CAR_Public/180918.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, September 18, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 187

                            Headlines

22 NOODLE MARKET: Underpays Delivery Workers, Mena Roque et al. Say
8POINT3 ENERGY: Taylor Securities Suit Dismissed
ABP BEST HOME: Underpays Home Care Aides, Hilton Suit Says
AKAL SECURITY: Bracewell Faces Subpoena Bid in Howard Dean Suit
ALDI INC: Fails to Pay Wages to Store Managers, Hunt et al. Say

ALISAL UNION: Claims in Suit on Reuse of Blood Test Needles Trimmed
AMAZON.COM: Removes Noflin Suit to C.D. California
BATH & BODY: Brawley Sues over Sale of Defective 3-Wick Candles
BLEECKER LLC: Fails to Pay Wages to Cooks, Rios Suit Alleges
BOWIN ASSOCIATES: Underpays Hostess & Servers, Estudianti Alleges

BT GROUP: New Jersey Court Dismisses Securities Fraud Suit
CENTURY TECHNICAL: Fails to Pay Wages to Inspectors, Johnson Says
CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Partial Dismissal of Data Breach Suit Endorsed
CINTAS SERVICES: Ordered to Meet/Confer on Positions in Williams
CORECIVIC OF TENNESSEE: Bid to Intervene in Gonzalez Suit Denied

DBI SERVICES: Underpays On Call Technicians, Dozier Suit Alleges
DENTSPLY SIRONA: Golombeck Sues over 33% Drop in Share Price
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Class Action Challenges Institutionalization
ELECTRONIC ARTS: Retired NFL Players Can't Sue as Class
EVEN T SIRLIN: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Bank Suit Alleges

FARMER RICE: Faces Ismael Labor Suit in Sacramento
FOCUS CONSTRUCTION: Underpays Construction Workers, Rodriguez Says
FORD MOTOR: Partial Decertification Bid in MyFord Suit Partly OK'd
FUYAO: Hundreds of Workers Join Wage Class Action
GENERAC POWER: Conditional Certification of Tom Class Denied

GEO GROUP: Underpays Security Officers, Ramirez Suit Alleges
HELIOS AND MATHESON: Braxton Sues over 96% Drop in Share Price
HOME DEPOT: Fails to Pay OT to Associates, Howard et al. Allege
INTELEMEDIA COMMUNICATIONS: Bid to Dismiss Johnson Suit Denied
JEUNESSE GLOBAL: Faces Xiong Suit in C.D. California

JONES FINANCIAL: Continues to Defend 401(k) Plan Related Suit
JONES FINANCIAL: Continues to Defend Bland Class Action
JONES FINANCIAL: Unit Continues to Defend Against Anderson Suit
JONES LANG LASALLE: Wacker Drive Sues over Monopoly of Labors
KROGER CO: Solano et al. Sue over 10-Cent Bottle Deposit Charge

L3 TECHNOLOGIES: Prelim Approval of Estes Deal Conditionally OK'd
LA BOTTEGA: Underpays Delivery Drivers, Kalland Suit Alleges
LA FARINE BAKERY: Fails to Pay OT to Bakers, Tellez et al. Claim
LANDRY'S RESTAURANTS: Cal. App. Affirms Dismissal of Martinez Suit
LOS ANGELES, CA: Faces Ferguson Suit in C.D. California

MAJESTIC CLEANING: Doesn't Pay OT to Manual Laborers, Zapata Says
MARRIOTT OWNERSHIP: Can Compel Arbitration in McComack FCRA Suit
MB FINANCIAL: Faces Parshall Suit over Fifth Third Merger
MDL 2179: Continental/CNA Granted Summary Ruling in Oil Spill Suit
MDL 2262: Citi and Barclays Settlements Have Final Approval

MERIDIAN BIOSCIENCE: Bid to Dismiss Forman Class Suit Underway
MIDLAND CREDIT: Blackwell Sues over Debt Collection Practices
MIDLAND CREDIT: Schonfeld Sues over Debt Collection Practices
MIDWEST SUPPLY: Underpays Janitors, Wanda Smith Alleges
MINNESOTA: Court Dismisses Jackson Suit

MOLINA HEALTHCARE: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Robinson Suit Says
MRS BPO LLC: Ridley Sues over Debt Collection Practices
MYLAN NV: Loses Bid to Scale Down EpiPen Antitrust MDL
NATURE'S BOUNTY: Court Narrows Claims in Muir Suit
NEW JERSEY: Final Approval of Antitrust Suit Settlements Affirmed

NRI USA: Can't Compel Arbitration in Garcia Wage and Hour Suit
OCWEN LOAN: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in Stromberg Suit
OFFIT KURMAN: Crowley et al. Sue over Debt Collection Practices
ON MY OWN: Can Compel Arbitration in Hartley FLSA Suit
ORACLE CORP:  Sunrise Firefighters Sue over 9.5% Share Price Drop

OYSHI TABLE: Underpays Kitchen Helpers, Jimenez and Franco Claim
PFIZER INC: Bid to Strike Nationwide Class Claims in Haj Denied
PFIZER INC: Continues to Defend Lipitor-Related Antitrust Suit
PFIZER INC: Court Tosses Antitrust Suit over Saline Solution
PFIZER INC: Still Defends Class Suit over EpiPen Sales

PFIZER INC: Wyeth Still Defends Class Suit over Effexor XR Sales
PIERCE COUNTY, WA: Court Strikes Bid to Certify Bango Class
PIXARBIO: Disgruntled Investors File Class Actions
PLYMOUTH ROCK: Failed to Pay Medicare, MSP Recovery Suit Alleges
POPSUGAR INC: Seeks Dismissal of Instagram Influencer's Case

PROCTER & GAMBLE: Discovery Order in Flushable Wipes Suit Affirmed
RINGCENTRAL INC: Underpays Sales Representatives, Stemple Claims
SANTANDER HOLDINGS: Deka Investment Suit Remains Stayed
SANTANDER HOLDINGS: Seeks Initial Approval of Parmlee Settlement
SEABOARD CORP: Class Action vs. Pork Processors Underway

SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT: "Anderson" Trial Scheduled for Oct. 2019
SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT: Accrues $11.5M for EZPay Class Suit Accord
SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT: Appeal in "Hall" Class Suit Still Pending
SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT: Bid to Appeal "Baker" Class Status Denied
SELECT PORTFOLIO: Court Issues Protective Order in Arellano Suit

SERVICELINK FIELD: Underpays Inspectors, Collins Suit Alleges
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Maurice Wutscher Attorney Discusses Ruling
SPECIALIZED LOAN: Erk Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections
SPECTRUM PHARMACEUTICALS: Consolidated Suit Underway in Nevada
STARDUST DINERS: Underpays Waitresses, Luisa Franco Alleges

STRAD ENERGY: Court Narrows Claims in Clark Labor Suit
TD AMERITRADE: Magistrate Judge Favors Nixing of Klein Class
TD AMERITRADE: Still Defends Aequitas Securities Litigation
TELUS COMMUNICATIONS: Class Action Heads to Canada Supreme Court
TEN WESTSIDE: Underpays Delivery Drivers, Toj Suit Alleges

TESLA INC: Analyst Says Class Actions May Pressure Cash Position
TESLA INC: Chamberlain Sues over Elon Musk's Go-Private Tweet
THURS TRUCKING: Underypays Truck Drivers, Zettler Suit Claims
TJ MAXX: Faces Class Action Over Deceitful Comparison Prices
TOOTSIE ROLL: Court Dismisses FAC in Junior Mints Slack-Fill Suit

TOTAL SYSTEM: Unit Still Defends Telexfree Securities Litigation
TRUSTMARK CORP: TNB Still Faces Class Suit over Stanford Financial
UGI CORP: Still Defends Against State Law Claims in Consumer Suit
UMH PROPERTIES: Can Compel Arbitration in Morgan FLSA Suit
UNIT CORP: Class Certification Bid in Panola Suit Still Underway

UNIT CORP: Still Defends Chieftain Royalty Company Class Suit
UNIT CORP: Still Defends Cockerell Oil Properties Class Suit
UNITED STATES: Court Hears Immigrants' Class Action v. ICE
UNITED STATES: IRS Class Action 3rd-Party Funder Gets $1.75MM
UNITED STATES: Suit Over Zero-Tolerance Policy Moved to S.D. Calif.

USF REDDAWAY: Court Enters Final Judgment in R. Moss's Suit
USG CORPORATION: Faces Anderson Suit over Knauf Merger
VECTOR GROUP: "Parsons" Personal Injury Class Suit Remains Stayed
VECTOR GROUP: "Young" Personal Injury Class Lawsuit Still Stayed
VECTOR GROUP: 60 Individual Tobacco Cases Pending vs. Liggett

VECTOR GROUP: 75 Claims Still Pending in Engle Progeny Cases
VECTOR GROUP: Liggett Incurs $3.6MM in Tobacco-Related Lawsuits
VECTRUS INC: Oct. 16 Fairness Hearing for Employment Suit Accord
VICTORY CONSULTANTS: Underpays Signature Gatherers, Wilson Claims
VIVINT SOLAR: Defends Putative Class Suit over TCPA Violations

VIVINT SOLAR: Faces Class Action over Power Purchase Deals
VIVINT SOLAR: Settlement Reached with 2 Plaintiffs in Calif. Suit
VOLUME SERVICES: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Jeffries FCRA Suit
VORA RETIREMENT: Bid to Dismiss Goetz Class Suit Still Pending
VOYA RETIREMENT: Bid to Dismiss Dezelan Class Suit Still Pending

ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES: Oct. 30 Final OK Hearing for Class Suit Accord

                            *********

22 NOODLE MARKET: Underpays Delivery Workers, Mena Roque et al. Say
-------------------------------------------------------------------
ALEJANDRO MENA ROQUE; EDIN LICETH YOS YAQUI; ELBER ULISER VASQUEZ
MIRANDA; MARCO GARCIA MENDOZA; and PEDRO TICUN COLO, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. 22
NOODLE MARKET CORP. D/B/A OBAO; LUCK WATANASUPARP; KANRUTHAI
MAHMUANG; and VIWON DARNCHARNJITT, Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-07297 (S.D.N.Y., Aug.13, 2018) is an action against the
Defendants to recover unpaid minimum wages, overtime compensation,
liquidated damages, interests, attorneys' fees and costs.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as delivery workers.
The Plaintiff Mena Roque was employed from February 7, 2012 to July
19, 2018. The Plaintiff Yos from July 2016 to July 13, 2018. The
Plaintiff Vasquez from 2011 to July 17, 2018. Mr. Garcia Mendoza
from March 2012 to July 20, 2018. Mr. Ticum Colo from April 2012 to
July 13, 2018.

22 Noodle Market Corp. d/b/a Obao owned, owned and operate a Thai
and Vietnamese restaurant in New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620


8POINT3 ENERGY: Taylor Securities Suit Dismissed
------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN TAYLOR, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. 8POINT3 ENERGY PARTNERS LP,
CHARLES D. BOYNTON, MARK R. WIDMAR, NATALIE F JACKSON, ALEX
BRADLEY, THOMAS C. O'CONNOR, NORMAN J. SZYDLOWSKI, and MICHAEL W.
YACKIRA, Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-01989-SI (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Susan Illston of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California

On March 31, 2018, the Plaintiff filed the case as a putative class
action alleging violations of Section 14(a) and Section 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and related regulations, with
respect to disclosures in a preliminary proxy statement soliciting
shareholder approval of the proposed acquisition of 8point3 Energy
Partners LP by Capital Dynamics, Inc., through its affiliates and
certain other co-investors.

On April 6, 2018, the Defendants filed a Form DEFM14A Definitive
Proxy Statement, scheduling the shareholder vote on the Proposed
Transaction for May 23, 2018.  On April 18, 2018, the Plaintiff
filed his Motion for a Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the
Shareholder Vote, until the Defendants disclose the information
sought by the Plaintiff.

The parties thereafter engaged in communications regarding the
Plaintiff's claims.  On May 2, 2018, the Defendants filed an
opposition to the Plaintiff's Injunction Motion and on May 7, 2018,
the Plaintiff filed his Reply to the Defendants' Opposition.  The
Defendants, agreed to file certain supplemental disclosures with
the SEC that addressed and/or substantially mooted the Plaintiff's
claims.

On May 8, 2018, the Plaintiff, after reviewing a draft of the
Supplemental Disclosures, filed a notice of withdrawal for the
Preliminary Injunction.  On May 9, 2018, the Defendants filed the
Supplemental Disclosures with the SEC.  On May 23, 2018, 8point3
Energy shareholders held their special meeting and voted to approve
the Proposed Transaction.

The Plaintiff has conducted a further investigation and reached the
conclusion that all viable claims have been mooted by the
Supplemental Disclosures.  He asserts that the Supplemental
Disclosures entitle his counsel to assert a claim for attorneys'
fees and expenses.  He intends to petition the Court to seek a
resolution of his claim for such fees and expenses if his claim
cannot be resolved through negotiations between the counsel for the
Plaintiff and the Defendants;

Now, therefore, the parties stipulated and Judge Illston granted
that the action is dismissed without prejudice, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(a)(1).  The Court retains continuing jurisdiction over
the parties solely for purposes of any potential further
proceedings related to the adjudication of any claim for the
Plaintiffs' Counsel attorneys' fees and/or expenses.  The
Stipulation is not intended to, and will not, waive or prejudice
any right or argument that may be asserted or presented by the
Plaintiff or the Defendants in support of or in opposition to any
claim for an award of attorneys' fees and expenses.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/XH7f2q from Leagle.com.

John Taylor, Plaintiff, represented by Juan E. Monteverde --
jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com -- Monteverde & Associates PC & David
Eldridge Bower -- dbower@monteverdelaw.com -- Monteverde &
Associates PC.

Robert D. Tas, Plaintiff, represented by Rosemary M. Rivas --
rrivas@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky LLP.

8Point3 Energy Partners LP, Charles D. Boynton, Mark R Widmar,
Natalie F Jackson, Alex Bradley, Thomas C O'Connor, Norman J
Szydlowski & Michael W Yackira, Defendants, represented by David D.
Sterling -- david.sterling@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Botts LLP, pro
hac vice, Jonathan Acker Shapiro -- jonathan.shapiro@bakerbotts.com
-- Baker Botts L.L.P., Matthew B. Allen --
matt.allen@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Botts LLP, pro hac vice &
Matthew Ryan Kempf -- matt.kempf@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Botts
LLP.


ABP BEST HOME: Underpays Home Care Aides, Hilton Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------
MARISELA HILTON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ABP BEST HOME CARE AGENCY, INC.; BORIS
KHANATAEV; and IZABELLA DANILOVA, Defendants, Case No. 18-2527
(Mass. Cmmw., Suffolk Cty., Aug. 13, 2018)

Ms. Hilton was employed by the Defendants as home care aides.

ABP Best Home Care Agency, Inc. is a company doing business in
Allston, Massachusetts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sarah R. O'Brien, Esq.
          Raven Moeslinger, Esq.
          Nicholas F. Ortiz, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF NICHOLAS F. ORTIZ, PC
          99 High Street, Suite 304
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 338-9400
          E-mail: rm@mass-legal.com


AKAL SECURITY: Bracewell Faces Subpoena Bid in Howard Dean Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned as HOWARD DEAN, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. AKAL SECURITY INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-mc-00106-TNM (D. Col., Aug. 9, 2018), the
Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Enforce and Compel Compliance with
Third Party Subpoena against Bracewell, LLC, formerly known as
Bracewell & Guiliani LLP.

The case is assigned to Judge Trevor N. McFadden.

Akal Security, Inc., a contract security company, provides judicial
security services for federal courthouses. Akal Security, Inc. was
founded in 1980 and is headquartered in Espanola, New Mexico. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew Seth Sarelson, Esq.
          KAPLAN YOUNG & MOLL PARRON
          600 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1715
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 330-6090
          E-mail: msarelson@kymplaw.com

Bracewell, LLC is represented by:

          Shelby J. Kelley, Esq.
          BRACEWELL LLP
          2001 M Street, NW, Suite 900
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 828-5859
          Facsimile: (800) 404-3970
          E-mail: shelby.kelley@bracewell.com


ALDI INC: Fails to Pay Wages to Store Managers, Hunt et al. Say
---------------------------------------------------------------
JEREMY HUNT; ROCHELLE ANDERSON; DAVID MARTIN; and ROBERT SIMMONS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. ALDI, INC., Defendant, Case No. 8:18-cv-02485-PX
(D. Md., Aug. 13, 2018) seeks to recover unpaid wages, liquidated
damages, interest, attorneys' fees and costs under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as store managers:

     -- Hunt was employed from June 2015 to November 2017;

     -- Anderson from January 2017 to November 2017;

     -- Martin from January 2013 to December 2017; and

     -- Simmons from September 2005 to March 2017.

ALDI Inc. operates grocery stores in the United States. It offers
fresh meats, fresh produce items, wines and beers, and home goods.
The company was incorporated in 1975 and is based in Batavia,
Illinois. ALDI Inc. operates as a subsidiary of ALDI Einkauf GmbH &
Co. oHG. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Benjamin L. Davis, III, Esq.
          George E. Swegma, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF PETER T. NICHOLL
          36 South Charles Street, Suite 1700
          Baltimore, MD 21201
          Telephone No: (410) 244-7005
          Facsimile No: (410) 244-8454
          E-mail: bdavis@nicholllaw.com
                  gswegman@nicholllaw.com


ALISAL UNION: Claims in Suit on Reuse of Blood Test Needles Trimmed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARIO V., et al., Plaintiffs, v. ALISAL UNION SCHOOL
DISTRICT, et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-00041-BLF (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Jose Division, (a) with
respect to the motion to dismiss brought by the District, Dr. Oscar
F. Loya Elementary School, and Diana Garcia, (i) granted without
leave to amend as to the District and Garcia in her official
capacity, and with prejudice as to the Section 1983 claims, and
without prejudice as to the state law claims; (ii) denied as to
Claim 1, and granted with leave to amend as to Claims 5, 10, and
11, as to Garcia in her individual capacity; and (iii) granted
without leave to amend as to Dr. Oscar F. Loya Elementary School;
and (b) with respect to the motion to dismiss brought by Armenta,
granted with leave to amend as Claims 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11.

The putative class action was filed after a fifth grade teacher
performed blood sugar testing on elementary school students without
their parents' knowledge or consent.  The teacher, Defendant Henry
Armenta, allegedly offered his students Gatorade in exchange for
staying after class and allowing him to extract their blood by
means of a finger-prick.  Armenta, who was not medically trained,
allegedly used the same needle on multiple students.

The Plaintiffs are students and parents of students who attended
public school at Dr. Oscar F. Loya Elementary School in Salinas,
California.  At the time of the events giving rise to the lawsuit,
Defendant Armenta taught fifth grade at the School and Defendant
Garcia was the School's principal.  The School is located within
Defendant Alisal Union School District.

The Plaintiffs allege that during the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018
school years, and during some prior years, Defendant Armenta told
students that he would give them free Gatorade in exchange for
staying after school and subjecting themselves to blood sugar
testing.  The minor Plaintiffs stayed after school where Armenta
performed the unauthorized and illicit medical procedure.  Armenta
used the same needle repeatedly on multiple students, thereby
exposing each student to any disease other students may have had.
Armenta at no time provided notice to the parents nor obtained
parental consent before conducting the medical procedure.

Garcia knew, should have known, and was informed that Armenta had
been extracting blood from fifth grade students for several years.
On Feb. 9, 2017, Garcia sent a letter to parents stating that the
District had been notified that a teacher at the School allegedly
had pricked the fingers of several students using a blood sugar
testing device, and advising the parents to have their children
tested for blood-borne pathogens such as Hepatitis and HIV.

The Plaintiffs filed the suit on behalf of themselves and similarly
situated students and parents.  They assert the following claims
under federal and state law: (1) Section 1983 claim against Armenta
and Garcia under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) Section 1983 claim
against Armenta under the Fourth Amendment; (3) Section 1983 claim
against the District under Monell2; (4) Section 1983 claim against
the District for failure to train, hire, and supervise; (5)
negligence claim against all the Defendants; (6) claim for failure
to train, hire and supervise against the District; (7) assault
claim against Armenta; (8) battery claim against Armenta; (9) false
imprisonment claim against Armenta; (10) concealment claim against
Armenta and Garcia; and (11) intentional infliction of emotional
distress against Armenta and Garcia.  In their prayer for relief,
the Plaintiffs seek damages and statutory penalties only; they do
not seek injunctive relief.

The District seeks dismissal of all claims asserted against it, and
against Garcia in her official capacity, under Rule 12(b)(1) on the
basis that the claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.  Garcia
seeks dismissal of all claims asserted against her in her
individual capacity under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim.  And finally, the District seeks dismissal of the School on
the ground that it is not a distinct entity subject to suit.

Judge Freeman finds that the District clearly is entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity based on the Ninth Circuit's
unequivocal statement in Sato that California school districts
remain arms of the state and continue to enjoy Eleventh Amendment
immunity.  That immunity extends to Garcia, a District employee, to
the extent she is sued in her official capacity.  The Plaintiffs'
arguments based on decisions evaluating the status of school
districts in states other than California are misplaced.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted without leave to
amend as to the District and Garcia in her official capacity, with
prejudice as to the Section 1983 claims and without prejudice as to
the state law claims.

Next, the Judge is satisfied that the Plaintiffs' Section 1983
claim is adequately alleged.  She's is unpersuaded by Garcia's
argument that the claim is insufficient absent an allegation as to
precisely when Garcia learned of Armenta's conduct. Garcia cites no
authority in support that argument, and in the Court's view that
level of detail is not required at the pleading stage with respect
to a Section 1983 claim.  Hence, the motion to dismiss therefore is
deneid as to Claim 1 with respect to Garcia in her individual
capacity.

While the Plaintiffs address those issues in opposition to the
motions to dismiss, the Court's role in evaluating the Rule
12(b)(6) motion is limited to determining whether the allegations
of the complaint are adequate to state a claim.  The Judge
therefore dismissed the state law claims with leave to amend so
that the Plaintiffs may satisfy the applicable pleading
requirements.  

Additionally, she concludes that as to Garcia, Claim 10 for
concealment is not alleged with sufficient particularity.  It is
her view that in order to satisfy that heightened pleading
standard, the Plaintiffs must allege facts showing that Garcia knew
that Armenta was conducting blood sugar testing on students and
concealed that fact from parents.  Claim 11 for intentional
infliction of emotional distress is wholly dependent on Claim 10.
Accordingly, Claims 10 and 11 are subject to dismissal on this
additional basis.  Hence, the motion to dismiss is granted with
leave to amend as to Claims 5, 10, and 11 against Garcia in her
individual capacity.

The Judge granted without leave to amend the motion to dismiss as
to Dr. Oscar F. Loya Elementary School.  The Plaintiffs concede
that the school itself is not a proper Defendant.

Finally, based solely on the Plaintiffs' failure to allege
compliance with the CTA or excuse for noncompliance, Armenta's
motion to dismiss is granted with leave to amend as to Claims 5, 7,
8, 9, 10, and 11.  The Judge is not persuaded, however, by
Armenta's alternative arguments that Plaintiffs have failed to
allege a statutory basis for their claims or that Plaintiffs have
failed to plead concealment with the particularity required by Rule
9(b).  The statutory basis for Plaintiffs' claims is alleged in
paragraph 72 of the complaint.  Moreover, while the Judge has
determined that the Plaintiffs' allegations regarding Garcia's
knowledge of Armenta's conduct are insufficient to satisfy Rule
9(b), Armenta himself is alleged to have conducted the blood sugar
testing and therefore is specifically alleged to have had the
requisite knowledge of wrongdoing.

Any amended complaint will be filed by Oct. 1, 2018.  Leave to
amend is limited to the defects addressed in the Order.  The
Plaintiffs may not add parties or claims without prior leave of the
Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/UqGqpv from Leagle.com.

Mario V., Geraldine Julie B., I.G.V., A Minor by and through their
Guardian Ad Litem, Y.G., A Minor by and through their Guardian Ad
Litem, O.D.G., A Minor by and through their Guardian Ad Litem,
Christina G., Oscar G., Alicia P., Hugo P. & A.P.H., A Minor by and
through their Guardian Ad Litem, Plaintiffs, represented by Charles
A. Bonner -- cbonner799@aol.com -- Law Offices of Bonner & Bonner &
Adam Cabral Bonner -- cabral@bonnerlaw.com -- Law Offices of Bonner
& Bonner.

Alisal Union School District & Diana Garcia, Defendants,
represented by Eric James Bengtson -- ebengtson@davisyounglaw.com
-- Davis and Young, APLC.

Henry Amenta, Defendant, represented by Christopher Edward Panetta
-- CPanetta@FentonKeller.com -- Fenton & Keller A Professional
Corporation.


AMAZON.COM: Removes Noflin Suit to C.D. California
--------------------------------------------------
The Defendants in the case of ANDREA NOFLIN, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
AMAZON.COM.NVDC LLC; PRIME NOW LLC; GOLDEN STATE FC LLC; Does 1
through 50, Defendants, filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from
the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Orange
(Case No. 30-02018-01002700-CU-OE-CXC) to the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California on August 9, 2018, and
assigned Case No. 8:18-cv-01400-JVS-SHK (C.D. Cal., Aug. 9, 2018).
The case is assigned to Judge James V. Selna and referred to
Magistrate Judge Shashi H. Kewalramani.

Amazon.com LLC was founded in 1994 and is based in Hebron,
Kentucky. Amazon.com LLC operates as a subsidiary of Amazon.com
Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Omid Nosrati, Esq.
          Tatiana Gassia Avakian, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF OMID NOSRATI
          1875 Century Park East 6th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 553-5630
          Facsimile: (310) 553-5691
          E-mail: omid@nosratilaw.com
                  tatiana@nosratilaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Barbara J Miller, Esq.
          Joel M Purles, Esq.
          Paul Bartholomew Quintans, Esq.
          MORGAN LEWIS AND BOCKIUS LLP
          600 Anton Bouleard Suite 1800
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: (714) 830-0600
          Facsimile: (714) 830-0700
          E-mail: barbara.miller@morganlewis.com
                  joel.purles@morganlewis.com
                  bart.quintans@morganlewis.com


BATH & BODY: Brawley Sues over Sale of Defective 3-Wick Candles
---------------------------------------------------------------
ASHLEY BRAWLEY, individually and on behalf of SAVANNAH BRAWLEY, a
minor; and LEVI CODY BRAWLEY, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. BATH & BODY WORKS, LLC; L
BRANDS, INC.; and DOES 1 through 10, Defendants, Case No.
3:18-cv-02098-S (N.D. Tex., Aug. 10, 2018) is an action against the
Defendants in developing and selling a defective 14.5-ounce,
Vanilla Bean Noel, three-wick candles.

The design and manufacture of the subject candles result in
improper fragrance loads and wick placement which causes high
flames. The unexpected flare and flashover of the candle creates an
unreasonable risk of personal injury and property damage and yet
the Defendants refuse to engage in actions that would prevent the
distribution of such dangerous products or warn consumers of the
risk.

Bath & Body Works, LLC operates retail stores for personal care
products. The company was founded in 1990 and is based in
Reynoldsburg, Ohio.  Bath & Body Works operates as a subsidiary of
Limited Retail Store Operations, Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          N. Scott Carpenter, Esq.
          Rebecca E. Bell-Stanton, Esq.
          CARPENTER & SCHUMACHER, P.C.
          2701 North  Dallas, Parkway, Suite 570
          Plano, TX 75093
          Telephone: (972) 403-1133
          Facsimile: (972) 403-0311
          E-mail: scarpenter@cstriallaw.com
                  rstanton@cstriallaw.com


BLEECKER LLC: Fails to Pay Wages to Cooks, Rios Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
FELIPE MARTINEZ RIOS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. 151 BLEECKER LLC d/b/a THE RED
LION; MOHAMMED ALAM; and ANDREW BRESLIN, Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-07287-PAE (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 13, 2018) seeks to recover from
the Defendants unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation,
liquidated damages, interests, attorneys' fees and costs under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Rios was employed by the Defendants as cook from
November 2013 to July 24, 2018.

151 Bleecker LLC d/b/a The Red Lion is a limited liability company
organized under the laws of the State of New York, engaged in the
restaurant business. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Giustino Cilenti, Esq.
          CILENTI & COOPER, PLLC
          708 Third Avenue, 6th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 209-3933
          Facsimile: (212) 209-7102


BOWIN ASSOCIATES: Underpays Hostess & Servers, Estudianti Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CICILIA ESTUDIANTI, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BOWIN ASSOCIATES, LLC; DOES I
through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X, Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-01494 (D. Nev., Aug. 10, 2018) seeks to recover from the
Defendants unpaid wages, unpaid overtime, and damages under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Estudianti was employed by the Defendants as a
hostess and as a server.

The Defendant is a Nevada Limited-Liability company engaged in the
restaurant business in the State of Nevada. The Company specializes
in Asian food. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Trevor J. Hatfield, Esq.
          HATFIELD & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
          703 South Eighth Street
          Las Vegas, NV 89101
          Telephone: (702) 388-4469


BT GROUP: New Jersey Court Dismisses Securities Fraud Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Kevin McNulty of the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the case,
JAMES CHRISTIAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BT GROUP PLC, GAVIN PATTERSON, IAN
LIVINGSTON, and TONY CHANMUGAM, Defendants, Case No.
2:17-cv-497-KM-JBC (D. N.J.).

The Plaintiffs bring a putative securities class action against BT
Group and three high-ranking individuals associated with that
company.  The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants were
knowledgeable -- or reckless in their ignorance of -- fraudulent
practices in one of its many subsidiaries, BT Italy.  According to
them, the Defendants made materially false or misleading
statements; the Plaintiffs relied on those statements when
investing in BT Group securities; and they allegedly were damaged
as a result.  

Now before the Court is the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim.  They argue that the
Plaintiffs have failed to plead scienter.

Judge McNulty finds that the allegations in the complaint do not
raise a plausible inference that the individual Defendants turned a
"blind eye" to "red flags" or had "no reasonable basis" for
certifying the Sarbanes-Oxley reports.  The more reasonable
inference is that these individual Defendants were unaware of the
fraud or other problems at BT Italy that later emerged.  The
Plaintiffs therefore do not sufficiently plead scienter regarding
the individual Defendants.

Addressing whether the Plaintiffs can pursue their Section 10(a)
and Rule 10b-5 claims by pleading corporate scienter, the Judge
finds that the facts and allegations presented by the Plaintiffs
are not so fundamental and pervasive as to support an inference of
corporate scienter.  The control issues at BT Italy did not
implicate such fundamental corporate matters.  Based on the
allegations, it is at least as likely that key individuals at BT
Group were unaware of the fraud, were not reckless in ignoring it,
and reacted appropriately when the relevant facts came out.  Even
if the corporate-scienter doctrine was permitted in the Circuit,
these facts would not satisfy that doctrine.  Therefore, the
Plaintiffs' Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims are thus dismissed
for failure to adequately plead corporate scienter.

Finally, since the Plaintiffs fail to adequately state Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims, the Section 20(a) claims against the
individual Defendants fail as well.  Liability under Section 20(a)
is predicated upon an independent violation of the chapter or the
rules or regulations thereunder.  Claims under Section 20(a)
therefore, are derivative -- requiring proof of a separate
underlying violation of the Exchange Act.  Because the Plaintiffs
have not pled a predicate violation of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5,
the Section 20(a) claim is dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge McNulty granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss is granted, without prejudice, to the filing of
an amended complaint within 30 days.  An appropriate order
accompanies the Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 1, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://bit.ly/2MmMwuq from Leagle.com.

Gary Claassen, Alice Korenblat, Robert Korenblat & Pierre-S.
Lefebvre, Movants, represented by BRUCE DANIEL GREENBERG --
bgreenberg@litedepalma.com -- LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC.

PAMCAH-UA Local 675 Pension Fund, Lead Plaintiff, represented by
DONALD A. ECKLUND -- DEcklund@carellabyrne.com -- CARELLA, BYRNE,
CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C. & JAMES E. CECCHI --
JCecchi@carellabyrne.com -- CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY &
AGNELLO, P.C.

JAMES CHRISTIAN, Plaintiff, represented by LAURENCE M. ROSEN --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, PA.

Clayton Hollister, Plaintiff, represented by DONALD A. ECKLUND,
CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C. & JAMES E.
CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.

BT GROUP PLC, GAVIN PATTERSON, IAN LIVINGSTON & TONY CHANMUGAM,
Defendants, represented by KEVIN HARRY MARINO --
kmarino@khmarino.com -- MARINO TORTORELLA & BOYLE, PC & JOHN D.
TORTORELLA -- jtortorella@khmarino.com -- MARINO, TORTORELLA &
BOYLE, P.C..


CENTURY TECHNICAL: Fails to Pay Wages to Inspectors, Johnson Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KENNEDY JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CENTURY TECHNICAL SERVICES, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 3:18-cv-00230 (S.D. Tex., Aug. 13, 2018) is an action
against the Defendants for failure to compensate the Plaintiff for
all hours in excess of forty in a workweek at one and one-half time
the regular rate.

Mr. Johnson was employed by the Defendant as inspector from May
2006 to July 2017.

Century Technical Services, LLC is a company organized under the
laws of the State of Louisiana. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Beatriz Sosa-Morris, Esq.
          John Neuman, Esq.
          SOSA-MORRIS NEUMAN
          ATTORNEYS AT LAW
          5612 Chaucer Drive
          Houston, TX 77005
          Telephone: (281) 885-8844
          Facsimile: (281) 885-8813
          E-mail: BSosaMorris@smnlawfirm.com
                  JNeuman@smnlawfirm.com


CHIPOTLE MEXICAN: Partial Dismissal of Data Breach Suit Endorsed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TODD GORDON, et al., individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL,
INC., Defendant, Civil Action No. 17-cv-1415-CMA-MLC (D. Colo.),
Magistrate Judge Mark L. Carman of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Colorado recommended that the Defendant's motion to
dismiss be granted in part and denied in part.

The purported class action regards a data breach that the Defendant
experienced in early 2017.  The Plaintiffs Gordon, Marc Mercer,
Kristen Mercer, Kristin Baker, Michelle Fowler, Greg Lawson and
Judy Conrad allege they used credit or debit cards to make
purchases at Chipotle restaurants during the data breach.  They
allege their personally identifiable information ("PII") was
thereby compromised, and consequently they had to take steps to
redress fraud and protect themselves from further fraud, including
identity theft.

On their own behalf and that of others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs bring several tort, contract, statutory and equitable
claims, apparently under the laws of the states in which they made
the purchases.

The Defendant moves to dismiss the claims of Plaintiffs Baker and
Lawson for lack of standing.  It further moves to dismiss all
claims for failure to state a claim.

Magistrate Judge Carman recommends granting in part the Rule
12(b)(1) motion to the extent Plaintiffs Lawson and Baker allege
overpayment for two reasons.  First, the Plaintiffs argue they did
not bring such a claim.  This constitutes either an admission or
withdrawal of the allegations that assert overpayment.  Second,
even if they did not intend to admit or withdraw their overpayment
allegations for certain claims, they allege overpayment in
conclusory fashion.  The overpayment theory also fails.  The
Plaintiffs do not allege facts to plausibly support that part of
the purchase price was dedicated to data security.

Turning to the Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Magistrate Judge concludes that for
the Plaintiffs in Arizona and California, Colorado law governs
their negligence claims.  He therefore recommends dismissing the
negligence claim in Count 1 as to all the Plaintiffs.

Given that the cases on which the Plaintiffs rely for negligence
per se claim (Count 2) do not apply Arizona, Colorado or Missouri
law, the generality of Section 5 does not define a standard of
conduct sufficiently specific to satisfy the elements of the claim
in those states, and the Plaintiffs' lack of citation to any FTC
regulation or other official pronouncements in which the FTC
prohibits specific conduct as a violation of Section 5, the court
concludes the negligence per se claim fails.  The Magistrate Judge
recommends dismissing Count 2.

As to the Plaintiffs' Colorado Consumer Protection Act ("CCPA")
claim (Count 3), based on the fact allegations, the Magistrate
finds that none of the named Plaintiffs allege any facts suggesting
Chipotle's alleged misconduct has affected them as actual or
potential consumers in Colorado.  None of the named Plaintiffs made
purchases from Chipotle in Colorado or allege they have suffered
any harm in Colorado.  He recommends dismissing Count 3.

He also finds that facts plausibly suggest the Mercers could have
begun to address the potential for their payment card to be used
fraudulently, and perhaps could have avoided the fraudulent
charges.  Giving reasonable inferences, the Mercers could have
stopped or changed automatic orders to prevent them from being
cancelled or delayed.  Therefore, the Magistrate recommends
granting the motion in part as to Count 7, to dismiss only the part
of the claim alleging a violation of Section 1798.82 brought by Ms.
Baker and Ms. Conard.

Finally, Ms. Fowler argues she is at risk of future harm because
the Defendant continues to utilize payment systems in the operation
of its business, and given that its 2004 data breach experience did
not lead Chipotle to maintain reasonable measures she cannot rely
on its representations in the future, citing Davidson v.
Kimberly-Clark.  However, Davidson regards California statutory
claims.  Its reasoning is opposite to the Illinois courts'
construction of the Illinois DTPA.  Count 11 also does not allege
Ms. Fowler is at risk of the same harm in the future.  The
Magistrate recommends dismissing Count 11, the Illinois Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim.

For each of the reasons stated, Magistrate Judge Carman granted in
part and denied in part the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Baker and
Lawson for lack of standing, to dismiss only the allegations of
independent value in the Plaintiffs' stolen PII and overpayment.
He (i) granted the motion to dismiss Counts 1, 2, 3, and 11; (ii)
denied it as to Counts 4, 6, 9, 10 and 12; and (iii) granted in
part and denied in part the motion to dismiss Counts 5, 7 and 8.
It does not appear that the Plaintiffs sought leave to amend the
Amended Complaint.  He nonetheless recommended allowing the
Plaintiffs to file a motion to amend to the extent they can allege
facts to cure the flaws noted.

Within 14 days after entry of the Recommendation, any party may
file objections to the Magistrate Judge's proposed findings and
recommendations.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 1, 2018 Recommendation is
available at https://goo.gl/jq7vPF from Leagle.com.

Todd Gordon, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin F. Johns --
bfj@chimicles.com -- Chimicles & Tikellis, LLP, Jessica L.
Titler-Lingle --  jlt@chimicles.com -- Chimicles & Tikellis, LLP,
Andrew William Ferich -- awf@chimicles.com -- Chimicles & Tikellis,
LLP, Jean Sutton Martin, Jean Sutton Martin, PLLC, Justin Daniel
Blum, Hannon Law Firm, LLC, Tina Wolfson --
twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com -- Ahdoot & Wolfson, PC & Kevin Scott
Hannon, Hannon Law Firm, LLC.

Marc Mercer, Kristen Mercer, Kristin Baker & Michelle Fowler,
Plaintiffs, represented by Jean Sutton Martin, Jean Sutton Martin,
PLLC, Justin Daniel Blum, Hannon Law Firm, LLC, Benjamin F. Johns,
Chimicles & Tikellis, LLP & Kevin Scott Hannon, Hannon Law Firm,
LLC.

Greg Lawson & Judy Conard, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Jean Sutton Martin,
Jean Sutton Martin, PLLC, Justin Daniel Blum, Hannon Law Firm, LLC
& Kevin Scott Hannon, Hannon Law Firm, LLC.

Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., Defendant, represented by Ann
Yackshaw, Baker & Hostetler, LLP, Paul Gregory Karlsgodt --
pkarlsgodt@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler, LLP, Sam Anthony
Camardo -- scamardo@bakerlaw.com -- Baker & Hostetler, LLP & Xakema
Henderson, Baker & Hostetler, LLP.


CINTAS SERVICES: Ordered to Meet/Confer on Positions in Williams
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ATO WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. CINTAS SERVICES CORPORATE
SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 4:17-cv-01623-JSW
(KAW) (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California ordered the
Defendant to further meet and confer, within seven days of the
Order, regarding the positions to be included in the putative
class.

Williams worked for Defendant Cintas Corporation No. 3 from
approximately October 2011 to September 2016.  He worked as both a
"Loader," a position in which he would be responsible for loading
and unloading vehicles and trucks, and as a "SANIS SSR," an
abbreviated method of referring to a service sales representative
whose main focus was providing sanitation services.

When Plaintiff was hired, the Defendant provided him with an
employee handbook containing a great deal of Cintas's policies and
procedures.  The Defendant produced documents detailing the pay
plan for rental SSRs in California, which includes Industrial,
Facility Services, Tile and Capret, Sanis, and Wholesale.  The
policy also includes the compensation process of Route Skippers,
Route Helpers, and SSRs in training.

On April 20, 2018, the parties filed a joint letter concerning the
Plaintiff's request for contact information for all putative class
members.  The Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 1, which seeks contact
information for all persons who are employed or have been employed
by the Defendant in the State of California as hourly, non-exempt
truck workers, industrial truck workers, industrial truck drivers,
industrial vehicle drivers, industrial workers, and/or other
similar job designations and titles during the class period.

On May 11, 2018, the Judge terminated that letter, because the
parties did not address the proportionality requirement in Rule 26
and did not indicate how many putative class members were located
in the 90 California locations.  As a result, the Court was unable
to determine whether the production of the information sought is
proportional to the needs of the case or if another method, such as
sampling, would be more appropriate than producing the contact
information for all putative class members.

Thereafter, the parties met and conferred regarding
proportionality, but they continue to disagree on the class
definition with Defendant arguing that it is too broad.  On July
13, 2018, the parties filed a second joint letter on the same
issue.  Therein, the Defendant provides that the putative class is
more than 2,000 employees.  Moreover, even if the Court were to
conclude that the class definition included all non-exempt
employees in California that would be approximately 5,000
employees.  The Plaintiff is amenable to the possibility of a
sampling, but is unable to evaluate whether sampling is
appropriate, because he believes that the Defendant is still
attempting to limit the scope of the Plaintiff's class.

The class has not been certified, and the parties are engaged in
pre-certification discovery.  The hearing on the Plaintiff's motion
for the class certification is currently scheduled for Oct. 12,
2018.

Judge Westmore finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to contact
information insofar as it is proportional to the needs of the case.
Given the relatively small number of employees for the sake of
proportionality, she finds that the a 25% sample is fair and
proportional to the needs of the case if, the parties' further meet
and confer efforts result in a putative class between 3,000 and
6,000 employees.  If the size of the putative class is agreed to be
less than 3,000 employees, a 50% percent sample is appropriate.  In
determining class size, the Defendant should produce the number of
employees in each position.  If the parties cannot narrow the
number of employees through their meet and confer efforts, contact
information for 25% of the non-exempt employees in California will
be provided.  The sample will be random, and without regard for
position or geographical location.  The parties are ordered to meet
and confer regarding how the random sample should be selected.

In light of the foregoing, the Defendant is ordered to further meet
and confer, within seven days of the Order, regarding the positions
to be included in the putative class.  If the parties cannot reach
an agreement, contact information will be produced for 25% of the
non-exempt employees in California.  If the parties do reach an
agreement and successfully narrow the number of putative class
members, the sample will be as provided.  The contact information
for the random sample will be without regard to position or
geographic area, and will be produced within 21 days of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/400zWe from Leagle.com.

Ato Williams, Plaintiff, represented by Jill Marie Vecchi --
jvecchi@turleylawfirm.com -- The Turley & Mara Law Firm, APLC,
William David Turley -- bturley@turleylawfirm.com -- The Turley Law
Firm, APLC, Gwendolyne Nicole Ousdahl -- nousdahl@turleylawfirm.com
-- The Turley & Mara Law Firm & Matthew Evan Crawford, The Turley
and Mara Law Firm.

Cintas Services Corporate Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Michelle Mei-Lin Full -- michelle.full@squirepb.com -- Squire
Patton Boggs (US) LLP.

Cintas Corporation No.3, Defendant, represented by Michael W. Kelly
-- michael.kelly@squirepb.com -- Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP,
Michelle Mei-Lin Full, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP & Suzanne
Spaulding Orza -- suzy.orza@squirepb.com -- Squire Patton Boggs
(US) LLP.


CORECIVIC OF TENNESSEE: Bid to Intervene in Gonzalez Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSE GONZALEZ, Plaintiff, v. CORECIVIC OF TENNESSEE,
LLC and CORECIVIC, INC., Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-01891-DAD-JLT
(E.D. Cal.), Judge Dale A. Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California denied non-party Jose Gonzales'
motion to intervene filed on June 12, 2018.

The case is a wage-and-hour class action filed on behalf of various
prisons guards and correctional staff at several private
correctional facilities owned by the Defendants.  The Plaintiff
claims class members were not permitted to clock in until after
they had undergone security screening and were therefore not
compensated for all of their hours worked.  The Plaintiff also
claims class members were regularly denied meal and rest breaks.

On April 13, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary
approval of a class action settlement.  The Court requested
additional briefing on the matter by minute order issued on May 16,
2018. The supplemental briefing was timely submitted on June 15,
2018, at which point the motion for preliminary approval of the
settlement was taken under submission.  The motion for preliminary
approval remains pending decision.

In his motion, the proposed intervenor asserts that he may
intervene in the matter as of right, because he -- and only he --
may pursue claims against the Defendants for violation of
California's Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") relating to the
alleged labor law violations.  The proposed intervenor filed a suit
alleging PAGA claims against the Defendants, on the same basis
alleged by the Plaintiff in the action, on July 25, 2016 in San
Diego County Superior Court.  The proposed intervenor claims that
the plaintiff in the suit lacks standing to bring or settle PAGA
claims, because the operative complaint before this court did not
allege such claims.

Additionally, the proposed intervenor asserts that Thomas Richards,
a plaintiff in a parallel suit that the Plaintiff has proposed be
jointly settled and which does allege PAGA claims, also lacks
standing to settle those PAGA claims, because the proposed
intervenor's suit was filed first.  The proposed intervenor also
objects to the inclusion of any PAGA claims in the settlement of
the action.

The parties in the action argue that the proposed intervenor has no
right to intervene, both because he has no protectable interests
and because any interests he may have are adequately represented.

Judge Drozd explains that the California Supreme Court has noted
that a PAGA suit is a type of qui tam action.  Other types of qui
tam actions, such as the federal False Claims Act, are subject to a
first-to-file limitation.  However, the limitation in those
contexts is imposed by statute.  He finds that the proposed
intervenor has not pointed to any provision of California's PAGA
statute that confers a similar right, nor has the Court located
any.  Indeed, at least one other court has explicitly rejected the
argument that there is a first-to-file rule under PAGA.  In short,
he is unpersuaded that California's PAGA statute contains a
first-to-file rule.

The Judge concludes that the proposed intervenor has no right to
intervene in the lawsuit.  To the extent the motion to intervene
registers objections to the proposed settlement of the action, the
objections are premature as no settlement has yet been
preliminarily approved.  If the Court preliminarily approves the
parties' settlement, notice will be sent to all class members, who
will have an opportunity to both object to and opt-out of the
settlement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 1, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2x0Pj7U from Leagle.com.

Jose Gonzalez, Plaintiff, represented by Peter R. Dion-Kindem ,
Peter R. Dion-Kindem, P.C., Adrian R. Bacon, Law Offices of Todd M.
Friedman, P.C., Jeff Holmes, Jeff Holmes, Esq., Lonnie C.
Blanchard, III -- lonnieblanchard@gmail.com -- The Blanchard Law
Group, APC & Todd M. Friedman, Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman,
P.C.

CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC & CoreCivic, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Paul M. Gleason -- pgleason@gleasonfavarote.com --
Gleason and Favarote LLP.


DBI SERVICES: Underpays On Call Technicians, Dozier Suit Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
OSCAR DOZIER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. DBI SERVICES, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
3:18-cv-00972-BJD-MCR (M.D. Fla., Aug. 10, 2018) seeks to recover
unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees
and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Mr. Dozier was employed by the Defendant as on call technician from
June 2014 to January 2018.

DBi Services, LLC provides infrastructure maintenance, operations,
and management solutions for government agencies, utilities,
private industries, railways, retailers, and other infrastructure
owners in North America and Europe. The company was founded in 1978
and is based in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, with additional offices
around the world.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael N. Hanna, Esq.
          Chanelle Joy Ventura, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          600 N. Pine Island Road, Suite 400
          Plantation, FL
          Telephone: (954) 318-0268
          Facsimile: (954) 327-3039
          E-mail: MHanna@forthepeople.com
                  CVentura@forthepeople.com


DENTSPLY SIRONA: Golombeck Sues over 33% Drop in Share Price
------------------------------------------------------------
IRVING GOLOMBECK, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated Plaintiff vs. DENTSPLY SIRONA, INC.; JEFFREY T.
SLOVIN; BRET W. WISE; CHRISTOPHER T. CLARK; MICHAEL C. ALFANO; ERIC
K. BRANDT; PAULA H. CHOLMONDELEY; MICHAEL J. COLEMAN; WILLIE A.
DEESE; WILLIAM F. HECHT; FRANCIS J. LUNGER; JOHN L. MICLOT; JOHN C.
MILES II; THOMAS JETTER; DAVID BEECKEN; WILLIAM K. HOOD; ARTHUR D.
KOWALOFF; HARRY M. JANSEN KRAEMER, JR.; TIMOTHY P. SULLIVAN, and
DOES 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 653981/2018 (N.Y. Sup., Aug. 9,
2018) alleges violation of the Securities Act of 1993.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and the class purchased
or acquired shares of Dentsply in exchange for their shares of
Sirona Dental Systems, Inc. in connection with Dentsply's
acquisition of Sirona on or about February 29, 2016.

On January 11, 2016, shareholders of both the former Dentsply and
the former Sirona "overwhelmingly approved" the Acquisition and on
February 29, 2016, the Defendants completed the Acquisition. Shares
of Sirona were halted from trading prior to the open of the NASDAQ
stock market on February 29, 2016 and ceased trading effective at
the close of business that day. Under the terms of the merger
agreement, the former Sirona shareholders received 1.8142 shares of
Dentsply common stock for each Sirona share they held.
Approximately 101.8 million shares of Dentsply common stock were
issued to the former shareholders of Sirona common stock,
representing approximately 42% of the approximately 242.2 million
total shares of Dentsply common stock outstanding on the
Acquisition date. Dentsply common stock closed at $60.96 per share
on February 29, 2016.

Following the Acquisition, after an antitrust action had been filed
against the three large third-party dental supply distributors by
would-be competitors and the Federal Trade Commission filed an
enforcement action against them, Dentsply has been forced to
repeatedly slash its financial guidance and to take more than $2
billion in impairment charges on its goodwill and other intangible
assets, the SEC's Division of Enforcement has asked Dentsply "to
provide documents and information concerning the Company's
accounting and disclosures, including its accounting and
disclosures relating to transactions with a significant distributor
of the Company." And soon thereafter, three of its senior most
executives unexpectedly and without explanation resigned.

Dentsply common stock is trading at approximately $40 per share,
representing a more than 33% decline from the price at which the
Dentsply shares were trading at when exchanged for the Sirona
shares in the Acquisition.

DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc. designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
various dental and oral health products, and other consumable
healthcare products primarily for the professional dental market
worldwide. The company was formerly known as DENTSPLY International
Inc. and changed its name to DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc. in February 2016.
DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc. was founded in 1899 and is headquartered in
York, Pennsylvania. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David A. Rosenfeld, Esq.
          Samuel H. Rudman, Esq.
          Mary K. Blasy, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          58 South Service Road, Suite 200
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: (631) 367-7100
          Facsimile: (631) 367-1173
          E-mail: srudman@rgrdlaw.com
                  drosenfeld@rgrdlaw.com
                  mblasy@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          James I. Jaconnette, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058
          Facsimile: (619) 231-7423


DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Class Action Challenges Institutionalization
------------------------------------------------------------------
Britain Eakin, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
representing minors who have been bounced around psychiatric
hospitals and group homes in Washington, D.C., children and
disability advocates claim in a federal class action that the
district is shirking its duty to provide intensive community-based
services.

Filed on Aug. 14 on behalf of lead plaintiffs M.J. and L.R., the
complaint says that the needless institutionalization of
Medicaid-eligible children creates a dangerous cycle and deprives
the class of proper follow-up care.

M.J. is described in the complaint as a 14-year-old who has been
hospitalized nine times since 2014. In addition to numerous school
changes and suspensions, M.J. was arrested in 2016 for assaulting
her mom. M.J. loves writing, dancing, cooking and animals, and
would like to become a veterinarian. According to the complaint,
the district has ignored requests  by M.J. and her mom for help in
crafting a plan to help the girl avoid further
institutionalization.

At the law firm Schulte Roth & Zabel -- which brought M.J.'s suit
with the Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law,
Disability Rights DC at University Legal Services and the National
Center for Youth Law -- they say children like M.J are being
segregated and discriminated against in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act.

"For many years, the members of the co-counsel group have attempted
to get the district to address these issues and comply with its
legal obligations," Howard Schiffman with Schulte Roth & Zabel said
in a statement.

These advocated were compelled to file suit now, Mr. Schiffman
added, because more than four months of pressure failed to move the
district. "We have been in contact with the district since April,"
Mr. Schiffman said, "urging in letters and an in-person meeting
that it recognize these shortfalls in necessary services and the
harm they are causing, in hopes that the district would promptly
address those problems without the need for litigation.  The
district's unsatisfactory response to those efforts led us to file
this lawsuit."

Under the Medicare Act, the District of Columbia must provide
medically necessary treatment services to children with physical
and mental health conditions and illnesses. That includes intensive
community-based services for Medicaid-eligible children, even if
not included in a state's plan, "to correct or ameliorate the
child's mental health disability."

Intensive community-based services include care coordination among
various providers to coordinate necessary services, along with
frequent and consistent behavior-support services and mobile crisis
services.

But the lawsuit alleges that no service providers in the District
of Columbia offer intensive community-based services, despite
having faced criticism for years that the absence of such services
hurts children.

"Years of reports from researchers, advocates, and the district
itself, as well as testimony before the district council, indicate
that district children do not get the ICBS they need," the
complaint says, abbreviating intensive community-based services.

According to the lawsuit, providing these children with intensive
community-based services would allow them to live at home or with a
foster family, integrate with their nondisabled peers, and succeed
at school and community activities.

The outcomes for children who receive these services are better,
too, the advocates say. They fare better in school, have fewer
contacts with law enforcement and have fewer suicide attempts, as
compared with those segregated in institutional settings.

According to the complaint, it's "impracticable" to count the
number of potential class members the lawsuit could cover.

"There are thousands of Medicaid-eligible children in the district
with a ‘serious emotional disturbance,'" the complaint states.
"In fiscal year 2017, over 300 of these children were admitted to a
psychiatric hospital or placed in a psychiatric residential
treatment facility. Over 100 of them had multiple admissions."

Had the city provided these children with the medically necessary
intensive community-based services they are entitled to under
Medicaid, according to the complaint, most of these
hospitalizations could have been averted.

The lawsuit names as defendants the District of Columbia; D.C.
Mayor Muriel Bowser; Tanya Royster, director of the District of
Columbia Department of Behavioral Health; and Wayne Turnage,
director of the District of Columbia Department of Health Care
Finance.

The District of Columbia Executive Office of the Mayor did not
immediately respond to a request for comment on the lawsuit. [GN]


ELECTRONIC ARTS: Retired NFL Players Can't Sue as Class
-------------------------------------------------------
Bill Donahue, writing for Law360, reports that a California federal
judge has ruled that retired players cannot collectively sue
Electronic Arts Inc. for featuring them in Madden NFL video games
without authorization, a major victory for the game maker after
years of litigation.

More than eight years after Michael Davis and other former players
sued the video game giant for using their likenesses on a "historic
teams" feature in Madden games, a judge ruled on Aug. 17 that the
case could not move forward as a class action.

The case is styled Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc., Case No.
3:10-cv-03328 (N.D. Cal.).  The case is assigned to Judge Richard
Seeborg.  The case was filed July 29, 2010. [GN]




EVEN T SIRLIN: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Bank Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
TODD C. BANK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. EVEN T. SIRLIN, Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-04536 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 10, 2018) seeks to stop the
Defendants' practice of making unsolicited calls.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd C. Bank, Esq.
          TODD C. BANK, ATTORNEY AT LAW, P.C.
          119-40 Union Turnpike, Fourth Floor
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Telephone: (718) 520-7125


FARMER RICE: Faces Ismael Labor Suit in Sacramento
--------------------------------------------------
An employment-related class action lawsuit has been filed against
Farmer Rice Cooperative. The case is captioned as Pita Ismael,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Farmer Rice Cooperative; and Does 1-50, Defendant,
Case No. 34-2018-00238641-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., Sacramento Cyt.,
Aug. 10, 2018).

Farmers' Rice Cooperative of California produces and supplies rice.
The Company serves food manufacturers, brewers, private retailers,
exporters, and distributors. Farmers' Rice Cooperative serves
customers worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Nazo Leon Koulloukian, Esq.
     Koul Law Firm
     Tel: 213-761-5484
     E-mail: nazo@koullaw.com

          - and -

     Sahag Majarian, II, Esq.
     Sahag Majarian II Law Offices
     Tel: 818-609-0807
     E-mail: sahagii@aol.com


FOCUS CONSTRUCTION: Underpays Construction Workers, Rodriguez Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
JAIR RODRIGUEZ; RAMON GONZALEZ; and ALFREDO VELASCO NAVARRO,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. FOCUS CONSTRUCTION & CONTRACTING, LLC; LEONA BROWN;
and MATTHEW BROWN, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-01246-PP (E.D.
Wisc., Aug. 13, 2018) seeks full compensation for all uncompensated
work, overtime, including penalties, liquidated damages, attorneys'
fees and costs.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as construction
workers.

Focus Construction & Contracting, LLC is a Florida-based general
contracting company specializing in the renovation and construction
of hospitality, residential, and mixed-use properties. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nathan D. Eisenberg, Esq.
          Joe Sexauer, Esq.
          THE PREVIANT LAW FIRM S.C.
          310 West Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 100MW
          Milwaukee, WI 53203
          Telephone: (414) 271-4500
          Facsimile: (414) 271-6308
          E-mail: nde@previant.com
                  jms@previant.com


FORD MOTOR: Partial Decertification Bid in MyFord Suit Partly OK'd
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE MYFORD TOUCH CONSUMER LITIGATION, Case No.
13-cv-03072-EMC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California granted in
part and denied in part Ford's motion for partial class
decertification.

Ford moves for partial class decertification on three grounds.
First, it argues that the California and Washington express
warranty claims should be decertified because common issues no
longer predominate due to the lack of records substantiating that
each class member presented their vehicle to Ford for repair on at
least two occasions.  Second, it argues that the Massachusetts
Consumer Protection Act ("MCPA") claim should be decertified
because Ford's knowledge about the MyFord Touch ("MFT") defect
varied over time with each software update, and thus there is no
common answer to whether Ford knew about the defect before sales
for all class members.  Third, Ford seeks decertification of all
classes to the extent they include persons who purchased used cars
from Ford dealerships, as the Plaintiffs have conceded that the
dealerships were not Ford's agent with respect to used vehicle
sales.

In light of the net benefits that resolution of common issues will
have over the potential individualized issues and the various tools
at the Court's disposal to address the individual questions, Judge
Chen denied Ford's motion to decertify the express warranty
classes, and concludes that Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance
requirement is still satisfied.

Although the MCPA claims have been reserved for Phase 2 of trial
and therefore will not be tried alongside the other class claims,
the question of knowledge is sufficiently complex such that
predominance and manageability as a class even in Phase 2 are no
longer satisfied.  And because both Ford's knowledge and the
knowledge of a reasonable consumer may have fluctuated over time,
predominance and manageability of Rule 23 are not satisfied.
Therefore, the Judge granted Ford's motion to decertify the MCPA
claim.

Finally, the Plaintiffs' concession that they lack any evidence of
an agency relationship between Ford dealerships and Ford with
respect to used vehicle sales raises a question as to whether Ford
can be held liable under the various legal theories asserted in
accordance with the laws of each jurisdiction.  Again, that is a
merits issue which does not materially alter class certification.
Therefore, the Judge denied Ford's motion to decertify the classes
to exclude used car purchasers.

For these reasons, Judge Chen granted Ford's motion to decertify
the classes with respect to the MCPA claim, but denied with respect
to the express warranty claim and used car purchasers.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 1, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2O6r5PS from Leagle.com.

Jennifer Whalen, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adam J. Levitt --
alevitt@dlcfirm.com -- DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC, Cory Steven
Fein, Attorney at Law, Craig Ripley Spiegel, Esq. --
craigs@hbsslaw.com -- Jason Allen Zweig, Esq. -- jasonz@hbsslaw.com
-- Catherine Gannon, Esq. -- catherineg@hbsslaw.com -- Jeff D.
Friedman, Esq. --
jefff@hbsslaw.com -- Jeniphr A.E. Breckenridge, Esq. --
jeniphr@hbsslaw.com -- Shelby Smith, Esq. -- shelby@hbsslaw.com --
Steve W. Berman, Esq. -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- and -- Tyler S.
Weaver, Esq. -- tyler@hbsslaw.com -- HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO
LLP -- Cynthia B. Chapman, Esq. -- cbc@caddellchapman.com -- and --
Michael A. Caddell, Esq. -- mac@cadellchapman.com -- CADDELL &
CHAPMAN -- Benjamin F. Johns, Esq. -- BenJohns@chimicles.com --
CHIMICLES & TIKELLIS LLP -- Jeffrey Scott Goldenberg, Esq. --
jgoldenberg@gs-legal.com -- GOLDENBERG SCHNEIDER, LPA -- Joseph
Bryce Kenney, Esq. -- jbk@mccunewright.com -- and -- Joseph G.
Sauder, Esq. -- jgs@mccunewright.com -- MCCUNEWRIGHT, LLP --
Vincent Louis DiTommaso, Esq. -- vdt@ditommasolaw.com -- DITOMMASO
LUBIN, P.C.

Thomas Mitchell, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Craig Ripley Spiegel, Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Benjamin F. Johns, Chimicles & Tikellis
LLP, pro hac vice, Jeff D. Friedman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
LLP, Joseph B. Kennedy, One Harverford Centre, pro hac vice, Mark
Philip Pifko, Baron & Budd, P.C., Nicholas E. Chimicles, Chimicles
and Tikellis LLP, pro hac vice, Roland K. Tellis, Baron Budd, P.C.,
Stephanie Elena Saunders, Chimicles and Tikellis LLP, pro hac vice,
Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice &
Vincent Louis DiTommaso, DiTommaso Lubin, P.C..

Joe D'Aguanno, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Deb Makowski, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Jose Randy Rodriguez, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated & Michael Ervin,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Adam J. Levitt, DiCello Levitt & Casey
LLC, Craig Ripley Spiegel, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Shana
E. Scarlett, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Benjamin F. Johns,
Chimicles & Tikellis LLP, pro hac vice, Gregory Michael Travalio,
Isaac, Wiles, Burkholder Teetor, LLC, pro hac vice, Jason Allen
Zweig, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Jeff D. Friedman, Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Joseph B. Kennedy, One Harverford Centre,
pro hac vice, Mark Philip Pifko, Baron & Budd, P.C., Nicholas E.
Chimicles, Chimicles and Tikellis LLP, pro hac vice, Roland K.
Tellis, Baron Budd, P.C., Shelby Smith, Hagens Berman, pro hac
vice, Stephanie Elena Saunders, Chimicles and Tikellis LLP, pro hac
vice, Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice & Vincent Louis DiTommaso, DiTommaso Lubin, P.C.

Ford Motor Company is represented by Randall W. Edwards, Esq. --
redwards@omm.com -- Brian Christopher Anderson, Esq. --
banderson@omm.com -- David Richard Dorey, Esq. -- ddorey@omm.com --
Edmundo Clay Marquez, Esq. -- emarquez@omm.com -- and -- Scott M.
Hammack, Esq. -- shammack@omm.com -- O'MELVENY AND MYERS -- Janet
L. Conigliaro, Esq. -- jconigliaro@dykema.com -- DYKEMA -- Warren
Earl Platt, Esq. -- wplatt@swlaw.com -- SNELL AND WILMER LLP.


FUYAO: Hundreds of Workers Join Wage Class Action
-------------------------------------------------
WDTN reports that auto glass manufacturer Fuyao is being sued over
pay.

A total of 636 current and former workers are joining a class
action lawsuit to change the way the company schedules and pays
their employees.

One of the attorneys representing the workers say there is no talk
of a settlement.

The workers want back pay for unpaid wages and overtime.

2 NEWS reached out to Fuyao, who say that they will not comment
about the ongoing investigation.[GN]


GENERAC POWER: Conditional Certification of Tom Class Denied
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TIMOTHY TOM, JR., Plaintiff, v. GENERAC POWER SYSTEMS,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 17-C-1413 (E.D. Wis.), Judge William C.
Griesbach of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin denied Tom's motion for conditional class certification.

Tom filed the action on behalf of himself and other similarly
situated manufacturing employees throughout Wisconsin employed by
the Defendant.  He alleges that Generac maintains a pay policy that
violates the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA") by rounding
manufacturing employees' start and end time to their scheduled
times rather than the times that they actually clocked in or out,
resulting in the alleged failure to compensate the employees for
hours worked in excess of 40 during the week.  

During the three years preceding the filing of the complaint, Tom
worked as a Material Handler and a Team Lead at Generac's Oshkosh
facility.  In this capacity, he worked with other manufacturing
employees to manually produce power products.

The matter comes before the Court on Tom's motion for conditional
certification of a collective action under the FLSA and for the
Court facilitated notice to the proposed class.  Tom seeks to
certify a conditional class consisting of all manufacturing
employees who worked at Generac's Wisconsin facilities in Eagle,
Jefferson, Oshkosh, Waukesha, and Whitewater between Oct. 16, 2014,
and Oct. 16, 2017.  In addition to Tom, 10 individuals have already
filed forms giving notice of their consent to join the lawsuit as
the Plaintiffs.

Judge Griesbach finds that focusing on the common electronic
timekeeping system and adjustment practices fails to adequately
describe Generac's policies, which also prohibit all employees from
working without authorization and from failing to report any time
that they work.  An employee in Tom's position who properly
followed Generac's policies would report any pre- or post-shift
work to the employee's supervisor -- although that employee might
risk disciplinary consequences for working without permission.

Moreover, considering the record as a whole, the Judge finds that
Tom has not made a modest factual showing to suggest that Generac
engages in an unofficial practice of requiring employees to work
before and after their scheduled shifts.  To the contrary, the
record indicates that Generac employs a number of measures -- time
clock reminders, bells, and supervisor reminders -- to ensure that
hourly manufacturing employees do not work before their scheduled
shift start times and after their scheduled shift end times.

Because he therefore concludes that Tom's claims arise out of his
individual actions and do not demonstrate a nexus between his
experience and the experience of members of the proposed class, the
Judge finds that conditional certification is not appropriate in
the case.  Accordingly, he denied Tom's motion for conditional
certification and Court-facilitated notice.  Because he denied the
motion for conditional certification, the Judge holds it is not
necessary to address the parties' arguments regarding Tom's
proposed notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2018 Decision and Order is
available at https://is.gd/ACEFKH from Leagle.com.

Timothy Tom, Jr, Plaintiff, represented by James A. Walcheske --
jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com -- Walcheske & Luzi LLC, David M.
Potteiger -- dpotteiger@walcheskeluzi.com -- Walcheske & Luzi LLC &
Matthew J. Tobin -- mtobin@walcheskeluzi.com -- Walcheske & Luzi
LLC.

Generac Power Systems Inc, Defendant, represented by Keith E.
Kopplin -- keith.kopplin@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash
Smoak & Stewart PC & Sarah J. Platt -- sarah.platt@ogletree.com --
Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart PC.


GEO GROUP: Underpays Security Officers, Ramirez Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
RAYMOND RAMIREZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. THE GEO GROUP, INC.; and DOES 1-100,
Defendants, Case No. 37-2018-00039882-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super., San
Diego Cty., Aug. 9, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for
failure to pay minimum wages, overtime compensation, authorize and
permit meal and rest periods, provide accurate wage statements, and
reimburse necessary business expenses.

Mr. Ramirez was employed by the Defendants as security officer from
March 2000 to December 2017.

The GEO Group, Inc. is the first fully integrated equity real
estate investment trust ("REIT") specializing in the design,
financing, development, and operation of correctional, detention,
and community reentry facilities around the globe. GEO is the
world's leading provider of diversified correctional, detention,
community reentry, and electronic monitoring services to government
agencies worldwide with operations in the United States, Australia,
South Africa, and the United Kingdom. GEO's worldwide operations
include the ownership and/or management of 139 facilities totaling
approximately 96,000 beds, including projects under development,
with a growing workforce of approximately 23,000 professionals.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James R. Patterson, Esq.
          Allison H. Goddard, Esq.
          Jacquelyn E. Quinn, Esq.
          PATTERSON LAW GROUP APC
          1350 Columbia St., Suite 603
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 756-6990
          Facsimile: (619)756-6991
          E-mail: jim@pattersonlawgroup.com
                  ali@pattersonlawgroup.com
                  jackie@pattersonlawgroup.com


HELIOS AND MATHESON: Braxton Sues over 96% Drop in Share Price
--------------------------------------------------------------
JEFFREY BRAXTON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HELIOS AND MATHESON ANALYTICS INC.; THEODORE
FARNSWORTH; and STUART BENSON, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-07242
(S.D.N.Y., Aug. 10, 2018) alleges violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the statements and
information filed by the Defendants with the SEC are materially
false and misleading because they misrepresented and failed to
disclose the following material adverse facts pertaining to the
Company's business, operations, and prospects, which were known to
the Defendants or recklessly disregarded by them. Specifically, the
Defendants failed to disclose that:

     i. Helios was touting MoviePass' valuation and path to
profitability even though there was no reasonable basis to even
imply that the MoviePass business model could lead to profitability
for Helios;

    ii. MoviePass' business model was not sustainable because there
was no reasonable basis to believe that MoviePass could monetize
the model to a degree that could be maintained before being too
buried in debt to survive,

   iii. That because the MoviePass business model was unsustainable
and without a reasonable basis to believe that it could be
profitable, that it was inevitable that Helios would run out of
cash or lose so much cash as to raise doubts as to its ability to
continue as a going concern.

When the truth emerges, in the course of the following trading
days, the price of the Company's common stock declined another
$1.76 to close on August 1, 2018 at $0.228 per share of Helios
common stock, an overall drop from July 26, 2018 of approximately
96.49%.

Helios and Matheson Analytics Inc. provides a range of information
technology (IT) solutions to Fortune 1000 companies and other
organizations in the United States. The company was formerly known
as Helios and Matheson Information Technology Inc. and changed its
name to Helios and Matheson Analytics Inc. in May 2013. Helios and
Matheson Analytics Inc. was founded in 1982 and is headquartered in
New York, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Levine, Esq.
          Melissa Emert, Esq.
          STULL, STULL & BRODY
          6 East 45th Street
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 687-7230
          Facsimile: (212) 490-2022
          E-mail: mlevine@ssbny.com
                  memert@ssbny.com

               - and -

          Joshua H. Eggnatz, Esq.
          Michael J. Pascucci, Esq.
          EGGNATZ PASCUCCI
          5400 S. University Drive, Ste. 417
          Davie, FL 33328
          Telephone: (954) 889-3359
          Facsimile: (954) 889-5913
          E-mail: Mpascucci@JusticeEarned.com
                  JEggnatz@JusticeEarned.com


HOME DEPOT: Fails to Pay OT to Associates, Howard et al. Allege
---------------------------------------------------------------
TIMOTHY HOWARD; BRUNEL JEAN PIERRE; and BRANDEN BROOKS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC. d/b/a HOME DEPOT, Defendant,
Case No. 1:18-cv-04549-ILG-RER (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2018) is an
action against the Defendants for failure to pay overtime pay and
pay for all hours worked under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendant as associates. The
Plaintiff Howard May 2, 2007 to July 26, 2017. The Plaintiff Pierre
was employed from February 22, 2014 to August 15, 2017. The
Plaintiff Brooks from June 12, 2014 to February 17, 2017.

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. d/b/a Home Depot is a corporation organized
pursuant to the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal
place of business located at 2455 Paces Ferry Road, Atlanta, GA and
has various places of business throughout the State of New York.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James Bouklas, Esq.
          BOUKLAS GAYLORD LLP
          400 Jericho Turnpike, Suite 226
          Jericho, NY 11753
          Telephone: (516) 742-4949
          Facsimile: (516) 742-1977


INTELEMEDIA COMMUNICATIONS: Bid to Dismiss Johnson Suit Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TARA JOHNSON and MELVIN BROWN, Plaintiffs, v.
INTELEMEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, INC. and INTELEMEDIA PREMIER LEADS,
LLC, Defendants, Case No. 5:18-cv-361-Oc-40PRL (M.D. Fla.), Judge
Paul G. Byron of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Ocala Division, denied the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

Johnson and Brown, bring the putative class action against the
Defendants, for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA").  The Plaintiffs allege they received prerecorded
telephone calls from the Defendants without their consent in
violation of the TCPA.  The calls were part of a telemarketing
scheme called "Moneycall" or "Dreamsweepstakes."

Intelemedia Premier is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Intelemedia
Communications.  The Plaintiff alleges that the phone number making
the impermissible calls is associated with a website operated by or
on behalf of the Defendants.  Both Intelemedia Premier and
Intelemedia Communications are defined as "Sweepstakes Entities" in
the website's "Official Rules" section.

The Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint for impermissibly
lumping the Defendants together in many of the allegations.
Furthermore, they maintain that the Complaint fails to specifically
connect any of the purportedly unlawful conduct to Intelemedia
Communications.

Judge Byron finds that the Defendants' first argument fails.
Although many of the allegations apply to both the Defendants, it
is because they allegedly both participated in the same unlawful
conduct.  The Complaint contains sufficient allegations to put each
of the Defendant on notice of what the Plaintiff is claiming,
despite the Plaintiffs' pleading style.

The Defendants also move to dismiss the Complaint as against
Defendant Intelemedia Communications for failure to specifically
allege any wrongful conduct by Intelemedia Communications.
However, the Judge finds that the Complaint alleges that
Intelemedia Communications operates the website associated with the
unlawful calls and is defined by the website as a "Sweepstakes
Entite."  

The Judge declines the Defendants' invitation to ignore the
"incorrect" allegation in the Complaint and take judicial notice of
their website, which purportedly establishes the error.  Rather,
accepting as true the well-pled allegations of the Complaint, and
viewing the Complaint in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiffs, the Judge is satisfied that the Complaint contains
sufficient factual allegations to support a plausible claim against
Defendant Intelemedia Communications.

Accordingly, Judge Byron denied the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss .
The Defendants will answer the Complaint by Aug. 15, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 1, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2MiVsAY from Leagle.com.

Ms. Tara Johnson & Melvin Brown, Plaintiffs, represented by Chafica
A. Singha, Singha Law Group, Andrew R. Kaufman -- akaufman@lchb.com
-- Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Benjamin J. Miller --
ben@higginsfirm.com -- THE HIGGINS FIRM, PLLC & Mark P. Chalos,
Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP.

Intelemedia Communications, Inc. & Intelemedia Premier Leads, LLC,
Defendants, represented by David Benjamin Singer, Johnson Pope
Bokor Ruppel & Burns LLP, Debra R. Bernard --
DBernard@perkinscoie.com -- Perkins Coie, LLP & Matthew Thomas
Newton -- mattn@jpfirm.com -- Johnson Pope Bokor Ruppel & Burns
LLP.


JEUNESSE GLOBAL: Faces Xiong Suit in C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Jeunesse Global. The
case is captioned as Helen Xiong, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Jeunesse Global; Kim Hui;
and Does 1-10, Defendants, Case No. 8:18-cv-01430-DOC-KES (C.D.
Cal., Aug. 10, 2018). The case is assigned to Judge David O. Carter
and referred to Magistrate Judge Karen E. Scott.

Jeunesse Global, LLC manufactures and sells skincare products and
supplements worldwide. The company offers its products online and
through distributors. Jeunesse Global, LLC was founded in 2009 and
is based in Lake Mary, Florida with additional offices around the
world. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Blake J Lindemann, Esq.
          LINDEMANN LAW FIRM APC
          433 North Camden Drive 4th Floor
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 279-5269
          Facsimile: (310) 300-0267
          E-mail: blake@lawbl.com


JONES FINANCIAL: Continues to Defend 401(k) Plan Related Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Jones Financial Companies, L.L.L.P. said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August
9, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the
company continues to defend itself in a class action lawsuit
involving 401(k) Plan.

On August 19, 2016, JFC, Edward Jones and certain other defendants
were named in a putative class action lawsuit (McDonald v. Edward
D. Jones & Co., L.P., et al.) filed in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri brought under ERISA, by a
participant in the Edward D. Jones & Co. Profit Sharing and 401(k)
Plan (the "Retirement Plan"). The lawsuit alleges that the
defendants breached their fiduciary duties to Retirement Plan
participants and seeks declaratory and equitable relief and
monetary damages on behalf of the Retirement Plan.  

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the McDonald lawsuit which
was granted in part dismissing the claim against JFC, and denied in
part as to all other defendants on January 26, 2017.

On November 11, 2016, a substantially similar lawsuit (Schultz, et
al. v. Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., et al.) was filed in the same
court. The plaintiffs consolidated the two lawsuits by adding the
Schultz plaintiffs to the McDonald case, and the Schultz action was
dismissed. The plaintiffs filed their first amended consolidated
complaint on April 28, 2017.  

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit on May 26,
2017, which was denied on March 27, 2018.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

The Jones Financial Companies, L.L.L.P., through its subsidiary,
Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., operates as a registered
broker-dealer. The company provides investment advisory services;
shareholder accounting services, including maintaining client
account information and other administrative services for the
mutual funds; insurance contract services to insurance companies;
and custodial and other account services. The Jones Financial
Companies, L.L.L.P. was founded in 1871 and is headquartered in Des
Peres, Missouri.


JONES FINANCIAL: Continues to Defend Bland Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
The Jones Financial Companies, L.L.L.P. said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August
9, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the
company continues to defend itself in a class action suit entitled,
Bland, et. al. v. Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P, et al.

On March 13, 2018, The Jones Financial Companies, L.L.L.P. (JFC)
and Edward Jones were named as defendants in a purported collective
and class action lawsuit (Bland, et al. v. Edward D. Jones & Co.,
L.P, et al.) filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois by four former financial advisors. The lawsuit
was brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act as well as Missouri
and Illinois law and alleges that the defendants unlawfully
attempted to recoup training costs from departing financial
advisors and failed to pay all overtime owed to financial advisor
trainees among other claims.  

The lawsuit seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory
and liquidated damages.  

JFC and Edward Jones intend to vigorously defend against the
allegations in this lawsuit.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

The Jones Financial Companies, L.L.L.P., through its subsidiary,
Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., operates as a registered
broker-dealer. The company provides investment advisory services;
shareholder accounting services, including maintaining client
account information and other administrative services for the
mutual funds; insurance contract services to insurance companies;
and custodial and other account services. The Jones Financial
Companies, L.L.L.P. was founded in 1871 and is headquartered in Des
Peres, Missouri.


JONES FINANCIAL: Unit Continues to Defend Against Anderson Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Jones Financial Companies, L.L.L.P. said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August
9, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that Edward
D. Jones & Co., L.P. and its affiliated entities continues to
defend a putative class action suit entitled, Anderson, et. al. v.
Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., et al.

On March 30, 2018, Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P. and its affiliated
entities and individuals were named as defendants in a putative
class action (Anderson, et al. v. Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., et
al.) filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California.  

The lawsuit was brought under the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as well as Missouri and California
law and alleges that the defendants inappropriately transitioned
clients from commission-based accounts to fee-based programs. The
plaintiffs have requested declaratory, equitable, and exemplary
relief, and compensatory damages.  

Edward Jones and its affiliated entities and individuals deny the
allegations and intend to vigorously defend this lawsuit.

The Jones Financial Companies, L.L.L.P., through its subsidiary,
Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., operates as a registered
broker-dealer. The company provides investment advisory services;
shareholder accounting services, including maintaining client
account information and other administrative services for the
mutual funds; insurance contract services to insurance companies;
and custodial and other account services. The Jones Financial
Companies, L.L.L.P. was founded in 1871 and is headquartered in Des
Peres, Missouri.


JONES LANG LASALLE: Wacker Drive Sues over Monopoly of Labors
-------------------------------------------------------------
WACKER DRIVE EXECUTIVE SUITES, LLC, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JONES LANG LASALLE
AMERICAS (ILLINOIS), LP, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05492 (N.D.
Ill., Aug. 13, 2018) is an action against the Defendant for damages
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

The complaint alleges that the Defendant conspired with the labor
unions representing its employees to force its tenants to hire
union only contractors, particularly movers and the building trades
such as electricians, painters and carpet installers. The result is
that the Defendant's tenants must pay for above-market price
unionized labor. These tenants have suffered damages from this
ongoing conspiracy.

Jones Lang Lasalle Americas (Illinois), LP is a limited partnership
organized under the laws of the State of Illinois. a professional
services company, provides commercial real estate and investment
management services worldwide. The Company operates as a subsidiary
of Jones Lang LaSalle Incorporated. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James B. Zouras, Esq.
          Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          205 N. Michigan Avenue, Suite 2560
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 233-1550
          E-mail: jzouras@stephanzouras.com
                  rstephan@stephanzouras.com

                - and -

          Howard Foster, Esq.
          Matthew Galin, Esq.
          FOSTER PC
          150 N. Wacker Dr., Suite 2150
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312)726-1600
          E-mail: hfoster@fosterpc.com
                  mgalin@fosterpc.com

               - and -

          Aaron Walner, Esq.
          THE WALNER LAW FIRM LLC
          555 Skokie Boulevard, Suite 250
          Northbrook, IL 60062
          Tel: (312) 371-2308
          E-mail: awalner@walnerlawfirm.com
                  walner@walnerlawfirm.com


KROGER CO: Solano et al. Sue over 10-Cent Bottle Deposit Charge
---------------------------------------------------------------
ELISHA SOLANO; DONNA JUEL; RICK VENEMAN; and PAUL RUGGLES,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. THE KROGER CO. d/b/a FRED MEYER, Defendant, Case No.
3:18-cv-01488-SI (D. Or., Aug. 13, 2018) alleges that the
Defendants unlawfully assessed bottle deposit charges on exempt
beverages that could not be refunded under Oregon law.

According to the complaint, in July and August 2018, the Plaintiffs
purchased an exempt beverage from the Defendant, and the Defendant
collected a 10-cent deposit charge from the Plaintiff for each
exempt beverage container. The Defendant did not disclose its
10-cent deposit charge in the advertisement of the exempt beverage
prices to the Plaintiffs.

Private investigation has revealed that the Defendant's store
locations in Forest Grove, Tualatin, Tigard, Wilsonville, Keizer,
Salem, Albany, Springfield, and Eugene all regularly misrepresent
the actual cost of certain exempt beverages, and all charge
customers a 10-cent deposit on exempt beverages that cannot be
returned for a refund under Oregon law.

The Kroger Co., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
retailer in the United States. It operates under the banner brands,
such as Kroger, Ralphs, Fred Meyer, King Soopers, etc., as well as
Simple Truth and Simple Truth Organic brands. As of March 8, 2018,
the company operated 2,800 retail food stores under various banner
names, as well as an online retail store. The Kroger Co. was
founded in 1883 and is based in Cincinnati, Ohio. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Fuller, Esq.
          OlsenDaines
          US Bancorp Tower
          111 SW 5th Ave.,
          Suite 3150
          Portland, OR 97204
          Telephone:(503) 743-7000
          E-mail: michael@underdoglawyer.com


L3 TECHNOLOGIES: Prelim Approval of Estes Deal Conditionally OK'd
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSEPH ESTES, an individual, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. L3 TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; L3
UNIDYNE, INC., Defendants, Case No. 3:17-CV-02356-H-JMA (S.D.
Cal.), Judge Marilyn L. Huff of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California conditionally granted the
Plaintiff's unopposed motion seeking provisional class
certification, preliminary approval of a proposed class action
settlement, approval of a proposed dissemination of class notice,
appointment of claims administrator, and a final approval
schedule.

In the operative, first amended complaint, filed on Feb. 9, 2018,
the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants provide a broad range of
communication and electronic systems products for military,
homeland security, and commercial use.  The Defendants are Delaware
corporations and maintain several offices through California,
including in the city and county of San Diego.

The Plaintiff was hired through the Defendants' San Diego office to
work as a mechanic.  He began work in September 2017, in Camp
Pendleton, California.  As part of his job application, he filled
out the Defendants' "Background Investigation Consent" form, which
purported to permit the Defendants to obtain a consumer report
verifying his background experience.  The Form also included a
liability release provision.

Thus, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants did not obtain
proper authorization for procurement of a consumer report because
the Background Investigation Consent Form did not consist solely of
the disclosure but rather also included the liability release
provision.  Moreover, he alleges that, in completing the Form, he
was not aware that he was signing both an authorization and a
waiver combined into one document.

In addition to the alleged FCRA violations, the Plaintiff alleges
that the Defendants violated California Labor Code Section 226(a)
by issuing wage statements to him that did not contain the name and
address of the legal entity that was his employer.  The Plaintiff's
wage statements allegedly contained neither the name nor address of
L3 Unidyne or L3 Technologies.

The Plaintiff brought the class action on behalf of himself and two
proposed classes: (1) a "Proposed FCRA Class," defined as all
persons in the United States who filled out the Defendants'
standard 'Background Investigation Consent' form that included an
authorization and a liability release clause at any time during the
period beginning five years prior to the filing of the Complaint to
the present time; and (2) a "Proposed Wage Statement Class,"
defined as aall employees who are employed or have been employed by
the Defendants in the State of California who worked one or more
pay periods since one year prior to the filing of the First Amended
Complaint in the action and continuing to the present.  The
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, statutory and punitive damages,
and attorneys' fees.

The Plaintiff filed the original, class action complaint on Nov.
21, 2017, naming L3 Technologies as the sole Defendant.  He brought
two causes of action under the FCRA based on L3 Technologies'
alleged unlawful inclusion of the liability release in the
Background Investigation Consent Form.

On Jan. 29, 2018, L3 Technologies filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint.  On Feb. 9, 2018, the Plaintiff filed the first amended
complaint, naming L3 Technologies and L3 Unidyne as the Defendants
and adding a third cause of action for violation of California
Labor Code Section 226(a)(8).

On Feb. 12, 2018, the Court denied as moot L3 Technologies' motion
to dismiss the original complaint.  On March 2, 2018, the
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint.
On March 13, 2018, the Court granted the parties' joint motion to
continue the hearing on the Defendants' motion to dismiss in order
to allow time for mediation.  On May 21, 2018, the Plaintiff filed
a notice of settlement, and the Defendants withdrew their motion to
dismiss.

Following a full-day mediation before the Hon. Carl J. West (Ret.)
of JAMS on May 9, 2018, the parties reached a tentative settlement
and subsequently engaged in extensive negotiations about the terms
and conditions of settlement.  By the present motion, the Plaintiff
seeks approval of the settlement class, preliminary approval of the
Proposed Settlement and class notice, and a scheduling order for
further proceedings.

The proposed settlement agreement would create an FCRA Class as
well as a Wage Statement Class.  There are an estimated 840 FCRA
Class members and 213 Wage Statement Class members.  Members of one
or both of these classes are deemed "Settlement Class Members."
The Settlement Class Members can opt-out of the Proposed Settlement
by submitting a written request to the claims administrator, and
they can object to the Proposed Settlement by filing an objection
with the Court.

Under the Proposed Settlement, the Defendants will establish a
settlement fund of $275,000 to resolve the litigation.  This amount
will pay approved claims as well as attorneys' fees and costs.
Each Class Member's recovery will consist of an amount for the
Member's FCRA claim and a separate amount for the Member's wage
statement claim, as applicable.  The parties have agreed that each
of the approximately 840 FCRA Class Members will receive $75,
meaning that $63,000 of the settlement fund will be allocated to
the FCRA class and $109,333.33 of the settlement fund will be
allocated to the Wage Statement Class.  The remainder of the
settlement fund will be divided pro rata among Wage Statement Class
members based on the estimated number of received eligible wage
statements, assuming two paychecks received per month for the
duration of the Wage Statement Class member's employment.

For attorneys' fees, the Plaintiff's counsel seeks $91,666.67, or
roughly 33% of the settlement fund.  For costs, the Plaintiff's
counsel requests $6,000, which will cover all past and future
litigation costs and expenses necessary to prosecute, settle, and
administer the litigation and the settlement.  The settlement fund
will also be used to pay the class representative an "enhancement"
payment of $5,000.  Any funds that remain uncashed after 180 days
will be distributed as follows: 25% to the State Treasury for
deposit in the Trial Court Improvement and Modernization Fund, 25%
to the State Treasury for deposit in the Equal Access Fund of the
Judicial Branch, and 50% to Bet Tzedek Legal Service.  The parties
request appointment of RG/2 Claims Administration LLC as claims
administrator.

The Court held a hearing on the motion on Aug. 1, 2018.

Judge Huff (i) approved the Plaintiff's request for provisional
certification of the class for purposes of settlement; (ii)
conditionally granted the Plaintiff's request for preliminary
approval of the proposed settlement; and (iii) approved the form
and manner of the notice of the proposed settlement to the class
members.  On Aug. 15, 2018, the parties must submit (1) evidence
demonstrating that a driving nexus exists between the putative
class and the currently proposed cy pres beneficiaries; or (2) an
alternative cy pres recipient(s) that satisfies the Ninth Circuit's
standards.  

Additionally, the Judge set the final approval hearing for Jan. 7,
2019, at 10:30 a.m.  The settlement administrator must mail class
notices by Aug. 31, 2018.  Potential class members must return
their claims or other responses by Nov. 16, 2018.  The Plaintiff
must file any motions for fee awards and incentive awards by Oct.
12, 2018.  The Plaintiff must file a motion for final approval of
the settlement on or before Dec. 21, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 1, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2oZL1ZG from Leagle.com.

Joseph Estes, an individual, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Eric B. Kingsley --
eric@kingsleykingsley.com -- Kingsley and Kingsley.

L3 Technologies, Inc. & L3 Unidyne, Inc., Defendants, represented
by Chet A. Kronenberg -- ckronenberg@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher
and Bartlett LLP.


LA BOTTEGA: Underpays Delivery Drivers, Kalland Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN KALLAND, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. LA BOTTEGA, INC.; LA BOTTEGA FOODS CORP.; LA
BOTTEGA FRANCHISE, INC.; LA BOTTEGA LYNBROOK, INC.; LA BOTTEGA OF
ROSLYN CORP.; MARISA ARTE E. COLLEZIONE, INC.; GUISEPPE RUTA; and
MARISA RUTA, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-04502-JS-AYS (E.D.N.Y.,
Aug. 9, 2018) is an action against the Defendants to recover unpaid
overtime compensation, minimum wages, damages, attorneys' fees and
costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Mr. Kalland was employed by the Defendants as delivery driver.

La Bottega, Inc. is engaged in the restaurant business. The company
operates within the State of New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Saul D. Zabell, Esq.
          Ryan M. Eden, Esq.
          ZABELL & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          1 Corporate Drive, Suite 103
          Bohemia, NY 11716
          Telephone: (631) 589-7242
          Facsimile: (631) 563-7475
          E-mail: SZabell@laborlawsny.com
                  REden@laborlawsny.com


LA FARINE BAKERY: Fails to Pay OT to Bakers, Tellez et al. Claim
----------------------------------------------------------------
ANDRES TELLEZ; JOSE TELLEZ; FELIPE TELLEZ; ROMUALDO TELLEZ; and
JUAN TELLEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. LA FARINE BAKERY #2, INC.; and RIDA SHAHIN,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-05521 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 13, 2018) is an
action against the Defendants for failure to pay overtime wages to
the Plaintiffs and other similarly situated bakers for all time
worked in excess of 40 hours in individual work weeks.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as bakers. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas M. Werman, Esq.
          Maureen A. Salas, Esq.
          Sarah J. Arendt, Esq.
          WERMAN SALAS P.C.
          77 West Washington Street, Suite 1402
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312)419-1008


LANDRY'S RESTAURANTS: Cal. App. Affirms Dismissal of Martinez Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Dennis M. Perluss of the Court of Appeals of California for
the Second District, Division Seven, affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the case, ROBERTO MARTINEZ, et al., Plaintiffs and
Appellants, v. LANDRY'S RESTAURANTS, INC., Defendant and
Respondent, Case No. B278513 (Cal. App.).

Martinez, Lisa Saldana, Craig Eriksen and Chanel Rankin-Stephens
sued Crab Addison, Inc., Ignite Restaurant Group, Inc. (formerly
known as Joe's Crab Shack Holdings, Inc.) and Landry's Restaurants,
Inc. on behalf of a putative class of salaried employees of Joe's
Crab Shack restaurants in California who were allegedly
misclassified as exempt managerial/executive employees and
unlawfully denied overtime pay.  Martinez, Saldana, Eriksen and
Rankin-Stephens are current or former employees of Joe's Crab Shack
restaurants in California.  

Martinez filed the original complaint in the lawsuit on Sept. 7,
2007, seeking to represent a class of salaried Joe's Crab Shack
employees on claims they had been misclassified as exempt
managerial/executive employees and were entitled to overtime pay.
The complaint also alleged meal period, rest period and wage
statement claims.

In March 2010 the trial court denied Martinez's motion for class
certification on the ground he was not an adequate class
representative.  Martinez did not appeal that order.  The trial
court permitted Saldana, Eriksen and Rankin-Stephens to join the
lawsuit as named plaintiffs and putative class representatives.

On Aug. 3, 2016 the trial court granted a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 583.310 and 583.360,
finding the Martinez parties had failed to bring their lawsuit to
trial within five years, as extended.

On appeal the Martinez parties argue the court abused its
discretion in refusing to exclude from its calculation of the
mandatory five-year period 319 days during which a writ petition
challenging that court's order to produce the names and contact
information for putative class members was pending, 169 days
between the notice of remand following removal of the case to
United States District Court and the Ninth Circuit's order
affirming the District Court's remand, and a nine-month period
between the court's order granting the Martinez parties' motion to
compel production of electronically stored information and full
compliance with that order.

The parties agree the jurisdiction of the trial court was suspended
for a total of 1,033 days while the action was pending in the
federal district court following removal (75 days) and during the
Martinez parties' appeal of the denial of their motion for class
certification (958 days).  The Martinez parties concede there are
no other mandatory exclusions from the five-year period to bring an
action to trial but contend it was impossible, impracticable or
futile to bring the action to trial during the writ proceedings
reviewing the order to produce contact information for putative
class members (319 days), the time between the district court's
order remanding the case following removal and the Ninth Circuit's
affirmance of that order (169 days), and the nine-month period
between the order to produce electronically stored information and
full production of that material.

Judge Perluss finds that in light of the Martinez parties' failure
to exercise reasonable diligence in prosecuting their case between
June 8 and Nov. 24, 2009, it was not an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to include that time within its calculation of the
five-year mandatory period to bring the action to trial.  He also
finds that the Martinez parties' election to conduct additional
class discovery, rather than immediately renew their class
certification motion, was a tactical decision.  The time devoted to
this discovery effort was properly included by the trial court in
calculating section 583.310's five-year deadline.

Finally, the Judge finds that he needs not resolve the issue on
whether the Court's writ review of the order compelling disclosure
of putative class members' contact information made it
impracticable or futile to bring the case to trial within the
statutory period.  As extended by the period of removal to federal
district court (75 days) and the appeal in Joe's Crab Shack II (958
days), but for the six-month provision in section 583.35017 the
time to bring the action to trial expired on July 7, 2015.  Adding
the time Joe's Crab Shack I was pending, however one calculates
that time, would still result in the five-year deadline falling at
least several weeks prior to the filing of both the motion to
dismiss and the Martinez parties' motion to sever and set for trial
Martinez's individual claims.  Accordingly, he finds that any error
in refusing to exclude this time from the five-year period would be
harmless.

For these reasons, Judge Perluss affirmed the judgment.  Landry's
Restaurants is to recover its costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 1, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://bit.ly/2MlAhhw from Leagle.com.

Righetti Glugoski, Matthew Righetti and John Glugoski, for
Plaintiffs and Appellants. Restaurant

Law Offices of Mary E. Lynch, Mary E. Lynch; Sheppard, Mullin,
Richter & Hampton and Charles F. Barker --
cbarker@sheppardmullin.com -- for Defendant and Respondent Landry's
Restaurants, Inc.


LOS ANGELES, CA: Faces Ferguson Suit in C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against the County of Los
Angeles. The case is captioned as THOMAS FERGUSON; and MIGUEL
ORTEGA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant, Case No.
2:18-cv-06861-JAK-ASx (C.D Cal., Aug. 10, 2018).

Los Angeles County, one of California's original 27 counties, was
established on Feb. 18, 1850. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Harry S. Stern, Esq.
          RAINS LUCIA STERN
          ST. PHALLE & SILVER, PC
          1428 2nd Street, Suite 200
          Santa Monica, CA 90401
          Telephone: (310) 393-1486


MAJESTIC CLEANING: Doesn't Pay OT to Manual Laborers, Zapata Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CARMEN ZAPATA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MAJESTIC CLEANING INC.; and RANDY S. GURIN,
Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-04507 (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 9, 2018) is an
action against the Defendants to recover unpaid overtime
compensation, minimum wages, damages, attorneys' fees and costs.

The Plaintiff Zapata was employed by the Defendants as manual
laborer.

Majestic Cleaning Inc. is engaged in the building maintenance
industry. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter A. Romero, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF PETER A. ROMERO PLLC
          825 Veterans Highway-Ste. B
          Hauppauge, NY 11788
          Telephone: (631) 257-5588
          E-mail: Promero@RomeroLawNY.com


MARRIOTT OWNERSHIP: Can Compel Arbitration in McComack FCRA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STACY McCOMACK, Plaintiff, v. MARRIOTT OWNERSHIP
RESORTS, INC., a Corporation, Defendant, Case No.
3:17-cv-01663-BEN-WVG (S.D. Cal.), Judge Robert T. Benitez of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California (i)
granted the Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay
Proceedings, and (ii) denied as moot the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss or Strike.

The Defendant develops, markets, sells and manages vacation
ownership and related products under the Marriott Vacation Club and
Grand Residences by Marriott brands.  The Plaintiff was a Sales
Executive for Defendant in California.  As a condition of
employment, the Plaintiff signed a Dispute Resolution Agreement
requiring arbitration of any claims between the Plaintiff and the
Defendant.  The Agreement also contains a clause which, if valid,
would deny each side the right to file a class action claim against
the other, whether in court, arbitration, or otherwise.

On Oct. 27, 2017, the Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against
the Defendant alleging various putative class and collective action
claims stemming from violations of California and federal labor
laws.  

The Defendant now moves to compel the Plaintiff to submit her
claims to arbitration on an individual basis.  It asserts that the
Court should compel the Plaintiff to honor her mutual agreement to
arbitrate her individual claims and stay further judicial
proceedings pending completion of arbitration.

The Plaintiff argues the Agreement is illegal, and therefore
unenforceable because it contains an unlawful waiver of a
representative Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") claim as well
as an illegal Class Action Waiver of concerted employee actions in
violation of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").

Judge Benitez explains that agreements to arbitrate must contain at
least 'a modicum of bilaterality' to avoid unconscionability."  He
finds that the Plaintiff fails to meet either of these
requirements.  The Plaintiff was made aware of the arbitration
clause during her onboarding.  Despite being made aware the
agreement was optional and had no effect on her employment
opportunities, she signed the agreement without any noted
objection.  Moreover, she was provided a 30-day option period to
opt-out, but she chose not to exercise that option.  Under these
facts, the Judge does not find Procedural Unconscionability.  The
Judge also does not find that the Plaintiff has demonstrated
Substantive Unconscionability.  Because the Plaintiff is unable to
demonstrate either Procedural or Substantive Unconscionability, the
arbitration agreement is enforceable.

After the parties filed their briefs in the case, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Morris v. Epic Sys. Corp.  The Court
considered Morris along with Seventh Circuit and Fifth Circuit
cases that addressed whether employees should be allowed to bring
class or collective actions where they agreed to one-on-one
arbitration and reversed Morris.  On May 21, 2018, the Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Morris in Epic,which
held that an arbitration agreement in which an employee agrees to
arbitrate claims against an employer on an individual basis, is
enforceable and does not violate the NLRA.  In light of the recent
decision in Epic, teh Plaintiff's argument that the class action
waiver violates the NLRA in this matter is without merit.
Therefore, the Motion to Compel Arbitration will be granted.

Finally, the Judge finds that a stay is proper in these
circumstances.  First, the factual issues that will be resolved in
arbitration clearly bear upon the instant] case because these facts
will determine the Defendant's liability for the Plaintiff's PAGA
claim.  Second, he is not convinced that there are any potential
Plaintiffs who will be prejudiced by the stay.  Thus, no unfair
prejudice will result from granting the stay.  In light of the
foregoing analysis granting the Defendant's Motion to Compel
Arbitration of Plaintiff's individual claims, the Judge will stay
the action pursuant to the FAA pending completion of the
arbitration proceedings.

Having determined that compelling arbitration is appropriate in the
matter, the Judge needs not address the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss or Strike Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint.
Accordingly, she will deny as moot the Motion to Dismiss or
Strike.

In accordance with the conclusions set forth, Judge Benitez granted
Marriott's Motion to Compel Arbitration as to the Plaintiff's
individual, non-PAGA claims.  The proceedings are stayed pending
arbitration, including as to the Plaintiff's non-arbitrable
representative PAGA claim.  Accordingly, in light of the stay, the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Strike Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint is denied as moot without prejudice to the Defendant's
ability to bring the motion when the stay is lifted.  The parties
are ordered to file a joint status report every three months from
the date of the Order or within 10 days of completion of
arbitration proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ELlrwl from Leagle.com.

Stacy McComack, an individual, on behalf of herself, and on behalf
of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Aparajit Bhowmik -- aj@bamlawlj.com -- Blumenthal Nordrehaug &
Bhowmik, Molly Ann DeSario -- Molly.DeSario@capstonelawyers.com --
Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik, Norman B. Blumenthal --
norm@bamlawlj.com -- Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik, Ruchira Piya
Mukherjee -- piya@bamlawlj.com -- Blumenthal, Nordrehaug & Bhowmik
& Victoria Bree Rivapalacio -- victoria@bamlawca.com -- Blumenthal
Nordrehaug & Bhowmik.

Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., a Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Mark D. Kemple -- kemplem@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg
Traurig.



MB FINANCIAL: Faces Parshall Suit over Fifth Third Merger
---------------------------------------------------------
PAUL PARSHALL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MB FINANCIAL, INC.; DAVID P. BOLGER; CHARLES
BRYAN DANIELS; MITCHELL FEIGER; SUNIL GARG; CHARLES J. GRIES; JAMES
N. HALLENE; THOMAS H. HARVEY; RICHARD J. HOLMSTROM; MARK A. HOPPE;
KAREN J. MAY; RENEE TOGHER; and FIFTH THIRD BANCORP, Defendants,
Case No. 1:18-cv-02474-CCB (D. Md., Aug. 13, 2018) alleges
violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

According to the complaint, on May 20, 2018, MB Financial's Board
of Directors caused the Company to enter into an agreement and plan
of merger with Fifth Third. Pursuant to the terms of the Merger
Agreement, if the deal is completed, MB Financial stockholders will
receive $5.54 in cash and 1.450 shares of Fifth Third common stock
for each share of MB Financial common stock they own.

On August 3, 2018, the Defendants filed a proxy statement with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with the
Proposed Transaction. The proxy statement omits material
information with respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders
it false and misleading. The proxy statement failed to disclose:
(i) the internal financial projections for MB Financial for the
years ending December 31, 2018 through December 31, 2022, as
provided by the senior management of MB Financial; (ii) the
terminal value of MB Financial common stock at December 31, 2022;
(iii) the basis for applying price to 2022 earnings multiplies
ranging from 14.0x to 18.0x and multiples of December 31, 2022
tangible book value ranging from 200% to 275%; and (iv) the inputs
and assumptions underlying the discount rates ranging from 8.5% to
11.5%.

MB Financial, Inc. operates as a bank holding company for MB
Financial Bank, N.A. that provides various financial services to
small and middle market businesses, and individuals in the United
States. MB Financial, Inc. was founded in 1911 and is headquartered
in Chicago, Illinois. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thomas J. Minton, Esq.
          GOLDMAN & MINTON, P.C.
          3600 Clipper Mill Rd., Suite 201
          Baltimore, MD 21211
          Telephone: (410) 783-7575
          E-mail: tminton@charmcitylegal.com


MDL 2179: Continental/CNA Granted Summary Ruling in Oil Spill Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In Re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in
the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, SECTION: J(2) This Document
Relates To: No. 14-cv-600, Andry Law Group, LLC, et al. v. CNA
Financial Corp., et al., Case No. MDL 2179 (E.D. La.), Judge Carl
Barbier of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants
Continental Casualty Co. and CNA Financial Corp. Continental and
against Andry Law Group, LLC and Jonathan Andry.

Member case 14-cv-600 is an insurance coverage dispute between
Plaintiffs Andry Law Group, LLC and Jonathan Andry, and Defendants
Continental Casualty Co. and CNA Financial Corp.  The parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the
insurance policy required Continental to defend Andry with respect
to a Court-ordered investigation and the resulting show cause order
concerning the administration of one of the class actions
settlements reached in the Multidistrict Litigation No. 2179.

In 2012, the Court approved the Economic and Property Damages
Settlement, a class action settlement that resolved many private
claims arising from the DEEPWATER HORIZON/Macondo Well oil spill.
The settlement was administered by the Court Supervised Settlement
Program ("CSSP").  Andry represented claimants in the CSSP.

In July 2013, the Court appointed a Special Master to perform an
independent external investigation into the facts and circumstances
that led to the resignation of a staff attorney with the CSSP,
conduct fact-finding as to any other possible ethical violations or
misconduct within the CSSP, and examine, evaluate, and make
recommendations regarding the internal compliance program and
anti-corruption controls within the CSSP.  The Special Master
determined in pertinent part that Jonathan Andry improperly
utilized a personal relationship and referral fee arrangement with
the former CSSP staff attorney in an attempt to expedite the claims
of clients of law firms associated with Jonathan Andry.

The Special Master made multiple recommendations, including that
the report be provided to the Department of Justice to determine
whether Andry violated federal criminal statues regarding fraud,
money laundering, conspiracy, or perjury; that the report be
referred to the State Bar of Louisiana to determine whether Andry
violated any disciplinary rules; and that the Court prohibit Andry
from representing any claimants in the CSSP and from receiving any
fees for this representation.  

The same day, the Court issued an order that required, inter alia,
that Jonathan Andry and any associated law firms to show cause why
they should not be disqualified from representing claimants in the
CSSP or collecting fees from such claimants.  It also authorized
the Special Master to initiate legal action to "clawback" the
payment of any fraudulent claims, including any contingent fees
received by attorneys representing claimants who made fraudulent
claims.

Continental Casualty Co. issued a Lawyers Professional Liability
Policy to the Andry Law Group, LLC for the period Jan. 1, 2013 to
Jan. 1, 2014.  On Oct. 15, 2013, Andry tendered notice to
Continental and demanded reimbursement for past and future defense
costs relating to the Special Master's investigation and the Show
Cause Order.  Continental denied coverage in a letter dated Jan. 7,
2014, explaining the Policy does not afford coverage for this
matter because there is no possibility of covered damages.

In February 2014, Andry sued Continental in state court for breach
of contract and sought a declaration that Continental is obligated
under the Policy to provide the attorneys with coverage for the
defense of the Court's demand for services.  The case was removed
and later consolidated with MDL 2179, where it was stayed while the
Court dealt with other matters in the MDL.

On Nov. 7, 2014, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing
regarding the Show Cause Order and made oral findings.  On Feb. 26,
2015, the Court issued an order imposing sanctions in accordance
with its oral findings. Relevant in the case, the Court
disqualified Jonathan Andry from representing any claimants in the
CSSP and barred him from collecting attorneys' fees, except that
the Court permitted him to collect fees for previous legal work
actually performed on legitimate (i.e., non-fraudulent) claims that
qualified for payment.  The Court also instructed the Special
Master to report the matter to the appropriate authorities
regarding attorney discipline.

Jonathan Andry appealed.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

On June 5, 2018, the Court issued a briefing schedule on the
instant cross motions for summary judgment which Continental and
Andry had filed before their case was stayed upon consolidation
with MDL 2179.  Each side filed a response, and Continental also
filed a reply.

Judge Barbier finds that because the Special Masters' Report and
the Show Cause Order do not reveal any possibility of liability
that would be covered by the Policy, Continental's duty to defend
was not triggered.  Accordingly, Continental is entitled to summary
judgment, and Andry is not.

In addition, the Judge finds that Defendant CNA is entitled to
summary judgment on separate grounds.  Andry's complaint asserts
causes of action only for breach of contract and declaratory
judgment.  CNA, however, did not issue the Policy and is not in
contractual privity Andry.  Accordingly, CNA cannot be liable to
Andry for breach of contract.  And, if CNA cannot be liable for
breach of contract, it follows that no judgment could issue
declaring that CNA is obligated by the Policy to provide Andry with
defense or coverage.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Barbier granted Continental's
Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Andry's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.  All claims asserted by Plaintiffs Andry Law
Group, LLC and Jonathan Andry in civil action no. 14-cv-600 are
dismissed with prejudice.  The Court will enter judgment in
accordance with the Order & Reasons.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 1, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2CIMYU9 from Leagle.com.

Plaintiff, Plaintiff, represented by James P. Roy --
jimr@wrightroy.com -- Domengeaux -- john Wright, Roy & Edwards &
Stephen J. Herman -- sherman@hhklawfirm.com -- Herman, Herman &
Katz, LLC.

Marine Spill Response Corporation, Dispersant defendant, Defendant,
represented by Alan Mark Weigel -- aweigel@blankrome.com -- Blank
Rome LLP.

Airborne Support, Inc., Dispersant defendant & Airborne Support
International Inc, Dispersant defendant, Defendants, represented
by Francis Xavier Neuner, Jr. -- fneuner@neunerpate.com --
NeunerPate, Ben Louis Mayeaux, NeunerPate, and Jed M. Mestayer,
NeunerPate.

Dynamic Aviation Group Inc, Defendant, represented by Leo Raymond
McAloon, III -- lmcaloon@glllaw.com -- Gieger, Laborde & Laperouse,
LLC & Michael D. Cangelosi -- mcangelosi@glllaw.com -- Gieger,
Laborde & Laperouse, LLC.

International Air Response Inc, Defendant, represented by Kevin
Richard Tully -- krtully@christovich.com -- Christovich & Kearney,
LLP & Howard Carter Marshall, Christovich & Kearney, LLP.

Lane Aviation, Defendant, represented by George Edmond Crow, Law
Office of George E. Crow.

National Response Corporation, Defendant, represented by Michael J.
Lyle -- mikelyle@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan, LLP, Eric C. Lyttle -- ericlyttle@quinnemanuel.com --
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Patrick Edward O'Keefe --
pokeefe@couhigpartners.com -- Couhig Partners, LLC, Philip S.
Brooks, Jr. -- pbrooks@gamb.law.com -- Gordon, Arata, Montgomery &
Barnett & Sylvia E. Simson -- sylviasimson@quinnemanuel.com --
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP.

DRC Emergency Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by Harold J.
Flanagan -- hflanagan@flanaganpartners.com -- Flanagan Partners,
LLP, Andy Joseph Dupre -- adupre@flanaganpartners.com -- Flanagan
Partners, LLP & Sean Patrick Brady -- sbrady@flanaganpartners.com
-- Flanagan Partners, LLP.

Tiger Rentals Ltd., Defendant, represented by John Emerson
Galloway, Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith & Cherrell
Simms Taplin, City Attorney's Office.

Defendant, Defendant, represented by David J. Beck --
dbeck@beckredden.com -- Beck, Redden & Secrest, LLP, pro hac vice,
Deborah DeRoche Kuchler -- dkuchler@kuchlerpolk.com -- Kuchler Polk
Schell Weiner & Richeson, LLC, Don Keller Haycraft --
dkhaycraft@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis, Donald E. Godwin, Godwin
Lewis PC, pro hac vice, J. Andrew Langan --
andrew.langan@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis, LLP, Kerry J.
Miller -- kjmiller@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker Donelson Bearman
Caldwell & Berkowitz, Michael J. Lyle, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan, LLP, Phillip A. Wittmann, Stone, Pigman, Walther,
Wittmann, LLC & Thomas Lotterman, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius.

Federal Government Interests, Interested Party, represented by R.
Michael Underhill, U. S. Department of Justice.

State Interests, Interested Party, represented by Luther J.
Strange, III, Attorney General's Office.

Lynn C. Greer, Transition Coordinator, Interested Party, pro se.


MDL 2262: Citi and Barclays Settlements Have Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, In re: LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust
Litigation, This Document Applies to: OTC Plaintiff Action, Case
Nos. 11 MD 2262 (NRB), 11 Civ. 5450 (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Naomi Reice
Buchwald of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York granted OTC Plaintiffs' motions for final approval of
settlements with two panel banks, Barclays and Citi.

The Judge finally approved the Plans of Distribution.  The Plan of
Distribution for the Barclays settlement and the Plan of
Distribution for the Citi Settlement, each provide for pro rata
distributions of the respective settlement funds net of expenses,
attorneys' fees, and incentive awards to class members.

The Judge certified two classes Settlement Classes: (1) a class
corresponding to the Barclays settlement and (2) a class
corresponding to the Citi settlement.  Each settlement class is
defined as all persons or entities (other than Defendants and their
employees, affiliates, parents, and subsidiaries) that purchased in
the United States, directly from a Defendant (or a Defendant's
subsidiaries or affiliates), a U.S. Dollar LIBOR-Based Instrument
and that owned the U.S. Dollar LIBOR-Based Instrument any time
during the period August 2007 through May 2010.

Consistent with the Court's prior orders, the Judge appointed
Susman Godfrey LLP and Hausfeld LLP as the class counsel for each
of the Settlement Classes.

Judge Buchwald approved and directed the implementation of all the
terms of the Barclays Settlement and the Citi Settlement.  Except
as to the Barclays and the Citi Opt-Outs, the Judge dismissed the
OTC Action, as well as all of the Released Claims, against any of
the Released Parties by the Releasing Parties, with prejudice.  The
Parties are to bear their own costs, except as otherwise provided
in the Barclays Settlement and Citi Settlement, provided that such
dismissal will not affect, in any way, the right of the Releasing
Parties to pursue claims, if any, outside the scope of the Released
Claims.

The Judge ordered that the motions for attorneys' fees, expenses,
and incentive awards remain under consideration and will be
addressed in a forthcoming order.  She respectfully directed the
Clerk of the Court to enter partial final judgment consistent with
hi Memorandum and Order pursuant to Rule 54 (b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 1, 2018 Memorandum, Order, and
Judgment is available at https://goo.gl/C2y3wZ from Leagle.com.

FTC Capital GMBH, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Lovell, Esq. --
LOVELL STEWART HALEBIAN JACOBSON LLP, Daniel Hume, Esq. --
dhume@kmllp.com -- David E. Kovel, Esq. -- dkovel@kmllp.com --
Lauren Wagner Pederson, Esq. -- lpederson@kmllp.com -- and Surya
Palaniappan, Esq. -- spalaniappan@kmllp.com -- KIRBY MCINERNEY LLP

FTC Futures Fund PCC Ltd, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Martin
McNeela -- amcneela@kmllp.com -- Kirby McInerney LLP, Christopher
Lovell, Lovell Stewart Halebian Jacobson LLP, Daniel Hume, Kirby
McInerney LLP, David E Kovel, Kirby McInerney LLP, Lauren Wagner
Pederson, Kirby McInerney LLP, Merrill G Davidoff --
mdavidoff@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.C, Roger W Kirby, Kirby
McInerney LLP, Samuel Howard Rudman, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP, Surya Palaniappan, Kirby McInerney LLP & Thomas W. Elrod --
telrod@kmllp.com -- Kirby McInerney, LLP.

FTC Futures Fund SICAV, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Martin
McNeela, Kirby McInerney LLP, Christopher Lovell, Lovell Stewart
Halebian Jacobson LLP, Daniel Hume, Kirby McInerney LLP, David E
Kovel, Kirby McInerney LLP, Lauren Wagner Pederson, Kirby McInerney
LLP, Roger W Kirby, Kirby McInerney LLP, Samuel Howard Rudman,
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Surya Palaniappan, Kirby
McInerney LLP & Thomas W. Elrod, Kirby McInerney, LLP.

Carpenters Pension Fund of West Virginia, Plaintiff, represented by
Daniel Hume, Kirby McInerney LLP, Darren J. Robbins --
darrenr@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice, David E Kovel, Kirby McInerney LLP, David W. Mitchell --
davidm@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice, Lucas F. Olts -- lolts@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP, Roger W Kirby, Kirby McInerney LLP, Samuel Howard Rudman,
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Surya Palaniappan, Kirby
McInerney LLP.

City of Dania Beach Police & Firefighters' Retirement System,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Hume, Kirby McInerney LLP, David E
Kovel, Kirby McInerney LLP, George E. Barrett, Barrette, Johnsn &
Parsley, Roger W Kirby, Kirby McInerney LLP, Samuel Howard Rudman,
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Surya Palaniappan, Kirby
McInerney LLP & Timothy L. Miles, Barrett, Johnston & Parsley.

Ravan Investments, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Hume,
Kirby McInerney LLP, David E Kovel, Kirby McInerney LLP, Jay W.
Eisenhofer, Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., John D. Radice, Radice Law
Firm, P.C., Kevin Bruce Love, Hanzman and Criden, Michael E.
Criden, Hanzman, Criden, Korge, Chaykin, Ponce & Heise, P.A., Peter
Anthony Barile, III, Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., Roger W Kirby, Kirby
McInerney LLP, Samuel Howard Rudman, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP & Surya Palaniappan, Kirby McInerney LLP.

Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Plaintiff, represented by Arun
Srinivas Subramanian, Susman Godfrey LLP, Christopher Lovell,
Lovell Stewart Halebian Jacobson LLP, Daniel Hume, Kirby McInerney
LLP, David E Kovel, Kirby McInerney LLP, Drew D Hansen, Susman
Godfrey LLP, pro hac vice, Gary Ivan Smith, Hausfeld LLP, pro hac
vice, Glenn Charles Bridgman, Susman Godfrey LLP, Hilary K
Scherrer, Hausfeld LLP, pro hac vice, Hilary Kathleen Scherrer,
Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, PLLC,Joel Davidow, Kile Goekjian
Reed & McManus Pllc, Jonathan Watson Cuneo, Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca,
LLP, Karen Oshman, Susman Godfrey LLP, Marc M. Seltzer, Susman
Godfrey, L.L.P., pro hac vice, Mary Kathryn Sammons, Susman Godfrey
LLP, Matthew Berry, Susman Godfrey LLP, pro hac vice, Michael C.
Kelso, Susman Godfrey LLP, pro hac vice,Nathaniel C. Giddings,
Hausfeld LLP, pro hac vice, Ralph Johnson Bunche, III, Hausfeld,
LLP, Roger W Kirby, Kirby McInerney LLP, Samuel Howard Rudman,
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Seth D. Ard, Susman Godfrey LLP,
Surya Palaniappan, Kirby McInerney LLP, William P. Butterfield,
Hausfeld LLP, pro hac vice & William Christopher Carmody, Susman
Godfrey LLP.

Richard Hershey & Jeffrey Laydon, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher
Lovell, Lovell Stewart Halebian Jacobson LLP, Daniel Hume, Kirby
McInerney LLP, David E Kovel, Kirby McInerney LLP, Douglas Mason
Chalmers, Douglas M. Chalmers P.C., Geoffrey Milbank Horn, Lowey
Dannenberg Cohen & Hart, P.C., Robert F. Coleman, Coleman Law Firm,
pro hac vice, Roger W Kirby, Kirby McInerney LLP, Samuel Howard
Rudman, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Steve R. Jakubowski,
Coleman Law Firm, Surya Palaniappan, Kirby McInerney LLP & Vincent
Briganti, Lowey Dannenberg Cohen & Hart, P.C..

Bank of America Corporation is represented by Paul Steel Mishkin,
Esq. -- paul.mishkin@davispolk.com -- Arthur J. Burke, Esq. --
arthur.burke@davispolk.com -- Julie Saranow Epley, Esq. --
julie.epley@davispolk.com -- Neal Alan Potischman, Esq. --
neal.potischman@davispolk.com -- and Robert Frank Wise, Jr., Esq.
-- robert.wise@davispolk.com -- DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP.

Barclays Bank PLC, Defendant, represented by David R. Boyd, Esq. --
dboyd@bsfllp.com -- and Jonathan David Schiller, Esq. -- BOIES
SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP, David Harold Braff, Esq. --
braffd@sullcrom.com -- Jeffrey T. Scott, Esq. --
scottj@sullcrom.com -- and Yvonne Susan Quinn, Esq. --
quinny@sullcrom.com -- SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, LLP.

Citibank NA, Defendant, represented by Alan M. Wiseman , Covington
& Burling, LLP, pro hac vice, Andrew Arthur Ruffino, Covington &
Burling LLP, David Marx, McDermott, Will & Emery LLP, Jonathan
James Gimblett, Covington & Burling, LLP, pro hac vice, Mark Jacob
Altschul, McDermott Will & Emery LLP, pro hac vice, Robert Frank
Wise, Jr., Davis Polk & Wardwell L.L.P., Tammy Albarran, Covington
and Burling LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas A. Isaacson, Covington &
Burling, LLP, pro hac vice.

Deutsche Bank AG, Defendant, represented by Aidan John Synnott,
Paul Weiss, Elizabeth M. Sacksteder, Paul Weiss, Moses Silverman ,
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Abram Jeremy Ellis,
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Arthur J. Burke, Davis Polk &
Wardwell, Hallie Suzanne Goldblatt, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison LLP & Robert Frank Wise, Jr., Davis Polk & Wardwell
L.L.P.

J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Defendant, represented by Abram Jeremy
Ellis, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Alan Craig Turner, Simpson
Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Alexander Nuo Li, Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett LLP, Arthur J. Burke, Davis Polk & Wardwell, Eamonn Wesley
Campbell , Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Francis John Acott ,
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Jonathan Thomas Menitove, Simpson
Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Lawrence H. Heftman, Schiff Hardin LLP,
Matthew Charles Crowl, Schiff Hardin LLP, Patrick E. King, Simpson
Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Paul Christopher Gluckow, Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett LLP, Robert Frank Wise, Jr., Davis Polk & Wardwell L.L.P.
& Sarah Emily Phillips, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP.

Lloyds Banking Group PLC, Defendant, represented by Benjamin Andrew
Fleming, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Kevin Timothy Baumann, Hogan Lovells
US LLP, Lisa Jean Fried, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Marc Joel Gottridge,
Hogan Lovells US LLP, Megan Polly Davis, Flemming Zulack Williamson
Zauderer, LLP, Robert Frank Wise, Jr., Davis Polk & Wardwell
L.L.P., Arthur J. Burke, Davis Polk & Wardwell & Megan Dixon, Hogan
Lovells US LLP.

Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, Defendant, represented by Robert
G. Houck Clifford Chance US, LLP, Andrea J. Robinson  Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, David Sapir Lesser  Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Harriet Hoder  Wilmer Cutler Pickering
Hale and Dorr LLP, Michael A. Mugmon  Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale
and Dorr LLP, Robert Frank Wise, Jr.  Davis Polk & Wardwell L.L.P.,
Fraser Lee Hunter, Jr., Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP &
Arthur J. Burke  Davis Polk & Wardwell.

The Norinchukin Bank, Defendant, represented by Alan M. Unger,
Sidley Austin LLP, Andrew W. Stern, Sidley Austin LLP, Arthur J.
Burke, Davis Polk & Wardwell, Kenneth Benjamin Meyer, Sidley Austin
LLP, Robert Frank Wise, Jr., Davis Polk & Wardwell L.L.P., Thomas
Andrew Paskowitz, Sidley Austin LLP & William J. Nissen, Sidley
Austin, LLP.

UBS AG, Defendant, represented by Arthur J. Burke , Davis Polk &
Wardwell, David Jarrett Arp, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, pro hac
vice, Gary Richard Spratling, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, pro hac
vice, Jefferson Eliot Bell, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Lawrence
Jay Zweifach, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Mark Adam Kirsch,
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Matthew Roffman Greenfield , Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Robert Frank Wise, Jr. , Davis Polk &
Wardwell L.L.P., Abram Jeremy Ellis, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP
& Eric Jonathan Stock, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP.

WestLB AG & WestDeutsche Immobilienbank AG, Defendants, represented
by Arthur J. Burke, Davis Polk & Wardwell, Christopher Martin
Paparella, Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, Marc Alan Weinstein, Hughes
Hubbard & Reed LLP & Robert Frank Wise, Jr., Davis Polk & Wardwell
L.L.P.


MERIDIAN BIOSCIENCE: Bid to Dismiss Forman Class Suit Underway
--------------------------------------------------------------
Meridian Bioscience Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company is seeking
dismissal of an amended class action complaint by Barbara Forman.

On November 15, 2017, Barbara Forman filed a class action complaint
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio naming Meridian, its Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Financial Officer (in their capacities as such) as defendants. An
amended complaint was filed on April 16, 2018 and the Company
believes the essential elements of the amended complaint are the
same.

The complaint and the amended complaint are hereafter referred to
as the "Complaint". The Complaint alleges that Meridian made false
and misleading representations concerning certain of Magellan's
lead test systems at or around the time of Meridian's acquisition
of Magellan and subsequent thereto. The Complaint seeks
compensatory damages, injunctive relief and attorneys' fees to all
members of the proposed class. Meridian filed a motion to dismiss
the Complaint and that motion remains pending.

Meridian said, "Because the litigation is in preliminary stages, we
do not have sufficient information to determine or predict the
ultimate outcome or estimate the range of possible losses, if any.
Accordingly, no provision for litigation losses has been included
within the accompanying Condensed Consolidated Statement of
Operations for the fiscal year-to-date period ended June 30,
2018."

Meridian Bioscience Inc., an integrated life science company,
manufactures, develops, sells, and distributes diagnostic test
kits. These are used primarily for respiratory, gastrointestinal,
viral, and parasitic infectious diseases. Meridian, founded in
1976, is based in Cincinnati, Ohio.


MIDLAND CREDIT: Blackwell Sues over Debt Collection Practices
-------------------------------------------------------------
TERRENCE BLACKWELL, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT INC.,
MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, and JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-02205-RMG (D. S.C., Aug. 10, 2018) seeks to stop the
Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt. The
case is assigned to Honorable Richard M Gergel.

Midland Credit Management, Inc., a licensed debt collector, assists
customers in resolving past-due financial obligations through
various education and payment plans. The company was founded in
1953 and is based in San Diego, California. Midland Credit
Management, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Encore Capital Group,
Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kenneth Edward Norsworthy, Jr., Esq.
          NORSWORTHY LAW LTD CO
          505 Pettigru Street
          Greenville, SC 29601
          Telephone: (864) 804-0581
          Facsimile: (864) 756-1153
          E-mail: kenorsworthy@me.com


MIDLAND CREDIT: Schonfeld Sues over Debt Collection Practices
-------------------------------------------------------------
EIDL SCHONFELD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC.; and JOHN
DOES 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 7:18-cv-07317 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 14,
2018) seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means
to collect a debt.

Midland Credit Management, Inc., a licensed debt collector, assists
customers in resolving past-due financial obligations through
various education and payment plans. The company was founded in
1953 and is based in San Diego, California. Midland Credit
Management, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Encore Capital Group,
Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel Kohn, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          E-mail: dkohn@steinsakslegal.com


MIDWEST SUPPLY: Underpays Janitors, Wanda Smith Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------
WANDA SMITH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MIDWEST SUPPLY & MAINTENANCE COMPANY; and
CHARLOTTE CALLAGHAM, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-12483-SFC-RSW
(E.D. Mich., Aug. 10, 2018) seeks to recover from the Defendants
unpaid wages, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and costs under
the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Smith was employed by the Defendants as janitor from
April 2017 to August 2017.

Midwest Supply & Maintenance Co Inc was founded in 1989. The
company's line of business includes the wholesale distribution of
equipment and supplies for personal service establishments.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bryan Yaldou, Esq.
          Omar Badr, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF BRYAN YALDOU, PLLC
          23000 Telegraph, Suite 5
          Brownstown, MI 48134
          Telephone: (734) 692-9200
          Facsimile: (734) 692-9201
          E-mail: bryan@yaldoulaw.com


MINNESOTA: Court Dismisses Jackson Suit
---------------------------------------
In the case, Tony Dejuan Jackson, Plaintiff, v. Mark Dayton et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-0880 (WMW/TNL) (D. Minn.), Judge
Wilhelmina M. Wright of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Minnesota (i) granted the Defendants' motions to dismiss, (ii)
denies as moot Jackson's motions for injunctive and other relief,
and (iii) dismissed with prejudice Jackson's complaint.

Jackson commenced the lawsuit under Title 42, United States Code,
Section 1983, alleging violations of his civil rights during his
incarceration in prisons operated by the State of Minnesota.
Jackson thereafter filed a 163-page amended complaint, which
alleges the following five violations of his civil rights: (1)
unconstitutional conditions of confinement; (2) unlawful
retaliation and mail tampering; (3) unfair wage practices; (4)
occurrences of hate crimes, harassment, and false imprisonment; and
(5) unlawful denial of Internet access.  He seeks injunctive
relief, declaratory relief, $3.5 billion in compensatory damages,
and punitive damages.  He subsequently filed additional motions to
enjoin the conduct alleged in his amended complaint and for other
relief related to the lawsuit.

The amended complaint names 52 Defendants that can be categorized
into three groups—state government officials and entities (state
Defendants), corporate entities, and non-governmental persons.
Numerous Defendants now move to dismiss Jackson's amended complaint
on a variety of grounds.

On April 2, 2018 Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung entered his Report
and Recommendation ("R&R").  The R&R recommends granting the
pending motions to dismiss, denying as moot Jackson's motions for
injunctive and other relief, and dismissing with prejudice
Jackson's amended complaint.  

Jackson filed timely objections to the R&R, and he subsequently
filed three additional motions seeking leave to further amend his
complaint.  His amended complaint alleges purported violations of
his civil rights arising from his incarceration in prisons that are
operated by the State of Minnesota. Jackson's amended complaint
spans 163 pages and names 52 Defendants.  

Judge Wright finds that despite admonitions to avoid duplication,
Jackson repeats verbatim -- no less than 14 times throughout the
amended complaint -- the general allegations about his conditions
of confinement.  Although the amended complaint cites a variety of
constitutional and statutory provisions, Jackson does not clearly
allege which provisions pertain to the actions of each the
Defendant.  Put simply, Jackson's allegations are neither short nor
plain.  Although as a pro se party Jackson is accorded leniency as
it pertains to the pleading standards, these pleading defects
render the entirety of Jackson's amended complaint inadequate.

In addition, she finds that none of Jackson's objections undermines
the soundness of the R&R's conclusions or remedies the amended
complaint's deficiencies.  Therefore, Jackson's objections to the
R&R are overruled and the Judge needs not address the R&R's
alternative analyses of Jackson's claims.

Finally, as thoroughly addressed in the R&R and despite prior
notice, the Judge finds that Jackson repeatedly failed to remedy
deficiencies in his motions and pleadings -- opting instead for
longer, more convoluted filings.  It is is Jackson's fourth attempt
at pleading the merits of this specific cause of action.  And
Jackson's failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is not an isolated incident.  Because Jackson has a
history of filing claims that fail to state a basis for relief,
Jackson already is restricted by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
from pursuing certain federal claims.  For these reasons, Jackson's
amended complaint is dismissed with prejudice, and Jackson's
motions to amend his complaint are denied as moot.

Based on the foregoing analysis, Judge Wright (i) overruled
Jackson's objections to the R&R; (ii) adopted the April 2, 2018
R&R; (iii) granted the Defendants' motions to dismiss; (iv)
dismissed without prejudice Jackson's amended complaint; (v) denied
as moot Jackson's motions for other relief; (vi) denied as moot
Jackson's motions for injunctive relief; and (vii) denied as moot
Jackson's motions to amend his complaint.  Judgment will be entered
accordingly.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/veGZUW from Leagle.com.

Tony Dejuan Jackson, Individually & on Behalf of other similarly
Situated Prisoner's At Stillwater Correctional Facility, Plaintiff,
pro se.

Mark Dayton, Governor, State of Minnesota, Tina Smith, Lieutenant
Governor, State of Minnesota, Tom Roy, Commissioner of Dept. of
Corrections & MINNCOR Industries Board Member, David Milton,
MINNCOR lndustries Chief Executive Officer & MINNCOR Industries
Board Member, Jeff Lonski, MINNCOR Industries Vice President of
Operations, Joseph Bjelland, MINNCOR Industries Chief Financial
Officer, Steve Hamann, MINNCOR CENTRALIZED Canteen Director, Terry
Carlson, Deputy Commissioner of Dept. of Corrections & MINNCOR
Industries Board Member, Chris Dodge, Chief Financial Officer Dept.
of Corrections & MINNCOR Industries Board Member, Eddie Miles,
Warden Stillwater Correctional Facility Former Assistant
Commissioner of Dept. of Corrections, Steve Hammer, Former Warden
Stillwater Correctional Facility, Victor Wanchena, Associate Warden
Administration, Chris Pawlick, Associate Warden Operations
Stillwater Correctional Facility, John Quist, Program Director
Stillwater Correctional Facility, Regina Stepney, Program Director
Stillwater Correctional Facility, Lisa Stenseth, Program Director
Stillwater Correctional Facility, Loretta Ryks, Daniel Kiser, Food
Service Supervisor Stillwater Correctional Facility, Jim Benson,
Warden of Rush City Correctional Facility, Bruce Reiser, Assistant
Commissioner of Dept. of Corrections, Gregg Smith, Associate Warden
Operations of Rush City Correctional Facility, Sandy O'Hara,
Associate Warden Administration of Rush City Correctional Facility,
Joe Winiecki, MINNCOR Industries Director and (PIECP) Coordinator,
Department of Labor, Dan Gorman, AFSCME UNION LOCAL 600 President,
John C. Hillyard, AFSCME UNION LOCAL 600, Vice President/Chief
Steward, Minnesota Department of Administration, Steve McCarty,
Former Office of Special Investigation Supervisor, Mike McMahon,
Former Office of Special Investigation Supervisor, Byron Matthews,
Captain, Stephen Harding, Captain, Richard Jennings, Canine Unit
Officer, Tamara Hopwood, Security Officer, Travis Green, Building &
Maintenance Staff, Lonnie Danielson, Former Physical Plant
Director, Rob Brouhard, Building & Maintenance Construction
Supervisor, Mary MCComb, Associate Warden Operations & Gloria
Andreachi, Lieutenant, Defendants, represented by Steven Forrest,
Minnesota Attorney General's Office.

Walmart Corporation, Defendant, represented by Angela Beranek
Brandt -- abrandt@larsonking.com -- Larson King, LLP & Bradley R.
Prowant -- bprowant@larsonking.com -- Larson King LLP.

3M Corporation, Defendant, represented by Anna Tobin --
atobin@greeneespel.com -- Greene Espel PLLP.

Plastech Corpartion, Defendant, represented by Travis J. Adams --
tadams@plklaw.net -- Peterson, Logren, & Kilbury, P.A.

A'Vianvs Food Service, Defendant, represented by Seth J.S.
Leventhal, LEVENTHAL pllc.


MOLINA HEALTHCARE: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Robinson Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
LASHAY ROBINSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MOLINA HEALTHCARE, INC.; and MOLINA
HEALTHCARE OF ILLINOIS, INC., Defendants, Case No. 18cv5522 (N.D.
Ill., Aug. 13, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for
failure to pay earned regular and overtime pay for all time worked
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Robinson was employed by the Defendants as an hourly,
non-exempt employee from February 2016 to present.

Molina Healthcare, Inc. provides Medicaid-related solutions to meet
the health care needs of low-income families and individuals; and
to assist state agencies in their administration of the Medicaid
program in the United States. Molina Healthcare, Inc. was founded
in 1980 and is headquartered in Long Beach, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           James X. Bormes, Esq.
           Catherine P. Sons, Esq.
           LAW OFFICE OF JAMES X. BORMES, P.C.
           8 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 2600
           Chicago, IL 60603
           Telephone: (312) 201-0575

               - and -

          Thomas M. Ryan, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF THOMAS M. RYAN, P.C.
          35 East Wacker Drive, Suite 650
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 726-3400


MRS BPO LLC: Ridley Sues over Debt Collection Practices
-------------------------------------------------------
FATIMA RIDLEY, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MRS BPO, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-12696-NLH-JS (D.N.J., Aug. 13, 2018) seeks to stop the
Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt. The
case is assigned to Judge Noel L. Hillman and referred to
Magistrate Judge Joel Schneider.

MRS BPO, LLC, a debt collection agency, provides accounts
receivables solutions. MRS BPO, LLC was formerly known as MRS
Associates, Inc. The company was incorporated in 1991 and is based
in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel Zemel, Esq.
          ZEMEL LAW LLC
          1373 Broad Street, Suite 203-C
          Clifton, NJ 07013
          Telephone: (862) 227-3106
          E-mail: dz@zemellawllc.com


MYLAN NV: Loses Bid to Scale Down EpiPen Antitrust MDL
------------------------------------------------------
Jeff Overley, writing for Law360, reports that Mylan NV and Pfizer
Inc. on Aug. 20 largely failed to scale down multidistrict
litigation over sky-high prices for emergency allergy treatment
EpiPen, as a Kansas federal judge mostly refused to throw out
wide-ranging consumer claims of anti-competitive shenanigans.

The setback came in a 128-page ruling from U.S. District Judge
Daniel D. Crabtree, who kept alive most of a proposed class action
that alleges "one of the most egregious examples of corporate greed
and malfeasance in our nation's history."

In his ruling, Judge Crabtree preserved allegations brought under
the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.

The case is styled In Re: Epipen (Epinephrine Injection, USP)
Marketing, Sales Practices and Antitrust Litigation, Case No.
2:17-md-02785.  The case is assigned to Judge Daniel D. Crabtree.
The case was filed August 4, 2017. [GN]


NATURE'S BOUNTY: Court Narrows Claims in Muir Suit
--------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL MUIR, MELISSA BOWERS, REGINA CORBIN, COLLEEN
GAINES, and DONNA BENGEN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. NATURE'S BOUNTY (DE), INC.,
REXALL SUNDOWN, LLC, and PURITAN'S PRIDE, INC., Defendants, Case
No. 15 C 9835 (N.D, Ill.), Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion
dismiss all the claims in the Second Amended Class Complaint except
those that Muir himself asserts under Illinois law.

It is Muir's third attempt to plead individual and class
allegations of consumer fraud and unjust enrichment arising from
his and proposed class members' purchases of the dietary supplement
St. John's Wort.  The Court dismissed Muir's original complaint
insofar as it asserted claims against manufacturers whose products
Muir did not purchase.

Muir amended his complaint to name only one manufacturer --
Nature's Bounty, Inc. -- as a Defendant, but the Court dismissed
both his nationwide class allegations (due to relevant conflicts in
state unjust-enrichment laws) and his multi-state class allegations
(due to Muir's lack of standing to assert claims under the consumer
fraud statutes of states where he did not purchase St. John's
Wort).

In a Second Amended Class Complaint, four new Plaintiffs now join
Muir in seeking damages -- individually and on behalf of a
multi-state class of certain persons who purchased St. John's Wort
in Illinois, California, Michigan, or Pennsylvania -- from Nature's
Bounty and two additional corporate Defendants.  In the
alternative, the Plaintiffs propose four subclasses of persons who
purchased St. John's Wort in one of each of these states.

The Defendants have moved to dismiss all the claims in the Second
Amended Class Complaint except those that Muir himself asserts
under Illinois law.

Because the non-Illinois Plaintiffs' claims do not arise from or
relate to the Defendants' contacts with Illinois, and because
Bristol-Myers bars Illinois courts from exercising pendent personal
jurisdiction based on the alleged existence of a common nucleus of
operative fact between those claims and the claims of the Illinois
Plaintiffs, Judge Pallmeyer granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the claims of Regina Corbin, Colleen Gaines, and Donna
Bengen.

Because the claims also raise common questions of both law and fact
-- including, but not limited to, whether the Defendants knowingly
made misrepresentations about their St. John's Wort products -- the
requirements for permissive joinder are satisfied, and the
Defendants' motion to "drop" Bowers and Puritan's Pride is denied.

The Judge declines to strike the class allegations at this time.
This ruling is not tantamount to an order certifying the
multi-state class proposed by the Plaintiff.  Instead, she simply
concludes that the Defendants have not shown that differences in
the applicable state consumer protection laws foreclose any
possibility of certifying that class.

For these reasons, Judge Pallmeyer granted in part and denied in
part the Defendants' motion to dismiss and strike.  The claims of
Plaintiffs Corbin, Gaines, and Bengen are dismissed for lack of
personal jurisdiction.  She declines to sever the claims of the
Plaintiffs Muir and Bowers or to strike the Plaintiffs' multi-state
class allegations.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 1, 2018 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is available at https://bit.ly/2NBt2Xq from Leagle.com.

Michael Muir, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory F. Coleman --
greg@gregcolemanlaw.com -- Greg Coleman Law PC, Joseph J. Siprut,
Siprut PC, Nick Suciu, III -- nicksuciu@bmslawyers.com -- Barbat,
Mansour & Suciu PLLC, pro hac vice, Ke Liu -- kliu@siprut.com --
Siprut Pc & Todd Lawrence McLawhorn , Siprut PC.

Melissa Bowers, Donna Bengen, Regina Corbin & Colleen Gaines,
Plaintiffs, represented by Gregory F. Coleman, Greg Coleman Law PC,
Joseph J. Siprut, Siprut PC, Nick Suciu, III, Barbat, Mansour &
Suciu PLLC, pro hac vice & Ke Liu, Siprut Pc.

Nature's Bounty (DE), Inc., Defendant, represented by Amanda L.
Groves -- agroves@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn, pro hac vice,
Jason Zachary Pesick -- jpesick@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn,
Ross Jacob Corbett -- rcorbett@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn,
LLP, Scott M. Ahmad -- sahmad@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn Llp &
Scott P. Glauberman -- sglauber@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn
LLP.

Rexall Sundown, LLC & Puritan's Pride, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Amanda L. Groves, Winston & Strawn & Jason Zachary
Pesick, Winston & Strawn.


NEW JERSEY: Final Approval of Antitrust Suit Settlements Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, IN RE: NEW JERSEY TAX SALES CERTIFICATES ANTITRUST
LITIGATION. ARLENE M. DAVIES, Appellant, Case Nos. 16-3965, 17-2451
(3rd Cir.), Judge Theodore McKee of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's order granting
final approval of settlements in the underlying antitrust class
action concerning New Jersey tax sale certificates.

Davies challenges the District Court's order granting final
approval of those settlements.  She also appeals the District
Court's order imposing an appeal bond.  Davies argues that the
District Court abused its discretion by approving a $9.59 million
cash compensation settlement in a class action lawsuit.  She
asserts that the settlement amount is not fair, reasonable, and
adequate, as required under Rule 23(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.  She also claims that the structure of the
settlement itself is unfair due to its distribution terms, which
she says precludes approval.

Judge McKee finds that although they are somewhat helpful to the
Plaintiffs' claims of liability as to specific Defendants, the
guilty pleas do not define the scope of any bid-rigging.  Without
more detailed evidence as to the specific auctions that were
affected by these Defendants' criminal activity, or the extent of
the impact, the Judge cannot say that the District Court abused its
discretion in acknowledging the limited value of these criminal
pleas in the overall context of the complex antitrust class action.


He also finds no abuse of discretion in the District Court's
discussion of the litigation risks.  Davies supplies no authority
for the proposition it would be easy to establish the Plaintiffs'
likely interest rate absent the conspiracy or for the proposition
that the duty to undertake such an inquiry should be lightly
weighed.

Next, the Judge finds that Davies provides no authority for her
claim that a settlement cannot be reasonable if it constitutes a
certain percentage of the best possible recovery.  Given his
conclusion that the District Court did not err in evaluating the
complexity of the action, the risks of trying to maintain class
certification and of establishing damages and liability, the court
did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement as within
the range of reasonableness.

He also finds that the Class Counsel provided the District Court
with copious information regarding the amount of informal discovery
obtained.  Furthermore, the Plaintiffs began obtaining discovery
from some defendants as early as 2012, and continued requesting and
receiving discovery until at least the middle of 2014.  The Judge
thus finds no error in the court's conclusion that the third Girsh
factor weighed in favor of settlement.

The Judge finds it reasonable that the negotiated settlement treats
class members who still maintain outstanding tax liens differently
than those without tax liens of relief.  While this may mean that
certain persons may receive greater settlement benefits than
others, such allocation is reasonable, and the District Court's
approval was not an abuse of discretion.  Davies provides no
binding authority for her claims.

He also notes that though the Plaintiffs requested an appeal bond
of at least $61,845, the District Court found their request
excessive and only ordered a $10,000 bond.  The District Court
reasoned, and he agrees, that the amount of the bond did not
foreclose Davies' ability to appeal the class settlement decision
while still providing some security to the Plaintiffs of the
original class action.  Given the District Court's vast reduction
of the bond request and its analysis of both the costs incurred by
the Plaintiffs as well as Davies' ability to pay, the Judge
discerns no abuse of discretion in its determination to order a
$10,000 appeal bond under Rule 7.

For the reasons he set forth above, judge McKee affirmed the
judgment of the District Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 1, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://goo.gl/rTkJvQ from Leagle.com.


NRI USA: Can't Compel Arbitration in Garcia Wage and Hour Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALEJANDRA GARCIA, Plaintiff, v. NRI USA, LLC; DECTON
INC.; DECTON SOUTHWEST INC.; DECTON HR INC.; DECTON CORPORATE
SERVICES INC.; DOES 1 through 50, Defendants, Case No.
2:17-CV-08355-ODW-GJS (C.D. Cal.), Judge Otis D. Wright, II of the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California denied
the Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration.

The case is a wage-and-hour putative class action.  The Decton
Defendants are a temporary staffing agency.  NRI is a warehouse
distribution company that ships and delivers goods to businesses
and residents throughout the country.  Decton hired the Plaintiff
in July 2014, and assigned her to work for NRI.  The Plaintiff
worked in NRI's warehouse facility in Los Angeles, California,
until March 2017.

On Nov. 15, 2017, the Plaintiff initiated the case against the
Defendants alleging state-law claims under the California Labor
Code and Unfair Competition Law.  In her FAC, the Plaintiff added a
collective action claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA").

On Jan. 25, 2018, the Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's
claims for lack of jurisdiction and asked, in the alternative, to
stay the case pending the Supreme Court's review of the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Morris v. Ernst & Young LLP.  The Court
denied Defendants' Motion on May 21, 2018, and declined to stay the
case.

On June 4, 2018, the Defendants moved to compel arbitration,
arguing that the Plaintiff signed a binding arbitration agreement
as a condition of her employment with Decton.  They also argued
that NRI could compel arbitration as an agent of Decton or
alternatively on third-party beneficiary and equitable estoppel
grounds.  The Plaintiff opposed the Defendants' Motion on June 18,
2018.

On June 20, 2018, the Plaintiff dismissed Decton without prejudice
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1).  NRI replied
in support of its Motion to Compel on June 25, 2018.

Judge Wright finds that the level of explanation and testimony is
sufficient to meet the Defendants' burden of proof to authenticate
the Arbitration Agreement and the Plaintiff's assent to be bound by
it.  The Judge says the Plaintiff's testimony that she does not
remember signing the Arbitration Agreement or accessing the online
system is not sufficient to contradict the Defendants' evidence.
Additionally, the Judge finds that a typo in Marquardt's
Declaration with regard to the Plaintiff's name does not undermine
the remainder of the authentication.  Therefore, he finds that the
Defendants have established that the Plaintiff entered into a
binding agreement to arbitrate.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiff's claims are covered under
the scope of the arbitration clause, which requires arbitration of
any claims having any relationship with the Plaintiff's seeking
employment with Decton.

The Defendants argue that NRI can enforce the Arbitration Agreement
even as a nonsignatory, because NRI is either a third-party
beneficiary of the agreement or Decton's agent.  They also argue
that NRI can compel arbitration under equitable estoppel
principles.

The Judge finds that the Defendants have not shown that Decton or
NRI ever had or maintained control over the other.  They fail to
establish that an agency relationship ever existed between them.
In addition, in California, equitable estoppel is inapplicable
where a plaintiff's allegations reveal no claim of any violation of
any duty, obligation, term or condition imposed by the agreements
containing the arbitration clause.  Therefore, equitable estoppel
does not permit NRI to enforce the Arbitration Agreement.  Because
he finds that NRI cannot compel arbitration and NRI is the only
remaining Defendant in the action, he finds it unnecessary to
decide whether the Arbitration Agreement is unconscionable.

For the reasons he discussed, Judge Wright denied the Defendants'
Motion to Compel Arbitration.  He will issue a scheduling order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 1, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2N4SrJO from Leagle.com.

Alejandra Garcia, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joshua D. Boxer --
jboxer@maternlawgroup.com -- Matern Law Group PC, Roy Karngwon Suh
-- rsuh@maternlawgroup.com --  Matern Law Group PC & Matthew John
Matern -- Mmatern@maternlawgroup.com -- Matern Law Group PC.

NRI USA, LLC, a California limited liability company, Decton Inc.,
a California corporation, Decton Southwest Inc., a Nevada
corporation, Decton HR Inc., a California corporation & Decton
Corporate Services, Inc., a California corporation, Defendants,
represented by David George Hagopian -- dhagopian@cdlitigation.com
-- Carothers DiSante and Freudenberger LLP, Garrett Voorhees Jensen
-- gjensen@cdflaborlaw.com -- Carothers DiSante and Freudenberger
LLP & Jeffrey L. Sikkema -- jsikkema@cdflitigation.com --
Carothers DiSante and Freudenberger LLP.


OCWEN LOAN: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in Stromberg Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BONNIE LYNNE STROMBERG, Plaintiff, v. OCWEN LOAN
SERVICING, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-04719-JST (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Jon S. Tigar of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted Ocwen's motion for summary
judgment.

In the putative class action, Stromberg asserts a single cause of
action for violation of California Civil Code Section 2941(b)
against two mortgage lenders and a mortgage loan servicing company
for failing to reconvey a deed of trust on real property within
thirty days after repayment of her home loan.

In March 2005, Stromberg obtained a $150,000 10-year home equity
line of credit from Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Credit Corp.,
secured by a deed of trust on her residential property in Gilroy,
California.  Stromberg executed the deed of trust in favor of
Morgan Stanley as the beneficiary and it was recorded by the Santa
Clara County Recorder on April 11, 2005.

In March 2006, Morgan Stanley and Citizens Bank of Massachusetts
entered into a Master Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement ("MPA")
pursuant to which Morgan Stanley sold and transferred all of its
interests in a portfolio of loans, including Stromberg's loan, to
Citizens.  After it sold Stromberg's loan to Citizens, Morgan
Stanley executed an assignment of the beneficial interest in
Stromberg's deed of trust to Citizens, but it was not recorded.

In connection with the loan purchase agreement, Citizens and Morgan
Stanley entered into a Master Servicing Agreement ("MSA") under
which Morgan Stanley retained the right to service the loans for
Citizens.  In May 2012, Ocwen entered into an Amended and Restated
Purchase Agreement ("APA") with Morgan Stanley to acquire the
servicing rights Morgan Stanley had acquired from Citizens under
the MSA.

Stromberg paid off her loan by wire transfer to Ocwen on Jan. 5,
2015, and then requested in writing that her line of credit be
closed.  After Stromberg returned a signed statement indicating her
desire to close the account, Ocwen sent her a letter dated Feb. 18,
2015, confirming that her loan had been fully paid.  In the same
letter, Ocwen stated that it will send the lien release document to
the county courthouse in which your property resides.  Once Ocwen
receives confirmation that the release document has been recorded,
it will forward you that information for her records.  Depending on
the state and county involved, the final step can take up to six
months.  Ocwen informed Stromberg that the recordation of a "lien
release document" would make it a matter of public record that
Ocwen no longer claims any interest in the property with respect to
the loan.

At the time Stromberg satisfied her loan in January 2015, Citizens
was the owner of the loan and Morgan Stanley was listed as the
beneficiary of record on the deed of trust.  On June 2, 2015,
Morgan Stanley executed an assignment of the deed of trust, in
which it transferred its beneficial interest, to Citizens.  The
assignment was recorded by the Santa Clara County Recorder on July
1, 2015.

None of the Defendants delivered the original note, deed of trust,
request for full reconveyance, or other necessary documents for
reconveyance to the trustee within 30 days of loan satisfaction as
required by California Civil Code Section 2941(b).  The trustee did
not execute a full reconveyance of the deed of trust to Stromberg
until June 25, 2015, and this reconveyance was not recorded by the
Santa Clara County Recorder until July 1, 2015.   

Stromberg alleges that this delay caused her to suffer injury in
the form of slander of title, incurred costs, impaired credit and
incomplete and inaccurate public records respecting her financial
obligations and credit worthiness.

Stromberg filed her complaint in California state court on Sept. 4,
2015.  Ocwen subsequently removed the action to the federal court.
Stromberg asserts a single cause of action under California Civil
Code Section 2941(b) against all the three Defendants.  She seeks
declaratory relief and statutory damages.

Before the Court is Ocwen's motion for summary judgment.

Judge Tigar finds addresses: (1) Ocwen's statement in its Feb. 18,
2015 letter; (2) whether Ocwen's right to ancillary income goes
beyond typical loan servicing rights and makes it an assignee of
the loan's beneficiary; and (3) whether all loan servicers acquire
a beneficial interest in the loans they service.

First, Stromberg's suggestion that Ocwen's 2015 letter conclusively
shows Ocwen's status as an assignee of the beneficiary is
unpersuasive.  Teh Judge finds that Ocwen's letter does not state
that it had a beneficial interest in Stromberg's loan does nor does
it refer to its status as a beneficiary or assignee of the
beneficiary under Section 2941(b)(1).  While the statement was
sufficient for Stromberg to adequately allege that Ocwen was an
"assignee" under Section 2941(b)(1), that statement alone is not
sufficient to survive summary judgment.

Turning to the second issue, Stromberg contends that the servicing
rights acquired by Ocwen go well beyond the mere right and
obligation to administer, collect, and remit payments of principal
and interest to the owners because Ocwen has the right to receive
all ancillary income.  The Judge holds that Stromberg seems to
place a distinction on ancillary income because she says a
mortgagors's obligation to pay these fees and charges arises
directly from the terms of the loans themselves.  However, she
cites no authority for the proposition that ancillary income is
materially different from the servicing fee Ocwen receives, which
is computed as a percentage of the mortgagors's payments on the
principal and interest of the loans.  Additionally, the Judge has
found nothing to suggest that Ocwen's compensation is atypical for
a loan servicer.

Finally, turning to the question of whether all loan servicers
acquire a beneficial interest in the loans they serve, Stromberg
cites no authority, and the Judge is aware of none, holding that a
loan servicer is a beneficiary or an assignee of a beneficiary of a
loan under Section2941(b)(1).  The fact that a lender or owner of a
loan can sell a portion of its beneficial interest in the loan does
not provide any authority for Stromberg's argument that Ocwen
acquired a beneficial interest in Stromberg's loan from Citizens
through its servicing rights.

Given the persuasive authority against finding that Ocwen was a
beneficiary, and in the absence of any contrary authority, the
Judge concludes that Ocwen, in its capacity as the loan servicer,
was not the beneficiary or the assignee of the beneficiary under
Section 2941(b)(1).  Accordingly, Judge Tigar granted Ocwen's
motion for summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/h8KXsq from Leagle.com.

Bonnie Lynne Stromberg, On behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Mark T. Johnson --
MJohnson@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky
Wotkyns LLP, Alexis Helene Castillo, Klafter Olsen and Lesser LLP,
pro hac vice, Charles Delbaum, National Consumer Law Center, pro
hac vice, Eric Lechtzin -- elechtzin@bm.net -- Berger Montague,
Kyle Geoffrey Bates -- kbates@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider
Wallace Cottrell Konecky Wotkyns LLP, Michael Hayden Reed, Klafter
Olsen and Lesser LLP, Seth Richard Lesser, Klafter Olsen & Lesser
LLP, Stuart Rossman, National Consumer Law Center, pro hac vice,
Todd Stowe Collins -- tcollins@bm.net -- Berger Montague, P.C., pro
hac vice & Todd Michael Schneider -- meschneider@lalive.law --
Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky Wotkyns LLP.

OCWEN Loan Servicing, LLC & RBS Citizens, N.A., Defendants,
represented by John B. Sullivan -- mjs@severson.com -- Severson &
Werson A Professional Corporation, Charles Kenzie LaPlante,
Greenberg Traurig LLP, Jon David Ives -- jdi@severson.com --
Severson & Werson, Joseph W. Guzzetta -- jwg@severson.com --
Severson & Werson A Professional Corporation, Mark Douglas Lonergan
-- mdl@severson.com --Severson & Werson A Profesional Corporation,
Michael Jan Steiner -- mjs@severson.com -- Severson & Werson A
Professional Corporation & Robert Sean Freund -- freundr@gtlaw.com
-- Greenberg Traurig LLP.

Morgan Stanley Private Bank, N.A., Defendant, represented by Jason
R. Scherr -- jr.scherr@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis and Bockius
LLP, Lucy Han Wang, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP & Patrick A. Harvey
-- patrick.harvey@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP.


OFFIT KURMAN: Crowley et al. Sue over Debt Collection Practices
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARGARET CROWLEY; MARGARET JONAS; FRANCINE JUPITER; and JAY
JUPITER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. OFFIT KURMAN, P.C. d/b/a OFFIT KURMAN,
P.A., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-00996-AJT-MSN (E.D. Va., Aug. 10,
2018) seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means
to collect a debt.

Offit Kurman PA is a law firm. The Firm's practice areas include
bankruptcy, government contracts, labor and employment, family,
estate, and nonprofit law.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Scott A. Surovell, Esq.
          Nathan D. Rozsa, Esq.
          SUROVELL ISAACS & LEVY PLC
          4010 University Drive, Suite 200
          Fairfax, VA 22030
          Telephone (703) 277-9750
          Facsimile (703) 591-9285
          E-mail: SSurovell@SurovellFirm.com
                  NRozsa@SurovellFirm.com


ON MY OWN: Can Compel Arbitration in Hartley FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, AMBER HARTLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ON MY OWN
COMMUNITY SERVICES, et al., Defendants, Case No.
2:17-cv-00353-KJM-EFB (E.D. Cal.), Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California granted
the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings.

Hartley and Taylor brought the collective and class action against
Defendants On My Own Community, and On My Own Independent Living
Services, claiming violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
California Labor Code, and California Business and Professions
Code.  The Plaintiffs later added claims for penalties under the
California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 ("PAGA").

The Defendants contend the parties' employment agreements require
the Plaintiffs to submit their claims to individual arbitration.
The employment agreements provide, in relevant part that there will
be no right or authority for any dispute to be brought, heard or
arbitrated as a class or collective action, except to the extent
that state law prohibits requiring arbitration of representative
claims in a private attorney general capacity.

Judge Mueller finds that a concerted action waiver in an
arbitration agreement does not render the agreement invalid and
unenforceable; the opposing party must raise a valid contract
defense to avoid arbitration.  The Plaintiffs' opposition focuses
exclusively on Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, raising no other
contract defenses.  

Under California law, the unconscionability defense requires a
showing of both procedural and substantive unconscionability; the
Plaintiffs have not shown the latter, even if they have shown the
former.  Because Morris does not bar enforcement in the case, and
because the Plaintiffs have raised no viable defense, controlling
law requires that the Judge grants the Defendant's motion.

The Judge declines, however, the Defendants' request to stay the
Plaintiffs' PAGA claim pending arbitration.  The Defendants
contend, without authority, that any simultaneous proceeding in the
Court on the Plaintiff's PAGA claim will disrupt the arbitration
and render it ineffective.  She is not persuaded.  Accordingly, the
case will proceed on the Plaintiffs' PAGA claims alone.

The parties will proceed to final and binding arbitration under the
terms of their agreement on all claims except the Plaintiffs' PAGA
claims.  With the exception of the Plaintiffs' PAGA claims, Judge
Mueller stayed the action pending completion of arbitration.  The
parties will file a joint status report within 14 days with the
contents as prescribed by the Court's initial scheduling order,
proposing dates for litigation of the PAGA claims.  They will
notify the Court within 14 days of the completion of the named
Plaintiffs' arbitration proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 1, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2N4h8Gr from Leagle.com.

Amber Hartley, Plaintiff, represented by Richard Anderson Hoyer --
rhoyer@hoyerlaw.com -- Hoyer & Hicks, Ryan Lee Hicks, Hoyer &
Hicks, Sean Desmond McHenry -- smchenry@hoyerlaw.com -- Hoyer &
Hicks & Walter L. Haines -- info@uelglaw.com -- United Employees
Law Group, PC.

Janice Taylor, Plaintiff, pro se.

On My Own Community Services & On My Own Independent Living
Services, Defendants, represented by Alden John Parker --
aparker@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher & Phillips, LLP & Katherine P.
Sandberg -- ksandberg@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher & Phillips LLP.


ORACLE CORP:  Sunrise Firefighters Sue over 9.5% Share Price Drop
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CITY OF SUNRISE FIREFIGHTERS' PENSION FUND, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ORACLE
CORPORATION; SAFRA A. CATZ; MARK HURD; LAWRENCE J. ELLISON; THOMAS
KURIAN; KEN BOND; and STEVE MIRANDA, Defendants, Case No.
5:18-cv-04844-BLF (N.D. Cal., Aug. 10, 2018) alleges violation of
the Securities Act of 1934.

According to the complaint, on March 19, 2018, when the Defendants
disclosed that cloud revenue growth had stagnated and forecasted
significantly slower sales growth for its cloud business than its
competitors. Following these disclosures, analysts connected
Oracle's poor financial performance to its improper sales tactics.
A leading research and advisory company observed that Oracle had to
rely on coercive practices because its cloud-based offering is a
"bare-bones minimum viable product." These revelations caused
Oracle shares to decline by $4.90 per share, or nearly 9.5%, which
is the Oracle's largest single-day stock drop in over five years.

Oracle Corporation develops, manufactures, markets, sells, hosts,
and supports application, platform, and infrastructure solutions
for information technology (IT) environments worldwide. The company
serves businesses, government agencies, educational institutions,
and resellers. Oracle Corporation was founded in 1977 and is
headquartered in Redwood City, California.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David R. Stickney, Esq.
          BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER
          & GROSSMANN LLP
          12481 High Bluff Drive, Suite 300
          San Diego, CA 92130
          Telephone: (858) 793-0070
          Facsimile: (858) 793-0323
          E-mail: davids@blbglaw.com

               - and -

          Mark Lebovitch, Esq.
          Avi Josefson, Esq.
          BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER
          & GROSSMANN LLP
          1251 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10020
          Telephone: (212) 554-1400
          Facsimile: (212) 554-1444
          E-mail: markl@blbglaw.com
                  avi@blbglaw.com

               - and -

          Robert D. Klausner, Esq.
          KLAUSNER KAUFMAN JENSEN & LEVINSON
          7080 Northwest 4th Street
          Plantation, FL 33317
          Telephone: (954) 916-1202
          Facsimile: (954) 916-1232
          E-mail: bob@robertdklausner.com


OYSHI TABLE: Underpays Kitchen Helpers, Jimenez and Franco Claim
----------------------------------------------------------------
ALEX HENRY JIMENEZ, and JORGE ALFONSO FRANCO, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. OYSHI TABLE
CORP., d/b/a TOASTIES, and MATTHEW AHN, Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-07295 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 13, 2018) is an action against the
Defendants to recover unpaid wages, unpaid overtime compensation,
liquidated damages, withheld tips, interests, attorneys' fees and
costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as kitchen helpers.
Mr. Jimenez was employed from April 2016 to March 20, 2018; Mr.
Franco from the year 2010 to May 2018.

Oyshi Table Corp., is a domestic business corporation organized
under the laws of the State of New York, doing business as
"Toasties", a fast food restaurant with a principal place of
business at 924 Third Avenue, New  York, New York 10022.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter H. Cooper, Esq.
          CILENTI & COOPER, PLLC
          708 Third Avenue, 6th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone (212) 209-3933
          Facsimile (212) 209-7102
          E-mail: pcooper@jcpclaw.com


PFIZER INC: Bid to Strike Nationwide Class Claims in Haj Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KARMEL AL HAJ, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PFIZER INC., Defendant,
Case No. 17 C 6730 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Gary Feinerman of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, denied Pfizer's renewed motion to strike the complaint's
nationwide class claims.

On behalf of himself and a putative nationwide class, Al Haj
alleges in the diversity suit that Pfizer deceives consumers by
charging more for "Maximum Strength" Robitussin cough syrup than
for "Regular Strength" Robitussin even though the former has a
lower concentration of active ingredients than the latter.

In the sequel to its first motion, Pfizer moves the Court to strike
the complaint's nationwide class allegations on the ground that,
under Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137
S.Ct. 1773 (2017), Pfizer is not subject to specific jurisdiction
as to absent class members whose claims lack the requisite nexus to
Illinois.  The cases have split on the question whether
Bristol-Myers requires that, for an absent class member to be part
of the class, and assuming the defendant is not subject to general
jurisdiction, the Court must have specific jurisdiction over the
Defendant as to that class member's claim.

In Judge Feinerman's view, Pfizer does not cite, and the He no
knowledge of, any pre-Bristol-Myers decision holding that, in a
class action where the defendant is not subject to general
jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction must be established not only as
to the named plaintiff(s), but also as to the absent class members.
The pre-Bristol-Myers consensus, rather, was that due process
neither precluded nationwide or multistate class actions nor
required the absent-class-member-by-absent-class-member
jurisdictional inquiry urged by Pfizer.

Likewise unpersuasive is Pfizer's argument that the Rules Enabling
Act ("REA"), compels the application of Bristol-Myers to putative
class actions pending in federal court both as to the claims of
named and unnamed class members.  True, the REA instructs that the
federal rules of procedure, including Civil Rule 23, will not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.  But the Court's
holding deprives the Defendants of no substantive right because a
defendant has no right to exclude an absent class member from the
class on the ground that the defendant is not subject to personal
jurisdiction as to that class member's claim.  It is for the same
reason that the cases holding that absent class members need not
establish their own standing, and are not considered for venue,
diversity of citizenship, or amount-in-controversy purposes, do not
violate the REA.

So, if Pfizer were right that Bristol-Myers applied to absent class
members, the hypothetical court would bear the onerous task of
determining, as to each absent class member not injured by the
product in the forum State, whether the product was manufactured at
the plant in the State, and thus whether a sufficient alternative
nexus existed between that the class member's injury and the forum
to permit the exercise of specific jurisdiction over the Defendant
as to that class member's claim.  Devlin counsels strongly against
such a result.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Feinerman (i) granted Pfizer's
motion under Civil Rule 12(b)(2) to dismiss the claims of Al Haj's
co-plaintiff, Timothy Woodhams, for lack of personal jurisdiction;
and (ii) denied Pfizer's motion under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(f) to
dismiss Al Haj's claims and to strike the complaint's nationwide
class claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2018 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/3AUFFn from Leagle.com.

Karmel Al Haj, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel J. Kurowski --
dank@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Elizabeth A.
Fegan -- beth@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Emily
Rees Brown -- emilyb@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro,
LLP & Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP.

Pfizer Inc, Defendant, represented by Gregory S. Bailey --
gregory.bailey@skadden.com -- Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom,
LLP, Jessica Davidson Miller -- jessica.miller@skadden.com --
Skadden, Aprs, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, pro hac vice, John H.
Beisner -- john.beisner@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom LLP, pro hac vice & Katherine Fletcher Morgan --
katherine.morgan@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom LLP.


PFIZER INC: Continues to Defend Lipitor-Related Antitrust Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Pfizer Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018, that the company continues to defend itself in
a purported class action lawsuit over sales of Lipitor.

Beginning in November 2011, purported class actions relating to
Lipitor were filed in various federal courts against, among others,
Pfizer, certain affiliates of Pfizer, and, in most of the actions,
Ranbaxy, Inc. (Ranbaxy) and certain affiliates of Ranbaxy. The
plaintiffs in these various actions seek to represent nationwide,
multi-state or statewide classes consisting of persons or entities
who directly purchased, indirectly purchased or reimbursed patients
for the purchase of Lipitor (or, in certain of the actions, generic
Lipitor) from any of the defendants from March 2010 until the
cessation of the defendants' allegedly unlawful conduct (the Class
Period).

The plaintiffs allege delay in the launch of generic Lipitor, in
violation of federal antitrust laws and/or state antitrust,
consumer protection and various other laws, resulting from (i) the
2008 agreement pursuant to which Pfizer and Ranbaxy settled certain
patent litigation involving Lipitor, and Pfizer granted Ranbaxy a
license to sell a generic version of Lipitor in various markets
beginning on varying dates, and (ii) in certain of the actions, the
procurement and/or enforcement of certain patents for Lipitor.

Each of the actions seeks, among other things, treble damages on
behalf of the putative class for alleged price overcharges for
Lipitor (or, in certain of the actions, generic Lipitor) during the
Class Period. In addition, individual actions have been filed
against Pfizer, Ranbaxy and certain of their affiliates, among
others, that assert claims and seek relief for the plaintiffs that
are substantially similar to the claims asserted and the relief
sought in the purported class actions described above.

These various actions have been consolidated for pre-trial
proceedings in a Multi-District Litigation (In re Lipitor Antitrust
Litigation MDL-2332) in the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey.

In September 2013 and 2014, the District Court dismissed with
prejudice the claims by direct purchasers. In October and November
2014, the District Court dismissed with prejudice the claims of all
other Multi-District Litigation plaintiffs. All plaintiffs have
appealed the District Court's orders dismissing their claims with
prejudice to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

In addition, the direct purchaser class plaintiffs appealed the
order denying their motion to amend the judgment and for leave to
amend their complaint to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.

In August 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed the District Court's decisions and remanded the claims to
the District Court.

Pfizer Inc. discovers, develops, manufactures, and sells healthcare
products worldwide. It operates in two segments, Pfizer Innovative
Health (IH) and Pfizer Essential Health (EH). Pfizer Inc. was
founded in 1849 and is headquartered in New York, New York.


PFIZER INC: Court Tosses Antitrust Suit over Saline Solution
------------------------------------------------------------
Pfizer Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018, that the District Court granted defendants'
motions to dismiss the consolidated amended complaint without
prejudice in intravenous saline solution related suit.

Beginning in November 2016, purported class actions were filed in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
against Hospira, Hospira Worldwide, Inc. and certain other
defendants relating to intravenous saline solution. Plaintiffs seek
to represent a class consisting of all persons and entities in the
U.S. who directly purchased intravenous saline solution sold by any
of the defendants from January 1, 2013 until the time the
defendants' allegedly unlawful conduct ceases.

Plaintiffs allege that the defendants' conduct restricts output and
artificially fixes, raises, maintains and/or stabilizes the prices
of intravenous saline solution sold throughout the U.S. in
violation of federal antitrust laws. Plaintiffs seek treble damages
(for themselves and on behalf of the putative classes) and an
injunction against defendants for alleged price overcharges for
intravenous saline solution in the U.S. since January 1, 2013.

All of these actions have been consolidated in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. In July 2018, the
District Court granted defendants' motions to dismiss the
consolidated amended complaint without prejudice.

On February 3, 2017, the company completed the sale of its global
infusion systems net assets, HIS, which includes intravenous saline
solution, to ICU Medical. The litigation is the subject of
cross-claims for indemnification by both Pfizer and ICU Medical
under the purchase agreement.

Separately, in April 2017, Pfizer, Hospira and two employees of
Pfizer received grand jury subpoenas issued by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in
connection with an investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division. The subpoenas seek documents related to the
sale, manufacture, pricing and shortages of intravenous solutions,
including saline, as well as communications among industry
participants regarding these issues. The Department of Justice
investigation is also the subject of cross-claims for
indemnification by both Pfizer and ICU Medical under the purchase
agreement. In addition, in August 2015, the New York Attorney
General issued a subpoena to Hospira for similar information.
Hospira has produced records to the New York Attorney General and
coordinated with ICU Medical to produce records to the U.S.
Department of Justice.

Pfizer Inc. discovers, develops, manufactures, and sells healthcare
products worldwide. It operates in two segments, Pfizer Innovative
Health (IH) and Pfizer Essential Health (EH). Pfizer Inc. was
founded in 1849 and is headquartered in New York, New York.


PFIZER INC: Still Defends Class Suit over EpiPen Sales
------------------------------------------------------
Pfizer Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018, that the company continues to defend against
the case, In re: EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Marketing,
Sales Practices and Antitrust Litigation.

Beginning in February 2017, purported class actions were filed in
various federal courts by indirect purchasers of EpiPen against
Pfizer, and/or its affiliates King and Meridian, and/or various
entities affiliated with Mylan N.V., and Mylan N.V. Chief Executive
Officer, Heather Bresch. The plaintiffs in these actions seek to
represent U.S. nationwide classes comprising persons or entities
who paid for any portion of the end-user purchase price of an
EpiPen between 2009 until the cessation of the defendants'
allegedly unlawful conduct.

In August 2017, a similar lawsuit brought in the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey on behalf of a purported class
of direct purchaser plaintiffs against Pfizer, King, Meridian and
Mylan was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. Against Pfizer
and/or its affiliates, plaintiffs generally allege that Pfizer's
and/or its affiliates' settlement of patent litigation regarding
EpiPen delayed market entry of generic EpiPen in violation of
federal antitrust laws and various state antitrust or consumer
protection laws.

At least one lawsuit also alleges that Pfizer and/or Mylan N.V.
violated the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act. Plaintiffs also filed various consumer protection and unjust
enrichment claims against, and relating to conduct attributable
solely to, Mylan Pharmaceuticals regarding EpiPen. Plaintiffs seek
treble damages for alleged overcharges for EpiPen since 2009.

In August 2017, the actions were consolidated for coordinated
pre-trial proceedings in a Multi-District Litigation (In re: EpiPen
(Epinephrine Injection, USP) Marketing, Sales Practices and
Antitrust Litigation, MDL-2785) in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Kansas with other EpiPen-related actions against Mylan
N.V. and/or its affiliates to which Pfizer, King and Meridian are
not parties.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Pfizer Inc. discovers, develops, manufactures, and sells healthcare
products worldwide. It operates in two segments, Pfizer Innovative
Health (IH) and Pfizer Essential Health (EH). Pfizer Inc. was
founded in 1849 and is headquartered in New York, New York.


PFIZER INC: Wyeth Still Defends Class Suit over Effexor XR Sales
----------------------------------------------------------------
Pfizer Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018, that Wyeth LLC and its affiliates continue to
defend a class action lawsuit relating to Effexor XR, which is the
extended-release formulation of Effexor.

Beginning in May 2011, actions, including purported class actions,
were filed in various federal courts against Wyeth LLC (Wyeth) and,
in certain of the actions, affiliates of Wyeth and certain other
defendants relating to Effexor XR, which is the extended-release
formulation of Effexor.

The plaintiffs in each of the class actions seek to represent a
class consisting of all persons in the U.S. and its territories who
directly purchased, indirectly purchased or reimbursed patients for
the purchase of Effexor XR or generic Effexor XR from any of the
defendants from June 14, 2008 until the time the defendants'
allegedly unlawful conduct ceased. The plaintiffs in all of the
actions allege delay in the launch of generic Effexor XR in the
U.S. and its territories, in violation of federal antitrust laws
and, in certain of the actions, the antitrust, consumer protection
and various other laws of certain states, as the result of Wyeth
fraudulently obtaining and improperly listing certain patents for
Effexor XR in the Orange Book, enforcing certain patents for
Effexor XR and entering into a litigation settlement agreement with
a generic drug manufacturer with respect to Effexor XR.

Each of the plaintiffs seeks treble damages (for itself in the
individual actions or on behalf of the putative class in the
purported class actions) for alleged price overcharges for Effexor
XR or generic Effexor XR in the U.S. and its territories since June
14, 2008. All of these actions have been consolidated in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey.

In October 2014, the District Court dismissed the direct purchaser
plaintiffs' claims based on the litigation settlement agreement but
declined to dismiss the other direct purchaser plaintiff claims. In
January 2015, the District Court entered partial final judgments as
to all settlement agreement claims, including those asserted by
direct purchasers and end-payer plaintiffs, which plaintiffs
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In
August 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed the District Court's decisions and remanded the claims to
the District Court.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Pfizer Inc. discovers, develops, manufactures, and sells healthcare
products worldwide. It operates in two segments, Pfizer Innovative
Health (IH) and Pfizer Essential Health (EH). Pfizer Inc. was
founded in 1849 and is headquartered in New York, New York.


PIERCE COUNTY, WA: Court Strikes Bid to Certify Bango Class
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DONALD BANGO, SCOTT BAILEY, Plaintiffs, v. PIERCE
COUNTY, WASHINGTON, PIERCE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Defendants,
Case No. 3:17-CV-06002-RBL-DWC (W.D. Wash.), Magistrate Judge David
W. Christel of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Tacoma, (i) granted in part the Defendants' Motion to
Strike Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Strike Class
Allegations; and (ii) denied the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel
Discovery and for Order of Protection.

The Plaintiffs initiated the lawsuit on Dec. 4, 2017.  On Dec. 21,
2017, the Plaintiffs filed the Motion to Certify. The Motion to
Certify was noted for the Court's consideration on Jan. 26, 2018.
After two stipulations by the parties, the Motion to Certify was
re-noted for the Court's consideration on June 8, 2018.

On May 30, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Motion Renoted,
re-noting the Motion to Certify to Aug. 17, 2018.  In the Notice,
the Plaintiffs state they intend to move to amend the Complaint in
the near future, and re-noted the Motion to Certify pursuant to LCR
7(l) so as to not prejudice the Defendants.  The Notice was not
stipulated to or signed by the defense counsel and the Court did
not grant leave to re-note the Motion to Certify.

The Defendants filed the Motion to Strike on June 7, 2018,
requesting the Court strikes the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify and
strikes the Plaintiff's class allegations because the Plaintiffs
have failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(c)(1)(A) and Local Civil Rule ("LCR") 23(i)(3).  The Defendants
assert that the Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the intent of
the Federal and Local Rules and the unilateral decision to re-note
the Motion to Certify resulted in a delay tactic that is
prejudicial to the Defendants.  The Defendants are essentially
requesting that the Court sanctions the Plaintiffs by striking both
the Motion to Certify and the class allegations.  The Plaintiffs
filed a Response stating they complied with both the Federal and
Local Rules and the Defendants are not prejudiced.

Magistrate Judge Christel finds that the Plaintiffs filed the
Motion to Certify on Dec. 21, 2017, 17 days after filing the
Complaint.  The parties agreed to extend the noting date twice and,
on May 30, 2018, the Plaintiffs unilaterally re-noted the Motion to
Certify to Aug. 17, 2018.  The Motion to Certify has remained
pending since Dec. 21, 2017.  Therefore, because the Plaintiffs
moved for a determination of whether the case should be maintained
as a class action within 180 days of filing the Complaint, the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify is in technical compliance with LCR
23(i)(3).

However, the Magistrate finds the Plaintiffs' conduct is
inconsistent with the spirit and intent of the Local Rules.  The
Plaintiffs unilaterally re-noted the Motion to Certify two business
days before the Defendants' response to the Motion to Certify was
due.  At that time, the Defendants had already spent a considerable
amount of time and expense preparing their response to the Motion
to Certify.  In light of their disclosure of their intent to amend
the Complaint so close to the date when the Defendants' response to
the Motion to Certify was due, the Plaintiffs should have moved for
the Court to postpone consideration of the Motion to Certify.
Thus, the Judge finds Plaintiffs' conduct warrants a determination
of whether sanctions should be imposed.

With respect to the imposition of sanctions, the Magistrate Judge
will grant in part the Motion to Strike.  She will strike the
Motion to Certify.  The Plaintiffs' class allegations remain in the
Complaint.  After determining if they will move to proceed on an
amended complaint, the Plaintiffs may file a motion requesting
enlargement of time to file a renewed motion to certify, which the
Court will consider under LCR 23(i)(3).

The Magistrate holds that the Plaintiffs' actions have caused delay
and created uncertainty as to status of the case.  As a motion to
amend has not been filed two months after the Plaintiffs indicated
they would be filing a motion to amend, he finds striking the
Motion to Certify is an appropriate sanction.  He, however,
declines to strike the class allegations in the Complaint and the
Plaintiffs may file a motion requesting enlargement of time to file
a renewed motion to certify after determining if they will indeed
move to proceed on an amended complaint.  This resolution avoids
prejudice to Defendants and allows the Court to effectively manage
its dockets, yet preserves the interest of deciding a dispositive
issue on the merits.

On June 14, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed the Motion to Compel,
requesting that the Court compels the Defendants to respond to
discovery requests, enter a protective order, and assess fees and
costs.   Teh Magistrate Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have not
cited to any legal authority stating the parties cannot agree to
limit discovery prior to the Rule 26(f) conference.  He finds that,
just as parties can enter a stipulation to conduct early discovery
without a Court order, parties can stipulate to limit the scope of
early discovery.  Therefore, he is not persuaded by the Plaintiffs
argument.  For these reasons, the Plaintiffs' request for an order
compelling the Defendants to provide responses to the early
discovery is denied.

As the evidence shows the parties are still attempting to resolve
any disagreement regarding a proposed protective order and have not
reached an impasse, the Magistrate finds the parties have not
completed the meet and confer requirement.  Therefore, the request
for a protective order is denied.  He directed the parties are
directed to continue engaging in discussions regarding a proposed
protective order.  The parties should only seek Court intervention
if the parties reach an impasse on a substantive issue.

As to the Plaintiffs' request for the Court to assess fees and
costs for bringing the Motion to Compel, the Magistrate Judge also
that the Plaintiffs have not shown an order compelling discovery
responses and a protective order is appropriate at this time.  As
he is denying the Motion to Compel, he declines to assess fees and
costs.

Finally, in light of the conduct described in the Order,
particularly the Plaintiff's delay in filing a motion to amend
after notifying the defense counsel and the Court of an intent to
file a motion to amend, the Magistrate finds a stay of discovery is
appropriate while the Plaintiffs determine how their case will
proceed (i.e. on the Complaint or moving to file an amended
complaint).  The stay of discovery will be lifted upon the entry of
a scheduling order, which the Court anticipates will occur after a
fetermination on class certification, or upon an order from the
Court, if the parties move to lift the stay of discovery prior to
the scheduling order being entered.

Magistrate Judge Christel has reviewed the Motion to Compel and the
relevant evidence.  For his stated reasons, he declined to: (1)
compel the Defendants to respond to the Plaintiffs' early discovery
requests; (2) enter a protective order; and (3) assess fees and
costs.  Therefore, he denied the Motion to Compel.  Accordingly, he
granted in part the Motion to Strike: he struck the Motion to
Certify, denied the Motion to Compel, and stayed the discovery in
the matter.  The Clerk is directed to strike the Motion to
Certify.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/CKFgtS from Leagle.com.

Donald Bango & Scott Bailey, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Antoinette
Marie Davis, ACLU OF WASHINGTON, Janelle Ellen Chase Fazio --
jchasefazio@gth-law.com -- GORDON THOMAS HONEYWELL LLP, Jessica
Wolfe, ACLU OF WASHINGTON & Sal Mungia -- smungia@gth-law.com --
GORDON THOMAS HONEYWELL LLP.

Pierce County, Washington & Pierce County Sheriff's Department,
Defendants, represented by Frank Cornelius, PIERCE COUNTY
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S OFFICE CIVIL DIVISION & Michelle Luna-Green,
PIERCE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S OFFICE CIVIL DIVISION.


PIXARBIO: Disgruntled Investors File Class Actions
--------------------------------------------------
Daniel D'Ambrosio, writing for Forbes, reports that as chief
executive officer and chief technology officer of PixarBio, Frank
Reynolds made some pretty bold claims to investors.

Mr. Reynolds said his Massachusetts-based startup was developing a
non-opioid pain reliever called NeuroRelease that was going to end
"thousands of years of morphine and opiate addiction." He also
claimed PixarBio was valued at $1 billion, and that Wall Street was
"soaring with excitement" at the prospect of NeuroRelease replacing
morphine.

It appears that none of these claims were true, according to the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. Attorney for
the District of Massachusetts. Reynolds and two of his associates
at PixarBio face civil and criminal prosecution. There are also
class action lawsuits being brought by disgruntled investors
against PixarBio and Mr. Reynolds personally.

Both the criminal and civil lawsuits allege several counts of
securities fraud, as well as manipulative trading. They call for
disgorgement and forfeiture of ill-gotten gains, plus civil
penalties and jail time if convicted. The plaintiffs in one class
action lawsuit want damages, as well as attorneys' fees, experts'
fees and "other costs."

Mr. Reynolds' attorney, David Axlerod of Ballard Spahr, LLP, in
Philadelphia, said his firm was going to "vigorously defend"
Reynolds from the charges lodged against him, adding that his
client has done a lot of "important work" at PixarBio, as well as
another company called InVivo, where Reynolds was CEO for eight
years, from 2005 to 2013.

InVivo's main product is the NeuroScaffold, a device used in
treating acute spinal cord injuries. Mr. Reynolds "abruptly
resigned" from InVivo on Aug. 22, 2013, according to the SEC, and
founded PixarBio one week later, on Aug. 29, 2013, primarily by
selling shares of InVivo stock.

After leaving InVivo, Reynolds claimed to be the "lead inventor" of
the NeuroScaffold, according to the U.S. attorney. In the criminal
complaint against Reynolds, the U.S. attorney says Reynolds had "no
formal training" in neuroscience.

"In fact, the NeuroScaffold was invented by a professor at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology ("MIT"), together with a
neurosurgeon from Harvard Medical School," the lawsuit states.

The SEC found that despite claiming to have co-invented on more
than 50 neurological patents since 2005, Reynolds is not identified
as a co-inventor on any issued patents, according to the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, and no patents have been issued to
PixarBio.

The U.S. attorney also rejected Mr. Reynolds' claim that he founded
PixarBio after "retiring" from InVivo.

"In fact, Mr. Reynolds resigned from InVivo because he expected to
be fired the next day," the criminal complaint states.

A class action lawsuit filed against Mr. Reynolds in New Jersey
points out that InVivo sued Reynolds in November 2013, alleging
that between March 2011 and August 2013 he "inappropriately
charged" more than $500,000 of "personal, exorbitant, and
unreasonable expenses to the company."

While at InVivo Mr. Reynolds allegedly expensed personal vacations
for himself, his "girlfriends" and his relatives, as well as
"personal goods," including nearly $200,000 in expenses for
limousine services and charges to his personal residential account
at the Ritz Carlton in Boston.

After leaving InVivo to establish PixarBio, Reynolds engaged in a
takeover bid for his former company, offering $77 million in stock,
less than half the value of the company at the time.

The U.S. attorney alleges that Mr. Reynolds knew he did not have
the capacity to offer even $77 million for InVivo.

On Jan. 23, 2017, the SEC halted trading in PixarBio securities,
citing concerns about possible "manipulative or deceptive
activities." On the same day, PixarBio announced it was abandoning
its attempt to acquire InVivo.

In its class action lawsuit, The Rosen Law Firm in South Orange,
New Jersey, points out that PixarBio was traded over-the-counter
throughout the class period from Oct. 31, 2016 to Jan. 23, 2017.

"While the number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiffs at this
time and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery,
Plaintiffs believe that there are hundreds or thousands of members
in the proposed Class," Rosen states.

In its complaint filed on April 24, 2018, the SEC estimated that
Mr. Reynolds and his associates, Ken Stromsland and Jay Herod,
raised approximately $12.7 million for PixarBio from about 211
investors.

The SEC complaint states that Mr. Reynolds makes all "significant
decisions" for PixarBio, including everything from business
strategy to drug development.

"He writes the substance of all the company's press releases and
offering materials. He reviews and approves all the company's
filings with the Commission, which he signs as the company's chief
executive officer," the SEC stated.

Those press releases often took on a Trumpian tone, complete with
misspellings and ALL CAPS proclamations. One press release was
titled, "It's Time to Make US Pharma GREAT Again."

Mr. Reynolds also apparently quoted himself in the press releases.

"'It's time for me to take back the technology and re-value what I
invented, and bring my neurological patent portfolio to market
after merging (PixarBio) with (InVivo)' said PixarBio CEO, CFO, and
Chief Science Officer Frank Reynolds. 'WE GOT THIS!!'"[GN]


PLYMOUTH ROCK: Failed to Pay Medicare, MSP Recovery Suit Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS, SERIES LLC; and SERIES 17-04-631, a series of
MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. PLYMOUTH ROCK ASSURANCE
CORPORATION, INC.; and THE PLYMOUTH ROCK COMPANY, INC., Defendants,
Case No. 1:18-cv-11702-ADB (D. Mass., Aug. 13, 2018) alleges the
Defendants' failure to meet its reimbursement obligations under the
Medicare Secondary Payer Act.

The Plaintiffs alleged in the complaint that the Class Members have
been unlawfully burdened with paying for the medical costs of their
beneficiaries when the law explicitly requires the Defendants to
make such payments. The Medicare Act and its subsequent amendments
were constructed to ensure an efficient and cost-effective system
of cooperation and communication between primary and secondary
payers. The Defendant's failure to reimburse the Plaintiffs and
Class Members runs afoul of the Medicare Act and has directly
contributed to the ever-increasing costs of the Medicare system.

The Defendants failed to provide primary payment and appropriately
reimburse the Class Members for money they were statutorily
required to pay under the MSP Law. This failure to reimburse
applies to the Plaintiffs, as the rightful assignees of the Class
Members.

Plymouth Rock Assurance Corporation provides insurance products and
services. The company was founded in 1982 and is based in Boston,
Massachusetts. Plymouth Rock Assurance Corporation operates as a
subsidiary of The Plymouth Rock Company Incorporated. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Walter Kelley, Esq.
          BERNHEIM DOLINSKY KELLEY, LLC
          Four Court Street
          Plymouth, MA 02360
          Telephone: (617) 963-7995
          E-mail: walterkelley@duejustice.com

               - and -

          Richard D. Meadow, Esq.
          THE LANIER LAW FIRM, P.C.
          6810 FM 1960 West
          Houston, TX 77069
          Telephone: (713) 659-5200
          E-mail: richard.meadow@lanierlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Eric A. Boss, Esq.
          PULASKI LAW FIRM, PLLC
          2925 Richmond Ave, Ste 1725
          Houston, TX 77098
          Telephone: (713) 664-4555
          E-mail: eric@pulaskilawfirm.com


POPSUGAR INC: Seeks Dismissal of Instagram Influencer's Case
------------------------------------------------------------
RJ Vogt, writing for Law360, reports that PopSugar Inc. urged a
California federal court on Aug. 17 to toss a law degree-holding
Instagram influencer's proposed class action over allegedly copied
posts, arguing that she can't accuse them of copyright infringement
without proving that she registered the copyrights before filing
suit.

Nita Mann, an Instagram influencer with more than 200,000 followers
and a law degree from Southern Methodist University's Dedman School
of Law, had alleged in June that the media and lifestyle company
copied thousands of her images, posted them on its site without
permission.

The case is styled Batra v. PopSugar, Inc., Case No. 4:18-cv-03752
(N.D. Calif.).  The case is assigned to Judge Magistrate Judge
Kandis A. Westmore.  The case was filed June 25, 2018. [GN]


PROCTER & GAMBLE: Discovery Order in Flushable Wipes Suit Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CITY OF WYOMING, MINNESOTA; VILLAGE OF HOLMEN,
WISCONSIN; CITY OF ELK RIVER, MINNESOTA; CITY OF MANKATO,
MINNESOTA; CITY OF PRINCETON, MINNESOTA; CITY OF FERGUS FALLS,
MINNESOTA; SAUK CENTRE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION; and CHISAGO
LAKES JOINT SEWAGE TREATMENT COMMISSION, on behalf ORDER AFFIRMING
of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY; KIMBERLY-CLARK CORPORATION; NICE-PAK
PRODUCTS, INC; PROFESSIONAL DISPOSABLES INTERNATIONAL, INC.; TUFCO
TECHNOLOGIES INC.; and ROCKLINE INDUSTRIES, Defendants, Civil No.
15-2101 (JRT/TNL) (D. Minn.), Judge John R. Tunheim of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota affirmed Magistrate
Judge Tony N. Leung's order denying the Plaintiffs' motion to
compel discovery from Defendant Kimberly-Clark.

The Plaintiffs brought the putative class action in April 2015
against companies marketing and selling "flushable wipes."  They
allege that the wipes do not degrade as advertised and have caused
damages to sewer systems and wastewater treatment plants.

On Jan. 3, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel discovery
from Defendant Kimberly-Clark, seeking production of additional
documents from three document custodians, addition of three new
document custodians, and incorporation of four additional search
terms regarding certain Kimberly-Clark projects.  Magistrate Leung
denied the motion in an oral ruling on Feb. 9, 2018, finding that
the Plaintiffs already had sufficient time to pursue the contested
matters with Kimberly-Clark and the Court.

The Plaintiffs now object to the ruling.  They object to the
Magistrate Judge's ruling on two grounds: (A) the ruling ignores
the Rule 26 affirmative obligations placed on litigants and (B) the
ruling is highly prejudicial to the Plaintiffs' trial preparation.
They seek modification of the Magistrate Judge's ruling and ask
that the Court compel Kimberly-Clark to produce all responsive
documents up to Nov. 28, 2017 (the agreed-upon date scope for
Kimberly-Clark's Rule 30(b)(6) deposition) and reproduce its
corporate designees for a deposition to authenticate and testify
about these improperly withheld documents.

Judge Tunheim will overrule the Plaintiffs' objections and deny
their request for modification of the order.  He holds that the
Magistrate Judge did not abuse his broad discretion by limiting the
extent of the parties' discovery pursuant to this rule and pursuant
to Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(ii) based on his conclusion that the Plaintiffs
had ample opportunity to raise these issues with Kimberly-Clark and
with the Court if need be, yet instead waited until at or near the
close of discovery.  The Magistrate Judge had broad discretion to
deny the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel, and his ruling was neither
clear error nor contrary to law.

The Plaintiffs also argue that the Magistrate Judge's ruling
rewards Kimberly-Clark's violation of Rule 26(g) and imposes a
manifest injustice upon the Plaintiffs.  But again, the Judge finds
that the Plaintiffs had ample opportunity to address these issues
before the close of discovery; thus, any prejudice resulting from
the delay is of their own making.

In overruling the Plaintiffs' objections and affirming the
Magistrate Judge's ruling, the Judge will deny the Plaintiffs
request to reopen Kimberly-Clark's witnesses' depositions.  But he
also notes that this request is not properly before the Court
because it was raised for the first time in the Plaintiffs'
objections.  Claimants may not make arguments in objections that
were neither argued to the magistrate judge nor addressed in the
judge's report, because to do so would contravene the purpose of
referring cases to a magistrate judge and would allow a claimant to
raise new claims to the district court and thus effectively have
two opportunities for judicial review.  He also reminds the parties
to comport with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local
Rules -- particularly with regard to word limits -- in all future
filings.

Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings
therein, Judge Tunheim orverruled the Plaintiffs' Appeal/Objection
of Magistrate Judge Decision, and affirmed the Magistrate Judge's
Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 1, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2x7rhae from Leagle.com.

City of Wyoming, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony D. Shapiro --
tony@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice,
Brant D. Penney -- b.penney@rwblawfirm.com -- Reinhardt Wendorf &
Blanchfield, Charles J. Kocher -- ckocher@smbb.com --  Saltz
Mongeluzzi Barrett & Bendesky, P.C., pro hac vice, Daniel E.
Gustafson -- dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com -- Gustafson Gluek PLLC,
David M. Cialkowski , Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, Eric W. Valen ,
Attorney at Law, Garrett D. Blanchfield, Jr. --
g.blanchfield@rwblawfirm.com -- Reinhardt Wendorf & Blanchfield,
James P. Watts -- james.watts@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed, LLP,
Jason S. Kilene -- jkilene@gustafsongluek.com -- Gustafson Glu ek
PLLC, Joshua J. Rissman -- jrissman@gustafsongluek.com -- Gustafson
Gluek PLLC, June Pineda Hoidal -- june.hoidal@zimmreed.com --
Zimmerman Reed LLP, Kristin J. Moody , Berman Tabacco, Mark
Reinhardt -- m.reinhardt@rwblawfirm.com -- Reinhardt Wendorf &
Blanchfield, Patrick Howard -- kmoody@bermantabacco.com -- Saltz,
Mongeluzzi, Barrett & Bendesky, P.C., pro hac vice, Raina Borrelli
-- rborrelli@gustafsongluek.com -- Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Roberta A.
Yard -- r.yard@rwblawfirm.com -- Reinhardt Wendorf & Blanchfield &
Simon Bahne Paris -- sparis@smbb.com -- Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett
Bendesky, PC, pro hac vice.

City of Mankato, Chisago Lakes Joint Sewage Treatment Commission,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Sauk
Centre Public Utilities Commission, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Village of Holmen, Wisconsin, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, City of Fergus
Falls, City of Elk River & City of Princeton, Plaintiffs,
represented by Anthony D. Shapiro, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
pro hac vice, Brant D. Penney, Reinhardt Wendorf & Blanchfield,
Charles J. Kocher, Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett & Bendesky, P.C., pro
hac vice, Daniel E. Gustafson, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, David M.
Cialkowski, Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, Garrett D. Blanchfield, Jr.,
Reinhardt Wendorf & Blanchfield, James P. Watts, Zimmerman Reed,
LLP, Jason S. Kilene, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Joshua J. Rissman,
Gustafson Gluek PLLC, June Pineda Hoidal, Zimmerman Reed LLP,
Kristin J. Moody, Berman Tabacco, Mark Reinhardt, Reinhardt Wendorf
& Blanchfield, Patrick Howard, Saltz, Mongeluzzi, Barrett &
Bendesky, P.C., pro hac vice, Raina Borrelli, Gustafson Gluek PLLC,
Roberta A. Yard, Reinhardt Wendorf & Blanchfield & Simon Bahne
Paris, Saltz Mongeluzzi Barrett Bendesky, PC, pro hac vice.

Procter & Gamble Company, Defendant, represented by Claire Catalano
Dean -- ccdean@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP, pro hac vice,
Cortlin Hall Lannin -- clannin@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP,
pro hac vice, Emily Johnson Henn -- ehenn@cov.com -- Covington &
Burling LLP, pro hac vice, Henry B. Liu -- hliu@cov.com --
Covington & Burling LLP, pro hac vice, John W. Lundquist,
Fredrikson & Byron, PA & Nicole M. Moen -- nmoen@fredlaw.com --
Fredrikson & Byron, PA.

Kimberly-Clark Corporation, Defendant, represented by Alexander B.
Porter, Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice, Eamon P. Joyce, Sidley
Austin LLP, pro hac vice, Kara L. McCall, Sidley Austin LLP, pro
hac vice & Tracy J. Van Steenburgh, Nilan Johnson Lewis PA.
Nice-Pak Products, Inc. & Professional Disposables International,
Inc., Defendants, represented by Chelsea M. Croy Smith, Tucker
Ellis LLP, pro hac vice, Dustin Bradley Rawlin, I, Tucker Ellis
LLP, pro hac vice, George W. Soule, Soule & Stull LLC, Jennifer L.
Mesko , Tucker Ellis LLP, pro hac vice, John Q. Lewis, Tucker Ellis
LLP, pro hac vice, Karl A. Bekeny, Tucker Ellis LLP, pro hac vice,
Melissa R. Stull, Soule & Stull LLC & Michael J. Ruttinger, Tucker
Ellis LLP, pro hac vice.

Tufco Technologies Inc., Defendant, represented by Aaron D. Van
Oort , Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Anthony T. Forte, Stradling Yocca
Carlson & Rauth, P.C., pro hac vice, Cicely R. Miltich, Dentons US
LLP, Jason Heinz Anderson, Stradling Yocca Carlson & Rauth P.C.,
pro hac vice & Kenneth Paul Hsu, Stradling Yocca Carlson & Rauth,
P.C., pro hac vice.

Rockline Industries, Defendant, represented by Charmaine K. Harris,
Blackwell Burke PA, Emily A. Ambrose, Blackwell Burke PA, Jerry W.
Blackwell, Blackwell Burke PA, Mary S. Young, Blackwell Burke PA,
Patrick Hauswald, Blackwell Burke P.A. & S. Jamal Faleel, Blackwell
Burke PA.


RINGCENTRAL INC: Underpays Sales Representatives, Stemple Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
Darren Stemple, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. RingCentral, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
3:18-cv-04909-LB (N.D. Cal., Aug. 13, 2018) seeks to recover unpaid
overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per
workweek, attorneys' fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

The Plaintiff Stemple was employed by the Defendant as sales
representative from April 2017 to December 2017.

RingCentral, Inc. provides software-as-a-service solutions for
business communications and collaboration primarily in the United
States. The company sells its products through a network of direct
sales representatives, as well as sales agents and channel
partners. RingCentral, Inc. was founded in 1999 and is
headquartered in Belmont, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew C. Helland, Esq.
          Daniel S. Brome, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER, LLP
          235 Montgomery St., Suite 810
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 277-7235
          Facsimile: (415) 277-7238
          E-mail: helland@nka.com
                  dbrome@nka.com


SANTANDER HOLDINGS: Deka Investment Suit Remains Stayed
-------------------------------------------------------
Santander Holdings USA, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that Deka Investment GmbH
et al. v. Santander Consumer USA Holdings Inc. et al., is still
stayed.

Santander Consumer USA Inc. (SC) is a defendant in a purported
securities class action lawsuit (the "Deka Lawsuit") in the United
States District Court, Northern District of Texas, captioned Deka
Investment GmbH et al. v. Santander Consumer USA Holdings Inc. et
al., No. 3:15-cv-2129-K.

The Deka Lawsuit is against SC, certain of its current and former
directors and executive officers and certain institutions that
served as underwriters in SC's initial public offering (the "IPO")
, including Santander Investment Securities Inc. (SIS) on behalf of
a class consisting of those who purchased or otherwise acquired SC
securities between January 23, 2014 and June 12, 2014. The amended
class action complaint alleges, among other things, that the IPO
registration statement and prospectus and certain subsequent public
disclosures violated federal securities laws by containing
misleading statements concerning SC's ability to pay dividends and
the adequacy of SC's compliance systems and oversight.

On December 18, 2015, SC and the individual defendants moved to
dismiss the lawsuit, which was denied. On December 2, 2016, the
plaintiffs moved to certify the proposed classes. On July 11, 2017,
the court entered an order staying the Deka Lawsuit pending the
resolution of the appeal of a class certification order in In re
Cobalt Int'l Energy, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. H-14-3428, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 91938 (S.D. Tex. June 15, 2017).

Santander Holdings USA, Inc. operates as the holding company for
Santander Bank, National Association that provides various banking
products and services primarily in the Mid-Atlantic and
Northeastern United States. The company was founded in 1984 and is
headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts. Santander Holdings USA,
Inc. is a subsidiary of Banco Santander, S.A.


SANTANDER HOLDINGS: Seeks Initial Approval of Parmlee Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
Santander Holdings USA, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that plaintiffs have
filed a motion seeking preliminary court approval of a class-wide
settlement calling for total payment of $9.5 million to the class
and its lawyers.

Two purported securities class action lawsuits filed in March and
April 2016 in the United States District Court, Northern District
of Texas, were consolidated and are now captioned Parmelee v.
Santander Consumer USA Holdings Inc. et al., No. 3:16-cv-783 (the
"Parmelee Lawsuits"). The Parmelee Lawsuits were filed against
Santander Consumer USA Inc. (SC) and certain of its current and
former directors and executive officers on behalf of a class
consisting of all those who purchased or otherwise acquired SC
securities between February 3, 2015 and March 15, 2016.

The complaint alleges, among other things, that SC violated federal
securities laws by making false or misleading statements, as well
as failing to disclose material adverse facts, in its periodic
reports filed under the Exchange Act and certain other public
disclosures, in connection with, among other things, SC's change in
its methodology for estimating its ACL and the correction of such
ACL for prior periods. On January 3, 2018, the court granted SC's
motion to dismiss the lawsuit as to defendant Ismail Dawood (SC's
former Chief Financial Officer) and denied the motion as to all
other defendants.

In July 2018, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking preliminary court
approval of a class-wide settlement calling for total payment of
$9.5 million to the class and its lawyers.

Santander Holdings USA, Inc. operates as the holding company for
Santander Bank, National Association that provides various banking
products and services primarily in the Mid-Atlantic and
Northeastern United States. The company was founded in 1984 and is
headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts. Santander Holdings USA,
Inc. is a subsidiary of Banco Santander, S.A.


SEABOARD CORP: Class Action vs. Pork Processors Underway
--------------------------------------------------------
Seaboard Corporation is facing a class action complaint filed on
behalf of a a putative class of indirect purchasers of pork
products, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018.

On June 28, 2018, Wanda Duryea and 11 other indirect purchasers of
pork products, acting on behalf of themselves and a putative class
of indirect purchasers of pork products, filed a class action
complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota
against several pork processors, including Seaboard Foods LLC
("Seaboard Foods"), and Agri Stats, Inc., a company described in
the complaint as a data sharing service.  Subsequent to the filing
of this initial complaint, additional class action complaints
making similar claims on behalf of putative classes of direct and
indirect purchasers were filed in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota.

The complaints allege, among other things, that beginning in
January 2009, the defendants conspired and combined to fix, raise,
maintain, and stabilize the price of pork products in violation of
U.S. antitrust laws by coordinating their output and limiting
production, allegedly facilitated by the exchange of non-public
information about prices, capacity, sales volume and demand through
Agri Stats, Inc.  The complaints on behalf of the putative classes
of indirect purchasers also include causes of action under various
state laws, including state antitrust laws, unfair competition
laws, consumer protection statutes, and state common law claims for
unjust enrichment.  The complaints also allege that the defendants
concealed this conduct from the plaintiffs and the members of the
putative classes.  The relief sought in the respective complaints
includes treble damages, injunctive relief, pre- and post-judgment
interest, costs, and attorneys' fees on behalf of the putative
classes.

The Company said, "Seaboard intends to defend these cases
vigorously.  It is impossible at this stage either to determine the
probability of a favorable or unfavorable outcome resulting from
these suits, or to estimate the amount of potential loss, if any,
resulting from the suits."

Seaboard Corporation operates as a diverse agribusiness and
transportation company worldwide.  The Company was founded in 1918
and is headquartered in Merriam, Kansas.


SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT: "Anderson" Trial Scheduled for Oct. 2019
----------------------------------------------------------------
Trial for the purported class action styled Marc Anderson, et al.,
v. SeaWorld Parks & Entertainment, Inc. is scheduled for October
2019, according to SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc.'s Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

On April 13, 2015, a purported class action was filed in the
Superior Court of the State of California for the City and County
of San Francisco against SeaWorld Parks & Entertainment, Inc.,
captioned Marc Anderson, et al., v. SeaWorld Parks & Entertainment,
Inc., (the "Anderson Matter").  The putative class consisted of all
consumers within California who, within the past four years,
purchased tickets to SeaWorld San Diego.  The complaint (as
amended) alleges causes of action under the California False
Advertising Law, California Unfair Competition Law and California
CLRA.  Plaintiffs' claims are based on their allegations that the
Company misrepresented the physical living conditions and care and
treatment of its orcas, resulting in confusion or misunderstanding
among ticket and orca plush purchasers with intent to deceive and
mislead the plaintiffs and purported class members.  The complaint
seeks actual damages, equitable relief, attorneys' fees and costs.
Based on plaintiffs' definition of the class, the amount in
controversy exceeds US$5.0 million, but the liability exposure is
speculative.  On May 14, 2015, the Company removed the case to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
California.

The Company filed a motion for summary judgment on October 30, 2017
which the Court granted in part and denied in part.  All three
named plaintiffs continue to have claims for individual restitution
and injunctive relief.  The case is in the preliminary stages of
discovery.  On May 23, 2018, the Plaintiffs represented to the
Court that they will not file a motion for class certification.
Trial is currently scheduled for October 2019.

SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc. is a theme park and entertainment
company providing experiences that matter and inspiring guests to
protect animals and the wild wonders of our world. The company is
based in Orlando, Florida.


SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT: Accrues $11.5M for EZPay Class Suit Accord
------------------------------------------------------------------
SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018, that it has accrued US$11.5 million
related to the proposed settlement of the EZPay Plan Class Action
Lawsuit.

On December 3, 2014, a purported class action lawsuit was filed in
the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Tampa Division against SeaWorld Parks & Entertainment,
Inc., captioned Jason Herman, Joey Kratt, and Christina Lancaster,
as individuals and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
SeaWorld Parks & Entertainment, Inc.  The certified class action
currently consists of two claims for breach of contract, unjust
enrichment and violation of federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act,
15 U.S.C. section 1693 et seq. on behalf of three individual
plaintiffs as well as on behalf of a two classes: (i) individuals
in the states of Florida, Texas, Virginia and California who paid
for an annual pass  through EZ pay in "less than twelve months,"
had their passes automatically renewed and did not use the renewed
passes after the first year or were not issued a full refund of
payments made after the twelfth payment; and (ii) all of these same
individuals who used debit cards.  

In April 2018, the Company reached a preliminary agreement in
principle to settle this matter for a payment of US$11.5 million,
plus certain administrative costs and expenses associated with the
proposed settlement.  The proposed settlement is still subject to
further documentation and court approval.  The Company has accrued
US$11.5 million related to this proposed settlement in other
accrued liabilities as of June 30, 2018 on the accompanying
unaudited condensed consolidated balance sheet.

SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc. is a theme park and entertainment
company providing experiences that matter and inspiring guests to
protect animals and the wild wonders of our world. The company is
based in Orlando, Florida.


SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT: Appeal in "Hall" Class Suit Still Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc. is still awaiting the court's decision
on the plaintiffs' appeal from the dismissal of the Holly Hall
class action lawsuit, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

On March 25, 2015, a purported class action was filed in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California
against the Company, captioned Holly Hall v. SeaWorld
Entertainment, Inc., (the "Hall Matter").  The complaint identifies
three putative classes consisting of all consumers nationwide who
at any time during the four-year period preceding the filing of the
original complaint, purchased an admission ticket, a membership or
a SeaWorld "experience" that includes an "orca experience" from the
SeaWorld amusement park in San Diego, California, Orlando, Florida
or San Antonio, Texas respectively.  The complaint alleges causes
of action under California Unfair Competition Law, California
Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), California False Advertising
Law, California Deceit statute, Florida Unfair and Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, as well as
claims for Unjust Enrichment.  Plaintiffs' claims are based on
their allegations that the Company misrepresented the physical
living conditions and care and treatment of its orcas, resulting in
confusion or misunderstanding among ticket purchasers, and omitted
material facts regarding its orcas with intent to deceive and
mislead the plaintiff and purported class members.  The complaint
further alleges that the specific misrepresentations heard and
relied upon by Holly Hall in purchasing her SeaWorld tickets
concerned the circumstances surrounding the death of a SeaWorld
trainer.  The complaint seeks actual damages, equitable relief,
attorney's fees and costs.  Plaintiffs claim that the amount in
controversy exceeds US$5.0 million, but the liability exposure is
speculative until the size of the class is determined (if
certification is granted at all).  In addition, four other
purported class actions were filed against the Company and its
affiliates.  Such actions were subsequently dismissed or
consolidated with the Hall Matter.  

The Company filed a motion to dismiss the entirety of the
plaintiffs' Second Consolidated Amended Complaint ("SAC") with
prejudice on February 25, 2016.  The Court granted the Company's
motion to dismiss the entire SAC with prejudice and entered
judgment for the Company on May 13, 2016.  Plaintiffs filed their
notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit on June 10, 2016.  The appeal has been fully briefed
and argued and the Company awaits the Court's decision.

SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc. is a leading theme park and
entertainment company providing experiences that matter and
inspiring guests to protect animals and the wild wonders of our
world. The company is based in Orlando, Florida.


SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT: Bid to Appeal "Baker" Class Status Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018, that the defendants' petition with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seeking permission to
appeal a class certification order in the case, Baker v. SeaWorld
Entertainment, Inc., et al., has been denied.

On September 9, 2014, a purported stockholder class action lawsuit
consisting of purchasers of the Company's common stock during the
periods between April 18, 2013 and August 13, 2014, captioned Baker
v. SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc., et al., was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California against the
Company, the Chairman of the Company's Board, certain of its
executive officers and Blackstone.

On February 17, 2015, Court-appointed Lead Plaintiffs,
Pensionskassen For Børne―Og Ungdomspædagoger and Arkansas
Public Employees Retirement System, together with additional
plaintiffs, Oklahoma City Employee Retirement System and Pembroke
Pines Firefighters and Police Officers Pension Fund (collectively,
"Plaintiffs"), then filed an amended complaint against the Company,
the Chairman of the Company's Board, certain of its executive
officers, Blackstone, and underwriters of the initial public
offering and secondary public offerings.

The amended complaint alleges, among other things, that the
prospectus and registration statements filed contained materially
false and misleading information in violation of the federal
securities laws and seeks unspecified compensatory damages and
other relief.  Plaintiffs contend that defendants knew or were
reckless in not knowing that Blackfish was impacting SeaWorld's
business at the time of each public statement.  On May 29, 2015,
the Company and the other defendants filed motions to dismiss the
amended complaint, which the Court granted on March 31, 2016.

On May 31, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a second amended consolidated
class action complaint ("Second Amended Complaint"), which, among
other things, no longer names the Company's Board or underwriters
as defendants.  The Court later denied a renewed motion to dismiss
the Second Amended Complaint.  In May 2017, Plaintiffs filed a
motion for class certification which the Court granted on November
29, 2017.

On December 13, 2017, Defendants filed a petition for permission to
appeal the Court's class certification order with the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which was denied on June
28, 2018.  Discovery is currently ongoing with the trial scheduled
for 2019.

SeaWorld Entertainment, Inc. is a leading theme park and
entertainment company providing experiences that matter and
inspiring guests to protect animals and the wild wonders of our
world. The company is based in Orlando, Florida.


SELECT PORTFOLIO: Court Issues Protective Order in Arellano Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Paul L. Abrams of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California has entered a stipulated protective
order in the case, TINA M. ARELLANO, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SELECT PORTFOLIO
SERVICING, INC. and Does 1-50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No:
2:18-cv-04442-JFW-PLA (C.D. Cal.).

Discovery in the Action is likely to involve production of
confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special
protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose
other than prosecuting this Action is warranted.  Accordingly, the
parties stipulated to and petitioned the Court to enter the
Stipulated Protective Order.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant violated California Civil
Code Sections 2923.7 and 2924.12.  The lawsuit involves the
Plaintiff and other similarly-situated persons requesting loan
assistance from the Defendant, which involves the disclosure of
sensitive financial records and other related data that will
encompass the Discovery Material.

Further, good cause exists for the entry of the Stipulated
Protective Order, as the Parties reasonably believe in good faith
that Discovery Material in the Action may include material that is
not within the public record or otherwise available in the public
domain, or which may be privileged or otherwise protected from
disclosure under applicable federal or state laws, court rules,
case decisions, or the common law.  Without limitation, the
Discovery Material may include the Defendant's confidential and
proprietary business or financial information; information
regarding confidential business practices; and other confidential
research, development, or commercial information.  The Discovery
Material is permitted to be designated as "Confidential"
Information under the Order.

The Parties also reasonably believe in good faith that Discovery
Material in the Action may include material which, if publicly
disclosed, would expose the Defendant and/or its services to a
significant competitive or commercial disadvantage.  Without
limitation, the Discovery Material may include trade secrets,
processes, formulas, systems, software, methodologies, customer
data, policy and training manuals, privileged materials, aggregate
customer information and indicators, personal identifying
information and other valuable research, commercial, technical
and/or proprietary information.  This Discovery Material is
permitted to be designated as "Confidential-Attorneys' Eyes Only"
Information under the Order.

Based upon the foregoing, the Parties agree that special protection
from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than
prosecution of this Action is warranted.  Accordingly, to
adequately preserve, protect, and defend the confidentiality of
Discovery Material; to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes
over the confidentiality of Discovery Material; to expedite the
flow of Discovery Material; to ensure that the Parties are
permitted reasonable necessary uses of Discovery Material in
preparation for trial; to address the handling of Discovery
Material at the conclusion of the Action; and to serve the ends of
justice, the Parties stipulated that the Protective Order is
justified and should be entered in the Action.

The protections conferred by the Stipulation and Order cover not
only Protected Material, but also: (1) any information copied or
extracted from Protected Material; (2) all copies, excerpts,
summaries, or compilations of Protected Material; and (3) any
testimony, conversations, or presentations by Parties or their
Counsel that might reveal Protected Material.  Any use of Protected
Material at trial will be governed by the orders of the trial
judge.  The Order does not govern the use of Protected Material at
trial.

Once a case proceeds to trial, all of the Court-filed information
to be introduced that was previously designated as confidential or
maintained pursuant to the protective order becomes public and will
be presumptively available to all members of the public, including
the press, unless compelling reasons supported by specific factual
findings to proceed otherwise are made to the trial judge in
advance of the trial.  Accordingly, the terms of the protective
order do not extend beyond the commencement of the trial, except
that any information filed with the Court under seal will remain
sealed and/or be destroyed at the conclusion of the case.

Any Party or Non-Party may challenge a designation of
confidentiality at any time that is consistent with the Court's
Scheduling Order.

Within 60 days after the final disposition of the Action, each
Receiving Party must return all Protected Material to the Producing
Party or destroy such material.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 1, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2x2BhlS from Leagle.com.

Tina M. Arellano, Plaintiff, represented by Reuben D. Nathan --
rnathan@nathanlawpractice.com -- Nathan and Associates APC & Ross
Cornell -- ross.law@me.com -- Ross Cornell Law Offices APC.

Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey
N. Williams -- jwilliams@wargofrench.com -- Wargo and French LLP,
Scott R. Laes -- slaes@wargofrench.com -- Wargo and French LLP &
Shanon J. McGinnis -- smcginnis@wargofrench.com -- Wargo and French
LLP.


SERVICELINK FIELD: Underpays Inspectors, Collins Suit Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH COLLINS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SERVICELINK FIELD SERVICES, LLC, and DOES
1-50, Defendants, Case No. 37-2018-00040352-CU-0E-CTL (Cal. Super.,
San Diego Cty., Aug. 10, 2018) is an action against the Defendants
for failure to pay minimum wages, overtime compensation, authorize
and permit meal and rest periods, provide accurate wage statements,
and reimburse necessary business expenses.

Mr. Collins was employed by the Defendants as inspector.

Servicelink Field Services, LLC is a limited liability corporation
organized under the laws of the State of Delaware. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           Dennis F. Moss, Esq.
           MOSS BOLLINGER, LLP
           15300 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 207
           Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
           Telephone: (310) 773-0323
           Facsimile: (818) 963-5954
           E-mail: dennis@dennismosslaw.com


SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Maurice Wutscher Attorney Discusses Ruling
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jeffrey Karek, Esq. -- jkarek@mauricewutscher.com -- of Maurice
Wutscher LLP, in an article for Lexology, reports that the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that, unless
the parties to a class action settlement agreement expressly agree
otherwise, class settlement agreements should not be read to bar
objectors from requesting fees for their efforts in adding value to
a settlement.

Because the Court determined that the objector did add value to the
settlement, it reversed the ruling of the trial court denying the
objector's motion for fees and an incentive award.

A copy of the opinion in Markow v. Southwest Airlines Co. is
available at https://is.gd/lX1Mok

Class action counsel settled a class action litigation against the
defendant airline wherein the airline made its customers whole by
giving them a replacement voucher after it stopped honoring
in-flight drink vouchers for customers who bought select fares.

In an initial appeal of the case, the Seventh Circuit "held that 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1712, enacted as part of the Class Action Fairness Act
allowed the trial court to award [class counsel] an attorney fee
based on the lodestar method rather than the value of the redeemed
vouchers," and therefore affirmed the approval of settlement. The
Seventh Circuit further affirmed but modified the trial court's
decision to award class counsel only $1,649,118 in fees even though
the airline agreed not to oppose $3 million, by further reducing
the awarded fees to $1,365,882 because one of class counsel's
lawyers failed to disclose a potential conflict of interest.

Following the first appeal, class counsel requested supplemental
fees in the trial court for work on a motion to amend the fee award
and the appeal. Specifically, class counsel "essentially requested
the difference between the $3 million [the airline] agreed not to
oppose" and the $1,365,882 that was approved by the Seventh Circuit
in the first appeal.

To get to that amount, class counsel requested a 1.5 multiplier for
its post-judgment time as for the initial fee award and by claiming
572 hours in attorney time for the motion to amend and 970 hours in
attorney time for the appeal.

The trial court determined that time was "grossly excessive" and
instead awarded class counsel $455,294 plus expenses.

An individual ("objector") moved for reconsideration under Rule 59
or, alternatively, for vacatur of the settlement approval and
accompanying fee orders under Rule 60(b). The trial court granted
the motion for reconsideration and vacated the additional fee award
so that the class would receive notice of any a chance to object to
it. The objector appealed.

Before the parties briefed the second appeal, they reached an
agreement wherein the objector agreed to dismiss his appeal and
class counsel agreed to take half its supplemental fee award
($227,647 plus $3,529.68 in expenses), and the airline agreed to
triple its relief to the class (two additional vouchers for every
one claimed).

Additionally, the trial court was told for the first time that the
correct number of vouchers claimed under the original settlement
was less than one third what the parties told the trial court
earlier about the original settlement it approved. Still, the trial
court approved the new settlement and the airline distributed the
vouchers and paid class counsel.

The objector then moved for $80,000 in attorney's fees and an
incentive award of $1,000 to come out of the more than $1.8 million
attorney fee award to class counsel. The trial court denied that
motion and the objector appealed.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted that the "underlying
settlement agreement and the agreement to settle the second appeal
. . . are silent on the issue of objector's fees," and therefore
the Court looked to the law, which permits objectors who add value
to a class settlement to be compensated for their efforts.

Specifically, "[u]nless the parties expressly agree otherwise,
settlement agreements should not be read to bar attorney fees for
objectors who have added genuine value. Because the equitable
common-fund doctrine applies, [the objector's] counsel should
receive fees for improving settlement."

Thus, because the original settlement agreement and joint status
reports leading up to the settlement of the second appeal were
silent as to objectors' fees, the trial court "made legal error by
reading them to bar [the objector's] request."

In so ruling, the Seventh Circuit noted that "because of the skewed
incentives in some class action settlements, objectors who bring
those incentives back into balance by increasing a settlement's
benefit to a class may be compensated for their efforts."

The Court further stated this is consistent with the common-fund
doctrine, which provides that "a litigant or a lawyer who recovers
a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his
client is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from the fund as
a whole."

The Seventh Circuit observed that "[t]he common-fund doctrine
applies as a default rule unless that parties draft their
settlement agreement to depart from it."

In this case, "[b]ecause these parties did not address objector's
fees, we ‘interpolate' the common-fund doctrine to avoid wreaking
unintended consequences."

Moreover, "[i]t would be inequitable for [the objector's] lawyer to
receive nothing despite negotiating . . . a tripling of relief for
the class and a significant cut in [class counsel's] fees."
Particularly where the objector's "$80,000 fee request is a modest
10% of the market value of the additional vouchers, $825,630."

Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of the
objector's motion for fees and remanded the matter for entry of
judgment granting the objector's request, payable from class
counsel. [GN]


SPECIALIZED LOAN: Erk Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections
-------------------------------------------------------
VIVIENNE ERK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff vs. SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 2:18-cv-12671 (D.N.J., Aug. 10, 2018) seeks to stop the
Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Specialized Loan Servicing LLC, a third-party mortgage servicer,
engages in the administration of residential mortgage loans in the
United States. The company was incorporated in 2002 and is based in
Highlands Ranch, Colorado with a mortgage servicing facility in
Tempe, Arizona. As of November 30, 2011, Specialized Loan Servicing
LLC operates as a subsidiary of Computershare Limited. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Auslaender, Esq.
          THOMPSON CONSUMER LAW GROUP, PLLC
          5235 E. Southern Ave., D106-618
          Mesa, AZ 85206
          Telephone: (347) 960-9671
          Facsimile: (347) 960-9252
          E-mail: jauslaender@ThompsonConsumerLaw.com


SPECTRUM PHARMACEUTICALS: Consolidated Suit Underway in Nevada
--------------------------------------------------------------
Spectrum Pharmaceuticals, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company still
defends a consolidated class action lawsuit in Nevada.

These cases were filed against the Company:

     -- Olutayo Ayeni v. Spectrum Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al.
(Filed September 21, 2016 in the United States District Court,
Central District of California; Case No. 2:16-cv-07074) (the "Ayeni
Action"); and

     -- Glen Hartsock v. Spectrum Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al.
(Filed September 28, 2016 in the United States District Court,
District Court of Nevada Case; No. 2:16-cv-02279-RFB-GWF) (the
"Hartsock Action").

On November 15, 2016, the Ayeni Action was transferred to the
United States District Court for the District of Nevada. The
parties have stipulated to a consolidation of the Ayeni Action with
the Hartsock Action. These class action lawsuits allege that the
company and certain of its executive officers made false or
misleading statements and failed to disclose material facts about
the company's business and the prospects of approval for its NDA to
the FDA for QAPZOLA in violation of Section 10(b) (and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended.

The plaintiffs seek damages, interest, costs, attorneys' fees, and
other unspecified equitable relief.

Spectrum Pharmaceuticals said, "We believe that these claims are
without merit, and intend to vigorously defend against these
claims. Furthermore, as of June 30, 2018, the value of a potential
settlement cannot be reasonably estimated given its highly
uncertain nature."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Spectrum Pharmaceuticals, Inc. develops and commercializes oncology
and hematology drug products. Spectrum Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was
founded in 1987 and is headquartered in Henderson, Nevada.


STARDUST DINERS: Underpays Waitresses, Luisa Franco Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------
LUISA FRANCO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. STARDUST DINERS, INC. D/B/A COLONY DINER;
GEORGE STRIFAS; and THOMAS STRIFAS, Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-04537-SJF-AYS (E.D.N.Y., Aug. 10, 2018) is an action
against the Defendants for failure to pay minimum wages, overtime
compensation, provide spread-of-hours payments, and provide wages
notice and paystubs.

Ms. Franco was employed by the Defendants as waitress from October
2015 to December 1, 2015.

Stardust Diners, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the State of New York. The Company is engaged in the
restaurant business. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Taubenfeld, Esq.
          FISHER TAUBENFELD LLP
          225 Broadway, Suite 1700
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 571-0700
          Facsimile: (212) 505-2001


STRAD ENERGY: Court Narrows Claims in Clark Labor Suit
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEVIN CLARK, on behalf of himself and all similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff, v. STRAD ENERGY SERVICES, USA, LTD., a
Colorado corporation, and STRAD OILFIELD SERVICES, INC., a Colorado
corporation, Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-cv-1242-WJM-KMT (D.
Colo.), Judge William J. Martinez of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Colorado granted Strad's Motion to Dismiss, in
Part, Plaintiff's First Amended Class and Collective Action
Complaint.

Clark brings the action against the Defendants for violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the Colorado Wage Claim Act
("CWCA"), the Colorado Minimum Wage Act ("CMWA"), and violations of
the overtime and/or minimum wage laws of various other states.

The Plaintiff is a former employee of Strad who worked as a field
service technician at various locations in Colorado, Montana, North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming.  He alleges that he was
frequently required to work more than 40 hours per work week and/or
12 hours per day.  He further alleges that he was not properly
compensated at the mandated time-and-a-half rate for his overtime
hours.

The Plaintiff also alleges that Strad's failure to properly
compensate him was not a limited occurrence.  Rather, none of
Strad's non-exempt employees were paid properly for their time
worked.  He alleges that Strad's employee compensation polices are
blatantly illegal and that Strad did not look into the validity of
its policies.

The Plaintiff filed the lawsuit on May 22, 2017, alleging
violations of the FLSA and wage laws of various states where Strad
has allegedly engaged in the conduct described by the Plaintiff.
He seeks to bring the action as a class action on behalf of himself
and those similarly situated under the laws of those various
states, including the CWCA and CMWA.  The Plaintiff also seek
relief under an FLSA collective action, separate and apart from the
state-law causes of action.

Currently pending before the Court is Strad's Motion to Dismiss, in
Part, Plaintiff's First Amended Class and Collective Action
Complaint.  Strad argues that the Plaintiff lacks standing to
assert claims under Kansas, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Virginia
law.  It also argues that the state wage-and-hour law claims should
be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Judge Martinez finds that whether the Plaintiff has standing to
bring claims under the laws of Pennsylvania and Utah is relevant
whether or not the class is certified.  He determines that it is
appropriate to consider at this juncture whether the Plaintiff has
adequately alleged standing under Pennsylvania and Utah law.  He
finds that the Plaintiff has not established an injury in fact
under the laws of Pennsylvania or Utah.  He never worked or resided
in those states, and has not established that he is otherwise
subject to the laws of those states.  The Plaintiff thus has no
injury under the laws of those states, and cannot bring claims on
behalf of a class under the laws of those states.

Taking the facts in the Amended Complaint as true, the Judge finds
that the Plaintiff has pled a claim for relief under the CWCA and
CMWA.  Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that he worked for the
Defendants in Colorado and was an "employee" within the meaning of
the CWCA and CMWA; that the Defendants are employers under the CWCA
and CMWA; that he was not paid for earned wages; that the
Defendants failed to properly compensate the Plaintiff for
overtime; and that the Defendants continue to fail to pay the
Plaintiff.  He says while the Plaintiff does not present detailed
allegations about the Defendants' failure to compensate him for
work in Colorado, the Federal Rules require only a short and plain
statement that a plaintiff is entitled to relief on the material
elements of the claim.  Here, the Plaintiff's short and plain
statement satisfies the federal pleading standard.  Thus, he denies
the Defendants' Motion as to the Colorado statutory claims.

In addition, the Judge finds that merely pleading, in a conclusory
fashion, that the Defendants have violated the applicable
overtime/minimum wage laws in each of the states where they do
business, is insufficient to state a claim for relief under states
laws.  At a minimum, the Plaintiff should identify the state law
and basic elements thereof and plead facts sufficient to show that
he is entitled to relief under the law of that state.  The
allegations in the Amended Complaint are insufficient for the Court
or opposing party to determine whether the Plaintiff can state a
claim for relief.  He thus dismisses the non-Colorado state law
claims without prejudice.

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Martinez granted in part and
denied in part the Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss.  The
Pennsylvania and Utah state claims of Claim Four (Violation of
Certain State Overtime/Minimum Wage Laws) are dismissed without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The remainder
of the non-Colorado state claims in Claim Four (Violation of
Certain State Overtime/Minimum Wage Laws) are dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim.  The Defendants' Partial
Motion to Dismiss is denied in all other respects.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 1, 2018 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2Ofs0gQ from Leagle.com.

Kevin Clark, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated
persons, Plaintiff, represented by Brian David Gonzales --
Bgonzales@ColoradoWageLaw.com -- Brian D. Gonzales, PLLC.

Strad Energy Services USA Ltd, a Colorado corporation & Strad
Oilfield Services Inc., a Colorado corporation, Defendants,
represented by Jeremy Michael Brenner --
brenner@armstrongteasdale.com -- Armstrong Teasdale, LLP, Kevin
David Evans -- kdevans@armstrongteasdale.com -- Armstrong Teasdale,
LLP & Vance Orlando Knapp -- vknapp@armstrongteasdale.com --
Armstrong Teasdale, LLP.


TD AMERITRADE: Magistrate Judge Favors Nixing of Klein Class
------------------------------------------------------------
TD Ameritrade Holding Corporation said in its Form 10-Q filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on August 7, 2018, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that on July 12, 2018,
the Magistrate Judge in the "Klein" putative class action issued
findings and a recommendation that plaintiffs' motion for class
certification be denied.  Plaintiff has filed objections to the
Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendation.

Five putative class action complaints were filed between August and
October 2014 regarding TD Ameritrade, Inc.'s routing of client
orders and one putative class action was filed in December 2014
regarding Scottrade, Inc.'s routing of client orders.  The cases
against TD Ameritrade were filed in, or transferred to, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Nebraska: Jay Zola et al. v. TD
Ameritrade, Inc., et al., Case No. 8:14CV288; Tyler Verdieck v. TD
Ameritrade, Inc., Case No. 8:14CV289; Bruce Lerner v. TD
Ameritrade, Inc., Case No. 8:14CV325; Michael Sarbacker v. TD
Ameritrade Holding Corporation, et al., Case No. 8:14CV341; and
Gerald Klein v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corporation, et al., Case No.
8:14CV396.

The case against Scottrade, Inc. was transferred to the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri: Nicholas Lewis
v. Scottrade, Inc., Case No. 4:15CV01255. The complaints in Zola,
Klein and Sarbacker allege that the defendants failed to provide
clients with best execution and routed orders to the market venue
that paid the most for its order flow.

The complaints in Verdieck, Lerner and Lewis allege that the
defendant routed its clients' non-marketable limit orders to the
venue paying the highest rates of maker rebates, and that clients
did not receive best execution on these kinds of orders.  The
complaints variously include claims of breach of contract, breach
of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of best execution, fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, violations of Section 10(b) and 20 of
the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, violation of Nebraska's
Consumer Protection Act, violation of Nebraska's Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, violation of the Missouri Merchandising
Practices Act, aiding and abetting, unjust enrichment and
declaratory judgment.

The complaints seek various kinds of relief including damages,
restitution, disgorgement, injunctive relief, equitable relief and
other relief.  The Company, including Scottrade, Inc., moved to
dismiss the putative class action complaints.  On March 23, 2016,
the U.S. District Court in Nebraska entered an order dismissing all
of the state law claims in the five actions against TD Ameritrade,
denying the motion to dismiss the federal securities claims in the
Klein case, and permitting the plaintiffs in the other four actions
to amend their complaints to assert a federal securities claim.  On
August 29, 2016, the U.S. District Court in Missouri entered an
order dismissing without prejudice all of the state law claims
against Scottrade, Inc.  None of the plaintiffs in the actions
filed an amended complaint.  The plaintiffs in the Zola, Sarbacker,
Verdieck and Lewis cases filed appeals.

The plaintiff in the Lerner case did not file an appeal and that
case is considered closed.  On January 9, 2018, the Court of
Appeals, 8th Circuit, affirmed the District Court's dismissal of
the Lewis case and on May 10, 2018, affirmed the District Court's
dismissal of the Zola, Sarbacker and Verdieck cases.

On July 12, 2018, the Magistrate Judge in the Klein case issued
findings and a recommendation that plaintiffs' motion for class
certification be denied.  Plaintiff has filed objections to the
Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendation.

The Company said it intends to vigorously defend against these
lawsuits and is unable to predict the outcome or the timing of the
ultimate resolution of these lawsuits, or the potential losses, if
any, that may result.

Certain regulatory authorities are conducting examinations and
investigations regarding the routing of client orders.  TD
Ameritrade, Inc., TDAC and Scottrade, Inc. have received requests
for documents and information from the regulatory authorities.  TD
Ameritrade, Inc., TDAC and Scottrade, Inc. are cooperating with the
requests.

TD Ameritrade Holding Corporation provides securities brokerage and
related technology-based financial services to retail investors,
traders, and independent registered investment advisors (RIAs) in
the United States. The company is based in Omaha, Nebraska.


TD AMERITRADE: Still Defends Aequitas Securities Litigation
-----------------------------------------------------------
TD Ameritrade Holding Corporation is still facing the Aequitas
Securities Litigation, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

An amended putative class action complaint was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Oregon in Lawrence Ciuffitelli
et al. v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, EisnerAmper LLP, Sidley Austin
LLP, Tonkon Torp LLP, TD Ameritrade, Inc., and Integrity Bank &
Trust, Case No. 3:16CV580, on May 19, 2016.  A second amended
putative class action complaint was filed on September 8, 2017, in
which Duff & Phelps was added as a defendant.

The putative class includes all persons who purchased securities of
Aequitas Commercial Finance, LLC and its affiliates on or after
June 9, 2010.  Other groups of plaintiffs have filed five non-class
action lawsuits in Oregon Circuit Court, Multnomah County, against
these and other defendants: Walter Wurster, et al. v. Deloitte &
Touche et al., Case No. 16CV25920 (filed Aug.  11, 2016), Kenneth
Pommier, et al. v. Deloitte & Touche et al., Case No. 16CV36439
(filed Nov. 3, 2016), Charles Ramsdell, et al. v. Deloitte & Touche
et al., Case No. 16CV40659 (filed Dec.  2, 2016), Charles Layton,
et al. v. Deloitte & Touche et al., Case No. 17CV42915 (filed
October 2, 2017) and John Cavanagh, et al. v. Deloitte & Touche et
al., Case No. 18CV09052 (filed March 7, 2018).

FINRA arbitrations have also been filed against TD Ameritrade, Inc.
The claims in these actions include allegations that the sales of
Aequitas securities were unlawful, the defendants participated and
materially aided in such sales in violation of the Oregon
securities laws, and material misstatements and omissions were
made.  While the factual allegations differ in various respects
among the cases, plaintiffs' allegations include assertions that:
TD Ameritrade customers purchased more than US$140 million of
Aequitas securities; TD Ameritrade served as custodian for Aequitas
securities; recommended and referred investors to financial
advisors as part of its advisor referral program for the purpose of
purchasing Aequitas securities; participated in marketing the
securities; recommended the securities; provided assurances to
investors about the safety of the securities; and developed a
market for the securities.

In the Ciuffitelli putative class action, plaintiffs allege that
more than 1,500 investors were owed more than US$600 million on the
Aequitas securities they purchased.  On August 1, 2018, the
Magistrate Judge in that case issued findings and a recommendation
that defendants' motions to dismiss the pending complaint be denied
with limited exceptions not applicable to the Company.  Discovery
has commenced.  In the five non-class action lawsuits,
approximately 200 named plaintiffs collectively allege a total of
approximately US$125 million in losses plus other damages.  In the
Wurster and Pommier cases, the Court, on TD Ameritrade's motion,
dismissed the claims by those plaintiffs who were TD Ameritrade
customers, in favor of arbitration.  Discovery is ongoing.  A stay
in the Ramsdell and Layton cases has been lifted.

On February 23, 2018, the Court in the Wurster and Pommier cases
denied TD Ameritrade's motion to dismiss the claims by the
plaintiffs who were not TD Ameritrade customers.

On July 17, 2018, plaintiffs in the Ciuffitelli case filed a motion
for preliminary approval of an US$18.5 million settlement with the
defendant Tonkon Torp law firm of the claims against it in all the
pending cases.

The Company said it intends to vigorously defend against this
litigation.  The Company is unable to predict the outcome or the
timing of the ultimate resolution of this litigation, or the
potential losses, if any, that may result.

TD Ameritrade Holding Corporation provides securities brokerage and
related technology-based financial services to retail investors,
traders, and independent registered investment advisors (RIAs) in
the United States. The company is based in Omaha, Nebraska.


TELUS COMMUNICATIONS: Class Action Heads to Canada Supreme Court
----------------------------------------------------------------
Shannon Kari, writing for Law Times, reports that the application
of a key provision in the provincial Arbitration Act when there are
class actions involving two different types of potential claimants
will be before the Supreme Court of Canada this fall.

Leave was granted to Telus from an Ontario Court of Appeal decision
last year that declined to issue a partial stay related to business
customers in a $520-million class action filed over the rounding up
of wireless calls to the next minute for billing purposes,
allegedly without disclosing the practice.

The appeal in Wellman v. Telus Communications Company, which has
attracted a number of consumer and business organizations seeking
leave to intervene, will also likely examine whether a Court of
Appeal decision in 2010 on similar issues is still good law.

Class actions that feature both consumers and business customers as
part of the group of claimants is not uncommon, says
Chantelle Cseh -- ccseh@dwpv.com -- a partner at Davies Ward
Phillips & Vineberg LLP in Toronto, who normally acts for clients
on the defence side of these proceedings.

"This arises frequently. We have decisions from a number of
jurisdictions. This is an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
clarify rules that will be of general application," says
Mr. Cseh.

The provincial Consumer Protection Act states that, in the case of
consumers, any user agreements that call for arbitration are
invalid in terms of restricting the right to be part of a legal
action. For the Court of Appeal, in its decision last year, the
main issue was whether business customers of Telus should be
excluded because those contracts included a mandatory arbitration
clause. Section 7(5) of the Arbitration Act permits a court to stay
certain "matters" within an arbitration agreement.

In the Telus litigation, about 70 per cent of the proposed class is
made up of consumers and 30 per cent are customers who purchased
business plans.

The wording of the arbitration statute does not grant authority to
override the arbitration provisions in its entirety, argue lawyers
for Telus in written submissions filed with the Supreme Court.  The
communications company is also arguing that the Court of Appeal
erred in distinguishing the Supreme Court's 2011 decision in Seidel
v. Telus, a case that originated in British Columbia and related to
its provincial consumer protection legislation.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the law in Ontario in this area
is still determined by Griffin v. Dell, a 2010 decision by a
five-judge panel that declined to stay non-consumer claims in a
class action over allegedly defective notebook computers.

"Seidel has not overtaken or altered the authority of Griffin, as
Griffin is consistent in principle with Seidel but was decided in a
different legislative context," wrote Justice Katherine van
Rensburg for the majority in the Wellman decision.

Justice Robert Blair, in a separate judgment, agreed with the
majority that Griffin has not been overruled in Ontario and that,
as a result, the class action can include business customers.
However, he also expressed reservations about the earlier
decision.

"While I have reservations about the correctness of the decision in
Griffin as it relates to a partial stay of the non-consumer claims,
it is binding on us and dispositive of the issue," wrote Blair.

Mr. Cseh agrees with the reservations expressed by Blair.

"I think Griffin was incorrectly decided," she says.

Telus, she believes, also has a strong case in its appeal to the
Supreme Court.

"Just because you have initiated a class action, should that oust
substantive rights?" she asks. Business customers can still pursue
claims against a company through an arbitration process, Mr. Cseh
suggests.

"It does not mean you are out of luck. It can be done very
efficiently," she says.

Jeremy Martin, a lawyer at Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP in
Toronto, suggests that if the Court of Appeal decision is upheld,
it would expand the ability to bring a class action beyond what was
originally intended.

"Class actions tend to be procedural only. They are to advance
claims that could not otherwise be brought," says Martin, whose
practice focuses on class action defence.

The relevant section of the Arbitration Act permits a court "to
separate issues" within an agreement and not the entire agreement
itself, he says.

"The question of whether you can get business claims through the
back door is about inflating the total damages," says Martin.

Mohsen Seddigh -- mseddigh@sotosllp.com -- a lawyer at Sotos LLP,
is acting for the Public Interest Advocacy Centre and the Consumers
Council of Canada, two of the groups seeking to be granted
intervener status at the Supreme Court.

Telus is proposing "a different statutory interpretation" of the
relevant section of the Arbitration Act than what the courts in
Ontario have found, says Mr. Seddigh. As well, he suggests that at
a time when the nature of the workforce is changing, there is not
always an obvious difference between a consumer or business
customer.

"Is an Uber driver a business customer? It is not always clear
cut," says Mr. Seddigh, noting that people may use wireless devices
both for personal and business purposes. The advocacy groups are
hoping that when hearing the appeal, the Supreme Court "will take
it out of an academic context, run an analysis and see if consumers
are going to be impacted," he says. [GN]


TEN WESTSIDE: Underpays Delivery Drivers, Toj Suit Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------
CARLOS ENRIQUE TOJ OVALLE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TEN WESTSIDE CORP. D/B/A ESSEN; 27
MADISON AVENUE CORP. D/B/A ESSEN; 100 BROAD STREET LLC D/B/A ESSEN;
AMICI 519 LLC D/B/A ESSEN; KYEONG HWANG; JOSEPHINE KIM; JOHN BYUN;
CHONG BYUN; WILLIAM BYUN; and MYONG BYUN, Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-07252 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 10, 2018) is an action against the
Defendants for failure to pay overtime compensation, minimum wage,
authorize and permit meal and rest periods, and provide accurate
wage statements under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Toj was employed by the Defendants s delivery worker
from December 2013 to June 2015, then from August 2016 to September
2017.

Ten Westside Corp. is a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the State of New York. The Company is engaged in the
restaurant business. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620


TESLA INC: Analyst Says Class Actions May Pressure Cash Position
----------------------------------------------------------------
Tae Kim, writing for CNBC, reports that Tesla's finances may be
hurt by the negative ramifications of CEO Elon Musk's controversial
plan to take the company private, according to Citi Research.

The firm reiterated its "neutral/high risk" rating on Tesla shares,
citing the company's deteriorating balance sheet.

"Ultimately, credit risk is a function of confidence, without which
a company's financial position can quickly spiral into distress.
Though we don't think Tesla has necessarily entered such a spiral,
the current state of affairs heightens the focus," analyst Itay
Michaeli said in a note to clients on Aug. 20. "If a go-private
transaction is looking less likely, we think it'd be wise for Tesla
to at least try to raise significant new equity capital sooner
rather than later."

Mr. Michaeli said if Musk's plan to take the company private
doesn't happen, the company's cash position may be "pressured" by
class-action lawsuits.

Tesla shares closed up 1 percent on Aug. 20 after the report.

Tesla's skeptics have called into question the state of the
company's financial position. It lost nearly $2 billion last year,
and through the first two quarters this year it has burned through
about $1.8 billion in cash after capital investments. The company
had $2.2 billion in cash at the end of the June quarter.

"When a company's balance sheet is fundamentally weak the outcome
can become self-fulfilling -- and that's really the risk we see
with Tesla right now," Mr. Michaeli said.

The analyst reaffirmed his $356 price target for Tesla shares,
representing 16.5 percent upside to the Aug. 17 close. The
company's stock is down 2 percent this year through Aug. 17 versus
the S&P 500's 7 percent gain.

Tesla did not immediately respond to a request for comment. [GN]


TESLA INC: Chamberlain Sues over Elon Musk's Go-Private Tweet
-------------------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM CHAMBERLAIN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TESLA INC., and ELON MUSK,
Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-04876-JST (N.D. Cal., Aug. 10, 2018)
alleges that the Defendants materially misled investors as to the
following material facts:

     (i) contrary to Tesla CEO Elon R. Musk's statements that
funding had been "secured" to take Tesla private at $420 per share,
no such funding had been secured; and

     (ii) contrary to Musk's statement that investor support to
take Tesla private "is confirmed", there was no such confirmation.

As a result, the public statements by the Defendants were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

Tesla, Inc. designs, develops, manufactures, and sells electric
vehicles, and energy generation and storage systems in the United
States, China, Norway, and internationally. The company was
formerly known as Tesla Motors, Inc. and changed its name to Tesla,
Inc. in February 2017. Tesla, Inc. was founded in 2003 and is
headquartered in Palo Alto, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Reed R. Kathrein, Esq.
          Michael W. Stocker, Esq.
          Danielle Smith, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          715 Hearst Ave., Suite 202
          Berkeley, CA 94710
          Telephone: (510) 725-3000
          Facsimile: (510) 725-3001
          E-mail: reed@hbsslaw.com
                  mikes@hbsslaw.com
                  danielles@hbsslaw.com


THURS TRUCKING: Underypays Truck Drivers, Zettler Suit Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
TIMOTHY ZETTLER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Thurs Trucking Jean Thurs, Defendants, Case
No. 3:18-cv-00654-jdp (W.D. Wis., Aug. 9, 2018) seeks to recover
unpaid overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Mr. Zettler was employed by the Defendants as truck driver.

Thurs Trucking Jean Thurs is a corporation organized under the laws
of the State of Wisconsin. The Company is engaged in the trucking
industry. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yingtao Ho, Esq.
          310 West Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 100MW
          Milwaukee, WI 53203
          Telephone: (414) 271-4500
          Facsimile: (414) 271-6308
          E-mail: yh@previant.com


TJ MAXX: Faces Class Action Over Deceitful Comparison Prices
------------------------------------------------------------
NECN reports that its many retail shoppers favorite place to score
a bargain, but a group of them is reportedly suing TJ Maxx for
allegedly deceitful practices regarding its comparison prices on
tags.

Business Insider reports that four plaintiffs filed a class-action
lawsuit against TJX Companies, TJ Maxx's parent company, in July.

The lawsuit, which was in a Florida district court, reportedly
claims the "Compare At" price listed on a TJ Maxx tag are
"fictional" and an "unverified estimate."

"This practice also serves to falsely convey the impression to the
consumer that the good in question is of such quality that it is
worth that higher 'Compare At' price, when, in fact, the item's
actual value is far less," the lawsuit reportedly claimed.

On TJ Maxx's website explaining "comparison pricing," the retailer
said when there isn't an identical item available, "we compare to
products of similar type, quality and style."

TJX Companies is headquartered in Framingham, Massachusetts. [GN]


TOOTSIE ROLL: Court Dismisses FAC in Junior Mints Slack-Fill Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BIOLA DANIEL, ABEL DURAN, and TREKEELA PERKINS, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. TOOTSIE ROLL INDUSTRIES, LLC, Defendant, No. 17 Civ. 7541 (NRB)
(S.D. N.Y.), Judge Noimi Reice Buchwald of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York (i) granted the Defendant's
motion to dismiss, and (ii) denied as moot its motion to strike.

The named Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, bring the action against the Defendant,
asserting violations of the Federal Food Drug & Cosmetic Act
("FDCA"), the New York General Business Law, and the Mississippi
Consumer Protection Act ("MPCA").  The Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendant's opaque boxes of Junior Mints candies contain
non-functional slack-fill, essentially wasted, empty air, which
mislead consumers as to the amount of product contained therein.

The Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Class Action
Complaint on Jan. 2, 2018.  They allege, on behalf of a putative
nationwide class and certain subclasses in the alternative, that
the Defendant manufactures, markets and sells the Products with
non-functional slack-fill" in violation of the FDCA.  However, as
the FDCA does not provide a private right of action, the Plaintiffs
bring claims pursuant to New York's prohibition on (1) deceptive
and unfair trade practices ("GBL Section 349"), and (2) false
advertising ("GBL Sections 350, 350-a"), as well as (3) the MPCA.
They Plaintiffs also assert a common law fraud claim.

On Feb. 16, 2018, the Defendant moved to dismiss the First Amended
Class Action Complaint.  It argues that: (1) the Plaintiffs do not
have standing with respect to claims under laws of states in which
they did not reside, the Products they did not purchase, and/or to
the extent they seek injunctive relief; (2) the Court may not
exercise personal jurisdiction with respect to Perkins' claims; (3)
the Plaintiffs have not plausibly pleaded that the slack-fill in
the Products is "non-functional," in violation of the FDCA; (4) no
reasonable consumer would be misled by the Products; (5) the
Plaintiffs have not alleged an injury under GBL Sections 349, 350,
and/or 350-a; (6) the Plaintiffs' fraud claims fail under Rule
9(b); and (7) the Plaintiffs' class claims should be dismissed or
stricken.

The Defendant now moves, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 9(b), 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(6), and 12(f), to dismiss
the Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint, and/or to
strike the Plaintiffs' class claims.

Judge Buchwald granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint.  Among other
things, he finds that given the prominence with which the Products'
weight appears on the front of the package, the ease with which
consumers can calculate the number of candies contained therein,
consumers' expectations of slack-fill, as well as the Plaintiffs'
conceded reliance on factors other than the Products' packaging, he
concludes as a matter of law that no reasonable consumer would be
misled by the presence of slack-fill, even assuming it were
non-functional, in the Products' packaging.  

For essentially the same reasons as she concludes that the
slack-fill in the Products did not constitute a "material
misrepresentation" for purposes of GBL Sections 349, 350, and
350-a, the Plaintiffs fail to plead reasonable reliance.  She says
a person of "ordinary intelligence" could easily ascertain the
amount of candy contained in the Product boxes by (1) inspecting
the net weight printed on the front, and (2) multiplying the
serving size by the number of servings in the box, as provided on
the back.  Moreover, reliance is even less justified given that
consumers may have come to expect significant slack-fill in Junior
Mints and other snack products.

The foregoing Memorandum and Order dismisses all of the Plaintiffs'
claims as a matter of law.  Therefore, Judge Buchwald needs not
address the merits of the Defendant's motion to strike the
Plaintiffs' class claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(f), which is denied as moot.

For the foregoing reasons, the Judge granted the Defendant's motion
to dismiss the Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint and
denied as moot the Defendant's motion to strike.  The Clerk of the
Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment for the Defendant,
and close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 1, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://goo.gl/qLfZSJ from Leagle.com.

Biola Daniel, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Melissa Seelig, Lee
Litigation Group, PLLC & C.K. Lee -- cklee@leelitigation.com -- Lee
Litigation Group, PLLC.

Abel Duran & Trekeela Perkins, Plaintiffs, represented by C.K. Lee,
Lee Litigation Group, PLLC.

Tootsie Roll Industries, LLC, Defendant, represented by David
William Haller -- dhaller@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP.


TOTAL SYSTEM: Unit Still Defends Telexfree Securities Litigation
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total System Services, Inc.'s subsidiary continues to defend itself
against a consolidated action styled In Re: Telexfree Securities
Litigation, according to Total System's Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018.

ProPay, Inc.  ("ProPay"), a subsidiary of the Company, has been
named as one of a number of defendants (including other merchant
processors) in several purported class action lawsuits relating to
the activities of TelexFree, Inc.  and its affiliates and
principals.  TelexFree is a former merchant customer of ProPay.
With regard to TelexFree, each purported class action lawsuit
generally alleges that TelexFree engaged in an improper multi-tier
marketing scheme involving voice-over Internet protocol telephone
services.  The plaintiffs in each of the purported class action
complaints generally allege that the various merchant processor
defendants, including ProPay, aided and abetted the improper
activities of TelexFree.  TelexFree filed for bankruptcy protection
in Nevada.  The bankruptcy proceeding was subsequently transferred
to the Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court.

Specifically, ProPay has been named as one of a number of
defendants (including other merchant processors) in each of the
following purported class action complaints relating to TelexFree:
(i) Waldermara Martin, et al. v. TelexFree, Inc., et al. (Case No.
BK-S-14-12524-ABL) (Bankr. D. Nev.); (ii) Anthony Cellucci, et al.
v. TelexFree, Inc., et al. (Case No. 4:14-BK-40987) (Bankr. D.
Mass.); (iii) Maduako C. Ferguson Sr., et al. v. Telexelectric,
LLP, et. al (Case No. 5:14-CV-00316-D) (E.D.N.C.); (iv) Todd Cook
v. TelexElectric LLP et al. (Case No. 2:14-CV-00134) (N.D. Ga.);
(v) Felicia Guevara v. James M. Merrill et al., CA No.
1:14-cv-22405-DPG) (S.D. Fla.); (vi) Reverend Jeremiah Githere, et
al. v. TelexElectric LLP et al. (Case No. 1:14-CV-12825-GAO) (D.
Mass.); (vii) Paulo Eduardo Ferrari et al. v. Telexfree, Inc. et
al. (Case No. 14-04080) (Bankr. D. Mass); (viii) Magalhaes v.
TelexFree, Inc., et al., No. 14-cv-12437 (D. Mass.); (ix) Griffith
v. Merrill et al., No. 14-CV-12058 (D. Mass.); (x) Abelgadir v.
Telexelectric, LLP, No. 14-09857 (S.D.N.Y.); and (xi) Rita Dos
Santos, v. TelexElectric, LLP et al., 2:15-cv-01906-NVW (D. Ariz.)
(together, the "Actions").

On October 21, 2014, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
("JPML") transferred and consolidated the Actions filed before that
date to the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts (the "Consolidated Action").  The JPML subsequently
transferred the remaining Actions to the Consolidated Action.  The
Consolidated Action is styled In Re: Telexfree Securities
Litigation (4:14-md-02566-TSH) (D. Mass.).

The plaintiffs in the Consolidated Action filed a First
Consolidated Amended Complaint on March 31, 2015 and filed a Second
Consolidated Amended Complaint (the "Second Amended Complaint") on
April 30, 2015.  The Second Amended Complaint, which supersedes the
complaints filed prior to consolidation of the Actions, purports to
bring claims on behalf of all persons who purchased certain
TelexFree "memberships" and suffered a "net loss" between January
1, 2012 and April 16, 2014.  With respect to ProPay, the Second
Amended Complaint alleges that ProPay aided and abetted tortious
acts committed by TelexFree, and that ProPay was unjustly enriched
in the course of providing payment processing services to
TelexFree.  Several defendants, including ProPay, moved to dismiss
the Second Amended Complaint on June 2, 2015.  The court held a
hearing on the motions to dismiss on November 2, 2015, but has not
yet issued a ruling on the vast majority of the motions.  The court
did, however, deny the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Katia
Wanzeler, the wife of one of the principals of TelexFree, in an
order dated May 7, 2018.  The court has not ruled on any motions to
dismiss since that time.

Total System Services, Inc.'s revenues are derived from providing
payment processing services, merchant services and related payment
services to financial and nonfinancial institutions, generally
under long-term processing contracts.


TRUSTMARK CORP: TNB Still Faces Class Suit over Stanford Financial
------------------------------------------------------------------
Trustmark Corporation's principal subsidiary, Trustmark National
Bank (TNB), remains a defendant in a class action proceeding
related to the collapse of the Stanford Financial Group, according
to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The purported class action complaint was filed on August 23, 2009
in the District Court of Harris County, Texas, by Peggy Roif
Rotstain, Guthrie Abbott, Catherine Burnell, Steven Queyrouze,
Jaime Alexis Arroyo Bornstein and Juan C. Olano (collectively,
Class Plaintiffs), on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, naming TNB and four other financial institutions
unaffiliated with Trustmark as defendants.  The complaint seeks to
recover (i) alleged fraudulent transfers from each of the
defendants in the amount of fees and other monies received by each
defendant from entities controlled by R.  Allen Stanford
(collectively, the Stanford Financial Group) and (ii) damages
allegedly attributable to alleged conspiracies by one or more of
the defendants with the Stanford Financial Group to commit fraud
and/or aid and abet fraud on the asserted grounds that defendants
knew or should have known the Stanford Financial Group was
conducting an illegal and fraudulent scheme.  Plaintiffs have
demanded a jury trial.  Plaintiffs did not quantify damages.  

In November 2009, the lawsuit was removed to federal court by
certain defendants and then transferred by the United States Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation to federal court in the Northern
District of Texas (Dallas) where multiple Stanford related matters
are being consolidated for pre-trial proceedings.  In May 2010, all
defendants (including TNB) filed motions to dismiss the lawsuit.
In August 2010, the court authorized and approved the formation of
an Official Stanford Investors Committee (OSIC) to represent the
interests of Stanford investors and, under certain circumstances,
to file legal actions for the benefit of Stanford investors.  In
December 2011, the OSIC filed a motion to intervene in this action.
In September 2012, the district court referred the case to a
magistrate judge for hearing and determination of certain pretrial
issues.  In December 2012, the court granted the OSIC's motion to
intervene, and the OSIC filed an Intervenor Complaint against one
of the other defendant financial institutions.  In February 2013,
the OSIC filed a second Intervenor Complaint that asserts claims
against TNB and the remaining defendant financial institutions.
The OSIC seeks to recover: (i) alleged fraudulent transfers in the
amount of the fees each of the defendants allegedly received from
Stanford Financial Group, the profits each of the defendants
allegedly made from Stanford Financial Group deposits, and other
monies each of the defendants allegedly received from Stanford
Financial Group; (ii) damages attributable to alleged conspiracies
by each of the defendants with the Stanford Financial Group to
commit fraud and/or aid and abet fraud and conversion on the
asserted grounds that the defendants knew or should have known the
Stanford Financial Group was conducting an illegal and fraudulent
scheme; and (iii) punitive damages.  The OSIC did not quantify
damages.  

In July 2013, all defendants (including TNB) filed motions to
dismiss the OSIC's claims.  In March 2015, the court entered an
order authorizing the parties to conduct discovery regarding class
certification, staying all other discovery and setting a deadline
for the parties to complete briefing on class certification issues.
In April 2015, the court granted in part and denied in part the
defendants' motions to dismiss the Class Plaintiffs' claims and the
OSIC's claims.  The court dismissed all of the Class Plaintiffs'
fraudulent transfer claims and dismissed certain of the OSIC's
claims.  The court denied the motions by TNB and the other
financial institution defendants to dismiss the OSIC's constructive
fraudulent transfer claims.  

On June 23, 2015, the court allowed the Class Plaintiffs to file a
Second Amended Class Action Complaint (SAC), which asserted new
claims against TNB and certain of the other defendants for (i)
aiding, abetting and participating in a fraudulent scheme, (ii)
aiding, abetting and participating in violations of the Texas
Securities Act, (iii) aiding, abetting and participating in
breaches of fiduciary duty, (iv) aiding, abetting and participating
in conversion and (v) conspiracy.  On July 14, 2015, the defendants
(including TNB) filed motions to dismiss the SAC and to reconsider
the court's prior denial to dismiss the OSIC's constructive
fraudulent transfer claims against TNB and the other financial
institutions that are defendants in the action.  On July 27, 2016,
the court denied the motion by TNB and the other financial
institution defendants to dismiss the SAC and also denied the
motion by TNB and the other financial institution defendants to
reconsider the court's prior denial to dismiss the OSIC's
constructive fraudulent transfer claims.  On August 24, 2016, TNB
filed its answer to the SAC.  On October 20, 2017, the OSIC filed a
motion seeking an order lifting the discovery stay and establishing
a trial schedule.

On November 7, 2017, the court denied the OSIC's motion seeking
class certification and designation of class representatives and
counsel, finding that common issues of fact did not predominate.
The court granted the OSIC's motion to lift the discovery stay that
it had previously ordered.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Trustmark Corporation is a bank holding company headquartered in
Jackson, Mississippi.  Through its subsidiaries, Trustmark operates
as a financial services organization providing banking and
financial solutions to corporate institutions and individual
customers through 194 offices in Alabama, Florida, Mississippi,
Tennessee and Texas.


UGI CORP: Still Defends Against State Law Claims in Consumer Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
UGI Corporation continues to face state law claims filed in the
Western Division of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Missouri by certain indirect customers, according to
the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

Between May and October of 2014, purported class action lawsuits
were filed in multiple jurisdictions against the Partnership/UGI
and a competitor by certain of their direct and indirect customers.
The class action lawsuits allege, among other things, that the
Partnership and its competitor colluded, beginning in 2008, to
reduce the fill level of portable propane cylinders from 17 pounds
to 15 pounds and combined to persuade their common customer,
Walmart Stores, Inc., to accept that fill reduction, resulting in
increased cylinder costs to retailers and end-user customers in
violation of federal and certain state antitrust laws.  The claims
seek treble damages, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs
on behalf of the putative classes.  

On October 16, 2014, the United States Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation transferred all of these purported class
action cases to the Western Division of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri ("District Court").  In
July 2015, the District Court dismissed all claims brought by
direct customers.  In June 2017, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit ("Eighth Circuit") ruled en banc to reverse
the dismissal by the District Court, which had previously been
affirmed by a panel of the Eighth Circuit.  In September 2017, the
Company filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court appealing the decision of the Eighth Circuit.  The
petition was denied in January 2018 and, as a result, the case was
transferred back to the District Court for further proceedings.

In July 2015, the District Court also dismissed all claims brought
by the indirect customers other than claims for injunctive relief.
The indirect customers filed an amended complaint with the District
Court claiming injunctive relief and state law claims under
Wisconsin, Maine and Vermont law.  In September 2016, the District
Court dismissed the amended complaint in its entirety.  The
indirect customers appealed this decision to the Eighth Circuit.
On July 21, 2016, several new indirect customer plaintiffs filed an
antitrust class action lawsuit against the Partnership in the
Western District of Missouri.  The new indirect customer class
action lawsuit was dismissed in September 2016 and certain indirect
customer plaintiffs appealed the decision, consolidating their
appeal with the indirect customer appeal then pending in the Eighth
Circuit.

In June 2018, the Eighth Circuit issued its decision affirming the
District Court's decision dismissing the federal antitrust claims,
and remanded the case back to the District Court for further
proceedings related to the state law claims.

UGI Corporation is a holding company that, through subsidiaries and
affiliates, distributes, stores, transports and markets energy
products and related services.


UMH PROPERTIES: Can Compel Arbitration in Morgan FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SUSAN MORGAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UMH PROPERTIES,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18 CV 948 (N.D. Ohio), Judge Donald C. Nugent
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or in
the Alternative, Stay Proceedings Pending Arbitration.

Morgan was employed by UMH from May 2016 through April 2018.  In
connection with her hiring, she was required to execute an
arbitration agreement, which she signed on May 23, 2016.  

On April 25, 2018, the Plaintiff filed the collective action
against UMH alleging that it maintained a practice and policy of
failing to include commissions and/or bonuses earned by the
Plaintiff and other similarly-situated hourly, non-exempt employees
in their regular rate of pay, for purposes of calculating their
overtime compensation.  She claims that this practice violates the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and Ohio's Minimum Fair Wage
Standards Act ("MFWSA").

The matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings Pending
Arbitration.  The Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to the Motion, and
the Defendant filed a Reply in support.

Judge Nugent finds that although the agreement does appear to have
been a "form" document, prepared by the Defendant, and even if the
Court were to infer an inequality of bargaining power between the
parties, these factors are not sufficient to establish procedural
unconscionability.  Because a finding of unconscionability requires
both procedural and substantive unconscionability, and there is
absolutely no basis upon which to find procedural
unconscionability, he needs not address the claim of substantive
unconscionability.

For these reasons, the Judge finds that the delegation provision in
the arbitration agreement was not procedurally unconscionable, and
that it is, therefore, enforceable.  Therefore, the validity of the
arbitration agreement is a question that is to be determined by the
arbitrator, and not by the Court.

Accordingly, Judge Nugent granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Or, In the Alternative, Stay Proceedings Pending Arbitration.  The
question of the arbitrability of Ms. Morgan's claims is, itself,
subject to arbitration.  All claims are, therefore, dismissed
without prejudice.  The case may be re-filed, if appropriate,
following the arbitrator's determination of the arbitrability of
the Plaintiff's claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 1, 2018 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is available at https://bit.ly/2Qrv638 from Leagle.com.

Susan Morgan, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony J. Lazzaro --
anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com -- Lazzaro Law Firm, Chastity L. Christy
-- chastity@lazzarolawfirm.com -- Lazzaro Law Firm & Lori M.
Griffin -- lori@lazzarolawfirm.com -- Lazzaro Law Firm.

UMH Properties, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey M. Embleton
-- jembleton@mggmlpa.com -- Mansour Gavin, Amy L. Kullik --
akullik@mggmlpa.com -- Mansour Gavin & Kenneth E. Smith --
ksmith@mggmlpa.com -- Mansour Gavin.


UNIT CORP: Class Certification Bid in Panola Suit Still Underway
----------------------------------------------------------------
Unit Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the motion for class
certification in the case, Panola Independent School District No.
4, et al. v. Unit Petroleum Company, is still pending.

Panola Independent School District No. 4, Michael Kilpatrick, Gwen
Grego, Carla Lessel, Thelma Christine Pate, Juanita Golightly,
Melody Culberson, and Charlotte Abernathy are the Plaintiffs and
are royalty owners in oil and gas drilling and spacing units for
which the company's exploration segment distributes royalty. The
Plaintiffs' central allegation is that the company's exploration
segment has underpaid royalty obligations by deducting
post-production costs or marketing related fees.

Plaintiffs sought to pursue the case as a class action on behalf of
persons who receive royalty from us for our Oklahoma production.

Unit Corp. said, "We have asserted several defenses including that
the deductions are permitted under Oklahoma law. We have also
asserted that the case should not be tried as a class action due to
the materially different circumstances that determine what, if any,
deductions are taken for each lease."

On December 16, 2009, the trial court entered its order certifying
the class. On May 11, 2012 the court of civil appeals reversed the
trial court's order certifying the class. The Plaintiffs petitioned
the Supreme Court for certiorari and on October 8, 2012, the
Plaintiff's petition was denied. On January 22, 2013, the
Plaintiffs filed a second request to certify a class of royalty
owners slightly smaller than their first attempt. Since then, the
Plaintiffs have further amended their proposed class to just
include royalty owners entitled to royalties under certain leases
in Latimer, Le Flore, and Pittsburg Counties, Oklahoma.

In July 2014, a second class certification hearing was held where,
besides the defenses described above, the company argued that the
amended class definition is still deficient under the court of
civil appeals opinion reversing the initial class certification.
Closing arguments were held on December 2, 2014.

Unit Corp. said, "There is no timetable for when the court will
issue its ruling. The merits of Plaintiffs' claims will remain
stayed while class certification issues are pending.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Unit Corp. engages in onshore contract drilling of oil and gas
wells (for its own account as well as for other companies),
exploration and production of oil and gas, and the gathering and
transportation of natural gas primarily in the U.S. It also
explores, develops, acquires, and produces oil and natural gas, and
buys, sells, gathers, processes, and treats natural gas. Unit was
founded in 1963 and is based in Tulsa, Oklahoma.


UNIT CORP: Still Defends Chieftain Royalty Company Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Unit Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company continue to
defend itself in a class action suit entitled, Chieftain Royalty
Company v. Unit Petroleum Company.

On November 3, 2016, a putative class action lawsuit was filed
against Unit Petroleum Company styled Chieftain Royalty Company v.
Unit Petroleum Company in LeFlore County, Oklahoma.

Plaintiff alleges that Unit Petroleum breached its duty to pay
royalties on natural gas used for fuel off the lease premises. The
lawsuit seeks actual and punitive damages, an accounting,
injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. Plaintiff is seeking relief
on behalf of Oklahoma citizens who are or were royalty owners in
the company's Oklahoma wells.

The company filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the claims
asserted by the Plaintiff and the putative class are barred because
they have already been asserted by the putative class in the Panola
lawsuit and are subject to its reversal of class certification. The
court denied the company's motion to dismiss and the company has
asked the court to certify its order so that it can be immediately
appealed. That issue is still pending before the court.

Unit Corp. said, "If we do not ultimately prevail on our claim of
issue preclusion, we have several other defenses, including that
the case cannot be properly certified as a class action because of
the wide variety of circumstances that determine whether a royalty
payment was wrongfully withheld. At this point, the issue of class
certification has not been set before the court."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Unit Corp. engages in onshore contract drilling of oil and gas
wells (for its own account as well as for other companies),
exploration and production of oil and gas, and the gathering and
transportation of natural gas primarily in the U.S. It also
explores, develops, acquires, and produces oil and natural gas, and
buys, sells, gathers, processes, and treats natural gas. Unit was
founded in 1963 and is based in Tulsa, Oklahoma.


UNIT CORP: Still Defends Cockerell Oil Properties Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Unit Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 9, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the company still
defends a putative class action suit entitled, Cockerell Oil
Properties, Ltd., v. Unit Petroleum Company.

On March 11, 2016, a putative class action lawsuit was filed
against Unit Petroleum Company styled Cockerell Oil Properties,
Ltd., v. Unit Petroleum Company in LeFlore County, Oklahoma.

The company removed the case to federal court in the Eastern
District of Oklahoma. The plaintiff alleges that Unit Petroleum
wrongfully failed to pay interest with respect to untimely royalty
payments under Oklahoma's Production Revenue Standards Act. The
lawsuit seeks actual and punitive damages, an accounting,
disgorgement, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. Plaintiff is
seeking relief on behalf of royalty owners in the company's
Oklahoma wells.

Unit Corp. said, "We have asserted several defenses including that
the case cannot be properly certified as a class action because of
the wide variety of circumstances that determine whether a royalty
payment was timely made or has accrued interest under Oklahoma law.
At this point, the court has not taken any action on the issue of
class certification."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Unit Corp. engages in onshore contract drilling of oil and gas
wells (for its own account as well as for other companies),
exploration and production of oil and gas, and the gathering and
transportation of natural gas primarily in the U.S. It also
explores, develops, acquires, and produces oil and natural gas, and
buys, sells, gathers, processes, and treats natural gas. Unit was
founded in 1963 and is based in Tulsa, Oklahoma.


UNITED STATES: Court Hears Immigrants' Class Action v. ICE
----------------------------------------------------------
Alexandra Leslie and Michelle Gere, writing for WPRI, report that a
hearing centered around a Providence mother made its way to Boston
on Aug. 20.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is requesting temporary
relief for its clients while the case continues through the court
system. The government is trying to dismiss the class action
lawsuit which challenges the arrest of immigrants seeking legal
residency through marriage.

Lillian Calderon is the lead plaintiff in the ACLU's class action
lawsuit, that challenges the Trump Administration's immigration
policies. Back in January, Calderon was detained by Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) after attending a marriage interview with
her husband in Johnston.

The ACLU of Massachusetts claims ICE and Immigration Services
collaborated to trap immigrant families seeking lawful immigration
status.

Ms. Calderon said her family still feels the impact of what
happened to her to this day.

"I have two small children and these are the formative years," Ms.
Calderon said outside of court on Aug. 20. "They are five and two,
they were four and one at the time. We just went through such a
horrific experience . . . Things that they are still seeking
professional help to get over."

A spokes person for ICE and the Department of Homeland Security
said the allegations of inappropriate behavior are unfounded. [GN]


UNITED STATES: IRS Class Action 3rd-Party Funder Gets $1.75MM
-------------------------------------------------------------
Yvonne Juris, writing for Law360, reports that an Ohio federal
court has awarded $1.75 million in fees to a third party that
funded a class action alleging the Internal Revenue Service
illegally targeted Tea Party groups vying for nonprofit status that
resulted in a $3.5 million settlement.

U.S. District Judge Michael R. Barrett on Aug. 17 approved the
reimbursement request of $1.75 million, or half of the settlement
fund, for expenses incurred by conservative organization Citizens
for Self Governance.

The case is styled NorCal Tea Party Patriots v. Internal Revenue
Service et al, Case No. 1:13-cv-00341 (S.D. Ohio).  The case is
assigned to Judge Michael R. Barrett.  The case was filed May 20,
2013. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Suit Over Zero-Tolerance Policy Moved to S.D. Calif.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, M.M.M., on behalf of his minor child, J.M.A., et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. JEFFERSON BEAUREGARD SESSIONS, III, Attorney General
of the United States, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-1759
(PLF) (D. D.C.), Judge Paul L. Friedman of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia granted the Defendants' motion to
transfer venue, subject to certain modifications.

The case arises out of the government's controversial
"zero-tolerance" immigration policy, under which immigrant parents
unlawfully entering the United States with their young children
were subject to criminal prosecution and forcibly separated from
their children for several weeks.  

On June 26, 2018, Judge Dana M. Sabraw of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of California certified a nationwide
class of separated parents and issued a class-wide preliminary
injunction requiring the government to reunify separated families
by July 26, 2018.  With approximately 1,800 families reunified to
date, attention has turned to what lies ahead for these parents and
their children.

Plaintiffs in the action are a putative class of non-citizen
children who were separated from their parents shortly after
crossing the United States-Mexico border.  They allege that the
Defendants -- various federal agencies and officials responsible
for enforcing immigration laws and regulations -- recently adopted
a policy of removing families from the United States immediately
after reunification and, as a result, have denied the Plaintiffs
access to certain asylum procedures guaranteed by statute and under
the Constitution.

On July 27, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction.  Following expedited
briefing, the Court held a hearing on the motion on July 31, 2018.
At the hearing, the Defendants orally moved to transfer venue to
the Southern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1404(a).  The Plaintiffs however, that transfer of the case to the
Southern District of California is both inappropriate and
impossible because the District has exclusive jurisdiction over one
of the Plaintiffs' four claims, Count IV concerning judicial review
of expedited removal orders under Section 1252(e)(3).

The following day, the Defendants submitted a written supplement in
support of their oral motion to transfer venue, and the Plaintiffs
addressed the transfer issue in two supplemental filings.

Judge Friedman easily concludes that under the circumstances, a
single judge -- Judge Sabraw -- should be entrusted to untie the
sailor's knot.  He says the Plaintiffs are correct, however, that
the Southern District of California is barred by statute from
considering Count IV.  The Judge therefore will sever Counts I, II,
and III and transfer the case with those three claims to the
Southern District of California, to be considered together with the
similar actions now pending before Judge Sabraw.  Because
jurisdiction over Count IV lies exclusively in the District,
however, Count IV must remain before the Court and will proceed as
a separate action brought under Section 1252(e)(3).

Accordingly, the Judge granted the Defendants' motion to transfer
venue.  He severed Count IV from Counts I, II, and III and
transferred the case with those three claims to the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California to be considered by
Judge Sabraw in conjunction with the related proceedings pending
before him.  The Court will retain jurisdiction over Count IV as a
separate action.  An Order consistent with the Opinion will issue.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/RWbvuq from Leagle.com.

M.M.M, On behalf of his minor child, J.M.A., I.A.T., On behalf of
his minor child E.A.H., N.B., On behalf of her minor child D.B.G.,
P.A.P., On behalf of her minor child, G.M.A., G.C.H., On behalf of
his minor child, A.M.C. & L.C.O., On behalf of her minor child,
L.A.A., Plaintiffs, represented by Ira M. Feinberg --
ira.feinberg@hoganlovells.com -- HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP, pro hac
vice, Justin Bernick -- justin.bernick@hoganlovells.com -- HOGAN
LOVELLS US LLP, Katherine A. Nelson --
katherine.nelson@hoganlovells.com -- HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP, pro hac
vice, Oliver J. Armas -- oliver.armas@hoganlovells.com -- HOGAN
LOVELLS US LLP, pro hac vice & Zachary W.H. Best --
zachary.best@hoganlovells.com -- HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP.

JEFFERSON BEAUREGARD SESSIONS, III, Attorney General of the United
States, KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, ALEX AZAR, Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services, RONALD VITIELLO, Acting Director of U.S.
Immigration and Custom Enforcement, L. FRANCIS CISSNA, Director of
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration, KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, Commissioner
of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, SCOTT LLOYD, Director of the
Office of Refugee Resettlement, DANIEL A. BIBLE, Director of ICE
San Antonio Field Office, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES & OFFICE OF
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, Defendants, represented by Briana Faith Yuh,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Office of Immigration Litigation -
District Court Section, Jeffrey S. Robins, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE & Scott Grant Stewart, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.


USF REDDAWAY: Court Enters Final Judgment in R. Moss's Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge John A. Kronstadt of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California has entered final judgment in the case,
ROBERT MOSS; and JAMIEL WATKINS, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. USF REDDAWAY, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 5:15-CV-01541-JAK-FFM (C.D. Cal.) in accordance
with the Class Action Settlement and the Order Granting Plaintiffs'
Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Motion for
Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, if any Class or Subclass Members
also worked at any time for YRC Inc., doing business as YRC
Freight, then their claims for time spent working for YRC as
alleged in the pending case of Hogue v. YRC Inc., Case No.
5:16-cv-01338-CJC-JEM (C.D. Cal.) are not released by the
Settlement Agreement.  Furthermore, the Settlement will not release
any person, party or entity from claims, if any, by the Class
Members for workers' compensation, unemployment, or disability
benefits of any nature, nor does it release any claims, actions, or
causes of action which may be possessed by Class Members under
state or federal discrimination statutes, including, without
limitation, the Cal. Fair Employment and Housing Act; the Unruh
Civil Rights Act; the California Constitution; Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Americans with Disabilities Act, as
amended; the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974; and
all of their implementing regulations and interpretive guidelines.

In accordance with the Final Approval Order, the Plaintiffs will be
paid Class Representative Incentive Awards of $14,000 each ($28,000
in total) in the manner provided by the Settlement.  The
Plaintiffs' counsel will be paid Attorneys' Fees in the amount of
$737,500 in fees and costs in the amount of $24,471.62 in the
manner provided by the Settlement.  The Settlement Administrator,
CPT Group, Inc. will be paid $12,500 as administration fees in
accordance with the terms of the Settlement.

Judge Kronstadt ordered that $75,000 will be allocated as payment
for penalties under the California Labor Code Private Attorney
Generals Act ("PAGA"), 75% of which (i.e. $56,250) will be paid to
the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") for
its portion of the PAGA penalties pursuant to Cal. Labor Code
sections 2698-2699.

Any checks paid to Settlement Participants will advise that they
will remain valid and negotiable for 90 calendar days from the date
of their issuance and may thereafter automatically be canceled if
not cashed by a Settlement Participant within that time, at which
time the Settlement Participant's check will be deemed void and
have no further force and effect.  Any Settlement Participant's
failure to negotiate and/or cash any such check will not abrogate
or affect that Settlement Participant's waivers or releases under
this Settlement.  The funds associated with any checks which are
not timely negotiated will be paid to the State of California's
Department of Industrial Relations' Unclaimed Wage Fund in the name
of the Settlement Participant(s) who did not cash their check.

The Court will maintain jurisdiction over the action for one year
from the date of entry of the Final Judgment for purposes of
enforcing the terms of the Settlement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2018 Final Judgment is
available at https://is.gd/pY1WQX from Leagle.com.

Robert Moss, individually & Jamiel Watkins, individually and on
behalf of all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Craig J. Ackermann -- cja@ackermanntilajef.com -- Ackermann and
Tilajef PC, Julian Ari Hammond -- jhammond@hammondlawpc.com --
HammondLaw PC & Sam Vahedi -- sv@svalawyers.com -- Ackermann and
Tilajef PC.

USF Reddaway Inc, Defendant, represented by Ronald J. Holland, II
-- ron.holland@dlapiper.com -- McDermott Will and Emery LLP &
Pankit J. Doshi -- pankit.doshi@dlapiper.com -- McDermott Will and
Emery LLP.

Ricardo Gomez, Interested Party, represented by Gregory E. Mauro --
GREG@MAUROLAWFIRM.NET -- James Hawkins APLC.


USG CORPORATION: Faces Anderson Suit over Knauf Merger
------------------------------------------------------
KEVIN D. ANDERSON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. USG CORPORATION; STEVEN F. LEER;
JENNIFER F. SCANLON; JOSE ARMARIO; WILLIAM H. HERNANDEZ; RICHARD P.
LAVIN BRIAN KENNEY; GRETCHEN R. HAGGERTY; MATHER CARTER, JR.;
THOMAS A. BURKE; GEBR. KNAUF KG; GEBR. KNAUF
VERWALTUNGSGESELLSCHAFT KG; C&G VERWALTUNGS GMBH; WORLD CUP
ACQUISITION CORPORATION; BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.; BERKSHIRE
HATHAWAY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEBRASKA; BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY
ASSURANCE CORPORATION NATIONAL INDEMNITY COMPANY; GENERAL RE LIFE
CORPORATION; GENERAL REINSURANCE CORPORATION; and GENERAL RE
CORPORATION, Defendants, Case No. 2018-0602- (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 13,
2018) is an action against Defendants for violations of statutory
law, breaches of fiduciary duty, and other violations of state law
arising out of their efforts to effectuate the sale of USG to
Knauf.

According to the complaint, on June 10, 2018, USG entered into an
agreement and plan of merger (the "Merger Agreement") with Knauf
and World Cup Acquisition Corporation ("Merger Sub"), pursuant to
which Merger Sub will merge with and into the Company, with the
Company surviving as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Knauf (the
"Proposed Buyout"). Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement,
USG shareholders will receive $44 in cash for each share of USG
common stock that they own (the "Merger Consideration").

This Merger Consideration and the Proposed Buyout are the result of
the Board's reactionary response to coordinated and sustained
pressure exerted by the Company's largest shareholders, Knauf and
Berkshire. As a result of this coordinated activity, the Board
suffered a stunning loss at its annual meeting, at which all four
of its recommended directors up for election failed to secure the
votes they needed to win election. Shortly thereafter, and despite
months of publicly and privately fending off Knauf's advances, the
Board surrendered to Knauf and Berkshire and agreed to a sale to
Knauf that it had both publicly and privately decided was
inadequate and not in shareholders' best interests.

The Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the shareholder vote on the Proposed
Buyout, or, in the event that the shareholder vote is held, enjoin
the consummation of the Proposed Buyout, until such time as the
Company receives the requisite number of shares required by Section
203 for the consummation of the Proposed Buyout and shareholders
are adequately informed that they are in the midst of a hostile
takeover of USG.

USG Corporation, through its subsidiaries, manufactures and sells
building materials worldwide. USG Corporation was founded in 1901
and is headquartered in Chicago, Illinois. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Blake A. Bennett, Esq.
          COOCH AND TAYLOR, P.A.
          The Brandywine Building
          1000 West Street, 10 th Floor
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 984-3800

               - and -

          Michael J. Palestina, Esq.
          Christopher R. Tillotson, Esq.
          KAHN SWICK & FOTI, LLC
          206 Covington Street
          Madisonville, LA 70447
          Telephone: (504) 455-1400
          Facsimile: (504) 455-1498
          E-mail: michael.palestina@ksfcounsel.com
                  christopher.tillotson@ksfcounsel.com


VECTOR GROUP: "Parsons" Personal Injury Class Suit Remains Stayed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Vector Group Ltd. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018, that the purported class action styled Parsons v. AC
& S Inc. remains stayed due to the December 2000 bankruptcy of
three of the defendants.

In February 1998, the purported class action was commenced on
behalf of all West Virginia residents who allegedly have personal
injury claims arising from exposure to cigarette smoke and asbestos
fibers.  The complaint seeks to recover US$1,000,000 in
compensatory and punitive damages individually and unspecified
compensatory and punitive damages for the class.  The case is
stayed due to the December 2000 bankruptcy of three of the
defendants.

Vector Group Ltd. is a holding company with subsidiaries engaged in
domestic cigarettes manufacturing, real estate development and
brokerage.


VECTOR GROUP: "Young" Personal Injury Class Lawsuit Still Stayed
----------------------------------------------------------------
The purported personal injury class action styled Young v. American
Tobacco Co. remains stayed, according to Vector Group Ltd.'s Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

In November 1997, the class action was commenced on behalf of
plaintiff and all similarly situated residents in Louisiana who,
though not themselves cigarette smokers, allege they were exposed
to secondhand smoke from cigarettes that were manufactured by the
defendants, including Liggett, and suffered injury as a result of
that exposure.  The plaintiffs seek to recover an unspecified
amount of compensatory and punitive damages.  No class
certification hearing has been held.  The stay order entered on
March 16, 2016 stays the case pending completion of the smoking
cessation program ordered by the court in Scott v. The American
Tobacco Co.

Vector Group Ltd. is a holding company with subsidiaries engaged in
domestic cigarettes manufacturing, real estate development and
brokerage.


VECTOR GROUP: 60 Individual Tobacco Cases Pending vs. Liggett
-------------------------------------------------------------
Vector Group Ltd. said in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018, that the company's subsidiary, Liggett Group LLC,
could be a defendant in approximately 60 individual cases related
to In Re: Tobacco Litigation (Personal Injury Cases).

In the case, "In Re: Tobacco Litigation (Personal Injury Cases)," a
West Virginia state court consolidated approximately 750 individual
smoker actions that were pending prior to 2001 for trial of certain
"common" issues.  Liggett was severed from trial of the
consolidated action.

In May 2013, the jury rejected all but one of the plaintiffs’
claims finding in favor of plaintiffs on the claim that ventilated
filter cigarettes between 1964 and July 1, 1969 should have
included instructions on how to use them. The court entered
judgment in October 2013, dismissing all claims against the
non-Liggett defendants except the ventilated filter claim on behalf
of 30 plaintiffs.

In May 2016, the trial court ruled that the case could proceed
against Liggett, notwithstanding the outcome of the first phase of
the trial against the non-Liggett defendants.

In October 2017, the trial court vacated the case management orders
for the second phase based on notice from the non-Liggett parties
of a settlement with the remaining 30 plaintiffs. In December 2017,
the court ordered plaintiffs’ counsel to confirm all remaining
plaintiffs with claims against Liggett. The court further agreed
that it would entertain a renewed motion by Liggett regarding the
impact of the final judgment in favor of co-defendants on the
claims against Liggett and whether those claims are barred by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.

In March and April 2017, Liggett moved to dismiss a number of
plaintiffs’ claims on various grounds.  The court granted the
motions as to approximately 25 plaintiffs and reserved ruling as to
other claims until additional information is provided by
plaintiffs.  The parties have been ordered to mediate, but a date
has not been selected. It is currently estimated that Liggett could
be a defendant in approximately 60 individual cases.

Vector Group Ltd. is a holding company with subsidiaries engaged in
domestic cigarettes manufacturing, real estate development and
brokerage.


VECTOR GROUP: 75 Claims Still Pending in Engle Progeny Cases
------------------------------------------------------------
Vector Group Ltd. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018, that approximately 75 plaintiffs' claims remain
pending in state court related to the Engle Progeny Cases.

In May 1994, Engle was filed against Liggett and others in
Miami-Dade County, Florida.  The class consisted of all Florida
residents who, by November 21, 1996, "have suffered, presently
suffer or have died from diseases and medical conditions caused by
their addiction to cigarette smoking." In July 1999, after the
conclusion of Phase I of the trial, the jury returned a verdict
against Liggett and other cigarette manufacturers on certain issues
determined by the trial court to be "common" to the causes of
action of the plaintiff class.  The jury made several findings
adverse to the defendants including that defendants' conduct "rose
to a level that would permit a potential award or entitlement to
punitive damages." Phase II of the trial was a causation and
damages trial for three of the class plaintiffs and a punitive
damages trial on a class-wide basis before the same jury that
returned the verdict in Phase I.  In April 2000, the jury awarded
compensatory damages of US$12,704,000 to the three class
plaintiffs, to be reduced in proportion to the respective
plaintiff's fault.  In July 2000, the jury awarded approximately
US$145,000,000,000 in punitive damages, including US$790,000,000
against Liggett.

In May 2003, Florida's Third District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court and remanded the case with instructions to decertify
the class.  The judgment in favor of one of the three class
plaintiffs, in the amount of US$5,831,000, was overturned as time
barred and the court found that Liggett was not liable to the other
two class plaintiffs.

In July 2006, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the decision
vacating the punitive damages award and held that the class should
be decertified prospectively, but determined that the following
Phase I findings are entitled to res judicata effect in Engle
progeny cases: (i) that smoking causes lung cancer, among other
diseases; (ii) that nicotine in cigarettes is addictive; (iii) that
defendants placed cigarettes on the market that were defective and
unreasonably dangerous; (iv) that defendants concealed material
information knowing that the information was false or misleading or
failed to disclose a material fact concerning the health effects or
addictive nature of smoking; (v) that defendants agreed to conceal
or omit information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or
their addictive nature with the intention that smokers would rely
on the information to their detriment; (vi) that defendants sold or
supplied cigarettes that were defective; and (vii) that defendants
were negligent.  The Florida Supreme Court decision also allowed
former class members to proceed to trial on individual liability
issues and compensatory and punitive damages issues.  In December
2006, the Florida Supreme Court added the finding that defendants
sold or supplied cigarettes that, at the time of sale or supply,
did not conform to the representations made by defendants.  In
October 2007, the United States Supreme Court denied defendants'
petition for writ of certiorari.

Pursuant to the Florida Supreme Court's July 2006 ruling in Engle,
which decertified the class on a prospective basis and affirmed the
appellate court's reversal of the punitive damages award, former
class members had until January 2008 in which to file individual
lawsuits.  As a result, Liggett and the Company, and other
cigarette manufacturers, were sued in thousands of Engle progeny
cases in both federal and state courts in Florida.  Although the
Company was not named as a defendant in the Engle case, it was
named as a defendant in substantially all of the Engle progeny
cases where Liggett was named as a defendant.

Engle Progeny Settlement I.  In October 2013, the Company and
Liggett entered into a settlement with approximately 4,900 Engle
progeny plaintiffs and their counsel ("Engle Progeny Settlement
I").  Pursuant to the terms of the settlement, Liggett agreed to
pay a total of approximately US$110,000,000, with approximately
US$61,600,000 paid in a lump sum and the balance to be paid in
installments over 14 years, starting in February 2015.  In
exchange, the claims of more than 4,900 plaintiffs, including the
claims of all plaintiffs with cases pending in federal court, were
dismissed with prejudice against the Company and Liggett.  Due to
the settlement, in 2013, the Company recorded a charge of
US$86,213,000 of which approximately US$25,000,000 is related to
certain payments discounted to their present value using an 11%
annual discount rate.  The installment payments total approximately
US$48,000,000 on an undiscounted basis.  The Company's future
payments will be approximately US$3,400,000 per annum through 2028,
with a cost of living increase beginning in 2021.  In December
2017, Liggett pre-paid the 2018 and 2019 installment payments.

Engle Progeny Settlement II.  In December 2016, the Company and
Liggett entered into an agreement with 124 Engle progeny plaintiffs
and their counsel ("Engle Progeny Settlement II").  Pursuant to the
terms of the settlement, Liggett agreed to pay US$17,650,000,
US$14,000,000 of which was paid on December 7, 2016 with the
balance of US$3,650,000 to be paid in equal quarterly payments
starting in January 2018, with 5% interest.  As a result of the
settlement, the Company recorded a charge of US$17,650,000 in the
fourth quarter of 2016.  In December 2017, Liggett prepaid all
remaining Engle Progeny Settlement II payments.

Notwithstanding the comprehensive nature of the Engle Progeny
Settlements, approximately 75 plaintiffs' claims remain pending in
state court.  Therefore, the Company and Liggett may still be
subject to periodic adverse judgments which could have a material
adverse affect on the Company's consolidated financial position,
results of operations and cash flows.

Vector Group Ltd. is a holding company with subsidiaries engaged in
domestic cigarettes manufacturing, real estate development and
brokerage.


VECTOR GROUP: Liggett Incurs $3.6MM in Tobacco-Related Lawsuits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Liggett Group LLC has incurred tobacco product liability legal
expenses and costs totaling US$3,584,000 for the six months ended
June 30, 2018, according to Vector Group Ltd.'s Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

Since 1954, Liggett and other United States cigarette manufacturers
have been named as defendants in numerous direct, third-party and
purported class actions predicated on the theory that cigarette
manufacturers should be liable for damages alleged to have been
caused by cigarette smoking or by exposure to secondary smoke from
cigarettes.

The cases have generally fallen into the following categories: (i)
smoking and health cases alleging personal injury brought on behalf
of individual plaintiffs ("Individual Actions"); (ii) lawsuits by
individuals requesting the benefit of the Engle ruling ("Engle
progeny cases"); (iii) smoking and health cases primarily alleging
personal injury or seeking court-supervised programs for ongoing
medical monitoring, as well as cases alleging that use of the terms
"lights" and/or "ultra lights" constitutes a deceptive and unfair
trade practice, common law fraud or violation of federal law,
purporting to be brought on behalf of a class of individual
plaintiffs ("Class Actions"); and (iv) health care cost recovery
actions brought by various foreign and domestic governmental
plaintiffs and non-governmental plaintiffs seeking reimbursement
for health care expenditures allegedly caused by cigarette smoking
and/or disgorgement of profits ("Health Care Cost Recovery
Actions").

The Company said, "The future financial impact of the risks and
expenses of litigation are not quantifiable.  For the six months
ended June 30, 2018 and 2017, Liggett incurred tobacco product
liability legal expenses and costs totaling US$3,584,000 and
US$4,820,000, respectively.  The tobacco product liability legal
expenses and costs are included in the operating, selling,
administrative and general expenses and litigation settlement and
judgment expense line items in the Condensed Consolidated
Statements of Operations.  Legal defense costs are expensed as
incurred."

Vector Group Ltd. is a holding company with subsidiaries engaged in
domestic cigarettes manufacturing, real estate development and
brokerage.


VECTRUS INC: Oct. 16 Fairness Hearing for Employment Suit Accord
----------------------------------------------------------------
Vectrus, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 29, 2018, that a fairness hearing for the settlement of a
class action employment lawsuit is scheduled for October 16, 2018.

The Company said, "We are defending a class action employment
lawsuit that was initiated in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington in April 2010 against the
predecessor of our Former Parent by individuals who worked on a
particular contract in Kuwait after April 12, 2009.  The plaintiffs
are alleging a breach of employment contract by the predecessor of
our Former Parent due to an alleged violation of Kuwait labor law.
In November 2016, following an interlocutory appeal by Vectrus, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's
decision certifying a class of plaintiffs.  Although we continue to
dispute liability, the parties have negotiated a proposed
settlement, the terms of which received preliminary approval by the
District Court on May 22, 2018.  Final approval by the District
Court is not expected until all requirements have been met,
including a fairness hearing currently scheduled for October 16,
2018."

Vectrus is a provider of services to the U.S. government worldwide.
The company operates in one segment and offer facility and
logistics services and information technology and network
communications services. The company is based in Colorado Springs,
Colorado.


VICTORY CONSULTANTS: Underpays Signature Gatherers, Wilson Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MONSATHONY WILSON, and NANCY URSCHEL, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. VICTORY CONSULTANTS,
INC.; and DOES 1 through 100, Defendants, Case No. 37-20
18-00040267-CU-0E-CTL (Cal. Super., San Diego Cty., Aug. 9, 2018)
is an action against the Defendants for failure to pay minimum
wages, overtime compensation, authorize and permit meal and rest
periods, provide accurate wage statements, and reimburse necessary
business expenses.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as signature
gathererers.

Victory Consultants, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the State of California. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John M. Bickford, Esq.
          R. Rex Parris, Esq.
          Kitty K. Szeto, Esq.
          Ryan A. Crist, Esq.
          PARRIS LAW FIRM
          43364 10th Street West
          Lancaster, California 93534
          Telephone: (661) 949-2595
          Facsimile: (661) 949-7524


VIVINT SOLAR: Defends Putative Class Suit over TCPA Violations
--------------------------------------------------------------
Vivint Solar, Inc. is facing a putative class action lawsuit in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia over alleged
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, according to
the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

In July 2018, an individual filed the putative class action
lawsuit, purportedly on behalf of himself and other persons who
received certain telephone calls.  The lawsuit alleges that the
Company violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and some of
its implementing regulations.  The complaint seeks statutory
penalties for each alleged violation.  The Company disputes the
allegations in the complaint and is in the process of retaining
counsel to represent it in the litigation.  The Company is unable
to estimate the amount or range of potential loss, if any, at this
time.

Vivint Solar, Inc. provides distributed solar energy to
residential, commercial, and industrial customers in the United
States. The company operates in two segments, Residential, and
Commercial and Industrial. The company is based in Lehi, Utah.


VIVINT SOLAR: Faces Class Action over Power Purchase Deals
----------------------------------------------------------
Vivint Solar, Inc. is facing a putative class action lawsuit
alleging violations of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act and
California Business and Professions Code Section 17200, according
to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

In June 2018, four of the Company's customers, on behalf of
themselves and a purported class, named the Company in the putative
class action requesting relief pursuant to Section 1689 of the
California Civil Code.  The complaint sought (1) rescission of
their power purchase agreements along with restitution to the
plaintiffs individually and (2) declaratory and injunctive relief.
The Company disputes the allegations in the complaint and intends
to vigorously defend itself.  The Company is unable to estimate the
amount or range of potential loss, if any, at this time.

Vivint Solar, Inc. provides distributed solar energy to
residential, commercial, and industrial customers in the United
States. The company operates in two segments, Residential, and
Commercial and Industrial. The company is based in Lehi, Utah.


VIVINT SOLAR: Settlement Reached with 2 Plaintiffs in Calif. Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Vivint Solar, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018, that the parties in the class action filed in Kern
County, California state court has reached a settlement with two
individual plaintiffs.

In September 2015, two of the Company's customers, on behalf of
themselves and a purported class, named the Company in a putative
class action, Case No. BCV-15-100925 (Cal. Super. Ct., Kern
County), alleging violation of California Business and Professions
Code Section 17200 and requesting relief pursuant to Section 1689
of the California Civil Code.  The complaint sought: (1) rescission
of their power purchase agreements along with restitution to the
plaintiffs individually and (2) declaratory and injunctive relief.

In October 2015, the Company moved to compel arbitration of the
plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the provisions set forth in the
PPAs, which the Court granted and dismissed the class claims
without prejudice.  The plaintiffs appealed the Court's order.

On July 26, 2017, the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate
District ruled that all issues concerning the interpretation,
validity, or enforceability of the PPAs, including the
arbitrability of class claims, must be submitted to arbitration.

The appellate court vacated the portion of the trial court's order
dismissing class claims, requiring that issue to be determined by
an arbitrator.  The case proceeded in arbitration administered by
JAMS.  In June 2018, the parties reached a settlement with the two
individual plaintiffs.

Vivint Solar, Inc. provides distributed solar energy to
residential, commercial, and industrial customers in the United
States. The company operates in two segments, Residential, and
Commercial and Industrial. The company is based in Lehi, Utah.


VOLUME SERVICES: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Jeffries FCRA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, granted Defendant Volume's Motion to Dismiss
the case, DORIS JEFFRIES, Plaintiff, v. VOLUME SERVICES AMERICA,
INC., et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-1788 (CKK) (D.
D.C.).

The Plaintiff used a credit card to make a purchase from Defendant
Volume, doing business as Centerplate and Centerplate/NBSE, and, in
some fashion, 10 Doe Defendants.  To memorialize the transaction,
the Defendants provided the Plaintiff with one or more
electronically printed receipts that contained the following pieces
of information from her credit card: the full 16-digit card number,
the expiration date, and the brand.

The Plaintiff brought a putative class action against the
Defendants for allegedly violating the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003 ("FACTA").  The transaction allegedly
occurred after the effective date of the amendment.

Defendant Centerplate seeks dismissal of the action under Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Judge Kollar-Kotelly finds that the Plaintiff cannot escape her
obligation to establish standing under Article III simply by
pointing to the potential availability of relief on the merits.
She has found that the Plaintiff has not alleged a sufficiently
imminent risk of harm such that she experienced a concrete injury
in fact.  Rather, the Plaintiff has merely speculated as to a
potential future injury.  Only if the Plaintiff had experienced a
concrete injury in fact, even without any actual damage, could the
Court proceed to consider the Plaintiff's entitlement to statutory
damages.

Because she will dismiss the case on Rule 12(b)(1) grounds, the
Judge holds she needs not reach the Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6)
grounds.  She relatedly denies the Plaintiff's request for leave to
amend the complaint.  The Plaintiff makes that proposal in the
context of responding to the Defendant's objection that she had not
included a copy of the receipt with her Complaint, nor had she
otherwise offered many details about the transaction.  But the
Plaintiff gives no indication that such details would remedy the
lack of concrete harm that the Court has identified.  Because such
an amendment would not establish standing, amending the Complaint
would be futile and is thus unwarranted.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Judge Kollar-Kotelly concludes
that the Plaintiff lacks standing under Article III to pursue the
relief that she seeks in the case.  The Court does not have
subject-matter jurisdiction to proceed further.  Accordingly, she
granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss contained in its Notice
of Motion, and dismissed the case.  An appropriate Order
accompanies the Memorandum Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 3, 2018 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/MfNF8m from Leagle.com.

DORIS JEFFRIES, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Chant Yedalian --
chant@chant.mobi -- CHANT & COMPANY A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION,
pro hac vice & Katherine Warren Van Dyck, CUNEO, GILBERT & LADUCA,
LLP.

VOLUME SERVICES AMERICA, INC., doing business as ENTERPLATE AND
CENTERPLATE/NBSE, Defendant, represented by Devin J. Stone --
devin.stone@BTLaw.com -- BARNES & THORNBURG LLP, Scott Neal Godes
-- scott.godes@btlaw.com -- BARNES & THORNBURG LLP & Mark Bayer --
Mark.Bayer@btlaw.com -- BARNES & THOMBURG, LLP, pro hac vice.


VORA RETIREMENT: Bid to Dismiss Goetz Class Suit Still Pending
--------------------------------------------------------------
Voya Retirement Insurance and Annuity Company said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August
9, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the
company's motion to dismiss the case entitled, Goetz v. Voya
Financial and Voya Retirement Insurance and Annuity Company, is
still pending.

Goetz v. Voya Financial and Voya Retirement Insurance and Annuity
Company (USDC District of Delaware, No. 1:17-cv-1289) (filed
September 8, 2017), a putative class action in which plaintiff, a
participant in a 401(k) plan, seeks to represent other participants
in the plan as well as a class of similarly situated plans that
"contract with (Voya) for recordkeeping and other services."

Plaintiff alleges that "Voya" breached its fiduciary duty to the
plan and other plan participants by charging unreasonable and
excessive recordkeeping fees, and that "Voya" distributed
materially false and misleading 404a-5 administrative and fund fee
disclosures to conceal its excessive fees. The Company denies the
allegations, which it believes are without merit, and intends to
defend the case vigorously. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on
January 4, 2018, and the Company filed a motion to dismiss the
amended complaint of February 8, 2018.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Voya Retirement Insurance and Annuity Company, together with its
subsidiaries, operates as a stock life insurance company in the
United States. The company is based in Windsor, Connecticut. Voya
Retirement Insurance and Annuity Company is a subsidiary of Voya
Holdings Inc.


VOYA RETIREMENT: Bid to Dismiss Dezelan Class Suit Still Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
Voya Retirement Insurance and Annuity Company said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August
9, 2018, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that the
company's motion to dismiss the case Dezelan v. Voya Retirement
Insurance and Annuity Company, is still pending.

Dezelan v. Voya Retirement Insurance and Annuity Company (VRIAC)
(USDC District of Connecticut, No. 3:16-cv-1251)(filed July 26,
2016), a putative class action in which plaintiff, a participant in
a 403(b) Plan, seeks to represent a class of plans whose assets are
invested in VRIAC "Group Annuity Contract Stable Value Funds."

Plaintiff alleges that VRIAC has violated the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 by charging unreasonable fees and
setting its own compensation in connection with stable value
products.  

Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, disgorgement of
profits, damages and attorney's fees. The Company denies the
allegations, which it believes are without merit, and intends to
defend the case vigorously.

On July 19, 2017, the district court granted the Company's motion
to dismiss, but permitted the plaintiff to file an amended
complaint. The plaintiff has filed a first amended complaint, and
the Company moved to dismiss that complaint on September 18, 2017.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Voya Retirement Insurance and Annuity Company, together with its
subsidiaries, operates as a stock life insurance company in the
United States. The company is based in Windsor, Connecticut. Voya
Retirement Insurance and Annuity Company is a subsidiary of Voya
Holdings Inc.


ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES: Oct. 30 Final OK Hearing for Class Suit Accord
------------------------------------------------------------------
Zebra Technologies Corporation disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018, that the hearing to consider approval
of the settlement of a class action lawsuit related to the
acquisition of Symbol Technologies is set for October 30, 2018.

In connection with the acquisition of the Enterprise business from
Motorola Solutions, Inc., the Company acquired Symbol Technologies,
Inc., a subsidiary of Motorola Solutions ("Symbol").  A putative
federal class action lawsuit, Waring v. Symbol Technologies, Inc.,
et al., was filed on August 16, 2005 against Symbol Technologies,
Inc.  and two of its former officers in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York by Robert Waring.  After
the filing of the Waring action, several additional purported class
actions were filed against Symbol and the same former officers
making substantially similar allegations (collectively, the New
Class Actions").  The Waring action and the New Class Actions were
consolidated for all purposes and on April 26, 2006, the Court
appointed the Iron Workers Local # 580 Pension Fund as lead
plaintiff and approved its retention of lead counsel on behalf of
the putative class.

On August 30, 2006, the lead plaintiff filed a Consolidated Amended
Class Action Complaint (the "Amended Complaint"), and named
additional former officers and directors of Symbol as defendants.
The lead plaintiff alleges that the defendants misrepresented the
effectiveness of Symbol's internal controls and forecasting
processes, and that, as a result, all of the defendants violated
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act") and the individual defendants violated Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act.  The lead plaintiff alleges that it was damaged by
the decline in the price of Symbol's stock following certain
purported corrective disclosures and seeks unspecified damages.
The court has certified a class of investors that includes those
that purchased Symbol common stock between March 12, 2004 and
August 1, 2005.

The parties completed fact and expert discovery.  They also agreed
to a schedule for the filing of dispositive motions, which the
court so-ordered on February 12, 2018.  However, by order entered
on April 2, 2018, the court adjourned the deadlines for summary
judgment briefing in light of the fact that the parties reached an
agreement in principle to settle the matter at the mediation held
on March 15, 2018.  The settlement is subject to approval of the
Court pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Zebra has reached agreements with certain of its
insurers to fund the settlement.

On April 30, 2018, the lead plaintiff commenced the process for
obtaining the court's approval of the settlement by filing a motion
for preliminary approval of the class action settlement, and on May
22, 2018, the Court entered an order: (1) preliminarily approving
the settlement with the hearing for final approval of the
settlement terms set for October 30, 2018; (2) approving the notice
provisions to be provided to the class; (3) appointing the
settlement administrator; and (4) setting forth the procedure and
timing by which class members may elect to participate in, opt out
of or object to the settlement.

Zebra Technologies Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiaries is
a global leader providing innovative Enterprise Asset Intelligence
("EAI") solutions in the automatic information and data capture
solutions industry.



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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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