CAR_Public/180821.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, August 21, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 167

                            Headlines

ABM AVIATION: Petitt Seeks Overtime Pay under Labor Code
ACCOUNT CONTROL: Wants to Collect Time Barred Debt, Loveday Says
ACOSTA INC: Court Grants Arbitration of Individual Labor Claims
ADVENTIST HEALTH: Court Narrows Claims in D. Sheedy's ERISA Suit
AIR EVAC: T. Chanze's Suit Remains in Federal Court

AJ THAI INC: Fails to Properly Pay Workers, Srimaharaja Says
ALERE HOME: Sandusky Wellness Center Sues over Unsolicited Fax
ALIBABA GROUP: Discovery Ongoing in Federal Securities Suit
ALLEGIANT AIR: Basiliali Asks Court to Certify Class & Subclasses
ALTICE USA: Rosen Law Firm Probes Securities Claims

AMERICOLLECT INC: Faces Mezzo Suit in District of New Jersey
AMYRIS INC: Court Dismisses Amended Derivative Shareholders' Suit
ANALOGIC CORPORATION: Faces Burcaw Suit over Altaris Merger
ARCHDIOCESE OF LOS ANGELES: Fails to Pay OT, Perez Suit Alleges
AUSTRALIA: Class Action Mulled Over White Spot Outbreak

AUTOZONE STORES: Court Won't Amend Denial of Class Certification
BANK OF AMERICA: Nov. 8 ISDAfix Instrument Settlement Hearing Set
BANK OF AMERICA: Ricciardi Suit Seeks to Recover OT Pay
BAR 20: Time to File Supplemental Brief in J. Maciel's Suit Tolled
BAVARIA HAUS: Rodriguez Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA

BILLINGS, TN: Faces Class Action Over Illegal Sales Tax
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: Faces Ballou Suit in D. New Jersey
BRIGHT HORIZONS: Faces Delacruz Suit in S.D. New York
BRIGHT HOUSE: Stephan Sliwa Seeks to Certify Two Classes
BRISTOL BAY: Underpays Role-Players, Abikar Suit Alleges

CALIFORNIA FIELD: Court Approves $15.4MM Class Settlement
CAPE CLOGS: Faces Crosson Suit in Eastern District of New York
CARHARTT INC: Accused by Nevitt Suit of Not Paying Overtime Wages
CARING PROFESSIONALS: Can't Compel Arbitration in HHCs' Suit
CAVALRY PORTFOLIO: Court Stays K. Krejci's TCPA Action

CENTURYLINK INC: Gainey McKenna Files Derivative Action
CHC GROUP: $586K Attorney's Fees Awarded in Securities Fraud Suit
CHICAGO ATHLETICS: Sued Over Members' Rewards Program Termination
CIVEO CORP: Philip Suhr Class Action Dismissed
CLACKAMAS COUNTY, OR: Court Narrows Claims in Strip Search Suit

CLIENT SERVICES: Faces Kirilova Suit in Eastern Dist. of New York
COLLECTION ANALYST: Class Settlement Has Prelim Approval
COLUMBIA PIPELINE: Arbitrage Fund Suit Moved to S.D. New York
CONNORS & FONG: Faces Crosson Suit in Eastern Dist. of New York
CONSTAR FINANCIAL: Faces Stehly Suit in Eastern Dist. of New York

COTIVITI HOLDINGS: Faces Shareholder Class Action in Delaware
CP OPCO: Asks Court to Deny Class Certification in McDonald Suit
CUPERTINO HEALTHCARE: Faces Class Action Over Understaffing
CVS PHARMACY: Deadline to Respond to Calif. Suit Extended
CWI INC: Landers Seeks to Recover Wages and Damages Under FLSA

DANSKO LLC: Faces Bunting Suit in Eastern District of New York
DAYLIGHT TRANSPORT: Misclassified Delivery Drivers, Ali Suit Says
DEL TACO: Discovery Ongoing in Former Employee's Class Suit
DESCHUTES COUNTY, OR: Sheriff's Office Faces Discrimination Case
DEUTSCHE BANK: Oct. 25 Libor Settlement Fairness Hearing Set

DGS CONSTRUCTION: Two Classes in Unpaid Wage Suit Certified
DOCTOR DIRECTORY: Denial of Bid to Remand TCPA Suit Vacated
EL PASO, TX: Tex. App. Affirms Dismissal of Jury Summons Suit
EL POLLO: Workers' Lawsuit Can Proceed as Class Action
ENHANCED RECOVERY: Knutson Sues over Debt Collection Practices

ENTERPRISE BANK: Underpays Mortgage Loan Officers, Heard Alleges
ERNST & YOUNG: Burns & Levinson Attorneys Discuss SCOTUS Ruling
ESURANCE PROPERTY: Bettor Suit Moved to Southern Dist. of Florida
EVERSOURCE ENERGY: Inflates Natural Gas Prices, PNE Claims
FACEBOOK INC: UK Advocacy Group Prepares Cambridge Analytica Case

FBCS INC: Goldson Seeks Relief for S.C. Consumers Under FDCPA
FINANCIAL RECOVERIES: Faces Singer Suit in District of New Jersey
FRIENDFINDER NETWORKS: Gutierrez Sues over Data Breach
GC SERVICES: Faces Karp Suit in Eastern District of New York
GC SERVICES: Faces Moskovits Suit in District of New Jersey

GC SERVICES: Kacinski Suit in Eastern District of New York
GDS HOLDINGS: Faces Ramzan Suit Over Misleading Statements
GENERAL CABLE: Court Dismisses L. Eley's ERISA Suit
GENKI SUSHI: Over 50,000 People Could Be Entitled to Money
GRAND ISLE SHIPYARD: Sandlin Seeks Overtime Pay

GRANDISON MANAGEMENT: Physical Therapist Files Wage-and-Hour Suit
HAKIMIAN MANAGEMENT: Faces Fischler Suit in S.D. New York
HENRY LIMOUSINE: Court Approves $260K Class Settlement
HILTON GRAND: Court Grants Prelim Approval of Class Settlement
HOME INSTEAD: Faces Delacruz Suit in Southern Dist. of New York

HOUSTON, TX: Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Over Rape Kit Backlog
IBILEY UNIFORM: Pineda Sues Over Marketing Text Messages
IMPERIAL J & Y: Fails to Pay OT Wages, Herrera-Cautle Suit Says
INNERWORKINGS INC: Faces "Brown" Securities Class Action Suit
INTERNATIONAL HAIR: Faces Doucet Suit in S.D. California

INVENTION SUBMISSION: Calhoun Suit Transferred to W.D. Pa.
JC WASHINGTON: Fails to Pay Wages to Delivery Driver, Bavaro Says
JFK MEDICAL: Mendez et al. Seek to Certify Two Classes
JUDICIAL CORRECTION: Removes Eaton Suit to N.D. Alabama
KAHALA HOTEL: Judgment in J. Kawakami's Suit Vacated

KESEF LLC: Fails to Pay Minimum Wages, Bonhomme Suit Alleges
KOCH FOODS: Court Denies Agri Stats' Bid for Protective Order
KONICA MINOLTA: Faces Randolph Suit in Sacramento, California
L3 TECHNOLOGIES: Underpays Mechanics, Thomas Suit Alleges
LOUISIANA: Court Stays Discovery in Drug Court Program Suit

LUNG INSTITUTE: Stem Cell Treatment Suit Remanded to State Court
LUXOTTICA RETAIL: Calif. Court Dismisses Unfair Competition Suit
MAGIC LAUNDRY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Juarez Suit Alleges
MANUFACTURERS AND TRADERS: D. Franklin Suit Remains in Dist. Court
MATSUYA QUALITY: Summary Judgment Bid in FLSA Suit Denied

MATTHEWS DINER: Uribe Suit Moved to District of New Jersey
MCDONALD'S: Gave Away $15MM to Customers Following Settlement
MDL 2545: Court Denies Certification of Nation-wide Class of TPPs
MENTOR CORP: Court Allows Amendment in Urbieta Couple's Suit
MERCANTILE ADJUSTMENT: Faces Goodman Suit in E.D. New York

MERCEDES-BENZ USA: Faces Dumond Suit over Defective Sunroofs
MIDWEST SUPPLY: Smith Seeks Certification of Collective Action
MOVIEPASS: Users Threaten Class Action After Series of Problems
NEVCO CONTRACTING: Underpays Construction Laborers, Contreras Says
NEW JERSEY: Court Dismisses Federal Claims in IDEA Suit

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY: Averts Workers' ERISA Class Action
NEW YORK: Homeowners to File Suit Over Build It Back Program
NEW ZEALAND: Ex-Bella Vista Residents Sue Tauranga City Council
NFL: Concussion Lawsuit Looms in Australia
NY HEALTH DEPARTMENT: Court Narrows Claims in Samele et al. Case

OHIO: Burger King Stunt Highlights "Pink Tax" Bill Issue
PACIFIC ENERGY: Court Dismisses A. Nelson's FAC in EFTA Suit
PICK-A-PART AUTO: Court Approves $195K Class Settlement
PROGRESSIVE SELECT: Lopez Suit Moved to Southern Dist. of Florida
PROVIDENCE HEALTH: Underpays Patient Sitter, Mamuyac Alleges

PROVIDENT SAVINGS: Court OKs FLSA Portion of $1.7MM Settlement
QUALITY SYSTEMS: Nov. 19 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
RF FISHER: Court Grants Prelim Approval of FLSA Settlement
ROANOKE, VA: Court Conditionally Certifies Collective Action
ROCKWELL MEDICAL: Faces Securities Fraud Class Action

ROSICKI ROSICKI: Dismissal of A. Cohen's FDCPA Suit Affirmed
RSKM LLC: Corr Sues over Debt Collection Practices
RUSHMORE LOAN: Wortman Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections
SAIC INC: Awaits Court Approval of Securities Case Settlement
SCANIA: RHA Sees Progress in Cartel Class Action

SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES: Classes in ICS Suit Decertified
SHILOH TREATMENT: Judge Orders Removal of Migrant Children
SKIPTHEDISHES: Drivers File Misclassification Class Action
SOLSTICE BENEFIT: Sends Unsolicited Fax Messages, Zauderer Claims
STEAK 'N SHAKE: 3rd. Cir. Flips Certification of Class in ADA Suit

STRACENER BROTHERS: Underpays Construction Workers, Brown Claims
STUCKY LAUER: Burton Sues over Debt Collection Practices
SUNRUN INC: Underpays Sales Representatives, Dart Suit Alleges
SWITCH INC: Mingbo Cai Suit Transferred to District of Nevada
SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL: Still Defends Cambell, Neal & Mott TCPA Suits

T&R MARKET: Judge Approves $1MM Class Action Settlement
TARGET CORP: Stops Selling Popular Potty Trainers
TATA CONSULTANCY: Court Grants Arbitration of Class Claims
TLC CASINO: Court Dismisses V. Williams's FCRA Suit
TRES AMIGOS: Flynn et al. Seek to Certify Hourly Servers Class

TRIANGLE CAPITAL: Court Denies Prelim Injunction in Securities Suit
UFC: Antitrust Class Action Moves Into Summary Judgment Stage
UNITED AIRLINES: Judge Tosses Employees' Biometrics Class Action
UNITED STATES: NY Ct. Transfers Separation Suit to Calif.
UNITED STATES: UPS Retired Employees File Class Action

UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Trujillo et al. Seek to Certify Class
US PHYSICAL: Court Dismisses S. Reilly's Securities Fraud Suit
VALLEY GYM CORPORATION: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Suit Claims
VEECO INSTRUMENTS: Pension Fund Balks at Ultratech Merger Deal
VISA INC: Deal Reached to Resolve Damages Class in Interchange MDL

WAL-MART STORES: 9th Cir. Vacates Dismissal of M. Omidi's UCL Suit
WARTBURG SENIOR: Website Not Accessible to Blind, Sypert Says
WASTE INDUSTRIES: Fails to Pay OT to Drivers, Bruce Claims
WELLS FARGO: Judge Refuses to Vacate Arbitrator's Findings
WESTERN EXPRESS: Rivera Suit Moved to Central Dist. of California

WILLIAM SONOMA: Faces Rushing Suit in N.D. California
WINNIPEG BALLET: Faces Class Action Over Monk Abuse Allegations
ZUFFA LLC: Seeks Dismissal of UFC Fighters' Antitrust Case
[*] U.K. Truckers' Trade Association Files Cartel Class Action

                            *********

ABM AVIATION: Petitt Seeks Overtime Pay under Labor Code
--------------------------------------------------------
LAURA PETITT, an individual, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. ABM AVIATION, INC.; and DOES
1 thru 50, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. BC717464 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Aug. 10, 2018), alleges that Defendant has had a
consistent policy of failing to pay wages and/or overtime to all
Aggrieved Employees when they work more than eight hours in a day
or 40 hours in a week.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and other Aggrieved
Employees were not properly compensated for wages and overtime
because Defendant required work to be performed off the clock;
failed to pay for compensable activities, including waiting for and
riding a mandatory shuttle to and from the time clock facility;
altered timesheets to make it appear that employees worked less
than they actually did, and issued paychecks that compensated for
less than the total hours worked.

The Defendant offers an array of services such as cargo, cleaning,
ground transportation, passenger services, ramp handling, security,
and outsource business solution.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eric B. Kingsley, Esq.
          Liane Katzenstein Ly, Esq.
          Ari J. Stiller, Esq.
          KINGSLEY & KINGSLEY, APC
          16133 Ventura Blvd., Suite 1200
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (818) 990 8300
          Facsimile: (818) 990 2903
          E-mail: eric@kingsleykingsley.com
                  liane@kingsleykingsley.com
                  ari@kingsleykingsley.com


ACCOUNT CONTROL: Wants to Collect Time Barred Debt, Loveday Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
MELISSA LOVEDAY, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated persons v. ACCOUNT CONTROL TECHNOLOGY, INC., and DOE-1,
Case No. 2:18-cv-12405-AJT-APP (E.D. Mich., August 2, 2018),
accuses the Defendants of violating the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, and mirror state law, in attempting to collect a
time barred debt, using a form letter, without informing the debtor
that s/he cannot be sued on the debt because of the age of the
debt.

ACT is a corporation incorporated under the laws of California, and
is registered in the state of Michigan as a Collection Agency,
License Number 2401001957.  The name of the Doe Defendant is
currently unknown to the Plaintiff.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Curtis C. Warner, Esq.
          WARNER LAW FIRM, LLC
          350 S. Northwest HWY., Suite 300
          Park Ridge, IL 60068
          Telephone: (847) 701-5290 (TEL)
          E-mail: cwarner@warner.legal

               - and -

          John A. Evancek, Esq.
          KELLEY & EVANCHECK PC
          43695 Michigan Ave.
          Canton, MI 48188
          Telephone: (734) 397-4540
          E-mail: john@kelawpc.com


ACOSTA INC: Court Grants Arbitration of Individual Labor Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the
case captioned RUDY TREVINO, Plaintiff, v. ACOSTA, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-06529 NC (N.D. Cal.).

Defendants Acosta, Inc., Mosaic Parent Holdings, Inc., and Mosaic
Sales Solutions US Operating Co., LLC, move to compel plaintiff
Rudy Trevino to arbitrate his California Labor Code claims, and do
so as an individual.

Trevino is a former employee of Mosaic. Trevino alleges that,
during his employment, he and all similarly situated employees
experienced violations of the California Labor Code, perpetrated by
Mosaic.

Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), a contract which evidences
intent to settle a controversy by arbitration is valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable unless it can be revoked on such
grounds as exist in law for the revocation of any contract.

Trevino argues that the arbitration agreement fails because: (1)
agreements to waive class status are illegal; (2) there was no
mutual assent; and regardless, (3) it is invalid based on the
doctrine of unconscionability.

The Waiver of Class Status Is Not Illegal.

First, Trevino argues that the arbitration agreement is illegal
because it contains a waiver of class status which violates the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).

Trevino's first argument that the agreement violates the NLRA was
decided by Epic Systems Corp. In Epic Systems Corp., as here, the
central issue was an arbitration agreement that included a waiver
of class status, and plaintiffs raised the same violation of the
NLRA as a reason to invalidate the arbitration agreement.  

The Supreme Court concluded that the NLRA did not override the
FAA's mandate to enforce arbitration agreements as written because
Congress did not manifest a clear intention to displace the FAA,
and thus, the Court should interpret the two statutes to work in
harmony. With this in mind, the Court ruled that a class action
lawsuit is not a concerted activity as envisioned by the NLRA and
that waivers of class status should be enforced per the FAA.   

Thus, Trevino's first argument fails.

Trevino's second argument, that the illusory opt-out clause renders
the waiver of class status illegal is equally untenable under Epic
Systems Corp. In Epic Systems Corp., the Court explained that
defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their
meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue
are invalid. Specifically, the Court said that an objection to
proceedings because they require individualized arbitration
proceedings instead of class or collective ones is invalid.

Here, Trevino is arguing that by law, a waiver of class status
requires a clear opt-out provision. His argument is invalid because
it is applicable only to arbitration clauses that contain waivers
of class status and is thus specifically prohibited by Epic Systems
Corp. In any event, the Court finds that the language of the
opt-out provision was clear.

Thus, Trevino's second argument fails.

The Arbitration Agreement Is Valid

Next, Trevino argues that the arbitration agreement is
unenforceable for lack of mutual assent because: (1) Mosaic's
evidence is inadmissible; and (2) Mosaic fails to establish that a
valid arbitration agreement exists.

Admissible Evidence

Trevino requests that the Court strike (i) the supplemental
declaration of Ava Miner and (ii) the arbitration agreement.

The Supplemental Declaration of Ava Miner is Admitted.

First, the Court considers Trevino's objection to the supplemental
declaration of Ava Miner. Trevino argues that the Court should
strike the declaration because it is new evidence.
In Tovar, plaintiff introduced new statistics to support her claim
in a reply brief, on appeal. Tovar, 3 F.3d at 1273 n.3. The Ninth
Circuit struck the evidence it considered new" because it was
outside of the record compiled by the district court. Here, the
case is not on appeal and thus, Tovar is not applicable.  

Therefore, the Court declines to strike the supplemental
declaration of Ava Miner or Mosaic's reply brief.

The Arbitration Agreement Is Not Inadmissible as Hearsay

Next the Court considers Trevino's argument that the arbitration
agreement, Exhibit C to Mosaic's motion to compel, should be
excluded as hearsay because it fails to meet the requirements of
the business records exception.

The business record exception allows hearsay to be admitted as
evidence if: (1) it was regular business practice to make that
record; (2) it was kept in the regular course of business; (3) it
was made by a person with knowledge; and (4) it was made at or near
the time the event recorded.

As to the first two requirements, Miner declared that the agreement
was made by and kept on the onboarding system, Taleo, in the
regular course of business. Trevino does not challenge this.

On the third requirement, Trevino argues that Miner's declarations
establish that she is not 'a person with knowledge. The Court can
only guess Trevino is referring to alleged inconsistencies in
Miner's declaration; in particular, Trevino mentions that Miner
listed items that would appear on a letter offer to Trevino, but
none of them appeared in the email offer.   

Therefore, the Court finds no reason to find that Miner is not a
person with knowledge.
On the fourth requirement, Trevino argues that there is no
indication that the arbitration agreement was made at or near the
time Trevino signed the document. Trevino cites no authority to
support his argument. Furthermore, the Court notes that other
courts have found electronically signed arbitration agreements
admissible as evidence.  

Therefore, the Court concludes that Exhibit C is admissible.

A Valid Arbitration Agreement Exists

Next, Trevino argues: (i) that the evidence does not authenticate
the signed arbitration agreement and (ii) that Trevino did not
understand what the arbitration agreement meant.

The Arbitration Agreement Is Authenticated

Trevino points to the fact that the arbitration agreement does not
have his physical signature on it and merely contains six asterisks
on the signature line.

In Tagliabue, the court explained that the plaintiff's argument
that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it did not
contain his physical signature lacked merit. Tagliabue,2015 WL
8780577, at *3.

Here, similar to Tagliabue, the Court finds the declarations of Ava
Miner, the onboarding manager, sufficient to prove that Trevino
electronically signed the arbitration agreement because like in
Tagliabue, the declarations prove that signing the arbitration
agreement was required of all new employees like Trevino. By
Trevino's own declaration, he was hired, he completed the
onboarding process, and typed his last name more than once in order
to acknowledge one thing or another. Like in Tagliabue, the
argument that his physical signature does not appear on the
document is without merit.

Yet, the Court recognizes the fact that the arbitration agreement
contains only asterisks and that Trevino's name is not written
anywhere on the arbitration agreement. However, in Tagliabue,the
court did not consider what the non-physical signature looked like
in order to determine if the agreement was authenticated; there was
no discussion of whether the computer generated signature appeared
to be the plaintiff's name.  

Instead, as already noted, the court looked only to the
declarations of the human resource managers to verify that
completing the onboarding process required a signature on the
arbitration agreement and that the plaintiff completed the
onboarding process. The defendant's declarations established both
points. Therefore, the court inferred that the arbitration
agreement was signed by the plaintiff.

Here, the asterisks look nothing like Trevino;  however, the
declarations of Miner are evidence that the agreement was
electronically signed by Trevino because Miner declared that
completing the onboarding process required a signature on the
arbitration agreement and that Trevino completed the onboarding
process. The Court also notes that Mosaic's burden is only to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that Trevino signed the
agreement; the asterisks cast some doubt, but the evidence proves,
more likely than not, that Trevino signed the agreement. As Trevino
provides no evidence to contradict Mosaic's, other than Trevino's
declaration that he did not remember everything he signed, the
Court finds by a preponderance of evidence that Trevino signed the
arbitration agreement.

Trevino's Lack of Understanding Does Not Invalidate the Agreement

The Court is unpersuaded by Trevino's argument that his lack of
understanding is grounds to invalidate the agreement because the
agreement is clearly labeled with ARBITRATION AGREEMENT at the top
of the page and does not appear to be concealed in any way from
Trevino before he had to sign it.   Furthermore, the Court cannot
invalidate the terms of the signed arbitration agreement merely
because Trevino did not understand the agreement or chose not to
read it; such a ruling would undermine the liberal policy favoring
arbitration agreements" by allowing any party to claim a failure of
mutual assent when forced to arbitrate against their will.
Trevino's subjective intentions are simply not enough because the
Court finds that the reasonable meaning of Trevino's electronic
signature was a manifestation of assent to the terms of the
arbitration agreement.

Therefore, the Court concludes that a valid arbitration agreement
exists.  

The Arbitration Agreement Is Not Unconscionable.

Procedural Unconscionability

Trevino argues that the agreement is procedurally unconscionable
because: (i) Trevino was not provided with the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) rules for arbitration procedures, (ii) the
parties had unequal bargaining power, and (iii) the opt-out
provision was not set apart in different sized text.

American Arbitration Association (AAA) Rules

The Court acknowledges cases cited by Trevino (in particular
Carlson v. Home Team Pest Def., Inc., 239 Cal.App.4th 619, 632-633
(2015); Carmona, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 84-85) that have found the
failure to provide arbitration rules is procedurally
unconscionable.

However, the court notes that in Carlson and Carmona, the
arbitration agreements did not contain instructions on how to
obtain the arbitration rules, much less a hyperlink to view them
online.   

The Court finds Mosaic's efforts to provide Trevino with the AAA
rules are sufficient such that if Trevino had wanted to look at the
rules before signing the agreement, he could have.

Therefore, the failure to explicitly provide the AAA rules does not
establish procedural unconscionability.

Opt-Out Provision

Trevino argues that the waiver of class status opt-out provision
was procedurally unconscionable because it was on the very last
page and not set apart in different sized text. Trevino cites no
authority for this proposition. Accordingly, the Court finds that
Trevino's argument lacks merit.

Unequal Bargaining Power

Trevino also argues that because he was provided with the
arbitration agreement on a take-it-or leave-it basis, he was not
afforded the opportunity to negotiate, and that establishes
procedural unconscionability.

The Court finds that the failure to provide the AAA rules and the
placement of the opt-out provision do not establish procedural
unconscionability. However, the take-it-or-leave-it nature of the
agreement establishes some degree of procedural unconscionability.
With that in mind, the Court proceeds to consider if the agreement
was substantively unconscionable.
Substantive Unconscionability

MoTrevino argues that the arbitration agreement is substantively
unconscionable because it: (i) lacks a modicum of bilaterality and
(ii) improperly limits his right to conduct discovery.dicum of

Bilaterality

First, the Court finds that the agreement is sufficiently bilateral
because it requires both parties to arbitrate employment disputes
and is thus distinguishable from Armendariz. In Armendariz,the
California Supreme Court held that an arbitration agreement was
unconscionable if it required the employee to arbitrate his claims
but exempted the employer from arbitrating his claims, thus lacking
a modicum of bilaterality. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 120.

Here, however, the arbitration agreement explicitly states: the
mutual obligations by the Company and Associate to arbitrate
disputes provide consideration for this Agreement. Furthermore, the
agreement does not go on to define claims which would not mutually
require arbitration.

Thus, the Court finds that the agreement is sufficiently
bilateral.

Discovery Limitations

Finally, Trevino challenges the availability of discovery in the
agreement because it incorporates the AAA rules for discovery and
those rules do not provide adequate discovery. The Court finds the
discovery provisions in the AAA rules are not unconscionable
because other courts have found that the AAA rules for discovery
provide parties with a sufficient opportunity for discovery.  

Thus, the arbitration agreement is not substantively
unconscionable. Therefore, despite there being some degree of
procedural unconscionability, the arbitration agreement is not
unconscionable and must be enforced.

Therefore, Mosaic's motion to compel arbitration is granted and
Trevino is required to arbitrate his claims against Mosaic as an
individual.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 23, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9oxshd4 from Leagle.com.

Rudy Trevino, Plaintiff, represented by Bernard James Fitzpatrick ,
Fitzpatrick & Swanston, Charles Swanston, Fitzpatrick & Swanston,
Larry W. Lee -- lwlee@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group,
P.C., Kristen Michelle Agnew -- kagnew@diversitylaw.com --
Diversity Law Group, APC, Kwanporn Tulyathan, Diversity Law Group &
Nicholas Rosenthal -- nrosenthal@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law
Group.

Acosta, Inc., Mosaic Parent Holdings, Inc. & Mosaic Sales Solutions
US Operating Co., LLC, Defendants, represented by John A. Van Hook
-- jvanhook@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuire, Woods, LLP, John Arthur
Van Hook -- jvanhook@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuire Woods LLP &
Michael David Mandel -- mmandel@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods
LLP.

ADVENTIST HEALTH: Court Narrows Claims in D. Sheedy's ERISA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Orlando Division, granted in part and denied in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned DONNA SHEEDY,
Plaintiff, v. ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM SUNBELT HEALTHCARE
CORPORATION, ADVENTIST RETIREMENT BOARD, ADVENTIST RETIREMENT PLAN
ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE and ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM BENEFITS
ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE, Defendants, Case No.
6:16-cv-1893-Orl-31GJK (M.D. Fla.).

The Plaintiff, Donna Sheedy, has filed suit against Adventist
Health Systems1 (AHS) and various affiliated entities (Defendants).
Her Amended Complaint asserts fifteen claims: eleven claims based
on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), one
constitutional claim, and three state law claims. These claims
involve two distinct defined-benefit pension plans associated with
AHS: the Hospital Plan and the Merged Plan.

The Church Plan Exemption

ERISA generally applies to any employee benefit plan, if it is
established or maintained by an employer or employee organization
engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting
commerce. However, ERISA contains an exemption for church plans.
Church plans are plans established and maintained for its employees
(or their beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention or
association of churches which is exempt from tax under section 501
of Title 26. 29 U.S.C. Section 1002(33)(A).

The Plaintiff alleges both plans are maintained by AHS, and that
the principal purpose of AHS is to provide healthcare services. The
Defendants claim that the "Plaintiff is wrong as a matter of law
that AHS maintains either of the Plans. However, whether an entity
maintains a pension plan is a fact-intensive inquiry, and it cannot
be said at this point that AHS does or does not maintain the Plans
as a matter of law. All of the Plaintiff's factual allegations are
taken as true at this stage, and the Plaintiff has plausibly
alleged that AHS is the entity that maintains the Plans.

Whether a different entity -- such as one of the administrating
organizations named by the Defendants -- in fact maintains the
Plans is a question that cannot be resolved at this early stage.
Because the Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the Plans do not
meet the first element of the Church Plan definition, the Court
need not address the remaining elements.

The Plaintiff's Standing

The Defendants first contend that the Plaintiff has failed to
establish standing for her claims of insufficient funding. To have
standing under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff must
satisfy three elements:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact an
invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, rather than conjectural
or hypothetical. Allegations of future injury can establish
standing if the threat of injury is certainly impending or if there
exists a substantial risk' that harm will occur.  

Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of; that is, the injury must be fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant rather than the
result of independent action of a third party.

The Defendants state that any risk of receiving pension payments
lower than those proposed is speculative and does not constitute a
concrete, particularized, actual, or imminent injury.   
Here, the Plaintiff alleges that she faces a future injury, stating
that, as a result of the underfunding, she faces substantial risk
of her pension being lost or severely reduced.

Hospital Plan

According to the December 31, 2016 Audited Consolidated Financial
Statements, the Hospital Plan is funded at 100.1% of its benefit
obligations. If the very document cited by the Plaintiff in the
Amended Complaint shows that the Hospital Plan is overfunded, she
cannot possibly establish a substantial risk of future injury based
on underfunding. Accordingly, the Plaintiff does not have standing
to bring Count III with respect to the Hospital Plan.

Merged Plan

The Plaintiff does not explain why, even if the Merged Plan is
presently underfunded, she faces a substantial risk of her pension
being lost or severely reduced.  She does not explain what benefit
she is entitled to under the Merged Plan, or when that benefit is
due. She does not indicate whether the Merged Plan has ever failed
to make a required payment, nor does she indicate when the Merged
Plan will need additional funding in order to meet its payment
obligations. The Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded that she
faces a substantial, rather than merely speculative, risk of future
injury.

Thus, the Plaintiff lacks standing to bring Count III with respect
to the Merged Plan.

Counts II.A, II.C, VI, and VII: Whether AHS is a Proper Defendant
Despite Not Being Administrator of the Plans

The Defendants argue that, because AHS is not the administrator of
the Plans, AHS is not the proper defendant in Counts II.A, II.C,
VI, and VII of the Amended Complaint. Only plan administrators can
be sued for violations of ERISA's notice and reporting
requirements.

The Amended Complaint asserts that the Plans do indeed have named
administrators, so there is no basis for the plan sponsor to be
deemed the administrator in this case. Accordingly, Counts II.A,
II.C, and VII will be dismissed to the extent that they include AHS
as a Defendant, and Count VI will be dismissed in full.

Counts VIII, IX, X, and XI: Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Prohibited
Transactions under ERISA
The Defendants argue that Counts VIII, IX, and XI, against all
Defendants, are insufficiently pled insofar as they fail to put the
Defendants on notice of the claims against them. Counts VIII, IX,
and XI combine all Defendants together and fail to distinguish
between actions taken by individual Defendants. Those three Counts
also do not differentiate between violations with respect to the
different Plans. Accordingly, Counts VIII, IX, and XI are all
inadequately pled and will be dismissed without prejudice.

As for Count X, the Defendants aver that the Plaintiff has failed
to adequately allege that (1) AHS is a fiduciary for the Hospital
Plan and that (2) AHS had a duty to monitor. The Plaintiff's
allegations relating to AHS as a fiduciary are conclusory
assertions that do little more than restate the statutory elements.
Count X does not adequately plead breach of fiduciary duty with
respect to the Hospital Plan, and thus, it should be dismissed with
respect to the Hospital Plan.9

Counts I, II.A, II.C, IV, VIII, IX, XI, and XIII: The Retirement
Board, the Hospital Plan Committee, and the Merged Plan Committee
as Defendants

The Plaintiff asserts several claims against the Retirement Board
and the Hospital Plan Committee with respect to the Merged Plan,
and several claims against the Merged Plan Committee with respect
to the Hospital Plan, even though the Retirement Board and Hospital
Plan Committee had nothing to do with the Merged Plans and the
Merged Plan Committee had nothing to do with the Hospital Plan. The
Plaintiff concedes this, stating that claims against certain
Defendants for certain Plans should not be included in the Amended
Complaint.  

Accordingly, Counts I, II.A, II.C, III, IV, and XIII will be
dismissed to the extent that they include claims against the
Retirement Board and the Hospital Plan Committee with respect to
the Merged Plans, and to the extent that they include claims
against the Merged Plan Committee with respect to the Hospital
Plan. Counts VIII, IX, and XI need not be addressed here, as they
are already due to be dismissed in full because of the inadequate
pleading discussed above in Subsection A(4).

Count XII: The Church Plan Exemption Violates the Establishment
Clause

The Plaintiff alleges that extension of the Church Plan exemption
to AHS would violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Defendants move to
dismiss this claim, and the United States filed a Memorandum in
Support of the Constitutionality of the ERISA Church Plan
Exemption. However, because the Court has not yet determined
whether the Plans qualify as Church Plans, the Constitutional claim
is premature.

Count XIII: Breach of Contract

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's state law claim for
breach of contract fails to state a viable claim. First, the
Defendants note that Count XIII is against all Defendants, but only
makes allegations against In the Response, the Plaintiff concedes
that the contract claim is only against AHS. But the flaws in Count
XIII do not end with a failure to distinguish between the
Defendants; Count XIII also fails to differentiate between the
Plans and their respective contractual provisions. With only
references to promises, obligations and good faith, the Amended
Complaint is not specific enough to state a claim for breach of at
least two different contracts.

Count XIII will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Unjust Enrichment: Count XIV

The Plaintiff pleads unjust enrichment as an alternative to the
breach of contract claim. The elements of a claim for unjust
enrichment under Florida law are: (1) the plaintiff conferred a
benefit on the defendant, who had knowledge of the benefit; (2) the
defendant accepted and retained the benefit; and (3) under the
circumstances it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain
the benefit without paying for it.  

The Plaintiff claims that the benefits conferred on AHS included
(1) tens of millions of dollars saved by not contributing to the
Plans; (2) contributions of the Plaintiff and other class members
made during the course of their employment, such as time, labor,
and experience; and (3) avoidance of costs associated with higher
employee turnover. But, in reality, the only benefit conferred on
the Defendant by the Plaintiff was her labor and services, for
which she received compensation by means of a salary or wages. Any
money saved by underfunding these plans would not be a benefit
conferred on AHS by the Plaintiff.

There is simply no equitable claim here, so Count XIV will be
dismissed.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Count XV

The Defendants contend that Count XV fails to distinguish between
individual Defendants in its allegation that the Defendants
breached fiduciary duties owed Plaintiff and the other class
members.

The Court agrees.

The Plaintiff's footnote, found in the Memorandum in Opposition,
summarily stating that claims against the Retirement Board and the
Hospital Plan Committee with respect to the Merged Plans, and
claims against the Merged Plan Committee with respect to the
Hospital Plan, should not be included in Count XV, is insufficient
to cure the pleading deficiency. Accordingly, Count XV does not put
each Defendant on fair notice of the claims against it, and it
should be dismissed as inadequately pled.  

The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART. Counts II.A, II.C, and VII are DISMISSED without prejudice to
the extent that they include AHS as Defendant. Count III is
DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of standing. Count X is
DISMISSED without prejudice with respect to the Hospital Plan.
Counts I, II.A, II.C, IV, and XIII are DISMISSED without prejudice
to the extent that they include claims against the Retirement Board
and the Hospital Plan Committee with respect to the Merged Plan,
and to the extent that they include claims against the Merged Plan
Committee with respect to the Hospital Plan. Counts VI, VIII, IX,
XI, XIII, XIV, and XV are DISMISSED in full, without prejudice.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 23, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yadadtfp from Leagle.com.

Donna Sheedy, On Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Bryan E. DeMaggio, Sheppard,
White, Kachergus, & DeMaggio PA, Gregory M. Egleston --
bgainey@gme-law.com -- Gainey, McKenna & Egleston, pro hac vice,
Thomas J. McKenna -- tjmckenna@gme-law.com -- Gainey & McKenna, pro
hac vice &William J. Sheppard -- sheplaw@sheppardwhite.com --
Sheppard, White, Kachergus, & DeMaggio PA.  

Adventist Health System Sunbelt Healthcare Corporation, doing
business as Adventist Health System (Healthcare Corporation),
Adventist Retirement Board & Adventist Retirement Plan
Administrative Committee, Defendants, represented by Lars C.
Golumbic -- lgolumbic@groom.com -- Groom Law Group, Chartered, pro
hac vice, Sean Abouchedid -- sabouchedid@groom.com -- Groom Law
Group, Chartered, pro hac vice & Walter A. Ketcham, Jr. --
waketcham@growerketcham.com -- Grower, Ketcham, Eide, Telan &
Meltz, PA.

Adventist Health System Benefits Administration Committee,
Defendant, represented by Lars C. Golumbic , Groom Law Group,
Chartered, Sean Abouchedid , Groom Law Group, Chartered, pro hac
vice & Walter A. Ketcham, Jr. , Grower, Ketcham, Eide, Telan &
Meltz, PA.
United States of America, Movant, represented by Emily Newton ,
U.S. Department of Justice.

AIR EVAC: T. Chanze's Suit Remains in Federal Court
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of West
Virginia denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand the case captioned
TROY CHANZE, SR., on his own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AIR EVAC EMS, INC., a Missouri
corporation, Defendant, Civil Action No. 5:18CV89 (N.D.W.V.).

This case arises out of alleged breach of implied contract between
the plaintiff, Troy Chanze, Sr. (Chanze) and defendant Air Evac
EMS, Inc. (Air Evac).

The Plaintiff's motion to remand, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 1446 and 28 U.S.C. Section 1332, asserts the the defendant
cannot meet the following requirements under the Class Action
Fairness Act (CAFA): (1) that the class must consist of 100 or more
members; and (2) that the amount in controversy must exceed
$5,000,000.00.

First, the plaintiff argues that the defendant has merely asserted
that the class exceeds 100 members without offering any supporting
evidence. The plaintiff contends that this is not enough to
establish jurisdiction, and states unless and until the Defendant
provides the Court with provable data demonstrating that the class
size does, in fact, exceed the 100-member minimum, the Plaintiff is
entitled to remand.

Applicable Law

A defendant may remove a case from state court to federal court in
instances where the federal court is able to exercise original
jurisdiction over the matter. The Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)
confers original jurisdiction on district courts over class actions
in which (1) the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs (2) any member of a
class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant and (3) there are 100 or more plaintiff class members.

In this case, once plaintiff contested the amount in controversy by
filing his motion to remand, the defendant appended to its response
to plaintiff's motion a declaration of the Manager of Compliance
and Audit for Revenue Cycle for Air Evac EMS, Inc., Joshua
Redfield.

In his declaration, Mr. Redfield states, in part, inter alia: "The
Court have also reviewed internal transport records for Air Evac
emergency transports in West Virginia during the relevant time
period."

From April 16, 2013 to April 16, 2018, Air Evac provided emergency
transports for at least 6,000 patients from a location in West
Virginia to a healthcare facility.

The total charges associated with the air ambulance services
provided to the more than 6,000 patients exceed $200 million.

In regard to whether the proposed class of the plaintiffs would
include at least 100 members, Air Evac has submitted proof to
establish the number of emergency transports during the class
period by attaching the declaration of Joshua Redfield, which
states, that Air Evac provided emergency air transportation to at
least 6,000 individuals from a location in West Virginia to a
healthcare facility during the period of April 16, 2013 to April
16, 2018.

This Court finds that the pleadings and declaration filed in this
case are sufficient to demonstrate, under the CAFA and by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the class of plaintiffs
consists of 100 or more members and that the amount in controversy
exceeds $5,000,000.00.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 23, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9ox694v from
Leagle.com.

Troy Chanze, Sr., on his own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by James G. Bordas, Jr.,
Bordas & Bordas, PLLC & Jason E. Causey, Bordas & Bordas, PLLC.

Air Evac EMS, Inc., a Missouri corporation, Defendant, represented
by Carte P. Goodwin, Frost Brown Todd, LLC, Joshua L. Fuchs --
jlfuchs@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, pro hac vice & Katelyn M.
Matscherz -- kmatscherz@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, pro hac vice.

AJ THAI INC: Fails to Properly Pay Workers, Srimaharaja Says
------------------------------------------------------------
CHAMAPUN SRIMAHARAJA, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated v. A.J. THAI INC. (D/B/A SARIN THAI), ACHARA
CHANGTRORALEKE, and PATCHAREE RUANGKONG, Case No. 1:18-cv-04377
(E.D.N.Y., August 2, 2018), alleges that the Plaintiff worked for
the Defendants without appropriate minimum wage and spread of hours
compensation for the hours that she worked, in violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

A.J. Thai Inc. (d/b/a Sarin Thai) is a domestic corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the state of New York.
The Individual Defendants serve or served as owners, managers,
principals, or agents of the Defendant Corporation.

The Defendants own, operate, or control a Thai Restaurant, located
at 43 Glen Cove Road, in Greenvale, New York, under the name "Sarin
Thai."  The Thai Restaurant is located in the Greenvale section of
Nassau County in Long Island.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Michael@Faillacelaw.com



ALERE HOME: Sandusky Wellness Center Sues over Unsolicited Fax
--------------------------------------------------------------
SANDUSKY WELLNES CENTER, LLC, an Ohio limited liability company,
individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly-situated persons, the Plaintiff, v. ALERE HOME
MONITORING, INC., ALERE, INC., Delaware corporations, and ABBOTT
LABORATORIES, an Illinois corporation, the Defendants, Case No.
4:18-cv-04869-KAW (N.D. Cal., Aug. 10, 2018), seeks to recover
damages as a result of Defendants' practice of sending "unsolicited
advertisements" by facsimile.

According to the complaint, the federal Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act
of 2005, and the regulations promulgated under the Act, prohibits a
person or entity from faxing or having an agent fax advertisements
without the recipient's prior express invitation or permission. The
JFPA provides a private right of action and provides statutory
damages of $500 per violation. The Defendants have sent facsimile
transmissions of unsolicited advertisements to Plaintiff and the
Class in violation of the JFPA, including, but not limited to, the
facsimile transmission of two unsolicited advertisements on August
9, 2016 and April 25, 2017. The Faxes promote the services and
goods of Defendants. The Defendants allegedly have sent, and
continue to send, unsolicited advertisements via facsimile
transmission in violation of the JFPA. Unsolicited faxes damage
their recipients. A junk fax recipient loses the use of its fax
machine, paper, and ink toner. An unsolicited fax wastes the
recipient's valuable time that would have been spent on something
else. A junk fax interrupts the recipient's privacy. Unsolicited
faxes prevent fax machines from receiving authorized faxes, prevent
their use for authorized outgoing faxes, cause undue wear and tear
on the recipients' fax machines, and require additional labor to
attempt to discern the source and purpose of the unsolicited
message.

Alere Home provides home anticoagulation monitoring services and
related products for patients and healthcare professionals in the
United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert C. Schubert, Esq.
          Willem F. Jonckheer, Esq.
          SCHUBERT JONCKHEER & KOLBE LLP
          Three Embarcadero Center, Suite 1650
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 788 4220
          Facsimile: (415) 788 0161
          E-mail: rschubert@sjk.law
                  wjonckheer@sjk.law

               - and -

          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          ANDERSON & WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Ste 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: (847)368 1500
          Facsimile: (847)368 1501
          E-mail: rkelly@andersonwanca.com


ALIBABA GROUP: Discovery Ongoing in Federal Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Alibaba Group Holding Limited said in its Form 20-F report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on July 27, 2018,
for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2018, that discovery is ongoing
in the Federal Consolidated Exchange Act Actions.

In January 2015, the company was named as a defendant in the first
of seven putative shareholder class action lawsuits filed in the
United States District Courts for the Southern District of New
York, Central District of California and Northern District of
California. The operative complaint is brought on behalf of a
putative class of shareholders who acquired the company's American
Depositary Shares from October 21, 2014 through January 29, 2015,
inclusive. The complaints assert claims under the United States
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

In June 2015, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
ordered transfer of the actions in the Central District of
California to the Southern District of New York for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings with the four actions before that
court. In June 2015, the Panel ordered transfer of the action
pending in the Northern District of California to the Southern
District of New York. The actions in the Southern District of New
York were consolidated under the master caption, Christine Asia
Co., Ltd. et al. v. Alibaba Group Holding Limited et al., No.
1:15-md-02631-CM (S.D.N.Y.), and related cases.

The Southern District of New York appointed a Lead Plaintiff and
Lead Counsel on behalf of the putative class pursuant to the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.

In June 2015, the Lead Plaintiff filed a consolidated amended
complaint, which generally alleged that the registration statement
and prospectus filed in connection with the company's initial
public offering and various other public statements contained
misrepresentations regarding the company's business operations and
financial prospects, and failed to disclose, among other things,
regulatory scrutiny by the SAIC prior to the company's initial
public offering.

Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the company should have
disclosed a 2014 SAIC anti-counterfeiting initiative in the
e-commerce market, a July 16, 2014 administrative guidance meeting
the company had with the SAIC that was later the subject of a
self-described "white paper" issued and then withdrawn by the SAIC,
and the alleged impact of the sale of counterfeit goods on our
financial results.

Plaintiffs asserted claims against the company and Executive
Chairman Jack Yun Ma, Executive Vice Chairman Joseph C. Tsai, then
Chief Executive Officer Jonathan Zhaoxi Lu and Chief Financial
Officer Maggie Wei Wu for violation of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the United States Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. Plaintiffs sought
unspecified damages, attorneys' fees and costs.

In July 2015, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim. In June 2016, the Southern
District of New York issued an order granting Defendants' motion to
dismiss without leave to amend. The order held that Plaintiffs
failed to plead that Defendants made actionable misstatements or
omissions or that Defendants acted with scienter.

In July 2016, Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

On December 5, 2017, the Second Circuit issued a summary order
vacating the Southern District of New York's dismissal order and
remanding the case to the Southern District of New York for further
proceedings.

On March 12, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a motion for class
certification and appointment of class representatives and class
counsel. Among other things, Plaintiffs requested that the Southern
District of New York certify a class of all persons and/or entities
that purchased or otherwise acquired the company's American
Depositary Shares or purchased call options or sold put options on
our American Depositary Shares between September 19, 2014 and
January 28, 2015, inclusive, with certain exclusions. The Southern
District of New York granted the motion on May 1, 2018. Discovery
in the action is ongoing.

Alibaba Group Holding Limited, through its subsidiaries, operates
as an online and mobile commerce company in the People's Republic
of China and internationally. The company operates in four
segments: Core Commerce, Cloud Computing, Digital Media and
Entertainment, and Innovation Initiatives and Others. The company
was founded in 1999 and is based in Hangzhou, the People's Republic
of China.


ALLEGIANT AIR: Basiliali Asks Court to Certify Class & Subclasses
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled LAYLA BASILIALI, an individual, on behalf of
herself and others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. ALLEGIANT
AIR, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; and DOES
1 through 50, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-03888-RGK-MRW (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff will move the
Court on October 15, 2018, for an order:

   1. certifying class and subclasses:

      Class of California based Flight Attendants:

      "all individuals employed by Defendants at any time during
      the period of four years prior to the filing of this
      lawsuit [March 15, 2014] and ending on a date as determined
      by the Court who have worked as a flight attendant with an
      assigned home base airport in California";

      Minimum Wages Subclass:

      "all Class members who were not compensated for all hours
      worked for Defendants at the applicable minimum wage";

      Wages and Overtime Subclass:

      "all Class members who were not compensated for all hours
      worked for Defendants at the required rates of pay,
      including for all hours worked in excess of eight in a day
      and/or forty in a week";

      Meal Period Subclass:

      "all Class members who were subject to Defendants' policy
      and/or practice of failing to provide unpaid 30-minute
      uninterrupted and duty-free meal periods or one hour of pay
      at the Employee's regular rate of pay in lieu thereof";

      Rest Break Subclass:

      "all Class members who were subject to Defendants' policy
      and/or practice of failing to authorize and permit
      Employees to take uninterrupted, duty-free, 10-minute rest
      periods for every four hours worked, or major fraction
      thereof, and failing to pay one hour of pay at the
      Employee’s regular rate of pay in lieu thereof";

      Expense Reimbursement Subclass:

      "all Class members who incurred necessary and reasonable
      expenses in connection with performing their job duties for
      Defendants and who were subject to a policy and/or practice
      under which such expenses were not reimbursed";

      Wage Statement Subclass:

      "all Class members who, within the applicable limitations
      period, were not provided with accurate itemized wage
      statements";

      Unauthorized Deductions from Wages Subclass:

      "all Class members who were subject to Defendants’ policy
      and/or practice of automatically deducting 30-minutes worth
      of wages from Employees for alleged meal periods they were
      denied and/or by understating the hours worked by
      Employees";

      Failure to Timely Pay Wages Twice Monthly Subclass:

      "all Class members who were subject to Defendants’ policy
      and practice of not timely paying all wages earned when
      they were due and payable at least twice monthly";

      UCL Subclass:

      "all Class members who are owed restitution as a result of
      Defendants’ business acts and practices, to the extent such

      acts and practices are found to be unlawful, deceptive,
      and/or unfair"; and

   2. appointing class counsel.

Attorneys for Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated:

          David Yeremian, Esq.
          Alvin B. Lindsay, Esq.
          DAVID YEREMIAN & ASSOCIATES, INC.
          535 N. Brand Blvd., Suite 705
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 230 8380
          Facsimile: (818) 230 0308
          E-mail: david@yeremianlaw.com
                  alvin@yeremianlaw.com

               - and -

          Walter Haines, Esq.
          UNITED EMPLOYEES LAW GROUP, PC
          5500 Bolsa Ave., Suite 201
          Huntington Beach, CA 92649
          Telephone: (310) 652 2242
          E-mail: walterhaines@yahoo.com


ALTICE USA: Rosen Law Firm Probes Securities Claims
---------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, is investigating
potential securities claims on behalf of shareholders of Altice
USA, Inc. resulting from allegations that Altice may have issued
materially misleading business information to the investing
public.

The investigation concerns whether Altice's filings with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") in connection with
its June 2017 initial public offering (the "IPO") contained untrue
statements of material fact or omitted material information. As of
August 3, 2018, Altice's share price had fallen more than 40% from
its IPO price of $30, thereby injuring investors.

Rosen Law Firm is preparing a class action lawsuit to recover
losses suffered by Altice investors. If you purchased shares of
Altice please visit the firm's website at
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1393.htmlto join the class action.


Follow us for updates on LinkedIn:
https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-rosen-law-firm or on Twitter:
https://twitter.com/rosen—firm.

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         Zachary Halper, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34thFloor
         New York, NY 10016
         Telephone: 212-686-1060
         Toll Free: 866-767-3653
         Fax: 212-202-3827
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com [GN]

AMERICOLLECT INC: Faces Mezzo Suit in District of New Jersey
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Americollect, Inc.
The case is captioned as ANTHONY MEZZO, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, the Plaintiff, v. AMERICOLLECT,
INC., the Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-12559 (D.N.J., Aug. 8,
2018).

Americollect, Inc. provides debt collection services to healthcare
industry. The company offers hospital collection, radiology
collection, and medical collection.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd D. Muhlstock, Esq.
          BAKER SANDERS LLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 741 4799
          E-mail: ECF@MuhlstockLaw.com


AMYRIS INC: Court Dismisses Amended Derivative Shareholders' Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint in the case captioned WAYNE BONNER, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. JOHN MELO, et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-04719-WHO (N.D.
Cal.).

In the Court's prior Order dismissing this shareholders derivative
class action, the Court explained that the plaintiff's complaint
suffered from significant omissions. First, the plaintiff did not
support his misstatement or failure to correct breach of fiduciary
duty claim with facts showing that the directors knowingly
disseminated false information or dishonestly failed to correct a
prior misrepresentation.  Second, the plaintiff did not support his
claim of demand futility with facts showing that any director acted
in self-interest or was necessarily beholden to the control of an
interested director to excuse demand. The Court gave the plaintiff
leave to amend.

In amending, the plaintiff changed his theories of liability and
demand futility. According to the plaintiff, the wrong committed by
the defendants alleged in the Amended Complaint (AC) is:
"Defendants continuing to tell the shareholders and the public that
the deal would result in $10 million in revenue to the Company
despite the fact the value of the stock received was between
$212,528.75 and $3.2 million and whether Defendants adequately
informed itself when renegotiating the deal."  These new theories
of liability run up against the business judgment rule, which
cannot avoided based on the plaintiff's own facts. The Plaintiff
continues to fail to plead facts showing knowing falsity with
respect to any of the alleged misrepresentations made by the
defendants. And demand futility has not been shown: the AC contains
no facts suggesting a significant risk of personal liability to the
defendants, evidence of bad faith, or that the decision falls
outside the protection of the business judgment rule.

The heart of the plaintiff's new theory, it seems, is that the
defendants' decision to allow the perception that Amyris would
still receive $10 million in revenue from the deal to continue was
a breach of their fiduciary duty because the defendants failed to
inform themselves as to the actual value of the equity. As support
for the failure to inform theory, the plaintiff looks to the actual
number of shares received by Amyris, transferred to Amyris on April
17, 2018, as disclosed in the Company's 10-Q filed on May 16, 2017
and using SweeGen's share prices from March and April 2017,
estimate the value as being under $300,000.  The Plaintiff also
points out that the actual revenue recognized from the equity
through June 30, 2017 was only $2.7 million and that an independent
valuation of the equity was only $3.2 million.  

But to state a breach of the duty of care, which is what this claim
sounds in, the plaintiff must plead facts showing gross negligence,
meaning conduct that constitutes reckless indifference or actions
that are without the bounds of reason, the intentional dereliction
of duty or the conscious disregard for one's responsibilities or
subjective bad intent.   
No such facts have been alleged here.

In light of these continuing deficiencies, the Amended Complaint is
dismissed. Given the multiple opportunities plaintiff has had to
plead his case, it is dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 23, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9ghtaw2 from Leagle.com.

Wayne Bonner, Derivatively on Behalf of Amyris, Inc., Plaintiff,
represented by Felipe Javier Arroyo -- farroyo@robbinsarroyo.com --
Robbins Arroyo LLP, Steven Ray Wedeking, II --
swedeking@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP & Brian J.
Robbins -- brobbins@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP.

Marc Goldstein, Plaintiff, represented by Steven Ray Wedeking, II ,
Robbins Arroyo LLP.
John Melo, Kathleen Valiasek, Geoffrey Duyk, John Doerr, Carole
Piwnica, Fernando de Castro Reinach, Abdullah bin Khalifa Al Thani,
R. Neil Williams, Patrick Yang, Abraham Klaeijsen, Christophe
Vuillez & Amyris, Inc., Nominal Defendant, Defendants, represented
by Jesselyn K. Friley -- jfriley@keker.com -- Keker Van Nest and
Peters, Laurie Carr Mims -- lmims@keker.com -- Keker Van Nes &
Peters LLP, Matan Shacham -- mshacham@keker.com -- Keker & Van Nest
LLP & Michael D. Celio -- mcelio@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP.

ANALOGIC CORPORATION: Faces Burcaw Suit over Altaris Merger
-----------------------------------------------------------
RUSS BURCAW, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ANALOGIC CORPORATION; BERNARD C. BAILEY;
JEFFREY P. BLACK; JAMES J. JUDGE; MICHAEL T. MODIC; STEPHEN A.
ODLAND; FRED PARKS and JOSEPH E. WHITTERS, Defendants, Case No.
1:18-CV-11557 (D. Mass., July 24, 2018) is an action against the
Defendants for violations of the federal securities laws arising
out of alleged false and misleading statements made by the
Defendants in connection with the solicitation of shareholders
votes in favor of the go-private sale of the Analogic to Altaris
Capital Partners, LLC.

According to the complaint, the Defendants' Proxy submitted on May
16, 2018, and supplemented on June 12, 2018, were false and
misleading when it recommended that stockholders vote in favor of
the merger, because the merger agreement and the merger are in the
best interests of the Company and its shareholders, and the $84
merger offer was more favorable to the Company shareholders than
all other alternatives, including remaining as a standalone
Company. The Defendants failed to disclose in the Proxy that the
Company's share could have been valued more than the $84 merger
offer.

Analogic Corporation designs, manufactures, and sells medical
imaging systems, ultrasound and security systems, and subsystems to
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and end users primarily for
the medical and airport security markets worldwide. The company was
founded in 1967 and is headquartered in Peabody, Massachusetts. As
of June 22, 2018, Analogic Corporation was taken private. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert Carmel-Montes, Esq.
          THE CARMEL LAW GROUP
          15 Broad Street, Suite 800
          Boston, MA 02109
          Telephone: (617) 227-6355
          Facsimile: (617) 227-6356


ARCHDIOCESE OF LOS ANGELES: Fails to Pay OT, Perez Suit Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
CARLOS OLMOS PEREZ, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF
LOS ANGELES, and DOES 1 through 25, Defendants, Case No. BC714164
(Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., July 18, 2018) is an action against
the Defendants for failure to pay overtime wages, authorize and
permit rest periods, and provide accurate itemized wage
statements.

Mr. Perez was employed by the Defendants as a non-exempt, hourly
employee from July 18, 2014 to present.

The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles is a California
Corporation doing business in Los Angeles, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           Michael H. Boyamian, Esq.
           Armand R. Kizirian, Esq.
           BOYAMIAN LAW, INC.
           550 North Brand Boulevard, Suite 1500
           Glendale, CA 91203-1922
           Telephone: (818) 547.5300
           Facsimile: (818)547.5678
           E-mail: michael@boyamianlaw.com
                   armand@boyamianlaw.com


AUSTRALIA: Class Action Mulled Over White Spot Outbreak
-------------------------------------------------------
David Simmons, writing for Business News Australia, reports that
more than 100 commercial fishers in Queensland are preparing for a
lawsuit against the federal government over the White Spot
outbreak.

The suit, which will be prepared by Chris Thompson from Law
Essentials, a Harvey Bay based law firm, is in relation to the
White Spot disease that has infected Queensland prawns and cost the
industry millions. Trawlers, crabbers and worm diggers operating
out of Moreton Bay say the federal government abandoned them after
the deadly disease was found in wild prawn stocks last year and are
now planning to sue for damages.

Queensland Seafood Industry Association chief executive Eric Perez
says the move is a last resort after lobbying efforts for
compensation failed.

Queensland fisherman say they have been forced to sit on their
hands and wait in hope that prawns infected with White Spot will
die off and stop the spread of the deadly disease.

Michael Wood has trawled for prawns off the Queensland coast for
decades but says his industry has been hit hard in the wake of an
outbreak in 2016.

"We're really hoping that the actual prawns that are infected die
out," says Mr. Wood.

"There's no other way we can manage it."

White Spot was found in the Logan River south of Brisbane and at
three of eight land-based prawn farms in 2016.

It was later detected in wild prawn stocks in Moreton Bay.

The disease is harmless to humans but causes high mortality rates
in prawns.

Mr. Wood says the federal government, responsible for stopping the
import of infected prawns, has abandoned his industry and left
fishermen to pick up the pieces.

"We just want everyone to know how hard we're doing it," says
Wood.

The disease has cost the industry hundreds of millions of dollars
and continues to impact fishermen, while state government imposed
restocking restrictions placed on farmers hit by the outbreak were
lifted in May.

Meanwhile, a Gold Coast bait supplier has been fined $10,000 for
moving infected raw prawns out of a control zone and selling them
to a bait shop in the Warwick area where they were quickly removed
by authorities.

In November 2017, three shipments of raw prawns imported from
overseas tested positive for white spot disease following the
lifting of the import ban.

The federal government banned raw prawn imports in January but
lifted the ban in July in a move that devastated local prawn
farmers who warned the imports could be dangerous.

The three overseas shipments were detected the white spot by
biosecurity tests despite an enhanced regime that requires
exporting countries to certify their shipments are free of the
disease.

The positive tests are certain to alarm the prawn industry which
lobbied to prevent the lifting of the import ban.

The Queensland Seafood Industry Association told a Senate Committee
farmers had "absolutely no confidence in the new testing
programs".

The Australian Prawn Farmers Association also railed against
lifting the ban. White spot poses no risk to human health but is
deadly to prawns. [GN]

AUTOZONE STORES: Court Won't Amend Denial of Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, declined to Amend its previous Order denying
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned
MICHAEL BRADY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AUTOZONE STORES, INC., and
AUTOZONERS LLC, Defendants, Case No. C13-1862 RAJ (W.D. Wash.).

This matter comes before the Court on the parties' submissions
regarding the impact of a Washington Supreme Court Advisory Opinion
on this Court's Class Certification Order, which denied Plaintiff
Michael Brady's (Mr. Brady) Motion for Class Certification.

Plaintiff Michael Brady filed an Amended Class Action Complaint in
state court seeking unpaid wages for meal breaks that Defendants
allegedly withheld from employees.

Brady later moved this Court to certify a class. Mr. Brady moved to
certify the following two classes:

   Class 1: All former and current hourly-paid AutoZone store
employees who worked more than five hours in a day but did not
receive a meal break within five hours of the start of their
shifts, for the period of September 25, 2010, to the date of the
Class Notice.

   Class 2: All former and current hourly-paid AutoZone store
employees who worked more than five hours after the conclusion of a
meal break but did not receive a second meal break within five
hours after the conclusion of the first meal break, for the period
of December 12, 2009, to the date of the Class Notice.

Mr. Brady sought review of this denial in the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, but that court would not permit Mr. Brady to appeal the
decision. Instead of moving forward with his individual claims, Mr.
Brady moved to certify two questions to the Washington Supreme
Court: (1) whether monetary damages are available for violations of
WAC 296-126-092; and (2) whether a plaintiff must show the reason
for why he did not receive a timely meal break in order to prove a
violation of WAC 296-126-092.  

This Court granted Mr. Brady's motion to certify in part, but
certified two different questions for the Washington Supreme
Court:

   1. Is an employer strictly liable under WAC 296-126-092?

   2. If an employer is not strictly liable under WAC 296-126-092,
does the employee carry the burden to prove that his employer did
not permit the employee an opportunity to take a meaningful break
as required by WAC 296-126-092?

The Washington Supreme Court ruled that the answer to the first
question was no, because employees may waive their meal breaks.  As
to the second question, the Washington Supreme Court stated that an
employee asserting a meal break violation under WAC 296-126-092 can
meet his or her prima facie case by providing evidence that he or
she did not receive a timely meal break. Once this happens, the
employer may then rebut this by showing that in fact no violation
occurred or a valid waiver exists.

Following the Opinion from the Washington Supreme Court, this Court
ordered the parties to file a legal memorandum addressing the
impact, if any, that the opinion issued by the Washington Supreme
Court has on this Court's Order denying class certification.

The court's decision to certify a class is discretionary. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 guides the court's exercise of
discretion. A plaintiff  bears the burden of demonstrating that he
has met each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least
one of the three alternative requirements of Rule 23(b).

Mr. Brady Has Still Failed to Prove Predominance

To meet the predominance requirement, common questions of law and
fact must be a significant aspect of the case that can be resolved
for all members of the class in a single adjudication.
Contrary to Mr. Brady's assertions, the Washington Supreme Court
did not describe what it means to receive a timely meal break, or
what evidence would show that an employee did not receive such a
break. Mr. Brady suggests that the Washington Supreme Court
specifically held that payroll records alone were sufficient
evidence, when submitted by plaintiffs, to establish that an
employee did not receive a timely meal break.  

This Court disagrees. The Washington Supreme Court raised the
possibility that payroll records may be used by defendants in
rebutting a prima facie claim by plaintiffs. The Washington Supreme
Court said nothing about what sort of evidence was appropriate for
plaintiffs to uphold their own burden of production. This Court has
already held that the time-card data was not sufficient to
establish predominance, and the Opinion does not address this
issue. As this Court predicted in its previous Order, this answer
by the Washington Supreme Court would not change the Court's denial
of class certification because Mr. Brady has not met his burden
either way with the submitted evidence.

Individualized inquiries as to waiver would overwhelm common
questions

The Court also notes that proposed class members would be subject
to affirmative defenses that turn on individualized factual
allegations.

As the Washington Supreme Court has made clear, employers are
entitled to rebut claims of violations under WAC 296-126-092 with
evidence for the affirmative defense that the individual waived
their break.

Here, the record indicates that dozens, if not hundreds, of
AutoZone employees waived their meal breaks in various ways.
AutoZone has submitted a multitude of evidence and dozens of
declarations that these waivers, which could be written, verbal, or
implied, were commonplace in AutoZone stores throughout the State
of Washington. AutoZone also submitted evidence that the waiver
practices varied between different AutoZone stores, and were
sometimes tailored to individual AutoZone employees based on the
employee's request. This defense does not simply go to damages; it
goes to the underlying liability under WAC 296-126-092.

In order to ascertain class-wide composition and liability, the
Court would thus be forced to engage in an individualized inquiry
for thousands of employees to determine if a WAC 296-126-092
violation occurred, whether the individual is properly included in
the class, and the extent of their damages. The presence of these
individualized inquiries to determine liability and then damages
would make a class proceeding unmanageable.

The Court finds that Mr. Brady still has not met his burden on
predominance with the evidence he provided.

Mr. Brady Has Still Failed to Prove Superiority

The Court also finds that Mr. Brady has still failed on the
superiority prong. If each class member has to litigate numerous
and substantial separate issues to establish his or her right to
recover individually, a class action is not superior. As discussed
above, the determination of whether or not the putative class
members either missed, waived, or did not receive their meal breaks
would require individual inquiries for almost every individual
claimed to be in the class. The Court is still not convinced, as
was Plaintiff's burden, that the class action is a superior vehicle
by which to litigate these numerous individual inquiries.

The Court's earlier decision that Mr. Brady failed to carry his
burden under the superiority prong of Rule 23(b)(3) stands.

This Court declines to disturb its earlier ruling denying Mr.
Brady's Motion for Class Certification. Based on the record before
it, the Court finds that Mr. Brady still has not met his burden to
show that common issues of law or fact predominate to make class
action the superior vehicle.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 23, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybu63pau from Leagle.com.

Michael Brady, Plaintiff, represented by Christie J. Fix --
cfix@frankfreed.com -- FRANK FREED SUBIT & THOMAS, Michael C. Subit
-- msubit@frankfreed.com -- FRANK FREED SUBIT & THOMAS & Steven
Bert Frank -- sfrank@frankfreed.com -- FRANK FREED SUBIT & THOMAS.

AutoZone Stores, Inc. & AutoZoners LLC, Defendants, represented by
Patrick M. Madden -- patrick.madden@klgates.com -- K&L GATES LLP,
Todd L. Nunn -- todd.nunn@klgates.com -- K&L GATES LLP & Stephanie
Wright Pickett -- stephanie.pickett@klgates.com -- K&L GATES LLP.

BANK OF AMERICA: Nov. 8 ISDAfix Instrument Settlement Hearing Set
-----------------------------------------------------------------
This is a new notice concerning an additional proposed settlement
(the "Proposed Settlement") reached in the matter of Alaska
Electrical Pension Fund, et al. v. Bank of America, N.A., et al.,
currently pending in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (the "Court"). It is to alert
Settlement Class Members to a new and additional settlement with
five Defendants: BNP Paribas (named in the Action as "B.N.P.
Paribas SA"); ICAP Capital Markets LLC (now known as Intercapital
Capital Markets LLC); Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC; Nomura Securities
International, Inc.; and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (collectively, the
"Newly Settling Defendants"), in a class action against Newly
Settling Defendants and other Defendants who previously settled.
The lawsuit alleges that Defendants, including the Newly Settling
Defendants, engaged in anticompetitive acts that affected the
market for ISDAfix Instruments, as defined below, in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1. The lawsuit also
alleges that certain Defendants were unjustly enriched under common
law and breached ISDA Master Agreements. The lawsuit was brought by
persons who transacted in ISDAfix Instruments. All Defendants deny
they did anything wrong.

A Proposed Settlement has been reached with the Newly Settling
Defendants. This is separate from the settlements that have already
been given final approval by the Court, which covered other
Defendants in the same action (the "Approved Settlements"). The
Newly Settling Defendants have agreed to pay $96 million (the
"Settlement Fund"). This amount is in addition to the fund created
from the $408.5 million paid in connection with the Approved
Settlements. Before any money is paid, the Court will have a
hearing to decide whether to approve the additional Proposed
Settlement.  Approval of the Proposed Settlement by the Court will
resolve this lawsuit in its entirety.

Subject to certain exceptions, the Settlement Class includes all
persons or entities (together, "Persons") who, from January 1,
2006, through January 31, 2014, entered into, received or made
payments on, settled, terminated, transacted in, or held an ISDAfix
Instrument. "ISDAfix Instrument" means (i) any and all interest
rate derivatives, including, but not limited to, any swaps, swap
spreads, swap futures, variance swaps, volatility swaps, range
accrual swaps, constant maturity swaps, constant maturity swap
options, digital options, cash-settled swaptions, physically
settled swaptions, swapnote futures, cash-settled swap futures,
steepeners, flatteners, inverse floaters, snowballs, interest
rate-linked structured notes, and digital and callable range
accrual notes, where denominated in USD or related to USD interest
rates; and (ii) any financial instruments, products, or
transactions related in any way to any USD ISDAfix Benchmark Rates,
including, but not limited to, any instruments, products, or
transactions that reference ISDAfix Benchmark Rates and any
instruments, products, or transactions relevant to the
determination or calculation of ISDAfix Benchmark Rates.

For anyone unsure whether they are a Settlement Class Member, they
can find more information, including a detailed Notice of an
Additional Proposed Settlement of Class Action (the "Notice"), at
www.ISDAfixAntitrustSettlement.com, or by calling the Claims
Administrator at 1-844-789-6862 (U.S.), or +1-503-597-5526 (Int.).

Settlement Class Members who do not opt out of the Settlement Class
will be eligible to file a Proof of Claim and Release Form (the
"Claim Form"). Claim Forms can be found at
www.ISDAfixAntitrustSettlement.com.  The amount of the payment will
be determined by a Plan of Distribution to be approved by the
Court. The proposed plan is functionally the same as the plan that
was given final approval by the Court in connection with the
Approved Settlements. Details are available at
www.ISDAfixAntitrustSettlement.com. A date for distribution of the
Settlement Fund has not been set. Claim Forms must be submitted by
December 23, 2018.

Settlement Class Members do not need to do anything if they
submitted a timely and valid claim form in connection with the
Approved Settlements. Any such submission will be treated as a
valid and timely Claim Form with respect to this additional
Proposed Settlement. Anyone unsure whether they did so can contact
the Claims Administrator by calling 1-844-789-6862 (U.S.), or
+1-503-597-5526 (Int.).

Settlement Class Members who do not opt out of the Settlement Class
will release certain legal rights against the Newly Settling
Defendants and the Released Defendant Parties, as explained in the
detailed Notice and Settlement Agreement, available at
www.ISDAfixAntitrustSettlement.com. Settlement Class Members who do
not want to take part in the Proposed Settlement  must opt out by
October 13, 2018.

Settlement Class Members may, but do not have to, comment on or
object to the Proposed Settlement, or Lead Counsel's application to
the Court for an award of attorneys' fees, expenses, and incentive
awards to the Class Plaintiffs for representing the Settlement
Class with respect to the Proposed Settlement. To do so, a
Settlement Class Member must file any comment or objection with the
Court by October 13, 2018.

Further information on how to opt out of the Settlement Class, or
file a comment or objection with the Court, is available at
www.ISDAfixAntitrustSettlement.com.

The Court will hold a hearing on November 8, 2018, at the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square,
Courtroom 1105, New York, NY 10007, to consider whether to approve
the Proposed Settlement, and Lead Counsel's application for an
award of attorneys' fees, expenses, and incentive awards to the
Class Plaintiffs. Settlement Class Members or their lawyers may ask
to appear and speak at the hearing at their own expense, but do not
have to.

The Court has appointed the lawyers listed below as Lead Counsel to
represent the Settlement Class in this Action:

          Daniel L. Brockett
          Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP
          51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
          New York, NY 10010

          David W. Mitchell
          Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101

          Christopher M. Burke
          Scott+Scott, Attorneys at Law, LLP
          600 West Broadway, Suite 3300
          San Diego, CA 92101

BANK OF AMERICA: Ricciardi Suit Seeks to Recover OT Pay
-------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN RICCIARDI AND KATHY PHILLIPS, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated v. BANK OF AMERICA CORP. and BANK OF
AMERICA, N.A., Case No. 1:18-cv-11629-FDS (D. Mass., August 2,
2018), seeks to recover overtime compensation for the Plaintiffs
and similarly situated Mortgage Loan Officers, who have been
employed by the Defendants in the United States.

Bank of America Corp. is a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Charlotte, North Carolina, and doing business
as a bank, mortgage lender, and financial institution nationwide
and within the state of Massachusetts.

Bank of America, N.A., is a nationally chartered banking
association headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina, doing
business as a bank, mortgage lender, and financial institution
nationwide and within the state of Massachusetts.  Bank of America,
N.A. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Bank of America Corp.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Hillary Schwab, Esq.
          Brant Casavant, Esq.
          FAIR WORK P.C.
          192 South Street, Suite 450
          Boston, MA 02111
          Telephone: (617) 607-3261
          Facsimile: (617) 488-2261
          E-mail: hillary@fairworklaw.com
                  brant@fairworklaw.com

               - and -

          Justin M. Swartz, Esq.
          Deirdre Aaron, Esq.
          Nina Martinez, Esq.
          OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 245-1000
          E-mail: jms@outtengolden.com
                  daaron@outtengolden.com
                  nmartinez@outtengolden.com

               - and -

          Gregg I. Shavitz, Esq.
          Paolo C. Meireles, Esq.
          SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
          951 Yamato Rd, Suite 285
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (561) 447-8888
          E-mail: gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com
                  pmeireles@shavitzlaw.com



BAR 20: Time to File Supplemental Brief in J. Maciel's Suit Tolled
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California further extended the Time to File Supplemental Briefing
in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement in the case captioned JOSE MACIEL and ELVIS BONILLA, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, and as
aggrieved employees on behalf of other aggrieved employees under
the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Plaintiffs,
v. BAR 20 DAIRY, LLC, a California limited liability company, and
DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, No. 1:17-cv-00902-DAD-SKO
(E.D. Cal.).

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yayq38kf from Leagle.com.

Jose Maciel, on behalf of himself, and all others similarly
situated, and as an "aggrieved employee" on behalf of other
"aggrieved employees" under the Labor Code Private Attorney General
Act of 2004, Plaintiff, represented by Caroline Tahmassian Zarneh ,
The Spivak Law Firm & David Glenn Spivak, The Spivak Law Firm.

Elvis Bonilla, on behalf of himself, and all others similarly
situated, and as an "aggrieved employee" on behalf of other
"aggrieved employees" under the Labor Code Private Attorney General
Act of 2004, Plaintiff, represented by Eric Bryce Kingsley --
eric@kingsleykingsley.com -- Kingsley & Kingsley APC & Kelsey M.
Peterson-More -- kelsey@kingsleykingsley.com -- Kingsley &
Kingsley.

Bar 20 Dairy, LLC, a California limited liability company,
Defendant, represented by Jared Hague -- jared@suttonhague.com --
Sutton Hague Law Corporation, PC, Joseph Vidal Macias --
joseph.macias@maximintegrated.com -- Sutton Hague Law Corporation,
PC, S. Brett Sutton -- brett@suttonhague.com -- Sutton Hague Law
Corporation, PC & Wesley Lawrence Carlson, Sutton Hague Law
Corporation.

BAVARIA HAUS: Rodriguez Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------
MIGUEL ANGEL RIBIERO RODRIGUEZ, and all others similarly situated
under 29 U.S.C. 216(b), the Plaintiff, vs. BAVARIA HAUS LLC, SASA
PERISIC, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-23231-FAM (S.D. Fla.,
Aug. 8, 2018), seeks to recover double damages and reasonable
attorney fees from Defendants, jointly and severally, pursuant to
the Fair Labor Standards Act, to be proven at the time of trial for
all overtime wages still owing from Plaintiffs' entire employment
period with Defendants or as much as allowed by the FLSA along with
court costs, interest, and any other relief that this Court finds
reasonable under the circumstances.

According to the complaint, the Defendants willfully and
intentionally refused to pay Plaintiffs' overtime wages as required
by the Fair Labor Standards Act as Defendants knew of the overtime
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act and recklessly failed
to investigate whether Defendants' payroll practices were in
accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J.H. Zidell, Esq.
          J.H. ZIDELL, P.A.
          300 71st Street, Suite 605
          Miami Beach, FL 33141
          Telephone: (305) 865 6766
          Facsimile: (305) 865 7167
          E-mail: ZABOGADO@AOL.COM


BILLINGS, TN: Faces Class Action Over Illegal Sales Tax
-------------------------------------------------------
Darrell Ehrlick, writing for Billings Gazette, reports that all six
district judges in Yellowstone County have either disqualified
themselves or have been substituted in a possible class action suit
against the City of Billings for collecting franchise fees on
utility bills from residents.

Judge Greg Pinski from the Eighth Judicial District in Great Falls
will now hear the case and decide if it can proceed as a
class-action suit.

The case, filed by six Billings residents, is being considered as a
possible class-action suit because it claims the city has illegally
collected franchise fees from all ratepayers on utility bills when
the city was not allowed to do so.

If the class-action suit were certified and successful, the city
could be on the hook for as much as $20 million in fees owed to
residents.

Five of the six judges in the district had disqualified themselves
from the case. In doing so, they do not have to list a reason for
the disqualification.

However, earlier in the case, Doug James, one of two attorneys
representing the city, had filed a "report" to the court showing
that all six judges lived within the city limits and had paid the
franchise fees as part of their bill. The city argued that because
they were all possible plaintiffs if the suit were certified as a
class action, they "may have a potential conflict of interest in
the case" because they stood to make money by the decision.

Matthew G. Monforton said that while the potential for a conflict
was there, Montana law and ethics canon also gives judges a way to
avoid the conflict, for example, by renouncing any monetary
settlement that is reached in the case.

The only other judge in the district, Don Harris, was substituted
from the case after initially hearing it. Montana allows any party
to the lawsuit to substitute, or "bump," a judge off a case once.
The City of Billings used its substitution to remove
Judge Harris.

Mr. Monforton, one of two attorneys representing the residents,
called the situation where five sitting judges were disqualified
"unprecedented."

"This makes the case more expensive and it adds cost," Mr.
Monforton said.

Mr. James disagreed, pointing out that Montana has only one
bankruptcy judge for the entire state and the cases are often
handled by videoconference or phone.

"The distances involved have not delayed cases or resulted in
significant additional expense," Mr. James said in a written
response to Gazette questions.

If the case were to go to trial, it would likely be held in
Billings, and Judge Pinski would travel.

Mr. James told The Gazette the case was originally assigned to
Department 7, one of the newly created judicial districts. Two
candidates, Colette Davies and Thomas Pardy, are running for that
seat. Mr. James said that if Mr. Pardy is elected, it's reasonable
for him to recuse himself because he is an attorney on the city's
legal staff. If Judge Davies is elected, the case could then be
transferred back to her from Judge Pinski in January when she's
sworn in.

Mr. Monforton said that his clients viewed the move as another
delay and stall tactic aimed at dragging the case out longer.

"There will also be a further delay because Judge Pinski will have
to get himself up to speed on the case he just inherited," Mr.
Monforton said.

Mr. James said it's not about slowing the case, instead it's about
making sure the city's interests are well represented in the case.


"We are not trying to slow the process down. However, we are
working to insure that the case is tried fairly for all parties,"
Mr. James said.

Instead, Mr. James pointed out that the city sent three separate
discovery requests to the plaintiffs on May 31, and is still
waiting for those. He said the city has agreed to three separate
extensions of time for them.  

Montana law allows for judges to hear cases from other districts
when there is a disqualification. Usually, those cases are heard by
a judge from a neighboring county. But because of workloads or
other issues, any sitting district judge can be called.

The next step in the case is likely to determine whether the
lawsuit qualifies as a class-action, meaning many ratepayers could
stand to get money back if the citizens' case is successful.

"We have a strong case, and we are certain we will prevail no
matter who hears the case," Mr. Monforton said. [GN]

BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: Faces Ballou Suit in D. New Jersey
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against BMW of North America
LLC. SUSAN BALLOU, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA LLC; and
BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE AKTIENESELLSCHAFT, Defendant, Case No.
2:18-cv-11765-CCC-MF (D.N.J., July 18, 2018).  The case is assigned
to Judge Claire C. Cecchi and referred to Magistrate Judge Mark
Falk.

BMW of North America, LLC engages in the import and distribution of
BMW luxury/performance vehicles.  BMW of North America operates as
a subsidiary of Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gary S. Graifman, Esq.
          KANTROWITZ, GOLDHAMER & GRAIFMAN, ESQS.
          210 Summit Avenue
          Montvale, NJ 07645
          Telephone: (201) 391-7000
          E-mail: ggraifman@kgglaw.com


BRIGHT HORIZONS: Faces Delacruz Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bright Horizons
Family Solutions LLC. The lawsuit is captioned as Emanuel Delacruz
on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. Bright Horizons Family Solutions LLC, the Defendant,
Case No. 1:18-cv-07228 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 10, 2018). The case involves
Americans with Disabilities Act violation.

Bright Horizons is a United States–based child-care provider and
is the largest provider of employer-sponsored child care.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 299 6612
          Facsimile: (929) 575 4195
          E-mail: joseph@cml.legal


BRIGHT HOUSE: Stephan Sliwa Seeks to Certify Two Classes
--------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned STEPHAN H. SLIWA, the Plaintiff, v. BRIGHT
HOUSE NETWORKS, LLC and ADVANCED TELESOLUTIONS, INC., the
Defendants, Case No. 2:16-cv-00235-JES-MRM (M.D. Fla.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court for an order certifying these classes:

-- Automatic Telephone Dialing Systems Class:

    "(1) all persons in the United States (2) who are not a
    customer of either defendant (3) to whose cellular telephone
    number (3) Defendants placed at least one non-emergency
    telephone call (4) using substantially the same dialing
    system(s) they used to telephone Plaintiff (5) within the
    4-year period preceding the filing of the complaint
    (6) after Defendants had already documented the number as
    a wrong number in their records"; and

-- Prerecorded Voice Class

    "(1) all persons in the United States (2) who are not a
    customer of either defendant (3) to whose cellular telephone
    number (3) Defendants placed at least one non-emergency
    telephone call (4) using a prerecorded voice (5) within the
    4-year period preceding the filing of the complaint
    (6) after Defendants had already documented the number as
    a wrong number in their records".

Attorneys for Plaintiff Stephan H. Sliwa:

          William Peerce Howard, Esq.
          THE CONSUMER PROTECTION FIRM, PLLC
          4030 Henderson Blvd.
          Tampa, Florida 33629
          Telephone: (813) 500-1500
          E-mail: Billy@TheConsumerProtectionFirm.com

               - and -

          Keith J. Keogh
          KEOGH LAW LTD
          55 W. Monroe, Ste. 3390
          Chicago, II. 60603
          Telephone: (312) 726 1092
          E-mail: keith@keoghlaw.com


BRISTOL BAY: Underpays Role-Players, Abikar Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------
ABUCAR NUNOW ABIKAR; BARKADLE SHEIKH MUHAMED AWMAGAN; ARAB MURSAL
DEH; MAJUMA MADENDE; OSMAN MUSA MOHAMED; OSMAN MUSA MUGANGA; RUKIA
MUSA; AND FATUMA SOMOW, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BRISTOL BAY NATIVE CORPORATION;
GLACIER TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS, LLC; WORKFORCE RESOURCES, LLC; and
DOES 1-50, Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-01700-DMS-AGS (S.D. Cal.,
July 25, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for failure to
pay overtime wages, provide accurate earning statements, pay all
wages due upon termination of employment.

According to the complaint, the Defendants contracted with the
United States Department of Defense to help train U.S. Marines in
East African, Iraqi, Afghani, Filipino and Mexican cultures of
interest to the military. To this end, the Defendants employed the
Plaintiffs as role-players to work in simulated villages as
shopkeepers, village elders, insurgents, and other roles. The
simulations teach Marines how to operate safely and effectively in
counter-insurgency operations they may face in future combat or
peace-keeping missions.

Bristol Bay Native Corporation, through its subsidiaries, engages
in oilfield and industrial service, construction, government
contracting, and petroleum distribution businesses. It offers
specialty services; nondestructive testing and inspection services;
and construction, maintenance, industrial cleaning, power
generation, and transportation services to support resource
development companies. Bristol Bay Native Corporation was founded
in 1971 and is based in Anchorage, Alaska. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          A. Melissa Johnson, Esq.
          Marilynn Mika Spencer, Esq.
          SPENCER JOHNSON McCAMMON LLP
          2727 Camino del Rio South, Suite 140
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Telephone: (619) 233-1313

               - and -

          David J. Duchrow, Esq.
          Jill A. Piano, Esq.
          DUCHROW & PIANO LLP
          2510 Main Street, Suite 205
          Santa Monica, CA 90405
          Telephone: (310) 452-4900


CALIFORNIA FIELD: Court Approves $15.4MM Class Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case captioned
DONALD ALLBAUGH, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. CALIFORNIA FIELD IRONWORKERS PENSION
TRUST; BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA FIELD IRONWORKERS
PENSION TRUST, PLAN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE CALIFORNIA FIELD
IRONWORKERS PENSION TRUST, Defendants, Case No.
2:12-CV-00561-JAD-GWF(D. Nev.).

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court approves the Settlement as set forth in the Agreement, finds
that said Settlement is, in all respects, fair, reasonable,
adequate and in the best interests of the members of the Classes,
directs that the Settlement be consummated in accordance with the
terms and conditions set forth in the Agreement, and orders all
Parties to take the necessary steps to effectuate the Settlement as
set forth in the Agreement.

The Settlement provides for a Settlement Fund including Settlement
Benefits and Class Counsel's Fee Award and Case Contribution Award,
in an aggregate value of $15,400,000 together with other valuable
relief including revised suspension of benefit procedures. After
adjustment for the Fee Award and Case Contribution Award, all of
the Settlement Fund will be paid to Class members and their
eligible beneficiaries as set forth in the Agreement and Plan of
Allocation.

The Fee Award, to be deducted from the Settlement Amount,
represents attorney's fees and costs reasonably expended in
prosecuting the Action. As set forth in Plaintiff's Motion for
Attorneys' Fees and Costs and supporting documentation, Class
Counsel's Fee Application, which consisted of a request for an
amount for attorney's fees of $5,133,333.33, $320,000 in reimbursed
costs, and the Case Contribution Award of $50,000 is fair,
reasonable and appropriate in accordance with the standards set
forth in this Circuit.

The Plan of Allocation is approved as fair and reasonable. The
distribution to Settlement Class members as set forth in the Plan
of Allocation is final and non-appealable. As set forth in the
Agreement, Defendants shall take all reasonable and diligent steps
to pay all eligible Settlement Class members by the Initial Payment
Date in accordance with the terms of the Agreement.

The Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs is granted.
The Defendants are ordered to pay Class Counsel's attorneys' fees
in the amount of $5,133,333.33, plus $320,000 in reimbursed costs,
for a total payment of $5,453,333.33.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7pb5n66 from Leagle.com.

Donald Allbaugh, Plaintiff, represented by Jennifer Kroll , Martin
& Bonnett, PLLC, pro hac vice, Kathleen J. England , Gilbert &
England Law Firm, Michael D. Lore , Michael D. Lore, PC, pro hac
vice & Susan Martin , Martin & Bonnett, PLLC, Phoenix, Arizona
85018, pro hac vice.

California Field Ironworkers Pension Trust, Defendant, represented
by George M. Kraw -- gkraw@kraw.com -- Kraw Law Group, APC, pro hac
vice, Katherine McDonough -- kmcdonouhg@kraw.com -- pro hac vice,
Kathleen Marie Paustian, Law Office of Kathleen M.Paustian,
Michelle Lynn Steinhardt -- msteinhardt@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees
LLP, Ronald K. Alberts -- ralberts@grdm.com -- Gordon & Rees, pro
hac vice, Susan L. Meyers -- smeyer@grsm.com -- Gordon Rees LLP,
pro hac vice, Ashlie L. Surur -- asururl@lawhic.com -- Hall Jaffe &
Clayton, LLP & Robert S. Larsen -- rlarsen@grsm.com -- Gordon &
Rees LLP.

Board of Trustees of the California Field Ironworkers Pension
Trust, Plan Administrator of the California Field Ironworkers
Pension Trust, Defendant, represented by Katherine McDonough , pro
hac vice, Kathleen Marie Paustian , Law Office of Kathleen
M.Paustian, Michelle Lynn Steinhardt , Gordon & Rees LLP, Ronald K.
Alberts , Gordon & Rees, pro hac vice, Susan L. Meter , Gordon Rees
LLP, pro hac vice, Ashlie L. Surur , Hall Jaffe & Clayton, LLP &
Robert S. Larsen , Gordon & Rees LLP.

CAPE CLOGS: Faces Crosson Suit in Eastern District of New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Cape Clogs, Inc. The
lawsuit is captioned as Aretha Crosson, Individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons, the
Plaintiff, v. Cape Clogs, Inc., the Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-04541 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 10, 2018). The case alleges Americans
with Disabilities Act violations.

Cape Clogs, Inc. is a designer, importer, distributor and online
retailer Swedish Orthopedic Clogs and Footwear from their Swedish
manufacturing partner.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


CARHARTT INC: Accused by Nevitt Suit of Not Paying Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
APRIL NEVITT and JUSTIN NEVITT, on Behalf of Themselves and All
Others Similarly-situated v. CARHARTT, INC., Case No.
4:18-cv-00126-JHM-HBB (W.D. Ky., August 2, 2018), accuses the
Defendant of not paying employees overtime for all work performed
in excess of 40 hours per week.

Carhartt, Inc., is a Michigan For-Profit Corporation with its
principal office in Dearborn, Michigan.

Carhartt sells jackets and other clothing, and operates
distribution facilities, including one in Hanson, Kentucky, for the
purpose of distributing its clothing products.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Mark N. Foster, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF MARK N. FOSTER, PLLC
          P.O. Box 869
          Madisonville, KY 42431
          Telephone: (270) 213-1303
          E-mail: MFoster@MarkNFoster.com


CARING PROFESSIONALS: Can't Compel Arbitration in HHCs' Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Shlomo S. Hagler of the New York County Supreme Court denied
the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration and stay the action in
the case, LYUDMYLA KONSTANTYNOVSKA and NATASHA SEVERIN,
individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated
who were employed by CARING PROFESSIONALS, INC., Plaintiffs, v.
CARING PROFESSIONALS, INC., Defendant, Docket No. 159883/2016 (N.Y.
Sup.).

In the class action complaint, Konstantynovska and Severin, on
behalf of themselves and other similarly situated home health care
attendants, allege that they were not paid the wages and benefits
that they were entitled to while working for their former employer,
Caring Professionals.

Konstantynovska initiated the class action by filing a complaint on
Nov. 23, 2016.  The Plaintiffs are home health care attendants
formerly employed by Caring Professionals, a business that provides
nursing and home health aide services at the residences of its
clients.  The Complaint states that all of the Plaintiffs in the
putative class ceased working for Defendant on or before Dec. 1,
2016.  Specifically, it indicates that Konstantynovska worked as a
home health care attendant from Oct. 24, 2012 through Nov. 7, 2016,
and that Severin worked for Defendant from August 2011 through June
2016.

The first four causes of action in the Complaint allege that the
Defendant violated various provisions of the New York Labor Law
("NYLL") and the New York Codes, Rules, and Regulations ("NYCRR")
when it failed to pay the Plaintiffs the statutory minimum wage,
overtime compensation, "spread of hours" compensation, and full
wages due and when it failed to reimburse the Plaintiffs for
supplies purchased for the Defendant's benefit.  

The fifth cause of action, grounded in breach of contract, alleges
that the Plaintiffs, as third party beneficiaries of the
Defendant's contract(s) with government agencies to pay wages as
required by the NY Health Care Worker Wage Parity Act, are entitled
to relief for the breach of this contractual obligation, plus
interest.  

In the sixth cause of action, the Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendant breached the "City Service Contract(s)" by not paying
them the living wages, health benefits or health benefit
supplements, which were incorporated into this contract for their
benefit.

In response to the Complaint, the Defendant sent a letter to the
president of the Plaintiffs' union, Local 713 I.B.O.T.U, U.M.D.,
I.L.A., AFL-CIO, and their counsel, requesting that the Plaintiffs
withdraw their complaint and submit their disputes to the mandatory
grievance and arbitration procedure set forth in the collective
bargaining agreement ("CBA") as set forth in an MOA dated Dec. 13,
2016.  When the Plaintiffs failed to withdraw the Complaint, the
Defendant made the instant motion, seeking to compel arbitration.

The Defendant states that all putative class action members are or
were union members who are represented by Local 713, and that
Caring Professionals and Local 713 entered into the CBA, which
governs various aspects of the Plaintiffs' employment with the
Defendant.  On Dec. 13, 2016, the parties entered into a
modification and amendment of the CBA, entitled memorandum of
agreement ("MOA"), requiring employees to submit wage and hour
claims, including claims alleging violations of the NYLL and the
New York Home Care Worker Wage Parity Law, to an exclusive
grievance and arbitration process.  The Defendant argues that the
MOA, coupled with the CBA, govern the employment relationship
between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant, and that the MOA is
applicable to all employees covered by the CBA, including the
Plaintiffs.  In the alternative, it argues that the proceedings
should be stayed so that an arbitrator can rule on whether the
Plaintiffs' claims are appropriate for arbitration.

In opposition, the Plaintiffs argue that, as former employees, they
cannot be bound to the MOA as it was entered into after they ceased
working for the Defendant.  They note that the MOA was executed on
Dec. 13, 2016.  Even if, as the Defendant states, Konstantynovska's
last date of employment was Dec. 27, 2016 and not in November 2016,
absent ratification, she cannot be bound to the MOA.  The
Plaintiffs note that the MOA contained new language pertaining to
arbitration requirements that had never been included in any prior
CBA agreements.

Judge Hagler finds that the arbitration provision applicable to the
Plaintiffs, found in the 2016 CBA, limited the grievance and
arbitration process to disputes about the misinterpretation or
misapplication of a specific written term in the CBA.  The
Plaintiffs' complaint does not concern allegations about the
interpretation of the CBA, but alleges various statutory violations
and breach of contract.  

Despite the presumption in favor of arbitration, it is well settled
that Courts will not compel arbitration of statutory claims where
the CBA in question did not effectuate a "clear and unmistakable"
waiver of those claims.  As the terms in the 2016 CBA do not
specifically provide that the Plaintiffs' claims alleging
violations of the NYLL and Wage Parity Law, among others, are
subject to arbitration, the 2016 CBA does not effectuate a "clear
and unmistakable" waiver as to these claims.

Without a valid and compulsory arbitration provision, the Judge
holds that the Plaintiffs cannot be compelled to arbitrate.
Accordingly, he finds that the parties did not have a valid
agreement to arbitrate the Plaintiffs' claims in the class action.

Judge Hagler denied the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration
and stay the action.  He directed the Defendant to serve an answer
to the complaint within 20 days after service of a copy of the
Order with notice of entry.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2018 Decision and Order is
available at https://is.gd/6rRrCA from Leagle.com.

CAVALRY PORTFOLIO: Court Stays K. Krejci's TCPA Action
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California granted Defendant's Motion to Stay the case captioned
KEVIN KREJCI, Plaintiff, v. CAVALRY PORTFOLIO SERVICES, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 3:16-cv-0211-JAH-WVG (S.D. Cal.), pending the
resolution of cross-motions for summary judgment in the related
case of Horton v. Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC, Case No.
3:13-CV-00307-JAH-WVG (S.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff filed the operative class action complaint asserting
that Defendant violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA).  Specifically, the complaint alleges that the Defendant
placed calls to the Plaintiff, and similar consumers, utilizing
impermissible automated technology, otherwise known as an automatic
telephone dialing system (ATDS).

A court's power to stay proceedings is incidental to its inherent
power to control the disposition of its cases in the interests of
efficiency and fairness to the court, counsel, and litigants.  

In determining whether a stay is appropriate, a district court must
weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance. Landis, 299
U.S. at 254-55. Among the competing interests are: (1) the possible
damage which may result from the granting of a stay, (2) the
hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to
go forward, and (3) the orderly course of justice measured in terms
of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions
of law which could be expected to result from a stay.

The Defendant contends that the issue to be decided by this Court
in the Horton is a crucial, disputed and potentially dispositive
issue in this case. The Defendant further contends that a limited
stay in this case will prevent hardship to both parties by avoiding
the need for expensive, time-consuming, and duplicative fact and
expert discovery which has already been conducted in Horton.

The Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that a stay in this case
will not simplify the issues or conserve the judicial resources
because discovery in this case will be required regardless of how
this Court rules on the Horton summary judgment motion. The
Plaintiff contends that another stay will result in a significant
hardship to the Plaintiff's interest in resolving his claims
expeditiously.  

Having considered and weighed the Landis factors, the Court finds
that a stay is appropriate in this case. First, the Plaintiff fails
to demonstrate any potential damage which may result from a limited
stay. Instead, the gravamen of the Plaintiff's opposition questions
the benefits of any proposed stay, arguing that the Horton summary
judgment findings may be inapplicable because the telephone system
used to call the Plaintiff is still a mystery. The Plaintiff does
maintain that he will suffer significant hardship if the stay is
granted, however, such a claim is too conclusory in nature to be
persuasive absent more detail or factual support.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 23, 2018 Order is
available at   https://tinyurl.com/ycnro8lw from Leagle.com.

Kevin Krejci, Plaintiff, represented by Sergei Lemberg, Lemberg
Law, LLC, pro hac vice & Trinette G. Kent -- tkent@kentlawpc.com --
Kent Law Offices.

Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by Tomio B.
Narita -- tnarita@snllp.com -- Simmonds & Narita LLP, Jeffrey Alan
Topor -- jtopor@snllp.com -- Simmonds and Narita LLP & Jennifer
Lawdan Yazdi -- jyazdi@snllp.com -- Simmonds & Narita LLP.

CENTURYLINK INC: Gainey McKenna Files Derivative Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston has filed a derivative action on behalf
of current stockholders of CenturyLink, Inc. ("CenturyLink" or the
"Company") because of alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by its
board of directors (the "Board"). The new action was filed in the
Western District of Louisiana, Case No. 3-18-cv-870.

A prior derivative action filed by Gainey McKenna & Egleston on
behalf of CenturyLink and against its directors was voluntarily
dismissed to allow for a demand upon the Board to take certain
requested actions.  That voluntarily dismissed action was also
filed in the Western District of Louisiana, Case No. 3-17-cv-1177.

The Complaint in the recently filed action alleges that the Board
violated its fiduciary duties by allowing CenturyLink to make false
and misleading statements and/or fail to disclose that: (1)
CenturyLink's policies allowed its employees to add services or
lines to accounts without customer permission, resulting in
millions of dollars in unauthorized charges to CenturyLink
customers; (2) CenturyLink's revenues were the product of illicit
conduct and unsustainable; (3) the foregoing illicit conduct was
likely to subject CenturyLink to heightened regulatory scrutiny;
and (4) as a result, CenturyLink's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.  The
Complaint further alleges that the failure of the Board to respond
to the plaintiff's demand to take action to rectify these breaches
was itself a breach of its fiduciary duty.

If you wish to discuss your rights or interests regarding this
class action please;

         Thomas J. McKenna, Esq.
         Gregory M. Egleston, Esq.
         Gainey McKenna & Egleston
         Telephone: (212) 983-1300
         Website: http://www.gme-law.com
         Email: tjmckenna@gme-law.com
                gegleston@gme-law.com. [GN]

CHC GROUP: $586K Attorney's Fees Awarded in Securities Fraud Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees in the case
captioned ERROL RUDMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHC GROUP LTD., et
al., Defendants, No. 15-cv-3773 (LAK)(S.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiffs brought these damages actions under the Securities
Act of 1933 claiming that the registration statement issued in
connection with the initial public offering of shares of CHC Group
Ltd. (CHC) contained false and misleading statements.

Less than a month after the filing of the notice of appeal, the
parties notified the Court of Appeals that they had reached a
settlement in principle and withdrew the appeal from active
consideration pending finalization of settlement papers and an
application to this Court to approve the settlement. The terms of
the settlement are straightforward. CHC's insurance carrier is
paying $3.85 million in cash.

The Kirby firm, suddenly joined by the Kahn firm, now seek
attorneys fees equal to one third of the settlement fund, or
$1,283,333.33 approximately 33.33 percent of the settlement fund.
Their combined lodestar allegedly is $725,913.25, which is said to
reflect 1,259.16 hours of work multiplied by the current billing
rates of the attorneys and other staff who worked on the case.

The Kirby Firm's Lodestar Reflects an Unreasonably High Number of
Hours

The Kirby firm achieved a benefit for the class, it obtained a
small settlement in an extremely weak case. Under the common
benefit theory, it is entitled to reasonable compensation for
having done so. The Court begins its analysis with the Kirby firm's
claimed lodestar.

The Kirby firm's claimed lodestar seeks compensation for 1138.76
hours, of which 769.01 are attributable to lawyers and paralegals.
The hourly rates claimed for these individuals range from $210 to
$985 per hour. The Court finds those hourly rates reasonable in all
the circumstances. But it has substantial concerns with respect to
the hours expended by those lawyers and paralegals.

Lawyers and Paralegals

The Court cannot justify compensating it for about 100 hours of
work spent on an essentially boilerplate motion.

Another category lumped together time spent on the motion to
dismiss the amended complaint and time spent on case management
without breaking those activities down and without providing
contemporaneous time records. The firm says it spent almost 210
hours on these tasks.

The perfunctory justification for those hours is that the firm
spent considerable time researching the impact of CHC's bankruptcy
on the Action in addition to responding to the motion to dismiss.
But counsel have given no details on what that research involved
and why it warranted so much time. Nor is there any explanation of
how much time was spent on case management or what that entailed.
This presents a difficulty.

The Court acknowledges that responding to the motion to dismiss was
a critically important task that deserved care and effort. But it
has no basis for concluding how much time was spent on that motion
or, for that matter, on bankruptcy research and case management,
let alone why that time was justified. Plaintiffs' counsel
therefore have failed to persuade the Court that an efficient
attorney would have engaged in similar time expenditures especially
considering the failure to justify time spent conducting bankruptcy
research and the failure to offer any description of whatever else
case management might entail. The motion to dismiss justifies a
significant amount of time, to be sure. But not 210 hours.

The 31 hours attributed to the appeal are even more difficult to
justify. Plaintiffs filed the notice of appeal on December 7, 2016.
They agreed to dismiss the appeal not much more than one month
later. They filed no brief. And plaintiffs' counsel has offered no
explanation as to why 31 hours were spent on a notice of appeal, a
notice of appearance, and a stipulation to withdraw the case.

Finally, the preliminary motion for settlement and class
certification, final settlement approval, and post-settlement
stages account for 137.51 hours of work. Each of these motions was
unopposed. Each of these tasks was something plaintiffs' counsel,
as experienced securities class action litigators, surely have
performed many times over. And again, plaintiffs' counsel offered
to the Court only a bare-bones description of the task and scant
justification for this large request. It is hard to believe that
all of these hours were spent usefully and reasonably.

Analysts and Administrative Clerks

In addition to the time invested by lawyers and paralegals, the
Kirby firm includes in its proposed lodestar 369.75 hours
attributed to senior analysts (360.75 hours) and administrative
clerks (9 hours).

It now is well established that attorneys' fee awards should
reflect reasonable compensation for the work product of attorneys.
In appropriate cases, such awards may include compensation for the
work of paralegals and other non-lawyers. The more difficult
question is how the work of non-lawyers is to be valued in
determining the overall attorneys' fee.  As the Supreme Court has
said with respect to paralegals, albeit in a Section 1988 case, the
prevailing practice in a given community is to govern whether
paralegals' time is billed separately, and whether it is billed at
cost or at market rates.

At this point, it is well known that paralegals, at least in this
market, customarily are billed by law firms for their time at
hourly rates. That is reflected in the Court's ruling here with
respect to the Kirby firm's paralegals. But the practices of the
Bar concerning senior analysts and administrative clerks, assuming
there are any general practices, is unknown to the Court and
certainly not established by the Kirby firm's papers.

Accordingly, the Court declines to include the hours and rates
advanced by the Kirby firm.
Plaintiffs Have Not Established Any Basis for a Fee Award to the
Kahn Firm
The Kahn firm, which was not chosen as lead counsel, seeks
compensation for 120.4 hours of work, including 33.90 hours for its
lead plaintiff motion.

The Court sees no basis at all for compensating the Kahn firm for
the time devoted to its unsuccessful motion to have its client
appointed lead plaintiff and itself appointed as lead counsel.
Although the motion was entirely appropriate under the PSLRA, it
was filed for the benefit of the Kahn firm, it was unsuccessful and
it accomplished nothing at all for the members of the alleged
class. That time contributed nothing to the $3.85 million common
fund that eventually was created in this case.

The Court declines in these circumstances to make any fee award to
the Kahn firm.

The Requested Fee Award Would Be An Unreasonably High Percentage of
the Fund

The report indicating a median fee award of 30 percent is slightly
more helpful. But, as this Court has observed before, the NERA
report shows higher fee awards than other reports have found. For
example, a different study found that from 1993-2003 the median fee
was 25 percent in cases with settlements between $2.8 and $5
million. And fee awards reportedly have been trending downward
since then.

Therefore, the Court finds that a fee award of one third of the
fund a percentage higher even than the median number given by the
plaintiff would be an unreasonably high percentage of the fund,
particularly given the almost trivial per share recovery. The
Court's proposed award based on a its revision of the lodestar is
approximately 15.2 percent of the fund. Although that percentage is
lower than the median award regardless of which study is cited, it
is not so much lower than the (likely less than) 25 percent median
at least one study has found.

The Court finds that a fee award of $586,047.76 would better
balance the interests of the class and adequate compensation of
counsel.

The Request for Reimbursement of Expenses

The Plaintiffs' counsel seeks $12,723.86 in reimbursement of
expenses. The majority of the expenses are attributable to
mediation and online legal research fees. Others include filing
fees and travel expenses. The Court finds nothing objectionable.
That is granted.

The Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and reimbursement of
expenses is granted to the extent that the Kirby firm is hereby
awarded an aggregate amount of $598,771.62. It is denied in all
other respects.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 23, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7hyu6d9 from
Leagle.com.

Peter McCrory, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situtated, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas Livezey Laughlin, IV --
TLAUGHLIN@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- Scott + Scott, L.L.P.

Errol Rudman & Rudman Partners LP, Movants, represented by Ira M.
Press -- ipress@kmllp.com -- Kirby McInerney LLP.

CHC Group Ltd., William J. Amelio, Joan S. Hooper, Rebecca Camden,
William E. Macaulay, Jonathan Lewis & Kenneth W. Moore, Defendants,
represented by Andrew J. Levander -- andrew.levander@dechert.com --
Dechert, LLP, Neil A. Steiner -- neil.steiner@dechert.com --
Dechert, LLP, Sarah Dean Lyons -- neil.steiner@dechert.com --
Dechert, LLP & Andrew Aaron Spievack -- andrew.buck@troutman.com --
Dechert, LLP.

J.P. Morgan Securities, LLC, Barclays Capital Inc., UBS Securities
LLC, HSBC Securities (USA) Inc., RBC Capital Markets, LLC, Wells
Fargo Securities, LLC, BNP Paribas Securities Corp., Standard Bank
Plc, Cormark Securities (USA) Ltd., Cowen and Company, LLC, Raymond
James & Associates, Inc., Simmons & Company, International & Tudor,
Pickering, Holt & Co. Securities, Inc., Defendants, represented by
Charles S. Duggan -- charles.duggan@davispolk.com -- Davis Polk &
Wardwell & Andrew Ditchfield -- andrew.ditchfield@davispolk.com --
Davis Polk & Wardwell.

CHICAGO ATHLETICS: Sued Over Members' Rewards Program Termination
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CBS reports that a class action lawsuit has been filed against
Chicago Athletic Clubs.

The lawsuit alleges that the eight clubs owned by the company
terminated their members' rewards programs without notice on
July 16.

Members in the rewards program were denied when they tried to
redeem points they had accrued, according to allegations made in
the lawsuit.

The complaint also alleges consumer fraud and breach of contract.

The Chicago Athletic Clubs group includes Bucktown Athletic Club,
Evanston Athletic Club, Lakeview Athletic Club, Lincoln Park
Athletic Club, Lincoln Square Athletic Club, Webster Place Athletic
Club, West Loop Athletic Club and Wicker Park Athletic Club. [GN]


CIVEO CORP: Philip Suhr Class Action Dismissed
----------------------------------------------
Civeo Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 27, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the putative class
action suit entitled, Philip Suhr v. Civeo Corporation, et al., has
been dismissed.

On January 26, 2018, a putative class action captioned Philip Suhr
v. Civeo Corporation, et al. was filed in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas against Civeo and members of its
board of directors, in connection with the Noralta acquisition.

The complaint alleged that Civeo filed a materially incomplete and
misleading proxy statement in connection with the Noralta
acquisition, in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 14a-9 of the Securities
and Exchange Commission.  The complaint originally sought
injunctive relief, including to enjoin the shareholder vote on the
Noralta acquisition as well as the acquisition itself, damages and
an award of attorneys' fees, in addition to other relief.  

On February 5, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction (the "Preliminary Injunction Motion") to prevent the
shareholder meeting on March 28, 2018 from taking place. On March
22, 2018, the plaintiff withdrew the Preliminary Injunction Motion
on the grounds that additional disclosures contained in Civeo's
March 22, 2018 Current Report on Form 8-K, which Civeo believes
were immaterial, mooted the claims raised in the plaintiff's
complaint and asserted as the basis for the Preliminary Injunction
Motion.  

In April 2018, Civeo paid a mootness fee in a nominal amount, and
the case was dismissed.

On April 2, 2018, Civeo announced that it has closed its
acquisition of 100% of the equity interests of Noralta Lodge Ltd.

Civeo Corporation offers workforce accommodation, logistics, and
facility management services to the natural resource industry in
Canada, Australia, the United States, and internationally. The
company is headquartered in Houston, Texas.


CLACKAMAS COUNTY, OR: Court Narrows Claims in Strip Search Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted
in part and denying in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in the
case captioned WILLIAM DILLON; SCOTT GRAUE; DAVID HODGES; ALBERT
LOVE; and JAYSON SAYLOR, individually, and on behalf of a class of
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CLACKAMAS COUNTY and
CRAIG ROBERTS, both individually and in his official capacity as
Sheriff, Defendants, Case No. 3:14-cv-820-YY. (D. Or.).

United States Magistrate Judge Youlee You issued Findings and
Recommendation in this case on May 2, 2018.  The Plaintiffs, former
inmates at Clackamas County Jail ("CCJ"), bring this class action
against the Defendants for alleged violations of the Plaintiffs'
state statutory and federal constitutional rights arising from
group strip searches at CCJ. Judge You recommended that (1) the
Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction be denied;
(2) the Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted in part
and denied in part; (3) the Plaintiffs' motion to certify the class
be granted in part and denied in part; and (4) the Plaintiffs'
motion for partial summary judgment be denied.

October 12, 2010 Emergency Shakedown

The Plaintiffs object to Judge You's finding that there was no
genuine question of material fact that the October 12, 2010
emergency shakedown search was unreasonable.

When there is a possibility that a prisoner has access to a weapon,
strip searches have a legitimate penological purpose, and the
Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that prison officials
intentionally used exaggerated or excessive means to enforce
security. Judge You found that the Plaintiffs failed to counter the
Defendants' evidence that the emergency search was conducted
because a possible weapon, in the form of a piece of metal, was
unaccounted for. Judge You also found that the Plaintiffs presented
no evidence that the Defendants' response to the discovery of the
missing metal was exaggerated or excessive.

Routine Return-From-Court Strip Searches

Both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants object to Judge You's
finding that, based on the record, it was impossible to determine
whether the daily return-from-court visual strip searches were
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and her recommendation
that the Court deny both motions for summary judgment on this
claim.

The Plaintiffs' objections to this finding are difficult to parse.
The Plaintiffs appear to argue that the record was sufficient to
justify summary judgment for the Plaintiffs because (1) the
Defendants' strip search practices were inconsistent with their own
regulations; and (2) it is uncontested that the opportunity existed
for staff members not involved in the searches to observe naked
inmates. Local laws and regulations may create privacy requirements
for strip searches that are more demanding than those imposed by
the Constitution. That an agency fails to follow its own standards,
therefore, does not render its actions unconstitutional as a matter
of law.

Similarly, that the privacy panels allowed for the opportunity for
staff members not involved in searches to observe the inmates does
not render the search practices unconstitutional as a matter of
law. The reasonableness test articulated in Bell (Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 559 1979))  and  Michenfelder (Michenfelder v.
Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332-333 (9th Cir. 1988)).is a highly
fact-specific inquiry. Judge You correctly concluded that a further
showing regarding to whom and how often the naked inmates were
actually exposed to third parties is necessary to demonstrate that
the scope, manner, justification and place of the search practices
were so unreasonable as to violate the Fourth Amendment.

ORS Section 30.865

The Defendants object to Judge You's finding that the Plaintiffs'
claim for invasion of privacy in violation of ORS Section 30.865,
which was alleged for the first time in the Plaintiffs' second
amended complaint, relates back to the Plaintiffs' original
complaint and is thus not barred by the statute of limitation. The
Court agrees with Judge You that conduct giving rise to the
Plaintiffs' statutory claim arises from the exact same conduct
alleged in the Plaintiffs' original complaint.

The Plaintiffs' statutory claim therefore relates back to the
filing date of the Plaintiffs' original complaint and is not
time-barred.

Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted
as to the plaintiffs' claims for alleged constitutional violations
based on the emergency shakedown search of October 10, 2012 and
granted as to all claims under the Eighth amendment. Otherwise,
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 23, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ya6qfku8 from Leagle.com.

William Dillon, Individually, on behalf of a class of others
similarly situated, Scott Vincent Graue, Individually, on behalf of
a class of others similarly situated, David Michael Hodges,
Individually, on behalf of a class of others similarly situated,
Jayson Saylor & Albert Love, Plaintiffs, represented by Leonard
Randolph Berman, Law Office of Leonard R. Berman.

Clackamas County & Craig Roberts, both individually and in his
official capacity as Sheriff, Defendants, represented by Stephen
Lewis Madkour, Clackamas County Counsel & Alexander Gordon,
Clackamas County Counsel.

CLIENT SERVICES: Faces Kirilova Suit in Eastern Dist. of New York
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Client Services, Inc.
The lawsuit is captioned as Kristina Kirilova on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Client
Services, Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-04538 (E.D.N.Y.,
Aug. 10, 2018). The case involves Fair Debt Collection Act
violation.

Client Services operates as a customer relationship management
company that offers a suite of accounts receivable management and
business processing.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mitchell L. Pashkin, Esq.
          775 Park Avenue, Ste. 255
          Huntington, NY 11743
          Telephone: (631) 335 1107
          E-mail: mpash@verizon.net


COLLECTION ANALYST: Class Settlement Has Prelim Approval
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for District of Nebraska granted
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement in the case captioned LAURA POWERS, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated; Plaintiff, v. THE COLLECTION
ANALYST, INC., and JUDITH D. RETELSDORF, Defendants, No. 8:17CV229
(D. Nev.).

This matter came on before the United States District Court Judge,
upon motion pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for preliminary approval of the proposed class action
settlement (Proposed Settlement) of the above-described action in a
Settlement Agreement.

The agreements, terms, and conditions of the parties' Proposed
Settlement, as embodied in the Agreement and the Exhibits attached
hereto, are preliminarily approved pending a final hearing on the
Proposed Settlement as provided herein.

The following are the Settlement Classes, and their members are
Class Members. In support of this Order, and for settlement
purposes only, the Court finds as follows:

   A. That there are a sufficient number of Class Members to
satisfy the numerosity requirement of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a)(1).

   B. There are questions of law and fact common to all Class
Members. Such includes, but is not necessarily limited to: Whether
Complaints in the form of Exhibits A to Plaintiff's Complaint
(Filing No. 1-1) violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
and/or Nebraska Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the members of
the Settlement Classes.
The court finds and determines that the proposed notice by Mail
given to Class Members in accordance with paragraph 5 herein, which
provides all case information, constitutes the best notice
practicable under the circumstances taking into account the nature
of the claims and facts presented and size of the class; that it
constitutes due and sufficient notice of the Proposed Settlement
and the matters set forth in said notice to all persons entitled to
receive notice; and that it fully satisfies the requirements of due
process and of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. The court approves Class
Settlement.com www.class-settlement.com of 20 Max Avenue,
Hicksville, NY (11801) (Class Settlement Administrator) as class
administrator herein.

Any Class Member who desires to request exclusion from the
Settlement Class, must submit a written Statement of Exclusion in
the manner required by the NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT and mailed NO LATER
THAN 90 days after the date of this Order by submitting a Request
for Exclusion to the Class Settlement Administrator at the
following address:

   Powers v. TCA Settlement
   c/o Class-Settlement.com
   20 Max Avenue Hicksville, NY 11801

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/ycuqd4vv from Leagle.com.

Laura Powers, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by O. Randolph Bragg , HORWITZ,
HORWITZ LAW FIRM, Pamela A. Car , CAR, REINBRECHT LAW FIRM &
William L. Reinbrecht , CAR, REINBRECHT LAW FIRM.

The Collection Analyst, Inc., Defendant, represented by John C.
Ochoa -- jochoa@salawus.com -- SMITH, AMUNDSEN LAW FIRM, pro hac
vice, Michael T. Gibbons -- mgibbons@woglaw.com -- WOODKE, GIBBONS
LAW FIRM & Patrick M. Heng , JEFFREY WELCH LAW FIRM.

Judith D. Retelsdorf, Defendant, represented by Patrick M. Heng ,
JEFFREY WELCH LAW FIRM.

COLUMBIA PIPELINE: Arbitrage Fund Suit Moved to S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled THE ARBITRAGE FUND, on behalf of
itself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
COLUMBIA PIPELINE GROUP, INC., ROBERT C. SKAGGS, JR., STEPHEN P.
SMITH, GLEN L. KETTERING, SIGMUND L. CORNELIUS, MARTY R. KITTRELL,
W. LEE NUTTER, DEBORAH S. PARKER, LESTER P. SILVERMAN, and TERESA
A. TAYLOR, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00861, was from the
U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, to the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York (Foley Square)
on Aug. 8, 2018. The Southern District of New York Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 1:18-cv-07127-GBD to the proceeding. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge George B. Daniels.

This class action is brought on behalf of all Columbia Pipeline
shareholders, except Defendants and their affiliates, (i) who held
common shares as of May 18, 2016, the record date for Columbia
Pipeline shareholders to be eligible to vote on the merger between
Columbia Pipeline and TransCanada Corporation and (ii) who held
common shares through July 1, 2016, the day the merger closed.

Columbia Pipeline, together with its subsidiaries, owns, operates,
and develops a portfolio of pipelines, storage, and related
midstream assets.[BN]

Attorneys for Arbitrage Fund on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated:

          Andrew J Entwistle, Esq.
          Jessica A. Margulis, Esq.
          Jonathan H. Beemer, Esq.
          Vincent Roger Cappucci, Esq.
          ENTWISTLE & CAPPUCCI LLP (NYC)
          299 Park Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10171
          Telephone: (212) 894 7200
          Facsimile: (212) 894 7272
          E-mail: aentwistle@entwistle-law.com
                  jmargulis@entwistle-law.com
                  jbeemer@entwistle-law.com
                  cappucci@entwistle-law.com

               - and -

          Brian E. Farnan, Esq.
          Michael J. Farnan, Esq.
          FARNAN LLP
          919 North Market Street, 12th Floor
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 777 0300
          Facsimile: (302) 777 0301
          E-mail: bfarnan@farnanlaw.com
                  mfarnan@farnanlaw.com


CONNORS & FONG: Faces Crosson Suit in Eastern Dist. of New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Connors, Fong and
Mancuso, Inc. The lawsuit is captioned as Aretha Crosson,
Individually and as the representative of a class of similarly
situated persons, the Plaintiff, v. Connors, Fong and Mancuso, Inc.
doing business as: Cliffs Shoes by White Mountain, the Defendant,
Case No. 1:18-cv-04540 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 10, 2018). The case alleges
Americans with Disabilities Act violations.

Connors, Fong And Mancuso, Inc. manufactures and sells women's
shoes under the brand name of White Mountain by Connors.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
          44 Court Street, Suite 1217
          Brooklyn, NY 11217
          Telephone: (917) 373 9128
          Facsimile: (718) 504 7555
          E-mail: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


CONSTAR FINANCIAL: Faces Stehly Suit in Eastern Dist. of New York
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Constar Financial
Services, LLC. The case is captioned as Mark Stehly, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
Constar Financial Services, LLC, the Defendant, Case No.
2:18-cv-04471 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 8, 2018).

Constar, an affiliate company of Empereon Marketing, LLC, provides
comprehensive consumer contact and account support solutions that
span the entire lifecycle of a consumer account.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


COTIVITI HOLDINGS: Faces Shareholder Class Action in Delaware
-------------------------------------------------------------
The securities litigation law firm of Brower Piven, A Professional
Corporation, notifies investors that a class action lawsuit has
been commenced in the United States District Court for the District
of Delaware on behalf of all common stockholders of Cotiviti
Holdings, Inc. (NYSE: COTV) ("Cotiviti" or the "Company") opposing
the proposed acquisition of Cotiviti by Veritas Capital.

The complaint seeks relief on behalf of the named plaintiff and all
other similarly situated shareholders of Cotiviti and asserts that
the Company's Board of Directors breached their fiduciary duties by
failing to disclose certain material information that is necessary
for shareholders to properly assess the fairness of the proposed
merger.

If you currently own common stock of Cotiviti and would like to
learn more about this lawsuit and your ability to participate as a
plaintiff, without cost or obligation to you, please contact Brower
Piven either by email at hoffman@browerpiven.com or by telephone at
(410) 415-6616.

Attorneys at Brower Piven have extensive experience in litigating
securities and other class action cases and have been advocating
for the rights of shareholders since the 1980s.  If you choose to
retain counsel, you may retain Brower Piven without financial
obligation or cost to you, or you may retain other counsel of your
choice.  You need take no action at this time to be a member of the
class. [GN]

CP OPCO: Asks Court to Deny Class Certification in McDonald Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned DAVID MCDONALD, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. CP OPCO, LLC, dba
CLASSIC PARTY RENTALS; INSPERITY PEO SERVICES, L.P; APOLLO GLOBAL
MANAGEMENT, LLC; APOLLO CENTRE STREET PARTNERSHIP, L.P.; APOLLO
FRANKLIN PARTNERSHIP, L.P.; APOLLO CREDIT OPPORTUNITY FUND III AIV
I LP; APOLLO SK STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS, L.P; APOLLO SPECIAL
OPPORTUNIITIES MANAGED ACCOUNT, L,P.; APOLLO ZEUS STRATEGIC
INVESTMENTS, L.P.; and DOES 1-20, the Defendants, Case No.
4:17-cv-04915-HSG (N.D. Cal.), the Defendants will move the Court
on September 20, 2018, for an order preemptively denying
certification to a portion of a class alleged in Plaintiff's second
amended complaint.

Attorneys for Insperity Peo Services, L.P.:

          John M. Polson, Esq.
          Mark J. Jacobs, Esq.
          Christopher M. Ahearn, Esq.
          Lauren Stockunas, Esq.
          FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP
          2050 Main Street, Suite 1000
          Irvine, CA 92614
          Telephone: (949) 851-2424
          Facsimile: (949) 851-0152
          E-mail: jpolson@fisherphillips.com
                  mjacobs@fisherphillips.com
                  cahearn@fisherphillips.com
                  lstockunas@fisherphillips.com


CUPERTINO HEALTHCARE: Faces Class Action Over Understaffing
-----------------------------------------------------------
Khalida Sarwari, writing for The Mercury News, reports that a
class-action lawsuit has been filed against Cupertino Healthcare &
Wellness Center and more than a dozen other skilled nursing homes
accused of deliberately running an understaffed business to make a
bigger profit.

The 24-hour skilled nursing home and rehab facility on Voss Avenue
is one of four Bay Area businesses named in the suit; the other
three are in Hayward, Novato and San Rafael. All four, in addition
to 11 others sued, are owned by Shlomo Rechnitz, who controls 60
skilled nursing facilities throughout the state, according to a
recent press statement announcing the lawsuit.

The suit was filed in June on behalf of Robert Barbendel, a
resident of Cupertino Healthcare & Wellness Center, in Los Angeles
County Superior Court by Garcia, Artigliere & Medby and the Arns
Law Firm. The 98-page complaint accuses Mr. Rechnitz and the
facilities' management of deliberately violating laws that protect
nursing home residents and taking on new patients without
disclosing they didn't have the requisite staff to provide adequate
care.

The alleged transgressions took place in the last three years,
according to the suit, which includes a graph submitted to the
Department of Public Health showing a discrepancy between the
number of hours the facilities' nurses worked and number of hours
expected of them. The reported hours do not take into account
state-mandated rest breaks, the suit alleges, which means that a
nurse who was put down for an eight-hour shift, for example, in
reality worked for seven hours and 40 minutes.

When reached for comment on July 27, a manager at Cupertino
Healthcare & Wellness Center hung up the phone. [GN]

CVS PHARMACY: Deadline to Respond to Calif. Suit Extended
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Francisco Division, issued an Order continuing
Deadline to Respond to Complaint in the case captioned JOHN DOE
ONE, JOHN DOE TWO, JOHN DOE THREE, JOHN DOE FOUR and JOHN DOE FIVE
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. CVS PHARMACY, INC.; CAREMARK, L.L.C.; CAREMARK
CALIFORNIA SPECIALTY PHARMACY, L.L.C.; NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER
CORPORATION d/b/a AMTRAK; LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC.; TIME WARNER,
INC.; and DOES 1-10, Inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
3:18-cv-1031-EMC (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs John Doe One, John Doe Two, John Doe Three, John Doe
Four, and John Doe Five (Plaintiffs) and Defendant Warner Media,
LLC, as successor in interest to Time Warner Inc. (Warner Media)
stipulate as follows, inter alia:

Counsel for Warner Media has been only recently retained and were
not previously involved in this litigation, and further given that
Attorney Bernstein will be out of the country through August 2,
2018, Warner Media and its counsel require additional time to
review the pleadings and the proceedings in the case thus far, and
determine an appropriate response;

Extending the deadline for Warner Media to respond to the operative
complaint to August 10, 2018, and if Warner Media elects to file a
motion directed at the pleading would set it for September 27,
2018, the same hearing date as the other pending motions, should
not alter the date of any event or any deadline already fixed by
Court order.

Warner Media must respond to the Plaintiffs' complaint on or before
August 10, 2018, (2) if Warner Media elects to file a motion
directed at the pleading would set it for September 27, 2018, the
same hearing date as the other pending motions; (3) this
Stipulation shall not affect any other deadlines presently
scheduled in the case, and (4) by entering into this Stipulation,
Plaintiffs do not waive any claim or defense to any response that
may be submitted by Warner Media.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 23, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y76oxfl2 from Leagle.com.

John Doe One, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, John Doe Two, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, John Doe Three, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated & John Doe Four, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Alan
M. Mansfield -- alan@clgca.com -- The Consumer Law Group, Benjamin
Reese Powell -- ben@consumerwatchdog.org -- Consumer Watchdog,
Charles Nicholas Dorman -- ndorman@whatleykallas.com -- Whatley
Kallas, LLP, Edith Marie Kallas -- ekallas@whatleykallas.com --
Whatley Kallas, LLP, Jerry Sinclair Flanagan --
jerry@consumerwatchdog.org -- Consumer Watchdog & Joe R. Whatley,
Jr. -- whatley@whatleykallas.com -- Whatley Kallas LLP.

John Doe Five, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented byAlan M. Mansfield, The Consumer
Law Group.

CVS Pharmacy, Inc., Caremark LLC & Caremark California Specialty
Pharmacy LLC, Defendants, represented by Enu A. Mainigi --
emainigi@wc.com -- Williams and Connolly LLP, Grant A. Geyerman --
ggeyerman@wc.com -- Williams Connolly, LLP, pro hac vice, Tami Sue
-- smasos@foley.com -- Foley & Lardner LLP, Benjamin Walker Graham
-- bgraham@wc.com -- Williams and Connolly LLP, Nicholas John Fox
-- nfox@foley.com -- Foley and Lardner LLP & Sarah Lochner O'Connor
-- soconnor@wc.com -- Wiliams & Connolly LLP.

CWI INC: Landers Seeks to Recover Wages and Damages Under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT LANDERS, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. CWI, INC., Case No. 1:18-cv-00102-GNS (W.D. Ky., August
2, 2018), seeks to recover compensation, liquidated damages,
attorneys' fees, and costs, pursuant to the provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938.

Specifically, CWI has intentionally deducted hours from the
Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members' time records and has
required them to perform work off the clock, according to the
complaint.

CWI, Inc., is a Kentucky for-profit corporation headquartered in
Bowling Green, Kentucky.  CWI sells Recreational Vehicles, Campers,
and related accessories across the United States.  CWI also
provides maintenance and repair services for RVs and Campers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Trent R. Taylor, Esq.
          Robert E. DeRose, Esq.
          BARKAN MEIZLISH HANDELMAN GOODIN DEROSE WENTZ, LLP
          250 E. Broad St., 10th Floor
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 221-4221
          Facsimile: (614) 744-2300
          E-mail: ttaylor@barkanmeizlish.com
                  bderose@barkanmeizlish.com

               - and -

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Lauren E. Braddy, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  lauren@a2xlaw.com



DANSKO LLC: Faces Bunting Suit in Eastern District of New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dansko, LLC. The
lawsuit is captioned as Rasheta Bunting, Individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons, the
Plaintiff, v. Dansko, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04539
(E.D.N.Y., Aug. 10, 2018). The case alleges Americans with
Disabilities Act violations.

Dansko is a comfort footwear company based in West Grove,
Pennsylvania. Dansko was founded in 1990 by husband and wife team,
Peter Kjellerup and Mandy Cabot.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


DAYLIGHT TRANSPORT: Misclassified Delivery Drivers, Ali Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SABIO ALI and ERIC BLAND, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated v. DAYLIGHT TRANSPORT, LLC, a California limited
liability company; and DOES 1 to 10 inclusive, Case No. RG18915217
(Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cty., August 2, 2018), seeks relief from
the Defendant's alleged unlawful misclassification of former and
current Daylight delivery drivers as "Independent Contractors."

By misclassifying the Delivery Drivers as "Independent
Contractors," the Defendant has sought to avoid various duties and
obligations owed to employees under the California Labor Code, the
California Minimum Wage Order, and the California Industrial
Welfare Commission's wage orders, including the duty to pay minimum
wage and the duty to indemnify employees for expenses and losses
incurred in connection with their employment, according the
complaint.

Daylight Transport, LLC, is a limited liability company, organized
and operated under the laws of the state of California.  The
Company does business in and operates delivery facilities in
California, including Hayward, California.  The Doe Defendants are
currently unknown to the Plaintiffs.

The Company provides delivery services to homes and businesses,
including delivery of furnishings and other merchandise.  These
shipping and delivery services form the core of the Defendant's
business.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Aaron Kaufmann, Esq.
          David Pogrel, Esq.
          Sara B. Tosdal, Esq.
          LEONARD CARDER, LLP
          1330 Broadway, Suite 1450
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 272-0169
          Facsimile: (510) 272-0174
          E-mail: akaufmann@leonardcarder.com
                  dpogrel@leonardcarder.com
                  stosdal@leonardcarder.com


DEL TACO: Discovery Ongoing in Former Employee's Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Del Taco Restaurants, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 27, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that discovery is ongoing in
former employee's class suit.

In March 2014, a former Del Taco employee filed a purported class
action complaint alleging that Del Taco has not appropriately
provided meal breaks and failed to pay wages to its California
hourly employees.

Discovery is in process and Del Taco intends to assert all of its
defenses to this threatened class action and the individual claims.
Del Taco has several defenses to the action that it believes could
prevent the certification of the class, as well as the potential
assessment of any damages on a class basis.

Del Taco said, "Legal proceedings are inherently unpredictable, and
the Company is not able to predict the ultimate outcome or cost of
the unresolved matter. However, based on management's current
understanding of the relevant facts and circumstances, the Company
does not believe that these proceedings give rise to a probable or
estimable loss and should not have a material adverse effect on the
Company's financial position, operations or cash flows. Therefore,
Del Taco has not recorded any amount for the claim as of June 19,
2018.

Del Taco Restaurants, Inc. operates a chain of fast food
restaurants. The company consists of two separate Mexican fast-food
groups, 79 Del Taco units and 36 Taco Villa restaurants. The
company offers Mexican food items, such as tacos, burritos,
quesadillas, burgers, French fries, and soft drinks. The company
was incorporated in 1983 and is based in Atlanta, Georgia. Del Taco
Restaurants, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of W.R. Grace & Co.


DESCHUTES COUNTY, OR: Sheriff's Office Faces Discrimination Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
Garrett Andrews, writing for The Bulletin, reports that the
Deschutes County Sheriff's Office received notice on July 30 that a
Portland lawyer intends to file a class action lawsuit alleging
discrimination against military veterans.

The tort claim notice names current sheriff's office employee David
Crump and former deputy Ronny Dozier, who retired in May after more
than two decades with the office, as alleged victims of
discrimination. Both are veterans of the U.S. Army.

"There exists sufficient evidence to assert that the Deschutes
County Sheriff's Office and Deschutes County has a history of
discriminating against veterans and disabled veterans," wrote
Portland attorney Sean Riddell.

In class action cases, a judge must first determine if a "class" of
people has been harmed by someone or some entity. If the judge
designates that a class exists, lawyers then work to add plaintiffs
to the case.

In this case, Mr. Riddell will attempt to find veterans who've
applied for jobs or promotions with the sheriff's office or
Deschutes County since 2015. He told The Bulletin he intends to
file records requests with the county to help identify these people
in the next few weeks.

"We just don't know how many people are out there," he said on July
30.

The most recent version of Oregon's veteran preference law was
passed in 2012. The federal government's was passed in 1944. They
require public employers to give preference to eligible veterans in
certain hiring decisions.

In Mr. Dozier's case, in May of 2016, the county human resources
department requested applications for promotions to the rank of
sergeant.

According to a lawsuit he filed in Deschutes County Circuit Court,
Mr. Dozier needed approval from his two immediate supervisors, who
refused to give it to him and later refused to give him an
explanation of how his veterans preference was applied to their
decision.

In Mr. Crump's case, Mr. Riddell says the county has an additional,
unnecessary hoop veterans must jump through to apply their veterans
preference points. Mr. Riddell says the county's extra requirement
-- a form that must be filled out -- violates state law.

Sheriff's spokesman Sgt. William Bailey said the agency was unable
to comment on the possible class action suit, due to pending legal
matters.

"A large portion of our workforce are veterans," Sgt. Bailey said.
"We value their experience and backgrounds and what they bring to
our agency."

Mr. Dozier has two active lawsuits against the sheriff's office and
Deschutes County. The first he filed last year alleges the agency
violated Oregon's veterans preference law.

The second he filed this year alleges retaliation against a
whistleblower, and other claims.

Mr. Dozier has filed two complaints with the Oregon Bureau of Labor
and Industries, one against the sheriff's office and one against
the county. Both were closed due to insufficient evidence.

Mr. Crump filed a BOLI complaint against Deschutes County and
prevailed when the agency found cause that the county failed to
apply Oregon's veterans preference policy in his case. [GN]

DEUTSCHE BANK: Oct. 25 Libor Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
------------------------------------------------------------
The following is being released by Susman Godfrey L.L.P. and
Hausfeld LLP.

There are lawsuits impacting individuals and institutions that
entered into over-the-counter financial derivative and
non-derivative instruments directly with 17 banks on the U.S.
Dollar LIBOR panel from 2007 to 2010 and that received payments
tied to U.S. Dollar LIBOR. Settlements totaling $340 million have
now been reached with Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft and HSBC
Bank plc. Earlier, settlements totaling $250 million were reached
with Barclays and Citibank. A Litigation Class represented by the
Plaintiffs in this litigation continues to assert claims against
Bank of America, N.A. and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. The lawyers for
the Litigation Class will have to prove their claims in Court and a
trial will be scheduled for a later date. The Litigation Class is
seeking to recover money for its members.

The litigation claims that the banks manipulated the U.S. Dollar
LIBOR rate during the financial crisis, artificially lowering the
rate for their own profit, which resulted in class members
receiving lower interest payments for their U.S. Dollar LIBOR-based
instruments from the banks than they should have. Plaintiffs assert
antitrust, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment claims.
Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Bank of America, and JPMorgan Chase deny all
claims of wrongdoing.

There are two groups of individuals and institutions that are
impacted by these lawsuits.

Litigation Class: Individuals and institutions are included if they
reside in the U.S. and directly purchased certain U.S. Dollar
LIBOR-based instruments (interest rate swaps or bond/floating rate
notes) from Panel Banks (Bank of America, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi,
Barclays, Citibank, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, HBOS, HSBC,
JPMorgan Chase, Lloyds, Norinchukin, Rabobank, Royal Bank of
Canada, Royal Bank of Scotland, Société Générale, UBS, and
WestLB), or any of their subsidiaries or affiliates; and pursuant
to the instruments, a Panel Bank paid them interest indexed to a
1-month or 3-month U.S. Dollar LIBOR rate set at any time between
August 2007 and August 2009. (This means they must have owned the
instrument(s) between August 2007 and August 2009.)

Settlement Classes: Individuals and institutions are included if
they directly purchased certain U.S. Dollar LIBOR-based instruments
from Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Barclays, Citibank, Bank of America, Bank
of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Citizens Bank, Credit Suisse, HBOS, JPMorgan
Chase, Lloyds, Norinchukin, Rabobank, Royal Bank of Canada, Royal
Bank of Scotland, Société Générale, UBS, or WestLB (or their
subsidiaries or affiliates) in the United States; and owned the
instruments at any time between August 2007 and May 2010. The
instruments in the Settlement Classes include certain interest rate
swaps, forward rate agreements, asset swaps, collateralized debt
obligations, credit default swaps, inflation swaps, total return
swaps, options, and bonds/floating rate notes.

The Deutsche Bank and HSBC Settlements will create Settlement Funds
totaling $340 million that will be used to pay eligible Class
Members who submit valid claims. Additionally, Deutsche Bank and
HSBC will cooperate with the Plaintiffs in their ongoing litigation
against the remaining defendants.

Class Members must submit a Proof of Claim to get a payment. They
can submit a Proof of Claim online or by mail. The deadline to
submit a Proof of Claim is December 20, 2018. Class Members are
entitled to receive a payment if they have a qualifying transaction
with Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Barclays, Citibank, Bank of America, Bank
of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Citizens Bank, Credit Suisse, HBOS, JPMorgan
Chase, Lloyds, Norinchukin, Rabobank, Royal Bank of Canada, Royal
Bank of Scotland, Societe Generale, UBS, or WestLB (or their
subsidiaries or affiliates). At this time, it is unknown how much
each Class Member who submits a valid claim will receive.

There is no money available now for the Litigation Class and no
guarantee that there will be. If money or benefits are obtained in
a future trial, Class Members will be notified about how to ask for
a share.

Settlement Class Members who do not file a timely claim or who opt
out of the Settlements will lose their right to receive money or
benefits from the $340 million in settlements with Deutsche Bank
and HSBC. Litigation Class Members who elect to opt out of the
Litigation Class will not be eligible for any money or benefits
obtained in a future trial against, or class settlements with,
JPMorgan Chase or Bank of America, unless they timely file their
own lawsuit. If Class Members would like to retain their right to
file their own lawsuit against Deutsche Bank, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase,
or Bank of America, they must opt out of the appropriate Class by
September 28, 2018. If they stay in the Settlement Classes, they
may object to the Settlements by September 28, 2018.

The Court will hold a hearing on October 25, 2018 to consider
whether to approve the Settlements and approve Class Counsel's
request of attorneys' fees of up to one-third of the Settlement
Funds, plus reimbursement of costs and expenses. Class Members or
their lawyers may appear and speak at the hearing at their own
expense.

More information is available about the Settlement Classes on the
website, www.USDollarLiborSettlement.com, and in the Long Form
Notice accessible on that website, or by calling 1-888-568-7640.

Contacts:

          Susman Godfrey LLP
          Seth Ard
          212-471-8354
          sard@susmangodfrey.com

DGS CONSTRUCTION: Two Classes in Unpaid Wage Suit Certified
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARIO ERNESTO AMAYA, JOSE NORLAND GONZALEZ and JOSE
AMADEO CASTILLO, Plaintiffs, v. DGS CONSTRUCTION, LLC and THE
WHITING-TURNER CONTRACTING COMPANY, Defendants, Civil Action No.
TDC-16-3350 (D. Md.), Judge Theodore D. Chuang of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Maryland granted both the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification and Motion for Leave to Amend the
Complaint.

Plaintiffs Amaya, Gonzalez, and Castillo, former carpenters
employed by the Defendant on the construction of the MGM Resort
Casino at National Harbor in Prince George's County, Maryland, have
brought suit against Schuster and Defendant Whiting-Turner for
violations of the Maryland Wage and Hour Law ("MWHL), and the
Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law ("MWPCL"), as well as for
state law claims of breach of contract and unjust enrichment.  The
Plaintiffs were each employed by Schuster during several months in
2015.

The Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment that they are
third-party beneficiaries of a Project Labor Agreement ("PLA")
signed by Whiting-Turner and various trade unions.  They allege
that Schuster failed to pay them at the rate for carpenters for
every hour worked and failed to pay certain fringe benefits for
overtime work as required by the PLA.

The Plaintiffs have identified approximately 1,600 employees who
allegedly were not paid overtime fringe benefits.  They have
further identified at least 388 employees who were classified as
carpenters on the Project.  The Plaintiffs retained a certified
public accountant to analyze the potential damages in lost wages
and benefits owed to all construction employees employed by
Schuster on the Project.  According to the expert's report,
carpenters employed on the Project were underpaid by approximately
$4.35 million, based on (1) hours paid at the laborer rate when
they should have been paid at the carpenter rate and (2) hours for
which carpenters were otherwise not paid at the carpenter rate.
The report further concludes that Schuster failed to pay its
Project employees approximately $1.11 million in overtime fringe
benefits.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification.  In their Motion for Class Certification, the
Plaintiffs seek certification of two classes.  The "Overtime Fringe
Benefit Class" is composed of 141 current and former employees who
were employed in any craft worker classification by Defendant
Schuster at the MGM Resort Casino at National Harbor and worked
overtime hours.  The "Carpenter Class" consists of all current and
former employees who were employed by Defendant Schuster at the MGM
Resort Casino at National Harbor and performed carpentry work.

The Plaintiffs have also filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the
Complaint.  Through the Motion, they seek to add (1) factual
support for the argument that all workers on the Project were
intended third-party beneficiaries of the PLA; (2) allegations that
Whiting-Turner was contractually obligated to enforce the PLA
against non-signatories to the PLA; (3) allegations that Schuster
assented to the terms of the PLA through its conduct; and (4)
allegations that Schuster failed to comply with the wage and fringe
benefits requirements of the Project Manual.  These proposed
amendments come after the Oct. 16, 2017 deadline for amending the
pleadings established in the Court's Amended Scheduling Order.

Judge Chuang finds that the Overtime Fringe Benefits Class is
clearly ascertainable, satisfies the Rule 23(a) factors, and meets
the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).
There is no dispute that Schuster can identify those workers who
were not paid overtime fringe benefits without a significant
administrative burden.  On numerosity, there are at least 100
members, and possibly up to 1,600 members, making joinder of all
members impractical.  On commonality, Schuster admits that it did
not pay any of its workers fringe benefits for overtime hours
worked, and the legality of this policy is a question that not only
is common to the class, but also predominates over any other factor
or defense that each individual class member might have on this
claim, such that a class action is a superior, more efficient means
to resolve this dispute.  As for typicality, the named Plaintiffs'
claims that they were not paid fringe benefits for overtime hours
worked, and their legal arguments regarding the applicability of
the PLA's provisions to Schuster and Whiting-Turner's
responsibility to enforce the agreement, are identical to the
claims and arguments that would be offered by other proposed class
members.  Adequacy is satisfied because there is no apparent
conflict of interest, and the Plaintiffs' counsel is experienced in
complex civil litigation.  Accordingly, he will grant the Motion
for Class Certification as to the Overtime Fringe Benefits Class.

As was the case for the Overtime Fringe Benefits class, there is no
significant dispute that the Carpenter Class satisfies the Rule
23(a) requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy, that common issues predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to all other methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.  The Motion for Class Certification
will also be granted as to the Carpenter Class.

Finally, as to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend the
Complaint, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have shown good
cause under Rule 16.  Having found that the Plaintiffs have
satisfied the requirements of Rule 16, he also finds that leave to
amend the complaint should be granted under the more liberal
standard of Rule 15, which permits amendment in the absence of bad
faith, prejudice, or futility.  The proposed amendments are not
futile.  They simply add more facts to support certain claims and
reframe others in a manner consistent with the legal arguments
advanced by the Plaintiffs throughout this litigation.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Chuang granted the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification and their Motion for Leave to Amend
the Complaint.  A separate Order will issue.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 10, 2018 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/ByMy4u from Leagle.com.

Mario Ernesto Amaya, Jose Norland Gonzalez & Jose Amadeo Castillo,
Plaintiffs, represented by Brian Joseph Markovitz --
bmarkovitz@jgllaw.com -- Joseph Greenwald and Laake PA & Joseph M.
Creed -- jcreed@jgllaw.com -- Joseph, Greenwald & Laake, P.A.

DGS Construction, LLC, doing business as, Defendant, represented by
Donald Eugene English, Jr. -- Donald.English@jacksonlewis.com --
Jackson Lewis P.C., Stephen M. Silvestri --
Stephen.Silvestri@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C. & Eileen
Carr Riley -- Eileen.Riley@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C.

The Whiting-Turner Contracting Company, Defendant, represented by
Lillian Lane Reynolds -- llreynolds@Venable.com -- Venable LLP &
Ronald W. Taylor -- rwtaylor@Venable.com -- Venable LLP.

DOCTOR DIRECTORY: Denial of Bid to Remand TCPA Suit Vacated
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, reversed the
judgment of the District Court denying the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Remand in the case captioned Davis Neurology PA, on behalf of
itself and all other entities and persons similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DoctorDirectory.com LLC; Everyday Health
Inc., Defendants-Appellees, John Does, 1-10, intending to refer to
those persons, corporations or other legal Entities that acted as
agents, consultants, Independent contractors or representatives,
Defendants, No. 17-1820 (8th Cir.).

The district court entered judgment on the pleadings for the
defendants in this case, and the plaintiff appeals. There is a
preliminary issue, however, concerning whether the lawsuit was
properly removed from Arkansas state court to federal court.

Davis Neurology, PA, brought a putative class action in Arkansas
state court, alleging that defendants DoctorDirectory.com, LLC and
Everyday Health, Inc. (Doctor Directory), violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The alleged violation occurred when
the defendants sent Davis Neurology an unsolicited facsimile that
contained an invitation to participate in a research study.

Doctor Directory filed a second notice of removal, claiming that
the footnote in Davis Neurology's state-court filing was the first
definitive notice that Davis Neurology was alleging an injury in
fact that was separate and distinct from the alleged statutory
violation. Doctor Directory argued that its ability to remove the
action was first ascertainable from the pleading filed on September
2, and that the notice of removal filed twenty-four days later was
timely under Section 1446(b)(3). Davis Neurology responded that the
removal was untimely because the September 2 footnote added nothing
to allegations of injury in the complaint or in earlier briefing,
and urged the district court to remand the case to state court
again.

The district court denied the motion for remand, concluding that
the Article III standing question was cured when Davis Neurology
filed its state-court pleading on September 2, 2016. The court
eventually granted judgment on the pleadings for Doctor Directory
on the ground that the challenged facsimile was not an unsolicited
advertisement governed by the TCPA.
The time limit on removal in Section 1446(b)(3) depends on the date
when it may first be ascertained that a case is removable.
Assuming for the sake of analysis that Section 1446(b)(3) allows
removal within thirty days of the date on which a party's Article
III standing is first ascertainable, we conclude that Davis
Neurology's September 2 footnote cannot serve as the basis for
removal under Section 1446(b)(3).

Davis Neurology made a nearly identical statement of injury in fact
more than three months earlier. On May 23, 2016, Davis Neurology
and Doctor Directory filed a revised joint report pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f).  Then, on June 23, in its
response to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, Davis
Neurology referred to lost time and spent resources caused by the
allegedly offending facsimile. That pleading argued that
operational costs for the machine, paper, and the risk of losing
legitimate business while the machine is tied up with unsolicited
advertisements constituted injuries in fact.

These two filings in May and June provided Doctor Directory with
information about Davis Neurology's alleged injury that was at
least equivalent to the statement set forth in the September 2
footnote. So even if Doctor Directory was entitled to additional
time for removal based on uncertainty about Davis Neurology's
standing to sue, the clock started to run no later than June 23.
The second notice of removal filed September 26 was well outside
the thirty-day time limit established by Section 1446(b)(3).
Accordingly, the district court erred when it denied Davis
Neurology's motion for remand.

Because second notice of removal was untimely, the district court
should have remanded the case to state court without reaching the
merits of the action. The Court therefore vacates the judgment, and
remand to the district court with instructions to return the case
to state court.

A full-text copy of the Eighth Circuit's July 23, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7shaaay from Leagle.com.

Alexander Graham Streett, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

James Albert Streett, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Joey Paul Leniski, Jr., for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Barbara A. Smith -- barbara.smith@bclplaw.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

David Alan Zetoony -- David.Zetoony@bclplaw.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Maria Z. Vathis -- Maria.Vathis@bclplaw.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Anthony A. Orlandi -- anthonyo@bsjfirm.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

EL PASO, TX: Tex. App. Affirms Dismissal of Jury Summons Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Texas, Eighth District, El Paso, affirming
the trial court's judgment granting the County's Plea and
dismissing Appellants' lawsuit in the case captioned JOSHUA
LUTTRELL, ANDREW DAVIS, MOISES ROMAN, JOE RODRIGUEZ; AND ON BEHALF
OF ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Appellants, v. EL PASO
COUNTY, Appellee, No. 08-16-00090-CV (Tex. App.).

The Tex. App. issued its original opinion on December 20, 2017, in
which it agreed with the trial court that Appellants had failed to
state a claim for relief against the County for which its immunity
had been waived, but holding that the trial court erred by failing
to give Appellants the opportunity to amend their petition to
attempt to state a viable claim for relief. The County filed a
motion for rehearing, arguing that Appellants had already been
given an opportunity to amend their petition after the County filed
its Plea to the Jurisdiction, and that Appellants did not request
the opportunity to file a second amended petition after the trial
court granted the County's Plea, thereby failing to preserve this
issue for appeal. Appellants did not file a response to the motion.
The Tex. App. grants the motion for rehearing, withdraw its prior
opinion and judgment, and substitute the following opinion. The
Tex. App. affirms the trial court's judgment granting the County's
Plea to the Jurisdiction and dismissing Appellants' lawsuit.

Appellants are four residents of El Paso who were found in contempt
by Senior Judge Jerry Woodard for failing to obey a jury summons.
Appellants filed a lawsuit on behalf of themselves and other
similarly situated persons, naming Judge Woodard and El Paso
County, requesting a declaration that their contempt judgments were
void for lack of jurisdiction, and that Judge Woodard imposed court
costs and fees in an "illegal" manner in their cases. In addition,
Appellants sought a permanent injunction restraining and enjoining
the defendants from charging illegal costs and fees in the future,
a refund of all court costs, fines and fees already paid by
Appellants.

Because the trial court ultimately dismissed Judge Woodard from the
case, with Appellants' consent, based on the doctrine of judicial
immunity, this left the County as the sole defendant in the case.
The County filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction also seeking dismissal
from Appellants' lawsuit, primarily arguing that it had
governmental immunity from suit. In response, Appellants amended
their Petition, adding an ultra vires claim against the County, as
well as a claim for an illegal "taking" under the Texas
Constitution. The trial court granted the County's Plea, and
dismissed Appellants' lawsuit in its entirety. Appellants did not
request an opportunity to file a second amended petition, and
instead appealed the trial court's judgment to this Court.

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting the
County's Plea, arguing that they raised valid causes of action in
their amended Petition for which the County's immunity was waived,
or in the alternative, that the trial court erred by not giving
them a second opportunity to amend their Petition to correct any
jurisdictional defects in their pleadings before dismissing their
lawsuit. The Tex. App. concludes that the trial court correctly
determined that Appellants' amended petition did not state any
valid causes of action for which the County's immunity was waived,
and the Tex. App. further concludes that the trial court did not
commit reversible error by failing to give Appellants a second
opportunity to amend their petition before dismissing their
lawsuit. The Tex. App. therefore affirms the trial court's judgment
granting the County's Plea and dismissing Appellants' lawsuit.

A full-text copy of the Tex. App.'s July 29, 2018 Opinion is
available at   https://tinyurl.com/ya4w2t6o from Leagle.com.

James D. Lucas , Mark T. Davis, for Joshua Luttrell, Andrew Davis,
Moises Roman, Joe Rodriguez; and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Appellant.

Jo Anne Bernal, Kevin McCary , for El Paso County, et al.,
Appellee.

EL POLLO: Workers' Lawsuit Can Proceed as Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
On July 30, 2018, the Honorable Judge William Claster ruled a
lawsuit brought on behalf of hourly El Pollo Loco workers in
California should be able to proceed as a class action. The El
Pollo Loco class action lawsuit, Case No. JCCP 4957, is currently
pending in the Orange County Superior Court for the State of
California.

The class action lawsuit originally filed by the Los Angeles Labor
Law Lawyers at Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP in
February of 2014 can be read here. The lawsuit alleges that El
Pollo Loco required hourly employees to work off the clock after
their closing shifts and also allegedly failed to provide their
Golden State workers with off-duty rest periods.

The Honorable Judge William claster stated in his order "[t]he
underpinning of this claim is that Defendant, pursuant to an
established written policy, did not allow its employees to leave
restaurant premises during their paid 10 minute breaks. According
to Plaintiff, this across-the-board limitation on all employees
violates the IWC wage orders and Labor Code Section 226.7 which
require duty-free rest breaks . . . The Court finds that Plaintiff
has satisfied the commonality requirement."

The court has certified the following Rest Break class in its
Order:

"[A]ll individuals employed by [El Pollo Loco, Inc.] as a
non-exempt employees in one of the restaurants owned by Defendant
El Pollo Loco, Inc. in California from february 24, 2010 to the
present." The Judge's Order certifying the Rest Break class of can
be read here. According to the Order, the rest break class includes
approximately 14,650 employees.

The Court also certified a class of hourly cooks who worked at
least one closing shift, but asked the Parties to meet and confer
regarding a revised class definition. According to the Order, the
off-the-clock hourly cook class includes approximately 3,403
employees.

In the coming months, all individuals who part of the classes will
be notified of their rights.

         Nicholas J. De Blouw,Esq.
         Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP
         Telephone: (415) 935-3957
         Email: nick@bamlawca.com [GN]

ENHANCED RECOVERY: Knutson Sues over Debt Collection Practices
--------------------------------------------------------------
JEAN KNUTSON, RACHEL HOLMES, and JANE RANFT, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. ENHANCED
RECOVERY COMPANY, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-01113-DEJ (E.D.
Wis., July 18, 2018) seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and
unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Enhanced Recovery Company LLC provides business process outsourcing
services that include recovery, outsourcing, and market research
primarily for Fortune 500 companies in the United States and
internationally. Enhanced Recovery Company LLC was formerly known
as Enhanced Recovery Corporation. The company was founded in 1999
and is based in Jacksonville, Florida with locations in the United
States, the Dominican Republic, Belize, and India. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-800
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


ENTERPRISE BANK: Underpays Mortgage Loan Officers, Heard Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
MATTHEW HEARD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. ENTERPRISE BANK & TRUST INC., Defendant,
Case No. 4:18-cv-00559-DGK (W.D. Mo., July 24, 2018) is an action
against the Defendant for failure to pay minimum and overtime wages
in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Mr. Heard was employed by the Defendant as a mortgage loan
officer.

Enterprise Bank & Trust, Inc. provides banking products and
services to privately-held businesses and their owner families, and
other individuals in St. Louis, Kansas City, and Phoenix areas.
Enterprise Bank & Trust, Inc. was formerly known as Enterprise Bank
and changed its name to Enterprise Bank & Trust, Inc. in January
2004. The company was founded in 1988 and is based in Clayton,
Missouri with additional locations in Creve Coeur, St. Louis, Saint
Charles, and Saint Peters, Missouri. Enterprise Bank & Trust, Inc.
operates as a subsidiary of Enterprise Financial Services Corp.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James B. Zouras, Esq.
          Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          205 N. Michigan Avenue, Suite 2560
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 233-1550
          E-mail: jzouras@stephanzouras.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey J. Carey, Esq.
          BOYD, KENTER, THOMAS & PARRISH, LLC
          229 SE Douglas Street, Suite 210
          Lee’s Summit, MO 64063
          Telephone: (816) 246-9445
          Facsimile: (816) 246-8006
          E-mail: jcarey@bktplaw.com


ERNST & YOUNG: Burns & Levinson Attorneys Discuss SCOTUS Ruling
---------------------------------------------------------------
Shepard Davidson, Esq. -- sdavidson@burnslev.com -- and Renee
Inomata, Esq. -- rinomata@burnslev.com -- of Burns & Levinson LLP,
in an article for Lexology, report that as noted in a prior post,
the differences between arbitration and litigation go well beyond
the fact that arbitration generally is a quicker and less expensive
process. As such, there are a host of reasons why a company may
want certain disputes -- including, but not limited to, those
brought by its own employees -- resolved through arbitration.
Similarly, companies almost always want to avoid the risk of being
sued in a class action. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court, in its
consolidated decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis; Ernst & Young
LLP v. Morris; and NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., ruled that class
action waivers are enforceable.

As Justice Gorsuch noted at the outset, while the three
consolidated cases had different facts, they each essentially
revolved around the same related questions:

Should employees and employers be allowed to agree that any
disputes between them will be resolved through one-on-one
arbitration? Or should employees always be permitted to bring their
claims in class or collective actions, no matter what they agreed
with their employers?

In the Ernst & Young case, Stephen Morris entered into an
employment agreement with E&Y, stating that (i) all disputes
between the two had to be arbitrated, and (ii) claims "pertaining
to different employees [must] be heard in separate proceedings."
Nevertheless, when Morris felt that he was misclassified as a
professional employee and not provided with overtime pay in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, he filed a class-action
lawsuit in federal court.

Not surprisingly, E&Y responded by moving to compel arbitration,
and the district court granted that motion. The Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court decision, however, reasoning that (i)
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act states that agreements to
arbitrate are enforceable, "save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract," and (ii) there
were grounds to revoke the contract in this case, because the
waiver contravened 29 U.S.C. §157, which grants employees the
right to engage in "concerted activities" – to wit, pursuing a
class action for alleged violations of the NLRA. Put another way,
Morris and the other employee/parties to these lawsuits argued that
it would be illegal for them to waive their right to pursue class
actions.

Ultimately, and for a multitude of reasons, the Supreme Court ruled
that there was nothing illegal about waiving the right to pursue a
class action, and there was no other basis on which the employees
could disavow their agreements to refrain from pursuing class
actions against their employers. So if you're concerned that
employees in your business might want to file a class action, or
even band together and sue jointly, consider obtaining their
agreement not to bring such actions (either with or without also
obtaining their agreement to arbitrate disputes). As the Supreme
Court has now made clear, such a waiver will be accorded the same
presumption of validity as any other business term. [GN]

ESURANCE PROPERTY: Bettor Suit Moved to Southern Dist. of Florida
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Richard Bettor, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
Esurance Property and Casualty Insurance Company, the Defendant,
Case No. CACE-18-015628-13, was removed from the U.S. District
Court for 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida,
to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida (Ft
Lauderdale) on Aug. 10, 2018. The Florida Southern District Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 0:18-cv-61860-FAM to the proceeding. The
case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Federico A. Moreno.

Esurance Property & Casualty Insurance Company operates as a
subsidiary of The Allstate Corporation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Herbert Zebersky, Esq.
          ZEBERSKY PAYNE, LLP
          110 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 2150
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 989 6333
          Facsimile: (954) 989 7781
          E-mail: ezebersky@zpllp.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Scott Allan Cole, Esq.
          COLE SCOTT & KISSANE
          Dadeland Centre II Suite 1400
          9150 S Dadeland Boulevard
          Miami, FL 33156
          Telephone: (305) 350 5300
          Facsimile: (305) 373 2294
          E-mail: scott.cole@csklegal.com


EVERSOURCE ENERGY: Inflates Natural Gas Prices, PNE Claims
----------------------------------------------------------
PNE ENERGY SUPPLY LLC, on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. EVERSOURCE ENERGY, a Massachusetts
voluntary association, and AVANGRID, INC., a New York Corporation,
the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-11690-DJC (D. Mass. Aug. 10,
2018), seeks treble damages, costs of suit, and other relief as may
be determined as just and proper, on behalf of Plaintiff and those
similarly situated against Defendants Eversource Energy and
Avangrid Inc. for illegally manipulating the supply of pipeline
capacity in the secondary capacity market in order to artificially
inflate New England natural gas and electricity prices, under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Section 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act.

Eversource Energy and Avangrid Inc. are two of the largest energy
companies in New England. Eversource is comprised of a family of
interrelated companies, including six wholly owned
subsidiaries.[BN]

Counsel for PNE Energy Supply LLC:

          Anthony Tarricone, Esq.
          Joseph P. Musacchio, Esq.
          Elizabeth Tully, Esq.
          KREINDLER & KREINDLER LLP
          855 Boylston Street, Suite 1101
          Boston, MA 02116
          Telephone: (617) 424 9100
          Facsimile: (617) 424 9120
          E-mail: atarricone@kreindler.com
                  jmusacchio@kreindler.com
                  etully@kreindler.com

               - and -

          Austin B. Cohen, Esq.
          Keith J. Verrier, Esq.
          LEVIN SEDRAN &BERMAN LLP
          510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
          Philadelphia, PA 19106-3997
          Telephone: (215) 592 1500
          Facsimile: (215) 592 4663
          E-mail: acohen@lfsblaw.com
                  kverrier@lfsblaw.com


FACEBOOK INC: UK Advocacy Group Prepares Cambridge Analytica Case
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Katie McQuater, writing for Populus, reports that advocacy group
The Fair Vote Project is preparing a class-action lawsuit against
Facebook following the Cambridge Analytica data scandal.

The suit is being readied by Kyle Taylor, director of Fair Vote UK,
and Bindmans LLP.

It follows the publication of the Digital, Culture, Media and
Sport's select committee interim report on fake news at the
weekend.

Bindmans LLP's Tamsin Allen -- t.allen@bindmans.com -- said: "We
are taking the first formal steps in proceedings against Facebook
for breaches on a vast scale of the agreement between the company
and its users, and breaches of UK personal data rules."

Facebook informed those whose data had been improperly obtained,
but Allen said the company's failure to protect users' data was
made "woefully apparent" during the investigation by the Commons
select committee.

Taylor, who is also one of the claimants, said: "It is now
abundantly clear the status quo with regard to how we hold internet
giants to account does not work. The solution is urgent reform to
properly regulate and oversee companies like Facebook. Because the
breaches took place before the GDPR came into effect, the fines are
simply not great enough to deter this behaviour."

Members of the public can check whether their personal data was
harvested via the Fair Vote UK website.

Separately, according to a report in Wired, a group of UK residents
has sent Facebook a letter threatening to sue, accusing the company
of violating data privacy regulations. [GN]

FBCS INC: Goldson Seeks Relief for S.C. Consumers Under FDCPA
-------------------------------------------------------------
Mikki Goldson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. FBCS, Inc., Cavalry SPV I, LLC and John Does 1-25, Case
No. 8:18-cv-02128-AMQ (D.S.C., August 2, 2018), seeks damages and
declaratory relief on behalf of a class of South Carolina consumers
under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act.

FBCS and Cavalry are "debt collectors" as the phrase is defined and
used in the FDCPA with an address in Hatboro, Pennsylvania.  FBCS
and Cavalry are companies, which use the mail, telephone, and
facsimile and regularly engage in business the principal purpose of
which is to attempt to collect debts alleged to be due another.
The names of the Doe Defendants are currently unknown.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ken Norsworthy, Esq.
          NORSWORTHY LAW, LTD. CO.
          505 Pettigru Street
          Greenville, SC 29601
          Telephone: (864) 804-0581
          E-mail: norsworthylaw@gmail.com


FINANCIAL RECOVERIES: Faces Singer Suit in District of New Jersey
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Financial Recoveries
Limited. The case is captioned as SARAH SINGER, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON
BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, the Plaintiff, v.
FINANCIAL RECOVERIES LIMITED, the Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-12563-JBS-AMD (D.N.J., Aug. 8, 2018).

Financial Recoveries is a full service accounts receivable
solutions & management company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd D. Muhlstock, Esq.
          BAKER SANDERS LLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 741 4799
          E-mail: ECF@MuhlstockLaw.com


FRIENDFINDER NETWORKS: Gutierrez Sues over Data Breach
------------------------------------------------------
ALEJANDRO GUTIERREZ, individually and on behalf of all other
similar situated individuals, the Plaintiff, vs. FRIENDFINDER
NETWORKS, INC., a Delaware Corporation, the Defendant, Case No.
18CV332813 (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 10, 2018), seeks to recover
restitution and injunctive relief caused by Defendant's alleged
data breach.

According to the complaint, the Defendant operates an adult online
dating site under the AdultFriendFinder trademark with the Internet
address, www.adultfriendfinder.com ("AFF"). The AFF website, in
operation since 1996, is designed to facilitate discreet adult
relationships between individuals and groups who seek to find
similar minded adults for sexual encounters and is described on the
company website as the "World's Largest Sex & Swinger Community."
While promising to keep its users' confidential personal
information secure, Defendant failed to safeguard this information.
As a result, in or about October 2016, a hacker or a group of
hackers breached Defendant's system and downloaded two decades
worth of information from approximately 339 million accounts,
making the AFF security breach the second largest in the 21st
Century, trailing only behind the massive Yahoo! breach. Of the 339
million accounts affected, approximately 71.9% belonged to users in
the United States and 15 million belonged to users who had
"deleted" their accounts. An additional 70 million users whose
information was stolen were customers of other x-rated websites,
which Defendant sold to Penthouse Global Media prior to the breach.
It is believed that the stolen information included: e-mail
addresses, passwords, whether or not a user was a VIP member,
browser information, the last IP address used to log in, and user
purchases, as well as other sensitive personal information, such as
users' photographs ("Personal Identifiable Information" or "PII").
AFF did not admit to the breach when it was contacted by a media
source, but approximately a week later began to notify its
customers of the breach by surfacing a message when a user logged
into his/her account. But, this type of notice did not reach
millions of users affected as, of the 700 million users AFF boasts,
according to an analysis of the last login dates, over 200 million
have not logged in since 2010, and 15 million of the compromised
accounts were "deleted" accounts.

The Defendant's failure to disclose information concerning the Data
Breach directly and promptly to affected customers, constitutes a
fraudulent act or practice in violation of California Business &
Professions Code section 17200, et seq.  The Plaintiff suffered
injury in fact and lost property and money as a result of
Defendant's conduct.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Putative Class:

          Julian Hammond, Esq.
          Polina Brandler, Esq.
          Ari Cherniak, Esq.
          HAMMONDLAW, P.C.
          1829 Reisterstown Rd. Suite 410
          Baltimore, MD 21208
          Telephone: (310) 601 6766
          Facsimile: (310) 295 2385
          E-mail: jhammond@hammondlawpc.com
                  pbrandler@hammondlawpc.com
                  acherniak@hammondlaw.com

               - and -

          Laura L. Ho, Esq.
          GOLDSTEIN, BORGEN, DARDARIAN & HO
          300 Lakeside Drive, Suite 1000
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 763 9800
          Facsimile: (510) 835 1417
          E-mail: lho@gbdhlegal.com


GC SERVICES: Faces Karp Suit in Eastern District of New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against GC Services Limited
Partnership. The lawsuit is captioned as Schneur Karp, on behalf of
himself and all other similarly situated consumers, the Plaintiff,
v. GC Services Limited Partnership, the Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-04531 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 10, 2018). The case alleges Fair Debt
Collection Act violations.

GC Services is a privately held outsourcing provider of call center
management.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


GC SERVICES: Faces Moskovits Suit in District of New Jersey
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against GC Services Limited
Partnership. The lawsuit is captioned as SHLOMO MOSKOVITS, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff,
v. GC SERVICES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, the Defendant, Case No.
3:18-cv-12649-AET-LHG 3:18-cv-12649-AET-LHG (D.N.J., Aug. 10,
2018). The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Anne E. Thompson. The
case alleges Fair Debt Collection Act violations.

GC Services is a privately held outsourcing provider of call center
management.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ibrahim Abohamra, Esq.
          SIROTKIN VARACALLI & HAMRA LLP
          110 East 59th Street, Suite 3200
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (646) 590 0571
          E-mail: ahamra@svhllp.com


GC SERVICES: Kacinski Suit in Eastern District of New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against GC Services Limited
Partnership. The case is captioned as Laurie Kacinski, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. GC
Services Limited Partnership, the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-04489
(E.D.N.Y., Aug. 8, 2018).

GC Services provides accounts receivable and customer care
solutions to public and private sector organizations. It offers
first party receivable programs, including cure programs, early
stage collections, and pre charge-off collections; third party
receivables management programs, such as post charge-off
collections and skip tracing services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mitchell L. Pashkin, Esq.
          775 Park Avenue, Ste. 255
          Huntington, NY 11743
          Telephone: (631) 335 1107
          E-mail: mpash@verizon.net


GDS HOLDINGS: Faces Ramzan Suit Over Misleading Statements
----------------------------------------------------------
HAMZA RAMZAN, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. GDS HOLDINGS LIMITED, WILLIAM WEI HUANG, and DANIEL
NEWMAN, Case No. 4:18-cv-00539 (E.D. Tex., August 2, 2018), seeks
to recover compensable damages caused by the Defendants' alleged
violations of the federal securities laws under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

The Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or
failed to disclose that: (1) GDS Holdings overstated the value of
certain data centers it had acquired; (2) GDS Holdings failed to
maintain adequate internal controls; (3) as a result, Defendants'
statements about its business, operations, and prospects were
materially false and/or misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis
at all relevant times, the Plaintiff alleges.

GDS Holdings is incorporated in the Cayman Islands and had
principal executive offices in the People's Republic of China.  The
Individual Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.

GDS Holdings is a US-listed developer and operator of data centers
in China.  GDS Holdings, together with its subsidiaries, purports
to design, build, and operate data centers in China.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          L. Kirstine Rogers, Esq.
          Dean Gresham, Esq.
          STECKLER GRESHAM COCHRAN PLLC
          12720 Hillcrest Rd., Suite 1045
          Dallas, TX 75230
          Telephone: (972) 387-4040
          Facsimile: (972) 387-4041
          E-mail: krogers@stecklerlaw.com
                  dean@stecklerlaw.com

               - and -

          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          Phillip Kim, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 686-1060
          Facsimile: (212) 202-3827
          E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                  pkim@rosenlegal.com


GENERAL CABLE: Court Dismisses L. Eley's ERISA Suit
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky, Northern Division, Covington, granted Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss the case captioned LONNIE E. ELEY, on behalf Of the
General Cable Savings And Investment Plan, himself, And a class
consisting of Similarly situated participants Of the Plan,
Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL CABLE CORP., ET AL., Defendants, Civil
Action No. 17-45 (WOB-CJS)(E.D. Ky.).

Plaintiff Lonnie M. Eley, on behalf of a putative class of
participants in the General Cable Savings and Investment Plan
(Plan), brings this action under Sections 404, 405, 409 and 502 of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended,
for the defendants' alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. Count One
of the Amended Class Action Complaint alleges breach of the duty of
prudence; Count Two alleges breach of the duty of loyalty; and
Count Three alleges breach of the duty to monitor.

The Defendants have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint, arguing
that it fails to state a claim under applicable law.  

Breach of the Duty of Prudence

The Plaintiff alleges that defendants breached their duty of
prudence by failing to act in response to non-public, insider
information.

To state a claim for breach of the duty of prudence on the basis of
inside information, a plaintiff must plausibly allege an
alternative action that the defendant could have taken that would
have been consistent with the securities laws and that a prudent
fiduciary in the same circumstances would not have viewed as more
likely to harm the fund than to help it.

The Plaintiff first alleges that the defendants should have made
early and candid disclosures of the FCPA violations because the
longer the concealment continued, the more of the Plan's good money
went into a bad investment.

The Plaintiff argues that early disclosure in this case would not
have caused significant harm compared to the losses that eventually
resulted because of the length of the Class Period, twelve years
and the fact that General Cable ultimately was a net purchaser due
to large purchases made towards the end of the Class Period.

The Sixth Circuit and other courts have rejected this argument
because it effectively invokes hindsight to task fiduciaries with
acting on information not available until years later. Graham, 2018
WL 315098, at *6, however, recognizing ERISA imposes the duty to
act in a prudent manner under the circumstances then prevailing,
courts have noted the duty requires prudence, not prescience.

Therefore, the plaintiff fails to plead a plausible claim based on
the disclosure theory.
The Plaintiff's allegation that defendants should have held
participants' contributions in cash or some other short-term
investment or should have simply frozen further purchases meets
with the same fate.

In sum, the plaintiff has not plausibly alleged any alternative
action the defendants could have taken that would have been
consistent with the securities laws and that a similarly situated
prudent fiduciary would not have viewed as more likely to harm than
help the Plan. The Plaintiff thus has failed to plead a claim for
breach of the duty of prudence.

Breach of the Duty of Loyalty

Count Two of the Amended Complaint alleges that the defendants
breached their duty of loyalty to Plan participants by continuing
to allow investment in General Cable stock; failing to engage
independent fiduciaries to make judgments about investing Plan
assets; placing their interests above the interest of participants;
misrepresenting information; satisfying General Cable's matching
obligations with company stock; and breaching their co-fiduciary
obligations.

These allegations largely mirror those underlying the plaintiff's
breach of prudence claim, and to that extent they are derivative
and fail for the same reasons. The wholly conclusory allegations
that defendants placed their interest ahead of participants also do
not pass muster under Rule 12(b)(6).

Breach of the Duty to Monitor

Finally, the plaintiff concedes that its duty to monitor claim is
derivative of its first two claims. This claim thus also fails as
the pleading stage.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 23, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ya3xj757 from
Leagle.com.

Lonnie E. Eley, on behalf of the General Cable Savings and
Investment Plan, himself, and a class consisting of simimlarly
situated participants of the Plan, Plaintiff, represented by
Michael J. Klein -- ONVI@ssbny.com -- Stull, Stull & Brody, pro hac
vice & Ronald R. Parry -- rrparry@strausstroy.com -- Strauss &
Troy, LPA.

General Cable Corporation, The Retirement Plans Finance Committee
of General Cable Corporation, The Retirement Plans Administrative
Committee of General Corporation, Elizabeth Mlekush, Robert J.
Siverd, Don Katchman, John Doe(s), 1-20, The Board of Directors of
General Cable Corporation, Gregory B. Kenny, Michael T. McDonnell,
Gregory E. Lawton, Craig P. Omtvedt, Patrick M. Prevost, Robert L.
Smialek, John E. Welsh, III, Sallie B. Bailey & Edward Childs Hall,
III, Defendants, represented by Brian T. Ortelere --
brian.ortelere@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Sean
K. McMahan -- sean.mcmahan@morganlewis.com -- Alston & Bird, LLP,
pro hac vice & David F. Fessler -- dfessler@fsgattorneys.com --
Fessler, Schneider & Grimme LLP.

GENKI SUSHI: Over 50,000 People Could Be Entitled to Money
----------------------------------------------------------
Allyson Blair, writing for Hawaii News Now, reports that it's been
two years since a deadly Hepatitis A outbreak struck Hawaii,
creating one of the largest outbreaks to hit the United States in
decades.

Those who got sick, or in some cases simply got the vaccine --
could be entitled to money -- but time is running out to make a
claim.

In August 2016, health investigators determined raw scallops served
at Genki Sushi on Oahu and Kauai as the source of the outbreak. A
total of 292 people were infected with the virus.

Of those infected, one woman died and more than 70 others had to be
hospitalized.

"These people were really sick," said Attorney Bill Marler, Esq. --
marler@marlerclark.com --
"Even the people who were modestly sick felt like they had the flu
for a month."

Marler represented 88 people whose cases have been settled. He says
Hawaii has a statute of limitations which means that those who got
sick as a result of the outbreak have two years to file a lawsuit.

"Anyone who got sick before August 15, 2016 has to bring a claim by
August 15, 2018," said Marler. "Anybody who got sick after the 15th
can bring a claim to the date when they got sick."

Marler says there are 182 people who were documented as having the
virus, but have yet to sue.

"The lawsuit is pretty simple. It just lays out what happened to
the person." said Marler.

"They can contact a lawyer to file that lawsuit for them or they
can file the lawsuit by themselves. Seaport, Koha Foods and Genki
Sushi are the three entities that were involved and those are the
three entities you need to file a lawsuit against."

There's also a class-action suit for people who received the
Hepatitis A vaccination after the health department revealed the
source of the outbreak.

Records show more than 50,000 people were vaccinated in the two
weeks following that announcement.

"The class action is seeking reimbursement for the cost of the shot
and time away from work," said Marler.

Hawaii News Now asked Marler about the amounts his clients got in
their settlements, but he said he couldn't comment due to a
confidentiality agreement.[GN]

GRAND ISLE SHIPYARD: Sandlin Seeks Overtime Pay
-----------------------------------------------
WESLEY SANDLIN, Individually and on behalf of other employees
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. GRAND ISLE SHIPYARD, INC.,
the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-07607-LMA-KWR (E.D. La., Aug. 10,
2018), seeks to recover unpaid back wages, additional equal amount
as liquidated damages, attorney's fees and costs, and pre- and
post-judgment interest, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938.

According to the complaint, GIS failed to maintain accurate time
records of Plaintiff's and the Putative Class's actual start times,
actual stop times, hours worked each day and total hours worked
each workweek, within the three year statute of limitations period.
As a result of the alleged underpayment of wages, Defendant is
indebted to Plaintiff and the Putative Class in the amount of the
unpaid overtime compensation.

GIS is an oilfield services company that provides construction,
maintenance and turnaround, production, and engineering
services.[BN]

Attorneys for Wesley Sandlin and Opt-Ins:

          Trang Q. Tran, Esq.
          TRAN LAW FIRM
          2537 S. Gessner Road, Suite 104
          Houston, TX 77063
          Telephone: (713) 223 8855
          Facsimile: (713) 623 6399
          E-mail: Ttran@tranlawllp.com

               - and -

          Scott Webre, Esq.
          WEBRE AND ASSOCIATES
          2901 Johnston Street, Suite 307
          Lafayette, LA 70503
          Telephone: (337) 237 5051
          Facsimile: (337) 237 5061
          E-mail: scott@webreandassociates.com


GRANDISON MANAGEMENT: Physical Therapist Files Wage-and-Hour Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DIANNAH ANNE ZENDON, Individually and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. GRANDISON MANAGEMENT,
INC., REHAB SYNERGY PT, P.C. and BASILIO E. LOPEZ, the Defendants,
Case No. 2:18-cv-04545-JFB-ARL (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 10, 2018), seeks to
recover damages and injunctive relief for violations of the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act, for failure to pay regular and
overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and
the New York Labor Law, for breach of the parties' employment
contract, and for a declaratory judgment that a $30,000.00
indenture and a nationwide, two-year non-compete clause in the
employment contract are unenforceable under the TVPA, the l3th
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and New York common
law.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff is a physical therapist
who was recruited in the Philippines to work for the Defendants
under contracts of indentured servitude for a three-year term. The
first contract she was made to sign, which was dated February 20,
2015, contained a so-called "liquidated damages" clause that
required her to pay or work off a $30,000 indenture before she
would be allowed to stop working for the Defendants. The contract
also contained non-compete provisions that purport to prohibit her
from practicing her profession anywhere in the United States for
two years.  The second contract dated July 13, 2017 also contained
a so-called "liquidated damages" clause that required Plaintiff to
pay "$200.00 for every 40 hours left in the Work Term".

When Plaintiff complained about risks to patient health and safety,
false billing practices, and the failure to pay her for all hours
worked, Grandison Management replied that it was allegedly normal
for a physical therapist to treat as many as 40 patients a day and
that there allegedly was no law restricting the number of patients
a physical therapist could treat in a day.  Grandison also replied
that Plaintiff was just merely adjusting to a new work environment
when she complained about her working during week-ends and even
evenings to finish her paperwork.

Grandison Management provides healthcare services.  The Company
offers nurses, therapists, and other specialties services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Felix Q. Vinluan, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF FELIX VINLUAN
          Woodside, NY 11377
          Telephone: (718) 478 4488
          Facsimile: (718) 478 4488
          E-mail: fqvinluan@yahoo.com

               - and -

          Manuel B. Quintal, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF MANUEL QUINTAL P.C.
          291 Broadway Suite, 1501
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 732 0055
          Facsimile: (212) 587 8933
          E-mail: quintallaw@aol.com


HAKIMIAN MANAGEMENT: Faces Fischler Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hakimian Management
Corporation. The lawsuit is captioned as Brian Fischler,
Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, v. Hakimian Management Corporation, doing business
as: The Addition LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-07230 (S.D.N.Y.,
Aug. 10, 2018). The case alleges Americans with Disabilities Act
violations.

Hakimian is a developer, owner, and manager of New York real estate
since 1970.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
          LIPSKY LOWE LLP
          630 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10017-6705
          Telephone: (212) 392 4772
          Facsimile: (212) 444 1030
          E-mail: chris@lipskylowe.com


HENRY LIMOUSINE: Court Approves $260K Class Settlement
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York granted Parties' Joint Letter for Settlement Approval in the
case captioned SEDDIQ ELAMRANI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HENRY
LIMOUSINE, LTD., et al., Defendants, No. 15 CV 2050
(CLP)(E.D.N.Y.).

The opt-in plaintiffs in this case are all former employees of
defendant Henry Limousine Company who are alleged to have worked
different overtime hours for the defendant employer.

Courts have identified several factors to consider when determining
whether a proposed settlement is fair and reasonable, including:
(1) the plaintiff's range of possible recovery; (2) the extent to
which the settlement will enable the parties to avoid anticipated
burdens and expenses in establishing their respective claims and
defenses; (3) the seriousness of the litigation risks faced by the
parties; (4) whether the settlement agreement is the product of
arm's-length bargaining between experienced counsel; and (5) the
possibility of fraud or collusion.

Settlement Amount

Damages Calculations

The parties propose a total settlement amount of $260,832.83. They
calculated this amount based on damages, including liquidated
damages, a base amount for each plaintiff, service awards for
select plaintiffs, and attorney's fees and costs.

Maximum Provable Damages

The parties calculated the weeks worked during this time period for
each plaintiff, and found that the plaintiffs worked, on average,
approximately fifty (50) hours per week. The parties multiplied
each plaintiff's number of hours worked by over forty (40) in a
week by the statutorily-applicable overtime rate of $10.88.

Liquidated Damages

As for liquidated damages, the parties calculated this amount at
25% of the total overtime amount owed for hours worked prior to
April 9, 2011. For hours worked after April 9, 2011, they
calculated liquidated damages at 100% of maximum provable damages.


The parties' submission includes a table with columns for each
plaintiff outlining (1) the number of weeks worked prior to 2013;
(2) the overtime rate of pay; (3) the maximum provable FLSA
damages, including both actual and liquidated recovery amounts; (4)
the settlement amount received after deductions for fees and costs;
and (5) the percentage of the maximum FLSA damages plus liquidated
damages received. After examining the parties' calculations, the
Court concludes that the total settlement amount is fair and
reasonable. The Court has also assessed the parties' methodology in
calculating individual damages, and, in light of each plaintiff's
hours worked and how long each plaintiff worked for, finds that
each plaintiff's portion of the total settlement amount is also
fair and reasonable.

Attorney's Fees and Costs

Finally, the settlement awards $84,941.16, or 32.5% of the
settlement, in attorney's fees. Citing case law in this district
routinely awarding 33% as attorney's fees in FLSA actions, the
parties assert that the amount of attorney's fees and costs here
are reasonable. Additionally, the parties include contemporary
billing records and use the lodestar method as a cross check to
ensure that counsel's fee award is not excessive in relation to the
amount of work actually performed. The Court notes that the parties
here include recent cases where courts in this district and in the
Southern District of New York have awarded plaintiffs' firm's
requested hourly rate to support the requested hourly rate for each
of the firm's partners and junior attorneys.  

The Court finds these attorney's fees reasonable based on both the
contingency fee percentage supported by case law in this district,
and the lodestar crosscheck.

In this case, after holding a fairness hearing and reviewing the
parties' submission, the Court finds that the settlement reached is
a fair and reasonable compromise of the plaintiff's claims,
considering the amount received, the issues of potential liability
that might have limited recovery, and the fact that the parties
engaged in arms' length negotiations among experienced counsel
sufficient to gain an understanding of the risks and benefits of
proceeding with the litigation.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9f7v7ex from Leagle.com.

Michael A. Levy, Mediator, pro se.

Seddiq Elamrani, on behalf of himself, individually and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey Robert
Maguire -- jrm@employmentlawyernewyork.com -- Borrelli &
Associates, Alexander T. Coleman -- atc@employmentlawyernewyork.com
-- Borrelli & Associates PLLC, Janine Kapp , Borrelli & Associates,
P.L.L.C., Joan Badere Lopez , Borrelli and Associates PLLC &
Michael J. Borrelli , Borrelli & Associates, P.C.

Henry Limousine, LTD. & Avraham Mazouz, in his individual and
professional capacities, Defendants, represented by Arthur H.
Forman , Attorney at Law & Roberta C. Pike , Pike & Pike, P.C..

HILTON GRAND: Court Grants Prelim Approval of Class Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, Florence Division, granted Parties' Joint Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Settlement in the case captioned THOMAS
KASPRZYK, STEVEN HUGHES, SHERRY SINGLETON, ERIC WILSON, HENRY
PERFILIO, WILLIAM NEVILLE, EDWARD BELAIR, KIM STRAWDERMAN, MICHAEL
WARE, JOHN MAYNARD, J.W. NAVE, RONALD L. HOWE, and CHRISTOPHER R.
DOBIS, Individually and on behalf of other employees similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. HILTON GRAND VACATIONS COMPANY, LLC;
HILTON GRAND VACATIONS MANAGEMENT, LLC; and HILTON RESORTS
CORPORATION, Defendants, Civil Action No.
4:17-cv-01393-RBH(D.S.C.).

This matter comes before the Court on the Parties' Joint Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Settlement, Certification of FLSA
Collective Action for Settlement Purposes Only, and Approval of
Proposed Notice of Settlement.

The Court preliminarily approves the settlement set forth in the
Parties' Settlement Agreement as being a fair, reasonable, and
adequate resolution of a bona fide dispute.

The proposed FLSA collective action is conditionally certified
under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) solely for settlement purposes to
give class members the opportunity to become party plaintiffs and
assert a claim. The Settlement Class is defined as the Named
Plaintiffs and all sales executives who have worked at Hilton Grand
Vacation's Myrtle Beach resort during the Class Period. The
Settlement Class will include Action Line Sales Executives and
In-House Sales Executives, but it will not include VIP
representatives, sales managers, or sales leaders (T.O.).

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 23, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ya74pzns from Leagle.com.

Steven Hughes, Individually and on behalf of other employees
similarly situated, Sherry Singleton, Individually and on behalf of
other employees similarly situated, Eric Wilson, Individually and
on behalf of other employees similarly situated, Ronald L Howe &
Christopher R Dobis, Plaintiffs, represented by William James Luse,
William J Luse Law Office, & Trang Quoc Tran --
Ttran@tranlawllp.com -- Tran Law Firm LLP, pro hac vice.

JW Nave, Individually and on behalf of other employees similarly
situated, Edward Belair, Individually and on behalf of other
employees similarly situated, William Neville, Individually and on
behalf of other employees similarly situated, John Maynard,
Individually and on behalf of other employees similarly situated,
Henry Perfilio, Individually and on behalf of other employees
similarly situated & Michael Ware, Individually and on behalf of
other employees similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
William James Luse , William J Luse Law Office.

Hilton Grand Vacations Company LLC, Hilton Grand Vacations
Management LLC & Hilton Resorts Corporation, Defendants,
represented by Donald Christopher Lauderdale --
lauderdc@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis PC, William Robert
Gignilliat, IV -- William.Gignilliat@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson
Lewis PC & Thomas Chase Samples -- chase.samples@jacksonlewis.com
-- Jackson Lewis PC.

HOME INSTEAD: Faces Delacruz Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Home Instead, Inc.
The lawsuit is captioned as Emanuel Delacruz, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Home Instead,
Inc., the Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-07225 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 10,
2018). The case alleges Americans with Disabilities Act
violations.

Home Instead provides senior home care services. It offers services
in the areas of occupational therapy, wound care, mobility
training, and pain management.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 299 6612
          Facsimile: (929) 575 4195
          E-mail: joseph@cml.legal


HOUSTON, TX: Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Over Rape Kit Backlog
----------------------------------------------------------
10 KWTX reports that a federal judge has dismissed a class action
lawsuit filed by thousands of women and minors against current and
former Houston officials over delays in testing of rape kits.

The lawsuit alleged the officials allowed the delays, meaning
suspects remained free and justice was denied to the victims.

In a 22-page opinion filed Wednesday, however, U.S. District Judge
Vanessa Gilmore ruled the lawsuit, filed last September, was filed
too late. She ruled that a two-year statute of limitations had
lapsed in 2013.

An attorney for those who brought the suit, Randall Kallinen,Esq.
of Houston, declined immediate comment on August 3.

The class action suit had represented about 6,000 women and several
hundred minors who said they were harmed when the Houston Police
Department failed to submit their rape kits to a crime lab. Kits
submitted in 2011 languished in storage for years.[GN]

IBILEY UNIFORM: Pineda Sues Over Marketing Text Messages
--------------------------------------------------------
CESAR PINEDA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. IBILEY UNIFORM, INC., a Florida Corporation, Case No.
1:18-cv-23162-JEM (S.D. Fla., August 2, 2018), alleges that the
Defendant violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by sending
marketing text messages, without first obtaining express written
consent to send those messages.

Ibiley is a Florida corporation with a principal office located in
Miami, Florida.  The Defendant owns and operates several brick and
mortar retail stores, as well as an online business specializing in
the marketing and distribution of uniform garments.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI, PLLC
          110 SE 6th Street
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 907-1136
          Facsimile: (855) 529-9540
          E-mail: jibrael@jibraellaw.com




IMPERIAL J & Y: Fails to Pay OT Wages, Herrera-Cautle Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
CLEMENTE HERRERA-CAUTLE, and all similarly situated present and
former employees of the defendants herein, pursuant to N.J.S.A.
34:11-56a25 and 29 U.S.C Section 216(b) v. IMPERIAL J & Y, LLC
(a.k.a IMPERIAL WOOD FLOORING, LLC), AHARON EHRENRICH, YEHUDA
MERMELSTEIN, AKIVA MERMELSTEIN, SMAUEL (a.k.a. SAMUEL) SITKO, and
JOHN/JANE DOES ##1-5, jointly, severally, and individually, Case
No. MER-L-001639-18 (N.J. Super. Ct., Mercer Cty., August 2, 2018),
alleges that the Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff at the
legally-required minimum wage and overtime rate, as required by the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law.

Imperial J & Y, LLC (a.k.a. Imperial Wood Flooring, LLC) is
organized under the laws of the state of New Jersey.  The Company's
main business address is listed as 410 Monmouth Avenue, in
Lakewood, New Jersey.  The Individual Defendants are members,
authorized agents or managers of the Company.  The identities of
the Doe Defendants are currently unknown.

The Company is engaged in the business of home remodeling in the
state of New Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roger Martindell, Esq.
          ROGER MARTINDELL, ATTORNEY AT LAW
          245 Nassau Street
          Princeton, NJ 08540
          Telephone: (609) 921-3355
          Facsimile: (609) 921-9345
          E-mail: martindell.law@gmail.com



INNERWORKINGS INC: Faces "Brown" Securities Class Action Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
InnerWorkings, Inc. said in its Form 10-K/A report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on July 27, 2018, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that the company is facing a
putative securities class action suit entitled, Errol Brown, et
al., v. InnerWorkings, Inc., et al.

In May 2018, shortly following the Company's announcement of its
intention to restate certain historical financial statements, a
putative securities class action complaint was filed against the
Company and certain of its current and former officers and
directors.  The action, Errol Brown, et al., v. InnerWorkings,
Inc., et al., is currently pending before the United States
District Court for the Central District of California.

The complaint alleges claims pursuant to Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Allegations in the
complaint include that the Company and its current and former
officers and directors made untrue statements or omissions of
material fact by issuing inaccurate financial statements for the
fiscal years ending December 31, 2015, 2016, and 2017, as well as
all interim periods. The putative class seeks an unspecified amount
of monetary damages as well as reimbursement of fees and costs,
including reasonable attorneys' fees, and other costs.

The Company and individual defendants dispute the claims. A motion
for appointment of lead plaintiff and lead counsel was filed on
July 9, 2018, and is scheduled for hearing on August 6, 2018.

InnerWorkings, Inc. provides marketing execution solutions in North
America and internationally. The company's software applications
and databases create an integrated solution that stores, analyzes,
and tracks the production capabilities of its supplier network, as
well as detailed pricing data. The company was founded in 2001 and
is headquartered in Chicago, Illinois.


INTERNATIONAL HAIR: Faces Doucet Suit in S.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Izabelle J. Doucet and Charlotte
Dukich, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. International Hair Institute, LLC, a
Virginia limited liability company; Keranique, LLC, a Virginia
limited liability company; Atlantic Coast Media Group, LLC, a
Virginia limited liability company; and Does 2-50, inclusive, the
Defendant, Case No. 37-2018-00009996-CU-MC-CTL, was removed from
the California Superior Court, County of San Diego, to the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California (San Diego)
on Aug. 10, 2018. The Southern District of California Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 3:18-cv-01879-WQH-KSC to the proceeding. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge William Q. Hayes.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Zachariah Paul Dostart, Esq.
          DOSTART HANNINK COVENEY LLP
          4180 La Jolla Village Drive, Suite 530
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          Telephone: (858) 623 4200
          Facsimile: (858) 623 4299
          E-mail: zdostart@sdlaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Lee S Brenner, Esq.
          KELLEY DRYE AND WARREN LLP
          10100 Santa Monica Boulevard, 23rd Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 712 6100
          Facsimile: (310) 712 6199
          E-mail: lbrenner@kelleydrye.com


INVENTION SUBMISSION: Calhoun Suit Transferred to W.D. Pa.
----------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled ETTA CALHOUN, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF
AND ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, the Plaintiff, INVENTION
SUBMISSION CORPORATION doing business as: INVENTHELP; TECHNOSYSTEMS
CONSOLIDATED CORP.; TECHNOSYSTES SERVICE CORP.; WESTERN INVENTION
SUBMISSION CORP.; UNIVERSAL PAYMENT CORPORATION; INTROMARK
INCORPORATED; INNOVATION CREDIT CORP.; ROBERT J. SUSA; THOMAS FROST
P.A.; ABOVE BOARD DRAFTING, INC.; JOHN DOE COMPANIES 1-10; JOHN DOE
INDIVIDUALS 1-10; THOMAS FROST; and ABOVE BOARD DRAFTING, INC., the
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-02307, was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(Pittsburgh) on Aug. 8, 2018. The Western District of Pennsylvania
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:18-cv-01022-RCM to the proceeding.
The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Robert C. Mitchell.

This class action arises out of a deceptive and fraudulent
invention promotion scam that has bilked thousands of aspiring
inventors and entrepreneurs into paying millions of dollars to
Defendants for invention promotion services that Defendants do not,
and never intend to, provide.[BN]

Attorneys for Etta Calhoun on behalf of herself and all other
persons similarly situated:

          Richard A. Levan, Esq.
          KLEHR, HARRISON, HARVEY, BRANZBERG & ELLERS
          260 South Broad Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (215) 568 6060

               - and -

          Jon-Jorge Aras, Esq.
          LEVAN LEGAL LLC
          Two Bala Plaza, Suite 300
          Bala Cynwyd, PA
          Telephone: (215) 525 1165
          E-mail: jjaras@levan.legal

Attorneys for Invention Submission Corporation; Technosystems
Consolidated Corp.; Technosystes Service Corp.; Western Invention
Submission Corp.; Universal Payment Corporation; Intromark
Incorporated; and Robert J. Susa:

          David Garraux, Esq.
          FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
          2000 Market St. 10th Fl
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 299 2847
          E-mail: dgarraux@foxrothschild.com


JC WASHINGTON: Fails to Pay Wages to Delivery Driver, Bavaro Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JULIA BAVARO, and NATHAN BLOSE, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JC WASHINGTON INC.; JC
NORTHERN PIKE, LLC; and JOHN DOE CORP. 1-10, Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-00982-RCM (W.D. Pa., July 26, 2018) seeks to recover
minimum wages as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act and
Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Law.

The Plaintiff Bavaro was employed by the Defendants as delivery
driver from January 2016 to March 2017. The Plaintiff Blose was
employed as delivery driver from October 2017 to February 2018.

JC Washington Inc. is a domestic corporation located in Washington,
Pennsylvania. The Company operates a pizza restaurants [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Gregory G. Paul, Esq.
          MORGAN & PAUL, PLLC
          100 First Avenue, Suite 1010
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 259-8375
          Facsimile: (888) 822-9421
          E-mail: gregpaul@morgan-paul.com

               - and -

          Andrew Biller, Esq.
          Andrew Kimble, Esq.
          Philip Krzeski, Esq.
          MARKOVITS, STOCK & DEMARCO, LLC
          3825 Edwards Road, Suite 650
          Telephone: (513) 651-3700
          Facsimile: (513) 665-0219
          Email: abiller@msdlegal.com
                 akimble@msdlegal.com
                 pkrzeski@msdlegal.com


JFK MEDICAL: Mendez et al. Seek to Certify Two Classes
------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled SANDRA LOIS MENDEZ, AMY R. BRAZEE, SETH
GATES, and LORI R SINGER f/k/a Lori R. Kogan, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v.
JFK MEDICAL CENTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP d/b/a JFK Medical Center,
NPAS, INC., HCA HOLDINGS, INC., PALMS WEST SURGERY CENTER, LTD.
d/b/a Palms West Surgicenter, UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, LTD. d/b/a
University Hospital & Medical Center, and MIAMI BEACH HEALTHCARE
GROUP, LTD. d/b/a Aventura Hospital and Medical Center, the
Defendants, Case No. 9:17-cv-80866-KAM (S.D. Fla.), the Plaintiffs
ask the Court for an order certifying these classes:

Class I:

   "For the period from four (4) years preceding the filing of
   this action through the date of the entry of judgment herein,
   all patients for whom JFK or NPAS billed or collected for
   amounts in excess of that authorized under the PIP Statute";

Class II:

   "For the period from four (4) years preceding the filing of
   the Second Amended Complaint through the date of the entry of
   judgment herein, all patients for whom HCA's Florida Providers
   (excluding JFK) billed or collected for amounts in excess of
   that authorized under the PIP Statute."

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Seth A. Kolton, Esq.
          William J. Cornwell, Esq.
          Seth A. Kolton, Esq.
          WEISS, HANDLER & CORNWELL, P.A.
          One Boca Place, Suite 218-A
          2255 Glades Road
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (561) 997-9995
          Facsimile: (561) 997-5280
          E-mail: wjc@whcfla.com
                  filings@whcfla.com
                  sak@whcfla.com
                  jh@whcfla.com

               - and -

          Bruce F. Silver, Esq.
          Silver & Silver, P.A.
          6100 Glades Road, Suite 201
          Boca Raton, FL 33434
          Telephone: (561) 488 3344
          Facsimile: (561) 488 5899
          E-mail: brucesilver@silverlawoffices.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Walter J. Tache, Esq.
          Magda C. Rodriguez, Esq.
          TACHE, BRONIS, CHRISTIANSON AND DESCALZO
          150 SE Second Avenue, Suite 600
          Miami, FL 33131
          E-mail: wtache@tachebronis.com
                  mrodriguez@tachebronis.com

               - and -

          John Emmanuel, Esq.
          Ashley Bruce Trehan, Esq.
          Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney, PC
          401 E Jackson Street, Suite 2400
          Tampa, FL 33602
          E-mail: john.emmanuel@bipc.com
                  Ashley.trehan@bipc.com


JUDICIAL CORRECTION: Removes Eaton Suit to N.D. Alabama
-------------------------------------------------------
The Defendants in the case of ETHEL LEE EATON, and TIMOTHY BLAINE
SMITH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. JUDICIAL CORRECTION SERVICES, LLC f/k/a Judicial
Correction Services, Inc.; CHC COMPANIES, LLC f/k/a CHC Companies,
Inc.; and CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendants, filed a notice
to remove the lawsuit from the Circuit Court of the State of
Alabama, County of Jefferson, (Case No. 01-CV-2018-902118) to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama on July 5,
2018, and assigned Case No. 2:18-cv-01034-LSC (N.D. Ala., July 5,
2018).

Judicial Correction Services, Inc. provides supervised probation
services to municipal and state courts for misdemeanor cases. It
offers judicial correction services and in-court procedures; and
provides accounting of financial, offender, and case notes. The
company was founded in 2000 and is based in Cumming, Georgia. It
also has offices in Hoover, Alabama; and Okaloosa, Florida. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Larry S. Logsdon, Esq.
          Michael L. Jackson, Esq.
          Wesley K. Winborn, Esq.
          WALLACE JORDAN RATLIFF & BRANDT, LLC
          P.O. Box 530910
          Birmingham, AL 35253
          Telephone: (205) 870-0555
          E-mail: llogsdon@wallacejordan.com
                  mjackson@wallacejordan.com
                  wwinborn@wallacejordan.com

               - and -

          Wilson F. Green, Esq.
          FLEENOR & GREEN LLP
          1657 McFarland Blvd. N., Ste G2A
          Tuscaloosa, Al 35406
          Telephone: (205) 722-1018
          E-mail: wgreen@fleenorgreen.com

               - and -

          F. Lane Finch, Jr., Esq.
          Brian C. Richardson, Esq.
          SWIFT CURRIE MCGHEE & HIERS LLP
          Two North 20th Street, Ste. 1405
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: (205) 314-2401
          E-mail: lane.finch@swiftcurrie.com
                  brian.richardson@swiftcurrie.com


KAHALA HOTEL: Judgment in J. Kawakami's Suit Vacated
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, JASON KAWAKAMI, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,
Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee v. KAHALA HOTEL
INVESTORS, LLC, dba KAHALA HOTEL AND RESORT
Respondent/Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Case No.
SCWC-11-0000594 (Haw.), Judge Michael D. Wilson of the Supreme
Court of Hawai'i (a) vacated the Intermediate Court of Appeals
("ICA")' affirmance of the circuit court's grant of judgment as a
matter of law ("JMOL"); (b) reinstated (i) the circuit court's
earlier grant of partial summary judgment to Kawakami as to the
Defendant's liability under HRS Section 481B-14; and (ii) the
jury's special verdict in favor of Kawakami on legal causation and
the amount of damages in the trial on damages that followed the
grant of partial summary judgment; and (c) remanded to the circuit
court for determination of additional damages and fees under
Hawaii's statute governing unfair or deceptive acts or practices.

The class action concerns Hawaii's hotel and restaurant service
charge law.  Kawakami held his wedding reception at the Kahala
Hotel and Resort in July 2007.  The hotel collected a 19% service
charge on the purchase of food and beverages for his reception, but
the hotel failed to distribute 100% of the funds from the service
charge directly to its service employees as tip income.  Instead,
the hotel retained 15% of those funds as what it termed "the
management share," then reclassified those funds and used them to
pay for the banquet employees' "wages."  

The "event agreement," a contract used by the hotel for large group
events, contained no disclosure that a portion of the service
charge would be diverted to the hotel, rather than directly
distributed to the banquet employees as tip income. A section of
the event agreement, titled "Service Charge and Tax," stated only
that all food and beverage prices are subject to a 19% service
charge.  No other disclosure was made to Kawakami that a portion of
the service charge would not be directly distributed to the banquet
employees as tips.

Kawakami filed a lawsuit on behalf of himself and other customers
who paid a service charge to the hotel in connection with the
purchase of food or beverages.  He claimed the hotel's conduct was
an unfair or deceptive act or practice ("UDAP") under HRS Section
481B-14 and HRS Section 480-2.  He moved for summary judgment "on
liability" because the undisputed facts established that the hotel
violated HRS Section 481B-14 and HRS Section 480-2.

The circuit court granted summary judgment as to liability only,
not remedies or damages, ruling that under HRS Section 481B-14 the
hotel had "a duty to disclose" to Kawakami that a portion of the
service charge would become the property of the hotel rather than
paid to its employees as tip income.  A jury trial to determine
damages followed.  The jury found that the hotel was the legal
cause of injury to the Plaintiff class and awarded $269,114.73 to
the class, corresponding to the amount of the combined service
charges retained by the hotel as "the management share."

A little more than a month after the verdict, the hotel renewed its
prior motions for JMOL, which had been denied by the circuit court.
This time the circuit court granted the motion for JMOL on the
theory there had been insufficient evidence the Plaintiffs suffered
injury as a result of the hotel's violation of HRS Section 481B-14.
It observed, the jury awarded as damages to the Plaintiffs a sum
that appears to be equal to the amount of the Management's Share of
the service charge.

On appeal the ICA vacated the circuit court's order granting
Kawakami's motion for summary judgment and held instead that
summary judgment should have been granted in favor of the hotel.
The ICA reasoned that because the hotel ultimately distributed the
management share of the service charge as wages, its actions were
in compliance with the language of HRS Section 481B-14 and no
disclosure to Kawakami was required.

On certiorari in Kawakami I, the Court rejected the ICA's
reasoning.  Instead, it recognized the well-settled duty of hotels
and restaurants under the statute to either distribute the entirety
of the service charge directly to non-management banquet employees
who served the consumers as 'tip income,' or to disclose its
practice of withholding the service charge.  Accordingly, the Court
vacated the ICA's judgment on appeal and remanded to the ICA.  It
directed the ICA to address on remand Kawakami's argument that the
circuit court erred when it granted JMOL to the hotel on the theory
that Kawakami suffered no injury as a result of the hotel's
actions.

On remand from the Court's decision in Kawakami I, the ICA affirmed
the circuit court's grant of JMOL to the hotel because, in the
ICA's view, Kawakami failed to establish that he was injured,
financially or otherwise, as a result of Kahala Hotel's deceptive
trade practices.  With respect to Kawakami's alternative claim of a
contract-based injury, the ICA rejected that claim largely on the
grounds that the required disclosure under HRS Section 481B-14 need
not take the form of a written provision in an event contract, nor
must it necessarily occur before parties enter into the contract,
and therefore there was no breach of contract.  As a result, the
ICA affirmed the circuit court's grant of JMOL.

On certiorari, Kawakami argues that the ICA erred by holding that
no contract-based or UDAP-based injury occurred.  He also argues
that the ICA erred in affirming the circuit court's order denying
the Plaintiffs' motion in limine no. 1, which sought to preclude
the admission of certain evidence.

Judge Wilson explains that it is undisputed that the hotel neither
distributed the proceeds from the service charges directly and
entirely to the service employees as tip income, nor clearly
disclosed that it failed to do so.  He finds that the hotel failed
to perform its contractual obligation, mandated by the implied
terms, to follow the baseline distribution pattern.  Nor did the
hotel opt out of the implied terms requiring the baseline
distribution pattern by following the statutorily-required route of
clearly disclosing to Kawakami or the members of the class the fact
that the hotel follows a different distribution pattern.  Instead,
the hotel retained for itself a percentage of the service charge,
an amount that, had the purchaser been given the benefit of his
bargain, would have been distributed entirely to the service
personnel who assisted at his wedding reception.

The Judge also finds that the allegations in the Paintiffs'
complaint gave the hotel fair notice that the hotel's pattern and
practice of violating HRS Section 481B-14 was at issue "on any
legal theory."  The rules do not require a statement of a cause of
action.  

His analysis of the relevant principles of contract law led him to
hold that Kawakami's damages for breach of contract based on his
expectation interest are properly measured by the 15% of the total
19% service charge which the hotel retained for itself rather than
directly distributing as tip income to service employees.  The jury
in the damages trial considered the factual evidence regarding the
total service charges collected over the relevant period.  The jury
awarded $269,114.73 to the class, corresponding to the amount of
the combined service charges retained by the hotel as "the
management share."  That amount is 15% of the total 19% service
charge and corresponds to the amount retained by the hotel. The
jury's award is supported by substantial evidence.  Having vacated
the circuit court's grant of JMOL to the hotel subsequent to trial,
the Judge reinstated the damages awarded at trial, in the amount
awarded, albeit on the ground that the amount equals Kawakami's
damages for the hotel's breach of contract.

Turning to the question of whether Kawakami and the class also
sustained damages under the Hawai'i statute forbidding UDAP, HRS
Chapter 480, the Judge holds that a violation of Hawaii's hotel and
restaurant service charge law, HRS Section 481B-14, is deemed to
also be an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of
any trade or commerce within the meaning of HRS section 480-2; the
injury to Kawakami's legally-protected interest was caused by the
hotel's breach of contract; and the amount of damages was proved at
trial.  Because Kawakami has met the elements for a UDAP claim, he
remanded to the circuit court for an award of treble damages and
attorney's fees.

Finally, the Judge holds that the circuit court did not err in
denying Kawakami's motion in limine no. 1.  The hotel was entitled
to present evidence relevant to its theory that Kawakami's economic
injury was limited to the 15% of the total service charge not paid
to those employees who were servers at his event.  The fact that
the hotel retained 15% of the total service charges tended to make
the hotel's theory of damages more likely and was therefore
relevant.  Moreover, Kawakami's motion in limine no. 1 is akin to a
motion for partial summary judgment regarding damages.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/TTD0In from Leagle.com.

James J. Bickerton -- bickerton@bsds.com -- perkin@perkinlaw.com --
JPierce@perkinscoie.com -- Brandee J.K. Faria --
bjkfaria@perkinlaw.com -- Bridget G. Morgan -- morgan@bsds.com --
Kristina M. Hanson -- kristinahanson@hansonlawgrp.com -- for
petitioners.

David J. Minkin -- dminkin@m4law.com -- Lisa W. Cataldo --
cataldo@m4law.com -- for respondent.

KESEF LLC: Fails to Pay Minimum Wages, Bonhomme Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
MARC BONHOMME, and MAXI MATHURIN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. KESEF, LLC d/b/a SOHO ASIAN
BAR & GRILL, and SHLOMI EZRA, Defendants, Case No. 75166665 (Fla.
Cir. Miami-Dade Cty., July 18, 2018) is an action against the
Defendants to recover unpaid minimum wages and tip credits pursuant
to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as non-exempt,
hourly employees. The Plaintiff Bonhomme was employed from December
15, 2014 to March 7, 2018, and the Plaintiff Mathurin from August
15, 2016 to March 29, 2018.

Kesef, LLC d/b/a Soho Asian Bar & Grill is a Florida company
engaged in the restaurant business. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           Peter J. Bober, Esq.
           Samara Robbins Bober, Esq.
           BOBER & BOBER, P.A.
           1930 Tyler Street
           Hollywood, FL 33020
           Telephone: (954) 922-2298
           Facsimile: (954) 922-5455
           E-mail: peter@boberlaw.com
                   samara@boberlaw.com


KOCH FOODS: Court Denies Agri Stats' Bid for Protective Order
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, denied Defendant Agri Stats Inc.'s
Motion for Protective Order in the case captioned IN RE BROILER
CHICKEN ANTITRUST LITIGATION, This Document Relates To: All
Actions, Case No. 16 C 8637(N.D. Ill.).

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Agri Stats Inc.'s
Motion for Protective Order as to requests for production of
documents and electronically-stored information (ESI) served by the
End User Consumer Plaintiffs (EUCPs).

The United States' Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ)
embarked on an investigation of Agri Stats. During that
investigation, Agri Stats says it searched for and produced to the
DOJ documents and information like what the EUCPs are requesting.
At issue in Agri Stats's Motion for Protective Order are the
custodial searches it ran during the DOJ investigation. Agri Stats
ran custodial searches for designated custodians and it produced to
the DOJ responsive documents it collected with those searches.

Agri Stats Has Not Made a Threshold Showing that the Information
EUCPs Are Seeking Is Not Reasonably Accessible Because of Undue
Burden or Cost

As Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(B) directs, a court may impose limits on
discovery of ESI if a party shows that it is not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost.

EUCPs contend that Agri Stats's claims of burden and cost are
vastly overstated. The Court tends to agree with EUCPs on this
record. It is not clear what it would cost in either time or money
to review and produce the custodial ESI now being sought by EUCPs
for the entire discovery period set forth in the ESI Protocol or
even for the pre-October 3, 2102 period. It seems that Agri Stats
itself also does not know for sure what it would have to do and how
much it would cost because the parties have not finished that
discussion. Because EUCPs say they are continuing to work with Agri
Stats to reduce what it must do to comply with their discovery
requests, the incremental burden on what Agri Stats now is being
asked to do is not clear.

Agri Stats falls woefully short of satisfying its obligation to
show that the information EUCPs are seeking is not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost.
Even if Agri Stats Had Shown Undue Burden or Cost, EUCPs Have Shown
Good Cause for the Production of the Requested ESI and Agri Stats
Does Not Satisfy the Rule 26(b)(2)(C) Factors
Even if a party makes a threshold showing that the information
sought is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or
cost, a court still may allow the discovery to proceed if the
requesting party shows good cause.

EUCPs Have Shown Good Cause for the Production of the Requested
ESI

The Court recognizes that there likely will be overlap between the
material Agri Stats produced to the DOJ and the information sought
in EUCPs' requests, but that overlap does not justify the broad
protective order sought by Agri Stats. Critical search terms that
the EUCPS want Agri Stats to run were not part of the DOJ's search,
including, according to EUCPs, the words broiler, supply, reduce,
price, inflate, Georgia, Dock, index as well as multiple domain
names for defendants in this case.

Because these terms were not searched during the DOJ investigation,
there is no burden associated with purported duplication at least
to the extent that data is now queried with search terms proposed
by the EUCPs. Moreover, omitting these search terms runs the risk
that information that is very relevant to EUCPs' case but was not
as relevant to the DOJ investigation will be missed.

The Court finds that EUCPs have shown there is good cause for the
discovery they seek. The other Defendants in this case appear to
have accepted, at least for the purposes of discovery, that the
time period set forth in the ESI Protocol is the relevant time
period that governs the search for and production of potentially
responsive documents. EUCPs also represent that other Defendants
have run their proposed search terms. It is more than reasonable
that Agri Stats be required to comply with the same scope and time
frame for discovery.

Agri Stats Does Not Satisfy the Rule 26(b)(2)(C) Factors

Even with a showing of good cause, Rule 26(b)(2)(C) provides that
the discovery still may be limited if: (a) it is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative; (b) it can be obtained from some other
source that is more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive;
(c) the party seeking the discovery has had ample opportunity to
obtain it; or (d) it is not relevant or is otherwise
disproportional to the needs of the case within the meaning of Rule
26(b)(1).

Considering the importance of the issues at stake in this
litigation, EUCPs allege in their Second Consolidated Amended Class
Action Complaint that Agri Stats was a significant participant in a
large antitrust conspiracy to fix the price of Broilers and that it
facilitated the conspiracy by providing the information and tools
that Broiler producers needed to monitor one another and ensure
that they were sticking to their agreement to reduce Broiler supply
and inflate broiler prices. In exchange for these monitoring
services which, EUCPs argue, allowed the Broiler producers to reap
billions of dollars, broiler producers paid Agri Stats at least
$45.8 million.

In addition, this litigation involves a massive amount of commerce
in the United States during the class period. As alleged in EUCPs'
Second Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, the value of
wholesale broilers produced in 2014 was $32.7 billion, and the
market value varied between $21.8 and $20.7 billion from 2008 to
2013. EUCPs' proposed discovery is calibrated to their claims, Agri
Stats is alleged to be an important player in the scheme EUCPs
assert, and it is reasonable to believe that Agri Stats has
information that is relevant and important to EUCPs' claims.

As for the parties' relative access to the information, Agri Stats
has access to all the information from its custodians to prepare
its defenses. Without the production of ESI from custodial searches
performed prior to October 3, 2012, EUCPs potentially will be
deprived of more than three and a half years of discovery from the
early class period notwithstanding that fact that Agri Stats has
agreed to perform targeted searches for documents prior to October
3, 2012. The Court finds that that such a gap in access to and
production of custodial documents would be unduly prejudicial to
EUCPs.

The Court is not persuaded by Agri Stats's burden argument.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that EUCPs have shown good cause
for Agri Stats to comply with the ESI Protocol and to search for
and produce pre-October 3, 2012 custodial documents, and that
production of that information is proportional to the needs of the
case. Therefore, a blanket protective order excusing Agri Stats
from performing any custodial searches prior to October 3, 2102
would not be appropriate.

It Is Not Clear the Parties Have Exhausted their Obligation to Meet
and Confer to Limit the Burden on Agri Stats

This Order addresses only the temporal scope of the custodial
searches that Agri Stats must perform because that is the thrust of
Agri Stats's argument in support of its Motion for Protective
Order. As explained above, the Court concludes that Agri Stats,
like all other Defendants in this case, must search for and produce
relevant documents and ESI from January 1, 2007, through September
2, 2106. However, it is not clear the parties have exhausted their
meet and confer obligations on the issue of EUCPs' revised search
terms or other proposals to reduce the burden on Agri Stats, nor is
it clear that the parties have engaged with the Special Master to
help resolve any issues that may be related to her domain of
electronic discovery.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 26, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybkrgunc from Leagle.com.

Maplevale Farms, Inc., individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Breanna LE Van
Engelen -- breannav@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
pro hac vice, Brian D. Clark -- bdclark@locklaw.com -- Lockridge
Grindal Nauen P.l.l.p., Daniel Warshaw -- dwarshaw@pswlaw.com --
Pearson, Simon & Warshaw, LLP, pro hac vice, Dennis Allen
Lienhardt, Jr. -- dal@miller.law -- The Miller Law Firm, P.C., pro
hac vice, Devon Paul Allard -- dpa@miller.law -- The Miller Law
Firm, P.C., pro hac vice, Elizabeth R. Odette --
erodette@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P., Joseph C.
Kohn -- jkohn@kohnswift.com -- Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C., pro hac
vice, Robert John McLaughlin -- rmclaughlin@hmelegal.com -- Hart
McLaughlin & Eldridge, LLC, Stephen M. Owen --
smowen@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P., pro hac
vice, Steven Alan Hart -- shart@hmelegal.com -- Hart McLaughlin
& Eldridge, LLC, Veronica W. Glaze , Pearson, Simon &
Warshaw LLP, pro hac vice.

Koch Foods, Inc., JCG Foods of Alabama, LLC, JCG Foods of Georgia,
LLC & Koch Meats Co., Inc., Defendants, represented by Stephen
Novack -- snovack@novackmacey.com -- Novack and Macey LLP, Brian E.
Cohen -- bcohen@novackmacey.com -- Novack and Macey LLP,
Christopher S. Moore -- cmoore@novackmacey.com -- Novack and Macey,
LLP, Marie Velinda Lim -- mlim@novackmacey.com -- Novack and Macey
LLP & Stephen J. Siegel -- ssiegel@novackmacey.com -- Novack
and Macey LLP.

Tyson Foods, Inc., Tyson Chicken, Inc., Tyson Breeders, Inc. &
Tyson Poultry, Inc., Defendants, represented by John M. Tanski --
jtanski@axinn.com -- Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider LLP-HTFD, Nicholas
Gaglio -- ngaglio@axinn.com -- Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider LLP,
pro hac vice, Rachel J. Adcox -- radcox@axinn.com -- Axinn, Veltrop
& Harkrider LLP, pro hac vice, Amy Beth Manning --
amanning@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, Christina M. Egan --
cegan@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuire Woods LLP, Daniel K. Oakes --
doakes@axinn.com -- Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider LLP, pro hac vice --
jtaylor@axinn.com -- Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider LLP, pro hac vice &
Kenina J. Lee -- klee@axinn.com -- Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider
LLP, pro hac vice.

KONICA MINOLTA: Faces Randolph Suit in Sacramento, California
-------------------------------------------------------------
An employment-related class action lawsuit has been filed against
Konica Minolta Business Solutions Inc.  The case is captioned as
Robert Randolph, Plaintiff v. Konica Minolta Business Solutions
Inc., and Does 1-100, Defendants, Case No.
34-2018-00237087-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., July 18, 2018).

Konica Minolta Business Solutions, U.S.A., Inc. provides document
management technologies and information technology services. Konica
Minolta Business Solutions, U.S.A., Inc. was formerly known as
Minolta Corporation and changed its name to Konica Minolta Business
Solutions, U.S.A., Inc. in October 2003. The company was founded in
1959 and is based in Ramsey, New Jersey. Konica Minolta Business
Solutions, U.S.A., Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Konica Minolta,
Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by Michael D Singer, Esq.


L3 TECHNOLOGIES: Underpays Mechanics, Thomas Suit Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------
DAVID THOMAS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. L3 TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; L-3 COMMUNICATIONS
CORPORATION; L3 UNIDYNE, INC.; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Case No.
37-2018-00035915-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super., Fresno Cty., July 18,
2018) is an action against the Defendants for failure to pay
minimum wages, overtime, reimburse business expenses, and furnish
accurate wage statements.

Mr. Thomas was employed by the Defendant as mechanic.

L3 Technologies, Inc. provides aerospace systems, communication,
electronic, and sensor systems used on military, homeland security,
and commercial platforms in the United States and internationally.
The company was formerly known as L-3 Communications Holdings, Inc.
and changed its name to L3 Technologies, Inc. in December 2016. L3
Technologies, Inc. was founded in 1997 and is headquartered in New
York, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alex M. Tomasevic, Esq.
          NICHOLAS & TOMASEVIC, LLP
          225 Broadway, 19th Floor
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Tel: (619) 325-0492
          Fax: (619) 325-0496
          E-mail: atomasevic@nicholaslaw.org

               - and –

          Cameron J. Gharabiklou, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF CAMERON J. GHARABIKLOU
          530 B Street, Suite 1530
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Tel: (858) 412-0019
          Fax: (619) 568-3341
          E-mail: Cameron@justice-lawgroup.com


LOUISIANA: Court Stays Discovery in Drug Court Program Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District Louisiana
granted Defendants' Motion to Stay Discovery in the case captioned
TAYLOR CARLISLE, ET AL., SECTION: "H"(1), v. NEWELL NORMAND, ET
AL., Civil Action No. 16-3767 (E.D. La.).

Before the Court are the Motions to Stay Discovery filed by
Patricia Klees and Sheriff Joseph Lopinto, in his official capacity
as Sheriff for the Parish of Jefferson (Sheriff).

The Plaintiffs' proposed class includes those probationers
participating in the Drug Court Program who were sentenced to "flat
time," or who were sentenced to jail time without a hearing or
opportunity to defend, or without a record from which to appeal.
Additionally, the Plaintiffs have a state law claim for legal
malpractice pending against Joseph Merino, and plaintiff Carlisle
has a negligence claim against Joe McNair and McNair & McNair, LLC,
arising out counseling services provided through the Drug Court
Program.

Rule 26(c) provides that the Court may, for good cause, protect a
party from undue burden or expense by issuing an order forbidding
the disclosure or discovery or specifying terms, including time for
the disclosure or discovery.

Officer Klees' Motion to Stay

The Plaintiffs argue that Klees' prescription claim is without
merit because the allegations against Klees in the Second Amending
and Supplementing Complaint relate back to the date of filing of
the original complaint. Plaintiffs do not address Klees' brief
argument in her motion to dismiss that Plaintiffs have failed to
state a claim that would support a class action against her.
Regardless, Plaintiffs do not argue any discovery is necessary to
oppose Klees' prescription defense.

The only discovery proceeding at this time is class certification
discovery, which was ordered by the District Judge. The Plaintiffs
have not explained why the testimony of Klees is necessary to class
certification discovery. At this time, it does not appear the
Plaintiffs are even pressing to proceed with class certification
discovery. The Court finds it would be inefficient to do so now in
light of the pending Motions to Dismiss. Further, to the extent the
District Court determines that limited discovery should be opened
for the purposes of defeating Klees' qualified immunity defense,
the District Court will address this issue in resolving the Motion
to Dismiss.

Accordingly the Court finds that a stay of discovery as to Klees
pending resolution of the Motions to Dismiss is appropriate at this
time.

The Sheriff's Motion to Stay

The Sheriff joins in and adopts the Motion to Stay filed by Klees.
He argues that he is entitled to a stay pending resolution of his
motion to dismiss because he insists that no amount of discovery
can lead to relevant, admissible evidence that can aid Plaintiffs
in prosecuting their claims against the Sheriff. The Sheriff points
out he has been subject to voluminous document discovery.  

The Court finds it appropriate to stay class certification
discovery pending resolution of the Sheriff's Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiffs have not presented any reason why discovery must proceed
now. On the other hand, the discovery that has been requested is
voluminous and if the Sheriff's Motion to Dismiss is successful,
then it will not have been necessary to conduct the discovery.

Further, the Plaintiffs have not established that discovery is
necessary to oppose the Sheriff's alternative no duty argument in
its motion to dismiss. It appears that is a claim that involves
analysis of the applicable statutes.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Order and
Reasons is available at https://tinyurl.com/yaebv9og from
Leagle.com.

Taylor Carlisle, individually and as Representative Member of a
Class & Emile Heron, Plaintiffs, represented by Marie Riccio
Wisner, Law Offices of Marie Riccio Wisner.

Joe McNair, Director of Counseling of the 24th JDC Drug Court
Intensive Probration Program & McNair & McNair, L.L.C., Defendants,
represented by Francis Horatio Brown, III -- fbrown@mcglinchey.com
-- McGlinchey Stafford, PLLC & Marshall Thomas Cox --
mcox@mcglinchey.com -- McGlinchey Stafford, PLLC.

Newell Normand, Sheriff and Administrator of the Jefferson Parish
Correctional Center, Defendant, represented by Daniel Rault Martiny
, Martiny & Associates & Jeffrey David Martiny , Martiny &
Associate.

Patricia Klees, Officer, Defendant, represented by Leonard Louis
Levenson , Leonard L. Levenson & Associates, Christian Wayne Helmke
, Leonard L. Levenson & Associates, Colleen Boyle Gannon , Richard
A. Weigand, APLC & Donna R. Barrios , Leonard L. Levenson &
Associates.

LUNG INSTITUTE: Stem Cell Treatment Suit Remanded to State Court
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Tampa Division, granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand the
case captioned TAMMY RIVERO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LUNG INSTITUTE,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 8:17-cv-3113-T-23MAP (M.D. Fla.).

Tammy Rivero and Howard Bennett each paid the Tampa Lung Institute
for stem cell treatment but without, or so the plaintiffs allege, a
satisfactory result. Rivero sued Lung Institute in state court
under Florida statutory and common law and alleged the deceptive
marketing of an ineffectual medical treatment.

The Court holds that RMS, a non-party, cannot remove the action.
Only the defendant or the defendants can remove an action under 28
U.S.C. Section 1446. A non-party, even one that claims to be a real
party in interest, lacks the authority to institute removal
proceedings.

However, Lung Institute fails in the attempt to retroactively
receive the benefit of RMS's putative but failed removal attempt.
The plaintiffs state correctly that the defendant's support for
removal: is based on removal by a non-party, non-intervenor,
non-participant of this action. RMS's removal was initially
improper. However, Lung Institute continues to rely on the motion
of a non-party, non-intervenor, non-participant. By way of adopting
and joining RMS's opposition to Plaintiff's motion to remand, Lung
Institute is effectively seeking to insert itself as the removing
party.  However, since Lung Institute's 30-day window in which to
remove has long since expired, it cannot now assert that it is
substituting itself for RMS.

Simply stated, Lung Institute is time-barred from removal.

CAFA's discretionary exception

Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(3)(A)-(F), six factors are
considered in deciding whether to decline jurisdiction. No single
factor is dispositive.  

Whether the claims asserted involve matters of national or
interstate interest

RMS owns five Lung Institutes nationwide, but the plaintiffs sue
only the Tampa facility. The plaintiffs argue that Florida has a
strong interest in regulating business within its borders. RMS
asserts that the defendant advertises nationwide and that patients
travel long distances for treatment.  

Whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of the State
in which the action was originally filed or by the laws of other
States

The plaintiffs assert all their claims under Florida law. RMS
argues that foreign law might govern the plaintiffs' common law
claims for breach of fiduciary duty and for conspiracy and that
these claims have not yet undergone a choice of law analysis. The
civil RICO and civil conspiracy claims allege that out-of-state
Lung Institutes and out-of-state individuals conspired with the
Tampa Lung Institute, but RMS argues that the plaintiffs offer no
analysis of why the out-of-state co-conspirators are subject to
Florida law.  

Whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to
avoid Federal jurisdiction

RMS argues (1) that the plaintiffs admit to having crafted the
third amended complaint to avoid federal jurisdiction and (2) that,
because Plaintiffs have artificially restricted a natural proposed
class, this weighs in favor of retaining federal jurisdiction. RMS
suggests (1) that a natural proposed class would be the patients of
all five Lung Institutes because the treatments and practices about
which Plaintiffs complain are shared by all five Lung Institutes
and (2) that by restricting the class to only patients of one of
the Lung Institutes, and by omitting federal claims that are
commonly filed in false advertising cases (such as a Lanham Act
claim), Plaintiffs have done what Congress sought to avoid
gerrymander a single state class.

Whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus
with the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants

RMS asserts that other states have a significant interest in this
litigation. 5.50% of Tampa Lung Institute's patients are citizens
of Texas and 5.04% of Tampa Lung Institute's patients are citizens
of Georgia. Citing a report from the United States Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, RMS asserts that because a state other than
Florida contains over 5% of putative class members, the putative
class members are widely dispersed thus both Texas and Georgia have
a strong interest in the action, which favors the district court's
adjudicating this action. But a report of the Committee lacks
binding authority on a federal court.  

Whether the number of citizens of the State in which the action was
originally filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate
is substantially larger than the number of citizens from any other
State, and the citizenship of the other members of the proposed
class is dispersed among a substantial number of States

As a representative sample, of the thirty-three Plaintiffs who have
retained the [plaintiffs' lawyer], other than the nineteen Florida
citizens: three are citizens of MI, two PA, two CA, and one of each
from WI, NH, NJ, VA, GA, AZ, and NC.

Whether, during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that
class action, 1 or more other class actions asserting the same or
similar claims on behalf of the same or other persons have been
filed

During the three-years before the plaintiffs sued, no class actions
were filed against the Tampa Lung Institute or any of her sister
entities.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 23, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y82ccqk3 from Leagle.com.

Tammy Rivero, Individidually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Howard Bennett, Individidually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Ben Andrew
Vinson, Jr. -- ben@vinsonlawoffice.com -- Vinson Law LLC.

Lung Institute, LLC, Defendant, represented by Megan R. Stelljes --
ben@vinsonlawoffice.com -- Foley & Lardner, LLP, Naikang Tsao --
ntsao@foley.com -- Foley & Lardner LLP, Nicholas E. Williams --
nwilliams@foley.com -- Foley & Lardner, LLP & Louis Xavier Amato --
louisa@louamato.com -- Louis X. Amato, PA.

LUXOTTICA RETAIL: Calif. Court Dismisses Unfair Competition Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
SANDRA SEEGERT, Plaintiff, v. LUXOTTICA RETAIL NORTH AMERICA, INC.;
and LUXOTTICA GROUP S.P.A., Defendants, Case No. 17cv1372
JM(BLM)(S.D. Cal.).

Luxottica, an Italian corporation, is alleged to be the largest
eyewear company in the world, operating retail brands such as
LensCrafters and Pearle Vision. LensCrafters operates 130 stores in
California and over 880 stores nationwide. Defendants market
prescription lenses and eyewear, and provide vision care services
such as eye exams and customized fittings.

The SAC, filed on March 15, 2018, alleges three causes of action
for violation of California's (1) Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"),
Bus & Prof Section 17200 et seq., (2) False Advertising Law
("FAL"), Bus & Prof Section 17500 et seq., and (3) Consumer Legal
Remedies Act ("CLRA"), Civ Code §1750 et seq. The Plaintiff
asserts jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act
("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2), and brings this action on behalf
of herself and others similarly situated and defined as:

     All persons who, within the State of California, from July 5,
2013 through the present (the Class Period), purchased lenses
offered at the discount promotion __% Off Lenses with Frame
Purchase at a Lens Crafters retail store and who have not received
a refund or credit for their purchase(s).

Defendants Luxottica Retail North America Inc., dba LensCrafters
and Luxotica Group S.P.A., (LensCrafters), move to dismiss the
Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim.  

Under Rule 9(b), claims sounding in fraud, such as the Plaintiff's
claims for violation of the UCL, FAL, and CLRA, must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting the fraud. Rule 9(b)
is satisfied by allegations of the time, place, and nature of the
alleged fraudulent statements.

The Plaintiff's central allegation is that the promotion or
advertisement, 40% Off Lenses With Frame Purchase, is deceptive.
The Plaintiff identifies no other allegedly deceptive
characteristic of the advertisement. In constructing its deception
argument, the Plaintiff alleges that the lenses were never offered
at full price and never sold at the original price either with or
without the purchase of eyeglass frames and, therefore, the
promotion is materially deceptive.

In large part, the Plaintiff argues that these conclusory
allegations are sufficient under Rule 9(b) to describe the nature
of the consumer fraud with particularity because the Plaintiff's
counsel conducted a pre-suit investigation.

In the spring of 2015, the Plaintiff's counsel launched an
investigation into the pricing practices of dozens of retail stores
in San Diego County that were engaged in allegedly improper
sale-discounting policies.  The investigation focused on
advertisers who utilized false regular prices and the investigators
recorded the prices of the corresponding discounts on products
offered for sale. The Plaintiff's counsel investigated five San
Diego LensCrafters retail stores and concluded that the lenses were
never sold at the regular undiscounted price either with ours
without the purchase of a pair of eyeglass frames. Furthermore, the
Plaintiff's Counsel's investigation confirmed that Lens Crafters'
prescription lenses were priced with false discounts from illusory
regular or reference prices.

Given the investigation by the Plaintiff's counsel at five
different San Diego LensCrafter's locations, it is virtually
inconceivable that the investigators did not attempt to purchase,
or otherwise cause to be purchased, prescription lenses, without
also purchasing eyeglass frames, or to take other affirmative steps
to investigate the central claim. While the parties have likely
expended substantial resources to date, conspicuously absent from
the allegations in the SAC is any reference to a purchase or an
attempted purchase of comparable lenses, without frames. Such a
straight-forward effort would not have required the commencement of
formal discovery, as asserted by Plaintiff, and would provide
particular facts to support or negate Plaintiff's central claim
that LensCrafters never sells prescription lenses at the original
price.

As a predicate to filing a claim, one would logically assume that
the Plaintiff's investigators conducted a thorough investigation
and obtained specific information to support (or negate) the
Plaintiff's conclusory claims. Whatever the nature and extent of
the Plaintiff's undisclosed investigation, the SAC fairs no better
than the First Amended Complaint in stating claims for violation of
the UCL, FAL, and CLRA.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yd2luqqt from Leagle.com.

Sandra Seegert, Plaintiff, represented by Todd D. Carpenter --
tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela &
Carpenter, LLP.

LensCrafters, Inc., an Ohio corporation, Luxottica Retail North
America, Inc., an Ohio corporation & Luxottica Group, S.P.A., an
Italian corporation, Defendants, represented by Stephanie A.
Sheridan -- ssheridan@steptoe.com -- Steptoe & Johnson LLP.

MAGIC LAUNDRY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Juarez Suit Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------
MARIA D. JUAREZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MAGIC LAUNDRY SERVICES, INC.; PARTNERS RISK
SPECIALISTS, INC.; PARTNERS RISK SOLUTIONS, LLC; BRIDGE GROUP; and
DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No. BC713767 (Cal. Super., Los
Angeles Cty., June 18, 2018) is an action against the Defendants
for unpaid regular hours, overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for
missed meal and rest periods.

Ms. Juarez was employed by the Defendants as hourly, non-exempt
employee.

Magic Laundry Services, Inc. is a California corporation doing
business in Los Angeles, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mehrdad Bokhour, Esq.
          BOKHOUR LAW GROUP, P.C.
          1901 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 450
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 975-1493
          Facsimile: (310) 300-1705

               - and –

          Jonathan Melmed, Esq.
          MELMED LAW GROUP P.C.
          1180 South Beverly Drive, Suite 610
          Los Angeles, CA 90035
          Telephone: (310) 824-3828
          Facsimile: (310) 862-6851


MANUFACTURERS AND TRADERS: D. Franklin Suit Remains in Dist. Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia, Bluefield, denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand the case
captioned DARLENNA FRANKLIN and CURTIS FRANKLIN, Plaintiffs, v.
MANUFACTURERS AND TRADERS TRUST COMPANY, d/b/a/ M&T BANK,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 1:18-00587(S.D.W.V.).

Plaintiffs, Darlenna and Curtis Franklin, became delinquent on
their mortgage sometime. The Plaintiffs retained an attorney who
notified the defendant, Manufacturers & Traders Trust Company (M&T
Bank), of his representation by letter. THe Defendant acknowledged
receipt of this letter.  Thereafter, M&T Bank allegedly continued
contacting plaintiffs by telephone and mail.  THe Plaintiffs filed
their complaint in Mercer County Circuit Court alleging these
communications violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and
Protection Act (WVCCPA), West Virginia Computer Crime and Abuse
Act, and constituted an invasion of privacy.  M&T Bank filed a
notice of removal to this court, alleging that it became aware that
removal was appropriate under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(CAFA).

The court must first determine what standard M&T Bank is held to in
ascertaining that the case is removable under 28 U.S.C. Section
1446(b)(3).  THe Plaintiffs claim that their June 2016 Amended
Complaint provided M&T Bank with a clue that removal was
appropriate, triggering the removal period and requiring M&T Bank
to engage in due diligence as to the numerosity and amount in
controversy thresholds.

In analyzing Section 1446, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in Lovern v. Gen. Motors Corp., 121 F.3d 160,
162 (4th Cir. 1997), stated: "The Court concludes only where an
initial pleading reveals a ground for removal will the defendant be
bound to file a notice of removal within 30 days. Where, however,
such details are obscured or omitted, or indeed misstated, that
circumstance makes the case stated by the initial pleading not
removable, and the defendant will have 30 days from the revelation
of grounds for removal in an amended pleading, motion, order, or
other paper to file its notice of removal."

The Court will not require courts to inquire into the subjective
knowledge of the defendant, an inquiry that could degenerate into a
mini-trial regarding who knew what and when. Rather, we will allow
the court to rely on the face of the initial pleading and on the
documents exchanged in the case by the parties to determine when
the defendant had notice of the grounds for removal, requiring that
those grounds be apparent within the four corners of the initial
pleading or subsequent paper.

While Lovern was decided prior to CAFA's enactment, every circuit
to have addressed this issue has likewise adopted some form of a
bright-line rule that limits the court's inquiry to the
clock-triggering pleading or other paper' in order to determine
removability. Instead, these courts have required the plaintiff to
provide a sufficiently detailed and unequivocal statement from
which the defendant may unambiguously ascertain that the CAFA
jurisdictional requirements have been satisfied.

Therefore, under this bright-line rule, a defendant is not required
to search its own business records or 'perform an independent
investigation into a plaintiff's indeterminate allegations to
determine removability.

After reviewing the Amended Complaint, the court determines that it
did not give M&T Bank adequate notice of grounds for removal under
CAFA. The Amended Complaint generally requests actual, statutory,
compensatory, and punitive damages along with costs and attorney's
fees. The only specific damages apparent within the four corners"
of the Amended Complaint are the $5,519.02 bill allegedly owed by
Darlenna and Curtis Franklin. This does not overcome CAFA's
$5,000,000 threshold, and M&T Bank is not required to deduce the
damages in controversy for the proposed class from this bill alone.


Moreover, with regard to CAFA's numerosity requirement, the Amended
Complaint offers no concrete size of the class, but only a blanket
assertion that joinder would be impractical. Because the Amended
Complaint fails to affirmatively establish that the damages
requested and the class size are sufficient for federal
jurisdiction under CAFA, the plaintiffs would require M&T Bank to
use its own efforts to ascertain if the Amended Complaint met the
thresholds of CAFA, in stark contrast with Lovern.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycpx6c7l from
Leagle.com.

Darlenna Franklin & Curtis Franklin, Plaintiffs, represented by
Christopher B. Frost -- cfrost@hamiltonburgess.com -- HAMILTON
BURGESS YOUNG & POLLARD, Jed Robert Nolan , MOUNTAIN STATE JUSTICE,
INC., Jonathan R. Marshall -- jmarshall@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY
& GLASSER, Patricia M. Kipnis -- pkipnis@baileyglasser.com --
BAILEY & GLASSER, Ralph C. Young , HAMILTON BURGESS YOUNG & POLLARD
& Steven R. Broadwater, Jr. , HAMILTON BURGESS YOUNG & POLLARD.

Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company, doing business as M&T
Bank, Defendant, represented by Justin J. Kontul --
jkontul@reedsmith.com -- REED SMITH, Richard David Owen --
rdo@goodwingoodwin.com -- GOODWIN & GOODWIN & Roy W. Arnold --
rarnold@reedsmith.com -- REED SMITH, pro hac vice.

MATSUYA QUALITY: Summary Judgment Bid in FLSA Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, XIN WEI LIU, Plaintiff, v. MATSUYA QUALITY JAPANESE
INC., d/b/a Matsuya Quality Japanese Eats, MATSUYA OF GREAT NECK,
INC., d/b/a Matsuya, BERNARD BENLEVI Defendants, Case No.
16-cv-3624 (ERK)(VMS)(E.D. N.Y.), Judge Edward R. Korman of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the
Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Liu formerly worked at a restaurant and caterer known as Matsuya.
In June 2013, Benlevi hired Liu as a sushi chef.  Liu worked at
Matsuya from June 2013 until he quit in September 2015.  Liu's job
interview, they orally agreed to certain terms of employment, but
each side characterizes the agreement differently.  According to
Benlevi, Liu was offered a minimum guarantee of $750 per week, with
a base rate of $10 per hour and $15 for overtime.  He also offered
Liu an additional $50 bonus for each party he worked.  But
according to Liu, the agreement was slightly different: he
testified that he was simply offered $750 for 40 hours of weekly
work, with no explicit base hourly rate.

The parties have produced two sets of evidence that bear directly
on Liu's total hours and compensation: the "notebook" and the
compensation schedules.  The notebook reveals Liu's total weekly
hours and compensation for most weeks from April 14, 2014, through
Sept. 13, 2015.  It shows that, during that period, Liu nearly
always worked more than 40 hours a week, averaging roughly 59.

Moreover, it apparently reveals the following compensation
arrangement: Liu would nearly always receive at least $800 per
week.  If Liu worked more than 55 hours, he would be paid an
additional $15 per hour for hours 55 through 60, and then another
$20 per hour for every hour above 60.  Additionally, Liu would
receive a $50 bonus for each party he worked, as well as additional
compensation for any hours worked before 8 a.m.  Liu has also
produced a sheet, seemingly from the notebook, that explicitly
outlines this arrangement.

According to the Defendants, Benlevi would give Liu a weekly
compensation schedule shortly after making each payment.  The
compensation schedule, however, calculates the hours differently.
The compensation schedule yields the same bottom line as in the
notebook, but, as should be evident, the accounting method differs
substantially and suggests a different compensation arrangement
from the one apparent in the notebook.

After quitting on Sept. 20, 2015, Liu filed a complaint against
Benlevi with the New York State Department of Labor ("DOL"),
alleging failure to pay overtime, along with other violations of
state labor laws.  After investigating Matsuya, the DOL found a
minimum wage/overtime underpayment with respect to both Liu and
another employee.  Moreover, it concluded that Benlevi had failed
to keep adequate records, in violation of New York Labor Law
Section 661, and that he had failed to furnish pay statements to
employees, in violation of Part 146-2.3 of the Hospitality Industry
Wage Order.  The DOL determined that Benlevi owed Liu $9,380.25 in
unpaid wages, plus $2,345.06 in "liquidated damages."  It also
found that he owed the other employee a total of $53,047.50.

In June 2016, Liu initiated the present action -- stylized as a
collective and class action -- alleging: (1) that the Defendants
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")'s overtime pay
requirements; (2) that the Defendants violated the  New York Labor
Law ("NYLL")'s overtime and spread of hours requirements; (3) that
they failed to provide notices and statements as required by NYLL
Section 195(1); and (4) that the Defendants failed to provide
detailed pay stubs as required by NYLL Section 195(3).  Liu later
amended his complaint, dropping the class and collective action
claims, but also adding as a Defendant Matsuya of Great -- another
corporate entity that also allegedly owned and operated the
restaurant.

In response, the Defendants counterclaimed that Liu was liable
under New York's "faithless employee doctrine," which obligates
employees to exercise the utmost good faith and loyalty in the
performance of their duties.  They claimed that Liu violated this
duty by (1) willfully misrepresenting his hours and then demanding
and receiving compensation for hours he never worked; (2) seizing
two of the restaurant's journals in which his working hours and
other information were recorded; and (3) filing false and
misleading claims with the DOL.

After engaging in discovery, the Defendants have now moved for
summary judgment on all four causes of action, and on their
counterclaim as to liability only.  Liu has not cross moved for
summary judgment.

Judge Korman denied the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
He finds that a reasonable jury could find that Liu did not intend
and understand that his weekly salary would include overtime
premiums.  And if so, Liu's compensation arrangement violated the
FLSA and NYLL.  Summary judgment for the Defendants is therefore
unwarranted.

A reasonable jury could also find that Benlevi agreed to treat
those breaks as hours worked for the purposes of calculating
overtime.  As demonstrated by the notebook, Benlevi paid Liu
overtime rates for hours worked above 55 a week.  That rate may not
have been sufficient under the FLSA.  But Benlevi still had an
overtime payment scheme for Liu.  And in applying that scheme,
Benlevi counted all the reported hours, even though he clearly knew
some were spent on a break.  When these facts are construed in the
light most favorable to Liu, a reasonable jury could find that
Benlevi agreed to count Liu's breaks as hours worked for the
purposes of determining overtime.  Accordingly, the Judge finds
that Liu's total hours included breaks does not entitle the
Defendants to summary judgment.

He also finds that the Defendants' last-ditch fluctuating workweek
argument is unavailing.  The Defendants' fluctuating workweek
argument is confusing given that it contradicts their version of
the facts.  Summary judgment is inappropriate on the Plaintiff's
FLSA and NYLL overtime claims.

Liu alleges that the defendants failed to make such payments.  The
Defendants, in seeking summary judgment on this claim, point to
their compensation schedules, which provide that "spread hrs" were
added for each day Liu worked more than 10 hours.  But the problem
is that the notebook suggests that Liu did not receive any
spread-of-hours pay.  Given these contradictory documents, the
Judge holds summary judgment is inappropriate.

Finally, because conflicting evidence exists as to whether Liu
received the required wage statements, summary judgment is
inappropriate on Liu's NYLL wage-notice claims as well.

As for the Defendants' counterclaims, the Judge finds that Liu has
put forth enough evidence for a jury to conclude that his
accusations have merit.  Indeed, after conducting its own
investigation, the DOL actually found that Liu's claims were
legitimate.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/VRoPL4 from Leagle.com.

Xin Wei Liu, individually and on behalf of all other employees
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Keli Liu --
kliu@hanglaw.com -- Hang & Associates, PLLC, Paul Mendez --
pmendez@hanglaw.com -- Hang and Associates, PLLC, Phillip Hakyeon
Kim -- pkim@hanglaw.com -- Hang & Associates, PLLC & Jian Hang --
jhang@hanglaw.com -- Hang & Associates, PLLC.

Matsuya Quality Japanese Inc., doing business as, Bernard Benlevi &
MATSUYA OF GREAT NECK, INC. d/b/a Matsuya, Defendants, represented
by Kenneth B. Schwartz -- SchwartzEsq@aol.com -- Schwartz Law Group
PC.

Bernard Benlevi, Matsuya Quality Japanese Inc. & MATSUYA OF GREAT
NECK, INC. d/b/a Matsuya, Counter Claimants, represented by Kenneth
B. Schwartz, Schwartz Law Group PC.

Xin Wei Liu, individually and on behalf of all other employees
similarly situated, Counter Defendant, represented by Keli Liu,
Hang & Associates, PLLC, Jian Hang, Hang & Associates, PLLC &
Phillip Hakyeon Kim, Hang & Associates, PLLC.

MATTHEWS DINER: Uribe Suit Moved to District of New Jersey
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Matthews Diner Inc.
The case is captioned as ROSALIO URIBE ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, the Plaintiff, v. MATTHEWS DINER INC.,
D/B/A MATTHEWS DINER AND PANCAKE HOUSE; and SAM MATTHEWS, the
Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-12545 (D.N.J., Aug. 8, 2018).

Matthews Diner is in restaurant business.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


MCDONALD'S: Gave Away $15MM to Customers Following Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------
Kate Taylor, writing for Business Insider, reports that fond
memories of McDonald's Monopoly giveaway may have soured with the
news that the game was rigged.

However, many customers may not have realized they missed out on
another chance to be a millionaire in the aftermath of the scam.

The story of how former police officer Jerry Jacobson masterminded
a scheme to defraud McDonald's out of more than $24 million through
its Monopoly promotion has been making the rounds after The Daily
Beast ran an in-depth report on the incident.

Launched in 1987, McDonald's Monopoly game offered customers the
chance to win up to $1 million if they collected the right pieces.
Jacobson reportedly worked at the company that printed the game
pieces and came up with a scheme in which he would provide people
with the winning Monopoly pieces in exchange for a cut of the
money.

Mr. Jacobson's network won almost every prize in the Monopoly game
for 12 years, until the scheme began to fall apart after the FBI
received a tip in 2000. In 2001, more than 50 people were convicted
of mail fraud and conspiracy in connection with the Monopoly
scheme.

McDonald's was not implicated in the scheme, but it pledged it
would hold a new giveaway to return money claimed by
Mr. Jacobson's network back to customers who had tried to win the
Monopoly giveaway fair and square. Two weeks after the attorney
general revealed the game had been rigged, the chain gave away $10
million to 55 random customers.

However, the $10 million wasn't enough. As part of the settlement
for a class-action lawsuit against the chain, related to the
Monopoly scam, McDonald's agreed to give away another $15 million
to random customers -- $1 million per winner.

"We made a commitment to return this money to our customers that
should have been part of the prize pools" Douglas Freeland, then
the US marketing director for McDonald's, told the New York Times
in 2004. "With the second giveaway, we will have done that."

In March 2004, the chain quietly awarded 15 random customers $1
million each.

There were no Monopoly pieces and minimal marketing, as two
customers had previously sued the chain arguing that promoting the
giveaway would drive sales and negate its purpose. Instead, the
winner was determined by picking a random time of day at a random
restaurant, and awarding whoever walked in the door at that moment
$1 million.

"I didn't know what was going on," one winner named Erika Mendez
told The Oklahoman at the time. "I completely forgot I was in there
for food. They finally had to ask me, 'So what do you want?' I
didn't take it too seriously. I thought, 'There has to be a catch
to this.'"[GN]

MDL 2545: Court Denies Certification of Nation-wide Class of TPPs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned IN RE: TESTOSTERONE REPLACEMENT
THERAPY PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. This document relates to:
MEDICAL MUTUAL OF OHIO, Plaintiff, v. ABBVIE INC., et al.,
Defendants, MDL No. 2545(N.D. Ill.).

Medical Mutual of Ohio (MMO) has moved to certify a nationwide
class of TPPs and an Ohio state sub-class of TPPs.

In this MDL proceeding, thousands of individual plaintiffs have
brought personal injury lawsuits against defendants, who are
manufacturers, promoters, and sellers of testosterone replacement
therapy (TRT) drugs. The individual plaintiffs allege that
defendants' TRT drugs caused them to suffer serious cardiovascular
and venous thromboembolic injuries.

Class Certification

To be certified, a proposed class must satisfy all four
requirements of Rule 23(a):"(1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.

MMO requests certification of the proposed class under Rule
23(b)(3), which requires that the questions of law or fact common
to class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.

Proposed class definitions

MMO defines its proposed nationwide and Ohio state sub-classes as
follows and contends that putative class members number in the
thousands:

Nationwide Class

All third-party payors (TPPs) in the United States and its
territories from January 1, 2000 through January 31, 2014, that
have (1) covered the cost of one or more of Defendants' TRT drug
products through insurance or employee benefit programs, and (2)
included one or more of Defendants' TRT drug products on a
formulary. TPPs include insurance companies, healthcare benefit
plans, health maintenance organizations, union health and welfare
plans, self-funded employer health and welfare plans, and employee
or retiree health plans.

Excluded from the class are:

   a. The Defendants and their officers, directors, employees,
predecessors-in-interest, successors-in-interest, assignees,
affiliates and subsidiaries;

   b. All governmental entities, except for government-funded
employee, retiree and Medicare Part D plans provided through
private insurance companies;

   c. All pharmaceutical wholesalers or distributors that purchased
one or more of the Defendants' TRT drug products for purposes of
resale; and

   d. Pharmacy Benefit Managers.

Ohio State Sub-ClassAll third-party payors (TPPs) in Ohio from
January 1, 2000 through January 31, 2014, that have (1) covered the
cost of one or more of Defendants' TRT drug products through
insurance or employee benefit programs, and (2) included one or
more of Defendants' TRT drug products on a formulary. TPPs include
insurance companies, healthcare benefit plans, health maintenance
organizations, union health and welfare plans, self-funded employer
health and welfare plans, and employee or retiree health plans.

Excluded from the class are:

   a. The Defendants and their officers, directors, employees,
predecessors-in-interest, successors-in-interest, assignees,
affiliates and subsidiaries;

   b. All governmental entities, except for government-funded
employee, retiree and Medicare Part D plans provided through
private insurance companies;

   c. All pharmaceutical wholesalers or distributors that purchased
one or more of the Defendants' TRT drug products for purposes of
resale; and

   d. Pharmacy Benefit Managers.

Adequacy of representation

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) requires a showing that
the representative part will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class. Adequacy of representation is composed of
two parts: the adequacy of the named plaintiff's counsel, and the
adequacy of representation provided in protecting the different,
separate, and distinct interest of the class members.

The Defendants, however, argue that MMO is an inadequate class
representative because it is vulnerable to several individualized
defenses. The Defendants contend that MMO is an atypical class
representative for the same reasons.

The Court agrees with the defendants that MMO is particularly
vulnerable to defenses regarding its claims of reliance and injury.
For these reasons, MMO cannot adequately represent the class.

First, MMO did not implement a prior authorization requirement for
topical TRTs until nearly four years after it alleges it first
received notice of defendants' alleged fraud. More specifically,
despite alleging that the FDA's January 2014 DSC triggered such
notice; despite proffering an expert opinion stating the same; and
despite filing this lawsuit in November 2014, MMO did not approve a
prior authorization requirement for the TRT drugs at issue until
July 2016 and did not implement the requirement until late 2017.

Second, the Court doubts MMO's adequacy as a class representative
in light of Dr. Giaquinta's opinions and the testimony of MMO's
Vice President of Pharmacy, Dr. Canaday, that MMO's formulary and
utilization management practices did not comport with industry
standards.

The Court concludes that the evidence of MMO's unconventional
pharmacy management practices could hinder its ability to prove
crucial elements of its case such as receipt of and reliance on
defendants' alleged misrepresentations.

The Court concludes that MMO is an inadequate class representative
and on that basis denies MMO's motion for class certification.

Predominance

The Court denies MMO's motion for class certification for the
independent reason that questions of law or fact common to class
members will not predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members.

Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement calls upon courts to give
careful scrutiny to the relation between common and individual
questions in a case. It asks whether the common,
aggregation-enabling, issues in the case are more prevalent or
important than the non-common, aggregation-defeating, individual
issues. The predominance requirement is met when `common questions
represent a significant aspect of a case and can be resolved for
all members of a class in a single adjudication.

MMO contends that common evidence can be used to prove nearly every
issue in this case. Defendants argue that there are no common'
questions central to each TPP's claim as to any Defendant. After
carefully reviewing the evidence, the Court concludes that
individual issues will predominate over common ones.

The Court denies MMO's motion for class certification.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 26, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycbv7f8n from
Leagle.com.

In Re: Testosterone Replacement Therapy Products Liability
Litigation, In Re, represented by Norman E. Siegel --
siegel@stuevesiegel.com -- Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP.

Kenneth Aurecchia & Stephen Benn, Plaintiffs, represented by
Benedict P. Morelli, Morelli Alters Ratner LLP, pro hac vice, David
Stuart Ratner -- david@davidratnerlawfirm.com -- David Ratner Law
Firm, pro hac vice, David T. Sirotkin , Morelli Alters Ratner LLP,
pro hac vice & Trent B. Miracle -- tmiracle@simmonsfirm.com --
Simmons Hanly Conroy.

Stephen Marino, Plaintiff, represented by Benedict P. Morelli,
Morelli Alters Ratner LLP, pro hac vice, Brendan A. Smith, Simmons
Hanly Conroy, David Stuart Ratner, David Ratner Law Firm, pro hac
vice, David T. Sirotkin, Morelli Alters Ratner LLP, pro hac vice,
Peter J. Flowers, Meyers & Flowers, LLC & Trent B. Miracle, Simmons
Hanly Conroy.

Steven Myers, Plaintiff, represented by Benedict P. Morelli,
Morelli Alters Ratner LLP, pro hac vice, Brendan A. Smith, Simmons
Hanly Conroy, David Stuart Ratner, David Ratner Law Firm, pro hac
vice, David T. Sirotkin, Morelli Alters Ratner LLP, pro hac vice &
Trent B. Miracle, Simmons Hanly Conroy.

Eli Lilly and Company, Defendant, represented by Janet H. Kwuon --
jkwuon@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith Llp, David Edward Stanley --
dstanley@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP, Jennifer Lynn Saulino --
jsaulino@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP, Margaret Grignon --
MGRIGNON@GRIGNONLAWFIRM.COM -- Reed Smith, Michael X. Imbroscio --
mimbroscio@cov.com -- Covington & Burling, LLP & Timothy Robert
Carwinski -- tcarwinski@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP.

Abbott Laboratories, Inc., Defendant, represented by David M.
Bernick -- dbernick@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton
& Garrison LLP, Hope S. Freiwald -- hope.freiwald@dechert.com --
Dechert LLP, Christopher Boisvert -- chip.boisvert@dechert.com --
Dechert LLP, Christopher S. Burrichter --
christopher.burrichter@dechert.com -- Dechert LLP,
Friedrich-wilhelm W. Sachse -- Dechert Llp, Katherine Unger Davis,
Dechert LLP, pro hac vice, Michelle H. Yeary --
michelle.yeary@dechert.com -- Dechert Llp, pro hac vice, Nathan E.
Hoffman -- nathan.hoffman@dechert.com -- Dechert LLP & Thomas
Joseph Dammrich, II -- tdammrich@shb.com -- Shook, Hardy & Bacon
LLP.

Lilly USA, Inc. & Lily USA, LLC, Defendants, represented by David
Edward Stanley , Reed Smith LLP.

MENTOR CORP: Court Allows Amendment in Urbieta Couple's Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
overruled Defendants' Objection of Order Granting Plaintiffs'
Motion to Alter/Amend/Supplement Pleadings in the case captioned
Graciela Urbieta and Mateo Urbieta, Plaintiffs, v. Mentor
Corporation and Mentor Worldwide LLC, Defendants. Civil No. 13-1927
ADM/LIB. (D. Minn.)

This matter is before the United States District Judge for a ruling
on Defendants' Objection to Magistrate Judge's Order granting
Plaintiffs Graciela Urbieta and Mateo Urbieta's (Urbietas) Motion
to Alter/Amend/Supplement Pleadings.

The Urbietas are members of a group of plaintiffs who have filed
cases against Mentor based upon Mentor's design, manufacture, and
sale of a transobturator vaginal sling device (ObTape) used for
treating urinary incontinence. The Urbietas allege that the ObTape
was defective and caused serious and permanent bodily injuries,
including erosion of the ObTape medical device through Graciela
Urbieta's internal bodily tissues, chronic infections, pain,
exacerbation of  urinary incontinence, and the need for multiple
additional surgical procedures and medical treatment as well as the
need for extensive future medical care.

Mentor's Objection

Mentor argues that the Punitive Damages Order is contrary to law
because it fails to apply Minnesota law. According to Mentor, Judge
Rau's misapplication of Shady Grove lead to the erroneous
conclusion that Rule 15 governs the motion to amend.

Shady Grove

In Shady Grove, the Supreme Court addressed whether Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 governing class actions conflicted with a New
York state law that precludes class action suits seeking penalties
or statutory minimum damages. The plaintiff brought a putative
class action in federal court on diversity grounds, seeking to
collect unpaid statutory interest under a New York state law. Under
New York law, statutory interest is a penalty.  

Therefore, the plaintiff's case would have been barred by Section
901 had it been brought in state court. The case was dismissed by
the district court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
Second Circuit affirmed, holding that Rule 23 and § 901 did not
conflict, and that Section 901 was substantive and must therefore
be applied by federal courts sitting in diversity.  

In a fragmented 4-1-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed. Justice
Scalia delivered the opinion of the court with respect to Parts I
and II-A. In Part II-A, the court reiterated the familiar two-step
framework that applies when a federal rule and a state law both
seemingly govern. The first step is determining whether the federal
rule directly conflicts with the state law. A direct conflict
exists if the federal rule answers the question in dispute. If it
does, the federal rule applies unless it exceeds statutory
authorization or Congress's rulemaking power.

The Punitive Damages Order's Application of Shady Grove

Under Shady Grove and predecessor cases, Judge Rau viewed the first
step of the analysis as whether Rule 15 answers the question of
whether Plaintiffs may amend their complaints to seek punitive
damages. Judge Rau determined the answer to be yes because Rule 15
permits amending a complaint when justice so requires. In contrast,
Minn. Stat. Section 549.191 requires affidavits showing the factual
basis for the claim, which requires a court to exercise its
gate0keeping function by examining submissions outside the
pleading.  If prima facie evidence supports the motion, it shall be
granted.

The when justice so requires standard of Rule 15 does not require
evidentiary proof. As Judge Rau explained, under Rule 15 an
amendment shall be permitted so long as the amended complaint is
not futile, meaning it can survive a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6).  In assessing the sufficiency of a pleading in the
context of Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court is generally prohibited
from considering matters outside the pleadings.

Accordingly, Judge Rau determined that Rule 15 affirmatively
answers the question of whether the amended pleading should be
permitted.

The Merits of Mentor's Objection

Mentor argues that Justice Stevens concurring opinion in Shady
Grove established a middle, narrower holding and it therefore
controls under Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1977).
According to Mentor, Judge Rau's failure to adhere to Justice
Stevens' framework resulted in a faulty analysis that supports an
erroneous conclusion.

First, Mentor contends that Judge Rau erred by not applying any of
Justice Stevens' concurrence when assessing whether Rule 15 answers
the question in dispute. Mentor argues that Judge Rau improperly
truncated step one" by failing to consider whether Rule 15 can
operate alongside Minn. Stat. Section 519.191, because a federal
rule, like any federal law, must be interpreted in light of many
different considerations, including sensitivity to important state
interests and regulatory policies. Mentor asserts that Judge Rau
failed to determine whether Rule 15 can operate in tandem with the
Minnesota law.

Mentor's argument is unpersuasive. The linchpin of Mentor's
position is that Justice Stevens' concurring opinion controls
pursuant to Marks. Under Marks, when a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments
on the narrowest grounds.

In Shady Grove, however, Justice Stevens agreed with the portion of
Justice Scalia's opinion that set forth the analysis for step one,
which was derived from Supreme Court cases that remain good law. In
this part of his opinion, Justice Scalia was writing for a five
justice majority that included Justice Stevens. Therefore, some
courts view Justice Scalia's opinion with respect to step one of
the analysis as controlling. Although other courts have reached the
opposite conclusion, Judge Rau's decision to rely upon Justice
Scalia's opinion for this step is not clearly erroneous or contrary
to law.

The Punitive Damages Order is not clearly erroneous or contrary to
law.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y89d8l3l from
Leagle.com.

Graciela Urbieta & Mateo Urbieta, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel
J. Thornburgh , Aylstock, Witkin, Kreis & Overholtz, PLLC, Douglass
A. Kreis , Aylstock, Witkin, Kreis & Overholtz, PLLC, pro hac vice,
Edward F. Blizzard , Blizzard & Nabers, LLP, pro hac vice,
Katherine Lindsey Cornell , Blizzard Law, PLLC & Yvonne M. Flaherty
-- ymflaherty@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP.

Mentor Worldwide LLC, Defendant, represented by Dustin Bradley
Rawlin, I -- dustin.rawlin@tuckerellis.com -- Tucker Ellis LLP, pro
hac vice, Jan R. McLean Bernier , Nilan Johnson Lewis PA, John Q.
Lewis -- john.lewis@tuckerellis.com -- Tucker Ellis LLP, pro hac
vice & Tracy J. Van Steenburgh , Nilan Johnson Lewis PA.

MERCANTILE ADJUSTMENT: Faces Goodman Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mercantile Adjustment
Bureau, LLC. The case is captioned as Mindy Goodman on behalf of
herself and all other similarly situated consumers, the Plaintiff,
v. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, LLC, the Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-04488 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 8, 2018).

Mercantile Adjustment provides collection and accounts receivable
management services to lenders and debt purchasers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Maxim Maximov, Esq.
          MAXIM MAXIMOV, LLP
          1701 Avenue P
          Brooklyn, NY 11229
          Telephone: (718) 395 3459
          Facsimile: (718) 408 9570
          E-mail: m@maximovlaw.com


MERCEDES-BENZ USA: Faces Dumond Suit over Defective Sunroofs
------------------------------------------------------------
LEIKA DUMOND, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff vs. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, and DAIMLER AG,
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-12017 (D.N.J., July 24, 2018) is an
action against the Defendants for their failure to design and
manufacture panoramic sunroofs that meet the new engineering
challenges, in that the sunroofs are unable to withstand
foreseeable stresses of ordinary use, which ultimately leads to a
catastrophic failure usually described as an explosion of the
sunroof in both moving and stationary environments.

The Plaintiff alleges that had the Defendants disclosed the
panoramic sunroof defect at the point of sale, the Plaintiff would
not have purchased the 2014 Mercedez-Benz CLA-250 with panoramic
sunfroof or she would have paid substantially less. In addition,
she would not have suffered the economic damages she sustained.

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC is engaged in the marketing and distribution
of Mercedes-Benz, smart, and Sprinter vehicles in the United
States. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC was formerly known as Mercedes-Benz
of North America, Inc. The company was founded in 1965 and is
headquartered in Montvale, New Jersey with an additional office in
Long Beach, California. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC operates as a
subsidiary of Daimler AG. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mitchell M. Breit, Esq.
          Paul J. Hanly, Jr., Esq.
          SIMMONS HANLY CONROY LLC
          112 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10016-7416
          Telephone: (212) 784-6400
          Facsimile: (212) 213-5949
          E-mail: mbreit@simmonsfirm.com
                  phanly@simmonsfirm.com

               - and -

          Gregory F. Coleman, Esq.
          Mark E. Silvey, Esq.
          Adam A. Edwards,Esq.
          GREG COLEMAN LAW PC
          First Tennessee Plaza
          800 S. Gay Street, Suite 1100
          Knoxville, TN 37929
          Telephone: (865) 247-0080
          Facsimile: (865) 522-0049
          E-mail: greg@gregcolemanlaw.com
                  mark@gregcolemanlaw.com
                  adam@gregcolemanlaw.com


MIDWEST SUPPLY: Smith Seeks Certification of Collective Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled WANDA SMITH, on behalf of herself and all
other persons similarly situated, known and unknown, the Plaintiff,
v. MIDWEST SUPPLY & MAINTENANCE COMPANY, a Michigan for-profit
corporation, and CHARLOTTE CALLAGHAM, a natural person, the
Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-12483-SFC-RSW (E.D. Mich.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court for an order:

   1. conditionally certifying a collective action for unpaid
      wages under section 216(b) of the FLSA;

   2. issuing Plaintiff Smith's proposed order;

   3. approving proposed court-supervised notice to the putative
      class members;

   4. appointing The Law Offices of Bryan Yaldou, PLLC, as class
      counsel;

   5. requiring Defendants to identify potential opt-in
      plaintiffs by promptly providing Plaintiff Smith with an
      updated computer-readable spreadsheet containing contac
      information for all potential opt-in plaintiffs within 10
      days;

   6. approving an opt-in period of 60 days;

   7. allowing Plaintiff Smith to send notice to similarly
      situated individuals via e-mail in addition to regular
      mail; and

   8. requiring the proposed notice to be posted in Defendants'
      workplaces (away from view of customers but in a common
      place for its employees to view).

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Bryan Yaldou, Esq.
          Omar Badr, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF
          BRYAN YALDOU, PLLC
          23000 Telegraph, Suite 5
          Brownstown, MI 48134
          Telephone: (734) 692 9200
          Facsimile: (734) 692 9201
          E-mail: bryan@yaldoulaw.com


MOVIEPASS: Users Threaten Class Action After Series of Problems
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sarah Berger, writing for CNBC, reports that the talk of Twitter on
July 31, of course, was the potential collapse of the cult-favorite
subscription service MoviePass.

After experiencing multiple outages, reportedly due to the company
burning through all its cash and being unable to pay for tickets,
MoviePass announced on July 31 a new pricing model. Within the next
30 days, it will be increasing its standard monthly rate of $9.95
per month to $14.95 per month. The company also said that some
movies will have limited availability during their first two
weeks.

While the company has long been plagued by criticism that its
prices were too low to be sustainable and that its customer service
is nearly non-existent, in recent days, the future of the company
seems particularly questionable.

So over the past 24 hours, frustrated MoviePass users have taken to
Twitter to comment on the company's roller-coaster ride of pricing
changes and outage issues; even billionaire Elon Musk weighed in.

Others, not so much; MoviePass has also made some people angry.

Meanwhile, some users have already begun eyeing different options
for subscription-like movie services, and others have threatened a
class-action lawsuit. [GN]

NEVCO CONTRACTING: Underpays Construction Laborers, Contreras Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
YONI BEQUER CONTRERAS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NEVCO CONTRACTING, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 7:18-cv-06686 (S.D.N.Y., July 25, 2018) seeks
to recover unpaid wages, overtime compensation, liquidated damages
and attorney's fees.

The Plaintiff Contreras was employed by the Defendant as a
construction laborer from June 2009 to July 2, 2018.

Nevco Contracting, Inc. is a New York corporation located in Mount
Vernon, New York. The Company is engaged in building construction
and renovation business. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Abdul K. Hassan, Esq.
          ABDUL HASSAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
          215-28 Hillside Avenue
          Queens Village, NY 11427
          Telephone: 718-740-1000
          Facsimile: 718-355-9668
          E-mail: abdul@abdulhassan.com


NEW JERSEY: Court Dismisses Federal Claims in IDEA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned ASAH; SPECTRUM360, VERONA; SPECTRUM360,
LIVINGSTON; MICHELE HOMA; HOLLYDELL SCHOOL, HURFFVILLE; and MAUREEN
GROSSI, Plaintiffs, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; KIMBERLY
HARRINGTON; KEVIN DEHMER; and ELISE SADLER-WILLIAMS, Defendants,
Civil Action No. 16-3935 (FLW) (DEA)(D.N.J.).

Presently before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

The Plaintiffs bring this case against the Defendants asserting
various state and federal constitutional claims challenging the
Department's regulations governing tuition reimbursement for
approved private schools for students with disabilities.

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), each
state that receives federal education funding must ensure that
disabled children receive a free appropriate public education'
(FAPE). The IDEA protects the rights of disabled children by
mandating that public educational institutions identify and
effectively educate those children, or pay for their education
elsewhere if they require specialized services that the public
institution cannot provide.

Plaintiffs' Claims

According to the Amended Complaint, prior to June 2015, the
Department had a decades-long practice of permitting (Approved
Private School for Students with Disabilities (APSSDs) to obtain
full reimbursement for related-services provided to students with
disabilities, provided that the related-services were administered
in fulfillment of students' IEPs and were provided by qualified
employees or approved agencies.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Department also permitted sending
districts to send their own staff to assist APSSDs in providing
related services to students with disabilities, without charge to
these APSSDs. The Plaintiffs further allege that APSSDs, such as
Spectrum360 and HollyDELL, relied on the Department's practice of
permitting full reimbursement in annually acquiring related
services at an amount sufficient to fulfill the requirements of
students' IEPs.

The Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed
for three reasons.
First, the Defendants maintain that the Plaintiffs' state and
federal constitutional claims are barred under the Eleventh
Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity, and that no exceptions to
immunity exist.

Second, the Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs' challenges to
the Department's July 2017 Regulations are not justiciable, because
the Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege the existence of
an actual and imminent threat of future harm, as required under the
doctrines of standing and ripeness.

Third, the Defendants argue that even if this Court has subject
matter jurisdiction, the Plaintiffs' claims fail on the merits.

Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or
by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.

Here, in arguing that the Department must be dismissed on sovereign
immunity grounds, the Defendants note that the Court already found
that the Department was entitled to sovereign immunity in its June
30, 2017 Opinion. Indeed, in its prior decision, the Court rejected
the Plaintiffs' argument that the exception to sovereign immunity
set forth in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) applied to the
Department, and thus, found that the Department was entitled to
sovereign immunity. And, in response to the instant Motion, the
Plaintiffs fail to present any new arguments as to why the
Department is not entitled to sovereign immunity.

Accordingly, Court's finding that the Department is entitled to
sovereign immunity stands, and thus, the Plaintiffs' federal claims
are dismissed as to the Department.

The Defendants raise two sovereign immunity arguments with respect
to the State Officials.

First, the Defendants argue that under Ex parte Young and its
progeny, the Plaintiffs' request in Count Three, the Plaintiffs'
substantive due process claim, seeking an Order granting APSSD
related-service providers compensation for any sums to which they
were previously entitled must be dismissed, because it is akin to a
request for retroactive monetary damages.

Second, the Defendants contend that each of the Plaintiffs' federal
claims should be dismissed, because ex parte Young only provides an
exception to sovereign immunity for claims seeking injunctive
relief to remedy a continuing violation of federal law, and the
Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts showing that there is
indeed an ongoing violation of federal law.

With respect to the Defendants' first argument, the Court agrees
that the Plaintiffs' request in Count Three -- seeking an Order
granting APSSD related-service providers compensation for any sums
to which they were previously entitled must be dismissed, because
such an award would more closely approximate an award of
retroactive monetary damages than prospective injunctive relief.

Accordingly, that request is stricken from Count Three as barred
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

Nonetheless, the Court finds that the State Officials are not
entitled to immunity with respect to the remainder of the
Plaintiffs' federal claims. Specifically, contrary to the
Defendants' assertion, the Plaintiffs do allege that Department's
enforcement of its APSSD tuition reimbursement regulations amounts
to a violation of federal law, and thus, that the Defendants should
be enjoined from continued enforcement of the same. For the
purposes of the Ex parte Young exception, the Plaintiffs need not
establish that the Defendants' conduct is, in fact,
unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court proceeds to the
Defendants' other arguments for dismissing the Plaintiffs' federal
claims.

Justiciability of Plaintiffs' Challenges to the Department's July
2017 Regulations

In arguing that the Plaintiffs have failed to present a justiciable
controversy with respect to the July 2017 Regulations, the
Defendants contend that the Amended Complaint fails to address the
added flexibility provided under those regulations. Specifically,
the Defendants note that, although the amended regulations set the
maximum salary rate for each position in reference to the 2016-2017
school year, they provide exceptions for the Relevant Positions at
issue in this case.

In that regard, the Defendants submit that, beginning July 1, 2017,
the regulations provide that: (i) maximum published salaries for
the Relevant Positions shall increase annually by the CPI from the
2016-17 published salary, the published maximum allowable salaries
list containing the total maximum hourly rate for the Relevant
Positions will include an allowance of 35 percent more than the
maximum allowable salary rate calculated and published pursuant to
N.J.A.C. Section 6A:23A-18.3(o)(1)(i) for those positions, that
APSSDs may contract with approved clinics or agencies for
contracted services above the maximum allowable published rates
detailed in N.J.A.C. Section 6A:23A-18.3(o)(1)(i), so long as the
APSSD complies with certain requirements.

APSSDs can request that the Commissioner of Education approve a
salary higher than the maximum allowable salary for "no more than
two APSSD employees in any fiscal year in which the APSSD
demonstrates, to the Commissioner's or his or her designee's
satisfaction, the maximum allowable salary is inadequate and would
cause a hardship to the Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint
is devoid of any allegations explaining how these regulations will
negatively impact the Plaintiffs, and thus, that the Plaintiffs'
alleged injury is conjectural.  

Despite the lack of specific allegations concerning the impact of
the flexibility provisions cited by the Defendants, the Plaintiffs
have sufficiently alleged a real and immediate injury with respect
to the July 2017 Regulations that they will suffer real costs as a
condition of compliance with a regulation that they urge is
unconstitutional. As the Third Circuit has observed, sufficient
injury exists to confer standing where 'the regulation is directed
at [the plaintiffs] in particular; it requires them to make
significant changes in their everyday business practices; and if
they fail to observe the rule they are quite clearly exposed to the
imposition of strong sanctions.

In Free Speech, 825 F.3d at 166, the plaintiffs, a collection of
individuals, entities, and interest groups engaged in the
production of sexually explicit images, challenged the
constitutionality of the recordkeeping, labeling, and inspection
requirements set forth in various statutes and their accompanying
regulations. The government argued that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to pursue injunctive relief, and that the plaintiffs'
claims were not ripe, because they have not demonstrated sufficient
threat of injury and their claims of future harm are not
redressable through injunctive relief given that no inspection
program has been in place since 2008.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged an
immediate threat of future harm, such that the Plaintiffs'
constitutional claims are justiciable.

Plaintiffs' Federal Claims

The Plaintiffs assert federal claims for: (1) violation of the
Equal Protection Clause; (2) violation of the Due Process Clause;
and (3) Violation of the Contracts Clause. The Court will examine
each of these claims, in turn.

Equal Protection Claim

In Count One of the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that
the Department's regulations governing APSSD reimbursement tuition,
including the disallowance of related service provider salaries
that exceed the regulatory maximum, amount to discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution.  

The Plaintiffs allege that the Department's regulations
discriminate against APSSDs, because they prohibit APSSDs from
procuring related services for students with disabilities at the
same cost as public entities.

Here, the parties dispute the standard of review that governs the
Plaintiffs' Equal Protection Claim. In that regard, the Defendants
contend that rational basis review applies, because the Plaintiffs
are not members of a suspect class and the regulations do not
implicate a fundamental right. Conversely, the Plaintiffs argue
that the Department's regulations both target a suspect class and
burden a fundamental right. In that regard, the Plaintiffs contend
that the Department's regulations impose salary limitations on
APSSDs and their related service providers, without imposing
similar limitations on public schools and their related service
providers.  

Additionally, the Plaintiffs argue that students with disabilities
are a suspect class and, due to their association with private
school students with disabilities, APSSDs and APSSD related-service
providers are also members of a protected class and entitled to
equal protection. Finally, Plaintiffs maintain that the
Department's regulations limit the ability of students with
disabilities to receive the educational services mandated by their
IEPs, and thus, that these regulations threaten the fundamental
right to education.  

Plaintiffs' arguments in support of applying a strict scrutiny
standard of review are without merit. At the outset, APSSDs and
their related service providers are not suspect classes for the
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, because these groups are
not discrete and insular minorities that have been subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.

Due Process Claims

In Counts Two and Three of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert
claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Procedural Due Process

In Count Two of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert a claim
for violation of procedural due process. Specifically, Plaintiffs
allege that the Department deprived Plaintiffs of their liberty
when it reversed its position regarding its enforcement of maximum
salaries for related-service providers and its requirement that
related-service be provided directly by APSSDs, without affording
Plaintiffs notice or an opportunity to be heard.  

To state a claim for violation of procedural due process,
Plaintiffs must allege that: (1) they were deprived of an
individual interest encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection of life, liberty, or property; and (2) that the
procedures available did not provide due process of the law.

Here, even accepting as true Plaintiffs' allegation that, prior to
the Department's June Memorandum, the Department reimbursed APSSDs
for the costs of providing all related services, the Court cannot
find that Plaintiffs have a legitimate entitlement to the
unregulated receipt of public funds covering the costs of any and
all related services. Significantly, Plaintiffs have failed to
identify any statutory or constitutional provision guaranteeing
APSSDs a specific level of funding as compensation for providing
related services to students with disabilities. Rather, the
Plaintiff-APSSDs' entitlement to tuition reimbursement funds stems
from the Tuition Contract, which requires APSSDs to comply with all
requirements promulgated by the Department and states that tuition
charges as well as the payment of the same shall be made in
accordance with the applicable New Jersey Statutes and the rules
and regulations of the State Board of Education.

In turn, New Jersey confers upon the Commissioner of Education and
the State Board of Education the authority to prescribe rules
governing the calculation of APSSD tuition. Under this regulatory
scheme, the Court cannot find that Plaintiffs had a legitimate
entitlement to an unfettered amount of tuition reimbursement funds.
To the contrary, Plaintiffs were on notice that their receipt of
tuition reimbursement funds was conditioned on compliance with the
Department's regulations.

Accordingly, because Plaintiffs did not have a legitimate claim to
unencumbered tuition reimbursement, or to particular regulations
being in place, they have not sufficiently alleged a deprivation of
a property right protected by procedural due process.

Substantive Due Process

In Count Three of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert a
substantive due process claim, alleging that the state deprived
Spectrum360, HollyDELL, Ms. Grossi, and Ms. Homa of economic
liberty via unlawful contract and compensation limitations.

Moreover, even if Plaintiffs' substantive due process claim could
be construed as a challenge to a non-legislative act, Plaintiffs'
claim still fails, because Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged
that the Department's regulations deprived them of a fundamental
right that is protected by substantive due process. To reiterate,
Plaintiffs allege that the Department deprived them of their
fundamental interests in contracting, working and earning a living,
and maintaining specific private employment. While Plaintiffs are
correct that the right to engage in any of the common occupations
of life is a fundamental liberty protected under the Constitution.


Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Department's regulations
deprived them of the opportunity to pursue a certain calling or
occupation altogether, or even to work as a related service
provider for an APSSD; rather, Plaintiffs merely contend that they
are unable to obtain the salary that they desire. This is not the
sort of fundamental employment interest protected under the
Constitution.

Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have failed to allege the
deprivation of an interest protected under the Constitution,
Plaintiffs' substantive due process claim must be dismissed.

Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts One, Two,
Three, and Five of the Amended Complaint, insofar as Plaintiffs
assert federal claims, is granted.  The Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' remaining state law
claims, and thus, Defendants' Motion is denied without prejudice as
to the remainder of the Amended Complaint.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 26, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7lq3vjw from Leagle.com.

ASAH, THE CHILDREN'S INSTITUTE, VERONA, THE CHILDREN'S INSTITUTE,
LIVINGSTON, MICHELE HOMA, HOLLYDELL SCHOOL, HURFFVILLE, MAUREEN
GROSSI, B.R., on behalf of M.R., S.D., on behalf of W.D. & SPECTRUM
360, LIVINGSTON, Plaintiffs, represented by VITO A. GAGLIARDI, Jr.
-- vagagliardi@pbnlaw.com -- PORZIO, BROMBERG & NEWMAN, PC.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, KIMBERLY HARRINGTON,
Commissioner of Education, KEVIN DEHMER & ELISE SADLER-WILLIAMS,
Defendants, represented by CAROLINE GENETT JONES , STATE OF NEW
JERSEY OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY: Averts Workers' ERISA Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Emily Brill, writing for Law360, reports that New York University
defeated an Employee Retirement Income Security Act class action on
July 31 when a federal judge rejected workers' claims that the
school's two employee retirement plans were mismanaged to the tune
of $358 million in losses.

A class of current and former New York University workers didn't
prove the university's retirement committee acted imprudently when
monitoring investments, a federal judge said on July 31.

The case is styled Sacerdote et al v. New York University, Case No.
1:16-cv-06284 (S.D.N.Y.).  The case is assigned to Judge Katherine
B. Forrest.  The case was filed August 9, 2016. [GN]



NEW YORK: Homeowners to File Suit Over Build It Back Program
------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Farinacci, writing for NY1, reports that on a warm summer
evening, a group of Gerritsen Beach homeowners sit around a dining
room table, trading war stories about the city's storm recovery
program, Build It Back.

"They put two doorknobs on the door, two doorknobs, because they
made a mistake. They bought the wrong door," said Laura McCann, a
participant in the Build it Back program.

Each of these six homeowners elevated their homes through Build It
Back in the hopes of protecting them from the threat of future
floodwaters.

They've all moved back home, and they all continue to experience
dangerous issues they say the program isn't adequately addressing.


Work at Maria Gonzalez's home was finished last summer. But just
days after she got her keys, she says that when she moved her
entertainment into her living room, "there was a big loud thud, and
it felt like the house was falling."

It's the same story at James Relay's home.

"I didn't think the house would cave in, but I just knew that it
was going to get worse and worse and worse," he said. "They had to,
they literally had to do 70 percent of my house, the support
underneath, over again."  

Build It Back told Natalie Caruso she could move back home on
December 11. A week later, she was forced to move out again because
the house was starting to sink.

Engineers blamed a supporting beam that was never installed for the
problem.

Contractors came back to fix the issue in January, but the house is
still crooked.

According to a city estimate, Build It Back has spent at least
$838,000 on repairs to her house, a number that doesn't include the
January work or work the Carusos are still fighting to have done.

"My house is uneven here, my house is crooked there," she said.
"All my doors upstairs do not work. You have to lift them because
the whole house is tilting."

Nearly six years after Sandy, their list of issues is so extensive,
and so similar, that this group of homeowners are banding together
to file a class action suit against Build It Back.

They charge that the program left them with unsafe conditions and
shoddy work, and they want to know how their homes passed
inspections.

The group is hoping their suit will force the city to a forensic
accounting of every home in the Build It Back program, and they're
seeking financial damages for what they call their pain and
suffering.

"We can't all be wrong," Ms. Gonzalez said.

The group is inviting other Build It Back participants to join in
their suit.

Because it has yet to be filed, the city Law Department could not
offer any comment. [GN]

NEW ZEALAND: Ex-Bella Vista Residents Sue Tauranga City Council
---------------------------------------------------------------
RNZ reports that all former residents of the botched Bella Vista
housing development in Tauranga will join a class action against
the Tauranga City Council.

The council has offered to buy back the unlivable properties at the
price buyers paid for them up to three years ago.

But residents said this will lock them out of the current housing
market.

The former residents were evacuated from their newly built homes in
March after they were deemed unsafe to live in.

Two households are already pursuing legal action against the
council, which signed off on shoddy construction work.

The remaining 19 families will now join them.

The residents said the council's offer to buy back the properties
at the price paid would leave them broke and force them out of
town.

Lee Konowe said there is no reason the council cannot front up with
more money, when most of it will be coming from insurers. [GN]

NFL: Concussion Lawsuit Looms in Australia
------------------------------------------
Cam Reddin, writing for Macquarie Sports Radio, reports that
Former American football player Colin Scotts warns failure to
protect against concussions will "kill" Australian sport.

In a week where estimated costs of the NFL's compensation payout
following a class action from 5,000 former players have blown out
to nearly double the original sum, there are now concerns a similar
lawsuit could be on its way to Australia.

Scotts says Australian sports administrations are exposing
themselves to legal action from players if they don't act quickly
to protect current and future players from debilitating brain
injuries.

"You would not believe how many teammates I have that are either
dead or running around with major mental illness," Scotts told
Macquarie Sports Radio's Cam Reddin.

Almost every weekend, Scotts receives messages from worried parents
in a panic because their child has taken a blow to the head while
playing junior sport.

Meanwhile, some of his closest football friends have fallen ill and
passed away from concussion-related illnesses like Chronic
Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE).

"[Heads of sport] are not sitting here like me getting all these
phone calls from America saying all my mates are dying and going
insane. It's not going away, it's getting worse," Scotts said.

"You can chop my legs off, I can still smile and have a beer. But
losing your mind is frightening. Life is already short as it is,"
he said.

In a warning to the major Australian football codes, Scotts says it
may take a lawsuit the scale of what we have seen in the NFL to
make concussion treatment and prevention a priority.

"Someone has to stand up. What do we need, some massive lawsuit
like the NFL before we wake up? Well, that's what's coming," Scotts
said.

"We're going to look back in 20 years and say it was absolute
abuse. The brain was not designed to rattle. There's no shock
absorbers, there's no airbags. It's the most important organ in the
human body and it was not designed to be hit," he said.

An NFL-style legal case may not be far away. Already, more than 70
former AFL players are undergoing testing, while they consider a
class action of their own.

"It's terrifying. We need to wake up and do something about it,
because it will kill sport. The lawsuits, the data's there now.
There are no excuses," Scotts said.

Under the terms of settlement reached in 2015, the NFL was ordered
to pay out compensation to help manage claims by those who were
affected by concussion-related illnesses long into the future.

The estimated total payout figure over 20 years was around $1
billion. But on latest count, not even three years after the
settlement, already more than $500 million has been paid out.

More than a decade ahead of time, the pool of money set aside for
compensation is already half up.

"Somebody needs to stand up and get on the front foot because a
tidal wave is coming," Scotts said.[GN]

NY HEALTH DEPARTMENT: Court Narrows Claims in Samele et al. Case
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled GEMMA SAMELE, SELMA ROHER by her next friend
MELANIE ROHER, and SALVATORE GUADAGNA, individually and on behalf
of all persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff(s), v. HOWARD
ZUCKER, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health,
the Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-03397 (E.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge
Arthur D. Spatt entered an order:

   1. denying without prejudice, with leave to renew, Plaintiffs'
      motion for class certification pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
      Rule 23; and

   2. granting in part, and denying in part Defendant's motion to
      dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rules 12(b)(1) and
      12(b)(6). It is granted to the extent that Samele and
      Roher's claims are dismissed because they do not have
      standing. It is denied  to the extent that the inherently
      transitory exception applies to claims such as Guadagna's,
      and his claims are preserved for the purposes of the
      putative class action."

The Court said, "In light of the Court's decision, the Plaintiffs
should address the size of any class encompassing persons who
switched from GuildNet to a new MLTCP, and received less care
without notice of a right to fair hearing with aid continuing.
While the Plaintiffs need not provide an exact number of
individuals to meet the numerosity requirement, they must at least
present some evidence of, or reasonably estimate, the number of
class members. Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 935 (2d Cir.
1993). As their motion dealt solely with a class of individuals who
had been previously been served by GuildNet, they did not provide
any evidence as to the number of individuals who received less care
upon switching to a new MLTCP. Although the Second Circuit has held
that a prospective class of forty or more raises the presumption of
numerosity, Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473,
483 (2d Cir. 1995), the Plaintiffs have not submitted any evidence
or estimated that the prospective class exceeds forty
individuals."

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Benjamin Wait Taylor, Esq.
          Elizabeth A. Jois, Esq.
          Julia Grossman Russell, Esq.
          Jane Greengold Stevens, Esq.
          NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP
          7 Hanover Square 18th floor
          New York, NY 10004

Attorneys for the Defendant:

          Dorothy O. Nese, Esq.
          OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
          200 Old Country Road Suite 460
          Mineola, NY 11501


OHIO: Burger King Stunt Highlights "Pink Tax" Bill Issue
--------------------------------------------------------
Danielle Serino, writing for WKYC, reports that a major fast food
chain is coming out against the so called "Pink Tax."

That's when retailers or companies charge women more for products
or services that are basically the same as what a man would get.

Now, the Pink Tax has been under attack for a while. Ohio
legislators recently introduced a bill aimed at ending taxes on
feminine hygiene products. A Class Action lawsuit was also filed
against Ohio's Department of Taxation.

But to highlight the disparity, Burger King pulled a stunt where
unsuspecting females were told they had to pay $1.40 more than the
men for the same serving of Chicken Fries.

In the video, which the company posted on YouTube, one woman
exclaimed "I'm not going to pay extra," when the cashier told her
the price of her Chicken Fries.

Another pointed out, "I ordered the same thing he did!"

They had no idea about the stunt the company dubbed the Burger King
Chick Tax.

Where women who ordered the fries, were charged nearly 83% more
than men.

The Cashier explained to them, "They're extra just because it comes
in a cute box with eyelashes and a bow."

That's when one customer asked, "Would you pay extra for a pink
box?"

When the Cashier told her not to get so excited, she sarcastically
answered, "Do I look excited?!"

Women have been unexcited for a long time over this kind of price
disparity, which applies to dozens of products that are virtually
the same as those for men.

Things like razors, deodorants and shampoo.

But as the Burger King spoof points out it's something women have
accepted for a long time.

One cashier asked a customer "When you go into the drugstore and
you pay $2 dollars more for razor blades, do you say something
then?"

She admitted she didn't.

But U.S. Congresswoman Jackie Speier of California is definitely
speaking up.

She recently introduced the Pink Tax Repeal Act to end gender-based
discrimination for the prices of goods and services. The Act allows
the FTC to enforce violations and gives State Attorneys General the
authority to take civil action.

"I think it's great to see. And great to bring the issue to the
forefront. Women deal with this every day, and to shine a light on
this is important, said Ohio State Representative Brigid Kelly.

She recently introduced her own bill which would ban sales tax on
all medically necessary feminine products, like Tampons.

According to a 2014 annual report by Maria Shriver and co-sponsored
by The Center for American Progress, eliminating that tax could
save women up to $1,700 dollars a year.

'Women generally make less and are paying more for products, which
doesn't make a lot of sense," said Representative Kelly.

And Burger King seems to agree, asking people to support
Congresswoman Speier's Pink Tax Repeal Act something at least women
seem to back.

The Federal Act still needs to be considered by the Commerce
Committee.

The Bill here in Ohio made it out of the Ways and Means Committee,
and has the support of several of the Democratic Male Congressmen.

Next stop is the House floor for a vote. [GN]

PACIFIC ENERGY: Court Dismisses A. Nelson's FAC in EFTA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona
granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint
in the case captioned Amanda Nelson, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Pacwest
Energy LLC, Defendant, No. CV-17-03304-PHX-DJH (D. Ariz.).

The Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and actual and statutory
damages resulting from Defendant Pacwest Energy, LLC, dba Jacksons
Car Wash’s (Jacksons) violation of the Electronic Fund Transfer
Act (EFTA). The Plaintiffs contend they were not provided a copy of
their authorization as required by the statute. The EFTA allows for
consumers to bring suit for money-damages when a violation of its
provisions occur, and further authorizes consumers to obtain
attorney's fees if they are successful.

Jacksons argues that the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring a claim
under the EFTA. Jacksons contends that the Plaintiffs did not
suffer a concrete injury as a result of Jacksons' failure to
provide the Plaintiffs a copy of their written authorization at the
time Fisher purchased a monthly car wash plan. Jacksons further
argues that any such injury in fact cannot be attributed to
Jacksons.

Jacksons argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
because the Plaintiffs have failed to establish they have standing
to sue under the EFTA. Article III provides that federal courts may
only exercise judicial power in the context of cases and
controversies.

To establish standing, a plaintiff seeking the jurisdiction of a
federal court has the burden of clearly demonstrating that he has:
(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.

Here, Jacksons argues that the Plaintiffs have failed to show that
they have standing to sue under the EFTA because (1) Plaintiffs
have not suffered any concrete injury; and (2) to the extent they
have, any injury Plaintiffs have suffered cannot be attributed to
Jacksons.  

Although Jacksons contends that the Plaintiffs' purported injury is
not plausibly traceable to Jacksons, its primary challenge is to
the existence of the Plaintiffs' injury in fact. An injury in fact
is an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized and (b) 'actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.

In determining whether a violation of a statutory provision
satisfies the injury-in-fact-concreteness requirement, the Ninth
Circuit has instructed courts to assess: (1) whether the statutory
provisions at issue were established to protect [plaintiffs']
concrete interests (as opposed to purely procedural rights), and if
so, (2) whether the specific procedural violations alleged in this
case actually harm, or present a material risk of harm to, such
interests. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir.
2017) (Spokeo III).

Whether the EFTA Procedural Requirements Were Established to
Protect Consumers' Concrete Interests

Given the stated purpose of the statute and the substance of the
various procedural requirements identified therein, the Court finds
that the statutory provisions of the EFTA were established to
protect consumers from unauthorized transfers and transfers made in
error. As such, the interests sought to be protected by these
requirements are concrete and are not purely procedural rights"
afforded to consumers engaging in electronic fund transfers.

Whether Jacksons' Failure to Provide a Copy of the Signed, Written
Authorization Actually Harmed Plaintiffs' Interests or Presented a
Material Risk of Harm to Those Interests

In their Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that they
suffered actual harm when Jacksons failed to provide them with a
copy of the written Authorization because they were (1) unaware
that the Defendant would be taking money from their bank account on
a monthly basis confused when they later found that the Defendant
had taken money from their bank account had to incur the time,
expense, and disutility associated with discovering why Defendant
had done so and (4) forced to obtain counsel to investigate the
matter further.

The Court finds that the allegations related to the Plaintiffs'
alleged actual harm in the FAC are insufficient to establish
standing under the EFTA. The Plaintiffs do not allege that Fisher
misunderstood the terms of the Authorization or that Jacksons
exceeded those terms in any way.

Moreover, the plain language of the signed Authorization
contradicts the Plaintiffs' allegation that they were unaware
Jacksons would be taking money from their bank account on a monthly
basis. As Jacksons notes in its reply brief, Fisher was provided
with and executed the Automatic Recharge Authorization ticket prior
to purchasing the carwash plan.  

Thus, the Court finds that any allegations that the Plaintiffs were
unaware or confused by the monthly charges are contradicted by the
terms of the written Authorization signed by Fisher. Moreover, any
injury the Plaintiffs suffered as a result of having to investigate
the charges to their account, including obtaining counsel to
investigate, does not amount to the harm Congress intended to
protect against when it mandated the receipt requirement in the
EFTA. Indeed, Congress addressed the risk of confusion in the
EFTA's error resolution provision, which outlines how consumer can
investigate erroneous transfers.  

The Plaintiffs' FAC also alleges that Jacksons' failure to provide
them with a written copy of the Authorization at the time of the
transaction exposed them to an increased risk of fraud. Beyond this
conclusory statement, Plaintiffs do not explain in their FAC how
this particular failure exposed them to an increased risk of fraud.
Citing recent district and subsequent appellate court decisions out
of the Second Circuit, Jacksons argue that none of the allegations
in the FAC establish that Plaintiffs suffered concrete injury to
interests sought to be protected under the EFTA.  

The issue of whether a plaintiff had alleged concrete injury for
purposes of standing under the EFTA where a defendant had failed to
obtain or provide the plaintiff a copy of her written authorization
was squarely addressed by the New York district court in Aikens.
Aikens v. Portfolio Recovery Ass. LLC, 716 Fed. Appx. 37 (2d Cir.
2017), aff'ming Aikens v. Portfolio Recovery Ass. LLC, 2017 WL
1091591 (E.D.N.Y Mar. 22, 2017). There, the plaintiff and a debt
collector entered into an oral agreement over the telephone,
whereby the plaintiff authorized the debt collector to
automatically debit her checking account each month until her debt
was satisfied. After debiting her account for nearly a year,
plaintiff brought suit under the EFTA, seeking statutory damages
for the debt collector's failure to obtain her written consent for
the monthly automated debits as well as its failure to provide her
with a copy of that consent at the time of the transaction.

The district court found the plaintiff lacked standing and
dismissed the action with prejudice.

The court specifically found that the plaintiff had failed to
allege any concrete injury and had only alleged a bare procedural
violation, insufficient for standing purposes under Spokeo II.  

The Plaintiffs have thus failed to allege any plausible concrete
injury suffered as a result of Jacksons' failure to provide Fisher
a copy of his Authorization.

The Traceability Requirement

Even if the Court were to find that the Plaintiffs had sufficiently
alleged a risk of fraud here, the Plaintiffs cannot and have not
alleged that such injury is fairly traceable to Jacksons. Although
the Plaintiffs do not have to prove that Jacksons proximately
caused injuries at this phase of the case, they do have the burden
of demonstrating that their injury-in-fact is fairly traceable to
the challenged action.

Here, the Plaintiffs' threadbare allegations fall short of
demonstrating that link. The Plaintiffs' FAC conclusively states
that because the Plaintiffs were not provided a copy of their
signed, written authorization at the time it was made, they were
unaware that the Defendant would be taking money from their bank
account on a monthly basis were confused when they later found that
the Defendant had taken money and had to incur the time, expense,
and disutility associated with discovering why the Defendant had
done so.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 23, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yb78j6ck from Leagle.com.

Amanda Nelson, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated & Louis Fisher, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Jose F. Gill ,
Thompson Consumer Law Group PLLC, Joseph Michael Panvini , Thompson
Consumer Law Group PLLC & Russell Snow Thompson, IV , Thompson
Consumer Law Group PLLC.

Pacwest Energy LLC, doing business as Jacksons Car Wash, Defendant,
represented by Andrew Carl Stanley -- astanley@srclaw.com -- Sacks
Ricketts & Case LLP, Cynthia Ann Ricketts -- cricketts@srclaw.com
-- Sacks Ricketts & Case LLP & Luanne Sacks -- lsacks@srclaw.com --
DLA Piper LLP US.

PICK-A-PART AUTO: Court Approves $195K Class Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of a Class
Action Settlement in the case captioned CIRENA TORRES, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
PICK-A-PART AUTO WRECKING (d/b/a Pick-A-Part); and DOES 1 through
10, inclusive, Defendants, No. 1:16-cv-01915-DAD-BAM (E.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff filed a class action complaint alleging defendant
violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA).
The Defendant operated a motor vehicle wrecking and recycling
facility, whose business included maintaining an inventory of used
vehicles, from which retail customers could dismantle parts to
purchase. The Plaintiff alleges that the defendant willfully
violated FACTA by printing the expiration date on receipts provided
to credit card and debit card cardholders transacting business with
defendant.

Notice

Adequate notice is critical to court approval of a class settlement
under Rule 23(e).
At the final fairness hearing, class counsel represented to the
court that despite the high number of claims submitted, class
counsel and the settlement administrator had conclusively
determined that many claims were invalid as apparent duplicates,
and further, that at least some of the valid claims accounted for
multiple transactions out of the 4,422 transactions during the
class period.  Given this, the court concludes adequate notice was
provided to the class here.

Final Fairness Hearing

In assessing the fairness of a class action settlement, courts
balance the following factors:
(1) the strength of the plaintiffs' case; (2) the risk, expense,
complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk
of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) the
amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed
and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and views of
counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental participant; and (8)
the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.

Strength of Plaintiff's Case

Class counsel thus represents that further litigation would likely
have caused delay, and posed substantial risk to the plaintiff
class if the case were to be later dismissed outright without any
recovery. In addition, class counsel recognizes the difficulty in
demonstrating that defendant's conduct was willful, as is required
to recover statutory damages under 15 U.S.C.  Therefore, while the
plaintiff potentially had meritorious claims, it is far from
certain that she would have prevailed on those claims, given recent
unfavorable case law and the difficulty in proving the defendant's
willful conduct.

Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further
Litigation, and Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Through
Trial

Here, the plaintiff contends that absent a settlement, the issues
of standing and willfulness would have resulted in prolonged
litigation that had the likely potential to take years and be
costly. Moreover, class certification remains highly contested
between the parties, and absent a settlement, would likely result
in continued litigation, delays, and potential appeals. By
contrast, the proposed settlement in this action provides
compensation that is available now, without the additional time and
risk of a decision that would likely be subject to a lengthy appeal
process.

The Amount Offered in Settlement

Here, the proposed settlement is for $195,000. The Plaintiff notes
that the settlement's maximum award of $250 per class member
amounts to 250 percent of the minimum statutory damages ($100), and
25 percent of the maximum statutory damages ($1000). If each of the
4,422 credit card and debit card transactions represents unique
individuals, which to the court appears to be highly unlikely, the
plaintiff and the class would be entitled to minimum statutory
damages of $100 per class member, or $442,200 total. If each
individual received the maximum statutory damages amount of $1000,
defendant's maximum liability would be $4,422,000. The proposed
settlement of $195,000 thus represents approximately 44 percent of
the plaintiff's minimum possible recovery, and 4.4 percent of the
plaintiff's maximum possible recovery.

Because of the concrete risks attendant with litigation, and the
limited recovery available given that the defendant ceased all
operations in January 2016, the court finds that the amount offered
in settlement weighs in favor of final approval of the settlement.

Extent of Discovery Completed

In this case, only informal, rather than formal, discovery was
exchanged between the parties. The Plaintiff asserts that,
nonetheless, a substantial amount of information was obtained and
exchanged, including specific figures concerning transactions
during the Settlement Class Period. Class counsel represents that
this information took time and effort to obtain and was critical to
informing the settlement discussions.

Based on these representations by counsel, the court is satisfied
that the parties' negotiation constituted genuine, informed, arm's
length bargaining.

Experience and Views of Counsel

Attorney Yedalian declares that aside from litigation, he also
advocates for consumer protection through legislative and
grassroots advocacy. Based on his experience and qualifications,
investigation of the disputed factual and legal issues involved in
this case, and evaluation of the risks of continued litigation,
attorney Yedalian concludes that the settlement is fair and
reasonable. Class counsel's experience and opinions weigh in favor
of final approval of the settlement.

Presence of a Governmental Participant

More than 90 days have elapsed since notice was given, and this
court has received no objections to this settlement from state or
federal officials, nor have any governmental entities sought to
intervene as demonstrated by the court's docket in this case.
Because there are no separate governmental participants involved in
the action, consideration of this factor is neutral in the court's
evaluation of the settlement.

Reaction of the Class to Proposed Settlement

According to the declaration of Christopher Q. Longley on behalf of
Atticus Administration, LLC, no member of the class has filed an
objection to the settlement before the court. Similarly, no class
members appeared at the final fairness hearing to raise any
objections to the settlement. Accordingly, consideration of this
factor weighs significantly in favor of granting final approval.

Although the very existence of a clear sailing provision increases
the likelihood that class counsel will have bargained away
something of value to the class, the existence of a clear sailing
provision is not necessarily fatal to final approval. Rather, when
confronted with a clear sailing provision, the district court has a
heightened duty to peer into the provision and scrutinize closely
the relationship between attorneys' fees and benefit to the class.
In the analysis of attorneys' fees below, the court finds that the
requested fees are justified and do not betray the class's
interests.

On balance, the court is satisfied that the settlement is not the
product of collusion, and therefore concludes that the settlement
is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion for final approval of the class
action settlement is granted, the settlement class is certified,
and the court approves the settlement as fair, reasonable, and
adequate.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 23, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yaay8xd9 from Leagle.com.

Cirena Torres, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Chant Yedalian --
chant@chant.mobi -- Chant & Company.

Pick-A-Part Auto Wrecking, Doing business as, Defendant,
represented by Ted A. Galfin -- tgalfin@galfinlaw.com -- Law
Offices Of Ted A. Galfin.

PROGRESSIVE SELECT: Lopez Suit Moved to Southern Dist. of Florida
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Michael A. Lopez, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
Progressive Select Insurance Company, the Defendant, Case No.
0:18-cv-61844-WPD, was removed to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida (Ft Lauderdale) on Aug. 8, 2018. The
case is assigned to the Hon. Judge William P. Dimitrouleas.

Progressive Select operates as a subsidiary of Progressive Direct
Holdings Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Herbert Zebersky, Esq.
          Mark S. Fistos, Esq.
          ZEBERSKY PAYNE, LLP
          110 S.E. 6th Street, Suite 2150
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 989 6333
          Facsimile: (954) 989 7781
          E-mail: ezebersky@zpllp.com
                  mfistos@zpllp.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Bryan Thomas West, Esq.
          AKERMAN LLP
          Three Brickell City Centre
          98 Southeast Seventh Street, Suite 1100
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 982 5504
          Facsimile: (305) 374 5095
          E-mail: bryan.west@akerman.com


PROVIDENCE HEALTH: Underpays Patient Sitter, Mamuyac Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
RAMONA MAMUYAC, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. PROVIDENCE HEALTH & SERVICES; and DOES 1-20,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. BC714163 (Cal. Super., July 18,
2018) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid regular hours,
overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal and rest
periods.

Ms. Mamuyac was employed by the Defendants as patient sitter from
April 6, 2015, to November 5, 2016.

Providence Health & Services offers health care services throughout
California, and headquartered in Renton, Washington. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Vache A. Thomassian, Esq.
          Caspar Jivalagian, Esq.
          KJT LAW GROUP LLP
          230 N. Maryland Ave., Suite 306
          Glendale, CA 91206
          Telephone: (818) 507-8525
          E-mail: vache@kjtlawgroup.com
                  caspar@kjtlawgroup.com

               - and –

          Christopher A. Adams, Esq.
          ADAMS EMPLOYMENT COUNSEL
          4740 Calle Carga
          Camarillo, CA 93012
          Telephone: (818) 425-1437
          E-mail: ca@AdamsEmploymentCounsel.com


PROVIDENT SAVINGS: Court OKs FLSA Portion of $1.7MM Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Settlement Approval in
the case captioned GINA McKEEN-CHAPLIN, individually, on behalf of
all others similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public,
Plaintiffs, v. PROVIDENT SAVINGS BANK, FSB, Defendant, Case No.
2:12-cv-03035-MCE-AC (E.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Gina McKeen-Chaplin filed a putative class and collective
action against Provident Savings Bank in this Court on December 17,
2012, asserting that Provident misclassified its mortgage
underwriters as exempt from overtime and therefore failed to pay
legally-required overtime pay.

Here, the Court finds the settlement is a reasonable compromise of
a bona fide dispute under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
Under the terms of the settlement, the Defendant agrees to pay a
total of $1,775,000.00, independent of any duty to pay
employer-side payroll taxes associated with the settlement
payments, to settle what the Court agrees is a bona fide dispute.
The Plaintiffs identify several unresolved issues in this
litigation, including disputes as to the amount of overtime hours
worked, whether damages should be calculated under the half-time
method, whether any FLSA violations were willful, and whether the
Plaintiffs would be eligible for liquidated damages. Indeed, this
action has been through many years of litigation, including an
appeal to the Ninth Circuit and subsequent appeal to the United
States Supreme Court.

The settlement allocates $612,000 to the FLSA claims. According to
the Plaintiffs, that amount is 78% of their best day in court, and
is greater than they would receive if they failed to prevail on
even one of the disputed issues. This settlement amount is
sufficient to warrant settlement approval.   

The Court also approves the Plaintiffs' Counsel's request for
attorney's fees in the amount of $591,666.67, or one-third of the
total settlement amount, subject to approval by the Superior Court
in Neal. While this is an upward departure from this Court's
benchmark of 25%, the Court finds it appropriate under the
circumstances.  

The Court also approves the Plaintiffs' Counsel's request for
reimbursement of litigation expenses of up to $56,000.00 from the
settlement amount, subject again to approval by the Superior Court
in Neal. To date, the Plaintiffs have incurred $54,000 in
litigation costs, and counsel anticipates additional costs in the
administration of the settlement. The Plaintiffs represent that
they will submit a final costs request in conjunction with its fee
petition and final approval in Neal, and are ordered to report
regarding the same when they request dismissal of this action
following final approval of Neal. No other costs are assessed
against Defendant.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc2276rr from Leagle.com.

Gina McKeen-Chaplin, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew C. Helland
-- helland@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, LLP & Daniel Solomon Brome --
dbrome@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, LLP.

Provident Savings Bank, F.S.B., Defendant, represented by Howard M.
Knee -- knee@blankrome.com -- Blank Rome LLP & Michael Lester
Ludwig -- ludwig@blankrome.com -- Blank Rome LLP.

QUALITY SYSTEMS: Nov. 19 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
--------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

In re QUALITY SYSTEMS, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION
No. 8:13-cv-01818-CJC-JPR

This Document Relates To:
ALL ACTIONS.

SUMMARY NOTICE OF (I) PENDENCY
OF CLASS ACTION AND PROPOSED
SETTLEMENT; (II) SETTLEMENT
HEARING; AND (III) MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES

IF YOU PURCHASED OR ACQUIRED QUALITY SYSTEMS, INC. ("QSI") COMMON
STOCK FROM MAY 26, 2011, THROUGH AND INCLUDING JULY 25, 2012, AND
WERE DAMAGED THEREBY (THE "CLASS"), YOU COULD RECEIVE A PAYMENT
FROM A CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT. CERTAIN PERSONS ARE EXCLUDED FROM
THE DEFINITION OF THE CLASS AS SET FORTH IN THE STIPULATION OF
SETTLEMENT.

PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY. YOUR RIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED BY A
CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT PENDING IN THIS COURT.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Order of the United States District Court
for the Central District of California, Southern Division, that the
above-captioned litigation (the "Litigation") has been certified as
a class action for the purposes of settlement only and that a
Settlement has been proposed for $19,000,000 in cash. A hearing
will be held on November 19, 2018, at 1:30 p.m., before the
Honorable Cormac J. Carney at the Ronald Reagan Federal Building
and U.S. Courthouse, 411 West Fourth Street, Courtroom 9B, Santa
Ana, CA 92701, for the purpose of determining whether: (1) the
proposed Settlement should be approved by the Court as fair,
reasonable and adequate; (2) the proposed Plan of Allocation for
distribution of the Settlement proceeds is fair, reasonable and
adequate and therefore should be approved; and (3) the application
of Lead Plaintiffs' counsel for the payment of attorneys' fees of
no more than 25% of the Settlement Amount (up to $4,750,000) and
payment of expenses of no more than $300,000 from the Settlement
Fund, including interest earned thereon, should be approved.

IF YOU ARE A MEMBER OF THE CLASS DESCRIBED ABOVE, YOUR RIGHTS MAY
BE AFFECTED BY THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LITIGATION, AND YOU MAY BE
ENTITLED TO SHARE IN THE SETTLEMENT FUND. If you have not received
a detailed Notice of (I) Pendency of Class Action and Proposed
Settlement; (Ii) Settlement Hearing; and (Iii) Motion for
Attorneys' Fees and Expenses (the "Notice") and a copy of the Proof
of Claim and Release, you may obtain a copy of these documents by
contacting the Claims Administrator: QSI Securities Settlement, c/o
A.B. Data, Ltd., P.O. Box 173037, Milwaukee, WI 53217,
1-866-963-9980. You may also obtain copies of the Stipulation of
Settlement, Notice and Proof of Claim and Release at
www.QSISecuritiesSettlement.com.

If you are a Class Member, to be eligible to share in the
distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, you must submit a Proof of
Claim and Release by mail postmarked no later than December 12,
2018, or submit it online by that date. If you are a Class Member
and do not submit a valid Proof of Claim and Release, you will not
be eligible to share in the distribution of the Net Settlement
Fund, but you will still be bound by any judgment entered by the
Court in this Litigation (including the releases provided for
therein).

To exclude yourself from the Class, you must submit a written
request for exclusion so that is received by October 29, 2018, in
accordance with the instructions set forth in the Notice. If you
are a Class Member and do not exclude yourself from the Class, you
will be bound by any judgment entered by the Court in this
Litigation (including the releases provided for therein) whether or
not you submit a Proof of Claim and Release. If you submit a
written request for exclusion, you will have no right to recover
money pursuant to the Settlement.

Any objection to the proposed Settlement, the Plan of Allocation of
Settlement proceeds, or the fee and expenses application must be
filed with the Court and delivered such that it is received by each
of the following no later than October 29, 2018:

          CLERK OF THE COURT
          UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
          CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
          Ronald Reagan Federal Building & U.S. Courthouse
          411 West Fourth Street
          Santa Ana, CA  92701

          Co-Lead Counsel:

          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          ROBERT R. HENSSLER JR.
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA  92101

          Co-Lead Counsel:
          BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP
          BENJAMIN GALDSTON
          12481 High Bluff Drive, Suite 300
          San Diego, CA  92130

          Defense Counsel:
          LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
          PETER A. WALD
          505 Montgomery Street, Suite 2000
          San Francisco, CA  94111

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT, THE CLERK'S OFFICE, DEFENDANTS, OR
DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL REGARDING THIS NOTICE. If you have any
questions about the Settlement, or your eligibility to participate
in the Settlement, you may contact Lead Counsel at the addresses
listed above or by calling 1-800-449-4900 or 1-800-380-8496.

BY ORDER OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

RF FISHER: Court Grants Prelim Approval of FLSA Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas granted
Parties' Joint and Amended Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Amended Collective Action Settlement in the case captioned MICHELLE
C. SMITH, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. R.F. FISHER ELECTRIC COMPANY, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 2:17-cv-02457-KGG (D. Kan.), after finding that the Proposed
Settlement is Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate.

In determining whether a proposed settlement under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) is fair and equitable, the factors which
courts consider in approving a class action settlements under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(e) are instructive, as well as factors relevant to
the history and policy of the FLSA.

The Requested Attorneys' Fees and Costs are Reasonable. Judge
Crabtree approved counsel's request for no fee and cost award.
Having reviewed the pleadings and the Amended Agreement, the Court
concur and approve Plaintiff's counsel's request for no fee and
cost award.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and  Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8eo662n
from Leagle.com.

Michelle C. Smith, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated., Plaintiff, represented by Michael A. Williams --
mwilliams@williamsdirks.com -- Williams Dirks Dameron LLC.

R.F. Fisher Electric Company, LLC, Defendant, represented by Alan
L. Rupe -- Alan.Rupe@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &
Smith, LLP & Jessica L. Skladzien --
Jessica.Skladzien@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &
Smith LLP.


ROANOKE, VA: Court Conditionally Certifies Collective Action
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned DAWN RENEE WRIGHT and MAURICE PENDELTON on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ROANOKE, VIRGINIA, the Defendant, Case No.
7:18-cv-00210-GEC (W.D. Va.), the Court entered an order on August
10, 2018:

   1. conditionally certifying case as a collective action under
      29 U.S.C. sectionn 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act;

   2. authorizing and approving judicial notice as agreed to by
      the parties to inform potential collective members of the
      action and to give them an opportunity to join this action
      as party plaintiffs by opting in;

   3. directing Plaintiffs' counsel to administer the notice
      through first class mail using a Notice substantially
      similar to the Notice proposed by the parties. Within 15
      calendar days of the entry of this Order, Defendant's
      counsel shall provide a list to Plaintiffs' counsel in an
      electronically manipulable format, e.g. Excel, of all
      persons employed by Defendant as police officers, whose
      eligibility for FLSA overtime was determined based on a 14
      day cycle at a rank lower than Lieutenant, with the City of
      Roanoke Police Department during the previous three years
      preceding May 11, 2018, including their names, last known
      addresses, personal email addresses (if known), telephone
      numbers, and employment dates. Plaintiffs' counsel shall
      disburse the Notice within 7 calendar days of receipt of
      such list from Defendant";

   4. scheduling Notice period ty extend 45 days from the date
      that Plaintiffs' counsel disburses the Notice. As soon as
      reasonably practicable, Plaintiffs' counsel will file a
      submission indicating Notice has been sent; and

   5. making entry of the Order is without prejudice to any
      subsequent effort of Defendant to decertify the collective
      action. Specifically, by agreeing to this conditional
      certification, Defendant is not agreeing that collective
      certification is appropriate and is not waiving any right
      to move to decertify the collective certification following
      discovery.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Harris D. Butler, III, Esq.
          Zev H. Antell, Esq.
          ButlerRoyals, PLC
          140 Virginia Street, Suite 302
          Richmond, VA 23219
          Telephone: (804) 648 4848
          Facsimile: (804) 237 0413
          E-mail: harris.butler@butlerroyals.com
                  zev.antell@butlerroyals.com

               - and -

          Thomas E. Strelka, Esq.
          L. Leigh R. Strelka, Esq.
          STRELKA LAW OFFICE, PC
          Warehouse Row
          119 Norfolk Avenue, S. W., Suite 330
          Roanoke, VA 24011
          E-mail: thomas@strelkalaw.com
                  eigh@strelkalaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Paul G. Klockenbrink, Esq.
          Catherine J. Huff, Esq.
          Gentry Locke, Esq.
          10 Franklin Road S.E., Suite 900
          P.O. Box 40013
          Roanoke, VA 24022-0013
          E-mail: klockenbrink@gentrylocke.com
                  huff@gentrylocke.com

               - and -

          Timothy R. Spencer, Esq.
          ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY
          CITY OF ROANOKE
          215 Church Avenue SW, Room 464
          Roanoke, VA 24011
          E-mail: timothy.spencer@roanokeva.gov


ROCKWELL MEDICAL: Faces Securities Fraud Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
Block & Leviton LLP, a securities litigation firm representing
investors nationwide, on July 31 disclosed that a securities fraud
class action has been filed against Rockwell Medical, Inc.
("Rockwell" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: RMTI) and certain of its
officers alleging violations of the federal securities laws. Block
& Leviton encourages shareholders to contact the Firm ahead of the
September 25, 2018 lead plaintiff deadline.

On June 27, 2018, Rockwell announced that its auditor, Plante &
Moran, PLLC, had resigned. Rockwell's auditor expressed concerns
that the Company already knew that its drug "Triferic" would not
receive "separate reimbursement" from the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS). The auditor alleged that the Company
failed to communicate this information and/or made misleading
representations. The auditor further stated that there were
material weaknesses in Rockwell's internal controls over financial
reporting.

On this news, Rockwell's share price fell $0.85, or over 16%, over
two consecutive trading days to close at $4.41 on June 28, 2018.

The complaint, filed in the United States District Court Eastern
District of New York, alleges that between March 16, 2018 and June
26, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"), Defendants made false
and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations,
and prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose that:
(1) Rockwell was aware that the CMS will not pursue Rockwell's
proposal for separate reimbursement for Triferic; (2) the estimated
reserves in Rockwell's Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31,
2018 were misstated; (3) there were material weaknesses in
Rockwell's internal control over financial reporting; (4)
consequently, Rockwell's internal controls over financial reporting
were ineffective; (5) Robert L. Chioini, former Chief Executive
Officer of Rockwell, withheld material information regarding
Triferic from Rockwell's auditor, corporate counsel and five
independent directors of Rockwell's Board; and (6) as a result,
Defendants' statements about Rockwell's business, operations and
prospects were materially false and misleading and/or lacked
reasonable bases at all relevant times.

If you purchased RMTI shares between March 16, 2018 and June 26,
2018 and wish to serve as a lead plaintiff, you must move the Court
no later than September 25, 2018. As a member of the class, you may
seek to file a motion to serve as a lead plaintiff or take no
action and remain an absent class member. If you wish to become
involved in the litigation or have questions about your legal
rights, you are encouraged to contact Attorney John DeFelice at
(888) 868-2385, by email at john@blockesq.com or by visiting
http://shareholder.law/rockwell.

Confidentiality to whistleblowers or others with information
relevant to this investigation is assured.

Block & Leviton LLP -- http://www.blockesq.com-- was recently
ranked 4th among securities litigation firms by ISS for recoveries
in 2017. The firm represents many of the nations' largest
institutional investors and numerous individual investors in
securities litigation throughout the country.  Indeed, its lawyers
have recovered billions of dollars for its clients. [GN]

ROSICKI ROSICKI: Dismissal of A. Cohen's FDCPA Suit Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed the
District Court's judgment granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned AARON COHEN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROSICKI, ROSICKI &
ASSOCIATES, P.C., DITECH FINANCIAL LLC, Defendants-Appellees,
Docket No. 17-950-cv (2nd Cir.).

The plaintiff, Aaron Cohen, brings this putative class action
against Ditech Financial LLC (Ditech), Cohen's mortgage-loan
servicer, and Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C. (Rosicki), the
servicer's law firm, alleging violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), in connection with their attempt
to initiate foreclosure proceedings on his home.

Ditech argues that Cohen lacks standing under Article III of the
Constitution to bring this action.  To satisfy the irreducible
constitutional minimum of Article III standing, a plaintiff must
demonstrate (1) injury in fact  (2) a causal connection between
that injury and the complained-of conduct, and (3) a likelihood
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

Here, Cohen alleges that the defendants violated 15 U.S.C. Sections
1692e and 1692g. The Court have held in the wake of Spokeo, albeit
in non-binding summary orders, that Sections 1692e and 1692g
protect an individual's concrete interests, so that an alleged
violation of these provisions satisfies the injury-in-fact
requirement of Article III.

Both of Cohen's FDCPA claims are based on the defendants' allegedly
incorrect identification of Green Tree as the creditor in the
foreclosure complaint, Certificate, and RJI. Taken as true, this
misrepresentation might have deprived Cohen of information relevant
to the debt prompting the foreclosure proceeding, posing a risk of
real harm insofar as it could hinder the exercise of his right to
defend or otherwise litigate that action. The Court concludes that
Cohen has alleged an injury-in-fact and therefore has standing.

Here, the purpose of the defendants' foreclosure proceeding was to
obtain payment of the underlying mortgage note. Indeed, every
mortgage foreclosure, judicial or otherwise, is undertaken for the
very purpose of obtaining payment on the underlying debt, either by
persuasion, i.e., forcing a settlement or compulsion, i.e.,
obtaining a judgment of foreclosure, selling the house at auction,
and applying the proceedings from the sale to pay down the
outstanding debt. Moreover, mortgage foreclosure is contemplated in
another portion of the statute.   

The Court therefore concludes that mortgage foreclosure meets the
FDCPA's broad definition of  debt collection.

Failure to State a Claim Under 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e

The Court nonetheless affirms the dismissal of Cohen's Section
1692e claim for failure to state a claim. Section 1692e prohibits
debt collectors from making any false, deceptive, or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of any
debt. Cohen's principal allegation is that the defendants violated
Section 1692e by falsely identifying Green Tree as the creditor
with respect to Cohen's mortgage in the foreclosure complaint, the
Certificate, and RJI.

Here, there is no indication that the identification of Green Tree
as the creditor misrepresented the nature or legal status of the
debt or undermined Cohen's ability to respond to the debt
collection. Although Ditech's response to the qualified written
request stated that Fannie Mae owned Cohen's mortgage account,
Green Tree was responsible for servicing the account. As the
account servicer, Green Tree had the right to collect mortgage
payments and to pursue foreclosure under New York law. Moreover, it
is undisputed that the entity to whom Cohen's payments on his debt
were owed in the first instance was Green Tree and that Green Tree
was also the primary point of contact for any questions Cohen may
have had about his mortgage.   

On the facts reflected in the complaint and attached documents, the
false identification of Green Tree as the creditor would not have
caused even a highly unsophisticated consumer to suffer a
disadvantage in charting a course of action in response to the
collection effort. Indeed, stating accurately that Fannie Mae was
the creditor to whom the debt is owed likely would have caused
confusion inasmuch as Cohen might then have been led to believe
wrongly, of course that he should make his monthly mortgage
payments to Fannie Mae.

The entity to which a debtor owes money potentially affects the
debtor in the most basic ways, such as what the debtor should write
after pay to the order of' on the payment check to ensure that the
debt is satisfied. A misrepresentation concerning the creditor's
identity in debt collection notices can cause a debtor confusion
and delay in trying to contact the proper party concerning payment
on her loan and resolution of the problem.

Here, however, the facts and circumstances of the foreclosure
proceeding and the foreclosure filings at issue in this lawsuit
admit no plausible claim that the challenged misrepresentation of
Green Tree rather than Fannie Mae as the creditor undermined
Cohen's or any other similarly situated mortgagor's ability to
respond to the debt.

Failure to State a Claim Under 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g

The Court also affirms the district court's dismissal of Cohen's
Section 1692g claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Cohen claims that the defendants violated Section
1692g(a)(2), which requires a debt collector, in its initial
communication with the debtor, to identify the creditor to whom the
debt is owed. Cohen contends that the Certificate and RJI9 were
initial communications as defined by Section 1692g(a) and that
because the defendants failed to identify the correct creditor in
these documents, they are liable for damages under the FDCPA.

The defendants counter that Cohen failed to state a Section 1692g
claim because the Certificate and RJI are exempt from the FDCPA's
definition of initial communications. The defendants rely on
Section 1692g(d), which provides that a communication in the form
of a formal pleading in a civil action shall not be treated as an
initial communication for purposes of subsection (a). This broad
exclusion applies not only to the formal documents that make up a
standard pleading, but also to any communication forming any part
thereof, including exhibits attached to a complaint.

The Court concludes that the Certificate falls within Section
1692g(d)'s pleading exclusion, and is therefore not an initial
communication, because the defendants were legally obligated to
file this document with the foreclosure complaint.

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's July 23, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc4j6pa7 from Leagle.com.

DANIEL A. EDELMAN, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, LLC
(Tiffany N. Hardy, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, LLC;
Shimshon Wexler, The Law Office of Shimshon Wexler, PC, on the
brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant.

HENRY MASCIA (Cheryl F. Korman, on the brief), Rivkin Radler LLP,
for Defendant-Appellee Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C.

MARTIN C. BRYCE, JR. (Adam P. Hartley -- HARTLEYA BALLARDSPAHR.COM
-- Alexander Kommatas -- KOMMATASA BALLARDSPAHR.COM -- on the
brief), Ballard Spahr LLP, New York, New York, for
Defendant-Appellee Ditech Financial, LLC.

Mary McLeod, General Counsel, John R. Coleman, Deputy General
Counsel, Steven Bressler, Assistant General Counsel, Nandan M.
Joshi , Joseph Frisone, Counsel, Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, in support of Plaintiff-Appellant.

RSKM LLC: Corr Sues over Debt Collection Practices
--------------------------------------------------
Vickie Corr, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. RSKM, LLC dba E&A Medical Billing &
Insurance Services, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-02323-DLR (D.
Ariz., July 24, 2018) seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and
unconscionable means to collect debt.

RSKM, LLC dba E&A Medical Billing & Insurance Services is a company
engaged as a debt collector. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Russell S. Thompson, IV, Esq.
          Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC
          5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618
          Mesa, AZ 85206
          Telephone: (602) 388-8898
          Facsimile: (866) 317-2674
          E-mail: rthompson@ThompsonConsumerLaw.com

               - and -

          Joseph Panvini, Esq.
          Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC
          5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618
          Mesa, AZ 85206
          Telephone: (602) 388-8875
          Facsimile: (866) 317-2674
          E-mail: jpanvini@ThompsonConsumerLaw.com


RUSHMORE LOAN: Wortman Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections
--------------------------------------------------------
Nicole T. Wortman, and Shane W. Wortman, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Rushmore Loan
Management Services LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04894 (N.D.
Ill., July 18, 2018) seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and
unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Rushmore Loan Management Services LLC provides residential mortgage
loan servicing and customer support for performing, re-performing,
and non-performing loans in the United States and Puerto Rico. The
company also provides wholesale loan origination services. It
serves borrowers, broker clients, homeowners, and investors. The
company was incorporated in 2008 and is based in Irvine,
California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph Scott Davidson, Esq.
          James C. Vlahakis, Esq.
          Mohammed Omar Badwan, Esq.
          SULAIMAN LAW GROUP, LTD.
          2500 S. Highland Avenue, Suite 200
          Lombard, IL 60148
          Telephone: (630) 575-8181
          E-mail: jdavidson@sulaimanlaw.com
                  jvlahakis@sulaimanlaw.com
                  mbadwan@sulaimanlaw.com


SAIC INC: Awaits Court Approval of Securities Case Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------
Leidos Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 27, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 29, 2018, that the parties in the case
entitled, In Re: SAIC, Inc. Securities Litigation awaits court
approval on their proposed settlement.

The terms of the proposed settlement remain subject to court
approval, which is expected to occur in 2018.

Between February and April 2012, alleged stockholders filed three
putative securities class actions against the Company and several
former executives relating to the Company's contract to develop and
implement an automated time and attendance and workforce management
system for certain agencies of the City of New York ("CityTime").
One case was withdrawn and two cases were consolidated in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York in In Re:
SAIC, Inc. Securities Litigation.

The consolidated securities complaint asserted claims under
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
based on allegations that the Company and individual defendants
made misleading statements or omissions about the Company's
revenues, operating income and internal controls in connection with
disclosures relating to the CityTime project. The plaintiffs sought
to recover from the Company and the individual defendants an
unspecified amount of damages class members allegedly incurred by
buying Leidos' stock at an inflated price.

The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice
and without leave to replead. The plaintiffs then appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which issued
an opinion affirming in part, and vacating in part, the District
Court's ruling. The Company filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, which was granted on March
27, 2017. The District Court granted the Company's request to stay
all proceedings, including discovery, pending the outcome at the
Supreme Court.

In September 2017, the parties engaged in mediation resulting in an
agreement to settle all remaining claims for an immaterial amount
to be paid by the Company. The amounts payable by the Company are
covered by an insurance policy. The terms of the proposed
settlement remain subject to court approval, which is expected to
occur in 2018.

Leidos Holdings, Inc. provides services and solutions in the
defense, intelligence, civil, and health markets primarily in the
United States. The company operates through three segments: Defense
Solutions, Civil, and Health. The company was founded in 1969 and
is headquartered in Reston, Virginia.


SCANIA: RHA Sees Progress in Cartel Class Action
------------------------------------------------
Handy Shipping Guide reports that regular readers with an eye on
the road freight industry will be aware of the accusations of
cartel activity aimed squarely at some of the continent's major
truck manufacturers, accusations which resulted in EUR2.9 billion
fines for four of the five companies involved two years ago.
Subsequently fines for Scania, which had plead innocence, pushed
this up to EUR3.8 billion. With the Road Haulage Association (RHA)
subsequently coordinating a legal class action on behalf of its
members, and indeed other operators, the latest developments see
the long legal battle begin to take shape and substance.

The RHA has now submitted its claim application to the Competition
Appeal Tribunal and says that, if successful, UK transport
operators could be in for a possible windfall of over GBP6,000 for
every 6-tonne and above vehicle bought or leased between 1997 and
2011. Broadly speaking, operators are entitled to claim for the
difference between what they paid for their trucks (new,
second-hand or leased) and what they would have paid had the cartel
not existed.

RHA chief executive Richard Burnett said the truck makers had been
operating ‘behind closed doors' and called for transparency. He
commented:

"If the RHA's competition claim is successful, there is a strong
potential that the majority of the industry's operators will
benefit. This won't happen overnight, it's a long process. But we
will continue to push for a result that will help the thousands of
operators who have been dealt a poor deal. We estimate that the
truck cartel will have impacted upon the buyers of 600,000 trucks
that were purchased in the UK between 1997 and 2011, amounting to a
potential compensation claim of over GBP5 billion.

"On the same basis, we estimate that operators in the rest of
Europe bought 3.4 million trucks and could also be due compensation
of over GBP25 billion. We are concerned that the profits made on
the back of truck sales could be the tip of a cartel iceberg. Many
of the truck manufacturers have a motor ‘arm', Volvo, Renault,
Mercedes and Iveco (Fiat and Ferrari). And who can forget the VW
emissions scandal in 2015?"

VW are the automotive side of truck manufacturers Scania and MAN
(which as the whistleblower escaped the EU penalty completely).
More than 50,000 VW owners have signed up for that class action in
a bid to get a pay-out because of defeat devices installed to fool
emission tests, and there is some speculation that they may receive
up to 100% of the original cost of their cars, on average around
GBP17,500. The European Commission has also said it is
investigating allegations of collusion among the German car
manufacturers over emissions having seen the depths of collusion in
the truck cartel case.

To process the class action suit the RHA built a dedicated website
which so far has seen over 3,600 operators sign up representing
over 160,000 trucks sold or leased during the cartel period. A
further almost 700 operators have registered their interest and are
in the process of signing up. Other class action suits are also
being pursued for example by lawyers CollyerBristow. [GN]

SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES: Classes in ICS Suit Decertified
-----------------------------------------------------
In the cases, SUSAN MOJICA and THOMAS MOJICA, Plaintiffs, v.
SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. Defendant, and IN RE GLOBAL TEL*LINK
CORPORATION ICS LITIGATION, Case Nos. 5:14-CV-5258, 5:14-CV-5275
(W.D. Ark.), Judge Timothy L. Brooks of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Arkansas, Fayetteville Division, (i)
granted Securus's Motion for Class Decertification; (ii) granted
Securus's Motion for Summary Judgment; (iii) denied the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; (iv) denied the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Primary Jurisdiction Referral and Stay Pending Referral;
(v) denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Primary Jurisdiction Referral
and Stay Pending Referral (vi) granted GTL's Motion to Decertify
Class and to Vacate Order Granting Class Certification; and (vii)
granted GTL's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The two cases are nationwide class action lawsuits involving rates
and fees charged for the provision of inmate calling services
("ICS") to prisoners and their loved ones.  Defendants Securus and
GTL are ICS providers; and the Plaintiffs and the class members are
users of ICS.  The lawsuit against Securus is brought by Susan and
Thomas Mojica; and the lawsuit against GTL is brought by Kaylan
Stuart, Dustin Murilla, Walter Chruby, and Rocky Hobbs.  In both
cases, the Plaintiffs seek to recover allegedly exorbitant rates
and fees they paid to the defendants, bringing claims under the
Federal Communications Act ("FCA") and the common law of unjust
enrichment.

In February 2000, a woman named Martha Wright, along with other
similarly situated individuals, filed a class action complaint in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against a
variety of defendants (including those named in the instant cases).
The plaintiffs in that lawsuit alleged that various telephone
companies entered into exclusive agreements to provide ICS at
correctional facilities throughout the United States and exploited
those monopolies by charging unjust and unreasonable rates for
inmate phone calls in violation of the FCA, thereby unjustly
enriching themselves.

In 2001, the Wright lawsuit was stayed, pending the resolution of
related proceedings before the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC").  Twelve years later, in September 2013, the FCC instituted
an interim regulatory scheme designed to prospectively curb the
practices complained of in the Wright lawsuit.

The two lawsuits against Securus and GTL were filed in August and
September of 2014, respectively.  But importantly, they're not the
only lawsuits that were filed in the Court against these Defendants
regarding ICS.  The instant lawsuits are concerned solely with
rates and fees associated with interstate calls.  But after these
two lawsuits were filed, two other lawsuits dealing only with
intrastate calls were filed in the Court: one against GTL in June
2015, see Chruby et al. v. Global Tel*Link Corp., Case No.
5:15-cv-1536, and one against Securus in January 2017, see Antoon
v. Securus Techs., Inc., Case No. 5:17-cv-5008.

In 2015, the FCC entered a Second Report and Order and Third
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking In the Matter of Rates for
Interstate Inmate Calling Services ("Second Report and Order"),
that imposed caps on the amounts that ICS providers could charge
consumers in calling rates and ancillary fees.

On Feb. 3, 2017, the Court entered orders in the two instant cases,
certifying nationwide classes on the Plaintiffs' claims under the
FCA for unjust and unreasonable calling rates and deposit fees on
prepaid accounts, along with multi-state subclasses on the
Plaintiffs' claims under state common law for unjust enrichment
from calling rates.  Their theory of liability for class
certification depended on the proposition that "site commissions,"
which the Defendants would pay to states in order to obtain ICS
contracts, were not legitimate costs of business, and that it was
unjust and unreasonable for the defendants to recoup site
commissions from the class members through inflated calling rates
and deposit fees.

However, four months later in the case of Global Tel*Link v. FCC,
866 F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded the Second Report and Order in
part on the grounds that site commissions are legitimate costs of
business when they are a condition precedent to obtaining ICS
contracts.  Then, five months after that, the Court entered an
order denying certification of an Arkansas unjust enrichment class
in the intrastate case of Chruby, Case No. 5:15-cv-1536, and
suggested that its reasons for doing so might also warrant
decertification of the unjust-enrichment classes in the instant two
interstate cases of Mojica v. Securus Techs., Inc., Case No.
5:14-cv-5258, and In re Global Tel*Link Corp. ICS Litig., Case No.
5:14-cv-5275 ("In re GTL").

Now, nine months and several stays later, the Court finally takes
up the issues in these two cases that were foreshadowed by the D.C.
Circuit opinion and the Court's denial of class certification in
Chruby.  

In the Opinion and Order, Judge Brooks rules on all such pending
motions that request class decertification, summary judgment, or
primary jurisdiction referral.  

He begins with the issue of decertification, in conjunction with
the Plaintiffs' pending requests for primary jurisdiction referral
to the FCC.  He holds that the FCA classes will be decertified with
respect to claims for unjust and unreasonable calling rates
because, in light of the D.C. Circuit opinion, common issues no
longer predominate over individual ones.  The matter will not be
referred to the FCC for additional guidance or clarification,
because none is needed.

The Judge presently believes that the same concerns informing its
decision not to certify intrastate unjust enrichment classes
warrant decertifying the interstate unjust enrichment classes in
both Mojica and In re GTL.  For any given phone call, it is
impossible to know whether a class member's use of ICS on that
occasion was voluntary or the product of, e.g., duress, without
examining the particular circumstances surrounding that call,
including the contents of the call itself.  Surely a phone call
between an inmate and his dying mother would defeat a
voluntary-payment defense; but it seems unlikely the same could be
said for a phone call between an inmate and a journalist made at
the journalist's expense.  

He has little doubt that there are a great many calls that could
defeat a voluntary-payment defense, but that is not the issue under
Rule 23(b)(3); rather, the issue is whether this can be adjudicated
without overwhelmingly individualized inquiry.  He believes it
cannot be, and that this means the unjust enrichment classes in
these two interstate cases never should have been certified.
Therefore, they will be decertified.

The Judge turns the parties' pending requests for summary judgment.
As with their claims for calling rates, he finds that the
Plaintiffs have not presented any theory of liability or damages on
their deposit fee claims in either of the instant cases that
accounts for site commissions as recoverable costs.  Since they've
not advanced a methodology by which the FCC could properly hold, in
the wake of the D.C. Circuit opinion, that their deposit fees were
unjust or unreasonable, their deposit fee claims will likewise be
dismissed.

Turning now to the individual claims for unjust enrichment in these
two cases: the Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary
judgment on these claims because they are preempted by federal law.
The Judge agrees.  He holds that the Plaintiffs' claims for unjust
enrichment in both Mojica and In re GTL will be dismissed with
prejudice.  He agrees with the Seventh and Tenth Circuits that 47
U.S.C. Sections 201 and 202, read together, demonstrate a
congressional intent that individual long-distance customers
throughout the United States receive uniform rates, terms and
conditions of service, and that this uniformity principle of the
FCA preempts state law challenges to the reasonableness of the
rates, terms, and conditions of service provided by
telecommunications carriers for interstate calls.  To hold
otherwise would result in the very discrimination Congress sought
to prevent through 47 U.S.C. Section 202(a)'s mandate that it will
be unlawful for any common carrier to subject any particular
locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.

For these reasons, in the case of Mojica v. Securus Techs., Inc.,
Judge Brooks decertified all classes previously certified in the
case, and dismissed with prejudice the named Plaintiffs' individual
claims.  Judgment will enter separately and contemporaneously with
the Order.

In the case of In re Global Tel*Link Corp. ICS Litig., the Judge
decertified all classes previously certified in the case, and
dismissed with prejudice the named Plaintiffs' individual claims.
Judgment will enter separately and contemporaneously with the
Order.

The notice to the classes of the order, in a form approved by the
Court, will be disseminated in accordance with a notice program to
be approved by the Court following consideration of the parties'
proposal(s) for the form and manner of notice, which proposal(s)
will be submitted to the Court within 14 days of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 29, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/hV3a2s from Leagle.com.

Susan Mojica, Individual claims dismissed with prejudice per order
filed 6/29/2018, Plaintiff, represented by Amanda Trask --
atrask@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, Amy C. Martin
-- amy@everettfirm.com -- Attorney at Law, Barbara A. Podell --
bpodell@bm.net -- Berger Montague P.C., Benjamin D. Brown --
bbrown@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers Toll PLLC, Donna
Siegel Moffa -- dmoffa@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP,
James Maro -- jmaro@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP,
pro hac vice, Peter R. Kahana -- pkahana@bm.net -- Berger Montague
P.C., Peter A. Muhic -- pmuhic@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer
Check LLP, Robert A. Braun -- RBraun@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen
Milstein Sellers Toll PLLC, Yechiel Michael Twersky --
mitwersky@bm.net -- BERGER MONTAGUE P.C., Patrick Howard --
phoward@smbb.com -- Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett Bendesky P.C. &
Samantha Holbrook -- sholbrook@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check, LLP.

Securus Technologies, Inc., Defendant, represented by James M.
Graves -- jgraves@bassettlawfirm.com -- Bassett Law Firm LLP,
Robert L. Jones, III, Conner & Winters, Woody Bassett --
wbassett@bassettlawfirm.com -- Bassett Law Firm, Craig A.
Stanfield, King & Spalding LLP, pro hac vice, David Bruce Salmons,
Morgan Lewis Bockius LLP, pro hac vice, Elizabeth Brooke
Herrington, Morgan Lewis Bockius LLP, Joshua Fowkes --
joshua.fowkes@arentfox.com -- Arent Fox LLP, Kerri E. Kobbeman,
Conner & Winters, LLP, Megan R. Braden, Morgan Lewis Bockius LLP &
Stephanie Joyce -- stephanie.joyce@arentfox.com -- Arent Fox LLP.

Thomas Mojica, Intervenor, represented by Amy C. Martin, Attorney
at Law, Peter A. Muhic, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, pro hac
vice, Donna Siegel Moffa, Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP &
Samantha Holbrook, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP.

SHILOH TREATMENT: Judge Orders Removal of Migrant Children
----------------------------------------------------------
Alex Johnson, writing for NBC News, reports that a federal judge on
July 30 ordered the government to transfer all but the most
troubled migrant children who have been separated from their
families out of an immigration facility in Texas that is alleged to
use psychotropic drugs on its wards.

U.S. District Judge Dolly Gee found conditions at the nonprofit
Shiloh Treatment Center, in Manvel, near Houston, in violation of a
1997 settlement, called Flores vs. Reno, requiring immigration
officials to place detained minors "in the least restrictive
setting appropriate to (each Class Member's) age and special
needs."

A class-action lawsuit filed on behalf of children at Shiloh in
April alleged that children being held in facilities like Shiloh
are almost certain to be administered psychotropic drugs like
Prozac regardless of their conditions and without their parents'
consent, it says. The suit alleges that the drugs are a "chemical
strait jacket" used to manage trauma preemptively.

Judge Gee ordered on July 30 that all children involved in the suit
be removed from the Shiloh facility "unless a licensed psychologist
or psychiatrist" determines that a particular child "poses a risk
of harm to self or others."

And she ordered the government to seek consent before giving
psychotropic drugs to any detained migrant child. Without consent,
the facility may administer such a drug only in an emergency or
under a court order, she said.

Judge Gee separately ruled on July 27 that an independent monitor
should be appointed to assess conditions at facilities like Shiloh.
[GN]

SKIPTHEDISHES: Drivers File Misclassification Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Diana Foxall, writing for Global News, report that SkipTheDishes is
known for delivering users' favourite food to their doors, but now,
the online service is being served a class-action lawsuit.

Charleen Pokornik has been a driver for the company since November
2016. On July 25, she filed a suit on behalf of drivers working in
the eight provinces Skip operates.

According to the statement of claim, Ms. Pokornik said drivers
should be classified as employees, and receive benefits like
vacation, overtime and minimum wage.

Instead, the company calls its drivers independent contractors and
treats them as such, the claim reads.

Ms. Pokornik's suit argues SkipTheDishes breaches legislation
governing acceptable employment standards across Canada in doing
so, and claims drivers have suffered damages and losses as a result
of the improper classification.

"This matter is before the courts and we look forward to responding
through the appropriate channels," said a spokesperson with
SkipTheDishes.

Competitor Uber Eats announced it would begin operations in
Winnipeg in August. [GN]

SOLSTICE BENEFIT: Sends Unsolicited Fax Messages, Zauderer Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MARC J. ZAUDERER, DMD, a Massachusetts resident, individually and
as the representative of a class of similarly-situated persons, the
Plaintiff, v. SOLSTICE BENEFIT SERVICES, INC. and SOLSTICE
BENEFITS, INC., Florida corporations, the Defendants, Case No.
0:18-cv-61820-BB (S.D. Fla., Aug. 7, 2018), challenges Defendants'
practice of sending unsolicited facsimiles.

According to the complaint, the Defendants knew or should have
known that (a) the Plaintiff and the other class members had not
given prior express invitation or permission for the Defendants or
anybody else to fax advertisements about the Defendants' products,
goods or services; (b) the Plaintiff and the other class members
did not have an established business relationship; (c) Defendants
transmitted advertisements; (d) the Faxes did not contain the
required Opt-Out Notice; and (e) Defendants' transmission of
advertisements that did not contain the required opt-out notice or
were sent without prior express invitation or permission was
unlawful.

The Defendants' actions caused damages to the Plaintiff and the
other class members. Receiving the Defendants' junk faxes caused
Plaintiff and the other recipients to lose paper and toner consumed
in the printing of the Defendants' faxes. Moreover, the Defendants'
faxes used the Plaintiff's and the other class members' telephone
lines and fax machine. The Defendants' faxes cost the Plaintiff and
the other class members time, as the Plaintiff and the other class
members and their employees wasted their time receiving, reviewing
and routing the unauthorized faxes. That time otherwise would have
been spent on the Plaintiff's and the other class members' business
activities. The Defendants' faxes unlawfully interrupted the
Plaintiff's and other class members' privacy interests in being
left alone.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: (847) 368 1500
          Facsimile: (847) 368 1501


STEAK 'N SHAKE: 3rd. Cir. Flips Certification of Class in ADA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, reversed the
District Court's judgment granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned CHRISTOPHER MIELO; SARAH
HEINZL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. STEAK 'N SHAKE OPERATIONS, INC., Appellant, No.
17-2678 (3rd Cir.).

The District Court certified the Plaintiffs' proposed class, and
Steak 'n Shake now appeals that certification decision.

In this class action lawsuit, two disability rights advocates have
sued Steak 'n Shake under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). Alleging they have personally experienced difficulty
ambulating in their wheelchairs through two sloped parking
facilities, these Plaintiffs seek to sue on behalf of all
physically disabled individuals who may have experienced similar
difficulties at Steak 'n Shake restaurants throughout the country.

PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO SATISFY RULE 23(A)

A plaintiff wishing to bring a lawsuit in federal court must first
satisfy the explicit requirements set forth in Rule 23(a). This
calls for a rigorous analysis that usually requires courts to make
factual findings and legal conclusions that overlap the underlying
merits of the suit. Second, if the requirements of Rule 23(a) have
been satisfied, the party seeking certification must also establish
that her claim fits within one of the three types of class
categories outlined in Rule 23(b).

Here, the Plaintiffs have sought to establish a Rule 23(b)(2)16
class for which injunctive relief is appropriate to the class as a
whole. But in defining the certified class, the District Court's
Rule 23 analysis was flawed from the start. Citing Eisenberg v.
Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, the District Court wrote that when doubt
exists concerning certification of the class, the court should err
in favor of allowing the case to proceed as a class action.

This was clear error.

Numerosity

Rule 23(a)(1) requires that the proposed class be so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable. Like other factual
determinations underlying Rule 23 determinations, it is a
plaintiff's burden to demonstrate numerosity by a preponderance of
the evidence.

The Plaintiffs attempt to carry their numerosity burden by offering
three strands of evidence but that evidence ultimately falls short.
First, the Plaintiffs point to census data showing that there are
between 14.9 million to 20.9 million persons with mobility
disabilities who live in the United States. Second, the Plaintiffs
point to a single off-hand comment made by a Steak 'n Shake
executive speculating that it would be fair to say that thousands
of people with disabilities utilize Steak 'n Shake parking lots
each year. Third, the Plaintiffs ask this Court to use its common
sense and conclude that numerosity has been satisfied.

The Plaintiffs' first strand of evidence indicating that there are
between 14.9 million to 20.9 million persons with mobility
disabilities who live in the United States suggests that it is
highly likely that at least 40 of those individuals would have
experienced access violations at one of the Steak 'n Shake
locations at issue in this litigation. But although those odds
might be enough for a good wager, the Court must be mindful that
mere speculation as to the number of class members even if such
speculation is a bet worth making cannot support a finding of
numerosity.

The Plaintiffs' second strand of evidence advances their Rule
23(a)(1) burden no further. The single statement of a Steak 'n
Shake executive characterizing the number of patrons who use
company parking lots does not assuage our concerns about
speculation. The fact that one of defendant's executives has
himself speculated as to the number of disabled individuals who
patronize a Steak 'n Shake restaurant and traverse their parking
lots adds nothing. Speculation squared is still speculation.

Because the Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence sufficient
to permit the Court to go beyond speculation as to the
impracticability of joinder, the Court concludes that the
Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their Rule 23(a)(1) burden. If
the Plaintiffs wish to attempt to satisfy their Rule 23(a)(1)
burden upon remand, they will need to provide evidence that will
permit the District Court to conclude that a sufficiently numerous
group of disabled individuals have experienced or will experience
ADA violations at a relevant Steak 'n Shake restaurant, and that
joinder is thereby impracticable.

Commonality

Rule 23(a)(2) requires the Plaintiffs to demonstrate that "there
are questions of law or fact common to the class."

The broad class definition certified by the District Court includes
a commonality issue. As previously set forth, the District Court
certified a class defined as:

     All persons with qualified mobility disabilities who were or
will be denied the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of any Steak
'n Shake restaurant location in the United States on the basis of a
disability because such persons encountered accessibility barriers
at any Steak 'n Shake restaurant where Defendant owns, controls
and/or operates the parking facilities.

Even assuming, arguendo, that a proper interpretation of the class
definition would limit the class to members who suffered injuries
within a Steak 'n Shake parking facility, the wide variety of
regulations quoted above reveal that there are still various types
of ADA violations that could occur specifically in a parking
facility. The Plaintiffs' own complaint, for example, lists seven
different categories of parking facility violations.   

The complaint refers to: (1) parking space slopes; (2) access aisle
slopes; (3) slopes relating to the route leading to a facility
entrance; (4) lack of proper parking signage; (5) lack of proper
van accessible designations; (6) improper mounting of accessible
parking signage; and (7) curb ramp slopes. Although all seven of
these categories allegedly constitute ADA violations, they harm
class members in materially different ways.

A class member, for example, complaining that accessible parking
signage was mounted less than 60 inches above the finished surface
of the parking area, has experienced harm different from that of a
class member complaining that the surfaces of one or more access
aisles had slopes exceeding 2.1%. As Dukes makes clear, suffering a
violation of the same provision of law is not enough. Instead,
class members' claims must depend upon a common contention that is
capable of class-wide resolution in one stroke. The wide variety of
potential ADA violations captured in the broad class definition
certified by the District Court does not lend itself to such a
resolution.

The Court therefore conclude that the Plaintiffs have failed to
satisfy Rule 23(a)(2).

Accordingly, the District Court's judgment will be reversed, and
this matter will be remanded to the District Court for
reconsideration of the class certification question.

A full-text copy of the Third Circuit's July 26, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7z2l4k3 from Leagle.com.

Maria G. Danaher, Patrick J. Fazzini, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash,
Smoak & Stewart.

David H. Raizman [ARGUED], Ogletree Deakins, Counsel for
Appellant.

Teresa L. Jakubowski , Barnes & Thornburg, Counsel for Amicus
Appellants.

Cary Silverman , Shook Hardy & Bacon, Counsel for Amicus
Appellants.

R. Bruce Carlson , Stephanie K. Goldin , Edwin J. Kilpela, Jr.
[ARGUED], Benjamin J. Sweet , Carlson Lynch Sweet & Kilpela,
Counsel for Appellee.

Sharon M. Krevor-Weisbaum , Brown Goldstein & Levy, Counsel for
Amicus Appellee.

Amy F. Robertston , Civil Rights & Enforcement Center, Counsel for
Amicus Appellees.

STRACENER BROTHERS: Underpays Construction Workers, Brown Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
TRAVIS BROWN and TERRANCE WILSON, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. STRACENER BROTHERS
CONSTRUCTION CORP.; N & M CONCRETE, LLC; NATO ISLAS ARAGON; MIGUEL
ISLAS, Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-00134-DPM (E.D. Ark., July 25,
2018) seeks to recover from the Defendants unpaid minimum and
overtime wages as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Arkansas Minimum Wage Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as construction
workers.

Stracener Brothers Construction Corp. is a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the State of Arkansas. The Company
provides on-site construction services. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Daniel Ford, Esq.
          Chris Burks, Esq.
          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          650 South Shackleford, Suite  411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: daniel@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  chris@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


STUCKY LAUER: Burton Sues over Debt Collection Practices
--------------------------------------------------------
Frankie Burton, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Stucky, Lauer & Young; and Credit Bureau
Collection Services, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-CV-2269 (S.D.
Ind., July 24, 2018) seeks to stop the Defendants' unfair and
unconscionable means to collect debt.

Stucky, Lauer & Young, LLP, is an Indiana limited liability
partnership and law firm that acts as a debt collector. The Company
operates a debt collection business and attempts to collect debts
from consumers in the State of Indiana. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David J. Philipps, Esq.
          Mary E. Philipps, Esq.
          Angie K. Robertson, Esq.
          Carissa K. Rasch, Esq.
          PHILIPPS & PHILIPPS, LTD.
          9760 S. Roberts Road, Suite One
          Palos Hills, IL 60465
          Telephone: (708) 974-2900
          Facsimile: (708) 974-2907
          E-mail: davephilipps@aol.com
                  mephilipps@aol.com
                  angiekrobertson@aol.com
                  carissa@philippslegal.com

               - and -

          John T. Steinkamp, Esq.
          5214 S. East Street, Suite D1
          Indianapolis, IN 46227
          Telephone: (317) 780-8300
          Facsimile: (317) 217-1320
          E-mail: steinkamplaw@yahoo.com


SUNRUN INC: Underpays Sales Representatives, Dart Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
SHARON DART, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SUNRUN INC., and Does 1 through 500,
Defendants, Case No. 18CECG02658 (Cal. Super., Fresno Cty., July
18, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for failure to pay
minimum wages, overtime compensation, reimburse business expenses,
provide meal periods, and furnish accurate wage statements.

Ms. Dart was employed by the Defendant as sales representative from
March 2018 to July 2018.

Sunrun Inc. engages in the design, development, installation, sale,
ownership, and maintenance of residential solar energy systems in
the United States. It also sells solar leads. The company markets
and sells its products through direct channels, partner channels,
mass media, digital media, canvassing, referral, retail, and field
marketing. Sunrun Inc. was founded in 2007 and is headquartered in
San Francisco, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Amy R. Lovegren-Tipton, Esq.
          TIPTON LEGAL
          7503 N. West Avenue, Suite 103
          Fresno, CA 93711
          Telephone: (559) 421-9137
          Facsimile: (559) 921-4333
          E-mail: Atipton@TiptonLegal.com


SWITCH INC: Mingbo Cai Suit Transferred to District of Nevada
-------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled MINGBO CAI, Individually and On
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. SWITCH,
INC., ROB ROY, GABE NACHT, ZAREH SARRAFIAN, DONALD SNYDER, TOM
THOMAS, BRYAN WOLF, GOLDMAN SACHS & CO. LLC, J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES
LLC, BMO CAPITAL MARKETS CORP., WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC,
CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC., CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES, JEFFERIES
LLC, BTIG, LLC, RAYMOND JAMES & ASSOCIATES, INC., STIFEL, NICOLAUS
& COMPANY, INC. and WILLIAM BLAIR & COMPANY, L.L.C., the
Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-10425, was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey, to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nevada (Las Vegas) on Aug. 8, 2018. The
District of Nevada Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:18-cv-01471-JCM-VCF to the proceeding. The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge James C. Mahan.

The case is a federal securities action on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired
Switch Class A common stock pursuant to and/or traceable to the
Company's initial public offering commenced on or around October 6,
2017 seeking to recover damages caused by Defendants' violations of
Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933.

Switch is a company based in Las Vegas, Nevada, that develops and
operates the SUPERNAP data center facilities and provides
co-location, telecommunications, cloud services, and content
ecosystems.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          609 W. South Orange Avenue, Suite 2P
          South Orange, NJ 07079
          Telephone: (973) 313 1887
          Facsimile: (973) 833 0399
          E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Kevin M. Mcdonough, Esq.
          LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
          885 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 906 1200


SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL: Still Defends Cambell, Neal & Mott TCPA Suits
------------------------------------------------------------------
Synchrony Financial said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 27, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company continues to
defend three putative class action lawsuits alleging violations of
the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Bank or the Company is, or has been, defending a number of
putative class actions alleging TCPA claims as a result of phone
calls made by the Bank. The complaints generally have alleged that
the Bank or the Company placed calls to consumers by an automated
telephone dialing system or using a pre-recorded message or
automated voice without their consent and seek up to $1,500 for
each violation, without specifying an aggregate amount.

Campbell et al. v. Synchrony Bank was filed on January 25, 2017 in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. The
original complaint named only J.C. Penney Company, Inc. and J.C.
Penney Corporation, Inc. as the defendants but was amended on April
7, 2017 to replace those defendants with the Bank.

Neal et al. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Synchrony Bank, for which
the Bank is indemnifying Wal-Mart, was filed on January 17, 2017 in
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina.
The original complaint named only Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. as a
defendant but was amended on March 30, 2017 to add Synchrony Bank
as an additional defendant.

Mott et al. v. Synchrony Bank was filed on February 2, 2018 in the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Synchrony Financial operates as a consumer financial services
company in the United States. The company offers private label
credit cards, dual cards, general purpose co-branded credit cards,
and small and medium-sized business credit products; and
promotional financing for consumer purchases, such as private label
credit cards and installment loans. Synchrony Financial was
incorporated in 2003 and is headquartered in Stamford,
Connecticut.


T&R MARKET: Judge Approves $1MM Class Action Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Westney, writing for Law360, reports that a New Mexico
couple who are members of the Navajo Nation asked a federal judge
on July 30 to approve a deal that would provide about $1 million to
resolve a proposed class action claiming companies near the Navajo
reservation preyed on consumers by charging secret fees and hiding
the true interest rate for loans tied to consumers' tax refunds.

In their July 2017 complaint, William and Sammia DeJolie sought to
represent the class of more than 1,000 who they said received tax
refund anticipation loans since November 2014.

The case is DeJolie et al v. T&R Market, Inc. et al, Case No.
1:17-cv-00733.  The case is assigned to Judge James O. Browning.
The case was filed July 13, 2017. [GN]



TARGET CORP: Stops Selling Popular Potty Trainers
-------------------------------------------------
Annamarya Scaccia, writing for Romper, reports that it goes without
saying that potty training is hard. The process, overall, is
frustrating for both parent and toddler, even if your kid gets the
hang of it relatively quickly. But one thing that potty training
shouldn't be is physically painful. That's why, as part of a
class-action lawsuit settlement, Target has stopped selling two
popular potty trainers that allegedly injured multiple boys'
genitals.

Target had disclosed that the company pulled the WeePOD Basix and
the WeePOD Toilet Trainer Squish from its shelves, two potty
training products manufactured by Prince Lionheart Inc., according
to Kron 4. The big box retailer agreed to stop selling the WeePOD
devices in order to settle its part in a class-action lawsuit that
claims boys who've used Prince Lionheart's potty trainers had
suffered serious injuries to their penises, Kron 4 reported.

"No one realizes it," John Kristensen, Esq., one of the attorneys
in the case, said at a news conference in June, when the complaint
was filed, according to The Press-Enterprise. "They look nice,
they're like $15 bucks. They're comfy, they're squishy, they sit on
a toilet seat. You're not going to realize that."

Romper reached out to both Target Corporation and Prince Lionheart
for comment, but did not hear back in time for publication. A
Target spokesperson, though, did tell The Mercury News back in
June:

Target is committed to providing high quality and safe products to
our guests, and we require all of our vendors to follow product
safety laws and CPSC guidelines for their products that they sell
at Target. Prince Lionheart manufactures the product and sells it
at a variety of retailers. Prince Lionheart has been in direct
communication with the guest's attorneys on this lawsuit, and any
additional questions should be directed to them.

Target has stopped selling the WeePOD Basix and the WeePOD Toilet
Trainer Squish with manufacturing dates before March 23, 2018,
according to The Mercury News. The class-action lawsuit alleges
that at least 15 young boys endured "gruesome ripping" and other
damages to their genitals after their penises became stuck to the
products, which have a built-in pee guard, The Mercury News
reported. One boy from Riverside, California, reportedly now has
"permanent erectile dysfunction," Kristensen to The Mercury News.

Kristensen told The Press-Enterprise back in June:

It's not the sharp edge, it's the inside that causes a friction. It
sticks to the penis like an old leather car seat [if] you're
wearing a tank top, it sticks.

He continued, according to The Press-Enterprise:

It's the same mechanisms, and then when you pull it off, the penis
is still stuck, the rest of the body is moving. That skin's so
sensitive that it rips.

Last year, Prince Lionheart had made some adjustments to the design
of the potty trainers so that genitals would not stick, according
to Kron 4. But the lawsuit alleges that Target, as well as Prince
Lionheart, failed to warn customers who bought the older defective
devices about the possible dangers, Kron 4.

At the time, Brad Snyder, Esq. -- brad@bradsnyderlaw.com -- the
attorney for Prince Lionheart Incorporated, denied the allegations
outlined in the lawsuit, telling ABC 7 in a statement:

The Court has issued a protective order that bars the parties and
their attorneys from disclosing any information that has been
produced during the discovery process. ... For that reason, I am
unable to comment about the details of the case. What I can say is
that my client is a family-owned company that has been developing
products that meet the highest standards in safety, quality, and
performance for the past 45 years.  Prince Lionheart has yet to
settle its part of the lawsuit, according to Kron 4.[GN]

TATA CONSULTANCY: Court Grants Arbitration of Class Claims
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration of
Claims Class Members in the case captioned BRIAN BUCHANAN, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, v. TATA CONSULTANCY SERVICES, LTD, Defendant, Case No.
15-cv-01696-YGR(N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs bring causes of action for disparate treatment under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Plaintiffs allege that Tata
Consultancy Services (TCS) discriminated against them in their
hiring, employment, and/or termination practices based on race and
national origin.

The parties do not dispute either the existence or applicability of
the arbitration agreements. Rather, the plaintiffs contend that the
agreements are unenforceable because TCS has waived its right to
demand arbitration and the Nationwide Agreement contains
impermissible waiver and unconscionable provisions.

A party seeking to prove waiver of a right to arbitration must
demonstrate: (1) knowledge of an existing right to compel
arbitration; (2) acts inconsistent with that existing right; and
(3) prejudice to the party opposing arbitration resulting from such
inconsistent acts.

While in some circumstances, the defendants' delay may constitute
cause to deny the motion, granting the motion here would merely
reduce the size of the class, not derail the litigation in its
entirety.  The Plaintiffs have not suggested that granting TCS's
motion will affect their ability to prosecute the instant class
action. Although parties dispute the precise size of the class, and
as discussed at the hearing, the Court notes that even assuming
numbers least favorable to the plaintiffs lowest class size and
highest number of class members bound by arbitration well over 100
class members would remain. Such reduction in class size would have
no impact on the plaintiffs' ability to maintain numerosity under
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(a)(1).  

Further, in this context, all the parties' litigation actions would
have had to occur in any event plaintiffs knew of the arbitration
agreements in drafting their motion for class certification and
opposition to TCS's motion for summary judgment.

Therefore, the granting of TCS's motion would not prejudice the
plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court finds that TCS has not waived
its right to arbitrated claims brought by class members bound by
the arbitration agreements.

The Plaintiffs also argue that the Nationwide Agreement violates
the effective vindication doctrine because it precludes
introduction of any pattern-or-practice evidence whatsoever, in
violation of the rights the Plaintiffs and class members enjoy in
this forum.

Here, by its terms, enforcement and interpretation of the
Nationwide Agreement is controlled by the state in which an
employee was terminated. The Plaintiffs apply California law. While
the Court has certified a nationwide class, even if California law
did govern the unconscionability determination for each of
agreements at issue, the plaintiffs have not shown that the
Nationwide Agreement is both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable.   

The Plaintiffs rest their argument for substantive
unconscionability on the agreement's selective overlay of a
pro-Defendant subset of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
namely that it allows TCS to file a motion to dismiss, while
denying the employee the opportunity to file a motion to strike or
motion for judgment on the pleadings. However, the plaintiffs do
not substantively elaborate on the unconscionability of that
procedural limitation.

First, the procedural and evidentiary rules apply equally to both
sides equally. Second, the noted limitation does not appear to rise
to the level of unconscionability. A defendant may use a motion to
dismiss to test the adequacy of allegations but a plaintiff
unilaterally files a complaint.

Motions to strike are disfavored and at times address concerns of
allegations in a public filing, and thus not relevant in private
arbitrations. Motions for judgment on the pleadings are easily
recast in terms of motions for summary judgment. Further, neither
of those motions are particularly relevant (nor were they used) in
this context. In short, the plaintiffs have failed to make a
persuasive argument with respect to unconscionability.

Accordingly, the Court grants TCS's motion to compel arbitration of
the claims belonging to class members who signed the arbitration
agreements.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 23, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9nskxw3 from Leagle.com.

Brian Buchanan & Christopher Slaight, Plaintiffs, represented by
Daniel A. Kotchen , Kotchen & Low LLP, Daniel Lee Low , Kotchen and
Low LLP, Michael J. von Klemperer , Kotchen and Low LLP, Lindsey
Grunert , Kotchen and Low LLP, Michael F. Brown --
mbrown@dvglawpartner.com -- DVG Law Partner LLC & Steven Gregory
Tidrick -- sgt@tidricklaw.com -- The Tidrick Law Firm.

Seyed Amir Masoudi & Nobel Mandili, Plaintiffs, represented by
Lindsey Grunert , Kotchen and Low LLP, Michael J. von Klemperer ,
Kotchen and Low LLP & Daniel A. Kotchen , Kotchen & Low LLP.

Tata Consultancy Services, Ltd, Defendant, represented by Michelle
M. LaMar -- mlamar@loeb.com -- Loeb & Loeb LLP, Bernard Robert
Given, II -- bgiven@loeb.com -- Loeb & Loeb, Erin Michelle Smith --
esmith@loeb.com -- Loeb and Loeb LLP, Laura Ann Wytsma --
lwytsma@loeb.com -- Loeb & Loeb LLP, Patrick Norton Downes --
pdownes@loeb.com -- Loeb And Loeb LLP, Terry D. Garnett --
tgarnett@loeb.com -- Loeb & Loeb LLP & William Michael Brody --
wbrody@loeb.com -- Loeb & Loeb.

Apple Inc., Movant, represented by Danielle Conley --
danielle.conley@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale &
Dorr LLP, Kathryn Diane Zalewski -- KATHRYN.ZALEWSKI@WILMERHALE.COM
-- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Kimberly A. Parker --
KIMBERLY.PARKER@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale &
Dorr LLP & Lauren Moore -- Lauren.Moore@wilmerhale.com -- Wilmer
Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP.

TLC CASINO: Court Dismisses V. Williams's FCRA Suit
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case captioned VALARIE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff(s), v. TLC CASINO ENTERPRISES, INC. et al., Defendant(s),
Case No. 2:17-CV-2810 JCM (GWF)(D. Nev.).

This is a class action brought by plaintiff and on behalf of all
similarly situated individuals. The Plaintiff filed her class
action complaint with jury demand. In her complaint, the plaintiff
alleges that the defendant routinely, willfully and systematically
violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) by procuring consumer
reports for employment purposes of the plaintiff and other putative
class members without first making proper disclosures in the format
required by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).

The nexus of the defendant's motion to dismiss centers around two
theories. As a threshold matter, the defendant asserts that the
plaintiff lacks Article III standing because, even if the defendant
failed to provide the plaintiff with a stand-alone document of a
legal disclosure, at most, this amounted to a bare procedural
violation of the FCRA, rather than a substantive issue.   

The Defendant also asserts that, even if the defendant's
conditional offer of employment violated the FCRA (which the
defendant does not admit), the plaintiff's claim still fails
because the plaintiff does not plausibly plead any concrete harm to
herself.  

The Plaintiff responds that the defendant's alleged violation of
the FCRA regarding stand-alone documents for legal disclosures
proffers standing to the plaintiff and the putative class members
because deprivation of the right to information and the right to
privacy guaranteed by section 1681b is sufficient to infer a
concrete injury.

To establish standing, the plaintiff must plead three elements: (1)
an injury-in-fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and
the alleged misconduct; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision.

Here, the plaintiff's complaint does not allege a concrete injury
in fact. Although the plaintiff appears to rely on her conclusory
statements that the defendant's alleged procedural violation caused
her a concrete harm, the plaintiff fails to demonstrate how an
actual or imminent concrete injury actually exists, let alone how
the injury affects the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.
In fact, the plaintiff's own reference to the defendant's alleged
violation of the FCRA is that the defendant failed to provide the
disclosure in the format required by the FCRA. A formatting error
such as this is a procedural issue that does not satisfy the
requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate a concrete,
particularized injury.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yck8882p from Leagle.com.

Valarie Williams, Plaintiff, represented by Christian James Gabroy,
Gabroy Law Offices, Leah Lin Jones -- leah@thiermanbuck.com --
Thierman Buck, LLP, Joshua D. Buck -- josh@thiermanbuck.com --
Thierman Buck, LLP, Kaine M. Messer, Gabroy Law Offices & Mark R.
Thierman, Thierman Buck, LLP.

TLC Casino Enterprises, Inc., doing business as & Four Queens, LLC,
doing business as, Defendants, represented by Joseph Anthony
Kroeger -- jkroeger@swlaw.com -- Snell & Wilmer, pro hac vice &
Paul Swenson Prior -- sprior@swlaw.com -- Snell & Wilmer.

TRES AMIGOS: Flynn et al. Seek to Certify Hourly Servers Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
In a lawsuit against Tres Amigos, Inc., and several entities, the
Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order pursuant to Section
216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act:

   1. granting conditional certification and approving a
      60-day opt-in period for the following collective:

      "all similarly situated current and former hourly servers
      who work or have worked for Defendants at any time from
      August 6, 2015 through the date of judgment";

   2. requiring Defendants to identify all potential opt-ins
      within 14 days of the grant of conditional certification by
      providing a list in electronic and importable format, of
      the names, job titles, addresses, telephone numbers, e-mail
      addresses, dates of employment, location of employment, and
      date of birth, of each potential opt-in; and

   3. approving the attached proposed form of notice and
      authorizing it to be sent by U.S. Mail and e-mail to all
      potential opt-in plaintiffs, along with a shortened text
      message notifying each individual that the notice form was
      mailed and emailed; and

   4. sending reminder notice via email and text to be sent 40
      days thereafter to anyone that did not respond.

The case is captioned, KILEY FLYNN, and GLORIA TOROVECI,
Individually, and on behalf of all similarly-situated individuals,
the Plaintiff, v. TRES AMIGOS, INC., a domestic profit corporation,
LOS TRES AMIGOS – CHELSEA, LLC, a domestic limited liability
company, LOS TRES AMIGOS – HOWELL, INC, a domestic profit
corporation, LOS TRES AMIGOS – JONESVILLE, LLC, a domestic
limited liability company, LOS TRES AMIGOS – LIVONIA, LLC, a
domestic limited liability company, LOS TRES AMIGOS – OWOSSO,
LLC, a domestic limited liability company, LOS TRES AMIGOS DOWNTOWN
LANSING, LLC, a domestic limited liability company, N.R.P.P., LLC,
a domestic limited liability company, LOS TRES AMIGOS FARMINGTON
DOWNTOWN, LLC, a domestic limited liability company, LOS TRES
AMIGOS PLYMOUTH, LLC, a domestic limited liability company, REDLINE
TRADING, LLC, a domestic limited liability company, LOS TRES AMIGOS
SOUTH SIDE, INC., a domestic profit corporation, LOS TRES AMIGOS
– CANTON, INC., a domestic profit corporation, LOS TRES AMIGOS -
EAST LANSING, INC., a domestic profit corporation, HACIENDA LOS
AMIGOS, INC., a domestic profit corporation, LOS TRES AMIGOS –
MASON RESTAURANT, INC., a domestic profit corporation, LOS TRES
AMIGOS – MASON, INC., a domestic profit corporation, LOS TRES
AMIGOS – MICHIGAN CENTER, INC., a domestic profit corporation,
LOS TRES AMIGOS – WEST JACKSON, INC., a domestic profit
corporation, LOS TRES AMIGOS – WEST SAGINAW, INC., a domestic
profit corporation, ARNULFO RAMIREZ, an individual, EDWARD HALL, an
individual, and MARCOS LLAMAS, an individual, the Defendants, Case
No. 2:18-cv-12426-MOB-DRG (E.D. Mich.).

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Kevin J. Stoops, Esq.
          Charles R. Ash IV, Esq.
          SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C.
          One Towne Square, 17th Floor
          Southfield, Michigan 48076
          Telephone: (248) 355-0300
          E-mail: kstoops@sommerspc.com
                  crash@sommerspc.com

               - and -

          Heidi T. Sharp, Esq.
          Syeda F. Davidson, Esq.
          BURGESS SHARP & GOLDEN, PLLC
          43260 Garfield Road, Suite 280
          Clinton Township, MI 48038
          Telephone: (586) 226 2627
          E-mail: heidi@bsglawfirm.com
                  syeda@bsglawfirm.com


TRIANGLE CAPITAL: Court Denies Prelim Injunction in Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court of the Eastern District of North
Carolina, Western Division, denied Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction in the case captioned DAN CARLSON,
Plaintiff, v. TRIANGLE CAPITAL CORPORATION, E. ASHTON POOLE, STEVEN
C. LILLY, W. McCOMB DUNWOODY, MARK M. GAMBILL, BENJAMIN S.
GOLDSTEIN, MARK F. MULHERN, SIMON B. RICH, JR., and GARLAND S.
TUCKER, III, Defendants, No. 5:18-CV-332-FL (E.D. N.C.).

The Plaintiff filed suit against Triangle Capital Corporation
(Triangle) and its board members, alleging violations of Sections
14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act), as amended by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PSLRA) (a) and 78t(a) respectively, and Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R.
Section 240.14a-9, in connection with the sale of all or
substantially all of defendant Triangle's assets to Benefit Street
Partners L.L.C. (BSP) for approximately $981.2 million in cash.

The Plaintiff filed motion for preliminary injunction, seeking to
enjoin that vote until defendants disclose to shareholders material
information allegedly omitted from the Proxy.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The statutory basis for the plaintiff's complaint is Section 14(a)
of the Exchange Act, which makes unlawful the solicitation of a
proxy regarding any security, by way of interstate commerce, in
contravention of the rules and regulations prescribed by the SEC.


To prevail on a Section 14(a) claim, a plaintiff must show that (1)
the proxy statement contained a material misrepresentation or
omission (2) that caused the plaintiff injury and that (3) the
proxy solicitation was an essential link in the accomplishment of
the transaction.

The court addresses each of plaintiff's three allegations of
material omissions in turn below.

Houlihan Valuation - DCF Analysis Inputs

Houlihan performed a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis based on
company projections, which indicated a value of the company of
$946.4 million to $1,030.4 million.

The Plaintiff's complaint alleges solely that the Proxy fails to
identify which style of projections were utilized in the analysis,
and whether those projections accounted for both Triangle's
projected assets and expected revenues. The Plaintiff then asserts
in his motion for preliminary injunction that the DCF analyses
appears to have only discounted the Company's assets and not the
Net investment income of approximately $41 million to $83 million
in the next five years.

Here, the Proxy discloses the chart of company projections,
discusses the analysis conducted by Houlihan, including, among
other things, summaries of its comparable companies analysis,
comparable transaction analysis, and DCF. The information sought by
the plaintiff is not required, and the Proxy provides a fair
summary of Houlihan's valuation.  

In sum, the plaintiff has not established likelihood of success on
the merits that the Proxy contained material omissions regarding
the Houlihan valuation.

Bidding Agreements - DADW Provisions

The Plaintiff also challenges the alleged Proxy omissions
concerning the sale process, focusing specifically on disclosures
surrounding confidentiality agreements entered into with potential
bidders during the strategic review process.

The Plaintiff offers no factual support for the claim that the
confidentiality agreements at issue may contain such clauses that
could conceivably block post-signing superior proposals, other than
what appears to be hypothetical speculation.  

The Defendants assert that plaintiff cannot offer any factual
support, because the agreements at issue did not contain DADW
provisions.  

Additionally, the numerous cases cited by plaintiff in no way
assist the court in determining the instant motion, or determining
whether a claim is stated, where as here there is no indication a
DADW term was included in the confidential agreements and where
evidence has been submitted stating otherwise, found in both the
Proxy and via the defendants' declaration.

In sum, the plaintiff has not established likelihood of success on
the merits that the Proxy contained material omissions regarding
the bidding agreements.

NAV Allegations from Complaint

In his complaint, the plaintiff also alleges additional omitted
information regarding net asset value (NAV), but does not address
these allegations in his motion for preliminary injunction.  It
appears that the plaintiff has abandoned this claim. To the extent
the plaintiff has not, the court finds that the plaintiff has not
established likelihood of success on the merits that the Proxy
contained material omissions regarding NAV.

Likelihood of Irreparable Harm

The Plaintiff argues that no amount of money can ever compensate a
stockholder who has been deprived of their ability to effectively
exercise their corporate suffrage rights.  The Plaintiff cites to
numerous cases in support of this proposition, but those cases
involved indications of false and misleading information to be
submitted for vote, which is not present here.

The Plaintiff offers no more, and as the defendants note,
conspicuously absent from the record is an affidavit by the
Plaintiff explaining how the alleged omitted disclosures would
inform his vote, that he has personally read the Proxy, and that he
has a fundamental understanding of the technical concepts about
which he seeks further information.

Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiff has not established
likelihood of irreparable harm.

Balance of Equities

The Plaintiff argues he only seeks an order to enjoining the
Shareholder Vote until the Defendants provide Triangle Capital's
shareholders with the material information identified above and
that inconvenience to the defendants is minimal, thus the balance
of equities weighs in the plaintiff's favor.  

The Defendants disagree, articulating seven reasons why a
preliminary injunction on the eve of the July 24, 2018 stockholder
vote would cause substantial harm to Triangle, its shareholders and
employees, Barings, and BSP, including expense, lost opportunity,
logistical problems, and the possibility the proposed transaction
could be jeopardized.  

Whether or not the potential harm to the defendants is as
significant as argued, plaintiff has not established the balance of
equities tips in the plaintiff's favor.

Public Interest

The Plaintiff has not established issuance of preliminary
injunction would be in the public interest. No public interest
would be served by the issuance of a preliminary injunction or
further disclosures containing information that is either already
disclosed or not material on the eve of a long-scheduled
stockholder vote.  

Accordingly, the court denied the plaintiff's motion.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 23, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8pmwtla from
Leagle.com.

Dan Carlson, Plaintiff, represented by Nancy Routh Meyers, Ward
Black Law.

Triangle Capital Corporation, E. Ashton Poole, Steven C. Lilly, W.
McComb Dunwoody, Mark M. Gambill, Benjamin S. Goldstein, Mark F.
Mulhern, Simon B. Rich, Jr. & Garland S. Tucker, III, Defendants,
represented by Benjamin W. Pope -- wpope@kslaw.com -- King &
Spalding LLP, Bradley Jason Lingo -- blingo@kslaw.com -- King &
Spalding LLP & Bethany M. Rezek -- brezek@kslaw.com -- King &
Spalding LLP.

UFC: Antitrust Class Action Moves Into Summary Judgment Stage
-------------------------------------------------------------
Paul Gift, writing for Forbes, reports that the ongoing antitrust
lawsuit against the UFC moved into the summary judgment stage on
July 30 with the MMA promotion filing paperwork in Las Vegas
federal court claiming no reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the former fighters leading the class-action case.

Originally filed in December 2014, Plaintiffs claim the UFC used an
anticompetitive scheme of long-term exclusive fighter contracts,
coercion, and acquisitions of rival MMA promoters to establish and
maintain dominance in the MMA industry and suppress fighter
compensation. After three-and-a-half years of pleadings,
interrogatories, affidavits, over 50 depositions, 900 pages of
expert reports, 3.2 million pages of UFC documents, and 64,000
pages of Plaintiff documents produced, the UFC believes "there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and it should be
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The plaintiff fighters will surely have a different take on the
matter and will express their opposing views in September. July 30
was the UFC's turn to make its case that the lawsuit doesn't even
merit a trial.

Early in the filing, the UFC noted that the Plaintiffs' initial
theory of monopoly and monopsony power in MMA as "mutually
reinforcing" appears to have changed, stating "After two years of
discovery, in seeking class certification, Plaintiffs abandoned
their monopolization theory, alleging a ‘Scheme' that makes no
mention of [UFC's] alleged monopolization of the market for
promotion of live Elite Professional MMA Fighter bouts."

The idea that elite, professional MMA was a relevant output market
to be monopolized when the UFC competes for consumers'
entertainment dollars (usually) on a Saturday night was always the
weakest part of the case, so while it wouldn't seem too surprising
for Plaintiffs to abandon it, it could cause problems from a
consumer welfare standard perspective. The UFC appeared to notice
this as well by arguing that a monopsonization theory on its own
"runs contrary to accepted antitrust principles." During class
certification, Plaintiffs seemed to propose a new theory of
consumer harm via reduced quality; i.e., that undercompensated
fighters wouldn't be able to promote themselves as well or enhance
their training. [GN]

UNITED AIRLINES: Judge Tosses Employees' Biometrics Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Diana Novak Jones, writing for Law360, reports that an Illinois
federal judge on July 31 dismissed claims against United Airlines
Inc. brought by a proposed class of employees under the Illinois
Biometric Information Privacy Act, saying the claims are preempted
by a collective bargaining agreement and don't go beyond a
surface-level statutory violation.

U.S. District Judge Virginia Kendall granted United's motion to
dismiss the employees' suit claiming the airline's use of a
fingerprint-based timekeeping system violates the Illinois privacy
law.

The case is Johnson v. United Airlines, Inc. et al, Case No.
1:17-cv-08858 (N.D. Ill.).  The case is assigned to Judge Honorable
Virginia M. Kendall.  The case was filed December 8, 2017. [GN]


UNITED STATES: NY Ct. Transfers Separation Suit to Calif.
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order transferring the case
captioned N.T.C. et al., Plaintiffs, v. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT et al., Defendants, No. 18-CV-6428
(JMF)(S.D.N.Y.), to the Southern District of California.

This action is brought on behalf of children who were separated
from their parents and are now being held in New York State.
Plaintiffs in this case argue that the Government plans to detain
them in facilities that do not meet applicable legal standards or
to repatriate them as a family unit with their parents, thereby
depriving each child of his or her ability to pursue his or her own
individual asylum and other child immigrant claims.

These are substantial claims, but the question right now is not
whether they have merit. Instead, the question is whether they
should considered in this forum or by Judge Sabraw in the Southern
District of California. Having considered the parties' arguments
made during a hearing held on the record on July 17, 2018, and in
letters submitted the next day, and (with the parties' consent)
having consulted with Judge Sabraw, the Court concludes for several
reasons that Plaintiffs' claims should be transferred to the
Southern District of California to be considered in conjunction
with the claims in Ms. L. First, the classes in the two cases
concern the same families: Plaintiffs in this case seek relief on
behalf of children whose parents are class members in Ms. L.
Second, the relief Plaintiffs seek in this case is, at bottom,
directly related to the reunification process being supervised by
Judge Sabraw.

The Court is, of course, mindful of the deference that is owed to a
plaintiff's choice of forum. The Court is also aware that
transferring this case will cause some inconvenience to Plaintiffs
and Plaintiffs' counsel, who are located in New York.
Nevertheless, the Court is confident that Judge Sabraw can and will
take steps to mitigate that inconvenience. And in any event, the
inconvenience to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' counsel is vastly
outweighed by the interests of justice, fairness, efficiency, and
avoidance of conflict advanced by having a single judge presiding
over both cases.

Accordingly, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section
1404(a), the Court transfers this case to the Southern District of
California.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 19, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and  Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9m6jbb5
from Leagle.com.

N.T.C., by and through his net friend Rev. Marie A. Tatro,
Plaintiff, represented by Scott Alan Rosenberg , The Legal Aid
Society, Gregory Paul Copeland , The Legal Aid Society
(Manhattan),Jennifer L. Levy , Office of The Public Advocate &
Sarah Telo Gillman , The Legal Aid Society.

H.M.C., by and through her next friend Mallory Winter, Plaintiff,
represented by Scott Alan Rosenberg , The Legal Aid Society,
Gregory Paul Copeland , The Legal Aid Society (Manhattan) &Jennifer
L. Levy , Office of The Public Advocate.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ("ICE"), U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, ("DHS"), U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
("CBP"), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, ("USCIS"), U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, ("HHS"), Office of Refugee
Resettlement, ("ORR"), Ronald Vitiello, Acting Director of ICE,
Kirstjen Nielsen, Secretary of DHS, Jefferson Beauregard Sessions
III, Attorney General of the United States, L. Francis Cissna,
Director of USCIS, Kevin K. McAleenan, Commissioner of CBP, Alex
Azar, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services &
Scott Lloyd, Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement,
Defendants, represented by Brandon Matthew Waterman , United States
Attorney's Office & Michael James Byars , U.S. Attorney's Office.

UNITED STATES: UPS Retired Employees File Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Michael Phillis, writing for Law360, reports that three retired UPS
employees filed a putative class action in Federal Claims court
against the federal government on July 31, demanding fair
compensation for the Treasury Department's approval of an allegedly
improper reduction in their vested pension benefits affecting a
proposed class of approximately 21,000.

Retired UPS workers William King, Anthony Gugliuzza and Stephen
Dardzinski said their multiemployer pension plan, the New York
State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund, received
permission from the government to reduce vested pension benefits
for thousands of its members. [GN]



UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Trujillo et al. Seek to Certify Class
---------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned DAVID TRUJILLO; DEANNA HARDEN; on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v.
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP INC.; UNITED HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC.;
UNITEDHEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY, the Defendants, Case No.
5:17-cv-02547-JFW-KK (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs will move the
Court September 17, 2018, for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all persons covered under health plans insured or
      administered by United Health Group, Inc., through its
      wholly-owned and controlled subsidiaries, including United
      Healthcare Insurance Company and United Healthcare
      Services, Inc., issued to private employers, whose requests
      for prosthetic arm and leg devices have been denied during
      the applicable statute of limitations"; and

   2. appointing them as class representative and appointing
      their counsel as Class Counsel.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Robert S. Gianelli, Esq.
          Joshua S. Davis, Esq.
          Adrian J. Barrio, Esq.
          GIANELLI & MORRIS, A Law Corporation
          550 South Hope Street, Suite 1645
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 489 1600
          Facsimile: (213) 489 1611
          E-mail: rob.gianelli@gmlawyers.com
                  joshua.davis@gmlawyers.com
                  adrian.barrio@gmlawyers.com

               - and -

          Conal Doyle, Esq.
          Stephen Beke, Esq.
          DOYLE LAW
          9401 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 608
          Beverly Hills, CA
          Telephone: (310) 385 0567
          Facsimile: (310) 943 1780
          E-mail: conal@conaldoylelaw.com
                  sbeke@conaldoylelaw.com


US PHYSICAL: Court Dismisses S. Reilly's Securities Fraud Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned SEAN
REILLY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. U.S. PHYSICAL THERAPY, INC., CHRISTOPHER J.
READING, LAWRANCE W. McAFEE, JON C. BATES, and GLENN W. McDOWELL,
Defendants, No. 17 Civ. 2347 (NRB)(S.D.N.Y.).

This federal securities class action was filed on behalf of all
persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired the
securities of defendant U.S. Physical Therapy, Inc. (USPH).  The
Plaintiffs alleged that USPH and four individual defendants,
Christopher J. Reading, Lawrance W. McAfee, Glenn W. McDowell, and
Jon C. Bates, violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (Exchange Act) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and
that the individual defendants violated Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act.

The Defendants challenge only the second element of a claim under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to
allege scienter because they have neither adequately alleged that
the defendants had the requisite motive and opportunity to commit
securities fraud nor adequately alleged conscious recklessness.

The Defendants argue that the plaintiffs failed to plead any
showing of motive. The Plaintiffs respond that they have adequately
pled motive based on their allegations in the SAC regarding the
defendants' bonuses, stock sales, and debt covenants.

Bonuses

The Plaintiffs allege that under USPH's Objective Bonus Plan,
defendants Reading, McAfee, and McDowell earned higher bonuses than
they would have absent USPH's accounting errors. The Plaintiffs
assert that these compensation packages established a direct link
with the alleged fraud and therefore provide the requisite strong
inference of scienter.

The Plaintiffs argue that the Second Circuit precedent in Acito,
Kalnit, and ECA is inapposite, and that the allegations in the
complaint instead "align" with the decisions in In re Wellcare
Management Group, Inc. Securities Litigation, 964 F.Supp. 632, 639
(N.D.N.Y. 1997), and Florida State Board of Administration v. Green
Tree Financial Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 661 (8th Cir. 2001). The Court
initially observe that neither Wellcare nor Green Tree binds this
Court. To the contrary, the Court join several other courts in
concluding that Wellcare's finding motive because defendants'
incentive compensation increased because of their allegedly
fraudulent conduct is inconsistent with the Second Circuit's
decisions in Acito and its progeny.

The Court's conclusion that the plaintiffs' allegations about the
defendants' bonuses are deficient because they comprise motives
generally possessed by most corporate directors and officers ends
this analysis.

Stock Sales

The Plaintiffs may sufficiently plead motive where they allege that
the defendants misrepresented corporate performance to inflate
stock prices while they sold their own shares.

The Plaintiffs allege that defendants Reading, McAfee, and McDowell
sold significant portions of their stock on various occasions
between the beginning of the Class Period and November 22, 2016,
but do not allege that any defendant sold a single share of USPH
stock after that date. The Plaintiffs assert that the timing of the
defendants' stock sales was suspicious because some of these sales
occurred shortly after the Company received a letter from the SEC
on October 15, 2014 and throughout the period when USPH was
exchanging correspondence with the SEC from October 2014 to January
2015.

The Court is persuaded by the defendants' response that this
correspondence never addressed the possibility of accounting for
non-controlling interests as liabilities, which was only raised in
the 2016-17 correspondence, and thus did not bear directly on the
issues that led to USPH's restatement.

The Plaintiffs next argue that the defendants' stock sales were
suspicious on the basis of their amount alone. But without more,
the amount of stock sold cannot be determinative. Otherwise, any
corporate insider who divests his stock holdings would furnish
opportunistic plaintiffs with the requisite scienter to survive a
motion to dismiss. To the contrary, courts routinely find that raw
sales numbers alone are insufficient to establish scienter. More
fundamentally, there was nothing unusual or suspicious about the
defendants' trades, even if they were relatively large, because
they occurred before defendants were on notice of the SEC inquiry
as to whether the Company's non-controlling interests should be
accounted for as equities or liabilities.

Debt Covenants

The Plaintiffs' final scienter argument is based on the defendants'
alleged motive to avoid violations of certain debt covenants in
USPH's credit agreements. This argument clearly fails. It is well
settled that a company's desire to maintain a high bond or credit
rating does not qualify as a sufficient motive for fraud. The
alleged motivation to maintain compliance with the covenants in the
Company's credit agreements is plainly inadequate to support an
allegation of intent to commit fraud.  

The Plaintiff's general allegations here would apply equally to any
company with debt covenants in its credit agreements, and if
scienter could be pleaded on that basis alone, virtually every
company in the United States that experiences a downturn in stock
price could be forced to defend securities fraud actions.

Conscious Misbehavior and Recklessness

Where motive is not apparent, it is still possible to plead
scienter by identifying circumstances indicating conscious behavior
by the defendant, though the strength of the circumstantial
allegations must be correspondingly greater.

The Plaintiffs also rely on the core operations doctrine, which
provides that when a plaintiff has adequately alleged that the
defendant made false or misleading statements, the fact that those
statements concerned the core operations of the company supports
the inference that the defendant knew or should have known the
statements were false when made. The Plaintiffs concede that this
doctrine may provide supplemental support but does not
independently establish scienter and several courts in this Circuit
have expressed doubts as to the doctrine's continuing import after
the enactment of the PSLRA.

The Plaintiffs next argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX)
certifications signed by defendants Reading, McAfee, and Bates were
probative of scienter. SOX certifications may be probative of
scienter if the complaint alleges glaring accounting irregularities
or other red flags, of which the certifying defendant had 'reason
to know.

However, these certifications typically add nothing substantial to
the scienter calculus because allowing Sarbanes-Oxley
certifications to create an inference of scienter in every case
where there was an accounting error by a public traded company
would eviscerate the pleading requirements for scienter set forth
in the PSLRA. The Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that the
defendants had any knowledge of glaring accounting irregularities
when they executed the SOX certifications in the Company's 10-Ks.
Rather, the accounting guidance at issue here was complex, the
accounting treatment of the non-controlling interests was difficult
to apply, and the SEC did not raise the relevant ASC until March
2017.

The Plaintiffs therefore do not adequately allege that the
defendants' certifications were knowingly false when made.

Accordingly, the Court grants the defendants' motion to dismiss in
its entirety with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 23, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yages5jn from
Leagle.com.

SEAN REILLY, Lead Plaintiff, represented by Jacob A. Goldberg --
jgoldberg@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., Keith Robert
Lorenze -- klorenze@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A. &
Phillip C. Kim -- pkim@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm P.A.

Maura Culhane, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Lesley Frank Portnoy --
lportnoy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

U.S. Physical Therapy, Inc., Christopher J. Reading, Lawrance W.
McAfee & Jon C. Bates, Defendants, represented by Jason Christopher
Vigna -- jason.vigna@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin Rosenman, LLP,
Bruce G. Vanyo -- bruce@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin Rosenman,
LLP & Michael Joseph Diver -- michael.diver@kattenlaw.com -- Katten
Muchin Rosenman LLP.

Glenn McDowell, Defendant, represented by Jason Christopher Vigna
-- jason.vigna@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin Rosenman, LLP & Bruce
G. Vanyo -- bruce@kattenlaw.com -- Katten Muchin Rosenman, LLP.

VALLEY GYM CORPORATION: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Suit Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
HARO BEZDIKIAN, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff vs. VALLEY GYM CORPORATION;
TEXTMUNICATION, INC., and DOES 1 through 25, Defendants, Case No.
3:18-cv-04372-SK (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2018), alleges that the
Defendants have violated the Telephone Consumers Protection Act by
sending unsolicited text messages without prior express written
consent, invading the consumers' right to privacy.

Valley Gym Corporation is a California corporation doing business
as "USA Fitness Center" or "USA Fitness" with a principal place of
business located at 13640 Foothill Boulevard, Sylmar, California
91342. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael H. Boyamian, Esq.
          Armand R. Kizirian, Esq.
          BOYAMIAN LAW, INC.
          550 North Brand Boulevard, Suite 1500
          Glendale, CA 91203-1922
          Telephone: (818) 547-5300
          Facsimile: (818) 547-5678
          E-mail:  michael@boyamianlaw.com
                   armand@boyamianlaw.com


VEECO INSTRUMENTS: Pension Fund Balks at Ultratech Merger Deal
--------------------------------------------------------------
CONSTRUCTION WORKERS PENSION TRUST FUND - LAKE COUNTY AND VICINITY,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. VEECO INSTRUMENTS, INC., SHUBHAM MAHESHWARI, JOHN R.
PEELER, JOHN P. KIERNAN, KATHLEEN A. BAYLESS, RICHARD A. D'AMORE,
GORDON HUNTER, KEITH D. JACKSON, PETER J. SIMONE, THOMAS ST. DENNIS
and DOES 1-25, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 18CV332644 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Aug. 8, 2018), asserts claims under the Securities Act
of 1933 against Veeco and certain members of the Company's
executive officers, directors and authorized representatives.

The case is a securities class action on behalf of all persons and
entities who purchased or acquired shares of Veeco stock pursuant
or traceable to the Company's Registration Statement and Prospectus
issued in connection with the merger of Veeco with Ultratech, Inc.
and their subsidiaries.

Pursuant to the Merger Agreement, Ultratech shareholders received
the right to receive, for each Ultratech share they owned, an
amount equal to: (i) $21.75 in cash without interest; (ii) 0.2675
of a share of Veeco stock; and (iii) cash in lieu of fractional
shares of Veeco common stock. Ultratech held a special meeting of
its stockholders to vote on matters related to the proposed merger.
The special meeting was held on May 25, 2017, at 2:00 p.m., local
time, at the offices of O'Melveny & Myers LLP, located at 2765 Sand
Hill Road, Menlo Park, California 94025.

To solicit Ultratech shareholders to vote in favor of the Merger,
Veeco and the Individual Defendants prepared, reviewed and signed a
Registration Statement on Form S-4 with the SEC on March 13, 2017
and an Amendment to the S-4 Registration Statement on April 21,
2017.  The lawsuit contends that the Offering Documents were false
and misleading because they failed to disclose Veeco's intellectual
property dispute with AMEC. In addition to omitting this material
information, the "Risk Factors" portion of the Prospectus was false
and misleading because it did not disclose the dispute and instead
only listed two shareholder lawsuits against Ultratech as legal
risks.

Veeco is a corporation which designs and manufactures thin film
equipment. Veeco's equipment is used to make electronic devices,
including light emitting diodes, micro-electromechanical systems,
wireless devices, power electronics, hard disk drives and
semiconductor devices.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          James I. Jaconette, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 231 1058
          Facsimile: (619) 231 7423

               – and -

          Samuel H. Rudman, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          58 South Service Road, Suite 200
          Melville, NY 11743
          Telephone: (631) 367 7100
          Facsimile: (631) 367 1173


VISA INC: Deal Reached to Resolve Damages Class in Interchange MDL
------------------------------------------------------------------
Visa Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 27, 2018, for the fiscal
year ended February 28, 2018, that defendants Visa, MasterCard, and
certain U.S. financial institutions have reached an agreement in
principle with plaintiffs purporting to act on behalf of the
putative Damages Class to resolve all Damages Class claims in
Interchange Multidistrict Litigation (MDL).

The agreement to resolve these claims is subject to negotiation of
a full written settlement agreement, and such negotiations are
ongoing. Discussions with plaintiffs purporting to act on behalf of
the Injunctive Relief Class are ongoing.

The Company believes at this stage that some loss resulting from
the Damages Class claims is probable and a range of loss is
reasonably estimable. On June 28, 2018, the Company deposited an
additional $600 million into its covered litigation escrow account.
During the nine months ended June 30, 2018, the Company increased
the U.S. covered litigation accrual to $1.43 billion.

The balance of $1.43 billion is consistent with the Company's
estimate of its share of the lower end of a probable and reasonably
estimable loss with respect to U.S. covered litigation. While this
estimate is consistent with the Company's view of the current
status of discussions, the probable and reasonably estimable loss
or range of such loss could materially vary if settlements cannot
be reached.

The Company will continue to consider and reevaluate this estimate
in light of the substantial uncertainties and mediation obstacles
that persist. The Company is unable to estimate a potential loss or
range of loss, if any, at trial if negotiated resolutions cannot be
reached.

Visa Inc. operates as a payments technology company worldwide. The
company facilitates commerce through the transfer of value and
information among consumers, merchants, financial institutions,
businesses, strategic partners, and government entities. Visa Inc.
was incorporated in 2007 and is headquartered in San Francisco,
California.


WAL-MART STORES: 9th Cir. Vacates Dismissal of M. Omidi's UCL Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed the
District Court's judgment granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned MOJDEH OMIDI, individually and as
representatives of the class and AURORA TELLERIA, individually and
as representatives of the class, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WAL-MART
STORES, INC., a Delaware corporation and FIRSTSIGHT VISION
SERVICES, INC., a California corporation, Defendants-Appellees, No.
17-55539 (9th Cir.).

The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing,
concluding that Omidi failed to establish an economic injury in
fact.

Wal-Mart and FirstSight advertise the availability of Independent
Doctors of Optometry at Wal-Mart, and Omidi claims that this
representation induced her to purchase an eye exam at a San
Diego-area location from Dr. Ho. Omidi's complaint alleges that Dr.
Ho was not "independent" as advertised, and that she would not have
purchased the eye exam if she had known this.

To establish standing under Article III, a plaintiff must have (1)
suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.

The key question in this case is whether Omidi has adequately
alleged that her optometrist lacked independence. The complaint
lacks specific allegations about Dr. Ho, and instead points to
various lease provisions indicating that Wal-Mart and FirstSight
were able to exercise undue influence over all of their resident
optometrists. These provisions include: setting rent as a
percentage of revenue, prescribing minimum operating hours, and
permitting the lessor to terminate leases at will. In addition, the
complaint contains several anecdotes concerning other optometrists
at other Wal-Mart locations, all of which suggest that Dr. Ho was
constrained in the rates he could charge and the therapies he could
recommend.

Injury in fact is not a substantial or insurmountable hurdle and
the complaint's allegations are sufficient to raise Omidi's claimed
injury paying for an eye exam that she would not have purchased had
she known Dr. Ho was not findependent above the conjectural or
hypothetical level. Because this injury is fairly traceable to the
misleading advertisements and is likely to be redressed by a
favorable judicial decision, Omidi has established standing under
Article III and the relevant state statutes.

The judgment of the District Court is vacated in part, reversed in
part, and remanded for consideration under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b).

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's July 23, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y86764jy from Leagle.com.

WARTBURG SENIOR: Website Not Accessible to Blind, Sypert Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
KATHLEEN SYPERT, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. WARTBURG SENIOR HOUSING, INC., the
Defendant, the Case No. 1:18-cv-07159 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 8, 2018),
alleges that Defendant failed to design, construct, maintain, and
operate its website to be fully accessible to and independently
usable by Plaintiff and other blind or visually impaired people.

According to the complaint, Defendant's denial of full and equal
access to its website, and therefore denial of its products and
services offered thereby and in conjunction with its physical
locations, is a violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Americans
with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Act.

The Plaintiff is a visually impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read website content using her
computer. Plaintiff uses the terms "blind" or "visually-impaired"
to refer to all people with visual impairments who meet the legal
definition of blindness in that they have a visual acuity with
correction of less than or equal to 20 x 200. Some blind people who
meet this definition have limited vision. Others have no vision.

Based on a 2010 U.S. Census Bureau report, approximately 8.1
million people in the United States are visually impaired,
including 2.0 million who are blind, and according to the American
Foundation for the Blind's 2015 report, approximately 400,000
visually impaired persons live in the State of New York.

Because Defendant's website, www.wartburg.org, is not equally
accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers, it violates
the ADA and the FHA. The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to
cause a change in Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and
procedures so that Defendant's website will become and remain
accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Fl.
          Brooklyn, N.Y. 11201
          Telephone: (929) 575-4175
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: Joseph@cml.legal

               - and -

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, N.Y. 10003-2461
          Telephone: (212) 228 9795
          Facsimile: (212) 982 6284
          E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
                  danalgottlieb@aol.com


WASTE INDUSTRIES: Fails to Pay OT to Drivers, Bruce Claims
----------------------------------------------------------
KEITH BRUCE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. WASTE INDUSTRIES, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
3:18-cv-00688 (M.D. Tenn., July 25, 2018) is an action against the
Defendants for unpaid regular hours, overtime hours, minimum wages,
wages for missed meal and rest periods.

The Plaintiff Bruce was employed by the Defendant as driver.

Waste Industries, LLC is a North Carolina limited liability company
doing business in the State of Tennessee. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian C. Winfrey, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          810 Broadway, Suite 105
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Telephone: (615) 928-9890
          Facsimile: (615) 928-9917
          E-mail: bwinfrey@forthepeople.com

               - and -

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Austin W. Anderson, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  austin@a2xlaw.com

               - and -

          C. Ryan Morgan, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          P.O. Box 4979
          Orlando, FL 32802-4979
          Telephone: (407) 420-1414
          Facsimile: (407) 867-4791
          E-mail: rmorgan@forthepeople.com

               - and -

          Paul M. Botros, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          600 N. Pine Island Road, Suite 400
          Plantation, FL 33324
          Telephone:  (954) 327-5352
          Facsimile:  (954) 327-3017
          E-mail: pbotros@forthepeople.com


WELLS FARGO: Judge Refuses to Vacate Arbitrator's Findings
----------------------------------------------------------
Braden Campbell, writing for Law360, reports that a New York
federal judge on July 31 rejected Wells Fargo Advisors LLC's
challenge to an arbitrator's decision letting workers pursue class
arbitration of their unpaid overtime claims, calling the company
out for trying to escape the same binding proceedings it imposes on
its employees.

U.S. District Judge Valerie Caproni refused to vacate an
arbitrator's findings that language in two workers' contracts with
Wells Fargo lets them bring their claims on behalf of a class.

The case is Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC v. Sappington, et al, Case
No. 1:16-cv-08956 (S.D.N.Y.).  The case is assigned to Judge
Valerie E. Caproni.  The case was filed November 17, 2016. [GN]



WESTERN EXPRESS: Rivera Suit Moved to Central Dist. of California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Marc Rivera, individually, and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. Western Express Inc., a Tennessee
Corporation dba Western Express Transport of California Inc., and
DOES 1 through 10, the Defendant, Case No. CIVDS1811980, as removed
from the San Bernardino Superior Court, to the
US District Court for the Central District of California (Eastern
Division - Riverside) on Aug. 3, 2018. The Central District of
California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:18-cv-01633 to the
proceeding.

Western Express, Inc. is an asset-based truckload carrier, founded
in 1991 by Donna and Wayne Wise.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


WILLIAM SONOMA: Faces Rushing Suit in N.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against William-Sonoma, Inc.
The case is captioned as, William Rushing, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
William-Sonoma, Inc.; William Sonoma DTC, Inc.; William Sonoma
Advertising, Inc.; The Pond Lady, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
4:18-MC-80122-DMR (N.D. Cal., July 18, 2018).  The case is assigned
to Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu.

Williams-Sonoma, Inc. operates as a multi-channel specialty
retailer of various products for home. Williams-Sonoma, Inc. was
founded in 1956 and is headquartered in San Francisco, California.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           Amber Eck, Esq.
           ZELDES HAEGGQUIST & ECK - SAN DIEGO
           225 Broadway, Suite 2050
           San Diego, CA 92101
           Telephone: (619) 342-8000

                - and -

           Audra Petrolle, Esq.
           ROSE LAW GROUP, PC – AZ
           7144 E. Stetson Drive, Suite 300
           Scottsdale, AZ 85251
           Telephone: (480) 505-3936

                - and -

           George Richard Baker, Esq.
           BAKER LAW PC
           625 E. Main Street, Suite 102 B
           Aspen, CO 81611
           Telephone: (970) 439-5905
           E-mail: richard@bakerlawpc.com

                - and -

           Kathryn Honecker, Esq.
           ROSE LAW GROUP, PC
           7144 East Stetson Drive, Suite 300
           Scottsdale, AZ 85251
           Telephone: (480) 505-3936
           Facsimile: (480) 505-3925
           E-mail: khonecker@roselawgroup.com

The Defendants are represented by:

           Benjamin O. Aigboboh, Esq.
           SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON, LLP
           1901 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1600
           Los Angeles, CA 90067
           Telephone: (310) 228-3700

                - and -

           Eric J. DiIulio, Esq.
           Robert A. Guite, Esq.
           SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON, LLP
           Four Embarcadero Center, 17th Floor
           San Francisco, CA 94111-4109
           Telephone: (415) 434-9100
           Facsimile: (415) 434-3947

                - and -

           P. Craig Cardon, Esq.
           SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
           Four Embarcadero Center, 17th Fl.
           San Francisco, CA 94111
           Telephone: (415) 774-2967
           E-mail: ccardon@sheppardmullin.com

                - and -

           Tanya Yarbrough Bowman, Esq.
           FROST BROWN TODD LLC
           400 W. Market Street, Suite 3200
           Louisville, KY 40202
           Telephone: (502) 589-5400
           Facsimile: (502) 581-1087
           E-mail: tbowman@fbtlaw.com


WINNIPEG BALLET: Faces Class Action Over Monk Abuse Allegations
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dance News Desk, citing Macleans, reports that a certified
class-action lawsuit has been filed against the Winnipeg Ballet.

Dancers allege teacher and photographer Bruce Monk pressured
dancers to post half-clothes or nude for photos between 1984 and
2015. Macleans reports the stories form a patter in which dancers
were told they would be posing for headshots or portfolios but were
then coerced into posing in states of undress.

Dancers also claim the photos, meant to be kept private, were made
for sale online.

Macleans writes that in his statement of defence, Monk denies all
the allegations, which have not proven in court.

More than 60 women, all former dancers, have joined the
class-action seeking 75 million in damages from Monk and the
Winnipeg Ballet.

Founded in 1939, Canada's Royal Winnipeg Ballet holds the double
distinction of being Canada's premiere ballet company and one of
the oldest ballet companies in North America. Versatility,
technical excellence and a captivating style are the trademarks of
Canada's Royal Winnipeg Ballet, qualities that have garnered both
critical and audience acclaim. RWB's superlative standards keep the
Company in demand around the globe as it presents more than 150
performances every season across Canada and in the United States,
South America, Europe, the Middle East, Russia, Japan, Asia and
Mexico. Under the artistic direction of André Lewis for 18 years,
the Company is said to have never looked more resplendent, more
assured, and more ravishing. [GN]

ZUFFA LLC: Seeks Dismissal of UFC Fighters' Antitrust Case
----------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Crosby, writing for Law360, reports that UFC's parent
company urged a Nevada federal court on July 30 to end an antitrust
suit lodged by a proposed class of mixed martial arts fighters who
accuse the organization of pushing out rival promoters and stifling
wages, saying fighters' wages are increasing and there's no
evidence that competitors are being shut out.

The company, Zuffa LLC, asked the court to grant its bid for
summary judgment against fighters who say the UFC unfairly controls
the MMA market by systematically pushing out rival promoters.

The case is styled Le et al v. Zuffa, LLC, Case No. 2:15-cv-01045.
The case is assigned to Judge Richard F. Boulware, II.  The case
was filed June 3, 2015. [GN]



[*] U.K. Truckers' Trade Association Files Cartel Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Crosby, writing for Law360, reports that a trade
association of United Kingdom truckers on July 31 said it's the
best candidate to represent hundreds of thousands of drivers bilked
by producers in a price-fixing cartel and suggested consumers
collectively could reap GBP30 billion ($39.37 billion).

The Road Haulage Association said it's applied to represent some
600,000 truck drivers in collective proceedings before the U.K.'s
Competition Appeal Tribunal. If successful, consumers could reap
GBP6,000 for every 6-ton and above vehicle bought or leased from
certain truck producers in the U.K. between 1997 and 2011. [GN]





                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***