CAR_Public/180911.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, September 11, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 182

                            Headlines

149 STREET FOOD: Fails to Pay Overtime Under FLSA, Rodriguez Says
ACCOUNTS SERVICES: Violates Fair Debt Collection Act, Lopez Says
AGRO CHEMICAL: Faces Garcia Class Suit in Calif. Superior Court
AIR EVAC: 8th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Ferrell's ATDPA Suit
ALINES AMERICAN: Moderno Labor Suit Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay

AMBIT ENERGY: Court Grants Final Approval of $9.3MM Settlement
AMBIT NORTHEAST: $1.45MM Class Settlement Has Final Approval
AMERICA HONDA: Bovgirya's TCCWNA Suit Remanded to State Court
AMICI 519: Court Denies Bid to Partially Dismiss Uraga's FLSA Suit
AP PREFERRED: Marmier-Romeo Action Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay

APPLE INC: Seeks Dismissal of Class Action Over Cracked Watches
AT&T MOBILITY: Judge Certifies Customers Class in Roaming Fees Suit
BANK OF AMERICA: Nov. 8 ISDAfix Settlement Approval Hearing Set
BANK OF AMERICA: Pastor Class Settlement Has Prelim Approval
BAYER: Women in Australia to Join Class Action Over Essure

BEST BUY: Court Denies Class Certification on Harris's Wage Suit
BRAMBLES: Faces 2nd Class Action Over Share Price Plunge
BRIGHTSTAR GROUP: Diaz Suit Asserts ADA Violation
BROOKLYN GASTROENTEROLOGY: Picon Suit Asserts ADA Violation
CARDINAL INNOVATIONS: Settles Class Action Over Unpaid OT Wages

CENTERPOINTE LENDING: Milosch Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
CENTRAL MAINE: Faces Class Action Over Alleged Fraud
CHECK-6 INC: Faces Goodly Suit in East. Dist. Louisiana
CHICAGO: Police Keeps Discriminatory Database, Says Suit
CHICKPEA AT 14TH: Pacheco Suit Seeks Civil Damages

CINEMARK USA: Court Certifies Class in Overtime Rates Suit
COGNIZANT TECHNOLOGY: Robbins Arroyo Probes Securities Claims
COMMONWEALTH FINANCIAL: Sellers Sue Over  FDCPA Violations
CREDIT PROTECTION: Accused by Friedman Suit of Violating FDCPA
CVS PHARMACY: Averts Class Action over Flu Shot Text Messages

CVS PHARMACY: Court Won't Certify Pharmacy Technicians' Class
DESERT DE ORO: Gauntt Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages Under FLSA
DIVERSIFIED CONSULTANTS: Weiss Files FDCPA Breach Suit in N.Y.
DIVINE AND SERVICE: Nicolaides Sues Over FDCPA Violations
EATON CORP: Court Dismisses 2nd Amended Securities Suit

ESTES FORWARDING: Faces Kirkland Suit in Calif. Superior Court
EXXON MOBIL: Bid to Dismiss Climate-Change Accounting Case Tossed
EZCORP INC: J. Rooney Can File TAC in Securities Suit
FBCS INC: Violates Fair Debt Collection Act, Sellers Suit Says
FIRSTMARK SERVICES: Can't Compel Arbitration in Goden's Suit

FORD MOTOR: Kessler Topaz Files Class Action Over Water Pumps
FOUNDATION MEDICINE: Bid to Drop Mahoney Class Suit Still Ongoing
GENERAL MOTORS: Faces Class Action Over Air Conditioning Problems
GOLDEN GATE: Blumenthal Nordrehaug Files Class Action
GOLDMAN SACHS: Shareholders Can Pursue Class Action Over CDOs

GUARDIAN PROTECTION: 3rd Cir. Remands UTPCPL Class Suit
HAWAII: Fullum Files Suit vs. Department of Education
HUDSON FURNITURE: Picon Files Suit Asserting ADA Violation
HUDSON THEATRE: Violates Disabilities Act, Castillo Suit Claims
IMC CREDIT SERVICES: Sheets Suit Disputes Collection Letter

INGLOT USA: Diaz Files Suit in N.Y. Over ADA Breach
INTERIM HEALTHCARE: Faces Diaz Suit Asserting ADA Violation  
IRVING LANGER: Court Denies Partial Dismissal of Contrera's Suit
KING COUNTY, WA: Court Flips Dismissal of Tenants' Suit
KNORR-BREMSE AG: Lonergan Files Antitrust Class Suit in Maryland

KROGER CO: Violates Disabilities Act, Diaz Class Suit Alleges
LIBERTY TRANSPORTATION: Dismissal of Truck Drivers' Suit Suggested
LM FUNDING: Court OKs Revised Solaris Class Action Settlement
LONDON GOLD: UBS Dropped as Defendant in Gold Fixing Suit
LONDON SILVER: Non-Fixing Banks Dismissed From Antitrust Suit

LYRIC THEATRE: Faces Castillo ADA Suit in S.D.N.Y.
MAIDS INTERNATIONAL: Faces Diaz ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MANHATTAN MUSIC: Violates Disabilities Act, Reyes Suit Alleges
MERCURY EAST: Castillo Suit Asserts ADA Violation
MICHAEL KORS: Wage Class Action Heading to Individual Arbitration

MIDCAP FINANCIAL: Garcia Class of Drivers Conditionally Certified
MINNESOTA: Minnesota Supreme Ct. Flips Cruz-Guzman Suit Dismissal
MONTEREY FINANCIAL: Can Compel Arbitration in Garrett's FDCPA Suit
NATIONAL GAS: Court Dismisses Johansen's TCPA Suit
NAVIENT SOLUTIONS: Can't Compel Arbitration in Homaidan's Suit

NEW HORIZON'S: Kurdinat Files FLSA Suit Over Unpaid Wages
NIKE INC: Faces Class Action Over Toxic Workplace Behavior
ONE ON ONE: Violates Disabilities Act, Diaz Class Suit Claims
OPEN DOOR: Court Orders Supplemental Brief in Conde's FLSA Suit
OPUS BANK: Cal. App. Affirms Judgment in Flores's Suit

PERRIGO CO: Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Suit Granted in Part
PIPEFITTERS ASSOC: Summ. Judgment Bid in Porter Suit Partly OK'd
PLS CHECK: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of P. Rangel's FLSA Suit
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY:  Benchemhoun Files Suit Over FDCPA Violation
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Tucker Suit Alleges FDCPA Breach

REMINGTON ARMS: 8th Cir. Affirms Final OK of Deal in Pollard's Suit
RIPPLE LABS: Plaintiff's Bid to Keep Class Action in Calif. Nixed
SOLOW BUILDINGS: Faces Fischler ADA Suit in New York
SOUTH PARK: Davis Suit Seeks to Recover Lost Wages
SOUTHWEST CREDIT: Faces Cirruzzo Suit Alleging FDCPA Violations

SPEAR CENTER: Sued by Diaz in N.Y. for Violating Disabilities Act
ST. JUDE MEDICAL: Stikeman Elliott Attorneys Discuss Court Ruling
SUNRUN INC: Agreement in Principle Reached in Fink Suit
SUNRUN INC: Agreement in Principle Reached in State Court Suit
SUNRUN INC: Bid for Initial Approval of Slovin Accord Underway

TDS TELECOM: Faces Tucker Suit in N. Dist. Georgia
TESLA INC: Faces 3rd Class Action Over Elon Musk's Stock Tweets
TESLA INC: Oct. 9 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
TIGER BRANDS: Two Listeriosis Class Actions Combined Into One
TLC RESORTS: Court Compels Arbitration in Augustine's TCPA Suit

TRAK-1 TECHNOLOGY: Wright Files Suit in S.C. Over FCRA Violation
TROPICAL CHINESE: Jianbo Sues Over Unpaid Min., Overtime Wages
ULTHERA INC: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Tryan's CLRA Suit
UNITED PARCEL: Court Approves Hoffman-Na Roche Notice in FLSA Suit
UNITED STATES: Judge Certifies Class of Cambodian Refugees

UNITED STATES: Lewis and Clark County Joins PILT Class Action
UNITYPOINT HEALTH: Class Action Amended to Cover Second Breach
US BANCORP: Faces Moret Suit FLSA Suit in Calif.
US XPRESS: Court Partly Grants Bid to Dismiss Morgan's TCPA Suit
VITALE'S III: Nyitray Files Suit Over Unpaid Wages

VUZIX CORP: Faces Two Purported Class Suits in New York
WAL-MART STORES: Court Narrows Claims in Pita Chips Suit
WASHINGTON: Denial of Class Certification in Suit vs. DRS Flipped
WEXLER DERMATOLOGY: Violates Disabilities Act, Picon Suit Says
WILLIAMS & FUDGE: Violates Fair Debt Collection Act, Joseph Says

YELP INC: Continues to Defend California Class Action
[*] JND Legal Administration Acquires Lien Resolution Group

                            *********

149 STREET FOOD: Fails to Pay Overtime Under FLSA, Rodriguez Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against 149 Street Food
Corp., et al.  The case is captioned as Anthony Rodriguez, on
behalf of himself, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly-situated v. 149 Street Food Corp. d/b/a Fine Fare
Supermarket; 675 Morris Ave Food Corp. d/b/a Fine Fare Supermarket;
Franklin Pimentel, individually; Daisy Pimentel, individually; and
Rigo Delgado, individually, Case No. 1:18-cv-07933 (S.D.N.Y.,
August 30, 2018).

The Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
resulting from denial of overtime compensation.

149 Street Food Corp. is a business based at 459 East 149th Street,
in Bronx, New York.  The Company does business as Fine Fare
Supermarket, a retail food store.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Michael John Borrelli, Esq.
   Law Offices Of Borrelli & Associates
   655 Third Avenue, Suite 1821
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: 212-679-5000
   Fax: 212-679-5005
   E-mail: mjb@employmentlawyernewyork.com  


ACCOUNTS SERVICES: Violates Fair Debt Collection Act, Lopez Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Accounts Services
Collections, Inc.  The case is captioned as Welquis R. Lopez,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Accounts Services Collections, Inc., Case No. 1:18-cv-00744 (W.D.
Tex., August 30, 2018).

The Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Accounts Services Collections, Inc., is a debt collection agency in
San Antonio, Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
          SANDERS LAW, PLLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 203-7600
          Facsimile: (516) 281-7601
          E-mail: csanders@sanderslawpllc.com


AGRO CHEMICAL: Faces Garcia Class Suit in Calif. Superior Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Agro Chemical, Inc.
The case is captioned as JAIME GARCIA, ON BEHALF OF OTHER MEMBERS
OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC SIMILARLY SITUATED v. AGRO CHEMICAL, INC., A
CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, Case No. BCV-18-102162 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Kern Cty., August 30, 2018).

The lawsuit arises from employment-related issues.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas Han, Esq.
          JUSTICE LAW CORPORATION
          411 N Central Ave., Suite 500
          Glendale, CA 91203-2095
          Telephone: (818) 230-7502
          Facsimile: (818) 230-7259
          E-mail: dhan@justicelawcorp.com


AIR EVAC: 8th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Ferrell's ATDPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, affirmed the
District Court judgment granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
case captioned James W. Ferrell, Individually and as Class
Representative Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Air EVAC EMS, Inc.
Defendant-Appellee. No. 17-2554. (8th Cir.).

The district court dismissed all claims as pre-empted by the
express pre-emption provision in the Airline Deregulation Act
(ADA).

James Ferrell checked into the emergency room at a hospital in
Warren, Arkansas, experiencing chest pain. Staff arranged for Air
EVAC EMS, Inc. (Air EVAC), an air-ambulance operator, to transport
him by helicopter to another hospital forty-one miles away. A few
months after the transport, Air EVAC sent Ferrell a bill for
$30,083.26. His insurer, Arkansas Blue Cross, paid $1000.00,
leaving him owing a balance of $29,083.26.

Ferrell brought this putative class action against Air EVAC
asserting three claims for relief under Arkansas law: (i) a
declaratory judgment that any contract between Air EVAC and class
members is unenforceable because it lacks an essential price term;
(ii) damages under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act for
concealing or omitting disclosure of its price until it completes
air-ambulance transport.

Before Congress enacted the ADA in 1978, the Federal Aviation Act
(FAA) authorized the Civil Aeronautics Board to regulate air
carriers' fares and trade practices; a savings provision preserved
preexisting statutory and common law remedies.

The Supreme Court has interpreted and applied the ADA's pre-emption
provision in three cases. In Morales, commercial airlines sued to
enjoin state attorneys general from enforcing guidelines regulating
airlines' fare advertising. The guidelines required clear and
conspicuous disclosure of the terms on which particular fares were
offered. Analogizing the ADA pre-emption provision to the similarly
worded and deliberately expansive provision in the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, the Court held that state
enforcement actions having a connection with or reference to
airline rates, routes, or services' are pre-empted. The Court
observed: One cannot avoid the conclusion that the advertising
restrictions in] the guidelines relate to airline rates. Beyond the
guidelines' express reference to fares, it is clear as an economic
matter that state restrictions on fare advertising have the
forbidden significant effect upon fares.

In American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995),
participants in American Airlines' frequent flyer program brought a
class action alleging that the airline violated the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and breached
its contract with participants by modifying the program to devalue
mileage credits participants had accumulated. Applying Morales, the
Court held that the ADA pre-empted plaintiffs' claim under the
Illinois consumer fraud statute.

Most recently, in Ginsberg, class action plaintiffs alleged that
Northwest Airlines violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing
when it revoked their membership in its frequent flyer program. 134
S. Ct. at 1426-27. The Court held that the pre-emption of
provisions having the force and effect of law includes common law
rules when they embody, like statutes and regulations, binding
standards of conduct that operate irrespective of any private
agreement.

The Claims at Issue

The district court dismissed Ferrell's three claims, explaining
that they not only relate to an air carrier's prices but are in the
heartland of price. The court concluded that the fairness of
Ferrell's transaction with Air EVAC and the reasonableness of Air
EVAC's price are governed by federal law.

Ferrell seeks a declaration that no express or implied contract
came into effect because there was no mutual assent on the amount
of the price. He rejects the price term set forth in the
Authorization Form that he will pay what Air EVAC charges, because
it does not state the price or provide an objective pricing
mechanism. He argues the First Cause of Action falls within the
pre-emption exception recognized in Wolens because it relies on a
basic principle of contract law there must be a meeting of the
minds on all essential terms for a contract to be enforceable. Air
EVAC responds that the Wolens exception saves only contract-law
rules aimed at discerning and enforcing the parties' bargain. But
Air EVAC acknowledges that courts have recognized that it is proper
to apply ordinary principles of contract law to ascertain whether
there was a binding agreement between the parties.

It is well settled in Arkansas that an indefinite price term or
even no price term does not necessarily render a contract
unenforceable. Although dressed in the language of contracts,
Ferrell's First Cause of Action, as pleaded, asserts that, under
Arkansas law, air-ambulance operators have no enforceable contract
unless they disclose the actual price they will charge before
transporting a patient, or the precise formula that will be used to
determine that price.

This is asserted on a class-wide basis, independent of the
relationship between an air-ambulance operator and a particular
patient. This is not a contract-based claim.

Like the pre-empted fraud claims in the Second Cause of Action,
this claim asserts a price-disclosure rule under Arkansas law that
would apply uniquely and across-the-board to the providers of
air-ambulance services operating as federally regulated air
carriers. The rule would impose a common-law standard of conduct
from which Air EVAC may not free itself. It is therefore a
pre-empted state-imposed obligation.  

For these reasons, we conclude that Ferrell's declaratory judgment
claims, like his fraud claims, are ADA-preempted. A judgment
declaring that Air EVAC has no claim for breach of contract, and no
right to recover for services it actually provided under any
equitable theory, because it did not disclose its pricing term
before providing the services, is clearly preempted under the ADA's
express preemption provision as construed in Morales, Wolens, and
Ginsberg.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Eighth Circuit's August 16, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ydgqtl8q from Leagle.com.

Charles Clifford Gibson, III, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Scott E. Poynter, for Defendant-Appellee.

Alex T. Gray, for Defendant-Appellee.

Jeremy Y. Hutchinson, for Defendant-Appellee.

Lee Douglas Curry, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Charlotte Taylor -- ctaylor@jonesday.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

George Nathan Steel, for Defendant-Appellee.

Joshua L. Fuchs -- jlfuchs@jonesday.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.


ALINES AMERICAN: Moderno Labor Suit Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Kyle Moderno, on behalf himself, and a class consisting of
similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, v. Alines American, Inc. and
Andy Aline, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-03566 (E.D. N.Y., June 19,
2018), seeks to recover overtime compensation for all hours worked
in excess of forty hours per week, unpaid compensation, liquidated
damages and attorneys' fees and costs for violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Laws.

Alines is a used car dealership in Suffolk NY where Moderno worked
as a parking attendant. Moderno claims to have worked, on an
average, 55 hours per work week without being paid overtime for
hours in excess of 40 hours.

Plaintiff are represented by:

     Saul D. Zabell, Esq.
     ZABELL & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
     1 Corporate Drive, Suite 103
     Bohemia, NY 11716
     Tel: (631) 589-7242
     Fax: (631) 563-7475
     Email: SZabell@laborlawsny.com


AMBIT ENERGY: Court Grants Final Approval of $9.3MM Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case captioned AMY
SILVIS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, v.
AMBIT ENERGY L.P, et al. Civil Action No. 14-5005. (E.D. Pa.).

Silvis switched from her local energy provider to Ambit Energy
after being enticed with attractive rates. Silvis contends that
Ambit Energy solicited customers throughout Pennsylvania and in
other states with teaser rates. After a short while, Ambit Energy
would replace the teaser rate with a variable rate that it asserted
would be based on energy and capacity markets, plus all applicable
taxes. Silvis initiated this action on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, against Ambit Energy and its associated
entities alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

The Proposed Settlement Terms

The parties estimate that the potential aggregated pay out for 100%
claims participation would be $9,300,000. Notice and claims
administration costs were paid by Ambit Energy. Ambit also agreed
to separately pay Silvis' service award of up to $5,000 and
attorney's fees and costs of up to $1,450,000. In exchange for the
benefits provided by the settlement, the class members agreed to
release all claims that they alleged or could have alleged in the
action.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), the settlement of a
class action requires court approval. A district court may approve
a settlement agreement only after a hearing and on finding that it
is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Whether the Proposed Settlement Is Fair and Reasonable

In Girsh, 521 F.2d at 156, the Third Circuit identified nine
factors to be considered when determining the fairness of a
proposed settlement: (1) the complexity, expense, and likely
duration of the litigation;(2) the reaction of the class to the
settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of
discovery completed; (4) the risks of establishing liability; (5)
the risks of establishing damages; (6) the risks of maintaining the
class action through trial; (7) the ability of the defendants to
withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of
the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; and (9)
the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible
recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation.

The Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of the Litigation

This case has been pending since August 27, 2014. Its continuation
would necessitate complex, expensive, and lengthy litigation. As
shown by its previous responsive briefs, Ambit Energy would have
defended itself vigorously. The parties would have been required to
file comprehensive class certification briefs and the Court would
have held a hearing with witnesses on the issue. The parties also
would have faced the possibility of a Rule 23(f) interlocutory
appeal of the certification decision. After resolution of this
issue, the parties would still be required to perform merits and
expert discovery, file additional dispositive motions, and face a
trial. The likely prospect of continued protracted litigation
weighs strongly in favor of approving the settlement.

The Reaction of the Class to Settlement

Of the 12,542 claims received, only ten class members requested
exclusion from the class and no members objected to the settlement
or attorney's fee petition. Thus, this factor also weighs heavily
in favor of the settlement.  

The Stage of the Proceedings

Here, the settlement was finalized only after a rigorous mediation
during which the parties engaged in analysis of the substantive
claims and defenses in the case. Moreover, the case has been
pending since August 2014 and the parties have briefed multiple
dispositive motions which afforded counsel an opportunity to assess
the strengths and weaknesses of the case. Finally, class counsel
has litigated similar cases and has a thorough understanding of the
factual and legal issues involved. The Court concludes that this
factor weighs in favor of settlement and that the parties
sufficiently appreciate the merits and dangers of the case.

The Risks of Continued Litigation

The parties have had sufficient opportunity to evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of the case, including the risks of
continuing the litigation. Such risks include the possibility of
class decertification or that conflicting state laws would hamper
certification. Silvis would also risk a finding that she failed to
establish that Ambit Energy breached its contract or overcharged
the class members for electricity. The class members would also run
the risk of being unable to adequately prove their individual
damages. The Settlement Agreement provides a remedy now to all
class members, rather than risking an uncertain result after years
of expensive litigation. Thus, these factors weigh in favor of the
settlement.

The Ability of the Defendant to Withstand Greater Judgment

Ambit Energy is capable of withstanding a larger judgment. However,
it would still not be required to pay more than the class members
are entitled. The Court finds that this factor does not weigh
heavily for or against the settlement.

The Range of Reasonableness of the Settlement in Light of the Best
Possible Recovery and the Attendant Risks of Litigation

In light of the risks of establishing liability and damages at
trial, Silvis believes that the settlement falls within the range
of reasonableness and is better than the other possible
alternatives, which include little or no recovery. Although a
verdict in this case might possibly have been greater than the
value of the settlement, such a verdict would still face the risk
of being overturned on appeal. The proposed settlement gives the
class members significant relief at the earliest possible time,
and, thus, these factors weigh in favor of settlement.

It is clear that upon balancing of the Girsh factors, they tip
strongly in favor of the settlement. Thus, the Court finds the
settlement fair and will approve the Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 16, 2018 Memorandum
is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y89qqpb2 from Leagle.com.

AMY SILVIS, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiff, represented by JONATHAN SHUB -- jshub@kohnswift.com --
KOHN SWIFT & GRAF PC, HARPER SEGUI -- hsegui@seguilaw.com -- KOHN
SWIFT & GRAF, P.C., KEVIN LAUKAITIS -- klaukaitis@kohnswift.com --
KOHN SWIFT & GRAF PC, SCOTT A. GEORGE -- sgeorge@seegerweiss.com --
SEEGER WEISS & TROY M. FREDERICK, MARCUS & MACK PC.

AMBIT NORTHEAST, LLC & AMBIT NORTHEAST, LLC, doing business as
AMBIT ENERGY, Defendants, represented by JOANNA J. CLINE --
clinej@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, STEPHEN C. RASCH --
Stephen.Rasch@tklaw.com -- THOMPSON & KNIGHT LLC, JENNIFER MEGHAN
NYLIN -- Meghan.Nylin@tklaw.com -- THOMPSON & KNIGHT LLP &MICHAEL
W. STOCKHAM -- Michael.Stockham@tklaw.com -- THOMPSON & KNIGHT
LLP.


AMBIT NORTHEAST: $1.45MM Class Settlement Has Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted Plaintiff's Application for a Judgment Finally
Approving the Settlement in the case captioned AMY SILVIS, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
AMBIT NORTHEAST, LLC, Defendant. No. 2:14-CV-05005-ER. (E.D. Pa.).

The Plaintiff for a judgment finally approving the Settlement that
is set forth in the Plaintiff's Amended Unopposed Motion for
Preliminary Approval Of Class Action Settlement.

This Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal further incorporates by
reference the definitions in the Settlement Agreement and unless
otherwise specified herein all capitalized terms contained in this
Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal shall have the meanings
attributed to them in the Settlement Agreement.

For purposes of effectuating this Settlement only, the Court Orders
final certification of the proposed Settlement Class, having found
that the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are met. The Settlement Class is defined as:

     All persons in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania who were
enrolled as a customer of Defendant and were on Defendant's Select
Variable Plan at any time from January 1, 2011 through February 22,
2018.

Excluded from the Settlement Class are:

     Defendant, any entities in which it has a controlling
interest, and any of their parents, subsidiaries, affiliates,
officers, directors, employees, and members of such person's
immediate family; the presiding judge(s) in this case and their
immediate family; and any person who has previously released claims
against Defendant.

The Court finds that a Fee and Expense Award to Class Counsel in
the amount of $1,450,000.00 is fair and reasonable. Therefore,
pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Defendant shall pay, within
ten (10) business days of the latest date of the following: (1) the
Effective Date; (2) the date that the time for taking an appeal
from the order awarding the fees has expired, with no appeal being
filed; or (3) if an appeal is taken from the order awarding the
fees, the highest court to which such appeal may be taken affirms
the order awarding the fees.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 16, 2018 Judgment
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7a5hj89 from
Leagle.com.

AMY SILVIS, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiff, represented by JONATHAN SHUB -- jshub@kohnswift.com --
KOHN SWIFT & GRAF PC, HARPER SEGUI -- hsegui@seguilaw.com -- KOHN
SWIFT & GRAF, P.C., KEVIN LAUKAITIS -- klaukaitis@kohnswift.com --
KOHN SWIFT & GRAF PC, SCOTT A. GEORGE -- sgeorge@seegerweiss.com --
SEEGER WEISS & TROY M. FREDERICK , MARCUS & MACK PC.

AMBIT NORTHEAST, LLC & AMBIT NORTHEAST, LLC, doing business as
AMBIT ENERGY, Defendants, represented by JOANNA J. CLINE --
clinej@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, STEPHEN C. RASCH --
Stephen.Rasch@tklaw.com -- THOMPSON & KNIGHT LLC, JENNIFER MEGHAN
NYLIN -- Meghan.Nylin@tklaw.com -- THOMPSON & KNIGHT LLP & MICHAEL
W. STOCKHAM -- Michael.Stockham@tklaw.com -- THOMPSON & KNIGHT
LLP.


AMERICA HONDA: Bovgirya's TCCWNA Suit Remanded to State Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand the case captioned TATIANA
BOVGIRYA, on behalf of herself and the putative class, Plaintiffs,
v. AMERICA HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., Defendant. Civ. No.
2:17-cv-06248 (WHW) (CLW). (D.N.J.)

The Plaintiff brought suit in the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Union County, alleging violations of New Jersey consumer protection
laws on behalf of herself and other similarly situated. The propose
class consists of every natural person to whom American Honda Motor
Company, Inc. sent or caused to be sent an e-mail advertisement
that was substantially the same as the advertisement sent to
Plaintiff, with the identified participating dealership located
within New Jersey.

The Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) provides original jurisdiction
in the federal courts over class actions if the matter in
controversy exceeds $5,000,000. In addition to the
amount-in-controversy requirement, the class must have at least 100
members and the parties must be minimally diverse. To determine
whether the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, the claims of
individual members must be aggregated.

The Defendant asserts that the amount in controversy is easily
satisfied, as it could be as high as $11,280,501. According to the
Defendant, the amount in controversy as to the TCCWNA claims should
be calculated at $1,200 per class member, because the Plaintiff
alleges that the email contained 12 unlawful provisions. The
Defendant argues that the Plaintiff would be entitled to recover
$100 per violative provision under TCWWNA.

The Defendant argues that in the alternative, the TCCWNA claims
should be calculated at $300 per class member, with $100 for each
regulation or statute allegedly violated. At the new class size of
8,697, this would produce an amount in controversy of $10,436,400.

The Plaintiff does not dispute that attorneys' fees should be
calculated at 30%. Consequently, to exceed $5 million, the total
amount in controversy must be $3,846,153.85 before attorneys' fees
are added. Accepting the Defendant's proposed valuation of $844,101
for Count Two, the value of Count One must exceed $3,002,052.85.
Because the current estimate of individuals for whom statutory
penalties are available is 8,697, jurisdiction is appropriate only
if each individual is entitled to statutory damages exceeding
$345.18 under the TCCWNA.

For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the Defendants
have not shown that each individual is entitled to statutory
damages exceeding $345.18, and consequently need not consider
Defendant's calculation of the valuation of Count Two.

Statutory Damages Under TCWWNA

To carry out this purpose, the TCCWNA reads:

No seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee shall in the course
of his business offer to any consumer or prospective consumer or
enter into any written consumer contract or give or display any
written consumer warranty, notice or sign after the effective date
of this act which includes any provision that violates any clearly
established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a
seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee as established by State
or Federal law at the time the offer is made or the consumer
contract is signed or the warranty, notice or sign is given or
displayed.

The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff
and the members of the TCCWNA class for statutory damages of $100
each, plus attorneys' fees and costs.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff argues that the amount in controversy
in the TCCWNA claims before attorneys' fees is $100 per class
member, or $869,700.

In response, the Defendant contends that the TCCWNA entitles each
consume $100 for each unlawful provision contained in the contract,
and therefore values the TCCWNA claims at $11,280,501.

This Court rejects the Defendant's argument. Courts regularly apply
a penalty of $100 per contract when determining TCCWNA liability.
Accordingly, courts assessing the value of TCCWNA claims for
purposes of CAFA jurisdiction have similarly calculated penalties
at $100 per contract.  

Valuing the claim at $100 per email rather than $100 per provision
is consistent with the text of the statute. If the Legislature's
intent is clear from the statutory language and its context with
related provisions, we apply the law as written. The TCCWNA
provides a civil penalty of not less than $100" against any person
who violates the provisions of this act. A violation occurs when a
seller offers to any consumer or prospective consumer or enters
into any written consumer contract, or gives or displays any
written consumer notice which includes any unlawful provision.

The statute is written in terms of the interaction between seller
and consumer, not in terms of individual provisions. The alleged
violation here occurred when Defendant displayed the email to
Plaintiff, not when Defendant inserted each of the twelve allegedly
unlawful provisions into the email.  

Here, there are no allegations in the complaint to support a
statutory penalty in excess of the $100, and Plaintiff has not
sought actual damages. The Court will therefore calculate the value
of the TCCWNA claims at $100 per class member, or $869,700.
Defendant has consequently not met its burden of establishing the
amount in controversy.  

The Court finds that the Defendant has failed to meet its burden to
establish the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. The
Plaintiff's motion to remand is granted. An appropriate order
follows.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 16, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yaeuu4jw from Leagle.com.

TATIANA BOVGIRYA, on behalf of herself and the putative class,
Plaintiff, represented by HENRY PAUL WOLFE --
hwolfe@wolflawfirm.net -- THE WOLF LAW FIRM, LLC.

AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., Defendant, represented by CLIFFORD
BRIAN KORNBREK -- bkornbrek@greenbaumlaw.com -- GREENBAUM, ROWE,
SMITH & DAVIS, LLP & THOMAS KILEY MURPHY, III --
tmurphy@greenbaumlaw.com -- GREENBAUM ROWE SMITH & DAVIS LLP.


AMICI 519: Court Denies Bid to Partially Dismiss Uraga's FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PEDRO URAGA, on behalf of himself, FLSA Collective
Plaintiffs and the Class, Plaintiff, v. AMICI 519 LLC D/B/A ESSEN,
ET AL., Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-03547 (ALC) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge
Andrew L. Carter, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York (i) denied the Defendants' motion to partially
dismiss; and (ii) granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification.

Uraga brings the action against the Defendants Amici 519, LLC,
doing business as Essen, BNP NY Foods, Inc., doing business as
Essen, Ten Westside Corp., doing business as Essen, 100 Broad
Street, LLC, doing business as Essen, Essen22, LLC doing business
as Essen, John Doe Corp. doing business as ESSEN ("Corporate
Defendants"), John Byun and Chong Won Byun ("Individual
Defendants") under the Fair Labor Standards Act, New York Labor
Law, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human
Rights Law to recover (1) unpaid overtime compensation; (2) unpaid
wages due to time shaving; (3) liquidated damages; (4) economic
damages; (5) compensatory damages; (6) punitive damages, and (7)
attorneys' fees and costs.

Between January 2017 and March 2017, the Plaintiff was employed by
the Defendants to work as a porter for their Essen Midtown West
Location.  The Plaintiff claims that he regularly worked over 40
hours a week; specifically, he was scheduled to work six days a
week for a total of 52 and half hours, for which he was paid at a
straight-time hourly rate.  The Plaintiff also alleges that the
Defendants' maintained a policy of time-shaving with respect to
meal breaks and indiscriminately and automatically deducted 30
minutes each workday from his payroll as meal breaks rather than
tracking actual meal breaks.  Moreover, he alleges that the
Defendants did not provide him with proper wage and hour notices or
wage statements.  The Plaintiff asserts that other non-managerial
employees at Essen Restaurants experienced similar issues based on
his personal observations and conversations with these employees.

The Defendants seek to partially dismiss the Complaint for failure
to state a claim as to all the Defendants except Amici 519, LLC for
three reasons.  First, the Plaintiff's Complaint does not
sufficiently allege that the Defendants are a single integrated
enterprise, and the allegations against the Individual Defendants
lack factual specificity.  Second, the Plaintiff only worked for
one corporate entity, and thus, lacks standing to represent class
members against Defendants.  Third, the Plaintiff has received his
wage statements, thereby warranting dismissal of his claims based
on violations of Wage Notice and Wage Statement laws.  The
Defendants forward the same arguments, with the exception of the
argument regarding Individual Defendants, in their opposition to
the Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification.

The Plaintiff, on the other hand, moves for (1) conditional
certification of the FLSA claim as a representative collective
action on behalf of Covered Employees; (2) court-facilitated notice
of the FLSA action to Covered Employees, including a consent form
(or opt-in form) as authorized by the FLSA; (3) approval of a
proposed FLSA notice (including Spanish translation) of the action
and the consent form; (4) production in Excel format of names,
social security numbers, titles, compensation rates, dates of
employment, last known mailing addresses, email addresses and all
known telephone numbers of all Covered Employees within 10 days of
Court approval of conditional certification; (5) posting of the
notice, along with the consent forms, at any time during regular
business hours in the Defendants' restaurants where Covered
Employees are employed; and (6) equitable tolling of the FLSA
statute of limitations until such time that the Plaintiff is able
to send notice to potential opt-in Plaintiffs.

Judge Carter holds that, at this stage, the Plaintiff has provided
sufficient factual information to support their allegation that the
Defendants are a single integrated enterprise.  Accordingly, the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to all Corporate Defendants except
Amici 519 will be denied, and the Defendants' first argument in
opposition to conditional certification is unavailing.

The Judge further holds that the Defendants' argument for
dismissing claims against the Individual Defendants is equally
unavailing.  The Plaintiff has alleged that the Individual
Defendants are senior executive officers of Corporate Defendants
who (1) have the authority to affect changes to the terms of
employees' employment, (2) who regularly visit restaurants and
reprimand employees, and (3) who ensure that the business is
operating efficiently and profitably.  Drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, the Complaint sufficiently
pleads that the Individual Defendants exercised operational control
and are therefore employers under the FLSA.

The Judge finds that the Plaintiff has sufficiently pled the
existence of a single integrated enterprise, and that Individual
Defendants are employers for the purposes of the FLSA.  Therefore,
Plaintiff has standing to bring claims against all the Defendants.
The Plaintiff has also made a modest factual showing that he and
others similarly situated were victims of a common policy that
potentially violates the law.  The Judge agrees with the
Plaintiff's contention and will deny the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the Plaintiff's claims brought under N.Y. Lab. Law Sections
195(1) and 195(3).

As the Plaintiff has met the minimal burden required for
conditional certification, and the Defendant has not provided
compelling reasons to deny the Plaintiff's motion, the Plaintiff's
motion for conditional certification of the FLSA collective action
will be granted.  He granted the Plaintiff's request to compel the
Defendants to produce the names, social security numbers, titles,
compensation rates, last known mailing addresses, e-mail addresses,
all known telephone numbers, and dates of employment of all
non-exempt employees employed by the Defendants at each of their
restaurants within the last six years, as to all information sought
except social security numbers as such information is private and
not necessary for Plaintiff to notify potential opt-in
Plaintiff's.

He approved the proposed notice form with the exception of the six
year limitations period.  At this stage, the notice form's
limitation period should be three years.  Additionally, he holds
that the form may also be translated into Spanish to increase the
likelihood of adequate notice to the putative class members.

Finally, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff has not demonstrated
that there are any extraordinary circumstances warranting tolling
in the matter.  Though it appears that the Plaintiff has been
diligently pursuing his rights, absent extraordinary circumstances,
this is not sufficient.  Should equitable tolling issues arise as
to an opt-in plaintiff after conditional certification, e.g., if
the Defendants argue that an individual Plaintiff's action is
untimely, the Judge will then consider tolling.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Carter denied the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint; and granted in part and
denied in part the Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification
as outlined.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 25, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/WPqzfS from Leagle.com.

Pedro Uraga, on behalf of himself, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and
the Class, Plaintiff, represented by Angela Saeyun Kwon , Lee
Litigation Group, PLLC, Anne Melissa Seelig, Lee Litigation Group,
PLLC & C.K. Lee, Lee Litigation Group, PLLC.

Amici 519 LLC, doing business as Essen, Defendant, represented by
Jonathan J. Lerner -- jlerner@starrgern.com -- Starr, Gern, Davison
& Rubin, P.C., Nicholas Stevens -- nstevens@starrgern.com -- Starr,
Gern, Davison & Rubin, P.C., pro hac vice & Jonathan Yoon Sue, Law
Offices of Jonathan Y. Sue, PLLC.

BNP NY Foods, Inc., doing business as Essen, Ten Westside Corp.,
doing business as Essen, 100 Broad Street LLC, doing business as
Essen, Essen22 LLC, doing business as Essen & John Doe Corp., doing
business as Essen, Defendants, represented by Jonathan J. Lerner,
Starr, Gern, Davison & Rubin, P.C. & Nicholas Stevens, Starr, Gern,
Davison & Rubin, P.C., pro hac vice.

John Byun & Chong Won Byun, Defendants, represented by Jonathan
Yoon Sue , Law Offices of Jonathan Y. Sue, PLLC & Nicholas Stevens,
Starr, Gern, Davison & Rubin, P.C., pro hac vice.


AP PREFERRED: Marmier-Romeo Action Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay
----------------------------------------------------------------
Samantha Marmier-Romeo, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AP Preferred Solutions, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-11943 (E.D. Mich., June 19, 2018), seeks
unpaid overtime compensation and prejudgment interest, liquidated
and exemplary damages, litigation costs, expenses, attorneys' fees
and such other and further relief under the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938.

AP Preferred Solutions, LLC a/k/a AccessPoint Health Care IT
provides information technology educational services for the
healthcare industry across the country. Romeo worked for Defendant
as a consultant providing support and training to AccessPoint's
clients in using a new recordkeeping system at Inspire Health
Network in New Jersey between March and May 2018. She routinely
worked more than forty hours a week but did not receive overtime
for hours worked in excess of forty a week. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Harold Lichten, Esq.
      Olena Savytska, Esq.
      LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
      729 Boylston St., Suite 2000
      Boston, MA 02116
      Telephone: (617) 994-5800
      Facsimile: (617) 994-5801
      Email: hlichten@llrlaw.com
             osavytska@llrlaw.com

             - and -

      Shanon J. Carson, Esq.
      Sarah R. Schalman-Bergen, Esq.
      Alexandra K. Piazza, Esq.
      BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C.
      1622 Locust Street
      Philadelphia, PA 19103
      Telephone: (215) 875-3000
      Facsimile: (215) 875-4604
      Email: scarson@bm.net
             sschalman-bergen@bm.net
             apiazza@bm.net

             - and -

      David M. Blanchard, Esq.
      BLANCHARD & WALKER, PLLC
      221 N. Main Street, Suite 300
      Ann Arbor, MI 48104
      Telephone: (734) 929-4313
      Email: blanchard@bwlawonline.com


APPLE INC: Seeks Dismissal of Class Action Over Cracked Watches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Emily Field, writing for Law360, reports that Apple urged a
California federal judge on Aug. 10 to toss a proposed class action
accusing the company of selling millions of watches with defective
screens that can crack or shatter, saying the watch that prompted
the suit broke after the warranty expired.

The tech giant said in a motion to dismiss that lead plaintiff
Kenneth Sciacca claims he bought a Series 2 Apple Watch in December
2016 and used it for over 15 months with no problem.

The case is Sciacca v. Apple, Inc., Case No. 5:18-cv-03312 (N.D.
Calif.).  The case is assigned to Judge Nathanael M. Cousins.  The
case was June 4, 2018. [GN]


AT&T MOBILITY: Judge Certifies Customers Class in Roaming Fees Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Bernardini, writing for Law360, reports that a California
federal judge certified a class of AT&T customers on Aug. 13 who
accused the company of misleading them about overseas roaming fees,
finding in the long-running suit that, though the customers had
gotten information from different sources, their claims could be
heard as a group.

U.S. District Judge Claudia Wilken found that the customers, who
claimed they were charged for phone calls they hadn't even answered
while traveling abroad, could have their claims heard together.

The case is McArdle v. AT&T Mobility LLC et al, Case No.
4:09-cv-01117 (N.D. Calif.).  The case is assigned to Judge Claudia
Wilken.  The case was filed March 13, 2009. [GN]


BANK OF AMERICA: Nov. 8 ISDAfix Settlement Approval Hearing Set
---------------------------------------------------------------
This is a new notice concerning an additional proposed settlement
(the "Proposed Settlement") reached in the matter of Alaska
Electrical Pension Fund, et al. v. Bank of America, N.A., et al.,
currently pending in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (the "Court").  It is to alert
Settlement Class Members to a new and additional settlement with
five Defendants: BNP Paribas (named in the Action as "B.N.P.
Paribas SA"); ICAP Capital Markets LLC (now known as Intercapital
Capital Markets LLC); Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC; Nomura Securities
International, Inc.; and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (collectively, the
"Newly Settling Defendants"), in a class action against Newly
Settling Defendants and other Defendants who previously settled.
The lawsuit alleges that Defendants, including the Newly Settling
Defendants, engaged in anticompetitive acts that affected the
market for ISDAfix Instruments, as defined below, in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1.  The lawsuit also
alleges that certain Defendants were unjustly enriched under common
law and breached ISDA Master Agreements.  The lawsuit was brought
by persons who transacted in ISDAfix Instruments.  All Defendants
deny they did anything wrong.

A Proposed Settlement has been reached with the Newly Settling
Defendants.  This is separate from the settlements that have
already been given final approval by the Court, which covered other
Defendants in the same action (the "Approved Settlements"). The
Newly Settling Defendants have agreed to pay $96 million (the
"Settlement Fund").  This amount is in addition to the fund created
from the $408.5 million paid in connection with the Approved
Settlements.  Before any money is paid, the Court will have a
hearing to decide whether to approve the additional Proposed
Settlement.  Approval of the Proposed Settlement by the Court will
resolve this lawsuit in its entirety.

Subject to certain exceptions, the Settlement Class includes all
persons or entities (together, "Persons") who, from January 1,
2006, through January 31, 2014, entered into, received or made
payments on, settled, terminated, transacted in, or held an ISDAfix
Instrument.  "ISDAfix Instrument" means (i) any and all interest
rate derivatives, including, but not limited to, any swaps, swap
spreads, swap futures, variance swaps, volatility swaps, range
accrual swaps, constant maturity swaps, constant maturity swap
options, digital options, cash-settled swaptions, physically
settled swaptions, swapnote futures, cash-settled swap futures,
steepeners, flatteners, inverse floaters, snowballs, interest
rate-linked structured notes, and digital and callable range
accrual notes, where denominated in USD or related to USD interest
rates; and (ii) any financial instruments, products, or
transactions related in any way to any USD ISDAfix Benchmark Rates,
including, but not limited to, any instruments, products, or
transactions that reference ISDAfix Benchmark Rates and any
instruments, products, or transactions relevant to the
determination or calculation of ISDAfix Benchmark Rates.

For anyone unsure whether they are a Settlement Class Member, they
can find more information, including a detailed Notice of an
Additional Proposed Settlement of Class Action (the "Notice"), at
www.ISDAfixAntitrustSettlement.com, or by calling the Claims
Administrator at 1-844-789-6862 (U.S.), or +1-503-597-5526 (Int.).

Settlement Class Members who do not opt out of the Settlement Class
will be eligible to file a Proof of Claim and Release Form (the
"Claim Form"). Claim Forms can be found at
www.ISDAfixAntitrustSettlement.com.  The amount of the payment will
be determined by a Plan of Distribution to be approved by the
Court. The proposed plan is functionally the same as the plan that
was given final approval by the Court in connection with the
Approved Settlements.  Details are available at
www.ISDAfixAntitrustSettlement.com.  A date for distribution of the
Settlement Fund has not been set.  Claim Forms must be submitted by
December 23, 2018.

Settlement Class Members do not need to do anything if they
submitted a timely and valid claim form in connection with the
Approved Settlements.  Any such submission will be treated as a
valid and timely Claim Form with respect to this additional
Proposed Settlement. Anyone unsure whether they did so can contact
the Claims Administrator by calling 1-844-789-6862 (U.S.), or
+1-503-597-5526 (Int.).

Settlement Class Members who do not opt out of the Settlement Class
will release certain legal rights against the Newly Settling
Defendants and the Released Defendant Parties, as explained in the
detailed Notice and Settlement Agreement, available at
www.ISDAfixAntitrustSettlement.com.  Settlement Class Members who
do not want to take part in the Proposed Settlement must opt out by
October 13, 2018.

Settlement Class Members may, but do not have to, comment on or
object to the Proposed Settlement, or Lead Counsel's application to
the Court for an award of attorneys' fees, expenses, and incentive
awards to the Class Plaintiffs for representing the Settlement
Class with respect to the Proposed Settlement. To do so, a
Settlement Class Member must file any comment or objection with the
Court by October 13, 2018.

Further information on how to opt out of the Settlement Class, or
file a comment or objection with the Court, is available at
www.ISDAfixAntitrustSettlement.com.

The Court will hold a hearing on November 8, 2018, at the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square,
Courtroom 1105, New York, NY 10007, to consider whether to approve
the Proposed Settlement, and Lead Counsel's application for an
award of attorneys' fees, expenses, and incentive awards to the
Class Plaintiffs.  Settlement Class Members or their lawyers may
ask to appear and speak at the hearing at their own expense, but do
not have to.

The Court has appointed the lawyers listed below as Lead Counsel to
represent the Settlement Class in this Action:

         Daniel L. Brockett
         Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP
         51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
         New York, NY 10010

         David W. Mitchell
         Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP
         655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
         San Diego, CA 92101

         Christopher M. Burke

         Scott+Scott, Attorneys at Law, LLP
         600 West Broadway, Suite 3300
         San Diego, CA 92101 [GN]


BANK OF AMERICA: Pastor Class Settlement Has Prelim Approval
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted Parties Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Class Action Settlement and Certification of Settlement Class in
the case captioned ROBERT A. PASTOR, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. BANK OF
AMERICA, Defendant. Case No. 15-cv-03831-VC. (N.D. Cal.).

The parties jointly filed a Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Class Action Settlement and Certification of Settlement Class
(Preliminary Approval Motion).

The Parties filed their Motion for Final Approval of Class Action
Settlement Agreement hereinafter referred to as the Final Approval
Motion. Pursuant to their Final Approval Motion, the Parties
requested final approval of the proposed Class Action Settlement.

The Court has read and considered the Agreement, Final Approval
Motion, and the record. All capitalized terms used herein have the
meanings defined herein and/or in the Agreement.

The Agreement, which has been filed with the Court and shall be
deemed incorporated herein, and the proposed settlement are finally
approved and shall be consummated in accordance with the terms and
provisions thereof, except as amended by any order issued by this
Court. The material terms of the Agreement include, but are not
limited to, the following:

   A. Defendant will pay each of the 114,512 claimants that made a
timely and valid claim $4.06;

   B. Defendant will pay to Class Counsel the sum of $431,250 in
attorneys' fees and $19,023.42 for costs incurred in litigating
this action.

The motion for attorneys' fees and costs is also granted. The
plaintiffs are awarded $431,250 in fees and $19,023.42 in costs.
Ten percent of the fee award must be withheld by the settlement
administrator until the Court approves its release, which will be
after plaintiffs' counsel files a notice of completion of duties
(discussed further below).

The requested $5,000 incentive fee for each named plaintiff is
approved.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 16, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yar8r8cf from Leagle.com.

Robert A. Pastor, Scott M. Van Horn, Regina M. Florence & William
E. Florence, III, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by David James McGlothlin --
david@westcoastlitigation.com -- Hyde & Swigart, Ryan Lee McBride
-- ryan@kazlg.com -- Kazerouni Law Group, Seyed Abbas Kazerounian
-- ak@kazlg.com -- Kazerouni Law Group & Joshua B. Swigart --
josh@westcoastlitigation.com -- Hyde & Swigart.

Bank of America, Defendant, represented by Christina Marie Vitale
-- christina.vitale@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis, Bockius LLP,
pro hac vice & Joseph Duffy -- joseph.duffy@morganlewis.com --
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.


BAYER: Women in Australia to Join Class Action Over Essure
----------------------------------------------------------
According to MassDevice's Fink Densford, citing a report from The
Guardian, a group of women in Australia will be joining other women
worldwide in pursuing a class action lawsuit against Bayer for
medical problems allegedly associated with its Essure permanent
birth control device, according to a report from The Guardian.

The suit, which will be led by law firm Slater and Gordon, joins
similar suits against Bayer in the US, Canada and the UK, according
to the report.

Slater & Gordon associate Ebony Birchall said the suit will examine
whether the product is inherently defective, according to The
Guardian.

"Essure was hailed as the new wave of contraceptive devices. Unlike
traditional permanent contraceptive surgery, Essure was marketed as
being fast, effective and minimally invasive, it could be inserted
in your doctor's office. However, for the women who have
experienced complications, it has been incredibly damaging," Mr.
Birchall said, according to the report.

Australia's Therapeutic Goods Administration announced last May
that Bayer decided to drop distribution of the Essure device in the
country "for business reasons," according to The Guardian.

Bayer has not released any details of how many devices were sold in
the country, and has not officially responded to news of the suit,
though a spokesperson told The Guardian that it was aware of the
suit and is "committed to the proper and objective consideration of
any legal claim made should such a claim be lodged."

Late in July, Bayer fired back against claims that its Essure
permanent birth control device is less than safe and effective
after having announced plans to pull the device from the shelves in
the US only a week earlier. [GN]


BEST BUY: Court Denies Class Certification on Harris's Wage Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the
case captioned STARVONNA HARRIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BEST BUY
STORES, L.P., Defendant. Case No. 17-cv-00446-HSG. (N.D. Cal.).

Class certification is a two-step process. First, Plaintiff must
establish that each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) is met:
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation. Second, Plaintiff must establish that at least one
of the bases for certification under Rule 23(b) is met.  

The Plaintiff must show that questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.

The parties agreed that only two putative subclasses remained
following the Strickland Summary Judgment Order: a Wage Statement
Subclass and a Waiting Time Subclass. The Wage Statement Subclass
comprises:

     All nonexempt individuals employed by DEFENDANT in California
who received wage statements containing one or more Previous Period
Hrs entries, (2) all members of the Overtime Wage Subclass, and (3)
all non-exempt individuals employed by DEFENDANT in California who
received wage statements listing hours worked that do not match the
hours worked in their time records for the same pay periods during
the applicable limitations period.

The Plaintiff's Waiting Time Subclass includes, in relevant part:
all non-exempt individuals formerly employed by DEFENDANT in
California who either did not receive their final hourly wages on
the date their employment was terminated or within 72 hours of
their resignation during the applicable limitations period.  

Wage Statement Subclass

Best Buy maintains a time entry system called the Time and Labor
Center (TLC). The TLC requires managers to approve certain time
entries input by employees, referred to as timesheet exceptions.

Timesheet exceptions can include manually input time entries and
corrections to prior time entries.  

TLC time entries determine how much an employee is paid and when.
Best Buy's pay periods are two weeks, and Best Buy's work week is
Sunday (12:00 am) to Saturday (11:59 pm). It is an employee's
responsibility to ensure that their time records are complete,
accurate and authorized by 5:00 pm (local time) on Sunday.

Plaintiff contends that the Previous Period Hrs. wage statement
entry is misleading. According to Plaintiff, this entry prevents
Best Buy employees from determining whether the hours were worked
and the wages were earned in the prior pay period or an earlier pay
period.

In response, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's Wage Statement
Subclass cannot satisfy Rule 23's commonality and predominance
requirements. To begin, Defendant claims that the Previous Period
Hrs. entry does not itself violate California Labor Code Section
226.  Defendant stresses that Plaintiff cannot show, as she must,
that Defendant's violation was knowing and intentional.

The Court agrees with Defendant.

Here, the Plaintiff fails to set forth how she could show, on a
classwide basis, that Best Buy managers knowingly and intentionally
delayed their approval of timesheet exceptions. To meet Rule
23(a)'s commonality requirement, Plaintiff's wage statement claim
must depend upon a common contention. . . capable of class-wide
resolution which means that determination of its truth or falsity
will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one
of the claims in one stroke. As the Dukes, 564 U.S. at 349, Court
stated, the commonality analysis is rigorous.

The Plaintiff accordingly cannot assert any common question rather,
she must define a question that will produce a common answer" to
the question driving the resolution of the litigation. That
question in this case is whether Defendant's managers knowingly and
intentionally failed to timely approve timesheet exceptions.
Notably, Plaintiff fails to show that Best Buy, as a corporate
actor, knew or intended for timesheet exceptions to be approved
late. Plaintiff also fails to present evidence demonstrating that
Best Buy otherwise sought to mislead employees as to their hours
worked and wages earned through the Previous Period Hrs. entry.

The Plaintiff does not present evidence suggesting that Best Buy
knowingly or intentionally instructed or encouraged managers to
unlawfully delay their approval of timesheet exceptions. Contrary
to Plaintiff's suggestion, nothing about the TLC system on its own
is unlawful or inadequate under Section 226. Rather, the questions
susceptible of class-wide proof', for instance, whether an
employee's pay statement inludes the Previous Period Hrs. entry)
offer limited answers as to Defendant's liability.  Plaintiff
provides no aggregate method for determining the issue of intent,
which Defendant's records cannot show on their own. Thus, the
fact-finder will need to determine in each case the conduct and
circumstances giving rise to a delayed approval.

Given that individual liability issues will predominate over common
concerns, the Court concludes that certification of the Wage
Statement Subclass is inappropriate.

Waiting Time Subclass

California Labor Code Section 203 provides:

If an employer willfully fails to pay, without abatement or
reduction, in accordance with Sections 201, 201.3, 201.5, 201.9,
202, and 205.5, any wages of an employee who is discharged or who
quits, the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from
the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action
therefor is commenced; but the wages shall not continue for more
than 30 days.

According to the Plaintiff, the procedures are deficient in that
they do not inform managers and other employees when final wages
must be paid to employees. Plaintiff asserts that understaffing
contributes to Defendant's poor record keeping practices, and has
resulted in hundreds of employees not receiving timely final wages.


In response, Defendant claims that its training to managers is
adequate and complies with California law. Defendant submits
evidence, including employee declarations and training materials,
to show that it instructs managers on the following three pay
requirements: (1) involuntary terminations must be paid
immediately; (2) voluntary terminations with 72 hours' notice must
be paid immediately; and (3) any other voluntary termination must
be paid within 72 hours of receiving notice.  Defendant contends
that its actual pay practices reflect those instructions.  

This putative subclass also fails under Rule 23(a). Plaintiff does
not identify a general policy maintained by Best Buy that resulted
in late payments, or some method for sampling records to provide
common proof that individual Best Buy managers acted unlawfully on
a systemic basis.  

While commonality may be established based on a pattern of
officially sanctioned illegal behavior, merely pointing to a
pattern of harm, untethered to the defendant's conduct, is
insufficient. Not only does Defendant present sufficient proof that
its training program is adequate, but also shows that individual
and unintentional payroll discrepancies preclude the type of common
proof required for class certification.   

For instance, Oracle termination dates and payroll records can
differ, obscuring when a terminated employee received his or her
final pay. Discrepancies can also arise where a manager forgets to
remove an employee from the TLC system after ER inputs their ISN.
In those instances, employees receive a duplicate payment for hours
already paid. Defendant claims, and Plaintiff does not dispute,
that Best Buy would not be liable for late payment in those cases.
Furthermore, Defendant provides numerous examples of duplicative
payments, or allegedly late payments that were actually paid on
time.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 16, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yaebhye8 from Leagle.com.

Starvonna Harris, individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated & Jonathan Strickland, individually and on behalf of those
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Kevin Francis
Woodall -- kevin@kwoodalllaw.com -- Woodall Law Offices & Page R.
Barnes , Barnes Law Offices.

Best Buy Stores, L.P., a limited partnership, Defendant,
represented by Barbara Jean Miller --
barbara.miller@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP,
Alejandro David Szwarcsztejn -- david.szwarcsztejn@morganlewis.com
-- Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP & Bryan Jarrett , Morgan Lewis &
Bockius LLP.


BRAMBLES: Faces 2nd Class Action Over Share Price Plunge
--------------------------------------------------------
Nick Toscano, writing for The Sydney Morning Herald, reports that
hundreds of aggrieved investors have signed up to a second
class-action suit against Australian logistics giant Brambles,
alleging the $15 billion company repeatedly withheld information
about its true financial position.

Brambles, which is listed on the ASX and operates in more than 60
countries, is facing serious claims of failing to comply with its
legal obligations as a public company to keep its shareholders
informed about the poor performance of its US-based pallets
business in 2015.

The disclosure violations, it is alleged, prompted Brambles to
suddenly slash its sales and profit forecasts, triggering two major
share price plunges at the beginning of 2017 and sigificantly
harming its shareholders.

The company is named in a new Maurice Blackburn-led lawsuit filed
in Australia's Federal Court on Aug. 14, which is being backed by
British litigation funder Harbour.

It comes less than a week after another prominent Australian law
firm, Slater & Gordon, filed separate class-action proceedings on
behalf of investors over Brambles' alleged disclosure failures.

Brambles said it had not yet been notified by Maurice Blackburn of
its class-action proceedings, filed on Aug. 14, but would
"vigorously defend" any potential proceedings brought against it.

A spokesman said the company strongly believed it had, at all
times, complied with its disclosure obligations and other legal
obligations to act in the best interests of its shareholders.

According to Maurice Blackburn, the law firm's investigations
allegedly show Brambles had systems in place to ensure senior
executives were aware as early as October 2016 that its pallets
business in America was facing major challenges due to customers
de-stocking and competitive pressures, indicating the company "knew
or ought to have known" that it would fall short of its projected 9
per cent sales growth and 11 per cent profit growth.

"Yet, despite this, senior executives repeatedly assured investors
its 2017 financial year guidance would be met, before dropping a
bombshell just 11 weeks after its annual general meeting that this
guidance could no longer be affirmed," Maurice Blackburn class
actions principal Andrew Watson said.

The lawsuit alleges there was ample opportunity for Brambles to
revise its forecasts much earlier than January or February 2017 to
indicate that forecast sales growth would be downgraded to 5 per
cent and profit would remain flat.

"The company repeatedly failed to do so, resulting in a significant
breach of its continuous-disclosure obligations that led to
substantial losses for investors," Mr Watson said.

Shareholders were significantly disadvantaged when Brambles
earnings downgrades led to share-price falls of almost 16 per cent
for the first revision, and almost 10 per cent for the second.

The emergence of two class-action lawsuits over Brambles'
disclosure obligations during a similar period raises the prospect
of the court ordering that they be combined. The cases may be
permitted to run beside each other, Mr Watson said, or the court
may order that one be discontinued.

Mr Watson said hundreds of shareholders, including retail investors
and some of Australia's largest financial institutions, had so far
signed up to the Maurice Blackburn-led class action, which is open
to any investors who purchased Brambles shares between October 20,
2016, and February 19, 2017. [GN]


BRIGHTSTAR GROUP: Diaz Suit Asserts ADA Violation
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Brightstar Group
Holdings, Inc.  The case is captioned as Edwin Diaz, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Brightstar Group
Holdings, Inc., doing business as: Brightstar Care, Case No.
1:18-cv-07960 (S.D.N.Y., August 30, 2018).

The Plaintiff accuses the Defendant of violating the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Brightstar Group Holdings Inc. operates as a holding company.  The
Company, through its subsidiaries, provides health care services
such as senior home care, child care, elder care, newborn care, and
nanny services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 299-6612
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: joseph@cml.legal


BROOKLYN GASTROENTEROLOGY: Picon Suit Asserts ADA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Brooklyn
Gastroenterology and Endoscopy, PLLC.  The case is titled Yelitza
Picon and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated v.
Brooklyn Gastroenterology and Endoscopy, PLLC, Case No.
1:18-cv-07936 (S.D.N.Y., August 30, 2018).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violations of the Americans
with Disabilities Act.

Brooklyn Gastroenterology and Endoscopy, PLLC, is located off the
Belt Parkway in Brooklyn, New York.  The Company's state-of-the-art
facility provides a multidisciplinary approach to the treatments of
gastrointestinal disease.  The Company's physicians provide medical
care, ranging from the most advanced endoscopic procedures to the
treatment of intestinal, hepatic, biliar, and pancreatic
diseases.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM PC
          175 Varick Street, 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Telephone: (646) 770-3775
          Facsimile: (646) 867-2639
          E-mail: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


CARDINAL INNOVATIONS: Settles Class Action Over Unpaid OT Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
Richard Craver, writing for Winston-Salem Journal, reports that a
settlement appears to have been reached in a federal class-action
lawsuit involving claims of violation of federal wage standards by
Cardinal Innovations affecting about 100 employees.

The lawsuit by primary plaintiff Molly Kirkpatrick of York, S.C.,
and seven others was filed in August 2016.  She is employed by
Cardinal as an intellectual/development disability (I/DD) care
coordinator.

The settlement notice was filed on Aug. 13 in U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina.

In a joint motion, the parties said they completed mediation Aug. 3
and reached a settlement "that provides a framework for the
resolution of this class action."  They were expected to complete a
final version of a written agreement by Aug. 17.

Cardinal is the largest of the state's seven behavioral-health
managed-care organizations, with more than 875,000 enrollees.  It
covers 20 counties, including Alamance, Davidson, Davie, Forsyth,
Rockingham and Stokes in the Triad, in overseeing providers of
mental-health, developmental-disability and substance-abuse
services.

Cardinal handles more than $675 million in annual federal and state
Medicaid money.

Ms. Kirkpatrick claims that Cardinal, under the management of
now-fired chief executive Richard Topping Jr. and oversight of a
since-disbanded board of directors, violated the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act by not providing overtime pay for work outside 40
hours a week "that takes them outside the learned-professional
exemption."

The act establishes minimum-wage, overtime-pay, record-keeping and
child-labor standards affecting full- and part-time workers in the
private sector and in federal, state and local governments.

Ms. Kirkpatrick claims that she and more than 100 other potential
plaintiffs' employment status have been misclassified by Cardinal.

Ms. Kirkpatrick estimated that on a near-weekly basis, she worked
between 41 to 66½ hours without receiving overtime pay.  She said
she was paid instead a straight 40-hour weekly salary.  She is
pursuing compensation to cover the missing overtime pay.

U.S. District Judge Thomas Schroeder has approved making any
Cardinal I/DD care counselor from the past four years eligible to
be included in the lawsuit.

Cardinal's official comment under previous management and board
oversight has been to deny the allegations and oppose the lawsuit.

On Aug. 14, Cardinal said that "while specific details of that
settlement are still pending, our I/DD care coordinators will
remain salaried, exempt employees."

They are "an integral part of Cardinal Innovations' community-based
approach to care," the managed-care organization said.

"We value their skill, experience and qualifications, and
compensate them accordingly."

N.C. Secretary of Health Mandy Cohen formally removed Mr. Topping
from the company Nov. 27 as part of the state's takeover of
Cardinal. Cohen also disbanded the Cardinal board at that time.

The new board named Trey Sutten as Cardinal's chief executive in
January.

The new board sued Mr. Topping on March 26 as part of an attempt to
recover about $3.8 million in severance pay from four former
Cardinal officials. Cardinal reimbursed the state the $3.8 million
from the organization's administrative funds.

In May, Mr. Topping filed a countersuit to thwart the attempt at
recovering $1.68 million he received in his severance package.

In June, Mr. Topping sued a former federal prosecutor for libel and
slander for his role in investigating Topping's management
actions.

Cardinal spokeswoman Ashley Conger said on Aug. 14 the agency has
no update on the Topping lawsuits. [GN]


CENTERPOINTE LENDING: Milosch Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------
Chris Milosch, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Centerpointe Lending Studen Loan Services and Does 1
through 10, Case No. 8:18-cv-01335 (C.D. Calif., August 1, 2018),
seeks damages and other available legal or equitable remedies
pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff is a resident of Laguna Niguel, California.

The Defendant Centerpointe Lending Studen Loan Services is a
student loan forgiveness document preparation company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
      Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
      Meghan E. George, Esq.
      Tom E. Wheeler, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
      21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
      Woodland Hills, CA 91367
      Tel: (877) 206-4741
      Fax: (866) 633-0228
      E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
              abacon@toddflaw.com
              mgeorge@toddflaw.com
              twheeler@toddflaw.com


CENTRAL MAINE: Faces Class Action Over Alleged Fraud
----------------------------------------------------
Liam Nee, writing for NEWS CENTER Maine, reports that a new class
action lawsuit against Central Maine Power (CMP) was scheduled to
be filed Aug. 15, accusing the electric utility company of fraud.

The impending suit alleges CMP trained its service personnel to
tell customers that the customer is at fault and that the power
company did nothing wrong, an attorney associated with the legal
filings said.

"Rather than acknowledging the errors," the complaint reads, "the
power company told their customers the following:

   1) the cold snap caused your furnace to be running more;
   2) bad wiring in your house;
   3) electrical appliances are causing over usage;
   4) your appliances are old;
   5) your kids must be playing too many video games;
   6) it's a heat pump;
   7) it must be your well pump."

"All of this was done to hide the real story," the lawsuit claims,
"that CMP's software program and meters were defective. The CMP
personnel knew when the statements were made to the customers 'that
it was the customers' fault.'"

The impending suit accuses CMP of serving a "disconnect notice"
through its software program when customers did not pay, knowing
bills were excessive and that customers were entering the winter
season.

"People were caused to readjust their priorities so as to not lose
their heat during the winter," the litigation claims, "so some went
without food and medications."

Four lead plaintiffs will represent the class: Mark Levesque,
involved in a previous class action filing; Christie Decker of
Wilton; Lisa McLeod of Greenwood; and Michael Platt of Corinna.

The plaintiffs intend to seek "excessively charged" amounts from
CMP as well as "punitive damages for fraud perpetrated on Maine
citizens" from both CMP and its parent company, Avangrid, Augusta
attorney Sumner Lipman said.

An initial lawsuit against CMP was filed July 19 by Augusta law
firm Lipman & Katz; Auburn law firm Trafton, Matzen, Belleau &
Frenette; and New York law firm Napoli & Shkolnik, on behalf of
class representative Mark Levesque. Its basis was one count of
"unjust enrichment," Mr. Lipman said. [GN]


CHECK-6 INC: Faces Goodly Suit in East. Dist. Louisiana
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Check-6 Inc., et al.
The case is titled as Joseph Goodly, on behalf of himself and other
persons similarly situated v. Check-6 Inc., Yarema Sos, Brian
Brurud, Dennis Romano, S. Eric Benson, Laura Owen and John Dillon,
Case No. 2:18-mc-08269-LMA-DEK (E.D. La., August 30, 2018).

Check-6 Inc. provides training services to the oil, gas, energy,
and mining industries in the United States and internationally.
The Company offers rig training program, and provides customized
training, mentoring, and coaching on the fundamentals of operating
in a high-risk/high-reliability environment; strategic
communications program, an interactive discussion that helps
further define the expectations of leaders within a company in a
practical way; high reliability leadership curriculum;
company-planned events, meetings, and workshops; checklists and
hazard identification programs; SEMS audits; and keynote
services.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Rodney J. Lacoste, Jr., Esq.
          Jordan M. Jeansonne, Esq.
          PERRIER & LACOSTE, LLC
          365 Canal Street, Suite 2550
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 212-8820
          E-mail: rlacoste@perrierlacoste.com
                  jjeansonne@perrierlacoste.com


CHICAGO: Police Keeps Discriminatory Database, Says Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Chicagoans for an End to the Gang Database: Black Youth Project 100
Chicago, Blocks Together, Brighton Park Neighborhood Council,
Latino Union, Mijente and Organized Communities Against
Deportation, as well as Donta Lucas, Jonathan Warner, Lester
Cooper, and Luis Pedrote-Salinas, on behalf of themselves and a
class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. City of
Chicago, Superintendent Eddie Johnson, and Chicago Police Officers
Michael Tomaso, Michael Golden, Peter Toledo, John Does 1-4 and
Jane Does 1-2, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-04242 (N.D. Ill., June
19, 2018), seeks to enjoin the Chicago Police District from
maintaining a discriminatory Gang Database in violation of the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, and providing gang
designations to any third party entity; compensatory and punitive
damages; reasonable attorneys' fees and costs; and such other and
further relief pursuant to the Illinois Civil Rights Act of 2003
and in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment.

The complaint says the Chicago Police Department uses, maintains,
publishes, and shares a Gang Database of all suspected gang members
in the City of Chicago that is arbitrary, discriminatory,
over-inclusive and error-ridden, and disproportionately targets
Black and Latino people for inclusion in the Gang Database. Police
officers wield this discretion in a discriminatory manner, often
falsely labeling people gang members based solely on their race and
neighborhood, it adds. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Sheila A. Bedi, Esq.
      Vanessa del Valle, Esq.
      MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER
      Northwestern Pritzker School of Law
      375 E. Chicago Avenue
      Chicago, IL 60611
      Tel: (312) 503-2492
      Email: sheila.bedi@law.northwestern.edu
             vanessa.delvalle@law.northwestern.edu

             - and -

      Elizabeth A. Homsy, Esq.
      The Law Officers of Elizabeth A. Homsy
      2506 N. Clark Street, Suite 286
      Chicago, IL 60614
      Tel: (773) 988-3486

             - and -

      Brendan Shiller, Esq.
      Chris Bergin, Esq.
      Tia Haywood, Esq.
      SHILLER PREYAR LLC
      601 S. California Avenue
      Chicago, IL 60612
      Tel: (312) 226-4590
      Email: brendan@shillerpreyar.com
             chris@shillerpreyar.com
             Thaywood4u@gmail.com

             - and -

      Joey L. Mogul, Esq.
      People's Law Office
      1180 N. Milwaukee Ave.
      Chicago, IL 60622
      Tel: (773) 235-0070


CHICKPEA AT 14TH: Pacheco Suit Seeks Civil Damages
--------------------------------------------------
Jorge Pacheco, on behalf of himself and class of similarly situated
individuals v. Chickpea at 14th Street Inc., et al., Case No.
1:18-cv-06907 (S.D. N.Y., August 1, 2018), seeks civil damages
against the Defendants for fraudulent filing of information
returns.

Throughout his entire employment, the Plaintiff was paid in cash,
and was not given any form of wage statement when he received his
pay, says the complaint. The Defendants failed to withhold any of
Plaintiff's wages for tax purposes. The Defendants further failed
to provide Plaintiff with an accurate W-2 tax statement for each
tax year during which Plaintiff worked, the complaint asserts.  

The Plaintiff, Jorge Pacheco was employed by the Defendants as a
dishwasher from in or around July 2015 until in or around September
2017.  

The Defendants operate a restaurant and catering enterprise under
the common trade name "Chickpea." Chickpea operates seven
restaurant locations in New York State and facilitates corporate
catering throughout the New York City area via the internet.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      C.K. Lee, Esq.
      William Brown, Esq.
      LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
      30 East 39th Street, Second Floor
      New York, NY 10016
      Tel: (212) 465-1188
      Fax: (212) 465-1181


CINEMARK USA: Court Certifies Class in Overtime Rates Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in
the case captioned JOSEPH AMEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CINEMARK USA
INC, et al., Defendants. Case No. 13-cv-05669-WHO. (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Silken Brown, a former employee of Cinemark USA Inc.,
(Cinemark) who worked for seven months at the theater in the San
Francisco-Westfield Mall, claims that Cinemark is liable for
failing to properly list overtime rates on wage statements.

The Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule (b)(3), requiring them
to establish that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

CLASS CERTIFICATION OF THE DIRECT WAGE STATEMENT CLAIM

The present motion seeks to certify a putative class consisting of
all current and former non-exempt employees who worked for
Defendants in California at any time from December 3, 2011 through
the present, and were paid overtime compensation during at least
one pay period, for the direct wage statement claim pursuant to
Rule 23.  

Cinemark only disputes the typicality and adequacy requirements of
Rule 23(a), and the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b).

Typicality

For class certification, Brown's claims must be typical of claims
advanced by the class. The typicality test is whether other members
have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on
conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether
other class members have been injured by the same course of
conduct. Under the rule's permissive standards, representative
claims are typical if they are reasonably co-extensive with those
of absent class members; they need not be substantially identical.
Unique defenses against a class representative counsel against
class certification only where they threaten to become the focus of
the litigation.

Cinemark challenges typicality, claiming that Brown is subject to
unique defenses such as a lack of standing and mootness because she
settled her individual claim. Despite this attempted carve out,
Cinemark points to language in the settlement agreement that
Plaintiff agrees to settle, release, and waive any and all
individual claims against Defendants for any and all individual
claims raised or that could have been raised in the Action through
the date of the Agreement. It contends, therefore, that Brown is no
longer a member of the class she attempts to represent since she
voluntarily settled her claims.   It further argues that Brown's
interest in attorneys' fees is insufficient to confer standing.

The correct inquiry for typicality is whether Brown suffered the
same type of injury from Cinemark's conduct as other class members.
Brown was a California employee for Cinemark for seven months
during the putative class period, and she was given the same
allegedly incorrect wage statements as other class members. Her
asserted injury at the time of the alleged inaccurate wage
statements was identical to those of absent class members and stems
from the same conduct by Cinemark. Typicality is satisfied.

Adequacy of Representation

Rule 23(a)(4) requires Brown to be deemed capable of adequately
representing the interests of the entire class, including absent
class members.

Cinemark argues that since Brown has settled her individual claim,
she does not have an incentive to represent the class and her
interests no longer align with the class. Brown indicates that she
has no conflicts of interest with the class and that there is no
evidence of antagonism.  

Cinemark questions whether Brown will vigorously pursue her claims
on behalf of the putative class without a personal financial
interest in the settlement. Brown has demonstrated and is
demonstrating vigorous pursuit of the claims. Brown and her counsel
have been litigating this case for years, completing an individual
settlement with the intent to appeal, prevailing on that appeal,
and now pursuing a second class certification motion for the direct
wage claim. Brown's counsel has ample experience in prosecuting
wage and hour class actions such as this case.  

The adequacy requirement is satisfied.

Predominance

Rule 23(b)(3) requires that questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members.

To recover damages for Cinemark's failure to accurately reflect
overtime pay in their wage statements, an employee must demonstrate
an injury that resulted from a knowing and intentional failure to
comply with California Labor Code section 226(a), which states,
every employer shall furnish each of his or her employees, an
accurate itemized statement in writing showing all applicable
hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding
number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee.

The central issue is whether the injury required for damages is
proven with actual individual injury or is presumed by the error
that appeared on the 66,527 wage statements. If an injury under
Section 226(e) is presumed from the erroneous wage statements,
there is little individualized inquiry required to establish
liability and common questions would predominate. Cinemark relies
on several cases, including to claim that the requisite injury in
this case must be individually demonstrated from the missing
information and may not be presumed. Brown responds that the cases
cited by Cinemark predate or do not account for the 2013 amendment
to the Labor Code, which contains plain language that employees are
deemed to suffer injury for purposes of this subdivision when their
wage statements contain errors.  

In this case, damages are determined by the objective standard of
an injury under the 2013 amendment. Whether a putative class member
can promptly determine information as required by 226(a) is a
common question with a common form of proof. Cinemark's liability
for the direct wage statement claim is answerable by common forms
of proof like Cinemark's uniform wage statements, and testimony of
leadership at Cinemark regarding knowledge and intent of any errors
in the wage statements.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 16, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ya33g5y5 from Leagle.com.

Joseph Amey, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
siturated, Plaintiff, represented by Hannah Ruth Salassi , Lvovich
& Szucsko, P.C., Scott Edward Cole -- scole@scalaw.com -- Scott
Cole & Associates, APC, Christopher Brian Johnson , Scott Cole &
Associates APC, Courtland Wayne Creekmore -- ccreekmore@scalaw.com
-- Scott Cole & Associates, APC, Jonathan Sing Lee --
Jonathan.Lee@capstonelawyers.com -- Capstone Law APC, Matthew
Roland Bainer -- mbainer@bainerlawfirm.com -- The Bainer Law Firm,
Stan Karas -- SKaras@glancylaw.com -- Capstone Law APC & Stephen
Noel Ilg , Ilg Legal Office, P.C.

Silken Brown, individually and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated and as aggrieved employees
pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"), Plaintiff,
represented by Jonathan Sing Lee , Capstone Law APC, Katherine Ward
Kehr , Capstone Law APC, Scott Edward Cole , Scott Cole &
Associates, APC, Christopher Brian Johnson , Scott Cole &
Associates APC, Liana Carol Carter , Capstone Law APC, Matthew
Roland Bainer , The Bainer Law Firm, Melissa Grant , Capstone Law
APC, Robert Joseph Drexler, Jr. , Capstone Law APC, Stan Karas ,
Capstone Law APC & Stephen Noel Ilg , Ilg Legal Office, P.C.

Mario De La Rosa, individually and on behalf of other members of
the general public similarly situated and as aggrieved employers
pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"), Plaintiff,
represented by Jonathan Sing Lee , Capstone Law APC, Katherine Ward
Kehr , Capstone Law APC, Matthew Thomas Theriault , Capstone Law
APC, Scott Edward Cole , Scott Cole & Associates, APC, Christopher
Brian Johnson , Scott Cole & Associates APC, Liana Carol Carter ,
Capstone Law APC, Matthew Roland Bainer , The Bainer Law Firm,
Melissa Grant , Capstone Law APC, Robert Joseph Drexler, Jr. ,
Capstone Law APC, Stan Karas , Capstone Law APC & Stephen Noel Ilg
, Ilg Legal Office, P.C.

Cinemark USA Inc, Defendant, represented by Emily Burkhardt Vicente
-- ebvicente@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, Matthew I.
Bobb -- mbobb@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton Andrew Kurth LLP & Michael
Brett Burns -- mbrettburns@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton Andrews Kurth
LLP.


COGNIZANT TECHNOLOGY: Robbins Arroyo Probes Securities Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Robbins Arroyo LLP is investigating
whether certain officers and directors of Cognizant Technology
Solutions Corporation (NasdaqGS: CTSH) breached their fiduciary
duties to shareholders.  Cognizant, a professional services
company, provides consulting, technology, and outsourcing services
worldwide.

Investors filed a class action complaint against Cognizant for
alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
According to the complaint, Cognizant officials engaged in an
illegal bribery scheme by making improper payments to obtain
permits and building licenses for some of the company's facilities
in India.  In so doing, Cognizant failed to enforce the company's
controls related to real estate and procurement in connection with
those facilities, all while falsely assuring investors that the
company operated under strict compliance with its anticorruption
policy.  On August 8, 2018, Senior U.S. District Court Judge
William H. Walls denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss
plaintiff's complaint, paving the way for litigation to proceed.

Cognizant Shareholders Have Legal Options

Concerned shareholders who would like more information about their
rights and potential remedies can contact attorney Leonid Kandinov
at (800) 350-6003, LKandinov@robbinsarroyo.com, or via the
shareholder information form on the firm's website.

Robbins Arroyo LLP -- http://www.robbinsarroyo.com-- is a
nationally recognized leader in shareholder rights law.  The firm
represents individual and institutional investors in shareholder
derivative and securities class action lawsuits, and has helped its
clients realize more than $1 billion of value for themselves and
the companies in which they have invested. [GN]


COMMONWEALTH FINANCIAL: Sellers Sue Over  FDCPA Violations
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Commonwealth
Financial Systems, Inc., et al.  The case is titled as Brittany
Sellers, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Commonwealth Financial Systems, Inc. and John Does 1-25
and Pendrick Capital Partners LLC, Case No. 2:18-cv-07576 (C.D.
Cal., August 30, 2018).

The lawsuit arises from alleged violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Commonwealth Financial Systems, Inc., provides financial services.
The Company offers first party outsourcing, check collection, skip
tracing, billing services, and debt purchasing services.

Pendrick Capital Partners provides consumer debt underwriting and
servicing services.  The Company is based in Key West,
Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan Aaron Stieglitz, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF JONATHAN A STIEGLITZ
          11845 West Olympic Boulevard, Suite 800
          Los Angeles, CA 90064
          Telephone: (323) 979-2063
          Facsimile: (323) 488-6748
          E-mail: jonathan.a.stieglitz@gmail.com


CREDIT PROTECTION: Accused by Friedman Suit of Violating FDCPA
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Credit Protection
Association L.P.  The case is styled as Aharon Friedman,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Credit Protection Association L.P., Case No. 7:18-cv-07924
(S.D.N.Y., August 30, 2018).

The Plaintiff accuses the Defendant of violating the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Headquartered in Dallas, Texas, Credit Protection Association L.P.
is a debt collector, and is licensed to collect debts
nationwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
          SANDERS LAW, PLLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 203-7600
          Facsimile: (516) 281-7601
          E-mail: csanders@sanderslawpllc.com


CVS PHARMACY: Averts Class Action over Flu Shot Text Messages
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Wichert, writing for Law360, reports that a New Jersey federal
judge on Aug. 14 nixed a putative class action against CVS Pharmacy
Inc. for allegedly violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
by notifying customers about the availability of flu shots via text
messages, finding that the messages fell under the so-called
"health care exemption."

U.S. District Judge Peter G. Sheridan said that exemption from the
TCPA liability applied to the matter because the company is a
health care provider and the text messages conveyed a health care
message. [GN]


CVS PHARMACY: Court Won't Certify Pharmacy Technicians' Class
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania denied Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class
Certification in the case captioned KEITH ROBERT DEAN, JR., and
ERIKA PRESSLEY, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. CVS PHARMACY, INC., and CVS CAREMARK
CORPORATION, Defendants. Civil Action No. 14-2136. (E.D. Pa.).

This is a putative class action on behalf of pharmacy technicians
against Defendant CVS Pharmacy, Inc., and CVS Caremark Corporation
(CVS). Plaintiff Keith Dean alleges that CVS forced technicians to
complete necessary educational certifications without pay in
violation of state wage protection statutes and basic contract law,
and, to that effect.

Rule 23(a) requires that (1) the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable (numerosity) (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class (commonality) (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class (typicality) and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class (adequacy).  

The Plaintiff seeks certification here under subsection (b)(3),
which further requires that the questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members (predominance), and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy (superiority).

The Plaintiff has failed to meet the requirements of Rule 23(a)
because he has not demonstrated commonality and typicality.
Plaintiff contends that he completed training modules on his own
time after hours, and in response to his repeated inquiries as to
how he would be compensated for that time, he was advised by his
supervisors that he was not entitled to any compensation. But after
extensive discovery, the record supports the conclusion that
Plaintiff's situation was an anomaly, the result of his supervisors
being ill-informed, and not representative of pharmacy technicians
in general.

The Plaintiff has also failed to show that his claims or defenses
are typical of the class. Unlike the commonality requirement,
typicality requires more than just one unifying factual or legal
question. Rather, it entails an inquiry as to whether the named
plaintiff's individual circumstances are markedly different or the
legal theory upon which the claims are based differs from that upon
which the claims of other class members will perforce be based.

The proposed class also fails to meet the additional requirement of
predominance under Rule 23(b)(3). The predominance inquiry requires
the court to "formulate some prediction as to how specific issues
will play out in order to determine whether common or individual
issues predominate in a given case." Here, the legal issues that
Plaintiff cites as predominant are not, because, as noted above,
CVS does not contest the right of technicians to be paid for
training time, and whether it has denied payment to any technician
besides Dean will require individualized determination.

Superiority is also lacking here. Subsection (b)(3)(C) of Rule 23
focuses the Court's attention on the desirability of concentrating
the claims in one judicial forum and on the record as it stands,
Dean's claim might be unique. Subsection (b)(3)(D) requires
consideration of the likely difficulties in managing a class
action. Given the fact-specific analysis that was required simply
to address the motions for summary judgement, it is apparent that
no simple rule can be applied to determine the merits of each
individual claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 16, 2018 Memorandum
is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yd3e9wy3 from Leagle.com.

KEITH ROBERT DEAN, JR., ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL D. DONOVAN ,
DONOVAN LITIGATION GROUP, LLC, & PHILIP J. GORDON --
pgordon@gordonllp.com -- GORDON LAW GROUP LLP.

MARILYN MONROE & ERIKA PRESSLEY, Plaintiffs, represented by MICHAEL
D. DONOVAN , DONOVAN LITIGATION GROUP, LLC.

CVS PHARMACY, INC. & CVS CAREMARK CORPORATION, Defendants,
represented by STEPHANIE JILL PEET --
stephanie.peet@jacksonlewis.com -- JACKSON LEWIS P.C. & FELICE B.
EKELMAN -- Felice.Ekelman@jacksonlewis.com -- JACKSON LEWIS.


DESERT DE ORO: Gauntt Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages Under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Brandon Gauntt, individually and on behalf of similarly situated
persons, Plaintiff, v. Desert De Oro Foods, Inc., Mark Peterson,
and Krystal Burge, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-01919 (D. Ariz., June
19, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime hours
owed under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Desert De Oro Foods operates numerous Pizza Hut franchise stores
where Gauntt worked as a delivery driver. He uses his own
automobile to deliver pizza.

The complaint says the Defendant use a flawed method to determine
reimbursement rates that provides such an unreasonably low rate
beneath any reasonable approximation of the expenses they incur
that the unreimbursed expenses cause wages to fall below the
federal minimum wage.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Matthew Haynie, Esq.
     Jay Forester, Esq.
     FORESTER HAYNIE PLLC
     1701 N. Market Street #201
     Dallas, TX 75202
     Phone: (214) 210-2100
     Email: matthew@foresterhaynie.com
            jay@foresterhaynie.com


DIVERSIFIED CONSULTANTS: Weiss Files FDCPA Breach Suit in N.Y.
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Diversified
Consultants Inc.  The case is titled as Joel Weiss, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Diversified
Consultants Inc., Case No. 1:18-cv-04942 (E.D.N.Y., August 30,
2018).

The lawsuit arises from alleged violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Diversified Consultants, Inc., provides claims collection services.
The Company offers pre-collection, claims adjustment, bad debt
management, third party transfer, and client access services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
          SANDERS LAW, PLLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 203-7600
          Facsimile: (516) 281-7601
          E-mail: csanders@sanderslawpllc.com


DIVINE AND SERVICE: Nicolaides Sues Over FDCPA Violations
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Divine and Service
LTD.  The case is styled as Nestor Nicolaides, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Divine and Service LTD.,
Case No. 2:18-cv-04945-JFB-AYS (E.D.N.Y., August 30, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Divine & Service Ltd. was founded in 1997.  The Company's line of
business includes collection and adjustment services on claims and
other insurance related issues.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
          SANDERS LAW, PLLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 203-7600
          Facsimile: (516) 281-7601
          E-mail: csanders@sanderslawpllc.com


EATON CORP: Court Dismisses 2nd Amended Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: EATON CORPORATION SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case
No. 16-cv-5894 (JGK) (S.D. N.y.), Judge John G. Koeltel of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Consolidated Class
Action Complaint.

The lawsuit is a securities action purportedly brought on behalf of
a class of all purchasers of publicly traded common stock and/or
exchange-traded options on such common stock of Eaton between May
21, 2012 and July 28, 2014, so long as they purchased at least one
share or option from Nov. 13, 2013 through July 28, 2014,
inclusive.  The lead Plaintiff, South Carolina Retirement Systems
Group Trust, asserts violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder,
against Eaton and two senior executives of the Company, namely,
Alexander M. Cutler and Richard H. Fearon.  The Plaintiff also
asserted control person liability under Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act against the individual Defendants.

On Jan. 13, 2017, the lead Plaintiff filed a Consolidated Class
Action Complaint ("CCAC").  Generally, the CCAC alleged that Cutler
and Fearon made misleading statements following the merger
regarding whether Eaton was able to spin-off the vehicle business
on a tax-free basis.  The CCAC alleged that Cutler and Fearon
misled the market into believing that there were no restrictions on
Eaton's ability to spin-off the automotive business when in reality
Eaton could not complete a tax-free spin-off for five years
following the merger.  In an Opinion and Order dated Sept. 20,
2017, the Court dismissed the CCAC without prejudice for failure to
plead any material misrepresentations or scienter.

On June 8, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Consolidated
Class Action Complaint ("SAC").  In the SAC, the Plaintiff asserts
the same theory of fraud, namely that the Defendants misled the
plaintiff and the market when they failed to disclose that the
automotive business could not be spun-off on a tax-free basis for
five years following Eaton's merger with Cooper.  However, the SAC
includes several new allegations, including additional alleged
misstatements, additional references to analyst reports, and two
expert opinions.

The SAC also adds references to, and quotes from, additional
analyst reports discussing a potential spin-off of the automotive
business.  It also includes opinions from two experts regarding the
economic viability of a taxable sale of the automotive business.

The Defendants now move to dismiss the SAC pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  They argue that (i) the Plaintiff
cannot expand the class period to encompass misrepresentations that
were made between May 21, 2012 and Nov. 12, 2013 because claims
from the expanded class period are allegedly barred by the statute
of limitations; (ii) the amendments in the CCAC do not undermine
the Court's finding that the Defendants were under no duty to
disclose the potential tax consequences of a spin-off of the
automotive division because they had repeatedly stated that they
did not intend to complete the spin-off and they never did spin-off
that division; and (iii) the SAC does not allege facts supporting a
strong inference of scienter.

Judge Koeltel the fact that the Plaintiff has successfully expanded
the class period does not affect the rationale for the dismissal of
the action.  In its original decision dismissing the CCAC, the
Court found that all of the misstatements alleged, except for the
Nov. 13, 2013 alleged misstatement, were not actionable because
they were not made during the class period.  Nevertheless it went
on to consider the merits of all of the eight alleged misstatements
and found that none of them was actionable.  Similarly, none of the
statements alleged in the SAC is actionable.

The Judge finds that the SAC fails to overcome the flaws of the
CCAC with respect to the pleading of material misstatements or
omissions.  Like the CCAC, the SAC does not allege plausibly that
the Defendants made any material misstatements or that Eaton was
subject to a duty to disclose the hypothetical tax consequences of
a theoretical spin-off of Eaton's automotive business that Eaton
repeatedly disclaimed it had any intention to complete, and never
did.

The allegations in the SAC do not change the Court's finding that
the compelling opposing inference is that neither Cutler nor Fearon
thought that they had any obligation to discuss the possible tax
consequences of a theoretical spin-off that Eaton had no plans to
make, and that neither executive intended to deceive anyone about
such tax consequences.  Therefore, the Judge holds the SAC does not
adequately plead a strong inference of scienter.

Finally, because the Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible primary
violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Plaintiff has not
satisfied the elements of a Section 20(a) claim, and that claim
must also be dismissed.

Judge Koeltel has considered all of the arguments raised by the
parties.  To the extent not specifically addressed, the arguments
are either moot or without merit.  For all of the reasons explained
in the Court's original opinion dismissing the CCAC, and the
reasons he explained, the Judge granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.  The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment
dismissing the action and closing the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 25, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/zw9OCQ from Leagle.com.

South Carolina Retirement Systems Group Trust, Lead Plaintiff,
represented by Christopher J. Keller -- keller@labaton.com --
Labaton Sucharow, LLP, Francis Paul McConville --
fmcconville@labaton.com -- Labaton & Sucharow LLP, Louis Gottlieb
-- lgottlieb@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow, LLP, Thomas A. Dubbs
-- tdubbs@labaton.com -- Labaton Sucharow, LLP, Irina Vasilchenko
-- ivasilchenko@labaton.com -- Labaton & Sucharow LLP & Jeffrey
Aaron Dubbin -- jdubbin@labaton.com -- Labaton & Sucharow LLP.

Steamfitters Local 449 Pension Plan, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Francis
Paul McConville, Labaton & Sucharow LLP, Louis Gottlieb, Labaton
Sucharow, LLP, Irina Vasilchenko, Labaton & Sucharow LLP, Jeffrey
Aaron Dubbin, Labaton & Sucharow LLP, Christopher J. Keller,
Labaton Sucharow, LLP & Thomas A. Dubbs, Labaton Sucharow, LLP.

Helene Karafin Gabriele, Individually and on behalf of all others
similiary situated, Consolidated Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy
Alan Lieberman -- jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Joseph
Alexander Hood, II -- ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Louisiana Sheriffs Pension & Relief Fund, Movant, represented by
Gerald H. Silk -- jerry@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
Grossmann LLP.

The Council of the Borough of South Tyneside Acting in Its Capacity
as the Administering Authority of the Tyne and Wear Pension Fund,
Movant, represented by David Avi Rosenfeld --
DRosenfeld@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Eaton Corporation PLC, Alexander Cutler & Richard Fearon,
Defendants, represented by James Ellis Brandt --
james.brandt@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP & Jeff G. Hammel --
jeff.hammel@lw.com -- Latham and Watkins.

International Union of Operating Engineers Pension Fund of Eastern
Pennsylvania and Delaware, Interested Party, represented by Mary
Sikra Thomas, Grant & Eisenhofer, PA.


ESTES FORWARDING: Faces Kirkland Suit in Calif. Superior Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Estes Forwarding
Worldwide LLC, et al.  The case is styled as GISELLE KIRKLAND, ON
BEHALF OF HERSELF, ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. ESTES
FORWARDING WORLDWIDE LLC, A VIRGINIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY and
DOES 1 TO 50, Case No. CGC18569316 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco
Cty., August 30, 2018).

Estes Forwarding Worldwide LLC provides logistics services.  The
Company offers truckload, consolidation, documentation, supply
chain, warehousing, distribution management, and other
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chaim Shaun Setareh, Esq.
          SETAREH LAW GROUP
          9454 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 907
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212-2911
          Telephone: (310) 888-7771
          Facsimile: (310) 888-0109
          E-mail: shaun@setarehlaw.com


EXXON MOBIL: Bid to Dismiss Climate-Change Accounting Case Tossed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Tom Korosec, writing for Bloomberg News, reports that Exxon Mobil
Corp. must face a lawsuit by investors who blamed a drop in the
company's shares on the disclosure that regulators were
scrutinizing its reserve accounting related to climate change.

U.S. District Judge Ed Kinkeade on Aug. 14 denied Exxon's bid to
dismiss the suit.  Judge Kinkeade wrote that the Greater
Pennsylvania Carpenters Pension Fund sufficiently pleaded
securities fraud claims against the oil giant and several
executives, including former Chief Executive Officer Rex
Tillerson.

In the case in Dallas federal court, investors said the Irving,
Texas-based company refused to write down any of its oil and gas
reserves in the face of declining oil prices.

On Aug. 13, Exxon said in a court filing that the Securities and
Exchange Commission concluded its investigation into the company
and didn't recommend any enforcement action.

The case is Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 3:16-cv-3111, U.S.
District Court, Northern District of Texas (Dallas). [GN]


EZCORP INC: J. Rooney Can File TAC in Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN ROONEY, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. EZCORP, INC. and MARK E.
KUCHENRITHER, Defendants, Cause No. A-15-CA-00608-SS (W.D. Tex.),
Judge Sam Sparks of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Texas, Austin Division, granted the Plaintiff's Motion
for Leave to File Third Amended Class Action Complaint.

The case is a securities fraud class action brought on behalf of
all persons who purchased Class A common stock of Defendant EZCORP
-- a company which provides instant cash services like payday loans
and pawn loans -- between Nov. 7, 2013 and Oct. 20, 2015.  Lead
Plaintiff Rooney, on behalf of the Plaintiff class, alleges that
during the Class Period, Defendant Mark Kuchenrither, EZCORP's CFO,
CEO, and the only individual Defendant, made material
misrepresentations to shareholders in violation of Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule
10b-5.

The Plaintiff filed the lawsuit on July 20, 2015, alleging the
Defendants false and misleading statements caused EZCORP's stock to
trade at artificially inflated prices and the Plaintiff suffered
financial losses as a result of EZCORP's restated financial
reports.  

The Court granted the Defendants' first motion to dismiss,
concluding the Plaintiff failed to plead facts demonstrating a
strong inference that Kuchenrither possessed the requisite scienter
when the statements were made.  The Court's dismissal was without
prejudice, and the Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint on
Nov. 4, 2016.

In the second amended complaint, the Plaintiff again alleged the
Defendants violated federal securities law by making false and
misleading statements designed to artificially inflate the price of
EZCORP's stock.  And again, the Defendants moved to dismiss.  This
time, the Court found the Plaintiff had adequately pled facts
giving rise to a strong inference of scienter as to the Loan Sale
statements, but not as to the Non-Performing Loan statements.

Discovery proceeded on the Plaintiffs surviving claims.  During the
course of discovery, the Plaintiff uncovered documents allegedly
bolstering their allegations of scienter as to misstatements made
about the Non-Performing Loans.  The Plaintiff now seeks to file a
third amended complaint containing new allegations based on these
documents.  

First, the Plaintiff alleges Kuchenrither received an email from
Jeff Byal in April 2014 which discussed Grupo Finmart's accounting
deficiencies.  Second, he alleges Kuchenrither likely received a
report on accounting shortcomings at Grupo Finmart before making at
least some of the misstatements identified by the Plaintiff.
Because the deadline for the filing of amended pleadings has
passed, the Plaintiff also seeks leave to amend the scheduling
order.

The Defendants argue the Court should deny the Plaintiffs motion
because the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") bars
the use of discovery materials to revive previously dismissed
claims.  They also argue the Court should deny the Plaintiff's
motion because he cannot demonstrate good cause to amend the
scheduling order under Rule 16(b) and because there is substantial
reason to deny leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2).

Judge Sparks finds thatthe Plaintiff's new allegations have
remedied the pleading shortcomings previously identified by the
Court.  The new allegations support a strong inference that
Kuchenrither knew or had reason to believe that deficiencies in
Grupo Finmart's accounting practices were obscuring weaknesses in
the company's loan portfolio.  The allegations also suggest
Kuchenrither knew of these deficiencies prior to making at least
some of the misstatements identified by Plaintiff in late 2014 and
early 2015.  Thus, because the Plaintiff's new allegations succeed
in establishing a strong inference of scienter, the Judge concludes
amendment would not be futile.  Further, because he finds there is
no substantial reason to deny leave to amend, he granted the
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Class Action
Complaint.

Though he granted the Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend, he's
mindful of the Defendants' desire to avoid unduly delaying the
litigation.  Therefore,he establishes a number of briefing
deadlines aimed at keeping the litigation on schedule.  The
Defendants will have until Aug. 3, 2018 to file an amended answer,
if necessary.  The Plaintiff's pending motion for class
certification is dismissed without prejudice.  The Plaintiff will
have until Aug. 31, 2018 to file an amended motion for class
certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 25, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/2RCdPD from Leagle.com.

John Rooney, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Charles H. Linehan ,
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Jacob Allen Walker --
Jake@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP, Jamie Jean McKey --
jmckey@kendalllawgroup.com -- Kendall Law Group PLLC, Jeffrey C.
Block -- Jeff@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP, Joseph D. Cohen
-- jcohen@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP & Joe
Kendall -- jkendall@kendalllawgroup.com -- Kendall Law Group,
PLLC.

EZCORP, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jennifer Barrett Poppe --
jpoppe@velaw.com -- Vinson & Elkins, Michael C. Holmes --
mholmes@velaw.com -- Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P. & Stephen S. Gilstrap
-- sgilstrap@velaw.com -- Vinson & Elkins LLP.

Mark E. Kuchenrither, Defendant, represented by Alithea Z. Sullivan
-- asullivan@ebbklaw.com -- Ewell, Brown & Blanke, LLP, Gary Ewell,
Ewell, Brown, Blanke & Knight LLP & Jennifer Barrett Poppe, Vinson
& Elkins.


FBCS INC: Violates Fair Debt Collection Act, Sellers Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against FBCS, Inc., et al.
The case is styled as Brittany Sellers, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. FBCS, Inc., CP Medical, LLC and
John Does 1-25, Case No. 2:18-cv-07577-PSG-SS (C.D. Cal., August
30, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

FBCS, Inc., collects consumer debt for healthcare, auto finance,
education, utility, and consumer credit industries.  CP Medical,
LLC, provide healthcare services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan Aaron Stieglitz, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF JONATHAN A. STIEGLITZ
          11845 West Olympic Boulevard, Suite 800
          Los Angeles, CA 90064
          Telephone: (323) 979-2063
          Facsimile: (323) 488-6748
          E-mail: jonathan.a.stieglitz@gmail.com


FIRSTMARK SERVICES: Can't Compel Arbitration in Goden's Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re: TASHANNA B. GOLDEN, fka TASHANNA B PEARSON,
Chapter 7, Debtor. TASHANNA B. GOLDEN, Plaintiff, v. JP MORGAN
CHASE BANK, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE TRUST, FIRSTMARK SERVICES, GOLDEN
TREE ASSET MANAGEMENT LP, GS2 2016-A (GS2), NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2005-3, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN TRUST
2006-4, PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE AGENCY D/B/A
AMERICAN EDUCATION SERVICES, Defendants, Case No. 16-40809-ess,
Adv. Pro. No. 17-01005-ess (E.D. N.Y.), Judge Elizabeth S. Stong of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, for the Eastern District of New York
denied Firstmark Services' motion to compel arbitration.

On Feb. 29, 2016, Golden, formerly known as Tashanna B. Pearson,
filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
On July 28, 2016, the Chapter 7 Trustee filed a no-asset report
stating that there is no property available for distribution from
the estate over and above that exempted by law.  On Aug. 3, 2016,
the Court entered an order discharging Ms. Golden, and on that same
day, her bankruptcy case was closed.  On Dec. 6, 2016, Ms. Golden
filed a motion to reopen her bankruptcy case to obtain a
determination of the dischargeability of certain of her student
loans, and on Jan. 10, 2017, the Court entered an order reopening
the case.

On Jan. 18, 2017, Ms. Golden commenced the adversary proceeding as
a putative class action, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, by filing a complaint against JP Morgan Chase Bank,
Firstmark Services, GoldenTree Asset, and National Collegiate Trust
seeking a determination that certain debts that she incurred as a
student are not nondischargeable student loan debts under
Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(8)(B), and a finding of contempt
against the Defendants for civil contempt for willful violations of
the bankruptcy discharge injunction.

On May 31, 2017, the Court approved a stipulation between Ms.
Golden and National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-3 and
2006-4, permitting the Trusts to intervene in the action.  And on
July 25, 2017, the Court approved a stipulation of dismissal as to
Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank.

On Oct. 17, 2017, Ms. Golden filed a First Amended Complaint to add
class action allegations and additional Defendants.  And on Nov. 2,
2017, Ms. Golden voluntarily dismissed Defendant GoldenTree Asset
Management from the action.

Ms. Golden alleges that the Defendants have knowingly appropriated
a legal presumption for a class of debt -- including certain loans
that she took out while she was a student at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School -- that they know is not entitled to a
presumption of nondischargeability.  She claims that the Defendants
knowingly misled her and other student debtors about the nature of
these obligations.

Ms. Golden advances these allegations on behalf of an alleged class
of similarly situated individuals who have declared bankruptcy
since 2005 across the United States, with loans originated or
serviced by the Defendants.  And Ms. Golden alleges that certain of
the debts that she incurred in connection with her law school
education are not nondischargeable student loans under Bankruptcy
Code Section 523, and that the Defendants, including Firstmark,
violated the discharge injunction entered in her bankruptcy case by
seeking to collect on these debts after she received her bankruptcy
discharge.

Ms. Golden requests a declaratory judgment, pursuant to Judiciary
Code Section 2201 and Bankruptcy Rule 7001(9), that her debts were
discharged by operation of law on Aug. 3, 2016, the date of her
bankruptcy discharge, because they are not student loans excluded
from discharge under Section 523(a)(8).  She claims that since the
Defendants were notified of the Discharge Order pursuant to
Bankruptcy Rule 4004(g) and still sought to collect on her debts by
use of dunning letters, e-mails, text messages, and telephone
calls, the Court should cite the Defendants for civil contempt and
order them to pay damages in an amount to be determined at trial
for willful violations of the Discharge Order and Bankruptcy Code
Section 524, and also to pay her attorneys' fees and costs.

On Dec. 8, 2017, Firstmark moved to compel arbitration of Ms.
Golden's claims, or in the alternative, to dismiss the case, and
filed a memorandum of law in support.  Firstmark argues that Ms.
Golden contractually agreed to arbitrate each of the claims that
she asserts here, and that her agreement to arbitrate is valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable.  It argues that the promissory note
that established the terms of the loan at issue, referred to as the
Citibank Loan, contains a sweeping arbitration provision.

Judge Stong finds that Ms. Golden's claims for a determination that
certain of her debts were discharged by operation of law because
they are not student loans excluded from discharge under Bankruptcy
Code Section 523(a)(8), and that the Defendants violated the
Discharge Order, are core matters.

The Judge finds that Ms. Golden's allegations and claims for relief
seek the enforcement of a court order -- the discharge injunction
-- that is central to the statutory scheme and purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code.  Courts -- not arbitration proceedings -- are the
appropriate forums to address alleged violations of court orders.
And the resolution of Ms. Golden's claims directly implicates goals
and objectives that are central to the purposes of the Bankruptcy
Code, including the goal of providing a debtor with a fresh start.
For these reasons, the Judge finds that arbitration of Ms. Golden's
claims would inherently conflict with the Bankruptcy Code's
objectives, and that therefore, the consideration too weighs
against compelling arbitration of these claims.

For these reasons, she finds that arbitration of Ms. Golden's
claims would present a severe and inherent conflict with the
Bankruptcy Code, and additionally, that it would necessarily
jeopardize the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code.  As a result, she
declines to compel arbitration of Ms. Golden's claims.

Based on the entire record, and for the reasons set forth, Judge
Stong concluded that Firstmark Services has not established that
the Court should compel arbitration of the claims in the adversary
proceeding, and Firstmark Services' Motion to Compel Arbitration is
denied.  An order in accordance with the Memorandum Decision will
be entered simultaneously with Memorandum Decision.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 25, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/0qGSIh from Leagle.com.

Tashanna B Golden, Plaintiff, rrepresented by George F. Carpinello
-- gcarpinello@bsfllp.com -- Boies Schiller Flexner, LLP, Adam Shaw
-- ashaw@bsfllp.com -- Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Austin C. Smith
-- smitha83@miamioh.edu -- Smith Law Group, Lynn E. Swanson --
swanson@jonesswanson.com -- Jones, Swanson, Huddell & Garrison, LLC
& Robert C. Tietjen -- rtietjen@bsfllp.com -- Boies Schiller
Flexner LLP.

National Collegiate Trust, Defendant, represented by Geoffrey J.
Peters --gpeters@weltman.com -- Weltman Weinberg & Reis Co LPA.

Firstmark Services, Defendant, represented by Charles F. Kaplan --
ckaplan@perrylawfirm.com -- Perry Guthery Haase & Gessford PC &
Barbara L. Seniawski, The Seniawski Law Firm PLLC.

GS2 2016-A, National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-3 &
National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-4, Defendants,
represented by Gregory T. Casamento -- gcasamento@lockelord.com --
Locke Lord LLP, James Matthew Goodin -- jmgoodin@lockelord.com --
Locke Lord LLP & Geoffrey J. Peters, Weltman Weinberg & Reis Co
LPA.

Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency, d/b/a American
Education Services, Defendant, represented by H. Peter Haveles, Jr.
-- havelesp@pepperlaw.com -- Pepper Hamilton LLP & Francis J.
Lawall -- lawallf@pepperlaw.com -- Pepper Hamilton, LLP.


FORD MOTOR: Kessler Topaz Files Class Action Over Water Pumps
-------------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP on Aug. 14
disclosed that it has filed a class action lawsuit against Ford
Motor Company ("Ford") in the Eastern District of Michigan on
behalf of all persons in the United States who purchased, own,
owned, lease or leased the following vehicles:  Ford Edge
(2007-2018); Ford Explorer (2011-2018); Ford F150 (2015-2017); Ford
Flex (2009-2018); Ford Fusion (2010-2012); Ford Taurus (2008-2018);
Lincoln MKX (2007-2010); Lincoln MKZ (2007-2012); and Mercury Sable
(2008-2009).  The case is Roe, et al. v. Ford Motor Company, Case
No. 2:18-cv-12528.

Owners or Lessees of Ford vehicles with a defective water pump who
wish to discuss their legal rights or interests are encouraged to
contact Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP (James Maro, Esq. or
Adrienne Bell, Esq.) at (888) 299-7706 or (610) 667-7706, or via
e-mail at info@ktmc.com.For additional information please visit:
www.ktmc.com/ford-lincoln-water-pump-engine-failure.

The complaint alleges that, beginning in 2007 and continuing
through the present, Ford has equipped millions of vehicles sold
under the Ford, Lincoln and Mercury brand names with the Ford
Cyclone Engine, also known as the Duratec engine.  Unbeknownst to
purchasers and lessees of these vehicles, the Ford Cyclone Engine
contains a defect in design, manufacturing, materials and/or
workmanship that causes the water pump to suddenly and prematurely
fail—before the end of the useful life of the engine—and can
lead to catastrophic engine failure.

The chain-driven water pump in the Ford Cyclone Engine is located
internal to the engine.  When the water pump prematurely fails,
coolant leaks from the water pump directly into engine parts or the
oil pan, destroying essential engine components or mixing with the
engine's oil.  In many cases, this mixture of engine oil and
coolant is carried throughout the engine, leading to destruction of
the engine.  This often occurs with little to no warning.  Despite
having knowledge of this defect, Ford has continued selling
defective vehicles, has failed to disclose the defect to owners and
lessees, has not issued a recall, and has not remedied the issue
and/or compensated owners and lessees of the defective vehicles.

Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP -- http://www.ktmc.com--
prosecutes class actions in state and federal courts throughout the
country.  Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP is a driving force
behind corporate governance reform, and has recovered billions of
dollars on behalf of institutional and individual investors from
the United States and around the world.  The firm represents
investors, consumers and whistleblowers (private citizens who
report fraudulent practices against the government and share in the
recovery of government dollars). [GN]


FOUNDATION MEDICINE: Bid to Drop Mahoney Class Suit Still Ongoing
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Foundation Medicine, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the court in the case,
Mahoney v. Foundation Medicine, Inc., et al. has not yet scheduled
oral argument on defendants' motion to dismiss.

On July 28, 2017, a purported stockholder of the Company filed a
putative class action in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Massachusetts, against the Company and certain of its current
and former executives, captioned Mahoney v. Foundation Medicine,
Inc., et al., No. 1:17-cv-11394.

The complaint alleges violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
thereunder based on allegedly false and misleading statements and
omissions when providing 2015 financial guidance.

The lawsuit seeks among other things, unspecified compensatory
damages in connection with the Company's allegedly inflated stock
price between February 26, 2014 and November 3, 2015, interest,
attorneys' fees and costs, and unspecified equitable/injunctive
relief.  

On December 22, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended class action
complaint alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder based on allegedly false and
misleading statements and omissions concerning providing 2015
financial guidance and other statements during the class period
concerning demand and reimbursement for certain of the Company's
tests.  

On February 20, 2018, the Company moved to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim, which plaintiffs opposed on April 23,
2018. On June 7, 2018, defendants filed a reply in further support
of their motion to dismiss.  

Foundation Medicine said "The court has not yet scheduled oral
argument on defendants' motion to dismiss. We believe this case is
without merit and, therefore, continue to vigorously defend
ourselves against the allegations."  

Foundation Medicine, Inc. provides various molecular information
products in the United States. The company was founded in 2009 and
is headquartered in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Foundation Medicine,
Inc. is a subsidiary of Roche Holdings, Inc.


GENERAL MOTORS: Faces Class Action Over Air Conditioning Problems
-----------------------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that a GM air
conditioning class-action lawsuit accuses the automaker of
manufacturing and selling a line of trucks and SUVs with air
conditioners that stop working.

According to the lawsuit, more than 2 million trucks and SUVs in
the U.S. share the same air conditioning designs and were built on
a vehicle platform known as GMT K2XX.

   -- 2015-2017 Cadillac Escalade and Escalade ESV
   -- 2015-2017 Chevrolet Suburban
   -- 2015-2017 Chevrolet Tahoe
   -- 2014-2017 GMC Sierra 1500
   -- 2015-2016 GMC Sierra Heavy Duty
   -- 2014-2017 Chevrolet Silverado 1500
   -- 2015-2016 Chevrolet Silverado Heavy Duty

One of the plaintiffs says he purchased a new 2014 Chevrolet
Silverado 1500 LTZ from a Chevy dealer in Florida, and living in
Florida means Manning needed a truck with a good working air
conditioner.

The plaintiff, Steve Manning, claims the air conditioner stopped
blowing cold air in March 2017 when the truck had about 50,000
miles on the odometer.  He took the Silverado to a GM dealer and
technicians said the problem was caused by leaks from the
low-pressure condenser hose and the condenser.

Mr. Manning says the dealer charged $154.00 for the diagnosis and
quoted the repair cost at $1367.17 to use GM parts.  However, the
dealer allegedly said it couldn't get the parts anytime soon, but
repairs could be made with non-GM certified parts for $1663.75.
Choosing this route would mean a wait of three months, something
the plaintiff didn't want to do in the Florida heat.

Mr. Manning says he did research online and discovered GM had
allegedly been having a lot of problems with the air conditioning
in its vehicles.  He also learned GM had created a special bracket
(part# 23264893) to prevent failures of the low-pressure condenser
hose.

According to the plaintiff, he was never told about the part that
cost less than $7.00, the same part that would have prevented his
air conditioning problems in the first place.  The plaintiff also
claims the GM parts were unavailable because his air conditioner
was out of warranty.

Mr. Manning says he found a non-GM part and made the repair himself
but paid about $500 to $600 for parts and tools, plus another $150
to recharge the air conditioning system.

The lawsuit alleges the plaintiff checked out pickup trucks from
Ford and Toyota before he purchased the Chevy Silverado and knowing
what he knows now he would not have bought the Silverado if GM
would have warned him about the air conditioner failures.

Air conditioners work only when the systems are properly sealed to
prevent refrigerant from escaping because even a tiny leak will
prevent the evaporators from cooling down and sending cold air into
the cabins where the occupants are riding.  In addition, other
system components are at risk of failing or seizing if the
refrigerant leaks out.

Vehicle condensers are used as heat exchangers where refrigerant
enters the condenser hot and is cooled there, but GM further says
the condenser functions as a "combination transmission fluid/oil
and AC condenser cooler."  This means the condenser has multiple
lines running into and out of it that carry different fluids at
different temperatures.

The class-action alleges there are at least two defective
components that cause the air conditioners to fail.  First is the
line leading from the compressor to the condenser, which is really
just an aluminum tube connected to a rubber hose.  The plaintiffs
claim the aluminum tube can disconnect from the rubber hose and
allow refrigerant to leak out.

GM allegedly no longer manufactures the compressor to condenser
line originally used in the vehicles because technical service
bulletin (TSB) PIT5331 tells GM technicians to replace the line
with a newly designed tube.  Additionally, dealers were told in the
2014 TSB to install a bracket to minimize the flexing and movement
of the line.

However, owners need to pay for this work if technicians perform
repairs after the warranties expire.

Along with the alleged problems with the compressor to condenser
lines, the lawsuit says the air conditioner condensers are
defective because the materials used to manufacture the condensers
are defective.

The plaintiffs claim documents from General Motors prove the
automaker knew about the air conditioner defects beginning from the
time GM sold the vehicles.  The 2014 TSB references "the compressor
to condenser line" and notes "[s]ome owners may comment that the
a/c is blowing warm."

General Motors goes on to write:

"If, after performing normal diagnostics and the source of the leak
is either not found, or it is found at/near the rear of the
compressor, it may be caused by a small crack in the compressor to
condenser line.  The compressor to condenser line may have a small
crack or pinhole located at the inside radius of the first bend
near the compressor, as shown below."

GM Compressor to Condenser Line Leak

"If the a/c line cracks, it may spray oil and refrigerant onto the
a/c compressor, making the leak very hard to identify.  To repair
this condition and prevent it from reoccurring, replace the
compressor to condenser line and install the line bracket shown
below.  After completing the repairs, recharge the refrigerant
system and perform a leak test to verify proper operation."

The plaintiffs claim the TSB was issued to dealers because of a
large number of complaints, then in May 2015 General Motors issued
bulletin PIE0340, "A/C Inoperative or Poor Performance on Recent
Built Vehicles."  The bulletin concerns 2015 models and how "Some
customers may comment on the A/C not performing as intended or the
A/C not performing at all."

According to the plaintiffs, this is further proof GM knew about
the defective air conditioners before the vehicles were even on
dealer lots.

The plaintiffs claim the condensers can't handle normal operations,
something GM took note of in November 2017 when the automaker
mailed notices to owners.  However, the lawsuit alleges only
certain customers were mailed the notices that said the vehicles:

". . . may have a condition where thermal cycling on the
combination transmission fluid/oil and AC condenser cooler creates
a crack that may allow refrigerant to escape.  This condition
consequently may deactivate the AC system . . . "

The letter said GM would provide additional protection for the
condition for 5 years or 60,000 miles, whichever occurs first, in
Suburbans, Tahoes and Yukons.  For owners of Cadillac Escalades the
extension was increased to 6 years or 72,000 miles, whichever
occurs first.  But Silverados and Sierras were not included in this
warranty extension.

The GM air conditioning class-action lawsuit was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Miami Division
- Manning, et al., v. General Motors Company, et al.

The plaintiffs are represented by the Hickey Law Firm, P.A., the
Law Office of Richard Schechter PC, Reich & Binstock LLP, and the
Law Offices of Ernest Bo Hopmann III. [GN]


GOLDEN GATE: Blumenthal Nordrehaug Files Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
The Los Angeles Employment law attorneys at Blumenthal Nordrehaug
Bhowmik De Blouw LLP, filed a class action lawsuit against Golden
Gate America West LLC, alleging that the company failed to lawfully
provide meal and rest periods and pay their California employees
for all overtime worked.  The class action lawsuit against Golden
Gate America West LLC, is currently pending in the Los Angeles
County Superior Court, Case No. BC714176.

The lawsuit alleges the company does not have a policy or practice
which provides legally compliant thirty minute uninterrupted meal
breaks and paid rest breaks to their California Drivers.  The
lawsuit further alleges that the failure of Golden Gate America
West LLC, to provide the legally required meal and rest period is
evidenced by the company's records.  The complaint further alleges,
DEFENDANT did not have in place an immutable timekeeping system to
accurately record and pay PLAINTIFF and other CALIFORNIA CLASS
Members for the actual time these employees worked each day,
including overtime hours.  As a result DEFENDANT was able to and
did in fact systematically, unlawfully, and unilaterally alter the
time recorded in DEFENDANT's timekeeping system for PLAINTIFF and
the members of the CALIFORNIA CLASS in order to avoid paying these
employees the applicable overtime compensation for overtime worked
and to avoid paying these employees for missed meal breaks.

Additionally, the lawsuit alleges that the employees were not
reimbursed for all their necessary business expenses incurred on
Defendant's behalf.  Under California Labor Code Section 2802,
employers are required to indemnify employees for all expenses
incurred in the course and scope of their employment. Cal. Lab.
Code § 2802 expressly states that "an employer shall indemnify his
or her employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred
by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or
her duties, or of his or her obedience to the directions of the
employer, even though unlawful, unless the employee, at the time of
obeying the directions, believed them to be unlawful."

For more information about the class action lawsuit against Golden
Gate America West LLC, call (858) 952-0354 to speak to Attorney
Nicholas De Blouw.

Blumenthal, Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP, is a labor law firm
with law offices located in San Diego County, Riverside County, Los
Angeles County, Sacramento County, and San Francisco County. The
firm has a statewide practice of representing employees on a
contingency basis for violations involving unpaid wages, overtime
pay, discrimination, harassment, wrongful termination and other
types of illegal workplace conduct. [GN]


GOLDMAN SACHS: Shareholders Can Pursue Class Action Over CDOs
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Stempel, writing for Reuters, reports that a federal judge
on Aug. 14 said Goldman Sachs Group Inc. shareholders may again
pursue class-action claims that the bank concealed conflicts of
interest when creating risky subprime securities before the 2008
financial crisis.

U.S. District Judge Paul Crotty in Manhattan said shareholders
could sue as a group because Goldman had not shown it more likely
than not that its alleged misstatements had no impact on its stock
price.

Goldman spokesman Michael DuVally declined to comment. Class
actions can allow plaintiffs to seek larger recoveries at lower
cost than if they sued individually.

The Arkansas Teacher Retirement System and other investors from
February 2007 to June 2010 claimed to have lost more than $13
billion because Goldman had in regulatory filings and public
comments overstated its ability to manage conflicts.

They said Goldman did this while concealing short positions that
the Wall Street bank or hedge fund manager John Paulson had made in
four subprime mortgage collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).

These CDOs included Abacus 2007 AC-1, the centerpiece of a probe
that led to Goldman's $550 million settlement of civil claims by
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.  Goldman did not admit
wrongdoing in agreeing to settle.

Judge Crotty had certified a class action in September 2015, but
the federal appeals court in Manhattan overturned him in January,
saying he imposed too high a burden on Goldman.

The Aug. 14 decision came after Goldman offered new testimony from
two expert witnesses, Harvard Business School professor Paul
Gompers and New York University law professor Stephen Choi.

But Judge Crotty said a damages model offered by the plaintiffs'
expert John Finnerty, a managing director at AlixPartners, "at the
very least, establishes a link between the news of Goldman's
conflicts and the subsequent stock declines."

That, he said, "is sufficient."

The plaintiffs "look forward to heading toward trial," Spencer
Burkholz, one of their lawyers, said in a statement.

The case is In re Goldman Sachs Group Inc Securities Litigation,
U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 10-03461.
[GN]


GUARDIAN PROTECTION: 3rd Cir. Remands UTPCPL Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Malfitano, writing for PennRecord, reports that a class
action lawsuit initiated against a Warrendale home security company
and which invoked the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law, has been remanded to its court of origin by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

On Aug. 6, Third Circuit judges Joseph A. Greenaway Jr., Patty
Shwartz and U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
Judge Jerome B. Simandle (appointed by designation) remanded the
case filed by Jose Danganan of Washington, D.C. versus Guardian
Protection Services, of Warrendale.

In April 2013, Mr. Danganan signed a standard form contract with
Guardian to provide home security at his Washington, D.C.
residence.  The contract set a monthly payment schedule, explained
the initial term of the agreement would be three years and included
a choice-of-law clause stating the agreement would be governed by
the laws of Pennsylvania.  The following year, Mr. Danganan sold
his Washington, D.C. home, moved to San Francisco, and notified
Guardian that he wished to cancel his service.  Despite this notice
of cancellation, Guardian continued to bill Mr. Danganan each
month.

Mr. Danganan made several of these monthly payments to Guardian
under self-proclaimed "protest," as he was concerned that doing
otherwise would adversely impact his credit rating.  Subsequent to
Mr. Danganan challenging the charges, Guardian offered him an
opportunity to buy out the duration of his contract for $525, which
he refused.  Instead, Mr. Danganan brought the instant class action
litigation on behalf of himself and more than 17,000 similarly
situated consumers, alleging that Guardian's standard contract was
"misleading, deceptive, and substantively unfair, in violation of
both the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law and Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act."

Guardian subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, which the District
Court granted, concluding that non-residents of Pennsylvania cannot
recover under the two statutes unless they plead allegations that
have a "sufficient nexus" with the Commonwealth.  That result led
Mr. Danganan to file the instant appeal.

Mr. Danganan alleges that Guardian violated the Pennsylvania
UTPCPL, along with the related FCEUA, by continuing to charge
monthly service fees to customers for whom the company was no
longer providing home protection services.

Judge Greenaway stated the lack of a precedential opinion on the
subject from a Pennsylvania court left the Third Circuit to
consider two questions: (1) Whether a non-Pennsylvania resident may
bring suit under the UTPCPL against a business headquartered in and
operating from Pennsylvania, based on transactions which occurred
outside Pennsylvania -- and secondly, (2) If the UTPCPL does not
allow a non-Pennsylvania resident to invoke its protections,
whether the parties ca, through a choice-of-law provision, expand
its protections to parties to the contract who are non-Pennsylvania
resident consumers.

"The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted the certification and, in
a thorough opinion, held that the UTPCPL's 'prescription against
deceptive practices employed by Pennsylvania-based businesses may
encompass misconduct that has occurred in other jurisdictions.' In
so concluding, the court reasoned that the statute's plain language
'evidences no geographic limitation or residency requirement
relative to the Law's application.' As such, the court "rejected
the sufficient nexus test as employed by the District Court and
advanced by Guardian.' This holding rendered the second certified
question moot," Judge Greenaway said.

"Adhering to the principle first articulated in Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins, that federal courts are required to apply state
substantive law to diversity actions, we must apply the conclusions
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this case. Because that court
concluded, contrary to the District Court, that the UTPCPL may
provide a cause of action to non-residents in circumstances like
those alleged by Mr. Danganan, we will reverse the decision of the
District Court dismissing his complaint and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion and the decision of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania."

The plaintiff is represented by James M. Pietz of Feinstein Doyle
Payne & Kravec in Pittsburgh, Michael D. Donovan of Donovan
Litigation Group in Berwyn and Christian X. Schreiber of Chavez &
Gertler in Mill Valley, Calif.

The defendant is represented by Laura E. Vendzules --
lvendzules@blankrome.com -- Michael A. Iannucci --
iannucci@blankrome.com -- Will Rosenzweig --
will.rosenzweig@kobrekim.com -- and Amy Joseph Coles --
acoles@blankrome.com -- of Blank Rome, in both Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh.

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit case 16-3379

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania case
2:18-cv-01495 [GN]


HAWAII: Fullum Files Suit vs. Department of Education
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dr. Christina
Kishimoto, et al.  The case is titled as Marchet Denise Fullum, on
behalf of minor child J.F.; Anna Grove, on behalf of minor child
T.G.; Gerald M Niblock, on behalf of minor child K.N. individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated; and Sandee Niblock,
on behalf of minor child K.N., individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Dr. Christina Kishimoto,
Superintendent of the State of Hawaii Department of Education;
Elynne E. Chung, Principal of Mililani Middle School; Dr.
Bernadette Tyrell, Principal of Castle High School; Beverly
Stanich, Principal of Wailuku Elementary School; Robert Davis,
Central Oahu Complex Area Superintendent; and Doe Defendants 1-20,
Case No. 1:18-cv-00332-KJM (D. Haw., August 30, 2018).

The nature of suit is stated as "Civil Rights: Education."

Dr. Christina Kishimoto is the Superintendent of the State of
Hawaii Department of Education.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Gina May Szeto-Wong, Esq.
          Jonathan M.F. Loo, Esq.
          Eric A. Seitz, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF ERIC SEITZ
          820 Mililani Street, Suite 714
          Honolulu, HI 96813
          Telephone: (415) 532-6946
          Facsimile: (808) 545-3608
          E-mail: szetogina@gmail.com
                  jloo33138@yahoo.com
                  eseitzatty@yahoo.com


HUDSON FURNITURE: Picon Files Suit Asserting ADA Violation
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hudson Furniture Inc.
The case is titled as YELITZA PICON AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER
PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. Hudson Furniture Inc., Case No.
1:18-cv-07929 (S.D.N.Y., August 30, 2018).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violations of the Americans
with Disabilities Act.

Hudson Furniture Inc., located in New York City, designs, makes and
sells furniture pieces.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM PC
          175 Varick Street, 3rd Floor
          New York, NY, 10014-5856
          Telephone: (646) 770-3775
          Facsimile: (646) 867-2639
          E-mail: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


HUDSON THEATRE: Violates Disabilities Act, Castillo Suit Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hudson Theatre, LLC.
The case is captioned as Evelyn Castillo, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated v. Hudson Theatre, LLC, doing
business as: Hudson Theatre, Case No. 1:18-cv-07931 (S.D.N.Y.,
August 30, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Hudson Theatre comprises a theatre located at 44th Street in New
York City.  As of December 16, 2017, Hudson Theatre was acquired by
The Ambassador Theatre Group Limited.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          30 East 39th Street, 2nd Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181
          E-mail: cklee@leelitigation.com


IMC CREDIT SERVICES: Sheets Suit Disputes Collection Letter
-----------------------------------------------------------
Chadwick Sheets, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. IMC Credit Services, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-01881, (S.D.
Ind., June 19, 2018), seeks actual and statutory damages, costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees under the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.

IMC attempted to collect defaulted consumer debts that she
allegedly owed for medical bills. Defendants sent a collection
letter that failed to that the debt was time-barred even
threatening to credit report these time-barred debts, says the
complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      David J. Philipps, Esq.
      Mary E. Philipps, Esq.
      Carissa K. Rasch, Esq.
      Angie K. Robertson, Esq
      PHILIPPS & PHILIPPS, LTD.
      9760 S. Roberts Road, Suite One
      Palos Hills, IL 60465
      Tel: (708) 974-2900
      Fax: (708) 974-2907
      Email: davephilipps@aol.com
             mephilipps@aol.com
             carissa@philippslegal.com
             angie@philippslegal.com

             - and -

      John T. Steinkamp, Esq.
      5214 S. East Street, Suite D1
      Indianapolis, IN 46227
      Tel: (317) 780-8300
      Fax: (317) 217-1320
      Email: steinkamplaw@yahoo.com


INGLOT USA: Diaz Files Suit in N.Y. Over ADA Breach
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Inglot USA, LLC.  The
case is captioned as Edwin Diaz, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Inglot USA, LLC, Case No.
1:18-cv-07956 (S.D.N.Y., August 30, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Inglot USA, LLC, manufactures color cosmetics.  The Company offers
face and body products, lip products, nail treatments, and eye
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 299-6612
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: joseph@cml.legal


INTERIM HEALTHCARE: Faces Diaz Suit Asserting ADA Violation  
-------------------------------------------------------------
Interim Healthcare Inc. is facing a a class action lawsuit
asserting violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The case is styled as Edwin Diaz, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Interim Healthcare Inc., Case No.
1:18-cv-07959 (S.D.N.Y., August 30, 2018).

Interim HealthCare Inc. provides healthcare services.  The Company
offers nursing, therapy, non-medical home care, hospice, and
healthcare staffing services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 299-6612
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: joseph@cml.legal


IRVING LANGER: Court Denies Partial Dismissal of Contrera's Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for Southern District of New York
issued a Memorandum and Order denying Defendants' Partial Motion to
Dismiss the Amended Complaint in the case captioned USVALDO
CONTRERA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. IRVING LANGER, et al., Defendants.
No. 16 CV 3851-LTS-GWG. (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiffs bring this collective action against Defendants alleging
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York
Labor Law NYLL) minimum wage and overtime provisions.

Janitorial Exemption

Under New York regulations for the building service industry, a
janitor is exempted from overtime compensation. A janitor is
defined as a person employed to render any physical service in
connection with the maintenance, care or operation of a residential
building. Where there is only one employee, such employee shall be
deemed the janitor.

The Defendants argue that the allegations in the AC and certain
exhibits incorporated by reference therein definitively establish
that both Contrera and Lopez are subject to the janitorial
exemption because they (1) performed physical service in connection
with the maintenance, care, or operation of a residential building,
(2) were the only employees in their respective residential
buildings, (3) lived in the residential building where they
performed janitorial services, and (4) were designated as
superintendents, a common term for janitors.

The Defendants' arguments are unavailing because, as the Report
correctly notes, the AC contains no allegations that indicate that
Contrera and Lopez were the only persons employed to render
janitorial services in their respective residential buildings, or
that they were designated by Defendants as janitors for purposes of
the exemption. Indeed, the AC suggests that other individuals, such
as Plaintiff Herrera, were employed at both of the buildings where
Contrera and Lopez worked. The AC also does not conclusively
establish that Defendants designated Contrera or Lopez as employees
who lives in the building as the janitor.

Because the allegations in the AC construed in the light most
favorable to Plaintiffs do not establish as a matter of law that
Contrera and Lopez are janitors within the scope of the NYLL
janitorial exemption, Defendants' objection with respect to this
aspect of the Report is overruled and Defendants' motion to dismiss
Contrera and Lopez's claims is denied without prejudice to further
litigation at a later stage.

FLSA Statute of Limitations

A FLSA action arising out of a willful violation must be commenced
within three years after the cause of action accrues.
  
Here, Lopez allegedly left his employment with Defendants on April
30, 2014, but failed to file a written consent form until July 25,
2017. However, on March 7, 2017, Lopez filed a sworn declaration in
connection with Plaintiffs' motion to conditionally approve this
case as a FLSA collective action, in which he stated that he was a
Plaintiff in this action and that he submitted his declaration in
support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Circulate a Notice of Pendency
under the FLSA.

Judge Gorenstein concluded that the Lopez Declaration qualified as
written consent within the meaning of section 256's written consent
requirement.

The Court agrees.

The Defendants argue that any form other than a customary opt-in
form would greatly alter the purpose of section 256(b) and convert
a beneficial notice provision for the defendant, into an
unnecessarily costly, time consuming and risky mandatory exercise
for defendants. Defendants offer no authority for their formalistic
interpretation of the written consent requirement, nor can the
Court conclude that a review of the public docket imposes on
Defendants additional burdens inconsistent with the purpose of the
written consent requirement. Because the Lopez Declaration was
sufficient to put Defendants on notice, and ensure that Lopez
intended to participate in the case rather than serve as a
procedural figurehead for an enterprising class action lawyer, the
Court finds that the Declaration meets the written consent
requirement.  

The Court overrules the Defendants' Objection in its entirety and
adopts Judge Gorenstein's Report except to the extent specified in
note one above) and its recommended conclusion that Defendants'
partial motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint be denied.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 16, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8medumu from
Leagle.com.

Usvaldo Contrera, Francisco Lopez, Pedro Batista, Fabian Herrera,
Antonio Reyes, Ramon Medina, Anibal Ruiz, Carlos Zambrano, Jose
Castillo & Doyle Gross, Plaintiffs, represented by Peter David
Winebrake , The Winebrake Law Firm, LLC, Meredith Reade Miller ,
Miller Law, PLLC & Marc Andrew Rapaport , Rapaport Law Firm, PLLC.

Carlos Dominguez, Danny Cruz-Guerrero, Hector Gracia, Ygnacio
Mercado, Amanuel Avila, Maurice Merritt, Rafael Parra Hiclalgo,
Wilfredo Perez, Hector R Rodriguez, James Mills, Sixto Rosario
Cruz, Franklyn Brito, Jesus Robles, Bryan Garriques, Douil Jackson,
Michael Smith, Generoso Saint Hilarie, Billy Rojas, Jose Arrieta,
Teddie Emmanuel, Lambert Samuel, Leonardo R Mejia, Michael Simon,
Curtis Brown, Keith Richards, Robert Joseph, Nelson V Castillos,
Charles Martin, James Carter, Jose A Nieves, Aisy Alfredo Montero
Marte, Maxwell Redhead, Vassel A Burke, Euclides Hilario, Anthony
Watson, Orlando Velez, Frank Johnson, Sherman Martin, Jose A Filpo,
Jose H. Rodriguez, Maximo Reyes, Ramon Abel Mora, Juan Tapia, Yowel
Castillo, Luis N Garcia, Juan A Garcia, Cruz De La Rosa Genao, Jose
Chavarria, Lucien Wellington, Sandy Taveras, Omar Nunez, Jose A.
Saa-Tolozano, Erol McLean, Gustavo Del Rosario Gomez, Alfonso
Trujillo, Francisco Gonzalez, Newton Marks, Bolivar Albarracin,
Jose D Taveras, Francisco Teijido, Neson Jeffers, Calville Joseph,
Manuel Soto & Manuel De La Rosa, Plaintiffs, represented by Marc
Andrew Rapaport , Rapaport Law Firm, PLLC.

Irving Langer, Leibel Lederman, Aryeh Z. Ginzberg, Meyer Brecher,
E&M Bronx Associates LLC, also known as E&M Holdings, also known as
E&M Associates, E&M Associates LLC, E&M Harlem Holdings LLC, E&M
Harlem Equities LLC, E&M Lafayette Portfolio LLC, E&M Lafayette
Owner LLC, Rainbow Estates LLC, Manhattanville Holdings LLC, Galil
Realty LLC, Galil Management LLC, 105-109 West 113 LLC, 107 West
113 LLC, 1070 Ogden LLC, 109 West 113 LLC, 11 West 172 Street Owner
LLC, 110 West 116th LLC, 113-115 West 113 LLC, 115 West 113 LLC,
117-129 West 116 LLC, 120-129 West 112 LLC, 124 West 112 Street
LLC, 126 West 112 LLC, 131-133 West 112 LLC, 133 West 112 Street
LLC, 133-135 West 116 LLC, 141 West 116 LLC, 141-143 West 113 LLC,
143 West 111 Street LLC, 145-153 Edgecombe Holdings LLC, 146 West
111 Street LLC, 151 West 228 St Owner LLC, 159 W 228 St Owner LLC,
161-171 Morningside LLC, 1631 Grand Ave Owner LLC, 164-172 West 141
Holdings LLC, 17-25 St Nicholas LLC, 1728-1730 Amsterdamn Avenue
LLC, 1786 Topping Ave Owner LLC, 1829-1835 7 LLC, 2006 ACP Blvd
Portfolio LLC, 2059 8 LLC, 2076-78 Creston Ave Owner LLC, 2238
Morris Ave Owner LLC, 226 W Tremont Ave Owner LLC, 2291 University
Ave Owner LLC, 230 West 116 LLC, 2322 Grand Ave Owner LLC, 239 West
116 LLC, 241 West 113 LLC, 243 West 116 LLC, 247-253 West 116 LLC,
255 West 116 LLC, 2755-61 Sedgwick Ave Owner LLC, 2925 Grand
Concourse Owner LLC, 2933 Grand Concourse Owner LLC, 2968 Perry Ave
Owner LLC, 301 West 111-2051 8 LLC, 302 West 112 Street LLC, 303
West 111 LLC, 303-309 West 113 LLC, 305 West 111 LLC, 305-309 West
113 LLC, 306-310 West 112 LLC, 307 West 113 LLC, 310 West 112th
Street LLC, 311 West 111 Street LLC, 337 West 138 Holdings LLC, 345
Manhattan Holdings LLC, 35 Morningside Holdings LLC, 350 West 115
LLC, 370-372 West 127 LLC, 373 West 126 LLC, 376 West 127 LLC, 41 W
184 St Owner LLC, 510 West 146 LLC, 521-523 W 156 St Owners LLC,
557-561 West 149 Holdings LLC, 6 Morningside LLC, 609-619 West 135
Street Owner LLC, 610-620 West 141 Holdings LLC, 617 West 143
Holdings LLC, 638 West 160 Holdings LLC, 655 West 160 Holdings LLC,
65-67 Lenox LLC, 67 Lenox LLC, 707 St Nicholas LLC, ACP Blvd
Portfolio LLC, Audobon 550 W 171 Portfolio LLC, Avenue W Equities
LLC, DDEH 319 E 115 LLC, E&M Associates I, LLC, Neighborhood
Stabilization Associates I, L.P., Neighborhood Stabilization
Associates II. L.P., NSA Associates I, NSA Associates II, Sarasota
Gold LLC, Sixth Avenue I Associates, Sixth Avenue Rehab I
Associates, Sunset Park Housing Associates, Sunset Park NSA I,
Sunset Park N S A II, Sunset Park NSA 11, Sunset Park NSA 2, Sunset
Park NSA II, 11-15 Broadway Owner LLC, 30-50 21 St Street Owner
LLC, 271 E 197 St Owner LLC, 750-760 Pelham Pkwy Owner LLC, 124 E
177 ST Owner LLC, 3472 Knox Place Owner LLC, 2320 Aqueduct Ave
Owner LLC, 1160 Cromwell Ave Owner LLC, 3940 Bronx Blvd Owner LLC,
1881 Grand Concourse Realty LLC, 3136 Perry Ave Owner LLC, 155 W
162 Street LLC, 1014 Gerard Ave Owner LLC, 1475 Sheridan Ave Owner
LLC, 320 E 197 St Owner LLC, 131 W Kingsbridge Owner LLC, 2701 Webb
Ave Owner LLC, 751 Gerard Ave Owner LLC, 2055 Anthony Ave Owner
LLC, 975 Walton Ave Owner LLC, 1212 Grand Concourse Owner LLC, 1530
Sheridan Ave Owner LLC, 323 E Mosholu Pkwy Owner LLC, 161-165 E 179
St Owner LLC, 2215 Properties LLC, DDEH 103 E 102 LLC, DDEH 112 E
103 LLC, DDEH 102 E 103 LLC, DDEH 122 E 103ST LLC, DDEH 124 E117
LLC, DDEH 126 E 103ST LLC, 124 E. 117 LLC, DDEH 137 E. 110 LLC,
DDEH 154 E. 106 LLC, DDEH 1567 Lexington LLC, DDEH 238 E 111 LLC,
DDEH 215 E 117 LLC, DDEH 2156 Second LLC, DDEH 216 E 118 LLC, DDEH
2171 Third LLC, DDEH 291 Pleasant LLC, DDEH 231 E 117 LLC, DDEH 233
E 111 Street LLC, DDEH 234 E 116ST LLC, DDEH 235 E 111ST LLC, DDEH
234 E116 LLC, DDEH 2371 Second LLC, DDEH 244 E 117 LLC, DDEH 311 E.
109 LLC, DDEH 312 E 106 LLC, DDEH 411 E 114 LLC, DDEH 411 E118LLC,
DDEH 417E 114ST LLC, DDEH 421 East 114th ST LLC, 131-133 West 112
Street LLC, 3030 Valentine Ave Owner LLC, 138-140 West 112 LLC,
3600 Broadway Owner LLC, Dunbar Owner LLC, E&M Harlem Portfolio
Owner LLC, SG2-E&M Harlem Portfolio Owner LLC, 3621 Broadway Owner
LLC, 414-102 Convent Owner LLC, 153-157 Lenox Holdings LLC &
Manhattanville Mezz LLC, Defendants, represented by Larry Rafael
Martinez -- lmartinez@meltzerlippe.com -- Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein
& Breitstone, LLP, Christopher Paul Hampton --
champton@meltzerlippe.com -- Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein &
Breitstone, LLP, Gerald Charles Waters -- gwaters@meltzerlippe.com
-- Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, Jonathan D. Farrell
-- jfarrell@meltzerlippe.com -- Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein &
Breitstone, LLP & Loretta Mae Gastwirth --
lgastwirth@meltzerlippe.com -- Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein &
Breitstone, LLP.


KING COUNTY, WA: Court Flips Dismissal of Tenants' Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed the
judgment of the District Court granting Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the case captioned EVA MOORE; BROOKE SHAW; CHERRELLE DAVIS;
NINA DAVIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JOHN URQUHART, in his official
capacity as King County Sheriff, Defendant-Appellee. No. 16-36086.
(9th Cir.).

The district court dismissed the action with prejudice on grounds
that the Sheriff rightly does not attempt to defend on appeal.

This is a class action challenging the constitutionality of a
Washington statute that allows tenants to be evicted from their
homes without a court hearing. The Plaintiffs seek declaratory and
injunctive relief against the Sheriff of King County, whose office
enforces the challenged statute by executing the eviction orders.

Because plaintiffs' action challenges the constitutionality of a
state statute, the district court invited the State of Washington
to intervene to defend the statute. Before the State entered an
appearance, though, the district court granted the Sheriff's motion
for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(c).

The court held that Section 375 does not violate the Due Process
Clause because, contrary to plaintiffs' contention, the statute
actually does require a hearing in all cases before a writ of
restitution may be issued. Under that reading of the statute, the
court concluded, plaintiffs had not stated a claim that Section 375
was unconstitutional and any further attempt to amend the complaint
would be futile. The court accordingly dismissed the action with
prejudice and denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification as
moot.

The Sheriff raises two principal arguments in defense of the
district court's judgment. First, he contends that plaintiffs'
action must be brought, if at all, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and
that the amended complaint fails to state a viable claim under that
statute.

Second, the Sheriff argues that plaintiffs' action is barred in any
event by the doctrine of judicial immunity.

The Sheriff's first argument is plainly without merit. Plaintiffs
would be required to proceed under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 if they
sought to recover money damages. But they are seeking only
declaratory and injunctive relief against the Sheriff in his
official capacity, a declaration that Section 375 is facially
unconstitutional and an injunction barring him from enforcing writs
of restitution issued under the statute. To obtain that relief,
plaintiffs do not need a statutory cause of action. They can rely
on the judge-made cause of action recognized in Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123(1908), which permits courts of equity to enjoin
enforcement of state statutes that violate the Constitution or
conflict with other federal laws.

The Sheriff's second argument is that, even if plaintiffs have a
viable cause of action under Ex parte Young, he is nonetheless
entitled to judicial immunity for his conduct. Judicial immunity is
a common law doctrine developed to protect judicial independence.
It bars suits against judges, and other officials who exercise
discretionary judgment similar to that of judges, when the
plaintiff's suit is predicated on actions taken in the judge's
judicial capacity. The Sheriff is correct that a similar immunity
has also been extended to protect non-judicial officers, like
sheriffs, who are sued merely for carrying out a non-discretionary
duty to execute lawfully issued court orders. In such cases, if the
judicial officer who issued the order is entitled to immunity, so
too is the executive officer who did nothing more than execute the
order. The executive officer's immunity, sometimes called
quasi-judicial immunity, is derivative of the judge's own immunity.


Common law judicial immunity is of no help to the Sheriff in this
action, for it only bars suits seeking damages. It does not
preclude a court from granting declaratory or injunctive relief.
Because the King County Superior Court judges who issue writs of
restitution would not be entitled to common law judicial immunity
in a suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, neither is the
Sheriff.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's August 16, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8wqj6zu from Leagle.com.

Toby J. Marshall -- tmarshall@terrellmarshall.com -- (argued) and
Elizabeth A. Adams -- eadams@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell
Marshall Law Group PLLC, Seattle, Washington; Rory O'Sullivan ,
King County Bar Association Housing Justice Project, for
Plaintiffs-Appellants.

David J. Hackett (argued) Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, King
County Prosecuting Attorney, Seattle, Washington, for
Defendant-Appellee.

Jeffrey T. Even , Deputy Solicitor General; Robert W. Ferguson ,
Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, Olympia,
Washington; for Amicus Curiae State of Washington.


KNORR-BREMSE AG: Lonergan Files Antitrust Class Suit in Maryland
----------------------------------------------------------------
Patricia Lonergan, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, Plaintiffs, v. Knorr-Bremse AG,
Knorr Brake Company LLC, New York Air Brake LLC, Westinghouse Air
Brake Technologies Corporation, WABTEC Passenger Transit, Faiveley
Transport, S.A. and Faiveley Transport North America, Inc.
Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-01828 (D. Md., June 19, 2018), seeks to
recover damages, including treble damages and other appropriate
relief.

The Defendants are the largest rail equipment suppliers in the
world. Plaintiffs are workers who claim antitrust violations with
regards to competition in the labor market for personnel. The
Defendants allegedly conspired not to recruit, solicit or hire each
other's personnel without prior approval. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Paul Mark Sandler, Esq.
      Eric R. Harlan, Esq.
      SHAPIRO SHER GUINOT & SANDLER
      250 West Pratt Street, Suite 2000
      Baltimore, MD 21201
      Tel: (410) 385-0202
      Fax: (410) 539-7611
      Email: pms@shapirosher.com
             erh@shapirosher.com

             - and -

      Joseph R. Saveri, Esq.
      Jiamin Chen, Esq.
      Steve N. Williams, Esq.
      Jiamin Chen, Esq.
      V. Chai Oliver, Esq.
      JOSEPH SAVERI LAW FIRM, INC.
      601 California Street, Suite 1000
      San Francisco, CA 94108
      Telephone: (415) 500-6800
      Facsimile: (415) 395-9940
      Emails: jsaveri@saverilawfirm.com
              jchen@saverilawfirm.com
              nherrera@saverilawfirm.com
              vprentice@saverilawfirm.com


KROGER CO: Violates Disabilities Act, Diaz Class Suit Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------
A lawsuit was brought against The Kroger Co. alleging violations of
the Americans with Disabilities Act.  The case is captioned as
Edwin Diaz, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
v. The Kroger Co., Case No. 1:18-cv-07953 (S.D.N.Y., August 30,
2018).

The Kroger Co., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
retailer in the United States.  The Company also manufactures and
processes food products for sale in its supermarkets.  The Company
operates supermarkets, multi-department stores, jewelry stores, and
convenience stores.  The Company's combination food and drug stores
offer natural food and organic sections, pharmacies, general
merchandise, pet centers, fresh seafood, and organic produce;
multi-department stores provide general merchandise items, such as
apparel, home fashion and furnishings, outdoor living, electronics,
automotive products, toys, and fine jewelry; and price impact
warehouse stores offer grocery, and health and beauty care
items.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 299-6612
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: joseph@cml.legal


LIBERTY TRANSPORTATION: Dismissal of Truck Drivers' Suit Suggested
------------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Hugh B. Scott of the United States District Court for
the Western District of New York issued a Report and Recommendation
granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned William
Indelicato, Plaintiff, v. Liberty Transportation, Inc., Defendant.
No. 18-CV-253V. (W.D.N.Y.).

The Defendant now has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for
lack of personal jurisdiction, under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).

Plaintiff William Indelicato responded to an online advertisement
from defendant Liberty Transportation, Inc. seeking New York truck
drivers to help with manifests for various shipping loads. The
Plaintiff eventually leased a truck from defendant and entered an
independent contractor agreement to accept manifests at his
discretion. Over time, plaintiff grew unhappy with how much
defendant was deducting from his paychecks for expenses set forth
in his independent contractor agreement. Plaintiff brought suit
here alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and
Article 6 of the New York Labor Law (Labor Law).

Rule 12(b)(2) motions to dismiss generally

When responding to a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant. In
deciding a pre-trial motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction a district court has considerable procedural leeway.
It may determine the motion on the basis of affidavits alone; or it
may permit discovery in aid of the motion; or it may conduct an
evidentiary hearing on the merits of the motion.

Personal jurisdiction generally

Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the
bounds of their jurisdiction over persons. This is because a
federal district court's authority to assert personal jurisdiction
in most cases is linked to service of process on a defendant who is
subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in
the state where the district court is located. State law will
determine the outermost boundaries here as well; the parties have
not pointed out any provision of the FLSA that would address those
limits. With respect to state law, for a court to exercise general
jurisdiction over a defendant, 1) state law must authorize general
jurisdiction; and 2) jurisdiction must comport with constitutional
due process principles.

In order for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a
claim, there must be an affiliation between the forum and the
underlying controversy, principally, an activity or an occurrence
that takes place in the forum State. When there is no such
connection, specific jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the
extent of a defendant's unconnected activities in the State.

Personal jurisdiction as applied here

With the general principles of personal jurisdiction in mind, the
Court now turns to the specific circumstances present here.
Defendant is not incorporated in New York, and it does not have a
principal place of business here. Defendant has no assets in New
York. That plaintiff might have signed his agreements in New York
is not a significant factor and would have been offset by the
completion of arrangements in Pennsylvania to pick up the leased
truck. Plaintiff had discretion to accept or to reject manifests as
he wished. When he did accept manifests, plaintiff's duties did not
include soliciting further business or making other logistical
arrangements for defendant.

The record is not clear as to exactly how defendant would go about
seeking new business opportunities, but anything that it did in
that regard did not involve plaintiff or New York very much if at
all.  

The nature of plaintiff's manifests, alone or in conjunction with
other factors that plaintiff has cited, does not change the
circumstances that the Court. The defendant in its reply papers
attached a complete list of all 167 manifests that the plaintiff
accepted during the time when he worked for plaintiff. Defendant
assessed the list of manifests to conclude that the plaintiff
incurred less than 10% of his miles in New York. To give the
plaintiff the benefit of the doubt for Rule 12 purposes, the Court
has examined the list of manifests a little differently.

The Court agrees with the defendant that 49 manifests started or
ended in New York. For an additional 34 manifests, however, the
route began on one side of New York states such as Pennsylvania,
Nebraska, or Oklahoma and ended in a New England state such as
Connecticut or Massachusetts. Taking judicial notice of the
geographical necessity of passing through New York to reach New
England states from Pennsylvania or points farther west, the Court
added these 34 manifests to the other 49 for a total of 83
manifests out of 167 that required at least some contact with New
York.

Additionally, if the Court generously gave plaintiff the benefit of
the doubt and counted all of the mileage for those 83 manifests as
mileage that had something to do with New York at some point then
the total would amount to 33,659.1 miles out of 85,658, a rate of
about 39 percent. The Court's calculations come closer to
plaintiff's informal estimates. Yet even with these more generous
numbers, plaintiff has not shown that his New York business
amounted to more than a small percentage of the millions of miles
that defendant claims as its annual business.  

Consequently, all of the above factors push the Court to conclude
that plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing of either general
or specific jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would mean that a
freight forwarder is subject to suit on any cause of action in any
jurisdiction to which it makes substantial shipments if, even
without maintaining an office, it solicits such business there.
Transfer of the case to a more appropriate district might have been
an option as an alternative to outright dismissal. The parties have
not mentioned transfer in their papers, however, and did not raise
the issue at oral argument. The Court accordingly will not address
the issue further.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 16, 2018 Report and
Recommendation is available at https://tinyurl.com/yayognhg from
Leagle.com.

William Indelicato, Plaintiff, represented by Harold L. Lichten --
hlichten@llrlaw.com -- Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C.,Samuel A. Alba
, Friedman & Ranzenhofer, P.C. & Peter D. Winebrake --
pwinebrake@winebrakelaw.com -- Winebrake & Santillo, LLC.

Liberty Transportation, Inc., Defendant, represented by Charles
Andrewscavage -- candrewscavage@scopelitis.com -- Scopelitis Garvin
Light Hanson & Feary, P.C., Rodney O. Personius --
rop@personiusmelber.com -- Personius Melber LLP & James T. Spolyar
-- JSPOLYAR@SCOPELITIS.COM -- Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson &
Feary, P.C., pro hac vice.


LM FUNDING: Court OKs Revised Solaris Class Action Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------
LM Funding America, Inc. (NASDAQ:LMFA) ("LM Funding" or the
"Company"), a technology-based specialty finance company offering
unique funding solutions to community associations, on Aug. 14
announced its financial results for the second quarter ended
June 30, 2018.

"During the second quarter, we continued to see positive results
from the steps we have taken to maximize our rental revenue and
improve our cost structure," said Bruce Rodgers, LM Funding's Chief
Executive Officer.  "We reduced operating expenses by approximately
55% and entered into a revised settlement for the Solaris class
action litigation resulting in a reversal of over $400,000 in
accrued expenses which led to positive net income during the
quarter and first six months as compared to a net loss for the same
periods the prior year.  Going forward, we will continue to
leverage our proprietary technology to unlock the significant value
of our receivables portfolio as we focus our marketing efforts to
grow our portfolio and explore new avenues to diversify our revenue
streams."

Second Quarter 2018 Financial and Operational Highlights:

   -- Operating revenues totaled $877,986 for the second quarter of
2018 as compared to $977,600 for the same period the year prior;
   -- Rental revenue, which accounted for 24.8% of total operating
revenue during the quarter, increased 28% to $217,904 as compared
to $170,283 for the same period the year prior;
   -- Operating expenses decreased by 54.5% to $733,170 as compared
to $1.6 million in the prior year period driven by a significant
reduction in staff costs and payroll, professional fees, and SG&A
expenses;
   -- Generated net income of $455,240 as compared to a net loss of
$794,511 for the second quarter 2017;
   -- During the second quarter 2018, decreased the $505,000Solaris
class action accrual incurred in the comparable 2017 period, to
$100,000 due to a revised settlement with the $405,000 change
reflected as income;
   -- As of June 30, 2018, the Company had $1.2 million in cash;
and
   -- Shareholder equity increased to $1.5 million or $0.24 per
share as of June 30, 2018, compared to shareholder equity of
$896,983 or $0.14 per share as of December 31, 2017.

On August 14, 2018, the Solaris court approved a revised settlement
of the Solaris class action litigation.  The settlement approves
the Plaintiff's Fourth Amended Complaint seeking no damages and
providing only a claim for declarative and injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs with existing active units being serviced by LM Funding
may opt to change from the standard distribution agreement to LMF's
50/50 distribution agreement on a prospective basis. In the
settlement Agreement LM Funding will pay Plaintiff's counsel
$99,000 plus an administrative fee.

Second Quarter and Six-Month Financial Results:

For the quarter ended June 30, 2018, total operating revenues were
$877,986, compared to $977,600 in the second quarter of 2017. This
includes an approximate $48,000 increase in rental revenue to
$217,904, compared to $170,283 for the quarter ended June 30, 2017,
due to continued improvement in the utilization of the Company's
rental properties. For the six months ended June 30, 2018, total
revenues were $1.8 million as compared to $2.0 million for the same
period the year prior.

Operating expenses for the second quarter of 2018 decreased 54.5%
to $733,170, compared to $1.6 million in the prior year period.
This is primarily attributable to approximately $197,000 in reduced
staffing costs, $471,000 in lower professional fees (including a
$200,00 insurance reimbursement for legal fees in 2018) and a
$128,000 decline in selling, general and administrative costs as
compared to the comparable period in 2017.  For the six months
ended June 30, 2018, total operating expenses decreased to $1.7
million as compared to $3.1 million for the same period the year
prior.

Net income for the quarter ended June 30, 2018 was $455,240,
compared to a net loss of $794,511 for the second quarter of 2017.
For the six months ended June 30, 2018, net income was
approximately $446,000 as compared to a net loss of $1.2 million.

At June 30, 2018, the Company had cash and cash equivalents of $1.2
million, compared with $590,394 at December 31, 2017.  Total
stockholder's equity increased to $1.5 million for the period ended
June 30, 2018 as compared to $896,983 for the period ended December
31, 2017.

                   About LM Funding America

LM Funding America, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, is a
technology-based specialty finance company that provides funding to
nonprofit community associations (Associations) primarily located
in the state of Florida, as well as in the states of Washington,
Colorado and Illinois.  The company offers funding to Associations
by purchasing a certain portion of the associations' rights to
delinquent accounts that are selected by the Associations arising
from unpaid Association assessments.  It is also involved in the
business of purchasing delinquent accounts on various terms
tailored to suit each Association's financial needs, including
under its New Neighbor Guaranty(TM) program. [GN]


LONDON GOLD: UBS Dropped as Defendant in Gold Fixing Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, IN RE: COMMODITY EXCHANGE, INC., GOLD FUTURES AND
OPTIONS TRADING LITIGATION. This Document Relates to All Actions,
Case Nos. 14-MD-2548 (VEC), 14-MC-2548 (VEC) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge
Valerie Caproni of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted UBS AG and its affiliates' motion to
dismiss the Third Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiffs in these consolidated cases allege a conspiracy to
fix the price of physical gold and gold-denominated financial
instruments from 2004 to 2012.  Until November 2014, the price of
physical gold was set twice daily through a private auction
involving some of the largest bullion banks in London.

The Plaintiffs allege that the afternoon "Gold Fixing" -- also
known as the "PM Fixing" -- was a cover for a price-fixing
conspiracy among the entity charged with operating the Gold Fixing,
Defendant London Gold Market Fixing Ltd., and the participant
banks: The Bank of Nova Scotia, Barclays Bank plc, Deutsche Bank
AG, HSBC Bank plc, and Société Générale SA ("Fixing Banks").
The Plaintiffs have also named as a Defendant UBS AG and its
affiliates.  Although UBS was not a member of the Gold Fixing at
any point during the alleged class period, the Plaintiffs contend
UBS conspired with the Fixing Banks to suppress the price of gold
as determined by the PM Fixing.

The Plaintiffs are individuals and entities that sold physical
gold, gold futures traded on the Commodity Exchange, Inc. market,
shares in gold exchange-traded funds ("ETFs"), or options on gold
ETFs during the Class Period.  Seeking to recover alleged losses
suffered as a result of the Defendants' alleged manipulation and
suppression of the price of gold through the gold "fixing" process,
the Plaintiffs bring putative class action claims for (1) unlawful
restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act;
(2) market manipulation in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act
("CEA"); (3) employment of a manipulative or deceptive device and
false reporting in violation of the CEA; (4) principal-agent
liability under the CEA; (5) aiding and abetting manipulation in
violation of the CEA; and (6) unjust enrichment.

Before the Court is UBS' motion to dismiss the TAC.  In brief, UBS
contends that its participation in a scheme to suppress the PM
Fixing is implausible.  According to UBS, the Fixing Banks, with
their ready-made forum for collusion and substantial market power,
had no reason to involve UBS in their alleged conspiracy.  It also
moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over a Swiss
entity, UBS AG.

Judge Caproni has evaluated the Plaintiffs' allegations as to UBS
as a whole and considered their combined character and effect, and
has done so in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, the TAC fails to allege a plausible link between UBS
and the price fixing scheme alleged against the Fixing Banks.  The
Plaintiffs' Sherman Act claims against UBS are dismissed.

The parties agree that the Plaintiffs' CEA claims depend on the
same theory of a conspiracy as the Plaintiffs' Sherman Act claims.
Accordingly, the Judge's conclusion that the Plaintiffs' Sherman
Act claims against UBS are implausible applies equally to their CEA
claims.  Hence, the Plaintiffs' CEA claims are dismissed as to
UBS.

For the reasons stated in In re Commodity Exch., Inc., Gold Futures
and Options Trading Litig., 213 F.Supp.3d 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
("Gold I"), the Judge also dismissed the Plaintiffs' unjust
enrichment claim.  In Gold I, the Court holds that the plaintiffs'
allegations that UBS quoted prices that were lower than market
averages were simply inadequate to create a plausible inference of
conspiracy.

Given that the Plaintiffs have already amended three times,
including based on discovery from Deutsche Bank, and that the
Plaintiffs have not requested leave to amend, the Judge denies
leave to amend.  The Plaintiffs are represented by competent,
experienced counsel.  If they had the facts necessary to plug the
obvious holes that exist in the TAC, the Judge is confident those
facts would have been included in the pleadings filed to date.

For these reasons, Judge Caproni granted UBS' motion to dismiss and
dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiffs' claims against UBS.  The
Clerk of the Court is directed to close the open motion at docket
entry 297 and terminate defendants UBS Securities, LLC and UBS AG.

The remaining parties are directed to appear for a status
conference with the Court at 11:00 a.m. on Aug. 24, 2018.  By Aug.
17, 2018, the parties must submit a joint letter of not more than 5
pages setting forth a proposed schedule for discovery in the
action.  The parties are forewarned that the Court will not accept
dueling letters; the parties are required to work together to
produce a joint letter.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 25, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/xQ5SO3 from Leagle.com.

London Gold Fixing Plaintiffs, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel
Lawrence Brockett -- danbrockett@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn
Emanuel.

London Gold Fixing Defendants, Defendant, represented by James
Vincent Masella, III -- jmasella@pbwt.com -- Patterson, Belknap,
Webb & Tyler LLP & R. James Madigan, III -- jmadigan@pbwt.com --
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP.


LONDON SILVER: Non-Fixing Banks Dismissed From Antitrust Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, N RE: LONDON SILVER FIXING, LTD., ANTITRUST
LITIGATION. This Document Relates to All Actions, Case Nos.
14-MD-2573 (VEC), 14-MC-2573 (VEC) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Valerie
Caproni of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted the Non-Fixing Banks' motion to dismiss the Third
Amended Complaint.

The case began as a benchmark-fixing case.  Until 2013, the price
of silver bullion was set in part through a daily private auction
among a small group of silver dealers ("Silver Fixing").  Based on
a sophisticated econometric analysis of thousands of price quotes
from the silver markets, Plaintiffs alleged that this daily private
auction was a cover for a conspiracy among the participating banks,
Deutsche Bank, HSBC, and Bank of Nova Scotia ("Fixing Banks"), to
suppress the price for physical silver and silver-denominated
financial products.

In September 2016, the Court held that the Plaintiffs had stated
claims against HSBC and Bank of Nova Scotia.  The Plaintiffs
settled with Deutsche Bank for $38 million dollars and what the
Plaintiffs hoped would be a treasure trove of preserved electronic
chat messages among precious metals traders employed by Deutsche
Bank and traders at Bank of America, Barclays, Standard Chartered,
BNP Paribas, and UBS ("Non-Fixing Banks").  The chat messages, many
of which are quoted in the TAC, appear to document sharing of
proprietary information and episodic attempts to coordinate
trading, apparently in the hopes of profiting from resulting
movement in the prices of silver and silver-denominated financial
instruments.  After acquiring these chat messages, the Plaintiffs
amended their complaint to allege that the Non-Fixing Banks
conspired with the Fixing Banks and among themselves to manipulate
the Silver Fixing and the silver markets more generally.

The TAC alleges a much broader conspiracy to manipulate the markets
for physical silver and silver-denominated assets.  According to
the Plaintiffs, the Defendants' comprehensive strategy has three
elements.  The first element is the Silver Fixing scheme described
above and addressed at length in Silver I.  Relying on chat
messages between traders at Deutsche Bank and the other Defendants
("Deutsche Bank Cooperation Materials"), the TAC also alleges a
scheme to manipulate the "bid-ask" spread in the market for
physical silver and a scheme to manipulate the silver markets
through coordinated trading and information sharing.  The TAC also
added as defendants a handful of banks that were not involved in
the Silver Fixing: Barclays Bank PLC, BNP Paribas Fortis S.A./N.V.,
Standard Chartered Bank, and Bank of America Corp. and its
subsidiary unit Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. ("BAML")
("New Defendants").

The Non-Fixing Banks have moved to dismiss the TAC.  They argue
that the TAC's allegations of a comprehensive conspiracy among the
Fixing Banks and Non-Fixing Banks are not plausible.  The
Non-Fixing Banks also argue that the Plaintiffs lack antitrust
standing as to the Non-Fixing Banks.  With respect to the
Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the CEA, the Non-Fixing Banks argue
that the Plaintiffs' claims are untimely because Plaintiffs were on
notice of possible manipulation of the silver markets more than two
years before they sought leave to amend in November 2017.  They
also contend that the Plaintiffs' CEA claims are impermissibly
extraterritorial because there is no alleged impact on a domestic
market from the Non-Fixing Banks' manipulation.  Failing these
defenses, certain of the Non-Fixing Banks contend the Court lacks
personal jurisdiction over them.  UBS, Standard Chartered, BNP
Paribas, and Barclays argue that Plaintiffs do not allege their
involvement in any in-forum, suit-related misconduct.

Judge Caproni finds that the TAC provides no support for the
Plaintiffs' argument that they have suffered a direct injury from
the Non-Fixing Banks' manipulation of the silver markets.  Although
this is an independently adequate basis to find that they are not
efficient enforcers, the other efficient enforcer factors also
weigh against the Plaintiffs' claims.

The Plaintiffs are not efficient enforcers.  Their claims are based
on an injury that is remote from the Non-Fixing Banks' alleged
coordinated trading and market-manipulation and speculative at
best.  And, because they do not allege that they dealt with the
Non-Fixing Banks and seek to recover on behalf of a class of all
participants in the silver markets, there is a significant
possibility of disproportionate liability.  Accordingly, the
Plaintiffs' Sherman Act claims against the Non-Fixing Banks are
dismissed.

The TAC further fails to allege that episodic manipulation by the
Non-Fixing Banks caused the Plaintiffs any actual damages.  Because
the Plaintiffs' vicarious liability, aiding-and-abetting, and Rule
180.1 claims rise and fall with their primary liability theory,
those claims fail as well.  The Plaintiffs' CEA claims against the
Non-Fixing Banks are dismissed.  The Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment
claim is also dismissed.

The Plaintiffs have not requested leave to amend, and they have not
attached a proposed, fourth amended complaint for the Court's
review.  Given that the Plaintiffs have already amended three
times, including based on discovery from Deutsche Bank, and that
the Plaintiffs have not requested leave to amend, the Judge denies
leave to amend.  The Plaintiffs are represented by competent,
experienced counsel.  If they had the facts necessary to plug the
holes that exist in the TAC, the Judge is confident those facts
would have been included in the pleadings filed to date.

For these reasons, Judge Caproni granted the Non-Fixing Banks'
motion to dismiss.  She dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiffs'
claims against the Non-Fixing Banks.  The Clerk of the Court is
directed to close the open motion at docket entry 302 and terminate
defendants Barclays, Standard Chartered, BNP Paribas, BAML, and UBS
from the case.

The remaining parties are directed to appear for a status
conference with the Court at 11:00 a.m. on Aug. 24, 2018.  By Aug.
17, 2018, the parties must submit a joint letter of not more than 5
pages setting forth a proposed schedule for discovery in the
action.  The parties are forewarned that the Court will not accept
dueling letters; the parties are required to work together to
produce a joint letter.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 25, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/RG9zRG from Leagle.com.

London Silver Fixing Plaintiffs, Plaintiff, represented by Michael
C. Dell'Angelo -- mdellangelo@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.C.,
Thomas Michael Skelton -- tskelton@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg,
P.C. & Vincent Briganti -- vbriganti@lowey.com -- Lowey Dannenberg
P.C.

London Silver Fixing Defendants, Defendant, represented by Michael
Lacovara -- michael.lacovara@lw.com -- Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer LLP.


LYRIC THEATRE: Faces Castillo ADA Suit in S.D.N.Y.
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Lyric Theatre of New
York, Inc.  The case is captioned as Evelyn Castillo, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. Lyric Theatre of New
York, Inc., doing business as: Lyric Theatre, Case No.
1:18-cv-07943 (S.D.N.Y., August 30, 2018).

The lawsuit arises from alleged violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Lyric Theatre of New York, Inc., operates the Lyric Theatre located
at 214 West 43rd Street, in New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          30 East 39th Street, 2nd Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181
          E-mail: cklee@leelitigation.com


MAIDS INTERNATIONAL: Faces Diaz ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Maids
International, Inc.  The case is styled as Edwin Diaz, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. The Maids
International, Inc., Case No. 1:18-cv-07958 (S.D.N.Y., August 30,
2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

The Maids International, Inc., provides cleaning services.  The
Company offers residential, recurring, occasional, spring, carpet,
window cleaning services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 299-6612
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: joseph@cml.legal


MANHATTAN MUSIC: Violates Disabilities Act, Reyes Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Manhattan Music
Group LLC.  The case is styled as Jose Reyes, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. The Manhattan Music Group LLC,
doing business as: Terminal 5, Case No. 1:18-cv-07941 (S.D.N.Y.,
August 30, 2018).

The Plaintiff accuses the Defendant of violating the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Manhattan Music Group LLC, doing business as Terminal 5, provides
sound recordings featuring music, musical performances,
performances for live stage shows and other audio-visual
recordings.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          30 East 39th Street, 2nd Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181
          E-mail: cklee@leelitigation.com


MERCURY EAST: Castillo Suit Asserts ADA Violation
-------------------------------------------------
The Mercury East, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit in New York.
The case is titled as Evelyn Castillo, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated v. The Mercury East, LLC, doing
business as: The Mercury Lounge, Case No. 1:18-cv-07942 (S.D.N.Y.,
August 30, 2018).

The Plaintiff accuses the Defendant of violating the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

The Mercury East, LLC, is a domestic limited liability company in
New York.  The Company does business as The Mercury Lounge.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          30 East 39th Street, 2nd Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181
          E-mail: cklee@leelitigation.com


MICHAEL KORS: Wage Class Action Heading to Individual Arbitration
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Siegal, writing for Law360, reports that a California
federal judge on Aug. 13 tentatively ruled that Michael Kors USA
Inc. and a staffing company can send to individual arbitration a
woman's putative class action alleging the companies stiff workers
on overtime and withhold rest and meal breaks.

At a hearing in downtown Los Angeles, U.S. District Judge Michael
Fitzgerald issued a written tentative ruling indicating he would
grant Michael Kors and Decton Inc.'s motion to compel plaintiff
Victoria Lucas to arbitrate her claims against them. [GN]


MIDCAP FINANCIAL: Garcia Class of Drivers Conditionally Certified
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSE GARCIA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. VASILIA a/k/a
"VAUNA" PETERSON, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. H-17-1601
(S.D. Tex.), Judge Gray H. Miller of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, granted the
Plaintiffs' motion to conditionally certify a collective action and
authorize notice.

The case is brought by individuals who drove moving trucks for a
company originally known as Graebel Cos., Inc.  According to the
Plaintiffs, Graebel Cos., Inc. became Graebel Van Lines, LLC, in
2015 and was eventually dissolved in March 2017.  There were 33
local terminal offices in the United States.

The drivers each worked under an independent contractor agreement,
but they contend that they were all governed by the same policies
and procedures, and the main company controlled the method and
manner in which the drivers performed their duties.  The Plaintiffs
allege that they were not paid a wage or overtime even though they
regularly worked in excess of forty hours a week.  They were,
instead, compensated, initially, via a complex contractor's rate
schedule.  However, in the fall of 2016, the company started
providing small partial advances to the Plaintiffs instead of
paying their wages under the schedule.  They believe the decision
to change the pay was made by the MidCap Funding X Trust, the
assignee of the initial loan for the earlier ownership transition.

The Plaintiffs were all drivers based at one of Graebel's 33
terminal branch locations, which operated as subsidiaries.  Many of
the named plaintiffs reside in Texas, but there are named
Plaintiffs from nine other states.  They filed suit against
Vasilia, also known as Vauna Peterson, Robert Peterson, Ormando
Gomez, All My Sons of Denton County, Inc., Graebel Van Lines
Holdings, LLC, doing business as Graebel Moving Services, Graebel
Van Lines, LLC, Graebel/Houston Movers, LLC, Graebel/Illinois
Movers, LLC, Graebel/Los Angeles Movers, LLC, Graebel Moving and
Warehouse Corp., Graebel Moving and Warehouse, LLC, Graebel/North
Carolina Movers, LLC, Graebel/St. Louis Movers, LLC, MidCap, MidCap
Financial Trust, formerly known as MidCap Financial, LLC, and John
Does 1-10.

The claims are as follows: (1) violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") for failure to pay wages against all named
defendants; (2) violation of the FLSA for failure to keep records
against all named defendants; (3) breach of contract against all
named defendants; (4) quantum meruit against all named Defendants;
(5) fraud against all named Defendants; (6) conspiracy and aider
and abetting liability for fraud against the Petersons, Gomez, and
MidCap; (7) successor liability of asset purchasers against John
Does 1-10; and (8) veil piercing and alter ego against MidCap,
Gomez, the Petersons, All My Sons, and Graebel Van Lines, LLC; and
(9) agency liability against MidCap.

The Plaintiffs filed these claims on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, and they now seek authority to mail and
email a notice of rights and a consent form to all potential
collective action members.  The proposed class is defined as all
the Graebel Drivers performing driving services from July 1, 2016
to present, for the entities identified as GMI Subsidiaries in the
Graebel Acquisition Agreement, their successors, and including but
not limited to, the subsidiaries making up the 33 Graebel branch
terminal locations.

The Plaintiffs also seek an order compelling the Defendants to
provide them with the names, birth dates, driver's license numbers,
telephone numbers, email addresses, all known addresses, and dates
of employment of all individuals who performed driving services for
entities identified as "GMI Subsidiaries" in the Graebel
Acquisition Agreement and their successors.

Judge Miller has ruled on MidCap's motions, and it finds that it is
not premature to now turn to the motion for conditional
ertification.  He agrees that the Plaintiffs have met their burden
of showing there was a nationwide pay issue that impacted all
members of the putative class.  And he finds that there is ample
evidence that similarly situated individuals exist who want to opt
in to the lawsuit.

Judge Miller therefore granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
conditional certification.  He conditionally certified the class of
all Graebel Drivers performing driving services from July 1, 2016
to present, for the entities identified as GMI Subsidiaries in the
Graebel Acquisition Agreement, their successors, and including but
not limited to, the subsidiaries making up the 33 Graebel branch
terminal locations.

The parties will meet and confer regarding the proposed notice and
timeline and submit documentation to the Court within 20 days of
the date of the Order.  Additionally, the Graebel Defendants will
provide the Plaintiffs with a list of individuals meeting the class
definition within 20 days of the date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 25, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/eVWNCH from Leagle.com.

Jose Garcia, Plaintiff, represented by Murray J. Fogler --
mfogler@fbfog.com -- Fogler, Brar, Ford, O'Neil & Gray LLP, Robert
Henry Ford -- rford@fbfog.com -- Fogler Brar Ford O'Neil Gray LLP &
Benjamin Witten Allen -- ben.allen@feldman.law -- Feldman &
Feldman, PC.

Mark Wilburn, Jose Luis Vazquez, Jose Caballero, Americo Fuentez,
Franciso Martinez-Villarreal, Jose Mejia, Kenneth Powell, Rosa
Ramirez, Alex Santos, Dulce Santos, James Stephens, Aaron Dunning,
Albert Foks, Gabriel Strasser, Ivan Diaz, Ramon Diaz, Melissa
Earley, Randall Morton Hooper, General Lee McKinney, Michael Kee,
Ed Krapf, Jordan O'Donnell, Marselo Rodriguez, Chet Painter,
William Shelton, Michael Willin, Larry Burt, Jeffrey Casady,
Wlodzimierz Debski & Albert Dennis, Plaintiffs, represented by
Robert Henry Ford, Fogler Brar Ford O'Neil Gray LLP & Benjamin
Witten Allen, Feldman & Feldman, PC.

Vasilia Peterson, also known as Vauna & Robert Peterson,
Defendants, represented by Alice Kwak --
Alice.Kwak@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois et al, Jeffrey S.
Ranen -- Jeffrey.Ranen@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois et al,
Katherine C. Den Bleyker -- Katherine.DenBleyker@lewisbrisbois.com
-- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP & William Scott Helfand ,
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP.

Ormando Gomez, Graebel Van Lines Holdings, LLC, doing business as
Graebel Moving Services, Graebel Van Lines, LLC, Graebel/Houston
Movers, LLC, Graebel Moving and Warehouse Corp. & Graebel/North
Carolina Movers, LLC, Defendants, represented by Alice Kwak, Lewis
Brisbois et al, Jeffrey S. Ranen, Lewis Brisbois et al, Katherine
C. Den Bleyker, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Katherine C.
Den Bleyker, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, pro hac vice &
William Scott Helfand, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP.

All My Sons of Denton County, Inc., Defendant, pro se.

MidCap Financial, LLC & Mid Cap Funding X Trust, Defendants,
represented by Jamil N. Alibhai -- jalibhai@munckwilson.com --
Munck Wilson Mandala LLP, John Maston O'Neal --
john.oneal@quarles.com -- Quarles & Brady LLP, pro hac vice & Sarah
J. Lopano -- slopano@munckwilson.com -- Munck Wilson Mandala, LLP,
pro hac vice.

John Does 1-10, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey S. Ranen, Lewis
Brisbois et al.

Graebel/St. Louis Movers, LLC & Graebel/Los Angeles, LLC,
Defendants, represented by Jeffrey S. Ranen, Lewis Brisbois et al,
Alice Kwak, Lewis Brisbois et al & Katherine C. Den Bleyker, Lewis
Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP.

Graebel/Illinois Movers, LLC, Defendant, represented by Alice Kwak,
Lewis Brisbois et al & Katherine C. Den Bleyker, Lewis Brisbois
Bisgaard & Smith LLP.


MINNESOTA: Minnesota Supreme Ct. Flips Cruz-Guzman Suit Dismissal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Alejandro Cruz-Guzman, as guardian and next friend of
his minor children, et al., Appellants/Cross-Respondents, v. State
of Minnesota, et al., Respondents/Cross-Appellants, and Higher
Ground Academy, et al., Defendants-Intervenors, Case No. A16-1265
(Minn.), Judge Natalie Hudson of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the
district court's order refusing to dismiss the Appellants' case for
lack of justiciability.

In November 2015, Appellants Cruz-Guzman, et al., commenced an
action against Respondents State of Minnesota, the Minnesota
Senate, the Minnesota House of Representatives, the Minnesota
Department of Education, and Dr. Brenda Cassellius, the
Commissioner of Education.  The Appellants are primarily parents of
children enrolled in Minneapolis and Saint Paul public schools.
They seek to represent a class of children enrolled, or expected to
be enrolled during the pendency of the action, in the Minneapolis
Public Schools, Special School District No. 1, and the Saint Paul
Public Schools, Independent School District 625.

The complaint contains copious data demonstrating a high degree of
segregation based on race and socioeconomic status in Minneapolis
and Saint Paul public schools.  The Appellants highlight several
practices by the Minneapolis and Saint Paul public schools, other
school districts, charter schools, and the State as contributing to
school segregation and inadequate educational outcomes.

The Appellants assert that the State has violated its
constitutional duty under the Education Clause of the Minnesota
Constitution.  They contend that in addition to failing to fulfill
its constitutional duty under the Education Clause, the State has
violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Minnesota Constitution by enabling school segregation and depriving
students of their fundamental right to an adequate education.

The complaint requests declaratory and injunctive relief.
Specifically, the Appellants have asked the district court to
permanently enjoin the State from continuing to engage in the
violations of law, to order the State to remedy the violations of
law, and to order the State "to provide the [students] forthwith
with an adequate and desegregated education.  They did not bring
any direct claims against either the Minneapolis Public Schools or
the Saint Paul Public Schools, and do not directly seek any
remedies from any school district or charter school.

The State moved to dismiss the complaint on multiple grounds,
including lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, and failure to join all
interested persons.  The district court dismissed certain
Defendants from the action and dismissed the claims brought under
the Minnesota Human Rights Act, but otherwise denied the motion to
dismiss.

The State filed an interlocutory appeal, raising the following
issues: (1) whether the district court erred by refusing to dismiss
the complaint for lack of justiciability; (2) whether the district
court erred by refusing to dismiss the claims against the Minnesota
Senate and House of Representatives based on legislative immunity;
and (3) whether the district court erred by refusing to dismiss the
complaint for failure to join individual school districts and
charter schools as parties.

The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Appellants' claims
present a nonjusticiable political question.  Accordingly, it
reversed the district court's order refusing to dismiss the
Appellants' case for lack of justiciability.  Because the court's
ruling on justiciability was dispositive, the court did not address
the State's other arguments concerning legislative immunity or the
failure to join necessary parties.

Judge Hudson granted the Appellants' petition for further review,
which raised the justiciability issue.  She also granted the
State's request for conditional cross-review, which asked the Court
to review the legislative immunity and joinder issues.

The Judge holds that the Appellants' constitutional claims under
the Education Clause do not present a political question and are
therefore justiciable.  She also concludes that the Appellants'
claims alleging violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Minnesota Constitution are justiciable.  Although
the Legislature plays a crucial role in education, it is ultimately
the judiciary's responsibility to determine what the constitution
requires and whether the Legislature has fulfilled its
constitutional duty.

The Judge declines to interpret one provision in the constitution
-- the Speech or Debate Clause -- to immunize the Legislature from
meeting its obligation under more specific constitutional
provisions -- the Education, Equal Protection, and Due Process
Clauses.  Moreover, none of the cases that the House and Senate
cite in support of their claims of legislative immunity involves a
legislature's failure to comply with an express constitutional
mandate.  She therefore holds that the protections of the Speech or
Debate Clause do not extend to claims that the Legislature has
violated its duty under the Education Clause or has violated the
Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses.

Addressing the State's argument that the district court lacks
jurisdiction over the Appellants' claims because the Appellants
failed to join all necessary parties, the Judge concludes that the
district court did not err when it denied the State's motion to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction under the
Declaratory Judgments Act.  Even if the school districts and
charter schools might eventually be affected by actions potentially
taken by the State in response to the litigation, those possible
effects are not enough to require that the school districts and
charter schools be joined as necessary parties.  

Finally, the Judge holds that school districts and charter schools
are not indispensable parties when relief is sought solely from the
State.  The district court therefore did not err when the court
denied the State's motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 19.

Judge Hudson concludes that separation-of-powers principles do not
prevent the judiciary from ruling on whether the Legislature has
violated its duty under the Education Clause or violated the Equal
Protection or Due Process Clauses of the Minnesota Constitution.
She also holds that the district court did not err when it denied
the State's motion seeking to dismiss the complaint based on
legislative immunity and the failure to join necessary parties.
She therefore reversed the decision of the court of appeals.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 25, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/sYNz2V from Leagle.com.

Daniel R. Shulman -- daniel.shulman@gpmlaw.com -- Joy Reopelle
Anderson -- joy.anderson@gpmlaw.com -- Richard C. Landon --
richard.landon@gpmlaw.com -- Kathryn E. Hauff, Gray, Plant, Mooty,
Mooty & Bennett, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota;

John G. Shulman, Jeanne-Marie Almonor, Minneapolis, Minnesota;

Mel C. Orchard, III, The Spence Law Firm, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming;
and

James Cook, Law Office of John Burris, Oakland, California, for
appellants/cross-respondents.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Karen D. Olson, Deputy Attorney
General, Kathryn M. Woodruff, Kevin A. Finnerty, Assistant
Attorneys General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for
respondents/cross-appellants.

Jack Y. Perry -- jperry@briggs.com -- Michael W. Kaphing --
mkaphing@briggs.com -- Briggs and Morgan, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota; and

John Cairns, John Cairns Law, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
amici curiae Higher Ground Academy, et al.

Teresa J. Nelson, John B. Gordon, American Civil Liberties Union of
Minnesota, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

William Z. Pentelovich -- bill.pentelovitch@maslon.com -- Jesse D.
Mondry -- jesse.mondry@maslon.com -- Maslon LLP, Minneapolis,
Minnesota, for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of
Minnesota.

Will Stancil, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amici curiae Concerned
Law Professors.

Eli M. Temkin -- etemkin@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Minneapolis,
Minnesota, Todd R. Geremia -- trgeremia@jonesday.com -- James M.
Gross, Jones Day, New York, New York; David G. Sciarra --
dsciarra@edlawcenter.org -- Education Law Center, Newark, New
Jersey; and Derek W. Black, Columbia, South Carolina, for amici
curiae Education Law Center and the Constitutional and Education
Law Scholars.

Lewis A. Remele, Jr. -- lremele@bassford.com -- Kate L. Homolka,
Bassford Remele, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amici curiae Tiffini
Flynn Forslund, et al.

Myron Orfield -- orfield@umn.edu -- Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
amicus curiae Myron Orfield.


MONTEREY FINANCIAL: Can Compel Arbitration in Garrett's FDCPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CARLA GARRETT, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated Plaintiff, v. MONTEREY FINANCIAL
SERVICES, LLC Defendant, Civil Action No. JKB-18-325 (D. Md.),
Judge James K. Bredar of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Maryland granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and to Compel
Arbitration.

In the putative class action, Garrett sues Monterey for violations
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  Monterey moves the
Court to compel arbitration and dismiss all causes of action.

Garrett entered into an electronic Installment Loan Agreement with
General Financial Inc. on June 4, 2013, through the website
www.justmilitaryloans.com.  The Agreement contains a Waiver of Jury
Trial and Arbitration provision.  Subsequently, the Agreement was
assigned to Monterey for collecting the debt.

On Feb. 26, 2018, after Garrett filed her Complaint, Monterey
produced the underlying contract and requested Garrett voluntarily
dismiss the instant litigation in light of the arbitration
provision from which Garrett did not opt-out.  Garrett did not
respond to the request.  Garrett does not dispute the existence or
scope of the arbitration provision but contends that it is
unconscionable.

Judge Bredar finds that Garrett has failed to carry her burden of
demonstrating that the arbitration provision is unconscionable.
The terms of the arbitration clause are not so one-sided as to be
oppressive.  Garrett also failed to demonstrate that the
arbitration provision violates the MLA.  Garrett's assertions
related to the interest rate cap imposed by the MLA do not relate
to the arbitration provision but to the Agreement as a whole.
Further, as Garrett states, the Agreement containing the
arbitration provision was signed in 2013, at which time the MLA did
not cover installment loans.  Finally, the Agreement does not
require the borrower to submit to arbitration because the
arbitration provision contains an opt-out clause.

Accordingly, the Judge holds that the arbitration provision is
enforceable.  Garrett does not maintain that her claims fall
outside the scope of the agreement to arbitrate, nor does she
contend that the Court, rather than the arbitrator, should
determine arbitrability of the claims.  The FAA requires a district
court to stay judicial proceedings involving issues covered by
arbitration agreements.  Dismissal is also a proper remedy under
the circumstances.  Therefore, as requested by Monterey, the Judge
will compel arbitration of all matters raised in the Complaint and
dismiss all causes of action.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Bredar granted the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss and to Compel Arbitration.  The Judgment will be
entered by separate Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 25, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/FXjMY4 from Leagle.com.

Carla Garrett, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Aryeh E. Stein --
astein@meridianlawfirm.com -- Meridian Law LLC.

Monterey Financial Services, Defendant, represented by Brendan H.
Little -- blittle@lippes.com -- Lippes Mathias Wexler Friedman LLP,
pro hac vice & James M. Brault -- jmb@braultgraham.com -- Brault
Graham LLC.


NATIONAL GAS: Court Dismisses Johansen's TCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, dismissed for failure to show cause the case
captioned KEN JOHANSEN, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL GAS & ELECTRIC LLC, Defendant.
Case No. 2:17-cv-587. (S.D. Ohio).

This matter is before the court on plaintiff's response to the
court's order to show cause why this action should not be dismissed
as meritless.

Plaintiff Ken Johansen brings this putative class action under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Johansen alleges that his
residential telephone number is on the national Do Not Call
Registry and that defendant National Gas & Electric LLC (NG&E)
violated the Act by calling him multiple times.

The Show Cause Order

The court's show cause order was precipitated by the filing that
plaintiff made in response to NG&E's motion to compel arbitration,
which the court denied. Plaintiff submitted an affidavit stating
that after NG&E first contacted him by telephone on June 13, 2017,
he called NG&E back to express interest in its services and
ultimately completed the enrollment process to seemingly become one
of its electric customers.

The Plaintiff, in seeking to avoid the arbitration provision of the
NG&E contract, argued that there never was a contract because he
knowingly provided incorrect information to NG&E. Plaintiff
admitted in his affidavit that he supplied a false address and
false account number. Thus, even though the NG&E representative on
the telephone would have believed that plaintiff was enrolling,
plaintiff knew that no matter what happened, he would not receive
NG&E's services.

Plaintiff's Response

The Plaintiff instead argues that NG&E committed a separate TCPA
violation during the same timeframe based on a different series of
calls. Plaintiff contends that the June 13 to 15 calls discussed in
the show cause order were made on NG&E's behalf by a telemarketing
vendor named St. Vincent. He claims that another third-party vendor
named Energy Telemarketers (ETM) called him on June 14, 2017 to
solicit him to enroll with NG&E. He received additional calls from
ETM and NG&E on June 15 and 16, and he argues that these calls
violated the TCPA.

Standard of Review

The court reviews plaintiff's response to the show cause order as
it would review a matter under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (summary judgment independent of a motion).

Under Rule 56, summary judgment is proper if the evidentiary
materials in the record show that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and that one party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

The ETM-Related Calls

Inter alia, at about 8:30 p.m. on June 14, 2017, plaintiff received
a call from ETM offering to help lower his electric bill. During
this call, the ETM representative verified plaintiff's address and
existing account number and offered to have an enrollment
specialist call him. Plaintiff agreed to be called back by an
enrollment specialist. Within ten minutes, NG&E twice attempted to
call plaintiff, but those calls went to voicemail and no messages
were left.  

ETM called again on June 15 around 11:45 a.m., following the same
script as the call placed the day before. Again, plaintiff verified
his address and account number and he responded, Okay, sounds good,
to the proposition that an enrollment specialist for the electric
supplier would be calling him. NG&E attempted to call plaintiff
twice within the next hour, but those calls went to voicemail and
no messages were left.

The Theory of a Different Telemarketing Vendor

The TCPA provides a private cause of action to a person who has
received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by
or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations
prescribed under this subsection.

The Plaintiff argues that the ETM-related calls are not covered by
the EBR which was created with NG&E as a result of the June 13,
2017 call from a different telemarketing vendor. Citing 47 C.F.R.
Section 64.1200(f)(5)(ii), plaintiff contends that an EBR with a
company does not extend to a call from the company's affiliates,
vendors or contractors unless the call is of the type the recipient
would reasonably expect to receive pursuant to the EBR. According
to plaintiff, the ETM-related calls were not reasonably connected
to the EBR because they were not follow-up calls or offers of
related services, but were new cold calls attempting to enroll him
in NG&E's services.

In response, NG&E argues that the ETM-related calls are covered by
the EBR because what matters under the statute is the entity
accountable for having the calls placed. NG&E contends that both
St. Vincent and ETM were calling on NG&E's behalf. Under
traditional agency principles, NG&E was the entity making the calls
and it had a right, by virtue of the EBR created on June 13, to
make telephone solicitations to plaintiff through its telemarketing
vendors.

The court finds that NG&E has correctly stated the law on this
issue. The text of the TCPA focuses on the entity who calls or on
whose behalf the call is made. If an individual has an EBR with an
entity, as plaintiff had with NG&E as of June 13, 2017), then a
call from the entity is excluded from the meaning of a telephone
solicitation under the Act regardless of whether the call is in the
nature of a solicitation.

Here, an EBR between plaintiff and NG&E was created on June 13,
2017. The court finds that the calls placed on NG&E's behalf by
agent ETM on June 14 and 15 are excluded from the definition of a
telephone solicitation. Thus, plaintiff's claim under the TCPA
fails as a matter of law.

Prior Express Permission

NG&E argues that even if the ETM-related calls are not exempt under
the EBR created on June 13, 2017, plaintiff expressly gave his
permission to ETM to be called. The court agrees.

A call is excluded from the definition of a telephone solicitation
if it is placed to any person with that person's prior express
invitation or permission. When an ETM representative proposed
during the June 14 call that an enrollment specialist would call
plaintiff, he responded, Okay, great. Sounds good. In the calls
which followed over the next several days, plaintiff never stated
that he did not wish to receive any more calls. He kept agreeing to
be called by an enrollment specialist and even attempted to call
NG&E to complete the enrollment process when one of the calls got
cut off.

The court thus finds as a matter of law that the ETM-related calls
are excluded from the definition of a telephone solicitation
because plaintiff gave prior express permission to be called.

The court grants summary judgment to defendant NG&E and dismisses
the complaint in its entirety.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 16, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8dq8vwl from
Leagle.com.

Ken Johansen, Plaintiff, represented by Brian K. Murphy --
murphy@mmmb.com -- Murray Murphy Moul Basil LLP, Anthony Paronich
-- anthony@broderick-law.com -- Broderick & Paronich, P.C., pro hac
vice, Edward A. Broderick , Broderick Law, P.C., pro hac vice &
Jonathan P. Misny -- misny@mmmb.com -- Murray Murphy Moul + Basil.

National Gas & Electric, LLC, Defendant, represented by John L.
Landolfi -- jllandolfi@vorys.com -- Vorys Sater Seymour & Pease,
Christopher Charles Wager -- ccwager@vorys.com -- Vorys, Sater,
Seymour & Pease LLP, Ezra Dodd Church , Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
LLP, pro hac vice & Michelle Pector --
michelle.pector@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, pro
hac vice.


NAVIENT SOLUTIONS: Can't Compel Arbitration in Homaidan's Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re: HILAL KHALIL HOMAIDAN, aka HELAL K HOMAIDAN,
Chapter 7, Debtor. HILAL KHALIL HOMAIDAN, Plaintiff, v. SLM
CORPORATION, SALLIE MAE, INC., NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, LLC, and NAVIENT
CREDIT FINANCE CORPORATION, Defendants, Case No. 08-48275-ess, Adv.
Pro. No.: 17-01085-ess (E.D. N.Y.), Judge Elizabeth S. Stong of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York denied
the motion to compel arbitration by Defendants Navient Solutions,
LLC, Navient Credit Finance Corp., and Sallie Mae, Inc.

On Dec. 4, 2008, Homaidan, also known as Helal K. Homaidan, filed a
petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, Case
No. 08-48275.  On Jan. 15, 2009, the Chapter 7 Trustee filed a
"no-asset" report stating that the estate has no non-exempt
property to distribute.  On April 9, 2009, the Court entered an
order discharging Mr. Homaidan, and on that same day, his
bankruptcy case was closed.  On April 14, 2017, Mr. Homaidan filed
a motion to reopen his bankruptcy case to obtain a determination of
the dischargeability of certain of his student loans, and on May
26, 2017, the Court entered an order reopening the case.

On June 23, 2017, Mr. Homaidan commenced the adversary proceeding
as a putative class action, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, by filing a complaint against SLM Corp., Sallie
Mae, Navient Solutions, and Navient Credit seeking a determination
that certain debts that he incurred as a student are not
nondischargeable student loan debts under Bankruptcy Code Section
523(a)(8)(B), and a finding of civil contempt for willful
violations of the bankruptcy discharge injunction.

On Oct. 30, 2017, the Defendants filed the motion to compel
arbitration, or in the alternative, to dismiss.  And on Dec. 1,
2017, the Court approved a stipulation of dismissal as to Defendant
SLM Corp.

Mr. Homaidan alleges that for the last 10n years, the Defendants
have engaged in a massive effort to defraud student debtors and to
subvert the orderly working of the bankruptcy courts.  He claims
that the Defendants originated and serviced dischargeable consumer
loans while disguising them as nondischargeable student loans.

Mr. Homaidan advances these allegations on behalf of an alleged
class of similarly situated individuals who have declared
bankruptcy since 2005 across the United States, with loans
originated and/or serviced by the Defendants.  And he alleges that
these loans do not meet the definition of a non-dischargeable
qualified education loan as set forth in Internal Revenue Code
Section 221(d) and Bankruptcy Code  Section 523(a)(8)(B). Id.

Mr. Homaidan attended Emerson College in Boston, Massachusetts
during the four academic years from 2003 to 2007.  He withdrew from
Emerson College in the Fall of 2006, and returned in the Spring of
2007 to complete his degree.  During the 2006-07 academic year, Mr.
Homaidan received $4,800 in scholarship funds from Emerson College,
and $22,100 in school-certified loans from the Defendants.  He
alleges that the Defendants lent him an additional $12,567 in
direct to consumer loans that were made outside the financial aid
office and were not made for qualified education expenses.

The Plaintiff requests a declaratory judgment pursuant to Judiciary
Code Section 2201 and Bankruptcy Rule 7001(9) that his debts were
discharged by operation of law on April 9, 2009, the date of his
bankruptcy discharge, because they were not student loans excluded
from discharge under Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(8).  He also
alleges that since the Defendants were notified of the Discharge
Order pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 4004(g), and still sought to
collect on his debts by use of dunning letters, phone calls,
negative reports made to credit bureaus, failure to update credit
reports, and commencing or continuing legal action to recover these
debts in violation of Bankruptcy Code Section 524], the Court
should cite the Defendants for civil contempt for their willful
violations of the Discharge Order, and order them to pay damages in
an amount to be determined at trial pursuant to Bankruptcy Code
Sections 524 and 105, and also to pay his attorneys' fees and
costs.

On Oct. 30, 2017, the Defendants moved to compel arbitration of Mr.
Homaidan's claims, or in the alternative, to dismiss the case, and
filed a memorandum of law in support.  They argue that Mr. Homaidan
agreed to arbitrate all claims alleged in his Complaint, and that
the agreement to arbitrate is "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable."  They argue that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")
provides that where the parties have entered into a valid
arbitration agreement, a party may move to compel the refusing
party to arbitrate its claims pursuant to the relevant agreement.

Judge Stong finds that Mr. Homaidan's claims for a determination
that certain of his debts were discharged by operation of law
because they are not student loans excluded from discharge under
Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(8), and that the Defendants violated
the Discharge Order, are core matters.  She holds that Mr.
Homaidan's allegations and claims for relief seek the enforcement
of a court order -- the discharge injunction -- that is central to
the statutory scheme and purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.  Courts --
not arbitration proceedings -- are the appropriate forums to
address alleged violations of court orders.  And the resolution of
Mr. Homaidan's claims directly implicates goals and objectives that
are central to the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, including the
goal of providing a debtor with a fresh start.  For these reasons,
the Judge finds that arbitration of Mr. Homaidan's claims would
inherently conflict with the Bankruptcy Code's objectives, and that
therefore, this consideration too weighs against compelling
arbitration of these claims.

For these reasons, she finds that arbitration of Mr. Homaidan's
would present a severe and inherent conflict with the Bankruptcy
Code, and additionally, that it would necessarily jeopardize the
objectives of the Bankruptcy Code.  As a result, she declines to
compel arbitration of Mr. Homaidan's claims.

Based on the entire record, and for the reasons set forth, Judge
Stong concluded that the Defendants have not established that the
Court should compel arbitration of the claims in the adversary
proceeding, and the Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration is
denied.  An order in accordance with the Memorandum Decision will
be entered simultaneously with the Memorandum Decision.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 25, 2018 Memorandum Decision
is available at https://is.gd/ygGbLd from Leagle.com.

Hilal Khalil Homaidan, Plaintiff, represented by George F.
Carpinello -- gcarpinello@bsfllp.com -- Boies Schiller Flexner,
LLP, Adam Shaw -- ashaw@bsfllp.com -- Boies Schiller Flexner LLP,
Austin C. Smith -- smitha83@miamioh.edu -- Smith Law Group, Lynn E.
Swanson -- swanson@jonesswanson.com -- Jones, Swanson, Huddell &
Garrison, LLC & Robert C. Tietjen -- rtietjen@bsfllp.com -- Boies
Schiller Flexner LLP.

Sallie Mae, Inc., Defendant, represented by Thomas M. Farrell --
tfarrell@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuire Woods LLP.

Navient Solutions, LLC & Navient Credit Finance Corporation,
Defendants, represented by Thomas M. Farrell, McGuire Woods LLP &
Shawn Randall Fox -- sfox@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuire Woods LLP.


NEW HORIZON'S: Kurdinat Files FLSA Suit Over Unpaid Wages
---------------------------------------------------------
Nicole Kurdinat, individually and as the representative of a class
of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, v. New Horizon's Baking
Company, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-00926 (N.D. Ohio, April
23, 2018), seeks compensatory damages in the amount of their unpaid
wages, as well as liquidated damages in an equal amount, costs and
attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this action and such
further relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act as well as the
Ohio overtime compensation statute.

New Horizon manufactures and distributes various baked goods.

The complaint says the Defendant excluded the nondiscretionary
bonus payments in determining their regular rates for purposes of
overtime compensation. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Hans A. Nilges, Esq.
      Shannon M. Draher, Esq.
      NILGES DRAHER LLC
      7266 Portage Street, N.W., Suite D
      Massillon, OH 44646
      Telephone: (330) 470-4428
      Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
      Email: hans@ohlaborlaw.com
             sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com


NIKE INC: Faces Class Action Over Toxic Workplace Behavior
----------------------------------------------------------
Matthew Kish, writing for Portland Business Journal, reports that a
federal lawsuit filed against Nike Inc. on Aug. 9 gives the fullest
picture yet of the toxic workplace behavior that is threatening to
become the company's biggest scandal since it repeatedly batted
away sweatshop criticisms in the 1990s.

The lawsuit, which seeks class action status, alleges "women's
careers (at Nike) are blunted because they are marginalized and
passed over for promotions."

"Nike judges women more harshly than men, which means lower
salaries, smaller bonuses, and fewer stock options. Women's
complaints to human resources about discrimination and harassment,
including sexual assault, are ignored or mishandled," the lawsuit
claims.

The lawsuit was filed on behalf of four former Nike employees, but
says the class could reach at least 500 members.

Nike declined comment on the lawsuit, but issued a general
statement on Aug. 9.

"Nike opposes discrimination of any type and has a long-standing
commitment to diversity and inclusion," the company said.  "We are
committed to competitive pay and benefits for our employees. The
vast majority of Nike employees live by our values of dignity and
respect for others."

Complaints about Nike's culture were first reported in March by the
Wall Street Journal after a group of female executives complained
to CEO Mark Parker. The New York Times and The Oregonian
subsequently reported on complaints about Nike's culture, which
some described as a "boys' club."

The Aug. 9 lawsuit recaps those reports and offers additional
allegations, including claims that a male Nike executive sent
inappropriate sexual messages and nude photographs of himself to
one of the plaintiffs, Sara Johnston, after a boozy Nike party in
December 2015.

Ms. Johnston complained about the behavior to a supervisor, but was
told "Nike has a culture that revolves around alcohol," and she
should "let the incidents go," according to the lawsuit.

The lawsuit claims no action was taken against the male executive.

Ms. Johnston claims she subsequently learned the same male
executive "pushed a female co-worker against a wall and reached his
hand up her skirt" at the same December 2015 party.

When she met with human resources in May 2016 to discuss the male
executive's behavior, Johnston claims she was told that Nike was
not taking any disciplinary action against the executive, who was
subsequently promoted to a position in which she had to work more
closely with him.

Also in the lawsuit, plaintiff Kelly Cahill, who also filed an
earlier sexual discrimination complaint again Nike with the state,
claims a former Nike executive referred to women as "dykes" on
several occasions and regularly berated female employees.

Ms. Cahill claims she complained to human resources four times, but
her complaints did not result in "meaningful" action.

Nike has taken several public steps to address its problem. In
March, Parker sent a memo to Nike employees in which he said he'd
"become aware of reports of behavior . . . that do not reflect our
core values of inclusivity, respect and empowerment."

At least 11 executives have since left the company, including
CEO-in-waiting Trevor Edwards. Nike also has overhauled its
compensation system, named its first chief diversity and inclusion
officer and appointed two new board members, including one with
expertise in diversity efforts. [GN]


ONE ON ONE: Violates Disabilities Act, Diaz Class Suit Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
Edwin Diaz filed a class action lawsuit against One On One Physical
Therapy, LLC pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act.  The
case is captioned Edwin Diaz, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. One On One Physical Therapy, LLC, Case No.
1:18-cv-07954 (S.D.N.Y., August 30, 2018).

One On One Physical Therapy is a group of physical therapist owned
practices, with locations throughout Brooklyn, Staten Island,
Manhattan and Queens.  The Company treats all orthopedic injuries,
as well as various neurological and degenerative conditions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 299-6612
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: joseph@cml.legal


OPEN DOOR: Court Orders Supplemental Brief in Conde's FLSA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CARLOS CONDE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. OPEN DOOR
MARKETING, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-04080-KAW (N.D.
Cal.), Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California has ordered the
Plaintiffs to provide a supplemental brief regarding the following
issues: (i) the number of opt-in Plaintiffs; (ii) calculation of
workweeks; (iii) released claims; (iv) reasonableness of the
settlement; non-disclosure requirements; and (v) binding effect on
California.

It is unclear how many opt-in Plaintiffs are affected by the
Settlement Agreement.  The motion for settlement approval states
there are 177 individuals, whereas the Settlement Agreement and the
Plaintiffs' notice to the opt-in Plaintiffs state there are 160
individuals.  The Plaintiffs will clarify the number of opt-in
Plaintiffs.

The settlement will be allocated based on the number of weeks
worked.  Specifically, the Plaintiffs' counsel will calculate the
number of weeks each opt-in Plaintiff claims to have worked for the
Defendants in California and Nevada.  Each week worked in Nevada
will count as one "share," and each week in California will
constitute two "shares."  The total number of shares will be
calculated.  The total shares that each individual opt-in Plaintiff
will then be divided by the total number of shares to determine the
percent of the net settlement amount to which the individual is
entitled to.  The Plaintiffs must explain why the California weeks
are being doubled.

The Settlement Agreement defines "Released Claims" as the wage and
hour claims, known or unknown, that could be asserted under the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") or any state law, as defined in
Section III A.  Section III.A, however, states that the released
claims will be any claims that were pled or could have been pled in
the Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Collective and Class Action
Complaint based on the factual allegations in that complaint,
including but not limited to any claims under state or federal
statutes or common law regarding the payment of wages.  This
suggests a broader release than the wage and hour claims only.  The
Plaintiffs will confirm that the Settlement Agreement is limited to
wage and hour claims as to the opt-in Plaintiffs who are not named
Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs estimate the maximum liability in the case to be
$511,379.05 (excluding civil penalties under California's Private
Attorneys General Act ("PAGA")).  The $125,000 settlement amount is
24.4% of the full verdict value.  In order for the Magistrate Judge
to determine whether this amount is "a fair and reasonable
resolution of a bona fide dispute, she requires further
information.  First, the Plaintiff must explain how maximum
liability was calculated, sufficient for the Court to determine
that this number is a reasonable estimate of Defendants' potential
liability.  Second, the Magistrate Judge requires further
information on the litigation risks faced by the Plaintiffs with
respect to the outside salespeople exemption under both the FLSA
and the California Labor Code.  The Plaintiffs must explain how the
outside salespeople exemptions would apply to the facts of the
instant case.

The Settlement Agreement provides that the parties and their
counsel will not discuss the litigation or settlement with any
person, except in limited circumstances.  In light of
Gonzalez-Rodriguez and the authority cited therein, and the fact
that the settlement agreement has already been filed on the public
record, the Plaintiffs must explain whether the non-disclosure
provision should be forced.

Finally, the Plaintiffs state that the release will be equally
binding on the State of California, and will preclude it from
seeking to recover civil penalties from 2020 with respect to any
violation of the California Labor Code arising out of such
allegations.  The Magistrata Judge orders the Plaintiffs to clarify
whether this is limited to the PAGA claims only.  Additionally, the
Plaintiffs will state whether they received any response from the
California Labor Workforce Development Agency regarding the PAGA
settlement.

The supplemental brief should be filed no later than Aug. 6, 2018
at 12:00 p.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 27, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/VjWIvX from Leagle.com.

Carlos Conde, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Shikwana Jennings, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated & Lisa Drake, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Shannon Liss-Riordan -- sliss@llrlaw.com -- Lichten & Liss-Riordan,
P.C.

Open Door Marketing, LLC, Larry Dale Clark & Jerrimy Farris,
Defendants, represented by Kristin Alexandria Smith --
ksmith@fosteremploymentlaw.com -- Foster Employment Law & Michael
Leslie Thompson, Lehr Middlebrooks Vreeland and Thompson, P.C.

20/20 Communications, Inc., Defendant, represented by Christopher
William Decker -- christopher.decker@ogletree.com -- Ogletree
Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart PC & Wendy V. Miller --
wendy.miller@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Law Firm, pro hac
vice.


OPUS BANK: Cal. App. Affirms Judgment in Flores's Suit
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SANDRA D'AMATO FLORES, Cross-complainant and
Appellant, v. OPUS BANK, Cross-defendant and Respondent, 2d Civil
No. B277112, Consolidated w/ No. BC514928 (Cal. App.), Judge Martin
J. Tangeman of the Court of Appeals of California for the Second
District, Division Six, affirmed the trial court's order granting
judgment for the Bank.

The appeal is one of three appeals by Flores.  The other two are
from intermediate orders in her putative class action for wage and
hour violations against the Bank on behalf of other managers (Los
Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC573070; 2d Civil Case Nos.
B269866 & B278309).

Flores was hired as Vice President and Retail Banking Manager for
the Bank.  She resigned 15 months later.  The Bank sued her.  She
cross-complained for various wage and hour violations.  The trial
court granted her motion for summary judgment on the Bank's
complaint.  Her cross-complaint proceeded to trial.

After a bench trial, the court granted judgment for the Bank.  It
found that Flores was properly classified as an exempt employee
under the executive exemption of Industrial Welfare Commission Wage
Order 4-2001.  

Judge Tangeman finds substantial evidence that supports the trial
court's determination that Flores' business development activities
were part of her management and oversight of the success and growth
of her branch and she was properly classified as exempt.  Flores'
duties involved management, as established by the testimony of the
Bank's human resources director and its chief banking officer that
Flores was the person responsible for managing a newly opened
Pasadena branch and, for several months, was also responsible for
managing the South Pasadena branch.  It was undisputed that Flores'
compensation of $101,000 in her 15 months with the Bank, was
sufficient to meet exemption salary requirements.  The record does
not support Flores' contention that the Bank forfeited reliance on
the administrative exemption.  Accordingly, the Judge affirmed the
judgment.  The Bank is awarded its costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 25, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/zdBzP3 from Leagle.com.

Brown Gitt Law Group, Cynthia E. Gitt and Thomas P. Brown, for
Plaintiff and Appellant.

Carothers DiSante & Freudenberger, Todd R. Wulffson --
twulffson@cdflaborlaw.com -- Robin E. Largent --
rlargent@cdflaborlaw.com -- and Ashley A. Halberda --
ahalberda@cdflaborlaw.com -- for Defendant and Respondent.


PERRIGO CO: Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Suit Granted in Part
------------------------------------------------------------
Perrigo Company plc said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the court has granted in
part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss a class
action lawsuit.

On May 18, 2016, a shareholder filed a securities case against the
company and its former CEO, Joseph Papa, in the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey (Roofers' Pension Fund v. Papa, et
al.).

The plaintiff purported to represent a class of shareholders for
the period from April 21, 2015 through May 11, 2016, inclusive.

The original complaint alleged violations of Securities Exchange
Act sections 10(b) (and Rule 10b‑5) and 14(e) against both
defendants and 20(a) control person liability against Mr. Papa.

In general, the allegations concerned the actions taken by the
company and the former executive to defend against the unsolicited
takeover bid by Mylan in the period from April 21, 2015 through
November 13, 2015. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants
provided inadequate disclosure concerning alleged integration
problems related to the Omega acquisition in the period from April
21, 2015 through May 11, 2016.

On July 19, 2016, a different shareholder filed a securities class
action against the company and its former CEO, Joseph Papa, also in
the District of New Jersey (Wilson v. Papa, et al.). The plaintiff
purported to represent a class of persons who sold put options on
the company's  shares between April 21, 2015 and May 11, 2016.

In general, the allegations and the claims were the same as those
made in the original complaint filed in the Roofers' Pension Fund
case. On December 8, 2016, the court consolidated Roofers' Pension
Fund case and the Wilson case under the Roofers' Pension Fund case
number. In February 2017, the court selected the lead plaintiffs
for the consolidated case and the lead counsel to the putative
class. In March 2017, the court entered a scheduling order.

On June 21, 2017, the court-appointed lead plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint that superseded the original complaints in the
Roofers' Pension Fund case and the Wilson case. The lead plaintiffs
seek to represent a class of shareholders for the period April 21,
2015 through May 3, 2017, and the amended complaint identifies
three subclasses - shareholders who purchased shares during the
period on the U.S. exchanges; shareholders who purchased shares
during the period on the Tel Aviv exchange; and shareholders who
owned shares on the final day of the Mylan tender offer November
13, 2015.

The amended complaint names as defendants the company and 11
current or former directors and officers of Perrigo (Mses. Judy
Brown, Laurie Brlas, Jacqualyn Fouse, Ellen Hoffing, and Messrs.
Joe Papa, Marc Coucke, Gary Cohen, Michael Jandernoa, Gerald
Kunkle, Herman Morris, and Donal O’Connor). The amended complaint
alleges violations of Securities Exchange Act sections 10(b) (and
Rule 10b‑5) and 14(e) against all defendants and 20(a) control
person liability against the 11 individuals.

In general, the allegations concern the actions taken by the
company and the former executives to defend against the unsolicited
takeover bid by Mylan in the period from April 21, 2015 through
November 13, 2015 and the allegedly inadequate disclosure
throughout the entire class period related to purported integration
problems related to the Omega acquisition, alleges incorrect
reporting of organic growth at the Company and at Omega, alleges
price fixing activities with respect to six generic prescription
pharmaceuticals, and alleges improper accounting for the Tysabri(R)
royalty stream. The amended complaint does not include an estimate
of damages.

In August 2017, the defendants filed motions to dismiss the amended
complaint. The plaintiffs filed their opposition in October 2017.
The defendants filed replies in support of the motions to dismiss
in November 2017.

On July 27, 2018, the court issued an opinion and order granting
the defendants' motions to dismiss in part and denying the motions
to dismiss in part. The court dismissed without prejudice
defendants Laurie Brlas, Jacqualyn Fouse, Ellen Hoffing, Gary
Cohen, Michael Jandernoa, Gerald Kunkle, Herman Morris, Donal
O’Connor, and Marc Coucke.

The court also dismissed without prejudice claims arising from the
Tysabri(R) accounting issue described above and claims alleging
incorrect disclosure of organic growth described above. The
defendants who were not dismissed are Perrigo Company, Joe Papa,
and Judy Brown. The claims (described above) that were not
dismissed relate to the integration issues regarding the Omega
acquisition and the alleged price fixing activities with respect to
six generic prescription pharmaceuticals.

Perrigo said, "We intend to defend the lawsuit vigorously."

Perrigo Company plc, a healthcare company, manufactures and
supplies over-the-counter (OTC) healthcare products, infant
formulas, branded OTC products, and generic pharmaceutical products
worldwide. The company operates through Consumer Healthcare
Americas, Consumer Healthcare International, and Prescription
Pharmaceuticals segments. Perrigo Company plc was founded in 1887
and is headquartered in Dublin, Ireland.


PIPEFITTERS ASSOC: Summ. Judgment Bid in Porter Suit Partly OK'd
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DUANE PORTER, KENNETH BLACK, RONALD BOUIE, RICKY
BROWN, SAMUEL CLARK, FRANK CRADDIETH, DONALD GAYLES, STEVE WILSON,
and JEFFREY PICKETT, on their own behalf and on behalf of a class
of all others who are similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
PIPEFITTERS ASSOCIATION LOCAL UNION 597, Defendant, Case No. 12 C
9844 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Sara L. Ellis of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, (i) grants
Local 597's motion for summary judgment with regard to the
Plaintiffs' Title VII disparate impact claims, two of their LMRA
claims (regarding Local 597's enforcement of contractor compliance
with the Referral Hall policy and Local 597's grievance policy),
and their retaliation claims; (ii) denied the motion with regard to
the Plaintiffs' Title VII intentional discrimination claims,
Section 1981 claim, and one of their LMRA claims (regarding the
creation of the Referral Hall policy); and (iii) denied Local 597's
motion to strike Exhibit A of the Plaintiffs' response to their
motion for summary judgment.

The named Plaintiffs are African American journeyman pipefitters
who either belong or belonged to Defendant Local 597.  Local 597 is
a labor organization and the exclusive bargaining agent for
pipefitters working within its territorial jurisdiction, as defined
in Local 597's agreement with the Mechanical Contractors
Association ("MCA").  The evolution of Local 597's job assignment
system, stemming back to a prior discrimination lawsuit, forms the
basis for the Plaintiffs' claims.

The Plaintiffs claim that they and other African American
pipefitters worked comparatively fewer hours than their non-African
American counterparts due to Local 597's inequitable job assignment
systems.  They filed the suit against Local 597, alleging
intentional and disparate impact discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and breach of Local
597's duty of fair representation under the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"), for failing to represent the
interests of all of its members.  

In addition to their class claims, each of the named Plaintiffs
brings a retaliation claim against Local 597, alleging that the
union retaliated against them for raising the issue of
discrimination.  All of the Plaintiffs base their retaliation
claims on the continued disparity in hours between African American
and white pipefitters, and Wilson and Gayles bring other specific
retaliation claims as well.

The Court certified the Plaintiffs' class action under Federal Rule
of Procedure 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), and Local 597 now moves for
summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' claims.  Local 597 moves for
summary judgment regarding the Plaintiffs' disparate treatment
claim on the basis that they've have not put forth any evidence to
show that Local 597 intentionally discriminated.  In addition to
its objections regarding the substance of the Plaintiffs' Section
1981 claim, Local 597 also argues that the statute of limitations
bars Plaintiffs' Section 1981 claim.

The Defendants also seek summary judgment on the Plaintiffs'
disparate impact claim, arguing that the Plaintiffs have not
isolated a specific policy that caused the impact and that they've
failed to demonstrate that the Hiring Hall and Referral Hall
policies actually caused a disparate impact.  The last of the
Plaintiffs' class claims are their allegations that Local 597
breached its duty of fair representation under the LMRA.

As a preliminary issue, Judge Ellis addresses Local 597's motion to
strike Exhibit A to the Plaintiffs' response.  Local 597 argues
that the Court should not consider Exhibit A, the Memorandum
Opinion of the special master appointed in the Daniels litigation,
because the Court has already struck Exhibit A and/or allegations
referencing it from two different iterations of the Plaintiffs'
complaint, and the exhibit is irrelevant, impertinent, and
inflammatory. Plaintiffs respond that Exhibit A is relevant,
admissible evidence of its claims, and that the Court's prior
rulings do not support striking Exhibit A in these circumstances.
The Judge finds that Exhibit A provides relevant information at
this point in the litigation and that Exhibit A is not unduly
prejudicial to Defendants, and so she denied Local 597's motion to
strike.

Although Local 597 is correct that these cases clarify the line
between an employer function and a union's agency function, the
Judge finds that they are not particularly helpful, where the
Plaintiffs have clearly identified a union policy that they argue
promoted or caused discriminatory practices to develop.
Essentially, Local 597 can be held liable under Title VII if its
actions opened the door for contractors to discriminate based on
race, but not for actions that the contractors took on their own.
The Plaintiffs' claims fall on the former side of that distinction.


Drawing all inferences in the Plaintiffs' favor, the Judge holds
that a factfinder could reasonably decide that the presence of the
Daniels litigation and the Cade testimony show that Local 597 knew
that their lack of enforcement of the Hiring Hall exceptions would
lead to discrimination against African American pipefitters.
Though it is possible that this argument will not prevail at trial,
the Plaintiffs have put forth enough evidence to survive a motion
for summary judgment.  

The other Local 597 decision that Plaintiffs highlight is the
union's decision to replace the Hiring Hall with the Referral Hall.
The Plaintiffs' intentional discrimination claim regarding this
decision survives for the same reason that their other intentional
discrimination claim survives.  If a reasonable factfinder could
find that Local 597 intentionally discriminated when it allowed the
abuse of the Hiring Hall exceptions, then Local 597 essentially
codified that status quo of discrimination when it created the
Referral Hall.

Because the Judge finds that Section 1981 Statute of Limitations
constitutes a continuing violation, she does not address the
Plaintiffs' argument that they did not discover their injury (and
thus the clock for the statute of limitations did not start) until
long after the implementation of the Referral Hall.  Also, the lack
of any evidence to show that a Local 597 policy or practice caused
the disparity in pipefitter hours is fatal to the Plaintiffs'
disparate impact claim.  The Plaintiffs have further put forth
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that Local 597's creation of the Referral Hall was
discriminatory.

Finally, the Judge turns to the Plaintiffs' individual retaliation
claims.  She finds that there is simply not enough information in
the record for the other coworker to be a helpful comparator in
demonstrating retaliation, and so this claim also is subject to
summary judgment.

Judge Ellis concluded that because the Plaintiffs have demonstrated
a genuine issue of material fact with regard to their intentional
discrimination claims, she denied Local 597's motion for summary
judgment with regard to the Plaintiffs' Title VII disparate
treatment claims, Section 1981 claim, and one of the Plaintiffs'
LMRA claims (regarding the creation of the Referral Hall policy).
However, the Judge granted Local 597's motion for summary judgment
with regard to the Plaintiffs' Title VII disparate impact claims
because they cannot establish a prima facie case at trial based on
the evidence in the record.  She additionally granted Local 597's
motion for summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' retaliation claims
and two of their LMRA claims (regarding Local 597's enforcement of
contractor compliance with the Referral Hall policy and Local 597's
grievance policy).  Finally, the Judge denied Local 597's motion to
strike Exhibit A of the Plaintiffs' response to their motion for
summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 25, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/usWiap from Leagle.com.

Duane Porter, Kenneth Black, Ronald Bouie, Ricky Brown, Samuel
Clark, Frank Craddieth, Donald Gayles & Steve Wilson, Plaintiffs,
represented by Jamie S. Franklin -- jsf@thefranklinlawfirm.com --
The Franklin Law Firm LLC, Adam B. Goodman -- agoodman@goodtov.com
-- Goodman Tovrov Hardy & Johnson LLC, Randall D. Schmidt --
r-schmidt@uchicago.edu -- Mandel Legal Aid Clinic & Wesley E.
Johnson -- wjohnson@goodtov.com -- Goodman Tovrov Hardy & Johnson
LLC.

Jeffrey Pickett, on their own behalves and on behalf of a class of
all others who are similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Jamie S. Franklin, The Franklin Law Firm LLC.

Pipefitters Association Local Union 597, Defendant, represented by
Aimee Elizabeth Delaney -- adelaney@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw &
Culbertson LLP, Leigh Christina Bonsall, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP,
Linda Kay Horras, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP & Tom H. Luetkemeyer --
tluetkemeyer@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.


PLS CHECK: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of P. Rangel's FLSA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed the
District Court's judgment granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned PEARL RANGEL, as an individual and on behalf of
all employees similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PLS CHECK
CASHERS OF CALIFORNIA, INC., a California corporation,
Defendant-Appellee. No. 16-56826. (9th Cir.).

Pearl Rangel appeals from the district court's dismissal, on res
judicata grounds, of her wage-and-hour action brought under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

PLS Check Cashers of California (PLS) is a check casher and payday
lender with branches across California. In early 2014, three PLS
workers (not including Rangel) filed suit against PLS and a related
company, alleging violations of several wage-and-hour and wage
statement provisions of the California Labor Code.

The parties reached a final settlement in April 2015. This
settlement, the so-called Dieguez settlement  covered all Class
Members who do not timely send a valid Opt-Out Request. The Dieguez
settlement defined the class members as all hourly paid or
non-exempt employees who worked at a Defendant store within the
state of California between January 6, 2010 and April 10, 2015.

PLS promptly moved to dismiss on res judicata grounds. PLS argued
that the Dieguez settlement resulted in a final judgment in state
court on the merits of Rangel's minimum wage and overtime claims.
PLS also argued that the Dieguez settlement, which expressly
released all claims that could have been brought based on the same
factual predicate, functioned as a waiver coextensive with the
scope of res judicata.

In opposition to PLS's motion to dismiss, Rangel took the position
that her FLSA claims could not have been released in the Dieguez
settlement because the settlement was the product of an opt-out
class asserting only state law labor claims. FLSA collective
actions, unlike Rule 23(b)(3) class actions and their state law
analogues, are strictly opt-in actions. Workers cannot become
plaintiffs to a collective action unless they first file a written
consent with the court expressly joining the litigation. According
to Rangel, this unique requirement of the FLSA prevented the
opt-out class settlement from releasing FLSA claims, and thus
prevented the state court's judgment from having any preclusive
effect with respect to those claims.

In California, res judicata applies if (1) the decision in the
prior proceeding was final and on the merits; (2) the present
proceeding is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding;
and (3) the parties in the present proceeding or parties in privity
with them were parties to the prior proceeding.

Rangel's FLSA claims, as federal versions of the state law claims
asserted in the Dieguez action, are typical examples of claims
invoking the same injury to the same right litigated in a prior
case. Rangel does not disagree on this point, but instead argues a
different one: Her FLSA claims must be distinguished from the
California Labor Code claims released in Dieguez because the FLSA
claims could not have been litigated through an opt-out class.
Rangel is not wrong in her premise; the collective action and
opt-out class mechanisms do differ. But she is wrong about the
import of that distinction for res judicata purposes. The mechanism
of litigation has no impact on the California primary rights
analysis. The same injuries to the same rights are at issue in both
cases.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's August 16, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycqb7u9c from Leagle.com.

Kevin Mahoney -- kmahoney@mahoney-law.net -- (argued), Katherine J.
Odenbreit -- kodenbreit@mahoney-law.net -- Atoy H. Wilson --
awilson@mahoney-law.net -- and Dionisios Aliazis --
daliazis@mahoney-law.net -- Mahoney Law Group APC, Long Beach,
California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Ines M. Monte -- imonte@littler.com -- (argued) and Abby Bochenek
-- abochenek@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson P.C., Chicago,
Illinois, for Defendant-Appellee.


PORTFOLIO RECOVERY:  Benchemhoun Files Suit Over FDCPA Violation
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Portfolio Recovery
Associates, L.L.C.  The case is titled as Samuel Benchemhoun, on
behalf of himself and all other similarly situated consumers v.
Portfolio Recovery Associates, L.L.C., Case No. 1:18-cv-04951
(E.D.N.Y., August 30, 2018).

The Plaintiff accuses the Defendant of violating the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, provides debt recovery and
collection services.  The Company specializes in contingency
collections for national credit card issuers, consumer lenders,
telecommunications providers, retail credit stores, healthcare,
utilities, and commercial accounts receivables.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam Jon Fishbein, Esq.
          ADAM J. FISHBEIN, P.C.
          735 Central Avenue
          Woodmere, NY 11598
          Telephone: (516) 668-6945
          E-mail: fishbeinadamj@gmail.com


PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Tucker Suit Alleges FDCPA Breach
----------------------------------------------------
Toby Tucker filed a class action lawsuit against Portfolio Recovery
Associates, LLC.  The case is titled as Toby Tucker, for himself
and on behalf of all those similarly situated individuals v.
Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, Case No. 2:18-cv-00140-cr (D.
Vt., August 30, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, provides debt recovery and
collection services.  The Company specializes in contingency
collections for national credit card issuers, consumer lenders,
telecommunications providers, retail credit stores, healthcare,
utilities, and commercial accounts receivables.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua R.I. Cohen, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF JOSHUA R.I. COHEN, LLC
          114 Route 100
          P.O. Box 1639
          West Dover, VT 05363
          Telephone: (802) 380-8887
          Facsimile: (860) 233-0339
          E-mail: jcohen@thestudentloanlawyer.com


REMINGTON ARMS: 8th Cir. Affirms Final OK of Deal in Pollard's Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Ian Pollard, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Remington Arms
Company, LLC; Sporting Goods Properties, Inc.; E.I. Du Pont Nemours
and Company, Defendants-Appellees, v. Terry Pennington; Rodney
Townsend Objectors. Lewis M. Frost; Richard Denney,
Objectors-Appellants. Commonwealth of Massachusetts; District of
Columbia; State of California; State of Hawaii; State of Illinois;
State of Maine; State of Maryland; State of New Mexico; State of
New York; State of Oregon; State of Pennsylvania; State of Rhode
Island; State of Vermont; State of Washington Amici on Behalf of
Appellant(s). State of Alabama; State of Arkansas; State of
Louisiana; State of Michigan; State of Missouri; State of Nebraska;
State of South Carolina; State of South Dakota; State of Utah;
State of West Virginia; State of Wisconsin Amici on Behalf of
Appellee(s), Case No. 17-1818 (8th Cir.), Judge Ralph R. Erickson
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court's order granting final approval of the class action
settlement agreement.

Pollard and others brought a class action complaint against
Remington; Sporting Goods Properties, Inc.; and E.I. Du Pont
Nemours and Co., in which they alleged certain Remington rifles
were susceptible to unintentional firing without a trigger pull.
Among other things, the class members sought to require Remington
to repair or replace their firearms.

After extensive settlement negotiations, the parties finalized a
nationwide settlement.  The settlement provided benefits in the
form of retrofitted triggers, vouchers, and/or reimbursement for
replacing the firearm's original trigger mechanism to United States
residents who owned certain Remington rifles manufactured from 1948
to the present.  In exchange for these benefits, the class members
would release claims associated with the firearms but the
settlement terms exempted claims for personal injury or property
damage.  The parties' notice plan included: (1) a joint press
release; (2) direct notice; (3) short form notice; (4) long form
notice; (5) notice through a settlement website; and (6) notice
through social media and the Internet.  The court approved service
award payments in the amount of $2,500 to each class representative
and approved $12.5 million in attorney's fees to the class counsel
minus costs and expenses in the amount of $474,892.75.

Appellants Frost and Denney ("objectors") appeal the district
court's order granting final approval of the class action
settlement agreement.  On appeal, they argue that the district
court abused its discretion by approving a class action settlement
that utilized an inadequate notice plan and one that provided
inadequate relief to the class members.

Judge Erickson holds that he's mindful that while the claim
submission rate is not desirable, the notice plan was adequate and
satisfied the methods and mechanisms for disseminating notice set
forth in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The
district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the notice
plan.

The Judge has carefully reviewed the record.  In determining
whether to approve the settlement, he finds that the district court
balanced the strength of the class members' claims against the
settlement terms, considered Remington's financial condition,
analyzed the complexity and expense of further litigation, and
reviewed the opposition to the settlement.  The objectors ignore
the substantial risk that they would not prevail if the litigation
had continued.

The parties removed personal injury and property damage claims from
the terms of the settlement agreement.  They also removed
differences among state law by agreement.  The Judge has found that
a settlement agreement is not rendered unfair because it does not
account for differences in state laws.

Finally, he finds that the record makes plain that the settlement
agreement was reached following meaningful discovery and
investigation by the class counsel and arm's length negotiations
between the parties.  He concludes that the settlement was fair,
reasonable, and adequate, and he affirms the district court's order
approving the settlement.  Accordingly, the judgment of the
district court is affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 25, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/y8xeFG from Leagle.com.

Mark T. Kempton, for Objector-Appellant.

Timothy W. Monsees, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

John R. Climaco -- jrclim@climacolaw.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

John K. Sherk, III -- jsherk@shb.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Richard J. Arsenault -- rarsenault@nbalawfirm.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Randall Seth Crompton -- scrompton@allfela.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Eric D. Holland -- eholland@allfela.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Charles E. Schaffer -- cschaffer@lfsblaw.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Molly S. Carella -- mcarella@shb.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Andrew Arthur Lothson -- alothson@smbtrials.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Scott Bursor -- scott@bursor.com -- for Objector-Appellant.

W. Mark Lanier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

John Peca -- japeca@climacolaw.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jon D. Robinson -- jrobinson@brelaw.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Amy M. Crouch -- amcrouch@shb.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.


RIPPLE LABS: Plaintiff's Bid to Keep Class Action in Calif. Nixed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Daily Hodl reports that a judge has denied an attempt to keep a
lawsuit against Ripple in the state of California.

The case, brought forth by XRP investor Ryan Coffey, claims Ripple
Labs and CEO Brad Garlinghouse violated federal securities laws
through the company's sale of XRP.

Mr. Coffey attempted to keep the case in California instead of
having it tried in federal court.  That effort was denied on Aug.
10.

Ripple's lawyers argued the case should be dismissed so that it
could be moved to federal court under the Class Action Fairness
Act, which allows federal courts to preside over certain
wide-ranging class-action lawsuits.

This case is one of three similar lawsuits filed against Ripple in
recent months. [GN]


SOLOW BUILDINGS: Faces Fischler ADA Suit in New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Solow Buildings
Company, L.L.C.  The case is captioned as Brian Fischler,
Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated
v. Solow Buildings Company, L.L.C., Case No. 1:18-cv-07945
(S.D.N.Y., August 30, 2018).

The Plaintiff alleges violations of the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Solow Building Company, LLC owns and builds residential properties.
The company is based in New York, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
          LIPSKY LOWE LLP
          630 Third Avenue, Fifth Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 392-4772
          Facsimile: (212) 444-1030
          E-mail: doug@lipskylowe.com


SOUTH PARK: Davis Suit Seeks to Recover Lost Wages
--------------------------------------------------
Holly Davis and Laura Staten, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. South Park Health Care,
LLC and Midwest Geriatric Management, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
18-cv-00594, (W.D. Okla., June 18, 2018), seeks recovery of lost
wages (front and back pay), compensatory and punitive damages,
reasonable judgment interest, reasonable attorneys' fees, court
costs and litigation costs and such further relief for violation of
the Oklahoma Protection of Labor Act.

Defendants own and operate multiple living centers that provide
rehabilitation, skilled nursing, and long-term care in Iowa,
Missouri and Oklahoma where Plaintiffs worked as staffing
coordinators at their healthcare facility at 5725 South Ross Avenue
in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73119.

Defendant allegedly did not record or maintain accurate records of
hours worked by the Plaintiffs and where not compensated for work
done outside their facilities. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      D. Colby Addison, Esq.
      Leah M. Roper, Esq.
      LAIRD HAMMONS LAIRD PLLC
      1332 SW 89th Street
      Oklahoma City, OK 73159
      Tel: (405) 703-4567
      Fax: (405) 703-4567
      E-mail: colby@lhllaw.com
              leah@lhllaw.com


SOUTHWEST CREDIT: Faces Cirruzzo Suit Alleging FDCPA Violations
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Southwest Credit
Systems, L.P.  The case is styled as Barbara Cirruzzo, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Southwest Credit
Systems, L.P., Case No. 1:18-cv-04949 (E.D.N.Y., August 30, 2018).

The Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Southwest Credit Systems, L.P., was founded in 2003.  The Company's
line of business includes collection and adjustment services on
claims and other insurance related issues.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
          SANDERS LAW, PLLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 203-7600
          Facsimile: (516) 281-7601
          E-mail: csanders@sanderslawpllc.com


SPEAR CENTER: Sued by Diaz in N.Y. for Violating Disabilities Act
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against S.P.E.A.R. Center,
LLC pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act.  

The case is styled as Edwin Diaz, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. S.P.E.A.R. Center, LLC, doing business
as: Spear, Case No. 1:18-cv-07955 (S.D.N.Y., August 30, 2018).[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 299-6612
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: joseph@cml.legal


ST. JUDE MEDICAL: Stikeman Elliott Attorneys Discuss Court Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Samaneh Hosseini, Esq. -- shosseini@stikeman.com -- of and Zev
Smith, Esq. -- zsmith@stikeman.com -- of Stikeman Elliott LLP, in
an article for Lexology, report that over the past few years,
third-party litigation funding -- including funding by major
international litigation funders -- has become increasingly common
in class actions litigation in Canada.

In a recent decision, Houle v. St. Jude Medical Inc., the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice summarized the current state of the law
regarding litigation funding agreements.

The decision is one of the first to address the interplay between
the Law Foundation of Ontario's Class Proceedings Fund[1] and
private third-party funding agreements, referring to the rules
relating to the Fund to limit (by analogy) a third-party funder's
contingency fee to 10%, with amounts greater than 10% being subject
to Court approval.
Background

The plaintiffs commenced a class action on behalf of all people in
Canada who were implanted with certain cardiac defibrillators
manufactured by the defendant, St. Jude Medical Inc. The
allegations were that St. Jude had:

   1. Negligently designed, developed, manufactured and distributed
several models of the defibrillators; and
Failed to warn its customers of the potential defects once they
were known.
   2. Agreements with Counsel and the Third-Party Funder

The representative plaintiffs retained counsel under a contingency
fee arrangement that originally specified that class counsel were
to receive 33% on a contingency basis.  However, class counsel
decided that they did not want to be responsible for disbursements
and any potential adverse awards of costs.  As a result, those
issues were dealt with in a separate litigation funding agreement
between the representative plaintiffs and Bentham IMF Limited, a
global litigation financier.  Bentham agreed to pay, on a
non-recourse basis:

   1. Disbursements incurred by class counsel up to a prescribed
maximum amount, after which amount, class counsel would fund the
disbursements;
   2. Any adverse costs awards against the representative
plaintiffs;
   3. Any security for costs; and
   4. 50% of the reasonable docketed time of class counsel, up to a
prescribed maximum amount. (The Court noted that this clause
effectively created a very unusual "hybrid" retainer whereby class
counsel was paid 50% of their fees on a non-contingent basis and
the remaining 50% on contingency.)

In exchange for the funding, Bentham would receive between 20%-25%
of the litigation proceeds with class counsel receiving between
10%-13% of such proceeds, depending on when the litigation was
resolved.  This arrangement (which superseded the 33% arrangement
in the retainer) had the unusual feature of allocating more of the
litigation funding to the third-party funder than it did to class
counsel (typically it is the other way around).

Approving a Funding Agreement: What the Court Will Consider

In considering whether to approve the funding agreement, the Court
concluded that the "general test for determining whether to approve
a third-funding [sic] agreement is that the agreement should not be
champertous or illegal and it must be a fair and reasonable
agreement that facilitates access to justice while protecting the
interests of the defendants."

The Court identified seven prerequisites for approval of a
litigation funding agreement in the context of a class action
proceeding:

   1. The procedural, technical, and evidentiary requirements that
enable the Court to scrutinize the funding agreement must be
satisfied. In assessing this, the Court will consider, among other
things, whether (i) the representative plaintiffs received
independent legal advice, (ii) the retainer and third party
financing agreement were disclosed to the Court and/or defendant;
(iii) the third party financier is willing to provide security for
costs; and (iv) the background factual circumstances are proffered
to the Court;
   2. Third-party funding must be necessary. Absent necessity, a
funding agreement will not be approved;
   3. The third-party financier must make a meaningful contribution
to access to justice or behaviour modification.  In essence, the
funding must be sufficient to achieve the goals of the class action
regime or administration of justice;
   4. The third-party financier must not be overcompensated or
unduly rewarded in the particular circumstances;
   5. The third party financier must not interfere with the
lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer's duty of loyalty and
confidentiality or the lawyer's professional judgment and carriage
of the litigation on behalf of the representative plaintiff or
class members;
   6. The litigation funding agreement must contain a term that the
third-party financier will be bound by the deemed undertaking rule
and will be bound not to disclose confidential or privileged
information; and
   7. The litigation funding agreement must not be illegal.

Application to this Case

Applying these factors to the proposed funding agreement, the Court
determined that the proposed funding agreement risked
overcompensating Bentham (point 4, above) and interfered with the
representative plaintiffs' lawyer-client relationship (point 5,
above):

   * With respect to overcompensation, the Court expressed concern
that Bentham's recovery was uncapped and that the amount of its
recovery would be unknown until the final determination of the
dispute when the amount of litigation proceeds is ultimately
determined.
   * The Court was of the view that the lawyer-client relationship
was undermined by the Bentham agreement, which gave the impression
that "the Houles and Class Counsel have promised to prosecute the
proposed class action as much, if not more, on behalf of Bentham
than on behalf of the Class Members."

While it passed the other tests, the inadequacy of the agreement
with respect to points 4 and 5 meant that the Court was not
prepared to approve the agreement in its current form.

However, the Court advised the parties that it was willing to
approve the agreement if Bentham made certain amendments, such as
reducing its share of the contingency fee to 10% -- i.e. treating
it in the same manner as Ontario's Class Proceedings Fund -- and
making the balance of its compensation conditional on court
approval.  The Court reasoned that such an amendment would ensure
that Bentham would not be overly compensated as any amounts in
excess of the Class Proceedings Fund would be subject to Court
approval.

Key Conclusions

Houle is instructive on the parameters and structure of acceptable
third party funding agreements in Canada and how the practices of
international litigation financiers may need to be adjusted for the
Canadian class proceedings environment.

Specifically, the decision provides:

That the financier's contingency fee should not be greater than 10%
unless any excess amounts are subject to Court approval; and That
the financier cannot, expressly or impliedly, usurp control or
carriage of the litigation from the representative plaintiff(s).
[GN]


SUNRUN INC: Agreement in Principle Reached in Fink Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Sunrun Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018, that the Company has reached an agreement in
principal with plaintiffs to settle all claims asserted in a
federal class action litigation against all defendants for $2.5
million, all of which will be funded by the Company's insurers.

On May 3, 2017, a purported shareholder class action captioned
Fink, et al. v. Sunrun Inc., et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-02537, was
filed in the United States District Court, Northern District of
California, against the Company and certain of the Company's
directors and officers.

The complaint generally alleges that the defendants violated
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934, and
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, by making false or
misleading statements in connection with public filings made
between September 15, 2015 and March 8, 2017 regarding the number
of customers who canceled contracts after signing up for the
Company's home-solar energy system. The plaintiff seeks
compensatory damages, including interest, attorney's fees, and
costs, on behalf of all persons other than the defendants who
purchased the Company's securities between September 16, 2015 and
May 2, 2017.

On May 4, 2017, a purported shareholder class action captioned
Hall, et al. v. Sunrun Inc., et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-02571, was
filed in the United States District Court, Northern District of
California.

On May 18, 2017, a purported shareholder class action captioned
Sanogo, et al. v. Sunrun Inc., et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-02865, was
filed in the United States District Court, Northern California
District of California.

The Hall and Sanogo complaints are substantially similar to the
Fink complaint, and seeks similar relief against similar defendants
on behalf of a substantially similar class. On August 23, 2017, the
Fink, Hall, and Sanogo actions were consolidated, and on September
25, 2017, plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended complaint which
alleges the same underlying violations as the original Fink, Hall
and Sanogo complaints (such consolidated action referred to as the
"federal court litigation").

On April 5, 2018, the court granted the Company's motion to dismiss
without prejudice. Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on
May 3, 2018. On July 19, 2018, the court again granted defendants'
motion to dismiss without prejudice.

On August 8, 2018, the Company reached an agreement in principal
with plaintiffs to settle all claims asserted in the federal court
litigation against all defendants for $2.5 million, all of which
will be funded by the Company's insurers.

Sunrun said "The Company and all defendants have denied, and
continue to deny, the claims alleged in the federal court
litigation and the settlement does not reflect any admission of
fault, wrongdoing or liability as to any defendant. The settlement
is subject to definitive documentation, shareholder notice and
court approval."

Sunrun Inc. engages in the design, development, installation, sale,
ownership, and maintenance of residential solar energy systems in
the United States. It also sells solar leads. The company markets
and sells its products through direct channels, partner channels,
mass media, digital media, canvassing, referral, retail, and field
marketing. Sunrun Inc. was founded in 2007 and is headquartered in
San Francisco, California.



SUNRUN INC: Agreement in Principle Reached in State Court Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Sunrun Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018, that the parties have entered into an
agreement in principle to settle all claims asserted in state court
litigation against all defendants.

On April 13, 2016, a purported shareholder class action captioned
Pytel v. Sunrun Inc., et al., Case No. CIV 538215, was filed in the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, against the
Company, certain of the Company's directors and officers, the
underwriters of the Company's initial public offering and certain
other defendants.

The complaint generally alleges that the defendants violated
Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 by making
false or misleading statements in connection with the Company's
August 5, 2015 initial public offering regarding the continuation
of net metering programs. The plaintiffs seek to represent a class
of persons who acquired the Company's common stock pursuant or
traceable to the initial public offering. Plaintiffs seek
compensatory damages, including interest, rescission or rescissory
damages, an award of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees, and any
equitable or injunctive relief deemed appropriate by the court.

On April 29, 2016, a purported shareholder class action captioned
Baker et al. v. Sunrun Inc., et al., Case No. CIV 538419, was filed
in the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo.

On May 10, 2016, a purported shareholder class action captioned
Nunez v. Sunrun Inc., et al., Case No. CIV 538593, was filed in the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo.

The Baker and Nunez complaints are substantially similar to the
Pytel complaint, and seek similar relief against similar defendants
on behalf of the same purported class.

On May 3, 2018, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint
including allegations related to the alleged effect of customer
cancellations on the Company's business.

On April 21, 2016, a purported shareholder class action captioned
Cohen, et al. v. Sunrun Inc., et al., Case No. CIV 538304, was
filed in the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo,
against the Company, certain of the Company's directors and
officers, and the underwriters of the Company's initial public
offering.

The complaint generally alleges that the defendants violated
Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 by making
false or misleading statements in connection with an August 5, 2015
initial public offering regarding the Company's business practices
and its dependence on complex financial instruments.

The Cohen plaintiffs seek to represent the same class and seek
similar relief as the plaintiffs in the Pytel, Nunez, and Baker
actions.    

On September 26, 2016, the Baker, Cohen, Nunez, and Pytel actions
were consolidated (such consolidated action referred to as the
"state court litigation"). On December 27, 2017, the court granted
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

Following a mediation on May 4, 2018, the parties entered into an
agreement in principle to settle all claims asserted in the state
court litigation against all defendants.

The aggregate amount of the proposed settlement is $32.0 million,
$30.1 million of which will be funded by the Company's insurers and
the remaining $1.9 million of which has been accrued.

Sunrun said, "The Company and all defendants have denied, and
continue to deny, the claims alleged in the state court litigation
and the settlement does not reflect any admission of fault,
wrongdoing or liability as to any defendant. The settlement is
subject to definitive documentation, shareholder notice and court
approval."

Sunrun Inc. engages in the design, development, installation, sale,
ownership, and maintenance of residential solar energy systems in
the United States. It also sells solar leads. The company markets
and sells its products through direct channels, partner channels,
mass media, digital media, canvassing, referral, retail, and field
marketing. Sunrun Inc. was founded in 2007 and is headquartered in
San Francisco, California.


SUNRUN INC: Bid for Initial Approval of Slovin Accord Underway
--------------------------------------------------------------
Sunrun Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018, that a motion for preliminary approval in the
putative class action suit entitled, Slovin et al. v. Sunrun Inc.
and Clean Energy Experts, LLC, is underway.

On November 20, 2015, a putative class action captioned Slovin et
al. v. Sunrun Inc. and Clean Energy Experts, LLC, Case No.
4:15-cv-05340, was filed in the United States District Court,
Northern District of California.

The complaint generally alleged violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (the "TCPA") on behalf of an individual and
putative classes of persons alleged to be similarly situated.
Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint on December 2, 2015, and
a Second Amended Complaint on March 25, 2016, also asserting
individual and putative class claims under the TCPA.

By Order entered on April 28, 2016, the Court granted the Company's
motion to strike the class allegations set forth in the Second
Amended Complaint, and granted leave to amend. Plaintiffs filed a
Third Amended Complaint on July 12, 2016 asserting individual and
putative class claims under the TCPA. On October 12, 2016, the
Court denied the Company's motion to again strike the class
allegations set forth in the Third Amended Complaint.

On October 3, 2017, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a
Fourth Amended Complaint, seeking to, among other things, revise
the definitions of the classes that plaintiffs seek to represent.
The Company has opposed that motion, which remains pending before
the Court.

In each iteration of their complaint, plaintiffs seek statutory
damages, equitable and injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees and
costs, on behalf of themselves and the absent classes.

On April 12, 2018, the Company and plaintiffs advised the Court
that they reached a settlement in principle, and the Court vacated
all deadlines relating to the motion for class certification.
Plaintiffs are required to file any motion for preliminary approval
by August 30, 2018.

Sunrun Inc. engages in the design, development, installation, sale,
ownership, and maintenance of residential solar energy systems in
the United States. It also sells solar leads. The company markets
and sells its products through direct channels, partner channels,
mass media, digital media, canvassing, referral, retail, and field
marketing. Sunrun Inc. was founded in 2007 and is headquartered in
San Francisco, California.


TDS TELECOM: Faces Tucker Suit in N. Dist. Georgia
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against TDS Telecom Service,
LLC.  The case is captioned as Bobby Tucker, Gay Vann, Dennis
Robichaud, William Cagle and Nema Mobley, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated v. TDS Telecom Service, LLC, Case
No. 2:18-cv-00150-RWS (N.D. Ga., August 30, 2018).

The nature of suit is stated as petition to order arbitration and
failure to arbitrate.

Headquartered in Madison, Wisconsin, TDS Telecommunications LLC is
the seventh largest local exchange telephone company in the U.S.
with 1.2 million connections to high-speed internet, phone, and TV
entertainment services in nearly 900 rural, suburban, and
metropolitan communities.  TDS operates BendBroadband, which is
part of TDS Broadband Service LLC.  For residential customers, TDS
deploys up to 1Gig internet access, IPTV service (TDS TV), cable TV
options, and traditional wireline services. For businesses, TDS
offers advanced communications solutions, including: VoIP
(managedIP Hosted voice), high-speed Internet, fiber optics, data
networking, and hosted-managed services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          William Todd Harvey, Esq.
          BURKE HARVEY, LLC
          3535 Grandview Parkway, Suite 100
          Birmingham, AL 35243
          Telephone: (205) 930-9091
          Facsimile: (205) 930-9054
          E-mail: tharvey@burkeharvey.com


TESLA INC: Faces 3rd Class Action Over Elon Musk's Stock Tweets
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bryan Menegus, writing for Gizmodo, reports that embattled electric
car manufacturer Tesla racked up its third class-action suit, filed
this evening in California's Northern District Court, stemming from
bizarre and potentially unfounded tweets sent by CEO Elon Musk.

The first such suit was filed on Aug. 10 by Tesla short seller
Kalman Isaacs, who contended that the tweets were solely intended
to manipulate the company's stock price -- a move that's estimated
to have cost Isaacs and those making similar bets upwards of $1
billion.  Those advocating for or actually shorting his electric
car venture have rankled Mr. Musk, who went so far as to call such
traders "jerks who want us to die."  Another, similar class-action
-- Chamberlain v Tesla—came the same day.

Interestingly, John Yeagar, the plaintiff in this new suit, was not
a short seller at all.  His suit states that "the fraudulent nature
of Musk's statements was uncovered over the next two days when
neither Tesla nor Mr. Musk substantiated Mr. Musk's claim that
there was secure financing for a going-private transaction at $420
a share" and causing the stock price to drop from "$379.57 per
share, on August 7, 2018, to close at $352.27 per share, on August
9, 2018."  One assumes Mr. Yeagar jumped at the opportunity to buy
Tesla stock and then sell it off at the proposed $420 per share
price tag, only to see its value drop after investors began to
question the veracity of Musk's claims.

Mr. Yeagar's filing reiterates what much of what the prior suits
allege: that despite affirmative statements from Musk of having
secured proper investment to go private, no such plans had been
made.

In essence, what was initially considered to be a stupid weed joke
has cost Mr. Musk the goodwill of Tesla fans (or at least those
seeking to profit from his offer to go private at $420), deepened
his already contentious relationship with short sellers, led to an
SEC investigation, and could potentially cost him quite a losses in
court.

Given the enormity of consequences, perhaps there's some credence
to Azealia Banks's accusation of the CEO tweeting while tripping on
LSD, given that main the alternative explanation is Musk engaging
in obvious, poorly-executed fraud. [GN]


TESLA INC: Oct. 9 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
----------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC on Aug. 13 notified investors
that a class action lawsuit has been filed Tesla, Inc. ("Tesla" or
the "Company") (NASDAQ :  TSLA) and its CEO, Elon Musk ("Musk"), on
behalf of shareholders who purchased or otherwise acquired Tesla
securities between August 7, 2018 and August 10, 2018, (the "Class
Period").  Such investors are encouraged to join this case by
visiting the firm's site: www.bgandg.com/tsla.

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The complaint states that on August 7, 2018, Musk stated on
Twitter: (1) "Am considering taking Tesla private at $420"; (2)
"Funding secured"; (3) "Shareholders could either to sell at 420 or
hold shares & go private"; and (4) "Investor support is confirmed."
Following these tweets, Tesla shares went up as much as $45.47 per
share, or 13%, during intraday trading before closing at $379.57 on
August 7, 2018.

Since then, both the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and
Tesla's board of directors are reportedly investigating the truth
of Musk's tweets, and whether in fact funding had been secured.
Several large investors and banks have said that they are unaware
of any funding.  Following the news of these investigations Tesla
stock has dropped to close at $355.49 per share on August 10,
2018.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) contrary to Musk's statements that funding had
been "secured" to take Tesla private at $420 per share, no such
funding had been secured; and (2) contrary to Musk's statement that
investor support to take Tesla private "is confirmed," there was no
such confirmation.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
review a copy of the Complaint you can visit the firm's site:
www.bgandg.com/tsla or you may contact Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or
his Investor Relations Analyst, Yael Hurwitz of Bronstein, Gewirtz
& Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If you suffered a loss in Tesla
you have until October 9, 2018 to request that the Court appoint
you as lead plaintiff.  Your ability to share in any recovery
doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC -- https://www.bgandg.com -- is
a corporate litigation boutique.  Its primary expertise is the
aggressive pursuit of litigation claims on behalf of our clients.
In addition to representing institutions and other investor
plaintiffs in class action security litigation, the firm's
expertise includes general corporate and commercial litigation, as
well as securities arbitration. [GN]


TIGER BRANDS: Two Listeriosis Class Actions Combined Into One
-------------------------------------------------------------
Marleny Arnoldi, writing for Creamer Media's Engineering News,
reports that the attorneys acting on behalf of the different
applicants in two separate listeriosis class action lawsuits
against Tiger Brands over the listeriosis outbreak have agreed to
combine the lawsuits into a single certification application.

Tiger Brands on Aug. 14 said its legal representatives had, on Aug.
13, met with the attorneys for claimants, Richard Spoor and LHL
Attorneys, and the Deputy Judge President of the Gauteng local
division of the High Court, Johannesburg to discuss the matter.

The attorneys will now jointly represent all the applicants and, as
a result, the application by LHL Attorneys will be discontinued.

At the meeting, the parties advised the Deputy Judge President that
they have agreed on the broad terms of a draft certification order.
The next step in the certification proceedings is for the
allocation of a judge, who will convene a hearing to consider the
proposed order.

The draft order agreed between the parties allows the certification
action to proceed.

In terms of the proposed order, it is envisaged that four distinct
groups of persons will constitute classes for the purposes of the
class action.

These four classes encompass all claimants who could potentially
have a claim against the company, following a listeriosis outbreak
in March at Tiger Brands' subsidiary Enterprise Foods'
manufacturing facility in Polokwane, which could potentially have
resulted in the 200 recorded listeriosis-caused deaths since the
outbreak.

Subject to the approval and granting of the certification order,
the class action will then proceed in two stages.  The first stage
is to determine whether or not the company is liable.

If at the end of the first stage, it is determined that the company
is liable in respect of all or any of the four classes, then all
claimants who had not opted out of the class action will be bound
by that ruling.

Following on from this, and assuming the company is held liable,
the class action will then proceed to the second stage, namely to
determine the extent of the damages due to each class in general,
and to each claimant in particular.

Claimants will be required to expressly opt in to the second stage
of the class action by giving formal notice to the claimants'
attorneys, and only those claimants who opt in will have the
benefit of and be bound by the outcome of the second stage.

Tiger Brands continues to work closely with its insurers to ensure
that the entire process is managed as efficiently as possible.

Up until June, the company has recalled and destroyed 4 000 t of
value-added meat products, costing the company R415-million. Tiger
Brands has also closed three plants and spent R50-million in
remediating its facilities.

These facilities are anticipated to reopen in September. [GN]


TLC RESORTS: Court Compels Arbitration in Augustine's TCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California granted Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the
case captioned OPHELIA AUGUSTINE, Plaintiff, v. TLC RESORTS
VACATION CLUB, LLC; and DOES 1 through 20, Defendants. Case No.
3:18-cv-01120-H-JMA. (S.D. Cal.).

Before the Court is Defendant TLC Resorts Vacation Club, LLC's
motion to compel arbitration or, in the alternative, to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.

The Plaintiff allegedly incurred a financial obligation to
Defendant as a result of unpaid timeshare membership dues (debt).
It is alleged that, in an effort to collect the debt and to promote
a marketing ploy, the Defendant sent the Plaintiff text messages in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).

Moving to compel arbitration, the Defendant submitted copies of
several documents comprising the Plaintiff's timeshare membership
enrollment packet, including a Membership Enrollment Agreement
(MEA), Verification of Purchase, and Participation Agreement, each
of which Plaintiff completed and signed in September 2014. The only
reference to arbitration among these documents is found in the
one-page MEA.

The Plaintiff opposes the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration
on the grounds that she never entered into an agreement to
arbitrate. In support of this argument, Plaintiff filed a
declaration stating she was never provided with the Club Rules at
any point. She also claimed that she had no opportunity to read the
Club Rules or any reason to investigate them because she believed
all substantive terms of the agreement were provided to her within
the documents she executed.

Legal Standards

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) permits a party aggrieved by the
alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under
a written agreement for arbitration to petition any United States
District Court for an order directing that arbitration proceed in
the manner provided for in the arbitration agreement.

Existence of Agreement to Arbitrate

As the party moving to compel arbitration, Defendant bears the
burden of proving the existence of an agreement to arbitrate by a
preponderance of the evidence. To determine whether an agreement to
arbitrate exists, the Court applies ordinary state-law principles
that govern the formation of contracts.

Choice of Law

The Membership Enrollment Agreement and Club Rules provide that
Nevada law governs Plaintiff's membership.

Here, both the Membership Enrollment Agreement, signed by
Plaintiff, and the Club Rules contain a choice-of-law provision
specifying that Nevada law applies. The Court finds that Nevada has
a substantial relationship to this dispute, given that Plaintiff
attended Defendant's sales presentation and purchased her timeshare
membership in Las Vegas, and that application of Nevada law would
not be contrary to any fundamental California policy. Additionally,
Plaintiff contends that the outcome in this case is the same
whether the Court applies Nevada or California law. In sum, Nevada
law applies to this dispute.

Whether Agreement to Arbitrate Exists Under Nevada Law

The Defendant bears the burden of showing the existence of an
arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. Under
Nevada law, an agreement contained in a record to submit to
arbitration any existing or subsequent controversy arising between
the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable and irrevocable
except as otherwise provided in Nevada Revised Statutes section]
597.995 or upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the
revocation of a contract.

Here, the Defendant has submitted a copy of Plaintiff's signed,
one-page Membership Enrollment Agreement, or MEA. Directly above
Plaintiff's signature on the MEA is the arbitration term: As
described more fully in the Club Rules, any disputes are subject to
mandatory arbitration to take place in and around Clark County,
Nevada. In signing the MEA, Plaintiff acknowledged that her
timeshare membership was governed by the Club Rules and the other
Club Documents and that she had reviewed and had the opportunity to
ask questions regarding the Club Documents prior to paying any
amount hereunder. Defendant has also submitted a copy of its Club
Rules, which contain a more detailed arbitration provision.

The Defendant's sales manager, who was present when Plaintiff
purchased her timeshare membership in Las Vegas, declares under
penalty of perjury that during the enrollment process,
representatives will review the enrollment forms with the guest,
make sure that everything is clear and understood and ensure that
the documents are executed. In addition, buyers are provided copies
of all documents they sign and an electronic copy of the Club Rules
on a DVD. He also states that Defendant's sales representatives
always point out that [they] are including a copy of the Club Rules
via DVD. To the best of his recollection, these standard procedures
were followed when the Plaintiff enrolled. Moreover, Defendant's
owner and manager states in his declaration that the Club Rules
were provided to Plaintiff.  

This evidence is sufficient to meet Defendant's burden. Plaintiff
does not deny that she signed the MEA, which contains a mandatory
arbitration term and expressly references the Club Rules.

Indeed, the MEA provides that Plaintiff  reviewed and had the
opportunity to ask questions regarding the Club Documents.

Validity of Agreement to Arbitrate

The Plaintiff next argues that any agreement to arbitrate in this
case is unconscionable because it contains overly harsh terms.

The Plaintiff cites no Nevada authority, and this Court is aware of
none, suggesting that mere inconvenience and expense are sufficient
to establish substantive unconscionability. Plaintiff's arguments
regarding the Club Rules arbitration clause's breadth are also
unpersuasive. Plaintiff relies on a case from this District, In re
Jiffy Lube International, Inc., 847 F.Supp.2d 1253 (S.D. Cal.
2012), but that case is factually distinguishable and did not
involve application of Nevada law or California law, for that
matter.  Moreover, numerous courts in Nevada and other states have
found arbitration provisions containing equally broad language
concerning the scope of the provision to be conscionable and
enforceable.

Furthermore, the Club Rules arbitration clause is bilateral, We
each agree to resolve any disputes through binding arbitration or
small claims court instead of in courts of general jurisdiction);
provides that Plaintiff will select the arbitrator from a panel
chosen by Defendant from the American Arbitration Association's
(AAA) pool of arbitrators; and establishes that AAA rules currently
in effect will apply to any arbitration. These provisions weigh
against a finding of substantive unconscionability. The Court
concludes that, under the circumstances, the Club Rules arbitration
clause is not substantively unconscionable.

Because the Plaintiff has not shown the existence of procedural and
substantive unconscionability, the arbitration clause may be
enforced under Nevada law.

The Court grants the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 16, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yba26zuu from Leagle.com.

Ophelia Augustine, Plaintiff, represented by Joshua B. Swigart ,
Hyde & Swigart & Daniel G. Shay , Law Offices of Daniel G. Shay.

TLC Resorts Vacation Club, LLC, Defendant, represented by Andrew
Daniel Bluth , Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP.


TRAK-1 TECHNOLOGY: Wright Files Suit in S.C. Over FCRA Violation
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Trak-1 Technology
Inc.  The case is titled Rodney Wright, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Trak-1 Technology Inc., Case No.
6:18-cv-02406-BHH (D.S.C., August 30, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

TRAK-1 Technology, Inc., owns and operates a Web-based screening
platform for employment, volunteer, and tenant background screening
needs.  The Company was founded in 1996 and is based in Tulsa,
Oklahoma.  As of April 16, 2018, TRAK-1 operates as a subsidiary of
PeopleFacts LLC.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David Andrew Maxfield, Esq.
          DAVID MAXFIELD ATTORNEY LLC
          PO Box 11865
          Columbia, SC 29211
          Telephone: (803) 509-6800
          Facsimile: (855) 299-1656
          E-mail: dave@consumerlawsc.com


TROPICAL CHINESE: Jianbo Sues Over Unpaid Min., Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jianbo Li, individually and on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, vs. Tropical Chinese Restaurant
Corp. (d/b/a Tropical Chinese), Wen Sho Yu, Lee Chu Yu, Gregory T.
Yu and Yu Mei, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-22459 (S.D. Fla., June
19, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid wages, unpaid minimum wages and
unpaid overtime compensation, interests, damages for unreasonably
delayed payment of wages, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs and
disbursements of the action pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Defendants own a restaurant located at 7991 SW 40 Street Miami,
Florida, "Tropical Chinese", where Jianbo was employed as a kitchen
helper. He was required to work for Defendants well in excess of
forty hours per week without overtime, says the complaint. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Martha L. Mendez, Esq.
      Brett Feinstein, Esq.
      FEINSTEIN & MENDEZ, P.A.
      14 N.E. 1st Avenue, Suite 1109
      Miami, FL 33132
      Tel: (786) 636-8938
      Fax: (786) 636-8941
      Email: martha@fpmlawfirm.com
             brett@fpmlawfirm.com

             - and -

      Jian Hang, Esq.
      HANG & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
      136-18 39th Ave., Suite #1003
      Flushing, NY 11354
      Telephone: (718) 353-8588
      Email: jhang@hanglaw.com


ULTHERA INC: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Tryan's CLRA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted in part and denied in part Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the case captioned GEORGIA TRYAN and MARILYN ECHOLS, as
individuals, and on behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ULTHERA, INC., a Delaware
corporation; and MERZ NORTH AMERICA, INC., a Delaware corporation,
Defendants, No. 2:17-cv-02036-MCE-CMK (E.D. Cal.).

Plaintiffs Georgia Tryan and Marilyn Echols, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, allege that Defendants
Ulthera, Inc., and Merz North America, Inc., engaged in false and
misleading marketing practices concerning their sale of an
ultrasound device designed to mitigate skin wrinkles. The
Plaintiffs' Complaint seeks relief under three California statutes:
(1) the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), (2) the False
Advertising Act, Business and Professions Code (FAL), and (3) the
Unfair Competition Law California Business and Professions Code
(UCL).

Implied Pre-emption

It should also be noted that FDCA regulations appear to directly
preclude preemption here given the fact that all of Plaintiffs'
causes of actions are for violations of California consumer
protection laws; namely the CLRA, the FAL and the UCL. 21 C.F.R.
Section 808.1(d)(1) provides that such state law claims alleging
unfair trade practices in which the requirements are not limited to
medical] devices are not preempted by the FDCA.
Significantly, too, the Supreme Court agrees that the FDCA does
not preempt state statutes of general applicability like those
asserted herein.

Lohr also makes it clear that the Section 510(k) clearance obtained
by defendants does not somehow preempt state law consumer claims,
stating that there is no suggestion in either the statutory scheme
or the legislative process that said clearance process was intended
to do anything to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer of
the device would have to defend itself against such state-law
claims. In Innovative Health Solutions, Inc. v. DyAnsys, Inc., 2015
WL 2398931 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2015), under circumstances analogous
to those involved here, the Northern District applied this
reasoning to UCL and FAL claims, finding that "to the extent
plaintiff alleges that defendants have false represented that they
obtained FDA approval for their products, those claims are not
precluded or preempted.

The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied on this point.

Alleged Misrepresentations

The Defendant also asserts that the FDA should in any event be
permitted to resolve the question of whether, and to what extent,
their alleged misrepresentations are indeed actionable. Defendant
reasons that since it is the FDA who determined whether a medical
device like Ultherapy is FDA approved or FDA cleared, it must
determine just what those terms mean and further decide if
Defendant misrepresented the FDA's imprimatur of its device.

The gravamen of the Plaintiffs' claims is that Ulthera's FDA
clearance, even if true, is improperly used to suggest that the
product had the FDA's seal of approval, which it did not. As
Plaintiffs point out, a claim that a business practice is
fraudulent under the UCL, FAL, or CLRA can properly be based not
only on patently untrue representations but also on representations
that may be accurate on some level but nonetheless can mislead or
deceive. Defendant's pleading challenge to the use of FDA-cleared
in Ulthera's advertising thus fails. Moreover, since whether a
business practice is deceptive is ordinarily a question of fact in
any event, it would be a rare situation in which granting a motion
like that presented here would be appropriate.

Heightened Pleading Standards

The Defendant next argues that since all of the Plaintiffs'
allegations sound in fraud, they must satisfy the heightened
pleading standard of Rule 9(b) applicable to fraud claims and fail
to cite the particularized facts necessary to support their
contention that they relied on any specific misrepresentations.

To satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b), averments of fraud must
be accompanied by the who, what, when, where and how of the
misconduct charged.

The Plaintiffs' pleading survives scrutiny in this regard. Both
named Plaintiffs allege that prior to purchasing Ultherapy they
saw, and relied upon, the Defendants' advertising materials,
including displays and brochures provided by the Defendants to
authorized medical practices for distribution to consumers, and
specifically relied on representations that Ultherapy was FDA
approved. Both the Plaintiffs also identify the medical practices
where they received their Ultherapy treatments and both state they
received treatments in late 2015.  Finally, both the Plaintiffs
allege that FDA approval was important because they reasonably
believed that the FDA's approval assured the safety and efficacy of
the Ultherapy devices and procedure.

Under these circumstances, the Plaintiffs have more than adequately
identified the basis for their fraud-based claims such that
Defendant can adequately respond to those claims. Defendant's
request to dismiss the allegations of Plaintiffs' claim on that
basis is therefore denied.

Pre-Suit Notice Requirements

The Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action alleges that Defendant's
allegedly deceptive acts and practices violated the CLRA by failing
to disclose and misrepresenting the true nature of the FDA's review
of Ultherapy and its efficacy. Under the CLRA, a plaintiff must
provide at least 30 days' notice of the particular alleged
violations" of the CLRA and demand that the potential defendant
correct, repair, replace or other rectify" the alleged violations
before bringing a suit for damages.  

Here, while the Defendant concedes the Plaintiffs provided
Defendants with notice of their alleged CLRA violations, they
allege that the August 2017 notices failed to comply because they
only vaguely referred to Defendant's advertisements, including
social media ads and brochures stating that Ultherapy is
FDA-cleared or FDA-approved. Defendant claims that because
Plaintiffs failed to otherwise describe the alleged marketing
materials with particularity, their notices did not comply with the
CLRA's pre-suit notice requirements as to each alleged violation of
the CLRA. Defendant makes this claim despite the fact that after
receiving Defendant's August 30, 2017, response to Plaintiffs' CLRA
notice letters, which alleged that Plaintiffs failed to
sufficiently identify or provide copies of the marketing materials
alleged to be in violation of the CLRA, Plaintiffs provided on
September 22, 2017, copies of two specific examples of Ultherapy
being advertised as FDA-approved.

Although the provision of actual copies of the advertisements was
less than 30 days prior to the September 30, 2017, date when
Plaintiffs' lawsuit was filed, it supplemented the otherwise
adequate notice which was provided during the requisite time period
prior to the filing of the Complaint. In any event, the gravamen of
Plaintiffs' allegations was clear from the notice letters
themselves; namely, that Defendant misrepresented that the
Ultherapy system had FDA approval, or gave the impression that the
system had such approval in order to assure consumers it was safe
and effective. Consequently, the letters adequately put Defendant
on notice of the CLRA violations being asserted and satisfied the
prerequisites for bringing suit in that regard.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 16, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9neh2oz from
Leagle.com.

Georgia Tryan & Marilyn Echols, Plaintiffs, represented by Trish
Kathleen Monesi -- Trisha.Monesi@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Capstone
Law APC, Bevin Elaine Allen Pike -- Bevin.Pike@capstonelawyers.com
-- Capstone Law APC & Robert Kenneth Friedl --
Friedl@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Capstone Law, APC.

Merz North America, Inc., a Delaware Company, Defendant,
represented by James F. Neale -- jneale@mcguirewoods.com --
McGuireWoods, LLP, pro hac vice, Arsen Kourinian --
akourinian@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, Bethany Gayle
Lukitsch -- blukitsch@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP & Molly
M. White -- mwhite@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP.


UNITED PARCEL: Court Approves Hoffman-Na Roche Notice in FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate S. Kato Crews of the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado issued a Report and Recommendation
granting in part Plaintiffs' Motion to Approve Hoffman-La Roche
Notice in the case captioned MICHAEL ORTEZ, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UNITED
PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Defendant. Civil Action No.
1:17-cv-01202-CMA-SKC. (D. Colo.).

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Approve
Hoffmann-La Roche Notice to Potentially Aggrieved Employees
(Hoffmann-La Roche Motion).

In the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, he brings a collective
action against his former employer, United Parcel Service, Inc.
(Defendant), under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to
pay him and other hourly, seasonal employees, the federal minimal
wage for all hours they worked. Plaintiff also brings class action
claims and two individual claims against Defendant under Colorado
state law.

Authorization of Hoffmann-La Roche Notice and Consent Forms

Plaintiff requests the Court authorize Plaintiff's proposed
Hoffmann-La Roche notice and consent forms. The Court has a duty to
ensure that the notice adequately advises potential opt-in
plaintiffs of their rights and options pertaining to any potential
FLSA claims they may have.  

The Court has reviewed the Plaintiff's proposed notice and consent
forms. The Court finds the proposed notice form adequately apprises
potential opt-in plaintiffs of their rights and options.

The consent form properly allows potential plaintiffs to join this
action in the manner they deem appropriate. As such, the Court
RECOMMENDS authorizing Plaintiff's dissemination of the Hoffmann-La
Roche notice and consent forms to the potential opt-in plaintiffs,
subject to revisions reflecting the Court's recommended conditional
certification above, and updating the reference in Section 1 of
ECF. #42-1 from Judge Hegarty to the undersigned Magistrate Judge.

Personal Information of Potential Plaintiffs

The Plaintiff's also request that Defendant produce the names,
dates of employment, last known physical addresses, any foreign
addresses, email addresses, and phone numbers of the putative
plaintiffs no later than 14 days after issuing an order in favor of
Plaintiff. A plaintiff seeking information about potential
plaintiffs from a defendant must show why it is necessary to obtain
the information. However, the Plaintiff has not satisfied the Court
that it is necessary for the Defendant to produce telephone numbers
of potential plaintiffs.

Thus, absent further showing, the Court RECOMMENDS requiring
Defendant to produce the names, dates of employment, last known
physical addresses, and any foreign addresses of the individuals to
whom Hoffmann-La Roche notice should be sent. The Court RECOMMENDS
this production occur within 14 days from the final order on the
Hoffman-LaRoche Motion.

Plaintiff's Requested Opt-In Period and Leave for Reminder Notice

The Plaintiff requests the Court order (1) that potential opt-in
plaintiffs be given 120 days to file their Consent to Join forms,
and (2) that the Plaintiffs be allowed to send a reminder to
potential opt-in plaintiffs 45 days before the opt-in period ends.
The Defendant does not address these requests.

The Court RECOMMENDS the following: (1) the notices shall be sent
within 14 days of disclosure by Defendant (2) the opt-in period
will run 120 days from the date the first notice is given (3) the
Plaintiff may also resend the approved notice and consent forms to
potential plaintiffs a second time no later than 45 days before the
end of the 120-day opt-in period.  

Plaintiff's Motion to Approve Hoffmann-La Roche Notice be GRANTED
IN PART, as follows:a.

Conditional certification of the class subject to the limitation
that the proposed opt-in group include only those seasonal drivers
who either (1) worked in the Centennial or Commerce City
facilities, or (2) attended trainings at the Commerce City
facility, from October 1, 2016 until the date of the final order on
this Report and Recommendation;

Plaintiff's notice and consent forms be approved subject to the
notice being amended to accurately reflect the parameters of the
group of potential opt-in plaintiffs as set out above, and update
the Magistrate Judge reference;

Within 14 days from the final order on this Report and
Recommendation, Defendant shall produce the names, dates of
employment, last known physical addresses, email addresses, and any
foreign addresses of the individuals to whom notice should be sent;
and,

The Hoffmann-La Roche notice will be sent within 14 days of
Defendant's above-disclosure; the opt-in period will run 120 days
from the date the first notice is given; and Plaintiff may resend
the approved notice and consent forms to potential plaintiffs a
second time no later than 45 days before the end of the 120-day
opt-in period.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 16, 2018 Report and
Recommendation is available at https://tinyurl.com/yaeuu4jw from
Leagle.com.

Michael Ortez, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Murdoch-Kitt Harrison,
Sawaya Law Firm.

United Parcel Service, Inc., an Ohio corporation, Defendant,
represented by Amber J. Munck , Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Jonathan L.
Sulds , Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Lindsay Nicole Uhl , Greenberg
Traurig, LLP & Naomi G. Beer , Greenberg Traurig, LLP.


UNITED STATES: Judge Certifies Class of Cambodian Refugees
----------------------------------------------------------
Martin Macias Jr., writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that a federal judge on Aug. 13 certified a class of Cambodian
refugees who claim the federal government is infringing on their
constitutional rights by unlawfully detaining them without proper
notice and a chance to stand before a judge.

In Oct. 2017, Immigration and Customs Enforcement launched a series
of raids that swept up individuals of Cambodian descent who later
were held in detention facilities.  Many of them were born in
refugee camps and had never set foot in Cambodia, according to
advocates.

With support from the firm Sidley Austin, and two California
chapters of advocacy group Asian Americans Advancing Justice,
detainees sued to stop any further detentions and filed a
nationwide class action lawsuit to challenge their arrests.

They claim the arrests are unlawful and deny detained Cambodians
their due process rights.

Advocates believe there are at least 1,900 Cambodians in the
country who could be subject to detention and deportation by ICE.
Many of them were released by ICE years ago, but could not be
deported due to Cambodia refusing to accept them.

U.S District Judge Cormac Carney said on Aug. 13 he would certify
the class after adjusting the language of his order to ensure that
class status doesn't extend to individuals who pose a danger to
their communities.

"I assume that some [members of the proposed class] are not perfect
angels," Judge Carney said.  "By certifying, am I impeding or
making it difficult for the government to arrest class members if
they need to?"

Darlene Cho -- dcho@sidley.com -- of Sidley Austin said any
injunctive relief would only prevent unlawful detention and
deportation, not impede law enforcement.

"We are not aware of any member who is a danger," Ms. Cho said,
adding that plaintiff's counsel has not yet completed a
comprehensive review of all 1,900 class members.

ICE also detained Cambodians after regular check-ins with the
agency.  Many were lawful permanent residents with criminal records
and had received deportation orders.

After initially refusing to accept deportees into the country, the
Cambodian government eventually agreed to issue them travel
documents.

Two of the plaintiffs representing the class, Nak Kim Chhouen and
Mony Neth, were detained under those conditions.

"I came to the United States when I was six years old as a refugee
from the war.  This is the only place I've ever known as home,"
Chhoeun said in a statement.

Chhoeun and Neth were born to families that fled Cambodia to the
United States to escape the Khmer Rouge, a brutal regime whose
genocide killed over 2 million Cambodians between 1975 and 1979.

Ms. Cho asked the court to acknowledge the more than 20 community
members that attended the hearing in support of the class members.

Judge Carney has taken a compassionate stance towards the proposed
class members.  He has said the federal government can't deport
them without notice.

He granted a temporary restraining order in Dec. 2017 to block the
deportation of over 50 detained Cambodian refugees in order for
them to challenge their deportation cases.

Judge Carney said he was concerned about individuals with criminal
records being included in the class.

"I want to ensure that if there's an incident involving terrorism,
that the government can move swiftly," he said.

"Under extreme cases like terrorism, the government can find other
grounds for detention," Ms. Cho said.

Justice Department attorney Troy Liggett said he was concerned
about individual class members being granted relief and then
absconding from deportation proceedings.

The federal government wants individuals transferred from criminal
custody to immigrant detention to be excluded,
Mr. Ligget said.

"I share your concern," Judge Carney said.

Jenny Zhao, staff attorney with Asian Americans Advancing Justice,
said the proposed injunctive relief wouldn't prevent ICE or other
law enforcement agencies from detaining anyone that committed a
crime. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Lewis and Clark County Joins PILT Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Thomas Plank, writing for Independent Record, reports that the
Lewis and Clark County Commission decided on Aug. 14 to join 1,956
other counties in a class-action lawsuit to recover unpaid funds
from the federal government.

Payments in Lieu of Taxes, or PILT funds, are a way for the federal
government to reimburse local and state governments for ownership
or use of land within their boundaries.  A lawsuit brought by King
County, Utah led a court to find that the federal government had
made a mistake in years past and had underpaid counties all over
the United States due to an issue with a formula that decided
reimbursement.

The class-action lawsuit is a way to claim remaining funds from
2015-2017.

All 56 counties in Montana receive some form of PILT funding. Lewis
and Clark County receives nearly $2.5 million per year in PILT
funding, which the federal government underpaid by $95,712,
according to documents provided by Smith, Currie and Hancock LLP,
the Washington, D.C. law firm in charge of the class-action suit.

Lewis and Clark County is claiming the second-highest amount of any
Montana county; only Flathead County is claiming more. However,
officials noted that about one-third of the $95,712 claimed would
be used to pay for legal fees, so the county would actually gain
about $60,000.  

An email from Shantil Siaperas, the communications director for the
Montana Association of Counties, explained that the genesis of the
underfunding began 12 years ago when Congress failed to fund PILT,
which led an Arizona county to bring a lawsuit against the federal
government.

Essentially, statutory funding was not written into congressional
appropriations for PILT funds, which allowed King County, Utah to
win a case and gain money it rightfully owned.

Tri-Lakes Fire Chief Bob Drake made a public comment requesting
that the county join in the class-action lawsuit.

"Our district's population doubles every Friday night," Mr. Drake
said. "It falls to local jurisdictions to take care of that."

Commissioner Jim McCormick said he was "not a litigious person,"
but found it necessary to go forward with the suit "to put Lewis
and Clark County on the list," to claim the unpaid PILT.

Commissioner Susan Good-Giese pointed to recent incidents in the
Bob Marshall Wilderness involving rescues that used county
resources.

"It would be remiss to walk away from money," Ms. Giese said. [GN]


UNITYPOINT HEALTH: Class Action Amended to Cover Second Breach
--------------------------------------------------------------
David Wahlberg, writing for WiscNews, reports that a class-action
lawsuit against UnityPoint Health over a data breach reported this
spring was amended on Aug. 13 to cover a second breach revealed in
July.

Four patients are named in the updated lawsuit.  They are among 1.4
million people, including 76,000 in Wisconsin, who were notified
July 30 that their names, addresses and medical information -- and,
for some, driver's license, Social Security and payment card or
bank account numbers -- may have been compromised.

The plaintiffs include Yvonne Mart Fox, of Middleton, and Grant
Nesheim, of Mazomanie. They were named in the original suit, filed
in May in U.S. District Court in Madison after UnityPoint Health
reported the first data breach in April. In that incident, notices
were sent to 16,400 patients.

The other plaintiffs named in the amended lawsuit are from Illinois
and Iowa.

Iowa-based UnityPoint Health owns Meriter Health Services in
Madison, which includes Meriter Hospital. The health care
organization declined comment on Aug. 13.

In July, UnityPoint Health said emails disguised to appear like
they came from an executive with the organization tricked employees
into providing sign-in information, giving the attackers access to
their accounts from March 14 to April 3.

The provider said it discovered the problem May 31. It said it
would offer free credit monitoring services for a year to people
whose driver's license or Social Security number was involved.

According to the amended lawsuit, Fox "is being harassed and
inundated with unwanted, unsolicited, and unlawful spam and
phishing emails and auto-dialed calls from unscrupulous
operators."

She and others "fear for their personal financial security and are
experiencing feelings of rage and anger, anxiety, sleep disruption,
stress, fear, and physical pain."

Mr. Nesheim learned in July there had been a fraudulent attempt to
open an unauthorized credit card in his name, the amended lawsuit
says.  He was so inundated with robocalls that he had to take on a
new number for work calls, the lawsuit says.

The updated lawsuit said UnityPoint Health told patients involved
in the second data breach they could receive credit monitoring
through Experian.

Experian has allegedly had its own data breaches, harming millions
of customers, the lawsuit says.

UnityPoint Health has said it reset passwords for compromised
accounts, conducted mandatory employee training about recognizing
phishing emails and implemented multi-factor authentication in
accessing systems, in an effort to prevent similar situations.
[GN]


US BANCORP: Faces Moret Suit FLSA Suit in Calif.
------------------------------------------------
Pedro Moret, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. U.S. Bancorp, U.S. Bank, NA, and Red Sky Risk Services,
LLC, and Does 1-10, Case No. 5:18-cv-01612 (C.D. Calif., August 1,
2018), is brought against the Defendants for violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

The Pedro Moret resides in Riverside County, California. U.S. Bank
hired him as a Staff Appraiser on or around 2010. He was affiliated
with U.S. Bank’s Riverside office and worked in Orange,
Riverside, and San Diego Counties while employed by Defendants.
Defendants terminated him on or about December 15, 2017.

The Defendant U.S. Bancorp is a Delaware corporation headquartered
in Minneapolis, Minnesota that does business in and maintains
offices in many states throughout the United States, including
California.

The Defendant U.S. Bank is a Delaware corporation headquartered in
St. Paul, Minnesota that does business in and maintains offices in
many states throughout the United States, including California. On
information and belief, Defendant U.S. Bank is a subsidiary of
Defendant U.S. Bancorp.

The Defendant Red Sky Risk Services, LLC is a Delaware corporation
headquartered in Minneapolis, Minnesota that does business in and
maintains offices in many states throughout the United States,
including California. On information and belief, Defendant Red Sky
is a subsidiary of Defendant U.S. Bank. Red Sky is a valuation
services company. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Bryan J. Schwartz, Esq.
      Rachel M. Terp, Esq.
      DeCarol A. Davis, Esq.
      BRYAN SCHWARTZ LAW  
      1330 Broadway, Suite 1630
      Oakland, CA 94612
      Tel: (510) 444-9300
      Fax: (510) 444-9301
      E-mail: bryan@bryanschwartzlaw.com
              rachel@bryanschwartzlaw.com
              decarol@bryanschwartzlaw.com

          - and -

      Aashish Y. Desai, Esq.
      Adrianne De Castro, Esq.
      DESAI LAW FIRM, P.C.
      3200 Bristol St., Suite 650 Costa
      Mesa, CA 92626
      Tel: (949) 614-5830
      Fax: (949) 271-4190
      E-mail: aashish@desai-law.com
              adrianne@desai-law.com


US XPRESS: Court Partly Grants Bid to Dismiss Morgan's TCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Norman K. Moon of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, Charlottesville Division, granted in part and
denied in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss the case,
CHRISTOPHER MORGAN, Plaintiff, v. U.S. XPRESS, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 3:17-cv-00085 (W.D. Va.).

The case arises under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA") which prohibits, among other things, the use of various
types of prerecorded calls.  The Defendant is a Nevada trucking
company headquartered in Tennessee.  The Plaintiff, Virginia
resident Morgan, alleges th Defendant used prerecorded calls to
recruit him to become a truck driver.  Importantly, he allegedly
received these calls on a residential, cellular telephone line.
The Plaintiff filed the putative class action in response.

Count One of the complaint alleges that the Defendant violated the
TCPA by calling the Plaintiff's residential telephone line.  Count
Two alleges Defendant violated the TCPA by calling his cellular
telephone line.  Both counts arise out of the same calls to the
Plaintiff's cell phone, which he labels a residential, cellular
telephone line.  The Plaintiff argues the same calls can give rise
to both Counts.  

The Defendant disagrees, and argues that calls made to a cell
phone, even when used at home, are not calls made to residential
telephone lines.  The Defendant has moved to dismiss these two
portions of the complaint.

Judge Moon holds that the structure and language of the TCPA
demonstrate that calls made to a cell phone are not calls made to a
residential telephone line, and so Count One will be dismissed.
The Plaintiff's characterization of the cell phone as a
residential, cellular telephone line is not determinative of this
question.  These are not factual allegations, but legal terms drawn
from the operative statute.

In the second portion of its motion, the Defendant argues that it
is not subject to personal jurisdiction as to non-Virginia resident
class members' claims.  The Judge is reluctant to believe that the
Supreme Court's straightforward application of settled principles
of personal jurisdiction in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court of California, San Francisco Cty. requires a substantial
limiting of that valuable tool.  Accordingly, he will not rush to
carry that case beyond its holding and logic, and so will deny this
aspect of the Defendant's motion to dismiss.

Judge Moon concludes that the Plaintiff's failure to plausibly
allege the calls were made to a residential telephone line within
the meaning of the relevant section of the TCPA dooms Count One.
But he will deny the motion to dismiss the claims of putative
nonresident class members because the Court has personal
jurisdiction over the Defendant as to their claims.  For these
reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted only in part.  An
appropriate order will issue.  The Clerk of Court is requested to
send a copy of the Opinion and the accompanying Order to the
parties.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 25, 2018 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/F3PXjH from Leagle.com.

Christopher Morgan, individually and on behalf of a class of all
persons and entities similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Michael Brian Hissam -- mhissam@baileyglasser.com -- Bailey &
Glasser L.L.P. & Ryan McCune Donovan, Bailey & Glasser L.L.P., pro
hac vice.

U.S. Xpress, Inc., Defendant, represented by John Curtis Lynch --
john.lynch@troutman.com -- TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP & David Michael
Gettings -- dave.gettings@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP.


VITALE'S III: Nyitray Files Suit Over Unpaid Wages
---------------------------------------------------
David L. Nyitray III and Isea Marichalar, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Vitale's III of Allegan,
LLC, Franco La Franca, Agostino LaFranca, Roberto Leonardi and Dave
Tinwalde, Case No. 1:18-cv-00846 (W.D. Mich., August 1, 2018), is
brought against the Defendants for failure to pay minimum and
overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff David L. Nyitray III worked as driver and cook for
the Defendants Vitale's, Leonardi, and Tinwalde from March 2015 to
December 2015 ("Term 1"), January 2016 to April 2017 ("Term 2"),
and February 2018 to present ("Term 3").

The Plaintiff Marichalar worked as driver and cook for the
Defendants Vitale's, Leonardi, and Defendant from approximately
2016 to 2017.

The Defendants own and operate Vitale's an Italian restaurant
serving pizza, pasta, and other such Italian cuisine. The
Defendants' principal place of business is located at 320 Western
Ave. Allegan MI 49010. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Robert Anthony Alvarez, Esq.
      Agustin Henriquez, Esq.
      AVANTI LAW GROUP, PLLC
      600 28th St. SW
      Wyoming, MI 49509
      Grand Rapids, MI 49503
      Tel: (616) 257-6807
      Email: ralvarez@avantilaw.com


VUZIX CORP: Faces Two Purported Class Suits in New York
-------------------------------------------------------
Vuzix Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company is facing
two purported class action lawsuits in New York.

On July 24, 2018, a purported shareholder class action lawsuit was
filed in the United States District Court, Southern District of New
York, against the Company, certain of its current and former
directors and executive officers and the placement agents of the
Company's registered direct offering that was completed in January
2018.

The complaint alleges violations of federal securities laws under
Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act and under Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Exchange Act on behalf of a putative class of
shareholders that purchased stock between November 9, 2017 and
March 20, 2018, or pursuant and/or traceable to the Company's
registration statement and prospectus filed in connection with the
registered direct offering.

The complaint alleges that the Company and certain of its officers
and directors made materially false and/or misleading statements
and failed to disclose material adverse events about the Company's
business, operations and prospects in press releases and public
filings. The complaint seeks damages in unspecified amounts, costs
and expenses of bringing the action, and other unspecified relief.


A similar purported class action was filed against the Company and
certain of its current and former executive officers and directors
on July 27, 2018, in the United States District Court, Southern
District of New York.

The Company believes the allegations are false and intends to
vigorously defend itself. The Company plans to file a motion to
dismiss the complaints.

Vuzix Corporation designs, manufactures, markets, and sells
wearable display devices in the United States and internationally.
Vuzix Corporation was founded in 1997 and is headquartered in West
Henrietta, New York.


WAL-MART STORES: Court Narrows Claims in Pita Chips Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted in part and denied in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned ERIN TERRAZZINO,
on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
WAL-MART STORES, INC., Defendant. No. 17-cv-01731. (N.D Ill.).

Presently before the Court is Walmart's motion to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b),
12(b)(1), and 12(b)(6).

Plaintiff Erin Terrazzino purchased a bag of Great Value All
Natural Pita Chips (Pita Chips) from Defendant Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc.'s (Walmart) website. Terrazzino alleges that despite the fact
that the Pita Chips were prominently branded as All Natural, the
product contained a variety of synthetic, artificial, and
heavily-processed ingredients. Consequently, Terrazzino has filed
this lawsuit alleging that Walmart's representation of the Pita
Chips as All Natural was false, misleading, and deceptive.

Terrazzino's complaint alleges common law claims for breach of
express warranty (Count I) and unjust enrichment (Count II) on
behalf of the National Class, and violations of the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act (ICFA) on behalf of the
Illinois Class (Count III).

Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing

Walmart first argues that Terrazzino lacks standing to assert
claims premised on the laws of states other than Illinois and
therefore any such claims must be dismissed. Specifically, Walmart
contends that because Terrazzino claims no injuries in any state
other than Illinois, she has no standing to pursue statutory causes
of action under the laws of any other state. Terrazzino counters
that this argument is premature.

To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that [the
plaintiff has] suffered an injury in fact (2) that is fairly
traceable to the action of the defendant and (3) that will likely
be redressed with a favorable decision.

To demonstrate an injury in fact, the plaintiff must allege that
she suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that is
concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical.

Terrazzino claims that because of Walmart's false, misleading, and
deceptive representations and omissions, she was injured in a
number of ways, including being deprived of the benefit of the
bargain because the product she purchased was different from what
Walmart represented. Terrazzino thus has alleged a concrete and
particularized injury, and she has constitutional standing to
pursue her claim. The standing issues highlighted by Walmart are
solely the product of Terrazzino's attempt to represent a national
class. What Walmart really contests is Terrazzino's ability to
represent the class, and that issue is best addressed at the class
certification stage.

The Court therefore denies the motion to dismiss for lack of
standing.

Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a complaint to
contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
the short and plain statement must meet two threshold requirements.
First, the complaint's factual allegations must be sufficient to
give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon
which it rests.

ICFA Claim

To state an ICFA claim, Terrazzino must allege: (1) a deceptive act
or practice by Walmart, (2) that the deceptive act or practice
occurred in the course of conduct involving trade or commerce, (3)
that Walmart intended that Terrazzino rely on the deception, and
(4) that the deception caused
Terrazzino actual damages.

Deceptive Act or Practice

Walmart argues that there was no deception here because the Pita
Chips' label disclosed all of the ingredients about which
Terrazzino complains specifically, enriched wheat flour and its
constituent parts.

In Ibarrola v. Kind, LLC, 83 F.Supp.3d 751 (N.D. Ill. 2015), as
instructive on this point, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant's product packaging was deceptive because it stated that
the product contained no refined sugars when in fact the product
contained evaporated cane juice and molasses.   The Ibarrola court
held that to arrive at a reasonable understanding of no refined
sugars, the plaintiff should have considered the ingredient label
on the back of the package, which notified the consumer that the
product contained evaporated cane juice and molasses.

Here, in contrast, Terrazzino does not allege that she read the
ingredient label. Further, Terrazzino purchased the Pita Chips
through Walmart's website, rather than at a physical store.

Terrazzino claims in her response to the motion to dismiss that it
was not only possible to purchase the Pita Chips without reading
the ingredient lists, but that Walmart made it fairly inconvenient
and even arduous to access the ingredient list. At the pleading
stage, the Court has no basis to doubt this assertion. In contrast,
the plaintiff in Ibarrola only had to flip over the package to
learn more about the ingredients contained in the product. As the
ingredients were arguably much more difficult to ascertain here
than in Ibarrola and Terrazzino has not alleged that she actually
read the ingredient label for the Pita Chips, Ibarrola's reasoning
has little application here.

The Court declines to dismiss Terrazzino's complaint simply because
an ingredient list was included on the website selling the
product.

Actual Damages

Walmart also contends that Terrazzino's ICFA claim fails because
she has not plausibly alleged an injury. To plead an ICFA claim
adequately, a plaintiff must allege actual damages.

In Camasta, 761 F.3d 732, the Seventh Circuit held that the
plaintiff's assertion that he could have shopped around and
obtained a better price in the marketplace was insufficient to
support a claim of actual damages under the ICFA.

Here, in contrast, Terrazzino's case rests on a misrepresentation
regarding the quality of the product she purchased. Terrazzino does
not need to rely solely on price to demonstrate that the product
was inferior instead she can, and does, rely on the fact that the
product was not All Natural. Because Camasta concern comparative
price deception, and this case involves product quality deception,
the standard for alleging damages differs. Terrazzino was not
required to shop around for other pita chips in order to prove that
the product was not worth what she paid for it.

Instead, Terrazzino's allegation that she paid more for the Pita
Chips because they were labeled as All Natural, and further that
she would not have bought the Pita Chips if she had known that they
were not, in fact, All Natural, is sufficient to allege actual
damages.

Proximate Cause

Walmart also argues that the ICFA claim fails because Terrazzino
has not adequately alleged causation.  

To properly plead the element of proximate causation in a private
cause of action for deceptive advertising brought under the ICFA, a
plaintiff must allege that he was, in some manner, deceived.
Terrazzino has alleged that Walmart's labeling of the Pita Chips as
All Natural was deceptive because the Pita Chips were not, in fact,
All Natural.Terrazzino further has alleged that this deceptive act
induced her to pay more for the chips than they were worth and that
she would not have bought the chips but for the deceptive act.

This is sufficient to plead the element of proximate cause.

Whether the ICFA Claim is Actually a Restated Breach of Contract
Claim

Breach of Warranty Claim

Walmart also contends that Terrazzino fails to plead a breach of
warranty claim adequately because she has not alleged pre-suit
notice.

Under Section 2-607 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), a buyer
alleging a breach of warranty must notify the seller of the breach
within a reasonable time after she discovers it or else she is
barred from any remedy.

Nowhere in the complaint does Terrazzino allege that Walmart had
actual knowledge that its Pita Chips were not all natural.
Terrazzino only makes two allegations as to Walmart's knowledge.

First, she alleges that Walmart knew that consumers would purchase
the Pita Chips because they were labeled All Natural and pass over
similar products that were not so labeled. And second, she alleges
that Walmart knew consumers bought the Pita Chips with the
expectation that they would be free of any artificial or synthetic
ingredients.  Neither of these allegations is sufficient to state a
claim of Walmart's actual knowledge that its product contained a
defect, namely, that its Pita Chips were not all natural.

Because Terrazzino failed to provide pre-suit notice and has not
demonstrated an applicable exception, her breach of warranty claim
(Count I) is dismissed without prejudice.

Unjust Enrichment

Walmart argues that Terrazzino's unjust enrichment claim should be
dismissed because it is simply a restated breach of contract claim.
But unjust enrichment is based on an implied contract, where there
is a specific contract which governs the relationship of the
parties, the doctrine of unjust enrichment has no application. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow pleading of alternative
statements of a claim. And Terrazzino is entitled to plead unjust
enrichment as an alternative to her breach of contract claim.

Walmart's motion to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim is denied.

Walmart's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
Specifically, the motion is granted with respect to Terrazino's
claim for breach of express warranty in Count I and her request for
injunctive relief; those claims are dismissed without prejudice.
The motion to dismiss is otherwise denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 16, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yas6u94k from
Leagle.com.

Erin Terrazzino, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Catherine P. Sons , Law Office
of James X. Bormes, P.C., Frank B. Castiglione , The Khowaja Law
Firm, LLC, James X. Bormes , Law Office of James X. Bormes, Thomas
Michael Ryan , Law Offices of Thomas Ryan & Kasif Khowaja , The
Khowaja Law, LLC.

Wal-mart Stores Inc, Defendant, represented by Francis A. Citera --
citeraf@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, LLP. & Brian D. Straw --
strawb@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, Llp.


WASHINGTON: Denial of Class Certification in Suit vs. DRS Flipped
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed the
District Court's judgment denying the Stipulated Motion to Certify
Class in the case captioned MICKEY FOWLER; LEISA MAURER, and a
class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
TRACY GUERIN, Director of the Washington State Department of
Retirement Systems, Defendant-Appellee. No. 16-35052. (9th Cir.).

The district court denied the stipulated motion to certify a class
and then dismissed the action as prudentially unripe.

Washington public school teachers Mickey Fowler and Leisa Maurer
bring this class action to order the Director of the Washington
State Department of Retirement Systems (DRS) to return interest
that was allegedly skimmed from their state-managed retirement
accounts.

The parties filed a stipulated motion to certify a class of all
active and retired members of the Teachers' Retirement System who
had transferred from Plan 2 to Plan 3 before January 20, 2002. The
district court denied the stipulated motion without prejudice,
concluding that the parties' explanation was not detailed enough
for the court to fulfill its independent responsibility to ensure
that the requirements of Rule 23 were met.

The district court then granted the Director's motion for summary
judgment, concluding that this case was prudentially unripe pending
the conclusion of DRS's new interest calculation rulemaking.

The Teachers timely appealed.

The first question presented is whether the Teachers' takings claim
is prudentially unripe.

The district court held that the Teachers' claim was unripe under
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). Williamson Countysets forth two
prudential hurdles for takings claims. First, a takings claim is
unripe until the government entity charged with implementing the
regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application
of the challenged regulations to the property at issue. Second, the
plaintiff must have sought and been denied compensation through the
procedures the State has provided.

Here, the Teachers bring a per se taking claim because DRS's
withholding of interest earned on funds in interest-bearing
accounts is a direct appropriation of private property. The Supreme
Court addressed this issue in a pair of cases concerning states'
Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account (IOLTA) programs. First, in
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, the Court held that the
interest income generated by funds held in IOLTA accounts is the
'private property' of the owner of the principal. 524 U.S. 156, 172
(1998). Then in Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, the Court
held that the law requiring interest on those funds to be
transferred to a third party is evaluated not as a regulatory
taking, but as a per se taking. 538 U.S. at 235.

As a result, DRS's withholding of the interest accrued on the
Teachers' accounts constitutes a per se taking to which Williamson
County's prudential ripeness test does not apply. The district
court erred in dismissing the Teachers' takings claim as
prudentially unripe.

The Director argues that the Teachers' takings claim fails on its
merits because there has been no taking of private property here.
In the state-court litigation, the Washington Court of Appeals held
that the state statutory scheme does not require the DRS to pay
daily interest. The Director asserts that there can be no federal
takings claim without this state-law property right.

The Court rejected a similar argument in Schneider v. California
Department of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). There the
Court observed that constitutionally protected property rights can
and often do exist despite statutes that appear to deny their
existence. Citing the Supreme Court's opinion in Phillips, the
Court noted that a State may not sidestep the Takings Clause by
disavowing traditional property interests long recognized under
state law. The Court then held that there is a core notion of
constitutionally protected property into which state regulation
simply may not intrude without prompting Takings Clause scrutiny.
This core is defined by reference to traditional background
principles of property law.  In that case, the Court concluded that
interest income earned on an interest-bearing account falls within
this class of fundamental property rights.

The Court holds that the Teachers state a takings claim for daily
interest withheld by DRS.

Next, the Director contends that the Teachers' claim is barred by
two related doctrines: issue preclusion and Rooker-Feldman.

According to the Director, the Washington Court of Appeals has
already adjudicated two issues on which the Teachers' takings claim
depends: whether the Teachers are entitled to daily interest, and
whether their takings claim is premature. The Director also argues
that the Teachers now seek both a direct and de facto appeal of the
state court's decisions on these issues.

The Court disagrees. The Washington Court of Appeals' first
decision expressly declined to reach the merits of the Teachers'
constitutional takings claim. Its discussion of the Teachers'
entitlement to daily interest turned solely on an issue of
Washington statutory law, not federal constitutional law. And the
state court's subsequent decision did not decide the issues before
the Court either. It found premature only the Teachers' speculation
that the forthcoming DRS rule-making would effect a taking, not
their argument here that DRS effected a taking by retaining some of
their earned interest years ago.  

No state-court judgment resolved the precise issues presented in
this case, and the Teachers do not complain of any error by the
state court or seek relief from the state court's judgments. The
Teachers' takings claim is not barred by issue preclusion or by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The Director contends that the Teachers' takings claim is
foreclosed by the Eleventh Amendment. In the Director's view, the
Teachers seek monetary damages, which would mean that the State is
the real party in interest and that a money award would
impermissibly be paid from the State's treasury.  

But as the Director previously has conceded, and as the Teachers'
complaint plainly shows, the Teachers actually seek an injunction
ordering the Director to return savings taken from them. Rather
than requiring payment of funds from the State's treasury, this
relief will likely involve applying a computerized formula to DRS
electronic records to determine the amount of interest that should
be moved to the class members

In sum, none of the Director's alternative arguments justifies the
district court's grant of summary judgment in this case.

The district court denied the stipulated motion based on its
concern that a Rule 23(b)(2) class would be inappropriate here. As
the district court pointed out, Rule 23(b)(2) does not authorize
the class certification of monetary claims. But as explained above,
the Teachers do not bring a claim requiring individualized
determinations of eligibility for damages. The Teachers instead
seek an injunction ordering the Director to apply a single formula
to DRS's electronic records to correct the amount of interest
credited to class members' accounts.  

The district court erred in denying the motion for class
certification on the ground that the Teachers' claim for an
indivisible injunction benefitting all its members at once was
really one for individualized monetary damages. The claim can be
certified for class treatment under Rule 23(b)(2) because the
relief of correcting the entire records system for the class member
accounts is in the nature of injunctive relief.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's August 16, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc69adfa from Leagle.com.

Stephen K. Festor -- skfestor@bs-s.com -- (argued), Stephen K.
Strong --
skstrong@bs-s.com -- David F. Stobaugh -- davidfstobaugh@bs-s.com
-- and Alexander F. Strong -- astrong@bs-s.com -- Bendich Stobaugh
& Strong P.C., Seattle, Washington, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Jeffrey A.O. Freimund -- jefff@fjtlaw.com -- (argued) and Michael
E. Tardif -- miket@fjtlaw.com -- Freimund Jackson & Tardif PLLC,
Olympia, Washington, for Defendant-Appellee.


WEXLER DERMATOLOGY: Violates Disabilities Act, Picon Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wexler Dermatology,
P.C.  The case is styled as YELITZA PICON AND ON BEHALF OF ALL
OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. WEXLER DERMATOLOGY, P.C., Case
No. 1:18-cv-07949 (S.D.N.Y., August 30, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Wexler Dermatology, P.C., is a privately held company in New York.
The Company's dermatology center is located at 145 East 32nd St.,
in New York City.  The Company, headed by Dr. Patricia Wexler,
provides various dermatologic services and procedures, including
acne treatment, arm rejuvenation and other cosmetic
procedures.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM PC
          175 Varick Street, 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Telephone: (646) 770-3775
          Facsimile: (646) 867-2639
          E-mail: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


WILLIAMS & FUDGE: Violates Fair Debt Collection Act, Joseph Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Williams & Fudge,
Inc.  The case is titled as Judeline S. Joseph, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Williams & Fudge, Inc.,
Case No. 1:18-cv-04948 (E.D.N.Y., August 30, 2018).

The lawsuit arises from alleged violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Williams & Fudge, Inc., provides financial services.  The Company
offers tuition, institutional, health profession, nursing, private
education loans, and other miscellaneous receivables.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
          SANDERS LAW, PLLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 203-7600
          Facsimile: (516) 281-7601
          E-mail: csanders@sanderslawpllc.com


YELP INC: Continues to Defend California Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
Yelp Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018, that the company continues to defend itself in
a putative class action lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California.

In January 2018, a putative class action lawsuit alleging
violations of the federal securities laws was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, naming as
defendants us and certain of our officers.

The complaint, which the plaintiff amended on June 25, 2018,
alleges violations of the Exchange Act by the company and its
officers for allegedly making materially false and misleading
statements regarding the company's business and operations on
February 9, 2017. The plaintiff seeks unspecified monetary damages
and other relief.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Yelp Inc. operates a platform that connects people with local
businesses in the United States, Canada, and internationally. The
company's platform covers various local business categories,
including restaurants, shopping, beauty and fitness, arts,
entertainment and events, home and local services, health,
nightlife, travel and hotel, auto, and others.  Yelp Inc. was
founded in 2004 and is headquartered in San Francisco, California.


[*] JND Legal Administration Acquires Lien Resolution Group
-----------------------------------------------------------
JND Legal Administration, founded by some of the nation's most
experienced legal settlement administrators, on Sept. 5 announced
the acquisition of Lien Resolution Group, a leading consulting
company providing settlement solutions to law firms and corporate
entities dealing with client healthcare liens.  As a part of the
acquisition, Lien Resolution Group's Managing Director Rachel
Stoering will join the JND team as chief operating officer -- class
action, mass tort & lien resolution.  The acquisition complements
JND's existing footprint, providing first class, end-to-end mass
tort settlement solutions.

"The acquisition of Lien Resolution Group completed the missing
piece to our mass tort puzzle," commented Jennifer Keough, JND
Legal Administration's chief executive officer and founder.
"Having Rachel Stoering join our team will enhance our services in
ways beyond liens and serve as a tremendous advantage to our
clients."   

"JND is transforming the settlement administration industry,"  said
Ms. Stoering.  "The companies' combined experience makes us a
powerful resource in the mass tort space, providing our clients
with the most advanced settlement administration solutions
available."  Ms. Stoering further added, "What drew me to JND is
that the company from the top down includes some of the industry's
best minds and finest talent. Right now, JND is the leading player
in the Legal Administration landscape and I am thrilled to be
joining the JND team."  

Ms. Stoering joins JND with a strong background in both lien
resolution and legal administration.  Prior to her tenure at Lien
Resolution Group, she oversaw class action operations at a claims
administration firm after working in private practice as an
attorney at Heins Mills & Olson PLC.  By combining JND's commitment
to provide full service settlement solutions with Rachel's
expertise, JND has set a new benchmark for service line offerings
in the legal administration industry.

                 About JND Legal Administration

JND Legal Administration -- http://www.JNDLA.com-- is a legal
management and administration company led by a team of industry
veterans who are passionate about providing superior service to
clients.  Armed with decades of expertise and a powerful set of
tools, JND has deep experience expertly navigating the intricacies
of multiple, intersecting service lines, including class action
settlements, corporate restructuring, e-discovery, mass tort claims
& lien resolution and government services.  JND is trusted by law
firms, government agencies and Fortune 500 companies across the
nation.  The company is backed by Stone Point Capital and has
offices in California, Colorado, Minnesota, New York, Washington
and Washington, D.C.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
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firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***