court denied appellants' motion to intervene.

In their first and second assignments of error, the appellants
collectively argue the trial court committed reversible error by
denying their motions to intervene without explanation.

The Appellants contend they were entitled to intervention as of
right pursuant to Civ.R. 24(A)(2) because their residential
mortgage agreements with Citi during the relevant time period did
not include an arbitration provision agreement.

A party seeking intervention of right must show (1) the application
is timely, (2) the intervenor claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action, (3) the intervenor is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede his or her ability to protect that interest, and (4) the
existing parties do not adequately represent his interest.

In this case, the class definition was certified on January 21,
2015, and notice of the class was sent to 275 identified class
members on October 12, 2016. Following the class certification, the
trial court denied several motions relating to the appellants'
interests, including Rimmer's motion for additional discovery and
her motion to expand the class notice. On June 15, 2017, the trial
court entered judgment in favor of 275 class members and against
Citi in the amount of $250 per class member, including an award of
attorney fees to plaintiff's counsel. The motions to intervene,
however, were not filed until July 5, 2017, approximately three
weeks after the judgment was entered against Citi, nearly seven
months after the trial court denied Rimmer's request to expand the
class notice to include individuals in the appellants' position,
and over eight months after each appellant purportedly became aware
of their claims against Citi for statutory damages under R.C.
5301.36(C).

After careful consideration, the Court finds the inconvenience and
delay that would have been occasioned if the motions to intervene
had been granted would have been extensive. The Appellants
correctly state that Civ.R. 24 only required them to claim an
interest relating to the property or transaction that is the
subject of the action, or identify a claim or defense that share a
common issue of law or fact with the main action.

However, had intervention been permitted in this case, the trial
court would have been required to make additional evidentiary
determinations concerning the merits of appellants' claims,
including whether they agreed to an arbitration provision with Citi
at the time they entered into their residential mortgage agreement.
As demonstrated in the parties' appellate briefs, this is a highly
contested issue of fact that has yet to be resolved. Thus,
appellants' motion to intervene, and the attached pleadings would
have interjected a number of new issues and required further
discovery and motion practice. Collectively, appellants' late
intervention would have caused significant costs and considerable
delay in the proceedings between the existing parties.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the motions to intervene
were untimely. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying appellants' separate motions to intervene.
The Court notes that future challenges to the trial court's
underlying judgments, including discovery orders and the scope of
the class notice, may implicate the appellants. Those judgments
will be appealable once issues involving attorney fees for
plaintiff's counsel are resolved.

The Appellants' first and second assignments of error are
overruled.

A full-text copy of the Ohio App.'s July 19, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8w2z7a6 from Leagle.com.

Brian Ruschel, Patrick J. Perotti, Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A.,
Attorneys for Appellants.

Kip T. Bollin , Mark R. Butscha, Jr. , James L. Defeo , Stacey A.
Greenwell , Thompson Hine, L.L.P., Attorneys for Appellee.

CITRUS WORLD: Faces Axon Suit over Natural Orange Juice Label
-------------------------------------------------------------
ALEXANDRA AXON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CITRUS WORLD, INC., and FLORIDA'S NATURAL
GROWERS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04162 (E.D.N.Y., July
20, 2018) is an action against the Defendants' deceptive labeling,
marketing, and sale of their orange juice products as "Natural"
despite the fact the products contain a synthetically created
biocide.

The complaint alleges that the Defendants sell several varieties of
orange juice that claim to be natural. In reality, the products are
not "Natural" because the products are highly processed and contain
glyphosate, a synthetic biocide frequently used to kill weeds.
Glyphosate is not a naturally occurring substance and therefore,
cannot be "Natural."

Citrus World, Inc., operates as Florida Natural, manufacturers and
markets beverages. The Company produces and retails orange,
grapefruit, cranberry cocktail, apple, lemonade, rasberry lemonade,
orange pineapple, orange strawberry, cranberry ruby, and orange
mango juices. Citrus World operates in Laek Wales, Florida and
markets to customers throughout the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kim E. Richman, Esq.
          RICHMAN LAW GROUP
          81 Prospect St.
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (212) 687-8291
          Facsimile: (212) 687-8292
          E-mail: krichman@richmanlawgroup.com

               - and -

          D. Greg Blankinship, Esq.
          Todd S. Garber, Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN, BLANKINSHIP, FREI-
          PEARSON & GARBER, LLP
          445 Hamilton Ave, Suite 605
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Telephone: (914) 298-3290
          E-mail: gblankinship@fbfglaw.com
                  tgarber@fbfglaw.com


COTTER CORP: Court Stays Bid to Dismiss T. Bank's Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Eastern Division, granted Plaintiff's Motion to Stay
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Pending Resolution of Plaintiff's
Motion for Remand in the case captioned TAMIA BANKS, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. COTTER
CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, No. 4:18-CV-00624 JAR (E.D. Mo.).

The Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the Defendants'
collective conduct over several decades, radioactive materials were
released into the environment in and around Coldwater Creek, a
tributary of the Missouri River that runs throughout North St.
Louis County, resulting in the radioactive contamination of the
Plaintiff's and class members' property and leading to various
forms of property damage. The Plaintiff asserts state-law claims
against the Defendants for, inter alia: (1) trespass; and (2)
permanent nuisance.

Whether the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction should be
addressed before the Court decides the merits of the Plaintiff's
petition. The Court acknowledges the Defendants' concerns; however,
upon consideration and for good cause shown, the motion to stay
will be granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 14, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y97qmyg2 from
Leagle.com.

Tamia Banks, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander L. Braitberg --
alex@keanelawllc.com -- KEANE LAW LLC, Celeste Brustowicz , THE
COOPER LAW FIRM, LLC, pro hac vice, Ryan A. Keane , KEANE LAW LLC,
& Victor T. Cobb , COOPER LAW FIRM, LLC, pro hac vice.

Cotter Corporation, Defendant, represented by Dale A. Guariglia --
daguariglia@bclplaw.com -- BRYAN CAVE LLP, Erin Lynn Brooks --
erin.brooks@bclplaw.com -- BRYAN CAVE LLP, John McGahren --
john.mcgahren@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN AND LEWIS LLP, pro hac
vice, Stephanie Feingold -- stephanie.feingold@morganlewis.com --
MORGAN AND LEWIS LLP, pro hac vice & Su Jin Kim --
su.kim@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN AND LEWIS LLP, pro hac vice.

Commonwealth Edison Company & Exelon Generation Company, LLC,
Defendants, represented by Alexander L. Braitberg , KEANE LAW LLC,
Dale A. Guariglia , BRYAN CAVE LLP, Erin Lynn Brooks , BRYAN CAVE
LLP, John McGahren , MORGAN AND LEWIS LLP, pro hac vice, Ryan A.
Keane , KEANE LAW LLC, Stephanie Feingold , MORGAN AND LEWIS LLP,
pro hac vice & Su Jin Kim , MORGAN AND LEWIS LLP, pro hac vice.

Exelon Corporation, Defendant, represented by Dale A. Guariglia ,
BRYAN CAVE LLP, Erin Lynn Brooks , BRYAN CAVE LLP, John McGahren ,
MORGAN AND LEWIS LLP, pro hac vice, Ryan A. Keane , KEANE LAW LLC,
Stephanie Feingold , MORGAN AND LEWIS LLP, pro hac vice & Su Jin
Kim , MORGAN AND LEWIS LLP, pro hac vice.

DJR Holdings, Inc., formerly known as, Defendant, represented by
Alexander L. Braitberg , KEANE LAW LLC, Ryan A. Keane , KEANE LAW
LLC & Saturnin Martin Jansky , MARTIN JANSKY LAW FIRM, PC.

CREDIT SUISSE: Cohen Millstein to Lead in Inverse VIX Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted ACM Group's Motion for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff
in the cases captioned RAJAN CHAHAL, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT SUISSE GROUP
AG, DAVID R. MATHERS and TIDJANE THIAM, Defendants; GLEN EISENBERG,
On Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff,
v. CREDIT SUISSE AG and JANUS INDEX & CALCULATION SERVICES LLC,
Defendants; SHAOLEI QUI, On Behalf of Himself and All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG and JANUS
INDEX & CALCULATION SERVICES LLC, Defendants, Nos. 18-CV-02268
(AT)(SN), 18-CV-02319 (AT)(SN), 18-CV-04045 (AT)(SN)(S.D.N.Y.).

This litigation arises out of three securities class actions
pending before the Court against Credit Suisse Group AG (Credit
Suisse) on behalf of all investors who purchased or otherwise
acquired Credit Suisse Velocity Shares Daily Inverse VIX Short Term
Exchange Traded Notes (Inverse VIX Short ETNs) and were damaged
thereby. The actions allege violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Eisenberg Action
additionally alleges claims under Section 11 of the Securities Act
of 1933.

The ACM Group is the Presumptive Lead Plaintiff

The Court finds that the ACM Group is the presumptive lead
plaintiff based on the factors described in the PSLRA. First, the
ACM Group timely filed a motion to be appointed lead plaintiff,
satisfying the requirement that it make a motion in response to a
notice of the putative class action. Notice of the class action was
published on March 14, 2018, and the ACM Group filed its motion on
May 14, 2018.

Second, out of all the movants, the ACM Group has the largest
financial interest in the relief sought by the class. The Court has
reviewed the figures provided by each movant to calculate each
movant's financial interest under the Lax factors. The Cannon Group
collectively purchased 347,508 shares (88,500 net shares), expended
$13,044,120.15 in net funds, and suffered approximately
$12,514,005.15 in losses. Y-GAR purchased 175,650 shares (0 net
shares), expended $10,250,986.79 in net funds, and suffered
approximately $10,250,986.79 in losses. MacEntee purchased 84,000
shares (80,000 net shares), spent $4,293,730.70 in net funds, and
suffered approximately $3,828,330.70 in losses. The ACM Group
collectively purchased 643,262 shares (633,262 net shares),
expended $18,425,998.55 in net funds, and suffered approximately
$14,383,668.05 in losses.

Under all four Lax factors, the ACM Group has the largest financial
interest.

Competing Movants Have Not Rebutted the Statutory Presumption

The competing movants assert that the ACM Group is inadequate
because (1) it is a lawyer-manufactured agglomeration of plaintiffs
who will be unable to direct the action, (2) its counsel is
conflicted, and (3) it is subject to unique defenses. The Court
rejects each of these arguments.

Adequacy of Plaintiff Group

Under the five-pronged test outlined in Varghese, the Court finds
that the other movants have not rebutted the presumption that the
ACM Group is the most adequate. As for the first factor, the ACM
Group effectively concedes that there was no pre-existing
relationship. The declaration does not note how the group came to
be and it seems likely that counsel introduced its members. This
factor cuts against adequacy.

As for the second factor, the ACM Group's declaration shows that
its members have been active in the litigation thus far. They plan
to supervise the prosecution of the case to guarantee that the
action is prosecuted efficiently. Before seeking appointment as
lead plaintiff, they convened a conference call to discuss the
responsibilities of the role and the benefits they would provide as
a group. Their supplemental declaration indicated that they
subsequently held a second conference to discuss the progress of
the litigation.  

This factor weighs in favor of their adequacy as lead plaintiff.

Attorney Conflicts

But any conflict of interest must be grounded in fact to rebut the
presumption of the most adequate lead plaintiff. For there to be
any basis to the Cannon Group's argument, Cohen Milstein would have
to be appointed lead counsel in the Atlantic Trading action, then
present evidence or make arguments in that action that conflict
with the claims in this action, and then Credit Suisse, who is not
a defendant in the antitrust actions, would somehow have to
capitalize on these potential inconsistencies.

This improbable if-you-give-a-mouse-a-cookie hypothetical about a
future series of events is far too attenuated to rebut the
statutory presumption. Atlantic Trading involves a separate class,
different financial instruments, and different defendants. Indeed,
when the case law mentions conflicts of interest, they typically
refer to defenses unique to or collusion with the presumptive
plaintiff, not potential ethical conflicts of interest.   

Accordingly, speculation about whether Cohen Milstein may represent
a lead plaintiff who mayhave adverse interests is insufficient to
rebut the presumption that the ACM Group is lead plaintiff.

The ACM Group's motion for appointment as lead plaintiff and to
approve its selection of Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC and
Levi Korinsky as co-lead counsel is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 21, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yctco2x4 from
Leagle.com.

Shaolei Qiu, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher J. Gray --
newcases@investorlawyers.net -- Law Office of Christopher J. Gray,
P.C.
Kershner Trading Group, LLC, Movant, represented by Barbara J. Hart
-- bhart@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg P.C.

Princeton Opportunistic Credit Fund L.P., Movant, represented by
Mark Allen Strauss -- mstrauss@kmllp.com -- Kirby McInerney LLP.

Janus Index & Calculation Services LLC, Defendant, represented by
Gillian Groarke Burns -- gillian.burns@cwt.com -- Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft LLP, Jason Michael Halper -- ason.halper@cwt.com
-- Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP & Jared Jon Stanisci
--jared.stanisci@cwt.com -- Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP.

CREDIT SUISSE: Wins Bid to Dismiss Fin'l Advisers' Wage & Hour Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
CHRISTOPHER M. LAVER, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA),
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-00828-WHO(N.D. Cal.).

CSSU's employment of financial advisers, including Laver and
members of his proposed class, was governed by form contracts
providing that the advisers' rights and obligations were governed
by laws of the State of New York. A primary component of Laver's
and the other financial advisers' compensation from CSSU was in the
form of deferred compensation, whereby a significant portion of
income for a given year is paid on a deferred basis in subsequent
years.

CSSU moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6) on
the grounds that Laver's claims are covered by a valid agreement to
arbitrate.  CSSU seeks dismissal of this action because Laver
agreed to submit any and all employment related disputes to
mediation and arbitration under the Employment Dispute Resolution
Program (EDRP) and, therefore, this action should be dismissed in
light of the enforceable arbitration agreement.

Laver opposes, arguing that this Court has the authority to
determine CSSU's motion to compel enforcement of the ERDP. He
contends that such a motion should have been filed in this case
instead of the litigation gymnastics CSSU has employed to assert
its arbitration defense.

CSSU argues that Rule 13204 was waived and cannot trump the EDRP
because Laver voluntarily agreed to the EDRP and its dispute
resolution process. It relies heavily on the Second Circuit's
decision in Cohen v. UBS Fin. Services, Inc., 799 F.3d 174 (2d Cir.
2015). There, the defendant moved to compel to arbitration the
individual claims of a putative class action plaintiff. The
district court granted the motion to compel, and the Second Circuit
affirmed. The Cohen court concluded that Rule 13204 does not
prohibit a pre-dispute waiver of class and collective action
procedures, and permits FINRA arbitration of individual
wage-and-hour claims.

It found that Rule 13204 says nothing about and cannot be read to
bar enforcement of contractual class action waivers. CSSU also
relies on Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Tracy, 812 F.3d 249
(2d Cir. 2016), which, following Cohen, held that a pre-dispute
private agreement to arbitrate before a non-FINRA arbitral forum
was enforceable, notwithstanding FINRA's Rule 13200, which provides
that disputes arising out of the business activities of a member or
its employee must be arbitrated under the FINRA Code.

But Regulatory Notice 16-25 does not mention Rule 13204, does not
mention Cohen, and does not indicate that all provisions in the
FINRA Code are un-waivable. While the Regulatory Notice explains
FINRA's broad position that FINRA rules are not mere contracts that
member firms and associated persons can modify, those
pronouncements are grounded in the fundamental point of the
Regulatory Notice: the mandatory nature of the FINRA rules'
requirement that FINRA arbitration must be available upon the
customer's request, even in the absence of an agreement to
arbitrate. The same is true for employees; FINRA arbitration must
always be an option.  That is not the issue before me nor was it
the issue before the Cohen court. Even if binding upon this Court,
Regulatory Notice 16-25 does not determine the outcome here nor
significantly undermine the persuasiveness of Cohen opinion.

Nor does Laver's reliance on a 2012 FINRA response letter
(responding to comments about changing the scope of Rule 13204 to
include collective actions, as subsequently approved by the SEC)
defeat CSSU's motion. In that letter, the Assistant Chief Counsel
of FINRA Dispute Resolution indicated that "any language in a
member firm's employment agreement that requires employees to waive
their right to file or participate in a collective action against a
member firm in other non-FINRA arbitral forums is contrary to the
provisions of the Industry Code. However, Laver provides no
authority to explain what deference, if any, the Court should give
to this comment letter. CSSU contends it should be given none.

Absent authority, the Court will follow the only direct authority
on point, the Cohen decision.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 21, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y74wpdhh from Leagle.com.

Christopher M. Laver, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Jay Nelson , Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, Jeffrey K. Riffer -
jriffer@elkinskalt.com -- Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside
LLP, Julie Z. Kimball - jkimball@elkinskalt.com -- Elkins Kalt
Weintraub Reuben Gartside LLP,Roger Norton Heller , Lieff Cabraser
Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, & Taras Peter Kick , The Kick Law Firm,
APC.

Credit Suisse Securities (USA), LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company, Defendant, represented by David Jacobs --
djacobs@ebglaw.com -- Epstein Becker & Green, PC & Deanna Lisa
Ballesteros -- dballesteros@ebglaw.com -- Epstein Becker & Green.

CSX CORP: Oral Argument in Fuel Surcharge Suit Set on Sept. 28
--------------------------------------------------------------
CSX Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 18, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that oral argument in the
Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Suit is to take place on September 28,
2018.

In May 2007, class action lawsuits were filed against CSXT and
three other U.S.-based Class I railroads alleging that the
defendants' fuel surcharge practices relating to contract and
unregulated traffic resulted from an illegal conspiracy in
violation of antitrust laws. In November 2007, the class action
lawsuits were consolidated in federal court in the District of
Columbia, where they are now pending.

The suit seeks treble damages allegedly sustained by purported
class members as well as attorneys' fees and other relief.
Plaintiffs are expected to allege damages at least equal to the
fuel surcharges at issue.

In June 2012, the District Court certified the case as a class
action. The decision was not a ruling on the merits of plaintiffs'
claims, but rather a decision to allow the plaintiffs to seek to
prove the case as a class. The defendant railroads petitioned the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for permission to appeal
the District Court's class certification decision.

In August 2013, the D.C. Circuit issued a decision vacating the
class certification decision and remanded the case to the District
Court to reconsider its class certification decision. On October
10, 2017, the District Court issued an order denying class
certification. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit is
reviewing the District Court's denial of class certification and
has scheduled oral argument to take place on September 28, 2018.

The District Court has delayed proceedings on the merits of the
case pending the outcome of the class certification remand
proceedings.

CSXT believes that its fuel surcharge practices were arrived at and
applied lawfully and that the case is without merit. Accordingly,
the Company intends to defend itself vigorously. However, penalties
for violating antitrust laws can be severe, and resolution of this
matter or an unexpected adverse decision on the merits could have a
material adverse effect on the Company's financial condition,
results of operations or liquidity in that particular period.

CSX Corporation, together with its subsidiaries, provides
rail-based transportation services in the United States and Canada.
The company offers rail services, as well as transports intermodal
containers and trailers. CSX Corporation was founded in 1978 and is
based in Jacksonville, Florida.

DETROIT, MI: MS Rentals Seeks to Certify 2 Classes
--------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled MS RENTALS, LLC and GARNER PROPERTIES &
MANAGEMENT, LLC, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF DETROIT, the Defendant, Case No.
2:18-cv-10165-DML-MKM (E.D. Mich.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
certify two classes:

   "all persons and entities that paid any rental registration or
   inspection fees to the City of Detroit for both commercial and
   residential property at any time from November 13, 2014
   through the date of final judgement pursuant to the City of
   Detroit's property maintenance code that requires property
   owners to forfeit their rights to be free from unreasonable
   searches and seizures;

   - and -

   "all persons and entities that have been deprived of a
   certificate of compliance and assessed a fine for refusing or
   otherwise failing to have their property inspected by the City
   of Detroit at any time from November 13, 2014 through the date
   of final judgement pursuant to the City of Detroit's property
   maintenance code that requires property owners to forfeit
   their rights to be free from unreasonable searches and
   seizures."

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Aaron D. Cox, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF AARON D. COX, PLLC
          23380 Goddard Rd.
          Taylor, MI 48180
          Telephone: (734) 287 3664
          E-mail: Aaron@aaroncoxlaw.com

               - and -

          Mark k. Wasvary, Esq.
          MARK K. WASVARY PC
          2401 W. Big Beaver Rd., Suite 100
          Troy, MI 48084
          E-mail: markwasvary@hotmail.com

Attorney for Defendant:

          Michael M. Muller, Esq.
          CITY OF DETROIT LAW DEPARTMENT
          2 Woodward Ave., Ste 500
          Detroit, MI 482226
          Telephone: (313) 237 2052
          E-mail: mullm@detroitmi.gov


DSW RESTAURANT: Bryant Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
---------------------------------------------------
Tamika Bryant, individually and on behalf of similarly situated
individuals v. DSW Restaurant, Inc. and 3625 Highway 146, Inc. and
dba Double Shoe Men's Club, Case No. 3:18-cv-00203 (S.D. Tex., July
19, 2018), is brought against the Defendants for violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff, Tamika Bryant is an individual residing in Harris
County, Texas. The Plaintiff was a hostess, entertainer, and erotic
dancer employed by DSW Restaurant, Inc.

The Defendant DSW Restaurant, Inc., and 3625 Highway 146, Inc. dba
Double Shoe Men’s Club is an establishment where live topless,
semi-nude or partially clothed dance entertainment is presented to
adult members of the general public.  This entity is a business
organization doing business at 3625 TX-146, Bacliff, Texas 77518.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Tristan C. Robinson, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF TRISTAN C. ROBINSON, PLLC
      1095 Evergreen Cir., Suite 200
      The Woodlands, TX 77380
      Tel: (281) 601-4569
      Fax: (713) 893-6940
      E-mail: tristan@tcrobinsonlaw.com


ECHELON CORPORATION: Aducci Balks at Adesto Tech Merger Deal
------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN ADUCCI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ECHELON CORPORATION; RON SEGE; ARMAS
CLIFFORD MARKKULA, JR.; ROBERT J. FINOCCHIO, JR.; ROBERT R.
MAXFIELD; and BETSY RAFAEL, Defendants, Case No. 5:18-cv-04415-LHK
(N.D. Cal., July 20, 2018) is a class action against the Defendants
alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act in connection
with the proposed acquisition of Ecehlon by Adesto Technologies
Corporation, through its wholly owned subsidiary, Circuit
Acquisition Corporation.

On June 28, 2018, the Echelon Board caused the Company to enter
into an Agreement and Plan of Merger, pursuant to which each common
share of Echelon will be converted into the right to receive $8.50
in cash.  On July 16, 2018, to convince Echelon's shareholders to
vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, Defendants authorized
the filing of a materially incomplete and misleading proxy
statement with the SEC.

The Proxy contains materially incomplete and misleading information
concerning: (i) financial projections for Echelon; and (ii) the
valuation analyses performed by Echelon's financial advisor, Piper
Jaffray & Co., in support of its fairness opinion.  According to
the lawsuit, the Proxy fails to provide Echelon's unlevered free
cash flow projections. Echelon's unlevered free cash flows were
utilized by Piper Jaffray in their valuation analyses, including
their discounted cash flow analysis for Echelon, and are material
to the shareholders. Without Echelon's unlevered free cash flow
projections, Echelon's shareholders will not be able to assess the
fairness of the Merger Consideration.

Echelon Corporation develops, markets, and sells embedded
components, modules, edge servers, and software. Echelon
Corporation was founded in 1988 and is headquartered in Santa
Clara, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David E. Bower, Esq.
          MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
          600 Corporate Pointe, Suite 1170
          Culver City, CA 90230
          Telephone: (213) 446-6652
          Facsimile: (212) 202-7880
          Email: dbower@monteverdelaw.com

               -and-

          Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
          MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
          The Empire State Building
          350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4405
          New York, NY 10118
          Telephone: (212) 971-1341
          Facsimile: (212) 202-7880
          Email: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com


EES SILVER: Underpays Home Care Aides, Barros Suit Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------
NICOLE BARROS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. EES SILVER LLC d/b/a HOMEWATCH CAREGIVERS;
LILLIAN COLMAN; and ROBERT COLMAN, Defendants, Case No. 18-0922
(Mass. Super., Norfolk Cty., July 19, 2018) is an action against
the Defendants for failure to pay overtime wages, travel time, and
reimburse transportation expenses.

Ms. Barros was employed by the Defendants as a home care aide from
August 2017 to May 12, 2018.

EES Silver LLC d/b/a Homewatch Caregivers is a domestic corporation
doing business in Bridgewater, Massachusetts. The Company provides
home care aide services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Raven Moeslinger, Esq.
          Stephanie C. Ozahowski, Esq.
          Nicholas F. Ortiz, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF NICHOLAS F. ORTIZ, PC
          99 High Street, Suite 304
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 338-9400
          E-mail: rm@mass-legal.com


EGS FINANCIAL: Court Dismisses M. Taubenfliegel's FDCPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
MENACHEM TAUBENFLIEGEL, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EGS FINANCIAL CARE, INC.,
Defendant, No. 18-cv-1962-ARR-JO (E.D.N.Y.).

EGS Financial Care, Inc., is a debt collector. The Plaintiff
alleges that defendant violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (FDCPA), by sending him an inaccurate and misleading debt
collection letter.

This understanding is also consistent with the Second Circuit's
decision in Taylor v. Financial Recovery Services, Inc., 886 F.3d
212 (2d Cir. 2018), which held that if a collection notice
correctly states a consumer's balance without mentioning interest
or fees, and no such interest or fees are accruing, then the notice
will neither be misleading within the meaning of Section 1692e, nor
fail to state accurately the amount of the debt under Section
1692g.

In that case, the debt was not accruing interest a fact on which
the collection notice was silent. The Taylor court acknowledged
plaintiff's favored language from Carlin that a collection notice
must inform the debtor what she will need to pay to resolve the
debt at any given moment in the future. But the court expressly
rejected a requirement of exhaustive disclosure, instead approving
a collection notice that was silent as to whether a debt is
accruing interest, thereby depriving the debtor of information she
would need to determine the exact amount of her future debt.

The defendant's collection letter here does not violate either
Section 1692e or Section 1692g because it qualifies for the
protection of Avila's safe harbor. It lists the actual amount due
rather than an estimated amount, states that that amount may
increase due to interest or other charges, and provides a way for
the debtor to contact the debt collector.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 21, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8hor5ke from
Leagle.com.

Menachem Taubenfliegel, on behalf of himself and all other
similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Jon
Fishbein , Adam J. Fishbein, P.C.

EGS Financial Care, Inc., Defendant, represented by Aaron R. Easley
-- aeasley@sessions.legal -- Sessions Fishman Nathan & Israel LLC.

EQUIFAX INC: Still Defends Cybersecurity Related Suits
------------------------------------------------------
Equifax Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on July 26, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018, that the company continues to defend itself in
several class action suits related to the 2017 cybersecurity
incident.

Following the 2017 cybersecurity incident, hundreds of class
actions were filed against the company in federal, state and
Canadian courts relating to the 2017 cybersecurity incident. The
plaintiffs in these cases, who purport to represent various classes
of consumers and small businesses, generally claim to have been
harmed by alleged actions and/or omissions by Equifax in connection
with the 2017 cybersecurity incident and assert a variety of common
law and statutory claims seeking monetary damages, injunctive
relief and other related relief.

In addition, certain class actions have been filed by financial
institutions that allege their businesses have been placed at risk
due to the 2017 cybersecurity incident and generally assert various
common law claims such as claims for negligence and breach of
contract, as well as, in some cases, statutory claims. The
financial institution class actions seek compensatory damages and
other related relief.

Furthermore, a lawsuit has been filed against the company by the
City of Chicago with respect to the 2017 cybersecurity incident
alleging violations of state laws and local ordinances governing
protection of personal data, consumer fraud and breach notice
requirements and business practices and seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief and the imposition of fines the aggregate amount
of which the complaint does not specifically quantify.

Beginning on December 6, 2017 and pursuant to multiple subsequent
orders, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered
the consolidation and transfer for pre-trial proceedings with
respect to the U.S. cases pending in federal court discussed above,
including the City of Chicago action, to the Northern District of
Georgia as the single U.S. District Court for centralized pre-trial
proceedings.

Based on this order, consolidated proceedings with respect to U.S.
consumer, small business, and financial institution federal class
actions related to the 2017 cybersecurity incident have been
conducted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia (“MDL Court”).

The MDL Court has established separate tracks for the consumer and
financial institution cases and appointed lead counsel on behalf of
plaintiffs in both tracks.

Separate consolidated nationwide class action complaints have been
filed on behalf of consumer, small business, and financial
institution plaintiffs. The cases before the MDL Court are in
preliminary stages.

Equifax said "We have moved to dismiss the consolidated complaints
filed by the U.S. consumers and the financial institutions, and
intend to file a motion to dismiss the small business complaint."

In addition to these federal court proceedings, several putative
class actions arising from the 2017 cybersecurity incident have
been filed against the company in the Fulton County Superior Court
in Georgia based on similar allegations and theories as alleged in
the U.S. consumer class actions seeking monetary damages,
injunctive relief and other related relief on behalf of Georgia
citizens. These cases have been transferred to a single judge in
the Fulton County Business Court and three of the cases were
consolidated into a single action.

Six Canadian class actions, four of which are on behalf of a
national class, have been filed against the company in Ontario,
Saskatchewan, Quebec and British Columbia. Each of the proposed
Canadian class actions asserts a number of common law and statutory
claims seeking monetary damages and other related relief in
connection with the 2017 cybersecurity incident. All such actions
are at the preliminary stages and one action has been stayed.

In addition, civil enforcement actions have been filed against
Equifax by the Attorneys General of Massachusetts and West Virginia
alleging violations of state/commonwealth consumer protection laws.
The Massachusetts action is pending in Suffolk Superior Court and
seeks permanent injunctive relief, civil penalties, restitution,
disgorgement of profits, costs, and attorneys' fees. The West
Virginia action is pending in the Circuit Court of Boone County and
seeks civil penalties and attorneys' fees.

The Attorney General of Puerto Rico filed an action against the
company in the United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico alleging negligence and seeking monetary damages on
behalf of aggrieved residents of Puerto Rico, disgorgement of
profits, costs, and attorneys' fees.

These three cases are all at the preliminary stages.

Finally, a lawsuit has been filed against the company by the City
of San Francisco in Superior Court in the City of San Francisco
alleging violations of California's unfair competition law due to
purported violations of statutory protections of personal data and
statutory data breach requirements and seeking statutory penalties,
injunctive relief, and restitution for California consumers among
other relief. The City of San Francisco action has been stayed by
the court.

Equifax said "We dispute the allegations in the complaints
described above and intend to defend against such claims."

Equifax Inc. provides information solutions and human resources
business process outsourcing services for businesses, governments,
and consumers. The company operates through four segments: U.S.
Information Solutions (USIS), International, Workforce Solutions,
and Global Consumer Solutions. Equifax Inc. was founded in 1899 and
is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.


ESSERMAN NISSAN: Casey Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
--------------------------------------------------
Sean Casey, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Esserman Nissan, Inc. dba Esserman International Acura,
Case No.  1:18-cv-22918 (S.D. Fla., July 19, 2018), is brought
against the Defendant for violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

The Plaintiff is a natural person who, at all times relevant to
this action, was a resident of Miami-Dade County, Florida.

The Defendant is an automotive dealership that sells vehicles.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
      SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
      14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 400
      Miami, FL 33132
      Tel: (305) 479-2299
      E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Court Amends Class Settlement Judgment
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Southern Division, issued a Judgment amending Order and
Final Judgment Granting Final Approval of the Class Action
Settlement of the case captioned TERRI N. WHITE, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant. AND
RELATED CASES: 05-cv-0173-DOC (MLGx) 05-cv-7821-DOC (MLGx)
05-cv-0392-DOC (MLGx) 05-cv-1172-DOC (MLGx) 05-cv-5060-DOC (MLGx),
Case No. 8:05-cv-1070(C.D. Cal.).

The Court entered an Order and Final Judgment granting final
approval of the class action settlement (Settlement) reached in the
above-captioned case and awarding attorneys' fees, expenses, and
certain service awards (Final Approval Order).

In accordance with these Orders and the Stipulation, the Court
enters the Amended Judgment, inter alia:

   -- The Court dismisses with prejudice all Released Claims
belonging to the Class Representatives and 23(b)(3) Settlement
Class members who did not timely and validly request exclusion from
the Settlement Class.

   -- Class members were afforded a reasonable opportunity to
request exclusion from the Settlement Class. Only 183 timely and
valid requests for exclusion were received by the Settlement
Administrator, and they are added to the 1,663 opt-out requests
submitted in conjunction with the 2009 Proposed Settlement. The
persons who timely requested exclusion from the Settlement Class
are listed in Exhibit B hereto. The Court hereby excludes the
persons listed in Exhibit B, as well as the 1,663 prior opt-outs,
from the Settlement Class, and they are not bound by the final
judgment in this consolidated case.

   -- Within five (5) business days of the Effective Date, each of
the three Defendants, Equifax Information Services, LLC, Experian
Information Solutions, Inc., and Trans Union LLC, will cause to be
deposited into the Registry Account an amount equal to three
hundred thirty-three thousand and three hundred thirty-three
dollars and thirty-three cents ($333,333.33).

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 18, 2018 Judgment is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/ychsu53k from Leagle.com.

Robert Radcliffe, Chester Carter, Arnold Lovell, Jr & Clifton C
Seale, III, Plaintiffs, represented by Adam R. Shaw , Boies
Schiller & Flexner, LLP, pro hac vice, Charles W. Juntikka ,
Charles Juntikka & Associates LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel Wolf --
dan@danielwolflaw.com  -- Daniel Wolf Law Offices, David Boies ,
Boies Schiller and Flexner LLP, pro hac vice, David L. Zifkin ,
Boies Schiller and Flexner LLP & George F. Carpinello , Boies
Schiller and Flexner LLP, pro hac vice.

Experian Information Solutions Inc, Defendant, represented by
Daniel J. McLoon -- djmcloon@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Thomas R.
Malcolm -- trmalcolm@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Amanda Kate Denker
Pushinsky -- apushinsky@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Christopher L.
Dengler -- cdengler@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Cindy D. Hanson --
cindy.hanson@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP & Shirin Nassi ,
Jones Day.

Transunion, LLC, Consol Defendant, represented by Julia B.
Strickland -- jstrickland@stroock.com -- Stroock Stroock & Lavan
LLP, Brian C. Frontino -- bfrontino@stroock.com -- Stroock Stroock
& Lavan, Christine E. Ellice -- cellice@stroock.com --  Stroock and
Stroock and Lavan LLP, Julieta Stepanyan -- jstepanyan@stroock.com
--  Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP & Stephen J. Newman --
snewman@stroock.com --  Stroock and Stroock and Lavan LLP.

EXPO CONVENTION: Chedebeau Suit Seeks Damages Under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------
Leonardo Taupier Chedebeau and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Expo Convention Contractors, Inc., Richard P Curran,
Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-22442 (S.D. Fla., June 18, 2018),
requests double damages and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to
the Fair Labor Standards Act for all overtime wages still owing
along with court costs, interest and any other relief.

Expo is a full-service trade show service design company based in
Miami FL. Chedebeau worked for Defendants as a cleaner from on or
about January 1, 2014 through June 13, 2018. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      J.H. Zidell, Esq.
      J.H. ZIDELL, P.A.
      300 71st Street, Suite 605
      Miami Beach, FL 33141
      Tel: (305) 865-6766
      Fax: (305) 865-7167
      Email: zabogado@aol.com


FARMERS CAPITAL: Parties in "Parshall" Suit Reach Settlement Pact
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Wesbanco, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission filed on July 18, 2018, that the parties in
Parshall v. Farmers Capital Bank Corporation have agreed to settle
the suit

As previously reported by each of Farmers Capital and WesBanco on
Current Reports on Form 8-K, each filed on July 12, 2018, on July
10, 2018 an alleged class action complaint was filed by a purported
stockholder of Farmers Capital in the Franklin Circuit Court of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky captioned Parshall v. Farmers Capital Bank
Corporation (Case No. 18-CI-00699) against Farmers Capital, United
Bank, the individual members of the board of directors of Farmers
Capital ("Defendant Directors"), WesBanco and WesBanco Bank (the
"Complaint").

The Complaint alleged generally, among other things, that each
member of Farmers Capital's board of directors (the "Director
Defendants") breached their fiduciary duties in approving the
Merger Agreement, that Farmers Capital and WesBanco aided and
abetted such breaches of fiduciary duty and that the disclosure
regarding the Proposed Merger contained in the Proxy
Statement/Prospectus was materially deficient.

On July 18, 2018, solely to avoid the costs, risks and
uncertainties inherent in litigation, Farmers Capital, United Bank,
WesBanco, WesBanco Bank and the Director Defendants (Farmers
Capital, United Bank, WesBanco, WesBanco Bank and the Director
Defendants (collectively the "Defendants"), agreed with the
plaintiff, among other things, that the Defendants would make
certain additional disclosures concerning the Proposed Merger, and
the plaintiff would dismiss his complaint with prejudice.

Plaintiff's counsel reserves the right to seek attorneys' fees and
expenses. The settlement will have no impact on the timing of the
special meeting of Farmers Capital shareholders scheduled for July
23, 2018 to vote upon a proposal to approve the Merger Agreement.
Nor will the settlement affect the merger consideration to be paid
to Farmers Capital's shareholders in connection with the Proposed
Merger.

The Defendants have vigorously denied, and continue to vigorously
deny, that they have committed or aided and abetted in the
commission of any violation of law or engaged in any of the
wrongful acts that were alleged in the Complaint, and expressly
maintain that, to the extent applicable, they diligently and
scrupulously complied with their fiduciary and other legal burdens
and entered into the agreement with the plaintiff solely to
eliminate the uncertainties, burden and expense of litigation.

A copy of the supplemental disclosure is available at
https://goo.gl/YqmXxm.

WesBanco, Inc. operates as the holding company for WesBanco Bank,
Inc. that provides retail banking, corporate banking, personal and
corporate trust, brokerage, and mortgage banking and insurance
services in the United States. It operates in two segments,
Community Banking, and Trust and Investment Services. The company
is headquartered in Wheeling, West Virginia.

FATHOM EVENTS: Court Extends Class Certification Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle Division, approved a stipulation extending the
deadline for class certification in the case captioned KATE
JOHNSTON, DEAN OLSON, JERRY BERGMAN, and MARIA C. "TINA" CHILDRESS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; THE
WASHINGTON STATE COMMUNICATION ACCESS PROJECT, a Washington
Corporation; and ASSOCIATION OF LATE DEAFENED ADULTS (ALDA),
Plaintiffs, v. FATHOM EVENTS JV, LLC; REGAL ENTERTAINMENT GROUP;
AMC ENTERTAINMENT INC.; and CINEMARK HOLDINGS, INC., Defendants,
No. 2:18-cv-00011-MJP (W.D. Wash.).

The plaintiff will move for a determination under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(1), as to whether the case is to be maintained as a class
action on or before forty five (45) days after the Court rules on
the pending dispositive motions.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 18, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9ez68fd from Leagle.com.

Kate Johnston, Dean Olson, Jerry Bergman, Maria C. "Tina"
Childress, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, The Washington State Communication Access Project, a
Washington corporation & Association of Late Deafened Adults,
Plaintiffs, represented by John Waldo -- johnfwaldo@hotmail.com --
LAW OFFICE OF JOHN F WALDO, pro hac vice & Roger M. Townsend --
rtownsend@bjtlegal.com -- BRESKIN JOHNSON & TOWNSEND PLLC.

AC JV, LLC, doing business as Fathom Events, Defendant, represented
by Nathaniel Joseph Wonderly -- joewonderly@dwt.com -- DAVIS WRIGHT
TREMAINE & Sheehan H. Sullivan Weiss -- sulls@dwt.com -- DAVIS
WRIGHT TREMAINE.

Regal Entertainment Group, AMC Entertainment Inc & Cinemark
Holdings Inc, Defendants, represented by Chris Farias --
farias@arifa.com -- LAW OFFICES OF CHRIS FARIAS, PLLC & M. Brett
Burns -- mbrettburns@HuntonAK.com -- HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP, pro
hac vice.

FCA US: Court Refuses to Alter Aug. 2017 Judgment in D. Beck's Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DONALD J. BECK, Plaintiff, v. FCA US LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 17-cv-10267 (E.D. Mich.), Judge Mark A. Goldsmith of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern
Division, denied Beck's motion to alter or amend the Court's Aug.
11, 2017 opinion, order, and judgment which granted FCA's motion to
dismiss and disposed of the case accordingly.

Beck, a California citizen, brought the putative class action,
alleging that several of FCA's vehicles have a defective gearshift
system that inaccurately indicates that the vehicles are in Park
when they, in fact, are not.  Beck alleged that the defect resulted
in a number of rollaway incidents.

FCA brought a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).  The Court granted the motion on the following
grounds: (i) Beck lacked standing to bring the suit because Beck
could not claim he suffered economic harm as a result of the
defect; (ii) Beck failed to provide pre-suit notice, as required by
California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"); (iii) Beck
failed to state a claim for any affirmative misrepresentation under
California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); (iv) Beck failed to
sufficiently allege facts that FCA had a duty to disclose the
defect, thus requiring dismissal under the UCL; (v) Beck did not
present his vehicle for repair, necessitating the dismissal of his
express warranty claims; and (vi) Beck did not stop driving his
vehicle, requiring that his implied warranty claims be dismissed.

Following entry of the judgment, Beck filed the instant motion to
alter or amend judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e).  Beck offers two principal arguments.  First, he argues that
the Court should not have dismissed his complaint with prejudice
and should now instead permit him to file an amended complaint,
which would cure the deficiencies in the dismissed complaint.
Second, Beck argues the Court committed clear error when it
dismissed his implied warranty claims.

FCA filed a response to the motion.

Judge Goldsmith finds both arguments of Beck lack merit.  As to
first argument, he says Beck is correct that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure require that leave to amend should be freely given
when justice so requires.  However, he ignores that the Sixth
Circuit has instructed that parties may not rely on the district
court's opinion to identify deficiencies in his complaint.  There
is no such compelling reason.  Accordingly, he will deny this
portion of Beck's motion.

As to Beck's second argument, the Judge finds that in order to
succeed on his motion, Beck must show that the Court made a clear
error in law.  However, Beck has not even cited controlling
precedent, let alone controlling precedent that contradicts the
Court's opinion dismissing the claims.  Beck cannot rely solely on
nonbinding precedent and still establish that the Court committed a
clear error in its decision.  Even if he could rely solely on
nonbinding precedent, Beck has not shown clear error in the Court's
decision.  Accordingly, this portion of Beck's motion is denied.

For these reasons, Judge Goldsmith denied Beck's motion to alter or
amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e).

A full-text copy of the Court's July 10, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/zNdLTY from Leagle.com.

Donald J. Beck, Plaintiff, represented by Dennis A. Lienhardt --
dal@millerlaw.com -- The Miller Law Firm, P.C., Joseph H. Meltzer
-- jmeltzer@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Peter
A. Muhic -- pmuhic@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP,
Sharon S. Almonrode -- ssa@millerlawpc.com -- The Miller Law Firm,
P.C., Tyler S. Graden -- tgraden@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer
& Check, LLP & E. Powell Miller -- epm@millerlawpc.com -- The
Miller Law Firm.

FCA US, LLC, Defendant, represented by Amanda J. Hettinger --
ahettinger@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn LLP, Kathy A.
Wisniewski -- kwisniewski@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn
LLP, Larry J. Saylor, Miller -- saylor@millercanfield.com --
Canfield & Stephen A. D'Aunoy -- sdaunoy@thompsoncoburn.com --
Thompson Coburn LLP.

FRED MEYER: Court Dismisses D. Walker's FCRA Suit
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned DANIEL WALKER,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. FRED MEYER, INC., Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-1791-YY
(D. Or.).

Plaintiff Daniel Walker brings a purported class action claim
against Fred Meyer, Inc., alleging violations of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's consumer
report disclosure and pre-adverse action notice violate FCRA
Sections 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) and 1681b(b)(3), respectively.

United States Magistrate Judge Youlee Yim You issued Findings and
Recommendation ("F&R") in this case on May 7, 2018. ECF 38. Judge
You recommended that the Court grant Defendant's motion to
dismiss.

First, the Plaintiff argues that Judge You mischaracterized the
applicable legal standards and ignored extraneous information in
the Defendant's disclosure.  Second, the Plaintiff argues that
Judge You overlooked the inclusion of information about
investigative consumer reports.  Third, the Plaintiff argues that
the F&R did not address the interplay of the Defendant's
authorization form with its disclosure form. Finally, the Plaintiff
argues that Judge You should have found that the disclosure and
authorization forms presented to Plaintiff were improperly
presented together and as part of a job application or employee
manual.

The Plaintiff argues first that Judge You mischaracterized the
applicable law on the FCRA's disclosure requirement. The Court
disagrees. Judge You properly characterized the requirements of the
FCRA, including by case law for examples of FCRA's application.

The first sentence sets out a consumer report disclosure, and there
is no further mention of the nature or scope of a potential
investigative report. Rather, the next mention of an investigative
report comes in the final paragraph, which states: "If GIS obtains
any information by interview, you have the right to obtain a
complete and accurate disclosure of the scope and nature of the
investigation performed. This sentence in fact emphasizes to the
reader that this disclosure is not in itself an investigative
report disclosure."

Thus, the Section 1681b disclosure is not overshadowed by the
limited Section 1681d disclosure.

The court found that this waiver was not an authorization within
the meaning of subsection (ii), and thus its inclusion in the
subsection (i) disclosure rendered the disclosure improper. The
Ninth Circuit did not, as Plaintiff suggests, hold that an
authorization may contain only an authorization for the procurement
of a credit report.

Thus, the Plaintiff's assertion, not contained in his Complaint,
that the authorization contained extraneous information,
nonetheless fails to state a claim for a violation of section
(b)(2)(A)(ii).

In this case, the Plaintiff's Complaint references the relevant
documents, and Defendant introduced them into the record. Judge You
took judicial notice of those document and Plaintiff does not
object to the Court taking judicial notice. Thus, apparently unlike
the court in Speer, Speer v. Whole Food Mkt. Grp., Inc., 2015 WL
1456981, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2015), the Court has before it
the disclosure and the authorization, which appear as two separate
documents, and not as part of Defendant's job application. Speer,
properly understood, does not support Plaintiff's argument that the
court should nonetheless "read them" as being joined and included
in Defendant's job application.

The Court therefore agrees with Judge You's finding that presenting
the disclosure with other employment documents did not destroy the
stand-alone character of the disclosure.
The Plaintiff objects to the F&R's conclusion that the Plaintiff
lacks standing to bring Count Two under Article III of the U.S.
Constitution. To satisfy Article III standing, the plaintiff must
have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable
to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely
to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.

The Court rejects the Defendant's argument that the Plaintiff lacks
standing because he frames the issue as having no opportunity to
discuss the report, including any accurate negative items, with the
Defendant. As an initial matter, Plaintiff has alleged that his
report contained inaccurate and erroneous information. Furthermore,
Congress did not condition the protections in the FCRA on the
accuracy or inaccuracy of the information contained in the consumer
report. The right at issue is simply a right to pre-adverse action
notice an informational right it does not depend on whether that
adverse action is based on accurate or false information.

As Judge You found, however, the Defendant simply has not cited any
FCRA provision (and the Court is aware of none) supporting the
Plaintiff's argument that his pre-adverse action notice was
required to include information about contacting his current or
future employer. The Plaintiff cites to no provision of the FCRA or
persuasive case law suggesting that the Defendant's notice was
deficient by not informing the Plaintiff that he could contact the
Defendant directly, or the date by which he must do so.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 21, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yb4jhofp from Leagle.com.

Daniel Walker, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick H. Peluso --
ppeluso@woodrowpeluso.com -- Woodrow & Peluso, LLC, pro hac vice,
Steven L. Woodrow -- swoodrow@woodrowpeluso.com -- Woodrow &
Peluso, LLC, pro hac vice, Taylor T. Smith --
tsmith@woodrowpeluso.com -- Woodrow & Peluso, LLC, pro hac vice &
Neal Weingart, Neal Weingart Attorney at Law, LLC.

Fred Meyer Inc, a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented by
Faith C. Whittaker -- faith.whittaker@dinsmore.com -- Dinsmore &
Shohl LLP, pro hac vice, J. Michael Porter , Miller Nash Graham &
Dunn LLP, Michael Baringhaus Mattingly , Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, pro
hac vice & Taylor D. Richman , Miller Nash Graham & Dunn LLP.

H&M HENNES: Ser Lao Bid to Certify Classes Granted in Part
----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled SER LAO, as an individual and on behalf of
all other similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. H&M HENNES &
MAURITZ, L.P., the Defendant, Case No. 5:16-cv-00333-EJD (N.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge Edward J. Davila entered an order on August
8, 2018, granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff's motion
for class certification:

  -- Plaintiff's motion to certify the Class is granted with
     respect to the security check claims to the extent these
     claims are predicated upon wait time and security checks at
     the end of a shift and at closing. Plaintiff's motion to
     certify the Class with respect to security checks conducted
     before rest breaks is denied.

  -- Plaintiff's motion to certify the Money Network Paycard
     Class is granted.

  -- The Court certifies Plaintiff as class representative for
     The Class (as limited by this Order) and the Money Network
     Paycard Class.

  -- Plaintiff's counsel of record, Larry W. Lee and Kristen M.
     Agnew of the Diversity Law Group, P.C., Dennis S. Hyun of
     Hyun Legal, APC, and William L. Marder of Polaris Law Group
     LLP, are appointed as class counsel.

  -- Plaintiff's motion to certify the Overtime Recalculation
     Wage Statement Class is denied.


HANSEN MEDICAL: Court Narrows Claims in Minority Stockholders' Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Chancery of Delaware granted in part and denied in
part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned IN RE HANSEN
MEDICAL, INC. STOCKHOLDERS LITIGATION, C.A. No. 12316-VCMR (Del.
Ch.).

The plaintiffs, representing a purported class of minority
stockholders, allege that a group of significant stockholders, who
together controlled more than fifty percent of the acquired
company, used their control of the company to negotiate a
beneficial deal for themselves at the expense of the minority
stockholders.

The Plaintiffs assert four claims. First, the Plaintiffs assert a
breach of fiduciary duty claim against Defendants Lowe, Vance, and
Schuler. Second, the Plaintiffs assert a breach of fiduciary duty
claim against the Controller Defendants. Third, the Plaintiffs
assert a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Defendant Schuler
as a de facto Controlling Shareholder. Fourth and finally, the
Plaintiffs assert an aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary
duties claim against Auris.

The Defendants, in their various Motions to Dismiss, respond in a
variety of ways.

First, the Defendants disagree with the Plaintiffs' contention that
the Merger should be reviewed under the entire fairness standard
because the Defendants argue that there was not a control group or
a controller.

Second, Defendant Schuler argues that he cannot be liable for any
breaches of fiduciary duty because he resigned from the Board
before the terms of the Merger were approved and because the Merger
was approved by the Board and Hansen's stockholders.

Third, the Director Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have
failed to plead non-exculpated claims, and under Corwin v. KKR
Financial Holdings LLC, the business judgment rule should apply.

Fourth and finally, Auris argues that the Plaintiffs have not pled
facts.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have stated a reasonably
conceivable claim that the Merger should be considered under the
entire fairness standard of review.

The Plaintiffs have alleged a long history of cooperation and
coordination between the Controlling Defendants. This history began
almost a quarter of a century ago when they entered into a voting
agreement and declared themselves to the SEC as a group of
stockholders in Quidel. The history continued for another
twenty-one years and included coordinating their investment
strategy in at least seven different companies.

This history culminated, at least for the purposes of this action,
in 2011 when they were the only participants in a private placement
that made them the largest stockholders of Hansen.  In 2013 and
2015, they were defined together as Principal Purchasers in private
placements of Hansen stock, enjoying the right to determine the
closing date, to oversee the press releases and other
communications regarding the transactions, to extend the
termination date under certain circumstances, and to amend the
agreement.

The Plaintiffs have further alleged that the Controller Defendants
received the opportunity to, and did, rollover their stock in
Hansen into preferred stock in Auris. The minority stockholders did
not receive this benefit. Instead, the Plaintiffs argue, the
minority stockholders received an unfairly low price. Because the
Plaintiffs have stated a reasonable conceivable claim that the
Controller Defendants constituted a control group and that the
control group received a non-ratable benefit, the Plaintiffs have
stated a reasonably conceivable claim that the entire fairness
standard of review applies.

Entire fairness is Delaware's most onerous standard.  Once entire
fairness applies, the defendants must establish 'to the court's
satisfaction that the transaction was the product of both fair
dealing and fair price.  Generally, the determination that the
entire fairness standard of review could reasonably apply will
prevent dismissal of an action at the motion to dismiss stage
because defendants do not have the luxury of arguing facts that
would counter the plaintiffs' well-pled allegations that are
assumed as true. This is true here and the Court is precluded from
dismissing the claims against the Controller Defendants at this
stage.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have stated a reasonably
conceivable non-exculpated claim against Defendant Schuler.

The Plaintiffs have stated a reasonably conceivable claim that
Schuler was part of a control group that competed with Hansen's
minority stockholders for consideration during the Merger,
resulting in a merger price for the minority stockholders that the
Plaintiffs argue was unfairly depressed. Thus, the Plaintiffs have
stated a reasonably conceivable claim that he violated his duty of
loyalty. Therefore, the Plaintiffs have stated a reasonably
conceivable non-exculpated claim against Schuler.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have stated reasonably
conceivable non-exculpated claims against the Director Defendants.

The Plaintiffs have stated a reasonably conceivable non-exculpated
claim for breach of fiduciary duties against the Director
Defendants due to material misstatements and omissions in the
Proxy. Directors of a Delaware corporation have a fiduciary duty to
disclose fully and fairly all material information. Under Delaware
law, when a board chooses to disclose a course of events or to
discuss a specific subject, it has long been understood that it
cannot do so in a materially misleading way, by disclosing only
part of the story, and leaving the reader with a distorted
impression. Instead, disclosures must provide a balanced, truthful
account of all matters they disclose. Partial disclosure, in which
some material facts are not disclosed or are presented in an
ambiguous, incomplete, or misleading manner, is not sufficient to
meet a fiduciary's disclosure obligations.

Defendant Lowe

The Plaintiffs have stated a reasonably conceivable claim that Lowe
breached his duty of loyalty in his capacity as a director. Lowe
prepared the management projections in his capacity as interim CFO.
Based on the facts pled by the Plaintiffs, it is reasonably
conceivable that Lowe knew the Proxy was materially misleading and
breached his duty of loyalty by allowing the Proxy to go to
stockholders. The exculpatory provision does not protect Lowe from
breaches of the duty of loyalty, and thus, the Plaintiffs have
stated a non-exculpated claim against him.

Defendant Vance

The fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of
directors. Vance affixed his signature to the Proxy in his capacity
as President and CEO and presented the information to the
stockholders for their consideration. This means he may be liable
for material misstatements in the Proxy in his capacity as an
officer in addition to his capacity as a director.  The exculpatory
provision does not protect Vance from breaches of his fiduciary
duties in his capacity as an officer; thus, the Plaintiffs have
pled non-exculpated claims against Vance.

The Plaintiffs have not stated a reasonably conceivable claim
against Auris for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.

The Plaintiffs failed to plead facts that make it reasonably
conceivable that Auris knowingly participated in any of the alleged
breaches of fiduciary duty. The Complaint does not include
well-pled facts that Auris took part in any nefarious activity. The
facts in the Complaint show only that Auris negotiated a
not-uncommon agreement to reduce its cash outlay by having the
major investors in Hansen rollover their stock. The Plaintiffs
offer the conclusory allegation that Auris exploited its existing
relationship with the Controller Defendants, and effectuated a
merger in which Hansen's Control Group, i.e., the Controller
Defendants, or alternatively Defendant Schuler alone, received a
benefit not shared with the minority stockholders, and which was
unfair to minority stockholders.

But, the Plaintiffs plead no facts to support that Auris knew of,
let alone exploited, any conflicts. Finally, the Plaintiffs allege
that Auris negotiated directly with the Key Stockholders. The Proxy
supports this, but this fact alone does not support a reasonable
inference that Auris colluded with the Controller Defendants.
Because the Complaint does not state well-pled facts that make it
reasonably conceivable Auris partook in more than arm's length
negotiations, the Plaintiffs have not stated a reasonably
conceivable claim for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary
duty against Auris.

Accordingly, the Controller Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is
denied, the Director Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied, and
Defendant Auris's Motion to Dismiss is granted.

A full-text copy of the Chancery Court's June 18, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yc2vglcl from
Leagle.com.

Carmella P. Keener -- ckeener@rmgglaw.com -- ROSENTHAL, MONHAIT &
GODDESS, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Carl L. Stine --
cstine@wolfpopper.com -- Matthew Insley-Pruitt --
MInsley-Pruitt@wolfpopper.com -- and Adam J. Blander --
ablander@wolfpopper.com -- WOLF POPPER LLP, New York, New York;
Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs.

C. Barr Flinn -- bflinn@ycst.com -- Kathaleen S. McCormick --
kmccormick@ycst.com -- Richard J. Thomas -- rjthomas@ycst.com --
and M. Paige Valeski -- pvaleski@ycst.com -- YOUNG CONAWAY STARGATT
& TAYLOR, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Tariq Mundiya --
tmundiya@willkie.com -- Benjamin P. McCallen --
bmccallen@willkie.com -- and Casey Donnelly --
cdonnelly@willkie.com -- WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP, New York,
New York; Attorneys for Defendants Jack W. Schuler, Jack W. Schuler
Living Trust, Renate Schuler, Schuler Family Foundation, Tino Hans
Schuler Trust, Tanya Eve Schuler Trust, Therese Heidi Schuler
Trust, Larry N. Feinberg, Oracle Partners, L.P., Oracle Ten Fund
Master, LP, Oracle Institutional Partners, L.P., the Feinberg
Family Foundation, Oracle Investment Management, Inc. Employees'
Retirement Plan, and Feinberg Family Trust.

Stephen C. Norman -- snorman@potteranderson.com -- Brian C. Ralston
-- bralston@potteranderson.com -- and Jacqueline A. Rogers --
jrogers@potteranderson -- POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware; Sara B. Brody -- SBRODY@SIDLEY.COM -- SIDLEY
AUSTIN LLP, San Francisco, California; Matthew J. Dolan --
MDOLAN@SIDLEY.COM -- SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, Palo Alto, California;
Attorneys for Defendants Cary G. Vance and Christopher P. Lowe.

HARTFORD FIRE: Court Certifies Merit-Only Class of Analysts
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Orlando Division, granted in part and denied in part
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned
KAREN ANDREAS-MOSES; ELIZABETH WAGNER; JACQUELINE WRIGHT; MIKAELA
DELPHA; STEPHANIE WEST; JOSEPH J. WOJCIK; TINA PALMER; and AMY
COOK, Plaintiffs, v. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant,
Case No. 6:17-cv-2019-Orl-37KRS (M.D. Fla.).

The Plaintiffs are eight individuals currently or formerly employed
by Defendant Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford) as Analysts
processing disability claims. They claim that Hartford
misclassified them as exempt from overtime and failed to provide
them accurate wage statements in violation of New York Labor Law
(NYLL).

The Plaintiffs propose this class:

     All employees of Defendant who, from November 18, 2010 through
the present (Class Period), worked for Defendant in New York,
processed disability claims, were classified as exempt from
overtime under [NYLL], were paid a salary, worked more than forty
(40) hours in a single work week, and were not paid overtime at a
rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for any
and all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a single work
week, and who did not receive accurate wage statements (Class).

Those 116 individuals are employees from three departments within
Hartford's Group Benefits Claims Field Operations (GBC) business
group: (1) Long-Term Disability (LTD); (2) Short-Term Disability
(STD); and (3) Continuing Annual Review (CAR).

Numerosity

Here, the Plaintiffs rely on their declarations and a phone list of
Hartford employees to show that their proposed class has at least
sixty-eight members. That numerosity is met here is confirmed by
Hartford's records, identifying 116 individuals who could be part
of Plaintiffs' proposed class. Breaking this number down, the clear
majority stem from the LTD department 108 to be exact. Numerosity
exists here.

Commonality

Here, the common question of law for the proposed class is whether
Hartford properly classified these employees as exempt. With this
and without Hartford's dispute the Court finds that commonality is
met.

Typicality

The Plaintiffs claim typicality is met because the named
plaintiffs, who would serve as class representatives, bring the
same legal claim as all class members. Be that as it may,
evaluating that legal claim whether Hartford properly classified
these employees as exempt requires information about an employee's
job duties and responsibilities.

As it stands, the named plaintiffs only worked in the LTD
department during the class period yet the class definition
encompasses employees from both the STD and CAR departments.
The Plaintiffs' assertion, on this record, the Court is not
convinced that a sufficient nexus exists between the named
plaintiffs in the LTD department and the proposed class's inclusion
of STD and CAR Analysts. With its judicial scissors, therefore, the
Court will trim STD and CAR Analysts from the class.

This cut's not too deep though; as the Court finds that the
Plaintiffs meet typicality for the LTD Analysts.

Adequacy

The Court has taken care of two of these concerns: by clipping the
class of STD and CAR employees and granting Hartford's motion to
dismiss based on arbitration Furthermore, the Court addressed the
discrepancy between the declarations and deposition testimony at
the Hearing and finds that this issue does not defeat adequacy.
Rather, the named plaintiffs seek to commonly adjudicate whether
they were properly classified as exempt and recover wages
accordingly. Thus, adequacy is met here.

So the Court finds that Plaintiffs have established the Rule 23(a)
elements for a class of LTD Analysts.

Predominance

The Court simply cannot accept the Plaintiffs' Counsel's statement
that using logger data, phone records, and email stamps is an
appropriate method of proving class-wide damages for the 108 LTD
Analysts here. The issue could have been mitigated had Counsel
presented information about how a representative sample could be
chosen here, in a scientifically sound and un-biased manner to
assure the Court this option was possible. But the Court did not
get even an inkling from Plaintiffs to that effect. The Court thus
cannot certify Plaintiffs' damages issue for class-wide
determination.

That said, the Plaintiffs' Counsel proposed bifurcating the merits
from damages should the Court find that individual inquiries
predominate in the damages context. For this, the Court weighs the
issues surrounding damages against the benefits of resolving the
merits on a class-wide basis. In that vein, the Court finds that
determining whether the LTD Analysts post-Segmentation were
properly classified as exempt is well-achieved through class
certification, and it is time this issue was settled. Indeed, the
Court is not too keen on engaging yet another round of Did Hartford
properly classify its Analysts?, since it would clearly crop up
again. Enough judicial resources have been spent. Thus the Court is
satisfied that the common merits question predominates over the
individualized damages inquiry, and bifurcating these two issues
does not preclude certification of an issue class on the merits.

Superiority

Hartford then attacks manageability, an element of superiority, in
a last-ditch effort to defeat certification. This argument largely
regurgitates Hartford's previous concerns about: (1) how the
administrative exemption will be proved; (2) employees subject to
arbitration; and (3) determining overtime hours. But with the
Court's refashioned class definition and bifurcation of the class
issue from damages, these concerns should be allayed. And if need
be, the Court can revisit class certification as this action
progresses, as certification of a class is always provisional in
nature until the final resolution of the case.

Indeed, the power of the district court to alter or amend class
certification orders at any time prior to a decision on the merits
`is critical, because the scope and contour of a class may change
radically as discovery progresses and more information is gathered
about the nature of the putative class members' claims. As it
stands, the Court finds that litigating the exemption issue as a
class does not pose management concerns.

With this, the Rule 23(b)(3) factors favor class certification for
determining the merits of the Plaintiffs' claims. The Court will
exercise its discretion under Rule 23(c)(4) to certify a
merits-only class and bifurcate damages from the merits.

Class Definition

Having found that the merits of the Plaintiffs' claims justify
class certification, the Court certifies the following
liability-only class for the Plaintiffs' overtime and wage
statements claims:

     All employees of Defendant who, from November 12, 2012 through
the present, work and/or worked for Defendant in New York as LTD
Analysts, were classified as exempt from overtime under the New
York Labor Law, were paid a salary, worked more than forty (40)
hours in a single work week, and were not paid overtime at a rate
of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for any and all
hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a single work week,
and who did not receive accurate wage statements.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 18, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ya3jseds from Leagle.com.

Karen Andreas-Moses, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Elizabeth Wagner, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Jacqueline Wright, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Mikaela Delpha, on behalf of
himself/herself and all others similarly situated, Stephanie West,
on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Joseph J.
Wojcik, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Tina Palmer, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
& Amy Cook, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Brian J. LaClair --
bjlaclair@bklawyers.com -- Blitman & King, LLP, pro hac vice, David
Victor Barszcz -- dbarszcz@lblaw.attorney -- Lytle & Barszcz, Mary
E. Lytle -- mlytle@lblaw.attorney -- Lytle & Barszcz & Robert N.
Sutton, III.

Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Hillary
J. Massey -- hmassey@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, pro hac
vice, Jesse Ian Unruh -- Jesse.Unruh@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson
Lewis, PC, Molly C. Mooney -- mmooney@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth
Shaw, LLP, pro hac vice, Patrick J. Bannon -- pbannon@seyfarth.com
-- Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, pro hac vice, Robert T. Szyba --
rszyba@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, Tasos C. Paindiris --
Tasos.Paindiris@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis, PC & Thomas G.
Rohback -- trohback@axinn.com -- Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider, LLP,
pro hac vice.

HARVARD RISK: LC Technology Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
-------------------------------------------------------
LC Technology International, Inc., individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Harvard Risk Management
Corporation and Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc. dba LegalShield, Case
No. 8:18-cv-01759 (M.D. Fla., July 18, 2018), is brought against
the Defendants for violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.

The Plaintiff is a Florida corporation headquartered in Clearwater,
Florida.

The Defendants LegalShield and Harvard Risk are engaged in a
pyramid sales scheme to sell legal services and identity theft
prevention products under the LegalShield and IDShield brands.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
      KAUFMAN P.A.
      400 NW 26th Street
      Miami, FL 33127
      Tel: (305) 469-5881
      E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com

          - and -

      Stefan Coleman, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF STEFAN COLEMAN, P.A.
      201 S. Biscayne Blvd., 28th Flr.
      Miami, FL 33131
      Tel: (887) 333-9427
      Fax: (888) 498-8946
      E-mail: law@stefancoleman.com

HISTORIC OLD: Monaco Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
------------------------------------------------
Gabrielle Monaco, on behalf of herself and other similarly situated
individuals v. The Historic Old Bermuda Inn, Inc. and John Vincent
Scalia, Sr., Case No. 1:18-cv-04101 (E.D. N.Y., July 18, 2018), is
brought against the Defendants for violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was employed as a banquet server for the Old Bermuda
Inn beginning in April 2018. The Plaintiff generally works two to
four events a week.

The Defendant, The Old Bermuda Inn is a banquet hall located in
Staten Island, New York. It hosts and serves food and beverages at
weddings, birthday parties, school and corporate events, and other
types of occasions.  

The Individual Defendant, John Vincent Scalia, Sr. owns and
operates Old Bermuda Inn. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jason L. Solotaroff, Esq.
      GISKAN SOLOTAROFF & ANDERSON LLP
      217 Centre Street, 6th Floor
      New York, NY 10013
      Tel: (212) 847-8315

HORIZONTAL WELL: Court Narrows Claims in W. Glover's ADA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the case captioned EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff, and WILBERT GLOVER, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Intervenor, v. HORIZONTAL WELL
DRILLERS, LLC, Defendant, Case No. CIV-17-879-R (W.D. Okla.).

The EEOC brought eight claims under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act, Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, and the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1991,
after which former employee Wilbert Glover intervened with two
related individual claims and three class action claims.

Glover brings Claims 1 and 2 individually and Claims 3 through 5 as
a class action under Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of himself and
the other 3,288 job applicants during the relevant period who
allegedly applied to HWD with the unlawful application and were
subjected to unlawful pre-offer workers' compensation searches.

A complaint may also be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dismissal is
proper if, viewing the well-pleaded factual allegations in the
complaint as true and in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, the complaint does not contain 'enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.

Exhaustion

The Defendant argues that Glover cannot meet his burden of proving
jurisdiction because he has not cited a Tenth Circuit case
establishing exhaustion of class remedies by a private employee
whose charge did not expressly seek class-based relief. That
argument ignores the baseline exhaustion standard. The Tenth
Circuit has consistently held that the test credits the scope of
the administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to
follow the charge. Glover shows that not only do Claims 3-5 arise
from an expected investigation of his charge of discrimination but
HWD repeatedly received notice of the class-based nature of the
investigation before the EEOC's determination.

In other words, Glover complied with the letter of the exhaustion
standard and its purpose, to protect employers by giving them
notice of the discrimination claims being brought against them.
Defendant argues for an exception to the rule, Gulley v. Orr, 905
F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1990), raises the burden to prove exhaustion
but the Court reads Tenth Circuit precedent as limiting that
exception to federal employees. Thus, Glover's exhaustion showing
remains intact.

Time Bar

The Court moves next to the Defendant's arguments for dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6). The Defendant raises a limitations defense to
the EEOC's Claims 1 and 2 in order to bar recovery from EEOC class
members who allege ADA failures to hire before June 5, 2012 and
from members who allege ADEA failures to hire before February 7,
2014.

ADA Limitation

The Court finds and the Defendant does not appear to dispute that
the EEOC alleges a plausible pattern-or-practice claim for failure
to hire under the ADA. Further, the Tenth Circuit's cases provide
for a continuing pattern-or-practice claim, and the EEOC alleges a
plausible continuing violation. Accordingly, the EEOC can use the
continuing violation exception to Section 706's timely filing rule
to recover on behalf of disabled individuals aggrieved by HWD's
alleged pattern or practice of failure to hire since at least
January 2012.  If at a later stage the EEOC cannot meet its burden
to prove a continuing violation, Defendant may raise this issue
again.

ADEA Limitation

The Defendant also asserts the same Section 706 timely filing
argument to challenge the EEOC's Claim 1 under the ADEA. Since at
least January 2012, HWD allegedly subjected applicants, including
Kurt Branch and James Cargal, to a pattern or practice of
discriminatory failure to hire based on age. THe Defendant received
notice of the EEOC's Claim 1 not from Glover's charge, but from a
charge by the EEOC's St. Louis Office on December 4, 2014, alleging
ADEA-improper hiring practices. Three hundred days prior was
February 7, 2014. Thus, the Defendant seeks to bar class members
allegedly discriminated against between January 2012 and February
2014.

Quasi-Estoppel and Waiver

The Defendant next seeks to bar the EEOC's ADA- and GINA-based
claims, Claims 2-5, that the EEOC allegedly resolved at
conciliation following former HWD employee Sedric Stewart's charge
of discrimination with the EEOC's Pittsburgh Office.

The Court defers consideration of these arguments for dismissal
because consideration of the Pittsburgh conciliation agreement
would require converting Defendant's 12(b)(6) motion to one for
summary judgment. Defendant may file a preliminary motion for
partial summary judgment addressing this issue without sacrificing
its ability to file an additional summary judgment motion after
discovery.

Redundancy

The Defendant argues that Glover's Claims 3-5 are redundant. Glover
concedes that his Claim 5 is duplicative of the EEOC's Claim 3. It
goes without saying that the courts can and should preclude double
recovery by an individual. Accordingly, the Court dismisses
Glover's Claim 5.
As for Glover's Claims 3 and 4, the Defendant fails to address the
apparent dissimilarities between those claims and the EEOC's
claims. Glover's Claims 3 and 4 concern the HWD employment
application's prohibited inquiries into medical information,
medical history, and family medical history under the ADA and GINA.
By contrast, the EEOC's only claim concerning a prohibited inquiry
targets HWD's post-application workers' compensation searches,
which is separate actionable conduct.

Delay

The Court cannot consider the Defendant's delay argument against
Glover's Claims 3-5 regarding the amount of time that passed
between the EEOC Charge and the alleged notice" because it is not
sufficiently briefed and it would likely require 12(b)(6)
consideration of documents outside the complaint that are not (1)
referred to in the complaint (2) central to Plaintiff's claim, and
(3) indisputably authentic.

Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Claims 1-5 of
Plaintiff EEOC's Amended Complaint is denied, and the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss Class Action Claims 3-5 of Plaintiff-Intervenor
Glover's Complaint is granted in part with respect to Glover's
Claim 5 and denied in part with respect to Glover's Claims 3 and
4.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 18, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yceakg38 from Leagle.com.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff, represented by
Emily A. Keatley -- emily.keatley@eeoc.gov -- Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission & Patrick J. Holman --
Patrick.holman@eeoc.gov -- Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.

Wilbert Glover, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan E.
Shook , Shook & Johnson PLLC.

Horizontal Well Drillers LLC, Defendant, represented by Denelda L.
Richardson , Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable, Jo Anne Deaton
, Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable,John H. Tucker , Rhodes
Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable & Michael P. Robertson , Rhodes
Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable.

HUB GROUP: Defendants Seek Supreme Court Review of Adame Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants in the "Adame" class suit has sought the California
Supreme Court's review of their denied request to dismiss the case,
according to Hub Group, Inc.'s Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 3, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On August 5, 2015, the Plaintiffs' law firm in the Robles case
filed a lawsuit in state court in San Bernardino County, California
on behalf of 63 named Plaintiffs against Hub Group Trucking and
five Company employees.  That case is entitled Adame, et al. v Hub
Group, Inc., et al.  The lawsuit alleges claims similar to those
being made in Robles and seeks monetary penalties under the Private
Attorneys General Act.  Of the 63 named Plaintiffs, at least 58 of
them previously accepted the settlement offers in the Robles case.

On October 29, 2015, Defendants filed a notice of removal to move
the case from state court in San Bernardino to federal court in the
Central District of California.  On November 19, 2015, Plaintiffs
filed a motion to remand the case back to state court, claiming
that the federal court lacks jurisdiction over the case because
there is not complete diversity of citizenship between the parties
and the amount in controversy threshold is not satisfied.  The
court granted Plaintiffs' motion to remand to the state court in
San Bernardino County on April 7, 2016.

On July 11, 2016, Defendants filed dismissal papers in state court,
asking the court to dismiss Plaintiffs' suit for various reasons,
including that the agreement between HGT and its former California
owner operators requires that this action be brought in Memphis,
Tennessee, or stay the action pending the outcome of Robles.
Defendants also asked the court to dismiss the individual
defendants because PAGA's language does not allow for individual
liability.  During a hearing on October 5, 2016, the judge issued
an oral tentative ruling stating that the choice of forum provision
was unenforceable.

On February 17, 2017, with the stipulation of the parties, the
Court entered an order dismissing, without prejudice, all of the
individual Defendants and accepting the parties' agreement that
jurisdiction and venue are proper in the San Bernardino Superior
Court and that Defendants will not seek to remove the case to
federal district court.  On April 12, 2017, the Court denied
Defendant's motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of the PAGA
letter notice.

On October 19, 2017, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint,
dismissing the previously named individuals as Defendants.  On
December 4, 2017, Defendants filed an Answer to Plaintiffs' First
Amended Complaint and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings arguing that
judgment should be entered for Defendants because Plaintiffs'
claims are preempted by the Federal Truth-In-Leasing regulations.

On January 31, 2018, a hearing was held on the motion to dismiss,
and on February 1, 2018, the motion was denied.  On March 27, 2018,
Defendants filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the Court of
Appeals.  On June 12, 2018, the Court of Appeals denied the
petition.  On June 21, 2018, Defendants filed a petition for review
with the California Supreme Court.

There is no timetable for when the Supreme Court will decide if it
will review the petition.

Hub Group, Inc. is a Delaware corporation that was incorporated on
March 8, 1995. The company is one of North America's leading
asset-light freight transportation management companies. The
company offers comprehensive intermodal, truck brokerage and
logistics services.


HYUNDAI MOTOR: Damico Sues over Defective 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe
---------------------------------------------------------------
ANDRE DAMICO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, Defendants, Case No.
8:18-cv-01276-CJC-ADS (C.D. Cal., July 20, 2018) is an action
against the Defendant for designing, manufacturing, distributing,
marketing, and selling a defective 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe vehicle.

According to the complaint, the 2017 Hyundai Santa Fe contains one
or more defects that cause significantly delayed acceleration, loss
of power, or rough shifting. Numerous vehicle owners have reported
a significant delay in the vehicle's response while attempting to
accelerate from a stop or while cruising situations that require
the ability to accelerate rapidly. Others have reported jerking,
lurching, and engine revving associated with the delayed
acceleration.

Hyundai Motor America manufactures and retails automobiles. The
Company offers compacts, sedans, hybrids, crossovers, passenger
cars, spare parts, tools, and equipments, including maintenance,
repair, and auto finance. Hyundai Motor America serves customers
throughout the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark S. Greenstone, Esq.
          GREENSTONE LAW APC
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9156
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
          E-mail: mgreenstone@greenstonelaw.com

               - and -

          Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
          Marc L. Godino, Esq.
          Danielle L. Manning, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
          E-mail: info@glancylaw.com


INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: Appeal in NY ERISA Class Suit Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------------------
International Business Machines Corporation said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July
31, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the
plaintiffs in the putative class action suit commenced in the
United States District Court for the Southern District made an
appeal to the court's order granting the motion to dismiss to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the appeal is pending.

In May 2015, a putative class action was commenced in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York related
to the company's October 2014 announcement that it was divesting
its global commercial semiconductor technology business, alleging
violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA").

Management's Retirement Plans Committee and three current or former
IBM executives are named as defendants. On September 29, 2017, the
Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the first amended
complaint. Plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals and the matter remains pending.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

International Business Machines Corporation operates as an
integrated technology and services company worldwide. International
Business Machines Corporation was founded in 1911 and is
headquartered in Armonk, New York.

JM ROMICH: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss C. Wallace's FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of New
York denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
CRANDALL WALLACE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. J.M. ROMICH ENTERPRISES, INC.,
d/b/a Everdry Waterproofing of Upstate New York and all other
entities affiliated with, controlling, or controlled by J.M. Romich
Enterprises, Inc., Defendant, No. 17-CV-6424 CJS(W.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiff brought this action against his former employer to
recover unpaid overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) as well as unpaid minimum wages, overtime compensation,
and spread-of-hours compensation under the New York Labor Law
(NYLL).
The Defendant contends that this Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's spread-of-hours claim, because
that claim is moot. A complaint must be dismissed under Rule
12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate' the case.

The Defendant asserts that the NYLL spread-of-hours claim is moot,
because the Defendant has unconditionally tendered to the Plaintiff
all of the monetary relief that the Plaintiff could obtain on that
claim through this action.  However, Second Circuit case law does
not permit a defendant to unilaterally moot a plaintiff's claim in
this manner. In Tanasi v. New Alliance Bank, 786 F.3d 195 (2d Cir.
2015), a defendant in a proposed class action made a Rule 68
settlement offer to the individual plaintiff, who rejected the
offer.

The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that even though the
plaintiff had rejected the settlement offer, the action was moot,
because the offer was for an amount greater than the statutory
damages to which the plaintiff would have been entitled if
successful. The district court agreed that the plaintiff's claim
was moot and dismissed the action, but on appeal the Second Circuit
held that the district court maintained Article III subject-matter
jurisdiction over the case, because an unaccepted Rule 68 offer
alone does not render a plaintiff's individual claims moot before
the entry of judgment against the defendants.

On this point, the Circuit Court further stated: "It remains the
established law of this Circuit that a rejected settlement offer
under Rule 68, by itself, cannot render moot a case. If the parties
agree that a judgment should be entered against the defendant, then
the district court should enter such a judgment. Then, after
judgment is entered, the plaintiff's individual claims will become
moot for purposes of Article III. Absent such agreement, however,
the district court should not enter judgment against the defendant
if it does not provide complete relief. Because the district court
had not yet entered judgment against the defendant when it reached
its decision on the motion to dismiss, the court maintained Article
III subject matter jurisdiction."

In sum, the law in this circuit is that a defendant's tender of
complete relief to a plaintiff, by itself, does not moot a
plaintiff's individual claim and deprive the court of subject
matter jurisdiction if the plaintiff rejects the tender; however,
even where a plaintiff rejects a defendant's tender of complete
relief, if the defendant obtains leave to pay the complete relief
into court, and then, at the defendant's request, judgment is
entered in the plaintiff's favor, the claim becomes moot.

In the instant case, after the Plaintiff rejected the Defendant's
tender of payment, the Defendant did not request leave to pay
Plaintiff's complete monetary relief into Court, and did not
request entry of default judgment in the Plaintiff's favor on the
spread-of-hours claim. Rather, the Defendant merely requested this
Court to dismiss that claim, based upon its unaccepted tender of
complete relief. The request must therefore be denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 18, 2018 Decision and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ya2skpge from
Leagle.com.

Crandall Wallace, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Elizabeth Linda Koo &
Peter O'Brian Dellinger.

J.M. Romich Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Everdry Waterproofing of
Upstate New York and all other entities affiliated with,
controlling, or controlled by J.M. Romich Enterprises, Inc.,
Defendant, represented by Katherine S. McClung -- kmcclung@bsk.com
-- Bond Schoeneck & King PLLC.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Ct. Narrows Claims in Hypoallergenic Label Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, granted in part and denied in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned AUSTIN RUGG,
JENNIFER FISH, and KAREN SANCHEZ, individually and on behalf of a
class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. JOHNSON &
JOHNSON, Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-05010-BLF (N.D. Cal.).

J&J has filed a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint
(FAC), seeking dismissal of the pleading as a whole under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.

Plaintiffs Austin Rugg, Jennifer Fish, and Karen Sanchez are
consumers who allege that they were misled by the term
hypoallergenic on labels of baby products manufactured by Defendant
Johnson & Johnson (J&J). The Plaintiffs seek to pursue nationwide
class claims under California's consumer protection laws and
similar statutes and under New Jersey's consumer protection laws.

RULE 12(b)(6) - FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

J&J seeks dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on numerous grounds,
including that: Plaintiffs' claims depend on a definition of
hypoallergenic which is unreasonable as a matter of law; the claims
fail to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b); Plaintiffs cannot pursue claims based
on a lack-of-substantiation theory; the claims are pre-empted in
several respects; and Plaintiff Rugg's claims have been released.

The Plaintiffs argue in opposition to J&J's motion that the
dictionary definitions of hypoallergenic are not substantively
different from the Plaintiffs' definition. That argument is without
merit, as the definition set forth in the FAC appears to be wholly
unrelated to the concept of allergic reaction, which is at the
heart of the dictionary definitions of hypoallergenic. The
Plaintiffs argue that a skin sensitizer is by definition a chemical
known to cause an allergic response, citing Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) regulations in support of their
position.

Because the FAC does not cite to the OSHA regulations upon which
the Plaintiffs rely, the Court cannot consider those regulations in
determining the sufficiency of the Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs
may, of course, incorporate the OSHA regulations into an amended
pleading. The Court is dubious, however, that such incorporation
would advance the Plaintiffs' position, as the ordinary consumer of
J&J baby products likely has not even heard of OSHA.

Because the reasonable consumer inquiry is an objective standard,
claims may be dismissed as a matter of law where an alleged
statement in context, is such that no reasonable consumer could be
misled in the manner claimed by the plaintiff. Applying this
standard, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' claims for violation
of consumer protection statutes (Claims 3-7), and for unjust
enrichment (Claim 2) based on such violation, are subject to
dismissal.

Even absent application of the reasonable consumer test, the Court
concludes that the claim for breach of express warranty is subject
to dismissal because it depends on Plaintiff's implausible
definition of hypoallergenic. To prevail on a breach of express
warranty claim, Plaintiffs must prove: (1) the seller's statements
constitute an affirmation of fact or promise or a description of
the goods; (2) the statement was part of the basis of the bargain;
and (3) the warranty was breached.

The Plaintiffs allege that J&J warrantied that its products were
hypoallergenic and breached those warranties by providing goods
that were not hypoallergenic. However, for the reasons discussed
above, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts showing that the
products in question are not hypoallergenic under a plausible
definition of that term.

The motion to dismiss is granted with leave to amend as to all
claims based on the Plaintiffs' implausible definition of the term
hypoallergenic.

Rule 9(b)

Rule 9(b) does apply to the remainder of the Plaintiffs' claims
(Claims 2-7), however, because those claims are grounded in fraud.
The Court has no difficulty concluding that Plaintiffs' fraud-based
claims fail to satisfy Rule 9(b). The FAC identifies thirty-two
products which allegedly were mislabeled as hypoallergenic despite
containing ingredients which do or might cause negative effects,
and it identifies seventy-nine such ingredients.

However, the FAC does not specify which of the thirty-two products
contain which of the seventy-nine ingredients. In opposition to the
motion, Plaintiffs argue that they have attached to the FAC images
of labels and ingredient lists corresponding to the products at
issue. The Court declines to page through those images in an
attempt to determine the substance of Plaintiffs' claims.  

The motion to dismiss is granted with leave to amend as to Claims
2-7 for failure to satisfy Rule 9(b).

RULE 12(b)(1) - LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

The Court agrees with J&J that Plaintiffs have not made the
requisite showing of substantial similarity to establish standing
with respect to the unpurchased products in this case. Plaintiffs
do allege that all of the products bear the same mislabeling, that
is, the word hypoallergenic. However, the thirty-two products
identified in the FAC are not all of the same kind, as they include
body wash, baby powder, lotion, cream, shampoo, conditioner, and
detangler.  

Moreover, the Plaintiffs have not alleged which products contain
which of the seventy-nine allegedly harmful ingredients identified
in the FAC. Plaintiffs thus have not provided enough information
about the products in question to show that they are substantially
similar.  
It is unclear whether the Plaintiffs assert false advertising or
other fraud-based claims based on advertisements or websites. To
the extent that they do assert such claims, the Plaintiffs have
failed to allege that they viewed and relied on such advertisements
or websites.  

RULE 12(b)(2) - LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Finally, J&J argues that Plaintiff Sanchez's claims must be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction
because the claims have no connection with California. J&J relies
on the Supreme Court's holding in Bristol-Myers Squibb that in
order for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a claim,
there must be an affiliation between the forum and the underlying
controversy, principally, an activity or an occurrence that takes
place in the forum State.

At the hearing, the Court acknowledged the importance of the
Bristol-Meyers Squibb issue in this case, but it expressed
reluctance to address Bristol-Meyers Squibb at this time because
the parties had devoted the bulk of their briefing to other issues.
The Court stated that it would deny this aspect of J&J's motion
without prejudice to renewal and consideration on adequate
briefing.

The motion to dismiss is denied without prejudice as to the issue
of lack of personal jurisdiction under Bristol-Meyers Squibb.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 18, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybtbaxnv from Leagle.com

Austin Rugg, Plaintiff, represented by David A. Searles --
dsearles@consumerlawfirm.com -- Francis & Mailman, pro hac vice,
James A. Francis -- jfrancis@consumerlawfirm.com -- Francis and
Mailman, P.C., pro hac vice, Stephanie R. Tatar --
stephanie@thetatarlawfirm.com -- Tatar Law Firm, APC & Yvette Y.
Golan -- ygolan@tgfirm.com -- The Golan Firm, pro hac vice.

Jennifer Fish & Karen Sanchez, Plaintiffs, represented by James A.
Francis , Francis and Mailman, P.C.

Johnson & Johnson, Defendant, represented by Kathrina Szymborski --
kszymborski@pbwt.com -- Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP, pro hac
vice, Joshua A. Kipnees - jkipnees@pbwt.com -- Patterson Belknap
Webb & Tyler LLP, pro hac vice, Travis J. Tu -- tjtu@pbwt.com --
Patterson Belknap Webb and Tyler LLP, pro hac vice & Mark A.
Neubauer --
mneubauer@carltonfields.com -- Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, LLP.

KAHALA HOLDINGS: Court Approves $75K Class Settlement in FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted Parties' Joint Application to Approve the Parties'
Settlement in the case captioned ANAYELI GUZMAN, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. KAHALA HOLDINGS, LLC, et al., Defendants, No. 15
Civ. 9625 (HBP)(S.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiffs brought this action under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) and the New York Labor Law (NYLL), alleging that they
routinely worked between 45 and 65 hours per week throughout their
employment, but that the defendants never provided them with
overtime premium pay. The Plaintiffs also claim, among other
things, that the defendants failed to maintain certain payroll
records and failed to provide certain notices as required by the
NYLL. The Plaintiffs allege that they are entitled to a total of
$81,145.63 in unpaid overtime wages.

Of this amount, Guzman claims that he is owed $31,665.00, and Reyes
claims that he is owed $49,480.63. Using these damages figures,
Guzman's pro rata share of the total damages claimed is
approximately 39% and Guzman's is approximately 61%.

The parties' counsel resubmitted their settlement agreement for
approval, claiming to have cured the defects identified in the
previous proposed agreements Under the proposed agreement, the
defendants agree to pay the plaintiffs $75,000.00 in full and final
satisfaction of the plaintiffs' claims. Of that amount, the
plaintiffs' counsel will receive $25,000.00 for attorney's fees.
The amount of alleged unpaid overtime wages claimed by each
plaintiff, and the net amount that will be received by each after
deduction of legal fees are as follows:

The proposed settlement agreement allocates $25,000.00, or
one-third, of the total settlement amount to plaintiffs' counsel as
fees. Attorney's fees of one-third in FLSA cases are routinely
approved in this Circuit.

The Court approves the settlement in this matter.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 18, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7blzdfu from
Leagle.com.

Anayeli Guzman, individually, Anayeli Guzman, on behalf of others
similarly situated, Hector Reyes, individually & Hector Reyes, on
behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Colin James Mulholland , Michael Faillace & Associates, P.C.,
Gerrald Ellis , Michael Faillace & Associates, P.C., Johanna
Sanchez -- johanna.sanchez@rivkin.com -- Rivkin Radler LLP, Joshua
S. Androphy , Michael Faillace & Associates, P.C. & Michael Antonio
Faillace , Michael Faillace & Associates, P.C.

Kahala Holdings, LLC, Kahala Restaurants LLC, Kahala Franchising
LLC, Kahala Restaurant Holdings LLC, Kahala Franchise Corp. &
Kahala Brands Ltd., Defendants, represented by Arthur L. Pressman ,
Nixon Peabody LLP, Craig R. Tractenberg , Nixon Peabody LLP,
Kathleen M. Balderston , Nixon Peabody LLP & Leslie Hartford ,
Nixon Peabody LLP.

New Age Food Concepts, Inc, doing business as Ranch 1, Vinod Kumar
Chand & Samy El Fouly, also known as Mohamed E. Hussein, also known
as Mohamed Samy Hussein, Defendants, represented by Andrew Joseph
Spinnell, Sr. , Law Offices of Andrew J. Spinnell, LLC.

Kahala Holdings, LLC, Kahala Franchise Corp., Kahala Franchising
LLC, Kahala Restaurant Holdings LLC, Kahala Brands Ltd. & Kahala
Restaurants LLC, Cross Claimants, represented by Craig R.
Tractenberg , Nixon Peabody LLP.

Vinod Kumar Chand, New Age Food Concepts, Inc & Samy El Fouly,
Cross Defendants, represented by Andrew Joseph Spinnell, Sr. , Law
Offices of Andrew J. Spinnell, LLC.

KENNETH LASSITER: Seelig Seeks to Certify Case as Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned Paul Seelig, the Plaintiff, v. Kenneth
Lassiter, et al., the Defendants, Case No. 5:18-ct-03206-D
(E.D.N.C.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order certifying
his case as a class action.

Mr. Seelig said, "The size of the class will exceed 90 inmates at
Green Correctional Institution, and with exceed 3000 inmates in the
North Carolina Department of Public Safety State Wide."

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


KNORR-BREMSE AG: Faces John Brand Suit over No-Poach Agreements
---------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN BRAND, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. KNORR-BREMSE AG; KNORR BRAKE COMPANY LLC;
NEW YORK AIR BRAKE LLC; BENDIX COMMERCIAL VEHICLE SYSTEMS LLC;
WESTINGHOUSE AIR BRAKE; TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; FAIVELEY
TRANSPORT S.A.; FAIVELEY TRANSPORT NORTH AMERICA, INC.; RAILROAD
CONTROLS, L.P.; WABTEC RAILWAY ELECTRONICS, INC.; XORAIL, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-02240-ELH (D. Md., July 23, 2018) is
an action against the Defendants, seeking to obtain injunctive
relief and recover damages, including treble damages, costs of
suit, and reasonable attorneys' fees arising from the Defendants'
violations of the Sherman Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants -- without the knowledge
and consent of their employees -- beginning in at least 2009,
entered into express agreements to eliminate or reduce competition
amongst them for skilled labor.  The intended and actual effect of
the no-poach conspiracy is to suppress employee compensation and
impose unlawful restrictions on employee mobility.  The no-poach
agreements were an effective means of reducing competition for
employees and contractors and suppressing employee and contractor
pay below competitive levels.

Knorr-Bremse Aktiengesellschaft develops, produces, markets, and
services braking systems for rail and commercial vehicles. The
Company provides entrance, windscreen wiper, driver assistance, and
power supply systems, as well as platform screen doors and
torsional vibration dampers. Knorr-Bremse serves customers
worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jennifer Duncan Hackett, Esq.
          James R. Martin, Esq.
          Miriam R. Vishio, Esq.
          ZELLE LLP
          1775 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 375
          Washington, D.C. 20006
          Telephone: (202) 899-4100
          E-mail: jhackett@zelle.com
                  jmartin@zelle.com
                  mvishio@zelle.com

               - and -

          Christopher T. Micheletti, Esq.
          Judith A. Zahid, Esq.
          Qianwei Fu, Esq.
          Heather T. Ranki, Esq.
          ZELLE LLP
          44 Montgomery Street, Suite 3400
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 693-0700
          E-mail: cmicheletti@zelle.com
                  jzahid@zelle.com
                  qfu@zelle.com
                  hrankie@zelle.com


KNORR-BREMSE AG: Lara Suit Alleges Sherman Act Violations
---------------------------------------------------------
Brian Lara and Timothy Bacco, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Knorr-Bremse AG, Knorr Brake Company,
New York Air Brake Corporation, Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies
Corporation, and Faiveley Transport North America Inc., Case No.
2:05-mc-02025 (W.D. Pa., July 18, 2018), seeks damages against the
Defendants for violations of Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act.

This class action challenges the unlawful agreements between three
of the world's largest rail equipment suppliers to restrain
competition in the labor market wherein they compete for employees.
Specifically, during the Class Period, the Defendants Knorr-Bremse
AG and Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation and Faiveley
Transport S.A., prior to its acquisition by Wabtec in November
2016, and certain of their subsidiaries, collectively agreed not to
solicit, recruit, or hire each other's employees without prior
approval, or otherwise compete for employees (collectively, the
"No-Poach Agreements" or the "No-Poach Conspiracy").

The Plaintiff Brian Lara is an adult resident of Verona,
Pennsylvania.  He worked for Wabtec from November 2011 to January
2017 as a skilled machinist machining component parts for the
assembly of various valve systems.

The Plaintiff Timothy Bacco is an adult resident of Ligonier,
Pennsylvania.  He worked for Wabtec from July 2000 to May 2018 in
the assembly department and as a skilled machinist making
locomotive brake cylinder parts.

The Defendant Knorr-Bremse AG is a privately-owned German company
with its headquarters in Munich, Germany. Knorr is a global leader
in the development, manufacture, and sale of equipment for rail and
commercial vehicle systems.  

The Defendant Knorr Brake Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Knorr incorporated in Delaware with its headquarters in
Westminster, Maryland. It manufactures train control, HVAC,
braking, and door systems used on passenger rail vehicles.  

The Defendant New York Air Brake Corporation is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Knorr incorporated in Delaware with its headquarters
in Watertown, New York. It manufactures railway air brakes and
other rail equipment used on freight trains.  

The Defendant Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation is a
Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Wilmerding,
Pennsylvania. Wabtec is a publicly held company, listed on the New
York Stock Exchange. With over 100 subsidiaries globally, Wabtec is
the world’s largest provider of rail equipment and services.

The Defendant Faiveley Transport North America, formerly a
subsidiary of Faiveley Transport S.A., is now a wholly owned
subsidiary of Wabtec, and is a New York corporation headquartered
in Greenville, South Carolina.  [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Joel R. Hurt, Esq.
      Ruairi McDonnell, Esq.
      FEINSTEIN DOYLE PAYNE & KRAVEC, LLC
      429 Fourth Avenue
      Law & Finance Building, Suite 1300
      Pittsburgh, PA 15219
      Tel: (412) 281-8400
      Fax: (412) 281-1007
      E-mail: jhurt@fdpklaw.com
              rmcdonnell@fdpklaw.com

          - and -

      M. Stephen Dampier, Esq.
      THE DAMPIER LAW FIRM P.C.
      55 N. Section Street
      Fairhope, AL 36532
      Tel: (251) 929-0900
      Fax: (251) 929-0800
      E-mail: stevedampier@dampierlaw.com

KOHL'S DEPARTMENT: Summary Ruling Against W. Chowning Affirmed
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed the
District Court's judgment granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment in the case captioned WENDY CHOWNING, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. KOHL'S DEPARTMENT STORES, INC.; KOHL'S CORPORATION; DOES, 1-20,
inclusive, Defendants-Appellees, No. 16-56272 (9th Cir.).

Wendy Chowning appeals the district court's grant of summary
judgment to Kohl's Department Stores, Inc. and Kohl's Corporation
(Kohl's) in her putative class action regarding alleged advertising
misrepresentations.

The proper calculation of restitution in this case is price paid
versus value received. Under California law, where a plaintiff
obtains value from the product, the proper measure of restitution
is the difference between what the plaintiff paid and the value of
what the plaintiff received.

Here, Chowning admits that she received value. Therefore, the
appropriate calculation for restitution is the price Chowning paid
for the articles versus the value of the articles she received.

Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate
time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.

Here, Chowning failed to meet her burden to prove she was entitled
to restitution. First, Chowning's expert testified that he was not
expressing an opinion on retail value.  Second, Chowning introduced
no competent evidence regarding the value of articles of clothing
of similar style, quality, etc. Restitution requires that the value
of what the plaintiff received was more than what the plaintiff
paid. Without evidence of the value received, that calculation is
impossible.

Therefore, Kohl's is entitled to summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's June 18, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8dombbq from Leagle.com.

KY MEDS: Nashville Pharma Suit Alleges Junk Fax Act Breach
----------------------------------------------------------
Nashville Pharmacy Services, LLC, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. KY Meds Inc., and John Does 1-10, Case
No. 3:18-cv-00667 (M.D. Tenn., July 18, 2018), is brought against
the Defendants for violation of the Junk Fax Prevention Act.

The lawsuit challenges KY Meds' practice of sending unsolicited
facsimiles.

The Plaintiff, Nashville Pharmacy Services, LLC, is a Tennessee
limited liability company. Plaintiff owns and operates pharmacies
in Tennessee, where it maintains telephone facsimile equipment.   

The Defendant KY Meds Inc. is a Kentucky corporation with its
principal place of business at 11381 Decimal Dr, Louisville,
Kentucky 40299.  [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Charles Barrett, Esq.
      Benjamin C. Aaron, Esq.
      NEAL & HARWELL, PLC
      1201 Demonbreun Street, Suite 1000
      Nashville, TN 37203
      Tel: (615) 244-1713
      Fax: (615) 726-0573
      E-mail: cbarrett@nealharwell.com
              baaron@nealharwell.com

LIBERY MUTUAL: Court Awards $345K Atty's Fees in Class Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Eastern Division, granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case captioned Lynn
Metrow, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Liberty Mutual Managed Care LLC, et
al., Defendants, Case No. EDCV 16-1133 JGB (KKx)(C.D. Cal.).

The Court awards Class Counsel attorneys' fees in the amount of
$345,081.50.  The Court also awards Class Counsel costs in the
amount of $37,806.32.  The Court awards a total of $40,000 to the
Named Plaintiffs, each to receive $10,000.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 14, 2018 Judgment is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y96kakb7 from Leagle.com.

Lynn Metrow, individuals, on behalf of thermselves, and on behalf
of all persons similarly situated & Linda Mastin, individuals, on
behalf of thermselves, and on behalf of all persons similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Aarin A. Zeif --
aarin@wageandhourlaw.com -- Gould and Associates, Aparajit Bhowmik
, Blumenthal Nordrehaug and Bhowmik LLP, Kyle R. Nordrehaug ,
Blumenthal Nordrehaug and Bhowmik, Michael A. Gould --
michael@wageandhourlaw.com -- Gould and Associates, Norman B.
Blumenthal , Blumenthal Nordrehaug and Bhowmik LLP & Victoria Bree
Rivapalacio , Blumenthal Nordrehaug and Bhowmik LLP.

Shanan Wali, individually, and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated, Consol Plaintiff, represented by
Aarin A. Zeif , Gould and Associates, Michael A. Gould , Gould and
Associates, Kyle R. Nordrehaug , Blumenthal Nordrehaug and Bhowmik
& Norman B. Blumenthal , Blumenthal Nordrehaug and Bhowmik LLP.

Liberty Mutual Managed Care LLC, a Limited Liability Company,
Defendant, represented by David R. Carpenter --
DRCARPENTER@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, Douglas Roger Hart --
DHART@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, Abigail Woodruff --
AWOODRUFF@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, Katherine Ann Roberts --
KATE.ROBERTS@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP & Sheryl K. Horwitz --
SHORWITZ@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP.

Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Consol Defendant, represented by
Douglas Roger Hart , Sidley Austin LLP, Abigail Woodruff , Sidley
Austin LLP & Sheryl K. Horwitz , Sidley Austin LLP.

LIONBRIDGE TECH: Union Seeks to Certify Stockholders Class
----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned LABORERS' LOCAL No. 231 PENSION FUND,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the
Plaintiff, v. RORY J. COWAN, et al., the Defendants, Case No.
1:17-cv-00478-MAK (D. Del.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all holders of Lionbridge Technologies, Inc. common
      stock on the record date, January 27, 2017, who were
      harmed by defendants' violations of section 14(a) and
      section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
      in connection with the merger of Lionbridge and
      HIG1 as alleged in the litigation."

      Excluded from the Class are defendants, the officers and
       directors of the Company at all relevant times, members of
      their immediate families and their legal representatives,
      heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which
      defendants have or had a controlling interest.

   2. appointing Class Representative and the appointing Robbins
      Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP as Class Counsel.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Peter B. Andrews, Esq.
          Craig J. Springer, Esq.
          David M. Sborz, Esq.
          ANDREWS & SPRINGER LLC
          3801 Kennett Pike Building C, Suite 305
          Wilmington, DE 19807
          Telephone: (302) 504 4957
          Facsimile: (302) 397 2681
          E-mail: pandrews@andrewsspringer.com
                  cspringer@andrewsspringer.com
                  dsborz@andrewsspringer.com

               - and -

          Randall J. Baron, Esq.
          David T. Wissbroecker, Esq.
          Christopher H. Lyons, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 231 1058
          Facsimile: (619) 231 7423
          414 Union Street, Suite 900
          Nashville, TN 37219
          Telephone: (615) 244 2203
          Facsimile: (615) 252 3798

               - and -

          Patrick J. O'Hara, Esq.
          CAVANAGH & O'HARA
          2319 West Jefferson Street
          Springfield, IL 62702
          Telephone: (217) 544 1771
          Facsimile: (217) 544 9894


MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Vazquez Bid for Class Certification Okayed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned ALINA VAZQUEZ, individually and on behalf
of all others similar situated, the Plaintiff, v. MARRIOTT
INTERNATIONAL, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 8:17-cv-00116-MSS-SPF
(M.D. Fla.), the Hon. Judge Mary S. Soriven entered an order August
7, 2018, granting Plaintiff's motion to certify a class consisting
of:

   "all participants are beneficiaries in the Defendant's Health
   Plan who: (1) were sent a COBRA notice by Defendant, during
   the applicable four-year statute of limitations period as a
   result of a qualifying event, as determined by Defendant, and
   (2) did not elect continuation coverage".

The Court said, "The focus of the superiority analysis is on 'the
relative advantages of a class action suit over whatever other
forms of litigation might be realistically available to the
plaintiffs.'" Palm Beach Golf Ctr., 311 F.R.D. at 699 (quoting Klay
v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1269 (11th Cir. 2004)). In
analyzing this requirement, courts often look at the size of the
class, the similarity of the claims, and the size of the potential
recovery for individual class members. See id. at 699 ("Given the
large number of purported members in this suit and the similarity
of their claims, disposition by class action is an efficient use of
judicial resources. Moreover, the relatively small potential
recovery in individual actions and reduced likelihood that
plaintiffs will bring suit also weighs in favor of class
resolution.") More than 15,000 potential class members received the
allegedly deficient COBRA Notice. If Plaintiff prevails, it is
likely that each individual class member would be entitled to
damages under the law. For many class members, the claims will be
small in relation to the costs and expenses of litigating the
claims, making it unlikely that the claims would be pursued
individually. Consequently, the Court finds that the class
mechanism is superior."


MASSACHUSETTS FINANCIAL: Court Narrows Claims in ERISA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
granted in part and denied in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned MELISSA VELAZQUEZ, individually and as
representative of a class of similarly situated persons, and on
behalf of the Massachusetts Financial Services Company Defined
Contribution Plan and the Massachusetts Financial Services Company
MFSavings Retirement Plan v. MASSACHUSETTS FINANCIAL SERVICES
COMPANY, d/b/a MFS Investment Management, MASSACHUSETTS FINANCIAL
SERVICES COMPANY RETIREMENT COMMITTEE, MASSACHUSETTS FINANCIAL
SERVICES COMPANY RETIREMENT INVESTMENT COMMITTEE, MFS SERVICE
CENTER, INC., and JOHN DOES 1-30, Civil Action No. 17-11249-RWZ (D.
Mass.).

The Plaintiff in this purported class action challenges the
management of two retirement plans, with allegations that
Defendants Massachusetts Financial Services Company d/b/a MFS
Investment Management, the Massachusetts Financial Services Company
Retirement Committee, the Massachusetts Financial Services Company
Retirement Investment Committee, MFS Service Center, Inc., and John
Does 1-30 have violated the Employee Retirement Income Securities
Act (ERISA).

Standing

The Defendants argue that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring
claims on behalf of a plan in which she was never enrolled and for
the period after which she closed her account.

Statute of Limitations

The limitations period for all claims arising under ERISA is six
years after the date of the last action or omission constituting a
part of the breach or violation, or three years after the earliest
date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or
violation.  
The Defendants argue that the three-year statute bars plaintiff's
claims because all material facts, including fee schedules and
performance for proprietary funds, were provided to participants in
required Plan disclosures.

Because the defendants have not shown it is clear from the face of
the complaint that plaintiff had actual knowledge of fees for the
comparable alternative funds more than three years before she filed
the instant action, it is not time-barred.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Failure to Monitor (Counts I and II)

It is certainly true that nothing in ERISA requires every fiduciary
to scour the market to find and offer the cheapest possible fund. A
claim of breach is sufficiently made out, however, when a plaintiff
plausibly alleges that the higher fees were unjustified or
otherwise improper.  

Here, the plaintiff alleges not only that defendants collected
excessive fees for high-cost proprietary funds, but also that they
failed to shed those funds in favor of cheaper similar alternatives
because to do so would have cost them their profits. This
sufficiently states a claim for breach of fiduciary duties.  The
Defendants' motion to dismiss is accordingly denied as to Count I.

Count II alleges that the defendants failed to adequately monitor
the Plans' managers and that they are liable for the breaches of
their co-fiduciaries pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 1109(a). A claim
for failure to monitor is derivative of the underlying breach.
Because the Court finds plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded Count I,
Count II also survives.

Prohibited Transactions (Counts III and IV)

In Counts III and IV, the plaintiff alleges that the investment of
Plan assets in affiliated mutual funds constitutes prohibited
transactions in violation of 29 U.S.C. Section 1106. Section 1106
supplements the fiduciary's general duty of loyalty to the plan's
beneficiaries by categorically barring certain transactions deemed
likely to injure the pension plan.

At least at this stage, that requirement is satisfied by the
plaintiff's allegation that the defendants failed to offer Plan
participants the separate account options and less expensive share
classes available to other investors, indicating that the
exemption's fourth condition is not met.

The Defendants' motion is thus denied as to Count III.

In Count IV, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants' mutual fund
fees violate 29 U.S.C. Sections 1106(a)(1)(D), 1106(b)(1), which
prohibit self-interested transactions involving plan assets. The
Defendants maintain that claim must fail where such fees are paid
out of fund, rather than Plan, assets. Though procedurally
distinguishable, Brotherston relied on binding precedent to reject
a very similar plan asset argument as a matter of law. Because I
agree that the plaintiff's broad construction of Plan assets is
foreclosed in the First Circuit, the defendants' motion is allowed
as to Count IV.

Equitable Relief (Count V)

The Plaintiff's final count seeks equitable relief under 29 U.S.C.
Section 1132(a)(3) in the defendants' non-fiduciary capacity. Such
relief is available only where clearly traceable to particular
funds or property in the defendant's possession. Specifically, the
plaintiff seeks to recover all assets of the Plans transferred to
any of the MFS entities. This request is insufficiently limited to
the profits on particular property held by the defendants.  
Disgorgement is similarly unavailable where section 1132(a)(3)
requires a showing that the non-fiduciaries had actual or
constructive knowledge of the circumstances that rendered the
transaction unlawful. The Plaintiff has not pleaded such scienter
here.

The Defendants' motion is allowed as to Count V.

The Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied as to Counts I, II, and
III, and allowed as to Counts IV and V.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/y9xfa6bx from Leagle.com.

Melissa Velazquez, individually and as representative of a class of
similarly situated persons, and on behalf of the Massachusetts
Financial Services Company Defined Contribution Plan and the
Massachusetts Financial Services Company MFSavings Retirement Plan,
Plaintiff, represented by Carl F. Engstrom -- cengstrom@nka.com --
Nicholas Kaster PLLP, pro hac vice, Kai H. Richter --
krichter@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster PLLP, pro hac vice, Mark E.
Thomson -- mthomson@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP, pro hac vice &
Jason M. Leviton -- jason@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP.

Massachusetts Financial Services Company, doing business as MFS
Investment Management, Massachusetts Financial Services Company
Retirement Committee, Massachusetts Financial Services Company
Retirement Investment Committee & MFS Service Center, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Matthew L. Riffee , Godwin Procter LLP,
pro hac vice, Michael K. Isenman -- misenman@goodwinlaw.com --
Goodwin Procter LLP, pro hac vice, Alison V. Douglas --
adouglass@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin Procter, LLP, James O. Fleckner
-- jfleckner@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin Procter, LLP & Katherine G.
McKenney -- kmckenney@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin Procter, LLP.

MDL 2048: Klodzinski vs. Purdue over Opiate Drugs Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Klodzinski, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff v. Purdue Pharma L.P.; Purdue
Pharma Inc.; Purdue Frederick Company, Inc.; Insys Therapeutics
Inc.; Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.; Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc.; Cephalon Inc.; Johnson & Johnson; Janssen
Pharmaceuticals Inc.; Endo Health Solutions Inc.; Endo
Pharmaceuticals Inc.; Actavis plc; Actavis Inc.; Watson
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Watson Laboratories Inc.; McKesson
Corporation; and AmerisourceBergen Corporation, the Defendants,
Case No. 1:18-cv-03927, was transferred from the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York, to the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio (Cleveland) on Aug. 9,
2018. The Ohio Northern District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:18-op-45938-DAP to the proceeding.

The Klodzinski case is being consolidated with MDL 2804 in re:
NATIONAL PRESCRIPTION OPIATE LITIGATION. The MDL was created by
Order of the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation on December 5, 2017. These cases concern the alleged
improper marketing of and inappropriate distribution of various
prescription opiate medications into cities, states and towns
across the country. Responding plaintiffs' positions on
centralization vary considerably. Plaintiffs in over 40 actions or
potential tag-along actions support centralization. Plaintiffs in
15 actions or potential tag-along actions oppose centralization
altogether or oppose transfer of their action.

In addition to opposing transfer, the State of West Virginia
suggests that the Panel delay transferring its case until the
Southern District of West Virginia court decides its motion to
remand to state court. Third party payor plaintiffs in an Eastern
District of Pennsylvania potential tag-along action (Philadelphia
Teachers Health and Welfare Fund) oppose centralization of third
party payor actions. Western District of Washington plaintiff City
of Everett opposes centralization and, alternatively, requests
exclusion of its case. Northern District of Illinois tag-along
Plaintiff City of Chicago asks the Panel to defer transfer of its
action until document discovery is completed. Presiding Judge in
the MDL is Sarah S. Vance, United States District Judge. The lead
case is 1:17-md-02804-DAP.[BN]

Attorneys for Michael Klodzinski individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated:

          Michael H. Park, Esq.
          CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PARK PLLC
          3 Columbus Circle, 15th Floor
          New York, NY 10024
          Telephone: (646) 456 4432
          E-mail: park@consovoymccarthy.com

Attorneys for Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. and Cephalon Inc.; and
Watson Laboratories Inc.:

          Stacey Anne Mahoney, Esq.
          MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS
          101 Park Avenue
          New York, NY 10178
          Telephone: (212) 309 6000
          Facsimile: (212) 309 6001
          E-mail: stacey.mahoney@morganlewis.com

Attorneys for Johnson & Johnson and Janssen Pharmaceuticals Inc.:

          Daniel Jonathan Franklin, Esq.
          O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
          7 Times Square
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 326 4310
          Facsimile: (212) 326 2061
          E-mail: dfranklin@omm.com

Attorneys for Cardinal Health Inc.:

          James Matthew Wicks, Esq.
          Kevin P. Mulry, Esq.
          FARRELL FRITZ, P.C. (LIS)
          1320 Reckson Plaza
          Uniondale, NY 11556
          Telephone: (516) 227 0700
          Facsimile: (516) 227 0777
          E-mail: jwicks@farrellfritz.com
                  kmulry@farrellfritz.com


MDL 2516: Court Grants Final Approval of $54MM Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
issued an Order granting Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal
Approving Indirect Purchaser Class Settlement and Dismissing
Indirect Purchaser Class Claims Against Boehringer and Teva in the
case captioned IN RE AGGRENOX ANTITRUST LITIGATION. THIS DOCUMENT
RELATES TO: ALL INDIRECT PURCHASER ACTIONS, No. 3:14 MD 2516
(SRU)(D. Conn.).

The Court certified a class for purposes of settlement (Indirect
Purchaser Class):

     All persons or entities in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
Arizona, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin, who, in one of the listed states, indirectly purchased,
paid and/or provided reimbursement for some or all of the purchase
price for branded or generic Aggrenox, for consumption by
themselves, their families, or their members, employees, insureds,
participants, or beneficiaries, other than for resale, from
November 30, 2009 through December 22, 2017.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court approves the Settlement in the amount of $50,229,193.00, and
finds that the Settlement is, in all respects, fair, reasonable and
adequate to Indirect Purchaser Class members. The Court approves
the amount deposited by the Defendants into the Settlement Fund.
The final net amount of the Settlement is $50,229,193.00, which is
the Settlement Fund Amount of $54,000,000.00 minus the agreed-upon
drawdown amount. Accordingly, the Settlement will be consummated in
accordance with the terms and provisions of the Settlement
Agreement.

Class Counsel for the Indirect Purchaser Class have moved for an
award of attorneys' fees, reimbursement of expenses and incentive
awards for the class representatives. Class Counsel request an
award of attorneys' fees of 33-1/3% of the Settlement (including
the interest accrued thereon), reimbursement of the reasonable
costs and expenses incurred in the prosecution of this action in
the amount of $439,514.59, and incentive awards totaling $160,000
collectively for the 16 named plaintiffs, and such motion has been
on the docket and otherwise publicly available since April 13,
2018.

Upon consideration of Class Counsel's petition for fees, costs and
expenses, Class Counsel are hereby awarded attorneys' fees totaling
$16,743,064.00 (representing 33 1/3% of the Settlement Fund) and
costs and expenses totaling $439,514.59, together with a
proportionate share of the interest thereon from the date the funds
are deposited in the Settlement Escrow Account until payment of
such attorneys' fees, costs and expenses, at the rate earned by the
Settlement Fund, to be paid solely from the Settlement Fund and Set
Aside Fund and only if and after the Settlement becomes final in
accordance with the Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Order is
available at   https://tinyurl.com/yapvrkus from Leagle.com.

Aggrenox Antitrust Litigation, Plaintiff, represented by Brian P.
Daniels -- bpdaniels@bswlaw.com -- Brenner, Saltzman & Wallman LLP
& David R. Schaefer -- dschaefer@bswlaw.com -- Brenner, Saltzman &
Wallman.

A.F. of L. - A.G.C. Buildings Trade Welfare Plan, on behalf of
itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Mathew P. Jasinski -- mjasinski@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice LLC,
Michael M. Buchman -- mbuchman@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice
LLC-NY, Renae D. Steiner , Heins Mills & Olson, PLC, pro hac vice &
William H. Narwold -- bnarwold@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice LLC.

Barr Pharmaceuticals Inc, a Delaware corporation, Duramed
Pharmaceuticals Inc, a Delaware corporation, Barr Lab Inc, a
Delaware corporation, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., a Delaware
corporation & Duramed Pharmaceuticals Sales Corp., a Delaware
corporation, Defendants, represented by Brigid M. Carpenter --
bcarpenter@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker, Donelson, Berman, Caldwell &
Berkowitz, P.C., Peter J. Carney -- pcarney@whitecase.com -- White
& Case, pro hac vice, Robert D. Carroll -- rcarroll@goodwinlaw.com
-- Goodwin Procter, LLP, pro hac vice, Sarah K. Frederick --
sfrederick@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin Procter, LLP, pro hac vice,
Christopher T. Holding -- cholding@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin
Procter LLP, James T. Shearin -- jtshearin@pullcom.com -- Pullman &
Comley & Timothy G. Ronan -- tronan@pullcom.com -- Pullman & Comley
LLC.

MDL 2672: Show Cause Order on Injunction Entered
------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN "CLEAN DIESEL" MARKETING, SALES
PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. This Order Relates
To: Dkt. No. 5068, MDL No. 2672 CRB (JSC) (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Charles R. Breyer of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California ordered Maria Luisa Maciel's counsel to show
cause, if any, for why the injunction should not be entered.

Pursuant to the Court-approved 2.0-liter class action settlement
agreement, all persons who owned or leased an eligible Volkswagen
vehicle as of Sept. 18, 2015, and who did not opt out of the
settlement agreement, agreed to release all claims, whether known
or unknown, against Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. ("VWGoA") and
any Volkswagen Dealers arising from or in any way related to the
2.0-liter TDI Matter.  In the order approving the 2.0-liter
settlement agreement, the Court enjoined class members from
commencing or pursing released claims in any judicial proceeding.

On June 4, 2018, VWGoA filed a motion to enforce the 2.0-liter
settlement release against Maria Luisa Maciel.  VWGoA asserts that
Ms. Maciel is a member of the 2.0-liter settlement class, and that
in breach of the release she is pursuing a claim related to the
2.0-liter TDI Matter against VWGoA and Ancira Volkswagen of Laredo,
a Volkswagen Dealer, in Texas state court.  It requests that the
Court enjoins Ms. Maciel from continuing to prosecute her state
court suit.  The Counsel for Ms. Maciel has not filed an opposition
to VWGoA's motion and the deadline for filing one has now passed.

The Court has reviewed VWGoA's filing, which includes a copy of Ms.
Maciel's state court complaint and copies of certain emails between
her counsel and the counsel for VWGoA.  It has also reviewed the
list of 2.0-liter settlement opt-outs.  Ms. Maciel is not shown as
an opt-out on that list, and from the allegations in her state
court complaint it appears that she is a 2.0-liter settlement class
member and that she is pursuing a released claim against VWGoA and
Ancira Volkswagen of Laredo.

Based on the record, the Court is inclined to grant the motion and
to invoke its authority under the All Writs Act to enjoin Ms.
Maciel from continuing to prosecute her state court suit against
VWGoA and Ancira Volkswagen of Laredo.  Before doing so, Judge
Breyer ordered Ms. Maciel's counsel to show cause, if any, for why
the injunction should not be entered.  VWGoA will serve the Order
on Ms. Maciel's counsel and file proof of service with the Court.
Ms. Maciel's counsel will have 14 days after the date of service to
answer in a filing before the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/9xbJ8K from Leagle.com.

Nicholas Benipayo, Plaintiff, represented by Robert B. Carey --
rob@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice,
Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas Eric Loeser --
toml@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice.

David Fiol, Plaintiff, represented by William M. Audet, Audet &
Partners, LLP, Jeff D. Friedman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
Peter B. Fredman -- peter@peterfredmanlaw.com -- Law Office of
Peter Fredman, Robert B. Carey, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
pro hac vice, Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
pro hac vice & Thomas Eric Loeser, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
LLP, pro hac vice.

Nadine Bonda, Plaintiff, represented by Adam M. Stewart --
astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP & Thomas G.
Shapiro -- tshapiro@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Brian Connelly, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas G. Shapiro.

Nicholas Allen, Plaintiff, represented by Caleb Marker --
caleb.marker@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed LLP, pro hac vice &
Charles S. Zimmerman -- charles.zimmerman@zimmreed.com --
Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, pro hac vice.

Brett Alters, Plaintiff, represented by Elizabeth J. Cabraser,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, David S. Stellings,
Lieff Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein, Kevin R. Budner, Lieff,
Cabraser, Heimann and Bernstein, LLP, Nicholas Diamand, Lieff
Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein LLP, Phong-Chau Gia Nguyen, Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Tana Lin --
tlin@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback LLP & Todd A. Walburg,
Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann, Bernstein.

Donald Ardine, Plaintiff, represented by Amy Williams-Derry --
awilliams-derry@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback L.L.P.,
Dean Noburu Kawamoto -- dkawamoto@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller
Rohrback LLP, Derek William Loeser -- dloeser@kellerrohrback.com
-- Keller Rohrback, LLP, Gretchen Freeman Cappio --
gcappio@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback, LLP, pro hac vice,
Lynn L. Sarko -- lsarko@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback
L.L.P., pro hac vice & Tana Lin, Keller Rohrback LLP.

Annie Argento, Plaintiff, represented by Amy Williams-Derry,
Keller Rohrback L.L.P., Dean Noburu Kawamoto, Keller Rohrback
LLP, Derek William Loeser, Keller Rohrback, LLP, Gretchen Freeman
Cappio, Keller Rohrback, LLP, pro hac vice, Lynn L. Sarko, Keller
Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice & Tana Lin, Keller Rohrback LLP.

Arkansas State Highway Employees Retirement System, Plaintiff,
represented by Jai K. Chandrasekhar -- jai@blbglaw.com --
Bernstein Litowitz Berger Grossmann LLP, pro hac vice, James A.
Harrod -- jim.harrod@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger
Grossmann LLP, Matthew I. Henzi -- mhenzi@swappc.com -- Sullivan,
War, Niki L. Mendoza, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP,
Ross M. Shikowitz -- ross@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz
Berger Grossmann LLP, pro hac vice & Susan Rebbeca Podolsky, The
Law Offices of Susan R. Podolsky.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., Defendant, represented by Amie
Adelia Vague -- avague@lightfootlaw.com -- Lightfoot Franklin &
White, Casey Erin Lucier -- clucier@mcguirewoods.com --
McGuireWoods LLP, Charles J. Baker, III -- cbaker@wcsr.com --
Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Colin Hampton Tucker --
chtucker@rhodesokla.com -- Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker &
Gable, Dana Woodrum Lang -- wlang@wcsr.com -- Womble Carlyle
Sandridge and Rice, David M. Eisenberg, Baker, Sterchi, Cowden &
Rice, LLC, Elizabeth L. Deeley -- elizabeth.deeley@kirkland.com -
- Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Henry Buist Smythe, Jr., Womble Carlyle
Sandridge and Rice, Howard Feller, McGuireWoods LLP, Hugh J.
Bode, Reminger & Reminger Co LPA, J. Randolph Bibb, Jr., Lewis,
Thomason, King, Krieg & Waldrop, P.C., James K. Toohey, Johns &
Bell LTD, Jeffrey L. Chase, Chase Kurshan Herzfeld & Rufin LLC,
Jeffrey S. Rugg, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, Jennifer
Marino Thibodaux, Gibbons PC, John W. Cowden, Baker, Sterchi,
Cowden & Ric, LLC-KCMO, John W. Cowden, Baker Sterchi Cowden and
Rice LLC, John L. Hone, Lipshultz and Hone Chtd, John H. Tucker,
Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable, Kerry R. Lewis, Rhodes
Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable, Kurt E. Lindquist, II, Womble
Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, Larry Martin Roth, Rumberger,
Kirk & Caldwell, PA, Michael D. Begey, Rumberger, Kirk &
Caldwell, PA, Michael R. McDonald, Gibbons PC, Natalie Marie
Lefkowitz, Chase Kurshan Herzfeld & Rubin LLC, Ronald G. DeWald,
Lipshultz and Hone Chtd, Russ Ferguson, Womble Carlyle Sandridge
& Rice LLP, Ryan Nelson Clark, Lewis, Thomason, King, Krieg &
Waldrop, P.C., Sara Anne Ford, Lightfoot Ffanklin & White LLC,
Seth Abram Schaeffer, McGuireWoods LLP, Thomas R. Valen, Gibbons
PC, William L. Boesch, Sugarman Rogers Barshak & Cohen, Adam K.
Bult, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Allison Rachel McLaughlin,
Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell LLP, Andrew Brian Clubok, Kirkland &
Ellis, pro hac vice, Andrew R. Levin, Sugarman Rogers Barshak &
Cohen, PC, Andrew R. Levin, Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen,
P.C., Anne Katherine Guillory, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, April L.
Watson, Sessions, Fishman & Nathan, Benjamin K. Reitz, Brownstein
Hyatt Farber Schreck, Blake Adam Gansborg, Wheeler Trigg
O'Donnell, LLP, Brett R. Leland, Verrill Dana LLP, Brian C.
Langs, Johnson & Bell LTD, C. Vernon Hartline, Jr., Hartline
Dacus Barger Dreyer LLP, pro hac vice, Carine M. Williams,
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice, Caroline M. Tinsley, BAKER
AND STERCHI, LLC, Charles William McIntyre, Jr., McGuireWoods
LLP, Charles Pendleton Mitchell, Rumberger Kirk & Caldwell,
Christine Kingston, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP,
Christopher Edward Tribe, McGuireWoods LLP Gateway Plaza, Dan R.
Larsen, Dorsey and Whitney LLP, Darrell L. Barger, Hartline Dacus
Barger Dreyer LLP, David L. Ayers, Watkins and Eager PLLC, David
A. Barry, Esq., Sugarman Rogers Barshak & Cohen, David N. May,
Bradshaw Fowler Proctor & Fairgrove, David M.J. Rein, Sullivan &
Cromwell LLP, David T. Schaefer, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Edward W.
Hearn, JOHNSON & BELL, PC, Elena Lalli Coronado, Sullivan and
Cromwell, Elizabeth Righton Johnson, Balch & Bingham LLP, Emily
Anne Ellis, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Shreck, Eric R. Burris,
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Erin Patricia Mead, Thorn,
Gershon, Tymann & Bonanni, LLP, Gail Ponder Gaines, Barber Law
Firm PLLC, Garrett L. Boehm, Jr., Johnson & Bell LTD, Harlan I.
Prater, IV, Lightfoot, Franklin & White, Hugh Brown McNatt,
McNatt, Greene & Peterson, J. Gordon Cooney, Jr., Morgan Lewis &
Bockius LLP, James L. Hollis, Balch & Bingham, Jeffrey L. Chase,
Herzfeld & Rubin PC, Jimmy B. Wilkins, WATKINS & EAGER, Jo E.
Peifer, Lavin, O'Neil, Ricci, Cedrone & DiSipio, John David
Ayers, WATKINS & EAGER, PLLC, John D. Donovan, Jr., Ropes and
Gray LLP, John Alan Knox, Williams Kastner & Gibbs, John Garrett
McCarthy, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice, John Thomas
Prisbe, Venable LLP, Jonathan M. Hoffman, MB Law Group, LLP, Joy
Goldberg Braun, Sessions, Fishman, Nathan & Israel, Kenneth
Abrams, McGuire Woods LLP, Kevin P. Polansky, Nelson Mullins
Riley & Scarborough LLP, Laura Kabler Oswell, Sullivan & Cromwell
LLP, Mark A. Weissman, Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., pro hac vice, Mary
E. Bolkcom, Hanson Bolkcom Law Group, Ltd., Matthew A. Schwartz,
Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice, Melissa Fletcher
Allaman, Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, LLP, Meredith J.
McKee, Womble Carlyle Sandridge & RIice, PLLC, Meredith J. McKee,
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, Michael Thad Allen, Day Pitney
LLP-HTFD, Michael B. Gallub, Herzfeld and Rubin, pro hac vice,
Michael E. Hale, Barber Law Firm PLLC, Michael L. O'Donnell,
Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell, LLP, Michael H. Steinberg, Sullivan &
Cromwell, LLP, Michael A. Yoshida, MB Law Group, LLP, Mickey W.
Greene, Hanson Bolkcom Law Group, Ltd., Miranda Hanley, Smith
Welch Webb & White, LLC, Ningur Akoglu, Herzfeld & Rubin PC,
Patricia Rodriguez Britton, Nelson Mullins Riley Scarborough LLP,
Patrick Demetrios Grindlay, Paul T. Collins, Nelson Mullins Riley
& Scarborough LLP, pro hac vice, Paul E.D. Darsow, Hanson Bolkcom
Law Group, Ltd., Paul D. Williams, Day Pitney LLP-Htfd-CT,
Richard White Crews, Jr., Hartline Dacus Barger Dreyer LLP,
Righton Johnson, Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Sullivan and Cromwell
LLP, Ryan P. McCarthy, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Ryan A.
Morrison, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, S. Keith Hutto, Nelson Mullins
Riley & Scarborough, Sarah Motley Stone, Womble Carlyle Sandridge
& Rice, PLLC, Sharon L. Nelles, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, Sharon
L. Nelles, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice, Shawn P.
George, George & Lorensen, Stanley Abbott Roberts, McGuireWoods
LLP, Stephen D. Bell, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Steve S. Tervooren,
Hughes Gorski Seedorf Odsen & Tervooren LLC, Stuart A. Drake,
Kirkland and Ellis LLP, pro hac vice, Suhana S. Han, Sullivan and
Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice, Sverker K. Hogberg, Sullivan &
Cromwell LLP, Thomas R. Ferguson, III, Womble Carlyle Sandridge &
Rice, PLLC, Thomas W. Purcell, MB Law Group LLP, William B.
Monahan, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice & William Henry
Wagener, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice.

Audi AG, Defendant, represented by Elizabeth L. Deeley --
elizabeth.deeley@kirkland.com - Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Matthew
Henry Marmolejo -- mmarmolejo@mayerbrown.com -- Mayer Brown LLP,
Michael Howard Steinberg -- steinbergm@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan &
Cromwell, LLP, Andrew Brian Clubok - andrew.clubok@kirkland.com -
- Kirkland & Ellis, pro hac vice, Andrew R. Levin --
levin@sugarmanrogers.c0m -- Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen,
P.C., Brett R. Leland - bleland@verrilldana.com -- Verrill Dana
LLP, David Maxwell James Rein --  reind@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan
& Cromwell LLP, G. Stewart Webb, Jr. -- gswebb@Venable.com --
Venable LLP, Garrett L. Boehm, Jr. -- boehmg@jbltd.com -- Johnson
& Bell LTD, J. Gordon Cooney, Jr. --
gordon.cooney@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP,
James K. Toohey -- tooheyj@jbltd.com -- Johns & Bell LTD, John
Thomas Prisbe -- jtprisbe@venable.com -- Venable LLP, Laura
Kabler Oswell -- oswelll@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan & Cromwell LLP,
Robert J. Giuffra, Jr. -- giuffrar@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan and
Cromwell LLP, Ryan P. McCarthy -- ryan.mccarthy@morganlewis.com -
- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Sharon L. Nelles --
nelless@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, Sharon L.
Nelles, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Stephen D. Bell --
bell.steve@dorsey.com -- Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Stuart A. Drake --
stuart.drake@kirkland.com -- Kirkland and Ellis LLP, pro hac vice
& William B. Monahan -- monahanw@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan and
Cromwell LLP.

Volkswagen AG, Defendant, represented by Elizabeth L. Deeley,
Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Matthew H. Marmolejo, Mayer Brown LLP,
Michael H. Steinberg, Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP, Andrew Brian
Clubok, Kirkland & Ellis, pro hac vice, Andrew R. Levin,
Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen, P.C., Brett R. Leland, David
M.J. Rein, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, G. Stewart Webb, Jr., Venable
LLP, John D. Donovan, Jr., Ropes and Gray LLP, Laura Kabler
Oswell, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Sullivan
and Cromwell LLP, Sharon L. Nelles, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP,
Stuart A. Drake, Kirkland and Ellis LLP, pro hac vice & William
B. Monahan, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP.

Audi of America LLC, Defendant, represented by Matthew H.
Marmolejo, Mayer Brown LLP, Andrew R. Levin, Sugarman Rogers
Barshak & Cohen, PC, Andrew R. Levin, Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak &
Cohen, P.C., Brett R. Leland, C. Vernon Hartline, Jr., Hartline
Dacus Barger Dreyer LLP, pro hac vice, Cheryl A. Bush, Bush,
Seyferth & Paige, PLLC, David A. Barry, Esq., Sugarman Rogers
Barshak & Cohen, David M.J. Rein, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Laura
Kabler Oswell, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Michael R. Williams, Bush
Seyferth & Paige PLLC, Ritchie E. Berger, Esq., Dinse, Knapp &
McAndrew, P.C., Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Sullivan and Cromwell
LLP, Sharon L. Nelles, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Stephen D. Bell,
Dorsey & Whitney LLP, W. Scott O'Connell, Nixon Peabody LLP, pro
hac vice & William B. Monahan, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP.

Volkswagen Group of America, a New Jersey corporation, Defendant,
represented by P. Arley Harrel, Williams Kastner & Gibbs, PLLC,
Gerard Cedrone, Lavin, O'Neil Ricci Cedrone & DiSipio, Kenneth
Abrams, McGuire Woods LLP, Laura Kabler Oswell, Sullivan &
Cromwell LLP & William B. Monahan, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP.

Audi of America, Inc., Defendant, represented by Matthew H.
Marmolejo, Mayer Brown LLP, Carine M. Williams, Sullivan &
Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice, Cheryl A. Bush, Bush, Seyferth &
Paige, PLLC, Colin H. Tucker, Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker &
Gable, David M.J. Rein, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, pro hac vice,
John H. Tucker, Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable, Laura
Kabler Oswell, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Melissa Fletcher Allaman,
Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, LLP, Michael R. Williams,
Bush Seyferth & Paige PLLC, Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Sullivan and
Cromwell LLP & William B. Monahan, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP.

Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG, Defendant, represented by Abby L.
Parsons, King & Spalding LLP, Adam G. Sowatzka, King & Spalding
LLP, Alexander K. Haas, King & Spalding LLP, Andrew R. Levin,
Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen, P.C., Brett R. Leland, David
M. Fine, King, Spaulding Law Firm, G. Stewart Webb, Jr., Venable
LLP, Garrett L. Boehm, Jr., Johnson & Bell LTD, J. W. Codinha,
Nixon Peabody, LLP, James K. Toohey, Johns & Bell LTD, James K.
Vines, King & Spalding, John Thomas Prisbe, Venable LLP, Joseph
Eisert, King & Spalding LLP, Kenneth Yeatts Turnbull, King &
Spalding LLP, Matthew A. Goldberg, DLA Piper LLP, pro hac vice,
Matthew A. Holian, DLA Piper LLP, Nathan P. Heller, DLA Piper
LLP, Sheldon T. Bradshaw, KING & SPALDING, Sonya R. Braunschweig,
DLA Piper LLP, W. Scott O'Connell, Nixon Peabody LLP, pro hac
vice & William F. Kiniry, Jr., DLA Piper LLP, pro hac vice.

David Antellocy, Defendant, represented by Thomas Eric Loeser,
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice, Scott Moen,
Defendant, represented by Peter B. Fredman, Law Office of Peter
Fredman, Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro
hac vice & Thomas Eric Loeser, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
pro hac vice.

Porsche AG, Defendant, represented by Alexander K. Haas, King &
Spalding LLP, Christina Courtney Sheehan, Modrall Sperling Roehl
Harris & Sisk PA, Joseph Eisert, King & Spalding LLP, Laura
Kabler Oswell, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Matthew A. Goldberg, DLA
Piper LLP, Nathan P. Heller, DLA Piper LLP, Susan Miller Bisong,
Modrall Sperling Roehl Harris & Sisk PA & William F. Kiniry, Jr.,
DLA Piper LLP.

Robert Bosch GmbH, Defendant, represented by Matthew D. Slater,
Cleary Gottlieb Steen and Hamilton LLP, pro hac vice, Carmine D.
Boccuzzi, Jr., Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, pro hac vice
& David Lloyd Anderson, Sidley Austin LLP.

Bay Ridge Volvo-American, Inc, Defendant, represented by Natalie
Marie Lefkowitz, Chase Kurshan Herzfeld & Rubin LLC.

Audi USA, Defendant, represented by Laura Kabler Oswell, Sullivan
& Cromwell LLP.

MDL 2804: Chu vs. Purdue over Opiate Drugs Consolidated
-------------------------------------------------------
Jordan Chu, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. Purdue Pharma L.P.; Purdue Pharma Inc.;
Purdue Frederick Company; Insys Therapeutics Inc.; Teva
Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.; Cephalon Inc.; Johnson & Johnson
Janssen Pharmaceuticals Inc.; Endo Health Solutions Inc.; Actavis
plc; Actavis Inc.; Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Watson
Laboratories Inc.; McKesson Corporation; Cardinal Health Inc.;
AmerisourceBergen Corporation; Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.; and
Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc., the Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-02576,
was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio (Cleveland) on Aug. 9, 2018. The Ohio Northern
District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:18-op-45930-DAP to the
proceeding.

The Chu case is being consolidated with MDL 2804 in re: NATIONAL
PRESCRIPTION OPIATE LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on
December 5, 2017. These cases concern the alleged improper
marketing of and inappropriate distribution of various prescription
opiate medications into cities, states and towns across the
country. Responding plaintiffs' positions on centralization vary
considerably. Plaintiffs in over 40 actions or potential tag-along
actions support centralization. Plaintiffs in 15 actions or
potential tag-along actions oppose centralization altogether or
oppose transfer of their action.

In addition to opposing transfer, the State of West Virginia
suggests that the Panel delay transferring its case until the
Southern District of West Virginia court decides its motion to
remand to state court. Third party payor plaintiffs in an Eastern
District of Pennsylvania potential tag-along action (Philadelphia
Teachers Health and Welfare Fund) oppose centralization of third
party payor actions. Western District of Washington plaintiff City
of Everett opposes centralization and, alternatively, requests
exclusion of its case. Northern District of Illinois tag-along
Plaintiff City of Chicago asks the Panel to defer transfer of its
action until document discovery is completed. Presiding Judge in
the MDL is Sarah S. Vance, United States District Judge. The lead
case is 1:17-md-02804-DAP.[BN]

Attorneys for Jordan Chu, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated:

          Todd M. Logan, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          123 Townsend Street, Suite 100
          San Francisco, CA 94107
          Telephone: (415) 212 9300
          Facsimile: (415) 373 9435
          E-mail: tlogan@edelson.com

               - and -

          Bryan Kipp Weir, Esq.
          CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PARK PLLC
          3033 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 700
          Arlington, VA 22201
          Telephone: (703) 243 9423
          E-mail: bryan@consovoymccarthy.com

               - and -

          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON - SAN FRANCISCO
          123 Townsend Street, Ste. 100
          San Francisco, CA 94107
          Telephone: (415) 212-9300
          Facsimile: (415) 373 9435
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com

Attorneys for Purdue Pharma L.P.; Purdue Pharma Inc.; and Purdue
Frederick Company:

          Lily Anna North, Esq.
          Mark S. Cheffo, Esq.
          DECHERT, LLP
          One Bush Street, Suite 1600
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 262 4500
          Facsimile: (415) 262 4555
          E-mail: lily.north@dechert.com
                  mark.cheffo@dechert.com

               - and -

          Jae Hong Lee. Esq.
          QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN
          50 California Street, 22nd Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 875 6600
          Facsimile: (415) 875 6700
          E-mail: jaelee@quinnemanuel.com

Attorneys for Johnson & Johnson and Janssen Pharmaceuticals Inc.:

          Sabrina Heron Strong, Esq.
          O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
          400 South Hope Street, 18th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 430 6000
          E-mail: sstrong@omm.com

Attorneys for Cardinal Health Inc.:

          Teresa Carey Chow, Esq.
          BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP
          11601 Wilshire Boulevard, Ste. 1400
          Los Angeles, CA 90025-0509
          Telephone: (310) 820 8800
          Facsimile: (310) 820 8859


MDL 2804: Grace vs. Purdue over Opiate Drugs Consolidated
---------------------------------------------------------
Edward Grace individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. Purdue Pharma L.P.; Purdue Pharma Inc.;
Purdue Frederick Company; Insys Therapeutics Inc.; Teva
Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.; Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,
Cephalon Inc.; Johnson & Johnson; Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.;
Endo Health Solutions Inc.; Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc.; Actavis plc;
Actavis Inc.; Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Watson Laboratories
Inc.; McKesson Corporation; Cardinal Health Inc.; and
AmerisourceBergen Corporation, the Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-10857, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio (Cleveland) on Aug. 9, 2018. The Ohio
Northern District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 18-_____ to the
proceeding.

The Grace case is being consolidated with MDL 2804 in re: NATIONAL
PRESCRIPTION OPIATE LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on
December 5, 2017. These cases concern the alleged improper
marketing of and inappropriate distribution of various prescription
opiate medications into cities, states and towns across the
country. Responding plaintiffs' positions on centralization vary
considerably. Plaintiffs in over 40 actions or potential tag-along
actions support centralization. Plaintiffs in 15 actions or
potential tag-along actions oppose centralization altogether or
oppose transfer of their action.

In addition to opposing transfer, the State of West Virginia
suggests that the Panel delay transferring its case until the
Southern District of West Virginia court decides its motion to
remand to state court. Third party payor plaintiffs in an Eastern
District of Pennsylvania potential tag-along action (Philadelphia
Teachers Health and Welfare Fund) oppose centralization of third
party payor actions. Western District of Washington plaintiff City
of Everett opposes centralization and, alternatively, requests
exclusion of its case. Northern District of Illinois tag-along
Plaintiff City of Chicago asks the Panel to defer transfer of its
action until document discovery is completed. Presiding Judge in
the MDL is Sarah S. Vance, United States District Judge. The lead
case is 1:17-md-02804-DAP.[BN]

Attorneys for Edward Grace individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated:

          Ashley C. Keller, Esq.
          Seth A. Meyer, Esq.
          Travis Lenkner, Esq.
          KELLER LENKNER LLC
          150 North Riverside Plaza, Suite 2750
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 741 5220
          E-mail: ack@kellerlenkner.com
                  sam@kellerlenkner.com
                  tdl@kellerlenkner.com

               - and -

          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Eli J. Wade-Scott, Esq.
          EDELSON - CHICAGO
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 589 6370
          Facsimile: (312) 589 6378
          E-mail: brichman@edelson.com
                  ewadescott@edelson.com

               - and -

          Michael H. Park, Esq.
          Patrick Strawbridge, Esq.
          Thomas R. McCarthy, Esq.
          William S. Consovoy, Esq.
          CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PARK PLLC
          745 Fifth Avenue, Suite 500
          New York, NY 10151
          Telephone: (212) 267 8006
          E-mail: park@consovoymccarthy.com
                  patrick@consovoymccarthy.com
                  tom@consovoymccarthy.com
                  will@consovoymccarthy.com

               - and -

          Rafey S. Bzalabanian, Esq.
          Todd M. Logan, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          123 Townsend Street, Ste. 100
          San Francisco, CA 94107
          Telephone: (415) 212 9300
          Facsimile: (415) 373 9435
          E-mail: rbalabanian@edelson.com
                  tlogan@edelson.com

Attorneys for Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.; Cephalon Inc.; and
Watson Laboratories Inc.:

          Sarah Paige, Esq.
          MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          One Federal Street
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 341 7518
          E-mail: sarah.paige@morganlewis.com

Attorneys for Cardinal Health Inc.:

          Brendan P. Mitchell, Esq.
          Christopher D. Hawkins, Esq.
          DEVINE, MILLIMET & BRANCH, P.A.
          111 Amherst Street
          Manchester, NH 03101
          Telephone: (603) 669 1000
          Facsimile: (603) 669 8547
          E-mail: bmitchell@devinemillimet.com
                  chawkins@devinemillimet.com


MEDIMETRIKS PHARMA: Made Unsolicited Calls, Cooper Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------------
RUTH ANN COOPER, D.P.M, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MEDIMETRIKS PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-11987 (D.N.J., July 23, 2018) seeks to
stop the Defendant's practice of sending unsolicited facsimiles to
the Plaintiff without her express consent.

Medimetriks Pharmaceuticals, Inc. manufactures and markets
prescription and personal skincare therapies. The company offers
moisturizing cosmetic cleansers, dietary supplements, cosmetic
washes, creams, and hair and body cleansers; and topical
antibiotics, antifungal products, inflammatory acne treatment
products, gels, cleansing pads, topical suspension cleansers, and
topical steroids. It serves customers via online. The company was
founded in 2008 and is based in Fairfield, New Jersey. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew N. Fiorovanti, Esq.
          Michael J. Canning, Esq.
          GIORDANO, HALLERAN & CIESLA
          125 Half Mile Road, Suite 300
          Red Bank, NJ 07701-6777
          Telephone: (732)741-3900
          Facsimile: (732)224-6599
          E-mail: mcanning@ghclaw.com
                  mfiorovanti@ghclaw.com

               - and -

          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: (847)368-1500
          Facsimile: (847)368-1501
          E-mail: rkelly@andersonwanca.com

               - and -

          Matthew Stubbs, Esq.
          MONTGOMERY, RENNIE & JONSON
          36 E. Seventh Street, Suite 2100
          Cincinnati, OH 45202
          Telephone: (513) 241-4722
          Facsimile: (513) 241-8775
          E-mail: mstubbs@mrjlaw.com


MODERN USA: 911 Dry Solutions Suit Moved to Florida State Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
911 DRY SOLUTIONS INC ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED AS ASSIGNEE OF TAYLOR, PATRICIA, the PLAINTIFF, v. MODERN
USA INSURANCE COMPANY, the DEFENDANT, Case No. 18-005215-CI, was
moved to the Florida Circuit Court, Pinellas Cty. on Aug. 9, 2018.

As of June 1, 2018, Modern USA Insurance Company was acquired by
American Traditions Insurance Company. Modern USA Insurance Company
provides property and casualty insurance products. The company was
incorporated in 2007 and is based in Pinellas Park, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jose Pete Font, Esq.
          FONT & NELSON, LLC
          200 S Andrews Ave Ste 501
          Ft Lauderdale, FL 33301-2063
          E-mail: jfont@fontnelson.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Patrick Michael Chidnese, Esq.
          HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP
          100 N Tampa St Ste 4100
          Tampa, FL 33602-3642
          Telephone: (813) 227 6424
          Facsimile: (813) 229 0134
          E-mail: patrick.chidnese@hklaw.com


MONDELEZ INTERNATIONAL: Suit over Trading of Wheat Futures Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------
Mondelez International, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 26, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company
continues to defend a Wheat Manipulation related suit.

On April 1, 2015, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
("CFTC") filed a complaint against Kraft Foods Group and Mondelez
Global LLC ("Mondelez Global") in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division (the "CFTC action")
following its investigation of activities related to the trading of
December 2011 wheat futures contracts that occurred prior to the
spin-off of Kraft Foods Group.

The complaint alleges that Kraft Foods Group and Mondelez Global
(1) manipulated or attempted to manipulate the wheat markets during
the fall of 2011; (2) violated position limit levels for wheat
futures and (3) engaged in non-competitive trades by trading both
sides of exchange-for-physical Chicago Board of Trade wheat
contracts.

The CFTC seeks civil monetary penalties of either triple the
monetary gain for each violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (the
"Act") or $1 million for each violation of Section 6(c)(1), 6(c)(3)
or 9(a)(2) of the Act and $140,000 for each additional violation of
the Act, plus post-judgment interest; an order of permanent
injunction prohibiting Kraft Foods Group and Mondelez Global from
violating specified provisions of the Act; disgorgement of profits;
and costs and fees.

Several class action complaints were filed against Kraft Foods
Group and Mondelez Global in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois by investors in wheat futures and
options on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. The
complaints make similar allegations as those made in the CFTC
action and seek class action certification; an unspecified amount
for damages, interest and unjust enrichment; costs and fees; and
injunctive, declaratory and other unspecified relief. In June 2015,
these suits were consolidated in the Northern District of Illinois.


Mondelez International said "It is not possible to predict the
outcome of these matters; however, based on our Separation and
Distribution Agreement with Kraft Foods Group dated as of September
27, 2012, we expect to bear any monetary penalties or other
payments in connection with the CFTC action."

Mondelez International, Inc., through its subsidiaries,
manufactures and markets snack food and beverage products
worldwide. It offers biscuits, including cookies, crackers, and
salted snacks; chocolates; gums and candies; coffee and powdered
beverages; and cheese and grocery products. The company was
formerly known as Kraft Foods Inc. and changed its name to Mondelez
International, Inc. in October 2012. Mondelez International, Inc.
was founded in 2000 and is based in Deerfield, Illinois.


MONSANTO CO: Johnson Sues Over Defective Crop System
----------------------------------------------------
Steve Johnson and Lisa Marie Johnson on behalf of the Steve Johnson
Farm Joint Venture, Muskrat Flats, LLC, and Rus Lanpher, on behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated v. Monsanto Company,
BASF Corporation, and BASF, SE, Case No. 1:18-cv-00177 (E.D. Mo.,
July 18, 2018), seeks damages for the Defendants' alleged willful
and negligent release of a defective Xtend crop system since the
beginning of 2015 and complicity in providing dicamba herbicides to
be sprayed over-the-top.

The Plaintiffs are among the thousands of farmers throughout the
nation who have been victimized by Monsanto's defective Xtend seed
system, BASF Corporation and BASF SE's dicamba-containing
herbicides, and their purchasers' inevitable use of dicamba, a
drift-prone herbicide that has affected millions of acres of
farmland in the United States, causing widespread destruction of
crops.

The complaint says the cause of this destruction to Plaintiffs'
crops is Defendants' willful and negligent release of their dicamba
products on the market. The Defendants methodically engaged in a
coordinated, systematic plan to release their defective products
onto the market, thereby ensuring, that non-DT crops would be
destroyed, it adds.

Each of the Plaintiff is an agricultural farmer and agricultural
farming organization that raises crops in the United States.

The Defendant Monsanto is a global agrochemical and agricultural
biotechnology corporation, incorporated in the State of Delaware,
with its world headquarters and principal place of business in St.
Louis, Missouri.

The Defendant BASF Corporation is a subsidiary of BASF SE and is
one of the largest chemical producers in the world. Defendant BASF
is incorporated in the state of Delaware and headquartered in
Florham Park, New Jersey. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Don M. Downing, Esq.
      Gretchen Garrison, Esq.
      Jason Sapp, Esq.
      Kaitlin Bridges, Esq.
      Jack Downing, Esq.
      GRAY, RITTER & GRAHAM, P.C.
      701 Market Street, Suite 800
      St. Louis, MO 63101
      Tel: (314) 241-5620
      Fax: (314) 241-4140
      E-mail: ddowning@ggrgpc.com
              ggarrison@grgpc.com
              jsapp@ggrgpc.com
              kbridges@grgpc.com
              jdowning@grgpc.com

MONSANTO COMPANY: Ruiz Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
----------------------------------------------------------
Jorge Ruiz, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case
No. 4:18-cv-01311 (E.D. Mo., Aug. 9, 2018), seeks to recover
damages suffered by Plaintiff as a direct and proximate result of
Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the
design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting,
marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the
herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient
glyphosate.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff maintains that Roundup
(TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health,
unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and
lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated
with its use. The Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking
thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were
avoidable.

"Roundup" refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup
products, including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison
Ivy and Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup
D-Pak herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Prodry Herbicide, Roundup Promax, and Roundup
Quik Stik Grass and Weed Killer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
          GOZA & HONNOLD LLC
          9500 Nall Ave. Suite 400
          Overland Park, KS 66207
          Telephone: (913) 451 3433
          Facsimile: (913) 839 0567
          E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Stump Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ruth Stump, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case
No. 4:18-cv-01310 (E.D. Mo., Aug. 9, 2018), seeks to recover
damages suffered by Plaintiff as a direct and proximate result of
Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the
design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting,
marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the
herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient
glyphosate.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff maintains that Roundup
(TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health,
unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and
lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated
with its use. The Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking
thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were
avoidable.

"Roundup" refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup
products, including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison
Ivy and Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup
D-Pak herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Prodry Herbicide, Roundup Promax, and Roundup
Quik Stik Grass and Weed Killer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
          GOZA & HONNOLD LLC
          9500 Nall Ave. Suite 400
          Overland Park, KS 66207
          Telephone: (913) 451 3433
          Facsimile: (913) 839 0567
          E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com


MUNICIPIO DE SAN JUAN: Fails to Pay Wages, Rosa et al. Say
----------------------------------------------------------
MINERVA SANCHEZ ROSA, MOISES DIAZ DIAZ, AND EDGARDO ALICEA, and
their conjugal partnerships, Individually, and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. MUNICIPIO DE SAN
JUAN, CARMEN YULIN CRUZ, in her official capacity, JOSE CALDERO, in
his official capacity, the Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-01558
(D.P.R., Aug. 9, 2018), alleges that Defendants failed to fail
wages to Plaintiffs and similarly situated persons who opt-in to
this action, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants failed to pay half of
plaintiffs' accumulated sick leave for 2016, failed to pay all of
plaintiffs' accumulated sick leave for 2017, failed to pay the half
of the Christmas bonus, which was provided for in the 2017-18
budget, and failed to liquidate the fringe benefits of those
plaintiffs who have resigned from the police force.

The Defendants willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs for time worked.
As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct,
Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer lost wages,
and other damages, all in excess of the jurisdictional
minimum.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jane Becker Whitaker, Esq.
          Jean Paul Vissepo Garriga, Esq.
          BECKER & VISSEPO, PSC
          P.O. Box 9023914
          San Juan, PR 00902-3914
          Telephone: (787) 585 3824
          Facsimile: (787) 764 3101
          E-mail: janebeckerwhitaker@yahoo.com
                  janebeckerwhitaker@gmail.com
                  jp@vissepolaw.com

               - and -

          J. Barton Goplerud, Esq.
          Brandon M. Bohlman, Esq.
          SHINDLER, ANDERSON, GOPLERUD & WEESE, P.C.
          5015 Grand Ridge Drive, Suite 100
          West Des Moines, IO 50265-5749
          Telephone: (515) 223 4567
          Facsimile: (515) 223 8887
          E-mail: goplerud@sagwlaw.com
                  bohlman@sagwlaw.com


NAGLE & ZALLER: Court Dismisses S. Archie's FDCPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
Southern Division, granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case
captioned SUZETTE ARCHIE, OM SHARMA, Plaintiffs, v. NAGLE & ZALLER,
P.C., Defendant, Case No. GJH-17-2524 (D. Md.).

On behalf of two classes of plaintiffs, Archie and Sharma allege
that N&Z is liable for filing Writs of Garnishment that
impermissibly sought post-judgment enforcement costs (Garnishment
Class), and for filing Statements of Lien that included language
improperly stating that the liens could increase or decrease in
value (Lien Class).

FDCPA Claims

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant's conduct violates Section
1692 of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).

Section 1692e of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using
false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in
connection with the collection of any debt.

In their Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendant violated the FDCPA by attempting to collect costs in an
amount greater than the costs actually assessed in the cases at
judgment from the Garnishment Class members and by threatening to
record or actually record multiple Statements of Lien not
authorized under Maryland law demanding future, unknown sums due
from the Lien Class members. They further specifically allege that
the Defendant's practice of filing documents in court records
improperly implies that the government has authorized the
collection effort when the government has not done so in violation
of Section 1692e(9). The Court addresses the Garnishment Class and
Lien Class FDCPA claims in turn.

Garnishment Class Claims

First, the Court examines the Garnishment Class's claim that the
Defendant's attempt to collect post-judgment enforcement costs
violates the FDCPA. The Defendant requested from the Clerk that a
Writ of Garnishment issue against Archie and sought $118 in costs,
an increase of $35 from the costs initially awarded.

Because the Defendant was permitted to collect its post-enforcement
collection costs in applying for the Writ of Garnishment, this
practice did not violate the FDCPA as the additional $35 was
properly owed and not a false representation. Judgment creditors
may enforce judgments as authorized by the Maryland Rules or by
statute. Maryland Rule 3-646 allows a judgment creditor to obtain
issuance of a writ of garnishment by filing a request in the same
action in which the judgment was obtained. The Maryland court
system has established form DC-CV-065 for judgment creditors to
fill out and submit to the court clerk when requesting a writ of
garnishment.  

Here, on the line next to court costs due, including this Writ, the
Defendant put 118.00. At the June 21, 2018 hearing, the parties
agreed that this form was reviewed and approved by the court clerk
prior to a writ of garnishment being actually issued. Thus, in
executing the Writ of Garnishment form as instructed by the
Maryland courts, the Defendant acted lawfully in seeking its
post-judgment enforcement costs.

Lien Class Claims

The liens against Sharma and Archie stated that: "The total amount
due to satisfy this lien shall include additional fines, late fees,
interest, costs of collection and attorney's fees actually
incurred, if any, as permitted by the Association's governing
documents, that may come due after the date this lien was drafted.
Said amount may increase or decrease to account for intervening
payments of some or all of the balance secured by this Statement of
Lien, or due to judgments obtained against the above-named owner(s)
for the same."

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff Archie's FDCPA
claims regarding the Statements of Liens filed against her are
time-barred. The FDCPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations.
Where a plaintiff challenges the filing of a lien, the limitations
period begins at the time the lien was placed on Plaintiff's
property, since this was the definitive action taken by Defendants
that is alleged to constitute an abusive debt collection practice.

Here, the liens filed against Archie were recorded on June 13,
2016, yet the Complaint was not filed until June 14, 2017. Thus,
Archie's FDCPA claims are time-barred.

Sharma's similar claim is not time-barred but still fails because
the inclusion of the continuing lien clause does not constitute a
violation of the FDCPA. The MCLA does not expressly permit or
prohibit a judgment creditor from filing a continuing lien whose
amount may increase or decrease.

If the Court were to interpret the MCLA as in fact prohibiting such
liens, creditors would need to file a new lien every day to account
for additional accrued interest, and every time the debtor made a
payment on the debt to account for such credits. Such an
interpretation of the MCLA would be bizarre and idiosyncratic and
not tenable.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Memorandum
and Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9q9pjo3 from
Leagle.com.

Suzette Archie, Individually and on behalf of three classes of
similarly situated persons & Om Sharma, Plaintiffs, represented by
Peter A. Holland , The Holland Law Firm PC, Phillip R. Robinson ,
Consumer Law Center, LLC,  Scott C. Borison , Legg Law Firm LLP &
Emanwel Josef Turnbull , The Holland Law Firm PC.

Nagle & Zaller, P.C., Defendant, represented by Stacey Ann Moffet
-- moffet@ewmd.com -- Eccleston and Wolf PC & Maria Iliadis ,
Eccleston & Wolf, P.C.

NATIONAL ENTERPRISE: Bower Files Placeholder Bid to Certify Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled RHONDA BOWER, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL
ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS INC., the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-01215-NJ
(E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order certifying
classes, appointing the Plaintiff as class representative, and
appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such
other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir. 2017).

                       *     *     *

In an August 8 Order, Magistrate Judge Nancy Joseph held that the
plaintiff's motion to stay the motion for class certification and
motion for relief from the Local Rules setting an automatic
briefing schedule are granted.  For administrative purposes, it is
necessary that the Clerk terminate the plaintiff's motion for class
certification.  However, the motion will be regarded as pending to
serve its protective purpose under Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662
F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011).

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


NATIONAL ENTERPRISE: Faces Mehmeti Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Enterprise
Systems, Inc. The case is captioned as Hejdi Mehmeti, on behalf of
himself and all other similarly situated consumers, the Plaintiff,
v. National Enterprise Systems, Inc., the Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-04523 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 9, 2018). The case alleges violation
of the Fair Debt Collection Act.

National Enterprise operates as a full-service debt collection
agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Maxim Maximov, Esq.
          MAXIM MAXIMOV, LLP
          1701 Avenue P
          Brooklyn, NY 11229
          Telephone: (718) 395 3459
          Facsimile: (718) 408 9570
          E-mail: m@maximovlaw.com


NETSHOES LIMITED: 1199SEIU Sues over 83% Share Price Drop
---------------------------------------------------------
1199SEIU HEALTH CARE EMPLOYEES PENSION FUND, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. NETSHOES
(CAYMAN) LIMITED, MARCIO KUMRUIAN, LEONARDO TAVARES DIB, FRANCISCO
ALVAREZDEMALDE, NILESH LAKHANI, HAGOP CHABAB, WOLFGANG SCHWERDTLE,
NICOLAS SZEKASY, DONALD PUGLISI, GOLDMAN SACHS & CO., J.P. MORGAN
SECURITIES LLC, BANCO BRADESCO BBI S.A., ALLEN & COMPANY LLC, and
JEFFERIES LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 157435/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Aug. 9, 2018), asserts strict-liability, non-fraud claims, under
the Securities Act of 1933 against Netshoes, certain of Netshoes's
senior executives and directors who signed the Registration
Statement in connection with the Company's initial public offering,
and each of the investment banks that acted as underwriters for the
Offering.

According to the complaint, the Defendant Netshoes is a sports and
lifestyle online retailer in Latin America. It has also expanded
into the online fashion and beauty market in Latin America.
Defendant Netshoes is listed on the New York Stock Exchange under
the symbol "NETS." In April 2017, Defendants commenced the Netshoes
IPO, issuing 8,250,000 shares of Netshoes common stock to the
investing public at $18 per share, all pursuant to the Registration
Statement. The Registration Statement contained untrue statements
of material fact and omitted to state material facts both required
by governing regulations and necessary to make the statements made
not misleading. The Defendants were required to disclose all of the
foregoing misrepresented and omitted information in the
Registration Statement. SEC Regulation required disclosure of any
known events or uncertainties that, at the time of the IPO, had
caused, or were reasonably likely to cause, a materially negative
impact on Netshoes.

The lawsuit notes that Netshoes faced intense competition in the
sports, fashion, and beauty ecommerce market, which threatened its
market share and profitability. To maintain its market share,
Netshoes provided significant discounts to customers. This
increased competition, as well as decelerating growth and falling
profitability, were likely to (and in fact did) materially and
adversely affect Netshoes. With these misrepresentations and
omissions in the Registration Statement, the IPO went forward and
was extremely lucrative for Defendants, who raised over $148.5
million in gross proceeds. But when the truth emerged, the
Company's stock price plummeted from an IPO price of $18 to
approximately $3, a decline of 83% in one year.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Thomas L. Laughlin, IV, Esq.
          Deborah Clark-Weintraub, Esq.
          Donald A. Broggi, Esq.
          Rhiana L. Swartz, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          The Helmsley Building
          230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10169
          Telephone: (212) 233 6444
          Facsimile: (212) 233 6334
          E-mail: tlaughlin@scott-scott.com
                  dweintraub@scott-scott.com
                  dbroggi@scott-scott.com
                  rswartz@scott-scott.com


NETSHOES LIMITED: Williams Sues over Plunge in Stock Price
----------------------------------------------------------
MELVIN WILLIAMS, JR. on Behalf of Himself and Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, v. NETSHOES (CAYMAN) LIMITED, MARCIO
KUMRUIAN, LEONARDO TAVARES DIB, FRANCISCO ALVAREZDEMALDE, NILESH
LAKHANI, HAGOP CHABAB, WOLFGANG SCHWERDTLE, NICOLAS SZEKASY, DONALD
PUGLISI, GOLDMAN SACHS & CO., J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES LLC, BANCO
BRADESCO BBI S.A., ALLEN & COMPANY LLC, and JEFFERIES LLC, the
Defendants, Case No. 653951/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Aug. 9, 2018),
asserts strict-liability, non-fraud claims, under the Securities
Act of 1933 against Netshoes, certain of Netshoes's senior
executives and directors who signed the Registration Statement in
connection with an initial public offering of Company securities,
and each of the investment banks that acted as underwriters for the
Offering.

According to the complaint, the Defendant Netshoes is a sports and
lifestyle online retailer in Latin America. It has also expanded
into the online fashion and beauty market in Latin America.
Netshoes is listed on the New York Stock Exchange under the symbol
"NETS." In April 2017, Defendants commenced the Netshoes IPO,
issuing 8,250,000 shares of Netshoes common stock to the investing
public at $18 per share, all pursuant to the Registration
Statement. The Registration Statement contained untrue statements
of material fact and omitted to state material facts both required
by governing regulations and necessary to make the statements made
not misleading. The Defendants were required to disclose all of the
foregoing misrepresented and omitted information in the
Registration Statement. SEC Regulation required disclosure of any
known events or uncertainties that, at the time of the IPO, had
caused, or were reasonably likely to cause, a materially negative
impact on Netshoes.

The Complaint notes that Netshoes faced intense competition in the
sports, fashion, and beauty ecommerce market, which threatened its
market share and profitability. To maintain its market share,
Netshoes provided significant discounts to customers. This
increased competition, as well as decelerating growth and falling
profitability, were likely to (and in fact did) materially and
adversely affect Netshoes. With these misrepresentations and
omissions in the Registration Statement, the IPO went forward and
was extremely lucrative for Defendants, who raised over $148.5
million in gross proceeds. But when the truth emerged, the
Company's stock price plummeted from an IPO price of $18 to
approximately $3, a decline of 83% in one year.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shannon L. Hopkins, Esq.
          Sebastiano Tornatore, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP
          30 Broad Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 363 7500
          Facsimile: (212) 363 7171
          E-mail: shopkins@zlk.com
                  stornatore@zlk.com


NORTH CAROLINA DMV: Johnson et al. Seek to Certify Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled SETI JOHNSON and MARIE BONHOMME-DICKS, on
behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, and SHAREE SMOOT
and NICHELLE YARBOROUGH, on behalf of themselves and those
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. TORRE JESSUP, in his
official capacity as Commissioner of the North Carolina Division of
Motor Vehicles, the Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-00467 (M.D.N.C.),
the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order certifying two classes:

-- Future Revocation Class:

    "all individuals whose drivers' licenses will be revoked in
    the future by the DMV due to their failure to pay fines,
    penalties, or court costs assessed by a court for a traffic
    offense"; and

-- Revoked Class:

    "all individuals whose driver's licenses have been revoked by
    the DMV due to their failure to pay fines, penalties, or court

    costs assessed by a court for a traffic offense."

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Kristi L. Graunke, Esq.
          Emily C.R. Early, Esq.
          Samuel Brooke, Esq.
          Danielle Davis, Esq.
          SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER
          150 E. Ponce de Leon Ave., Ste. 340
          Decatur, GA 30030
          Telephone: (404) 221 4036
          E-mail: kristi.graunke@splcenter.org
                  emily.early@splcenter.org
                  samuel.brooke@splcenter.org
                  danielle.davis@splcenter.org

               - and -

          Laura Holland, Esq.
          SOUTHERN COALITION FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE
          1415 W. NC Hwy 54, Suite 101
          Durham, North Carolina 27707
          Telephone: (919) 323 3380
          Facsimile: (919) 323 3942
          E-mail: lauraholland@southerncoalition.org

               - and -

          Christopher A. Brook, Esq.
          Cristina Becker, Esq.
          Sneha Shah, Esq.
          Nusrat J. Choudhury, Esq.
          R. Orion Danjuma, Esq.
          AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
            OF NORTH CAROLINA LEGAL FOUNDATION
          P.O. Box 28004
          Raleigh, NC 27611
          Telephone: (919) 834 3466
          E-mail: cbrook@acluofnc.org
                  cbecker@acluofnc.org
                  sshah@acluofnc.org
                  nchoudhury@aclu.org
                  odanjuma@aclu.org

Attorneys for Defendant:

          Neil Dalton, Esq.
          Kathryne E. Hathcock, Esq.
          Ann W. Mathews, Esq.
          Alexander Peters, Esq.
          N.C. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          P.O. Box 629
          Raleigh, NC 27602
          E-mail: ndalton@ncdoj.gov
                  khathcock@ncdoj.gov
                  amathews@ncdoj.gov
                  apeters@ncdoj.gov


OASIS MEDIA: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Terri Alves Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
TERRI ALVES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff V. OASIS MEDIA GROUP, INC., and DOES 1 through
10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-06242 (C.D. Cal., July
19, 2018) seeks to stop the Defendants' practice of contacting the
cellular telephones number of the Plaintiff to solicit purchase of
services without the Plaintiff's prior express written consent.

Oasis Media Group, Inc. is an online business consultant company.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
     Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
     Meghan E. George, Esq.
     Tom E. Wheeler, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
     21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
     Woodland Hills, CA 91367
     Telephone: 877-206-4741
     Facsimile: 866-633-0228
     E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
             abacon@toddflaw.com
             mgeorge@toddflaw.com
             twheeler@toddflaw.com


OMNI MANAGEMENT: Brown Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
---------------------------------------------------------
Kelly Brown and Stephanie Forrester, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. Omni Management Group LLC, All
Seasons Travel and Resort Inc., and Lawrence Flynn and Deslyn
Patram Flynn, Case No. 8:18-cv-01772 (M.D. Fla., July 19, 2018),
seeks to recover unpaid wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and Florida's Wage Act.

The Plaintiff Forrester has worked for Defendants from November
until December 2017 in the call center as a Sales Representative,
and then from December 2017 to the present in the position of
Travel Coordinator and also called a Reservationist.

The Plaintiff Brown was hired on or about May 2018, and was
terminated from her position by Defendants in June 2018.  She
worked approximately 5 weeks. The Plaintiff was not given any
formal job title, but through communications with co-workers in the
same position, and communications with her superiors, came to be
known also as a reservationist or travel consultant, notes the
complaint.

The Defendants operate a business enterprise selling timeshare
vacation packages and other travel promotions related in part or
whole to a resort called Silver Lakes, located in Kissimmee,
Florida, from a call center type office in Tampa Florida.  The
Defendants operate out of primarily one physical principal office
location located at 10500 University Drive, in Suites #190, and
180, as well as utilizing Silver Lakes Resort for additional
operations, and use the fictitious names of Astar Travel. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Mitchell L. Feldman, Esq.
      FELDMAN WILLIAMS LLC
      6940 West Linebaugh Avenue Suite #101
      Tampa, FL 33625
      Tel: (813) 639-9366
      Fax: (813) 639-9376
      E-mail: mlf@feldmanlegal.us

OXY USA: Cooper Suit Moved to District of Kansas
------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Cooper Clark Foundation on behalf
of itself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. OXY
USA Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 2016-CV-000039, was removed from
the Grant County District Court, to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Kansas (Wichita) on Aug. 9, 2018. The District of
Kansas Court Clerk assigned Case No. 6:18-cv-01222-JWB-KGG to the
proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge John W.
Broomes.

OXY USA Inc. offers exploration, production, and marketing of crude
oil and natural gas. OXY USA Inc. was formerly known as Cities
Service Oil and Gas Corp.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Barbara C. Frankland, Esq.
          Rex A. Sharp, Esq.
          Ryan C. Hudson, Esq.
          REX A. SHARP, PA
          5301 W. 75th Street
          Prairie Village, KS 66208
          Telephone: (913) 901 0505
          Facsimile: (913) 901 0419
          E-mail: bfrankland@midwest-law.com
                  rsharp@midwest-law.com
                  rhudson@midwest-law.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          James M. Armstrong, Esq.
          Mikel L. Stout, Esq.
          FOULSTON SIEFKIN LLP - WICHITA
          1551 N Waterfront Parkway, Suite 100
          Wichita, KS 67206-4466
          Telephone: (316) 291 9576
          Facsimile: (316) 267 6345
          E-mail: jarmstrong@foulston.com
                  mstout@foulston.com


PATHWAY LEASING: Ct. Denies Reconsideration Bid in FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration in the case captioned
FRANKLIN MERRILL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PATHWAY LEASING LLC, a
Colorado limited liability company, MATTHEW HARRIS, an individual,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-cv-02242-KLM (D. Colo.).

The Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint alleged failure to pay
minimum wage in violation of the FLSA.  Here, the Plaintiffs seek
reconsideration of one aspect of the Court's Order, whether the
Defendants are judicially estopped from arguing that opt-in
Plaintiffs have not asserted state law claims.

It is well-established in the Tenth Circuit that grounds for a
motion to reconsider are limited to the following: (1) an
intervening change in the controlling law; (2) new evidence
previously unavailable; and (3) the need to correct clear error or
prevent manifest injustice.

The Plaintiffs did not clearly discuss the factors to be considered
by the Court when determining whether judicial estoppel applies.  

Regarding the first factor, a party's subsequent position must be
clearly inconsistent with its former position. The Plaintiffs
direct the Court's attention to two statements made by the
Defendants in the Motion to Decertify Collective Action: (1) and if
the Plaintiffs were permitted to prosecute their state-law claims
as a class, then a series of over 50 mini-trials would need to be
conducted just to determine their damages and (2) These variations
counsel strongly against attempting to manage 50-plus Plaintiffs'
individual claims as the FLSA collective-action claims in the same
case.

The second factor is that the party succeeded in persuading a court
to accept that party's former position, so that judicial acceptance
of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create the
perception that either the first or the second court was misled.
The Court did not previously determine whether Plaintiffs'
state-law claims should be decertified, because the Court held that
Plaintiffs never properly certified such claims in the first place.


The third factor is that the party would gain an unfair advantage
in the litigation if not estopped. Given that, based on the first
two factors, the Court has found that Defendants' previous legal
arguments do not amount to a statement of a position which may form
the basis for judicial estoppel, it need not determine the issue of
unfair advantage.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 18, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ydh9susm from Leagle.com.

Franklin Merrill, Anthony Glover, Anthony Dennis, Larry Jurcak,
Sami Nasr, Ronald Dennis, Rodney Lacy, James Newberry, Tami
Potirala, Craig Williams, Zigmund Gutowski, Joseph Horion, Eric Ard
& Tim Hollingsworth, Plaintiffs, represented by Sarah Ann Wolter --
sarah.wolter@andruswagstaff.com -- Andrus Wagstaff, P.C. & John
Reily Crone -- john.crone@andruswagstaff.com -- Andrus Wagstaff,
P.C.

Keith Herring, Plaintiff, represented by John Reily Crone , Andrus
Wagstaff, P.C.
Pathway Leasing LLC, a Colorado limited liability company & Matthew
Harris, an individual, Defendants, represented by Jeremy Ben
Merkelson , Holland & Hart, LLP, Mark Brian Wiletsky , Holland &
Hart, LLP & Robert M. Thomas , Holland & Hart, LLP.

Rodney Lacy, Anthony Dennis, Anthony Glover, Keith Herring, Larry
Jurcak, Franklin Merrill, Sami Nasr, Eric Ard, Ronald Dennis,
Zigmund Gutowski, Tim Hollingsworth, Joseph Horion, James Newberry,
Tami Potirala & Craig Williams, Counter Defendants, represented by
John Reily Crone, Andrus Wagstaff, P.C.

Matthew Harris, an individual & Pathway Leasing LLC, a Colorado
limited liability company, Counter Claimants, represented by Mark
Brian Wiletsky , Holland & Hart, LLP & Robert M. Thomas , Holland &
Hart, LLP.

PERSONAL TOUCH: Julie Bridges Seeks to Certify Caregivers Class
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned JULIA BRIDGES, on behalf of herself and
all those similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. PERSONAL TOUCH
HEALTHCARE SERVICES, LLC AND LESLIE HENRY, the Defendants, Case No.
2:17-cv-12423-EEF-DEK (E.D. La.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for
an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all persons in the United States, who, since August 2015,
      previously worked or currently work for Defendants as home
      health caregivers, but were not paid for all hours worked
      for Defendants due to Defendants' refusal to pay them for
      more than the hours for which Defendant could be
      reimbursed, regardless of how long they actually worked,
      thereby depriving them of the federally mandated minimum
      wage for each hour worked and/or federally mandated
      overtime for all hours worked in excess of 40 per week";
      and

   2. authorizing notice to allow potential members of the Fair
      Labor Standards Act Collective Class to opt in to preserve
      their rights.

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Action Plaintiffs:

          Jody Forester Jackson, Esq.
          Mary Bubbett Jackson, Esq.
          JACKSON+JACKSON
          201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 2500
          New Orleans, LA 70170
          Telephone: (504) 599 5953
          Facsimile: (888) 988 6499
          E-mail: jjackson@jackson-law.net
                  mjackson@jackson-law.net


PINNACLE FOODS: Paquette Balks at Merger Deal with Conagra
----------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT H. PAQUETTE, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. PINNACLE FOODS INC., ROGER
DEROMEDI, MARK CLOUSE, ANN FANDOZZI, MARK JUNG, JANE NIELSEN,
MUKTESH PANT, RAYMOND P. SILCOCK, and IOANNIS SKOUFALOS, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-12578 (D.N.J., Aug. 9, 2018), seeks to
enjoin Defendants from holding the shareholder vote on a proposed
merger transaction and taking any steps to consummate the proposed
transaction unless and until material information is disclosed to
Pinnacle's shareholders sufficiently in advance of the vote on the
proposed transaction or, in the event the Proposed Transaction is
consummated, to recover damages resulting from the Defendants'
violations of the Exchange Act.

This action is brought as a class action by Plaintiff on behalf of
himself and all other similarly situated public shareholders of
Pinnacle Foods Inc. against Pinnacle and the members of the
Company's board of directors for their violations of Sections 14(a)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Securities
and Exchange Commission Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9, in
connection with the proposed acquisition of Pinnacle by Conagra
Brands, Inc. by means of the merger of Patriot Merger Sub Inc., a
Delaware corporation and a direct wholly owned subsidiary of
Conagra, with Pinnacle, after which Pinnacle will survive the
merger as a wholly owned subsidiary of Conagra.

On June 26, 2018, the Board caused the Company to enter into an
Agreement and Plan of Merger, pursuant to which each common share
of Pinnacle will be converted into the right to receive: (i) $43.11
in cash without interest and (ii) 0.6494 shares of Conagra common
stock. On July 25, 2018, to convince Pinnacle's shareholders to
vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, Defendants authorized
the filing of a materially incomplete and misleading Form S-4
Registration Statement with the SEC, in violation of Sections 14(a)
and 20(a) of the Exchange Act. In particular, the Proxy contains
materially incomplete and misleading information concerning: (i)
financial projections for Conagra; (ii) the valuation analyses
performed by Pinnacle's financial advisors, Evercore Group L.L.C.
and Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, in support of their
fairness opinions; and (iii) the sales process leading up to the
Proposed Transaction.

The special meeting of Pinnacle shareholders to vote on the
Proposed Transaction is forthcoming. It is therefore imperative
that the material information that has been omitted from the Proxy
is disclosed to the Company's shareholders prior to the shareholder
vote so that they can properly exercise their corporate suffrage
rights. For these reasons, and as set forth in detail herein,
Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants for violations of
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Joseph J. DePalma, Esq.
          Susana Cruz Hodge, Esq.
          LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG
          570 Broad Street, Suite 1201
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 623 3000
          Facsimile: (973) 623 0858
          E-mail: jdepalma@litedepalma.com
                  scruzhodge@litedepalma.com


PIONEER CREDIT: Faces Stirpe Suit in Western District of New York
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Pioneer Credit
Recovery, Inc. The case is captioned as Sarah Stirpe, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., the Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-00882-LJV (W.D.N.Y., Aug. 9, 2018). The case is assigned to
the Hon. Lawrence J. Vilardo. The case involves debt collection
related complaint.

Pioneer Credit Recovery is a national leader in credit recovery on
defaulted debt specializing in government collections.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alexander Jerome Douglas, Esq.
          DOUGLAS FIRM, P.C.
          36 West Main Street, Suite 500
          Rochester, NY 14614
          Telephone: (585) 703 9783
          E-mail: alex@lawroc.com


PIZZA HUT: Richard Cook Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages
-----------------------------------------------------
Richard Cook, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated persons v. Pizza Hut of Kokomo Inc. dba "Pizza Hut", and
Pamela Beckom, Case No. 1:18-cv-02211 (S.D. Ind., July 19, 2018),
seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime hours under the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the Indiana Minimum Wage Law.

The Plaintiff Richard Cook was employed by Defendants until June
2018 as a delivery driver at Defendants' Pizza Hut stores located
in the Kokomo, Indiana area and within the District.  

The Defendants own and operate numerous Pizza Hut franchise stores
including stores in Kokomo, Indiana.  [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Matthew Haynie, Esq.
      FORESTER HAYNIE PLLC
      1701 N. Market Street, Suite 210
      Dallas, TX 75202
      Tel: (214) 210-2100
      Fax: (214) 346-5909

PONZIOS RD: Court Won't Reconsider Class Certification in FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
Camden Vicinage, denied Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of
the Certification of Plaintiff's Class in the case captioned OSCAR
CASCO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff(s), v. PONZIOS RD, INC. d/b/a METRO DINER; and Doe
Defendants 1-10, Defendant(s), Civil No. 16-2084 (RBK/JS)(D.N.J.).

The Plaintiff, an employee at the Defendant's restaurant, alleges
that the Defendant engaged in several illegal practices that
resulted in the systematic underpayment of the Plaintiff and the
class he sought to represent, in violation of both federal and
state law. The Plaintiff brought this suit on behalf of a
nationwide collective class as a collective action, pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act, and on behalf of all other similarly
situated employees of the Defendant in New Jersey, pursuant to the
New Jersey Wage and Hour Law.

This matter comes before the Court upon Ponzios RD, LLC's, doing
business as Metro Diner, (Defendant) motion for reconsideration of
this Court's April 30, 2018 Opinion and Order reversing and
revising in part its earlier March 8, 2018 decision and certifying
Oscar Casco's (Plaintiff) state class action claim against
Defendant.

The Defendant argues that this Court failed to consider Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes when deciding that the Plaintiff's state-law
claims could be properly certified. 564 U.S. 338.
Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350, allegations of improper use of the tip
credit for all employees, standard tip credit notification policy,
standard compensation policy, minimum wage deficiency, and
statutory and regulatory compliance are all questions common to the
class.

The Defendant contends that even if there are common questions
across the members of the class, there are no common answers apt to
drive the resolution of litigation. This Court disagrees a finding
that Defendant either did or did not violate the tip credit system
or practice class-wide minimum wage deficiencies would resolve an
issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in
one stroke. While the amount owed to each class member if a
violation were to be found may vary, this does not result in the
type of problem the court in Wal-Mart was contemplating.

The Court did not fail to consider Wal-Mart in its analysis of the
Plaintiff's class certification, and no clear error of law
resulting in manifest injustice occurred as a result of its alleged
failure.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 18, 2018 Opinion is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/ycvrv9lg from Leagle.com.

OSCAR CASCO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by GERALD D. WELLS --
gwells@cwglaw.com -- Connolly Wells & Gray, LLP & LAWRENCE
KALIKHMAN -- lkalikhman@kalraylaw.com -- KALIKHMAN & RAYZ, LLC.

PONZIOS RD, INC., doing business as METRO DINER, Defendant,
represented by RALPH R. SMITH, III , CAPEHART & SCATCHARD & KELLY
ESTEVAM ADLER , CAPEHART & SCATCHARD PA.

PROCTER & GAMBLE: Foronda Suit Transferred to C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Ivan Foronda, on behalf of himself
and others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. The Procter &
Gamble Company, a Delaware corporation; Procter & Gamble Health
Products, Inc., a Delaware corporation; and Does 1 through 50,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. BC700535, was removed from the
Los Angeles County Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California (Western Division - Los Angeles)
on Aug. 9, 2018.  The California Central District Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 2:18-cv-06844 to the proceeding.

Procter & Gamble Co. is an American multi-national consumer goods
corporation headquartered in downtown Cincinnati, Ohio, founded in
1837 by British American William Procter and Irish American James
Gamble.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


PROFESSIONAL ADJUSTMENT: Faces Rodriguez Suit in M.D. Florida
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Professional
Adjustment Corp. of SW Florida, Inc. The case is captioned as Juan
Rodriguez, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. Professional Adjustment Corp. of SW
Florida, Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-00549-JES-MRM (M.D.
Fla., Aug. 9, 2018). The case is on account of debt collection
practices.

Professional Adjustment is a debt collection agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jon Paul Dubbeld, Esq.
          BERKOWITZ & MYER
          4900 Central Ave
          St Petersburg, FL 33707
          Telephone: (727) 344 0123
          Facsimile: (727) 344 0185
          E-mail: Jon@Berkmyer.com

               - and -

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (732) 695 3282
          Facsimile: (732) 298 6256
          E-mail: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


PROMOLOGICS INC: Courts Allows Amendment to Class Definition
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted in part and denied in part
Defendants' Motion to Strike Class Allegations in the case
captioned AMERICA'S HEALTH AND RESOURCE CENTER, LTD.; AFFILIATED
HEALTH GROUP, LTD., Plaintiffs, v. PROMOLOGICS, INC.; JANSSEN
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., Defendants, Case No. 16 C 9281 (N.D. Ill.).

The Plaintiffs allege Defendants sent them, and each member of
their proposed class, a fax in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. Section 227.

The Defendants moves to strike the class allegations asserted by
Plaintiffs America's Health & Resource Center, Ltd. and Affiliated
Health Group, Ltd.

According to the Defendants, the Court should strike the class
allegations in part or in whole for three reasons:

   (1) Under the Supreme Court's decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1783-84
(2017), this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Defendants
as to the claims of the non-Illinois-resident class members;

   (2) due to an imprecise class definition, the named Plaintiffs'
claims are not typical of the claims of the other class members;
and

   (3) individualized issues of consent predominate over common
questions of law or fact, so the class fails to clear Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), as required here.
Personal Jurisdiction under Bristol-Myers Squibb

Despite contending in their Complaint that Defendant Janssen is
subject to this Court's general jurisdiction, the Plaintiffs make
no general jurisdiction arguments in their present briefing as to
either Defendant, both of which are incorporated and maintain their
principal places of business outside of Illinois. As such, the
remaining jurisdictional inquiry is specific.

Here, that inquiry depends on the Supreme Court's ruling in
Bristol-Myers Squibb. 137 S. Ct. at 1783-84. That case began as a
mass tort action in California state court involving hundreds of
individual plaintiffs, most of whom were not California residents.
On review, the Supreme Court considered the compatibility of the
state court's exercise of jurisdiction with the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause and concluded that the state court
lacked specific jurisdiction over the defendant as to the claims of
the non-resident plaintiffs.

In this class action, the Bristol Myers opinion is applicable and
its import clear: The Court lacks jurisdiction over the Defendants
as to the claims of the nonresident, proposed class members. As
such, the Defendants' Motion is granted in relevant part, and those
class members who are not Illinois residents and who allegedly
received the fax outside of this state's borders may not be part of
this case. To the extent that the proposed class allegations
comprise any such unnamed plaintiffs, they are stricken.
Subtracting those proposed class members shrinks the class but
might not destroy it; the Complaint is unclear as to how many of
the proposed plaintiffs are Illinois residents, so the Court cannot
yet say whether the remaining balance is sufficiently numerous to
satisfy Rule 23. Given that uncertainty, the Court will address the
rest of the Defendants' Motion-to-Strike arguments lest any of them
succeeds in further reducing the proposed class.

Typicality Challenge

Beyond their jurisdictional assault, the Defendants also attack the
proposed class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. To do so,
the Defendants cite to this Court's reasoning in another TCPA case,
A Custom Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Kabbage, Inc., No. 16
CV 2513, 2018 WL 488257, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2018). There,
the Court found that because the proposed class definition failed
to distinguish between those members who received unsolicited faxes
and those members who received solicited faxes, the claims of the
named plaintiffs who allegedly received only the former variety
were not typical of the claims of the class.

The proposed class is:

     Each person that was sent one or more facsimiles from
Defendants inviting them to participate in a promotional
educational program that did not state on its first page that the
fax recipient may request that the sender not send any future fax
and that the failure to comply with such a request within 30 days
would be unlawful.

Because this class definition rests upon abrogated authority, it
does not properly describe a class of TCPA plaintiffs. The Court
accordingly grants the Defendants' Motion to Strike this
definition, but allows Plaintiffs leave to amend.

Predominance Challenge

As their final argument, the Defendants charge that individualized
issues of consent predominate over common questions of law or fact
and thus confound class certification. But where the defendant's
objection to class certification fails to set forth specific
evidence and instead only makes vague assertions about consent,
individualized issues regarding consent will not predominate over
common questions of law or fact. Though the Defendants assert in
their papers that the proposed class includes members who provided
consent and/or had an ongoing business relationship with
Defendants, the Defendants have not produced any evidence
whatsoever to back up that assertion.

Supposition alone does not create a meritorious consent objection
in this context.  

The Defendants' predominance objection thus fails.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8t2ozgz from
Leagle.com.

America's Health & Resource Center, Ltd., an Illinois Corporation,
Plaintiff, represented by Phillip A. Bock -- phil@classlawyers.com
-- Bock Law Firm, LLC dba Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC,
Daniel J. Cohen , Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC, James
Michael Smith -- jim@classlawyers.com -- Bock Law Firm, LLC dba
Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC, Julia Lynn Mohan --
jmohan@ralaw.com -- Roetzel & Andress LPA, Kimberly M. Watt , Sb2,
Inc., Molly Elizabeth Stemper , Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC
& Tod Allen Lewis -- tod@classlawyers.com -- Bock Law Firm, LLC dba
Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC.

Affiliated Health Group, Ltd., an Illinois corporation,
individually and as the representatives of a class of
similarly-situated persons, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel J.
Cohen , Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC, James Michael Smith ,
Bock Law Firm, LLC dba Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC & Molly
Elizabeth Stemper , Bock, Hatch, Lewis & Oppenheim, LLC.

Promologics, Inc., doing business as Health-Scripts, Defendant,
represented by Avanti Bakane -- abakane@grsm.com -- Gordon Rees
Scully Mansukhani LLP, Brian H. Myers -- bmeyers@grsm.com -- Gordon
Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP & Christina Rose Spiezia --
cspiezia@grsm.com -- Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP.

Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Defendant, represented by Bradley
Joseph Andreozzi -- bradley.andreozzi dbr.com -- Drinker Biddle &
Reath LLP, Iman N. Boundaoui -- Iman.Boundaoui dbr.com -- Drinker
Biddle And Reath Llp & Marsha J. Indych -- marsha.indych@dbr.com --
Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, pro hac vice.

PROOPTICS LLC: Retina Associates Sues over Unwanted Fax Messages
----------------------------------------------------------------
RETINA ASSOCIATES MEDICAL GROUP, INC., individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. PROOPTICS LLC,
the Defendant , Case No. 8:18-cv-01404 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 9, 2018),
alleges that on or about April 25, 2018, Defendant, or someone
acting on its behalf, used a telephone facsimile machine, computer,
or other device to send to Plaintiff's telephone facsimile machine
at (714) 633-7470 an unsolicited advertisement. The Plaintiff
received the Fax through Plaintiff's facsimile machine. The Fax
constitutes material advertising the quality or commercial
availability of goods.  The Defendant obtained Plaintiff's fax
number through a contract or business relationship with Schaeffer
Vicron Optical, Inc., an Illinois Corporation that now operates
under the name VS Corporation. The Fax identifies SCHAEFFER VICRON
and the website SchaefferVicron.com and contains pricing for
multiple goods, including Chin Rest Paper "Made in the USA by
Pro-Optics." The Defendant has sent other facsimile transmissions
of material advertising the quality or commercial availability of
goods to Plaintiff and to at least 40 other persons as part of a
plan to broadcast fax advertisements, of which the Fax is an
example, or, alternatively, the Fax was sent on Defendant's
behalf.

According to the complaint, the Defendant approved, authorized and
participated in the scheme to broadcast fax advertisements by (a)
directing a list to be purchased or assembled, (b) directing and
supervising employees or third parties to send the faxes, (c)
creating and approving the fax form to be sent, and (d) determining
the number and frequency of the facsimile transmissions.  The
Defendant had a high degree of involvement in, actual notice of, or
ratified the unlawful fax broadcasting activity and failed to take
steps to prevent such facsimile transmissions. Defendant created,
made, or ratified the sending of the Fax and other similar or
identical facsimile advertisements to Plaintiff and other members
of the "Class".

Pro-Optics has manufactured high quality, value-priced professional
Optical Accessories, Ophthalmic Products, & Post-Mydriatic Glasses
in the USA since 1965.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Seth M. Lehrman, Esq.
          EDWARDS POTTINGER LLC
          425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 524 2820
          Facsimile: (954) 524 2822
          E-mail: seth@epllc.com


RASH CURTIS: Court Won't Review Summary Judgment in TCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California denied Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration in the
case captioned SANDRA McMILLION, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. RASH CURTIS
& ASSOCIATES, Defendant, Case No. 16-cv-03396-YGR. (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs bring this class action against defendant Rash
Curtis & Associates (Rash Curtis) alleging that the defendant
called the plaintiffs and class members without consent in
violation of several laws, including the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA).

The Court granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment
regarding the dialer systems defendant used to make the alleged
phone calls and held that those Dialers constitute Automatic
Telephone Dialing Systems (ATDSs) within the meaning of the TCPA.
The Court also granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
judgment on the issue of prior express consent with regard to Perez
and held that Rash Curtis never possessed prior express consent to
call Perez.

Now, Rash Curtis moves that the Court reconsider the parties'
motions for summary judgment in light of the recent outcome in ACA
International v. Federal Communications Commission, 2018 WL 1352922
(D.C. Cir. March 16, 2018).

The Court finds that the FCC's 2015 ruling, in describing the
functions a device must perform to qualify as an autodialer, fails
to satisfy the requirement of reasoned decision making and noting
that it may be permissible for the FCC to adopt either
interpretation).  Even if the D.C. Circuit had vacated the 2003 and
2008 FCC Orders, ACA International has no bearing on pre-existing
Ninth Circuit precedent. In 2009, the Ninth Circuit held that for a
dialing system to be an ATDS it need not actually store, produce,
or call randomly or sequentially generated telephone numbers, it
need only have the capacity to do it.

The decision in ACA International may influence a future ruling,
but it does not itself constitute a change in the controlling law.
Additionally, even if ACA International did constitute controlling
law, it does not change the Ninth Circuit's finding in Meyer that
prior express consent is consent to call a particular telephone
number in connection with a particular debt that is given before
the call in question is placed.

Accordingly, because the D.C. Circuit's ruling in ACA International
does not constitute controlling law this circuit, the Court finds
that parties' motions for summary judgment are not appropriate for
reconsideration.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 18, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybenuglw from Leagle.com.

Sandra McMillion, Jessica Adekoya & Ignacio Perez, on Behalf of
Themselves and all Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Yeremey O. Krivoshey -- ykrivoshey@bursor.com --
Bursor Fisher, P.A. & Lawrence Timothy Fisher --
ltfisher@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher, P.A.

Rash Curtis & Associates, Defendant, represented by Andrew M.
Steinheimer , Ellis Law Group, LLP, Anthony Paul John Valenti ,
Ellis Law Group, LLP & Mark Ewell Ellis , Ellis Law Group, LLP.

Kourtney Richardson, Movant, represented by Yeremey O. Krivoshey --
yeremeyk@gmail.com -- Bursor Fisher, P.A..

RD LEGAL: Court Won't Dismiss CFPB's Suit Over Cash Advances
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU and THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK, BY ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE
OF NEW YORK, Plaintiffs, v. RD LEGAL FUNDING, LLC; RD LEGAL
FINANCE, LLC; RD LEGAL FUNDING PARTNERS, LP; and RONI DERSOVITZ,
Defendants, No. 17-cv-890 (LAP)(S.D.N.Y.).

This is an action by Plaintiffs Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau and the People of the State of New York, by Eric T.
Schneiderman, Attorney General for the State of New York ("NYAG" or
the "Attorney General") against Defendants RD Legal Funding, LLC;
RD Legal Finance, LLC; RD Legal Funding Partners, LP (collectively,
the "RD Entities"); and Roni Dersovitz, the founder and owner of
the RD Entities (together with the RD Entities, the "Defendants").

The Government asserts that the Defendants violated certain
provisions of the Consumer Financial Protection Act ("CFPA" or the
"Act"). NYAG independently asserts that the RD Entities are liable
under New York law for the same actions and events that form the
basis of the CFPA claims.

The RD Entities are companies that offer cash advances to consumers
waiting on payouts from settlement agreements or judgments entered
in their favor. The Government alleges that the Defendants misled
these consumers into entering cash advance agreements that the the
Defendants represented as valid and enforceable sales but, in
reality, functioned as usurious loans that were void under state
law.

At issue in this case are two specific groups of consumers
(collectively, the "Consumers") with which the RD Entities
transacted: (1) class members in the National Football League
("NFL") Concussion Litigation class action ("NFL Class Members" or
"Class Members") and (2) individuals ("Eligible Claimants") who
qualify for compensation under the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001 ("VCF").

NFL Class Members

On January 31, 2012, a federal multidistrict litigation was created
in United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania for lawsuits on behalf of former NFL players who
suffer from mild traumatic brain injury due to playing professional
football. See Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Settlement
Agreement") Preamble, In re NFL Players' Concussion Injury Litig.,
MDL No. 2323 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2015).  The Defendants in that
case, the NFL and NFL Properties LLC, ultimately agreed that
settlement of the claims in that complex putative class action was
appropriate. Accordingly, on February 13, 2015, a federal district
court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania approved the NFL
Concussion Litigation Settlement Agreement ("NCLSA") between the
Class Members, by and through class counsel, and defendants NFL and
NFL Properties LLC. The NFL Class Members at issue in this case are
former NFL players who have been diagnosed with neurogenerative
diseases such as chronic traumatic encephalopathy ("CTE"),
Alzheimer's, or Parkinson's disease and who have received
notification of their entitlement to a settlement award under the
NCLSA for these injuries.
VCF Eligible Claimants

In January 2011, President Obama signed the James Zadroga 9/11
Health and Compensation Act of 2010 ("Zadroga Act"), which served
to renew the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 (the
"VCF"). 49 U.S.C. Section 40101. Congress created the VCF to
provide compensation to individuals and personal representatives of
deceased individuals who suffered physical injury or were killed as
a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks or were harmed
during the removal of debris immediately following those attacks.
Proposed Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 76 No. 119 (Jun. 21, 2011).
The Zadroga Act authorizes a Special Master appointed by the
Attorney General to carry out the administration of the VCF by
enacting substantive and procedural rules, including making
determinations as to what award amount an eligible individual
("Eligible Claimant") is entitled to under the VCF. 28 C.F.R.
Section 104.51.

According to the Complaint, the Eligible Claimants with whom the RD
Entities transact have received an award letter from the VCF's
Special Master indicating the amount of compensation to which they
are entitled under the VCF. Eligible Claimants who are entitled to
compensation include individuals who suffer from respiratory
illnesses and cancers related to their exposure to dust and debris
at the World Trade Center site as well as from post-traumatic
stress disorder, depression, anxiety disorder, and memory loss
following the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks.

The Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint on three principal
grounds. First, the Defendants argue that the CFPA is
unconstitutionally structured and therefore lacks the authority to
bring claims under the CFPA. Second, the Defendants contend that
the Court lacks federal jurisdiction because the RD Entities are
not "covered persons" under the CFPA and therefore do not come
within the Act's jurisdictional purview. Third and finally, the RD
Entities move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim
for relief.

Because the CFPB's structure is unconstitutional, it lacks the
authority to bring claims under the CFPA and is terminated as a
party to this action. The NYAG, however, has independent authority
to bring claims under the CFPA. The Court concludes that NYAG has
alleged plausibly claims under the CFPA and under New York law.
Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint is
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 21, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9r23b4r from
Leagle.com.

People of the State of New York, by Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney
General for the State of New York, Plaintiff, represented by Jane
M. Azia , Attorney Gen., N.Y.S. & Melvin L. Goldberg, State of New
York -- Office of The Attorney General.

RD Legal Funding LLC, RD Legal Funding Partners, LP, RD Legal
Finance, LLC & Roni Dersovitz, Defendants, represented by Eric Todd
Kanefsky , Harris, O'Brien, St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP,  Jeffrey M.
Hammer , McDermott, Will & Emery, pro hac vice, David K. Willingham
, Caldwell Leslie & Proctor, PC, pro hac vice & Michael Dietz Roth
, Caldwell Leslie & Proctor, PC.

Proposed Amicus Curie Plaintiff Settlement Class, Amicus,
represented by Christopher Adam Seeger , Seeger Weiss LLP, Diogenes
P. Kekatos , Seeger Weiss LLP & TerriAnne Benedetto , Seeger Weiss
LLP.

American Legal Finance Association, Amicus, represented by Carolina
A. Fornos -- carolina.fornos@pillsburylaw.com --  Pillsbury
Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP.

REEDLEY COMMUNITY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Ridgeway Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
ERIC RIDGEWAY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. REEDLEY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL; ADVENTIST HEALTH
SYSTEM/WEST; and Does 1 through 50, Defendants, Case No.18CECG02609
(Cal. Super., Fresno Cty., July 16, 2018) is an action against the
Defendants for failure to pay minimum wages and overtime
compensation.

Mr. Ridgeway was employed by the Defendants as an hourly non-exempt
employee since October 2017.

Reedley Community Hospital is a California non-profit corporation
that maintains operations in the State of California, including in
Reedley, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Larry W. Lee, Esq.
          Kristen M. Agnew, Esq.
          Nicholas Rosenthal, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.
          515 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554


RENT RECOVER: Hearing Tuesday on Bid to Dismiss Pilarksi Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned PETER PILARSKI, individually and on behalf
of similarly situated persons, the Plaintiff, v. RENT RECOVER OF
BETTER NOI LLC, later incorporated as RENT RECOVER, LLC, and
BETTERNOI, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-08659 (N.D. Ill.),
the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all persons with a Michigan address who were sent a letter
      that contained, in part, a statement that "Your account
      will accrue interest at a rate of 7.00 percent annum"; and

   2. appointing Plaintiff as the class representative, and
      appointing Mr. Warner as counsel for the class.

                            *     *     *

According to the docket entry on August 8, 2018, the Hon. Judge
Rebecca R. Pallmeyer entered an order providing that:

     -- The Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended
complaint is entered and continued for briefing. Reply to be filed
by or on August 15, 2018.  Ruling is set for August 21, 2018 at
9:00 a.m.

     -- The Plaintiff's motion for class certification is entered
and continued for briefing. Response is to be filed by or on August
29, 2018.  Reply is to be filed by or on September 12, 2018.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Curtis C. Warner, Esq.
          WARNER LAW FIRM, LLC
          350 S. Northwest HWY, Ste. 300
          Park Ridge, IL 60068
          Telephone: (847) 701 5290
          E-mail: cwarner@warner.legal

Defendant is represented by:

          Katherine Maria Saldanha Olson, Esq.
          Joseph Shaw Messer, Esq.
          Stephanie Anne Strickler, Esq.
          Tel: 312-334-3444
          E-mail: kolson@messerstrickler.com
                  jmesser@messerstrickler.com
                  sstrickler@messerstrickler.com


REV GROUP INC: Leah Bitar Sues over 19% Drop in Share Price
-----------------------------------------------------------
LEAH BITAR, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. REV GROUP, INC.; TIMOTHY W. SULLIVAN; DEAN
J. NOLDEN; THOMAS B. PHILLIPS; PAUL BAMATTER; JEAN MARIE CANAN;
DINO CUSUMANO; CHARLES DUTIL; JUSTIN FISH; KIM MARVIN; and JOEL
ROTROFF, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-06239 (C.D. Cal., July 19,
2018) alleges that the Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements in the registration statement as well as
failed to disclose material adverse facts about the their business,
operations, and prospects, in connection with the Defendants'
initial public offering on January 27, 2017, in violation of the
Securities Exchange Act.

According to the complaint, on June 6, 2018, post-market, the
Defendants issued a press release reporting their fiscal 2018
second quarter results. Therein, the Defendants disclosed that its
second quarter 2018 results were below expectations due to "cost
inflation" across many of the commodities and services they
purchased, the unavailability of chassis, and a negative impact on
margins attributed to "lower-than-expected sales of certain
higher-content product categories including custom fire apparatus,
large commercial buses, and Class A RVs." The The Defendants also
lowered its fiscal year 2018 guidance-predicting "full-year 2018
revenue of $2.4 to $2.6 billion" compared to "$2.4 to $2.7
billion", and "Net Income of $72 to $87 million" compared to "$90
to $110 million".

After announcing its Q2 2018 financial results, the Defendants
issued a press release appointing Ian Walsh as Chief Operating
Officer, replacing Thomas B. Phillips.

On June 7, 2018, the Defendants held a conference call to discuss
its Q2 2018 results. The Defendants' CEO, Timothy W. Sullivan,
elaborated and reported the Defendants' poor Q2 2018 financial
results.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $3.39, or 18.9%, to
close at $14.52 on June 7, 2018, on unusually heavy trading
volume.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to disclose that:
(i) the Company was experiencing cost inflation across many of the
commodities and services it bought; (ii) the Company was
experiencing difficulty obtaining the chassis necessary for
production; (iii) the Company's margins were being negatively
impacted by a lower sales of high margin products, including custom
fire apparatus, large commercial buses, and Class A RVs; (iv) the
Company did not have "strong visibility into future net sales" to
"effectively plan" and manage its backlog of vehicles; (v) the
Company's manufacturing operations were not operating efficiently
or at a low cost to satisfy customer demand; and (vi) as a result
of the foregoing, the Defendants' statements about Company's
business, operations, and prospects, were materially false and
misleading and lacked a reasonable basis.

REV Group, Inc. designs, manufactures, and distributes specialty
vehicles in the United States, Canada, Europe, Africa, the Middle
East, and internationally. REV Group, Inc. was formerly known as
Allied Specialty Vehicles, Inc. and changed its name to REV Group,
Inc. in November 2015. The company is headquartered in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jennifer Pafiti, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          468 North Camden Drive
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (818) 532-6499
          E-mail: jpafiti@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          POMERANTZ, LLP
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          Ten South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 377-1181
          Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
          E-mail: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
          BRONSTEIN, GEWIRTZ
          & GROSSMAN, LLC
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4600
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 697-6484
          E-mail: peretz@bgandg.com


RIGHT CHOICE: Court Won't Vacate Arbitration Award in FLSA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, denied Defendant's Motion to Vacate
Arbitration Award in the case captioned VINCENT THOMAS and ALAN
QUEEN, Plaintiffs, v. RIGHT CHOICE STAFFING GROUP, LLC, ADEPT
SERVICES GROUP, INC., DOWNRIVER STAFFING GROUP, LLC, AUTOLINE
TRANSPORTATION, INC., TIMOTHY SCHULTZ, and TRACY SHAFFER,
Defendants, Civil Case No. 15-10055(E.D. Mich.).

The Plaintiffs filed this putative class action lawsuit against the
Defendants asserting violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).  THe Defendants thereafter moved to compel arbitration
based on an arbitration clause in an agreement signed by the
Plaintiffs. In a decision issued, this Court granted in part and
denied in part the Defendants' motion. Finding the arbitration
agreement effective, the Court held that the Plaintiffs could be
compelled to arbitrate only their FLSA claims arising after that
date. The Court stayed the Plaintiffs' FLSA claims arising before
that date until arbitration was concluded.

The Defendants identify that Arbitrator Blum failed to previously
disclose the following:

   (1) He was apparently a founding member of the Macomb County ADR
Committee, together with Joseph Golden, a partner at Burgess,
Sharp, and Golden and, at that time, a director of the Macomb
County Bar Association. (Exhibit 13, at 12-14);

   (2) Sharp was also a member of the Macomb County ADR Committee
at the same time as Arbitrator Blum, Exhibit 14, at 20);

   (3) He organized a presentation on November 4, 2013 on ADR
techniques with Golden, which featured Sharp as one of the event's
speakers. At the time, the ADR Committee consisted of just 26
members.

   (4) Sharp, Blum, and Golden were all members of the ADR
Committee as of at least February 2015, after Judge Levy entered an
Order compelling arbitration of Conner's claims on January 16,
2015.

Pursuant to the FAA, a court may intervene and vacate an
arbitration award upon application of any party to the arbitration:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;(3) where the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or(4) where the
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.

In this case, the Defendants argue that vacatur is necessary
because Arbitrator Blum exhibited evident partiality.

An arbitration award may be vacated on the basis of evident
partiality only where a reasonable person would have to conclude
that an arbitrator was partial to the other party to the
arbitration. The Court finds that the Defendants fail to satisfy
this standard.

First, the Defendants do not identify facts from which a
"reasonable person would have to conclude that" Arbitrator Blum was
partial to one party to the arbitration. Arbitrator Blum's
professional involvement with Golden in forming the MCBA ADR
committee and organizing a brown bag lunch to present ADR
techniques both which occurred at least four years before the
arbitration would not necessarily render him biased in favor of
Conner, who was represented in the arbitration by someone with whom
Golden later formed a partnership.

Second, the Defendants fail to identify concrete actions in which
Arbitrator Blum appeared to actually favor Conner or Thomas. An
adverse award in and of itself is no evidence of bias absent some
evidence of improper motivation. As evidence of partiality, the
Defendants also point to Arbitrator Blum's holding Autoline and
Schultz jointly liable where Conner did not name them as defendants
in his federal lawsuit suit and Arbitrator Blum's award of damages
to Conner that exceeded the amount he sought in his specification
of claims.

The Defendants fail to demonstrate that Arbitrator Blum was partial
to Conner or Thomas. As such, they do not establish a basis for
vacatur.  Defendants fail to demonstrate that Arbitrator Blum was
partial to Conner or Thomas. As such, they do not establish a basis
for vacatur.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 18, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y79n9w6t from
Leagle.com.

Vincent Thomas & Alan Queen, Plaintiffs, represented by Caitlin E.
Malhiot, Gold Star Law, PC, David A. Hardesty, Gold Star Law & Maia
Johnson Braun, Gold Star Law.

Downriver Staffing Group, LLC, Tracy Shaffer & Adept Services
Group, Inc., Defendants, represented by Mark S. Demorest , Demorest
Law Firm & Michael K. Hayes , Demorest Law Firm PLLC.

Autoline Transportation, Inc., Timothy Schultz & Right Choice
Staffing Group, LLC, Defendants, represented by Lisa Michelle
Okasinski , Demorest Law Firm, Mark S. Demorest , Demorest Law Firm
& Michael K. Hayes , Demorest Law Firm PLLC.

ROANOKE, VA: Wright and Pendelton Seek to Certify Class
-------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled DAWN RENEE WRIGHT and MAURICE PENDELTON on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF ROANOKE, VIRGINIA, the Defendant, Case No.
7:18-cv-00210-GEC (W.D. Va.), the Parties ask the Court for
conditional collective certification and judicial notice.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Harris D. Buttler, III, Esq.
          Zev H. Antell, Esq.
          BUTLERROYALS, PLC
          140 Virginia Street, Suite 302
          Richmond, VA 23219
          E-mail: harris.butler@butlerroyals.com
                  Zev.antell@butlerroyals.com

               - and -

          Thomas E. Strelka, Esq.
          L. Leigh R. Strelka, Esq.
          STRELKA LAW OFFICE, PC
          Warehouse Row
          119 Norfolk Avenue, S.W., Suite 330
          Roanoke, VA 24011
          E-mail: thomas@strelkalaw.com
                  leigh@strelkalaw.com

Counsel for Defendant:

          Paul G. Klockkenbrink, Esq.
          Catherine J. Huff, Esq.
          GENTRY LOCKE
          10 Franklin Road S.E. Suite 900
          P.O. Box 40013
          Roanoke, VA 24022 0013
          E-mail: klockbrink@gentrylocke.com
                  huff@gentrylocke.com

               - and -

          Timothy R., Spencer, Esq.
          City of Roanoke
          215 Church Avenue SW Room 464
          Roanoke, VA 24011
          E-mail: Timothy.spencer@roanokeva.gov


ROOTER-MAN CORP: Faces Burbon Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Rooter-Man Corp. The
case is captioned as Luc Burbon, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Rooter-Man Corp., the
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-07186 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 9, 2018).  The
case alleges violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Rooter-Man, Corp. provides residential and commercial sewer and
drain cleaning services in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003-2461
          Telephone: (212) 228-9795


SANTANDER CONSUMER: Initial Approval of Parmlee Case Accord Sought
------------------------------------------------------------------
Santander Consumer USA Holdings Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the lead
plaintiff in the case entitled, Parmelee v. Santander Consumer USA
Holdings Inc. et al., filed an unopposed motion for preliminary
approval of a class action settlement of the lawsuit for a cash
payment of $9,500.

The Company is a defendant in two purported securities class
actions lawsuits that were filed in March and April 2016 in the
United States District Court, Northern District of Texas.

The lawsuits were consolidated and are now captioned Parmelee v.
Santander Consumer USA Holdings Inc. et al., No. 3:16-cv-783.

The lawsuits were filed against the Company and certain of its
current and former directors and executive officers on behalf of a
class consisting of all those who purchased or otherwise acquired
our securities between February 3, 2015 and March 15, 2016.

The complaint alleges that the Company violated federal securities
laws by making false or misleading statements, as well as failing
to disclose material adverse facts, in its periodic reports filed
under the Exchange Act and certain other public disclosures, in
connection with, among other things, the Company's change in its
methodology for estimating its allowance for credit losses and
correction of such allowance for prior periods.

On March 14, 2017, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the
lawsuit. On January 3, 2018, the court granted the Company's motion
as to defendant Ismail Dawood (the Company's former Chief Financial
Officer) and denied the motion as to all other defendants.

In July 2018, the lead plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for
preliminary approval of a class action settlement of the lawsuit
for a cash payment of $9,500.

Santander Consumer USA Holdings Inc., a specialized consumer
finance company, provides vehicle finance and third-party servicing
in the United States. Its products and services include retail
installment contracts and vehicle leases, as well as dealer loans
for inventory, construction, real estate, working capital, and
revolving lines of credit. he company was founded in 1995 and is
headquartered in Dallas, Texas. Santander Consumer USA Holdings
Inc. is a subsidiary of Santander Holdings USA, Inc.


SERENITY SQUARE: Solomon Seeks Overtime Wage under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------
MATHILDA SOLOMON, on Behalf of Herself and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. SERENITY SQUARE LLC and
GWENDOLYN CAILLIER, the Defendants, Case No. 6:18-cv-01025-TAD-CBW
(W.D. La., Aug. 9, 2018), seeks to recover overtime wage pursuant
to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants employ home health care
aides or those working in similar job positions, and classifies
them as "exempt" employees, paying them on an hourly basis for all
hours worked, even when more than 40 hours of work is performed in
a particular week. The Plaintiff and similarly situated employees
routinely work more than 40 hours in a workweek but are not paid an
overtime premium for any of their overtime hours. As a result of
Defendants' unlawful classification of Plaintiff and similarly
situated employees as "exempt" for the purposes of overtime
compensation, and Defendants' failure to compensate Plaintiff and
similarly situated employees for all hours worked, The Defendants
have violated the requirements of the FLSA, by failing to pay
Plaintiff and similarly situated employees, overtime compensation
for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in one week as required
under the FLSA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          George B. Recile, Esq.
          Preston L. Hayes, Esq.
          Ryan P. Monsour, Esq.
          CHEHARDY, SHERMAN, WILLIAMS,
            MURRAY, RECILE, STAKELUM & HAYES, L.L.P.
          One Galleria Boulevard, Suite 1100
          Metairie, LA 70001
          Telephone: (504) 833 5600
          Facsimile: (504) 613 4528


SPRINGFIELD, MA: Court Dismisses ADA Suit
-----------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
granted Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings based on
the Absence of IDEA Exhaustion in the case captioned S.S., a minor,
by his mother, S.Y., on behalf of himself and other similarly
situated students; the PARENT/PROFESSIONAL ADVOCACY LEAGUE; and the
DISABILITY LAW CENTER, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD,
MASSACHUSETTS; DOMENIC SARNO, in his official capacity as Mayor of
City of Springfield; SPRINGFIELD PUBLIC SCHOOLS; DANIEL J. WARWICK,
in his official capacity as Superintendent of Springfield Public
Schools, Defendants, Civil Action No. 14-30116-MGM (D. Mass.).

The one-count complaint alleged the Defendants violated Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), with respect to S.S. and
members of the proposed class by failing to provide the educational
programs and services that would have allowed them equal access to
the educational resources offered students attending neighborhood
schools.  In the course of arguing that the Plaintiffs lack
standing, the Defendants raised concerns about IDEA exhaustion.

In order to establish standing, a plaintiff must show that (1) he
or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the challenged conduct; (2) the injury can be fairly traced to that
conduct; and (3) the injury likely will be redressed by a favorable
decision from the court.

Turning to the first two elements, the court considers whether the
Amended Complaint adequately establishes that the
Parent/Professional Advocacy League (PPAL) and the Disability Law
Center (DLC) have at least one constituent with individual standing
to sue and whether efforts to support the educational needs of
students attending the Springfield Day School are germane to the
each organization's core purposes.

As the plaintiffs, PPAL and DLC have the burden of showing at least
one constituent (1) suffered some actual or threatened injury that
(2) can fairly be traced to the failure of SPS to provide the
school-based behavioral services (SBBS) PPAL and DLC seek, and (3)
that injury likely will be redressed by a favorable decision from
the court.

The Amended Complaint identifies two individual students who were
allegedly harmed by being placed at the Springfield Public Day
School: S.S. and N.D., both of whom were constituents of PPAL and
DLC at the time the Amended Complaint was filed. The court finds
the allegations in the Amended Complaint sufficiently assert that
each of these students suffered an actual injury as a result of
attending the Public Day School, they would have attended
neighborhood schools had SBBS been available, and their educational
needs would have been better met at neighborhood schools offering
SBBS. Additionally, the involvement of both PPAL and DLC in this
litigation, and its attempt to secure access to better educational
services for a set of constituents, is consistent with the core
purposes each organization serves.

This brings the court to the third requirement for associational
standing, that the individual members' participation is not
necessary to either the claim asserted or the relief requested. As
noted above, unlike the first two requirements, this third
requirement does not arise from Article III of the Constitution.
Instead, the courts created this requirement to address matters of
administrative convenience and efficiency. Again referencing this
court's decision to deny class certification, Defendants argue this
third prong weighs against PPAL and DLC establishing associational
standing because the relevant harms, if any, suffered by their
constituents require individualized remedies.

The Defendants also point to the court's earlier ruling finding
exhaustion was required and assert relief is unavailable for any
constituent who has not exhausted. In response, the Plaintiffs
argue the relief they request can be granted without the
participation of individual constituents and, therefore, this third
prong is satisfied. Additionally, the Plaintiffs argue that
Congress abrogated application of this third prong to the DLC
through statutes which authorize DLC to seek legal remedies for its
constituents.

This court's denial of the motion for class certification followed
a probing review of submissions from both parties that went well
beyond the amended complaint. That review led the court to
determine class certification was not appropriate because
Plaintiffs had not demonstrated the members of the proposed class
had suffered the same injury and a common remedy would apply to the
whole class. The court also declined to certify the class because
of its concerns regarding the application of the IDEA exhaustion
requirement.

While these conclusions raise substantive questions about the
viability of the claims brought by PPAL and DLC, they do not, and
should not, have a direct bearing on the threshold issue of
standing. For this reason, the court assesses the third element of
associational standing in the context of the allegations made in
the Amended Complaint.

As presented there, PPAL and DLC seek prospective relief to address
an alleged problem that has caused the same harm to a group of
their constituents and, therefore, does not require the
participation of individual students. Viewed in this way, the court
cannot conclude that the prudential concerns underlying the third
element provide a basis for finding that PPAL and DLC lack
associational standing.

EXHAUSTION

Under the IDEA, parties must exhaust the available administrative
remedies before filing a civil action under another law if the
parties are seeking relief that is also available under IDEA. The
First Circuit has ruled the exhaustion requirement is not absolute
and, therefore, it is not determinative of a court's subject matter
jurisdiction to hear a case, but rather is a condition precedent to
entering federal court. As a result, where IDEA exhaustion is
required, a plaintiff who has not exhausted cannot proceed with an
ADA claim.

PPAL and DLC argue an exception to the exhaustion requirement
should be made for them because (1) IDEA administrative remedies
are available only to students' families and local educational
authorities, not entities like PPAL and DLC, (2) any such
exhaustion would be futile because the relief sought is not
available through the IDEA administrative process, and (3), in the
case of DLC, any exhaustion requirement is abrogated for Protection
and Advocacy groups seeking systemic remedies.

These arguments are not persuasive because each is premised on the
assumption that PPAL and DLC are, in fact, seeking systemic relief
for a failure to provide services unrelated to the provision FAPE
to a particular group of students. The court sees the situation
differently.

In the context of this case, whether the ADA requires something
more than the IDEA cannot be determined without consideration of
what the IDEA requires. The IDEA sets up a detailed system for
ensuring that disabled students receive individualized educational
services and the exhaustion requirement ensures that courts asked
to make determinations about whether a student has received FAPE in
the LRE have the benefit of an administrative record assembled by
educational experts. At the motion to dismiss stage, this court
narrowly determined dismissal was not appropriate because a gap
exists between the requirements of the IDEA and those of the ADA.
The court observed that in the context of S.S., such a gap could
exist only if the ADA required some support, as a reasonable
accommodation, that would have enabled S.S. to attend a
neighborhood school and receive FAPE, but that was not required
under the IDEA.

While the court expressed some doubt as to whether such a gap could
be ultimately be shown, the Amended Complaint had adequately
pleaded facts from which the court could infer there were services
which could be required by the ADA, but not the IDEA, that would
enable S.S. to attend a neighborhood school. The administrative
record from S.S.'s BSEA appeal would clearly be relevant to making
such a determination.

Though S.S. is no longer a party to this litigation, the needs
served by the exhaustion requirement are still relevant. As set out
in the Amended Complaint, the relief sought by PPAL and DLC is
closely related to questions about the provision of FAPE to their
constituents. As a result, IDEA exhaustion is required. In the
absence of such exhaustion, PPAL and DLC are unable to state a
claim for relief under the ADA.

The court finds PPAL and DLC have associational standing, but
grants the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings based
on the absence of IDEA exhaustion.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7ccr8f2 from
Leagle.com.

S B, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by Elizabeth M. Bresnahan --
elizabeth.bresnahan@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
LLP.

Parent/Professional Advocacy League, Plaintiff, represented by
Alison Barkoff -- abarkoff@cpr-us.org -- Center for Public
Representation, pro hac vice, Elizabeth M. Bresnahan --
elizabeth.bresnahan@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP,
Robert E. McDonnell -- robert.mcdonnell@morganlewis.com -- Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP, Sandra J. Staub -- sstaub@cpr−ma.org --
Center for Public Representation, Deborah A. Dorfman , The Center
for Public Representation, Ira A. Burnim , Judge Bazelon Center for
Mental Health Law, Jeff Goldman -- jeff.goldman@morganlewis.com --
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Jennifer Mathis , Bazelon Center for
Mental Health Law, pro hac vice, Matthew T. Bohenek --
matthew.bohenek@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP,
Michael D. Blanchard , Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP & Samuel R.
Miller -- smiller@cpr−ma.org -- The Center for Public
Representation.

ST. LOUIS, MO: Ct. Won't Consolidate M. Faulk's Claim with "Ahmad"
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned MALEEHA AHMAD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, Defendant, Case No. 4:17 CV 2455 CDP (E.D.
Cal.), Michael Faulk moves to consolidate his individual Section
1983 claim for damages (Case No. 4:18CV308 JCH) with the instant
potential class action case seeking solely injunctive relief.
Faulk is not a plaintiff in this case, and there is no indication
that the parties to the instant case seek consolidation with
Faulk's case.  Given the age and advanced procedural posture of the
instant case, as well as the differing types of relief sought in
each case, the motion to consolidate will be denied.  

Accordingly, the The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, Eastern Division, denied the The motion to
consolidate the instant case with Case Number 4:18 CV 308 JCH.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 14, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8ss53jo from
Leagle.com.

Maleeha S. Ahmad, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony E. Rothert ,
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI FOUNDATION, Gillian R.
Wilcox , AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI, Jessie M.
Steffan , AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI FOUNDATION &
Omri E. Praiss , AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI
FOUNDATION.

Brian Baude & W. Patrick Mobley, Plaintiffs, represented by Anthony
E. Rothert , AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI FOUNDATION
& Omri E. Praiss , AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI
FOUNDATION.

Michael A Faulk, Plaintiff, represented by John McCann Waldron --
jwaldron@archcitydefenders.org -- ARCHCITY DEFENDERS.

City of St. Louis, Missouri, Defendant, represented by H. Anthony
Relys , ST. LOUIS CITY COUNSELOR'S OFFICE & Thomas R. McDonnell ,
ST. LOUIS CITY COUNSELOR.

SURNAIK HOLDINGS: Personal Injury Suit Remanded to State Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia, Charleston Division, granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand
the case captioned PAUL SNIDER, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SURNAIK HOLDINGS OF WV, LLC, a
West Virginia limited liability company, Defendant, Civil Action
No. 2:17-cv-04388 (S.D.W.V.), to to the Circuit Court of Wood
County, West Virginia.

The Complaint alleges that the proposed class incurred personal
injury and property damages arising from the toxic smoke from the
fire and smoldering ruins of the warehouse which continued to be a
nuisance and health hazard to residents and workers in the vicinity
of the fire for days. Plaintiff asserts (1) negligence; (2)
reckless, willful, and wanton indifference motivated by financial
gain; (3) nuisance; and (4) trespass.

The main dispute between the parties as to this motion is whether
the home-state exception under the Class Action Fairness Act
applies. The home-state exception provides that a district court
shall decline to exercise jurisdiction over a class action in which
two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes
in the aggregate, and the primary defendants, are citizens of the
State in which the action was originally filed.

The Plaintiff provides an affidavit and letter report analyzing the
distribution of residents within the 8.5 mile radius of the
warehouse, which is the proposed class for this case. The report
shows that based on 2010 census data, 88% of the residents reside
in West Virginia and only 12% reside in Ohio. The 88% of residents
within the proposed class is clearly above the two-thirds required
by the statute, yet the Defendant is right that this letter-report
only considers residency while the law looks at citizenship. The
Defendant further suggests that the letter-report is unreliable
because it looks at data from 2010 and includes countless
individuals who are not part of the proposed class. While that may
be correct in theory, Defendant's argument are lengthy reaches. The
Defendant fails to cast enough doubt on the affidavit provided by
Plaintiff to persuade this Court that less than two-thirds of the
proposed class hold West Virginia citizenship, even when
considering the Defendant's objections.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 18, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7g5lj2d from
Leagle.com.

Paul Snider, on behalf of himself and a class of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander D. McLaughlin , THE
CALWELL PRACTICE, John H. Skaggs , THE CALWELL PRACTICE & Melissa
H. Luce , THE CALWELL PRACTICE.

Surnaik Holdings of WV, LLC, A West Virginia Limited Liability
Company, Defendant, represented by Bradley K. Shafer --
bshafer@defensecounsel.com -- MINTZER SAROWITZ ZERIS LEDVA &
MEYERS, Isaac Ralston Forman -- iforman@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY
& GLASSER, Jason G. Wehrle -- jwehrle@defensecounsel.com -- MINTZER
SAROWITZ ZERIS LEDVA & MEYERS, Jennings L. Hart, III --
jhart@defensecounsel.com -- MINTZER SAROWITZ ZERIS LEDVA & MEYERS,
Jonathan Zak Ritchie -- zritchie@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY &
GLASSER, Michael B. Hissam -- mhissam@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY &
GLASSER & Ryan McCune Donovan -- rdonovan@baileyglasser.com --
BAILEY & GLASSER.

TAYLOR & TYLER: Underpays AirCon Technicians, Archon Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
TYLER ARCHON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TAYLOR & TYLER, INC.; and ERIC GUILLORY,
Case No. 2:18-cv-06854-ILRL-MBN (E.D. La., July 19, 2018) is an
action against the Defendants to recover unpaid overtime wages, and
damages.

Mr. Archon was employed by the Defendants as air conditioning
technician from July 2017 to June 2018.

Taylor & Tyler, Inc. is a Louisiana corporation providing air
conditioning, heating, and insulation services for residential and
commercial businesses. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew S. Parmet, Esq.
          PARMET HEDGPETH LLP
          800 Sawyer St.
          Houston, TX 77007
          Telephone: (713) 999-5228
          E-mail: matt@parmethedgpeth.com


TBC RETAIL: Court Dismisses Ouachita Residents' ADTPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, Charleston Division, granted Moving Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the case captioned ANDREW GORDON, TAVIS MCNEIL, DONALD
WRIGHTON, NICHOLAS COLE, JACOB GRISSON, AND DAWN DEWEY, on behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TBC
RETAIL GROUP, INC. d/b/a TIRE KINGDOM, Defendant, No.
2:14-cv-03365-DCN (D.S.C.).

The Plaintiffs bring claims in their capacities as personal
representatives of the estates of two former residents of the
Ouachita Nursing and Rehabilitation Center (Facility) as well as on
behalf of a proposed class consisting of all residents and estates
of residents who resided at Camden Operations, LLC and
Camden-Progressive Eldercare Services, Inc. both d/b/a Ouachita
Nursing and Rehabilitation Center.

In the Third Amended Class Action Complaint, the Plaintiffs assert
causes of action for (1) violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (ADTPA)  (2) breach of the admission agreement (3)
illegal exaction under Article Sixteen, section Thirteen of the
Arkansas Constitution  (4) civil conspiracy/acting in concert and
(5) unjust enrichment.

Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act Claims

The Moving Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs have failed to
sufficiently plead an ADTPA claim and that, therefore, the
Plaintiffs' claims against the Moving Defendants for alleged ADTPA
violations should be dismissed. The Court finds it unnecessary to
re-state the reasons why the Plaintiffs' claims warrant dismissal,
as the same reasoning and rationale that warrants dismissal of the
Plaintiffs' ADTPA claims against the Camden Defendants apply with
equal force to the Moving Defendants.  Therefore, the Court finds
that the Plaintiffs' ADTPA claims against the Moving Defendants
should be dismissed.

Breach of Contract

The Moving Defendants further assert that the Plaintiffs' breach of
contract claims against them must be dismissed because none of the
Moving Defendants aside from Separate Defendant Camden-Progressive
Eldercare Services, Inc., d/b/a Ouachita Nursing and Rehabilitation
Center (Camden-PES) are parties to the allegedly breached admission
agreement.

In response, the Plaintiffs state that they bring breach of
contract claims against Separate Defendants Camden Operations, LLC
d/b/a Ouachita Nursing and Rehabilitation Center and Camden-PES
only and are not seeking breach of contract claims against the
remaining Moving Defendants.  Accordingly, the instant motion
should be granted insofar as it seeks dismissal of all breach of
contract claims against the Moving Defendants, excluding Separate
Defendant Camden-PES.

Unjust Enrichment

The Moving Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment
claims must be dismissed because there is an express contract. In
response, the Plaintiffs assert that the existence of an express
contract does not foreclose a cause of action for unjust
enrichment.

In the case at bar, the Plaintiffs do not specifically argue that
any exceptions to the general rule apply or that the contract at
issue the admission agreement does not fully address the subject of
staffing. Even assuming arguendo that the Plaintiffs did make such
arguments, the Court finds that none of the exceptions apply. There
is no indication that there has been a rescission at law, that the
contract was discharged by impossibility or frustration of purpose,
or that there has been a fundamental mistake about something
important in the contract.

Moreover, although the admission agreement in this case does not
specifically discuss staffing levels, it does require that the
facility provide care and services to the residents in exchange for
payment. The Facility's staffing levels directly impact the
quality, consistency, and frequency of the care and services that
the residents receive, Thus, the Court finds that the admission
agreements fully address the subject of resident care, including
staffing levels. As a result, no exceptions apply to allow the
Plaintiffs to assert an unjust enrichment claim in concert with
their breach of contract claims.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for unjust
enrichment against all the Defendants.

Illegal Exaction

The Moving Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs' illegal exaction
claims must be dismissed because the Plaintiffs have not alleged
any wrongful action by the State of Arkansas. The parties'
arguments on this issue essentially repeat the arguments put
forward in regard to the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Camden
Defendants. The Court has addressed this issue in the order
concerning the Camden Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. In that order,
the Court found that the Plaintiffs' illegal exaction claims fail
and, accordingly, should be dismissed. The Court finds it
unnecessary to re-state the reasons why the Plaintiffs' claims
warrant dismissal, as the same reasoning and rationale that
warrants dismissal of the Plaintiffs' illegal exaction claims
against the Camden Defendants apply with equal force to the Moving
Defendants. Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs' illegal
exaction claims against the Moving Defendants should be dismissed.


Civil Conspiracy/Acting in Concert

The Moving Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs' civil
conspiracy/acting in concert claims must be dismissed because there
is no tort to support such claims. In response, the Plaintiffs
assert that a civil conspiracy/acting in concert claim may be based
on some tortious activity such as an ADTPA claim. Upon
consideration, the Court finds it unnecessary to re-state the
reasons why the Plaintiffs' claims warrant dismissal, as the same
reasoning and rationale that warrants dismissal of the Plaintiffs'
civil conspiracy/acting in concert claims against the Camden
Defendants apply with equal force to the Moving Defendants.

Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs' civil
conspiracy/acting in concert claims against the Moving Defendants
should be dismissed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yam2rhw5 from
Leagle.com.

Andrew Gordon, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated individuals, Tavis McNeil, Individually and on behalf of
all other similarly situated individuals, Donald Wrighton,
Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated
individuals, Nicholas Cole, Individually and on behalf of all other
similarly situated individuals, Jacob Grisson, Individually and on
behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Dawn Dewey,
Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated
individuals, Justin Woody, Charles Mullis, Luan Truong, Michael
Sienerth, Roger McQueen, Roger Carroll, Beamon Lucas, Andrew Cohn,
George Whitener, Christopher Winemiller, Billy Griffin, David
Valentine, Michael Smith, Andrew Montgomery, Plaintiffs,
represented by Marybeth E. Mullaney , Mullaney Law LLC, 321 E Bay
StCharleston, SC 29401

TBC Retail Group Inc, doing business as Tire Kingdom, Defendant,
represented by Kristin Starnes Gray -- kgray@fordharrison.com --
Ford and Harrison, Wade Edward Ballard -- wballard@fordharrison.com
-- Ford and Harrison & Louis Percival Britt, III --
lbritt@fordharrison.com -- FordHarrison, pro hac vice.

TRI-STATE CAREFLIGHT: Move to Strike W. Payne's Wage Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
denied Defendants' Motion to Strike the case captioned WILLIAM D.
PAYNE; NICOLE PAYNE; LESLIE B. BENSON; KEITH BASTIAN; JACQUELINE
FERNANDEZ-QUEZADA; CASON N. HEARD; GREGORY OLDHAM and SHERRY K.
WELCH, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. TRI-STATE CAREFLIGHT, LLC, and BLAKE A. STAMPER,
individually, Defendants, No. CIV 14-1044 JB/KBM (D.M.N.).

Tri-State CareFlight operates a fleet of aircraft, which it staffs
with pilots and trained medical personnel. Tri-State CareFlight and
Defendant Blake Stamper are or were employers within the definition
of the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act (NMMWA). This case is a
wage-and-hour dispute. The Plaintiffs seek to recover unpaid
overtime compensation under the NMMWA and other unpaid compensation
on a theory of unjust enrichment.

In the Motion to Strike, the Defendants argue that the Court should
dismiss the Complaint, because the case remains closed. The
Plaintiffs may not file their Complaint until they convince the
Court to set aside the Final Judgment. The Defendants contend that
the Court should strike or dismiss the Complaint on jurisdictional
grounds pursuant to rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, or pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, because the Court cannot provide relief so long as the
Final Judgment remains in place.

The Plaintiffs argue that filing the Complaint was proper, because
the Plaintiffs contend the Court's Intervention MOO establishes
that the Plaintiffs may proceed with their claims without moving to
set aside the Final Judgment. The Plaintiffs contend that they do
not seek to undo the Final Judgment, which resolves five
Plaintiffs' individual claims but did not affect the nascent class
interests. The Plaintiffs also contend that the Defendants, in
bringing the Motion to Strike, aim to keep the Plaintiffs' claims
active in the sister proceeding Bell, which could mean that some
Plaintiffs' and proposed class members' claims might be time
barred.

The Court will deny the Motion to Strike. The Plaintiffs will make
a rule 59 or a rule 60 motion to undo the Final Judgment, or
convince the Court that it need not set the Final Judgment aside to
proceed on their claims. Filing a rule 12(b) motion to dismiss a
complaint tolls the time required for the defendant to answer the
complaint. If the Court ultimately determines that the Plaintiffs
may proceed with their claims in this case, the Court will have an
operative Complaint on file and the Defendants can answer it or
otherwise respond to it, and the time for the Defendants to answer
the Complaint will no longer be tolled.

If the Court determines that the Plaintiffs cannot proceed on their
claims, and if the Court does not allow the Plaintiffs to use this
case as a vehicle to litigate their claims, the Complaint will be
of no effect. The only prejudice that the Defendants have expressed
is that, if the Complaint remains on the docket, they do not know
whether to respond to it; the Court can solve that problem by
saying that the Defendants do not have to respond.

Accordingly, the Court will not require the Defendants to answer
the Complaint, but the Court will also not strike the Complaint.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 21, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9xathtl from
Leagle.com.

Usvaldo R. Trujillo, Daniel Bergman, Danielle Irvin, Michael
Castro, Alex Jones, Jason Perry, William Dallas Bundrant, Jr.,
Alexander Howell, Shane Herron, Greg Walsh, Shailendra Basnet,
Philip Qubain, Donald Luke Keenan, Courtney Guerra, Kevin Napp,
Paul Ratigan, Kristy Bell, Kristen Grado, Erin Johnson, Ron
McDearmid, Daron Ruckman, Eric Parker, Joseph Root, Ian Stephens,
Paul Serino, Luke Forslund, David Daniels, Thomas Cislo, Cindy D.
Maxwell, Kara Cervantes, Virginia Williams, Rehannon Gonzales, Adam
Doyle, Amanda Petersen, Tyler Wilkins, Christian Speakman, Chase
Carter, Harold Joseph Fisher, Kathy Onsurez-Wilson, Darren Een,
Daniel Kuhler, Daniel St. Peters, Darrin Hamilton, Bethany
McCandless, Dan Meehan, Christina Fleeman, James O'Connor, Jennifer
Mazzanti, Allen Jacobs, Jennifer Valdez, William J. McConnell,
Graciela Villalobos, Brent Place, Paul Vacula, Walter Fabian,
Nathan Maplesden, Salustiano Fragoso, Toby Eicher, Deborah Berest,
Rocky H. Burrows, II, Terry Zacharias, Frederic Ruebush, Jennifer
Salaverry, Jimmy Ronald Primm, Jr., Michael Zulaski, Brenda
Casarez, Simon Lucero, Eric Vogt & Raphael Mahaim, Intervenor
Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher M. Moody , Moody & Stanford
PC.

Tri-State Careflight, LLC & Blake A. Stamper, Individually,
Defendants, represented by Charles J. Vigil -- cvigil@rodey.com --
Rodey Dickson Sloan Akin & Robb, P.A., Melanie B. Stambaugh --
mstambaugh@rodey.com -- Rodey Dickason Sloan Akin & Robb PA &
Jeffrey L. Lowry -- jlowry@rodey.com -- Rodey, Dickason, Sloan,
Akin & Robb, P.A.

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: Faces "Weiss" and "Lowinger" Suits
--------------------------------------------------------
Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. (21CF) said in its Form 8-K filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filed on July 13,
2018, that the company faces two class purported class action suits
entitled, Weiss v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. et al. and
Lowinger v. Twenty-First Century Fox, In. et al.

On July 9, 2018, 21CF received notice of a complaint filed July 6,
2018 by Robert Weiss, a purported 21CF shareholder, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, against 21CF and the
21CF board.

The purported class action lawsuit was filed in the District of
Delaware and is captioned Weiss v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.
et al. , No. 18-1007 (D. Del.).

The complaint alleges, among other things, that 21CF and the 21CF
board violated Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act,
15.U.S.C. Sections 78n(a), 78t(a), and SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R.
240.14a-9. Specifically, Mr. Weiss alleges that material
information concerning various aspects of the transactions has been
omitted or misrepresented.

In addition, on July 11, 2018, purported 21CF shareholder Robert
Lowinger, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
filed a complaint in the Southern District of New York alleging,
among other things, that 21CF and the 21CF board violated Sections
14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15.U.S.C. Sections 78n(a),
78t(a), and SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9. The case is
captioned as Lowinger v. Twenty-First Century Fox, In. et al. , No.
18-6261 (S.D.NY.). Specifically, Mr. Lowinger alleges that material
information concerning various aspects of the transactions has been
omitted or misrepresented.

Through these actions, Messrs. Weiss and Lowinger seek to enjoin
the July 27, 2018 21CF special meeting. The defendants believe that
both actions are without merit.

Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
operates as a diversified media and entertainment company primarily
in the United States, the United Kingdom, Continental Europe, Asia,
and Latin America. It operates through Cable Network Programming,
Television, and Filmed Entertainment segments. The company is based
in New York, New York.

UNITED STATES: Court Certifies Class of Somalian Deportees
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District Florida
granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case
captioned Farah IBRAHIM, Ibrahim MUSA, Khalid Abdallah MOHMED,
Ismail JIMCALE ABDULLAH, Abdiwali Ahmed SIYAD, Ismael Abdirashed
MOHAMED, and Khadar Abdi IBRAHIM, on behalf of themselves and all
those similarly situated, Plaintiffs/Petitioners, v. Juan ACOSTA,
Assistant Field Officer Director, Miami Field Office, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; David HARDIN, Sheriff of Glades County;
Marc J. MOORE, Field Office Director, Miami Field Office,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Thomas HOMAN, Acting Director,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Kirstjen NIELSEN, Secretary of
Homeland Security, Defendants/Respondents, Case No.
17-cv-24574-GAYLES (S.D. Fla.).

The Plaintiffs allege they were subjected to inhumane conditions
and egregious abuse on the December 7th flight. The Plaintiffs
further contend that the international news attention surrounding
the botched deportation flight has exacerbated circumstances that
now make their return to Somalia unsafe.

The party seeking certification must satisfy the four threshold
requirements of Rule 23(a) that: (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class. A class is properly
certified under Rule 23(b)(2) when a single injunction or
declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the
class.

Numerosity

The Court finds that the class definition of 92 individuals with
removal orders who were present on the December 7, 2017, attempted
flight to Somalia is adequately defined and ascertainable. In
addition, while unchallenged by the Defendants, the Court finds
that the class size of 64 individuals is sufficient to satisfy the
numerosity requirement.

Commonality

According to the Complaint, the putative class members' claims
arise out of a common nucleus of fact in that they have final
orders of removal, they were present on the attempted December 7th
deportation flight to Somalia, and they contend that the
circumstances surrounding the December 7th flight have impacted
their risk of being tortured or persecuted upon return to Somalia.


Typicality

The claims and legal theories advanced by the named Plaintiffs are
typical to those of the putative class members as all class members
seek an opportunity to move to reopen their immigration cases based
on changed circumstances arising, at least in part, from the
December 7th flight. While there may be factual differences among
the class members' claims to be presented before the immigration
courts, the Court finds that the issues raised by the named
Plaintiffs in this action are typical of the claims of the other
class members.

Adequacy of Representation

At first glance, the Defendants' arguments are not without merit.
Indeed, several putative class members have moved to be excused
from this litigation and returned to Somalia rather than remain in
detention and pursue motions to reopen before the immigration
courts. However, the Plaintiffs have taken efforts in the interests
of all class members to ensure that any putative class members who
do not wish to be included in this litigation can opt-out and be
subject to immediate removal. As the Plaintiffs have pursued the
instant relief on behalf of putative class members who wish to
reopen their removal proceedings and facilitated the wishes of
other putative class members who do not want to reopen their
proceedings, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs will fairly
represent the interests of the class.

Rule 23(b)(2)

The Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the Defendants have acted on
common grounds as to the putative class members as evidenced by the
Defendants attempts to immediately remove them to Somalia. The
putative class members share a common injury in that their
immediate removal would effectively preclude their ability to
exercise their statutory right to move to reopen their removal
cases. Further, the class-wide injunctive relief that may
potentially be awarded in this action would address the common
injuries shared by the class members. Accordingly, the Court finds
that the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) have been met.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 21, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yaolmw9t from Leagle.com.

Farah Ibrahim, Plaintiff, represented by Andrea Nahra Crumrine  --
acrumrine@aijustice.com -- Americans for Immigrant Justice, Andrea
Montavon-McKillip -- amontavon@legalaid.org -- Legal Aid Service of
Broward County, Inc., Benjamin Richard Casper – caspe010@umn.edu
-- James H. Binger Center for New Americans, Lee Gelernt --
lgelernt@aclu.org -- America Civil Liberties Union, pro hac vice,
Lisa M. Berlow-Lehner -- llehner@aijustice.com -- Americans for
Immigrant Justice, Michele Garnett McKenzie, The Advocates for
Human Rights, pro hac vice, Amien Kacou , American Civil Liberties
Union of Florida, Nancy Gbana Abudu , American Civil Liberties
Union of Florida, Romy Louise Lerner -- rlerner@law.miami.edu --
University of Miami School of Law Immigration Clinic & Rebecca Ann
Sharpless -- rsharpless@law.miami.edu -- University of Miami School
of Law.

Ibrahim Musa, Khalid Abdallah Mohmed, Ismail Jimcale Abdullah,
Abdiwali Ahmed Siyad, Ismael Abdirashed Mohamed & Khadar Abdi
Ibrahim, on behalf of themselves and all those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Andrea Nahra Crumrine , Americans for
Immigrant Justice, Andrea Montavon-McKillip , Legal Aid Service of
Broward County, Inc., Benjamin Richard Casper , James H. Binger
Center for New Americans, Lee Gelernt , America Civil Liberties
Union, pro hac vice, Lisa M. Berlow-Lehner , Americans for
Immigrant Justice, Michele Garnett McKenzie , The Advocates for
Human Rights, pro hac vice, Amien Kacou , American Civil Liberties
Union of Florida, Romy Louise Lerner , University of Miami School
of Law Immigration Clinic & Rebecca Ann Sharpless , University of
Miami School of Law.

Assistant Field Office Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Juan Acosta, Sheriff of Glades County, David Hardin,
Field Office Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Miami Office, Marc J. Moore, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Thomas Homan & Secretary of Homeland Security,
Kirstjen Nielsen, Defendants, represented by Dexter Lee , United
States Attorney's Office, Sheetul S. Wall , U.S. Department of
Justice Office of Immigration Litigation & Anthony D. Bianco , U.S.
Department of Justice Civil Division, Office of Immigration
Litigation.

USCB INC: Aparicio Sues over Debt Collection Practices
------------------------------------------------------
IMELDA APARICIO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff vs. USCB, INC., and DOES 1-10, Defendant, Case
No. 2:18-cv-06312 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2018) seeks to stop the
Defendants' unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

USCB, Inc., doing business as USCB America, provides accounts
receivable and resource management services. The company caters to
hospitals, healthcare networks, financial institutions, and
governmental agencies. USCB, Inc. was formerly known as United
States Credit Bureau. The company was founded in 1915 and is based
in Los Angeles, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com


VALLEY COLLECTION: Court Dismisses C. Lester's Class Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, issued an Order of Dismissal in the case
captioned COREY LESTER, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. VALLEY COLLECTION SERVICE, LLC, Defendant,
No. C17-1260RSL. (W.D. Wash.).

Plaintiff Corey Lester and Defendant Valley Collection Service, LLC
having stipulated for dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against
Defendant.  All claims brought by Plaintiff Corey Lester
individually are dismissed with prejudice and without cause, and
without an award of costs or fees to any party.  All claims brought
by Plaintiff Corey Lester on behalf of the purported class are
dismissed without prejudice, and without an award of costs or fees
to any party.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 18, 2018 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/ybu37xs4 from Leagle.com.

Corey Lester, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Abbas Kazerounian -- ak@kazlg.com --
KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP APC, Joshua Swigart --
josh@westcoastlitigation.com -- HYDE & SWIGART & Ryan Lee McBride
-- ryan@kazlg.com -- KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP APC.

Valley Collection Service LLC, Defendant, represented by David
Edward Worley --dworley@scheerlaw.com -- SCHEER LAW GROUP LLP &
Jonathan Dirk Holt - dholt@scheerlaw.com -- SCHEER LAW GROUP LLP.

VENATOR MATERIALS: Sees Final  Settlement Approval Hearing in Q4
----------------------------------------------------------------
Venator Materials PLC said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 31, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the final settlement
approval hearing in the TiO2 antitrust related suit is expected to
occur in the fourth quarter of 2018.

In the past, the company was named as a defendant in multiple civil
antitrust suits alleging that the company, its co-defendants and
other alleged co-conspirators conspired to fix prices of TiO2 sold
in the U.S. The company settled litigation involving both direct
purchasers of TiO2 and purchasers who opted out of the direct
purchaser litigation for amounts immaterial to the company's
unaudited condensed consolidated and combined financial
statements.

Venator Materials said "We were also named as a defendant in a
class action civil antitrust suit filed on March 15, 2013 in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California by
purchasers of products made from TiO2 (the "Indirect Purchasers")
making essentially the same allegations as did the direct
purchasers.

On October 14, 2014, plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Class
Action Complaint narrowing the class of plaintiffs to those
merchants and consumers of architectural coatings containing TiO2.

On August 11, 2015, the court granted the company's motion to
dismiss the Indirect Purchasers litigation with leave to amend the
complaint. A Third Amended Class Action Complaint was filed on
September 29, 2015 further limiting the class to consumers of
architectural paints. Plaintiffs have raised state antitrust claims
under the laws of 15 states, consumer protection claims under the
laws of nine states, and unjust enrichment claims under the laws of
16 states.

On November 4, 2015, the company and its co-defendants filed
another motion to dismiss. On June 13, 2016, the court
substantially denied the motion to dismiss except as to consumer
protection claims in one state.

Venator Materials said, "We have agreed to settle this matter for
an amount immaterial to our unaudited condensed consolidated and
combined financial statements. The court preliminarily approved the
settlement on December 13, 2017 and the final approval hearing is
expected to occur in the fourth quarter of 2018. The Indirect
Purchasers sought to recover injunctive relief, treble damages or
the maximum damages allowed by state law, costs of suit and
attorneys' fees. We are not aware of any illegal conduct by us or
any of our employees."

Venator Materials PLC manufactures and markets chemical products
worldwide. It operates through two segments, Titanium Dioxide and
Performance Additives. he company was founded in 2017 and is
headquartered in Stockton-On-Tees, the United Kingdom.

VITAJUWEL USA: Removes Ashkinazi Suit to N.D. Illinois
------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of ANNA ASHKINAZI, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. VITAJUWEL
USA, INC., Defendant, filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from the
Circuit Court of the State of Illinois, Cook County (Case No.
2018-CH-07777) to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois on July 20, 2018, and assigned Case No. Case No.
1:18-cv-04965 (N.D. Ill., July 20, 2018).

VitaJuwel USA, Inc. is a California corporation with its principal
place of business in Concord, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jordan E. Wilkow, Esq.
          Michael I. Rothstein, Esq.
          Timothy A. Hudson, Esq.
          TABET DIVITO & ROTHSTEIN LLC
          209 South LaSalle Street, 7th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 762-9450
          E-mail:    mrothstein@tdrlawfirm.com
                     thudson@tdrlawfirm.com
                     jwilkow@tdrlawfirm.com


VITALE'S PIZZERIA: Collier Suit Alleges FLSA Violation
------------------------------------------------------
Monica Collier, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Vitale's Pizzeria of Hudsonville, LLC, Maurizio
Logiudice, and Mandy Tithof, Case No. 1:18-cv-00804  (D. Mich.,
July 19, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid overtime compensation under
the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff worked as a server for Defendants Vitale's Pizzeria
of Hudsonville, Maurizio LoGiudice, and Mandy Tithof from July 2011
until October 2017.  

The Defendants own and operate Vitale's, an Italian restaurant
serving pizza, pasta, and other such Italian cuisine. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Robert Anthony Alvarez, Esq.
      Agustin Henriquez, Esq.
      AVANTI LAW GROUP, PLLC
      600 28th St. SW
      Wyoming, MI 49509
      Tel: (616) 257-6807
      E-mail: ralvarez@avantilaw.com

WELLS FARGO: Minnesota Court Grants Dismissal of ERISA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the plaintiff's second
amended complaint in the case captioned IN RE: WELLS FARGO ERISA
401(k) LITIGATION, Case No. 16-CV-3405 (PJS/BRT)(D. Minn.).

The Plaintiffs then brought this lawsuit under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), against Wells Fargo and
corporate insiders who served as fiduciaries of their 401(k) plan.
The Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated two distinct duties
under ERISA the duty of prudence and the duty of loyalty by failing
to disclose Wells Fargo's unethical sales practices.

The Defendants argue that the Dudenhoeffer (Dudenhoeffer, 134 S.
Ct. at 2464) pleading standard should be applied not only to
prudence claims, but to loyalty claims and that, under that
standard, plaintiffs' loyalty claim should be dismissed for the
same reasons that their prudence claim was dismissed.  The
Defendants also argue that, even if the Dudenhoeffer pleading
standard is not applied to plaintiffs' loyalty claim, that claim
should nevertheless be dismissed.

APPLICATION OF DUDENHOEFFER TO LOYALTY CLAIMS

The Defendants first argue that, even though Dudenhoeffer described
only what was necessary to plead viable prudence claims, its
pleading standard should also be applied to loyalty claims.

In Dudenhoeffer, the Supreme Court eliminated the presumption of
prudence, holding that the law does not create a special
presumption favoring ESOP fiduciaries. Rather, the Supreme Court
said, the same standard of prudence applies to all ERISA
fiduciaries, including ESOP fiduciaries .

In its earlier order in this case, this Court characterized this
more-harm-than-good standard as very tough and explained why
plaintiffs will only rarely be able to plausibly allege that a
prudent fiduciary 'could not' have concluded that a later
disclosure of negative inside information would have less of an
impact on the stock's price than an earlier disclosure. After
examining plaintiffs' amended complaint, the Court concluded that
plaintiffs have failed to plead specific facts to make plausible
their allegation that, under the circumstances of this particular
case, a prudent fiduciary 'could not have concluded' that a later
disclosure would result in a smaller loss to the Fund than an
earlier disclosure.

For that reason, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' prudence
claim.

That brings the Court to the plaintiffs' loyalty claim. The
Defendants concede that Dudenhoeffer was explicitly limited to
prudence claims. But, say defendants, just about any prudence claim
can easily be recast as a loyalty claim. That is particularly true
in insider-information cases. By definition, these are cases in
which the defendant was a corporate insider who served as the
fiduciary of an ESOP plan, the defendant received negative inside
information about the company, and the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant breached the duty of prudence by not disclosing or
otherwise acting upon that inside information. In that context,
defendants argue, turning a prudence claim into a loyalty claim
requires nothing more than adding the allegation that, in failing
to disclose or otherwise act upon the inside information, the
defendant was motivated by a desire to protect his position as a
corporate insider.

To this point, the Court agrees with the defendants. And the Court
also agrees with the defendants that given how easy it is for a
plaintiff to convert a prudence claim into a loyalty claim in an
insider-information case the Supreme Court would have as much
concern about these loyalty claims as it had about the prudence
claims in Dudenhoeffer. After all, these loyalty claims place ESOP
fiduciaries between a rock and a hard place in the same manner as
the prudence claims discussed in Dudenhoeffer. 134 S. Ct. at 2470.
And thus, these loyalty claims will deter companies from offering
ESOP plans unless district courts apply a mechanism for weeding out
meritless claims.

Here, however, is where this Court and defendants part ways: the
Defendants argue that this Court should apply the same mechanism
for weeding out meritless loyalty claims that Dudenhoeffer said
should be applied for weeding out meritless prudence claims. In
particular, the defendants point to the Supreme Court's admonition
that, in inside-information cases, lower courts should consider
whether the complaint has plausibly alleged that a prudent
fiduciary in the defendant's position could not have concluded that
stopping purchases or publicly disclosing negative information
would do more harm than good to the fund. The Defendants urge that
this more-harm-than-good standard should be applied to both
prudence and loyalty claims.

Given that the Court has already held that the plaintiffs' prudence
claim does not meet the standard, the defendants argue, the Court
must dismiss the plaintiffs' loyalty claim for the same reason.

APPLICATION OF IQBAL AND TWOMBLY TO PLAINTIFFS' LOYALTY CLAIM

Applying the Iqbal/Twombly standard to the plaintiffs' loyalty
claim, the Court finds that the claim is not plausible, and thus
the Court dismisses it.

To begin, the second amended complaint alleges that the individual
defendants breached their duty of loyalty by failing to avoid
conflicts of interest. It further alleges that the defendants were
Wells Fargo officers, employees, and Board members who were
incentivized to avoid doing or saying anything that would harm the
image or reputation of Wells Fargo because doing so would be
reasonably likely to damage their relationships within Wells Fargo
and on the Board, and thus harm their own careers or their places
on the Board.

In this case, the plaintiffs do not claim that the defendants
misled them about plan- and benefit-specific information, such as
the terms of Wells Fargo's 401(k) plan  Instead, the plaintiffs
claim that the defendants failed to disclose inside corporate
information that might affect the value of the corporation's stock
information that would be of interest to every member of the
investing public.  

As the Court held in Wright, the defendants have no duty under
ERISA to disclose that information; any such duty would arise under
the securities laws, and, if defendants have acted wrongly, they
can be held accountable under those laws. Therefore, to the extent
that plaintiffs' loyalty claim relies solely on defendants'
nondisclosure of inside information about Wells Fargo's present and
future financial condition, plaintiffs' loyalty claim must be
dismissed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8v85k47 from Leagle.com.

Francesca Allen, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated and on behalf of the Wells Fargo & Company 401(k) Plan,
Plaintiff, represented by Adam J. Levitt , Dicello Levitt & Casey
LLC, pro hac vice, Amy Elisabeth Keller -- akller@dlcfirm.com --
DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC, pro hac  vice, Carolyn G. Anderson --
carolyn.anderson@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, Daniel R.
Ferri -- dferri@dlcfirm.com -- Dicello Levitt & Casey LLC, pro hac
vice, Douglas J. Nill , Douglas J. Nill, P.L.L.C., Greg G. Gutzler
-- ggutzler@egslitigation.com -- Elias Gutzler Spicer LLC, pro hac
vice, June Pineda Hoidal -- june.hoidal@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman
Reed LLP, Leslie L. Pescia , Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis
& Miles, P.C., pro hac vice, Lori G. Feldman , Geragos & Geragos,
pro hac vice, Michael Brian Ershowsky -- mershowsky@zlk.com -- Levi
& Korsinsky LLP, pro hac vice, Rebecca A. Peterson --
rapeterson@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP, Richard M.
Elias -- relias@egslitigation.com -- Elias Gutzler Spicer LLC, pro
hac vice, Robert K. Shelquist -- rkshelquist@locklaw.com --
Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP, Tamara M. Spicer --
tspicer@egslitigation.com -- Elias Gutzler Spicer LLC, pro hac vice
&Wilson Daniel Miles, III , Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis &
Miles, P.C., pro hac vice.

Wells Fargo & Company & Wells Fargo Employee Benefits Review
Committee, Defendants, represented by Howard Shapiro --
howshapiro@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose, LLP, pro hac vice,
Joseph Emanuel Clark -- jclark@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose LLP,
pro hac vice, Kirsten E. Schubert -- schubert.kirsten@dorsey.com --
Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Lindsey H. Chopin -- lchopin@proskauer.com --
Proskauer Rose LLP, pro hac vice, Madeline Chimento Rea --
mrea@proskauer.com -- Proskauer Rose LLP, pro hac vice, Nicholas J.
Bullard -- bullard.nick@dorsey.com -- Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Russell
Laurence Hirschhorn -- bullard.nick@dorsey.com -- Proskauer Rose
LLP, pro hac vice & Stephen P. Lucke -- lucke.steve@dorsey.com --
Dorsey & Whitney LLP.

Wells Fargo Bank, NA, Timothy J. Sloan & Michael J. Heid,
Defendants, represented by Howard Shapiro , Proskauer Rose, LLP,
pro hac vice, Kirsten E. Schubert , Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Lindsey
H. Chopin , Proskauer Rose LLP, pro hac vice, Madeline Chimento Rea
, Proskauer Rose LLP, pro hac vice, Nicholas J. Bullard , Dorsey &
Whitney LLP, Russell Laurence Hirschhorn , Proskauer Rose LLP, pro
hac vice & Stephen P. Lucke , Dorsey & Whitney LLP.

XPO LOGISTICS: 170 Intermodal Drayage Claims Pending at June 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
XPO Logistics, Inc. still faces Intermodal Drayage Classification
Claims involving approximately 170 claimants in three separate
actions pending in California Superior Court, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

Certain of the Company's intermodal drayage subsidiaries received
notices from the California Labor Commissioner, Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement (the "DLSE"), that a total of approximately
150 owner operators contracted with these subsidiaries filed claims
in 2012 with the DLSE in which they assert that they should be
classified as employees, rather than independent contractors.
These claims seek reimbursement for the owner operators' business
expenses, including fuel, tractor maintenance and tractor lease
payments.

After a decision was rendered by a DLSE hearing officer in seven of
these claims, in 2014, the Company appealed the decision to the
California Superior Court, San Diego, where a de novo trial was
held on the merits of those claims.

On July 17, 2015, the court issued a final statement of decision
finding that the seven claimants were employees rather than
independent contractors, and awarding an aggregate of US$2.9
million plus post-judgment interest and attorneys' fees to the
claimants.

The Company exhausted its appeals in this matter and the Superior
Court entered final judgment against the Company in January 2018
and that judgment has been paid.

Separate decisions were rendered in June 2015 by a DLSE hearing
officer in claims involving five additional plaintiffs, resulting
in an award for the plaintiffs in an aggregate amount of
approximately US$0.9 million, following which the Company appealed
the decisions in the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California.

On May 16, 2017, the Court issued judgment finding that the five
claimants were employees rather than independent contractors, and
awarding an aggregate of approximately US$1.0 million plus
post-judgment interest and attorneys' fees to the claimants.  The
Company has appealed this judgment, but cannot provide assurance
that such appeal will be successful.

In addition, separate decisions were rendered in April 2017 by a
DLSE hearing officer in claims involving four additional
plaintiffs, resulting in an award for the plaintiffs in an
aggregate amount of approximately US$0.9 million, which the Company
has appealed to the California Superior Court, Long Beach.

The remaining DLSE claims (the "Pending DLSE Claims") have been
transferred to California Superior Court in three separate actions
involving approximately 170 claimants, including the claimants who
originally filed claims in 2012.

In addition, certain of the Company's intermodal drayage
subsidiaries are party to putative class action litigations in
California brought by independent contract carriers who contracted
with these subsidiaries in which the contract carriers assert that
they should be classified as employees, rather than independent
contractors.

XPO Logistics said, "The Company believes that it has adequately
accrued for the potential impact of loss contingencies that are
probable and reasonably estimable relating to the claims referenced
above.  The Company is unable at this time to estimate the amount
of the possible loss or range of loss, if any, in excess of its
accrued liability that it may incur as a result of these claims
given, among other reasons, that the range of potential loss could
be impacted substantially by future rulings by the courts involved,
including on the merits of the claims."

XPO Logistics, Inc. and its subsidiaries ("XPO" or the "Company")
use an integrated network of people, technology and physical assets
to help customers manage their goods more efficiently throughout
their supply chains. The Company's customers are multinational,
national, mid-size and small enterprises, and include many of the
most prominent companies in the world. XPO runs its business on a
global basis, with two reportable segments: Transportation and
Logistics.


XPO LOGISTICS: Last Mile Logistics Classification Claims Ongoing
----------------------------------------------------------------
XPO Logistics, Inc. still defends Last Mile Logistics
Classification Claims, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

Certain of the Company's last mile logistics subsidiaries are party
to several putative class action litigations brought by independent
contract carriers who contracted with these subsidiaries in which
the contract carriers assert that they should be classified as
employees, rather than independent contractors.  The particular
claims asserted vary from case to case, but the claims generally
allege unpaid wages, unpaid overtime, or failure to provide meal
and rest periods, and seek reimbursement of the contract carriers'
business expenses.

The cases include four related matters pending in the Federal
District Court, Northern District of California: Ron Carter, Juan
Estrada, Jerry Green, Burl Malmgren, Bill McDonald and Joel Morales
v. XPO Logistics, Inc., filed in March 2016; Ramon Garcia v. Macy's
and XPO Logistics Inc., filed in July 2016; Kevin Kramer v. XPO
Logistics Inc., filed in September 2016; and Hector Ibanez v. XPO
Last Mile, Inc., filed in May 2017.

XPO Logistics said, "The Company believes that it has adequately
accrued for the potential impact of loss contingencies relating to
the foregoing claims that are probable and reasonably estimable.
The Company is unable at this time to estimate the amount of the
possible loss or range of loss, if any, in excess of its accrued
liability that it may incur as a result of these claims given,
among other reasons, that the number and identities of plaintiffs
in these lawsuits are uncertain and the range of potential loss
could be impacted substantially by future rulings by the courts
involved, including on the merits of the claims."

XPO Logistics, Inc. and its subsidiaries ("XPO" or the "Company")
use an integrated network of people, technology and physical assets
to help customers manage their goods more efficiently throughout
their supply chains. The Company's customers are multinational,
national, mid-size and small enterprises, and include many of the
most prominent companies in the world. XPO runs its business on a
global basis, with two reportable segments: Transportation and
Logistics.


XPO LOGISTICS: Settlement of Last Mile TCPA Claims Has Final OK
---------------------------------------------------------------
XPO Logistics, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018, that the Court has approved the settlement of the
Last Mile TCPA Claims and has entered final judgment.

XPO Logistics said, "The Company is a party to a putative class
action litigation (Leung v. XPO Logistics, Inc., filed in May 2015
in the U.S. District Court, Illinois) alleging violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") related to an automated
customer call system used by a last mile logistics business that
the Company acquired.  The Company has reached an agreement to
resolve the Leung case, and the Court has approved the settlement
and entered final judgment.  The Company has accrued the full
amount of the approved settlement."

XPO Logistics, Inc. and its subsidiaries ("XPO" or the "Company")
use an integrated network of people, technology and physical assets
to help customers manage their goods more efficiently throughout
their supply chains. The Company's customers are multinational,
national, mid-size and small enterprises, and include many of the
most prominent companies in the world. XPO runs its business on a
global basis, with two reportable segments: Transportation and
Logistics.



                            *********

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