CAR_Public/180828.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, August 28, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 172

                            Headlines

3D SYSTEMS: Time to Appeal KBC Case Settlement Approval Expires
ABBVIE INC: Has 596 Product Liability Claims on Depakote Risks
ABBVIE INC: Medical Mutual's TRT Class Lawsuit Still Ongoing
ABBVIE INC: Putative Class Suit by Rubinstein, et al. Pending
ABBVIE INC: Still Faces TRT-Related Claims in Various State Courts

ADVANCED DISPOSAL: Still Defends Class Suits over Improper Fees
AIMCO/BETHESDA HOLDINGS: Winters Suit Removed to S.D. Calif.
ALARM.COM HOLDINGS: Bid to Drop Fisher Class Action Pending
ALARM.COM HOLDINGS: Expects TCPA Class Suit Trial in October 2018
ALL YEAR MANAGEMENT: Fischler Files Suit in N.Y. for ADA Violation

AMC ENTERTAINMENT: Still Defends Combined Securities Class Suits
AMERIGAS PARTNERS: Still Defends Antitrust Class Action Lawsuits
ANDEAVOR: Still Defends 6 Class Suits over MPC Merger Pact
ANTARES PHARMA: Court Appoints Serghei Lungu as Lead Plaintiff
ARROWHEAD PHARMACEUTICALS: Appeal Pending in Drug Research Suit

AVANOS MEDICAL: 9th Cir. Appeal in Bahamas Surgery Case Pending
AVANOS MEDICAL: Still Defends Jackson Class Action
BAUSCH  HEALTH: Accord in Allergan Suits Gets Final Court Approval
BAUSCH HEALTH: Accord in Solodyn(R) Antitrust Suit Has Final Okay
BAUSCH HEALTH: Appeal from Class Status in Quebec Suit Pending

BAUSCH HEALTH: Appeal from Nixed Class Status Bid Still Pending
BAUSCH HEALTH: Consolidated RICO Class Action Remains Stayed
BAUSCH HEALTH: Contact Lens Antitrust Class Action Underway
BAUSCH HEALTH: Continues to Defend Canadian Securities Lawsuits
BAUSCH HEALTH: Defends Securities Suits by 27 Investor Groups

BAUSCH HEALTH: Nov 4 Class Status Hearing in British Columbia Case
BAUSCH HEALTH: Timber Hill Securities Suit Consolidated
BBVA COMPASS: Appeal in Plains All American Securities Suit Ongoing
BBVA COMPASS: BSI Dismissed as Defendant in Teachers' Plan Lawsuit
BBVA COMPASS: BSI Still Faces Suit by Firefighters' Pension Trust

BBVA COMPASS: In Settlement Talks for Bellissimo TCPA Class Suit
BBVA COMPASS: Still Defends Hossfeld Suit over TCPA Violations
BBVA COMPASS: Still Defends Lopez Class Suit on Overdraft Fees
BBVA COMPASS: Still Defends Oklahoma Firefighters' Class Lawsuit
BELLICUM PHARMA: Bid for Lead Plaintiff & Counsel Still Pending

BEST BUY: Filing of 2nd Amended IBEW Securities Suit Denied
BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD: Court Dismisses HIV/AIDS Patient's ADA Suit
BRIGHTHOUSE FINANCIAL: Faces Roycroft Group Annuity Class Suit
CA INC: Faces Putative Class Action over Broadcom Merger Pact
CAPSTONE TURBINE: Sept. 24 Mediation in Securities Class Suit

CAVOTEC SA: Cal. App. Reverses Bid for Judgment Denial in "Colaco"
CHSPSC LLC: Wins Summary Judgment in S. Sutton's FLSA Suit
CITIZENS INC: Time to Appeal Gamboa Case Dismissal Expires
CIVITAS SOLUTIONS: Employee Class Actions Remain Pending
CKO KICKBOXING: Diaz Files ADA Suit in S.D.N.Y.

CLIENT SERVICES: Yusifov Sues Over FDCPA Breach
COHU INC: Putative Shareholder Class Suits v. Xcerra Underway
COLE HAAN: Court Partly Dismisses K. Park's FTCA Suit
DELL TECHNOLOGIES: Still Defends Pontiac Securities Suit in N.Y.
DUKE ENERGY: DCC/Preemption Claims Dismissal Affirmed

EBIX INC: Court Certifies Stockholder Class
EDGE FITNESS: Court Conditionally Certifies MAs' Class
EHEALTH INC: Defends Putative Class Suit on Alleged TCPA Breaches
EQUIFAX INFORMATION: "Lemmon" Class Cert. Deadlines Moved
FCA US: Court Narrows Claims in Suit Over Flawed Uconnect System

FCA US: Final Pretrial Conference in "Victorino" Cont. to Aug. 31
FELDSOTT LEE: Violates Fair Debt Collection Act, Hedayati Claims
FINANCIAL TRUST: Faces Gerber Class Suit in S.D. New York
FLORIDA: Ct. Denies Judgment on Pleadings in Inmate Transport Suit
FLUOR CORP: Court Certifies VC Summer Workers' Class

FRESNO COMMUNITY: "Solario" Class Certification Denial Reversed
GC SERVICES: 6th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of FDCPA Suit
GIGAMON INC: J. Rodriguez's Securities Fraud Suit Dismissed
GREYHOUND LINES: Hearings on Dismissal Bid in "Smith" Moved
HANDI-HOUSE MFG: Court Denies Bid for Sanctions in Workers' Suit

HANESBRANDS INC: Sued by Diaz Over ADA Violation
HENRY COUNTY, IN: Objections to June 1 Order in "Baker" Overruled
HENRY SCHEIN: Bid for Class Status Pending in Dental Supplies Suit
HENRY SCHEIN: Still Defends Marion Diagnostic Lawsuit in Illinois
HENRY SCHEIN: Still Defends Securities Class Action in E.D.N.Y.

HERTZ GLOBAL: Still Defends Ramirez's Shareholder Class Action
HEWLETT PACKARD: "Enoh" Employment Discrimination Suit Dismissed
HSBC USA: "Nypl" Putative Class Action Still Pending in S.D.N.Y.
HSBC USA: 2nd Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Allen Class Action
HSBC USA: Bid to Nix Suit over Canadian Dealer Offered Rate Pending

HSBC USA: Faces Vasquez Class Action over Ponzi Scheme
HSBC USA: FX Antitrust Suit Settlement Awaits Final Court OK
HSBC USA: Still Defends Mortgage Securitization Trust Litigation
HSBC USA: Still Faces Contant Putative Class Action in S.D.N.Y.
HUSKY ENERGY: Faces Bruzek Class Suit in W.D. Wisconsin

JACOBY & MEYERS: Court Grants Bid to Amend N. Harding's Suit
KAG WEST: P. Malone's Suit Remanded to State Court
KRG JCS: Faces Blancher's Wage-and-Hour Suit
MAGICJACK VOCALTEC: Bid to Drop Freedman Lawsuit Still Pending
MAGICJACK VOCALTEC: Martinez & Lopez Sue over Robocalls

MARATHON PETROLEUM: Defends 6 Class Suits over Andeavor Merger
MASSACHUSETTS: Court Allows A. Burnham to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
MDL 1720: HSBC Reaches Settlement in Credit Card Lawsuit
MDL 2084: Court Denies Class Status in AndroGel Antitrust Case
MDL 2460: AbbVie Still Faces 2 Consolidated Suits on Niaspan Deal

MONARCH RECOVERY: Faces Gould Suit Over FDCPA Violation
MONEYGRAM PAYMENT: Faces Diaz ADA Suit in New York
MONITRONICS INT'L: Telemarketing Suit Settlement Awaits Final OK
NANTKWEST INC: Still Defends Sudunagunta Securities Class Action
NASSAU COUNTY, NY: Court Won't Dismiss S. Lopez's Strip Search Suit

NEW YORK: Ct. Approves Settlement in Public-School Bullying Suit
NEWLINK GENETICS: Seeks to Drop 2nd Amended Abramson Complaint
PEPSI-COLA CO: Consumers Ask 2nd Cir. to Revive Class Action
PROGRESSIVE CORP: MAO-MSO Recovery Suit Dismissed
RACHAEL RAY: Sued for $5MM Over Chemical in Dog Food Products

RENTOKIL NORTH: Court Grants Arbitration in A. Carbajal's Wage Suit
ROOT9B TECHNOLOGIES: Dismissal of Securities Fraud Suit Affirmed
SCHURMAN FINE: $237.5K Attorney's Fees Awarded in Data Theft Suit
SEA TO TABLE: Minami Tamaki Mulls Mislabeling Class Action
SEMPRA ENERGY: 382 Suits Filed over Aliso Canyon Leak at Aug. 1

SEMPRA ENERGY: Bid to Revive Securities Suit Still Pending
SEMPRA ENERGY: California Supreme Court Review Underway
SERVICESOURCE INTERNATIONAL: Patton Case Underway in Delaware
SNOOZE HIC: Faces Class Action in California Over Unpaid Wages
SNYDER & SNYDER: Dismissal of Malpractice Claims Affirmed

SYNGENTA AG: Plaintiffs Attorney Seeks $150MM in Legal Fees
TECHNIPFMC PLC: Still Defends Prause Shareholder Class Action
TENET HEALTHCARE: Bid for Class Status in Maderazo Suit Pending
TESLA INC: Bid to Dismiss Suit over Model 3 Production Underway
TESLA INC: Faces Litigation Relating to 2018 CEO Performance Award

TESLA INC: Shareholder Suit over SolarCity Acquisition Continues
TRANS UNION: Violates Fair Credit Reporting Act, Marshall Suit Says
TRANSAMERICA LIFE: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss K. McMahon's Suit
TURTLE BEACH: Shareholders Class Action Trial Set for Nov. 2019
TYSON FOODS: Bid to Nix Broiler Chicken Grower Suit Still Pending

TYSON FOODS: Faces Antitrust Class Suits over Pork Product Prices
TYSON FOODS: Hillshire Unit Still Defends Philippine Labor Case
TYSON FOODS: Maplevale Farms Lawsuit Still in Discovery Phase
UFC: Seeks Dismissal of Antitrust Class Action
UNIFUND CCR: Partial Denial of Certification in FDCPA Suit Affirmed

UNITED STATES: Campbell County Joins PILT Program Class Action
UNITED STATES: Judge Issues Ruling on Attorney Fees Issue
UNITYPOINT HEALTH: Class Action Mulled Over 2nd Data Breach
VENETIAN CASINO: Court OKs M. Yousif to File 4th Amended Complaint
VIRTU FINANCIAL: Faces 2nd Amended Complaint over KCG Acquisition

VISTRA ENERGY: Still Defends Consolidated Gas Index Pricing Suit
VOYA FINANCIAL: Appeal from Dismissal of Patrico Suit Underway
VOYA FINANCIAL: Bid to Dismiss "Cutler" COI Lawsuit Underway
VOYA FINANCIAL: Bid to Dismiss Amended "Goetz" Complaint Pending
VOYA FINANCIAL: Bid to Dismiss Dezelan Amended Complaint Underway

VOYA FINANCIAL: Bid to Trim Barnes Complaint Pending
WASATCH ADVANTAGE: Calif. Court Certifies Tenant Class
WILL LIFE: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss S. Fairlie's Suit
WILLIAMS-SONOMA: W. Rushing's Suit Moved to N.D. Calif.
WILLIS TOWERS: $9.75M Paid for "Sanchez" Litigation Settlement

WILLIS TOWERS: 3 Merger Class Suits in Delaware Consolidated
WILLIS TOWERS: 4th Circuit Asked to Reinstate Proxy Litigation
WILLIS TOWERS: Stanford Settlement Approval Challenged
WOK 88: Can Compel Arbitration of Unpaid Overtime Suit
XPLORE TECHNOLOGIES: Faces Investor Class Action Over Zebra Deal

XTO ENERGY: To Assess Allocation Plan in Royalty Suit
ZILLOW GROUP: Awaits Ruling on Bid to Drop Consolidated Suit
ZIMMER BIOMET: Bid to Drop "Shah" Class Suit in Indiana Ongoing

                            *********

3D SYSTEMS: Time to Appeal KBC Case Settlement Approval Expires
---------------------------------------------------------------
The time for any party to appeal from the final approval of the
settlement of the case entitled, KBC Asset Management NV v. 3D
Systems Corporation, et al. expired on July 25, 2018, according to
3D Systems Corporation's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018.

The Company and certain of its former executive officers have been
named as defendants in a consolidated putative stockholder class
action lawsuit pending in the United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina.  The consolidated action is styled KBC
Asset Management NV v. 3D Systems Corporation, et al., Case No.
0:15-cv-02393-MGL.  The Amended Consolidated Complaint (the
"Complaint"), which was filed on December 9, 2015, alleges that
defendants violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
(the "Exchange Act"), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by
making false and misleading statements and omissions and that the
former officers are control persons under Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act.  The Complaint was filed on behalf of stockholders
who purchased shares of the Company's common stock between October
29, 2013, and May 5, 2015 and seeks monetary damages on behalf of
the purported class.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety
on January 14, 2016, which was denied by Memorandum Opinion and
Order dated July 25, 2016 (the "Order").  Defendants filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Order on August 4, 2016, which was
denied by Order dated February 24, 2017.  On September 28, 2017,
the Court granted Lead Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification.

On February 14, 2018, following mediation, the parties entered into
a Stipulation of Settlement that provides for, among other things,
payment of US$50,000,000 by the Company's insurance carriers and a
mutual exchange of releases.  The Stipulation of Settlement calls
for a dismissal of all claims against the Company and the
individual defendants with prejudice following Court approval, a
denial by defendants of any wrongdoing, and no admission of
liability.

On February 15, 2018, Lead Plaintiff filed an Unopposed Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement.  On February 21,
2018, the Court entered an Order Preliminarily Approving Settlement
and Providing for Notice.

The Court held a final fairness hearing on June 25, 2018, and
entered the Order and Final Judgment and Order Awarding Attorneys'
Fees on the same day.  The time for any party to appeal expired on
July 25, 2018.  A current liability of US$50,000,000 was recorded
for the agreed upon settlement amount and an offsetting receivable
of US$50,000,000 was recorded for related insurance proceeds.

3D Systems Corporation is a holding company incorporated in
Delaware in 1993 that markets its products and services through
subsidiaries in North America and South America (collectively
referred to as "Americas"), Europe and the Middle East
(collectively referred to as "EMEA") and the Asia Pacific region
("APAC"). The company is based in Rock Hill, South Carolina.


ABBVIE INC: Has 596 Product Liability Claims on Depakote Risks
--------------------------------------------------------------
Over 90% of the approximately 596 Depakote claims are pending in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois, and the rest are pending in various other federal and
state courts, according to AbbVie Inc.'s Form 10-Q filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

Plaintiffs in the product liability cases generally allege that
AbbVie did not adequately warn about risk of certain injuries,
primarily various birth defects, arising from use of Depakote.
Plaintiffs generally seek compensatory and punitive damages.

AbbVie is a global, research-based biopharmaceutical company formed
in 2013 following separation from Abbott Laboratories (Abbott).


ABBVIE INC: Medical Mutual's TRT Class Lawsuit Still Ongoing
------------------------------------------------------------
AbbVie Inc. continues to defend itself in a putative class action
lawsuit initiated by Medical Mutual of Ohio, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 7, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June
30, 2018.

In November 2014, a putative class action lawsuit, Medical Mutual
of Ohio v. AbbVie Inc., et al., was filed against several
manufacturers of testosterone replacement therapies (TRTs),
including AbbVie, in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois on behalf of all insurance companies,
health benefit providers, and other third party payers who paid for
TRTs, including AndroGel.  The claims asserted include violations
of the federal RICO Act and state consumer fraud and deceptive
trade practices laws.  The complaint seeks monetary damages and
injunctive relief.

AbbVie is a global, research-based biopharmaceutical company formed
in 2013 following separation from Abbott Laboratories (Abbott).


ABBVIE INC: Putative Class Suit by Rubinstein, et al. Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------
AbbVie Inc. still faces a putative class action suit captioned
Rubinstein, et al. v Gonzalez, et al., according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on
August 7, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

In November 2014, five individuals filed a putative class action
lawsuit, Rubinstein, et al. v Gonzalez, et al., on behalf of
purchasers and sellers of certain Shire plc (Shire) securities
between June 20 and October 14, 2014, against AbbVie and its chief
executive officer in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois alleging that the defendants made
and/or are responsible for material misstatements in violation of
federal securities laws in connection with AbbVie's proposed
transaction with Shire.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

AbbVie is a global, research-based biopharmaceutical company formed
in 2013 following separation from Abbott Laboratories (Abbott).


ABBVIE INC: Still Faces TRT-Related Claims in Various State Courts
------------------------------------------------------------------
AbbVie Inc. continues to defend itself against claims related to
testosterone replacement therapies (TRTs) across various state
courts, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

Product liability cases are pending in which plaintiffs generally
allege that AbbVie and other manufacturers of TRTs did not
adequately warn about risks of certain injuries, primarily heart
attacks, strokes and blood clots.  Approximately 4,130 claims are
consolidated for pre-trial purposes in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois under the MDL Rules as
In re: Testosterone Replacement Therapy Products Liability
Litigation, MDL No. 2545.  Approximately 200 claims against AbbVie
are pending in various state courts.  Plaintiffs generally seek
compensatory and punitive damages.

Six cases have gone to trial.  Four of those have resulted in
complete verdicts for AbbVie: three by juries in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in January,
May, and June 2018, and one by a jury in the Cook County, Illinois
Circuit Court in August 2017.  Another case in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois resulted in a
jury verdict for AbbVie on two claims and for the plaintiff on one
claim and an award of US$150 million in punitive damages with no
compensatory damages in July 2017.  In orders from December 2017
and February 2018, the court vacated that verdict and ordered a new
trial.  In the March 2018 retrial, the jury reached a verdict for
AbbVie on strict liability and fraud and for the plaintiff on
negligence and awarded US$200,000 in compensatory damages and US$3
million in punitive damages, which is the subject of post-trial
proceedings.  Another case in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois resulted in a jury verdict for
AbbVie on strict liability and for the plaintiff on remaining
claims and an award of US$140,000 in compensatory damages and
US$140 million in punitive damages in August 2017.  In July 2018,
the court vacated that verdict and ordered a new trial.

AbbVie is a global, research-based biopharmaceutical company formed
in 2013 following separation from Abbott Laboratories (Abbott).


ADVANCED DISPOSAL: Still Defends Class Suits over Improper Fees
---------------------------------------------------------------
Advanced Disposal Services, Inc. still faces class actions lawsuits
over improper fees, according to Company's Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

In February 2009, the Company and certain of its subsidiaries were
named as defendants in a purported class action suit in the Circuit
Court of Macon County, Alabama.  Similar class action complaints
were brought against the Company and certain of its subsidiaries in
2011 in Duval County, Florida and in 2013 in Quitman County,
Georgia and Barbour County, Alabama, and in 2014 in Chester County,
Pennsylvania.  The 2013 Georgia complaint was dismissed in March
2014.  In late 2015 in Gwinnett County, Georgia, another purported
class action suit was filed.

The plaintiffs in those cases primarily allege that the defendants
charged improper charges (fuel, administrative and environmental
charges) that were in breach of the plaintiffs' service agreements
with the Company and seek damages in an unspecified amount.

The Company believes that it has meritorious defenses against these
purported class actions, which it will vigorously pursue.  Given
the inherent uncertainties of litigation, including the early stage
of these cases, the unknown size of any potential class, and legal
and factual issues in dispute, the outcome of these cases cannot be
predicted and a range of loss, if any, cannot currently be
estimated.

Advanced Disposal Services, Inc. together with its consolidated
subsidiaries, as a consolidated entity, is a nonhazardous solid
waste services company providing collection, transfer, recycling
and disposal services to customers in the South, Midwest and
Eastern regions of the United States.


AIMCO/BETHESDA HOLDINGS: Winters Suit Removed to S.D. Calif.
------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit entitled Winters, et al. v. AIMCO/Bethesda
Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No. 37-02018-00014085-CU-OE-CTL, was
removed on August 20, 2018, from the Superior Court of California,
County of San Diego, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California (San Diego).

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:18-cv-01937-JAH-MDD to
the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as contract dispute.

AIMCO/Bethesda Holdings's line of business includes real estate
investment trusts or related mortgage assets.[BN]

Plaintiffs Felicia Winters, an individual, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, and Me'Kayla Renter, an individual,
on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Craig McKenzie Nicholas, Esq.
          NICHOLAS AND TOMASEVIC
          225 Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 325-0492
          Facsimile: (619) 325-0496
          E-mail: cnicholas@nicholaslaw.org

Defendants AIMCO/Bethesda Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation,
and AIMCO Properties Finance Corp., a Delaware corporation, are
represented by:

          Julie Rae Trotter, Esq.
          CALL JENSEN AND FERRELL
          610 Newport Center Drive, Suite 700
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 717-3000
          Facsimile: (949) 717-3100
          E-mail: jtrotter@calljensen.com


ALARM.COM HOLDINGS: Bid to Drop Fisher Class Action Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------
Alarm.Com Holdings, Inc.'s motion to dismiss the class action suit
by Nick Fisher remains pending, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The Company said, "On March 29, 2018, a putative class action
lawsuit was filed against us by Nick Fisher in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging violations of
the [Telephone Consumer Protection Act], and the Telemarketing And
Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, or TCFAPA.  The complaint
alleges that Alarm.com and another defendant, Nortek Security &
Control LLC, violated the TCPA and TCFAPA through purportedly
unauthorized telephone calls to Fisher, and seeks to hold us
responsible for the alleged calls, including under principles of
agency and vicarious liability.

"The complaint seeks monetary damages under the TCPA and TCFAPA,
injunctive relief, and other relief, including attorneys' fees.  We
answered the complaint and filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on June 18, 2018.  The matter remains pending.  Based on currently
available information, we determined a loss is not probable or
reasonably estimable at this time."

Alarm.com Holdings, Inc. offers a comprehensive suite of
cloud-based solutions for the smart home and business, including
interactive security, video monitoring, intelligent automation and
energy management.


ALARM.COM HOLDINGS: Expects TCPA Class Suit Trial in October 2018
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Alarm.Com Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018, that it anticipates a trial in a class action
lawsuit will take place in October 2018.

The Company said, "On December 30, 2015, a putative class action
lawsuit was filed against us in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, alleging violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, or TCPA.  The complaint does not
allege that Alarm.com itself violated the TCPA, but instead seeks
to hold us responsible for the marketing activities of our service
provider partners under principles of agency and vicarious
liability.  Specifically, the plaintiffs seek to hold us liable for
telemarketing calls made by one of our service providers, as well
as calls made by one of its sub-dealer agents, that purportedly
violated the TCPA's provisions concerning use of Automatic
Telephone Dialing Systems ("ATDS") and placing calls to numbers
listed on the national Do-Not-Call ("DNC") registry.  The complaint
seeks monetary damages under the TCPA, injunctive relief, and other
relief, including attorneys' fees.

"On May 5, 2017, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for class
certification, and certified two plaintiff classes: a DNC class and
an ATDS class.  Plaintiffs claim that 393,762 individuals received
3,002,373 telephone calls in violation of the TCPA's DNC-related
provisions, and that 22,055 individuals received 119,484 telephone
calls in violation of the TCPA's ATDS-related provisions.
Discovery is closed, and the matter remains pending in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California.  The court
has denied the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, and
based on the current schedule, we anticipate a trial will take
place in October 2018.

"The outcome of this legal claim and proceeding against us cannot
be predicted with certainty.  While we believe we have valid
defenses to plaintiffs' claims, a negative outcome could result in
a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition,
cash flows and results of operations.  If plaintiffs' claims are
successful, a jury could award damages of up to US$500 per
telephone call made to class members on the Do Not Call Registry.
Calls made in violation of the ATDS-related provisions are subject
to statutory damages of US$500 per call.  Both ATDS- and
DNC-related damages may be trebled if the violations are found to
be knowing or willful.  Should we decide to appeal an adverse
verdict, we would be required to post a bond in the amount of that
verdict to stay execution of the judgment while the appeal is
pending, which may not be available on reasonable terms, if at all.
Based on currently available information, we determined a loss is
not reasonably estimable at this time."

Alarm.com Holdings, Inc. offers a comprehensive suite of
cloud-based solutions for the smart home and business, including
interactive security, video monitoring, intelligent automation and
energy management.


ALL YEAR MANAGEMENT: Fischler Files Suit in N.Y. for ADA Violation
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against All Year Management
LLC, doing business as Denizen Bshwk.  The case is styled as Brian
Fischler, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated v. All Year Management LLC doing business as: Denizen
Bshwk, Case No. 1:18-cv-04704 (E.D.N.Y., August 20, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Denizen Bshwck is a new apartment development by All Year
Management currently under construction at 54 Noll St, Brooklyn, NY
11206, USA, Kings County.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
          LIPSKY LOWE LLP
          630 Third Avenue, Fifth Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 392-4772
          Facsimile: (212) 444-1030
          E-mail: doug@lipskylowe.com


AMC ENTERTAINMENT: Still Defends Combined Securities Class Suits
----------------------------------------------------------------
AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc. still defends itself against a
consolidated federal securities class action, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On January 12, 2018 and January 19, 2018, two putative federal
securities class actions, captioned Hawaii Structural Iron workers
Pension Trust Fund v. AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc., et al.,
Case No. 1:18-cv-00299-AJN (the "Hawaii Action"), and Nichols v.
AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No.
1:18-cv-00510-AJN (the "Nichols Action," and together with the
Hawaii Action, the "Actions"), respectively, were filed against the
Company in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York.

The Actions, which name certain of the Company's officers and
directors and, in the case of the Hawaii Action, the underwriters
of the Company's February 8, 2017 secondary public offering, as
defendants, assert claims under some or all of Sections 11,
12(a)(2) and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with respect to
alleged material misstatements and omissions in the registration
statement for the secondary public offering and in certain other
public disclosures.

On May 30, 2018, the court consolidated the Actions and appointed
the International Union of Operating Engineers Pension Fund of
Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware as lead plaintiff.

AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc. owns and operates a theatrical
exhibition company in the United States and Europe.


AMERIGAS PARTNERS: Still Defends Antitrust Class Action Lawsuits
----------------------------------------------------------------
AmeriGas Partners, L.P. continues to defend itself against
purported class action lawsuits over alleged violations of
antitrust laws, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

Between May and October of 2014, purported class action lawsuits
were filed in multiple jurisdictions against the Partnership/UGI
and a competitor by certain of their direct and indirect customers.
The class action lawsuits allege, among other things, that the
Partnership and its competitor colluded, beginning in 2008, to
reduce the fill level of portable propane cylinders from 17 pounds
to 15 pounds and combined to persuade their common customer,
Walmart Stores, Inc., to accept that fill reduction, resulting in
increased cylinder costs to retailers and end-user customers in
violation of federal and certain state antitrust laws.  The claims
seek treble damages, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs
on behalf of the putative classes.  

On October 16, 2014, the United States Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation transferred all of these purported class
action cases to the Western Division of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri ("District Court").  In
July 2015, the District Court dismissed all claims brought by
direct customers.  In June 2017, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit ("Eighth Circuit") ruled en banc to reverse
the dismissal by the District Court, which had previously been
affirmed by a panel of the Eighth Circuit.  In September 2017, the
Company filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court appealing the decision of the Eighth Circuit.  The
petition was denied in January 2018 and, as a result, the case was
transferred back to the District Court for further proceedings.
  
In July 2015, the District Court also dismissed all claims brought
by the indirect customers other than claims for injunctive relief.
The indirect customers filed an amended complaint with the District
Court claiming injunctive relief and state law claims under
Wisconsin, Maine and Vermont law.  In September 2016, the District
Court dismissed the amended complaint in its entirety.  The
indirect customers appealed this decision to the Eighth Circuit.
On July 21, 2016, several new indirect customer plaintiffs filed an
antitrust class action lawsuit against the Partnership in the
Western District of Missouri.  The new indirect customer class
action lawsuit was dismissed in September 2016 and certain indirect
customer plaintiffs appealed the decision, consolidating their
appeal with the indirect customer appeal then pending in the Eighth
Circuit.  In June 2018, the Eighth Circuit issued its decision
affirming the District Court's decision dismissing the federal
antitrust claims, and remanded the case back to the District Court
for further proceedings related to the state law claims.

AmeriGas Partners, L.P., is a publicly traded master limited
partnership that is the largest retail propane distributor in the
United States based on volumes of propane distributed annually.


ANDEAVOR: Still Defends 6 Class Suits over MPC Merger Pact
----------------------------------------------------------
Andeavor is still facing six putative class actions related to its
merger agreement with Marathon Petroleum Corporation, according to
Andeavor's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 7, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June
30, 2018.

Andeavor and Marathon Petroleum Corporation ("MPC") entered into an
Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of April 29, 2018 (the "MPC
Merger Agreement"), under which MPC will acquire all of Andeavor's
outstanding shares (the "MPC Merger").

Between June 20 and July 11, 2018, six putative class actions were
filed against some or all of Andeavor, the directors of Andeavor,
and MPC and certain of its subsidiaries, relating to the MPC
Merger.  Two complaints, Malka Raul v. Andeavor, et al., and
Stephen Bushansky v. Andeavor, et al., were filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Texas.  Four other
complaints, captioned The Vladimir Gusinsky Rev. Trust v. Andeavor,
et al., Lawrence Zucker v. Andeavor, et al., Mel Gross v. Andeavor,
et al., and Hudson v. Andeavor, et al., were filed in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Delaware.

The complaints generally allege that Andeavor, the directors of
Andeavor, MPC and certain of its subsidiaries disseminated a false
or misleading registration statement regarding the proposed merger
in violation of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9
promulgated thereunder.  Specifically, the complaints allege that
the registration statement filed by MPC misstated or omitted
material information regarding the parties' financial projections
and the analyses performed by Andeavor's and MPC's respective
financial advisors, and that disclosure of material information is
necessary in light of preclusive deal protection provisions in the
merger agreement, the financial interests of Andeavor's officers
and directors in completing the deal, and the financial interests
of Andeavor's and MPC's respective financial advisors.

The complaints further allege that the directors of Andeavor and/or
MPC are liable for these violations as "controlling persons" of
Andeavor under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  The complaints
seek injunctive relief, including to enjoin and/or rescind the MPC
Merger, damages in the event the merger is consummated, and an
award of attorneys' fees, in addition to other relief.

The Company said, "Additional lawsuits arising out of the MPC
Merger may be filed in the future.  There can be no assurance that
any of the defendants will be successful in the outcome of the
pending or any potential future lawsuits.  A preliminary injunction
could delay or jeopardize the completion of the MPC Merger, and an
adverse judgment granting permanent injunctive relief could
indefinitely enjoin the completion of the MPC Merger.  Andeavor and
Marathon believe that the lawsuits are without merit and intend to
defend vigorously against them and any other lawsuits challenging
the transaction."

Andeavor is an independent refiner and marketer of petroleum
products, operating ten refineries in the Western United States
with a combined rated crude oil capacity of approximately 1,200,000
barrels (190,000 m3) per day. Formerly known as Tesoro Corporation,
or simply as Tesoro, the company is a Fortune 100 and a Fortune
Global 500 company headquartered in Texas at San Antonio, with 2013
annual revenues of $37 billion, and over 13,000 employees
worldwide.


ANTARES PHARMA: Court Appoints Serghei Lungu as Lead Plaintiff
--------------------------------------------------------------
The court has appointed Serghei Lungu as lead plaintiff for the
putative class action lawsuit initiated by Randy Smith in New
Jersey, according to Antares Pharma, Inc.'s Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

On October 23, 2017, Randy Smith filed a complaint in the District
of New Jersey, captioned Randy Smith, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated v. Antares Pharma, Inc., Robert F.
Apple and Fred M. Powell ("Smith"), Case No. 3:17-cv-08945-MAS-DEA,
on behalf of a putative class of persons who purchased or otherwise
acquired Antares securities between December 21, 2016 and October
12, 2017, inclusive, asserting claims for purported violations of
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended, against Antares, Robert F. Apple and Fred M. Powell.

The Smith complaint contends that defendants made false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Antares
had provided insufficient data to the FDA in connection with the
NDA for XYOSTEDTM; and (ii) accordingly, Antares had overstated the
approval prospects for XYOSTEDTM.

On July 27, 2018, the court entered an order appointing Serghei
Lungu as lead plaintiff, Pomerantz LLP as lead counsel, and Lite
DePalma Greenberg, LLC as liaison counsel for plaintiff.

On August 3, 2018, the parties submitted a stipulation and proposed
order, setting forth an agreed-upon schedule for responding to the
complaint, which is currently pending before the court.

Antares Pharma said, "The Company believes that the claims in the
Smith action lack merit and intends to defend them vigorously."

Antares Pharma, Inc., a specialty pharmaceutical company, focuses
on developing and commercializing self-administered parenteral
pharmaceutical products and technologies worldwide.  The Company
was founded in 1978 and is headquartered in Ewing, New Jersey.


ARROWHEAD PHARMACEUTICALS: Appeal Pending in Drug Research Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The plaintiffs' appeal in a consolidated class action related to
Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'s drug research programs remain
pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018.

The Company and certain executive officers were named as defendants
in a putative consolidated class action in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California regarding
certain public statements in connection with the Company's drug
research programs.

The consolidated class action, initially filed as Meller v.
Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., No. 2:16-cv-08505 (C.D.
Cal., filed Nov. 15, 2016), Siegel v. Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., et al., No. 2:16-cv-8954 (C.D. Cal., filed Dec.  2, 2016),
and Unz v. Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al.,
No.2:17-cv-00310 (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 13, 2017) asserts claims
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 regarding certain public statements in connection with the
Company's drug research programs and seek damages in an unspecified
amount.

Additionally, a putative stockholder derivative action captioned
Johnson v. Anzalone, et al., (Los Angeles County Superior Court,
filed January 19, 2017) asserting substantially similar claims is
pending in Los Angeles County Superior Court and is stayed pending
the related consolidated class action.

Two additional putative stockholder derivative actions, captioned
Lucas v. Anzalone, et al., No. 2:17-cv-03207 (C.D.  Cal., filed
April 28, 2017), and Singh v. Anzalone, et al., No. 2:17-cv-03160
(C.D.  Cal., filed April 27, 2017), alleging breach of fiduciary
duty by the Company's Board of Directors in connection with the
alleged facts underlying the securities claims, are pending in the
United States District Court for the Central District of
California.

The Lucas and Singh actions have been consolidated.

On December 21, 2017, the federal district court dismissed the
consolidated class action with prejudice.

On December 27, 2017, the plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  The Lucas
and Singh actions are stayed pending resolution of the Ninth
Circuit appeal.

Arrowhead said, "The Company believes it has meritorious defenses
and intends to vigorously defend itself in these matters.  The
Company makes provisions for liabilities when it is both probable
that a liability has been incurred and the amount can be reasonably
estimated.  No such liability has been recorded related to these
matters.  The Company cannot predict the ultimate outcome of this
matter and cannot accurately estimate any potential liability the
Company may incur or the impact of the results of this matter on
the Company."

Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals, Inc. develops novel drugs to treat
intractable diseases by silencing the genes that cause them.


AVANOS MEDICAL: 9th Cir. Appeal in Bahamas Surgery Case Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
Avanos Medical, Inc. (formerly Halyard Health, Inc.) awaits the
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the
Company's appeal from a court ruling in the "Bahamas" putative
class action, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018.

The Company said, "We have an Indemnification Obligation for, and
have assumed the defense of, the matter styled Bahamas Surgery
Center, LLC v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation and Halyard Health, Inc.,
No. 2:14-cv-08390-DMG-SH (C.D.  Cal.) ("Bahamas"), filed on October
29, 2014.  In that case, the plaintiff brought a putative class
action asserting claims for common law fraud (affirmative
misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment) and violation of
California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") in connection with our
marketing and sale of MicroCool surgical gowns.

"On April 7, 2017, a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff,
finding that Kimberly-Clark was liable for US$4 million in
compensatory damages (not including prejudgment interest) and
US$350 million in punitive damages, and that Avanos was liable for
US$0.3 million in compensatory damages (not including prejudgment
interest) and US$100 million in punitive damages.  Subsequently,
the court also ruled on the plaintiff's UCL claim and request for
injunctive relief.  The court found in favor of the plaintiff on
the UCL claim but denied the plaintiff's request for restitution.
The court also denied the plaintiff's request for injunctive
relief.

"On May 25, 2017, we filed three post-trial motions: a renewed
motion for judgment as a matter of law; a motion to decertify the
class; and a motion for new trial, remittitur, or amendment of the
judgment.  On March 30, 2018, the court ruled on the post-trial
motions.  The court denied all three, except it granted in part the
motion to reduce the award of punitive damages to a 5 to 1 ratio
with compensatory damages.

"On April 11, 2018, the court issued an Amended Judgment in favor
of the plaintiff and against us and Kimberly-Clark.  The judgment
against us is US$0.3 million in compensatory damages and
pre-judgment interest and US$1.3 million in punitive damages.  The
judgment against Kimberly-Clark is US$3.9 million in compensatory
damages, US$1.3 million in pre-judgment interest and US$19.4
million in punitive damages.

"On April 12, 2018, we filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals.  We intend to continue our vigorous
defense of the Bahamas matter."

Avanos Medical, Inc. operates as a medical technology company that
focuses on eliminating pain, speeding recovery, and preventing
infection for healthcare providers and patients worldwide.  The
Company was formerly known as Halyard Health, Inc. and changed its
name to Avanos Medical, Inc. in June 2018.  Avanos Medical, Inc.
was incorporated in 2014 and is headquartered in Alpharetta,
Georgia.


AVANOS MEDICAL: Still Defends Jackson Class Action
--------------------------------------------------
Avanos Medical, Inc. (formerly Halyard Health, Inc.) continues to
defend itself in a putative class action suit captioned Jackson v.
Halyard Health, Inc., Robert E. Abernathy, Steven E. Voskuil, et
al., according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018.

The Company said, "We were served with a complaint in a matter
styled Jackson v. Halyard Health, Inc., Robert E. Abernathy, Steven
E. Voskuil, et al., No. 1:16-cv-05093-LTS (S.D.N.Y.), filed on June
28, 2016.  In that case, the plaintiff brings a putative class
action against the Company, our Chief Executive Officer, our Chief
Financial Officer and other defendants, asserting claims for
violations of the Securities Exchange Act, Sections 10(b) and
20(a).  The plaintiff alleges that the defendants made
misrepresentations and failed to disclose certain information about
the safety and effectiveness of our MicroCool gowns and thereby
artificially inflated the Company's stock prices during the
respective class periods.

"The alleged class period for purchasers of Kimberly-Clark
securities who subsequently received Avanos securities is February
25, 2013 to October 21, 2014, and the alleged class period for
purchasers of Avanos securities is October 21, 2014 to April 29,
2016.

"On February 16, 2017, we moved to dismiss the case.  On March 30,
2018, the court granted our motion to dismiss and entered judgment
in our favor.  On April 27, 2018, the plaintiff filed a Motion for
Relief from the Judgment and for Leave to Amend.  We intend to
continue our vigorous defense of this matter."

Avanos Medical, Inc. operates as a medical technology company that
focuses on eliminating pain, speeding recovery, and preventing
infection for healthcare providers and patients worldwide.  The
Company was formerly known as Halyard Health, Inc. and changed its
name to Avanos Medical, Inc. in June 2018.  Avanos Medical, Inc.
was incorporated in 2014 and is headquartered in Alpharetta,
Georgia.


BAUSCH  HEALTH: Accord in Allergan Suits Gets Final Court Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court has granted final approval of the settlement for the
Allergan Shareholder Class Actions on June 12, 2018, according to
Bausch Health Companies Inc.'s Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018.

On December 16, 2014, Anthony Basile, an alleged shareholder of
Allergan filed a lawsuit on behalf of a putative class of Allergan
shareholders against the Company, VPI, AGMS, Pershing Square, PS
Management, GP, LLC, PS Fund 1 and William A.  Ackman in the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California (Basile v.
Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc., et al., Case No.
14-cv-02004-DOC).  On June 26, 2015, lead plaintiffs the State
Teachers Retirement System of Ohio, the Iowa Public Employees
Retirement System and Patrick T. Johnson filed an amended complaint
against the Company, VPI, J. Michael Pearson, Pershing Square, PS
Management, GP, LLC, PS Fund 1 and William A. Ackman.  The amended
complaint alleged claims on behalf of a putative class of sellers
of Allergan securities between February 25, 2014 and April 21,
2014, against all defendants contending that various purchases of
Allergan securities by PS Fund were made while in possession of
material, non-public information concerning a potential tender
offer by the Company for Allergan stock, and asserting violations
of Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act and rules promulgated by the
SEC thereunder and Section 20A of the Exchange Act.  The amended
complaint also alleged violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange
Act against Pershing Square, various Pershing Square affiliates,
William A. Ackman and J. Michael Pearson.  The amended complaint
sought, among other relief, money damages, equitable relief, and
attorneys' fees and costs.  On March 15, 2017, the Court entered an
order certifying a plaintiff class comprised of persons who sold
Allergan common stock contemporaneously with purchases of Allergan
common stock made or caused by defendants during the period
February 25, 2014 through April 21, 2014.
On June 28, 2017, Timber Hill LLC, a Connecticut limited liability
company that allegedly traded in Allergan derivative instruments,
filed a lawsuit on behalf of a putative class of derivative traders
against the Company, VPI, AGMS, Michael Pearson, Pershing Square,
PS Management, GP, LLC, PS Fund 1 and William A.  Ackman in the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (Timber
Hill LLC v. Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P., et al., Case
No. 17-cv-04776-DOC).  The complaint alleged claims on behalf of a
putative class of investors who sold Allergan call options,
purchased Allergan put options and/or sold Allergan equity forward
contracts between February 25, 2014 and April 21, 2014, against all
defendants contending that various purchases of Allergan securities
by PS Fund were made while in possession of material, non-public
information concerning a potential tender offer by the Company for
Allergan stock, and asserting violations of Section 14(e) of the
Exchange Act and rules promulgated by the SEC thereunder and
Section 20A of the Exchange Act.  The complaint also alleged
violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against Pershing
Square, various Pershing Square affiliates, William A. Ackman and
Michael Pearson.  The complaint sought, among other relief, money
damages, equitable relief, and attorneys' fees and costs.  On July
25, 2017, the Court decided not to consolidate this lawsuit with
the Basile action.

On December 28, 2017, all parties agreed to settle the ongoing,
related Allergan shareholder class actions for a total of US$290
million.  As part of that proposed settlement, the Company parties
are to pay US$96 million, being 33% of the settlement amount, while
the Pershing Square parties are to pay US$195 million, being 67% of
the settlement amount.  The Court preliminarily approved the
settlement on March 19, 2018.  Following a hearing held on June 12,
2018, the Court granted final approval of the settlement; the
Company is awaiting the judge to formally enter the final order.

Bausch Health Companies Inc. develops, manufactures, and markets a
range of pharmaceutical, medical device, and over-the-counter
products primarily in the therapeutic areas of eye health,
gastroenterology, and dermatology.  The Company was formerly known
as Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. and changed its name
to Bausch Health Companies Inc. in July 2018.  Bausch Health
Companies Inc. was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in Laval,
Canada.


BAUSCH HEALTH: Accord in Solodyn(R) Antitrust Suit Has Final Okay
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The District Court has granted final approval of the settlements
with the End-Payor and Direct Purchaser classes in the Solodyn(R)
Antitrust Class Actions on July 18, 2018, according to Bausch
Health Companies Inc.'s Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30,
2018.

Beginning in July 2013, a number of civil antitrust class action
suits were filed against Medicis Pharmaceutical Corporation
("Medicis"), Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. ("VPII")
and various manufacturers of generic forms of Solodyn(R), alleging
that the defendants engaged in an anticompetitive scheme to exclude
competition from the market for minocycline hydrochloride extended
release tablets, a prescription drug for the treatment of acne
marketed by Medicis under the brand name, Solodyn(R).  The
plaintiffs in such suits alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Secs. 1, 2, and of various state
antitrust and consumer protection laws, and further alleged that
the defendants have been unjustly enriched through their alleged
conduct.  The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief
and, where applicable, treble, multiple, punitive and/or other
damages, including attorneys' fees.

By order dated February 25, 2014, the Judicial Panel for
Multidistrict Litigation ("JPML") centralized the suits in the
District of Massachusetts, under the caption In re Solodyn
(Minocycline Hydrochloride) Antitrust Litigation, Case No.
1:14-md-02503-DJC, before U.S. District Judge Denise Casper.

After the Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiffs and the End-Payor Class
Plaintiffs each filed a consolidated amended class action complaint
on September 12, 2014, the defendants jointly moved to dismiss
those complaints.  On August 14, 2015, the Court granted the
Defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to claims brought under
Sherman Act, Section 2 and various state laws but denied the motion
to dismiss with respect to claims brought under Sherman Act,
Section 1 and other state laws.  VPII was dismissed from the case,
but the litigation continued against Medicis and the generic
manufacturers as to the remaining claims.

On March 26, 2015, and on April 6, 2015, while the motion to
dismiss the class action complaints was pending, two additional
non-class action complaints were filed against Medicis by certain
retail pharmacy and grocery chains ("Individual Plaintiffs") making
similar allegations and seeking similar relief to that sought by
Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiffs.  Those suits were centralized
with the class action suits in the District of Massachusetts.
Following the Court's August 14, 2015 decision on the motion to
dismiss, the Individual Plaintiffs each filed amended complaints on
October 1, 2015, and Medicis answered on December 7, 2015.  A third
non-class action was filed by another retail pharmacy against
Medicis on January 26, 2016, and Medicis answered on March 28,
2016.

Plaintiffs reached settlements with two of three generic
manufacturer defendants prior to the close of discovery.  On April
14, 2017, the Court granted the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs' and
End-Payor Plaintiffs' motions for preliminary approval of those
settlements and granted final approval on November 27, 2017.  For
the remaining parties, following the close of fact discovery and
expert discovery, the Court granted Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs'
and End-Payor Plaintiffs' motions for class certification for the
purposes of damages, but denied End-Payor Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification for the purposes of injunctive and declaratory
relief.  The remaining defendants petitioned to appeal the
certification of the End-Payor Class and this petition was denied.

Plaintiffs and the remaining defendants each filed motions for
summary judgment.  The Court heard oral argument on the parties'
summary judgment motions on January 12, 2018.  On January 25, 2018,
the Court issued a Memorandum and Order denying the parties'
motions, except for partially allowing defendants' motion on market
power.  In February 2018, Medicis agreed to resolve the class
action litigation with the End Payor and Direct Payor classes for
an amount of US$58 million and has resolved related litigation with
opt-out retailers for additional consideration.  On July 18, 2018,
the district court granted final approval of these settlements with
the End-Payor and Direct Purchaser classes.

Bausch Health Companies Inc. develops, manufactures, and markets a
range of pharmaceutical, medical device, and over-the-counter
products primarily in the therapeutic areas of eye health,
gastroenterology, and dermatology.  The Company was formerly known
as Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. and changed its name
to Bausch Health Companies Inc. in July 2018.  Bausch Health
Companies Inc. was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in Laval,
Canada.


BAUSCH HEALTH: Appeal from Class Status in Quebec Suit Pending
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Superior Court of Quebec's certification of class status in a
case against Bausch Health Companies Inc. and various Johnson &
Johnson entities is currently on appeal, Bausch Health said in its
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The plaintiff sought to certify a proposed class action on behalf
of persons in Quebec who have used Johnson & Johnson's Baby Powder
or Shower to Shower, as well as their family members, assigns and
heirs, and is alleging negligence in failing to properly test,
failing to warn of health risks, and failing to remove the products
from the market in a timely manner.

A certification (also known as authorization) hearing in the Quebec
matter was held on January 11, 2018.  On May 2, 2018, the Court
certified (or as stated under Quebec law, authorized) the bringing
of a class action by a representative plaintiff on behalf of people
in Quebec who have used Johnson & Johnson's Baby Powder and/or
Shower to Shower in their perineal area and have been diagnosed
with ovarian cancer and/or family members, assigns and heirs.  The
Court's authorization order is currently on appeal.

The plaintiffs in the action are seeking awards of general,
special, compensatory and punitive damages.

Bausch Health Companies Inc. develops, manufactures, and markets a
range of pharmaceutical, medical device, and over-the-counter
products primarily in the therapeutic areas of eye health,
gastroenterology, and dermatology.  The Company was formerly known
as Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. and changed its name
to Bausch Health Companies Inc. in July 2018.  Bausch Health
Companies Inc. was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in Laval,
Canada.


BAUSCH HEALTH: Appeal from Nixed Class Status Bid Still Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
The plaintiff's appeal from the court decision dismissing an
application for class certification in the Afexa Class Action
remains pending in the Supreme Court of Canada, according Bausch
Health Companies Inc.'s Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30,
2018.

On March 9, 2012, a Notice of Civil Claim was filed in the Supreme
Court of British Columbia which sought an order certifying a
proposed class proceeding against the Company and a predecessor,
Afexa Life Sciences Inc. ("Afexa") (Case No. NEW-S-S-140954).  The
proposed claim asserted that Afexa and the Company made false
representations respecting Cold-FX(R) to residents of British
Columbia who purchased the product during the applicable period and
that the proposed class has suffered damages as a result.  On
November 8, 2013, the Plaintiff served an amended notice of civil
claim which sought to re-characterize the representation claims and
broaden them from what was originally claimed.

On December 8, 2014, the Company filed a motion to strike certain
elements of the Plaintiff's claim for failure to state a cause of
action.  In response, the Plaintiff proposed further amendments to
its claim.  The hearing on the motion to strike and the Plaintiff's
amended claim was held on February 4, 2015.  The Court allowed
certain additional subsequent amendments, while it struck others.

The hearing to certify the class was held on April 4-8, 2016 and,
on November 16, 2016, the Court issued a decision dismissing the
plaintiff's application for certification of this action as a class
proceeding.  On December 15, 2016, the plaintiff filed a notice of
appeal in the British Columbia Court of Appeal appealing the
decision to dismiss the application for certification.  The
plaintiff filed its appeal factum on March 15, 2017 and the Company
filed its appeal factum on April 19, 2017.  The appeal hearing was
held on September 19, 2017 and, on April 30, 2018, the British
Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

On June 29, 2018, the plaintiff filed leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada ("SCC") in this matter.  The Company's
reply is due 30 days from the date a matter is opened by the SCC.
The Company intends to vigorously defend this matter.

Bausch Health Companies Inc. develops, manufactures, and markets a
range of pharmaceutical, medical device, and over-the-counter
products primarily in the therapeutic areas of eye health,
gastroenterology, and dermatology.  The Company was formerly known
as Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. and changed its name
to Bausch Health Companies Inc. in July 2018.  Bausch Health
Companies Inc. was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in Laval,
Canada.


BAUSCH HEALTH: Consolidated RICO Class Action Remains Stayed
------------------------------------------------------------
The consolidated RICO class action litigating filed against Bausch
Health Companies Inc., among other third-party defendants, is still
stayed, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018.

Between May 27, 2016 and September 16, 2016, three virtually
identical actions were filed in the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey against the Company and various third
parties, alleging claims under the federal Racketeer Influenced
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") on behalf of a putative class of
certain third party payors that paid claims submitted by Philidor
for certain Company branded drugs between January 2, 2013 and
November 9, 2015 (Airconditioning and Refrigeration Industry Health
and Welfare Trust Fund et al. v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International. Inc. et al., No. 3:16-cv-03087, Plumbers Local Union
No. 1 Welfare Fund v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc. et
al., No. 3:16-cv-3885 and N.Y. Hotel Trades Council et al v.
Valeant Pharmaceuticals International. Inc. et al., No.
3:16-cv-05663).

On November 30, 2016, the Court entered an order consolidating the
three actions under the caption In re Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International, Inc. Third-Party Payor Litigation, No.
3:16-cv-03087.  A consolidated class action complaint was filed on
December 14, 2016.  The consolidated complaint alleges, among other
things, that the Defendants committed predicate acts of mail and
wire fraud by submitting or causing to be submitted prescription
reimbursement requests that misstated or omitted facts regarding
(1) the identity and licensing status of the dispensing pharmacy;
(2) the resubmission of previously denied claims; (3) patient
co-pay waivers; (4) the availability of generic alternatives; and
(5) the insured's consent to renew the prescription.  The complaint
further alleges that these acts constitute a pattern of
racketeering or a racketeering conspiracy in violation of the RICO
statute and caused plaintiffs and the putative class unspecified
damages, which may be trebled under the RICO statute.

The Company moved to dismiss the consolidated complaint on February
13, 2017.  Briefing of the motion was completed on May 17, 2017.
On March 14, 2017, other defendants filed a motion to stay the RICO
class action pending the resolution of criminal proceedings against
Andrew Davenport and Gary Tanner.  The Company did not oppose the
motion to stay.  On August 9, 2017, the Court granted the motion to
stay and entered an order staying all proceedings in the case and
accordingly terminating other pending motions.

Bausch Health Companies Inc. develops, manufactures, and markets a
range of pharmaceutical, medical device, and over-the-counter
products primarily in the therapeutic areas of eye health,
gastroenterology, and dermatology.  The Company was formerly known
as Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. and changed its name
to Bausch Health Companies Inc. in July 2018.  Bausch Health
Companies Inc. was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in Laval,
Canada.


BAUSCH HEALTH: Contact Lens Antitrust Class Action Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------
Bausch Health Companies Inc. continues to defend itself against a
consolidated antitrust class action related to contact lenses,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018.

Beginning in March 2015, a number of civil antitrust class action
suits were filed by purchasers of contact lenses against B&L Inc.,
three other contact lens manufacturers, and a contact lens
distributor, alleging that the defendants engaged in an
anticompetitive scheme to eliminate price competition on certain
contact lens lines through the use of unilateral pricing policies.

The plaintiffs in such suits alleged violations of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1, and of various state antitrust and
consumer protection laws, and further alleged that the defendants
have been unjustly enriched through their alleged conduct.  The
plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and, where
applicable, treble, punitive and/or other damages, including
attorneys' fees.

By order dated June 8, 2015, the JPML centralized the suits in the
Middle District of Florida, under the caption In re Disposable
Contact Lens Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 3:15-md-02626-HES-JRK,
before U.S. District Judge Harvey E. Schlesinger.  After the Class
Plaintiffs filed a corrected consolidated class action complaint on
December 16, 2015, the defendants jointly moved to dismiss those
complaints.

On June 16, 2016, the Court granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss with respect to claims brought under the Maryland Consumer
Protection Act, but denied the motion to dismiss with respect to
claims brought under Sherman Act, Section 1 and other state laws.
Discovery has been concluded.

On March 3, 2017, the Class Plaintiffs filed their motion for class
certification.  On June 15, 2017, defendants filed a motion to
oppose the plaintiffs' class certification motion, as well as
motions to exclude plaintiffs' expert reports.

An evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Schlesinger on August
1 and 2, 2018.

The Company said it intends to vigorously defend all of these
actions.

Bausch Health Companies Inc. develops, manufactures, and markets a
range of pharmaceutical, medical device, and over-the-counter
products primarily in the therapeutic areas of eye health,
gastroenterology, and dermatology.  The Company was formerly known
as Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. and changed its name
to Bausch Health Companies Inc. in July 2018.  Bausch Health
Companies Inc. was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in Laval,
Canada.


BAUSCH HEALTH: Continues to Defend Canadian Securities Lawsuits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bausch Health Companies Inc. is still defending itself against
securities lawsuits in Canada, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

In 2015, six putative class actions were filed and served against
the Company in Canada in the provinces of British Columbia, Ontario
and Quebec.  These actions are captioned: (a) Alladina v. Valeant,
et al. (Case No. S-1594B6) (Supreme Court of British Columbia)
(filed November 17, 2015); (b) Kowalyshyn v. Valeant, et al.
(CV-15-540593-00CP) (Ontario Superior Court) (filed November 16,
2015); (c) Kowalyshyn et al. v. Valeant, et al. (CV-15-541082-00CP
(Ontario Superior Court) (filed November 23, 2015); (d) O'Brien v.
Valeant et al. (CV-15-543678-00CP) (Ontario Superior Court) (filed
December 30, 2015); (e) Catucci v. Valeant, et al. (Court File No.
540-17-011743159) (Quebec Superior Court) (filed October 26, 2015);
and (f) Rousseau-Godbout v. Valeant, et al. (Court File No.
500-06-000770-152) (Quebec Superior Court) (filed October 27,
2015).  The Alladina, Kowalyshyn, O'Brien, Catucci and
Rousseau-Godbout actions also name, among others, certain current
or former directors and officers of the Company.  The
Rosseau-Godbout action was subsequently stayed by the Quebec
Superior Court by consent order.

Each of the five remaining actions alleges violations of Canadian
provincial securities legislation on behalf of putative classes of
persons who purchased or otherwise acquired securities of the
Company for periods commencing as early as January 1, 2013 and
ending as late as November 16, 2015.  The alleged violations relate
to, among other things, alleged misrepresentations and/or failures
to disclose material information about the Company's business and
prospects, relating to drug pricing, the Company's policies and
accounting practices, the Company's use of specialty pharmacies
and, in particular, the Company's relationship with Philidor.  The
Alladina, Kowalyshyn and O'Brien actions also assert common law
claims for negligent misrepresentation, and the Alladina claim
additionally asserts common law negligence, conspiracy, and claims
under the British Columbia Business Corporations Act, including the
statutory oppression remedies in that legislation.  The Catucci
action asserts claims under the Quebec Civil Code, alleging the
Company breached its duty of care under the civil standard of
liability contemplated by the Code.

The Company is aware of two additional putative class actions that
have been filed with the applicable court but which have not yet
been served on the Company.  These actions are captioned: (i)
Okeley v. Valeant, et al. (Case No. S-159991) (Supreme Court of
British Columbia) (filed December 2, 2015); and (ii) Sukenaga v
Valeant et al. (CV-15-540567-00CP) (Ontario Superior Court) (filed
November 16, 2015), and the factual allegations made in these
actions are substantially similar to those outlined above.  The
Company has been advised that the plaintiffs in these actions do
not intend to pursue the actions.

On June 10, 2016, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice rendered
its decision on carriage motions (motions held to determine who
will have carriage of the class action) heard on April 8, 2016,
provisionally staying the O'Brien action, in favor of the
Kowalyshyn action.  On September 15, 2016, in response to an
arrangement between the plaintiffs in the Kowalyshyn action and the
O'Brien action, the court ordered both that the Kowalyshyn action
be consolidated with the O'Brien action and that the consolidated
action be stayed in favor of the Catucci action pending either the
further order of the Ontario court or the determination of the
motion for leave in the Catucci action.

In the Catucci action, motions for leave under the Quebec
Securities Act and for authorization as a class proceeding were
heard the week of April 24, 2017, with the motion judge reserving
her decision.  Prior to that hearing, the parties resolved
applications by the defendants concerning jurisdiction and class
composition, with the plaintiffs agreeing to revise the definition
of the proposed class to exclude claims in respect of Company
securities purchased in the United States.  On August 29, 2017, the
judge released her reasons for judgment granting the plaintiffs
leave to proceed with their claims under the Quebec Securities Act
and authorizing the class proceeding.  On October 12, 2017, the
Company and the other defendants filed applications for leave to
appeal from certain aspects of the decision authorizing the class
proceeding.  The applications for leave to appeal were heard on
November 22, 2017 and were dismissed on November 30, 2017.  On
October 26, 2017, the plaintiffs issued their Judicial Application
Originating Class Proceedings.  A timetable for certain pre-trial
procedural matters in the action has been set and the notice of
certification has been disseminated to class members.  Among other
things, the timetable established a deadline of June 19, 2018 for
class members to exercise their right to opt-out of the class.

In addition to the class proceedings, on April 12, 2018, the
Company was served with an application for leave filed in the
Quebec Superior Court of Justice to pursue an action under the
Quebec Securities Act was commenced in the Quebec Superior Court of
Justice against the Company and certain current or former officers
and directors.  This action is captioned BlackRock Asset Management
Canada Limited et al. v. Valeant, et al. (Court File No.
500-11-054155-185).  The allegations in the proceeding are similar
to those made by plaintiffs in the Catucci class action.  On June
18, 2018, the same BlackRock entities filed an originating
application against the same defendants asserting claims under the
Quebec Civil Code in respect of the same alleged
misrepresentations.

The Company is aware that certain other members of the Catucci
class exercised their opt-out rights prior to the June 19, 2018
deadline.

The Company said it believes that it has viable defenses in each of
these actions.  In each case, the Company intends to defend itself
vigorously.

Bausch Health Companies Inc. develops, manufactures, and markets a
range of pharmaceutical, medical device, and over-the-counter
products primarily in the therapeutic areas of eye health,
gastroenterology, and dermatology.  The Company was formerly known
as Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. and changed its name
to Bausch Health Companies Inc. in July 2018.  Bausch Health
Companies Inc. was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in Laval,
Canada.


BAUSCH HEALTH: Defends Securities Suits by 27 Investor Groups
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bausch Health Companies Inc. said in its Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018, that 27 groups of individual investors in the
Company's stock and debt securities at this point have chosen to
opt out of the consolidated putative class action and filed
securities actions in the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey against the Company and certain current or former
officers and directors and other such proceedings may be initiated
or asserted.  Another case was initially filed in New York but was
later transferred to New Jersey.

The 27 actions are captioned: T. Rowe Price Growth Stock Fund, Inc.
v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. (Case No.
16-cv-5034); Equity Trustees Limited as Responsible Entity for T.
Rowe Price Global Equity Fund v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International Inc. (Case No. 16-cv-6127); Principal Funds, Inc. v.
Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. (Case No. 16-cv-6128);
BloombergSen Partners Fund LP v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International, Inc. (Case No. 16-cv-7212); Discovery Global
Citizens Master Fund, Ltd. v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International, Inc. (Case No. 16-cv-7321); MSD Torchlight Partners,
L.P. v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. (Case No.
16-cv-7324); BlueMountain Foinaven Master Fund, L.P.  v. Valeant
Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. (Case No. 16-cv-7328); Incline
Global Master LP v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc.
(Case No. 16-cv-7494); VALIC Company I v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International, Inc. (Case No. 16-cv-7496); Janus Aspen Series v.
Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. (Case No. 16-cv-7497)
("Janus Aspen"); Okumus Opportunistic Value Fund, LTD v. Valeant
Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. (Case No. 17-cv-6513)
("Okumus"); Lord Abbett Investment Trust- Lord Abbett Short
Duration Income Fund, v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals International,
Inc. (Case No. 17-cv-6365) ("Lord Abbett"); Pentwater Equity
Opportunities Master Fund LTD v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International, Inc., et al. (Case No. 17-cv-7552), Public
Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi v. Valeant
Pharmaceuticals International Inc. (Case No. 17-cv-7625)
("Mississippi"); The Boeing Company Employee Retirement Plans
Master Trust v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc., et al.,
(Case No. 17-cv-7636) ("Boeing"); State Board of Administration of
Florida v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc. (Case No.
17-cv-12808); The Regents of the University of California v.
Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. (Case No. 17-cv-13488);
GMO Trust v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. (Case No.
18-cv-0089); Första AP Fonden v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International, Inc. (Case No. 17-cv-12088); New York City
Employees' Retirement System v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International, Inc. (Case No. 18-cv-0032) ("NYCERS"); Blackrock
Global Allocation Fund, Inc. v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International, Inc. (Case No. 18-cv-0343) ("Blackrock"); Colonial
First State Investments Limited As Responsible Entity for
Commonwealth Global Shares Fund 1 v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International, Inc. (Case No. 18-cv-0383); Bharat Ahuja v. Valeant
Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. (Case No. 18-cv-0846); Brahman
Capital Corp. v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. (Case
No. 18-cv-0893); The Prudential Insurance Company of America v.
Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. (Case No.
3:18-cv-01223) ("Prudential"); Senzar Healthcare Master Fund LP v.
Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. (Case No. 18-cv-02286)
("Senzar"); and 2012 Dynasty UC LLC v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International, Inc. (Case No. 18-cv-08595) ("2012 Dynasty").

In addition, one group of individual investors in the Company's
stock securities chose to opt out of the consolidated putative
class action and filed a securities action in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York against the Company and
certain current or former officers and directors.  This action was
captioned: Hound Partners Offshore Fund, LP v. Valeant
Pharmaceuticals International, Inc.  (Case No. 18-cv-0076) ("Hound
Partners").  Defendants filed a motion to transfer the Hound
Partners case to the District of New Jersey on February 2, 2018.
On April 24, 2018, the Court granted Defendants' motion and the
case was transferred to the District of New Jersey on May 1, 2018
(Case No. 3:18-cv-08705).

These individual shareholder actions assert claims under Sections
10(b), 18, and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, Sections 11, 12(a)(2),
and 15 of the Securities Act, common law fraud, and negligent
misrepresentation under state law, based on alleged purchases of
Company stock, options, and/or debt at various times between
January 3, 2013 and August 10, 2016.  Plaintiffs in the Lord
Abbett, Boeing, Mississippi, NYCERS, Hound Partners and 2012
Dynasty cases additionally assert claims under the New Jersey
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.  The
allegations in the complaints are similar to those made by
plaintiffs in the putative class action.

Plaintiffs in the Janus Aspen action amended the complaint on April
28, 2017.  Defendants filed motions for partial dismissal in ten
individual actions in the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey on June 16, 2017.  Briefing of those motions was
completed on August 25, 2017.  On January 12, 2018, the Court
dismissed the negligent misrepresentation claims and otherwise
denied the motions for partial dismissal.

On October 19, 2017, the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey entered an order requesting briefs from the parties
regarding whether the Court should stay the putative securities
class action and the individual securities law actions filed in the
District of New Jersey until after the resolution of criminal
proceedings against Andrew Davenport and Gary Tanner.  The Court's
order immediately stayed all deadlines, briefing schedules, and
discovery in securities actions pending completion of the briefing
and the Court's decision.  The Court directed the parties to file
briefs either supporting or opposing the stay, with such briefs to
be concluded by November 8, 2017.  On November 29, 2017, the Court
entered an order staying all proceedings and discovery, except for
a document production in the putative securities class action and
the briefing and resolution of any motions to dismiss, in the
putative securities class action and all current and subsequent
related individual securities law actions filed in the District of
New Jersey.  On June 5, 2018, the Court lifted the stay.

Defendants filed motions for partial dismissal in the Lord Abbett,
Mississippi, and Boeing cases on December 6, 2017.  Briefing on
those motions was completed on March 15, 2018.  On July 31, 2018,
the Court dismissed the common law fraud and negligent
misrepresentation claims and otherwise denied the motions for
partial dismissal.  Defendants filed actions for partial dismissal
in the Okumus case in December 18, 2017.  On February 1, 2018, the
parties filed a stipulation and proposed order in the Okumus case
that would withdraw Defendants' motions for partial dismissal, and
dismiss Okumus' state-law claims.  The Court entered that
stipulation on February 2, 2018.  Defendants filed a motion for
partial dismissal in the Pentwater case on February 13, 2018.
Briefing on that motion was completed on March 27, 2018.
Defendants filed motions for partial dismissal in the NYCERS and
Blackrock cases on February 23, 2018.  Briefing on those motions
was completed on April 30, 2018.  Defendants filed a motion for
partial dismissal in the Senzar case on May 4, 2018.  Briefing on
this motion was completed on June 18, 2018.  Defendants filed a
motion for partial dismissal in the Hound Partners case on May 22,
2018.  Briefing on that motion was completed on July 30, 2018.
Defendants filed a motion for partial dismissal in the 2012 Dynasty
case on June 15, 2018.  Briefing on that motion was completed on
July 27, 2018.

Bausch Health Companies Inc. develops, manufactures, and markets a
range of pharmaceutical, medical device, and over-the-counter
products primarily in the therapeutic areas of eye health,
gastroenterology, and dermatology.  The Company was formerly known
as Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. and changed its name
to Bausch Health Companies Inc. in July 2018.  Bausch Health
Companies Inc. was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in Laval,
Canada.


BAUSCH HEALTH: Nov 4 Class Status Hearing in British Columbia Case
------------------------------------------------------------------
A hearing for class certification is set for November 4, 2018, in
the proposed class action filed against Bausch Health Companies
Inc. and various Johnson & Johnson entities in the Supreme Court of
British Columbia, according to Bausch Health's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

The plaintiff seeks to certify a proposed class action on behalf of
persons in British Columbia and Canada who have purchased or used
Johnson & Johnson's Baby Powder or Shower to Shower, including
their estates, executors and personal representatives, and is
alleging that the use of this product increases certain health
risks.

The plaintiffs in the action are seeking awards of general,
special, compensatory and punitive damages.

Bausch Health Companies Inc. develops, manufactures, and markets a
range of pharmaceutical, medical device, and over-the-counter
products primarily in the therapeutic areas of eye health,
gastroenterology, and dermatology.  The Company was formerly known
as Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. and changed its name
to Bausch Health Companies Inc. in July 2018.  Bausch Health
Companies Inc. was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in Laval,
Canada.


BAUSCH HEALTH: Timber Hill Securities Suit Consolidated
-------------------------------------------------------
The putative class action filed by Timber Hill LLC against Bausch
Health Companies Inc., among other defendants, has been
consolidated with In re Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc.
Securities Litigation, (Case No. 3:15-cv-07658), according to
Bausch Health's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

From October 22, 2015 to October 30, 2015, four putative securities
class actions were filed in the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey against the Company and certain current or
former officers and directors.  Those four actions, captioned
Potter v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. et al. (Case
No. 15-cv-7658), Chen v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals International,
Inc. et al. (Case No. 15-cv-7679), Yang v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International, Inc. et al. (Case No. 15-cv-7746), and Fein v.
Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. et al. (Case No.
15-cv-7809), all asserted securities fraud claims under Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Exchange Act") on behalf of putative classes of persons who
purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's stock during various
time periods between February 28, 2014 and October 21, 2015.  The
allegations relate to, among other things, allegedly false and
misleading statements and/or failures to disclose information about
the Company's business and prospects, including relating to drug
pricing, the Company's use of specialty pharmacies, and the
Company's relationship with Philidor.

On May 31, 2016, the Court entered an order consolidating the four
actions under the caption In re Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International, Inc.  Securities Litigation, Case No. 3:15-cv-07658,
and appointing a lead plaintiff and lead plaintiff's counsel.  On
June 24, 2016, the lead plaintiff filed a consolidated complaint
naming additional defendants and asserting additional claims based
on allegations of false and misleading statements and/or omissions
similar to those in the initial complaints.  Specifically, the
consolidated complaint asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Exchange Act against the Company, and certain current
or former officers and directors, as well as claims under Sections
11, 12(a)(2) and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities
Act") against the Company, certain current or former officers and
directors, and certain other parties.  The lead plaintiff seeks to
bring these claims on behalf of a putative class of persons who
purchased the Company's equity securities and senior notes in the
United States between January 4, 2013 and March 15, 2016, including
all those who purchased the Company's securities in the United
States in the Company's debt and stock offerings between July 2013
to March 2015.  On September 13, 2016, the Company and the other
defendants moved to dismiss the consolidated complaint.  Briefing
on the Company's motion was completed on January 13, 2017.  On
April 28, 2017, the Court dismissed certain claims arising out of
the Company's private placement offerings and otherwise denied the
motions to dismiss.  Defendants' answers to the consolidated
complaint were filed on August 18, 2017.

On June 6, 2018, a putative class action was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey against the Company
and certain current or former officers and directors.  This action,
captioned Timber Hill LLC, v. Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International, Inc., et al., (Case No. 2:18-cv-10246), asserts
securities fraud claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act on behalf of a putative class of persons who purchased
call options or sold put options on the Company's common stock
during the period January 4, 2013 through August 11, 2016.

Bausch Health Companies Inc. develops, manufactures, and markets a
range of pharmaceutical, medical device, and over-the-counter
products primarily in the therapeutic areas of eye health,
gastroenterology, and dermatology.  The Company was formerly known
as Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. and changed its name
to Bausch Health Companies Inc. in July 2018.  Bausch Health
Companies Inc. was founded in 1983 and is headquartered in Laval,
Canada.


BBVA COMPASS: Appeal in Plains All American Securities Suit Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------------------------
An appeal remains pending from the dismissed putative class action
styled In re Plains All American Pipeline, L.P. Securities
Litigation, according to BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc.'s Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

In January 2016, BBVA Securities Inc. ("BSI") was named as a
defendant in a putative class action lawsuit filed in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, In re
Plains All American Pipeline, L.P. Securities Litigation, wherein
the plaintiffs challenge statements made in registration materials
and prospectuses filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
in connection with eight securities offerings of stock and notes
issued by Plains GP Holdings and Plains All American Pipeline and
underwritten by BSI, among others.  The plaintiffs seek unspecified
monetary relief.

On April 2, 2018, the court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss with prejudice.  The plaintiffs have appealed.

The Company said it believes there are substantial defenses to
these claims and intends to defend them vigorously.

BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. is a Sunbelt-based bank holding
company whose subsidiary, Compass Bank, operates 687 branches,
under the trade name BBVA Compass.  BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc.
is a United States financial holding company headquartered in
Birmingham, Alabama and is a wholly owned subsidiary of BBVA.


BBVA COMPASS: BSI Dismissed as Defendant in Teachers' Plan Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------------------
An amended complaint filed on June 22, 2018 in the putative class
action lawsuit styled Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Board,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Teva
Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., et al., did not allege claims
against BBVA Securities Inc. ("BSI") and the other underwriters,
according to BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc.'s Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

"This matter is now concluded," BBVA Compass said in the SEC
document.

In August 2017, BSI was named as a defendant in a putative class
action lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut, Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Board,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Teva
Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., et al., wherein the plaintiffs
allege that Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.  ("Teva"), its
officers and directors, and the underwriting defendants (including
BSI) made inaccurate and misleading statements in the offering
materials related to Teva's role in an alleged conspiracy to
inflate the market prices of certain generic drug products.  The
plaintiffs seek unspecified monetary relief.  The plaintiffs filed
an amended complaint on June 22, 2018 that did not allege claims
against BSI and the other underwriters.  This matter is now
concluded.

BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. is a Sunbelt-based bank holding
company whose subsidiary, Compass Bank, operates 687 branches,
under the trade name BBVA Compass.  BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc.
is a United States financial holding company headquartered in
Birmingham, Alabama and is a wholly owned subsidiary of BBVA.


BBVA COMPASS: BSI Still Faces Suit by Firefighters' Pension Trust
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BBVA Securities Inc. ("BSI") continues to defend itself in a
putative class action lawsuit styled St. Lucie County Fire District
Firefighters' Pension Trust, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Southwestern Energy Company, et al.,
according to BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc.'s Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

In October 2016, BSI was named as a defendant in a putative class
action lawsuit filed in the District Court of Harris County, Texas,
St. Lucie County Fire District Firefighters' Pension Trust,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Southwestern Energy Company, et al., wherein the plaintiffs allege
that Southwestern Energy Company, its officers and directors, and
the underwriting defendants (including BSI) made inaccurate and
misleading statements in the registration statement and prospectus
related to a securities offering.  The plaintiffs seek unspecified
monetary relief.

BBVA Securities said it believes there are substantial defenses to
these claims and intends to defend them vigorously.

BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. is a Sunbelt-based bank holding
company whose subsidiary, Compass Bank, operates 687 branches,
under the trade name BBVA Compass.  BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc.
is a United States financial holding company headquartered in
Birmingham, Alabama and is a wholly owned subsidiary of BBVA.


BBVA COMPASS: In Settlement Talks for Bellissimo TCPA Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018, that the parties in a putative class
action lawsuit styled Lara Bellissimo, et al. individually and on
behalf of similarly situated individuals v. BBVA Compass, are in
the process of finalizing that settlement.

The Company said, "In September 2017, BBVA Compass was named as a
defendant in a putative class action lawsuit filed in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
dismissed and refiled in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County,
Alabama, Lara Bellissimo, et al. individually and on behalf of
similarly situated individuals v. BBVA Compass, alleging violations
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act in the context of
collections calls to the cell phones of individuals who were not
the individuals that provided the phone numbers to BBVA Compass.
The plaintiffs seek unspecified monetary relief.  The parties
reached a settlement in principle on February 13, 2018 and are in
the process of finalizing that settlement."

BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. is a Sunbelt-based bank holding
company whose subsidiary, Compass Bank, operates 687 branches,
under the trade name BBVA Compass.  BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc.
is a United States financial holding company headquartered in
Birmingham, Alabama and is a wholly owned subsidiary of BBVA.


BBVA COMPASS: Still Defends Hossfeld Suit over TCPA Violations
--------------------------------------------------------------
BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. continues to face a putative class
action lawsuit filed by Robert Hossfeld related to alleged
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, according to
the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

In December 2016, BBVA Compass was named as a defendant in a
putative class action lawsuit filed in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Robert Hossfeld,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. BBVA
Compass and MSR Group, LLC, alleging violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act in the context of customer satisfaction
survey calls to the cell phones of individuals who have not given,
or who have withdrawn, consent to receive calls on their cell
phones.  The plaintiffs seek unspecified monetary relief.  The
Company believes there are substantial defenses to these claims and
intends to defend them vigorously.

BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. is a Sunbelt-based bank holding
company whose subsidiary, Compass Bank, operates 687 branches,
under the trade name BBVA Compass.  BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc.
is a United States financial holding company headquartered in
Birmingham, Alabama and is a wholly owned subsidiary of BBVA.


BBVA COMPASS: Still Defends Lopez Class Suit on Overdraft Fees
--------------------------------------------------------------
BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. still defends a putative class action
lawsuit by Petra Lopez and Colea Wright related to certain
overdraft fees, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

In January 2018, BBVA Compass was named as a defendant in a
putative class action lawsuit filed in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Petra Lopez and Colea
Wright, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
v. BBVA Compass, challenging BBVA Compass' assessment of certain
overdraft fees.  The plaintiffs seek unspecified monetary relief.
The Company believes there are substantial defenses to these claims
and intends to defend them vigorously.

BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. is a Sunbelt-based bank holding
company whose subsidiary, Compass Bank, operates 687 branches,
under the trade name BBVA Compass.  BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc.
is a United States financial holding company headquartered in
Birmingham, Alabama and is a wholly owned subsidiary of BBVA.


BBVA COMPASS: Still Defends Oklahoma Firefighters' Class Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The purported class action lawsuit styled Oklahoma Firefighters
Pension & Retirement System, et al., on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated v. BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc.,
BSI, et al., is still ongoing, according to BBVA Compass
Bancshares, Inc.'s Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

In March 2018, the Company and BBVA Securities Inc. ("BSI") were
named as defendants in a putative class action lawsuit filed in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & Retirement System, et al., on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. BBVA
Compass Bancshares, Inc., BSI, et al., alleging that the defendant
banks and their named subsidiaries engaged in collusion with
respect to the sale of Mexican Government Bonds.  Five
substantially similar lawsuits were filed that will be consolidated
with the original lawsuit.  The plaintiffs seek unspecified
monetary relief.  The Company believes there are substantial
defenses to these claims and intends to defend them vigorously.

BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. is a Sunbelt-based bank holding
company whose subsidiary, Compass Bank, operates 687 branches,
under the trade name BBVA Compass.  BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc.
is a United States financial holding company headquartered in
Birmingham, Alabama and is a wholly owned subsidiary of BBVA.


BELLICUM PHARMA: Bid for Lead Plaintiff & Counsel Still Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bellicum Pharmaceuticals, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018, that the District Court has yet to rule
on the motions filed by putative class members for appointment as
lead plaintiff and approval of lead counsel in a consolidated class
action lawsuit.

On February 6, 2018, a purported securities class action complaint
captioned Nipun Kakkar v. Bellicum Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Rick Fair
and Alan Musso was filed against the Company, and certain of its
officers in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, Houston Division.

A second substantially similar class action was filed on March 14,
2018 by plaintiff Frances Rudy against the same defendants in the
same court.

The lawsuits purport to assert class action claims on behalf of
purchasers of the Company's securities during the period from May
8, 2017 through January 30, 2018.  The complaints allege that the
defendants violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
(the "Exchange Act"), by making materially false and misleading
statements concerning the Company's clinical trials being conducted
in the U.S. to assess BPX-501 as an adjunct T-cell therapy
administered after allogeneic hematopoietic stem cell
transplantation.

The complaints purport to assert claims for violations of Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder.  The complaints seek, on behalf of the purported class,
an unspecified amount of monetary damages, interest, fees and
expenses of attorneys and experts, and other relief.

On April 9, 2018, the District Court consolidated the two lawsuits
under the Kakkar action and motions were filed by putative class
members for appointment as lead plaintiff and approval of lead
counsel.  The District Court has yet to rule on the motions.

Bellicum Pharmaceuticals, Inc. a clinical stage biopharmaceutical
company focused on discovering and developing novel cellular
immunotherapies for various forms of cancer, including both
hematological cancers and solid tumors, as well as orphan inherited
blood disorders. The company is based in Houston, Texas.


BEST BUY: Filing of 2nd Amended IBEW Securities Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Best Buy Co., Inc., et al., Defendants, Civil No. 11-429 (DWF/FLN)
(D. Minn.), Magistrate Judge Franklin L. Noel of the U.S. of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota (i) denied the
Lead Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended class
complaint; and (ii) denied without prejudice his motion to compel.

The protracted securities litigation stems from a dispute over the
impact that a series of Best Buy's late 2010 public statements had
on the valuation of, and demand for, its publicly traded stock
shares.  At the heart of the dispute is the Lead Plaintiff's
allegation that Best Buy knew that its late 2010 statements were
false and were issued with the fraudulent intent of galvanizing
investor interest and confidence in its stock value at a time when
its sales, revenues, and market share were in perceptible decline.

On Sept. 14, 2010, at around 8:00 a.m., Best Buy issued a press
release regarding its forecasted financial performance, market
position, and product line sales revenue for the second fiscal
quarter of 2011.  Specifically, the press release reported a
decline of 0.1% in comparable store sales growth; lower sales
across home theater, and entertainment hardware and software;
decreased traffic in stores; and its first decline in market share
in eighteen quarters.  Best Buy's common stock, which closed the
day before at $34.65, opened the morning of Sept. 14, 2010, at
$37.25 per share, a 7.5% increase.  Throughout November of 2010,
Best Buy's stock value continued to rise, trading at a high point
of $45.63 per share on Nov. 23, 2010.

On Nov. 24, 2010, two days before Black Friday, Mike Vitelli, Best
Buy's Enterprise Executive Vice President and President for the
Americas claimed in an interview with Neil Cavuto of Fox News that
Best Buy's flat-screen TV sales were "going really strong" and
intimated that customer demand for the product was high.  On the
morning of Black Friday, Nov. 26, 2010, Best Buy's CEO, Brian Dunn
stated that Best Buy estimated about an 8% increase in their store
traffic.  On Dec. 13, 2010, Best Buy's stock value had stabilized
at $41.70 per share.

Despite the optimism of the Black Friday statements, beginning in
mid December 2010, Best Buy's public statements reported marginal
or poor sales performance.  By the day's end on Dec. 14, 2010, Best
Buy's stock value had dropped to $35.52 per share, a 14% decline.

On Feb. 18, 2011, the action was initiated on behalf of Best Buy
common stock purchasers between Sept. 14, 2010, and Dec. 13, 2010.
Throughout the case, the Plaintiffs have asserted that both Best
Buy's 8:00 a.m. press release and 10:00 a.m. conference call on
Sept. 14, 2010, were false and misleading statements and issued
with the intended effect of causing Best Buy's stock to trade at
artificially inflated prices throughout the Class Period.  They
have also maintained that, as to the Black Friday related Nov. 24,
2010, Fox News interview, Best Buy knew that its flatscreen TV
sales were declining long before the interview was given, and that
Vitelli's false statement was material to investors.

On June 7, 2011, Marion Haynes was appointed the Lead Plaintiff,
and theCourt consolidated several related actions against Best Buy
into the action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a).
On July 22, 2011, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Consolidated
Class Complaint, raising two counts under Section 10(b), Rule
10b-5, and Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.

On March 20, 2012, the District Court dismissed the Plaintiffs'
Amended Consolidated Class Complaint with prejudice, and denied
their motion for leave to file a proposed first amended class
complaint.  

On Oct. 22, 2012, the District Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e), vacated judgment and granted the Plaintiffs'
motion for leave to file their proposed first amended class
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).  On
Aug. 5, 2013, the District Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), again dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims related
to the Sept. 14, 2010, 8:00 a.m. press release.

On Sept. 13, 2013, the parties filed a joint report pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) for the remaining claims
related to the Sept. 14, 2010, 10:00 a.m. conference call.  Shortly
thereafter, on Sept. 25, 2013, this Court entered the Scheduling
Order.

On Jan. 31, 2014, the Plaintiffs moved to certify the class on the
remaining claims relating to the Sept. 14, 2010, 10:00 a.m.
conference call.  On Aug. 6, 2014, the District Court, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, certified the class on those
claims.

On Sept. 4, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to compel
Best Buy to reverse the indiscriminate and improper designation of
documents highly confidential and to search for and produce
documents from personal e-mail text messages.  On Sept. 11, 2014,
before Best Buy was required to respond to the instant motion to
compel, and before a hearing could be held, the District Court
provisionally stayed the case because Best Buy had petitioned the
Eighth Circuit to review the District Court's class certification
Order on the remaining Sept. 14, 2010, 10:00 a.m. conference call
claims.

On Sept. 24, 2014, the Eighth Circuit granted Best Buy's petition
to appeal the District Court's class certification Order.  On Oct.
22, 2014, the District Court indefinitely stayed the case, "pending
appeal" and the Eighth Circuit's resolution of the class
certification issue on the remaining Sept. 14, 2010, 10:00 a.m.
conference call claims.

On April 12, 2016, the Eighth Circuit Court reversed the District
Court's grant of class certification on the claims relating to the
remaining Sept. 14, 2010, 10:00 a.m. conference call claims and
remanded the case for further proceedings.  On June 1, 2016, the
Eighth Circuit denied the Plaintiffs' Petition for an en banc
rehearing, rendering its reversal of the District Court's class
certification Order as final.

On Jan. 20, 2017, the Lead Plaintiff formally moved for leave to
file a new motion for class certification on the remaining Sept.
14, 2010, conference call claims.  The Lead Plaintiff's request to
revisit the issue of class certification was based on his desire to
proffer new evidence that the Sept. 14, 2010, 10:00 a.m. conference
call had a price impact by artificially maintaining the inflated
stock price.  On June 23, 2017, the District Court denied Lead
Plaintiff's request for leave to file a new motion for class
certification.

The Lead Plaintiff now moves for leave to file his proposed second
amended class complaint.  He argues that discovery has shown that
the allegations in the First Amended Class Complaint to be
manifestly correct and the proposed second amended class complaint
identifies three additional materially false and misleading
statements made in Best Buy's Sept. 14, 2010, 8:00 a.m. press
release, not previously alleged.

Magistrate Judge Noel holds that neither newly discovered facts, a
change in circumstance, or a change in law justify the Lead
Plaintiff's belated motion for leave to amend.  The accessibility
of the Courts would have no particular societal benefit if the
actions so filed were not able to be timely brought to Trial.  This
fundamental truth, clearly articulated in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 1, underscores the focus of Rule 16(b) on the diligence
of the party seeking to modify a Scheduling Order, as opposed to
unpersuasive excuses, inclusive of inadvertence and neglect, which
commonly undergird an untimely Motion to Amend.

Considering how long the Lead Plaintiff has possessed the discovery
used to support the instant motion for leave to amend, and how
long, armed with that discovery, the Magistrate Judge finds that
the Lead Plaintiff has waited to bring the motion while at the same
time opting to pursue the class certification issue on the
remaining Sept. 14, 2010, 10:00 a.m. conference call claims.  He
must conclude that the Lead Plaintiff has not shown the required
good cause nor been diligent in moving for leave to amend.  As a
result, Lead Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend is denied
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4).

In addition to undue delay, granting the Lead Plaintiff's motion
for leave to amend would prejudice Best Buy.  Specifically,
granting the Lead Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend based on
the Sept. 14, 2010, 8:00 a.m. press release and Vitelli's Nov. 24,
2010 Black Friday Fox News interview is redolent of restarting the
litigation on a fourth operative complaint in a case that has
proceeded before both the District Court and Eighth Circuit at
different junctures for seven years on matters already litigated
and decided.

The Magistrate Judge finds that during the seven year pendency of
the case, the parties have engaged in discovery, produced
deponents, and extensively argued the issues raised in the Lead
Plaintiff's instant motion for leave to amend.  Fundamentally, Best
Buy would be prejudiced by having to defend a revived action that
is based on previously rejected arguments.  Accordingly, the Lead
Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend is also denied under Rule
15(a)(2) because the request was unduly delayed and Best Buy would
suffer prejudice.

In addition, the Magistrate Judge finds no compelling reason or
clear error or manifest injustice in these holdings.  Indeed, the
Court does not find it appropriate to permit amendment based on an
issue competently decided by the Eighth Circuit and District Court.
After seven years of litigation, and in light of the Eighth
Circuit and District Court's rulings, the case must now proceed as
an individual action based on the Sept. 14, 2010, 10:00 a.m.
conference call.

Given that the motion to compel was filed nearly four years ago,
has not been fully briefed, has not been set for oral argument, and
that no party during the 2016 case management conference or 2017
letter briefing expressed an interest in having the matter
adjudicated, he will deny the Lead Plaintiff's motion to compel
without prejudice.  In his view, the class certification issue and
long delay has likely obviated the need for judicial resolution of
the instant motion to compel.  The Lead Plaintiff may raise the
matter again, if necessary.

On a final note, the Magistrate Judg observes that the parties have
not moved to maintain the seal over several docket entries filed in
conjunction with the instant motion for leave to amend.  Local Rule
5.6(d)(2) imposes strict time-limits on when parties are required
to move to maintain the seal over a temporality sealed docket
entry.  The parties are instructed to file a joint motion regarding
continued sealing in conformity with the Local Rule 5.6(d)(2)
within 10 days of the Order or risk having those docket entries
unsealed.

Because the Lead Plaintiff's proposed second amended class
complaint fails to satisfy either Rule 16(b)(4) or 15(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or Rule 16.3 of the Local Rules
for the District of Minnesota, Magistrate Judge Noel denied the
Lead Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended class
action complaint for violation of the federal securities law.  In
addition, he denied without prejudice the Lead Plaintiff's motion
to compel.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/5v5yC0 from Leagle.com.

IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Aelish M. Baig
-- aelishb@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice, Clayton D. Halunen -- halunen@halunenlaw.com -- Halunen Law,
Daniel J. Pfefferbaum -- dpfefferbaum@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Darren J. Robbins --
darrenr@rgrdlaw.com -- David C. Walton -- davew@rgrdlaw.com --
Kenny J. Black -- kennyb@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Melissa S. Weiner, Halunen Law, Shawn J.
Wanta -- sjwanta@baillonthome.com -- Baillon Thome Jozwiak & Wanta
LLP, Shawn A. Williams -- shawnw@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, Steven F. Marino -- smarino@marinoassociates.net
-- & Vernon J. Vander Weide -- vjvanderweide@locklaw.com --
Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP.

Marion Haynes, Lead Plaintiff, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Aelish M.
Baig, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Clayton D.
Halunen, Halunen Law, Daniel J. Pfefferbaum, Robbins Geller Rudman
& Dowd LLP, Kenny J. Black, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro
hac vice, Melissa S. Weiner, Halunen Law, Shawn J. Wanta, Baillon
Thome Jozwiak & Wanta LLP & Shawn A. Williams, Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Rene LeBlanc, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adrienne O. Bell --
abell@ktmc.com -- Clayton D. Halunen, Halunen Law, D. Seamus
Kaskela, Barroway Topaz Kessler Meltzer & Check, LLP, pro hac vice,
David M. Promisloff , Barroway Topaz Kessler Meltzer & Check, LLP,
pro hac vice, Garrett D. Blanchfield, Jr.
--g.blanchfield@rwblawfirm.com -- Reinhardt Wendorf & Blanchfield &
Shawn J. Wanta, Baillon Thome Jozwiak & Wanta LLP.

Best Buy Co., Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel J. Stujenske
-- dstujenske@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, pro hac
vice, Eric J. Magnuson -- EMagnuson@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins
Kaplan LLP, George S. Wang -- gwang@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey Sullivan Gleason --
JGleason@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan LLP, Joseph M.
McLaughlin -- jmclaughlin@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph M. McLaughlin, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
LLP & Stephen P. Safranski -- SSafranski@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins
Kaplan LLP.

Brian J Dunn, Jim Muehlbauer & Mike Vitelli, Defendants,
represented by Eric J. Magnuson, Robins Kaplan LLP, Jeffrey
Sullivan Gleason , Robins Kaplan LLP, Joseph M. McLaughlin, Simpson
Thacher & Bartlett LLP & Stephen P. Safranski, Robins Kaplan LLP.


BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD: Court Dismisses HIV/AIDS Patient's ADA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee, Western Division, granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff John Doe's First Amended Complaint in the case captioned
JOHN DOE, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD OF TENNESSEE, INC., Defendant,
No. 2:17-cv-02793-TLP-cgc (W.D. Tenn.).

The Amended Complaint asserts claims against the Defendant for
disability discrimination in violation of Section 1557 of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) (Count I) and
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)
(Count II), breach of contract (Count III), and unjust enrichment
(Count IV).

Discrimination in Violation of the ACA

The Plaintiff claims that the Program's disproportionate effect on
him and other BCBST enrollees who suffer from HIV/AIDS violates
Section 1557 of the ACA. By contrast, the Defendant argues that the
Plaintiff fails to state a viable claim under Section 1557 of the
ACA as enforced by Section 504 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehab Act) Section 1557 is the ACA's anti-discrimination statute,
which prohibits discrimination by any health plan on the basis of
race, gender, age, or disability.

A discrimination claim under Section 504 of the Rehab Act requires
a plaintiff to show: (1) the plaintiff is a handicapped' person
under the Rehab] Act; (2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified for
participation in the program at issue; (3) the plaintiff is
excluded from participation in, being denied the benefits of, or
being subjected to discrimination under the program solely by
reason of his handicap;' and (4) the relevant program or activity
is receiving Federal financial assistance.

Disparate Treatment Claim

To state a claim for disparate treatment under Section 504 of the
Rehab Act, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted
intentionally, i.e., that the defendant engaged in discriminatory
conduct intentionally, or solely by reason of the plaintiff's
disability.

The Plaintiff argues that his allegations of BCBST intentionally
discriminating against HIV/AIDS patients and being driven by profit
are not mutually exclusive. The Plaintiff asserts that his
disability discrimination claim is valid under a mixed motive
theory as seen in employment cases.

The allegations that the Defendant's Program specifically targets
individuals based on their disability, including HIV/AIDS, and
affirmatively discriminates against them based on their disability,
are conclusory and thus insufficient to state a claim for disparate
treatment. So the Amended Complaint fails to state a prima facie
claim that Defendant enacted the Program to discriminate against
HIV/AIDS patients because of their disability.

The Court then turns to the issues of whether the Plaintiff may
pursue an ACA disability discrimination claim under a disparate
impact theory and, if so, whether the Plaintiff has made a prima
facie disparate impact claim.

Disparate Impact Claim

In those jurisdictions which allow such claims, a plaintiff must
prove (1) the occurrence of certain outwardly neutral practices,
and (2) a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on
persons of a particular type produced by the defendant's facially
neutral acts or practices.

Here the Plaintiff's disparate impact claim asserts that the
Program's requiring HIV/AIDS patients to obtain their HIV/AIDS
medications by mail from a few B&M specialty pharmacies effectively
discriminates against the Plaintiff and potential class members
based on their status as being HIV/AIDS positive.  

The parties disagree on two fronts whether the Plaintiff may assert
an ACA discrimination claim under a disparate impact theory. One,
they disagree whether one or all the enforcement mechanisms of the
civil rights statutes applies to the Plaintiff's claim; two, they
dispute whether disparate impact claims are available under the
Rehab Act.

Determining Which Enforcement Mechanism Applies

The Plaintiff relies on the OCR's interpretation of Section 1557
and the Rumble (Rumble, 2015 WL 1197415, at *11) decision to
support its argument that Section 1557 thus incorporates the
enforcement mechanisms of all of the named statutes.

The Defendant counters that the plain language of Section 1557 is
unambiguous and that the enforcement mechanism of the Rehab Act
shall apply as the sole theory under which Plaintiff may bring his
disability discrimination claim under Section 1557.

Here, the Court similarly concludes that if Congress intended for a
single standard to apply to all Section 1557 discrimination claims,
repeating the references to the civil-rights statutes and expressly
incorporating their distinct enforcement mechanisms would have been
a pointless and confusing exercise. As in Briscoe (Briscoe v.
Health Care Serv. Corp., 281 F.Supp.3d 725 (N.D. Ill. 2017), the
Court analyzes the Plaintiff's ACA disability discrimination claim
under the Rehab Act's enforcement mechanism.

Whether the Rehab Act Allows Disparate Impact Claims

The Court's analysis and holding are not questioning the difficulty
experienced by the Plaintiff's and other patients with HIV/AIDS who
obtain their medications through the Defendant's Program. The Court
also recognizes that despite advances in education and medicine,
being HIV/AIDS positive still carries a stigma. Those diagnosed
with either condition face significant challenges, including the
discrimination they encounter in many aspects of their daily lives.
Perhaps the Program here makes that reality even more painful for
the Plaintiff. All the same, the Court finds that the Amended
Complaint stops short of alleging that the Plaintiff's insurer has
completely deprived him of access to his HIV/AIDS medication. This
is particularly compelling when considering whether the Plaintiff
has stated a claim for disparate impact under the Rehab Act.

The Court grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and the
Plaintiff's Count I of the Amended Complaint is dismissed with
prejudice.

Title III of the ADA

The Plaintiff's second cause of action is that the Defendant's
allegedly discriminatory Program violates Title III of the ADA.
This title provides, "No individual shall be discriminated against
on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person
who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation."

To state a claim for disability discrimination under Title III, a
plaintiff must allege that: (1) [he] is disabled within the meaning
of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns,
leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the
plaintiff was denied public accommodations by the defendant because
of his disability.

The Amended Complaint alleges that the Program denies the Plaintiff
full access to and enjoyment of community pharmacies, which are
places of public accommodation under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. Section
12181(7)(F). The Plaintiff argues that the terms of the Plaintiff's
policy with BCBST violates Title III of the ADA because BCBST
effectively operates pharmacies by controlling enrollees' access to
and enjoyment of community pharmacies through the terms of their
health plans.

Here, the essence of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint centers on
the terms of the Defendant's specialty medication Program under his
health insurance plan. That the Plaintiff may not use his plan
benefits at a community pharmacy of his choosing to pay for his
HIV/AIDS medication fails to support a valid claim against his
insurance provider under Title III of the ADA. The Sixth Circuit's
language in Parker suggests that there is no nexus between the
disparity in benefits under the Plaintiff's health plan and the
services offered by a community pharmacy.  

Viewing the Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, the Court finds persuasive the Defendant's point that
Plaintiff's ADA claim is based on the terms of BCBST's coverage for
specialty medications, not the availability of coverage for those
medications even when the effect of those terms is that the
Plaintiff may not obtain his HIV/AIDS medication from a community
pharmacy without incurring exorbitant costs. The Plaintiff is not
complaining that he cannot use a community pharmacy at all. At
bottom, the Plaintiff's complaint is that his health insurance
provider will not pay for one of his medications if he goes to his
local pharmacy.

Thus, the Plaintiff has no claim under Title III of the ADA, and
Count II of the Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

Breach of Contract

The Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is also based on an
alleged violation of the Rider. The Plaintiff alleges here that
Defendant agreed to cover the Plaintiff's prescription drugs,
subject to a copay, so long as those drugs were (a) filled on or
after Plaintiff's coverage began; (b) approved for use by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA); (c) dispensed by a licensed
pharmacist or network physician; and (d) listed on BCBST's
Preferred Formulary.

By contrast, the Defendant maintains that Count III should be
dismissed because the Plaintiff fails to identify any contractual
provision that BCBST purportedly breached and because the Plaintiff
may not assert a standalone claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The Plaintiff's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing claim, it is well established under Tennessee law that
performance of a contract according to its terms cannot be
characterized as bad faith. And the implied obligation of good
faith and fair dealing does not create new contractual rights or
obligations, nor can it be used to circumvent or alter the specific
terms of the parties' agreement. A claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on compliance with a
contractual term and which fails to identify the precise terms that
the Defendant allegedly breached cannot survive because it would
require the Court to rewrite the Plaintiff's health plan. Reading
the contractual terms cited in the Amended Complaint in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court still finds that the
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for breach of contract.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff fails to allege a plausible
breach of contract claim, so, Count III of the Amended Complaint is
dismissed with prejudice.

Unjust Enrichment

Even though a plaintiff may not recover for both breach of contract
and unjust enrichment, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
affirmatively allow plaintiffs to plead in the alternative,
regardless of consistency. Here, however, the parties admit that
the Plaintiff's BCBST health plan controls the relationship between
the parties, and the Plaintiff does not appear to contend that the
health plan would not cover some aspect of the Plaintiff's ability
to obtain his HIV/AIDS medications.

The Court also finds that the health plan is an enforceable
contract controlling the parties' relationship, which means that,
the Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim, even pleaded
alternatively, necessarily fails.

Thus, Count IV of the Amended Complaint is dismissed with
prejudice.

Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint is granted
as follows: (1) Count I is dismissed with prejudice; (2) Count II
is dismissed with prejudice; (3) Count III is dismissed with
prejudice; and (4) Count IV is dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 30, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yalv8ukj from
Leagle.com.

John Doe, Plaintiff, represented by Alan McQuarrie Mansfield --
alan@clgca.com -- pro hac vice, Benjamin Reese Powell --
Benjamin.Scharf@vta.org -- CONSUMER WATCHDOG, pro hac vice, David
W. Garrison , BARRETT JOHNSTON MARTIN & GARRISON LLC, Edith Marie
Kallas , WHATLEY KALLAS, LLP, pro hac vice, Gerald Sinclair
Flanagan -- jerry@consumerwatchdog.org -- CONSUMER WATCHDOG, pro
hac vice, Seth M. Hyatt -- shyatt@barrettjohnston.com -- BARRETT
JOHNSTON MARTIN & GARRISON LLC & Gerald E. Martin --
jmartin@barrettjohnston.com -- BARRETT JOHNSTON MARTIN & GARRISON
LLC.

Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee, Inc., Defendant, represented
by Abraham Judson Souza -- asouza@reedsmith.com -- REED SMITH LLP,
pro hac vice, Bryan Matthew Webster -- bwebster@reedsmith.com, REED
SMITH, pro hac vice & Robert E. Boston -- bob.boston@wallerlaw.com
-- WALLER LANSDEN DORTCH & DAVIS.


BRIGHTHOUSE FINANCIAL: Faces Roycroft Group Annuity Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Brighthouse Financial, Inc. is facing a purported class action
filed by Edward Roycroft related to a Martindale-Hubbell group
annuity contract, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

The case is styled, Edward Roycroft v. Brighthouse Financial, Inc.,
et al. (U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, filed
June 18, 2018).

Edward Roycroft filed a purported class action against Brighthouse
Financial, Inc., MetLife, Inc., and Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company.  The complaint alleges plaintiff is a beneficiary of a
Martindale-Hubbell group annuity contract and did not receive
payments plaintiff claims he was entitled to upon his retirement in
1999.  Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of all beneficiaries
who were due annuity benefits pursuant to group annuity contracts
and whose annuity benefits were released from reserves.
Plaintiff's causes of action are for conversion, unjust enrichment,
an accounting and for a constructive trust.  Plaintiff seeks
damages, attorneys' fees, declaratory and injunctive relief and
other equitable remedies.  Brighthouse Financial, Inc. intends to
defend this action vigorously.


CA INC: Faces Putative Class Action over Broadcom Merger Pact
-------------------------------------------------------------
CA, Inc. is facing a purported class action complaint was filed on
behalf of the Company's stockholders related to its merger
agreement with Broadcom Inc., according to its Form 10-Q filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The Company said, "On August 3, 2018, subsequent to the Company's
announcement of its agreement to be acquired by Broadcom Inc.
("Broadcom") pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, a
purported class action complaint was filed on behalf of the
Company's stockholders against the Company, members of its Board of
Directors, Collie Acquisition Corp. and Broadcom in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.  The
plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendants from consummating the
proposed transaction, or, if the transaction is consummated, the
plaintiff alternatively seeks rescission and/or damages.  The
plaintiff also seeks costs and fees associated with the suit."

CA, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, develops, markets,
delivers, and licenses software products and services in the United
States and internationally.  It operates through three segments:
Mainframe Solutions, Enterprise Solutions, and Services.  The
Company was formerly known as CA Technologies and changed its name
to CA, Inc. in 2006.  CA, Inc. was founded in 1974 and is
headquartered in New York, New York.


CAPSTONE TURBINE: Sept. 24 Mediation in Securities Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The parties in a consolidated federal securities class action in
California are scheduled to participate in mediation on September
24, 2018, according to Capstone Turbine Corporation's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

Federal Securities Class Action

Two putative securities class action complaints were filed against
the Company and certain of its current and former officers in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
under the following captions:  David Kinney, etc.  v. Capstone
Turbine, et al., No. 2:15-CV-08914 on November 16, 2015 (the
"Kinney Complaint") and Kevin M. Grooms, etc.  v. Capstone Turbine,
et al., No. 2:15-CV-09155 on December 18, 2015 (the "Grooms
Complaint").

The putative class in the Kinney Complaint is comprised of all
purchasers of the Company's securities between November 7, 2013 and
November 5, 2015.  The Kinney Complaint alleges material
misrepresentations and omissions in public statements regarding BPC
and the likelihood that BPC would not be able to fulfill many legal
and financial obligations to the Company.  The Kinney Complaint
also alleges that the Company's financial statements were not
appropriately adjusted in light of this situation and were not
maintained in accordance with GAAP, and that the Company lacked
adequate internal controls over accounting.  The Kinney Complaint
alleges that these public statements and accounting irregularities
constituted violations by all named defendants of Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, as well as violations
of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act by the individual defendants.

The Grooms Complaint makes allegations and claims that are
substantially identical to those in the Kinney Complaint, and both
complaints seek compensatory damages of an undisclosed amount.

On January 16, 2016, several shareholders filed motions to
consolidate the Kinney and Grooms actions and for appointment as
lead plaintiff.  On February 29, 2016, the Court granted the
motions to consolidate, and appointed a lead plaintiff.

On May 6, 2016, a Consolidated Amended Complaint with allegations
and claims substantially identical to those of the Kinney Complaint
was filed in the consolidated action.  The putative class period in
the Consolidated Amended Complaint is June 12, 2014 to November 5,
2015.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Consolidated Amended
Complaint on June 17, 2016.  On March 10, 2017, the Court issued an
order granting Defendants' motion to dismiss in its entirety with
leave to amend.

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on April 28, 2017.  On
February 9, 2018, the Court issued an Order denying Defendants'
motion to dismiss.

On March 30, 2018, Defendants filed an answer to the Consolidated
Amended Complaint.  On May 17, 2018, the Court issued a scheduling
order setting a trial date of March 17, 2020.

On June 26, 2018, the Court entered an order vacating all deadlines
through the end of October 2018 and temporarily staying formal
discovery and other proceedings to allow the parties time to
conduct a mediation.  The parties are scheduled to participate in
mediation on September 24, 2018.

The Company has not recorded any liability as of June 30, 2018
since any potential loss is not probable or reasonably estimable
given the current status of the proceedings.

Capstone Turbine Corporation develops, manufactures, markets and
services microturbine technology solutions for use in stationary
distributed power generation applications, including cogeneration
(combined heat and power ("CHP"), and combined cooling, heat and
power ("CCHP")), renewable energy, natural resources, critical
power supply, transportation and marine. In addition, the Company's
microturbines can be used as battery charging generators for hybrid
electric vehicle applications. The Company was organized in 1988
and has been producing its microturbine generators commercially
since 1998.


CAVOTEC SA: Cal. App. Reverses Bid for Judgment Denial in "Colaco"
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL COLACO et al., Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants
and Appellants, v. CAVOTEC SA et al., Defendants,
Cross-complainants and Respondents, Case No. G052619 (Cal. App.),
Judge Richard M. Aronson of the Court of Appeals of California for
the Fourth District, Division Three, reversed the judgment of the
trial court's order denying the Appellants' motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV").

Appellants Inet Airport Systems, Inc., Inet Airport Systems, LLC,
Michael Colaco, and April Barry appeal from the judgment entered
against them in the action arising from Inet's sale of its assets
to respondents Cavotec SA and Cavotec Inet US, Inc.  Colaco was
Inet's sole shareholder and its CEO, and Barry was Inet's director
of administration.  After the transaction, Colaco became Cavotec
Inet US, Inc.'s president and a member of its board of directors,
and Barry became the company's chief financial officer.

In August 2011, Colaco and Inet entered into the "Asset Purchase
Agreement and Plan of Reorganization" with Cavotec SA and Cavotec
Inet US Inc., a Delaware corporation Cavotec SA formed as a
subsidiary for the transaction.  Under the APA, Inet agreed to sell
substantially all of its assets to Cavotec, including Inet's
long-term, in-process customer contracts, Inet's inventory and
equipment, all leasehold improvements to Inet's manufacturing
facility, and Inet's intellectual property.  In exchange, Cavotec
agreed to transfer to Inet 7.7 million shares of Cavotec SA stock
and make two, $2 million "Performance Earn-out Payments" to Inet,
one on the APA's first anniversary in August 2012 and another on
its second anniversary in August 2013.  

In the APA, the parties valued the Cavotec SA shares at nearly $21
million.  Although Colaco was a signatory to the APA, he gave only
a limited number of warranties and assumed minor obligations that
are not at issue.  When the APA closed, Colaco became Cavotec Inet
US, Inc.'s president and a member of its board of directors, and
Barry became the company's chief financial officer.

In late August 2012, Cavotec SA's chairperson and its chief
executive officer met with Colaco to discuss how they amicably
could part ways. These discussions resulted in a one-page document
entitled, Memorandum of Understanding.  Under the MOU, Cavotec
agreed to pay the first Performance Earn-out Payment and accelerate
the second so that the entire $4 million would be paid by
mid-September 2012.  It also agreed to pay Colaco for certain
tenant improvements identified in the APA.  In return, Colaco
agreed to immediately resign as both a director and president of
Cavotec Inet US, Inc., and to cooperate in completing the
transition of Inet's business to Cavotec.

A few days after the parties entered into the MOU, Cavotec locked
Colaco and Barry out of its facilities because it suspected they
were soliciting employees to start a competing business and
destroying or stealing files rather than working cooperatively to
transition Inet's business to Cavotec.

In October 2012, Colaco and Inet filed the lawsuit alleging Cavotec
breached the APA as amended by the MOU.  The complaint sought the
second $2 million Performance Earn-out Payment and other payments
Cavotec agreed to make under both the APA and the MOU.  Cavotec
answered the complaint, alleging the amendments to the APA made by
the MOU were unenforceable because Colaco fraudulently induced
Cavotec to enter into the MOU through misrepresentations and false
promises he did not intend to perform.  Cavotec further alleged
Inet's breach of the APA excused its performance under the
contract.

Cavotec also filed a cross-complaint against Inet, Colaco, and
Barry. C avotec alleged Inet breached the APA and the Guidelines,
and also alleged a common count for money had and received based on
the postclosing customer payments Inet received on Cavotec's
behalf, but failed to forward to Cavotec.  Cavotec separately
alleged Colaco breached his Employment Contract and the fiduciary
duties he owed as an officer of Cavotec Inet US, Inc. by creating
false and backdated invoices and engaging in other misconduct that
caused Inet to withhold customer payments owed to Cavotec.  Based
on her cooperation with Colaco, Cavotec also alleged Barry breached
her fiduciary duty as an officer of Cavotec Inet US, Inc.  Finally,
Cavotec alleged Colaco and Barry converted certain of its funds to
their personal use.  As damages, the cross-complaint sought the
customer payments Inet withheld and the lost profits caused by
Colaco and Barry's misconduct. Cavotec also sought punitive damages
against Colaco and Barry.

Following a lengthy trial, the jury awarded Cavotec $1.313 million
against Inet, Colaco, and Barry, jointly and severally, based on
the jury's findings that (1) Inet breached its asset purchase
agreement with Cavotec by failing to forward all postclosing
customer payments Inet received on Cavotec's behalf; (2) Colaco and
Barry breached the fiduciary duties they owed as Cavotec officers
by causing Inet to withhold customer payments and creating false
and backdated invoices to conceal Inet's failure to pay; (3)
Colaco's conduct breached the employment contract he entered into
as Cavotec Inet US Inc.'s president; and (4) Colaco and Barry
converted Cavotec's funds for their personal use.  The jury also
awarded Cavotec $2 million in punitive damages against Colaco
only.

On appeal, Inet argues the trial court erred in denying its motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the undisputed
evidence showed Cavotec breached the asset purchase agreement by
failing to make its final $2 million payment. Inet contends the
trial court should have offset that $2 million against the $1.313
million Inet failed to pay to Cavotec, and the net result is a
judgment for $687,000 in Inet's favor.

Judge Aronson agrees that the trial court erred in denying Inet's
motion.  Cavotec's obligation to make the final $2 million payment
and Inet's obligation to turn over all postclosing payments to
Cavotec are independent covenants under the asset purchase
agreement.  Inet's breach of its obligation therefore did not
excuse Cavotec from its obligation.  Rather, Cavotec was
contractually required to perform and then seek damages or an
offset from Inet.  The jury's verdict, however, excused Cavotec
from its obligation based on Inet's breach and awarded Cavotec
damages for the same breach.  That is an impermissible windfall
that allows Cavotec to retain the assets it purchased from Inet
without paying the full purchase price.

Colaco contends the trial court erred in refusing to apply Delaware
law to the claims against him because Cavotec Inet US, Inc., was
incorporated in Delaware, and therefore the internal affairs
doctrine required the court to apply Delaware law in resolving the
issues regarding Colaco's performance as an officer of Cavotec Inet
US, Inc. Colaco asserts he was entitled to judgment on Cavotec's
fiduciary duty and punitive damages claims because Delaware law
bars fiduciary duty claims that arise from contractual obligations
and prohibits punitive damages on fiduciary duty claims.

The Judge disagrees.  In Colaco's employment agreement, he and
Cavotec Inet US, Inc. agreed California law would govern all their
rights and liabilities.  California law recognizes a strong public
policy favoring enforcement of choice-of-law provisions and our
courts may  refuse to enforce a provision bearing a reasonable
relationship to the parties or their transaction only when the
opponent shows a state other than the one on which the parties
agreed has a materially greater interest in the determination of
the particular issues involved.  Colaco fails to explain how
Delaware has a materially greater interest in applying its law on
the fiduciary duty claims raised in the case.  Instead, he simply
argues the internal affairs doctrine establishes a bright line rule
that overrides the parties' choice-of-law provision.  It does not,
and Colaco fails to explain how applying California law on these
particular issues will impair internal corporate affairs.

Barry also argues the internal affairs doctrine required the trial
court to apply Delaware law regarding the fiduciary duty and
punitive damages claims against her.  Barry's position differs from
Colaco's because she did not enter into a contract with Cavotec
Inet US, Inc. and she never agreed California law would govern her
rights and liabilities.  Nonetheless, the Judge holds he needs not
decide whether the internal affairs doctrine required the trial
court to apply Delaware law because the result on the claims
against Barry are the same under both Delaware and California law,
and therefore Barry cannot establish any error was prejudicial.

The Judge also rejects Colaco's contention the asset purchase
agreement barred Cavotec's claims for breach of his employment
contract and punitive damages.  He says the exclusive remedy
provision on which Colaco relies only applies to claims arising
under the asset purchase agreement, but Cavotec sued Colaco for
breaching his fiduciary duties and his employment agreement, not
the asset purchase agreement.  Contrary to Colaco's contention, the
jury's decision to award Cavotec damages on its claim against Inet
for breach of the asset purchase agreement and award the same
amount of damages for Colaco's breach of his employment contract
does not mean the jury held Colaco liable for Inet's breach of the
asset purchase agreement.  Rather, it simply means the breach of
those separate agreements resulted in the same damages, nothing
more.  Similarly, the punitive damages waiver in the asset purchase
agreement does not apply to Cavotec's punitive damages claim
against Colaco because that claim is not made under the asset
purchase agreement.

Ultimately, the Judge concludes Cavotec's $1.313 award against Inet
must be offset against its failure to make the second $2 million
payment owed under the APA.  Finally, for the reasons expressed at
the end of the opinion, he leaves undisturbed Cavotec's $2 million
punitive damage award against Colaco.

For these reasons, Judge Aronson reversed the trial court's
judgment and remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter
a new judgment in favor of Inet and against Cavotec for $687,000 in
compensatory damages on Inet's complaint; in favor of Cavotec and
against Colaco for $2 million in punitive damages on Cavotec's
cross-complaint; and in favor of Cavotec and against Barry on
Cavotec's cross-complaint.  All parties are to bear their own costs
on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/R7yOey from Leagle.com.

Stradling Yocca Carlson & Rauth, Jason H. Anderson --
janderson@sycr.com -- Jason de Bretteville and Bradley E. Marrett
-- jdebretteville@sycr.com -- for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Greenberg Gross, Alan A. Greenberg -- agreenberg@ggtriallaw.com --
Wayne R. Gross -- wgross@ggtriallaw.com -- and Howard M. Privette
-- hprivette@ggtriallaw.com -- for Defendants and Respondents.


CHSPSC LLC: Wins Summary Judgment in S. Sutton's FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee, Eastern Division, granted Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment seeking dismissal of all of Plaintiff's claims in the case
captioned STEPHEN SUTTON, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CHSPSC, LLC, a/k/a Dyersburg
Ambulatory Corp., f/k/a Community Health Systems Professional
Services, KNOXVILLE HMA HOLDINGS, LLC, a/k/a Dyersburg Ambulatory
Corp., d/b/a Tennova Healthcare, LLC, DYERSBURG HOSPITAL
CORPORATION, a/k/a Tennova Healthcare - Dyersburg Regional, a/k/a
Dyersburg Regional Medical Center, a/k/a Ambulance Service of
Dyersburg, and AMBULANCE SERVICES OF DYERSBURG, INC., f/k/a
Dyersburg Regional EMS, d/b/a Tennova EMS, Defendants, No.
1:16-cv-01318-STA-egb (W.D. Tenn.).

In this class action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (the
"FLSA"), the Plaintiff, on behalf of himself as well as those
similarly situated, seeks compensation for minimum-wage and
overtime violations of the FLSA. The Defendants in this case are
CHSPSC, LLC, Knoxville HMA Holdings, LLC, Dyersburg Hospital
Corporation, and Ambulance Services of Dyersburg, Inc. Plaintiff
Stephen Sutton has filed suit on behalf of himself and other
emergency medical technicians or paramedics employed by the
Defendants. The Plaintiff and the class members provide emergency
services to patients in the West Tennessee area, primarily Dyer
County, Tennessee.

The Plaintiff raises three FLSA claims against the Defendants: (1)
a class-action claim for violation of the FLSA's minimum-wage
requirements; (2) a class-action claim for violation of the FLSA's
overtime-wage requirements; and (3) a personal retaliation claim.

Class Minimum Wage Claim

The FLSA requires every employer to pay to each of his employees
who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages at not
less than $ 7.25 an hour.  But several courts have held that an
employer meets the minimum wage requirements if the total weekly
wage paid is equal to or greater than the number of hours worked in
the week multiplied by the statutory minimum hourly rate. U.S.
Dep't of Labor v. Cole Enterprises, Inc., 62 F.3d 775, 780 (6th
Cir. 1995).

Whether This Court Is Bound By Cole Enterprises

Clearly, the Sixth Circuit did not say it was adopting the weekly
method. And it was far from necessary to the appellate court's
decision to adopt it when considering the third alternative
argument of the third assignment of error in a challenge to the
trial court's finding. The Sixth Circuit ruled against those
defendants in every aspect of their appeal, including the
defendants' own test. Thus, it was not necessary to adopt the test
to resolve the case. The Sixth Circuit merely entertained the
defendants' proffered test and demonstrated that even then they
could not prevail. Though such actions would perhaps make the test
binding under the standards of the Ninth Circuit, the weekly method
of calculation was not adopted by the Sixth Circuit under any
traditional view of precedent. Accordingly, the Court holds that it
is not bound by the Sixth Circuit's "application" of the weekly
method of wage calculation in Cole Enterprises.

Whether the Weekly Method Is the Proper Test

In the Court's view, the phrase "in any workweek" is a clear
invocation of that necessary context of the typical case of
employment that frames the lives of most Americans: the workweek.
The phrase sets the parameters within which the minimum hourly wage
must be calculated. It is only the examinations of the statute by
prior courts that gives this Court reason to reflect on the
surplussage canon. At the very least, in any workweek should be
construed in light of this canon to require the weekly method of
calculation. But the use of this canon is likely unnecessary
because the Court sees no point that the phrase in any workweek"
might add emphasis too. For these reasons, the Court holds that the
weekly method of wage calculation is required by the FLSA.

The Plaintiff has presented no proof or even argued that, under the
weekly method of wage calculation, he or the other class members
received less than the minimum wage. Accordingly, the Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiff's minimum wage
claim. That claim is dismissed.

Class Overtime Wage Claim

The Defendants next seek summary judgment on the class claim for
violation of the overtime provisions of the FLSA. The Defendants'
argument is that, because the class plaintiffs are seeking
compensation for hours allegedly worked but not claimed, the
plaintiffs cannot prevail under the FLSA.

The FLSA provides that "no employer shall employ any of his
employees for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such
employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the
hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half
times the regular rate at which he is employed."  The Plaintiff
maintains that the Defendants violated this provision by failing to
compensate the class plaintiffs for all work performed in excess of
forty hours by the statutorily mandated rate.

The Plaintiff does not directly address this argument. The
Plaintiff instead sticks to his primary assertion that all sleep
time hours constitute hours worked and should contribute to the
count of weekly hours paid as overtime. In this instance, the
Defendants are correct. The undisputed facts demonstrate that the
class plaintiffs were free to write down hours that they were awake
during sleep time as hours worked but did not always do so for a
variety of reasons. Defendants cannot held be held responsible for
the class plaintiffs' failure in this regard.

Therefore, as to the Plaintiff's overtime-wage claim, the
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 5, 2018 Order is
available at   https://tinyurl.com/ydejzsl2 from Leagle.com.

Stephen Sutton, Plaintiff, represented by Alan G. Crone , THE CRONE
LAW FIRM, PLC, Bailey H. Dorsey , THE CRONE LAW FIRM, PLC & Laura
Ann Elizabeth Bailey , THE CRONE LAW FIRM, PLC.

CHSPSC, LLC, agent of a/k/a Dyersburg Ambulatory Corp, agent of
f/k/a Community Health Systems Professional Services, Knoxville HMA
Holdings, LLC, agent of a/k/a Dyersburg Ambulatory Corp, agent of
d/b/a Tennova Healthcare, LLC, Dyersburg Hospital Corporation,
agent of a/k/a Tennova Healthcare - Dyersburg Regional, agent of
a/k/a Dyersburg Regional Medical Center, agent of a/k/a Ambulance
Service of Dyersburg & Ambulance Services of Dyersburg, Inc., agent
of f/k/a Dyersburg Regional EMS, agent of d/b/a Tennova EMS,
Defendants, represented by Charles John Mataya --
sbible@bradley.com -- BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLC, John
Patrick Rodgers -- jrodgers@bradley.com -- BRADLEY ARANT BOULT
CUMMINGS LLP & Racquel Bianca Martin -- jrodgers@bradley.com --
BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP.


CITIZENS INC: Time to Appeal Gamboa Case Dismissal Expires
----------------------------------------------------------
Citizens, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018, that the period for the plaintiffs to appeal
from the dismissal of the putative class action lawsuit by Juan
Gamboa has expired.

The Company said, "On or about March 16, 2017, Juan Gamboa filed a
putative class action lawsuit against the Company and five of its
current and former directors and executive officers in the United
States District Court, Western District of Texas.  The lawsuit
alleged that the defendants violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder by making false and/or misleading statements, as well as
failing to disclose material adverse facts about the Company's
business, operations and prospects.  On May 25, 2017, the court
appointed lead plaintiffs, and on July 31, 2017, the lead
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.  The amended complaint
sought an award of damages in an unspecified amount on behalf of a
putative class consisting of persons who purchased the Company's
common stock between March 11, 2015 and March 8, 2017, inclusive.
On September 28, 2017, we filed a motion to dismiss.  On May 29,
2018, the court granted our motion, dismissed with prejudice the
plaintiffs' claims against all defendants and ordered the case
closed.  It is our understanding that the plaintiffs' appeal period
has expired."

Citizens, Inc. is a financial services company listed on the New
York Stock Exchange under the symbol CIA.  The Company utilizes a
three-pronged strategy for growth based upon worldwide sales of
U.S. Dollar-denominated whole life cash value insurance policies,
life insurance product sales in the U.S. and the acquisition of
other U.S.-based life insurance companies.


CIVITAS SOLUTIONS: Employee Class Actions Remain Pending
--------------------------------------------------------
Civitas Solutions, Inc. continues to defend employee-related class
action lawsuits, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

Specifically, the Company said that it is subject to
employee-related claims under state and federal law, including
claims for wage and hour violations under the Fair Labor Standards
Act or state wage and hour laws and claims for discrimination,
wrongful discharge or retaliation.

The Company currently has two pending complaints in California
state court that allege certain wage and hour violations of
California labor laws and seek to be designated as a class-action.

Two additional wage and hour class action claims have been settled,
one of which was settled and approved by the court on January 31,
2018 and one of which has been preliminarily approved by the court.
Final approval and payment for this claim is expected in September
2018.

Civitas Solutions, Inc. provides home- and community-based health
and human services to must-serve individuals with intellectual,
developmental, behavioral, and/or medically complex disabilities
and challenges in the United States.  It operates through
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (I/DD), Post-Acute
Specialty Rehabilitation Services (SRS), and At-Risk Youth (ARY)
segments.  It was formerly known as NMH Holdings, Inc. The company
was founded in 1980 and is based in Boston, Massachusetts.  Civitas
Solutions, Inc. is a subsidiary of Vestar Capital Partners.


CKO KICKBOXING: Diaz Files ADA Suit in S.D.N.Y.
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CKO Kickboxing
Corporation.  The case is captioned as Edwin Diaz, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. CKO Kickboxing
Corporation, Case No. 1:18-cv-07584 (S.D.N.Y., August 20, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

CKO Kickboxing offers nationwide health fitness and kickboxing gym
franchise opportunities.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 299-6612
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: joseph@cml.legal


CLIENT SERVICES: Yusifov Sues Over FDCPA Breach
-----------------------------------------------
Client Services, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The case is styled as Naum
Yusifov, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v.
Client Services, Inc., Case No. 1:18-cv-04705 (E.D.N.Y., August 20,
2018).

Client Services, Inc., operates as a customer relationship
management company that offers a suite of accounts receivable
management, business processing outsourcing (BPO), and healthcare
solutions.  The Company provides customer care, technical support,
customer acquisition, cross sell/up-sell, customer retention,
product/account activation, appointment setting/reminders, disaster
support, first notice of loss, market research, customer
satisfaction surveys, and multi-channel interaction management
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel C. Cohen, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (929) 575-4175
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: dan@cml.legal


COHU INC: Putative Shareholder Class Suits v. Xcerra Underway
-------------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder class action complaints have been filed in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts related to
the merger deal of Cohu, Inc. and Xcerra Corporation, according to
Cohu's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On May 8, 2018, Cohu announced that it entered into an Agreement
and Plan of Merger (the "Merger Agreement"), dated as of May 7,
2018, by and among Cohu, Xavier Acquisition Corporation, a Delaware
corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Cohu (the "Merger
Sub") and Xcerra Corporation, a Massachusetts corporation
("Xcerra").  Under the terms of the Merger Agreement, Merger Sub
will merge with and into Xcerra (the "Merger"), with Xcerra
continuing as the surviving corporation of the Merger (the
"Surviving Corporation") and a wholly owned subsidiary of Cohu.

On July 23, 2018 and July 30, 2018, putative shareholder class
action complaints were filed in the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts against Xcerra and each member of
the Xcerra Board, captioned Xinkang Shui v. Xcerra Corporation, et
al., C.A. No. 1:18-cv-11529 and Waseem Khan v. Xcerra Corporation,
et al., C.A. No. 1:18-cv-11592, respectively.  The complaints
allege, among other things, that Xcerra and each member of the
Xcerra Board violated federal securities laws and regulations by
soliciting stockholder votes in connection with the Merger through
a proxy statement that purportedly omits material facts necessary
to make the statements therein not false or misleading.  The
complaint seeks, among other things, either to enjoin Xcerra from
conducting the stockholder vote on the Merger unless and until the
allegedly omitted material information is disclosed or, in the
event the Merger is consummated, to recover damages.

Xcerra is reviewing the complaint and has not yet formally
responded to it, but believes that the plaintiffs' allegations are
without merit and intends to defend against them vigorously.
However, litigation is inherently uncertain and there can be no
assurance regarding the likelihood that Xcerra's defense of the
actions will be successful.  Additional complaints containing
substantially similar allegations may be filed in the future.

Cohu, Inc., through its subsidiaries, engages in the development,
manufacture, sale, and servicing of semiconductor test and
inspection handlers, micro-electro mechanical system (MEMS) test
modules, test contactors, and thermal sub-systems for semiconductor
manufacturers and test subcontractors worldwide.  The Company was
formerly known as Cohu Electronics, Inc. and changed its name to
Cohu, Inc. in 1972.  Cohu, Inc. was founded in 1947 and is
headquartered in Poway, California.


COLE HAAN: Court Partly Dismisses K. Park's FTCA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
Judge Larry Alan Burns of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California granted in part the Defendants' motions to
dismiss the case, KEVIN PARK, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. COLE HAAN, LLC; APAX
PARTNERS WORLDWIDE LLP, Defendant, Case No. 17cv1422-LAB (BGS)
(S.D. Cal.).

Park alleges that on June 25, 2017, he bought a pair of shoes for
his wife at a Cole Haan outlet, supposedly at a 50% discount.  He
alleges the shoes were not in fact discounted, and he would have
either not purchased the shoes or not paid as much for them had he
not believed he was getting a discount.

This is a putative class action.  Park brings claims under
California's Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising Laws, or
Consumer Legal Remedies Act.  He seeks to represent a class of all
people who bought a product made for the Cole Haan outlet in
California, provided the product they bought bore an original
price.  He seeks restitution to the class for their losses,
unspecified injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs.

The Defendants have moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.  Defendant Apax
Partners Worldwide LLP also moves to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.

Judge Burns finds that the Complaint falls short of even the Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly/Ashcroft v. Iqbal, pleading standard, and
even shorter of the Rule 9(b) standard.  It does not state a claim
under California's Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising Laws,
or Consumer Legal Remedies Act.  Nevertheless, it is not absolutely
clear that Park cannot correct its defects by amendment.  

He granted in part the motion to dismiss, and dismissed without
prejudice and with leave to amend the case.  No later than 28
calendar days from the date the Order is issued, Park may file an
amended complaint correcting the defects the Order identifies.
This includes typographic and formatting problems.

In particular, the amended complaint must plead facts establishing
jurisdiction.  It is not enough merely to conclude, as the original
complaint does, that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.
Any amended complaint must plead facts showing that the conclusion
has a reasonable factual basis.  If jurisdictional facts are not
adequately pled, the action will be dismissed without prejudice.

In the Order, Judge Burns has assumed that Park intends to allege
that his claims apply equally to all products sold in the outlet --
i.e., that all products are sold using the same misrepresentations
and are more cheaply made than those sold in retail stores.  Park
should make a reasonable investigation to confirm this, and to
amend his allegations if necessary, so that they accurately reflect
the scope of his claims and their likely monetary value.  If the
amount in controversy is not met, it is better for all concerned to
know this sooner rather than later.

Any amended complaint must not include claims for injunctive
relief, unless Park can plead facts showing he has standing under a
theory consistent with the order.

Park should bear in mind that the Judge has found the Defendants'
criticism of the Complaint's allegations to be generally
well-taken.  After a reasonable investigation, he should therefore
correct as many as he can, and supply the missing factual
allegations.  He should not omit facts needed to support his claims
on the assumption that he will be given another chance to meet the
pleading standard.  Rather, the Judge's working assumption will be
that if he does not allege important facts, it is because he
cannot.

If Park does not file an amended complaint within the time
permitted, the action will be dismissed without leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 17, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/vrO6Ko from Leagle.com.

Kevin Park, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alisa A. Martin --
alisa@amartinlaw.com -- Amartin Law, PC & Lindsay Christine David
-- lcdavid@brennanlawgrp.com -- Brennan & David Law Group.

Cole Haan, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company & Apax
Partners Worldwide, LLP, a Limited Liability Partnership,
Defendants, represented by Stephanie A. Sheridan --
ssheridan@steptoe.com -- Steptoe & Johnson LLP.


DELL TECHNOLOGIES: Still Defends Pontiac Securities Suit in N.Y.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dell Technologies, Inc. still defends itself in a securities class
action in New York, according to the Company's revised items of
Form 10-K, which served as an attachment of the Company's Form 8-K
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6,
2018.

On May 22, 2014, a securities class action seeking compensatory
damages was filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, captioned the City of Pontiac
Employee Retirement System vs. Dell Inc. et al. (Case No.
1:14-cv-03644).  The action names as defendants Dell Inc.  and
certain current and former executive officers, and alleges that
Dell made false and misleading statements about Dell's business
operations and products between February 22, 2012 and May 22, 2012,
which resulted in artificially inflated stock prices.  The case was
transferred to the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas, where the defendants filed a motion to dismiss.
On September 16, 2016, the Court denied the motion to dismiss and
the case is proceeding with discovery.  The defendants believe the
claims asserted are without merit and the risk of material loss is
remote.

Dell Technologies is a strategically aligned family of businesses
that brings together the entire infrastructure from hardware to
software to services -- from the edge to the data center to the
cloud. Dell Technologies is a leader in the traditional technology
of today and a leader in the cloud-native infrastructure of
tomorrow.


DUKE ENERGY: DCC/Preemption Claims Dismissal Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------
Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court
dismissing the Dormant Commerce Clause ("DCC") claim and the
preemption claim in the case, WILLIAM B. NEWTON, NOREEN ALLISON,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DUKE ENERGY FLORIDA, LLC, a Florida
imited iability company, FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a Florida
profit corporation, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 17-10080 (11th
Cir.).

In 2006, the Florida Legislature enacted the Florida Renewable
Energy Technologies and Energy Efficiency Act.  The Act authorized
the Florida Public Service Commission ("PSC") to create a plan to
incentivize energy utilities to invest in nuclear power plant
construction.  Acting on this authority, the PSC promulgated a
regulation creating the Nuclear Cost Recovery System ("NCRS"). If a
utility chooses to participate in the NCRS and receives PSC
approval of its plant construction project, it may preemptively
charge its customers through an electricity rate increase for costs
incurred in the siting, design, licensing, and construction" of the
project through its completion.  Under the NCRS, the utility
retains the funds generated by the rate increase even if the
project is never completed.

The case is a putative class action.  The Plaintiffs' class
representatives, William Newton and Noreen Allison ("Plaintiffs"),
claim that two provisions of the Act which authorize the NCRS,
Florida Statutes Sections 366.93 and 403.519(4), are invalid under
the DCC, which precludes a state from regulating Commerce among the
several States, and directly limits the power of the States to
discriminate against interstate commerce.  They also claim that the
two provisions of the Act are preempted by the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, and the Energy Policy Act of 2005.

The Plaintiffs did not bring these claims against the State of
Florida, the PSC (which is charged with implementing and
administering the Act), or its members.  Instead, they seek the
Act's invalidation solely by suing two electric utilities, Duke
Energy Florida and Florida Power & Light ("Utilities"), who have
been collecting rate increases from them and their class members
for nuclear plant construction that has been discontinued.

The Utilities separately moved the District Court to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) on numerous grounds.  As to the DCC claim, Utilities
argued that if a cause of action lies under the DCC, it belongs to
the States that may have been injured due to Florida's regulation
of interstate commerce and not to the Plaintiffs, who are Florida
utility customers.  They also argued that they are private parties,
not state actors, and, as such, could not have violated the DCC.
As to the preemption claims, they argued that they failed for
numerous reasons, including that preemption is a defense, not a
claim for relief.  The Utilities also argued that the preemption
claims failed on the merits.

The District Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' DCC claim for lack of
prudential standing because they were not in the zone of interests
protected by the Clause.  It dismissed the Plaintiffs' preemption
claims based on the Atomic Energy Act and the Energy Policy Act on
the ground that neither act created a cause of action, express or
implied.  The Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims without
granting leave to amend.

The Plaintiffs moved the District Court for reconsideration
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).  The motion
focused on the Court's dismissal of their claims without leave to
amend.  Citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), they
argued that they could cure the deficiencies in their complaint if
given leave to join the State of Florida as a defendant and to
prosecute their claims against Utilities under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983 on the ground that, in increasing their rates under the NCRS,
Utilities acted under color of state law.

The District Court denied the Rule 60(b) motion.  Its reading of
the motion was that the Plaintiffs were seeking to bolster their
claims against Utilities by joining the State as a Defendant.  This
would be futile.  Simply joining the State as a party, the Court
explained, would not suddenly empower the Plaintiffs to bring
constitutional claims against private entities, such as the
Utilities.  The Court did not expressly respond to the Plaintiffs'
request to bring their DCC claim against Utilities under Section
1983, but it implicitly rejected the request in stating that
Utilities were not acting under color of state law in participating
in the NCRS.

The Plaintiffs appeal the District Court's judgment, arguing that
the allegations of their complaint were sufficient to make out
their DCC claim and their preemption claim under the Atomic Energy
Act.  They also appeal the Court's denial of their Rule 60(b)
motion, arguing that the Court abused its discretion in denying the
request for leave to amend asserted in the motion.

Judge Tjoflat holds that the Plaintiffs are Florida electric
utility customers.  The Utilities are Florida companies.  They are
not "states" such that their actions could give rise to DCC claims
from an out-of-state person or entity.  The Plaintiffs' interests
are well beyond the zone the DCC is meant to protect.  For these
reasons, he affirms the dismissal of Plaintiffs' DCC claim under
Rule 12(b).

Turning to the Plaintiffs' preemption claim, the Judge finds that
the Plaintiffs point to no cases holding (nor authorities
suggesting) that state laws promoting investment in new nuclear
plants, or shifting the costs of nuclear plant construction, are
preempted by the Atomic Energy Act.  That failure is not surprising
given the language of 42 U.S.C. Section 2021(k).  They do cite 42
U.S.C. Section 2209 for the proposition that the Atomic Energy Act
specifically prohibits ccommercial reactors from receiving
subsidies.  But Section 2209 says only that no funds of the Atomic
Energy Commission will be employed in the construction or operation
of commercial nuclear reactors.  As the NCRS does not involve
Commission funds, Section 2209 does not help the Plaintiffs.
Therefore, he holds hold that the Atomic Energy Act does not
preempt the NCRS.

Finally, he considers whether the District Court abused its
discretion in denying the Plaintiffs' request for leave to amend
their complaint.  He finds that the request possessed no legal
effect for two reasons.  First, where a request for leave to file
an amended complaint simply is imbedded within an opposition
memorandum, the issue has not been raised properly.  Second, a
request for a court order must be made by motion.  The motion must
be in writing unless made during a hearing or trial.  The
Plaintiffs' inclusion of the request for leave in their opposition
to a motion to dismiss did not constitute a "motion" and thus did
not comply with this Rule 7(b) command.

Judge Tjoflat concluded that there's no merit in the Plaintiffs'
appeal.  The Plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim for
relief.  Accordingly, he affirmed the judgment of the District
Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/DokQMA from Leagle.com.

Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Robert M. Brochin -- bobby.brochin@morganlewis.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Jack Reise -- JReise@rgrdlaw.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Paul J. Geller -- PGeller@rgrdlaw.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Arnold Bradley Fagg -- brad.fagg@morganlewis.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Robert S. Peck -- robert.peck@cclfirm.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Stuart H. Singer -- ssinger@bsfllp.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Gary K. Harris -- gharris@bsfllp.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Elizabeth A. Shonson -- eshonson@rgrdlaw.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Lauren Fleischer Louis, for Defendant-Appellee.

Stephanie Schuster -- stephanie.schuster@morganlewis.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Barbara Mahoney -- barbaram@hbsslaw.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jerrod C. Patterson -- jerrodp@hbsslaw.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

William Russell Snyder, Jr. -- will_snyder@gensler.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Marcia Joan Cleveland, for Plaintiff-Appellant.


EBIX INC: Court Certifies Stockholder Class
-------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE EBIX, INC. STOCKHOLDER LITIGATION, Consolidated
C.A. No. 8526-VCS (Del. Ch.), Judge Joseph R. Slights, III of the
Court of Chancery of Delaware granted the Initial Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification.

On Oct. 31, 2016, Initial Plaintiffs Spagnola and Desert States
Employers & UFCW Union Pension Plan filed a Motion for Class
Certification in the action.   On Oct. 13, 2017, Defendants-Outside
Directors, Hans U. Benz, Pavan Bhalla, Neil D. Eckert, Rolf Herter,
and Hans U. Keller, filed a brief in opposition to the Motion.  On
Oct. 17, 2017, Barington Defendants, Joseph R. Wright, Jr. and
George W. Hebard, III, filed their joinder in the Outside
Directors' opposition to the Motion.

On Nov. 14, 2017, the Initial Plaintiffs filed their reply in
further support of their Motion.

On Jan. 5, 2018, Plaintiff, Amalgamated Bank, as Trustee for
LongView SmallCap 600 Index Fund and LongView Broadmarket 300 Index
Fund, filed a Motion for Permissive Joinder as Plaintiff, which was
granted on April 2, 2018.

By Order dated April 4, 2018, the Court directed the parties to
submit supplemental briefing on the Motion.

On May 2, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental brief in support of
their Motion.  On May 16, 2018, the Outside Directors filed a
supplemental brief in opposition to the Motion.  Defendants Ebix
and Robin Raina, do not oppose the Motion.  

On May 23, 2018, the Court heard oral argument on the Plaintiffs'
Motion.  The Plaintiffs, Spagnola, Desert States and Amalgamated
seek to be designated as class representatives.  The Defendants
take no position on the proposed class counsel.

Judge Slights finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the
proposed class satisfies the requirements under Rule 23(a) and
Rule 23(b).  Therefore, he certified the action as a class action
pursuant to Delaware Court of Chancery Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1) and
(2) without opt-out rights.  The Class will consist of all holders
of Ebix common stock and their successors in interest.

The Judge appointed Spagnola, Desert States and Amalgamated as the
Class Representatives; and the law firms PRICKETT, JONES & ELLIOTT,
P.A., 1310 N. King Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19801; and GRANT &
EISENHOFER P.A., 123 Justison Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19801,
as the Class Counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 17, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/UdpEKM from Leagle.com.


EDGE FITNESS: Court Conditionally Certifies MAs' Class
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification in the
case captioned MELISSA McARTHUR, individually and on behalf of all
other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. EDGE FITNESS,
LLC, Defendant, No. 3:17-cv-01554 (JAM)(D. Conn.).

The Plaintiff moves for conditional certification of this suit as a
collective action on behalf of all MAs who have worked for
defendant.

The Plaintiff asserts that for a period of her employment, the
defendant wrongly classified her as an exempt employee for Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) purposes and failed to pay her overtime
when she worked more than 40 hours a week.

The Plaintiff seeks to conditionally certify two separate classes,
pursuant to FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b), consisting of:

   i. All persons who have worked for defendant as Membership
Advisors in Connecticut from September 15, 2014, to November 24,
2016, who were classified as exempt and paid a salary and
commissions but no overtime pay in violation of state and federal
laws.

  ii. All persons who have worked for defendant as Membership
Advisors in Connecticut from November 25, 2016, to the date of
final judgment in this action who were classified as non-exempt but
who were not paid overtime on their commissions in violation of
state and federal laws.

Conditional Certification

Section 16(b) of the FLSA not only authorizes an employee to bring
a private cause of action on his or her own behalf but also allows
an employee to bring a collective action on behalf of similarly
situated employees. Unlike a Rule 23 class action in which putative
class members must opt out in order to remove themselves from the
class, a FLSA collective action requires employees to affirmatively
opt in to the case in order to join the collective action group.

The Defendant argues that conditional collective action
certification is inappropriate because the plaintiff is dissimilar
from other MAs and is not a proper collective action
representative. More specifically, the defendant argues that (1)
the plaintiff held a management-level position during the alleged
time period, so she was not similarly situated to the putative
plaintiffs for part of the alleged time period; (2) the plaintiff
suffered injuries in a motor vehicle accident that led her to file
a separate suit against a third party in 2017; and (3) the
plaintiff and opt-in plaintiffs have not worked at all thirteen of
its locations throughout Connecticut, and have no basis to show
that MAs at locations where they have not worked are subject to the
common policy or plan that they allege the defendant subjected them
to. The Court does not agree that any of these distinctions are
material to its initial threshold determination that other MAs may
be similarly situated to plaintiff for the time when she served as
an MA.

Because it is undisputed that all Membership Advisors had the same
job duties and were subject to the same allegedly unlawful
compensation policies, the Court concludes that the plaintiff and
potential opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated for FLSA
purposes and, accordingly, will conditionally certify this case as
a FLSA collective action. The collective group to receive notice
will be comprised of all persons employed as Membership Advisors in
the three years prior to the date the plaintiff filed her
complaint.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 5, 2018 Ruling is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yd6tdupf from Leagle.com.

Melissa McArthur, individually and on behalf of other similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Deborah L. McKenna
-- dmckenna@hayberlawfirm.com -- The Hayber Law Firm, LLC, Michael
T. Petela, Jr. , The Hayber Law Firm, LLC & Richard Eugene Hayber ,
The Hayber Law Firm LLC.

Edge Fitness, LLC, Defendant, represented by Daniel Adam Schwartz
-- dschwartz@goodwin.com -- Shipman & Goodwin LLP, Jarad M. Lucan
-- jlucan@goodwin.com -- Shipman & Goodwin & Keegan A. Drenosky --
kdrenosky@goodwin.com -- Shipman & Goodwin.


EHEALTH INC: Defends Putative Class Suit on Alleged TCPA Breaches
-----------------------------------------------------------------
eHealth, Inc. is facing a putative class action complaint for
allegedly violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018.

On May 8, 2018, an individual filed a putative class action
complaint against us.  The complaint alleges that we violated the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. Sec. 227(c) and
certain provisions of 47 C.F.R. Sec. 64.1200 promulgated thereunder
by initiating or causing to be initiated telephone solicitations to
telephone subscribers who registered their respective telephone
numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry.

The complaint alleges, among other things, that we (i) made more
than one unsolicited telephone call to Plaintiff and putative class
members within a 12-month period without express consent to place
such calls in violation of 47 U.S.C. Sec. 227(c)(5); and (ii)
initiated calls for telemarketing purposes without instituting
procedures that comply with regulatory minimum standards for
implementing Do Not Call in violation of 47 C.F.R. Sec.
64.1200(d).

The complaint seeks (i) an order certifying a class of individuals
in the United States who (A) received more than one telephone call
made by or on behalf of eHealth within a 12-month period; and (B)
to a telephone number that had been registered with the National Do
Not Call Registry for at least 30 days; (ii) an award of actual and
statutory damages for each negligent violation to each member of
the class pursuant to 47 U.S.C. Sec. 227(b)(3)(B); (iii) an award
of actual and statutory damages for each knowing and/or willful
violation to each member of the class pursuant to 47 U.S.C. Sec.
227(b)(3)(A); (iv) an injunction requiring us and our agents to
cease all unsolicited telephone activities and otherwise protecting
the interest of the class pursuant to 47 U.S.C.  Sec.
227(b)(3)(A); and (v) pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on
monetary relief.

Due to the preliminary nature of this matter and uncertainty of
litigation, we are unable at this time to estimate the likelihood
of liability or the amount of potential damages.

eHealth, Inc. is a leading private health insurance exchange for
individuals, families and small businesses. The company is based in
Mountain View, California.


EQUIFAX INFORMATION: "Lemmon" Class Cert. Deadlines Moved
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEONARD A. LEMMON, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-01464-JLR (W.D. Wash.), Judge
James L. Robart of the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Washington has issued a stipulated order extending deadlines
related to discovery and class certification.

On Jan. 16, 2018, the Court ratified the Parties' first stipulation
extending certain deadlines pertaining to class certification
discovery and briefing on the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.  On April 23, 2018, the Court ratified the Parties'
second stipulation extending those deadlines after the Parties
exchanged written discovery, scheduled depositions, and engaged in
settlement discussions.

The Parties have scheduled a global mediation of the and other
class action cases pending across the country involving the
reporting of public records matters on Aug. 23, 2018 in Boston, MA
with mediator Eric Green.  The counsel for the Parties have
conferred and agree that an additional 90-day extension of existing
case deadlines will promote the efficient resolution of the case by
allowing the Parties to focus their efforts on preparing for and
participating in the August mediation.

Good cause therefore exists to extend the deadlines set by the
Court for discovery related to class certification and the
Plaintiff's class certification motion.

Therefore the Parties stipulated and agreed, and Judge Robart
granted, that the case deadlines in the matter should be reset as
follows:

     i. Parties to file a Joint Status Report apprising the Court
of the outcome of the August mediation - From N/A  to Aug. 10,
2018

     ii. The Deadline to complete fact discovery related to class
certification - From July 27, 2018 to Oct. 26, 2018

     iii. The Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification- From Aug.
24, 2018 to Nov. 30, 2018

     iv. The Defendant's Opposition to Class Certification - From
Sept. 21, 2018 to Jan. 4, 2019

     v. The Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Class Certification -
From Oct. 5, 2018 to Jan. 18, 2018

A full-text copy of the Court's July 17, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/vwL4BE from Leagle.com.

Leonard A. Lemmon, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Elizabeth Anne Adams --
eadams@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC,
Erika L. Nusser -- enusser@terrellmarshall.com -- TERRELL MARSHALL
LAW GROUP PLLC, James A. Francis -- info@consumerlawfirm.com --
FRANCIS & MAILMAN PC, pro hac vice, John Soumilas, FRANCIS &
MAILMAN PC, pro hac vice, Lauren K.W. Brennan, FRANCIS & MAILMAN
PC, pro hac vice & Beth E. Terrell -- bterrell@terrellmarshall.com
-- TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC.

Equifax Information Services LLC, Defendant, represented by John C.
Toro -- jtoro@kslaw.com -- KING & SPALDING LLP, pro hac vice,
Katherine McFarland Stein -- kstein@kslaw.com -- KING & SPALDING
LLP, pro hac vice, Meryl W. Roper -- mroper@kslaw.com -- KING &
SPALDING LLP, pro hac vice, Zachary A. McEntyre --
zmcentyre@kslaw.com -- KING & SPALDING LLP, pro hac vice & Jeffrey
M. Edelson -- JeffEdelson@MarkowitzHerbold.com -- MARKOWITZ HERBOLD
PC.


FCA US: Court Narrows Claims in Suit Over Flawed Uconnect System
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motions for
summary judgment in the case captioned BRIAN FLYNN, GEORGE BROWN,
KELLY BROWN, and MICHAEL KEITH, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. FCA US LLC doing business
as CHRYSLER GROUP LLC, and HARMAN INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-0855-MJR-DGW (S.D. Ill.).

The Plaintiffs filed against the Defendants alleging a number of
claims related to design flaws in the Uconnect system, which was
manufactured by Harman and installed in certain 2013-2015 Chrysler
vehicles. According to the Plaintiffs, the Uconnect is an
infotainment system that allows integrated control over phone,
navigation, and entertainment functions in certain vehicles, and
its design and installation makes it vulnerable to hackers seeking
to take remote control of one of the affected vehicles, as reported
in a 2015 WIRED magazine article.

FCA's Motion for Summary Judgment on All Claims

FCA's first motion for summary judgment raises two issues: first,
that the Plaintiffs have no evidence of a defect and, second, that
they have no evidence of damages.

The Plaintiffs provide evidence that the design and installation of
the Uconnect devices themselves, rather than the software operating
the devices, is defective and that fixing the software may not have
fixed the alleged defects. Accordingly, the Court finds that
genuine disputes of material fact exist such that summary judgment
cannot be granted as to all counts at this time.

Motions for Summary Judgment on Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and
Common Law Implied Warranty Claims

FCA also argues that summary judgment on Flynn's claims must be
granted because he purchased from a dealership, rather than
directly from FCA. Illinois law requires privity for an implied
warranty claim and FCA maintains that there is no evidence of
privity here. Privity inquiries into the relationship between a
purchaser, a seller, and a manufacturer are fact-intensive. In some
circumstances, a manufacturer is in privity with a consumer who
purchased through a remote seller, but in others privity cannot be
established between a consumer and a manufacturer. Based on the
evidence presented, there is a genuine question of material fact as
to whether privity exists, and summary judgment cannot be granted
at this time.

The Court denies FCA's motions for summary judgment as to Keith's
and Flynn's state-based and nationwide MMWA claims (Counts 1, 4,
and 11). FCA's motion for summary judgment on Flynn's common law
implied warranty of merchantability claim (Count 5) is denied.
Harman's motion for summary judgment on the claims of Brian Flynn
is granted as to the nationwide class claim (Count 1). Harman's
motion for summary judgment on the MMWA claims of Michael Keith
(Counts 1 and 11) is denied.

Here, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
information about the Uconnect design and installation that
allegedly was withheld would have changed Flynn's decision to
purchase his vehicle or whether it was the type of information that
he would be expected to rely on in deciding to purchase a vehicle.
Defendants gloss over Flynn's evidence that he did not fully
understand the cybersecurity risks of the Uconnect device in his
car by pointing to testimony that Flynn understands that computers
can be hacked and that he purchased a car with a computer. That is
insufficient to warrant summary judgment on the basis of
materiality.

Motions for Summary Judgment on Brian Flynn's Common Law Fraud and
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act Claims

The Defendants next argue that Flynn cannot demonstrate that he
relied on the information at issue, but ICFA does not require
proving reliance, only that a defendant intended that a consumer
would rely on a deceptive or unfair practice. Flynn, however, must
establish causation, as Defendants point out. His ICFA claim
contends that FCA's advertisements touting the safety of the class
vehicles were deceptive because FCA knew their design and
installation was not, in fact, safe, but Flynn cannot point to a
specific communication or advertisement that he saw.

Under ICFA, deceptive advertising cannot be the proximate cause of
damages unless the advertisement actually deceives the plaintiff.
Additionally, Illinois courts have held that a plaintiff cannot
establish proximate cause where he cannot identify a specific
communication between himself and the defendant. Flynn's ICFA
theory that alleges that the Defendants engaged in deceptive
advertising in order to protect profits and to avoid recalls that
would damage their brand image is essentially a "market theory of
causation" that Illinois courts squarely reject.  Flynn offers no
evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact as to
causation. He cannot establish causation and fails to meet the
requirements of pursuing an ICFA claim. Accordingly, the Court
grants the Defendants' motions for summary judgment on counts two,
six, and seven as to Brian Flynn.

Motions for Summary Judgment on Brian Flynn's Unjust Enrichment
Claims  

Where unjust enrichment claims are based on the same conduct the
fraud claims, the claims rise or fall together. To that end, Flynn
incorporates his fraud claim arguments as his argument against
summary judgment on his unjust enrichment claims.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the fraud claims and unjust
enrichment claims rest on the same allegedly improper conduct and
that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment against Flynn.
Even if the Court were not granting summary judgment on Flynn's
fraud claims, however, Flynn has not produced any evidence of a
benefit conferred on FCA or Harman to create a genuine issue of
material fact.

The Court grants the motions by Harman and FCA as to Flynn's unjust
enrichment claims (Counts 3 and 8).

Motions for Summary Judgment on Keith's Michigan Consumer
Protection Act Claim  

Keith alleges that both Harman and FCA violated the Michigan
Consumer Protection Act.
According to Keith, the Defendants both made affirmative
misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts in
connection with the sale of the class vehicles.

Here, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Keith
reasonably could have known of the alleged defect in his vehicles
and whether that information would have altered his leasing
decision. Keith has presented sufficient evidence to create an
issue of fact as to whether Defendants knew of the alleged defects
at the time of production and sale of the class vehicles and
whether they failed to disclose the defects to consumers.

Accordingly, Keith can demonstrate material questions of fact as to
the heart of his fraudulent omission MCPA claim, and the
Defendants' motions for summary judgment on count twelve are denied
as to that claim.

Motions for Summary Judgment on George and Kelly Brown's Missouri
Merchandising Practices Act Claim

FCA attempts to add a requirement that the Browns show something
beyond the typical bad faith or recklessness showings for omission
claims under the MMPA, but the scienter requirement for claims
alleging an omission of material fact relates to whether FCA knew,
or upon reasonable inquiry would have known, the material facts it
allegedly failed to disclose. The Browns present sufficient
evidence to clear this hurdle, so their MMPA claim against FCA
survives summary judgment.

The Browns are in a different position as to their fraudulent
omission claims against Harman. They offer no evidence that Harman
knew, or upon reasonable inquiry would have known, that the
installation of the Uconnect device in their vehicle led to cyber
security defects. Harman's evidence shows that they manufactured
the Uconnect device to FCA's specifications but that they had no
role in the installation or fitting of the units in FCA's vehicles.
The Browns offer no evidence to the contrary.

Further there is no evidence or case law before the Court that
suggests that Harman is a seller within the meaning of the MMPA.
There is no evidence that Harman sold anything to the Browns. They
produced components for a vehicle sold by FCA. Absent evidence that
the Browns purchased something from Harman, as required by the
plain language of the MMPA, the Browns' MMPA claims fail against
Harman.

Accordingly, FCA's motion for summary judgment is denied and
Harman's motion for summary judgment is granted as to count nine.

Motions for Summary Judgment on Missouri and Michigan Unjust
Enrichment Claims  

Both the Browns and Keith bring unjust enrichment claims under the
laws of their home states. In order to sustain a claim for unjust
enrichment under Michigan law, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the
defendant received a benefit conferred by the plaintiff, and (2)
that there was a resulting inequity to the plaintiff.  Similarly,
Missouri requires a plaintiff to prove (1) that they conferred a
benefit on a defendant; (2) that the defendant received the
benefit, and (3) that the defendant retained the benefit under
circumstances that render that retention inequitable.

Here, both the Browns and Keith face the same roadblock: they fail
to put forth any evidence that a benefit was conferred on either
Defendant, relying instead on conclusory statements. As the record
is devoid of evidence that could create a genuine issue of material
fact, the Court grants Defendants' motions for summary judgment on
the Missouri unjust enrichment claim (Count 267, 348) and the
Michigan unjust enrichment claim (Count 267, 350).

Accordingly, the Defendants' motions for summary judgment are
granted in part and denied in part. At the close of the case, the
Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment as follows:

   -- On Count One, in favor of Harman and against Brian Flynn.

   -- On Counts Two and Three, in favor Harman and FCA and against
Flynn, Keith, and George and Kelly Brown

   -- On Counts Six, Seven, and Eight, in favor of Harman and FCA
and against Flynn;

   -- On Count Nine, in favor of Harman and against the Browns;

   -- On Count Ten, in favor of Harman and FCA and against the
Browns; and

   -- On Count Thirteen, in favor of Harman and FCA and against
Keith.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 5, 2018 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/yacjf9yh from Leagle.com.

Brian Flynn, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, George Brown, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated & Kelly Brown, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher
D. Baucom -- cbaucom@armstrongteasdale.com -- Armstrong Teasdale
LLP, Christopher F. Cueto -- ccueto@cuetolaw.com -- Law Office of
Christopher Cueto, LTD, IJay Palansky --
ipalansky@armstrongteasdale.com -- Armstrong Teasdale LLP, pro hac
vice, Lloyd M. Cueto, Law Office of Lloyd M. Cueto, P.C., Lucas T.
Pendry -- lpendry@armstrongteasdale.com -- Armstrong Teasdale LLP,
Stephen R. Wigginton, Law Office of Stephen R. Wigginton & Michael
J. Gras , Law Office of Christopher Cueto, LTD Generally Admitted.

Michael Keith, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented byChristopher D. Baucom ,
Armstrong Teasdale LLP, Christopher F. Cueto , Law Office of
Christopher Cueto, LTD, Michael J. Gras , Law Office of Christopher
Cueto, LTD Generally Admitted & Stephen R. Wigginton , Law Office
of Stephen R. Wigginton.
FCA US LLC, formerly known as Chrysler Group LLC, Defendant,
represented by Kathy A. Wisniewski --
kwisniewski@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn, Stephen A.
D'Aunoy -- adaunoy@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn & Scott H.
Morgan -- smorgan@thompsoncoburn.com -- One US Bank Plaza Thompson
Coburn LLP.


FCA US: Final Pretrial Conference in "Victorino" Cont. to Aug. 31
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CARLOS VICTORINO and ADAM TAVITIAN, individually, and
on behalf of other members of the general public similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. FCA U.S. LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company, Defendant, Case No. 16cv1617-GPC(JLB)(S.D. Cal.), Judge
Gonzalo P. Curiel of the U.S. District Court for the Suthern
District of California granted in part the Plaintiff's ex parte
motion and continued the final pretrial conference set Aug. 3, 2018
to Aug. 31, 2018.

On July 11, 2018, the Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion to vacate
the current amended scheduling order, or to continue the pre-trial
dates for 60 days pending a ruling on his petition for permission
to appeal order denying motion for class certification pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 23(f).

The Defendant filed an opposition on July 13, 2018. On the same
day, the Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a reply to his
ex parte motion and attached a proposed reply.  On July 16, 2018,
Defendant filed an opposition to the Plaintiff's motion for leave
to file a reply.

On June 13, 2018, the Court denied the Plaintiff's amended motion
for class certification. ( On June 28, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a
notice of appeal of the Court's order on class certification
pursuant to Rule 23(f).  In the instant ex parte motion, the
Plaintiff seeks a stay of the pretrial proceedings until a ruling
by the Ninth Circuit on his Rule 23(f) petition.  The Defendant
disagrees.

According to the amended scheduling order, the remaining deadlines
that currently remain are the preparing of the pretrial order by
July 20, 2018, the lodging of the proposed final pretrial
conference order by July 27, 2018, and the final pretrial
conference set with the Court on Aug. 3, 2018.  The parties
acknowledge and the Court notes that the Magistrate Judge, after
the scheduling order had been amended several times, cautioned the
parties that the Court anticipates granting no further extensions
absent extraordinary circumstances.

In the case, Judge Curiel finds that all that remains are two dates
related to pre-trial preparations.  Discovery and dispositive
motions as well as the class certification motions have been ruled
on.  There is one cause of action for breach of the implied
warranty under state and federal law.  Any pre-trial work for
Victorino, as an individual, would necessarily be conducted even if
the Ninth Circuit reversed the court's ruling on class
certification.  If the Ninth Circuit disagrees with the Court's
ruling on certification, the case would shift from an individual
claim of breach of implied warranty to a class action.  In such a
case, the Court would grant the parties' leave to conduct any
supplemental pretrial proceedings to include a class action.  

The Judge concludes that the Plaintiff has not demonstrated
irreparable harm.  Because the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
the two key factors to support a stay, the Judge concludes a stay
is not justified.  Moreover, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated
extraordinary circumstances justifying vacating the amended
scheduling order.

Because the parties and the Court agree that a trial should not be
scheduled until a ruling by the Ninth Circuit, Judge Curiel granted
in part the Plaintiff's ex parte motion and continued the final
pretrial conference date from Aug. 3, 2018 to Aug. 31, 2018.  All
other dates in the amended scheduling order will remain.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 17, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/KyRKL6 from Leagle.com.

Carlos Victorino, individually, and on behalf of a class of
similarly situated individuals & Adam Tavitian, individually, and
on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs,
represented by Cody R. Padgett -- Cody.Padgett@CapstoneLawyers.com
-- Capstone Law APC, Jordan L. Lurie --
Jordan.Lurie@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Capstone Law, APC, Robert
Kenneth Friedl -- Robert.Friedl@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Capstone Law
APC & Tarek H. Zohdy -- Tarek.Zohdy@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Capstone
Law APC.

FCA US LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendant,
represented by Kathleen Ann Wisniewski --
kwisniewski@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn LLP, pro hac
vice, Scott H. Morgan -- smorgan@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson
Coburn LLP, pro hac vice, Stephen Anthony D'Aunoy --
sdaunoy@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn LLP, pro hac vice,
Thomas L. Azar, Jr. -- tazar@thompsoncoburn.com -- Thompson Coburn
LLP, pro hac vice, William M. Low, Higgs Fletcher & Mack LLP &
Edwin Mendelson Boniske -- boniske@higgslaw.com -- Higgs Fletcher &
Mack, LLP.


FELDSOTT LEE: Violates Fair Debt Collection Act, Hedayati Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Feldsott Lee Pagano &
Canfield and Parkside Community Association.  The case is styled as
Mohammad Hedayati, On Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly
Situated v. Feldsott Lee Pagano & Canfield and Parkside Community
Association, A Non-Profit Mutual Benefit Corporation, Case No.
8:18-cv-01479 (C.D. Cal., August 20, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Feldsott Lee Pagano & Canfield is a law firm representing
homeowners associations and property owners for over 40 years.  As
one of the pioneers in the field of association law in Southern
California, Feldsott Lee Pagano & Canfield has been providing
skilled legal advice to clients since 1972.

The Parkside Community Association, A Non-Profit Mutual Benefit
Corporation, is Buffalo's oldest, largest and most active
neighborhood association in the City of Buffalo.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew Paul Rundquist, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF ANDREW P. RUNDQUIST
          501 W Broadway, Suite A144
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 992-9148
          E-mail: andrew@rundquistlaw.com


FINANCIAL TRUST: Faces Gerber Class Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Financial Trust
Company, XYZ Corporation, ABC Inc. and Jeffrey E. Epstein with
claims of fraud.  The case is titled as Marvin Gerber and Kalma
Koenig, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
v. The Financial Trust Company, XYZ Corporation, ABC Inc. and
Jeffrey E. Epstein, Case No. 1:18-cv-07580 (S.D.N.Y., August 20,
2018).

The Financial Trust Company is a trust formed under the laws of St.
Thomas.  The Company runs a hedge fund.  Jeffrey E. Epstein serves
as the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Financial Trust
Company.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Frank Rocco Schirripa, Esq.
          HACH ROSE SCHIRRIPA & CHEVERIE LLP
          112 Madison Avenue, 10th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 213-8311
          Facsimile: (212) 779-0028
          E-mail: fs@hachroselaw.com


FLORIDA: Ct. Denies Judgment on Pleadings in Inmate Transport Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida denied Defendant Prisoner Transportation Services, LLC's
(PTS) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in the case captioned
JEFFREY EMIL GROOVER, Plaintiff, v. PRISONER TRANSPORTATION
SERVICES, LLC and U.S. CORRECTIONS, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
15-cv-61902-BLOOM/Valle(S.D. Fla.).

In the Amended Complaint, Groover, an inmate at the Butner Low
Security Federal Correctional Institution in Butner, North
Carolina, alleges that U.S. Corrections LLC (USC), transported him
from Butner, North Carolina to Fort Lauderdale, Florida in a
windowless transport van lacking sufficient ventilation and air
conditioning. Groover claims that he was deprived of sleep, water,
and refuge from the heat.

PTS argues that it is not liable as a matter of law for the actions
of USC the entity that transported Plaintiff. With regard to Count
I, PTS argues it did not acquire USC until after the incident
occurred and it cannot be directly liable.

As to Count II, PTS argues that PTS did not transport Groover and
did not, therefore, injure Groover. As a result, Groover cannot be
a member of the putative class injured by PTS' transportation
practices, lacking standing to bring a class action lawsuit against
PTS.

Count I

With regard to Count I, PTS argues that, under Florida law, there
are three ways in which a parent corporation can be held liable for
the acts of its subsidiaries: (1) an alter ego theory to 'pierce
the corporate veil;' (2) vicarious liability based on general
agency principles; or (3) direct liability where the parent
corporation directly participated in the wrong complained of.

PTS argues that the Amended Complaint is devoid of such
allegations, requiring the entry of judgment in its favor. In
response, Groover argues that judgment on the pleadings should be
denied because PTS is directly liable under three
successor-in-interest theories of liability: (1) express or implied
assumption of liabilities; (2) de facto merger; and (3) mere
continuation of a predecessor business.

Express or Implied Assumption of Liability

The Plaintiff first contends that, through its acquisition of USC,
PTS expressly or impliedly assumed its liabilities.

The record contains a document entitled Contribution Agreement for
Membership Interest in PTS.

Within the section entitled Purchase of Membership Interest, the
document provides that the members of USC, a limited liability
company, agreed to purchase specified percentages of interest in
PTS and that PTS, in turn, acquired all shares belonging to the USC
members along with all tangible assets used or useful in USC's
business operations. The Contribution Agreement refers to the
acquisition of this property as the Contributed Property.

The Contribution Agreement also contains a section entitled
Representations and Warranties Regarding the Contributed Property,
which provides that all representations and warranties that USC's
members made in Annex A to the agreement form part of the
"Contributed Property" that PTS was acquiring. Included in Annex A
is a section entitled Litigation containing a disclosure of all
pending or threatened investigations, actions or proceedings
against USC. More specifically, USC's members warrant to PTS that
there is no pending or threatened investigation, action, or
proceeding against USC by or before any court.

Except as disclosed on Schedule 1.08. Schedule 1.08, in turn, makes
multiple disclosures. From these documents, an inference can be
made that the Litigation disclosure is part of the Contributed
Property that PTS acquired. As the legal standard of a motion to
dismiss is similar to that of a judgment on the pleadings and the
Court is, therefore, required to accept all allegations in the
Amended Complaint as true and draw all inferences in Plaintiff's
favor, the supplemental evidence creates an inference that PTS
assumed USC's liabilities.  While the parties are free to revisit
this issue on summary judgment, at this juncture, the Motion must
be denied.

De Facto Merger

In determining whether an asset sale constitutes a de facto merger,
courts consider the following: (1) whether there is a continuation
of the enterprise of the seller corporation, so that there is
continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets and
general business operations; (2) whether there is a continuity of
shareholders, accomplished by paying for the acquired corporation
with shares of stock; (3) whether there is a dissolution of the
seller corporation, and (4) whether the purchasing corporation
assumes the obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of normal business operations.

Here, the Court finds that, within the four corners of the Amended
Complaint, the documents referenced therein, and the supplemental
documents, Groover failed to state a claim under a de facto merger
theory. Specifically, the Court finds that there are no allegations
demonstrating that USC has been dissolved. While Groover argues
that USC was effectively dissolved in the transaction and was
subsumed into PTS, there are no such allegations in the Amended
Complaint nor can the Court draw any such inferences from the
documents referenced in the Amended Complaint.

Further, based on the Court's review of the newly submitted
documents, there is nothing from which the Court can infer that USC
has been dissolved. To the contrary, these newly filed documents
indicate that PTS formally acquired all interest in USC, making USC
a wholly owned subsidiary of PTS and thus negating the existence of
a de facto merger. Looking at the four corners of the Amended
Complaint, the documents referenced therein, and the supplemental
documents, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to state a claim
for relief on a de facto merger theory of liability against PTS.

Mere Continuation

To determine whether one corporation is a continuation of another,
the test is whether there is a continuation of the corporate entity
of the seller not whether there is a continuation of the seller's
business operations.

Based on the four corners of the Amended Complaint, the documents
referenced therein and the supplemental documents, the Court
concludes that PTS had a corporate existence separate and apart
from USC at the time of the acquisition and PTS is not, therefore,
a mere continuation of USC.

This is because the companies had completely different ownership
and assets prior to the acquisition. The documents referenced in
the Amended Complaint contradict any notion that PTS is a mere
continuation of USC or that USC is simply wearing the new hat" of
PTS. As a result, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint fails
to state a plausible claim against PTS for successor liability
under a mere continuation of USC theory.

Count II

Count II defines the putative class as follows:

     All pretrial detainees and prisoners who were transported by
Prisoner Transportation Services, LLC or any of its affiliates or
subsidiaries, including U.S. Corrections, LLC, and forced to remain
in a transport van in excess of twenty-four (24) continuous hours,
subject only to brief, intermittent breaks, at any time between
June through September of any year in the statutory period.

PTS' argument here is contingent upon a finding that PTS cannot be
directly liable for Groover's claims in Count I. However, the Court
has already determined that the Plaintiff's claims against PTS in
Count I remain viable. It, therefore, follows that PTS' argument as
to Groover's standing in Count II fails. Given that the Plaintiff
has filed a Motion for Class Certification, the parties will have
the opportunity to readdress the Plaintiff's standing on behalf of
the putative class at that time as the class definition has evolved
since the filing of this Motion.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 30, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yah6g9xh from Leagle.com.

Jeffrey Emil Groover, Plaintiff, represented by Frank S. Hedin --
fhedin@hedinhall.com -- Hedin Hall LLP, David W. Hall --
dhall@hedinhall.com -- Hedin Hall LLP, pro hac vice & Vanessa
Shakib , Ahdoot & Wolfson, PC, pro hac vice.

Prisoner Transportation Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by D.
David Keller -- david.keller@kellerlandsberg.com -- Keller
Landsberg PA & Jose R. Riguera -- jose.riquera@kellerlandsberg.com
-- Keller Landsberg PA.

U.S. Corrections, LLC, Defendant, represented by Erin G. Jackson --
ejackson@jacksonjohnson.com -- Johnson Jackson LLC & Ashley Americo
Tinsley -- atinsley@johnsonjackson.com -- Johnson Jackson LLC.


FLUOR CORP: Court Certifies VC Summer Workers' Class
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, Harry Pennington III and Timothy Lorentz, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Fluor
Corporation, Fluor Enterprises, Inc., Fluor Daniel Maintenance
Services, Inc., SCANA Corporation, and South Carolina Electric &
Gas Company, Defendants, Civil Action No.: 0:17-cv-02094-JMC (D.
S.C.), Judge J. Michelle Childs of the U.S. District Court for the
District of South Carolina, Rock Hill Division, granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

The matter is before the Court pursuant to Plaintiffs Pennington
and Lorentz's Motion for Class Certification, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated.  Defendants Fluor
Corp., Fluor Enterprises, Inc., Fluor Daniel Maintenance Services,
Inc. ("Fluor Defendants"), SCANA Corp. and South Carolina Electric
& Gas Co. ("SCE&G") ("SCANA Defendants") filed responses in
opposition.

The case arises out of the decision on July 31, 2017, to stop all
construction at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station in Jenkinsville,
South Carolina.  As a result of that decision, the Plaintiffs
allege that approximately 5,000 employees were laid off who had
been working and/or receiving assignments at VC Summer. Until their
respective terminations, the Plaintiffs further allege that
Pennington worked directly for Fluor Daniel at VC Summer as a Heavy
Equipment Operator and Lorenz was employed by Westinghouse Electric
Co., LLC ("WEC") as a Project Manager.  However, at the same time,
for purposes of the WARN Act, they allege that they were employees
of SCANA Defendants.  To this point, the Plaintiffs generally
allege that SCANA Defendants were the single employer together with
Fluor Defendants and/or WEC of all individuals working at VC
Summer.

In their Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that in 2008,
SCANA Defendants entered into an agreement with WEC for the purpose
of constructing two AP-10001 nuclear reactors known as VC Summer 2
and 3.  They further allege that in or around 2015, Fluor Corp. was
brought in as a subcontractor to WEC to provide staffing for craft
(manual labor) employees and take primary responsibility for
on-site construction to include responsibility for the craft, field
engineers, and project controls personnel including the costs and
scheduling of personnel.  At the same time, WEC generally accepted
liability for the cost overruns on the Summer Project, by agreeing
to build it for a 'fixed-price' at SCANA Defendants' option, which
option was exercised in May 2016 thus capping costs for the Summer
Project at close to $14 billion.

The Plaintiffs allege that in early 2017, WEC experienced cash
shortfalls related to the Summer Project and a deepening liquidity
crisis, which eventually led to WEC and its subsidiaries filing
voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the
U.S. States Bankruptcy Code in the Southern District of New York on
March 29, 2017.  They allege that as a result of WEC's bankruptcy,
SCANA Defendants became financially accountable for the ongoing
costs and plan of completion for the VC Summer Project.  Moreover,
the Plaintiffs assert that SCANA Defendants took over complete
control of the VC Summer Project.

The Plaintiffs allege that after SCANA Defendants gained control of
the VC Summer Project, they recognized by at least March 2017, that
mass layoffs and shutdowns were almost inevitable at the Summer
Project in mid-summer. Subsequently, on July 31, 2017, SCANA
Defendants sent WARN Act correspondence to the Director of Business
Services for the South Carolina Department of Employment and
Workforce that they've decided to stop the construction of both
Unit 2 and Unit 3 and file a petition for approval of abandonment
with the Public Service Commission of South Carolina.
Unfortunately, this process is expected to involve immediate,
total, and permanent termination of the new nuclear construction
project at VC Summer Nuclear Station.

Also on July 31, 2017, the Plaintiffs allege that Fluor Defendants
and WEC were told by SCE&G to cease work on the project immediately
resulting in the immediate termination of the Plaintiffs'
employment.  Additionally, the Plaintiffs contend that SCANA
controlled the decision to terminate all the employees on the site
without advance notice.

As a result of the foregoing, Pennington filed a putative class
action Complaint in the Court against Defendants Fluor Corp., Fluor
Enterprises, Inc. and SCANA on Aug. 8, 2017, alleging violations of
the WARN Act.  In his Complaint, Pennington sought to represent all
other similarly situated former employees, pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
Section 2104(a)(5) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), who worked at,
reported to, or received assignments from one of the Defendants'
Facilities and were terminated without cause on or about July 31,
2017, and within 30 days of that date, or were terminated without
cause as the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the mass layoffs
and/or plant closings ordered by Defendants on or about July 31,
2017.

Pennington further alleged that Fluor Corp.n, Fluor Enterprises,
Inc. and SCANA knowingly failed to give their employees at least 60
days prior notice of termination of their employment as required by
the WARN Act.  

On Oct. 25, 2017, Pennington filed an Amended Class Action
Complaint, which provided additional WARN Act allegations and added
Lorentz as Plaintiff and Fluor Daniel and SCE&G as Defendants.  On
Nov. 20, 2017, Fluor Defendants answered the Amended Complaint and
asserted their affirmative defenses.

As it pertains to the present Motion, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion
for Class Certification and Supplemental Motions in Support of
Class Certification, stating that they've satisfied the
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

SCANA Defendants and Fluor Defendants filed a response in
opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion.

Judge Childs finds that the Plaintiffs satisfy all of the
requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3).  As such, she holds
that class certification is appropriate.  Accordingly, she granted
the Plaintiffs' Motion.

She certified the class comprising of the Plaintiffs and all
persons (i) who were former employees of Defendants and worked at,
reported to, or received assignments from the V.C. Summer Nuclear
Station (the Facility), located at Highway 215 & Bradham Blvd,
Jenkinsville, South Carolina 29065; (ii) who were terminated
without cause on or about July 31, 2017 or within 30 days of that
date, or were terminated without cause as the reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the mass layoffs and/or plant closings
ordered by Defendants on or about July 31, 2017; (iii) who are
affected employees within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. Section
2101(a)(5); and (iv) who have not filed a timely request to opt-out
of the Class.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 17, 2018 Order and Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/ShqMwd from Leagle.com.

Harry Pennington, III, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated & Timothy Lorentz, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Lucy Clark
Sanders, Bloodgood and Sanders, Jack A. Raisner --
jar@outtengolden.com -- Outten and Golden LLP, pro hac vice, Nancy
Bloodgood, Bloodgood and Sanders & Rene S. Roupinian --
rsr@outtengolden.com -- Outten and Golden LLP, pro hac vice.

Fluor Corporation & Fluor Enterprises Inc, Defendants, represented
by John Hagood Tighe -- htighe@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher and
Phillips, David Kresser -- dkresser@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher
and Phillips LLP, pro hac vice & Kathleen McLeod Caminiti --
kcaminiti@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher and Phillips LLP, pro hac
vice.

SCANA Corporation & South Carolina Electric & Gas Company,
Defendants, represented by Charles T. Speth, II --
ted.speth@ogletree.com
-- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and Stewart PC, D. Michael
Henthorne -- michael.henthorne@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins
Nash Smoak and Stewart PC, James H. Fowles, III --
james.fowles@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and
Stewart PC & Christopher Ray Thomas --
christopher.r.thomas@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak
and Stewart PC.

Fluor Daniel Maintenance Services Inc, Defendant, represented by
John Hagood Tighe, Fisher and Phillips.


FRESNO COMMUNITY: "Solario" Class Certification Denial Reversed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CESAR SOLORIO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. FRESNO
COMMUNITY HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant and Respondent,
Case No. F073953 (Cal. App.), Judge Donald R. Franson, Jr. of the
Court of Appeals of California for the Fifth District reversed the
trial court's order denying the Palintiff's motion for class
certification.

Medical Center is a California nonprofit public benefit corporation
that operates two medical care facilities with emergency rooms in
Fresno County.  One of its facilities is Community Regional Medical
Center in downtown Fresno.

On Sept. 22, 2015, Solario received emergency screening,
stabilization, treatment and services at Community Regional Medical
Center.  The Plaintiff was provided with a three-page form contract
labeled Conditions of Admission or Service.  The form stated the
patient agreed to pay for services in accordance with the regular
rates and terms of Medical Center.  The parties dispute how this
contractual language should be interpreted and applied.

The Plaintiff was not covered by health insurance or a governmental
health program.  As a result, he was a self-pay patient for his
emergency room visit.  Medical Center billed plaintiff $7,812.03
for the treatment and services provided, which did not include
charges by physicians and other nonhospital providers.  The billing
statement did not itemize the charges, but simply listed the
balance owed as $7,812.03.

The litigation involves the interpretation of a hospital's
admissions contract and the rates charged to an uninsured emergency
room patient under that contract.  Similar billing disputes between
uninsured emergency room patients and hospitals have arisen across
the United States and have generated numerous reported decisions
and journal articles.  Many of those decisions, like this one,
address a trial court's denial of a motion for class
certification.

In the case, Solorio signed an admissions contract stating he
agreed to pay for emergency room services in accordance with the
regular rates and terms of the Medical Center.  After receiving a
bill for $7,812.03, the Plaintiff filed a class action complaint
alleging the rates set forth in Medical Center's charge description
master and billed to self-pay patients are inflated and exorbitant.
As to the interpretation of Medical Center's admissions contract,
he seeks a declaratory judgment stating the contract contains an
open price term and, pursuant to Civil Code section 1611, self-pay
patients are obligated to pay no more than the reasonable value of
the services provided.  The Plaintiff seeks further declaratory
relief stating (1) the admissions contract does not permit Medical
Center to bill self-pay emergency care patients its chargemaster
rates and (2) Medical Center's billing practices are unconscionable
and unreasonable.

The complaint proposed a class of all individuals who, over the
last four years, had one or more eligible patient hospital visits
to an emergency room operated by Medical Center.  It defined
"eligible patient hospital visit" using four criteria: (1) the
patient was billed at the hospital's full Chargemaster rates; (2)
there have been no full writeoffs, discounts or adjustments to the
full Chargemaster billing under Medical Center's charity care
policies; (3) the bill has not otherwise been waived or written off
in full by Medical Center; and (4) no payments for the hospital
visit have been made by other than the patient or the patient's
representatives.

In November 2015, the Plaintiff filed an early motion for class
certification.  The trial court denied the Plaintiff's motion for
class certification on the ground the proposed class could not be
ascertained without undue effort and expense.

On a disputed question of law about California's ascertainability
requirement, Judge Franson concludes that requirement applies to
cases like this one where only declaratory relief is sought.  He
furthers conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying class certification as to the whole case.  However, he also
concludes the question of whether the admissions contract contains
an open price term is certifiable as a class issue pursuant to
California Rules of Court, rule 3.765(b).

The Judge explains that the state Supreme Court has recognized
questions of contract interpretation involving form contracts are
ideal for class adjudication.  Here, notice need not be provided to
class members until after the declaratory judgment is entered and
the notice may be given by publication.  At that time, former
patients will be able to identify whether or not they meet the
class definition -- that is, whether they are self-pay patients who
signed Medical Center's standard admissions contract and received
treatment at Medical Center's emergency rooms during the specified
period.  The class issue of contract interpretation also satisfies
the other requirements for certification -- that is, predominance
of common questions, typicality, adequacy of representation, and
superiority.  Accordingly, the class issue merits certification.

Judge Franson therefore reversed the order denying the motion for
class certification.  He directed the the trial court to certify an
issue class pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.765(b)
and to conduct further proceedings not inconsistent with his
Opinion.  The Plaintiff will recover its costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/16Wq1U from Leagle.com.

Carpenter Law, Gretchen Carpenter --gretchen@gcarpenterlaw.com; Law
Office of Barry Kramer, and Barry L. Kramer, for Plaintiff and
Appellant.

Hooper, Lundy & Bookman, Amanda L. Hayes-Kirbreab --
ahayes-kibreab@health-law.com -- and Sansan Lin --
slin@health-law.com -- for Defendant and Respondent.


GC SERVICES: 6th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, affirmed the
District Courts' judgment denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
case captioned WILBUR MACY; PAMELA J. STOWE, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. GC SERVICES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Defendant-Appellant. No.
17-5593. (6th Cir.)

Plaintiffs Wilbur Macy and Pamela J. Stowe brought this putative
class action against GC Services Limited Partnership, a debt
collector, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA). THe Plaintiffs alleged that GC, in
attempting to collect debt owed by the Plaintiffs to GC's client,
sent the Plaintiffs letters that contained legally deficient
warnings and advisories, in violation of Section 1692g of the
FDCPA.

GC moved to dismiss the action for lack of Article III standing,
arguing that the alleged violations of the FDCPA do not constitute
harm sufficiently concrete to satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement of standing.

GC argues that: (1) the Plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed
because the Plaintiffs lack Article III standing, and (2) the
district court abused its discretion by certifying the class
because the certified class is not limited to individuals who
sustained a concrete injury.

The District Court denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

Here, GC challenges the Plaintiffs' ability to demonstrate the
first standing requirement injury in fact.

Injury in Fact and Spokeo

The Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992)), stated that injury in fact "may exist solely by virtue of
statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing." However, after Lujan, courts divided over whether a
statutory violation, in and of itself, is sufficient to establish
injury in fact; the Supreme Court addressed the issue in Spokeo.
See 136 S. Ct. at 1549.

The Court held that a plaintiff does not automatically satisfy the
injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a
statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to
vindicate that right because Article III standing requires a
concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation. Thus,
a plaintiff does not satisfy the standing requirement by alleging a
bare procedural violation of a statute. Rather, to establish injury
in fact, a plaintiff must allege that the procedural statutory
violation caused the plaintiff to suffer some harm that actually
exists; there must be an injury that is real and not abstract or
merely procedural.

In sum, Spokeo categorized statutory violations as falling into two
broad categories: (1) where the violation of a procedural right
granted by statute is sufficient in and of itself to constitute
concrete injury in fact because Congress conferred the procedural
right to protect a plaintiff's concrete interests and the
procedural violation presents a material risk of real harm to that
concrete interest; and (2) where there is a bare procedural
violation that does not meet this standard, in which case a
plaintiff must allege additional harm beyond the one Congress has
identified.

Congress enacted the FDCPA because of abundant evidence of the use
of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many
debt collectors that contribute to the number of personal
bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to
invasions of individual privacy.

Section 1692g(a) requires a debt collector to provide a consumer
with a notice that contains:
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in
writing within a thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion
thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification
of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy
of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by
the debt collector; and
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within a
thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer
with the name and address of the original creditor, if different
from the current creditor.

The Plaintiffs allege in their complaint: "the Defendant's
misstatement of the rights afforded by the FDCPA would cause the
least-sophisticated consumer[8] to understand, incorrectly, that
validation of the debt, or a request for the name and address of
the original creditor, could be obtained through an oral request,
or by means other than in writing. Such a misunderstanding could
lead the least-sophisticated consumer to waive or otherwise not
properly vindicate her rights under the FDCPA."

Indeed, failing to dispute the debt in writing, or failing to
request the name and address of the original creditor, in writing,
would cause a consumer to waive the important protections afforded
by 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g(b) namely, that a debt collector cease
contacting the consumer until the debt collector provides the
consumer with verification of the alleged debt and/or the original
creditor's name and address, as requested.

Thus, the Plaintiffs allege a risk of harm that is traceable to
GC's purported failure to comply with federal law, namely, the
possibility of an unintentional waiver of FDCPA's debt-validation
rights, including suspension of collection of disputed debts under
Section 1692g(b). Without the information about the in-writing
requirement, the Plaintiffs were placed at a materially greater
risk of falling victim to abusive debt collection practices. And,
as the FDCPA declares, its purpose is to eliminate such abusive
practices. 15 U.S.C. Section 1692(e). To that end, the FDCPA grants
a private right of action to a consumer who receives a defective
communication.

Finally, GC argues that the district court incorrectly found
standing based on potential harm to class members instead of to the
two named Plaintiffs. GC is correct that potential class
representatives must demonstrate individual standing vis-a-vis the
defendant; they cannot acquire such standing merely by virtue of
bringing a class action.  However, the Court concludes de novo that
the named Plaintiffs have standing, thus, even if the district
court found standing based on harm to potential class members, any
error in the district court's analysis is of no significance.

The Sixth Circuit finds that, in sum, the Plaintiffs have satisfied
the concreteness prong of the injury-in-fact requirement of Article
III standing by alleging that GC's purported FDCPA violations
created a material risk of harm to the interests recognized by
Congress in enacting the FDCPA.

A full-text copy of the Sixth Circuit's July 30, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8fatptn from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: William S. Helfand -- Bill.Helfand@lewisbrisbois.com --
LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH, Houston, Texas, for Appellant.

James L. Davidson -- mgreenwald@gdrlawfirm.com -- GREENWALD,
DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC, Boca Raton, Florida, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF: William S. Helfand , LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH,
Houston, Texas, for Appellant.
James L. Davidson , GREENWALD, DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC, Boca Raton,
Florida, for Appellees.


GIGAMON INC: J. Rodriguez's Securities Fraud Suit Dismissed
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the case, JOSEPH RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. GIGAMON
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 5:17-cv-00434-EJD (N.D. Cal.),
with leave to amend.

In the securities fraud class action suit, the Plaintiffs allege
that executive officers of Gigamon made false and misleading
statements about the Company's revenue and sales backlog in
violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.

The Plaintiffs purport to bring the securities fraud suit on behalf
of all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired the
securities of Gigamon between Oct. 27, 2016 and Feb. 2, 2017.
Gigamon is a technology company that provides software and services
to other companies. Gigamon's products are designed to monitor and
control data traveling across internet networks.  Paul A. Hooper is
Gigamon's CEO.  Michael J. Burns is Gigamon's CFO.  Hooper and
Burns routinely provided investors with estimates concerning
Gigamon's future revenue.

On Oct. 27, 2016, the Company held a conference call with investors
and analysts to discuss the Company's third quarter 2016 financial
results.  During that call, the Defendants provided the public with
estimates concerning the Company's revenue and backlog for the
fourth quarter, which was almost halfway complete.  They estimated
fourth quarter revenue to be in the range of $91 million to $93
million.

These statements led investors to believe that Gigamon had
significant unrecognized revenue, that there were product bookings
in the backlog which would significantly increase revenue, and
that, overall, increased revenue was guaranteed.  On Oct. 28, 2016,
the first trading day following the conference call, the price of
Gigamon's common stock increased from $47.38 per share to $55.01
per share.

Unbeknownst to investors, the Defendants did not have a reasonable
basis in fact for the revenue estimate that they provided.  The
truth about Gigamon's fourth quarter revenue emerged on Jan. 17,
2017, when the Company issued a press release entitled "Gigamon
Announces Preliminary Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2016 Results."
The press release disclosed preliminary fourth quarter 2016
revenue of $84.5 million to $85 million, compared to the Company's
prior guidance of $91 million to $93 million.  The price of
Gigamon's common stock fell $12.65 per share (or 28.7%) to close at
$31.40 per share on Jan. 18, 2017.  Between Feb. 2, 2017 and Feb.
3, 2017, Gigamon's common stock declined from $32.10 to $30.40 (or
5.3%).

The Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint for two fundamental
reasons: the challenged statements are not actionable and the
Complaint lacks sufficient facts to support a strong inference of
scienter.  As to the first argument, the Defendants contend that
the challenged statements are forward-looking and protected by the
PSLRA's Safe Harbor, vague statements of corporate optimism, and
that the Plaintiffs have failed to allege particular facts showing
that any alleged misstatement was false or misleading when made.
As to the second argument, they contend that neither Hooper's
November 2 statement nor the stock sales allegations, viewed
individual or holistically, are sufficient to support a compelling
inference of scienter.

Judge Davila finds that Burns made mixed statements containing
forward-looking and non-forward-looking statements.  Burns made a
forward-looking prediction about fourth quarter revenue.  Burns'
forward-looking prediction was accompanied by a non-forward-looking
statement regarding Gigamon's "large deferred service," "healthy
product backlog," and "consistent quarterly linearity," which
provided the factual predicate for Burns' revenue prediction.
Burns' the non-forward-looking portions of his statement are not
protected by the Safe Harbor Provisions of the PSLRA.  

Hooper's statement, however, could also be interpreted as a
statement about Gigamon's current business condition, the Judeg
finds.  The Plaintiffs contend that they are challenging Hooper's
reference to "healthy backlog" as a fraudulent representation about
the present state of affairs at the Company.  The Judge accepts the
Plaintiffs' characterization of their claim and will treat Hooper's
statement as a mixed statement.  It follows that the
non-forward-looking portion of Hooper's statement is not protected
by the Safe Harbor provisions of the PSLRA.

Construing the Complaint liberally in favor of the Plaintiffs, the
Judge treats the "orders" included in the backlog as firm
commitments to purchase that existed as of the date of teh
Defendants' alleged misstatements.  He says the Defendants do not
explain how Gigamon's cautionary statement about the potential
failure to "close" transactions, which presumably refers to future
transactions, provides a meaningful warning about orders existing
at the time of the Defendants' alleged misstatements.  They also do
not explain how a cautionary statement about the "timing of orders"
and "the budgeting cycles and internal purchasing priorities" of
customers, which also presumably refer to future orders and future
purchasing priorities of customers, provides a meaningful warning
about orders existing at the time of Defendants' alleged
misstatements.  Because it is not apparent from the pleadings that
the Defendants' cautionary language corrected the alleged
misstatement regarding Gigamon's backlog, it is premature to decide
whether the Safe Harbor immunizes them from liability.

The Judge finds that the Defendants went beyond just providing
subjective or emotive descriptions of Gigamon's product backlog,
deferred service revenue, revenue and profitability.  Their
challenged statements cannot be dismissed as mere puffery.

Inexplicably, the Plaintiffs do not mention CWs even once in their
Opposition, much less attempt to refute the Defendants' arguments.
The Judge treats the Plaintiffs' failure to address the Defendants'
arguments as a tacit acknowledgement of their merit.  Hence, he
finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts to show the
Defendants' statements were false or misleading when made.

Finally, the Jduge finds tha Hooper's November 2 statement does not
support a strong inference that the Defendants made false or
misleading statements intentionally or with deliberate
recklessness.  The Plaintiffs' allegations of Gigamon stock sales
by several non-defendant officers and directors fail to support an
inference of scienter.  They do not allege any facts to show that
these stock sales were unusual or suspicious.  In sum, their
allegations, whether viewed separately or holistically, are
insufficient to raise an inference of scienter.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Davila granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss with leave to amend.  The Plaintiffs may file and
serve an amended complaint no later than July 30, 2018.  The Court
will conduct a case management conference at 10:00 a.m. on Oct. 11,
2018.  The parties will file a joint case management statement no
later than Oct. 1, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/rA0xsv from Leagle.com.

Joseph Rodriguez, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Henry Linehan
-- clinehan@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP, Lesley
F. Portnoy -- lportnoy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay and Murray
LLP, Lionel Z. Glancy -- lglancy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP & Robert Vincent Prongay -- RProngay@glancylaw.com --
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Gigamon Inc., Paul A. Hooper, Michael J. Burns & Rex S. Jackson,
Defendants, represented by Jerome F. Birn, Jr. -- JBirn@wsgr.com --
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Caz Hashemi -- chashemi@wsgr.com
-- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Jessica L. Snorgrass --
jsnorgrass@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati A
Professional Corporation & Nicholas R. Miller -- nmiller@wsgr.com
-- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich and Rosati.

The Gigamon Investor Group, Movant, represented by Laurence M.
Rosen -- lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

The McGowan, Kreling, and Salinas Group, Movant, represented by
Adam Christopher McCall -- amccall@zlk.com -- Levi Korsinsky, LLP,
Adam Marc Apton -- aapton@zlk.com -- Levi Korsinsky, LLP & Nicholas
Ian Porritt -- nporritt@zlk.com -- Levi and Korsinsky, pro hac
vice.

City of Daytona Beach Police & Fire Pension Fund, Movant,
represented by Danielle Suzanne Myers -- danim@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Shawn A. Williams --
shawnw@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Babak Roushanaee, Movant, represented by Jeffrey Philip Campisi --
jcampisi@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox and Kilsheimer LLP & Laurence
D. King -- lking@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP.


GREYHOUND LINES: Hearings on Dismissal Bid in "Smith" Moved
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JUSTIN SMITH, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. GREYHOUND LINES, INC., a
Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 2:17-CV-02238-TLN-AC (E.D. Cal.), Judge Troy L. Nunley of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California has
issued a stipulated order continuing the hearings on the
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and the Defendant's Motion to Stay the
Action in order to facilitate settlement.

The Plaintiff filed a Class Action against the Defendant in the
Superior Court of California for the County of Sacramento, Case No.
34-2017-00219188 on Sept. 15, 2017.  The Defendant removed the
Plaintiff's Action to the U.S. Superior Court for the Eastern
District of California and filed a Notice of Removal on Oct. 25,
2017.

The Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand on Nov. 21, 2017 and the
Hearing for that Motion is scheduled for July 26, 2018 at 2:00 p.m.
per the Court's order entered on June 11, 2018 extending the
hearing date.

The Defendant filed a Motion to Stay the Action on Nov. 21, 2017
and the Hearing for that Motion is scheduled for July 26, 2018 at
2:00 p.m. per the Court's order entered on June 11, 2018 extending
the hearing date;

The Defendant has not yet filed an opposition to the Plaintiff's
Motion to Remand.  The Plaintiff has not yet filed an opposition to
the Defendant's Motion to Stay the Action.

The Parties are engaged in continued settlement discussions and
they agree it is in their best interest to further continue the
motion hearings in order to facilitate settlement.  A ruling on the
pending motions prior to a final determination between the Parties
on whether settlement can be achieved will negatively affect the
prospect of resolution.

Therefore the Parties stipulated and agreed, and Judge Nunley
granted, that:

     1. the Court will continue the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand
Hearing currently set for 2:00 p.m. on July 26, 2018 to 2:00 p.m.
on Nov. 15, 2018;

     2. the Court will continue the Defendant's Motion to Stay
Hearing currently set for 2:00 p.m. on July 26, 2018 to 2:00 p.m.
on Nov. 15, 2018;

     3. all opposition and reply briefs due to be filed in
connection with the Motion to Remand and/or Motion to Stay will be
now be due based on the newly set hearing dates and in accordance
with Local Rules; and

     4. nothing in the stipulation and proposed order, or the act
of entering into this stipulation and proposed order, will
prejudice the Parties in any argument they may otherwise make in
the opposition and/or reply briefs.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 17, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/hIEc6R from Leagle.com.

Justin Smith, Plaintiff, represented by Galen T. Shimoda --
attorney@shimodalaw.com -- Shimoda Law Corp. & Justin Paul
Rodriguez -- jrodriguez@shimodalaw.com - Shimoda Law Corp.

Greyhound Lines, Inc., Defendant, represented by David J. Dow --
ddow@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, Pc & Kelsey Elizabeth Papst
-- kpapst@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson.


HANDI-HOUSE MFG: Court Denies Bid for Sanctions in Workers' Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEROY BRANTLEY, JR.; HAROLD H. RICKS; ROGER SMITH; and
SHON BUTLER, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. HANDI-HOUSE MFG. CO., and DONALD FLANDERS,
Defendants, Case No. CV 617-089 (S.D. Ga.), Magistrate Judge Brian
K. Epps of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia, Statesboro Division, denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Sanctions for Spoliation of Evidence.

On behalf of current and former employees of Handi-House, the class
action complaint seeks damages from the alleged operation of a
payday lending scheme charging weekly interest of 30% and
collecting $1.17 million of interest over a five-year class period.
The complaint alleges Handi-House employees, primarily General
Manager and Director of Sales James Akridge and Plant Manager John
Wilkerson, made weekly cash loans to Handi-House employees in
advance of their paychecks, charging $6 in interest on every $20
loaned.  Akridge and Wilkerson allegedly forced the Plaintiffs to
agree to these loans by verbal threats and shows of authority, and
they threatened any Handi-House employee who refused to take a loan
would be suspended without pay or terminated.

The Plaintiffs further allege Defendant Flanders, CEO and CFO of
Handi-House, and his wife Stephanie have overseen the illegal
lending operation and have taken steps to ensure that their
co-conspirators continue operating it within Handi-House
facilities.  However, Akridge and Wilkerson averred they operated
the loan program personally and kept all interest and profits.
Moreover, according to Handi-House employee Charlie Fluellen,
Handi-House ran an institutional loan program that allowed
employees to obtain interest-free loans.

The loan repayment procedure for the payday loan program was quite
simple.  Brenda Williamson, who is the employee responsible for
preparing payroll checks for Handi-House, allegedly annotated the
paychecks of employees receiving loans with the loan balance and
distributed the borrowers' paychecks to Akridge and Wilkerson for
collection.  Akridge and Wilkerson required borrowers to endorse
the paycheck and hand it back to them.  Akridge and Wilkerson
cashed the paychecks in the office, kept cash sufficient to cover
the loan balance, and gave the remaining cash to the borrower.  At
some unidentified point in time, they started writing the loan
balances on a sticky note attached to each pay stub rather than
directly on the pay stub.

Throughout the loan program's existence, on a weekly basis Akridge
and Wilson created a notebook sheet of paper for each personal loan
that outlined the amount of the loan and interest associated with
the loan, if any.  They testified they regularly discarded or
destroyed the loan lists through termination of the loan program in
July 2017.  However, after litigation commenced, Alfred Johnson, a
Handi-House employee and putative class member, produced to the
Plaintiffs' counsel a photograph he took at work of such a loan
list on Dec. 7, 2017.  This prompted the Plaintiffs to file the
present sanctions motion alleging the Defendants purposefully
destroyed the loan list and possibly other loan program documents
after actual pendency of the litigation or after they reasonably
knew Plaintiffs were contemplating litigation.

Johnson provided the following affidavit and deposition testimony
regarding the loan list.  Contrary to the Defendants' contention,
Johnson testified the loan program continued after July 2017 and
into December 2017, with the important modification that Akridge
and Wilkerson now trusted borrowers to cash their own paychecks and
remit the loan balances to them.  On Dec. 7, 2017, co-worker
Charlie Fluellen approached Johnson and showed him a loan list.
Johnson claimed by affidavit he knew the list was from the week of
Dec. 4, 2017 because the list accurately reflected he borrowed $20
that week and owed $26.  He later claimed during his deposition the
date of Dec. 4, 2017 was written on the reverse side of the list,
of which he failed to take a picture.  Johnson claimed Fluellen
"found" the list up there by James' office and later returned the
list to Akridge.

Fluellen testified Johnson is lying and he had never seen the list
before his deposition.  Moreover, Fluellen testified he never
received a personal loan from Akridge and Wilkerson and instead
took advantage of interest-free employee loans offered by Defendant
Handi-House.  Akridge and Wilkerson state by affidavit the list was
created in early July 2017 but later lost.  Three Handi-House
employees, two of whom were identified as borrowers on the loan
list in question, also submitted sworn statements confirming all
loan operations ceased in July 2017.

Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the Court dismissed all the
Defendants except Handi-House and Donald Flanders, as well as
Counts Seven and Ten of the Complaint.  Therefore, Magistrate Judge
Epps will consider the sanctions motion only as to the remaining
Defendants, Handi-House and Flanders.

He finds that five witnesses testified under oath concerning the
July loan cessation, and the only evidence to suggest continuation
of the loan program after July 2017 is the affidavit and deposition
testimony of Johnson.  Because Johnson's testimony is not credible,
the evidence fails to show the loan scheme continued after July
2017, the loan list was created after July 2017, or the loan list
was returned to Akridge after Johnson photographed it.

The Magistrate Judge concludes the Defendants could not have
reasonably known the Plaintiffs were in fact contemplating
litigation before the Plaintiffs filed and served the complaint.
Unlike Phillips v. Harmon, there was no catastrophic event leading
to serious injury or loss of life.  The relationship and course of
conduct between the parties did not suggest the employees planned
litigation either.  There is no evidence of any past litigation or
threatened litigation.  Litigation frequency in similar
circumstances does not weigh heavily in favor of Defendants.  An
employee loan program is not widely known to the general public as
a frequent cause of litigation, and it is doubtful whether it is
known as such even among employers or attorneys who do not
specialize in labor and employment or finance.  Any such frequency
would undoubtedly pale in comparison to the frequency of litigation
generated by car accidents, slip and falls, workplace injuries, and
malpractice.

Nor is there any evidence the Defendants were concerned about the
prospect of litigation before the lawsuit began, such as notice to
insurers or legal counsel or an internal investigation.  In sum,
nothing gave the Defendants any indication the Plaintiffs were
contemplating filing suit before they received the complaint.

For all of these reasons, Magistrate Judge Epps finds that the
Defendants neither knew nor should have known the Plaintiffs were
in fact contemplating litigation prior to filing of the complaint,
and denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/sdGJ0s from Leagle.com.

Leroy Brantley, Jr., Harold H. Ricks, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Roger Smith, on behalf for
themselves and all others similarly situated & Shon Butler, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Jeffrey Francis Peil -- jpeil@hugginsfirm.com -- Joe
Edward Mathews, Jr. -- matt@edenfieldlaw.com -- Edenfield, Cox,
Bruce & Classens, PC, John J. Czura -- john@czuralaw.com -- John J.
Czura, PC, Travers W. Paine, III -- tpaine@painefirm.com -- Travers
W. Paine, III, P.C., V. Sharon Edenfield -- sharri@edenfieldlaw.com
-- Edenfield, Cox, Bruce & Classens, PC & Matthew Wade Padgett --
packages@hugginsfirm.com -- Huggins Peil LLC.

Handi-House MFG. CO. & Donald Flanders, Defendants, represented by
Allan C. Galis -- agalis@HunterMaclean.com -- Hunter Maclean, Exley
& Dunn, P.C., Timothy D. Roberts -- troberts@olivermaner.com --
Oliver Maner, LLP, Larry Evans -- levans@olivermaner.com -- Oliver
Maner, LLP & Wade Wilkes Herring, II -- wherring@HunterMaclean.com
-- Hunter Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C..


HANESBRANDS INC: Sued by Diaz Over ADA Violation
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hanesbrands Inc.
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is
captioned as Edwin Diaz, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. Hanesbrands Inc. doing business as: Hanes,
Case No. 1:18-cv-07588 (S.D.N.Y., August 20, 2018).

Hanesbrands Inc., a consumer goods company, designs, manufactures,
sources, and sells a range of basic apparel for men, women, and
children in the United States.  The Company operates through three
segments: Innerwear, Activewear, and International.  The Company
sells bras, panties, men's underwear, children's underwear,
activewear, socks, hosiery, intimate apparel, shapewears, and home
goods; and T-shirts, fleece, sport shirts, performance T-shirts and
shorts, sports bras, and thermals, as well as licensed logo apparel
in collegiate bookstores, mass retailers, and other channels.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 299-6612
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: joseph@cml.legal


HENRY COUNTY, IN: Objections to June 1 Order in "Baker" Overruled
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTOPHER BAKER, individually and on behalf of the
present and future inmates of Henry County Jail, Plaintiff, v.
RICHARD McCORKLE, individually and in his official capacity as
Sheriff of Henry County, BRUCE BAKER, KIM CRONK, ED YANOS, RICHARD
BOUSLOG, ROBIN RENO-FLEMING, STEVEN DUGGER, NATHAN LAMAR, CLAY
MORGAN, MICHAEL THALLS, HAROLD GRIFFIN, HENRY COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
and HENRY COUNTY COUNCIL, Defendants, Case No.
1:16-cv-03026-JMS-MPB (S.D. Ind.), Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
Indianapolis Division, overruled the Plaintiffs' Objection to the
Magistrate Judge's June 1, 2018 Order.

Baker brings the action on behalf of current or future persons
confined at the Henry County, Indiana Jail.  He alleges that the
Jail is overcrowded in violation of his and the class members'
constitutional rights.

The Court certified a class of any and all persons currently
confined or who will in the future be confined in the Jail, and
Class Notices have been placed at the Jail.

The parties have disagreed regarding several issues related to the
Plaintiffs' counsel's desire to tour and inspect the Jail, and
these disagreements resulted in the Defendants filing a Motion for
Protective Order Regarding the Parameters of Plaintiffs' Jail Tour
and Inspection.  After the parties briefed the Motion for
Protective Order, the Magistrate Judge granted the motion and set
forth specific parameters to be followed during the Plaintiffs'
counsel's Jail tour/inspection.

On June 7, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion Appealing the Order
of the Magistrate Judge and Posing Restrictions on a Visit to the
Henry County Jail.  They argue that there have been at least four
tours of the Jail without incident involving the inmates, but that
it is true that on one occasion during the second visit the jail
commander made a sarcastic remark to which the Plaintiffs' counsel
responded and caused a little bit of ruckus in the administrative
area but not in front of the inmates.

The Plaintiffs also argue that not allowing their counsel to
introduce and explain why he was there would demean his position
and his representation of the class.  They assert that they
responded to accusations that the Jail tours were disruptive,
noting that they had visited the Jail twice with no problems.  They
also argue that their allegations relate to security at the Jail,
so the Plaintiff's counsel should be permitted to take pictures and
document the security conditions.  The Plaintiffs' counsel
submitted an Affidavit in support of the Objection.

Judge Magnus-Stinson finds that the Plaintiffs have not provided
any legal grounds for their Objection.  They have not demonstrated
how the Magistrate Judge's decision is clearly erroneous or
contrary to law, instead only expressing disagreement with the
decision and presenting information that was not presented in
response to the Defendants' Motion for Protective Order.  She
overruled the Plaintiffs' Objection relating to the parameters for
a Jail tour/inspection set forth in the Magistrate Judge's June 1,
2018.

The Plaintiffs also argue in their Objection that their counsel
should be allowed to take pictures and document the security
conditions at the Jail.  This argument, according to the Judge is
puzzling for two reasons.  First, this issue was not before the
Magistrate Judge, as the Defendants did not request a protective
order related to the Plaintiffs' counsel photographing or
videotaping the security cameras at the Jail.  Second, she says,
the Defendants' counsel has conveyed to the Plaintiffs' counsel
that he may photograph and video record any security equipment and
surveillance cameras in plain view during his tour/inspection.
Because this is a non-issue, and was not raised in the Defendants'
Motion for Protective Order nor discussed by the Magistrate Judge
in the June 1, 2018 Order in any event, she overruled the
Plaintiffs' Objection.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Magnus-Stinson overruled the
Plaintiffs' Objection to the Magistrate Judge's June 1, 2018 Order.
The Judge is compelled to address one other issue -- specifically,
she is disturbed by the Plaintiffs' counsel's attacks on the
Defendants' counsel, both leading up to the April 17
tour/inspection and carrying over into the briefing of the
Defendants' Motion for Protective Order and Plaintiffs' Objection.

Specifically, she noted the following examples:

     i. the Defendants' counsel's email in which she recounts the
Plaintiffs' counsel calling her ignorant during a telephone call
regarding the tour/inspection;

     ii. the Plaintiffs' counsel's statement that the Defendants'
counsel began to invent reasons why it was inappropriate for the
Plaintiffs' counsel to introduce himself to inmates;

     iii. the Plaintiffs' counsel's statement that he believes the
Defendants' counsel is attempting to control him rather than
conduct discovery in a professional and courteous manner; and

     iv. the Plaintiffs' counsel's statement that he believes the
Defendants' counsel is making this a personal matter rather than
representing her client's interests.

The Judge reminded the Plaintiffs' counsel of the "Lawyers' Duties
to Other Counsel" set forth in the Seventh Circuit Standards for
Professional Conduct.  She cautioned the Plaintiffs' counsel that
his statements approach -- if not cross -- the lines drawn by these
standards, and he should take care not to approach those lines
again.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 17, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/A9THPy from Leagle.com.

CHRISTOPHER BAKER, Individually and on Behalf of the Present and
Future Inmates of Henry County Jail, Plaintiff, represented by
Julie A. Newhouse, NEWHOUSE AND NEWHOUSE, Michael K. Sutherlin --
msutherlin@gmail.com -- MICHAEL K. SUTHERLIN & ASSOCIATES, PC &
Tracy J. Newhouse, NEWHOUSE & NEWHOUSE.

RICHARD MCCORKLE, Individually And In His Official Capacity As
Sheriff of Henry County, BRUCE BAKER, Henry County Commissioner,
KIM CRONK, Henry County Commissioner, ED YANOS, Henry County
Commissioner, RICHARD BOUSLOG, Henry County Council, ROBIN
RENO-FLEMING, Henry County Council, STEVEN DUGGER, Henry County
Council, NATHAN LAMAR, Henry County Council, CLAY MORGAN, Henry
County Council, MICHAEL THALLS, Henry County Council, HAROLD
GRIFFIN, Henry County Council, HENRY COUNTY, INDIANA COMMISSIONERS
& HENRY COUNTY COUNCIL, Defendants, represented by represented by
James S. Stephenson, STEPHENSON MOROW & SEMLER & Pamela G.
Schneeman, STEPHENSON MOROW & SEMLER.


HENRY SCHEIN: Bid for Class Status Pending in Dental Supplies Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
A motion for class certification in the consolidated case styled In
re Dental Supplies Antitrust Litigation remains pending, according
to Henry Schein, Inc.'s Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018.

Beginning in January 2016, purported class action complaints were
filed against Patterson Companies, Inc. ("Patterson"), Benco Dental
Supply Co. ("Benco") and Henry Schein, Inc.  Although there were
factual and legal variations among these complaints, each of these
complaints alleges, among other things, that defendants conspired
to fix prices, allocate customers and foreclose competitors by
boycotting manufacturers, state dental associations and others that
deal with defendants' competitors.  On February 9, 2016, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York ordered all of
these actions, and all other actions filed thereafter asserting
substantially similar claims against defendants, consolidated for
pre-trial purposes.

On February 26, 2016, a consolidated class action complaint was
filed by Arnell Prato, D.D.S., P.L.L.C., d/b/a Down to Earth
Dental, Evolution Dental Sciences, LLC, Howard M. May, DDS, P.C.,
Casey Nelson, D.D.S., Jim Peck, D.D.S., Bernard W. Kurek, D.M.D.,
Larchmont Dental Associates, P.C., and Keith Schwartz, D.M.D., P.A.
(collectively, "putative class representatives") in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, entitled In re
Dental Supplies Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No.
1:16-CV-00696-BMC-GRB.

In the consolidated class action complaint, putative class
representatives allege a nationwide agreement among Henry Schein,
Benco, Patterson and non-party Burkhart Dental Supply Company, Inc.
("Burkhart") not to compete on price.  The consolidated class
action complaint asserts a single count under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, and seeks equitable relief, compensatory and treble
damages, jointly and severally, and reasonable costs and expenses,
including attorneys' fees and expert fees.

On February 22, 2018, plaintiffs moved to certify a class that,
subject to certain exclusions, includes all private dental
practices and laboratories that purchased dental supplies directly
from Henry Schein, Patterson, Benco, Burkhart or any combination
thereof, during the period beginning January 1, 2009 until March
31, 2016.  That motion is currently pending.

The Company said, "We intend to defend ourselves vigorously against
these actions."

Henry Schein, Inc. provides health care products and services to
dental practitioners and laboratories, animal health clinics,
physician practices, government, institutional health care clinics,
and other alternate care clinics worldwide. It operates through two
segments, Health Care Distribution, and Technology and Value-Added
Services. The company is based in Melville, New York.


HENRY SCHEIN: Still Defends Marion Diagnostic Lawsuit in Illinois
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Henry Schein, Inc. continues to defend itself against a class
action lawsuit pending in the Southern District of Illinois,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018.

On May 3, 2018, a class action complaint, Marion Diagnostic Center,
LLC v. Dickinson, and Co., 3:18-cv-01509 (S.D. Ill), was filed in
the Southern District of Illinois against Becton, Dickinson, and
Co. ("Becton"); Vizient, Inc. ("Vizient"); Cardinal Health, Inc.
("Cardinal"); Owens & Minor Inc. ("O&M"); and Henry Schein, Inc.
The complaint alleges that the defendants entered into a vertical
conspiracy to force healthcare providers into long-term
exclusionary contracts that restrain trade in the nationwide
markets for conventional and safety syringes and safety IV
catheters and that inflate the prices of certain Becton products to
above-competitive levels.

The named plaintiffs seek to represent three separate classes
consisting of all healthcare providers that purchased (i) Becton's
conventional syringes, (ii) Becton's safety syringes, or (iii)
Becton's safety catheters directly from Becton, Cardinal, O&M or
Henry Schein on or after May 3, 2014.  The complaint asserts a
single count under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and seeks
equitable relief, compensatory and treble damages, jointly and
severally, and reasonable costs and expenses, including attorneys'
fees and expert fees.

On June 15, 2018, an amended complaint was filed asserting the same
allegations against the same parties and adding McKesson
Medical-Surgical, Inc. as an additional defendant.

The Company said, "We intend to defend ourselves vigorously against
this action."

Henry Schein, Inc. provides health care products and services to
dental practitioners and laboratories, animal health clinics,
physician practices, government, institutional health care clinics,
and other alternate care clinics worldwide. It operates through two
segments, Health Care Distribution, and Technology and Value-Added
Services. The company is based in Melville, New York.


HENRY SCHEIN: Still Defends Securities Class Action in E.D.N.Y.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Henry Schein, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the lead plaintiff in
the case captioned In re Henry Schein, Inc.  Securities Litigation
intends to file a new complaint by September 14, 2018.

On March 7, 2018, Joseph Salkowitz, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, filed a putative class action
complaint for violation of the federal securities laws against
Henry Schein, Inc., Stanley M. Bergman and Steven Paladino in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
Case No. 1:18-cv-01428.  The complaint seeks to certify a class
consisting of all persons and entities who, subject to certain
exclusions, purchased publicly traded Henry Schein securities from
March 7, 2013 through February 12, 2018 (the "Class Period").

The complaint alleges, among other things, that the defendants made
materially false and misleading statements about Henry Schein's
business, operations and prospects during the Class Period,
including matters relating to the issues in the antitrust class
actions and the FTC action, thereby causing the plaintiff and
members of the purported class to pay artificially inflated prices
for Henry Schein securities.  The complaint seeks unspecified
monetary damages and a jury trial.

Pursuant to the provisions of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (the "PSLRA"), plaintiff's counsel published
notice of the commencement of this action, and thereby provided
notice of the 60-day period during which any putative class member
could apply to be lead plaintiff under the PSLRA.  The court
appointed lead plaintiff and lead counsel on June 22, 2018 and
recaptioned the putative class action as In re Henry Schein, Inc.
Securities Litigation, under the same case number.  Lead plaintiff
intends to file a new complaint by September 14, 2018.

The Company said, "We intend to defend ourselves vigorously against
this action."

Henry Schein, Inc. provides health care products and services to
dental practitioners and laboratories, animal health clinics,
physician practices, government, institutional health care clinics,
and other alternate care clinics worldwide. It operates through two
segments, Health Care Distribution, and Technology and Value-Added
Services. The company is based in Melville, New York.


HERTZ GLOBAL: Still Defends Ramirez's Shareholder Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. continues to defend itself against a
purported shareholder class action filed by Pedro Ramirez,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018.

The case is captioned In re Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. Securities
Litigation.

In November 2013, a purported shareholder class action, Pedro
Ramirez, Jr. v. Hertz Global Holdings, Inc., et al., was commenced
in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey naming
Old Hertz Holdings (as defined in the Company's 2017 Form 10‑K)
and certain of its officers as defendants and alleging violations
of the federal securities laws.  The complaint alleged that Old
Hertz Holdings made material misrepresentations and/or omissions of
material fact in its public disclosures during the period from
February 25, 2013 through November 4, 2013, in violation of Section
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.  The complaint sought an
unspecified amount of monetary damages on behalf of the purported
class and an award of costs and expenses, including counsel fees
and expert fees.

In June 2014, Old Hertz Holdings responded to the amended complaint
by filing a motion to dismiss.  After a hearing in October 2014,
the court granted Old Hertz Holdings' motion to dismiss the
complaint.  The dismissal was without prejudice and plaintiff was
granted leave to file a second amended complaint within 30 days of
the order.

In November 2014, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint which
shortened the putative class period such that it was not alleged to
have commenced until May 18, 2013 and made allegations that were
not substantively very different than the allegations in the prior
complaint.

In early 2015, this case was assigned to a new federal judge in the
District of New Jersey, and Old Hertz Holdings responded to the
second amended complaint by filing another motion to dismiss.

On July 22, 2015, the court granted Old Hertz Holdings' motion to
dismiss without prejudice and ordered that plaintiff could file a
third amended complaint on or before August 22, 2015.

On August 21, 2015, plaintiff filed a third amended complaint.  The
third amended complaint included additional allegations, named
additional current and former officers as defendants and expanded
the putative class period such that it was alleged to span from
February 14, 2013 to July 16, 2015.

Plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint to add a new plaintiff
on March 1, 2016.  Old Hertz Holdings and the individual defendants
moved to dismiss the fourth amended complaint in its entirety with
prejudice on March 24, 2016, and plaintiff filed its opposition to
same.

The plaintiffs filed their Initial Brief in November 2017 and Old
Hertz Holdings -- joined by two of the individual defendants along
with a separate brief by one of the individual defendants -- filed
Opposition Briefs in January 2018.

The plaintiffs' Reply Brief was thereafter filed in February of
2018.  Oral arguments were requested and were held on June 12,
2018.

Hertz operates a vehicle rental business globally through the
Hertz, Dollar and Thrifty brands from approximately 9,700 corporate
and franchisee locations in North America, Europe, Latin America,
Africa, Asia, Australia, The Caribbean, the Middle East and New
Zealand.


HEWLETT PACKARD: "Enoh" Employment Discrimination Suit Dismissed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ENOH I ENOH, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. HEWLETT PACKARD
ENTERPRISE COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-04212-BLF
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California, San Jose Division, (i)
granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss for improper venue; and
(ii) granted in part the remainder of the Defendants' motion to
dismiss and motion to strike.

Plaintiffs Enoh, Christopher Jackson, Derek Mobley and William
Murrell bring the putative class and collective action against
Defendants HP Inc. and HPE to challenge the Defendants' employment
practices that allegedly discriminate against African-American
employees and applicants over the age of 40.  Specifically, the
Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants engaged in race and age
discrimination in hiring, promotions, and lay-offs in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").

Although the Plaintiffs filed the case in the Northern District of
California, and the Defendants are headquartered in Palo Alto,
California, none of the named Plaintiffs resided in California or
worked for either the Defendant in California during the relevant
class period.  All four of the named Plaintiffs are
African-American males over the age of 40.

Mr. Enoh alleges that he is a resident of Maryland and worked for
"HP" from 1996 until he was terminated on May 26, 2017.  Although
not alleged by the Plaintiffs, the Defendants provide evidence that
Mr. Enoh worked for HPE in Maryland at all times after
Hewlett-Packard reorganized in November 2015.  Mr. Enoh's last held
position was Field Services Engineer.  As a result of his
termination from employment, Mr. Enoh brings claims for race
discrimination against the Defendants in violation of Title VII and
Section 1981 (Counts 1 and 2) as well as intentional discrimination
and disparate impact age discrimination claims pursuant to the ADEA
(Counts 3 and 4).

Mr. Jackson also alleges that he was terminated from his
decades-long employment at HP as a result of age and race
discrimination.  Mr. Jackson is a resident of Atlanta, Georgia who
worked for HP Inc. in Georgia from July 15, 1996 to July 18, 2016
with the last held position of District Manager.  In the SAC, Mr.
Jackson asserts race discrimination in violation of Title VII and
Section 1981, as well as age discrimination in violation of the
ADEA under both intentional discrimination and disparate impact
theories.

Plaintiff Mobley is a resident of Atlanta, Georgia who began
working for HPE in November 2016 as a contract employee in Georgia.
Mr. Mobley was part of a training class for Advanced Solutions
Engineers made up of contract workers who were trying to gain
permanent employment with HP.  Mr. Mobley alleges that he applied
for approximately seven open positions at HP, including the job he
is currently performing.  He alleges that each of his applications
has been rejected despite his satisfactory performance rating.  As
it pertains to the SAC, Mr. Mobley asserts claims of race
discrimination in hiring based on theories of intentional
discrimination and disparate impact in violation of Title VII and
Section 1981.

Mr. Murrell is a resident of Atlanta, Georgia, and a current
employee of HP Inc. in Georgia.  Mr. Murrell began his career as a
contract employee at Hewlett-Packard in or around 2000, and became
a full-time employee in 2007.  Mr. Murrell is currently a Field
Service Support Representative.  In the SAC, Mr. Murrell brings
claims for race discrimination in promotion in violation of Title
VII and Section 1981, based on theories of both intentional
discrimination and disparate impact.

Defendants HP Inc. and HPE now move to dismiss the lawsuit, or
transfer it to the Northern District of Georgia where three of the
named Plaintiffs lived and worked, on the grounds that venue in the
Northern District of California is improper under 42 U.S.C. Section
2000e-5(f)(3).

The Plaintiffs oppose, arguing that venue is proper in the District
where the Defendants are headquartered based on comments made by
former Hewlett-Packard President and CEO Meg Whitman.  They argue
that Ms. Whitman's comments, such as her issuance of an alleged
directive to managers nationwide to make sure that they have a
labor pyramid with lots of young people coming in right out of
college and graduate school and early in their careers, evidence an
overarching plan to discriminate against older workers at HP Inc.
and HPE.

In addition to the specific experiences of each named Plaintiff,
the SAC includes a number of general allegations regarding HP Inc.
and HPE's employment practices.  The Plaintiffs allege that HP
intentionally restricted and excluded African-Americans from higher
paying and higher responsibility positions by preventing and/or
discouraging them from seeking any such positions.  With regard to
their age discrimination claims, Plaintiffs allege that HP
initiated a "Workforce Reduction Plan" or "WRP" that was aimed at
making the company younger.

In response to the filing of the Plaintiffs' operative SAC,
Defendants filed a combined motion to (1) dismiss or transfer the
case for lack of proper venue; (2) dismiss the Plaintiffs' age
discrimination claims pursuant to the first-to-file rule in light
of an earlier filed case Forsyth, et. al v. HP Inc., et al.; (3)
dismiss all claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6); and (4) strike the Plaintiffs' class
allegations on the grounds that the class definitions are
temporally overbroad and exceed the applicable statute of
limitations.

The Court held a hearing on the Defendants' combined motion on May
31, 2018.  Judge Freeman addresses the Defendants' motion to
dismiss or transfer for improper venue, and finds that it is
dispositive.  She finds that venue is improper in the Northern
District of California under Title VII's venue provision allowing a
plaintiff to bring an action where the unlawful employment practice
is alleged to have been committed.  The challenged employment
decisions based on alleged age discrimination were made and
implemented by the Plaintiffs' managers in Maryland and Georgia,
and the effects of those actions were felt by Plaintiffs Enoh and
Jackson in Maryland and Georgia, respectively.  Ms. Whitman's
comments explaining the Workforce Reduction Plan do not suffice to
meet the Plaintiffs' burden to show that the underlying employment
decisions were made in the District, or that the managers made the
challenged decisions based on directives emanating from the
District.

At the May 31, 2018 hearing, Plaintiffs indicated that it is not
clear where venue should be, and the Judge agrees that venue could
be proper in several districts.  Having considered the
circumstances of the case and the positions of the parties, she
finds that the interests of justice are best served by dismissing
the Plaintiffs' claims without prejudice to re-filing in a district
that satisfies the requirements of Section 2000e-5(f)(3).

The Judge will not transfer the action but rather dismiss the
Plaintiffs' claims without prejudice to filing the action in a
district where venue is proper.  Accordingly, she addresses
additional deficiencies in the SAC that warrant dismissal of the
Plaintiffs' claims with leave to amend, and directs the Plaintiffs
to address such deficiencies prior to re-filing this case in
another district.

First, although the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants became
two separate entities in November 2015, the SAC fails to plead any
facts specific to each entity.  The Judge also finds that the
Plaintiffs' disparate impact allegations against the Defendants are
insufficient.  The Plaintiffs also fail to explain how the adverse
employment decisions complained of were the result of the
Defendants' alleged "hazy" selection process.

Finally, as to the Defendants' motion to strike the Plaintiffs'
class definition for their race discrimination claims as overly
broad, the Judge agrees with them.  The Plaintiffs must amend their
overbroad class definition for their race discrimination claims to
exclude individuals who are barred by their failure to timely file
a claim with the EEOC, or who suffered injuries outside of the four
year statute of limitations period under Section 1981.  Contrary to
the Plaintiffs' argument that motions to strike class allegations
at the pleading stage are generally disfavored, she finds that
imposing time limitations on the class definition at the outset of
the litigation is necessary to protect the Defendants from
burdensome and unnecessary class discovery on barred claims and
individuals.

For the foregoing reasons, Judg Freeman granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the action for improper venue; (ii) grante din
part without prejudice the Defendants' remaining motion to dismiss
and motion to strike in line with the discussion above and on the
record at the May 31, 2018 hearing.  The Judge dismissed the
Plaintiffs' claims without prejudice to re-filing this action in a
District where venue is proper pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section
2000e-5(f)(3).  The Clerk will close the file.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/JORKhI from Leagle.com.

Enoh I Enoh, Plaintiff, represented by Jay Patrick Greene --
jay@jaygreenelawfirm.com -- The Greene Law Firm, Lee David Winston,
Winston Cooks, LLC, pro hac vice & Roderick Twain Cooks, Winston
Cooks, LLC, pro hac vice.

Christopher Jackson & William Murrell, Plaintiffs, represented by
Jay Patrick Greene, The Greene Law Firm & Roderick Twain Cooks,
Winston Cooks, LLC, pro hac vice.

Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company & HP Inc., Defendants,
represented by Donald William Myers --  dwmyers@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson, PC, pro hac vice, Jeffrey J. Mann --
jmann@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C., Lindbergh Porter, Jr.
-- lporter@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, PC, Lisa A. Schreter
-- lschreter@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C., pro hac vice,
Paul Erich Bateman -- pbateman@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson,
P.C., pro hac vice & Richard W. Black -- rblack@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson, P.C., pro hac vice.


HSBC USA: "Nypl" Putative Class Action Still Pending in S.D.N.Y.
----------------------------------------------------------------
A putative class action filed on behalf of retail customers against
HSBC entities, among other defendants, remain pending in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
according to HSBC USA Inc.'s Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The case is styled Nypl v. JPMorgan Chase, et al.; No.
1:15-CV-9300.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

HSBC USA Inc., incorporated under the laws of Maryland, is a New
York State based bank holding company and a wholly-owned subsidiary
of HSBC North America Holdings Inc., which is an indirect
wholly-owned subsidiary of HSBC Holdings plc.


HSBC USA: 2nd Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Allen Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
HSBC USA Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit has affirmed the U.S. district court's dismissal
of the "Allen" action.

The case is styled Allen v. Bank of America Corporation, et al.;
No. 1:15-CV-4285). It is a putative class action filed on behalf of
ERISA plan participants against HSBC entities, among other
defendants, filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.  The Second Circuit affirmed the
dismissal in a July 2018 ruling.

HSBC USA Inc., incorporated under the laws of Maryland, is a New
York State based bank holding company and a wholly-owned subsidiary
of HSBC North America Holdings Inc., which is an indirect
wholly-owned subsidiary of HSBC Holdings plc.


HSBC USA: Bid to Nix Suit over Canadian Dealer Offered Rate Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------------
HSBC USA Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that defendants have filed a
motion to dismiss in the Canadian Dealer Offered Rate putative
class action.

The case is styled Fire & Police Pension Association of Colorado,
et al. v. Bank of Montreal, et al. (Case No. 18-cv-00342).  The
motion to dismiss was filed in July 2018.

HSBC USA Inc., incorporated under the laws of Maryland, is a New
York State based bank holding company and a wholly-owned subsidiary
of HSBC North America Holdings Inc., which is an indirect
wholly-owned subsidiary of HSBC Holdings plc.


HSBC USA: Faces Vasquez Class Action over Ponzi Scheme
------------------------------------------------------
The putative class action styled Rigoberto Vasquez and Eva Garcia
et al v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd., HSBC Bank
USA, N.A., et al., is ongoing, according to HSBC USA Inc.'s Form
10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on
August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

This putative class action was filed in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York in March 2018 against HSBC Bank
USA and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Corporation and contains
allegations similar to the Ramiro Giron, et al. v. Hong Kong and
Shanghai Bank Corporation, Ltd., et al action.

Plaintiffs purport to represent those that invested in a Ponzi
scheme allegedly orchestrated by Phil Ming Xu and certain companies
he allegedly controlled, such as WCM777.  Hong Kong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation is alleged to have accepted wire transfers from
plaintiffs to WCM777 from investors in furtherance of the Ponzi
scheme.  HSBC Bank USA is alleged to have acted as Hong Kong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation's correspondent bank for certain wire
transfers to WCM777.  The purported class period is from June 2013
to May 2014.

Plaintiffs allege claims for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act violations, aiding and abetting fraud, aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting
conversion.  Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages in the amount of
US$37 million plus punitive damages, interest and attorneys' fees
and costs.

HSBC USA Inc., incorporated under the laws of Maryland, is a New
York State based bank holding company and a wholly-owned subsidiary
of HSBC North America Holdings Inc., which is an indirect
wholly-owned subsidiary of HSBC Holdings plc.


HSBC USA: FX Antitrust Suit Settlement Awaits Final Court OK
------------------------------------------------------------
HSBC USA Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that a consolidated action
has been settled subject to final court approval.  The case is
captioned In re Foreign Exchange Benchmark Rates Antitrust
Litigation; No. 13-CV-7789(LGS).

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

HSBC USA Inc., incorporated under the laws of Maryland, is a New
York State based bank holding company and a wholly-owned subsidiary
of HSBC North America Holdings Inc., which is an indirect
wholly-owned subsidiary of HSBC Holdings plc.


HSBC USA: Still Defends Mortgage Securitization Trust Litigation
----------------------------------------------------------------
HSBC USA Inc. continues to face the Mortgage Securitization Trust
Litigation, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

Since 2014, Plaintiff-Investors in 280 RMBS trusts have sued HSBC
Bank USA, as mortgage securitization trustee, in a number of cases:
BlackRock et al., Royal Park Investments SA/NV ("RPI"), Phoenix
Light SF Limited, the National Credit Union Administration Board,
as Liquidating Agent, Commerzbank AG, and Triaxx, IKB Bank AG, RMBS
Recovery Holdings I LLC, et al., VRS Holdings 2 LLC and Reliance
Standard Life Insurance Company.  BlackRock's and RPI's motion for
class certification has been denied, and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit denied a request for review of the
decision.

HSBC USA Inc., incorporated under the laws of Maryland, is a New
York State based bank holding company and a wholly-owned subsidiary
of HSBC North America Holdings Inc., which is an indirect
wholly-owned subsidiary of HSBC Holdings plc.


HSBC USA: Still Faces Contant Putative Class Action in S.D.N.Y.
---------------------------------------------------------------
A putative class action filed on behalf of "indirect purchasers" of
Foreign Exchange against HSBC entities, among other defendants,
remain pending in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, according to HSBC USA Inc.'s Form 10-Q filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The case is styled Contant v. Bank of America Corporation, et al.;
No. 1:17-CV-03139.

Plaintiffs have filed a motion for leave to amend in response to
the court's dismissal of the action in March 2018.

HSBC USA Inc., incorporated under the laws of Maryland, is a New
York State based bank holding company and a wholly-owned subsidiary
of HSBC North America Holdings Inc., which is an indirect
wholly-owned subsidiary of HSBC Holdings plc.


HUSKY ENERGY: Faces Bruzek Class Suit in W.D. Wisconsin
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Husky Energy Inc. and
Superior Refining Company LLC.  The case is titled Jasen Bruzek,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Hope
Koplin, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated; and Neil Miller, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Husky Energy Inc. and Superior Refining
Company LLC, Case No. 3:18-cv-00697 (W.D. Wisc., August 20, 2018).

The Plaintiffs filed the case over alleged property damage.

Husky Energy Inc. is one of Canada's largest integrated energy
companies, headquartered in Calgary, Alberta.

Superior Refining Company LLC is the owner and operator of the
refinery located in Superior, Wisconsin, and does business under
the licensed and registered trade name "Husky Energy."[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John Gordon Rudd, Jr., Esq.
          Patricia A. Bloodgood, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN REED, P.L.L.P.
          1100 IDS Center
          80 South Eighth Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 341-0400
          Facsimile: (612) 341-0844
          E-mail: gordon.rudd@zimmreed.com
                  patricia.bloodgood@zimmreed.com


JACOBY & MEYERS: Court Grants Bid to Amend N. Harding's Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NANCY HARDING and JEFFREY HARDING, on Behalf Of
Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. JACOBY
& MEYERS, LLP, FINKELSTEIN & PARTNERS, LLP, TOTAL TRIAL SOLUTIONS,
LLC, ANDREW FINKELSTEIN and KENNETH OLIVER, Defendants. BARBARA J.
SMALLS, on Behalf Of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, v. JACOBY & MEYERS, LLP, TOTAL TRIAL SOLUTIONS, LLC and
ANDREW FINKELSTEIN, Defendants, Civil Action Nos. 14-5419 (JMV),
15-6559 (JMV) (D. N.J.), Magistrate Judge Mark Falk of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the Complaint.

This is a putative class action for breach of fiduciary duty and
breach of contract.  The matter arises from a dispute between
Plaintiffs Nancy and Jeffrey Harding ("Plaintiffs") and their
former lawyers, Finkelstein & Partners, LLP ("F&P").  The
Plaintiffs retained F&P to separately represent them in two
unrelated personal injury lawsuits.  Each executed a retainer
agreement which provided for, among other things, that F&P would
receive a one-third contingency fee.  Both of the Hardings'
personal injury cases settled.  F&P deducted from the settlement
proceeds payments made to Defendant Total Trial Solutions, LLC
("TTS"), an alleged litigation support company that is owned, at
least in part, by Defendant Andrew Finkelstein and Defendant
Kenneth Oliver.

The Plaintiffs commenced the putative class action on Aug. 28,
2014, asserting claims for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty
and breach of contract.  They allege that they were improperly
charged for work performed by TTS.  According to the Plaintiffs,
the Defendants formed TTS to evade ethics rules forbidding
attorneys from collecting more than one-third from a net recovery
in a personal injury case, as well as rules proscribing charging
clients more than the actual cost of the disbursements.  The
Plaintiffs claim that TTS's work should have been actually covered
by F&P's contingency fee arrangement; instead the Plaintiffs were
charged for TTS's work as a separate expense.

Following dispositive motion practice, and prior to the Undersigned
being assigned to the case, multiple scheduling orders were entered
by two other Magistrate Judges initially case managing the action.
Pursuant to one of these Orders entered July 10, 2015, the date by
which motions to amend were to be filed was July 24, 2015.  In
September 2015, the parties raised various discovery disputes with
the Court.

On Oct. 15, 2015, the Court entered an Order providing that current
expert and class certification motion dates were to be held in
abeyance pending a decision on the discovery disputes.  No further
Orders regarding scheduling of the matter were entered.

On March 9, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to consolidate the
case with Smalls v. Jacoby and Meyers, LLP et al., 15-6559 (JMV).
On July 25, 2016, the Court denied the motion and granted the
Plaintiffs leave to file their class certification motion by Aug.
30, 2016.  Although the cases were nearly identical, consolidation
was denied primarily because the cases were at different procedural
stages.  The Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification
which District Judge Vazquez denied, without prejudice, on Oct. 30,
2017.

On Dec. 7, 2017, the Plaintiff moved again to consolidate the
Smalls and Harding cases.  Given the passage of time and other
developments, the reason for denying consolidation no longer
existed.  On June 29, 2018, the Smalls case was consolidated into
the Harding case.

According to the Plaintiff, while the motion for class
certification was pending in the case, deposition testimony taken
in Smalls, including the deposition of Mr. Finkelstein, TTS's COO,
and F&P's Chief Financial Officer, revealed that TTS was the
alter-ego of F&P.  At a conference before the Court in Smalls on
May 18, 2017, the counsel advised of its intention to seek leave to
amend to add allegations that TTS is the alter-ego of Mr.
Finkelstein and/or Jacoby & Meyers, LLP and is used by them to
circumvent ethics rules prohibiting a law firm from charging a
profit on disbursements expended by a law firm on a client's
behalf.  The Plaintiffs in Smalls filed an application to amend.
The Court granted the Plaintiffs' application on Nov. 16, 2017, and
the Smalls Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on Nov. 27, 2017.

The Plaintiffs now seek leave to amend their Complaint in the now
consolidated Harding case to assert nearly identical allegations to
those asserted in Smalls that TTS is the alter-ego of Mr.
Finkelstein and F&P.  The Defendants do not oppose the motion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.4.  Instead, they argue that the
Plaintiffs' motion is out of time and that the Plaintiffs have
failed to make a showing of good cause to permit moving after the
date to amend provided in the July 10, 2015 Scheduling Order.  More
specifically, they contend that the Plaintiffs' deadline to seek
leave to amend expired on July 24, 2015, and that the Plaintiffs
have not demonstrated good cause as required by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 16 to warrant relief from the Scheduling Order.

Plaintiffs argue that they were diligent through out the course of
the litigation, and reasonably moved for leave to amend after facts
were learned in Smalls revealing that TTS shares an alter-ego
relationship with Mr. Finkelstein, Jacoby & Meyers, and F&P.  The
Plaintiffs contend that their efforts were delayed by the
Defendants' scheduling their witnesses for deposition near the end
of discovery, the then pending motion for class certification, as
well as complying with the Court's procedure for seeking leave.
The Plaintiffs further argue that the Defendants unfairly focus on
the outdated scheduling order deadline while completely ignoring
the evolving procedural history and circumstances in this case and
in Smalls.

Magistrate Judge Falk finds that finds that the Plaintiffs have
made a sufficient showing to satisfy the good cause standard of
Rule 16 to permit leave to amend the Complaint now.  The Plaintiffs
had not discovered the facts that support the proposed allegations
of veil-piercing until long after the July 25, 2015 deadline to
amend contained in the Scheduling Order.  Therefore, it would not
have been possible for them to have complied with the deadline in
the Scheduling Order.  While he recognizes that much time has
passed since the old deadline to amend expired, the passage of
time, by itself, the Magistrate Judge finds that it does not
preclude a finding of good cause.

Given the totality of the circumstances, and in particular the
Plaintiffs' diligence in moving to amend once they learned of the
factual basis underlying their veil-piercing claim, the Magistrate
Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have shown good cause to grant them
leave to amend their Complaint.  Accordingly, he granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/n7fkW5 from Leagle.com.

NANCY HARDING & JEFFREY HARDING, Plaintiffs, represented by JOSEPH
R. SANTOLI & OLIMPIO LEE SQUITIERI, SQUITIERI & FEARON, LLP.

BARBARA J. SMALLS, Plaintiff Consolidated, represented by JOSEPH R.
SANTOLI.

JACOBY & MEYERS, LLP, FINKELSTEIN & PARTNERS, LLP, TOTAL TRIAL
SOLUTIONS, LLC, ANDREW FINKELSTEIN & KENNETH OLIVER, Defendants,
represented by A. RICHARD ROSS, CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN,
JAMES E. CECCHI -- JCecchi@carellabyrne.com -- CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI
OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C. & LINDSEY H. TAYLOR --
LTaylor@carellabyrne.com -- CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY
& AGNELLO.


KAG WEST: P. Malone's Suit Remanded to State Court
--------------------------------------------------
In the cases, KAG WEST, LLC, a California limited liability
company; THE KENAN ADVANTAGE GROUP, INC., a Delaware corporation,
Petitioners, v. PATRICK MALONE, an individual, Respondent. PATRICK
MALONE, an individual, on behalf of himself, all others similarly
situated, and the general public, Plaintiff, v. KAG WEST, LLC, a
California limited liability company, Defendant, Case Nos.
4:15-cv-03827-YGR, 4:15-cv-04262-YGR (N.D. Cal.), Judge Yvonne
Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for the District of
California granted the Parties' Joint Stipulation to Remand Action
to Alameda County Superior Court.

The action of KAG West, LLC, et al. v. Patrick Malone, Northern
District of California Case No. 4:15-cv-03827-YGR was initiated by
the Defendants-Petitioners on Aug. 21, 2015 in the form of a
Petition to Compel Arbitration against Plaintiff-Respondent Malone
for the various wage and hour claims he had asserted in
correspondence dated July 22, 2015 ("District Court Action");

The alleged putative wage and hour class action and Private
Attorney General Act ("PAGA") action of Patrick Malone v. KAG West,
LLC, Alameda County Superior Court Case No. RG15784137 was filed by
the Plaintiff-Respondent in California Superior Court on Sept. 1,
2015 ("California Superior Court Action");

The Defendants-Petitioners removed the California Superior Court
Action to the Northern District of California on Sept. 18, 2015.

District Court Judge Thelton E. Henderson (Ret.) granted the
Defendants-Petitioners' Petition to Compel Arbitration in the
District Court Action on Nov. 3, 2015, correspondingly stayed
Plaintiff Malone's PAGA representative claims and consolidated the
District Court Action and the Removed California Superior Court
Action.  The Plaintiff and Respondent Malone's putative class
claims were subsequently dismissed by a JAMS arbitrator.

In addition to the consolidated action in federal court for claims
brought forth by Mr. Malone, a representative PAGA suit initiated
by an individual named James Souza remains pending in Alameda
County Superior Court under the title of James Souza v. KAG West,
LLC, Case No. RG16814354. Mr. Souza is represented by the same
counsel of record in the action.

The Souza v. KAG West action, as a PAGA only action, could not be
removed to the Northern District of California from Alameda County
Superior Court as currently pled and remains pending there.

The Parties in the consolidated action, along with Plaintiff Souza
in James Souza v. KAG West, LLC, Case No. RG16814354, have reached
a global settlement of their wage and hour claims against the
Defendants-Petitioners that is subject to court review and
approval.  This global settlement, if approved, would resolve all
claims alleged in the consolidated action, in Malone's individual
action pending in arbitration before JAMS, and in the Alameda
County Superior Court Souza PAGA action.

The Parties believe it would be most efficient to have a single
court consider their global settlement.  It is in the interests of
judicial economy to have a single court consider the global
settlement reached by the Parties.  The present consolidated
federal court action could be remanded from the Northern District
of California back to state court based on the original filing of
the Malone v. KAG West California Superior Court Action in Alameda
County Superior Court.

Therefore, the Parties agreed and Judge Rogers granted that for the
sole purpose of facilitating state court review and potential
approval of the Parties' global settlement of all disputed claims
between the Parties, the consolidated action will be remanded back
to Alameda County Superior Court under the docket Patrick Malone v.
KAG West, LLC, Case No. RG15784137.  The compliance hearing set for
July 20, 2018 is vacated.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 17, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/XgJ6CI from Leagle.com.

Patrick Malone, Plaintiff, represented by Michael Hagop Boyamian --
michael@boyamianlaw.com -- Boyamian Law, Inc., Michael Scott
Morrison -- mmorrison@akgllp.com -- Alexander Krakow & Glick LLP,
Thomas Walker Falvey -- thomaswfalvey@gmail.com -- Law Offices of
Thomas W. Falvey & Armand Raffi Kizirian -- armand@kizirianlaw.com
-- Boyamian Law, Inc.

KAG WEST, LLC, Defendant, represented by Brian Lee Johnsrud, Esq.
-- bjohnsrud@curleyhessinger.com -- Christopher W. Loweth, Esq. --

cloweth@curleyhessinger.com -- Patrick Michael Sherman, Esq. --
psherman@curleyhessinger.com -- CURLEY, HESSINGER & JOHNSRUD LLP.


KRG JCS: Faces Blancher's Wage-and-Hour Suit
--------------------------------------------
JAMES BLANCHER, an individual, the Plaintiff, v. KRG JCS, LLC, a
limited liability company; FUN EATS AND DRINKS, LLC, limited
liability company; KELLY COMPANIES OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, LLC;
LARRY KECK, an individual; and DOES 1-100, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. RG18916321 (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 10, 2018),
alleges that during Blancher's employment, he was not:

     -- provided with a 30-minute meal period for every five hours
worked.

     -- relieved of all duty to take such a meal period and the
high demands of the job otherwise prevented him from taking one.

     -- paid with an hour of pay at his regular rate of
compensation for every meal period that was unlawfully denied him.

In addition, the wage statements issued to Blancher were inaccurate
and incomplete:

     -- they did not show the inclusive dates of the period for
which Blancher was paid; they showed only the "period ending"
date.

     -- they did not show the total hours worked by Blancher.

     -- they did not reflect the missed meal periods and the
premium pay thus due and owing, and thus did not accurately show
the gross and net wages earned.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff James Blancher and the Putative Class:

          Robert J. Wasserman, Esq.
          William J. Gorham, Esq.
          Nicholas J. Scardigli, Esq.
          John P. Briscoe, Esq.
          MAYALL HURLEY, P.C.
          112453 Grand Canal Boulevard
          Stockton, CA 95207-8253
          Telephone: (209) 477 3833
          Facsimile: (209) 473 4818
          E-mail: nvasserman@mayallaw.com
                  wgorham@mayallaw.com
                  nscardigli@mayallaw.com
                  briscoe@mayallaw.com


MAGICJACK VOCALTEC: Bid to Drop Freedman Lawsuit Still Pending
--------------------------------------------------------------
magicJack VocalTec Ltd. said in its Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that no decision has yet been
reached on the motion to dismiss the putative class action lawsuit
captioned Freedman v. magicJack VocalTec Ltd. et al.

On August 11, 2017, a putative class action lawsuit titled Freedman
v. magicJack VocalTec Ltd. et al., Case 9-17-cv-80940, was filed
against the Company and its Board of Directors in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida.  The complaint
alleged claims against the Company and the current members of its
Board of Directors as well as two former members for violations of
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
arising from proxy statements issued in connection with the April
19, 2017 shareholders meeting and the July 31, 2017 shareholders
meeting that allegedly misrepresented material facts concerning the
"true value" of Broadsmart Global, Inc. and its future prospects in
order that the individual defendants (the Board members) could
entrench themselves on the Board and extract unwarranted
compensation from the Company in connection with their attempt to
sell the Company.

In January 2018, the plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint.  On
February 16, 2018, the Company and all of the individual defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint.  The plaintiff
filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss on April 2, 2018, and
defendants' reply was filed on April 19, 2018.  No decision has yet
been reached on the motion.

magicJack said, "The Company cannot estimate the amount of
potential liability, if any, that could arise from this matter."

magicJack VocalTec Ltd. and its subsidiaries is a cloud
communications leader that is the inventor of the magicJack devices
and other magicJack products and services.


MAGICJACK VOCALTEC: Martinez & Lopez Sue over Robocalls
-------------------------------------------------------
magicJack VocalTec Ltd. is facing putative class action lawsuit
related to alleged violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On July 12, 2018, plaintiffs Ramon G. Martinez and Moses Lopez
filed a putative class action Complaint against magicJack LP and
YMAX Holdings Corporation alleging violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act in connection with calls placed by an
autodialer using a pre-recorded voice without the requisite
consent.  The case is pending in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida as case number 9:18-cv-80917-RLR.  The
Complaint is brought on behalf of a nationwide class, and the
putative class representative plaintiffs allege that the damages
could exceed US$5 million.

magicJack said, "The Company disputes the plaintiffs' claims and
intends to vigorously defend the action.  The Company cannot
estimate the amount of potential liability, if any, that could
arise from this matter."

magicJack VocalTec Ltd. and its subsidiaries is a cloud
communications leader that is the inventor of the magicJack devices
and other magicJack products and services.


MARATHON PETROLEUM: Defends 6 Class Suits over Andeavor Merger
--------------------------------------------------------------
Marathon Petroleum Corporation is facing six putative class action
lawsuits related to the company's pending merger with Andeavor,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018.

On April 29, 2018, the Company ("MPC") and Andeavor ("ANDV")
entered into a definitive merger agreement under which MPC has
agreed to acquire all of ANDV's outstanding shares.

Between June 20 and July 11, 2018, six putative class actions were
filed against some or all of Andeavor, the directors of Andeavor,
and MPC Mahi Inc. ("Merger Sub 1") and Mahi LLC ("Merger Sub 2"
and, together with MPC and Merger Sub 1, the "MPC Defendants"),
relating to the merger.  Two complaints, Malka Raul v. Andeavor, et
al., and Stephen Bushansky v. Andeavor, et al., were filed in the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas.  Four
complaints, captioned The Vladimir Gusinsky Rev. Trust v. Andeavor,
et al., Lawrence Zucker v. Andeavor, et al., Mel Gross v. Andeavor,
et al., and Hudson v. Andeavor, et al. were filed in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Delaware.

The complaints generally allege that Andeavor, the directors of
Andeavor and the MPC Defendants disseminated a false or misleading
registration statement regarding the proposed merger in violation
of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 promulgated
thereunder.  Specifically, the complaints allege that the
registration statement filed by MPC misstated or omitted material
information regarding the parties' financial projections and the
analyses performed by Andeavor's and MPC's respective financial
advisors, and that disclosure of material information is necessary
in light of preclusive deal protection provisions in the merger
agreement, the financial interests of Andeavor's officers and
directors in completing the deal, and the financial interests of
Andeavor's and MPC's respective financial advisors.

The complaints further allege that the directors of Andeavor and/or
the MPC Defendants are liable for these violations as "controlling
persons" of Andeavor under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  The
complaints seek injunctive relief, including to enjoin and/or
rescind the merger, damages in the event the merger is consummated,
and an award of attorneys' fees, in addition to other relief.

The Company said, "Additional lawsuits arising out of the proposed
merger may be filed in the future.  We believe that the lawsuits
are without merit and intend to defend vigorously against them and
any other lawsuits challenging the merger.  Therefore, at this
time, we do not believe the ultimate resolution of these lawsuits
will have a material adverse effect."

Marathon Petroleum Corporation is a large independent refining and
marketing company headquartered in Findlay, Ohio.  MPLX LP is a
publicly traded midstream logistics master limited partnership
(MLP) also headquartered in Findlay, Ohio whose general partner is
Marathon Petroleum Corporation.


MASSACHUSETTS: Court Allows A. Burnham to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ARTHUR BURNHAM, on behalf of 45 Block-2 Prisoners,
"class action," Plaintiff, v. DOUGLAS W. DEMOURA, et al.,
Defendants, C.A. No. 18-11464-ADB (D. Mass.), Judge Allison D.
Burroughs of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts (1) granted the Plaintiff's motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis; (2) ordered that summonses issue; and
(3) denied the Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

On July 13, 2018, pro se Plaintiff Burnham, who is confined at MCI
Cedar Junction, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 and state law in which he complains that he and the
other prisoners at MCI Cedar Junction are being subjected to cruel
and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
because temperatures in their cells have recently reached 120
degrees and prison officials refuse to turn on exhaust fans to
abate the situation.  According to Burnham, beginning on June 30,
2018, he and other prisoners complained to prison officials about
the excessive heat in their cells and asked that exhaust fans be
turned on to reduce the temperature.  Correction officers allegedly
responded that they were not allowed to do so.  Burnham claims that
multiple prisoners experienced heat stroke, fainting, and other
conditions because of the cell temperatures, and that these inmates
required medical attention.

Burnham reports that, beginning on June 30, 2018, he made several
attempts to obtain a grievance form to formally complain that the
exhaust fans were not being employed, but that prison employees
refused to provide him with the same. He states that he told prison
employees that he was preparing to file a class-action lawsuit
concerning the temperature in the prison and showed them a cover
sheet for the same.

Burnham represents that, since July 4, 2018, the exhaust fans have
been periodically turned on for all the blocks at MCI Cedar
Junction except for the Block 2, where Burnham is housed.  He
asserts that his block was singled out in retaliation for
attempting to file grievances about the heat and stating that he
would file a class action.  The Plaintiff alleges that the action
has placed him at grave risk of reprisal from dangerous now
agitated prisoners.

Burnham purportedly brings the action on behalf of himself and the
other prisoners of Block 2.  He has filed a separate motion for
certification of a plaintiff class, with himself as the
representative party.  Burnham argues in his motion that class
certification is in the interest of justice because, absent class
certification, the case will become moot when he is released from
prison on Aug. 23, 2018.

Upon review of Burnham's motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, Judge Burroughs finds that he is without income or assets
to prepay the filing fee.  Accordingly, the motion is granted.
Because it appears that Burnham has been without income or assets
for the six months preceding the filing of the action, no initial
partial filing fee is assessed.  

Even if the proposed class of Block 2 prisoners met all the class
certification requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Judge holds that the absence of the counsel
prevents the Court from certifying a class.  Section 1654 of Title
28 of the United States Code provides, in pertinent part, that in
all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct
their own cases personally or by counsel.

Accordingly, Burroughs granted the motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis.  No initial partial filing fee is assessed.  The
entire $350 filing fee will be collected in accordance with 28
U.S.C. Section 1915(b)(2).  The Judge denied without prejudice the
motion for class certification.  

The Clerk will issue summonses as to both the Defendants.  The
Plaintiff is responsible for serving the summonses, complaint, and
this order on the Defendants in compliance with Rule 4 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 4.1.  Service must
be completed within 90 days of the date of the Order.  Failure to
comply with this deadline may result in dismissal of the action.

Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, he may elect
to have service completed by the United States Marshals Service
("USMS").  If he chooses to have service completed by the USMS, he
will provide the agency with all papers for service on the
defendants and a completed USM-285 form for each party to be
served.  The USMS will complete service as directed by the
Plaintiff with all costs of service to be advanced by the United
States.  The Clerk will provide the Plaintiff with forms and
instructions for service.

The Clerk will immediately provide counsel for the Massachusetts
Department of Correction with electronic copies of the complaint
and the order.  The Defendants shall, no later than July 23, 2018
at 1:00 p.m., file with the Court a status report concerning the
use of exhaust fans or other air-cooling methods used in Block 2,
including the circumstances which would trigger the use of these
measures and the maximum inside temperature experienced by Block 2
prisoners in the last 30 days, with and without the use of exhaust
fans or other air-cooling methods.  If Burnham is no longer housed
in Block 2, the status report will also include the same
information about the block in which Burnham's cell is located.
The Defendants' submission of the status report will not constitute
a waiver of service of summons.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 17, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/UrcRdm from Leagle.com.

Arthur Burnham, On behalf of 500 prisoners class action, Plaintiff,
pro se.


MDL 1720: HSBC Reaches Settlement in Credit Card Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------
HSBC USA Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the defendants,
including the HSBC entities, have reached an agreement in principle
with counsel for the putative Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3) opt-out class to resolve all claims as filed in a third
consolidated amended class action complaint in In re Payment Card
Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, MDL
1720, E.D.N.Y.

The settlement, reached in June 2018, is subject to documentation
of final settlement terms and court approval.  If the settlement is
finalized and approved, certain HSBC entities are responsible for a
pro rata portion of the settlement amount, for which they are
reserved, pursuant to the settlement and judgment sharing
agreements entered into by the defendants.

HSBC USA Inc., incorporated under the laws of Maryland, is a New
York State based bank holding company and a wholly-owned subsidiary
of HSBC North America Holdings Inc., which is an indirect
wholly-owned subsidiary of HSBC Holdings plc.


MDL 2084: Court Denies Class Status in AndroGel Antitrust Case
--------------------------------------------------------------
AbbVie Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that a court has denied the
purported class members' motion for class certification in the
consolidated trials under In re: AndroGel Antitrust Litigation, MDL
No. 2084.

Several pending lawsuits filed against Unimed Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (a company Abbott acquired in
February 2010 and now known as AbbVie Products LLC) and others are
consolidated for pre-trial purposes in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia under the Multi-District
Litigation (MDL) Rules as In re: AndroGel Antitrust Litigation, MDL
No. 2084.  These cases, brought by private plaintiffs and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), generally allege Solvay's patent
litigation involving AndroGel was sham litigation and the 2006
patent litigation settlement agreements and related agreements with
three generic companies violate federal antitrust laws.  Plaintiffs
generally seek monetary damages and/or injunctive relief and
attorneys' fees.  These cases include: (a) four individual
plaintiff lawsuits; (b) three purported class actions; and (c)
Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. et al.  Following the
district court's dismissal of all plaintiffs' claims, appellate
proceedings led to the reinstatement of the claims regarding the
patent litigation settlements, which are proceeding in the district
court.  In July 2018, the court denied the purported class members'
motion for class certification.

AbbVie is a global, research-based biopharmaceutical company formed
in 2013 following separation from Abbott Laboratories (Abbott).


MDL 2460: AbbVie Still Faces 2 Consolidated Suits on Niaspan Deal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
AbbVie Inc. still defends lawsuits, including two consolidated
purported class actions, related to a 2005 patent litigation
settlement involving Niaspan, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7,
2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

Lawsuits are pending against AbbVie and others generally alleging
that the 2005 patent litigation settlement involving Niaspan
entered into between Kos Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (a company acquired
by Abbott in 2006 and presently a subsidiary of AbbVie) and a
generic company violates federal and state antitrust laws and state
unfair and deceptive trade practices and unjust enrichment laws.
Plaintiffs generally seek monetary damages and/or injunctive relief
and attorneys' fees.

The lawsuits consist of four individual plaintiff lawsuits and two
consolidated purported class actions: one brought by three named
direct purchasers of Niaspan and the other brought by ten named
end-payer purchasers of Niaspan.  The cases are consolidated for
pre-trial proceedings in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania under the MDL Rules as In re:
Niaspan Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 2460.

In October 2016, the Orange County, California District Attorney's
Office filed a lawsuit on behalf of the State of California
regarding the Niaspan patent litigation settlement in Orange County
Superior Court, asserting a claim under the unfair competition
provision of the California Business and Professions Code seeking
injunctive relief, restitution, civil penalties and attorneys'
fees.

In May 2018, the California Court of Appeals ruled that the
District Attorney's Office may not bring monetary claims beyond the
scope of Orange County.

AbbVie is a global, research-based biopharmaceutical company formed
in 2013 following separation from Abbott Laboratories (Abbott).


MONARCH RECOVERY: Faces Gould Suit Over FDCPA Violation
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Monarch Recovery
Management Inc. and John Does pursuant the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.  The case is titled as Donna Gould, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Monarch Recovery
Management Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation and John Does, Case No.
1:18-cv-01282-WCG (E.D. Wisc., August 20, 2018),

Monarch Recovery Management, Inc., an accounts receivable
management company, provides financial recovery solutions.  The
Company offers collection and payment processing services in
various asset classes and industry sectors, including auto
deficiencies, commercial paper, credit union accounts, government
receivables, student loan receivables, bank credit card
receivables, retail credit card receivables, sub-prime credit card
receivables and debt buyer paper.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Philip D. Stern, Esq.
          Andrew T. Thomasson, Esq.
          STERN THOMASSON LLP
          150 Morris Ave., 2nd Floor
          Springfield, NJ 07081
          Telephone: (973) 379-7500
          Facsimile: (973) 532-5868
          E-mail: philip@sternthomasson.com
                  andrew@sternthomasson.com


MONEYGRAM PAYMENT: Faces Diaz ADA Suit in New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Moneygram Payment
Systems, Inc.  The case is captioned as Edwin Diaz, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Moneygram Payment
Systems, Inc., Case No. 1:18-cv-07585 (S.D.N.Y., August 20, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

MoneyGram Payment Systems, Inc., provides money transfer and
remittance services.  The Company also provides express bill
payment services through its agent locations in the United States.
The Company was founded in 1988 and is based in Lakewood, Colorado.
MoneyGram operates as a subsidiary of Moneygram International
Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 299-6612
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: joseph@cml.legal


MONITRONICS INT'L: Telemarketing Suit Settlement Awaits Final OK
----------------------------------------------------------------
Monitronics International, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the agreement to
settle the consolidated putative class actions related to
telemarketing calls remains subject to court approval and the
court's entry of a final order dismissing the actions.

The Company was named as a defendant in multiple putative class
actions consolidated in U.S. District Court (Northern District of
West Virginia) on behalf of purported class(es) of persons who
claim to have received telemarketing calls in violation of various
state and federal laws.  The actions were brought by plaintiffs
seeking monetary damages on behalf of all plaintiffs who received
telemarketing calls made by a Brinks Home Security Authorized
Dealer, or any Authorized Dealer's lead generator or sub-dealer.

In the second quarter of 2017, the Company and the plaintiffs
agreed to settle this litigation for US$28,000,000 ("the Settlement
Amount").  The Company is actively seeking to recover the
Settlement Amount under its insurance policies.  The settlement
agreement remains subject to court approval and the court's entry
of a final order dismissing the actions.

In the third quarter of 2017, the Company paid US$5,000,000 of the
Settlement Amount pursuant to the settlement agreement with the
plaintiffs.

Monitronics International, Inc., provides security alarm monitoring
and related services to residential and business subscribers
throughout the U.S. and parts of Canada.  The Company is based in
Farmers Branch, Texas.


NANTKWEST INC: Still Defends Sudunagunta Securities Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Nantkwest, Inc. continues to face a putative securities class
action complaint captioned Sudunagunta v. NantKwest, Inc., et al.,
No. 16-cv-01947, according to the Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

In March 2016, the complaint was filed in federal district court
for the Central District of California related to the Company's
restatement of certain interim financial statements for the periods
ended June 30, 2015 and September 30, 2015.

A number of similar putative class actions were filed in federal
and state court in California.  The actions originally filed in
state court were removed to federal court, and the various related
actions have been consolidated.

Plaintiffs assert causes of action for alleged violations of
Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.  Plaintiffs seek unspecified damages, costs
and attorneys' fees, and equitable/injunctive or other relief on
behalf of putative classes of persons who purchased or acquired the
Company's securities during various time periods from July 28, 2015
through March 11, 2016.

In September 2017, the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss
the third amended consolidated complaint.  A trial date has been
set for August 2019.

The Company said, "Management intends to vigorously defend these
proceedings.  At this time, the Company cannot predict how the
Court will rule on the merits of the claims and/or the scope of the
potential loss in the event of an adverse outcome.  Therefore,
based on the information available at present, the Company cannot
reasonably estimate a range of loss for this action.  Should the
Company ultimately be found liable, the liability could have a
material adverse effect on the Company's results of operations for
the period or periods in which it is incurred."

NantKwest is a pioneering clinical-stage immunotherapy company
focused on harnessing the power of the innate immune system by
using the natural killer cell to treat cancer, infectious diseases
and inflammatory diseases.


NASSAU COUNTY, NY: Court Won't Dismiss S. Lopez's Strip Search Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
STEPHEN STUART LOPEZ, Plaintiff, v. NASSAU COUNTY SHERIFFS
DEPARTMENT, and NASSAU COUNTY CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Defendants, No.
17-CV-3722 (DRH) (GRB) (E.D.N.Y.).

This action arises from a related matter before this Court, In re
Nassau County Strip Search Case,99-CV-02844 (DRH) (Strip Search
Class Action) of which the plaintiff was a class member. The
plaintiffs in the Strip Search Class Action had been arrested on
misdemeanor charges, unrelated to weapons or drugs and were
thereafter strip searched without individualized suspicion, at the
Nassau County Correctional Center (NCCC) in accordance with a
blanket policy in effect at NCCC prior to 1999.

The Defendants argue that the plaintiff's claims are time-barred
because the already tolled statute of limitations has expired.

The Plaintiff concedes that his Complaint was filed past the
expiration of the statute of limitations but alleges that he was
not at fault.

The statute of limitations for claims brought under Section 1983 is
governed by state law and New York applies a statute of limitations
period of three years to such claims. However, in the instant case,
given the equitable toll imposed in the Strip Search litigation,
the plaintiff's claim for special damages expired on December 13,
2016.

Equitable tolling allows courts to extend the statute of
limitations beyond the time of expiration as necessary to avoid
inequitable circumstances. However, the doctrine is reserved for
rare and exceptional circumstances. Thus, the Second Circuit has
applied the doctrine as a matter of fairness where a plaintiff has
been prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his
rights, or has asserted his rights in the wrong forum.

The Plaintiff concedes, that he failed to file a timely claim for
special damages. Under the tolling period for in the Final Judgment
plaintiff had until December 13, 2016 to initiate a lawsuit
claiming special damages. This information was specified in the
Claims Notice that was mailed to all class members. The Plaintiff
filed the instant Complaint on June 1, 2017, 5-1/2 months after the
expiration of the tolled statute of limitations.  

In his opposition to the defendants' motion for dismissal, the
plaintiff asserts that he did not receive the Claims Notice until
Mach 18, 2017, three months after the December 13, 2016 cutoff
date. The Plaintiff contends that one of the reasons for his late
receipt of the Claims Notice was his homelessness condition; he did
not have a permanent address as he was wandering around from one
homeless shelter to another. Although not labeled as such, it
appears that this pro se plaintiff seeks equitable tolling for the
statute of limitations period.

As a pro se plaintiff's pleadings must be interpreted to raise the
strongest arguments that they suggest, the plaintiff should be
given the opportunity to show that extraordinary circumstances
prevented him from filing his claim on time.

Accordingly, the Court denies the defendants' motion to dismiss
without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 5, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yapt56rd from
Leagle.com.

Stephen Stuart Lopez, Plaintiff, pro se.

Nassau County Sheriffs Department & Nassau County Correctional
Center, Defendants, represented by Liora M. Ben-Sorek , Nassau
County Attorney's Office.


NEW YORK: Ct. Approves Settlement in Public-School Bullying Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Settlement
Agreement in the lawsuit filed by public-school students.

Twenty-three New York City (NYC) public-school students
(Plaintiffs) challenge the alleged failure of the NYC Department of
Education (DOE) to prevent or adequately redress bullying in public
schools. The Plaintiffs allege that, although the DOE has issued
regulations intended to address violence and other forms of
bullying in schools including both student-on-student and
staff-on-student abuse, schools routinely fail to comply with these
regulations. The Plaintiffs contend that this alleged failure
violates the procedural due process, substantive due process, and
equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as
the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), Article
XI of the New York State Constitution, and Section 7803 of the New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Proposed Settlement Agreement

Filing, Documenting, and Tracking Complaints

To improve the ability of parents to file and track their
complaints, the DOE agrees to propose revisions to Chancellor's
Regulation A-832. These revisions would introduce an electronic
reporting system to allow parents to report bullying electronically
and to learn when their complaints have been substantiated or
resolved. This system will be available in multiple languages,
generate a confirmation of receipt and a tracking number for each
complaint, and provide parents with a Notice of Determination once
the investigation is resolved.

Investigating Complaints

Under the terms of the settlement, the DOE will direct principals
to complete investigations of all bullying complaints within ten
school days, except when there are Extenuating Circumstances which
DOE staff must document. Additionally, principals will be required
to document more investigation-related information than before; for
example, they must obtain written statements from the alleged
victim, accused offender, and any witnesses where feasible.

Remediating Substantiated Cases

The settlement requires principals to provide support3 to victims
of  Material Incidents and to develop, implement, and document
individualized support plans (ISPs) for victims of multiple
Material Incidents in the same school year.

Substantive Fairness: Fairness, Reasonableness, and Adequacy

To grant final approval of a proposed settlement, the court must
find that its terms are fair, reasonable, and adequate. In City of
Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974), the
Second Circuit developed nine factors to consider in making this
determination:

Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of the Litigation

The SAC raises complex factual and legal issues, including (but not
limited to) the DOE's alleged systemic failure to prevent and
redress bullying and whether unmitigated acts of bullying and other
forms of abuse substantially interfere with Plaintiffs' right to a
public education.

The Plaintiffs claim that if this case went to trial, they would
retain experts in education policy and child psychology, which
could result in an expensive battle of the experts at trial.
Moreover, litigation would only further delay the relief to class
members in a suit that has now been pending for over two years.   

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of approving the
settlement.

Reaction of the Class to the Settlement

If only a small number of objections are received, that fact can be
viewed as indicative of the adequacy of the settlement. The court
only received one objection from a class member.  
Such a small number militates in favor of approval.

Stage of Proceedings and Amount of Discovery Completed

While the parties did not engage in formal discovery in this case,
Plaintiffs' counsel represent that they nonetheless conducted a
thorough investigation into their clients' claims. They met with
many class members, reviewed numerous relevant documents, and
consulted with a child psychologist regarding the impact of
unresolved bullying on children. The SAC also contains detailed
allegations that could only have been the product of a searching
inquiry.  

Based on this record, the court finds that counsel had sufficient
information to act intelligently on behalf of the class and that
this factor weighs in favor of approval.

Risks of Class Prevailing (Establishing Liability, Establishing
Damages, Maintaining the Class through Trial

The court considers together the fourth, fifth, and sixth factors
risks of establishing liability, risks of establishing damages, and
risks of maintaining the class action through trial as they all
relate to the risks Plaintiffs would face in taking this to trial.


The Plaintiffs' chances of establishing liability are difficult to
assess. This case presents complex factual and legal issues,
including the DOE's alleged systemic failure to prevent and redress
bullying and whether unmitigated acts of bullying and other forms
of abuse substantially interfere with the Plaintiffs' right to a
public education.  

In contrast, the proposed settlement can be implemented before the
next school year, thus providing relief to the Class almost
immediately. The Plaintiffs contend that the remedies available at
the end of litigation might not be much better than what they would
receive from this settlement.

Accordingly, this factor militates in favor of approval.

Range of Reasonableness of the Settlement in Light of the Best
Possible Recovery and Attendant Risks of Litigation

There are some discrepancies between the relief the Plaintiffs
sought in their SAC and what is provided for by the proposed
settlement agreement. For example, the SAC includes requests that
the DOE review all previous, unresolved reports of school violence
by class members and that the court appoint an independent monitor
to audit the DOE's progress. Overall, though, the relief in the
proposed settlement is comparable to what the Plaintiffs sought in
the SAC. Some of the reforms contemplated in the SAC are very
similar to ones included in the proposed settlement.

For example, the SAC included a request that the DOE regularly
review and update training programs for teachers and staff'
regarding anti-bullying techniques. Similarly, the proposed
settlement mandates that the DOE will require schools to include
anti-bullying techniques in its annual training sessions for
teachers and staff.  

Thus, this factor weighs in favor of approving the settlement.

Accordingly, the court grants the Plaintiffs' Motion for Final
Approval of the Settlement.

The case is in the case captioned JOHN DOE #1, a minor by his
parent and natural guardian PARENT #1; JOHN DOE #2, a minor by his
parent and natural guardian PARENT #2; JOHN DOE #3, a minor by his
parent and natural guardian PARENT #3; JANE DOE #4, a minor by her
parent and natural guardian PARENT #4; JANE DOE #5, a minor by her
legal guardian GRANDPARENT #5; JANE DOE #6 a minor by her legal
guardian GRANDPARENT #5; JOHN DOE #7, a minor by his parent and
natural guardian PARENT #7; JANE DOE #8, a minor by her parent and
natural guardian PARENT #8; JOHN DOE #9, a minor by his parents and
natural guardians PARENT # 9A and PARENT #9B; JANE DOE #10, a minor
by her parent and natural guardian PARENT #10; JANE DOE #11, a
minor by her parent and natural guardian PARENT #11; JANE DOE #12,
a minor by her parent and natural guardian PARENT #12; JOHN DOE
#13, a minor by his parent and natural guardian PARENT #13; JANE
DOE #14, a minor by her parent and natural guardian PARENT #14;
JANE DOE #15, a minor by her parent and natural guardian PARENT
#15; JOHN DOE #16, a minor by his parent and natural guardian
PARENT #16; JOHN DOE #17, a minor by his parents and natural
guardians PARENT #17A and PARENT #17B; JOHN DOE #18, a minor by his
parents and natural guardians PARENT #18A and PARENT #18B; JOHN DOE
#19, a minor by his parent and natural guardian PARENT #19; JANE
DOE #20, a minor by her parent and natural guardian PARENT #20;
JOHN DOE #21, a minor by his parent and natural guardian PARENT
#21; JOHN DOE #22, a minor by his parent and natural guardian
PARENT #22; and JOHN DOE #23, a minor by his parent and natural
guardian PARENT #23, on behalf of all persons similarly situated.
Plaintiffs, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant,
No. 16-CV-1684(NGG) (RLM)(E.D.N.Y.).

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 30, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9qoavlz from Leagle.com.

John Doe #1, a minor by his parent and natural guardian Parent #1,
John Doe #2, a minor by his parent and natural guardian Parent #2,
John Doe #3, a minor by his parent and natural guardian Parent #3,
Jane Doe #4, a minor by her parent and natural guardian Parent #4,
Jane Doe #5, a minor by her legal guardian Grandparent #5, Jane Doe
#6, a minor by her legal guardian Grandparent #5, John Doe #7, a
minor by his parent and natural guardian Parent #7, Jane Doe #8, a
minor by her parent and natural guardian Parent #8, John Doe #9, a
minor by his parents and natural guardians Parents #9A and #9B,
Jane Doe #10, a minor by her parent and natural guardian Parent #10
& Jane Doe #11, a minor by her parent and natural guardian Parent
#11, Plaintiffs, represented by Adam Philip Cohen --
acohen@wmhlaw.com -- Walden Macht & Haran LLP, Daniel A. Cohen --
dcohen@wmhlaw.com -- Walden Macht & Haran LLP, Johnson Li Lin --
jlin@wmhlaw.com -- Walden Macht & Haran LLP & James A. Walden --
jwalden@wmhlaw.com -- Walden Macht & Haran LLP.

Jane Doe #15, a minor by her parent and natural guardian Parent
#15, Jane Doe #20, a minor by her parent and natural guardian
Parent #20, John Doe #16, a minor by his parent and natural
guardian Parent #16, John Doe #23, a minor by his parent and
natural guardian Parent #23, John Doe #17, a minor by his parents
and natural guardians Parent #17A and Parent #17B, Jane Doe #14, a
minor by her parent and natural guardian Parent #14, John Doe #22,
a minor by his parent and natural guardian Parent #22, John Doe
#21, a minor by his parent and natural guardian Parent #21, Jane
Doe #12, a minor by her parent and natural guardian Parent #12,
John Doe #19, a minor by his parent and natural guardian Parent
#19, John Doe #13, a minor by his parent and natural guardian
Parent #13 & John Doe #18, a minor by his parents and natural
guardians Parent #18A and Parent #18B, Plaintiffs, represented by
Johnson Li Lin , Walden Macht & Haran LLP & James A. Walden ,
Walden Macht & Haran LLP.

New York City Department of Education, Defendant, represented by
Evan Robert Schnittman , New York City Law Department & Marilyn
Richter , The City of New York Law Department Office of Corporation
Counsel.

Legal Aid Society, Amicus, represented by Celia Goldwag Barenholtz
-- cbarenholtz@cooley.com -- Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, William J.
Schwartz -- wschwartz@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Cara Ann Chambers ,
The Legal Aid Society & Lisa Freeman , The Legal Aid Society.


NEWLINK GENETICS: Seeks to Drop 2nd Amended Abramson Complaint
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants in a putative securities class action lawsuit initiated
by Trevor Abramson filed a motion to dismiss the second amended
complaint on July 31, 2018, according to Newlink Genetics
Corporation's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June
30, 2018.

On or about May 12, 2016, Trevor Abramson filed a putative
securities class action lawsuit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, or the Court, captioned
Abramson v. NewLink Genetics Corp., et al., Case 1:16-cv-3545, or
the Securities Action.

Subsequently, the Court appointed Michael and Kelly Nguyen as lead
plaintiffs and approved their selection of Kahn, Swick & Foti, LLC
as lead counsel in the Securities Action.  On October 31, 2016, the
lead plaintiffs filed an amended complaint asserting claims under
the federal securities laws against the Company, the Company's
Chief Executive Officer Charles J. Link, Jr., and the Company's
Chief Medical Officer and President Nicholas Vahanian, or
collectively, the Defendants.

The amended complaint alleges the Defendants made material false
and/or misleading statements that caused losses to the Company's
investors. In particular, the lead plaintiffs allege that the
Defendants made material misstatements or omissions related to the
Phase 2 and 3 trials and efficacy of the product candidate
algenpantucel-L. The lead plaintiffs do not quantify any alleged
damages in the amended complaint but, in addition to attorneys'
fees and costs, they sought to recover damages on behalf of
themselves and other persons who purchased or otherwise acquired
the Company's stock during the putative class period of September
17, 2013 through May 9, 2016, inclusive, at allegedly inflated
prices and purportedly suffered financial harm as a result.

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on
July 14, 2017. The lead plaintiffs filed an opposition to the
motion to dismiss on September 12, 2017. The Defendants filed a
reply in support of the motion to dismiss on September 26, 2017.
Oral argument was held on October 19, 2017, after which the Court
reserved decision.  On March 29, 2018, the Court dismissed the
amended complaint for failure to state a claim, without prejudice,
and gave the lead plaintiffs until May 4, 2018 to file any amended
complaint attempting to remedy the defects in their claims.

On May 4, 2018, the lead plaintiffs filed a second amended
complaint asserting claims under the federal securities laws
against the Defendants. Like the first amended complaint, the
second amended complaint alleges that the Defendants made material
false and/or misleading statements or omissions relating to the
Phase 2 and 3 trials and efficacy of the product candidate
algenpantucel-L that caused losses to the Company's investors. The
lead plaintiffs do not quantify any alleged damages in the second
amended complaint but, in addition to attorneys' fees and costs,
they sought to recover damages on behalf of themselves and other
persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's stock
during the putative class period of September 17, 2013 through May
9, 2016, inclusive, at allegedly inflated prices and purportedly
suffered financial harm as a result.

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the second amended
complaint on July 31, 2018. The Company intends to continue
defending the Securities Action vigorously.

Newlink Genetics Corporation is a clinical-stage immuno-oncology
company focused on discovering and developing novel
immunotherapeutic products for the treatment of patients with
cancer. The company is based in Ames, Iowa.


PEPSI-COLA CO: Consumers Ask 2nd Cir. to Revive Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Rick Archer, writing for Law360, reports that a pair of consumers
on Aug. 3 asked the Second Circuit to revive their putative class
action accusing Pepsi-Cola Co. of misrepresenting that its "diet"
drinks help with weight loss, saying the district court improperly
dismissed their arguments and evidence.

Elizabeth Manuel and Vivien Grossman argued their claims were
plausible enough to survive PepsiCo's summary judgment motion and
that the district court judge had improperly decided questions of
fact when he dismissed their case.

The case is styled Manuel v. Pepsi-Cola Company, Case No. 18-1748
(2nd Cir.).  The case was filed June 12, 2018. [GN]



PROGRESSIVE CORP: MAO-MSO Recovery Suit Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------
Judge Christopher A. Boyko of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, dismissed without
prejudice the case, MAO-MSO RECOVERY II, LLC, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. PROGRESSIVE CORP., Defendant, Case No. 1:17CV390 (N.D. Ohio)

The Plaintiffs filed the putative class action suit against
Progressive Corp., its direct and indirect subsidiaries.  The case
is one of several filed around the country by the Plaintiffs
against various automobile insurance companies.

The action arises under the Medicare Secondary Payer ("MSP")
provisions of the Medicare Act.  When the Medicare program was
enacted in 1965, Medicare paid for all medical treatment within its
scope and left private insurers merely to pick up whatever expenses
remained.  The MSP empowers Medicare to seek reimbursement for any
conditional medical payments from the primary payer if it is
demonstrated that the primary payer has responsibility to pay.  The
MSP also provides for a private right of action with double
recovery to encourage private parties who are aware of non-payment
by primary plans to bring actions to enforce Medicare's rights.

In 1997, Congress created Medicare Part C, which allows for private
Medicare Advantage plans.  Under this system, private insurers may
become Medicare Advantage Organizations ("MAOs") and administer
Medicare benefits pursuant to contracts with the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS").

The Plaintiffs are entities which allege that they have been
assigned all rights, title, and interest allowing them to bring
these claims by several unspecified MAOs.  They allege that the
Defendant provided no-fault automobile insurance coverage, which
obligated the Defendant to pay all medical expenses up to a certain
threshold to several Medicare enrollees.  The Plaintiffs thus
contend that the Defendant was a primary payer and that the MAOs
covering these Medicare enrollees were secondary payers.  They
allege that the Defendant failed to pay medical bills that it was
statutorily obligated to pay, resulting in economic loss to the
Plaintiffs.  The Plaintiffs assert claims for Double Damages under
the Private Right of Action established by the MSP in 42 U.S.C.
Section 1395y(b)(3)(A) and for Breach of Contract.

The Defendant moves to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims for lack of
jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and for failure to
state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Judge Boyko finds that like in MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., the Plaintiffs have failed to
present any evidence demonstrating a valid assignment from any MAO.
Standing is not a mere pleading requirement but rather an
indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, and as such, it must be
supported in the same way as any other matter on which the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and
degree of evidence required at the successive stages of litigation.


He finds that the Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that they
have suffered an injury-in-fact.  They have merely made conclusory
allegations in their Complaint that they have been assigned rights
of recovery from several unnamed MAOs.  However, without
documentation showing that at least one Plaintiff has been assigned
recovery rights from at least one MAO, he cannot find that the
Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of proving Article III
standing.  Since the Plaintiffs themselves are not MAOs, they must
show an injury-in-fact by presenting a valid assignment from an
MAO.  Because the Plaintiffs have not done so, the Judge finds that
it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case.

Lastly, because Article III standing is a threshold question in
every federal case and determines the power of the court to
entertain the suit, the Judge finds that it is unnecessary to
consider the Defendant's arguments under 12(b)(6) because it has
already found that the Plaintiffs have failed to establish Article
III standing.  

Therefore, for the foregoing reason, Judge Boyko granted the
Defendant's Motion and dismissed the case without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 17, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/TlVom5 from Leagle.com.

MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher L.
Coffin -- ccoffin@pbclawfirm.com -- Pendley Baudin & Coffin, pro
hac vice, Courtney L. Stidham -- cstidham@pbclawfirm.com -- Pendley
Baudin & Coffin, Michael L. Baum -- MBaum@BaumHedlundLaw.com --
Baum Hedlund Aristei & Goldman, Nicholas R. Rockforte --
nrockforte@pbclawfirm.com -- Pendley Baudin & Coffin, Pedram
Esfandiary -- PEsfandiary@BaumHedlundLaw.com -- Baum Hedlund
Aristei & Goldman, R. Brent Wisner -- RBWisner@BaumHedlundLaw.com
-- Baum Hedlund Aristei & Goldman & Tracy L. Turner --
tturner@pbclawfirm.com -- Pendley Baudin & Coffin.

MSP Recovery, LLC & MSPA Claims 1, LLC, Plaintiffs, represented by
Michael L. Baum, Baum Hedlund Aristei & Goldman, Pedram Esfandiary,
Baum Hedlund Aristei & Goldman, R. Brent Wisner, Baum Hedlund
Aristei & Goldman & Tracy L. Turne , Pendley Baudin & Coffin.

Progressive Corporation, Defendant, represented by David J. Farber
-- dfarber@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding, Emily S. Newton --
enewton@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding, Jeffrey S. Cashdan --
jcashdan@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding, pro hac vice, Kenneth G.
Prabucki -- kprabucki@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler, Michael K.
Farrell -- mfarrell@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler & Zachary A.
McEntyre -- zmcentyre@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding, pro hac vice.

Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by
David J. Farber, King & Spalding, Emily S. Newton, King & Spalding,
Jeffrey S. Cashdan, King & Spalding, Kenneth G. Prabucki, Baker &
Hostetler, Michael K. Farrell, Baker & Hostetler & Zachary A.
McEntyre, King & Spalding, pro hac vice.


RACHAEL RAY: Sued for $5MM Over Chemical in Dog Food Products
-------------------------------------------------------------
Megan Sheets, writing for Dailymail.com, reports that Rachael Ray
has defended her "natural" dog food brand after a $5 million class
action lawsuit alleged her products contain a chemical commonly
found in weed killer.

The suit, filed by Bronx resident Markeith Parks on behalf of
himself and others, alleges that an independent lab detected the
herbicide glyphosate in Rachael Ray Nutrish dog chow.

Court documents obtained by DailyMail.com state: "Rachael Ray
Nutrish aggressively advertises and promotes the products as
'natural'. These claims are false, deceptive, and misleading.

The suit names Rachael Ray Nutrish along with its parent company
Ainsworth Pet Nutrition, which was acquired by The JM Smucker
Company this spring.

A spokesperson for the celebrity chef told DailyMail.com: "Rachael
herself has always championed the great lengths Ainsworth Pet
Nutrition and now The JM Smucker Company take to create and provide
the highest quality and safest pet food products on the market.

"This is why she does, and will continue to, feed Nutrish to her
own dog Isaboo and her extended pet family."

The spokesperson also called previous reports alleging that Rachael
herself had been named in the suit 'libelous'.

Bobby Modi, vice president of Pet Food and Pet Snacks for JM
Smucker, said: "We are in the process of reviewing the details of
the claim but strongly stand behind the quality of our products,
ingredients, and sourcing practices.

"As animal lovers and humans, it goes without saying that we do not
add pesticides to our products as an ingredient. We plan to
aggressively fight these claims.

"Pet parents with questions about our pet food recipes or treats
are encouraged to contact us directly by calling 1-800-323-7738 or
via nutrish.com."

Plaintiff Parks claims to have purchased the dog food on several
occasions from BJ's Wholesale Club in the Bronx because he trusted
claims by the Nutrish brand that its products are natural.

It is unclear what led Parks to have the products tested, but the
suit claims that an independent lab detected 'the unnatural
chemical glyphosate, a potent biocide and endocrine disruptor, with
detrimental health effects that are still becoming known'.

Glyphosate is the active ingredient found in weed killer products
such as RoundUp.

The suit speculates that "crops such as peas, soy, corn, beets and
alfalfa are sprayed with the chemical in order to dry them and
produce an earlier, more uniform harvest".

According to the lawsuit, Rachael Ray Nutrish does not disclose the
fact that their product contains glyphosate.

"By deceiving consumers about the nature, quality, and/or
ingredients of the products, Rachael Ray Nutrish is able to sell a
greater volume of the products," it says.  

The lawsuit goes on to cite a 2014 survey conducted by the Consumer
Reports National Research Center to assess consumer opinion
regarding food labeling. They claim that 66 percent 'of all
respondents in the Consumer Reports survey said that a "natural"
label on packaged and processed foods means that 'no toxic
pesticides were used'.

Mr. Parks also claims that studies have shown that "glyphosate may
be a causal agent related to the rise of pet cancers".

"No reasonable consumer would expect this controversial and
potentially harmful synthetic chemical to be present in "Natural"
dog food," the suit states.

Mr. Parks alleges the amount in damages at issue exceeds
$5,000,000. [GN]


RENTOKIL NORTH: Court Grants Arbitration in A. Carbajal's Wage Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the
case captioned ANTONIO CARBAJAL, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. RENTOKIL NORTH AMERICA,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 17-CV-06651-YGR (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Antonio Carbajal brings this putative class action
against defendant Rentokil North American, Inc. for alleged
violations of California wage and hour laws and the Fair Labor and
Standards Act (FLSA). Carbajal brings the following four causes of
action against defendants: (i) failure to pay overtime and
double-time premium wages; (ii) pay stub violations; (iii) unfair
competition; and (iv) FLSA violations.

Procedural Unconscionability

The Plaintiff argues that the agreement is procedurally
unconscionable because the employer had superior bargaining power,
which gave him no meaningful opportunity to opt-out of the
agreement. Relying on Circuit City, plaintiff argues that an
agreement drafted by an employer with superior bargaining power
which does not allow employees to make any modifications or to
decline arbitration, is unconscionable. Failure to permit a
reasonable opportunity to opt-out indicates procedural
unconscionability.

Here, the plaintiff indicates that he was not given the opportunity
to negotiate the agreement or to opt out of it, and he felt
pressure to sign it in order to keep his job. The Defendant does
not dispute this, and no provision of the Agreement indicates that
an employee may opt not to sign it and retain employment.

The Plaintiff further argues that the agreement is procedurally
unconscionable because it references the AAA arbitration rules but
does not attach them or state where they can be found, and the
defendant never provided the plaintiff a copy. However, the
California Supreme Court has held that failure to attach the AAA
rules does not establish procedural unconscionability. The failure
to include the AAA rules or some direction about how to find them
does not weigh in favor of invalidating the Agreement.

Considering the terms of the agreement, its adhesive nature, the
defendant's superior bargaining power, and the lack of an opt-out
provision, plaintiff has demonstrated some amount of procedural
unconscionability.

Substantive Unconscionability

The Plaintiff raises four arguments to support a finding that the
agreement is substantively unconscionable: (i) the Agreement
unlawfully limits plaintiff's remedies; (ii) the class action
provision is unenforceable in the Ninth Circuit; (iii) inclusion of
a delegation clause is unconscionable because it unfairly gives the
arbitrator the power to determine which claims are arbitrable,
contrary to a layperson's expectations; and (iv) the Agreement's
silence as to which state's substantive law applies unfairly allows
defendant to assert less-favorable, non-California defenses.

Limitations on Available Relief

The Plaintiff argues that since the Agreement here only provides
the arbitrator power to award legal relief, the Agreement
necessarily precludes equitable relief.

The Court finds that the plain language of the Agreement does not
preclude equitable remedies. The agreement is drafted to encompass
all employment-related claims either party might have against the
other. Defendant agrees that there is no prohibition on pursuing
equitable relief. Further, to the extent that the Agreement can be
construed to preclude equitable relief, it is severable  

Thus, remedies provision does not support a finding of substantive
unconscionability.

Class Action Waiver

Second, the plaintiff argues that the Agreement's terms constitute
a class action waiver. As such, the plaintiff contends that the
inclusion of a class action waiver is unlawful and unconscionable,
citing Morris v. Ernst & Young. 834 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 2016).
Morris has since been overturned by the Supreme Court's decision in
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018).  

Therefore, both Epic Systems and Concepcion foreclose plaintiff's
argument that a class action waiver renders the Agreement
substantively unconscionable.

Delegation Clause

The Plaintiff next argues that the delegation clause, incorporated
into the Agreement by its reference to the AAA rules, is
unconscionable.

The Defendant agrees that arbitrability should not be delegated to
the arbitrator under this Agreement. To the extent the Agreement
otherwise could have been read to include a delegation clause, the
parties agree it is not enforceable. Thus, it is, in effect,
severed from the Agreement. Whether the provision might be
enforceable, or unconscionable, under other circumstances is not
properly before the Court in these circumstances. Therefore, the
incorporation of the AAA rules on this issue does not render the
Agreement substantively unconscionable.

Delegation Clause

The Plaintiff next argues that the delegation clause, incorporated
into the Agreement by its reference to the AAA rules, is
unconscionable. The Plaintiff contends that allowing arbitrators to
decide whether a claim is within their own jurisdiction is is not
within the adhering party's reasonable expectations since
arbitrators are not normally expected to determine their own
jurisdiction, citing Htay Htay Chin v. Advanced Fresh Concepts
Franchise Corp., 194 Cal.App.4th 704, 710-11 (2011).

The defendant agrees that arbitrability should not be delegated to
the arbitrator under this Agreement. To the extent the Agreement
otherwise could have been read to include a delegation clause, the
parties agree it is not enforceable. Thus, it is, in effect,
severed from the Agreement. Whether the provision might be
enforceable, or unconscionable, under other circumstances is not
properly before the Court in these circumstances. Therefore, the
incorporation of the AAA rules on this issue does not render the
Agreement substantively unconscionable.

Failure to Include Choice-of-Law Provision

Finally, the plaintiff argues that the Agreement is unconscionable
for failure to include a choice-of-law provision.  

The Agreement's silence as to the choice of law is not
unconscionable. As with the other legal issues subject to
arbitration under the Agreement, determination of which state's law
applies must be decided by the arbitrator, absent an agreement of
the parties to the contrary.
The Plaintiff offers no authority to support the notion that
allowing the arbitrator to decide what substantive law applies to
the claims would be unfair or shock the conscience.

Accordingly, the motion to compel arbitration is granted as to all
claims in this case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 5, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybz8kgbv from Leagle.com.

Antonio Carbajal, Plaintiff, represented by Michael Anthony Strauss
-- mike@strausslawyers.com -- Strauss & Strauss, APC & Rabiah A.
Rahman -- rrahman@mwgjlaw.com -- Strauss and Strauss, APC.

Rentokil North America, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation,
Defendant, represented by Jennifer Lynn Santa Maria --
Jennifer.santamaria@ogletreedeakins.com -- Ogletree Deakins --
jesse.ferrantella@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins & Timothy Lloyd
Johnson -- tim.johnson@
ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and Stewart, P.C.


ROOT9B TECHNOLOGIES: Dismissal of Securities Fraud Suit Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, affirmed the
judgment of the District Court granting Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the case captioned DAVID HAMPTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, and
TY MESSERLI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. ROOT9B TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; JOSEPH J. GRANO,
JR.; KENNETH T. SMITH, Defendants-Appellees, No. 16-1417 (10th
Cir.).

This appeal arises from the district court's dismissal of
Plaintiff-Appellant David Hampton's securities-fraud class action
against Defendants-Appellees root9B Technologies, Inc., a provider
of cybersecurity products and services, Joseph J. Grano, Jr.,
root9B's Chief Executive Officer and Chairman, and Kenneth T.
Smith, root9B's former Chief Financial Officer (Defendants).

Mr. Hampton brought this action pursuant to Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Sections
78j(b) & 78t(a), and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5, claiming that root9B made false
or misleading statements in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities.

Mr. Hampton identified two statements that he alleges were false or
misleading and material:

(1) a letter from Mr. Grano to investors language from which was
repeated in a number of SEC filings attesting that root9B was
differentiated from competitors by its proprietary hardware and
software and (2) a press release and associated report published by
root9B in which the company claimed to have detected a planned
cyber attack against a number of international financial
institutions. He further alleges that the individual defendants,
Mr. Grano and Mr. Smith are jointly and severally liable under
Section 20(a).

The district court dismissed Mr. Hampton's claims, finding that he
had failed to sufficiently plead that the identified statements
were false or misleading. Mr. Hampton appeals, and exercising
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1291,

To state a claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff
must plausibly allege that:
A defendant made statements that: (1) contained false or misleading
statements of material fact, (2) related to the purchase or sale of
a security, (3) were made with intent to defraud investors or
conscious disregard of a risk that shareholders would be misled
(scienter), (4) led to reliance by the plaintiff, and (5) caused
the plaintiff's loss (loss causation).

In reviewing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's pleadings, the Court
evaluate the facts alleged in a complaint to determine whether,
taken as a whole, they support a reasonable belief that the
defendant's statements identified by the plaintiff were false or
misleading. In doing so, the Court evaluates:

(1) the level of detail provided by the facts stated in a
complaint; (2) the number of facts provided; (3) the coherence and
plausibility of the facts when considered together; (4) whether the
source of the plaintiff's knowledge about a stated fact is
disclosed; (5) the reliability of the sources from which the facts
were obtained; and (6) any other indicia of how strongly the facts
support the conclusion that a reasonable person would believe that
the defendant's statements were misleading.

To meet the pleading standard, plaintiffs are not required to
disclose the documentary or personal sources from which they
learned the facts alleged. The PSLRA did heighten the standard of
pleading securities fraud, however, and where a plaintiff does not
identify the sources of the facts stated in the complaint, the
facts alleged will usually have to be particularly detailed,
numerous, plausible, or objectively verifiable by the defendant
before they will support a reasonable belief that the defendant's
statements were false or misleading.

There is a meaningful distinction between statements of opinion and
statements of fact; the former require a plaintiff to meet a higher
pleading standard. Pure statements of opinion and statements of
optimism that are not capable of objective verification are not
material misstatements unless they inaccurately represent the
speakers' beliefs concerning then-present factual conditions.

Statements of opinion or belief must rest on 'a factual basis that
justifies them as accurate, the absence of which renders them
misleading.

Having reviewed the applicable law, the Court addresses, in turn,
Mr. Hampton's arguments that the district court erred in dismissing
his claims based on root9B's proprietary-hardware and Sofacy
statements. The Court concludes, as to both sets of statements,
that Mr. Hampton fails to sufficiently plead the first prong, i.e.,
that root9B made materially false statements.

Accordingly, the Court rejects Mr. Hampton's contentions of error
and upholds the district court's dismissal of his amended
complaint.

Mr. Hampton alleges that root9B's statements were false based on
(1) the Pump Stopper article (which in turn relied on an alleged
interview with CFO Smith), and (2) the subsequent omission of the
relevant statements from root9B's SEC filings.

The Tenth Circuit agrees with the district court's conclusions for
a number of reasons.

First, Mr. Hampton cannot show that the low margin hardware
installation and resale products that the Pump Stopper article
identifies which Mr. Hampton claims refers to a third-party's
hardware, are in fact the same products that the Grano letter and
related SEC filings refer to as proprietary hardware and software.
Therefore, Mr. Hampton necessarily falters in demonstrating that
the proprietary label was false or misleading because he cannot
raise a plausible inference that the label does not fit the
products it references. Indeed, aside from citing to the stock
market's reaction to the alleged revelation of the Pump Stopper
article, Mr. Hampton points to no facts that push his allegation
beyond a mere possibility.  

Second, the exclusion of the proprietary hardware and software
language from subsequent SEC filings does not provide sufficient
evidence that the language was removed on account of the Pump
Stopper article's representations; rather, a reasonable reading of
the language that replaced the propriety hardware and software
language is that it simply provides greater details regarding the
products comprising that hardware or software.

Third, as the district court noted, even assuming arguendo that Mr.
Hampton was able to link the proprietary hardware language, which
root9B's SEC filings spoke of, to the Pump Stopper article's
reference to low margin hardware installation, his claim fails
because there is nothing inherently inconsistent between those two
statements. Mr. Hampton attacks this reasoning, arguing that the
district court's discussion disregards that the crux of Plaintiff's
allegations concerning the proprietary hardware statements was not
the amount of margins [root9B] was receiving from selling the
hardware, but whether the hardware root9B was selling was in fact
proprietary' to root9B.

However, the district court specifically and persuasively addressed
this issue by stating that Mr. Hampton's claim was meritless absent
evidence that revealed that the proprietary hardware' in question
was off-the-shelf equipment equally available to root9B's customers
or competitors.  And, on appeal, Mr. Hampton still fails to show
that it is anything more than merely possible that the proprietary
hardware at issue was in fact freely available to root9B's
potential customers and competitors as opposed to being controlled
by root9B and subject to its restrictions or limitations.

Because Mr. Hampton fails to plead sufficient facts to show that
root9B's proprietary-hardware statements were false or misleading,
the Court upholds the district court's conclusion on this issue.

Mr. Hampton's Sofacy-based claim. Relying on the Krebs article, Mr.
Hampton asserts that root9B's Sofacy press release, its APT28
report, and Mr. Grano's Fox Business interview misattributed the
source of the planned cyberattack that root9B claimed to have
uncovered.

The Court agrees with the district court's determination that Mr.
Hampton fails to show that the Sofacy attribution was false or
misleading. To be sure, the Krebs article provides factual
allegations regarding the registration of the domains identified as
suspicious by root9B. But, despite Mr. Hampton's protestations, we
conclude that the Krebs article merely provides an alternative
attribution, potentially Nigerian scammers and therefore falls far
short of establishing that the Sofacy attribution was untrue or
even misleading.

For example, the Krebs article fails to explicitly state that the
Sofacy attribution was actually untrue, and instead only indicates
that it was more likely that the attack was perpetrated by a
different source. Indeed, the article even hedges on its
alternative finding by noting that root9B could have been holding
back key details about their research, which, if true, could
presumably impact the Krebs assessment.

The Court affirms the district court's judgment.

A full-text copy of the Tenth Circuit's July 30, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8k246nc from Leagle.com.

Nicholas I. Porritt , of Levi & Korsinsky LLP, Washington, D.C.
(Alexander A. Krot, III, of Levi & Korsinsky LLP, and Kip B. Shuman
-- kip@shumanlawfirm.com -- and Rusty E. Glenn --
rusty@shumanlawfirm.com -- of The Shuman Law Firm, Denver,
Colorado, with him on the briefs), for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Nina F. Locker -- nlocker@wsgr.com -- of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &
Rosati Professional Corporation, Palo Alto, California (Steven
Guggenheim -- Sguggenheim@wsgr.com -- Joni L. Ostler --
jostler@wsgr.com -- Evan L. Seite -- eseite@wsgr.com -- of Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati Professional Corporation, Palo Alto,
California, and Holly Stein Sollod -- hsteinsollod@hollandhart.com
-- Christina F. Gomez -- cgomez@hollandhart.com -- Cici Cheng, of
Holland & Hart LLP, Denver, Colorado, with her on the briefs) for
Defendants-Appellees.


SCHURMAN FINE: $237.5K Attorney's Fees Awarded in Data Theft Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Francisco Division, granted Plaintiffs' Unopposed
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement in the
case captioned IRENE SUNG, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SCHURMAN FINE
PAPERS d/b/a SCHURMAN RETAIL GROUP, Defendant, Case No.
17-cv-02760-LB (N.D. Cal.).

The plaintiffs are current and former employees (and their spouses
and dependents) of Schurman Fine Papers d/b/a Schurman Retail Group
(SRG). They contend that a phishing attack on SRG in 2016 and SRG's
lax security and poor training  resulted in the theft of their W-2
data: names, addresses, compensation, and Social Security Numbers.

SRG will fund a non-reversionary Settlement Administration Account
of $325,000 for the reimbursement of economic costs incurred by
Settlement Class Members that are not reimbursable under the
original or additional All Clear Plans. Settlement Class Members
may submit one or more claims for reimbursement of such economic
costs (including mileage reimbursement at the current IRS rate) up
to an aggregate total of $500 per Settlement Class Member.
Settlement Class Members may also submit a claim for time spent
addressing the Data Incident at a rate of $15 per hour for up to 10
hours, for a total of $150. The total reimbursable amount thus is
$650.

The settlement agreement provided that plaintiffs' counsel would
petition the court for reasonable attorney's fees and costs not to
exceed $237,500.

Class certification requires the following: (1) the class must be
so numerous that joinder of all members individually is
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class; (3) the claims or defenses of the class representatives must
be typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the
person representing the class must be able to fairly and adequately
protect the interests of all class members.

The court finds (for settlement purposes only) that the proposed
Settlement Classes meet the Rule 23(a) requirements of numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy.

First, there are approximately 2,700 persons in the Settlement
Employee Class.  The class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable.

Second, there are questions of law and fact common to the class.
The class members allege identical claims under a
breach-of-contract theory, and they allege identical UCL and
negligence claims.

Third, the claims of the representative parties are typical of the
claims of the class. All Settlement Employee Class Members allege
that they provided PII to SRG as a condition of employment, and
they may have provided PII for their spouses or other dependents.

Fourth, the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class. They share the same interests
as Settlement Class Members, there are no conflicts of interest,
and the named plaintiffs and counsel will vigorously prosecute the
case.

The court finds too that certification of a nationwide class under
California law is appropriate under the facts of this case.

The court finds that they have claims that are typical of members
of the Settlement Classes generally and that they are adequate
representatives of the other members of the proposed Settlement
Classes.

The court confirms its previous appointment of Rosemary M. Rivas of
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP and Gayle M. Blatt of Casey Gerry Schenk
Francavilla Blatt & Penfield LLP as Settlement Class Counsel. As
the court found previously, they have the appropriate
qualifications, experience, and expertise in prosecuting class
actions.

The court previously appointed Rust Consulting as the claims
administrator.

Class counsel asks for $237,500 for attorney's fees and costs.

Based on the declarations submitted by the plaintiff's counsel
establishing that the fees are a.25 percent discount from the
collective lodestar, the court finds that that requested fees and
costs are reasonable and appropriate under the lodestar method. The
billing rates are within normal and customary ranges for
timekeepers with similar qualifications and experience in the
relevant market. The rates counsel used are appropriate given the
deferred and contingent nature of counsel's compensation. Counsel
also submitted a sufficient breakdown of the attorneys' billing
efforts for the court to reach its conclusion about the lodestar.

The court concludes that a fee award at the requested amount is
justified. It is appropriate based on counsel's efforts and the
substantial benefits to the class. It is supported by the lodestar,
the efficiency of the litigation, the quality of the
representation, and the contingent risk.

District courts must evaluate proposed incentive awards
individually, using relevant factors that include the actions the
plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class, the
degree to which the class has benefitted from those actions and the
amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended in pursuing the
litigation. Such awards are discretionary and are intended to
compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the
class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in
bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness
to act as a private attorney general.

The Ninth Circuit has noted that in some cases incentive awards may
be proper but has cautioned that awarding them should not become
routine practice. The Ninth Circuit also has emphasized that
district courts must be vigilant in scrutinizing all incentive
awards to determine whether they destroy the adequacy of the class
representatives.

Counsel described sufficiently the efforts of the named plaintiffs,
including consulting with counsel, assisting in discovery, and
otherwise participating in the litigation. The court approves the
service award of $1,500 each to the named plaintiffs.

The court approves the class-action settlement. From the total
settlement fund, and pursuant to the settlement terms, the court
allocates (1) $237,500 to attorney's fees and costs, (2) $40,000
for administration costs, and (3) a $1,500 service award to each
named plaintiff.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 5, 2018 Order is
available at    https://tinyurl.com/yd9o3xw2 from Leagle.com.

Irene Sung, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Kimberly Carboni, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Annie Fulton, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Cary Berger, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Emmalyne Owens, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, Ruth Phelps, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated & Christine Willetts, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Alyssa M. Williams , Casey Gerry Schenk Francavilla
Blatt and Penfield LLP, Ethan Thomas Litney , Casey Gerry Schenk
Francavilla Blatt and Penfield, LLP, Gayle Meryl Blatt , Casey
Gerry Schenk Francavilla Blatt & Penfield LLP, Quentin Alexandre
Roberts -- qroberts@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky LLP & Rosemary M.
Rivas -- rrivas@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky LLP.

Melissa Berger, Linda Graves & Christine Niziban, Plaintiffs,
represented by Gayle Meryl Blatt, Casey Gerry Schenk Francavilla
Blatt & Penfield LLP & Rosemary M. Rivas, Levi & Korsinsky LLP.

Schurman Fine Papers, d/b/a Schurman Retail Group, Defendant,
represented by Gina Elizabeth Och -- goch@murchisonlaw.com --
Murchison and Cumming, LLP, Matthew Scott Kenefick --
MKenefick@jmbm.com -- Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP, Claudia
Drennen McCarron -- cmccarron@mullen.law -- Mullen Coughlin &
Katelyn M. Knight , Murchison & Cumming, LLP.


SEA TO TABLE: Minami Tamaki Mulls Mislabeling Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Undercurrent News reports that Minami Tamaki, a law firm based in
San Francisco, California, is promoting its interest in further
scrutinizing the claims made by seafood supplier Sea to Table
following the Associated Press' recent expose. It's an apparent
effort to build a case for a class-action lawsuit.

"Companies that prey on consumers' good intentions for their own
profit may be in violation of federal law and subject to criminal
charges," the law firm said in a press release, before offering up
its phone number to any consumers that may have purchased from Sea
to Table. "The Food and Drug Administration and the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration are charged with enforcing
laws outlawing mislabeling of seafood."

Sea to Table founder Sean Dimin recently responded to the AP
report, published June 13, that questioned the traceability and
local origins of a US distributor. He argued that the journalists
cut corners and failed to deliver a complete picture of his
organization's work and said the news service informed him that it
was coming back for another story on his company. [GN]


SEMPRA ENERGY: 382 Suits Filed over Aliso Canyon Leak at Aug. 1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sempra Energy disclosed in its Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the Company's subsidiary
Southern California Gas Company is facing 382 lawsuits, including
approximately 48,000 plaintiffs, as of August 1, 2018, related to
Proposition 65.  Some of the cases have also named Sempra Energy.
All of these cases, other than a matter brought by the Los Angeles
County District Attorney and the federal securities class action,
are coordinated before a single court in the LA Superior Court for
pretrial management (the Coordination Proceeding).

On October 23, 2015, SoCalGas discovered a leak at one of its
injection-and-withdrawal wells, SS25, at its Aliso Canyon natural
gas storage facility (the Leak), located in the northern part of
the San Fernando Valley in Los Angeles County.  The Aliso Canyon
natural gas storage facility has been operated by SoCalGas since
1972.  SS25 is one of more than 100 injection-and-withdrawal wells
at the storage facility.  SoCalGas worked closely with several of
the world's leading experts to stop the Leak, and on February 18,
2016, the California Department of Conservation’s Division of
Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Resources (DOGGR) confirmed that the well
was permanently sealed. SoCalGas calculated that approximately 4.62
Bcf of natural gas was released from the Aliso Canyon natural gas
storage facility as a result of the Leak.

Various governmental agencies, including DOGGR, Los Angeles County
Department of Public Health or DPH, South Coast Air Quality
Management District or SCAQMD, the California Air Resources Board
or CARB, Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board,
California Division of Occupational Safety and Health, the
California Public Utilities Commission or CPUC, the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration or PHMSA, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency or EPA, Los Angeles County District
Attorney's Office and California Attorney General's Office, have
investigated or are investigating this incident.  Other federal
agencies (e.g., the DOE and the U.S. Department of the Interior)
investigated the incident as part of a joint interagency task
force.  In January 2016, DOGGR and the CPUC selected Blade Energy
Partners to conduct, under their supervision, an independent
analysis of the technical root cause of the Leak, to be funded by
SoCalGas. The timing of the root cause analysis is under the
control of Blade Energy Partners, DOGGR and the CPUC.

Pursuant to the Coordination Proceeding, in March 2017, the
individuals and business entities asserting tort and Proposition 65
claims filed a Second Amended Consolidated Master Case Complaint
for Individual Actions, through which their separate lawsuits will
be managed for pretrial purposes.  The consolidated complaint
asserts causes of action for negligence, negligence per se, private
and public nuisance (continuing and permanent), trespass, inverse
condemnation, strict liability, negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent concealment, loss of
consortium and violations of Proposition 65 against SoCalGas, with
certain causes also naming Sempra Energy.

The consolidated complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages
for personal injuries, lost wages and/or lost profits, property
damage and diminution in property value, injunctive relief, costs
of future medical monitoring, civil penalties (including penalties
associated with Proposition 65 claims alleging violation of
requirements for warning about certain chemical exposures), and
attorneys' fees.

In September and October of 2017, property developers filed two
complaints, one of which was amended in July 2018, against SoCalGas
and Sempra Energy alleging causes of action for strict liability,
negligence per se, negligence, continuing nuisance, permanent
nuisance and violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, as
well as claims for negligence against certain directors of
SoCalGas.  The complaints seek compensatory, statutory and punitive
damages, injunctive relief and attorneys' fees.  These claims are
joined in the Coordination Proceeding.

Sempra Energy, together with its subsidiaries, engages in energy
business worldwide.  It was founded in 1998 and is headquartered in
San Diego, California.


SEMPRA ENERGY: Bid to Revive Securities Suit Still Pending
----------------------------------------------------------
A reconsideration of the order that dismissed a federal securities
class action against Sempra Energy and its subsidiary Southern
California Gas Company remains pending, according to Sempra
Energy's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June
30, 2018.

The federal securities class action alleging violation of the
federal securities laws has been filed against Sempra Energy and
certain of its officers and certain of its directors in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California.  In
March 2018, the District Court dismissed the action with prejudice,
and in April 2018 the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the
order.

Sempra Energy, together with its subsidiaries, engages in energy
business worldwide.  It was founded in 1998 and is headquartered in
San Diego, California.


SEMPRA ENERGY: California Supreme Court Review Underway
-------------------------------------------------------
Sempra Energy still defends two consolidated class action
complaints in California, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6,
2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.  A review by
the California Supreme Court of the ruling in the Business Class
Action is underway.

In January 2017, pursuant to the Coordination Proceeding, two
consolidated class action complaints were filed against SoCalGas
and Sempra Energy, one on behalf of a putative class of persons and
businesses who own or lease real property within a five-mile radius
of the well (the Property Class Action), and a second on behalf of
a putative class of all persons and entities conducting business
within five miles of the facility (the Business Class Action).

Both complaints assert claims for strict liability for
ultra-hazardous activities, negligence and violation of California
Unfair Competition Law.  The Property Class Action also asserts
claims for negligence per se, trespass, permanent and continuing
public and private nuisance, and inverse condemnation.  The
Business Class Action also asserts a claim for negligent
interference with prospective economic advantage.  Both complaints
seek compensatory, statutory and punitive damages, injunctive
relief and attorneys' fees.

In December 2017, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District ruled that the purely economic damages alleged in the
Business Class Action are not recoverable under the law.  In
February 2018, the California Supreme Court granted a petition
filed by the plaintiffs to review that ruling.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Sempra Energy, together with its subsidiaries, engages in energy
business worldwide.  It was founded in 1998 and is headquartered in
San Diego, California.


SERVICESOURCE INTERNATIONAL: Patton Case Underway in Delaware
-------------------------------------------------------------
ServiceSource International, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the Company will
continue to "vigorously defend" itself against the claims asserted
in the case, Sarah Patton, et al v.  ServiceSource Delaware, Inc.

On August 23, 2016, the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee granted conditional class certification in a
lawsuit originally filed on September 21, 2015 by three former
senior sales representatives.  The lawsuit, Sarah Patton, et al v.
ServiceSource Delaware, Inc., asserts a claim under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, alleging that certain sales account representatives
and senior sales representatives in the Company's Nashville
location were not paid for all hours worked and were not properly
paid for overtime hours worked.

The complaint also asserts claims under Tennessee state law for
breach of contract and unjust enrichment; however, the plaintiffs
have not yet filed a motion to certify the state law breach of
contract and unjust enrichment claims as a class action.

The Company will continue to vigorously defend itself against these
claims.

ServiceSource International, Inc. is a global leader in outsourced,
performance-based customer success and revenue growth solutions.
The company is based in Denver Colorado.


SNOOZE HIC: Faces Class Action in California Over Unpaid Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jenie Mallari-Torres, writing for Northern California Record,
reports that a server employed by a restaurant owner alleges that
it did not pay servers overtime, meal and/or rest period wages or
waiting time wages.

Trinity Amador-Stewart filed a complaint on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated on July 16 in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of California against Snooze HIC LLC and
Does 1-100 alleging violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the plaintiff was employed by the
defendant as a server at one of its San Diego restaurants. She
alleges she was denied pay for all hours worked.

The plaintiff holds Snooze HIC LLC and Does 1-100 responsible
because the defendants allegedly failed to provide class members
with accurate semi-monthly itemized wage statements, failed to
consistently provide uninterrupted 30-minute meal periods and/or
10-minute rest periods, failed to pay all wages upon termination,
and failed to compensate class members for overtime hours worked.

The plaintiff requests a trial by jury and seek judgment against
defendant for damages, certify class action, award of civil
penalties, restitution, accounting, interest, attorneys' fees,
costs of suit, and other relief as the court deems just. She is
represented by Scott Edward Cole and Andrew Daniel Weaver of Scott
Cole & Associates APC in Concord and Daniel D. Bodell --
dbodell@BODELLLAWGROUP.COM -- of Bodell Law Group in San Diego.

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California case
number 3:18-cv-01604 [GN]


SNYDER & SNYDER: Dismissal of Malpractice Claims Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DONNA CHINN and THOMAS MCGEE, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. STEPHEN SNYDER, ESQ., SNYDER & SNYDER, MADELINE HOUSTON, ESQ.,
and HOUSTON & TOTARO, Defendants-Respondents, Case No. A-2585-16T4
(N.J. Super. App. Div.), Judge Harry G. Carroll of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed the trial court
orders (i) dismissing Chinn and McGee's purported class action
legal malpractice claims with and without prejudice pursuant to
Rule 4:23-5(a)(1) and (2) for failure to produce discovery; (ii)
denying reconsideration of those orders; and (iii) denying their
motion to reinstate their amended complaint.

On Sept. 21, 2015, Chinn and McGee filed a putative class action
complaint in the Law Division alleging legal malpractice and
related claims against attorneys who represented them in a
multi-county consolidated matter alleging employment discrimination
against Prudential Life Insurance Co.  They claimed that they, and
certain other Prudential employees and agents, settled their
employment discrimination claims on a compromised basis because of,
among other things, the alleged negligence of their attorneys,
Defendants Stephen Snyder, Esq., and his firm, Snyder & Snyder, and
Madeline Houston, Esq., and her firm, Houston & Totaro.

On Nov. 2, 2015, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint refining
their claims, but naming no new parties.  Both the complaint and
the amended complaint were filed by Edward R. Grossi, Esq., as the
counsel for Plaintiffs.

On March 21, 2016, Roper & Thyne, LLC (Roper) filed a notice of
appearance as co-counsel for the Plaintiffs.  

On April 5, 2016, Houston moved to disqualify Roper as the
Plaintiffs' counsel based on conflicts of interest arising from its
involvement in the Prudential matter.  On April 12, 2016, Snyder
moved to disqualify Grossi and Roper as the Plaintiffs' counsel
based on conflicts of interest arising from their involvement in
the Prudential matter, and in a separate fee dispute arising from
the Prudential matter.  On May 13, 2016, the trial court granted
the Defendants' motions to disqualify Grossi and Roper as the
Plaintiffs' counsel.

On July 13, 2016, the Plaintiffs retained Scott Piekarsky, Esq., to
represent them.  However, Piekarsky did not file a substitution of
counsel until Oct. 6, 2016, almost three months later.  Piekarsky's
representation of the Plaintiffs was unknown to the Defendants'
counsel until Oct. 6, 2016.

On July 27, 2016, Houston's counsel, unaware of Piekarsky's
representation of the Plaintiffs, sent letters to the Plaintiffs at
the addresses in the amended complaint.  The letters advised the
Plaintiffs that their responses to Houston's discovery requests
were overdue, and that if responses were not received by Aug. 19,
2016, Houston would move to dismiss the amended complaint.

On July 29, 2016, Snyder's counsel, similarly unaware of
Piekarsky's representation of the Plaintiffs, sent letters to the
Plaintiffs at the addresses in the amended complaint via
first-class, regular mail, and certified mail, return receipt
requested.  The letters advised the Plaintiffs that their responses
to Snyder's discovery requests were overdue, and that if responses
were not received by Aug. 15, 2016, Snyder would move to dismiss
the amended complaint.  Copies of the discovery requests were
enclosed.

On Aug. 29, 2016, Houston moved to dismiss the amended complaint
without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4:23-5(a)(1) for the Plaintiffs'
failure to respond to Houston's discovery requests.  Because
Piekarsky had not yet filed a substitution of counsel, Houston's
counsel served the motion on the Plaintiffs at the addresses in the
amended complaint.  Both the certified mail and regular mail sent
to both Plaintiffs was returned unclaimed.

On Sept. 6, 2016, Snyder moved to dismiss the amended complaint
without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4:23-5(a)(1) for the Plaintiffs'
failure to respond to Snyder's discovery requests.  Because
Piekarsky had not yet filed a substitution of counsel, Snyder's
counsel served the motion on the Plaintiffs at the addresses in the
amended complaint.  Both the certified mail and regular mail sent
to both Plaintiffs was returned unclaimed.

It is undisputed that when they filed their motions to dismiss the
amended complaint without prejudice the Defendants were not
delinquent with respect to the discovery requests served on them.

On Sept. 16, 2016, the trial court granted Houston's unopposed
motion to dismiss the amended complaint without prejudice pursuant
to Rule 4:23-5(a)(1) for failure to respond to Houston's discovery
requests.  On September 22, 2016, Houston's counsel served a copy
of the trial court's Sept. 16, 2016 order, along with the notice to
pro se parties required by Rule 4:23-5(a)(1), on the Plaintiffs at
the addresses in the amended complaint.  The certified mail sent to
Chinn was returned marked "Attempted - Not Known."  The regular
mail sent to both Plaintiffs was not returned.

On Sept. 30, 2016, the trial court granted Snyder's motion to
dismiss the amended complaint without prejudice pursuant to Rule
4:23-5(a)(1) for failure to respond to Snyder's discovery requests.
It also dismissed the Plaintiffs' purported class action claims
with prejudice because no counsel of record had appeared on behalf
of the Plaintiffs.

On Oct. 6, 2016, Snyder's counsel served a copy of the trial
court's Sept. 30, 2016 order, along with the notice to pro se
parties required by Rule 4:23-5(a)(1), on the Plaintiffs at the
addresses in the amended.  The certified mail sent to both
Plaintiffs was returned unclaimed and the regular mail sent to was
not returned.  

Also on Oct. 6, 2016, Piekarsky filed a substitution of counsel the
notifying the Defendants that he represented the Plaintiffs.  Upon
receipt of a copy of the substitution, Snyder's counsel emailed a
copy of the trial court's Sept. 30, 2016 order to Piekarsky.

On Oct. 10, 2016, Snyder's counsel emailed Piekarsky a copy of the
motion papers that resulted in entry of the Sep. 30, 2016 order.  

On Oct. 11, 2016, Houston moved to disqualify Piekarsky as the
Plaintiffs' counsel.  The trial court granted the motion on Nov. 4,
2016.

On Nov. 16, 2016, Houston moved to dismiss the amended complaint
with prejudice pursuant to Rule 4:23-5(a)(2).  Houston's counsel
served the motion papers, along with the notice to pro se parties
required by the Rule, on the Plaintiffs at the addresses in the
amended complaint.

On Nov. 29, 2016, Snyder moved to dismiss the amended complaint
with prejudice pursuant to Rule 4:23-5(a)(2).  Snyder's counsel
served the motion papers, along with the notice to pro se parties
required by the Rule, on the Plaintiffs at the addresses in the
amended complaint.

On Dec. 9, 2016, the court sent a notice to each Plaintiff
notifying them that they were required to appear on Dec. 16, 2016,
the return date of the motions.  McGee admits receiving the court's
notice.

On Dec. 15, 2016, after business hours, Michael J. Epstein, Esq.,
sent the Defendants' counsel an email stating that he had been
retained by the Plaintiffs.  Epstein stated that he intended to
appear on the Plaintiffs' behalf the next day to seek an
adjournment of the Defendants' motions to permit him to complete
the Plaintiffs' discovery responses and move to reinstate the
amended complaint.

On Dec. 16, 2016, Epstein appeared on the return date of the
motions.  Although the court had directed the Plaintiffs to appear
in person, they did not do so.  Epstein requested an adjournment of
the motions.  On Dec. 16, 2016, the trial court granted the
Defendants' motions to dismiss the amended complaint with
prejudice.  

On Jan.10, 2017, the Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the
trial court's Dec. 16, 2016 orders dismissing the amended complaint
with prejudice, and for reinstatement of the amended complaint.  In
support of the motions, they submitted certifications denying that
they had received any of the mail sent to them by the Defendants'
counsel.

On Feb. 3, 2017, the trial court denied the Plaintiffs' motions for
reconsideration and to reinstate the amended complaint.  The trial
court placed its findings of fact and conclusions of law for both
motions on the record.  The Plaintiffs did not file a transcript of
the court's Feb. 3, 2017 oral decision.  As a result, it is not
possible to ascertain from the record the reason for the trial
judge's decisions.

The appeal followed.  The Plaintiffs appeal the Sept. 16, and Sept.
30, 2016 orders dismissing the amended complaint without prejudice,
the Dec. 16, 2016 orders dismissing the amended complaint with
prejudice, and the Feb. 3, 2017 order denying their motion for
reconsideration of the Dec. 16, 2016 orders.  They also challenge
the Feb. 3, 2017 order denying their motion to reinstate the
amended complaint.

Judge Carroll concludes that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when entering the orders under appeal.  As to the Sept.
16, 2016 and Sept. 30, 2016 orders dismissing the amended complaint
without prejudice, he finds that the Defendants' motions to dismiss
the amended complaint without prejudice pursuant to Rule
4:23-5(a)(1) were unopposed.  He's not persuaded by the Plaintiffs'
argument that the Defendants improperly took advantage of the
Plaintiffs by moving to dismiss the amended complaint without
prejudice after the disqualification of Grossi and Roper.  Also,
there is nothing in the record supporting the proposition that the
Defendants' counsel attempted to exclude Piekarsky from being
notified of the motions to dismiss.

As to the Dec. 16, 2016 orders dismissing the amended complaint
with prejudice, the Judge also concludes that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the amended complaint
with prejudice.  The trial court record established that the
Defendants satisfied all of the requirements of Rule 4:23-5(a)(2).
Orders dismissing the amended complaint without prejudice had been
entered more than 60 days prior to the filing of the motions.  The
Defendants produced proof of service of the motions, as well as
proof of service of the notices to pro se parties required by the
Rule.

Finally, as to the Feb. 7, 2017 order denying reconsideration, and
Feb.7, 2017 order denying motion to reinstate amended complaint,
the Judge finds that the trial court placed its findings of fact
and conclusions of law with respect to the Plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration on the record on Feb. 3, 2017.  The Plaintiffs did
not file a copy of the transcript of the Feb. 3, 2017 proceedings,
contrary to Rule 2:5-3(b).  He is, therefore, unable to review the
reasons given by the trial court for denying the Plaintiffs'
motion, and decline to entertain the Plaintiffs' arguments.  The
same is true for the Plaintiffs' motion to reinstate the amended
complaint, which was also decided in an oral opinion delivered on
Feb. 3, 2017.

In light of his decision affirming the dismissal of the amended
complaint with prejudice, the Judge needs not reach the Plaintiffs'
challenge to the orders concerning disqualification of counsel.

Accordingly, Judge Carroll affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/B2dGRO from Leagle.com.

Kenneth S. Thyne argued the cause for appellant (Roper & Thyne,
LLC, attorneys; Kenneth S. Thyne, on the brief).

Marshall D. Bilder -- mbilder@eckertseamans.com -- argued the cause
for respondents Stephen Snyder, Esq. and Snyder and Snyder (Eckert
Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, attorneys; Marshall D. Bilder, of
counsel and on the brief).

Madeline Houston -- HoustonTotaro@gmail.com -- respondent, argued
the cause pro se and for respondent Houston & Totaro.


SYNGENTA AG: Plaintiffs Attorney Seeks $150MM in Legal Fees
-----------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for Law.com, reports that Texas plaintiffs
attorney Mikal Watts is asking for at least $150 million in legal
fees from the $1.5 billion settlement with Syngenta AG, citing his
firm's "unique position in this litigation."

The Watts Guerra attorney's fee request, filed last month but
updated on Aug. 3, sets up a potential clash over what could be an
estimated $500 million in fees in the class action settlement,
which resolves claims by more than 600,000 farmers who alleged
Syngenta sold genetically modified corn seed that China refused to
import, causing farmers to lose billions of dollars. In a separate
request for fees, lead counsel in the federal multidistrict
litigation in Kansas are seeking that amount—about 33 percent of
the total settlement fund.

"This fee request is based on Watts Guerra's enormous investment in
this litigation," Mr. Watts wrote in his motion. "It is on the high
end of the range, perhaps, but not unprecedented."

Watts claims to represent 57,000 farmers who could be entitled to
between $345 million and $750 million under the settlement.

Mr. Watts did not respond to a request for comment.

The requests come as at least four other lawyers have challenged
the fees in the deal, particularly those going to Mr. Watts.
Oppositions to the fee requests are due Aug. 17.

Chris Seeger of New York's Seeger Weiss, a member of the
plaintiffs' settlement negotiation team, along with Watts and
Patrick Stueve -- stueve@stuevesiegel.com -- of Kansas City,
Missouri-based Stueve Siegel Hanson, co-lead and liaison counsel of
federal multidistrict litigation, did not respond to requests for
comment.

The Syngenta litigation was coordinated in both federal
multidistrict litigation in Kansas and in two proceedings in
Minnesota and Illinois state courts. In their fee request, the lead
lawyers in Syngenta want 50 percent of the $500 million, plus about
$6.7 million in costs and expenses, which would go to a total 44
law firms. They want another 12.5 percent to go to the lead lawyers
in the Minnesota state court, and 17.5 percent to attorneys in
Illinois state court. The remaining $100 million would be reserved
for other lawyers.

The dispute mirrors fee fights that have erupted in mass torts
between plaintiffs attorneys appointed to represent members of a
class action and those who have brought individual suits on behalf
of their clients. The vast majority of the farmers Watts represents
have retainer agreements with him and filed individual suits in
Minnesota state court.

Last year, as part of the federal multidistrict litigation, a jury
awarded $217.7 million to a class of Kansas farmers in the first
bellwether trial. It was one of eight subclasses of farmers planned
for trials. A second, on behalf of Minnesota farmers, was ongoing
when both sides struck a deal.

Watts Guerra partner Francisco Guerra -- fguerra@wattsguerra.com --
was co-lead plaintiffs counsel in Minnesota state court, but no one
from the firm had a lead role in the federal multidistrict
litigation. The firm did work on the Minnesota trial, however, and
Watts was one of four lawyers appointed to the plaintiffs'
negotiating committee.

"That trial forced Syngenta finally to accept that it faced not
just hundreds of millions of dollars in compensatory damages but a
likely multibillion-dollar judgment based on intentional misconduct
-- for the farmers in a single state," Mr. Watts wrote. "Then, in
an instant, it was over."

The initial settlement called for two agreements -- one on behalf
of the class, and one on behalf of the individual plaintiffs,
according to court filings. But the negotiated deal encompassed
four subclasses -- two on behalf of farmers, one for grain handling
facilities and another for ethanol producers.

Final approval of the settlement is set for Nov. 15.

Earlier this year, two attorneys in Beaumont, Texas, claiming to
represent 9,000 farmers filed a motion to delay approval of the
settlement, insisting the lead lawyers who negotiated the deal kept
their clients in the dark on "how the settlement would be divided
and distributed between the class actions and the individual
producer plaintiffs." In particular, they claimed
Mr. Watts and another lawyer on the plaintiffs settlement
negotiation committee, Clayton Clark of Clark, Love & Hutson in
Houston, dropped a more favorable settlement for farmers with
individual lawsuits in exchange for higher fees.

Another lawyer, D. Allen Hossley -- allen@hossleyembry.com -- of
Hossley & Embry in Tyler, Texas, who claimed to represent 650
farmers, joined the motion, filed by Mitchell Toups --
matoups@wgttlaw.com -- of Weller, Green, Toups & Terrell and
Richard Coffman -- rcoffman@coffmanlawfirm.com -- of The Coffman
Law Firm (Toups and Coffman are now seeking $34 million in fees,
while Hossley wants nearly $2.7 million).

On April 24, Minneapolis attorney Doug Nill sued Mr. Watts. He
claimed Mr. Watts, firm partner Guerra and Jon Givens, of counsel,
who lives in Alaska, and 13 other small law firms or solo
practitioners conspired to convince 60,000 farmers not to
participate in the class action, and now could end up with $200
million in fees. The suit asked to void the retainer agreements,
which included a contingency fee rate of 40 percent.

In his fee request, Mr. Watts said he would drop his contingency
fee to 33.3 percent. When accounting for what he had agreed to pay
lead lawyers in the federal multidistrict litigation -- referred to
as a common benefit assessment -- his contingency fee would drop to
less than 24.2 percent, he wrote.

But, anticipating that "some of the other common benefit counsel"
may demand one-third of the settlement for themselves, he insisted
that his fees come out of the $500 million and that he get
reimbursed for the $12.8 million in common benefit expenses he paid
in the Minnesota state court litigation. He cited a 2015 joint
prosecution agreement that was designed to resolve future fee
disputes among lawyers in both the Minnesota state court cases and
federal multidistrict litigation.

Mr. Watts backed up his fee request, which also includes 332 law
firms that worked on his cases, with expert reports from six
prominent legal scholars, including Brian Fitzpatrick of Vanderbilt
Law School and Geoffrey Miller of New York University School of
Law.

It's not the first time Mr. Watts has faced scrutiny. Federal
prosecutors indicted him on charges that he submitted phony clients
to recover damages from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010. A
federal jury acquitted him in 2016. [GN]


TECHNIPFMC PLC: Still Defends Prause Shareholder Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
TechnipFMC plc continues to defend itself against the "Prause"
purported shareholder class action in Texas, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June
30, 2018.

A purported shareholder class action filed in 2017 and amended in
January 2018 and captioned Prause v. TechnipFMC, et al., No.
4:17-cv-02368 (S.D.  Texas) is pending in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas against the Company and certain
current officers and a former employee of the Company.

The suit alleges violations of the federal securities laws in
connection with the Company's restatement of our first quarter 2017
financial results and a material weakness in our internal control
over financial reporting announced on July 24, 2017.

The Company is vigorously contesting the litigation and cannot
predict its duration or outcome.

TechnipFMC plc, a public limited company incorporated and organized
under the laws of England and Wales, with registered number
09909709, and with registered office at One St. Paul's Churchyard,
London EC4M 8AP, United Kingdom is a global leader in the subsea,
onshore/offshore, and surface industries, with market-leading
positions in oil and gas projects, technologies, systems, and
services.


TENET HEALTHCARE: Bid for Class Status in Maderazo Suit Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
Tenet Healthcare Corporation said in its Form 10-Q filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the Company is still
awaiting the court's ruling on class certification in a purported
class suit entitled, Maderazo, et al. v. VHS San Antonio Partners,
L.P. d/b/a Baptist Health Systems, et al.

The Company said, "In Maderazo, et al. v. VHS San Antonio Partners,
L.P. d/b/a Baptist Health Systems, et al., filed in June 2006 in
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, a
purported class of registered nurses employed by three unaffiliated
San Antonio-area hospital systems allege those hospital systems,
including our Baptist Health System, and other unidentified San
Antonio regional hospitals violated Section Sec.  1 of the federal
Sherman Act by conspiring to depress nurses' compensation and
exchanging compensation-related information among themselves in a
manner that reduced competition and suppressed the wages paid to
such nurses.  The suit seeks unspecified damages (subject to
trebling under federal law), interest, costs and attorneys' fees.
The case was stayed from 2008 through mid-2015.  At this time, we
are awaiting the court's ruling on class certification and will
continue to vigorously defend ourselves against the plaintiffs'
allegations.  It remains impossible at this time to predict the
outcome of these proceedings with any certainty; however, we
believe that the ultimate resolution of this matter will not have a
material effect on our business, financial condition or results of
operations."

Tenet Healthcare Corporation is a diversified healthcare services
company. The company is based in Dallas, Texas.


TESLA INC: Bid to Dismiss Suit over Model 3 Production Underway
---------------------------------------------------------------
The court hearing on the motion to dismiss a securities litigation
relating to production of Model 3 vehicles was set for August 24,
2018, according to Tesla, Inc.'s Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On October 10, 2017, a purported stockholder class action was filed
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
against Tesla, Inc., two of its current officers, and a former
officer.  The complaint alleges violations of federal securities
laws, and seeks unspecified compensatory damages and other relief
on behalf of a purported class of purchasers of Tesla securities
from May 4, 2016 to October 6, 2017.

The lawsuit claims that Tesla supposedly made materially false and
misleading statements regarding the Company's preparedness to
produce Model 3 vehicles.  Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on
March 23, 2018, and defendants filed a motion to dismiss on May 25,
2018.  The court hearing on the motion to dismiss is set for August
24, 2018.

The Company said, "We believe that the claims are without merit and
intend to defend against this lawsuit vigorously.  We are unable to
estimate the possible loss or range of loss, if any, associated
with this lawsuit."

Tesla, Inc., designs, develops, manufactures, and sells electric
vehicles and energy storage products in the United States, China,
Norway, and internationally.  The Company operates in two segments,
Automotive, and Energy Generation and Storage.  The Company was
formerly known as Tesla Motors, Inc. and changed its name to Tesla,
Inc. in February 2017.  Tesla, Inc. was founded in 2003 and is
headquartered in Palo Alto, California.


TESLA INC: Faces Litigation Relating to 2018 CEO Performance Award
------------------------------------------------------------------
Tesla, Inc. is facing a putative class and derivative action in the
Delaware Court of Chancery, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for on
August 6, 2018, the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On February 21, 2018, a purported Tesla stockholder made a demand
to inspect Tesla's books and records, purportedly to investigate
potential breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with the Tesla
board's approval of a conditional stock-based compensation plan for
Elon Musk, Tesla's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, in January
2018.

On June 4, 2018, that stockholder filed the putative class and
derivative action alleging that Tesla's directors breached their
fiduciary duties by approving the stock-based compensation plan.
The complaint seeks, among other things, monetary damages and
rescission or reformation of the stock-based compensation plan.

The Company said, "We believe the claims asserted in this lawsuit
are without merit and intend to defend against them vigorously."

Tesla, Inc., designs, develops, manufactures, and sells electric
vehicles and energy storage products in the United States, China,
Norway, and internationally.  The Company operates in two segments,
Automotive, and Energy Generation and Storage.  The Company was
formerly known as Tesla Motors, Inc. and changed its name to Tesla,
Inc. in February 2017.  Tesla, Inc. was founded in 2003 and is
headquartered in Palo Alto, California.


TESLA INC: Shareholder Suit over SolarCity Acquisition Continues
----------------------------------------------------------------
Tesla, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018, that the securities litigation relating to the
SolarCity acquisition "will now proceed."

Between September 1, 2016 and October 5, 2016, seven lawsuits were
filed in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware by
purported stockholders of Tesla challenging the Company's
acquisition of SolarCity.  Following consolidation, the lawsuit
names as defendants the members of Tesla's board of directors and
alleges, among other things, that board members breached their
fiduciary duties in connection with the acquisition.  The complaint
asserts both derivative claims and direct claims on behalf of a
purported class and seeks, among other relief, unspecified monetary
damages, attorneys' fees, and costs.  On January 27, 2017,
defendants filed a motion to dismiss the operative complaint.
Rather than respond to the defendants' motion, the plaintiffs filed
an amended complaint.  On March 17, 2017, defendants filed a motion
to dismiss the amended complaint.  On December 13, 2017, the Court
heard oral argument on the motion.  On March 28, 2018, the Court
denied defendants' motion to dismiss.  Defendants filed a request
for interlocutory appeal, but the Delaware Supreme Court denied
that request, electing not to hear an appeal at this early stage of
the case.  Defendants filed their answer on May 18, 2018.  This
case will now proceed.

These plaintiffs and others filed parallel actions in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Delaware on April 21, 2017.
Those actions have been consolidated and are stayed pending the
Chancery Court litigation.  They include claims for violations of
the federal securities laws and breach of fiduciary duties by
Tesla's board of directors.  That action is stayed pending the
Chancery Court litigation.

On February 6, 2017, a purported stockholder made a demand to
inspect Tesla's books and records, purportedly to investigate
potential breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with the
SolarCity acquisition.

The Company said, "We believe that claims challenging the SolarCity
acquisition are without merit and intend to defend against them
vigorously.  We are unable to estimate the possible loss or range
of loss, if any, associated with these claims."

Tesla, Inc., designs, develops, manufactures, and sells electric
vehicles and energy storage products in the United States, China,
Norway, and internationally.  The Company operates in two segments,
Automotive, and Energy Generation and Storage.  The Company was
formerly known as Tesla Motors, Inc. and changed its name to Tesla,
Inc. in February 2017.  Tesla, Inc. was founded in 2003 and is
headquartered in Palo Alto, California.


TRANS UNION: Violates Fair Credit Reporting Act, Marshall Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Kattie Marshall brought a class action lawsuit under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act against Trans Union, LLC, Synchrony Bank and
certain John Does.  The case is titled as Kattie Marshall,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Trans Union, LLC, Synchrony Bank and John Does 1-25, Case No.
1:18-cv-03954-MHC-CMS (N.D. Ga., August 20, 2018).

Trans Union LLC develops and delivers information and risk
management solutions.  The Company offers various credit monitoring
products, risk management solutions, marketing services, and other
related solutions.  TransUnion provides its products and services
throughout the world.

Synchrony Bank provides banking products and services.  Synchrony
Bank provides certificates of deposit, money market and savings
accounts, and IRAs, as well as online and mobile banking options.
Synchrony Bank was formerly known as GE Capital Retail Bank and
changed its name to Synchrony Bank in June 2014.  Synchrony Bank
was founded in 1988 and is based in Draper, Utah.  Synchrony Bank
operates as a subsidiary of Synchrony Financial.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan Braxton Mason, Esq.
          MASON LAW GROUP, LLC
          1100 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 200
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 920-8040
          Facsimile: (404) 920-8039
          E-mail: jmason@atlshowbizlaw.com


TRANSAMERICA LIFE: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss K. McMahon's Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Leonard T. Strand of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Iowa, Cedar Rapids Division, denied the Defendant's
motion to dismiss the case, KAREN McMAHON, HEATHER McMAHON, and
RONALD PERKINS, Plaintiffs, v. TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant, Case No. C17-149-LTS (N.D. Iowa).

On Dec. 11, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a purported class action
complaint against the Defendant.  The Plaintiffs contend that they
represent a class of persons who purchased Transamerica's universal
life insurance policies in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  They
contend that in August 2015, Transamerica suddenly, unilaterally,
and massively began increasing monthly deductions withdrawn from
the Policies' accounts, falsely stating the increases were
permitted by the terms of the Policies, when in fact the reasons
for imposing the dramatic increases were to: (a) subsidize
Transamerica's cost of meeting its interest rate guarantees under
the Policies; (b) recoup past losses in violation of the terms of
the Policies; and (c) induce Policy terminations by policyholders.
They contend that these actions further weakened Transamerica's
policy reserves, resulting in near-term losses to its bottom line.

The Plaintiffs assert two claims against Transamerica arising out
of the conduct.  Although they admit that Transamerica did not
raise the MDR above the maximum amount guaranteed by the Policies,
the Plaintiffs contend that Transamerica nevertheless breached the
Policies by increasing the MDR for reasons not permitted by the
terms of the Policies (specifically, to recover Transamerica's past
losses).  Further, they contend that even if Transamerica did not
technically breach the Policies, its conduct constitutes a breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  They
contend that Transamerica misrepresented the reason for the MDR
increases and intended the increases for improper purposes,
including inducing shock lapses, negating the value of the
guaranteed interest rates and recovering past losses.  The
Plaintiffs seek monetary damages, as well as declaratory and
injunctive relief.

The Defendants responded on May 7, 2013, by filing a pre-answer
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).  Transamerica argues that the Plaintiffs fail to state a
claim for breach of contract because the Policies do not limit
which factors Transamerica takes into consideration when setting
the MDRs, as long as Transamerica does not exceed the maximum
guaranteed MDRs.  Regarding the Plaintiffs' claim for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Transamerica
repeats its argument that it did not breach the contract, and
contends as a result that it did not injure the Plaintiffs' rights
under the Policies.  Finally, it claims that the Plaintiffs'
request for declaratory judgment must be dismissed because it is
duplicative of the breach of contract claim. Plaintiffs generally
resist.  The parties are proceeding under the assumption that Iowa
law applies.

Judge Strand agrees with the court in Feller v. Transamerica Life
Ins. Co. that the Policies at issue are susceptible to the
Plaintiffs' interpretation.  It is apparent from the face of the
contract that Transamerica cannot consider its past losses in
exercising its discretion to set the MDR, and it is plausible that
there are other limitations on its exercise of discretion.  Because
the Plaintiffs have adequately plead that Transamerica considered
past losses and factors other than those related to the COI in
raising the MDR, Transamerica's motion to dismiss Count One (breach
of contract) is denied.

The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that
their purpose in purchasing the Policies was to secure affordable
life insurance while taking advantage of the guaranteed interest
rate and avoiding the potential risks of a future economic
downturn.  They have also plausibly alleged that by raising the MDR
for the purpose of inducing shock lapses and by misrepresenting the
reasons for the MDR increase, Transamerica has acted in bad faith
to undermine plaithe Ptiffs' rights in the Policies.
Transamerica's argument that it did not raise the MDR's above the
guaranteed maximum rate misses the point, because technical
compliance with the contract terms does not defeat a claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Transamerica's argument that it did not raise the MDRs for the
purposes alleged ignores the directive, at this stage of the case,
to accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true.
Transamerica's motion to dismiss Count Two (breach of the implied
covenant of good faith) is denied.

Finally, although there is overlap between the claim for breach of
contract and the request for a declaratory judgment, such that the
claims may be considered duplicative, it is unclear at this point
whether resolution of the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim
would necessarily resolve the parties' prospective rights under the
Policies.  Dismissal of the declaratory judgment action is
premature.  The Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.

For these reasons, Judge Strand denied the Defendant's motion to
dismiss in its entirety.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Pe9AU4 from Leagle.com.

Karen McMahon, Heather McMahon & Ronald Perkins, Plaintiffs,
represented by Jenna Lee Green, Hupy and Abraham, Paul V. Sweeny --
paul@sfclasslaw.com -- Squitieri & Fearon, LLP, pro hac vice,
Stephen J. Fearon -- stephen@sfclasslaw.com -- Squitieri & Fearon,
LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas William Kyle, Hupy and Abraham.

Transamerica Life Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by
Wilford H. Stone -- wstone@lynchdallas.com -- Lynch Dallas PC, Erin
E. Bennett -- erin.bennett@mhllp.com -- McDowell Hetherington LLP,
pro hac vice, Hutson B. Smelley, McDowell Hetherington LLP, pro hac
vice, Jarrett E. Ganer -- jarrett.ganer@mhllp.com -- McDowell
Hetherington LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas F.A. Hetherington --
tom.hetherington@mhllp.com -- McDowell Hetherington LLP, pro hac
vice.


TURTLE BEACH: Shareholders Class Action Trial Set for Nov. 2019
---------------------------------------------------------------
The hearing for a shareholders class action related to the merger
of Turtle Beach Corporation and VTB Holdings, Inc. has been set for
November 2019, according to Turtle Beach's Form 10-Q filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On August 5, 2013, VTBH and the Company (f/k/a Parametric)
announced that they had entered into the Merger Agreement pursuant
to which VTBH would acquire an approximately 80% ownership interest
and existing shareholders would maintain an approximately 20%
ownership interest in the combined company.

Following the announcement, several shareholders filed class action
lawsuits in California and Nevada seeking to enjoin the Merger.
The plaintiffs in each case alleged that members of the Company's
Board of Directors breached their fiduciary duties to the
shareholders by agreeing to a Merger that allegedly undervalued the
Company.  VTBH and the Company were named as defendants in these
lawsuits under the theory that they had aided and abetted the
Company's Board of Directors in allegedly violating their fiduciary
duties.

The plaintiffs in both cases sought a preliminary injunction
seeking to enjoin closing of the Merger, which, by agreement, was
heard by the Nevada court with the California plaintiffs invited to
participate.  On December 26, 2013, the court in the Nevada cases
denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.

Following the closing of the Merger, the Nevada plaintiffs filed a
second amended complaint, which made essentially the same
allegations and sought monetary damages as well as an order
rescinding the Merger.  The California plaintiffs dismissed their
action without prejudice, and sought to intervene in the Nevada
action, which was granted.

Subsequent to the intervention, the plaintiffs filed a third
amended complaint, which made essentially the same allegations as
prior complaints and sought monetary damages.  On June 20, 2014,
VTBH and the Company moved to dismiss the action, but that motion
was denied on August 28, 2014.  On September 14, 2017, a unanimous
en banc panel of the Nevada Supreme Court granted defendants'
petition for writ of mandamus and ordered the trial court to
dismiss the complaint but provided a limited basis upon which
plaintiffs could seek to amend their complaint.

Plaintiffs amended their complaint on December 1, 2017 to assert
the same claims in a derivative capacity on behalf of the Company,
as a well as in a direct capacity, against VTBH, Stripes Group,
LLC, SG VTB Holdings, LLC, and the former members of the Company's
Board of Directors.

All defendants moved to dismiss this amended complaint on January
2, 2018, and those motions were denied on March 13, 2018.
Defendants petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court to reverse this
ruling on April 18, 2018.

On June 15, 2018, the Nevada Supreme Court denied defendants' writ
petition without prejudice.  The district court subsequently
entered a pretrial schedule and set trial for November 2019.

Turtle Beach Corporation, headquartered in San Diego, California,
and incorporated in the state of Nevada in 2010, is a premier audio
technology company with expertise and experience in developing,
commercializing and marketing innovative products across a range of
large addressable markets operating under two reportable segments,
Turtle Beach(R) ("Headset") and HyperSound(R).


TYSON FOODS: Bid to Nix Broiler Chicken Grower Suit Still Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Tyson Foods, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that a motion to dismiss the
consolidated amended complaint styled In re Broiler Chicken Grower
Litigation remains pending.

On January 27, 2017, Haff Poultry, Inc., Craig Watts, Johnny
Upchurch, Jonathan Walters and Brad Carr, acting on behalf of
themselves and a putative class of broiler chicken farmers, filed a
class action complaint against Tyson and certain of its poultry
subsidiaries, as well as several other vertically-integrated
poultry processing companies, in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Oklahoma.

On March 28, 2017, a second class action complaint making similar
claims on behalf of a similarly defined putative class was filed in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma.  Plaintiffs in the two cases sought to have the matters
consolidated, and, on July 10, 2017, filed a consolidated amended
complaint styled In re Broiler Chicken Grower Litigation.  The
plaintiffs allege, among other things, that the defendants colluded
not to compete for broiler raising services "with the purpose and
effect of fixing, maintaining, and/or stabilizing grower
compensation below competitive levels."

The plaintiffs also allege that the defendants "agreed to share
detailed data on [g]rower compensation with one another, with the
purpose and effect of artificially depressing [g]rower compensation
below competitive levels." The plaintiffs contend these alleged
acts constitute violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and Section
202 of the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921.
The plaintiffs are seeking treble damages, pre- and post-judgment
interest, costs, and attorneys' fees on behalf of the putative
class.

The Company and the other defendants filed a motion to dismiss on
September 8, 2017.  That motion is pending.

Tyson Foods is one of the world's largest food companies.


TYSON FOODS: Faces Antitrust Class Suits over Pork Product Prices
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Tyson Foods, Inc. is facing putative class actions suits over
alleged violation of antitrust laws related to pork and pork
products, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On June 18, 2018, Wanda Duryea, Matthew Hosking, John McKee, Lisa
Melegari, Michael Reilly, Sandra Steffan, Paul Glantz, Edwin
Blakey, Jennifer Sullivan, Lisa Axelrod, Anbessa Tufa and Christina
Hall, acting on behalf of themselves individually and on behalf of
a putative plaintiff class consisting of all persons and entities
who indirectly purchased pork, filed a class action complaint
against the Company and certain of its pork subsidiaries, as well
as several other pork processing companies, in the federal district
court for the District of Minnesota.

Subsequent to the filing of the initial complaint, additional
lawsuits making similar claims on behalf of putative classes of
direct and indirect purchasers were also filed in the same court.

To date, four separate direct purchaser actions and four separate
indirect purchaser actions have been filed, all in the District of
Minnesota.  The complaints allege, among other things, that
beginning in January 2009 the defendants conspired and combined to
fix, raise, maintain, and stabilize the price of pork and pork
products in violation of United States antitrust laws.

The complaints on behalf of the putative classes of indirect
purchasers also include causes of action under various state unfair
competition laws, consumer protection laws, and unjust enrichment
common laws.  The plaintiffs are seeking treble damages, injunctive
relief, pre- and post-judgment interest, costs, and attorneys' fees
on behalf of the putative classes.

Tyson Foods is one of the world's largest food companies.


TYSON FOODS: Hillshire Unit Still Defends Philippine Labor Case
---------------------------------------------------------------
A subsidiary of Tyson Foods, Inc. continues to defend itself in a
consolidated labor case pending in the Philippines, according to
the Company's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June
30, 2018.

The Company's subsidiary, The Hillshire Brands Company (formerly
named Sara Lee Corporation), is a party to a consolidation of cases
filed by individual complainants with the Republic of the
Philippines, Department of Labor and Employment and the National
Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") from 1998 through July 1999.

The complaint was filed against Aris Philippines, Inc., Sara Lee
Corporation, Sara Lee Philippines, Inc., Fashion Accessories
Philippines, Inc., and Attorney Cesar C. Cruz (collectively, the
"respondents").  The complaint alleges, among other things, that
the respondents engaged in unfair labor practices in connection
with the termination of manufacturing operations in the Philippines
in 1995 by Aris Philippines, Inc., a former subsidiary of The
Hillshire Brands Company.  In late 2004, a labor arbiter ruled
against the respondents and awarded the complainants
PHP3,453,664,710 (approximately US$65 million) in damages and
fees.

The respondents appealed the labor arbiter's ruling, and it was
subsequently set aside by the NLRC in December 2006.  Subsequent to
the NLRC's decision, the parties filed numerous appeals, motions
for reconsideration and petitions for review, certain of which
remained outstanding for several years.  While various of those
appeals, motions and/or petitions were pending, The Hillshire
Brands Company, on June 23, 2014, without admitting liability,
filed a settlement motion requesting that the Supreme Court of the
Philippines order dismissal with prejudice of all claims against it
and certain other respondents in exchange for payments allocated by
the court among the complainants in an amount not to exceed
PHP342,287,800 (approximately US$6.4 million).  Based in part on
its finding that the consideration to be paid to the complainants
as part of such settlement was insufficient, the Supreme Court of
the Philippines denied the respondents' settlement motion and all
motions for reconsideration thereof.

The Supreme Court of the Philippines also set aside as premature
the NLRC's December 2006 ruling.  As a result, the cases were
remanded back before the NLRC to rule on the merits of the case.

On December 15, 2016, the Company learned that the NLRC rendered
its decision on November 29, 2016, regarding the respondents'
appeals regarding the labor arbiter's 2004 ruling in favor of the
complainants.  The NLRC increased the award for 4,922 of the total
5,984 complainants to PHP14,858,495,937 (approximately US$278
million).  However, the NLRC approved a prior settlement reached
with the group comprising approximately 18% of the class of 5,984
complainants, pursuant to which The Hillshire Brands Company agreed
to pay each settling complainant PHP68,000 (approximately
US$1,300).  The settlement payment was made on December 21, 2016,
to the NLRC, which is responsible for distributing the funds to
each settling complainant.

On December 27, 2016, the respondents filed motions for
reconsideration with the NLRC asking that the award be set aside.
The NLRC denied respondents' motions for reconsideration in a
resolution received on May 5, 2017, and entered a judgment on the
award on July 24, 2017.  Each of Aris Philippines, Inc., Sara Lee
Corporation and Sara Lee Philippines, Inc. appealed this award and
sought an injunction to preclude enforcement of the award to the
Philippines Court of Appeals.

On November 23, 2017, the Court of Appeals granted a writ of
preliminary injunction that precluded execution of the NLRC award
during the pendency of the appeal.  The Court of Appeals
subsequently vacated the NLRC's award on April 12, 2018.
Complainants have filed motions for reconsideration with the Court
of Appeals.

The Company said, "If those motions are denied, the Court of
Appeals' decision nevertheless remains subject to appeal to the
Supreme Court of the Philippines.  We continue to maintain an
accrual for this matter."

Tyson Foods is one of the world's largest food companies.


TYSON FOODS: Maplevale Farms Lawsuit Still in Discovery Phase
-------------------------------------------------------------
The class action complaint filed by Maplevale Farms, Inc. against
Tyson Foods, Inc. related to alleged violations of U.S. antitrust
laws over broiler chicken prices is still in discovery phase,
according to the Form 10-Q filed by Tyson Foods with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On September 2, 2016, Maplevale Farms, Inc., acting on behalf of
itself and a putative class of direct purchasers of poultry
products, filed a class action complaint against the Company and
certain of its poultry subsidiaries, as well as several other
poultry processing companies, in the Northern District of Illinois.
Subsequent to the filing of this initial complaint, additional
lawsuits making similar claims on behalf of putative classes of
direct and indirect purchasers were filed in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

The court consolidated the complaints, for pre-trial purposes, into
actions on behalf of three different putative classes: direct
purchasers, indirect purchasers/consumers and
commercial/institutional indirect purchasers.  These three actions
are styled In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation.  Several
amended and consolidated complaints have been filed on behalf of
each putative class.

The currently operative complaints allege, among other things, that
beginning in January 2008 the defendants conspired and combined to
fix, raise, maintain, and stabilize the price of broiler chickens
in violation of United States antitrust laws.

The complaints on behalf of the putative classes of indirect
purchasers also include causes of action under various state unfair
competition laws, consumer protection laws, and unjust enrichment
common laws.  The complaints also allege that defendants
"manipulated and artificially inflated a widely used Broiler price
index, the Georgia Dock." It is further alleged that the defendants
concealed this conduct from the plaintiffs and the members of the
putative classes.  The plaintiffs are seeking treble damages,
injunctive relief, pre- and post-judgment interest, costs, and
attorneys' fees on behalf of the putative classes.

The court issued a ruling on November 20, 2017 denying all
defendants' motions to dismiss.

The Company said, "Decisions on class certification and summary
judgment motions likely to be filed by defendants are not expected
before the latter part of calendar year 2020 under the scheduling
order currently governing the case.  Scheduling for trial, if
necessary, will occur after rulings on class certification and any
summary judgment motions.  Certain putative class members have
opted out of this matter and are proceeding separately, and others
may do so in the future."

Tyson Foods is one of the world's largest food companies.


UFC: Seeks Dismissal of Antitrust Class Action
----------------------------------------------
Dmitriy Shakhnevich, writing for MMA News, reports that several
years ago, in December of 2014, the UFC was sued by numerous former
fighters under their banner. The basis of the lawsuit, which
ultimately named such notables as Cung Le, Jon Fitch and Nate
Quarry as plaintiffs, was centered around the UFC's allegedly
anti-competitive business model as it relates to the MMA industry.
Basically, the plaintiffs alleged that the UFC is simply
monopolizing the entire sport and thus, limiting opportunities for
fighters. The law doesn't like when companies seek to dominate an
industry by restricting where the workforce could go to make money.
The UFC's defense is simple: "we're just better than everyone else.
Others had the money at various points in history, but we still won
and will continue to win."

The UFC filed a Summary Judgment Motion, seeking to dismiss the
lawsuit. Such a motion requires that the party making the motion
show the following: (1) there are no facts in dispute; and (2) the
law is clear that the moving party should win. Usually, the first
prong is the hardest one to show. Naturally, when there are two
opposing sides to a lawsuit, the facts are usually in dispute. Such
is the case here.

The UFC claimed that it won and continues to win because it pays
fighters more, has better marketing/branding techniques and runs
its company the best. Thus, fighters don't want to go elsewhere and
other promotions die. The plaintiffs will likely claim that
fighters cannot go anywhere else because the UFC buys other
companies to shut them down, stages other events for free at the
same time as rival promotions and contractually limits fighters in
a way that reduces their worth in the marketplace. See how the
facts can always be argued?

This Summary Judgment Motion and the case in general will turn on
how many pieces of documentary and testimonial evidence can speak
to the above arguments. If there are indications that the evidence
illustrates certain facts in dispute, the Motion should be denied.

One thing is for sure: if the UFC has this case dismissed, then the
fight for some of these athletes outside of the Octagon may be as
hard as it is/was inside of it. [GN]


UNIFUND CCR: Partial Denial of Certification in FDCPA Suit Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District, Ashtabula County,
affirmed the District Court's judgment denying in part Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned UNIFUND CCR
PARTNERS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. LISA R. PIASER,
Defendant-Appellant, No. 2016-A-0076 (Ohio App.).

Appellant, Lisa R. Piaser, appeals the judgment of the Ashtabula
County Court of Common Pleas in favor of appellee, Unifund CCR
Partners, et al., denying in part her motion for class
certification on her counterclaim for violations of the federal
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).

Unifund filed a complaint against Ms. Piaser in the Ashtabula
County Municipal Court to collect an alleged credit card debt. The
account was opened in April 2000, and the last payment she made was
on July 5, 2000, leaving a balance of $267. Unifund alleged that
Providian National Bank was the original creditor and that Unifund
purchased the account from Providian.

In her first amended answer and counterclaim, Ms. Piaser denied the
material allegations of the complaint. She also asserted individual
and class counterclaims, alleging Unifund violated the FDCPA, and
the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (CSPA) and committed various
common law torts.

Ms. Piaser filed a motion seeking to certify her counterclaims as a
class action and Unifund filed a brief in opposition. Despite the
court's earlier ruling that Unifund filed its claim against Ms.
Piaser within the statute of limitations, Ms. Piaser sought to
certify the Time-Bar Class, alleging that Unifund sued her and
other class members outside the statute of limitations. She also
asked the court to certify another class, which she called the
Incompetence Class, alleging that Unifund sued her and others
without a valid statutory assignment of the debt.

The trial court entered judgment on Ms. Piaser's motion to certify.
The court: (1) denied Ms. Piaser's motion to reconsider the court's
June 28, 2013 judgment finding that Unifund timely filed its suit
within the 15-year limitations period; (2) denied her motion to
certify the Time-Bar Class; and (3) granted her motion to certify
the Incompetence Class, but only as to her claim under the FDCPA,
not as to her claim under the CSPA. Thus, the class action would
proceed only as to the Incompetence Class on Ms. Piaser's claim for
a violation of the FDCPA.

Ms. Piaser appeals: (1) the trial court's 2013 judgment finding the
15-year statute of limitations applied; (2) the 2014 judgment
denying her motion to compel discovery regarding the Time-Bar
Class; and (3) that part of the 2016 judgment denying her motion
for reconsideration of the court's 2013 judgment applying the
15-year statute. She asserts two assignments of error. For her
first, she alleges:

The trial court erred to the prejudice of defendant-appellant in
finding that the Time-Bar Class failed the class certification
requirement that the named representative must be a member of the
class.

For her second assigned error, Ms. Piaser alleges: The trial court
abused its discretion in overruling defendant-appellant's motion to
compel discovery of information relevant to the court's inquiry of
defendant-appellant's motion for class certification.

This assigned error refers to the court's 2013 judgment denying Ms.
Piaser's motion for additional discovery regarding the Time-Bar
Class. However, because this judgment is not a final order, this
assignment of error lacks merit. In any event, Ms. Piaser concedes
that Unifund produced enough discovery materials to support her
motion to certify the Time-Bar Class. Moreover, she does not
specify what additional information she needed or how not having it
would prejudice her.

Unifund asserts three cross-assignments of error. They contend:

   -- The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms.
Piaser's motion to certify a time-bar class because Ms. Piaser's
claims are not common to or typical of the purported class claim.

   -- The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms.
Piaser's motion to certify a time-bar class because Ms. Piaser did
not satisfy Civ.R. 23(B)(2).

   -- The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms.
Piaser's motion to certify a time-bar class because Ms. Piaser did
not satisfy Civ.R 23(B)(3).

In light of the Ohio App.'s disposition of Ms. Piaser's first
assignment of error, Unifund's cross assignments of error are
moot.

The assignments of error and cross-assignments of error are
overruled. It is the order and judgment of this court that the
judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas is
affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Ohio App.'s July 30, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yb6pcw2j from Leagle.com.

Alan H. Abes, and Elizabeth M. Shaffer, Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP (For
Plaintiffs-Appellees).

Robert S. Belovich, and Anand N. Misra , The Misra Law Firm, L.L.C.
(For Defendant-Appellant).


UNITED STATES: Campbell County Joins PILT Program Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
WNE reports that Campbell County will join a class-action lawsuit
against the federal government that alleges underfunding of the
Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) program in 2015, 2016 and 2017.

PILT are federal payments made to local governments that help
offset losses in property taxes due to non-taxable federal lands in
their boundaries. In fiscal year 2018, Campbell County received
$773,973 in PILT.

In June 2017, Kane County, Utah, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims. The class action alleges the federal government
has underpaid counties' PILT for fiscal years 2015-2017. Since
then, hundreds of counties have joined the lawsuit.

Campbell County Deputy Attorney Carol Seeger --
cseeger@seegerweiss.com -- said if the suit is successful, the
county stands to get about $25,000 in PILT.

"This is an opportunity to get $25,000 you may not have gotten,"
said County Administrative Director Robert Palmer.

With a class action lawsuit, the settlement already has been agreed
upon, Ms. Seeger said, and every participating county "is going to
be subject to whatever they feel your percentage would've been."

While the county won't have a seat at the table, it won't cost the
commissioners to participate.

"Is there any risk to being a part of this at all?" asked
Commissioner Clark Kissack.

"Unless you want to initiate a lawsuit yourself, there's no problem
with joining," Ms. Seeger said.

"Which we wouldn't do for $25,000," said Commission Chairman
Mark Christensen. "It'd cost us more than we'd get."

Campbell County joins 11 other Wyoming counties, including
Sheridan, Converse and Crook counties, in the lawsuit. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Judge Issues Ruling on Attorney Fees Issue
---------------------------------------------------------
Scott Flaherty, writing for The American Lawyer, reports that a
lateral move to a firm with roots in a more expensive city doesn't
mean a judge is going to award that lawyer a bump in attorney fees
in litigation, even if some of the work then gets done in that
pricier hub, a recent court ruling shows.

Ruling on a fee request by Arent Fox after a $130,000 settlement
with the U.S. government on behalf of a group of Florida
landowners, U.S. Court of Federal Claims Judge Patricia
Campbell-Smith held that the firm deserves attorney fees based on
the St. Louis market rates the lead attorney initially charged
while working out of St. Louis-based Lathrop Gage's headquarters.
She rejected the argument that he should earn the higher rates
charged by Washington, D.C.-based Arent Fox after the lawyer
switched to that firm's St. Louis office. Arent Fox had sought more
than $1.1 million in fees plus more than $14,000 in costs.

As the judge explained in her opinion, the fee issue arose in a
"rails to trails" lawsuit that dates back to 2009.

A team from Lathrop Gage, led by Mark "Thor" Hearne II, served as
plaintiffs lawyers in the suit, representing a group of Florida
landholders whose property included railway tracks formerly used by
CSX Transportation Inc. CSX stopped using the railroad lines in
2004, and soon after, a federal agency proposed to set aside a
strip of land near the tracks for recreational trails. The
landowners alleged that amounted to an unlawful seizure of their
land and sought compensation, according to court documents.

Shortly after the suit was filed, Mr. Hearne and his team moved to
the Arent Fox, still working primarily from that firm's
St. Louis outpost. The litigation started as a putative class
action, but was winnowed down to a smaller case with some 14
landholder plaintiffs. Following a summary judgment ruling in the
government's favor, the case was narrowed further to claims from
three plaintiffs. In 2013, the two sides struck the $130,000
settlement.

Since then, they've been litigating Arent Fox's potential fees in
light of a settlement in favor of its clients. The firm has argued
for an award based on current market rates in Washington, D.C.,
while the government has urged lower St. Louis rates, adjusted to
take account of the years in which the work was actually
performed.

Judge Campbell-Smith awarded $14,362 in costs to Arent Fox. But her
ruling, made public on Aug. 1, faults the firm's fee request for
$1.1 million in part because it relied on the legal market rates in
Washington, D.C. -- where the firm is based and the federal claims
litigation took place.

Instead, the judge ruled, most of the lawyers' work happened in St.
Louis, and since there's a significant difference between billing
rates in Washington and St. Louis, the St. Louis rates should win
out. To illustrate the differences in billing rates between the two
cities, Campbell-Smith pointed to the proposed hourly rate for the
lead partner in the case, Mr. Hearne. Arent Fox sought an hourly
rate of $826 for Mr. Hearne, while the likely St. Louis market rate
would be more like $504 per hour for a partner with Mr. Hearne's
amount of experience, the judge wrote.

Judge Campbell-Smith detailed several reductions she would impose
when figuring out what to award Arent Fox in the case, according to
her decision. Still, she didn't set a final fee award, concluding
that the firm and the government needed to provide more information
about the average St. Louis market rates for lawyers at different
seniority levels, as laid out in billing rate surveys conducted by
the publication "Missouri Lawyers Weekly."

The Federal Claims judge also sided with the government on another
key issue related to Arent Fox's fee request -- whether the award
should be based on current or historical market rates for legal
services.

"The attorney billing rates shall be calculated based on the
average hourly rates as reflected in the 'Missouri Lawyers Weekly'
surveys, and shall be awarded historically," Judge Campbell-Smith
wrote. [GN]


UNITYPOINT HEALTH: Class Action Mulled Over 2nd Data Breach
-----------------------------------------------------------
David Wahlberg, writing for Wisconsin State Journal, reports that
an attorney who filed a class-action lawsuit against UnityPoint
Health about a data breach discovered earlier this year is
investigating additional action regarding a second security
incident announced by the health system.

In the latest problem, UnityPoint Health notified 1.4 million
patients, including 76,000 in Wisconsin, that their names,
addresses and medical information -- and, for some, driver's
license, Social Security and payment card or bank account numbers
-- may have been compromised.

The Iowa-based provider, which includes UnityPoint Health-Meriter
in Madison, said emails disguised to appear like they came from an
executive with the organization tricked employees into providing
sign-in information, giving the attackers access to their accounts
from March 14 to April 3.

UnityPoint Health said it discovered the problem May 31. The health
system said it would offer free credit monitoring services for a
year to people whose driver's license or Social Security number was
involved.

In April, UnityPoint Health notified 16,400 patients of a separate
phishing attack, discovered in February and potentially involving
data going back to November.

A class-action lawsuit filed in May in U.S. District Court in
Madison named two patients affected by the first breach. It alleges
UnityPoint Health delayed reporting the problem and falsely told
patients no Social Security numbers were involved.

One of the patients, Yvonne Mart Fox, of Middleton, said in the
lawsuit that she noticed an increase in robocalls and spam emails
in early 2018.

She said she had experienced daily anger and sleep disruption as a
result of the data breach, which makes it "feel like I'm having
surgery in public."

Robert Teel, the Seattle attorney who filed the lawsuit, said on
Aug. 6 that he is investigating the new breach. Fox and Grant
Nesheim, of Mazomanie, the other patient named in the lawsuit, also
received notice about the latest incident, Mr. Teel said.

UnityPoint Health said it has reset passwords for compromised
accounts, conducted mandatory employee training about recognizing
phishing emails and implemented multi-factor authentication in
accessing systems, in an effort to prevent similar situations.

Patients who have questions or concerns can call 888-266-9285.
[GN]


VENETIAN CASINO: Court OKs M. Yousif to File 4th Amended Complaint
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MUSTAFA YOUSIF and SHARONE WALKER on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE
VENETIAN CASINO RESORT, LLC; LAS VEGAS SANDS, CORP. and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:16-cv-02941-RFB-NJK
(D. Nev.), Judge Richard F. Boulware, II of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Nevada has entered the parties' stipulated
order allowing the Plaintiffs to file with the Court, without
further motion, their Proposed Fourth Amended Complaint.

At the hearing held on May 24, 2018, the Court granted in part and
denied in part the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second
Amended Complaint and instructed the Plaintiffs to file a Third
Amended Complaint.  On May 29, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed their
Third Amended Complaint; on June 12, 2018, the Defendants filed
their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint.

After reviewing and meeting and conferring with the Defendants
regarding the same, the Plaintiffs now seek to amend their
complaint for a fourth time by further narrowing the Plaintiffs'
claims and removing allegations that are not supported by the
evidence.

By agreeing to the Plaintiffs filing the Proposed Fourth Amended
Complaint, the Defendants are not agreeing to the merits of any
claim, the factual allegations in the Fourth Amended Complaint, or
waiving any defenses they may assert.

The Parties further stipulated and agreed that the Defendants have
21 days from the date the Fourth Amended Complaint is filed to
respond accordingly.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/hFxPDm from Leagle.com.

Mustafa Yousif & Sharone Walker, Plaintiffs, represented by Joshua
D. Buck -- josh@thiermanbuck.com -- Thierman Buck, LLP, Leah Lin
Jones , Thierman Buck, LLP & Mark R. Thierman , Thierman Buck,
LLP.

The Venetian Casino Resort, LLC & Las Vegas Sands, Corp.,
Defendants, represented by Anthony L. Martin --
anthony.martin@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart, P.C., Patrick F. Hulla -- patrick.hulla@ogletree.com --
Ogletree Deakins, pro hac vice & Dana B. Salmonson --
dana.salmonson@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak &
Stewart, P.C..


VIRTU FINANCIAL: Faces 2nd Amended Complaint over KCG Acquisition
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Virtu Financial, Inc. is defending itself against a second amended
class action complaint related to its acquisition of KCG Holdings,
Inc. ("KCG"), according to Virtu Financial's Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

The Company said, "In connection with the Acquisition of KCG, a
previously filed complaint, which was initially captioned Greenway
v. KCG Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No. 2017-421-JTL and filed on
behalf of a putative class in Delaware Chancery Court, was
recaptioned Chester County Employees' Retirement Fund v. KCG
Holdings, Inc., et al., amended and refiled on February 14, 2018 to
include claims for the alleged breach of fiduciary duties against
former KCG board members, claims against each of Virtu and
Jefferies for allegedly aiding and abetting the KCG board members'
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and a claim against Virtu and
Jefferies for alleged civil conspiracy.  The amended complaint was
again amended on July 16, 2018 with the filing of the Verified
Second Amended Class Action Complaint (the "Second Amended
Complaint") to include additional factual allegations.  No amount
of damages is stated in the Second Amended Complaint, against which
Virtu intends to defend vigorously."

Virtu Financial, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, provides
market making and liquidity services through its proprietary,
multi-asset, and multi-currency technology platform to the
financial markets worldwide.  The Company was founded in 2008 and
is headquartered in New York, New York.


VISTRA ENERGY: Still Defends Consolidated Gas Index Pricing Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Vistra Energy Corp. continues to face a consolidated lawsuit in
Nevada related to alleged gas index pricing manipulation, according
to the Company's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018.

The Company, through its subsidiaries, and other energy companies
are named as defendants in several lawsuits claiming damages
resulting from alleged price manipulation through false reporting
of natural gas prices to various index publications, wash trading
and churn trading from 2000-2002.  The cases allege that the
defendants engaged in an antitrust conspiracy to inflate natural
gas prices in three states (Kansas, Missouri and Wisconsin) during
the relevant time period and seek damages under the respective
state antitrust statutes.

Four of the cases are putative class actions and one case,
Reorganized FLI (nka J.P. Morgan Trust Co., National Assn.) v.
Oneok Inc., et al., is an individual action on behalf of Farmland
Industries, Inc. (Farmland), with Farmland seeking full
consideration damages (i.e., the full amount it paid for natural
gas purchases during the relevant timeframe).  The cases are
consolidated in a multi-district litigation proceeding pending in
the U.S. District Court for Nevada.

In March 2017, the court denied the class plaintiffs' motions to
certify class actions in each of the states, which decision now is
on an interlocutory appeal to U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit (Ninth Circuit Court); the appeal is fully briefed and was
argued in July 2018.

As for the Farmland matter, in March 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court
reversed a summary judgment in favor of the defendants and it
shortly will be remanded for further discovery and other pretrial
proceedings.

The Company said, "While we cannot predict the outcome of these
legal proceedings, or estimate a range of costs, they could have a
material impact on our results of operations, liquidity or
financial condition."

Vistra Energy Corp. is a Texas-based energy company focused on the
competitive energy and power generation markets.



VOYA FINANCIAL: Appeal from Dismissal of Patrico Suit Underway
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff's appeal from the dismissal of the putative class
action styled Patrico v. Voya Financial, Inc., et al (USDC SDNY,
No. 1:16-cv-07070) (filed September 9, 2016) remains pending in the
U.S Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, according to Voya
Financial's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June
30, 2018.

The putative class action in which plaintiff, a participant in a
401(k) Plan, seeks to represent a class of plans "for which Voya or
its subsidiaries provide recordkeeping, investment management or
investment advisory services and for which Financial Engines
provides investment advice to plan participants."

Plaintiff alleges that the Company and its affiliates have violated
ERISA by charging unreasonable fees in connection with in-plan
investment advice provided in conjunction with Financial Engines, a
third-party investment adviser.  Plaintiff seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief, disgorgement of profits, damages and attorney's
fees.

The Company denies the allegations, which it believes are without
merit, and intends to defend the case vigorously.  On June 20,
2017, the district court granted the Company's motion to dismiss,
but permitted the plaintiff to file an amended complaint.  The
plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a first amended
complaint, the Company opposed that motion, and on March 13, 2018,
the district court denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to file
an amended complaint and closed the case.

Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal to the U.S Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit on April 11, 2018.

Voya Financial, Inc. operates as a retirement, investment, and
insurance company in the United States. It operates through
Retirement, Investment Management, Individual Life, and Employee
Benefits segments. The company is based in New York.


VOYA FINANCIAL: Bid to Dismiss "Cutler" COI Lawsuit Underway
------------------------------------------------------------
Voya Financial, Inc.'s motion to dismiss the cost-of-insurance
litigation styled Cutler v. Voya Financial, Inc. and ReliaStar Life
Insurance Company (USDC S.D.  Florida, No. 1:18-cv-20723) (filed
February 23, 2018) remains pending, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on
August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The Company said, "Industry wide, life insurers continue to be
exposed to class action litigation related to the cost of insurance
rates and periodic deductions from cash value.  Common allegations
include that insurance companies have breached the terms of their
universal life insurance policies by establishing or increasing the
cost of insurance rates using cost factors not, permitted by the
contract or that thereby unjustly enriching themselves.  This
litigation is generally known as cost of insurance litigation.

"Such litigation includes Cutler v. Voya Financial, Inc. and
ReliaStar Life Insurance Company (USDC S.D.  Florida, No.
1:18-cv-20723) (filed February 23, 2018), in which the plaintiff
alleges that his insurance policy only permitted the Company to
rely upon his expected future mortality experience to establish and
increase his cost of insurance, but the Company instead relied upon
other, non-disclosed factors to do so."

On April 16, 2018, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the Cutler
complaint in its entirety against Voya Financial and partially
against ReliaStar.  The Plaintiff has opposed the Company's
motion.

Voya Financial, Inc. operates as a retirement, investment, and
insurance company in the United States. It operates through
Retirement, Investment Management, Individual Life, and Employee
Benefits segments. The company is based in New York.


VOYA FINANCIAL: Bid to Dismiss Amended "Goetz" Complaint Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
A motion to drop the amended complaint in the putative class action
styled Goetz v. Voya Financial and Voya Retirement Insurance and
Annuity Company (USDC District of Delaware, No. 1:17-cv-1289)
(filed September 8, 2017) remains pending, according to Voya
Financial, Inc.'s Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018.

The putative class action in which plaintiff, a participant in a
401(k) plan, seeks to represent other participants in the plan as
well as a class of similarly situated plans that "contract with
[Voya] for recordkeeping and other services."

Plaintiff alleges that "Voya" breached its fiduciary duty to the
plan and other plan participants by charging unreasonable and
excessive recordkeeping fees, and that "Voya" distributed
materially false and misleading 404a-5 administrative and fund fee
disclosures to conceal its excessive fees.  The Company denies the
allegations, which it believes are without merit, and intends to
defend the case vigorously.

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on January 4, 2018, and the
Company filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on February
8, 2018. No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC
report.

Voya Financial, Inc. operates as a retirement, investment, and
insurance company in the United States. It operates through
Retirement, Investment Management, Individual Life, and Employee
Benefits segments. The company is based in New York.


VOYA FINANCIAL: Bid to Dismiss Dezelan Amended Complaint Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A motion to dismiss a first amended complaint in the putative class
actions styled Dezelan v. Voya Retirement Insurance and Annuity
Company (USDC District of Connecticut, No. 3:16-cv-1251) (filed
July 26, 2016) remains pending, according to Voya Financial, Inc.'s
Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on
August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The putative class action in which plaintiff, a participant in a
403(b) Plan, seeks to represent a class of plans whose assets are
invested in Voya Retirement Insurance and Annuity Company ("VRIAC")
"Group Annuity Contract Stable Value Funds."

Plaintiff alleges that VRIAC has violated the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") by charging unreasonable fees
and setting its own compensation in connection with stable value
products.  Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief,
disgorgement of profits, damages and attorney's fees.  The Company
denies the allegations, which it believes are without merit, and
intends to defend the case vigorously.

On July 19, 2017, the district court granted the Company's motion
to dismiss, but permitted the plaintiff to file an amended
complaint.  The plaintiff has filed a first amended complaint, and
the Company moved to dismiss that complaint on September 18, 2017.

Voya Financial, Inc. operates as a retirement, investment, and
insurance company in the United States. It operates through
Retirement, Investment Management, Individual Life, and Employee
Benefits segments. The company is based in New York.


VOYA FINANCIAL: Bid to Trim Barnes Complaint Pending
----------------------------------------------------
Voya Financial, Inc.'s move for a partial dismissal of the
cost-of-insurance putative class action styled Barnes v. Security
Life of Denver (USDC Colorado, No. 1:18-cv-00718) (filed March 27,
2018) remains pending, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018,
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The plaintiff in this putative class action alleges that his
insurance policy only permitted the Company to rely upon his
expected future mortality experience to establish and increase his
cost of insurance, but the Company instead relied upon other,
non-disclosed factors to do so.

The Company said it denies the allegations in the complaint,
believes both to be without merit, and intends to defend the case
vigorously.

On May 15, 2018, the Company moved for a partial dismissal of the
Barnes complaint.  The Plaintiff in the action has opposed the
Company's motion.

Voya Financial, Inc. operates as a retirement, investment, and
insurance company in the United States. It operates through
Retirement, Investment Management, Individual Life, and Employee
Benefits segments. The company is based in New York.


WASATCH ADVANTAGE: Calif. Court Certifies Tenant Class
------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in
the case captioned UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel. DENIKA TERRY
and ROY HUSKEY III, and each of them for themselves individually,
and for all other persons similarly situated and on behalf of the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiffs/Relators, v. WASATCH ADVANTAGE
GROUP, LLC, WASATCH PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC., WASATCH POOL
HOLDINGS, LLC, CHESAPEAKE COMMONS HOLDINGS, LLC, LOGAN PARK
APARTMENTS, LLC; LOGAN PARK APARTMENTS, LP, Defendants, No.
2:15-cv-00799 KJM DB (E.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs are tenants who receive rental assistance through
the federally subsidized Housing Choice Voucher Program commonly
known as Section 8.  They claim the defendant lessors improperly
charged the plaintiffs, as well as the putative class members they
seek to represent, for washer and dryer rentals, renter's insurance
and covered parking. The Plaintiffs argue these services constitute
impermissible rent under the Section 8 contracts and regulations,
and the defendants therefore violated the Section 8 contracts and
submitted false claims for reimbursement under the federal
program.

Plaintiffs seek certification of two classes. First, plaintiffs
seek certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class for damages or
restitution defined as:

     All persons who, in the time period starting four years prior
to the date of filing this Complaint through the final resolution
of this matter, (1) have been tenants at any of Defendants'
California properties; (2) have participated in the Section 8
Housing Choice Voucher Program in connection with their tenancies
at the California properties; and (3) have paid additional charges
set forth in Additional Services Agreements in excess of their
individual portions of the contract set forth in the HAP
Contracts.

Second, the plaintiffs seek certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class
for declaratory and injunctive relief defined as:

     All persons who: (1) are or will become tenants at any of
Defendants' California properties; (2) participate or will
participate in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program in
connection with their tenancies at the California properties; and
(3) pay or will pay additional charges set forth in Additional
Services Agreements in excess of their individual portions of the
contract rent set forth in the HAP Contracts.

The Plaintiffs seek to certify these classes as to plaintiffs'
California state law claims for breach of contract, violation of
the Consumer Legal Remedies Act and violation of the Unfair
Competition Law.  

Numerosity

The Plaintiffs contend they have satisfied the numerosity
requirement of Rule 23(a).  
The Defendants do not disagree.

Under the numerosity requirement, a class must be so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable. This requirement is
presumptively satisfied when there are at least forty members.  

The Plaintiffs have indicated an inability to compile a class list
despite multiple discovery requests to the defendants. According to
the plaintiffs, opposing counsel has replied that the plaintiffs'
counsel should compile such a class list ourselves based on the
document production despite deposition testimony that certain
Section 8 tenant files could not be located, and thus were not
provided.

The Plaintiffs have therefore estimated class size until the matter
maybe pressed during merits discovery.

Regardless, the plaintiffs assert the class size exceeds 150
members "in four Sacramento properties alone" and the court finds
the evidence provided supports this assertion. The Plaintiffs have
satisfied the numerosity requirement.

Typicality

The Plaintiffs contend the HAP Contracts and other documents
attached to the Terry and Huskey declarations are standard form HAP
contracts and standard forms used by defendants at all of their
California properties.

For the Rule 23(b)(3) class, defendants assert named plaintiffs'
claims are not typical of the class because the named plaintiffs
are subject to unique defenses that other putative class members
currently living in Wasatch properties would not be subject to.

For Terry, this would include the affirmative defense of res
judicata because she was evicted in a judicial proceeding for
failure to pay rent and perjury at her deposition. For Huskey,
unique defenses would include his eviction for repeated racist
conduct and his voluntarily signing up for additional service or
appliances.

The court finds the claims of the named plaintiffs typical of the
claims and defenses of the class. Here, the plaintiffs claim
defendants treated additional charges as rent in violation of state
law and contrary to standard form contracts between defendants and
their Section 8 tenants. The contracts for Terry, Huskey and the
other tenants are substantially identical. The Defendants' use of
standard forms for these contracts supports typicality. The
Defendants' treatment of Terry's and Huskey's additional charges
does not appear to differ from the defendants' treatment of
additional charges for other potential class members.   

Here, there is no concern about variation in the named plaintiffs'
damages from class members' damages because it is sufficient for
typicality if the plaintiff endured a course of conduct directed
against the class.

The Defendants' argument that Terry's eviction operates as res
judicata here also is unavailing because an unlawful detainer
action would not preclude the plaintiffs' putative class action
claims. The Plaintiffs' putative class action claims do not involve
the right of possession or any claims related to title.

Additionally, Huskey's voluntary signing up for additional services
would not and did not change how the defendants handled any past
due amounts in relation to a tenant's rent obligations, default,
and notices to perform or quit. Nor would the defendants' basis for
their 3 Day Notice to Perform or Quit serve as a unique defense
that will become the focus of the litigation over the defendants'
alleged treatment of additional charges as rent. These legally
irrelevant differences, along with the legally irrelevant basis for
Huskey's eviction, do not render Huskey's or Terry's claims
atypical.

Adequacy

The Plaintiffs contend putative class members have suffered the
same injuries from the defendants' unlawful actions as named
plaintiffs: being charged more rent than allowed under federal law
and the HAP Contracts.

Although the defendants do not expressly contend the named
plaintiffs are not adequate to represent the class, the defendants
do refer to deposition testimony in which Terry admits she did not
read the complaint in this case and believed the class action
complaint involved the same claims as her state habitability
lawsuit.

But supplemental deposition transcripts provided by the plaintiffs
provide the full context of Terry's understanding of her position
as a class representative. For instance, Terry understood she was
not the only person that will possibly be going through the things
that she is going through.

Terry also clearly stated an understanding of the lawsuit involving
Section 8, things like insurance. Terry noted she paid for
insurance, for the washers, dryers, things of that nature that was
required that had nothing to do with Section 8 that they were
charging us for.

The Plaintiffs have satisfied the adequacy requirement.

Commonality and Predominance

For their breach of contract claim, the plaintiffs contend the core
issue common to the class is whether the side payments for
additional charges constitute additional rent prohibited under the
HAP Contracts and leases.

For their CLRA claim, the plaintiffs contend defendants violated
the statute because they were prohibited by law from charging
additional rent beyond the contract rent and therefore
misrepresented an obligation to tenants prohibited by law.

For their UCL claim, the plaintiffs assert common issues
predominate in part because the UCL claims here are based on the
defendants' unlawful business act or practice of charging and
collecting additional side payments from Section 8 tenants, a
policy that violates federal law prohibiting an owner from charging
or accepting rent beyond the contract rent.

To prevail on a motion to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), the
party seeking certification must show: (1) that the existence of
individual injury resulting from the alleged violation is capable
of proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class
rather than individual to its members; and (2) that the damages
resulting from that injury [are] measurable on a class-wide basis
through use of a common methodology.

Here, the plaintiffs have established common questions of law that
apply to all class members' claims. The Plaintiffs' claims all
involve the resolution of whether the defendants' additional
charges set forth in Additional Services Agreements violated the
defendants' HAP Contract provisions with Section 8 tenants or
federal law. Resolving this issue would resolve the plaintiffs'
breach of contract claim, CLRA claim, UCL claim under any prong,
and even the non-class False Claims Act claim. The Defendants have
not contested the plaintiffs' substantial evidence that the
defendants used the same standard forms for the various agreements
that apply to all potential class members.

California courts often find predominance satisfied in CLRA cases
because causation, on a class-wide basis, may be established by
materiality, meaning that if the trial court finds that material
misrepresentations have been made to the entire class, an inference
of reliance arises as to that class.  Here, the plaintiffs allege
the misrepresentations occurred in the standard form agreements and
other documents, including Three-Day Notices to Perform Financial
Covenant of Lease or Quit, misrepresenting to class members their
obligation to pay additional charges prohibited by federal law. All
evidence before the court indicates all members of the plaintiffs'
proposed class received these same standard forms, including
deposition testimony from defendants' witnesses.  

No issues pertaining to commonality preclude class certification of
the plaintiffs' UCL claim. To the extent the plaintiffs' claims
rely on the UCL's unlawful prong, the court has already addressed
common issues above because the breach of contract claim overlaps
with asserted federal law violations and the defendants' violating
the CLRA would satisfy the unlawful prong. The Plaintiffs' False
Claims Act claim involves the same issue, namely conduct violating
the HAP Contract provisions prohibiting defendants from charging
additional rent above the contract rent.  

The Defendants' contentions about materiality and reliance related
to the CLRA are unavailing as well when applied to the plaintiffs'
UCL claims. Claims under the fraudulent and unfair prongs of the
UCL statute require a plaintiff to satisfy a modest burden of
proof: the representative plaintiff must show that members of the
public are likely to be deceived by the practice. Courts assess
likelihood of deception under a reasonable consumer standard. All
evidence currently before the court indicates the named plaintiffs,
class members and the defendants all expected the tenant class
members to pay their additional charges or face eviction. No
evidence suggests class members believed they were not obligated to
pay additional charges, including mandatory additional charges or
optional charges once the tenant chose those options.

Superiority: Rule 23(b)(3) Class

The Plaintiffs contend a class action suit is superior to other
methods here in part because the individual damages are really
small and would be outweighed by the expense and burden of separate
lawsuits that cannot be sustained by low-income individuals
receiving rent subsidies under Section 8.

The Defendants contest the plaintiffs' claims that the litigation
would devolve into a series of individualized mini-trials and would
involve presentation of historic market data, comparable property
data, what was considered the locality, vacancy rates, 30 day
notice rates, and other evidence that would be daunting for even
the most enthusiastic juror.

Rule 23(b)(3) provides that superiority is determined by
considering, for example,
(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions;(B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun
by or against class members;(C) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; and(D) the likely difficulties in managing the class
action.

Here, the individual damages are quite low. Additionally, putative
class members, as members of the Section 8 program, are low-income
tenants who likely lack the resources to finance and direct
individual suits. This factor favors certification.

The second factor, the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class, is meant to assure judicial economy and reduce the
possibility of multiple lawsuits.  Here, plaintiffs' counsel are
not aware of any other related litigation. Defendants do not assert
any concerns about related litigation. This factor favors
certification.

The third factor is the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation in this forum. The putative Rule
23(b)(3) class comprises only those current and former tenants
located in California, coinciding with California state law claims.
This factor favors certification.

The fourth factor weighs the likely difficulties in managing the
class action. As discussed previously, defendants' concerns about
individualized mini-trials in essence repeat their concerns about
individualized damages, not individual determinations of liability.
As recognized by other federal courts, the fourth factor overlaps
with the court's commonality and typicality analysis.

Here, the court's commonality and typicality analyses identify no
difficulties in managing the class action that would cause this
factor to weigh against certification.

The court finds the Rule 23(b)(3) class satisfies the superiority
requirement.

Ascertainability

The Defendants contend the class definition is so overbroad it
violates the ascertainability requirement of a certifiable class.
The Plaintiffs contend the defendants ignore the clear, objective
class definition in the proposed TAC and moving papers: Section 8
tenants at the defendants' California properties who have paid
additional charges during a specific time period. Proposed class
members are therefore readily determined from the defendants'
records.

The court finds the plaintiffs' definition satisfies the
ascertainability requirement. The Plaintiffs' proposed class
definition will allow the court to efficiently and objectively
ascertain whether a particular person is a class member based on
the defendants' records. And the defendants' concerns about
additional rent payments as part of the definition is already
resolved by the plaintiffs' change in the definition to additional
charges set forth in Additional Services Agreements.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification as to
the Rule 23(b)(3) class is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 30, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7ammo4z from Leagle.com.

Denika Terry & Roy Huskey, III, Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew
Wolff -- andrew@awolfflaw.com -- Law Office of Andrew Wolff, PC &
Jesse Mica Newmark.

United States of America, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by
Vincente Antonio Tennerelli , United States Attorney's Office.

Wasatch Advantage Group, LLC, a California Limited Liability
Company, Wasatch Property Management, Inc., a California
Corporation, Wasatch Pool Holdings, LLC, a California Limited
Liability Company, Chesapeake Commons Holdings, LLC, a California
Limited Liability Company, Logan Park Apartments, LLC, a California
Limited Liability Company & Logan Park Apartments, LP, a California
Limited Partnership, Defendants, represented by Joseph A. Salazar,
Jr. -- Joe.Salazar@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and
Smith LLP & Ryan James Matthews -- ryan.matthews@lewisbrisbois.com
-- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith.


WILL LIFE: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss S. Fairlie's Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Judge Leonard T. Strand of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Iowa, Cedar Rapids Division, denied the Defendant's
motion to dismiss the case, SUZANNE FAIRLIE and ODIS, WRIGHT,
Plaintiffs, v.  WILL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and  WILL  PREMIER LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. C18-32-LTS (N.D. Iowa).

On March 29, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a purported class action
complaint against the Defendant.  The Plaintiffs contend that they
represent three classes of persons who purchased  will's universal
life insurance policies in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  They
allege that in August 2015,  will  suddenly, unilaterally, and
massively began increasing monthly deductions withdrawn from the
Policies' accounts, falsely stating the increases were permitted by
the terms of the Policies, when in fact the reasons for imposing
the dramatic increases were to: (a) subsidize  will 's cost of
meeting its interest rate guarantees under the Policies; (b) recoup
past losses in violation of the terms of the Policies; and (c)
induce Policy terminations by policyholders.  They contend that
these actions further weakened  will 's policy reserves, resulting
in near-term losses to its bottom line.

The Plaintiffs assert claims for breach of contract, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of
California's unfair competition law, violation of Pennsylvania's
unfair trade practice and consumer protection law, and elder abuse
under California law.  They seek declaratory and injunctive relief
in addition to monetary damages.  

The Defendants responded on June 11, 2018, by filing a pre-answer
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).   will  first argues that Wright's claims must be
dismissed in their entirety, because the pleadings embrace only the
contract terms contained in Fairlie's Policy.  Turning to the
breach of contract claim,  will  argues that the Plaintiffs fail to
state a claim for breach of contract because the Policies do not
limit which factors  will  takes into consideration when setting
the MDRs, as long as  will  does not exceed the maximum guaranteed
MDRs.  Regarding the Plaintiffs' claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing,  will  repeats its
argument that it did not breach the contract, and contends as a
result that it did not injure plaintiffs' rights under the
Policies.   will  contends that Fairlie's claim for a violation of
Pennsylvania's consumer protection laws fails to meet the
requirements under that law.  And finally, it claims that the
Paintiffs' request for declaratory judgment must be dismissed
because it is duplicative of the breach of contract claim.

The Plaintiffs generally resist.

Judge Strand agrees with the court in Feller v.  will  Life Ins.
Co. that the Policies at issue are susceptible to the Plaintiffs'
interpretation.  It is apparent from the face of the contract that
will  cannot consider its past losses in exercising its discretion
to set the MDR, and it is plausible that there are other
limitations on its exercise of discretion.  Because the Plaintiffs
have adequately plead that  will  considered past losses and
factors other than those related to the COI in raising the MDR,
will 's motion to dismiss Count One (breach of contract) is
denied.

The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that
their purpose in purchasing the Policies was to secure affordable
life insurance while taking advantage of the guaranteed interest
rate and avoiding the potential risks of a future economic
downturn.  They have also plausibly alleged that by raising the MDR
for the purpose of inducing shock lapses and by misrepresenting the
reasons for the MDR increase,  will  has acted in bad faith to
undermine the Plaintiffs' rights in the Policies.   will 's
argument that it did not raise the MDR's above the guaranteed
maximum rate misses the point, because technical compliance with
the contract terms does not defeat a claim for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.   will 's argument
that it did not raise the MDRs for the purposes alleged ignores the
directive, at this stage of the case, to accept the factual
allegations of the complaint as true.   will 's motion to dismiss
Count Two (breach of the implied covenant of good faith) is
denied.

In Dixon v. N.W. Mutual, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that
a claim arising from inaccurate statements on an insurance billing
statement -- a deception or misrepresentation under the UTPCPL --
was not foreclosed by the "gist of the action" doctrine because the
misrepresentation was not essential to the breach of contract
claim.  The same reasoning appears to apply to Fairlie's claims, at
least at this stage of the case.  The judge denied  will 's motion
to dismiss Count Three (Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practice and
Consumer Protection Law).

Finally, although there is overlap between the claim for breach of
contract and the request for a declaratory judgment, such that the
claims may be considered duplicative, it is unclear at this point
whether resolution of the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim
would necessarily resolve the parties' prospective rights under the
Policies.  Dismissal of the declaratory judgment action is
premature.  The Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.

For these reasons, Judge Strand denied the Defendant's motion to
dismiss in its entirety.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/CtsXV0 from Leagle.com.

Suzanne Fairlie & Odis Wright, Plaintiffs, represented by Jenna Lee
Green, Hupy and Abraham, Paul V. Sweeny -- paul@sfclasslaw.com --
Squitieri & Fearon, LLP, pro hac vice, Stephen J. Fearon --
stephen@sfclasslaw.com -- Squitieri & Fearon, LLP, pro hac vice &
Thomas William Kyle, Hupy and Abraham.

will  Life Insurance Company &  will  Premier Life Insurance
Company, Defendants, represented by Wilford H. Stone --
wstone@lynchdallas.com -- Lynch Dallas PC, Erin E. Bennett --
erin.bennett@mhllp.com -- McDowell Hetherington LLP, pro hac vice,
Hutson B. Smelley, McDowell Hetherington LLP, pro hac vice, Jarrett
E. Ganer -- jarrett.ganer@mhllp.com -- McDowell Hetherington LLP,
pro hac vice & Thomas F.A. Hetherington --
tom.hetherington@mhllp.com -- McDowell Hetherington LLP, pro hac
vice.


WILLIAMS-SONOMA: W. Rushing's Suit Moved to N.D. Calif.
-------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, WILLIAM RUSHING, Individually and on Behalf of all
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, V. WILLIAMS-SONOMA, INC., et
al., Defendants, Civil Action Nos. 5:18-CV-411-KKC, 5:18-CV-420-KKC
(E.D. Ky.), Judge Karen K. Caldwell of the U.S.District Court for
the Easter District Kentucky, Central Division, Lexington, ordered
that pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(f), transferred
these matters to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California, which is presiding over the underlying litigation of
William Rushing v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., et al.

These matters are before the Court on motions to quash two
subpoenas served by the Defendants in an action pending in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California.

In one action (5:18-cv-411), Lynn A. Rushing is the individual
moving to quash the subpoena.  In the second action (5:18-cv-420),
a company called The Pond Lady, LLC is the movant.  The Pond Lady,
LLC is jointly owned by Lynn and her husband, William Rushing.

William is the Lead Plaintiff in the California case, which is a
putative class action against Williams-Sonoma.  William asserts
that he purchased sheets and pillowcases that Williams-Sonoma
advertised were 600-thread count.  William alleges that the true
thread count of the sheets and pillowcases was less than half the
advertised thread count.  He asserts claims under various
California statutes prohibiting false advertising and unfair
competition.

Neither of the movants in the Court -- Lynn nor The Plant Lady, LLC
-- is a party to the California action.  Nevertheless,
Williams-Sonoma alleges that Lynn and the LLC have the credit card
used to purchase the bedding that forms the basis for William's
suit was purchased on a credit card issued, not to William himself,
but to The Pond Lady, LLC.  Williams-Sonoma further alleges that
the card agreement prohibits the credit card's use for personal,
family, or household purposes.  This, Williams-Sonoma argues,
allows it to assert a defense of "unclean hands" against William's
claims.

Towards that end, Williams-Sonoma served two subpoenas in the
California case.  It subpoenaed Lynn to testify at a deposition and
to produce documents relating to the credit card agreement and any
documents indicating who has authority to use the card.  And it
subpoenaed a representative of The Pond Lady, LLC to testify at a
deposition and produce documents about a variety of topics
including the LLC, any purchases of goods from Williams-Sonoma by
the LLC's members, and the use of the credit card at issue by any
of the LLC's members.

Both Lynn and The Pond Lady, LLC move to quash the subpoenas served
on them.  

Judge Caldwell finds that exceptional circumstances in the case
warrant the transfer of the motions at issue to the California
district court.  The California court has presided over the action
since March 2016.  Discovery has been ongoing since May 2017 and
the district judge and magistrate judge in the California court
have already resolved some discovery disputes between the parties
and will soon resolve issues regarding whether the credit card
agreement at issue should be produced.  This is because
Williams-Sonoma also served a subpoena on Capital One Bank (USA)
N.A., the bank that issued the credit card, commanding the bank to
produce the agreement. William moved to quash that subpoena in the
District of Columbia.  On June 19, 2018, that motion was
transferred under Rule 45(f) to the California district court for
decision.

Further, the court presiding over the underlying litigation is
better suited to resolve the kinds of objections The Pond Lady, LLC
raises to the subpoena.  The LLC raises three objections.  First,
it asserts that William, who owns 80 percent of the LLC, is the
appropriate representative to appear in response to the subpoena
for The Pond Lady, LLC under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
30(b)(6).  Williams-Sonoma deposed William in his individual
capacity on June 11, 2018.  The LLC argues that Williams-Sonoma
should have conducted its 30(b)(6) deposition of Rushing at the
same time.

The LLC also argues that the subpoena should be quashed because the
deadline for class discovery in the California action was June 19,
2018.  Williams-Sonoma argues the depositions do not involve class
certification but instead the merits of William's claims.  The
California court should be permitted to manage the deadlines in the
discovery schedule it established.  Further, it has the knowledge
and expertise to best determine the purpose of the deposition and
the relevance of the requested information.

Finally, the Pond Lady, LLC argues that the subpoena is now
irrelevant to the underlying litigation due to a recent substantive
ruling by the California court.  This is best determined by the
court that issued the ruling.

In deciding whether to transfer a motion to quash to the court that
issued the subpoena, the prime concern should be avoiding burdens
on local nonparties subject to subpoenas.  As to any burden on
William as The Pond Lady, LLC's 30(b)(6) representative, he chose
to file the underlying action in the California district court.
Accordingly, the Judge cannot find that litigating this motion in
California inflicts an undue burden on him or the LLC he owns.

As to Lynn, her motion to quash could likely be resolved without
the physical presence of her or her attorney in California.  Lynn
and the LLC corporate representative must be deposed in Kentucky,
even if this motion is transferred to the California court.  In
addition, the rule provides that attorneys authorized to practice
in this Court may file papers and appear on the motion as an
officer of the issuing court.

Lynn raises privilege issues in her motion to quash that do not
appear to require the fact-intensive inquiry of the underlying case
that the LLC's objections require.  Nevertheless, the subpoena
issued to Lynn may well be rendered moot by the California court's
rulings on the motions filed by Capitol One and the LLC.
Accordingly, the Judge holds it is appropriate to transfer her
motion to quash to the court that will render the decisions on the
other subpoenas at issue.

For all these reasons, Judge Caldwell ordered that, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(f), these matters are
transferred to the U.S. District Court, Northern District of
California, which is presiding over the underlying litigation of
William Rushing v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., et al., Case No.
3:16-cv-1421-WHO.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 17, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/n56E6i from Leagle.com.

William Rushing, Individually & on Behalf of all Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Amber Eck -- ambere@haelaw.com
-- Zeldes Haeggquist & Eck, Audra Petrolle --
apetrolle@roselawgroup.com -- Rose Law Group, PC, George Richard
Baker  -- richard@bakerlawpc.com -- Baker Law PC & Kathryn Honecker
-- khonecker@roselawgroup.com -- Rose Law Group, pc.

William-Sonoma, Inc., doing business as, Pottery Barn,
Williams-Sonoma DTC, Inc., a California corporation &
Williams-Sonoma Advertising, Inc., a California Corporation,
Defendants, represented by Benjamin O. Aigboboh --
baigboboh@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard, Mullin, Richter &
Hampton, LLP, Eric J. DiIulio -- ediiulio@sheppardmullin.com --
Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, P. Craig Cardon --
ccardon@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton
LLP, Robert A. Guite -- rguite@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard
Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, pro hac vice & Tanya Yarbrough Bowman
-- tbowman@fbtlaw.com -- Frost Brown Todd LLC.

Lynn A. Rushing, Movant, represented by Scott T. Rickman --
str@m-p.net -- Morgan & Pottinger, P.S.C..


WILLIS TOWERS: $9.75M Paid for "Sanchez" Litigation Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
Willis Towers Watson Public Limited Company disclosed in its Form
10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on
August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that
the amount of US$9.75 million has been paid as part of the
settlement of the Elma Sanchez, et al., litigation.

On August 6, 2013, three individual plaintiffs filed a putative
class action suit against the California Public Employees'
Retirement System ('CalPERS') in Los Angeles County Superior Court.
On January 10, 2014, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which
added as defendants several members of CalPERS' Board of
Administration and three Legacy Towers Watson entities, Towers
Watson & Co., Towers Perrin, and Tillinghast-Towers Perrin ('Towers
Perrin').

Plaintiffs' claims all relate to a self-funded, non-profit Long
Term Care Program that CalPERS established in 1995 (the 'LTC
Program').  Plaintiffs' claims seek unspecified damages allegedly
resulting from CalPERS' 2012 decision to implement in 2015 and 2016
an 85 percent increase in the premium rates of certain of the long
term care policies it issued between 1995 and 2004 (the '85%
Increase').

The amended complaint alleges claims against CalPERS for breach of
contract and breach of fiduciary duty.  It also includes a single
cause of action against Towers Perrin for professional negligence
relating to actuarial services Towers Perrin provided to CalPERS
relating to the LTC Program between 1995 and 2004.

Plaintiffs principally allege that CalPERS mismanaged the LTC
Program and its investment assets in multiple respects and breached
its contractual and fiduciary duties to plaintiffs and other class
members by impermissibly imposing the 85% Increase to make up for
investment losses.  Plaintiffs also allege that Towers Perrin
recommended inadequate initial premium rates at the outset of the
LTC Program and used unspecified inappropriate assumptions in its
annual valuations for CalPERS.  Plaintiffs claim that Towers
Perrin's allegedly negligent acts and omissions, prior to the end
of its retainer in 2004, contributed to the need for the 85%
Increase.

In May 2014, the court denied the motions to dismiss filed by
CalPERS and Towers Perrin addressed to the sufficiency of the
complaint.  On January 28, 2016, the court granted plaintiffs'
motion for class certification.  The certified class as currently
defined includes those long term care policy holders whose policies
were "subject to" the 85% Increase.  The court thereafter set an
October 2, 2017 trial date.

In May 2016, the case was reassigned to a different judge.  The
court agreed that Towers Perrin may file a motion for summary
judgment which was initially scheduled to be heard on February 3,
2017.  The motion was then fully briefed, and the hearing date was
thereafter moved to March 8, 2017.

On March 1, 2017, Towers Perrin and Plaintiffs participated in a
mediation and reached a settlement in principle.  Pursuant to the
settlement in principle, in exchange for a dismissal of the claims
of all class members and a release of Towers Perrin by all class
members, Towers Perrin would pay a total of US$9.75 million into an
interest-bearing settlement fund, to be used to reimburse class
counsel's costs, and for later distribution to class members as
approved by the Court.  This proposed settlement amount was accrued
during the three months ended March 31, 2017.  At the hearing on
final approval held on January 26, 2018, the Court granted final
approval of the settlement.  Class members who properly objected to
the settlement had standing to appeal by April 9, 2018.  No class
members filed an appeal and, therefore, the judgment is now final.

The settlement amount of US$9.75 million was paid on June 5, 2018.

Willis Towers Watson Public Limited Company operates as an
advisory, broking, and solutions company worldwide. Its Human
Capital and Benefits segment provides actuarial support, plan
design, and administrative services for traditional pension and
retirement savings plans; plan management consulting, broking, and
administration services for health and group benefit programs; and
benefits outsourcing services. The company is based in London,
England.


WILLIS TOWERS: 3 Merger Class Suits in Delaware Consolidated
------------------------------------------------------------
Willis Towers Watson Public Limited Company disclosed in its Form
10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on
August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that
three Merger-Related Securities putative class action complaints in
Delaware has been consolidated.

On February 27, 2018 and March 8, 2018, two purported former
stockholders of Legacy Towers Watson, City of Fort Myers General
Employees' Pension Fund ('Fort Myers') and Alaska
Laborers-Employers Retirement Trust ('Alaska'), filed putative
class action complaints on behalf of a putative class of Legacy
Towers Watson stockholders against the former members of the Legacy
Towers Watson board of directors, Legacy Towers Watson, Legacy
Willis and ValueAct, in the Delaware Court of Chancery, captioned
City of Fort Myers General Employees' Pension Fund v. Towers Watson
& Co., et al., C.A. No. 2018-0132, and Alaska Laborers-Employers
Retirement Trust v. Victor F. Ganzi, et al., C.A. No. 2018-0155,
respectively.

Based on similar allegations as the Eastern District of Virginia
action, the complaints assert claims against the former directors
of Legacy Towers Watson for breach of fiduciary duty and against
Legacy Willis and ValueAct for aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty.

On March 9, 2018, Regents filed a putative class action complaint
on behalf of a putative class of Legacy Towers Watson stockholders
against the Company, Legacy Willis, ValueAct, and Messrs. Haley,
Casserley, and Ubben, in the Delaware Court of Chancery, captioned
The Regents of the University of California v. John J. Haley, et
al., C.A. No. 2018-0166.

Based on similar allegations as the Eastern District of Virginia
action, the complaint asserts claims against Mr. Haley for breach
of fiduciary duty and against all other defendants for aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty.

Also on March 9, 2018, Regents filed a motion for consolidation of
all pending and subsequently filed Delaware Court of Chancery
actions, and for appointment as Lead Plaintiff and for the
appointment of Bernstein as Lead Counsel for the putative class.

On March 29, 2018, Fort Myers and Alaska responded to Regents'
motion and cross-moved for appointment as Co-Lead Plaintiffs and
for the appointment of their counsel, Grant & Eisenhofer P.A. and
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP as Co-Lead Counsel.

On April 2, 2018, the court consolidated the Delaware Court of
Chancery actions and all related actions subsequently filed in or
transferred to the Delaware Court of Chancery.

On June 5, 2018, the court denied Regents' motion for appointment
of Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel and granted Fort Myers' and
Alaska's cross-motion.

On June 20, 2018, Fort Myers and Alaska designated the complaint
previously filed by Alaska (the 'Alaska Complaint') as the
operative complaint in the consolidated action.  The defendants
have not yet responded to the Alaska Complaint.

Willis Towers Watson Public Limited Company operates as an
advisory, broking, and solutions company worldwide. Its Human
Capital and Benefits segment provides actuarial support, plan
design, and administrative services for traditional pension and
retirement savings plans; plan management consulting, broking, and
administration services for health and group benefit programs; and
benefits outsourcing services. The company is based in London,
England.


WILLIS TOWERS: 4th Circuit Asked to Reinstate Proxy Litigation
--------------------------------------------------------------
Willis Towers Watson Public Limited Company disclosed in its Form
10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on
August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that
the Lead Plaintiff in the case entitled, In re Willis Towers Watson
plc Proxy Litigation, has taken an appeal to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit from the dismissal of the case.

On November 21, 2017, a purported former stockholder of Legacy
Towers Watson filed a putative class action complaint on behalf of
a putative class consisting of all Legacy Towers Watson
stockholders as of October 2, 2015 against the Company, Legacy
Towers Watson, Legacy Willis, ValueAct Capital Management
('ValueAct'), and certain current and former directors and officers
of Legacy Towers Watson and Legacy Willis (John Haley, Dominic
Casserley, and Jeffrey Ubben), in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia.

The complaint asserted claims against certain defendants under
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 'Exchange
Act') for allegedly false and misleading statements in the proxy
statement for the Merger; and against other defendants under
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act for alleged "control person"
liability with respect to such allegedly false and misleading
statements.  The complaint further contended that the allegedly
false and misleading statements caused stockholders of Legacy
Towers Watson to accept inadequate Merger consideration.  The
complaint sought damages in an unspecified amount.

On February 20, 2018, the court appointed the Regents of the
University of California ('Regents') as Lead Plaintiff and
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman LLP ('Bernstein') as Lead
Counsel for the putative class, consolidated all subsequently
filed, removed, or transferred actions, and captioned the
consolidated action "In re Willis Towers Watson plc Proxy
Litigation," Master File No. 1:17-cv-1338-AJT-JFA.

On March 9, 2018, Lead Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint.  On
April 13, 2018, the defendants filed motions to dismiss the Amended
Complaint, and, on July 11, 2018, following briefing and argument,
the court granted the motions and dismissed the Amended Complaint
in its entirety.

On July 30, 2018, Lead Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the
court's July 11, 2018 dismissal order to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

Willis Towers Watson Public Limited Company operates as an
advisory, broking, and solutions company worldwide. Its Human
Capital and Benefits segment provides actuarial support, plan
design, and administrative services for traditional pension and
retirement savings plans; plan management consulting, broking, and
administration services for health and group benefit programs; and
benefits outsourcing services. The company is based in London,
England.


WILLIS TOWERS: Stanford Settlement Approval Challenged
------------------------------------------------------
Willis Towers Watson Public Limited Company said in its Form 10-Q
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6,
2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that regarding
the agreement to settle the lawsuits related to the collapse of The
Stanford Financial Group, the Company "will not make the US$120
million settlement payment unless and until the appeals are decided
in its favor and the settlement is not subject to any further
appeal."

The Company has been named as a defendant in 15 similar lawsuits
relating to the collapse of The Stanford Financial Group, for which
Willis of Colorado, Inc. acted as broker of record on certain lines
of insurance.  The complaints in these actions generally allege
that the defendants actively and materially aided Stanford's
alleged fraud by providing Stanford with certain letters regarding
coverage that they knew would be used to help retain or attract
actual or prospective Stanford client investors.  The complaints
further allege that these letters, which contain statements about
Stanford and the insurance policies that the defendants placed for
Stanford, contained untruths and omitted material facts and were
drafted in this manner to help Stanford promote and sell its
allegedly fraudulent certificates of deposit.

The 15 actions are as follows:

* Troice, et al. v. Willis of Colorado, Inc., et al., C.A.  No.
3:9-CV-1274-N, was filed on July 2, 2009 in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Texas against Willis Group Holdings
plc, Willis of Colorado, Inc. and a Willis associate, among others.
On April 1, 2011, plaintiffs filed the operative Third Amended
Class Action Complaint individually and on behalf of a putative,
worldwide class of Stanford investors, adding Willis Limited as a
defendant and alleging claims under Texas statutory and common law
and seeking damages in excess of US$1 billion, punitive damages and
costs.  On May 2, 2011, the defendants filed motions to dismiss the
Third Amended Class Action Complaint, arguing, inter alia, that the
plaintiffs' claims are precluded by the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ('SLUSA').

On May 10, 2011, the court presiding over the Stanford-related
actions in the Northern District of Texas entered an order
providing that it would consider the applicability of SLUSA to the
Stanford-related actions based on the decision in a separate
Stanford action not involving a Willis entity, Roland v. Green,
Civil Action No. 3:10-CV-0224-N ('Roland').  On August 31, 2011,
the court issued its decision in Roland, dismissing that action
with prejudice under SLUSA.

On October 27, 2011, the court in Troice entered an order (i)
dismissing with prejudice those claims asserted in the Third
Amended Class Action Complaint on a class basis on the grounds set
forth in the Roland decision discussed above and (ii) dismissing
without prejudice those claims asserted in the Third Amended Class
Action Complaint on an individual basis.  Also on October 27, 2011,
the court entered a final judgment in the action.

On October 28, 2011, the plaintiffs in Troice filed a notice of
appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Subsequently, Troice, Roland and a third action captioned Troice,
et al. v. Proskauer Rose LLP, Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-01600-N,
which also was dismissed on the grounds set forth in the Roland
decision discussed above and on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, were consolidated for purposes of briefing
and oral argument.  Following the completion of briefing and oral
argument, on March 19, 2012, the Fifth Circuit reversed and
remanded the actions.  On April 2, 2012, the defendants-appellees
filed petitions for rehearing en banc.  On April 19, 2012, the
petitions for rehearing en banc were denied.  On July 18, 2012,
defendants-appellees filed a petition for writ of certiorari with
the United States Supreme Court regarding the Fifth Circuit's
reversal in Troice.  On January 18, 2013, the Supreme Court granted
the Company's petition.  Opening briefs were filed on May 3, 2013
and the Supreme Court heard oral argument on October 7, 2013.  On
February 26, 2014, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's
decision.

On March 19, 2014, the plaintiffs in Troice filed a Motion to Defer
Resolution of Motions to Dismiss, to Compel Rule 26(f) Conference
and For Entry of Scheduling Order.

On March 25, 2014, the parties in Troice and the Janvey, et al. v.
Willis of Colorado, Inc., et al. action discussed below stipulated
to the consolidation of the two actions for pre-trial purposes
under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  On March
28, 2014, the Court 'so ordered' that stipulation and, thus,
consolidated Troice and Janvey for pre-trial purposes under Rule
42(a).

On September 16, 2014, the court (a) denied the plaintiffs' request
to defer resolution of the defendants' motions to dismiss, but
granted the plaintiffs' request to enter a scheduling order; (b)
requested the submission of supplemental briefing by all parties on
the defendants' motions to dismiss, which the parties submitted on
September 30, 2014; and (c) entered an order setting a schedule for
briefing and discovery regarding plaintiffs' motion for class
certification, which schedule, among other things, provided for the
submission of the plaintiffs' motion for class certification
(following the completion of briefing and discovery) on April 20,
2015.

On December 15, 2014, the court granted in part and denied in part
the defendants' motions to dismiss.  On January 30, 2015, the
defendants except Willis Group Holdings plc answered the Third
Amended Class Action Complaint.

On April 20, 2015, the plaintiffs filed their motion for class
certification, the defendants filed their opposition to plaintiffs'
motion, and the plaintiffs filed their reply in further support of
the motion.  Pursuant to an agreed stipulation also filed with the
court on April 20, 2015, the defendants on June 4, 2015 filed
sur-replies in further opposition to the motion.  The Court has not
yet scheduled a hearing on the motion.

On June 19, 2015, Willis Group Holdings plc filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.  On
November 17, 2015, Willis Group Holdings plc withdrew the motion.

On March 31, 2016, the parties in the Troice and Janvey actions
entered into a settlement in principle that is described in more
detail below.

* Ranni v. Willis of Colorado, Inc., et al., C.A.  No. 9-22085,
was filed on July 17, 2009 against Willis Group Holdings plc and
Willis of Colorado, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida.  The complaint was filed on behalf of
a putative class of Venezuelan and other South American Stanford
investors and alleges claims under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (and Rule 10b-5 thereunder) and Florida
statutory and common law and seeks damages in an amount to be
determined at trial.  On October 6, 2009, Ranni was transferred,
for consolidation or coordination with other Stanford-related
actions (including Troice), to the Northern District of Texas by
the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the 'JPML').
The defendants have not yet responded to the complaint in Ranni.
On August 26, 2014, the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary
dismissal of the action without prejudice.

* Canabal, et al. v. Willis of Colorado, Inc., et al., C.A.  No.
3:9-CV-1474-D, was filed on August 6, 2009 against Willis Group
Holdings plc, Willis of Colorado, Inc. and the same Willis
associate named as a defendant in Troice, among others, also in the
Northern District of Texas.  The complaint was filed individually
and on behalf of a putative class of Venezuelan Stanford investors,
alleged claims under Texas statutory and common law and sought
damages in excess of US$1 billion, punitive damages, attorneys'
fees and costs.  On December 18, 2009, the parties in Troice and
Canabal stipulated to the consolidation of those actions (under the
Troice civil action number), and, on December 31, 2009, the
plaintiffs in Canabal filed a notice of dismissal, dismissing the
action without prejudice.

* Rupert, et al. v. Winter, et al., Case No. 2009C115137, was
filed on September 14, 2009 on behalf of 97 Stanford investors
against Willis Group Holdings plc, Willis of Colorado, Inc. and the
same Willis associate, among others, in Texas state court (Bexar
County).  The complaint alleges claims under the Securities Act of
1933, Texas and Colorado statutory law and Texas common law and
seeks special, consequential and treble damages of more than US$300
million, attorneys' fees and costs.  On October 20, 2009, certain
defendants, including Willis of Colorado, Inc., (i) removed Rupert
to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, (ii)
notified the JPML of the pendency of this related action and (iii)
moved to stay the action pending a determination by the JPML as to
whether it should be transferred to the Northern District of Texas
for consolidation or coordination with the other Stanford-related
actions.  On April 1, 2010, the JPML issued a final transfer order
for the transfer of Rupert to the Northern District of Texas.  On
January 24, 2012, the court remanded Rupert to Texas state court
(Bexar County), but stayed the action until further order of the
court.  On August 13, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a motion to lift
the stay, which motion was denied by the court on September 16,
2014.  On October 10, 2014, the plaintiffs appealed the court's
denial of their motion to lift the stay to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  On January 5, 2015, the Fifth
Circuit consolidated the appeal with the appeal in the Rishmague,
et ano.  v. Winter, et al. action discussed below, and the
consolidated appeal, was fully briefed as of March 24, 2015.  Oral
argument on the consolidated appeal was held on September 2, 2015.
On September 16, 2015, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.  The defendants
have not yet responded to the complaint in Rupert.

* Casanova, et al. v. Willis of Colorado, Inc., et al., C.A.  No.
3:10-CV-1862-O, was filed on September 16, 2010 on behalf of seven
Stanford investors against Willis Group Holdings plc, Willis
Limited, Willis of Colorado, Inc.  and the same Willis associate,
among others, also in the Northern District of Texas.  The
complaint alleges claims under Texas statutory and common law and
seeks actual damages in excess of US$5 million, punitive damages,
attorneys' fees and costs.  On February 13, 2015, the parties filed
an Agreed Motion for Partial Dismissal pursuant to which they
agreed to the dismissal of certain claims pursuant to the motion to
dismiss decisions in the Troice action discussed above and the
Janvey action discussed below.  Also on February 13, 2015, the
defendants except Willis Group Holdings plc answered the complaint
in the Casanova action.  On June 19, 2015, Willis Group Holdings
plc filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction.  Plaintiffs have not opposed the motion.

* Rishmague, et ano.  v. Winter, et al., Case No. 2011CI2585, was
filed on March 11, 2011 on behalf of two Stanford investors,
individually and as representatives of certain trusts, against
Willis Group Holdings plc, Willis of Colorado, Inc., Willis of
Texas, Inc.  and the same Willis associate, among others, in Texas
state court (Bexar County).  The complaint alleges claims under
Texas and Colorado statutory law and Texas common law and seeks
special, consequential and treble damages of more than US$37
million and attorneys' fees and costs.  On April 11, 2011, certain
defendants, including Willis of Colorado, Inc., (i) removed
Rishmague to the Western District of Texas, (ii) notified the JPML
of the pendency of this related action and (iii) moved to stay the
action pending a determination by the JPML as to whether it should
be transferred to the Northern District of Texas for consolidation
or coordination with the other Stanford-related actions.  On August
8, 2011, the JPML issued a final transfer order for the transfer of
Rishmague to the Northern District of Texas, where it is currently
pending.  On August 13, 2012, the plaintiffs joined with the
plaintiffs in the Rupert action in their motion to lift the court's
stay of the Rupert action.  On September 9, 2014, the court
remanded Rishmague to Texas state court (Bexar County), but stayed
the action until further order of the court and denied the
plaintiffs' motion to lift the stay.  On October 10, 2014, the
plaintiffs appealed the court's denial of their motion to lift the
stay to the Fifth Circuit.  On January 5, 2015, the Fifth Circuit
consolidated the appeal with the appeal in the Rupert action, and
the consolidated appeal was fully briefed as of March 24, 2015.
Oral argument on the consolidated appeal was held on September 2,
2015.  On September 16, 2015, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.  The
defendants have not yet responded to the complaint in Rishmague.

* MacArthur v. Winter, et al., Case No. 2013-07840, was filed on
February 8, 2013 on behalf of two Stanford investors against Willis
Group Holdings plc, Willis of Colorado, Inc., Willis of Texas, Inc.
and the same Willis associate, among others, in Texas state court
(Harris County).  The complaint alleges claims under Texas and
Colorado statutory law and Texas common law and seeks actual,
special, consequential and treble damages of approximately US$4
million and attorneys' fees and costs.  On March 29, 2013, Willis
of Colorado, Inc. and Willis of Texas, Inc. (i) removed MacArthur
to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas and
(ii) notified the JPML of the pendency of this related action.  On
April 2, 2013, Willis of Colorado, Inc. and Willis of Texas, Inc.
filed a motion in the Southern District of Texas to stay the action
pending a determination by the JPML as to whether it should be
transferred to the Northern District of Texas for consolidation or
coordination with the other Stanford-related actions.  Also on
April 2, 2013, the court presiding over MacArthur in the Southern
District of Texas transferred the action to the Northern District
of Texas for consolidation or coordination with the other
Stanford-related actions.  On September 29, 2014, the parties
stipulated to the remand (to Texas state court (Harris County)) and
stay of MacArthur until further order of the court (in accordance
with the court's September 9, 2014 decision in Rishmague (discussed
above)), which stipulation was 'so ordered' by the court on October
14, 2014.  The defendants have not yet responded to the complaint
in MacArthur.

* Florida suits: On February 14, 2013, five lawsuits were filed
against Willis Group Holdings plc, Willis Limited and Willis of
Colorado, Inc.  in Florida state court (Miami-Dade County) alleging
violations of Florida common law.  The five suits are: (1) Barbar,
et al. v. Willis Group Holdings Public Limited Company, et al.,
Case No. 13-05666CA27, filed on behalf of 35 Stanford investors
seeking compensatory damages in excess of US$30 million; (2) de
Gadala-Maria, et al. v. Willis Group Holdings Public Limited
Company, et al., Case No. 13-05669CA30, filed on behalf of 64
Stanford investors seeking compensatory damages in excess of
US$83.5 million; (3) Ranni, et ano.  v. Willis Group Holdings
Public Limited Company, et al., Case No. 13-05673CA06, filed on
behalf of two Stanford investors seeking compensatory damages in
excess of US$3 million; (4) Tisminesky, et al. v. Willis Group
Holdings Public Limited Company, et al., Case No. 13-05676CA09,
filed on behalf of 11 Stanford investors seeking compensatory
damages in excess of US$6.5 million; and (5) Zacarias, et al. v.
Willis Group Holdings Public Limited Company, et al., Case No.
13-05678CA11, filed on behalf of 10 Stanford investors seeking
compensatory damages in excess of US$12.5 million.  On June 3,
2013, Willis of Colorado, Inc. removed all five cases to the
Southern District of Florida and, on June 4, 2013, notified the
JPML of the pendency of these related actions.  On June 10, 2013,
the court in Tisminesky issued an order sua sponte staying and
administratively closing that action pending a determination by the
JPML as to whether it should be transferred to the Northern
District of Texas for consolidation and coordination with the other
Stanford-related actions.  On June 11, 2013, Willis of Colorado,
Inc. moved to stay the other four actions pending the JPML's
transfer decision.  On June 20, 2013, the JPML issued a conditional
transfer order for the transfer of the five actions to the Northern
District of Texas, the transmittal of which was stayed for seven
days to allow for any opposition to be filed.  On June 28, 2013,
with no opposition having been filed, the JPML lifted the stay,
enabling the transfer to go forward.

On September 30, 2014, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion to
remand in Zacarias, and, on October 3, 2014, the court denied the
plaintiffs' motions to remand in Tisminesky and de Gadala Maria.
On December 3, 2014 and March 3, 2015, the court granted the
plaintiffs' motions to remand in Barbar and Ranni, respectively,
remanded both actions to Florida state court (Miami-Dade County)
and stayed both actions until further order of the court.  On
January 2, 2015 and April 1, 2015, the plaintiffs in Barbar and
Ranni, respectively, appealed the court's December 3, 2014 and
March 3, 2015 decisions to the Fifth Circuit.  On April 22, 2015
and July 22, 2015, respectively, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the
Barbar and Ranni appeals sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction.  The
defendants have not yet responded to the complaints in Ranni or
Barbar.

On April 1, 2015, the defendants except Willis Group Holdings plc
filed motions to dismiss the complaints in Zacarias, Tisminesky and
de Gadala-Maria.  On June 19, 2015, Willis Group Holdings plc filed
motions to dismiss the complaints in Zacarias, Tisminesky and de
Gadala-Maria for lack of personal jurisdiction.  On July 15, 2015,
the court dismissed the complaint in Zacarias in its entirety with
leave to replead within 21 days.  On July 21, 2015, the court
dismissed the complaints in Tisminesky and de Gadala-Maria in their
entirety with leave to replead within 21 days.  On August 6, 2015,
the plaintiffs in Zacarias, Tisminesky and de Gadala-Maria filed
amended complaints (in which, among other things, Willis Group
Holdings plc was no longer named as a defendant).  On September 11,
2015, the defendants filed motions to dismiss the amended
complaints.  The motions await disposition by the court.

* Janvey, et al. v. Willis of Colorado, Inc., et al., Case No.
3:13-CV-03980-D, was filed on October 1, 2013 also in the Northern
District of Texas against Willis Group Holdings plc, Willis
Limited, Willis North America Inc., Willis of Colorado, Inc.  and
the same Willis associate.  The complaint was filed (i) by Ralph S.
Janvey, in his capacity as Court-Appointed Receiver for the
Stanford Receivership Estate, and the Official Stanford Investors
Committee (the 'OSIC') against all defendants and (ii) on behalf of
a putative, worldwide class of Stanford investors against Willis
North America Inc.  Plaintiffs Janvey and the OSIC allege claims
under Texas common law and the court's Amended Order Appointing
Receiver, and the putative class plaintiffs allege claims under
Texas statutory and common law.  Plaintiffs seek actual damages in
excess of US$1 billion, punitive damages and costs.  As alleged by
the Stanford Receiver, the total amount of collective losses
allegedly sustained by all investors in Stanford certificates of
deposit is approximately US$4.6 billion.

On November 15, 2013, plaintiffs in Janvey filed the operative
First Amended Complaint, which added certain defendants
unaffiliated with Willis.  On February 28, 2014, the defendants
filed motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, which
motions, other than with respect to Willis Group Holding plc's
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, were granted
in part and denied in part by the court on December 5, 2014.  On
December 22, 2014, Willis filed a motion to amend the court's
December 5 order to certify an interlocutory appeal to the Fifth
Circuit, and, on December 23, 2014, Willis filed a motion to amend
and, to the extent necessary, reconsider the court's December 5
order.  On January 16, 2015, the defendants answered the First
Amended Complaint.  On January 28, 2015, the court denied Willis's
motion to amend the court's December 5 order to certify an
interlocutory appeal to the Fifth Circuit.  On February 4, 2015,
the court granted Willis's motion to amend and, to the extent
necessary, reconsider the December 5 order.

As discussed above, on March 25, 2014, the parties in Troice and
Janvey stipulated to the consolidation of the two actions for
pre-trial purposes under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.  On March 28, 2014, the Court 'so ordered' that
stipulation and, thus, consolidated Troice and Janvey for pre-trial
purposes under Rule 42(a).

On January 26, 2015, the court entered an order setting a schedule
for briefing and discovery regarding the plaintiffs' motion for
class certification, which schedule, among other things, provided
for the submission of the plaintiffs' motion for class
certification (following the completion of briefing and discovery)
on July 20, 2015.  By letter dated March 4, 2015, the parties
requested that the court consolidate the scheduling orders entered
in Troice and Janvey to provide for a class certification
submission date of April 20, 2015 in both cases.  On March 6, 2015,
the court entered an order consolidating the scheduling orders in
Troice and Janvey, providing for a class certification submission
date of April 20, 2015 in both cases, and vacating the July 20,
2015 class certification submission date in the original Janvey
scheduling order.

On November 17, 2015, Willis Group Holdings plc withdrew its motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

On March 31, 2016, the parties in the Troice and Janvey actions
entered into a settlement in principle.

* Martin v. Willis of Colorado, Inc., et al., Case No. 201652115,
was filed on August 5, 2016, on behalf of one Stanford investor
against Willis Group Holdings plc, Willis Limited, Willis of
Colorado, Inc.  and the same Willis associate in Texas state court
(Harris County).  The complaint alleges claims under Texas
statutory and common law and seeks actual damages of less than
US$100,000, exemplary damages, attorneys' fees and costs.  On
September 12, 2016, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which
added five more Stanford investors as plaintiffs and seeks damages
in excess of US$1 million.  The defendants have not yet responded
to the amended complaint in Martin.

* Abel, et al. v. Willis of Colorado, Inc., et al., C.A.  No.
3:16-cv-2601, was filed on September 12, 2016, on behalf of more
than 300 Stanford investors against Willis Group Holdings plc,
Willis Limited, Willis of Colorado, Inc.  and the same Willis
associate, also in the Northern District of Texas.  The complaint
alleges claims under Texas statutory and common law and seeks
actual damages in excess of US$135 million, exemplary damages,
attorneys' fees and costs.  On November 10, 2016, the plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint, which, among other things, added
several more Stanford investors as plaintiffs.  The defendants have
not yet responded to the complaint in Abel.

The plaintiffs in Janvey and Troice and the other actions above
seek overlapping damages, representing either the entirety or a
portion of the total alleged collective losses incurred by
investors in Stanford certificates of deposit, notwithstanding the
fact that Legacy Willis acted as broker of record for only a
portion of time that Stanford issued certificates of deposit.  In
the fourth quarter of 2015, the Company recognized a US$70 million
litigation provision for loss contingencies relating to the
Stanford matters based on its ongoing review of a variety of
factors as required by accounting standards.

On March 31, 2016, the Company entered into a settlement in
principle for US$120 million relating to this litigation, and
increased its provisions by US$50 million during that quarter.

The settlement is contingent on a number of conditions, including
court approval of the settlement and a bar order prohibiting any
continued or future litigation against Willis related to Stanford,
which may not be given.  Therefore, the ultimate resolution of
these matters may differ from the amount provided for.  The Company
continues to dispute the allegations and, to the extent litigation
proceeds, to defend the lawsuits vigorously.

Settlement.  On March 31, 2016, the Company entered into a
settlement in principle, as reflected in a Settlement Term Sheet,
relating to the Stanford litigation matter.  The Company agreed to
the Settlement Term Sheet to eliminate the distraction, burden,
expense and uncertainty of further litigation.  In particular, the
settlement and the related bar orders described below, if upheld
through any appeals, would enable the Company (a newly-combined
firm) to conduct itself with the bar orders' protection from the
continued overhang of matters alleged to have occurred
approximately a decade ago.  Further, the Settlement Term Sheet
provided that the parties understood and agreed that there is no
admission of liability or wrongdoing by the Company.  The Company
expressly denies any liability or wrongdoing with respect to the
matters alleged in the Stanford litigation.

On or about August 31, 2016, the parties to the settlement signed a
formal Settlement Agreement memorializing the terms of the
settlement as originally set forth in the Settlement Term Sheet.
The parties to the Settlement Agreement are Ralph S.  Janvey (in
his capacity as the Court-appointed receiver (the 'Receiver') for
The Stanford Financial Group and its affiliated entities in
receivership (collectively, 'Stanford')), the Official Stanford
Investors Committee, Samuel Troice, Martha Diaz, Paula
Gilly-Flores, Punga Punga Financial, Ltd., Manuel Canabal, Daniel
Gomez Ferreiro and Promotora Villa Marina, C.A.  (collectively,
'Plaintiffs'), on the one hand, and Willis Towers Watson Public
Limited Company (formerly Willis Group Holdings Public Limited
Company), Willis Limited, Willis North America Inc., Willis of
Colorado, Inc. and the Willis associate referenced above
(collectively, 'Defendants'), on the other hand.  Under the terms
of the Settlement Agreement, the parties agreed to settle and
dismiss the Janvey and Troice actions (collectively, the 'Actions')
and all current or future claims arising from or related to
Stanford in exchange for a one-time cash payment to the Receiver by
the Company of US$120 million to be distributed to all Stanford
investors who have claims recognized by the Receiver pursuant to
the distribution plan in place at the time the payment is made.

The Settlement Agreement also provides the parties' agreement to
seek the Court's entry of bar orders prohibiting any continued or
future litigation against the Defendants and their related parties
of claims relating to Stanford, whether asserted to date or not.
The terms of the bar orders therefore would prohibit all
Stanford-related litigation described above, and not just the
Actions, but including any pending matters and any actions that may
be brought in the future.  Final Court approval of these bar orders
is a condition of the settlement.

On September 7, 2016, Plaintiffs filed with the Court a motion to
approve the settlement.  On October 19, 2016, the Court
preliminarily approved the settlement.  Several of the plaintiffs
in the other actions above objected to the settlement, and a
hearing to consider final approval of the settlement was held on
January 20, 2017, after which the Court reserved decision.  On
August 23, 2017, the Court approved the settlement, including the
bar orders.  Several of the objectors have since appealed the
settlement approval and bar orders to the Fifth Circuit.  The
briefing related to the appeals is now completed.  There is no date
certain for when the appeal will be decided.  The Company will not
make the US$120 million settlement payment unless and until the
appeals are decided in its favor and the settlement is not subject
to any further appeal.

Willis Towers Watson Public Limited Company operates as an
advisory, broking, and solutions company worldwide.  Its Human
Capital and Benefits segment provides actuarial support, plan
design, and administrative services for traditional pension and
retirement savings plans; plan management consulting, broking, and
administration services for health and group benefit programs; and
benefits outsourcing services.  The company is based in London,
England.


WOK 88: Can Compel Arbitration of Unpaid Overtime Suit
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, QIN HUI LI, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated,: Plaintiff, v. WOK 88 INC. d/b/a Wok 88, WOK ON 88TH:
RESTAURANT INC. d/b/a Wok 88, WOK WOK CORP. d/b/a Wok 88, AI CHIU
CHIANG, and STEVE WU, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-8715-GHW (S.D.
N.Y.), Judge Gregory H. Woods of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York (i) granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss case and compel arbitration ; and (ii) denied their motion
for sanctions.

Li was employed by the Defendants as a deliveryman for Wok 88, a
Chinese restaurant in Manhattan, between August 2016 and November
2017.  Li agreed to arbitrate any claims arising from his
employment.  After the Plaintiff's employment with the Defendants
ended, he brought various claims against his employers under the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the New York Labor Law
("NYLL").

Rather than pursue those claims in arbitration, as he had agreed to
do, the Plaintiff filed the lawsuit on Nov. 9, 2017.  After
conceding that the arbitration agreement executed by the Plaintiff
was valid and enforceable under the law at the time, the
Plaintiff's counsel nonetheless refused to stipulate to the
dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims in favor of arbitration.

On March 29, 2018, Defendants Wok 88 and Chiang filed a motion to
dismiss the case and compel arbitration.  In that motion, which is
unopposed by the Plaintiff, the Defendants also seek the imposition
of sanctions under 28 U.S.C. Section 1927.  They ask the Court to
award them reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in
connection with the matter.

The Plaintiff's opposition to that motion was due no later than
April 12, 2018 -- two weeks after service of the motion.  The
Plaintiff did not file an opposition.  On April 27, 2018, the Court
held a telephone conference with the parties, during which the
Plaintiff's counsel agreed to stipulate to the dismissal of the
claims against Defendants Wok 88 and Chiang and to proceed with
arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement.  

During that conference, however, the Defendants' counsel stated
that, despite the Plaintiff's willingness to stipulate to the
dismissal of the action, the Defendants still wished to proceed
with their motion to recover attorneys' fees under Section 1927.
As a result, the Plaintiff did not stipulate to the dismissal of
the action, and the Court is required to evaluate the Defendants'
unopposed motion.

Judge Woods finds that it is also undisputed that the Plaintiff
received notice and assented to the Arbitration Agreement.  In the
absence of any allegations or evidence to the contrary, the Judge
concludes that the Plaintiff knew of and assented to the terms of
the Arbitration Agreement.  In addition, there is no dispute that
the claims Plaintiff asserts in his complaint are within the scope
of the Arbitration Agreement: all of the Plaintiff's claims fall
under the FLSA, the NYLL, or otherwise have to do with unpaid
wages.  The Arbitration Agreement explicitly captures each of these
types of claim.  

Therefore, absent any asserted defenses to the validity and
enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement, he concludes that the
Arbitration Agreement is valid and enforceable.  For these reasons,
the Judge granted the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration.
The Plaintiff will have the opportunity to pursue his claims
against the Defendants Wok 88 and Ai Chiu Chiang in arbitration.

The Judge finds that it is worth noting that the Plaintiff's
counsel avoided the potential imposition of sanctions under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which does not require a showing of bad
faith.  The Plaintiff's counsel was able to evade the possibility
of Rule 11 sanctions because he failed to present any signed
opposition to the motion, or any other filing that could have
formed the basis for a Rule 11 motion.  

The Court has declined to award sanctions under Section 1927
because the stringent bad faith standard is not met.  Nonetheless,
the Judge does not condone the dilatory behavior exhibited by the
Plaintiff's attorneys. In the future, he hopes that the Plaintiff's
counsel will evaluate any applicable arbitration agreement before
bringing a lawsuit that he concedes is not viable under existing
law.  Accordingly, he denied the Defendants' motion for sanctions
under Section 1927.

The Defendants have not requested that the Court stay these
proceedings pending arbitration of the Plaintiff's claims against
them.  The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the motion
pending at Dkt. No. 26.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 11, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/MHqQ7J from Leagle.com.

Qin Hui Li, Plaintiff, represented by John Troy --
johntroy@troypllc.com -- Troy Law, PLLC.


XPLORE TECHNOLOGIES: Faces Investor Class Action Over Zebra Deal
----------------------------------------------------------------
Rose Krebs, writing for Law360, reports that an investor filed a
proposed class action in Delaware federal court on Aug. 4 seeking
to halt the estimated $90 million sale of tablet maker Xplore
Technologies Corp. to Zebra Technologies Corp., claiming he needs
more information about the transaction.

Xplore shareholder Amir Mencher filed a complaint against the
company, Chairman of the Board Thomas B. Pickens III and four other
board members claiming that information about financial projections
including cash flow and the amount to be paid to a financial
adviser were omitted from the statement.

The case is styled Mencher v. Xplore Technologies Corporation et
al., Case No. 1:18-cv-01172.  The case was filed August 4, 2018.
[GN]




XTO ENERGY: To Assess Allocation Plan in Royalty Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
Hugoton Royalty Trust said in its Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that XTO Energy is analyzing
the final plan of allocation to calculate the impact on the Trust
and will report to the Trustee when that analysis is complete.

In December 2010, a royalty class action lawsuit was filed against
XTO Energy styled Chieftain Royalty Company v. XTO Energy Inc. in
Coal County District Court, Oklahoma.  XTO Energy removed the case
to federal court in the Eastern District of Oklahoma.  The
plaintiffs allege that XTO Energy wrongfully deducted fees from
royalty payments on Oklahoma wells, failed to make diligent efforts
to secure the best terms available for the sale of gas and its
constituents, and demand an accounting to determine whether they
have been fully and fairly paid gas royalty interests.  The case
was certified as a class action in April 2012.

XTO Energy advised the Trustee that in December 2017, it reached a
tentative settlement with the plaintiffs for US$80 million and an
additional US$750 thousand for costs to administer the settlement
following final approval.  In March 2018, XTO Energy advised the
Trustee that it believed the portion of the settlement that relates
to the Trust could be as much as US$20 million, but the settlement
allocable to the Trust cannot be finally determined until after the
judge approves the final plan of allocation.

On July 27, 2018, plaintiffs submitted their final plan of
allocation which was approved by the court on the same date.  XTO
Energy is analyzing the final plan of allocation to calculate the
impact on the Trust and will report to the Trustee when that
analysis is complete.  XTO Energy has advised the Trustee that
depending on its analysis of the final plan of allocation, the
portion of the settlement XTO Energy believes should be allocated
to the Trust may exceed US$20 million.

On May 2, 2018, the Trustee submitted a demand for arbitration
styled Simmons Bank (successor to Southwest Bank and Bank of
America, N.A.) vs. XTO Energy Inc. (the "Arbitration") through the
American Arbitration Association seeking a declaratory judgment
that the Chieftain settlement is not a production cost and that XTO
Energy is prohibited from charging the settlement as a production
cost under the conveyance or otherwise reducing the Trust's
payments now or in the future as a result of the Chieftain
litigation.

In the Arbitration, the Trustee also made claims for disputed
amounts on the computation of the Trust's net proceeds for 2014
through 2016 in excess of US$5 million.  XTO Energy filed its
answer denying the Trustee's claims.  The parties have begun the
process of assembling an arbitration panel.

The Royalty Trust said, "If US$20 million or more of the Chieftain
settlement is required to be borne by the Trust, it would result in
excess costs under the Oklahoma conveyance that, based on recent
distribution levels under such conveyance, would likely result in
no distributions under the Oklahoma conveyance for several years."

Hugoton Royalty Trust is an express trust created under the laws of
Texas pursuant to the Hugoton Royalty Trust Indenture entered into
on December 1, 1998 between XTO Energy Inc. (formerly known as
Cross Timbers Oil Company), as grantor, and NationsBank, N.A., as
trustee.  Southwest Bank is now the trustee of the Trust.


ZILLOW GROUP: Awaits Ruling on Bid to Drop Consolidated Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Zillow Group, Inc.'s motion to dismiss the consolidated amended
complaint in the "Vargosko" and "Shotwell" lawsuits is still
ongoing, according to the Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30,
2018.  The Company has filed its reply in support of its motion to
dismiss the consolidated amended complaint in June 2018.

The Company said, "In August and September 2017, two purported
class action lawsuits were filed against us and certain of our
executive officers, alleging, among other things, violations of
federal securities laws on behalf of a class of those who purchased
our common stock between February 12, 2016 and August 8, 2017.  One
of those purported class actions, captioned Vargosko v. Zillow
Group, Inc.  et al, was brought in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California.  The other purported class action
lawsuit, captioned Shotwell v. Zillow Group, Inc.  et al, was
brought in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington.  The complaints allege, among other things, that during
the period between February 12, 2016 and August 8, 2017, we issued
materially false and misleading statements regarding our business
practices.  The complaints seek to recover, among other things,
alleged damages sustained by the purported class members as a
result of the alleged misconduct.  In November 2017, an amended
complaint was filed against us and certain of our executive
officers in the Shotwell v. Zillow Group class action lawsuit,
extending the beginning of the class period to November 17, 2014."

"In January 2018, the Vargosko v. Zillow Group purported class
action lawsuit was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington and consolidated with the Shotwell
v. Zillow Group purported class action lawsuit.  In February 2018,
the plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended complaint, and in April
2018, we filed our motion to dismiss the consolidated amended
complaint.  In May 2018, the plaintiffs filed their opposition to
our motion to dismiss the consolidated amended complaint.  In June
2018, we filed our reply in support of our motion to dismiss the
consolidated amended complaint.  We have denied the allegations of
wrongdoing and intend to vigorously defend the claims in this
lawsuit.  We have not recorded an accrual related to this lawsuit
as of June 30, 2018 and December 31, 2017, as we do not believe a
loss is probable."

Zillow Group, Inc. operates a real estate and home-related
information marketplaces on mobile and the web, with a
complementary portfolio of brands and products to help consumers
find vital information about homes and connect with local
professionals. The company is based in Seattle, Washington.


ZIMMER BIOMET: Bid to Drop "Shah" Class Suit in Indiana Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------------------
The defendants' motions to dismiss to dismiss the case, Shah v.
Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. et al., are still ongoing, according
to Zimmer Biomet's Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission on August 6, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018.

The Company said, "On December 2, 2016, a complaint was filed in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana (Shah
v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. et al.), naming us, two of our
officers and one of our now former officers as defendants.  On June
28, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a corrected amended complaint,
naming as defendants, in addition to those previously named,
current and former members of our Board of Directors, one
additional officer, and the underwriters in connection with
secondary offerings of our common stock by certain selling
stockholders in 2016.  On October 6, 2017, the plaintiffs
voluntarily dismissed the underwriters without prejudice.

"On October 8, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a second amended
complaint, naming as defendants, in addition to those current and
former officers and Board members previously named, certain former
stockholders of ours who sold shares of our common stock in
secondary public offerings in 2016.  The second amended complaint
relates to a putative class action on behalf of persons who
purchased our common stock between June 7, 2016 and November 7,
2016.  The second amended complaint generally alleges that the
defendants violated federal securities laws by making materially
false and/or misleading statements and/or omissions about our
compliance with FDA regulations and our ability to continue to
accelerate our organic revenue growth rate in the second half of
2016.

"The defendants filed their respective motions to dismiss on
December 20, 2017, plaintiffs filed their omnibus response to the
motions to dismiss on March 13, 2018 and the defendants filed their
respective reply briefs on May 18, 2018.  The plaintiffs seek
unspecified damages and interest, attorneys' fees, costs and other
relief.  We believe this lawsuit is without merit, and we and the
individual defendants are defending it vigorously."

Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
designs, manufactures, and markets musculoskeletal healthcare
products and solutions in the Americas, Europe, the Middle East,
Africa, and the Asia Pacific. The company is based in Warsaw,
Indiana.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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