CAR_Public/180905.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, September 5, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 178

                            Headlines

ACT INC: Faces ADA Class Suit in California
ADVANCE AMERICA: Settles Class Action Over Interest Rates
ADVANCED MICRO: Bid for Class Certification in "Dickey" Underway
ADVANCED MICRO: Continues to Defend Hauck Class Suit
ADVANCED MICRO: Faces Kim Class Action in California

ALLERGAN INC: Settlement in Derivative Suit Has Final Approval
AMERISOURCEBERGEN: DOJ to Participate in Opioid Settlement Talks
ANALOGIC CORP: Kahn Swick Files Securities Class Suit
ARCONIC INC: Bid to Dismiss Howard Class Action Underway
ARP WAVE: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Christopher Lowe Says

ARRIS INT'L: Seeks 9th Circuit Review of Ruling in Reyna Suit
ARYZTA AMERICAS: Sued Over Racial Hiring Discrimination
AT&T INC: Appeal in DirectTV's NFL Ticket Package Suit Pending
ATOSSA GENETICS: Court Enters Final Judgment in Securities Suit
BECTON DICKINSON: Agreement Reached in 14,944 Women's Health Suit

BECTON DICKINSON: Faces 2,299 Hernia Product Claims at June 30
BECTON DICKINSON: Wins Favorable Ruling in Filter Products Trial
BRISTOL BAY: Filing of 2nd Amended A. Abikar Suit Denied
BT GROUP: NJ District Court Dismisses Securities Class Action
CACERES INTERIOR: Underpays Plaster Finishers, Pacheco et al. Say

CALIFORNIA: A. Cejas's Suit May Proceed in Forma Pauperis
CASHCALL INC: Calif. High Court Reverses Summary Ruling in UCL Suit
CEMTREX INC: Robbins Arroyo Files Amended Securities Class Action
CENTRA TECH: Florida Judge Issues Ruling in ICO Class Action
CENTRAL CALIFORNIA ALMOND: Court Sets Schedule in J. Urena Suit

CHINA CACHE: Court Approves Class Settlement in G. Xu's Suit
CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Court Grants Subpoena on Employment Records
CIGNA CORP: Amara Pension Plan Suit Underway
CIGNA CORP: Defending Suits over Express Scripts Merger
CIGNA CORP: Franco Class Action Still Ongoing

CNX RESOURCES: Places Settlement Payment Into Escrow Account
COGNIZANT TECHNOLOGY: Bid to Dismiss Class Suit Still Pending
COLLECTO INC: Sanctions Against Attorneys Affirmed
CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Huntsman Sues Over Collection Calls
CORIZON HEALTH: Pennell's Bid to Certify Class of Inmates Denied

COTIVITI HOLDINGS: Geller Files Securities Suit in New York
CRESTWOOD EQUITY: Oct. Hearing to Approve Accord in Trucking Suit
CURATIVE CARE: Siderits Moves to Certify Nurses Class Under FLSA
DALGLISH 7 INC: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Balcon et al. Allege
DARDEN RESTAURANTS: Can Compel Arbitration in J. Silva's FLSA Suit

DIPLOMAT PHARMACY: Ct. Won't Review Denial of Dismissal Bid
DIXIE GROUP: Memorandum of Understanding Reached in Garcia Suit
DOLLAR TREE: Loses Bid for Preliminary OK of Nakooka Suit Deal
DOS REALES: Court Denies Waiters' Bid for Conditional Certification
DUKE ENERGY: Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Fla. Suit Due Oct.

ECHELON CORP: Faces Aducci and Rosenblatt Suits over Merger Deal
ECLIPX GROUP: Bannister Law Mulls Shareholder Class Action
ENDURANCE INTERNATIONAL: McGee Settlement Awaits Initial Approval
ETRADE FIN'L: 2nd Cir. Affirms Securities Class Action Dismissal
EVERGREEN MONEYSOURCE: Court Grants Prelim OK of Class Settlement

EXLSERVICE HOLDINGS: Agreement in Principle Reached in Calif. Suit
FACEBOOK INC: Avoiding Testimony May Ramp Up Legal Fees
FAIVELEY TRANSPORT: Employees' Suit Transferred to W.D. Pa
FERRARA CANDY: Settles Underfilling Class Action for $2.5MM
FOUNDATION MEDICINE: Kent Suit Voluntarily Dismissed

FOUNDATION MEDICINE: Wang Suit Voluntarily Dismissed
GDS HOLDINGS: Faces Allison Suit Over 38% Drop in ADR Price
GDS HOLDINGS: Oct. 1 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
GDS HOLDINGS: Pomerantz Probes Claims on Behalf of Investors
GLOBAL EAGLE: Awaits 9th Cir. Hearing on Hart Class Action Appeal

GLOBAL TEL: Class Certified in Inflated Prison Phone Fees Case
GOOGLE INC: Faces Location Sharing Class Action Lawsuit
HEGEWISCH DEV'T: Violated Privacy Act, Faces Class Action Claims
HELIOS AND MATHESON: Chang Sues over 96.49% Drop in Shares Price
HELIOS AND MATHESON: Oct. 1 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline

HEMPSTEAD COUNTY, AR: Underpays Detention Officers, Middleton Says
INDIANA: Motorists Set to Get $3.3MM Payout in BMV Class Action
INSULET CORP: Settlement of Teacher Retirement Suit Approved
INSURANCE COMPANY: Construction Workers' Suit Remanded to State Ct.
INSYS THERAPEUTICS: Di Donato Securities Suit Underway

INSYS THERAPEUTICS: Still Defends Consolidated Suit in New York
KINGDOM TRUST: Securities Firms Not Liable to Ponzi Scheme Victims
KOCH FOODS: Settles Discrimination Class Action for $3.75MM
LIFE STORAGE: NJ Court Approves $8M Settlement Agreement
LINCOLN NATIONAL: Unit Faces Class Suit by TVPX ARS

LIQUIDITY SERVICES: Final Settlement Approval Hearing on Oct. 5
M&T BANK: Settlement of Suit v. Wilmington Trust Gets Initial OK
MEDLEY CAPITAL: Faces Two Class Suits in Virginia
MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Faces Calloway Suit over Price Fixing of DRAM
NANTHEALTH INC: Bucks County Employees Retirement Fund Suit Stayed

NANTHEALTH INC: Trial on Deora Class Action Set for August 2019
NET PAY ADVANCE: Gonzalez Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
NEW JERSEY: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss M. Jackmon's RLUIPA Suit
NEW JERSEY: Faces Class Action Over E-Z Pass Late Fees
NORTH AMERICAN POWER: Judge Inks $16.05MM Class Action Settlement

NORTH CAROLINA: Court Certifies 2 Classes in Medicaid Suit
NORTHAND INVESTMENT: Judge Won't Remove Claims Against CEO
NRG ENERGY: Awaits 9th Circuit Decision on Plaintiffs' Petition
NRG ENERGY: Bid for Summary Judgment in Rice Suit Ongoing
NRG ENERGY: Continues to Defend Braun Suit in California

NRG ENERGY: Griffoul Suit in New Jersey Still Ongoing
NRG ENERGY: Says TCPA Class Suit in California Concluded
ODWALLA INC: Averts Food Labeling Class Action
PAYSON PETROLEUM: Class Certification in Securities Suit Denied
PNC FINANCIAL: White Suit Dismissed Following Accord

POWERLINE FUNDING: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Abante Rooter Says
PREMIERE CREDIT: Jacobs Sues over Debt Collection Practices
PROSPERITY 89: Prudente Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
PROVIDENT CAPITAL: IOOF Settles Class Action for $44.25MM
RAY'S SUPER: Diaz Suit Alleges FLSA and NYLL Violations

REGENCE BLUESHIELD: Court Narrows Claims in Minors' ERISA Suit
REGULUS THERAPEUTICS: Baran Polat Securities Class Action Underway
ROYAL WINNIPEG: Court Certifies Sexual Assault Class Action
SCANA CORP: Bid to Dismiss Metzler Class Action Underway
SCANA CORP: Class Certification Bid in Lightsey et al Case Pending

SCANA CORP: Suit by Christine Delmater Dismissed
SCANA CORP: Suit by Firemen's Retirement Sys. Back to State Court
SCANA CORP: Warren Police's Suit Remanded to Lexington Court
SCIENTIFIC GAMES: Bid to Dismiss Fife Class Action Underway
SCIENTIFIC GAMING: Bid to Dismiss Raqqa Class Action Underway

SEARS HOLDINGS: Settles Suit Over Craftsman Movers for $3.2MM
SERVICE EMPLOYEES: Faces Class Action Lawsuit Over Dues
SEWERAGE & WATER: Faces Class Action Over Flood Damages
SINCLAIR BROADCAST: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Securities Class Suit
SIX FLAGS: Y. Katz's FACTA Suit Remanded to NJ State Court

SOLOMON AND SOLOMON: Faces Piscazzi Suit Over FDCPA Violations
SOUTHWESTERN ENERGY: Arkansas Royalty Litigation Still Ongoing
SSM HEALTH: Feather Appeals Opinion and Orders to 8th Circuit
STEEL & TUBE: Class Action Could Snowball With Fresh Court Action
SYNGENTA CORP: Deadline Approaching for Farmers to Join Lawsuit

TARGET CORP: Faces Walters Suit in California District Court
TESLA INC: Lieff Cabraser Files Securities Class Action
TETRAPHASE PHARMA: Faces Ignite3-Related Class Action
TETRAPHASE PHARMA: Garity Suit Asserts Securities Act Violation
TEXAS CES: Court Refuses to Certify FLSA Class in Debord Suit

TEZOS FOUNDATION: Judge Advances Cryptocurrency Class Action
TIMOTHY FOLSTED: Court Dismisses J. Benedict's Suit
TJ MAXX: Faces Class Action on "Phantom Markdowns"
TOYOTA MOTOR: Court Dismisses Suit Over Soybean-Coated Wiring
TREEHOUSE FOODS: PERS Mississippi Status Report Due Today

TRIPLE-S MANAGEMENT: Appeal in Blue Cross Antitrust Suit Underway
ULTA BEAUTY: Seeks Dismissal of Used-Makeup Class Action
ULTA SALON: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss M. Hancox's FLSA Suit
UNIKRN: Hit By Class Action Lawsuit Over ICO
UNION PACIFIC: Court Grants Protective Order in Discrimination Suit

UNITED PARCEL: Agreement Reached in Morgate Suit
UNITED PARCEL: Agreement Reached in Suit by Wright and Zislin
UNITED STATES: Ark. Landowners' New Bid for Atty's Fees Junked
UNITED STATES: EPA Faces Class Action Over El Paso Air Quality
UNITED STATES: Fed. Cir. Narrows Claims in Suit Over USSS OT Pay

UNITED STATES: Mich. Tea Party Groups to Share IRS Settlement
UNITED STATES: Teton County to Join PILT Class Action
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL: Court Sanctions Failure to Preserve Discovery
US BANK: Court Won't Stay Royal Park's RMBS Suit
US STEEL: Continues to Defend Shareholder Class Suit in W.D. Pa.

VEECO INSTRUMENTS: Faces Wolther Class Action in California
WELLS FARGO: Averts Class Action Over Alleged Self-Dealing
WESTERN UNION: Court to Preserve Unclaimed Funds
WILLIAMS COMPANIES: 9th Circuit Appeal Underway
WINDHAM PROFESSIONALS: Time to Respond to Barnes Suit Extended

WORKFORCE RESOURCES: Court Allows A. Jamil to File FAC
XCERRA CORP: Monteverde & Associates Files Class Action
XEROX CORP: Appeal in Firefighters Pension Fund Suit Underway
XEROX CORP: Awaits Preliminary Approval of Fuji Merger Suit Accord
YALE UNIVERSITY: Mason Sues over Personal Information Data Breach

ZION OIL: Oct. 9 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
ZION OIL: Wolf Haldenstein Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
[*] Bond Schoeneck Attorney Discusses Class Action Waivers
[*] SEC Best Interest Proposal May Open Back Door for Class Action

                            *********

ACT INC: Faces ADA Class Suit in California
--------------------------------------------
Attorneys with Panish Shea & Boyle LLP and Miller Advocacy Group
have filed a nationwide, class action lawsuit against ACT,
administrator of the leading U.S. standardized college-entrance
exam, for violating the civil rights of students with disabilities
under federal and California law. Plaintiffs allege and seek to end
the illegal practice by the college admissions gatekeeper of
acquiring the disability status of students taking the ACT Test and
then disclosing their confidential disability information on score
reports to colleges and other programs as well as selling the
information to them for recruitment and enrollment purposes -- a
direct violation of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), Unruh
Act, California Constitution, and California's Unfair Competition
Law.

"ACT flags students' test scores, discloses their confidential
information to colleges pre-admission, and stigmatizes students
with disabilities in the admissions process," says Rahul Ravipudi
-- ravipudi@psblaw.com -- of Panish Shea & Boyle LLP. "Not only
does this unlawful practice violate the privacy, security and
confidentiality of information entrusted to ACT by the students in
its care -- it does so for profit, and at the expense of America's
most vulnerable students who are striving to further their
education."

Mr. Ravipudi is assisted on the matter by Panish Shea & Boyle LLP
and social justice attorney Jesse Creed as well as attorney Marci
Lerner Miller -- hmiller@bsk.com -- of Miller Advocacy Group.

As alleged in the complaint filed in United States District Court,
Central District of California, ACT illegally uses student
disability information in two primary ways. First, ACT "flags"
student score reports by disclosing detailed student disability
information and the use of accommodations on the score reports it
sends to colleges. The company collects this information through
questions on the online ACT Student Profile Section that every
student fills out when registering for the college-entrance exam,
as well as through its Student Information Form that test takers
must respond to on test day without their parents, teachers or
counselors present. Second, ACT sells the detailed student
disability data to various postsecondary organizations including
colleges, scholarship programs, and other third parties who use it
for recruitment and marketing related to the admissions process.
ACT knows that colleges must practice "disability-blind" admissions
under federal civil rights laws and seeks to circumvent this
prohibition on colleges by acquiring the information for them.

Unlike the ACT score reports sent to colleges, the teenage
test-takers as well as the high schools they attend are
intentionally kept unaware of ACT's practice of reporting
confidential disability status to colleges, because the ACT score
reports sent to students as well as those ACT score reports sent to
the student's high school do not show any disability information.

Plaintiff Halie Bloom is a college-bound, 2018 high school graduate
who had an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) under the IDEA and a
504 Plan under the Rehabilitation Act since middle school, and she
took the ACT several times with approved accommodations. ACT
acquired Ms. Bloom's disability status from her testing
registration and annotated her score reports with "learning or
cognitive disability" that requires special provisions. ACT
disclosed Ms. Bloom's disabilities on all ACT Test score reports
sent on her behalf to colleges to which she applied and thereby
flagged her score reports. She had no expectation that ACT would
include her disability status with her score reports or otherwise
ever disclose her confidential disability information.

ACT also sold the details of Halie's disabilities as part of its
enrollment management services without her knowledge or permission,
allowing colleges and scholarship organizations to exclude her on
the basis of her disability status.

"I was shocked to learn that ACT was using my disability
information against me and making it more difficult for me to get
into college and get the money I need to go to college," says Ms.
Bloom. "I'm speaking out, because I know that someone has to
stand-up for all of the students who are scared about how their
disabilities will be used against them."

Ms. Bloom, as well as the plaintiffs and subclass members named in
the lawsuit, has suffered actual damages as well as emotional
distress, anxiety, lost opportunity, frustration, humiliation, loss
of dignity and self-esteem as a direct result of ACT's unlawful
practices and are seeking restitution at trial. They are likewise
seeking a nationwide injunction to stop this practice.

                 About Panish Shea & Boyle LLP

Panish Shea & Boyle LLP -- http://www.psblaw.com-- represents
plaintiffs in wrongful death, catastrophic personal injury, product
liability, mass torts, and business litigation cases.  Firm
attorneys are repeatedly recognized for their excellence by other
trial lawyers, legal organizations and publications nationwide and
have dedicated themselves to obtaining justice for clients who are
dealing with a life-altering injury, death of a family member or
other challenges caused by the wrongful act of another.  The firm
is consistently ranked among the best plaintiff's law firms in the
country, including by U.S. News & World Report, where it has been
recognized as a Tier One law firm in the areas of Plaintiffs
Personal Injury Litigation and Plaintiffs Product Liability
Litigation, as well as by the National Law Journal which named the
firm in its Elite Trial Lawyers list.

                  About Miller Advocacy Group

Miller Advocacy Group -- http://www.milleradvocacy.com-- is a
full-service education and disability rights law firm that provides
a continuum of advocacy and counseling services designed to prepare
students for the successful transition to college and postsecondary
life.  All firm attorneys and advocates are the parents of children
with disabilities, and use their personal experience, as well as
their years of combined professional experience, to serve students
and families who need assistance navigating the educational system.
[GN]


ADVANCE AMERICA: Settles Class Action Over Interest Rates
---------------------------------------------------------
Peter Bernard, writing for WFLA, reports that check your mailbox.
You could be one of thousands of people getting money from a class
action settlement involving a payday loan company.

The settlement puts an end to nearly 2 decades of fighting over
interest rates of nearly 400 percent.

Payday lenders, doing business as "Advance America," agreed to pay
out $4.3 million.

With a baby on the way and bills piling up, Stephanie Marshall
turned to payday lender Advance America, 20 years ago, to make ends
meet.

"Every other Saturday I went to one place to the next, writing a
new check, paying the fees, rolling it over," said Marshall.

She found herself in a cycle of debt, with three payday loans and
no hope of paying them off.

"It was like a rat. I was running around in circles chasing my
tail," she said.

She has advice for those considering such a loan.

"Don't. I look there at your camera, say don't. Don't do it," said
Marshall, as she looked directly at a News Channel 8 camera.

"You need to look at exactly what you're signing up for," said
Attorney, Jesse Hoyer. Her firm is one of the companies that
handled the litigation.

She warns "mandatory arbitration agreements" in payday contracts
prevent customers from suing in a court of law.

"It's something that's actually very dangerous for consumers
because it takes away a lot of your rights," said Ms. Hoyer.

Advance America spokesman Jamie Fulmer said the settlement does not
involve any findings of wrongdoing or admission of liability. He
said Florida consumers are best served by having reliable access to
regulated short-term, small dollar credit and related financial
services.

Stephanie Marshall's payout IS $1,521.90.

When asked, "What was you're reaction?" she responded: "Thank you
Jesus."

Settlement payments range from a few hundred to $3,000.

That sounds good, but more than 100,000 customers won't get a dime,
because of that "mandatory arbitration" clause.

Jamie Fulmer, Senior Vice President of Advance America, Cash
Advance Centers, Inc. issued this statement to News Channel 8:

Advance America has agreed to settle two lawsuits in Florida that
resolve claims connected to loans made there from 1997-2001. The
settlement includes a fund from which eligible claimants can be
reimbursed. The settlement does not involve any findings of
wrongdoing or admission of liability, and Advance America continues
to believe Florida consumers are best served by having reliable
access to regulated, short-term, small-dollar credit and related
financial services. This agreement was a deliberate business
decision, which provides closure on the matters that have been
pending in Florida for nearly two decades and eliminates ongoing
costly legal expenses. [GN]


ADVANCED MICRO: Bid for Class Certification in "Dickey" Underway
----------------------------------------------------------------
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the plaintiffs in
the case, Dickey et al. v. AMD, are seeking class certification.

On October 26, 2015, a putative class action complaint captioned
Dickey et al. v. AMD, No. 15-cv-04922 was filed against the Company
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California. Plaintiffs allege that the Company misled consumers by
using the term “"ight cores" in connection with the marketing of
certain AMD FX CPUs that are based on the Company's "Bulldozer"
core architecture.

The plaintiffs allege these products cannot perform eight
calculations simultaneously, without restriction. The plaintiffs
seek to obtain damages under several causes of action for a
nationwide class of consumers who allegedly were deceived into
purchasing certain Bulldozer-based CPUs that were marketed as
containing eight cores. The plaintiffs also seek attorneys' fees.

On December 21, 2015, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, which was granted on April 7, 2016.

The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint with a narrowed
putative class definition, which the Court dismissed upon the
Company's motion on October 31, 2016.

The plaintiffs subsequently filed a second amended complaint, and
the Company filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint.
On June 14, 2017, the Court issued an order granting in part and
denying in part the Company's motion to dismiss, and allowing the
plaintiffs to move forward with a portion of their complaint.

On March 27, 2018, plaintiffs filed their motion for class
certification. The putative class definition does not encompass the
Company's RyzenTM or EPYCTM processors.

Advanced Micro Devices said, "Based upon information presently
known to management, the Company believes that the potential
liability, if any, will not have a material adverse effect on its
financial condition, cash flows or results of operations."

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. operates as a semiconductor company
worldwide. It operates in two segments, Computing and Graphics; and
Enterprise, Embedded and Semi-Custom. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
was founded in 1969 and is headquartered in Santa Clara,
California.


ADVANCED MICRO: Continues to Defend Hauck Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company still
defends against a class action suit entitled, Diana Hauck et al. v.
AMD, Inc.

Since January 19, 2018, three putative class action complaints have
been filed against the Company in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California: (1) Diana Hauck et al. v.
AMD, Inc., Case No. 5:18-cv-0047, filed on January 19, 2018; (2)
Brian Speck et al. v. AMD, Inc., Case No. 5:18-cv-0744, filed on
February 4, 2018; and (3) Nathan Barnes and Jonathan Caskey-Medina,
et al. v. AMD, Inc., Case No. 5:18-cv-00883, filed on February 9,
2018.

On April 9, 2018, the court consolidated these cases and ordered
that Diana Hauck et al. v. AMD, Inc. serve as the lead case. On
June 13, 2018, six plaintiffs (from California, Louisiana, Florida,
and Massachusetts) filed a consolidated amended complaint alleging
that the Company failed to disclose its processors' alleged
vulnerability to Spectre.

Plaintiffs further allege that the Company's processors cannot
perform at its advertised processing speeds without exposing
consumers to Spectre, and that any "patches" to remedy this
security vulnerability will result in degradation of processor
performance. The plaintiffs seek damages under several causes of
action on behalf of a nationwide class and four state subclasses
(California, Florida, Massachusetts, Louisiana) of consumers who
purchased AMD processors and/or devices containing AMD processors.
The plaintiffs also seek attorneys' fees, equitable relief, and
restitution.

Advanced Micro Devices said, "Based upon information presently
known to management, the Company believes that the potential
liability, if any, will not have a material adverse effect on its
financial condition, cash flows or results of operations."

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. operates as a semiconductor company
worldwide. It operates in two segments, Computing and Graphics; and
Enterprise, Embedded and Semi-Custom. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
was founded in 1969 and is headquartered in Santa Clara,
California.


ADVANCED MICRO: Faces Kim Class Action in California
----------------------------------------------------
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company is
facing a putative class action suit, entitled, Kim et al. v. AMD,
et al.

On January 16, 2018, a putative class action lawsuit captioned Kim
et al. v. AMD, et al., Case No. 3:18-cv-00321 was filed against the
Company in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California.

The complaint purports to assert claims against the Company and
certain individual officers for alleged violations of Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange
Act. The plaintiff seeks to represent a proposed class of all
persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's common
stock during the period February 21, 2017 through January 11, 2018.


The complaint seeks damages allegedly caused by alleged materially
misleading statements and/or material omissions by the Company and
the individual officers regarding a security vulnerability
(Spectre), which statements and omissions, the plaintiff claims,
allegedly caused the Company's common stock price to be
artificially inflated during the purported class period. The
complaint seeks unspecified compensatory damages, attorneys' fees
and costs.

Advanced Micro Devices said "Based upon information presently known
to management, the Company believes that the potential liability,
if any, will not have a material adverse effect on its financial
condition, cash flows or results of operations."

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. operates as a semiconductor company
worldwide. It operates in two segments, Computing and Graphics; and
Enterprise, Embedded and Semi-Custom. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
was founded in 1969 and is headquartered in Santa Clara,
California.


ALLERGAN INC: Settlement in Derivative Suit Has Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Southern Division, granted Final Approval of Class
Action Settlement in the case captioned IN RE ALLERGAN, INC. PROXY
VIOLATION DERIVATIVES LITIGATION, Case No. 2:17-cv-04776 DOC (KESx)
(C.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Timber Hill, LLC (Timber Hill) on behalf of itself and
the Class, on the one hand, and defendants Pershing Square Capital
Management, L.P., PS Management GP, LLC, William Ackman, PS Fund 1,
LLC, Pershing Square, L.P., Pershing Square II, L.P., Pershing
Square GP, LLC, Pershing Square Holdings, Ltd., Pershing Square
International, Ltd., Michael Pearson, Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International, and Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc.
(Defendants), on the other hand, entered into a Stipulation and
Agreement of Settlement (Stipulation) in the litigation (Action).

The Class Plaintiff's class action complaint, is dismissed in its
entirety, with prejudice, and without costs to any Settling Party,
except as otherwise provided in the Stipulation.

The Court further finds that during the course of the Action, the
Settling Parties and their respective counsel at all times complied
with the requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Upon the Effective Date, Timber Hill and each and every other Class
Member on behalf of themselves and each of their respective heirs,
executors, trustees, administrators, predecessors, successors, and
assigns, shall be deemed to have fully, finally, and forever
waived, released, discharged, and dismissed each and every one of
the Released Claims as against each and every one of the
Defendants' Released Parties and shall forever be barred, enjoined
and restrained from commencing, instituting, prosecuting or
maintaining any and all of the Released Claims against any and all
of the Defendants' Released Parties.

A separate order will be entered regarding Class Counsel's
application for attorneys' fees and payment of expenses as allowed
by the Court. A separate order shall be entered regarding the
proposed Plan of Allocation for the Net Settlement Fund. Such
orders shall in no way disturb or affect this Judgment and shall be
considered separate and apart from the Stipulation and this
Judgment.

The charges of the Claims Administrator for class notice and claims
administration services and expenses to be deducted from the
Settlement Fund shall not exceed $200,000.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 13, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybvp2cwq from Leagle.com.

Timber Hill LLC, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew J. Entwistle --
aentwistle@entwistle-law.com -- Entwistle and Cappucci LLP, pro hac
vice, Arthur V. Nealon , Entwistle and Cappucci LLP, pro hac vice,
Brendan J. Brodeur , Entwistle and Cappucci LLP, pro hac vice,
Edgar G. Sargent -- esargent@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey
LLP, pro hac vice, Joshua K. Porter , Entwistle and Cappucci LLP,
pro hac vice, Krysta Kauble Pachman -- kpachman@susmangodfrey.com
-- Susman Godfrey LLP, Robert N. Cappucci , Entwistle and Cappucci
LLP, pro hac vice, Steven G. Sklaver -- ssklaver@susmangodfrey.com
-- Susman Godfrey LLP, Vincent R. Cappucci , Entwistle and Cappucci
LLP, pro hac vice & Marc M. Seltzer , Susman Godfrey LLP.

State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio & Iowa Public Employees
Retirement System, Plaintiffs, represented by Richard D. Gluck --
Rich.Gluck@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger and Grossmann
LLP.

Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P., PS Management GP, LLC,
William Ackman, PS Fund 1, LLC, Pershing Square, L.P., Pershing
Square II, L.P., Pershing Square GP, LLC, Pershing Square
International & Pershing Square Holdings, Ltd., Defendants,
represented by Mark C. Holscher -- mark.holscher@kirkland.com --
Kirkland and Ellis LLP, Austin C. Norris --
austin.norris@kirkland.com -- Kirkland and Ellis LLP, C. Robert
Boldt -- robert.boldt@kirkland.com -- Kirkland and Ellis LLP, Jay
Bhimani -- jay.bhimani@kirkland.com -- Kirkland and Ellis LLP,
Michael J. Shipley -- michael.shipley@kirkland.com -- Kirkland and
Ellis LLP &Tanya Louise -Greene -- tanya.greene@kirkland.com --
Kirkland and Ellis LLP.


AMERISOURCEBERGEN: DOJ to Participate in Opioid Settlement Talks
----------------------------------------------------------------
AmerisourceBergen Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the U.S. Department
of Justice's motion to participate in settlement discussions has
been granted.

A significant number of counties, municipalities, and other
governmental entities in a majority of U.S. states and Puerto Rico,
as well as several states and tribes, have filed lawsuits in
various federal, state and other courts against pharmaceutical
wholesale distributors (including the Company and its subsidiary
AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation ("ABDC"), pharmaceutical
manufacturers, retail chains, medical practices, and physicians
relating to the distribution of prescription opioid pain
medications.

Additionally, several counties and municipalities have named H.D.
Smith, a subsidiary that the Company acquired in January 2018, as a
defendant in such lawsuits. Other lawsuits regarding the
distribution of prescription opioid pain medications have been
filed by: third-party payors and similar entities; hospitals;
hospital groups; and individuals, including cases styled as
putative class actions.

The lawsuits, which have been filed in federal, state, and other
courts, generally allege violations of controlled substance laws
and various other statutes as well as common law claims, including
negligence, public nuisance, and unjust enrichment, and seek
equitable relief and monetary damages.

After a motion filed by certain plaintiffs and a hearing before the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in November 2017, an
initial group of cases was consolidated for Multidistrict
Litigation ("MDL") proceedings before the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio. Additional cases have
been, and will likely continue to be, transferred to the MDL.

In April 2018, the United States, through the Department of Justice
("DOJ"), filed a motion to participate (i) in settlement
discussions and (ii) as a friend of the Court by providing
information to facilitate non-monetary remedies. The DOJ's motion
to participate in settlement discussions was granted on June 19,
2018.

On April 11, 2018, the Court issued an order creating a litigation
track, which includes dispositive motion practice, discovery, and
trials in certain bellwether jurisdictions that are scheduled to
commence in March 2019.

Dispositive motion practice and fact discovery have commenced in
certain bellwether cases. Additionally, the Court has continued to
oversee court-ordered settlement discussions with attorneys for the
plaintiffs and certain states that it instituted at the beginning
of the MDL proceedings.

AmerisourceBergen Corporation sources and distributes
pharmaceutical products in the United States and internationally.
AmerisourceBergen Corporation was founded in 1985 and is
headquartered in Chesterbrook, Pennsylvania.


ANALOGIC CORP: Kahn Swick Files Securities Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC and KSF partner, the former Attorney General
of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors with large
financial interests that they have only until August 21, 2018 to
file lead plaintiff applications in a securities class action
lawsuit against Analogic Corporation ("Analogic" or the "Company")
(NasdaqGS: ALOG) in connection with the sale of the Company to
Altaris Capital Partners, LLC. This action is pending in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.

What You May Do

If you held common stock of Analogic at the relevant times and
would like to discuss your legal rights and how this case might
affect you and your right to recover for your economic loss, you
may, without obligation or cost to you, contact KSF Managing
Partner Lewis Kahn toll-free at 1-877-515-1850 or via email
(lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com), or visit
https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqgs-alog/ to learn more. If
you wish to serve as a lead plaintiff in this class action by
overseeing lead counsel with the goal of obtaining a fair and just
resolution, you must request this position by application to the
Court by August 21, 2018.

         Lewis Kahn, Esq.
         Managing Partner
         Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC
         1100 Poydras St., Suite 3200
         New Orleans, LA 70163
         Telephone: 1-877-515-1850
         Email: lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com [GN]


ARCONIC INC: Bid to Dismiss Howard Class Action Underway
--------------------------------------------------------
Arconic Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018, that all defendants in the case, Howard v.
Arconic Inc. et al., have moved to dismiss the consolidated amended
complaint for failure to state a claim.

A purported class action complaint related to the Grenfell Tower
fire was filed on August 11, 2017 in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against Arconic Inc.
and Klaus Kleinfeld. A related purported class action complaint was
filed in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania on August 25, 2017, under the caption Sullivan v.
Arconic Inc. et al., against Arconic Inc., two former Arconic
executives, several current and former Arconic directors, and banks
that acted as underwriters for Arconic's September 18, 2014
preferred stock offering (the "Preferred Offering").

The plaintiff in Sullivan had previously filed a purported class
action against the same defendants on July 18, 2017 in the Southern
District of New York and, on August 25, 2017, voluntarily dismissed
that action without prejudice.

On February 7, 2018, on motion from certain putative class members,
the court consolidated Howard and Sullivan, closed Sullivan, and
appointed lead plaintiffs in the consolidated case. On April 9,
2018, the lead plaintiffs in the consolidated purported class
action filed a consolidated amended complaint.

The consolidated amended complaint alleges that the registration
statement for the Preferred Offering contained false and misleading
statements and omitted to state material information, including by
allegedly failing to disclose material uncertainties and trends
resulting from sales of Reynobond PE for unsafe uses and by
allegedly expressing a belief that appropriate risk management and
compliance programs had been adopted while concealing the risks
posed by Reynobond PE sales. The consolidated amended complaint
also alleges that between November 4, 2013 and June 23, 2017
Arconic and Kleinfeld made false and misleading statements and
failed to disclose material information about the Company's
commitment to safety, business and financial prospects, and the
risks of the Reynobond PE product, including in Arconic's Form
10-Ks for the fiscal years ended December 31, 2013, 2014, 2015 and
2016, its Form 10-Qs and quarterly financial press releases from
the fourth quarter of 2013 through the first quarter of 2017, its
2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 Annual Reports, and its 2016 Annual
Highlights Report.

The consolidated amended complaint seeks, among other things,
unspecified compensatory damages and an award of attorney and
expert fees and expenses.

On June 8, 2018, all defendants moved to dismiss the consolidated
amended complaint for failure to state a claim. Briefing on that
motion remains ongoing.

Arconic Inc. engineers, manufactures, and sells lightweight metals
of aluminum, titanium, and nickel worldwide. It operates through
three segments: Engineered Products and Solutions, Global Rolled
Products, and Transportation and Construction Solutions. Arconic
Inc. was founded in 2016 and is based in New York, New York.


ARP WAVE: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Christopher Lowe Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER LOWE HICKLIN DC, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ARP WAVE, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 8:18-cv-01890-T-23-CPT (M.D. Fla., August 1, 2018) alleges
that Defendant has made unsolicited calls in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

ARP Wave, LLC develops medical devices for athletes and teams
worldwide. It serves customers through the offices of doctors or
surgeons. ARP Wave, LLC was founded in 2007 and is based in Apple
Valley, Minnesota. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          ANDERSON WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: (847) 368-1500
          Facsimile: (847) 368-1501
          E-mail: rkelly@andersonwanca.com


ARRIS INT'L: Seeks 9th Circuit Review of Ruling in Reyna Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant ARRIS International Plc filed an appeal from a court
ruling in the lawsuit entitled Carlos Reyna, et al. v. ARRIS
International Plc, Case No. 5:17-cv-01834-LHK, in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, on March 31,
2017, Carlos Reyna, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated filed a putative class action lawsuit against ARRIS
alleging that the SB6190 modem which includes the Intel Puma 6
chipset is defective.  Other state court complaints have been
filed, but are stayed pending the outcome of the California action.
The Plaintiff alleges violation of the California Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act, California Consumer Legal Remedies Act,
California False Advertising Law, and California Unfair Competition
Law.

The appellate case is captioned as Carlos Reyna, et al. v. ARRIS
International Plc, Case No. 18-80099, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents CARLOS REYNA, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, et al., are represented by:

          Willem Jonckheer, Esq.
          Noah Schubert, Esq.
          SCHUBERT JONCKHEER & KOLBE LLP
          Three Embarcadero Center
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 788-4220
          E-mail: wjonckheer@sjk.law
                  nschubert@sjk.law

Defendant-Petitioner ARRIS INTERNATIONAL PLC is represented by:

          Nancy Louise Stagg, Esq.
          KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP
          11225 El Camino Real, Suite 250
          San Diego, CA 92130
          Telephone: (858) 350-6156
          E-mail: nstagg@kilpatricktownsend.com


ARYZTA AMERICAS: Sued Over Racial Hiring Discrimination
-------------------------------------------------------
Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, writing for Chicago Tribune, reports that a
lawsuit seeking class action status alleges black job candidates
were passed over in favor of Hispanic workers at two Chicago-area
bakeries that hired through staffing agencies to hide the
discriminatory practices.

The lawsuit, filed on Aug. 6 in Chicago federal court, alleges that
systemic racial discrimination occurred from 2014 through early
2018 at the Cloverhill industrial baking factories in Chicago's
Galewood neighborhood on the Northwest Side and in west suburban
Cicero, which at the time were owned by Swiss parent company
Aryzta.

Aryzta in February sold the Galewood bakery to Hostess Brands for
about $25 million and the Cicero plant to Bimbo Bakeries for an
undisclosed sum.

The lawsuit names as defendants Aryzta and two staffing agencies,
Labor Network and Metro Staffing Service. Hostess and Bimbo are not
named in the lawsuit.

The attorney behind the lawsuit, Christopher Williams, has filed
numerous racial discrimination claims against Chicago companies
that use temporary staffing firms. A suit he brought against
Ferrara Candy resulted in a $1.54 million settlement in 2016 for a
class of African-Americans who applied and were denied by the
company over a period of six years.

The plaintiff in the new suit, Anthony Stewart, who is black,
alleges that Aryzta conspired with Labor Network and Metro Staffing
to weed out African-American workers seeking assignments at the
bakeries.

Mr. Stewart, 59, who lives in the Austin community, alleges he went
to both the Galewood and Cicero plants seeking work starting in
2014 and was told he must apply through Metro Staffing's dispatch
office. He alleges he was never told about an on-site dispatch
office run by Labor Network in the parking lot of Aryzta, where, he
alleges, only nonblack workers were sent.

Despite returning repeatedly to Metro Staffing over the next three
years seeking work, Mr. Stewart alleges in court documents that he
never got an assignment. His suit alleges that on some occasions,
Hispanic laborers were immediately assigned to work after filling
out an application even though he and other black laborers had been
in the office longer that day.

Mr. Stewart, who currently works as an assistant chef on the boats
at Navy Pier, said at a news conference on Aug. 7 announcing the
lawsuit that he wanted to work at Aryzta because it is in his
neighborhood, and commuting long distances is expensive. He has
food and warehouse management skills that would qualify him for the
jobs, and at first he thought his age might be working against him,
but he noticed that young black men were also being passed over.

Mr. Stewart said he is not angry at the Hispanic workers, but at
the companies who don't give everyone a fair shot.

"This is not a black or white or brown thing, it's a green thing,"
Stewart said on Aug. 7. "It's all about money. Everyone wants to
work."

Aryzta said in an emailed statement that it cannot comment on the
specific allegations, as it has not yet been served with the
complaint.

"However, ARYZTA values diversity and treats all individuals with
respect," the company statement said. "We are an equal opportunity
employer and make all employment decisions on the basis of merit
and business needs."

Labor Network and Metro Staffing could not be reached for comment.

Mr. Stewart's filing includes, as an exhibit, an unrelated
breach-of-contract lawsuit filed in September by a consulting
company that Aryzta had hired to help it reduce waste and improve
efficiency. In its suit, Georgia-based Klin Konsept Consulting
Services says the majority of tenured and experienced employees at
Aryzta were Hispanics without legal immigration status, who had
been placed by Labor Network.

The Klin Konsept lawsuit alleges that Aryzta changed its talent
sourcing strategy in 2017 "to protect the business from imminent
talent loss due to immigration status of talented and key operators
and supervisors," which resulted in increased costs that were
beyond the consultant's control. The bakery started sourcing more
black workers from Metro Staffing, which charged more, and paying
more to existing Hispanic workers to train the new workers.

The result, the Klin lawsuit alleges, was that "the bakery
employees were divided along ethnic lines."

The change increased costs and turnover and reduced productivity,
according to the Klin Konsept lawsuit, which claims it is owed more
than $125,000 by Aryzta for meeting targets set before the labor
changes took place.

The Galewood bakery lost 800 employees, about a third of its
workforce, last year after an immigration audit on a labor
supplier, Aryzta reported in its annual report.

Stewart's lawsuit alleges that, before Aryzta changed labor
strategy last year, it requested that both Metro Staffing and Labor
Network provide primarily nonblack workers and that the agencies
complied.

In addition to violating civil rights, the lawsuit alleges the
companies engaged in racketeering. By using the staffing agencies,
the lawsuit alleges, Aryzta could avoid revealing the true racial
composition of its workforce to the government, which companies of
a certain size are required to do by federal law to help regulatory
agencies enforce anti-discrimination laws.

The suit seeks back pay from the denial of employment, as well as
punitive damages.

Though Hostess was not named in the lawsuit, activists called on
the new owner of the Galewood bakery to follow through on promises
it has made to improve conditions at the plant.

Activists from the group Black Workers Matter, which was formed on
Chicago's West Side three years ago to fight discriminatory hiring
practices and organized the Aug. 7 news conference, delivered a
petition to the front door of the Galewood bakery seeking "fair
supervision" at the factory, which includes no favoritism in
schedules or job assignments and consistency enforcing rules.

Matt Hall, vice president of human resources at Kansas City,
Mo.-based Hostess Brands, greeted the activists with a fact sheet
listing dozens of reforms the company has made since taking over in
February. Among them are hiring a new head of human resources at
the bakery, converting longtime temporary employees to permanent
full-time employees, making more people eligible for health and
retirement benefits, and giving bonuses and wage increases. The
bakery employs 600 full-time employees and 80 temps, a spokeswoman
said.

"While we cannot speak to the practices or principles of previous
owners, our six-month track record clearly demonstrates our
commitment," the Hostess fact sheet said. "We believe strongly in
operating facilities free from harassment or discrimination of any
kind. We have met every employee in the facility and communicated
this message strongly with clear direction on how to report any
violations of these policies."

Black Workers Matter organizer Mikala Barrett said the reforms are
an improvement but expressed disappointment that the company has
still not complied with a central request that Hostess schedule the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to do an anti-racism
training for all managers and supervisors. [GN]


AT&T INC: Appeal in DirectTV's NFL Ticket Package Suit Pending
--------------------------------------------------------------
AT&T Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018, that the appeal related to DirectTV's NFL
Ticket Package suit has been fully briefed and the company
anticipates the oral argument will occur in 2019.

More than two dozen putative class actions were filed in the U.S.
District Courts for the Central District of California and the
Southern District of New York against DIRECTV and the National
Football League (NFL).

These cases were brought by residential and commercial DIRECTV
subscribers that have purchased NFL SUNDAY TICKET. The plaintiffs
allege that (i) the 32 NFL teams have unlawfully agreed not to
compete with each other in the market for nationally televised NFL
football games and instead have "pooled" their broadcasts and
assigned to the NFL the exclusive right to market them; and (ii)
the NFL and DIRECTV have entered into an unlawful exclusive
distribution agreement that allows DIRECTV to charge
"supra-competitive" prices for the NFL SUNDAY TICKET package. The
complaints seek unspecified treble damages and attorneys' fees
along with injunctive relief.

The first complaint, Abrahamian v. National Football League, Inc.,
et al., was served in June 2015. In December 2015, the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the cases outside the
Central District of California to that court for consolidation and
management of pre-trial proceedings.

The company vigorously dispute the allegations the complaints have
asserted. In August 2016, DIRECTV filed a motion to compel
arbitration and the NFL defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint. In June 2017, the court granted the NFL defendants'
motion to dismiss the complaint without leave to amend, finding
that: (1) the plaintiffs did not plead a viable market; (2) the
plaintiffs did not plead facts supporting the contention that the
exclusive agreement between the NFL and DIRECTV harms competition;
(3) the claims failed to overcome the fact that the NFL and its
teams must cooperate to sell broadcasts; and (4) the plaintiffs do
not have standing to challenge the horizontal agreement among the
NFL and the teams.

In light of the order granting the motion to dismiss, the court
denied DIRECTV's motion to compel arbitration as moot. In July
2017, plaintiffs filed an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, which is pending.

AT&T said "The appeal has been fully briefed and we anticipate the
oral argument will occur in 2019."

AT&T Inc. provides communications and digital entertainment
services. The company operates through four segments: Business
Solutions, Entertainment Group, Consumer Mobility, and
International.  The company was formerly known as SBC
Communications Inc. and changed its name to AT&T Inc. in November
2005. AT&T Inc. was founded in 1983 and is based in Dallas, Texas.


ATOSSA GENETICS: Court Enters Final Judgment in Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Ricardo S. Martinez of the U.S. District Court for the
Western district of Washington, has entered Order and Final
Judgment in the case, In re Atossa Genetics, Inc. Securities
Litigation, Civil Action No. 13-cv-01836-RSM (W.D. Wash.).

The Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement dated March 23, 2018,
of the captioned consolidated class action and the settlement
contemplated therein, entered into by the Parties through their
undersigned counsel, was presented for hearing on July 20, 2018,
pursuant to the Order Preliminarily Approving Settlement and
Authorizing Notice and Scheduling Settlement Hearing entered on
April 13, 2018.

Judge Martinez finds that the Settlement and all transactions
preparatory or incident thereto, are fair, reasonable, adequate,
and in the best interests of the Class.  Accordingly, he approved
the Settlement in all respects pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(e).  The Parties to the Stipulation are authorized and
directed to comply with and to consummate the Settlement in
accordance with its terms and provisions.

The Judge dismissed with prejudice on the merits.  The Parties are
to bear their own costs, except as provided in the Order and Final
Judgment.  The plan of allocation for the Settlement Fund as set
forth in the Notice is approved, and the Lead Counsel and the
Claims Administrator are directed to administer the Stipulation in
accordance with its terms and provisions.

Without further Order of the Court, the parties may agree to
reasonable extensions of time or other reasonable modifications
necessary to carry out any of the provisions of the Settlement.
There is no reason for delay in the entry of the Order and Final
Judgment and immediate entry and docketing by the Clerk of the
Court is directed.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 20, 2018 Order and Final
Judgment is available at https://is.gd/IQJKbU from Leagle.com.

Miko Levi, Bandar Almosa & Gregory Harrison, Movants, represented
by Jacob A. Walker -- jake@blockesq.com -- BLOCK & LEVITON LLP, pro
hac vice, Jeffrey C. Block -- jeff@blockesq.com -- BLOCK & LEVITON
LLP, pro hac vice, Marc I. Gross -- igross@jrlawplc.com --
POMERANTZ LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Jonathan Wernke, POMERANTZ
LLP, pro hac vice & Dan Drachler -- ddrachler@zsz.com -- ZWERLING
SCHACHTER & ZWERLING.

Hai Dam, Movant, represented by Nicholas I. Porritt --
nporritt@zlk.com -- LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP, pro hac vice & Clifford
A. Cantor .

Nicholas Cook, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy A. Lieberman
-- jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- POMERANATZ LLP, pro hac vice, Marc I.
Gross, POMERANTZ LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Jonathan Wernke,
POMERANTZ LLP, pro hac vice & Dan Drachler, ZWERLING SCHACHTER &
ZWERLING.

David Chobanian, Plaintiff, pro se.

Atossa Genetics, Inc. & Steven C. Quay, an individual, Defendants,
represented by Barry M. Kaplan -- bkaplan@wsgr.com -- WILSON
SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, Christopher M. Petroni --
cpetroni@wsgr.com -- WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI & Gregory
Lewis Watts -- gwatts@wsgr.com -- WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH &
ROSATI.


BECTON DICKINSON: Agreement Reached in 14,944 Women's Health Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Becton, Dickinson and Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the Company has
reached agreements or agreements in principle approximately 14,944
of the Women's Health Product Claims.

As of June 30, 2018, the Company is defending approximately 1,522
product liability claims involving Bard's line of pelvic mesh
devices. The majority of those claims are currently pending in a
federal MDL in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, but claims are also pending in other
state and/or federal court jurisdictions, including a coordinated
proceeding in New Jersey State Court.

In addition, those claims include putative class actions filed in
the United States. Not included in the figures above are
approximately 1,063 filed and unfiled claims that have been
asserted or threatened against Bard but lack sufficient information
to determine whether a Bard pelvic mesh device is actually at
issue. The claims identified above also include products
manufactured by both Bard and two subsidiaries of Medtronic plc (as
successor in interest to Covidien plc) ("Medtronic"), each a
supplier of Bard.

Medtronic has an obligation to defend and indemnify Bard with
respect to any product defect liability relating to products its
subsidiaries had manufactured. In July 2015 the Company reached an
agreement with Medtronic (which was amended in June 2017) regarding
certain aspects of Medtronic's indemnification obligation. The
foregoing lawsuits, unfiled claims, putative class actions, and
other claims, together with claims that have settled or are the
subject of agreements or agreements in principle to settle, are
referred to collectively as the "Women’s Health Product Claims."


The Women's Health Product Claims generally seek damages for
personal injury allegedly resulting from use of the products.

As of June 30, 2018, the Company has reached agreements or
agreements in principle with various plaintiffs' law firms to
settle their respective inventories of cases totaling approximately
14,944 of the Women's Health Product Claims.

The Company believes that these Women's Health Product Claims are
not the subject of Medtronic's indemnification obligation. These
settlement agreements and agreements in principle include unfiled
and previously unknown claims held by various plaintiffs' law
firms, which are not included in the approximate number of lawsuits
set forth in the first paragraph of this section. Each agreement is
subject to certain conditions, including requirements for
participation in the proposed settlements by a certain minimum
number of plaintiffs.

The Company continues to engage in discussions with other
plaintiffs' law firms regarding potential resolution of unsettled
Women's Health Product Claims, which may include additional
inventory settlements.

Becton, Dickinson and Company develops, manufactures, and sells
medical supplies, devices, laboratory equipment, and diagnostic
products worldwide. It operates in two segments, BD Medical and BD
Life Sciences. Becton, Dickinson and Company was founded in 1897
and is based in Franklin Lakes, New Jersey.


BECTON DICKINSON: Faces 2,299 Hernia Product Claims at June 30
--------------------------------------------------------------
Becton, Dickinson and Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that as of June 30, 2018,
the Company is defending approximately 2,299 product liability
claims involving Bard's line of hernia repair devices
(collectively, the "Hernia Product Claims").

The majority of those claims are currently pending in a coordinated
proceeding in Rhode Island State Court, but claims are also pending
in other state and/or federal court jurisdictions. In addition,
those claims include multiple putative class actions in Canada.
Generally, the Hernia Product Claims seek damages for personal
injury allegedly resulting from use of the products. From time to
time, the Company engages in resolution discussions with
plaintiffs' law firms regarding certain of the Hernia Product
Claims, but the Company also intends to vigorously defend Hernia
Product Claims that do not settle, including through litigation.

Trials are scheduled throughout 2019 in various state and federal
courts. The Company expects additional trials of Hernia Product
Claims to take place over the next 12 months.

On April 11, 2018, plaintiffs' attorneys filed a request for the
creation of a new hernia multi-district litigation ("MDL") in
either the Southern District of Ohio or the Western District of
Missouri, and a hearing was scheduled on July 26, 2018 to address
the creation and location of that MDL.

The Company cannot give any assurances that the resolution of the
Hernia Product Claims that have not settled, including asserted and
unasserted claims and the putative class action lawsuits, will not
have a material adverse effect on the Company's business, results
of operations, financial condition and/or liquidity.

Becton, Dickinson and Company develops, manufactures, and sells
medical supplies, devices, laboratory equipment, and diagnostic
products worldwide. It operates in two segments, BD Medical and BD
Life Sciences. Becton, Dickinson and Company was founded in 1897
and is based in Franklin Lakes, New Jersey.


BECTON DICKINSON: Wins Favorable Ruling in Filter Products Trial
----------------------------------------------------------------
Becton, Dickinson and Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that a jury in the second
MDL trial in the Filter Product Claims unanimously found in favor
of the Company on all claims.

As of June 30, 2018, the Company is defending approximately 4,192
product liability claims involving Bard's line of inferior vena
cava filters (collectively, the "Filter Product Claims"). The
majority of those claims are currently pending in an MDL in the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona, but
claims are also pending in other state and/or federal court
jurisdictions, including a coordinated proceeding in Arizona State
Court.

In addition, those claims include putative class actions filed in
the United States and Canada. The Filter Product Claims generally
seek damages for personal injury allegedly resulting from use of
the products. The Company has limited information regarding the
nature and quantity of certain of the Filter Product Claims.

The Company continues to receive claims and lawsuits and may in
future periods learn additional information regarding other unfiled
or unknown claims, or other lawsuits, which could materially impact
the Company's estimate of the number of claims or lawsuits against
the Company.

Trials are scheduled throughout 2018 in the MDL and state courts.
On March 30, 2018, a jury in the first MDL trial found the Company
liable for negligent failure to warn and entered a verdict in favor
of plaintiffs. The jury found the Company was not liable for (a)
strict liability design defect; (b) strict liability failure to
warn; and (c) negligent design.

The Company intends to challenge that verdict.

On June 1, 2018, a jury in the second MDL trial unanimously found
in favor of the Company on all claims.

The Company expects additional trials of Filter Product Claims may
take place over the next 12 months.

Becton, Dickinson and Company develops, manufactures, and sells
medical supplies, devices, laboratory equipment, and diagnostic
products worldwide. It operates in two segments, BD Medical and BD
Life Sciences. Becton, Dickinson and Company was founded in 1897
and is based in Franklin Lakes, New Jersey.


BRISTOL BAY: Filing of 2nd Amended A. Abikar Suit Denied
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ABUCAR NUNOW ABIKAR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BRISTOL
BAY NATIVE CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, Case No.
3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS (S.D. Cal.), Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denied
without prejudice the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint.

The Plaintiffs filed the putative class action on May 18, 2017,
asserting claims of discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C.
Section 1981.  The Defendants in the case are Bristol Bay Native
Corp. ("BBNC"), Glacier Technical Solutions, LLC ("GTS"), and
Workforce Resources, LLC .  

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants, the Plaintiffs'
employers, discriminated against them on the basis of race, color,
national origin, gender, sex, and religion, and also retaliated
against them for speaking out against such discrimination.  The
Plaintiffs amended their claim as a matter of course on Oct. 6,
2017, adding claims under California's Fair Employment and Housing
Act ("FEHA".

On Jan. 9, 2018, the Court granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' First Amended
Complaint.  In that order, the Court dismissed a sizable portion of
the Plaintiffs' claims.  It dismissed their Title VII claims
because, under 43 U.S.C. Section 1626(g), Title VII does not govern
the actions of the Defendants as employers.

On May 22, 2018, the Plaintiffs moved for leave to file a second
amended complaint.  The Proposed Second Amended Complaint ("PSAC"),
attached to the motion, adds claims of (1) breach of contract and
(2) fraud and deceit.  

The PSAC lists three such representations: (1) a poster in GTS's
Oceanside office stating that employees experiencing discrimination
should contact the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"); (2) Workforce's employee handbook, which stated, inter
alia, that no Workforce employee will discriminate against a fellow
employee because of race, religion, color, sex, national origin,
age, disability, veteran's or any other legally-protected status;
and (3) BBNC's website, which, at the time the FAC was filed,
included a statement that BBNC was an equal opportunity employer.


The PSAC alleges that these representations created a contractual
obligation on the part of the Defendants to comply with Title VII
by avoiding discrimination and providing the Plaintiffs with
remedies if they experienced discrimination.  It also alleges that
the Plaintiffs relied on these representations when they accepted
employment with the Defendants.  According to the PSAC, the
Defendants breached these contractual obligations by taking the
position in their earlier motion to dismiss that the Plaintiffs are
not entitled to Title VII's protections.

The proposed fraud and deceit claim is based on the same factual
premise.  The PSAC alleges that the representations discussed were
false because the Plaintiffs were, in fact, not covered by Title
VII, and that the Defendants knowingly made these false statements
to induce the Plaintiffs to accept and continue their employment by
the Defendants.  According to the PSAC, the Plaintiffs did not
discover this fraud until they unsuccessfully sought redress as a
result of experiencing discrimination.

The Defendants argue, inter alia, that the Plaintiffs should not be
granted leave to file the PSAC because amending the complaint as
proposed would be futile.

Considering the PSAC as proposed, Judge Curiel agrees that the
PSAC's proposed breach of contract claim does not state a plausible
claim for relief.  First, because the PSAC does not allege any
breach of a promise made in the subject poster, the poster cannot
serve as the basis for a breach of contract claim.  Second,
Workforce's employee handbook did not create a contract with the
Plaintiffs because the handbook expressly stated that its contents
do not create a contract with Workforce's employees.  Last, the
statement on BBNC's website regarding discrimination, without
further supporting allegations, does not alleged a contract between
BBNC and the Plaintiffs.  In sum, the PSAC, as currently proposed,
does not present a plausible claim for breach of contract.
Amending the FAC to add such a claim would therefore be futile.

As to the second claim the Plaintiffs seek to add, fraud and
deceit, the Judge finds that PSAC's allegations cannot support a
fraud and deceit claim.  First, the poster at GTS' office cannot
support a claim for fraud because there is no allegation in the
PSAC that the Defendants did anything contrary to what the poster
stated.  Second, Workforce's handbook could not have induced any
reliance.  Last, the statement on BBNC's website cannot support a
fraud claim because there is no allegation that any of the
Plaintiffs viewed the statement. Without at least enabling the
inference that anyone viewed the statement, the Plaintiffs cannot
allege reliance.

For the reasons stated, Jugde Curiel holds that permitting the
Plaintiffs to file the PSAC as it is currently composed would be
futile.  Additional factual allegations, however, might enable them
to assert a plausible claim of breach of contract and/or fraud and
deceit.  As a result, he denied the motion to amend without
prejudice.  If the Plaintiffs wish to seek further amendment of the
operative complaint, they must do so within 14 days of the date the
Order is issued.

In their opposition to this motion, the Defendants highlight the
fact that the Plaintiffs' counsel has consistently failed to meet
Court-established deadlines in the case and has failed to adhere to
the Court's local rules.  The Judge acknowledges this pattern of
conduct, and it warns the Plaintiffs' counsel that it is unlikely
to grant a last-minute (or untimely) request to extend the deadline
for filing any further motion to amend the complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 20, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/OJWLmc from Leagle.com.

Abucar Nunow Abikar, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Barkadle Sheikh Muhamed Awmagan, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Arab Mursal Deh, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Majuma
Madende, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Osman Musa Mohamed, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Osman Musa Muganga, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Rukia Musa, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated & Fatuma Somow, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by David J. Duchrow -- djduchrow@yahoo.com -- Law
Offices of David J. Duchrow & Marilynn Mika Spencer --
mspencer@thespencerlawfirm.com -- The Spencer Law Firm.

Bristol Bay Native Corporation, Glacier Technical Solutions, LLC &
Workforce Resources, LLC, Defendants, represented by Amy Todd-Gher
-- atodd-gher@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C & Ruth Dapper
-- rdapper@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson.


BT GROUP: NJ District Court Dismisses Securities Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP, in an article for Mondaq, reports that on
August 1, 2018, Judge Kevin McNulty of the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed without prejudice a
putative securities class action asserting claims under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act against the telecommunications
company BT Group PLC and certain of its officers.  Plaintiffs, who
purchased BT Group American Depository Receipts ("ADRs"), based
their claims on allegations that defendants made a series of
misstatements between 2013 and 2017 relating to control problems at
a BT Group subsidiary in Italy.  Christian v. BT Group plc, No.
17-cv-497 (KM-JBC) (D.N.J. Aug. 1, 2018).  The Court held that
plaintiffs failed to adequately allege scienter and therefore
dismissed the action.

In October 2016, BT Group (formerly known as British Telecom)
announced that it would take a write-down of £145 million due to
"certain historical accounting errors" at its BT Italy division
which were identified through an internal investigation following
"allegations of inappropriate management behavior."  Slip op. at
3-4.  In January 2017, BT Group announced that the write-down was
being increased to GBP530 million.  Id. at 4.  BT Group explained
at that time that the "extent and complexity of inappropriate
behavior" was greater than previously identified, and revealed
"improper accounting practices and a complex set of improper sales,
purchase, factoring, and leasing transactions" resulting in the
overstatement of earnings at BT Italy over a number of years.  Id.

Plaintiffs attempted to establish scienter with respect to the
individual defendants by arguing that they knew, or were reckless
in ignoring, significant concerns that were raised in the BT Group
Audit Committee's annual reports.  Id. at 10.  For example, each
annual report from 2013 to 2016 noted that monitoring BT's
operations in Italy had been a particular focus, and several of
those reports also stated that "progress has been made to improve
the control environment."  Id. at 10-11.  Plaintiffs argued that BT
Group was put on notice of fraud at BT Italy through the Audit
Committee's monitoring and that the individual defendants were
reckless in failing to discover and disclose the fraud.  The Court,
however, found that the "more reasonable inference" was that the
individual defendants were unaware of the fraud or other problems
at BT Italy, given that BT Italy was one of 300 BT Group
subsidiaries and the reports in question merely noted "potential
control issues" and in themselves "did not reveal fraud or point
out problems with the company's core operations or products."  Id.
at 12-13.  The Court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that the
individual defendants should have inquired about the situation at
BT Italy sooner, characterizing that argument as merely alleging
mismanagement.

In addition, the Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that
"corporate scienter" could be imputed to BT Group.  The Court noted
that the Third Circuit had neither accepted nor rejected the
doctrine, but had suggested that a plaintiff might invoke the
doctrine in "unique and extraordinary circumstances."  Id. at 14
(citing City of Roseville Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Horizon Lines, LLC,
442 F. App'x 672, 676 (3d Cir. 2011)).  The Court further explained
that courts outside the Third Circuit that had permitted plaintiffs
to plead "corporate scienter" without successfully pleading
scienter against any individual defendant still required a strong
inference that someone in the corporation -- whether or not that
person was named as an individual defendant -- acted with scienter.
Id. at 13.  The Court thus held that, even if "corporate scienter"
were to be permitted within the Third Circuit, plaintiffs'
allegations would be insufficient.  Id. at 5.  For example, the
Court found that (i) various allegations about the knowledge and
actions of individuals at BT Group's subsidiaries could not be
imputed to the officers of the BT Group parent company, and (ii) a
reduction in pay to BT Group executives merely reflected actual
financial results after taking account of the write-downs
necessitated by the fraud, as opposed to an indication that those
executives had participated in the fraud.  Id. at 15-17.  Citing
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323
(2007), the Court found that, "taken collectively," the allegations
were not "so fundamental and pervasive as to support an inference
of corporate scienter," and in fact an opposing inference was "at
least as likely."  Slip op. at 17.  The Court therefore granted
defendants' motion to dismiss, while permitting plaintiffs to file
an amended complaint within 30 days.

This decision is a reminder that, in the parent-subsidiary context,
the relative scale of control issues at a subsidiary will affect
whether an inference of scienter is reasonable as to individual
defendants at the parent, and also that corporate scienter will not
be lightly inferred at the parent level without a compelling
inference of scienter on the part of officers of the parent company
itself. [GN]


CACERES INTERIOR: Underpays Plaster Finishers, Pacheco et al. Say
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SANTIAGO US PACHECO; and EDA PATRICIA FIGUEROA VELASQUEZ;
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs vs. CACERES INTERIOR PARTITIONS, INC.; JORGE E CACERES,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-23127-CMA (S.D. Fla., August 1, 2018)
is an action against the Defendants for failure to pay overtime
compensation and minimum wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as plaster
finishers. Mr. Pacheco was employed from November 1, 2017 to May
29, 2018; and Ms. Figueroa Velasquez from November 1, 2017 to March
28, 2018.

Caceres Interior Partitions, Inc. is a Florida corporation doing
business in Dade County. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          J.H. Zidell, Esq.
          J.H. ZIDELL, P.A.
          300 71st Street, Suite 605
          Miami Beach, FL 33141
          Telephone: (305) 865-6766
          Facsimile: (305) 865-7167
          Email: ZABOGADO@AOL.COM


CALIFORNIA: A. Cejas's Suit May Proceed in Forma Pauperis
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANDREW A. CEJAS, CDCR #F-34368, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT
BROWN; FABRICE HADJADJ; J. DAVIES; P. COVELLO, Defendants, Case No.
3:18-cv-00543-WQH-JLB (S.D. Cal.), Judge William Q. Hayes of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California (i)
denied Cejas's Motions for Joinder; and (ii) granted Cejas's Motion
to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP Motion").

The Plaintiff proceeding pro se and incarcerated at Richard J.
Donovan Correctional Facility ("RJD") in San Diego, California, has
filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
against Defendants Robert Brown, Fabrice Hadjadj, J. Davies, and P.
Covello.

Cejas claims RJD officials violated his right to free exercise of
his Buddhist faith under the First Amendment, imposed a substantial
burden on the exercise of that faith in violation of the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), and denied
him equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment from
2016 through 2018.

Cejas did not prepay the $400 civil filing fee required by 28
U.S.C. Section 1914(a) at the time of filing; instead, he has filed
his IFP Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a).  He has also
filed two Motions seeking permission to join three similar pending
civil rights actions filed by his fellow inmates Robert McCullock,
James Austin, and Zachary Harmon together with his own; or in the
alternative, to certify his case as a class action.  McCullock,
Austin, and Harmon have all submitted Declarations in Support of
Cejas's Motions.

In support of his IFP Motion, Cejas has submitted a copy of his
CDCR Inmate Statement Report as well as a Prison Certificate
completed by an accounting officer at RJD.  These statements show
that Cejas has carried no average monthly balance, has had no
monthly deposits to his account over the 6-month period immediately
preceding the filing of his Complaint, and had no available balance
on the books at the time of filing.  Based on this accounting, no
initial partial filing fee is assessed.  Therefore, Judge Hayes
will grant Cejas' IFM Motion, will decline to exact any initial
filing fee.

The Judge also finds that Cejas' Complaint contains sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to allege First Amendment free
exercise, RLUIPA, and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims
for relief that are plausible on their face," and therefore,
sufficient to survive the sua sponte screening required by 28
U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).  Therefore, he will order
the U.S. Marshal to effect service upon the Defendants on Cejas'
behalf.

To the extent Cejas, who is proceeding pro se, seeks class
certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, his request must be
denied.  Pro se litigants have no authority to represent the legal
interest of any other party.  Therefore, because only Cejas is a
proper plaintiff to the action at this time, his request to
represent himself, McCullock, Austin, and Harmon as a class
representative will be denied.

As to Cejas' requests that his case be joined together with the
cases filed McCullock, Austin, and Harmon pursuant to Rule 20(a)(1)
on the grounds that the cases involve common questions of law and
fact and arise out of the same series of transactions and
occurrences, the Judge will deny the motions without prejudice.  He
says although Cejas, McCullock, Austin, and Harmon all allege that
RJD's implementation of its religious policies violates their
rights to free exercise of their Buddhist faith, determining
whether each individual Plaintiff's right under the First Amendment
and the RLUIPA have been violated will require an individualized
consideration of the facts regarding the specific burdens
Defendants allegedly placed on each of their sincerely held
religious beliefs and/or practices.  Each Plaintiff's equal
protection claim will require a similar individualized analysis as
to the Defendants' alleged intent to discriminate against them as
members of a protected class, and the harm each may have suffered
as a result.  Moreover, each Plaintiff must have exhausted
available administrative remedies prior to filing their respective
suits.

For the reasons he discussed, Judge Hayes denied Cejas' Motions for
Joinder, and granted Cejas' Motion to Proceed IFP.  He directed the
Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from Cejas'
prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in the case by
garnishing monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to
20% of the preceding month's income and forwarding those payments
to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account
exceeds $10.  All payments will be clearly identified by the name
and number assigned to the action.  The Judge also directed the
Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of the Order on Scott Kernan,
Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California,
94283-0001;

He further directed the Clerk to issue a summons as to Cejas'
Complaint and forward it to Cejas along with a blank U.S. Marshal
Form 285 for each named Defendant.  In addition, the Clerk will
provide Cejas with a certified copy of the Order, a certified copy
of his Complaint, and the summons so that he may serve Defendants.
Upon receipt of the "IFP Package," Cejas must complete each Form
285 as completely and accurately as possible, include an address
where each Defendant may be served, and return them to the United
States Marshal according to the instructions the Clerk provides in
the letter accompanying his IFP package.

The U.S. Marshal will serve a copy of the Complaint and summons
upon Defendants as directed by Cejas on the USM Form 285s provided
to him.  All costs of that service will be advanced by the United
States.  The Defendants, once served, will reply to Cejas'
Complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions of
Rule 12(a).

Cejas, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to
serve upon the Defendants, or, if appearance has been entered by
the counsel, upon the Defendants' counsel, a copy of every further
pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the Court's
consideration pursuant to Rule 5(b).  Cejas must include with every
original document that he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court
a certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy
of that document has been was served on the Defendants or their
counsel, and the date of that service.  Any document received by
the Court which has not been properly filed with the Clerk, or
which fails to include a Certificate of Service upon the
Defendants, may be disregarded.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 20, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Qscpch from Leagle.com.

Andrew A. Cejas, Plaintiff, pro se.


CASHCALL INC: Calif. High Court Reverses Summary Ruling in UCL Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of California reversed the District Court
judgment granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
EDUARDO DE LA TORRE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CASHCALL,
INC., Defendant and Respondent, No. S241434 (Cal.).

The Plaintiffs allege that CashCall violated California's Unfair
Competition Law (UCL). The UCL defines "unfair competition" to
include "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or
practice."  The Plaintiffs bring their claim under the unlawful
prong of the UCL and assert that CashCall's lending practice was
unlawful because it violated section 22302, the section that
applies the unconscionability doctrine to consumer loans.  The
court granted CashCall's motion for summary judgment.

The Plaintiffs appealed. After reviewing the parties' arguments,
the Ninth Circuit certified to the state Supreme Court this
question: Can the interest rate on consumer loans of $2500 or more
governed by California Finance Code Section 22303, render the loans
unconscionable under California Finance Code  Section 22302?

The answer is yes.

An interest rate on a loan is the price of that loan, and it is
clear that the price term, like any other term in a contract, may
be unconscionable.

An interest rate is the price charged for lending a particular
amount of money to a given individual or entity.

CashCall's arguments to the contrary fail to persuade the Court.
Although section 22303 sets maximum interest rates only on loans
less than $2,500, whether an interest rate is unconscionable is
fundamentally a different inquiry than whether the rate exceeds a
numerical cap. Unconscionability is a flexible standard in which
the court looks not only at the complained-of term but also at the
process by which the contractual parties arrived at the agreement
and the larger context surrounding the contract, including its
commercial setting, purpose, and effect.

In contrast, an interest rate cap is a bright-line rule policing a
single facet of loan agreement. As such, just because loans of at
least $2,500 are not subject to a numerical ceiling on the interest
rate does not mean that they cannot be found unconscionable. The
Legislature made this clear when it enacted section 22302 which
applies the unconscionability doctrine to all consumer loans  at
the same time that it lifted interest caps on loans exceeding
$2,500.

So the Court concludes plaintiffs have indeed stated a cause of
action in this litigation by bringing an unfair competition claim
that alleges a violation of section 22302 due to an unconscionably
high interest rate. To arrive at this conclusion, the Court
considers the Financial Code, the UCL, and the unconscionability
doctrine itself.

In 1985, the Legislature approved Senate Bill 447, enacting into
law the current versions of sections 22302 and 22303. Before the
bill's passage, the Legislature had set maximum interest rates for
consumer loans up to $5,000. The bill, as codified at section
22303, lowered this threshold to $2,500.

Just as the Legislature was enacting section 22303, it also
approved an amendment with precisely the same language found in
section 22302 today. The amendment (now section 22302) consists of
two subdivisions. The first subdivision applies the
unconscionability doctrine to consumer loans.  The second provides
that an unconscionable loan violates the consumer lending law and
subjects the lender to the remedies specified in this division.

By incorporating Civil Code section 1670.5, section 22302 applies
the unconscionability doctrine to contract terms in a consumer loan
agreement. To wit: unconscionability applies to the provisions of a
loan contract that is subject to this division. The division at
issue is Division 9 of the Financial Code, the part of the Code
that regulates loans made to consumers. Not only does section 22302
apply the unconscionability doctrine to consumer loans, it applies
the doctrine to the provisions of a loan contract, one of which is
undeniably the interest rate on the loan.   

So under its ordinary terms, section 22302 applies the
unconscionability doctrine to the interest rate on a consumer loan.
At least here, there is no question regarding to what exactly the
term applies applies both that term and its context support the
conclusion that it was the Legislature's purpose to leave
unconscionability as a relevant consideration in cases involving
interest rates in consumer loans. In addition, because section
22302 imposes no restriction on the amount of money lent under the
contract, the interest rate on a consumer loan  even one of at
least $2,500 may render the loan unconscionable.

The Plaintiffs advance an unfair competition claim under the UCL.
The claim is premised on unlawful business conduct, which section
17200 of the UCL proscribes.  By prohibiting unlawful business
practices, section 17200 borrows violations of other laws and
treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law
makes independently actionable. In this case, section 22302
supplies the requisite violations of other laws by making a loan
found to be unconscionable a violation of the Financing Law. The
UCL, in turn, makes that violation independently actionable.

So the fact that section 22302 does not provide for a private cause
of action is immaterial since it is in enacting the UCL itself, and
not by virtue of particular predicate statutes, that the
Legislature has conferred upon private plaintiffs 'specific power'
citation to prosecute unfair competition claims. Similarly, it does
not matter that plaintiffs cannot recover the remedies made
available under section 22302. The Plaintiffs are not praying for
remedies under section 22302. They are seeking UCL remedies
restitution and injunctive relief which are recoverable cumulative
of any other remedies.

So the Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action by basing their UCL
claim on the allegation that the interest rate on CashCall's
consumer loans of at least $2,500 rendered the loans unconscionable
under section 22302.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's August 13, 2018
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/ydbfjlsx from
Leagle.com.

The Strudevant Law Firm, James C. Sturdevant ; Rukin Hyland Doria &
Tindall, Gibbs Law Group,Steven M. Tindall , Andre M. Mura ; Rukin
Hyland, Rukin Hyland & Riggin, Jessica Riggin ; Law Offices of
Damon M. Connolly, Damon M. Connolly ; Law Office of Arthur D. Levy
and Arthur D. Levy -- arthur@yesquire.com -- for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.

Xavier Becerra , Attorney General, Nicklas A. Akers , Assistant
Attorney General, Michele Van Gelderen and Michael Reynolds ,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Attorney General of the State of
California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and
Appellants.

Caryn Becker -- Caryn.Becker@responsiblelending.org -- Seth E.
Mermin -- TMermin@law.berkeley.edu -- Brady C. Williams ; Williams
Cuker Berezofsky , Berezofsky Law Group, Michael J. Quirk --
mquirk@eblawllc.com -- Ellen Harnick ; and Scott L. Nelson for
Center for Responsible Lending, National Association of Consumer
Advocates, Public Citizen, Inc., and Public Good Law Center as
Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.


CEMTREX INC: Robbins Arroyo Files Amended Securities Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Robbins Arroyo LLP on Aug. 7 disclosed
that purchasers of Cemtrex, Inc. (NasdaqCM: CETX) filed an amended
class action complaint against the company's officers and directors
for alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
between December 26, 2012 and March 6, 2017. Cemtrex provides
electronic manufacturing services of electric system assemblies,
broad-based industrial services, and industrial air filtration and
environmental control equipment and systems worldwide.

Cemtrex Accused of Scheming to Manipulate the Company's Stock

According to the complaint, Cemtrex insiders schemed to use the
company for their own private gain by manipulating its common
stock. In furtherance of this conspiracy, Cemtrex used acquisitions
to give the illusion of a prospering company while simultaneously
lining the pockets of its prominent insiders through related party
transactions, lucrative incentive awards, and unreported stock
sales. In the process, Cemtrex officials not only avoided their
mandatory reporting responsibilities to report all transactions
involving Cemtrex securities, but concealed the exchange of debt
instruments for additional securities. When the discrepancies in
Cemtrex's reported insider holdings and misrepresentations about
the performance of the company's automotive business were brought
to investors' attention in February 2017, Cemtrex's stock price
plummeted and has since continued to decline.

Cemtrex Shareholders Have Legal Options

Concerned shareholders who would like more information about their
rights and potential remedies can contact attorney Leonid Kandinov
at (800) 350-6003, LKandinov@robbinsarroyo.com, or via the
shareholder information form on the firm's website.

Robbins Arroyo LLP -- http://www.robbinsarroyo.com-- is a
nationally recognized leader in shareholder rights law.  The firm
represents individual and institutional investors in shareholder
derivative and securities class action lawsuits, and has helped its
clients realize more than $1 billion of value for themselves and
the companies in which they have invested. [GN]


CENTRA TECH: Florida Judge Issues Ruling in ICO Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Margaret A. Dale, Esq. -- mdale@proskauer.com -- and Mark D.
Harris, Esq. -- mharris@proskauer.com -- of Proskauer Rose, in
article for New York Law Journal, report that for digitally savvy
investors itching to know whether U.S. courts would treat
crypto-tokens as securities subject to the regulatory requirements
of the Securities Act of 1933, the wait is over—sort of. The
first federal judge to decide the issue in the class-action context
landed on the same side as the SEC did back in 2017, finding that
the virtual tokens in the case could be characterized as
securities.

On June 25, 2018, Magistrate Judge Andrea M. Simonton of the
Southern District of Florida issued this cutting-edge opinion in
Rensel v. Centra Tech. Her Report and Recommendation (R&R)
considered a motion for a temporary restraining order to safeguard
the proceeds from an initial coin offering (ICO). The underlying
shareholder class action alleged that Centra Tech, a Florida-based
technology start-up company, and several of its founders and
executives, had violated various provisions of the Securities Act.
To reach her decision, Judge Simonton analyzed whether the tokens
Centra Tech offered during the course of its ICO were securities
for purposes of the Securities Act (despite the defendants
conceding the point for purposes of the motion).

Case Background
By way of background, the defendants in the case are Centra Tech
and its founders and officers, Sohrab Sharma, Raymond Trapani,
Robert Farkas and William Hegener. The complaint alleges that, in
late 2017, Centra Tech and its executives told investors they were
developing what promised to be a groundbreaking solution to a major
problem for holders of virtual currency -- the fact that most
vendors do not accept it. Centra Tech claimed that it had created
"the world's first Debit Card that is designed for use with
compatibility on 8+ major cryptocurrencies blockchain assets." In
essence, the card would allow virtual-currency holders to actually
spend their money. According to Centra Tech, through their
platform, users could easily convert their cryptocurrency to the
kind most vendors accept -- "fiat" currency, which is traditional
legal tender, like U.S. dollars or euros.

To raise capital for this innovative debit card and related
projects, Centra Tech conducted an ICO, from July through October
2017. Part of the ICO involved the company selling Centra Tokens,
or CTRs, to the public. The company told would-be investors that in
order to use the products it was developing, they would have to own
CTRs. No registration statement was in effect at any time the
company was selling the tokens.

The plaintiffs in Rensel filed suit in the Southern District of
Florida in December 2017, bringing a putative class-action for
violations of Sections 12(a)(1) and 15(a) of the Securities Act of
1933. In the introduction to the complaint, plaintiffs likened the
Centra Tech ICO to an offer and sale of unregistered securities and
stressed the important role of the Securities Act to protect
investors, citing the "varied and innumerable ways in which
investors can be, and are likely to be, manipulated and harmed" in
its absence.

In April 2018, the SEC took a similar position, suing Sharma,
Farkas and Trapani for securities fraud and violations of rules
relating to registration statements under various provisions of the
Securities and Exchange Acts, as well as for aiding and abetting
Centra Tech in committing the same violations. Just one month
later, in May 2018, the Department of Justice indicted Sharma,
Trapani and Farkas. The government's press release announced that
it was charging the defendants with "securities and wire fraud in
connection with a scheme to induce victims to invest millions of
dollars' worth of digital funds for the purchase of unregistered
securities, in the form of digital currency tokens issued by Centra
Tech, through material misrepresentations and omissions."

Application of the 'Howey' Factors
Like the SEC in 2017, Judge Simonton applied the Howey test to
determine whether CTRs could be characterized as "investment
contracts," which is one of the enumerated definitions of a
security in the Securities Act. The Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946), set forth a four-prong test
for identifying an investment contract:  (1) an investment of money
(2) in a common enterprise (3) with a reasonable expectation of
profits (4) to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial
efforts of others. Though expressing it as a three-prong test,
Judge Simonton found all of the factors satisfied.

The purchase of CTRs constituted an "investment of money" because,
the court concluded, that term includes any investment that could
subject the investor to financial losses. Whether by fiat currency
(in the form of U.S. dollars or euros, for example) or virtual
currency (in the form of Bitcoin or Ether), people buying CTRs from
Centra Tech in the hopes of profiting from the company's success
were subjecting themselves to potential losses. Simple enough.

The court next evaluated the "common enterprise" prong through the
lens of Eleventh Circuit precedent, which defines such an
enterprise as existing when (1) the investors' profits are directly
linked to the success or failure of the developer's products, and
(2) the investor lacks control over the success or failure of the
investment. Because the value of the investments in Centra Tech
rose or fell with the products, over which investors had no
control, this prong was satisfied.

Having not directly addressed, but ostensibly assumed, that the
investors had a reasonable expectation of profits, the court
evaluated the last Howey factor, describing the test as whether
"the efforts made by those other than the investor are the
undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise." Given
Centra Tech investors' lack of control over the development of the
company's purportedly revolutionary products, investors were
entirely dependent on Centra Tech's managerial efforts for the
success or failure of the enterprise.

With all Howey factors satisfied, the court recommended that the
district judge find that "the offering of Centra Tokens was an
investment contract under the Securities Act, such that the
Defendants sold or offered to sell securities by virtue of the
Centra Tech ICO." Despite this finding, the court ultimately
recommended denying the temporary restraining order on the basis
that the plaintiffs' harm was not irreparable because it could be
remedied by a monetary award.

Key Takeaways
The precedential value of the Rensel decision is limited in three
notable ways. First, because the decision is an R&R issued by a
Magistrate Judge, it will be subject to de novo review by U.S.
District Court Judge James Lawrence King. (As of August 1, 2018,
both plaintiff and defendants had filed and briefed objections to
the R&R.) Second, because the opinion was issued on a motion for a
temporary restraining order, the judge evaluated the question using
the "likelihood of success on the merits" standard, rather than by
making an actual judgment on the merits. Third and finally, the
defendants in the case had conceded, for purposes of the temporary
restraining order, that the tokens constituted securities under the
Securities Act.

As it stands, the question of whether crypto-tokens are securities
subject to regulation under the Securities Act is far from settled.
In light of Rensel's limitations, coupled with the expanding
popularity of virtual currency and related products, we expect to
see courts across the country begin to weigh in more definitively.
We'll be watching. [GN]


CENTRAL CALIFORNIA ALMOND: Court Sets Schedule in J. Urena Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Erica P. Grosjean of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California has issued a scheduling
conference order in the case, JOSE URENA, Plaintiff, v. CENTRAL
CALIFORNIA ALMOND GROWERS ASSOCIATION, Defendant, Case No.
1:18-CV-00517 LJO EPG (E.D. Cal.).

The Court conducted a scheduling conference on July 17, 2018.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b), the Magistrate Judge sets a
schedule for the action.

Any motions or stipulations requesting leave to amend the pleadings
must be filed no later than Aug. 31, 2018.  The parties are advised
that the filing of motions and/or stipulations requesting leave to
amend the pleadings does not imply good cause to modify the
existing schedule.

The parties have not consented to the Magistrate Judge
jurisdiction.  They're reminded of the availability of U.S.
Magistrate Judge Grosjean to conduct all proceedings in the action.
However, the parties are informed that no substantive rulings or
decisions will be affected by whether a party chooses to consent.
They're directed to consider consenting to Magistrate Judge
jurisdiction to conduct all further proceedings, including trial.

All non-expert discovery will be completed no later than Aug. 30,
2019.  The following deadlines are set with regard to the filing of
a class certification motion: (i) Motion for Class Certification -
June 26, 2019; (ii) Opposition - Aug. 1, 2019; and (iii) Reply -
Aug. 19, 2019.  The hearing on the Motion for Class Certification,
to be heard by the Magistrate Judge is set for Sept. 6, 2019, at
10:00 a.m.  The Court will set additional deadlines regarding class
merits discovery and trial dates if necessary after a ruling on any
motion for class certification.

The parties will simultaneously file expert witness disclosures by
June 26, 2019.  The expert discovery deadline has not been set at
this time.

A Mid-Discovery Status Conference will be held on Feb. 25, 2019, at
9:30 a.m.  The parties are directed to file a joint report, of up
to five pages, outlining the status of the case, any additional
discovery still planned, potential for settlement, and any other
issues pending that would benefit from the Court's
assistance/direction.  They will file the report one full week
prior to the conference, and email a copy, in Word format, to
epgorders@caed.uscourts.gov. If the parties are appearing
telephonically, each party will dial 1 (888) 251-2909 and enter
access code 1024453.

The parties are advised that unless prior leave of the Court is
obtained before the filing deadline, all moving and opposition
briefs or legal memoranda, including joint statements of discovery
disputes, filed in civil cases before Magistrate Judge Grosjean,
will not exceed 25 pages.  The reply briefs by the moving party
will not exceed 10 pages.  These page limits do not include
exhibits.  When scheduling motions (other than discovery motions)
the parties will comply with Local Rule 230.

The counsel or pro se parties may appear and argue motions by
telephone, provided a request to so do is made to Michelle Rooney,
Magistrate Judge Grosjean's Courtroom Deputy (unless prior
permission has been given by the judge), no later than five court
days before the noticed hearing date.  The requests can be made by
emailing Ms. Rooney at mrooney@caed.uscourts.gov. If the parties
are appearing telephonically, each party will dial 1 (888) 251-2909
and enter access code 1024453.

In order to file a discovery motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37,
a party must receive permission from the Court following an
informal telephone conference.  A party wishing to schedule such a
conference should contact chambers to receive available dates. The
Court will schedule the conference as soon as possible, taking into
consideration the urgency of the issue.

Prior to the conference, both parties will simultaneously submit
letters, outlining their respective positions regarding the
dispute.  The Court will provide the date the letters are due at
the time the conference is scheduled.  Such letters will be no
longer than three pages single spaced, and may include up to five
pages of exhibits.  The letters will be emailed to Magistrate Judge
Grosjean's chambers at epgorders@caed.uscourts.gov, and not filed
on the docket.

At the time of conference, the parties will dial 1 (888) 251-2909
and enter access code 1024453.  Telephonic conferences will not be
on the record and the Court will not issue a formal ruling at that
time.  Nevertheless, the Court will attempt to provide guidance to
the parties to narrow or dispose of the dispute.  If no resolution
can be reached without formal motion practice, the Court will
authorize the filing of a formal discovery motion.

If a motion is brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, after
receiving permission from the Court, the parties must prepare and
file a Joint Statement re: Discovery Disagreement ("Joint
Statement") as required by Local Rule 251.2 In scheduling such
motions, Magistrate Judge Grosjean may grant applications for an
order shortening time pursuant to Local Rule 144(e).  Motions to
shorten time will only be granted upon a showing of good cause.  If
a party does not obtain an order shortening time, the notice of
motion must comply with Local Rule 251.

A Joint Statement must be filed seven calendar days before the
scheduled hearing date.  In addition to filing the Joint Statement
electronically, a copy of the Joint Statement in Word format must
be sent to Magistrate Judge Grosjean's chambers via email to
epgorders@caed.uscourts.gov. Courtesy copies for any pleading in
excess of 25 pages (including exhibits) will also be delivered to
chambers at the time the Joint Statement is electronically filed.
Motions may be removed from the Court's calendar if the Joint
Statement is not timely filed, or if courtesy copies are not timely
delivered.

All counsel are expected to familiarize themselves with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the Eastern
District of California and to keep abreast of any amendments
thereto.  The Court requires strict compliance with these rules.
Sanctions will be imposed for failure to follow the rules as
provided in both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local
Rules of the Eastern District of California.

The order represents the Court and the parties' best estimated
schedule to complete the case.  Any party unable to comply with the
dates outlined in the order will immediately file an appropriate
motion or stipulation identifying the requested modification(s).

The dates set in the Order are considered to be firm and will not
be modified absent a showing of good cause, even if a stipulation
to modify is filed.  Stipulations extending the deadlines contained
herein will not be considered unless they are accompanied by
affidavits or declarations with attached exhibits, where
appropriate, that establish good cause for granting the requested
relief.  Due to the impacted nature of the civil case docket, the
Court disfavors requests to modify established dates.

Failure to comply with the Order will result in the imposition of
sanctions.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 20, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/3cA5x7 from Leagle.com.

Jose Urena, as individual, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Emil Davtyan --
EDavtyan@lacare.org -- Davtyan Professional Law Corporation, Eric
Bryce Kingsley -- eric@kingsleykingsley.com -- Kingsley & Kingsley
APC & Kelsey M. Peterson-More, Kingsley & Kingsley.

Central California Almond Growers Assn., Defendant, represented by
Paul J. Bauer, Sagaser Watkins & Wieland, PC.


CHINA CACHE: Court Approves Class Settlement in G. Xu's Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California issued an Order and Judgment approving Agreement of
Class Settlement in the case captioned GUANGYI XU, Individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
CHINACACHE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD., SONG WANG, JING AN, and KEN
VINCENT QINGSHI ZHANG, Defendants, Case No: 2:15-cv-07952-CAS
(RAOx)(D.C. Cal.).

Hearing having been held before this Court to determine: (1)
whether the terms and conditions of the Stipulation and Agreement
of Settlement are fair, reasonable and adequate for the settlement
of all claims asserted by the Settlement Class against the
Defendants (as defined in the Stipulation.

No member of the Settlement Class objected to the Settlement, and
none requested exclusion from the Settlement Class.

The Court finds that the risks associated with protracted
litigation and Lead Plaintiff's proving his claims and the claims
of the putative class at trial were substantial, supporting the
fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the Settlement.

First, the Court dismissed both Lead Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint and his Second Amended Complaint for failure to allege
falsity adequately.

Second, the Court finds that even had the Ninth Circuit reversed
the order of dismissal, Lead Plaintiff faced obstacles to proving
that Defendants made the allegedly false and misleading statements
at issue with scienter.

Third, the Court finds that, on remand, even if the Court sustained
the adequacy of the Complaint's other allegations, Lead Plaintiff
would have encountered substantial difficulties obtaining full
discovery from persons and entities located in the People's
Republic of China (PRC).

Fourth, the Court acknowledges that even if Lead Plaintiff
prevailed in a jury trial, proving each element of a Rule 10b-5
claim, substantial risk existed that he would have been unable to
enforce a judgment in the PRC, on behalf of himself and the Class.

As such, the Court hereby awards Class Counsel 25% of the
Settlement Amount in attorneys' fees, or $247,500, which the Court
finds to be fair and reasonable, and $29,297.04 in reimbursement of
expenses.

The Court awards the Class Representative $2,500, which the Court
finds to be fair and reasonable. Beyond payment of the Settlement
Amount, ChinaCache and the Released Parties shall have no
responsibility for, and no liability whatsoever with respect to,
any payments to Class Counsel, the Class Representative, the
Settlement Class and/or any other Person who receives payment from
the Settlement Fund.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 13, 2018 Order and
Judgment is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6v7jbmb from
Leagle.com.

Guangyi Xu, Lead Plaintiff, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jacob A.
Goldberg -- jgoldberg@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm PA, pro
hac vice & Laurence M. Rosen -- lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen
Law Firm PA.

ChinaCache International Holdings Ltd, Defendant, represented by
Matthew John Tako -- matthew.tako@skadden.com -- Skadden Arps Slate
Meagher and Flom LLP, Peter Bradley Morrison --
pmorriso@skadden.com -- Skadden Arps Slate Meagher and Flom LLP &
Virginia F. Milstead -- virginia.milstead@skadden.com -- Skadden
Arps Slate Meagher and Flom LLP.


CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Court Grants Subpoena on Employment Records
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted Parties' Joint Discovery in the case captioned
ADRIANA GUZMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-02606-HSG (KAW)(N. D.
Cal.).

The parties filed a joint letter concerning the Defendants'
subpoenas of Plaintiff Guzman's medical providers and the
Plaintiffs' subsequent employers and locations where the Plaintiffs
applied for employment.

The Plaintiffs filed the instant putative class action, alleging
that Defendants Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. and Chipotle Services,
LLC, discriminated against their employees of Hispanic race and/or
Mexican national origin.

Under Rule 26, in a civil action, a party may obtain discovery
regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's
claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case
considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action,
the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant
information, the parties' resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.

Medical Record Subpoenas re Plaintiff Guzman

The Defendants seek to enforce subpoenas to Plaintiff Guzman's
medical providers, seeking medical records, psychiatric records,
psychological records, billings, and prescription and insurance
records.

In response to the Defendants' interrogatories requesting that
Plaintiff Guzman identify specific conditions she suffered as a
result of the complained of conduct, Plaintiff Guzman responded
that she suffered from depression, anxiety, insomnia, headaches,
loss of self-worth and feelings of isolation, and that she was
receiving medication and treatment, including continuing to take
fluoxetine for her depression.

Here, in contrast, Plaintiff Guzman has alleged that she continues
to suffer from symptoms, including depression, for which she
obtains treatment from Dolores Jiminez, PhD, Guadulpe Pacheco,
LCSW, and MHHC Primary Care. Plaintiff Guzman also continues to
take fluoxetine for her depression. Such symptoms are more than the
simple or usual emotional distress in Lira, but are, instead, a
specific psychiatric disorder.

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff Guzman has asserted more than
garden variety emotional distress, therefore making medical and
mental health records related to the symptoms she suffered as a
result of Defendants' alleged actions relevant. The Court will
therefore limit the subpoenas to the treatment of the conditions
Plaintiff Guzman identified in her discovery responses.

Employment Records

The Defendants seek to enforce subpoenas to the Plaintiffs'
subsequent employers and locations where they applied for
employment, requesting employment records, personnel files,
disciplinary records, workers' compensation files, pay stubs, time
sheets, doctor's notes, work restrictions, and payroll documents.


The Court finds that discovery of disciplinary records, performance
reviews, and termination records is, at this point, overbroad and
disproportionate to the needs of discovery. This does not appear to
be a case where Plaintiffs are working high-level jobs that are
dependent on performance reviews for raises and other salary
adjustments. Further, there does not appear to be any evidence that
Plaintiffs were ever terminated from their subsequent positions, or
if they suffered pay reductions or demotions.

While the Plaintiffs have a reduced privacy interest in their
employment records, they still have some privacy interest, and the
Defendants' generalized arguments that disciplinary records,
performance reviews, and termination records could show that the
Plaintiffs' wages were lower due to poor performance is too
speculative to warrant such invasive discovery. If the Defendants
discover that the Plaintiffs were subjected to termination, pay
reductions, or demotions the latter of which would be revealed in
the payroll and benefits records the Court may be open to
permitting discovery into the reasons for those adverse actions. At
this point, however, discovery of such records runs the risk of
harassing the Plaintiffs.

Thus, the Court will limit the subpoenas for employment records to
wage and benefit records only.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 9, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybmng52s from
Leagle.com.

Adriana Guzman, Juan Pablo Aldana Lira & Jonathon Poot, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Carolyn Hunt Cottrell --
ccottrell@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace Cottrell
Konecky Wotkyns LLP, Adalberto Corres-Morales --
adalberto@e-licenciados.com -- Villegas Carrera, LLP, David
Christopher Leimbach, Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky Wotkyns
LLP, Karen C. Carrera -- karen@e-licenciados.com -- Villegas
Carrera, LLP, Mira Pearl Karageorge , Schneider Wallace Cottrell
Konecky Wotkyns LLP, Ori Edelstein , Schneider Wallace Cottrell
Konecky Wotkyns & Virginia Villegas , Villegas Carrera, LLP.

Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., Defendant, represented by Nima
Darouian , Messner Reeves LLP,Amish Ashok Shah , Messner Reeves
LLP, Charles C. Cavanagh , Messner Reeves LLP &Jacqueline Raquel
Guesno , Messner Reeves.

CHIPOTLE SERVICES, LLC, Defendant, represented by Nima Darouian ,
Messner Reeves LLP,Amish Ashok Shah , Messner Reeves LLP &
Jacqueline Raquel Guesno , Messner Reeves, pro hac vice.


CIGNA CORP: Amara Pension Plan Suit Underway
--------------------------------------------
Cigna Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that class action suit filed
by Janice Amara is still ongoing.

In December 2001, Janice Amara filed a class action lawsuit in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut against Cigna
Corporation and the Cigna Pension Plan (the "Plan") on behalf of
herself and other similarly situated Plan participants affected by
the 1998 conversion to a cash balance formula.  

The plaintiffs allege various violations of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), including that the Plan's
cash balance formula discriminates against older employees; that
the conversion resulted in a wear-away period (when the
pre-conversion accrued benefit exceeded the post-conversion
benefit); and that the Plan communications contained inaccurate or
inadequate disclosures about these conditions.

In 2008, the District Court (1) affirmed the Company's right to
convert to a cash balance plan prospectively beginning in 1998; (2)
found for plaintiffs on the disclosure claim only; and (3) required
the Company to pay pre-1998 benefits under the pre-conversion
traditional annuity formula and post-1997 benefits under the
post-conversion cash balance formula. From 2008 through 2015, this
case has undergone a series of court proceedings that resulted in
the original District Court order being largely upheld. In 2015,
the Company submitted to the District Court its proposed method for
calculating the additional pension benefits due to class members
and plaintiffs responded in August 2015.

In January 2016, the District Court ordered the method of
calculating the additional pension benefits due to class members.
The court order left several aspects of the calculation of
additional plan benefits open to interpretation. From that time
through July 25, 2018, both parties have disputed various aspects
of the Court's interpretation and the Court has attempted to
clarify.  

On July 14, 2017, the Court issued a ruling clarifying certain
aspects of the January 2016 order.  

The Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the July 14,
2017 ruling that was denied by the Court on November 7, 2017. On
July 25, 2018, the Court issued an oral ruling.  

It is anticipated that the Plan will be amended promptly to comply
with the District Court's orders and the remedy benefits will begin
to be paid as soon as practicable thereafter. The Company's reserve
for this litigation is adequate at June 30, 2018, based on
calculations consistent with the latest guidance from the Court.

Cigna Corporation, a health services organization, provides
insurance and related products and services in the United States
and internationally. It operates through Global Health Care, Global
Supplemental Benefits, Group Disability and Life, and Other
Operations segments. Cigna Corporation was founded in 1792 and is
headquartered in Bloomfield, Connecticut.


CIGNA CORP: Defending Suits over Express Scripts Merger
-------------------------------------------------------
Cigna Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company is facing
putative class action lawsuits related to the merger agreement with
Express Scripts.

Following announcement of the Company's Merger Agreement with
Express Scripts, putative class action complaints (collectively the
"complaints") have been filed against Express Scripts and the
Express Scripts board of directors.  

Certain of these complaints also include Cigna, New Cigna, Cigna
Merger Sub and Express Scripts Merger Sub as defendants.  

The complaints allege that the registration statement filed in
connection with the Merger (and certain amendments thereto) omitted
material information in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of
the Exchange Act, rendering the registration statement false and
misleading.  

Among other remedies, the complaints seek to enjoin the Express
Scripts special meeting and the closing of the Merger, as well as
damages, costs and attorneys' fees.  The defendants believe that
the lawsuits are without merit.

Cigna Corporation, a health services organization, provides
insurance and related products and services in the United States
and internationally. It operates through Global Health Care, Global
Supplemental Benefits, Group Disability and Life, and Other
Operations segments. Cigna Corporation was founded in 1792 and is
headquartered in Bloomfield, Connecticut.


CIGNA CORP: Franco Class Action Still Ongoing
---------------------------------------------
Cigna Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company continues to
defend a consolidated class action suit entitled, Franco v.
Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, et al.

In April 2004, the Company was sued in a number of putative
nationwide class actions alleging that the Company improperly
underpaid claims for out-of-network providers through the use of
data provided by Ingenix, Inc., a subsidiary of one of the
Company's competitors.

These actions were consolidated into Franco v. Connecticut General
Life Insurance Company, et al., pending in the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey.  The consolidated amended
complaint, filed in 2009 on behalf of subscribers, health care
providers and various medical associations, asserted claims related
to benefits and disclosure under ERISA, the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act, the Sherman Antitrust Act
and New Jersey state law and seeks recovery for alleged
underpayments from 1998 through the present.  Other major health
insurers have been the subject of, or have settled, similar
litigation.

In September 2011, the District Court (1) dismissed all claims by
the health care provider and medical association plaintiffs for
lack of standing; and (2) dismissed the antitrust claims, the New
Jersey state law claims and the ERISA disclosure claim. In January
2013 and again in April 2014, the District Court denied separate
motions by the plaintiffs to certify a nationwide class of
subscriber plaintiffs.  

The Third Circuit denied plaintiffs' request for an immediate
appeal of the January 2013 ruling. As a result, the case is
proceeding on behalf of the named plaintiffs only. In June 2014,
the District Court granted the Company's motion for summary
judgment to terminate all claims, and denied the plaintiffs'
partial motion for summary judgment. In July 2014, the plaintiffs
appealed all of the District Court's decisions in favor of the
Company, including the class certification decision, to the Third
Circuit. On May 2, 2016, the Third Circuit affirmed the District
Court's decisions denying class certification for the claims
asserted by members, the granting of summary judgment on the
individual plaintiffs' claims, as well as the dismissal of the
antitrust claims.  

However, the Third Circuit also reversed the earlier dismissal of
the providers' ERISA claims. The Company will continue to
vigorously defend its position.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Cigna Corporation, a health services organization, provides
insurance and related products and services in the United States
and internationally. It operates through Global Health Care, Global
Supplemental Benefits, Group Disability and Life, and Other
Operations segments. Cigna Corporation was founded in 1792 and is
headquartered in Bloomfield, Connecticut.


CNX RESOURCES: Places Settlement Payment Into Escrow Account
------------------------------------------------------------
CNX Resources Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that Company has paid the
settlement in the Hale Litigation into an escrow account from which
it will be disbursed upon final court approval or returned to CNX.

This class action lawsuit was filed on September 23, 2010 in the
U.S. District Court in Abingdon, Virginia. The putative class
consists of force-pooled unleased gas owners whose ownership of the
coalbed methane (CBM) gas was declared to be in conflict with
rights of others. The lawsuit seeks a judicial declaration of
ownership of the CBM and damages based on allegations that CNX Gas
failed either to pay royalties due to conflicting claimants or
deemed lessors, or paid them less than required because of the
alleged practice of improper below market sales and/or taking
alleged improper post-production deductions.

On September 30, 2013, the District Judge entered an Order
certifying the class, and CNX Gas appealed the Order to the U.S.
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. On August 19, 2014, the Fourth
Circuit agreed with CNX Gas, reversed the Order certifying the
class and remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with the decision.

On April 23, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Renewed Motion for Class
Certification, which CNX opposed. On March 29, 2017, the Court
issued an Order certifying four issues for class treatment: (1)
allegedly excessive deductions; (2) royalties based on purported
improperly low prices; (3) deduction of severance taxes; and (4)
Plaintiffs' request for an accounting. On April 13, 2017, CNX filed
a Petition for Allowance of Appeal with the Fourth Circuit, and on
May 22, 2017 the Petition was denied.

CNX and plaintiffs' counsel have reached an agreement in principal
to settle the certified class claims. On March 20, 2018, the Court
preliminarily approved the class settlement, and on August 23,
2018, the Court will conduct a hearing to consider final approval
of the proposed Settlement Agreement and Class Counsels' request
for attorneys' fees. No class member has opted out of, or objected
to, the settlement and the time for doing so has passed.

The Company has paid the settlement into an escrow account from
which it will be disbursed upon final court approval (or returned
to CNX).

CNX Resources Corporation, an independent oil and natural gas
company, explores for, develops, and produces natural gas in the
Appalachian Basin. CNX Resources Corporation was incorporated in
1991 and is headquartered in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania.


COGNIZANT TECHNOLOGY: Bid to Dismiss Class Suit Still Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------
Cognizant Technology Solutions Corporation said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August
2, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the
parties in a consolidated class action lawsuit are awaiting a court
ruling on motions to dismiss an amended complaint.

On October 5, 2016, October 27, 2016, and November 18, 2016, three
putative securities class action complaints were filed in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, naming
the company and certain of its current and former officers as
defendants. In an order dated February 3, 2017, the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey consolidated the
three putative securities class actions into a single action and
appointed lead plaintiffs and lead counsel.

On April 7, 2017, the lead plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended
complaint on behalf of a putative class of stockholders who
purchased the company's common stock during the period between
February 27, 2015 and September 29, 2016, naming the company and
certain of its current and former officers as defendants and
alleging violations of the Exchange Act, based on allegedly false
or misleading statements related to potential violations of the
FCPA, its business, prospects and operations, and the effectiveness
of its internal controls over financial reporting and its
disclosure controls and procedures. The lead plaintiffs seek an
award of compensatory damages, among other relief, and their
reasonable costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees.

Under a stipulation filed by the parties on February 23, 2017,
defendants filed motions to dismiss the consolidated amended
complaint on June 6, 2017, plaintiffs filed an opposition brief on
July 21, 2017 responding to defendants' motions to dismiss, and
defendants filed reply briefs in further support of their motions
to dismiss on September 5, 2017.

On September 5, 2017, defendants also filed a motion to strike
certain allegations in the consolidated amended complaint,
plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to strike on October
2, 2017, and, on October 10, 2017, the company filed a reply brief
in further support of the motion to strike.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp. provides information
technology consulting and technology services in North America,
Europe, and Asia. The company was founded in 1994 and is based in
Teaneck, New Jersey.


COLLECTO INC: Sanctions Against Attorneys Affirmed
--------------------------------------------------
In the case, WALTER DIAZ, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES MESSER, Attorney
for Defendant Collecto, Inc.; et al., Appellants, v. COLLECTO,
INC., DBA EOS CCA, Defendant, Case No. 17-15402 (9th Cir.), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the sanctions
the district court imposed against Appellants Charles R. Messer,
David J. Kaminski, and Stephen A. Watkins, attorneys for Defendant
Collecto, under 28 U.S.C. Section 1927.

In the ongoing class action underlying the appeal, Diaz alleges
that Collecto, a debt collection agency, violated California's
Invasion of Privacy Act ("IPA") -- specifically California Penal
Code Sections 632 and 632.7 -- by recording its telephone calls
with Diaz without first obtaining his consent.

In the case, the district court found that Collecto's attorneys
made a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion that was both frivolous and
filed recklessly.  Among its frivolous Rule 12(c) contentions,
Collecto challenged Diaz's claim under California Penal Code
Section 632 by arguing that Collecto's employees' telephone
conversations with Diaz about his debt were not private or
confidential.  

The Appellate Court finds that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in deeming this argument to be contrary to California
case law addressing what is a confidential communication under
Section 632.  In addition, that argument contradicted Diaz's
well-pled factual allegations, which must be accepted as true at
the Rule 12(c) stage of litigation.

As to its challenges to Diaz's claims implicating both California
Penal Code Sections 632 and 632.7, Collecto relied on Illinois case
law to contend, frivolously, that California's IPA was overbroad as
applied to Collecto.  In asserting its overbreadth argument,
Collecto specifically eschewed any facial challenge to the
California statutes, expressly asserting only an as-applied
overbreadth challenge to the California statute.  But a litigant
cannot make an as-applied overbreadth argument; an overbreadth
challenge must be addressed to the facial validity of a statute.
Understandably, then, the Illinois cases on which Collecto based
its as-applied argument addressed instead a facial overbreadth
challenge to an Illinois statute.

Furthermore, in support of its as-applied overbreadth argument,
Collecto asserted that because its debt collectors could take
written notes of their conversation with Diaz, the IPA's
prohibition against recording those conversations violated
Collecto's First Amendment rights.  But the Illinois cases which
Collecto used to support this argument did not hold that, because
one can take written notes of a private conversation, a state
legislature cannot constitutionally preclude recording that
conversation.

The district court, thus, did not abuse its discretion in deeming
Collecto's Rule 12(c) arguments to be frivolous, the Ninth Circuit
holds.

Such frivolous arguments alone will not support Section 1927
sanctions, however.  The attorneys making those frivolous arguments
must have also acted with subjective bad faith.  The Ninth Circuit
has recognized that such bad faith is present when an attorney
recklessly raises a frivolous argument.  Here, the district court
did not clearly err in finding that Collecto's attorneys acted
recklessly when they asserted these frivolous Rule 12(c) arguments.
The quality of these arguments was a gross deviation from the
standard of legal arguments one would expect under these
circumstances.  That is particularly so because the case law on
which Appellants based their arguments was so clearly inapposite.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 20, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/QfZIbH from Leagle.com.


CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING: Huntsman Sues Over Collection Calls
-----------------------------------------------------------
Richard C. Huntsman, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. and
John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-03535, (E.D. Pa., August
20, 2018), seeks damages and declaratory and injunctive relief
pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Convergent Outsourcing, Inc. is a "debt collector" who attempted to
collect a debt from Huntsman via an automated telephone dialing
system. Despite admitting that it was a wrong number, Convergent
continued these calls. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      David P. Mitchell, Esq.
      MANEY & GORDON, P.A.
      101 East Kennedy Blvd., Suite 3170
      Tampa, FL 33602
      Telephone: (813) 221-1366
      Fax: (813) 223-5920
      Email: David@MitchellConsumerLaw.com

             - and -

      Robert P. Cocco, Esq.
      ROBERT P. COCCO, P.C.
      1500 Walnut Street, Suite 900
      Philadelphia, PA 19102
      Tel: (215) 351-0200
      Fax: (215) 261-6055


CORIZON HEALTH: Pennell's Bid to Certify Class of Inmates Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Ortrie D. Smith denies without prejudice the motion for
class certification filed by the Plaintiffs in the lawsuit entitled
LINDA PENNELL, REBECCA FUNK, and TONYA SMITH, o/b/o themselves and
all others similarly situated v. CORIZON HEALTH, INC., and DOES 1 -
10, Case No. 5:18-cv-06034-ODS (W.D. Mo.).

Linda Pennell, Rebecca Funk, and Toni Smith are Missouri Department
of Corrections ("MDOC") inmates, incarcerated at the Chillicothe
Correctional Center in Chillicothe, Missouri.  The Plaintiffs'
amended complaint alleges that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983,
Defendants MDOC Director Anne Precythe, CCC Warden Chris McBee, and
Corizon Health Inc. provided inhumane conditions and inadequate
healthcare at CCC in violation of the Plaintiffs' civil rights.

The Plaintiffs seek certification of a class of current and future
inmates incarcerated at CCC.

Judge Smith notes that the Court cannot determine whether the
proposed class is sufficiently numerous.  Although a class of
current and future CCC inmates is likely greater in size than a
nominal number, there is no suggestion Corizon has treated each
inmate housed in the facility.  Indeed, Plaintiff Funk includes no
allegations specific to her that Corizon failed to diagnose or
treat a condition.

The greater concern for the Court is the typicality and commonality
requirements, according to the Order and Opinion.  Broadly
construed, Plaintiffs' allegation of inadequate healthcare may
apply to all proposed class members, but resolution of individual
cases will require an analysis of how Corizon's policies or
procedures operated to deny an individual's right to care, Judge
Smith opines.

Judge Smith also notes that the Plaintiffs' counsel cites four
cases from federal district courts in Missouri, suggesting he
served as class counsel in these matters.  The Court attempted to
independently verify counsel's involvement in these matters, but
counsel's name does not appear on the docket or class certification
filings in any of the four matters.

"While the Court does not preclude finding counsel adequate if
class certification is sought again in this matter, the Court
expects counsel's representations to this Court to be accurate and
honest.  Indeed, counsel has a professional responsibility to act
with candor toward the Court," Judge Smith states.  "His apparent
misrepresentation causes the Court to wonder if that duty has been
met here."


COTIVITI HOLDINGS: Geller Files Securities Suit in New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
Eugene Geller, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Cotiviti Holdings, Inc. et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-06797
(S.D. N.Y., July 27, 2018), is brought against the Defendants for
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The class action is brought in connection with the proposed merger
between Cotiviti and Verscend Technologies, Inc., an affiliate of
Veritas Capital. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants failed
to disclose certain material information that is necessary for
shareholders to properly assess the fairness of the Proposed
Merger, thereby rendering certain statements in the Proxy false and
misleading.

The Plaintiff is a Cotiviti shareholder.

The Defendant Cotiviti is incorporated in Delaware and maintains
its principal executive offices at 115 Perimeter Ctr. Place, The
South Terraces, Suite 700, Atlanta, Georgia 30346. The Company
trades on the NYSE under the ticker symbol: "COTV".

The Individual Defendants are members of Cotiviti's board of
directors. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Van Gorder, Esq.
      FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
      20 Montchanin Road, Suite 145
      Wilmington, DE 19807
      Tel.: (302) 482-3182
      E-mail: mvangorder@faruqilaw.com


CRESTWOOD EQUITY: Oct. Hearing to Approve Accord in Trucking Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Crestwood Equity Partners LP said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the hearing for
final approval of the settlement in the California Trucking Lawsuit
is scheduled for October 4, 2018.

On March 13, 2017, a former Crestwood truck driver filed a lawsuit
in the Superior Court (the Court) for Kern County, California on
behalf of all Crestwood Transportation LLC's California drivers
alleging that Crestwood Equity and its officers, directors and
employees violated the California wage and hour laws by failing to
comply with certain requirements of the laws. The plaintiffs
currently include a total of 13 former and current Company drivers,
however they are seeking to certify this lawsuit as a class action,
which could potentially include approximately 160 drivers.

On February 26, 2018, the parties entered into a memorandum of
agreement with respect to the lawsuit to settle any or all of the
claims of the potential class members. On April 16, 2018, the
parties executed the Stipulation of Settlement of Class Action and
Release of Claims, which was preliminarily approved by the Court on
May 29, 2018. The hearing for final approval of the settlement is
scheduled for October 4, 2018. If approved and no appeals are
filed, the settlement of this lawsuit should be finalized by late
2018.

Crestwood Equity Partners LP provides infrastructure solutions to
liquids-rich natural gas and crude oil shale plays in the United
States. It operates through three segments: Gathering and
Processing (G&P); Storage and Transportation (S&T); and Marketing,
Supply and Logistics (MS&L). Crestwood Equity Partners LP was
founded in 2001 and is headquartered in Houston, Texas.


CURATIVE CARE: Siderits Moves to Certify Nurses Class Under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled JENNIFER SIDERITS, MIA NEWTON,
and RITA GRIFFIN on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated v. CURATIVE CARE NETWORK, INC., Case No. 2:17-cv-01773-PP
(E.D. Wisc.), ask the Court to conditionally certify this class:

     Case Managers and Registered Nurses employed by Curative for
     the My Choice Family Care Program as hourly paid, non-exempt
     employees who worked in excess of forty (40) hours in any
     workweek during the representative time period beginning on
     December 20, 2014 and ending on May 31, 2017 and who were
     not paid overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of
     40.

The Plaintiffs, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act also move
the Court for an order (1) appointing their counsel of record as
Collective Action Counsel; (2) approving the form and content of
the attached Notice of Right to Join Lawsuit; and (3) directing the
Defendant to provide Collective Action Counsel with a list of all
persons known to it meeting the class definition, including their
first and last names, most recent known address, (Street, City,
State and Zip code), dates of employment, job title, personal
e-mail address and the last four digits of their social security
number of all potential class members.

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Mary C. Flanner, Esq.
          William Wetzel, Esq.
          Nola J. Hitchcock Cross, Esq.
          CROSS LAW FIRM, S.C.
          845 N. 11th Street
          Milwaukee, WI 53233
          Telephone: (414) 224-0000
          Facsimile: (414) 273-7055
          E-mail: mflanner@crosslawfirm.com
                  wetzel@crosslawfirm.com
                  njhcross@crosslawfirm.com


DALGLISH 7 INC: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Balcon et al. Allege
---------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE MANUEL BALCON; NAZARENO LARIOS; MARIA VILLA BALBUENA; and
AMALIA CORTES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. DALGLISH 7 INC. dba CARRAGHER'S PUB &
RESTAURANT; BRIAN MCLAUGHLIN; and MICHAEL ROMERO, Defendants, Case
Number. 18cv6596 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 2, 2018) seeks to recover from the
Defendants unpaid wages, minimum wages, and overtime compensation,
liquidated damages, prejudgment and post judgment interest, and
attorneys' fees and costs.

Mr. Balcon was employed by the Defendants as cook from April 2015
to March 2018.

Mr. Larios was employed by the Defendants as dishwasher from August
2015 to September 2017.

Ms. Balbuena and Ms. Cortes were employed by the Defendants as
non-exempt, hourly employees from February 2015 to June 24, 2018.

Dalglish 7, Inc., is a domestic business entity organized and
existing under the laws of the State of New York, engaged in the
restaurant business. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter H. Cooper, Esq.
          CILENTI & COOPER, PLLC
          708 Third Avenue 6th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 209-3933
          Facsimile: (212) 209-7102
          E-mail: pcooper@jcpclaw.com


DARDEN RESTAURANTS: Can Compel Arbitration in J. Silva's FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Otis D. Wright, II of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California granted the Defendants' Motion to Compel
Arbitration in the case, JENER DA SILVA, Plaintiff, v. DARDEN
RESTAURANTS, INC.; GMRI, INC.; YARD HOUSE USA, INC.; YARD HOUSE
NORTHRIDGE LLC; and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants, Case No.
2:17-CV-05663-ODW (E) (C.D. Cal.).

Silva brings the putative class action against his former employer
for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the
California Labor Code.  The Defendants move to compel arbitration
of the Plaintiff's claims.  The litigation was previously stayed
pending the outcome of the Supreme Court's decision in Epic Systems
Corp v. Lewis.  The Supreme Court issued its ruling in Epic Systems
in May 2018, and the Defendants now move again to compel
arbitration.

The Plaintiff was employed at Defendants' restaurant in Northridge,
California from approximately June 2014 through June 20, 2015.  He
alleges that during the time of his employment, the Defendants
failed to pay him, and other employees similarly situated, all
wages due, including minimum wages, overtime compensation, and
necessary expenditures incurred in discharging duties.  He further
alleges that the Defendants did not allow meal and rest periods and
failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements or maintain
required records.

The Plaintiff initiated the lawsuit on July 31, 2017, alleging
various causes of action under the FLSA and the California Labor
Code, on behalf of himself and a putative class of the Defendants'
current and former non-exempt employees in the State of California.
The Defendants initially moved to compel arbitration of the
Plaintiff's claims on Sept. 29, 2017, arguing that the Plaintiff
signed an agreement containing a mandatory arbitration clause for
all employment-related disputes.  The Plaintiff opposed the
Defendants' motion, arguing primarily that because the Plaintiff
signed the DRP as a condition of his employment and that agreement
contains a waiver of all class and collective actions, the
agreement is invalid pursuant to the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP.

The Court ordered a stay in thecase because the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review Morris.  In its opinion in Epic
Systems, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Morris, finding that a waiver of collective action contained in an
arbitration agreement that was a condition of employment did not
invalidate the agreement.  Therefore the arbitration agreement in
this case could not be found invalid for the reasons that it was a
condition of employment and contained a waiver of collective
actions.  After the Court lifted the stay, the Defendants moved
again to compel arbitration on June 18, 2018.

The Plaintiff now opposes the Defendants' motion on the grounds
that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") does not apply to the
Dispute Resolution Process Agreement ("DRP"), or alternatively that
the DRP is unenforceable because it is unconscionable.

The Defendants request that the Court takes judicial notice of
three documents in deciding the motion; (1) the Employment
Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures of the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA Rules"); (2) the District Court
decision in Garcia v. GMRI, Inc.; and (3) the District Court
decision in Martinez v. Darden Restaurants, Inc.  As these
documents are generally known in the Court's territorial
jurisdiction and can be determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot be questioned, Judge Wright deemed they satisfy the
requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), and granted the
Defendants' request for judicial notice.

The Judge finds that the very arbitration agreement has twice been
found to be enforceable under the FAA by judges in the Central
District of California.  He also finds it very hard to believe, and
indeed the Plaintiff submits no evidence to support, that while
working at the Defendants' national restaurant chain the Plaintiff
served only "California customers."  Moreover, the Defendants
operate 1,536 restaurants across the country, and use the same
arbitration agreement for all of their approximately 150,000
employees.  Therefore, the Judge finds that the agreement affects
interstate commerce, and application of the FAA is appropriate.

The arbitration agreement at issue in the case also satisfies the
two requirements for the Court to compel the enforcement of its
terms.  First, both parties clearly agreed to arbitrate.  The DRP
also clearly covers the claims that make up this dispute.  As both
of these threshold questions have been answered in the affirmative,
the Judget must compel enforcement of the arbitration agreement
according to its terms, unless the agreement may be invalidated
according to a traditional contract defense.

The Judge further finds the agreement to contain elements of
procedural unconscionability.  The DRP is subject to the AAA Rules,
but these were not provided to the Plaintiff.  Not providing the
rules which govern an arbitration agreement has also been found to
be procedurally unconscionable, on the basis of unfair surprise.
Further, the Defendants do not specify which version of the AAA
Rules would be controlling on the claim and a failure to so specify
has been found to heighten procedural unconscionability.

As unconscionability is determined as a sliding scale between
procedural and substantive unconscionability, even a strong showing
of procedural unconscionability requires at least some substantive
unconscionability for the contract term to be invalid.  In this
case, while there is procedural unconscionability present in the
DRP, there is no substantive unconscionability, and so the Judge
will order the parties to comply with the terms of the arbitration
agreement as it is a valid arbitration agreement.

Finally, as he has found that the parties' arbitration agreement
covers all of the Plaintiff's claims, the Judge wll dismiss the
action.

For the forgoing reasons, Judge Wright granted the Defendants'
Motion to Compel Arbitration, and dismissed the case. The Clerk of
the Court shall close the case.


DIPLOMAT PHARMACY: Ct. Won't Review Denial of Dismissal Bid
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, denied Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration regarding a previous denial of Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss the case captioned DAVID N. ZIMMERMAN, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. DIPLOMAT PHARMACY, INC., PHILIP R. HAGERMAN, GARY W.
KADLEC, and SEAN M. WHELAN, Defendants, Case No. 16-14005 (E.D.
Mich.).

The case involves allegations of federal securities fraud under
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act) and under U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) Rule 10b-5. Sections 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.

Local Rule 7.1 of the Local Rules of the Eastern District of
Michigan provides the movant must not only demonstrate a palpable
defect by which the court has been misled but also show that
correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the
case.

The PSLRA requires a complaint to state with particularity both the
facts constituting the alleged violation, and the facts evidencing
scienter.

The Defendants argue the Court applied the wrong standard in
denying their motion to dismiss because the Court cites Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).

Even if the Court had applied the wrong pleading standard which it
did not Defendants fail to convince the Court that applying the
heightened pleading standard under the PSLRA would result in a
different disposition of the case. Plaintiffs' one-hundred and
thirty-eight paragraphed complaint outlines a detailed claim for
securities fraud with sufficient particularity. Although the
inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or
reasonable it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any
opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent, Plaintiffs have
satisfied this standard. The inference that the defendant acted
with scienter need not be irrefutable, i.e., of the smoking-gun
genre, or even the most plausible of competing inferences.

Instead, this Court must assess the allegations holistically and
ask: When the allegations are accepted as true and taken
collectively, would a reasonable person deem the inference of
scienter atleast as strong as any opposing inference? This Court
answers in the affirmative and finds that the Plaintiffs' complaint
meets the requirements of the PLSRA.

The Defendants have failed to meet the standard for
reconsideration. The Court did not err in denying the Defendants'
motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 9, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7usyuoj from Leagle.com.

David N. Zimmerman, Plaintiff, represented by Dennis A. Lienhardt
-- dal@miller.law - The Miller Law Firm, P.C., Jonah H. Goldstein
-- jonahg@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and Down LLP, Joshua
L. Crowell -- jcrowell@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray
LLP, Matthew I. Alpert -- malpert@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman and Dowd LLP, Sharon S. Almonrode -- ssa@miller.law -- The
Miller Law Firm, P.C. & E. Powell Miller -- epm@millerlawpc.com --
The Miller Law Firm.

Government Employees' Retirement System of the Virgin Islands,
Plaintiff, represented byDennis A. Lienhardt , The Miller Law Firm,
P.C., Joshua L. Crowell , Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Thomas C.
Michaud , VanOverbeke, Michaud & Matthew I. Alpert , Robbins Geller
Rudman and Dowd LLP.

William Kitsonas, Plaintiff, represented by Dennis A. Lienhardt ,
The Miller Law Firm, P.C.,Joshua L. Crowell , Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP & Matthew I. Alpert , Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd
LLP.

Diplomat Pharmacy, Inc., Philip R. Hagerman, Gary W. Kadlec & Sean
M. Whelan, Defendants, represented by Andrew M. Pauwels --
apauwels@honigman.com -- Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn, James
W. Ducayet -- JDUCAYET@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, Nicholas B.
Gorga -- ngorga@honigman.com -- Honigman, Miller & Nilofer I. Umar
-- NUMAR@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP.


DIXIE GROUP: Memorandum of Understanding Reached in Garcia Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Dixie Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the parties in the case
entitled, Carlos Garcia v. Fabrica International, Inc. et al., have
reached a memorandum of understanding.

As of June 25, 2018, the Company and the Class Representative, as a
result of court ordered mediation, have agreed to a Memorandum of
Understanding regarding settlement of the class action litigation
styled Carlos Garcia v. Fabrica International, Inc. et al Orange
County Superior Court Case No. 30-2017-00949461-CU-OE-CXC.

The parties have agreed during the quarter to file a motion for
approval of a memorandum of understanding with the court in which
the case is pending, and to finalize a definitive settlement
agreement subject to court approval. The required court approval of
the settlement is expected to occur within the next quarter.

During the quarter ended June 30, 2018, the Company has recorded
costs of approximately $1,514 to reflect our estimate of the costs
related to such issues.

The Dixie Group, Inc. manufactures, markets, and sells
floorcovering products for residential and commercial applications
primarily in the United States. It offers residential carpets and
custom rugs, specialty carpets and rugs, residential tufted
broadloom and rugs, and broadloom and modular carpet tiles. The
company was founded in 1920 and is based in Dalton, Georgia.


DOLLAR TREE: Loses Bid for Preliminary OK of Nakooka Suit Deal
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. James Donato denied without prejudice the Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Settlement filed in the lawsuit captioned
Nakooka, et al. v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., Case No.
3:17-cv-03955-JD (N.D. Cal.).

The Court finds that the proposed settlement is not "fair,
reasonable, and adequate," citing Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.  As discussed at the hearing, Judge Donato
notes, the per capita recovery anticipated for each putative class
member is unacceptably tiny in light of plaintiffs' valuation of
the case and the circumstance that the legal and factual issues in
the case are far from settled.  The scope of the release is worded
in a way that makes it potentially far broader than the employee
uniform claim that is the centerpiece of the First Amended
Complaint.

"Additional problems include the proposed form of notice. The
settlement contemplates U.S. mail notice only.  That is
unreasonable and unduly restrictive; email notice plus a dedicated
website should be considered.  The proposed cy pres distribution of
unclaimed funds is not appropriate.  Those funds should be
distributed to claimants in a second round of checks. Class members
should have at least 75 days to object and/or opt out of the
settlement, and 180 days to cash their checks," Judge Donato
opines.

"The proposed administrative fees seem disproportionately high in
light of the fact that this is not a claims-made settlement,"
according to the Court's Notes and Orders.

While attorneys' fees and costs, and "incentive" payments to the
named plaintiffs, will be determined separately, the Court has
concerns.  The case was stayed just a few months after it was
filed, and no meaningful discovery, motion practice or other work
has been done other than settlement talks, Judge Donato notes.

Judge Donato points out that the proposed reservation of up to 25%
of the settlement for attorneys' fees is unwarranted in these
circumstances.  The Court is also skeptical that the named
plaintiffs should receive "incentive" payments that would vastly
exceed the per capita recovery by putative class members.  The
parties are advised to consult the Court's many prior orders on
this issue.

The parties are advised to adhere to the district's Procedural
Guidance for Class Action Settlements, available on the district
Web site, according to the Order.

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Reed W.L. Marcy, Esq.
          AIMAN-SMITH & MARCY PC
          7677 Oakport St., Suite 1150
          Oakland, CA 94621
          Telephone: (510) 817-2711
          Facsimile: (510) 562-6830
          E-mail: rwlm@asmlawyers.com

Defendant Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., is represented by:

          Jeffrey D. Wohl, Esq.
          Ryan D. Derry, Esq.
          PAUL HASTINGS LLP
          101 California Street, 48th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 856-7000
          Facsimile: (415) 856-7100
          E-mail: jeffwohl@paulhastings.com
                  ryanderry@paulhastings.com


DOS REALES: Court Denies Waiters' Bid for Conditional Certification
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied
Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Conditional Certification of
Settlement Class, Proposed Class Notice, and Preliminary Approval
of the Proposed Class Settlement and Attorney Fees in the case
captioned ANATOLIO PENA OLIVERA and MARIA FERNANDA MARTINEZ
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. DOS REALES, INC. and ALVARO QUEZADA, Defendants,
Case No. 17-2203-KGS (D. Kan.).

The Plaintiffs' complaint asserts class claims under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), the Kansas Minimum Wage and Maximum Hours Law
(KMWMHL) and the Kansas Wage Payment Act (KWPA). The complaint
alleges that the defendants failed to pay the plaintiffs and a
proposed class of other waiters earned overtime wages and earned
tips.

Rule 23(a) requires a moving party to satisfy the requirements of
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and fair and adequate
representation. Rule 23(b)(3) requires a showing that common
questions of law or fact common to the class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members and that a
class action is a superior method for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the action.

The Plaintiffs' motion satisfies none of the above requirements.
Instead, these matters are addressed in a single sentence: The
parties agree that Rule 23(b)(3) treatment is appropriate for the
proposed Settlement Class because the putative class contains
enough members to make joinder impracticable, questions of law or
fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members given the Defendants' common
overtime practices, and the class representatives are adequate
representatives with claims and defenses that are typical for the
entire class of employees.

Respectfully, the parties cannot stipulate to a Rule 23 class
action, and the plaintiffs still bear the burden of demonstrating
that they are entitled to the relief sought.

The motion also seeks preliminary approval of a Rule 23 class
action settlement while overlooking Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g), which
requires that a court certifying a Rule 23 class action must
appoint class counsel. Essentially, the plaintiffs are asking the
court to preliminarily approve a settlement that counsel had no
authority to negotiate because counsel has not been appointed to
represent a Rule 23 class.

Moreover, Rule 23(g) lists matters the court must consider in
appointing counsel. Although some of this information can be
extrapolated from the section of the motion seeking preliminary
approval of attorney fees, the motion fails to specifically address
any of Rule 23(g)'s requirements.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 9, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yab5oo9o from
Leagle.com.

Antonoia Pena Olivera, individually and on behalf all others
similarly situated & Maria Fernanda Martinez, individually and on
behalf all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Heather J. Schlozman -- heather@duganschlozman.com -- Dugan
Schlozman LLC, Mark V. Dugan -- mark@duganschlozman.com -- Dugan
Schlozman LLC & Paul H. Mose -- paul@rbr3.com -- Rebein Brothers
PA.

Dos Reales, Inc. & Alvaro Quezada, Defendants, represented by
Donald M. McLean , Law Office of Donald M. McLean.


DUKE ENERGY: Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Fla. Suit Due Oct.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Duke Energy Florida, LLC said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the plaintiffs in the
Florida class action lawsuit have until October 9, 2018, to file a
petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.

On February 22, 2016, a lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Florida on behalf of a putative
class of Duke Energy Florida and Florida Power & Light Company's
(FP&L's) customers in Florida.

The suit alleges the state of Florida's nuclear power plant cost
recovery statutes (NCRS) are unconstitutional and pre-empted by
federal law. Plaintiffs claim they are entitled to repayment of all
money paid by customers of Duke Energy Florida and FP&L as a result
of the NCRS, as well as an injunction against any future charges
under those statutes. The constitutionality of the NCRS has been
challenged unsuccessfully in a number of prior cases on alternative
grounds.

Duke Energy Florida and FP&L filed motions to dismiss the complaint
on May 5, 2016. On September 21, 2016, the Court granted the
motions to dismiss with prejudice. Plaintiffs filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied.

On January 4, 2017, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the
Eleventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals (Eleventh Circuit). On July
11, 2018, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court's
dismissal of the lawsuit. Plaintiffs have until October 9, 2018, to
file a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.

Duke Energy Florida, LLC, a regulated public utility, generates,
transmits, distributes, and sells electricity in Florida. The
company was founded in 1899 and is based in St. Petersburg,
Florida. Duke Energy Florida, LLC is a subsidiary of Progress
Energy, Inc.


ECHELON CORP: Faces Aducci and Rosenblatt Suits over Merger Deal
----------------------------------------------------------------
Echelon Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company is defending
against two lawsuits over a merger transaction:

     -- Aducci v. Echelon Corporation, et al., and
     -- Rosenblatt v. Echelon Corporation, et al.

On June 28, 2018, the Company entered into an Agreement and Plan of
Merger among Adesto Technologies Corporation, Circuit Acquisition
Corporation, and Echelon.  Pursuant to the Merger Agreement, Merger
Sub will be merged with and into the Company, with the Company
continuing as the surviving company in the Merger and as a wholly
owned subsidiary of Adesto. As a result of the Merger, Echelon
Corporation will cease to be a publicly traded company.

On July 20, 2018, and July 26, 2018, putative class action lawsuits
were filed by purported stockholders of the Company in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California and
in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware
(the "Lawsuits").

The Lawsuits are captioned Aducci v. Echelon Corporation, et al.,
No. 5:18-cv-4415 (N.D. Cal.) and Rosenblatt v. Echelon Corporation,
et al., No. 1:18-cv-01103-UNA (D. Del.).

The Lawsuits assert claims under Section 14(a) and Section 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the
disclosures contained in the preliminary proxy statement filed by
the Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 16,
2018.

The Lawsuits name the Company and its directors as defendants. The
complaints seek a variety of equitable and injunctive relief
including, among other things, enjoining the consummation of the
merger and awarding the plaintiffs costs and attorneys' fees.

The Company's management believes that the plaintiffs' claims are
without merit and the defendants intend to defend the Lawsuits
vigorously. As of June 30, 2018, no amounts have been provided for
the Lawsuit.

Echelon Corporation develops, markets, and sells embedded
components, modules, edge servers, and software. The company offers
chips, gateways, and design and management software under the
LONWORKS and IzoT brands. Echelon Corporation was founded in 1988
and is headquartered in Santa Clara, California.


ECLIPX GROUP: Bannister Law Mulls Shareholder Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Vesna Poljak, writing for Financial Review, reports that the 40 per
cent share price plunge linked to Eclipx Group's downgrade on Aug.
7 has Bannister Law investigating the prospect of mounting a
shareholder class action.

Eclipx, which owns the auction site GraysOnline and provides fleet
management services and asset-backed finance, slashed 2017-18
profit guidance three months after it reaffirmed expectations in
its previous update to shareholders.

In May, the company maintained a forecast for 27 per cent-to-30 per
cent growth in net profit after tax and amortisation, which it
issued in 2017 "subject to unforeseen circumstances".

That's now 13 per cent-to-17 per cent profit growth, or $77 million
to $80 million. Bannister Law is investigating whether Eclipx
breached its continuous disclosure obligations.

"GraysOnline auction activity is being affected both by a 10-year
low in bank-initiated insolvencies in Australia and the current
buoyant construction sector where large plant and equipment is
being deployed for longer periods in infrastructure projects,
resulting in reduced auctioned equipment disposals," the market
update said.

Shares of the group fell 41 per cent to $1.80. Eclipx listed in
April 2015 at $2.30 a share.

Eclipx also expects softer trading in the Right2Drive business,
citing competition from auto insurers.

"Notwithstanding the implications of this decade low in insolvency
auction volumes, GraysOnline has grown its national insolvency
marketshare in FY18 and increased its volumes in the non-insolvency
industrial and auto auction categories.

"Eclipx views its GraysOnline auto auction business as a strategic
capability that is key to maximising value in end of lease disposal
and its rapidly growing used car trade-in service," chief executive
Doc Klotz said.

The company has a September 30 financial year end. [GN]


ENDURANCE INTERNATIONAL: McGee Settlement Awaits Initial Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Endurance International Group Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August
2, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the
plaintiffs in the case, William McGee v. Constant Contact, Inc., et
al., filed an unopposed motion seeking preliminary approval of the
proposed settlement, certification of the proposed settlement class
for settlement purposes only, and approval of notice to the
settlement class.

On August 7, 2015, a purported class action lawsuit, William McGee
v. Constant Contact, Inc., et al, was filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Constant
Contact and two of its former officers. An amended complaint, which
named an additional former officer as a defendant, was filed
December 19, 2016.

The lawsuit asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act, and is premised on allegedly false and/or misleading
statements, and non-disclosure of material facts, regarding
Constant Contact's business, operations, prospects and performance
during the proposed class period of October 23, 2014 to July 23,
2015.

The parties mediated the claims on March 27, 2018, and as a result
of that mediation reached an agreement in principle with the lead
plaintiff to settle the action.

The parties then negotiated the terms and conditions of a
stipulation and agreement of settlement and related papers, which
provide for the release of all claims asserted against Constant
Contact and its former officers.

On May 18, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion seeking
preliminary approval of the proposed settlement, certification of
the proposed settlement class for settlement purposes only, and
approval of notice to the settlement class. The court has not yet
ruled on this motion.

Endurance International SAID "The Company's contribution to the
settlement pool under the proposed settlement would be
approximately equal to the amount it reserved in connection with a
possible settlement of this action. The aggregate amount of this
reserve and the reserve for the Endurance Machado litigation was
originally $8.5 million recorded during the three months ended
March 31, 2018, and subsequently adjusted to $8.3 million during
the three months ended June 30, 2018. The Company cannot make any
assurances as to whether the settlement will be approved by the
court."

Endurance International Group Holdings, Inc., together with its
subsidiaries, provides cloud-based platform solutions for small-and
medium-sized businesses worldwide. The company operates in three
segments: Web Presence, Domain, and Email Marketing. Endurance
International Group Holdings, Inc. was founded in 1997 and is
headquartered in Burlington, Massachusetts.


ETRADE FIN'L: 2nd Cir. Affirms Securities Class Action Dismissal
----------------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP, in an article for Lexology, reports that
on July 31, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit unanimously affirmed the dismissal of a putative class
action asserting state-law claims for breach of fiduciary duty,
unjust enrichment, and declaratory relief. Plaintiff's claims were
all based on the allegation that defendant violated its duty of
best execution by routing customer trades—specifically, limit
orders -- to trading venues that were willing to pay the largest
rebates to E*TRADE. Rayner v. E*TRADE Fin. Corp., --.3d --, 2018 WL
3625378 (2d Cir. 2018). The Second Circuit held that plaintiff's
claims were precluded by the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA") because they alleged fraudulent
misrepresentations even though framed as claims for breach of
fiduciary duty.

SLUSA precludes covered class actions based on state law claims
alleging that defendants made a "misrepresentation or omission of
material fact" or used a "manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance" in connection with the purchase or sale of covered
securities. Id. at *2. Plaintiff argued that his complaint did not
allege fraud in the form of a misrepresentation or omission of a
material fact or the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance, and, separately, did not allege fraud "in connection
with" the purchase or sale of covered securities. Id.

The Second Circuit, "emphasiz[ing] substance over form," concluded
that "the gravamen" of the complaint was that "E*TRADE made
material misrepresentations and omissions that were designed to
induce clients to execute non‐directed, standing limit orders
with E*TRADE even though E*TRADE allegedly had no intention of
fulfilling its purported fiduciary obligations." Id. at *3.
Although plaintiff argued that his fiduciary duty claim was based
on defendant's breach of a "non-fraud" based fiduciary duty, the
Court noted that plaintiff could not escape SLUSA by artfully
characterizing a claim as dependent on a theory other than falsity
when falsity was essential to the claim. Here, for example, E*TRADE
on its website stated that it would "do everything possible to seek
best execution each and every time you trade" in order to deliver
"the right blend of execution price, speed, and price improvement."
Id. Moreover, the fact that E*TRADE's trade routing practices led
to less optimal execution was allegedly not known to plaintiff, and
therefore plaintiff was "induced by an omission of a material fact"
to purchase and sell securities. Id. The Court also noted that its
conclusion was consistent with the holdings of the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits that best execution claims alleging misrepresentations and
omissions related to the routing of trades to take advantage of
"kickbacks" from trading venues satisfied the "misrepresentation or
omission" element of SLUSA. See Zola v. TD Ameritrade, Inc., 889
F.3d 920, 923–25 (8th Cir. 2018); Lewis v. Scottrade, Inc., 879
F.3d 850, 854–55 (8th Cir. 2018); Fleming v. Charles Schwab
Corp., 878 F.3d 1146, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2017).

The Second Circuit also rejected plaintiff's argument that the
alleged fraudulent conduct did not arise "in connection with" the
purchase or sale of covered securities. Here, the Court found that
the alleged fraud would have "allegedly caused Rayner and other
E*TRADE clients to purchase and sell securities at unfavorable
prices and at lower volumes than expected" and therefore arose "in
connection" with a purchase or sale. Rayner, 2018 WL 3625378, at
*4. The Court also observed that it was "frivolous to suggest that
negatively influencing the price and quantity at which clients may
buy and sell securities would not make a significant difference to
someone's decision to purchase or to sell a covered security." Id.
The Court further rejected plaintiff's argument that the fraud did
not arise "in connection" with a purchase or sale within the
meaning of SLUSA because E*TRADE was technically the party that
decided to buy or sell the security (which in some instances
resulted in the order not being placed); the Court held because
E*TRADE's clients were trying to take an ownership
position—regardless whether E*TRADE was the entity filling the
order—the allegations were subject to SLUSA. Id.

This decision reinforces that courts will analyze the factual
substance of a plaintiff's claim, regardless of the legal theory
plaintiff purports to pursue, in analyzing SLUSA preclusion. [GN]


EVERGREEN MONEYSOURCE: Court Grants Prelim OK of Class Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for preliminary
approval of the proposed class, proposed class counsel and claims
administrator, proposed class settlement, and proposed
implementation schedule in the case captioned JARED ACOSTA,
Plaintiff, v. EVERGREEN MONEYSOURCE MORTGAGE COMPANY, a Washington
Corporation; and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, Defendants. No.
2:17-CV-00466-KJM-DB. (E.D. Cal.)

The Plaintiff contends his former employer, defendant Evergreen,
forbids its loan originators from earning proper wages and accruing
paid sick leave and vacation benefits. He sues Evergreen for wage,
hour and rest break violations on behalf of himself and all
similarly situated California employees.

CLASS CERTIFICATION

Rule 23 requires that the class contain enough members to warrant
litigating the issues as a class rather than individually; the suit
involves questions common to all class members; the proposed class
representative's claims typify the class members' claims; and the
proposed class representative and his counsel fairly and adequately
protect class interests. Plaintiff must also show that the common
class questions predominate over any individual member questions
and that a class action is the superior method of vindicating the
rights at issue.

Numerosity

The class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable.  Here, the proposed class is 59 members. The
Plaintiff's 59-member putative class satisfies the numerosity
requirement.

Commonality, Typicality and Predominance

The Plaintiff's claims must be typical of the class, and there must
be questions of law or fact common to the class that predominate
over individual questions.

Here, plaintiff has shown typicality, commonality and predominance.
First, plaintiff's claims typify the class's claims: the Plaintiff
and each class member allegedly held the same position at roughly
the same time, and allegedly were subjected to the same policies
regarding wages, commissions, hours, rest periods, sick leave and
vacation accruals.  

Second, the litigation poses common class questions. Plaintiff
alleges five common, allegedly unlawful practices that affected
every class member: (1) Unpaid rest periods; (2) unpaid wages owed
at termination, which triggered waiting time penalties; (3)
inaccurate wage statements that included neither the employer's
full name nor the itemized rest period premiums owed; (4) no paid
sick leave; and (5) delayed termination wages.  

Third, the common class questions predominate over individual
questions.  Each theory of recovery is based on defendants' alleged
common practices and uniformly applied policies. The central issue
is whether these standardized policies, which affected every class
member, are unlawful. The only individual question is how much each
policy damaged a particular employee, which is invariably an
individual question and does not defeat class action treatment.

The Plaintiff has established commonality, typicality and
predominance.

Adequacy

The Plaintiff and the plaintiff's counsel must adequately represent
the class interests.  
Here, nothing before the court suggests a conflict of interest
between class members and plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel. First,
plaintiff and his counsel have sworn under penalty of perjury they
have no such conflicts. Second, as explained above, plaintiff
shares common questions and injuries with the class, which ensures
a common goal. Third, plaintiff has proposed a single settlement
class with all members receiving a distribution based on the same
formula, which eliminates any possible incentive to favor one
subclass over another.  Fourth, plaintiff's class representative
enhancement award is not conditioned on the class representatives'
accepting the settlement agreement.  

The Plaintiff has established adequacy.

Superiority

A class action must also be the superior method of vindicating the
rights at issue.  
Here, based on the record currently before the court, the class
action method appears superior to other potential adjudication
methods. Difficulties in managing the class action at trial are
irrelevant here because this settlement class will not proceed to
trial if it obtains final approval. There is no indication putative
class members are involved in separate litigation against the same
defendant regarding similar issues. If left to individual
litigation or adjudication, class members may reap smaller rewards
than they would as part of this settlement class.  

The superiority factor is satisfied.

The motion to preliminarily certify the class is granted.

CLASS SETTLEMENT

Legal Standard

The court next considers whether the proposed settlement appears
fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Proposed Settlement Terms

The proposed class settlement includes the following material
terms. The Defendant agrees to pay a gross amount of $350,000 to
settle all claims, excluding tax obligations. Of this total,
$20,000 is for plaintiff's class representative enhancement award.
The Agreement reserves up to $10,000 for claim administrator fees,
with the remainder reverting to the settlement fund to be divided
as follows. Up to $10,000.00 will go towards the PAGA claims, three
quarters of which are $7,500 will be paid to the State with the
remaining quarter of $2,500 paid to class. Up to 25 percent of the
total settlement award is for plaintiff's attorneys' fees, and
defendant will not oppose any fee request within this threshold.  
Up to $10,000.00 is for plaintiff's litigation costs.

The Court's Reservations

First, plaintiff's $20,000 enhancement award is unusually high. The
court recognizes the Agreement is not contingent on the award, but
final approval if granted will require substantial justification
detailing the basis for such a high award. Prior to final approval,
the parties also should address whether this high award, and the
relatively high fees discussed below, are in some way vestiges of
the large demand plaintiff made going into mediation.

Second, the class administration fee, which could reach up to
$10,000, is particularly high considering the class is relatively
small and geographically restricted to California. Final approval
will require a more detailed justification for this expense.

Third, the motion for preliminary approval omits any discussion of
the critical question of how the settlement amount relates to the
merits of the class members' individual claims. As noted above, the
court has received and examined the parties' mediation statements
and is preliminarily satisfied that the agreement is reasonable and
fair. See Lodging Acknowledgment. But final approval will require a
more detailed explanation of how the parties' settlement sum
relates to the merits of the case.

Fourth, the Agreement contemplates that if certain class members
receive no notice packet because, for instance they are returned as
undeliverable, those members will not receive a payment, yet they
still will release their claims. This provision may not satisfy
absent members' due process guarantees. Before final approval, the
parties should be prepared to explain how their plans comply with
the fairness requirement.

Fifth, although the court preliminarily approves the 25 percent
attorneys' fee provision as within the Ninth Circuit's accepted
range, defendant's agreement not to oppose any motion for
attorneys' fees within this range raises a red flag. Clear sailing
provisions such as this can be evidence of collusion. Before
approving any final request for attorneys' fees, the court must
have enough information to determine if the requested fee is
reasonable.

The court discussed the above concerns with counsel at hearing,
each of which must be addressed in more detail before final
approval. For now, the motion for preliminary approval is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 13, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybl28vnb from Leagle.com.

Jared Acosta, Plaintiff, represented by Galen T. Shimoda --
attorney@shimodalaw.com -- Shimoda Law Corp. & Justin Paul
Rodriguez -- jrodriguez@shimodalaw -- Shimoda Law Corp.

Evergreen Moneysource Mortgage Company, Defendant, represented by
Julie Grace Yap -- jyap@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP,
Alexander A. Baehr -- alexb@summitlaw.com -- Summit Law Group,
PLLC, pro hac vice & Tiffany Tran -- ttran@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth
Shaw LLP.


EXLSERVICE HOLDINGS: Agreement in Principle Reached in Calif. Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
ExlService Holdings Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that parties in the putative
class action lawsuit filed in California have reached an agreement
in principle.

In March 2017, the Company was named in a putative class action
lawsuit filed in California, which included several causes of
action seeking damages but did not include a monetary demand. The
Company filed its answer in April 2017 vigorously denying the
allegations. Both parties agreed to participate in a court-approved
mediation which occurred in March 2018.

The parties reached an agreement in principle whereby the Company,
without any admission of wrongdoing or liability, would pay $2,400
to settle the litigation, which amount has been accrued under
"General and administrative expenses" for the six months ended June
30, 2018.

The agreement remains subject to final court approval, which is
expected to occur in the fourth quarter of 2018 although there can
be no guarantee as to approval or timing.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

ExlService Holdings Inc. outsources business processes, including
transaction processing and Internet and voice-based customer care
services, to Global 1000 companies in banking, financial services,
and insurance. ExlService also offers technical support and
advisory services. The company's clients are located principally in
the U.S. and Britain. The company was founded in 1999 and is
headquartered in New York.


FACEBOOK INC: Avoiding Testimony May Ramp Up Legal Fees
-------------------------------------------------------
Ronald Barusch, writing for The Wall Street Journal, reports that
legal fees for the prevailing lawyers in class actions can be
eye-popping.

Take the $129 million sought by those who successfully challenged a
Facebook Inc. proposal in 2016 to issue nonvoting stock to help
Mark Zuckerberg keep control of the company. Facebook, in fighting
the fee, says it represents a $9,146 hourly rate. Pretty good work
if you can get it.

But there is a more impressive number at work here. Late in July,
Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster effectively told Facebook that if
it wanted to continue the fee fight in his Delaware court, Mr.
Zuckerberg needs to testify at a hearing expected to take up to six
hours.

In my view, Mr. Zuckerberg won't want to do that, particularly
since the company threw in the towel when his testimony was
imminent in the underlying litigation last year. But I predict
skipping a trip to Delaware could end up costing Facebook somewhere
close to $20 million for each hour of testimony Mr. Zuckerberg
avoids.

Since Facebook's IPO in 2012, Mr. Zuckerberg has held a class of
stock with 10 times the voting power of the shares sold to the
public. That allows him to have a majority of the votes even though
he only has a minority of the overall shares. However, Mr.
Zuckerberg is committed to contributing a substantial portion of
his net worth to charity, and that will require him to dispose of
most of his supervoting shares and ultimately lose his ability to
control Facebook.

So in 2016, Facebook proposed issuing a new class of nonvoting
stock and distributing it as a dividend to all shareholders along
with some governance improvements Mr. Zuckerberg agreed to. The
distribution of the new shares would enable Mr. Zuckerberg to sell
stock to fund much of his charitable commitment without losing any
of his voting power.

Facebook was then hit with class-action lawsuits seeking to block
issuance of the nonvoting shares. Although shareholders approved
the plan, the company needed Mr. Zuckerberg's supervoting shares to
keep the most controversial elements from being rejected. Last
September, a few days before the trial in which Mr. Zuckerberg was
going to be required to testify, the whole plan was called off.

The plaintiffs' lawyers claimed victory and asked Facebook to pay
them that big fee because of all the value they say they created
for shareholders. (Lawyers typically seek a so-called "mootness
fee" when a company gives up on a challenged plan before a court
can rule on the class action, and Facebook hasn't objected to some
fee but it says it shouldn't be more than $20 million.)

To be clear, shareholders didn't collect any cash, but the lawyers'
view is the outcome accelerates the timetable for the public to
control the company.

At the hearing, there was a lot of squabbling about that and how
much longer Mr. Zuckerberg will be in control.

That led to Vice Chancellor Laster requiring Mr. Zuckerberg to come
to Delaware and testify at a two-day hearing. Since the executive
gave up last year before appearing in court, who thinks Mr.
Zuckerberg is going to want to subject himself to cross-examination
now just to save Facebook legal fees that, although astonishing for
the rest of us, are a rounding error for a company worth $500
billion? I suspect the Vice Chancellor doesn't.

According to the Journal's Barusch, "Instead, I predict a
negotiated settlement that could value Mr. Zuckerberg's court time
at around $20 million an hour, because to get the law firms to
settle without a hearing, Facebook will probably have to give them
much of what they seek."

Facebook said in a statement: "The reclassification proposal has
been withdrawn. The only issue still being litigated is
compensation for plaintiffs' lawyers, who are seeking the second
highest fee in the history of the court. We continue to oppose
their efforts to recover a windfall at the expense of
stockholders."

It's easy to be critical of the attorneys' fees in class actions.
Big fee awards in cases like this where no cash goes to
shareholders or companies do give pause.  But in our system there
is no sanction for breach of directors' fiduciary duties other than
through this type of litigation.  Plus, recent Delaware court
decisions have restricted the circumstances in which such claims
can be made. If there aren't big fees for the lawyers who do
prevail, don't expect anyone to challenge dicey deals anymore.
[GN]


FAIVELEY TRANSPORT: Employees' Suit Transferred to W.D. Pa
----------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Edward Kubik, Deondra Randle and Allyn Basore,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, vs. Faiveley Transport S.A., Faiveley Transport North
America, Inc., Knorr-Bremse AG, Knorr Brake Company, New York Air
Brake LLC, and Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation
d/b/a WABTEC Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 18-CV-01618 (D.S.C.,
June 13, 2018), was transferred to the Western District of
Pennsylvania on August 17, 2018 under Case No. 18-cv-01100.

Plaintiffs seeks to recover damages and obtain injunctive relief
for injuries caused under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

Defendants and their related subsidiaries are rail equipment used
in freight and passenger rail applications suppliers who are
alleged of restraining competition in the labor markets in which
they compete for employees. Defendants are each other's top
competitors for rail equipment, including for skilled employees.
However, rather than compete to attract the best employees by
offering more attractive salary and benefits packages to
prospective job seekers, they instead conspired to enter into a
series of agreements intended to circumvent competition for
employees and suppress wages and job opportunities, thus
suppressing compensation and potential new job opportunities and
restraining competition in the market for their employees'
services.

Kubik worked for Wabtec as a Senior Engineer while Randle worked as
Design Engineer and Systems Engineer. As a result of the No-Poach
Agreements, their compensation was suppressed during the time they
worked for Wabtec, says the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Chad A. McGowan, Esq.
      MCGOWAN HOOD FELDER AND JOHNSON
      1539 Healthcare Drive
      Rock Hill, SC 29732
      Tel: (803) 327-7800
      Fax: (803) 328-5656
      Email: cmcgowan@mcgowanhood.com

             - and -

      Russell Thomas Burke, Esq.
      MCGOWAN HOOD AND FELDER LLC
      1517 Hampton Street
      Columbia, SC 29201
      Tel: (803) 779-0100
      Fax: (803) 787-6400
      Email: rburke@mcgowanhood.com

             - and -

      Jason Scott Hartley, Esq.
      HARTLEY LLP
      550 West C Street, Suite 1750
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Tel: (619) 400-5822
      Fax: (619) 400-5832
      Email: hartley@hartleyllp.com

             - and -

      Vincent J. Esades, Esq.
      HEINS MILLS & OLSON, P.L.C.
      310 Clifton Avenue
      Minneapolis, MN 55403
      Tel: (612) 338-4605
      Fax: (612) 338-4692
      Email: vesades@heinsmills.com

Faiveley Transport S.A. and WABTEC Corp. are represented by:

      Jennifer Hess Thiem, Esq.
      K&L Gates LLP (Chas)
      134 Meeting Street, Suite 500
      Charleston, SC 29401
      Tel: (843) 579-5638
      Email: jennifer.thiem@klgates.com


FERRARA CANDY: Settles Underfilling Class Action for $2.5MM
-----------------------------------------------------------
Nona Tepper, writing for Forest Park Review, reports that Ferrara
Candy Co. has agreed to pay $2.5 million to settle a class-action
lawsuit alleging the candy manufacturer did not adequately fill the
boxes of several of its product brands.

Plaintiff Thomas Iglesias, of San Francisco, California, filed the
complaint in February 2017, alleging Ferrara's failure to fill 18
products housed in an "opaque cardboard box (including bag-in-a-box
products)," like Lemonheads, RedHots, Brach's and more, were
intentionally deceptive to consumers, constitute unjust enrichment
and violate consumer protection statutes, according to a motion
filed by Judge Vince Chhabria on June 26 in U.S. District Court for
the Northern District California.

Ferrara filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in May 2017,
essentially saying that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
should decide how much empty space is adequate in a candy box, and
that it shouldn't be subject to a legal opinion. The FDA already
regulates how much "slack fill," or empty space, is permitted in
product packaging. The motion also stated that Ferrara's packaging
clearly specifies the weight of the product. Ferrara did not
respond to an interview request.

"Reasonable consumers understand, based on life experience, that
many food products, including snack food and candy, contain some
empty space," Robert Hawk, an attorney for Hogan Lovells U.S.,
representing Ferrara, wrote in the motion. "If consumers seek
specifics about the actual quantity of candy in Ferrara's candy
boxes, they need look no further than the front or back of the
package itself, where standard, legally required disclosures state
the product's net weight and servings per container."

The court declined Ferrara's motion to dismiss the complaint the
next month and, in May 2018, expanded the lawsuit to nationwide
class-action status.

Iglesias "is typical of consumers around the country in that they
were all exposed to identical product packaging, which is alleged
to have been deceptive for identical reasons," Judge Chhabria wrote
in the June motion.  

Those who believe they have purchased a Ferrara candy box or bag
that was under-filled can file a claim at
www.ferraracandysettlement.com with an administrator the court put
in charge of collecting claims. The deadline to file a claim is
Sept. 20 and proof of purchase is not required. The matter will be
decided on Oct. 25 in the U.S. District Court - Northern District
Court. The final settlement amount will be approved then, as will
requests for reimbursement for attorney's fees and court costs.

Chandra Hatch and Lora Pate also have until Sept. 20 to decide if
they would like to be included in Iglesias' complaint or pursue
their separate complaint, currently pending in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which alleges that 13
Ferrara products are intentionally under-filled or slack-filled.
Ms. Hatch and Ms. Pate filed their complaint on March 22, and have
alleged that Ferrara is settling Mr. Iglesias' complaint because
Iglesias was not seeking a large settlement.  

"Ferrara intends to move to stay the Hatch action, pending approval
of this settlement," Michael Shephard --
michael.shepard@hoganlovells.com -- an attorney from Hogan Lovells
U.S., which is representing Ferrara, wrote in an April 20 action.

Ferrara also faces a separate complaint from a plaintiff in St.
Louis, who is likewise alleging the candy manufacturer under-fills
its products. [GN]


FOUNDATION MEDICINE: Kent Suit Voluntarily Dismissed
----------------------------------------------------
Foundation Medicine, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the case entitled, Kent
v. Foundation Medicine, Inc. et al., has been dismissed.

On July 11, 2018, a putative securities class action complaint,
Kent v. Foundation Medicine, Inc. et al., No. 1:18-cv-01028 (the
"Kent Complaint"), was filed in the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware by purported Company shareholder
Michael Kent against the Company, the Company's directors and Roche
in connection with the Offer.

The Kent Complaint alleged that the Schedule 14D-9 filed by the
Company on July 2, 2018 in connection with the Offer omitted
certain supposedly material information concerning (1)
communications regarding the positions of the Company's directors
and officers following the transactions and (2) compensation
received by Goldman Sachs in connection with the Company's initial
public offering and Roche Holdings' 2015 investment in the Company.


The Kent Complaint asserted claims against all the defendants for
violation of Sections 14(d) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act, and
against the Company's directors and Roche for violation of Section
20(a) of the Exchange Act. The Kent Complaint sought declaratory
and injunctive relief, as well as damages and attorneys' fees and
costs.

On August 2, 2018, the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary
dismissal, dismissing the case without prejudice.

Foundation Medicine, Inc. provides various molecular information
products in the United States. The company was founded in 2009 and
is headquartered in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Foundation Medicine,
Inc. is a subsidiary of Roche Holdings, Inc.


FOUNDATION MEDICINE: Wang Suit Voluntarily Dismissed
----------------------------------------------------
Foundation Medicine, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the plaintiff in Wang v.
Foundation Medicine, Inc. et al., has dismissed his case.

On July 10, 2018, a putative securities class action complaint,
Wang v. Foundation Medicine, Inc. et al., No. 1:18-cv-11435, was
filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts by purported Company shareholder Elaine Wang against
the Company and the Company's directors in connection with the
offer by Roche to acquire all of the issued and outstanding shares
of the company's common stock (the "Offer").

An amended complaint (the "Wang Complaint") was filed on July 11,
2018 against the Company, the Company's directors and Roche. The
Wang Complaint alleged that the Schedule 14D-9 filed by the Company
on July 2, 2018 in connection with the Offer omitted certain
supposedly material information concerning (1) communications
regarding the positions of the Company's directors and officers
following the transactions, (2) communications regarding
compensation to be paid to the Company's directors and officers in
connection with the transactions, and (3) compensation received by
Goldman Sachs in connection with the Company's initial public
offering and Roche Holdings' 2015 investment in the Company.

The Wang Complaint asserted claims against all the defendants for
violation of Sections 14(d) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act, and
against the Company's directors and Roche Holdings for violation of
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. The Wang Complaint sought
declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages and
attorneys' fees and costs.

On July 31, 2018, the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary
dismissal, dismissing the case with prejudice.

Foundation Medicine, Inc. provides various molecular information
products in the United States. The company was founded in 2009 and
is headquartered in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Foundation Medicine,
Inc. is a subsidiary of Roche Holdings, Inc.


GDS HOLDINGS: Faces Allison Suit Over 38% Drop in ADR Price
-----------------------------------------------------------
CHRIS ALLISON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GDS HOLDINGS LIMITED; WILLIAM WEI HUANG; and
DANIEL NEWMAN, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-06960 (S.D.N.Y., Aug.
2, 2018) is a class action against the Defendants alleging
violation of the Federal Securities Law in connection with the
initial public offering of the Defendants' American Depositary
Shares (ADS) during the period November 2, 2016.

On July 31, 2018, a report was released alleging that the GDS
Holdings is borrowing crippling amounts of debt to enrich insiders
by acquiring data centers from undisclosed related parties which
are not nearly as valuable as GDS Holdings claims.

The report further claims that since becoming a public company, GDS
Holdings has borrowed recklessly to siphon off at least RMB 696
million to insiders by inflating the purchase price of undisclosed
related party acquisitions. The report also alleges suspect
accounts receivable and payable practices.

On this news, the GDS Holdings's ADS price fell $13.42 per share,
or over 38%, to close at $21.83 per share on July 31, 2018.

GDS Holdings Limited, together with its subsidiaries, designs,
builds, and operates data centers in the People's Republic of
China. The company provides colocation, managed hosting, and
managed cloud services. GDS Holdings Limited was incorporated in
2006 and is headquartered in Shanghai, the People's Republic of
China.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           Todd S. Garber, Esq.
           FINKELSTEIN BLANKINSHIP
             FREI-PEARSON & GARBER, LLP
           445 Hamilton Ave, Suite 605
           White Plains, NY 10601
           Telephone: (914) 298-3283
           Facsimile: (914) 908-6721
           E-mail: tgarber@fbfalaw.com

                - and -

           Jeffrey C. Block, Esq.
           BLOCK & LEVITON LLP
           155 Federal Street, Suite 400
           Boston, MA 02110
           Telephone: (617) 398-5600
           Facsimile: (617) 507-6020
           E-mail: Jeff@blockesg.com


GDS HOLDINGS: Oct. 1 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
------------------------------------------------
ClaimsFiler, a FREE shareholder information service, reminds
investors that they have until October 1, 2018 to file lead
plaintiff applications in securities class action lawsuits against
GDS Holdings Limited (NasdaqGM: GDS), if they purchased the
Company's securities between November 2, 2016 and July 31, 2018,
inclusive (the "Class Period").  The actions are pending in the
United States District Courts for the Eastern District of Texas and
Southern District of New York.

GDS investors should visit us at
https://www.claimsfiler.com/cases/view-gds-holdings-limited-securities-litigation


                        About the Lawsuit

GDS and certain of its executives are charged with failing to
disclose material information during the Class Period, violating
federal securities laws.

On July 31, 2018, Blue Orca Capital reported that "GDS is borrowing
crippling amounts of debt to enrich insiders by acquiring data
centers from undisclosed related parties which are not nearly as
valuable as the Company claims. We believe that since becoming a
public Company, GDS has borrowed recklessly to siphon off at least
RMB 696 million to insiders by inflating the purchase price of
undisclosed related party acquisitions."

On this news, the price of GDS shares plummeted.

GDS investors should visit us at:

         Website: https://www.claimsfiler.com/cases/view-gds-
                  holdings-limited-securities-litigation   
                  www.claimsfiler.com.
         Toll-free: (844) 367-9658 [GN]  

GDS HOLDINGS: Pomerantz Probes Claims on Behalf of Investors
------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP is investigating claims on behalf of investors of GDS
Holdings Limited ("GDS" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: GDS) Investors
are advised to contact Robert S. Willoughby at
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888-476-6529, ext. 9980.

The investigation concerns whether GDS and certain of its officers
and/or directors have violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On July 31, 2018, Blue Orca Capital published a report alleging,
among other issues, that GDS had borrowed heavily in order to
enrich insiders by acquiring data centers from undisclosed related
parties, and that these data centers were significantly less
valuable than GDS claimed.

On this news, GDS's stock price fell $12.92 per share, or 37.18%,
to close at $21.83 per share on July 31, 2018.

         Contact:
         Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
         Pomerantz LLP
         Website: www.pomerantzlaw.com
         Email: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]


GLOBAL EAGLE: Awaits 9th Cir. Hearing on Hart Class Action Appeal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Global Eagle Entertainment Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company expects
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to conduct a
hearing in late 2018 or early 2019 on the appeal made by plaintiff
in the putative securities class action lawsuit filed by M&M Hart
Living Trust and Randi Williams.

On February 23, 2017 and on March 17, 2017, following the company's
announcement that the company anticipated a delay in filing its
Annual Report for the year ended December 31, 2016 (or "2016 Form
10-K") and that its former CEO and former CFO would separate from
the company, three putative securities class action lawsuits were
filed in United States District Court for the Central District of
California.

These lawsuits alleged violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against the company, its former
CEO and two of its former CFOs. The plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissed two of these lawsuits.

The third lawsuit, brought by putative stockholder M&M Hart Living
Trust and Randi Williams (the "Hart complaint"), alleged that the
company and the other defendants made misrepresentations and/or
omitted material information about the EMC Acquisition, the
company's projected financial performance and synergies following
that acquisition, and the impact of that acquisition on its
internal controls over financial reporting. The plaintiffs sought
unspecified damages, attorneys' fees and costs.

On November 2, 2017, the Court granted the company's and the other
defendants' motion to dismiss the Hart complaint, and dismissed the
action with prejudice.

On November 30, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or
amend the Court's previous judgment of dismissal to permit them to
file a further amended complaint. On January 8, 2018 the Court
denied the plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend the previous
judgment.

On January 29, 2018, the plaintiffs appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from the Court's denial of
the plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend the judgment.

Global Eagle said "We expect the Ninth Circuit to hear the appeal
in late 2018 or early 2019. We believe that a loss relating to this
matter is probable, but we believe that it is unlikely to be
material and therefore have accrued an immaterial amount related to
this loss contingency. We intend to vigorously defend ourselves
against this claim."

Global Eagle Entertainment Inc. provides content, connectivity, and
digital media solutions for travel industry worldwide. The company
operates through two segments, Media & Content and Connectivity.
Global Eagle Entertainment Inc. is headquartered in Los Angeles,
California.


GLOBAL TEL: Class Certified in Inflated Prison Phone Fees Case
--------------------------------------------------------------
P.J. D'Annunzio, writing for Law.com, reports that a suit claiming
that the private company contracted to provide phone services at
nearly every New Jersey correctional facility charges improperly
inflated rates has been granted class action status.

U.S. District Senior Judge William J. Martini of the District of
New Jersey on Aug. 6 approved the plaintiffs' request for class
certification in their case against Global Tel Link and its
subsidiaries, lodged over claims that it overcharged for calls and
tacked on superfluous fees.

The certification was granted on claims lodged under the
unconscionability section of the Consumer Fraud Act and the takings
clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs allege that GTL
engaged in "unconscionable business practices by setting grossly
excessive rates and fees," Martini wrote in his opinion. Although
pricing varied across facilities, the inmates claim that even the
lowest rates and fees were "unconscionably high" in relation to the
actual cost of providing inmate calling services.

The company provides services for 20 state Department of
Corrections facilities and 21 county facilities -- every such
facility in the state, except for Passaic County's jail, according
to the decision.

GTL, in opposing class certification, argued that in order for
conduct to be unconscionable, an element of deception has to be
involved.

Martini said: "The court agrees that if the CFA requires deception,
then individual questions of fact likely predominate. On the other
hand, if conduct can be 'unconscionable' without deception, and if
unconscionability pertains to a single pattern or practice
undertaken by GTL, then 'questions of law or fact common to class
members' likely predominate over questions affecting individual
class members. For reasons set forth in the summary judgment
opinion, the court finds that a defendant's business practice does
not need to be deceptive in order to be 'unconscionable' under the
CFA. Further, plaintiffs allege that even the lowest pricing
schemes were unconscionably expensive. Plaintiffs therefore satisfy
the commonality requirement."

As for the takings clause count, the argument hinged on whether GTL
was a "willful participant in a joint activity with the state or
its agents" and if so, whether the state encouraged the company's
alleged price-gouging.

"Although the counties may have selected different 'options' from
GTL's [request for proposal], the essential business practice --
and its causal relationship to the alleged harm sustained by
plaintiffs -- is common to all class members. Specifically, the
government and GTL formed exclusive contracts under which GTL
allegedly shifted the costs of higher site commissions to end users
in the form of higher calling rates and ancillary fees," Judge
Martini said.

The plaintiffs' attorney is James Cecchi of Carella, Byrne, Cecchi,
Olstein, Brody & Agnello.

"We are pleased with the court's decision and look forward to
presenting our clients' case at trial," Mr. Cecchi said in an
email.

Aaron Van Nostrand -- vannostranda@gtlaw.com -- of Greenberg
Traurig represents GTL. He did not respond to a request for
comment. [GN]


GOOGLE INC: Faces Location Sharing Class Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------
Jon Parton, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that a
class action privacy lawsuit against Google was filed in federal
court in San Francisco on August 17, claiming that the technology
giant continued to track the location of cell phone users after
they turned off tracking.

The lawsuit alleges that Google tracked users' geolocation through
its Android mobile operating system and related apps even when
settings were purportedly supposed to protect user privacy.

"Despite users' attempts to protect their location privacy, Google
collects and stores users' location data, thereby invading users'
reasonable expectations of privacy, counter to Google's own
representations about how users can configure Google's products to
prevent such egregious privacy violations," the complaint states.

The lawsuit comes after an Associated Press investigative story
published on August 13  explained that even when location tracking
is turned off, it may still be used by some Google apps.

Plaintiff Napoleon Patacsil states in the complaint that Google
apps on his iPhone continued to track his location after he turned
the apps' Location History storage option off. Patacsil said that
Google continued to track him even after its website stated that
turning off location tracking in an account turns off "all devices
associated with that Google Account."

"Google's representation was false. As recently publicly revealed,
turning off "Location History" only stopped Google from creating a
location timeline that the user could view," the complaint states.
"Google, however, continues to track the phone owners and keep a
record of their locations."

The lawsuit claims that Google violated federal law by tracking
individual geolocations without permission, referring to a Federal
Trade Commission law that calls it a "deceptive trade practice."

Additionally, Patascil claims that the practice violates the
California Invasion of Privacy Act and California's constitutional
right to privacy.

In addition to damages, Patascil seeks a court order demanding that
Google destroy all data captured from its geolocation tracking
technology of the plaintiff and class members.

Patascil is represented by Michael Sobol, Esq. and Nicholas
Diamand, Esq. of Lieff Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein and Hank
Bates, Esq. of Carney Bates and Pulliam. A call to his attorneys
and to Google for comment were made after business hours and not
immediately returned August 17 evening.[GN]


HEGEWISCH DEV'T: Violated Privacy Act, Faces Class Action Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jenie Mallari-Torres, writing for Cook County Record, reports that
an employee has filed a class action lawsuit against Hegewisch
Development Corp. and its subsidiaries, citing alleged violation of
the Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA).

Lead plaintiff Fallon White filed a complaint July 30 in Cook
County Circuit Court, claiming the defendants failed to exercise
care in protecting employees' personal information.

According to the complaint, White and the other class members
allegedly were not informed in writing of the purpose and length of
time for which their fingerprints were being collected, stored,
disseminated and used by the defendants or a schedule for permanent
destruction of the biometric data.

The lawsuit also claims the defendants shared the fingerprint data
with third parties.

White claims the defendants' failure to destroy the biometric data
heightened the risk for identity theft, and the defendants failed
to obtain written releases from the employees before collecting
their fingerprints.

The plaintiff requests a trial by jury and seeks a judgment against
the defendants, certification of the class action, statutory
damages of $5,000 for each reckless violation and $1,000 for each
negligent violation, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs,
litigation expenses, interest and further relief as the court deems
just. It is represented by Ryan Stephan, Esq., James Zouras, Esq.
and Haley Jenkins, Esq. of Stephen Zouras LLP in Chicago.[GN]


HELIOS AND MATHESON: Chang Sues over 96.49% Drop in Shares Price
----------------------------------------------------------------
JEFFREY CHANG, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HELIOS AND MATHESON ANALYTICS INC., THEODORE
FARNSWORTH, and STUART BENSON, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-06965
(S.D.N.Y., Aug. 2, 2018) is a class action against the Defendants
seeking remedies under the Securities Exchange Act in connection
with the Defendants' sale of their common stock between August 15,
2017 and July 26, 2018.

According to the complaint, on August 15, 2017, Helios issued a
press release, announcing it would acquire a majority stake in
MoviePass Inc., a movie subscription technology company, and
introduce a new $9.95 flat no-contract monthly fee.

On September 15, 2017, Helios issued a press release, announcing
more than 400,000 monthly subscribers to MoviePass and describing
Helios' "sustainable" business model."

On October 12, 2017, Helios issued a press release, announcing it
had increased its ownership stake in MoviePass to 53.71 percent and
was providing another advance payment to MoviePass.

On March 14, 2018, Helios filed a Form 8-K with the SEC announcing
a new subscription agreement with MoviePass, whereby in lieu of
MoviePass repaying previous advance payments Helios had accepted to
receive MoviePass common stock "based on a pre-money valuation of
MoviePass of $240 million as of December 31, 2017."

The statements in paragraphs made by the Defendants were materially
false and misleading because they misrepresented and failed to
disclose the following adverse facts pertaining to the Helio's
business, operations, and prospects, which were known to Defendants
or recklessly disregarded by them. Specifically, the Defendants
failed to disclose that: (i) Helios was touting MoviePass'
valuation and path to profitability; (ii) MoviePass' business model
was not sustainable, (iii) consequently, Helios would run out of
cash, (iv) Defendants' actions were only reducing shareholder
value, and (v) as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' statements
about Helios' business, operations, and prospects, were false and
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

On July 27, 2018, Helios filed a Form 8-K with the SEC announcing
that it had issued a demand note in the principal amount of $6.2
million because it was unable to make required payments to its
merchants and fulfillment processors leading to a service
interruption.

On this news, the price of the Helios's common stock declined $4.83
from a close on July 26, 2018 at $6.83 per share of Helios common
stock, to a close on July 27, 2018 at $2.00 per share of Helios
common stock, a drop of approximately 70.72%.

In the course of the following trading days, the price of the
Helios's common stock declined another $1.76 to close on August 1,
2018 at $0.228 per share of Helios common stock, an overall drop
from July 26, 2018 of approximately 96.49%.

Helios and Matheson Analytics Inc. provides a range of information
technology (IT) solutions to Fortune 1000 companies and other
organizations in the United States. The company was formerly known
as Helios and Matheson Information Technology Inc. and changed its
name to Helios and Matheson Analytics Inc. in May 2013. Helios and
Matheson Analytics Inc. was founded in 1982 and is headquartered in
New York, New York.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eduard Korsinsky, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
          30 Broad Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 363-7500
          Facsimile: (212) 363-7171
          Email: ek@zlk.com


HELIOS AND MATHESON: Oct. 1 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------
Pawar Law Group on Aug. 7 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed on behalf of shareholders who purchased shares of Helios
and Matheson Analytics Inc. (NASDAQ: HMNY) from August 15, 2017
through July 26, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit
seeks to recover damages for Helios and Matheson investors under
the federal securities laws.

To join the Helios and Matheson class action, go to
http://pawarlawgroup.com/cases/helios-and-matheson-analytics-inc/
or call Vik Pawar, Esq. toll-free at 888-589-9804 or email
vik@pawarlawgroup.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants during the Class Period made
materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) Helios and Matheson was touting MoviePass'
valuation and path to profitability; (2) MoviePass' business model
was not sustainable; (3) consequently, Helios and Matheson would
run out of cash; (4) defendants' actions were only reducing
shareholder value; and (5) as a result, defendants' statements
about Helios and Matheson's business, operations, and prospects
were false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis. When
the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that
investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than October 1,
2018. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
http://pawarlawgroup.com/cases/helios-and-matheson-analytics-inc/
or to discuss your rights or interests regarding this class action,
please contact Vik Pawar, Esq. of Pawar Law Group toll free at
888-589-9804 or via e-mail at vik@pawarlawgroup.com.

Pawar Law Group represents investors from around the world. [GN]


HEMPSTEAD COUNTY, AR: Underpays Detention Officers, Middleton Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
Gary Middleton, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Hempstead County, Arkansas, Defendant, Case
Number: 4:18-cv-04112-SOH (W.D. Ark., August 1, 2018) seeks
declaratory judgment, monetary damages, liquidated damages,
prejudgment interest, costs and attorneys' fees as a result of the
Defendant's practice of failing to pay the Plaintiff proper
overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Mr. Middleton was employed by the Defendant as a detention officer
from July 2014 to May 2018.

Hempstead County is a county located in the U.S. state of Arkansas.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel Ford, Esq.
          Chris Burks, Esq.
          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 South Shackleford, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: daniel@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  chris@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


INDIANA: Motorists Set to Get $3.3MM Payout in BMV Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
John Tuohy, writing for Indianapolis Star, reports that an
agreement in a 16-year-old legal fight with the Indiana Bureau of
Motor Vehicles is expected to help drivers who were overcharged for
licenses claim the last $3.3 million of a much larger class-action
settlement.

A bureaucratic snag of unknown origin had prevented people from
receiving their payments from the Indiana attorney general's
unclaimed property division. Irwin Levin, a lawyer for the
plaintiffs, asked Marion County Superior Court Judge Heather Welch
a little over a month ago to help resolve the problem after a woman
complained that she had received a letter saying her $8 refund was
unavailable from the attorney general's office.

Judge Welch signed an order on Aug. 4 that directs the BMV to
refund the money itself through credits or refund checks. The cash,
which was sent from the BMV to the attorney general a year ago,
will now be sent back to the BMV, Mr. Levin said.

Mr. Levin and BMV outside counsel Carl Hayes said they did not know
why the attorney general's office was unable to make the payments.

"There was a hiccup of some sort," Mr. Hayes said. When the
attorney general's office realized the problem earlier this year,
it asked the BMV to resume making the payments itself, Mr. Hayes
said. The unclaimed fund was whittled down from roughly $4.5
million to $3.3 million that way, Mr. Levin said.

A representative of the attorney general's office could not be
reached immediately for comment.

The BMV was sued twice for charging motorists too much for
licenses, vehicle registrations and other services between 2002 and
2014. In two settlements, one for $30 million and the other for $62
million, the BMV agreed to refund millions of drivers between $1
and $50 each.

The BMV sent refunds that were never collected to the attorney
general's office after the window for the first $30 million
settlement closed, more than a year ago. Those uncompensated
drivers were supposed to have been able to claim the cash from the
unclaimed property division.

But at least one claimant who tried to get her money was instead
sent a letter in June stating "properties turned over by the BMV
are not currently available to claim."

"We are working with the Indiana BMV to make these properties
available as soon as possible," the letter read.

Mr. Hayes said the order by Judge Welch "is good for Hoosiers."

"It makes sense to allow BMV to refund it because the credits can
be tied directly to licenses' renewal fees, which are a recurring
expense," Mr. Hayes said. [GN]


INSULET CORP: Settlement of Teacher Retirement Suit Approved
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Arkansas Teacher Retirement System v. Insulet
Corporation et al., Case No. 1:15-cv-12345 (D. Mass., June 16,
2015), the Hon. Judge Mark L. Wolf held a hearing August 2, 2018,
to consider approval of the parties' settlement agreement.
Following the hearing, the Court approved the settlement.  The
Court took the request for payment of attorney's fees and awards
under advisement.

Insulet Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that between May 5, 2015 and
June 16, 2015, three class action lawsuits were filed by
shareholders in the U.S. District Court, for the District of
Massachusetts, against the Company and certain individual current
and former executives of the Company. Two suits subsequently were
voluntarily dismissed.

Arkansas Teacher Retirement System v. Insulet, et al.,
1:15-cv-12345, ("ATRS") alleged that the Company (and certain
executives) committed violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) and
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by making
allegedly false and misleading statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects.

On December 14, 2017, following a series of negotiations, the
Company, the individual defendants and their insurers reached an
agreement in principle with the plaintiffs in the ATRS matter,
individually and on behalf of the respective classes they purport
to represent, to settle and release all claims with respect to the
matter. On February 8, 2018, the parties executed a binding
stipulation of settlement.

On April 6, 2018, the court preliminarily approved the settlement,
and scheduled a final settlement approval hearing for August 2,
2018.

Under the terms of the settlement stipulation, a payment will be
made to the plaintiffs and the classes they purport to represent.

Insulet said "The Company has accrued fees and expenses in
connection with this matter up to and including the amount of the
expected residual settlement liability that would not be covered by
insurance, and such amount is not material to the Company's
consolidated financial statements."

Insulet Corporation develops, manufactures, and sells insulin
delivery systems for people with insulin-dependent diabetes in the
United States and internationally. Insulet Corporation was founded
in 2000 and is headquartered in Billerica, Massachusetts.


INSURANCE COMPANY: Construction Workers' Suit Remanded to State Ct.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID L. HISKEY, RANDY A. FALLANG, and OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, v. INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE WEST,
Defendant, Case No. CV 18-38-GF-BMM (No. CV 18-38-GF-BMM), Judge
Brian Morris of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Montana, Great Falls Division, granted the Plaintiffs filed a
Motion to Remand.

Hiskey and Fallang, on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of
others similarly situated, filed the action in Montana's Eighth
Judicial District Court, Cascade County on Oct. 27, 2017.
Defendant Insurance Company of the West ("ICW") removed the action
to federal court on Feb. 16, 2018, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1441, based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. Section 1332.  The Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand on
Feb. 27, 2018.  The Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on Feb.
23, 2018.

The Plaintiffs are construction workers who worked for Wadsworth
and its various subsidies.  Wadsworth employed them on public works
construction projects.  Some of the Wadsworth projects were subject
to the prevailing wage provisions of the Little Davis Bacon Act of
Montana.

Wadsworth deducted $0.20 per hour from the Plaintiffs' wages on
certain public works projects.  The Montana Department of Labor
("MDOL") issued two determinations finding that Wadsworth's
deductions violated Montana law.  MDOL advised Wadsworth that
Wadsworth could avoid further liability and penalties by refunding
the deduction to all of its employees.  Wadsworth and MDOL entered
into a settlement agreement with MDOL in which Wadsworth agreed to
refund each employee the deduction.  Wadsworth provided the refund
checks to MDOL, and MDOL, in turn, disbursed the checks to
Wadsworth's employees.

The Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a putative class, filed
suit against Wadsworth in the Montana Eighth Judicial District
Court, Cascade County, on March 8, 2010.  They seek statutory
damages and penalties under Montana law to which they claim they
are entitled due to Wadsworth's deductions, and Wadsworth's alleged
misclassification of employees resulting in underpayment.

ICW provided performance and payment surety bonds for some of the
Wadsworth construction projects at issue in the underlying case.
The Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment that these surety bonds
render ICW jointly and severally liable for their damages in the
underlying state court claim.  The Plaintiffs further seek to hold
ICW responsible for breach of contract.

ICW filed a Notice of Removal on Feb. 16, 2018.  The Plaintiffs
filed a Motion to Remand on Feb. 27, 2018, asserting that ICW had
not met the amount in controversy required for the Court to
exercise diversity jurisdiction.  They contend that the claims of
the named Plaintiffs alone, without the members of the putative
class, must meet the $75,000 threshold prescribed by statute.

ICW has also filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.  ICW argues that the Plaintiffs'
failure to identify specific projects and surety bonds render ICW
unable to respond to the allegations contained in the complaint.
It further argues that the Plaintiffs' failure to allege that they
filed a notice with ICW within 90 days of the completion of each
project subject to an ICW surety bond, as required by Montana law,
represents a failure to assert all the elements of a viable claim
for relief.  Finally, ICW claims that the Plaintiffs lack
standing.

The Court held a hearing on the motions on April 26, 2018.  It
ordered the parties to notify the Court of any supplemental
authority on the issue of whether the anti-aggregation rule applies
where a class of plaintiffs proceeding on a state law class claim
seek declaratory judgment regarding a defendant's joint and several
liability.  The parties filed supplements on May 4, 2018.

Judge Morris finds that ICW's arguments fail because declaratory
judgment presents no standalone cause of action that would have
permitted the claim to have been filed in federal court originally.
In addition, even ICW's highest estimate of Hiskey and FaHang's
wage and penalty claims each amount to less than one third of the
$75,000 threshold.  Only by dividing evenly the attorney fees for
the underlying class action can ICW argue that the threshold has
been met.

In sum, ICW has failed to meet their burden to demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy
requirement has been met.  Because the right of the removal remains
in doubt, the Judge must remand to state court for further
proceedings.

Accordingly, Judge Morris granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Remand.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 20, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/miqJij from Leagle.com.

David L Hiskey, Randy A Fallang & Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Lawrence A. Anderson -- laalaw@me.com --
ANDERSON LAW OFFICE.

Insurance Company of the West, Defendant, represented by Robert J.
Phillips -- rjphillips@garlington.com -- GARLINGTON LOHN &
ROBINSON, PLLP & Emma L. Mediak -- elmediak@garlington.com --
GARLINGTON LOHN & ROBINSON, PLLP.


INSYS THERAPEUTICS: Di Donato Securities Suit Underway
------------------------------------------------------
Insys Therapeutics, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company still
defends against a class action suit entitled, Richard Di Donato v.
Insys Therapeutics, Inc., et al.

On or about February 2, 2016, a complaint (captioned Richard Di
Donato v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., et al., Case 2:16-cv-00302-NVW)
was filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona against the company and certain of its current and former
officers.

The complaint was brought as a purported class action on behalf of
purchasers of the company's common stock between March 3, 2015 and
January 25, 2016.

In general, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws by making
materially false and misleading statements regarding our business,
operations and compliance with laws during the class period,
thereby artificially inflating the price of our common stock.

On June 3, 2016, the Court appointed Clark Miller to serve as lead
plaintiff. On June 24, 2016, the plaintiff filed a first amended
complaint naming a former employee of Insys Therapeutics, Inc. as
an additional defendant and extending the class period. On December
22, 2016, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, primarily
to add allegations relating to an indictment of Michael L. Babich
and certain of the company's former employees announced on December
8, 2016, and to extend the class period from August 12, 2014
through December 8, 2016.

On January 12, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss the second
amended complaint. Oral arguments were heard by the Court on July
28, 2017, and the Court granted the motion in part and denied it in
part.

The plaintiff subsequently moved for leave to further amend the
complaint, which the company opposed. The Court denied Plaintiff's
motion on March 31, 2018, and Insys filed its answer on April 13,
2018. The plaintiff seeks unspecified monetary damages and other
relief.

Insys Therapeutics said, "We continue to vigorously defend this
matter."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Insys Therapeutics, Inc. is a commercial-stage specialty
pharmaceutical company that develops and commercializes innovative
supportive care products. The company is based in Chandler,
Arizona.


INSYS THERAPEUTICS: Still Defends Consolidated Suit in New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
Insys Therapeutics, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company continues to
defend itself in a consolidated class action lawsuit filed in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

On or about March 17, 2017, a complaint (captioned Kayd Currier v.
Insys Therapeutics, Inc., et al., Case 1:17-cv-01954-PAC) was filed
in United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York against the company and certain of our current and former
officers.

The complaint was brought as a purported class action on behalf of
purchasers of our securities between February 23, 2016, and March
15, 2017.

In general, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws by making
materially false and misleading statements regarding our business
and financial results during the class period, thereby artificially
inflating the price of our securities.

On or about March 28, 2017, a second complaint making similar
allegations (captioned Hans E. Erdmann v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc.,
et al., Case 1:17-cv-02225-PAC) was filed in the same Court.

On May 31, 2017, the Court consolidated the first and second
complaint and appointed lead counsel in the consolidated action.

On July 31, 2017, the lead counsel filed a consolidated complaint.
On October 11, 2017, the Court held a pre-motion conference, at
which the Court granted leave to plaintiffs to again amend the
complaint. The amendment was filed on October 27, 2017, and the
company moved to dismiss. The Court subsequently dismissed the
complaint as to Santosh Vetticaden and otherwise denied the
company's motion to dismiss.  Insys filed its answer on June 26,
2018. The plaintiffs in both actions seek unspecified monetary
damages and other relief.

Insys Therapeutics said, "We continue to vigorously defend this
matter."

Insys Therapeutics, Inc. is a commercial-stage specialty
pharmaceutical company that develops and commercializes innovative
supportive care products. The company is based in Chandler,
Arizona.


KINGDOM TRUST: Securities Firms Not Liable to Ponzi Scheme Victims
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the District Court's judgment
granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned BOYD ET
AL., v. KINGDOM TRUST COMPANY ET AL., No. 2017-1336 (Ohio).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
certified a question of Ohio law that asks whether R.C. 1707.43, a
provision of the Ohio Securities Act, imposes joint and several
liability on persons who aided in the purchase of illegal
securities but did not participate or aid in the sale of the
illegal securities.

Ohio residents Cynthia Boyd and Thomas Flanders, the
plaintiffs-petitioners in this matter, are the alleged victims of a
Ponzi scheme operated by William Apostelos. Apostelos asked
investors to direct the trust companies to purchase his securities
or to execute powers-of-attorney giving him the ability to direct
the trust companies to purchase his securities using the investors'
IRA assets. Apostelos allegedly used the money raised from these
investors to pay earlier investors and promoters and to fund his
own personal expenses.

Kingdom Trust and PENSCO Trust filed motions to dismiss for failure
to state a claim. The district court granted the motions.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit noted that this court had not
addressed whether the Ohio Securities Act extends joint and several
liability to persons who aided in the purchase of illegal
securities.

The Ohio Securities Act, R.C. 1707.01 et seq., governs the sale and
purchase of securities in Ohio. The statute also provides that:
"the person making such sale or contract for sale, and every person
that has participated in or aided the seller in any way in making
such sale or contract for sale, are jointly and severally liable to
the purchaser for the full amount paid by the purchaser and for all
taxable court costs."

Boyd and Flanders argue that R.C. 1707.43(A)'s use of the phrase in
any way indicates the General Assembly's intent to impose liability
on anyone participating in a transaction, even if the individual or
entity was not involved in and did not induce the particular sale
at issue.

The weight of Ohio authority offers no support for petitioners'
reading of the statute. To the contrary, Ohio courts have
consistently construed R.C. 1707.43(A) as imposing liability only
on persons who played a role in the sale of unlawful securities,
such as acting in concert with the seller of an unlawful
investment.  

And Ohio courts have held that a financial institution's mere
participation in a transaction, absent any aid or participation in
the sale of illegal securities, does not give rise to liability
under R.C. 1707.43(A).  

The Court, accordingly, answers the certified question in the
negative and concludes that R.C. 1707.43 does not impose joint and
several liability on a person who, acting as the custodian of a
self-directed IRA, purchased on behalf and at the direction of the
owner of the self-directed IRA illegal securities.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's August 9, 2018
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/ydxl5jhw from
Leagle.com.

Sebaly, Shillito & Dyer, Toby K. Henderson -- thenderson@ssdlaw.com
-- and Scott S. Davies
-- sdavies@ssdlaw.com -- for petitioners.

Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P., Frances Floriano Goins -- fgoins@ulmer.com
-- and Daniela Paez -- dpaezparedes@ulmer.com -- for respondent
Kingdom Trust Company.

Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., and Caroline H. Gentry --
cgentry@porterwright.com -- and Shartsis Friese, L.L.P., Jahan P.
Raissi  -- jraissi@sflaw.com -- and Roey Z. Rahmil --
rrahmil@sflaw.com -- for respondent PENSCO Trust Company, L.L.C.

Womble Bond Dickinson, L.L.P., Katrina L.S. Caseldine --
Katrina.Caseldine@wbd-us.com -- Kevin A. Hall --
kevin.hall@wbd-us.com -- and M. Todd Carroll --
todd.carroll@wbd-us.com -- in support of respondents for amicus
curiae Retirement Industry Trust Association.

Meyer Wilson Co., L.P.A., and David P. Meyer --
dmeyer@meyerwilson.com -- in support of neither party for amicus
curiae Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association.


KOCH FOODS: Settles Discrimination Class Action for $3.75MM
-----------------------------------------------------------
Marian Johns, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that one of the
nation's largest poultry suppliers has agreed to settle a class
employment discrimination lawsuit filed by the federal government
for $3.75 million, according to the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

The settlement resolves EEOC allegations that Koch Foods subjected
Hispanic employees and female employees to a hostile work
environment. The allegations include supervisors touching and
making sexually suggestive comments to Hispanic female employees
and hitting Hispanic employees and charging them money for everyday
work activities. After complaining about the harassment, the EEOC
alleges the employees were then fired and subjected to other forms
of punishment in retaliation.

"We take allegations of abuse seriously," EEOC Birmingham District
Office director Bradley Anderson said in a statement. "No one
working in America deserves to be harassed in the workplace and, as
evidenced in this lawsuit, the EEOC will engage in vigorous law
enforcement efforts to protect workers."

In addition to the monetary relief, the three-year consent decree
also requires Koch to implement a 24-hour discrimination complaint
hotline in both English and Spanish as well as create new
discrimination prevention policies and practices. [GN]


LIFE STORAGE: NJ Court Approves $8M Settlement Agreement
--------------------------------------------------------
Life Storage LP said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that an $8.0 million
settlement agreement of a class action suit won New Jersey court
approval.

On or about August 25, 2014, a putative class action was filed
against the Company in the Superior Court of New Jersey Law
Division Burlington County. The action sought to obtain
declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief for a class of
consumers based upon alleged violations by the Company of various
statutory laws.

On October 17, 2014, the action was removed from the Superior Court
of New Jersey Law Division Burlington County to the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey.

The parties subsequently reached a settlement of all claims for an
aggregate amount of $8.0 million, and the settlement was approved
by the court on June 12, 2018.  

The Company is in the process of making payments under the
settlement to the members of the class. The aggregate settlement
amount of $8.0 million ($6.0 million after considering income tax
impact) has been recorded as a liability in the Company's
consolidated balance sheet. A portion of the settlement expense
relates to self-storage facilities that are managed by the Company
through its taxable REIT subsidiary. There is an income tax impact
to the Company on that portion of the settlement expense as a
result.

Life Storage LP operates as a self-administered and self-managed
real estate investment trust that owns and operates self-storage
facilities in the United States. Life Storage LP was founded in
1982 and is based in Williamsville, New York. Life Storage LP
operates as a subsidiary of Life Storage, Inc.


LINCOLN NATIONAL: Unit Faces Class Suit by TVPX ARS
---------------------------------------------------
Lincoln National Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that its affiliate,
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, is defending against a
putative class action suit initiated by TVPX ARS Inc.

The case, TVPX ARS INC., as Securities Intermediary for
Consolidated Wealth Management, LTD. v. The Lincoln National Life
Insurance Company, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, No. 2:18-cv-02989, is a putative class
action that was filed on July 17, 2018.  

Plaintiff alleges that Lincoln National Life Insurance Company
(LNL) charged more for non-guaranteed cost of insurance than
permitted by the policy. Plaintiff seeks to represent all universal
life and variable universal life policyholders who own policies
issued by LNL or its predecessors containing non-guaranteed cost of
insurance provisions that are similar to those of Plaintiff's
policy and seeks damages on behalf of all such policyholders.  

Lincoln National said, "We are vigorously defending this matter."

Lincoln National Corporation, through its subsidiaries, operates
multiple insurance and retirement businesses in the United States.
It operates through four segments: Annuities, Retirement Plan
Services, Life Insurance, and Group Protection. Lincoln National
Corporation was founded in 1904 and is headquartered in Radnor,
Pennsylvania.


LIQUIDITY SERVICES: Final Settlement Approval Hearing on Oct. 5
---------------------------------------------------------------
Liquidity Services Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that final approval hearing
of settlement in Howard v. Liquidity Services, Inc., et al., Civ.
No. 14-1183 (D. D. C. 2014), is scheduled for October 5, 2018.

On July 14, 2014, Leonard Howard filed a putative class action
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia (the "District Court") against the Company and its chief
executive officer, chief financial officer, and chief accounting
officer, on behalf of stockholders who purchased the Company's
common stock between February 1, 2012 and May 7, 2014.

The complaint alleged that the defendants violated Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by, among other
things, misrepresenting the Company's growth initiative, growth
potential, and financial and operating conditions, thereby
artificially inflating the Company's stock price, and sought
unspecified compensatory damages and costs and expenses, including
attorneys' and experts' fees.

On October 14, 2014, the Court appointed Caisse de Depot et
Placement du Quebec and the Newport News Employees' Retirement Fund
as co-lead plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on
December 15, 2014, which alleges substantially similar claims, but
which does not name the chief accounting officer as a defendant.

On March 2, 2015, the Company moved to dismiss the amended
complaint for failure to state a claim or plead fraud with the
requisite particularity. On March 31, 2016, the Court granted that
motion in part and denied it in part. Only the claims related to
the Company's retail division were not dismissed.

On May 16, 2016, the defendants answered the amended complaint,
denying all allegations of wrong-doing. Plaintiffs' class
certification motion was granted, and defendants' motion for
partial summary judgment was denied, on September 6, 2017.

On June 19, 2018, the parties reached agreement to settle this
action, including the dismissal and release of all claims against
all defendants, in exchange for the payment by the Company's
insurance carriers of $17 million to plaintiffs and the class. The
agreement was submitted to the District Court and was preliminarily
approved on June 20, 2018.  

Final approval of the settlement will be decided at a hearing
before the District Court scheduled for October 5, 2018 after
notice to the class and other customary conditions are satisfied.

Liquidity Services said, "There can be no assurance that the
settlement will be approved and, even if approved, whether the
conditions to effectiveness will be satisfied."

Liquidity Services Inc. operates an online auction marketplace for
wholesale, surplus, and salvage assets primarily in the U.S. and
Europe. The company is based in Bethesda, Maryland.


M&T BANK: Settlement of Suit v. Wilmington Trust Gets Initial OK
----------------------------------------------------------------
M&T Bank Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the settlement of the
class action lawsuit against Wilmington Trust Corporation has been
granted preliminary approval by the court.

Wilmington Trust Corporation ("WTC"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of
M&T, is the subject of a class action lawsuit alleging that WTC's
financial reporting and securities filings prior to its acquisition
by M&T in 2011 were in violation of securities laws.  

In April 2018, the parties reached an agreement in principle and a
formal settlement agreement was executed and filed with the court
later in the second quarter of 2018.

The proposed settlement was preliminarily approved by the court in
July 2018.  

The final settlement hearing is scheduled to occur in the fourth
quarter of 2018.  In the first quarter of 2018, the Company
increased its reserve for litigation matters by $135 million in
anticipation of the settlement.  

M&T Bank Corporation operates as the holding company for
Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company; and Wilmington Trust,
National Association that provide retail and commercial banking
services.


MEDLEY CAPITAL: Faces Two Class Suits in Virginia
-------------------------------------------------
Two class action lawsuits have been filed against Medley Capital
Corporation in Virginia federal district court, the Company said in
its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 9, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June
30, 2018.

Medley LLC, Medley Capital Corporation, Medley Opportunity Fund II
LP, Medley Management, Inc., Medley Group, LLC, Brook Taube, and
Seth Taube were named as defendants, along with other various
parties, in a putative class action lawsuit captioned as Royce
Solomon, Jodi Belleci, Michael Littlejohn, and Giulianna Lomaglio
v. American Web Loan, Inc., AWL, Inc., Mark Curry, MacFarlane
Group, Inc., Sol Partners, Medley Opportunity Fund, II, LP, Medley
LLC, Medley Capital Corporation, Medley Management, Inc., Medley
Group, LLC, Brook Taube, Seth Taube, DHI Computing Service, Inc.,
Middlemarch Partners, and John Does 1-100, filed on December 15,
2017 and amended on March 9, 2018, in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Newport News Division,
as Case No. 4:17-cv-145 (hereinafter, "Class Action 1").

Medley Opportunity Fund II LP and Medley Capital Corporation were
also named as defendants, along with various other parties, in a
putative class action lawsuit captioned George Hengle and Lula
Williams v. Mark Curry, American Web Loan, Inc., AWL, Inc., Red
Stone, Inc., Medley Opportunity Fund II LP, and Medley Capital
Corporation, filed February 13, 2018, in the United States District
Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, as Case No.
3:18-cv-100 ("Class Action 2") (together with Class Action 1, the
"Class Action Complaints").

The plaintiffs in the Class Action Complaints filed their putative
class actions alleging claims under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, and various other claims arising out of
the alleged payday lending activities of American Web Loan.

The claims against Medley Opportunity Fund II LP, Medley LLC,
Medley Capital Corporation, Medley Management, Inc., Medley Group,
LLC, Brook Taube, and Seth Taube (in Class Action 1), and the
claims against Medley Opportunity Fund II LP and Medley Capital
Corporation (in Class Action 2), allege that those defendants in
each respective action exercised control over American Web Loan's
payday lending activities as a result of a loan to American Web
Loan.

The loan was made by Medley Opportunity Fund II LP in 2011.
American Web Loan repaid the loan from Medley Opportunity Fund II
LP in full in February of 2015, more than 1 year and 10 months
prior to any of the loans allegedly made by American Web Loan to
the alleged class plaintiff representatives in Class Action 1; in
Class Action 2, the alleged class plaintiff representatives have
not alleged when they received any loans from American Web Loan.
Medley LLC, Medley Capital Corporation, Medley Management, Inc.,
Medley Group, LLC, Brook Taube, and Seth Taube never made any loans
or provided financing to, or had any other relationship with,
American Web Loan.

Medley Opportunity Fund II LP, Medley LLC, Medley Capital
Corporation, Medley Management, Inc., Medley Group, LLC, Brook
Taube, Seth Taube are seeking indemnification from American Web
Loan, various affiliates, and other parties with respect to the
claims in the Class Action Complaints.

Medley Capital said, "Medley Opportunity Fund II LP, Medley LLC,
Medley Capital Corporation, Medley Management, Inc., Medley Group,
LLC, Brook Taube, and Seth Taube believe the alleged claims in the
Class Action Complaints are without merit and they intend to defend
these lawsuits vigorously."

Medley Capital Corporation is a business development company. The
fund seeks to invest in privately negotiated debt and equity
securities of small and middle market companies. The company is
based in New York, New York.


MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Faces Calloway Suit over Price Fixing of DRAM
----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSHUA CALLOWAY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff vs. MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC.; MICRON
SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS, INC.; SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.;
SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.; SK HYNIX, INC. F/K/A HYNIX
SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.; SK HYNIX AMERICA, INC. F/K/A HYNIX
SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA, INC.; Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-04672
(N.D. Cal., Aug. 2, 2018) is an action out of a contract,
combination and conspiracy among the Defendants and their
co-conspirators to fix, raise, stabilize, and maintain the prices
of Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) sold by the Defendants and
their affiliates during the period from approximately June 1, 2016
through February 1, 2018.

According to the complaint, from early 2016 through February 1,
2018, the Defendants combined and conspired to fix and raise the
prices at which they sold DRAM in the United States. The Defendants
were able to coordinate, facilitate, and monitor such a conspiracy
by publicly announcing their intentions to cut or limit DRAM
supplies, despite a steady increase in demand. The Defendants
further took advantage of the concentrated DRAM market and its high
barriers to entry in facilitating the conspiracy. As a result of
the conspiracy, DRAM prices rose on average more than 300% during
the Class Period.

As a direct result of the anticompetitive and unlawful conduct
alleged herein, The Plaintiff and the Class paid artificially
inflated prices for DRAM or a finished product containing DRAM
during the Class Period and have thereby suffered antitrust injury
to their business or property.  The prices exceeded the amount that
they would have paid if the price for DRAM had been determined by a
competitive market.

Micron Technology, Inc. provides semiconductor systems worldwide.
It markets its products to original equipment manufacturers and
retailers through its internal sales force, independent sales
representatives, and distributors; and through a Web-based customer
direct sales channel, and channel and distribution partners. The
company was founded in 1978 and is headquartered in Boise, Idaho.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          R. Alexander Saveri, Esq.
          Geoffrey C. Rushing, Esq.
          Cadio Zirpoli, Esq.
          Sarah Van Culin, Esq.
          SAVERI & SAVERI, INC.
          706 Sansome Street
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 217-6810
          Facsimile: (415) 217-6813
          E-mail: Rick@saveri.com
                  Geoff@saveri.com
                  Cadio@saveri.com
                  Sarah@saveri.com

               - and -

          Garrett D. Blanchfield, Esq.
          Mark Reinhardt, Esq.
          Brant Penney, Esq.
          REINHARDT WENDORF & BLANCHFIELD
          W-1050 First National Bank Building
          332 Minnesota Street
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone:  (651) 287-2100
          Facsimile:  (651) 287-2103
          E-mail: g.blanchfield@rwblawfirm.com
                  m.reinhardt@rwblawfirm.com


NANTHEALTH INC: Bucks County Employees Retirement Fund Suit Stayed
------------------------------------------------------------------
NantHealth, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that case entitled, Bucks
County Employees Retirement Fund v. NantHealth, Inc., has been
stayed.

In May 2017, a putative class action complaint was filed in
California Superior Court, Los Angeles County, asserting claims for
violations of the Securities Act based on allegations similar to
those in Deora. That case is captioned Bucks County Employees
Retirement Fund v. NantHealth, Inc., BC 662330.

The parties agreed to a stay of the case pending resolution of the
motion to dismiss in the federal case, captioned Deora v.
NantHealth, Inc., 2:17-cv-01825, pending in the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California.

The Company believes that the claims lack merit and intends to
vigorously defend the litigation.

NantHealth, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as an
evidence-based personalized healthcare company in the United States
and internationally. The company engages in converging science and
technology through an integrated clinical platform to provide
health information at the point of care. The company was founded in
2010 and is headquartered in Culver City, California. NantHealth,
Inc. is as a subsidiary of NantWorks, LLC.


NANTHEALTH INC: Trial on Deora Class Action Set for August 2019
---------------------------------------------------------------
NantHealth, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that a trial date in the case
captioned as Deora v. NantHealth, Inc., has been set for August
2019.

In March 2017, a number of putative class action securities
complaints were filed in U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, naming as defendants the Company and
certain of its current or former executive officers and directors.


These complaints have been consolidated with the lead case
captioned Deora v. NantHealth, Inc., 2:17-cv-01825. In June 2017,
the lead plaintiffs filed an amended consolidated complaint, which
generally alleges that defendants violated federal securities laws
by making material misrepresentations in NantHealth's IPO
registration statement and in subsequent public statements.

In particular, the complaint refers to various third-party articles
in alleging that defendants misrepresented NantHealth's business
with the University of Utah, donations to the university by
non-profit entities associated with the company's founder Dr.
Soon-Shiong, and orders for GPS Cancer. The lead plaintiffs seek
unspecified damages and other relief on behalf of putative classes
of persons who purchased or acquired NantHealth securities in the
IPO or on the open market from June 1, 2016 through May 1, 2017.

In March 2018, the court largely denied Defendants' motion to
dismiss the consolidated amended complaint. A trial date has been
set for August 2019.

The Company believes that the claims lack merit and intends to
vigorously defend the litigation.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

NantHealth, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as an
evidence-based personalized healthcare company in the United States
and internationally. The company engages in converging science and
technology through an integrated clinical platform to provide
health information at the point of care. The company was founded in
2010 and is headquartered in Culver City, California. NantHealth,
Inc. is as a subsidiary of NantWorks, LLC.


NET PAY ADVANCE: Gonzalez Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------
Angel Gonzalez, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. Net Pay Advance, Inc., and Does 1 through 10, Case No.
2:18-cv-06516 (C.D. Calif., July 27, 2018), is brought against the
Defendants for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.

The Plaintiff was contacted by the Defendants on his cellular
telephone from around February 2018, in an attempt to collect an
alleged outstanding debt owed, says the complaint.

The Defendant Net Pay Advance, Inc. is a loan provider and
collector. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
      Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
      Meghan E. George, Esq.
      Thomas E. Wheeler, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
      21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
      Woodland Hills, CA 91367
      Tel: (877) 206-4741
      Fax: (866) 633-0228
      E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
              abacon@toddflaw.com
              mgeorge@toddflaw.com
              twheeler@toddflaw.com


NEW JERSEY: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss M. Jackmon's RLUIPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Kevin McNulty of the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss the case,
MORRIS JACKMON, Plaintiff, v. N.J. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendant, Civ. No. 18-149 (KM) (D. N.J.).

In October 2017, Mr. Jackmon, a state prisoner at East Jersey State
Prison, filed a civil rights complaint against the New Jersey
Department of Corrections alleging violations of the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA").  

In his complaint, Jackmon alleges that he is a sincere member of
the Nation of Gods and Earths ("Nation").  As a member of the
Nation, Jackmon states that he is compelled to practice various
religious activities.  Jackmon explains that the Department enacted
a policy in 1998 which designated the Nation as a Security Threat
Group.  According to him, activities of all designated Security
Threat Groups are restricted.

Because of this designation, Jackmon states that he is unable to
exercise his religious beliefs and a substantial burden has been
placed on his religious exercise.  He seeks injunctive relief
requiring the Department to remove the Nation from the list of
Security Threat Groups and permit him and others to engage in its
religious practice.

On Jan. 5, 2018, the Department filed a notice of removal to the
United States District Court.  Thereafter, it moves to dismiss
Jackmon's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
The Department responds that Jackmon fails to state a claim under
RLUIPA because the Department's policy designating the Nation as a
security threat is the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling government interest.

Under the facts as alleged in the complaint, Mr. Jackmon is a
follower of the Nation.  The Department has enacted a
zero-tolerance policy prohibiting all Nation literature,
activities, and holy day observances, which are compelled by the
religion.  Nation adherents may not associate with any other Nation
members, and may not possess any symbols, drawings, photographs, or
texts that refer to the Nation's beliefs.  Prisoners who violate
that policy are subject to significant disciplinary punishments or
may face criminal prosecution.  Based on these facts, Judge McNulty
is satisfied that Jackmon has pled facts sufficient to show that
the Department's policy substantially burdens his sincerely held
religious beliefs.

He also finds that the Department appears to concede that Mr.
Jackmon's religious observances are substantially burdened by the
Department's policy.  The Department argues, however, that the
policy is the least restrictive means of pursuing a compelling
government interest.  This, however, he says, is not a proper
argument at the pleading stage. At this stage, Mr. Jackmon is not
required to established that he is entitled to relief; his burden
is only to plead sufficient factual matter to state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face.  He has done so.

Finally, RLUIPA emphasizes the particular burden on the particular
the Plaintiffs' beliefs: RLUIPA requires a defendant to demonstrate
that the compelling government interest and least restrictive means
test is satisfied with respect to the particular claimant and
should be addressed on a case-by-case basis.  Thus even RLUIPA
precedents relating to the Nation's religious practices must be
applied cautiously.

For all of these reasons, Judge McNulty denied the Defedant's
motion to dismiss.  An appropriate Order follows.

It also appears that Mr. Jackmon filed a motion for class action
certification in state court, which the Department attached as
Exhibit B in their notice of removal.  To the extent Mr. Jackmon is
still seeking class certification, Judge McNulty denied that
motion.  Pro se plaintiffs cannot adequately represent a proposed
class.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 20, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/a2HPAx from Leagle.com.

MORRIS A. JACKMON, Plaintiff, pro se.

NJ DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant, represented by ADAM ROBERT
GIBBONS, STATE OF NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.


NEW JERSEY: Faces Class Action Over E-Z Pass Late Fees
------------------------------------------------------
CBSNewYork reports that outrage over huge administrative fees
assessed against toll violators in New Jersey has led to a class
action lawsuit.

The lawsuits filed in federal and New Jersey state courts are all
about how much you pay when, for a variety of reasons, your E-ZPass
doesn't work on the New Jersey Turnpike or Garden State Parkway.

The New Jersey Turnpike Authority believes its fees are legitimate
while drivers think the state is lining its pockets.

"It went through four different toll booths so we have $200 worth
of fines," said Long Island resident Sarah Garcia.  "I was so
annoyed."

Ms. Garcia says the tolls were only 50 cents and now knows drivers
are charged the toll and an administrative fee.  She's not a member
of the class action suit filed last December.

"If they're going to collect fines like that, I'd be happy to pay
it if they're going to send me devices that work or the tags like
they have in Florida or brand new toll booths," Ms. Garcia said.

The lawsuit contends the Turnpike Authority has overcharged drivers
when the E-ZPass malfunctions. It says the overcharging started in
2011 when the Turnpike Authority raised fees to $50.

The lawsuit says processing violators costs less and the fees are
generating revenue.

But the Turnpike Authority says the cost to operate the violation
system is more than the $50 it currently charges and believes it
will prevail in the lawsuit.

"Livid. It's like highway robbery really," Ms. Garcia said. "To be
honest, I didn't know I could call until a couple weeks ago --
someone tweeted me -- so I think since 2011, I've most likely paid
about $1,000 in these assessment fines and now that I know it, it
makes me even more angry."

Commuters started complaining about cashless tolls last year --
automatic draft failures, faulty E-ZPass boxes and no way to know
when an account balance was low all led to massive fees.

"Where does the money go? That's what I want to know," said Ms.
Garcia.

The lawsuit wants administrative fees reduced and for excess fees
from the last seven years to be repaid to drivers.

Ms. Garcia says after a call, her fees were wiped from her account,
then showed back up and were wiped a second time.

Before the change in 2011, administrative fees on the roadways were
only $25. [GN]


NORTH AMERICAN POWER: Judge Inks $16.05MM Class Action Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Storace, writing for Connecticut Law Tribune, reports that a
federal judge has signed off on a more than $16.05 million class
action settlement involving claims that Connecticut-based North
American Power & Gas LLC overcharged customers.

The settlement signed off on Aug. 3 by U.S. District Judge Victor
Bolden comes five weeks after another judge signed off on an $18.5
million class action settlement involving Viridian Energy. The
plaintiffs in both class actions were represented by attorneys from
West Hartford-based Izard Kindall & Raabe -- craabe@ikrlaw.com

In both cases, it's alleged the companies misled customers about
its variable rate plans. The companies did not admit liability in
either case.

The core of the case against NAPG involved allegations the company,
a third-party retail electricity supplier with customers in 12
states, agreed to sell power to its customers at a rate that should
have varied based on wholesale market conditions. Plaintiff
attorneys claim the rates did not vary much, and that the company
overcharged customers in certain months. The company, in court
papers, claimed there was a contract that was followed.

"We had an expert that agreed with us and they had an expert that
agreed with them," said Robert Izard -- rizard@ikrlaw.com -- a
partner with Izard Kindall.

Mr. Izard told the Connecticut Law Tribune on Aug. 7 that the
company has about 500,000 accounts, which account for about 400,000
people. He said that, as of July 23, 20,862 people had filed valid
claims with the claim administrator. The deadline to file claims
has passed, Izard said.

The money each claimant will receive, Mr. lzard said, will vary
depending on how long that person was a customer and how much power
they used between Feb. 20, 2012, and June 5, 2017, the dates the
class action covers.

The minimum check will be for $2, while some customers will get
checks for more than $1,000, Izard said. Each customer, Izard said,
will get about .351 cents per kilowatt-hour. That, he said, entails
multiplying the amount of kilowatt-hours purchased during the class
period by .351 cents.

It's the hope, in both class actions settlements, Izard said, that
customers will receive settlement funds by the end of the calendar
year. "The claims administrator has a process to go through," he
said.

The NAPG class action originally had eight plaintiffs from six
states, including Paul Edwards and Gerry Wendrovsky from
Connecticut.

In court papers, NAPG disputed the plaintiffs' assertions.

"All of plaintiffs' claims necessarily fail because they are
predicated on the court imposing an obligation on NAPG that is not
contained in the contract," it argued.

The company continued: "Nothing in the language of the service
agreement states that NAPG's variable rate will necessarily rise
and fall in any proportion, direct or otherwise, to a wholesale
price of electricity."

U.S. District Judge Stefan Underhill signed off on the Viridian
Energy agreement on June 27.

In that case, 17,171 claims were processed and the average refund
is $70, Izard said. With Viridian, the class period was from July
1, 2008, through Dec. 31, 2016. Class members alleged Viridian
enticed them to shift their electric service, with promises of
meaningful savings that never materialized.

In court papers, Viridian said the class action lawsuit "amounts to
nothing more than [plaintiffs'] unhappiness with Viridian's
variable rates for electricity."

"Plaintiffs disregard the clear and express terms of their contract
with Viridian, which grants Viridian the discretion to decrease or
increase its variable rate each month based on any number of broad
wholesale market conditions, and warn customers of the risk that
their rates may be higher or lower than the [utility's] rate in any
given month," the company argued.

NAPG was represented by Greil Roberts and Peter Siachos of Gordon
Rees Scully Mansukhani. Roberts declined to comment on Aug. 7 and
Mr. Siachos did not respond to a request for comment. NAPG does not
have a media relations department. A customer representative for
the company said a request for comment would be delivered to upper
management. As of press time, no one from the company had responded
to a request for comment.

Viridian was represented by Maura Grinalds --
maurabarry.grinalds@skadden.com -- of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom and by Dan Blynn -- dsblynn@Venable.com -- of Venable. Ms.
Grinalds did not respond to a request for comment and Mr. Blynn
declined to comment. In addition, no one from Viridian responded to
a request for comment.

Assisting Mr. Izard were Craig Raabe and Seth Klein, both with
Izard Kindall. [GN]


NORTH CAROLINA: Court Certifies 2 Classes in Medicaid Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina, Western Division, granted in part and denied in part
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned
MARCIA ELENA QUINTEROS HAWKINS, ALICIA FRANKLIN, VANESSA LACHOWSKI,
AND KYANNA SHIPP, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. MANDY COHEN, in her official capacity as
Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Health and Human
Services, Defendant, No. 5:17-CV-581-FL. (E.D.N.C.).

The Plaintiffs commenced this putative class action alleging
violations by the defendant of provisions of the federal Medicaid
Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) section 1557 of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The
plaintiffs challenge policies and procedures of the defendant that
allegedly caused the plaintiffs and others similarly situated to
lose Medicaid benefits without sufficient notice, without adequate
determination of eligibility for benefits, and without reasonable
accommodation of disabilities and language barriers.

In their motion to certify class, the plaintiffs seek certification
of an overarching class and three subclasses. In particular, the
plaintiffs propose a class defined as:

     All individuals whose Medicaid coverage was, is, or will be
interrupted or terminated, effective January 1, 2014 or later, by
Defendant Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Health and
Human Services [hereinafter DHHS], or any of her employees,
contractors, agents, or assigns, without first making an
individualized determination of ineligibility under all Medicaid
eligibility categories.

The Plaintiffs propose three subclasses as follows:

   Subclass One: All individuals whose Medicaid coverage was, is,
or will be terminated or interrupted, effective January 1, 2014 or
later, by Defendant Secretary of DHHS, or any of her employees,
contractors, agents, or assigns, without first making an
individualized determination of ineligibility under all Medicaid
eligibility categories and without first sending the beneficiary at
least 10-day prior written notice of the termination of Medicaid
that describes the specific reasons for the termination, the
specific regulation supporting the termination, and the right to a
pre-termination hearing.

   Subclass Two: All individuals for whom Medicaid coverage was,
is, or will be terminated or interrupted, effective January 1, 2014
or later, by Defendant Secretary of DHHS, or any of her employees,
contractors, agents, or assigns without first making an
individualized determination of ineligibility under all Medicaid
eligibility categories and without accommodating the beneficiary's
disability during the eligibility redetermination process.

   Subclass Three: All individuals for whom Medicaid coverage was,
is, or will be terminated or interrupted, effective January 1, 2014
or later, by Defendant Secretary of DHHS, or any of her employees,
contractors, agents, or assigns, without first making an
individualized determination of ineligibility under all Medicaid
eligibility categories and without communicating during the
redetermination process in the beneficiary's primary language where
the beneficiary has limited English proficiency.

Class Definition

Given the specific factual allegations of the named plaintiffs and
proposed class members, along with the evidence presented in
conjunction with the plaintiffs' motions, the court finds that a
reconstruction of the class definition is warranted in the
following respects.

Instead of a class and a Subclass One, the court identifies and
names herein two independent classes: Class One and Class Two. The
Class One definition appropriately is narrowed from the originally
proposed class definition to include now only the following, with
modifications in bold type:

Class One: All individuals whose Medicaid coverage was or is based
upon a non-disability category, and whose Medicaid coverage was,
is, or will be interrupted or terminated, effective January 1, 2014
or later, by Defendant Secretary of the North Carolina Department
of Health and Human Services, or any of her employees, contractors,
agents, or assigns, without first making an individualized
determination of continued Medicaid eligibility under a
disability-based category.

The Plaintiffs' proposed class definition is too broad in that it
covers circumstances that are not fairly encompassed within the
specific factual allegations in the complaint and not commensurate
with the current scope of injunction contemplated through
preliminary injunction motion. While it is conceivable that there
are other categories of eligibility that could be treated in the
same respect as disability-based categories as suggested in the
abstract in the complaint paragraph 70 plaintiffs have not alleged
specific facts supporting claims or class definition on the basis
of such additional categories.

Next, the former subclass one and now Class Two definition is
redefined to include now only the following, with modifications in
bold type:

Class Two: All individuals whose Medicaid coverage was or is based
upon a disability category, and whose Medicaid coverage was, is, or
will be terminated or interrupted, effective January 1, 2016 or
later, by Defendant Secretary of DHHS, or any of her employees,
contractors, agents, or assigns, without first sending the
beneficiary at least 10-day prior written notice of the termination
of Medicaid that describes the specific reasons for the
termination, the specific regulation supporting the termination,
and the right to a pre-termination hearing.

In sum, because the court does not accept the plaintiffs' proposed
class definitions, but rather constructs new class definitions
based upon the present circumstances in the case, plaintiffs'
motion for class certification is denied in part on the basis of
class definition. The court proceeds next to examine the Rule 23(a)
and (b) factors with respect to the two classes presently defined.

Class One

Class One, as presently defined, satisfies the numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation factors
required by Rule 23.

With respect to numerosity, the plaintiffs have demonstrated
minimally that there are a sufficient number of individuals whose
Medicaid coverage was or is based upon a non-disability category,
and whose Medicaid benefits have terminated or will terminate
without consideration of eligibility under a disability-based
category, to warrant certification under the Class One definition.
While the exact number of such individuals is not specified by
plaintiffs, they have demonstrated numerosity by a combination of
statistics on disability claims by county coupled with statistics
on non-disability Medicaid terminations by county.

Given that the relief sought is injunctive in nature, and that the
defendant does not dispute the numerosity requirement with respect
to this class, the court finds the numerosity requirement met.

With respect to commonality and typicality, Class One as presently
defined presents common issues of fact and law regarding
requirements for DHHS to consider eligibility under a
disability-based category prior to termination of Medicaid
benefits, with plaintiffs Hawkins and Shipp representative of this
class with members of the same type. Class One claims depend upon a
common contention, here that the Medicaid Act requires
consideration of alleged disability before terminating Medicaid
benefits, that is capable of classwide resolution which means that
determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is
central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.

Further supporting certification, the Class One definition
contemplates a unified remedy common to all class members, as it is
presently applied for purposes of plaintiffs' motion for
preliminary injunctive relief. Where, as discussed further below,
the court has narrowly tailored the award of preliminary injunctive
relief for Class One members, the court finds that such narrowly
tailored remedy and administration thereof further supports
certification of Class One. In the event plaintiff proceeds forward
with requesting additional relief, for reinstatement of solely
past-terminated beneficiaries, not presently sought in preliminary
injunction motion, the court may then consider the propriety of
dividing Class One into two subclasses, one for past terminations,
and one for future terminations, in order to provide unified method
of relief to members of each class.  

In sum, the plaintiffs have demonstrated satisfaction of class
certification factors for Class One as defined and applied herein.

Class Two

Class Two, as presently defined, also satisfies the numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation factors
required by Rule 23.

As an initial matter, there is no issue raised or presented by the
record as to numerosity for Class Two as presently defined. The
Plaintiffs have demonstrated that there have been, and will be as
of the filing of the complaint, a large number of terminations
without notice, which satisfy the Class Two definition. Likewise,
for the same reasons stated as to Class One, the court finds
plaintiffs provide adequate class representation.

With respect to commonality and typicality, the court notes that
there does not appear to be genuine dispute over the common
substantive legal contention underlying the class, where the
requirement of notice and opportunity for hearing before
termination of benefits is well established. Certain common factual
issues regarding violations of this standard also are
straightforward. Plaintiff Lachowski was subjected to termination
of her disability-based Medicaid benefits without notice, and as of
the filing of the complaint, imminently is at risk of termination
without notice.

She therefore is typical of the class, presenting with a common
question of fact whether the subject individual was (1) receiving
disability based Medicaid benefits, and (2) subjected to a
termination without notice since January 1, 2016, or imminently is
at risk of re-termination without notice. Other proposed class
members, such as Leroy Rivers (Rivers), are similarly situated.

The court recognizes that the present Class Two definition does not
extend as broadly as plaintiffs originally proposed, where it is
now limited to individuals whose Medicaid coverage was or is based
upon a disability category, rather than just all individuals whose
Medicaid coverage was, is, or will be terminated. But, the
originally proposed definition presented insurmountable problems
with commonality and typicality, given that those receiving
Medicaid benefits on the basis of disability are subject to
recurring eligibility determinations, whereas other types of
beneficiaries may not be. Including in a class together
allindividuals who had their Medicaid benefits terminated without
notice since January 1, 2014, presents an impractical divergence of
circumstances and available remedies.

In particular, individuals who received Medicaid benefits solely
based upon their age may have been terminated without notice in
January, 2014, but there is no reasonable basis for them to expect
a recurring issue of terminations, to have the same benefit arising
from resending notice in 2018, or consideration of reinstatement.
If they happen to also allege disability, and would seek to have
Medcaid benefits based instead on disability, they may properly
fall within Class One. By contrast, individuals like plaintiff
Lachowski and proposed member Rivers, who already received Medicaid
benefits based upon their disability status, reasonably would
expect a recurring issue of terminations, and will benefit in
similar manner from a resent notice or consideration of
reinstatement, and may properly fall within Class Two.  

In these respects, the court's redefinition of Class Two addresses
issues raised in opposition by defendant to the originally proposed
class definition. In opposing class certification, defendant
suggests for example that potential members of each of the classes
may have had a change in circumstance that no longer requires the
remedy sought, in that individuals who may have had Medicaid
terminated in the past had their Medicaid coverage reinstated;
proven to actually be ineligible for Medicaid and never been
reinstated; secured other coverage; or, no longer required Medicaid
coverage through the North Carolina Medicaid Program by virtue of a
change in circumstances such as death or moving to another state.
By limiting Class Two to individuals, like plaintiff Lachowski, who
receive Medicaid benefits based upon disability, the Class Two
definition avoids the standing and remedy problems raised by
defendant's hypothetical.  

In sum, the record supports certification of classes proposed by
plaintiffs only to the extent of Class One and Class Two as defined
herein:

   Class One: All individuals whose Medicaid coverage was or is
based upon a non-disability category, and whose Medicaid coverage
was, is, or will be interrupted or terminated, effective January 1,
2014 or later, by Defendant Secretary of the North Carolina
Department of Health and Human Services, or any of her employees,
contractors, agents, or assigns, without first making an
individualized determination of continued Medicaid eligibility
under a disability-based category.

   Class Two: All individuals whose Medicaid coverage was or is
based upon a disability category, and whose Medicaid coverage was,
is, or will be terminated or interrupted, effective January 1, 2016
or later, by Defendant Secretary of DHHS, or any of her employees,
contractors, agents, or assigns, without first sending the
beneficiary at least 10-day prior written notice of the termination
of Medicaid that describes the specific reasons for the
termination, the specific regulation supporting the termination,
and the right to a pre-termination hearing.

Given the court's rulings herein and the continuation of
proceedings for the plaintiffs' first and fourth claims for relief,
such ruling is without prejudice to the plaintiff seeking
certification of a further class of individuals not falling within
Class One or Class Two, provided the requisite showing under the
Rule 23 factors can be made.

In addition, within 30 days of the date of this order, the
plaintiffs are directed to file a form of proposed notice and
method of notice to class members for Class One and Class Two as
defined herein.  The Defendant is directed to file a response
thereto, within 15 days of the filing of any proposed notice by the
plaintiffs. Thereupon the court will make such further ruling as is
warranted to direct appropriate notice to the classes as herein
defined. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 9, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7k4697m from Leagle.com.

Marcia Elena Quinteros Hawkins, Alicia Franklin, Vanessa Lachowski
& Kyanna Shipp, Plaintiffs, represented by Joseph W. McLean ,
National Health Law Program, Martha Jane Perkins , National Health
Law Program & Douglas Stuart Sea, Legal Services of Southern
Piedmont.

Mandy Cohen, in her official capacity as Secretary of the North
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant,
represented by Rajeev K. Premakumar , North Carolina Department of
Justice & Thomas James Campbell , NC Department of Justice.


NORTHAND INVESTMENT: Judge Won't Remove Claims Against CEO
----------------------------------------------------------
Mary E. O'Leary, writing for New Haven Register, reports that
Superior Court Judge Linda K. Lager has refused to remove the
claims against Larry Gottesdiener, chief executive officer of
Northand Investment Corp., in a suit filed on behalf of former
Church Street South housing tenants.

Lager did, however, dismiss the claims against two entities:
Northland Fund II LP and Northland Fund II Partners LLC.

"The allegations in the operative complaint and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, suffice to allege Gottesdiener's
personal liability, subject to trial proof of Gottesdiener's direct
involvement in the conduct alleged," Lager wrote.

She explained that a motion to strike a defendant from a suit
obligates the court "to examine the allegations of the complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs."

Attorney David Rosen, Esq. filed a class-action suit against
Northland in fall 2016, charging that Gottesdiener and the two
other business creations allowed the complex to fall into disrepair
so they then could raze the apartments and use the land for a
better return.

Rosen represents 271 tenants, while six are named as plaintiffs.
Contractors currenty are demolishing all the apartments on the
13-acre site.

Northland bought the property in 2008 and by end of 2015, the
tenants were moving out after many spent time temporarily in hotels
because of the condition of the buildings.

The plaintiffs allege that as a result of the conduct of the
defendants, the tenants suffered physical and emotional injuries,
loss of personal property and other losses.

Lager wrote that the "court's role is not to decide whether the
evidence will support the cause of action but only to determine
whether the allegations are legally sufficient to state the cause
of action."

The class-action status is expected to come up when court resumes
hearing the case Aug. 30 in Waterbury.

The two corporate entities and Gottesdiener said the complaint
fails to allege sufficient facts to impose liability.

Rosen claims that Northland Fund II LP and Northland Fund II
Partners LLC were "shell defendants" which "cannot insulate
Northland from liability under the general law of corporations and
partnerships."

Lager wrote that usually a corporate structure protects
shareholders and corporate leaders. The doctrine of "piercing the
corporate veil" allows a court to disregard the corporate
structure.

The multiple Northland entities were established in Delaware.

"Delaware law favors coporate structures," Lage wrote in her
ruling.

Quoting another case:

"It should be noted at the outset that persuading a Delaware Court
to disregard the corporate entity is a difficult task. The legal
entity of a corporation will not be disturbed until sufficient
reason appears," according to the Delaware case.

Quoting another case, Lager wrote that the "fraud or injustice must
consist of something more than the alleged wrong in the complaint
and relate to a misuse of the corporate structure."

The bottom line is Lager found that the plaintiffs failed to meet
the requirements to "pierce the corporate veil" to connect the
multiple Northland entities to wrongdoing.

The suit seeks to hold Gottesdiener personally liable for the
conditions at Church Street South.

The plaintiffs' suit says there are differences between the
corporate protections for Northland Fund II LP and Northland Fund
II Partners LLC, and the law governing Gottesdiener.

They said Connecticut law applies to the CEO and there are no
"piercing the corporate veil" stipulations.

The plaintiffs charge that Gottesdiener, from the beginning, was
involved in the purchase and day-to-day management of Church Street
South, including moving families to motels.

It states that he and the other officers knew that in order to
provide "decent, safe and sanitary" housing, the complex needed a
lot of work.

The defendants say there are not enough specific facts to back
those allegations.

Lager pointed out that at this stage, "the court must deal only
with the sufficiency of the allegations and not their accuracy as
the court must presume compliance with the Practice Book ....
requirement that there is ‘good ground' to support the
allegations of the complaint."[GN]


NRG ENERGY: Awaits 9th Circuit Decision on Plaintiffs' Petition
---------------------------------------------------------------
NRG Energy, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has heard oral arguments on
plaintiffs' petition for interlocutory review, and the case is
under submission pending a decision.

GenOn has been a party to several lawsuits, certain of which are
class action lawsuits, in state and federal courts, of which four
remain pending involving plaintiffs in Kansas, Missouri and
Wisconsin.

These lawsuits were filed in the aftermath of the California energy
crisis in 2000 and 2001 and the resulting Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission's (FERC's) investigation and related to the alleged
conduct to increase natural gas prices in violation of state
antitrust law and similar laws. The lawsuits seek treble or
punitive damages, restitution and/or expenses. The lawsuits also
name as parties a number of energy companies unaffiliated with NRG.


In July 2011, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada,
which was handling four of the five cases, granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims against GenOn
in those cases. The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, or the Ninth Circuit, which reversed
the decision of the District Court. GenOn along with the other
defendants in the lawsuit filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
to the U.S. Supreme Court challenging the Ninth Circuit's decision
and the U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition. On April 21, 2015,
the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's holding that
plaintiffs' state antitrust law claims are not field-preempted by
the federal Natural Gas Act and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.  

The U.S. Supreme Court left open whether the claims were preempted
on the basis of conflict preemption. The U.S. Supreme Court
directed that the case be remanded to the U.S. District Court for
the District of Nevada for further proceedings.

On March 7, 2016, class plaintiffs filed their motions for class
certification. On March 30, 2017, the court denied the plaintiffs'
motions for class certification, which the plaintiffs appealed to.
The plaintiffs petitioned the Ninth Circuit for interlocutory
review. On July 12, 2018, the Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments
and the case is under submission pending a decision.

On February 26, 2018, GenOn filed objections to the proofs of claim
filed in the Chapter 11 Cases by all of the plaintiffs in each of
the four cases. GenOn filed that same day a motion asking the
Bankruptcy Court to estimate all of the proofs of claim at zero
dollars, to which the plaintiffs objected. The Bankruptcy Court
denied the plaintiffs' objection, ruling that it had the authority
to consider GenOn's objections to the proofs of claim and to
estimate the claims, but has certified its decision for review by
either the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals or the District Court.

In June 2018, GenOn reached a settlement with plaintiffs in three
of the four remaining suits, which leaves only the one purported
class action involving plaintiffs in Wisconsin. CenterPoint Energy
Services is a defendant in that case, and GenOn has agreed to
indemnify CenterPoint against certain losses relating to the
lawsuit. The Nevada District Judge granted summary judgment in
favor of CenterPoint in that lawsuit and the plaintiffs appealed
that decision to the Ninth Circuit. The appeal was argued on
February 16, 2018, and the case is under submission pending a
decision.

NRG Energy, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as an
integrated power company in the United States. The company is
involved in the generation of electricity using fossil fuel and
nuclear sources. The company was founded in 1989 and is
headquartered in Princeton, New Jersey.


NRG ENERGY: Bid for Summary Judgment in Rice Suit Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------------
NRG Energy, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that a  motion for summary
judgment is being addressed in the purported class action suit
entitled, Rice v. NRG.

On April 14, 2017, plaintiffs filed a purported class action
lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania against NRG, First Energy Corporation and Matt
Canastrale Contracting, Inc.

Plaintiffs generally claim personal injury, trespass, nuisance and
property damage related to the disposal of coal ash from GenOn's
Elrama Power Plant and First Energy's Mitchell and Hatfield Power
Plants. Plaintiffs generally seek monetary damages, medical
monitoring and remediation of their property.

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on August 14, 2017. On
October 20, 2017, NRG filed its answers and affirmative defenses.
On July 6, 2018, NRG filed a motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion for summary
judgment on July 29, 2018.

NRG Energy, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as an
integrated power company in the United States. The company is
involved in the generation of electricity using fossil fuel and
nuclear sources. The company was founded in 1989 and is
headquartered in Princeton, New Jersey.


NRG ENERGY: Continues to Defend Braun Suit in California
--------------------------------------------------------
NRG Energy, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that NRG Yield, Inc.
continues to defend itself in a class action suit entitled, Braun
v. NRG Yield, Inc.

On April 19, 2016, plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit
against NRG Yield, Inc., the current and former members of its
board of directors individually, and other parties in California
Superior Court in Kern County, CA.  

Plaintiffs allege various violations of the Securities Act due to
the defendants' alleged failure to disclose material facts related
to low wind production prior to the NRG Yield, Inc.'s June 22, 2015
Class C common stock offering.  Plaintiffs seek compensatory
damages, rescission, attorney's fees and costs.

The Defendants filed demurrers and a motion challenging
jurisdiction on October 18, 2016. On July 30, 2018, the plaintiffs
filed an opposition to the defendants' motion to quash service of
the summons and an opposition to the defendants' demurrer.

NRG Energy, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as an
integrated power company in the United States. The company is
involved in the generation of electricity using fossil fuel and
nuclear sources. The company was founded in 1989 and is
headquartered in Princeton, New Jersey.


NRG ENERGY: Griffoul Suit in New Jersey Still Ongoing
-----------------------------------------------------
NRG Energy, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that NRG Residential Solar
Solutions continues to defend itself in Griffoul v. NRG Residential
Solar Solutions.

On February 28, 2017, plaintiffs, consisting of New Jersey
residential solar customers, filed a purported class action lawsuit
in New Jersey state court. Plaintiffs allege violations of the New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Action and Truth-in-Consumer Contracts,
Warranty and Notice Act with regard to certain provisions of their
residential solar contracts. The plaintiffs seek damages and
injunctive relief as to the proper allocation of the solar
renewable energy credits.

On June 6, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to compel
arbitration or dismiss the lawsuit. Plaintiffs filed their
opposition on June 29, 2017. On July 14, 2017, the court denied
NRG's motion to compel arbitration or dismiss the case. On July 25,
2017, NRG filed a motion for reconsideration of the appeal, which
was denied.

On August 22, 2017, NRG filed a notice of appeal. After oral
argument on April 24, 2018, the Appellate Division reversed the
lower court on May 4, 2018, and ordered that the plaintiff must
arbitrate their claims against NRG.

On May 23, 2018, the plaintiff filed a petition for certification
with the Supreme Court of New Jersey seeking to overturn the
Appellate Division ruling. The petition and objection are fully
briefed.

NRG Energy, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as an
integrated power company in the United States. The company is
involved in the generation of electricity using fossil fuel and
nuclear sources. The company was founded in 1989 and is
headquartered in Princeton, New Jersey.


NRG ENERGY: Says TCPA Class Suit in California Concluded
--------------------------------------------------------
NRG Energy, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the court in the
California Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) case has
entered an order dismissing the lawsuit.

Three purported class action lawsuits have been filed against NRG
Residential Solar Solutions, LLC, one in California and two in New
Jersey.  The plaintiffs generally allege misrepresentation by the
call agents and violations of the TCPA, claiming that the
defendants engaged in a telemarketing campaign placing unsolicited
calls to individuals on the "Do Not Call List."

The plaintiffs seek statutory damages of up to $1,500 per
plaintiff, actual damages and equitable relief. On June 22, 2017,
plaintiffs in the California case filed a motion for leave to file
a second amended complaint to substitute new plaintiffs. Defendants
filed an opposition to this motion on June 26, 2017.

The court granted plaintiffs' motion to substitute new plaintiffs
and on August 1, 2017, defendants filed an answer to the second
amended complaint. On August 31, 2017, the court in the California
case agreed that the litigation should be stayed pending final
court approval of the New Jersey settlement. On July 12, 2017, the
parties in one of the New Jersey actions reached an agreement in
principle to resolve the class allegations which was confirmed by a
term sheet signed by the parties on July 28, 2017.

On September 27, 2017, plaintiffs in one of the New Jersey cases
filed their motion for preliminary approval of the class settlement
which was approved by the court on November 17, 2017. On May 14,
2018, the court entered a final order approving the class action
settlement and dismissing the lawsuit, thereby ending the New
Jersey lawsuits. On July 2, 2018, the court in the California case
entered an order dismissing the lawsuit.

NRG Energy, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as an
integrated power company in the United States. The company is
involved in the generation of electricity using fossil fuel and
nuclear sources. The company was founded in 1989 and is
headquartered in Princeton, New Jersey.


ODWALLA INC: Averts Food Labeling Class Action
----------------------------------------------
Glenn G. Lammi of Washington Legal Foundation, in an article for
Forbes, reports that when judges defer to an administrative
agency's interpretation of its own rule, targets of government
regulation normally lose out. Private enterprises and organizations
like Washington Legal Foundation have been urging the U.S. Supreme
Court to reconsider Auer v. Robbins, the precedent that unleashed
this doctrine that allows the proverbial fox to guard the hen
house. The Washington Legal Foundation also routinely criticize
class action lawsuits alleging that true statements on food labels
are unlawfully false, misleading, unfair, or illegal.

It is not without a sense of irony, then, that we applaud a July
30, 2018 Central District of California opinion in Wilson v.
Odwalla, which relied on "Auer deference" in granting the
defendant's motion for summary judgment in a consumer class action
suit. The district court faithfully applied Auer to reach the
correct decision. The Food and Drug Administration rule at issue in
Wilson is clearly ambiguous -- a key factor in the Auer analysis.

Wilson asserts that he and other unnamed plaintiffs purchased
Odwalla orange juice based on the "no added sugar" claim on the
label. The statement, Wilson argues, runs afoul of an FDA
regulation. A violation of an FDA rule also infringes on
California's Sherman Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law, which private
plaintiffs can enforce through claims under the state's Unfair
Competition Act and other California consumer-protection laws.

Odwalla argued in its summary-judgment motion that federal law
preempted Wilson's state-law claims. The court rejected Odwalla's
preemption defense, reasoning that Wilson was not asking the
company to do (or undo) anything on its label different from what
FDA required. The court then turned to whether Odwalla violated the
rule.

The FDA rule states that food processors can only print "no added
sugar" and similar statements on their labels only if "the food
that it resembles and for which it substitutes normally contains
added sugars." Wilson argues that the only group of products for
which Odwalla's juice substitutes is other 100% orange juice
drinks. But Odwalla contends that its product substitutes for any
beverage containing fruit juice. The court concluded that because
both interpretations are reasonable, the applicable federal rule is
ambiguous.

Under Auer, if a rule is ambiguous, a reviewing court will defer to
the promulgating agency's interpretation. Odwalla pointed to an
August 2017 letter from FDA to the Center for Science in the Public
Interest (CSPI) responding to the group's concern that juice
beverage makers were unlawfully misleading consumers with "no added
sugar" labeling statements. FDA did not agree with CSPI's narrow
interpretation of "substitutes." The letter stated that a
substitute product need not be "very similar." It continued, "For
example, juices with no added sugar could substitute for juices
with added sugar, fruit-flavored soft drinks sweetened with sugar,
or other sugar-sweetened beverages."

Under FDA's interpretation of the rule at issue in Wilson,
Odwalla's label was compliant, so the court granted summary
judgment for the defendant.

Given that private plaintiffs in many state-law food-labeling suits
essentially stand in the shoes of federal food regulators, courts
should determine FDA's position on the relevant law or rule when
assessing a claim's merit. Failure to do so, especially in
situations where the applicable rule is susceptible to different
but equally plausible interpretations, would allow private parties
and courts to undercut national uniformity with judge-made
alternative regulations. And as long as Auer is binding precedent,
defendants should continue to invoke its rule on judicial deference
to help preserve regulatory uniformity, even if doing so leaves a
saccharine taste in their mouths, as it does in ours. [GN]


PAYSON PETROLEUM: Class Certification in Securities Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, Dallas Division, denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned TIM MOORE, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. PAYSON PETROLEUM GRAYSON, LLC, et al., Defendants, No.
3:17-CV-1436-S-BH (N.D. Tex.).

The Plaintiffs filed this class action suit alleging violations of
the Texas Securities Act against several defendants.  The
Plaintiffs filed this action on behalf of themselves and all
persons and entities, other than the Defendants, who purchased or
otherwise acquired units in the 3 Well Program by means of two sets
of fraudulent offering documents.

Plaintiffs move for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3).  

Rule 23

The four Rule 23(a) prerequisites are:

(1) numerosity a class so large that joinder of all members is
impracticable (2) commonality questions of law or fact common to
the class (3) typicality named parties' claims or defenses are
typical of the class and (4) adequacy of representation
representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.

The two additional Rule 23(b) requirements are predominance and
superiority which require that common questions predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members and that class
resolution be superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Numerosity

The Plaintiffs contend that numerosity is established because
joinder is impractical, as the proposed class consists of over 150
investors.

Here, the Plaintiffs allege that the proposed class consists of
over 150 investors, that joinder is impracticable because they are
geographically dispersed and it would be economically unfeasible
for each aggrieved investor to vindicate his or her rights
individually. They fail to demonstrate some evidence of these
allegations, however, and they also fail to provide any explanation
as to why over 150 investors is a reasonable estimate. Their reply
explains that their counsel has already identified more than 150
class members in numerous states and this information can be
provided at the Court's request. They do not contend that this
information was unavailable when their motion was initially filed,
and they fail to explain why this information was not included in
the affidavit from Plaintiffs' counsel or why the burden is on the
Court to request it. Plaintiffs have accordingly failed to meet
their burden to show the existence of the numerosity requirement.
Because they have failed to show the prerequisite of numerosity,
Plaintiffs do not meet their burden to show that class
certification is proper.

Adequacy of Representation

Here, the Plaintiffs argue that they may fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the proposed class because their attorneys
have "extensive experience in the field of securities litigation
and their interests are predicated on the same wrongful conduct
that gives rise to the claims of the proposed class. They provide
their counsel's firm resume and the affidavits from three of the
seven named Plaintiffs.  

In the affidavits, Moore, Martin, and Wilshire declare that they
are willing to serve as a class representative, understand their
responsibility to absent class members, and are able to diligently
perform all such duties required of them. The Plaintiffs, however,
do not explain why the remaining four proposed class
representatives did not submit affidavits affirming their
willingness to serve as a class representative, and they wholly
fail to include any specific factual allegations about the four
named plaintiffs who did not submit an affidavit, even after the
Defendants specifically point out this lack of evidence.

This deficiency is particularly significant as to plaintiff
Humphrey because she is the sole named plaintiff to have allegedly
purchased from Financial West and Valentine, which would make her
the only proposed representative for those class members who
purchased solely from those two defendants. The Plaintiffs have
accordingly failed to demonstrate that all of the proposed class
representatives have shown "an inclination to take [an] active role
in monitoring class counsel's activities."  The Plaintiffs have not
met their burden to show that class certification is proper under
Rule 23.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 13, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9r96sl7 from
Leagle.com.

Tim Moore, David Vednor, Roland Lentz, James Rosemeyer, Virginia
Humphrey, William Martin, Jeff Wilshire, Individually and on behalf
of all others similary situated, Tapan & Anisa Daftari & Mike Wang,
Plaintiffs, represented by R. Dean Gresham , Steckler Gresham
Cochran, Brent John LaPointe -- blpointe@rosenlegal.com -- The
Rosen Law Firm, pro hac vice, Bruce William Steckler, The Steckler
Law Firm, Brent John LaPointe, Daniel Sadeh --
dsadeh@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, pro hac vice, L.
Kirstine Rogers , Steckler Gresham Cochran, Laurence Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, pro hac vice & Phillip
Kim -- pkim@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm PA, pro hac vice.

Dan Nichter, Defendant, represented by Kevin P. Perkins , Vanacour
Perkins PLLC.

EDI Financial Inc, Defendant, represented by Lindsey M. Rames ,
Rames Law Firm, P.C.

Financial West Group & Gene Charles Valentine, Defendants,
represented by David B. Winter -- dwinter@zelle.com -- Zelle LLP,
Brad E. Brewer -- bbrewer@zelle.com -- Zelle LLP, Edward Scott
Zusman -- ezusman@mczlaw.com -- Markun Zusman Freniere & Compton
LLP, pro hac vice & Kevin Eng -- keng@mzclaw.com -- Markun Zusman
Freniere & Compton LLP, pro hac vice.


PNC FINANCIAL: White Suit Dismissed Following Accord
----------------------------------------------------
The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2,
2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the
parties in White, et al. v. The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.,
et al., have entered into a final agreement settling the case,
following which the case was dismissed.

In December 2011, a lawsuit (White, et al. v. The PNC Financial
Services Group, Inc., et al. (Civil Action No. 11-7928)) was filed
against PNC (as successor in interest to National City Corporation
and several of its subsidiaries) and several mortgage insurance
companies in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.

This lawsuit, which was brought as a class action, alleged that
National City structured its program of reinsurance of private
mortgage insurance in such a way as to avoid a true transfer of
risk from the mortgage insurers to National City's captive
reinsurer. The plaintiffs alleged that the payments from the
mortgage insurers to the captive reinsurer constitute kickbacks,
referral payments, or unearned fee splits prohibited under the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), as well as common law
unjust enrichment.

The plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that from the beginning
of 2004 until the end of 2010 National City's captive reinsurer
collected from the mortgage insurance company defendants at least
$219 million as its share of borrowers' private mortgage insurance
premiums and that its share of paid claims during this period was
approximately $12 million.

The plaintiffs sought to certify a nationwide class of all persons
who obtained residential mortgage loans originated, funded or
originated through correspondent lending by National City or any of
its subsidiaries or affiliates between January 1, 2004 and the
present and, in connection with these mortgage loans, purchased
private mortgage insurance and whose residential mortgage loans
were included within National City's captive mortgage reinsurance
arrangements.

Plaintiffs sought, among other things, statutory damages under
RESPA (which include treble damages), restitution of reinsurance
premiums collected, disgorgement of profits, and attorneys' fees.

As of July 2013, the plaintiffs had filed two amended complaints.
In March 2015, the parties stipulated to, and the court ordered, a
stay of all proceedings pending the outcome of another matter then
on appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
that also involves overlapping issues. In February 2016, the court
of appeals in the other matter issued a decision favorable to the
company's position. In September 2016, the plaintiffs moved to lift
the stay and for permission to file a Third Amended Class Action
Complaint to add claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) and to assert that the RESPA claim is not
barred by the statute of limitations under the "continuing
violations doctrine" because every acceptance of a reinsurance
premium is a new occurrence for these purposes.

In January 2017, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend
to add a RICO claim, but granted their motion permitting them to
rely on the continuing violations doctrine to assert claims under
RESPA.

In July 2018, the parties entered into a final agreement settling
the case, following which the case was dismissed. The financial
impact of the settlement was not material to PNC.

The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. operates as a diversified
financial services company in the United States and
internationally. The company operates through four segments: Retail
Banking, Corporate & Institutional Banking, Asset Management Group,
and BlackRock. The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. was founded
in 1922 and is headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.


POWERLINE FUNDING: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Abante Rooter Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ABANTE ROOTER AND PLUMBING, INC., individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff vs. POWERLINE FUNDING LLC, and
DOES 1 through 10, Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-04671-KAW (N.D.
Cal., Aug. 2, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for
negligently, knowingly, or willfully contacting the Plaintiff on
the Plaintiff's cellular telephone without its express consent in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Powerline Funding LLC is a small business loan financing company.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          Tom E. Wheeler, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@ toddflaw.com
                  abacon@ toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                  twheeler@toddflaw.com


PREMIERE CREDIT: Jacobs Sues over Debt Collection Practices
-----------------------------------------------------------
Amelia Jacobs a/k/a Amelia Liston, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Premiere Credit of
North America, LLC, and John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-01132-UNA (D. Del., August 1, 2018) seeks to stop the
Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Premiere Credit of North America, LLC provides accounts receivable
management services in the United States. Premiere Credit of North
America, LLC was formerly known as Premiere Credit, LLC. The
company was founded in 1999 and is based in Indianapolis, Indiana
with additional offices in Indianapolis, Indiana; Batavia, New
York; and Nashville, Tennessee. As of January 29, 2004, Premiere
Credit of North America, LLC operates as a subsidiary of Nelnet,
Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Antranig Garibian, Esq.
          GARIBIAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          1010 N. Bancroft Pkwy, Suite 22
          Wilmington, DE 19805
          Telephone: (302) 722-6885
          E-mail: ag@garibianlaw.com


PROSPERITY 89: Prudente Suit Alleges FLSA Violations
----------------------------------------------------
Antolin Galvez Prudente, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated v. Prosperity 89 Inc. dba Thais New York, Lucky
Charm 6365 Corp. dba Thais New York, Adidsuda Chunton, Gift
Rakowski, and Bipen Doe, Case No. 1:18-cv-06796 (S.D. N.Y., July
27, 2018), is brought against the Defendants for violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff Galvez was employed as a delivery worker at the Thai
restaurant located at 1750 2nd Ave, New York, NY 10128.

The Defendants own, operate, or control a Thai restaurant, located
at 1750 2nd Ave, New York, NY 10128 under the name "Thais New
York." [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Faillace, Esq.
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Tel: (212) 317-1200
      Fax: (212) 317-1620


PROVIDENT CAPITAL: IOOF Settles Class Action for $44.25MM
---------------------------------------------------------
Tim Stewart, writing for Investor Daily, reports that Australian
Executor Trustees, the wholly owned subsidiary of IOOF, has agreed
to pay plaintiffs in the Provident class action $44.25 million.

The class action against Provident Capital was settled by Slater
and Gordon on behalf of 1,800 investors on 30 July.

Provident, a debenture fund that collapsed in 2012, was the
responsibility of IOOF subsidiary Australian Executor Trustees
(AET).

IOOF announced on the ASX on Aug. 7 that it had entered into a
settlement with one of the representative plaintiffs,
Mr Creigton, and that it would shortly enter into a similar
agreements with Mr and Mrs Smith.

The settlements, which are subject to Supreme Court of NSW
approval, will mean AET is obliged to pay the plaintiffs and group
members $44.25 million.

However, IOOF said it and AET will continue to pursue a own class
action against its insurers and insurance broker to judgment (if a
satisfactory settlement cannot be reached).

"In pursuing those claims, AET and IOOF are seeking to recover from
those parties up to the whole of the amount that they will be
obliged to pay the plaintiffs and group members in the Provident
proceedings," said the ASX statement.

IOOF has also agreed to settle cross claims brought by AET against
the auditors of Provident, PwC and HLB Mann Judd. [GN]


RAY'S SUPER: Diaz Suit Alleges FLSA and NYLL Violations
-------------------------------------------------------
Jose Rafael Diaz, individually and on behalf of all other employees
similarly situated v. Ray's Super Deli Inc. dba Ray's Super Deli,
Jaafar Safa aka Jeff, Hassan H. Safa aka Alex, and Ramon Velasquez,
Case No. 1:18-cv-06759 (S.D. N.Y., July 27, 2018), is brought
against the Defendants for violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff Jose Rafael Diaz is a resident of the Bronx and was
employed as a delivery worker by Defendants, with its principal
place of business at 452 Hudson Street, New York, NY 10014, from on
or about May 1, 2018 to June 25, 2018.

The Defendants own, operate and manage a deli grocery store located
at 452 Hudson Street, New York, NY 10014. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Lorena P. Duarte, Esq.
      HANG & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
      136-20 38th Ave., Suite #10G
      Flushing, NY 11354
      Tel: (718) 353-8522
      E-mail: lduarte@hanglaw.com


REGENCE BLUESHIELD: Court Narrows Claims in Minors' ERISA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, granted in part and denied in part Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss the case captioned A. Z., by and through her
parents and guardians, E.Z. and D.Z., individually, and on behalf
of the JUNO THERAPEUTICS, INC., HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN, and on behalf
of similarly situated individuals and plans, Plaintiff, v. REGENCE
BLUESHIELD; and CAMBRIA HEALTH SOLUTIONS, INC., f/k/a THE REGENCE
GROUP, Defendants, No. C17-1292 TSZ (W.D.Wash.).

Plaintiff A.Z. is a 16-year-old female who was diagnosed with
depression.  Following her doctors' recommendation, she attended an
outdoor residential mental health program in Oregon. She sought
reimbursement for the costs of the program under her parents'
health benefit plan, but was denied.

A.Z., by and through her parents and guardians and on behalf of the
Juno Therapeutics, Inc. Health Benefit Plan (Plan), brings this
putative class action against defendants Regence Blueshield
(Regence) and Cambria Health Solutions Inc. seeking remedies under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) for
Regence's alleged failure to comply with the terms of the Plan and
denial of coverage for the services she received at the outdoor
mental health program she attended.

Coverage Under the Plan (First and Second Claims)

A.Z.'s first and second claims hinge on whether the Plan provided
coverage for the Evoke wilderness program. If no coverage exists,
then A.Z. cannot succeed on her claim to recover benefits or for
breach of fiduciary duties for denying such benefits. The Amended
Complaint alleges that the Plan provides coverage to A.Z. for
Mental Health Services which specifically includes Residential Care
provided by a licensed facility. The Amended Complaint asserts that
Evoke's wilderness program is a covered facility within the
corresponding terms of the Plan.  

The Defendants dispute this characterization and argue that the
program is not a benefit covered under the Plan.

The Plan covers Mental Health Services for treatment of Mental
Health Conditions

Mental Health Condition

The Amended Complaint alleges that A.Z. has a diagnosed mental
illness, depression, which is contained in the most recent edition
of the DSM [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders.Thus, A.Z. has alleged that she suffers from a Mental
Health Condition expressly covered by the Plan. Plan at Regence
0041. A.Z. alleges that, to treat this condition, her doctors
recommended that she attend Evoke's wilderness program.  

Mental Health Services & Residential Care

Addressing the Plan's Residential Care definition, the parties'
dispute whether the Evoke wilderness program was (1) an organized
program (2) provided by a facility that was (3) licensed for the
particular level of care for which reimbursement was sought.

The Defendants' brick and mortar argument is unconvincing, as the
ordinary meaning of facility is not so restrictive. The common
dictionary definition of facility supplied by Defendants includes
something that is established to serve a particular purpose. That
same dictionary also provides an alternative definition of
facility, which Defendants appear to ignore: something that makes
an action, operation, or course of conduct easier. Drawing all
inferences in favor of A.Z., as it must on a motion to dismiss, the
Court concludes that Evoke's wilderness program could plausibly
qualify as a facility under both definitions. On the one hand, A.Z.
alleges that Evoke was established to serve the particular purpose
of providing treatment to children suffering from various
conditions, including depression.  

On the other hand, the Amended Complaint alleges that the Evoke
wilderness program is something that makes the treatment of mental
health disorders in children easier. The Court disagrees with
Defendants' myopic view of what a wilderness program is and, for
purposes of resolving the instant Motion, concludes that A.Z. has
plausibly alleged that Evoke is a facility within the definition of
Residential Care.

Whether Evoke's wilderness program is excluded

The Amended Complaint also alleges that Defendants improperly
denied coverage by relying on the Plan's Counseling in the Absence
of Illness exclusion. Defendants argue that A.Z. fails to assert
plausible assertions that the Counseling in the Absence of Illness'
exclusion does not apply under the plain language of the Plan.

The Amended Complaint alleges that A.Z. was diagnosed with an
illness (depression) and attended the wilderness program to treat
that illness. It makes no difference that the exclusion lists
wilderness programs as an example of a non-covered service, as that
example is only illustrative of situations where wilderness program
services are rendered in the absence of illness. These allegations
are enough to plausibly establish that the Counseling in the
Absence of Illness exclusion may not apply.

The Court denies the Motion to dismiss the first and second claims
on this basis.

Whether A.Z. has adequately pleaded Plan losses in support of her
second claim for breach of fiduciary duties

The Defendants also argue that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's
second claim for breach of fiduciary duties under 29 U.S.C. Section
1132(a)(2) for failing to plead losses to the Plan. A.Z.'s second
claim for breach of fiduciary duties merely contains the conclusory
allegation that A.Z. seeks recovery on behalf of the Plan for its
losses. A.Z. has not, however, offered any supporting allegations
suggesting that the denial of coverage for wilderness programs has
caused losses to the Plan itself. This allegation is therefore
insufficient to state a claim for relief under 29 U.S.C. Section
1132(a)(2).   

The Court dismisses the Plaintiff's second claim with prejudice.

Parity Act Violation (Third and Fourth Claims)

Finding that the Amended Complaint plausibly alleges coverage under
the Plan, the Court turns to A.Z.'s third and fourth claims. The
gravamen of those claims is whether Defendants' alleged exclusion
of benefits violated the Parity Act. Under the Parity Act, a group
health plan must ensure that (1) the treatment limitations
applicable to mental-health benefits are no more restrictive than
the predominate treatment limitations applied to substantially all
medical and surgical benefits covered by the plan and (2) there are
no separate treatment limitations that are applicable only with
respect to mental health or substance use disorder benefits.

The Defendants argue that A.Z. has (1) misidentified the relevant
exclusion by focusing on a blanket exclusion not found in the Plan;
and (2) failed to allege the relevant processes, strategies,
evidentiary standards, or other factors Regence employed in
deciding to exclude wilderness programs. Motion at 14-19. In making
these arguments, Defendants rely heavily on Welp v. Cigna Health &
Life Ins. Co., No. 17-cv-80237, 2017 WL 3263138 (S.D. Fla. July 20,
2017).   

In Welp, the court granted the plan administrator defendants'
motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to allege a Parity Act
violation.  The plan at issue covered treatment at a Psychiatric
Residential Treatment Facility or PRTF, but excluded coverage for
all wilderness programs. Defendants relied on this exclusion in
denying coverage to plaintiff's son, who had suffered from various
mental health issues and attended a therapeutic wilderness program
in Utah.

Here, A.Z. alleges both theories identified by the court in Welp.
Although she alleges that the face of the Plan impermissibly
excludes wilderness programs in violation of the Parity Act, she
also alleges that the wilderness program satisfied all criteria for
coverage under the Plan. In contrast to the pertinent plan
provisions at issue in Welp that excluded all wilderness programs
that did not qualify as PRTFs, the Plan here merely lists
wilderness programs as an example of an excluded service that would
not be covered in the absence of illness. Without specifying any
criteria that could be analogized to the pertinent non-quantitative
treatment limitations articulated in the Parity Act, Defendants
explained that, under their interpretation of the Plan, wilderness
programs are not covered. For example, in their October 17, 2016
denial letter, Defendants stated that this is not a determination
of medical necessity; rather, it is a limitation of your health
care contract.

Because the Amended Complaint alleges that the Plan covers the
services A.Z. received at the Evoke wilderness program, Welp does
not control the outcome of this case. To the contrary, the Welp
court tailored its decision to the specific terms of the plan at
issue and left open the possibility of alternative avenues for
pleading a Parity Act violation. On its face, the decision
carefully avoids answering whether a complaint alleging that a
wilderness program met the criteria for coverage under a plan is
sufficient to state a Parity Act claim.

A.Z. sufficiently pleads both categorical and as applied Parity Act
violations

A.Z. alleges that while Regence generally covers medical and
surgical services when provided in intermediate settings, it has a
practice of excluding wilderness therapy  a form of intermediate
therapy to treat mental illnesses. This practice occurs even when
exclusion is not permitted by the plan. Put differently, A.Z.
contends that the improper exclusion occurs in application rather
than by the Plan's terms. These allegations are also a sufficient,
independent basis to allege a Parity Act claim. Reading these
allegations and the Amended Complaint in a light most favorable to
A.Z., as the Court must do on a motion to dismiss, the Court
concludes the allegations that Defendants disparately apply an
otherwise facially neutral plan term are sufficient for purposes of
withstanding dismissal at the pleadings stage.

In sum, the Court concludes that A.Z. has met the applicable
pleading standards in stating a Parity Act violation. This
conclusion furthers the equitable concerns articulated by the Ninth
Circuit in Danny P. and allows A.Z. to develop her legal theories
on the merits. Danny P., 891 F.3d at 1160. This case should proceed
to the discovery phase and A.Z. should be permitted to test the
processes Defendants employ in denying coverage for
outdoor/wilderness behavioral healthcare programs and whether such
disparate application of the Counseling in the Absence of Illness
exclusion in fact exists.

The Court denies the Motion's request to dismiss claims three and
four for failure to allege a Parity Act violation.

ACA Violation (Third and Fourth Claims)

A.Z. further alleges that Regence's application of the Counseling
in the Absence of Illness exclusion violates the provider
non-discrimination provision of the ACA.  A.Z. relies on 42 U.S.C.
Section 300gg-5(a), which provides that a group health plan and a
health insurance issuer offering group or individual health
insurance coverage shall not discriminate with respect to
participation under the plan or coverage against any health care
provider who is acting within the scope of that provider's license
or certification under applicable State law. But Section 300gg-5
does not create a private right of action. As such, A.Z. is not
entitled to any relief due to any purported ACA violation.

To the extent the third and fourth claims rely on an alleged
violation of the ACA, they are dismissed with prejudice.

The Defendants' motion to dismiss A.Z.'s first claim is denied.

The Defendants' motion to dismiss A.Z.'s second claim is granted.
A.Z.'s second claim is dismissed with prejudice.

The Defendants' motion to dismiss A.Z.'s third and fourth claims is
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 9, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8atfahz from Leagle.com.

A. Z., by and through her parents and guardians, E.Z. and D.Z.,
individually, and on behalf of the Juno Therapeutics, Inc. Health
Benefit Plan, and on behalf of similarly situated individuals and
plans, Plaintiff, represented by by Jordan Matthew Lewis, Esq. --
jordan@jml-lawfirm.com, JORDAN LEWIS, PA, pro hac vice, Richard E.
Spoonemore , SIRIANNI YOUTZ SPOONEMORE HAMBURGER & Eleanor
Hamburger , SIRIANNI YOUTZ SPOONEMORE HAMBURGER.

Regence BlueShield & Cambia Health Solutions Inc, formerly known as
The Regence Group, Defendants, represented by James Derek Little ,
KARR TUTTLE CAMPBELL, Medora A. Marisseau , KARR TUTTLE CAMPBELL &
Stephanie R. Lakinski , KARR TUTTLE CAMPBELL.


REGULUS THERAPEUTICS: Baran Polat Securities Class Action Underway
------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulus Therapeutics Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company continues to
defend against a putative class action lawsuit in California.

On January 31, 2017, a putative class action complaint was filed by
Baran Polat in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California, or District Court, against the company,
Paul C. Grint (the company's former Chief Executive Officer), and
Joseph P. Hagan (then the company's Chief Operating Officer and
currently our President and Chief Executive Officer).

The complaint includes claims asserted, on behalf of certain
purchasers of our securities, under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

In general, the complaint alleges that, between January 21, 2016,
and June 27, 2016, the defendants violated the federal securities
laws by making materially false and misleading statements regarding
our business and the prospects for RG-101, thereby artificially
inflating the price of our securities. The plaintiff seeks
unspecified monetary damages and other relief.

On February 10, 2017, a second putative class action complaint was
filed by Li Jin in the District Court against the Company, Mr.
Hagan, Dr. Grint, and Timothy Wright, the Company's Chief Research
and Development Officer. The Complaint alleges claims similar to
those asserted by Mr. Polat. The actions have been related.

On February 17, 2017, the District Court entered an order stating
that defendants need not answer, or otherwise respond, until the
District Court enters an order appointing, pursuant to the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, lead plaintiff and lead
counsel, and the parties then submit a schedule to the District
Court for the filing of an amended or consolidated complaint and
the timing of defendants' answer or response.

On April 3, 2017, two motions for consolidation of the two actions,
appointment of lead plaintiff and approval of counsel were filed in
the actions, or the Consolidation and Lead Plaintiff Motions. On
October 26, 2017, the District Court entered an order consolidating
the cases, appointing lead plaintiffs, and appointing lead counsel
for lead plaintiffs. On December 22, 2017, lead plaintiffs filed a
consolidated complaint against the Company, Dr. Grint, Mr. Hagan,
and Michael Huang (our former Vice President of Clinical
Development).

The consolidated complaint alleges that between February 17, 2016
and June 12, 2017, the Defendants violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, by making
materially false and misleading statements regarding RG-101. The
consolidated complaint seeks unspecified monetary damages and an
award of attorneys' fees and costs.

On February 6, 2018, defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Consolidated Complaint. On March 23, 2018, plaintiff filed their
opposition to the motion and on April 24, 2018, defendants filed
their response. No hearing date has been set.

Regulus Therapeutics said, "We intend to vigorously defend this
matter."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Regulus Therapeutics Inc., a clinical stage biopharmaceutical
company, engages in the discovery and development of medicines that
target microRNAs to treat a range of diseases in the United States
and Europe. Regulus Therapeutics Inc. was founded in 2007 and is
headquartered in San Diego, California.


ROYAL WINNIPEG: Court Certifies Sexual Assault Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Henry Ngan, Esq. -- HNgan@blg.com -- of Borden Ladner Gervais LLP,
in an article for Lexology, reports that by his June 27, 2018
decision in Doucet v. The Royal Winnipeg Ballet, Justice Perell of
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice granted certification to a
proposed class action involving students of the renowned Royal
Winnipeg Ballet.

In April 2015, a number of national news outlets published articles
reporting that Bruce Monk was dismissed by the Royal Winnipeg
Ballet because of allegations that he had photographed young female
students in the nude. Between 1984 and 2015, Mr. Monk was employed
as a member of the dance company as an instructor/teacher and also
as a photographer at the ballet school.

On April 18, 2015, Maclean's Magazine published a cover story
entitled "Scandal at the Ballet." The article tells the stories of
four former students of the Royal Winnipeg Ballet who were
photographed by Mr. Monk in nude or partial nude poses. It was
reported that Mr. Monk had published and sold some of the images,
including sales over the internet.

The class action was filed on November 17, 2016. Some of the women
mentioned in the Maclean's article became involved in the class
action, including Ms. Doucet, who was the class representative
plaintiff.

The plaintiffs allege three core wrongdoings: (1) by his conduct of
taking intimate photographs in the private settings, Mr. Monk
sexually assaulted the students he photographed; (2) Mr. Monk's
taking of intimate images of the students was a breach of fiduciary
duty by abusing his position of power and trust; and (3) Mr. Monk's
disseminating and selling the intimate photographs without the
students' consent was a breach of a variety of statutory and
common-law privacy and confidentiality torts.

The plaintiffs proposed 45 common issues based on the following
causes of action: (a) negligence; (b) vicarious liability; (c)
breach of fiduciary duty; (d) breach of contract; (e) breach of
trust; (f) intrusion upon seclusion; (g) breach of confidence; (h)
public disclosure of private facts; (i) unjust enrichment; (j)
sexual assault and sexual abuse; (k) occupiers' liability; (l)
privacy statute violations; and (m) dependents' derivative claims
under s. 61 of the Family Law Act.

Sexual assault as alleged is by its very nature an individual tort.
In that regard, Justice Perell agreed with the defendants that
individual issues trials are inevitable in this case. However, he
nevertheless held that there were sufficient common issues for the
matter to be certified as a class action. He reasoned that, in the
immediate case, the relationship between a teacher and student at
the Royal Winnipeg Ballet arguably creates a duty of care and a
fiduciary relationship, based on the class members' shared
vulnerability.

In other words, "there is an institutional association that brought
Mr. Monk and the putative Class Members together, and the dance
students tell essentially the same story about their experiences
with Mr. Monk." As such, Justice Perell proceeded to certify the
class action on 23 of the proposed common issues.

Significantly, Justice Perell's decision affirms that alleged
sexual misconduct (in some cases going back decades) has the
potential to form the basis of certified class actions, if a common
thread experience can be pulled out of the systemic and historical
fabric of the alleged tort. Yet, it is worth bearing in mind that
not all cases will have the requisite commonality underpinning the
alleged sexual misconduct. Even if sexual assault claims are not
certifiable as a class action, they could nevertheless proceed as
many individualized actions.

The Royal Winnipeg Ballet is part of a slate of other institutions,
historically functioning in environments with noticeable gender
imbalances (such as law enforcement, the military, entertainment,
and aviation), that have been implicated in proposed or certified
class actions. In light of the current social and political
climate, this slate is anticipated to grow.

While the allegations underpinning these matters have yet to be
proven in court, these cases give renewed impetus for employers to
implement comprehensive workplace harassment and complaints
policies, promote a culture of diversity and inclusion within the
organization, and develop expertise in investigating and resolving
complaints that have been brought forward. [GN]


SCANA CORP: Bid to Dismiss Metzler Class Action Underway
--------------------------------------------------------
SCANA Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that Dominion Energy's motion
to dismiss the class action lawsuit by Metzler Asset Management
GmbH and Joseph Heinz in the Richland County Court is pending.

On February 8, 2018, a purported class action was filed against
Gregory Aliff, James Bennett, John Cecil, Sharon Decker, Maybank
Hagood, Lynne Miller, James Roquemore, Maceo Sloan, Alfredo
Trujillo, Dominion Energy, and Sedona by plaintiffs Metzler Asset
Management GmbH and Joseph Heinz in the Richland County Court.

The plaintiffs allege, among other things, that defendants violated
their fiduciary duties to shareholders by executing a merger
agreement that would unfairly deprive plaintiffs of the true value
of their SCANA stock, and that Dominion Energy and Sedona aided and
abetted these actions. Among other remedies, the plaintiffs seek to
enjoin and/or rescind the proposed merger, as well as unspecified
monetary damages, attorneys' fees, and any other relief the court
deems proper.

On February 21, 2018, Dominion Energy removed the case to the
District Court, and filed its Motion to Dismiss on March 9, 2018.
At June 30, 2018, the Motion to Dismiss was pending.

SCANA Corporation, through its subsidiaries, engages in the
generation, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity to
retail and wholesale customers in the United States. The company
was founded in 1924 and is based in Cayce, South Carolina.


SCANA CORP: Class Certification Bid in Lightsey et al Case Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------
SCANA Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the motion for class
certification in the case entitled, Richard Lightsey, LeBrian
Cleckley, Phillip Cooper et al. on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated v. SCE&G, SCANA, and the State of South
Carolina, is pending.

In May 2018, certain purported ratepayer class actions were
consolidated. These include actions which in previous Exchange Act
filings were defined as the Cleckley Lawsuit, the Lightsey Lawsuit,
and an action filed by plaintiff Edwinda Goodman.

The consolidated complaint is styled Richard Lightsey, LeBrian
Cleckley, Phillip Cooper et al. on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated v. SCE&G, SCANA, and the State of South
Carolina (the "SCE&G Ratepayer Case") and was filed in the State
Court of Common Pleas in Hampton County (the "Hampton County
Court"). The plaintiffs allege, among other things, that SCE&G was
negligent and unjustly enriched, breached alleged fiduciary and
contractual duties, and committed fraud and misrepresentation in
failing to properly manage the Nuclear Project, and that SCE&G
committed unfair trade practices and violated state anti-trust
laws.

The plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that SCE&G may not
charge its customers for any past or continuing costs of the
Nuclear Project.

In addition, the plaintiffs also seek to have the defendants'
assets frozen and all monies recovered from Toshiba and other
sources be placed in a constructive trust for the benefit of
ratepayers. The plaintiffs seek specific performance of the alleged
implied contract to construct the now abandoned project, as well as
compensatory, punitive and statutory treble damages, attorneys'
fees, and any other relief the court deems proper.

At June 30, 2018, the Motion for Class Certification and other
motions were pending.

SCANA Corporation, through its subsidiaries, engages in the
generation, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity to
retail and wholesale customers in the United States. The company
was founded in 1924 and is based in Cayce, South Carolina.


SCANA CORP: Suit by Christine Delmater Dismissed
------------------------------------------------
SCANA Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the case, Christine
Delmater et al. v. SCANA, has been dismissed.

On January 31, 2018, a purported class action was filed by
Plaintiff Timothy Glibowski, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, in the District Court (the "Glibowski
Lawsuit").

The action, as subsequently amended on April 23, 2018, is against
SCANA, SCE&G, Kevin Marsh, Jimmy Addison, Stephen Byrne, Martin
Phalen, Mark Cannon, Russell Harris, Ronald T. Lindsay, James
Micali, and Lonnie Carter.

The plaintiff alleges, among other things, that the Company, SCE&G
and the individual defendants participated in an unlawful
racketeering enterprise in violation of RICO 18 U.S.C. Section 1961
et seq., and conspired to violate RICO 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c) by
fraudulently inflating utility bills to generate unlawful proceeds.


Plaintiff seeks treble damages, attorneys' fees, and any other
relief the court deems proper.

As amended, the Glibowski Lawsuit effectively consolidated the
claims brought by Christine Delmater as reported in previous
Exchange Act filings. The case Christine Delmater et al. v. SCANA
was dismissed on May 18, 2018.

SCANA Corporation, through its subsidiaries, engages in the
generation, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity to
retail and wholesale customers in the United States. The company
was founded in 1924 and is based in Cayce, South Carolina.


SCANA CORP: Suit by Firemen's Retirement Sys. Back to State Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SCANA Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the case filed by the
Firemen's Retirement System of St. Louis, has been remanded back to
the Richland County Court.

On December 13, 2017, a purported shareholder derivative action was
filed against Kevin Marsh, Jimmy Addison, Stephen Byrne, Maybank
Hagood, Lynne Miller, James Bennett, Maceo Sloan, Sharon Decker,
James Roquemore, Alfredo Trujillo, John F.A.V. Cecil, Gregory
Aliff, James Micali, Harold Stowe, and nominal defendant SCANA by
plaintiff Firemen's Retirement System of St. Louis, purportedly on
behalf of SCANA, in the Richland County Court.

The plaintiff makes substantially similar allegations as those
alleged in the Crangle and Todd Lawsuits. On January 8, 2018, the
court notified the parties that this lawsuit, the Crangle Lawsuit
and the Todd Lawsuit would be consolidated in the Business Court
Pilot Program in Richland County. On January 12, 2018, the suit was
amended to add Dominion Energy and Sedona as defendants and to
assert putative class action claims alleging, among other things,
that defendants violated their fiduciary duties to shareholders by
executing a merger agreement that unfairly deprived plaintiffs of
the true value of their SCANA stock, and that Dominion Energy and
Sedona aided and abetted these actions.

Among other remedies, the plaintiff seeks to enjoin defendants from
finalizing and consummating the proposed merger and seeks
compensatory and consequential damages, injunctive relief,
restitution, attorneys' fees, and any other relief the court deems
proper.

On February 21, 2018, Dominion Energy removed the case to the
District Court. On June 27, 2018, the case was remanded back to the
Richland County Court.

SCANA Corporation, through its subsidiaries, engages in the
generation, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity to
retail and wholesale customers in the United States. The company
was founded in 1924 and is based in Cayce, South Carolina.


SCANA CORP: Warren Police's Suit Remanded to Lexington Court
------------------------------------------------------------
SCANA Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the purported class
action suit filed by the City of Warren Police and Fire Retirement
System, has been remanded back to the Lexington County Court.

On January 23, 2018, a purported class action was filed against
SCANA, Dominion Energy, Sedona, Jimmy Addison, Gregory Aliff, James
Bennett, John Cecil, Sharon Decker, Maybank Hagood, Lynne Miller,
James Roquemore, Maceo Sloan, and Alfredo Trujillo, by plaintiff
City of Warren Police and Fire Retirement System in the State Court
of Common Pleas in Lexington County, South Carolina (the "Lexington
County Court").

The plaintiff alleges, among other things, that defendants violated
their fiduciary duties to shareholders by executing a merger
agreement that would unfairly deprive plaintiffs of the true value
of their SCANA stock, and that Dominion Energy and Sedona aided and
abetted these actions. Among other remedies, the plaintiff seeks to
enjoin and/or rescind the proposed merger, as well as unspecified
monetary damages, attorneys' fees, costs and any other relief the
court deems proper.

On February 21, 2018, Dominion Energy removed the case to the
District Court, and filed its Motion to Dismiss on March 9, 2018.
On June 27, 2018, the case was remanded back to the Lexington
County Court.

SCANA Corporation, through its subsidiaries, engages in the
generation, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity to
retail and wholesale customers in the United States. The company
was founded in 1924 and is based in Cayce, South Carolina.


SCIENTIFIC GAMES: Bid to Dismiss Fife Class Action Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------
Scientific Games Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company has
asked the district court to toss the putative class action lawsuit
initiated by Sheryl Fife.

On April 17, 2018, plaintiff Sheryl Fife filed a putative class
action complaint against the Company in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington. In her complaint,
plaintiff seeks to represent a putative class of all persons in the
State of Washington who purchased and allegedly lost virtual coins
playing the Company's online social casino games, including but not
limited to Jackpot Party(R) Social Casino and Gold Fish(R) Casino.


The complaint asserts claims for alleged violations of Washington's
Recovery of Money Lost at Gambling Act, Washington's consumer
protection statute, and for unjust enrichment, and seeks
unspecified money damages (including treble damages as
appropriate), the award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs,
pre- and post-judgment interest, and injunctive and/or declaratory
relief.

On July 2, 2018, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.

Scientific Games said, "Due to the very early nature of this
litigation, we are currently unable to determine the likelihood of
an outcome or estimate a range of reasonably possible loss."

Scientific Games Corporation develops technology-based products and
services, and related content for the gaming, lottery, and
interactive gaming industries worldwide. Scientific Games
Corporation was founded in 1984 and is headquartered in Las Vegas,
Nevada.


SCIENTIFIC GAMING: Bid to Dismiss Raqqa Class Action Underway
-------------------------------------------------------------
Scientific Games Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the defendants are
seeking dismissal of a class action complaint by Raqqa, Inc. et
al., with prejudice.

On May 4, 2018, plaintiffs Raqqa, Inc. Pittsburg Liquors, Inc.,
Omdev, Inc., Om Riya, Inc., E and B Liquors, Inc., Michael Cairo,
and Jason Van Lente (collectively, "plaintiffs") filed a putative
class action complaint against Northstar Lottery Group LLC, IGT
Global Solutions Corporation, and Scientific Games International,
Inc. (collectively, "defendants"), in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

In their complaint, plaintiffs seek to represent two putative
classes of persons: (1) all persons who were or are parties to a
contract to sell at retail Illinois Lottery instant game tickets at
any time between July 1, 2011 and the present; and (2) all natural
persons who purchased one or more Illinois Lottery instant game
tickets at any time between July 1, 2011 and the present.

The complaint alleges that Northstar Lottery Group LLC discontinued
certain Illinois instant-ticket lottery games before all grand
prizes were awarded, and further alleges that those
discontinuations caused economic harm to lottery players, and to
lottery retailers who receive commissions on winning tickets. The
complaint asserts claims for alleged tortious interference with
contract, alleged tortious interference with prospective economic
advantage, alleged common law fraud, alleged violation of Illinois'
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, alleged unjust
enrichment and alleged civil conspiracy. The complaint seeks
unspecified money damages and the award of plaintiffs’ attorneys'
fees and costs.

On June 18, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice.

Scientific Games said, "Due to the very early nature of this
litigation, we are currently unable to determine the likelihood of
an outcome or estimate a range of reasonably possible loss."

Scientific Games Corporation develops technology-based products and
services, and related content for the gaming, lottery, and
interactive gaming industries worldwide. Scientific Games
Corporation was founded in 1984 and is headquartered in Las Vegas,
Nevada.


SEARS HOLDINGS: Settles Suit Over Craftsman Movers for $3.2MM
-------------------------------------------------------------
Scott Holland, writing for Cook County Record, reports that a
federal judge has signed off on a preliminary deal to settle a
class action lawsuit against Sears, which had leveled accusations
that some of its Craftsman riding lawnmowers caught fire as a
result of faulty fuel systems.

U.S. District Judge Manish Shah issued an order Aug. 6 in Chicago
granting preliminary approval to the settlement, explained in a
July 23 court filing. Under the deal, Sears will provide free
inspections and repairs for up to 18 months for anyone who
identifies problems with certain Craftsman riding mower models
bought from Sears any time from 2009 through 2015. It also will
reimburse class members up to $125 for money customers already
spent on repairing fuel systems.

Attorneys for the plaintiffs would receive up to $3.23 million in
fees, though the precise number would be hashed out in later court
proceedings before the judge considers granting final approval. A
hearing on a likely request for final approval is scheduled for
Jan. 29, 2019.

Plaintiffs Rebecca Rysewyk, Katie Smith and Brian Van Vooren filed
a complaint in May 2015 alleging the mowers were built with fuel
delivery system components -- such as grommets, clamps and lines --
that are prone to leaking, which allegedly can result in the mowers
bursting into flames. The settlement terms will require people to
inspect their mowers for a fuel leak or loose connection, then call
a toll-free number to arrange to bring their mower to a service
technician or have one sent to inspect their equipment.

In-store visits will be free, while in-home visits will cost the
customer $35, which Sears said is a steep discount from its usual
rate of $65 to $130 for house calls. The company said 40 percent of
people who buy the affected mowers transport the products on their
own, implying those customers should be able to bring them back to
a Sears service center and avoid the $35 fee.

According to the July agreement, service technicians "will make
reasonable good faith efforts to perform the inspection and repair
within 21 days of being contacted by a settlement class member, and
each settlement class member can request such service up to three
times during the allotted time periods" based on when they bought
their mower.

Attorneys could earn $2.75 million in attorney fees and an
additional $483,121 in expenses they say they incurred in pursuing
the lawsuit. Sears also will pay up to $10,000 in service award to
each named plaintiff.

Representing the class in the matter are attorneys Shanon J.
Carson, Jeffrey L. Osterwise and Michael T. Fantini of Berger &
Montague P.C., of  Philadelphia; Gregory F. Coleman, Adam A.
Edwards and Lisa Anne White, of Greg Coleman Law P.C., of
Knoxville, Tenn.; and Edward A. Wallace and Andrew D. Welker, of
Wexler Wallace LLP, of Chicago.

In their motion for preliminary settlement approval, the class
attorneys said if the case proceeded to trial, it was likely a jury
would be "faced with a battle of the experts" over whether the
mowers actually had the defective parts the plaintiffs alleged.
They noted Sears had already filed a motion for summary judgment
and moved to strike testimony from the plaintiffs' expert witness.

They also said the relief is substantial as it effectively gives
customers an extended warranty, noting even those who bought mowers
in 2009 would be covered for roughly 10 years after the purchase,
aligning with the expected lifetime of a riding mower.

"The agreement provides comprehensive relief and monetary
compensation to eligible members of the settlement class," Shah
wrote. "It was entered into after arm's-length negotiations by
experienced counsel on behalf of the settlement class. There is no
evidence of collusion or that the class counsel placed their
interests above those of the settlement class."

Sears has been represented in the action by the firm of Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, of Washington, D.C., Chicago and
New York, including attorneys Jessica D. Miller --
jessica.miller@skadden.com -- John H. Beisner --
john.beisner@skadden.com -- Richard T. Bernardo --
richard.bernardo@skadden.com -- Michael J. Alonso, Christopher D.
Cox, Jessica A. Frogge, Nina R. Rose, R. Ryan Stoll and Geoffrey M.
Wyatt. [GN]


SERVICE EMPLOYEES: Faces Class Action Lawsuit Over Dues
-------------------------------------------------------
Tim Pearce, writing for The Daily Caller, reports that a free
market labor group has filed a class action lawsuit against the
largest health care worker union in the U.S. to refund millions in
forced dues.

The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation (NRWLDF) filed
a lawsuit on August 16 against the Service Employees International
Union (SEIU) in a California district court on behalf of state
employee William Hough and potentially 5,000 others, according to
the NRWLDF.

"In the Foundation-won Janus decision, the Supreme Court finally
upheld public sector workers' First Amendment right to choose
whether or not to support a union without the threat of being
fired," National Right to Work Foundation vice president Patrick
Semmens said in a statement. "Further, the high court made it clear
that fees cannot be collected without a clear waiver of First
Amendment rights."

Hough has worked for the Santa Clara Valley Transportation
Authority (VTA) since 2005 but did not join the local union,
instead opting to pay the union "agency fee" required from
nonmembers in the VTA as a condition of employment.

The Supreme Court ruled in Janus v. AFSCME on June 27 that such
"agency fees" in the public sector violated the non-members right
to free speech by forcing workers to support unions bargaining with
government entities to set the wages, benefits and working
conditions of public-sector workers, an inherently political act.

Hough's lawsuit is not the first legal action taken against unions
since the SCOTUS ruling on agency fees. At least eight class action
lawsuits have been filed against other unions seeking repayment of
all agency fees that workers were forced to pay as a condition of
employment. If the suits are successful, unions are facing a
potential loss of millions of dollars.The SEIU did not respond to a
request for comment.[GN]


SEWERAGE & WATER: Faces Class Action Over Flood Damages
-------------------------------------------------------
Beau Evans, writing for NOLA.com, reports that lawsuits against the
Sewerage & Water Board stemming from last summer's flooding have
piled up in recent weeks, culminating with the filing (Aug. 6) of a
class-action lawsuit by the same attorney team that has represented
Uptown home and business owners in a so-far successful case against
the utility for damages from drainage canal construction.

Online court records show at least eight lawsuits alleging damages
from flooding on either July 22 or Aug. 5, 2017, have been filed in
Orleans Parish Civil District Court since late July. All eight
claim the agency was negligent in its upkeep of critical drainage
and power equipment and did not warn the New Orleans public in
advance of the potential dangers posed by heavy storms.

State law required lawsuits seeking flood damages by Monday (Aug.
6), although plaintiffs attorneys have said a one-year extension
the Sewerage & Water Board granted for parties filing damage claims
directly with the utility would likely apply to court cases, too.

The Sewerage & Water Board declined to comment on the lawsuits,
citing a policy against discussing pending litigation.

Among the parties suing the Sewerage & Water Board are the Zulu
Social Aid and Pleasure Club, whose headquarters on North Broad
Street near Orleans Avenue saw severe flooding last Aug. 5; the
Circle Food Store, which likewise saw heavy Aug. 5 flooding; and
four insurance companies representing more than 150 clients
claiming to have lost their cars on July 22 and Aug. 5. The suing
insurers include Allstate, Geico, Progressive and State Farm.

On Aug. 6, attorneys representing Sixth Union Baptist Church in
Treme and five New Orleans residents filed a class-action lawsuit.
If a judge certifies the case as a class action, it would allow a
swarm of aggrieved home and vehicle owners to join the lawsuit.
According to court filings, plaintiffs in the potential class
action would be divided into two categories: one for people
alleging property damage, another for vehicular damage.

The lawsuit, filed by attorneys Joseph Bruno and Michael Whitaker,
estimates "thousands of property owners" could potentially join the
class action as plaintiffs.

Mr. Whitaker, a California-based attorney, said over the phone on
Aug. 6 that if a judge officially certifies the plaintiff class,
anyone claiming to have suffered property or vehicular damage from
the Aug. 5 flood could fill out a "damage form" to join the suit.
If that happens, Mr. Whitaker said his team plans to advertise how
to mail in damage forms and set up a website for people to submit
the forms online. Volunteers with iPads would also fan out through
neighborhoods affected by the flooding to let residents fill out
the forms on the spot, he added.

"This had a significant economic outfall on residents who could ill
afford it," Mr. Whitaker said. "The people that were harmed by this
flooding generally are not in an economic position to re-purchase
or repair whatever property was damaged." [GN]


SINCLAIR BROADCAST: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Securities Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC notifies investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against Sinclair Broadcast Group,
Inc. and certain of its officers, on behalf of shareholders who
purchased or otherwise acquired Sinclair securities between
February 22, 2017 and July 19, 2018, both dates inclusive (the
"Class Period"). Such investors are encouraged to join this case by
visiting the firm's site: http://www.bgandg.com/sbgi.

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) the Sinclair/Tribune Merger was not in
compliance with FCC rules and regulations; (2) Sinclair was not
using its best efforts to eliminate any impediment to regulatory
approval; (3) Sinclair was engaging in non-arm's length
transactions with buyers connected to Sinclair's controlling
shareholders in order to skirt FCC ownership rules; and (4) that,
as a result of the foregoing, Defendant's public statements were
materially false and/or misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
review a copy of the Complaint you can visit the firm's site:
http://www.bgandg.com/sbgior you may contact Peretz Bronstein,
Esq. or his Investor Relations Analyst, Yael Hurwitz of Bronstein,
Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If you suffered a loss in
Sinclair you have until October 9, 2018 to request that the Court
appoint you as lead plaintiff.  Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

         Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
         Yael Hurwitz, Esq.
         Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC
         Telephone: 212-697-6484
         Email: peretz@bgandg.com[GN]


SIX FLAGS: Y. Katz's FACTA Suit Remanded to NJ State Court
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand the case captioned YAAKOV A.
KATZ, individually and on behalf of a class, Plaintiff, v. SIX
FLAGS GREAT ADVENTURE, LLC and SIX FLAGS ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-116 (FLW) (DEA)(D.N.J.).

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants willfully violated the Fair
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA), by printing
more than the last 5 digits of Plaintiff's credit card number on a
cash register receipt.

The Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that the Plaintiff lacks Article III
standing.

In response, the Plaintiff moves to remand this matter to state
court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(c), on the grounds that
if, as the Defendants assert, subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking, the proper remedy is remand rather than dismissal.

Significantly for the purposes of the instant dispute, the
constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and
accordingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations of a
case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even
when they address issues of federal law, as when they are called
upon to interpret the Constitution or a federal statute.
Accordingly, except where a federal statute expressly or impliedly
provides for exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts, a plaintiff
may choose to file federal claims in either state or federal
court.

Article III Standing

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff lacks Article III standing
because the Plaintiff has not alleged an injury-in-fact.
Specifically, the Defendants contend that the harm alleged by the
Plaintiff a future risk of identity theft is entirely speculative,
and thus, does not constitute a concrete injury-in-fact. The
Plaintiff takes no position on the issue of Article III standing,
arguing that, because the Defendants, the parties bearing the
burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction, concede that
subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, this Court should remand
the matter without rendering a finding on the issue of Article III
standing.

To meet the irreducible constitutional minimum of Article III
standing, the plaintiff must satisfy three well-settled elements:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact-an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.

Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of-the injury has to be fairly traceable to
the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the
independent action of some third party not before the court.

Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

Here, the determination of whether the Plaintiff has alleged a
sufficiently concrete and particularized injury-in-fact implicates
the Supreme Court's decision in Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547, which
clarified the injury-in-fact inquiry in the context of statutory
violations. In Spokeo, a consumer brought an action alleging that a
website operator violated the FCRA by disseminating inaccurate
information regarding the consumer's creditworthiness over the
operator's public search engine database. After the district court
dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, the Ninth Circuit
reversed, finding that the consumer met the injury-in-fact
requirement by alleging that: (i) the operator violated his
statutory rights, not just the rights of other people; and (ii)
that his personal interests in the handling of his credit
information were individualized rather than collective.

The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision as
incomplete, finding that although the injury-in-fact requirement
requires a plaintiff to allege an injury that is both concrete and
particularized, the Ninth Circuit erred in focusing on the second
characteristic (particularity) without analyzing the first
(concreteness). After reiterating that an injury-in-fact must be
both concrete and particularized, the Spokeo Court provided
guidance as to what constitutes a concrete injury, and remanded the
case for a finding on the concreteness factor.  

The only injury alleged in the Complaint that, as a result of
Defendants' failure to comply with FACTA's truncation provision,
Plaintiff has been exposed to an elevated risk of identity theft in
the future, is precisely the sort of bare procedural violation that
may result in no harm" that is insufficient to constitute a
concrete injury-in-fact.  

In that regard, it is well-established that allegations of possible
future injury are not sufficient to satisfy Article III. Instead, a
threatened injury must be certainly impending, and proceed with a
high degree of immediacy, so as to reduce the possibility of
deciding a case in which no injury would have occurred at all.

Here, the Court cannot find that the harm alleged by Plaintiff, an
increased risk of future identity theft is certainly impending,
such that Plaintiff has Article III standing. Simply put,
Plaintiff's alleged harm rests purely on conjecture, as the
Complaint fails to even include allegations that Plaintiff's credit
card information was accessed by another individual, let alone
allege with any degree of specificity how someone may access that
information in the future. As a result of these deficiencies, the
Court is left to speculate as to how any alleged identify theft
will occur. Moreover, outside the context of FACTA, the Third
Circuit has held that allegations of an increased risk of identity
theft are insufficient to secure standing.

Under these circumstances, the Court cannot find that the Plaintiff
has alleged a concrete injury-in-fact, and thus, the Plaintiff
lacks Article III standing.

Remand is Required

Having found that the Plaintiff lacks Article III standing, and
thus, that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction
over this case, the Court must turn, next, to the parties'
arguments regarding whether the proper course of action is to
remand or dismiss this case. In that regard, the Plaintiff argues
that because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must
remand this case under 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(c).

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 13, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8l6rqa9 from Leagle.com.

YAAKOV A KATZ, individually and on behalf of a class, Plaintiff,
represented by RYAN LEYLAND GENTILE , LAW OFFICES OF GUS MICHAEL
FARINELLA PC.

SIX FLAGS GREAT ADVENTURE, LLC & SIX FLAGS ENTERTAINMENT
CORPORATION, Defendants, represented by ANDREA L. D'AMBRA --
andrea.dambra@nortonrosefulbright.com -- NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US
LLP.


SOLOMON AND SOLOMON: Faces Piscazzi Suit Over FDCPA Violations
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Solomon and Solomon,
P.C.  The case is styled as Corrado Piscazzi, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. Solomon and Solomon, P.C.,
Case No. 1:18-cv-04806 (E.D.N.Y., August 23, 2018).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Solomon and Solomon, P.C., is a law firm.  The Company provides
full service legal advice.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel C. Cohen, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (929) 575-4175
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: dan@cml.legal


SOUTHWESTERN ENERGY: Arkansas Royalty Litigation Still Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------------------
Southwestern Energy Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the Arkansas Royalty
Litigation is underway.

The Company has been a defendant in three certified class actions
alleging that the Company underpaid lessors of lands in Arkansas by
deducting from royalty payments costs for gathering, transportation
and compression of natural gas in excess of what is permitted by
the relevant leases.  Two of the these class actions were filed in
Arkansas state courts and the third in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.  The Company denied
liability in all these cases.

In June 2017, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
Company on all counts in Smith v. SEECO, Inc. et al., the class
action in the federal court, whose plaintiff class comprises the
vast majority of the lessors in these cases.  

The plaintiff had asserted claims for, among other things, breach
of contract, fraud, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment and
violation of certain Arkansas statutes.  

Following the verdict, the court entered judgment in favor of the
Company on all claims. The trial court denied the plaintiff's
motion for a new trial, and the plaintiff has filed a notice of
appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit.  

Independent of the plaintiff’s appeal, several different parties
sought to intervene in the Smith case prior to or shortly after
trial, and have appealed the trial court's order denying their
request to intervene. Briefing is complete in the intervenor's
appeal, and oral argument is expected to occur sometime in the
third quarter of 2018.

In the second quarter of 2018, the Company entered into an
agreement to settle another of the class actions, which has been
pending in the Circuit Court of Conway County, Arkansas under the
caption Snow et al. v. SEECO, Inc., et al.  The proposed settlement
has received preliminary approval from the court in Arkansas and is
subject to its final approval.  

The hearing for final approval is scheduled during the third
quarter of 2018. The amount of the settlement is reflected in the
Company's unaudited condensed consolidated statement of operations
for the second quarter of 2018. The third class action was
dismissed in the second quarter of 2018.

A small percentage of the Company's Arkansas lessors opted out
of the Smith and the Snow cases. Most of those have filed separate
actions. The Company does not expect those cases to have a material
adverse effect on the results of operations, financial position or
cash flows of the Company.

Southwestern Energy said, "Additionally, it is not possible at this
time to estimate the amount of any additional loss, or range of
loss, that is reasonably possible."

Southwestern Energy Company, an independent energy company, engages
in the exploration, development, and production of natural gas and
oil in the United States. It operates through two segments,
Exploration and Production, and Midstream. Southwestern Energy
Company was founded in 1929 and is headquartered in Spring, Texas.


SSM HEALTH: Feather Appeals Opinion and Orders to 8th Circuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Stanley Beiermann, Lisa Feather and Holly Pyatt filed an
appeal from the District Court's Opinion & Order, and Opinion, Memo
& Order both entered on July 23, 2018, in their lawsuit entitled
Lisa Feather, et al. v. SSM Health, et al., Case No.
4:16-cv-01669-HEA, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri - St. Louis.

The appellate case is captioned as Lisa Feather, et al. v. SSM
Health, et al., Case No. 18-2823, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the case seeks
an order requiring SSM Health to comply with Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) and afford the Class all the
protections of ERISA with respect to SSM Health's defined benefit
pension plans, as well as an Order finding that the Church Plan
exemption, as claimed by SSM Health, is unconstitutional because it
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

According to the complaint, the ERISA Church Plan exemption, as
claimed by SSM Health, is an attempt to extend the accommodation
beyond churches and associations of churches, to SSM Health -- a
non-profit hospital conglomerate that has chosen to compete with
commercial businesses, including other non-profits as well as
for-profits, by entering the economic arena and trafficking in the
marketplace.  Extension of the Church Plan exemption to SSM Health
violates the Establishment Clause because it (A) is not necessary
to further the stated purposes of the exemption, (B) harms SSM
Health workers, (C) puts SSM Health competitors at an economic
disadvantage, (D) relieves SSM Health of no genuine religious
burden created by ERISA, and (E) creates more government
entanglement with alleged religious beliefs than compliance with
ERISA creates.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appendix is due on October 3, 2018;

   -- Brief of Appellants Stanley Beiermann, Lisa Feather and
      Holly Pyatt is due on October 3, 2018;

   -- Appellee brief is due 30 days from the date the court
      issues the Notice of Docket Activity filing the brief of
      appellant;

   -- Appellant reply brief is due 14 days from the date the
      court issues the Notice of Docket Activity filing the
      appellee brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Lisa Feather, on behalf of herself,
individually, and all others similarly situated, and on behalf of
the SSM Pension Plans; Stanley Beiermann, on behalf of himself,
individually, and all others similarly situated, and on behalf of
the SSM Pension Plans; and Holly Pyatt, on behalf of herself,
individually, and all others similarly situated, and on behalf of
the SSM Pension Plans, are represented by:

          Laura R. Gerber, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-1900
          Facsimile: (206) 623-3384
          E-mail: lgerber@kellerrohrback.com

Plaintiff-Appellant Lisa Feather, on behalf of herself,
individually, and all others similarly situated, and on behalf of
the SSM Pension Plans, is represented by:

          Matthew Hall Armstrong, Esq.
          ARMSTRONG LAW FIRM LLC
          8816 Manchester Road
          St. Louis, MO 63144
          Telephone: (314) 258-0212
          E-mail: matt@mattarmstronglaw.com

               - and -

          Mary J. Bortscheller, Esq.
          Jamie L. Bowers, Esq.
          Karen L. Handorf, Esq.
          Julie G. Reiser, Esq.
          Michelle C. Yau, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL, PLLC
          West Tower, Suite 500
          1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 408-4600
          Facsimile: (202) 408-4699
          E-mail: mbortscheller@cohenmilstein.com
                  jbowers@cohenmilstein.com
                  khandorf@cohenmilstein.com
                  jreiser@cohenmilstein.com
                  myau@cohenmilstein.com

               - and -

          Robert A. Izard, Esq.
          Mark P. Kindall, Esq.
          Douglas Patrick Needham, Esq.
          IZARD, KINDALL & RAABE, L.L.P.
          29 S. Main Street, Suite 305
          West Hartford, CT 06107
          Telephone: (860) 493-6292
          Facsimile: (860) 493-6290
          E-mail: rizard@ikrlaw.com
                  mkindall@ikrlaw.com
                  dneedham@ikrlaw.com

               - and -

          Ron Kilgard, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.
          3101 N. Central Avenue, Suite 1400
          Phoenix, AZ 85012
          Telephone: (602) 248-0088
          E-mail: rkilgard@kellerrohrback.com

               - and -

          Lynn Sarko, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-1900
          Facsimile: (206) 623-3384
          E-mail: lsarko@kellerrohrback.com

Defendants-Appellees SSM Health, a Missouri Non-profit Corporation;
The Pension Committee for the Retirement Plan for SSM Employees;
and John and Janes Does 1-20, John and Jane Does 21-40, Members of
the Pension Committee for the Retirement Plan for SSM Employees,
each an individual, are represented by:

          Amy L. Blaisdell, Esq.
          GREENSFELDER, HEMKER & GALE, P.C.
          10 S. Broadway, Suite 2000
          Saint Louis, MO 63102-0000
          Telephone: (314) 241-9090
          E-mail: apb@greensfelder.com

Defendants-Appellees The Pension Committee for the Retirement Plan
for SSM Employees; and John and Janes Does 1-20, John and Jane Does
21-40, Members of the Pension Committee for the Retirement Plan for
SSM Employees, each an individual, are represented by:

          Heather M. Mehta, Esq.
          Daniel J. Schwartz, Esq.
          GREENSFELDER, HEMKER & GALE, P.C.
          10 S. Broadway, Suite 2000
          Saint Louis, MO 63102-0000
          Telephone: (314) 241-9090
          E-mail: hmm@greensfelder.com
                  djs@greensfelder.com

               - and -

          Russell Kenneth Scott, Esq.
          GREENSFELDER, HEMKER & GALE, P.C.
          12 Wolf Creek Drive, Suite 100
          Swansea, IL 62226
          Telephone: (618) 257-7308
          E-mail: rks@greensfelder.com


STEEL & TUBE: Class Action Could Snowball With Fresh Court Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Tom Pullar-Strecker, writing for Stuff, reports that Law firm Adina
Thorn Lawyers is renewing its efforts to persuade home owners to
sign up to a class action lawsuit against steel mesh suppliers, in
the wake of a $540,000 fine handed down to Brilliance Steel on
August 17.

Brilliance had earlier pleaded guilty to 20 charges under the Fair
Trading Act for misleading customers about whether some its steel
had been tested and certified as complying with a new earthquake
safety standard.

Thorn said it was expecting a separate announcement within days on
the penalty Steel & Tube would face after it pleaded guilty to 24
charges as a result of same the Commerce Commission investigation
into mesh steel.

Steel & Tube had a much larger share of the market than Brilliance,
it said.

"We envisage that number will increase considerably after the Steel
& Tube announcement in the coming days," she said.

Timber King and NZ Steel Distributor were fined $400,950 for also
making false and misleading representations about their steel mesh
products earlier this year.

The commission filed 59 charges against Euro Corporation in
December. It is a much larger supplier of steel than Brilliance,
but not as large as Steel & Tube.

What is the issue with the steel mesh?

The steel subject to the successful prosecutions was marketed as
complying with, and/or having being tested to meet, a new
Australian/New Zealand Standard for reinforcing steel suitable for
structural use in earthquake zones, between about 2012 and 2016.

How much steel and what is it used for?

Thorn believes overall about a million sheets of steel are
involved. Some of the steel in question was imported from China and
Malaysia. It is used for reinforcing concrete. According to the Law
Society, most of the 100,000 homes built in New Zealand since 2012
have concrete slab floors with steel mesh in them.

What is the purpose of the standard?

To ensure that the steel mesh can stretch 10 per cent without
breaking, if it is put under strain.

So is the steel unsafe?

The message from officials is not to worry.

The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) said in
2016 that initial testing showed the products sold by Brilliance
and Euro Corporation did not meet the requirements of the standard
(AS/NZ 4671:2001), and that the steel mesh the commission tested
only stretched on average 8 per cent before failing.

It noted that Euro Corp did not accept that its product was
non-complying

MBIE also noted that before 2011, steel mesh in concrete was only
designed to have 2 per cent stretch, so homes built using the steel
at the centre of the controversy would "still be more resilient
than the many thousands of houses built prior to 2011".

On that basis, it said it was not concerned that the steel products
concerned posed a safety risk for newly built houses.

Why was the standard improved?

Some houses in Christchurch experienced more damage than expected
during its 2011 earthquake, MBIE said.

It also said some of that damage might have been avoided if
concrete floor slabs contained reinforcing steel to tie the
foundations together, and the steel had higher ductility (was more
stretchy).

What is the purpose of the class action lawsuit?

Adina Thorn says she does not want to be a "panic merchant", but
the steel was not the product consumers understood they were
getting or paid for, so the law firm believes they are entitled to
compensation.

Thorn said it was mainly hoping to help homeowners win compensation
for the "stress and anxiety" they had faced.

What has Steel & Tube said?

It has maintained the mesh that it sold will perform in "materially
the same way" as mesh tested in full compliance with the
requirements of the new standard.[GN]


SYNGENTA CORP: Deadline Approaching for Farmers to Join Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Pam Eggemeier, writing for Saukvalley, reports that  a local
attorney will lead a workshop to help corn producers and landlords
navigate the largest agriculture class-action lawsuit in the
nation's history.

Paul Osborn, Esq. of Ward, Murray, Pace and Johnson, will present
information and field questions at no charge from 8 to 9 a.m.
August 15 at Sterling Federal Bank, 110 E. Fourth St.

A $1.5 billion settlement was reached in March against ag giant
Syngenta for its sales of genetically modified corn seed that had
been approved in the U.S., but not yet been OK'd for export.

The plaintiffs contend that the new corn strains, brought to the
U.S. market for the 2011 growing season, caused China to reject
U.S. corn in 2013 because of the modified trait MIR-162.

Without access to the Chinese market, corn prices dropped from $7 a
bushel in June 2013 to $3.25 a bushel in June 2014. The lawsuit
claims that Syngenta's false assurances about imminent approval by
the Chinese government constituted fraud and the rejection of corn
by the Chinese caused the drop in the market, causing monetary
damages.

The case has been difficult for farmers to follow because of how
long it has been in the courts and how broad its scope has become.

The settlement agreement isn't just for farmers who grew Syngenta's
modified strains. It now includes anyone who had a direct financial
interest in corn between Sept. 15, 2013, and April 10, 2018. That
means growers, landlords, grain elevators and ethanol plants that
were impacted by low corn prices during those years.

While ethanol plants would normally benefit from low corn prices,
they are factoring in money they lost when the prices dropped below
where they were hedged.

Money could be distributed to those who have opted into the
class-action lawsuit in the first half of next year.

While the high-profile case has sparked a lot of conversation among
local farmers, ag leaders say it's difficult to gauge how many will
join the lawsuit.

"There has been a lot of buzz about it, but we really don't know
many people locally will file claims," Lee County Farm Bureau
Manager Danelle Burrs said. "I think that many of them are still
trying to figure out the process."

Osborn has carved out a niche in agriculture since graduating from
law school in 1980 and joining Ward, Murray, Pace and Johnson. He
had spent a great deal of time studying a dramatically changed
federal bankruptcy code that was passed in 1979.

"Not many area attorneys were familiar with bankruptcy law then,
and I kind of became our bankruptcy guy," Osborn said.

Then came the farm crisis of the 1980s and many of those
bankruptcies came from the agriculture sector.

"Commodity prices were low, interest rates were high, and 10 to 12
percent of the farmers were going bankrupt," Osborn said.

Osborn's goal for the Syngenta workshop is to summarize the
settlement language and walk producers through the claims process.

"This is straightforward enough so that they should be able to get
through this without hiring an attorney," Osborn said.

He said the law firm has no ulterior motive for conducting the
workshop. While farmers can pursue individual lawsuits, most would
find it to be cost-prohibitive, Osborn said.

"The banks and the Chamber are active in working with farmers and
they wanted to organize this," Osborn said. "The banks have a lot
of ag loans, so it's in their best interest to look out for the
farmers."

Filing forms have been sent to more than 600,000 potential
plaintiffs in the case. The deadline for submitting the forms is
Oct. 12. Those who join the class-action suit lose the right to
take any further legal action with Syngenta. Those who choose to
opt out of the class-action filing lose their right to any
settlement money, but can file an individual lawsuit. If farmers
don't file anything, they are included in the class-action.

Lee County farmer Allyn Buhrow said it's been a while since he's
seen a class-action lawsuit that had anything close to the impact
this one has had on ag.

"The last really big one I recall was the lawsuit for faulty
General Motors pickup fuel tanks in the early 1990s," Buhrow said.
"It didn't directly involve farmers, but many of us were driving
those trucks."

The Syngenta strains in question appear to show up more in Iowa
than Illinois, but farmers don't have to use them to benefit.

Jim Schielein, who grows corn in Lee County, said there have been
issues with several seed companies over the years. Genetics have
become increasingly important, but as seed costs have gone up,
farmers must be smart about what they choose to grow.

"Seed used to be less than 10 percent of a farmer's overall costs,
but now it's the number one expense for most of us," Schielein
said. "Excluding cash rents, it's about one-fourth of the variable
costs."

Schielein said he lives by one simple seed rule -- if if isn't
approved for export, don't grow it. Even if farmers do avoid the
unapproved seed, their crops can still be contaminated.

"Corn pollen can travel up to 30 miles and cross-pollinate with
yours and it can contaminate the entire crop," Schielein said.

Schielein filed the paperwork to become part of the lawsuit, but
the money wasn't his primary motivation. Attorneys could get nearly
one-third of the settlement money, and with a high percentage of
prospective plaintiffs expected to join, the check might not amount
to much.

"I'm just glad the lawsuit went forward because these huge
companies need to be held responsible when they break the rules,"
Schielein said.

It's impossible to even estimate how much money farmers will
receive until the number of claims has been determined. Osborn said
a nickel a bushel for the corn produced during the designated
period would be "extremely optimistic". The payments are based on
the number of acres registered for corn production and then it is
multiplied by the average yield in each county.

But to put the amount in perspective, the initial proposal from the
Trump administration for tariff loss reimbursements for all ag
crops was $12 billion.[GN]


TARGET CORP: Faces Walters Suit in California District Court
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Target Corp.  The
case is titled as James Walters, on Behalf of Himself and Those
Similarly Situated v. Target Corp., Case No. 5:18-mc-80138-VKD
(N.D. Cal., August 23, 2018).

The lawsuit is a Civil Miscellaneous Case.

Target Corporation operates general merchandise discount stores.
The Company focuses on merchandising operations, which includes
general merchandise and food discount stores and a fully integrated
online business.  Target also offers credit to qualified applicants
through its branded proprietary credit cards.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel, Esq.
          Sophia Goren Gold, Esq.
          KALIEL PLLC
          1875 Connecticut Avenue NW, 10th Floor
          Washington, DC 20009
          Telephone: (202) 350-4783
          E-mail: jkaliel@kalielpllc.com
                  sgold@kalielpllc.com


TESLA INC: Lieff Cabraser Files Securities Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
The law firm Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP disclosed that
class action litigation has been filed on behalf of investors who
purchased or acquired, sold, or had open short positions or put
options for the securities of Tesla, Inc. ("Tesla" or the
"Company") (Nasdaq: TSLA) between August 7, 2018 and August 14,
2018, inclusive (the "Class Period").

If you purchased or otherwise acquired, sold, or had open short
positions or put options for Tesla securities during the Class
Period, you may move the Court for appointment as lead plaintiff by
no later than October 9, 2018. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party who acts on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your share of any recovery in the actions will not be
affected by your decision of whether to seek appointment as lead
plaintiff. You may retain Lieff Cabraser, or other attorneys, as
your counsel in the actions.

Tesla investors who wish to learn more about the litigation and how
to seek appointment as lead plaintiff should click here or contact
Sharon M. Lee of Lieff Cabraser toll-free at 1-800-541-7358.

Background on the Tesla Securities Class Litigation

Tesla, incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Palo Alto,
California, designs, manufactures, and sells electric vehicles and
electric vehicle powertrain components.

The action alleges that, during the Class Period, defendants Tesla
and Elon Musk, Tesla's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, issued
false and misleading statements and/or failed to disclose material
adverse facts regarding a possible deal to take the Company
private. The action alleges that defendants specifically failed to
disclose: (1) that defendants had not secured funding for a
transaction to take the Company private; (2) that Musk's statements
that the deal only required shareholder approval to proceed were
false; and (3) that the status and likelihood of the deal were
misrepresented to the market given that financing was not secured
and the approval of the Board was still required.

On August 7, 2018, Musk stated in a tweet that he was "considering
taking Tesla private at $420. Funding secured." He then stated in
another tweet that "[i]nvestor support is confirmed. Only reason
why this is not certain is that it's contingent on a shareholder
vote." On this news, the price of Tesla common stock rose $37.58,
almost 11% higher than the previous closing price of $341.99 on
August 6, 2018, to close at $379.57 per share on August 7, 2018, on
extremely heavy trading volume.

On August 8, 2018, before markets opened, members of Tesla's Board
of Directors issued a statement revealing that the board was still
evaluating the prospect of taking Tesla private, and thus confirmed
that any deal was still subject to board approval. On this news,
the price of Tesla common stock fell $9.23 per share, or 2.43% from
the previous day's closing price, to close at $370.34 per share on
August 8, 2018, on heavy trading volume.

The same day, after markets closed, The Wall Street Journal
reported that the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") had
asked Tesla about Musk's announcement on August 7, 2018 and that
Musk "could be in trouble if regulators develop evidence that he
made a statement aimed at goosing his company's stock price."

On August 9, 2018, Reuters reported that Tesla's Board of Directors
was investigating whether funding was in fact "secured." On this
news, the price of Tesla's common stock dropped $17.89 per share,
or 4.83% from the previous day's closing price, to close at $352.45
per share on August 9, 2018, on heavy trading volume.

On the morning of August 13, 2018, Musk posted a statement on
Tesla's blog confirming that funding for a deal to take Tesla was
not yet secured, that proceeding on a deal with Saudi Arabia's
sovereign wealth fund for funding was "subject to financial and
other due diligence and their internal review process for obtaining
approvals."

The same day, after the markets closed, Musk stated in a tweet:
"I'm excited to work with Silver Lake and Goldman Sachs as
financial advisors . . . on the proposal to take Tesla private."
Then, on August 14, 2018, Bloomberg reported that neither Goldman
Sachs nor Silver Lake were yet working with Musk in an official
capacity. On this news the price of Tesla common stock dropped
$8.77 per share, or 2.46% from a previous closing price of $356.41
on August 13, 2018, to close at $347.64 per share on August 14,
2018.

On August 15, 2018, The Wall Street Journal reported that the SEC
had formally subpoenaed Tesla and was seeking information from each
of the Company's directors. [GN]


TETRAPHASE PHARMA: Faces Ignite3-Related Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
Tetraphase Pharmaceuticals, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company is
facing a purported securities class action suit related to
IGNITE3.

In July 2018, a purported securities class action lawsuit was filed
against the Company, its chief executive officer, its chief
scientific officer and the underwriters of its July 2017 public
offering, in the United States Southern District Court for New
York.

The complaint is brought on behalf of an alleged class of those who
purchased Tetraphase securities pursuant and/or traceable to the
Company's July 2017 secondary public offering and those who
purchased the Company's securities between March 8, 2017 and
February 13, 2018.

The complaint purports to allege claims arising under Sections 10
and 20 of the Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Sections 11 and
15 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended. The complaint
generally alleges that the defendants violated the federal
securities laws by, among other things, making material
misstatements or omissions concerning IGNITE3.

The complaint seeks, among other relief, unspecified compensatory
damages, attorneys' fees, and costs.

Tetraphase said, "The Company believes it has valid defenses
against these claims, and will engage in a vigorous defense of such
litigation."

Tetraphase Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a clinical-stage
biopharmaceutical company, develops various antibiotics for the
treatment of serious and life-threatening multidrug-resistant
infections.  The company was founded in 2006 and is headquartered
in Watertown, Massachusetts.


TETRAPHASE PHARMA: Garity Suit Asserts Securities Act Violation
---------------------------------------------------------------
Edward Garity, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. Tetraphase Pharmaceuticals, Inc. et al., Case No.
1:18-cv-06797 (S.D. N.Y., July 27, 2018), seeks to pursue claims
against the Defendants under the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

This is a class action on behalf of persons and entities that: a)
acquired Tetraphase securities pursuant and traceable to the
Company's false and misleading registration statement and
prospectus issued in connection with the Company's July 2017
secondary public offering; and, b) acquired Tetraphase securities
between March 8, 2017 and February 13, 2018, inclusive.

The Plaintiff Edward Garity purchased Tetraphase common stock
during the class period.

The Defendant Tetraphase is a clinical-stage biopharmaceutical
company that develops antibiotics for serious and life-threatening
multidrug-resistant infections. Tetraphase's principal executive
offices are located at 480 Arsenal Way in Watertown, Massachusetts.


The Individual Defendants are officers of Tetraphase. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Lesley F. Portnoy, Esq.
      GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
      230 Park Avenue, Suite 530
      New York, NY 10169
      Tel: (212) 682-5340
      Fax: (212) 884-0988
      E-mail: lportnoy@glancylaw.com


TEXAS CES: Court Refuses to Certify FLSA Class in Debord Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. David Counts entered an order in the lawsuit styled JERRY
DEBORD, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated v.
TEXAS CES, INC., and TEXAS CES, INC., d/b/a FELDERHOFF BROTHERS
DRILLING SERVICES, Case No. 7:17-cv-00215-DC (W.D. Tex.), denying
without prejudice the Plaintiff's:

   -- Motion for Conditional Certification; and

   -- Motion for Approval and Distribution of Notice and for
      Disclosure of Contact Information.

The case arises from the Plaintiff's employment with the Defendants
-- corporations providing products and services in the oil and gas
industry.  On November 1, 2017, the Plaintiff filed this case as a
collective action against the Defendants alleging violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.  Specifically, the Plaintiff asks the
Court to conditionally certify this class:

     All persons employed by Defendants as Salaried Supervisors
     and/or Salaried Coordinators at any time since November 1,
     2014.

Since the filing of this suit on November 1, 2017, no other
potential class members have opted in to the suit, Judge Counts
notes.  The Court finds the Plaintiff's affidavit alone is
insufficient to support a finding that other aggrieved coworkers
would like to join the litigation.

In light of Plaintiff's so-far-unsubstantiated belief that others
will join the lawsuit, and considering the broad remedial purposes
of the FLSA, the Court denies the Plaintiff's Motion without
prejudice to allow the Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended
motion.


TEZOS FOUNDATION: Judge Advances Cryptocurrency Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Iovino, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
in a case involving novel issues of whether digital currency
investments are subject to U.S. securities laws, a federal judge on
Aug. 7 advanced a class action against a husband and wife team that
raised $232 million for a new cryptocurrency.

U.S. District Judge Richard Seeborg refused to dismiss lead
plaintiff Arman Anvari's class action against Tezos virtual
currency creators Arthur and Kathleen Brietman, their company
Dynamic Ledger Solutions (DLS) and Tezos Stiftung, the Swiss
foundation they set up to oversee an initial coin offering in July
2017.

After touting Tezos as the "solution" to shortcomings plaguing
other digital currencies, the Breitmans organized a "crowdsale" in
2017 to help finance the creation of a new blockchain, or secure
network for exchanging Tezos tokens.

Four class actions were filed and later consolidated after an
internal dispute delayed the launch of the new Tezos blockchain
last fall.

The defendants say the initial coin offering was merely a
fundraiser, not an investment scheme, and that they have no
obligation to provide Tezos tokens to contributors. The plaintiffs
say the contributions were investments, which means the defendants
were required to register with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission before accepting money.

The Breitmans argued they could not be liable for the sale of
unregistered securities because a separate Swiss entity, Tezos
Sitfung, oversaw the initial coin offering. Judge Seeborg rejected
that argument, finding the couple and the foundation were "deeply
intertwined, if not functionally interchangeable" throughout the
process.

Judge Seeborg found allegations the Breitmans developed websites
and applications used for the initial coin offering, and promoted
the fundraiser on popular online forums, adequately support a
conclusion that their involvement rose well above the level of
"collateral participation."

The judge also rejected claims the lawsuit seeks to apply U.S.
securities laws to conduct that occurred overseas. Although a Swiss
foundation oversaw the initial coin offering, Judge Seeborg found
the Breitmans' development of key elements for the project took
place in California, and that marketing for the offering almost
exclusively targeted U.S. investors.

In rejecting the extraterritorial argument, Judge Seeborg also
noted the lead plaintiff initiated his investment transaction on a
website hosted on a server in Arizona, and that his contribution of
the digital currency Ethereum was "validated by a network of global
'nodes' clustered more densely in the United States than in any
other country."

Judge Seeborg dismissed some defendants with leave to amend,
including American venture capitalist Tim Draper. Mr. Draper
invested $1.5 million in DLS, gaining a board seat and 10 percent
ownership stake in the company, and publicly touted Tezos. But
Judge Seeborg found Mr. Anvari failed to show he relied on anything
Draper said when he chose to invest in Tezos.

Additionally, Judge Seeborg dismissed the company Bitcoin Suisse as
a defendant, finding its role in providing virtual currency
conversion services for Tezos investors makes it "not appear to be
a key player in this action."

Mr. Anvari is represented by Hung Ta of New York, who did not
return a request for comment by press time.

The Breitmans are represented by Brian Klein -- sklein@ikrlaw.com
-- of Baker Marquart in Los Angeles, who said he believes his
clients will eventually prevail.

"Although we are understandably disappointed by the ruling, this
was not a decision on the merits of the case," Klein said. "We
believe Kathleen, Arthur, and DLS will ultimately be fully
vindicated. They did not violate any laws and Tezos contributors
were not harmed."

In June, Tezos unveiled a test version of its blockchain, or
digital exchange system for Tezos tokens, after months of delay.

As of Aug. 7, a single Tezos unit was valued at $1.70, down 4.8
percent and dramatically lower than its all-time high of $10.39 in
mid-December 2017. [GN]


TIMOTHY FOLSTED: Court Dismisses J. Benedict's Suit
---------------------------------------------------
Judge William E. Smith of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Rhode Island dismissed without prejudice the case, JOHN
BENEDICT, SR., Plaintiff, v. TIMOTHY FOLSTED, Defendant, C.A. No.
18-242 WES (D. R.I.).

Magistrate Judge Lincoln D. Almond filed a Report and
Recommendation ("R&R") in the case, recommending the Court
dismisses without prejudice.  The Plaintiff is a Massachusetts
resident and the current President of the Rhode Island Chapter of
the Seed of Abraham Motorcycle Club.  The Defendant is a Minnesota
resident and the Interim President of the National Seed of Abraham
Motorcycle Club.  The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant promised
"unity" of the nation of motorcycle clubs known as Seed of Abraham,
but that his actions belie his promise of unity.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant has scheduled a meeting of
the Seed of Abraham Motorcycle Clubs to elect the new National
President.  The meeting is scheduled for June 22-24, 2018 in El
Paso, Texas, and the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant is
requiring Members of local clubs to be physically present at that
meeting to cast a vote for the next National President.  The
Plaintiff alleges the requirement to be physically present to vote
does not further the goal of "unity" and will impose a financial
hardship upon him and Chapter Presidents from nine other states.

The Plaintiff claims the requirement to be physically present to
vote is unsupported by the rules or bylaws of the Club.  He
estimates his travel expenses to Texas would be roughly $12,000.
He brings his Complaint for negligence, promissory estoppel and
undue influence.  He seeks injunctive and declaratory relief and
asks that the Court restrains the Defendant from holding the
National Meeting in Texas from June 22-24, 2018, and prevents tge
Defendant from acting in any capacity on behalf of the National
Chapter of the Motorcycle Club until the issues raised in this suit
are resolved.

The Magistrate Judge finds that neither the Plaintiff nor the
proposed Plaintiffs from nine other chapters similarly situated
have alleged a claim surpassing the $75,000 threshold.
Accordingly, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction
over the case.  Further, the Plaintiff's Complaint must be
dismissed because it was brought in an improper venue.  The
Plaintiff does not allege any events giving rise to the claim
occurred in Rhode Island.  The Defendant is not a resident of Rhode
Island and there are no facts alleged that would support the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendant in the District.
Thus, proper venue does not lie in this District.  Because the
Plaintiff has also failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements
for diversity jurisdiction, transfer of the case is not warranted,
and it should be dismissed for improper venue.

For the reasons stated, the Magistrate Judge granted the
Plaintiff's Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees.
However, be dismissed without prejudice.

After careful review of the complaint, and of the R&R, and having
heard no objection, Judge Smith accepted the R&R and adopted its
recommendation and reasoning.  He dismissed the case without
prejudice.  The Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order is consequently denied.  The Plaintiff has not shown he is
likely to have a federal court entertain -- much less rule in his
favor on -- his claim.  The Judge also denied the Plaintiff's
Motion to Certify Class.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 20, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Bm2ryj from Leagle.com.

John Benedict, Sr., Plaintiff, pro se.


TJ MAXX: Faces Class Action on "Phantom Markdowns"
--------------------------------------------------
Mary Hanbury, writing for Stamford Advocate, reports that a group
of shoppers is accusing TJ Maxx of deceiving customers with
misleading discounts.

The United States' largest off-price retailer is known for being a
bargain hunter's paradise, offering discounts of 20% to 60% on
designer clothing. To highlight these deals to shoppers, it tags
most items with its own price versus what it would cost at a
full-price store. This is identified as the "Compare At" price on
the tag.

In July, four plaintiffs filed a class-action lawsuit against its
parent company, TJX Companies, in the southern district court in
Florida, alleging that the "Compare At" prices at TJ Maxx are
"fictional" and that the store is creating "phantom markdowns."

"The comparative price is not a bona fide price, but rather, an
unverified estimate of what Defendant believes comparable products
may sell for at other retailers," the plaintiffs claim in the
lawsuit.

They continue: "This practice also serves to falsely convey the
impression to the consumer that the good in question is of such
quality that it is worth that higher 'Compare At' price, when, in
fact, the item's actual value is far less."

On its website, TJ Maxx clarifies that there are instances when
identical items are not available. In this case, it compares
products of "a similar type, quality, and style."

"Prices vary among other sellers and change over time, but our
buying staff's goal is always to provide you with a useful
comparison based on prices at which we believe substantial sales of
the same or a similar item have been made at full-price department
or specialty retailers in the area or online," it says.

A spokesperson for TJ Maxx declined to comment on the lawsuit but
said in an email to Business Insider that customers are
well-informed on what its "Compare At" prices mean through signs in
its stores and information on its website.

This isn't the first time the off-price retailer has come under
scrutiny for its pricing tactics.

In 2015, a class-action lawsuit was filed against the company in
California by two plaintiffs who accused TJ Maxx of "using
deceptive comparative prices to trick its customers into mistakenly
believing they are saving specific and substantial amounts on name
brand items," ABC News reported.

A California judge ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and TJ Maxx's
parent company, TJX Companies, agreed to an $8.5 million
settlement. Customers who purchased products with a TJX price tag
that included a "Compare At price" at any of its TJ Maxx,
Marshalls, or HomeGoods stores in California between July 17, 2011
and December 6, 2017 were eligible to make a claim. The company
declined to comment on this suit.[GN]


TOYOTA MOTOR: Court Dismisses Suit Over Soybean-Coated Wiring
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned
MELINDA ESPINELI AND MOHAMMAD MOGHADDAM, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES
U.S.A., INC., a California Corporation; TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, a
Japanese Corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Defendants, No. 2:17-cv-00698-KJM-CKD (E.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff car owners contend the defendant car manufacturers
should be held liable for damages caused by rats chewing on
soybean-coated wiring placed in the defendants' vehicles during
manufacture and assembly, before sale to the public.

Plausible Theory of Liability

Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. Instead, to
state a plausible claim for relief, plaintiffs must plead facts
that tend to exclude a plausible and innocuous alternative
explanation.

The Defendants' alternative explanation that rats have a propensity
to chew generally does not fairly qualify as an alternative
explanation under the applicable law; even if it is a plausible
alternative explanation, it is not so convincing that it makes
plaintiff's explanation implausible. The Defendants' argument that
plaintiffs are required to allege more facts showing rats are more
likely to chew on wires with soy-based coating is unavailing.
Plaintiffs have set forth a plausible theory of liability in this
respect.

Express Warranty Claims

The Defendants argue the plaintiffs' express warranty claim fails
because the express warranty here does not cover design defects,
and the warranty excludes damages resulting from environmental
conditions, including damage caused by wild animals.  

The express warranty here does not cover the type of defect at
issue, and dismissal of the express warranty claims is thus
appropriate. The court need not address whether the alleged damage
caused by rodents falls within the warranty exception for damage
resulting from environmental conditions" because, as concluded
above, it is well settled that the type of warranty here does not
cover the defect.  

The repairs the plaintiffs seek are not covered by the express
warranty, and plaintiffs therefore cannot allege defendants
breached the express warranty. Dismissal of the express warranty
claim is therefore appropriate.

Implied Warranty Claims

To prevail on a breach of an implied warranty of merchantability
claim, the plaintiff must show that the product did not possess
even the most basic degree of fitness for ordinary use.

The Defendants argue the plaintiffs allege only that there is some
chance a defect' might manifest sometime in the future as a result
of an external intervention, such as a rodent getting inside the
vehicle and causing damage. The court agrees. The Plaintiffs'
implied warranty claim relies on the rodents to invade the engine
compartment and feast on soy-based wiring. Without the rodents, the
vehicle does not become inoperable, and the plaintiffs are, in
effect, asking the Court to stretch the implied warranty of
merchantability to include some promise that no external actor will
later harm the Plaintiffs' vehicles. The Plaintiffs have not
alleged the defendants sold them vehicles unfit to be driven, as
required for an implied warranty claim.  

The court dismisses the implied warranty of merchantability claim.

Fraud and Consumer Protection Claims

Here, the plaintiffs' fraud and consumer protection claims are not
supported by a sufficiently pleaded misstatement or omission. In
their complaint, the plaintiffs merely cross-reference prior
allegations and make conclusory statements alleging the defendants'
misstatements and omissions. They have failed to identify the who,
what, when, where, and how of the alleged misconduct as required
here.

Because the plaintiffs have failed to plead their fraudulent
omission and consumer protection claims with the appropriate level
of specificity, the court dismisses those claims.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 9, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6vvddcy from Leagle.com.

Melinda Espineli & Mohammad Moghaddam, Plaintiffs, represented by
Stuart C. Talley -- stuart@kctlegal.com -- Kershaw, Cook & Talley
PC, Gregory Lawrence Bentley -- gbentley@bentleymore.com -- Bentley
& More LLP & William A. Kershaw -- bill@kctlegal.com -- Kershaw,
Cook & Talley PC.

Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., Defendant, represented by Amir M.
Nassihi -- anassihi@shb.com -- Shook Hardy and Bacon LLP.


TREEHOUSE FOODS: PERS Mississippi Status Report Due Today
---------------------------------------------------------
TreeHouse Foods, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the next status report
in Public Employees' Retirement Systems of Mississippi v. TreeHouse
Foods, Inc., et al., is scheduled for September 5, 2018.

On November 16, 2016, a purported TreeHouse shareholder filed a
class action captioned Tarara v. TreeHouse Foods, Inc., et al.,
Case No. 1:16-cv-10632, in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois against TreeHouse and certain of its
officers.

The complaint, amended on March 24, 2017, is purportedly brought on
behalf of all purchasers of TreeHouse common stock from January 20,
2016 through and including November 2, 2016, asserts claims under
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder and seeks, among other things,
damages and costs and expenses.

On December 22, 2016, another purported TreeHouse shareholder filed
an action captioned Wells v. Reed, et al., Case No. 2016-CH-16359,
in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, against TreeHouse
and certain of its officers. This complaint, purportedly brought
derivatively on behalf of TreeHouse, asserts state law claims
against certain officers for breach of fiduciary duty, unjust
enrichment, and corporate waste.

On February 7, 2017, another purported TreeHouse shareholder filed
an action captioned Lavin v. Reed, Case No. 17-cv-01014, in the
Northern District of Illinois, against TreeHouse and certain of its
officers. This complaint, like Wells, is purportedly brought
derivatively on behalf of TreeHouse, and it asserts state law
claims against certain officers for breach of fiduciary duty,
unjust enrichment, abuse of control, gross mismanagement, and
corporate waste.

All three complaints make substantially similar allegations (though
the amended complaint in Tarara now contains additional detail).
Essentially, the complaints allege that TreeHouse, under the
authority and control of the individual defendants: (i) made
certain false and misleading statements regarding the Company's
business, operations, and future prospects; and (ii) failed to
disclose that (a) the Company's private label business was
underperforming; (b) the Company's Flagstone business was
underperforming; (c) the Company's acquisition strategy was
underperforming; (d) the Company had overstated its full-year 2016
guidance; and (e) TreeHouse’s statements lacked reasonable basis.


The complaints allege that these actions artificially inflated the
market price of TreeHouse common stock during the class period,
thus purportedly harming investors.

Treehouse Fodds said "We believe that these claims are without
merit and intend to defend against them vigorously."

Since its initial docketing, the Tarara matter has been
re-captioned as Public Employees' Retirement Systems of Mississippi
v. TreeHouse Foods, Inc., et al., in accordance with the Court's
order appointing Public Employees' Retirement Systems of
Mississippi as the lead plaintiff. On May 26, 2017, the Public
Employees' defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the court
denied on February 12, 2018.

On April 12, 2018, the Public Employees' defendants filed their
answer to the amended complaint. On April 23, 2018, the parties
filed a joint status report with the Court, describing the nature
of the case and issues involved, as well as setting forth a
proposed discovery and briefing schedule for the Court's
consideration.  The next status report is scheduled for September
5, 2018.

Additionally, due to the similarity of the complaints, the parties
in Wells and Lavin have entered stipulations deferring the
litigation until the earlier of (i) the court in Public Employees'
entering an order resolving defendants' anticipated motion to
dismiss therein or (ii) plaintiffs' counsel receiving notification
of a settlement of Public Employees’ or until otherwise agreed to
by the parties. The parties in Wells and Lavin are currently
drafting further deferrals in light of the Public Employees’
Court's denial of the motion to dismiss in February 2018. In Lavin,
the parties filed a joint status report on the progress of the
related litigation on October 26, 2017.  

The Lavin parties also filed additional status reports with the
Court on March 12, 2018 and June 19, 2018. There is no set status
date in Lavin at this time.

TreeHouse Foods, Inc. operates as a food and beverage manufacturer
in the United States, Canada, and Italy. The company operates
through Baked Goods, Beverages, Condiments, Meals, and Snacks
segments. TreeHouse Foods, Inc. was founded in 1862 and is based in
Oak Brook, Illinois.


TRIPLE-S MANAGEMENT: Appeal in Blue Cross Antitrust Suit Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Triple-S Management Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that notice of appeal is
filed in In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litigation

Triple-S Management Corporation (TSS) is a co-defendant with
multiple Blue Plans and the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association
(BCBSA) in a multi-district class action litigation filed by a
group of providers and subscribers on July 24, 2012 and October 1,
2012, respectively, that has since been consolidated by the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama,
Southern Division, in the case captioned In re Blue Cross Blue
Shield Association Antitrust Litigation.

Essentially, provider plaintiffs allege that the exclusive service
area requirements of the Primary License Agreements with the Blue
Plans constitute an illegal horizontal market allocation under
federal antitrust laws.

As per provider plaintiffs, the quid pro quo for said "market
allocation" is a horizontal price fixing and boycott conspiracy"
implemented through the Inter-Plans Program Committee ("IPPC") and
whose benefits are allegedly derived through the BCBSA's Blue
Card/National Accounts Program. Among the remedies sought, provider
plaintiffs seek increased compensation rates and operational
changes.

In turn, subscriber plaintiffs allege that the alleged conspiracy
to allocate markets have prevented subscribers from being offered
competitive prices and resulted in higher premiums for Blue Plan
subscribers. Subscribers seek damages in the form of
supra-competitive premiums allegedly charged by the Blue Plans
and/or the difference between what subscribers have paid the Blues
and the lower competitive premiums that non-competing Blues would
have charged. Both actions seek injunctive relief.

Prior to consolidation, motions to dismiss were filed by several
plans, including TSS whose request was ultimately denied by the
court without prejudice. On April 6, 2015, plaintiffs filed suit in
the United States District Court of Puerto Rico against TSS.

Said complaint, nonetheless, is believed not to preclude TSS'
jurisdictional arguments. Since inception, the Company has joined
BCBSA and other Blue Plans in vigorously contesting these claims.
On April 5, 2018, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama, Southern Division, issued it's ruling on the
parties' respective motions for partial summary judgment on the
standard of review applicable to plaintiffs' claims under Section 1
of the Sherman Act and subscriber plaintiffs' motion for partial
summary judgment on the Blue Plan's single entity defense.

After considering the "undisputed" facts (for summary judgment
purposes only) and evidence currently on record in the light most
favorable to defendants, the court essentially found that: (a) the
Exclusive Service Areas constitute horizontal market allocations
that are subject to the Per Se standard of review; (b) the National
Best Efforts Rule constitutes an 'output restriction' subject to
the Per Se standard of review; (c) there remain genuine issues of
material fact as to whether defendants' conduct can be shielded by
the "single entity" defense; and (d) claims concerning the BlueCard
Program and uncoupling rules are due to be analyzed under the Rule
of Reason standard.

On April 16, 2018 Defendants moved the Federal District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama to certify for immediate
interlocutory appeal the court's April 5, 2018 Standard of Review
Ruling.  On June 12, 2018 the Judge agreed to grant Defendant's
motion for certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b).
Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal on July 12, 2018.

Triple-S Management Corporation, through its subsidiaries, provides
a portfolio of managed care and related products in the commercial,
Medicare, and Medicaid markets in Puerto Rico, the United States.
The company operates through three segments: Managed Care, Life
Insurance, and Property and Casualty Insurance.


ULTA BEAUTY: Seeks Dismissal of Used-Makeup Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Lauraann Wood, writing for Law360, reports that Ulta Beauty Inc.
asked an Illinois federal judge to toss a putative class action
over its alleged sale of used, repackaged products, saying the suit
lobs too vague claims on behalf of too broad a class.

Ulta told U.S. District Judge Jorge Alonso that Kimberly
Smith-Brown's lawsuit must be tossed because its named plaintiffs
cannot assert nationwide claims based on "products they did not
purchase that arise under the laws of states in which they do not
live."

The case is styled Smith-Brown v. Ulta Beauty, Inc., Case No.
1:18-cv-00610 (N.D. Ill.).  The case is assigned to Judge Honorable
Jorge L. Alonso.  The case was filed January 26, 2018. [GN]


ULTA SALON: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss M. Hancox's FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John J. Tharp, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denied Ulta's
motion to dismiss the case, MONIQUE HANCOX, Plaintiff, v. ULTA
SALON, COSMETICS, & FRAGRANCE, INC., a Delaware Corporation, and
DOES 1-100, Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-01821 (N.D. Ill.).

Hancox, a former designer and hair stylist for the beauty retailer
Ulta), brings the complaint against Ulta for failure to pay minimum
and overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA").  Hancox alleges that Ulta violated the FLSA by failing to
consider the commission wages that she earned when it calculated
her overtime rate of pay.  She also claims that Ulta denied her
minimum and/or overtime wages by requiring her to perform work
during unpaid meal breaks.

Ulta is a nationwide beauty retailer that provides cosmetics,
fragrance, skin, and hair care products and services.  Its
headquarters are located in this district, in Bolingbrook,
Illinois.  From August 2014 to March 2016, Hancox worked as a
Designer/Hair Stylist at two Ulta locations in California. In that
role, she was responsible for providing salon services to guests
and selling Ulta's products and services.

At the beginning of her employment with Ulta, Hancox earned a
minimum hourly rate of $9.  She also had the opportunity to earn
commissions through Ulta's Salon Commission Plan.  The Plan
entitles employees to nondiscretionary bonus and commission pay
when certain sales and services goals are met.  Hancox and all
other non-exempt hourly employees who held similar salon
professional positions were required to participate in the Plan.
Under the Plan, Hancox would be paid whichever amount was greater
for each week.

While she was employed at Ulta, Hancox worked more than 40 hours
per week during approximately 30 to 35 different pay periods.  When
she worked overtime, Hancox was paid one and one-half times her
minimum guaranteed hourly rate of pay without inclusion of the
commission wages that she earned for the week.  In addition,
throughout Hancox's employment, she met or exceeded her commission
target goals, but Ulta failed to pay her all the commission wages
that she was entitled to under the Plan.  These unpaid commission
wages were also omitted from Hancox's overtime wages when she
worked more than 40 hours in one week.  Other Ulta employees who
held similar salon professional positions experienced the same
conduct.

Hancox was also denied rest and meal periods when she worked at
Ulta.  Ulta schedules clients in a manner that leaves inadequate
time between appointments for a salon professional to take meal or
rest breaks. Ulta failed to provide adequate shift relief and
overbooked Hancox's schedule, making it impossible to take breaks.
Even though Hancox was required to work through break periods, she
was still obligated to record a thirty-minute unpaid meal period on
her time records.  Therefore, she was not paid for the time she
worked during break periods.  The practice frequently resulted in
Hancox working more than 40 hours in a workweek.  Other salon
professionals who worked at Ulta were also required to perform
unpaid work during break periods.

Hancox filed a complaint against Ulta on March 7, 2017, alleging a
collective action claim for violations of the FLSA and class action
claims for violations of the California Labor Code.  After Ulta
filed a motion to dismiss her first complaint, Hancox filed an
amended complaint on May 30, 2017.  The amended complaint also
pleads a FLSA collective action claim and class action claims under
California law. Ulta again moved to dismiss the complaint.  

After Ulta's motion to dismiss was fully briefed by the parties,
they filed a joint motion to dismiss all the California law claims
and to strike the Rule 23 class action allegations in the
complaint.  The only claim remaining in the case and subject to the
pending motion to dismiss is Hancox's collective action FLSA
claim.

Ulta's motion argues that Hancox has failed to adequately or
plausibly plead a FLSA claim and the complaint should therefore be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).

Judge Tharp finds that Hancox has alleged that there was in fact at
least one week when she was undercompensated for her overtime work,
which is sufficient to state a FLSA overtime claim.  Furthermore,
taken together and interpreted in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, the allegations support Hancox's assertion that she was
never paid proper wages for any weeks that she worked overtime.
FLSA claims do not require the plaintiffs to plead infinitesimal
details to render them plausible or provide the defendants with
fair notice of the claims against them.  Here, the amended
complaint provides enough facts regarding when and how Ulta
underpaid Hancox for the overtime work that she performed.  Because
the complaint adequately pleads a FLSA claim for overtime wages,
Ulta's motion will be denied.

Accordingly, Judge Tharo denied Ulta's motion to dismiss.  Hancox
may proceed on a claim for unpaid overtime wages under the FLSA.
The amended complaint does not, however, state a claim for unpaid
minimum wages and the case will not proceed under that theory.
Ulta's answer to Count I of the amended complaint is due by Aug.
10, 2018.  A status hearing is scheduled for Aug. 15, 2018 at 9:00
a.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 20, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/PiOqHd from Leagle.com.

Monique Hancox, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Morgan Eileen Glynn --
mglynn@mahoney-law.net -- Mahoney Law Group, Apc, Atoy H. Wilson --
awilson@mahoney-law.net -- MAHONEY LAW GROUP APC, pro hac vice,
Katherine J. Odenbreit -- kodenbreit@mahoney-law.net -- Mahoney Law
Group APC, pro hac vice, Kevin Mahoney , MAHONEY LAW GROUP APC, pro
hac vice, Lisa L Clay -- lclay@clayatlaw.com -- Lisa L. Clay &
Treana Allen -- tallen@mahoney-law.ne -- MAHONEY LAW GROUP APC, pro
hac vice.

Ulta Salon, Cosmetics, & Fragrance, Inc., a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant, represented by John Anthony Ybarra --
jybarra@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C. & Catherine Sarah
Lindemann -- clindemann@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.c..


UNIKRN: Hit By Class Action Lawsuit Over ICO
--------------------------------------------
Wolfie Zhao, writing for Coindesk, reports that Unikrn, a
Seattle-based e-sport betting startup that conducted an initial
coin offering (ICO) last year, is now facing a class action suit
accusing it of violating securities law in the U.S.

Las Vegas resident and lead plaintiff John Hastings filed the case
at a court in Washington State on Aug. 13, alleging that Unikrn and
its founder Rahul Sood sold unregistered securities to the public
via the ICO for its blockchain-based UnikoinGold Tokens (UKG).

Hastings, a participant in the ICO, argued that the UKG tokens
should be treated as securities since investors were led to expect
that the tokens "would increase in value and become worth more than
the virtual currencies invested."

He further claimed that Unikrn has "crafted a flimsy façade that
UKG Tokens are not securities by claiming they are 'utility
tokens.'" Sood said in a news report from Geekwire on August 16
that Unikrn is "aware of the lawsuit," but declined to give further
comment on the case.

As previously reported by CoinDesk, Unikrn collected 112,720 ether
via its token sale between September and October 2017, an amount
worth around $31 million at the time.

Based on a file submitted by Unikrn to the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) on Oct. 6, the firm also raised at least
$16 million from accredited investors through an investment
contract known as a SAFT -- Simple Agreement for Future Tokens.

Founded in 2014, Unikrn planned last year to launch its own token
for a blockchain-based betting platform and subsequently conducted
the ICO to raise funds for the project's development.

The ICO was notably backed by "Shark Tank" VC Mark Cuban, who
confirmed with CoinDesk his participation in the offering -- a
first for the owner of the Dallas Mavericks NBA franchise. "High
risk. High reward," he commented at the time.

Following the token sale, UKG was listed for trading on several
crypto exchanges including U.S.-based Bittrex.

The case was filed at a time when the price of UKG declined from
its all-time-high around $2 early this year to $0.05 as of press
time according to data from CoinMarketCap.

The case comes as the latest class action lawsuit filed by
investors against an ICO project they had invested in.

A court in California blocked a move that sought to dismiss a class
action alleging that the ICO conducted by the Tezos Foundation
violated securities laws in the U.S.[GN]


UNION PACIFIC: Court Grants Protective Order in Discrimination Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska
granted Defendant's Motion for Protective Order in the case
captioned QUINTON HARRIS, GEOFFREY MILLER, NORMAN MOUNT, SCOTT
ZINN, THOMAS TAYLOR, and JOHN BAKER, Plaintiffs, v. UNION PACIFIC
RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant, No. 8:16CV381 (D. Nev.).

The Plaintiffs allege, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, that the Defendant's Fitness-for-Duty
evaluation procedures unlawfully discriminate against employees on
the basis of disabilities and genetic information.
  
The Defendant seeks a protective order precluding the Plaintiffs
from conducting discovery on the Defendant's Color Vision Field
Test (CVFT) and shielding the Defendant from the Plaintiffs'
Interrogatory Nos. 23 and 24, which relate to Defendant's CVFT.

The Defendant argues that discovery regarding its CVFT is
irrelevant because the Amended Complaint does not mention the CVFT,
or allege that it is an unlawful method to examine an employee's
vision. The Defendant points out that none of the named Plaintiffs
suffer from vision issues or have been removed from service based
on a failed CVFT.

The Court agrees that discovery related to the validity/methodology
of the Defendant's CVFT is irrelevant to the claims in this suit.
This action involves allegations that the Defendant excluded the
Plaintiffs from their positions on the basis of disabilities that
had no impact on their ability to perform the essential functions
of their jobs. There is no allegation that the Defendant uses an
improper test in connection with fitness-for-duty evaluations.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 9, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ydbypwcd from Leagle.com.

Quinton Harris, Geoffrey Miller, Norman Mount, Scott Zinn, Thomas
Taylor & John Baker, Plaintiffs, represented by Anthony S. Petru --
petru@hmnlaw.com -- HILDEBRAND, MCLEOD LAW FIRM, pro hac vice,
Charles A. Delbridge -- cdelbridge@nka.com -- NICHOLS, KASTER LAW
FIRM, pro hac vice, Corey L. Stull , ATWOOD, HOLSTEN LAW FIRM,
David E. Schlesinger -- schlesinger@nka.com -- NICHOLS, KASTER LAW
FIRM, pro hac vice, James H. Kaster -- kaster@nka.com -- NICHOLS,
KASTER LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Laura Baures -- lbaures@nka.com --
NICHOLS, KASTER LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Neil D. Pederson --
npederson@nka.com -- NICHOLS, KASTER LAW FIRM, pro hac vice,
Nicholas D. Thompson, MOODY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice & Robert L.
Schug -- schug@nka.com -- NICHOLS, KASTER LAW FIRM, pro hac vice.

Union Pacific Railroad Company, Defendant, represented by Allison
D. Balus -- abalus@bairdholm.com -- BAIRD, HOLM LAW FIRM,
Christopher R. Hedican -- chedican@bairdholm.com -- BAIRD, HOLM LAW
FIRM, David P. Kennison -- dkennison@bairdholm.com -- BAIRD, HOLM
LAW FIRM, Leigh C. Joyce -- lcampbell@bairdholm.com -- BAIRD, HOLM
LAW FIRM & Scott P. Moore -- spmoore@bairdholm.com -- BAIRD, HOLM
LAW FIRM, pro hac vice.


UNITED PARCEL: Agreement Reached in Morgate Suit
------------------------------------------------
United Parcel Service, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company reached an
agreement to resolve the case, Morgate v. The UPS Store, Inc. et
al.

UPS and its subsidiary The UPS Store, Inc. are defendants in
Morgate v. The UPS Store, Inc. et al., an action in the Los Angeles
Superior Court brought on behalf of a certified class of all
franchisees who chose to rebrand their Mail Boxes Etc. franchises
to The UPS Store in March 2003.

Plaintiff alleges that UPS and The UPS Store, Inc. misrepresented
and omitted facts to the class about the market tests that were
conducted before offering the class the choice of whether to
rebrand to The UPS Store.

Defendants' motion to decertify the class was granted in August
2017. The plaintiff has filed a notice of appeal, and further
proceedings in the trial court are stayed pending resolution by the
California Court of Appeal.

In May 2018, the company reached an agreement to resolve the case
for an immaterial amount. Final resolution of this matter is
subject to court approval.

United Parcel Service, Inc. provides letter and package delivery,
specialized transportation, logistics, and financial services. It
operates through three segments: U.S. Domestic Package,
International Package, and Supply Chain & Freight. The company was
founded in 1907 and is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.


UNITED PARCEL: Agreement Reached in Suit by Wright and Zislin
-------------------------------------------------------------
United Parcel Service, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company has reached
an agreement to resolve the case, Ryan Wright and Julia Zislin v.
United Parcel Service Canada Ltd.

The company is a defendant in Ryan Wright and Julia Zislin v.
United Parcel Service Canada Ltd., an action brought on behalf of a
certified class of customers in the Superior Court of Justice in
Ontario, Canada.

Plaintiffs filed suit in February 2007, alleging inadequate
disclosure concerning the existence and cost of brokerage services
provided by the company under applicable provincial consumer
protection legislation and infringement of interest restriction
provisions under the Criminal Code of Canada. Partial summary
judgment was granted to the company and the plaintiffs by the
Ontario motions court in August 2011, when it dismissed plaintiffs'
complaint under the Criminal Code and granted plaintiffs' complaint
of inadequate disclosure.

The company appealed the Court's decision pertaining to inadequate
disclosure in September 2011.

In June 2018, the company reached an agreement to resolve the case
for an immaterial amount. Final resolution of this matter is
subject to court approval.

United Parcel Service, Inc. provides letter and package delivery,
specialized transportation, logistics, and financial services. It
operates through three segments: U.S. Domestic Package,
International Package, and Supply Chain & Freight. The company was
founded in 1907 and is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.


UNITED STATES: Ark. Landowners' New Bid for Atty's Fees Junked
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Federal Claims denied Plaintiffs' Motion
for Attorney's Fees and Costs in the case captioned ROSALIE
GREENWOOD, et al., Individually and as Representatives of a Class
of Similarly Situated Individuals, Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED
STATES, Defendant, No. 10-15L (Fed. Cl.).

The Plaintiffs, who consist of 53 landowners that collectively own
78 parcels of land along a 6.70-mile corridor in Lawrence County,
Arkansas, filed the original opt-in class action lawsuit. The court
approved the settlement agreement reached by the parties regarding
just compensation, finding it to be fair, reasonable, and adequate.
The court awarded the plaintiffs $326,310.00 as reimbursement for
attorneys' fees and $12,248.00 for litigation costs separate from
the settlement in the underlying takings case.

Pending before the court is the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys'
fees and litigation costs under the Uniform Relocation Assistance
and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (URA), which
vests this court with jurisdiction to reimburse the plaintiffs for
their reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses, including
reasonable attorney fees, actually incurred in cases brought under
the Tucker Act.

The Plaintiffs filed the pending motion seeking additional
attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses in connection with
the withdrawn appeal.

The Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction to Consider Plaintiffs' Motion
for Additional Fees

The government argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear
the plaintiffs' motion for additional fees for two reasons. First,
the government maintains that once an appeal was filed, this court
lost jurisdiction over the case. Second, the government argues that
the court cannot exercise ancillary jurisdiction over plaintiffs'
claim for additional fees because attorneys' fees were made part of
the court's judgment and those fees have been paid by the Judgment
Fund.

The court agrees with the government that the court lacks
jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' motion for additional fees because
the Federal Circuit expressly stated each party would bear its own
costs and plaintiffs did not seek a remand for URA fees and costs
before the Federal Circuit, seeking URA attorneys' fees and costs
associated with the withdrawn appeal only after the URA attorneys'
fees and costs had been paid by the Judgment Fund. In such
circumstances, this court has nothing pending to allow for the
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in the underlying takings
action.

The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction generally recognizes federal
courts' jurisdiction over some matters otherwise beyond their
competence that are incidental to other matters properly before
them. A trial court, therefore, retains ancillary jurisdiction over
collateral matters, including claims for attorneys' fees, relating
to the underlying claim.

Nevertheless, a court can only retain ancillary jurisdiction,
including for attorneys' fees and costs filed under the URA, while
a proceeding is pending before it. In other words, the trial court
cannot exercise its ancillary jurisdiction if there is no
proceeding to which a collateral matter may attach. In the instant
case, a final judgment had been entered on attorneys' fees and
costs. While this court may have retained jurisdiction to ensure
that a final judgment was paid, once the appeal was withdrawn and
the judgment was paid, including the judgment for attorneys' fees
and costs, there was no longer any proceeding pending before this
court related to the underlying takings action.

For this court to consider a new motion for additional fees, the
plaintiffs needed to have requested the Federal Circuit to remand
the proceeding to this court. Plaintiffs did not do so. Nor did
plaintiffs seek to reopen the judgment before this court. Instead,
as noted, plaintiffs filed this motion for additional fees nearly
five months after the Federal Circuit had dismissed the appeal and
more than a month after the judgment had been paid. In such
circumstances, there was no proceeding remaining before this
court.

A full-text copy of the Court of Federal Claims' August 13, 2018
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybknxfy5 from
Leagle.com.

ROSALIE GREENWOOD, Individually, for Herself, and As Representative
of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons, Plaintiff, represented by
Steven Mathew Wald -- Stewart@swm.legal -- Stewart Wald & McCulley,
LLC.

USA, Defendant, represented by Sean Christian Duffy , U.S.
Department of Justice.


UNITED STATES: EPA Faces Class Action Over El Paso Air Quality
--------------------------------------------------------------
Christina Aguayo, writing for KVIA, reports that The Chamizal
Families of El Paso are demanding accountability from EPA. This
morning Familias Unidas del Chamizal joined the City of Sunland
Park and the Sierra Club in a class-action lawsuit against the EPA.
They claim that the EPA violated the Clean Air Act by failing to
list El Paso as a non-attainment area for ozone levels.

Ozone is described as being 'smog', which is a dangerous air
pollutant that contributes to serious health problems.

Represented by David Baake, who is an attorney for the petitioners,
the group hopes to reverse the EPA's decision.  According to Mr.
Baake, pollution monitors located at UTEP, reported unsafe levels
of smog in each of the last three years. Mr. Baake's plan is to
require El Paso to adopt new technologies to reduce emissions, and
improve health outcomes for El Paso residents.

Sunland Park, which neighbors El Paso, has been designated as
non-attainment or unsafe.  Javier Perea, The Mayor of Sunland Park
is confused by the designations saying he does not understand how
his city is deemed unsafe while El Paso is deemed safe when all the
residents share the same air.  He feels it is unfair to his city.


Hilda Villegas, a member of Familias Unidas de Chamizal said,
"According to the Clean Air Act, the EPA is obligated to designate
a city as being a non-attainment area if that city is a major
contributor to an area that is classified as a non-attainment area.
Sunland Park has been identified as being a non-attainment area.
Why then is the EPA neglecting its obligation set out by the Clean
Air Act? If the EPA continues to relieve El Paso from its
responsibility, we will never be able to address how pollution is
affecting families in the Chamizal," said Villegas.  She also is
also worried about the health of the children saying, "Our children
greatly suffer because of that pollution, we have children with
asthma, and we also have children who have different diseases and
it only makes it worse.

According o the EPA website, the acceptable amount of Ozone
pollution is 70 parts per billion. The EPA reports El Paso meets
the standard, but the lawsuit claims the numbers have been
doctored.

Mr. Baake, who represents the petitioners said, "looking at the
analysis, what EPA has done looked like it was more politically
motivated than really based on the science."  Mr. Baake claims a
2015 letter from the governor asked the Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality for an exception, which allowed on of the
highest ozone readings to e dropped from the report. Mr. Baake
claims this changed El Paso's status from unsafe to safe.  I
reached out to the TCEQ, but they failed to respond by deadline.

According to the lawsuit, Ciudad Juarez and the City of El Paso
make up 75% of the pollution, so it doesn't make sense to Baake or
Mayor Perea that Sunland Park's air quality is rated as unsafe and
El Paso's isn't.  Mr. Baake saying, "Immediately as someone who
lives in this area, it made no sense to me, because obviously we
share the same air." Mayor Parea agreed saying "There is no
difference in the air between the two area's here. Studies have
shown that a major part of the pollution is coming from El Paso and
Juarez so to have different designations is unfair to us and our
community."

We went to the city for their thoughts on the lawsuits claims that
El Paso should take responsibility. Karl Rimkus, Environmental
Compliance Manager, told us that the City of El Paso is not
responsible for the designations, and that El Paso does everything
that is required of them by law.  He said "Pollution in one
jurisdiction can often affect other's as well because as the wind
blows everyone is affected by it." He said, " Currently El Paso is
in attainment status for ozone, so that's pretty much the role the
city plays, we don't have any direct regulatory control over
whether we're in attainment or not in attainment."  

Mr. Rimkus Karl told ABC 7 that the city only collects air quality
data and reports it to the state, who then delivers it to the EPA
for analysis.

ABC 7 reached out to the EPA for their response to the lawsuit, and
they failed to respond by deadline.

Mr. Baake said the lawsuit could take over a year to resolve. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Fed. Cir. Narrows Claims in Suit Over USSS OT Pay
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Timothy B. Dyk of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Federal
Claims' dismissal of the case, MICHAEL HORVATH, INDIVIDUALLY, AND
ON BEHALF OF THE CLASSES OF FEDERAL SECRET SERVICE AGENTS SIMILARLY
SITUATED TO HIM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 2017-1801 (Fed. Cir.).

Mr. Horvath brought the putative class-action lawsuit in the Claims
Court seeking overtime and related compensation on behalf of
himself and similarly situated special agents of the U.S. Secret
Service.  Among his theories of recovery, Mr. Horvath asserted that
regulations promulgated by the Office of Personnel Management
("OPM") improperly required that certain overtime hours be worked
consecutively in order to trigger compensation.

Mr. Horvath has been employed as a special agent of the Secret
Service since 2010.  As such, he is a law enforcement officer
entitled to certain enhancements to his pay to compensate for his
availability and overtime hours.  

First, Mr. Horvath receives a 25% enhancement to his base salary
under a provision known as Law Enforcement Availability Pay or
"LEAP."  Second, Mr. Horvath is additionally entitled to overtime
compensation for some -- but not all -- of the overtime hours he
works.

However, there is an exception when performing certain duties,
including the protective services performed by the Secret Service.
For that kind of work, employees are compensated for all scheduled
overtime, notwithstanding subsection (d)(1)'s limitations, if the
investigator performs, on that same day, at least two hours of
overtime work not scheduled in advance of the administrative
workweek.  OPM has promulgated regulations substantially restating
this exception but adding one relevant detail: the exception
applies only if the investigator performs on that same day at least
2 consecutive hours of overtime work that are not scheduled in
advance of the administrative workweek and are compensated by
availability pay.

Mr. Horvath filed suit in the Claims Court on June 10, 2016,
claiming that he is entitled to back pay on a variety of theories.
The government moved to dismiss for want of subject-matter
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.  The Claims Court
found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider some of Mr. Horvath's
claims and that others, over which it had jurisdiction, failed to
state a claim.  Mr. Horvath timely appealed.

Judge Dyk agrees that dismissal was proper with respect to three of
Mr. Horvath's four asserted claims.  

First, as the Court has since held in Adams v. United States,
Section 6101 is not money-mandating and cannot support jurisdiction
over a claim against the flexing policy.  Like the employees in
Adams, Mr. Horvath was not entitled to regular pay for hours not
worked on the midweek flex day, nor was he entitled to overtime pay
for the regular hours worked on the rescheduled day.  Second, to
the extent Mr. Horvath was even eligible for compensatory time off,
Section 5543 uses wholly discretionary language and is not
money-mandating.  Third, given the plain language of the statute,
the Claims Court properly found that Mr. Horvath had failed to
state a plausible claim for relief under the 8-2-2 policy.  Mr.
Horvath's resort to the legislative history, which itself is
inconclusive, cannot overcome the clear language of the statute.

As to Mr. Horvath's final claim that OPM's consecutivehours
requirement is contrary to the plain meaning of 5 U.S.C. Section
5542(e), which he argues is triggered by any two hours of
unscheduled overtime, whether consecutive or not, the Judge reviews
Mr. Horvath's challenge to OPM's interpretation of the statute
under the two-step analysis announced in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council.  First, he asks whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue; if so, he
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
If, however, the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, he asks whether the agency's interpretation is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.

The Judge finds that while the text of Section 5542(e) is silent,
the rest of Section 5542 suggests that the consecutive-hours
requirement is not appropriate.  When the statute refers to periods
of hours, it consistently does so in a manner that clearly refers
to a cumulative tally of hours, which are not always consecutive.
Moreover, the consecutive-hours requirement is not consistent with
the history and purpose of the statute.

At oral argument, the government for the first time asserted that
the approach of the OPM regulation serves the statutory purpose of
discouraging overtime abuse.  But the government has identified
nothing in the structure, purpose, or history of the statute that
suggests its purpose is abuse deterrence.  And the government has
offered no logical nexus between abuse and whether overtime hours
are worked consecutively.

At Chevron's step one, using the traditional tools of statutory
construction, the Judge finds that Section 5542(e) unambiguously
applies without regard to whether the two hours of unscheduled
overtime are consecutive.  He therefore needs not reach step two.
With this understanding, he concludes that the Claims Court erred
in dismissing Mr. Horvath's complaint for failure to state a claim
concerning Section 5542(e).

With respect to Mr. Horvath's claim for overtime compensation
denied under OPM's consecutive-hours requirement, Judge Dyk
reverses the Claims Court's dismissal and remanded for further
proceedings.  On remand, the Claims Court should consider whether
class certification is appropriate in the action.  As to the
remaining claims, the Judge affirmed the dismissal.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 20, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/yr8WGk from Leagle.com.

NICHOLAS WIECZOREK , Clark Hill PLLC, Las Vegas, NV, argued for
plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by DAVID JAMES VENDLER --
dvendler@mpplaw.com -- Law Offices of David J. Vendler, San Marino,
CA.

SOSUN BAE -- sosun.bae@usdoj.gov -- Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by CHAD A.
READLER -- chadreadler@gmail -- ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., CLAUDIA
BURKE -- claudia.burke@gov.sk.ca.


UNITED STATES: Mich. Tea Party Groups to Share IRS Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------
Melissa Nann Burke, writing for The Detroit News, reports that four
Michigan tea party groups will share in a $3.5 million class-action
settlement reached with the Internal Revenue Service after five
years of litigation, according to the lead attorney for the
plaintiffs.

A judge signed off on the settlement between the IRS and hundreds
of tea party groups over what the groups said was improper scrutiny
and illegal targeting for political purposes during the
tax-exemption application process.

The IRS has said it made changes so that similar targeting won't
happen in the future.

It's still unclear how much the Michigan groups each would
receive.

The judge must still rule on a motion for reimbursement of
attorneys fee and incentive payments for the five class
representatives, said Edward D. Greim,Esq. attorney for the class
of more than 400 members.

Greim said several Michigan groups were part of the class, and four
of those submitted claims and will be receiving part of the
settlement:

-- Foundation for Michigan Freedom
-- Gadsden Center Inc.
-- Independents for Responsible Government (formerly the
    Independent Tea Party Patriots)
-- ProgressNow

"The settlement shows that when a government agency decides to
target citizens based on their viewpoints, a price will be paid,"
Greim said.

The case arose after a treasury inspector general's audit found in
2013 that groups with "tea party" or "patriot" in their names
received greater scrutiny during consideration of their
applications for tax-exempt status starting in 2010.

The matter blew up into a firestorm on Capitol Hill, prompting
congressional hearings, a Justice Department inquiry and the
resignations of the then-acting commissioner of the IRS Steven T.
Miller and that of Lois Lerner, who had been as director of the IRS
exempt organizations division.

Republicans claimed the administration was weaponizing the IRS for
political gain, while the White House argued the agency ran
independent of political oversight.

The settlement did not resolve certain outstanding issues in the
litigation, such whether to grant a motion to unseal a transcript
of Lerner's deposition and place it in the public record.

The plaintiffs had alleged violations of the the First and Fifth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the statute that protects
the confidentiality of tax-return information.

In announcing the settlement last fall, Attorney General Jeff
Sessions said the First Amendment prohibits the federal government
from treating groups differently based solely on their viewpoint or
ideology.

"The IRS's use of these criteria as a basis for heightened scrutiny
was wrong and should never have occurred," Sessions said in a
statement at the time.

"There is no excuse for this conduct. Hundreds of organizations
were affected by these actions, and they deserve an apology from
the IRS. We hope that today's settlement makes clear that this
abuse of power will not be tolerated."

The Justice Department also settled a separate, related suit but
won't pay damages in that case.[GN]              


UNITED STATES: Teton County to Join PILT Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
KIFI/KIDK reports that the Teton County, Wyoming Board of County
Commissioners has voted to join a Kane County, Utah lawsuit against
the U.S. Department of Interior.

Kane County filed and won a lawsuit claiming the government had
failed its obligation to make Payments in Lieu of Taxes for federal
lands immune from state and local taxes. Formulas used to calculate
the amount of payments were part of the funding statute.

Congress tried to get around the obligation by inserting language
in the 2017 budget bill which stated, "in the event, the sums
appropriated for any fiscal year for payments pursuant to the PILT
Act are less than full payments to all units of local government
then the payment to each local government shall be made
proportionally."   

Kane County filed a second lawsuit. A federal judge ruled in March
2018 that the new language did not relieve the federal government
from paying its full obligation. Kane County won again.

Then, in April, the Judge issued an order certifying the case as a
class action.

In a written statement to the board, County Attorney Keith Gingery
said it appears the federal government is now prepared to make
payments to all those within the class action lawsuit based on the
Kane County case.

The County Treasurer estimated the county's underpayment for 2015,
2016, and 2017 was approximately $50,000. Teton County has to join
the suit and submit its claim by September 14, 2018. [GN]


UNIVERSITY MEDICAL: Court Sanctions Failure to Preserve Discovery
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada adopted
in part and overruled in part the Special Master's Report and
Recommendation and Final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in
the case captioned DANIEL SMALL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNIVERSITY
MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:13-cv-0298-APG-PAL
(D. Nev.).

This case involves a dispute over unpaid wages and overtime
compensation. Three named plaintiffs filed the case individually
and on behalf of all other similarly situated employees of
defendant University Medical Center (UMC). The case was filed as a
collective action pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, (FLSA),
and initially as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the fourth amended
complaint in October 2016. Judge Gordon found that the plaintiffs
plausibly alleged the defendants knew or should have known that UMC
employees were regularly missing meal breaks or having meal breaks
interrupted but were still having 30 minutes deducted from their
time automatically, without compensation. Additionally, Judge
Gordon found the plaintiffs adequately alleged that Espinoza is an
employer within the meaning of the FLSA. Viewing the allegations
and inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and
considering that the definition of an employer is to be given an
expansive interpretation, he found the fourth amended complaint
states a plausible FLSA claim against Mr. Espinoza.

Judge Gordon, therefore, denied the motion to dismiss.

THE SPECIAL MASTER'S ACTIVITIES AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Over the course of approximately five months, Special Master Garrie
conducted at least five in-person, all-day hearings, and 14
telephonic hearings. He obtained at least 20 declarations from
employees and agents of UMC, and various written submissions from
counsel and ESI experts. At the conclusion of his investigation,
Special Master Garrie filed a Report and Recommendation and Final
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. He concluded that "UMC
destroyed evidence by failing to identify, preserve, collect,
process, and search multiple repositories." His findings,
conclusions, and recommendation are summarized below, inter alia:

   A. UMC's preservation efforts were insufficient.

      1. UMC had no policy for issuing litigation holds, and no
such hold was issued for at least the first eight months of this
litigation.

      2. UMC executives were unaware of their preservation duties,
ignoring them altogether, or at best addressing them in a hallway
in passing.

      3. UMC's prior and current counsel failed to conduct timely
custodian interviews. As a result, key custodians and repositories
of ESI were left unidentified, and substantial data was lost,
including:

         a. Shared Q-Drive files containing human resources,
corporate compliance, employee grievance, payroll, and DOL
investigation data.

         b. Laptop and desktop local drive data, with local drives
not being preserved until some 18 months into this litigation.

         c. Intranet server containing policies and procedures
regarding meal breaks and compensation.

THE PARTIES' RESPONSES TO THE SPECIAL MASTER'S R & R

UMC's Objection

UMC filed an Objection to the Special Master's R & R pursuant to
Rule 53. UMC acknowledges that the special master identified ESI
that should have been produced to plaintiffs as admittedly relevant
to the parties' claims and defenses. UMC also acknowledges that
some of the evidence presented to the special master showed that
UMC struggles itself to identify and fulfill its obligations with
respect to determining the relevance of vast amounts of ESI.

Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Objection

The Plaintiffs' Response argues that UMC's objection is rooted in
factually unsupported claims that the special master was biased
and/or failed to discharge his duties. The response asserts that
the special master's R & R is supported by both fact and law.
Plaintiffs ask that the court overrule

UMC's objections in their entirety and adopt the special master's R
& R in its entirety.
Plaintiffs contend the record does not support UMC's claim the
special master was biased and, in fact, shows that he was
courteous, professional, fair, and accommodating to UMC's witnesses
and counsel. Many of UMC's complaints with the record consist of
ministerial citation errors that can be easily corrected and do not
render the R & R unreliable.

UMC's Reply

UMC filed a Reply, which argues that its objections are fully
supported in the record. It accuses plaintiffs of engaging in a
smear campaign against UMC instead of addressing the merits of
their claims. UMC reiterates arguments that it was shocked by the
special master's R & R. Its counsel can only guess what might have
happened to cause the special master to completely retract his ex
parte statements that everything would be fine and reverse his
thinking so dramatically and punitively to impose discovery
sanctions never before seen in Ninth Circuit jurisprudence.

THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Special Master Garrie was Professional, Neutral, Possessed
Specialized Knowledge and Expertise, and Remedied Much of UMC's ESI
Deficiencies

The fact that UMC now purports to be shocked by the special
master's findings and conclusions only reinforces the court's
conclusion that the special master did indeed do his job in a
professional, courteous, and neutral manner. Otherwise, UMC would
not be shocked with his findings and recommendations. The special
master had extraordinary specialized expertise necessary to ask the
right questions of the right personnel at UMC to uncover what
occurred, and what additional sources of ESI had not been
identified. Certainly, if he was as discourteous and biased as UMC
now claims in its objection, UMC would have addressed its concerns
with the court. It did not do so.

UMC Failed to Comply with the Court's Orders to Preserve and
Produce ESI

UMC repeatedly failed to comply with its own requested ESI
production deadlines after the motion to compel was granted, even
after the court granted UMC relief from its asserted burden by
limiting the initial round of ESI productions to five key
custodians and ten key search terms. UMC repeatedly failed to
comply with the ESI protocol drafted by its former counsel.
Additionally, as outlined in great detail in Section II D of this
Order, UMC's current counsel blamed former counsel and their ESI
consultants for the delay in producing responsive ESI. Counsel for
UMC advised the court at the hearing on June 25, 2013, that the
client did not have any real understanding of what MPP had done or
what data had been collected. This representation turned out to be
false.

As the declarations and testimony obtained in special master
proceedings make clear, MPP and its vendor met with UMC's IT staff
to collect relevant ESI and memorialized the collection in an
e-data processing form filled out April 15, 2013. UMC's Network
Security Administrator Dean Schaibley was involved in the initial
data collection in April 2013, and was able to describe his
involvement during special master proceedings. Mr. Schaibley
described exactly what he collected in his Amended Declaration.

Thus, the representation UMC's current counsel made to the court
that the client did not have any real idea of what prior counsel
had done regarding ESI collection was patently false. In the light
most favorable to current counsel, they did not ask the right
questions of the individuals involved in the initial collection.
The people involved in the process MPP, its vendors and
consultants, and the IT personnel at UMC who did the collection of
ESI from 26 custodians were simply not asked until after the
special master was appointed and made the appropriate inquiries.

UMC Had No Preservation Policy or Litigation Hold Policy and Failed
to Timely Implement One

Glen McIntire, UMC's former Director of Risk Management, provided
testimony during special master proceedings. McIntire was not aware
of any formal process within UMC for providing preservation notices
that were not sent directly to his office.  He testified that the
Chief of HR, John Espinoza, or his number two man, Doug Spring,
would have been responsible for the preservation process in labor
employment disputes. McIntire did not remember ever seeing a
litigation hold related to this case. When asked whether he ever
received an email informing him of the obligation to preserve
documents related to this case, Mr. McIntire responded that he may
have received something from Doug Spring in an email he was copied
on; however, it was not sent to him, he was just carbon copied on
it.  

McIntire reviewed Ms. Phillips' declaration and testified that the
procedures she outlined in her declaration were followed while he
was at UMC in August 2012. However, he testified that he had never
seen those policies and procedures in writing. He became aware of
these policies when he first checked in there and was told about
them by Patricia Kennedy.

In short, there is ample support in the record for the special
master's findings that (1) UMC had no policy for issuing litigation
holds to appropriate personnel hospital wide, (2) UMC issued no
litigation hold until April 15, 2103, eight months after the
complaint was filed, and (3) UMC executives were not aware of their
preservation obligations.

UMC Executives Failed to Accept Responsibility for Ensuring that
ESI was Preserved and Failed to Notify Key Custodians and IT Staff
to Preserve, and Prevent Loss, or Destruction of Relevant,
Responsive ESI

In status reports and hearings, the court was repeatedly told that
counsel was working on carefully scheduling a time to download data
from executive mobile devices ordered to be produced. Yet no effort
was made to communicate with IT staff to see that this data was
preserved and data on the devices of Brannman, Espinoza, and
Mumford was deliberately wiped six months after the motion to
compel was granted. Ms. Kisner, UMC's IT Customer Service Manager,
who supervised the communications and PBX staff and handled the
day-to-day customer service issues with the Blackberries was not
told, and did not learn of the need to preserve this data until
January 21, 2014. By then it was too late. The data was wiped on
some unknown date in January 2014 before the devices were scheduled
to be downloaded.

In short, it is crystal clear that UMC executives failed to accept
responsibility for ensuring that discoverable ESI was preserved and
failed to notify key custodians and IT staff to take appropriate
steps to see that discoverable ESI was not lost, destroyed, or
modified. There is ample support in the record that UMC executives
displayed a cavalier attitude about their preservation obligations
addressing them in passing, and that UMC executives repeatedly took
the position in declarations and testimony that responsibility for
preservation was someone else's job. UMC executives' lack of
understanding of the legal duty to preserve and cavalier attitude
towards preservation is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that
the key custodians whose ESI was collected in April and August of
2013, and the key IT personnel who collected their information as
well as IT personnel responsible for seeing data was preserved,
were not notified to preserve information relevant to this case
until after the special master was appointed.

UMC Failed to Disclose the Existence of Relevant ESI Repositories,
Including Multiple Timekeeping Systems and the Q-Drive Until Late
in the Special Master Proceedings

It is undisputed that multiple UMC time tracking databases were not
disclosed until near the end of the special master's hearing
process in August 2014. UMC's explanation for why this was not
disclosed during Mr. Espinoza's testimony and special hearing
testimony was that Espinoza did not use the alternative time
tracking databases and therefore was not familiar with them, and
had no duty to disclose them. This explanation illustrates UMC's
failure to appreciate its legal duties, and supports the finding
that UMC executives repeatedly displayed a cavalier attitude
concerning the legal duty to preserve discoverable information.
Moreover, the explanation is not credible.

UMC concedes in its objection that Mr. Spring, Mr. Espinoza's
number two man and the person responsible for contact with former
and current UMC counsel, approved the CrimeStar and TeleTracking
databases.

It is undisputed that both of these databases were used by opt-in
plaintiffs to report meal breaks. Mr. Gurrola's Declaration
establishes that Spring authorized Public Safety employees to use
CrimeStar to track meal breaks after Spring was advised that UMC's
new policy to track meal breaks, which was implemented after the
DOL investigation, was not working for that department.

Spring not only knew about and approved use of the databases, but
he approved CrimeStar specifically to track meal breaks. Gurrola's
declaration also establishes that UMC received feedback from
employees in November 2012 staff meetings that the new system of
using CrimeStar to track meal breaks was working. The court simply
does not believe that Mr. Spring was not familiar enough with
CrimeStar, which he authorized to keep track of meal breaks, to
understand that this timekeeping system should have been
disclosed.

UMC Modified, Lost, Deleted and/or Destroyed ESI Responsive to
Plaintiffs' Discovery Requests

UMC argues in its' reply that just because these executives used
their computers for work does not mean they contained information
relevant to this lawsuit or plaintiffs' discovery requests.

However, Brannman, Espinoza and Mumford were three of the five key
custodians identified for the first ESI search using the ten agreed
upon search terms. UMC told the court in the September 19, 2013
joint status report and at the September 24, 2013 hearing that the
search for all five custodians using the ten terms resulted
5,000,000 hits and the collection of 70 gigs of raw data, or 2,100
boxes of hard copies UMC had printed out.
These are key players. The only logical conclusion from the vast
amount of data collected by UMC during the first phase ESI
collection using search terms unquestionably relevant to the
parties claims and defenses is that they also had information
relevant to this case on their personal computers and devices.

Key custodians did not even preserve the August 2012 preservation
letters in this case the special master proved they received.
Espinoza and Spring did not preserve the November 2012 preservation
letter prior counsel for UMC, Mr. Wieczorek, attested he forwarded
to them before meeting with Espinoza, Spring and UMC IT personnel
regarding UMC's initial ESI collection in this case. The court has
no difficulty concluding evidence relevant to plaintiffs' discovery
requests that the court compelled UMC to produce was lost from key
custodians' personal computers when these key custodians who were
in charge of this case did not even preserve the preservation
letters they denied receiving, but undeniably received.

The special master correctly found that UMC's failure to preserve
documents on the personal computers of key custodians identified by
the plaintiffs likely resulted in the destruction of ESI responsive
to plaintiffs' discovery requests.

UMC's Failure to Comply with its Legal Duty to Preserve, Failure to
Put in Place a Timely Litigation Hold, Failure to Comply with
Multiple Court Orders to Preserve and Produce Responsive ESI, and
Loss and Destruction of Responsive ESI (1) Necessitated the
Appointment of a Special Master, (2) Caused Substantial Delay of
these Proceedings, and (3) Caused Plaintiffs to Incur

Needless Monetary Expenses

Special master proceedings outlined in this order make it clear
that UMC's own IT personnel, and in particular, Mr. Schaibley had
the knowledge and expertise needed to inform and assist counsel in
the preservation, collection, and production of responsive ESI.
Former counsel consulted and worked with Mr. Schaibley in the
collection of ESI from key custodians, yet no one informed Mr.
Schaibley of the need to preserve until after the special master
was appointed. Moreover, current counsel and their ESI consultants
did not confer with prior counsel and their ESI consultants or even
the UMC personnel involved in the collection.

As a result, current counsel incorrectly represented to the court
and opposing counsel at the July 12, 2013 hearing that the client
didn't really have any real understanding of what the prior firm
did or what the data collection they were involved in with UMC's
own IT personnel entailed.

Current counsel represented that the prior collection was worthless
and as a result they had to start over. However, much, if not most
of the confusion and technical problems could have and should have
been resolved by UMC and its counsel by simply consulting their own
highly specialized and knowledgeable IT staff, and prior counsel.
When finally asked by the special master Mr. Schaibley was able to
explain exactly what was collected and from what sources.

Under the circumstances it would be inequitable to force plaintiffs
to pay for costs and fees that would not have been incurred if UMC
had taken reasonable steps to preserve and produce responsive ESI.

The Special Master Correctly Concluded UMC Repeatedly
Misrepresented the Completeness of its Production of Documents
Produced to DOL; However, UMC Was Not Ordered to Produce Kronos
Payroll Data in Spreadsheet Format.

UMC made additional misrepresentations to the court and opposing
counsel about its ESI capabilities that the special master did not
catch. For example, UMC's counsel told the court at hearings prior
to the special master's appointment that UMC was unable to
de-duplicate its ESI collection. However, the declaration of Craig
Renard of LDG, retained by UMC's prior counsel, indicates that LDG
began unpacking and de-duplicating the ESI it collected on April
19, 2013.   

These de-duplication efforts began just before LDG was terminated.
To the best of Mr. Renard's recollection, he received a call from
an LBBS attorney, UMC's current counsel, informing Renard that LBBS
did not need the data he collected. Because of this conversation
with LBBS, Renard decided to hold onto the UMC ESI data for an
additional 90 days, at which time the data was destroyed.  

As pointed out elsewhere in this order current counsel for UMC also
told the court that the client had no real understanding of what
ESI was collected by prior counsel and their consultants. This
representation was patently false. Mr. Schaibley provided a
declaration that identified precisely what was collected. While
LBBS and upper level UMC executives may not have had a detailed
understanding of what LDG collected at the request of MPP, UMC
personnel involved in the process certainly were. It was LDG who
initially worked with UMC's McKinley, Schaibley, and Connie Sadler
to collect data from the initial 26 custodians. Thus, the court
simply does not accept current counsel for UMC's representations
that "the client" had no real understanding of the ESI collection
efforts made on its behalf by prior counsel and their consultants.

There is no question UMC failed to implement a timely litigation
hold, and failed to communicate its legal preservation duties to
key custodians of discoverable evidence. There is no question that
UMC failed to preserve discoverable ESI. There is no question data
was lost or destroyed as a result. There is no question sanctions
are warranted. UMC concedes they are. The only question is what
sanctions are appropriate and proportional for the violations. The
special master found UMC spoliated ESI responsive to plaintiffs'
discovery requests. The court agrees. The special master
recommended a wide range of dispositive, evidentiary, and monetary
sanctions. Plaintiffs urge the court to adopt his recommendations
in their entirety. UMC urges the court to impose lesser sanctions
in the form of an adverse inference instruction and monetary
sanctions for the increased cost plaintiffs and their consultants
incurred before the special master was appointed.

The court finds the sanctions recommended by the special master are
too harsh, and inconsistent with evolving federal law on spoliation
of ESI. The court finds lesser sanctions are appropriate and
proportional for UMC's multiple violations of its legal duties, and
the court's orders. The court finds UMC should be sanctioned in the
form of an instruction to the jury that the court has found UMC
failed to comply with its legal duty to preserve discoverable
information, failed to comply with its discovery obligations, and
failed to comply with a number of the court's orders.

The instruction will provide that these failures resulted in the
loss or destruction of some ESI relevant to the parties' claims and
defenses and responsive to plaintiffs' discovery requests, and that
the jury may consider these findings with all other evidence in the
case for whatever value it deems appropriate.

The Special Master's Report and Recommendation and Final Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law  is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED in part and
OVERRULED in part consistent with this order. The Special Master's
recommendation of case dispositive sanctions are OVERRULED.

UMC is sanctioned in the form of an instruction to the jury that
the court has found UMC failed to comply with its legal duty to
preserve discoverable information, failed to comply with its
discovery obligations, and failed to comply with a number of the
court's orders. The instruction will provide that these failures
resulted in the loss or destruction of some ESI relevant to the
parties' claims and defenses and responsive to plaintiffs'
discovery requests, and that the jury may consider these findings
with all other evidence in the case for whatever value it deems
appropriate.

Monetary sanctions are also imposed against UMC in the form of
reasonable costs and attorneys' fees unnecessarily incurred by
plaintiffs, including costs incurred for plaintiffs' ESI
consultants in connection with (1) filing the May 2013 motion to
compel; (2) efforts to obtain compliance with the order compelling
UMC to produce information responsive to the discovery requests in
dispute; (3) attempts to identify and remedy UMC's deficient ESI
productions; and (4) cost of participating in special master
proceedings.4. Plaintiffs shall have until August 14, 2018, to file
an application for an award of attorneys' fees in compliance with
the requirements of LR 54-14.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 9, 2018 Order is
available at  https://tinyurl.com/yce78w6s from Leagle.com.

Daniel Small, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony M. Carter --
acarter@tostrudlaw.com -- Tostrud Law Group, P.C., pro hac vice,
Joseph Nathan Mott , Law Offices of Steven J. Parsons, Lionel Z.
Glancy -- lglancy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, pro
hac vice, Raymond B. Walton , pro hac vice, Andrew L. Rempfer , Law
Offices of Steven J. Parsons, Jon A. Tostrud --
jtostrud@tostrudlaw.com -- Tostrud Law Group, P.C., pro hac vice,
Kara M. Wolke -- kwolke@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray
LLP, Kevin F. Ruf -- kruf@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Binkow & Goldberg
LLP, Marc L. Godino -- mgodino@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP, pro hac vice, William M. O'Mara , The O'Mara Law Firm,
PC & David C. OMara , The OMara Law Firm, P.C.

Carolyn Small, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony M. Carter ,
Tostrud Law Group, P.C., pro hac vice, Joseph Nathan Mott , Law
Offices of Steven J. Parsons, Lionel Z. Glancy , Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP, pro hac vice, Raymond B. Walton , pro hac vice, Andrew
L. Rempfer , Law Offices of Steven J. Parsons, Jon A. Tostrud ,
Tostrud Law Group, P.C., pro hac vice, Kara M. Wolke , Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP, Kevin F. Ruf , Glancy Binkow & Goldberg LLP,
Marc L. Godino , Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, pro hac vice & David
C. OMara , The OMara Law Firm, P.C.

University Medical Center of Southern Nevada, Defendant,
represented by Cayla Witty , Nevada Court of Appeals, Danielle
Miller -- Danielle.Miller@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois
Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Robert W. Freeman, Jr. --
Robert.Freeman@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith
LLP & Joseph M. Ortuno, Edward M. Bernstein & Associates.

Clark County, Defendant, represented by Cayla Witty , Nevada Court
of Appeals.

John Espinoza, Defendant, represented by Cayla Witty , Nevada Court
of Appeals, Danielle Miller , Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP &
Robert W. Freeman, Jr. , Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP.


US BANK: Court Won't Stay Royal Park's RMBS Suit
------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied Plaintiffs' Request of Stay in the case captioned ROYAL
PARK INVESTMENTS SA/NV, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
as Trustee, Defendant, No. 14 Civ. 2590 (VM) (RWL)(S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Royal Park Investments SA/NV (Royal Park) requests a stay
of further proceedings in this residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) case.

Royal Park brought this action on behalf of itself and a putative
class of investors in the RMBS held by 21 separate trusts.
Defendant U.S. Bank National Association (U.S. Bank) is the trustee
of those trusts. Royal Park claims that U.S. Bank breached its
contractual and fiduciary obligations by failing to enforce its
rights to require the RMBS issuers to repurchase defective loans
underlying the securities.

Legal Standard

The four factors are (1) whether the stay applicant has made a
strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits (2)
whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay (3)
whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other
parties interested in the proceeding and (4) where the public
interest lies.

To begin, one of Royal Park's two pillars supporting their request
has fallen away, or at least weakened substantially. On May 22,
2018, the Second Circuit issued a mandate denying a nearly
identical Rule 23(f) petition filed by Royal Park in its RMBS case
against trustee HSBC Bank USA N/A.   And on August 7, 2018, the
Second Circuit denied Royal Park's Rule 23(f) petitions in two
additional cases against trustees that are very similar to this
one.

In other words, at this point in time, the Second Circuit has
thrice denied Rule 23(f) petitions in Royal Park investor cases
against RMBS trustees. Although Royal Park's Rule 23(f) petition in
the present case is pending, there is no reason to expect any
different outcome. In short, the pendency of Royal Park's Rule
23(f) petition provides no meaningful support for a stay.

Nor does the pendency of Royal Parks' objections to the Protective
Order warrant a stay. Most notably, Royal Park's likelihood of
success of prevailing on its objections are slim to none. As set
forth in the Protective Order, every court in this district to have
considered the issue to date four district judges and two
magistrate judges  have determined that expert sampling discovery
is not warranted in investor actions against trustees. Each
decision has endorsed the reasoning of the other decisions. Again,
there is no basis to believe that Royal Park's objections in this
case will have a different outcome.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 13, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybhwuots from Leagle.com.

Royal Park Investments SA/NV, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Darryl J.
Alvarado -- dalvarado@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP, Hillary B. Stakem -- hstakem@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph Marco Janoski Gray --
mjanoski@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Lucas F.
Olts -- lolts@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP,
Arthur C. Leahy -- artl@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP, Christopher M. Wood -- cwood@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Juan Carlos Sanchez --
jsanchez@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice, Samuel Howard Rudman  -- SRudman@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Steven W. Pepich -- stevep@rgrdlaw.com
-- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice.

U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee, Defendant, represented
by Michael Stephan Kraut -- michael.kraut@morganlewis.com --
Morgan, Lewis and Bockius LLP, Benjamin Patrick Smith --
benjamin.smith@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP,
Chelsea Walcker -- CWalcker@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan, LLP,
pro hac vice,  David E. Marder -- DMarder@RobinsKaplan.com --
Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, LLP, pro hac vice, Hillel Ira
Parness , Parness Law Firm, PLLC, Joseph Edward Floren --
joseph.floren@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Kevin
M. Papay -- kevin.papay@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
LLP, pro hac vice, Martin Richard Lueck -- MLueck@RobinsKaplan.com
-- Robins Kaplan Miller & Ciresi, Michael Collyard --
MCollyard@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi
L.L.P., Morgia Dampf Holmes , Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi
L.L.P, pro hac vice, Peter Cooper Ihrig , Robins Kaplan Miller &
Ciresi, pro hac vice, Rachael Catherine Chan --
rchan@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, pro hac vice,
Rollin Bernard Chippey -- rchippey@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis
& Bockius LLP, Sherli Furst -- SFurst@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins
Kaplan, LLP, Stacey Paige Slaughter -- SSlaughter@RobinsKaplan.com
-- Robins Kaplan LLP, Tera Marie Heintz --
tera.heintz@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP & Thomas
F. Berndt -- tfberndt@rkmc.com -- Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi
L.L.P., pro hac vice.


US STEEL: Continues to Defend Shareholder Class Suit in W.D. Pa.
----------------------------------------------------------------
United States Steel Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company
continues to defend itself in an amended shareholder class action
suit in the Federal Court in the Western District of Pennsylvania.

On October 2, 2017, an Amended Shareholder Class Action Complaint
was filed in Federal Court in the Western District of Pennsylvania
consolidating previously-filed actions. Separately, four related
shareholder derivative lawsuits were filed in State and Federal
courts in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

The underlying consolidated class action lawsuit alleges that U. S.
Steel, certain current and former officers, an upper level manager
of the Company and the financial underwriters who participated in
the August 2016 secondary public offering violated federal
securities laws in making false statements and/or failing to
discover and disclose material information regarding the financial
condition of the Company.

The lawsuit claims that this conduct caused a prospective class of
plaintiffs to sustain damages during the period from January 27,
2016 to April 25, 2017 as a result of the prospective class
purchasing the Company's common stock at artificially inflated
prices and/or suffering losses when the price of the common stock
dropped.

The derivative lawsuits generally make the same allegations against
the same officers and also allege that certain current and former
members of the Board of Directors failed to exercise appropriate
control and oversight over the Company and were unjustly
compensated. They seek to recover losses that were allegedly
sustained.

The Company is vigorously defending these matters.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report

United States Steel Corporation produces and sells flat-rolled and
tubular steel products primarily in North America and Europe. It
operates through three segments: Flat-Rolled Products
(Flat-Rolled), U. S. Steel Europe (USSE), and Tubular Products
(Tubular). United States Steel Corporation was founded in 1901 and
is headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.


VEECO INSTRUMENTS: Faces Wolther Class Action in California
-----------------------------------------------------------
Veeco Instruments Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company is defending
against a purported class action suit entitled, Wolther v.
Maheshwari et al.

On June 8, 2018, an Ultratech shareholder who received Veeco stock
as part of the consideration for the Ultratech acquisition filed a
purported class action complaint in the Superior Court of the State
of California, County of Santa Clara, captioned Wolther v.
Maheshwari et al., Case No. 18CV329690, on behalf of himself and
others who purchased or acquired shares of Veeco pursuant to the
registration statement and prospectus which Veeco filed with the
SEC in connection with the Ultratech acquisition.

The complaint seeks to recover damages and fees under Sections 11,
12, and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 for, among other things,
alleged false/misleading statements in the registration statement
and prospectus relating to the Ultratech acquisition, relating
primarily to the alleged failure to disclose delays in the advanced
packaging business, increased MOCVD competition in China, and an
intellectual property dispute.

Veeco believes this lawsuit is without merit and intends to
vigorously contest this matter.

Veeco Instruments Inc., together with its subsidiaries, develops,
manufactures, sells, and supports semiconductor process equipment
worldwide. Veeco Instruments Inc. was founded in 1945 and is
headquartered in Plainview, New York.


WELLS FARGO: Averts Class Action Over Alleged Self-Dealing
----------------------------------------------------------
Alex Padalka, writing for Financial Advisor IQ, reports that Wells
Fargo scored a win in the courts when a panel of judges upheld a
previous decision to dismiss a lawsuit accusing the firm of
steering its employees to proprietary products, according to
Law360.com.

The Eighth Circuit upheld a decision reached by a Minnesota federal
judge to throw out the proposed class action brought in 2016 by
John Meiners, which accused Wells Fargo of steering billions of
dollars in its workers' retirement accounts into its own
target-date funds when better options were allegedly available, the
legal news website writes.

Mr. Meiners had argued the company should have put employee savings
into a Vanguard fund instead, according to Law360.com. U.S.
District Judge David Doty dismissed the suit last year, arguing the
Vanguard fund and the Wells Fargo funds used different strategies
and therefore couldn't be compared, the website writes. And in its
decision, the Eighth Circuit panel found that the complaint failed
to demonstrate that the company's 12 funds were inappropriate,
according to Law360.com.

"The fact that one fund with a different investment strategy
ultimately performed better does not establish anything about
whether the Wells Fargo TDFs were an imprudent choice at the
outset," the court wrote on Aug. 3, according to the website.

The panel also said Mr. Meiners failed to demonstrate that Wells
Fargo, by putting employees into its own products, engaged in
self-dealing, Law360.com writes.

The decision clears Wells Fargo of charges that it breached its
fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
the website writes. Wells Fargo says in a statement cited by
Law360.com that it's pleased with the court's decision. Lawyers for
parties involved in the suit didn't respond to the website's
request for comment.

Meanwhile, Citigroup has just settled a $6.9 million lawsuit
accusing the firm of breaching its fiduciary duty in its 401(k)
plan, InvestmentNews writes. First filed in 2007 in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, the suit
claimed Citigroup put its workers' retirement savings into
allegedly expensive and underperforming investments overseen by
Citigroup and its affiliates Smith Barney and Salomon Brothers,
according to the publication.

Citigroup didn't admit wrongdoing as part of the settlement, which
still needs a judge's approval, InvestmentNews writes. The class
action applies to those invested in one of Citigroup's nine
in-house funds from October 2001 to December 2005, according to the
publication. A Citigroup spokesman declined comment to
InvestmentNews. [GN]


WESTERN UNION: Court to Preserve Unclaimed Funds
------------------------------------------------
The Western Union Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the court overseeing the
cases, James P. Tennille v. The Western Union Company and Robert P.
Smet v. The Western Union Company, has entered an order creating a
fund for the remainder of class members' unclaimed funds.

The Company and one of its subsidiaries are defendants in two
purported class action lawsuits: James P. Tennille v. The Western
Union Company and Robert P. Smet v. The Western Union Company, both
of which are pending in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado.

The original complaints asserted claims for violation of various
consumer protection laws, unjust enrichment, conversion and
declaratory relief, based on allegations that the Company waits too
long to inform consumers if their money transfers are not redeemed
by the recipients and that the Company uses the unredeemed funds to
generate income until the funds are escheated to state governments.


During the fourth quarter of 2012, the parties executed a
settlement agreement, which the Court preliminarily approved on
January 3, 2013. On June 25, 2013, the Court entered an order
certifying the class and granting final approval to the settlement.
Under the approved settlement, a substantial amount of the
settlement proceeds, as well as all of the class counsel's fees,
administrative fees and other expenses, would be paid from the
class members' unclaimed money transfer funds.

During the final approval hearing, the Court overruled objections
to the settlement that had been filed by several class members. In
July 2013, two of those class members filed notices of appeal. On
May 1, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision to overrule the
objections filed by the two class members who appealed.

On January 11, 2016, the United States Supreme Court denied
petitions for certiorari that were filed by the two class members
who appealed. On February 1, 2016, pursuant to the settlement
agreement and the Court's June 25, 2013 final approval order,
Western Union deposited the class members' unclaimed money transfer
funds into a class settlement fund, from which class member claims,
administrative fees and class counsel's fees, as well as other
expenses have been paid, with the remainder to go to eligible
jurisdictions to which the unclaimed funds would have escheated in
the absence of a settlement.

On April 3, 2018, the Court entered an order creating a fund for
the remainder of the unclaimed funds, which gives eligible
jurisdictions one year to execute a release to receive their
proportionate share of the fund.

Some jurisdictions may opt not to participate in the settlement,
taking the position that the Company must escheat those
jurisdictions' full share of the settlement fund and that the pro
rata deductions for class counsel's fees, administrative costs, and
other expenses that are required under the settlement agreement are
not permitted. In that event, there is a reasonable possibility a
loss could result up to approximately the pro rata amount of those
fees and other expenses.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

The Western Union Company provides money movement and payment
services worldwide. The company operates in two segments,
Consumer-to-Consumer and Business Solutions. The Western Union
Company was incorporated in 2006 and is headquartered in Englewood,
Colorado.


WILLIAMS COMPANIES: 9th Circuit Appeal Underway
-----------------------------------------------
The Williams Companies, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has granted the plaintiffs' petition
for permission to appeal a court order and the appeal is still
pending.

Direct and indirect purchasers of natural gas in various states
filed individual and class actions against the company, its former
affiliate WPX Energy, Inc. (WPX) and its subsidiaries, and others
alleging the manipulation of published gas price indices and
seeking unspecified amounts of damages. Such actions were
transferred to the Nevada federal district court for consolidation
of discovery and pre-trial issues.

The company had agreed to indemnify WPX and its subsidiaries
related to this matter.

In the individual action, filed by Farmland Industries Inc.
(Farmland), the court issued an order on May 24, 2016, granting one
of the company's co-defendantss motion for summary judgment as to
Farmland's claims. On January 5, 2017, the court extended such
ruling to the company, entering final judgment in itsfavor.
Farmland appealed. On March 27, 2018, the appellate court reversed
the district court's grant of summary judgment, and on April 10,
2018, the defendants filed a petition for rehearing with the
appellate court, which was denied on May 9, 2018. The case has been
remanded to the Nevada federal district court.

In the putative class actions, on March 30, 2017, the court issued
an order denying the plaintiffs' motions for class certification.
On June 13, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit granted the plaintiffs' petition for permission to appeal
the order, and the appeal is now pending.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

The Williams Companies, Inc. operates as an energy infrastructure
company primarily in the United States. It owns and operates
natural gas pipeline system extending from Texas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and the Gulf of Mexico through Alabama, Georgia, South
Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware,
Pennsylvania, and New Jersey to the New York City metropolitan
area. The Williams Companies, Inc. was founded in 1908 and is
headquartered in Tulsa, Oklahoma.


WINDHAM PROFESSIONALS: Time to Respond to Barnes Suit Extended
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order extending Time for Defendant to Respond
to Class Action Complaint in the case captioned TYRONE BARNES,
Plaintiffs, v. WINDHAM PROFESSIONALS, INC., Defendants. Case No.
2:18-CV-01736-WBS-EFB. (E.D. Cal.)

The Court, having reviewed and considered the parties' Stipulation
to Extend Time for Defendant to Respond to Class Action Complaint
(Stipulation), and good cause appearing therefore,

Defendant Windham Professionals, Inc. (Defendant) shall have an
additional thirty (30) days to respond to the Class Action
Complaint of plaintiff Tyrone Barnes. Defendant's response shall
therefore be due September 6, 2018.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 6, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y765zfj5 from Leagle.com.

Tyrone Barnes, Plaintiff, represented by Lawrence Timothy Fisher --
ltfisher@bursor.com -- Bursor and Fisher, PA.

Windham Professionals, Inc., Defendant, represented by Daria
Carlson -- dcarlson@mzclaw.com -- MZFC LLP.


WORKFORCE RESOURCES: Court Allows A. Jamil to File FAC
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, AHMAD JAWAD ABDUL JAMIL, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
WORKFORCE RESOURCES, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-27-JLS
(NLS) (S.D. Cal.), Judge Janis L. Sammartino of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California (i) granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint, and
(ii) denied as moot the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Complaint.

Plaintiffs Ahmad Jawad Abdul Jamil, Ahmad Jamshid Abduh Jamil, and
Ahmad Farhad Abdul Jamil, proceeding individually and on behalf of
others similar situated, filed a Class Action Complaint in superior
court.  The Defendant named in the Complaint is Workforce.  The
Plaintiffs then named Bristol Bay Native Corp. as a Defendant in
place of Doe 1.  The Plaintiffs bring the action seeking recovery
of unpaid wages and penalties under California Business and
Professions Code Section 17200, et. seq., and Labor Code Sections
200, 226, 226.7, 510, 1194, and 1198.

The Plaintiffs worked for the Defendants as cultural
advisor[s]/role players[s] for members of the United States Armed
Forces.  They do not state the exact location where they worked,
only stating that the Defendants' office is located in Oceanside,
California and the Plaintiffs were transported from the office to a
military base.  The Defendants state the military base was Camp
Pendleton and that the Plaintiffs were role players in a simulated
Afghan village within Camp Pendleton boundaries that was built to
assist with training exercises for deploying United States Marines
to Afghanistan.

The Plaintiffs allege the Defendants failed to pay for traveling
time and "off-the-clock" work that took place at the Defendants'
Oceanside office.  They allege they were not compensated for their
travel time from the office to the military base and from their
time commuting from the military base back to the office.

At all relevant times, the Defendant's management would keep
timesheets for the Plaintiffs.  During busy times, the Plaintiffs
would not be able to take their lawful 10-minute rest break or
their 30-minute meal break before the end of their fifth hour.  At
these times, at all relevant times, the Defendant did not pay the
Plaintiffs premium pay for missed meal and/or rest breaks.

The Defendants removed the case to the Court under the federal
enclave doctrine.  They then filed a motion to dismiss, and the
Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand.  Finding Camp Pendleton to be
a federal enclave, and finding that the events pertinent to the
Plaintiffs' claim took place at Camp Pendleton, the Court denied
the Plaintiffs' motion to remand.  The Plaintiffs then filed the
present Motion requesting leave to file an amended complaint.

The Plaintiffs seek to make the following changes to their
complaint: (1) narrow the scope of injury to "off-the-clock" work,
second meal period violations and second and/or third rest period
violations, which occurred away from the federal enclave; and (2)
add a cause of action for Violation of Labor Code Section 2698 et
seq., Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 ("PAGA").  

They say the first change will narrow their claims and they are
only seeking damages and penalties for work done away from the
federal enclave.  They admit they were paid for all time spent on
the federal enclave so it will be disingenuous to allege they are
owed money for the time spent on the enclave.  As to the second
change, the Plaintiffs state the Parties have stipulated to a
tolling of statute of limitations to file a First Amended Complaint
alleging a cause of action for violations of PAGA, and that they
are permitted "as a matter of right" to add a PAGA claim.  The
Defendants object to both proposed changes.

Judge Sammartino finds that the Plaintiffs state they seek to amend
their claims to be only those that occurred away from the federal
enclave, so the Defendants' argument that the claims are barred by
the federal enclave doctrine may be incorrect.  She holds that the
Defendants have not established that the Plaintiffs' amendments are
futile under every set of facts, and finds that the Defendants'
arguments on the merits of the Plaintiffs' proposed amendment are
better addressed on a motion to dismiss.

Without deciding the merits of each argument, the Judge also finds
that the Defendants have not demonstrated that the Plaintiffs'
proposed amendments are futile under every set of facts.  Thus, she
finds it appropriate to grant leave to amend.

For these reasons, Judge Sammartino granted the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Leave to File First Amended Complaint.  The Plaintiffs will
file their amended complaint within seven days of the electronic
docketing of the Order.  Accordingly, the Judge denied as moot the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 20, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/uyaVop from Leagle.com.

Ahmad Jawad Abdul Jamil, Ahmad Jamshid Abdul Jamil & Ahmad Farhad
Abdul Jamil, individually and on behalf of all employees similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Treana L. Allen --
info@mahoney-law.net -- Mahoney Law Group, APC.

Workforce Resources, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company &
Bristol Bay Native Corporation, Defendants, represented by Amy
Todd-Gher -- atodd-gher@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C &
Matthew B. Riley -- mriley@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C.


XCERRA CORP: Monteverde & Associates Files Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Monteverde & Associates PC on Aug. 7 disclosed that it has filed a
class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, Case No.1:18-cv-11529, on behalf of
shareholders of Xcerra Corporation ("Xcerra" or the "Company")
(NASDAQ:XCRA) who have been harmed by Xcerra's and its board of
directors' alleged violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the Company's
acquisition by Cohu, Inc. ("Cohu") (the "Transaction").

Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, each share of
Xcerra's common stock issued and outstanding will be converted into
the right to receive (i) $9.00 in cash, without interest, and (ii)
0.2109 shares of common stock of Cohu (the "Merger Consideration").
Accordingly, if the Proposed Transaction is consummated, Xcerra
shareholders will only own approximately 28% of Cohu's outstanding
common stock. The complaint alleges that the proxy statement
regarding the Transaction fails to disclose material facts
concerning the Transaction, thereby preventing shareholders from
casting an informed vote for or against the Transaction.
Specifically, the complaint alleges that the proxy statement omits
and/or misrepresents material information concerning, among other
things, certain financial projections related to the Transaction
and the valuation analyses performed by Xcerra's financial advisor
Cowen and Company, LLC.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than 60 days from August 7, 2018.  Any member of the putative
class may move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff through counsel
of their choice, or may choose to do nothing and remain an absent
class member.  If you wish to discuss this action, or have any
questions concerning this notice or your rights or interests,
please contact:

Click here for more information:
https://monteverdelaw.com/case/xcerra-corporation. It is free and
there is no cost or obligation to you.

Monteverde & Associates PC is a national class action securities
and consumer litigation law firm committed that has recovered
millions of dollars and is committed to protecting shareholders and
consumers from corporate wrongdoing.  Monteverde & Associates PC
lawyers have significant experience litigating Mergers &
Acquisitions and Securities Class Actions, whereby they protect
investors by recovering money and remedying corporate misconduct.
Mr. Monteverde, who leads the legal team at the firm, has been
recognized by Super Lawyers as a Rising Star in Securities
Litigation in 2013 and 2017, an award given to less than 2.5% of
attorneys in a particular field.  He has also been selected by
Martindale-Hubbell as a 2017 Top Rated Lawyer. [GN]


XEROX CORP: Appeal in Firefighters Pension Fund Suit Underway
-------------------------------------------------------------
Xerox Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the appeal from a ruling
in the case, Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and Retirement System v.
Xerox Corporation, Ursula M. Burns, Luca Maestri, Kathryn A.
Mikells, Lynn R. Blodgett, Robert K. Zapfel, David H. Bywater and
Mary Scanlon, remains pending.

On October 21, 2016, the Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and
Retirement System ("plaintiff") filed a purported securities class
action complaint against Xerox Corporation, Ursula Burns, Luca
Maestri, Kathryn Mikells, Lynn Blodgett and Robert Zapfel
(collectively, "defendants") in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York on behalf of the plaintiff and
certain purchasers or acquirers of Xerox common stock.

The complaint alleged that defendants made false and misleading
statements, in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, relating to the
operations and prospects of Xerox's Health Enterprise business.
Plaintiff sought, among other things, unspecified monetary damages
and attorneys' fees. Other, similar lawsuits may follow.

On December 28, 2016, the Court entered a stipulated order setting
out a schedule for amendment of the complaint and for defendants'
response to that complaint following the Court's appointment of
lead plaintiff under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.
On February 28, 2017, the Court issued an opinion and order
appointing the Arkansas Public Employees Retirement System
("APERS") as lead plaintiff. On May 1, 2017, APERS filed an amended
complaint, alleging substantially similar claims and seeking
substantially similar relief, but adding David Bywater and Mary
Scanlon as defendants.

On June 30, 2017, defendants moved to dismiss the amended
complaint, and the motions were fully briefed on October 13, 2017.
On March 20, 2018, the Court entered an opinion and order granting
the motions, and on March 23, 2018, the Court entered a judgment of
dismissal and closed the case.

On April 20, 2018, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Xerox will vigorously defend against this matter.

Xerox said "At this time, it is premature to make any conclusion
regarding the probability of incurring material losses in this
litigation. Should developments cause a change in our determination
as to an unfavorable outcome, or result in a final adverse judgment
or settlement, there could be a material adverse effect on our
results of operations, cash flows and financial position in the
period in which such change in determination, judgment, or
settlement occurs."

Xerox Corporation designs, develops, and sells document management
systems and solutions worldwide. It offers managed document
services, including managed print services and multi-channel
communication services, as well as a range of digital solutions,
such as workflow automation services, content management, and
digitization services. Xerox Corporation was founded in 1906 and is
headquartered in Norwalk, Connecticut.


XEROX CORP: Awaits Preliminary Approval of Fuji Merger Suit Accord
------------------------------------------------------------------
Xerox Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the class has not yet
been certified, and preliminary approval has not been granted in
Deason v. Fujifilm Holdings Corp., et al.; Deason v. Xerox Corp.,
et al.; In re Xerox Corporation Consolidated Shareholder
Litigation.

In February 2018, five complaints, including four putative class
actions (which have been consolidated), were filed by Xerox
shareholders in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County
("Court") in connection with the proposed transaction to combine
Xerox and Fuji Xerox ("Fuji Transaction"). All of the complaints
name as defendants Xerox, its directors, and FUJIFILM Holdings
Corporation ("Fujifilm").

The complaint in one of the actions also names as a defendant
Ursula M. Burns, the former Chief Executive Officer of Xerox. The
plaintiffs allege, among other things, that Xerox's directors
breached their fiduciary duties in negotiating, approving, and
purportedly making false and misleading disclosures about the Fuji
Transaction, and that Fujifilm aided and abetted those breaches.

The complaint in one of the actions further alleges that Xerox and
the director defendants engaged in common law fraud by purportedly
failing to disclose information about the joint venture agreements
between Xerox and Fujifilm.

The lawsuits seek injunctive relief preventing the previously
proposed transactions, and/or additional disclosures by Xerox's
directors, unspecified damages from Xerox's directors, costs and
attorneys' fees, as well as other relief.

Another complaint filed by Darwin Deason, a Xerox shareholder,
against Xerox and its directors in the same Court on March 2, 2018
alleged that defendants breached their fiduciary duties by refusing
Mr. Deason's request for a waiver of the deadline for nomination of
a new slate of Xerox directors, and sought to enjoin Xerox and its
directors from enforcing Xerox's advance notice by-laws, thereby
allowing Mr. Deason to proceed with the nominations, as well as
costs, fees, and other relief.

On April 27, 2018, the Court issued decisions and orders granting
plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motions, which (i) enjoin Xerox
from "taking any further action to consummate the change of control
transaction between Xerox and Fuji that was announced on January
31, 2018 pending a final determination of the claims asserted in
the underlying action;" (ii) enjoin Xerox from enforcing its
advance notice bylaw provision requiring shareholders to nominate
directors for election at the 2018 annual shareholder meeting by
December 11, 2017; and (iii) require Xerox to waive such advance
notice bylaw provision to permit the noticing of a slate of
director nominees for election at the 2018 annual shareholder
meeting, and denying defendants' motions to dismiss.

On May 1, 2018, Xerox entered into a Director Appointment,
Nomination and Settlement Agreement (the "Settlement Agreement")
with Carl Icahn and Darwin Deason, among others, that would have
resolved the pending proxy contest in connection with Xerox's 2018
Annual Meeting of Shareholders, as well as the ongoing litigation
brought by Mr. Deason against Xerox and its directors related to
the Fuji Transaction. The agreement expired by its terms on May 3,
2018 without becoming effective.

On May 7, 2018, defendants filed with the Supreme Court of the
State of New York, Appellate Division, First Judicial Department,
notices of appeal of, and motions to stay pending appeal, the lower
Court's decision and order. Defendants also moved the appellate
court for interim relief ordering that the appeal be heard on an
expedited basis.

At a hearing before the appellate court on May 7, 2018, the
appellate court ruled that the appeals would be heard on an
expedited basis and granted a partial interim stay allowing Xerox
and Fujifilm to take steps to seek regulatory approvals related to
the Fuji Transaction pending a ruling from the appellate court on
defendants' motions to stay pending appeal.

On May 13, 2018, a settlement agreement with respect to the Deason
cases was signed on behalf of plaintiff Deason, the Icahn Group and
related parties, and all defendants except Fujifilm, and a
memorandum of understanding regarding settlement of the putative
class case was signed by all defendants except Fujifilm.

Pursuant to the settlements, the settling defendants withdrew their
appeal and motion to stay in the Deason cases. The settling
defendants also withdrew their motion to stay in the putative class
case. Fujifilm's appeal and motion for a stay of the proceedings in
the first Deason case and the putative class case remain pending
before the Appellate Division.

The Court entered a stipulation of discontinuance as to the
settling parties in the second Deason case on May 14, 2018, and
agreed on June 22, 2018 to do the same in the first Deason case.

On June 14, 2018, Fujifilm filed answers in the first Deason case
and the putative class case, along with cross-claims against the
members of the Xerox Board (as constituted before May 13, 2018) and
a third-party complaint against Xerox director Jonathan
Christodoro, seeking contribution for any potential award against
Fujifilm for aiding and abetting purported breaches of fiduciary
duties.

On June 19, 2018, the putative class plaintiffs filed a motion for
preliminary approval of a stipulation of settlement that would
resolve the claims asserted by the plaintiffs in the putative class
case against all defendants, other than Fujifilm, Carmen Ribbe, the
plaintiff in a derivative action, and Fujifilm filed oppositions to
the motion on July 10, 2018.

On June 22, 2018, the Court entered an order denying a joint motion
by the putative class plaintiffs and the settling defendants to
dissolve the injunction in the class case as against the settling
defendants, and entered an order denying Fujifilm's motion to
dissolve the injunctions in the class case and the first Deason
case in their entirety. The class has not yet been certified, and
preliminary approval has not been granted.

Xerox will vigorously defend these lawsuits to the extent that the
proceedings continue as to Xerox.

Xerox said, "At this time, however, it is premature to make any
conclusion regarding the probability of incurring material losses
in these lawsuits. Should developments cause a change in our
determination as to an unfavorable outcome, or result in a final
adverse judgment or settlement, there could be a material adverse
effect on our results of operations, cash flows and financial
position in the period in which such change in determination,
judgment, or settlement occurs."

Xerox Corporation designs, develops, and sells document management
systems and solutions worldwide. It offers managed document
services, including managed print services and multi-channel
communication services, as well as a range of digital solutions,
such as workflow automation services, content management, and
digitization services. Xerox Corporation was founded in 1906 and is
headquartered in Norwalk, Connecticut.


YALE UNIVERSITY: Mason Sues over Personal Information Data Breach
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JULIE MASON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Yale University, Defendant, Case Number:
3:18-cv-01280 (D. Conn., August 1, 2018) is an action against for
negligence against the Defendant for failing to disclose the data
breach in an accurate and timely manner.

According to the complaint, on July 26 and 27, 2018, the Defendant
mailed letters informing individuals that, approximately one decade
ago, their personal information, including names, Social Security
numbers, and, in nearly all cases, dates of birth, had been
accessed and extracted during a breach of its databases. In many
cases, e-mail addresses and, in some cases, physical addresses were
also extracted. The Defendant discovered this data breach in June
2018 – one decade too late for any of the victims to do anything
to protect themselves from the violation of their private, personal
information.

Yale University is a higher educational institution that offers
undergraduate, graduate, and postdoctoral courses in the fields of
biological sciences, engineering, health and medicine, humanities,
and physical and social sciences. The institution was formerly
known as Yale College and changed its name to Yale University on
May 25, 1887. Yale University was founded in 1701 and is based in
New Haven, Connecticut. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James J. Reardon, Jr.
          REARDON SCANLON LLP
          45 South Main Street, 3rd Floor
          West Hartford, CT 06107
          Telephone: (860) 955-9455
          Facsimile: (860) 920-5242
          Email: james.reardon@reardonscanlon.com

               - and -

          Scott A. Bursor, Esq.
          Philip L. Fraietta, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          888 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (646) 837-7150
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          Email: scott@bursor.com
                 pfraietta@bursor.com


ZION OIL: Oct. 9 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
--------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, reminds
purchasers of the securities of Zion Oil & Gas, Inc. (NASDAQ:ZN)
from March 12, 2018 through July 10, 2018, inclusive (the "Class
Period") of the important October 9, 2018 lead plaintiff deadline
in the class action. The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Zion
investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Zion class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1391.html or call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants during the Class Period made
materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) Zion was either already or was likely to soon
become the subject of an SEC investigation; and (2) as a result,
Zion's public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times. When the true details entered the market, the
lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than October 9,
2018. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1391.html or to discuss your
rights or interests regarding this class action, please contact
Phillip Kim, Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll
free at 866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
zhalper@rosenlegal.com.

Follow us for updates on LinkedIn:
https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-rosen-law-firm or on Twitter:
https://twitter.com/rosen—firm.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Attorney Advertising. Prior results do
not guarantee a similar outcome.

View source version on
businesswire.com:https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180817005410/en/

         Laurence Rosen, Esq.
         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         Zachary Halper, Esq.
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34thFloor
         New York, NY 10016
         Telephone: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Website: www.rosenlegal.com
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                zhalper@rosenlegal.com [GN]


ZION OIL: Wolf Haldenstein Files Securities Class Action Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP announces that a federal
securities class action lawsuit has been filed in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas on behalf of
investors that purchased or otherwise acquired securities of Zion
Oil & Gas, Inc. ("Zion" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: ZN) between
March 12, 2018, and July 10, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period").

Investors who have incurred losses in the shares of Zion Oil & Gas,
Inc. are urged to contact the firm immediately at
classmember@whafh.com or (800) 575-0735 or (212) 545-4774. You may
obtain additional information concerning the action on our website,
www.whafh.com.

If you have incurred losses in the shares of Zion Oil & Gas, Inc.,
you may, no later than October 9, 2018, request that the Court
appoint you lead plaintiff of the proposed class. Please contact
Wolf Haldenstein to learn more about your rights as an investor in
Zion Oil & Gas, Inc.

The filed Complaint alleges that Defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that:

   -- Zion was either already or was likely to soon become the
subject of a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
investigation; and

   -- as a result, Zion's public statements were materially false
and misleading at all relevant times.

On July 11, 2018, Zion disclosed that the Company had received a
subpoena to produce documents from the Fort Worth office of the
SEC, informing Zion of the existence of a non-public, fact-finding
inquiry into the Company. On this news, Zion's share price fell
$0.44 per share, or 11%, to close at $3.56 per share on July 12,
2018.

Subsequently, on the evening of August 16, 2018, after the close of
trading, the Company announced that its Megiddo-Jezreel #1 well in
Israel is not commercially successful. Intraday, the stock was
trading down over 25%, trading at $1.85 per share. This
announcement clearly shocked the market since on February 13, 2018,
the Company announced that they found "clear evidence" of oil and
gas in the deeper portion of the well. On that day, the stock
closed at $4.30, up $2.00.

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions regarding
your rights and interests in this case, please immediately contact
Wolf Haldenstein by telephone at (800) 575-0735, via e-mail at
classmember@whafh.com, or visit our website at www.whafh.com.

         Gregory Stone
         Director of Case and Financial Analysis
         Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP
         Telephone: (800) 575-0735
                    (212) 545-4774
         Email: gstone@whafh.com   
                classmember@whafh.com [GN]


[*] Bond Schoeneck Attorney Discusses Class Action Waivers
----------------------------------------------------------
Howard Miller, Esq., of Bond Schoeneck & King, in an article for
libn.com, reported that in his seminal and gut-wrenching novel The
Jungle, Upton Sinclair characterizes corporate power-brokers with
clarity of vision:

"The whole of society is in their grip, the whole labor of the
world lies at their mercy -- and like fierce wolves they rend and
destroy, like ravening vultures they devour and tear!"

That novel, thankfully, sparked a wide array of reforms and
laudable laws. But, fast forwarding more than 100 years later and,
from management's perspective, the balance of power in labor
relations has tipped decidedly in employees' favor, at least in
some areas. Take, for example, profligate wage and hour class
action lawsuits. At its most basic level, the class action concept
is straightforward and salutary in purpose. A group of low-wage
workers are not being paid statutory overtime due to either
negligence or design on the part of their employer. An individual
worker may not be able to fund a lawsuit against an employer and an
individual attorney may not think it worth his or her time to take
on a case that may net only a few hundred or few thousand dollars.


But, a large group of employees can band together as a "class" to
obtain recompense for themselves, not to mention a proverbial
mountain of gold for plaintiffs' counsel. The class action vehicle,
consequently, does not just give David a slingshot, but a fully
loaded bazooka. To be sure, class actions have righted many wrongs,
but they have also coerced massive settlements from innocent
employers. For example, a single plaintiff with only $500 in
potential damages can force a multimillion-dollar settlement when
there is little to no merit to the claim because the cost of
defending a class action is inordinate and the potential liability
prohibitive. As stated by Justice Ginsberg in a 2010 dissenting
opinion: "A court's decision to certify a class accordingly places
pressure on the defendant to settle even unmeritorious claims . . .
When representative plaintiffs seek statutory damages, pressure to
settle may be heightened because a class action poses the risk of
massive liability unmoored to actual injury."

It is against these competing interests that in 2018, a sharply
divided Supreme Court in Epiq Systems v. Lewis upheld an employer's
use of class action waivers in arbitration agreements. The court
noted that while the policy implications of its holding were open
to debate, there was no doubt that the Federal Arbitration Act
permits employers to make individual arbitration of wage and hour
claims mandatory.

The dissent in Epiq and in editorial pages from prominent
newspapers view the decision as a giant step backwards that divests
employees of a necessary tool to vindicate their rights. Under this
line of reasoning, once management has an arbitration agreement in
hand it will have little incentive to comply with the wage and hour
laws, a view given short shrift by the majority. But this view was
given short shrift by the majority, which stated, "But like most
apocalyptic warnings, this one proves a false alarm."

So, what does it all mean? Yes, employers should use class action
waivers. But these waivers are not likely to be viewed by
management as a proverbial get-out-of-jail-free card. The same
lawyers who would be inclined to file a class action lawsuit may
still be inclined to use the coercive power of filing dozens if not
up to thousands of individual arbitrations to leverage a
settlement. The difference, though, is that these lawyers cannot
rely on the so-called "notice" rules of finding additional
plaintiffs, but instead must have the plaintiffs in-hand at the
time of demanding arbitration. Further, notwithstanding waivers,
employees retain their rights to file claims with the Department of
Labor, and I've yet to meet an employer that welcomes a
governmental wage and hour audit.

Epiq strictly enforces the letter and policy of the Federal
Arbitration Act. Its result is not a panacea or a curse for either
side, though it may temper frivolous claims. At this juncture, any
further policy debate seeking to recalibrate the balance of power
in employee relations will need to play out in the Legislative
branch. [GN]


[*] SEC Best Interest Proposal May Open Back Door for Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------------
Benefits Pro reports that the Securities and Exchange Commission's
proposed Regulation Best Interest, designed to rein in
broker-dealers' conflicts to retail investors, does not include
specific language that would make it easier for investors to bring
class-action lawsuits for breach of contract.

But the lengthy preamble to the actual regulation includes what one
prominent securities attorney calls "a more prescriptive approach"
to mitigating or eliminating conflicts that tracks closely with
language in the Labor Department's fiduciary rule.

Language in the preamble "could be relied on by a court" if brokers
don't apply specific recommendations to avoid conflicts, writes
Kent Mason -- kamason@davis-harman.com -- a partner with Davis &
Harmon, in a comment letter to the SEC.

The Labor Department's fiduciary rule, which was vacated by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in March, included a
so-called private right of action that gave investors in IRAs the
ability to bring class-action lawsuits against investment providers
and broker-dealers.

In several lawsuits brought against the Labor Department's rule,
courts were split over whether Labor actually created a new private
right of action, which only Congress can do, or if the rule merely
expanded an existing private right of action created by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The 5th Circuit ultimately
ruled Labor did create a new private right of action, which in part
justified its decision to vacate the controversial rule.

While the Obama-era Labor Department made no bones over its
intention for the private right of action provision to enforce the
fiduciary rule, the SEC "very appropriately" is not trying to
create a private right of action with Reg BI, writes Mason.

Language in the regulation itself applies a principles-based
approach to addressing, disclosing, mitigating, and eliminating
conflicts, with which Mason agrees. His lobbying clients have
included Vanguard, TIAA, Voya, the American Benefits Council, and
LPL Financial, according to opensecrets.org.

But in the preamble, regulators get specific. Broker-dealers
"generally should consider" a list of practices to assure they are
in compliance with Reg BI, the preamble says.

Levelizing compensation of proprietary products, eliminating
compensation incentives among comparable product lines,
implementing new supervisory procedures for rollovers, and avoiding
sales contests and bonuses based on the accumulation of assets
under management are among the practices that made the list.

The preamble language borrows from Labor's fiduciary rule "in
strongly pushing broker-dealers toward a regime where any
differential in representative pay must be based on a neutral
factor test," says Mr. Mason.

While the SEC is not mandating restrictions on compensation in the
preamble, firms may be compelled to do so in order to comply with
Reg BI.

Doing so could lead to broker-dealers choosing to mitigate risk by
eliminating services to small account holders and restricting
access to some products, like variable annuities -- two negative
consequences of Labor's fiduciary rule, argues Mason.

"The practices described as possibly in need of elimination seem
almost arbitrary," writes Mason. "What is concerning about
incentives based on assets under management? Isn't that simply an
incentive to advise well and grow customer assets and recruit
additional customers based on such good results?"

Mr. Mason claims the SEC fails to give guidance on which conflicts
can be mitigated, and which must be eliminated. "A set of
prescriptive rules without a logical framework underlying them is
very hard to comply with," he says.

Agreement from one Commissioner
"Regulating critical issues in the preamble is not consistent with
a sound regulatory structure," Mr. Mason says in his comment
letter.

At least one SEC Commissioner is in agreement.

In a recent address to attendees at a National Association of Plan
Advisors forum, Commissioner Hester Peirce, a Republican first
nominated by President Obama and later by President Trump,
referenced Mason's comment letter and the risk of applying
perceived regulatory prescriptions outside the actual language of a
regulation.

"Obligations should be imposed through the rule text, not through
language in the rulemaking release," said Commissioner Peirce.
"Especially in an area like this in which investors and registered
representatives need to know what the rules are, a lengthy
rulemaking release that supplements the rule text can breed
confusion."

Mr. Mason is suggesting the SEC eliminate all of the prescriptive
examples in the preamble to the Reg BI proposal, and replace them
with a statement of principles in line with those laid out in the
actual rule.

"The DOL introduced a demonstrably counterproductive approach based
on rigid mechanical rules that were not workable," says Mason. "We
urge the Commission to reject that approach and apply a
principles-based approach that is much more workable and is
espoused specifically in parts of the preamble."

He is also requesting the SEC clarify that broker-dealers can
disclaim liability for the new rules in client contracts, so as to
avoid the unintended creation of a new private right of action.

"Any broker's customer contract should be permitted to contain
disclaimers stating that the new Commission rules are not part of
the broker's contractual obligation," writes Mr. Mason. [GN]



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