CAR_Public/180921.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, September 21, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 190

                            Headlines

1FORCE GOVERNMENT: Mitchell Suit Moved to C.D. California
50-01 2ND STREET: Fischler Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
ABRA MANAGEMENT: Failed to Pay Wages and Overtime, Lewinstein Says
ACOSTA INC: Court Denies Conditional Certification of Ezell Class
ADAMS & ASSOCIATES: Allstate Insurance Files Suit in W.D. Oklahoma

ADVIA CREDIT: Summary Judgment Bid in Pingston-Poling Suit Denied
AKAL SECURITY: Dean Suit Moved to Western District of Louisiana
ALL NIPPON: Court Certifies 2 Classes in Wortman Antitrust Suit
ALLIED CONSTRUCTION: Court Narrows Claims in DiSantis Suit
ALORICA INC: Fails to Pay OT to CSRs, Dyer et al. Suit Allege

AMAGERBANKEN: Shareholders' Class Action Fails at High Court
AMAZON FULFILLMENT: Hagman et al. Suit Moved to E.D. California
AMPIO PHARMA: Oct. 24 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
ANADARKO BASIN: Certification of Settlement Class Sought
ASCENSIONPOINT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed

ATASCADERO STATE: Pines Suit Moved to C.D. Calif.
AUSTRALIA: Victoria EPA May Face Suit Over Arsenic Contamination
AUTOBAHN INC: Court Certifies Settlement Class in Ferrari Suit
BANKERS LIFE: Toma Suit Moved to Southern District of California
BANNER HEALTH: Spcl. Master's Report #7 in Ramos Partly Adopted

BEMIS COMPANY: Shareholder Class Action Mulled Over Amco Deal
BIMBO BAKERIES: Camp et al. Seek to Certify FLSA Class
BLARNEY ENTERPRISES: Kulchawik Seeks to Certify Minimum Wage Class
BMW: 120 Owners File Class Action Over Spontaneous Engine Fires
BRONX LEGACY: Zulaine Perez Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.

C.R. ENGLAND: Silva Suit Moved to Central District of Utah
CA INC: Faces Jacob Scheiner Sit over Broadcom Merger
CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT: Cabral Sues over Resort Fee Tax
CANTERBURY RESTAURANT: Underpays Servers, Charlotte Lindsay Claims
CENTRAL MAINE: Loses Customers' Trust Amid Utility Class Action

CIGNA HEALTH: Court Narrows Claims in Neufeld ERISA Suit
CITIGROUP INC: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Christine Head Alleges
CLAUDIO & JOHNSON: Toler Suit Moved to S.D. West Virginia
CLOUD NINE MARINE: Contreras Sues to Recover Withheld Gratuities
COCONINO COUNTY, AZ: Judge Tosses Class Action Against Sheriff

COGINT INC: Court Certifies Class of Account Executives
COMMERCIAL FURNITURE: Spann Seeks Unpaid OT under FLSA
CORIZON HEALTH: Rojas et al. Seek Overtime Pay under FLSA
DOLLAR GENERAL: Nocera Files ADA Suit in W.D. Pennsylvania
DST SYSTEMS: Faces Class Action Over Profit-Sharing Plan

DUKE UNIVERSITY: Employees Mull Class Action Over Retirement Plan
EDUCATOR GROUP: Elzen Sues over Unsolicited Text Messages
EL PASO COUNTY, CO: Trial Pending in Immigration Suit v. Sheriff
EQUITY RESIDENTIAL: Court Narrows Claims in Pleznac Fraud Suit
F.S.R. TRUCKING: Fails to Pay Drivers Overtime, Inglesias Alleges

FACEBOOK INC: Rankins Sues over Backdoor Data-Sharing Partnerships
FIBRWRAP CONSTRUCTION: Morales & Miranda Sue for Minimum Wages & OT
FIELD ASSET: Bid to Decertify Bowerman Class of Vendors Denied
FOODSERVICES INC: Paul Weiss Attorneys Discuss Court Ruling
FORD MOTOR: Weidman et al. Allege F-150 Truck Brake Defect

FXCM INC: Shearman & Sterling Discusses Class Action Dismissal
GALA FRESH: Plaintiff Can't Sue Based Solely on Sales Receipts
GAZELLE TRANSPORTATION: Contreras Sues for Minimum Wage & OT Pay
GIRARD, OH: Motion to Dismiss Speed Camera Class Action Pending
GLOBAL CREDIT: Williams Seeks to Certify Settlement Class

GLOBALSCAPE INC: Settles Stockholders' Class Action for $1.4MM
GLYNN COUNTY, GA: Georgia Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Tax Case
GOLDEN 1199: Failed to Pay Wages and Overtime, Gonzalez Says
GOLDEN GATE BELL: Collins Sues over Labor Code Violations
GREEN MOTION: Faces Tommi Wage-and-Hour Suit

H&M HENNES: Court Partly Grants Class Certification Bid in Lao
HAIN CELESTIAL: Swartz et al. Sue over Sale of Earth's Best Wipes
HAMILTON LAW: Douglas Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
HARDWICK INVESTORS: Menichiello Sues over Unwanted Phone Calls
HCL TECHNOLOGIES: Ex-Employee Files Discrimination Class Action

HEALTHRIGHT 360: Failed to Pay Minimum & Overtime, Egardo Says
HERBALIFE: Disgruntled Distributors File New Class Action
HOLLYWOOD FIREFIGHTERS: Trustees Sued over Loan Repayment Scheme
HOUSTON, TX: Tex. App. Declares Drainage Fee Ordinance Invalid
I PLAY: Bid to Dismiss Spearman Suit Denied

I'ON CO: S.C. App. Reverses in Part Rulings in Walbeck ILSA Suit
IKEA: Beer Files Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
JACK PARKER: Fischler Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
JACKSON NATIONAL: Summary Judgment Bid in Cruson Partly Granted
JMR RESTAURANT: Castillo Seeks Overtime Wages for Sous Chef

JUNO THERAPEUTICS: Securities Suit Settlement Has Prelim Approval
KEYME INC: Rafidia Sues over Use of Biometric Information
KNOWLEDGESTAFF LLC: Zenni Seeks Unpaid Wages under FLSA
LEE CONSTRUCTION: Tyler Seeks to Certify Class of Workers
LG ELECTRONICS: Court Narrows Claims in Villa Lara's Suit

LITE-BITE INC: Goldboss Calls Customer Bill Surcharge "Unlawful"
LULAROE LLC: Hill Files Fraud Suit in D. Montana
MANPOWER US: Clemons Suit Moved to Western District of Tennessee
MAXIM HEALTHCARE: Bid to Dismiss "Scheck" FLSA Suit Partly Granted
MDL 1720: Court Reverses Denial of American Pipe Tolling

MDL 2504: Class Certification Bid Nixed in Amazon Wage & Hour Suit
MDL 2741: Hyman et al. v. Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
MDL 2741: Leonard et al . vs Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
MDL 2741: Manes v. Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
MDL 2741: Medlin vs Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.

MDL 2741: Morrison vs Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
MDL 2741: Mullins et al. v. Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
MDL 2741: Osborne vs Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
MDL 2741: Ruiz v. Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
MDL 2741: Schade v. Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.

MDL 2741: Smith et al. v. Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
MDL 2741: Vertz et al. vs Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
MEDICAL REIMBURSEMENTS: Hoops Seeks to Certify Two Classes
MEDTRONIC INC: Dec. 11 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
MERCK & CO: Faces Kish et al. Suit over Sale of ZOSTAVAX Vaccine

MICHIGAN LOGISTICS: Underpays Delivery Drivers, De la Cruz Claims
MIDLAND CREDIT: McFarland Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. California
MONEY STORE: Court Narrows Claims in 1st Amended Asberry Suit
MONSANTO CO: Belews Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO CO: Faces Johnson Suit over Sales of Herbicide Roundup

MONSANTO CO: Hightower Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO CO: Lasseigne Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO CO: Miller & Merriett Sue over Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO CO: Noe Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO CO: Russ Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup

MONSANTO CO: Smiths Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO CO: Stump Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO CO: Thompson Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MORTGAGE CONTRACTING: Court to Approve Weinstein Case Accord
MURRAY GOULBURN: 2 Law Firms File Investors' Class Action

MURRAY GOULBURN: New Class Action May Delay Wind-Up, Payments
NATHAN KASED: Baru Sues over Signing Fee Agreements
NEW MEXICO: Settles Class Action Over Driver's Authorization Card
NEW ZEALAND: Conifer Grove Residents Urged to File Roadworks Case
NEWALTA ENVIRONMENTAL: Berryman Seeks to Certify Class

NINE ENERGY: Court Partly Grants Bid to Dismiss Patterson Suit
NORTHSHORE UNIVERSITY: Conditional Class Certification Bid Shelved
NTT DATA: Mandala & Barnett Sue over Background Checks, Race Bias
O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE: Miller et al. Suit Moved to W.D. Missouri
PHILZ COFFEE: Goldboss  Sues over Customer Bill Surcharge

PINDUODUO INC: Oct. 22 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
PINNACLE FOODS: Faces Rosenblatt Suit over Conagra Merger
PRACHIMA LLC: Goldboss Says Customer Bill Surcharge "Illegal"
PRIME/PARK: Kim Files Suit Class Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
RECEIVABLE MANAGEMENT: Placeholder Bid for Class Cert. Filed

RESTAURANT BRANDS: Tim Hortons Franchisee Settles License Lawsuit
RHINEHART RAILROAD: Court Conditionally Certifies FLSA Class
RIPPLE LABS: Calif. Court Denies Motion to Remand Class Action
SAFELITE FULFILLMENT: Curative Notice Appeal in Ontiveros Nixed
SANDIA CORP: Court Affirms Order to Compel Production in Kennicott

SHANGHAI YINLING: Siegmund Seeks to Certify Class
SNAP INC: DiBiase Seeks to Certify Class in Securities Action
STATE FARM: Court Narrows Claims in Schwartz Suit
STONEBRIDGE OF ARLINGTON: Goel Sues over Tenant Utility Charges
SUMITOMO RIKO: Vitec Alleges Price Fixing of Automotive Hoses

SUSHI ROCK: Misclassifies Restaurant Staff, Usmani Says
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION: Attys' Fees Ruling in Fritsch Suit Reversed
TARGET CORP: De La Cruz Labor Suit Dismissed
TCL COMMUNICATION: Final Approval of Matthews Settlement Endorsed
TESLA INC: Violates Securities Exchange Act, Sodeifi Says

THANK YOU: 2d Cir. Vacates Dismissal of Catzin Labor Suit
THREE KNIGHTS: Kelly Baker Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
TIAN CHENG: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Lin Says
TIDAL: Court Urged to Certify Class Action Over Kanye West Tweet
TNG GP: Employment Discrimination Suits Consolidated

TOLTECA ENTERPRISES: Hackler Seeks to Certify Class
TRADER JOE'S: Sanchez Suit Moved to S.D. California
US IMMIGRATION: Class of Unaccompanied Alien Children Certified
USG CORP: Gusinsky Trust Balks at Merger Deal with Knauf
VOLUME SERVICES: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Raquedan FCRA Suit

WABTEC CORP: 9th Cir. Refuses to Remand Busker to State Court
WALGREEN CO: Scheduling Conference in Le Suit Set for Dec. 3
WCW & AIR: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Coffen's FDUTPA Suit
WORLD MARKETING: Carroll et al. Seek to Certify Class of Employees
YUM! BRANDS: John West Seeks Unpaid Wages under FLSA

[*] National Labor Relations Board Permitting Class Action Waivers

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 14-Year Old Girl Diagnosed with Mesothelioma
ASBESTOS UPDATE: ACT Homeowners Ignored Asbestos Management Plan
ASBESTOS UPDATE: AMETEK Still Defends Lawsuits at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Appeals Court Reverses $4.6MM Asbestos Win
ASBESTOS UPDATE: ArvinMeritor Had 1,600 Pending Claims at June 30

ASBESTOS UPDATE: ArvinMeritor Had US$65MM Reserves at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Disease Longer to Develop on Children
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Found at Another Canberra School
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Found in UK School Lab Equipment
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Kills 400 Former Pupils Annually in UK

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos, Smoking Gives Man Fatal Cancer
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Baby Powder Has No Asbestos, Imerys Says
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Brady's PI Suit Remanded to State Court
ASBESTOS UPDATE: CECONY Manhattan Rupture Debris Has Asbestos
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Con Edison Accrues $8MM Liability at June 30

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crozier's PI Claims vs. J&J Entities Dismissed
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Duke Energy Carolinas Has $466MM Liabilities
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Exelon Unit Had $80MM Reserves at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Maremont Had 1,700 Claims Pending at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Maremont Had US$70MM Reserves at June 30

ASBESTOS UPDATE: McAllister Bid for Expedited Trial Setting Denied
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Mum-of-Four Gets Asbestos Payout
ASBESTOS UPDATE: NRG Energy Still Faces Claims of ComEd, Exelon
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Thomas-Fish's Suit Remains in District Court
ASBESTOS UPDATE: U.S. Steel Faces 760 Active Cases at June 30



                            *********

1FORCE GOVERNMENT: Mitchell Suit Moved to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Janet Mitchell, on behalf of
herself, all others similarly situated, and the general public, the
Plaintiff, v. 1Force Government Solutions, LLC, a Georgia limited
liability company and Does 1-50, inclusive, the Defendants, Case
No. BC712871, was removed from the Superior Court for the County of
Los Angeles, to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California (Western Division - Los Angeles) on Aug. 30, 2018. The
California Central District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:18-cv-07612-PSG-SK to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Philip S. Gutierrez.

1Force Government was founded in 2006. The company's line of
business includes providing management consulting services.[BN]

Attorneys for Janet Mitchell on behalf of herself, all others
similarly situated, and the general public:

          David G Spivak, Esq.
          Sarah Scott, Esq.
          SPIVAK LAW FIRM
          16530 Ventura Boulevard Suite 312
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (818) 582 3086
          Facsimile: (818) 582 2561
          E-mail: david@spivaklaw.com

Attorneys for 1Force Government Solutions, LLC:

          Mark C. Bailey, Esq.
          CLINTONBAILEY APC
          8865 Reseach Drive Suite 200
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Telephone: (949) 852 9899
          E-mail: mcb@clintonbailey.com


50-01 2ND STREET: Fischler Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against 50-01 2nd Street
Associates, LLC, et al. The case is styled as Brian Fischler
individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. 50-01 2nd Street Associates, LLC, Lightstone Real
Estate Income Trust Inc., Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-05162
(E.D.N.Y., Sept. 13, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990.

50-01 2ND STREET ASSOCIATES LLC is an entity registered at NEW YORK
county with company number 4132155. C/O THE LIGHTSTONE GROUP
located at the address Attn: Legal Department 1985 Cedar Bridge
Ave. Lakewood, New Jersey, 08701. The company is incorporated on
August 13, 2011.

Lightstone Real Estate Income Trust Inc. focuses on originating,
acquiring, and managing a portfolio of real estate-related
investments in the United States. It intends to invest in mezzanine
loans, first lien mortgage loans, second lien mortgage loans,
bridge loans, and preferred equity interests, as well as in debt
and derivative securities related to real estate assets. Lightstone
Real Estate Income Trust Inc. was founded in 2014 and is based in
Lakewood, New Jersey

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


ABRA MANAGEMENT: Failed to Pay Wages and Overtime, Lewinstein Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
MINA LEWINSTEIN, an individual, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. ABRA MANAGEMENT, INC.; and
DOES 1 to 50, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. BC720150 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Sept. 5, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid wages and
overtime under the California Labor Code.

According to the complaint, from at least four years prior to the
filing of this action continuing to the present, Defendants have
had a consistent policy of failing to pay wages and/or overtime to
all hourly employees for all work perform at the proper rate of
compensation. Plaintiff and the Proposed Class were not properly
compensated for all the time worked because Defendant has a policy
of requiring Plaintiff and the Proposed Class to remain on-call and
respond on-call without proper compensation. In addition, Defendant
also has a policy of compensating Plaintiff and the Proposed Class
with the rental value of their apartment or partial-value of their
rent without factoring the value into the regular rate of pay,
which resulted in the underpayment of wages and/or overtime.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Darren M. Cohen, Esq.
          KINGSLEY & KINGSLEY, APC
          16133 Ventura Blvd., Suite 1200
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (818) 990 8300
          Facsimile: (818) 990 2903
          E-mail: dcohen@kingsleykingsley.com


ACOSTA INC: Court Denies Conditional Certification of Ezell Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Ronnie L. White of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, Eastern Division, denied the Plaintiffs'
motion for conditional certification in the case, MARGUERITE EZELL
and SHERILYN SILVER, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ACOSTA, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 4:16CV870 RLW (E.D. Mo.).

The Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Class Action Complaint on
Sept. 1, 2016, alleging claims for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), and violations of Missouri Common Law and
Public Policy against Acosta.  They purport to bring the putative
collection action on behalf of other former and current
Merchandisers1 employed by the Defendant across the United States.

The Plaintiffs allege that Acosta has engaged in an unlawful
pattern and practice of failing to pay Merchandisers minimum wage
and overtime pay as required by the FLSA.  According to the
Defendant, Acosta is a full-service sales and marketing agency that
provides outsourced sales, merchandising, marketing and promotional
services to consumer packaged goods companies and retailers across
the United States.  Acosta employees work in retail establishments
such as Wal-Mart, Kroger, and Target.

Both Ezell and Silver were employed in Missouri as Wal-Mart
Continuity Associates ("WMCAs").  The Named Plaintiffs are joined
by opt-in Plaintiffs Judy Gambucci and Kay Mader, both employed as
Grocery Retail Coverage Merchandisers ("Grocery RCMs").
Specifically, the Named Plaintiffs allege that Acosta willfully
failed to pay them and others similarly situated overtime wages for
all off-the-clock work performed in excess of 40 hours in a
workweek.  

On Jan. 15, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Notice and
Conditional Certification.  They moved for an order granting notice
and conditional certification of the FLSA collective action on
behalf of all current and former Wal-Mart Retail Continuity
Associates and Grocery Retail Coverage Merchandisers who are or
were currently employed by Acosta.

On April 4, 2018, the Court held a hearing on the Motion.

Judge White finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish a colorable basis for their claim
that they and the putative collection action Plaintiffs were denied
overtime pay under a single decision, policy, or plan of Defendant
Acosta.  The Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that a single policy
applied to the WMCAs, Grocery RCMs, or both. Plaintiffs claim that
Defendant has a de facto common, illegal off-the-clock RCM overtime
practice.  

A review of the evidence shows the performance of the off-the-clock
duties were the result of the Plaintiffs' personal decisions, not a
policy or general practice at Acosta.  The evidence shows
differences in the time instructions given to the WMCAs and the
RCMs.  The evidence shows that Named Plaintiffs and the Opt-in
Plaintiffs followed different instructions with respect to
allocation of their time, and while perhaps some supervisors knew
that they worked over 40 hours, none of them testified that the
supervisors instructed them to work over 40 hours.

For these reasons, Judge White denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Notice and Conditional Certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/dgRJZ8 from Leagle.com.

Marguerite Ezell & Sherilyn Silver, on behalf of themselves and all
others similary situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Fran L. Rudich
-- fran@klafterolsen.com -- KLAFTER AND OLSEN LLP, Jonathan E.
Fortman -- jef@fortmanlaw.com -- LAW OFFICE OF JONATHAN E. FORTMAN,
LLC, Michael H. Reed --  michael.reed@klafterolsen.com -- KLAFTER
AND OLSEN LLP, Seth R. Lesser -- seth@klafterolsen.com -- KLAFTER
AND OLSEN LLP, W. Christopher McDonough -- wcm@mcdlawfirm.net --
THE MCDONOUGH LAW FIRM, LLC & Ryan A. Keane -- ryan@keanelawllc.com
-- KEANE LAW LLC.

Acosta, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant, represented by
Lisa A. Schreter -- lschreter@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON,
P.C., Patricia J. Martin -- pmartin@littler.com -- LITTLER
MENDELSON, P.C. & Richard W. Black -- rblack@littler.com -- LITTLER
MENDELSON, P.C. & Jennifer C. Znosko -- jznosko@littler.com --
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C..


ADAMS & ASSOCIATES: Allstate Insurance Files Suit in W.D. Oklahoma
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Adams & Associates
PC, et al. The case is styled as Allstate Insurance Company,
Plaintiff v. Adams & Associates PC, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, Helenas Adventures in Travel Inc.,
Defendants, Case No. 5:18-cv-00899-F (W.D. Okla., Sept. 13, 2018).

This a an insurance-related suit, with cause of action stated as
Diversity-Declaratory Judgment.

Adams & Associates PC is an integrated tax and financial services
firm located at 1719 Callender Rd. Thompson, PA 18465.

Helenas Adventures in Travel Inc. is a full service travel agency
located at 7404 S Walker Ave, Oklahoma City, OK 73139.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Ronald L Walker, Esq.
     Tomlinson McKinstry PC
     211 N Robinson Ave, Suite 450
     Oklahoma City, OK 73102
     Phone: (405) 606-3370
     Fax: (877) 917-1559
     Email: ronw@tmoklaw.com

          - and -

     Jerry D Noblin, Jr., Esq.
     Tomlinson McKinstry PC
     211 N Robinson Ave, Suite 450
     Oklahoma City, OK 73102
     Phone: (405) 606-3359
     Fax: (877) 917-1559
     Email: jerryn@tmoklaw.com


ADVIA CREDIT: Summary Judgment Bid in Pingston-Poling Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Gordon J. Quist of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Michigan, Southern Division, denied Advia's motion for
summary judgment in the case, BECKY PINGSTON-POLING, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ADVIA
CREDIT UNION, Defendant, Case No. 1:15-CV-1208 (W.D. Mich.).

In her First Amended Class Action Complaint, Pingston-Poling
alleges that Advia violated Regulation E of the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act ("EFTA") by using an Opt-in Agreement that failed to
adequately describe Advia's overdraft service, as required by 12
C.F.R. Section 1005.17(d)(1).  More specifically, Pingston-Poling
claims that the Opt-in Agreement failed to notify members that
Advia used the available balance as the basis for imposing
overdraft fees, instead of the actual/ledger balance in the
member's account.  She further claims that Advia breached the
Member Account Agreement and the Opt-in Agreement by charging her
an overdraft fee based on her available account balance, instead of
her actual/ledger balance.

The Court's Dec. 29, 2016, Opinion regarding Advia's motion to
dismiss set forth the pertinent facts supporting the claims.  The
facts are thus limited to those pertaining to Advia's statute of
limitations argument.

Pingston-Poling became a member of Advia on May 21, 2009, when it
was known as First Community Federal Credit Union.  The terms of
the First Community/Advia Account Agreement in effect when
Pingston-Poling became a member pertaining to when a member's
account will be overdrawn and when funds will be available for a
member to use have remained unchanged over the years.

In November 2009, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System amended Regulation E to limit the ability of a financial
institution to assess an overdraft fee for paying an ATM or
one-time debit card transaction that overdraws a consumer's
account, unless the consumer consented or affirmatively opted into
the institution's overdraft program.  The affirmative consent
requirement became effective for accounts opened prior to July 1,
2010, on Aug. 15, 2010.  Pingston-Poling opted in to Advia's
overdraft protection program on June 22, 2010.

Pingston-Poling first overdrew her Advia checking account on May
29, 2009.  Following her opt-in consent to Advia's "Courtesy Pay"
overdraft program, Advia assessed Pingston-Poling an overdraft fee
in connection with a one-time debit card transaction on Aug. 30,
2010.

Advia moves for summary judgment on the Plaintiff's claim for
violation of the EFTA and breach of contract on the grounds that
the claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation.
Advia further argues that, in the absence of Pingston-Poling's EFTA
claim, the Court lacks jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness
Act to entertain Pingston-Poling's state-law breach of contract
claim.

Judge Quist agrees with the reasoning in Smith v. Bank of Hawaii,
which acknowledges and explains why overdraft fees constitute
discrete harms that do not constitute a single transaction
providing for recurring transfers.  He does not find Walbridge v.
Northeast Credit Union, which cited Wheeler v. Native Commerce
Studios, LLC, or Whittington v. Mobiloil Federal Credit Union,
persuasive because neither case considered the differences between
preauthorized recurring transfers and non-recurring overdraft fees.
Rather, both cases simply apply the rule for recurring
transactions to non-recurring overdraft charge without analysis.

In addition, although the agreements at issue cannot be considered
analogous to installment contracts -- because they do not call for
periodic payments or performances -- the Judge also concludes that
Commercial Coin Laundry Systems v. McGraw, is not applicable.  In
contrast to Commercial Coin Laundry, Advia breached the agreements
each time it imposed an overdraft fee based on a separate
transaction.  Thus, in this regard, the instant case is closer to
H. J. Tucker & Associates, Inc. v. Allied Chucker and Engineering
Co., and Harris v. City of Allen Park.  Moreover, in Blazer Foods,
Inc. v. Restaurant Properties, Inc., -- which rejected the
"continuing wrong" doctrine in breach of contract claims -- the
court noted that the plaintiffs were not necessarily precluded from
recovering.  Accordingly, Pingston-Poling's breach of contract
claim is timely.

For the reasons he explained, Judge Quist concluded that neither
claim is time-barred.  Therefore, he denied Advia's motion.  A
separate order will enter.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/TFzwbO from Leagle.com.

Becky Pinkston-Poling, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, plaintiff, represented by Jae Eddie Kook Kim --
jkk@mccunewright.com -- McCuneWright LLP, Philip J. Goodman, Philip
J. Goodman, P.C., Richard Dale McCune, Jr. -- rdm@mccunewright.com
-- McCuneWright LLP, Eric B. Abramson -- eabramson@serlinglaw.com
-- Michael B. Serling, P.C. & Taras Kick -- info@kicklawfirm.com --
The Kick Law Firm.

Advia Credit Union, defendant, represented by Brandon John Wilson
-- BWilson@howardandhoward.com -- Howard & Howard Attorneys PLLC &
Stephen Paul Dunn -- sdunn@HowardandHoward.com -- Howard & Howard
Attorneys PLLC.


AKAL SECURITY: Dean Suit Moved to Western District of Louisiana
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Howard Dean and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Akal Security Inc., the
Defendant and Bracewell LLC, formerly known as: Bracewell &
Guiliani LLP, the Movant, Case No. 1:18-mc-00106, was transferred
from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, to the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana
(Alexandria) on Sep. 5, 2018. The Louisiana Western District Court
Clerk assigned Case No. 1:18-mc-00033 to the proceeding.

Akal Security, Inc. is a security company which has federal
contracts to guard immigration detention centers, federal
courthouses, NASA facilities, federal buildings in Washington,
D.C., and numerous embassies under construction.[BN]

Attorneys for Howard Dean and all others similarly situated

          Matthew Seth Sarelson, Esq.
          KAPLAN YOUNG ET AL
          600 Brickell Ave Ste 1715
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 330 6090
          Facsimile: (305) 531 2405
          E-mail: msarelson@kymplaw.com

Attorneys for Akal Security Inc.:

          Joseph Erwin Schuler, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS (VA)
          10701 Parkridge Blvd Ste 300
          Reston, VA 20191
          Telephone: (703) 843 8300
          Facsimile: (703) 843 8301
          E-mail: schulerj@jacksonlewis.com

Attorneys for Bracewell LLC:

          Shelby J Kelley, Esq.
          Bracewell (DC)
          2001 M St N W Ste 900
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 828 5859
          Facsimile: (800) 404 3970
          E-mail: shelby.kelley@bracewell.com


ALL NIPPON: Court Certifies 2 Classes in Wortman Antitrust Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Charles R. Bryer of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted the Plaintiffs' motion to certify
two classes in the case, DONALD WORTMAN, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. AIR
NEW ZEALAND, et al., Defendants, Case No. 07-cv-05634-CRB (N.D.
Cal.).

The Plaintiffs filed the action in 2007, alleging that multiple
international airlines fixed the prices of transpacific air travel
in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  Since then, nearly all
of the 26 Defendants settled or were dismissed.  Only All Nippon
Airways Corp., Ltd. ("ANA") remains.

On Nov. 22, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint
("SAC"), alleging that ANA, Japan Airlines International Co., Ltd.
("JAL"), and other airlines conspired to artificially fix, raise,
maintain, and/or stabilize the prices of passenger air
transportation, including surcharges, for flights between the
United States and Asia in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.  The Court recently denied the Defendant's motion for summary
judgment.

In the present motion, the Plaintiffs propose two classes focusing
on purported damages caused by price-fixing activities in two
specific areas: (1) fuel surcharges and (2) special types of
discounted tickets known as "satogaeri" fares.

At a hearing before the Court on Aug. 3, 2018, the parties
discussed and agreed to several modifications to the class
definitions as proposed in the Plaintiffs' motion.

These class definitions reflect these modifications:

     a. Japan Class: All persons and entities that directly
purchased tickets for passenger air transportation from JAL or ANA,
or any predecessor, subsidiary or affiliate thereof, that
originated in the United States and included at least one flight
segment from the United States to Japan between the period
beginning Feb. 1, 2005 and ending Dec. 31, 2007.

     b. Satogaeri Class: All persons and entities that directly
purchased satogaeri fares from JAL or ANA or any predecessor,
subsidiary or affiliate thereof that originated in the United
States and included at least one flight segment to Japan and does
not include travel to countries other than the United States and
Japan between the period beginning Jan. 1, 2000 and ending April 1,
2006.

These two classes are not mutually exclusive. Between February 2005
and March 2006, all Satogaeri fares sold would have also included a
fuel surcharge.  Therefore all Satogaeri Class members purchasing a
ticket during this period are also members of the proposed Japan
Class, barring unusual circumstances in individual cases.

Judge Bryer finds that the Plaintiffs have satisfied the
requirements of the Rule 23(a) and the Rule 23(b)(3).  Accordingly,
he granted the their motion to certify both classes.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/IxlE6v from Leagle.com.

Boston Amateur Basketball Club, III, Ltd., on behalf of itself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Whitney E.
Street -- whitney@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP, Domenico
Minerva -- dminerva@labaton.com -- Erica G. Langsen, Lesley
Elizabeth Weaver , Bleichmar Fonti & Auld LLP, Peter G.A.
Safirstein, Morgan & Morgan & Roger Alan Sachar, Jr., Morgan and
Morgan, P.C..


ALLIED CONSTRUCTION: Court Narrows Claims in DiSantis Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN DISANTIS and VICTOR HUNTER, on behalf of
themselves and those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ALLIED
CONSTRUCTION, LLC and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants, Civil Action No.
17-11379 (JBS-KMW) (D. N.J.), Judge Jerome B. Simandle of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey:

     (i) denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), 12(b)(4), and 12(b)(5);

    (ii) denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6);

   (iii) granted in part the Defendant's a motion to dismiss the
Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6).

The case is an action brought by the Named Plaintiffs, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, against their former
employer, the Defendant.  The Plaintiffs generally allege that
Allied failed to fully compensate them for overtime work performed
and owed commissions and/or nondiscretionary bonuses in violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the New Jersey Wage
Payment Law ("NJWPL"), the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law ("NJWHL"),
and the common law.

On Nov. 17, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed the initial Complaint.  They
first attempted to serve Allied by delivering a copy of the Summons
and Complaint to Ellen McDowell, whom they believed was an attorney
for Allied, on Dec. 5, 2017.  On Dec. 26, 2017, Allied moved to
dismiss the Complaint for insufficient process pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(4), for insufficient service of process pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5), and for lack of personal jurisdiction
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) because, according to Allied,
McDowell was neither Allied's representative nor authorized to
accept service on Allied's behalf.

On Jan. 17, 2018, the Plaintiffs served Allied again, this time by
delivering a copy of the Summons and Complaint to Allied's managing
agent.  Allied agreed that the January 17th service was proper but
declined to withdraw its first motion to dismiss.  The Plaintiffs
subsequently filed a response brief in opposition to Allied's
motion to dismiss and Allied filed a reply brief.

Allied next moved to dismiss the Complaint in part pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing, inter alia, that the
Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim was preempted by the FLSA and
that Plaintiffs had failed to set forth a claim for Auditors upon
which relief can be granted.  Rather than respond to the second
motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff filed a consent motion (i.e., a
motion with the Defendant's consent) for leave to file an Amended
Complaint.  The Court granted the unopposed motion, and the Amended
Complaint was filed.

Thereafter, Allied filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint
in part pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).  In this
motion, Allied avers that the Plaintiffs' FLSA claim preempts the
breach of contract claim in the Amended Complaint and so the latter
should be dismissed.  Further, it asserts that claims on behalf of
the Auditors should be dismissed because DiSantis and Hunter lack
standing to represent them and because, as currently plead, the
Amended Complaint does not assert any wrongful conduct by Allied
towards Auditors.  The Plaintiffs filed a response brief in
opposition to Allied's motion to dismiss in part and Allied filed a
reply brief in support of its motion to dismiss in part.

Judge Simandle finds that the Defendant concedes that, regardless
of whether the Plaintiffs' service on McDowell was proper, service
was properly effectuated by Jan. 17, 2018, which is well within 90
days of when the original Complaint was filed.  Thus, service was
proper.  In any event, the original Complaint has been superseded
by the Amended Complaint, the filing of which the Defendant
consented to.  The Defendant makes no argument that the Plaintiffs
failed to properly serve the Amended Complaint.  For these reasons,
Allied's first motion to dismiss for insufficient service of
process will be denied.

In Count Four, the Plaintiffs are suing for Allied's failure to pay
its employees owed commissions and/or non-discretionary bonuses in
connection with the performance of "mini-audits" and installation
agreements.  The Judge finds that the FLSA does not preempt the
breach of contract claims in Count Four of the Amended Complaint
because a claim for owed commissions and/or non-discretionary
bonuses is factually distinguishable from an overtime compensation
claim under the FLSA.  For this, the Defendant's motion to dismiss
Count Four will be denied.

Finally, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have not adequately
alleged common questions of fact between the Named Plaintiffs and
unnamed Auditors for the NJWPL and NJWHL class action claims.
Therefore, the claims in the Amended Complaint brought on behalf of
the Auditors will be dismissed.  Because it is not clear that
amendment would be futile in its ability to address the above
deficiencies of the present pleading, he will dismiss these claims
without prejudice.  The Plaintiffs may file a motion for leave to
file a Second Amended Complaint that clarifies the Auditors'
allegations and plausibly alleges common questions of fact between
the Named Plaintiffs and unnamed Auditors.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Simandle denied the Defendant's
first two motions, but granted in part the Defendant's third motion
and dismissed the claims on behalf of the Auditors without
prejudice.  The Plaintiffs may file a motion for leave to amend the
Amended Complaint to address the deficiencies noted only within 14
days from the entry of this Opinion and Order upon the docket.  The
Defendant must also file its Answer to the Amended Complaint within
14 days from the entry of the Opinion and Order upon the docket. An
accompanying Order will follow.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 31, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://bit.ly/2MjybPv from Leagle.com.

JOHN DISANTIS & VICTOR HUNTER, on behalf of themselves and those
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by JOSHUA S. BOYETTE --
jboyette@swartz-legal.com -- SWARTZ SWIDLER LLC & TRAVIS B.
MARTINDALE-JARVIS -- tmartindale@swartz-legal.com -- SWARTZ SWIDLER
LLC.

ALLIED CONSTRUCTION, LLC, doing business as ALLIED ENERGY
EFFICIENCY EXPERTS, INC., Defendant, represented by MATTHEW A.
GREEN -- matthew.green@obermayer.com -- MATTHEW ADAM GREEN,
OBERMAYER REBMANN MAXWELL & HIPPELL LLP & LISA MICHELLE KOBLIN,
OBERMAYER REBMANN MAXWELL & HIPPEL LLP.


ALORICA INC: Fails to Pay OT to CSRs, Dyer et al. Suit Allege
-------------------------------------------------------------
CHELSEA DYER, ASHLEY HAMILTON, ANTWAN HENDRY and BETTY FULLER,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. ALORICA, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03900-SCJ
(N.D. Ga., Aug. 15, 2018) is an action against the Defendant for
failure to pay overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess
of 40 per workweek in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendant as customer service
representative.

Alorica Inc. provides customer management solutions for
business-to-consumer and business-to-business (B2B) sectors in the
United States and internationally. Alorica Inc. was formerly known
as Advanced Contact Solutions, Inc. The company was founded in 1999
and is headquartered in Irvine, California with locations in North
America, Central and South America, and Asia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C. Andrew Head, Esq.
          HEAD LAW FIRM, LLC
          4422 N. Ravenswood Ave.
          Chicago, IL 60640
          Telephone: (404) 924-4151
          Facsimile: (404) 796-7338
          E-mail: ahead@headlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Chris Burks, Esq.
          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          650 South Shackleford, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: chris@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


AMAGERBANKEN: Shareholders' Class Action Fails at High Court
------------------------------------------------------------
The Copenhagen Post reports that in other banking news, a class
action involving 454 Amagerbanken shareholders has failed at the
eastern high court, Ostre Landsret, to recover 30.5 million kroner
in compensation after helping to raise funds to aid the bank's
recovery in late 2010.

However, despite a two-year state guarantee and funding, the bank
was shut down 88 days later in February 2011, and the shareholders
allege they were misinformed by the FSA. [GN]


AMAZON FULFILLMENT: Hagman et al. Suit Moved to E.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Brittany Hagman and Alberto
Gianini, individually, and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. Amazon
Fulfillment Services, Inc., a Delaware Corporation and Golden State
FC, LLC, a Delaware Corporation, the Defendants, Case No.
5:18-cv-00024, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for
Central District of California to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California on Aug 31, 2018. The California
Eastern Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:18-cv-01176-DAD-SKO to the
proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Dale A. Drozd.
The suit alleges Labor-Management Relations violation.

Amazon Fulfillment Services, Inc. distributes consumer products,
which are later sold by Amazon.com Inc. through its website.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Shawn Charles Westrick, Esq.
          WESTRICK LAW FIRM
          11075 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 125
          Los Angeles, CA 90025
          Telephone: (310) 746 5303
          Facsimile: (310) 943 3373
          E-mail: swestrick@westricklawfirm.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Barbara J. Miller, Esq.
          Alejandro David Szwarcsztejn, Esq.
          Joel M. Purles, Esq.
          Paul Bartholomew Quintans, Esq.
          Roberta Harting Kuehne, Esq.
          MORGAN LEWIS AND BOCKIUS LLP
          600 Anton Blvd., Suite 1800
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: (714) 830 0600
          Facsimile: (714) 830 0700
          E-mail: barbara.miller@morganlewis.com
                  david.szwarcsztejn@morganlewis.com
                  joel.purles@morganlewis.com
                  bart.quintans@morganlewis.com
                  roberta.kuehne@morganlewis.com


AMPIO PHARMA: Oct. 24 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
--------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard LLP, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, on Aug. 26 disclosed that a securities class action lawsuit
has been filed on behalf of those who purchased or acquired the
securities of Ampio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Ampio" or the
"Company") (NYSE MKT: AMPE) between December 14, 2017 through
August 7, 2018, both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit seeks to recover Ampio shareholders' investment losses.

If you purchased Ampio securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options, please visit Ampio Shareholder Class
Action Lawsuit or contact Daniel Sadeh toll free at (877) 779-1414
or dsadeh@bernlieb.com.

According to the lawsuit, throughout the Class Period Defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) the FDA would find Ampio's AP-003-C Phase 3 clinical
trial inadequate and not well-controlled; (2) as a result, Ampio
had not successfully completed two pivotal clinical trials for
Ampion; (3) consequently, Defendants' public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times. When the
true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors
suffered damages.

On August 7, 2018, during aftermarket hours, Ampio filed a Form 8-K
with the SEC providing a regulatory update of the FDA's review of
Ampion, including the AP-003-A trial. Ampio stated that it "met
with the FDA in July 2018 and have received a letter in response
thereto." In the letter, "the FDA stated that…that as a single
trial the AP-003-A study alone does not appear to provide
sufficient evidence of effectiveness to support a BLA…[and] the
FDA does not consider the AP-003-C trial to be an adequate and
well-controlled clinical trial." Ampio stated that "[t]he FDA
recommended that [it] perform an additional randomized trial with a
concurrent control group and that [it] request a Special Protocol
Assessment to obtain FDA concurrence of the trial design before
beginning the study."

On this news, Ampio stock fell $2.25 per share, or over 78%, from
its previous closing price to close at $0.61 per share on August 8,
2018, damaging investors.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than October 24, 2018. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

If you purchased Ampio securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options, please visit
https://www.bernlieb.com/cases/ampio-pharmaceuticals-inc-ampe-lawsuit-class-action-fraud-stock-76/
or contact Daniel Sadeh toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
dsadeh@bernlieb.com.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years. [GN]


ANADARKO BASIN: Certification of Settlement Class Sought
--------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit RE: ANADARKO BASIN OIL AND GAS LEASE ANTITRUST
LITIGATION, Case No. 5:16-cv-00209-HE (W.D. Okla.), the Plaintiffs
will move the Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(e), for an Order:

   1. appointing Settlement Class Counsel;

   2. certifying proposed settlement class;

   3. preliminarily approving proposed settlement agreement;

   4. approving form and manner of providing notice of the
      settlement to the settlement class;

   5. issuing stay of all proceedings against Defendants except
      those proceedings provided for or required by the
      settlement agreement; and

   6. setting a hearing date for final approval of the
      settlement.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Warren T. Burns, Esq.
          Daniel H. Charest, Esq.
          Will Thompson, Esq.
          BURNS CHAREST LLP
          900 Jackson Street, Suite 500
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (469) 904 4550
          E-mail: wburns@burnscharest.com
                  dcharest@burnscharest.com
                  wthompson@burnscharest.com

               - and -

          Terrell W. Oxford, Esq.
          Shawn Raymond, Esq.
          SUSMAN GODFREY LLP
          1000 Louisiana, Suite 5100
          Houston, TX 77002-5096
          Telephone: (713) 651 9366
          E-mail: toxford@susmangodfrey.com

               - and -

          William C. Carmody, Esq.
          Arun Subramanian, Esq.
          SUSMAN GODFREY LLP
          560 Lexington Avenue, 5th Floor
          New York, NY 1002-6828
          Telephone: (212) 336 8330
          E-mail: bcarmody@susmangodfrey.com
                  asubramanian@susmangodfrey.com

               - and -

          Christopher J. Cormier, Esq.
          Richard A. Koffman, Esq.
          Robert W. Cobbs, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS &
          TOLL, PLLC
          5290 Denver Tech Center Parkway
          Greenwood Village, CO 80111
          Telephone: (720) 630 2092
          E-mail: ccormier@cohenmilstein.com
                  rkoffman@cohenmilstein.com
                  rcobbs@cohenmilstein.com

               - and -

          Todd M. Schneider, Esq.
          Jason Kim, Esq.
          Kyle G. Bates, Esq.
          SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL
          KONECKY WOTKYNS, LLP
          2000 Powell Street, Suite 1400
          Emeryville, CA 94608
          Telephone: (415) 421 7100
          E-mail: TSchneider@schneiderwallace.com
                  jkim@schneiderwallace.com
                  kbates@schneiderwallace.com

               - and -

          Larry D. Lahman, Esq.
          Michael E. Kelly, Esq.
          Carol Hambrick Lahman, Esq.
          MITCHELL DECLERCK
          202 West Broadway Avenue
          Enid, OK 73701
          Telephone: (800) 287 5144
          Facsimile: (580) 234 8890


ASCENSIONPOINT: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned AUDREY MACHNIK, as Representative of the
Estate of MICHAEL MACHNIK, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. ASCENSIONPOINT RECOVERY
SERVICES, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-01375 (E.D. Wisc.),
the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order certifying classes in
this case, appointing the Plaintiff as class representative, and
appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such
other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further requests that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative’s claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class.  Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir. 2017).
One defendant has attempted a similar tactic by sending a certified
check to the proposed class representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio,
Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D. Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern
Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24, 2016).

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


ATASCADERO STATE: Pines Suit Moved to C.D. Calif.
-------------------------------------------------
Judge Susan Illston of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California tranferred the case, MICHAEL T. PINES,
Plaintiff, v. DIRECTOR OF ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-04386-SI (N.D. Cal.), to the Central
District of California.

Pines, currently in custody at Atascadero State Hospital, has filed
a class action complaint for civil rights 42 USC Sections 1983 and
Bivens.  His complaint is now before the Court for review under 28
U.S.C. Section 1915A.

Pines alleges in his complaint that the Plaintiff-class consists of
prisoners who are being held beyond their proper release date,
having been transported from the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation to Atascadero State Hospital or
Patton State Hospital.  He further alleges that his situation is
typical: he is still being held in Atascadero, when it is clear he
doesn't meet any of the criteria for being a Mentally Disordered
Offender ("MDO") under Penal Code Section 2962.  He also alleges
that, at some unspecified date in the past, he spent about a year
at Patton State Hospital when he did not meet criteria for being
classified as mentally incompetent to stand trial.

Pines' criminal convictions occurred in San Diego County Superior
Court.  He requests, among other things, damages and an injunction
preventing the Defendants from sending prisoners to hospitals when
those prisoners do not meet the criteria for placement as an MDO or
due to incompetency to stand trial.

Judge Illston explains that Pines purports to bring the case as a
class action, but he cannot bring a class action.  Pines thinks he
would be a proper class representative because he is in a unique
position in that he has been an Attorney since 1977 and has also
been a patient at both Defendant Hospitals.  But he has been
disbarred, and is no longer authorized to practice law in
California.  He is in the same position as other pro se litigants:
he has no authority to represent anyone other than himself.  

Thus, the Judge looks at Pines' claims on behalf of himself only
for purposes of considering the appropriate venue for the action.
She finds that the only potential claims in the action are that
Pines has been placed at Atascadero as an MDO and that he earlier
was sent to Patton for restoration of his competency to stand trial
when he did not meet the criteria for either placement.

She also finds that the venue for the action is proper in the
Central District of California.  It would be the more convenient
forum for several reasons.  Atascadero State Hospital is located in
San Luis Obispo County and Patton State Hospital is located in San
Bernardino County.  The witnesses and evidence likely will be found
primarily in the Central District of California as that is the
district in which the relevant events and omissions occurred and
the plaintiff is in custody.  None of the events or omissions
giving rise to the complaint occurred in the Northern District of
California, and it does not appear that any witnesses are located
in the Northern District of California.  Although Pines would
prefer to litigate in the Northern District of California, he does
not reside there and does not allege that his claims have any
substantial connection to the Northern District of California.

Accordingly, for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and
in the interest of justice, Judge Illston transferred the action to
the Central District of California.  The clerk will transfer the
matter forthwith.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/L9rQoV from Leagle.com.

Michael T Pines, Plaintiff, pro se.


AUSTRALIA: Victoria EPA May Face Suit Over Arsenic Contamination
----------------------------------------------------------------
Australian Associated Press reports that Victoria's environmental
watchdog could be facing a class action over arsenic contamination
in Melbourne from abandoned gold mines.

Gordon Legal says the Environmental Protection Authority has known
about the issue since 2000, with soil sampling revealing high
levels of the chemical in Diamond Creek soil and a family at one
property also testing positive.

"We are in the early stages of investigating how widespread this is
and how many people may be affected. Based on this, this may result
in a class action," Gordon Legal associate, Fiona Rothville, said
in a statement on Aug. 27. [GN]


AUTOBAHN INC: Court Certifies Settlement Class in Ferrari Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled STEVE FERRARI, et al., the Plaintiffs, v.
AUTOBAHN, INC. DBA AUTOBAHN MOTORS; MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC; AND
SONIC AUTOMOTIVE, INC., the Defendants, Case No. 4:17-cv-00018-YGR
(N.D. Cal.), the Court entered an order on Aug. 28, 2018:

   1. provisionally certifying a Settlement Class defined as
      follows:

      "all consumers who during the period January 1, 2005
      through February 28, 2018 received service from Autobahn,
      together with all consumers who purchased a CPO automobile
      from Autobahn during the period January 1, 2007 through
      December 31, 2012, as reflected in the business records of
      Autobahn, Inc."

The Settlement Class is divided into sub-Classes 1A, 1B, 2, 3A, and
3B, which are defined in the Settlement Agreement. Excluded from
the Class are: (a) any persons who are employees directors,
officers, and agents of the Autobahn Defendants or their
subsidiaries and affiliated companies; (b) any persons who timely
and properly exclude themselves from the Settlement; and (c) the
Court, the Court's immediate family, and Court staff.

   2. appointing Varnell & Warwick, P.A. and Franck & Associates
      as Class Counsel.

   3. appointing Steve Ferrari, Michael Keynejad, Patricia Rubin,
      John Diaz, Ray Gapasin, and Harold Fethe as Class
      Representatives for the Settlement Class; and

   4. directing parties to select a Settlement Administrator to
      carry out all duties and responsibilities of the Settlement
      Administrator specified in the Settlement.

   5. approving program for disseminating notice to the Class set
      forth in the Settlement, as revised by the Second
      Supplemental Brief In Support of Preliminary Approval of
      Pro Tanto Class Action Settlement for Class Members.

The Court said, "Certification of the Settlement Class shall be
solely for settlement purposes and without prejudice to the Parties
in the event the Settlement is not finally approved by this Court
or otherwise does not take effect. In support of this Preliminary
Approval Order, the Court conditionally and preliminarily finds,
for settlement purposes only, that: (a) the members of the
Settlement Class are so numerous that joinder of all members of the
Settlement Class is impracticable; (b) there are questions of law
and fact common to the Class Members, each of whom could have
asserted the types of claims raised in the Action, and these
questions predominate over any questions affecting individual Class
Members; (c) the named Class Representatives' claims are typical of
the claims of the Class Members; (d) the named Class
Representatives and Class Counsel identified below are able to
adequately represent the Class Members; and (e) class-wide
treatment of the disputes raised in the Action is superior to other
available methods for adjudicating the controversy. The Court
preliminarily approves the proposed Settlement as fair, reasonable,
and adequate, entered into in good faith, free of collusion, and
within the range of possible judicial approval. The Court makes
note of the Parties' representation that the Settlement was reached
through extensive arm's-length negotiations supervised by mediator
and retired Judge Raul Ramirez. The Court approves the form and
content of the proposed forms of notice in the forms attached
hereto as Exhibits B and C. The Court finds that the proposed forms
of notice are clear and readily understandable by Class Members.
The Court finds that the Notice Program, including the proposed
forms of notice, constitutes the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, constitutes valid, due, and sufficient notice to the
Class in full compliance with the requirements of applicable law,
including Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution, and is the only notice to
the Class of the Settlement that is required."


BANKERS LIFE: Toma Suit Moved to Southern District of California
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Androw Toma, on behalf of himself,
all others similarly situated, and the general public, the
Plaintiff, v. Bankers Life and Casualty Company, an Illinois
Corporation; Colonial Penn Life Insurance Company, a Pennsylvania
Corporation; and Does 1 through 100, inclusive, the Defendants,
Case No. 37-02018-00038568-CU-OE-CTL, was removed from the
California Superior Court, San Diego, to the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of California (San Diego) on Sep. 4,
2018.  The Southern District of California Court Clerk assigned
Case No. 3:18-cv-02046-WQH-AGS to the proceeding. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge William Q. Hayes. The suit alleges
employment discrimination violation.

Established in 1879 in Chicago, Bankers Life is the primary
subsidiary of CNO Financial Group, Inc. CNO is a Fortune 1000
company whose subsidiaries provide insurance products and services
to customers in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alvin Mark Gomez, Esq.
          GOMEZ LAW GROUP
          2725 Jefferson Street, Suite 7
          Carlsbad, CA 92008
          Telephone: (858) 552 0000
          Facsimile: (760) 720 5217
          E-mail: alvingomez@thegomezlawgroup.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          William Hays Weissman, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          1255 Treat Boulevard, Suite 600
          Walnut Creek, CA 94597
          Telephone: (925) 927 4545
          Facsimile: (925) 891 2551
          E-mail: wweissman@littler.com


BANNER HEALTH: Spcl. Master's Report #7 in Ramos Partly Adopted
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LORRAINE M. RAMOS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BANNER
HEALTH, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 15-cv-2556-WJM-MJW (D.
Colo.), Judge William J. Martinez of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Colorado (i) adopted in part and rejected in part
Special Master John P. Leopold's Report No. 7; (ii) overruled in
part and sustained in part the Plaintiffs' Objection to Special
Master Report No. 7; and (iii) granted in part and denied in part
the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel.

Ramos and others assert claims under Section 502 of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") against Defendants
Banner Health and several of its officers as well as against
Jeffrey Slocum & Associates, Inc.  The case is currently before the
Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Supplementation of the
Banner Defendants' Discovery Responses and Special Master's Report
No. 7 concerning the Motion.

The Plaintiffs seek production of five categories of documents
related to materials prepared, developed, and used at meetings of
the Banner Health Retirement Plans Advisory Committee ("RPAC") and
the Banner Investment Committee; quarterly asset balances through
the present; Plan participant counts through the present; and a
spreadsheet related to a 2016 audit.  The discovery dispute was
referred to Special Master Leopold for a recommendation, which he
provided on Jan. 16, 2018 by way of Report No. 7.

Judge Martinez concludes that he needs not resolve the question of
whether objections to a special master recommendation on the scope
of discovery should be decided de novo or under an abuse of
discretion standard of review.  Both the Plaintiffs and Banner
contend that the Court should review Report No. 7 de novo, which
the Court may in any event do in its discretion.

Reviewing under a de novo standard, he concurs in part with the
Special Master and orders Banner to produce the 2016 RPAC minutes
and materials.  The Judge rejects the Special Master's
recommendation on the quarterly asset balances and Plan participant
counts, and orders Banner to produce docum ents with such
information through Nov. 30, 2017.  In addition, because the
Special Master recommendation did not directly address the audit
spreadsheet, the Judge reviewed the underlying Motion and now
orders production of the subject document.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Martinez (i) adopted in part and
rejected in part Special Master John P. Leopold's Report No. 7;
(ii) overruled in part and sustained in part the Plaintiffs'
Objection to Special Master Report No. 7; and (iii) granted in part
and denied in part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel.

He granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel as to the following
documents: (i) 2016 RPAC meeting minutes and materials; (ii)
quarterly asset balances and Plan participant counts through Nov.
30, 2017; and (iii) the spreadsheet created by Michael O'Connor as
a result of the 2016 audit and discussed at Mr. O'Connor's Nov. 28,
2017 deposition.  The Judge denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel in
all other respects.

By no later than Sept. 10, 2018 the Banner Defendants will produce
the documents listed in 4.a, 4.b, and 4.c.  The Order in no way
limits the Banner Defendants' ability to appropriately redact or
withhold such documents for privilege only, consistent with the
prior recommendation of the Special Master adopted by the Court.
The Judge emphasizes that his ruling in the Order will not be
treated as an invitation to the Parties to ask the Court to
reconsider any other already-decided discovery issue, re-open fact
discovery, or compel additional fact discovery.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/qdYOkM from Leagle.com.

Lorraine M. Ramos, Constance R. Williamson, Karen F. McLeod, Robert
Moffitt, Cherlene M. Goodale, Linda Ann Heyrman & Delri Hanson,
individually and as reprentatives of a class of plan participants,
on behalf of the Banner Health Employees 401 (k) Plan, Plaintiffs,
epresented by Aaron Elliott Schwartz -- aschwartz@uselaws.com. --
Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP, Heather Lea, Schlichter Bogard
and Denton, LLP, James Redd, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP,
Kurt Charles Struckhoff, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP, Michael
Armin Wolff, Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP, Troy Andrew Doles,
Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP, & Jerome Joseph Schlichter --
jschlichter@uselaws.com -- Schlichter Bogard and Denton, LLP.

Banner Health, Banner Health Board of Directors, Laren Bates,
Wilford A. Cardon, Ronald J. Creasman, Gilbert Davila, William M.
Dwyer, Peter S. Fine, Susan B. Foote, Michael J. Frick, Michael
Garnreiter, Richard N. Hall, Barry A. Hendin, David Kikumoto, Larry
S. Lazarus, Steven W. Lynn, Anne Mariucci, Martin L. Shultz, Mark
N. Sklar, Quentin P. Smith, Jr., Christopher Volk, Cheryl
Wenzinger, Banner Health Retirement Plans Advisory Committee,
Brenda Schaefer, Bruce E. Pearson, Charles P. Lehn, Colleen
Hallberg, Dan Weinman, Dennis Dahlen, Ed Niemann, Jr., Ed Oxford,
Jeff Buehrle, Jennifer Sherwood, Julie Nunley, Margaret Dehaan,
Patricia K. Block, Paulette Friday, Richard O. Sutton, Robert Lund,
Michael Gillen, Steven L. Seiler & Thomas R. Koelbl, Defendants,
represented by Richard Jason Pearl -- richard.pearl@dbr.com --
Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP & Theodore M. Becker --
theodore.becker@dbr.com -- Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP.

Jeffrey Slocum & Associates, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Christopher Joseph Boran -- christopher.boran@morganlewis.com --
Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Emily Taylor Jastromb --
emily.jastromb@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP,
Hillary E. August -- hillary.august@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis
& Bockius, LLP, James P. Looby -- james.looby@morganlewis.com --
Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Jeremy P. Blumenfeld --
jeremy.blumenfeld@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP &
Sari M. Alamuddin -- sari.alamuddin@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis
& Bockius, LLP.


BEMIS COMPANY: Shareholder Class Action Mulled Over Amco Deal
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jacob Greber, writing for Australian Financial Review, reports that
US analysts are treating with disdain attempts by "scurrying
cockroach" law firms to build a class action on behalf of
supposedly aggrieved shareholders of Bemis Company, which is being
bought out by Amcor, but it may well be Amcor's shareholders who
should be wary of the $US6.8 billion ($9.3 billion) deal.

US-based analysts who have watched Bemis closely for decades may
know little about Amcor but they say the acquisition will only work
out if it can overcome a history of poor performance.

"I don't know if it's management's fault, or of the [Bemis]
business -- but management's promises over the last decade have
fallen way short," Chip Dillon, a partner at Stamford,
Connecticut-based Vertical Research Partners told The Australian
Financial Review.

"I don't know if it's the execution, or the nature of their
business. I have a feeling, though, that what Amcor is seeing, and
the synergy numbers, speaks to this.

"They see a situation where they can probably add a lot of value by
streamlining Bemis."

Both firms ended more than a year of speculation in August,
announcing Amcor would swallow the Neenah, Wisconsin-based flexible
plastic packaging company that dates back to the Civil War.

With 57 plants in 12 countries and 16,000 workers, joining up with
Amcor would create the world's largest maker of such packaging, and
substantially boost growth for ASX-listed Amcor, which already
operates 200 plants in 43 countries.

Mark Wilde, an analyst at investment bank BMO Capital Markets, said
Bemis was a pretty good business to buy because it has "good assets
that have not been particularly well run".

"They have not had – for most of their history – real strong
financial people," he told the Financial Review. "It's basically
been a company run by chemical engineers."

Missed opportunities
That means it's missed opportunities in the fast-evolving retail
sector, particularly in the US, where chains such as WholeFoods and
Trader Joe's appear to have built their success of "home brand" and
bespoke groceries.

Bemis has "tied themselves to the biggest processing food companies
and a lot of the growth in the packaging food business has been the
upstart brands", Mr Wilde said.

Mr Dillon is equally critical of the company's market positioning.
"They're in all the wrong places in the grocery store," he said.
"They sell factory-based packages for processed foods, and people
would rather eat fresh foods."

Amcor chief executive Ron Delia, who announced a squeeze on profit
margins because of spikes in raw material costs in 2017-18, said he
had been gratified by the response from investors over the previous
fortnight to the proposed deal. "Long-term investors see the value
creation that comes from this," he said.

Mr Wilde warned Mr Delia will need to act fast for that to become
true. "Their technical know-how is probably best in class -- and
the assets are well capitalised . . . I don't think there's a need
to invest a lot of incremental capital in the [Bemis] business."

However, he said the "mediocrity" of its previous generation of
management, and attempts by its current management to deal with
those challenges, have created "a little turmoil and uncertainty".

"If the Amcor guys come in strong, have a clear point of view about
what needs to be done . . . and they don't waste time getting at
it, I think there's a pretty good opportunity here," Mr Wilde
said.

"This is a company that is screaming out for some pretty strong
leadership."

'Most people don't know Amcor very well'
Mr Wilde said the financial terms of the deal -- which involve
Amcor issuing 5.1 of its shares for every Bemis share -- are
"actually not too bad" from the acquirer's perspective, but less so
for Bemis shareholders, who were probably hoping for a cash
component. "Most people don't know Amcor very well," he said. [GN]


BIMBO BAKERIES: Camp et al. Seek to Certify FLSA Class
------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned DAVID CAMP and KEITH HADMACK, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v.
BIMBO BAKERIES USA, INC. and BIMBO BAKERIES DISTRIBUTION, LLC, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00378-SM (D.N.H.), the Plaintiff asks
the Court to conditionally certifying a collective pursuant to
section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standard Act, defined as follows:

   "all individuals who executed a Distributor Agreement, either
   on their own behalf or on behalf of a corporation or other
   entity, and personally delivered products for Defendants in
   New England from May 8, 2015 to the present."

The Plaintiffs have worked as Distributors since 1999 and 2010,
respectively. In providing this vital service to Defendants, they
often work more than 40 hours per week, and at least on some days
each week they drive their personal vehicles (and not their
delivery trucks) to perform work for Defendants, and therefore they
are protected by the FLSA; however, they have never received any
overtime pay, despite the provisions in the FLSA. To avoid their
statutory obligations to fairly compensate Plaintiffs, Defendants
have willfully misclassified Plaintiffs and all other Distributors
as independent contractors.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to approve notice to be issued to
other similarly situated employees of Defendants.

Counsel for Plaintiffs:

          Harold Lichten, Esq.
          Matthew Thomson, Esq.
          LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
          729 Boylston St, Suite 2000
          Boston, MA 02116
          Telephone: (617) 994 5800
          E-mail: hlichten@llrlaw.com
                  mthomson@llrlaw.com

               - and -

          Christopher B. Coughlin, Esq.
          Coughlin Law Group, PC
          35 India Street Suite 3
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 758 8888
          E-mail: cbc@coughlinlawgroup.com


BLARNEY ENTERPRISES: Kulchawik Seeks to Certify Minimum Wage Class
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned MORGAN KULCHAWIK, AUSTIN IVES AND
BERNADETTE BALEK, on behalf of themselves and those similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. BLARNEY ENTERPRISES, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05962 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiff asks
the Court for an order granting the Motion for Class Certification
of Plaintiffs' Illinois Minimum Wage Law claim following class
certification discovery and the filing of supplemental evidence and
briefing.

The proposed Illinois Minimum Wage Law Class is defined as:

   "all current and former bartenders or servers who have been
   employed by Defendant in Illinois during the time period
   August 30, 2015 to the present and whom Defendant required to
   pay for cash register shortages, or pay for walk-outs, from
   their tips."

To prevent the Defendant from attempting to "pick off" Plaintiffs
-- and, by extension, the proposed Class' claims -- Plaintiffs
request that they be allowed limited discovery on the following
subjects prior to supplementing this motion for class certification
with evidentiary materials and a supporting memorandum of law --
whether Plaintiffs are similarly situated to other bartenders or
servers in being forced to use their tips to pay cash register
drawer shortages and for "walk-outs".


BMW: 120 Owners File Class Action Over Spontaneous Engine Fires
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Chonsunilbo reports that some 120 BMW owners on Aug. 20 filed a
lawsuit against the carmaker and its dealer Deutsche Motors over a
series of spontaneous engine fires.

Lawyer Ha Jong-sun from Bareun Law LLC, which represents them, said
the plaintiffs own cars that fall under a BMW recall but have not
caught fire.  They filed a suit at the Seoul Central District Court
seeking W5 million in damages per person (US$1=W1,123).

The number of owners suing the carmaker has now risen to 141.

Separately, about 1,500 consumers have joined another class action
suit against the carmaker since late July.

About 42 BMW models and 106,317 cars are subject to the recall.
[GN]


BRONX LEGACY: Zulaine Perez Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bronx Legacy Inc. The
case is styled as Perez, Zulaine individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Bronx Legacy Inc., Bronx
Family Eye Care, Inc., Southern Vision Care, P.C., Southern Eye
Care, Inc., Southern Vision Center, Inc., Vip Eye Care Optometry,
P.C. And Jennifer Ulitsky PC, Defendants, Case No. 26890/2018 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct., Bronx Cty, Sept. 13, 2018).

The case type is stated as "E-Filed OTH".

Bronx Family Eye Care Inc. is a well-known Corneal and Contact
Management Optometrist Center of Bronx, New York. It is situated at
2336 Grand Concourse, Bronx.

Southern Vision Care has been the leading provider of optometry
services and vision care products in the Mobile community since
2005.

Vip Eye Care Optometry P.c. is a well-known Optometrist Center of
New York, New York. It is situated at 714 W 181st St, New York.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Delmas A. Costin, Jr., Esq.
     Phone: (718) 618-0589

The Defendants is represented by:

     SINAYSKAYA YUNIVER, P.C.
     710 AVENUE U
     BROOKLYN, NY 11223
     Phone: (718) 402-2240


C.R. ENGLAND: Silva Suit Moved to Central District of Utah
----------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled CARLOS SILVA, an individual, on
behalf of himself, and on behalf of all persons similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, vs. C.R. ENGLAND, INC., a Utah Corporation; C.R.
ENGLAND, INC. PROFIT SHARING; ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE C.R.
ENGLAND, INC. PROFIT SHARING; C.R. ENGLAND, INC. HEALTH AND WELFARE
BENEFIT PLAN; ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE C.R. ENGLAND, INC.
HEALTH AND WELFARE BENEFIT PLAN, the Defendants, Case No.
3:17-cv-02099, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California to the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of Utah on Aug. 28, 2018. The Utah Central
District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:18-cv-00679-BCW to the
proceeding. The case is assigned to Hon. Judge Brooke C. Wells.

The Defendants in this allegedly engaged in a scheme to undermine
Employee Retirement Income Security Act's protections, including
its vesting requirements, and deny or otherwise limit benefits the
law requires. The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, to end
Defendants' illegal and abusive practices. The Plaintiff brings
this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc.
23(b)(2) and/or (3), defined as all individuals who worked for
Defendant C.R. England, Inc. in the United States as truck drivers
and who were classified by CRE as independent contractors beginning
on the date established by the Court's determination of any
applicable statute of limitations, after consideration of any
tolling and accrual issues, and ending on a date determined by the
Court. C.R. England has employed thousands of Truck Drivers across
the country to provide transportation services on behalf of C.R.
England.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Norman B. Blumenthal, Esq.
          Kyle R. Nordrehaug, Esq.
          Aparajit Bhowmik, Esq.
          BLUMENTHAL, NORDREHAUG & BHOWMIK LLP
          Website: www.bamlawca.com
          2255 Calle Clara
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          Telephone: (858) 551 1223
          Facsimile: (858) 551 1232

               - and -

          Marc S. Schechter, Esq.
          Corey F. Schechter, Esq.
          BUTTERFIELD SCHECHTER LLP
          Website: www.bsllp.com
          10021 Willow Creek Road, Suite 200
          San Diego, CA 92131
          Telephone: (858) 444 2300
          Facsimile: (858) 444 2345


CA INC: Faces Jacob Scheiner Sit over Broadcom Merger
-----------------------------------------------------
JACOB SCHEINER RETIREMENT ACCOUNT, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CA, INC.; MICHAEL
GREGOIRE; JENS ALDER; RAYMOND BROMARK; JEAN HOBBY; ROHIT KAPOOR;
JEFFREY KATZ; KAY KOPLOVITZ; CHRISTOPHER LOFGREN; and RICHARD
SULPIZIO, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-01251-UNA (D. Del., Aug. 15,
2018) alleges violation of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934.

According to the complaint, on July 11, 2018, CA, Inc. and Broadcom
Inc. issued a joint press release announcing they had entered into
an Agreement and Plan of Merger dated July 11, 2018, to sell CA to
Broadcom. Under the terms of the Merger Agreement, each CA
stockholder will receive $44.50 for each share of CA common stock
they own. The Proposed Transaction is valued at approximately $18.9
billion.

On August 10, 2018, CA filed a Definitive Proxy Statement on
Schedule 14A. The Proxy Statement, which recommends that CA
stockholders vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, omits or
misrepresents material information concerning, among other things:
(i) the Company's financial projections; (ii) the valuation
analyses performed by CA's financial advisor, Qatalyst Partners LP
("Qatalyst"); and (iii) the background of the Proposed Transaction.
The failure to adequately disclose such material information
constitutes a violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange
Act as CA stockholders need such information in order to make a
fully informed decision whether to vote in favor of the Proposed
Transaction or seek appraisal.

CA, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, develops, markets,
delivers, and licenses software products and services in the United
States and internationally. The company was formerly known as CA
Technologies and changed its name to CA, Inc. in 2006. CA, Inc. was
founded in 1974 and is headquartered in New York, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan M. Ernst, Esq.
          Daniel P. Murray, Esq.
          O'KELLY ERNST & JOYCE, LLC
          901 N. Market St., Suite 1000
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 778-4000
          E-mail: rernst@oelegal.com
                 dmurray@oelegal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Acocelli, Esq.
          Michael A. Rogovin, Esq.
          Kelly C. Keenan, Esq.
          WEISSLAW LLP
          1500 Broadway, 16th Floor
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 682-3025
          Facsimile: (212) 682-3010


CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT: Cabral Sues over Resort Fee Tax
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit, Case No. A-18-780380-C (D. Nev., Aug 31,
2018), seeks damages and restitution, on behalf of Plaintiffs and
the members of the Classes, for the total amount of taxes
Defendants unlawfully charged and collected on the portion of the
Resort Fees that constitutes charges for Internet access under the
Internet Tax Freedom Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs do not challenge the
mere collection of Resort Fees or the manner in which Resort Fees
were disclosed. The Plaintiffs also do not seek to enjoin, suspend,
or restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of the Clark County
Combined Transient Lodging Tax by Clark County or the State of
Nevada, but rather the illegal conduct of Defendants in applying
the Tax to the portion of the Resort Fee that constitutes charges
for Internet access.

The Defendants charge overnight guests mandatory, per-night Resort
Fees which include amenities such as Internet access, local phone
calls, and gym access (the "Resort Fees"). The Resort Fees are
incurred by all overnight guests visiting Defendants' properties
regardless of whether the goods or services included in the Resort
Fee are used. Generally, even if an overnight guest's room charge
has been "comped" (i.e., provided for free), the guest is still
required to pay the Resort Fee and any taxes applied to the Resort
Fee.

The primary good or service of value included in Defendants' Resort
Fees is the provision of Internet access.  When charging Plaintiffs
and members of the Classes a Resort Fee that included Internet
access, Defendants applied the Clark County Combined Transient
Lodging Tax, as set forth in Clark County Code Chapter 4.08, to the
entire amount of the Resort Fee, which includes the portion of the
Resort Fee that constitutes charges for Internet access.

Caesars Entertainment Corporation is an American gaming corporation
based in Paradise, Nevada, that owns and operates over 50 casinos
and hotels, and seven golf courses under several brands. It was the
fourth-largest gaming company in the world, with annual revenues of
$8.6 billion.

The case is captioned as MARGARITA CABRAL, an individual; DUSTIN
CHAPMAN, an individual; STEPHANIE COHEN, an individual; RYAN
COURTNEY, an individual; EDMOND DAVID, an individual; BUFFY MILLER
aka BUFFY HAUGH, an individual; CATHY GRAVILE, an individual; GINA
MARINELLI, an individual; ERIC MARMION, an individual; ASHLEY
MCGOWAN, an individual; TODD MILLER, an individual; MARITZA RIVAS,
an individual; DIANE SOMMER, an individual; SUSAN UNGER, an
individual; DAN UNGER, an individual; ANDRA VERSTRAETE, an
individual; MARY PHELPS, an individual; VICTOR WUKOVITS, an
individual; LARRY LAWTER, an individual; CINDY MONTGOMERY, an
individual; ASHLEY BOLDUS, an individual; DARRELL BIESHADA, an
individual; DAVID DUNPHY, an individual; KERRI SHAPIRO, an
individual; JACOB TALLMAN, an individual; CATHY KONGPHOUTHAKHOUN,
an individual; JULIE MUTSKO, an individual; JAMES STREHLE, an
individual; JOHN CERVANTES, an individual; LISA BARRETT, an
individual; PAUL DININO, an individual; STEVEN SCHNITZER, an
individual; MARIANNE DENIS, an individual; GABRIEL LEVIN, an
individual; MARIA MARTINEZ, an individual; ABIGAIL ROBINSON, an
individual; IAN INMAN, an individual; CHARLES BOWES, an individual;
DAVID KAMSLER, an individual; ROBERT HERRERA, an individual;
PRISCILLA HERNANDEZ, an individual; TIFFANI WASHINGTON, an
individual; PATRICIA L. FALCONE, Ph.D., an individual; JEFFERY
MASON, an individual; ERIC SERRANO, an individual; JULIE HANSON an
individual; RHONDA WEBSTER, an individual; MEGHAN PALLANSCH
(formerly known as Meghan Hennessey), an individual; on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs.
CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation; CAESARS
ENTERTAINMENT OPERATING COMPANY, INC, a Delaware corporation;
CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT RESORT PROPERTIES, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT RESORT PROPERTIES HOLDCO
LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; CAESARS ENTERPRISE
SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; CAESARS GROWTH
BALLY'S LV, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; CAESARS
GROWTH PROPERTIES HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company; CAESARS GROWTH PROPERTIES PARENT, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; CAESARS GROWTH PARTNERS, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; CAESARS GROWTH QUAD LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; CAESARS GROWTH PH, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; CAESARS WORLD, LLC, a Florida limited liability
company; CAESARS PALACE CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation; 3535
LV NEWCO, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company d/b/a THE LINQ
HOTEL AND CASINO; DESERT PALACE, LLC, Nevada limited liability
company d/b/a CAESARS PALACE; FLAMINGO LAS VEGAS OPERATING COMPANY,
LLC, a Nevada limited liability company d/b/a/ FLAMINGO LAS VEGAS;
HARRAH'S LAS VEGAS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company d/b/a
HARRAH’S CASINO HOTEL LAS VEGAS; PARBALL NEWCO, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company d/b/a BALLY’S LAS VEGAS; PHWLV, LLC, a
Nevada limited liability company d/b/a PLANET HOLLYWOOD RESORT &
CASINO; RIO PROPERTIES, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company
d/b/a RIO ALL-SUITE HOTEL & CASINO; PARIS LAS VEGAS OPERATING
COMPANY, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company d/b/a PARIS LAS
VEGAS; MGM RESORTS INTERNATIONAL, a Delaware corporation; RAMPARTS,
INC., a Nevada corporation d/b/a Luxor Las Vegas Resort and Casino;
MGM GRAND HOTEL, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, d/b/a MGM
Grand Las Vegas; NEW YORK - NEW YORK HOTEL & CASINO, LLC, a Nevada
limited liability company, d/b/a New York New York Hotel & Casino;
ARIA RESORT & CASINO HOLDINGS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability
company, d/b/a Aria Resort & Casino; BELLAGIO, LLC, a Nevada
limited liability company, d/b/a Bellagio Las Vegas; NEW CASTLE
CORP., a Nevada corporation, d/b/a Excalibur Hotel & Casino;
VICTORIA PARTNERS, a Partnership, d/b/a Park MGM (fka Monte Carl
Resort & Casino); THE MIRAGE CASINO-HOTEL, LLC, a Nevada limited
liability company, d/b/a The Mirage – Las Vegas Hotel & Casino;
MANDALAY CORP. d/b/a MANDALAY BAY RESORT AND CASINO; MANDALAY
CORP., a Nevada corporation d/b/a DELANO; CIRCUS CIRCUS CASINOS,
INC., a Nevada corporation, d/b/a Circus Circus Hotel & Casino;
FOUR SEASONS HOTELS LIMITED, a Canadian corporation; WYNN RESORTS,
LTD., a Nevada corporation; WYNN LAS VEGAS, LLC, a Nevada limited
liability company d/b/a Wynn Las Vegas and Encore at Wynn Las
Vegas; LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., a Nevada corporation; VENETIAN CASINO
RESORT, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; LAS VEGAS SANDS,
LLC, a Nevada limited liability company d/b/a Venetian Resort Hotel
Casino and Palazzo Resort Hotel Casino; LAS VEGAS RESORT HOLDINGS,
LLC., a Delaware limited liability company d/b/a SLS LAS VEGAS
a/k/a SLS HOTEL & CASINO LAS VEGAS; PENN NATIONAL GAMING, INC., a
Pennsylvania corporation; TROPICANA LAS VEGAS HOTEL AND CASINO,
INC., a Delaware corporation; TROPICANA LAS VEGAS, INC. a Nevada
corporation d/b/a Tropicana Las Vegas; NEVADA PROPERTY 1 LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company d/b/a The Cosmopolitan of Las
Vegas; TREASURE ISLAND, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company
d/b/a/ Treasure Island Hotel & Casino; RUFFIN ACQUISITION, LLC, a
Nevada limited liability company; AMERICAN CASINO & ENTERTAINMENT
PROPERTIES, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company; STRATOSPHERE
GAMING, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company dba Stratosphere
Casino, Hotel & Tower; GOLDEN ENTERTAINMENT (NV), INC., a Minnesota
Corporation; GOLDEN CASINOS NEVADA, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; WESTGATE RESORTS, INC., a Florida corporation;
NAV-LVH, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company dba Westgate Las
Vegas Resort & Casino; FP HOLDINGS, LP, a Nevada limited
partnership d/b/a Palms Casino Resort; FIESTA PARENTCO, LLC, a
Nevada limited liability company; STATION CASINOS, LLC, a Nevada
limited liability company; NP PALACE, LLC, a Nevada limited
liability company d/b/a Palace Station Hotel & Casino; RED ROCK
RESORTS, INC., a Delaware corporation; GAUGHAN SOUTH LLC, a Nevada
limited liability company dba South Point Hotel, Casino & Spa; HRHH
HOTEL/CASINO, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company d/b/a Hard
Rock Hotel & Casino; PLAZA HOTEL & CASINO, LLC, a Nevada limited
liability company d/b/a Plaza Hotel and Casino; PLAYLV GAMING
OPERATIONS, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; GNLV CORP., a
Nevada Corporation d/b/a GOLDEN NUGGET HOTEL & CASINO; GOLDEN
NUGGET, INC., a Nevada Corporation; and, LANDRY'S, INC., a Delaware
Corporation, the Defendants.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Don Springmeyer, Esq.
          Bradley Schrager, Esq.
          WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO,
          SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
          3556 E. Russell Road, 2nd Floor
          Las Vegas, Nevada 89120-2234
          Telephone: (702) 341 5200
          Facsimile: (702) 341 5300
          E-mail: dspringmeyer@wrslawyers.com
                  bschrager@wrslawyers.com

               - and -

          Michael Dell'Angelo, Esq.
          Josh Ripley, Esq.
          BERGER MONTAGUE P C
          1818 Market Street, Ste. 3600
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 875 3000
          Facsimile: (215) 875 4604
          E-mail: mdellangelo@bm.net
                  jripley@bm.net

               - and -

          R. Bryant McCulley, Esq.
          MCCULLEY MCCLUER PLLC
          1022 Carolina Blvd., Ste. 300
          Charleston, SC 29451
          Telephone: (855) 467 0451
          Facsimile: (662) 368 1506
          E-mail: bmcculley@mcculleymccluer.com


CANTERBURY RESTAURANT: Underpays Servers, Charlotte Lindsay Claims
------------------------------------------------------------------
CHARLOTTE LINDSAY, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CANTERBURY RESTAURANT, LLC; DAVID
P. SCHEFFENACKER, JR; and SAKIS GEORGAKOPOULOS, Defendants, Case
No. 1:18-cv-02504-PWG (D. Md., Aug. 15, 2018) is an action against
the Defendants to recover unpaid minimum wages, liquidated and
statutory damages, attorneys' fees and costs under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Lindsay was employed by the Defendants as server.

Canterbury Restaurant, LLC is a limited liability corporation
formed in the State of Maryland to engage in the operation of
Timbuktu, a restaurant and bar in Hannover, Maryland. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Howard B. Hoffman, Esq.
          Jordan S. Liew, Esq.
          HOFFMAN EMPLOYMENT LAW, LLC
          600 Jefferson Plaza, Suite 204
          Rockville, MD 20852
          Telephone: (301) 251-3752
          Facsimile: (301) 251-3753


CENTRAL MAINE: Loses Customers' Trust Amid Utility Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Tux Turkel, writing for Press Herald, reports that Maine's largest
electric utility has lost the trust of thousands of its customers.

Never before in Central Maine Power's 119-year history has the
company been under assault from more directions. CMP is facing a
storm of attacks for how it treats and bills its customers and
whether it's telling the truth about problems at the utility.

State regulators have launched investigations into storm response,
rate charges, company earnings and a proposed transmission line.
Attorneys for ratepayers are seeking a class-action lawsuit over
extraordinarily high electric bills. They are even alleging
corporate fraud -- saying CMP trained its workers to blame spiking
bills on customers, rather than the company's faulty billing and
metering systems, a charge CMP strongly denies.

The company's new president and CEO, Doug Herling, acknowledges the
firestorm, saying "we're probably the most mistrusted company now."
But his explanation for the public relations nightmare sounds like
an alternate reality to CMP's many detractors.

Mr. Herling blames social media, news coverage, suspicion of CMP's
foreign ownership and opposition to company initiatives as primary
reasons for that mistrust.

Critics aren't buying it.


"They need to stop blaming the customers and acknowledge that
customers are being overcharged and they will put a stop to it,"
said Lauren Loomis, who administers the CMP Ratepayers Unite
Facebook page.

The group, which now has 5,634 members, was formed in the wake of
an October windstorm that left 450,000 customers without power,
thousands of whom complained about CMP's response and ensuing high
bills. Billing complaints continue to stream in, Loomis said,
despite assurances from CMP that problems are being fixed.

Mr. Herling says he's working on it.

During a recent interview with the Portland Press Herald/Maine
Sunday Telegram, Mr. Herling was both defensive and thoughtful
about his company's predicament. A 55-year-old Maine native who has
spent much of his adult life working for CMP, he admitted being
stung by the ugliness of the public criticism.

PRAISING METERS SEEMED TONE-DEAF

He even found himself personally at the center of one recent
controversy, a misstep that to CMP's critics underscores how
tone-deaf the company has become.

In July, CMP issued a news release to note steps it had taken to
harden and back up its smart-meter network, which was hobbled when
power was off for days during the big storm. But before listing the
upgrades, Mr. Herling thought it was important to praise the
meters' performance.

"At the height of the October wind and rain storm," Mr. Herling
said, "the smart meter system gave us excellent data on the scope
of damage, and as repairs progressed, it allowed us to confirm
restoration more efficiently."

Excellent data?

It took 10 days to get everyone back online. Two days after the
storm, CMP couldn't retrieve information from roughly half of the
meters. And 10 months later, thousands of customers are still
stewing over poor communication and sky-high bills that they think
are the result of malfunctioning meters or bad billing software.

Against that backdrop, Mr. Herling's statement didn't ring true to
the company's critics, and they pounced.

In early August, the state's public advocate, Barry Hobbins, said
it sounded to him like CMP was in denial. An adversary in the
Legislature, Rep. Seth Berry, D-Bowdoinham, said the company should
admit its mistakes to regain public trust. A resident who
frequently posts criticisms of CMP on social and mainstream media
was more blunt: "Doug Herling lies like a rug," Nancy Sosman
wrote.

In the end, a story intended to restore confidence in the company
turned into another chance to bash CMP.

Mr. Herling cited an irony: Compared with most Maine corporations,
CMP is very transparent. It's heavily regulated by a state agency
that controls its earnings, orders its managers to testify and can
ask to see all its email.

"And yet, we're probably the most mistrusted company now," he
said.

Viewed in a larger context, CMP is under siege at a pivotal time.

The growing, worldwide imperative to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions is prompting a gradual transition away from fossil fuels,
in favor of an economy powered by renewable energy. Climate change
also appears to be producing stronger storms. Both trends argue for
strong, well-supported electric utilities with robust distribution
networks.

"The question is, are we creating the utility we need for the
future?" said Tony Buxton, a Portland lawyer who focuses on energy
matters.

Mr. Buxton said he's "reluctant to indict" CMP. But he stressed how
important it is for the company to quickly solve its billing and
smart-meter problems.

"Electricity is the ultimate technology," Buxton said. "It doesn't
wait around. It doesn't forgive mistakes. You have to be sure
things work. And when they don't, you have to have a way to correct
it."

To regain customer trust, both CMP and the Maine Public Utilities
Commission need to be more transparent, according to David Littell,
a former PUC commissioner whose term expired in 2015.

"The public, taxpayers and ratepayers paid for CMP's smart-meter
system and its billing system," said Littell, who's now a principal
at the Regulatory Assistance Project, an international group
working to advance clean energy.

"These systems are integral to a modern grid. Yet what has emerged
is that the public does not have access to information on how well
the meters and data management systems are working."

THREE FACTORS IN 'PERFECT STORM'

Mr. Herling is the public face of CMP in a TV ad campaign that
began Aug. 13, perhaps the company's most visible response to the
crisis. In it, Mr. Herling personally apologizes for not responding
well enough to billing concerns and pledges to do better.

It's a good ad, but coming too late, according to Felicia Knight, a
public relations expert and president of the Knight Canney Group in
Portland.

"CMP does seem to realize that it needs to rebuild the public's
trust," she said. "That's never easy and it's never immediate. An
ad is a way to begin that public conversation, but that can't be
all there is."

In the interview, which took place prior to the ad campaign, Mr.
Herling discussed the reasons he thinks CMP is taking so much flak
and whether some of it is self-inflicted.

In Mr. Herling's view, three issues have put a target on CMP's
back:

   * One is net metering, the arrangement by which people with
solar-electric panels are compensated for the power they generate.
Net metering has been a flash point in the Legislature and at the
PUC. Reflecting a nationwide debate, CMP is at odds with solar
installers and environmental groups over the level and shape of
compensation. Media coverage, Mr. Herling said, has portrayed CMP
as a villain that's against solar, when the disagreement is really
over whether net metering is an obsolete subsidy. That debate is
playing out in the Legislature, the PUC and in court.

   * CMP also faces growing opposition to plans to build a new
transmission line from Quebec through Maine to bring hydropower to
Massachusetts. New England Clean Energy Connect beat out 41 other
proposals in a multibillion-dollar competition. But the losing
energy companies and their lawyers are now ganging up with
environmental groups, Mr. Herling said, to hamstring CMP at
regulatory proceedings in Maine and Massachusetts.

   * Mr. Herling said CMP also suffered from a "perfect storm" in
October. After CMP planned for years to switch its billing system
from an old mainframe computer, an intense wind and rainstorm
struck precisely during a critical, four-day changeover period.
Brutal cold and an increase in energy supply rates followed,
leading to high bills for many customers and incorrect bills for
others.

The outrage has been fanned by CMP's detractors, especially on
social media. Months later, disgruntled customers were complaining
about bills they don't understand on the CMP Ratepayers Unite
page.

From Chelsey Sawyer: "Mine's usually $140-$170, they've been around
$300 every month since November. I've paid $1,500 somehow I'm still
behind $700. I didn't even use the ACs this summer because of how
high the bills were without them."

Sawyer got this reply from Michelle Emerson: "Mine was $190 in
August and is usually $115 to $130. Ridiculous."

A fact-trained engineer, Mr. Herling began work at the Wyman power
station in Yarmouth in 1985. He has struggled to comprehend a realm
where truth and fiction are opaque. He says he was caught off guard
and is frustrated by the raw power of social media to shape the
public narrative.

Mr. Herling said CMP's news release on the smart-meter upgrades was
his idea. It was a way to counter the negative press, by assuring
customers that CMP was working to make things better.

Critics say it was the wrong move to declare the meter problem
fixed, when many people still are wrestling with bills they don't
understand.

Mr. Herling disagreed. What most people don't realize, he said, is
that the meters worked fine immediately after the storm, until
backup batteries died. They provided crucial data on outage
locations. They sped up first-day response time. He wanted
customers to know that.

RESPONSE 'REASONABLE,' PUC SAYS

Mr. Herling also stuck by statements he made last spring after an
early internal audit found no explanation for spikes in customer
bills, although the cause remains under investigation. And he
defended CMP's outage website during the storm, which failed to
provide accurate information on where and when power was restored.
That stance might grate on some people, who – seeing on the
website that power had been restored to their streets – returned
home from hotels only to find that the lights were still out.

The PUC's staff concluded that CMP's response to the storm was
"reasonable," although the case is not over.

Mr. Herling is one of three presidents in Avangrid's Networks
division, which has eight electric and natural gas utilities
serving 3.2 million customers in New York and New England. He was
named president of CMP last January.

A Maine Maritime Academy graduate trained in marine engineering, he
has spent 35 years in various management roles at CMP and headed up
the company's $1.4 billion transmission system upgrade. In 2016, as
part of the Avangrid merger, he became responsible for utility
electric operations in Maine, New York and Connecticut.

Based in Orange, Connecticut, Avangrid issues publicly traded
stock. Any statements from CMP that could have a material impact on
trading have to be cleared at the corporate level. That has made
CMP less nimble in reacting and communicating during breaking news
stories, Mr. Herling acknowledged. The delay has given adversaries
time to shape public opinion.

On the other hand, he said, customers benefit from the combined
resources of a bigger company. It's not much different, he
suggested, from how CMP was formed a century ago from dozens of
small electric companies.

But as time has gone on, the company also has gotten leaner. Under
its new corporate structure, CMP no longer shares employment
figures, although a recent job-listing page says the company has
more than 1,100 workers.

To the company's unionized workforce, staff trimming in recent
years has left CMP less able to make timely appointments with
customers and respond to emergencies, according to Dick Rogers,
business manager for IBEW Local 1837.

"I don't fault the current management at CMP," Rogers said. "The
decisions aren't being made locally. They are being made in
Connecticut or Spain. That has handcuffed them quite a bit, in my
opinion."

The harms of consolidation are amplified, for some, by foreign
ownership. CMP operates as a 3-year-old subsidiary of energy
services company Avangrid and its Spanish corporate parent,
Iberdrola.

BLISTERING SOCIAL MEDIA ATTACKS

To rally opposition to CMP, some critics are tapping into the
national vein of nativism that runs through today's politics and
culture. They are aided by Mainers' historic suspicion of things
and people "from away."

For example: On a Facebook page for CMP opponents and in online
postings of media stories, some people refer to the company as
"Central Spain Power." They post statements that are inflammatory
and sometimes inaccurate.

From Tony Campbell on March 24: "Keep in mind that we are not
fighting CMP, a local utility within the control of MPUC. We are
fighting IBERDROLA, one of the largest power providers in the
world. It's estimated that they control power for the majority of
Eastern Europe and in the last 10 years or so have taken over much
of the East Coast of the US."

From Jhophyde on Aug. 4: "A foreign holding company should not be
allowed to own a monopoly on a public utility. People are choosing
between buying groceries and paying their overinflated CMP bills
with no relief in sight. The over billing continues while the MPUC
gladhands the Spanish scammers."

From "Seth Berry for Legislature" on Aug. 4: "CMP is owned by
Avangrid, which is owned by Iberdrola, which is owned by
international shareholders. They hold a monopoly -- the keys to our
homes and our power -- because we give it to them. If basic trust
is not restored soon, it may be time to take away the keys."

Ms. Sosman, the resident who often posts criticism of CMP on social
media, referred to Iberdrola in a post as "the foreign conglomerate
that is wreaking havoc on Maine."

Asked about the reason for highlighting CMP's overseas connections,
Ms. Sosman said it counters the notion that the company has the
best interest of Mainers at heart, when in fact, it's really just
an investment. But upon reflection, she agreed to rethink whether
using this loaded language is necessary.

"When you're in the pit, fighting the good fight, sometime you take
low blows," she said.

FOREIGN-OWNED, BUT NOT ALONE

Mr. Herling said he sees xenophobic comments as just another way
for CMP's opponents to demonize the company. People don't cast
aspersions on other major Maine employers with foreign ownership,
he observed, such as Hannaford Supermarkets, part of a chain in the
Netherlands, or South African-based Sappi Fine Paper. Notably, Mr.
Herling makes a point in his TV ad to mention that he's a native
Mainer.

Mr. Herling hopes a renewed effort to satisfy customers will work.
He said he has instructed customer service representatives to focus
on resolving billing disputes, even though many calls can take an
hour.

"It's winning back customers one at a time," he said.

Having a chief executive take responsibility and become the public
face of a company in crisis can be an effective response. It has
worked in the past for CMP.

Steve Ward, who served as Maine's public advocate from 1986 to
2007, recalls former CMP chief executive David Flanagan speaking
directly to Mainers after the 1998 ice storm, which was Maine's
electric outage storm of record until last October. Mr. Flanagan
helped convey the sense that CMP and its lineworkers were doing all
they could to get the lights on fast.

"The ice storm was really his triumph," Mr. Ward said. "It caused
many people to feel positively about CMP, maybe for the last time."
[GN]


CIGNA HEALTH: Court Narrows Claims in Neufeld ERISA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned JEFFREY NEUFELD and AUBREY SREDNICKI,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. CIGNA HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
No. 3:17-cv-01693-WWE. (D. Conn.).

Plaintiffs Jeffrey Neufeld and Aubrey Srednicki, who received
health benefits through group health plans issued and administered
by Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company and its controlled
subsidiaries, bring this action on behalf of themselves and a Class
and Subclass of similarly situated persons alleging (a) violations
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and
(b) violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), resulting from Cigna's common fraudulent
and deceptive scheme to artificially inflate medical costs causing
consumers to pay more than they should have paid for medically
necessary products and services.

Breach of the Plans

The Neufeld Plan

According to his plan, Neufeld may be required to pay a portion of
the Covered Expenses incurred for medical services and supplies.
Those expenses are based on charges, which means the actual billed
charges, except when the provider has contracted directly or
indirectly with Cigna for a different amount.

Presumably, when the provider has contracted for a different
amount, the charges must correspond to such amount. Likewise, the
portion that Neufeld may be required to pay must be based on this
amount. Nevertheless, Cigna argues without support that the charges
may be based instead upon a third number, not described by the
definition of charges. Cigna contends that the plan allows it to
base Neufeld's charges on an amount it has agreed to pay an
intermediary. But the amended complaint alleges that such
intermediaries provide no medical services or supplies and exist
primarily to inflate the charges billed by the actual providers.  

Cigna argues that even if all of this is true, no terms of the
plans have been breached, but the court must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs have plausibly
alleged that Cigna's actions are in violation of Neufeld's plan
language in that Cigna has failed to base its charges on either (1)
the provider's actual billed charges, or (2) the different amount
for which the provider has contracted. Under the plain terms of his
plan, Neufeld may be entitled to charges based on these rates, not
the inflated rates Cigna has agreed to pay a shell intermediary.

The Srednicki Plan

According to her plan, Srednicki is required to pay for a
percentage of her Covered Expenses. Expenses are defined as the
charges for a covered service or supply. Similar to Neufeld,
Srednicki alleges that Cigna billed her for expenses that were not
based on charges for medical services or supplies.  

Srednicki alleges that she received no medical services or supplies
to justify the inflated bills. For example, Srednicki alleges that
the explanation of benefits provided by Cigna listed HLTH DIAG LAB
as the provider of a blood test when the actual provider was
LabCorp. Although LabCorp's cash price for the test is $449, Cigna
listed the amount billed by HLTH DIAG LAB at $17,363.

The Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Cigna's actions are in
violation of Srednicki's plan language, namely that Cigna violated
the plan by secretly determining that Srednicki must pay inflated
cost sharing payments unrelated to the charge for a covered service
or supply.  

Standing

Cigna argues that, having alleged injury only from Cigna's
relationship with CareCentrix (Neufeld) and Health Diagnostic
Laboratory (Srednicki), plaintiffs have no stake in pursuing claims
relating to any other healthcare managers or vendors. Cigna
contends that the nature of the services each plaintiff received
and the roles that Cigna, the vendor, and the provider each played
are completely different.

The Plaintiffs maintain that regardless of the nature and
circumstances of underlying relationships with various participants
in Cigna's health networks, Cigna's conduct implicates the same set
of concerns: Cigna's disguised and inflated billing practices in
contravention of plaintiffs' plans, whose terms require plaintiffs'
responsibility to be based on the providers' charges for the
medical services or supplies. The Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged
that their portion of medical expenses should correspond with the
providers' charges for a covered service or supply but that Cigna
has fraudulently avoided such requirement, in breach of the plans.
The Plaintiffs have alleged personal injury traceable to
defendant's conduct that is likely to be redressed by the requested
relief.

The instant case involves equivalent allegations of material
misrepresentation and concealment, which the court finds may be
susceptible to similar generalized proof. The Plaintiffs allege
that Cigna's contracts are materially uniform insofar as they
misrepresent the services of middlemen to inflate invoice prices.
The Plaintiffs' allegations plausibly implicate the same set of
concerns as the conduct alleged to have caused injury to other
members of the putative class. Accordingly, the plaintiffs'
complaint will not be dismissed for lack of standing.

Exhaustion

Cigna argues that Neufeld failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies before filing her claim pursuant to ERISA Section
502(a)(1)(B).

Utilization of an administrative appeals process to satisfy the
court-imposed exhaustion requirement is necessary only where that
process is capable of remedying the alleged harm.

The Plaintiffs are not required to exhaust administrative remedies
where such pursuit would be futile, and the plaintiffs may assert
equitable defenses of waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.
Moreover, plan participants will not be required to exhaust
administrative remedies where they reasonably interpret the plan
terms not to require exhaustion and do not exhaust their
administrative remedies as a result.

Failure to exhaust ERISA administrative remedies under section
502(a)(1)(B) is an affirmative defense. Cigna has not demonstrated
that is has established a reasonable claims and appeals procedure
in compliance with DOL regulations relevant to Neufeld's overcharge
claims. Moreover, consideration of defendant's exhaustion defense
is more appropriate on summary judgment. At this time, the
plaintiffs' complaint will not be dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.

ERISA Fiduciary Claims

Cigna argues that the plaintiffs' fiduciary duty claims should be
dismissed because Cigna paid the plaintiffs' claims in accordance
with their plans' terms. But as with respect to breach of the
plans, the plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Cigna failed to
act in accordance with the plans' terms.

Cigna next argues that the calculation of benefits is the type of
ministerial task that does not constitute a fiduciary act because
it requires no exercise of discretion. Further, Cigna contends its
decisions on how to structure its contractual relationships and
provider network are not fiduciary acts. Cigna submits that while a
claims administrator can act as a fiduciary when administering a
plan, it does not when designing or making business decisions
allowed for by a plan even if its determinations may impact plan
members.  

Nevertheless, here the plaintiffs allege that Cigna made decisions
not allowed for by the plans when it secretly forced the plaintiffs
to pay inflated deductible and cost-sharing payments by disguising
Cigna's bills as representing providers' charges for medical
services and supplies. Moreover, effecting such a scheme is not
equivalent to the miscalculation of benefits in that it requires
the exercise of noteworthy discretion.

The court is not persuaded by Cigna's attempts to characterize its
alleged conduct as the mere calculation of benefits. Nor is the
court persuaded by Cigna's argument that these are business
decisions about how to structure its contractual relationships. The
Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Cigna's actions violated
terms of the plans.

Cigna next argues that the plaintiffs' fiduciary claims should be
dismissed because they are duplicative of the plaintiffs' breach
claims pursuant to § 502(a)(1)(B). More specifically, Cigna
contends that plaintiffs have merely repackaged their 502(a)(1)(B)
claims as 502(a)(2) and (3) claims.

Here, in addition to recovering benefits and enforcing rights as
individual participants in the plans, the plaintiffs seek to enjoin
Cigna's billing practices, redress alleged ERISA violations, and
enforce provisions of the subchapter and the terms of their plans.
This is not a simple action to recover benefits, so the plaintiffs'
equitable claims are not superfluous.

Cigna argues that the plaintiffs have failed to plead any conduct
that would give rise to a prohibited transaction claim under ERISA
Section 406. Relying on In re UnitedHealth Group PBM Litigation,
2017 WL 6512222, (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2017), Cigna contends that
plaintiffs' spread theory is insufficient to establish that Cigna
engaged in a prohibited transaction. But UnitedHealth does not
support such a generalized conclusion about spread billing
practices.

Rather, UnitedHealth determined that some of the plaintiffs' plans
did not entitle them to pay the discounted rate if it was less than
the copayment amount. Because the language of those plaintiffs'
plans permitted UnitedHealth Group to retain profits when the
copayment amount was greater than the pharmacies' charges, the
defendant's conduct was not prohibited by those plans. In contrast,
some of the UnitedHealth plaintiffs participated in plans that did
entitle them to the discounted rate: So too in the instant case,
plaintiffs' plausibly allege that their plans prohibited Cigna's
conduct regarding retaining profits from the spread.

The Plaintiffs have asserted plausible claims that Cigna is a
fiduciary and that it exercised its discretion over the plans in
breach of its fiduciary duties. Accordingly, the court will deny
the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim with respect to
the ERISA fiduciary claims.

Discrimination under ERISA Section 702(B) (Count V)

Plaintiffs consent to dismissal of Count V.

RICO

First, Cigna argues that the plaintiffs have failed to plead a RICO
enterprise or that Cigna participated or conducted the affairs of
any enterprise. The Plaintiffs respond that the Cigna Manager
Enterprises allegations are more than sufficient to satisfy the
notice standard of Rule 8(a).

Cigna contends that the complaint merely describes Cigna as
directing its own affairs during normal, arm's-length commercial
transactions. But the pleadings allege that Cigna orchestrated and
directed its managers' actions and prevented managers and providers
from divulging the scheme. The Plaintiffs submit that Cigna
directed the affairs of each manager in the Cigna Manager
Enterprise through uniform contracts and agreements that required
those managers to intentionally misrepresent the cost-sharing
amount and collect that unlawful sum from all Cigna participants.

Pursuant to the operation management test, one is liable under RICO
only if he participated in the operation or management of the
enterprise itself.

Second, Cigna argues that the plaintiffs have failed to plead a
pattern of predicate acts. Cigna asserts that the plaintiffs have
failed to identify any actual misrepresentations with the
specificity required by Rule 9. But here again, Cigna relies on its
contention that nothing in the plaintiffs' plans suggests the
amount represented in the plans was any different than the amount
the plaintiffs' were asked to pay, nor do any provisions suggest
that the plaintiffs' were entitled to the spread they now seek.

Racketeering activity is defined to include a list of enumerated
predicate acts, including any act which is indictable under the
mail and wire fraud statutes. The Plaintiffs' complaint details how
the fraudulent billing scheme worked, and includes many specific
misrepresentations made by Cigna.

This is sufficient to meet the standards of Rule 9(b) for the
plaintiffs' allegations that the mails and wires were used in
furtherance of Cigna's fraudulent scheme.

As in Negron, the court finds that the plaintiffs have plausibly
alleged more than an entitlement to lower-cost medical services and
supplies. The complaint plausibly alleges that Cigna acted with
scienter by alleging that it intentionally sought to charge excess
amounts and that it required managers to conceal from the insureds
the amounts of the prescription drug costs.

Third, Cigna argues that the plaintiffs have failed to allege
fraudulent mailing or wire transfers in furtherance of the scheme
to defraud.

The essential elements of both mail and wire fraud are: (1) a
scheme to defraud, (2) money or property as the object of the
scheme, and (3) use of the mails or wires to further the scheme. To
allege a scheme to defraud, the plaintiffs must plead: (i) the
existence of a scheme to defraud, (ii) the requisite scienter (or
fraudulent intent) on the part of the defendant, and (iii) the
materiality of the misrepresentations. Plaintiffs have adequately
alleged fraudulent mailing and wire transfers in furtherance of a
scheme to defraud.

Accordingly, Cigna's motion to dismiss is granted in part and
denied in part. Counts V, IX and XI are dismissed. The balance of
the plaintiffs' claims remain.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 30, 2018 Memorandum
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8xx3u7r from Leagle.com.

Jeffrey Neufeld, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher M. Barrett --
cbarrett@ikrlaw.com -- Izard, Kindall & Raabe, LLP, Craig A. Raabe
-- craabe@ikrlaw.com -- Izard, Kindall & Raabe LLP, Robert A.
Izard, Jr. -- rizard@ikrlaw.com -- Izard, Kindall & Raabe, LLP,
Mathew P. Jasinski -- mjasinski@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice LLC,
Meghan Oliver -- moliver@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice, LLC, Seth
R. Klein -- sklein@ikrlaw.com -- Izard Kindall & Raabe & William H.
Narwold -- bnarwold@motleyrice.com -- Motley Rice LLC.

Aubrey Srednicki, Plaintiff, represented by Craig A. Raabe, Izard,
Kindall & Raabe LLP, Seth R. Klein, Izard Kindall & Raabe & Robert
A. Izard, Jr., Izard, Kindall & Raabe, LLP.

Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by
Joshua B. Simon -- joshua.simon@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis,
pro hac vice, Warren Haskel -- warren.haskel@kirkland.com --
Kirkland & Ellis, pro hac vice, James Scott Rollins --
james.rollins@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough, LLP, James M. Sconzo -- jsconzo@carltonfields.com --
Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A. & Michael A. Valerio --
mvalerio@carltonfields.com -- Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A..


CITIGROUP INC: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Christine Head Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTINE HEAD, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CITIGROUP, INC., Defendant, Case No.
3:18-cv-08189-MHB (D. Ariz., Aug. 15, 2018) seeks to stop the
Defendant's practice of making unsolicited calls.

Citigroup Inc., a diversified financial services holding company,
provides various financial products and services for consumers,
corporations, governments, and institutions. The company operates
through two segments, Global Consumer Banking (GCB) and
Institutional Clients Group (ICG). Citigroup Inc. was founded in
1812 and is based in New York, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew R. Wilson, Esq.
          Michael J. Boyle, Jr., Esq.
          MEYER WILSON CO., LPA
          1320 Dublin Road, Ste. 100
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 224-6000
          Facsimile: (614) 224-6066
          E-mail: mwilson@meyerwilson.com
                  mboyle@meyerwilson.com

               - and -

          Michael L. Greenwald, Esq.
          GREENWALD DAVIDSON RADBIL PLLC
          5550 Glades Road, Suite 500
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (561) 826-5477
          Facsimile: (561) 961-5684
          E-mail: mgreenwald@gdrlawfirm.com


CLAUDIO & JOHNSON: Toler Suit Moved to S.D. West Virginia
---------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Shanna Toler, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Claudio
& Johnson, Attorneys at Law, LLC and Professional Account Services,
Inc., the Defendants, Case No. 18-C-139, was removed from the
Fayette County Circuit, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia (Charleston) on Aug. 29, 2018. The
Southern District of West Virginia Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:18-cv-01267 to the proceeding. The suit alleges Fair Debt
Collection Act violation.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Ralph C. Young, Esq.
          Steven R. Broadwater , Jr., Esq.
          HAMILTON BURGESS YOUNG & POLLARD
          P. O. Box 959
          Fayetteville, WV 25840-0959
          Telephone: (304) 574 2727
          Facsimile: (304) 574 3709
          E-mail: ryoung@hamiltonburgess.com
                  sbroadwater@hamiltonburgess.com

Attorneys for Professional Account Services, Inc.

          Angela L. Beblo, Esq.
          SPILMAN THOMAS & BATTLE
          P. O. Box 273
          Charleston, WV 25321-0273
          Telephone: (304) 340 3800
          Facsimile: (304) 340 3801
          E-mail: abeblo@spilmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Bruce M. Jacobs, Esq.
          SPILMAN THOMAS & BATTLE
          P. O. Box 273
          Charleston, WV 25321-0273
          Telephone: (304) 340 3800
          Facsimile: (304) 340 3801
          E-mail: bjacobs@spilmanlaw.com


CLOUD NINE MARINE: Contreras Sues to Recover Withheld Gratuities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alejandro Contreras and Marshall Maor, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Cloud Nine Marine
Enterprises, Inc., Cloud Nine Marine NYC LLC, Victoria Vizio, Peter
Vizio and any other related entities, Defendants, Case No.
157930/2018, (N.Y. Sup., August 27, 2018), seeks to recover
unlawfully retained tips and gratuities owed under the New York
Labor Law and New York Codes, Rules and Regulations.

Defendants operate a catering business in New York City where
Contreras and Maor were employed as catering service staff.
Defendants charge clients 20% in connection with the administration
of catered events.  Plaintiffs claim that this amount is a form of
a gratuity that should be distributed among the wait staff. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Laura R. Reznick, Esq.
      LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
      One Old Country Road, Suite 347
      Carle Place, NY 11514
      Tel: (516) 873-9550
      Email: jbrown@leedsbrownlaw.com


COCONINO COUNTY, AZ: Judge Tosses Class Action Against Sheriff
--------------------------------------------------------------
Arizona Daily Sun reports that U.S. District Judge David G.
Campbell dismissed a lawsuit against Coconino County Sheriff James
Driscoll and Jail Commander Matthew Figueroa on Aug. 20.

Plaintiff Guillermo Tenorio-Serrano and the ACLU initially moved to
dismiss the lawsuit on July 30 after Judge Campbell ruled against
the plaintiff on July 5.

According to a press release, Mr. Tenorio-Serrano originally filed
the lawsuit alleging that the sheriff's policy of holding pretrial
detainees -- at the request of the United States Department of
Homeland Security through Immigration and Customs Enforcement --
after satisfying conditions for release on state charges was
unlawful and violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article 2, Section 8, of the Arizona
Constitution.

Mr. Tenorio-Serrano was initially arrested by the Arizona
Department of Public Safety on Dec. 11, 2017, for driving under the
extreme influence of alcohol. At the time of his arrest,
Mr. Tenorio-Serrano blew .203 and .195 on a breathalyzer and was
taken to the Coconino County Jail.

Prior to the lawsuit, Sheriff Driscoll said it was his
understanding that state law required the jail to cooperate with
federal authorities and honor ICE detainer requests. The sheriff
further stated that he intended to cooperate with the requests of
federal authorities, and that the intent of Arizona law is that
state law enforcement agencies cooperate with federal agencies
enforcing the immigration laws of the United States.

The sheriff also said "if a court having jurisdiction over us
changes the law, we'll change our policy to comply with that
immediately."

A day after Mr. Tenorio-Serrano's arrest, ICE sent a notice of
action -- immigration detainer and a warrant for Mr.
Tenorio-Serrano to the Coconino County Sheriff's Office. The
detainer stated that there was probable cause to believe that Mr.
Tenorio-Serrano was a removable alien and requested that the office
maintain custody of him for two days beyond the time he would
otherwise be released in order for ICE officers to take custody of
him.

Mr. Tenorio-Serrano and the ACLU sought a preliminary injunction
ordering his immediate release in the March filing.

Judge Campbell ruled against the ACLU and Mr. Tenorio-Serrano on
July 5, determining that the plaintiffs did not have "a fair chance
of success on the merits," and denied the request for a preliminary
injunction.

Judge Campbell noted that the sheriff would face serious hardship
if the court ordered him to refrain from complying with ICE
detainers and further noted that an injunction would interfere with
Driscoll's judgment as an elected official, would interfere with
the Arizona Legislature's policy determination that Arizona should
cooperate with federal immigration enforcement, and might interfere
with Arizona's interest in preventing unlawful immigration as
specifically recognized by the United States Supreme Court.

But that preliminary injunction ruling put an end to this case,
said Billy Peard, an attorney with the American Civil Liberties
Union who was on Mr. Tenorio-Serrano's legal team.

"It was a preliminary order, not a final decision, but effectively
for our client it was a final decision because in order for us to
have kept fighting forward that would have meant our client would
have had to spend another six months or up to a year in jail," Mr.
Peard said.

Judge Campbell wrote that while state law says state and local
officers may not limit the enforcement of federal immigration laws,
"it does not appear to be an affirmative grant of authority." That
statement, Mr. Peard said, means Driscoll isn't required to honor
ICE detainers.

The judge also cast doubt on the argument by the plaintiffs,
however. They argued that the sheriff lacks the authority under
state law to detain individuals based on civil immigration
offenses. At this stage in the case, the sheriff's compliance with
the ICE detainers appears to fall within federal laws, he wrote.

The members of Keep Flagstaff Together, a group that has been
pressuring the sheriff to stop complying with the ICE detainer
requests, said Judge Campbell's language supports their case. [GN]


COGINT INC: Court Certifies Class of Account Executives
-------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned MICHELLE MOHAMED, on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. COGINT, INC., f/k/a
IDI, Inc., INTERACTIVE DATA, LLC, and RED VIOLET, INC., the
Defendants, Case No. 9:18-cv-80686-DLB (S.D. Fla.), the Hon. Judge
Dave Lee Brannon granting, in part, and denying, in part, the
Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification.  Specifically:

     1. The motion is granted with respect to the class of Account
Executives a/k/a Inside Sales Representatives employed at the
specified Boca Raton location between May 24, 2015 and the filing
of the Complaint on May 24, 2018.

     2. Plaintiffs shall amend their proposed notice of lawsuit and
consent form m accordance this Order's requirements and submit the
amended documents to opposing counsel and to the Court by September
11, 2018, for final approval before mailing it to the class of
potential opt-in plaintiffs conditionally certified pursuant to
this Order.

     3. To facilitate notice, Defendants shall provide Plaintiffs'
counsel the full names, job titles, addresses, telephone numbers,
dates of employment, and locations of employment of all employees
who fall within the conditional class definition by September 11,
2018.

     4. Plaintiffs will be required to file all Consents to Become
Party Plaintiffs in this lawsuit within 60 days of the Court's
approval of their notice and consent form.


COMMERCIAL FURNITURE: Spann Seeks Unpaid OT under FLSA
------------------------------------------------------
SAVON SPANN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. COMMERCIAL FURNITURE INSTALLATION,
INC., JOHN HASELHOSRST and JACKIE ARMAGOST, the Defendants, Case
No. 3:18-cv-00608-CWR-FKB (S.D. Miss., Aug 31, 2018), seeks to
recover unpaid overtime compensation, employment benefits, and
Liquidated damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants willfully did not pay
Plaintiff, and other employees similarly situated to Plaintiff,
overtime pay equal to one and one-half time their regular rate of
pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek.

CFI provides furniture systems.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          E. Carlos Tanner, III, Esq.
          TANNER & ASSOCIATES, LLC
          Post Office Box 3709
          Jackson, MI 39207
          Telephone: (601) 460 1745
          Facsimile: (662) 796 3509
          E-mail: carlos.tanner@thetannerlawfirm.com


CORIZON HEALTH: Rojas et al. Seek Overtime Pay under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------
BRUCE MORRELLI, JOSE ROJAS, JANICE ANDRES’ SANDRA CRUZ PEREZ,
VICTORIA MARTINEZ: VERONICA VIZCARRA, and LAURA PADILLA, the
Plaintiff, v. CORIZON HEALTH, INC., a Delaware corporation and DOES
l through 25 inclusive, Case No. 18CECG03296 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Sept. 5, 2018), seeks to recover overtime pay under the California
Labor Code.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
established and carried out a policy which violated California's
wage and hour laws, in that Plaintiffs and class members were not
paid wages according to California law for hours they were required
to work, including hours devoted to work during statutory lunch and
break periods; work constituting overtime hours; travel time; times
spent giving reports; and preparations to begin work. The
Defendants required Plaintiffs and class members to work a minimum
of three 12-hour shifts per week, failed to provide off-duty meal
and rest breaks as required by California law, wrongfully
restricted plaintiffs and class members to the work site instead of
allowing meal breaks, and unlawfully deducted paid time daily for
meal breaks it failed to provide.

Corizon Health, formed by a 2011 merger of Correctional Medical
Services, Inc. and Prison Health Services, Inc., is a privately
held prison healthcare contractor in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Andrew B. Jones, Esq.
     Daniel M. Kopfman, Esq.
     Lawrence M. Artenian, Esq.
     WAGNER, JONES, KOPFMAN & ARTENIAN LLP
     1111 East Herndon Avenue, Suite 317
     Fresno, CA 93720
     Telephone: (559) 449 1800
     Facsimile: (559) 449 0749


DOLLAR GENERAL: Nocera Files ADA Suit in W.D. Pennsylvania
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dollar General
Corporation, et al. The case is styled as Rebecca Nocera
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Dollar General Corporation, doing business as: Dollar
General, DOLGENCORP, LLC, doing business as: Dollar Genereal,
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-01222-MRH (W.D. Pa., Sept. 13, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990.

Dollar General Corporation, a discount retailer, provides various
merchandise products in the southern, southwestern, midwestern, and
eastern United States.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     R. Bruce Carlson, Esq.
     Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela & Carpenter, LLP
     1133 Penn Avenue
     5th Floor
     Pittsburgh, PA 15222
     Phone: (412) 322-9243
     Email: bcarlson@carlsonlynch.com


DST SYSTEMS: Faces Class Action Over Profit-Sharing Plan
--------------------------------------------------------
David Hudnall, writing for The Pitch, reports that it wasn't so
much a question of if the layoffs were coming. It was a question of
when.

DST Systems, one of the largest private employers in Kansas City --
indeed, one of the great business success stories in the history of
the city -- had been acquired, in January, for $5.4 billion. The
buyer was a Connecticut-based firm called SS&C. That SS&C was a
competitor was especially bad news for DST employees. Many
positions in Kansas City would become redundant after the two
companies merged.

It didn't happen right away. For five months, DST employees went to
work with the faint sound of knives sharpening in the distance. How
many heads would roll? Who would be saved?

The answer arrived first thing on the morning of Tuesday, June 26.
In one building -- DST maintains several offices scattered across
downtown -- workers were asked to gather their most critical
personal belongings and led to a conference room that had been
reassembled into a sort of layoff assembly line: last names
beginning with A–D here, E–L there, etc. Directing the
proceedings were human resources representatives with unfamiliar
faces -- contract workers who specialized in layoffs, perhaps, or
SS&C employees flown in for the occasion. Having been informed
their positions had been eliminated, effective immediately,
employees were instructed to turn over their work badges, company
credit cards, and any other DST property they possessed. They were
told the remaining personal contents in their desks and offices
would be packed up by their managers and shipped to their homes.
Employees were then handed a large white envelope containing the
details of their severance packages and escorted off the premises
by plainclothes security. Armed guards stood alert in the lobby.

The number of DST employees let go is believed to be right around
1,000, though no official numbers were released. Many of the newly
jobless repaired that day to nearby bars like the Quaff and the
Peanut, establishments that have long relied on DST for their
customer base. They ordered drinks, shed tears, and talked about
their time -- in many cases, decades -- at the company, the
friendships formed, the memories shared. Local media stopped by,
having heard about the layoffs, but few of the now-former employees
were willing to speak freely. Most had signed severance agreements
barring them from talking to reporters. All had been very
specifically reminded on their way out the door not to discuss the
day's events with the media.

Nevertheless, Mr. Hudnall has interviewed more than 25 current and
former employees at DST Systems, both prior to the layoffs of June
26 and after. Their individual experiences vary -- some are
devastated, some are relieved, some who survived remain tense --
but in the aggregate they tell what amounts to the same tale. It's
a story about a firm that lost its way after its founder departed.
It's a story about how public markets in this age of unrestrained
capitalism prevent hometown companies from doing good in their
hometowns. It is, above all, a story about the grotesque expanse of
inequality that lies between the winners and losers in corporate
America in 2018.

The winners: DST executives who engineered the sale and are now
cashing in on compensation agreements granting them unimaginable
wealth.

The losers: everybody else.

If you have lived in Kansas City long enough, you likely know
somebody who works at, or used to work at, DST Systems.

Headquartered in Kansas City since its founding in 1969, DST was
until recently one of the largest employers in the metropolitan
area, with nearly 5,000 local employees and another 8,000
worldwide. (The number of local employees is likely down below
4,000 now, though DST has not released the exact number of layoffs
and did not respond to repeated requests to comment for this
story.)

DST's impact on Kansas City over the last 50 years has been almost
immeasurably immense. The company epitomized a Midwestern version
of business success: large, quiet, boring, conservative, sturdily
led. DST began as a unit inside another venerable local company,
Kansas City Southern Industries; it created software to monitor
freight on Kansas City Southern railroads. Before long, it began
deploying its technology to track mutual fund transactions.

This innovation proved revolutionary in the emerging world of
information processing systems. DST grew rapidly and was eventually
spun off and taken public in 1995. Its clients today include
financial services giants like American Funds, T. Rowe Price,
Fidelity, and Invesco. It also maintains records for firms in the
healthcare and insurance industries.

The man who started DST and built it into a 13,000-person global
operation is a Kansas Citian named Tom McDonnell.

"There are few people in the history of Kansas City who have made
an impact, particularly in the downtown area, that surpasses what
Tom McDonnell has done through DST," former Mayor Emanuel Cleaver
said of McDonnell.

It would not be difficult to make the case that downtown Kansas
City owes its current renaissance more to DST Systems than it does
artists reimagining lofts in the 1990s or the construction of the
Power & Light District in the 2000s. In the 1980s, when businesses
were fleeing downtown for the Kansas suburbs, DST went the other
way, reinvesting in the urban core. The company, which eventually
launched its own real-estate subsidiary, transformed the west side
of downtown, buying up old buildings around Quality Hill in which
it housed its growing workforce. In all, DST revived -- through
historic rehabs and new construction -- almost 40 buildings in
downtown Kansas City.

"DST made a commitment to downtown at a time when downtown was on
its heels -- and long before the revitalization that started in the
last decade," says Joe Reardon, president and CEO of the Greater
Kansas City Chamber of Commerce. "The company's decision to keep
its headquarters downtown, renovating a number of different
buildings, its support for the development of Quality Hill, its
renovation of a number of historic buildings in that district,
paved the way for the vibrant downtown we see today."  

Buying up all that property was a business strategy, and, given the
prices buildings fetch downtown these days, it can safely be deemed
a wise one. But civic purpose was also baked into those plans. In
the late 1980s, the company turned several old Quality Hill
buildings into a campus for nonprofits. It received tax increment
financing (TIF) from the city, yes, but at a time when TIF was
being used in Kansas City the way it was intended: to correct
blight so daunting that developers actually needed an incentive to
build.

And DST often reinvested that TIF money in its neighbors. The
Kansas City Business Journal reported that, in 1992, DST used 30
percent of its TIF proceeds to "make grants to others in the
district who needed help improving building facades and
streetscapes." Phil Kirk, the former chairman of DST Realty, put
together the deal that transformed a crumbling Bank of America
building at 10th and Baltimore into what is today the Central
branch of the Kansas City Public Library.

"It was, on the whole, a very positive use of TIF," says Kansas
City Public Library director Crosby Kemper, an otherwise vocal TIF
skeptic. "Phil and Tom saw the value in reviving downtown through a
public institution like the library."

DST Realty was also instrumental in the efforts to renovate Union
Station and the surrounding properties along the Pershing Road
corridor, such as the National Archives, the Kansas City Ballet,
and the one-million-square-foot IRS processing center. Roughly half
of the land on which the Power and Light District, Sprint Center,
and H&R Block headquarters now sit was purchased piecemeal by DST
Realty in the early 2000s and sold back to the city in 2004. But
DST hardly turned a profit on the deal. It sold those 25 parcels to
the city at cost.

"That was a critical piece that gave us ability to assemble land,
remediate it, and get ready for construction," city manager Wayne
Cauthen told the Star at the time.

Suffice it to say that Cordish Companies -- the Baltimore-based
owner of the Power & Light District as well as One Light, Two
Light, and other Lights soon to rise into our skyline -- does not
share this spirit of civic solidarity. The company recently
demanded (and received) from the city a 100 percent property tax
abatement for 25 years on a 300-unit luxury apartment building and
a $17.5 million tax break for a parking garage.

Being a publicly traded company -- as DST has been since 1995 --
does not lend itself well to the kind of community-oriented
approach DST took under McDonnell, though. When you are a public
company, your duty is to your shareholders, and most of those
shareholders 1.) do not live in the community in which your
business is based and 2.) wish to see consistent, ever-rising
profits. Handing out subsidies to the coffee shop next door, or
buying up distressed assets and selling them at cost are, in the
eyes of sociopathic capitalists, unnecessary acts of philanthropy.
It's the type of thing that can draw the attention of corporate
raiders and activist hedge funds, entities that buy up stock in a
company and then use their power to demand the short-term
maximization of profits.

Over the years, DST has fended off hostile investors, some of whom
were, as the Kansas City Business Journal put it in 2011, "put off
by the significant amount of assets on [DST's] balance sheet that
aren't reflected in earnings, such as its $1 billion portfolio of
publicly traded securities and nearly 3 million square feet of real
estate, including office space."

In other words: these investors didn't like the fact that DST was
investing in piddly Kansas City buildings that failed to show quick
quarterly returns.

"That's the real problem with a company like DST going away,"
Kemper says. "For a long time, Tom had a sympathetic board. He'd
made the company very profitable, and they had money to spend. But
when you lose control of a company that size, you lose control of
your ability to invest in your city. Those outside shareholders
didn't understand the long-term value of DST's investments in the
city."

In 2009, Mr. McDonnell stepped down as president of DST. He stayed
on as CEO until 2012. His departure was widely viewed as related,
at least in part, to demands of a board that did not share his
enthusiasm for investing in Kansas City's future.   

"I think the new board is driving toward the idea that executives
have less community involvement and work just for the
shareholders," Kirk told the Business Journal at the time.

Mr. McDonnell was replaced -- as president, and then as CEO -- by
Steven Hooley, who notably does not hail from this community.
Hooley comes from Boston, where he worked for a company that DST
later acquired. Talk to enough people who've worked at DST Systems,
and a distinct and unyielding impression swirls into focus. Under
Mr. McDonnell, DST was generally perceived to be a
community-oriented local company where employees enjoyed job
security and relatively generous benefits. After Mr. McDonnell --
the Hooley era -- the civic goodwill dissipated, benefits were
scaled back, retirement funds were mismanaged, workers felt
exploited, and layoffs always loomed. The baseline of shared
prosperity and civic obligation at DST faded away. Things would
never be the same.

In 2010, not long after Mr. Hooley assumed the role of president at
DST, the company announced it would be laying off approximately 750
workers -- the first substantial round of cuts in its history. It
was the height of the Great Recession, and the company's revenues
were down three percent.

"That was a very uncertain financial time for most companies, and I
think we all understood the need for the move," a current employee
says.  

But DST also began to hack away at costs in subtle ways that did
not make it into begrudging press releases. DST had long provided
free health insurance to employees. ("It was the best coverage I'd
had since I served [in the military]," one former employee says.)
In 2012, DST eliminated this policy. Employees now paid a premium
for more expensive coverage. Those costs have risen every year
since.

"Last year, my policy increased $90 per month," a recently laid-off
employee says. "Which is a lot when you're getting the same
coverage. I don't know if McDonnell and [Tom] McCullough [the
longtime COO who retired in 2009] were eating that cost before, and
Hooley and the new team decided to stop eating it and instead pass
the costs along to us, or Hooley made some kind of change to the
plan that was not visible to the employees. But whatever it was, we
have seen an increase in our healthcare costs each of the last six
years."

Salary increases were delayed and reduced. Certain paid holidays
were eliminated. Employees could no longer carry paid time off
(PTO) over from year to year. Employees who reached their 20th year
with the company were no longer rewarded with a sixth week of
vacation. And so on. And as the layoffs piled up, those who
remained found themselves assigned to workloads that previously
required three employees.

"We would have these annual performance reviews, and we'd be told
by our superiors that we weren't meeting expectations," a former
employee says. "They put me on a probationary period. I was verging
on suicidal territory just trying to keep up with my work and the
two other people whose work I inherited after they were laid off.
Finally, I was able to prove to management that I had done 143
percent more work than the previous year. They gave me a two
percent raise."

Says a former supervisor on the development side: "They would fire
a bunch of senior-level software engineers and outsource their jobs
to Bangkok or Hyderabad. All of a sudden, I'm spending my whole day
teaching an entry-level person in India how to do my job. And then
they [DST] come for my job. That's it in a nutshell."

The company de-emphasized recruitment, training, and research and
development, employees say. Interns who showed promise had no
position to step into. Job openings remained unfilled for months
and months.

"It turned into a total sweatshop mentality," says an employee who
started with DST in the early 1990s. "They were turning it into
this revolving-door type of place where they hire young,
entry-level people, work them to death until they leave, and get
new ones. Like replacements in a war."

Then there was the retirement plan debacle. DST has long had a
unique retirement plan. Half is a participant-directed 401(k) —
meaning employees decide for themselves where to invest. The other
half is a profit-sharing plan that is managed by an investment
advisory firm appointed by DST — meaning ordinary employees have
no control over where that pool of money is invested.

It's this latter half that is currently the subject of a
class-action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York, owing to
the fact that the firm DST appointed to manage its profit-sharing
plan -- Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb Inc. -- invested heavily in
Valeant Pharmaceuticals. At the end of 2014, 30 percent of DST's
profit-sharing plan was invested in Valeant. (At one point,
according to the lawsuit, almost 50 percent of the profit-sharing
plan was invested in Valeant.) Another way of saying this is that,
at the beginning of 2015, a full 15 percent of every single DST
employee's retirement benefits was tied to the stock performance of
Valeant Pharmaceuticals.

There is a reason why prudent investors -- in particular, managers
of retirement plans and pension funds, on which thousands of people
rely for their livelihoods -- diversify their investments across
multiple companies and industries. If you have a disproportionate
share of your assets in one stock, and that stock tanks, you are
screwed. Call it "Investing 101: Don't Put Too Many Eggs In One
Basket."

SEC guidelines, in fact, require mutual funds investing more than a
quarter of their assets in one industry to disclose that strategy
to investors. Even DST's own plan statement warns employees about
diversifying their 401(k): "If you invest more than 20% of your
retirement savings in any one company or industry, your savings may
not be properly diversified," it reads. And yet DST's
profit-sharing plan invested more than that in a single stock:
Valeant Pharmaceuticals.

Valeant was a Wall Street darling until, very suddenly, it wasn't.
Its strategy of buying pharmaceutical companies and then jacking up
the prices of the drugs it acquired -- in one case, it raised the
price of a heart drug 525 percent overnight -- was predatory and
repulsive, but the financials looked great on paper. Valeant's
stock rose sharply as it continued its acquisition spree and
triple-digit percent price hikes.

DST was there from the beginning. Its profit-sharing plan began
investing in Valeant in 2010, the same year Valeant's new CEO
Michael Pearson embarked on this aggressive strategy. By July 2015,
Valeant's stock was trading at $258 a share. DST's position in the
company -- that is, the value of the profit-sharing plan — was
worth $415 million.

Then came the fall. Spurred by public outrage over the drug price
hikes, multiple federal agencies and state prosecutors began
investigating Valeant. The probes revealed massive fraud at the
company. Valeant had also amassed $30 billion in debt -- three
times its revenue. Investors fled. The stock tumbled.

Investing 101 (or, perhaps, 201) would advise retirement plan
managers to realize gains before they evaporate. So, as Valeant's
share price grew, a prudent manager of DST's profit-sharing plan
would have sold off a portion of Valeant, realized the gain, and
reinvested it. But the managers at Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb Inc.
did no such thing. They let it ride. Then Valeant's stock dropped
to $15 a share, and DST's retirement plan lost nearly $400 million
in value in a few short months.

The class-action suit, filed in the Southern District of New York,
alleges breach of fiduciary duty on the part of DST Systems and
Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb. (It describes the latter as "a battered
investment manager that has been mired in litigation and plagued
with redemptions, dismal performance and director resignations in
the face of poor investment performance.") The suit details the
firm's "opaque" and "shockingly reckless" investment in Valeant and
goes on to accuse DST brass of having conflicts of interest that
resulted in the plan participants -- DST employees -- paying Ruane,
Cunniff & Goldfarb a "grossly excessive" 1 percent flat fee to
manage the profit-sharing plan.

"Flat fees for traditional asset management mandates are
exceptionally rare," the lawsuit states. "DST's $750 million
institutional account easily could have negotiated a much lower fee
[with Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb]."

James Miller, one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in the case,
tells The Pitch: "The DST profit-sharing plan was largely being run
as a clone of Seqouia Fund, which Ruane runs for high-net worth
individuals who can absorb the losses that come with risky
investments. So DST was paying Ruane this high management fee, and
Ruane was in turn investing DST retirement funds imprudently -- as
though the money belonged to high-net-worth individuals, rather
than the employees of DST."

To sum up: the DST board wildly overpaid money managers -- to the
tune of "tens of millions of dollars," according to the lawsuit
-- using the retirement accounts of its own employees. Those money
managers then lost hundreds of millions of dollars after investing
DST employees' retirement funds in a company that turned out to be
the Enron of the pharmaceutical industry. It gets worse from here.


On May 31, 2017, DST received $2 million from the Missouri
Department of Economic Development in support of DST's pledge to
create 400 jobs in Kansas City.

"This will mean 415 new, good-paying jobs with a company that
embodies innovation, and represents the best of corporate
citizenship," Kansas City Mayor Sly James said at the time.

Not exactly. For starters, a year before, DST had laid off
approximately 150 people in Kansas City.

One month after Missouri wrote that $2 million check, a
company-wide email informed DST employees that staff reductions
were taking place in multiple DST departments and locations,
including Kansas and Missouri. This was, evidently, due to DST's
recent purchase of a DST-adjacent company called BFDS. The sale was
a family affair. Before Steve Hooley became CEO of DST, he was the
CEO of BFDS, from 2004 to 2009. At the time of DST's purchase of
BFDS, its CEO was Jay Hooley -- Steve's brother.

"Many, though not all, of the reductions were the result of
synergies and duplication of work between the BFDS and DST
organizations," Vercie Lark, head of financial services division at
DST, wrote in an email to employees at the time.

Steve Hooley described the purchase of BFDS using word choices that
approach corporate satire: "As part of our integration strategy, we
believe we can bring these two organizations together in a way that
drives significant enhancements to the client experience, improves
our ability to execute on key initiatives, and unlocks meaningful
synergies that enhance value for DST and its shareholders."

Yet more layoffs -- in financial services and DST's health and
enterprise services organization -- were announced internally in
October 2017. Then came the announcement of the sale to SS&C in
January.

After the deal was finalized, in April of this year, Mr. Hooley and
other executives began announcing their departures from DST. In
2017, Hooley earned $7.5 million in total compensation -- an amount
more than 100 times as large as the median DST employee's salary.

But selling DST, and selling out Kansas City, is where the real
money is. By virtually every metric, DST became a worse company
after Mr. Hooley was appointed to lead it. But that matters not in
the diseased swamp of corporate America. Hollowing out DST entitled
Mr. Hooley to obscene wealth: $38 million in stock options, plus
another $28 million in golden parachute compensation. Various
bonuses cited in its Securities and Exchange Commission proxy
statement could add millions more to Mr. Hooley's payday. He now
enters the ranks of the super-rich.

A handful of other high-level executives also cashed in. According
to SEC filings, chief financial officer Gregg Givens left with
stock holdings totaling $8.5 million, plus another $7 million in
golden parachutes compensation. General counsel Randall Young's
stock-and-parachute combo totaled $12 million. Beth Sweetman, the
chief HR officer who administered all those layoffs and benefits
cuts, walked with more than $5 million -- $3 million in stock
options, $1.9 in severance, and a $600,000 stock grant. She worked
at the company for less than five years.

The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, or WARN,
requires companies to give 60-day notice to Missouri officials
before eliminating more than 500 jobs. Though DST refuses to
comment on the number of people it laid off June 26, it is known to
be well over 500. Despite this, the company gave no WARN notice to
the state.

Nor did anyone at DST contact TeamKC, whose mission involves
connecting displaced local workers with new jobs in order to keep
them in the KC metro. As the Star noted in a July 9 article, other
local companies, such as Sprint and Teva Pharmaceuticals, have
worked with TeamKC following layoffs. DST's senior director of
global talent acquisition, Douglas A. King, is even a member of the
TeamKC advisory board. But neither King nor anybody else in a
leadership role at DST apparently even considered the value of
offering outplacement services to the thousand Kansas Citians whose
jobs had been eliminated.

Correction: at least one DST employee was extended this courtesy.
In addition to his millions in stock options and golden parachute
compensation, chief financial officer Gregg Givens received a
$25,000 lump-sum cash payment for "anticipated outplacement
counseling services."

Best of luck to Gregg.

What now for DST? What now for KC?  

As a 2015 Washington Monthly article noted, "Empirical studies have
shown that when a city loses a major corporate headquarters in a
merger, the replacement of locally based managers by 'absentee'
managers usually leads to lower levels of local corporate giving,
civic engagement, employment, and investment, often setting in
motion further regional decline."

At DST under Mr. Hooley, much of this has already come to pass. It
will continue now that DST has been bought by an East Coast firm;
SS&C has openly stated that layoffs at DST will be ongoing through
December. Even the Chamber of Commerce is having a hard time
putting a positive spin on the situation.

"We certainly hope the company's commitment to Kansas City
continues," Reardon says. "However, since the company's
headquarters is now in Connecticut, there is a chance that we could
see that commitment diminish."

The most realistic-seeming outcome for DST I've heard predicted
came from a rank-and-file guy who's been at the company for 20
years. He survived the June layoffs and describes the aftermath as
chaotic: understaffed teams, massive knowledge gaps, confusion
about the details of the restructuring.

"Most folks think SS&C had no idea what exactly they were buying
when they bought DST," he told me. "That may be true. But the
long-term contracts DST has for many of its clients are probably
appealing -- they will cover the bills on some of SS&C's other
ventures. But if we stay the course, it's going to be a hard sell
in a few years to get those clients to renew. When that happens,
SS&C will probably just break it up and sell whatever is left."

He described DST as a place where "once-cutting-edge technology
became embarrassingly outdated" and innovation died on the vine.
Many others I spoke to for this story had a similar perspective: at
some point, DST fell behind and could never get back to where it
once was. Even relatively low-level employees expressed great
frustration about this. Why couldn't DST spend more money on
research and development? Why couldn't it innovate? Why would a
company that wanted to thrive cut the benefits of its workers? Why
would it lay off so many people? Why would it dismantle the sense
of community that had been fostered over the previous 40 years?

The answer -- that, as a public company in the United States of
America, DST operates inside a broken and depraved capitalist
system that is foundationally incapable of factoring human lives
into its decision structure; that the economic violence inflicted
upon these workers was not the unfortunate byproduct of naive or
hapless leadership but rather a deliberate strategy rooted in banal
but intransigent greed — was at once too simple and too dizzying
to contemplate.

"When I started [at DST], I naively figured that we worked for our
clients and their satisfaction was the most important thing," that
same rank-and-file employee told me. "But as time went on, and the
Toms [McDonnell and McCullough] left the company, it was obvious
that Hooley's only concern was the bottom line, the board of
directors, and the stock price." Still, he continued, "At the end
of the day, I'm guessing DST probably isn't any better or worse
than most big companies."

He might be right about that. But that doesn't make 99 percent of
us any less doomed. [GN]


DUKE UNIVERSITY: Employees Mull Class Action Over Retirement Plan
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Lauren K. Ohnesorge, writing for Triangle Business Journal, reports
that a trio of Duke University employees are trying to bring a
class action lawsuit against the school in federal court over
what's alleged to be a "fiduciary breach" regarding the Duke
Faculty and Staff Retirement Plan. [GN]


EDUCATOR GROUP: Elzen Sues over Unsolicited Text Messages
---------------------------------------------------------
DAVID VAN ELZEN, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. EDUCATOR GROUP PLANS,
INSURANCE SERVICES, INC., a Texas company, the Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-01373-WCG (E.D. Wisc., Sept. 5, 2018), seeks injunctive
relief, requiring the Defendant to cease placing unsolicited
prerecorded voice calls and sending unsolicited text messages to
consumers, as well as an award of statutory damages to the members
of the Classes and costs.

EFES sells products and services primarily for insurance agents
that, among other things, provides insurance agents and other
salespeople products to sell and leads to sell them EFES uses
telemarketing in order to market and sell their products and
services to insurance agents and other salespeople throughout the
U.S. In order to reach more potential agents, EFES places
prerecorded calls and sends autodialed text messages to consumers
that have not provided consent to receive such calls or text
messages.

According to the complaint, in Plaintiff's case, EFES placed more
than five unsolicited, prerecorded marketing calls, and sent eight
unsolicited, autodialed marketing text messages to his cellular
phone, despite Plaintiff having never given EFES consent to contact
him.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the putative Classes:

          Stefan Coleman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF STEFAN COLEMAN, P.A.
          201 S. Biscayne Blvd, 28th Floor
          Miami, Fl 33131
          Telephone: (877) 333 9427
          Facsimile: (888) 498 8946
          E-mail: law@stefancoleman.com

               - and -

          Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          400 NW 26th Street
          Miami, FL 33127
          Telephone: (305) 469 5881
          E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com


EL PASO COUNTY, CO: Trial Pending in Immigration Suit v. Sheriff
----------------------------------------------------------------
Noelle Phillips, writing for The Denver Post, reports that the ACLU
of Colorado and two Colorado sheriffs are headed toward a legal
showdown over whether the sheriffs can keep people in their jails
solely at the request of federal immigration officials, potentially
changing a 4-year-old tradition among the state's 64 sheriffs of
ignoring such detainer requests.

Lawsuits filed by the ACLU this year against El Paso County Sheriff
Bill Elder and Teller County Sheriff Jason Mikesell are being
watched by sheriffs and immigration advocates across the state.

Some believe the cases will end up before the 10th Circuit Court of
Appeals after two state judges made contradictory early rulings.
While two other circuits have ruled that sheriffs cannot hold
people suspected of being in the country illegally beyond their
scheduled release, the 10th Circuit, which has jurisdiction over
Colorado, has not been asked to weigh in on the legality.

"I knew at some point this was going to come up in the 10th," said
Chris Johnson, executive director of the County Sheriffs of
Colorado. "To get this issue resolved once and for all, it's going
to have to go all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court."

In 2014, the county sheriffs wrote a public letter explaining why
they did not believe they could hold people suspected of living in
the country illegally on detainer requests from U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement beyond their release dates. Since then,
sheriffs across the state have followed that custom.

Late last year, Mr. Elder started holding people, and the ACLU
filed a class-action lawsuit accusing him of unlawfully imprisoning
dozens of individuals solely at ICE's request. El Paso District
Court Judge Eric Bentley granted the ACLU's request for a
preliminary injunction, forcing Elder to stop holding immigrants
unless they were served warrants signed by a federal judge.

This summer, the ACLU sued Mr. Mikesell over the same issue, and
Teller County District Judge Linda Billings-Vela denied the ACLU's
motion for a preliminary injunction against Mikesell, which allows
him to continue to hold people on behalf of ICE.

"This is not a political agenda; this is an agenda to protect our
citizens," Mr. Mikesell said in a statement. "We believe there is a
need to stand on morals and ethical values and not allow the ACLU
to intimidate law enforcement agencies."

Trials are pending in both cases, but court observers say the
rulings on the preliminary injunctions signal how the judges likely
will rule in the end.

When someone is booked into a jail, their fingerprints and other
identifying information are sent to a U.S. Department of Homeland
Security database. If the person is flagged as potentially having
an immigration issue, ICE sends a detainer request to the sheriff
that runs the jail.

But most sheriffs have followed the precedent set by legal rulings
that say holding someone on such a detainer violates the Fourth
Amendment. If an inmate has finished a jail sentence, posted bond
or had charges dropped, the sheriffs will release them.
Notifications of release dates and times are sent to ICE, but
typically no ICE agent is available to pick people up before they
walk out the jail doors.

"The sheriffs of Colorado are trying to work with ICE and Homeland
Security on that issue," Mr. Johnson said. "It's still an issue for
sheriffs that a detainer filed by ICE is a civil matter. Sheriffs,
by and large, can't hold on a civil violation."

The immigration detainer requests are particularly controversial
when an immigrant is released from a county jail only to commit
another crime. Those incidents bring heavy criticism toward
sheriffs, especially from those who believe people living in the
country illegally are public safety threats.

For example, the Denver Sheriff Department was a target of national
criticism in February 2017 when Ever Valles, an alleged Mexican
gang member, was arrested in connection with the shooting death of
32-year-old Tim Cruz during a robbery at a light rail station. Mr.
Valles had been released from the Downtown Detention Center in
December in spite of an ICE detainer request.

After the shooting, ICE issued statements pointing out the detainer
request had been ignored. The sheriff's department had sent notice
to ICE announcing when Mr. Valles would be released, but agents
didn't receive the fax until an hour after he had left the jail.

The 2018 lawsuits against El Paso and Teller counties are not the
ACLU's first legal battles over immigration detainers. In 2014, the
civil rights organization sued the Arapahoe County sheriff for
detaining a woman on behalf of ICE after she originally called
police over a domestic violence incident. The county settled the
suit for $30,000.

This time, the ACLU is arguing that sheriffs are violating a state
law that prohibits warrantless arrests. In Colorado, law
enforcement officials can only arrest someone after they have
established probable cause, said Mark Silverstein, the state ACLU's
legal director

"It's the equivalent of a new arrest," Mr. Silverstein said of
holding people in jail beyond their planned release. "It's
depriving someone of their freedom for a new reason."

Immigration detainers are not documents supporting probable cause
of a crime, Silverstein said. Instead, they represent probable
cause for deportation, which is a federal civil violation.

The ACLU received notice of the El Paso and Teller sheriffs holding
people on ICE detainers from the Colorado Immigrant Rights
Coalition, which operates a statewide hotline for immigration
crises.

Brendan Greene, campaigns director for the coalition, said the ICE
detainers are a public safety issue, but he sees it from a
different perspective.

Rather than keeping dangerous people off the streets, the detainers
intimidate immigrants enough that they fear police -- even when
they are crime victims, Greene said. People will be afraid to
report crimes or call for help if they perceive local law
enforcement is collaborating with ICE, he said.

"When sheriffs go out of their way to collaborate with ICE, that
community trust is broken," Mr. Greene said. "We believe everybody
is safer when all of our communities feel safe and confident in
cooperating with local law enforcement." [GN]


EQUITY RESIDENTIAL: Court Narrows Claims in Pleznac Fraud Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SARAH S. PLEZNAC, Plaintiff, v. EQUITY RESIDENTIAL
MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-2732 (CRC) (D. D.C.),
Judge Christopher R. Cooper of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia granted in part and denied in part Equity's
motion to dismiss all of Pleznac's claims under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

In September 2017, Pleznac filed the putative class action against
her former landlord, Equity.  The gist of Pleznac's complaint is
that Equity perpetrated a "bait-and-switch" scheme that fooled her
and other tenants into paying higher rents than they expected, and
that it retaliated against her for complaining about its
practices.

Equity is an S&P 500 company that owns and manages hundreds of
apartment buildings around the country, including several in the
District of Columbia.  Ms. Pleznac lived in one of its D.C.
properties, 3003 Van Ness, from 2013 to 2017.  Pleznac claims that
Equity's practices violated the District of Columbia Consumer
Protection Procedures Act ("CPPA"), and amounted to a breach of
contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud.


She also alleges that, when she and other tenants complained about
Equity's practices, the company retaliated by filing frivolous
lawsuits against them for nonpayment of rent.  It would also report
false information to credit reporting agencies and then refuse to
correct those knowingly false reports after tenants contested them.


In Pleznac's view, these suits against tenants amounted to
malicious prosecution.  And the false reports to credit agencies
were both defamatory and contrary to the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA"), a federal statute that requires entities that relay
information to consumer reporting agencies to diligently
investigate disputed credit-related information and promptly
correct any errors.

Pleznac initially filed suit in D.C. Superior Court, but Equity
removed the case to federal court.  The Court upheld the removal
over Pleznac's objection, finding that the case was removable under
the Class Action Fairness Act because it involved over 100
potential class members and put at least $5 million at issue.

Equity has now moved to dismiss all of Pleznac's claims on various
grounds pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  It
contends that the Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead several
of her claims and that others are time-barred.

Judge Cooper granted in part and denied in part Equity's motion.
He granted it with respect to Pleznac's claims under the CPPA
(Count 1) and for defamation (Count 3), fraud (Counts 7-9), and
punitive damages (Count 10).  Equity's motion is denied with
respect to her claims under the FCRA (Count 2) and for breach of
contract (Count 4), malicious prosecution (Count 5), and
intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 6).

Among other things, the Judge finds that because Pleznac admits
learning of the alleged deception and experiencing some resulting
injury over three years before filing her complaint, she cannot
recover for that deception under the CPPA or through claims for
fraud.  He says he needs not rule on Equity's alternative asserted
basis for dismissing Pleznac's CPPA claim: that her claim arises
out of "landlord-tenant relations" and is therefore categorically
outside the scope of the CPPA.  He also finds that Pleznac's claim
for defamation (Count 3) falls squarely within the FCRA's
preemption provision; and (iv) without opining on the availability
of punitive damages in the case, Count 10 appears as a separate
claim.

A separate order accompanies the Memorandum Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/SLJzWO from Leagle.com.

SARAH S. PLEZNAC, Plaintiff, represented by Jamil Zouaoui, MIZENE
PLLC.

EQUITY RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., Defendant, represented by
Craig M. White -- cwhite@bakerlaw.com -- BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, pro
hac vice & Carey S. Busen -- cbusen@bakerlaw.com -- BAKER &
HOSTETLER, LLP.


F.S.R. TRUCKING: Fails to Pay Drivers Overtime, Inglesias Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RAUL IGLESIAS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly-situated, Plaintiff v. F.S.R. TRUCKING, INC. d/b/a POSTAL
CARRIER CORP., Defendant, 1:18-cv-23322-DPG (S.D. Fla., Aug. 15,
2018) seeks to recover from the Defendant half-time overtime
compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and costs under
the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Mr. Iglesias was employed by the Defendant as driver from May 31,
2013 to August 24, 2016.

F.S.R. Trucking, Inc. was founded in 1977. The company's line of
business includes provides trucking or transfer services. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zandro E. Palm, Esq.
          ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
          9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
          Miami, FL 33156
          Telephone: (305) 446-1500
          Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
          E-mail: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


FACEBOOK INC: Rankins Sues over Backdoor Data-Sharing Partnerships
------------------------------------------------------------------
VELMA SERINA RANKINS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. FACEBOOK, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-05350 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 30, 2018),
alleges that Facebook shares its users' personal data with
third-party mobile device makers, including Apple, Amazon, and
Samsung, without the users' consent and despite its promises that
it does not share its users' personal information without either
providing notice or obtaining users' permission.

Specifically, backdoor data-sharing partnerships between Facebook
and device makers have enabled device makers to obtain substantial
information, including users' relationship status, religion, and
information about users; friends -- even where those users have
denied Facebook permission to share data with any third parties.
Indeed, in June 2018, the New York Times reported that Facebook
entered into data-sharing partnerships with nearly 60 device
makers. For years prior to the New York Times report, Facebook did
not disclose to its users that these data-sharing partnerships with
device makers existed.  Facebook's data-sharing partnerships have
violated the privacy of millions of people.  Because Facebook
systematically and covertly shared users' data with dozens of
device makers without Plaintiff's and Class members' consent or
even knowledge.

The complaint further notes that Facebook leads its consumers to
believe that their information is being kept private. Facebook
provides privacy settings that purport to limit the sharing of
personal information. Facebook also requires the use of a login and
password. These purported privacy protections, and the fact that
Facebook did not disclose that data is freely shared with device
makers, leads reasonable consumers to believe that their
information is secure, when, in fact, Facebook has been knowingly
funneling data to device makers through data partnerships for
years. To make matters worse, Facebook falsely represented to
users, and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), that it would not
share users' data without their informed consent. Despite this
promise, Facebook continues to improperly and illegally share --
and profit from -- its users' data.

The data-sharing partnerships at issue are not the only example of
Facebook's data aggregation and for-profit information-sharing
scheme, the complaint says. The New York Times’ report revealing
these data-sharing partnerships came on the heels of the revelation
that tens of millions of Facebook users' data was shared without
users' consent by an academic researcher working with Cambridge
Analytica, a political consulting firm. Cambridge Analytica used
the data to influence voters, including those who voted in the 2016
United States presidential election. Facebook's lax handling of
that data breach alarmed users and regulators alike and raises
concerns about whether it provides any oversight on its
data-sharing partnerships with device makers.

Facebook is a data aggregation and marketing company disguised as a
social networking platform. Facebook's surface-level social
networking platform facilitates the sharing of information,
photographs, website links, and videos among friends, family, and
coworkers.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff:

          Sabita J. Soneji, Esq.
          Annick Persinger, Esq.
          Tanya Koshy, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          483 Ninth St., Suite 200
          Oakland, CA 94607
          Telephone: (510) 254 6808
          Facsimile: (202) 973 0950
          E-mail: ssoneji@tzlegal.com
                  apersinger@tzlegal.com
                  tkoshy@tzlegal.com


FIBRWRAP CONSTRUCTION: Morales & Miranda Sue for Minimum Wages & OT
-------------------------------------------------------------------
JUAN MORALES, and FELIPE MIRANDA, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. FIBRWRAP
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC., a business entity, form unknown; and
DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. BC780138
(Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 30, 2018), alleges that Defendants failed to
pay prevailing and minimum wages, failed to pay overtime wages,
failed to timely pay all wages to terminated employees, and failed
to furnish accurate wage statements in violation of the California
Labor Code.

According to the complaint, by virtue of Defendants' unlawful
failure to pay additional premium rate compensation to the
Plaintiffs and the Class for their overtime hours worked.  The
Plaintiffs and the Class have suffered, and will continue to
suffer, damages in amounts which are presently unknown to them but
which exceed the jurisdictional minimum of this Court and which
will be ascertained according to proof at trial.

Fibrwrap Construction operates as a subsidiary of Aegion
Corporation.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Juan Morales and Felipe Miranda:

          Kane Moon, Esq.
          Justin F. Marquez, Esq.
          Allen Feghali, Esq.
          MOON & YANG, APC
          1055 W. Seventh St., Suite 1880
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 232 3128
          Facsimile: (213) 232 3125
          E-mail: kane.moon@moonyanglaw.com
                  justin.marquez@moonyanglaw.com
                  allen.feghali@moonyanglaw.com


FIELD ASSET: Bid to Decertify Bowerman Class of Vendors Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FRED BOWERMAN, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. FIELD ASSET
SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 13-cv-00057-WHO (N.D.
Cal.), Judge William H. Orrick of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California denied the Defendants' motion for
for decertification of the Plaintiffs' class.

Leaving no stone unturned, the Defendants ("FAS") moved a second
time for decertification of the Plaintiffs' class following a
bellwether trial in which the jury found in favor of the
Plaintiffs.  Given that Judge Orrick had already denied FAS' first
motion to decertify, Decertification and SJ Order, he granted the
Plaintiffs' motion to strike the second motion but construed it as
a motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration and called
for a response -- the case has raised novel issues and he wanted a
complete record for himself and the Ninth Circuit.

FAS asserts that the bellwether trial proved that the Plaintiffs
cannot show by common evidence whether the vendor class members
worked overtime hours and whether their claimed expenses are
reimbursable under California law; therefore, the Plaintiffs cannot
establish the predominance requirement under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3).  FAS identifies differences in the testimony of
the vendors at trial and reminds the Judge that the Plaintiffs'
damages expert was withdrawn after he raised questions about the
reliability of his data and opinions concerning an aggregate
damages model.  

FAS argues that the 72-hour work order completion policy does not
dictate its liability for failure to pay overtime because the
policy does not mean that vendors necessarily worked any overtime.
However, the Judge has previously determined that in addition to
misclassifying the vendors, FAS employed the policies and practices
that generally required the vendors to work overtime.

The issue on decertification in the case boils down to
predominance.  Misclassification is the predominant issue in the
case.  Proof by the testimony of vendors is necessary, but that
should not be a hurdle to class certification since the lack of
documentation was caused by FAS' policies and practices.  The math
for calculating overtime is straight forward and consistent across
the class, as is the math for adding up the business expenses.
This "methodology" is sufficient under Comcast Corp. v. Behrend.
While the damages calculations are necessarily individualized, that
does not change the Judge's conclusion that class certification in
this matter was proper.

Since FAS' first motion to decertify, a jury has resoundingly found
that the vendors in the bellwether trial were each entitled to
substantial damages.  The trial testimony viewed as a whole
confirmed his view that FAS retained all necessary control over
vendors' work, that the vendors were required to work overtime and
expend their own money for business expenses in order to maintain
their positions with FAS, and that FAS' denials of those facts were
not credible to the jury.

Judge Orrick concludes that the damages phase of the class action
is far messier than promised by the Plaintiffs' counsel when he
certified the case.  It is made more onerous by FAS' legitimate but
cumbersome choice to try the entire damages phase in front of a
jury instead of by using one of a number of alternative methods
suggested by the Plaintiffs.  But as the Ninth Circuit decided in
Briseno v ConAgra Foods, a class certification should not be denied
solely due to manageability concerns, and in the case, the
certification is proper and the most equitable way to resolve the
litigation.  Accordingly, he denied the Defendants' motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/najWf7 from Leagle.com.

Fred Bowerman, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated & Julia Bowerman, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Thomas E. Duckworth
-- tom@dpolaw.com -- Duckworth Peters LLP, Chiharu Gina Sekino --
csekino@sfmslaw.com -- Shepherd Finkelman Miller & Shah, LLP, James
Edward Miller -- jmiller@sfmslaw.com -- James C. Shah, Esq. --
jshah@sfmslaw.com -- Kolin Tang, Esq. -- ktang@sfmslaw.com --
Laurie Rubinow, Esq. -- lrubinow@sfmslaw.com -- Nathan Curtis
Zipperian, Esq. -- nzipperian@sfmslaw.com -- and -- Ronald Scott
Kravitz, Esq. -- rkravitz@sfmslaw.com -- SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN,
MILLER & SHAH, LLP.

Field Asset Services, Inc. & Field Asset Services LLC, a successor
in interest, Defendants, represented by Robert G. Hulteng, Esq.
--rhulteng@littler.com -- Alison Jacquelyn Cubre, Esq. --
acubre@littler.com -- Aurelio Jose Perez, Esq. --
aperez@littler.com -- Danton Wai-Ky Liang, Esq. --
dliang@littler.com -- Kevin R. Vozzo, Esq. -- kvozzo@littler.com --
LITTLER MENDELSON & Matthew J. Hank -- Emhank@littler.com -- pro
hac vice.


FOODSERVICES INC: Paul Weiss Attorneys Discuss Court Ruling
-----------------------------------------------------------
Martin Flumenbaum, Esq. -- mflumenbaum@paulweiss.com -- and Brad S.
Karp, Esq. -- bkarp@paulweiss.com -- of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison, in an article for New York Law Journal, wrote
that when it comes to class action certification, named plaintiffs
suing on behalf of out-of-state class members face numerous
challenges.  But after the Second Circuit decision, by Judges John
M. Walker Jr., Gerard Lynch and Denny Chin, in Langan v. Johnson &
Johnson, No. 17-1605, 2018 WL 3542624 (2d Cir. 2018), having
standing to sue on behalf of unnamed class members with
out-of-state claims is no longer one of them.

For several years now, district courts in the Second Circuit have
split on whether named plaintiffs must establish Article III
standing for out-of-state claims asserted by nonparty class members
from different states.  To clear up the confusion, the Second
Circuit has now "made explicit" what it had implied in prior cases:
for purposes of class action certification, named plaintiffs only
need standing for their own claims.

An Attempt to Resolve the Debate
There has been considerable disagreement about whether Article III
impacts plaintiffs seeking class certification for claims brought
on behalf of out-of-state, nonparty class members.  In re
Foodservices Inc. Pricing Litigation, 729 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2013).
The Second Circuit previously attempted to clarify, albeit
implicitly, that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(3)'s
predominance test -- i.e., whether questions of law or fact are
common among class members and predominate over any individual
issue -- is the proper analysis for these certification issues, not
Article III standing.

In Foodservices, the Second Circuit granted an interlocutory appeal
challenging a nationwide class certification of claims under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) and, as
relevant here, breach of contract.  After concluding that the
district court properly certified the class under RICO, the Second
Circuit turned to the breach of contract claims, which
"implicate[d] the laws of many jurisdictions." Id. at 112.

The court first explained that "putative class actions involving
the laws of multiple states are often not properly certified
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3)," because of the variations of legal
issues related to those laws. Id. at 126 (emphasis added). The
court nevertheless observed that these concerns are lessened when
state laws do not materially vary. As such, the court explained,
the proper inquiry for class certification is whether the laws of
multiple jurisdictions differ materially, not whether those laws
are merely implicated.  Finding that the multistate claims'
commonalities predominated, the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's grant of class certification.  Notably, the court
never addressed whether the named plaintiffs had standing to bring
claims on behalf of out-of-state, nonparty class members.

District Courts Split
If the Second Circuit believed it had clarified in Foodservices
that Article III standing has no bearing on plaintiffs seeking
class certification for nonparty class members' out-of-state
claims, that clarification was lost on the district courts. In the
years that followed, several district courts came to the opposite
conclusion.

Consider, for example, Richards v. Direct Energy Services, 120 F.
Supp. 3d 148 (D. Conn. 2015).  There, the district court dismissed
plaintiff's claims for injuries suffered by potential class members
in Massachusetts.  Because plaintiff had only alleged personal
injuries in Connecticut and not in Massachusetts, the court
reasoned that plaintiff's claims turned on whether some unnamed
parties in Massachusetts suffered harm. Plaintiff accordingly
lacked standing to bring his Massachusetts claims, and his intent
to seek class certification did not relieve his burden to establish
it.  The district court in In re HSBC Bank, USA, N.A., Debit Card
Overdraft Fee Litigation, 1 F. Supp. 3d 34 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)
similarly explained that "Article III standing is generally a
prerequisite to class certification." Id. at 49.  It, in turn, also
concluded that plaintiffs, in bringing a consolidated putative
class action, lacked standing to bring claims under state laws to
which they were not personally subjected.

These conclusions starkly contrasted with other district court
decisions issued prior to Foodservices.  The court in In re Bayer
Corp. Combination Aspirin Products Marketing and Sales Practices
Litigation, 701 F. Supp. 2d 356 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), for example,
explained that the issue of standing should not "be conflated with
Rule 23 class action requirements." Id. at 376. It thus rejected
any standing issues related to nonparty class members' out-of-state
claims.  As the court put it, whether named plaintiffs had standing
to bring suit in each state was "immaterial" because plaintiffs did
not personally bring those nonparties' claims in a multistate class
action.  Likewise, the court in In re Grand Theft Auto Video Game
Consumer Litigation (No. II), 2006 WL 3039993 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25,
2006), found that it was better to "treat class certification as
logically antecedent to standing where class certification is the
source of potential standing problems."  Id. at *2.

The 'Langan' Opinion
With the district courts split on standing, the Second Circuit in
Langan provided much-needed clarification. Langan concerned a class
action lawsuit against Johnson & Johnson for deceptively labeling
its baby bath and wash products as "natural." Seeking damages on
behalf of herself and "all others similarly situated," plaintiff
alleged that defendant violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practice Act, as well as the consumer protection laws of 20 other
states.  The case reached the Second Circuit after defendant
appealed the district court's order certifying plaintiff's class.
On appeal, defendant argued that: (i) plaintiff lacked standing to
bring a class action on behalf of out-of-state consumers, and (ii)
the district court erroneously concluded that the state laws at
issue were sufficiently similar to support certification.

The only real standing-related dispute was whether plaintiff had
"standing to bring a class action on behalf of unnamed,
yet-to-be-identified class members from other states under those
states' consumer protection laws." Langan, 2018 WL 3542624, at *3.
Accordingly, the court took the opportunity to "make explicit what
[it] previously assumed in" Foodservices: if a named plaintiff has
standing to bring its claims against a named defendant, any issue
about whether plaintiff's class could include unnamed members'
out-of-state claims is a question for Rule 23(b)(3) predominance,
not Article III standing. Id.

To reach this conclusion, the Second Circuit emphasized that class
actions are an exception to the general rule that one person cannot
litigate injuries on behalf of another.  Indeed, by their very
nature, class actions permit named plaintiffs to bring claims on
behalf of other class members even if they had not personally
suffered the class members' specific injuries. The court reasoned
that it would make little sense to dismiss out-of-state claims
belonging to unnamed class members on standing grounds if no
equivalent standing requirement existed for named plaintiffs to
bring claims on behalf of class members in the first place.  Thus,
if any doubt remained about the relevance of Article III standing
to this inquiry, the Second Circuit soundly put the notion to bed.

Where Things Stand
Langan aligns the Second Circuit with the Supreme Court's
"preference for dealing with modest variations between class
members' claims as substantive questions, not jurisdictional." Id.
at *5.  In so ruling, the court unequivocally removed an
additional—and potentially unnecessary—barrier to class
certification.

Nevertheless, Langan did not create an unbridled path for
plaintiffs to freely bring claims on behalf of out-of-state class
members. In fact, the Langan court vacated the grant of class
certification because the district court's Rule 23(b)(3)
predominance analysis lacked rigor.  As such, although no longer
required to make a now-unnecessary showing of standing, plaintiffs
must nevertheless be prepared to satisfy the other significant
class certification requirements in circumstances where their
class-wide claims extend across multiple states. [GN]


FORD MOTOR: Weidman et al. Allege F-150 Truck Brake Defect
----------------------------------------------------------
PAUL WEIDMAN, RAUL VALENTIN, ERICA GOMEZ, PERRY BURTON, AND TERESA
PERRY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
the Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No.
2:18-cv-12719-GAD-EAS (E.D. Mich., Aug. 30, 2018), seeks to recover
damages and equitable relief, individually and on behalf of the
other Class members, each of whom purchased or leased one or more
model year 2013-2018 Ford F-150 trucks.

According to the complaint, each of the Class Vehicles contains a
defective Hitachi front brake master cylinder that places it at
risk of suddenly and unexpectedly losing braking ability. A brake
master cylinder is an essential component of hydraulic brake
systems that controls the amount of brake fluid pushed to brake
calipers located on each wheel. When properly functioning, the
master cylinder ensures that enough hydraulic pressure from the
brake fluid is supplied to the calipers so that they can clamp shut
on the wheel rotors in response to the driver’s application of
the brake pedal.

The lawsuit explains that in the Class Vehicles, piston cup seals
within the Master Cylinders roll within their grooves and become
unseated, allowing brake fluid to escape from the Master Cylinder.
This loss of brake fluid leads to a loss of hydraulic pressure and
a resulting loss of brake function for the Class Vehicles' front
brake circuits. Front brake circuits are responsible for 75% of a
vehicle's braking force, and thus the Master Cylinder Defect
results in an almost complete loss of stopping power.

Owners and lessees of Class Vehicles, including Plaintiffs Paul
Weidman and Teresa Perry, have experienced sudden loss of braking
force in life-threatening situations, such as while driving on
highways or in congested traffic, and have recounted rolling
through stop signs and red lights due to brake failure, caused by
the Master Cylinder Defect. Scores of complaints documenting the
effects of the Master Cylinder Defect have been submitted to the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, as well as other
websites and Ford owner forums. On information and belief, these
complaints represent only a small fraction of the number of actual
incidents experienced by consumers.

The Master Cylinder Defect should not have come as a surprise to
Ford, given the unique design of the Master Cylinders. Prior to the
use of the Master Cylinder in the F-150, Ford used brake master
cylinders manufactured by Bosch instead. The Bosch master cylinders
used two, balanced, cup seals per piston to contain brake fluid,
which were tightly fitted around the outside of the piston bodies,
rather than seated inside the master cylinder bore. The Master
Cylinders supplied by Hitachi, on the other hand, rely on a single
cup seal per piston that is fitted within a groove in the Master
Cylinder bore. Given the lack of concern that the Hitachi design
shows for brake fluid containment, Ford should have expected the
resultant Master Cylinder failures.

Beginning with model year 2013 F-150s, there was a dramatic spike
in online complaints and warranty claims for loss of braking power
due to the Master Cylinder Defect. Despite this, Ford has continued
installing the same Master Cylinder in its F-150s through the
present day. The rash of complaints concerning the loss of braking
power, including in potentially deadly circumstances, has continued
unabated in the Class Vehicles. Purchasers who complain to Ford
about the effects of the Master Cylinder Defect are frequently told
by Ford service professionals that failure events are commonplace
among the Class Vehicles.

In February 2016, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration's Office of Defects Investigation opened a
preliminary evaluation into reports of brake fluid leaking from the
Master Cylinder in 2013-14 Ford F-150s with 3.5L Engines. In
response, in May 2016, Ford Motor Company issued a safety recall
16S24 to address loss of the front brake circuit function in a
subset of model year 2013 and 2014 Ford F-150, specifically those
F-150s with 3.5L Ecoboost engines that were built between August 1,
2013 and August 31, 2014.

In Safety Recall 16S24, Ford admitted the existence of the Master
Cylinder Defect. Ford cited risk of a "compromised" primary cup
seal and the corresponding loss of brake fluid "into the brake
booster." The recall also notified dealers that "the driver may
experience a change in brake pedal travel and feel, and reduced
brake function in the front wheels." Ford warned, "reduced brake
function in the front wheels can extend stopping distance,
increasing the risk of a crash." The recall, however, was grossly
inadequate. Not only did the recall not even address all affected
model year 2013-14 F-150s, it did not address any model year
2015-18 vehicles, even though all model year 2013-18 F-150s
vehicles share the same Master Cylinder as the recalled vehicles,
and all model year 2013-18 F-150s have the Master Cylinder Defect.
Further, the recall provides an ineffective remedy even for the
vehicles that it does address. It merely calls for the replacement
of the Master Cylinder with a new Master Cylinder that is
internally identical to that which failed. In other words, the
recall simply calls for the replacement of one defective part with
another defective part.

As a result of Ford's unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent business
practices, Plaintiffs and the other Class members were damaged in
that they purchased Class Vehicles that they would not have
purchased, or at least paid more for their Class Vehicles than they
would have paid, had they known about the Master Cylinder Defect.

Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Classes:

          E. Powell Miller, Esq.
          Sharon S. Almonrode, Esq.
          Dennis A. Lienhardt, Esq.
          THE MILLER LAW FIRM, P.C.
          950 W. University Drive, Suite 300
          Rochester, MI 48307
          Telephone: (248) 841 2200
          E-mail: epm@millerlawpc.com
                  ssa@millerlawpc.com
                  dal@millerlawpc.com

               - and -

          W. Daniel "Dee" Miles, III, Esq.
          H. Clay Barnett, III, Esq.
          BEASLEY, ALLEN, CROW
          METHVIN, PORTIS & MILES, P.C.
          272 Commerce Street
          Montgomery, Alabama 36104
          Telephone: (334) 269 2343
          E-mail: Dee.Miles@Beasleyallen.com
                  Clay.Barnett@BeasleyAllen.com

               - and -

          Adam J. Levitt, Esq.
          John E. Tangren, Esq.
          Daniel R. Ferri, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT & CASEY LLC
          Ten North Dearborn Street, Eleventh Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 214 7900
          E-mail: alevitt@dlcfirm.com
                  jtangren@dlcfirm.com
                  dferri@dlcfirm.com


FXCM INC: Shearman & Sterling Discusses Class Action Dismissal
--------------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP, in an article for Mondaq, wrote that Judge
Kimba M. Wood of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York dismissed a putative securities class action
against foreign exchange trading company FXCM Inc. ("FXCM" or the
"Company") and its CEO.  Ret. Bd. of the Policemen's Annuity and
Benefit Fund of Chicago v. FXCM, No. 15-cv-03599 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10,
2018).  Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act") and Rule 10b-5 by making material misstatements and omissions
concerning certain risks associated with the Company's business
model.  The Court held that the alleged misrepresentations were
inactionable "puffery," too vague to be actionable, or were not
misleading because the alleged risks were adequately disclosed when
the Company's disclosures were viewed as a whole.  The Court also
held that plaintiff had failed to allege a strong inference of
scienter.

FXCM is a brokerage firm that provides access to the FX market.
According to the complaint, the Company eschewed the "principal
model" adopted by most retail brokerage firms, under which the
broker takes the opposite side of its customers' trades, in favor
of an "agency model" under which the Company served as an
intermediary between customers and banks.  The Company allegedly
had a "no debit policy" under which customers could take long,
highly-leveraged currency positions and the Company would be
responsible for covering all losses beyond the amount of collateral
in the customers' accounts.  In January 2015, the Swiss National
Bank announced it would de-peg the Swiss Franc from the Euro,
triggering a sharp devaluation of the Euro in relation to the
Franc.  Plaintiff alleged that, as a result of this devaluation,
many of the Company's customers suffered losses well above their
collateral, leading to $276 million in losses for the Company.
According to plaintiff, to avoid regulatory default, the Company
agreed to a "punitive" financing agreement with an outside
investment company and, as a result, the Company's stock price
dropped from $14.87 to $1.60 within one week.

The Court first considered plaintiff's allegations that the Company
made misleading statements about its agency model and the risks the
Company faced from its "no debit policy," liquidity, and risk
factors.  Plaintiff had alleged that the Company misrepresented
that, because under the agency model the Company did not take the
opposite side of its customers' trades, this "reduced [the
Company's] risk" and the Company was "not exposed to the market
risk of a position moving up or down in value."  The Court held
that the Company's statements were either nonactionable puffery or
were not misleading in the context in which they were made because
the Company's model was clear to investors.  The Court similarly
dismissed plaintiff's argument that the Company had not disclosed
the "no debit policy," finding that the Company's 10-K, when
reviewed as a whole, "plainly disclose[d] that FXCM could be
exposed to liability in the event that a customer's losses exceed[]
the amount of cash in their account."  Similarly, statements in the
Company's Form 10-K that it had a "fairly conservative margin
policy," "maintained a sustainable pool of liquidity," and
"maintained excess regulatory capital" were held to be inactionable
statements, as the Court found them to be the types of general
statements on which investors are unlikely to rely.

The Court then considered whether plaintiff had adequately alleged
scienter.  Plaintiff had alleged that:  the Company's CEO knew that
the Company was exposed to a $2.2 billion open position on the
Euro-Swiss Franc pair and knew there was a risk the pair would be
de-pegged; the CEO tried to cover up the extent of the loss by
claiming the open position was $1 billion rather than $2.2 billion;
and the CEO blamed the loss on the failure of banks to provide
pricing and liquidity.  The Court concluded that these allegations
did not create a strong inference of scienter, noting that while
the CEO allegedly knew about the $2.2 billion open position and was
aware of extreme price movement in other currencies, plaintiff had
failed to allege that the CEO perceived the risk that the
Euro-Swiss Franc would be de-pegged as a serious possibility at the
time.  The Court also found that statements to which plaintiff
pointed to support the inference of a cover up were not
contradictory and did not lend themselves to an inference of
scienter.  The Court added that the CEO's alleged understanding of
the agency model was insufficient to establish a strong inference
of scienter given the Court's determination that the Company
sufficiently disclosed in its Form 10-K that it was exposed to risk
from customer losses exceeding collateral.  The CEO was also
allegedly aware that other companies had raised margin requirements
with respect to the Euro-Swiss Franc pair, but the Court noted that
this indicated "nothing more than a different business judgment."

Finding that plaintiff failed to adequately plead material
misstatements and scienter, the Court dismissed plaintiff's claims
under Sections 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without addressing defendants'
loss causation argument.  The Court also dismissed plaintiff's
Section 20(a) control person liability claim because plaintiff
failed to adequately allege a primary violation by the Company.
[GN]


GALA FRESH: Plaintiff Can't Sue Based Solely on Sales Receipts
--------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Booth, writing for Law.com, reports that a plaintiff in a
putative class action cannot sue two northern New Jersey
supermarkets for allegedly overcharging sales tax based solely on
receipts he received from the stores, a New Jersey appeals court
has ruled.

The Appellate Division in an unpublished opinion released Aug. 17
said the action lodged by plaintiff Frank Barile failed to state a
claim under the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice
Act.

"We conclude that the complaint should have been dismissed with
prejudice because the sales receipts are not a violation of the
TCCWNA, and they are not contracts or notices under the act," said
Appellate Division Judges Thomas Sumners Jr. and Scott Moynihan.

The appeals court also said that any dispute over alleged
overcharges in sales taxes falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the director of the state Division of Taxation.

Mr. Barile, according to the ruling, shopped at Gala Fresh stores
in Paterson and Passaic several times over a three-week period in
2016. During that period, he was given sales receipts showing that
he had been charged more in sales tax for taxable items than the 7
percent allowed by law at the time, he claimed.

He filed a putative class-action lawsuit alleging violations of the
TCCWNA based solely on the sales receipts, the ruling said.

On a defense motion, Passaic County Superior Court Judge Randal
Chiocca dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice. He said, under the
TCCWNA, the sales receipts did not constitute contracts or
guarantees, and that any offense was in the overcharging of sales
taxes, which was an issue for the division to decide.

The panel, quoting from case law, noted that TCCWNA is a statute
that prohibits certain affirmative actions -- "'that is, the
offering of or signing of a consumer contract, or giving or
displaying of consumer warranties, notices, or signs, which violate
a substantive provision of law.'"

Sales receipts memorialize the plaintiff's purchases, but go no
further in substantiating a TCCWNA violation, the court said.

"The fact that the TCCWNA is remedial legislation does not allow us
to impose requirements that are not within the four corners of its
language," the judges said.

Mr. Barile's attorney, Andrew Wolf, who heads a firm in North
Brunswick, said: "We are considering our options."

The supermarkets' attorney, Douglas Sanchez --
dsanchez@cmlawfirm.com -- of the Woodcliff Lake office of Cruser,
Mitchell, Novits, Sanchez, Gaston & Zimet, did not return a call
seeking comment. [GN]


GAZELLE TRANSPORTATION: Contreras Sues for Minimum Wage & OT Pay
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, David Contreras, on behalf of himself all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. GAZELLE TRANSPORTATION, LLC,
a Delaware limited liability company; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. BC7l94l9 (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug.
30, 2018), the Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have failed to
provide him and all other similarly situated individuals with meal
periods; failed to provide with rest periods; failed to pay premium
wages for missed meals and/or rest periods; failed to pay at least
minimum wage for all hours worked; failed to pay overtime wages at
the correct rate; failed to pay double time wages at the correct
rate; failed to provide with accurate written wage statements; and
failed to pay all their final wages separation of employment.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff worked for Defendants as
a non-exempt, hourly employee from November 1, 2015 through
September 1, 2017. The Plaintiff regularly worked shifts of eight
to twelve hours per day, without being afforded a meal break during
the first five hours and/or second meal break after 10 hours as
required by California Law.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shaun Setareh, Esq.
          H. Scott Leviant, Esq.
          William M. Pao, Esq.
          SETAREH LAW GROUP
          9454 Wilshire Boulevard. Suite 907
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone (310) 888 7771
          Facsimile (310) 888 0109
          E-mail: shaun@setarehlaw.com
                  scottf@setarehlaw.com
                  william@selareh1aw.com


GIRARD, OH: Motion to Dismiss Speed Camera Class Action Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
Samantha Phillips, writing for The Vindicator, reports that a
motion by the city to dismiss a class-action lawsuit against
Girard, regarding what an attorney claims are erroneously issued
speed camera tickets, is pending in Trumbull County Common Pleas
Court.

The litigation revolves around the contested speed limit on a
portion of Interstate 80 between Dec. 7, 2017, and Jan. 7, 2018,
after construction was complete. The typical speed limit is 65
miles per hour, but during construction it was reduced to 55 mph.

Erica Hawkins with the Ohio Department of Transportation said the
journalized speed limit was raised back to 65 mph by the ODOT
district director after Dec. 7, 2017, but the construction
contractor left the reduced-speed-limit signs up.

Drivers who got cited for speed violations maintain they treated
the interstate as being back at its regular speed despite the
signs, because construction was over.

The motion, filed on the city's behalf by attorneys with the
Cleveland-based firm Sutter O'Connell Co., argues the lawsuit,
filed by Atty. Marc Dann and six class members, doesn't have a
legal basis for why the citations were invalid or how the drivers
are entitled to relief.

"We vigorously oppose the motion to dismiss the suit, and I'm
optimistic that our theories will move the case forward," Mr. Dann
said.

The city is firm that the limit was still reduced: "The posted
speed is what the violations were issued on," said Girard Law
Director Brian Kren.

The motion is at odds over several claims made in the lawsuit,
including that the drivers' due process rights were violated.

The lawsuit alleged certain plaintiffs tried to contest their
citations but were denied. But the motion states the plaintiffs
didn't make the request within the required 30 days of getting the
notice.

"I was hoping Girard would come to the table wanting to resolve
this, but if they want to litigate, we are perfectly able to do
that," Mr. Dann said. [GN]


GLOBAL CREDIT: Williams Seeks to Certify Settlement Class
---------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned SAMUEL WILLIAMS, pleading on his own
behalf and on behalf of all other similarly situated consumers, the
Plaintiff, vs. GLOBAL CREDIT & COLLECTIONS; and VELOCITY
INVESTMENTS, LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-03323 (N.D.
Ill.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order granting
preliminary approval of the settlement on behalf of this class:

   "all persons in the State of Pennsylvania who were sent
   collection letters and/or notices from GCC on a debt owed to
   Velocity that was beyond the statute of limitations, wherein
   Defendant made a settlement offer on said debt without
   disclosing the debt was beyond the statute of limitations,
   during a period beginning May 2, 2016 through June 9, 2017."

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Daniel Zemel, Esq.
          Elizabeth Apostola, Esq.
          ZEMEL LAW, LLC
          1373 Broad St., Suite 203-C
          Clifton, NJ 07013
          Telephone: (862) 227 3106
          E-Mail: dz@zemellawllc.com
                  ea@zemellawllc.com

Attorneys for Defendants

          Brian W. Ledebuhr, Esq.
          VEDDER PRICE
          222 North LaSalle Street, Suite 2300
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 609 7845
          E-mail: bledebuhr@vedderprice.com


GLOBALSCAPE INC: Settles Stockholders' Class Action for $1.4MM
--------------------------------------------------------------
Patrick Danner, writing for Chron, reports that San Antonio
software developer GlobalScape Inc. has settled a securities
class-action lawsuit brought by stockholders for $1.4 million.

In a regulatory filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on Aug. 20, GlobalScape said it entered into a binding memorandum
of understanding to resolve the litigation brought against the
company and various officers and directors in San Antonio federal
court.

The insurance carrier for GlobalScape and the officers and
directors will pay the class $1.4 million, which includes
attorneys' fees and litigation expenses that the court may award.

The number of individuals in the class hasn't been determined but
they hold an estimated 3.2 million shares, said Jeffery C. Block, a
Boston attorney for the group. The company has almost 22 million
shares outstanding, but about 12 million are available for trading,
according to Bloomberg.

"We estimated that the total damages in our case under the federal
securities laws — what we could recover if we won, was about $1.5
million," Block said. "So our feeling was to recover $1.4 million
right now was a pretty good deal. To do it quickly and get the
money back to the shareholders quickly is probably a pretty good
result."

The lawsuit will be dismissed with prejudice, meaning it can't be
refiled, and all claims against the defendants will be dismissed.

The settlement is subject to execution of a "definitive settlement
agreement," notice to the class and final approval of the court.
Settlement papers must be submitted to U.S. District Judge Xavier
Rodriguez by Sept. 13, according to an order he issued.

GlobalScape said the memorandum of understanding contains no
admission of wrongdoing.

"The Company and the Individual Defendants have always maintained
and continue to believe that they did not engage in any wrongdoing
or otherwise commit any violation of federal or state securities
laws or other laws," it said in the SEC filing. It added that
settling was in its "best interest" given the potential costs of
litigation.

Besides GlobalScape, the suit names Matthew Goulet, CEO and
president; James Albrecht, former CFO; Chairman Thomas Brown; and
directors David Mann, Frank Morgan and Thomas Hicks.

Lead plaintiff Ifran Rahman filed the lawsuit a little more than a
year ago and amended it in July after GlobalScape's former vice
president of global sales, David Lee Burke in May pleaded guilty to
wire fraud for intentionally inflating sales numbers.

Mr. Burke, of Columbus, Ohio, admitted to "fudging" sales revenue
of the publicly traded company as he faced internal pressures to
meet management's projected growth targets." He faces up to 20
years in prison and a $250,000 fine when he's sentenced this fall.

The amended lawsuit alleges a scheme was carried out to report
better than expected earnings.

"The motive was clear," the action says. "Defendants (Mann and
Brown) . . .  were hoping to sell $12 million of their stock in a
January 2017 private transaction."

The suit adds, "Burke was under pressure from his superiors to meet
his sales targets so the stock sale could close. On the heels of
this, Mann and Brown closed on their $12 million stock sale."

Last August, GlobalScape revealed an internal forensic audit found
"improper arrangements with customers" in the fourth quarter of
2016 that overstated its earnings and revenue. In June, GlobalScape
corrected its financial results for all of 2016 and the first
quarter of 2017.

The SEC has opened a formal investigation into the restatements.
The U.S. attorney's office in San Antonio also is investigating
potential improper recognition of revenue, GlobalScape said in its
regulatory filing.

Meanwhile, GlobalScape announced Brown will not stand for
re-election as chairman when his term ends later this year. Brown,
a San Antonio stock broker and investment adviser, has been
chairman since 2002.

GlobalScape develops and sells computer software that provides
secure information exchange.

In another filing on Aug. 21, GlobalScape said it plans to purchase
up to $15 million of its shares at a price range between $4 and
$4.50 a share.  The tender offer is expected to start in the next
few days and remain open for 20 business days, it said.

Under the offer, stockholders can indicate how many shares and at
what price within the range they wish to tender. The company will
then determine the lowest price per share that will enable it to
buy the shares. If the tender offer is fully subscribed, the
company will purchase 15.2 percent to 17.1 percent of its
outstanding shares.

Shares were up 54 cents to $4 in early trading on August 21, 2018.
[GN]


GLYNN COUNTY, GA: Georgia Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Tax Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
Taylor Cooper, writing for The Brunswick News, reports that Georgia
Supreme Court declined on Aug. 20 to hear the case of a class
action lawsuit against Glynn County alleging it overcharged 7,500
homeowners on their property taxes.

With its decision, the class action lawsuit representing around
7,500 Glynn County homeowners will return to Superior Court for
determination of damages, Jay Roberts, with St. Simons Island law
firm Roberts Tate, said in March.

Mr. Roberts said the case is now settled, and all that's left to do
is see whether the county will refund the residents or dispute the
amount of the refund.

"At this point, it's nothing but math," Mr. Roberts said.

Glynn County Attorney Aaron Mumford declined to comment on the
matter, saying that he will need to discuss the next step in the
case with the Glynn County Commission.

Mr. Roberts said the county will need to take action soon, however,
because it can't continue taxing the homeowners involved in the
case at the same property tax rate.

"If they send out tax bills again in November, it will be in
violation of the court's ruling," Mr.Roberts said.

The decision handed down by the court of appeals stated the
original class action suit, one of three, was filed in 2012.

State law only allows tax refunds for the preceding three years,
meaning the members of the original lawsuit can't seek refunds for
years prior to 2009.

The case started in 2012 with J. Matthew and Elizabeth Coleman.
They alleged they and many others were overcharged from 2001 to
2010. Two more cases were filed in 2013 and 2014, alleging more
taxpayers had been overcharged.

Cobb County Superior Court Judge G. Grant Brantley -- who took the
case after all of Glynn County's judges recused themselves -- sided
with the county in 2015, but Georgia Court of Appeals judges
partially overturned the ruling in 2016.

In a court of appeals filing, the Colemans claimed the county
overcharged residents with homestead exemptions by assigning them
the wrong base year. Under the homestead exemption in question,
property taxes do not increase with assessed value past the base
year.

Glynn County claimed in a response filing that it couldn't use the
base years the homeowners wanted it to use, as they hadn't paid a
full year of property taxes, or any at all, during those years. As
such, it used the only year it could as the base year, according to
the response.

According to the appeals court, the county did, in fact, assign the
wrong base year to the homestead exemptions. However, it upheld the
Superior Court's ruling that state law still stands, and the
landowners can only seek refunds of overpaid taxes of the last
three years.

In 2014, a former Glynn County chief appraiser claimed the county
had been overcharging people on their property taxes for years,
saying it could have overcharged more than $11 million. County
officials denied the claims at the time, chalking it up to spite
from a disgruntled former employee.

Roberts estimated the total amount may have been as high as $15-17
million in March of this year.

Assistant County Manager Kathryn Downs, the then-county
spokeswoman, said in March that taxpayers would be ones hurt if the
court of appeals overturned the superior court case, and made the
county and Glynn County Schools refund all of the allegedly
overcharged taxes.

"People may get a small refund, but in the long term it's really
going to be detrimental to the county and (Glynn County Schools)."
Downs said in March. "It will affect the level of service we can
provide."

If the county and school system are made to repay the funds, the
majority would have to come from the school board, as it imposes a
higher millage rate than the county. [GN]


GOLDEN 1199: Failed to Pay Wages and Overtime, Gonzalez Says
------------------------------------------------------------
JULIO GONZALEZ, an individual, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, the PLAINTIFF, v. GOLDEN 1199 GATE AMERICA,
LLC, a Florida limited liability company; GOLDEN GATE AMERICA WEST,
LLC, a Florida limited liability company; and DOES 1 thru 50,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. BC719092 (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug.
30, 2018), alleges that the Defendants failed to pay wages and/or
overtime under the California Labor Code.

According to the complaint, from at least four years prior to the
filing of this action and continuing to the present, the Defendants
have had a common policy and practice of failing to pay Proposed
Class Members proper overtime wages. Specifically, Proposed Class
Members were required to work hours without being paid all wages at
the appropriate rate pursuant to the Defendants' time rounding and
auto-deduct policies and practices. These uncompensated hours
caused Proposed Class Members to work in excess of eight hours on a
given day and/or 40 hours on a given week, entitling them to
overtime wages which they were systemically denied.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eric B. Kingsley, Esq.
          Kelsey M. Szamet, Esq.
          KINGSLEY & KINGSLEY, APC
          16133 Ventura Blvd., Suite 1200
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (818) 990 8300
          Facsimile: (818) 990 2903
          E-mail: eric@kingsleykingsley.com
                  kelsey@kingsleykingsley.com

               - and -

          Emil Davtyan, Esq.
          DAVTYAN PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION
          5959 Topanga Canyon Blvd., Suite 130
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (818) 875 2008
          Facsimile: (818) 722 3974
          E-mail: support@davtyanlaw.com


GOLDEN GATE BELL: Collins Sues over Labor Code Violations
---------------------------------------------------------
Ethan Collins, an individual, appearing on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Golden Gate Bell,
LLC and DOES 1-10, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 18CV333797
(Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 30, 2018), seeks to recover wages,
reimbursement and civil penalties as a result of a series of Labor
Code violations committed against the Plaintiff and other employees
by Defendant Golden Gate Bell, LLC.

According to the complaint, the Defendant is a limited liability
company that owns and operates Taco Bell restaurants throughout
California. The Plaintiff was first employed with Defendant as an
hourly assistant General Manager, then as an hourly General Manager
in Training. The Defendant maintains a common policy and practice
regarding meal breaks for all of its non-exempt employees in
California. The Defendant maintains a common policy and practice
regarding rest breaks for all of its non-exempt employees in
California. The Defendant maintains a common policy and practice
regarding expense reimbursement for all of its employees in
California. The Defendant uses a common system to track work hours
for all of their non-exempt employees in California. The Defendant
uses a common system to track payroll for all of their non-exempt
employees in California.

Golden Gate Bell, LLC owns and operates Taco Bell franchisee
restaurants. The company is based in Pleasanton, California.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Allen Graves, Esq.
          Jacqueline Treu, Esq.
          Jenny Yu, Esq.
          THE GRAVES FIRM
          122 N. Baldwin Ave., Main Floor
          Sierra Madre, CA 91024
          Telephone: (626) 240 0575
          Facsimile: (626) 737 7013
          E-mail: allen@gravesfirm.com
                  jacqueline@gravesfirm.com
                  jennyyu@gravesfirm.com


GREEN MOTION: Faces Tommi Wage-and-Hour Suit
--------------------------------------------
RYAM EDWARD TOMMI, an individual, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. GREEN MOTION CALIFORNIA LLC;
and DOES 1 to 50, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. CGC-18-569411
(Cal. Super., Ct., Sept. 4, 2018), alleges that, from at least four
years prior to the filing of this action continuing to the present,
the Defendants have had a consistent policy of failing to pay wages
and/or overtime to all hourly employees for all work perform at the
proper rate of compensation.  The Plaintiff and the Proposed Class
were not properly compensated for overtime at the appropriate rate
of pay because the commission and/or bonus pay that was part of
their compensation was not blended into their regular rate of
pay.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class:

          Darren M. Cohen, Esq.
          KINGSLEY & KINGSLEY, APC
          16133 Ventura Blvd., Suite 1200
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (818) 990 8300
          Facsimile: (818) 990 2903
          E-mail: dcohen@kingsleykingsley.com


H&M HENNES: Court Partly Grants Class Certification Bid in Lao
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, granted in part and
denied in part the Plaintiff's motion for class certification in
the case, SER LAO, as an individual and on behalf of all other
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. H&M HENNES & MAURITZ, L.P.,
Defendant, Case No. 5:16-cv-00333-EJD (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiff initiated the wage and hour putative class action
against the Defendant in Santa Clara Superior Court to challenge
three allegedly company-wide policies and practices, namely, (1)
requiring employees to undergo security checks without compensating
employees for the time spent being inspected or waiting to be
inspected; (2) automatically issuing Money Network ATM cards
("Money Network Paycards") for final wage payments to separated
employees without first obtaining the employees' consent; and (3)
failing to specify the applicable hourly rates and number of hours
worked on wage statements for pay periods during which an employee
worked overtime and earned a bonus and/or non-discretionary
incentive pay.

The Defendant is an international clothing retailer that currently
operates approximately 80 retail and outlet stores throughout
California.  The Plaintiff was hired by Defendant to work as an
hourly, non-exempt employee at the Defendant's retail store located
in Fresno, California.  He worked for the Defendant from on March
3, 2014 until Sept. 23, 2015.  During his employment with the
Defendant, the Plaintiff elected to have his wages paid to him via
direct deposit.

The Plaintiff asserts claims for (1) violation of California Labor
Code section 226(a) for failure to provide accurate wage
statements; (2) violation of California Labor Code sections 558,
1194, 1197 and 1197.1 for failure to pay minimum wages; (3)
violation of California Labor Code sections 558, 1194, 1197 and
1197.1 for failure to pay overtime wages; (4) violation of
California Labor Code section 226.7 for failure to provide proper
rest breaks; (5) violation of California Labor Code sections 201 to
203 for failure to pay earned and unpaid wages at the time of
separation; (6) violation of California Labor Code section 2698, et
seq. ("PAGA"); and (7) violation of California Business and
Professions Code section 17200 et seq. for unfair business
practices.

The Defendant removed the matter to the Court pursuant to the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA").  

Presently before the Court is the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.  

The Plaintiff seeks an order certifying the following classes:

     a. All current and former non-exempt retail store employees
who were employed by Defendants in the State of California at any
time from Dec. 11, 2011, through the present ("The Class");

     b. All former employees who were employed by the Defendants in
the State of California at any time from Dec. 11, 2012, through the
present, who during their employment received their normal payroll
wages through check or direct deposit, but upon their separation of
employment received their terminating wages in the form of a Money
Network ATM Paycard ("Money Network Paycard Class"); and

     c. All current and former non-exempt retail store employees
who received non-discretionary incentive pay and worked overtime in
the same pay period at any time from Dec. 11, 2014, through the
present, such that the employee received an overtime recalculation,
and received a wage statement ("Overtime Recalculation Wage
Statement Class").

The Plaintiff also seeks an order certifying him as the class
representative and appointing his counsel and their respective
firms, Larry W. Lee and Kristen M. Agnew of Diversity Law Group,
P.C., Dennis S. Hyun of Hyun Legal, APC, and William L. Marder of
Polaris Law Group LLP, as the class counsel.

The motion was heard on May 31, 2018 and submitted.  Thereafter,
each party filed a Notice of New Authority addressing the
California Supreme Court's recent opinion in Troester v. Starbucks
Corp., Cal. Case No. S234969, 2018 WL 3582702 (Cal. July 26,
2018).

Judge Davila granted in part the denied in part the Plaintiff's
motion for class certification.  The Plaintiff's motion to certify
The Class is granted with respect to the security check claims to
the extent these claims are predicated upon wait time and security
checks at the end of a shift and at closing.  His motion to certify
The Class with respect to security checks conducted before rest
breaks is denied.  

The Judge granted the Plaintiff's motion to certify the Money
Network Paycard Class.  He certified the Plaintiff as the class
representative for The Class (as limited by the Order) and the
Money Network Paycard Class.  The Plaintiff's counsel of record,
Larry W. Lee and Kristen M. Agnew of the Diversity Law Group, P.C.,
Dennis S. Hyun of Hyun Legal, APC, and William L. Marder of Polaris
Law Group LLP, are appointed as the class counsel.

Finally, the Judge denied the Plaintiff's motion to certify the
Overtime Recalculation Wage Statement Class.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/kkU8Ld from Leagle.com.

Ser Lao, as an individual and on behalf of all other similarly
situated, Plaintiff,  Dennis Sangwon Hyun -- dhyun@hyunlegal.com --
Hyun Legal APC & Larry W. Lee -- lwlee@diversitylaw.com --
Diversity Law Group, P.C..

H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P., a New York limited partnership,
Defendant, represented by Eve L. Torres -- eltorres@manatt.com --
Manatt, Phelps & Andrew Lee Satenberg -- asatenberg@manatt.com --
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP.


HAIN CELESTIAL: Swartz et al. Sue over Sale of Earth's Best Wipes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ERIN LINDQUIST, DAVID SWARTZ, and MARTHA VALENTINE, on behalf of
themselves, the general public and those similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, v. THE HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP, INC., the Defendants, Case
No. CGC-18-569306 (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 30, 2018), seeks
injunction to prohibit sale of Earth's Best Wipes within a
reasonable time after entry of judgment, unless packaging and
marketing is modified to remove the misrepresentation "Earth
Friendly" and to disclose the omitted facts about the true
composition of the wipes.

According to the complaint, such misconduct by Defendants, unless
and until enjoined and restrained by order of this Court, will
continue to cause injury in fact to the general public and the loss
of money and property in that Defendants will continue to violate
the laws of California, unless specifically ordered to comply with
the same. This expectation of future violations will require
current and future consumers to repeatedly and continuously seek
legal redress in order to recover monies paid to Defendants to
which Defendants were not entitled.

Defendants engaged in these unfair practices to increase their
profits. Accordingly, Defendants have engaged in unlawful trade
practices, as defined and prohibited by the California Business and
Professions Code. As a direct and proximate result of such actions,
Plaintiffs and the other members the Class have suffered and
continue to suffer injury in fact and have lost money and/or
property as a result of such deceptive and/or unlawful trade
practices and unfair competition in an amount which will be proven
at trial, but which is in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of
this Court. In particular, Plaintiffs and those similarly situated
paid a price premium for the Earth's Best Wipes, i.e., the
difference between the price consumers paid for the Earth's Best
Wipes and the price that they would have paid but for Defendants'
misrepresentation. This premium can be determined by using
econometric or statistical techniques such as hedonic regression or
conjoint analysis.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Adam J. Gutride, Esq.
          Seth A. Safier, Esq.
          Marie Mccrary, Esq.
          Kristen G. Simplicio, Esq.
          GUTRIDE SAFIER LLP
          100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 271 6469
          Facsimile: (415) 449 6469


HAMILTON LAW: Douglas Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hamilton Law Group,
PC. The case is styled as Jamie J. Douglas individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Hamilton Law
Group, PC, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-05177 (E.D. N.Y., Sept. 13,
2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case for Consumer Credit under the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act.

Hamilton Law Group, PC is a law firm located at Post Office Box
90301, Allentown, PA 18109.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Sanders Law, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: csanders@sanderslawpllc.com


HARDWICK INVESTORS: Menichiello Sues over Unwanted Phone Calls
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH MENICHIELLO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. HARDWICK INVESTORS GROUP,
LLC d/b/a QUICK FI CAPITAL, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and
each of them, the Defendant, Case No. 8:18-cv-01550-JVS-ADS (C.D.
Cal., Aug. 30, 2018), seeks to recover damages and any other
available legal or equitable remedies resulting from the illegal
actions of the Defendant in negligently, knowingly, and/or
willfully contacting the Plaintiff on his cellular telephone in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, and related
regulations, specifically the National Do-Not-Call provisions,
thereby invading the Plaintiff's privacy.

According to the complaint, beginning in or around October 2017,
the Defendant contacted the Plaintiff on his cellular telephone
number ending in -7270, in an attempt to solicit the Plaintiff to
purchase the Defendant's services. The Defendant used an "automatic
telephone dialing system" as defined by 47 U.S.C. section 227(a)(1)
to place its call to the Plaintiff. The Defendant's calls were not
for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. section
227(b)(1)(A). The Defendant did not possess the Plaintiff's "prior
express consent" to receive calls using an automatic telephone
dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice on his
cellular telephone pursuant to 47 U.S.C. section 227(b)(1)(A).
Further, the Plaintiff's cellular telephone number ending in -7270
was added to the National Do-Not-Call Registry on or about February
22, 2007. The Defendant placed multiple calls soliciting its
business to the Plaintiff on his cellular telephone ending in -7270
beginning in or around October 2017, and continuing through July
2018.  Those calls constitute solicitation calls pursuant to 47
C.F.R. section 64.1200(c)(2) as they were attempts to promote or
sell the Defendant's services. The Plaintiff received numerous
solicitation calls from the Defendant within a 12-month
period.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          Tom E. Wheeler, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206 4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633 0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                  twheeler@toddflaw.com


HCL TECHNOLOGIES: Ex-Employee Files Discrimination Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Neha Alawadhi, writing for moneycontrol, reports that an
ex-employee of HCL Technologies in the United States has filed a
class action complaint against the company, alleging that the IT
major favours South Asians, mainly Indians, over Americans.

California-based The Mercury News and the web portal law.com
reported that Texas resident Reese Voll has filed a class action
complaint in the US District Court for the Northern District of
California.

Mr. Voll, who joined HCL Technologies in November 2014, has alleged
in his complaint, a copy of which was provided by law.com, that HCL
promoted and chose H-1B visa holders to work on projects, most of
whom are Indians.                                         

At the time of publishing, HCL Technologies had not responded to a
request for comment from Moneycontrol.

Daniel Low, the attorney for Kotchen & Low who has filed the
complaint, told Moneycontrol in an email response, "The key
allegations are that HCL discriminates against non-South Asians in
hiring, promotions and terminations in four ways."

These include using fraudulent H-1B visa applications to secure
South Asian workers from overseas and giving preference to those
workers ahead of American workers.

"HCL gives substantial preference to South Asian applicants when
hiring for local positions in the US . . . HCL consistently
promotes more South Asian employees than their non-South Asian
counterparts . . . HCL benches and terminates non-South Asians at
disproportionately higher rates. At least 70 percent of HCL's
employees are South Asian, despite South Asians making up about 12
percent of the US IT industry," Mr. Low added.

The complaint notes that HCL submits visa petitions for more
positions than actually exist in the US subsidiary of the company.
"This is to maximize its chances of securing the highest number of
available H-1B visas from the lottery process. In this way, HCL has
been able to secure visas for far more individuals than it actually
has a present need for," the plaintiff Voll has alleged in the
complaint.

Mr. Voll was initially part of HCL's contract with PepsiCo, and was
put on bench or given unassigned project status in July 2016. When
he told his superiors he was told he would be working on other
projects as well, he was asked to contact human resources.

As per HCL's policy, an employee is terminated after being on bench
for 30 days. While some initial conversations to join a few
projects happened, none fructified and Mr. Voll as asked to quit in
August 2016.

Mr. Voll has further claimed that he applied for open job roles
within HCL between 2016 and 2018 several times, but was not hired
for any role in spite of being adequately qualified.

The Indian IT industry has been accused of misusing the H-1B work
visas, the most popular route for IT employees to work in the US.

The industry has consistently denied this claim and all top four IT
companies- Tata Consultancy Services, Infosys, HCL and Wipro- have
spoken about hiring more Americans but the issue remains a thorny
one with President Donald Trump's regime cracking down heavily on
H-1B misuse by making the process more stringent and also
increasing the number of checks.

Mr. Low said he has been involved in similar litigation against
Infosys, TCS and US-based Cognizant.

Last year, a former employee of Infosys, Erin Green had filed a
Green had filed a lawsuit alleging that Infosys favoured employees
who are of South Asian, especially Indian descent.

Similarly, a federal judge in Oakland, California expanded  a 2015
case into a class action against TCS, on behalf of American workers
who lost their jobs at TCS offices in the US because they hadn't
been assigned to any of its clients.

HCL Technologies has for long held that it does not depend on H-1B
visas as much as before.

The complaint says that HCL employees 12,000 people in the US, but
received 10,432 new H-1B visas between 2015 and 2017.

Mr. Voll has also alleged that HCL Technologies promotes South
Asians (Indians) and terminates non-South Asians
disproportionately. [GN]


HEALTHRIGHT 360: Failed to Pay Minimum & Overtime, Egardo Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
TOMI DANTAN EGARDO, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. HEALTHRIGHT 360, a California
corporation; and DOES I through 10, inclusive, the Defendants, Case
No. BC719094 (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 30, 2018), alleges that
Defendants failed to pay minimum and straight time wages and
overtime compensation under the California Labor Code.

According to the complaint, due to the Defendants' time rounding,
Plaintiff and the Class are frequently paid for less than all their
work time. The Defendants also required Plaintiff and the Class to
work "off-the-clock", uncompensated, by, for example, requiring
Plaintiff and the Class to clock out and continue to work,
averaging between 5-30 minutes every other day. Some of this unpaid
work should have been paid at the overtime rate.  The Defendants
also failed to maintain accurate records of the hours Plaintiff and
the Class worked.

The Defendants provide integrated care including primary medical,
mental health, and substance use disorder treatment and re-entry
services.[BN]

Attorneys for Tomi Dantan Egardo:

          Kane Moon, Esq.
          Justin F. Marquez, Esq.
          Allen Feghali, Esq.
          MOON & YANG, APC
          J055 W. Seventh St., Suite 1880
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 232 3128
          Facsimile: (213) 232 3125
          E-mail: kane.moon@moonyanglaw.com
                  justin.marquez@moonyanglaw.com
                  allen.feghali@moonyanglaw.com


HERBALIFE: Disgruntled Distributors File New Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
Douglas W. House, writing for Seeking Alpha, reports that a new
class action lawsuit has been filed in a south Florida district
court by former Herbalife distributors that has the potential to
involve as much as $1B in damages. The plaintiffs accuse the
company of misrepresenting the amount of potential income they
would earn by signing on and hosting events.

Herbalife attorneys counter that the plaintiffs have been unable to
specify exactly how they were misled and are seeking a dismissal of
the suit or a transfer to a California court. The also assert that
many of the claims in the Florida case are covered by the 2015
settlement with distributors, although the ones involved there
either could not sell the products without a loss or wanted to
return them beyond the one-year return policy. [GN]


HOLLYWOOD FIREFIGHTERS: Trustees Sued over Loan Repayment Scheme
----------------------------------------------------------------
THOMAS DINGES and JOHN KELLERMAN, both individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Board of
Trustees of City of Hollywood Firefighters' Pension System, the
Defendant, Case No. CACE-18-021027 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., Sept. 5,
2018), alleges that members of the City of Hollywood Firefighter's
Pension System have been wronged by the very Board of Trustees that
is supposed to look out for their best interests.

According to the complete, the Board offered members the
opportunity to borrow from their retirement account and repay the
loan via their monthly pension checks. Many members did so -- and
repaid their loans in full many years ago. But now, the Board
claims it erred because the members were not allowed to repay their
loans with their monthly pension checks. The Board now wants to
pretend that no payments ever were made on the loans, and has
declared them to be in default- such that the entire amount remains
due and owing (plus substantial re-amortized interest). The Board's
wrongful actions have triggered massive tax penalties and other
damages.

The Pension System is a local law plan established and governed
pursuant to Chapter 175 of the Florida Statutes and City of
Hollywood Ordinance sections 33.034 through 33.064. Members of the
Pension System are entitled to participate in a Deferred Retirement
Option Plan ("DROP") -- essentially a retirement benefit.

In or about 1989, the Board extended an offer to members of the
Pension System whereby they could borrow moneys from their DROP
accounts. In or about 2003, the Board extended an offer to members
of the Pension System whereby they could not only borrow moneys
from their DROP accounts, but also repay the loan via the monthly
contribution made to their DROP account.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Jared A. Levy, Esq.
          David A. Rothstein, Esq.
          Lorenz M. Pruss, Esq.
          DIMOND KAPLAN & ROTHSTEIN, P.A.
          Northbridge Center
          515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite P-300
          West Palm Beach, FL 33401
          Telephone: (561) 671 1920
          Facsimile: (561) 370 7401
          E-mail: lpruss@dlqpa.com
                  mvan@dlqpa.com
                  mari@dlqpa.com
                  jlevey@dkrpa.com
                  drothstein@dkrpa.com


HOUSTON, TX: Tex. App. Declares Drainage Fee Ordinance Invalid
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Texas, First District, Houston, affirmed in
part and reversed in part the Trial Court's judgment granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned ELIZABETH C.
PEREZ, Appellant, v. SYLVESTER TURNER, MAYOR, KARUN SREERAMA,
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AND ENGINEERING, AND THE CITY OF HOUSTON,
Appellees. No. 01-16-00985-CV. (Tex. App.).

Appellant, Elizabeth C. Perez, appeals the trial court's order
granting the plea to the jurisdiction filed by Appellees, Mayor
Sylvester Turner, the Director of Public Works and Engineering
Karun Sreerama, and the City of Houston and dismissing all of
Perez's claims.

Perez seeks a judgment declaring the drainage fee ordinance
invalid; an injunction against the assessment, collection, and
expenditure of taxes and fees pursuant to the ordinance; and
reimbursement, on behalf of herself and all other similarly
situated persons or entities, of taxes and fees assessed and
collected pursuant to the ordinance and paid under duress.

The trial court dismissed Perez's lawsuit for want of
subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court found that Perez's
purported constitutional claims were not ripe for adjudication,
that Perez had no standing to challenge the validity, legality,
and/or constitutionality of the assessment and/or collection of
City of Houston drainage fees, the November 2010 Pay-As-You-Go
charter amendment [Proposition I], and/or the April 2011 Drainage
Fee Ordinance because she has suffered no particularized injury as
a matter of law, that she had no standing to seek money damages
and/or a refund as a taxpayer as a matter of law, and that
governmental immunity also barred her refund claim.

Standard of Review of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Both ripeness and standing are components of subject-matter
jurisdiction.  The ripeness doctrine prohibits suits involving
uncertain or contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. An issue is ripe for
decision when at the time a lawsuit is filed the facts are
sufficiently developed so that an injury has occurred or is likely
to occur, rather than being contingent or remote.

Impact of Dacus on Perez's Claims in this Suit

As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses the portions of
Perez's pleadings and complaints on appeal in which she asserts
complaints related to the Charter Amendment, including her claim
that the Drainage Fee Ordinance has already been determined to be
invalid because of the litigation surrounding the Charter
Amendment.

In Dacus II, the Texas Supreme Court declared that Proposition I,
providing for the creation of the Pay-As-You-Go Fund (the DDSR
Fund) was not submitted to the voters in November 2010 with such
definiteness and certainty that voters would not be misled. On
remand for further proceedings, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, in
Dacus III, affirmed the judgment of the trial court holding that
the election on Proposition I, amending the City charter to provide
for the DDSR Fund, was void, and it ordered the City to hold a new
election on the measure. The supreme court denied the City's
petition for review of the Fourteenth Court of Appeals' decision in
Dacus III, finally resolving the controversy regarding the validity
of the Charter Amendment.

In this suit, Perez challenges the legality of the DDSR Fund
established in December 2011 pursuant to Proposition I. Perez filed
this suit after the supreme court held, in Dacus II, that the
language of Proposition I was too uncertain to enable voters to
make an informed choice on the Proposition, but before the
Fourteenth Court of Appeals held, in Dacus III, that the election
was void and ordered a new one. Because of the Fourteenth Court of
Appeals' decision in Dacus III,which became final after Perez filed
this suit and while this appeal was pending, issues relating to the
Charter Amendment have been resolved by the judgment declaring the
Charter Amendment void and ordering a new election on the measure.
Any further complaints regarding the Charter Amendment are moot.

Perez's Standing

In her first issue on appeal, Perez argues that she has standing to
assert a legal claim for reimbursement of all drainage charges made
under the Drainage Fee Ordinance because, as a municipal taxpayer
who paid, and continues to pay under duress, an illegal drainage
tax assessed by the City, she can demonstrate both that she has
suffered a particularized injury and that she has standing to sue
as a taxpayer.

Perez failed to demonstrate a particularized injury

Perez argues that she owned two separate real properties which were
assessed on a monthly basis for drainage charges. As evidence,
Perez provided her water bills with a line item for drainage
charges and also including assessment of additional late payment
fees. Perez argues that these payments demonstrate a particularized
injury, thereby giving her standing to seek reimbursement of the
paid drainage fees. She argues in her appellate brief. Indeed, no
one but Perez was charged with this illegal drainage fee for these
two specific pieces of real estate, and no one was forced to pay an
illegal fee under duress for these two specific parcels of land
except for Perez.

To establish that she suffered a particularized injury that
conferred standing upon her, Perez had to demonstrate she suffered
a particularized injury distinct from that suffered by the general
public by the drainage fees collected pursuant to the Drainage Fee
Ordinance. Perez argues that she suffered a unique injury distinct
from that suffered by the general public because she is the only
person who was required to pay the drainage fees associated with
her unique pieces of property. However, this is insufficient to
demonstrate a unique injury. The municipal fees were assessed to
property owners across the City. The payment of municipal fees,
like the drainage fees assessed against Perez's properties here and
numerous other properties in the City, does not constitute a
particularized injury sufficient to confer standing to sue for
recovery of the fees.  

The Court overrules this part of Perez's first issue.

Perez's standing as a taxpayer

Perez also argues that she has demonstrated her standing as a
taxpayer.

There is a long-established exception to the general rule that a
particularized injury is required for taxpayer standing: a taxpayer
has standing to sue in equity to enjoin the illegal expenditure of
public funds, even without showing a distinct injury. However,
under this exception, a taxpayer may maintain an action solely to
challenge proposed illegal expenditures; a taxpayer may not sue to
recover funds previously expended.

The City also argues that Perez has failed to prove that the City
is actually expending money illegally. Again, the City cites
Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 179, which stated, to be entitled to
municipal taxpayer standing, a litigant must prove that the
government is actually expending money on the activity that the
taxpayer challenges; merely demonstrating that tax dollars are
spent on something related to the allegedly illegal conduct is not
enough. Perez's live petition alleged, in part, that the City was
illegally assessing, collecting, and expending funds for drainage
and street improvements pursuant to the allegedly void Ordinance.
The jurisdictional evidence indicates that the City passed the
complained-of Ordinance and that it has implemented it. This is
sufficient to demonstrate for jurisdictional purposes that the City
is actually assessing and expending money based on the
complained-of Ordinance.  

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Perez has established
taxpayer standing here.  

The Court sustains Perez's first issue in part.

The City's and the Ultra Vires Defendants' Immunity to Perez's
Suit

In her second issue, Perez argues that she properly asserted
ultra-vires claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. And, in
her third issue, Perez asserts that the City's immunity was waived
by the statutory requirement that the City be joined as a necessary
party to her claims asserting the unconstitutionality and/or
illegality of specific city ordinances. The Court addresses these
issues together.

The Legislature has mandated that municipalities be made parties to
declaratory judgment actions that challenge the validity of
municipal ordinances. For claims challenging the validity of
ordinances or statutes the Declaratory Judgment Act requires that
the relevant governmental entities be made parties, and thereby
waives immunity. Generally, however, suits against state officers
in the exercise of their discretion are barred by governmental
immunity. Nevertheless, when a state officer acts beyond his
legally granted discretion, i.e., without legal authority, his acts
are not protected. Thus, suits to require state officials to comply
with statutory or constitutional provisions are not prohibited by
sovereign immunity.

Here, Perez contends that the Drainage Fee Ordinance, creating a
drainage utility and allowing that utility to assess and collect
drainage fees pursuant the City's home-rule authority and the
provisions of Local Government Code Chapter 552, is illegal because
it was created pursuant to a void charter amendment. And she seeks
to enjoin the collection of fees pursuant to that Ordinance and to
recover damages for herself and all other persons and entities
similarly situated in the form of reimbursement of all fees
collected by the City pursuant to the Drainage Fee Ordinance.

The Court hold, first, that Perez has standing to sue the City and
the ultra vires defendants to determine the legality of the
Drainage Fee Ordinance and so to determine whether the City
officers charged with assessing and collecting taxes and spending
public monies as authorized by the Ordinance are acting without
legal authority, and thus ultra vires, in assessing and collecting
fees and spending public money under the Ordinance and whether
those activities may therefore be enjoined. Just as she has
standing to seek to enjoin future expenditures, Perez has standing
to sue the individual defendants charged with carrying out the
provisions of the allegedly illegal Ordinance. This is so because
the individual defendants do not have governmental immunity for
their future acts to enforce the Ordinance to the extent it is
determined to be invalid in their official capacities. However
Perez may maintain this taxpayer action solely to seek to enjoin
proposed future illegal expenditures as measured from the date of
any injunction she might obtain, not to recover funds previously
expended.  

Accordingly, the Court sustain Perez's second and third issues
insofar as they assert her standing to seek a declaration that the
Drainage Fee Ordinance is illegal, and, therefore, that the
continued assessment, collection, and expenditure of fees under the
Drainage Fee Ordinance is illegal. And the Court sustain those
issues insofar as she alleges that the individual ultra vires
defendants do not have governmental immunity to her suit for an
injunction against the prospective assessment, collection, and
expenditure of taxes in the event the Ordinance is declared invalid
and only from the date an injunction issues. The Court otherwise
overrule Perez's second and third issues.

Ripeness of Constitutional Claims

In her fourth issue, Perez challenges the trial court's
determination that her constitutional claims are not ripe.

The Court concludes, on the basis of the foregoing facts and
authorities, that the issues whether the Drainage Fee Ordinance is
illegal and, hence, whether the assessment and collection of fees
under the Ordinance is illegal and should be enjoined are ripe. The
City has relied on its authority pursuant to the Texas
Constitution's home-rule authority provision and Local Government
Code Chapter 552 to collect the fees pursuant to the Drainage Fee
Ordinance and has collected and expended fees on the basis, and
Perez has claimed that she has been injured by the City's
collection of fees pursuant to that Ordinance. Thus, the issues are
sufficiently developed so that Perez's claim seeking a declaration
that the Ordinance is invalid and an injunction against the City's
future collection or expenditure of funds pursuant to that
Ordinance is ripe for adjudication.

Accordingly, the Court sustains Perez's fourth issue contending
that the controversy between herself and the City is ripe for
decision.

The Court affirms the trial court's dismissal of Perez's claim for
reimbursement of drainage and street improvement fees for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court further affirms the
dismissal her claims against the City on grounds of governmental
immunity insofar as the claims seek an injunction against the
assessment, collection, and expenditure of taxes pursuant to the
Drainage Fee Ordinance prior to any determination that the
Ordinance is in fact invalid. The Court reverses the dismissal as
it relates to Perez's claim that the Drainage Fee Ordinance is
invalid and her claim seeking to enjoin any future collection or
expenditure of fees pursuant to that Ordinance, and the Court
remands for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A full-text copy of the Tex. App.'s August 30, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y943rawm from Leagle.com.

Collyn A. Peddie, Patricia L. Casey, for Sylvester Turner, Mayor,
Karun Sreerama, Director of Public Works and Engineering and The
City of Houston, Appellee.

Andy Taylor, for Elizabeth C. Perez, Appellant.


I PLAY: Bid to Dismiss Spearman Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------
In the case, DUSTY SPEARMAN, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. I PLAY, INC., Defendant, Case No.
2:17-cv-01563-TLN-KJN (E.D. Cal.), Judge Troy L. Nunley of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California (i) denied
without prejudice the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and (ii)
granted the Plaintiff's Jurisdictional Discovery request.

The case is a class action on behalf of the Purchasers of Green
Sprouts baby teethers in the United States.  The Defendant
manufactures the teethers and represents on the product packaging
that the teethers are "BPA free."  However, the Plaintiff alleges
laboratory testing has shown that the teethers contain BPA.  He
alleges that the Defendant exploited consumer demand for products
labeled "BPA free" by falsely marketing, labeling, and selling its
teethers as "BPA free" at a price premium.  He further alleges that
the Defendant's teethers have been falsely labeled as "BPA free" at
all times during the last four years.  The Plaintiff seeks to
represent a class defined as all persons in the United States who
purchased Green Sprouts baby teethers over the last four years.

The Plaintiff alleges the Court has subject matter jurisdiction
over the proposed class action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1332(d), which, under the provisions of the Class Action Fairness
Act ("CAFA"), explicitly provides for the original jurisdiction of
the federal courts in any class action with at least 100 members in
the proposed plaintiff class, any member of the plaintiff class is
a citizen of a State different from any defendant, and the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum of $5 million, exclusive of interest
and costs.  He alleges that the total claims of individual members
of the proposed Class are well in excess of $5 million in the
aggregate, exclusive of interest and costs.

The Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on three grounds: (1) the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the amount in
controversy is less than $5 million; (2) the Complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted; and (3) that the
Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the non-resident putative
class members.  The Plaintiff opposes the motion and requests
Jurisdictional Discovery.

Because the Plaintiff has failed to specify the proper calculation
of damages, or properly allege that the amount in controversy is in
excess of $5 million, Judge Nunley finds that the Plaintiff has not
made a prima facie showing of subject matter jurisdiction.  Because
the Plaintiff has specifically asked for the price premium in her
discovery requests, and the material facts of whether the minimum
amount in controversy is met are controverted and largely in the
sole possession of the Defendant, he believes that some limited
jurisdictional discovery is appropriate in the case.  To continue
the action, he says the Plaintiff must demonstrate that the price
premium attributed to the use of the "BPA free" label for total
sales of allegedly fraudulently labeled teethers over the class
period is in excess of $5 million.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Nunley denied without prejudice
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, subject to limited
jurisdictional discovery.  He incorporated by reference the list of
jurisdictional discovery requests in the Plaintiff's Opposition to
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and limited discovery to those
documents requested.  The Plaintiff is afforded 60 days from the
date of this Order to conduct jurisdictional discovery.

The Plaintiffs will file a supplemental opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss discussing only the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
and the amount in controversy within 14 days of the close of
jurisdictional discovery.  The Defendants may then file a
supplemental reply within seven days of the Plaintiff's
opposition.

The Judge will afford the Defendant an opportunity to refile a
Motion to Dismiss at a later date should the Court determines it
has subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/zKEoSN from Leagle.com.

Dusty Spearman, Plaintiff, represented by Lawrence Timothy Fisher
-- ltfisher@bursor.com -- Bursor and Fisher, PA, Michael Thomas
Fraser -- mfraser@thefraserlawfirm.net -- The Fraser Law Firm,
P.C., Thomas Andrew Reyda -- treyda@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher,
P.A. & Joel Dashiell Smith -- jsmith@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher,
P.A.

iPlay, Inc., Defendant, represented by Trenton H. Norris --
trent.norris@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP &
George F. Langendorf -- george.langendorf@arnoldporter.com --
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, LLP.


I'ON CO: S.C. App. Reverses in Part Rulings in Walbeck ILSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Brad J. Walbeck and Lea Ann Adkins, individually and
derivatively on behalf of The I'On Assembly, Inc., and I'On
Assembly, Inc., Respondents, v. The I'On Company, LLC, The I'On
Club, LLC, The I'On Group, LLC f/k/a Civitas, LLC; and I'On Realty,
LLC, Appellants, Opinion No. 5588 (S.C. App.), Judge John D.
Geathers of the Court of Appeals of South Carolina affirmed in part
and reversed in part the circuit court's orders (1) denying the
Defendants' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
("JNOV") or new trial absolute and new trial nisi remittitur, (2)
declaring a recreational easement invalid, (3) denying their motion
for attorney's fees against Respondent Lea Ann Adkins, and (4)
granting attorney's fees to Respondent Brad J. Walbeck.

At the heart of the convoluted case is a developer's promise to
convey certain recreational facilities in a residential community
to a homeowner's association.  Specifically, the Respondents allege
that the Appellants promised they would convey the Community Dock
and Creekside Park located on lot CV-6 in I'On Village to
Respondent I'On Assembly, Inc., the HOA, but instead sold these
facilities to a third party.  The Appellants, however, allege they
promised to convey a "generic" community dock and creekside park to
the HOA but not the specific ones located on lot CV-6.  The
Appellants also allege they conveyed the recreational facilities as
promised.

On June 16, 2014, the Respondents filed their Fourth Amended
Complaint reflecting the HOA's realignment as a Plaintiff, Russo's
dismissal from the action, and elimination of the claims for
Tortious Interference and Aiding and Abetting.  Exactly one year
later, the circuit court issued an order declaring the Recreational
Easement invalid and void ab initio because the I'On Club lacked
title to lot CV-6 at the time it executed the easement.  The
circuit court also concluded the easement was not perpetual but was
limited to a term of 30 years.

The parties re-tried the case from July 28 through Aug. 1, 2014.
The jury returned verdicts for Walbeck on his claims for violation
of ILSA ($1), Negligent Misrepresentation ($20,000), and Breach of
Contract ($10,000) and for the HOA on its claims for Breach of
Contract ($1 million), Breach of Fiduciary Duty ($1.75 million),
and Negligent Misrepresentation ($1 million).  The HOA elected to
recover on its Breach of Fiduciary Duty claim, and Walbeck elected
to recover on his Negligent Misrepresentation claim.

The circuit court denied the Appellants' motion for a JNOV or new
trial absolute and new trial nisi remittitur.  It also denied the
Appellants' motion for an award of attorney's fees against Adkins
and awarded attorney's fees to Walbeck pursuant to ILSA.  The
appeal followed.

In this action alleging violation of the Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act ("ILSA"), the Appellants seek review of the circuit
court's orders.  They argue (1) Walbeck and Adkins could not pursue
the action as a derivative action; (2) the Respondents' claims are
barred by the statute of limitations; (3) the disputed recreational
easement was valid and perpetual; (4) there was no fiduciary duty
to convey certain common areas to the homeowners association,
Respondent I'On Assembly, Inc.; (5) the directed verdict on
Appellants' abuse of process counterclaim was improper because I'On
presented ample evidence of an ulterior purpose and a willful act
in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the
proceedings; (6) I'On was entitled to attorney's fees as the
prevailing party on Adkins' breach of contract claim; (7) the
attorney's fees award to Walbeck was unreasonable because he was
awarded merely nominal damages on his ILSA claim; (8) the circuit
court's ruling that Appellants were amalgamated was improper; and
(9) Walbeck failed to show he relied on any representation made by
I'On and, therefore, he failed to establish a claim under ILSA.

Judge Geathers reversed the denial of the Appellants' JNOV motion
as to the negligent misrepresentation and ILSA claims because they
are barred by the statute of limitations, but affirmed the denial
of Appellants' JNOV motion as to all other grounds.  He also
affirmed the order declaring the Recreational Easement invalid and
the order denying the Appellants' request for attorney's fees
against Adkins.  Finally, he reversed the award of attorney's fees
to Walbeck.

Among other thigs, the Judge finds that like the negligent
misrepresentation claim, the question as to the ILSA claim is when
Walbeck knew or should have known of the falsity of the
representations in the 1998 Property Report.  The only reasonable
inference from the evidence is that Walbeck should have known of
the falsity of these representations by early November 2004.
Therefore, the circuit court erred in submitting this question to
the jury.  Accordingly, he reversed the corresponding denial of the
Appellants' JNOV motion as to this claim.

He also finds that even if the Appellants had challenged the
conclusion that the Recreational Easement was not an arms-length
transaction, he agrees with the circuit court.  The evidence shows
that the same individual, Joe Barnes, the I'On Co.'s general
manager, signed the Recreational Easement on behalf of all three
parties to the transaction, the I'On Co., the I'On Club, and the
HOA.  Therefore, he may affirm on this basis as well.  As he
affirms the circuit court's declaration of invalidity, he needs not
address the Appellants' challenge to the finding that the
Recreational Easement was limited to a term of 30 years.

Finally, he finds that the Appellants' petition for attorney's fees
does not indicate that the addition of Adkins as a plaintiff
required any significant increase in the efforts of counsel to
defend the case.  While the petition requests one-half of the total
fees and expenses incurred from the date of the Second Amended
Complaint's filing through the end of trial, it does not state that
Adkins' presence in the case actually generated a corresponding
amount of time or money expended.  Moreover, the counsel's
attorney's fee affidavit is not in the record.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/Hd9Vbd from Leagle.com.

Brian C. Duffy -- bduffy@duffyandyoung.com -- Seth W. Whitaker ,
and Julie L. Moore, all of Duffy & Young, LLC, of Charleston, for
Appellants.

Justin O'Toole Lucey -- jlucey@lucey-law.com -- and Joshua F. Evans
-- jevans@lucey-law.com -- both of Justin O'Toole Lucey, P.A., of
Mount Pleasant, for Respondents.

Timothy W. Bouch and Yancey Alford McLeod, III, both of Leath Bouch
& Seekings of Charleston, for Respondent I'On Assembly, Inc.


IKEA: Beer Files Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against IKEA North America
Services, LLC. The case is styled as Bennett Beer on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. IKEA North
America Services, LLC, doing business as: IKEA, Defendants, Case
No. 2:18-cv-03961-RK (E.D. Pa., Sept. 13, 2018).

The cause of action is stated as Diversity-Other Contract.

IKEA North America Services, LLC operates a chain of home
furnishing retail stores in North America. It provides functional
home furnishing products. The Company offers sofas, side tables,
wardrobes, sink cabinets, bar tables, and bedroom textiles. Ikea
North America Services serves customers worldwide.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Richard M. Golomb, Esq.
     GOLOMB & HONIK
     1835 Market Street, Suite 2900
     Philadelphia, PA 19103
     Phone: (215) 985-9177
     Fax: (215) 985-4169
     Email: rgolomb@golombhonik.com


JACK PARKER: Fischler Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Jack Parker
Corporation. The case is styled as Brian Fischler individually and
on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. The
Jack Parker Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-08324 (S.D.
N.Y., Sept. 13, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990.

The Jack Parker Corporation, founded in 1955, is a family owned
company. To date the company has designed, built, and continues to
manage more than 15,000 residences with high-rise luxury rentals,
condominiums, and single family homes located throughout the
Northeast and Florida.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
     Lipsky Lowe LLP
     630 Third Avenue Fifth Floor
     New York, NY 10017
     Phone: (212) 392-4772
     Fax: (212) 444-1030
     Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


JACKSON NATIONAL: Summary Judgment Bid in Cruson Partly Granted
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Amos L. Mazzant of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas, Sherman Division, granted in part and denied in
part Jackson's motion for summary judgment in the case, DAVID
CRUSON and JOHN DENMAN, v. JACKSON NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Civil Action No. 4:16-CV-00912 (E.D. Tex.).

The Named Plaintiffs bring the proposed nationwide class action on
behalf of themselves and others who purchased variable annuity
contracts from Jackson.  In so doing, they aim to wrest and remedy
harm resulting from Jackson's systemic contractual
misrepresentation and breach when assessing certain fees --
surrender charges -- on those products.

Jackson nationally markets variable annuities through a network of
individual sales agents, marketing organizations, third-party
marketing organizations, brokerage firms, and financial
institutions. Jackson sells variable annuities through four
distribution channels -- independent broker/dealers, regional
broker/dealers, financial institutions, and individual sales
agents.  To support its affiliated agents, Jackson prepares,
approves, and disseminates account service forms, brochures,
marketing, and sales materials.  Affiliated agents use these
materials to market and sell annuities to customers, many of whom
are senior citizens.  Jackson primarily markets variable annuities
to older customers and senior citizens in the Eastern District of
Texas and nationwide.  When marketing its annuities, Jackson touts
their guaranteed safety of principal, lifetime income streams, and
opportunities for market growth.

A deferred annuity can either be fixed or variable.  Fixed
annuities appreciate at a guaranteed fixed interest rate.  The
issuer of a fixed annuity pays the purchaser a guaranteed interest
rate -- similar to a debt instrument.  Variable annuities, on the
other hand, invest in equity portfolios and do not appreciate at a
guaranteed fixed rate.  As equity markets shift in value, so does
the return on the annuity.

Fees significantly shape variable annuity performance. One fee --
the surrender charge -- generates substantial revenue for issuers
like Jackson.  Such surrender charges include withdrawal charges
and recapture charges.  From 2009 to 2013, Jackson published the
following surrender charges -- 2009: $25,432,934; 2010:
$31,960,116; 2011: $37,748,144; 2012: $40,792,400; 2013:
$52,189,880.  In 2014, Jackson stopped publicly reporting surrender
charges.  Given this burgeoning trend of annual surrender charges,
however, the Plaintiffs presume that Jackson earned over $50
million in surrender charges in 2014 and 2015.

The Plaintiffs claim that Jackson assesses surrender charges on
withdrawals from annuities and again on the surrender charges
themselves.  In doing so, they aver that Jackson breaches the plain
language of its contract and contravenes Securities and Exchange
Commission annuity consumer protection guidelines.  The Plaintiffs
aim to stop this practice and compensate current and former
contract holders who paid excess surrender charges.

On Jan. 19, 2018, Jackson filed its motion for summary judgment.
On June 5, 2018, the Court held a hearing on Jackson's motion.

Judge Mazzant granted in part Jackson's Motion for Summary
Judgment.  He denied with regard to the Plaintiffs' breach of
contract claim, and granted with regard to the Plaintiffs' breach
of fiduciary duty claim.

The Plaintiffs concede that the economic loss rule likely
forecloses their ability to recover damages for their breach of
fiduciary duty claim because the damages they seek to recover for
the class are the same damages they seek for breach of contract.
The Judge agrees and summary judgment is granted as to the
Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim.

The Judge finds that the Entire Contract provision describes the
documents that make up the entire contract and it is clear that the
parties did not intend for the prospectus to become part of the
contract.  Accordingly, he finds that the contracts are fully
integrated and self-serving parol evidence cannot be used to vary
or contradict the terms of the subject policies.

However, the Judge finds that Jackson has failed to prove as a
matter of law that it properly calculates and applies the surrender
charges pursuant to the unambiguous language of the contracts.
Thus, Jackson has failed to prove as a matter of law that it is not
in breach of the contracts and summary judgment is therefore
denied.

Finally, while a contract dispute commonly involves a 'disputed
truth' about the proper interpretation of the terms of a contract,
that does not mean one party omitted a material fact by failing to
anticipate, discover and disabuse the other of its contrary
interpretation of a term in the contract.  As such, he finds that
the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is not barred by the
SLUSA.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/kXRBHp from Leagle.com.

David Cruson, Dale Morris, Ronald L. Wyatt & Janice Morris,
Plaintiffs, represented by Gary Dean Corley, Corley Law Firm,
Rudolph Fink, IV -- rfink@mckoolsmith.com -- McKool Smith PC,
Samuel Franklin Baxter -- sbaxter@mckoolsmith.com -- McKool Smith &
Lewis T. LeClair -- lleclair@mckoolsmith.com -- McKool Smith PC.

John Denman, Plaintiff, represented by Lewis T. LeClair, McKool
Smith PC.

Jackson National Life Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by
David Jack Levy -- david.levy@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis &
Bockius, LLP, Adam Auchter Allgood -- adam.allgood@morganlewis.com
-- Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Jason Faris Muriby, Morgan Lewis &
Bockius, LLP, Scott T. Schutte -- scott.schutte@morganlewis.com --
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP & Thomas R. Davis --
thomas.davis@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP.


JMR RESTAURANT: Castillo Seeks Overtime Wages for Sous Chef
-----------------------------------------------------------
JESUS ABEL ULLOA CASTILLO, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. JMR RESTAURANT CORP. (D/B/A
RORY DOLAN'S RESTAURANT & BAR), RORY DOLAN, MARY FE, RUAIRI P
DOLAN, MICHAEL BRENNAN, and JOSEPH CARTY, the Defendants, Case No.
7:18-cv-07948 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 30, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid
overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and
the New York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was employed as a sous
chef at the restaurant located at 890 McLean Avenue, Yonkers, NY
10704. The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants in excess of 40
hours per week, without appropriate overtime and spread of hours
compensation for the hours that he worked. Rather, the Defendants
failed to maintain accurate recordkeeping of the hours worked and
failed to pay Plaintiff Ulloa appropriately for any hours worked
over 40 at the additional overtime premium. Further, the Defendants
failed to pay Plaintiff Ulloa the required "spread of hours" pay
for any day in which he had to work over 10 hours a day.
Furthermore, the Defendants repeatedly failed to pay Plaintiff
Ulloa wages on a timely basis.  The Defendants' conduct extended
beyond Plaintiff to all other similarly situated employees. The
Defendants maintained a policy and practice of requiring Plaintiff
Ulloa and other employees to work in excess of 40 hours per week
without providing the overtime compensation required by federal and
state law and regulations.

JMR Development Group, Corp. owns and operates hotels and
casinos.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317 1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317 1620
          E-mail: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com


JUNO THERAPEUTICS: Securities Suit Settlement Has Prelim Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re JUNO THERAPEUTICS, INC., Case No. C16-1069-RSM
(W.D. Wash.), Judge Ricardo S. Martinez of the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Washington, Seattle, granted the
parties' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement.

The parties entered into a Stipulation of Settlement dated July 31,
2018, which, together with the Exhibits thereto, sets forth the
terms and conditions for the Settlement of the claims alleged in
the Action.  

The Judge, having read and considered the Stipulation and the
accompanying documents, including the Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Action Settlement, preliminarily finds that the
Settlement is sufficiently fair, reasonable, and adequate to
warrant providing notice of the Settlement to the Class.

He reaffirmed the Class of all persons or entities who purchased or
acquired shares of Juno's common stock between June 4, 2016 and
Nov. 22, 2016, both dates inclusive, and who were damaged thereby.


The Final Approval Hearing is scheduled to be held before on Nov.
16, 2018, at 11:00 a.m.

The Judge approved the form, substance and requirements of the
Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class Action, Motion for
Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, and Final Approval Hearing, the
Summary Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class Action, and the
Proof of Claim and Release Form.

He appointed A.B. Data, Ltd. as the Settlement Administrator.  The
Settlement Administrator will cause the Notice and the Proof of
Claim within 14 calendar days of the entry of the Order, to all
Class Members who can be identified with reasonable effort.  Within
five calendar days of the Order, Juno, at its expense, will
promptly make, or cause to be made, the last known addresses of
Class Members, or other identifying information, as set forth in
the books and records regularly maintained by the Company or its
transfer agent, available to the Settlement Administrator for the
purpose of identifying and giving notice to the Class.  The
Settlement Administrator will cause the Summary Notice to be
published in a national business internet newswire within 10
calendar days after the mailing of the Notice.

The Class Counsel shall, at least 14 calendar days before the Final
Approval Hearing, file with the Court and serve on the settling
Parties proof of mailing of the Notice and Proof of Claim and proof
of publication of the Summary Notice.

In order to be entitled to participate in the Net Settlement Fund,
in the event the Settlement is consummated in accordance with its
terms set forth in the Stipulation, each Class Member will take the
following actions and be subject to the following conditions:

     (a) Each Person claiming to be an Authorized Claimant will be
required to submit to the Settlement Administrator no later than 10
calendar days prior to the Final Approval Hearing a completed Proof
of Claim signed under penalty of perjury.

     (b) Except as otherwise ordered by the Court, all the Class
Members who fail to timely submit a Proof of Claim within such
period, or such other period as may be ordered by the Court, or
otherwise allowed, will be forever barred from receiving any
payments pursuant to the Stipulation and the Settlement set forth
therein, but will in all other respects be subject to and bound by
the provisions of the Stipulation, the releases contained therein,
and the Judgment.

     (c) As part of the Proof of Claim, each Class Member will
submit to the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the claim
submitted, and will (subject to effectuation of the Settlement)
release all Released Claims as provided in the Stipulation.

A Class Member wishing to make exclusion request shall, no later
than 14 calendar days prior to the date scheduled for the Final
Approval Hearing.

Judg Martinez will consider objections to the Settlement, the
proposed Plan of Allocation, and/or the award of attorneys' fees
and expenses.  To the extent any person wants to object, such
objections and any supporting papers, accompanied by proof of Class
membership (i.e., confirmations of all purchases and sales during
the Class Period), will be filed no later than 14 calendar days
prior to the date scheduled for the Final Approval Hearing.

If an objector hires an attorney to represent him, her or it for
the purposes of making an objection, the attorney must both effect
service of a notice of appearance on the counsel listed and file it
with the Court by no later than 14 calendar days prior to the Final
Approval Hearing.

All papers in support of the Settlement, the proposed Plan of
Allocation, and any application by the Class Counsel for attorneys'
fees and expenses will be filed 30 calendar days prior to the Final
Approval Hearing.  All reply papers will be filed and served at
least seven calendar days prior to the Final Approval Hearing.

All funds held by the Escrow Agent will be deemed and considered to
be in custodia legis of the Court, and will remain subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court, until such time as such funds will be
distributed pursuant to the Stipulation and/or further order of the
Court.

The Defendants' counsel and the Class Counsel will promptly furnish
each other with copies of any and all objections that come into
their possession.

All reasonable expenses incurred in identifying and notifying Class
Members, as well as administering the Settlement Fund, will be paid
as set forth in the Stipulation.  In the event the Settlement is
not approved by the Court, or otherwise fails to become effective,
neither the Plaintiffs nor any of their counsel will have any
obligation to repay any amounts actually and properly disbursed, or
due and owing from the Settlement Fund as provided for in the
Stipulation.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/iyvyRl from Leagle.com.

Man Nguyen, Movant, represented by Clifford A. Cantor .

Gilbert Hoang Nguyen, Movant, represented by Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- POMERANATZ LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph
Alexander Hood, II -- ahood@pomlaw.com -- POMERANTZ LLP, pro hac
vice, Leigh Handelman Smollar -- lsmollar@pomlaw.com -- POMERANTZ
LLP, pro hac vice, Omar Jafri -- ojafri@pomlaw.com -- POMERANTZ
LLP, pro hac vice & Clifford A. Cantor.

Goce Veljanoski, Plaintiff, represented by Janissa Ann Strabuk --
jstrabuk@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS, Jeffrey C. Block --
jeff@blockesq.com -- BLOCK & LEVITON LLP, pro hac vice, Joel
Fleming -- joel@blockesq.com -- BLOCK & LEVITON LLP, pro hac vice &
Kim D. Stephens -- kstephens@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN
STEPHENS.\

Liberata Paradisco, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Duncan Calvert
Turner -- duncanturner@badgleymullins.com -- BADGLEY MULLINS TURNER
PLLC.

Gilbert Hoang Nguyen, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick V.
Dahlstrom -pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com -- POMERANTZ LLP, pro hac vice &
Clifford A. Cantor.

Susan Tan, Plaintiff, pro se.

Juno Therapeutics Inc, Hans E Bishop, individually and on behalf of
the marital community, Steven D. Harr & Mark J. Gilbert,
Defendants, represented by Daniel Slifkin -- dslifkin@cravath.com
-- CRAVATH SWAINE & MOORE, pro hac vice, Drew Liming --
dliming@wsgr.com -- WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, pro hac vice,
Ignacio E. Salceda -- Isalcedo@wsgr.com -- WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH
& ROSATI, pro hac vice, Joni Ostler -- jostler@wsgr.com -- WILSON
SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, pro hac vice, Karin A. DeMasi --
kdemasi@cravath.com -- CRAVATH SWAINE & MOORE, pro hac vice, Lauren
M. Rosenberg -- lrosenberg@cravath.com -- CRAVATH SWAINE & MOORE,
pro hac vice, Morgan J. Cohen, CRAVATH SWAINE & MOORE, pro hac
vice, Nina F. Locker -- NLocker@wsgr.com -- WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH
& ROSATI, pro hac vice & Gregory Lewis Watts -- Gwatts@wsgr.com --
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI.


KEYME INC: Rafidia Sues over Use of Biometric Information
---------------------------------------------------------
HENRY RAFIDIA, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated individuals, the Plaintiff, v. KEYME, INC., a Delaware
corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 2018CH11240 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
Cook Cty., Sept. 5, 2018), seeks to stop the Defendant its capture,
collection, use, and storage of individuals' biometric identifiers
and/or biometric information in violation of the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act, and to obtain redress for all persons
injured by its conduct.

BIPA defines a "biometric identifier" as any personal feature that
is unique to an individual, including fingerprints and palm scans.
"Biometric information" is any information based on a biometric
identifier, regardless of how it is converted or stored.
Collectively, biometric identifiers and biometric information are
known as "biometrics." This case is about a key reproduction
company capturing, collecting, storing, and using Plaintiffs and
other users' biometric identifiers and/or biometric information
without regard to BIPA and the concrete privacy rights and
pecuniary interests that BIPA protects.  The Defendant collects its
customers' unique fingerprints to upload, store, and fabricate
scanned keys without complying with BIPA's requirements. In direct
violation of the foregoing provisions, the Defendant actively
captures, collects, stores, and uses, without obtaining informed
written consent, the biometrics of hundreds of Illinois residents
whose fingerprints are captured and stored for key fabrication
purposes.  The Defendant is a technology company focusing in the
locksmith industry.  To authenticate the identity of individuals to
allow access to scanned keys and request their reproduction, the
Defendant captures, collects, or otherwise uses their fingerprints,
or data derived.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Myles McGuire, Esq.
          Jad Sheikali, Esq.
          William P. Kingston, Esq.
          MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
          55 W. Wacker Drive, 9th Fl.
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 893 7002
          E-mail: mmcguire@mcgpc.com
          jsheikali@mcgpc.com
          wkingston@mcgpc.com


KNOWLEDGESTAFF LLC: Zenni Seeks Unpaid Wages under FLSA
-------------------------------------------------------
CLIFFORD ZENNI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. KNOWLEDGESTAFF LLC, FRAN JUSTE and JEAN
DUMAS, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-08002 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 31,
2018), seeks payment of back wages, including unpaid overtime wages
in violation of state law, and compensation for unlawful payments
which Defendants required Plaintiff to make pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the New York state law.

The Plaintiff alleges that he and other similarly situated
consultants were knowingly and improperly classified as independent
contractors, and, as a result, did not receive legally required
compensation, including overtime pay, for hours worked in excess of
40 in a workweek. In
addition, the Plaintiff alleges that, while working for
KnowledgeStaff, he was required to make payments in the amount of
several hundred dollars each week in order to receive shift
assignments. These payments constitute unlawful kickbacks in
violation of the FLSA and/or forced deductions within the meaning
of the New York Labor Law.

KnowledgeStaff delivers consulting and staffing services for a
range of industries.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Classes:

          Russell Paul, Esq.
          Shanon J. Carson, Esq.
          Sarah R. Schalman-Bergen, Esq.
          Alexandra K. Piazza, Esq.
          BERGER MONTAGUE PC
          1818 Market Street, Suite 3600
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 875 3000
          Facsimile: (215) 875 4604
          E-mail: rpaul@bm.net
                  scarson@bm.net
                  sschalman-bergen@bm.net
                  apiazza@bm.net

               - and -

          Harold Lichten, Esq.
          Olena Savytska, Esq.
          LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
          729 Boylston St., Suite 2000
          Boston, MA 02116
          Telephone: (617) 994 5800
          Facsimile: (617) 994 5801
          E-mail: hlichten@llrlaw.com
                  osavytska@llrlaw.com

               - and -

          David M. Blanchard, Esq.
          BLANCHARD & WALKER, PLLC
          221 N. Main Street, Suite 300
          Ann Arbor, MI 48104
          Telephone: (734) 929 4313
          E-mail: blanchard@bwlawonline.com


LEE CONSTRUCTION: Tyler Seeks to Certify Class of Workers
---------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled TERRI TYLER, Individually and On Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. LEE CONSTRUCTION
AND MAINTENANCE COMPANY d/b/a LMC CORPORATION AND JERRY R. LEE, the
Defendants, Case No. 5:18-cv-00273-DAE (W.D. Tex.), the Plaintiff
asks the Court for an order:

   1. conditionally certifying case as a collective action on
      behalf of:

      "all current and former workers classified as independent
      contractors and paid on a flat hourly basis by LMC at any
      time within the three-year period immediately preceding
      entry of the order granting conditional certification"; and

   2. approving the notice and consent forms;

   3. directing Defendants to provide names and contact
      information of all proposed Class Members, and authorize
      Plaintiff's counsel to send all proposed Class Members the
      notice and consent forms included in Plaintiff's appendix.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Josh Borsellino, Esq.
          BORSELLINO, P.C.
          1020 Macon St., Ste. 15
          Fort Worth, TX 76102
          Telephone: 817 908 9861
          Facsimile: 817 394 2412
          E-mail: josh@dfwcounsel.com


LG ELECTRONICS: Court Narrows Claims in Villa Lara's Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge John R. Tunheim of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Minnesota granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
motion to dismiss all claims in the case, IVAN VILLA LARA,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. LG ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC., BEST BUY CO., INC., BEST
BUY STORES, L.P., and BESTBUY.COM, LLC, Defendants, Civil No.
17-5222 (JRT/KMM) (D. Minn.).

The putative class action arises from Villa Lara's purchase of an
LG television advertised to have a 120Hz refresh rate.  Villa Lara
alleges that the television, in fact, has a 60Hz refresh rate.  He
filed the action against the Defendants asserting claims for
violations of Minnesota, New Jersey, and California
consumer-protection laws, along with various common-law claims.

The Defendants move to dismiss all claims.  They argue that Villa
Lara lacks standing to maintain the action.  They also move to
dismiss all the claims in the Amended Complaint under Rule
12(b)(6).

Judge Tunheim granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
LG's Motion to Dismiss.  He granted it with respect to the
Plaintiff's fraud-based claims [Counts I-VI, X], dismissed without
perjudice Counts I-VI and X, and denied the motion in all other
respects.  The Judge also granted in part and denied in part Best
Buy's Motion to Dismiss.  He granted it with respect to Minnesota's
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act [Count II], dismissed with
prejudice Count II to the extent that it seeks relief beyond
injunctive relief, and denied the motion in all other respects.

Among other things, the Judge finds that Villa Lara pleads
sufficient facts to show that he suffered an injury in fact.  Villa
Lara also has statutory standing under the California Unfair
Competition Law because he satisfies the "lost money" prong.  Villa
Lara alleges that he lost money due to the Defendants' unfair
competition, and he satisfies the UCL's standing requirement.  He
also denied the Defendants' motion NJCFA claim (Count IV) for
failure to plead ascertainable loss.

He also finds that Villa Lara's complaint lacks sufficient facts
about fraud or misrepresentations by LG.  The Amended Complaint's
limited references to LG's conduct include its "spec sheets" on its
website, but the Amended Complaint says nothing about how, when, or
where Villa Lara viewed or relied on these spec sheets, if at all.
The Judge therefore dismissed without prejudice Villa Lara's
fraud-based claims against LG.

The Judge holds that the relief under the MDTPA is limited to
injunctive relief, and Villa Lara does not oppose this part of the
Defendant's motion.  He therefore granted the Defendants' motion in
this respect.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 7, 2018 Memorandum Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/pAs9ts from Leagle.com.

Ivan Villa Lara, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alyssa Leary --
alyssa.leary@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed, Brittany N. Resch --
bresch@gustafsongluek.com -- Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Daniel C.
Hedlund -- dhedlund@gustafsongluek.com -- Gustafson Gluek PLLC,
David M. Cialkowski -- david.cialkowski@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman
Reed, PLLP & Luke Hudock, Hudock Law Group, S.C., pro hac vice.

LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc., Best Buy Co., Inc., Best Buy Stores,
L.P. & BestBuy.com, LLC, Defendants, represented by Alicia Paller
-- alicia.paller@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP, Peter H.
Walsh -- peter.walsh@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP,
Phoebe Anne Wilkinson -- phoebe.wilkinson@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan
Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice & Robert Benjamin Wolinsky --
obert.wolinsky@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac
vice.


LITE-BITE INC: Goldboss Calls Customer Bill Surcharge "Unlawful"
----------------------------------------------------------------
LAUREN GOLDBOSS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. LITE-BITE INC., a California
Corporation dba LITE BITE; and DOES 1 to 25, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. CGC-18-569409 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sep. 4, 2018),
alleges that the Defendant is misleading the public as to the
actual prices of their food and drinks by not raising their menu
prices, and instead adding an undisclosed, unauthorized, and
unlawful surcharge onto a customer's bill.

The Defendant owns restaurants that represent to the general public
certain prices for food and drinks in their in-restaurant and
advertised menus, but then, after the food and/or drink is ordered,
the Defendant adds a surcharge, including, but not limited to, a
surcharge which it calls "Gov Mandate," which is actually an
undisclosed, unauthorized, and unlawful charge, to the balance of
the final bill total which consumers thereafter pay.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua Bordin-Wosk, Esq.
          Shannon Guevara, Esq.
          Talissa Mulholland, Esq.
          B|B LAW GROUP LLP
          6100 Center Drive, Suite 1100
          Howard Hughes Center
          Los Angeles, CA 90045
          Telephone: (323) 925 7800
          Facsimile: (323) 925 7801
          E-mail: JBordinWosk@BBLawGroupLLP.com
                  SGuevara@BBLawGroupLLP.com
                  TMulholland@BBLawGroupLLP.com


LULAROE LLC: Hill Files Fraud Suit in D. Montana
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against LLR doing business
as: LuLaRoe Inc., d/b/a LuLaRoe.  The case is styled as Melissa
Hill individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. LLR, doing business as: LuLaRoe Inc. d/b/a LuLaRoe,
LuLaRoe LLC, Defendants, Case No. 4:18-cv-00120-BMM (D. Mont.,
Sept. 13, 2018).

The cause of action is stated as Diversity-Fraud.

LuLaRoe is a United States-based multi-level marketing company that
sells women's clothing.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Domenic A. Cossi, Esq.
     WESTERN JUSTICE ASSOCIATES
     303 West Mendenhall, Suite 1
     Bozeman, MT 59715
     Phone: (406) 587-1900
     Fax: (406) 587-1901
     E-mail: domenic@westernjusticelaw.com

         - and -

     Maxwell E. Kirchhoff, Esq.
     WESTERN JUSTICE ASSOCIATES
     303 West Mendenhall, Suite 1
     Bozeman, MT 59715
     Phone: (406) 587-1900
     Email: max@westernjusticelaw.com


MANPOWER US: Clemons Suit Moved to Western District of Tennessee
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Dorothy Clemons, on behalf of
herself and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. Manpower US, Inc. and Mike Forbess, the Defendants,
Case No. 7554, was removed from the Circuit Court for Tipton
County, to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee (Memphis) on Sep. 4, 2018.  The Tennessee Western
District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:18-cv-02609-JTF-tmp to the
proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge John T. Fowlkes,
Jr. The suit alleges Fair Credit Reporting Act violation.

ManpowerGroup is a Fortune 500 American multinational corporation
headquartered in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian C. Winfrey, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN
          810 Broadway, Suite 105
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Telephone: (615) 601 1276
          Facsimile: (615) 473 3243
          E-mail: bwinfrey@forthepeople.com

Attorneys for Manpower US, Inc.:

          J. Christopher Anderson, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, PC
          333 Commerce Street, Suite 1450
          Nashville, TN 37201
          Telephone: (615) 383 0775
          Facsimile: (615) 691 7976
          E-mail: chrisanderson@littler.com


MAXIM HEALTHCARE: Bid to Dismiss "Scheck" FLSA Suit Partly Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John R. Adams of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, Eastern Division, granted in part the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss the case, LINDA SCHECK, on behalf of herself and
other similarly situated employees, Plaintiff, v. MAXIM HEALTHCARE
SERVICES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 5:17CV2480 (N.D. Ohio).

The Plaintiff brings the putative class action against her former
employer, Maxim, under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and
Ohio law, for unpaid overtime compensation from Jan. 1, 2015 to
Oct. 31, 2015.  Maxim provides in-home personal care, management,
and/or treatment of a variety of conditions by nurses, therapists,
medical social works, and Home Health Aids ("HHAs").  

The Plaintiff worked for Maxim as an HHA, allegedly from
approximately July 1, 2010 to July 1, 2016.  As an HHA, the
Plaintiff provided companionship services in the homes of Maxim's
clients to whom she was assigned.  Consequently, she was classified
as an exempt employee under the FLSA, pursuant to the companionship
services exemption.  During the Plaintiff's employment, she worked
more than 40 hours in some workweeks.  Because she was an exempt
companionship services employee, however, Maxim paid her straight
time for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek.

In mid-October 2015, Maxim began paying full and complete overtime
compensation to all HHAs nationwide, including the Plaintiff.  The
Plaintiff filed the lawsuit more than two years later, on Nov. 27,
2017.

The matter is before the Court upon Maxim's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Linda Scheck's ("Plaintiff") Complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The Plaintiff has
opposed the motion to dismiss.

Judge Adams holds that the effective date of the Home Care Final
Rule is Jan. 1, 2015.  He rejects the contention that the effective
date was Oct. 13, 2015, when the D.C. Circuit issued its mandate,
or at a later date when the DOL commenced enforcement of the rule.
Having determined that the Home Care Final Rule should be
retroactively applied to Jan. 1, 2015, the Judge finds that the
Plaintiff's FLSA claims are subject to a two-year statute of
limitations.  Thus, her claims are limited to the two years prior
to the filing of the Complaint, and not the three years she
proposes.  Any of the Plaintiff's FLSA claims falling outside of
the two years must be dismissed.

In addition to her claims under the FLSA, the Plaintiff has brought
Ohio law claims under R.C. Section 4111.01 ("OMFWSA") (Count II),
and R.C. Section 4113.15 ("Ohio Prompt Pay Act") (Count III).  The
Plaintiff has dismissed her claim under the OMFWSA, without
prejudice.  Thus, the Plaintiff has no timely claim under the
Prompt Pay Act because she filed her Complaint on Nov. 27, 2017.

For the reasons stated, Judge Adams granted in part Maxim's Motion
to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).  He concludes that although he
holds that the effective date for the Home Care Final Rule is Jan.
1, 2015, he finds that the Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a
claim for "willful" violations of the FLSA.  Accordingly, the
Plaintiff's FLSA claims are subject to a two-year statute of
limitations, and are limited to the two years prior to the filing
of the Complaint.  He further finds that the Plaintiff's claims
under Ohio's Prompt Pay Act are barred by the applicable two-year
statute of limitations.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/0Z3Ijz from Leagle.com.

Linda Scheck, on behalf of herself and other similarly situated
employees, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew R. Biller --
abiller@msdlegal.com -- Markovits, Stock & DeMarco, C. Ryan Morgan
-- RMorgan@forthepeople.com -- Morgan & Morgan & Andrew P. Kimble
-- akimble@msdlegal.com -- Markovits, Stock & DeMarco.

Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by Allison
N. Powers -- allison.powers@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius, David A. Campbell, III -- dacampbell@vorys.com -- Vorys,
Sater, Seymour & Pease, Gregory C. Scheiderer --
gcscheiderer@vorys.com -- Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Liana R.
Hollingsworth -- lrhollingsworth@vorys.com -- Vorys, Sater, Seymour
& Pease, Lincoln O. Bisbee -- lincoln.bisbee@morganlewis.com --
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius & Thomas F. Hurka --
thomas.hurka@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius.


MDL 1720: Court Reverses Denial of American Pipe Tolling
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York granted Plaintiff's appeals of the Magistrate Judge's ruling
in the case captioned IN RE PAYMENT CARD INTERCHANGE FEE AND
MERCHANT DISCOUNT ANTITRUST LITIGATION, This document refers to:
ALL ACTIONS. No. 05-MD-1720 (MKB). (E.D.N.Y.).

Currently before the Court are Plaintiffs' appeals of Judge
Orenstein's ruling that the amendments do not relate back to the
original Complaints and that Direct Action Plaintiffs are not
entitled to American Pipe tolling.

A putative class of over twelve million merchants brought antitrust
actions under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections 1 and 2, and
state antitrust laws, against Defendants Visa and MasterCard
networks, as well as various issuing and acquiring banks.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants harmed competition and charged
merchants supracompetitive prices by creating unlawful contracts
and rules, and by engaging in conspiracies.

Judge Orenstein's September 2017 Order

Judge Orenstein granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs'
motions to file amended complaints. Judge Orenstein (1) granted
leave to amend the Complaints to add the alternative two-sided
market theory to the extent that the claims were not time-barred,
but found that the amendments could not relate back to the time of
the filing of the original Complaints pursuant to Rule 15(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and (2) determined that Direct
Action Plaintiffs' amendments are not entitled to American Pipe
tolling.

Direct Action Plaintiffs

The Direct Action Plaintiffs' relation back arguments are similar
to those of the Class Plaintiffs. They argue that the proposed
amendments challenge the same conduct as set forth in the prior
Complaints and therefore satisfy Rule 15, and, in any event, they
are not bound by the prior definition of the relevant market. The
Direct Action Plaintiffs further contend that the denial of
relation back prevents adjudication of the case on the merits.
Finally, the Direct Action Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants
had requisite notice both for the purposes of relation back and
American Pipe tolling.

Defendants' response to Plaintiffs' appeal

The Defendants contend that the Court should affirm the September
2017 Decision in its entirety because Judge Orenstein correctly
found that the amendments should not relate back to the date of the
original Complaints in view of the fact that Defendants lacked
notice that they would be forced to defend themselves against
factual claims directed to the cardholder side of a two-sided
market.

Standard of review

Under the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 636, and Rule
72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a magistrate judge "may
issue orders regarding non-dispositive pretrial matters and the
district court reviews such orders under the clearly erroneous or
contrary to law standard."

An order is clearly erroneous if, based on all the evidence, a
reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed. An order is contrary to law when it
fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules
of procedure.

The Plaintiffs did not consent to Judge Orenstein deciding a
dispositive motion
the Defendants argue that the Court can only review the September
2017 Order for clear error because the Plaintiffs consented to
Judge Orenstein's authority by filing the original motion to amend
the Complaints with him.

The practice in this district requires parties consenting to a
magistrate judge's authority to rule on a dispositive matter to
sign a document acknowledging their consent, which document must
then be so-ordered by a district judge. Consent may be implied
where a party is aware of the need to consent in an unequivocally
dispositive matter.

A motion to amend a complaint is not unequivocally dispositive.
Unlike in Roell, where entering judgment after a jury verdict was
an unequivocally dispositive matter, it is unclear whether a motion
to amend a complaint is dispositive. Given the lack of clarity, the
Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs were aware of the need for
consent in filing the motion before Judge Orenstein.

The lack of clarity as to whether a magistrate judge, when
considering a motion to amend, can decide the issue or must submit
a recommended ruling to a district judge also weighs in favor of
the Court conducting a de novo review.  

The Amended Complaints relate back to the earlier Complaints

The Class Plaintiffs contend that in order to determine if the
amendments relate back, the Court must review the Defendants'
alleged anticompetitive conduct as alleged in the earlier
Complaints.

The Direct Action Plaintiffs argue in their appeal that the
amendments at issue challenge the same conduct as the original
Complaints, the Visa and Mastercard rules that restrain horizontal
competition among card issuers, resulting in supracompetitive
interchange fees charged to merchants.

Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs when an
amended pleading relates back to the date of a timely filed
original pleading and is thus itself timely even though it was
filed outside an applicable statute of limitations. The purpose of
Rule 15 is to provide maximum opportunity for each claim to be
decided on its merits rather than on procedural technicalities.

In determining whether the amendments arise out of previously
alleged conduct, under Rule 15, the central inquiry is whether
adequate notice of the matters raised in the amended pleading has
been given to the opposing party within the statute of limitations
by the general fact situation alleged in the original pleading.

The Court finds that the Defendants correctly note that the Amended
Complaints include new facts about the impact of the Defendants'
conduct on cardholders, a group not previously identified by
Plaintiffs. However, that conduct, the Defendants' horizontal
agreements and network rules resulting in supracompetitve prices
was previously alleged in Plaintiffs' earlier Complaints.
Specifically, the alleged anticompetitive conduct supporting
Plaintiff's claim that the Defendants imposed supracompetitive
interchange fees consists of the rules implemented by the
Defendants, such as the Honor All Cards Rule, the No Surcharge
Rule, the Honor All Issuers Rule, and other Anti-Steering
Restraints.  The relevant inquiry is not whether the amendments
include any new facts, but whether the amendments rely on facts
consisting of new conduct that was not previously alleged.  

Thus, since the amendment of the alternative market definition does
not involve any new conduct by the Defendants, but rather calls for
consideration of additional impact from the conduct already alleged
in the original Complaints, the amendments relate back to the
original Complaints.

American Pipe tolling

The Defendants and the Direct Action Plaintiffs agree that the
Court's decision on whether the amendments relate back informs the
applicability of American Pipe tolling to the Direct Action
Plaintiffs' amendments because both doctrines require notice to the
opposing party.  

The Direct Action Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to
American Pipe tolling because in applying this doctrine, courts
consider whether the factual basis of the absent class members'
claims was the same as in the initial putative class action, so
that there is notice to preserve evidence.

Commencement of a class action tolls the statute of limitations for
the claims of all potential members of the class. The commencement
of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as
to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties
had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action. This
rule applies not only to putative class members who seek to
intervene in an action where class certification has been denied],
but also to would-be class members who later file their own
independent actions. Complaints introducing new legal theories can
be tolled under American Pipe, so long as they rely on the same
facts as those alleged by the class.

The requirements of American Pipe tolling operate in harmony with
the amendment and relation back rules of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and therefore deciding one issue has implications for the
other. Similar to the relation back analysis, a court deciding
whether claims can be tolled under American Pipe needs to ensure
that the defendant had notice of such claims.  

Judge Orenstein based his decision that American Pipe tolling did
not apply to the Direct Action Plaintiffs' claims on his finding
that the amendments proposed by the Class Plaintiffs did not relate
back to the original Complaints due to lack of notice of the
two-sided market theory. The Defendants concede that the denial of
American Pipe tolling is a logical continuation of the finding that
the class amendments do not relate back.

Having found that the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaints relate back to
their prior Complaints because Defendant had the requisite notice
of the alleged anticompetitive conduct resulting in
supracompetitive interchange fees, the Court finds that American
Pipe tolling applies to Direct Action Plaintiffs' amendments for
the same reason.

The Court finds that the amendments to the Class Complaint relate
back to the original pleadings, and that American Pipe tolling
applies to the amended claims by Direct Action Plaintiffs. The
Court sets aside Judge Orenstein's decision to the contrary.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 30, 2018 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yb84tmu3 from
Leagle.com.

Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust
Litigation, In Re, represented by Linda P. Nussbaum --
lnussbaum@nussbaumpc.com -- Nussbaum Law Group, PC, Alexandra S.
Bernay -- xanb@rgrdlaw.com -- Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman &
Robbins LLP, pro hac vice, Benjamin R. Nagin -- BNAGIN@SIDLEY.COM
-- Sidley Austin LLP, Carmen A. Medici -- cmedici@rgrdlaw.com --
Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP, pro hac vice, D.
Cameron Baker, Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP, David W.
Mitchell, Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP, pro hac vice,
Dennis Stewart -- dstewart@hulettharper.com -- Hulett Harper
Stewart LLP, Eric P. Barstad -- EBarstad@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins
Kaplan LLP, Eric H. Grush, Sidley Austin LLP, Gary R. Carney, Jr.
-- gcarney@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garison, LLP, H. Laddie Montague -- hlmontague@bm.net -- Berger &
Montague, P.C., Jonah H. Goldstein -- jonahg@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, K. Craig Wildfang --
KCWildfang@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan L.L.P., Merrill G.
Davidoff -- mdavidoff@bm.net -- Beger & Montague, P.C., Patrick
Joseph Coughlin -- patc@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller, Ryan W.
Marth -- RMarth@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan LLP, pro hac
vice, Stacey Slaughter -- SSlaughter@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins,
Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P. & Thomas J. Undlin --
TUndlin@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan, L.L.P.


MDL 2504: Class Certification Bid Nixed in Amazon Wage & Hour Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit RE: AMAZON.COM, INC., FULFILLMENT CENTER FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) AND WAGE AND HOUR LITIGATION, the Hon. Judge
David J. Hale entered an order on August 30, 2018:

   1. granting Defendant Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc.'s
      motion for joinder;

   2. granting Defendants Amazon.com, Inc. and Amazon.com. DEDC,
      LLC's motion for summary judgment;

   3. denying as moot Plaintiffs' motion for class certification;

   4. denying without prejudice Plaintiffs' and Defendants'
      motions to seal; and

   5. directing parties to submit renewed motions to seal.

The cases related to this order are:

      "Heimbach, et al., v. Amazon.com, Inc., et al., Case No.
3:14-cv-00204-DJH (W.D. Ken.)"; and

      "Heimbach, et al., v. Amazon.com, Inc., et al., Case No. Case
3:14-md-02504-DJH (W.D. Ken.)".


MDL 2741: Hyman et al. v. Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled LARRY E. HYMAN and MARY C. HYMAN,
the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY and JOHN DOES 1-50, the
Defendants, Case No. 4:18-cv-01249, was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California (San
Francisco) on Aug. 28, 2018. The Northern District of California
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:18-cv-1249 to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by Plaintiffs as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Hyman case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Plaintiffs each allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Eric D. Holland, Esq.
          HOLLAND LAW FIRM
          300 North Tucker, Suite 801
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: 314 241 8111
          Facsimile: 314 241 5554
          E-mail: eholland@allfela.com

               - and -

          Jessica L. Richman, Esq.
          PARKER WAICHMAN LLP
          6 Harbor Park Drive
          Port Washington, NY 11050
          Telephone: (516) 723 4627
          Facsimile: (516) 723 4727
          E-mail: jrichman@yourlawyer.com


MDL 2741: Leonard et al . vs Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled ALPHONSE LEONARD AND KATHY LEONARD,
the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, BAYER CORPORATION and BAYER
AG, the Defendants Case No. 4:18-cv-01069, was transferred from the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (San
Francisco) on Aug. 28, 2018.  The Northern District of California
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:18-cv-05255-VC to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by Plaintiffs as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Leonard Case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Plaintiffs each allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222 2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421 0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MDL 2741: Manes v. Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
-------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled FRANKIE R. MANES, the Plaintiff, v.
MONSANTO COMPANY and JOHN DOES 1-5, the Defendants, Case No.
4:18-cv-01251, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California (San Francisco) on Aug. 28, 2018.
The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
4:18-cv-1251 to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by Plaintiffs as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Manes case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Plaintiffs each allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Eric D. Holland, Esq.
          HOLLAND LAW FIRM
          300 North Tucker, Suite 801
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: 314 241 8111
          Facsimile: 314 241 5554
          E-mail: eholland@allfela.com

               - and -

          Jessica L. Richman, Esq.
          PARKER WAICHMAN LLP
          6 Harbor Park Drive
          Port Washington, NY 11050
          Telephone: (516) 723 4627
          Facsimile: (516) 723 4727
          E-mail: jrichman@yourlawyer.com


MDL 2741: Medlin vs Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
--------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled ROGER C. MEDLIN, the Plaintiffs, v.
MONSANTO COMPANY, BAYER CORPORATION and BAYER AG, the Defendant,
Case No. 4:18-cv-01099, was transferred from the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California (San Francisco) on
Aug. 28, 2018.  The Northern District of California Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 3:18-cv-05262-VC to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by Plaintiffs as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Medlin case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Plaintiffs each allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222 2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421 0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com

Attorneys for Bayer Corporation:

          W. Jason Rankin, Esq.
          HEPLERBROOM LLC
          130 North Main Street
          P.O. Box 510
          Edwardsville, IL 62025
          Telephone: (618) 307 1138
          Facsimile: (618) 656 1364
          E-mail: wjr@heplerbroom.com


MDL 2741: Morrison vs Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
----------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled ALVIN F. MORRISON SR., the
Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, BAYER CORPORATION and BAYER AG, the
Defendants, Case No. 4:18-cv-01097, was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California (San
Francisco) on Aug. 28, 2018. The Northern District of California
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:18-cv-05261-VC to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by Plaintiffs as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Morrison case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re:
Roundup Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order
of the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on
October 3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions
arising out of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide,
particularly its active ingredient, glyphosate, causes
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. Plaintiffs each allege that they or their
decedents developed non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over
the course of several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that
the use of glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in
particular the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA),
renders Roundup even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues
concerning general causation, the background science, and
regulatory history will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222 2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421 0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MDL 2741: Mullins et al. v. Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled CHAD A. MULLINS and LORA D.
MULLINS, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY and JOHN DOES 1-50,
the Defendants, Case No. , 4:18-cv-01252, was transferred from the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (San
Francisco) on Aug. 28, 2018.  The Northern District of California
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:18-cv-1252 to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by Plaintiffs as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Mullins case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Plaintiffs each allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Eric D. Holland, Esq.
          HOLLAND LAW FIRM
          300 North Tucker, Suite 801
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: 314 241 8111
          Facsimile: 314 241 5554
          E-mail: eholland@allfela.com

               - and -

          Jessica L. Richman, Esq.
          PARKER WAICHMAN LLP
          6 Harbor Park Drive
          Port Washington, NY 11050
          Telephone: (516) 723 4627
          Facsimile: (516) 723 4727
          E-mail: jrichman@yourlawyer.com


MDL 2741: Osborne vs Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
---------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled AGNES C. OSBORNE INDIVIDUALLY AND
ON BEHALF OF WALTER R. OSBORNE (DECEASED), the Plaintiffs, v.
MONSANTO COMPANY, BAYER CORPORATION and BAYER AG, the Defendants,
Case No. 4:18-cv-01075, was transferred from the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California (San Francisco) on
Aug. 28, 2018. The Northern District of California Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 3:18-cv-05260-VC to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by Plaintiffs as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Osborne case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Plaintiffs each allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222 2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421 0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MDL 2741: Ruiz v. Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Jorge Ruiz, the Plaintiff, v.
MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01311, was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California (San Francisco) on Aug. 28, 2018. The Northern District
of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:18-cv-05320-VC to the
proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by Plaintiffs as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Ruiz case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Plaintiffs each allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
          Goza & Honnold LLC
          9500 Nall Ave. Suite 400
          Overland Park, KS 66207
          Telephone: (913) 451 3433
          Facsimile: (913) 839 0567
          E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com


MDL 2741: Schade v. Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
--------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled BRIAN E. SCHADE, the Plaintiff,
v. MONSANTO COMPANY and JOHN DOES 1-50, the Defendants, Case No.
4:18-cv-01250, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California (San Francisco) on Aug. 28, 2018.
The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:18-cv-05315-VC to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by Plaintiffs as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Schade case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Plaintiffs each allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Eric D. Holland, Esq.
          HOLLAND LAW FIRM
          300 North Tucker, Suite 801
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: 314 241 8111
          Facsimile: 314 241 5554
          E-mail: eholland@allfela.com

               - and -

          Jessica L. Richman, Esq.
          PARKER WAICHMAN LLP
          6 Harbor Park Drive
          Port Washington, NY 11050
          Telephone: (516) 723 4627
          Facsimile: (516) 723 4727
          E-mail: jrichman@yourlawyer.com


MDL 2741: Smith et al. v. Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled LARRY A. SMITH and JUDY SMITH, the
Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY and JOHN DOES 1-50, the Defendants,
Case No. 4:18-cv-01247, was transferred from the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California (San Francisco) on
Aug. 28, 2018. The Northern District of California Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 3:18-cv-05312-VC to the proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by Plaintiffs as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Smith case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Plaintiffs each allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Eric D. Holland, Esq.
          HOLLAND LAW FIRM
          300 North Tucker, Suite 801
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: 314 241 8111
          Facsimile: 314 241 5554
          E-mail: eholland@allfela.com

               - and -

          Jessica L. Richman, Esq.
          PARKER WAICHMAN LLP
          6 Harbor Park Drive
          Port Washington, NY 11050
          Telephone: (516) 723 4627
          Facsimile: (516) 723 4727
          E-mail: jrichman@yourlawyer.com


MDL 2741: Vertz et al. vs Monsanto Consolidated in N.D. Calif.
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled RANDALL J. VERTZ AND DEBRA E.
VERTZ, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, BAYER CORPORATION and
BAYER AG, the Defendants, Case No. 4:18-cv-01063, was transferred
from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
(San Francisco) on Aug. 28, 2018.  The Northern District of
California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:18-cv-05252-VC to the
proceeding.

This is an action for damages suffered by Plaintiffs as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Luellen case is being consolidated with MDL 2741 in re: Roundup
Products Liability Litigation. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October
3, 2016. These actions share common factual questions arising out
of allegations that Monsanto's Roundup herbicide, particularly its
active ingredient, glyphosate, causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Plaintiffs each allege that they or their decedents developed
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma after using Roundup over the course of
several or more years. Plaintiffs also allege that the use of
glyphosate in conjunction with other ingredients, in particular the
surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA), renders Roundup
even more toxic than glyphosate on its own. Issues concerning
general causation, the background science, and regulatory history
will be common to all actions.

In its October 3, 2016 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
in this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that
centralization in the Northern District of California will serve
the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just
and efficient conduct of this litigation. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings (including with respect to discovery, privilege, and
Daubert motion practice); and conserve the resources of the
parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the
MDL is Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria. The lead case is
3:16-md-02741-VC.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222 2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421 0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MEDICAL REIMBURSEMENTS: Hoops Seeks to Certify Two Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned CYNTHIA HOOPS, the Plaintiff, v. MEDICAL
REIMBURSEMENTS OF AMERICA, INC. and MERCY HOSPITALS EAST
COMMUNITIES, the Defendants, Case No. 4:16-cv-01543-AGF (E.D. Mo.),
the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order:

   1. granting its motion for class certification under the
      Telephone Consumer Protection Act:

      Consent and Agreement Class:

      "all Missouri residents who (1) received medical treatment
      from any Mercy-owned or Mercy-affiliated hospital/provider
      in Missouri (2) while being covered by valid commercial
      health insurance, (3) who signed a Consent and Agreement,
      and (4) Mercy sought collection from a source other than a
      patient’s commercial health insurance by asserting a
      medical lien for the total unadjusted amount charged,
      during the period of August 25, 2011 to the present"; and

      Network Agreement Class:

      "all Missouri residents who (1) received medical treatment
      from any Mercy-owned or Mercy-affiliated hospital/provider
      in Missouri while (2) being covered by Blue Cross Blue
      Shield/Anthem health insurance, and (3) Mercy sought
      collection from a source other than the patient’s
      commercial health insurance by asserting a medical lien for
      the total unadjusted amount charged, during the period of
      August 25, 2011 to the present";

   3. appointing Holloran Schwartz & Gaertner, LLP as counsel for
      the Class; and

   4. granting such other relief as the Court deems just and
      proper under the circumstances.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Thomas E. Schwartz, Esq.
          Rebecca E. Grossman, Esq.
          HOLLORAN SCHWARTZ & GAERTNER LLP
          9200 Litzsinger Road
          St. Louis, Missouri 63144
          Telephone: 314 772 8989
          Facsimile: 314 279 1333
          E-mail: tschwartz@holloranlaw.com
                  rgrossman@holloranlaw.com


MEDTRONIC INC: Dec. 11 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP and Motley Rice LLP regarding the Medtronic, Inc.
Securities Litigation:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
In re MEDTRONIC, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION   
Master File No. 0:13-cv-01686-MJD-KMM

CLASS ACTION

This Document Relates To:
ALL ACTIONS.

TO:

ALL PERSONS WHO PURCHASED OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRED MEDTRONIC, INC.
("MEDTRONIC") PUBLICLY TRADED COMMON STOCK DURING THE PERIOD FROM
SEPTEMBER 8, 2010, THROUGH AND INCLUDING JUNE 28, 2011 (THE
"CLASS")

PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY. YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY
A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT PENDING IN THIS COURT.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota, that the above-captioned
action (the "Litigation") has been certified as a class action on
behalf of the Class, except for certain persons and entities who
are excluded from the Class by definition as set forth in the full
printed Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class Action (the
"Notice").

YOU ARE ALSO NOTIFIED that Plaintiffs in the Litigation, Employees'
Retirement System of the State of Hawaii, Union Asset Management
Holding AG, and West Virginia Pipe Trades Health & Welfare Fund, on
behalf of themselves and the other Members of the Class, have
reached a proposed settlement of the Litigation with defendants
Medtronic, William A. Hawkins, Gary L. Ellis,
Dr. Julie Bearcroft, and Dr. Martin Yahiro (collectively,
"Defendants") for the sum of $43,000,000 in cash (the
"Settlement").  If the Settlement is approved, it will resolve all
claims in the Litigation.

A hearing will be held on December 11, 2018, at 9:30 a.m. CT,
before the Honorable Michael J. Davis at U.S. Courthouse, 300 South
Fourth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55415, for the purpose of
determining: (1)whether the proposed Settlement should be approved
by the Court as fair, reasonable and adequate; (2)whether,
thereafter, this Litigation should be dismissed with prejudice
against the Defendants as set forth in the Stipulation of
Settlement dated July 17, 2018; (3) whether the Plan of Allocation
of Settlement proceeds is fair, reasonable, and adequate and
therefore should be approved; and (4)the reasonableness of the
application of Lead Counsel for the payment of attorneys' fees and
expenses incurred in connection with this Litigation, together with
interest thereon (which request may include a request for
reimbursement of Plaintiffs' reasonable costs and expenses pursuant
to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995).

IF YOU PURCHASED OR ACQUIRED MEDTRONIC PUBLICLY TRADED COMMON STOCK
DURING THE PERIOD FROM SEPTEMBER 8, 2010, THROUGH AND INCLUDING
JUNE 28, 2011 (THE "CLASS PERIOD"), YOUR RIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED BY
THIS LITIGATION AND THE SETTLEMENT THEREOF. If you have not
received a detailed Notice as referred to above and a copy of the
Proof of Claim and Release form, you may obtain copies by writing
to Medtronic Securities Settlement, Claims Administrator, c/o
Gilardi & Co. LLC, P.O. Box 404078, Louisville, KY 40233-4078, or
by downloading this information at
www.MedtronicSecuritiesSettlement.com.  If you are a Class Member,
in order to share in the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund,
you must submit a Proof of Claim and Release online at
www.MedtronicSecuritiesSettlement.comby January 2, 2019, or by mail
postmarked no later than January 2, 2019, establishing that you are
entitled to a recovery.  You will be bound by any judgment rendered
in the Litigation unless you request to be excluded, in writing,
postmarked by November 19, 2018.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Medtronic publicly traded
common stock during the Class Period and you desire to be excluded
from the Class, you must submit a request for exclusion such that
it is postmarked no later than November 19, 2018, in the manner and
form explained in the detailed Notice referred to above.  All
Members of the Class who do not validly request exclusion from the
Class will be bound by any judgments or orders entered in the
Litigation pursuant to the Stipulation of Settlement.

Any objection to any aspect of the Settlement must be filed with
the Clerk of the Court and also delivered by hand or First-Class
Mail to each of the following addresses such that it is received no
later than November 19, 2018:

COURT:

          CLERK OF THE COURT
          UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
          202 U.S. COURTHOUSE
          300 South Fourth Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55415

LEAD COUNSEL:

          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          ELLEN GUSIKOFF STEWART
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900   
          San Diego, CA 92101

          MOTLEY RICE LLC    
          CHRISTOPHER F. MORIARTY    
          28 Bridgeside Blvd.    
          Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464

DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL:

          WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP
          JOSEPH G. PETROSINELLI
          725 Twelfth Street, N.W.
          Washington, DC 20005

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT OR THE CLERK'S OFFICE REGARDING
THIS NOTICE.

DATED: August 16, 2018                 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA


MERCK & CO: Faces Kish et al. Suit over Sale of ZOSTAVAX Vaccine
----------------------------------------------------------------
DONNA E. KISH;JUDITH K. MORRIS; ANNAMARIE DEFRANCIS; CATHERINE
WADE; BARBARA KERRIGAN; ROSEMARIE CASE; DONALD THERING; ALLEN
MUELLER; LEONARD MURRELL; and DELORES STEWART, Plaintiffs v. MERCK
& CO., INC.; MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP.; and McKESSON CORP.,
Defendants, Case No. 516293/2018 (N.Y. Sup., Kings Cty., Aug. 9,
2018) is an action against the Defendants for personal injuries and
damages suffered by the Plaintiffs and the class as a direct and
proximate result of being inoculated with the ZOSTAVAX vaccine
intended for the long-term prevention of shingles and
zoster-related injuries.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendants failed
to exercise reasonable care in the design, formulation,
manufacture, sale, testing, quality assurance, quality control,
labeling, marketing, promotions, and distribution of the ZOSTAVAX
vaccine because Merck and MSD knew, or should have known, that the
ZOSTAVAX vaccine was meant for long-term prevention of shingles and
zoster-related disease and injuries, but it was actually not
effective for the long-term prevention of shingles zoster-related
disease and injuries, and it was not effective at all after four
years post-vaccination.

Merck & Co., Inc. provides healthcare solutions worldwide. Merck &
Co., Inc. has collaborations with Pfizer Inc., AstraZeneca PLC,
Bayer AG, Eisai Co., Ltd., IO Biotech, Premier Inc., Cue Biopharma,
Inc., and Foundation Medicine, Inc. It serves drug wholesalers and
retailers, hospitals, government agencies and entities, physicians,
physician distributors, veterinarians, distributors, animal
producers, and managed health care providers. The company was
founded in 1891 and is headquartered in Kenilworth, New Jersey.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Debra J. Humphrey, Esq.
          MARC J. BERN & PARTNERS LLP
          One Grand Central Place
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 950
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 702-5000
          E-mail: dhumphrey@bernllp.com


MICHIGAN LOGISTICS: Underpays Delivery Drivers, De la Cruz Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE DE LA CRUZ URENA, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MICHIGAN LOGISTICS, INC. d/b/a
DILIGENT DELIVERY SYSTEMS; and NORTHEAST LOGISTICS, INC. d/b/a
DILIGENT DELIVERY SYSTEMS, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-07390
(S.D.N.Y., Aug. 15, 2018) is brought against the Defendants to
recover unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages,
attorneys' fees and costs.

The Plaintiff De La Cruz Urena was employed by the Defendants as
delivery driver from January 2016 to September 2016.

Michigan Logistics, Inc. d/b/a Diligent Delivery Systems provides
transportation and logistics services in the United States.
Diligent Delivery Systems, Inc. was founded in 1994 and is based in
Houston, Texas. It has locations in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Troy L. Kessler, Esq.
          Marijana F. Matura, Esq.
          Saranicole A. Duaban, Esq.
          SHULMAN KESSLER LLP
          534 Broadhollow Road, Suite 275
          Melville, New York 11747
          Telephone: (631) 499-9100


MIDLAND CREDIT: McFarland Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Midland Credit
Management, Inc. et al. The case is styled as Thomas McFarland
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Midland Credit Management Inc., Midland Funding LLC,
John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-02140-WQH-JMA (S.D.
Cal., Sept. 13, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Midland Credit Management (MCM) is a company that helps consumers
resolve past-due financial obligations.
Midland Funding LLC is one of the nation’s largest buyers of
unpaid debt. Midland Funding LLC purchases accounts with an unpaid
balance where consumers have gone at least 180 days without making
a payment, or paid less than the minimum monthly payment.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jonathan Stieglitz, Esq.
     Law Offices Of Jonathan A. Stieglitz
     11845 W. Olympic Blvd., Suite 800
     Los Angeles, CA 90064
     Phone: (323) 979-2063
     Fax: (323) 488-6748
     Email: jonathan.a.stieglitz@gmail.com


MONEY STORE: Court Narrows Claims in 1st Amended Asberry Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DARRELL ASBERRY, MICHAEL F. CORDES, SHIRLEY PIATT, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. THE MONEY STORE, TMS MORTGAGE, INC., HOMEQ SERVICING CORP.,
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendants, Case No. 2:18-CV-01291-ODW
(PLAx) (C.D. Cal.), Judge Otis D. Wright, II of the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California granted in part and
denied in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
First Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).

The Named Plaintiffs bring the putative class action on behalf of
themselves and two subclasses seeking damages for the Defendants'
allegedly fraudulent lending practices.  The Plaintiffs bring
claims for 1) Breach of Contract; 2) Breach of the Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing; 3) Unfair Business Practices; 4)
Restitution to Avoid Unjust Enrichment; and 5) Fraud.

The Plaintiffs seek to certify two classes: the Late Fee Class II
and the Fee-Split Class II.  

The Late Fee Class II includes all borrowers of loans originated by
or assigned to HomEq who, after March 1, 2000, paid late fees after
acceleration of the loan where the loan was not subsequently
reinstated by the borrower's payment of the entire delinquent
amount outstanding; and/or (b) all borrowers of loans owned and/or
serviced by HomEq for property located in California, Ohio,
Delaware, Montana, New Jersey and/or Michigan who, after March 1,
2000, paid post-acceleration late fees.

The Fee-Split Class II includes all borrowers of loans owned and/or
serviced by HomEq for property located in California who, after
March 1, 2000, paid fees in foreclosure, bankruptcy or eviction
actions which (i) were shared with Fidelity National Foreclosure
Solutions or another non-attorney outsourcer; or (ii) were in
excess of the fees which were allowed to be charged under HomEq's
governing Master Service Agreement with Fidelity and/or the Network
Agreements with law firms and/or other service providers.

The filing of the action follows a jury trial, and subsequent
appeal in the Second Circuit, which involved the same Defendants,
and similarly situated plaintiffs: Mazzei v. The Money Store
("Mazzei Action"), No. 01 Cv. 5694(JGK) (S.D.N.Y. filed June 22,
2001).

The Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiffs' FAC pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  They first argue that
the judgment in the Mazzei Action bars the Plaintiffs' claims
pursuant to res judicata principles.  Next, they claim that the
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the relevant statutes of
limitations, and should not be tolled.

Judge Wright granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.  Specifically, he dismissed (i) without leave to
amend the Fee Split Class II in its entirety; (ii) without leave to
amend the Late Fee Class II, as to the class members who reside
outside of California,; (iii) without leave to amend Shirley
Piatt's individual claims; (iv) with leave to amend the Late Fee
Class II, as it pertains to California residents, within 21 days of
the order; (v) with leave to amend Asberry and Cordes' individual
claims, within 21 days of the Order; and (vi) without leave to
amend the Plaintiffs' UCL claims, without leave to amend.

Among other things, the Judge finds that (i) the Fee-Split Class
II's claims are barred by res judicata; (ii) the Late Fee Class II
claims are not barred on res judicata grounds; (iii) Piatt is not a
California resident, and thus her Late Fee Class II claims are also
barred by the statute of limitations; (iv) the Plaintiffs' UCL
claims are barred by the statute of limitations; and (v) because
the Plaintiffs' remaining claims are barred by the statute of
limitations absent some form of tolling, she declines to address
the Defendants' remaining arguments.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Mh6mYj from Leagle.com.

Shirley Piatt, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Darrell Asberry, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated & Michael Cordes, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Robert J.
Girard, II -- rgirard@girardbengali.com -- Girard Bengali APC, Paul
S. Grobman, The Law Offices of Paul Grobman, pro hac vice & Omar H.
Bengali -- obengali@girardbengali.com -- Girard Bengali APC.

The Money Store, TMS Mortgage Inc, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. & HomEq
Servicing Corporation, Defendants, represented by Amy P. Williams
-- amy.williams@troutman.com -- Troutman Sanders LLP, pro hac vice
& Jessica Rose Ellis Lohr -- jessica.lohr@troutmansanders.com --
Troutman Sanders LLP.


MONSANTO CO: Belews Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-------------------------------------------------------
JOHN BELEW and MARILYN BELEW, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY,
the Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01458 (E.D. Mo., Aug. 30, 2018),
seeks to recover damages suffered by Plaintiff as a direct and
proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff maintains that Roundup
(TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health,
unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and
lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated
with its use. The Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking
thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were
avoidable.

"Roundup" refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, and Roundup Prodry Herbicide.

Monsanto Company, together with its subsidiaries, provides
agricultural products for farmers worldwide. It operates in two
segments, Seeds and Genomics, and Agricultural Productivity.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222 2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421 0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MONSANTO CO: Faces Johnson Suit over Sales of Herbicide Roundup
---------------------------------------------------------------
MACK JOHNSON, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant,
Case No. 4:18-cv-01450 (E.D. Mo., Aug. 29, 2018), seeks to recover
damages suffered by Plaintiff as a direct and proximate result of
Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the
design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting,
marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the
herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient
glyphosate.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff maintains that Roundup
(TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health,
unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and
lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated
with its use. The Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking
thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were
avoidable.

"Roundup" refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, and Roundup Prodry Herbicide.

Monsanto Company, together with its subsidiaries, provides
agricultural products for farmers worldwide. It operates in two
segments, Seeds and Genomics, and Agricultural Productivity.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222 2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421 0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MONSANTO CO: Hightower Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
----------------------------------------------------------
JUNE HIGHTOWER, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant,
Case No. 4:18-cv-01449 (E.D. Mo., Aug. 29, 2018), seeks to recover
damages suffered by Plaintiff as a direct and proximate result of
Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the
design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting,
marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the
herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient
glyphosate.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff maintains that Roundup
(TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health,
unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and
lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated
with its use. The Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking
thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were
avoidable.

"Roundup" refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, and Roundup Prodry Herbicide.

Monsanto Company, together with its subsidiaries, provides
agricultural products for farmers worldwide. It operates in two
segments, Seeds and Genomics, and Agricultural Productivity.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222 2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421 0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MONSANTO CO: Lasseigne Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
----------------------------------------------------------
STACEY LASSEIGNE, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01459 (E.D. Mo., Aug. 30, 2018), seeks
to recover damages suffered by Plaintiff as a direct and proximate
result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in connection
with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff maintains that Roundup
(TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health,
unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and
lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated
with its use. The Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking
thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were
avoidable.

"Roundup" refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, and Roundup Prodry Herbicide.

Monsanto Company, together with its subsidiaries, provides
agricultural products for farmers worldwide. It operates in two
segments, Seeds and Genomics, and Agricultural Productivity.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222 2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421 0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MONSANTO CO: Miller & Merriett Sue over Herbicide Roundup
---------------------------------------------------------
FAYE MILLER and CARL MERRIETT, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY,
the Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01454 (E.D. Mo., Aug. 29, 2018),
seeks to recover damages suffered by Plaintiff as a direct and
proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff maintains that Roundup
(TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health,
unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and
lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated
with its use. The Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking
thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were
avoidable.

"Roundup" refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, and Roundup Prodry Herbicide.

Monsanto Company, together with its subsidiaries, provides
agricultural products for farmers worldwide. It operates in two
segments, Seeds and Genomics, and Agricultural Productivity.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222 2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421 0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MONSANTO CO: Noe Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
----------------------------------------------------
GALEN NOE, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case
No. 4:18-cv-01475 (E.D. Mo., Aug. 31, 2018), seeks to recover
damages suffered by Plaintiff as a direct and proximate result of
Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the
design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting,
marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the
herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient
glyphosate.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff maintains that Roundup
(TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health,
unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and
lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated
with its use. The Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking
thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were
avoidable.

"Roundup" refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, and Roundup Prodry Herbicide.

Monsanto Company, together with its subsidiaries, provides
agricultural products for farmers worldwide. It operates in two
segments, Seeds and Genomics, and Agricultural Productivity.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eric D. Holland, Esq.
          HOLLAND LAW FIRM
          300 North Tucker, Suite 801
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: (314) 241 8111
          Facsimile: (314) 241 5554
          E-mail: eholland@allfela.com

               - and -

          Jessica L. Richman, Esq.
          PARKER WAICHMAN LLP
          6 Harbor Park Drive
          Port Washington, NY 11050
          Telephone: (516) 723 4627
          Facsimile: (516) 723 4727
          E-mail: jrichman@yourlawyer.com


MONSANTO CO: Russ Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-----------------------------------------------------
GAYLE RUSS, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case
No. 4:18-cv-01473 (E.D. Mo., Aug. 31, 2018), seeks to recover
damages suffered by Plaintiff as a direct and proximate result of
Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the
design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting,
marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the
herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient
glyphosate.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff maintains that Roundup
(TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health,
unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and
lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated
with its use. The Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking
thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were
avoidable.

"Roundup" refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, and Roundup Prodry Herbicide.

Monsanto Company, together with its subsidiaries, provides
agricultural products for farmers worldwide. It operates in two
segments, Seeds and Genomics, and Agricultural Productivity.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eric D. Holland, Esq.
          HOLLAND LAW FIRM
          300 North Tucker, Suite 801
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: (314) 241 8111
          Facsimile: (314) 241 5554
          E-mail: eholland@allfela.com

               - and -

          Jessica L. Richman, Esq.
          PARKER WAICHMAN LLP
          6 Harbor Park Drive
          Port Washington, NY 11050
          Telephone: (516) 723 4627


MONSANTO CO: Smiths Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------
AMOS L. SMITH JR. and RUBY SMITH, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01470 (E.D. Mo., Aug. 31,
2018), seeks to recover damages suffered by Plaintiff as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff maintains that Roundup
(TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health,
unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and
lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated
with its use. The Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking
thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were
avoidable.

"Roundup" refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, and Roundup Prodry Herbicide.

Monsanto Company, together with its subsidiaries, provides
agricultural products for farmers worldwide. It operates in two
segments, Seeds and Genomics, and Agricultural Productivity.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222 2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421 0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MONSANTO CO: Stump Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------
Ruth Stump, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant, Case
No. 3:18-cv-05319-VC (E.D. Mo., Aug. 29, 2018), seeks to recover
damages suffered by Plaintiff as a direct and proximate result of
Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the
design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting,
marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the
herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient
glyphosate.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff maintains that Roundup
(TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health,
unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and
lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated
with its use. The Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking
thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were
avoidable.

"Roundup" refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, and Roundup Prodry Herbicide.

Monsanto Company, together with its subsidiaries, provides
agricultural products for farmers worldwide. It operates in two
segments, Seeds and Genomics, and Agricultural Productivity.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Kirk J. Goza, Esq.
          Goza & Honnold LLC
          9500 Nall Ave., Suite 400
          Overland Park, KS 66207-2950
          Telephone: (913) 451 3433
          Facsimile: (913) 839 0567
          E-mail: kgoza@gohonlaw.com


MONSANTO CO: Thompson Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
---------------------------------------------------------
KIMBERLY B. THOMPSON INDIVIUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF JOYCE C. THOMPSON
(DECEASED), the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant,
Case No. 4:18-cv-01465 (E.D. Mo., Aug. 30, 2018), seeks to recover
damages suffered by Plaintiff as a direct and proximate result of
Defendant negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the
design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting,
marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the
herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active ingredient
glyphosate.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff maintains that Roundup
(TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health,
unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and
lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated
with its use. The Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking
thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were
avoidable.

"Roundup" refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, and Roundup Prodry Herbicide.

Monsanto Company, together with its subsidiaries, provides
agricultural products for farmers worldwide. It operates in two
segments, Seeds and Genomics, and Agricultural Productivity.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222 2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421 0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MORTGAGE CONTRACTING: Court to Approve Weinstein Case Accord
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Lawrence Weinstein, the Plaintiff, v.
Mortgage Contracting Services LLC, the Defendant, Case No.
5:14-cv-02521-JGB-SP (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Jesus G. Bernal
entered an order on Aug. 20, 2018, granting the motion for
attorney's fees and the motion for final approval of class action
settlement.

The Court reduced the incentive award from $20,000 to $15,000.

As stated on the record, on July 25, 2018, Defendant Mortgage
Contracting Services, LLC provided notice of settlement of this
action to all appropriate federal and state officials. Counsel is
requesting the order giving final approval of the proposed
settlement not be issued earlier than 90 days on which the
appropriate Federal official and the appropriate State official are
served with the notice. The Court granted this request, saying it
will not issue the judgment and order until October 23.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Dennis Frank Moss, Esq.
          15300 Ventura Blvd, Ste 207
          Sherman Oaks, CA 91403-5824
          Telephone: (310) 773 0323
          Facsimile: (818) 963 5954
          E-mail: dennis@dennismosslaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          Liat Leah Yamini, Esq.
          Jones Day, 555 S Flower St Fl 50
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 243 2317
          Facsimile: (213) 243 2539
          E-mail: lyamini@jonesday.com

               - and -

          Richard J Bergstrom
          MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
          Sacramento, CA
          Telephone: (858) 720 5100
          Facsimile: (858) 720 5125


MURRAY GOULBURN: 2 Law Firms File Investors' Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
Geoff Adams, writing for Shepparton News, reports that Melbourne
lawyers, Slater and Gordon, have filed a threatened class action
against former dairy co-operative, Murray Goulburn, on behalf of
investors in the Murray Goulburn Unit Trust.

The lawyers announced this year they were proposing the class
action and on Aug. 16 filed the action with the Victorian registry
of the Federal Court.

The action revolves around the claim investors in the unit trust
were misled by a profit forecast and were further misled by the
company breaching continuous disclosure rules.

Slater and Gordon said it had more than 1000 investors signed up,
including some dairy farmers.

The claim has been brought on behalf of current and former
investors who acquired units in Murray Goulburn's trust between May
29, 2015 and April 26, 2016, including through the initial public
offering in 2015.

Slater and Gordon senior lawyer Andrew Paull said the firm had a
strong interest in this class action.

"Our clients collectively invested many millions of dollars in the
company, on the back of statements by Murray Goulburn that appear
to have been made without any reasonable basis," Mr Paull said.

"More than 40 per cent of that investment value was lost in April
2016, when the company ultimately withdrew its previous market
guidance.

"Murray Goulburn investors understandably feel that they have been
misled and have engaged Slater and Gordon to seek to recover their
losses in court."

IMF Bentham is funding the class action and participants will not
be required to pay any fees unless the class action is successful.

The parties are expected to appear in the court on September 21 to
determine the next steps.

Canadian company Saputo has bought most of Murray Goulburn's
assets, but Murray Goulburn has set aside some cash to deal with
any litigation. [GN]


MURRAY GOULBURN: New Class Action May Delay Wind-Up, Payments
-------------------------------------------------------------
Simone Smith, writing for The Weekly Times, reports that a new
class action against defunct dairy processor Murray Goulburn could
delay the wind-up of the former co-operative and payment of
remaining share money to dairy farmers.

A class action, on behalf of more than 1000 investors, filed by law
firm Slater and Gordon on Aug. 20, adds to an existing class action
by John Webster, a trustee for the Elcar Pty Ltd Super Trust Fund.

There's also ongoing Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
action against Murray Goulburn.

These relate to Murray Goulburn cutting its farmgate milk price and
downgrading its profit forecast in April 2016.

The profit forecast went from an initial forecast of $85.8 million
in May 2015 to $63 million in March 2016, then $39-$42 million in
April 2016.

The value of Murray Goulburn units collapsed as a result of the
April 2016 downgrade.

But despite these legal woes hanging over Murray Goulburn, shares
were trading at 33c on Aug. 20.

These shares, representing a potential of what payout could still
come to former dairy farmer suppliers, have risen steadily from 24c
early in July.

Following the Murray Goulburn extraordinary general meeting in
April, where shareholders voted to sell Murray Goulburn's assets
and liabilities to Canadian dairy giant Saputo for $1.31 billion,
shares dropped to 14c from 94.5c overnight.

This took into account the 80c payment to shareholders in May from
the sale to Saputo.

There is no timeline for when Murray Goulburn shareholders will
receive their additional money.

On August 20's value, plus the 80 cents/share payout, the combined
total would be more than $1. Murray Goulburn shareholders who
bought shares before it listed on the ASX paid $1 for their
shares.

In a statement to the ASX on Aug. 20, Murray Goulburn said it
intended to defend the latest action.  Murray Goulburn company
secretary Richa Puri did not respond to questions from The Weekly
Times.

Some farmers told The Weekly Times they feared this newest case
would further erode potential share returns.

Murray Goulburn held over $235 million from the sale to Saputo,
with $195 million earmarked for potential litigation costs.

The Slater and Gordon claim alleged Murray Goulburn mislead
investors by downgrading the profit forecast "without a reasonable
basis".

The claim also alleged Murray Goulburn entities breached continuous
disclosure laws by failing to announce the FY16 downgrade prior to
April 27 2016. [GN]


NATHAN KASED: Baru Sues over Signing Fee Agreements
---------------------------------------------------
JESSICA BARU, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. NATHAN KASED, an individual; KASED LAW
GROUP, APC, a California professional corporation; and DOES 1-100,
inclusive the Defendant, Case No. 37-2018-00044777-CU-BT-CTL (Cal.
Super. Ct., Sept. 5, 2018), alleges that the Defendants engaged in
unfair business practices, breach of fiduciary duty, and
professional negligence.

According to the complaint, the Defendants fraudulently induced
each of the members of the Plaintiff Class into signing fee
agreements with this language by affirmatively stating that the
provision was lawful, or by concealing the fact that it was
unlawful.  The payment of the "true retainer" by each member of the
Plaintiff Class resulted in the total fee paid to the Defendants to
be unconscionable within the meaning of Cal. Rules of Professional
Conduct, Rule 4-200.  Each of the members of the Plaintiff Class
paid the so-called "true retainer" to the Defendants.  Upon receipt
of the "true retainer" from each of the members of the Plaintiff
Class, the Defendants commingled these funds with their own,
separate funds, rather than deposit them into the Defendants'
client trust account.

The Defendants' law practice is focused on various aspects of
employment and wage and hour litigation, with a primary focus on
representing plaintiffs in such litigation. As is the general
custom and practice in this type of litigation, the Defendants are
often, if not always, retained on a contingency basis, which is set
forth in the Defendants' standard fee agreement.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph A. Lara, Esq.
          Bart Blechschmidt, Esq.
          BUSINESS LAW GROUP, PC
          906 Sycamore Ave., Ste. 100
          Vista, CA 92081
          Telephone: (760) 431 7771
          Facsimile: (760) 431 1116


NEW MEXICO: Settles Class Action Over Driver's Authorization Card
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dan McKay, writing for Albuquerque Journal, reports that New Mexico
residents who want a driver's authorization card -- not a license
issued under the U.S. Real ID Act -- should have it easier next
time they head to the Motor Vehicle Division.

A coalition of community groups has reached a settlement with the
state Taxation and Revenue Department that expands the list of
acceptable documents for proving age, identity and New Mexico
residency.

It also ensures that applicants don't have to take a Social
Security card to get the driver's authorization card.

The settlement resolves a class-action lawsuit that accused the
state of illegally denying the authorization cards and similar IDs
to New Mexicans who couldn't or didn't want to provide the
documents required for a federally compliant driver's license.

Under a 2016 law, New Mexico has a two-tiered system for drivers'
licenses -- one that complies with the Real ID Act and one that
doesn't. The less-stringent option is particularly important,
advocates say, for homeless people, the elderly and immigrants. It
allows people to drive but is not good for federal purposes, such
as boarding airliners.

Former Santa Fe Mayor David Coss, the lead plaintiff in the
lawsuit, said he was improperly turned away when trying to get a
driver's authorization card. The denial meant he couldn't drive
legally, he said, which interfered with his caretaking
responsibilities for relatives.

"It hurt my family. It hurt me," Mr. Coss told a news conference on
Aug. 21. "But as I pursued this, I found it was hurting lots of New
Mexicans all over New Mexico."

State District Judge David Thomson approved the settlement late on
Aug. 17.  The state Motor Vehicle Division agreed to new training
for employees, an appeals process for applicants who are denied a
credential in certain circumstances and an expansion of acceptable
documents.

The state also dropped a requirement to show proof of an
"identification number" -- such as a Social Security card -- for
applicants who want the driver's authorization card.

Mr. Coss is one of seven plaintiffs identified by name in the
lawsuit, filed in January. The New Mexico Coalition to End
Homelessness and Somos un Pueblo Unido, a group that advocates for
immigrants' rights, are also plaintiffs.

Marcela Díaz, executive director of Somos un Pueblo Unido, said
the settlement is a sensible solution to help people who need
access to the driver's authorization card.

Even for people who don't drive, an ID of some kind is needed to
cash a check, open a bank account or rent a hotel room -- "critical
tools for residents to navigate everyday life,"
Ms. Diaz said.

The lawsuit doesn't affect driver's licenses issued to comply with
the Real ID Act.

A spokesman for the MVD said the agency is committed to helping New
Mexico residents obtain either the authorization card or the
driver's license. [GN]


NEW ZEALAND: Conifer Grove Residents Urged to File Roadworks Case
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ben Leahy, writing for NZ Herald, reports that a Queen's Counsel
lawyer was able to win a large financial payout from Auckland
Council after proving his Herne Bay house had been damaged by heavy
roadworks machinery, the Herald has discovered.

Revelations of the 2010 payout come as Conifer Grove residents say
they are locked in a David-and-Goliath battle with the NZ Transport
Agency and construction firm CPB Contractors over roadworks on the
Southern Motorway.

The home owners allege vibrations from rumbling machinery working
on the motorway is causing hundreds-of-thousands of damage to their
properties -- a claim the NZTA denies.

Their plight has caught the attention of law firm Adina Thorn,
which says it is interested in speaking to the home owners to
understand whether there was a case for a class action.

Retired QC Paul Cavanagh, meanwhile, says he went through a similar
problem almost 10 years ago when roadworks on Curran Street sent
cracks snaking through the walls of his Herne Bay townhouse.

Yet -- unlike the Conifer Grove residents -- Cavanagh spent a legal
career representing those affected by public building projects and
was well equipped to sue for damages.

He didn't reveal how much he won in compensation, but said it was
high enough for Auckland Council "to squabble over and try and
avoid paying".

"It just so happened they shouldn't have upset my house," he said.

He recommended that -- with potentially a dozen or more Conifer
Grove residents alleging the motorway roadworks had damaged their
homes -- they band together to mount their case.

"Get a good lawyer and act as a group," he said, when asked what
they should do. [GN]


NEWALTA ENVIRONMENTAL: Berryman Seeks to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled CHRIS BERRYMAN, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. NEWALTA
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
2:18-cv-00793-NBF (W.D. Pa.), Mr. Berryman moves the Court for an
order:

   1. conditionally certifying a class of:

      "all current and former solids control consultants employed
      by, or working on behalf of Newalta Environmental Services,
      Inc. who were classified as independent contractors and
      paid a day rate basis and not paid overtime during the last
      three years."

   2. directing judicial notice be sent to all Putative Class
      Members;

   3. directing mailing and e-mailing of the proposed notice,
      along with a reminder notice after 30 days;

   4. directing Newalta to post the notice documents at Newalta's
      offices for the entire opt-in period;

   5. authorizing follow up calls to ensure returned notices are
      delivered to the Putative Class Members;

   6. directing Newalta to produce to Class Counsel the contact
      information for each Putative Class Member within 20 days
      of the Court's Order; and

   7. authorizing 60-day notice period for Putative Class
      Members to join the case.

Attorneys In Charge For Plaintiff:

          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: 713 352 1100
          Facsimile: 713 352 3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Joshua P. Geist, Esq.
          GOODRICH & GEIST, P.C.
          3634 California Ave.
          Pittsburgh, PA 15212
          Telephone: (412) 766 1455
          Facsimile: (412) 766 0300
          E-mail: josh@goodrichandgeist.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH, P.L.L.C.
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877 8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877 8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com


NINE ENERGY: Court Partly Grants Bid to Dismiss Patterson Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
granted in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the First Amended
Class Action Complaint in the case captioned RYAN PATTERSON,
Plaintiff, v. NINE ENERGY SERVICE, LLC, Defendant. No. CIV 17-1116
JB/GBW. (D.M.N.).

Patterson now alleges in this class action that Nine Energy failed
to pay him and other employees overtime wages in violation of the
New Mexico Minimum Wage Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. Section 50-4-22(D).

Nine Energy moves the Court to dismiss this case for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and to compel arbitration. Nine Energy
first contends that Patterson's claims fall within the Arbitration
Agreement's scope, because the Arbitration Agreement's provisions
cover all disputes, claims, or disagreements relating to
Plaintiff's employment.

Nine Energy then argues that the Arbitration Agreement contains
adequate consideration, asserting that the bargained for exchange
in this case was Plaintiff's offer of employment with Nine Energy
in exchange for signing the Confidentiality and Dispute Resolution
Agreement as well as the Parties' mutual agreement to submit all
employment disputes to arbitration.

Patterson responds. According to Patterson, the Arbitration
Agreement section allowing Nine Energy to bring an action for
injunctive relief in court to enforce an employee's confidentiality
obligations, such as the protection of trade secrets, represents a
unilateral carve-out favoring Nine Energy and is therefore
unconscionable. Second, Patterson avers that the Arbitration
Agreement contains no consideration and is thus illusory.

Under Section 4 of the FAA, a party aggrieved by another party's
failure to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may
petition a federal court for an order directing that such
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.
If one party's refusal to arbitrate under a written agreement
aggrieves another party, the district court, upon petition, shall
hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not
in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to
proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.

Nine Energy replies.   

Nine Energy first asserts that the Arbitration Agreement's
consideration is Patterson's initial offer of employment and not
continued at-will employment, because Patterson signed the
Arbitration Agreement on the same day he accepted his employment
offer and did not begin working for Nine Energy until twenty days
later. Additionally, Nine Energy contends that "there was separate,
valid consideration for the Agreement. In exchange for Plaintiff
agreeing to arbitrate his employment-related disputes, Nine Energy
promised not only to hire Plaintiff, but also to provide him access
to its confidential information and trade secrets.

The Surreply

Patterson first asserts that Nine Energy's employment offer was not
contingent on signing the Arbitration Agreement, so the employment
offer is not consideration for the agreement.  

Second, Patterson takes issue with Nine Energy's assertion that it
promised to provide confidential information and trade secrets to
Patterson as consideration for him signing the Arbitration
Agreement.  

Third, Patterson argues for the first time that the Arbitration
Agreement is unconscionable, because the terms of the agreement
prevent Plaintiff from vindicating his statutory rights under the
FLSA.

New Mexico Law

New Mexico's Uniform Arbitration Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. Section
44-7a-1 to -32 (NMUAA), provides that an agreement to submit any
controversy arising between the parties to arbitration is valid,
enforceable and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law
or in equity for the revocation of a contract. If the court
concludes that there is an enforceable agreement to arbitrate, it
shall order the parties to arbitrate. Where the provision for
arbitration is disputed, the court's function is to determine
whether there is an agreement to arbitrate and to order arbitration
where an agreement is found.

Procedural Unconscionability

Procedural unconscionability may be found where there was
inequality in the contract formation. A contract is procedurally
unconscionable only where the inequality is so gross that one
party's choice is effectively non-existent.

When assessing procedural unconscionability, courts should consider
whether the contract is one of adhesion. An adhesion contract is a
standardized contract that a transacting party with superior
bargaining strength offers to a weaker party on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis, without opportunity for bargaining.
Adhesion contracts generally warrant heightened judicial scrutiny
because the drafting party is in a superior bargaining position.
Although not all adhesion contracts are unconscionable, an adhesion
contract is procedurally unconscionable and unenforceable `when the
terms are patently unfair to the weaker party.

Substantive Unconscionability

Substantive unconscionability requires courts to consider whether
the contract terms are commercially reasonable and fair, the
purpose and effect of the terms, the one-sidedness of the terms,
and other similar public policy concerns to determine the legality
and fairness of the contract terms themselves. Accordingly, when
examining a contract for substantive unconscionability, courts must
"examine the terms on the face of the contract and  consider the
practical consequences of those terms. Thus, the party bearing the
burden of proving substantive unconscionability need not make any
particular evidentiary showing and can instead persuade the
factfinder that the terms of a contract are substantively
unconscionable by analyzing the contract on its face.

When its terms are unreasonably favorable to one party, a contract
may be held to be substantively unconscionable.

With respect to arbitration agreements specifically, the Supreme
Court of New Mexico has held that arbitration agreements are
substantively unconscionable and thus unenforceable where the
arbitration agreement contains a unilateral carve out that
explicitly exempts from mandatory arbitration those judicial
remedies that a lender is likely to need, while providing no such
exemption for the borrower.

THE PARTIES HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED DIVERSITY JURISDICTION

The Court concludes that the parties have not presented
sufficiently clear evidence establishing diversity jurisdiction.
The Amended Complaint does not, however, allege the location of
Nine Energy's principal place of business. The Amended Complaint
alleges that at least one NM Class Member is from a different state
than Defendant, but the Court cannot confirm that for two reasons.
First, the Court does not know Nine Energy's principal place of
business. Second, the Amended Complaint does not allege the
citizenship of any of the NM Class Members. Patterson alleges that
the NM class members consist of Defendant's current and former
Operators who received pay on a salary or salary-plus-bonus basis
that worked over 40 hours in at least one workweek in New Mexico
since the time Defendant began paying Operators on a salary or
salary-plus bonus basis in New Mexico. Working for at least one
week in New Mexico does not, however, show that an individual is a
citizen of New Mexico, because, for diversity jurisdiction
purposes, a person's domicile determines citizenship. A person's
domicile is defined as the place in which the party has a residence
in fact and an intent to remain indefinitely, as of the time of the
filing of the lawsuit. Patterson's Amended Complaint does not show
the domicile of any of the putative class members.

Because the citizenships of the parties are not adequately pled,
the Court will enter an order requiring the parties to show cause
within ten calendar days why the Court should not dismiss this case
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. If the parties do not
adequately demonstrate that the Court has jurisdiction, the Court
will dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and not decide any issues on the merits.

Accordingly, the Court ordered that: (i) if the Court has
subject-matter jurisdiction, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
First Amended Class Action Complaint and Compel Arbitration, filed
December 6, 2017, will be granted in part; and (ii) the requests in
the Surreply in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
Class Action Complaint and Serve, filed January 10, 2018, are
granted.  The parties are directed to show cause within ten
calendar days why this case should not be dismissed for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. If the Court is satisfied that it has
subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court will compel arbitration and
stay the case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 30, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8xweohc from
Leagle.com.

Ryan Patterson, Plaintiff, represented by J. Derek Braziel --
jdbraziel@l-b-law.com -- Lee & Braziel LLP, Jack L. Siegel --
jack@siegellawgroup.biz -- Siegel Law Group PLLC & Travis Andrew
Gasper, Lee & Braziel, LLP.

Nine Energy Service, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jennifer L.
Anderson -- janderson@joneswalker.com -- Jones Walker LLP &
Christopher S. Mann -- cmann@joneswalker.com -- Jones Walker LLP.


NORTHSHORE UNIVERSITY: Conditional Class Certification Bid Shelved
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Sakeena Barrett, the Plaintiff, v. Northshore
University HealthSystem, the Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-09088
(N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge Andrea R. Wood entered an order taking
under advisement for ruling the Plaintiff's Pre−Discovery Motion
for Conditional Certification and Court−Authorized Notice to
Potential Opt−In Plaintiffs.

According to the docket entry made by the Clerk of Court on August
29, 2018, the Court's written ruling on Plaintiff's Pre−Discovery
Motion for Conditional Certification and Court−Authorized Notice
to Potential Opt−In Plaintiffs has been taken under advisement
for ruling. Discovery in this matter remains stayed.  Status
hearing is set for October 31, 2018, at 9:00 a.m.


NTT DATA: Mandala & Barnett Sue over Background Checks, Race Bias
-----------------------------------------------------------------
GEORGE MANDALA, and CHARLES BARNETT, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. NTT DATA, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 6:18-cv-06591 (W.D.N.Y., Aug. 15, 2018) alleges
violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

The Plaintiffs allege in the complaint that the Defendant has in
the past, and continues to, utilize a job applicant screening
process that systematically eliminates qualified African American
applicants based on their race, color or national origin.

NTT DATA, Inc. operates as an information technology (IT) services
company. NTT DATA, Inc. was formerly known as Keane, Inc. As a
result of acquisition of Keane, Inc. by NTT Data Corporation, NTT
DATA, Inc. name was changed in January 2011. The company was
founded in 1967 and is headquartered in Plano, Texas with
operations worldwide. As of January 3, 2011, NTT DATA, Inc.
operates as a subsidiary of NTT Data Corporation. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ossai Miazad, Esq.
          Christopher M. McNerney, Esq.
          Elizabeth V. Stork, Esq.
          OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 245-1000
          Facsimile: (646) 509-2060
          E-mail: om@outtengolden.com
                  cmcnerney@outtengolden.com
                  estork@outtengolden.com


O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE: Miller et al. Suit Moved to W.D. Missouri
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Joe Miller and Kenny Higgs,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, v. O'Reilly Automotive, Inc.; Ozark Automotive
Distributors, Inc.; and O'Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc., doing
business as: O'Reilly Auto Parts Omni Specialty Packaging, LLC,
Case No. 18CA-CC00153, was removed from the Circuit Court of Cass
County, Missouri to the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Missouri (Kansas City) on Aug. 30, 2018. The Missouri
Western District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:18-cv-00687-ODS to
the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Ortrie D.
Smith.

O'Reilly Auto Parts is an American auto parts retailer that
provides automotive aftermarket parts, tools, supplies, equipment,
and accessories in the United States serving both the professional
service providers and do-it-yourself customers.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Bryan White, Esq.
          Gene P. Graham, Jr., Esq.
          WHITE GRAHAM BUCKLEY & CARR, LLC
          19049 East Valley View Parkway, Suite C
          Independence, MO 64055
          Telephone: (816) 373 9080
          Facsimile: (816) 373 9319
          E-mail: bwhite@wagblaw.com

               - and -

          Dirk L. Hubbard, Esq.
          Thomas V. Bender, Esq.
          HORN, AYLWARD & BANDY, LLC
          2600 Grand Boulevard, Suite 1100
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Telephone: (816) 421 0700
          Facsimile: (816) 421 0899
          E-mail: dhubbard@hab-law.com
                  ggraham@wagblaw.com
                  tbender@hab-law.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Edward T. Pivin, Esq.
          Robert W Tormohlen, Esq.
          Scott A Wissel, Esq.
          Thomas P. Berra, Jr., Esq.
          LEWIS RICE LLC-STL
          600 Washington Ave., Ste. 2500
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: (314) 444 7851
          Facsimile: (314) 612 7851
          E-mail: epivin@lewisrice.com
                  rwtormohlen@lewisricekc.com
                  sawissel@lewisricekc.com
                  tberra@lewisrice.com


PHILZ COFFEE: Goldboss  Sues over Customer Bill Surcharge
---------------------------------------------------------
LAUREN GOLDBOSS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. PHILZ COFFEE, INC., a Delaware
Corporation dba in California as PHILZ COFFEE; and 17 DOES 1 to 25,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. CGC-18-569411 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Sep. 4, 2018), alleges that the Defendant is misleading the public
as to the actual prices of their food and drinks by not raising
their menu prices, and instead adding an undisclosed, unauthorized,
and unlawful surcharge onto a customer's bill.

The Defendant owns restaurants that represent to the general public
certain prices for food and drinks in their in-restaurant and
advertised menus, but then, after the food and/or drink is ordered,
the Defendant adds a surcharge, including, but not limited to, a
surcharge which it calls "Gov Mandate," which is actually an
undisclosed, unauthorized, and unlawful charge, to the balance of
the final bill total which consumers thereafter pay.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua Bordin-Wosk, Esq.
          Shannon Guevara, Esq.
          Talissa Mulholland, Esq.
          B|B LAW GROUP LLP
          6100 Center Drive, Suite 1100
          Howard Hughes Center
          Los Angeles, CA 90045
          Telephone: (323) 925 7800
          Facsimile: (323) 925 7801
          E-mail: JBordinWosk@BBLawGroupLLP.com
                  SGuevara@BBLawGroupLLP.com
                  TMulholland@BBLawGroupLLP.com


PINDUODUO INC: Oct. 22 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline Set
---------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP on Aug. 21 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Pinduoduo Inc. ("Pinduoduo" or the "Company")
(NASDAQ:  PDD) and certain of its officers and directors.   The
class action, filed in United States District Court, Southern
District of New York, and docketed under index 18-cv-07625, is on
behalf of a class consisting of all persons other than Defendants
who purchased or otherwise acquired the securities of Pinduoduo
Inc. ("Pinduoduo") pursuant and/or traceable to the Company's July
26, 2018 initial public offering (the "IPO" or the "Offering").
Plaintiff pursues claims against the Defendants, under the
Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act"), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 77 et
seq.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Pinduoduo securities
pursuant and/or traceable to the Company's July 26, 2018 IPO, you
have until October 22, 2018, to ask the Court to appoint you as
Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the Complaint can be
obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To discuss this action, contact
Robert S. Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or
888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who inquire by e-mail
are encouraged to include their mailing address, telephone number,
and the number of shares purchased.

Pinduoduo is an e-commerce platform allowing users to participate
in group buying deals.  The Company was founded in 2015 and is
based in Shanghai, China.  On or around July 26, 2018, Pinduoduo
completed its IPO, offering 85.6 million ADSs priced at $19.00 per
share and raising $1.63 billion.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements, as well as
failed to disclose material adverse facts about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects.  In the Registration Statement
and Prospectus issued in connection with Pinduoduo's IPO,
Defendants made materially false and misleading statements
regarding the Company's business, operational and compliance
policies. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Pinduoduo's controls
were ineffective to prevent third-party vendors from selling
counterfeit goods on the Company's online platform; (ii)
consequently, Pinduoduo's revenues and the number of active
merchants using its platform were traceable in part to unlawful
conduct and thus unsustainable; and (iii) as a result, Pinduoduo's
public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.

On July 31, 2018, and August 1, 2018, media outlets reported that
China's State Administration for Market Regulation was
investigating Pinduoduo after reports of third-party vendors
selling counterfeit goods on the Company's group-discounting
website.

On this news, the price of Pinduoduo ADSs fell $2.28, or 10.09%, to
close at $20.31 on August 1, 2018.  At the time of the filing of
the complaint, Pinduoduo's ADS price had not recovered, and traded
below its Offering price of $19.00 per share.

With offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Paris, The
Pomerantz Firm -- http://www.pomerantzlaw.com-- is acknowledged as
one of the premier firms in the areas of corporate, securities, and
antitrust class litigation.  Founded by the late Abraham L.
Pomerantz, known as the dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz
Firm pioneered the field of securities class actions.  Today, more
than 80 years later, the Pomerantz Firm continues in the tradition
he established, fighting for the rights of the victims of
securities fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate
misconduct.  The Firm has recovered numerous multimillion-dollar
damages awards on behalf of class members. [GN]


PINNACLE FOODS: Faces Rosenblatt Suit over Conagra Merger
---------------------------------------------------------
JORDAN ROSENBLATT, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PINNACLE FOODS INC.; ROGER
DEROMEDI; MARK CLOUSE; ANN FANDOZZI; MARK JUNG; JANE NIELSEN;
MUKTESH PANT; RAYMOND P. SILCOCK; IOANNIS SKOUFALOS; CONAGRA
BRANDS, INC.; and PATRIOT MERGER SUB INC, Defendants, Case No.
2018-0605 (Del. Ch., Aug. 15, 2018) alleges that the Defendants
omit material information in the Registration Statement filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission related to a merger
transaction.

On June 26, 2018, Pinnacle's Board of Directors caused the Company
to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with Conagra Brands,
Inc.  Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, Pinnacle's
stockholders will receive $43.11 in cash and 0.6494 shares of
Conagra common stock for each share of Pinnacle common stock they
hold.

On July 25, 2018, the Defendants filed a registration statement
with the SEC in connection with the Proposed Transaction. The
Registration Statement omits material information regarding the
Company's and Parent's financial projections, as well as the
valuation analyses performed by the Company's financial advisors in
connection with the Proposed Transaction, Evercore Group L.L.C. and
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC.

Pinnacle Foods Inc. manufactures, markets, and distributes branded
convenience food products in North America. The company sells its
products through supermarkets, grocery wholesalers and
distributors, mass merchandisers, super centers, convenience
stores, dollar stores, natural and organic food stores, drug
stores, warehouse clubs, and e-commerce websites in the United
States and Canada, as well as in military channels and foodservice
locations. It is headquartered in Parsippany, New Jersey. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Seth D. Rogrodsky, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          Jeremy J. Riley, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310

               - and -

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800


PRACHIMA LLC: Goldboss Says Customer Bill Surcharge "Illegal"
-------------------------------------------------------------
LAUREN GOLDBOSS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. PRACHIMA, LLC, a California Limited
Liability Company, doing business as SUBWAY; and DOES 1 to 25,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. CGC-18-569412 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Sep. 4, 2018), alleges that the Defendant is misleading the public
as to the actual prices of their food and drinks by not raising
their menu prices, and instead adding an undisclosed, unauthorized,
and unlawful surcharge onto a customer's bill.

The Defendant owns restaurants that represent to the general public
certain prices for food and drinks in their in-restaurant and
advertised menus, but then, after the food and/or drink is ordered,
the Defendant adds a surcharge, including, but not limited to, a
surcharge which it calls "Gov Mandate," which is actually an
undisclosed, unauthorized, and unlawful charge, to the balance of
the final bill total which consumers thereafter pay.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua Bordin-Wosk, Esq.
          Shannon Guevara, Esq.
          Talissa Mulholland, Esq.
          B|B LAW GROUP LLP
          6100 Center Drive, Suite 1100
          Howard Hughes Center
          Los Angeles, CA 90045
          Telephone: (323) 925 7800
          Facsimile: (323) 925 7801
          E-mail: JBordinWosk@BBLawGroupLLP.com
                  SGuevara@BBLawGroupLLP.com
                  TMulholland@BBLawGroupLLP.com


PRIME/PARK: Kim Files Suit Class Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Prime/Park Labrea,
LLC, et al. The case is styled as Kim, David individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Does 1 to
100, Prime/Park Labrea 10, L.P., Prime/Park Labrea Holdings, L.P.,
Prime/Park Labrea Investements L.P., Prime/Park Labrea Titleholder,
LLC, Prime/Park Labrea, LLC, Defendants, Case No. CGC18569721 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Francisco, Sept. 13, 2018).

The case type is stated as "Business Tort".

Prime/Park Labrea, LLC is a domestic company located at 50
CALIFORNIA ST STE 2525 SAN FRANCISCO CA 94111.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     SCHUBERT, ROBERT C., Esq.
     Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP
     3 Embarcadero Ctr #1650
     San Francisco, CA 94111
     Phone: (415) 788-4220
     Fax: (415) 788-0161
     E-mail: rschubert@schubertlawfirm.com


RECEIVABLE MANAGEMENT: Placeholder Bid for Class Cert. Filed
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned GINA ALLENDE, Individually and on Behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. THE RECEIVABLE
MANAGEMENT SERVICES LLC, the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-01377
(E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order certifying
classes in this case, appointing the Plaintiff as class
representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiff file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative’s claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class.  Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir. 2017).
One defendant has attempted a similar tactic by sending a certified
check to the proposed class representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio,
Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D. Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern
Account Systems of Connecticut, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24, 2016).

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482 8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482 8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


RESTAURANT BRANDS: Tim Hortons Franchisee Settles License Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Aleksandra Sagan, writing for The Canadian Press, reports that a
Tim Horton's franchisee who had brought legal action against the
chain's parent company has settled his suit and severed his ties to
the company.  

Mark Kuziora operated two locations in Toronto and was an outspoken
member of the Great White North Franchisee Association, an
unsanctioned franchisee group started more than a year ago. He was
also the lead plaintiff in a class action against Restaurant Brands
International Inc.

He filed a $4 million lawsuit against RBI after the company
allegedly refused to renew a licence for one of his two stores in
bad faith. RBI maintained it was right in its decision not to
approve a new restaurant agreement, which expires at the end of
August.

Mr. Kuziora met with Tim Hortons president Alex Macedo several
weeks ago, said Duncan Fulton, RBI's chief corporate officer.

The pair had a productive conversation and signed an agreement
settling the suit about two weeks ago, he said.

"We certainly believe that it's in everyone's best interest," he
said.

Mr. Kuziora sold his two locations back to the company, Mr. Fulton
said, and a new franchisee will take over operating them.

Fulton would not disclose any terms of the settlement.

GWNFA broke its silence on the issue in a letter to members from
president David Hughes that said the group had been asked to remain
silent while lawyers worked out a deal.

"We tried everything to have RBI rescind Mark's situation, but to
no avail," Mr. Hughes wrote. "We have suspicions that their only
goal was to send a message to our board!"

This was a settlement between Messrs. Kuziora and Macedo, and
nobody else, Mr. Fulton said when asked to respond to the
allegations within the letter.

RBI has had a fraught relationship with some of its franchisees in
recent months.

A group of them banded together to form GWNFA, which now also
boasts an American chapter and claims to represent about half of
franchisees in Canada and the U.S.  The group works to give a voice
to franchisees concerned about alleged mismanagement.

RBI has been reluctant to talk to GWNFA representatives. Instead,
the company chooses to rely on its elected franchisee advisory
board, whose scope it expanded in recent months in an effort to
ease ongoing tensions.

The company said Mr. Macedo and his leadership team will continue
to work with the advisory board after the president for Tim Hortons
Canada, Sami Siddiqui, accepted a new role as chief financial
officer for its Burger King brand. [GN]


RHINEHART RAILROAD: Court Conditionally Certifies FLSA Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled JAMES DIEFFENBAUCH, individually and on
behalf of all similarly situated, the Plaintiff(s), v. RHINEHART
RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
8:17-cv-01180-LEK-CFH (N.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge Lawrence E. Kahn
entered an order:

   1. conditionally certifying this collective Fair Labor
      Standards Act class:

      "all persons employed by Rhinehart Railroad Construction,
      Inc. as "Railroad Workers" ("Operators/Laborers") in
      Pennsylvania, North Carolina, New York, Massachusetts,
      and/or Maryland from October 2014 to the present, who
      worked more than forty (40) hours per week and were paid an
      hourly rate but were not paid for travel time from: (a)
      their home to an assigned project location; (b) one
      assigned project location to another assigned project
      location; and/or (c) an assigned project locations back to
      their home";

   2. within 30 days, directing Defendant to produce to
      Plaintiff a list containing the full names, job titles,
      last known addresses, and dates of employment for all
      putative class members who worked as Operator/Laborers for
      Defendant in Pennsylvania, North Carolina, New York,
      Massachusetts, and/or Maryland between October 2014 and the
      present;

   3. directing Plaintiff that any notice sent by them to any of
      the individuals disclosed by Defendant as putative class
      members be sent by first-class mail;

   4. directing individuals disclosed by Defendant as putative
      class members to have 60 days from the date the notices to
      file a form opting-in to this action; and

   5. directing neither party to contact any individual disclosed
      by Defendant as a putative class member for reasons related
      to this litigation until after such individual has filed a
      form indicating their consent to opt-in to this lawsuit.


RIPPLE LABS: Calif. Court Denies Motion to Remand Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP, in an article for Lexology, reports that
on August 10, 2018, United States District Judge Phyllis J.
Hamilton of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California denied a motion to remand to state court a
putative securities class action against digital currency issuer
Ripple Labs, Inc., one of its subsidiaries, and its Chief Executive
Officer. Coffey v. Ripple Labs Inc., No. 18-cv-03286-PJH (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 10, 2018).  Plaintiff, a purchaser of XRP, Ripple's digital
currency, sued defendants in California state court, alleging
violations of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") and
California's blue sky statute.  Plaintiff alleges that defendants'
sale of XRP to investors in an initial coin offering (in which
digital assets are sold to consumers in exchange for legal tender
or other cryptocurrencies) constituted an unregistered sale of
securities in violation of the Securities Act and the California
Corporations Code.  Defendants removed the action to federal court
pursuant to Section 1453 of the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"),
and plaintiff moved to remand the action to state court.  The Court
denied plaintiff's motion, holding that Section 1453 of CAFA
provides an independent right to removal that is not precluded by
the anti-removal provision in Section 22(a) of the Securities Act,
at least in cases not involving a "covered security" as defined in
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA").

The Court observed that the core issue in question -- whether
Securities Act claims bar a defendant from removing an action on
the basis of state law claims that independently satisfy CAFA's
jurisdictional requirements -- was an issue of first impression.
The parties and the Court agreed that, absent the assertion of
Securities Act claims, defendants could properly remove the action
under CAFA based on plaintiff's assertion of state law claims
because plaintiff sought $340 million in damages on behalf of a
putative class of thousands of investors.  Under Section 1453 of
CAFA, a defendant may remove an action if the amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million, the putative class has more than 100 members,
and the citizenship of any class member is diverse from the
citizenship of any one defendant.  A few specific exceptions apply,
including -- importantly -- that securities class actions
"concerning a covered security" under SLUSA are not removable under
CAFA. That exception did not apply, however, because XRP is not a
security traded on a national securities exchange (or a security
issued by an investment company) and thus is not a "covered
security."

Plaintiff argued that Section 22(a) of the Securities Act (15
U.S.C. § 77v(a)) nevertheless bars removal of any action that
includes a Securities Act claim (subject to certain inapplicable
exceptions).  The Court disagreed with plaintiff's contention that
the Supreme Court's decision earlier this year in Cyan, Inc. v.
Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018), as
well as the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Kircher v. Putnam
Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633 (2006), and the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031
(9th Cir. 2008), required the Court to remand the action to state
court.  In Cyan, the Supreme Court held that state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over class actions alleging only Securities
Act violations, and that SLUSA does not override the bar against
removal of such actions set forth in Section 22 of the Securities
Act.  In Kircher, the Supreme Court addressed only whether an order
remanding a case removed under SLUSA is appealable (as opposed to a
case removed under CAFA). The Court thus held that Cyan, another
decision purely addressing SLUSA, and Kircher "have nothing to do
with CAFA."  The Court then turned to Luther, in which the Ninth
Circuit addressed both CAFA and Section 22(a) of the Securities
Act.  Luther held that a state court class action alleging only
violations of the Securities Act was not removable under CAFA,
because Section 22(a) addressed "a narrow, precise, and specific
subject," i.e., "claims arising under the Securities Act" and was
"not submerged by" the more generalized coverage in CAFA.  The
Court found that this case is distinguishable from Luther because,
here, plaintiff alleged claims under both California law and the
Securities Act, and defendants had removed the action based on the
California claims, which independently satisfied CAFA's
requirements—a situation that Luther does not address.  The Court
also stated that part of Luther's reasoning has been undermined by
the Supreme Court's decision in Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co.,
LLV v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014), which addressed another
decision that, like Luther, relied on the Ninth Circuit's general
rule that "removal statutes are strictly construed against removal"
and that "any doubt is resolved against removability." In Dart
Cherokee, the Supreme Court stated that "no antiremoval presumption
attends cases invoking CAFA, which Congress enacted to facilitate
adjudication of certain class actions in federal court." The Court
noted that Luther's rationale was inconsistent with Dart Cherokee.

The Court then considered the general statutory operation of
removal provisions, and pointed out that, under other removal
regimes, such as 28 U.S.C. Section 1441's provision for federal
question or diversity jurisdiction, defendants may successfully
remove actions without satisfying the requirements of other
inapplicable removal provisions.  Emphasizing that a defendant may
successfully remove an action from state to federal court by
pointing to and complying with a statutory basis for removal rather
than every statutory basis for removal, the Court turned to the
plain language of CAFA's removal provision, Section 1453(b).  The
Court concluded that, read as a whole, CAFA's plain language
"creates original jurisdiction for and removability of all class
actions that meet the minimal requirements and do not fall under
one of the limited exceptions."  The Court also compared and
contrasted Section 1453 with Section 1441(a), the general removal
statute, which includes a broader clause "excepting" removal if
such exception is expressly provided by any statute, and concluded
that Section 1453 says nothing about incorporating Section
1441(a)'s broader exception clause.

While adding that it need not address CAFA's purpose or legislative
history because Section 1453's plain language is unambiguous, the
Court noted that those considerations support the same conclusion.
Citing Dart Cherokee's indication that CAFA's provisions should be
read broadly with a strong preference that interstate class actions
be heard in federal court if properly removed, the Court pointed
out that granting plaintiff's motion to remand would contradict the
general independence of the removal provisions and CAFA's purpose.

In sum, the Court concluded that CAFA is a valid basis for removal
in Securities Act class actions not involving a "covered security"
where the plaintiff asserts both Securities Act and state law
claims.  The decision, while potentially useful to defendants in
some cases, is likely to be of limited impact given that securities
class action plaintiffs rarely assert state law claims and most
such cases involve covered securities as defined in SLUSA.

Because a Court of Appeals can accept an immediate appeal of a CAFA
removal decision, it will soon be clear whether this decision will
be appealed to the Ninth Circuit. [GN]


SAFELITE FULFILLMENT: Curative Notice Appeal in Ontiveros Nixed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, YADIR A. ONTIVEROS, as an individual, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SAFELITE
FULFILLMENT, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant, and
SAFELITE GROUP, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-56644 (9th
Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed
the Defendant's appeal from the district court's decision ordering
it to send a curative notice to the individuals who had received
its packets containing settlement agreements and encouraging the
putative class members to settle.

In the class action, Ontiveros alleges that the Defendant violated
California's wage and hour laws.  The parties agreed to have the
district court decide the merits of the Plaintiff's claims first,
on summary judgment, and then to litigate class certification.
After the district court resolved several key issues in the
Plaintiff's favor, the Defendant mailed to the putative class
members packets containing settlement agreements and encouraging
putative class members to settle.  The district court ruled that
the communications were misleading, invalidated the releases
contained in the settlement agreements, and ordered the Defendant
to send a "curative notice" to the individuals who had received the
packets.  The Defendant appeals.  

On de novo review, the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction.

The Court holds that in the absence of a final judgment, it lacks
jurisdiction to review the orders in question.  No exception to the
final judgment rule applies because the Defendant has not
identified a right at stake that will be destroyed if not
vindicated before trial.

It explains that the Defendant's interests in avoiding the
uncertainty and costs of litigation, alone, are not so great as to
justify immediate review.  Assuming that the settlement agreements
at issue are valid, only some putative class members settled their
claims.  If the result is adverse to the Defendant, it remains free
to argue, in a later appeal following final judgment, that the
district court erred in invalidating the releases and that those
releases free the Defendant from having to compensate the settling
class members further.

As for the argument that the orders infringe on the Defendant's
First Amendment rights, the Court holds that the Defendant has not
identified a risk of harm so great as to justify across-the-board
appellate review of all orders requiring curative notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/VcJGfG from Leagle.com.


SANDIA CORP: Court Affirms Order to Compel Production in Kennicott
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
affirmed the Magistrate Judge's Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion
to Compel Production of Documents in the case captioned LISA A.
KENNICOTT, LISA A. GARCIA, SUE C. PHELPS, and JUDI DOOLITTLE, on
behalf of themselves and a class of those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. SANDIA CORPORATION d/b/a SANDIA NATIONAL
LABORATORIES, Defendant. No. CIV 17-0188 JB/GJF. (D.N.M.).

The Plaintiffs allege that Sandia Labs' Title VII violations are
based on a continuing policy, pattern, and practice of sex
discrimination against female employees, with respect to
performance evaluations, pay, promotions, and other terms and
conditions of employment. The Plaintiffs also allege that Sandia's
company-wide policies and practices systematically violate female
employees' rights and operate in a corporate culture infected with
gender bias.

The Plaintiffs argue that Sandia Labs must produce employee
complaints related to sexual harassment, pregnancy discrimination,
hostile work environment, and retaliation and the full complaint
investigation files rather than summaries. The Plaintiffs contend
that the complaints are relevant because they show a pattern or
practice of discrimination.

The Response

Sandia Labs argues that discovery is limited to the pleadings'
claims and defenses. According to Sandia Labs, the internal
complaints related to sexual harassment, pregnancy discrimination,
hostile work environment, and retaliation are irrelevant to the
Plaintiffs' claims  which focus on performance evaluations,
compensation, and promotions because sexual harassment, pregnancy
discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation are
separate and discrete theories of liability that the Plaintiffs do
not plead.

The Order

Magistrate Judge Fouratt identified six findings and conclusions,
four of which are relevant to Sandia Labs' Objections. Magistrate
Judge Fouratt concludes that,
there may be relevant evidence in complaints filed by Defendant's
female employees asserting pregnancy discrimination, sexual
harassment, gender-based hostile work environment, and retaliation
for making these categories of complaints, which could inform or
support Plaintiffs' claim that there is a culture of gender
discrimination at Sandia that is most prominently manifested in
pay, promotions, and performance evaluations.

LAW REGARDING OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE DISCOVERY ORDERS

Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party
to file objections to a Magistrate Judge's non-dispositive order
within fourteen days after being served with the order. The
district judge in the case must consider timely objections and
modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous
or is contrary to law. To overturn the Magistrate Judge's decision
as clearly erroneous under rule 72(a), the district court must have
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. A
district court is required to defer to the magistrate judge's
ruling unless it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

LAW REGARDING DISCOVERY

Discovery's proper scope is any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the
needs of the case. The factors that bear upon proportionality are:
the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in
controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information,
the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.

The Court concludes that Magistrate Judge Fouratt's Order is not
contrary to law, because he reasonably applied rule 26(b) to this
case. Magistrate Judge Fouratt reasonably concludes that the
Plaintiffs seek discovery that is relevant to their claims and
Sandia Labs' affirmative defenses.

Accordingly, the Court overrules Sandia Labs' Objections, and
affirms Magistrate Judge Fouratt's Order.

THE ORDER IS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW.

Sandia Labs argues that Magistrate Judge Fouratt applies the
pre-2015 rule 26(b) scope of discovery because his order cited EEOC
v. Outback Steakhouse of Fla., Inc. But Magistrate Judge Fouratt
cited that case in the portion of his Order which emphasizes that,
in employment discrimination cases, relevance is construed
broadly.Sandia Labs does not cite to any cases concluding that the
2015 amendment of rule 26(b) changed the established principle that
discovery in employment discrimination cases is broad.  

Sandia Labs argues that Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp. 522 F.2d 333,
344 (10th Cir. 1975), does not support discovery of the complaints
at issue here because the plaintiffs in that case sought discovery
that was related to the allegations pled. Again, Magistrate Judge
Fouratt cited Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp. to show only that the
Tenth Circuit does not "narrowly circumscribe discovery in EEOC
cases.

Sandia Labs argues that Magistrate Judge Fouratt erred by including
pregnancy discrimination, sexual harassment, hostile work
environment, and retaliation under the umbrella of gender
discrimination.

Again, Magistrate Judge Fouratt did not find or otherwise conclude
that Plaintiffs' claim of intentional discrimination through
disparate treatment under Title VII also includes class claims for
pregnancy discrimination, sexual harassment, hostile work
environment, or retaliation.

Sandia Labs argues that the presence of class claims "does not open
the door to irrelevant discovery. That point is well-taken as far
as it goes, but the Court does not read Magistrate Judge Fouratt's
order as doing what Sandia Labs contends it does. The Plaintiffs
articulate why internal complaints about pregnancy discrimination,
hostile work environment, sexual harassment, and retaliation are
relevant to their class claim of intentional discrimination based
on gender.

Because the Plaintiffs allege class claims under Title VII,
Plaintiffs must eventually prove commonality, among other
requirements for class certification, under rule 23(a). Because the
Plaintiffs already explain why the discovery they seek is relevant
to gender discrimination in performance evaluations, pay, and
promotions, that Plaintiffs must clear a high rule 23(a) hurdle is
also relevant to whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to this
discovery under rule 26(b).

Given the allegations in the Amended Complaint, the Court concludes
that Magistrate Judge Fouratt's conclusions are on firm ground.
This case is  in a very general but very real way about how Sandia
Labs treats its female employees on a wide array of topics:
discrimination, pregnancy, pay, performance review, and
retaliation. Problems in one area may indicate that there are
problems in other areas. Just because a document is about pregnancy
discrimination does not mean that the information it contains would
not be helpful to the Plaintiffs in proving pay discrimination. The
Plaintiffs are entitled to see what is in all the documents related
to Sandia Labs' problems with its female employees.14 Accordingly,
the Court does not have a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed" by Magistrate Judge Fouratt in his
Order. There are no sound grounds to reverse or modify Magistrate
Judge Fouratt's Order, and the Court therefore overrules Sandia
Labs' Objections.

The Defendant's Objections to Magistrate Judge's Order Granting
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents are overruled;
and (ii) Defendant Sandia Labs shall comply with Magistrate Judge
Fouratt's Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 30, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybgy53hm from
Leagle.com.

Lisa A. Kennicott, Lisa A. Garcia & Sue C. Phelps, on behalf of
themselves and a class of those similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Anne Brackett Shaver -- ashaver@lchb.com -- Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Gretchen Mary Elsner, Elsner Law
& Policy, LLC, Kelly Maureen Dermody -- kdermody@lchb.com -- Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Rachel Bien --
rmb@outtengolden.com -- Outten & Golden LLP, pro hac vice, Adam T.
Klein -- atk@outtengolden.com -- Outten & Golden LLP, pro hac vice,
Cheryl-Lyn Bentley -- cbentley@outtengolden.com -- Outten & Golden
LLP, pro hac vice, David Lopez -- pdl@outtengolden.com -- Outten &
Golden LLP, pro hac vice, Lin Yee Chan -- lchan@lchb.com -- Lieff
Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Michael Ian Levin-Gesundheit --
mlevin@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Shira
J. Tevah -- stevah@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein,
LLP & Tiseme Gabriella Zegeye -- tzegeye@lchb.com -- Lieff Cabraser
Heimann & Bernstein, LLP.

Sandia Corporation, doing business as, Defendant, represented by
Scott D. Gordon -- sgordon@rodey.com -- Rodey, Dickason, Sloan,
Akin & Robb, P.A., Grace E. Speights --
grace.speights@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, pro
hac vice, Jeffrey L. Lowry -- jllowry@rodey.com -- Rodey, Dickason,
Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Krissy A. Katzenstein --
krissy.katzenstein@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP,
pro hac vice, Michael S. Burkhardt --
michael.burkhardt@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP,
pro hac vice, Paola Viviana Jaime, Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin &
Robb, P.A. & Theresa W. Parrish -- tparrish@rodey.com -- Rodey,
Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.


SHANGHAI YINLING: Siegmund Seeks to Certify Class
-------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled FREDERICK SIEGMUND, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. XUELIAN
BIAN, WEI GUAN, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, SHANGHAI YINLING ASSET
MANAGEMENT CO., LTD., LEADING FIRST CAPITAL LIMITED and LEADING
WORLD CORPORATION, the Defendants, Case No. 0:16-cv-62506-FAM (S.D.
Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "at least 200 U.S. public street name shareholders of
      Linkwell common stock, living throughout the United States,
      whose shares of Linkwell stock were unilaterally cancelled
      in the Freeze-Out Merger, which was approved at the
      September 19, 2014 Special Meeting of Shareholders without
      due notice, and who were damaged."

      Excluded from the Class are Bian, Guan, Sidley and its
      employees or agents, Yinling, Leading First, Leading World
      and their subsidiaries and affiliates.

   2. appointing Plaintiff as the representative for the Class;
      and

  3. appointing Wolf Haldenstein as counsel for the Class.

The Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of a proposed class of
all similarly-situated public street name shareholders of Linkwell
Corporation, brought this action asserting claims for violations of
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and state law claims for breach of
fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and
civil conspiracy, against defendants Xuelian Bian, Wei Guan, Sidley
Austin LLP, Shanghai Yinling Asset Management Co., Ltd., Leading
First Capital Limited, and Leading World Corporation. These claims
arise from Defendants' direct participation in a fraudulent scheme
to cause the forced sale of the stock owned by the beneficial
owners of Linkwell's common stock -- without their knowledge or
approval -- through the consummation of a covert freeze-out merger
transaction. By participating in this scheme, Defendants engaged in
a common course of conduct that operated as a fraud on all Class
members. For Plaintiff and the Class, Defendants' misconduct caused
significant damages, depriving them of the fair value of their
Linkwell stock.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Michael A. Fischler, Esq.
          FISCHLER & FRIEDMAN, P.A.
          1000 South Andrews Avenue
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316
          Telephone: (954) 763-5778
          E-mail: michael@ffpa-law.com

               - and -

          Charles J. Hecht, Esq.
          Daniel W. Krasner, Esq.
          Malcolm T. Brown, Esq.
          Daniel Tepper, Esq.
          WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
          270 Madison Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 545 4600
          E-mail: hecht@whafh.com
                  krasner@whafh.com
                  brown@whafh.com
                  tepper@whafh.com



SNAP INC: DiBiase Seeks to Certify Class in Securities Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit RE: SNAP INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case No.
2:17-CV-03679-SVW-AGR, the Lead Plaintiff will move the Court on
November 19, 2018, for an order:

   1. granting Lead Plaintiff's motion for class certification
      against Defendants Snap Inc., Evan Spiegel, Robert Murphy,
      Andrew Vollero, and Imran Khan, on behalf of the following
      class:

      "all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise
      acquired Snap Class A common stock ("Snap Common Stock")
      between March 2, 2017 and August 10, 2017, inclusive, and
      were damaged thereby";

   2. appointing Thomas DiBiase, Donald R. Allen and Shawn B.
      Dandridge as Class Representatives; and

   3. appointing Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP as Class
      Counsel and Rosman & German LLP as Liaison Counsel to the
      Class.

Attorneys for Lead Plaintiff Thomas DiBiase, Proposed Named
Plaintiffs Donald R. Allen and Shawn B. Dandridge, and Lead Counsel
for the Putative Class:

          Jennifer L. Joost, Esq.
          Stacey M. Kaplan, Esq.
          Sharan Nirmul, Esq.
          Ethan J. Barlieb, Esq.
          Nathan Hasiuk, Esq.
          Jonathan F. Neumann, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
          One Sansome Street, Suite 1850
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 400-3000
          Facsimile: (415) 400-3001
          E-mail: jjoost@ktmc.com
                  skaplan@ktmc.com
                  snirmul@ktmc.com
                  ebarlieb@ktmc.com
                  nhasiuk@ktmc.com
                  jneumann@ktmc.com


STATE FARM: Court Narrows Claims in Schwartz Suit
-------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
denied in part and granted in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned DANA SCHWARTZ, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. No. 1:18-cv-00328-WJ-SCY.
(D.N.M.).

The Plaintiff generally alleges that the Defendant misrepresented
and misled the nature of underinsured motorist coverage she
purchased, causing her to reasonably expect that the purchased
coverage would compensate her for damages that were greater than
the limits of the tortfeasor's liability limits.  The Plaintiff
claims that Defendant did not inform her of the limited nature of
underinsured motorist coverage when purchased at the minimum level.
Based on this allegation, the Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting
the following claims:

   Count I: Negligence;

   Count II: Violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act;

   Count III: Violations of the Unfair Insurance Practices Act;

   Count IV: Breach of Contract and Claim for Motorist Coverage;

   Count V: Breach of Contract and Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing.

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1).

The Defendant argues that this case should be dismissed under Rule
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because the
Plaintiff lacks standing. The Plaintiff must demonstrate standing
to sue by establishing (1) an injury in fact, (2) a sufficient
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,
and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.

The Defendant's sole argument in the motion is that the Plaintiff
failed to plead any facts that she was actually harmed. The
Defendant points out that it in fact paid the Defendant $3,225
under the underinsured motorist coverage, and therefore the
Plaintiff has no standing to assert a denial of underinsured
coverage. However, this payment was apparently solely for property
damage. The Defendant's argument does not tend to facially attack
the Plaintiff's complaint, because she alleges that she sustained
bodily injuries in an accident in which she was not at fault and
for which she was not compensated under her underinsured motorist
coverage. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant denied coverage
under her underinsured motorist coverage. Based on these
allegations, the Plaintiff has adequately pled an injury in fact.

Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6)

Legal Standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Plaintiff States a Claim for Negligent Misrepresentation

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff failed to state a claim as
to the negligence count, because (1) she failed to allege
sufficient facts to support a negligence claim, and (2) as a matter
of law a negligence claim may not arise where there is contractual
relationship between an insurer and insured.  

Negligent misrepresentation claim in New Mexico requires as
follows: (1) the defendant made a material representation to
plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff relied upon the representation, (3)
the defendant knew the representation was false or made it
recklessly, and (4) the defendant intended to induce reliance by
the plaintiff.

The Plaintiff adequately pled sufficient facts to assert a
plausible negligent misrepresentation claim. The Plaintiff alleges
that the Defendant misrepresented to her that she would benefit
from the underinsured coverage when they should have known that the
coverage was meaningless. In other words, the Plaintiff argues that
the Defendant failed to inform her that the coverage she was
purchasing would provide little to no coverage. The Plaintiff has
also adequately pled that a duty to disclose arose between the
Defendant and the Plaintiff, which is dependent on the facts and
circumstances of each case.   

Therefore, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff states a
plausible claim for relief.
Unfair Practices Act (UPA), NMSA Section 57-12-1 et seq.

State Farm is not exempt from the misrepresentation and disclosure
claims under the UPA. Defendant argues that actions expressly
permitted by law administered by a regulatory body of New Mexico
are exempt from the UPA.

NMSA Section 57-12-7 provides:

Nothing in the Unfair Practices Act shall apply to actions or
transactions expressly permitted under the laws administered by a
regulatory body of New Mexico or the United States, but all actions
or transactions forbidden by the regulatory body, and about which
the regulatory body remains silent, are subject to the Unfair
Practices Act.

The Defendant has not pointed to anything from a regulatory body
that expressly permits them to, as Plaintiff alleges, misrepresent
the nature of the coverage or fail to disclose material
information.The purpose of this exemption is to give deference to a
regulatory body. Here, Defendant has pointed to nothing that has
been expressly permitted by a regulatory body.

Unfair Insurance Practices Act (UIPA) NMSA Section 59A-16-1 (Count
III)

THe Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant violated the UIPA by:

   -- misrepresenting to its insured pertinent facts or policy
provisions in violation of Section 59A-16-20(A);

   -- failing to acknowledge and act reasonable and promptly upon
communications with respect to claims from its insureds arising
under the policy in violation of Section 59A-16-20(b);

   -- failing to adopt and implement reasonable standard for prompt
investigation and processing of its insured's claims arising under
the policy in violation of Section 59A-16-20(C);

   -- failing to properly affirm and pay the coverage for claims of
its insured within a reasonable period of time after proof of loss
requirements under policy as completed and submitted, in violation
of Section 59A-16-20(D);

   -- failing to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair
and equitable settlement of the Plaintiff's claims in which
liability has become reasonably clear, in violation of
59A-16-20(E).

The Defendant seeks dismissal of all the claims for failing to
plead any facts supporting them.

The Plaintiff has pled detailed facts regarding misrepresentation
or nondisclosure, and pled a plausible claim of misrepresentation,
pursuant to Section 9A-16-20(A). As to sections (B)-(D), the Court
concludes that Plaintiff merely pled a threadbare recital of the
elements of the cause action, and did plead any facts in support
thereof. Therefore, the Court will dismiss those claims, but grants
Plaintiff leave to amend.

Plaintiff fails states a claim for breach of contract (Count IV)

Under New Mexico law, the elements of a breach-of-contract action
are the existence of a contract, breach of the contract, causation,
and damages.

Count IV as currently pled does not allege a breach. the Plaintiff
has not pointed to any contract term Defendant has breached.
Because of the threadbare pleading, it is unclear how insurer is
not complying with the policy, or what term has been breached.  

Rather than seeking a remedy for a breach, it appears that the
Plaintiff seeks to somehow get around the offset provision, so that
the Defendant is forced to pay the full $25,000 underinsured
motorist coverage. Rather than breach of contract, these
allegations appear to implicate other contract-law based theories,
such as an illusory coverage claim or reformation. If that is so,
the Plaintiff is required to plead as much.

The Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of the covenant
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Count V).

Claims for breach of good faith and fair dealing between an insured
and insurer may sound in either contract or tort. Moreover, the
tort recovery breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
is available where a special relationship exists, such as between
insurer and insured.  

This claim suffers from the same insufficiencies as the breach of
contract claim. It appears that Plaintiff bases her bad faith claim
on a breach of contractual terms. However, as stated above, it is
unclear what term was breached. Merely stating that a breach of
contract occurred is not sufficient by itself to allege a breach of
contract claim. Moreover, factual insufficiencies make it
impossible to determine how Defendant is alleged to have violated
the covenant.

Therefore, the Court will dismiss this claim with leave to amend.

Affirmative Defenses

Statute of Limitations. To dismiss claims at this stage on the
basis of affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations,
infirmities must be plain on the face of the complaint. Here,
because statute of limitations infirmities are not clear on the
face of the complaint, the Court may not rule on statute of
limitations issues at this time.

The Defendant appears to argue that the statute of limitations may
have started running in 1999, when insurance was originally
purchased. However, it is unclear when claims were discovered.
Moreover, it is unclear when any breach occurred. Therefore, the
Court denies this requested relief at this time.

The majority of the Plaintiff's claims (Counts I, II, and portions
of III) state a plausible claim for relief. However, the Court will
dismiss Counts IV, V, and VI, because the Plaintiff only pled a
bare, formulaic recitation of the elements of the claims, with
leave to amend. Moreover, the Court dismisses several claims under
Count III (NMSA Section 59A-16-20(B)-(D)) with leave to amend, and
dismisses with prejudice the claim pursuant to Section
59A-16-20(E).

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 30, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9ux5ogn from
Leagle.com.

Dana Schwartz, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Justin P. Pizzonia, Pizzonia
Law, LLC, & Paul M. Dominguez -- paul@thedominguezlawfirm.com --
The Dominguez Law Firm, LLC.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Defendant,
represented by Terry R. Guebert, Guebert Bruckner P.C., James
Gaughan -- gaughan@rshc-law.com -- Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila
LLP, Joseph A. Cancila, Jr. -- jcancila@rshc-law.com -- Riley Safer
Holmes & Cancila, LLP, Mariangela Seale -- mseale@rshc-law.com --
Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP, pro hac vice & Elizabeth M.
Piazza, Guebert Bruckner PC.


STONEBRIDGE OF ARLINGTON: Goel Sues over Tenant Utility Charges
---------------------------------------------------------------
ROHAN GOEL, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. STONEBRIDGE OF ARLINGTON HEIGHTS LLC,
STONEBRIDGE OF ARLTNGTON HEIGHTS LOB LLC, STONEBRIDGE OF ARLTNGTON
HEJGHTS AMBERWOOD LLC, and THE CONNOR GROUP, A REAL ESTATE
INVESTMENTS FIRM, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 2018CH11015 (Ill.
Cir. Ct., Cook Cty., Aug. 30, 2018), seeks to recover damages as a
result of Defendants' violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud &
Deceptive Business Practices Act, Illinois Tenant Utility Payment
Disclosure Act, Illinois Security Deposit Interest Act, Illinois
Security Deposit Return Act, and Illinois common law.

According to the complaint, the Defendants, three of whom own and
one of whom manages a 586-unit apartment complex in Arlington
Heights, routinely violated Illinois public policy by secretly
shifting the cost of maintaining the common areas of the property
on to tenants, and mishandling their security deposits.
Specifically, the Defendants charged tenants for utilities they
weren't allowed to charge for under TUPDA. This includes gouging
Plaintiff $38.88 per month just for trash removal. These actions
violate the ICFA.

The Defendants also mishandled and improperly withheld money from
tenants' security deposits.  The Defendants failed to pay interest
on security deposits as required by the SDIA.  They also kept
portions of tenants' deposits to cover the cost of repairing
alleged damage without providing receipts substantiating the
alleged repair costs, as required by the SDRA.

Finally, the Defendants kept part of Plaintiffs security deposit to
(1) pay alleged repair costs he did not owe; and (2) cover utility
charges he had already paid, even after he gave the Defendants
documentary proof demonstrating he had timely paid the
charges.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael S. Hilicki, Esq.
          KEOGH LAW, LTD.
          55 W. Monroe, Ste. 3390,
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 726 l092
          Facsimile: (312) 726 l093


SUMITOMO RIKO: Vitec Alleges Price Fixing of Automotive Hoses
-------------------------------------------------------------
VITEC, L.L.C., Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. SUMITOMO RIKO CO., LTD.; SUMITOMO RIKO
AMERICA, INC.; and SUMIRIKO TENNESSEE, INC., the Defendants, Case
No. 2:18-cv-12711-SFC-MKM (E.D. Mich., Aug. 30, 2018), alleges that
the Defendant and its co-conspirators -- which are U.S. and global
manufacturers and suppliers of automotive hoses -- violated the
antitrust laws by perpetrating a continuing conspiracy to rig bids
and fix, raise, maintain, or stabilize prices of Automotive Hoses
sold in the United States and elsewhere at supracompetitive levels
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and Section 4 of the Clayton
Act.

According to the complaint, because of this unlawful conduct, the
Plaintiff and other Class members paid artificially inflated prices
for Automotive Hoses and have suffered antitrust injury to their
business or property.

Sumitomo Riko Co. Ltd. is a Japanese company which produces rubber
and other synthetic resin products. In June 2014, the company
changed its corporate name from Tokai Rubber Industries to Sumitomo
Riko to clarify that it is a part of the Sumitomo Group.[BN]

Counsel for Plaintiff Vitec, L.L.C. and the Proposed Class:

          David H. Fink, Esq.
          Darryl Bressack, Esq.
          Nathan J. Fink, Esq.
          FINK + ASSOCIATES LAW
          38500 Woodward Ave; Ste. 350
          Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304
          Telephone: (248) 971-2500
          E-mail: dfink@finkandassociateslaw.com
                  dbressack@finkandassociateslaw.com
                  nfink@finkandassociateslaw.com

               - and -

          Gregory P. Hansel, Esq.
          Randall B. Weill, Esq.
          Jonathan G. Mermin, Esq.
          Michael S. Smith, Esq.
          PRETI FLAHERTY, BELIVEAU & PACHIOS LLP
          One City Center, P.O. Box 9546
          Portland, ME 04112
          Telephone: (207) 791 3000
          E-mail: ghansel@preti.com
                  rweill@preti.com
                  jmermin@preti.com
                  msmith@preti.com

               - and -

          Joseph C. Kohn, Esq.
          William E. Hoese, Esq.
          Douglas A. Abrahams, Esq.
          Stephen H. Schwartz, Esq.
          KOHN SWIFT & GRAF, P.C.
          1600 Market Street, Suite 2500
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 238 1700
          E-mail: jkohn@kohnswift.com
                  whoese@kohnswift.com
                  dabrahams@kohnswift.com
                  sschwartz@kohnswift.com

               - and -

          Joseph M. Fischer, Esq.
          CARSON FISCHER, P.L.C.
          4111 Andover Road West
          Second Floor, West Bldg.
          Bloomfield Hills, MI 48302
          Telephone: (248) 644 4840
          E-mail: jfisher@carsonfisher.com

               - and -

          Steven A. Kanner, Esq.
          William H. London, Esq.
          Michael E. Moskovitz, Esq.
          FREED KANNER LONDON & MILLEN LLC
          2201 Waukegan Road, Suite 130
          Bannockburn, IL 60015
          Telephone: (224) 632 4500
          E-mail: skanner@fklmlaw.com
                  wlondon@fklmlaw.com
                  mmoskovitz@fklmlaw.com

               - and -

          Eugene A. Spector, Esq.
          William G. Caldes, Esq.
          Jonathan M. Jagher, Esq.
          Jeffrey L. Spector, Esq.
          SPECTOR ROSEMAN & KODROFF, P.C.
          1818 Market Street, Suite 2500
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 496-0300
          E-mail: espector@srkw-law.com
                  bcaldes@srkw-law.com
                  jjagher@srkw-law.com
                  jspector@srkw-law.com

               - and -

          Irwin B. Levin, Esq.
          COHEN & MALAD, LLP
          One Indiana Square, Suite 1400
          Indianapolis, IN 46204
          Telephone: (317) 636 6481
          E-mail: ilevin@cohenandmalad.com


SUSHI ROCK: Misclassifies Restaurant Staff, Usmani Says
-------------------------------------------------------
BILAL USMANI, 14335 Lorain Avenue Cleveland, Ohio, 44111 On behalf
of himself and all others similarly-situated, the Plaintiff, v.
SUSHI ROCK, LLC, 15607 Madison Avenue, Lakewood, Ohio, 44107;
WOODFORD & CABERNET MANAGEMENT, LLC, P.O. Box 39164 Solon, Ohio
44139; and GIUSEPPE GALLO a.k.a Joe Gallo 7550 Ludwin Drive Seven
Hills, Ohio 44131, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-02031 (N.D. Ohio,
Sept. 5, 2018), alleges that Defendants misclassified Plaintiff and
other tipped employees in their restaurant and catering businesses
as "subcontractors" and failed to provide Usmani or those
similarly-situated with a tip-credit notice; and paid less than the
legally required minimum wage, in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and laws of Ohio.

According to the complaint, Usmani is a former employee of
Defendants. Usmani began his employment with Defendants in or
around March of 2018. Usmani was paid only $3.00 per hour plus tips
to work for Defendants as a waiter/server at Agostino's Sushi Rock.
In 2018, the minimum wage for tipped employees under Ohio law was
$4.15 per hour plus tips. In 2018, the minimum wage for employees
for whom an employer may not claim tip credit was $8.30 per hour
under Ohio law and $7.25 per hour under the FLSA.  Defendants told
Usmani he was a "subcontractor" and required him sign paperwork to
this effect.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Spitz, Esq.
          Chris P. Wido, Esq.
          Tina M. Scibona, Esq.
          THE SPITZ LAW FIRM, LLC
          25200 Chagrin Boulevard, Suite 200
          Beachwood, OH 44122
          Telephone: (216) 291 4744
          Facsimile: (216) 291 5744
          E-mail: chris.wido@spitzlawfirm.com


SWIFT TRANSPORTATION: Attys' Fees Ruling in Fritsch Suit Reversed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GRANT FRITSCH, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION COMPANY OF ARIZONA, LLC, Defendant-Appellant,
Case No. 18-55746 (9th Cir.), Judge Sandra Segal Ikuta of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Dritsch filed the wage-and-hour class action in San Bernardino
Superior Court.  According to the third amended complaint filed in
state court, Fritsch worked for Swift, a trucking and
transportation company, as a local driver.  He alleged that Swift
denied him and other employees proper overtime pay, meal periods,
and appropriate wage statements. Fritsch sought wages and premiums
owed, prejudgment interest, statutory penalties, attorneys' fees
under California Labor Code Sections 218.5 and 1194,1 and costs of
suit.  He also asked for equitable relief under California's unfair
competition law and statutory damages under California's Private
Attorneys General Act.

Swift removed Fritsch's third amended class action complaint to
district court, alleging that it had subject matter jurisdiction
under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").  The district court
remanded the action to state court on the ground that Swift failed
to prove that the matter in controversy exceeded the sum or value
of $5 million, as required for jurisdiction under CAFA.  In
reaching this conclusion, the court held that only attorneys' fees
that had been incurred as of the date of removal could be included
in the amount in controversy.

Swift timely petitioned the Court for permission to appeal under 28
U.S.C. Section 1453(c).  While the petition was pending, litigation
proceeded in state court.

On April 20, 2018, the Court issued its decision in Chavez v.
JPMorgan Chase & Co., which held that the amount in controversy is
not limited to damages incurred prior to removal, but rather is
determined by the complaint operative at the time of removal and
encompasses all relief a court may grant on that complaint if the
plaintiff is victorious.  

The Court granted Swift's petition to appeal on June 11, 2018.  Two
days later, Swift filed a second notice of removal in district
court, contending that the Court's intervening decision in Chavez
now demonstrates beyond any doubt that the amount in controversy in
this action exceeds the jurisdictional minimum.

The Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing on
whether Swift's second notice of removal rendered the present
appeal moot.  Shortly after it heard oral argument, Fritsch moved
to remand Swift's second notice of removal on a number of grounds,
including that it was untimely.  Fritsch argued that the Court's
rule that a defendant can file a successive removal notice within
30 days after a change in law did not help Swift, because Swift had
filed its second removal order 59 days after it issued Chavez.

Applying the collateral consequence doctrine here, Judge Ikuta
concludes that Swift's appeal of the first remand order is not
moot.  In his motion in district court to remand Swift's second
removal, Fritsch argued that the removal was untimely, because
Swift had removed the action more than 30 days after the Court
issued its decision in Chavez.  If she dismisses Swift's appeal of
the first remand as moot, Swift will have to defend against this
timeliness challenge.  

By contrast, the district court determined that Swift's first
notice of removal was timely because Swift removed the action
within 30 days of receiving Fritsch's damages chart.  Fritsch did
not appeal that determination.  If she holds that the district
court's first remand order was erroneous, Swift will not be
vulnerable to the argument that its removal was untimely.  Because
the Court's decision on the merits will put Swift on better footing
with regard to a timeliness argument, she concludes that Swift's
appeal of the first remand order is not moot.

Turning to the merits of Swift's appeal, the Judge finds that the
only issue is whether the district court erred in concluding that
Swift failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
CAFA's amount-in-controversy requirement was met.  She finds that
she must vacate the district court's remand order.  In his
complaint, Fritsch demanded attorneys' fees permitted by California
law.  Because the law entitles Fritsch to an award of attorneys'
fees if he is successful, such future attorneys' fees are at stake
in the litigation, and must be included in the amount in
controversy.  Therefore, the district court's conclusion that, as a
matter of law, the amount in controversy included only the $150,000
in attorneys' fees incurred up to the time of removal and could not
include any future fees, was incorrect.  Accordingly, the Judge
must remand to allow the district court to determine whether Swift
can carry its burden of proving that the amount in controversy
(including future attorneys' fees) exceeds the jurisdictional
threshold.

For the same reason, the Judge rejects Swift's argument that she
should hold that, as a matter of law, the amount of attorneys' fees
in controversy in class actions is 25% of all other alleged
recovery.  She explains that a state may adopt the lodestar method
for determining reasonable attorneys' fees under certain statutes,
or, as in the case, not allow recovery of attorneys' fees for legal
work on certain types of claims: that the attorneys' fees shifting
provisions in California Labor Code Sections 218.5 and 1194 do not
apply to legal work relating to meal and rest period claims.  The
Court's determination regarding the amount of attorneys' fees at
stake must take into account the statutory and contractual
restrictions.  Accordingly, she will leave the calculation of the
amount of the attorneys' fees at stake to the district court on
remand.

For these reasons, Judge Ikuta concludes that if a plaintiff would
be entitled under a contract or statute to future attorneys' fees,
such fees are at stake in the litigation and should be included in
the amount in controversy.  The Defendant retains the burden,
however, of proving the amount of future attorneys' fees by a
preponderance of the evidence.  She reversed and remanded.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/ESW97R from Leagle.com.

Paul Scott Cowie -- pcowie@sheppardmullin.com -- (argued), Karin
Dougan Vogel -- kvogel@sheppardmullin.com -- John D. Ellis --
jellis@sheppardmullin.com -- and Reanne Swafford-Harris --
rswafford-harris@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter &
Hampton LLP, San Francisco, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Michael A. Strauss -- mike@strausslawyers.com -- (argued), Strauss
& Strauss, Ventura, California; Daniel J. Palay --
info@calemploymentcounsel.com -- and Brian D. Hefelfinger --
bdh@calemploymentcounsel.com -- Palay Hefelfinger APC, Ventura,
California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.


TARGET CORP: De La Cruz Labor Suit Dismissed
--------------------------------------------
Judge Dana M. Sabraw of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California dismissed without prejudice the case,
ARMANDO DE LA CRUZ, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TARGET CORPORATION, and DOES 1
through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-0867 DMS (WVG)
(S.D. Cal.).

On March 6, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a wage and hour class action
lawsuit on behalf of current and former employees of the Defendants
in San Diego County Superior Court.  He seeks to represent a class
consisting of the Defendant's non-exempt California employees
employed during the time frame commencing four years prior to the
filing of the original complaint in the matter up to and including
the present.

The Plaintiff alleges the following claims for relief: (1) failure
to provide rest periods, in violation of Cal. Labor Code Sections
226.7 and 512 and the applicable IWC wage order, (2) failure to
provide accurate itemized wage statements, in violation of Cal.
Labor Code Section 226 and the applicable IWC wage order, (3)
waiting time penalties for failure to timely pay wages under Cal.
Labor Code Section 203, and (4) unlawful and unfair business
practices, in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200 et
seq.  The Plaintiff alleges, in part, the Defendant maintained a
policy and practice of compelling employees to remain on company
premises at all times thereby denying the employees their legally
mandated rest breaks.

On May 4, 2018, the Defendant removed the action to the Court
pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act.  On June 28, 2018, it
filed the present motion, seeking dismissal, or in the alternative,
a stay of the action pursuant to the first-to-file rule.
Specifically, the Defendant contends the Plaintiff is not the first
to file a putative action alleging its non-exempt California
employees were denied rest breaks based on its on-premises rest
break policy.  It explains a substantially identical class action,
Halley v. Target Corp., Case No. 17-cv-00692-JGB-MRW (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 6, 2017), was filed in the Central District of California one
year before the Plaintiff initiated the present action.

Pending before the Court is the Defendant's motion to dismiss, or
in the alternative, stay action pursuant to first-to-file rule.
The Plaintiff filed an opposition, and the Defendant filed a reply.


The parties do not dispute the first-to-file rule applies to the
case.  Nonetheless, Judge Sabraw addresses whether the requirements
for the first-to-file rule as satisfied.  The first factor,
chronology of the lawsuits, is met.  The case was filed one year
after Halley.  The second factor, similarity of the parties, is
satisfied.  The Defendant in each case is the same and although the
named Plaintiffs in each case are different, the classes they
purport to represent are substantially similar.  Lastly, the third
factor requires the Court to look to the similarity of the issues
in the relevant actions.  Here, the parties agree the issues in the
two actions are substantially similar.

The Judge concludes that the proposed class and the issues
presented are essentially identical to those presented in the
Halley action, such that there is nothing to suggest the action
would be certified while the Halley action would not.  The case is
at its infancy, and allowing the case to proceed would both impede
judicial efficiency and run a significant risk of conflicting
judgments.  And although the Plaintiff argues the suit should be
stayed rather than dismissed, the Judge finds that dismissal is
more appropriate.  The Plaintiff has not presented any compelling
reasons to allow the action to proceed.

For these reasons, Judge Sabraw granted the Defendant's motion
based on the first-to-file-rule and dismissed without prejudice the
case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/awlSLA from Leagle.com.

Armando De La Cruz, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Cody Robert Kennedy
-- ckennedy@marlinsaltzman.com -- Marlin & Saltzman.

Target Corporation, Defendant, represented by Julie A. Dunne --
jdunne@littler.com -- LITTLER MENDELSON & Matthew B. Riley --
mriley@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C.


TCL COMMUNICATION: Final Approval of Matthews Settlement Endorsed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ELLA MATTHEWS and RUSSELL NOLL, individually and on
behalf of all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TCL
COMMUNICATION INC., TCT MOBILE, INC., TCT MOBILE (US) INC., and TCT
MOBILE (US) HOLDINGS INC., Defendants, Civil Action No.
3:17-CV-095-FDW-DCK (W.D. N.C.), Magistrate Judge David C. Keesler
of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina, Charlotte Division, recommended that the Court (i) grants
the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion For Final Approval Of Settlement,
Certification Of The Settlement Class, And Approval Of The Named
Plaintiffs' Incentive Awards And Attorneys' Fees, Costs And
Expenses; and (ii) adopts the Proposed Final Approval Order.

The parties entered into the Settlement Agreement on Feb. 21, 2018,
to settle the Class Action.  The Court entered the Preliminary
Approval Order, dated March 14, 2018, preliminarily approving the
parties' settlement consistent with the requirements of Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, certifying the Settlement
Class for settlement purposes and ordering notice be sent to the
Settlement Class members providing them with an opportunity either
to participate in the settlement, exclude themselves from the
Settlement Class, or object to the proposed settlement; and,

The Court held the Fairness Hearing on Aug. 8, 2018.  Based on the
submissions of the parties, upon reviewing all prior proceedings,
and on the evidence adduced at the settlement fairness hearing,
Magistrate Judge Keesler finds that the Settlement Class satisfies
all applicable requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

The Settlement Class consists of all persons residing in North
Carolina and/or Kentucky who purchased Alcatel OneTouch Idol 34.7
inch or 5.5 inch smartphones (Idol 3 Smartphones) during the time
period of Jan. 1, 2015 to Dec. 27, 2016.   Nicholas A. Migliaccio
and Jason S. Rathod of Migliaccio & Rathod LLP, and Gary E. Mason,
Scott Harris and Jennifer Goldstein of Whitfield Bryson & Mason LLP
as the Class Counsel have fully and adequately represented the
Settlement Class.

The Magistrate finds that the Class notices and their distribution
to Settlement Class members have been implemented pursuant to the
Settlement Agreement and the Court's Preliminary Approval Order.
The Parties are directed to implement and consummate the Settlement
Agreement according to its terms and provisions.

The Class Counsel are awarded attorneys' fees, costs and expenses
totaling $120,000.  Such fees and expenses are to be paid pursuant
to the conditions set forth in the Settlement Agreement.  The
Defendants will not be required to pay for any other attorneys'
fees and expenses, costs, or disbursements incurred by Class
Counsel or any other counsel representing the Class Representative
or Settlement Class members, or incurred by the Class
Representative or Settlement Class members, or any of them, in
connection with or related in any manner to the Class Action, the
settlement of the Class Action, the administration of such
settlement, and/or the claims settled in the Class Action.

The Magistrate finds that an enhancement payment to each Class
Representative in the amount of $2,500, to be paid by the
Defendants for service and assistance to the Settlement Class in
the Class Action, is reasonable and appropriate.  He also finds
that administrative costs of the third-party administrator in an
amount of up to $34,966.50, to be paid by the Defendants to the
Claims Administrator, are reasonable and appropriate.  The
enhancement payment and the settlement administration costs are to
be paid pursuant to the conditions set forth in the Settlement
Agreement.

He authorized the parties, upon approval of the Court, to agree to
and adopt amendments to, and modifications and expansions of, the
Settlement Agreement, as are in writing and signed by the parties'
counsel and are consistent with the Final Approval Order and do not
limit the rights of Settlement Class members under the Settlement
Agreement.

For these reasons, Magistrate Judge Keesler respectfully
recommended that the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion For Final
Approval Of Settlement, Certification Of The Settlement Class, And
Approval Of The Named Plaintiffs' Incentive Awards And Attorneys'
Fees, Costs And Expenses" be granted and that the foregoing
proposed Final Approval Order be adopteed by the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Memorandum and
Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/DC0WB8 from
Leagle.com.

Ella Matthews, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Gary E. Mason --
gmason@wbmllp.com -- Whitfield Bryson & Mason LLP, pro hac vice,
Jason Samuel Rathod -- jrathod@classlawdc.com -- Migliaccio &
Rathod, pro hac vice, Jennifer Shari Goldstein --
jgoldstein@wbmllp.com -- Whitfield Bryson & Mason, LLP, pro hac
vice, Nicholas A. Migliaccio -- nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com --
Migliaccio & Rathod LLP, pro hac vice & Scott Crissman Harris --
scott@wbmllp.com -- Whitfield, Bryson & Mason, LLP.

Russell Noll, Plaintiff, represented by Gary E. Mason, Whitfield
Bryson & Mason LLP, pro hac vice, Jennifer Shari Goldstein,
Whitfield Bryson & Mason, LLP, pro hac vice, Nicholas A.
Migliaccio, Migliaccio & Rathod LLP & Scott Crissman Harris,
Whitfield, Bryson & Mason, LLP.

TCL Communication Inc., TCT Mobile (US) Inc., TCT Mobile, Inc. &
TCT Mobile (US) Holdings Inc., Defendants, represented by Jon A.
Berkelhammer -- jon.berkelhammer@elliswinters.com -- Ellis &
Winters LLP.


TESLA INC: Violates Securities Exchange Act, Sodeifi Says
---------------------------------------------------------
SHAHRAM SODEIFI, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. TESLA, INC., a Delaware corporation, and
ELON R. MUSK, an individual, the Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-07575
(C.D. Cal,, Aug. 30, 2018), seeks to recover compensable damages
caused by Defendants' violation of the federal securities laws and
to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

The case is a federal securities lawsuit on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons, other than Defendants, who purchased or
sold securities of Tesla between August 7, 2018 and August 10, 2018
and suffered financial damages as a result of the alleged
statements and omissions.

According to the complaint, on August 7, 2018, Musk stated the
following on his personal Twitter: (1) "Am considering taking Tesla
private at $420. Funding secured;" (2) "Shareholders could either
to sell at 420 or hold shares & go private;" (3) "Investor support
is confirmed.: "4. Additionally, on August 7, 2018, Defendant Tesla
stated on its Twitter account: "Taking Tesla Private."

As a result of these statements made on Twitter, the common stock
rose $37.58, almost 11% higher than the previous closing price of
$341.99 on August 6, 2018, to close at $379.57 per share on August
7, 2018. On August 8, 2018, members of Tesla's Board of Directors
issued a statement revealing that the board was still evaluating
the prospects of taking Tesla private, and confirmed that such a
deal was subject to board approval. Further, the Securities
Exchange Commission began investigating the truth of Musk's
statements about the prospects of taking Tesla private.

On August 9, 2018, after it was reported that the Board of
Directors of Tesla was still investigating the funding that was
allegedly secured, Tesla's common stock dropped $17.89 per share,
or 4.83% from the previous day's closing price, to close at $352.45
per share. As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions,
and the increase and decrease in the market value of the Tesla's
common shares, Plaintiff and other class members who purchased or
sold securities of Tesla have suffered significant losses and
damages.

Tesla, Inc., formerly known as Tesla Motors, Inc. was founded in
2003. It is headquartered in Palo Alto, California and it
specializes in electric vehicles, lithium-ion battery energy
storage and solar panel manufacturing. Its stock trades on the
NASDAQ Global Select Market under the symbol "TSLA."[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class:

          Marc Y. Lazo, Esq.
          2105 Foothill Blvd., Suite B121
          La Verne, CA 91750
          Telephone: (855) 471 1110
          Facsimile: (855) 471 1110
          E-mail: marclazo@cox.net


THANK YOU: 2d Cir. Vacates Dismissal of Catzin Labor Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Judge Barrington D. Parker of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit cavated the vacated the District Court's dismissal
of the case, LUCIA LOPEZ CATZIN, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, SILVIA VILLANO CLEMENTE, and YADIRA
AGUILAR-CANO, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THANK YOU & GOOD LUCK CORP.
and ZENG LAN WANG, Defendants-Cross-Defendants-Appellees, IGOR
BIRZH, EXCLUSIVE MANAGEMENT SOLUTION GROUP, INC., DIMITRI
BEREZOVSKY, and 115th STREET AND FIRST AVE LAUNDROMAT INC.,
Defendants-Appellees, OFF-BROADWAY LAUNDROMAT INC. and 2167 3rd AVE
LAUNDROMAT LLC, Defendants-Cross-Claimants-Appellees, Case No.
17-2497-cv (2d Cir.), and remanded for further proceedings.

The appeal from an order of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Forrest, J.) requires the Appellate
Court to decide whether the District Court properly sua sponte
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs'
state-law claims and dismissed the case without affording the
parties notice or an opportunity to be heard.

The Plaintiffs, several low-wage laundromat workers, sued their
employers under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and the New
York Labor Law ("NYLL"), alleging that their employers failed to
pay them the minimum wage, overtime, and failed to provide various
required wage notices and statements.

The case was litigated for nearly two years, through discovery and
summary judgment.  The parties' cross motions for partial summary
judgment were granted in part and denied in part, ultimately
leaving various FLSA and NYLL claims to be resolved at trial.
Three weeks prior to the start of trial and two weeks prior to the
final pretrial conference, the parties filed their required
pretrial submissions, which omitted mention of the FLSA and focused
on the alleged NYLL violations.  Shortly before the final pretrial
conference, the Plaintiffs filed a letter that noted, among other
things, that they intended to pursue only their NYLL claims at
trial because they had concluded, on the basis of an intervening
clarification in Second Circuit law, that any potential recovery
under the FLSA would be subsumed by the recovery available under
the NYLL.

For reasons that are inadequately supported by the record, the
District Court concluded that the Plaintiffs' inclusion of the FLSA
claims had all along been disingenuous and was a stratagem to
manufacture federal jurisdiction.  Acting on this assumption, the
day before the final pretrial conference, and without affording the
parties notice or an opportunity to be heard, the District Court
sua sponte issued an order that deemed the Plaintiffs to have
abandoned their federal-law claims.  The District Court cancelled
the pretrial conference and the trial scheduled to start the
following week.  The District Court then declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' state-law claims and
dismissed them without prejudice, leaving the parties to start from
the beginning in state court, and ordered the case closed.

The Plaintiffs appeal.

Judge Parker concludes that by failing to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction under the circumstances of the case, the District
Court committed three interrelated errors.  First, it acted sua
sponte without affording the parties notice and an opportunity to
be heard.  Second, it impugned, on the record, the Plaintiffs'
counsel's motives without affording any notice about this
assessment of the counsel's conduct or any opportunity to explain
himself.  Finally, the District Court's analysis of the factors
considered under 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(c) for determining whether
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction was inadequate.

His review of the record before him leaves him with significant
doubt as to how the District Court viewed the supplemental
jurisdiction factors.  Litigants come to court to have their
problems solved.  The three Plaintiffs here are immigrant laborers
who are seeking allegedly unpaid minimum wages and overtime wages
totaling roughly $13,000 (along with liquidated damages) for
washing, drying, and folding clothes.  While this amount of money
may be modest to some, it could well be significant to individuals
in the Plaintiffs' circumstances. The fact that the case has been
vigorously litigated for so long is to us an indication of its
importance to the parties.

The Defendants are small business owners of laundromats who
presumably have experienced years of legal bills and distraction
from the responsibilities of running their businesses.  The record
yields no clarity as to how judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, or comity might be served by requiring the parties to
expend additional years as well as dollars re-litigating in state
court.  

While the Judge certainly mindful of the fact that district courts
face significant caseloads and real pressure to move cases along,
the pressure to close cases must not overshadow the federal courts'
paramount role of being a forum where disputes are efficiently and
fairly resolved.  After all, as the very first Rule of Civil
Procedure provides, procedure in the district courts is meant to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Parker vacated the order of the
District Court, and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with his Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/kQVN83 from Leagle.com.

Michael Taubenfeld -- michael@fishertaubenfeld.com -- Fisher
Taubenfeld LLP, New York, N.Y., for appellants Lucia Lopez Catzin,
Silvia Villano Clemente, and Yadira Aguilar-Cano.

Mark R. Kook -- mkook@kooklaw.com -- Law Office of Mark R. Kook,
New York, N.Y., for appellees Igor Birzh, Exclusive Management
Solution Group, Inc., and Dimitri Berezovsky.

Oleg A. Mestechkin -- om@lawmlg.com -- (Wing K. Chieu on the
brief), Mestechkin Law Group P.C., New York, N.Y., for appellees
Off-Broadway Laundromat, Inc., 2167 3rd Ave Laundromat LLC, and
115th Street and First Ave Laundromat Inc.


THREE KNIGHTS: Kelly Baker Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Three Knights LLC.
The case is styled as Baker, Kelly on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated and on behalf of the general public,
Plaintiff v. Does 1 to 10, Three Knights LLC, Defendants, Case No.
34-2018-00240666 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento Cty, Sept. 13,
2018).

The case type is stated as "Other employment".

Three Knights LLC, is a privately held company in Milwaukee, WI and
is a Single Location business. Categorized under Unclassified, it
is located at 4530 North 106th Street, Milwaukee, WI 53225.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Roman Otkupman, Esq.
     Otkupman Law Firm, ALC
     28632 Roadside Dr, Ste 203
     Agoura Hills, CA 91301-6015
     Phone: (818) 293-5623
     Fax: (888) 850-1310
     E-mail: roman@OLFLA.com

TIAN CHENG: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Lin Says
-------------------------------------------------
GUANG J. LIN ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, the Plaintiff, v. TIAN CHENG INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC.
d/b/a Ivy INTERNATIONAL GROUP, JITAO NIU, QUAN YUAN, CLARA WEN, WEN
REN, the Defendants, Case No. 18-2511 (Mass. Super. Ct., Aug. 30,
2018), alleges that the Defendants unlawfully treated the Plaintiff
as exempt-from-overtime and denied overtime, deprived of employee
benefits given to Ivy International's employees and forced to incur
self-employment tax.

According to the complaint, Ms. Lin and other Homestay Coordinators
and Homestay Managers classified by Ivy as independent contractors
did not receive from Ivy any paid time off due to illness or to
care for a family member. Ivy withheld payroll taxes and paid the
employer portion of federal and/or state payroll taxes for the
Homestay Coordinators and Homestay Managers Ivy classified as
employees. Ivy did not withhold payroll taxes from the compensation
paid to Ms. Lin and other Homestay Coordinators and Homestay
Managers classified by Ivy as independent contractors.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Travis J. Jacobs, Esq.
          THE JACOBS LAW, LLC
          36 Bromfield Street, Ste. 502
          Boston, MA 02108
          Telephone: 800 652 4783
          Facsimile: 888 613 1919
          E-mail: TJacobs@TheJacobsLaw.com


TIDAL: Court Urged to Certify Class Action Over Kanye West Tweet
----------------------------------------------------------------
Eriq Gardner, writing for Hollywood Reporter, reports that lawsuit
attempts to figure out how to include those who signed up for a
Tidal subscription based on the hip-hop artist's word that the
'Life of Pablo' album would only be available there.

Tesla founder Elon Musk might be August's poster boy for inviting
legal trouble with a single tweet, but don't forget Kanye West, who
in February 2016, told his followers, "My album [The Life of Pablo]
will never never never be on Apple.  And it will never be for sale
. . . . You can only get it on Tidal."

Six weeks later, after Tidal's subscription numbers tripled from 1
million to 3 million, The Life of Pablo became available for free
streaming on Apple Music and Spotify.

Justin Baker-Rhett, who forked over $9.99 to hear West's album on
Tidal, is now suing the hip-hop artist and Tidal's owner Aspiro,
and in June, a New York federal judge allowed him to move forward
with a claim of fraudulent inducement.  Now the question is whether
Mr. Baker-Rhett's attorneys have any hopes of obtaining the big
bucks with class certification.

How to properly define the class of consumers who subscribed to
Tidal based on that single tweet? Here's the attempt by his
attorneys at Edelson and Kurzman Eisenberg:

"All persons in the United States who both (1) subscribed to the
Tidal streaming service between February 15, 2016 and April 1,
2016, and (2) streamed any track from The Life of Pablo within the
first 24 hours after initiating his or her subscription."

Defendants will surely fight it, but regardless, it won't end the
case.  The memorandum in support of class certification also
highlights some of the questions that will be material as the
lawsuit moves forward:

"Was the at-issue Tweet false at the time it was made? Did the
post-release changes West made to The Life of Pablo render the
widely released album different, such that the album's eventual
release rendered West's statements immaterial? What was Mr. West's
intent when he told the world that The Life of Pablo would only
ever be available on Tidal? Was it reasonable to rely on that
representation? Can Aspiro be held liable for West's statements?"

U.S. District Court Gregory Woods chimed in with his opinion about
Mr. West's argument of innocent intent when making his tweet back
in June.

"Mr. West's argument is tenuous, and certainly does not pass muster
in the context of a motion to dismiss, when the Court is required
to draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party," wrote the
judge.  "After all, Mr. West tweeted that 'My album will never
never never be on Apple.  And it will never be for sale' (emphasis
added). He did not commit that a particular version, or mix, or
master of his album would not be on Apple -- his commitment was
that the 'album,' 'it,' would not be. And the album was made
available on Apple Music shortly after the Tweet. Regardless of
whether or not Mr. West's argument will persuade a jury at a later
stage in the case, the Court has little difficulty concluding that
the complaint plausibly pleads that Mr. West's statement that his
album would never never never be available on Apple Music or for
sale was false." [GN]


TNG GP: Employment Discrimination Suits Consolidated
----------------------------------------------------
Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California consolidated Cooks II (Case No.
2:16-cv-02113-KJM-AC) with the case, JEANNETTE COOKS, an
individual; and ALWENA FRAZIER, an individual; for themselves and
on behalf of all others similarly situated Plaintiffs, v. TNG GP, a
Delaware General Partnership; THE NEWS GROUP, INC., a Delaware
Corporation; SELECT MEDIA SERVICES, L.L.C., a Delaware Limited
Liability Company, and, DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 2:16-CV-01160-KJM-AC (E.D. Cal.).

The Judge has considered the Parties' Stipulation to Consolidated
Actions, and deemed Cooks II (Case No. 2:16-cv-02113-KJM-AC) is
related to the instant action.  The lower number case, Cooks I,
will be the lead case for all purposes.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/cEp78F from Leagle.com.

Jeannette Cooks & Alwena Frazier, Plaintiffs, represented by Jeff
Geraci -- jgeraci@ckslaw.com -- Cohelan Khoury and Singer, Michael
D. Singer -- msinger@ckslaw.com -- Cohelan Khoury & Singer & Olivia
Sanders, Law Offices of Olivia Sanders.

TNG GP, News Group, Inc. & Select Media Services, L.L.C.,
Defendants, represented by Jerome L. Rubin --
jrubin@williamskastner.com -- Williams Kastner & Gibbs, PLLC, pro
hac vice & Anthony J. DeCristoforo --
anthony.decristoforo@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak &
Stewart, PC.


TOLTECA ENTERPRISES: Hackler Seeks to Certify Class
---------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled SADIE HACKLER, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. TOLTECA ENTERPRISES,
INC. d/b/a PHOENIX RECOVERY GROUP, the Defendant, Case No.
5:18-cv-00911-XR (W.D. Tex.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order certifying a class consisting of:

   "all persons in the United States and its territories, who,
   within the year proceeding the filing of the suit, were sent
   an initial communication letter by Defendant that:

   a. did not have the words "in writing" and "written request"
      in the letter; or

   b. regardless of whether the letter contained the words "in
      writing" and "written request", the letter included the
      statement "Your balance may reflect a one-time agency
      collection fee" but did not state whether the amount due
      did or did not include an agency fee, or if it did,
      the amount of the fee.

The case is brought under the Federal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act. It concerns as form letter Defendant uses in its
debt collection business. The form letter does not include certain
notices required by the FDCPA, nor does is accurately state the
amount of the debt sought to be collected.

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Benjamin R. Bingham, Esq.
          BINGHAM & LEA, P.C.
          319 Maverick Street
          San Antonio, Texas 78212
          Telephone: (210) 224 1819
          Facsimile: (210) 224-0141
          E-mail: ben@binghamandlea.com

               - and -

          William M. Clanton, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF BILL CLANTON, P.C.
          926 Chulie Dr.
          San Antonio, TX 78216
          Telephone: 210 226 0800
          Facsimile: 210 338 8660
          E-mail: bill@clantonlawoffice.com


TRADER JOE'S: Sanchez Suit Moved to S.D. California
---------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled Lisa Sanchez, an individual on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated and the general
public, the Plaintiff, v. Trader Joe's Company, T.A.C.T. Holding
Inc., and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, the Respondents, and Serena
Wong, the Intervenor, Case No. 2:18-cv-06040, was transferred from
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California to
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California
(San Diego) on Sept. 5, 2018. The California Southern District
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:18-cv-02052-AJB-NLS to the
proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Anthony J.
Battaglia.

Trader Joe's is an American chain of grocery stores based in
Monrovia, California, owned by a German private equity family
trust.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ross Cornellm, Esq.
          111 W. Ocean Blvd., Suite 400
          Long Beach, CA 90802
          Telephone: (562) 612 1708
          Facsimile: (562) 394 9556
          E-mail: ross.law@me.com

               - and -

          Reuben D. Nathan, Esq.
          NATHAN & ASSOCIATES, APC
          600 W. Broadway, Suite 700
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 272 7014
          Facsimile: (619) 330 1819
          E-mail: rnathan@nathanlawpractice.com

The Respondents are represented by:

          Raymond Collins Kilgore, Esq.
          Dawn Sestito, Esq.
          O'MELVENY AND MYERS LLP
          400 South Hope Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-2899
          Telephone: (213) 430 6000
          Facsimile: (213) 430 6407
          E-mail: dsestito@omm.com

Attorneys for Intervenor:

          Ronald A Marron, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF RONALD A MARRON APLC
          651 Arroyo Drive
          San Diego, CA 92103
          Telephone: (619) 696 9006
          Facsimile: (619) 564 6665


US IMMIGRATION: Class of Unaccompanied Alien Children Certified
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned WILMER GARCIA RAMIREZ, et al., the
Plaintiffs, v. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, et al.,
the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00508-RC (D.D.C.), the Hon. Judge
Rudolph Contreras entered an order on August 30, 2018:

   1. denying Defendants' motion to dismiss; and

   2. granting Plaintiffs' motion for class certification of:

      "all former unaccompanied alien children who are detained
      or will be detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement
      (ICE) after being transferred by ORR because they have
      turned 18 years of age and as to whom ICE did not consider
      placement in the least restrictive setting available,
      including alternatives to detention programs, as required
      by 8 U.S.C. section 1232(c)(2)(B)."


USG CORP: Gusinsky Trust Balks at Merger Deal with Knauf
--------------------------------------------------------
VLADIMIR GUSINSKY REV. TRUST, Individually and On Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. USG CORPORATION, JOSE
ARMARIO, THOMAS A. BURKE, MATTHEW CARTER, JR., GRETCHEN R.
HAGGERTY,WILLIAM H. HERNANDEZ, BRIAN A. KENNEY, RICHARD P. LAVIN,
STEVEN F. LEER, and JENNIFER F. SCANLON, the Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-01346-UNA (D. Del., Aug. 30, 2018), seeks to enjoin the
Defendants and all persons acting in concert with them from
proceeding with, consummating, or closing a proposed merger
transaction, and in the event Defendants consummate the Proposed
Transaction, to rescind it and set it aside or award rescissory
damages.

According to the complaint, the action stems from a proposed
transaction announced on June 11, 2018, pursuant to which USG
Corporation will be acquired by Gbr. Knauf KG and its indirect
wholly-owned subsidiary, World Cup Acquisition Corporation. On June
10, 2018, USG's Board of Directors caused the Company to enter into
an agreement and plan of merger with Knauf. Pursuant to the terms
of the Merger Agreement, if the Proposed Transaction is approved by
USG's shareholders and completed, USG's stockholders will receive
43.50 in cash for each share of USG common stock they own, plus a
conditional special cash dividend of $0.50 per share if the
Proposed Transaction is approved by USG's stockholders at the
special stockholder meeting, which is currently scheduled to take
place on September 26, 2018.

On August 23, 2018, defendants filed a proxy statement with the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with
the Proposed Transaction. The Proxy Statement omits material
information with respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders
the Proxy Statement false and misleading. Accordingly, plaintiff
alleges that defendants violated Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the Proxy
Statement.

USG Corporation, also known as United States Gypsum Corporation, is
an American company which manufactures construction materials, most
notably drywall and joint compound. The company is the largest
distributor of wallboard in the United States and the largest
manufacturer of gypsum products in North America.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295 5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654 7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324 6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631 1305
          E-mail: rm@maniskas.com


VOLUME SERVICES: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Raquedan FCRA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Lucy H. Koh of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, denied the Defendant's
motion to dismiss the case, MONIQUE RAQUEDAN, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. VOLUME SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No.
18-CV-01139-LHK (N.D. Cal.).

Raquedan and Ronald Martinez bring the instant putative class
action against the Defendant for causes of action arising out of
the latter's alleged practice of acquiring credit and background
reports on prospective, current, and former employees without
providing proper disclosures.  They filed the instant putative
class action on Feb. 22, 2018.

In their complaint, they allege that they were hired by the
Defendant in August 2014 and on July 24, 2014, respectively, as
hourly, non-exempt employees to work at an entertainment venue in
California.  The Plaintiffs further allege that when they applied
for employment with the Defendant, the Defendant performed
background investigations on them.  However, the Plaintiffs assert
that the Defendant failed to provide legally compliant disclosure
forms before procuring those reports.

The Plaintiffs allege that Defendant's disclosure forms failed to
comply with the law in a number of ways.  First, they allege that
the disclosure forms were embedded with extraneous information and
were not clear and unambiguous.  Second, the Plaintiffs allege that
the Defendant's disclosure forms failed to inform them of the right
to have it provide a complete and accurate disclosure of the nature
and scope of the investigation it requested.  Third, the Plaintiffs
allege that the Defendant's disclosure forms failed to provide a
legally compliant summary of rights.  Finally, they allege that the
Defendant's disclosures failed to identify the specific basis under
subdivision (a) of Section 1024.5 of the California Labor Code for
use of the credit report, which clearly violated Section
1785.20.5(a) of the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act
("CCRAA").  They further allege that this omission was willful.

Based on these alleged violations, the Plaintiffs assert five
causes of action against the Defendant, including: (1) failure to
provide proper disclosure in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act ("FCRA"); (2) failure to give proper summary of rights in
violation of the FCRA; (3) failure to make proper disclosure in
violation of California's Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies
Act ("ICRAA"); (4) "failure to make proper disclosure in violation
of the CCRAA; and (5) unfair competition in violation of California
Unfair Competition Law ("UCL").

The Plaintiffs seek to assert these causes of action on behalf of
three proposed classes:

     (1) a "FCRA Class," which is comprised of all of the
Defendant's current, former and prospective applicants for
employment in the United States who applied for a job with the
Defendant at any time during the period for which a background
check was performed beginning five years prior to the filing of the
action and ending on the date that final judgment is entered in
the;

     (2) an "ICRAA Class," which is comprised of all of the
Defendant's current, former and prospective applicants for
employment in California, at any time during the period beginning
five years prior to the filing of the action and ending on the date
that final judgment is entered in the action; and

     (3) a "CCRAA Class," which is comprised of all of the
Defendant's current, former and prospective applicants for
employment in California, at any time during the period beginning
seven years prior to the filing of the action and ending on the
date that final judgment is entered in the action.

On March 20, 2018, the Defendant filed the instant motion to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' complaint.  In its motion to dismiss, the
Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed
based on the following grounds: (1) they have failed to adequately
plead any violations of law against the Defendant; (2) their claims
are barred by the doctrine of res judicata" based on the Thompson
v. Centerplate of Delaware, Inc. et al. settlement; (3) the
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the release in Thompson; (4)
because their claims are barred, the Plaintiffs' claims are moot
and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; and (5) the
Plaintiffs' failure to file a notice of pendency of other action or
proceeding violates Local Rule 3-13.

Judge Koh finds that the Plaintiffs' causes of action in the
instant action can be barred by res judicata based on the Thompson
settlement only if the Plaintiffs worked at the 2016 Super Bowl as
employees of the Defendant.  In support of its assertion that the
Plaintiffs were members of the Thompson class, hte Defendant states
that both the Plaintiffs participated in the class recovery in
Thompson.  For their part, the Plaintiffs do not dispute that they
received notice of and payment from the Thompson settlement, nor do
they contend that they did not work at the 2016 Super Bowl as
employees of the Defendant.  Thus, the Defendant has satisfied the
same party component of its res judicata argument that the
Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed as barred by the Thompson
settlement.

By operation of the "identical factual predicate" rule, none of the
Plaintiffs' causes of action are precluded by the Thompson
settlement because none of their causes of action are substantively
the same as those asserted in Thompson.  As a result, the Judge
finds that the Defendant cannot prevail on its argument that the
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata based
on the Thompson settlement.

As to the Defendant's jurisdictional argument, the Judge finds that
it is premised on the notion that all of the Plaintiffs' claims are
covered and barred by the Thompson Judgment and Release.  However,
she finds that none of the Plaintiffs' causes of action in the
instant case are barred by claim preclusion based on the settlement
in Thompson.  As a result, the Defendant's jurisdictional argument
necessarily fails.

The Judge also finds that (i) the Plaintiffs' failure to assert the
dates of their applications or alleged background checks does not
warrant dismissal of any of their causes of action; (ii) the
Plaintiffs' factual allegations are sufficient to support their
first four causes of action at this stage of the proceedings; and
(iii) that the Plaintiffs have adequately pled claims under both 15
U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(2)(a) and California Civil Code Section
1786.16(a)(2) by alleging that (1) the Defendant procured consumer
reports regarding the Plaintiffs; and (2) the Defendant's
disclosures included liability releases.

Finally, the Judge finds that the Defendant's Rule 3-13 argument is
without merit.  She says the Plaintiffs had little incentive to try
to "avoid" adverse merits rulings in Raquedan I by filing the
instant action as a separate lawsuit and failing to file a notice
disclosing Raquedan I.  As a result, the Defendant's forum-shopping
argument is unavailing, and thus it has failed to establish why the
Plaintiffs' alleged violation of Rule 3-13 warrants a dismissal of
the Plaintiffs' complaint.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Koh denied the Defendant's motion
to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/NTAGCg from Leagle.com.

Monique Raquedan & Ronald Martinez, Plaintiffs, represented by
Chaim Shaun Setareh -- info@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group.

Volume Services, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by Scott J. Witlin -- scott.witlin@BTLaw.com -- Barnes
& Thornburg, LLP & Steve Lou Hernandez -- steve.hernandez@btlaw.com
-- Barnes & Thornburg LLP.


WABTEC CORP: 9th Cir. Refuses to Remand Busker to State Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of Busker's motion to remand the case, JOHN
BUSKER, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated and
the general public, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WABTEC CORPORATION, a
Pennsylvania corporation; MARK MARTIN, an individual; DOES, 1
through 100, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 17-55165 (9th Cir.) to
state court.

Busker filed a putative class action in state court alleging Wabtec
and its employee, Mark Martin, violated California's prevailing
wage law.  Wabtec removed the action to federal court under the
Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").  Busker appeals the district
court's denial of his motion to remand the case to state court and
the district court's grant of summary judgment.

The Court affirmed the denial of the motion to remand, and rejected
one of Busker's three theories in favor of coverage by the
prevailing wage law.  

The local controversy exception has four elements.  The only
element at issue in the case is the presence of a "significant"
local defendant.  To meet this element, Busker must show that at
least one defendant (1) is a citizen of California (2) from whom
significant relief is sought and (3) whose alleged conduct forms a
significant basis for the claims asserted in the complaint.  The
only allegations in the complaint specifically about the sole local
Defendant, Martin, are that he was an employee, agent, and/or
representative of Wabtec and that he, as a project manager of
Wabtec, on behalf of his employer violated, or caused to be
violated certain provisions of the Labor Code.  Busker does not
specifically allege Martin's role in the conduct that is the basis
of the complaint.

The case is qualitatively distinct from both Benko v. Quality Loan
Serv. Corp. and Allen v. Boeing Co., the primary cases Busker
cites.  In both Benko and Allen, the Court finds that the local
defendants were alleged to have acted independently from the other
defendants as a principal wrongdoer.  In contrast, Martin's sole
alleged conduct was undertaken as an agent of Wabtec, which is
Busker's employer and the real target of his action for unpaid
wages.  Martin's liability could arise, if at all, only
derivatively through his role as an agent of Wabtec.  The Court
agrees with Wabtec that Busker's non-specific allegations about
Martin are insufficient to satisfy the local controversy
exception.

Busker also advances three independent arguments for why he is
entitled to a prevailing wage: (1) the "on-board work" performed by
Wabtec employees constitutes "construction" and "installation" as
those terms are used in California Labor Code Section 1720(a)(1);
(2) the on-board work is sufficiently related to the "field
installation work" performed on the wayside (which the parties
agree is covered by the prevailing wage law); and (3) Wabtec is
contractually obligated to pay a prevailing wage.  The Court
addresses only Busker's breach of contract theory.

It agrees with Busker that the district court erred in not
addressing his breach of contract theory, but it rejects his breach
of contract theory on its merits.  Although Busker raised this
theory for the first time in his opposition to the summary judgment
motion, his operative complaint may fairly be read as containing
the factual basis for a breach of contract claim.  But it sees no
basis for holding that Wabtec had a contractual duty to pay a
prevailing wage.  Busker's case thus turns on the viability of his
statutory theories (on which the Court certified a question to the
Supreme Court of California).

For these reasons, the Court affirmed the denial of Busker's motion
to remand the case to state court.  Its foregoing disposition
pertains only to the district court's denial of Busker's motion to
remand under CAFA and one of Busker's theories for entitlement to a
prevailing wage.  As to Busker's remaining arguments challenging
the grant of summary judgment, the appellate proceedings are stayed
pending final action by the Supreme Court of California in response
to the Court's order certifying a question of state law to that
court.  The case is withdrawn from submission.  The panel retains
jurisdiction over further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 8, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/nxAb4r from Leagle.com.


WALGREEN CO: Scheduling Conference in Le Suit Set for Dec. 3
------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants removed the lawsuit captioned as MARCIE LE, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
WALGREEN CO., an Illinois corporation; WALGREENS BOOTS ALLIANCE, a
Delaware corporation, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 8:18-cv-01548-DOC-ADS (C.D. Cal., Aug. 30,
2018), removed from the Orange County Superior Court, Case No.
30-2018 01008756-CU-OE-CXC, to the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California.

On September 6, the Defendants filed a notice of unavailability for
their counsel, Christopher J. Archibald, Eq.  According to the
notice, counsel of record for Walgreen Co. and Walgreens Boots
Alliance, Inc. will be unavailable for any purposes, including but
not limited to court proceedings, meetings, receiving notices of
any kind, responding to ex parte applications, appearing in court,
attending depositions, or attending trial from September 18 through
October 5.

Also on September 6, Judge David O. Carter, who presides over the
case, entered an order setting a scheduling conference for December
3, 2018, at 8:30 a.m.

The case alleges labor law violations.[BN]

Attorneys for Walgreen Co. and Walgreens Boots:

          Allison Eckstrom, Esq.
          Christopher J. Archibald, Esq.
          Michael E. Olsen, Esq.
          BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER LLP
          3161 Michelson Drive, Suite 1500
          Irvine, CA 92612 4414
          Telephone: (949) 223 7000
          Facsimile: (949) 223 7100
          E-mail: allison.eckstrom@bcplaw.com
                  christopher.archibald@bcplaw.com
                  michael.olsen@bcplaw.com


WCW & AIR: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Coffen's FDUTPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida, Pensacola Division, denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned JONATHAN COFFEY et. al, Plaintiffs, v. WCW &
AIR, INC. et. al, Defendants. Case No. 3:17-cv-90-MCR-CJK. (N.D.
Fla.).

The Plaintiffs filed this putative class action against Defendants
WCW & Air, Inc. d/b/a World Class Water (World Class Water),
Acquion, Inc. d/b/a Rainsoft (Acquion), and Home Depot, U.S.A. Inc.
(Home Depot) for violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), unjust enrichment, and civil
conspiracy. They allege that the Defendants sold them water
treatment systems after creating the false impression that their
home water supply was unsafe to drink.

Legal Standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a
complaint. To survive a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations
in a complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its face and
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.  

Acquion argues that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this suit,
World Class Water argues that the Amended Complaint is a shotgun
pleading and all three Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed
to plausibly state their claims for FDUTPA violations, unjust
enrichment, and civil conspiracy.

Standing

Acquion argues that the Coffeys lack standing because they have yet
to pay off the debt they owe on their water treatment system.
Because standing is jurisdictional, the Court addresses this
argument as a preliminary matter.   

The Coffeys satisfy this standard. Plaintiffs allege that: (1) the
Coffeys suffered actual injury by paying a non-refundable $49.00
processing fee and incurring thousands of dollars of debt, (2)
these injuries occurred due to Defendants' scheme to sell water
treatment systems, and (3) Defendants' conduct violates FDUTPA and
support their claims of unjust enrichment and civil conspiracy.
These allegations establish the Coffeys' standing at this stage.

FDUTPA

To state a FDUTPA claim, a plaintiff must allege (1) a deceptive
act or unfair practice; (2) causation; and (3) actual damages. An
unfair practice is one that offends established public policy and
one that is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or
substantially injurious to consumers while a deceptive act occurs
if there is a representation, omission, or practice that is likely
to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to
the consumer's detriment.

Accordingly, each Defendant is on notice of its alleged role in the
joint scheme to purposely effectuate a FDUTPA violation. Because
Rule 9(b) allows intent to be averred generally and Florida courts
have long held that a plaintiff can bring a FDUTPA claim against a
defendant based solely on his "direct participation" in a FDUPTA
violation. Thus, the Plaintiffs have satisfied the pleading
standard for a FDUTPA claim.

The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs have failed to state
a FDUTPA claim. Acquion suggests that the allegations in the First
Amended Complaint lack credibility because of their similarity to
those raised by different plaintiffs in a different case against
Acquion and Home Depot. The Court fails to see how that would
warrant a dismissal. The fact that other parties have raised
substantially similar allegations against the same Defendants
arguably makes the Plaintiffs' allegations more credible, not less.
More importantly, on a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs'
allegations are accepted as true. Acquion also argues that selling
water treatment systems that only remove certain minerals from
water is not a deceptive act, citing websites purportedly showing
that Acquion water treatment systems have been certified by various
trade associations.

However, the certifications of these systems have not been raised
in either the First Amended Complaint or the documents the
Defendants asked the Court to consider on this motion.  As a
result, the Court cannot consider the websites or system
certifications at this time. Regardless, what the water treatment
system is or is not able to do is immaterial to the Plaintiffs'
theory of the case -- that the Defendants used a water quality test
to create the false impression that the Plaintiffs' home water
supply was unsafe without water treatment.

Acquion and Home Depot also argue that, even if the Plaintiffs were
misled by the water quality test, they had no duty to disclose what
the test detected.  It is not clear whether the plaintiffs must
establish an independent duty to disclose on a FDUTPA claim based
on an omission affirmatively used to mislead.  The Court disagrees
with Acquion and Home Depot, regardless. The Florida Supreme Court
has long held that a seller has a duty to disclose material
information that is not equally within the ken of the buyer.

Such is the case here. The Plaintiffs allege that, as part of a
sales pitch for water treatment systems, Manzo conducted an in-home
water quality test designed to invariably show that their home
water supply was contaminated without revealing that the test only
detects the presence of minerals found in ordinary tap water.
Because it is at least plausible that the Plaintiffs could not
readily determine what the Defendant's water quality test actually
detected and because this information appears to be material to the
sale of a water treatment system designed to treat the water
conditions found at the time of the water test, the Court declines
to find, as a matter of law, that the Defendants did not have a
duty to disclose this information.

World Class Water and Home Depot argue that, because the Coffeys
agreed to an integration clause in which the Coffeys expressly
disclaim the existence of express or implied representations that
conditioned their agreement for the installation of the water
treatment system, they are unable to successfully state a FDUTPA
claim. To support this argument, World Class Water and Home Depot
cite a handful of Florida cases finding that a FDUTPA claim cannot
be based on misrepresentations that are expressly contradicted by
the agreement at issue. These courts reason that a consumer cannot
be reasonably deceived when the contract that is ultimately signed
expressly contradicts the misrepresentation.  

This case is distinct. Although the pertinent integration clause
suggests that the Coffeys did not rely on the Defendants'
suggestion that their home water supply was not safe to drink
without water treatment, it does not contradict that suggestion.
This distinction is material because, as stated, FDUTPA requires
plaintiffs to prove only that the allegedly deceptive conduct would
deceive an objective reasonable consumer, not that they actually or
even justifiably relied on the deceptive conduct in question,  

Acquion argues that the Plaintiffs have not adequately pled damages
under FDUTPA. FDUTPA provides that a prevailing plaintiff may
recover actual damages, plus attorney's fees and court costs. It
also provides that a plaintiff may not have a claim for damage to
property other than the property that is the subject of the
consumer transaction. Florida courts have interpreted these
provisions to mean that a plaintiff may only recover actual damages
and not consequential damages to other property attributable to the
consumer's use of such goods or services. Plaintiffs have outlined
their entitlement to actual damages in this case.

The Plaintiffs allege that Defendants created the impression that
their home water supply was unsafe, which allowed Defendants to
charge a premium on the total cost of the respective water
treatment systems. This allegedly caused Plaintiffs direct,
compensable injuries either because they paid for the total cost of
the treatment system (including this premium) out of pocket or by
paying a $49.00 processing fee initially and incurring a debt for
the remaining cost of the treatment system also including this
premium.

Unjust Enrichment

An unjust enrichment claim exists where (1) the plaintiff conferred
a benefit on the defendant, (2) the defendant voluntarily accepted
the benefit, and (3) under the circumstances, it would be
inequitable for the defendant to retain that benefit without paying
the plaintiff for its value.

Existence of Valid and Enforceable Contract

Home Depot and World Class Water argue that the Plaintiffs cannot
proceed on their unjust enrichment claim because agreements already
exist on the same subject matter: the Plaintiffs' agreements with
World Class Water to purchase the Water Treatment System and the
Coffey's agreement with Home Depot for the installation of that
system. The Court is unconvinced. As the Defendants note, the
Plaintiffs' theory of the case is that the Defendants deceived them
into purchasing a water treatment system, which would make the
Plaintiffs' subsequent agreements voidable. It would be premature
to decide that the Plaintiffs are precluded from raising an unjust
enrichment claim in these circumstances.

Voluntary Receipt of Direct Benefit

In this case, the Plaintiffs allege they paid for the cost of the
water treatment system (either out of pocket or by incurring debt)
and the $49.00 processing fee; that the Defendants are jointly
responsible for inducing them to pay those fees through the water
quality test scheme; and that the Defendants were in a position to
profit from the scheme. There is no suggestion that any defendant
only benefited from the scheme by performing services for a
different party under a separate contract. Whether the Defendants
voluntarily received a direct benefit under these circumstances is
a question of fact the Court declines to reach at this stage.

Circumstances Making Retention Unjust

As with the FDUTPA claim, the Defendants argue that the
circumstances that would allow the Defendants to retain the full
price the Plaintiffs paid for their water treatment systems must be
pleaded with particularity, which the Plaintiffs have purportedly
failed to do. For the reasons stated when discussing the FDUTPA
claim, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have pled their unjust
enrichment claim with the particularity Rule 9(b) requires.

A full-text copy of the District Court's August 30, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yb3s2awl from Leagle.com.

JONATHAN COFFEY, SYDNEY COFFEY & VALERIE DIANE VAN DYKE,
Plaintiffs, represented by BRIAN DOUGLAS HANCOCK , TAYLOR WARREN &
WEIDNER PA & J. PHILLIP WARREN , TAYLOR WARREN & WEIDNER PA.

WCW & AIR INC, doing business as WORLD CLASS WATER, Defendant,
represented by KELLY OVERSTREET JOHNSON --
kjohnson@bakerdonelson.com -- BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN ETC PC.

AQUION INC, doing business as WORLD CLASS WATER, Defendant,
represented by RICHARD TRENT TAYLOR -- rtaylor@mcguirewoods.com --
MCGUIRE WOODS LLP, THOMAS LARRY HILL , MOORE HILL & WESTMORELAND PA
& CHARLES FRANKLIN BEALL, Jr. , MOORE HILL & WESTMORELAND PA.

HOME DEPOT USA INC, Defendant, represented by ROBERT CONRAD PALMER,
III , SHELL FLEMING DAVIS ETC.


WORLD MARKETING: Carroll et al. Seek to Certify Class of Employees
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned AMY CARROLL, RALPH FORD, and ROY S. ADDIS
IV on their own behalf and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. WORLD MARKETING HOLDINGS, LLC, and
BLUE STREAK HOLDINGS, INC., the Defendants, Case No.
2:17-cv-01309-LA (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order:

   1. certifying a class consisting of:

      "all former employees nominally employed by one or more of
      the following: World Marketing Dallas, LLC, World Marketing
      Chicago, LLC, World Marketing Atlanta, LLC, and/or World
      Marketing Holdings, LLC; who worked at or were based at one
      or more of the facilities located at 7950 West Joliet Road,
      McCook, Illinois 60525 (the "Illinois facility"); 8801
      Autobahn Road, Suite 100, Dallas, Texas 75237 (the "Texas
      facility") and 1961 S. Cobb Industrial Boulevard, SE,
      Smyrna, Georgia 30082 (the "Georgia facility" and
      collectively, the "Facilities"), and were allegedly
      terminated on or about September 28, 2015, within thirty
      days of that date or thereafter, as part of, or as the
      reasonably expected consequence of, plant closings ordered
      on or about September 28, 2015, as defined by the WARN Act,
      and who do not file a timely request to opt-out of the
      class;

   2. appointing Plaintiffs Amy Carroll, Ralph Ford and Roy S.
      Addis IV as Class Representatives;

   3. appointing The Gardner Firm, P.C., Lankenau & Miller, LLP
      and The Previant Law Firm, S.C. as Class Counsel;

   4. approving the form and manner of Notice to the Class; and

   5. granting such other and further relief as this Court may
      deem proper.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Frederick Perillo, Esq.
          THE PREVIANT LAW FIRM, S.C.
          310 West Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 100 MW
          Milwaukee, WI 53203
          Telephone: (414) 271 4500
          Facsimile: (414) 271 6308

               - and -

          Mary E. Olsen, Esq.
          M. Vance McCrary, Esq.
          THE GARDNER FIRM, P.C.
          P.O. Drawer 3103
          Mobile, AL 36652
          Telephone: (251) 433 8100
          Facsimile: (251) 433

               - and -

          Stuart J. Miller, Esq.
          LANKENAU & MILLER, LLP
          132 Nassau Street, Suite 1100
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 581 5005
          Facsimile: (212) 581 2122
          E-mail: sjm@lankmill.com


YUM! BRANDS: John West Seeks Unpaid Wages under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------
JOHN WEST II, on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly
situated, known and unknown, the Plaintiff, v. YUM! BRANDS, INC., a
Kentucky for-profit business, the Defendant, Case No.
2:18-cv-12750-GCS-RSW (E.D. Mich., Sept. 5, 2018), seeks
declaration that Plaintiff's rights under the Fair Labor Standards
Act have been violated, award of the unpaid wages, award of
liquidated damages in an amount equal to the unpaid wage, and an
award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as provided for in
the FLSA, to compensate Plaintiff for damages suffered, and to
ensure that they and future employees will not suffer as a result
of such illegal conduct on the part of Defendant Yum! Brands in the
future.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff West regularly worked
more than 40 hours in a workweek. The Plaintiff West typically
worked four or five days a week between the hours of 4:00 p.m. and
7:00 a.m. The Plaintiff West personally saw his managers reduce the
hours that hourly employees worked in their timekeeping system
located in the backroom. Managers would joke and laugh about
deleting employees' hours from the timekeeping system. The
Plaintiff West personally witnessed at least three managers engage
in this practice. From what Plaintiff West saw and talked to the
managers about, he knows of at least five employees whose hours
were deleted. The plaintiff believes that he was not paid for all
of the time that he worked because his records of punching in and
out did not reflect his paychecks.

Yum! is an American fast food company. A Fortune 500 corporation,
Yum! operates the brands Taco Bell, KFC, Pizza Hut, and WingStreet
worldwide, except in China, where the brands are operated by a
separate company, Yum China.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bryan Yaldou, Esq.
          Elaina S. Bailey, Esq.
          Omar Badr, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF BRYAN YALDOU, PLLC
          23000 Telegraph, Suite 5
          Brownstown, MI 48134
          Telephone: (734) 692 9200
          Facsimile: (734) 692 9201
          E-mail: bryan@yaldoulaw.com


[*] National Labor Relations Board Permitting Class Action Waivers
------------------------------------------------------------------
David J. Pryzbylski, Esq., of Barnes & Thornburg LLP, in an article
for The National Law Review, reports that for years employers
around the country operated in area of uncertainty with respect to
whether "class action waivers" in employment agreements -- such as
those included in mandatory arbitration programs -- were
enforceable.

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) routinely took the view
that such waivers violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
Now, the board is finally backing off that position.

Class action waivers prohibit employees from forming class or
collective actions under employment laws (e.g., the Fair Labor
Standards Act) against companies by requiring claims to be brought
only on an individual basis. In 2012, the NLRB issued its infamous
decision in D.R. Horton Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (2012) that
ruled class action waivers violate the NLRA because they impede
"concerted activity." That is, the NLRB viewed the potential
formation of class actions contesting alleged unlawful practices as
"group activity" protected by the NLRA.

While the NLRB struck these waivers down for years following its
decision in D.R. Horton Inc., some federal courts disagreed with
the board and ruled they were, in fact, lawful – creating a legal
headache for companies utilizing these programs. Earlier this year,
the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in to resolve the dispute and
overruled the NLRB's position.

In other words, generally, class action waivers are now lawful, at
least when it comes to compliance with the NLRA. And now, in the
wake of the Supreme Court's decision, the NLRB is finally backing
off its former position that class action waivers are unlawful. For
example, on August 6, the NLRB decided to dismiss a complaint
against a car dealer who was alleged to have maintained an unlawful
class action waiver.

This is welcome news for all companies who currently use -- or are
considering using -- these waivers to stave off potentially costly
class claims by current or former employees. [GN]


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 14-Year Old Girl Diagnosed with Mesothelioma
-------------------------------------------------------------
Tom Herbert at Metro reported that a 14-year-old girl has become
one of the youngest sufferers in the world to be diagnosed with an
asbestos-related cancer.

Macie Greening, of Cullompton, Devon, is one of only nine children
in the world to be suffer from mesothelioma after she was diagnosed
in March. But despite undergoing four rounds of chemotherapy, Macie
has been told her treatment hasn't worked and is now pinning her
hopes on fresh trials becoming available. Macie Greening is one of
only nine children to suffer from peritoneal mesothelioma.

Her friends have launched a JustGiving page to raise GBP15,0000 to
send her and her family on a dream holiday to Disney World,
Florida. This includes parents Tracey and Nellie, twin sister
Madison and sister, Saskia, 17. Macie’s aunt, Sonia Hurst, said:
'It was hoped she could have surgery but we've since learnt that is
not an option. She wants to go on a dream holiday to Disney World
in Florida.

Macie loves being a princess and is obsessed with unicorns so she
would love to go to Disney World. 'She's such an amazing girl and
an inspiration to us all. 'Macie has been so strong through all of
this and we are so incredibly proud of her.' Her family say she is
one of the world's youngest to have an asbestos-related cancer.

Macie suffers from peritoneal mesothelioma, which starts in the
tissue lining of the abdomen and is caused by inhaling or
swallowing asbestos fibers. There are just 500 sufferers diagnosed
each year, with just nine children currently fighting the disease.
Sufferers can survive for several years after diagnosis with
successful chemo but prognosis is generally poor. Her friends and
family are raising GBP15,000 to take her to America.

The JustGiving page says: 'The chemotherapy was not working so her
consultant decided to stop the course. 'Macie's consultant was
exploring other options that are available to her, surgery being
the main one, but in August Macie had a laparoscopy to find out
that surgery was not an option. 'We are not sure what will happen
from here but Macie is such a strong, beautiful young lady. Her
family has been told her treatment hasn't worked.

She is continuing to make everyone laugh and smile like she usually
would. 'She has already been through enough and is taking the whole
situation in her stride, a true inspiration to all.'


ASBESTOS UPDATE: ACT Homeowners Ignored Asbestos Management Plan
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Canberra Times reported that the owners of almost half the ACT
homes required to have an asbestos contamination management plan
are ignoring their legal obligations.

Homeowners who continue to live in properties affected by Mr Fluffy
loose-fill asbestos are required under the Dangerous Substances Act
to have a management plan in place to minimise the future risk of
exposure to themselves, other occupants or visitors to the
property.

WorkSafe ACT, which is responsible for enforcing compliance with
asbestos management plans, says 77 residential properties remain
affected by loose-fill asbestos, with 48 of them required to have a
management plan.

A WorkSafe ACT spokesperson said 21 of those 48 properties were
non-compliant, with four partially compliant and 23 fully
compliant.

The regulator will not reveal the addresses of the non-compliant
homes, despite there being a public register listing the 1023
properties found to have been contaminated by Mr Fluffy asbestos.

"There is a public register of loose-fill asbestos properties,
including those that remain affected," the spokesperson said.

"While privacy requirements prevent the publication of
non-compliant households, visitors including trade persons can
check the public register for loose-fill asbestos properties and at
the property can check for relevant signage or ask for a copy of
the [asbestos management plan]."

The register available to the public lists all 1023 properties and
does not distinguish between the 77 still affected by Mr Fluffy
asbestos and the 946 that have been removed from the Asbestos
Response Taskforce's affected residential premises register after
demolition and soil testing.

The affected residential premises register, which lists the 77
properties still affected, is not a public document.

While the WorkSafe ACT spokesperson said the regulator took
compliance with asbestos contamination management plans "very
seriously", there are no clear consequences for homeowners who fail
to have such a plan prepared by a licensed asbestos assessor.

The spokesperson said the obligation to inform visitors to
asbestos-affected properties of the contamination rested with
homeowners, but WorkSafe ACT would continue to monitor compliance.

"Should the homeowners not co-operate with their legislative
requirements, the regulator will consider taking further action,"
the spokesperson said.

"This will be on a case-by-case basis."

Residents who decided to continue living in Mr Fluffy homes and not
to take part in the ACT government's buyback scheme were required
to have asbestos management plans in place by February 2016.

The plans last two years and require homeowners to pay for asbestos
assessments when the plan is renewed, and to arrange for any
recommended remidiation works to be carried out within six months
of the assessment.

Homeowners subject to an asbestos management plan must also take
defined steps to inform visitors of the contamination, including
labelling on the property's metre box and on the locked manhole.

However, non-compliant or partially compliant properties may not
have any visible signs in place alerting visitors to the
contamination.

Figures released under freedom of information laws show that, as of
October 25 last year, 19 residential properties required to have an
asbestos management plan were non-compliant.

The WorkSafe ACT spokesperson said that number had since risen to
21 properties as a result of two-year asbestos management plans
expiring and not being renewed.

WorkSafe ACT commissioner Greg Jones has written to non-compliant
homeowners at least twice to remind them of their legal
obligations.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: AMETEK Still Defends Lawsuits at June 30
---------------------------------------------------------
AMETEK, Inc. still faces a number of asbestos-related lawsuits,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018.

AMETEK, Inc. states, "The Company (including its subsidiaries) has
been named as a defendant in a number of asbestos-related lawsuits.
Certain of these lawsuits relate to a business which was acquired
by the Company and do not involve products which were manufactured
or sold by the Company.  In connection with these lawsuits, the
seller of such business has agreed to indemnify the Company against
these claims (the "Indemnified Claims").

"The Indemnified Claims have been tendered to, and are being
defended by, such seller.  The seller has met its obligations, in
all respects, and the Company does not have any reason to believe
such party would fail to fulfill its obligations in the future.

"To date, no judgments have been rendered against the Company as a
result of any asbestos-related lawsuit.  The Company believes that
it has good and valid defenses to each of these claims and intends
to defend them vigorously."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/6Zcq7S


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Appeals Court Reverses $4.6MM Asbestos Win
-----------------------------------------------------------
Emily Field of Law360 of an Illinois appeals court overturned a
$4.6 million verdict awarded to a mechanic who developed lung
cancer from inhaling asbestos in the 1960s, saying the company that
made welding rods containing asbestos didn't know then that the
rods could release the carcinogen.

The Fourth District Appellate Court said that Hobart Brothers Co.'s
industry had no knowledge in the early 1960s that welding rods
could emit asbestos fibers and that the company couldn't have owed
plaintiff Charles McKinney a duty to warn of a hazard.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: ArvinMeritor Had 1,600 Pending Claims at June 30
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Meritor, Inc.'s subsidiary, ArvinMeritor, Inc., continues to defend
itself against approximately 1,600 pending active asbestos claims
in lawsuits at June 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended July 1, 2018.

The Company states, "ArvinMeritor, Inc. ("AM"), a subsidiary of
Meritor, along with many other companies, has also been named as a
defendant in lawsuits alleging personal injury as a result of
exposure to asbestos used in certain components of Rockwell
products many years ago.  Liability for these claims was
transferred at the time of the spin-off of the automotive business
from Rockwell in 1997.  Rockwell had approximately 1,600 pending
active asbestos claims in lawsuits that name AM, together with many
other companies, as defendants at June 30, 2018 and September 30,
2017.

"A significant portion of the claims do not identify any of
Rockwell's products or specify which of the claimants, if any, were
exposed to asbestos attributable to Rockwell's products, and past
experience has shown that the vast majority of the claimants will
likely never identify any of Rockwell's products.  Historically, AM
has been dismissed from the vast majority of similar claims filed
in the past with no payment to claimants.  For those claimants who
do show that they worked with Rockwell's products, management
nevertheless believes it has meritorious defenses, in substantial
part due to the integrity of the products involved and the lack of
any impairing medical condition on the part of many claimants."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/hTFYaP


ASBESTOS UPDATE: ArvinMeritor Had US$65MM Reserves at June 30
-------------------------------------------------------------
Meritor, Inc.'s subsidiary, ArvinMeritor, Inc., had reserves of
US$65 million for asbestos-related liabilities at June 30, 2018,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
July 1, 2018. Of this amount, US$63 million was attributed to
pending and future claims while US$2 million was for billed but
unpaid claims.

The Company states, "ArvinMeritor, Inc. ("AM"), a subsidiary of
Meritor, along with many other companies, has also been named as a
defendant in lawsuits alleging personal injury as a result of
exposure to asbestos used in certain components of Rockwell
products many years ago.  Liability for these claims was
transferred at the time of the spin-off of the automotive business
from Rockwell in 1997.

The company engaged Bates White to assist with determining whether
it would be possible to estimate the cost of resolving pending and
future Rockwell legacy asbestos-related claims that have been, and
could reasonably be expected to be, filed against the company.  As
of September 30, 2017, Bates White provided a reasonable and
probable estimate that consisted of a range of equally likely
possibilities of Rockwell's obligation for asbestos personal injury
claims over the next ten years of US$63 million to US$74 million.
After consultation with Bates White, management recognized a
liability for the pending and future claims over the next ten years
of US$63 million as of each of June 30, 2018 and September 30,
2017.  The ultimate cost of resolving pending and future claims is
estimated based on the history of claims and expenses for
plaintiffs represented by law firms in jurisdictions with an
established history with Rockwell.

"Rockwell has insurance coverage that management believes covers
indemnity and defense costs, over and above self-insurance
retentions, for a significant portion of these claims.  In 2004,
the company initiated litigation against certain of these carriers
to enforce the insurance policies.  During the fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2016, the company executed settlement agreements with
two of these carriers, thereby resolving the litigation against
those particular carriers.  Pursuant to the terms of one of those
settlement agreements, in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2016
the company received US$32 million in cash from an insurer, of
which US$10 million was recognized as a reduction in asbestos
expense, and US$22 million was recorded as a liability to the
insurance carrier as it is required to be returned to the carrier
if additional asbestos liability is not ultimately incurred.
During fiscal year 2017 and the first nine months of fiscal year
2018, Rockwell recognized an additional US$10 million and US$7
million, respectively, of the cash settlement proceeds as a
reduction in asbestos expense.  Pursuant to the terms of a second
settlement agreement, in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2016 the
company recorded a US$12 million receivable to reflect expected
reimbursement of future defense and indemnity payments under a
coverage-in-place arrangement with that insurer.  In addition to
the coverage provided from the settlement agreements executed
during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2016, the company
maintains a receivable of US$7 million related to a previously
executed coverage-in-place arrangement with other insurers.  The
insurance receivable for Rockwell's asbestos-related liabilities
totaled US$36 million and US$38 million as of June 30, 2018 and
September 30, 2017, respectively.  Included in these amounts are
insurance receivables of US$17 million as of each of June 30, 2018
and September 30, 2017, which are associated with policies in
dispute and have been fully reserved.  From time to time the
company negotiates with insurance carriers regarding policies in
dispute.

"The amounts recorded for the asbestos-related reserves and
recoveries from insurance companies are based upon assumptions and
estimates derived from currently known facts.  All such estimates
of liabilities and recoveries for asbestos-related claims are
subject to considerable uncertainty because such liabilities and
recoveries are influenced by variables that are difficult to
predict.  The future litigation environment for Rockwell could
change significantly from its past experience, due, for example, to
changes in the mix of claims filed against Rockwell in terms of
plaintiffs' law firms, jurisdictions and diseases; legislative or
regulatory developments; Rockwell's approach to defending claims;
or payments to plaintiffs from other defendants.  Estimated
recoveries are influenced by coverage issues among insurers and the
continuing solvency of various insurance companies.  If the
assumptions with respect to the estimation period, the nature of
pending claims, the cost to resolve claims and the amount of
available insurance prove to be incorrect, the actual amount of
liability for Rockwell asbestos-related claims, and the effect on
the company, could differ materially from current estimates and,
therefore, could have a material impact on the company's financial
condition and results of operations."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/hTFYaP


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Disease Longer to Develop on Children
---------------------------------------------------------------
Alex Strauss of Surviving Mesothelioma reported that Australian
researchers say it may take longer for asbestos-exposed children to
develop malignant mesothelioma than it takes adults with the same
level of exposure.

Public health researchers with multiple Australian Universities and
Utrecht University in The Netherlands say being younger may offer a
short-term reprieve from the mesothelioma-inducing effects of
asbestos.

Unfortunately, that lower susceptibility is unlikely to last for a
lifetime.

Studying the People of Wittenoom

Scientists determined that asbestos-exposed children are less
likely to contract malignant mesothelioma, at least in the short
term, by studying the records of Australians who lived around the
notorious Wittenoom asbestos mine.

The Wittenoom mine, which mined for crocidolite or "blue" asbestos
from 1943 to 1966, has now been linked to hundreds of mesothelioma
deaths among the 7,000+ people who either worked in the plant or
lived in the dusty town.

After the plant was closed in 1966, the Australian government
deemed the town to be too contaminated with mesothelioma-causing
asbestos to be cleaned up and closed Wittenoom for good.

After adjusting the survival data for differences in age, gender,
and exposure level, the Australian researchers found that
non-occupationally asbestos-exposed adults were more likely to have
received a mesothelioma diagnosis over the same time period than
were children with the same exposure.

Lower Mesothelioma Rates in Asbestos-Exposed Children

The study determined susceptibility by looking at the incidence of
mesothelioma per 100,000 “person years” among two groups —
those were who were younger than 15 when they were first exposed to
environmental asbestos and those who were older than 15.

Among the kids, the mesothelioma rate was 76.8 per 100,000. Among
people who were first exposed to asbestos as adults, the rate was
nearly one-and-a-half times as high at 121.3 per 100,000.

"We found no greater susceptibility to mesothelioma among those
first exposed to asbestos as children than those first exposed as
adults," reports lead author Alison Reid in Occupational and
Environmental Medicine.

That is the good news.

Lifetime Risk of Mesothelioma Still Likely to Be High

The bad news for the kids of Wittenoom, many of whom are still
living, is that they still have plenty of time to develop malignant
mesothelioma and some probably will.

Mesothelioma has one of the longest latency periods of any cancer,
meaning that it can take 40 years or more for signs of the cancer
to develop after asbestos exposure.

The researchers caution that the results may simply mean that
younger bodies are better able to hold the cancer at bay for
longer.

"Given the long latency of mesothelioma, and the greater years of
life yet to be lived by the Wittenoom children, it is likely that
there will be more cases of mesothelioma in the future among those
first exposed as children," concludes the report.

Thousands of children around the world live or attend school in
older building that were built with a variety of asbestos products.
In the US, virtually every home or public building constructed
before 1981 contains some asbestos.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Found at Another Canberra School
----------------------------------------------------------
The Sydney Morning Herald reported that the ACT chief health
officer has told The Canberra Times asbestos found at a public
school poses a low risk to families, amid relevations more
non-friable material had been found at a second school in the
territory's north.

Mother Teresa Catholic Primary School principal Peter Hughes
confirmed the new discovery, and said the school's architect was
now going back through the original building specifications to
track where the material might have come from.

Mother Teresa Catholic Primary School principal Peter Hughes in the
school car park, where garden beds have been fenced off after the
discovery of asbestos.

Just a few hundred metres away, material assessed as non-friable
had been found in garden beds at the Harrison School.

Mr Hughes told The Canberra Times the asbestos discovered at Mother
Teresa was mixed with crushed concrete gravel in a garden bed in
the front car park.

He said the material had also been assessed as non-friable --
meaning it is unable to be pulverised, crumbled or reduced to power
by hand.

Both schools remain open, with garden beds in the Mother Teresa car
park fenced off and every garden bed on Harrison School grounds
also inaccessible.

In the case of the Harrison School, the ACT chief health officer Dr
Paul Kelly has advised that the material should remain undisturbed
and students and staff should not touch it.

But, based off assessments of the material as non-friable provided
by the education directorate including reports of children playing
in the garden beds, Dr Kelly considered the asbestos presented a
low immediate risk.

"The chief health officer has recommended the material be
remediated by a licensed asbestos removalist as a precaution," a
spokesman told The Canberra Times.

At Mother Teresa, which had not yet been considered in Dr Kelly's
assessment, Mr Hughes said he was trying to be open with parents.
Children did not play in the garden beds where the material was
found, which had since been fenced off, he said.

"It's been found, [but] it's not overly dangerous at this stage,
[and] a plan's been going in place," he said.

"Kids have been advised to stay away from the area and there's no
other location where we have this crushed concrete on site."

Mr Hughes asked the Catholic Education Office to test the car
park's garden beds, after learning from the Harrison School
principal that the asbestos at the neighbouring school was mixed
with crushed concrete gravel and recycled building materials.

Testing was conducted at Mother Teresa and the results confirmed
the next day before temporary fencing was put up and parents
notified of the test results.

Mr Hughes said it was unlikely that anyone would have had dangerous
contact with the material given its location.

"Really, it would only be people coming through the car park that
walked on it [who came into contact], but most of them use the
pedestrian crossing," he said.

"I think we were just lucky to catch it, really."

He was unsure how the asbestos came to be at the school, which
opened in 2010, saying he had only worked there for four years but
the material would have been there since the school was built.

Mr Hughes said the asbestos assessor, John Robson, told him the
asbestos at his school had likely come from the same place as the
material found at Harrison School. Mr Robson declined to comment.

Catholic Education Office Canberra and Goulburn director Ross Fox
said the asbestos would be removed from Mother Teresa outside
school hours.

Asked how the asbestos came to be at the school and which
contractor would have carried out the landscaping works in the car
park, Mr Fox said he did not have that information.

"Our first priority is to make the place safe and the [area
containing asbestos] has been fenced off," Mr Fox said.

"Then I guess we'll try and understand where it came from. Part of
that will be whether it's related to the claims about asbestos at
[Harrison School]."

All garden beds at the Harrison School were fenced off for
testing.

A spokeswoman for the ACT government's education directorate said a
search of department records had narrowed in on a list of
contractors linked to landscaping at the Harrison School since its
opening but investigators had not yet identified the source of the
asbestos there.

Testing of the school's garden beds was now complete and final
results were expected in the coming days.

"The advice from the licensed asbestos assessor is that the
material remains non-friable despite being in the garden beds at
the school," the spokeswoman said.

Principal Jason Holmes has been sending daily updates to parents
since tests confirmed asbestos at the public school, and
directorate officials have been on hand this week at drop-off and
pick-up times to answer questions. But some parents who spoke to
The Canberra Times said many remained unanswered, especially
concerning students who played in the garden beds at the school.

The school and the directorate are remaining in close communication
with Mother Teresa to share information, Mr Holmes said.

Michelle Young, a parent at Mother Teresa, said she was comfortable
with how her own school was handling the situation.

"We got a letter home from the principal straight away letting us
know that they'd found some asbestos and that it wasn't airborne,"
she said.

"It's not [a concern] and they're putting the right things in
place."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Found in UK School Lab Equipment
----------------------------------------------------------
Connor Sephton of Sky News reported that asbestos has been found in
a common piece of science lab equipment sold by two companies to
schools across the UK.

Metal gauze mats, which are designed for use over Bunsen burners,
are affected -- and schools are being urged to stop using them
altogether until they can be certain their gauzes are free of
asbestos.

As a result, science experiments in some classrooms have been
cancelled or delayed at the start of a new school year.

Schools have received guidance to stop using any gauzes that date
back to 1976, and there are growing calls to publicly name the two
suppliers involved.

Chris Keates, the general secretary of the NASUWT union, said: "It
is shocking that suppliers, clearly it seems only interested in
profit not people, have distributed such life-threatening equipment
to schools putting children and teachers and other staff at risk."

She added that it was "unacceptable" that the suppliers have not
been named, as this information would help schools determine if
they have this "potentially deadly material" in their buildings.

"Staff, pupils and parents will be deeply anxious as a result of
this announcement. If schools had the names of the suppliers the
anxiety and distress could be alleviated as they could confirm that
they had not used these suppliers," Ms Keates warned.

"There are serious questions to be asked and answered about this
appalling situation."

The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) told Sky News that it is
"limited by legal process" in what it can say about the suppliers
involved, but said both companies are actively cooperating in its
investigation.

A spokeswoman added that it is not clear how many schools, colleges
and other users have been affected.

The Department for Education said: "Following advice from the
Health and Safety Executive we have immediately written to all
secondary schools and colleges advising them to take steps to
remove and dispose of potentially hazardous mesh gauze used in
science lessons.

"We will continue to liaise with the HSE and CLEAPSS [the
organisation which advises local authorities and schools on science
and technology] over this issue."

The HSE believes that the risk posed by these gauzes is "extremely
low", and schools should only stop using them as a precautionary
measure.

Nonetheless, teachers and technicians are being told to treat
suspect gauzes as hazardous waste by double bagging them or sealing
off cupboards where they are stored until they can be completely
sure that they are safe to use.

The HSE said "limited quantitative testing" on gauze materials from
the two suppliers showed that they contained 20% to 30% asbestos --
however, it was not detected in all gauzes tested.

A relatively rare type of asbestos, known as tremolite, was found.

Officials are investigating how they entered the UK in the first
place as EU laws prevent asbestos from being used -- and the HSE
believes the affected gauze mats are imports. Enforcement notices
have been served on the two suppliers involved.

In June and July, several makes of gauze mats in New Zealand were
recalled because they were also found to contain tremolite
asbestos. However, there is nothing to suggest that the companies
affected by these recalls were supplying equipment to the UK.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos Kills 400 Former Pupils Annually in UK
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lucy Jonhson of Express.co.uk reported that almost four hundred
former school pupils will die of lung cancer every year after being
exposed to asbestos while at school, research shows. It means
Britain will have the highest number of ex-pupils and teachers in
the world to die after exposure to the deadly substance.

Despite this, schools have no obligation to tell parents whether
asbestos is present in their child's school.

Health and Safety Executive (HSE) figures show deaths from asbestos
related lung cancer, mesothelioma, among teachers and support staff
have risen by a third -- to 40 each year -- between 2015 and 2016.


A separate study carried out by the American Environmental
Protection Agency, estimates that for every death among school
staff, nine former pupils can be also expected to die.

This would equate to 360 Britons a year being killed by asbestos
they were exposed to at school when they were pupils.

The study, out on Tuesday shows a total of 363 deaths from
mesothelioma have been recorded among teachers since 2001 and
numbers are rising.

Across the country, mesothelioma still kills 2,400 people a year in
the UK although the substance, often used in construction, was
banned here in 1999.

Just one exposure can lead to the deadly lung disease decades
later, meaning most cases -- but not all -- will not develop until
pupils or teachers have left.

A recent report showed up to 86 per cent of schools contain
asbestos.

However, a BBC documentary, broadcast tomorrow, reveals that,
despite this, schools are not obliged to tell parents if their
child’s school contains asbestos.

The BBC1 regional Inside Out programme highlights the fact that the
law requires employers to inform employees about any risk and
protect them from asbestos exposure.

Yet schools have no obligation towards parents and their children.


A National Union of Teachers survey found only 46 per cent of
teachers knew if their school was affected.

Inside Out spoke to parents at Whitehaven Academy, Cumbria, which
was closed temporarily after asbestos was found there earlier this
year.

One parent said: "You expect to send your children to school for
them to be safe in the building they're in.

"You assume everything is managed correctly and if an asbestos
disturbance has taken place, it's acted on immediately -- which in
this instance, it doesn't seem to be the case. It could have been
there for months."

Official HSE advice states that schools are "low risk" and asbestos
is safe, as long as it's contained, properly managed and not
disturbed.

However the BBC investigation found the HSE was told of 200 serious
incidents in schools in the five years.

Peter Middleman of the National Education Union, said: "The
Government seem to be satisfied with the reassurance that there is
a low risk of disturbance, but one disturbance and it's too late. A
corner of a desk penetrates a wall coating or drawing pin is
inserted into a tile with asbestos will release deadly fibres.

"Government complacency is informed by the administrative cost of
meeting our demand to remove -- rather than conceal -- asbestos in
schools, which would cost billions.

"It has concluded it is cheaper to let people die than remove
asbestos but if the problem was not shrouded in secrecy and if the
true extent was widely known the political pressure to do something
would be intense."

He added: "If you start from a position that asbestos causes cancer
in children or children who are exposed to asbestos go on to get
cancer in later life, then your starting position needs to be that
it's removed as a priority.

"They're paying GBP7billion to renovate the House of Commons,
another GBP150million for the royal palaces.

"It would take GBP13billion to get schools up to a satisfactory
standard without removing asbestos, it'll cost a lot more to do it
properly but we think it's a price worth paying."

A spokesman for the Department for Education said: "The safety of
staff and pupils in schools is paramount.

"We expect all local authorities and academy trusts to have robust
plans in place to safely manage asbestos in buildings, and provide
detailed guidance for them on doing so.

"We have also recently launched the new Asbestos Management
Assurance Process to make sure they are following these
requirements.

"Since 2015, we have invested GBP5.6billion in the maintenance of
school buildings, which can be used to fund the removal of asbestos
when it is the safest course of action to do so."

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Asbestos, Smoking Gives Man Fatal Cancer
---------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Siegal of Law360 reported that a combination of smoking
cigarettes made by R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris and exposure to
an auto parts company's asbestos-laden brakes caused a man's fatal
lung cancer, counsel for the man's widow told a Boston jury during
opening statements.

At the start of the trial before Middlesex County Superior Court
Judge Heidi Brieger, Jerome H. Block of Levy Konigsberg LLP,
representing plaintiff Joanna Summerlin, told the jury that his
client's late husband Louis Summerlin got hooked on cigarettes at a
time when tobacco companies knew of the dangers.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Baby Powder Has No Asbestos, Imerys Says
---------------------------------------------------------
John Sammon of Northern California Record reported that a lead
scientist for Imerys Talc America Inc., the talc mining company
that supplies Johnson & Johnson with the talc used in its baby
powder, said testing showed no asbestos.

"Based on your 24 years of experience and all the tests you have
analyzed, does Imerys Vermont talc contain asbestos?" Peter
Masaitis the attorney for Johnson & Johnson asked.

"It does not," responded Julie Pier, mineralogical and geology
analyst for San Jose-based Imerys Talc America.

"Do you currently use Johnson & Johnson baby powder?" Masaitis
asked.

"I do," Pier said. "I used it on my four children when they were
little. I don't have any concerns."

The attorney for the plaintiff, Carolyn Weirick, argued the testing
done on talc baby powder is not full-proof.

Weirick is suing Johnson & Johnson claiming the baby powder she
used for decades caused her to develop mesothelioma, a rare and
fatal cancer.

Imerys Talc America is a co-defendant in the case and has its own
defense lawyers.

Coverage of the trial in the Los Angeles Superior Court is being
streamed courtesy of Courtroom View Network.

During the session, Pier described to a jury testing of talc, a
mined mineral rock that for 100 years has been ground up into a
powder and sold by Johnson & Johnson as a cosmetic to keep babies
and adults dry.

Pier said today's technologies include microscopes so sensitive
they can detect particles tiny enough to float in ambient air.

"Asbestos is very rare," she said. "It requires very specific
geologic conditions to form involving the right chemistry,
temperature and pressure."

In previous years Johnson & Johnson received talc from mines the
company owned in Vermont. Pier said the conditions there were not
right for the formation of asbestos.

"It (asbestos) requires rocks pulling apart and causing voids," she
said. "Asbestos grows in the voids. We have no information that in
Vermont this was the geologic environment."

Pier said a microscopic technology called polarized light
microscopy (PLM) had proven adept at spotting long fiber materials
of the kind that indicate asbestos.

Masaitis displayed a 1992 Vermont ore testing report.

"What does this report tell us about chrysotile or any amphibole
(asbestos related minerals)?" he asked.

"There was nothing detected," Pier responded.

Scientists in the report also labeled some mineral samplings NQ,
meaning "not quantified," meaning some trace of amphibole might be
present in a sample, but not enough to detect by another technology
called "X-ray diffraction."

Defense lawyers during the trial have made the point that testing
of the talc took place not only in Johnson & Johnson's in-house
labs and those at Imerys Talc America, but also outside independent
labs including facilities at Harvard University and the McCrone
Research Institute in Chicago.

Pier said testing methods can detect particles sized at
eight-ten-thousands of a percent, or three-one-millionths of a
percent.

"What does this mean?" Masaitis asked.

"It means the sensitivity of the (testing) method is very high,"
Pier said.

Under cross examination Jay Stuemke Weirick's attorney questioned
Pier about testing of Vermont talc that continued past 2003 after
Imerys stopped selling the Vermont talc to Johnson & Johnson (today
the talc comes from China).

"Is testing of Vermont talc after 2003 relevant to what was in the
talc before 2003?" Stuemke asked.

"It shows we have tested all along and it's the same deposit, but
it's different now because we're not using the same processing,"
Pier said.

"Is it relevant or not?" Stuemke asked again. "You just talked to
this jury for a long time about how you continued to test it and
you presented the results of that testing to the jury."

"Argumentative!" the defense lawyer called.

"Overruled," pronounced Superior Court Judge Margaret Oldendorf.

"It is relevant in certain aspects," Pier said.

"You rely on that testing, even after 2003, correct?" Stuemke
asked.

"I do think all of our tests are important, yes," Pier said. "After
2003 it doesn't have to do with Johnson & Johnson. We shifted to a
new deposit."

Stuemke produced a document that stated it is difficult to deal
with even minor occurrences of asbestos in talc products because
there is no recognized safe level of exposure to asbestos -- the
presence of any amount of asbestos in talc is a serious problem.

"The limits of X-ray diffraction and PLM (microscopy) in
identifying talc has been known by Imerys and its predecessors for
decades, correct?" Stuemke asked.

"The limitations of the methods we use has been a well-known thing,
yes," Pier answered.

Stuemke displayed a workshop study done in 1978 by employees of
Cyprus Minerals Co. which said some talc products on the market
contain asbestos minerals the most common being tremolite and
anthophyllite. The study concluded that asbestos-related chrysotile
has also been found.

"I believe this was talking about some competitor talc of ours that
was used for industrial purposes," Pier said.

Stuemke exhibited a power point demonstration document authored by
Pier in which she described three impacts of what was called a
false negative, testing that says there's no asbestos in talc when
in fact there is.

The three impacts listed were potential worker health problems,
public health issues and significant litigation potential.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Brady's PI Suit Remanded to State Court
--------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Sarah S. Vance of the U.S. District Court for the Eastert
District Louisiana remanded the case entitled Terry Brady and
Glenda Brady, v. Taylor Seidenbach, Inc. et al., Civil Action No.
18-3350, (E.D. La.) to the Civil District Court for the Parish of
Orleans.

The case arises out of plaintiff Terry Brady's alleged asbestos
exposure at various workplaces. The relevant period of employment
is Mr. Brady's service in the U.S. Navy from 1968 to 1989 as a
Machinists Mate and Master Chief aboard several vessels. Mr. Brady
testified in a deposition that while he was aboard the USS Robert
A. Owens, the vessel was docked at Avondale Shipyards for feed pump
refurbishment. According to Mr. Brady, he had little interaction
with the shipyard workers while at Avondale and took orders only
from his Naval officers. Mr. Brady alleges that he developed lung
cancer because of his exposure to asbestos.

On February 8, 2018, Mr. Brady and his wife, Glenda Brady, filed an
action in state court for negligence. Plaintiffs named numerous
defendants, including Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (Avondale).
Plaintiffs' negligence allegations against Avondale include failure
to warn, failure to provide a safe environment, and failure to
employ safe procedures for handling asbestos. Avondale removed the
case to federal court on March 28, 2018. In its notice of removal,
Avondale asserted that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1442(a)(1), because plaintiffs' claims are
for or related to acts performed under color of federal office. In
response, plaintiffs moved to remand this action to state court.

In their motion to remand, plaintiffs concede that Avondale is a
person within the meaning of the statute. The parties principally
contest the causal nexus element.

Avondale removed this case to federal court based on its work as a
military contractor. Avondale argues that a 2011 amendment to the
removal statute replaced the causal nexus test with a less
restrictive test. Before 2011, the statute permitted removal by a
federal officer who is sued "for any act under color of such
office."

Plaintiffs argue that the causal nexus element is not satisfied
because the Navy had no control over safety at Avondale. Plaintiffs
submit the deposition of Peter Territo, an Avondale safety officer.
Territo testified that Navy inspectors neither controlled the
Avondale safety department, nor directed Avondale to follow certain
safety policies or procedures.16 Plaintiffs also submit the
affidavit of Felix Albert, a ship inspector for the U.S. Navy who
worked at Avondale from 1965 to 1976. Albert attests that Avondale
employees did not work under the direct orders of a ship inspector
during the construction of governing vessels, and that they did not
act under the direction of a ship inspector. Mr. Albert further
attests that government inspectors neither monitored nor enforced
safety regulations.

Under similar circumstances, the Court mentions Bartel v. Alcoa
S.S. Co., 805 F.3d 169, 174-75 (5th Cir. 2015), where the Fifth
Circuit held that a military contractor does not satisfy the causal
nexus requirement for negligence claims unless the federal
government has some control over the contractor's safety practices.
Likewise, in Savoie v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 817 F.3d 457, 463
(5th Cir. 2016), the court held that the federal government's
mandate of asbestos insulation did not cause Avondale to engage in
alleged negligent conduct. The plaintiffs in Savoie alleged both
negligence, such as failure to take reasonable precautions and
failure to warn, and strict liability. The court held that the
government's specifications requiring the use of asbestos, which
Avondale was contractually obligated to follow, sufficed to show a
causal nexus between the strict liability claims and Avondale's
actions under the color of federal authority.

In this case, the Court finds Avondale's representatives have
provided statements that the government did not monitor or enforce
safety regulations at Avondale and that safety was the
responsibility of Avondale's safety department. Because Avondale
had not shown government control over its safety practices,
Avondale failed to establish the causal nexus element and the
district court remanded the case. The Court explains that causal
nexus prong requires a showing of direct government control over
warnings, such that the government's direction and control directly
interfered with the defendant's ability to fulfill its state law
obligation to warn employees of safety hazards.

The Court determines that Avondale presents no evidence suggesting
that the Navy had any control over Avondale's safety procedures
during the refurbishment of the USS Robert A. Owens. Nor does
Avondale point to any government orders prohibiting warnings about
the risks of asbestos. Under Fifth Circuit precedent, this dearth
of evidence is fatal to Avondale's contention that there was a
causal nexus between Avondale's actions under color of federal
office and plaintiffs' negligence claims. Because Avondale does not
satisfy the causal nexus standard, the Court need not address
Avondale's argument that it has presented a colorable federal
defense. Accordingly, the Court finds that Avondale's notice of
removal invalid and that federal jurisdiction does not exist over
this matter.

A copy of the Order and Reasons dated August 1, 2018, is available
at https://tinyurl.com/yahqkwjf from Leagle.com.

Terry Brady & Glenda Brady, Plaintiffs, represented by Ashley
Lynette Page -- apage@gorijulianlaw.com -- Gori, Julian &
Associates, P.C., Alex S. Dunn, Jr. -- adunn@gorijulianlaw.com --
Gori, Julian & Associates, P.C. & Roshawn H. Donahue --
rdonahue@gorijulianlaw.com -- Gori, Julian & Associates, P.C.

CBS Corporation, Successor by Merger to CBS Corp., Defendant,
represented by John Joseph Hainkel, III -- jhainkel@frilot.com --
Frilot L.L.C., Angela M. Bowlin -- abowlin@frilot.com -- Frilot
L.L.C., Barry C. Campbell -- bcampbell@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C.,
Kelly L. Long -- klong@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Kelsey A. Eagan
-- keagan@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Lacey Taylor McCoy --
LMcCoy@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C. & Magali Ann Puente-Martin --
mpuente@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C.

Certain-Teed Corporation, Defendant, represented by Barbara
Bourgeois Ormsby , Deutsch Kerrigan LLP, Arthur Wendel Stout, III ,
Deutsch Kerrigan LLP, Jason P. Franco , Deutsch Kerrigan LLP,
Jennifer E. Adams , Deutsch Kerrigan LLP & William Claudy Harrison,
Jr. , Deutsch Kerrigan LLP.

Crane Company, Defendant, represented by Lawrence G. Pugh, III --
lpugh@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, LLC, Donna M. Young , Pugh,
Accardo, LLC, Jacqueline Romero -- jromero@pugh-law.com -- Pugh,
Accardo, LLC & Shelley L. Thompson , Pugh, Accardo, LLC.

Eagle, Inc., formerly known as Eagle Asbestos & Packing Co., Inc.,
Defendant, represented by Susan Beth Kohn -- suek@spsr-law.com --
Simon, Peragine, Smith & Redfearn, LLP, Douglas Kinler --
douglask@spsr-law.com -- Simon, Peragine, Smith & Redfearn, LLP &
Louis Oliver Oubre -- louiso@spsr-law.com -- Simon, Peragine, Smith
& Redfearn, LLP.

General Electric Company & Trane US, Inc., formerly known as
American Standard, Inc., Defendants, represented by John Joseph
Hainkel, III , Frilot L.L.C., Angela M. Bowlin --
abowlin@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Barry C. Campbell --
bcampbell@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., James H. Brown, Jr. --
jbrown@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Kelly L. Long --
klong@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Kelsey A. Eagan --
keagan@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Lacey Taylor McCoy --
LMcCoy@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C. & Magali Ann Puente-Martin --
mpuente@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C.

IMO Industries Inc., Individually and as Successor-In-Interest to
Delaval Turbine Inc. & Warren Pumps, LLC, formerly known as Warren
Pumps Inc, Defendants, represented by Joseph Henry Hart, IV --
jhart@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, LLC, Daniel E. Oser --
doser@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, LLC, Kathleen Erin Jordan --
kjordan@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, Haas, Radecker & Carey &
Thomas A. Porteous -- tporteous@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo,
LLC.

Industrial Holdings Corporation, formerly known as Carborundum
Company, Defendant, represented by Robert E. Dille --
RDille@maronmarvel.com -- Maron Marvel Bradley & Anderson, LLC,
Richard Munice Crump -- RCrump@maronmarvel.com -- Maron Marvel
Bradley & Anderson, LLC & Shelley K. Napolitano --
SNapolitano@maronmarvel.com -- Maron Marvel Bradley & Anderson,
LLC.

Taylor Seidenbach, Inc., Defendant, represented by Christopher
Kelly Lightfoot -- klightfoot@hmhlp.com -- Hailey, McNamara, Hall,
Larmann & Papale, LLP, Edward J. Lassus, Jr. -- elassus@hmhlp.com
-- Hailey, McNamara, Hall, Larmann & Papale, LLP & Richard J.
Garvey, Jr. -- rgarvey@hmhlp.com -- Hailey, McNamara, Hall, Larmann
& Papale, LLP.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., Defendant, represented by Jay
Morton Jalenak, Jr. -- jay.jalenak@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller &
Patrick Dale Roquemore -- patrick.roquemore@keanmiller.com -- Kean
Miller.

Huntington Ingalls Incorporated, formerly known as Avondale
Industries, Inc., formerly known as Northrop Grumman Ship Systems,
Inc., formerly known as Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc.,
formerly known as Avondale Shipyards, Inc, formerly known as
Avondale Marine Ways, Inc., Defendant, represented by Timothy
Farrow Daniels -- tdaniels@irwinllc.com -- Irwin Fritchie Urquhart
& Moore, LLC, Alex Tyler Robertson -- arobertson@irwinllc.com --
Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, LLC, David Michael Melancon --
dmelancon@irwinllc.com -- Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, LLC,
Edward Winter Trapolin -- etrapolin@irwinllc.com -- Irwin Fritchie
Urquhart & Moore, LLC & Gustave A. Fritchie, III --
gfritchie@irwinllc.com -- Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, LLC.

Huntington Ingalls Incorporated, Per Doc. 18, Third Party
Plaintiff, represented by Timothy Farrow Daniels --
tdaniels@irwinllc.com -- Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, LLC, Alex
Tyler Robertson -- arobertson@irwinllc.com -- Irwin Fritchie
Urquhart & Moore, LLC, David Michael Melancon --
dmelancon@irwinllc.com -- Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, LLC,
Edward Winter Trapolin -- etrapolin@irwinllc.com -- Irwin Fritchie
Urquhart & Moore, LLC & Gustave A. Fritchie, III --
gfritchie@irwinllc.com -- Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, LLC.

Huntington Ingalls Incorporated, Per Doc. 18, Cross Claimant,
represented by Timothy Farrow Daniels -- tdaniels@irwinllc.com --
Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, LLC, Alex Tyler Robertson --
arobertson@irwinllc.com -- Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, LLC,
David Michael Melancon -- dmelancon@irwinllc.com -- Irwin Fritchie
Urquhart & Moore, LLC, Edward Winter Trapolin --
etrapolin@irwinllc.com -- Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, LLC &
Gustave A. Fritchie, III -- gfritchie@irwinllc.com -- Irwin
Fritchie Urquhart & Moore, LLC.

CBS Corporation, Successor by Merger to CBS Corp. Per Doc. 18,
Cross Defendant, represented by John Joseph Hainkel, III , Frilot
L.L.C., Angela M. Bowlin -- abowlin@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C.,
Barry C. Campbell -- bcampbell@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Kelly
L. Long -- klong@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Kelsey A. Eagan --
keagan@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Lacey Taylor McCoy --
LMcCoy@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C. & Magali Ann Puente-Martin --
mpuente@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C.

Certain-Teed Corporation, Per Doc. 18, Cross Defendant, represented
by Barbara Bourgeois Ormsby -- bormsby@deutschkerrigan.com --
Deutsch Kerrigan LLP, Arthur Wendel Stout, III --
wstout@deutschkerrigan.com -- Deutsch Kerrigan LLP, Jason P. Franco
-- jfranco@deutschkerrigan.com -- Deutsch Kerrigan LLP, Jennifer E.
Adams -- jadams@deutschkerrigan.com -- Deutsch Kerrigan LLP &
William Claudy Harrison, Jr. -- wharrison@deutschkerrigan.com --
Deutsch Kerrigan LLP.

Crane Company, Per Doc. 18, Cross Defendant, represented by
Lawrence G. Pugh, III -- lpugh@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, LLC,
Donna M. Young -- dyoung@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, LLC &
Shelley L. Thompson -- sthompson@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo,
LLC.

Eagle, Inc., Per Doc. 18, Cross Defendant, represented by Susan
Beth Kohn -- suek@spsr-law.com -- Simon, Peragine, Smith &
Redfearn, LLP, Douglas Kinler -- douglask@spsr-law.com -- Simon,
Peragine, Smith & Redfearn, LLP & Louis Oliver Oubre --
louiso@spsr-law.com -- Simon, Peragine, Smith & Redfearn, LLP.

General Electric Company, Per Doc. 18 & Trane US, Inc., Per Doc.
18, Cross Defendants, represented by John Joseph Hainkel, III ,
Frilot L.L.C., Angela M. Bowlin -- abowlin@frilot.com -- Frilot
L.L.C., Barry C. Campbell -- bcampbell@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C.,
James H. Brown, Jr. -- jbrown@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Kelly L.
Long -- klong@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Kelsey A. Eagan --
keagan@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Lacey Taylor McCoy --
LMcCoy@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C. & Magali Ann Puente-Martin --
mpuente@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C.

IMO Industries Inc., Individually and as Successor-In-Interest to
Delaval Turbine Inc. Per Doc. 18 & Warren Pumps, LLC, Per Doc. 18,
Cross Defendants, represented by Joseph Henry Hart, IV --
jhart@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, LLC, Daniel E. Oser --
doser@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, LLC, Kathleen Erin Jordan --
kjordan@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, Haas, Radecker & Carey &
Thomas A. Porteous -- tporteous@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo,
LLC.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., Per Doc. 18, Cross Defendant,
represented by Jay Morton Jalenak, Jr. --
jay.jalenak@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller & Patrick Dale Roquemore
-- patrick.roquemore@keanmiller.com -- Kean Miller.

Taylor Seidenbach, Inc., Per Doc. 18, Cross Defendant, represented
by Christopher Kelly Lightfoot -- klightfoot@hmhlp.com -- Hailey,
McNamara, Hall, Larmann & Papale, LLP, Edward J. Lassus, Jr. --
elassus@hmhlp.com -- Hailey, McNamara, Hall, Larmann & Papale, LLP
& Richard J. Garvey, Jr. -- rgarvey@hmhlp.com -- Hailey, McNamara,
Hall, Larmann & Papale, LLP.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: CECONY Manhattan Rupture Debris Has Asbestos
-------------------------------------------------------------
Consolidated Edison, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018, that it is unable to estimate the amount or
range of its possible loss related to the rupture of a steam main
owned by its subsidiary in Manhattan.

The Company states, "In July 2018, a CECONY steam main located on
Fifth Avenue and 21st street in Manhattan ruptured.  Debris from
the incident included dirt and mud containing asbestos.  The
response to the incident required the closing of buildings and
streets for various periods.  The NYSPSC has commenced an
investigation.  The company has notified its insurers of the
incident and believes that the policies currently in force will
cover the company's costs, in excess of a required retention (the
amount of which is not material), to satisfy any liability it may
have for damages to others in connection with the incident.  The
company is unable to estimate the amount or range of its possible
loss related to the incident.  At June 30, 2018, the company had
not accrued a liability related to the incident."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/cqPcUp


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Con Edison Accrues $8MM Liability at June 30
-------------------------------------------------------------
Consolidated Edison, Inc. had accrued liability of US$8 million for
asbestos suits at June 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.  The Company also
deferred US$8 million as regulatory assets related to asbestos
suits at June 30, 2018.

On the other hand, subsidiary Consolidated Edison Company of New
York, Inc. (CECONY) had accrued liability of US$7 million for
asbestos suits and deferred US$7 million as asbestos-related
regulatory assets at June 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Suits have been brought in New York State and
federal courts against the Utilities and many other defendants,
wherein a large number of plaintiffs sought large amounts of
compensatory and punitive damages for deaths and injuries allegedly
caused by exposure to asbestos at various premises of the
Utilities.  The suits that have been resolved, which are many, have
been resolved without any payment by the Utilities, or for amounts
that were not, in the aggregate, material to them.  The amounts
specified in all the remaining thousands of suits total billions of
dollars; however, the Utilities believe that these amounts are
greatly exaggerated, based on the disposition of previous claims.

"At June 30, 2018, Con Edison and CECONY have accrued their
estimated aggregate undiscounted potential liabilities for these
suits and additional suits that may be brought over the next 15
years as shown in the following table.  These estimates were based
upon a combination of modeling, historical data analysis and risk
factor assessment.  Courts have begun, and unless otherwise
determined on appeal may continue, to apply different standards for
determining liability in asbestos suits than the standard that
applied historically.  As a result, the Companies currently believe
that there is a reasonable possibility of an exposure to loss in
excess of the liability accrued for the suits.  The Companies are
unable to estimate the amount or range of such loss.

"In addition, certain current and former employees have claimed or
are claiming workers' compensation benefits based on alleged
disability from exposure to asbestos.  CECONY is permitted to defer
as regulatory assets (for subsequent recovery through rates) costs
incurred for its asbestos lawsuits and workers' compensation
claims."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/cqPcUp


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crozier's PI Claims vs. J&J Entities Dismissed
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Manuel J. Mendez of the Supreme Court of New York County
has granted Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson
Consumer Inc.'s motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint and all Cross-Claims against it for lack of personal
jurisdiction.

In the case styled In Re: New York City Asbestos Litigation.
Beverly Crozier and Donald Crozier, Plaintiffs, v. Avon Products,
Inc., et al., Defendants, Docket No. 190385/2016, Motion Seq. No.
001, (N.Y.), Johnson & Johnson and Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc.
(the "J&J Entities") move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint
and all Cross-Claims against them pursuant to CPLR Section
3211(a)(8) and CPLR Section 327(a).

Plaintiff Beverly Crozier, a citizen of Texas, was diagnosed with
mesothelioma on April 6, 2016. Plaintiffs allege Mrs. Crozier was
exposed to asbestos in a variety of ways. Plaintiffs allege
exposure to Johnson & Johnson's asbestos-containing Baby Powder and
Shower to Shower products when using them from the mid-1950s
through the late 1960s three times a week. Mrs. Crozier testified
that her mother would use Johnson & Johnson's Baby Powder on her
when she was a baby, and then as a teenager, Mrs. Crozier would
apply Shower to Shower on herself all over her body. Mrs. Crozier
has never had any contact with New York. She has lived and worked
in various towns and cities in Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas.

The J&J Entities contend that the Court does not have personal
jurisdiction over them because Beverly Crozier's exposures occurred
outside of the State of New York, Mrs. Crozier did not reside in
the State of New York, Johnson & Johnson and JJCI are not
incorporated in New York and do not maintain their principal places
of business here, and therefore, there is no general jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the J&J Entities contend that Plaintiffs' claims do
not arise from any of the J&J Entities New York transactions, and
that the J&J Entities did not commit a tortious act within the
State of New York or without the state of New York that caused an
injury to person or property within the State of New York, and
therefore, there is no specific jurisdiction. Finally, the J&J
Entities contend that if this court finds that it can exert
personal jurisdiction over them, the action should be dismissed on
the ground of forum non conveniens.

Johnson & Johnson is a New Jersey holding company with its
principal place of business in New Jersey. Johnson & Johnson does
not sell or manufacture any products. JJCI is a subsidiary of
Johnson & Johnson and is a New Jersey Corporation with its
principal place of business in New Jersey. JJCI manufactured and
distributed Johnson & Johnson's Baby Powder and Shower to Shower
products during the subject time period. JJCI does not own any
property in New York. JJCI does not manufacture, research, develop,
design, or test Johnson & Johnson's Baby Powder or Shower to Shower
products in New York.

Plaintiffs oppose the motion contending that this court does have
personal general jurisdiction and long-arm jurisdiction over the
J&J Entities and that this court should deny the J&J Entities
attempt to dismiss this action on the grounds of forum non
conveniens. The Plaintiffs further contend that if personal
jurisdiction over the J&J Entities cannot be established at this
time, the motion should be denied to allow for jurisdictional
discovery as they have made a "sufficient start."

The Court sustains that it cannot exercise general personal
jurisdiction over Johnson & Johnson because it is not incorporated,
nor does it have its principal place of business in the State of
New York. Johnson & Johnson is a New Jersey corporation with its
principal place of business in the State of New Jersey. Plaintiffs'
contention that Johnson & Johnson subjected itself to general
jurisdiction because of several isolated events that Johnson &
Johnson was involved in (including industry meetings that Johnson &
Johnson employees attended in the 1970s, four (4) letters sent from
Johnson & Johnson representatives to New York-based scientists, and
two statements made to the New York Times) is unavailing since only
"continuous and systematic" contacts can establish general personal
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate
"exceptional circumstances" for the Court to exercise general
personal jurisdiction over Johnson & Johnson.

Likewise, the Court is also not able to exercise general personal
jurisdiction over JJCI because it is not incorporated, nor does it
have its principal place of business in the State of New York. JJCI
is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in
the State of New Jersey. The Plaintiffs do not allege or present
evidence of any New York contacts on behalf of JJCI to demonstrate
"exceptional circumstances" for this court to exercise general
personal jurisdiction over JJCI.

Likewise, the Court cannot exercise specific personal jurisdiction
under CPLR Section 302(a)(1) because there is no articulable nexus
or substantial relationship between the J&J Entities' New York
conduct and the claims asserted. This section of the statute is
triggered when a defendant transacts business in New York and the
cause of action asserted arises from that activity. The record
before the Court establishes that the injuries asserted by the
Plaintiffs did not arise from any of Johnson & Johnson's activity
within the State of New York. Plaintiffs' assertion that JJCI
maintained domestic operations in New York including a facility for
dental products is unavailing as this conduct does not have an
articulable nexus or substantial relationship to Plaintiffs'
claims. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs admitted that the product at
issue was purchased in Texas and Oklahoma.

The Court cannot exercise personal specific jurisdiction under CPLR
Section 302(a)(2) because the J&J Entities have not committed a
tortious act within the state of New York. All of the alleged
exposures to JJCI's Baby Powder and Shower to Shower occurred in
the States of Texas and Oklahoma. The Court maintains that exercise
of specific jurisdiction under this section requires a defendant to
be physically present in New York.

Also, the Court cannot exercise personal specific jurisdiction
under CPLR Section 302(a)(3) because the injury did not occur in
the State of New York. Mrs. Crozier was never exposed to JJCI's
products in New York, but rather exposed in Texas or Oklahoma
meaning those states are potentially the situs of the injury. Since
the exposure and the injury the original event took place outside
of the State of New York, Mrs. Crozier is not and has never been a
resident of the State of New York, the New York courts cannot
exercise jurisdiction.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to make a "sufficient start"
for the Court to grant jurisdictional discovery. Regarding specific
jurisdiction, the relevant question is whether there is any
"connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue."
Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate "that discovery would uncover
facts establishing" jurisdiction. The J&J Entities are not "at
home" in New York, and Mrs. Crozier did not purchase or use any
product manufactured by JJCI in New York.

Since this court is unable to exercise personal jurisdiction over
the J&J Entities, the Court rules that Plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint must be dismissed without the necessity to analyze
whether the Amended Complaint should have been dismissed on grounds
of forum non conveniens.

A copy of the Order dated July 31, 2018, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ybup39zb from Leagle.com.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Duke Energy Carolinas Has $466MM Liabilities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, has recognized asbestos-related
reserves of US$466 million at June 30, 2018, according to Duke
Energy Corporation's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Duke Energy Carolinas has recognized
asbestos-related reserves of US$466 million at June 30, 2018, and
US$489 million at December 31, 2017.  These reserves are classified
in Other within Other Noncurrent Liabilities and Other within
Current Liabilities on the Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets.
These reserves are based upon the minimum amount of the range of
loss for current and future asbestos claims through 2037, are
recorded on an undiscounted basis and incorporate anticipated
inflation.  In light of the uncertainties inherent in a longer-term
forecast, management does not believe they can reasonably estimate
the indemnity and medical costs that might be incurred after 2037
related to such potential claims.  It is possible Duke Energy
Carolinas may incur asbestos liabilities in excess of the recorded
reserves."

"Duke Energy Carolinas has third-party insurance to cover certain
losses related to asbestos-related injuries and damages above an
aggregate self-insured retention.  Duke Energy Carolinas'
cumulative payments began to exceed the self-insurance retention in
2008.  Future payments up to the policy limit will be reimbursed by
the third-party insurance carrier.  The insurance policy limit for
potential future insurance recoveries indemnification and medical
cost claim payments is US$797 million in excess of the self-insured
retention.  Receivables for insurance recoveries were US$585
million at June 30, 2018, and December 31, 2017.  These amounts are
classified in Other within Other Noncurrent Assets and Receivables
within Current Assets on the Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets.
Duke Energy Carolinas is not aware of any uncertainties regarding
the legal sufficiency of insurance claims.  Duke Energy Carolinas
believes the insurance recovery asset is probable of recovery as
the insurance carrier continues to have a strong financial strength
rating."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/pVKbtU


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Exelon Unit Had $80MM Reserves at June 30
----------------------------------------------------------
Exelon Corporation's subsidiary, Exelon Generation Company, LLC,
had reserved US$80 million at June 30, 2018 for asbestos-related
claims, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Generation maintains a reserve for claims
associated with asbestos-related personal injury actions in certain
facilities that are currently owned by Generation or were
previously owned by ComEd and PECO.  The estimated liabilities are
recorded on an undiscounted basis and exclude the estimated legal
costs associated with handling these matters, which could be
material.

"At June 30, 2018 and December 31, 2017, Generation had recorded
estimated liabilities of approximately US$80 million and US$78
million, respectively, in total for asbestos-related bodily injury
claims.  As of June 30, 2018, approximately US$22 million of this
amount related to 224 open claims presented to Generation, while
the remaining US$58 million is for estimated future
asbestos-related bodily injury claims anticipated to arise through
2050, based on actuarial assumptions and analyses, which are
updated on an annual basis.  On a quarterly basis, Generation
monitors actual experience against the number of forecasted claims
to be received and expected claim payments and evaluates whether
adjustments to the estimated liabilities are necessary."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/iYHyL5


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Maremont Had 1,700 Claims Pending at June 30
-------------------------------------------------------------
Meritor, Inc.'s subsidiary, Maremont Corporation, had around 1,700
pending asbestos-related claims at June 30, 2018, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended July 1, 2018.

The Company states, "Maremont Corporation ("Maremont"), a
subsidiary of Meritor, manufactured friction products containing
asbestos from 1953 through 1977, when it sold its friction product
business.  Arvin Industries, Inc., a predecessor of the company,
acquired Maremont in 1986.  Maremont and many other companies are
defendants in suits brought by individuals claiming personal
injuries as a result of exposure to asbestos-containing products.

"Maremont had approximately 1,700 and 2,800 pending
asbestos-related claims at June 30, 2018 and September 30, 2017,
respectively.  Although Maremont has been named in these cases, in
the cases where actual injury has been alleged, very few claimants
have established that a Maremont product caused their injuries.
Plaintiffs' lawyers often sue dozens or even hundreds of defendants
in individual lawsuits, seeking damages against all named
defendants irrespective of the disease or injury and irrespective
of any causal connection with a particular product.  For these
reasons, the total number of claims filed is not necessarily the
most meaningful factor in determining Maremont's asbestos-related
liability."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/hTFYaP


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Maremont Had US$70MM Reserves at June 30
---------------------------------------------------------
Meritor, Inc.'s subsidiary, Maremont Corporation, had reserves of
US$70 million for asbestos-related liabilities at June 30, 2018,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
July 1, 2018.  Specifically, US$68 million is for pending and
future claims while the remaining US$2 million is for billed but
unpaid claims at June 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Maremont Corporation ("Maremont"), a
subsidiary of Meritor, manufactured friction products containing
asbestos from 1953 through 1977, when it sold its friction product
business.  Arvin Industries, Inc., a predecessor of the company,
acquired Maremont in 1986.  Maremont and many other companies are
defendants in suits brought by individuals claiming personal
injuries as a result of exposure to asbestos-containing products.

"A portion of the asbestos-related recoveries and reserves are
included in Other Current Assets and Liabilities, with the majority
of the amounts recorded in Other Assets and Liabilities.

"Maremont engaged Bates White LLC ("Bates White"), a consulting
firm with extensive experience estimating costs associated with
asbestos litigation, to assist with determining the estimated cost
of resolving pending and future asbestos-related claims that have
been, and could reasonably be expected to be, filed against
Maremont.  Although it is not possible to estimate the full range
of costs because of various uncertainties, Bates White advised
Maremont that it would be possible to determine an estimate of a
reasonable forecast of the cost of the probable settlement and
defense costs of resolving pending and future asbestos-related
claims, based on historical data and certain assumptions with
respect to events that may occur in the future.

"As of September 30, 2017, Bates White provided a reasonable and
probable estimate that consisted of a range of equally likely
possibilities of Maremont's obligation for asbestos personal injury
claims over the next ten years of US$68 million to US$82 million.
After consultation with Bates White, management recognized a
liability of US$68 million as of each of June 30, 2018 and
September 30, 2017 for pending and future claims over the next ten
years.  The ultimate cost of resolving pending and future claims is
estimated based on the history of claims and expenses for
plaintiffs represented by law firms in jurisdictions with an
established history with Maremont.  Maremont has recognized
incremental insurance receivables associated with recoveries
expected for asbestos-related liabilities as the estimate of
asbestos-related liabilities for pending and future claims
changes.

"Maremont has historically had insurance that reimburses a
substantial portion of the costs incurred defending against
asbestos-related claims.  The insurance receivable related to
asbestos-related liabilities was US$18 million and US$25 million as
of June 30, 2018 and September 30, 2017, respectively.  The
receivable is for coverage provided by one insurance carrier based
on a coverage-in-place agreement.  Maremont currently expects to
exhaust the remaining limits provided by this coverage sometime in
the next ten years.  The difference between the estimated liability
and insurance receivable is primarily related to exhaustion of
settled insurance coverage within the forecasted period.

"Maremont maintained insurance coverage with other insurance
carriers that management believed also covers indemnity and defense
costs.  During fiscal year 2013, Maremont re-initiated lawsuits
against these carriers, seeking a declaration of its rights to
coverage for asbestos claims and to facilitate an orderly and
timely collection of insurance proceeds.  During the first quarter
of fiscal year 2016, the dispute related to these insurance
policies was settled.  As a part of this settlement, on December
12, 2015, Maremont received US$17 million in cash, of which US$5
million was recognized as a reduction in asbestos expense and US$12
million was recorded as a liability to the insurance carrier as it
is required to be returned to the carrier if additional asbestos
liability is not incurred.  During the fourth quarter of fiscal
year 2016, Maremont recognized an additional US$9 million of the
cash settlement proceeds as a reduction in asbestos expense.
During the first quarter of fiscal year 2017, the company
recognized the remaining US$3 million of the cash settlement
proceeds as a reduction in asbestos expense.  The settlement also
provides additional recovery for Maremont if certain future defense
and indemnity spending thresholds are met.

"The amounts recorded for the asbestos-related reserves and
recoveries from insurance companies are based upon assumptions and
estimates derived from currently known facts.  All such estimates
of liabilities and recoveries for asbestos-related claims are
subject to considerable uncertainty because such liabilities and
recoveries are influenced by variables that are difficult to
predict.  The future litigation environment for Maremont could
change significantly from its past experience, due, for example, to
changes in the mix of claims filed against Maremont in terms of
plaintiffs' law firms, jurisdictions and diseases; legislative or
regulatory developments; Maremont's approach to defending claims;
or payments to plaintiffs from other defendants.  Estimated
recoveries are influenced by coverage issues among insurers and the
continuing solvency of various insurance companies.  If the
assumptions with respect to the estimation period, the nature of
pending and future claims, the cost to resolve claims and the
amount of available insurance prove to be incorrect, the actual
amount of liability for Maremont's asbestos-related claims, and the
effect on the company, could differ materially from current
estimates and, therefore, could have a material impact on the
company's financial condition and results of operations."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/hTFYaP


ASBESTOS UPDATE: McAllister Bid for Expedited Trial Setting Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Shelly D. Dick of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Louisiana denied Plaintiff, James T.
McAllister's Motion for Expedited Trial Setting in the case styled
James T. Mcallister, Jr., v. McDermott, Inc., f/k/a J. Ray
McDermott & Co., Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 18-361-SDD-RLB,
(M.D. La.).

The lawsuit was filed by Plaintiff in state court on January 8,
2018 and was removed to this Court on March 29, 2018. This case
arises out of Plaintiff's diagnosis of mesothelioma allegedly
caused by his exposure to asbestos. Plaintiff sat for a deposition
on February 27 and 28, 2018. On May 14, 2018, Plaintiff filed the
pending motion seeking an expedited trial date due to his rapidly
declining health.

Defendant Air & Liquid Systems Corporation opposes this motion
noting that this case involves twenty-seven defendants, remains in
the very early stages of discovery, and expert reports for at least
eleven identified experts have yet to be exchanged.

While the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff's failing health, the
Court is unable to provide Plaintiff with an expedited trial date.
However, the Court must deny Plaintiff's motion for these reasons:


     (1) The Court has an obligation to ensure a fair trial for all
parties involved. Considering the procedural posture of the
litigation, it would be highly prejudicial to all Defendants,
considering what remains to be accomplished through discovery, to
force them to go to trial in a matter of months.

     (2) The Court's docket simply has no availability to set this
trial, or any other trial, until the spring of 2019.

     (3) The Court maintains an active criminal docket, with
several criminal cases involving multi-defendant drug conspiracy
charges, and criminal matters and settings take precedence over all
civil matters as a matter of law.

A copy of the Ruling dated July 31, 2018, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ya9wat89 from Leagle.com.

James T. McAllister, Jr., Plaintiff, represented by Frank J. Swarr
-- fswarr@landryswarr.com -- Landry & Swarr, LLC, Amanda Jones
Ballay -- aballay@landryswarr.com -- Landry & Swarr, Jean-Michel
LeCointre -- jlecointre@simmonsfirm.com -- Simmons Hanly Conroy,
pro hac vice, Jeffrey A. O'Connell --
jeffreyoconnell@nemerofflaw.com -- The Nemeroff Law Firm, Matthew
C. Clark , Sher, Garner, Cahill, Richter, Klein, McAlister &
Hilbert, Melissa C. Schopfer -- mschopfer@simmonsfirm.com --
Simmons Hanly Conroy, pro hac vice, Mickey P. Landry --
mlandry@landryswarr.com -- Landry & Swarr, LLC & Philip Charles
Hoffman -- phoffman@landryswarr.com -- Landry & Swarr, LLC.

Air & Liquid Systems Corporation, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey
P. Hubbard -- hubbard@hubbardmitchell.com -- Hubbard Mitchell
Williams and Strain, PLLC, pro hac vice & Stacey Leigh Strain --
strain@hubbardmitchell.com -- Hubbard, Mitchell, Williams, and
Strain, PLLC.

Armstrong International, Inc., Defendant, represented by Robert E.
Peyton -- repeyton@christovich.com -- Christovich & Kearney & James
A. Holmes -- jaholmes@christovich.com -- Christovich & Kearney.

Anco Insulations, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jamie H. Baglio
-- jbaglio@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, Haas, Radecker & Carey,
LLC, Donna Mannina Young -- dyoung@pugh-law.com -- Pugh Accardo
Haas Radecker Carey and Hymel LLC, Douglas R. Elliott --
delliott@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, Haas, Radecker & Carey, LLC
& Margaret Moran Joffe -- mjoffe@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo,
Haas, Radecker & Carey, LLC.

Aurora Pump Company, Defendant, represented by Brandie Mendoza
Thibodeaux -- bthibodeaux@mgmlaw.com -- MG+M Law Firm, Glenn Lyle
Maximilian Swetman -- mswetman@mgmlaw.com -- Manion Gaynor &
Manning, LLC & Helen Meredith Buckley -- hbuckley@mgmlaw.com --
Manion Gaynor & Manning LLP.

Carrier Corporation, Defendant, represented by Joseph M. Guillot --
jmguillot@christovich.com -- Christovich & Kearney.

Cleaver-Brooks, Inc., General Electric Company & Trane US, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by John J. Hainkel, III --
jhainkel@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Angela M. Bowlin --
abowlin@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Barry C. Campbell , Frilot,
LLC, James H. Brown, Jr. -- jbrown@frilot.com -- Frilot, Partridge,
LC, Kelly Lorraine Long -- klong@frilot.com -- Frilot LLC, Kelsey
Anne Eagan -- keagan@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C., Lacey T. McCoy --
LMcCoy@frilot.com -- Frilot L.L.C. & Magali Ann Puente-Martin --
mpuente@frilot.com -- Frilot LLC.

Crane Co., Defendant, represented by Donna Mannina Young --
dyoung@pugh-law.com -- Pugh Accardo Haas Radecker Carey and Hymel
LLC, Jacqueline Romero -- jromero@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo,
Haas, Radecker, Carey, Loeb & Hymel, Lawrence G. Pugh, III --
lpugh@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, Haas, Radecker & Carey, LLC &
Shelley L. Thompson -- sthompson@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo,
Haas & Radecker, LLC.

Flowserve US, Inc., Defendant, represented by Stacey Leigh Strain
-- strain@hubbardmitchell.com -- Hubbard, Mitchell, Williams, and
Strain, PLLC.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Defendant, represented by Gregory
E. Bodin -- gbodin@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker, Donelson, Bearman,
Caldwell & Berkowitz, Christopher Michael Vitenas --
cvitenas@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz PC & Robert S. Emmett -- remmett@bakerdonelson.com --
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz.

The Gorman-Rupp Company, Defendant, represented by Donna Mannina
Young -- dyoung@pugh-law.com -- Pugh Accardo Haas Radecker Carey
and Hymel LLC, Jacqueline Romero -- jromero@pugh-law.com -- Pugh,
Accardo, Haas, Radecker, Carey, Loeb & Hymel & Lawrence G. Pugh,
III -- lpugh@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, Haas, Radecker & Carey,
LLC.

Goulds Pumps, LLC & ITT Corporation, Defendants, represented by
Lauren Ann McCulloch -- lauren.mcculloch@morganlewis.com -- Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP & Mitchell F. Tedesco --
mitchell.tedesco@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius.

McCarty Corporation, Defendant, represented by Susan Beth Kohn --
suek@spsr-law.com -- Simon, Peragine, Smith & Redfearn, LLP, April
A. McQuillar -- aprilm@spsr-law.com -- Simon, Peragine, Smith &
Redfearn, L.L.P., Douglas R. Kinler -- douglask@spsr-law.com --
Simon, Peragine, Smith & Redfearn, LLP, Douglas W. Redfearn --
douglasr@spsr-law.com -- Simon, Peragine, Smith & Redfearn, LLP,
Janice Marie Culotta -- janicec@spsr-law.com -- Simon, Peragine,
Smith & Redfearn, LLP & Louis Oliver Oubre -- louiso@spsr-law.com
-- Simon, Peragine, Smith & Redfearn, LLP.

McDermott, Inc., Defendant, represented by Joseph J. Lowenthal, Jr.
-- jlowenthal@joneswalker.com -- Jones Walker LLP & Madeleine
Fischer -- mfischer@joneswalker.com -- Jones Walker LLP.

The Nash Engineering Company, Defendant, represented by Paul D.
Palermo -- ppalermo@bluewilliams.com -- Blue Williams, LLC, Brett
Tweedel -- btweedel@bluewilliams.com -- Blue Williams LLP, Craig V.
Sweeney -- csweeney@bluewilliams.com -- Blue Williams, L.L.P. &
Cynthia Cleland Roth -- croth@bluewilliams.com -- Blue Williams,
LLP.

Powell Valves, formerly known as The William Powell Company,
Defendant, represented by Paula M. Wellons , Taylor, Wellons,
Politz & Duhe & Desiree W. Adams , Taylor, Wellons, Politz & Duhe,
APLC.

Spirax-Sarco, Inc., Defendant, represented by Ralph H. Wall --
rwall@couhigpartners.com -- Couhig Partners, LLC.

Tate Andale, Inc., Defendant, represented by Lawrence G. Pugh, III
-- lpugh@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, Haas, Radecker & Carey, LLC
& Kathleen Jordan -- kjordan@pugh-law.com -- Pugh Accardo Haas
Radecker & Carey, LLC.

Taylor-Seidenbach, Inc., Defendant, represented by Christopher
Kelly Lightfoot -- klightfoot@hmhlp.com -- Hailey, McNamara, Hall,
Larmann & Papale, Edward J. Lassus, Jr. -- elassus@hmhlp.com --
Hailey, McNamara, Hall, Larman, Papale & Richard J. Garvey, Jr. --
rgarvey@hmhlp.com -- Hailey McNamara Hall Larmann & Papale LLC.
Travelers Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Kristopher
T. Wilson -- kwilson@lawla.com -- Lugenbuhl, Wheaton, Peck, Rankin
& Hubbard, Annissa M. Alario -- aalario@garrisonyount.com --
Garrison Yount Forte & Mulcahy, Darrin L. Forte --
dforte@garrisonyount.com -- Garrison, Yount, Lormand, Forte &
Mulcahy, LLC, Katherine L. Osborne , Lugenbuhl, Wheaton, Peck,
Rankin & Hubbard, Kevin Truxillo -- ktruxillo@garrisonyount.com --
Garrison, Yount, Forte & Mulcahy, LLC & Lyon H. Garrison --
lgarrison@garrisonyount.com -- Garrison, Yount, Forte & Mulcahy,
LLC.

Velan Valve Corporation, Defendant, represented by Robert E. Dille
-- RDille@maronmarvel.com -- Maron Marvel Bradely Anderson & Tardy
& Shelley Kathryn Napolitano -- SNapolitano@maronmarvel.com --
Maron Marvel Bradley Anderson & Tardy.

York International Corporation, Defendant, represented by Rocky
Wayne Eaton .

Warren Pumps, LLC, Defendant, represented by Joseph Henry Hart, IV
-- jhart@pugh-law.com -- Pugh, Accardo, Daniel Edwin Oser , Duncan
Courington & Rydberg LLC, Kathleen Jordan -- kjordan@pugh-law.com
-- Pugh Accardo Haas Radecker & Carey, LLC & Thomas A. Porteous ,
Pugh Accardo.

Weir Valves & Controls USA, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Jennifer E. Adams -- jadams@deutschkerrigan.com -- Deutsch,
Kerrigan & Stiles, Arthur Wendel Stout, III --
wstout@deutschkerrigan.com -- Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, Barbara
Bourgeois Ormsby -- bormsby@deutschkerrigan.com -- Deutsch,
Kerrigan & Stiles, LLP, Jason P. Franco --
jfranco@deutschkerrigan.com -- Deutsch Kerrigan, LLP & William C.
Harrison, Jr. -- wharrison@deutschkerrigan.com -- Deutsch, Kerrigan
& Stiles.

Atwood & Merrill, Defendant, represented by Jason P. Franco --
jfranco@deutschkerrigan.com -- Deutsch Kerrigan, LLP.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Mum-of-Four Gets Asbestos Payout
--------------------------------------------------
BBC News reported that Susan Maughan inhaled the toxic dust in 1983
after the blaze at army base COD Donnington which scattered ash,
containing asbestos, for miles around.

She, like others, cleaned it up after the council did not start its
clean-up for three days, family solicitors said.

Mother-of four Ms Maughan died from mesothelioma in 2015, aged 63.

The Ministry of Defence said (MoD) said: "Our thoughts remain with
the family and friends of Susan Maughan.

"When compensation claims are received they are considered on the
basis of whether or not the MOD has a legal liability to pay. Where
there is proven legal liability, compensation is paid."

Daughter Lorraine, 47, who was 11 at the time of the fire, said:
"Sadly I don't think mum will be the last victim.

"My sisters and I now also worry for our health as we played with
the dust and debris, which looked like snow, as did many other
children."

Madelene Holdsworth, from Slater and Gordon who represented the
family, said: "The ash was spread across a 15-square mile area,
much of it residential, so it is likely that hundreds, if not
thousands, of people were exposed to asbestos that day."

In 2008, BBC Inside Out reported that defence chiefs were warned
the base was not safe prior to the fire.

Documents showed safety measures were ruled out in 1977 -- six
years before the fire -- on "operational grounds" and cost, the
programme said.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: NRG Energy Still Faces Claims of ComEd, Exelon
---------------------------------------------------------------
NRG Energy, Inc. continues to defend itself against the
asbestos-related claims of Commonwealth Edison and Exelon,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018.

NRG Energy states, "The Company, through its subsidiary, Midwest
Generation, may be subject to potential asbestos liabilities as a
result of its acquisition of EME.  The Company is currently
analyzing the scope of potential liability as it may relate to
Midwest Generation.  The Company believes that it has established
an adequate reserve for these cases.  On March 27, 2018, ComEd
filed a Motion to Compel Payments of Claims seeking US$61 million
related to asbestos liabilities.  On April 25, 2018, NRG filed an
Omnibus Objection to All Remaining Claims of ComEd and Exelon."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/CEoLXW


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Thomas-Fish's Suit Remains in District Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Renee Marie Bumb of the United States District Court for
the District New Jersey denied the Motion to Remand filed by
Plaintiff Helen Thomas-Fish in the case entitled Helen Thomas-Fish,
Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Robert C. Fish,
Plaintiff, v. Aetna Steel Products Corp., et al., Defendants, Civil
No. 17-cv-10648 RMB/KMW, (D. N.J.).

On September 22, 2017, Plaintiff Helen Thomas-Fish originally filed
this products liability suit against Defendants in the Superior
Court of New Jersey, alleging that her deceased husband, Robert
Fish, contracted and died from mesothelioma caused by his exposure
to asbestos-containing joiner panels during the construction of the
N.S. Savannah. The N.S. Savannah was a "prototype nuclear-powered
merchant marine vessel" developed under the direction of the United
States Maritime Administration ("MARAD"), an agency within the
United States Department of Commerce, and the Atomic Energy
Commission ("AEC").

Defendants removed this suit to the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey pursuant to the federal officer
removal statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 1442(a)(1). Defendants assert
that removal is proper because the joiner panels at issue were
installed pursuant to design specifications approved by MARAD, a
federal agency, in conjunction with MARAD's contracts for the
construction of the non-nuclear components of the N.S. Savannah.
Defendants' Notice of Removal included the report of maritime
design expert Dr. Kenneth Fisher (the "Fisher Report"), which
states that the use of asbestos-containing joiner panels was
contractually required by the federal government for the N.S.
Savannah.

Plaintiff argues that Defendants have failed to meet the "acting
under," "for or relating to," and "colorable federal defense"
requirements necessary to establish federal jurisdiction under the
federal officer removal statute. Plaintiff challenges jurisdiction
facially and does not dispute the facts alleged by Defendants in
their Notice of Removal. Therefore, the Court must consider these
facts in the light most favorable to Defendants.

The Court finds this case closely analogous to Papp, where the
Third Circuit held that the 'acting under' requirement was "easily
satisfied." In Papp, the plaintiff's "allegations [were] directed
at actions [the defendant] took while working under a federal
contract to produce an item the government needed, to wit, a
military aircraft that the government otherwise would have been
forced to produce on its own." Very similarly in this case, the
Court determines that Plaintiff's allegations are directed at
Defendants' actions, or alleged failures to act, while working
under a contract with MARAD (a government agency) to construct an
item the government needed, to wit, a nuclear powered ship, that
the government would otherwise have been forced to construct on its
own.

Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants cannot meet their burden
because they have failed to "produce a single contract" or "a
single material specification specific to the N.S. Savannah." Thus,
according to Plaintiff, "Defendants' removal is based on [nothing
more than] adherence to federal regulations that were applicable to
every vessel (commercial, government or otherwise-owned)
constructed in the United States." Plaintiff's argument
misrepresents the record.

While it is true that Defendants do not submit to the Court, at
this early stage of the litigation, the documents specific to the
N.S. Savannah, Plaintiff does not dispute that the N.S. Savannah
was constructed pursuant to contracts with MARAD. Moreover,
Defendants submit the report of maritime design and construction
consultant, Kenneth W. Fisher, Ph.D., which states that the N.S.
Savannah was designed and constructed pursuant to MARAD contracts.
The Court finds this sufficient to establish the "acting under"
requirement as explained and applied in Papp.

The Court overrules Plaintiff's argument that Defendants have
failed to show that they were "acting under" a federal agency in
carrying out the complained-of conduct -- the failure to warn --
because they do not provide any evidence that MARAD explicitly
directed Defendants not to provide warnings about the dangers
associated with the asbestos-containing joiner panels. The Court
explains that the Defendants are not required to prove that the
"complained-of conduct was done at the specific behest of the
federal officer or agency" in order to satisfy the "acting under"
requirement. Rather, Defendants meet the "acting under" requirement
because they have demonstrated that they manufactured, supplied,
installed, or distributed the joiner panels at issue pursuant to
contracts with MARAD.

In their Notice of Removal, the removing Defendants assert that:
(a) "the construction of the N.S. Savannah took place under the
direction and control of federal officers;" (b) the United States
Government either "procured," "furnished," and/or "selected" the
asbestos-containing products; and (c) MARAD and OSHA published
standards for asbestos exposure which "effectively told
shipbuilding industry participants of the hazards associated with
the use of asbestos during ship construction." The Court finds
these allegations sufficient to establish the requisite connection
or association between the alleged failure to warn and the federal
agency. Contrary to Plaintiff's argument as to this prong,
Defendants are not required to allege that a federal officer
specifically directed the private contractor to do, or not do, the
specific complained-of act, Papp's standard only requires a
"connection or association" between the conduct and the federal
agency.

In addition, in their Notice of Removal, Defendants claim that they
are entitled to the "government contractor" defense as stated in
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). Under
Boyle, a government contractor is immune from state tort liability
in the workplace if: "(1) the United States approved reasonably
precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those
specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about
the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the
supplier but not to the United States." Although the Boyle test was
announced in the context of design defect liability, the Third
Circuit has applied the government contractor defense in
failure-to-warn cases.

Construing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to
Defendants, the Court determines that Defendants have raised a
colorable government contractor defense. Defendants satisfy the
first element of the Boyle test through their assertions that the
federal government maintained complete control over the
specifications of the joiner panels on the N.S. Savannah and the
health hazards in privately operated, government-owned defense
plants including NY Ship, where the N.S. Savannah was constructed.


Furthermore, the U.S. Public Health Service took on "the
responsibility for the evaluation and control of health hazards in
government-owned but privately operated defense plants." The Court
finds Defendants' evidence sufficiently establishes, for purposes
of the colorable defense analysis, that MARAD approved "reasonably
precise specifications" for the joiner panels.

Moreover, the Fisher Report states that "the bulkhead joinery
system incorporated into the N/S Savannah utilized asbestos cement
panels such as the Johns-Manville's Marinite panels," demonstrating
that Defendants' joiner panels conformed to MARAD's specifications.


The Fisher Report also states that the U.S. Navy and U.S. Maritime
Commission had published recommended limits of exposure to air
contamination for all shipyards that remained in place throughout
the period of the N.S. Savannah's construction. Defendants maintain
that, at the time the N.S. Savannah was built, "shipbuilding
industry participants effectively had been told that whatever
hazards were associated with the use of asbestos during ship
construction were already identified by the federal government,"
and "the federal government was enforcing appropriate standards of
air cleanliness at the shipyards constructing ships for government
agencies."

Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendants had shown that they
did not have superior knowledge of the risks of asbestos that they
failed to share with the government. Defendants have put forth
facts that sufficiently satisfy, at this stage of the case, each of
the three elements of the government contractor defense, thus
presenting a colorable federal defense pursuant to Section
1442(a)(1).

The Court holds that Defendants have sufficiently established this
Court's jurisdiction pursuant to the federal officer removal
statute. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion to remand will be denied.

A copy of the Opinion dated July 31, 2018, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y7db9mcy from Leagle.com.

Helen Thomas-Fish, individually and as Executrix of the Estate of
Robert C. Fish, Plaintiff, represented by Amber Rose Long , Levy
Konigsberg, LLP & Joseph J. Mandia , Levy Konigsberg LLP.

Avborne Accessory Group, Inc, Dover Corporation, Dover Engineered
Systems, Inc., formerly known as, RBC Sonic, Sargent Aerospace &
Defense, LLC, formerly known as, Sargent Industries, Inc. & Roller
Bearing Company of America, Inc., formerly known as, Defendants,
represented by William D. Sanders -- wsanders@mklaw.us.com --
McGivney, Kluger & Cook, P.C.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: U.S. Steel Faces 760 Active Cases at June 30
-------------------------------------------------------------
United States Steel Corporation still defends itself against 760
active asbestos cases involving approximately 2,300 plaintiffs as
of June 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

The Company states, "As of June 30, 2018, U.S. Steel was a
defendant in approximately 760 active cases involving approximately
2,300 plaintiffs.  The vast majority of these cases involve
multiple defendants.  At December 31, 2017, U.S. Steel was a
defendant in approximately 820 cases involving approximately 3,315
plaintiffs.  As of June 30, 2018, about 1,540, or approximately 67
percent, of these plaintiff claims are currently pending in
jurisdictions which permit filings with massive numbers of
plaintiffs.  Based upon U.S. Steel's experience in such cases, we
believe that the actual number of plaintiffs who ultimately assert
claims against U.S. Steel will likely be a small fraction of the
total number of plaintiffs.

"Historically, asbestos-related claims against U.S. Steel fall into
three groups: (1) claims made by persons who allegedly were exposed
to asbestos on the premises of U.S. Steel facilities; (2) claims
made by persons allegedly exposed to products manufactured by U.S.
Steel; and (3) claims made under certain federal and maritime laws
by employees of former operations of U.S. Steel.

"The amount U.S. Steel accrues for pending asbestos claims is not
material to U.S. Steel's financial condition.  However, U.S. Steel
is unable to estimate the ultimate outcome of asbestos-related
claims due to a number of uncertainties, including: (1) the rates
at which new claims are filed, (2) the number of and effect of
bankruptcies of other companies traditionally defending asbestos
claims, (3) uncertainties associated with the variations in the
litigation process from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, (4)
uncertainties regarding the facts, circumstances and disease
process with each claim, and (5) any new legislation enacted to
address asbestos-related claims.  Despite these uncertainties,
management believes that the ultimate resolution of these matters
will not have a material adverse effect on U.S. Steel's financial
condition, although the resolution of such matters could
significantly impact results of operations for a particular
quarter."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/X109q3



                            *********

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