CAR_Public/180827.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, August 27, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 171

                            Headlines

22ND DISTRICT: Cal. App. Affirms Demurrer Ruling in FLSA Suit
A CANAAN SUSHI: Fails to Pay OT to Deliveryman, Gao Suit Says
ARIZONA: 9th Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in J. Torres's Suit
BANKRUPTCY MANAGEMENT: Court Dismisses Antitrust Suit
BEST BUY COMPANY: Removes Eldredge Suit to W.D. Washington

BOB ROBISON COMMERCIAL: Fails to Pay OT to Helper, Martinez Says
BODY SCULPT: Court Grants Arbitration in A. Thompson's FLSA Suit
BRF SA: Birminghan Named Lead Plaintiff in Securities Suit
CAL WEST: $185K Class Settlement Has Prelim Court Approval
CBOE EXCHANGE: Cassandra Trading Sues over VIX Price Manipulation

COMMERCIAL TRADE: Schnorrbusch Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections
CONTINENTAL RESOURCES: To Complete "Strack" Settlement in 2019
COUNTY OF INYO, CA: More Info Needed in "Wagner" Settlement
CSK AUTO: Court OKs $395K Class Settlement in "Melgar"
CSX TRANSPORTATION: Darrel Andrews Sues over Mass Layoff

DANELL CUSTOM: $1.5MM Settlement in FLSA Suit Has Final Approval
DAVITA INC: Delaware Court Stays Securities Fraud Suit
DEFENDERS INC: 3rd Cir. Affirms Remand of TCCWNA Suit
DENTSPLY SIRONA: Futuredontics Still Defends Olivares Class Suit
DIPLOMAT PHARMACY: Bid to Reconsider Michigan Court Order Pending

DR PEPPER SNAPPLE: Underpays Sales Specialist, Aly et al. Claim
DYNAVAX TECHNOLOGIES: Plaintiff Appeals from Nixed Securities Suit
EATON CORP: SC Retirement Appeals Decision in Steamfitters Suit
EHEALTH INC: Settlement of Calif. Suits Still Subject to Final OK
ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Bid to Drop Securities Class Suit Pending

ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Faces Shareholder Suits over Merger Agreement
ETSY INC: Consolidated Cervantes & Weiss Actions Still Pending
FALL RIVER: Settlement in A. Pintor FLSA Suit Has Prelim Approval
FAMMA GROUP: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Benavides Suit Claims
FEDERAL SIGNAL: Firefighters' Hearing Loss Lawsuits Still Ongoing

FINANCIAL CREDIT: Solis Sues over Debt Collection Practices
FLOWERS FOODS: Court Won't Review Dismissal of M. Abugeith's Suit
G.O.O.D. BUSINESS: Lambert Sues over Edipure Product Mislabeling
GENERAL MOTORS: Doucet Sues over Defective 2011 Chevrolet Equinox
GEO GROUP: Seeks 9th Circuit Review of Ruling in Chen Suit

GLASS FAMILY: Fails to Pay OT to Delivery Drivers, Begley Claims
GLOBAL TELLINK: Seeks 3rd Cir. Review of Ruling in James Suit
GLV INC: Loses Bid to Dismiss L. Mullen's IPFSA Suit
GURSTEL LAW: Borges Sues over Debt Collection Practices
HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES: Protective Order in Majestic Partly OK'd

INDEPENDENT PHARMACY: Nashville Pharmacy Sues over Faxed Ads
J&L CABLE TV: Fails to Pay OT to Technicians, Jean-Pierre Claims
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Faces Bard Suit over Sale of Talcum Products
JONATHAN NEIL: Court Extends Settlement Notice Filing Date
LBT ACQUISITION: Court Narrows Claims in Securities Fraud Suit

LL BEAN: Court OKs Dismissal of V. Bondi's MMWA Suit
LUBRICATING SPECIALTIES: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Landeros Says
MACY'S RETAIL: Filing of 2nd Amended "Orellana" Suit Partly OK'd
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Swartz Sues over Violation of ADA
MASSACHUSETTS: Governor Faces McMann Suit in D. Massachusetts

MDL 2047: Court Grants WWIC's Bid to Dismiss
MDL 2262: Court Won't Reconsider GDB Fraud Claims Dismissal
MENTOR GRAPHICS: WPEE Pension Fund Appeals Order to Ninth Circuit
MICHIGAN: Court Dismisses D. Lamar's Inmates Civil Rights Suit
MINNESSOTA: Certification Bid in G. Greene's Inmate Suit Denied

MONDELEZ INT'L: Suit Over Ginger Snaps PHO Remain in Dist. Court
MSG HOLDINGS: Conditional Certification of Intern Class Denied
MUTUAL OF OMAHA: Can Compel Subpoena Compliance in "Johansen" Suit
NCAA: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Residence Rule Suit
NESTLE WATERS: Court Narrows Claims in A. Geis' Suit

NEW PENN FINANCIAL: Chong Sues over Force-Placed Insurance
PEPSI-COLA SALES: Ct. Needs Supplemental Brief in S. Helton's Suit
PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY: Underpays Production Workers, Suit Claims
ROSEMONT REALTY: South Point Wins Summary Ruling in ADEA Suit
SCAN HEALTH PLAN: Fails to Pay Proper OT, Greenwood Suit Says

SECURITY LIFE: Advance Trust Sues over Excessive Cost of Insurance
SECURITY PROS: Underpays Security Guards, Morrison Suit Claims
SIMM ASSOCIATES: Court Stays J. Brotz's Suit Pending Mediation
SPRINT CORP: Underpays Operations Specialists, Oliphant Says
SSF IMPORTED: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Lopez Suit Alleges

SUKAR AND SONS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Ramirez Suit Alleges
SUNTEC CONCRETE: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Enriquez Suit Says
T-MOBILE USA: Jan. 17 Hearing on Class Certification Motion
TAMKO BUILDING: Loses Bid to Dismiss J. Snyder's Suit
TEXAS GUARANTEED: Berumen Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections

TOLL GLOBAL: Court Dismisses C. Marquez's Wage & Hour Suit
TRAVELERS PROPERTY: Removes Anheuser Busch Suit to E.D. Missouri
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Bollinger Alleges
UNITED AIRLINES: Fails to Provide Meal & Rest Period, Medina Says
US ENVIRONMENTAL: Court Narrows Claims in B. Formica's FLSA Suit

WELLS FARGO: Allen Appeals Order and Judgment to 8th Cir.
WELLS FARGO: Court OKs Amendments to V. Fowler's Complaint

                            *********

22ND DISTRICT: Cal. App. Affirms Demurrer Ruling in FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSE LUIS MORALES et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v. 22nd DISTRICT AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant and
Respondent, Case No. D072378 (Cal. App.), Judge Cynthia Aaron of
the Court of Appeals of California for the Fourth District,
Division One, affirmed the trial court's order sustaining the DAA's
demurrer without leave to amend.

Defendant DAA is a California agency that owns and manages the Del
Mar Fairgrounds and the Del Mar Horsepark.  Plaintiff Morales and a
group of other seasonal employees of the DAA filed a putative class
action alleging that the DAA failed to pay them overtime
compensation required by state law under Labor Code section 5103
and federal law under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
("FLSA").

The trial court sustained, without leave to amend, the DAA's
demurrer to the Plaintiffs' section 510 cause of action.  After the
trial court conditionally certified the case as a collective
action, the DAA asserted an affirmative defense to the Plaintiffs'
FLSA claim.  Specifically, the DAA alleged that the employees were
exempt from the FLSA overtime compensation requirements pursuant to
a statutory exemption commonly referred to as the "amusement
exemption.  

The trial court held a jury trial on the DAA's affirmative defense
to the Plaintiffs' FLSA claim.  The jury rendered a verdict in
favor of the DAA and the trial court entered a judgment in favor of
the DAA.  The Plaintiffs timely appealed.

The primary issues on appeal in Morales related to the Plaintiffs'
claim under the FLSA.  The Morales court concluded that the trial
court properly granted judgment for the DAA on the FLSA claim.  The
present appeal presents no issues with respect to that claim.

The Morales court also rejected the Plaintiffs' contention that the
trial court erred in sustaining the DAA's demurrer to the
Plaintiffs' section 510 claim.  After reviewing relevant case law,
statutory law, and administrative regulations, the Appellate Court
concluded that when section 510 and Wage Order No. 10-2001 are
viewed together, the inescapable conclusion is that public
employees in the amusement and recreation industry are exempt from
state overtime requirements.  

The Appellate Court concluded that the Plaintiffs should be granted
leave to amend their complaint, concluding that the Plaintiffs
should be permitted to amend their section 510 claim since they
have shown how they can potentially amend their complaint to state
a valid claim under the joint employee doctrine.  Accordingly, it
reversed that part of the order sustaining the demurrer without
leave to amend and direct the trial court to grant the Plaintiffs
leave to amend the complaint.  In so doing, it expressed no view as
to the ultimate merits of the Plaintiffs' section 510 claim.  It
remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to grant the
Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.

On remand, the Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint as a
putative class action for the recovery of unpaid overtime
compensation.  In their second amended complaint, they alleged that
they had worked as joint employees of the DAA and certain Outside
Promoters.  They further alleged that the DAA had failed to pay
them overtime compensation required by section 510, subdivision
(a).
Based on their allegations, the Plaintiffs brought a single cause
of action for recovery of overtime compensation, attorney fees, and
costs pursuant to section 510, subdivision (a) and section 1194,
subdivision (a)6 on behalf of themselves and a putative class of
119 day employees.

The DAA filed a demurrer to the second amended complaint.  In its
demurrer, the DAA argued that in Morales, the Appellate concluded
that it was exempt from paying overtime compensation as specified
in section 510, subdivision (a).  It further argued that it was not
liable to the Plaintiffs for overtime compensation under section
510, subdivision (a) by virtue of its alleged status as the
Plaintiffs' joint employer.  The DAA argued that Noe v. Superior
Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 316, 333-334 (Noe) confirms that the
joint employer doctrine does not extend California's overtime laws
to a joint employer who is otherwise exempt from that law.

The Plaintiffs filed an opposition in which they argued that the
second amended complaint stated a cause of action for overtime
violations under section 1194, subdivision (a), which, as the Noe
court recognized, imposes a duty on every employer (i.e., including
all co-employers), to ensure that that employees receive overtime
compensation mandated by section 510, subdivision (a).  They
further argued that the Morales decision precludes the DAA's
current argument, because Morales held that the Plaintiffs'
then-proposed amendment would state a claim if joint employment
were to be properly pleaded.  Finally, the Plaintiffs argued that
if the trial court were to conclude that Noe cannot be harmonized
with Morales, it would be required to follow Morales under the
law-of-the case doctrine.

After further briefing and a hearing, the trial court sustained the
DAA's demurrer without leave to amend.  It thereafter entered a
judgment in favor of the DAA.

The Plaintiffs timely appealed from the judgment.  They contend
that the trial court erred in concluding that the second amended
complaint did not adequately state a claim against the DAA for
overtime compensation pursuant to sections 510, subdivision (a) and
1194, subdivision (a).

Judge Aaron concludes that the DAA may not be liable for overtime
compensation mandated by section 510, subdivision (a) when the DAA
acts as a joint employer with another entity.  Accordingly, she
rejects the Plaintiffs' claim that they properly stated a section
1194, subdivision (a) claim for section 510, subdivision (a)
overtime compensation against the DAA pursuant to a joint
employment theory of liability.

The Judge also concludes that the law-of-the-case doctrine does not
require that we reverse the trial court's order sustaining the
demurrer.  She finds that the Morales court did not hold that the
Plaintiffs yet-to-be pleaded joint employment theory adequately
stated a cause of action against the DAA.  Even if she were to
agree with them that the Morales court did hold that exempt public
employees could sue their public employer for overtime compensation
to the extent the public employer jointly employed such employees
with a private employer, the law-of-the-case doctrine would not
require that the Court adhere to this erroneous conclusion.

Finally, the Judge concludes that the Plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate how they have sufficiently stated a claim under section
1194, subdivision (a) for overtime compensation due under section
510, subdivision (a) based on the theory that the DAA was not the
plaintiffs' direct employer.  The Plaintiffs have not provided any
authority as to the meaning of the term "directly employed" in Wage
Order No. 10.  They have failed to explain how such factual
allegations sufficiently state a claim based on the theory that the
DAA is not their direct employer.  Moreover, the Plaintiffs point
to no other allegations in their second amended complaint
demonstrating that they are not directly employed by the DAA.

For these reasons, Judge Aaron affirmed the trail court's judgment.
In the interests of justice, each party is to bear its own costs
on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 10, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/WiYJLq from Leagle.com.

Law Offices of David J. Gallo and David J. Gallo for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.

Gordon & Rees, James J. McMullen, Jr. -- jmcmullen@grsm.com --
Matthew G. Kleiner -- mkleiner@grsm.com -- and Justin M. Michitsch
-- jmichitsch@grsm.com -- for Defendant and Respondent.

League of California Cities and California State Association of
Counties, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.


A CANAAN SUSHI: Fails to Pay OT to Deliveryman, Gao Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
SHIQIANG GAO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. A CANAAN SUSHI INC. d/b/a CANAAN SUSHI; JIA
ZHUANG WANG, and JANE WANG, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-06442
(S.D.N.Y., July 17, 2018) seeks to recover from the Defendants
unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages,
unreimbursed out-of-pocket vehicle costs, prejudgment interests,
and attorneys' fees and cost.

The Plaintiff Gao was employed by the Defendants as deliveryman
from February 15, 2016 to August 15, 2016.

A Canaan Sushi Inc. d/b/a Canaan Sushi is a corporation organized
under the laws of the State of New York. The Company is engaged in
the restaurant business. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John Troy, Esq.
          TROY LAW, PLLC
          41-25 Kissena Boulevard, Suite 119
          Flushing, NY 11355
          Telephone: (718) 762-1324


ARIZONA: 9th Cir. Affirms Summary Judgment in J. Torres's Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed the
District Court's judgment granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment in the case captioned JAVIER TORRES; LIA RIVADENEYRA,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TERRY GODDARD, in his individual
capacity; CAMERON H. HOLMES, AKA Kip Holmes, in his individual
capacity; THOMAS C. HORNE, Attorney General, Attorney General of
the State of Arizona, Defendants-Appellees, No. 16-16315 (9th
Cir.)

On remand, the court again denied class certification, and granted
the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that qualified
immunity protected the defendants against these claims.

Named plaintiffs Javier Torres and Lia Rivadeneyra brought this
putative class action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the
Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General of the State of
Arizona. They allege that two warrants issued by the Maricopa
County Superior Court against plaintiffs' money orders with Western
Union Financial Services (Western Union) violated their Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Torres and Rivadeneyra first argue that defendants are not entitled
to qualified immunity for the execution and service of the
warrants, because the warrants were insufficiently particularized.
They argue that the Attorney General's use and issuance of
criteria-based warrants violates the requirement of particularized
probable cause and the prohibition on using profile evidence as
probable cause and that both propositions were clearly
established.

Even assuming plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights were violated,
such a violation was not clearly established at the time. This
second prong of the qualified immunity analysis requires the Court
to examine the contours of the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights
to determine whether those particular rights were clearly
established and ask whether a reasonable official would have known
that what he was doing violated that right. The Plaintiffs carry
the burden of showing that the law was clearly established at the
time of the alleged violation and the Court defines clearly
established law not at a high level of generality, but with a fair
degree of granularity.

The Court agree with the district court's analysis, and the Court
finds that the cases cited by plaintiffs would not have provided
defendants with notice in 2006 that their conduct constituted an
unconstitutional seizure in violation of plaintiffs' Fourth
Amendment rights.  

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's June 25, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ydcf68o5 from Leagle.com.


BANKRUPTCY MANAGEMENT: Court Dismisses Antitrust Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned McGARRY & McGARRY LLP, Plaintiff, v. BANKRUPTCY
MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 17 CV 5779 (N.D
Ill.).

McGarry filed in Illinois state court a single count against BMS
alleging the same horizontal conspiracy to fix the manner of
charging fees for its bankruptcy software services in violation of
the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 ILCS 10/3 (count I), which BMS
promptly removed to this court.

In the first action, the court granted BMS's motion to dismiss
because McGarry was not the appropriate party to bring a claim
under federal antitrust law. BMS moves to dismiss McGarry's single
count of violation of the Illinois Antitrust Act (IAA) on the same
grounds. To bring an antitrust suit, a plaintiff must show two
things: they must have standing to bring an antitrust suit, and
they must allege that they have sustained antitrust injury.

McGarry points out that a bankruptcy estate is different from a
company in that the former does not exist to generate a profit.
Therefore, the relationship between the Integrated Estate and
McGarry more closely resembles a principal/agent relationship,
where the principal has standing to sue despite the general
derivative standing rule. The court struggles to understand
McGarry's argument and does not see how the Integrated Estate would
be McGarry's agent, as it would seemingly follow that a bankruptcy
estate would be the agent of each of its individual creditors. If
anyone is the agent of the bankruptcy estate, it is the trustee.

As the court has pointed out, because a trustee in bankruptcy owes
a fiduciary duty to an estate's creditors, the trustee could pursue
the debtor's claim against the defendant on behalf of all the
debtor's creditors equally, without preference for any particular
creditor. That injury is much more efficiently measured on behalf
of the debtor, moreover, rather than in fortuitous segments claimed
by those creditors who happen to sue.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 2, 2018Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yan7h6lv from Leagle.com.
McGarry & McGarry, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Marianne C.
Holzhall -- mch@mcgarryllc.com -- McGarry & McGarry, LLC & William
Dunnegan -- wd@dunnegan.com -- Dunnegan & Scileppi LLC, pro hac
vice.

Bankruptcy Management Solutions, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Jonathan M. Herman -- herman.jonathan@dorsey.com -- Dorsey &
Whitney, Kaleb McNeely -- mcneely.kaleb@dorsey.com -- Dorsey &
Whitney LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Anthony Lindsay --
lindsay.michael@dorsey.com -- Dorsey & Whitney LLP, pro hac vice &
Michael Irving Leonard -- mleonard@leonardmeyerllp.com --
LeonardMeyer LLP.


BEST BUY COMPANY: Removes Eldredge Suit to W.D. Washington
----------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of Sharon Eldredge, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Best Buy
Company, Inc., Defendant, filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from
the Superior Court of the State of Washington, County of King,
(Case No. 18-00002-15074-4-KNT) to the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington on July 25, 2018, and assigned Case
No. 2:18-cv-01093-RSM (W.D. Wash., July 25, 2018). The case is
assigned to Judge Ricardo S. Martinez.

Best Buy Co., Inc. operates as a retailer of technology products,
services, and solutions in the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
The company was formerly known as Sound of Music, Inc. Best Buy
Co., Inc. was founded in 1966 and is headquartered in Richfield,
Minnesota. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Blythe H Chandler, Esq.
          TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC
          936 North 34th Street, Suite 300
          Seattle, WA 98103-8869
          Telephone: (206) 816-6603
          E-mail: bchandler@terrellmarshall.com

               - and –

          Toby James Marshall, Esq.
          TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC
          936 North 34th Street, Suite 300
          Seattle, WA 98103-8869
          Telephone: (206) 816-6603
          Facsimile: (206) 319-5450
          E-mail: tmarshall@terrellmarshall.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Fred B Burnside, Esq.
          Nathan W. Rouse, Esq.
          DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE (SEA)
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200
          Seattle, WA 98101-3045
          Telephone: (206) 622-3150
          Facsimile: (206) 757-7700
          E-mail: fredburnside@dwt.com
                  nathanrouse@dwt.com


BOB ROBISON COMMERCIAL: Fails to Pay OT to Helper, Martinez Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
ALBERT MARTINEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BOB ROBISON COMMERCIAL FLOORING, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-00136-DPM (E.D. Ark., July 26, 2018) is
an action against the Defendant for declaratory judgment, monetary
damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees
and costs, as a result of the Defendant's failure to pay the
Plaintiff lawful overtime compensation for hours worked in excess
of 40 hours per week.

Mr. Martinez was employed by the Defendant as helper for its
commercial flooring company from February 2017 to June 2018.

Bob Robison Commercial Flooring specializes in floor laying,
refinishing, and resurfacing. The Company offers several options
for its clients such as carpets, and rugs.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christopher Burks, Esq.
          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 South Shackleford, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: chris@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


BODY SCULPT: Court Grants Arbitration in A. Thompson's FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York granted Defendant's Motion for Arbitration in the case
captioned ARIA CAROLINA THOMPSON; and KIMBERLY CAPUANO,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. BODY SCULPT INTERNATIONAL, LLC (d/b/a SONO BELLO);
TRINET HR CORP.; TRINET HR III, INC.; AESTHETIC PHYSICIANS, P.C.
(d/b/a SONO BELLO); MICHAEL J. GARRISON; and JOHN/JANE DOES #1-18,
Defendants, No. 18-cv-1001-ARR-GRB (E.D.N.Y).

The Defendants request that the Court stays the proceedings in this
court and compel plaintiffs to attend arbitration.  

Plaintiffs Maria Thompson and Kimberly Capuano bring this putative
collective action against defendants. Plaintiffs allege that
defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), by failing
to pay them overtime.

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) makes arbitration agreements
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

Because the TriNet Agreement is valid and enforceable, Capuano must
arbitrate any and all of her FLSA claims in bilateral arbitration
with defendants. And because the Body Sculpt Agreement is valid and
enforceable, Thompson must also arbitrate any and all of her FLSA
claims in bilateral arbitration with defendants.

Capuano entered into both the Hand-Signed Agreement and the TriNet
Agreement, and Thompson entered into the Hand-Signed Agreement, the
TriNet Agreement, and the Body Sculpt Agreement. The Plaintiffs
argue that defendants have not shown that they entered into the
TriNet Agreement or the Body Sculpt Agreement. But each in fact
admits that she assented to both contracts.   Specifically, they
swear that they were forced to sign  the agreements in order to
keep their jobs. But whether they were pressured into assenting to
the agreements goes to whether the contracts were procedurally
unconscionable, not whether they entered into the contract in the
first place. Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
plaintiffs, therefore, they assented to the agreements at issue.

THe Plaintiffs argue that the Hand-Signed Agreement is the only
agreement at issue, because it contains a clause that provides that
it can only be revoked or modified by a writing signed by the
parties which specifically states an intent to revoke or modify
this Agreement. The Court concludes, however, that the Hand-Signed
Agreement was revoked by the TriNet Agreement, which in turn was
revoked by the Body Sculpt Agreement.

Plaintiffs argue that the Hand-Signed Agreement is unenforceable
because it is unconscionable.

None of the plaintiffs' arguments as to substantive
unconscionability would apply to the Body Sculpt or TriNet
Agreements, which substantially modified or removed the provisions
with which the plaintiffs took issue in the Hand-Signed Agreement.

The Plaintiffs argue that the Hand-Signed Agreement is procedurally
unconscionable for a number of reasons. The parties' bargaining
power was unequal, the plaintiffs contend, because plaintiffs were
less sophisticated having only completed a high school education
and worked in sales for most of their careers and because the
plaintiffs' only choice was to accept the agreement or not work. In
addition, the defendants presented the agreement along with other
papers, and put the plaintiffs under constant pressure to sign it
as soon as possible, before the close of the same business day.
Moreover, the plaintiffs allege, the defendants did not tell them
that they could negotiate the terms or consult an attorney. Nor did
the defendants tell them that the Hand-Signed Agreement applied a
shorter statute of limitations than the FLSA, or where they could
access the AAA arbitration rules.  

These allegations, however, are not enough to establish procedural
unconscionability. It is true that the bargaining power between the
plaintiffs and the defendants was not equal. But equality is not
required, provided the circumstances of the contract's creation are
not grossly unreasonable. Taking the facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, they spoke and read fluent English,
had well over a decade of experience in the working world, and were
given at least until the end of a business day to review the
agreement. And the fact most likely to indicate a lack of
meaningful choice that the contract was a condition of their
continued employment has been ruled insufficient to render an
agreement's formation grossly unreasonable.

The Court cannot conclude, therefore, that the Hand-Signed
Agreement is procedurally unconscionable.

The Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint but, in the
alternative, request that the Court stays the case and compel the
parties to arbitration. The Court concludes that the Court  must
stay the case. As the Second Circuit has observed, the FAA's text,
structure, and underlying policy require me to stay the case rather
than dismiss it. Although dismissing the matter might assist in
efficient docket management, the FAA clearly removes such
discretion. The Court therefore stay the case while the parties
proceed to arbitration.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 2, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ya87db3v from
Leagle.com.

Maria Carolina Thompson & Kimberly Capuano, Indvidually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Jeffrey D. Johnson, Garson Johnson LLC, pro hac vice, James A.
DeRoche, Garson Johnson LLC, pro hac vice, Robert E. DeRose --
bderose@barkanmeizlish.com -- Barkan Meizlish, pro hac vice & Robi
J. Baishnab -- rbaishnab@barkanmeizlish.com -- Barkan Meizlish,
LLP, pro hac vice.

Body Sculpt International, LLC, doing business as, TriNet HR
Corporation, doing business as, TriNet HR III, Inc., doing business
as, Aesthetics Physicians, P.C., doing business as & Michael J.
Garrison, Defendants, represented by Adam E. Collyer --
Adam.Collyer@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smthi
LLP & Jason D. Stitt -- Jason.Stitt@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis
Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, pro hac vice.


BRF SA: Birminghan Named Lead Plaintiff in Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District New York
granted the City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System’s
Motion for a Appointment as Lead Plaintiff in the case captioned
RYO NAKAMURA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. BRF S.A., PEDRO DE ANDRADE FARIA, JOSE
ANTONIO DO PRADO FAY, CLAUDIO GALEAZZI, JOSE ALEXANDRE CARNEIRO
BORGES, AUGUSTO RIBEIRO JUNIOR, LEOPOLDO VIRIATO SABOYA and HELIO
RUBENS MENDES DOS SANTOS JUNIOR, Defendant, No.
18-cv-2213(PKC)(S.D.N.Y.).

Two motions for appointment as lead plaintiff have been filed by
purported class members. One motion is brought by Birmingham, a
public pension fund that purchased and sold American Depository
Receipts (ADRs) in defendant BRF S.A.

This case is brought as a putative class action asserting claims
under sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.

BRF is alleged to be the world's largest poultry exporter, with its
headquarters in Brazil. Its ADRs trade on the New York Stock
Exchange.

The Complaint alleges that the defendants materially misrepresented
and omitted that BRF had bribed public officials in order to
undermine food safety inspections and conceal unsanitary conditions
at BRF's meatpacking facilities.  The Complaint alleges that the
defendants' misstatements and omissions artificially inflated BRF's
stock price, which dropped when investors learned the truth about
company practices and the increased risk of regulatory enforcement
and prosecution in light of the defendants' alleged scheme.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) provides that
the district court shall appoint a lead plaintiff that it
determines to be most capable of adequately representing the
interests of class members.

Soares Group

The Soares Group asserts that it has lost $879,276.97 as a result
of the defendants' alleged fraud, and has submitted charts
reflecting transactions in BRF shares. ARS purchased 90,000 shares
during the class period and Platinum purchased 316,000 shares. It
appears that each entity has retained those share. ARS asserts that
it has lost $248,250 as a result of defendants' alleged fraud, and
Platinum claims that it has lost $631,026.97. The Soares Group
states that it satisfies the criteria of Rule 23 because its losses
are typical of members of the proposed class and that its interests
are aligned with the class in seeking maximum recovery for any
losses incurred.  
The Soares Group's moving papers did not include any submission on
the appropriateness of grouping the two Soares entities each
separately owned and controlled by a different brother together as
a lead plaintiff. In its response papers, it filed a joint
declaration of Arlindo and Nelson Soares.

Their assertions do not satisfy the threshold requirements that are
weighed in the grouping of proposed lead plaintiffs. The joint
declaration identifies Arlindo and Nelson Soares as brothers with a
long history of cooperation in business matters. The Court affords
some weight to the brothers' familial relationship and the
likelihood that they will act in unison.

Second, the declaration is similarly vague as to their involvement
in the litigation to date. The declaration states only that they
have reviewed the Complaint's allegations, and, after consulting
with our counsel, thereafter approved the filing of this motion.
Their involvement in the litigation thus far appears to be
minimal.

Third, the plans for cooperation described in the declaration are
vague and conclusory. The joint declaration states that they will
oversee their counsel, exercise joint decision-making, actively
monitor the activities of their counsel and that they have
established procedures for overseeing the progress of the
litigation and communicating regularly between themselves and their
counsel.

The Court concludes that the Soares Group has not satisfied its
burden of showing that is appropriate to aggregate the two separate
holding companies as a single lead plaintiff. Its motion for
appointment as lead plaintiff is therefore denied.

Birmingham

Birmingham asserts that it purchased 145,673 BRF ADRs and has lost
$749,857 as a result of defendants' alleged fraud. It has submitted
a chart reflecting that during the class period, Birmingham
purchased BRF's ADRs at a price of $1,862,231.21, and sold them
during the class period for proceeds of $1,112,373.60, reflecting
total losses of $749,857.61.  Birmingham states that it satisfies
the criteria of Rule 23 because its losses are typical of members
of the proposed class and that his interests are aligned with the
class in seeking maximum recovery for any losses incurred.

The Soares Group urges that Birmingham is not an appropriate lead
plaintiff because it falls under the PSLRA's professional plaintiff
restriction.

Even if Birmingham fell within the professional plaintiff
restriction, the Court would be inclined to grant its motion, given
both its status as an institutional investor and the presumptively
most adequate plaintiff. The provision of the PSLRA restricting the
use of professional plaintiffs was largely directed at private
individuals, and courts have routinely waived the restriction in
the case of qualified institutional investors.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 2, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yd47fuom from
Leagle.com.

City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System, Lead Plaintiff,
represented by David Avi Rosenfeld -- drosenfeld@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.
Ryo Nakamura, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph Alexander Hood, II --
ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy Alan Lieberman
-jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Steven Trabish, Movant, represented by Adam M. Apton --
aapton@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky LLP.

John Smolen, Movant, represented by Phillip C. Kim --
pkim@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm P.A.

BPRINT Investments LLC & Julio Almeida, Movants, represented by
Jeremy Alan Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP.

Soares Group, Movant, represented by Michael Walter Stocker --
mikes@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

BRF S.A., Defendant, represented by Jay B. Kasner –
jay.kasner@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP
& Scott D. Musoff – scott.musoff@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.


CAL WEST: $185K Class Settlement Has Prelim Court Approval
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Class Settlement and Conditional Certification of Settlement Class
in the case captioned CARMELA MORA, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CAL WEST AG SERVICES,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:15-cv-1490-LJO-EPG (E.D.
Cal.)

Plaintiff Carmela Mora, as an individual and on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, filed suit against Defendants
Cal West Ag Services, Inc., Jon Marthedal, and Eric Marthedal
alleging the following wage and hour claims for the proposed class,
inter alia:

   1. Violations of the Agricultural Worker Protection Act (AWPA)

   2. Failure to Pay Minimum Wages; California Industrial Welfare
Commission (IWC)

   3. Failure to Provide Timely Paid Rest Periods or Compensation
in Lieu Thereof

The Settlement amount is $185,000, and is proposed to be
distributed as follows: (1) payments to the named Plaintiff in
compensation for her role as class representative; (2) payments to
class counsel for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs; (3) payment
to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) as
the LWDA's share of the settlement of civil penalties under the
agreement; (4) payment to the settlement administrator for its
reasonable fees and expenses; and (5) distribution of the net
settlement amount to all class members who submit a timely and
valid claim form.

Numerosity

Here, the proposed class is defined as: All Cal West AG Service
Inc.'s non-exempt workers who were employed by and/or performed
work for Defendants Jon and Eric Marthedal as agricultural workers
at Marthedal Farms in California. The settling parties represent
that the core damages affect "approximately 225 non-exempt field
workers who worked for Defendants for the relatively brief time
picking and packing blueberries," but that the broader dates of
working for Defendants were used for the settlement class to
provide for any claims outside the briefer period that may be
discovered when the class data is produced.  

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has demonstrated that the
numerosity requirements of Rule 23(a)(1) are satisfied.

Commonality

Here, the Plaintiff contends that the class's claims involve common
questions of both fact and law regarding Defendants' alleged
failure to abide by federal and state wage and hour law.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to pay class
members the minimum wage; failed to provide class members with rest
periods or compensation in lieu of rest periods; failed to provide
class members with lawful full 30-minute meal periods; failed to
provide class members with accurate, itemized wage statements; and
failed to timely pay terminated class members their full pay at the
time of termination. The Plaintiff has demonstrated that the
commonality requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) are satisfied.

Typicality

Here, the Plaintiff contends that her claims are essentially
identical to the claims for the expected claimants of non-exempt
field workers who worked for Defendants for the relatively brief
time from April 30, 2015 to June 5, 2015 picking and packing
blueberries. According to the Complaint, the Plaintiff was employed
as a non-exempt employee directly or jointly by the Defendants on
land owned, leased, and/or operated by Defendant Cal West Ag and
the Marthedal Defendants at various times during the class period
of September 30, 2011, through September 30, 2015, and suffered
from the same types of alleged violations of federal and state law
by the Defendants as suffered by the absent proposed class members.
The Plaintiff has demonstrated that the typicality requirement of
Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied because the claims of Plaintiff Mora,
the class representative, is reasonably co-extensive with those of
the absent proposed class members.

Adequacy of Representation

Here, the Plaintiff class representative, Mora, has submitted
evidence that there is no conflict of interest between herself and
the rest of the class. Mora possesses the same interests and
injuries as the absent proposed class members, and has vigorously
prosecuted this case on behalf of the class, as demonstrated by
initiating this lawsuit, undertaking and affirmatively
participating in the investigation of the issues in the case,
discovery, and settlement negotiations. The Court finds that
Plaintiff class representative Mora satisfies the adequacy of
representation requirement.

The Plaintiff class representative seeks appointment of her current
counsel, Mallison & Martinez, as Class Counsel. The attorneys at
this firm have prosecuted this action on behalf of the Plaintiff
and the proposed class since the commencement of the litigation;
have extensive experience litigating class actions; and have been
certified by numerous state and federal courts as adequate class
counsel. The Court finds that the Plaintiff class representative's
current counsel of Mallison & Martinez satisfies the adequacy
requirements with respect to the proposed class.

Rule 23(b) Requirements

Here, the Plaintiff asserts that common questions to class members
raised in this action predominate over any individualized
questions. The Court agrees. The Complaint alleges that the
Defendants failed to pay class members the minimum wage; failed to
provide class members with rest periods or compensation in lieu of
rest periods; failed to provide class members with lawful full
30-minute meal periods; failed to provide class members with
accurate, itemized wage statements; and failed to timely pay
terminated class members their full pay at the time of termination.


The Court finds that the predominance requirement is met here.

Superiority

Here, the Plaintiff contends that a class action is superior to
other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the claims. The Defendants' alleged state wage and hour violations
resulted in class-wide injuries and damages to an estimated 225
workers. The Plaintiff's counsel estimates that, if all of these
workers participate in the Settlement, each would be entitled to
approximately $393. Thus, this case involves multiple claims for
relatively small individual sums. If plaintiffs cannot proceed as a
class, some  perhaps most will be unable to proceed as individuals
because of the disparity between their litigation costs and what
they hope to recover.

The Court finds that the superiority requirement is met here.

Preliminary Fairness Determination

Although the factors in a court's fairness assessment will vary
from case to case, courts generally must weigh: (1) the strength of
the plaintiff's case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely
duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class
action status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in
settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed and the stage of
the proceedings; (6) the experience and views of counsel; (7) the
presence of a governmental participant; and (8) the reaction of the
class members of the proposed settlement.

Here, after balancing the relevant factors, the Court finds
preliminary approval of the Settlement to be appropriate.

Nature of Settlement Negotiations; Extent of Discovery; Stage of
Proceedings; Experience and Views of Counsel

Based on these representations, the Court finds that the settling
parties agreed to the Settlement after conducting extensive
investigation and discovery, which permitted counsel to properly
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the case.

The facts represented by the Plaintiff, as well as the
representations of counsel during the May 3, 2018, hearing in this
matter, convinces the Court that the Settlement was the product of
serious, informed, arm's-length negotiations by the parties.

Risks of Continued Litigation

The Plaintiff explains in her brief that the proposed settlement
represents a fair compromise, given the value of the class wage
claims and the significant risk of continued litigation, which
would provide no guarantee of increased benefits over the
settlement amount. If the action were to continue without
settlement, the Plaintiff anticipates vigorous and lengthy
challenges to the merits of the class claims, and that while the
Plaintiff is confident of a favorable outcome, there is a
substantial risk that legal developments could seriously diminish
the value of the class claims.  

The Court finds that the risks and uncertainties of continued
litigation weigh in favor of the Settlement.

The Amount Offered in Settlement

In determining whether the amount offered in settlement is fair and
reasonable, a court compares the proposed settlement amount to the
best possible outcome for the class.  

Here, the Settlement provides for $185,000 in total payment. The
settlement share for each claimant will be determined by the
Settlement Administrator and will be based on (a) the claimant's
total number of pay periods in which the claimant was employed by
Cal West at Marthedal Farms during the class period, (b) divided by
the aggregate number of pay periods for the Defendants of all
participating class members between September 30, 2011, and the
date of the preliminary approval, (c) multiplied by the value of
the net settlement amount.  Although the Plaintiff did not, in her
moving papers, provide an estimate of the monetary relief expected
for each class member, during the May 3, 2018, hearing, the
Plaintiff's counsel represented that, assuming all of the estimated
225 potential class members participate in the settlement, each
would receive, on average, approximately $393.

The Plaintiff's counsel has provided an estimate of $1,200,000 as
the likely recovery at trial if they were to prevail, with
$1,000,000 of that based on derivative penalties. As noted, the
amount of the Settlement is $185,000.

Although the Settlement amount is only 15% of the $1,200,000 likely
recovery estimate provided by the Plaintiff's counsel, when the
$1,000,000 in estimated derivative penalties is removed, the
estimated likely recovery drops to $200,000, making the Settlement
amount 92% of the estimated likely recovery. The Court finds this
degree of recovery to be fair and reasonable in light of the
uncertainties the proposed class faces in this case, including the
uncertainties surrounding the recovery of penalties.

Accordingly, the following persons be preliminarily certified as
Class Members solely for the purpose of entering a settlement in
this matter:

     All Cal West Ag Service Inc.'s non-exempt workers who were
employed by and/or performed work for Defendants Jon and Eric
Marthedal as agricultural workers at Marthedal Farms in California
between September 30, 2011 and [the date of preliminary approval].

The Settlement Agreement be granted preliminary approval as it
falls within the range of possible approval as fair, adequate, and
reasonable, and appears to be the product of arm's length and
informed negotiations and to treat all Class Members fairly.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 28, 2018 Findings and
Recommendations is available at https://tinyurl.com/yatbhflc from
Leagle.com.

Carmela Mora, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Mario Martinez --
mmartinez@farmworker.com -- Martinez Aguilasocho & Lynch Aplc, Eric
Sebastian Trabucco -- etrabucco@themmlawfirm.com -- Mallison &
Martinez, Hector Rodriguez Martinez -- HectorM@TheMMLawFirm.com --
Mallison & Martinez, Joseph Donald Sutton --
JSutton@TheMMLawFirm.com -- Mallison & Martinez, Marco A. Palau --
MPalau@TheMMLawFirm.com -- Mallison & Martinez & Stanley S.
Mallison -- stanm@mallisonlaw.com -- Mallison & Martinez.

Cal West Ag Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by Anthony Peter
Raimondo  -- apr@raimondoassociates.com -- Raimondo & Associates,
Gerardo Hernandez, Jr. -- gvh@raimondoassociates.com -- Raimondo &
Associates & Thomas Elmer Campagne -- tcampagne@campagnelaw.com --
Campagne & Campagne, A Prof. Corp.

Jon Marthedal & Eric Marthedal, Defendants, represented by Thomas
Elmer Campagne, Campagne & Campagne, A Prof. Corp. & Justin Thomas
Campagne, Campagne & Campagne, A Prof. Corp.
Jon Marthedal, Counter Claimant, represented by Justin Thomas
Campagne, Campagne & Campagne, A Prof. Corp.

Cal West Ag Services, Inc., Counter Defendant, represented by
Gerardo Hernandez, Jr., Raimondo & Associates.

Cal West Ag Services, Inc., Counter Claimant, represented by
Anthony Peter Raimondo, Raimondo & Associates & Gerardo Hernandez,
Jr., Raimondo & Associates.

Jon Marthedal, Counter Defendant, represented by Justin Thomas
Campagne, Campagne & Campagne, A Prof. Corp.


CBOE EXCHANGE: Cassandra Trading Sues over VIX Price Manipulation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CASSANDRA TRADING GROUP, LLC, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CBOE EXCHANGE, INC.; CBOE
GLOBAL MARKETS, INC.; CBOE FUTURES EXCHANGE, LLC; and JOHN DOES,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-05093 (N.D. Ill., July 25, 2018) is an
action pursuant to the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the
Commodity Exchange Act, for damages, costs of suit, injunctive
relief and other relief against the Defendants for their illegal
manipulation of the Chicago Board Options Exchange ("CBOE")
Volatility Index ("VIX").

According to the complaint, the Defendant CBOE alone had access to
the SPX Options data used to calculate VIX settlement prices, was
solely responsible for calculating those prices, and was solely
responsible for publishing the final settlement prices to the
market. The Defendant CBOE had access to all of the relevant data
necessary to reveal the fact that manipulators rigged the
settlement prices. Having viewed these data on the relevant
settlement dates in real-time as part of its Special Opening
Quotation process, the Defendant CBOE knew or was reckless as to
whether the Defendants manipulated the VIX settlement values.
Rather than disclosing the fact of the manipulation, however, the
Defendant CBOE affirmatively and knowingly, or recklessly,
published the wrong, manipulated prices to the market.

The Defendant CBOE not only ignored the flaws in the settlement
process, but it allowed and encouraged the Defendants to exploit
them. Although CBOE's proprietary settlement process for VIX
Options and Futures was complex, it was subject to corruption by
those who knew how to manipulate the process.

The Defendant CBOE created the environment in which this collusive
conduct can occur. Indicative of the Defendant CBOE's intent to
facilitate the manipulation and collusion of VIX Instruments when
it decided to: (a) incorporate out-of-the-money SPX Options in the
VIX settlement calculation; (b) give greater weight to certain SPX
Options; (c) not require a premium threshold for SPX Options to be
included in the settlement calculation; (d) base the SOQ on a
single opening price; (e) sometimes use a special opening price
based not on actual trades but solely on bid-ask spreads; and (f)
grant SPX Options market-making privileges to some or all of the
same institutions engaging in collusive and manipulative conduct.

Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. serves as a financial options
trading platform. The Company offers a range of services including
index options allowing cash-settled agreements awarding holdings
based on the underlying dollar value of the index, as well as
metrics and electronic reference services. Chicago Board Options
Exchange serves clients worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas A. Millen, Esq.
          Michael J. Freed, Esq.
          Michael E. Moskovitz, Esq.
          Brian M. Hogan, Esq.
          FREED KANNER LONDON & MILLEN LLC
          2201 Waukegan Road, Suite 130
          Bannockburn, IL 60015
          Telephone: (224) 632-4500
          Facsimile: (224) 632-4521
          E-mail: dmillen@fklmlaw.com
                  mfreed@fklmlaw.com
                  mmoskovitz@fklmlaw.com
                  bhogan@fklmlaw.com

               - and -

          Guido Saveri, Esq.
          R. Alexander Saveri, Esq.
          SAVERI & SAVERI, INC.
          706 Sansome Street
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 217-6810
          Facsimile: (415) 217-6813
          E-mail: guido@saveri.com
                  rick@saveri.com

               - and -

          Vincent J. Esades, Esq.
          HEINS MILLS & OLSON, P.L.C.
          310 Clifton Avenue
          Minneapolis, MN 55403
          Telephone: (612) 338-4605
          Facsimile: (612) 338-4692
          E-mail: vesades@heinsmills.com


COMMERCIAL TRADE: Schnorrbusch Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections
----------------------------------------------------------------
AMANDA SCHNORRBUSCH, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. COMMERCIAL TRADE, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 3:18-cv-01850-G (N.D. Tex, July 18, 2018) seeks to stop
the Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Commercial Trade, Inc. offers debt collection services. he company
caters to hospitals, ambulance companies, medical doctors,
anesthesiologists, surgeons, occupational therapists, medical
equipment suppliers, and pediatricians. Commercial Trade, Inc. was
founded in 1967 and is based in Bakersfield, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joel S. Halvorsen, Esq.
          Gregory M. Klote, Esq.
          HALVORSEN KLOTE
          680 Craig Road, Suite 104
          St. Louis, MO 63141
          Telephone: (314) 451-1314
          Facsimile: (314) 787-4323
          E-mail: joel@hklawstl.com
                  greg@hklawstl.com


CONTINENTAL RESOURCES: To Complete "Strack" Settlement in 2019
--------------------------------------------------------------
Continental Resources, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that it expects to satisfy
the remainder of its settlement obligations in the class action
suit by Billy J. Strack and Daniela A. Renner in 2019.

The Court entered an order formally approving the settlement on
June 12, 2018. The order approving the settlement is not subject to
appeal.  On June 20, 2018, the court entered an order approving
Plaintiff Counsels' request for Attorney Fees and Expenses.  The
deadline for an appeal of the order approving Attorney Fees and
Expenses was August 13, 2018.  In accordance with the settlement
terms, the Company expects to make payments totaling approximately
US$50 million in the third quarter of 2018 and expects to satisfy
the remainder of its settlement obligations in 2019.

In November 2010, a putative class action was filed in the District
Court of Blaine County, Oklahoma by Billy J. Strack and Daniela A.
Renner as trustees of certain named trusts and on behalf of other
similarly situated parties against the Company.  The Petition, as
amended, alleged the Company improperly deducted post-production
costs from royalties paid to plaintiffs and other royalty interest
owners from crude oil and natural gas wells located in Oklahoma.
The plaintiffs alleged a number of claims, including breach of
contract, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and
other claims and sought recovery of compensatory damages, interest,
punitive damages and attorney fees on behalf of the proposed class.
The Company denied all allegations and denied that the case was
properly brought as a class action.

On June 11, 2015, the trial court certified a "hybrid" class
requested by plaintiffs over the objections of the Company.  The
Company appealed the trial court's class certification order.  On
February 8, 2017, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reversed the
trial court's ruling on certification and remanded the case for
further proceedings.  The plaintiffs filed a Petition for Rehearing
which was denied by the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals.
Plaintiffs then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on May 23,
2017 to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which was denied on October 2,
2017.

On October 10, 2017, Plaintiffs filed with the trial court a
"Second Amended and Renewed Motion for Class Action Certification
and Request that the Court to Set a Briefing Schedule Related to
Class Certification." During the litigation the Company was not
able to estimate a reasonably possible loss or range of loss or
what impact, if any, the ultimate resolution of the action would
have on its financial condition, results of operations or cash
flows due to the preliminary status of the matter, the complexity
and number of legal and factual issues presented by the matter and
uncertainties with respect to, among other things, the nature of
the claims and defenses, the existence and the potential size of
the class, the scope and types of the properties and agreements
involved, the production years involved, and the ultimate potential
outcome of the matter.

The Company further disclosed that it was reasonably possible one
or more events could occur in the near term that could impact the
Company's ability to estimate the potential effect of this matter
if any, on its financial condition, results of operations or cash
flows.  During the litigation the Company also disclosed plaintiffs
alleged underpayments in excess of US$200 million as damages, which
may increase with the passage of time, a majority of which would be
comprised of interest.

After certification of the case as a class action was reversed the
parties continued settlement negotiations.  Due to the uncertainty
of and burdens of litigation, on February 16, 2018, the Company
reached a settlement in connection with this matter.

Under the settlement, the Company initially expected to make
payments and incur costs associated with the settlement of
approximately US$59.6 million.  The Company accrued a loss for such
amount at December 31, 2017, which was subsequently increased to
US$61.7 million at June 30, 2018 to reflect additional settlement
obligations resulting from the passage of time.  Such accrual is
included in "Accrued liabilities and other" on the condensed
consolidated balance sheets.

On April 3, 2018, the District Court of Garfield County, Oklahoma
preliminarily approved the settlement and set certain dates
applicable to the settlement including the timing and content of
Notice, Opt-out, and Objections to Class Members.  The Fairness
Hearing was held on June 11, 2018.

Continental Resources, Inc. is an independent crude oil and natural
gas company engaged in the exploration, development and production
of crude oil and natural gas. The company is based in Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma.


COUNTY OF INYO, CA: More Info Needed in "Wagner" Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order Requiring Supplemental Submission in
Support of Stipulation and Proposed Order for Approval of
Settlement Agreement and Dismissal in the case captioned AMANDA
WAGNER and HEALTHER LIND, et al., on behalf of themselves and all
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF INYO,
Defendant, No. 1:17-cv-00969-DAD-JLT (E.D. Cal.).

Nine plaintiffs join in this action brought against defendant
County of Inyo with allegations that they were denied proper
compensation in violation of the Fair Labor standards Act (FLSA).

Here, the parties have submitted a stipulation and proposed order
for court approval of a settlement along with the request to
dismiss the action with prejudice. Therein, the parties make only a
cursory mention of what they characterize as three bona fide
disputes: (1) a dispute about the proper methodology for
calculating the regular rate and defendant's entitlement to seek
offsets and credits pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 207(h)(2); (2) whether
the defendant can present a good faith defense; and 3) whether the
defendant can present a defense to the extent of liability on the
basis of willfulness. The parties' stipulation provides no factual
representations or significant analysis as to why this settlement
agreement is a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide
dispute, as required under the FLSA. As a result, the court is not
able to make the findings that are required in order to approve
this proposed settlement agreement.

Accordingly, the parties are directed to supplement their
stipulation for approval and dismissal by way of declaration(s),
briefing or both, addressing why the proposed settlement is a fair
and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute, including with
respect to the attorneys' fees to be awarded.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 28, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y839at5jfrom Leagle.com.

Amanda Wagner & Heather Lind, Plaintiffs, represented by David
Emilio Mastagni -- davidm@mastagni.com -- Mastagni Holstedt, APC,
Isaac Sean Stevens -- istevens@mastagni.com --  Mastagni Holstedt,
APC, Ace Thomas Tate -- atate@mastagni.com -- Mastagni Holstedt,
APC & Ian Barclay Sangster -- isangster@mastagni.com --  Mastagni
Holstedt, APC.

County of Inyo, Defendant, represented by Barbara S. Van Ligten --
bvanligten@aalrr.com -- Atkinson Andelson & Nate J. Kowalski --
nkowalski@aalrr.com -- Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo.


CSK AUTO: Court OKs $395K Class Settlement in "Melgar"
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of a
Class Action Settlement in the case captioned OSMIN MELGAR, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. CSK AUTO, INC., Defendant, Case No. 13-cv-03769-EMC
(N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs filed a class action against Defendant CSK Auto,
Inc. ("CSK"), now known as O'Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC ("OR"),
claiming that the company failed to reimburse Store Managers,
Assistant Store Managers, and/or Retail Service Specialists for
costs incurred in using their personal vehicles to make bank
deposits on behalf of OR. The operative complaint is the second
amended complaint.

Under the settlement agreement, the gross settlement amount that OR
would pay the class is $395,000. Although the gross amount is
relatively small, the Court finds that the settlement falls within
a reasonable range of possible settlements, such that the motion
for preliminary approval may be granted.

Accordingly, the Court grants preliminary approval. At this
juncture, however, the granting of the motion is conditioned on
certain modifications to the settlement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 25, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yaxwvaze from Leagle.com.

Osmin Melgar, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Karo Khatchadoorian, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Michael Malk
-- mm@malklawfirm.com -- Michael Malk, ESQ, APC.

CSK Auto, Inc., an Arizona Corporation, Defendant, represented by
James Michael Peterson -- peterson@higgslaw.com -- Higgs Fletcher
and Mack LLP, Edwin Mendelson Boniske -- boniske@higgslaw.com --
Higgs Fletcher and Mack LLP & Jason Conroy Ross --
jasross@gmail.com -- Higgs Fletcher Mack.


CSX TRANSPORTATION: Darrel Andrews Sues over Mass Layoff
--------------------------------------------------------
DARREL ANDREWS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Defendants, Case
NO. 3:18-cv-00659 (M.D. Tenn., July 17, 2018) alleges violation of
the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act.

According to the complaint, on July 18, 2017 -- with an effective
date of July 25, 2017 -- the Defendant made a mass layoff of its
mechanical craft employees who were employed at the CSX Nashville,
TN Mechanical shops. The Defendant failed to provide 60 days'
advance written notice as required by the WARN Act, to the affected
employees.

Because of the July 18, 2017 terminations, the Defendant's
reduction in forces constituted a mass layoff which became
effective July 25, 2017 at the Nashville Mechanical Shop. As such
the Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees, should have
received the full protection afforded by the WARN act.

CSX Transportation, Inc. operates rail networks in the United
States. CSX Transportation, Inc. was formerly known as Seaboard
System Railroad, Inc. and changed its name to CSX Transportation,
Inc. in July 1986. The company was incorporated in 1944 and is
based in Jacksonville, Florida. CSX Transportation, Inc. operates
as a subsidiary of CSX Corp. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J. Gerard Stranch, Esq.
          Benjamin A. Gastel, Esq.
          BRANSTETTER, STRANCH & JENNINGS, PLLC
          223 Rosa Parks Ave. Suite 200
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Telephone: (615) 254-8801
          Facsimile: (615) 255-5419
          E-mail: gerards@bsjfirm.com
                  beng@bsjfirm.com

               - and -

          Daniel R. Francis, Esq.
          CRUMLEY ROBERTS, LLP
          2400 Freeman Mill Road, Suite 200
          Greensboro, N.C. 27406
          Telephone.: (336) 333-9899
          E-mail: DRFrancis@CrumleyRoberts.com


DANELL CUSTOM: $1.5MM Settlement in FLSA Suit Has Final Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DANELL
CUSTOM HARVESTING, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No.
1:16-cv-01848-SAB (E.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
granted the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for final approval of the
class action settlement.

The Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and other members of the
public similar situated, filed the action on Dec. 7, 2016, against
the Defendants alleging failure to pay overtime wages in violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"); failure to pay overtime
wages in violation of California Labor Code sections 510, 1194 and
IWC wage orders; failure to provide meal and rest periods in
violation of California Labor Code section 226.7 and IWC wage
orders; failure to furnish accurate wage statements in violation of
California Labor Code section 226; indemnification of work related
expenses, California Labor Code section 2802; waiting time
penalties, California Labor Code section 203; Unfair Business
Practices in violation of California Business and Professions Code
section 17200, et seq.; and civil penalties for violation of the
California Labor Code section 2699.

The Plaintiffs brought this action proposing six classes of
non-exempt employees who worked for the Defendants during the
limitations period:

     (a) Class of mechanics, maintenance workers, truck drivers,
and weighers who worked more than 40 hours per work week, and were
not compensated for all said overtime hours at the appropriate
rates of pay ("FLSA Overtime Class");

     (b) Class of mechanics and weighers who worked more than eight
hours per work day and/or 40 hours per work week, and were not
compensated for all said overtime hours at the appropriate rates of
pay ("Labor Code Overtime Class");

     (c) Class of employees (all five employee groups) who were not
provided with adequate meal and rest breaks as required by law
("Meal and Rest Period Class)";

     (d) Class of employees (all five employee groups) who were not
furnished with accurate wage statements ("Wage Statement Class");

     (e) Class of mechanics, maintenance workers and weighers who
have not been reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses
("Indemnification of Work-Related Expenses Class"); and

     (f) Class of employees (all five employee groups) whose
employment ended and were not paid all of their wages ("Waiting
Time Penalties Class").

The Plaintiffs' filed a motion for preliminary approval of the
class action settlement on Nov. 22, 2017.   A hearing on the motion
for preliminary approval was held on Dec. 13, 2017.  Following
supplemental briefing and several telephonic conferences on Feb.
23, 2018, an order issued granting preliminary approval of the
class action settlement.

On June 8, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for final
approval of the class action settlement.  On June 22, 2018, the
Plaintiffs filed a declaration in support of the motion for
attorney fees and the unredacted time accounting records were filed
under seal.

The settlement agreement provides $1.5 million to resolve all
claims of the settlement class for the alleged failure to provide
meal and rest breaks and pay wages, penalties, reimbursement of
work related expenses, and attorney fees and costs.  

The following class is certified for purposes of settlement only:
all persons who are or were employed in California by Defendants as
non-exempt (i) mechanics, (ii) maintenance workers, (iii) farm
equipment operators, (iv) truck drivers, and (v) weighers at any
point during the Class Period and who do not properly and timely
opt out of the Settlement Class by having requested exclusion. This
definition excludes all workers who previously settled and released
their claims in the California Labor Commissioner.  The class
period is defined as any time between Dec. 7, 2012, and the
preliminary approval order.

Prior to any settlement funds being paid to eligible class members,
deductions to the common fund will be made for service awards to
the named Plaintiffs, an award of attorney fees and costs to the
class counsel, all costs of settlement administration, and a
Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") payment to the California
Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA").

The Class counsel will receive 25% of the gross settlement fund for
a total of $375,000.  Additionally, the class counsel will be paid
$31,000 for the costs incurred in prosecuting the action.  The
named Plaintiffs will each receive a payment of $7,500 as a service
award for the efforts that they have taken on behalf of the class,
in addition to the amount he or she will receive under the
settlement.  The remainder of the common fund constitutes the net
settlement fund.  The Defendants will separately pay their share of
the payroll taxes to the Claims Administrator.

The net settlement funds are allocated as follows: 25% for unpaid
wage claims; 80% less $10,000 for statutory penalties and interest.
Of the $10,000 withheld for penalties, $7,500 will be paid to the
LWDA as the agency's share of the PAGA penalties.  The Settlement
shares will be distributed by using the dates worked by each class
member from Dec. 10, 2012 through May 2017 and calculating the
number of pay periods worked by each class member and the combined
number of pay periods for the entire class.

The actual hours worked and the hourly rate of each class member
will be used to calculate damages and the percentage that each
employee would be entitled to from the collective total amount
owed.  This will determine the percentage that each settlement
class member will receive from the net settlement amount.
Twenty-one percent of the net settlement fund constitutes overtime
wages for the FLSA class.

Any unclaimed funds will be sent to the State of California Unpaid
Property Fund to be held in the name of and for the benefit of the
class member under California's escheatment laws.

Since the preliminary approval, the parties have agreed to the
following modifications to the settlement agreement.  The named
class members have reduced the amount they are seeking an
enhancement award for their services in the action from $7,500 to
$5,000.  Any unclaimed funds will be sent to the California
Division of Labor Standards Enforcement's Unpaid Wages Fund to be
held in the name of and for the benefit of the class members under
California's escheatment laws.  This is the more specific fund for
unclaimed wages.

Magistrate Judge Boone, having reviewed the record and considering
that no class member has objected to the settlement, finally
approved the settlement agreement and all provisions will be
effectuated.  Upon completion of administration of the settlement
agreement, the claims administrator will provide written
certification of such completion to the Court and the counsel for
the parties.

Class representatives Rodriguez, Jesus Hernandez Infante, Marcos
Garcia, Juan Manuel Bravo, Estela Patino, Jose F. Orozco, and
Antonio Ortiz are each awarded an incentive award of $4,000, to be
paid from the gross settlement fund.  The class counsel is awarded
attorney fees in the amount of $375,000 and costs of $31,000, to be
paid from the gross settlement fund.

The Magistrate Judge finds that an allocation of $10,000 of the
gross settlement fund to the PAGA claims is reasonable.  The claims
administrators will pay $7,500 (75% of the allocation) to the
California Labor and Workforce Development Agency.  The claims
administrator will be paid $14,500 from the gross settlement fund
for the cost of notice and claims administration.

He finally approved and ordered the payment of the individual
settlement payments to be paid to the class members and members of
the collective action as set forth in the Settlement Agreement to
be made from the net settlement proceeds in accordance with the
terms of the Settlement Agreement.  The claims administrator will
send any unclaimed funds to California Division of Labor Standards
Enforcement's Unpaid Wages Fund to be held in the name of and for
the benefit of class members under California's escheatment laws.

The Magistrate Judge entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs
and against the Defendants, and approved the terms of the
settlement agreement.  He dismissed with prejudice the action.
Each side will bear its own costs and attorney fees, except as
provided by the settlement agreement and set forth.  The hearing
set for July 11, 2018, is vacated.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 10, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/iuTa8X from Leagle.com.

Francisco Rodriguez, Jesus Hernandez Infante, Marco Garcia, Juan
Manuel Bravo, Estela Patino, Jose F. Orozco & Antonio Ortiz,
Plaintiffs, represented by Enrique Martinez, Law Offices of John E.
Hill.

Danell Custom Harvesting, LLC, a California Company, Rance Danell,
Eric Danell, David Danell & Justin Danell, Defendants, represented
by Howard A. Sagaser -- has@sw2law.com -- Sagaser, Watkins &
Wieland, PC, Ian Blade Wieland -- ian@sw2law.com -- Sagaser,
Watkins & Wieland, PC & William M. Woolman -- bill@sw2law.com --
Sagaser, Watkins & Wieland PC.


DAVITA INC: Delaware Court Stays Securities Fraud Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware
granted Defendant's Motion to Stay the case captioned In re DAVITA
INC. STOCKHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION. This Document Relates To:
ALL ACTIONS. C.A. No. 17-152-MPT (D. Del.) pending the outcome of a
motion to dismiss in a related securities action filed in the
District of Colorado.

The initial complaint was filed, followed by two other actions,
with the three matters eventually consolidated and present
operative complaint. The amended complaint alleges breaches of
fiduciary duties, unjust enrichment, corporate waste and violations
of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from at
least 2015 through the present.

Courts typically consider three factors in deciding whether a stay
is appropriate: 1) whether the granting of a stay would cause the
non-moving party to suffer undue prejudice from any delay or allow
the moving party to gain a clear tactical advantage over the
non-moving party; 2) whether a stay will simplify the issues for
trial; and 3) whether discovery is complete and a trial date set.

The Defendants' position is that a stay is appropriate as
prosecution of this Derivative Action is antithetical to DaVita's
defensive position in the Securities Action; as such, DaVita is
forced to accuse its directors of violations of federal securities
laws, while, at the same time, defending itself against the same
allegations in the present action.

The Plaintiffs allege that current prosecution of this Derivative
Action will not jeopardize DaVita's defenses in the Securities
Action since the Defendants do not demonstrate actual conflict as
their arguments are speculative. The Plaintiffs contend that both
cases are in their early stages, and therefore, it will be a while
before any real risk of conflict presents itself, if at all.

The court finds that staying this action for a limited period will
simplify the issues in the instant case: specifically, it will
relieve the tension on DaVita caused by alleging wrongful conduct
in this matter while defending against substantially similar
allegations of wrongful conduct in the Securities Action in the
District of Colorado. Further, discovery has not begun in this
district and no trial date has been set, while the motion to
dismiss briefing in the Securities Action is well underway in the
District of Colorado and is scheduled to be completed by June 28,
2018.

A review of the challenged statements (allegations of patient
steering and alleged false and misleading statements contained in
SEC filings, press releases and investor conference calls) reveal
that the core allegations of these two actions are substantially
similar and center on allegedly materially false or misleading
statements in Da Vita's financial statements and its failure to
disclose such purported steering. Both actions focus on alleged
violations of securities laws based on similar and often identical
omissions relying on the same or similar documents filed with the
SEC. The overlap in these two matters is significant.

The Court finds that the Defendants have sufficiently established
that a stay of a limited time period is justified.

Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to stay is granted for the
limited time period.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 25, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yctwk7rk from
Leagle.com.

Charles Blackburn, derivatively on behalf of Davita Inc.,
Plaintiff, represented by Seth D. Rigrodsky -- sdr@rl-legal.com --
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., Brian D. Long -- bdl@rl-legal.com --
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., Gina M. Serra -- gms-rl-legal.com --
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A. & Peter B. Andrews --
pandrews@andrewsspringer.com -- Andrews & Springer LLC.

City of Warren Police and Fire Retirement System, Plaintiff,
represented by Benny C. Goodman, III -- bennyg@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Erik Luedeke --
eluedeke@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Peter B.
Andrews --  pandrews@andrewsspringer.com -- Andrews & Springer LLC,
Travis E. Downs -- travisd@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Craig J. Springer --
cspringer@andrewsspringer.com -- Andrews & Springer LLC & David M.
Sborz --  dsborz@andrewsspringer.com -- Andrews & Springer LLC.

Davita Inc., Nominal Defendant, represented by Jody Barillare --
jody.barillare@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Karen
Pieslak Pohlmann -- karen.pohlmann@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis
& Bockius LLP, pro hac vice, Laura Hughes McNally --
laura.mcnally@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, pro
hac vice & Marc J. Sonnenfeld -- marc.sonnenfeld@morganlewis.com --
Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, pro hac vice.


DEFENDERS INC: 3rd Cir. Affirms Remand of TCCWNA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, affirmed the
District Court's Memorandum and Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion
to Remand the case captioned NORMAN WALSH, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, v. DEFENDERS, INC., d/b/a Protect Your
Home; ADT SECURITY SERVICES, INC.; B&R RECOVERY LLC, Defenders,
Inc.; ADT Security Services, Inc., n/k/a Tyco Integrated Security
LLC; and ADT LLC, Appellants, No. 18-2156 (3rd Cir.) to state
court.

Walsh alleged that starting in December 2009 he and the class
members purchased home security equipment and monitoring service
from defendants and signed contracts that defendants prepared which
contained illegal provisions relating to fees due on cancellation
of the contracts. Walsh advances two claims based on the allegedly
illegal provisions relating to fees due on cancellation of the
contracts, one under New Jersey's Truth-in-Consumer Contract,
Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA) and the other under the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act (NJCFA).

The local controversy exception to a district court's class action
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) requires a
court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over a class action where
more than two-thirds of the proposed plaintiff class members and at
least one defendant, here ADT SSI-Tyco, are citizens of the state
in which the suit was filed, here New Jersey, provided that the
local defendant is one "from whom significant relief is sought by
members of the plaintiff class and whose alleged conduct forms a
significant basis for the claims asserted.

ADT SSI-Tyco is a local defendant.

In SmithKline Beecham, a Pennsylvania corporation, was sued, along
with several related entities over allegations that it manufactured
an injurious defective pharmaceutical drug. But before the case was
filed, it had dissolved as a Pennsylvania corporation, domesticated
as a Delaware corporation, and converted to a limited liability
company called GSK LLC. When the plaintiffs, one of whom was a
Pennsylvania citizen, subsequently brought the action in state
court and defendants removed it to the district court, the
plaintiffs claimed that the case should be remanded because
SmithKline Beecham and one of the plaintiffs were Pennsylvania
citizens and thus diversity of citizenship was absent. Plaintiffs
claimed that the former SmithKline Beecham should be considered in
the jurisdiction analysis as it was still a real party in interest
because Pennsylvania statutory law preserved a dissolved
corporation's interest in litigation against it.

The Defendants claim that the Court should treat ADT SSI-Tyco like
SmithKline Beecham, and, by extension, treat ADT LLC, which is not
a New Jersey citizen, like GSK LLC. But the entities are in
different positions. Unlike SmithKline Beecham, which dissolved
completely and passed all of its liability to GSK LLC, ADT SSI-Tyco
is an active entity that has not dissolved. It did not pass all of
its liabilities to ADT LLC, to the end that ADT LLC has stepped
into [its] shoes; rather, ADT SSI-Tyco is subject to liability in
this case, depending on its outcome,8 and can defend the claims
against it. Accordingly, SmithKline Beecham does not preclude us
from holding that ADT SSI-Tyco is a real party in interest in this
case.

In sum, the Court agrees with the District Court's ultimate
conclusion that ADT SSI-Tyco is a local defendant under CAFA. ADT
SSI-Tyco has an interest in the litigation and the Court correctly
took into account its citizenship for the purposes of determining
subject matter jurisdiction.

Other elements of the local controversy exception are satisfied.

The Court now considers the two remaining disputed prongs of the
local controversy exception: First, whether the proposed class
seeks significant relief from ADT SSI-Tyco and second, whether ADT
SSI-Tyco's conduct forms a significant basis for the claims
asserted by the proposed plaintiff class.

The Court has no difficulty in concluding that Walsh's amended
complaint seeks significant relief from ADT SSI-Tyco. In evaluating
whether the amended complaint seeks significant relief from a given
defendant, the Court looks to the complaint rather than extrinsic
materials such as those on which defendants rely, as the complaint
is the best evidence of the relief that the plaintiffs seek.

While the Court has observed that the significant basis prong "does
not establish an absolute quantitative requirement for the number
of class members asserting claims based on a local defendant's
conduct, the number of claims involving the local defendant can be
a helpful consideration in the analysis.” The Court agrees with
the District Court that Walsh's evidence satisfies the required
showing for the significant basis prong of the local controversy
exception.

Though a greater number of class members entered into
alarm-services contracts with ADT LLC than with ADT SSI-Tyco, the
local controversy exception does not require that the local
defendant's conduct be the most significant conduct or that it
predominates over claims against other defendants. Because of ADT
SSI-Tyco's role with respect to the use of allegedly illegal
provisions, and because over a third of the class members entered
into contracts directly with ADT SSI-Tyco, it is clear that ADT
SSI-Tyco's conduct forms a significant basis for the claims of the
class.

The Court concludes that the District Court did not err in
remanding this action to the state court based on CAFA's local
controversy exception to the exercise of its jurisdiction.  Because
ADT SSI-Tyco is a local defendant and the elements of the exception
are otherwise satisfied, the Court will affirm the remand order of
January 25, 2018, under consideration.

A full-text copy of the Third Circuit’s July 2, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycs2mwd6 from Leagle.com.

Yongmoon Kim, Kim Law Firm.

Henry P. Wolfe, The Wolf Law Firm, Counsel for Appellee.

Charles C. Eblen, Gregory Wu, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Counsel for
Appellants.


DENTSPLY SIRONA: Futuredontics Still Defends Olivares Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Futuredontics, Inc. continues to defend itself against a purported
class action lawsuit brought by Henry Olivares and other similarly
situated individuals, according to Dentsply Sirona Inc.'s Form 10-Q
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7,
2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The lawsuit was filed on January 25, 2018, in the Superior Court of
the State of California for the County of Los Angeles. The
plaintiff class alleges several violations of the California wage
and hours laws, including, but not limited to, failure to provide
rest and meal breaks and the failure pay overtime. The Company has
filed its answer to the complaint and the parties have initiated
written and other discovery. The Company continues to vigorously
defend against this matter.

Dentsply Sirona is the world's largest manufacturer of professional
dental products and technologies, with a 130-year history of
innovation and service to the dental industry and patients
worldwide. Dentsply Sirona develops, manufactures, and markets a
comprehensive solutions offering including dental and oral health
products as well as other consumable medical devices under a strong
portfolio of world class brands.


DIPLOMAT PHARMACY: Bid to Reconsider Michigan Court Order Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Diplomat Pharmacy, Inc. is still awaiting decision on its motion to
reconsider the Court's prior ruling against the Company's bid to
dismiss a putative class action complaint filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the
Company and certain of its officers, according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On November 10, 2016, a putative class action complaint was filed
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
against Diplomat Pharmacy, Inc. and certain officers of the
Company.  Following the appointment of lead plaintiffs and lead
counsel, an amended complaint was filed on April 11, 2017.  The
amended complaint alleges violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with public
filings made between February 29, 2016 and November 2, 2016 (the
"potential class period").  The plaintiff seeks to represent a
class of shareholders who purchased stock in the potential class
period.  The complaint seeks unspecified monetary damages and other
relief.

The Company filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on May
24, 2017.  The court issued an order denying the Company's motion
to dismiss on January 19, 2018.  The Company filed a motion for
reconsideration of its motion to dismiss on February 2, 2018.

The Company said it believes the complaint and allegations to be
without merit and intends to vigorously defend itself against the
action.  The Company is unable at this time to determine whether
the outcome of the litigation would have a material impact on its
results of operations, financial condition or cash flows.

Diplomat Pharmacy, Inc. is the largest independent provider of
specialty pharmacy services in the United States of America.  The
company is based in Flint, Michigan.


DR PEPPER SNAPPLE: Underpays Sales Specialist, Aly et al. Claim
---------------------------------------------------------------
SAID ALY, JULIO ULLOA, and RICHARD DICRESCENTO, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. DR PEPPER
SNAPPLE GROUP, INC.; THE AMERICAN BOTTLING COMPANY; and LARRY
YOUNG, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-04230 (E.D.N.Y., July 26, 2018)
is an action against the Defendants for failure to pay overtime
compensation, and comply with notice and record-keeping
requirements.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as sales
specialist.

The Plaintiff Aly was employed by the Defendants from February 2014
to May 2018. The Plaintiff Ulloa was employed by the Defendants
from November 2014to July 2107. The Plaintiff Discrescento was
employed by the Defendants from February 2014 to May 2017.

As of July 9, 2018, Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc. was acquired by
Maple Parent Holdings Corp., in a reverse merger transaction. Dr
Pepper Snapple Group, Inc. manufactures and distributes
non-alcoholic beverages in the United States, Mexico and the
Caribbean, and Canada. Dr Pepper Snapple Group, Inc. was
incorporated in 2007 and is headquartered in Plano, Texas. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ariadne Panagopoulou, Esq.
          PARDALIS & NOHAVICKA, LLP
          950 Third Avenue, 25th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (718) 777-0400
          Facsimile: (718) 777-0599
          Email: ari@pnlawyers.com


DYNAVAX TECHNOLOGIES: Plaintiff Appeals from Nixed Securities Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The lead plaintiff in the recently dismissed consolidated suit
styled In re Dynavax Technologies Securities Litigation has until
October 11, 2018 to file an opening appellate brief, according to
Dynavax Technologies Corporation's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018.

On November 18, 2016, two substantially similar securities class
action complaints were filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California against the Company and two of its
executive officers, in Soontjens v. Dynavax Technologies
Corporation et al., ("Soontjens") and Shumake v. Dynavax
Technologies Corporation et al., ("Shumake").

The Soontjens complaint alleges that between March 10, 2014 and
November 11, 2016, the Company and certain of its executive
officers violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, in connection with statements
related to HEPLISAV-B.  The Shumake complaint alleges violations of
the same statutes related to the same subject, but between January
7, 2016 and November 11, 2016.  The plaintiffs in both actions are
seeking an unspecified amount of damages and attorneys' fees and
costs.

On January 17, 2017, these two actions and all related actions that
subsequently may be filed in, or transferred to, the District Court
were consolidated into a single case entitled In re Dynavax
Technologies Securities Litigation.  On January 31, 2017, the court
appointed lead plaintiff and lead counsel.  Lead plaintiff filed a
consolidated amended complaint on March 17, 2017.  Defendants'
filed a motion to dismiss the consolidated amended complaint on May
1, 2017.  On September 12, 2017, the District Court granted
Defendants' motion to dismiss, but gave lead plaintiff an
opportunity to amend his complaint.

On October 3, 2017, plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint
on November 3, 2017.  A hearing on Defendants' motion to dismiss
was set for January 23, 2018, but the hearing was vacated by the
Court on January 18, 2018.

On April 24, 2018, the Court reset the hearing on Defendants'
motion to dismiss for May 8, 2018.  On June 4, 2018, Defendants'
motion to dismiss was granted and the case was dismissed with
prejudice.  On July 3, 2018, lead plaintiff filed a notice of
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  Lead
plaintiff's opening appellate brief is currently due on October 11,
2018.

Dynavax Technologies Corporation is a clinical-stage immunotherapy
company focused on leveraging the power of the body's innate and
adaptive immune response through toll-like receptor ("TLR")
stimulation.


EATON CORP: SC Retirement Appeals Decision in Steamfitters Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff South Carolina Retirement Systems Group Trust filed an
appeal from the District Court's memorandum opinion and order dated
July 25, 2018, and judgment dated July 26, 2018, entered in the
lawsuit styled Steamfitters Local 449 Pension Plan v. Eaton
Corporation plc, Case No. 16-cv-5894, in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York (New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
asserts claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on behalf
of all persons or entities, who purchased or otherwise acquired the
publicly traded securities of Eaton between Nov. 13, 2013, and July
28, 2014, inclusive.

The complaint alleges that during the Class Period, the Defendants
violated provisions of the Exchange Act by issuing false and
misleading statements regarding the Company's unencumbered ability
to divest its automobile-part manufacturing business.

Eaton is an Ireland-based manufacturer of engineered products
marketed to customers in the industrial, agricultural,
construction, aerospace, and vehicle markets.  For most of its 100
year history, Eaton primarily was a vehicle component manufacturer.
Since 2008, however, the Company has been making strategic shifts
away from its vehicle business, while growing its electrical
component businesses.

The appellate case is captioned as In re: Eaton Corp Securities,
Case No. 18-2450, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant South Carolina Retirement Systems Group Trust
is represented by:

          Thomas A. Dubbs, Esq.
          LABATON SUCHAROW LLP
          140 Broadway
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 907-0700
          E-mail: tdubbs@labaton.com

Defendants-Appellees Eaton Corporation PLC, Alexander Cutler and
Richard Fearon are represented by:

          James E. Brandt, Esq.
          LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
          885 3rd Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 906-1200
          E-mail: james.brandt@lw.com


EHEALTH INC: Settlement of Calif. Suits Still Subject to Final OK
-----------------------------------------------------------------
eHealth, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the settlement in the
class action suits in California remains subject to final approval
of the court after the notice has been sent to the class and after
a hearing before the court.  The settlement previously received the
court's preliminary approval on April 23, 2018.

The Company said, "On January 26, 2017, a purported class action
lawsuit was filed against us in the Superior Court of the State of
California, County of Santa Clara.  The complaint alleges that we
negligently failed to take necessary precautions required to
protect from unauthorized disclosure of personally identifiable
information contained on 2016 Form W-2s for current and former
employees.  The complaint purports to allege causes of action
against us for negligence, violation of Section 17200 et seq. of
the California Business & Professions Code, declaratory relief and
breach of implied contract.  The complaint seeks actual damages,
punitive damages, statutory damages, costs, including experts' fees
and attorneys' fees, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as
prescribed by law and equitable, injunctive and declaratory relief
as appropriate.

"In April 2017, an additional purported class action lawsuit was
filed against us in the Superior Court of State of California,
County of Santa Clara, relating to the same circumstances.  The
second complaint purports to allege causes of action against us for
negligence, violation of California Customer Records Act
(California Civil Code Section 1798.80 et seq.), violation of the
California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (California
Civil Code Section 56 et seq.), invasion of privacy by public
disclosure of private facts, breach of confidentiality and
violation of the California Unfair Competition Law (California
Business & Professions Code Section 17200 et seq.).

"The causes of action for violations of the California Customer
Records Act and the California Confidentiality of Medical
Information Act were dismissed without prejudice.  The second
complaint seeks actual damages, statutory damages, restitution,
disgorgement, equitable, injunctive and declaratory relief, costs,
including experts' fees and attorneys' fees and costs of
prosecuting the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest
as prescribed by law.

"In July 2017, we entered into a binding settlement term sheet
where we and the plaintiffs in each of the above-described cases
agreed to enter into a settlement, pursuant to which we would
receive a release of all claims that were or could have been
alleged related to the unauthorized disclosure at issue in each of
the cases.  In exchange for the release, we agreed to (i) pay,
subject to an aggregate cap of US$250,000, up to US$2,500 to each
impacted individual for reasonable, documented out-of-pocket losses
or expenses related to the data security incident; (ii) offer to
individuals who signed up for identity theft protection that we
offered at the time of the incident a one-year extension of the
identity theft protection; (iii) offer to individuals who did not
sign up for identity theft protection that we offered at the time
of the incident three-years of identity theft protection; and (iv)
not oppose a request by class counsel for attorneys' fees, costs
and class representative enhancements of up to US$245,000 in the
aggregate.

"In December 2017, we entered into a joint stipulation for
settlement of class action consistent with the settlement term
sheet.  The court entered an order preliminarily approving the
settlement on April 23, 2018.  As a result, notice of the
settlement was sent to members of the class informing them of the
settlement and the possible relief available to them thereunder.
The settlement is subject to final approval of the court after the
notice has been sent to the class and after a hearing before the
court.

"As of June 30, 2018, we maintained an accrual in our consolidated
financial statements for estimated potential damages and other
amounts we expect to be required to pay in connection with the
matter."

eHealth, Inc. is a leading private health insurance exchange for
individuals, families and small businesses. The company is based in
Mountain View, California.


ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Bid to Drop Securities Class Suit Pending
--------------------------------------------------------------
A motion to dismiss a consolidated securities class action
complaint remains pending in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Tennessee, according to Envision Healthcare
Corporation's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On August 4, 2017, a shareholder filed a purported class action in
the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee (M.D. Tenn.) against the Company and several of its
officers and former officers alleging that the Company and the
individual defendants violated the federal securities laws by
making allegedly false and misleading statements and failing to
disclose certain information.  On September 29, 2017, and October
23, 2017, respectively, two purported class actions were filed in
the same court making similar allegations.  The Court subsequently
consolidated these cases into a single action.

Plaintiff filed a consolidated class action complaint (CAC) on
January 26, 2018.  In addition to the Company and certain current
and former officers of the Company, the CAC also named Clayton
Dubilier & Rice, LLC (CD&R), a former Envision investor, and
certain CD&R affiliates.  On April 3, 2018, defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the CAC.  That motion remains pending.

On November 20, 2017, a shareholder filed a derivative action in
the M.D. Tenn. against the Company and its Board.  The plaintiff
generally alleges that the Company and/or certain of its officers
breached its fiduciary duties and violated the federal securities
laws.  On December 12, 2017, and December 15, 2017, respectively,
two additional derivative actions were filed in the same court
raising essentially the same allegations.  Those derivative actions
were consolidated on May 21, 2018.  On August 2, 2018, the
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and added class action claims
in connection with the Merger.  In addition to the derivative
claims, the amended complaint now includes claims for violations of
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9
promulgated thereunder based on various alleged omissions of
material information from the Proxy Statement filed on July 9,
2018, in connection with the Merger.  The amended complaint also
alleges a claim against the individual defendants for breaches of
fiduciary duties.  It seeks, among other relief, to enjoin the
Merger (or, in the alternative, an award of rescissory damages in
the event the Merger is completed), and an award of costs and
attorneys' fees.

The Company said it believes these claims are without merit and
intends to vigorously defend these actions.  Given the preliminary
stage of these matters, the Company is unable to estimate the
amount of potential damages, if any, in any of these actions.

Envision Healthcare Corporation is a provider of emergency medical
services in the U.S. Envision operates an extensive emergency
department, hospital, anesthesiology, radiology, and neonatology
physician outsourcing segment.


ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Faces Shareholder Suits over Merger Agreement
------------------------------------------------------------------
Envision Healthcare Corporation is facing three shareholder
lawsuits, one of which is filed on behalf of a putative class of
the Company's public shareholders, related to the Company's merger
agreement with Enterprise Parent Holdings Inc., according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On June 10, 2018, the Company entered into an Agreement and Plan of
Merger (the Merger Agreement) with Enterprise Parent Holdings Inc.,
a Delaware corporation (Parent), and Enterprise Merger Sub Inc., a
Delaware corporation and an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of
Parent (Merger Sub), pursuant to which Merger Sub will be merged
with and into the Company, with the Company continuing as the
surviving corporation (the Merger).

In July 2018, three shareholder lawsuits were filed in connection
with the Merger: Modi v. Envision Healthcare Corporation, et al.,
Case No. 3:18-cv-00648 (the Modi Action), filed in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee on
behalf of a putative class of the Company's public shareholders;
White v. Envision Healthcare Corporation, et al., Case No.
1:18-cv-01068 (the White Action), filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware by an individual
purported shareholder; and Rosenblatt v. Envision Healthcare
Corporation, et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-01077 (the Rosenblatt
Action), also filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware on behalf of a putative class of the Company's
public shareholders.

The White and Rosenblatt Actions name as defendants the Company and
each of the Company's directors individually; the Modi Action names
as defendants the Company, each of the Company's directors
individually, Parent and Merger Sub.

All three actions allege violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of
the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder based on
various alleged omissions of material information from the Proxy
Statement filed on July 9, 2018, in connection with the Merger.

The Modi Action also alleges a claim against the individual
defendants for breach of fiduciary duties under Delaware law.  All
three actions seek, among other relief, to enjoin the Merger (or,
in the alternative, an award of rescissory damages in the event
that the Merger is completed), and an award of costs and attorneys'
and expert fees.

The Company said it believes these claims are without merit.  Given
the preliminary stage of these matters, the Company is unable to
estimate the amount of potential damages, if any, in any of these
actions.

Envision Healthcare Corporation is a provider of emergency medical
services in the U.S. Envision operates an extensive emergency
department, hospital, anesthesiology, radiology, and neonatology
physician outsourcing segment.


ETSY INC: Consolidated Cervantes & Weiss Actions Still Pending
--------------------------------------------------------------
The consolidated Cervantes and Weiss action filed against Etsy,
Inc., among other defendants, is still pending, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On July 21, 2015, a purported securities class action complaint
(Cervantes v. Dickerson, et.al., Case No. CIV 534768) was filed in
the Superior Court of State of California, County of San Mateo
against the Company, certain officers, directors, and underwriters.
The complaint asserts violations of Sections 11 and 15 of the
Securities Act.  The complaint alleges misrepresentations in the
Company's Registration Statement on Form S-1 and Prospectus with
respect to, among other things, merchandise for sale on the
Company's website that may be counterfeit or constitute trademark
or copyright infringement.  The complaint seeks certification as a
class action and unspecified compensatory damages plus interest and
attorneys' fees.  On December 7, 2015, the Company and the
underwriter defendants moved to stay the Cervantes action on the
grounds of forum non conveniens.

On November 5, 2015, another purported securities class action
complaint (Weiss v. Etsy et al., No. CIV 536123) was filed in the
Superior Court of State of California, County of San Mateo.  The
Weiss complaint names as defendants the Company and the same
officers, directors, and underwriters named in the Cervantes
complaint, and also asserts violations of Sections 11 and 15 of the
Securities Act based on allegedly false or misleading statements or
omissions with respect to, among other things, merchandise for sale
on the Company's website that may be counterfeit or constitute
trademark or copyright infringement.

On December 24, 2015, the court consolidated the Cervantes and
Weiss actions.  On February 3, 2016, the court granted the
Company's motion to stay the consolidated actions.  The Company and
the named officers and directors intend to defend themselves
vigorously against these consolidated actions.  In light of, among
other things, the early stage of the litigation, the Company is
unable to predict the outcome of this matter and is unable to make
a meaningful estimate of the amount or range of loss, if any, that
could result from an unfavorable outcome.

Etsy builds markets, services and economic opportunity for creative
entrepreneurs.


FALL RIVER: Settlement in A. Pintor FLSA Suit Has Prelim Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALVIN PINTOR, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FALL RIVER GROUP, INC., d/b/a
Fall River Manufacturing Company, Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-865-pp
(E.D. Wis.), Judge Pamela Pepper of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin (i) granted the parties' joint motion
for preliminary approval of class and collective action settlement;
and (ii) approved the parties' joint stipulation to certify a
collective action.

On May 25, 2018, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary
approval of class and collective action settlement.  They attached
their settlement agreement, and submitted a brief explaining why
they believe the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.  The
parties also applied the Rule 23(a) and (b) standards to the
proposed Rule 23 class of all hourly employees who worked for the
defendant between July of 2015 and December of 2016.

Judge Pepper granted their joint motion for preliminary approval of
class and collective action settlement, and joint stipulation to
certify a collective action under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) and to
certify a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

The Judge appointed Alvin Pintor as the class representative; and
Hawks Quindel, S.C. as the class counsel.

Having found that the parties' Notice of Class Action Settlement is
the best notice practicable under the circumstances for
distribution to all putative members; and constitutes valid, due,
and sufficient notice for distribution to the class, the Judge
ordered the Defense counsel to produce a class list to Class
Counsel as a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet including each putative
Class Member's  name, street address, city, state, zip code, and
phone number (with each piece of data as a separate column) within
seven days of the date of the Order.

The class counsel will mail the notice within seven days of the
defense counsel providing a class list as set forth.  The Putative
Collective Class members may file a consent form within 30 days of
the notice's mailing.  Any individual who wishes to exclude himself
or herself from the Rule 23 Class must opt out, per the instruction
in the Notice of the Class Action Settlement, within 30 days of the
mailing of that notice.  Any Rule 23 Class member who wishes to
object in any way to the proposed settlement agreement must file
and serve those objections -- following the instructions in the
Notice of Class Action Settlement -- together with copies of all
papers in support of his or her position, no later than 30 days
after the mailing of the Notice of Class Action Settlement.

The Court had originally scheduled a fairness hearing for Aug. 1,
2018. Due to a conflict in its calendar, Judge Peper scheduled that
fairness hearing to Sept. 18, 2018 at 2:30 p.m.

The class counsel will file a motion for approval of attorneys'
fees on or before a date at least 21 days prior to the fairness
hearing.  Any supplemental brief in support of final approval of
the settlement agreement or in response to any objections to the
application for attorney's fees will be filed at least seven days
prior to the fairness hearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/HMZrr4 from Leagle.com.

Alvin Pintor, Plaintiff, represented by Summer H. Murshid --
smurshid@hq-law.com -- Hawks Quindel SC, Timothy P. Maynard --
tmaynard@hq-law.com -- Hawks Quindel SC & Larry A. Johnson --
ljohnson@hq-law.com -- Hawks Quindel SC.

Fall River Group Inc, doing business as Fall River Manufacturing
Company, Defendant, represented by Elizabeth N. Larson, Michael
Best & Friedrich LLP, Mitchell W. Quick -- mwquick@michaelbest.com
-- Michael Best & Friedrich LLP & Bethany C. McCurdy --
bcmccurdy@michaelbest.com -- Michael Best & Friedrich LLP.


FAMMA GROUP: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Benavides Suit Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE CARLOS BENAVIDES, and JOSE DAVID BENAVIDES, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. FAMMA
GROUP, INC.; JOE KAMARI; and DOES 1 through 100 inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. BC715063 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., July
25, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for failure to pay
overtime wages, provide meal breaks, provide rest breaks, pay wages
upon termination, and reimburse business expense.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as an hourly-paid,
and non-exempt employees in California.

Famma Group Inc. was founded in 2012. The company's line of
business includes the wholesale distribution of men's and boys'
apparel and furnishings. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sarkis Sirmabekian, Esq.
          SIRMABEKIAN LAW FIRM PC
          3435 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 1710
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (818) 473-5003
          Facsimile: (818) 476-5619

               - and –

          Haig B. Kazandjian, Esq.
          HAIG B. KAZANDJIAN LAWYERS APC
          801 N. Brand Blvd. Suite 970
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 696-2306
          Facsimile: (818) 696-2307


FEDERAL SIGNAL: Firefighters' Hearing Loss Lawsuits Still Ongoing
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Signal Corporation continues to defend itself in Hearing
Loss Litigation, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

The Company has been sued for monetary damages by firefighters who
claim that exposure to the Company's sirens has impaired their
hearing and that the sirens are therefore defective.  There were 33
cases filed during the period of 1999 through 2004, involving a
total of 2,443 plaintiffs, in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois.  These cases involved more than 1,800 firefighter
plaintiffs from locations outside of Chicago.  In 2009, six
additional cases were filed in Cook County, involving 299
Pennsylvania firefighter plaintiffs.  During 2013, another case was
filed in Cook County involving 74 Pennsylvania firefighter
plaintiffs.

The trial of the first 27 of these plaintiffs' claims occurred in
2008, whereby a Cook County jury returned a unanimous verdict in
favor of the Company.

An additional 40 Chicago firefighter plaintiffs were selected for
trial in 2009.  Plaintiffs' counsel later moved to reduce the
number of plaintiffs from 40 to nine.  The trial for these nine
plaintiffs concluded with a verdict against the Company and for the
plaintiffs in varying amounts totaling US$0.4 million.  The Company
appealed this verdict.  On September 13, 2012, the Illinois
Appellate Court rejected this appeal.  The Company thereafter filed
a petition for rehearing with the Illinois Appellate Court, which
was denied on February 7, 2013.  The Company sought further review
by filing a petition for leave to appeal with the Illinois Supreme
Court on March 14, 2013.  On May 29, 2013, the Illinois Supreme
Court issued a summary order declining to accept review of this
case.  On July 1, 2013, the Company satisfied the judgments entered
for these plaintiffs, which has resulted in final dismissal of
these cases.

A third consolidated trial involving eight Chicago firefighter
plaintiffs occurred during November 2011.  The jury returned a
unanimous verdict in favor of the Company at the conclusion of this
trial.

Following this trial, on March 12, 2012 the trial court entered an
order certifying a class of the remaining Chicago Fire Department
firefighter plaintiffs for trial on the sole issue of whether the
Company's sirens were defective and unreasonably dangerous.  The
Company petitioned the Illinois Appellate Court for interlocutory
appeal of this ruling.  On May 17, 2012, the Illinois Appellate
Court accepted the Company's petition.  On June 8, 2012, plaintiffs
moved to dismiss the appeal, agreeing with the Company that the
trial court had erred in certifying a class action trial in this
matter.  Pursuant to plaintiffs' motion, the Illinois Appellate
Court reversed the trial court's certification order.

Thereafter, the trial court scheduled a fourth consolidated trial
involving three firefighter plaintiffs, which began in December
2012.  Prior to the start of this trial, the claims of two of the
three firefighter plaintiffs were dismissed.  On December 17, 2012,
the jury entered a complete defense verdict for the Company.

Following this defense verdict, plaintiffs again moved to certify a
class of Chicago Fire Department plaintiffs for trial on the sole
issue of whether the Company's sirens were defective and
unreasonably dangerous.  Over the Company's objection, the trial
court granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification on March
11, 2013 and scheduled a class action trial to begin on June 10,
2013.  The Company filed a petition for review with the Illinois
Appellate Court on March 29, 2013 seeking reversal of the class
certification order.

On June 25, 2014, a unanimous three-judge panel of the First
District Illinois Appellate Court issued its opinion reversing the
class certification order of the trial court.  Specifically, the
Appellate Court determined that the trial court's ruling failed to
satisfy the class-action requirements that the common issues of the
firefighters' claims predominate over the individual issues and
that there is an adequate representative for the class.  During a
status hearing on October 8, 2014, plaintiffs represented to the
Court that they would again seek to certify a class of firefighters
on the issue of whether the Company's sirens were defective and
unreasonably dangerous.  On January 12, 2015, plaintiffs filed
motions to amend their complaints to add class action allegations
with respect to Chicago firefighter plaintiffs as well as the
approximately 1,800 firefighter plaintiffs from locations outside
of Chicago.  On March 11, 2015, the trial court granted plaintiff's
motions to amend their complaints.  On April 24, 2015, the cases
were transferred to Cook County chancery court, which will decide
all class certification issues.  On March 23, 2018, plaintiffs
filed a motion to certify as a class all firefighters from the
Chicago Fire Department who have filed lawsuits in this matter.
The Company has served discovery upon plaintiffs related to this
motion and intends to continue its objections to any attempt at
certification.  A further status hearing on class certification
issues has been scheduled for September 18, 2018.

Federal Signal Corporation is a global manufacturer and supplier of
vehicles and equipment for maintenance and infrastructure
end-markets, including sewer cleaners, vacuum trucks, street
sweepers, dump truck bodies and trailers; and safety, security and
communication equipment, such as lights, sirens and warning
systems. The company is based in Oak Brook, Illinois.


FINANCIAL CREDIT: Solis Sues over Debt Collection Practices
-----------------------------------------------------------
Suzanne Acosta Solis, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Financial Credit Service, Inc.,
and John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-625 (W.D. Tex.,
July 26, 2018) seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and
unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Financial Credit Service, Inc. is a debt buyer and debt collector
and purchases outstanding debt from major banks and credit card
companies. They also handle local retail collections. FCS also does
business as Asset Recovery Associates, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yaakov Saks, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282-6500
          Facsimile: (201) 282-6501
          E-mail: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


FLOWERS FOODS: Court Won't Review Dismissal of M. Abugeith's Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MAJDI ABUGEITH and JIMMY BREWER, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. FLOWERS
FOODS, INC. and FLOWERS BAKING CO. OF HOUSTON, LLC, Defendants,
Civil Action No. H-17-2934 (S.D. Tex.), Judge Sim Lake of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston
Division, denied both of the Plaintiffs' (i) Emergency Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Sanctions ("Motion for
Reconsideration"); and (ii) Motion for Sanctions, Temporary
Restraining Order, Temporary and Permanent Injunction and and
Motion for Court Issued Notice to Current and Putative Plaintiffs
of Improper Actions by Defendants ("Motion for Sanctions").

Abugeith and Jimmy Brewer, on behalf of themselves and other
similarly situated individuals, sued the Defendants under the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").  The Plaintiffs executed a
distributor agreement and signed Flowers Baking Co. of Houston, LLC
Amendment to Distributor Agreement -- which included a mandatory
arbitration clause -- and they each signed an Arbitration Agreement
contained in Exhibit 2 of the Amendment.

The Plaintiffs filed the action on Sept. 29, 2017, seeking overtime
wages, liquidated damages, attorney's fees, and costs under the
FLSA on behalf of themselves and a putative class of distributors.
The Defendants filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b) (1), 12(b) (3), and 12(b) (6) seeking an order
dismissing the lawsuit and requiring the Plaintiffs to arbitrate
their claims withthe Defendants.

On May 15, 2018, the Court granted the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.  Because it concluded that the Arbitration Agreement and
the delegation clause and class-action waiver within the
Arbitration Agreement were enforceable, the Court dismissed the
action and compelled the Plaintiffs to arbitrate the dispute
individually.

On June 12, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed their Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Sanctions urging the court to
reconsider its Memorandum Opinion and Order granting the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, to impose sanctions against the
Defendants for improper conduct, and to issue a temporary
restraining order and a preliminary injunction.  They argue that
recently discovered information and the need to prevent manifest
injustice require that the Court reconsiders its order compelling
arbitration and dismissing the action.

The Defendants filed a response on June 26, 2018, opposing the
Plaintiffs' motion.  They respond that the Plaintiffs fail to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 59 (e).

Judge Lake finds that the Plaintiffs have not attached their own
affidavits and have not presented any other evidence that they were
personally harassed, coerced, or intimidated by these tactics
causing them to unwillingly sign the Amendment and the Arbitration
Agreement.  Moreover, even if they were newly discovered evidence,
none of the attached affidavits mention Plaintiffs Abugeith and
Brewer.  Because the Plaintiffs have provided no newly discovered
evidence establishing that they did not voluntarily sign the
Amendment or the Arbitration Agreement, the Judge concluded that
the Plaintiffs are not entitled to Rule 59(e) relief.

The Judge also finds that the Defendants have not impaired the
Plaintiffs' ability to seek relief under the FLSA because the
Plaintiffs brought the action and may now seek complete relief in
arbitration.  The Defendants have not deprived them of the
constitutional right of access to the courts because they
voluntarily agreed to arbitrate their claims.  Moreover, he says,
the Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that the Defendants took
any retaliatory actions against them for bringing the action.
Therefore, there is no substantial risk that irreparable harm will
occur and any injunctive relief as to these Plaintiffs is not
appropriate.

Because Plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence that the
Defendants directed any sanctionable conduct towards them or
impaired the Plaintiffs' right to relief, Judge Lake denied the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/z3bSqE from Leagle.com.

Majdi Abugeith & Jimmy Brewer, Individually and on Behalf of all
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Alfonso
Kennard, Jr. -- alfonso.kennard@kennardlaw.com -- KENNARD RICHARD
PC.

Flowers Foods, Inc & Flowers Baking Co. of Houston, LLC,
Defendants, represented by Michael D. Mitchell --
michael.mitchell@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins et al & Stephen
Eric Hart -- stephen.hart@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins et al.


G.O.O.D. BUSINESS: Lambert Sues over Edipure Product Mislabeling
----------------------------------------------------------------
TINA LAMBERT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. G.O.O.D. BUSINESS COOPERATIVE, INC.; SCOTT
BERGIN d/b/a EDIPURE; EDIPURE; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 37-2018-00037131-CU-BT-CTL (Cal. Super., San
Diego Cty., July 24, 2018) alleges violation of the Consumer Legal
Remedies Act.

According to the complaint, the EdiPure Edibles packaging was
prominently marked with 25mg THC. The product packaging was also
marked with 5mg per pc. Per laboratory results, the test yielded
significantly less THC in the Edipure Edibles than advertised.
Laboratory results found the Edipure Edible tested contained merely
0.29mg of THC per piece, contrary to the 5mg of THC per piece
advertised on the packaging, confirming that EdiPure Edibles
contain significantly lower levels of THC than falsely advertise.

G.O.O.D. Business Cooperative, Inc. is a California corporation
doing business in San Diego, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John H. Donroli, Esq.
          Raquel S. Mor, Esq.
          DONBOLI LAW GROUP, APC
          11682 El Camino Real, Suite 100
          San Diego, CA 92130
          Telephone: (858) 252-2015
          Facsimile: (858) 724-1490


GENERAL MOTORS: Doucet Sues over Defective 2011 Chevrolet Equinox
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LORENA DOUCET, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. BC714943 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles
Cty., July 24, 2018) alleges that the Defendants wrongfully
manufacture, distribute and sell a defective motor vehicle.

According to the complaint, the 2011 Chevrolet Equinox manufactured
by the Defendants suffered defects such as excessive oil
consumption, premature failure of the engine balance chains,
premature failure of the fuel pump plunger seal, fuel leaks into
the crankcase, rough running of the engine, loss of power, rough
idle, and stalling.  The motor vehicle defects are dangerous to
consumers as they can cause engine failure while the motor vehicle
is in operation at any time and under any driving condition or
speed, thereby exposing the drivers, passengers, and third persons
to serious risk of accident and injury.

General Motors LLC was incorporated in 2009 and is based in
Wilmington, Delaware. General Motors LLC operates as a subsidiary
of General Motors Company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Tionna Dolin, Esq.
          Daniel Tai, Esq.
          STRATEGIC LEGAL PRACTICES
          A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
          1840 Century Park East, Suite 430
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 929-4900
          Facsimile: (310) 943-3838
          E-mail: tdolin@slpattorney.com
                  dtai@slpattorney.com


GEO GROUP: Seeks 9th Circuit Review of Ruling in Chen Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Defendant The Geo Group, Inc., filed an appeal from a court ruling
in the lawsuit entitled CHAO CHEN, individually and on behalf of
those similarly situated v. THE GEO GROUP, INC., Case No.
3:17-cv-05769-RJB, in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington, Tacoma.

The appellate case is captioned as Ugochukwu Nwauzor, et al. v. The
Geo Group, Inc., Case No. 18-80095, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on August 2, 2018, Judge
Robert J. Bryan granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend
Class Action Complaint.

Mr. Chen seeks leave to amend his class action complaint to
substitute three individuals as named Plaintiffs and to withdraw
him as a named Plaintiff.  The proposed First Amended Class Action
Complaint for Damages introduces as the Plaintiffs three
individuals: Ugochukwu Goodluck Nwauzor, Fernando Aguirre-Urbina,
and Fabiola Alicia Camorlinga Cruz.  The second version of the
First Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages, filed in the
Plaintiff's Reply, drops Ms. Cruz as a named Plaintiff.  For
purposes of considering Plaintiff's motion, the Court will construe
the second version as the operative proposed complaint.

The Defendant is prejudiced, it argues, because the proposed
Plaintiffs cannot survive a motion for class certification and
should not be permitted to be used as placeholders.  Judge Bryan
finds this as an argument on the merits of class certification,
which the Court has not reached.  Whether the proposed Plaintiffs
can survive a motion for class certification remains unresolved. He
finds only minimal prejudice to the Defendant.  He says he may look
askance at future efforts to amend the named Plaintiffs, but
presently, the Plaintiff has made the threshold showing that the
amendment is offered to reach the merits of the case.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents UGOCHUKWU GOODLUCK NWAUZOR and FERNANDO
AGUIRRE-URBINA, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, are represented by:

          Adam Jared Berger, Esq.
          Lindsay L. Halm, Esq.
          SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER
          810 Third Avenue, Suite 500
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (206) 622-8000
          E-mail: berger@sgb-law.com
                  halm@sgb-law.com

               - and -

          Robert Andrew Free, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF R. ANDREW FREE
          P.O. Box 90568
          Nashville, TN 37209
          Telephone: (844) 321-3221
          E-mail: andrew@immigrantcivilrights.com

               - and -

          Meena Pallipamu Menter, Esq.
          MENTER IMMIGRATION LAW PLLC
          8201 164th Avenue NE, Suite 200
          Redmond, WA 98052
          Telephone: (206) 419-7332
          E-mail: meena@mmenterlaw.com

               - and -

          Devin T. Theriot-Orr, Esq.
          SUNBIRD LAW, PLLC
          1001 Fourth Avenue, Suite 3200
          Seattle, WA 98154
          Telephone: (206) 962-5052
          E-mail: devin@sunbird.law

Defendant-Petitioner THE GEO-GROUP, INC., a Florida corporation, is
represented by:

          Mark Emery, Esq.
          NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
          799 9th Street, NW, Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20001-4501
          Telephone: (202) 662-0210
          E-mail: mark.emery@nortonrosefulbright.com


GLASS FAMILY: Fails to Pay OT to Delivery Drivers, Begley Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
PAUL BEGLEY, individually and on behalf of similarly situated
persons, Plaintiff v. GLASS FAMILY PIZZA d/b/a CINCY DOMINOS, LLC;
and JOHN GLASS, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-00124-DLB-CJS (E.D.
Ky., July 17, 2018) seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages and
overtime hours under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Mr. Begley was employed by the Defendants as delivery driver.

Glass Family Pizza, Inc. was founded in 1996.  The company's line
of business includes the retail sale of prepared foods and drinks
for on-premise consumption. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David O'Brien Suetholz, Esq.
          BRANSTETTER, STRANCH
          & JENNINGS, PLLC
          515 Park Avenue
          Louisville, KY 40208
          Telephone: 502-636-4333
          E-mail: davids@bsjfirm.com

               - and -

          J. Gerard Stranch, IV, Esq.
          BRANSTETTER, STRANCH
          & JENNINGS, PLLC
          223 Rosa L. Parks Avenue, Ste. 200
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Telephone: (615) 254-8801
          Facsimile: (615) 255-5419
          E-mail: gerards@bsjfirm.com

               - and -

          J. Forester, Esq.
          Matthew Haynie, Esq.
          FORESTER HAYNIE PLLC
          1701 N. Market Street, Suite 210
          Dallas, TX 75202
          Telephone: (214) 210-2100
          Facsimile: (214) 346-5909
          E-mail: www.foresterhaynie.com


GLOBAL TELLINK: Seeks 3rd Cir. Review of Ruling in James Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Global TelLink Corp. and DSI ITI LLC filed an appeal
from a court ruling in the lawsuit entitled Bobbie James, et al. v.
Global TelLink Corp., et al., Case No. 2-13-cv-04989, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on August 15, 2018, the
Hon. William J. Martini entered an order on August 6, 2018,
certifying a class of:

   "all persons of the United States who, between 2006 and 2016,
   were incarcerated in a New Jersey prison or correctional
   institution and who used the phone system provided by
   Defendants, or who established an advance pay account with
   Defendants in order to receive telephone calls from a person
   incarcerated in New Jersey, excluding Essex County prior to
   June 2010, or persons receiving calls from persons
   incarcerated in Essex County prior to June 2011."

The appellate case is captioned as Bobbie James, et al. v. Global
TelLink Corp., et al., Case No. 18-8043, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that response,
if any, to the Petitioners' Motion to Seal Certain Portions of the
Petition for Permission to Appeal is due on August 30, 2018.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents BOBBIE JAMES, CRYSTAL GIBSON, BETTY KING,
BARBARA SKLADANY, MARK SKLADANY, MILAN SKLADANY and DR. JOHN F.
CROW, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
are represented by:

          James E. Cecchi, Esq.
          Lindsey H. Taylor, Esq.
          CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO PC
          5 Becker Farm Road
          Roseland, NJ 07068
          Telephone: (973) 994-1700
          E-mail: JCecchi@CarellaByrne.com
                  LTaylor@carellabyrne.com

               - and -

          Joseph H. Meltzer, Esq.
          Peter A. Muhic, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          E-mail: jmeltzer@ktmc.com
                  pmuhic@ktmc.com

               - and -

          James A. Plaisted, Esq.
          Lin C. Solomon, Esq.
          Justin P. Walder, Esq.
          PASHMAN STEIN WALDER HAYDEN
          21 Main Street, Suite 200
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (973) 992-5300
          E-mail: jplaisted@pashmanstein.com
                  lsolomon@pashmanstein.com
                  jpwalder@pashmanstein.com

Defendants-Petitioners GLOBAL TELLINK CORP. and DSI ITI LLC are
represented by:

          Robert J. Herrington, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP
          1840 Century Park East, Suite 1900
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 586-7816
          E-mail: herringtonr@gtlaw.com

               - and -

          Aaron Van Nostrand, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP
          500 Campus Drive
          Florham Park, NJ 07932
          Telephone: (973) 360-7900
          E-mail: vannostranda@gtlaw.com

               - and -

          T. Dietrich Hill, Esq.
          Derek T. Ho, Esq.
          Matthew R. Huppert, Esq.
          Benjamin Softness, Esq.
          KELLOGG HANSEN TODD FIGEL & FREDERICK PLLC
          1615 M Street NW, Suite 400
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 326-7990
          E-mail: dhill@kellogghansen.com
                  dho@kellogghansen.com
                  mhuppert@kellogghansen.com
                  bsoftness@kellogghansen.com


GLV INC: Loses Bid to Dismiss L. Mullen's IPFSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, denied Defendant GLV, Inc., Ricky
Butler, and Cheryl Butler’s Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
LAURA MULLEN, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. GLV, INC., RICKY BUTLER, and CHERYL BUTLER,
Defendants, Case No. 18 C 1465 (N.D. Ill.).

Mullen asserts six claims in her complaint:

   1. Count 1 is a claim under the Illinois Physical Fitness
Services Act (IPFSA), 815 ILCS 645/11.

   2. Count 2 is also a claim under the IPFSA.

   3. Count 3 is a claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act
(ICFA), which permits suits by consumers for injuries caused by
unfair or deceptive acts and practices, 815 ILCS 505/10a; it is
essentially parallel to Count 1.

   4. Count 4 is a common law fraud claim.

   5. Count 5 is a common law fraudulent concealment claim; again,
these claims are essentially parallel to Count 1.

   6. Count 6 is a claim of unjust enrichment.

Claims based on fraud, fraudulent concealment, and deceptive
practices

Illinois law requires a plaintiff to allege the following five
elements to state a claim for fraud: (1) a false statement of
material fact; (2) defendant's knowledge that the statement was
false; (3) defendant's intent that the statement induce the
plaintiff to act; (4) plaintiff's reliance upon the truth of the
statement; and (5) plaintiff's damages resulting from reliance on
the statement.

The Court finds that Mullen's fraudulent concealment allegations
are sufficient. The Court overrules the defendants' contention that
Mullen has failed to adequately allege that defendants had a duty
to disclose. Under Illinois law, a defendant may have a duty to
speak if, among other things, it makes a statement while holding
back facts that would show it is a half-truth, or when the
defendant's silence is accompanied by deceptive conduct.

Mullen's allegations regarding the defendants' statements about
having the highest quality coaches and providing a safe environment
suffice as allegations of misleading half-truths, and her
allegations of active concealment, including an allegedly
misleading manifesto posted by the defendants denies the
allegations about Butler and the defendants' alleged attempts to
silence accusers, qualify for present purposes as deceptive conduct
giving rise to a duty to speak. In addition, these allegations
clearly meet the requirements of Rule 9(b).

For these reasons, Counts 4 (fraud) and 5 (fraudulent concealment)
each state a claim upon which relief may be granted. And for the
same reasons, Mullen's other deception-based claims, Counts 1
(IPFSA) and 3 (ICFA) each state a claim
IPFSA contract claim.

In Count 2, Mullen alleges that defendants violated provisions of
the IPFSA requiring a written contract, a copy of which must be
given to the customer, and requiring all contracts to have a term
permitting the customer to cancel within three days after signing.
The Defendants argue that Mullen has failed to attach a contract to
her complaint, but that would be a bit odd, seeing as how she
contends the defendants violated a provision of IPFSA requiring a
copy of a contract with a physical fitness center to be given to
the customer. Count 2 may not be the strongest of Mullen's claims
on its face, but she has adequately alleged a violation of sections
4 and 6 of the IPFSA. The questions of what damages are properly
recoverable or whether Mullen can actually prove harm from the
violation(s) are premature at this stage of the litigation.

Unjust enrichment claim

In their opening memorandum, the defendants seek dismissal of
Mullen's unjust enrichment claim on the ground that unjust
enrichment is not a separate cause of action under Illinois law.
The Court finds the contention incorrect. Mullen has also
adequately alleged that defendants benefitted to her detriment, by
obtaining fees from her when she enrolled her daughter in
defendants' programs.

Accordingly, the Court denies the defendants' motion to dismiss and
directs the defendants to answer the complaint.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 2, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7zm7fgu from Leagle.com.

Laura Mullen, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alfred Kirkland Murray, II –
amurray@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Eve Lynn J. Rapp –
erapp@edelson.com -- Edelson P.C., Jay Edelson –
jedelson@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Sydney M. Janzen –
sjanzen@edelson.com -- Edelson Pc & Christopher Lillard Dore –
cdore@edelson.com -- Edelson PC.

GLV, Inc, an Illinois corporation, Ricky Butler, an Individual &
Cheryl Butler, an Individual, Defendants, represented by Donald
John Angelini, Jr., Angelini & Ori, LLC & Danielle C. D'ambrose,
Angelini & Ori, Llc.


GURSTEL LAW: Borges Sues over Debt Collection Practices
-------------------------------------------------------
THOMAS BORGES, JR., individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GURSTEL LAW FIRM, P.C. f/k/a
GURSTEL CHARGO, P.A.; and CAVALRY SPV I, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
8:18-cv-00344-LSC-MDN (D. Neb., July 18, 2018) seeks to stop the
Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Gurstel Law Firm, P.C. f/k/a Gurstel Chargo, P.A. is a law firm
engaged in the business of collecting debts due or alleged to be
due to others across the state of Nebraska, doing business from
locations in Omaha, Nebraska. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Pamela A. Car, Esq.
          William L. Reinbrecht, Esq.
          CAR & REINBRECHT, P.C., LLO
          2120 S. 72 nd Street, Suite 1125
          Omaha, NE 68124
          Telephone: (402) 391-8484
          Facsimile: (402) 391-1103
          E-mail: pacar@cox.net

               - and -

          O. Randolph Bragg, Esq.
          HORWITZ, HORWITZ & ASSOC.
          25 East Washington St., Suite 900
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 372-8822
          Facsimile: (312) 372-1673
          E-mail: rand@horwitzlaw.com


HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES: Protective Order in Majestic Partly OK'd
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MAJESTIC BUILDING MAINTENANCE, INC., Plaintiff, v.
HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INCORPORATED, Defendant, Civil Action No.
2:15-cv-3023 (S.D. Ohio), Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern
Division, (i) denied Majestic's Motion for Leave to File a Second
Amended Complaint; and (ii) granted in part and denied in part
Huntington's Motion for Protective Order, which seeks to prevent or
limit the Plaintiff's deposition topics for Huntington's corporate
representative.

Majestic initiated the matter as a putative class action against
Huntington on Nov. 20, 2015.  At that time, Majestic alleged that
Huntington violated Ohio's version of the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC") by failing to refund monies paid out of Majestic's business
checking account on four unauthorized checks.

In November 2010, Majestic opened a business checking account with
Huntington.  The complaint alleges that Majestic received a Master
Services Agreement at the time the account was opened which
contains a section of Standard Terms of Conditions and a section of
Rules and Regulations for Business Accounts.

Luther McNeil is Majestic's President and the only authorized
signatory on the account.  On Nov. 24, 2014, McNeil was reviewing
the account online and noticed that unauthorized checks had been
cleared from the account on that same day.  Upon examination,
McNeil found that four checks totaling $3,973.96 had been debited
from the account.  Each check contained a forgery of his signature
and each one was made payable to an individual who was unknown to
McNeil or Majestic.  

McNeil immediately contacted Huntington about the forged checks and
filled out paperwork for a fraud complaint and a request for
reimbursement.  Huntington denied his request for reimbursement on
the grounds that he had not enrolled in Huntington's Check Positive
Pay/Reverse Positive Pay service.

Following Huntington's denial of the request for reimbursement,
Majestic filed the action.  Majestic alleges that Huntington
violated Section 4-401 of the U.C.C., which provides for the
default rule that a customer is not liable for a check which is not
properly payable.  It further alleges that Huntington violated
Section 4-103(a) of the U.C.C. because it breached its duty of good
faith and ordinary care by attempting to contractually shift
liability for forged checks to a customer.  

The complaint also contains class allegations.  Majestic seeks to
represent a six-state class of Huntington business accounts holders
who suffered a financial loss from Huntington making payments out
of their accounts for items which were not properly payable.  The
complaint alleges that Huntington has violated the U.C.C. by
attempting to shift liability for unauthorized checks upon business
account customers unless they enroll in Check Positive Pay, Reverse
Positive Pay or a similar fraud detection service.

The Court granted Huntington's Motion to Dismiss, explaining that
several provisions of the Master Services Agreement plainly
reaffirmed Huntington's duties to act in good faith and exercise
ordinary care.  Majestic appealed, and the Sixth Circuit reversed
the Order of dismissal and remanded the case with instructions to
allow the Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint and
conduct discovery.

The Court gave Majestic until Dec. 15, 2017, to amend the Complaint
in the matter.  On that date, Majestic filed its First Amended
Complaint.  The First Amended Complaint contains nearly identical
factual allegations as the initial complaint but changed the
putative class definition to include all Huntington business
account holders who experienced a financial loss due to Huntington
paying instrument(s), where Huntington was notified that those
instrument(s) were improperly paid.

Roughly six months later, on June 7, 2018, Majestic moved for leave
to file a Second Amended Complaint, asserting that it did not wish
to substantively change any of the Plaintiff's claims, but rather
seeks to clarify Majestic's class definition.  It now seeks to
define the class as all Huntington account holders, as opposed to
just business account holders, that (1) have a bank account subject
to a provision that disclaims liability for transactions on the
account if the customer does not avail themselves of products
purportedly designed to discover or prevent unauthorized
transactions; (2) where the customer did not avail themselves of
any of the product(s) available under the Provision; (3) where
Huntington paid the instrument(s) from the customer's account; and
(4) where it was later learned that the instrument(s) were not
properly payable.

Huntington opposes the amendment, arguing that by eliminating the
word "business" from the proposed Second Amended Complaint,
Majestic seeks to expand the class substantially with only ten
weeks remaining in discovery.  On June 28, 2018, Majestic filed a
Reply.

Majestic also seeks corporate testimony from Huntington on 52
topics.  Despite efforts to narrow the scope of the deposition, the
parties reached an impasse.  Consequently, Huntington filed a
Motion for Protective Order on April 26, 2018, seeking to eliminate
or limit various categories of deposition topics.  In moving for a
protective order, Huntington also seeks its reasonable fees and
costs.  Moreover, Huntington asked the Court to prevent the
deposition of its corporate representative from proceeding until a
ruling was made on the protective order.

The Court, noting that the deposition at issue was scheduled for
May 4, 2018, expedited briefing and ordered the deposition not to
proceed until after the Court ruled on the pending Motion for
Protective Order.  Consistent with the expedited schedule, Majestic
filed a Response in Opposition, and Huntington filed a Reply.

Magistrate Judge Jolson finds that Majestic has not established the
good cause required for leave to amend under Rule 16(b), and she
needs not undertake any analysis under Rule 15(a).  For those
reasons, she denied Majestic's Motion for Leave to File a Second
Amended Complaint.

The Magistrate Judge granted in part and denied in part
Huntington's request for a protective order as to Topic 1.
Specifically, Majestic may ask Huntington's 30(b)(6) deponent about
its Answer and any affirmative defenses.  She granted Huntington's
request for a protective order as to Topic 3.  Majestic may,
however, question Huntington's 30(b)(6) deponent about witnesses it
identifies as particularly relevant, as long as those witnesses are
communicated to Huntington at least seven days prior to the
deposition.

She finds that because Topic 2 does not describe the intended topic
with reasonable particularity, it will be limited to Huntington's
proposal -- all communications related to the case.  She granted
Huntington's request for a protective order as to Topic 2.

She also finds Topic 4 to be overbroad and lacking reasonable
particularity.  Accordingly, she granted Huntington's request for a
protective order as to Topic 4.  Majestic may, however, identify a
reasonable number of documents it seeks to have authenticated in
the deposition, if those specific documents are identified for
Huntington at least seven days prior to the deposition.

The Magistrate Judge directed the parties to meet and confer on
deposition topics that concern the general number of accounts that
fit into each category described in Topics 32, 36, and 37.  The
meet and conferral should occur at least seven days prior to the
deposition.  Based upon Majestic's change of position, she denied
as moot Huntington's request for a protective order as to Topics
32, 36, and 37.  To the extent Topics 19, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,
and 36 seek specific names and account numbers, Huntington's
request for a protective order is granted.  Majestic may, however,
inquire about the total number of accounts that exist for each
category.

The Magistrate Judge agrees with Majestic and finds that allowing
inquiry into all types of fraud is still proportional to the needs
of the case.  Thus, in the topics at issue, the term "Fraud" will
have the same meaning assigned by Huntington in its Rule and
Regulations for Business Accounts.  She denied Huntington's request
for a protective order to limit the definition of the term "Fraud"
in Topics 5, 6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 26, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,
37, and 38.

She granted Huntington's request for a protective order limiting
the timeframe in Topics 9, 14, 16, and 17 from Jan. 1, 2012 to Dec.
31, 2017.  Majestic may, however, serve written discovery on any
relevant policy changes.

It is unclear what type of "legal issues" Majestic might ask
Huntington's representative about relating to Topic 1, but for the
reasons explained above, questions involving legal implications are
improper.  However, consistent with her reasoning, to the extent
the questions on Topic 1 are related to the factual bases of
Huntington's affirmative defenses, those questions are
permissible.

Finally, she denied Huntington's request as to Topic 46, and its
representative must be prepared to answer questions on this topic.

As to Huntington's Request for Fees and Costs, the Magistrate Judge
does not, in her discretion, find that an award of attorney's fees
is warranted.  Among other reasons, she comes to this conclusion
because Huntington's Motion is granted only in part.  Thus, she
denied Huntington's request for reasonable fees and costs in
seeking a protective order.

Huntington is ordered to produce a corporate representative or
corporate representatives to appear and testify on various topics
in accordance with the limitations described in the Order.  The
parties are further ordered to meet and confer over the next seven
days to set an appropriate and convenient date and time for the
deposition.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 10, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/oP1DxN from Leagle.com.

Majestic Building Maintenance, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Sean
M. Kohl -- sean@doucet.law -- Andrew J. Gerling --
andrew@doucet.law -- Doucet & Associates, Inc., Timothy J. Cook --
timothy@doucet.law -- Doucet & Associates Co, LLC & Troy John
Doucet -- troy@doucet.law.com.

Huntington Bancshares Incorporated, doing business as The
Huntington National Bank, Defendant, represented by Brett A. Wall
-- bwall@bakerwall.com -- Baker & Hostetler & Lisa M. Ghannoum --
lghannoum@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler LLP.


INDEPENDENT PHARMACY: Nashville Pharmacy Sues over Faxed Ads
------------------------------------------------------------
NASHVILLE PHARMACY SERVICES, LLC, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. INDEPENDENT PHARMACY
COOPERATIVE, and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-00668
(M.D. Tenn., July 18, 2018) seeks to stop the Defendants' practice
of making unsolicited sending of facsimiles without the Plaintiff's
express consent.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendant has sent
facsimile transmissions of unsolicited advertisements to the
Plaintiff and the class, including but not limited to the
unsolicited fax advertisements sent to the Plaintiff without its
express consent.

Independent Pharmacy Cooperative, Inc. operates a group purchasing
organization for independent pharmacies in the United States.
Independent Pharmacy Cooperative, Inc. was formerly known as Badger
State Independent Pharmacy Cooperative. The company was founded in
1983 and is based in Sun Prairie, Wisconsin. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Charles Barrett, Esq.
          Benjamin C. Aaron, Esq.
          NEAL & HARWELL, PLC
          1201 Demonbreun Street, Suite 1000
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Telephone: (615) 244-1713
          Facsimile: (615) 726-0573
          E-mail: cbarrett@nealharwell.com
                  baaron@nealharwell.com


J&L CABLE TV: Fails to Pay OT to Technicians, Jean-Pierre Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
ROBENSON JEAN-PIERRE, and JEAN METELUS, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. J&L CABLE TV
SERVIES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-11499 (D. Mass., July
18, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid regular
hours, overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal and
rest periods.

Mr. Jean-Pierre was employed by the Defendant as technician from
June 2016 to May 2017.

J & L Cable TV Services, Inc. operates as a cable company. The
Company provides installation of cable services such as news,
entertainment and sports cable networks, television production
operations, internet, and phone services. J & L Cable TV Services
serves residential and commercial customers in the United States.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew W. Thomson, Esq.
          LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
          729 Boylston Street, Suite 2000
          Boston, MA 02116
          Telephone: (617) 994-5800
          Facsimile: (617) 994-5801
          E-mail: mthomson@llrlaw.com

               - and -

          Sarah R. Schalman-Bergen, Esq.
          Stacy Savett, Esq.
          Shoshana Savett, Esq.
          BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C.
          1622 Locust Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 875-3000
          Facsimile: (215) 875-4604
          E-mail: sschalman-bergen@bm.net
                  stasavett@bm.net
                  stsavett@bm.net

               - and -

          Carolyn Hunt Cottrell, Esq.
          David C. Leimbach, Esq.
          SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL
          KONECKY WOTKYNS LLP
          2000 Powell Street, Suite 1400
          Emeryville, CA 94608
          Telephone: (415) 421-7100
          Facsimile: (415) 421-7105
          E-mail: ccottrell@schneiderwallace.com
                  dleimbach@schneiderwallace.com


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Faces Bard Suit over Sale of Talcum Products
---------------------------------------------------------------
NANCY BARD, and CHARLES BARD, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON; JOHNSON
& JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES,
INC.; IMERYS TALC AMERICA, INC.; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 18CV331733 (Cal. Super., Santa Clara Cty.,
July 24, 2018) seeks to recover damages as a result of Plaintiff
Nancy Bard's ovarian cancer, which was directly and proximately
caused by the wrongful conduct of the Defendants, the false and
fraudulent representations, omissions, and concealments of the
defective nature of talcum powder, the main ingredient of the
Defendants' product.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff Nancy Bard developed
ovarian cancer, and suffered effects and sequelae therefrom, as a
direct and proximate result of the unreasonably dangerous and
defective nature of talcum powder, the main ingredient of the
Defendants' products. The Defendants also committed wrongful and
negligent conduct in the research, development, testing,
manufacture, production, formulation, processing, packaging,
promotion, distribution, marketing, and sale of the their products
and the talcum powder that comprises the products.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. The company markets its products to general
public, retail outlets and distributors, wholesalers, hospitals,
and health care professionals for prescription use, as well as for
use in the professional fields by physicians, nurses, hospitals,
eye care professionals, and clinics. Johnson & Johnson was founded
in 1885 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Lee Cirsch, Esq.
          Michael Akselrud, Esq.
          THE LANIER LAW FIRM, PC
          21550 Oxnard Street, 3rd Floor
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (310) 277-5100
          Facsimile: (310) 277-5103
          E-mail: lee.cirsch@lanierlawfirm.com
                  michael.akselrud@lanierlawfirm.com


JONATHAN NEIL: Court Extends Settlement Notice Filing Date
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order continuing Deadline for Parties to File
Notice Regarding Action Settlement in the case captioned TERI
BROWN, Plaintiff, v. JONATHAN NEIL AND ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 1:17-cv-00675-SAB.(E.D. Cal.).

On July 2, 2018, the parties informed the Court that they wished to
schedule an informal conference to discuss settlement and requested
an extension of the deadline to file their notice.

Accordingly, the deadline to file notice regarding whether the
parties will be pursuing settlement or the matter should proceed to
a scheduling conference is continued.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 2, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y874wvu3 from Leagle.com.

Teri Brown, Plaintiff, represented by Ari H. Marcus --
Ari@MarcusZelman.com -- Marcus & Zelman, LLC, pro hac vice,Yitzchak
Zelman -- Yzelman@MarcusZelman.com -- Marcus & Zelman, LLC, pro hac
vice & Tammy L. Hussin -- Tammy@HussinLaw.com -- Hussin Law.

Jonathan Neil and Associates, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Christopher Michael Egan -- cegan@porterscott.com -- Porter Scott,
APC, Derek Joseph Haynes -- dhaynes@porterscott.com -- Porter
Scott, PC & Lynette Mary Komar, Porter Scott.


LBT ACQUISITION: Court Narrows Claims in Securities Fraud Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware
granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the second amended complaint in case captioned LABORERS' LOCAL #231
PENSION FUND, v. RORY J. COWAN, et al., Civil Action No. 17-478 (D.
Del.).

Pension Fund files a second amended complaint suing H.I.G. Capital
L.L.C.; LBT Acquisition, Inc., LBT Merger Sub, Inc. & Lionbridge
Technologies, Inc.'s board of directors and officers alleging the
January definitive proxy statement violated the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 and its implementing regulations. Pension Fund
alleges Lionbridge omitted from the proxy statement the material
fact the financial projections did not incorporate Lionbridge's
potential growth through its acquisition growth strategy and
rendered six statements in the proxy materially false or misleading
under Section 14(a) of the '34 Act.

Pension Fund pleads one limited Section 14(a) claim against
Lionbridge and its board and officers

To plead a Section 14(a) violation, Pension Fund must allege (1) a
proxy statement contained a material misrepresentation or omission
which (2) caused the plaintiff injury and (3) that the proxy
solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect in the
solicitation materials, was an essential link in the accomplishment
of the transaction.

The Delaware court of appeals instructs the Court that claims
sounding in fraud brought under Section 14(a) are subject to the
heightened pleading standards found in the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act. Under the heightened standard, the complaint
shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the
reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on
information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed. The Reform
Act is designed to restrict abuses of class action securities
litigation. The Reform Act mandates the Court dismiss a complaint
failing to meet the heightened pleading requirements.

Under the '34 Act and Reform Act, the Court limits its review to
the statements alleged to be false or misleading in Pension Fund's
second amended complaint.

Pension Fund again fails to allege a false or misleading statement
based on the projection numbers and assumptions.

In OFI Asset Mgmt., 834 F.3d 481 (3d Cir. 2016), the court of
appeals affirmed the dismissal of a complaint based on alleged
misleading financial projections included in a proxy statement. The
plaintiff in OFI Asset alleged the proxy statement contained
materially false and misleading financial projections because the
projections did not provide accurate estimates of the defendant's
future revenue and operating profits.

In its Second Amended Complaint, Pension Fund again claims the
projections and assumptions underlying the projections are false
and misleading because the projections did not include Lionbridge's
potential growth through acquisitions. Pension Fund does not allege
new facts or raise new legal arguments relating to the projections
and assumptions.

As in OFI Asset Mgmt., Lionbridge accompanied its financial
projections with a lengthy and specific disclaimer.  The disclaimer
included in the proxy closely resembles the disclaimer analyzed in
OFI Asset Mgmt. The disclaimer highlighted the fact Lionbridge
included the projections cited by Pension Fund in the proxy
statement for the purpose of providing the voting shareholders with
information Lionbridge's board, special committee, and financial
advisor used to assess the potential merger. Based on the
disclaimer accompanying the projections, the only relevant
statement of fact a shareholder may draw from the inclusion of the
projections is Lionbridge provided the same projections to its
special committee of independent directors and to Union Square in
assessing the proposed merger with LBT Merger Sub.

Pension Fund does not allege how the omission of potential growth
through an acquisition strategy is materially misleading or false
based on the information reported to Union Square. Pension Fund
does not allege Lionbridge's board did not provide the projections
to its special committee, or financial advisor.  Whether the
projection incorporated the acquisition strategy does not negate
Lionbridge's representation it provided the same projection to
others involved in assessing the merger. The representation in the
proxy statement is true. Pension Fund's claim the Defendants should
have told Union Square more information may have been or could have
been part of the pre-merger Chancery Court litigations, but this
"should have disclosed" is not part of the plead Section 14 claim
here.

Pension Fund's claim based on the projection assumptions fails for
the same reasons. Pension Fund does not identify how the
assumptions render the statement of fact the same projections were
provided to Lionbridge's board and Union Square is materially false
or misleading. Even assuming it is true the assumptions do not
reflect Lionbridge's acquisition strategy, it would not negate the
representation by Lionbridge it provided the same projections based
on the same purported assumptions to its board, special committee
and financial advisor. Allowing Pension Fund to backdoor a claim
based on the projections by alleging false and misleading
assumptions would allow Pension Fund to wholly bypass our court of
appeals' decision in OFI Asset Mgmt.Based on our liberal reading of
Pension Fund's second amended complaint, Lionbridge provided the
same allegedly flawed projections to its board, special committee,
and financial advisors as it did to its shareholders.

Pension Fund fails to sufficiently allege the board's consideration
of Lionbridge's business and financial prospects if it remained an
independent, publicly traded company is false or misleading.

Pension Fund claims the following statement in the proxy is
materially false or misleading because the proxy statement did not
disclose the projections did not include potential growth through
an acquisition strategy: “During the course of its deliberations,
the Special Committee held numerous meetings and consulted with our
senior management, Union Square and Goodwin Proctor, and reviewed,
evaluated and considered numerous factors and a significant amount
of information and data, together with our full Board of Directors,
including our business and financial prospects if we were to remain
an independent, publicly-traded company and the growth and scale
required to effectively compete in the localization and
interpretation industries, including forecasts of future financial
performance set forth in the disclosed projections.”

Pension Fund's claim directly contradicts the lengthy and specific
disclaimer attached to the projections in the proxy statement. The
disclaimer stated Lionbridge did not consider the projections to be
predictive of Lionbridge's actual business prospects. Specifically,
the disclaimer stated, The inclusion of the selected elements of
the forecasts in the table and accompanying narrative above should
not be regarded as an indication that Lionbridge and/or any of our
affiliates, officers, directors, advisors or other representatives
consider the forecasts to be predictive of actual future events,
and this information should not be relied upon as such.  Pension
Fund attempts to backdoor a claim based on the projection numbers
and bypass OFI Asset Mgmt. Lionbridge included the projections to
provide its shareholders the same projections the board, special
committee, and Union Square used in assessing the merger. Pension
Fund fails to allege this challenged statement is false or
misleading under Section 14.

Pension Fund alleges Lionbridge's expressed belief Union Square's
fairness opinion is a positive reason supporting its decision to
approve the merger is materially false or misleading.

Based on a liberal reading of Pension Fund's second amended
complaint, Lionbridge did not incorporate acquisition based growth
into its projections it provided to Union Square. Lionbridge also
did not disclose to its shareholders it omitted acquisition based
growth in its financial projections. This omission conflicts with
the information a reasonable investor could have taken from the
representation in the proxy.  The board allegedly knew its
projections and Union Square's fairness opinion did not account for
acquisition based growth but simultaneously expressed confidence in
the same opinion to its shareholders. Pension Fund states a claim
under Section 14 based on the board's expressed belief Union
Square's fairness opinion is a positive reason supporting its
decision to approve the merger.

Pension Fund fails to allege the board's belief $5.75 provided
shareholders with greater certainty of value over their share's
potential trade price is materially false or misleading.

The board, with knowledge of Lionbridge's acquisition growth
strategy, expressed its subjective belief $5.75 provided
shareholders greater certainty and Pension Fund does not allege the
board did not hold this belief or the board did not account for
Lionbridge's acquisition strategy when making its own valuation
analysis. Pension Fund fails to allege a false or misleading
statement under Section 14 based on the board's subjective belief
$5.75 provides its shareholders greater certainty in value.

Pension Fund fails to plead a Section 14(a) claim against HIG, LBT
Acquisition, and LBT Merger Sub but pleads a claim against Mr.
Litz.

Section 14(a) applies to any person who solicits or permits the use
of his name to solicit a proxy in violation of securities
regulations.

Pension Fund does not allege HIG, LBT Acquisition, and LBT Merger
Sub solicited or permitted Lionbridge to use their name to solicit
Lionbridge shareholders' proxy. Pension Fund fails to allege a
Section 14(a) claim against HIG, LBT Acquisition, and LBT Merger
Sub.

Pension Fund pleads a Section 20(a) claim against Mr. Litz, HIG,
LBT Acquisition, and LBT Merger Sub.

Section 20(a) of the '34 Act imposes liability on every person who
controls any person liable under any provision of the '34 Act. To
plead control person liability, Pension Fund must allege (1) a
primary violation of federal securities law by a controlled person
and (2) control of the primary violator by the defendant.

Lionbridge sufficiently alleges control of Lionbridge and its board
and directors by HIG and its affiliate companies. Under the merger
agreement, LBT Acquisition and LBT Merger Sub, entities created by
HIG, were obligated to cooperate in preparing and filing the proxy
statement and to provide Lionbridge certain information. LBT
Acquisition also had the opportunity to review and comment on the
proxy statement before Lionbridge issued it to its shareholders.
Pleading opportunities to provide information, to review the proxy,
and to comment on the substance of the proxy, Pension Fund alleges
sufficient facts to support the inference HIG, LBT Acquisition, and
LBT Merger Sub at least had the potential to influence Lionbridge's
board in approving and recommending the merger to its
shareholders.

Accordingly, the Court grants in part and denies in part the
Defendants' motion to dismiss. Pension Fund pleads a Section 14(a)
claim against Lionbridge and its board and officers based on the
statement the board viewed Union Square's fairness opinion as a
positive reason supporting its decision to approve the proposed
merger.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 2, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycql9w69 from Leagle.com.

Laborers' Local #231 Pension Fund, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Peter B.
Andrews -- pandrews@andrewsspringer.com -- Andrews & Springer LLC &
Craig J. Springer -- cspringer@andrewsspringer.com -- Andrews &
Springer LLC.

Rory J. Cowan, Edward A. Blechschmidt, Michael G. Dallas, Guy L. de
Chazal, Susan Jane Kantor, Jack Noonan, James A. Quella, Claude P.
Sheer & Marc Litz, Defendants, represented by David John Teklits -
dteklits@mnat.com -- Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP & Deborah
Birnbach -- dbirnbach@goodwinprocter.com -- Goodwin, pro hac vice.

Paul A. Kavanaugh, Defendant, represented by David John Teklits,
Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP.

H.I.G. Capital L.L.C., Defendant, represented by Anne Shea Gaza --
agaza@ycst.com -- Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor LLP, Elena C.
Norman -- enorman@ycst.com -- Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor LLP
& Joshua Z. Rabinovitz -- joshua.rabinovitz@kirkland.com --
Kirkland & Ellis LLP, pro hac vice.

LBT Acquisition, Inc., LBT Merger Sub, Inc. & Lionbridge
Technologies, Inc., Defendants, represented by Anne Shea Gaza --
agaza@ycst.com -- Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor LLP & Elena C.
Norman -- enorman@ycst.com -- Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor
LLP.


LL BEAN: Court OKs Dismissal of V. Bondi's MMWA Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned VICTOR BONDI, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. L.L. BEAN, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 18 C 1101 (N.D. Ill.)

Plaintiff Victor Bondi, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, has brought a five count putative class action
complaint against defendant L.L. Bean, Inc. alleging: (1) violation
of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) (2) breach of express
warranty (3) violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (ICFA)
(4) unjust enrichment; and (5) declaratory relief.

The Defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(1), arguing that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring his
claims.

The Defendant argues that the plaintiff has failed to establish
that he has suffered a concrete and particularized injury because
he has not alleged that he has tried to return any product that he
purchased from defendant prior to February 9, 2018, let alone
alleging that those efforts have been denied.

Article III standing has three elements: (1) the plaintiff must
have suffered an injury in fact, an invasion of a legally protected
interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury must be
fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3)
it must be redressable by a favorable decision.

The court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim
for breach of warranty. This failure also dooms plaintiff's MMWA
claim.  As a result, neither Count I or nor Count II state a
claim.

The Plaintiff also fails to state a claim under the ICFA, which
proscribes both deceptive and unfair practices. To state a claim
under the ICFA for deceptive practices, plaintiff must allege: (1)
a deceptive act or practice by defendant; (2) defendant's intent
that plaintiff rely on the deception; (3) the occurrence of the
deception in the course of conduct involving trade or commerce; and
(4) actual damage to plaintiff proximately caused by the deception.
To determine whether a practice is unfair, courts consider whether
the defendant's conduct: (1) violates public policy; (2) is
immoral, unethical, or unscrupulous; and (3) causes substantial
injury to consumers.  

Although unclear, it appears that the plaintiff is attempting to
assert claims for both deceptive acts and unfair practices. Both
claims, however, are premised entirely on the plaintiff's
allegation that the February 9, 2018, statement is a repudiation of
the old warranty. Because the court has already concluded that the
claim fails to allege such a repudiation, both claims fail. The
statement, as written, is neither unfair nor deceptive.
Additionally, the plaintiff has not yet incurred any damage.
Consequently, the court concludes that the plaintiff fails to state
a claim under the ICFA and Count III is dismissed.

Count IV purports to allege a claim for unjust enrichment. In
Illinois, a claim for unjust enrichment is unavailable if an
express contract governs the transaction. The Plaintiff's unjust
enrichment claim is based on exactly the same conduct that forms
the basis of his express warranty claims. And, because there is not
dispute as to the existence of a contract, the unjust enrichment
claim must be dismissed.  

Finally, Count V, for declaratory relief also fails because it is
again based on the plaintiff's claim of repudiation, which the
court has already rejected.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 28, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycq6y6fh from
Leagle.com.

Victor D. Bondi, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ben Barnow, Barnow and
Associates, P.C., Erich Paul Schork, Barnow and Assoc., PC &
Anthony L. Parkhill, Barnow and Associates, P.C.

L.L. Bean, Inc., a Maine corporation, Defendant, represented by
Anthony J. Anscombe, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Meegan Bay BROOKS --
mbrooks@steptoe.com -- Steptoe & Johnson LLP, pro hac vice,
Stephanie A. SHERIDAN -- Sheridan@steptoe.com -- Steptoe & Johnson
LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel E. Raymond -- draymond@steptoe.com --
Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Darlene Kay Alt, Steptoe & Johnson LLP &
Mary E. Buckley, Steptoe & Johnson LLP.


LUBRICATING SPECIALTIES: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Landeros Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BERTHA LANDEROS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. LUBRICATING SPECIALTIES COMPANY, and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. BC715153 (Cal. Super.,
Los Angeles Cty., July 24, 2018) is an action against the
Defendants for failure to pay overtime wages at the correct rate,
minimum wage, provide proper wage statements, provide meal and rest
periods, timely pay final wages at termination, and provide notice
of sick leave.

Ms. Landeros was employed by the Defendants as non-exempt, hourly
employee from August 2007 to August 2017.

Lubricating Specialties Company, Inc. operates as a blender and
packager of lubricants and greases in the Western United States.
Lubricating Specialties Company, Inc. has a strategic partnership
with TOP 1 Oil Products Company. The company was founded in 1928
and is based in Pico Rivera, California. Lubricating Specialties
Company, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of LSC Funding Corp. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Farzad Rastegar, Esq.
          Amir Seyedfarshi, Esq.
          RASTEGAR LAW GROUP, APC
          22760 Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 200
          Torrance, CA 90505
          Telephone: (310) 961-9600
          Facsimile: (310) 961-9094
          E-mail: farzad@rastegarlawgroup.com
                  amir@rastegarlawgroup.com


MACY'S RETAIL: Filing of 2nd Amended "Orellana" Suit Partly OK'd
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CINTHIA CAROLINA REYES ORELLANA and SAMYA I. MOFTAH,
individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs, v. MACY'S RETAIL HOLDINGS, INC. d/b/a MACY'S f/k/a
MACY'S EAST a/k/a MACY'S, INC.; LAW OFFICES OF PALMER, REIFLER and
ASSOCIATES, P.A., Defendants, Case No. 17 Civ. 5192 (NRB) (S.D.
N.Y.), Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in
part the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their first amended
class action complaint against Macy's.

As a mercantile establishment, Macy's is authorized under two
separate New York statutory schemes to (1) reasonably detain
suspected shoplifters, and (2) collect civil penalties and damages
therefrom.  The Plaintiffs' proposed amended class action complaint
alleges that Macy's has abused and exceeded these authorizations by
implementing them in combination.  According to the Plaintiffs,
Macy's demands that suspected shoplifters (1) pay, or agree to pay,
civil penalties; and (2) confess to shoplifting, while they are
being detained. Further, the Plaintiffs allege that Macy's falsely
promises suspected shoplifters that they will be released if they
meet Macy's demands, only to be subsequently arrested at Macy's
behest.

The Plaintiffs' proposed amended class action complaint asserts a
variety of causes of action with respect to this conduct, including
false imprisonment, fraud, abuse of process, and consumer
deception.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent a putative class of individuals
who Macy's detained as suspected shoplifters, pursuant to GBL
Section 218 and GOL Section 11-105, in its New York stores.  Their
proposed amended class action complaint describes Macy's "loss
prevention" scheme as follows.

Upon suspicion of shoplifting, a Macy's employee approaches a
suspect and directs him to an in-store jail complete with private
search areas, handcuffs, and jail cells with adjoining desks.  Upon
detention, the employee performs a full-body search, inspects the
contents of the accused shoplifter's wallet, and conducts an
interrogation.

Key to this litigation, the loss prevention employee also promises
the detained shoplifter that he will be released so long as he (1)
completes a promissory note, i.e., a civil demand notice, agreeing
to pay, either immediately or in the future, a civil penalty, and
(2) signs a confession.  Yet, according to the proposed amended
class action complaint, contrary to the employee's representation,
Macy's instead calls the police, and the suspect is held until he
is arrested and transferred to police custody, along with a
supporting deposition prepared by a Macy's loss prevention
employee.

The proposed amended class action complaint asserts causes of
action against Macy's for (1) false imprisonment, (2) abuse of
process, (3) "fraud/unjust enrichment," (4) deceptive business
practices in contravention of New York General Business Law Section
349, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law Section 349, (5) assault/battery, and (6)
deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

The Plaintiffs seek, inter alia, a permanent injunction of in-store
demands for immediate payments, signed confessions, and promissory
notes from suspected shoplifters in Macy's custody in New York, a
refund of all moneys collected in custody, and money damages to
each Plaintiff that was subjected to in-store demands.

The Plaintiffs define the class they seek to represent as
consisting of all persons who, while accused of shoplifting and
detained by Macy's at their New York department stores, have been
or will be subjected to in-store demands for confessions of
shoplifting, and demands to pay civil penalties.  There are 11n
named Plaintiffs.

Now pending is the Plaintiffs' motion, pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 15(a), 20(a)(1), 21, and 81(c)(2), to amend their
operative first amended class action complaint to (1) add nine new
Lead Plaintiffs (Ramirez, Perullo, Melgar, Lema, Ratner, Nahar,
Hoque, Acteopan, and Osongba), (2) withdraw all claims against
Palmer, (3) assert new causes of action against Macy's for fraud
and deceptive business practices under GBL Section 349, (4) modify
the pre-existing causes of action, and (5) redefine the contours of
the class.

Judge Buchwald granted leave to amend with respect to (1) Orellana,
Moftah, Ramirez, Perullo, Melgar, and Lema's fraud claims, to the
extent they allege that Macy's misrepresented that they would be
released if they paid or agreed to pay civil fines and/or sign
confessions to shoplifting; (2) Orellana, Moftah, Ramirez, Perullo,
Melgar, and Ratner's GBL Section 349 claims, to the extent they
allege that Macy's engaged in a deceptive business practice by
misrepresenting that they would be released if they paid or agreed
to pay civil fines and/or sign confessions to shoplifting; and (3)
Orellana, Moftah, Ramirez, Perullo, Ratner, Hoque, Nahar, Acteopan,
and Osongba's "assault/battery" and false imprisonment claims.
Leave to amend is also granted to the extent all claims against
Palmer are withdrawn.

The Judge denied with prejudice the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to
amend in all other respects.  She denied without prejudice the
Plaintiffs' motion for leave to move to enforce the Supreme Court
preliminary injunction, and for contempt sanctions in violation
thereof.

The Plaintiffs will file an amended class action complaint in
accordance with, and within 14 days of, the Memorandum and Order.
All the counsel for extant parties will thereafter appear for a
status conference before the Court on Aug. 2, 2018 at 2:30 p.m.

The Clerk of Court is directed to (1) terminate Law Offices of
Palmer, Reifler and Associates, P.A. as a Defendant (and amend the
case caption accordingly), and (2) terminate docket numbers 28
(granted in part and denied in part) and 38 (denied without
prejudice).

A full-text copy of the Court's July 10, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/UXCImt from Leagle.com.

Cinthia Carolina Reyes Orellana, individually and on behalf of all
similiarly situated retail customers, Plaintiff, represented by
Faruk Usar -- fusar@usarlaw.com -- Usar Law Group, P.C. & Steven B.
Wasserman, Legal Aid Society.

Samya I Moftah, individually and on behalf of all similiarly
situated retail customers, Plaintiff, represented by Faruk Usar,
Usar Law Group, P.C.

Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc., doing business as Macy's formerly
known as Macy's East also known as Macy's Inc., Defendant,
represented by Alison B. Marshall -- abmarshall@jonesday.com --
Jones Day, Meir Feder -- mfeder@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Michael
E. McDonagh -- mmcdonagh@lskdnylaw.com -- Lester, Schwab, Katz and
Dwyer LLP & Robert Nicholas Dunn -- dunn@lskdnylaw.com -- Lester,
Schwab, Katz and Dwyer LLP.


MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL: Swartz Sues over Violation of ADA
---------------------------------------------------------
HELEN SWARTZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 2:18-cv-03135-GJP (E.D. Pa., July 25, 2018) alleges
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendant failed to
provide facilities accessible to and useable by individuals with
disabilities as required by the ADA. The Defendant has
discriminated against the Plaintiff, and those with disabilities,
by denying access to, and full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of
the Defendant's hotel.

Marriott International, Inc. operates, franchises, and licenses
hotel, residential, and timeshare properties worldwide. As of June
7, 2018, it operated, franchised, and licensed approximately 6,500
properties in 127 countries and territories. Marriott International
was founded in 1927 and is headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David S. Dessen, Esq.
          DESSEN MOSES & ROSSITO
          600 Easton Road
          Willow Grove, PA 19090
          Telephone: (215) 496-2902
          Facsimile: (215) 564-2879
          E-mail: ddessen@dms-lawyer.com

               - and –

          Lawrence A. Fuller, Esq.
          FULLER FULLER & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
          12000 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 502
          North Miami, FL 33181
          Telephone: (305) 891-5199
          Facsimile: (305) 893-9505
          E-mail: lfuller@fullerfuller.com


MASSACHUSETTS: Governor Faces McMann Suit in D. Massachusetts
-------------------------------------------------------------
PAUL J. MCMANN, and EILEEN R. MCMANN, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. CHARLES BAKER, JR.,
Governor of Massachusetts; STEPHANIE POLLACK, Secretary of
Transportation; ERIN DEVENEY, Registrar at Massachusetts Department
of Transportation; CHRISTOPHER C. HARDING, Commissioner of
Massachusetts Department of Revenue; CHARLES BORSTEL, Director of
the Divison of Professional Licensure; and MAURA HEALY, Attorney
General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-11550-LTS (D. Mass., July 23, 2018) alleges violation of
the due process and equal protection clause under the U.S.
Constitution.

According to the complaint, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
violated the Plaintiffs' rights under the U.S. Constitution when
the Plaintiffs driver's licenses were revoked by the Massachusetts
Registry of Motor Vehicles. The revocation was because of state
taxes they owed; when the Plaintiff Paul McMann's real estate
license was revoked by the Division of Professional Licensure
because he owed state taxes; when the Commonwealth has placed the
McMann's names on a national database regarding the suspension of
their driver's licenses. Because the McMann's names are on a
national database with their driver's license revocations, the
McManns are unable to move to a new state and obtain new
licenses.[BN]

The Plaintiffs filed the case pro se.


MDL 2047: Court Grants WWIC's Bid to Dismiss
--------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana granted Defendant Western World Insurance Company's
Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Due to InEx Settlement the case
captioned IN RE: CHINESE-MANUFACTURED DRYWALL PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION. THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: Hakenjos, et al v. Tallow
Creek LLC, et al, No. 10-2579, SECTION L (5). Civil Action MDL No.
2047.(E.D. La.).

Drywall manufactured in China was brought into the United States
and used to construct and refurbish homes in coastal areas of the
country, notably the Gulf Coast and East Coast. Sometime after the
installation of the Chinese drywall, homeowners began to complain
of emissions of foul-smelling gas, the corrosion and blackening of
metal wiring, surfaces, and objects, and the breaking down of
appliances and electrical devices in their homes.

The Court granted preliminary approval of a class action settlement
agreement reached by the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee, InEx, and
InEx's primary insurers. This settlement also provided for
settlement of claims against certain entites downstream in the
chain of commerce from InEx.

The Petitioners do not oppose this motion. Accordingly, the Court
will grant the motion as uncontested, and for good reason because
the Court finds that WWIC is in fact a downstream releasee under
the InEx Settlement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 2, 2018 Order and
Reasons is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9lz7qfj from
Leagle.com.

Lynn C Greer, Special Master, pro se.

Plaintiff, Plaintiff, represented by Russ M. Herman --
rherman@hhklawfirm.com -- Herman, Herman & Katz, LLC & Leonard A.
Davis -- ldavis@hhklawfirm.com -- Herman, Herman & Katz, LLC.

Homebuilders and Installers Steering Committee, Defendant,
represented by Phillip A. Wittmann -- pwittmann@stonepigman.com --
Stone, Pigman, Walther, Wittmann, LLC.

Insurer Steering Committee, Defendant, represented by Judy Y.
Barrasso -- JBarrasso@BarrassoUsdin.com -- Barrasso,Usdin,
Kupperman, Freeman & Sarver, LLC.

Defendant, Defendant, represented by Kerry J. Miller --
kmiller@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz & Andrew J Brien -- brien@carverdarden.com --  Carver,
Darden, Koretzky, Tessier, Finn, Blossman & Areaux.

Defendant, Liaison Counsel for Taishan, BNMB entities, and CNBM
entities, Defendant, represented by Harry Rosenberg --
harry.rosenberg@phelps.com -- Phelps Dunbar, LLP.


MDL 2262: Court Won't Reconsider GDB Fraud Claims Dismissal
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration in the case
captioned In re: LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust
Litigation. This Document Applies to: Lender Action. Nos. 11 MD
2262 (NRB), 12 Civ. 5723 (S.D.N.Y.).

The lender plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the Court's decision
in LIBOR V, 2015 WL 6696407 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2015), dismissing as
time-barred the fraud claims asserted by Government Development
Bank for Puerto Rico (GDB) slip op.

The Lender plaintiffs base this motion on the analysis of the
statute of limitations applicable under California law set forth in
Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of America Corp., 883 F.3d 68, 97-98
(2d Cir. 2018).

The motion is denied.

The Court considered a comparable request from the Exchange
plaintiffs two months ago, and this request fares no better. As a
threshold matter, even assuming that Schwab's analysis of statutes
of limitations and inquiry notice under California law applies
directly to GDB's fraud claims under Puerto Rico law, Lender
plaintiffs offer no justification for why their motion was not
filed until sixteen weeks after the Second Circuit's issuance of
Schwab. As sixteen is greater than seven, this unexplained delay
alone warrants denial of GDB's pending application as well.

Lender plaintiffs' motion falls far short, too, of the substantive
standard for reconsideration. Reconsideration on the basis of an
intervening change in controlling law is appropriate only when the
court has a clear conviction of error with respect to a point of
law on which its previous decision was predicated. Mere doubt is
not enough to open the point for full reconsideration.

At this point in the litigation, Lender plaintiffs should be well
aware of the importance of variations in state law.  And yet,
Lender plaintiffs do not consider, address, or even cite any Puerto
Rico law in contending that the Court should reconsider our prior
analysis of Puerto Rico law  even though issues regarding statutes
of limitations generally and the recognition of a defendant
reassurance exception specifically, have figured in this litigation
from the outset, slip op.

The lender plaintiffs' application for reconsideration untimely,
underdeveloped, and ultimately unpersuasive is denied. The lender
plaintiffs must revise the notice program proposed in relation to
the pending settlements to acknowledge both LIBOR V's dismissal of
GDB's fraud claims and LIBOR VII's denial of class certification,
as directed by the Court during the conference held on June 18,
2018.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 2, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yatbhflc from
Leagle.com.

FTC Capital GMBH, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Lovell --
clovell@lshllp.com -- Lovell Stewart Halebian Jacobson LLP, Daniel
Hume -- dhume@kmllp.com -- Kirby McInerney LLP, David E. Kovel --
dkovel@kmllp.com -- Kirby McInerney LLP, Roger W. Kirby, Kirby
McInerney LLP, Samuel Howard Rudman -- SRudman@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Surya Palaniappan, Kirby
McInerney LLP.

Bank of America Corporation, Defendant, represented by Paul Steel
Mishkin -- paul.mishkin@davispolk.com -- Davis Polk & Wardwell
L.L.P., Abram Jeremy Ellis -- aellis@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher
& Bartlett LLP, Arthur J. Burke -- arthur.burke@davispolk.com
-Davis Polk & Wardwell, Edward Fu -- edward.fu@davispolk.com --
Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Julie Saranow Epley, Davis Polk &
Wardwell, Neal Alan Potischman -- neal.potischman@davispolk.com -,
Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Patrick Wyatt Blakemore --
patrick.blakemore@davispolk.com -- Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Peter
John Davis -- peter.davis@davispolk.com -- Davis Polk & Wardwell
LLP & Robert Frank Wise, Jr. -- robert.wise@davispolk.com -- Davis
Polk & Wardwell L.L.P.


MENTOR GRAPHICS: WPEE Pension Fund Appeals Order to Ninth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Western Pennsylvania Electrical Employees Pension Fund
filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit styled WPEE
Pension Fund v. Mentor Graphics Corporation, et al., Case No.
3:16-cv-00470-PK, in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Oregon, Portland.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, pursuant to
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, WPEE Pension
Fund is appointed as Lead Plaintiff, and the law firm of Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP is approved as Lead Counsel for the
putative class.

The appellate case is captioned as WPEE Pension Fund v. Mentor
Graphics Corporation, et al., Case No. 18-35693, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Mediation Questionnaire is due on August 27, 2018;

   -- Transcript must be ordered by September 17, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on October 16, 2018;

   -- Appellant Western Pennsylvania Electrical Employees Pension
      Fund's opening brief is due on November 26, 2018;

   -- Appellees Gregory K. Hinckley, Mentor Graphics Corporation,
      Joseph Reinhart and Walden C. Rhines' answering brief is
      due on December 26, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRICAL EMPLOYEES
PENSION FUND, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, is represented by:

          Susan Katina Alexander, Esq.
          Kenny Black, Esq.
          Andrew Love, Esq.
          Willow E. Radcliffe, Esq.
          Shawn Anthony Williams, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD, LLP
          One Montgomery Street
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 288-4545
          E-mail: salexander@rgrdlaw.com
                  kennyb@rgrdlaw.com
                  alove@rgrdlaw.com
                  willowr@rgrdlaw.com
                  shawnw@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Gary M. Berne, Esq.
          Jennifer S. Wagner, Esq.
          STOLL STOLL BERNE LOKTING & SHLACHTER, P.C.
          209 SW Oak Street
          Portland, OR 97204
          Telephone: (503) 227-1600
          E-mail: gberne@ssbls.com
                  jwagner@stollberne.com

Defendants-Appellees MENTOR GRAPHICS CORPORATION, WALDEN C. RHINES,
GREGORY K. HINCKLEY and JOSEPH REINHART are represented by:

          Barry M. Kaplan, Esq.
          John C. Roberts, Jr., Esq.
          Gregory L. Watts, Esq.
          WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, PC
          701 Fifth Avenue
          Seattle, WA 98104-7036
          Telephone: (206) 883-2500
          E-mail: bkaplan@wsgr.com
                  jroberts@wsgr.com
                  GWatts@wsgr.com

               - and -

          Jeanne Kallage Sinnott, Esq.
          MILLER NASH GRAHAM & DUNN LLP
          111 S.W. Fifth Avenue, Suite 3400
          Portland, OR 97204-3699
          Telephone: (503) 205-2418
          E-mail: jeanne.sinnott@millernash.com


MICHIGAN: Court Dismisses D. Lamar's Inmates Civil Rights Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned DEANDRE CURRIE-LAMAR, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v.
SCOTT STEPHENSON, ET AL., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-11663 (E.D.
Mich.).

The Plaintiffs allege unlawful jail conditions, highlighting
inmates' inability to help other inmates with legal work and
inmates' lack of timely access to medical care. The Plaintiffs also
complain of the inclusion of pork in meals, the cost of hygiene
packages, legal copies and mailings, and the prohibition on
attending church services or visiting the law library when
privileges were lost.

To the extent Currie-Lamar seeks to represent other Plaintiffs in
this action, his request is denied.  He cannot adequately protect
the interests of the other Plaintiffs.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 2, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybcuf6gp from Leagle.com.

Deandre Currie-Lamar, Plaintiff, pro se.

Tyrone Price, Plaintiff, pro se.

Keithon Porter, Plaintiff, pro se.

Earl D. Logan, Plaintiff, pro se.

Jonathone J Johnson, Plaintiff, pro se.

Lamar Moore, Plaintiff, pro se.

Davaughn Gaines, Plaintiff, pro se.

D'Angelo Davis, Plaintiff, pro se.

Thadeous Hoof, Plaintiff, pro se.


MINNESSOTA: Certification Bid in G. Greene's Inmate Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
denied Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification in the case
captioned Guy I. Greene, Plaintiff, v. Kelly Lake; Paul Coughlin;
Brian Belich; Dave Kumanen; Jason Wilmes; Cammi Werner; Travis
Warnygora; Tom Roy; John Does, an unknown number; and Jane Does,
and unknown number; sued in their individual and official
capacities, Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-3551 (SRN-KMM)(D. Minn.).

This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation
(R&R) of Magistrate Judge Katherine M. Menendez, recommending
denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification.

The Plaintiff is housed with the Minnesota Sex Offender Program at
Moose Lake, where he has limited access to legal resources and to
the internet. He brought this civil rights action pro se under 42
U.S.C. Section 1983 for alleged harms arising out of an unrelated
period of incarceration in the Carlton County Jail.

In the R&R, the Magistrate recommends that the Plaintiff's Motion
for Class Certification be denied. She concludes that the Plaintiff
could not be an adequate class representative acting pro se. She
additionally recommends that the Court not appoint class counsel
because doing so is outside the scope of Rule 23(g).

The Magistrate properly found that Plaintiff is unable to satisfy
the adequacy requirement by virtue of his pro se status. It is well
established that a non-attorney pro se plaintiff cannot adequately
represent a class.

The Magistrate also properly recommended that the Court not appoint
counsel to represent the class. Rule 23(g)(1) states that a court
that certifies a class must appoint class counsel and (g)(3)
permits the court to designate interim counsel on behalf of a
putative class before determining whether to certify the action as
a class action.

In the present case, the Plaintiff's requests for the appointment
of counsel have already been denied once before. The posture of
this case has not substantially changed since that time, despite
the Plaintiff's request to have this case certified as a class
action.

In conclusion, after a de novo review of the record, the Court
finds that the Magistrate properly analyzed the Plaintiff's motion
for class certification. The Court therefore adopts her
recommendations denying class certification and declining to
appoint counsel for Plaintiff.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification is
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 25, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y96328bc from Leagle.com.

Guy I. Greene, et al., and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, pro se.

Kelly Lake, Carlton County Sheriff, sued in their individual and
official capacity, Carlton County Jail, Paul Coughlin, Carlton
County Jail Administrator, sued in their individual and official
capacity, Brian Belich, Carlton County Deputy Sheriff, sued in
their individual and official capacity, Jason Wilmes, Carlton
County Jail Sergeant, sued in their individual and official
capacity, Cammi Werner, Carlton County Jail Employee, sued in their
individual and official capacity, Travis Warnygora, Carlton County
Jail Employee, sued in their individual and official capacity &
Dave Kumanen, Carlton County Jail Sergeant; sued in their
individual and official capacity, Defendants, represented by Susan
M. Tindal — susan@irc-law.com -- Iverson Reuvers Condon.

Tom Roy, Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Corrections, sued in
their individual and official capacity, Defendant, represented by
Kelly S. Kemp, Minnesota Attorney General's Office.


MONDELEZ INT'L: Suit Over Ginger Snaps PHO Remain in Dist. Court
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand the case captioned
VALORIE WINN, Plaintiff, v. MONDELEZ INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-02524-HSG (N.D. Cal.).

Mondolez and Pak 'N Save market and sell Ginger Snaps, a cookie
product that contained partially hydrogenated oil (PHO) until as
recently as December 28, 2014. The Plaintiff alleges that PHO is a
food additive banned in the United States and many parts of the
world due to its artificial trans fat content and devotes a
substantial portion of the Complaint to detailing her allegations
that artificial trans fat is a toxic, unlawful food additive.
Mondolez filed its Notice of Removal.

The Court has original jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's action
under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).  First, there is the
requisite minimal diversity: the Plaintiff purports to be a citizen
of California, and Mondolez is alleged to be a Virginia corporation
with its principal place of business in Illinois. Second, there are
more than 100 members in the putative class. And third,
notwithstanding the Plaintiff's prayer for relief in the amount of
less than $5 million and her express disclaimer of all relief that
would subject her action to CAFA jurisdiction the Court is
satisfied that Mondolez has shown that the potential damages could
exceed the jurisdictional amount.

The local controversy exception does not encompass the Plaintiff's
claims because she did not incur her principal injuries in
California.

Irrespective of the Court's original jurisdiction, the Plaintiff
contends that this case is a local controversy within the meaning
of section 1332(d)(4), which would require this Court to decline to
exercise CAFA jurisdiction. The Defendant counters that federal
courts have repeatedly held the local controversy exception is to
be applied narrowly and only to controversies that are truly local
and that this action, which challenges conduct that occurred
nationwide does not qualify. This amounts to an argument that the
Plaintiff's action does not meet the requirements of section
1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III) (section III), which requires that the
principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any
related conduct of each defendant be incurred in the State in which
the action was originally filed.

The Court agrees that the Plaintiff's action fails to meet the
requirements of section III, and that as a result, the local
controversy exception does not apply.

The Plaintiff contends that this case is a local controversy within
the meaning of section 1332(d)(4), which would require this Court
to decline to exercise CAFA jurisdiction. The Defendant counters
that federal courts have repeatedly held the local controversy
exception is to be applied narrowly and only to controversies that
are truly local and that this action, which challenges conduct that
occurred nationwide does not qualify. This amounts to an argument
that the Plaintiff's action does not meet the requirements of
section 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III) (section III), which requires that
the "principal injuries” resulting from the alleged conduct or
any related conduct of each defendant be incurred in the State in
which the action was originally filed.

The Court agrees that the Plaintiff's action fails to meet the
requirements of section III, and that as a result, the local
controversy exception does not apply.

Because the Plaintiff alleges that the harm caused by the
Defendants is national in scope, the local controversy exception
does not apply.

As relevant to this analysis, the Plaintiff alleges that Ginger
Snaps were placed into interstate commerce by the Defendants and
sold throughout the country and in this Alameda County.

In other words, the Plaintiff's own allegations establish that the
principal injuries alleged in this suit are not limited to
California because Ginger Snaps are sold nationwide.  While that
was not determinative in Kearns which described its reasoning is
compelling with respect to why the Court should decline to apply
the local controversy exception. CAFA's legislative history, while
not binding on this Court, is clear in stating that section III
looks at where the principal injuries were suffered by everyone who
was affected by the alleged conduct not just where the proposed
class members were injured.

Moreover, the Plaintiff encounters the same obstacle as did the
plaintiff in Waller: her action is local only in the trivial and
almost tautological sense that the definition of the putative class
and the legal bases of the asserted claims make it so. THe
Plaintiff has defined the putative class as consumers in
California, while at the same time alleging that the harm, i.e.,
the selling of Ginger Snaps is national in scope.  The Court looks
beyond this framing, to the nature and scope of the alleged wrong,
which the Complaint itself establishes is not California-specific
or otherwise meaningfully local. Whether the Plaintiff intends to
bring this action on a state-by-state basis is irrelevant. What
matters is that the Plaintiff's claims are local only because of
the manner in which she alleges them.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to show that her
alleged harm was incurred in California within the meaning of
section III. Because she has failed to satisfy this requirement of
the local controversy exception, her motion to remand is denied.

Accordingly, the Court denies the Plaintiff's motion to remand.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 28, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8pk62d9 from Leagle.com.

Valorie Winn, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory Weston --
greg@westonfirm.com --& Andrew Christopher Hamilton --
andrew@westonfirm.com -- The Weston Firm.

Mondelez International, Inc., Defendant, represented by Christina
Avedissian Aryafar -- caryafar@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP,
Dean N. Panos -- dpanos@jenner.com -- Jenner And Block LLP &
Kenneth Kiyul Lee -- klee@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP.


MSG HOLDINGS: Conditional Certification of Intern Class Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District New York
denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification in the case
captioned CHRISTOPHER FRATICELLI, individually and on behalf of
other persons similarly situated who were employed by MSG HOLDINGS,
L.P. and THE MADISON SQUARE GARDEN COMPANY and/or any other
entities affiliated with or controlled by MSG HOLDINGS, L.P. and
THE MADISON SQUARE GARDEN COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. MSG HOLDINGS, L.P.
and THE MADISON SQUARE GARDEN COMPANY, and/or any other entities
affiliated with or controlled by MSG HOLDINGS, L.P. and THE MADISON
SQUARE GARDEN COMPANY, Defendants, No. 13 Civ. 6518 (HBP)
(S.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiffs move for conditional certification of the collective
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).

The Plaintiffs worked for the defendants as unpaid interns in
various departments and allege that they were uniformly
misclassified by the defendants as exempt from the federal and
state minimum wage and overtime requirements. The Plaintiffs seek
to recover, among other things, unpaid wages, attorney's fees and
liquidated damages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
29 U.S.C. Sections 201 et seq., the New York Labor Law ("NYLL")
Sections 650 et seq., NYLL Sections 190 et seq., and Title 12 of
the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations, Section 142-2.1.

Legal Principles Applicable to Certification of a Rule 23 Class


Class certification under Rule 23(a) requires that (1) the class is
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims of
the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class;
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class. If each of these four threshold
requirements are met, class certification is appropriate if the
action also satisfies one of the three alternative criteria set
forth in Rule 23(b).
Plaintiffs here claim that class certification is proper under Rule
23(b) (3), which provides that a class action may be maintained
where the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members
and a class action is superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Judge Furman's Denial of 216(b) Conditional Certification

On May 7, 2014, Judge Furman denied the plaintiffs' motion for
conditional certification of a Section 216(b) collective,
concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to make the modest
factual showing' that they and potential opt-in plaintiffs together
were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law.

The Plaintiffs next argue that Section 216(b) and Rule 23
conditional certification is appropriate here because the standard
is lower when conditional certification is sought in connection
with a settlement than when it is sought in connection with an
action that is being litigated. Some of the cases plaintiffs cite
in this regard are not conditional certification decisions are
actually orders that were drafted by the plaintiffs' counsel and
issued with minimal, if any, edits. Such orders should be given
little precedential value.

In any event, the plaintiffs vastly overstate the impact of the
settlement on the proposed collective and class certification
issues. The Supreme Court and Circuit precedents establish that,
other than manageability, the existence of a settlement does not
attenuate the requirements for class certification.  Moreover, in
none of the cases cited by the plaintiff was there an earlier
finding, as there was here, that the experiences of the members of
the putative collective were so varied that the modest threshold
for Section 216(b) had not been met. Given Judge Furman's prior
decision, granting conditional 216(b) or class certification here,
in the absence of additional evidence demonstrating that members of
the collective or class were subject to a common policy or plan
that violated the law, would effectively mean that the requirements
for Section 216(b) and Rule 23 certification evaporate when there
is a settlement. The precedents do not go that far.

In support of their contention that conditional certification of
the collective and the class is appropriate here because the
parties have agreed to a settlement, the plaintiffs rely heavily on
the decision of the Honorable Alison J. Nathan, United States
District Judge, in Tart v. Lions Gate Entm't Corp., 14 Civ. 8004
(AJN), 2015 WL 5945846 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2015), in which she
concluded because Amchem teaches that a settlement eliminates the
manageability requirement for class certification, the fact that
each intern member of a collective or a class has a different
intern experience is not sufficient to defeat certification of a
settlement class.  Tart is distinguishable. There was no prior
decision in Tart that the interns' experience was so diverse that
the not even the modest threshold for Section 216(b) conditional
certification was met.

Judge Furman not only found that the wide diversity among the
duties performed by interns weighed against conditional
certification, he also found that the conclusory declarations
offered in support of plaintiffs' claim of commonality were not
credible.13 Because plaintiffs have not supplemented the record
with evidentiary material filling this lacuna, there is no credible
evidence in the record that the experience of the four affiants
proffered by plaintiffs was shared by anyone else.

The Court appreciate that due to the running of the statute of
limitations, the failure to grant conditional certification to the
collective and the class will result in the majority of interns who
worked for the defendants receiving nothing. However, this
unfortunate consequence cannot serve to excuse the plaintiffs'
failure to comply with the requirements of Section 216(b) and Rule
23. In the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to
the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the
best guarantee of even handed administration of the law.

Accordingly, for all these reasons, the plaintiffs' application for
conditional certification of the 216(b) collective and the putative
class is denied. Counsel are directed to report to Court to discuss
the next steps to be taken in this matter.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 2, 2018 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybvrj5j3 from
Leagle.com.

Christopher Fraticelli, individually and on behalf of other persons
similarly situated who were employed by MSG Holdings, L.P. and The
Madison Square Garden Company and/or any other entities affiliated
with or controlled by MSG Holdings, L.P. and The Madison Square
Garden Compan, Plaintiff, represented by Lloyd Robert Ambinder --
lambinder@vandallp.com -- Virginia & Ambinder, LLP, Charles R.
Virginia -- cvirginia@vandallp.com -- Virginia & Ambinder, LLP,
Daniel Harris Markowitz, Leeds Brown Law PC, Jeffrey Kevin Brown,
Leeds Morelli & Brown, LaDonna Marie Lusher -- llusher@vandallp.com
-- Virginia & Ainbinder, LLP, Michael Alexander Tompkins, Leeds
Brown Law PC & Suzanne Brooke Klein, Virginia & Ambinder, LLP.

Oritt Blum, Fernando Herrera, Scott H. Winter & Kristin Slattery,
Plaintiffs, represented by Lloyd Robert Ambinder, Virginia &
Ambinder, LLP.

MSG Holdings, L.P., The Madison Square Garden Company, and/or any
other entities affiliated with or controlled by MSG Holdings, L.P.
& The Madison Square Garden Company, Defendants, represented by Ira
G. Rosenstein -- ira.rosenstein@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis &
Bockius, LLP & Sam Scott Shaulson -- sam.shaulson@morganlewis.com
-- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.


MUTUAL OF OMAHA: Can Compel Subpoena Compliance in "Johansen" Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEN JOHANSEN, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MUTUAL OF OMAHA INSURANCE
COMPANY, AMERIQUOTE, INC., Defendants, Case No.
3:18-cv-00325-MMD-WGC (D. Nev.), Magistrate Judge William G. Cobb
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada granted
AmeriQuote's motion to compel compliance with Rule 45 subpoenas.

AmeriQuote is a party in a putative class action against it and
Mutual of Omaha filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia.  The Plaintiff in the underlying litigation
alleges the Defendants made unsolicited calls to the telephones of
the Plaintiff and others on the National Do Not Call Registry in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

On Oct. 13, 2017, the District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia issued an order requiring AmeriQuote to obtain records from
third party vendors.  AmeriQuote initially served a subpoena on an
entity called Insurance Marketing Innovations, Inc. ("IMI").  When
AmeriQuote received no response to its subpoenas from IMI,
AmeriQuote then served deposition subpoenas to Matthew S. Jones and
Anna L. Jones who were officers of IMI.  Matthew Jones and Anna
Jones were directed by their subpoenas to appear for their
depositions on March 8, 2018, at Bonanza Reporting Services, Reno,
Nevada.  The Joneses appear to be residents of Washoe County,
Nevada.  The subpoenas were personally served on Feb. 24, 2018.

After service of the subpoenas, the counsel for AmeriQuote was
initially contacted by Anna Jones and thereafter by John Collier,
Esq., who indicated he was representing Matthew and Anna Jones.
The counsel for AmeriQuote agreed, at Mr. Collier's request, to
vacate the depositions to be reset at a mutually convenient date.
AmeriQuote's counsel has heard nothing further from Mr. Collier
subsequent to April 23, 2018, despite several follow-up attempts
with Mr. Collier.

The motion to compel compliance with Rule 45 subpoenas followed.
It was initially filed in the unofficial Southern Division of the
District of Nevada.  Because the deponents and their putative
attorney are located in Reno, the Judge Andrew P. Gordon, United
States District Judge, ordered the case transferred to the
unofficial Northern Division of the District of Nevada.

Magistrate Judge Cobb finds that AmeriQuote properly served
deposition subpoenas on Matthew and Anna Jones.  The time and place
of the depositions as set forth in the subpoenas was vacated at the
request of the counsel for the Jones.  The counsel for AmeriQuote
attempted to resolve the matter of rescheduling the depositions, as
is required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(ii) and LR 26-7(c), to no
avail.  AmeriQuote's motion to compel is properly filed in the
district where compliance is required.  Matthew and Anna Jones have
waived any objections to the subpoenas by failed to make timely
objections.  Despite service on attorney Collier, no response to
the AmeriQuote motion to compel was received by the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nevada.

The Magistrate Judge granted AmeriQuote's motion.  Matthew S. Jones
and Anna L. Jones are ordered to attend the revised time and place
for their depositions as may be noticed by the counsel for
AmeriQuote.  Matthew S. Jones and Anna L. Jones are advised that
their failure to attend their depositions, and/or to produce the
identified documents, may result in a contempt of court order of
the Court.  The Clerk will send a copy of the Order to the names
and addresses listed on AmeriQuote's Certificate of Service.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/AROysZ from Leagle.com.

Ken Johansen, Plaintiff, pro se.

Ameriquote, Inc., Defendant, represented by Beth A. Cook --
bcook@skanewilcox.com -- Skane & Wilcox, Elizabeth A. Skane --
eskane@skanewilcox.com -- Skane Wilcox LLP, Matthew N. Foree --
mforee@fmglaw.com -- Freeman Mathis & Gary LLP & Josh H. Goselin --
jgoselin@fmglaw.com -- Freeman Mathis & Gary LLP, pro hac vice.


NCAA: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Residence Rule Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, affirmed the
District Court's judgment granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned PETER DEPPE, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellee, No. 17-1711 (7th Cir.).

This case raises an antitrust challenge to the NCAA's year in
residence rule, which requires student-athletes who transfer to a
Division I college to wait one full academic year before they can
play for their new school. A Division I football player filed a
class-action lawsuit alleging that the rule is an unlawful
restraint of trade in violation of  Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The NCAA moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6),
arguing that the year-in-residence bylaw is an eligibility rule and
thus is presumptively pro-competitive under Board of Regents and
Agnew and need not be tested for anticompetitive effect under a
full rule-of-reason analysis.

The district judge agreed and dismissed the case.

Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce.To prevail in a suit alleging a
violation of Section 1, the plaintiff must prove three elements:
(1) a contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) a resultant
unreasonable restraint of trade in [a] relevant market; and (3) an
accompanying injury. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 335 (quoting Denny's
Marina, Inc. v. Renfro Prods., Inc., 8 F.3d 1217, 1220 (7th Cir.
1993)).

Deppe insists that the year-in-residence rule does not fit within
the contours of a traditional eligibility bylaw. On the contrary,
the rule falls neatly in line with other rules courts have
characterized as eligibility rules. In Agnew, the Court gave the
example of a class-attendance requirement to explain why
eligibility rules are entitled to a pro-competitive presumption.
The Agnew court said: "There may not be such a thing as a student
athlete, for instance, if it was not for the NCAA rules requiring
class attendance, and thus no detailed analysis would be necessary
to deem such rules pro-competitive. Bylaws that have been
classified as eligibility rules include: a bylaw revoking a
student-athlete's eligibility to compete if he enters the
professional draft or hires a professional agent, a rule allowing
the suspension of a college football program for illicitly
compensating players beyond scholarships and a bylaw making
student-athletes ineligible to compete at a graduate school
different from their undergraduate institution."

The Court had no difficulty concluding that the year-in-residence
bylaw is an eligibility rule.

Next, Deppe argues that the NCAA enforces the year-in-residence
requirement for economic reasons and not to preserve the product of
college football. He asks the Court to infer an economic motive
from the fact that the one-time transfer exception is unavailable
to most Division I football, basketball, and ice-hockey players,
the highest-revenue sports programs in the NCAA. This argument
ignores the innocent explanation that these are precisely the
athletes who are most vulnerable to poaching. Without transfer
restrictions, the players in these high-revenue sports could be
traded like professional athletes.

In sum, the year-in-residence rule is, on its face, a presumptively
pro-competitive eligibility rule under Agnew and Board of Regents.
Accordingly, a full rule-of-reason analysis is unnecessary. Deppe's
Sherman Act challenge to the NCAA's year-in-residence bylaw fails
on the pleadings.

A full-text copy of the Seventh Circuit's June 25, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ydcf68o5 from Leagle.com.

Gregory L. Curtner -- gcurtner@rshc-law.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kathy L. Osborn -- kathy.osborn@FaegreBD.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Elizabeth Anne Fegan -- BETH@HBSSLAW.COM -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Daniel Pulliam -- daniel.pulliam@FaegreBD.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.


NESTLE WATERS: Court Narrows Claims in A. Geis' Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned ALEXIS GEIS, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, KARA LYNDON, and TIFFANY MORRIS,
Plaintiffs, v. NESTLE WATERS NoRTH AMERICA, INC. and SCOTT KELLY,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-12165-PBS (D Nev.).

Nestle Waters North America, Inc. (NWNA) filed a motion to dismiss
Counts I-IV, based on lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, and a failure to state claims upon
which relief can be granted.

Alexis Geis brings this class action against Nestle Waters North
America, Inc., alleging that NWNA failed to honor one-year
agreements for lower prices on its products. In the First Amended
Complaint, Geis asserts four counts on behalf of a putative class:
Count I (breach of contract); Count II (violation of Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 93A, Section 11); Count III (fraud); and Count IV
(violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, Section 9).  NWNA moved to
dismiss Geis's FAC on three grounds: (1) lack of personal
jurisdiction; (2) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; and (3)
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Massachusetts Long-Arm Statute

The Massachusetts long-arm statute permits a court to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an
agent, as to a cause of action in law or equity arising from the
person's transacting any business in this commonwealth.

To determine the reasonableness of exercising personal
jurisdiction, the Court looks to the gestalt factors: (1) the
burden on the defendant (2) the forum state's interest in
adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief, (4) the judicial system's interest
in obtaining the most effective resolution of the controversy, and
(5) the common interests of all sovereigns in promoting substantive
social policies.

NWNA disputes this Court's specific personal jurisdiction under all
three elements of the Due Process Clause test. The Court holds that
it has specific jurisdiction over NWNA.

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Legal Standards
Rule 12(b)(1) motions ask a court to dismiss a case for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.

The irreducible constitutional minimum of standing has three
elements: (1) injury in fact; (2) causation; and (3)
redressability. An injury in fact must be both concrete and
particularized and actual or imminent.

NWNA maintains that Geis lacks Article III standing to pursue Count
II and Count IV under chapter 93A because she has never lived in
Massachusetts, has not suffered an injury in the state, and is not
protected by its laws. NWNA relies on caselaw holding that named
plaintiffs do not have standing to bring actions under the consumer
protection statutes of different states.

An injury under chapter 93A may be either economic or noneconomic.
To demonstrate a cognizable economic injury, a plaintiff only must
show real economic damages, as opposed to some speculative harm. A
plaintiff's complaint must plead objective, identifiable harm that
goes beyond the defendant's alleged deception itself.

Here, Geis has claimed that she lost money as a result of the
allegedly deceptive practices that arose from the Massachusetts
call center. This is enough to allege an injury in fact for Article
III standing purposes.

Failure to State a Claim

Legal Standard

In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept the
factual allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true, construe
reasonable inferences in its favor, and determine whether the
factual allegations in the plaintiff's complaint set forth a
plausible claim upon which relief may be granted.

Breach of Contract (Count I)

NWNA asserts that Geis fails to state a claim for breach of
contract because she does not append a contract to her FAC, does
not plausibly establish the existence of a valid oral agreement and
does not "properly allege the damages element.” These arguments
do not hold water.

First, Geis was not obligated to attach a written contract to her
complaint, as the alleged oral agreement negotiated by the NWNA
call center representative for lower water prices is the relevant
contract.  

To adequately plead a breach of contract claim under Massachusetts
law, a plaintiff need only allege "that there was an agreement
between the parties; the agreement was supported by consideration;
the plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to perform his or her
part of the contract; the defendant committed a breach of the
contract; and the plaintiff suffered harm as a result.”

Geis has alleged that, in return for her agreeing to continue using
NWNA as her water supplier, an NWNA call center representative
orally promised to reduce the price of her water for one year. This
agreement is memorialized in call notes, according to Geis. She
also alleges that NWNA breached that agreement when it increased
the prices just a few months later. The FAC states that Geis paid
the increased prices without knowing and thus lost money as a
result of the alleged breach.
Accordingly, Geis has pleaded all elements of a breach of contract
claim, including damages.

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, Section 11 (Count II)

NWNA also argues that Geis's claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A,
Section 11 fails because she does not engage in trade or commerce
and therefore does not have statutory standing. On this point, NWNA
is correct.

Section 11 allows private causes of action under chapter 93A by any
person who engages in the conduct of any trade or commerce. There
is no indication in the FAC that Geis was acting in a business
context when she purchased her water from NWNA. The FAC states only
that "Geis is an individual who resides at 8 Boston Lane, Palm
Coast, Florida. Because section 11 affords no relief to consumers,
Geis cannot bring a claim under this section.

Fraud (Count III)

NWNA next argues that Geis does not meet Rule 9(b)'s particularity
requirement for her fraud count and that the economic loss theory
precludes a fraud claim. Neither argument justifies dismissal of
Count III.

Geis has also claimed that the alleged false statement was made
over the phone by an NWNA agent who worked at the Raynham call
center.

In some cases, the First Circuit has required a plaintiff to
specify the name of the person who made the allegedly fraudulent
misrepresentation. Instead of giving an individual's name, Geis has
alleged that promising one-year pricing terms was a company-wide
policy followed by all call center representatives, and that a
representative did in fact promise her a one-year term on the day
she called. The Court will not dismiss the fraud claim for Geis's
failure to include a specific name, as the allegations in the FAC
satisfy the purposes of Rule 9(b).

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, Section 9 (Count IV)

A claim under Section 9 requires, at a minimum, a showing of (1) a
deceptive act or practice on the part of the seller; (2) an injury
or loss suffered by the consumer; and (3) a causal connection
between the seller's deceptive act or practice and the consumer's
injury.

NWNA's final argument is that the chapter 93A claim is another
recast of a simple billing dispute and must be dismissed. NWNA is
correct that a mere breach of contract is not an unfair or
deceptive act or practice.  But here, Geis has alleged more: that
there was a false representation about the one-year agreements, and
also that upper management knew that it was breaching one-year
agreements with customers and was trying to sneak the breach past
them. These are the types of unfair and deceptive acts at which
chapter 93A is targeted.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is allowed with respect to the
claim for violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, Section 11 (Count
II), and is denied in all other respects. NWNA's motion to dismiss
Counts I-III of Plaintiffs' original complaint is denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 2, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yb34vohp from
Leagle.com.

Alexis Geis, individually and on behalf of all others similary
situated, Kara Lyndon & Tiffany Morris, Plaintiffs, represented by
Christopher J. Trombetta, Law Office of Christopher J. Trombetta.

Nestle Waters North America, Inc., Defendant, represented by Lauren
M. Papenhausen -- lauren.papenhausen@whitecase.com -- White & Case,
LLP, Lisa Stephanian Burton -- lisa.burton@
ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Soak & Stewart, P.C.,
Bryan A. Merryman -- bmerryman@whitecase.com -- White & Case LLP,
pro hac vice, Julian A. Lamm -- jlamm@whitecase.com -- White & Case
LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Kendall-  michael.kendall@whitecase.com
-- White & Case, LLP, Nailah Freeman -- nailah.freeman@
ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C. &
Samuel R. Feldman -- samuel.feldman@whitecase.com -- White & Case,
LLP.

Scott Kelly, Defendant, represented by Lisa Stephanian Burton --
lisa.burton@
ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Soak & Stewart, P.C. &
Nailah Freeman -nailah.freeman@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins
Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C..


NEW PENN FINANCIAL: Chong Sues over Force-Placed Insurance
----------------------------------------------------------
DOROTHY KERR CHECA CHONG, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NEW PENN FINANCIAL, LLC d/b/a
SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE SERVICING, Defendant, Case No.
9:18-cv-80948-RLR (S.D. Fla., July 18, 2018) seeks to recover
damages that the class has suffered as a result of Defendant's
wrongful conduct in manipulating the consumer market through
collusive agreements involving kickback arrangements and other
forms of improper compensation and their standard practice of
charging borrowers undisclosed and illegitimate costs in connection
with force-placed insurance.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendant engaged
in a pattern of unlawful and unconscionable profiteering and
self-dealing in the purchase and placement of force-placed, or
lender-placed, insurance ("FPI") coverage on behalf of its
borrowers in Florida and throughout the country.

The Defendant enters into exclusive agreements with insurance
agents such as Overby-Seawell Company ("OSC") and Proctor Financial
Inc. ("Proctor") to monitor the entire Defendants' loan portfolio
and issue certificates of insurance through exclusive,
single-interest master policies procured through surplus lines
insurers National Fire & Marine Insurance Company, IronShore Europe
Limited, and Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London.  These
exclusive master policies cover the entire the Defendant's
portfolio. Because these insurers are surplus lines insurers, they
do not file their rates with the state of Florida and therefore the
filed rate doctrine does not apply.

The FPI Insurers and Agents provide the Defendant with various
kickbacks that the Defendant attempts to disguise as legitimate
compensation. These kickbacks include, but are not limited to, one
or more of the following: (1) unearned "commissions" paid to the
Defendant or an affiliate for work purportedly performed to procure
individual policies; (2) "expense reimbursements" allegedly paid to
reimburse the Defendant for expenses it incurred in the placement
of force-placed insurance coverage on homeowners; (3) free or
below-cost mortgage-servicing functions that FPI Insurers and
Agents perform for the Defendant that often have nothing to do with
the placement of insurance coverage; and (4) payments of illusory
reinsurance premiums that carry no commensurate transfer of risk.

Because of these kickbacks, the Defendant essentially receives a
rebate on the cost of the force-placed insurance; however, the
Defendant's homeowners ultimately bear the cost of these kickbacks
because the Defendant does not pass on these rebates to the
borrowers. The charges for FPI are deducted from borrowers' escrow
accounts and the Defendant attempts to disguise the kickbacks as
legitimate when, in fact, they are unearned, unlawful profits.

New Penn Financial, LLC offers mortgage lending products and
services in the United States. The company was incorporated in 2007
and is based in Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania with locations
across the United States. As of June 2, 2011, New Penn Financial,
LLC operates as a subsidiary of Shellpoint Partners LLC. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam Moskowitz, Esq.
          Howard M. Bushman, Esq.
          Joseph M. Kaye, Esq.
          THE MOSKOWITZ LAW FIRM, PLLC
          2 Alhambra Plaza, Suite 601
          Coral Gables, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 740-1423
          E-mail: adam@moskowitz-law.com
                  howard@moskowitz-law.com
                  joseph@moskowitz-law.com


PEPSI-COLA SALES: Ct. Needs Supplemental Brief in S. Helton's Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California directed the parties in the case captioned NATHANIEL
HELTON, Plaintiff, v. PEPSI-COLA SALES AND DISTRIBUTION, INC., et
al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-01135-EMC (N.D. Cal.) to submit a
joint supplemental brief in relation to the motion for preliminary
approval.

The settlement class is defined somewhat differently, namely, all
Drivers which is inclusive of Bulk Drivers, Delivery Bay Drivers,
Drivers, Delivery Drivers, Delivery Driver Trainees, Relief
Drivers, GEOBox Drivers, FSV Drivers, and Transport Drivers
employed by New Bern in California at any point between January 25,
2013, and the date the Court issues an order preliminarily
approving the settlement.

Mr. Helton acknowledges at least one difference in the class
definitions, stating that the settlement class definition is more
specific than the language used to refer to drivers in the SAC,
lending more clarity to the particular individuals included within
the Class. However, Mr. Helton does not address another difference,
i.e., the SAC class definition refers to employees to all three
defendants while the settlement class definition refers to
employees of New Bern only.

The Court directs the parties to address this difference in their
joint supplemental brief. For example, are any drivers actually
employed by the two Pepsi defendants, or is New Bern the only
employer of drivers and the two Pepsi defendants are simply
affiliated companies? What is the exact relationship among the
three defendant companies? The Court notes that the releases in the
settlement agreement apply to all three defendants.

The motion discusses litigation risks associated with each of the
asserted claims. The Court orders the parties to address the
following issues related to the litigation risks.

1. According to New Bern, there are penalties if employees do not
comply with the written policies on rest and meal breaks. The
parties shall explain what those penalties are.

2. New Bern indicates that, if the case were litigated, it would
argue that it is exempt from the rest and meal period requirements
based on California Labor Code Sections 514 and 512. The parties
shall explain what evidence there is to suggest that those
exemptions apply.

In IX(12)(f)(2) of the settlement agreement, the parties require an
individual who wishes to exclude herself to state in substance that
she (1) has read the class notice, (2) wishes to opt out of the
settlement, and (3) understands that, by opting out, she is not
bound by the judgment and is not entitled to any payment from the
settlement. The parties shall address why (3) is necessary (i.e.,
why (1) and (2) are not sufficient).

The settlement agreement allows Defendants to opt out if the
requests for exclusion total in number more than the number
specified in a separate Supplemental Agreement between the Parties.
The parties shall lodge (not file) under seal a copy of the
Supplemental Agreement with the Court.

Under the settlement agreement, the State Law Awards and Federal
Law Awards will be reduced by any legally-required employee and/or
employer-owed state and federal withholding taxes or other
applicable payroll deductions. The parties shall address what is
the amount of the average deduction that will be taken.

The settlement agreement provides that checks are valid and
negotiable for 120 days. The parties shall address whether that
time period should be extended to 180 days.

Under the settlement agreement, Mr. Helton may be awarded an
incentive fee not to exceed $7,500. Mr. Helton shall address how
much time he personally has spent on the litigation of this case.
He shall also clarify whether he is a current or former employee of
any defendant.

The settlement agreement provides that class counsel may be awarded
up to 25% of the gross settlement fund. Although the Court is not
requiring Mr. Helton to file a fee motion at this juncture, it does
need more information from Mr. Helton regarding the fee request. In
particular, Mr. Helton must provide information about the lodestar
in this case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 28, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yatg8zmc from Leagle.com.

Nathaniel Helton, on behalf of himself, all others similarly
situated, and on behalf of the general public, Plaintiff,
represented by David Thomas Mara -- dmara@turleylawfirm.com -- The
Turley Law Firm, APLC, Jamie Kathryn Serb --
jserb@turleylawfirm.com -- The Turley Law Firm, William David
Turley -- bturley@turleylawfirm.com -- The Turley Law Firm, APLC &
Tony Roberts -- troberts@turleylawfirm.com -- The Turley and Mara
Law Firm, APLC.

Pepsi-Cola Sales and Distribution, Inc., New Bern Transport
Corporation & PepsiCo, Inc., Defendants, represented by Daniel
Francisco De La Cruz -- ddelacruz@shepparmullin.com -- Sheppard,
Mullin, Richter, Hampton, LLP, Samantha D. Hardy --
shardy@sheppardmullin.com --  Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton &
Ashley Teiko Hirano -- ahirano@sheppardmullin.comj -- Sheppard
Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP.


PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY: Underpays Production Workers, Suit Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
TIMOTHY GREEN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY, and DOES 1-50,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. BC713777 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles
Cty., July 23, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid
regular hours, overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal
and rest periods.

Mr. Green was employed by the Defendants as production employee in
their Santa Maria, California refinery, from April 2014 to November
2017.

Phillips 66 Company is a Delaware corporation engaged in owning and
operating as an energy manufacturer and logistics company. The
Company owns and operates refineries in San Francisco, Santa Maria,
and Los Angeles, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James Hawkins, Esq.
          Gregory Mauro, Esq.
          Michael Calvo, Esq.
          JAMES R. HAWKINS APLC
          9880 Research Drive, Suite 200
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Telephone: (949) 387-7200
          Facsimile: (949) 387-6676
          E-mail: James@jameshawkinsaplc.com
                  Greg@jameshawkinsaplc.com
                  Michael@jameshawkinsaplc.com


ROSEMONT REALTY: South Point Wins Summary Ruling in ADEA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana, Lafayette Division, granted the Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Rosemont Realty ("Rosemont"), Jack Stahl Company,
LLC ("Jack Stahl"), South Point Operating Associates, LP ("South
Point"), and Cheryl Willoughby ("Willoughby"), in the case
captioned ORAY BREAUX, JR., MICHAEL CAMERON, v. ROSEMONT REALTY ET
AL. Civil Action No. 14-2265 (LEAD), No. 14-2268 (MEMBER) (W.D.
La.).

The Plaintiffs' are former maintenance technicians at South Point
Apartments in Lafayette, Louisiana. The remaining claims are: (1)
age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) (2) retaliation under the Louisiana Environmental
Whistleblower Act (LEWA) (3) breach of duty to provide a safe work
place pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 23:13; and (4) damages caused by
ruin of building per La. Civ. Code art. 2322.

Age Discrimination Claim

The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of age.

To establish a prima facie case of an ADEA claim, a plaintiff must
show that (1) he was discharged; (2) he was qualified for the
position; (3) he was within the protected class at the time of
discharge; and (4) he was either (i) replaced by someone outside
the protected class, (ii) replaced by someone younger, or (iii)
otherwise discharged because of his age.

Cameron argues that he has established a prima facie case of age
discrimination. The record demonstrates that Cameron was qualified
for the position of maintenance technician. Cameron was within the
protected class, age 56, and he was discharged.

However, Cameron cannot establish the fourth prong of his prima
facie case because the employee he identified as his replacement,
Anthony Trahan, was hired before Cameron's termination. It is
Cameron's belief that Trahan was hired to replace him because
things were going on that they were considering terminating me for.
Cameron's subjective speculation is insufficient to establish that
he was replaced by a significantly younger individual.  

Cameron has also failed to provide competent summary judgment
evidence to demonstrate that he was otherwise discharged because of
age" by establishing that a comparable employee benefited from
disparate treatment under nearly identical circumstances.

Cameron was asked during his deposition whether he believed other
employees were treated better than him or were given preferential
treatment, to which be responded: “Generally, I would say no. I
would say that, you know, I didn't think I—I—they were given
preferential treatment. There were certain instances of people who
would work that, you know, noticeably had it easier than other
people. You know, they weren't assigned, like, dirty jobs and stuff
like that.” This testimony is insufficient to establish disparate
treatment because a comparator has not been identified.

Cameron did provide evidence of alleged comments by an unidentified
maintenance technician who referred to him as grandpa and old man.
However, remarks made by co-workers without authority or influence
over the employment decision are insufficient to defeat summary
judgment of his claim for wrongful termination under the ADEA.  

Accordingly, this Court finds that Cameron has failed to establish
a prima facie case.

Cameron has offered no additional evidence to suggest that
Defendants' proffered reason is false or unworthy of credence.
There is simply insufficient evidence to establish or even suggest
that Cameron's age was the but-for cause of his termination.

Therefore, Cameron's ADEA claim is hereby dismissed.

Breaux also argues that he has established a prima facie case of
discrimination. The record demonstrates that Breaux was qualified
for the position of maintenance technician.  Breaux was within the
protected class, age 56, and he was discharged. However, Breaux has
not established that he was replaced by someone younger, or outside
the protected class, with competent summary judgment evidence.
Breaux alleges that Koateska was hired to replace him, even though
Koateska was hired before his termination. Breaux stated in his
deposition that Koateska told him that he was hired to replace him,
and that Koateska learned of this information directly from
Willoughby.

The Defendants argue that Breaux's account of what Koateska
allegedly stated regarding his employment is rank hearsay and
should not be considered competent summary judgment evidence.
Breaux did not respond to this objection in his opposition brief.
The alleged statement by Koateska is hearsay evidence because
Breaux offers the statement for the truth for which it is asserted.


Accordingly, this statement cannot be considered for purposes of
this motion.

Breaux has also failed to provide competent summary judgment
evidence to demonstrate that he was otherwise discharged because of
his age by establishing that a comparable employee benefited from
disparate treatment under nearly identical circumstances. Breaux
testified that Betsy Primeaux treated him differently than the
other maintenance technicians by placing unnecessary restrictions
upon him, such as telling him not to talk to the other technicians
while the other technicians could talk to each other.

Breaux also testified that Kerri Primeaux treated him differently
by assigning him tasks suitable for an old man by giving him
assignments that were slow while giving harder assignments to the
other technicians. Breaux also testified that Kerri Primeaux
treated him as if he had Alzheimer's or something by repeating
herself to him. Breaux believed Betsy Primeaux and Kerri Primeaux
were trying to make me quit I think, because the treatment didn't
match the behavior. These allegations do not identify a comparator,
nor do they offer a comparison under nearly identical
circumstances.

Accordingly, Breaux's ADEA claim is dismissed.

IBreach of Duty to Provide Safe Workplace

The Louisiana Workers' Compensation statute provides that an
employer is responsible for compensation benefits to an employee
who receives a personal injury by accident arising out of and in
the scope and course of his employment. An employer is also
responsible for every employee who is disabled because of the
contraction of an occupational disease arising out of and in the
course of his employment. An occupational disease is defined as a
disease or illness which is due to causes and conditions
characteristic of and peculiar to the particular trade, occupation,
process, or employment in which the employee is exposed to such
disease.

The Plaintiffs in this case allege injuries consistent with an
occupational disease as defined by La. Rev. Stat. 23:1031.1(B).
Plaintiffs were hired as maintenance technicians, whose primary job
duties included servicing and repairing HVAC systems. Plaintiffs
were also required to perform necessary repairs inside the
apartment units. As part of their duties, the Plaintiffs cleaned
the AC units when requested to do so, and during the cleaning
process the Plaintiffs came into direct contact with mold. Cameron
testified that when he cleaned the AC units he would see mold in
the AC units, including the condenser, evaporator, and drain pans.


Breaux testified that he was required to clean the AC coils to stop
mold from growing.  Breaux also testified that he came into contact
with mold when he was required to do sheetrock work. Cameron
testified that mold was also present in the apartment units around
windows, bathtubs, toilets, and under the linoleum floors. Breaux
testified to the presence of mold in the subfloors and ceilings of
the apartments.  Breaux testified that the maintenance crew
received work orders about water leaks on a daily basis, and orders
related to mold once or twice a week. Cameron also testified that
the maintenance crew received work orders regarding mold in
apartment units.

This Court does not view the degree of the mold encountered to be
dispositive on this issue. Even if the Court were to assume that
all of the Plaintiffs' allegations are indeed true and South
Point's facilities contained excessive mold, there is no right to
relief under La. Rev. Stat. 23:13. The Plaintiffs allege that they
encountered mold during the course of performing their work duties.
Any injury or illness resulting therefrom is squarely within the
realm of Workers' Compensation. The Plaintiffs' sole remedy is to
file a claim for Workers' Compensation. Accordingly, Plaintiffs'
La. Rev. Stat. 23:13 claims against South Point are dismissed.

Ruin of Building Claim

A plaintiff must prove the following elements to hold the owner of
a building liable for damages: (1) ownership of the building; (2)
the owner knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have
known of the ruin or defect; (3) the damage could have been
prevented by the exercise of reasonable care; (4) the defendant
failed to exercise such reasonable care; (5) causation, and (6) the
ruinous building created and unreasonable risk of harm.

The evidence in the record demonstrates that South Point owned the
apartment complex in question. Willoughby testified that South
Point purchased the apartment complex in 1999 or 2000. Because La.
Civ. Code art. 2322 is only applicable to building owners,
Plaintiffs' claims against Jack Stahl and Cheryl Willoughby must be
dismissed.

Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Claim

The Plaintiffs have also asserted claims pursuant to the Louisiana
Environmental Whistleblower Act (LEWA). The LEWA provides in
pertinent part as follows:

   A. No firm, business, private or public corporation,
partnership, individual employer, or federal, state, or local
governmental agency shall act in a retaliatory manner against an
employee, acting in good faith, who does any of the following:

     (1) Discloses, or threatens to disclose, to a supervisor or to
a public body an activity, policy, practice of the employer, or
another employer with whom there is a business relationship, that
the employee reasonably believes is in violation of an
environmental law, rule, or regulation.(2) Provides information to,
or testifies before any public body conducting an investigation,
hearing, or inquiry into any environmental violation by the
employer, or another employer with whom there is a business
relationship, of an environmental law, rule, or regulation.

The five elements required for a cause of action under LEWA are as
follows: (1) employee acts in good faith; (2) employee reports, or
threatens to report a violation; (3) employee reasonably believes
the activity, policy, or practice undertaken by his employer, or
another employer with whom there is a business relationship with
his employer, is a violation of an environmental law; (4) employee
reports or threatens to report the violation to a supervisor or to
a public body of the employer; and (5) employer acts in retaliatory
manner because the employee reported or threatened to report a
violation.

There is no evidence of temporal connection between Cameron's
complaints and his termination. Like Breaux, Cameron also reported
violations to management throughout his tenure with South Point. He
stated that he requested OSHA compliant respirators and reported
Freon issues immediately after he was hired. There is simply
insufficient evidence to establish a causal connection between the
Plaintiffs' protected activity and their termination. As such, this
Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie
case for violations of LEWA.

Even if a prima facie case were established, the Defendants offered
legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the Plaintiffs'
termination. The Defendants assert that Cameron was terminated for
frequent absences and serious performance issues. The Defendants
assert that Breaux was terminated for insubordination in direct
response to his letter regarding the DAR in which he suggested that
Betsy Primeaux was stupid. The uncontested facts surrounding
Breaux's termination stand as uncontroverted.

The burden is shifted back to the Plaintiffs to provide sufficient
evidence to suggest that their protected activity was the but-for
cause of their termination. To avoid summary judgment, the
Plaintiffs must show a conflict in substantial evidence' on the
question of whether the employer would not have taken the action
but-for' the protected activity.

The Plaintiffs have not met this burden. There is no evidence in
the record to suggest that the Plaintiffs' protected activity was
even considered by South Point when their employment was
terminated. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' LEWA claims are
dismissed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 2, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7wugmcs from Leagle.com.

Oray Breaux, Jr, Plaintiff, represented by DeVonn Harry-Joseph
Jarrett, Jarrett Law Group.
Mike Cameron, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Wendell C. Woods,
Law Office of Wendell C Woods & DeVonn Harry-Joseph Jarrett,
Jarrett Law Group.

South Point Operating Associates L P, Rosemont Realty, doing
business as, Jack Stahl Co L L C & Cheryl Willoughby, Defendants,
represented by David K. Theard -- dtheard@joneswalker.com -- Jones
Walker & Thomas P. Hubert -- thubert@joneswalker.com -- Jones
Walker.
South Point Apartments, doing business as, Defendant, represented
by David K. Theard, Jones Walker.


SCAN HEALTH PLAN: Fails to Pay Proper OT, Greenwood Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
LARRY GREENWOOD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SCAN HEALTH PLAN; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. BC715157 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles
Cty., July 25, 2018) seeks to recover from the Defendants unpaid
overtime compensation, meal and rest period premiums, and minimum
wages.

Greenwood was employed by the Defendants as an hourly-paid, and
non-exempt employee from June 2014 to January 2016, in Los Angeles,
California.

SCAN Health Plan, Inc. provides health plans to members in
California. It offers Medicare Advantage Plans, as well as plans
for individuals who are dually eligible for Medicare and Medi-Cal
(D-SNP). The company also offers Healthy At Home (HMO SNP) and
VillageHealth (HMO SNP/HMO POS-SNP) plans. It sells its plans
through brokers and agents. SCAN Health Plan, Inc. was founded in
1977 and is headquartered in Long Beach, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
          LAWYERS FOR JUSICE, PC
          410 West Arden Avenue, Suite 203
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 265-1020
          Facsimile: (818) 265-1021


SECURITY LIFE: Advance Trust Sues over Excessive Cost of Insurance
------------------------------------------------------------------
ADVANCE TRUST & LIFE ESCROW SERVICES, LTA, as securities
intermediary for LIFE PARTNERS POSITION HOLDER TRUST, on behalf of
itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SECURITY
LIFE OF DENVER INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-01897
(D. Colo., July 26, 2018) alleges that the Defendants unlawfully
and excessively charged the Plaintiff for cost of insurance.

According to the complaint, in September 2015, the Defendant sent
letters to policyholders notifying them of significant cost of
insurance increases for the policies. The increase imposed on the
policies was a massive 42%, which is costing the Plaintiff hundreds
of thousands of dollars each year. The Defendant's letters to
policyholders were deliberately cryptic as to the reasons for the
increases, making no mention of mortality experience and stating
only that "[t]he increase in the cost of insurance rates was made
in response to the increase in the anticipated cost of providing
future coverage."

In sum, the Defendant has violated the terms of the policies by
failing to base cost of insurance rates on the projected cost of
insurance. In the face of the substantially improved mortality
experience that has benefited the Defendant enormously, it has not
only failed to reduce cost of insurance rates -- it has increased
them. The Defendant  apparently believes that it has the right to
load cost of insurance rates with profit margins and other
impermissible considerations unrelated to the actual costs of
insurance, despite imposing separate charges for profits and
expenses. As a result of the Defendant's misconduct, the Plaintiff
was being forced to pay unlawful and excessive cost of insurance
charges.

Security Life of Denver Insurance Company provides life and health
insurance products and services for individuals, professionals, and
business owners. The company was formerly known as Security Life
and Accident Company and changed its name to Security Life of
Denver Insurance Company in May 1981. The company was incorporated
in 1928 and is based in Atlanta, Georgia. Security Life of Denver
Insurance Company operates as a subsidiary of Voya Financial, Inc.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Paul H. Schwartz, Esq.
          Jonathan A. Helfgott, Esq.
          SHOEMAKER GHISELLI + SCHWARTZ LLC
          1811 Pearl Street
          Boulder, CO 80302
          Telephone: (303) 530-3452
          E-mail: pschwartz@sgslitigation.com

               - and -

          Steven G. Sklaver, Esq.
          SUSMAN GODFREY LLP
          1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-6029
          Telephone: (310) 789-3100
          Facsimile: (310) 789-3150
          E-mail: ssklaver@susmangodfrey.com

               - and -

          Ryan Kirkpatrick, Esq.
          Seth Ard, Esq.
          SUSMAN GODFREY LLP
          1301 Avenue of the Americas, 32nd Floor
          New York, NY 10019-6023
          Telephone: (212) 336-8330
          Facsimile: (212) 336-8340
          E-mail: rkirkpatrick@susmangodfrey.com
                  sard@susmangodfrey.com

               - and -

          Stephen E. Morrissey, Esq.
          SUSMAN GODFREY LLP
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3800
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 516-3880
          Facsimile: (206) 516-3883
          E-mail: smorrissey@susmangodfrey.com


SECURITY PROS: Underpays Security Guards, Morrison Suit Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
CODY MORRISON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SECURITY PROS PRIVATE SECURITY; WENDAN PS;
and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 18CECG02751
(Cal. Super., Fresno Cty., July 25, 2018) is an action against the
Defendants for failure to provide accurate itemized wage
statements, provide off-duty meal and rest periods, premium pay for
missed breaks, and timely pay wages.

The Plaintiff Morrison was employed by the Defendants as security
guards from March 16, 2018 to May 5, 2018.

Security Pros Private Security is a California corporation engaged
in providing security services in the State of California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William L. Marder, Esq.
          POLARIS LAW GROUP LLP
          501 San Benito Street, Suite 200
          Hollister, CA 95023
          Telephone: (831) 531-4214
          Facsimile: (831) 634-0333

               - and –

          Dennis S. Hyun, Esq.
          HYUN LEGAL, APC
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554


SIMM ASSOCIATES: Court Stays J. Brotz's Suit Pending Mediation
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Orlando Division, stays the case captioned JOYCE LORRAINE
BROTZ, Plaintiff, v. SIMM ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant, Case No.
6:17-cv-1603-Orl-40TBS (M.D. Fla.), pending mediation between the
parties.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 25, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yb7jmxdb from Leagle.com.

Joyce Lorraine Brotz, Individually and on behalf of a class of
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brian W.
Warwick -- bwarwick@varnellandwarwick.com -- Varnell & Warwick, PA,
Donald Edward Petersen, Law Office of Donald E. Petersen & Janet R.
Varnell, Varnell & Warwick, PA.

Simm Associates, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by Dale Thomas Golden -- dgolden@gsgfirm.com -- Golden
Scaz Gagain, PLLC, Graeme E. Hogan -- manlawfirm.com -, Fineman,
Krekstein & Harris, PC, pro hac vice, Joseph C. Proulx
-jproulx@gsgfirm.com -- Golden Scaz Gagain, PLLC & Richard J. Perr
-- rperr@finemanlawfirm.com -- Fineman, Krekstein & Harris, PC, pro
hac vice.


SPRINT CORP: Underpays Operations Specialists, Oliphant Says
------------------------------------------------------------
DAKOTA OLIPHANT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SPRINT CORPORATION; and SPRINT/UNITED
MANAGEMENT COMPANY, Defendants, Case No. 8:18-cv-00353-JMG-MDN (D.
Neb., July 24, 2018) alleges that the Defendants failed to pay
overtime compensation and the regular pay for actual hours worked
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Oliphant was employed by the Defendants as operations
specialist from August 2017 to April 1, 2018.

Sprint Corporation, together with its subsidiaries, provides
various wireless and wireline communications products and services
to consumers, businesses, government subscribers, and resellers in
the United States, Puerto Rico, and the United States Virgin
Islands. Sprint Corporation offers its services under the Sprint,
Boost Mobile, Virgin Mobile, and Assurance Wireless brands. The
company was founded in 1899 and is headquartered in Overland Park,
Kansas. Sprint Corporation is a subsidiary of SoftBank Group Corp.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William B. Zastera, Esq.
          Aimee L. Lowe, Esq.
          VANDENACK WEAVER LLC
          17007 Marcy Street, Suite 3
          Omaha, NE 68118
          Telephone: (402) 504-1935
          E-mail: wzastera@vwattys.com
                  alowe@vwattys.com


SSF IMPORTED: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Lopez Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------
JOSE M. LOPEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SSF IMPORTED AUTO PARTS, LLC; and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, Case No. BC715154 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles
Cty., July 24, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for
failure to pay overtime wages at the correct rate, minimum wage,
provide proper wage statements, provide meal and rest periods, and
timely pay final wages at termination.

Mr. Lopez was employed by the Defendants as warehouse employee from
November 16, 2017 to June 13, 2018.

SSF Imported Auto Parts LLC distributes auto replacement parts to
the European automotive repair industry. It also serves customers
via online. The company was founded in 1976 and is based in South
San Francisco, California with warehouses in San Francisco, Carson,
Irvine, Los Angeles, and San Diego, California; and Phoenix,
Arizona. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kane Moon, Esq.
          Justin F. Marquez, Esq.
          Allen Feghali, Esq.
          MOON & YANG, APC
          1055 W. Seventh St., Suite 1880
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 232-3128
          Facsimile: (213) 232-3125
          E-mail: kane.moon@moonyanglaw.com
                  justin.marquez@moonyanglaw.com
                  allen.feghali@moonyanglaw.com


SUKAR AND SONS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Ramirez Suit Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
ABBY RAMIREZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SUKAR AND SONS OF CALIFORNIA; SUGAR AND SONS
OF CALIFORNIA, INC.; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No.
BC715061 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., July 25, 2018) is an
action against the Defendants for failure to pay minimum wages,
overtime compensation, authorize and permit meal and rest periods,
provide accurate wage statements, and reimburse necessary business
expenses.

The Plaintiff Ramirez was employed by the Defendants as non-exempt
employee in California.

Sukar & Sons Inc was founded in 1986. The company's line of
business includes the wholesale distribution of groceries and
related products. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andranik Tsarukyan, Esq.
          Armen Zenjiryan, Esq.
          REMEDY LAW GROUP LLP
          610 E. Providencia Ave., Unit B
          Burbank, CA 91501
          Telephone: (818) 422-5941
          E-mail: Andy.Tsarukyan@remedylawgroup.com
                  Armen.Zenjiryan@remedylawgroup.com


SUNTEC CONCRETE: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Enriquez Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
CESAR ENRIQUEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SUNTEC CONCRETE, INC., and DOES 1 through
100, Defendants, Case No. 37-2018-00037091-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super.,
San Diego Cty., July 24, 2018) is an action against the Defendants
for unpaid regular hours, overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for
missed meal and rest periods.

Mr. Enriquez was employed by the Defendants as a non-exempt
employee from August 21, 2017 to September 17, 2017.

Suntec Concrete, Inc., a concrete construction company, produces
concrete surfaces in Arizona. The company specializes in
structural, tilt panel, flatwork, and foundation construction.
Suntec Concrete, Inc. was founded in 1984 and is based in Phoenix,
Arizona. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Paul K. Haines, Esq.
          Tuvia Korobkin, Esq.
          Stacey M. Shim, Esq.
          Jamin Xu, Esq.
          HAINES LAW GROUP, APC
          222 N. Sepulveda Blvd., Suite 1550
          El Segundo, CA 90245
          Telephone: (424) 292-2350
          Facsimile: (424) 292-2355
          E-mail: phaines@haineslawgroup.com
                  tkorobkin@haineslawgroup.com
                  sshim@haineslawgroup.com
                  jxu@haineslawgroup.com


T-MOBILE USA: Jan. 17 Hearing on Class Certification Motion
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., of the U.S. Court for the Northern
District of California granted the parties' Joint Stipulation to
Continue Case Deadlines in the case, JESSE BLACK, individually, and
on behalf of other members of the general public similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. T-MOBILE USA, INC., a Delaware corporation;
and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
4:17-cv-04151 (N.D. Cal.).

He ordered as follows:

      i. Deadline to participate in private mediation - Aug. 30,
2018

      ii. Completion of precertification fact discovery - Oct. 1,
2018

      iii. Precertification expert disclosure deadline - Oct. 1,
2018

      iv. Deadline to file Class Certification Motion - Oct. 10,
2018

      v. Deadline to file Opposition to Class Certification - Nov.
26, 2018

      vi. Motion Completion of precertification expert discovery -
Dec. 12, 2018

      vii. Deadline to file Reply to Class Certification Motion -
Dec. 19, 2018

      viii. Hearing on Class Certification Motion - Jan. 17, 2019

No dates for trial and dipositive motions will currently be set.
The Parties will meet and confer and submit a further proposed
scheduling order within 30 days of a ruling on the Plaintiff's
Motion for Class Certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2018 Scheduling Order is
available at https://is.gd/LEmKlN from Leagle.com.

Jesse Black, Plaintiff, represented by Arnab Banerjee --
Arnab.Banerjee@capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone Law APC.

T-Mobile USA, Inc, Defendant, represented by Gregory G. Iskander --
giskander@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C., Keith Adam Jacoby
-- kjacoby@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, Sophia Behnia --
sbehnia@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C. & Perry Kim Miska --
pmiska@littler.com -- Jr., Littler Mendelson, P.C.


TAMKO BUILDING: Loses Bid to Dismiss J. Snyder's Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
JEFFREY SNYDER, MARTIN and BETH MELNICK, LIA LOUTHAN, and
SUMMERFIELD GARDENS CONDOMINIUM on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TAMKO BUILDING PRODUCTS,
INC., a Missouri Corporation, Defendant, No. 1:15-cv-01892-TLN-KJN
(E.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs allege the shingles are plagued by design and/or
manufacturing flaws that result in the shingles generally
deteriorating and leaking. The Plaintiffs allege the Defendant
represented its shingles as durable, reliable and free from defects
on its website, and advertised that its shingles meet certain
industry standards.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) permits a party to move
for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction before pleading if
a responsive pleading is allowed.

The Defendant argues its contacts with California are not
sufficient to render it at home in the state, as required for
general jurisdiction, nor do those contacts give rise to the
Challenged Plaintiffs' claims, as required for specific
jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs argue the Defendant waived this
defense because the Defendant earlier filed motions to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and did not assert
a 12(b)(2) defense in the earlier motions as required.

The Defendant could have asserted the defense in this Court at the
time the Defendant filed its 12(b)(6) motions. The Defendant could
have preserved the defense in its responsive pleading or initial
motions and alerted the Court to the pending decision in
Bristol-Myers. Sloan, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 855; Alvarez v. NBTY,
Inc., 2017 WL 6059159, at 5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 06, 2017). The
Defendant did neither and waived the defense.

The Defendant's citation to Gucci America does not support its
argument. In Gucci America,controlling precedent from the Second
Circuit barred nonparty Bank of China from challenging personal
jurisdiction. Gucci America, 768 F.3d at 136. The Supreme Court
decided Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) during the
pendency of Gucci America, and the holding in Daimler was directly
contrary to the prior Second Circuit precedent. Bank of China was
only able to challenge personal jurisdiction after the Supreme
Court's decision in Daimler.

The Supreme Court's decision in Bristol-Myers does not represent a
change in law or creation of new law that made the 12(b)(2) defense
available to Defendant as the Daimler decision did for Bank of
China in the Second Circuit. The absence of Ninth Circuit precedent
did not prevent Defendant from timely challenging personal
jurisdiction in its initial motion to dismiss or responsive
pleadings. Accordingly, the Court denies the Defendant's motion.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 2, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yadrfsh5 from Leagle.com.

Jeffrey Snyder, Martin Melnick & Beth Melnick, Plaintiffs,
represented by Charles E. Schaffer -- cschaffer@lfsblaw.com --
Levin Sedran & Berman, pro hac vice, Jacob M. Polakoff --
jpolakoff@bm.net -- Berger and Montague, pro hac vice,Lawrence
Deutsch -- ldeutsch@bm.net -- Berger and Montague, pro hac vice,
Richard Norman Sieving -- rsieving@sievinglawfirm.com -- The
Sieving Law Firm A.P.C., Shanon J. Carson -- scarson@bm.net --
Berger and Montague, pro hac vice & Luke Gabriel Pears-Dickson,
Sieving Law Firm, APC.

Lia Louthan & Summerfield Gardens Condominium, Plaintiffs,
represented by Charles E. Schaffer, Levin Sedran & Berman, pro hac
vice, Jacob M. Polakoff  -lpearsdickson@sievinglawfirm.com --
Berger and Montague, pro hac vice & Richard Norman Sieving, The
Sieving Law Firm A.P.C.

Tamko Building Products, Inc., Defendant, represented by Charles
Stephen Painter, Ericksen Arbuthnot, Jessica D. Miller –
jessica.miller@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom,
LLP, pro hac vice, John H. Beisner – john.beisner@skadden.com --
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom,LLP & Richard T. Bernardo –
richard.bernardo@skadden.com -- Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom,
LLP, pro hac vice.


TEXAS GUARANTEED: Berumen Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections
-----------------------------------------------------------
MARIA BERUMEN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TEXAS GUARANTEED STUDENT LOAN CORPORATION
d/b/a TRELLIS COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 5:18-cv-00738 (W.D.
Tex., July 17, 2018) seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and
unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Texas Guaranteed Student Loan Corporation operates as a non-profit
corporation. The Company promotes educational access and offers low
interest loans to serve students and their parents pay for
education beyond high school. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William M. Clanton, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF BILL CLANTON, P.C.
          926 Chulie Dr.
          San Antonio, TX 78216
          Telephone: (210) 226-0800
          Facsimile: (210) 338 8660
          E-mail: bill@clantonlawoffice.com

               - and -

          Benjamin R. Bingham, Esq.
          BINGHAM & LEA, P.C.
          319 Maverick Street
          San Antonio, Texas 78212
          Telephone: (210) 224-1819
          Facsimile: (210) 224-0141
          E-mail: ben@binghamandlea.com


TOLL GLOBAL: Court Dismisses C. Marquez's Wage & Hour Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
CARLOS MARQUEZ, an individual, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TOLL GLOBAL FORWARDING (USA)
INC., a New York corporation; TGF MANAGEMENT GROUP HOLDCO, INC., a
New Jersey corporation; INSPERITY EXPENSE MANAGEMENT, INC., a Texas
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-03054-ODW (ASx)(C.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff filed his Complaint alleging seven causes of action:
(1) Recovery of Unpaid Minimum Wage and Overtime; (2) Meal Period
Violations; (3) Rest Period Violations; (4) Unpaid Wages During
Employment; (5) Failure to Pay Wages Due at Separation of
Employment; (6) Failure to Issue Accurate Itemized Wage Statements;
and (7) Unfair Business Practices.

Plaintiff's First Cause of Action: Failure to Pay All Wages
(Overtime)

The Plaintiff alleges that the Plaintiff Class worked hours in
excess of eight hours per day and forty hours per week, for which
they were not paid the overtime guaranteed under the Cal. Labor
Code. Overtime provisions are covered in Section 510 of the Cal.
Labor Code. The CBAs expressly provide for each of these in the
following articles: wages hours working conditions, premium wages
and regular wage great than minimum. The Court finds that all
requirements of Section 514 are met, and the Plaintiff's overtime
claim is statutorily barred.  Therefore, Plaintiff's first cause of
action must be dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff's Second and Third Causes of Action: Meal and Rest Break
Violations

The Plaintiff alleges the Defendants scheduled employees in a way
that failed to reasonably ensure they could take meal breaks, and
failed to implement a relief system so that they could take rest
breaks. Therefore, adjudication of these claims will require
analysis of the Defendants' scheduling policies, combined with
analysis of what it means under the CBA to permit an employee to
take a break. Namely the question will hinge on how exactly the
defendants' policies prevented employees from taking the breaks
they were permitted. Additionally, the same provision of the CBA
provides: Employees may not leave a load unattended to take a meal
or rest break. The Defendants argue that deciding the Plaintiff's
claims will require interpretation of what a load is, what it means
to leave a load and what unattended means. In both instances,
addressing the issue will require more than merely applying the
terms of the CBA. It will require interpretation, and the parties
will likely dispute the meaning of these terms.

Because the Plaintiff's meal and rest break claims require analysis
of the CBA, they are preempted under Section 301 of the LMRA.
Additionally, the Plaintiff has not pleaded that he has exhausted
the grievance procedures stipulated by the CBA. The Plaintiff does
not assert that he made any attempt to exhaust the grievance or
arbitration procedures in the CBA. Instead, he argues that he was
not required to exhaust such claims, because his claims do not
require interpretation of the CBA.

The Court disagrees with the Plaintiff on this point and finds that
he was required to exhaust the grievance procedures under the CBA.
Therefore, the Court finds that granting the Plaintiff leave to
amend to plead exhaustion would be futile and dismisses with
prejudice the Plaintiff's second and third causes of action.

Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action: Failure to Pay Timely Wages
During Employment

The remedy for violations of Section 204 is stated in Section
210(b), which grants the state labor commissioner, not individual
plaintiffs, the ability to seek remedies. Therefore the Plaintiff's
fourth cause of action is not based on a cognizable legal theory,
and the Court dismisses it with prejudice.

Plaintiff's Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action: Failure to
Pay Wages of Terminated or Resigned Employees, Failure to Keep
Accurate Payroll Records, Unfair Competition

This claim is clearly derivative of the Plaintiff's second and
third causes of action. Finally in his seventh cause of action, the
Plaintiff alleges that "Among other things, the acts and practices
(of the Defendants') have forced [Plaintiff Class] to labor for
many hours in a row without receiving the meal and rest periods and
overtime compensation to which they are entitled by law.”  The
Plaintiff provides no factual allegations related to the "other
things" that could form the basis for his claim, therefore he has
not stated a claim for this cause of action that is not derivative
of his overtime and meal and rest break claims. As the Plaintiff's
first three causes of action are pre-empted or statutorily barred,
the Court dismisses with prejudice the Plaintiff's Fifth, Sixth,
and Seventh causes of Action.

Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion is granted and the Plaintiff's
claims are dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 28, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7sx7ayu from Leagle.com.

Carlos Marquez, an individual and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin Mahoney  --
kmahoney@mahoney-law.net -- Mahoney Law Group APC & George Bernard
Singer -- gsinger@mahoney-law,net -- Mahoney Law Group.
Toll Global Forwarding USA Inc., a corporation, Defendant,
represented by Eric E. Hill, Seyfarth Shaw LLP.

TGF Management Group Holdco, Inc., a corporation & Insperity PEO
Services, L.P., Erroneously Sued As, Defendants, represented by
Eric E. Hill, Seyfarth Shaw LLP & William J. Dritsas, Seyfarth Shaw
LLP.


TRAVELERS PROPERTY: Removes Anheuser Busch Suit to E.D. Missouri
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendants in the case of Anheuser Busch Employee Credit Union,
Plaintiff v. Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, and
The Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company, Defendants, filed a notice
to remove the lawsuit from the Circuit Court of the State of
Missouri, City of St. Louis (Case No. 1822-CC10769) to the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on July 23,
2018, and assigned Case No. Case No. 4:18-cv-01208-CDP (E.D. Mo.,
July 23, 2018). The case is assigned to District Judge Catherine D.
Perry.

The Travelers Property Casualty Company of America offers property
and casualty insurance products and services. It was formerly known
as The Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois, Inc. and changed
its name to The Travelers Property Casualty Company of America in
December 2003. The company was incorporated in 1971 and is based in
Hartford, Connecticut. The Travelers Property Casualty Company of
America operates as a subsidiary of The Phoenix Insurance Company.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David Eric Larson, Esq.
          MARTIN PRINGLE
          9401 Indian Creek Pkwy., Suite 1150
          Overland Park, KS 66210
          Telephone: (913) 491-5500
          Facsimile: (913) 491-3341
          E-mail: delarson@martinpringle.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Jonathan Ryan Shulan, Esq.
          ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP
          7700 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1800
          St. Louis, MO 63105
          Telephone:(314) 621-5070
          Facsimile: (314) 621-5065
          E-mail: jshulan@armstrongteasdale.com

               - and -

          Patrick J. Kenny, Esq.
          ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP
          7700 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1800
          St. Louis, MO 63105
          Telephone: (314) 621-5070
          Facsimile: (314) 612-2262
          E-mail: pkenny@armstrongteasdale.com


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Bollinger Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
SHELTON BOLLINGER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-04538 (N.D. Cal., July 26, 2018) seeks
to stop the Defendants' practice of making unsolicited calls.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendant
intentionally or willfully caused autodialed text messages to be
sent to the cellular phones of the Plaintiff and other consumers
without their prior express consent.

Uber Technologies, Inc. develops, markets, and operates a
ridesharing mobile application which allows consumers to submit a
trip request, which is routed to crowd-sourced partner drivers. The
company was formerly known as UberCab Inc. and changed its name to
Uber Technologies, Inc. in October 2010. Uber Technologies, Inc.
was founded in 2008 and is based in San Francisco, California, with
an engineering center in Bengaluru, India and a regional office in
Singapore. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel C. Girard, Esq.
          Angelica M. Ornelas, Esq.
          Simon S. Grille, Esq.
          GIRARD GIBBS LLP
          601 California Street, Suite 1400
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 981-4800
          Facsimile: (415) 981-4800
          E-mail: dcg@girardgibbs.com
                  amo@girardgibbs.com
                  sg@girardgibbs.com


UNITED AIRLINES: Fails to Provide Meal & Rest Period, Medina Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE MEDINA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.; and DOES 1 through
100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. BC715062 (Cal. Super., Los
Angeles Cty., July 25, 2018) is an action against the Defendants
for failure to provide proper meal and rest periods, and keep
accurate records.

Mr. Medina was employed by the Defendants as mechanic.

United Airlines, Inc. provides air transportation services in North
America, the Asia-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, and Latin
America. The company was founded in 1934 and is headquartered in
Chicago, Illinois.  United Airlines is a subsidiary of United
Continental Holdings, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Larry W. Lee, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554
          E-mail: lwlee@diversitylaw.com

               - and –

          Edward W. Choi, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF CHOI & ASSOCIATES
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 381-1515
          Facsimile: (213) 465-4885
          E-mail: Edward.choi@choiandassociates.com

               - and –

          William L. Marder, Esq.
          POLARIS LAW GROUP
          501 San Benito Street, Suite 200
          Hollister, CA 95023
          Telephone: (831) 531-4214
          Facsimile: (831) 634-0333


US ENVIRONMENTAL: Court Narrows Claims in B. Formica's FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Timothy J. Savage of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania dismissed the claims for breach of
contract and unjust enrichment in the case, BRENT FORMICA,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly-Situated, v. US
ENVIRONMENTAL INC., Civil Action No. 18-459. (E.D. Pa.).

Formica brings the collective and class action against his
employer, US Environmental, seeking relief under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") and Pennsylvania law.  From January 2017 to
September 2017, Formica worked for US Environmental as a field
service technician, cleaning oilfield tanks at various job sites.
He claims he was not paid for all time worked and for overtime at
time-and-a-half.  

Specifically, he alleges he was not compensated for the time spent
while travelling on the job and for meal periods when he remained
on duty.  He contends that these times should have been included in
the hours worked for the purpose of calculating overtime.  In
addition to bringing these claims under the FLSA, the Pennsylvania
Minimum Wage Act of 1968, and the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and
Collection Law, he asserts state common law claims for breach of
contract and unjust enrichment.

US Environmental moves to dismiss the latter two claims, arguing
they are preempted by the FLSA because they are duplicative of the
FLSA claim.

Judge Savage finds that Formica's breach of contract and unjust
enrichment claims are based on the same facts as his FLSA claim,
which requires US Environmental to pay him for all hours worked.
Because the FLSA provides a remedy for all of Formica's claims, his
common law claims are preempted.  Therefore, he granted the motion,
and dismissed the claims for breach of contract and unjust
enrichment.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2018 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/VF66J4 from Leagle.com.

BRENT FORMICA, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY-SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by KEVIN I. LOVITZ --
kevin@lovitzlaw.com -- LOVITZ LAW FIRM, P.C., PHILIP BOHRER --
phil@bohrerbrady.com -- BOHRER BRADY, LLC & SCOTT E. BRADY --
scott@bohrerbrady.com -- BOHRER BRADY, LLC.

US ENVIRONMENTAL, INC., Defendant, represented by BRIAN P. SHIRE --
shire@swbcounsellors.com -- SUSANIN WIDMAN BRENNAN PC & BRIAN W.
WAERIG -- bwaerig@swbcounsellors.com -- SUSANIN WIDMAN & BRENNAN
PC.


WELLS FARGO: Allen Appeals Order and Judgment to 8th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Francesca Allen, John Sterling Ross and Mary Lou Shank
filed an appeal from the District Court's order filed on July 19,
2018, and judgment filed July 20, 2018, in their lawsuit titled
Francesca Allen, et al. v. Wells Fargo & Company, et al., Case No.
0:16-cv-03405-PJS, in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Minnesota.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on August 20, 2018, the
District Court granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
Plaintiffs' second amended complaint.

The Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), against Wells Fargo and corporate
insiders, who served as fiduciaries of their 401(k) plan.  The
Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants violated two distinct duties
under ERISA, the duty of prudence and the duty of loyalty, by
failing to disclose Wells Fargo's unethical sales practices.

The appellate case is captioned as Francesca Allen, et al. v. Wells
Fargo & Company, et al., Case No. 18-2781, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript is due on or before October 1, 2018;

   -- Appendix is due on October 9, 2018;

   -- Brief of Appellants Francesca Allen, John Sterling  
       Ross and Mary Lou Shank is due on October 9, 2018;

   -- Appellee brief is due 30 days from the date the court
      issues the Notice of Docket Activity filing the brief     
      of appellant; and

   -- Appellant reply brief is due 14 days from the date the
      court issues the Notice of Docket Activity filing the
      appellee brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Francesca Allen, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated and on behalf of the Wells Fargo &
Company 401(k) Plan; John Sterling Ross, and all other individuals
similarly situated; and Mary Lou Shank are represented by:

          Carolyn G. Anderson, Esq.
          June Pineda Hoidal, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN REED, PLLP
          1100 IDS Center
          80 S. Eighth Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402-4123
          Telephone: (612) 341-0400
          E-mail: carolyn.anderson@zimmreed.com
                  june.hoidal@zimmreed.com

               - and -

          Richard M. Elias, Esq.
          Greg G. Gutzler, Esq.
          Tamara M. Spicer, Esq.
          ELIAS GUTZLER SPICER LLC
          130 S. Bemiston Avenue, Suite 302
          Saint Louis, MO 63105
          Telephone: (314) 637-6350
          E-mail: relias@egslitigation.com
                  ggutzler@egslitigation.com
                  tspicer@egslitigation.com

               - and -

          Michael Brian Ershowsky, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP
          30 Broad Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 363-7500
          E-mail: mershowsky@zlk.com

               - and -

          Daniel R. Ferri, Esq.
          Amy Elisabeth Keller, Esq.
          Adam Levitt, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT & CASEY LLC
          10 N. Dearborn Street, Eleventh Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 214-7900
          E-mail: dferri@dlcfirm.com
                  akller@dlcfirm.com
                  alevitt@gelaw.com

               - and -

         Wilson Daniel Miles, III, Esq.
         BEASLEY, ALLEN, CROW, METHVIN, PORTIS & MILES, P.C.
         218 Commerce Street
         P.O. Box 4160
         Montgomery, AL 36103-4160
         Telephone: (334) 269-2343
         E-mail: Dee.Miles@beasleyallen.com

               - and -

          Douglas J. Nill, Esq.
          NILL, PLLC
          120 S. Sixth Street, Suite 2050
          Minneapolis, MN 55402-1801
          Telephone: (612) 573-3669
          E-mail: dnill@farmlaw.com

               - and -

          Rebecca A. Peterson, Esq.
          Robert K. Shelquist, Esq.
          LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN PLLP
          100 Washington Avenue, S., Suite 2200
          Minneapolis, MN 55401-0000
          Telephone: (612) 339-6900
          E-mail: rapeterson@locklaw.com
                  rkshelquist@locklaw.com

Defendants-Appellees Wells Fargo & Company, Wells Fargo Bank NA,
Wells Fargo Director of Human Resources, Wells Fargo Director of
Compensation and Benefits, Wells Fargo Employee Benefits Review
Committee, Lloyd H. Dean, Susan E. Engel, Donald M. James, Stephen
W. Sanger, John Does 1-30, John G. Stumpf, Hope A. Hardison, Justin
C. Thornton, Greatbane Trust Company, John Does, Richard Roes, Hope
Hardison, Timothy J. Sloan, David A. Hoyt, Michael J. Heid, Frank
Codel, Justin C. Thornton, John Shrewsberry, Kevin Oden, Patricia
Callahan, Stanhope Kelly, Dawn Martin Harp, Suzanne Ramos, James
Steiner, George Wick and Martin Davis are represented by:

          Nicholas J. Bullard, Esq.
          Stephen P. Lucke, Esq.
          Kirsten Schubert, Esq.
          DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
          50 S. Sixth Street, Suite 1500
          Minneapolis, MN 55402-1498
          Telephone: (612) 340-2600
          E-mail: bullard.nick@dorsey.com
                  lucke.steve@dorsey.com
                  schubert.kirsten@dorsey.com

               - and -

          Madeline Chimento Rea, Esq.
          Lindsey H. Chopin, Esq.
          Joseph Emanuel Clark, Esq.
          Howard Shapiro, Esq.
          PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
          650 Poydras Street, Suite 1800
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 310-4085
          E-mail: mrea@proskauer.com
                  lchopin@proskauer.com
                  jclark@proskauer.com
                  howshapiro@proskauer.com

               - and -

          Russell Laurence Hirschhorn, Esq.
          PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
          11 Times Square
          New York, NY 10036-2899
          Telephone: (212) 969-3000
          E-mail: bullard.nick@dorsey.com


WELLS FARGO: Court OKs Amendments to V. Fowler's Complaint
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, Oakland Division, granted the Stipulated Amendments to
the Complaint in the case captioned VANA FOWLER, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated Plaintiff, v. WELLS
FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendant, Case No. 4:17-cv-02092-HSG (N.D.
Cal.).

The Complaint originally alleged causes of action for violation of
California Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq. and
a California class.

Wells Fargo moved to dismiss the Complaint and the Court granted in
part and denied in part Wells Fargo's motion.

The Parties reached a nationwide settlement which they are
presenting concurrently with the submission of this Joint
Stipulation to Conditionally Amend the Complaint for Settlement
Purposes.

The Parties have agreed to stipulate to the filing of an amended
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 15(a)(2), subject to the Court's
approval, as follows:

   1. Upon entry of the Order granting this Joint Stipulation, the
Plaintiff will be permitted to amend her Complaint to conform to
the terms of the proposed settlement as follows: (1) add Michael
Peters as a plaintiff pursuant to Federal Rules 15 and 24; (2)
allege a cause of action for breach of contract; and (3) amend the
class definition to allege a nationwide class.

   2. Upon the entry of the Order granting this Joint Stipulation,
the First Amended Complaint will be deemed filed and served. The
Defendant's previously filed Answer to the Plaintiff's Complaint
will be deemed as Defendant's Answer to Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint.

   3. This agreement will remain in effect only if the settlement
becomes final, which means that neither party has voided the
settlement, the settlement is approved by the Court, and the
judgment becomes final, in that all dates for appeal have passed
and no successful appeal challenging the judgment has occurred. If,
for some reason, the settlement does not become final, then this
agreement and this amendment to the complaint shall be deemed null
and void, the operative complaint in this action will be the
Complaint, and the Parties will be returned to their status as of
the date of this filing without prejudice to any claim, right, or
defense.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 28, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8dd2zhc from Leagle.com.

Vana Fowler, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Lewis Hoipkemier, Epps,
Holloway, DeLoach and Hoipkemier, LLC, pro hac vice, Kevin Epps,
EHDH, LLC, pro hac vice, Michael Francis Ram --
MRam@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan LLP, Jeffrey William
DeLoach, Epps, Holloway, DeLoach and Hoipkemier, LLC, Samuel Joseph
Strauss -- sam@turkestrauss.com -- Turke and Strauss LLP & Susan S.
Brown -- sbrown@robinskaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan LLP.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Defendant, represented by David S. Reidy --
dreidy@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, K. Issac deVyver --
kdevyver@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, pro hac vice, Karla
Lynn Johnson -- kjohnson@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP &
Sara F. Holladay-Tobias -- stobias@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods
LLP, pro hac vice.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Copyright 2018. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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