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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, September 25, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 192

                            Headlines

ACADIA PHARMA: Staublein and Stone Securities Suits Underway
ADVANCE PIERRE: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Hawkins' Suit
ADVANCED MICRO: Court Stays Shareholder Derivative Suit
ALASKA AIR: Oct. 2018 Trial Set for VA Flight Attendants' Lawsuit
AMCOR RIGID: Cornejo Sues over Use of Biometric Data

AMERICAN AIRLINES: Employees File Class Action Over New Uniforms
AMP: Multiple Class Actions Supported by External Funding Bodies
AMP: NSW Supreme Court Set to Pick Up Firm to Run Class Action
AQUA METALS: Still Defends Securities Suit over Financial Reports
ARCELOR MITTAL: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Antitrust Suit

ARRIS INT'L: Certification Bid in Modem Consumer Suit Partly OK'd
ARRIS INTERNATIONAL: Still Defends Cable Modem Consumer Lawsuit
AUSTRALIA: Williamtown Suit vs. Defense Dept. Won't Solve Problems
BANC OF CALIFORNIA: Still Faces Securities Class Action Lawsuit
BIG PHARMA: Faces Class Action Over Babies Exposed to Opioids

BLACKROCK INC: Appeal in iShares ETFs Investors Suit Still Pending
BLACKROCK INC: Opposes Plaintiffs' Bid to File Amended Complaint
BRIGHTHOUSE LIFE: Roycroft Suit over Group Annuity Underway
BUDGET WIRELESS: Patterson Seeks Wages and OT Pay
C & H SUGAR: Court OKs Preliminary Approval of Class Certification

CANADA: Student Loan Privacy Breach Victims May Get $60+ Payout
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: Natanelova Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
CAVALRY PORTFOLIO: Yakubov Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
CENTURY ALUMINUM: Records $13.3MM Settlement Cost at June 30
CERES, CA: Court Approves $161K Settlement in Firefighters' Suit

CHEMICAL FINANCIAL: Appeal from Nixed City of Livonia Suit Pending
CHESAPEAKE ENERGY: Settles Antitrust Class Action for $7MM
CHICAGO, IL: John Healy Sues for Duty Availability Pay to Cops
COMCAST INC: US Judge OKs $15.5MM Settlement In Class Action
COMMUNICATIONS UNLIMITED: Court Denies Dismissal of FLSA Suit

CURADEN USA: Faces Lyngaas Suit in S.D. California
CVS PHARMACY: Court Dismisses Bailey TCPA Suit
CVS SCIENCES: Disputes Allegations in Securities Class Action
CYNOSURE: Faces Class Action Over Vaginal Rejuvenation Device
DEAN INTERNATIONAL: Students File Class Action Suit

DEUTSCHE BANK: Court Denies Bid to Certify 2 Classes in FX Suit
DIGNITY HEALTH: Court Narrows Claims in Rollins' ERISA Suit
ECONOMIC RECOVERY: Jones FDCPA Suit Dismissed
EMIL GAYED: Law Firm Considers Suit Against Disgraced Surgeon
ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Monteverde & Associates Files Class Action

FANHUA INC: Kaskela Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
FANHUA INC: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Class Action
FCA US: Zuehlsdorf Sues over Defective Transmission in Vehicles
FLORIDA AUTO PHONE: Guerrero Seeks Unpaid Wages
FORJAS TAURUS: Partly Compelled to Produce Docs in Burrow Suit

GATOR HOSPITALITY: Quarterman Files ADA Suit in N.D. Florida
GEO GROUP: Burch Seeks Overtime Pay under Labor Code
GEORGETOWN SYNAGOGUE: Sanford Seeks Preliminary OK of Settlement
GOLDEN QUEEN MINING: Windham Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
GOLDMAN SACHS: Judge Expresses Doubt on Appeal in Bias Case

GOOGLE INC: Judge Refuses to Certify AdWords Class Action
GREAT AMERICAN: 9th Cir. Vacates Remand of Wage & Hour Suit
GREAT AMERICAN: Remand of King's Suit to L.A. Superior Ct. Vacated
GREYSTAR REAL ESTATE: Faces Young Suit in S.D. California
HARDEE'S RESTAURANTS: Customers Sue After Hepatitis A Outbreak

HARRIS & HARRIS: Espinal Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. New York
HEALTH NET: Misrepresents Quality of Health Plans, Poe Alleges
HILTON MANAGEMENT: Hernandez Seeks Minimum Wage & Overtime
HMR OF ALABAMA: Dismissal of Cooley FLSA Suit Partly Reversed
JUUL LABS: Faces Class Action Lawsuit Over Nicotine Levels

JUUL LABS: Viscomi et al. Sue over Sale of e-Cigarette & Pods
KASHIA SERVICES: RICO Class Action Targets Lending Service
KATE SOMMERVILLE: Kiler Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
KENTUCKY FRIED: Appeals Court Sends Suit Back to District Court
KNORR-BREMSE: Wells Suit over "No Poach" Deal Moved to W.D. Pa.

LIFE IS GOOD: Martinez Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
LOGMEIN INC: Block & Leviton Files Securities Class Action
LOUISIANA: Public Defender Lawsuit Gets Class-Action Status
MABVAX THERAPEUTICS: Court Consolidates Securities Fraud Suits
MARKETSOURCE INC: Compelled to Respond to Brum Discovery Requests

MENARD INC: Griffith et al. Suit Transferred to N.D. Ohio
MERCADO LATINO: Tapia Seeks OT & Minimum Wages under Labor Code
MERRILL LYNCH: Kazerouni, Hyde & Swigart File Securities Lawsuit
NATIONAL GAS: Ziedel Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
NAVY FEDERAL: Faces Ronquillo FCRA Suit in S.D. Calif.

NCAA: Sports Economist Testifies in Pay Limit Case
NCAA: Student Athletes' Lawyers Challenge Pay Caps
NEW AGE DISTRIBUTION: Moses Flores Seeks Unpaid Wages
NEW JERSEY: 3rd Cir. Affirms $9.59MM Deal in Tax Sales Cert. Suit
NEW JERSEY: 3rd Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Section 1983 Suit

NEW JERSEY: Settlement in Class Action Upheld on Appeal
NFL: 9th Cir. Reverses Dismissal of Retired Football Players' Suit
NFL: 9th Cir. Revives Class Action Over Painkillers
NORTH CAROLINA: Amended Dillard Suit Dismissed
NORTHLAND INVESTMENT: Judge Weighs Class Action Argument

OMNI FINANCIAL: Ronquillo Files FCRA Suit in S.D. California
OPHTHOTECH CORP: Shareholders File Derivative Complaint
ORANGE COUNTY, CA: Appeals Court Refuses to Dismiss Class Action
PAPA JOHN'S: Brower Piven Files Class Action Lawsuit
PARAGON SYSTEMS: Robinson Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code

PARAMOUNT EQUITY: Titus FLSA Class Has Conditional Certification
PENNSYLVANIA: Court Narrows Claims in McRae Discrimination Suit
PLACER COUNTY, CA: $1.4MM Fund OK'd in Inmate Abuse Settlement
QURATE RETAIL: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Class Action
R&S HOSPITALITY: Sandman Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Law

RAI GROUP: Baez Seeks Unpaid Wages under FLSA
RIPPLE LABS: Bid to Remand Coffey Securities Fraud Suit Denied
RIPPLE: Counsel Departs Firm Amid Class-Action Dispute Over XRP
ROBERT HALF: Cal. App. Affirms Arbitration Ruling in Gentry Suit
ROCKWELL MEDICAL: Sept. 25 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline

RUSSIAN SCHOOL OF MATHEMATICS: Failed to Pay Wages, Loginova Says
SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CA: Summons in Mays' Prisoners Suit Issued
SAN FRANCISCO, CA: Faces Class Action Over Excessive Docking Fees
SECURITY AUTO: Prelim. Conference in Benson Suit Set for Oct. 1
SERVICELINK FIELD: Loses Bid to Deny Class Certification in Britton

SHRINATH BJM: Quarterman Files ADA Suit in N.D. Florida
SIRNAIK LLC: IEI Fire Insurance Subject of Dispute
SMURFIT KAPPA: Protective Order Issued in Chavez Labor Suit
SOUND TRANSIT: Judge Tosses Lawsuit Over Car-Tab Taxes
SOUTHERN COMPANY: Bid to Dismiss Remaining Claims Still Pending

SQUARE H BRANDS: Fails to Pay for Overtime Work, Rodriguez Says
STANFORD UNIVERSITY: Faces Student Discrimination Class Action
SYNAPSE GROUP: Bid to Amend Protective Order in Price Denied
TESLA INC: Dua Sues over Go-Private Tweet, Share Price Drop
TESLA INC: Labaton Sucharow Files Class Action Lawsuit

TESLA INC: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Class Action
TRANSLINK: First Cambie Merchants Win Damages in Class-Action Suit
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Settlement Supported by Former Engineer
UNITED AUTO WORKERS: Michigan EMTs File Class Action Lawsuit
UNITED PARCEL: UPS-Delaware Dismissed as Defendant in Santos

UNITED STATES: Arizona Activists Sue Over Police Actions at Rally
UNITED STATES: Federal Judge OKs Vietnamese Refugee Class Action
UNITED STATES: Moffat County to Join PILT Class Action Lawsuit
UNIVERSAL HANDICRAFT: Settlement in Mollicone Has Final Approval
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS: Doe Suit Moved to C.D. Illinois

UOOLIGAN GAS: Vazquez Seeks Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages
US NATIONAL PERSONAL: Fails to Pay Wages, Dodds and Itric Says
VELOCITY EXPRESS: Case Management Deadlines in Flores Extended
VERISMA SYSTEMS: Court Grants Stay on McCracken PHL Suit
VICTORIA: 'In Lawsuit Territory' Over Document Breach

VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Settles American Investors' Emission Lawsuit
WABTEC CORP: 9th Cir. Certifies Question in Busker
WENDY'S INTERNATIONAL: Owens Sues over Use of Biometric Data
WHOLE FOODS: Investors Urge Court to Revive Class Action
[*] Shook Hires McGuireWoods' Class Action Co-Chairman


                            *********

ACADIA PHARMA: Staublein and Stone Securities Suits Underway
------------------------------------------------------------
ACADIA Pharmaceuticals Inc. is facing two putative class action
lawsuits related to financial disclosures over NUPLAZID, according
to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

Between July 19 and July 23, 2018, in the wake of recent negative
publicity about NUPLAZID, two purported Company stockholders filed
putative securities class action complaints (captioned Staublein v.
ACADIA Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Case No. 18-cv-01647-JAH-MDD, and
Stone v. ACADIA Pharmaceuticals Inc., Case No. 18-cv-01672-LAB-JMA)
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California
against the Company and certain of its current executive officers.

"The complaints generally allege that defendants violated Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by making
materially false and misleading statements regarding the Company's
business, operations, and prospects by failing to disclose that
adverse events and safety concerns regarding NUPLAZID threatened
initial and continuing FDA approval, and by failing to disclose
that the Company engaged in business practices likely to attract
regulatory scrutiny.  The complaints seek unspecified monetary
damages and other relief.

ACADIA said, "The Company has assessed such legal proceedings, and
given the unpredictability inherent in litigation, the Company
cannot predict the outcome of these matters.  At this time, the
Company is unable to estimate possible losses or ranges of losses
that may result from such legal proceedings, and it has not accrued
any amounts in connection with such legal proceedings other than
ongoing attorneys' fees."

ACADIA Pharmaceuticals Inc., a biopharmaceutical company, focuses
on the development and commercialization of small molecule drugs
that address unmet medical needs in central nervous system
disorders.  The Company was founded in 1993 and is headquartered in
San Diego, California.


ADVANCE PIERRE: 9th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Hawkins' Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the case, SHAVONDA HAWKINS, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. ADVANCEPIERRE FOODS, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 16-56697
(9th Cir.).

Hawkins brought a putative class action suit against the
Defendant-Appellee, on behalf of a nationwide class of individuals
who purchased Fast Bites, a line of microwavable sandwiches
containing partially hydrogenated oil ("PHO") manufactured or
distributed by AdvancePierre.  Hawkins alleged that the use of PHOs
in human food violated California law.  The district court
dismissed Hawkins' complaint, and Hawkins timely appealed.

The Court affirmed.  It finds that Hawkins has failed to state a
claim for a violation of California's Unfair Competition Law
("UCL") or for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.
Hawkins has standing to assert a claim under the UCL because she
has alleged an economic injury as a direct result of
AdvancePierre's inclusion of PHO in Fast Bites.  However, her
allegations do not establish the requisite unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business act or practice.

A claim under the "unlawful" prong requires a predicate violation
of another law, but federal law did not prohibit PHOs prior to June
18, 2018.  Hawkins complaint also cited a provision of California's
Sherman Act that adopted federal law, Cal. Health & Safety Code
Section 110100, but AdvancePierre's use of PHOs did not violate
this provision because it did not violate federal law.  Hawkins
cannot satisfy the "unfair" prong of the UCL under either of the
two tests used by California courts.

Hawkins has also failed to state a claim under California law for
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.  Her allegation
that she is a busy person and cannot reasonably inspect ingredients
in the food she purchases does not excuse her failure to examine
the labels on the Fast Bites she purchased.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/jPuGz5 from Leagle.com.


ADVANCED MICRO: Court Stays Shareholder Derivative Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California stayed the case, IN RE ADVANCED
MICRO DEVICES, INC., SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION, This
Document Relates To: ALL ACTIONS, Lead Case No. 5:18-cv-03575-BLF,
Consolidated with No. 5:18-cv-03811 (N.D. Cal.), pending a ruling
on the scheduled motions to dismiss in the case, Kim v. Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc., et al., No. 5:18-cv-00321-EJD ("Securities
Class Action").

On June 14 and 26, 2018, two stockholder derivative actions were
filed in the Court, on behalf of AMD.  On July 6, 2018, the Parties
submitted a stipulation and proposed order consolidating the two
related stockholder derivative actions and appointing the lead
counsel.  On July 12, 2018, the Court consolidated the two
stockholder derivative actions ("Derivative Action").

The deadline for the Plaintiffs to file a consolidated complaint in
the Derivative Action is Aug. 13, 2018.  The Securities Class
Action, a related securities class action, is pending in the
Northern District of California before the Hon. Edward J. Davila.

A briefing schedule has been ordered for anticipated motions to
dismiss in the Securities Class Action providing for a hearing date
on the motions to dismiss of Jan. 17, 2019.  While the case is a
derivative action asserting different claims for liability on
behalf of (rather than against) AMD, it involves some of the same
parties as and some factual overlap with the Securities Class
Action.

While the Plaintiffs believe that that the derivative claims are
not dependent on and have merit independent of the Securities Class
Action and the Defendants do not agree, the Parties agree a ruling
on the scheduled motions to dismiss in the Securities Class Action
may help inform the manner in which the Derivative Action
proceeds.

The counsel for the Parties have met and conferred and, given the
circumstances of the case, in the interests of judicial efficiency,
and to preserve the Company's and the Court's resources, agreed,
and Judge Freeeman granted, that a stay of the Derivative Action on
the terms set forth, until a decision is rendered on the scheduled
motions to dismiss in the Securities Class Action, is appropriate
and in the Company's best interests.

The Plaintiffs will be permitted to file a consolidated complaint
notwithstanding the agreed-to stay, but the Defendants need not
respond to any such complaint during the pendency of the stay.

All proceedings and deadlines in the action are stayed until
further order of the Court or except as otherwise provided in the
Order.  The Parties will file a joint status report with the Court
every 120 days with an update regarding the proceedings in the
Securities Class Action.

The Defendants' counsel will inform the Plaintiffs' counsel of the
occurrence of the ruling on the motions to dismiss in the
Securities Class Action within seven days of such occurrence.

Within 21 days after the ruling on the motions to dismiss in the
Securities Class Action, the Parties in the Derivative Action will
meet and confer in good faith to determine a schedule for further
proceedings in the Derivation Action, and will submit a proposed
scheduling stipulation for the Court's review and approval.

If the Defendants become aware of any other stockholder derivative
proceedings initiated on behalf of AMD based on the same or a
similar set of facts alleged in the Derivative Action, then the
Company will notify counsel for the Plaintiffs promptly.

In the event that during the pendency of the stay the Company
provides Company documents to any other AMD stockholder in
connection with another stockholder derivative action on behalf of
AMD based on the materially same set of facts alleged in the
Derivative Action, the Company agrees to offer to provide those
documents to the Plaintiffs pursuant to the same confidentiality
and use terms previously agreed to by the Company and such other
stockholder except for use terms that expressly conflict with the
Plaintiffs' desire to litigate in this forum.

In the event that the Company receives a demand for the inspection
of books and records of AMD based on the materially same set of
facts alleged in the Derivative Action, the Company agrees to
notify the Plaintiffs within 21 days.

In the event that during the pendency of the stay the Company
provides Company documents to any other AMD stockholder in
connection with a demand for the inspection of books and records of
AMD based on the materially same set of facts alleged in the
Derivative Action, the Company agrees to provide those documents to
the Plaintiffs pursuant to the same confidentiality and use terms
previously agreed to by the Company and such other stockholder
except for use terms that expressly conflict with the Plaintiffs'
desire to litigate in this forum.

At any time during which the Derivative Action is stayed pursuant
to the Order, any party may file a motion with the Court seeking to
modify the terms of the Order or lift the stay, which may be
opposed by any other party.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/CMIDqt from Leagle.com.

Jacqueline Dolby, Derivatively on Behalf of Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Brian J. Robbins --
brobbins@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP, Felipe Javier
Arroyo -- farroyo@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP & Steven
Ray Wedeking, II -- SWedeking@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo
LLP.

Vladimir Gusinsky Revocable Trust, Plaintiff, represented by Conrad
Brandon Stephens -- conrad@stephensfirm.com -- Stephens and
Stephens LLP & Steven Ray Wedeking, II, Robbins Arroyo LLP.

Lisa T. Su, Devinder Kumar, John E. Caldwell, Nicholas M. Donofrio,
Ahmed Yahia, Nora M. Denzel, Michael J. Inglis, Joseph A.
Householder, John W. Marren, Abhi Y. Talwalkar, Mark Durcan, Bruce
L. Claflin & Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., Nominal Defendant,
Defendants, represented by Matthew W. Close -- mclose@omm.com --
O'Melveny & Myers LLP & Brittany Allison Rogers -- brogers@omm.com
-- OMelveny and Myers.

Jacqueline Dolby, Interested Party, represented by Steven Ray
Wedeking, II, Robbins Arroyo LLP.


ALASKA AIR: Oct. 2018 Trial Set for VA Flight Attendants' Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska Air Group, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018, that a trial on the remaining claim in a class
action lawsuit filed by Virgin America flight attendants is
currently set for October 2018.

In 2015, three flight attendants filed a class action lawsuit
seeking to represent all Virgin America flight attendants for
damages based on alleged violations of California and City of San
Francisco wage and hour laws.  Plaintiffs received class
certification in November 2016.  Virgin America filed a motion for
summary judgment seeking to dismiss all claims on various federal
preemption grounds.  In January 2017, the Court denied in part and
granted in part Virgin America's motion.

In January 2018, Virgin America filed a motion to decertify the
class and Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment seeking
the court to rule in their favor on all remaining claims.  In July
2018, the Court denied in part and granted in part Virgin America's
motion to decertify the class and granted in part and denied in
part Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.  A trial on the
remaining claim is currently set for October 2018.

The Company said it believes the claims in this case are without
factual and legal merit and intends to defend the remaining claim
in this lawsuit and will appeal the claims decided in the
Plaintiffs' favor.

Air Group operates Alaska, Virgin America and Horizon Air.  It
completed the acquisition of Virgin America on December 14, 2016,
at which time Virgin America became its wholly-owned subsidiary.


AMCOR RIGID: Cornejo Sues over Use of Biometric Data
----------------------------------------------------
DAVID CORNEJO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. AMCOR RIGID PLASTICS USA, LLC a
Delaware limited liability company, the Defendant, Case No.
2018CH11424 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook Cty., Sept. 11, 2018), alleges
that Amcor disregards its employees' statutorily protected privacy
rights and unlawfully collects, stores, and uses their biometric
data in violation of the Biometric Information Privacy Act.

When employees first begin their jobs at Amcor's facilities, they
are required to scan their fingerprint in its biometric time
tracking system as a means of authentication, instead of using key
fobs or other identification cards. While there are tremendous
benefits to using biometric time clocks in the workplace, there are
also serious risks. Unlike key fobs or identification cards --
which can be changed or replaced if stolen or compromised --
fingerprints are unique, permanent biometric identifiers associated
with the employee.  This exposes employees to serious and
irreversible privacy risks. For example, if a fingerprint database
is hacked, breached, or otherwise exposed, employees have no means
by which to prevent identity theft and unauthorized tracking.

Recognizing the need to protect its citizens from situations like
these, Illinois enacted the BIPA, specifically to regulate
companies that collect and store Illinois citizens' biometrics,
such as fingerprints.

Amcor Rigid manufactures and delivers packaging solutions. The
Company offers containers for carbonated beverages, water, juices,
teas, and sports drinks.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          J. Eli Wade-Scott, Esq.
          EDELSON PC 350
          North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: 312 589 6370
          Facsimile: 312 589 6378
          E-mail: brichman@edelson.com
                  ewadescott@edelson.com

               - and -

          David Fish, Esq.
          John Kunze, Esq.
          THE FISH LAW FIRM, P.C.
          200 East Fifth Avenue, Suite 123
          Naperville, IL 60563
          Telephone: 630 355 7590
          Facsimile: 630 778 0400
          E-mail: dfish@fishlawfirm.com
                  jkunze@fishlawfirm.com


AMERICAN AIRLINES: Employees File Class Action Over New Uniforms
----------------------------------------------------------------
HarrisMartin Publishing reports that employees, including flight
attendants and pilots, of American Airlines have filed a class
action lawsuit against the airline and the manufacturer of their
uniforms, saying that the clothes contain chemicals and are
inducing a number of health ailments.

In the Aug. 24 class action lawsuit filed in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the plaintiffs said
that the uniforms are made of synthetic materials and have been
found to contain cadmium, formaldehyde, and other harmful
carcinogens.

"One conclusion that is clear . . . is the new uniforms are causing
these health problems," the suit claims. [GN]


AMP: Multiple Class Actions Supported by External Funding Bodies
----------------------------------------------------------------
Emily Cadman, writing for Sydney Morning Herald, reports that when
shares of AMP plunged earlier this year as the wealth manager found
itself engulfed in its fee-for-no-service scandal, the firm was hit
within weeks by the first of five separate class action lawsuits.

It wasn't just the seriousness of the situation -- which included
an admission that AMP repeatedly misled regulators and charged
clients for services they didn't receive -- that prompted the
attention of so many law firms. The multiple suits were all
supported by external funding bodies, whose coffers have been
swelled by a flood of money moving into litigation financing in
Australia and elsewhere.

Endowment funds, family offices and other savvy investors have been
allocating cash to lawsuits, attracted by juicy payouts and the
sense that -- similar to private equity and real estate -- the
returns aren't necessarily correlated to movements in sharemarkets
and bonds.

"We believe there is a large amount of capital looking to enter
this market," said Michael Peet, an analyst at Goldman Sachs in
Sydney. "Litigation funding is rapidly emerging as an alternative
asset class."

While there are no good figures for the total amount of money
backing litigation in Australia (or globally for that matter),
there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that the tide is rising.


Connection Capital in London, which invests on behalf of wealthy
individuals, has seen a "considerable level of interest from new
and existing investors" according to Emma Bewley, the firm's head
of funds. "Returns across a portfolio are similar to private equity
but are expected to be generated within a shorter time frame," she
said.

Sydney-based IMF Bentham., one of the largest publicly traded
litigation specialists, has responded by raising its first three
external funds during the past 16 months, gathering a total of $270
million. Investors include $US40 billion ($55 billion) private
equity firm Fortress Investment and $US24 billion outsourced
investment office Partners Capital Investment, which acts on behalf
of endowments, foundations and high-net-worth families.

The interest was so strong that the firm now views its future as
"more of a fund manager," IMF Bentham Chief Executive Officer
Andrew Saker said in a phone interview. Two years ago, all lawsuits
were financed from the company's own resources.

The rise of litigation funding globally has been constrained by an
old English legal restriction that prevented a third party from
sharing in the proceeds of a judgement.

Australia the trailblazer
Australia was the first major jurisdiction to allow exceptions in
the early 1990s, while the UK followed suit in the 2000s. In 2017,
Singapore and Hong Kong became the latest to permit it, in certain
cases.

For IMF Bentham, the new money is helping it expand overseas. The
firm is exploring opportunities in the US, Singapore, Hong Kong,
continental Europe and Canada as it focuses more on corporate
litigation, whistle-blower suits and US law firm portfolio funding,
Saker said.

Australian shareholder class actions now only represent 13 per cent
of its funded cases versus more than 50 per cent three years ago,
according to Goldman analysis.

Indeed, here in Australia -- where litigation funding first
originated -- there are signs of saturation. While the overall
number of class action suits is relatively stable, the number of
investor and shareholder cases -- the ones that tend to attract
outside funding -- have risen sharply.

More than 60 per cent of local class actions received funding so
far this year, according to law firm King & Wood Mallesons,
compared with less than 40 per cent four years prior.

Over the past five years, 100 per cent of shareholder class actions
have been funded versus about 30 per cent for consumer protection
litigation, according to separate data from the Australian Law
Reform Commission and Professor Vince Morabito.

"Funders play a critical role in Australian securities class
actions," said Michael Lange, a securities litigation counsel at
Financial Recovery Technologies, a US group that helps
institutional investors track class actions.

"Past settlements have attracted more funders and their numbers
have grown in recent years," he said. That's now starting to cause
a squeeze, with commission rates falling.

It's just one example of the challenges facing the sector,
highlighting the difficulty of delivering the stellar returns that
attracted limited partnerships and other investors in the first
place.

While the right fund manager can still generate outsized returns,
"the real issue that no one talks about is whether there is too
much capital chasing this asset class and how does the litigation
fund manager find quality of case inventory in a crowded global
market," said Dan Farrell, the chairman and chief executive officer
of Privos Capital, a global multi-family office.

"In other words, are there enough good litigation cases to go
around?" [GN]


AMP: NSW Supreme Court Set to Pick Up Firm to Run Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Misa Han, writing for Australian Financial Review, reports that the
NSW Supreme Court is likely to pick the winning law firm for
running the class action against AMP.

On Aug. 29, the full bench of the Federal Court transferred four
AMP class actions run by Maurice Blackburn, Slater and Gordon, Phi
Finney McDonald and Shine Lawyers in the Federal Court to the NSW
Supreme Court.

Unless the class action firms file a special leave application to
the High Court, the four firms and Quinn Emanuel are now likely to
compete in a so-called "beauty parade" before the NSW Supreme Court
that will decide which class action firm and funder will run the
action.

In a damning judgment to class action lawyers and litigation
funders, Chief Justice James Allsop said it would be unsatisfactory
to have more than one open class action in this case.

"As was clear, the running of multiple actions by different
lawyers, with different funders was, in principle, potentially
inimical to the administration of justice and, in particular,
potentially inimical to the interests of group members, and
potentially oppressive to AMP," Chief Justice Allsop said.

All roads lead to Sydney
"Those bringing the action have their own self-interests: any
funders for their percentage take, lawyers for their professional
fees, and, sometimes, lead plaintiffs for any special position they
can negotiate in the overall arrangement"

Chief Justice Allsop's decision also suggests Quinn Emanuel will
not be advantaged simply because it was the first of the five law
firms to file the class action against AMP.

He said there are dangers in adopting a "first-in-best-dressed
approach", as it can encourage "hasty preparation and lack of
mature reflection".

Justices John Middleton and Jonathan Beach agreed with the chief
justice's judgment. Justice Middleton concluded: "[A]ll roads lead
to Rome, or rather in this case, to Sydney".

AMP will continue to defend
An AMP spokeswoman said in a statement the company welcomes this
decision.

"Once this occurs we are hopeful that decisions can be made as to
the efficient management of all five proceedings," she said.

"AMP will continue to vigorously defend the class actions and
denies that it breached its continuous disclosure obligations, as
alleged."

In defence filed in July, AMP said its misrepresentations to the
corporate regulator had no material impact on the company share
price. Herbert Smith Freehills is representing AMP. [GN]


AQUA METALS: Still Defends Securities Suit over Financial Reports
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Aqua Metals, Inc. continues to defend itself against a consolidated
action styled In Re: Aqua Metals, Inc.  Securities Litigation Case
No 3:17-cv-07142, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

Beginning on December 15, 2017, three purported class action
lawsuits were filed in the United Stated District Court for the
Northern District California against the Company, Stephen Clarke,
Thomas Murphy and Mark Weinswig.  On March 23, 2018, the cases were
consolidated under the caption In Re: Aqua Metals, Inc.  Securities
Litigation Case No 3:17-cv-07142.  On May 23, 2018, the Court
appointed lead plaintiffs and approved counsel for the lead
plaintiffs.  On July 20, 2018, the lead plaintiffs filed a
consolidated amended complaint, on behalf of a class of persons who
purchased the Company's securities between May 19, 2016 and
November 9, 2017, against the Company, Stephen Clarke, Thomas
Murphy and Selwyn Mould.

The complaint alleges the defendants made false and misleading
statements concerning the Company's lead recycling operations in
violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.  The
complaint seeks to hold the individual defendants as control
persons pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  The
complaint also alleges a violation of Section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") based on alleged false and
misleading statements concerning the Company's lead recycling
operations contained in, or incorporated by reference in, the
Company's Registration Statement on Form S-3 filed in connection
with its November 2016 public offering.  That claim is asserted on
behalf of a class of persons who purchased shares pursuant to, or
that are traceable to, that Registration Statement.

The complaint seeks to hold the individual defendants liable as
control persons pursuant to Section 15 of the Securities Act.  The
amended consolidated complaint seeks unspecified damages and
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs.  The Company denies that the
claims in the complaint have any merit and it intends to vigorously
defend the action.

Aqua Metals, Inc. was formed as a Delaware corporation on June 20,
2014 for the purpose of engaging in the business of recycling lead
through a novel, proprietary and patent-pending process that the
company developed and named "AquaRefining". Since its formation,
the company focused its efforts on the development and testing of
its AquaRefining process, the development of its business plan, the
raise of its present working capital and the development of its
initial lead acid battery, or LAB, recycling facility in the Tahoe
Regional Industrial Center, McCarran, Nevada ("TRIC"). The company
is based in Alameda, California.


ARCELOR MITTAL: 7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Antitrust Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, affirmed the
District Court's judgment granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned SUPREME AUTO TRANSPORT, LLC, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ARCELOR MITTAL USA, INC., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees. No. 17-2910. (7th Cir.).

The Plaintiffs, indirect purchasers of steel, assert that eight
U.S. steel producers colluded to slash output in an effort to drive
up the price of steel nationwide. Years after their initial
complaint, however, the plaintiffs transformed their theory of
liability. The original complaint, filed in 2008, charged that
plaintiffs overpaid for steel sheets, rods, and tubing manufactured
by the defendants at their steel mills.

The district court dismissed the suit for two reasons. First, it
determined that plaintiffs' amended complaint is timebarred because
it redefines steel products in a way that gives rise to an entirely
different, and exponentially larger, universe of plaintiffs.
Second, in the alternative, the court held that the amended
complaint does not plausibly plead a causal connection between the
alleged antitrust conspiracy and plaintiffs' own injuries.

The Court begins by addressing the statute of limitations. The
Plaintiffs concede that their amended complaint, filed in April
2016, falls outside all relevant limitations periods. The longest
period for any of plaintiffs' claims is six years, meaning that
their claims expired, at the latest, sometime in the late summer of
2014, six years after the alleged conspiracy ended, and a year and
a half before plaintiffs filed their amended complaint. Thus, the
amended complaint is untimely unless the plaintiffs can show that
their claims were tolled or that the amendments to their new
complaint relate back to the original one.

The Court also sees no basis for tolling the statute of
limitations. Tolling is not available under American Pipe &
Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), which suspends the
applicable statute of limitations in class action suits to all
members of the purported class, because the plaintiffs named in the
amended complaint were not asserted members of the class defined in
the original complaint and their claims were not encompassed by the
original suit. If there were any doubt about this and the Court
have none, the Supreme Court's recent decision in China Agritech,
Inc. v. Resh, 138 S.Ct. 1800 (2018) to the effect that upon denial
of certification, a putative class member may not commence a new
class action beyond the time allowed by the applicable statute of
limitations also supports our reasoning.

The substantial prejudice to defendants who had no reason to think
in 2008 that they should preserve evidence relating to the
gargantuan number of consumer products now at issue further
counsels against applying any form of equitable tolling.

Given that plaintiffs' amended complaint is time-barred, the Court
could end our analysis now without reaching the proximate causation
issue. But since the district court ruled in the alternative, and
the Court recognizes that we do not necessarily have the last word,
we think it prudent also to say a word about this basis for the
district court's decision.

Proximate causation is an essential element that plaintiffs must
prove in order to succeed on any of their claims. The purpose of
the proximate causation requirement in both antitrust and tort law
is to avoid speculative recovery by requiring a direct relation
between the plaintiff's injury and the defendant's behavior.

Along with the ordinary requirement of proximate causation, federal
antitrust law imposes additional limits on recovery in suits for
treble damages under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 15. One of
the most significant is the direct-purchaser requirement announced
in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 729-30 (1977),
which held that only direct purchasers of a product can sue the
supplier for damages. Allowing private suits by purchasers further
down the supply chain, the Court held, would risk duplicative
awards.

There are many suits that satisfy ordinary principles of proximate
causation but nevertheless would be barred under federal law by
Illinois Brick's direct-purchaser requirement. This very case
provides an example: many if not all Illinois-Brick repealer states
would have allowed Supreme Auto's original complaint to go forward.
That first complaint alleged injury based on the purchase of steel
rods and similar items from distributors who, in turn, had
purchased those same items from the defendants. The original
complaint involves an indirect purchase (and so would be barred by
Illinois Brick at the federal level where the alleged injury is
still fairly traceable to the defendant steel manufacturers.

The amended complaint is a different story. It alleges that
plaintiffs purchased steel only insofar as it was one among many
components of other more complex products, all of which have gone
through numerous manufacturing alterations and lines of
distribution. In many of these products, steel is not even a
primary or necessary ingredient. The Court cannot imagine and
plaintiffs have not told us how one might tackle the task of
tracing the effect of an alleged overcharge on steel through the
complex supply and production chains that gave rise to the consumer
products at issue here. The district court thus appropriately ruled
that the claims asserted here were too remote to support a claim
under the different state laws plaintiffs invoked.

A full-text copy of the Seventh Circuit's September 6, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ya9te3es from Leagle.com.

Joel G. Chefitz, 444 West Lake Street, Chicago, IL 60606-0029,  for
Defendant-Appellee.

Nathan P. Eimer -- neimer@eimerstahl.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Marvin A. Miller, 1203 Duke Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22314, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Andrew S. Marovitz -- amarovitz@mayerbrown.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Jonathan S. Quinn -- jquinn@nge.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Christopher Lovell -- Lovell@lshllp.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.


ARRIS INT'L: Certification Bid in Modem Consumer Suit Partly OK'd
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE ARRIS CABLE MODEM CONSUMER LITIGATION, This
Document Relates to: All Actions, Case No. 17-CV-01834-LHK (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Lucy H. Koh of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Jose Division, (a) granted in
part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification; (b) denied the Defendants' motions to exclude the
expert testimony of Richard Newman and Steve Gaskin; and (c) denied
as moot (i) the Plaintiffs' motion to exclude the expert testimony
of Krista Holt Holt and (ii) the Defendants' motion to exclude the
expert testimony of Colin Weir.

The Plaintiffs bring the putative class action against Defendant
Arris International plc, based on the Defendant's alleged failure
to disclose defects with the SB6190 cable modem.  The Defendant
manufactures cable modem hardware for cable service providers and
consumers.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of consumers who purchased
the SURFboard SB6190 cable modem sold and manufactured by the
Defendant.  They allege that the Defendant marketed the Modem as
fast and reliable.  In contrast to the Defendant's representations
about the Modem's speed and reliability, the Modem -- specifically,
the Modem's Intel Puma 6 chip -- has a defect that causes severe
network latency.  They allege that the Defendant was aware of at
least some of the Puma 6 latency defects while developing the Modem
prior to public release.  The Plaintiffs allege that Intel had
"experienced issues" with latency with the Puma 6 chip and had
communicated these issues to the Defendant.

The Defendant claims that it made no representations regarding
latency in the Modem and there is no standard, specification or
limit for latency in DOCSIS 3.0 or otherwise in the industry.

On March 31, 2017, Plaintiff Carlos Reyna filed a putative class
action complaint against the Defendant.  On May 11, 2017, Greg
Knowles and 16 other Plaintiffs brought a separate putative class
action against the Defendant.  On May 25, 2017, Reyna filed an
administrative motion to consider whether his case and the Knowles
case should be related. On June 5, 2017, the Court granted Reyna's
motion to relate the Knowles case. On June 30, 2017, the Court
granted the parties' stipulation to consolidate the cases.  On July
5, 2017, the Court approved the parties' stipulation to streamline
the cases by adjudicating the California law claims before the
claims from other states.

On July 21, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed the consolidated amended
complaint, which included several additional named Plaintiffs.  The
Plaintiffs alleged four causes of action under California law on
behalf of the named California Plaintiffs and the California
Subclass including (1) the California's Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act; (2) the California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act
("CLRA"); (3) California's False Advertising Law ("FAL"); and (4)
California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL").  They individually and
on behalf of the Nationwide Class also asserted a claim for unjust
enrichment/quasi-contract.

On Aug. 21, 2017, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and to
strike parts of the CAC.  On Jan. 4, 2018, the Court granted the
Defendant's motion to dismiss with leave to amend and denied the
motion to strike.  On Feb. 5, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed the SACC.


On May 3, 2018, the Plaintiff filed the instant motion for class
certification.  They seek certification for their UCL and FAL
claims on behalf of the class of all persons who purchased an Arris
SURFboard SB6190 cable modem in California on or after Oct. 1,
2015.  They seek certification of their claims under California's
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and the CLRA on behalf of the
consumer subclass of all persons who purchased an Arris SURFboard
SB6190 cable modem in California for personal, family, or household
purposes on or after Oct. 1, 2015.

On May 31, 2018, the Defendant filed an opposition to the motion
for class certification.  It also filed Daubert challenges to all
three of the Plaintiffs' experts, and motions to strike those
experts' declarations.

On June 22, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a reply in support of their
motion for class certification.  They also filed a Daubert
challenge against the Defendant's expert Krista Holt.

Judge Koh denied the Defendant's motions to exclude Newman and
Gaskin, denied as moot the Defendant's motion to exclude Weir,
denied as moot the Plaintiffs' motion to exclude Holt, and granted
in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.

She certified the following class and subclass:

     a. Class: All persons who purchased an Arris SURFboard SB6190
cable modem in California on or after Oct. 1, 2015.

     b. Subclass: All persons who purchased an Arris SURFboard
SB6190 cable modem in California for personal, family, or household
purposes on or after Oct. 1, 2015.

The class seeks relief under the UCL and FAL.  The subclass seeks
relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and CLRA.

The Judge appointed  Greg Knowles and Brian Alexander as
representatives of the class and subclass.  As the Defendant does
not challenge the adequacy of the proposed class counsel, he also
appointed Willem Jonckheer, Dustin Schubert, and Noah Schubert of
Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP as the class counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/9ilAUo from Leagle.com.

Carlos Reyna, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Greg Knowles, Brian Alexander, Jon Walton, Kelly Smith,
Christopher Stevens, Matthew Penner, Timothy Oefelein, Tom Kisha,
Kaci Roar, Tony Romeo, John Matsayko, David Eisen, Wes Tilley,
Andrew Prowant, Marco Fernandez, Damien Probe, Paul Dubey, Callan
Christensen, Michael Bresline, Christopher Bullard, Giovanni
Murphy, William Haworth, Rodney Bryant, Yong Jae Lee, Larry Bavry,
William Rosenberg, Jean Pierre Crespo & Mike Alexander, Plaintiffs,
represented by Willem F. Jonckheer -- wjonckheer@sjk.law --
Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP & Noah M. Schubert --
nschubert@sjk.law -- Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP.P.

ARRIS International plc, Plaintiff, represented by Joe Patrick
Reynolds -- jreynolds@kilpatricktownsend.com -- Kilpatrick Townsend
and Stockton LLP, pro hac vice.

Arris International plc, Defendant, represented by Nancy L. Stagg
-- nstagg@kilpatricktownsend.com -- Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton
LLP.


ARRIS INTERNATIONAL: Still Defends Cable Modem Consumer Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Arris International plc still defends itself against the putative
class action lawsuit styled In Re ARRIS Cable Modem Consumer
Litigation, C.A. 5:17-cv-01834, Northern District of California,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarter ended June 30,
2018.

On March 31, 2017, Carlos Reyna, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated filed a putative class action lawsuit against
ARRIS alleging that the SB6190 modem which includes the Intel Puma
6 chipset is defective.  Other state court complaints have been
filed but are stayed pending the outcome of the California action.
The plaintiff alleges violation of the California Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act, California Consumer Legal Remedies Act,
California False Advertising Law, and California Unfair Competition
Law.

Arris said, "It is premature to assess the likelihood of an
unfavorable outcome.  In the event of an unfavorable outcome, we
may be required to pay damages."

ARRIS is a global leader in entertainment, communications and
networking technology. The company is based in Suwanee, Georgia.


AUSTRALIA: Williamtown Suit vs. Defense Dept. Won't Solve Problems
------------------------------------------------------------------
Donna Page, writing for the Newcastle Herald, reports that
Williamtown residents are "fully aware" a class action launched
against the Department of Defence will fall "well short" of
resolving issues they face from toxic firefighting chemicals.

In a submission to a parliamentary inquiry into the federal
government's handling of the contamination, lawyers representing
the community said, even if they win, monetary compensation will
not address the issue.

Dentons Australia lawyers, representing more than 400 'red zone'
residents and business owners, said its clients wanted to be in the
same position they were in before the contamination occurred.

"Full and proper compensation extends well beyond mere monetary
compensation that the class action can provide...," the submission
said.

"Defence's responsibility to take appropriate action extends far
beyond the economic loss that is being sought in the Williamtown
class action."

During a public hearing in July, Defence conceded responsibility
for putting the per- and poly-fluoroalkyl chemicals (PFAS) "into
the ground" and admitted it was unable to stop their spread from
Williamtown RAAF Base.

The lawyers' submission said any resolution of the class action
would not halt the spread of the contamination or provide regular
health checks for the community.

It stressed that residents want a buy-back scheme for people
wishing to leave the red zone, a remediation plan and fair
compensation for losses suffered beyond the quantifiable economic
loss claim made in the class action.

They also want the government to extend the scope of its
epidemiology study.

"It is important for the committee to understand that even if our
clients are entirely successful on all claims against Defence in
the Williamtown class action, this will only result in a monetary
payment to our clients for the economic claims pleaded by the class
members," it said.

"We do not act for all Williamtown residents."

The submission pointed to "larger legislative issues" that need
addressing, including the lack of a federal environmental watchdog
and whether this contributed to inaction on the Williamtown
contamination.

"The responses to the Williamtown residents were consistent and
clear: Defence has failed to adequately respond to the community
and has failed to take responsibility for the claims arising from
the contamination in and around Williamtown...," the submission
said.

"We principally make this submission to bring to the attention of
the committee on behalf of the Williamtown community that the
resolution of the issues faced by those residents extends far
beyond the scope of the claims in the class action and those
members of the community who we represent."

The submission set out that prior to lodging the class action,
Dentons sent a letter of demand asking Defence to provide residents
with proposals on "compensation for their losses" and a "clear
remediation" plan.

Dentons' partner Ben Allen urged Defence to take the opportunity to
avoid litigation and placing "further stress and anxiety" on the
members of the class action, whose properties have been
contaminated by chemicals used in firefighting foam at the RAAF
base for around 40 years.

Mr Allen accused Defence of continuing to use the firefighting foam
for more than a decade after it was informed the chemicals were
persistent in the environment and potentially hazardous to human
and animal health.

According to the submission, Defence responded several days later
stating the matters raised in the letter of demand required
"whole-of-government consideration" and it was not in a position to
respond.

"No attempt was made to engage in any aspect of the proposed scheme
and the class members felt that they were left with no choice but
to pursue their claims through the courts," it said.

"At the date of this submission, nearly three years since the
public announcement of the contamination, Defence has still not
addressed the concerns of the Williamtown residents or the class
members, nor properly addressed the contamination caused by the use
of AFFF (Aqueous Film Forming Foam) at the RAAF Base Williamtown
through remediation or appropriate compensation."

The Dentons' submission stressed that comments made by Defence
during a public hearing held in Williamtown in July were "plainly
and strikingly at odds" with previous public statements. This
included the revelation that it was Defence policy that AFFF would
still be used at Williamtown. [GN]


BANC OF CALIFORNIA: Still Faces Securities Class Action Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Banc of California, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018, that trial in a consolidated putative class
action against the Company is set for October 21, 2019.

The Company was named as a defendant in several complaints filed in
the United States District Court for the Central District of
California in January 2017 alleging violations of sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  The complaints
were brought as purported class actions on behalf of stockholders
who purchased shares of the Company's common stock between varying
dates, inclusive of August 7, 2015 through January 23, 2017.  Those
actions were consolidated, a lead plaintiff was appointed, and the
lead plaintiff filed a Consolidated Amended Complaint on May 31,
2017.  The defendants moved to dismiss the Consolidated Amended
Complaint.

On September 18, 2017, the district court granted in part and
denied in part Defendants' motions to dismiss.  Specifically, the
court denied the defendants' motions as to the Company's April 15,
2016 Proxy Statement which listed the positions held by Steven A.
Sugarman (the Company's then (now former) Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer) with COR Securities Holdings Inc., COR
Clearing LLC, and COR Capital LLC while omitting their alleged
connections with Jason Galanis.

Trial is currently set for October 21, 2019.

The Company said it believes that the action is without merit and
intends to vigorously contest it.

Banc of California, Inc. is a financial holding company under the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended, headquartered in
Santa Ana, California and incorporated under the laws of Maryland.


BIG PHARMA: Faces Class Action Over Babies Exposed to Opioids
-------------------------------------------------------------
Aubrey Whelan and Marie McCullough, writing for The Philadelphia
Inquirer, report that a Philadelphia law firm has filed a proposed
class-action lawsuit against a number of opioid manufacturers,
alleging that they are responsible for the medical needs of babies
exposed to opioids before birth.

John Weston, the attorney at Sacks Weston Diamond who brought the
suit on Aug. 24 on behalf of an anonymous baby boy and his mother,
said he believes the case is the first of its kind in Pennsylvania.
Lawsuits on behalf of babies with neonatal abstinence syndrome, or
NAS, have been filed in several other states, but are not as common
as the wave of litigation against pharmaceutical companies, often
filed by state and local governments seeking to recover costs
related to the opioid epidemic.

"It's basically the same theory as all of the other opioid cases,"
which allege that pharmaceutical companies sparked the opioid
crisis by aggressively marketing opioid pain medications and
downplaying their addictive properties, Mr. Weston said. "It's just
a different group of plaintiffs" --  children exposed to opioids in
the womb who display symptoms of withdrawal at birth.

"You can argue about who's at fault," he said, "but it's certainly
not the kid."

If the suit is successful, Weston said, the class of plaintiffs who
stand to benefit would be limited to children whose mothers could
prove their own addiction began with prescription opioids.

Though the suit claims that newborns with NAS face long-term
adverse health outcomes, questions about lasting harm are far from
settled because unbiased studies are hard to do. While the symptoms
of newborn withdrawal -- such as excessive crying, fever, tremors
-- go away within days or weeks, some studies suggest opioids can
leave children with behavioral, cognitive, vision and movement
problems.

But researchers say the effects of licit and illicit opioids are
hard to isolate from the effects of other substances mothers might
have used, such as alcohol, and from the impact of factors such as
poverty and poor prenatal care.

Another obstacle to holding companies liable for children's
long-term problems is that many women trying to control their
addiction are prescribed milder opioids, either methadone or
buprenorphine, that cut cravings without delivering euphoric
effects. Abruptly quitting opioids increases the risk of
miscarriage, so pregnant women are urged to continue or begin such
medication-assisted treatment.

Pennsylvania Medicaid data consistently show that the majority of
pregnant women taking prescribed opioids are on buprenorphine or
methadone. In Tennessee, which collects data on the sources of
neonatal drug exposure, 70 percent of cases were linked to the
mothers' medication-assisted treatment in 2017. [GN]


BLACKROCK INC: Appeal in iShares ETFs Investors Suit Still Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs' appeal from the dismissal of a class action lawsuit by
investors in certain iShares ETFs is still pending, according to
BlackRock, Inc.'s Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On June 16, 2016, iShares Trust, BlackRock, Inc. and certain of its
advisory affiliates, and the directors and certain officers of the
iShares ETFs were named as defendants in a purported class action
lawsuit filed in California state court.  The lawsuit was filed by
investors in certain iShares ETFs (the "ETFs"), and alleges the
defendants violated the federal securities laws, purportedly by
failing to adequately disclose in prospectuses issued by the ETFs
the risks to the ETFs' shareholders in the event of a "flash
crash."

Plaintiffs seek unspecified monetary damages.  The plaintiffs'
complaint was dismissed in December 2016 and on January 6, 2017,
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.  The defendants filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings dismissing that complaint.

On September 18, 2017, the court dismissed the lawsuit.  On
December 1, 2017, the plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their
lawsuit.

BlackRock, Inc. is a publicly traded investment management firm
with $6.317 trillion of AUM at March 31, 2018. With approximately
14,000 employees in more than 30 countries, BlackRock provides a
broad range of investment, risk management and technology services
to institutional and retail clients worldwide. The company is based
in New York.


BLACKROCK INC: Opposes Plaintiffs' Bid to File Amended Complaint
----------------------------------------------------------------
In a purported class action lawsuit brought in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California by a former employee
on behalf of all BlackRock employee 401(k) Plan participants and
beneficiaries, the defendants have opposed the plaintiffs' request
to file a Second Amended Complaint, according to BlackRock, Inc.'s
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

On April 5, 2017, BlackRock, Inc., BlackRock Institutional Trust
Company, N.A. ("BTC"), the BlackRock, Inc. Retirement Committee and
various sub-committees, and a BlackRock employee were named as
defendants in a purported class action lawsuit brought in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California by a former
employee on behalf of all BlackRock employee 401(k) Plan (the
"Plan") participants and beneficiaries in the Plan from April 5,
2011 to the present.

The lawsuit generally alleges that the defendants breached their
duties towards Plan participants in violation of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 by, among other things,
offering investment options that were overly expensive,
underperformed peer funds, focused disproportionately on active
versus passive strategies, and were unduly concentrated with
investment options managed by BlackRock.

While the complaint does not contain any specific amount in alleged
damages, it claims that the purported underperformance and hidden
fees cost Plan participants more than US$60 million.  On October
10, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, which, among
other things, adds as defendants certain current and former members
of the BlackRock Retirement and Investment Committees.  The Amended
Complaint also includes a new purported class claim on behalf of
investors in certain Collective Trust Funds ("CTFs") managed by
BTC.  Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that BTC, as fiduciary to
the CTFs, engaged in self-dealing by, most significantly, selecting
itself as the lending agent on terms that plaintiffs claim were
excessive.

The defendants believe the claims in this lawsuit are without merit
and are vigorously defending the action.  BlackRock moved to
dismiss the Amended Complaint on November 8, 2017.

On July 13, 2018, the plaintiffs sought leave of the court to file
a Second Amended Complaint to add additional defendants and
additional allegations regarding BTC's securities lending services
and fees.  On August 3, 2018, the defendants opposed the
plaintiffs' request to file a Second Amended Complaint.

BlackRock, Inc. is a publicly traded investment management firm
with $6.317 trillion of AUM at March 31, 2018. With approximately
14,000 employees in more than 30 countries, BlackRock provides a
broad range of investment, risk management and technology services
to institutional and retail clients worldwide. The company is based
in New York.


BRIGHTHOUSE LIFE: Roycroft Suit over Group Annuity Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------
Brighthouse Life Insurance Company is facing a group annuity class
action styled Edward Roycroft v. Brighthouse Financial, Inc., et
al. (U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, filed June
18, 2018), according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended June 30, 2018.

Edward Roycroft filed a purported class action against Brighthouse
Financial, Inc., MetLife, Inc., and Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company.  The complaint alleges plaintiff is a beneficiary of a
Martindale-Hubbell group annuity contract and did not receive
payments plaintiff claims he was entitled to upon his retirement in
1999.  Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of all beneficiaries
who were due annuity benefits pursuant to group annuity contracts
and whose annuity benefits were released from reserves.
Plaintiff's causes of action are for conversion, unjust enrichment,
an accounting and for a constructive trust.  Plaintiff seeks
damages, attorneys' fees, declaratory and injunctive relief and
other equitable remedies.  Brighthouse Financial, Inc. intends to
defend this action vigorously.

Brighthouse Life Insurance Company offers a range of individual
annuities and individual life insurance products.  It is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Brighthouse Holdings, LLC, which is a
direct wholly-owned subsidiary of Brighthouse Financial, Inc.


BUDGET WIRELESS: Patterson Seeks Wages and OT Pay
-------------------------------------------------
JARVIS PATTERSON, an individual, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. BUDGET WIRELESS CALIFORNIA
LLC; and DOES l to 50, inclusive, the Defendant, Case No. BC719486
(Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 31, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid wages
and/or overtime under the California Labor Code.

According to the complaint, Defendant has had a consistent policy
of failing to pay wages and/or overtime to all hourly employees for
all work perform at the proper rate of compensation. The Defendant
has not reimbursed Plaintiff and the Proposed Class the cost and
maintenance of their personal vehicles necessary to perform their
job duties during the relevant time period in violation of the
California Labor Code.

Budget Wireless California, LLC was founded in 2014. The company's
line of business includes the wholesale distribution of electronic
parts and electronic communications equipment.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class:

          Darren M. Cohen, Esq.
          KINGSLEY & KINGSLEY, APC
          16133 Ventura Blvd., Suite 1200
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (818) 990 8300
          Facsimile: (818) 990 2903
          E-mail: dcohen@kingsleykingsley.com


C & H SUGAR: Court OKs Preliminary Approval of Class Certification
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval
Certifying Class in the case captioned RAY STRONG, et al., on
behalf of himself and all similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs, v. C & H SUGAR COMPANY, INC.; AMERICAN SUGAR REFINING,
INC.; and DOES 1-100 inclusive, Defendants. Case No.
3:17-cv-00480-RS. (N.D. Cal.).

This action satisfies the requirements for conditional
certification as a Collective Action under the Federal Labor
Standards Act (FLSA). The questions of law and fact common to the
members of the collective action with respect to the Defendants'
calculation of the regular rate predominate over questions relevant
only to individual members of the collective action. Collective
action adjudication is superior to any other method of adjudication
for the fair and efficient adjudication of this matter.

This action is conditionally certified as a collective action
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).

For purposes of conditional certification as a Collective Action
Class, the parties agree Plaintiff is similarly situated to all
individuals employed by Defendants in non-exempt positions covered
by the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Sugar Workers
Union No. 1, Seafarers International Union of N.A. AFL-CIO (SWU
Local 1) and Defendants that worked beyond forty hours in a week
and received any Incentives as defined in the Settlement Agreement
and the motion at any time within the three year period prior to
the date the action was filed or the effective date of any
applicable tolling agreement. (Collective Action Class) The
Collective Action Class shall be divided into subclasses as
follows:

   a. Collective Action Opt-In Plaintiff Subclass shall be defined
as all Collective Action Class members who have opted into this
action.

   b. Collective Action Putative Plaintiff Subclass shall be
defined as all Collective Action Class members who have not opted
into this action.

This action also satisfies the requirements for preliminary
certification as a Class Action under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 23. The questions of law and fact common to the members
of the class with respect to the Defendants' calculation of the
regular rate as it relates to the California law claims alleged in
the action predominate over questions relevant only to individual
members of the class. Class adjudication is superior to any other
method of adjudication for the fair and efficient resolution of
this matter.

For the purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23, this
court preliminarily certifies a class consisting of all individuals
employed by Defendants in non-exempt positions covered by the CBA
that worked beyond forty hours in a week and received any
Incentives as defined in the Settlement Agreement and the motion at
any time within the four year period prior to the date the action
was filed or the effective date of any applicable tolling agreement
whichever is earlier.

The California Class is divided into subclasses as follows:

   a. California Opt-In Plaintiff Subclass shall be defined as all
Collective Action Class members who have opted into this action.

   b. California Putative Plaintiff Subclass shall be defined as
all Collective Action Class members who have not opted into this
action.

The California Class and subclasses as defined in Plaintiff's
motion are sufficiently numerous that joinder is not practicable.
The California Class has almost three hundred individuals, while
each subclass exceeds one hundred individuals each.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybl994ab from Leagle.com.

Ray Strong, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiff, represented byAce Thomas Tate --
atate@mastagni.com -- Mastagni Holstedt, APC, Isaac Sean Stevens,
Mastagni, Holstedt, Amick, Miller, Johnsen & Uhrhammer & David
Emilio Mastagni, Mastagni Holstedt Amick Miller Johnsen &
Uhrhammer.

C & H Sugar Company, Inc. & American Sugar Refining, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Steven R. Blackburn --
sblackburn@ebglaw.com -- Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. & Matthew A.
Goodin -- mgoodin@ebglaw.com -- Eptstein Becker & Green, P.C..


CANADA: Student Loan Privacy Breach Victims May Get $60+ Payout
---------------------------------------------------------------
Josh Dehaas, writing for CTVNews.ca, reports that Canadians who
received federal student loans between 2000 and 2007 may be
entitled to $60 or more after the federal government settled a
class action lawsuit related to a lost hard drive containing
borrowers' sensitive personal information.

Ottawa agreed in December to pay $17,500,000, plus an unlimited
amount of actual losses, to settle the lawsuit brought by those
affected when the portable drive went missing from Gatineau, Que.
The drive contained information, including social insurance
numbers, about 583,000 Canadians who received student loans between
2000 and 2007.

That settlement was approved by a judge in May and the government
has now attempted to send letters to all of those affected,
according to Chelsea Hermanson, one of the lawyers involved.
Ms. Hermanson points out that it is possible some of the eligible
people's addresses have changed. It may therefore be worth making a
claim even if you haven't received a letter.

Those who believe they were affected must apply online by filling
out a short form before the deadline, which is 5 p.m. on Jan. 18,
2019.

Those who suffered "inconvenience" associated with the loss are
expected to get about $60, although that figure could change. Those
who suffered "actual losses" can claim additional amounts, which
lawyer Sharon Strosberg, who is also involved, says will be decided
by an arbitrator on a case-by-case basis.

Examples of actual losses could include things like cost of credit
protection for those who paid for it after learning of the breach,
and financial losses stemming from someone having opened a credit
card using information stolen from the drive. It's not yet clear
whether information from the drive was used improperly.

Ms. Strosberg said there are "definitely a number of class members
who intend to apply for those actual losses."

Ms. Strosberg said that people wishing to make claims for "actual
losses" can opt to hire a lawyer or represent themselves to the
arbitrator, who will then decide whether the government owes them
more than $60. [GN]


CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: Natanelova Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Capital Management
Services, LP. The case is styled as Ister Natanelova on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Capital
Management Services, LP, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05195 (E.D.
N.Y., Sept. 14, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Capital Management Services L.P., a collections agency, provides
delinquent receivables resolutions. It monitors and tracks debt
collection laws, state licensing, company profile, and client
contractual expectations. The company was formerly known as Ventus
Capital Services, LP and changed its name to Capital Management
Services L.P. in October 2006. Capital Management Services L.P. was
incorporated in 2004 and is based in Buffalo, New York

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Daniel C Cohen, Esq.
     Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West
     12th Floor
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (929) 575-4175
     Fax: (929) 575-4195
     Email: dan@cml.legal


CAVALRY PORTFOLIO: Yakubov Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Cavalry Portfolio
Services, LLC. The case is styled as Diana Yakubov on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Cavalry
Portfolio Services, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05193 (E.D.
N.Y., Sept. 14, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC provides financial resolution
services. Its services cover various areas, such as collection
account and debt control. The company was founded in 1991 and is
based in Valhalla, New York. Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC
operates as a subsidiary of Cavalry Investments, LLC.

The Plaintiff appears pro se.



CENTURY ALUMINUM: Records $13.3MM Settlement Cost at June 30
------------------------------------------------------------
Century Aluminum Company disclosed US$2.0 million in other current
liabilities and US$11.3 million in other liabilities at June 30,
2018, related to a settlement agreement of two lawsuits associated
to Ravenswood Retiree Medical Benefits, according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

In November 2009, Century Aluminum of West Virginia ("CAWV") filed
a class action complaint for declaratory judgment against the
United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy,
Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union ("USW"),
the USW's local and certain CAWV retirees, individually and as
class representatives ("CAWV Retirees"), seeking a declaration of
CAWV's rights to modify/terminate retiree medical benefits.  Later
in November 2009, the USW and representatives of a retiree class
filed a separate suit against CAWV, Century Aluminum Company,
Century Aluminum Master Welfare Benefit Plan, and various John Does
with respect to the foregoing.  

On August 18, 2017, the District Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia approved a settlement agreement in respect of these
actions.  Under the terms of the settlement agreement, CAWV agreed
to make payments into a trust for the benefit of the CAWV Retirees
in the aggregate amount of US$23.0 million over the course of 10
years.

The Company said, "Upon approval of the settlement, we paid US$5.0
million to the aforementioned trust in September 2017 and agreed to
pay the remaining amounts under the settlement agreement in annual
increments of US$2.0 million for nine years.  At June 30, 2018, we
had US$2.0 million in other current liabilities and US$11.3 million
in other liabilities related to this agreement."

Century Aluminum Company is a global producer of primary aluminum
and operates aluminum reduction facilities, or "smelters," in the
United States and Iceland.  The Company's primary aluminum
facilities produce standard-grade and value-added primary aluminum
products.  The Company is a Delaware corporation with principal
executive offices located in Chicago, Illinois.


CERES, CA: Court Approves $161K Settlement in Firefighters' Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted Parties' Joint Motion for Approval of the
Settlement Agreement in the case captioned JONATHAN MCMANUS, et
al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF CERES, Defendant. No.
1:17-cv-00355-DAD-BAM. (E.D. Cal.).

The twenty plaintiffs joined in this action are current or former
firefighters for defendant City of Ceres (City). Plaintiffs
initiated this action against the City under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), alleging that the City failed to provide
required overtime compensation by excluding certain incentives in
the calculation of plaintiffs' pay.

The settlement agreement proposes a total payment of $161,432.86,
to be allocated as follows: $45,881.43 in settlement of plaintiffs'
claims for overtime compensation; $45,881.43 in settlement of
plaintiffs' claims for liquidated damages; and $69,670.00 for
attorneys' fees and costs.

LEGAL STANDARD

To determine whether the proposed FLSA settlement is fair,
adequate, and reasonable, courts in this circuit have balanced
factors such as: the strength of the plaintiffs' case; the risk,
expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the
risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the
amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and
the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel;
the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the
class members to the proposed settlement.

Bona Fide Disputes

The parties contend that there is a bona fide dispute over the
existence and extent of the City's FLSA liability. The City
generally denies plaintiffs' allegations that it willfully violated
the FLSA and did not act in good faith with respect to the
calculation of the regular rate.The City further contends that it
has paid plaintiffs overtime more generously than required by the
FLSA, which the City claims entitles it to offsets that
significantly reduce or eliminate liability to each plaintiff.

The Proposed Settlement is Fair and Reasonable

Plaintiffs' Range of Possible Recovery

Under the proposed settlement agreement, the City will pay a total
of $161,432.86, which includes $45,881.43 for unpaid overtime
compensation, $45,881.43 in liquidated damages, and $69,670 in
attorneys' fees and costs.

The parties assert that the settlement amount thus represents the
maximum amount that plaintiffs could expect to recover if the case
were litigated to judgment calculated based on the extended
three-year statute of limitations and including liquidated damages.
Consideration of the factor relating to the range of possible
recovery weighs, in this case, heavily in favor of approval of the
FLSA settlement.

The Stage of the Proceedings and the Amount of Discovery Completed

Here, the parties have sufficient information to make an informed
decision regarding settlement. As noted above, the parties engaged
in an extensive analysis of payroll and time records, produced by
Defendant to Plaintiffs, in order to calculate the damages based on
Plaintiffs' hours worked in excess of 204 hours in a 27-day work
period, while taking into account hours of paid leave counted
toward the threshold. Counsel for both parties performed their own
calculations and came to a consensus as to each plaintiff's damages
amount. All twenty plaintiffs, moreover, were given the opportunity
to review these calculations and the underlying methodology used in
arriving at them. Under these circumstances, the court finds that
the parties had sufficient information to reach an appropriate
early-stage settlement.

The Seriousness of the Litigation Risks Faced by the Parties

Courts favor settlement where "there is a significant risk that
litigation might result in a lesser recover[y] or no recovery at
all." Although plaintiffs had a strong likelihood of prevailing on
their FLSA claims, the court recognizes that the parties seek to
avoid incurring further litigation costs and expenses. The risks
inherent in lengthy litigation weigh in favor of early settlement
here, where plaintiffs will recoup the full amount of their
expected recovery.  

The Scope of Any Release Provision in the Settlement Agreement

A FLSA release should not go beyond the specific FLSA claims at
issue in the lawsuit itself.

Here, the release provision: "extends only to all grievances,
disputes or claims of every nature and kind, known or unknown,
suspected or unsuspected, arising from, or attributable to
Plaintiffs' claims that the City of Ceres violated the FLSA up to
and including the effective date of this Agreement by failing to
properly calculate the regular rate of pay. The parties understand
that this release does not include claims relating to conduct or
activity which does not arise from or is not attributable to
Plaintiffs' FLSA claims or to any conduct or activity which occurs
after the effective date of this Agreement."

Consideration of this factor therefore also weighs in favor of
approval of the FLSA settlement.

The Possibility of Fraud or Collusion

Here, the court finds that there is a low probability of fraud or
collusion because the parties used payroll record data to calculate
back overtime pay and liquidated damages, and provided all
plaintiffs the opportunity to review their settlement amounts, the
methodology used to calculate those amounts, and the amount of
attorneys' fees and costs.  Plaintiffs' counsel asserts that the
settlement amount represents 100 percent of plaintiffs' expected
recovery, and that no plaintiff has objected to the settlement.
This approach, based on an objective analysis of plaintiffs' time
records, "guards against the arbitrariness that might suggest
collusion.

Upon considering the totality of the circumstances, as reviewed
above, the court finds that the proposed settlement is fair and
reasonable.

Attorneys' Fees
Under Ninth Circuit law, the district court has discretion in
common fund cases to choose either the percentage-of-the-fund or
the lodestar method for awarding attorneys' fees.  

Here, the settlement agreement includes $69,670 in attorneys' fees
and costs. At the hearing on the present motion, counsel for
plaintiffs estimated that costs alone amounted to approximately
$14,457 of that total amount. The remaining $55,213 in attorneys'
fees represents approximately 34 percent of the overall settlement
amount, which is above the 25 percent benchmark for this circuit.
However, the court finds that the results obtained by plaintiffs'
counsel support an above-benchmark fee award here, given that
plaintiffs will receive 100 percent of what they could expect to
recover if the case were litigated all the way to judgment, and the
requested attorneys' fees and costs do not undermine plaintiffs'
recovery.

The Plaintiffs' counsel has accrued $84,097.89 in attorneys' fees
and costs for 280.6 hours of work. This number amounts, on average,
to an hourly rate of just under $300, which is certainly
appropriate given the experience of plaintiffs' counsel.
Plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. Coploff, represented at the hearing that
he has primarily litigated FLSA cases for over eight years as both
an associate and a partner, and that co-counsel in this matter has
decades of experience litigating FLSA, union, and wage and hour
cases. Moreover, the requested award for attorneys' fees and costs
amounts to $14,427.89 less than the lodestar.  Therefore, have
fully considered the lodestar cross-check, the court approves the
award of $69,670 in attorneys' fees and costs in approving the
settlement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybpjwm3r from Leagle.com.

Jonathan McManus, Tyler Born, Alex Craig, Jason Cripe, Vincent
Dilberto, William Finley, Zachary Fowler, Jonathan Goulding, Mike
Gomes, Jeremy Hackett, Charles Hampton, Dominic Magagnini, Vince
Milbeck, Michael Miller, Jeffrey Serpa, Joseph Spani, Christopher
Steenburgh, David Steenburgh & Randy Sullivan, Plaintiffs,
represented by Theodore Reid Coploff, Woodley & McGillivary, LLP,
pro hac vice, Thomas A. Woodley, Woodley and McGillivary, &
Christopher Eugene Platten -- cplatten@wmprlaw.com -- Wylie,
Mcbride, Platten & Renner.

City of Ceres, California, Defendant, represented by Jesse Jeremy
Maddox -- jmaddox@lcwlegal.com -- Liebert Cassidy Whitmore &
Michael David Youril -- myouril@lcwlegal.com -- Liebert Cassidy
Whitmore.


CHEMICAL FINANCIAL: Appeal from Nixed City of Livonia Suit Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs' appeal from the court order dismissing the City of
Livonia case is still pending in the Michigan Court of Appeals,
according to Chemical Financial Corporation's Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

On February 22, 2016, two putative class action and derivative
complaints were filed in the Circuit Court for Oakland County,
Michigan by individuals purporting to be a shareholder of Talmer
Bancorp, Inc. ("Talmer").  The actions are styled Regina Gertel Lee
v. Chemical Financial Corporation, et al., Case No. 2016-151642-CB
and City of Livonia Employees' Retirement System v. Chemical
Financial Corporation et al., Case No. 2016-151641-CB.

These complaints purport to be brought derivatively on behalf of
Talmer against the individual defendants, and individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated against Talmer and the
Corporation (collectively, the "Defendants").  The complaints
allege, among other things, that the directors of Talmer breached
their fiduciary duties to Talmer's shareholders in connection with
the merger by approving a transaction pursuant to an allegedly
inadequate process that undervalues Talmer and includes preclusive
deal protection provisions, and that the Corporation allegedly
aided and abetted the Talmer directors in breaching their duties to
Talmer's shareholders.

The complaints also allege that the individual defendants have been
unjustly enriched.  Both complaints seek various remedies on behalf
of the putative class (consisting of all shareholders of Talmer who
are not related to or affiliated with any defendant).  They
request, among other things, that the Court enjoin the merger from
being consummated in accordance with its agreed-upon terms, direct
the Talmer directors to exercise their fiduciary duties, rescind
the merger agreement to the extent that it is already implemented,
award the plaintiff all costs and disbursements in each respective
action (including reasonable attorneys' and experts' fees), and
grant such further relief as the court deems just and proper.

The City of Livonia plaintiff amended its complaint on April 21,
2016 to add additional factual allegations, including but not
limited to allegations that Keefe Bruyette & Woods, Inc.  ("KBW")
served as a financial advisor for the proposed merger despite an
alleged conflict of interest, that Talmer's board acted under
actual or potential conflicts of interest, and that the defendants
omitted and/or misrepresented material information about the
proposed merger in the Form S-4 Registration Statement relating to
the proposed merger.

These two cases were consolidated as In re Talmer Bancorp
Shareholder Litigation, case number 2016-151641-CB, per an order
entered on May 12, 2016.  On October 31, 2016, the plaintiffs in
this consolidated action again amended their complaint, adding
additional factual allegations, adding KBW as a defendant, and
asserting that KBW acted in concert with the Corporation to aid and
abet breaches of fiduciary duty by Talmer's directors.

The Defendants all filed motions for summary disposition seeking
dismissal of all claims with prejudice.  The Court issued an
opinion and order on those motions on May 4, 2017 and granted
dismissal to the Corporation, but denied the motions filed by KBW
and the individual defendants.  KBW and the individual defendants
filed an application seeking leave to appeal the Court's ruling to
the Michigan Court of Appeals.  That application was denied by the
Michigan Court of Appeals on August 16, 2017.

On June 8, 2017, the Defendants filed a notice with the Court that
the plaintiffs had failed to timely certify a class as required by
the Michigan Court Rules.  Upon the filing of that notice, the City
of Livonia case became an individual action brought by the two
named plaintiffs, and cannot proceed as a class action.  On October
19, 2017, the Defendants filed motions for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C) (10) in the City of Livonia case, again seeking
the dismissal of the case.  A hearing on those motions was held on
April 11, 2018.

On May 11, 2018, the Court issued its opinion and order granting
the motion of the Defendants, and dismissing the case.  On May 25,
2018, the plaintiffs filed a claim of appeal from the Court's
decision with the Michigan Court of Appeals.

Chemical Financial Corporation is a financial holding company
headquartered in Midland, Michigan, that was incorporated in the
State of Michigan in August 1973. The company's common stock is
listed on the NASDAQ under the symbol "CHFC." The company is based
in Midland, Michigan.


CHESAPEAKE ENERGY: Settles Antitrust Class Action for $7MM
----------------------------------------------------------
David Lee, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
class of landowners in Oklahoma and Kansas announced on Sept. 6 the
settlement of a federal antitrust lawsuit against Chesapeake Energy
and others for nearly $7 million, ending claims filed a day after
indicted former CEO Aubrey McClendon died in a fiery single-car
crash.

The plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of the
settlement on Sept. 5 in Oklahoma City federal court. They say the
agreement was the "hard-fought product of two separate all-day
mediation sessions" conducted by a former federal judge. If
approved, the money will be dispersed to potentially thousands of
individual and commercial property owners in northwest Oklahoma's
Anadarko Basin.

Several lawsuits were filed against Chesapeake, SandRidge Energy
and former SandRidge CEO Tom L. Ward after March 2, 2016, the day
Mr. McClendon's car collided with a concrete embankment in Oklahoma
City, killing him. The plaintiffs cited a federal indictment filed
against Mr. McClendon a day earlier accusing him of conspiring to
rig bids for their natural gas leases in violation of the Sherman
Act.

The leases allowed Chesapeake to drill for natural gas under their
property in exchange for signing bonuses and subsequent royalties.
The lawsuits were consolidated one month later.

The plaintiffs claim a conspiracy existed to "fix, stabilize and
artificially suppress" the prices paid for their leasehold
interests, that bids were rigged and prices paid were agreed upon
by conspirators.

Christopher Cormier with Cohen Milstein in Denver, a co-lead
attorney for the plaintiffs, said the settlement gives the
landowners the "relief and justice they deserve."

"In case proceedings, Chesapeake admitted to potential isolated
instances of anticompetitive conduct, and while the plaintiffs
believe a large-scale conspiracy could ultimately be proven, they
determined this guaranteed settlement provides much-needed closure
and accountability," he said in a written statement.

Chesapeake declined to comment on the settlement on Sept. 6.
Spokesman Gordon Pennoyer confirmed published reports that
Chesapeake is paying $2.65 million of the settlement amount.

The defendants denied any wrongdoing under the terms of the
settlement.

"Defendants contended that there was no overarching conspiracy or
any communications outside of these select few transactions, and
that Chesapeake did not admit to a larger conspiracy in the
parallel DOJ investigation," the plaintiff's motion states. "Mr.
Ward denies that any such communications related to those purchases
violated the antitrust laws in any way. They parties heavily
debated these issues throughout the course of litigation and during
the mediation."

Mr.  McClendon's estate is not a party to the lawsuit. Law
enforcement said he "pretty much drove straight" into a highway
overpass the day after his indictment and died. He faced up to 10
years in federal prison and a $1 million fine if convicted. He was
well-known as part owner of the Oklahoma City Thunder basketball
team.

Mr. McClendon founded Chesapeake in Oklahoma City in 1989. It
became the second-largest natural gas producer in the country,
growing its business through hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, in
major domestic shale formations including the Marcellus Shale,
spanning from West Virginia to New York, and the Barnett Shale in
North Texas.


CHICAGO, IL: John Healy Sues for Duty Availability Pay to Cops
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN HEALY, the Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, the Defendant, Case
No. 2018CH11146 (Ill. Cir., Cook County, Aug. 31, 2018), seeks to
recover declaratory and equitable relief, damages, interest, costs,
attorney's fees, and/or any such other relief the Court may deem
appropriate under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act.

According to the complaint, duty availability pay is a pensionable,
quarterly payment made to Chicago Police Officers, Sergeants and
Lieutenants pursuant to their respective collective bargaining
agreements with the City.  Each of the respective wage agreements
states that: "Entitlement to duty availability pay is not dependent
on an [Officer/Sergeant/Lieutenant] being present for duty for an
entire pay period." At present, Chicago Police Officers (including
sergeants and lieutenants) are paid $900 per quarter on the 1st of
April, July, October, and January, for a total of $3,600 per year
in duty availability pay. The City of Chicago's improper and
unlawful failure to pay any duty availability pay to a retired
officer whose retirement date was within the first two weeks of a
given month has affected thousands of retirees.

Chicago, on Lake Michigan in Illinois, is among the largest cities
in the U.S. Famed for its bold architecture, it has a skyline
punctuated by skyscrapers such as the iconic John Hancock Center,
1,451-ft. Willis Tower (formerly the Sears Tower) and the
neo-Gothic Tribune Tower.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Paul D. Geiger, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF PAUL D. GEIGER
          W. Frontage Road, Suite 3020
          Northfield, IL 60093
          Telephone: 773 410 0841
          E-mail: pauldgeiger@gmail.com


COMCAST INC: US Judge OKs $15.5MM Settlement In Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Max Mitchell, writing for The Legal Intelligencer, reports that a
Philadelphia federal district judge has granted preliminary
approval of a $15.5 million class action settlement against the
cable giant Comcast.

The proposed settlement stems from claims that the
Philadelphia-based communications company unlawfully tied the sale
of its premium cable service to the rental of a set-top box. U.S.

District Judge Anita Brody of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
gave preliminary approval on September 5 to the settlement, finding
that the terms appeared to be fair and supported by the discovery
that had taken place.

"Because of the formal and informal discovery and the parties'
multiple rounds of briefing on the arbitration issue, class counsel
knew the strengths and weaknesses of the case during settlement
negotiations with Comcast," Brody said. "Therefore, the
investigation of plaintiffs' claims supports preliminary approval
of the proposed settlement."

Brody, however, also determined that the there were several
problems with the notice and the claim form. She ordered the
plaintiffs to resubmit revised versions of those before she would
consider final approval.

The proposed settlement would resolve the multidistrict litigation,
In re Comcast Corp. Set-Top Cable Television Box Antitrust
Litigation. According to the list of MDLs as of mid-August, only
two actions were pending, but according to Brody's opinion there
are more than 3.5 million proposed class members.

The proposed settlement is meant to compensate current and former
Comcast subscribers from Washington, California and West Virginia,
who, beginning in 2005, rented a set-top box. Comcast, according to
the allegations, had made renting the set-top box mandatory for the
subscribers who opted for premium cable, which included
high-definition channels and the ability to purchase other
channels, such as HBO.

The plaintiffs claimed that tying the cable box to the premium
cable package was anti-competitive and led them to pay
"supracompetitive" prices.

The proposed settlement includes between $10 and $15 in cash for
former users, and current users also have the option of receiving
in-kind relief, including free movie rentals. The value of the
in-kind relief, according to Brody, ranged from $5.99 to $59.95.

In approving the settlement, Brody said the disparity between the
amount that could be collected for current versus former uses did
not constitute favoritism for one group over the another. She noted
that although the costs to the consumers are different, the cost to
Comcast to provide the relief is roughly the same.

"The $59.95 maximum value of in-kind relief that a current
subscriber may receive only costs Comcast $15, or less," she said.
"At best, the in-kind relief is equivalent to the cash payments
available to all putative class members."

Both Dianne Nast, Esq. -- dnast@nastlaw.com -- of NastLaw, who is
representing the plaintiffs, and Jaime Bianchi, Esq. --
jbianchi@whitecase.com -- of White & Case, who is representing
Comcast, did not return a call for comment.[GN]


COMMUNICATIONS UNLIMITED: Court Denies Dismissal of FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Eastern Division, denies Defendants move to dismiss
Plaintiff Tacita Fair's claims for overtime pay under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Missouri Minimum Wage Law (MMWL) in
the case captioned TACITA FAIR, Plaintiff, v. COMMUNICATIONS
UNLIMITED, INC, et al., Defendants. No. 4:17 CV 2391 RWS. (E.D.
Mo.).

Defendant Communications Unlimited of Alabama (CUA) produced a
document purporting to be an Arbitration Agreement signed by Fair.
If enforced, the agreement would require Fair to arbitrate her FLSA
and MMWL claims instead of filing an original action in federal
court. If enforced, the agreement would require Fair to arbitrate
her FLSA and MMWL claims instead of filing an original action in
federal court.

LEGAL STANDARD

When one party claims that an arbitration agreement precludes an
action, the Court must determine whether a valid arbitration
agreement exists and whether it applies to the dispute at hand.

Fair argues that the arbitration agreement produced by CUA is not
valid because, among other reasons, CUA has not signed it. Fair
also argues that CUA and other defendants have waived their right
to arbitration by only raising the issue more than two years after
the original claim was filed.

In their reply brief, Defendants C.U. Employment, Inc., and
Communications Unlimited, Inc., state that they asserted their
right to arbitrate within three weeks of learning of the
arbitration agreement from CUA. CUA, however, does not raise a
counter-argument to Fair's waiver argument.

None of the Defendants responds to Fair's claim that the agreement
is invalid because CUA did not sign it.

Under Missouri law, any bilateral agreement, such as this
arbitration agreement here, must be accepted by both parties for a
contract to be formed. Some evidence, usually a signature, must be
provided to demonstrate that both parties intended to enter into
the contract.

Even if CUA had produced evidence that it signed the agreement,
Fair offers compelling evidence that it waived its right to
arbitrate. The Eighth Circuit has held that a party may waive its
right to arbitrate if it (1) knew of an existing right to
arbitration; (2) acted inconsistently with that right; and (3)
prejudiced the other party by these inconsistent acts. In
evaluating inconsistent action, I may consider whether defendants
substantially invoked the litigation machinery prior to demanding
arbitration. Similarly, in determining prejudice, the Court may
consider the length of delay in demanding arbitration and the
expense incurred from participating in the litigation process.

CUA's actions meet all these requirements. First, to the extent
that any right to arbitrate existed, it is clear that CUA knew of
that right because it provided the arbitration agreement to Fair
for her signature. It is also clear that CUA acted inconsistently
with that right: it litigated this matter through two cases
including fully briefing a motion to toll and a motion to compel,
in the most recent case. Third, it is clear that Fair has been
prejudiced: the instant litigation has involved her time and
resources for almost a year, and CUA's actions have no doubt
influenced how she decides to pursue her claims. For all of these
reasons, to the extent that any right to arbitration existed, CUA
has waived that right for itself. Because CUA is the only defendant
that is a party to the contract, CUA has also waived any right to
arbitrate that the other Defendants possessed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2018
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybbr3djn
from Leagle.com.

Charter Communications, Inc., Movant, represented by Ashley N.
Jaros -- ajaros@thompsoncoburn.com -- THOMPSON COBURN, LLP.

Tacita Fair, individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin J. Dolley --
Kevin@dolleylaw.com -- LAW OFFICES OF KEVIN J. DOLLEY, LLC &
Michael G. Mueth -- michael.mueth@dolleylaw.com -- LAW OFFICES OF
KEVIN J. DOLLEY, LLC.

C.U. Employment, Inc., Communications Unlimited Contracting
Services, Inc. & Martin C. Rocha, Defendants, represented by Steven
H. Schwartz -- sschwartz@bjpc.com -- BROWN AND JAMES, P.C.

Communications Unlimited Alabama, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Fredrick J. Ludwig , LUDWIG LAW FIRM, LLC.


CURADEN USA: Faces Lyngaas Suit in S.D. California
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Curaden USA, Inc. et
al. The case is styled as Bryan J. Lyngaas, D.D.S., a Michigan
resident, individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Curaden USA, Inc., Curaden
AG, Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-02138-L-NLS (S.D. Cal., Sept. 14,
2018).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Statutory Actions for
Unsolicited Telephone Sales.

Curaden USA Inc. is in the toothbrushes industry.

Curaden AG is one of the fastest growing oral care companies. It
was founded in 1954 by Hans Breitschmid and taken over by his son
Ueli, the company remains a family-owned Swiss company and is based
near Lucerne. The last year it generated sales in excess of CHF 150
million and manufactured over 28 million toothbrushes.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Kimberly Anne Edmunds, Esq.
     13931 Via Rimini
     San Diego, CA 92129
     Phone: (858) 692-5615
     Email: kimaedmunds@gmail.com


CVS PHARMACY: Court Dismisses Bailey TCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------
Judge Peter G. Sheridan of the U.S. District Court for the New
Jersey granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case, JACLYN
BAILEY, Plaintiff, v. CVS PHARMACY, INC., Defendant, Case No.
17-cv-1 1482 (PGS)(LHG)(D. N.J.).

In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges CVS violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, based on sending text messages notifying
recipients of the availability of flu shots.  At its core, the case
about three words: "Flu shots available."  In the putative class
action, Bailey alleges that CVS has violated the TCPA, and brings
the action on behalf of herself and other CVS customers who, during
the 2014-15 flu season, received a text message notifying them that
their prescription was ready for pickup and, in the middle of the
message, included those three words.

CVS operates retail pharmacies nationwide that provide various
healthcare services, including influenza vaccinations.  During the
class period, CVS established and maintained a text messaging
program, "CVS Ready Text Program," which notified patients who
enrolled in the program that their prescription was ready for
pickup.  To sign up, customers simply provided their phone numbers
to a CVS employee and their information would be saved into the
program; no formal paperwork was required.  The terms and
conditions of the program were made available in stores and on
CVS's website.  

Enrollment in the service requires providing a mobile phone number
and agreeing to these terms and conditions.  Customers will be
allowed to opt out of the program at any time.  It should be noted
that CVS contends there is an older version of the Terms and
Conditions which ceased operation in November 2014.  The terms are
essentially the same, except that the Terms and Condition in
November 2014 also state that to stop receiving text alerts, one
can text STOP to CVSTXT (287898).

On Nov. 24, 2014, the Plaintiff visited a CVS pharmacy in Oakhurst,
New Jersey, for purposes of having a drug prescription filled.
While preparing her prescription, a CVS employee asked her for her
phone number, so that she could receive text messages notifying her
when her prescription was ready for pickup.  The Plaintiff provided
the employee with her number.

This being said, the Plaintiff avers that she never gave any
consent -- whether oral, written or through conduct -- to receive
any messages regarding flu shots or the sale of flu shots, or for
any other purpose other than the very limited purpose described by
CVS. In any event, upon providing the CVS employee her phone
number, she received text message, which purportedly gives rise to
the action:

Besides this one message, the Plaintiff does not claim to have
received any other messages from CVS, which contain the "Flu shots
available" language.  She claims the message received above
constitutes negligent and willful violations of Section 227 of the
TCPA and seeks to bring this action on behalf of herself and
similarly situated individuals.

The proposed class is defined as all persons to whom CVS sent a
text message between Sept. 1, 2014 and Feb. 28, 2015, which
contained the words Flu shot available, who had never purchased or
received a flu shot at CVS.  She also seeks to bring on behalf of a
sub-class, which she defines as all persons to whom CVS sent a text
message between Sept. 1, 2014 and Feb. 28, 2015, which contained
the words Flu shot available, where CVS obtained the customer's
cell phone number at the point of purchase while the customer was
ordering a prescription drug refill, and the customer had never
purchased or received a flu shot at CVS.

The matter comes before the Court on CVS's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff Jaclyn Bailey's Complaint and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs
Class Allegations.

Judge Sheridan finds the Defendant's Rule 12(b)(1) arguments
unpersuasive, since the present cause of action arises under a
federal statute.  As such, he will not dismiss the Plaintiffs claim
based on lack of standing pursuant Federal Rule 12(b)(1).

Next, he finds (1) CVS is a covered entity under the Healthcare
Exemption; (2) CVS' "Flu shot available" message conveyed a health
care message; and (3) CVS had the Plaintiffs prior express consent
when it sent the message.  Therefore, because the Healthcare
Exemption applies, CVS' motion to dismiss will be granted.  Since
the Healthcare Exemption is applicable, any amendment would be
futile.

Having carefully reviewed and taken into consideration the
submissions of the parties, Judge Sheridan granted the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss and denied as moot the Defendant's Motion to
Strike Class Allegations.  He ordered the Clerk to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/Z0SYFT from Leagle.com.

JACLYN BAILEY, Plaintiff, represented by STEPHEN PATRICK DENITTIS
-- sdenittis@denittislaw.com -- DENITTIS OSEFCHEN, PC & ROSS H.
SCHMIERER, DeNittis Osefchen Prince, P.C.

CVS PHARMACY, INC., Defendant, represented by ERIC TODD KANEFSKY --
eric@ck-litigation.com -- CALCAGNI & KANEFSKY LLP.


CVS SCIENCES: Disputes Allegations in Securities Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
CV Sciences, Inc. (OTCQB:CVSI) has been informed of a class action
lawsuit filed against the Company that alleges violations of
federal securities laws.  The Company disputes the allegations in
the complaint and will vigorously defend this lawsuit.

"We believe that any claims alleging violations of securities laws
by the Company are without merit and we intend to vigorously defend
our position," stated Joseph Dowling, Chief Executive Officer of CV
Sciences.

The lawsuit piggy-backs on allegations made in a public "report" by
Citron Research, a firm that sources indicate is run by an activist
short seller.  Citron issued its report on Monday, August 20th,
after the Company's stock had risen more than 25% in the day.

Both the Citron report and the newly filed lawsuit allege, in
pertinent part, that the Company violated securities laws by
failing to disclose that it had received notice from the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) that its pending patent
application, U.S. Patent Application No. 15/426,617 (the '617
Application), had been "finally rejected" by the USPTO.  The
complaint draws the conclusion that this notice from the USPTO
terminated the Company's patent application, and that the Company's
efforts to obtain patent protection for the inventions disclosed in
the '617 Application have therefore failed.

"The conclusions in the complaint and in the 'report' by Citron
Research are outright false, and demonstrate either an ignorance, a
disregard, or both, of the basics of patent prosecution," stated
Mr. Dowling.  "A 'final rejection' in the context of patent
prosecution is anything but final.  It by no means indicates that
the applicant has failed in its efforts to obtain an issued
patent." We will continue to prosecute the '617 Application and
plan to file and prosecute several more applications related to the
inventions described in the '617 Application."

Mr. Dowling continued, "While the end result is not assured, both
the Company and our patent counsel at Banner & Witcoff continue to
have comfort that we will obtain an issued patent pursuant to the
'617 Application."

                     About CV Sciences, Inc.

CV Sciences, Inc. (OTCQB:CVSI) -- http://www.cvsciences.com--
operates two distinct business segments: a drug development
division focused on developing and commercializing novel
therapeutics utilizing synthetic CBD; and, a consumer product
division focused on manufacturing, marketing and selling
plant-based CBD products to a range of market sectors. CV Sciences,
Inc. has primary offices and facilities in San Diego, California
and Las Vegas, Nevada. [GN]


CYNOSURE: Faces Class Action Over Vaginal Rejuvenation Device
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jacob Maslow, writing for LegalScoops, reports that a class-action
lawsuit has been filed against Cynosure, maker of the MonaLisa
Touch vaginal rejuvenation device, over alleged deceptive marketing
practices.

The complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court, District of
Massachusetts, aims to represent medical professionals who leased
or purchased the laser to treat vaginal conditions associated with
sexual function, menopause or urinary incontinence.

The lawsuit states that the MonaLisa Touch laser device sells for
upwards of $150,000. The plaintiffs allege that the laser is
dangerous and cannot be used for its advertised purposes.

"The aggregate lease payments exceed $200,000," the lawsuit states.
"In light of the July 30, 2018 FDA Warning, Three R LLC can no
longer use the MonaLisa Touch unit, although payments on the unit
remain due."

The lawsuit seeks damages for breach of implied warranty and
fitness for a particular purpose.

In July, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced that it
warned several companies to stop marketing their laser devices for
"vaginal rejuvenation" procedures. The agency called the procedures
deceptive and dangerous.

The lasers were originally permitted onto the market for treatment
of serious conditions, like genital warts, cancer or surgery. But
manufacturers have been promoting the lasers as a treatment for
symptoms related to menopause, vaginal atrophy and urinary
incontinence.

Although the device was only approved for certain treatments,
doctors can still legally use the lasers to treat off-label
conditions.

"These products have serious risks and don't have adequate evidence
to support their use for these purposes," said Dr. Scott Gottlieb,
FDA commissioner, in a statement. "We are deeply concerned women
are being harmed."

Dr. Gottlieb also expressed concern that deceptive marketing
practices may prevent patients from getting the appropriate
treatments for serious medical conditions.

The FDA said it has found cases of vaginal scarring, burning and
lasting pain after treatments. The agency received more than 100
reports of adverse events related to the treatments. [GN]


DEAN INTERNATIONAL: Students File Class Action Suit
---------------------------------------------------
Flight students seeking reimbursement of their tuition payments
along with the Law Offices of Patrick Cordero, P.A. filed a class
action lawsuit against Dean International Flight School on August
21, 2018. The owner, Ian Dean, closed the school after promising to
return all the money the students paid in advance for their pilot's
licenses.

"Each student paid Dean International, Inc. in excess of $34,000
for pilot training they will now never receive. The question is not
whether Dean International has damaged these students, the question
is now how much of a ripple effect these damages will cause in
light of the stigma these students could now face for being linked
to Dean International," said Maria Daneri, point attorney of the
case.

Most of the students were in the country under I-20 visas linked to
their training at Dean, but now are forced to return to their home
countries, and hope they can get admitted into another flight
school.

Abdulelah Ashi, one of the students seeking reimbursement for their
tuition payments, is taking action against the school.

"Most of us took several financial commitments to get the large
amount of money for the tuition and living expenses, some students
got bank loans, and others got family commitments. Now, after the
closing of the school and the termination of our immigration visa
by the school owner, some of us were forced to leave the USA due to
financial restraints, while others are trying to find a way to get
the money together to pay new schools to complete their training,"
Ashi said.

"With this suit, we are striving to ensure that Dean International,
Inc. and Ian Dean be held accountable so that these students can be
made whole," Daneri said.

The Law Offices of Patrick Cordero, P.A., teamed with Daneri Diez,
P.A., are fighting to get these students compensated for the losses
they suffered along with what they are going to endure in the
future. Not only did Dean International abruptly shut their doors
and discontinued these students' training, but to add insult to
injury, they have failed to reimburse them for the tuition monies
the students had paid in advance. Simply put, these students were
left out in the cold without any justification and have been
severely damaged as a result.

"What happened wasn't their fault and a school with this history
should have been more prepared to protect these innocent
individuals just looking for a solid education as pilots. These
students were doing their part, the school and owner should have
been doing theirs, especially when most of the education was
prepaid by the students," Cordero said.

         Tomas Gallo, Esq.
         Public Relations Outreach
         The Law Offices of Patrick Cordero, P.A.
         Telephone: 954-299-7152
         Email: tomas@nextlevelsem.com [GN]


DEUTSCHE BANK: Court Denies Bid to Certify 2 Classes in FX Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case
captioned AXIOM INVESTMENT ADVISORS, LLC, et al. Plaintiffs, v.
DEUTSCHE BANK AG, Defendant. No. 15 Civ. 9945 (LGS). (S.D.N.Y.)

This putative class action arises out of Defendant Deutsche Bank
AG's (Deutsche Bank) alleged practice of delaying execution of
electronically matched trade orders in the foreign exchange (FX)
market in order to take advantage of how the market moved in the
interim a practice known as Last Look. Plaintiffs Axiom Investment
Advisors, LLC and Axiom Investment Company, LLC, by and through
their Trustee Gildor Management, LLC (Axiom), assert claims against
Deutsche Bank for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

Axiom moves to certify two classes under Rule 23(b)(3), for the
period on or after December 21, 2011 (the Class Period):

The Express Contract Class

     All persons who (1) entered into a Service Level Agreement or
Electronic Platform Terms with Deutsche Bank that contained a
provision calling for the application of New York law; (2)
submitted an FX order to Deutsche Bank on or after December 21,
2011, via an application programming interface on ABFX, RAPID, or
an ECN subject to Electronic Platform Terms and (3) had their order
rejected by Deutsche Bank because of a price generated after
Deutsche Bank received the order.

The Implied Contract Class

     All persons who (1) submitted an FX order to Deutsche Bank on
or after December 21, 2011, on an ECN not subject to Electronic
Platform Terms; (2) had their order rejected by Deutsche Bank
because of a price generated after Deutsche Bank received the
order; and (3) were either (a) domiciled in the United States, or
(b) if domiciled elsewhere, had their order routed over a Deutsche
Bank or ECN server based in New York.
By their terms, these definitions do not include GUI Autobahn
users, who were subject to the Ts&Cs.

STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) provides that plaintiffs may
sue on behalf of a class where: (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.  

A plaintiff seeks to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), the
plaintiff also must show that the questions of law or fact common
to class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.

Express Contract Class

The key question underlying the claims of the Express Contract
Class is whether Deutsche Bank's post-receipt price withdrawals
breached the SLAs and EPTs. The relevant contractual provisions of
the SLAs are ambiguous, and extrinsic evidence suggests that a
substantial proportion of class members understood the provisions
to allow the practice. Thus, this question cannot be answered on a
class-wide basis as to customers subject to SLAs. Moreover, the EPT
submitted with this motion explicitly allows post-receipt price
withdrawals.

Given the substantial evidence in the record that many of Deutsche
Bank's clients were aware of the bank's use of post-receipt price
withdrawals, any Express Contract Class member seeking to prove
breach of contract would have to show through individualized
extrinsic evidence that it had reached an understanding with the
bank that post-receipt price checks were prohibited under the SLA
the parties signed. This individualized inquiry would be the crux
of any such lawsuit and would overwhelm common questions as to
Deutsche Bank's general use of Last Look.  

The Plaintiffs cite case law suggesting that ambiguities in form
contract language need not defeat class certification. These cases
are inapplicable here. In In re U.S. Foodservice, Inc. Pricing
Litigation, the Second Circuit addressed alleged fraudulent
overbilling by a food distributor, in violation of state contract
law. There, the class members had all signed cost-plus contracts
with the defendant, but these contracts were not identical.

The Second Circuit held that arguments as to the importance of
individualized extrinsic evidence as to the contract claims failed
because the record lacked evidence of any USF customer's contract
negotiations or individualized conduct in performing pursuant to
the contract that tended to show either that the customer
understood his contract to authorize the pricing arrangements or
that he otherwise acquiesced in them. The court credited expert
testimony that the contracts at issue essentially all say the same
thing' and that in the food service industry, `it is well
understood what a cost plus contract is.

In contrast, in this case, the SLAs are ambiguous as to the central
issue of this case whether or not they permit post-receipt price
withdrawals. Furthermore, the evidence shows that many Express
Contract Class members likely understood their contracts to
authorize the practice.

In Gillis v. Respond Power, LLC, 677 F. App'x 752, 757 (3d Cir.
2017) (summary order), the Third Circuit vacated a denial of class
certification based on consumers' individual understandings of a
variable rate provision in a company's form service agreement.
Interpreting Pennsylvania law, the unpublished, out-of-circuit
summary order holds that extrinsic evidence of one party's
undisclosed, subjective understanding, intent, or opinion about the
meaning of ambiguous contract language cannot be used to
substantiate a particular interpretation of that language. The
opinion explains that the court's objective in considering
extrinsic evidence is to discover the meaning that each party had
reason to know would be given to the words by the other party.

In this case, Deutsche Bank's extrinsic evidence does not show its
undisclosed subjective understanding. Instead, it shows what
defendants in Gillis could not show  that many of the bank's
clients had reason to know about the bank's use of post-receipt
price withdrawals when they traded under the SLA; thus supporting
an interpretation of the SLA that the practice was permissible.

The Plaintiffs cite Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 738 F.3d
432 (1st Cir. 2013), in which the court declined to consider
extrinsic evidence in a putative class action involving uniform
mortgage contracts. Plaintiffs rely on Kolbe for the proposition
that extrinsic evidence of the parties' unique intentions regarding
a uniform clause is generally uninformative because unlike
individually tailored contracts, uniform clauses do not derive from
the negotiations of the specific parties to a contract. As an
initial matter, this out-of-circuit opinion, decided en banc by a
divided court, is not controlling here. Kolbe is also
distinguishable because the contracts at issue in this case are not
uniform.

First, the SLA and EPT submitted with this motion contain
materially differing provisions relevant to the permissibility of
post-receipt price withdrawals. Second, Deutsche Bank has proffered
deposition testimony and emails suggesting that at least some SLAs
and EPTs were individually negotiated by counsel. Plaintiffs also
cite Steinberg v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company,224 F.R.D.
67, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), a case involving form insurance contracts,
for the proposition that claims arising from interpretations of a
form contract appear to present the classic case for treatment as a
class action. Steinberg is inapplicable here for the same reasons
as Kolbe.

For all of these reasons, the Express Contract Class fails to
satisfy predominance.

Implied Contract Class

Because many participants in the FX market were aware of liquidity
providers' use of post-receipt price withdrawals, the Implied
Contract Class fails the predominance requirement as well. Under
New York law, a contract may be implied where inferences may be
drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case and the
intention of the parties as indicated by their conduct. Whether a
contract has been formed does not depend on either party's
subjective intent; instead, the determination must be based on the
objective manifestations of the intent of the parties as gathered
by their expressed words and deeds.

To succeed on a claim for breach against Deutsche Bank, an Implied
Contract Class member must prove that, as manifested by the conduct
of the parties, it had somehow reached an understanding with the
bank that precluded the bank's use of post-receipt price
withdrawals. Given the general understanding in the market that
liquidity providers like Deutsche Bank used this practice, such
proof would have to be individualized. As with the Express Contract
Class, this issue would be central to any lawsuit brought by
Implied Contract Class members, thus defeating the predominance
requirement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ydywzpvj from
Leagle.com.

Axiom Investment Company, LLC, by and through its Trustee, Gildor
Management, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron M. Zigler --
azieleg@koreintillery.com -- Korein Tillery, pro hac vice, Amanda
F. Lawrence -- ALAWRENCE@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- Scott & Scott, LLC,
Bonny E. Sweeney -- bsweeney@hausfeld.com -- Hausfeld, Carol Lee
O'Keefe -- cokeefe@koreintillery.com -- Korein Tillery, LLC,
Garrett R. Broshuis -- gbroshuis@koreintillery.com -- Korein
Tillery, LLC, Hugh Daniel Sandler -- hsandler@nussbaumpc.com --
Nussbaum Law Group, P.C., Linda P. Nussbaum --
lnussbaum@nussbaumpc.com -- Nussbaum Law Group, P.C., Michael E.
Klenov -- mklenov@koreintillery.com -- Korein Tillery, LLC,
Michaela Spero -- mspero@hausfeld.com -- Hausfeld, LLP, Peter
Anthony Barile, III -- PBARILE@SCOTT-SCOTT.COM -- Scott+Scott,
Attorneys At Law, LLP, Steven Michael Berezney --
sberezney@koreintillery.com -- Korein Tillery, LLC & Timothy S.
Kearns -- tkearns@hausfeld.com -- Hausfeld LLP.

Gildor Management LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron M. Zigler,
Korein Tillery, pro hac vice, Carol Lee O'Keefe, Korein Tillery,
LLC, Hugh Daniel Sandler, Nussbaum Law Group, P.C., Joseph Peter
Guglielmo, Scott + Scott, L.L.P., Linda P. Nussbaum, Nussbaum Law
Group, P.C., Michael E. Klenov, Korein Tillery, LLC, Michaela
Spero, Hausfeld, LLP & Steven Michael Berezney, Korein Tillery,
LLC.

Deutsche Bank AG, Defendant, represented by Joseph Serino, Jr. --
joseph.serino@lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP, Eric Foster Leon --
david.foster@retiredpartner.lw.com -- Latham & Watkins LLP & George
Patrick Montgomery -- pmontgomery@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding LLP,
pro hac vice.


DIGNITY HEALTH: Court Narrows Claims in Rollins' ERISA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the first amended complaint in the case captioned STARLA
ROLLINS, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. DIGNITY HEALTH, et al., Defendants.
Case No. 13-cv-01450-JST. (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs bring this putative class action on behalf of all
participants, former participants, and beneficiaries of the Dignity
Health Pension Plan (Plan). The Plaintiffs allege that the Plan
violates many provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA).

THe Plaintiffs challenge the Defendants' claim that the Plan is
exempt from ERISA because it is a church plan. The Plaintiffs bring
claims alleging violations of ERISA and, alternatively, state law
claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of
common law fiduciary duty.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter that, when accepted as true,
states a claim that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.

Federal Claims

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) exempts
church plans' from its otherwise-comprehensive regulation of
employee benefit plans.

Plaintiffs Adequately Allege That The Dignity Plan Is Not Properly
Maintained As A Church Plan

The Plaintiffs plausibly allege that the Plan is not properly
maintained as a church plan. First, they allege that the Plan is
"maintained" by Dignity for its own and its affiliates' employees,
and that Dignity is neither a church, a convention or association
of churches, nor an organization whose principal purpose or
function is the administration or funding of the Plan as required
by section 1002(33)(C)(i).  

The Defendantss respond that the Plan is maintained by a
Sub-Committee whose principal purpose is the administration of the
plan.

The Defendants take issue with the Plaintiffs' allegation that even
if a committee within Dignity maintained' the Plan, such an
internal committee of Dignity does not qualify as a distinct
principal-purpose organization. The Defendants argue there is no
requirement that a principal-purpose organization be separately
constituted from the plan sponsor, given that Section
1002(33)(C)(i) broadly provides that the organization may be a
civil law corporation or otherwise. But the Defendants do not
assign a specific meaning to the phrase or otherwise; they merely
disagree with the Plaintiffs' contention that a principal-purpose
organization must have an existence separate from Dignity. Or
otherwise cannot simply encompass any possible entity, or else the
statutory distinction would lose all meaning.

Again, the Plaintiffs have the better argument. Subject to the
Court's prior caveat about the benefits of discovery, the
Defendants' motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.

Plaintiffs Plausibly Allege That Dignity Health And The
Sub-Committee Are Not Associated With A Church

The Defendants properly note that church control is not necessary
for association. The Defendants also remind the Court that it
should not delve too deeply into the religious beliefs or practices
of an organization. The Defendants urge the Court not to adopt the
test in Lown v. Continental Casualty Co., 238 F.3d 543, 548 (4th
Cir. 2001) to determine association.

That case holds that courts determining whether an organization is
associated with a church should consider three primary factors: (1)
whether the religious institution plays any official role in the
governance of the organization; (2) whether the organization
receives assistance from the religious institution and (3) whether
a denominational requirement exists for any employee or
patient/customer of the organization.  

However, the Defendants provide this Court with no test, other than
the statutory language and the Oxford English Dictionary, for
evaluating whether Dignity Health and the sub-committee is
associated with a church. Instead, the Defendants argue that
Dignity Health and the Sub-Committee are clearly associated with
the Catholic Church. The Defendants cite to Dignity Health's
website, bylaws, membership of its Board of Directors, and
Sponsorship Council, and financial support of the Sponsoring
Congregations. The majority of these materials cannot properly be
considered on a motion to dismiss because they pertain to disputes
of fact between the parties.

The Defendants' motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.

State Law Claims

The Plaintiffs allege alternative claims for breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, and breach of common law fiduciary duty.
Defendants argue that the Court should not exercise jurisdiction
that the Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue the state law claims
and that the state law causes of action do not state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.

Standing

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs lack standing because the
Plaintiffs do not allege that they have suffered any injury or that
Dignity Health has failed to pay any benefit payment, and they do
not allege any breach that is unrelated to the alleged failure to
fully fund the Plan. Also, they do not allege any facts to support
the conclusion that there is any imminent risk of default.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have underfunded the Plan
by nearly 1.8 billion dollars, such that the Plan was only funded
at approximately 72% as of June 30, 2016. They further allege that
their benefits are at great risk because the Plan provides that if
it terminates, plan participants' accrued benefits will be
nonforfeitable only to the extent that the Dignity Plan trust is
funded. The Plaintiffs also allege that participants and
beneficiaries' benefits are only guaranteed by the assets of the
Plan and are not protected by Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
guarantees as an ERISA plan would be. In light of these
allegations, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently
alleged that Dignity and/or the Retirement Committee enhanced a
risk of default.

Accordingly, they do have standing.

Breach of Contract

The Plaintiffs' alternative claim for specific performance,
however, fails. Specific performance of a contract may be decreed
whenever: (1) its terms are sufficiently definite; (2)
consideration is adequate; (3) there is substantial similarity of
the requested performance to the contractual terms; (4) there is
mutuality of remedies; and (5) plaintiff's legal remedy is
inadequate. Here, Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law in the
form of damages.

Canova v. Trustees of Imperial Irrigation District Employee Pension
Plan is instructive. In that case, participants in the defendants'
pension plan alleged that the defendant's adoption of certain plan
amendments had resulted in the underfunding of their pensions. They
brought claims for declaratory relief and specific performance. The
Court of Appeal concluded that specific performance was not
available because when a party has a fully matured cause of action
for money, the party must seek the remedy of damages, and not
pursue a declaratory relief claim. Canova v. Trs. of Imperial
Irrigation Dist. Emp. Pension Plan, 150 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497
(2007). Because plaintiffs could seek money damages, they were not
entitled to injunctive relief or specific performance because they
had an adequate remedy at law.

The Plaintiffs try to distinguish this case from Canova by noting
that case involved individual retirement accounts, whereas this one
involves a pension plan. The distinction is immaterial. As the
plaintiffs did in Canova, the Plaintiffs here seek performance of
Dignity's obligation to make contributions to the Dignity Plan
trust in an amount which is sufficient, on an actuarial basis, to
pay for all accrued pension benefits. Once those damages are paid
if they are found to be due there will be no need for equitable
relief.  

The Defendants' motion is granted as to the Plaintiffs' claims for
specific performance.

Unjust Enrichment

The Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the Plaintiffs'
unjust enrichment claim because where there is a valid and
enforceable contract, a party cannot bring a claim for unjust
enrichment.

The Defendants are correct that an action based on quasi-contract
cannot lie where a valid express contract covering the same subject
matter exists between the parties. In other words, even though a
plaintiff may not ultimately prevail under both unjust enrichment
and breach of contract, it may plead both in the alternative. A
defendant is not entitled to have a cause of action dismissed for
failure to state a claim simply because it conflicts with another
cause of action.

At a later stage of the case, perhaps the Plaintiffs will be forced
to elect among these claims. At this point, however, they may plead
in the alternative. The Defendants' motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim is denied.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

The Defendants' only argument against the Plaintiffs' breach of
fiduciary duty claim is that it fails for the same reason the
Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim fails. Because the Court
denies the Defendants' motion to dismiss that claim, it denies the
motion as to this claim as well.

Accordingly, the Court grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' specific performance claim. In all other respects, the
Court denies the motion.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ya68xv4g from Leagle.com.

Patricia Wilson, on behalf of themselves, individually, on behalf
of all others similarly situated, and on behalf of the Dignity
Plan, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Graver --
cgraver@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback L.L.P., Juli E.
Farris -- jfarris@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback LLP, pro
hac vice, Havila C. Unrein -- hunrein@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller
Rohrback L.L.P., Karen L. Handorf -- khandorf@cohenmilstein.com --
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC, pro hac vice, Lynn Lincoln
Sarko -- lsarko@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro
hac vice, Matthew M. Gerend -- mgerend@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller
Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice & Michelle C. Yau --
myau@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, pro
hac vice.

Dignity Health, a California Non-profit Corporation & Herbert J.
Vallier, an individual, Defendants, represented by Barry Scott
Landsberg -- blandsberg@manatt.com -- Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP,
Charles M. Dyke -- cdyke@nixonpeabody.com -- Nixon Peabody LLP,
Colin Michael McGrath -- cmcgrath@manatt.com -- Manatt Phelps &
Phillips, LLP, Craig Steven Rutenberg -- crutenberg@manatt.com --
Manatt Phelps & Phillips, LLP, David S. Shapiro --
dshapiro@law.harvard.edu -- Attorney at Law, pro hac vice, Harvey
L. Rochman -- hrochman@manatt.com -- Manatt Phelps & Phillips, LLP,
Matthew J. Frankel -- mfrankel@nixonpeabody.com -- Nixon Peabody
LLP & R. Bradford Huss -- bhuss@truckerhuss.com -- Trucker Huss, A
Professional Corporation.


ECONOMIC RECOVERY: Jones FDCPA Suit Dismissed
---------------------------------------------
In the case, HEATHER JONES a/k/a HEATHER DEMPSEY, individually, and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ECONOMIC
RECOVERY CONSULTANTS, INC. and JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-01025 (W.D. Ark.), Judge Susan O. Hickey of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, El Dorado
Division, granted the Economic Recovery's Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings.

The action arises under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA").  The Defendant is a "debt collector" within the meaning
of FDCPA, with its principal place of business in Searcy, Arkansas.
According to the Complaint, the Plaintiff allegedly incurred a
debt to Ouachita County Medical Center for medical services
provided to her.  The Defendant contracted with Ouachita Medical to
collect the alleged debt.

On Jan. 31, 2018, the Plaintiff received a collection letter from
the Defendant demanding payment on her past due account with
Ouachita Medical.  The Plaintiff alleges, however, that the letter
fails to provide any address below the language where the consumer
can dispute or get information about the debt. It is further
alleged that the only information below the paragraph is a phone
number for the Defendant's collection department.

On April 27, 2018, the Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all
other similarly situated consumers, filed a putative class action
complaint against the Defendant, alleging two violations of the
FDCPA stemming from the collection letter.  Specifically, the
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant made deceptive and misleading
representations when it sought to collect a debt from her but
failed to provide an address where it could be contacted, in
violation of 15 U.S.C. Sections 1692 and 1692e(10).  In addition,
she asserts that the Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g
because the letter failed to clearly display the address to send
disputes and only provided a phone number, thereby causing
consumers' rights to be limited.

On June 6, 2018, the Defendant filed the instant motion pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), arguing that the Plaintiff's
allegations regarding the collection letter are unsupported by the
contents of the letter.  Specifically, it asserts that its address
is listed below the directive to address all future correspondence
and payments concerning the account to the address indicated in the
letter.  The Defendant further contends that its address is listed
at the top of the letter.  According to the Defendant, an
unsophisticated consumer would not be misled as to its mailing
address.  Thus, the letter is not deceptive or violative of the
FDCPA as a matter of law.

Viewing the letter as a whole, Judge Hickey is unconvinced that an
unsophisticated consumer would be confused regarding the correct
address to contact the Defendant.  Accordingly, she finds that the
Defendant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings with regard to
the Plaintiff's section 1692e(10) claim.

Moreover, the Judge agrees with the Defendant that the Plaintiff's
claim under section 1692g fails because the letter provides an
address for the Plaintiff to send correspondence to dispute her
alleged debt, despite the Plaintiff's allegations that the letter
lists a telephone number as the Defendant's sole contact
information.  Accordingly, she finds that the Defendant is entitled
to judgment on the pleadings as to Count II of the Plaintiff's
Complaint.

For the reasons she explained, Judge Hickey granted the Defendant's
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.  Accordingly, she dismissed
the Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/m0qtdW from Leagle.com.

Heather Jones, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Yaakov Saks --
ysaks@rclawgroup.com -- Stein Saks, PLLC.

Economic Recovery Consultants, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Adrienne Lee Baker -- abaker@wlj.com -- Wright Lindsey Jennings
LLP.


EMIL GAYED: Law Firm Considers Suit Against Disgraced Surgeon
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Guardian reports that following an investigation by Guardian
Australia, the law firm Slater and Gordon is considering a class
action against disgraced obstetrician and gynaecologist, Emil
Shawky Gayed.

Gayed was found guilty of professional misconduct by the NSW Civil
and Administrative Tribunal in June following the mismanagement of
seven patients spanning more than three years at the Manning Base
Hospital in Taree, NSW.

The tribunal heard Gayed had performed an unnecessary hysterectomy
on one woman and irreversible surgeries on patients without their
consent. He carried out multiple invasive procedures that fell
"significantly below" professional standards on women that could
have been treated with painkillers and bed rest, the tribunal
heard.

But Guardian Australia revealed his harm was much more widespread
and spanned more than two decades, and that one woman died after
unnecessary treatment. It prompted the New South Wales Department
of Health to order an independent inquiry into Gayed and his work
in public hospitals throughout the state.

In a statement, Slater and Gordon said it was investigating a
potential class action against Gayed.

"The investigation will also look at the conduct of the hospitals
he worked within and the regulator, the Australian Health
Practitioner Regulation Agency (Ahpra)," the firm said in a
statement.

"We urge any person who is concerned about treatment they received
from Dr Gayed to contact us as we continue to investigate."

Sydney law firm Carroll & O'Dea Lawyers has been representing women
allegedly harmed by Gayed and investigating their claims since his
harms were first made public. But other law firms have since
offered their services to affected women as more cases come
forward.

The independent investigation is being headed by the senior counsel
Gail Furness, known for her work on the child sexual abuse royal
commission, and will also examine whether hospital management took
adequate measures to report and stop him. Furness is due to deliver
her report to government by the end of September.[GN]


ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Monteverde & Associates Files Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Monteverde & Associates PC on Aug. 28 disclosed that it has filed a
class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware, Case No. 1:18-cv-01219-UNA, on behalf of
shareholders of Envision Healthcare Corporation ("Envision" or the
"Company") (NYSE:EVHC) who hold Envision shares and have been
harmed by Envision's and its board of directors' alleged violations
of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the "Exchange Act") in connection with the sale of the Company to
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. ("KKR") ( the "Proposed
Transaction").

Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, dated June 10, 2018,
Envision shareholders are only anticipated to receive $46.00 for
each share of Envision common stock held.  The complaint questions
the fairness of the consideration offered to the Company's
shareholders and alleges that the proxy statement regarding the
Proposed Transaction (the "Proxy") fails to disclose material
information that is necessary for shareholders to properly assess
the fairness of the Proposed Transaction, thereby rendering certain
statements in the Proxy incomplete and misleading.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than 60 days from August 28, 2018.  Any member of the
putative class may move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff
through counsel of their choice, or may choose to do nothing and
remain an absent class member.  If you wish to discuss this action,
or have any questions concerning this notice or your rights or
interests, please contact:

Click here for more information:
https://monteverdelaw.com/case/envision-healthcare-corporation.  It
is free and there is no cost or obligation to you.

Monteverde & Associates PC is a national class action securities
and consumer litigation law firm committed that has recovered
millions of dollars and is committed to protecting shareholders and
consumers from corporate wrongdoing.  Monteverde & Associates PC
lawyers have significant experience litigating Mergers &
Acquisitions and Securities Class Actions, whereby they protect
investors by recovering money and remedying corporate misconduct.
Mr. Monteverde, who leads the legal team at the firm, has been
recognized by Super Lawyers as a Rising Star in Securities
Litigation in 2013 and 2017, an award given to less than 2.5% of
attorneys in a particular field.  He has also been selected by
Martindale-Hubbell as a 2017 Top Rated Lawyer.

Contact:

     Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
     MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
     The Empire State Building
     350 Fifth Ave, Suite 4405
     New York, NY 10118
     Tel: (212) 971-1341
     Email: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com [GN]


FANHUA INC: Kaskela Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------
Kaskela Law LLC disclosed that an investor class action lawsuit has
been filed against Fanhua, Inc. (NASDAQ: FANH) ("Fanhua" or the
"Company") on behalf of purchasers of the Company's securities
between April 20, 2018 through August 27, 2018, inclusive (the
"Class Period").

IMPORTANT DEADLINE: Investors who purchased Fanhua's securities
during the Class Period may, no later than November 6, 2018, seek
to be appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class.

Fanhua investors who have suffered investment losses in excess of
$100,000 and seek to take an active role in this litigation are
encouraged to contact Kaskela Law LLC (D. Seamus Kaskela, Esq.) at
(888) 715-1740 or skaskela@kaskelalaw.com for additional
information about their legal rights.  Investors may also submit
their information to the firm online at
http://kaskelalaw.com/case/fanhua/.

On August 27, 2018, stock analyst Seligman Investments published an
article that described Fanhua as a "questionable company" and
detailed a history of alleged fraud within the Company, including
accounting irregularities in the Company's second quarter 2018
financial results.  On this news, Fanhua's share price fell $2.75
per share, or 10.52%, to close at $23.40 on August 27, 2018.

The class action complaint alleges that defendants made a series of
false and misleading statements during the Class Period and failed
to disclose to investors that: (i) Fanhua was engaged in improper
business practices, including irregular accounting; and (ii) the
foregoing practices were intended to benefit Company insiders and
overstated Fanhua's financial assets and performance metrics.  The
complaint further alleges that, as a result of the foregoing,
investors purchased Fanhua's securities at artificially inflated
prices during the Class Period, and have suffered financial damages
as a result of defendants' conduct.

Fanhua investors who have suffered investment losses in excess of
$100,000 and seek to take an active role in this litigation are
encouraged to contact Kaskela Law LLC. Kaskela Law LLC exclusively
represents investors in state and federal courts throughout the
country.  

         D. Seamus Kaskela, Esq.
         KASKELA LAW LLC
         201 King of Prussia Road
         Suite 650
         Radnor, PA 19087
         Telephone: (484) 258 – 1585
                    (888) 715 – 1740
         Website: www.kaskelalaw.com
         Email: skaskela@kaskelalaw.com [GN]


FANHUA INC: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Class Action
-------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP disclosed that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against Fanhua, Inc. ("Fanhua" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: FANH) and
certain of its officers.

The class action, filed in United States District Court, Southern
District of New York, and index under 18-cv-08183, is on behalf of
a class consisting of all persons other than Defendants who
purchased or otherwise acquired Fanhua securities between April 20,
2018 through August 27, 2018, both dates inclusive (the "Class
Period"), seeking to recover damages caused by Defendants'
violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder,
against the Company and certain of its top officials.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Fanhua securities between
April 20, 2018 and August 27, 2018, both dates inclusive, you have
until November 6, 2018, to ask the Court to appoint you as Lead
Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the Complaint can be obtained
at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To discuss this action, contact Robert
S. Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or
888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who inquire by e-mail
are encouraged to include their mailing address, telephone number,
and the number of shares purchased.

Founded in 1998, Fanhua (formerly known as "CNinsure Inc.") is a
leading independent online-to-offline financial services provider.
Through its online platforms and offline sales and service network,
Fanhua offers a wide variety of life and property and casualty
insurance products, and provides insurance claims adjusting
services.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Fanhua engaged in improper
business practices, including irregular accounting; (ii) the
foregoing practices were intended to benefit Company insiders and
overstated Fanhua's financial assets and performance metrics; and
(iii) as a result, Fanhua's public statements were materially false
and misleading at all relevant times.

On August 27, 2018, stock analyst Seligman Investments published an
article that described Fanhua as a "questionable company" and
detailed a history of alleged fraud within the Company, including
accounting irregularities in the Company's second quarter 2018
financial results.   The article also described "company insiders"
engaging in "self-dealing tactics", and asserted that Fanhua's
"numerous acquisitions, mostly of other insurance intermediaries .
. . are rife with related-party abuses."

On this news, Fanhua's ADS price fell $2.75 per share, or 10.52%,
to close at $23.40 on August 27, 2018.

         Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
         Pomerantz LLP
         Telephone: 888-476-6529 ext. 9980
         Email: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com[GN]


FCA US: Zuehlsdorf Sues over Defective Transmission in Vehicles
---------------------------------------------------------------
STEVE ZUEHLSDORF, individually, and on behalf of a class of
similarly situated individuals, the Plaintiff, v. FCA US LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company, the Defendant, Case No.
5:18-cv-01877-JGB-KK (N.D. Cal., Aug. 31, 2018), alleges that
Defendant failed to disclose material facts and safety concern to
consumers regarding vehicle equipped with a Jatco JF011E
Continuously Variable Transmission (Class Vehicles) designed,
manufactured, marketed, distributed, sold, warranted, and/or
serviced by FCA US LLC, formerly known as Chrysler Group LLC.

According to the complaint, the CVT is defective in that it causes
sudden, unexpected shaking and violent jerking when drivers attempt
to accelerate the class vehicle. In addition, when the driver tries
to accelerate, the CVT will cause the vehicle to lag and fail to
accelerate as intended by the driver. Further, the CVT is
inordinately prone to overheating, which causes the vehicle to
abruptly decelerate and lose power at highway speeds. Finally, the
CVT fails and requires replacement.

The CVT Defect is inherent in each Class Vehicle and was present at
the time of sale. Chrysler began selling the CVT-equipped Jeep
Patriot, Jeep Compass, and Dodge Caliber with the 2007 model year,
and issued the first Technical Service Bulletin addressing the CVT
Defect on April 28, 2007. Accordingly, Plaintiff is informed and
believes that since 2007, if not earlier, Chrysler knew of the CVT
Defect. Following bankruptcy proceedings in June 2009, Chrysler was
reorganized as Chrysler Group LLC.

FCA US undertook affirmative measures to conceal failures and other
malfunctions through, among other things, Technical Service
Bulletins issued to its authorized repair facilities. Although FCA
US was sufficiently aware of the CVT Defect from pre-production
testing, design failure mode analysis, calls to its customer
service hotline, and customer complaints made to dealers, this
knowledge and information was exclusively in the possession of FCA
US and its network of dealers and, therefore, unavailable to
consumers. The CVT Defect is material because it poses a serious
safety concern. As attested by Class Members in scores of
complaints to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
the CVT Defect can impair any driver's ability to control his or
her vehicle and greatly increase the risk of collision. The CVT
Defect is also a material fact because consumers can incur
significant and unexpected repair costs. FCA US's omission at the
time of purchase of the CVT's marked tendency to fail is material
because no reasonable consumer expects to spend hundreds, if not
thousands, of dollars to repair or replace essential transmission
components.  Had FCA US disclosed the CVT Defect, Plaintiff and
Class Members would not have purchased the Class Vehicles or would
have paid less for them.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Jordan L. Lurie, Esq.
          Tarek H. Zohdy, Esq.
          Cody R. Padgett, Esq.
          Trisha K. Monesi, Esq.
          CAPSTONE LAW APC
          1875 Century Park East, Suite 1000
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 556 4811
          Facsimile: (310) 943 0396
          E-mail: Jordan.Lurie@capstonelawyers.com
                  Tarek.Zohdy@capstonelawyers.com
                  Cody.Padgett@capstonelawyers.com
                  Trisha.Monesi@capstonelawyers.com


FLORIDA AUTO PHONE: Guerrero Seeks Unpaid Wages
-----------------------------------------------
FRANCIS MIGUEL GUERRERO and other similarly situated individuals,
the Plaintiff, v. FLORIDA AUTO PHONE, INC. a Florida· Profit
Corporation; T & A WIRELESS LLC, a Florida Limited Liability
Company; JOSE J. MONTES, individually; BRENDA MONTES, individually;
ALEJANDRO MONTES, individually; FRANK DOME, individually; and
UNEEZA MAHMOOD, individually, the Defendant, Case No. 77318114
(Fla. Cir., 11th Jud., Miami-Dade County, Aug. 31, 2018), seeks to
recover damages exceeding $15,000, excluding attorneys' fees or
costs, resulting from the Defendants' alleged violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff began working for the
Defendants on or about May 2016 until on or about October 2017.
Throughout his employment, the Plaintiff worked approximately 44
hours in a given work week.  Throughout his employment, the
Defendants paid Plaintiff a salary plus commissions. On or about
July 2017, the Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff his commission.
Therefore, the Plaintiff contacted the Owner, Mr. Montes of
nonpayment of his commission, Mr. Montes responded by screaming at
Plaintiff and stated "we're gonna see how long you'll be with the
company". Consequently, Mr. Montes paid Plaintiff owed commission.
Shortly after, the Defendants transferred Plaintiff to another
store and demoted Plaintiff to Assistant Manager.

Florida AutoPhone was established in 1985 as a single retail store
selling wireless services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anthony M. Georges-Pierre, Esq.
          Max L. Horowitz, Esq.
          REMER &· GEORGES-PIERRE, PLLC
          44 West Flagler Street, Suite 2200
          Miami, FL 33130
          Telephone: (305) 416 5000
          Facsimile: (305) 416 5005
          E-mail: agp@rgpattorneys.com
                  mhorovitz@rgpattorneys.com


FORJAS TAURUS: Partly Compelled to Produce Docs in Burrow Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM BURROW, OMA LUISE BURROW, SUZZANE M. BEDWELL,
individually and as mother and next friend of R.Z.B., a minor, and
ERNEST D. BEDWELL, individually and as father and next friend of
R.Z.B., a minor., Plaintiffs, v. FORJAS TAURUS S.A. and BRAZTECH
INTERNATIONAL, L.C., Defendants, Case No. 16-21606-Civ-TORRES (S.D.
Fla.), Magistrate Judge Edwin G. Torres of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida granted in part and denied in
part the Plaintiffs' motion to compel the Defendants to produce
documents previously withheld under a claim of privilege or, in the
alternative, to produce to the Court the documents requested for an
in camera inspection.

The case is a products-liability case premised on specific
revolvers that Forjas Taurus manufactured in Brazil and that
Braztech imported into the United States.  On Feb. 5, 2014, Mrs.
Burrow claims that she dropped her revolver on the ground and --
despite the firearm being holstered with its safety latch engaged
-- it discharged a bullet into her leg.  The Bedwells also
experienced a drop-fire incident that resulted in a gunshot wound
to their minor child.  Therefore, the Plaintiffs have brought the
consolidated action on behalf of all owners of the defective
firearms.

The matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs motion to compel
the Defendants to produce documents previously withheld under a
claim of privilege or, in the alternative, to produce to the Court
the documents requested for an in camera inspection.  The
Defendants responded to the Plaintiffs' motion on May 24, 2018 to
which the Plaintiffs replied on May 31, 2018.

The Plaintiffs' motion relates to an internal investigation that
the Defendants conducted after the Plaintiffs' firearm expert
inspected a revolver.  The documents, reports, and other
correspondence related to Defendants' investigation form the basis
of the Plaintiffs' motion.  Specifically, the Defendants refuse to
produce documents related to their internal investigation on the
basis that they are protected under the attorney-client privilege,
the self-critical analysis privilege, and/or the work product
doctrine.  While the Plaintiffs generally agree that the
Defendants' privilege logs1 meet the informational requirements for
withholding documents, they conclude that the Defendants' privilege
objections are conclusory and that the items requested should be
produced.

The Magistrate finds that since the Defendants have already
performed their extensive research using their unique testing
protocols, there is no persuasive reason to withhold those items
any longer.  The Plaintiffs lack the facilities, equipment,
technology, staffing, and expertise to replicate Defendants'
testing and analysis.  They have little to no knowledge, when
compared to the Defendants, of what type of tests Defendants
performed, how they were performed, or the results.  Because the
Plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial need and an undue
hardship, he holds that the Defendants' engineering reports,
photos, videos, and other technical documents cannot be withheld on
the basis of the work product doctrine.

Magistrate Judge Torres granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiffs' motion to compel.  The Plaintiffs' motion to compel the
Defendants to produce their engineering reports, photos, videos,
and other technical documents is granted.  The Defendants will
produce these items to the Plaintiffs within 14 days from the date
of the Order.

The Magistrate granted the Plaintiffs' motion to compel the
Defendants to produce to the Court all remaining items on the
Defendants' privilege log for an in camera review.  The Defendants
will produce these items to the Court within 14 days from the date
of the Order.  After the in camera review is completed, a separate
Order will follow.

He finds that because the SCA Privilege has not been codified by
Rule 26, adopted by the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, or the Florida Supreme Court, the Defendants have no
basis to withhold documents under this privilege.

He denied the Plaintiffs' motion to compel all documents on the
Defendants' privilege log, absent an in camera review.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/s3pjVP from Leagle.com.

William Burrow & Oma Louise Burrow, Plaintiffs, represented by
Brannon J. Buck -- bbuck@badhambuck.com -- Badham & Buck, LLC, pro
hac vice, Gregory A. Brockwell, Letman, Siegal & Payne, P.C., pro
hac vice, Vincent Swiney -- jvs@sblaw.net -- Swiney & Bellenger,
LLC, pro hac vice & Andrew Franklin Knopf, Knopf Bigger.

Ernest D. Bedwell & Suzanne M. Bedwell, Plaintiffs, represented by
Brian William Warwick, Varnell & Warwick, P.A., Christian Bataille,
Flanigan & Bataille, Richard Blackburn Adams, Jr., Cole Scott &
Kissane, David K. Lietz, Coale Cooley Lietz McInerny & Broadus, pro
hac vice & Andrew Franklin Knopf, Paul Knopf Bigger.

William Burrow & Oma Louise Burrow, Intervenor Plaintiffs,
represented by David K. Lietz, Coale Cooley Lietz McInerny &
Broadus, pro hac vice & Andrew Franklin Knopf, Paul Knopf Bigger.

Forjas Taurus, S.A., Defendant, represented by Colin Dang Delaney
-- cdelaney@sgrlaw.com -- Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, pro hac
vice & John Patrick Marino -- jmarino@sgrlaw.com -- Smith Gambrell
Russell.

Braztech International, L.C., Defendant, represented by Colin Dang
Delaney, Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, pro hac vice, John Patrick
Marino, Smith Gambrell Russell, John F. Weeks, IV --
jweeks@sgrlaw.com -- Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, pro hac vice &
Timothy A. Bumann -- tbumann@sgrlaw.com -- Smith Gambrell & Russell
LLP, pro hac vice.


GATOR HOSPITALITY: Quarterman Files ADA Suit in N.D. Florida
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Gator Hospitality,
LLC, et al. The case is styled as Lanie Quarterman individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Gator
Hospitality, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company, Choice
Hotels International, Inc., Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-00178-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla., Sept. 14, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990.

Gator Hospitality, LLC is in the renovation, hotel/motel business
industry.

Choice Hotels International, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
operates as a hotel franchisor worldwide. It operates through Hotel
Franchising and SkyTouch Technology segments. The company
franchises lodging properties under the brand names of Comfort Inn,
Comfort Suites, Quality, Clarion, Sleep Inn, Econo Lodge, Rodeway
Inn, MainStay Suites, Suburban Extended Stay Hotel, Cambria hotels
& suites, and Ascend Hotel Collection. It also develops and markets
cloud-based technology products to the hotel industry, including
inventory management, pricing, and connectivity to third party
channels and hoteliers; and provides onsite and remote
installation, training, and phone support services.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jessica Lynn Kerr, Esq.
     JESSICA L KERR PA - FORT LAUDERDALE FL
     200 SE 6th Street, Suite 504
     Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Phone: (954) 282-1858
     Fax: (844) 786-3694
     Email: service@advocacypa.com


GEO GROUP: Burch Seeks Overtime Pay under Labor Code
----------------------------------------------------
ALLISON BURCH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. THE GEO GROUP, INC., dba GEO
CALIFORNIA. INC.; GEO CORRECTIONS HOLDINGS, INC.; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. BC720139 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Sept. 1, 2018), alleges that the Defendants failed to
pay wages including overtime as required by the California Labor
Code.

According to the complaint, the Defendants employed Plaintiff and
other persons in the capacity of non-exempt positions, however
titled, throughout the state of California. The Defendants continue
to employ non-exempt employees, however titled, in California and
implement a uniform set of policies and practices to all non-exempt
employees. The Defendants were advised by skilled lawyers and other
professionals, employees, and advisors with knowledge of the
requirements of California's wage and employment laws. The
Defendants compensated Plaintiff and Class Members based upon an
hourly rate. The Defendants failed to provide accurate itemized
wage statements to Plaintiff and Class Members as the wage
statements provided failed to accurately account for all hours
worked. The Defendants failed to keep accurate records pursuant to
California Labor Code.

GEO Group, Inc. is a Florida-based company specializing in
privatized corrections, detention, and mental health treatment,
stress control.  It maintains facilities in North America,
Australia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Allison Burch, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated:

          James R. Hawkins, Esq.
          Gregory Mauro, Esq.
          Michael Calvo, Esq.
          JAMES HAWKINS APLC
          9880 Research Drive, Suite 800
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Telephone: (949) 387 7200
          Facsimile: (949) 387 6676
          E-mail: James@jameshawkinsaplc.com
                  Greg@jameshawkinsaplc.com
                  Michael@jameshawkinsanlc.com


GEORGETOWN SYNAGOGUE: Sanford Seeks Preliminary OK of Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
Attorneys at Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP on Aug. 27 filed for
preliminary approval of a $14.25 million class action settlement in
Jane Doe 2 v. Georgetown Synagogue - Kesher Israel Congregation et
al., pending in D.C. Superior Court.

The class action lawsuit arises from a deplorable betrayal of trust
by disgraced Rabbi Bernard Freundel, a once prominent rabbi who for
years illicitly filmed women as they undressed in a Jewish ritual
bath facility he oversaw, called the National Capital Mikvah. The
U.S. Attorney's Office ultimately confirmed that he filmed over 150
women, and Freundel was convicted of numerous counts of voyeurism.
Women victimized by Freundel filed a class action lawsuit against
him and four religious institutions that he was affiliated with --
The Georgetown Synagogue -- Kesher Israel Congregation, the
National Capital Mikvah, Inc., The Rabbinical Council of America,
Inc., and the Beth Din of the United States of America. These
organizations are the settling defendants in the class action
settlement.

The settlement is a compromise of disputed claims and was reached
only after nearly two years of negotiations with the settling
defendants. The settling defendants did not admit any liability as
part of the settlement and specifically denied any wrongdoing. The
$14.25 million payment will be made by the liability insurer for
several of the settling defendants.

"This settlement will help the many women traumatized by Freundel
avoid the ordeal of protracted litigation -- including its burdens,
risks, costs, and uncertainties," said David Sanford --
dsanford@sanfordheisler.com -- founder of Sanford Heisler Sharp and
Lead Interim Class Counsel for the proposed class. "This settlement
provides an excellent recovery for class members in a complex and
highly sensitive matter."

The class action settlement covers a proposed class of females who
were videotaped by Freundel or otherwise used the National Capital
Mikvah. According to the Settlement, class members who complete
minimal paperwork will receive $25,000 if they were confirmed as
videotaped by the U.S. Attorney's Office, and those who used the
Mikvah but were not confirmed as videotaped will receive $2,500 if
they attest that they experienced emotional distress after learning
about Freundel's videotaping. In addition, these class members will
have the opportunity to recover even larger total payments if they
complete a more detailed Claim Form. To make the Claim Form as easy
to answer as possible, the Claim Form provides class members with
checkboxes to indicate the harms they suffered and does not require
class members to provide any further narrative. The paperwork that
class members must complete in order to obtain payments will be
kept strictly confidential and not provided to the public,
Freundel, or any of the other Defendants.

                 About Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP

Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP is a public interest class-action
litigation law firm with offices in Washington, D.C. and Baltimore,
as well as New York, San Francisco, San Diego, and Nashville.  The
Firm is committed to civil rights and general public interest
cases, representing plaintiffs with claims of employment
discrimination, sexual violence, labor and wage violations,
predatory lending, consumer fraud, and whistleblowing, among other
claims. Along with a focus on class actions, the Firm also
represents individuals and has achieved extraordinary success in
the representation of executives and attorneys in employment
disputes.

For more information go to www.sanfordheisler.com or call (646)
402-5650 or email dsanford@sanfordheisler.com [GN]


GOLDEN QUEEN MINING: Windham Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed Golden Queen Mining Company,
LLC. The case is styled as Ricky Windham, as an individual and on
behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Golden Queen
Mining Company LLC, a California Limited Liability Corporation,
Defendant, Case No. BCV-18-102304 (Cal. Super. Ct., Kern Cty, Sept.
14, 2018).

The case type is stated as "Other employment – Civil Unlimited".

Golden Queen Mining Company, LLC offers exploration and mining of
gold and silver ores. The company was founded in 1985 and is based
in Mojave, California. Golden Queen Mining Company, LLC operates as
a subsidiary of Gauss LLC and Golden Queen Mining Co. Ltd.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Peter M. Hart, Esq.
     Law Office of Peter M Hart
     12121 Wilshire Blvd Ste 725
     Los Angeles, CA 90025-1188
     Phone: (310) 207-2277
     Fax: (509) 561-6411
     E-mail: hartpeter@msn.com



GOLDMAN SACHS: Judge Expresses Doubt on Appeal in Bias Case
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jack Newsham, writing for Law360, reports that a Second Circuit
judge expressed skepticism about Goldman Sachs' arguments on Aug.
28 in the bank's bid to decertify a class of women employees who
claim sex discrimination, saying she wasn't convinced that lower
courts need guidance on applying the U.S. Supreme Court's Dukes
decision in employment class actions.

A Second Circuit judge said she wasn't convinced that a lower
court's class certification decision in a Goldman Sachs sex
discrimination suit merited review.

Circuit Judge Susan Carney was doubtful of Goldman Sachs Group
Inc.'s contention. [GN]


GOOGLE INC: Judge Refuses to Certify AdWords Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
John Breslin, writing for Northern California Record, reports that
a federal judge has refused to certify a class action against
Google because the lead, and only named plaintiff's business
connection with class counsel "creates an intolerable conflict of
interest."

But District Judge Edward Davila at the Northern District of
California did allow the plaintiff, Arkansas attorney Rick Woods,
to add a new representative and make a fresh attempt at
certification.

The case, which centers on claims that Google "bilked" advertisers
into overpaying for its AdWords platform, specifically by
artificially inflating the number of clicks, dates back to early
2011 when Woods first filed his complaint, after retaining the
services of two firms, Taylor Law Partners (TLP) of Fayetteville,
Ark. and Nix, Patterson & Roach of Austin, Texas.

In a motion asking the court to deny class certification, Google
focused on Mr. Woods' relationship with the two firms, and a third
one that later joined the action.

Based almost entirely on the "serious mismatch" between Mr. Woods's
interest and that of others who may be similarly affected, Judge
Davila denied class certification.

"The way that this case unfolded (and that Mr. Woods became
entangled with the lawyers) is somewhat unusual," Davila wrote.

The court papers reveal that Woods, prior to being the
representative in the case, was a debt collection and personal
injury lawyer.

After signing the agreement to act as the representative in the
class action to be led by the two law firms, Mr. Woods was hired as
a partner by TLP. He signed a new agreement with Nix and a third
firm, Kessler Topaz.

The latter agreement including confirmation that Mr. Woods'
"retention of the founding partner at (TLP) as counsel in any
matters pertaining to Google ha[d] been mutually terminated." But
there was no date on this agreement, though it appears it was
executed in 2013, the district court found.

"More troubling, however, is that the new retainer agreement does
not mention TLP's fees and that Woods does not identify any
documentation or other concrete evidence conclusively establishing
that TLP relinquished any fee interest in this action," Judge
Davila wrote.

"If TLP stands to earn a fee if this case is successful, Woods's
status as equity partner at TLP presents a plain conflict of
interests with the class because Woods could receive a portion of
that possibly sizable fee."

It also emerged, as detailed in the court's finding, that TLP was
co-counsel with either Nix Patterson or Kessler Topaz on at least
16 occasions while the Google action continued. This included seven
class actions from which TLP "recovered substantial attorney's fees
and expenses on multiple of these class actions."

The court also had to decide whether to allow Mr. Woods to file an
amended class action complaint with a new named representative.
Google argued against the motion, claiming it would be "highly
prejudicial."

But Judge Davila found that Google had failed for some years to
challenge Woods' ability to adequately represent the interests of
the class. In fact, it only did so in December 2017, after which
his lawyers went looking for another representative.

On March 20, 2018, less than four months after receiving notice of
Google's intent to raise the adequacy issue, Woods filed his motion
for leave to file the third amended class action complaint, Davila
wrote.

"On the facts of this case, four months is a reasonable span of
time to find a new class representative, research his claims, and
draft a motion to amend as well as an updated complaint," he
wrote.

Judge Davila granted Google's motion to deny class certification,
but granted Woods' motion for leave to a file a third amended class
action complaint.

In his initial complaint, Woods claimed that Google and what are
described as "special partners" employ a series of measures
"designed with one goal in mind: to artificially inflate the number
of paying clicks on Google's advertisers' ads."

It continued, "As a result of this unlawful scheme, Google and its
Special Partners have methodically pilfered the advertising budgets
of Google's unwary advertisers by charging for invalid click
activity." [GN]


GREAT AMERICAN: 9th Cir. Vacates Remand of Wage & Hour Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, vacates the
District Court's judgment remanding the action to the Superior
Court in the case captioned CELENA KING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
GREAT AMERICAN CHICKEN CORP, OPINION INC., DBA Kentucky Fried
Chicken, Defendant-Appellant. No. 18-55911. (9th Cir.)

Great American Chicken Corp, Inc. (GAC), which does business in
California as Kentucky Fried Chicken, appeals the district court's
remand of plaintiff Celena King's putative class action to Los
Angeles Superior Court.

King filed a putative class action complaint on behalf of all
non-exempt California GAC employees in the Los Angeles Superior
Court. The complaint alleged various violations of California
wage-and-hour laws.

The question presented in this appeal is whether the district court
correctly found that King met her burden of proving a factual
requirement for remand under these exceptions, specifically that
greater than two-thirds of the putative class members were
California citizens at the time the case was removed to federal
court.

Under CAFA, federal courts have original diversity jurisdiction
over class actions where the aggregate amount in controversy
exceeds $5,000,000, where the putative class size exceeds 100
persons, and where, among other possibilities, any member of a
class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant.

The only issue on appeal is whether King met her burden to
establish that greater than two-thirds of the putative class
members were California citizens as of the date the case became
removable.

Mondragon

In Mondragon, 736 F.3d at 884, the Court vacated an order of remand
based on the local controversy exception in a putative class action
because the plaintiff submitted no evidence regarding the disputed
issue, the citizenship of prospective class members.

The Court was careful to point out that the burden of proof placed
upon a plaintiff should not be exceptionally difficult to bear.
Instead, a district court should consider the entire record' to
determine whether evidence of residency can properly establish
citizenship.

Evidence of citizenship in this case

In the current case, the district court relied in its order of
remand upon the stipulation that at least two-thirds of the
putative class members had last-known addresses in California. To
qualify for remand under the local controversy exception in CAFA,
King had to establish that greater than two-thirds of the class
members were citizens of California.

While King's burden of proof should not be exceptionally difficult
to bear she did not meet it here. In addition to the former
employee identified by GAC in its notice of removal who had become
a citizen of Texas, GAC provided evidence that at least one other
employee permanently moved to Arizona. It seems likely that at
least some others in the group would have moved out of California
as well. Given the class definition, many of the addresses were at
least four years old, and there was evidence that GAC's records
included last-known addresses that were even older.

Moreover, it is not implausible that at least a few GAC employees
were citizens of other states even if they temporarily had a
residential address in California, such as an out-of-state student
working while attending college in California. A person's state of
citizenship is established by domicile, not simply residence, and a
residential address in California does not guarantee that the
person's legal domicile was in California.

Though the Court have concluded that King did not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that greater than two-thirds of the
putative class members were California citizens, it is clear from
the record that King did not have a full opportunity to do so. GAC
resisted King's requests for jurisdictional discovery. The district
court accepted GAC's stipulation instead of permitting King to
pursue that discovery. In its order, the district court expressed
support for allowing King additional jurisdictional discovery, if
necessary. In Mondragon, the Court vacated the district court's
order and remanded with instructions to allow Mondragon an
opportunity, if he so chooses, to renew his motion to remand and to
gather evidence to prove that more than two-thirds of putative
class members are citizens of California. The Court do the same
here. If GAC complains that the burden placed on it is too onerous,
it is free to propose a stipulation that would better address
King's burden.

The district court's finding that King proved by a preponderance of
the evidence that greater than two-thirds of the putative class
members were California citizens was not supported by sufficient
evidence. The order of remand must be vacated. On remand to the
district court, however, King should be given an opportunity to
seek additional jurisdictional discovery and to renew her motion to
remand.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's September 6, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yd3ot32y from Leagle.com.


GREAT AMERICAN: Remand of King's Suit to L.A. Superior Ct. Vacated
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CELENA KING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GREAT AMERICAN
CHICKEN CORP, OPINION INC., DBA Kentucky Fried Chicken,
Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 18-55911 (9th Cir.), Judge Richard
Clifton of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated
the district court's remand of King's putative class action to Los
Angeles Superior Court.  

Defendant GAC, which does business in California as Kentucky Fried
Chicken, appeals the district court's remand of the class action to
Los Angeles Superior Court.  The action was originally filed in
that court and removed to federal court by GAC under the Class
Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").

It is undisputed that removal under CAFA was proper here, but King
sought remand to state court based on the local controversy or
home-state controversy exception to CAFA jurisdiction.  The
question presented in the appeal is whether the district court
correctly found that King met her burden of proving a factual
requirement for remand under these exceptions, specifically that
greater than two-thirds of the putative class members were
California citizens at the time the case was removed to federal
court.

After GAC removed the case to federal court, King sought discovery
from GAC relevant to that factual question.  It resisted King's
discovery requests.  In lieu of providing responses to the
requests, GAC proposed a stipulation that at least two-thirds
(sometimes expressed as at least 67%) of the putative class members
under the definition proposed by King -- current and former GAC
employees -- had last-known addresses in California.  King declined
GAC's proposal, but the district court held that the stipulation
resolved the discovery dispute and ordered that it be accepted.
Subsequently, based on the stipulation and other inferences, the
district court granted King's motion to remand, finding King had
made the necessary factual showing.

Judge Clifton explains that King had the burden to prove that
greater than two-thirds of the putative class members were citizens
of California.  The stipulation left very little cushion, if any,
to account for former employees who were not domiciled in
California at the time the case was removed to federal court,
because, for example, they had moved to another state.  Similarly,
there was little margin to cover employees who may have had
last-known addresses in California but who did not qualify as
citizens of California because they were not citizens of the United
States.  There was no evidentiary basis for the district court to
find that subtracting those groups would not reduce the fraction of
class members that were California citizens at the time of removal
to a level less than the required greater than two-thirds.  

Because there was no other evidence before the district court on
that subject, the finding that more than two-thirds of the putative
class members were citizens of California at the time of removal
was clearly erroneous.  The order of remand to state court must be
vacated, and the case must be remanded to federal district court
for further proceedings.  In district court, however, King should
be permitted to conduct jurisdictional discovery in this matter and
to renew her motion to remand.

Accordingly, Judge Clifton vacated the district court's remand of
King's putative class action to Los Angeles Superior Court, and
remanded for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/xAP77U from Leagle.com.


GREYSTAR REAL ESTATE: Faces Young Suit in S.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Greystar Real Estate
Partners, LLC. The case is styled as Jonathan Young individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC, doing business as: Dylan Point
Loma Apartments, Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-02149-BEN-AGS (S.D.
Cal., Sept. 14, 2018).

This is a civil rights case filed over Group Health Insurance.

Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC, an integrated real estate
company, provides management, development and investment services
for residential properties in the United States and
internationally. It offers property management services that
include national property management, due diligence services,
financial services, construction management, master insurance
programs, procurement, information technology, education and
training, and marketing and communications; and development and
construction services for multifamily projects.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Matthew M. Loker, Esq.
     Kazerouni Law Group, APC
     245 Fischer Avenue
     Unit D1
     Costa Mesa, CA 92626
     Phone: (800) 400-6808
     Fax: (800) 520-5523
     Email: ml@kazlg.com



HARDEE'S RESTAURANTS: Customers Sue After Hepatitis A Outbreak
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kirstin Garriss, writing for Charlotte Spectrum News, reports that
two customers among the thousands potentially exposed to Hepatitis
A at a West Charlotte Hardee's restaurant have filed a class action
lawsuit against the chain.

   -- Lawsuit was initially filed in July in the county, but moved
to federal court

   -- Lawsuit states customers potentially impacted are living with
"severe emotional and mental anguish

   -- Two customers are asking for an excess of $25,000 in damages

The lawsuit was initially filed in July in Mecklenburg County but
now, the case hs been moved to federal court.

The Mecklenburg County Health Department gave out free vaccinations
to more than 2,100 people during the health scare this summer.     
  

The Hardee's employee who tested positive of Hepatitis A is one of
19 confirmed cases in Mecklenburg County so far this year.

"That's why we're considering this an outbreak. That's a larger
number than we normally have," said Mecklenburg County Health
Director Gibbie Harris.

The lawsuit states these customers, and the thousands of other
people potentially affected by this outbreak, are living with
"severe emotional and mental anguish," because of Hardee's
negligence. Both customers received a vaccine this summer and were
advised to receive a second one in six months.

"The first dose gives them about 90 to 95 percent coverage and it's
good for up to ten years but if they get that second dose, that
bumps up to almost 100 percent coverage and they're good for a
lifetime," said Harris.

As of right now, director Harris says there haven't been any new
confirmed cases of Hepatitis A following this specific incident at
Hardee's.

The two customers are asking for an excess of $25,000 in damages
for negligence and other two other listed failures by the company.
The lawsuit names CKE Restaurants Holdings, Inc. which owns,
operates and franchises thousands of Hardee's chains in the country
as well as Food Systems, LLC; Hardee's Restaurants, LLC; and
Morning Star NC, LLC.

Spectrum News reached out to CKE Restaurants Holdings, Inc. along
with the attorney representing the other companies named in this
lawsuit, but we haven't gotten a response.[GN]


HARRIS & HARRIS: Espinal Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Harris & Harris, Ltd.
The case is styled as Jennifer Espinal individually and on behalf
of all those similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Harris & Harris,
Ltd., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-08400 (S.D. N.Y., Sept. 14,
2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Founded in 1968 and based in Chicago, Illinois, Harris & Harris,
Ltd. operates as a collection agency and law firm. It offers
outstanding accounts receivable services. The company also focuses
on litigation management, disaster recovery, debt purchasing, asset
identification, commercial insurance resolution, and primary and
secondary contingency collection activities. It serves government
agencies, and utility and healthcare industries in the United
States.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Sanders Law, PLLC
     100 Garden City PLaza, Ste 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: csanders@sanderslawpllc.com


HEALTH NET: Misrepresents Quality of Health Plans, Poe Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM POE, individually, and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. HEALTH NET, INC.; HEALTH NET COMMUNITY
SOLUTIONS, INC.; HEALTH NET OF CALIFORNIA, INC.; CENTENE
CORPORATION; CENTENE MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC; DOES 1 through 1000,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. BC719420 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sep.
1, 2018), alleges that Defendants have fraudulently accumulated
long list of purportedly available healthcare providers in their
directories by using a variety of methods in violation of the
Consumer Legal Remedies Act.

The Defendants attract healthcare providers by misrepresenting the
quality of their health plans and their reimbursement policies.
After healthcare providers "sign up" to participate in the health
plans offered by the Defendants, they soon realize that due to the
corrupt business practices of the Defendants, those health plans do
not generate significant revenue for the healthcare providers.
Thereafter, the healthcare providers who bad initially participated
in one of the health plans offered by the defendants then decide
that they will no longer accept patients in those health plans. At
that point, even though the Defendants know that certain healthcare
providers have abandoned their health plans, they nevertheless
continue to publish the names of those healthcare providers in
their paper directory and in their electronic directory.

According to the complaint, the Defendants provide health insurance
to rail millions of individuals throughout California and the
United States. In the last decade or more, they have greatly
expanded their profits through a consistent pattern of fraudulent
and deceptive tactics. They have raised the art and science of
corrupt business practices to an entirely new level of
sophistication. In a nutshell, this litigation arises out of the
efforts of Defendants to reformulate the well-known scam of
"selling the Brooklyn Bridge" so it can be applied in the arena of
healthcare services. In so doing, they are exploiting the
vulnerable conditions of millions of low income individuals and
injuring their health.

As a result of the Defendants' wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and
others similarly situated have suffered losses including, but not
limited to, the following: damage to health status; pain and
suffering; impairment in the ability to obtain medical services in
the future; monetary losses; and additional general damages.

Centene is a provider of health insurance services to low income
individuals throughout the United States. This company is currently
valued in excess of S40 billion, and it posted revenues in excess
of $14 billion in the second quarter of 2018.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert C. Moest, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT C. MOEST
          13210 Harbor Blvd., No. 405
          Garden Grove, CA 92843 1737
          Telephone: (310) 915 6628


HILTON MANAGEMENT: Hernandez Seeks Minimum Wage & Overtime
----------------------------------------------------------
CARLOS HERNANDEZ; MIGUEL HERNANDEZ, the Plaintiff, v. HILTON
MANAGEMENT LLC; HILTON WORLDWIDE, INC.; HILTON DOMESTIC OPERATING
COMPANY LLC; and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No.
BC720343 (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 31, 2018), seeks civil penalties,
reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and any other applicable relief
based on the Defendants' failure to pay employees for all hours
worked the minimum wage and/or applicable overtime rates of pay,
failure to include all remuneration when calculating, the
applicable overtime rate of pay, failure to provide legally
compliant meal periods and/or pay meal period premium wages, and
failure to provide legally compliant rest breaks and/or pay rest
break premium wage.

Hilton Management manages and operates hotels and resorts.  The
company was incorporated in 2007 and is based in McLean,
Virginia.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Joseph Lavi, Esq.
          Anwar D. Burton, Esq.
          LAVI & EBRAHIMIAN, LLP
          8889 W. Olympic Blvd. Suite 200
          Beverly Hills, CA 90211
          Telephone: (310) 432 0000
          Facsimile: (310) 432 0001
          E-mail: jlavi@lela-wfirm.com
                  aburton@lelawfirm.com


HMR OF ALABAMA: Dismissal of Cooley FLSA Suit Partly Reversed
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, affirmed in
part and reversed in part the District Court's judgment granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned JACQUELINE COOLEY,
HEATHER ADAMS, ROSIE BOYD, EBONY BYERS, SHAKELIA CALHOUN, KIMBERLY
CAMPBELL, MYRANIA CARLTON, JEWELL CHANDLER, JALYSA EMBRY, APRIL
EVANS, VONCEL FREEMAN, LEASA GOWERS, TASHA HARRIS, CECELIA HAWKINS,
ELLEON HERRING, ALMELIA HILL, JOHNNIE HOLLIS, SHANELLE HURRELL,
REGINA ISAAC, TRAVIS IVY, ANGELA JONES, SANTRECIA KELLY, SARAH
MARBURY, ANGELA MCCRAY, MARGARET MIXON, VANESSA MOTEN, PATRICIA
PARKS, DENETHA PETTY, BETTY PHILLIPS, PATRICIA ROBINSON, TOINETTA
SUTTON, CHERVON TANNER, TRENEIA TOYER, CLARISSA TRUSS, SUJUTORIA
TRUSS, CAMEKA TURNER, DAVID VAUGHAN, DEBRA VAUGHAN, JILL VAUGHAN,
PATRICIA WALLACE, CONSTANCE WILLIAMS, ANGELA WILSON, RUBY WILSON,
ANDREA WOOD, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HMR OF ALABAMA, INC., d.b.a.
Robert L. Howard Veterans Home, Defendant-Appellee. No. 18-10657
(11th Cir.).

The Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their Fair Labor Standards
Act and state law claims for unpaid overtime and gap time wages.

All of the plaintiffs work for HMR at Robert L. Howard Veterans
Home. Thirty-three of the plaintiffs are certified nursing
assistants or CNAs; three are licensed practical nurses or LPNs and
eight hold dual positions, such as CNA/Concierge and Driver/Driver
Coordinator. The employees alleged that they had worked without
compensation during their meal breaks for the past six years.

The district court dismissed with prejudice the amended complaint,
finding that the employees failed to allege essential elements of
their FLSA and state law claims. For the FLSA count, it found that
they failed to adequately identify the type of compensable work
performed during breaks. And for the quantum meruit claim it found
that they failed to plead that they expected compensation for work
performed during meal breaks.

To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need not give
detailed factual allegations, but the complaint must provide the
grounds of his entitlement to relief and include more than labels
and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action.

HMR argues that the phrases caring for patient needs and tending to
patients are nothing more than generic job descriptions and for
that reason are not specific enough to state a claim under Twombly
and Iqbal. The allegation that each employee was caring for patient
needs and tending to patients, when combined with each employee's
specific job title, is more than a formulaic recitation of the
elements of an FLSA claim and is enough to give the defendant fair
notice of the employees' claims and the grounds upon which they
rest.  

Because the amended complaint states plausible claims under the
FLSA, the district court erred by dismissing with prejudice the
FLSA count.

The employees also contend that the district court erred by
dismissing with prejudice their state law claim for
quasi-contract/work and labor done/quantum meruit. To raise a valid
claim on those theories under Alabama law, the employees had to
plead, among other things, that they reasonably expected to be
compensated for work performed during meal breaks. The employees
argue that the district court should have inferred that expectation
from the facts in the amended complaint. But they never argued that
inference in the district court.

Instead, after HMR moved to dismiss the claim based on the
employees' failure to plead that they reasonably expected to be
compensated, the employees' only argument was that Alabama's form
pleading for quantum meruit does not include any language requiring
that the Plaintiffs expected compensation. Because they did not
fairly present it in the district court, their argument that an
expectation should be inferred is waived.  

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's September 6, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9w7nzvj from Leagle.com.

Michael K. Beard, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Richard J. Riley -- RRiley@MurphyRiley.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Wesley C. Redmond -- wredmond@fordharrison.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Kira Yalon Fonteneau, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Allen Durham Arnold, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Susan Ware Bullock -- sbullock@fordharrison.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Jane Fulton Mauzy, for Plaintiff-Appellant.


JUUL LABS: Faces Class Action Lawsuit Over Nicotine Levels
----------------------------------------------------------
Mari A. Schaefer, writing for The Inquirer Daily News Philly.com,
reports that the maker of the popular e-cigarette Juul has been
sued in a Philadelphia federal court by users who allege the
company has violated consumer protections laws, engaged in
deceptive marketing and failed to include warnings about the level
of nicotine the product delivers.

The class action complaint was filed Aug. 31 on behalf of four
plaintiffs and others in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The
plaintiffs are seeking monetary damages and asks that Juul change
its marketing and product, according to court papers.

"We do anticipate amending the complaint to add many more state
classes," said Russell Paul, Esq. -- rpaul@bm.net -- an attorney
representing the plaintiffs. "People are reaching out to us from
all over."

A similar lawsuit was filed in New York in July, the Washington
Post reported.

The Philadelphia lawsuit alleges the company markets on social
media sites frequented by children including Twitter, Instagram and
Facebook. It claims the company is aware youths "discuss and
promote" the product through the use of hashtags and comments to ad
campaigns on social media.

"JUUL Labs does not believe the cases have merit and will be
defending them vigorously," stated Victoria Davis, a spokesperson
for the company.

The San Francisco-based firm is a spinoff of Pax Labs, which is
also named in the lawsuit. The company was founded in 2007 by two
Stanford University design students and has seen the use of its
trendy product skyrocket.

Juul has captured about 68 percent of the U.S. e-cigarette market
and is valued at $15 billion, Bloomberg reported in June.

"We are not familiar with the lawsuit, but we are very concerned
that Juul and other e-cigarette products are attracting young
people into nicotine addiction," Thomas Farley, Philadelphia's
health commissioner, said on September 7.

The digital-like design and tiny pods filled with flavored nicotine
juice have caught on fast with the under-18 set. The device
resembles a computer thumb drive, making it easily concealable,.
Some school districts have even banned the use of real USB drives
on campus.

"Kids are smoking in class, that is how easy it is," said Aaron J.
Freiwald, Esq.-- ajf@freiwaldlaw.com-- one of the attorneys
representing the plaintiffs.  Parents are not even aware their
children are using the product, he said

One Juul pod delivers about 200 puffs or as much nicotine as a pack
of cigarettes, the lawsuit states.

One of the plaintiffs, David Lechtzin, was 17-year-old high school
student in Huntingdon Valley, when he was introduced to the
e-cigarettes at a party. Before he was able to buy them on his own,
he got the pods from his older friends. He saw Instagram posts that
portrayed Juul as "cool," according to the lawsuit.

Lechtzin claimed that when he first began using Juuls he was not
aware now much nicotine they contained. At that time, the device
and packaging did not contain any warnings about nicotine. He now
uses at least four pods a week and considers himself an addict.
Lechtzin would not have tried Juul had he known they contained
nicotine, according to the lawsuit.

Juul recently has been advertising in newspapers, including The
Inquirer, stating that its product is intended for adults.

Another plaintiff, David Masessa of Chatham, N.J., began using Juul
in 2015 in an effort to stop smoking cigarettes. He had been
smoking up to a pack a day and saw claims in online publications
and on the Juul website that using the pods would help wean him off
cigarettes and other nicotine products. Masessa now believes he is
addicted to using Juuls and uses one pod every two to four days.

The suit states that Juuls deliver "dangerous toxins and
carcinogens to its users," an assertion the company has disputed.
Research on the products — both on its possible dangers and on
whether it helps people quit smoking cigarettes — is ongoing.

Exposure to nicotine increased the risk of coronary vascular
disease and peripheral artery disease. In addition, the act of
inhaling the vapors, or vaping, introduces foreign substances into
the lungs and with prolonged use may result in chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, the suit claims.

"There is a lot more science coming out as the product becomes more
widely used," said Freiwald. "The claim that this is a safer
alternative, is false."

A study in the journal Tobacco Control, released on September 7,
looked at the nicotine exposure of 506 adolescent e-cigarette
users, specifically those using Juuls and other vape pod systems.
The researchers found levels of a byproduct of nicotine metabolism
in the study group's urine that were higher than what has been
reported among adolescent cigarette smokers. The finding "raises
significant concerns about the risk of nicotine addiction and long
term product use," said Rachel Boykan, a pediatrician at Stony
Brook Children's Hospital in New York and the study's principal
investigator.[GN]


JUUL LABS: Viscomi et al. Sue over Sale of e-Cigarette & Pods
-------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL VISCOMI, DAVID MASESSA, MATTHEW PEDECINE AND DAVID
LECHTZIN, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated,
the Plaintiffs, v. JUUL LABS, INC. and PAX LABS, INC., the
Defendants, Case No. 5:18-cv-03760-EGS (E.D. Pa, Aug. 31, 2018),
alleges that Defendants violated the Pennsylvania and New Jersey
Consumer Protection laws; committed negligence, fraud and unjust
enrichment; failed to warn; and breached implied and express
warranties regarding the sale and use of JUUL e-cigarette and/or
JUUL Pods in Pennsylvania, including to minors.

According to the complaint, the case arises out of Defendants'
false and deceptive sale, marketing, labelling and advertising of
JUUL e-cigarette devices and JUUL pods which came into the market
in 2015. This device has been called the "health problem of the
decade." E-cigarettes, also known as vapes, are battery-operated
devices that heat up liquid nicotine to generate an aerosol that
users inhale. Although Defendants claim that the device is intended
exclusively for adult use, the devices appeals to youth because it
can be easily charged on a laptop, its decal covers come in
colorful designs, and the pods are available in different flavors.
Moreover, using e-cigarettes is more discreet and easier to hide
than traditional cigarettes, particularly for teens at school or at
home and young adults.

To use one JUUL pod, the nicotine cartridge is inserted into the
device and heated. It delivers about 200 puffs, which delivers
approximately as much nicotine as a pack of cigarettes, according
to the product website. Thus, if a teen consumes one pod a week, in
five weeks, it is equivalent to about 100 cigarettes (5 packs of
cigarettes). This makes the teen equivalent to an established
smoker. Medical professionals and public health advocates say that
the e-cigarette trend reminds them of the heyday of cigarettes,
when smoking behind school buildings and in parking lots was in
vogue. However, the risks here are magnified because, unlike
traditional cigarettes, JUUL can be used indoors without anyone
noticing. It also packs a more powerful nicotine punch than
traditional cigarettes because JUUL contains roughly twice the
nicotine concentration as cigarettes and other vape pens.

The lawsuit notes that Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL) and 10 other
Senators have sent two letters to JUUL saying that their products
"are undermining our nation's efforts to reduce tobacco use among
youth." The Plaintiffs allege that Defendants knew that JCUL
e-cigarettes were not safe under any circumstances for non-smokers
and posed a risk of aggravating nicotine addiction in those already
addicted to nicotine. Defendants also knew that JUCL's nicotine
solution could deliver more nicotine into the bloodstream than a
cigarette, and did so more quickly than a cigarette. Defendants
were under a duty to disclose these material facts, but never did
so. Instead, they continued to disseminate false, misleading and
deceitful information to Plaintiffs and the public on JUUL's
website, in interviews, advertisements and through social media.
Defendants created an online culture and community targeted to
young people and designed to encourage use of their products.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Classes:

          Sherrie R. Savett, Esq.
          Barbara A. Podell, Esq.
          Russell D. Paul, Esq.
          BERGER MONTAGUE P.C.
          1818 Market Street, Suite 3600
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 875-3000
          E-mail: ssavett@bm.net
                  bpodell@bm.net
                  rpaul@bm.net

               - and -

          Aaron J. Freiwald, Esq.
          FREIW ALD LAW
          1500 Walnut Street, 18th Floor
          Philadelphia, PA 191 02
          Telephone: (215) 875 8000
          E-mail: ajf@freiwaldlaw.com


KASHIA SERVICES: RICO Class Action Targets Lending Service
----------------------------------------------------------
Bree Gonzales, writing for Penn Record, reports that  a
Pennsylvania resident has filed a class action lawsuit against
Derrick J. Franklin, Alyssa Franklin, Reno Keoni Franklin, Dino
Franklin Jr. and Brandon Wilder, employees of Kashia Services,
citing alleged violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act.

Isiah A. Jones III filed a complaint on behalf of all others
similarly situated on July 17 in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the defendants, alleging
that they participated in a RICO conspiracy by operating an
enterprise through the collection of unlawful debt.

Kashia Services operates an online lending service owned by the
Kashia Band of Pomo Indians of the Stewarts Point Rancheria.

Jones accuses the defendants of violating RICO, the
Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) and the Pennsylvania Loan Interest and
Protection Law (LIPL).

The plaintiff alleges that in December 2017, he was issued a $500
loan at a rate of interest believed to be in excess of 700% APR
from Kashia Services.

Payments were due weekly and were made by allowing Kashia Services
to make automatic ACH withdrawals from his bank account.

He had fallen behind and entered into a second loan transaction to
refinance the balance. The second loan dated March 5, was for
$598.44 at 775.81% A.P.R. The loan calls for weekly payments of
$90.01 until December 28, for a total of $3,804.53.

Plaintiff made payments on the loans from December 2017 until May
2018 and then refused to pay more. At that point, plaintiff had
paid Kashia Services a total of $1,530.73 on a $500 loan, so he had
paid about $1,000 more than he borrowed, he says.

The plaintiff holds Derrick J. Franklin, Alyssa Franklin, Reno
Keoni Franklin, Dino Franklin Jr and Brandon Wilder responsible
because the defendants allegedly under Pennsylvania law, were not
allowed to charge plaintiff more than 6% annual interest, 41 P.S.
§ 201, and at that rate, most of the funds plaintiff paid in
excess of the loan was usurious interest.

Furthermore, defendants are participants along with others in a
conspiracy to operate one or more business entities that make loans
online to residents of Pennsylvania in violation of Pennsylvania's
usury laws and banking regulations, according to the lawsuit.

The plaintiff requests a trial by jury and seeks an award of actual
and statutory damages, attorney's fees and costs, and any other
relief that is just and appropriate. He is represented by Robert F.
Salvin, Esq. in Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania.

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Case
number 2:18-cv-02982-JS [GN]


KATE SOMMERVILLE: Kiler Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Kate Somerville
Skincare, LLC. The case is styled as Marion Kiler individually and
as the representative of a class of similarly situated persons,
Plaintiff v. Kate Somerville Skincare, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-05192 (E.D. N.Y., Sept. 14, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990.

Kate Somerville Skincare, LLC manufactures and sells skin care
products. The company offers cleansers and toners, exfoliators and
masks, serums and treatments, moisturizers, protection, eye
treatments, and acne solutions for skin concerns, such as acne,
anti-aging, anti-aging and acne, sensitive, discoloration, dry, and
oily. It also provides exfoliating, moisturizing, and protecting
products for the body; and travel sets. It operates a skin care
clinic in Los Angeles, California and sells its products through
stores throughout the United States, as well as an online store.

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


KENTUCKY FRIED: Appeals Court Sends Suit Back to District Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
Charmaine Little, writing for Northern California Record, reports
that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded a
class action lawsuit on Sept. 6 against Great American Chicken
Corp. after it failed to meet a residency rule for class action
members.

Circuit Judge Richard R. Clifton authored the opinion. Circuit
Judge Morgan B. Christen and District Judge Cynthia M. Rufe
concurred.

Celena King, who sued the Great American Chicken Corp., also known
as Kentucky Fried Chicken, failed to prove that at least two-thirds
of the class action members were California citizens when the class
action was remanded from federal court to Los Angeles Superior
Court.

The lawsuit is over alleged violations of state labor and wage
laws.

Kentucky Fried Chicken had removed the lawsuit to federal court
from superior court, under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).

While both parties agreed to the removal via CAFA, the plaintiff
had wanted to remand the case to the state court under the local
controversy or home-state controversy exception of the CAFA
jurisdiction.

The ultimate question of whether King could remand the case was
based on whether she proved more than two-thirds of the class
members were California citizens when it was removed to federal
court.

While the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California granted King's remand and removed the lawsuit to state
court after it determined she met her burden of approval, the
appeals court disagreed.

It said there wasn't enough evidence to prove that eliminating
those who might have had last-known addresses in the state, but
weren't actually state citizens because they weren't even U.S.
citizens, would mean that King still met her requirement.

"Because there was no other evidence before the district court on
the subject, the finding that more than two-thirds of the putative
class members were citizens of California at the time of removal
was clearly erroneous."

The appeals court vacated the remand of the case to the state court
and remanded it back to federal district court. Still, it also
added King will be allowed to have proper jurisdictional discovery
to renew her motion to remand the case to the state court.[GN]


KNORR-BREMSE: Wells Suit over "No Poach" Deal Moved to W.D. Pa.
---------------------------------------------------------------
BYRON K. WELLS, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, the Plaintiff, v. KNORR-BREMSE AG, KNORR BRAKE COMPANY,
NEW YORK AIR BRAKE LLC, WESTINGHOUSE AIR BRAKE TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION, and FAIVELEY TRANSPORT NORTH AMERICA, INC., the
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-02256, was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland, to the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh). The
Pennsylvania Western District Court clerk assigned Case No.
2:18-cv-01199-JFC to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Joy Flowers Conti.

According to the complaints, the Defendants, through "no poach"
agreements entered into without the knowledge of their employees,
collectively agreed not to solicit or recruit each other's
employees, hire each other's employees without prior approval, or
otherwise compete for employees. Rail equipment employees, like
employees in any labor market, benefit when their employers compete
for their services. Competition among employers leads to greater
negotiating leverage for employees, which in turn leads to higher
wages and greater mobility. The Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants
responsible for entering into unlawful agreements to restrain
competition in the labor market for rail-equipment-service
employees.

The Defendants Knorr and Wabtec, along with their respective
subsidiaries, are each other's top competitors for passenger and
freight rail equipment. Prior to Faiveley's acquisition by Wabtec
in November 2016, Faiveley also competed with Knorr and Wabtec to
attract, hire, and retain employees. Thus, Defendants competed with
each other to attract, hire, and retain various employees,
including rail-equipment industry project managers, engineers,
sales executives, business unit heads, and corporate officers.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Nicholas A. Migliaccio, Esq.
          Jason S. Rathod, Esq.
          MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP
          412 H Street NE, Suite 302
          Washington, DC 20002
          Telephone: (202) 470 3520
          Facsimile: (202) 800 2730
          E-mail: nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com
                  jrathod@classlawdc.com

               - and -

          Daniel E. Gustafson, Esq.
          Daniel C. Hedlund, Esq.
          Catherine K. Smith, Esq.
          Brittany N. Resch, Esq.
          GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC
          Canadian Pacific Plaza
          120 South Sixth Street, Suite 2600
          Minneapolis, MN
          Telephone: (612) 333 8844
          Facsimile: (612) 339 6622
          E-mail: dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com
                  dhedlund@gustafsongluek.com
                  csmith@gustafsongluek.com
                  bresch@gustafsongluek.com

               - and -

          Richard M. Paul, III, Esq.
          Ashlea G. Schwarz, Esq.
          PAUL LLP
          601 Walnut Street, Suite 300
          Kansas City, MO 64106
          Telephone: (816) 984 8103
          Facsimile: (816) 984 8101
          E-mail: Rick@PaulLLP.com
                  Ashlea@PaulLLP.com

               - and -

          Kevin Landau, Esq.
          Tess Bonoli, Esq.
          TAUS, CEBULASH &
          LANDAU, LLP
          80 Maiden Lane, Suite 1204
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 931 0704
          Facsimile: (212) 931 0703
          E-mail: klandau@tcllaw.com
                  tbonoli@tcllaw.com

               - and -

          Brian Douglas Penny, Esq.
          GOLDMAN SCARLATO & PENNY, P.C.
          Eight Tower Bridge, Suite 1025
          161 Washington Street
          Conshohocken, PA 19428
          Telephone: (484) 342 0700
          Facsimile: (484) 580 8747
          E-mail: penny@lawgsp.com

               - and -

          Simon B. Paris, Esq.
          Patrick Howard, Esq.
          SALTZ, MONGELUZZI,
          BARRETT & BENDESKY, P.C.
          1650 Market Street, 52nd Floor
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 496 8282
          Facsimile: (215) 496 0999
          E-mail: sparis@smbb.com
                  phoward@smbb.com

               - and -

          Dianne M Nast, Esq.
          NAST LAW LLC
          1101 Market Street, Suite 2801
          Philadelphia, PA 19108
          Telephone: (215) 923 9300
          Facsimile: (215) 923 9302
          E-mail: dnast@nastlaw.com


LIFE IS GOOD: Martinez Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Life is Good
Company. The case is styled as Pedro Martinez individually and as
the representative of a class of similarly situated persons,
Plaintiff v. The Life is Good Company, Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-05191 (E.D. N.Y., Sept. 14, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990.

The Life Is Good Company is an American apparel and accessories
wholesaler, retailer, and lifestyle brand founded in 1994 and best
known for its optimistic T-shirts and hats, many of which feature a
smiling stick figure named Jake and the registered trademark "Life
is good".

The Plaintiff appears pro se.



LOGMEIN INC: Block & Leviton Files Securities Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Block & Leviton LLP, a securities litigation firm representing
investors nationwide, disclosed that a securities fraud class
action has been filed against LogMeIn, Inc. ("LogMeIn" or the
"Company") (NASDAQ:LOGM) and certain of its officers alleging
violations of the federal securities laws. Block & Leviton
encourages shareholders to contact the Firm ahead of the October
19, 2018 lead plaintiff deadline.

On July 26, 2018, LogMeIn's CEO, William Wagner, stated that a
"combination of imperfect execution and some hangover effects of
last year's merger with the GoTo business led to disappointing
renewal rates." On this news, LogMeIn stock dropped $26.60 per
share or over 25% to close at $77.85 on July 27, 2018.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) LogMeIn's business practices had negatively
impacted renewal rates for certain of its services; and (2) as a
result, defendants' public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

If you purchased LOGM shares between March 1, 2017 and July 26,
2018 and wish to serve as a lead plaintiff, you must move the Court
no later than October 19, 2018. As a member of the class, you may
seek to file a motion to serve as a lead plaintiff or take no
action and remain an absent class member. If you wish to become
involved in the litigation or have questions about your legal
rights, you are encouraged to contact Attorney John DeFelice at
(888) 868-2385, by email at john@blockesq.com or by visiting
http://shareholder.law/logmein.

Confidentiality to whistleblowers or others with information
relevant to this investigation is assured.

         John DeFelice, Esq.
         BLOCK & LEVITON LLP
         155 Federal Street, Suite 400
         Boston, MA 02110
         Telephone: (617) 398-5600
         Email: john@blockesq.com [GN]


LOUISIANA: Public Defender Lawsuit Gets Class-Action Status
-----------------------------------------------------------
Natalie Schwartz, writing for Daily Comet.com, reports that a
district judge has granted class-action status to a lawsuit
claiming the state is violating the constitutional rights of poor
defendants by overburdening their public defenders.

Any adult in the state assigned a public defender is eligible for
the class action, except those facing charges punishable by the
death penalty.

The lawsuit, filed by the Southern Poverty Law Center, seeks to
overhaul the Louisiana public defender system's high caseloads and
its unique reliance on fines from traffic tickets and convictions
for its revenue, which can vary unpredictably year to year.

No other state relies primarily on court fees and fines to pay for
its public defender system, according to the lawsuit, and the
Louisiana Public Defender Board described the money stream as
"unreliable, unstable and insufficient" in its 2017 annual report.

"How am I going to say go write more tickets so I can get more
money?" said Lafourche Chief Public Defender Mark Plaisance. "I
can't do that, nor will I do that. ... Ultimately, the Legislature
is going to have decide, amongst all the other issues, how they are
going to fund public defender services."

However, Plaisance said he had several issues with the lawsuit,
including that it mentioned individual districts -- including
Lafourche Parish -- in the complaint.

"There is now a conflict, because how can an attorney go to court
to represent an individual who is part of a group that is claiming
they are ineffective?" Plaisance said. "It puts the lawyers in an
ethical and professional quandary."

In its argument, the lawsuit notes how some annual revenues for
public defender offices are dwarfed by revenues for district
attorney offices.

In Lafourche, for example, the Public Defender's Office has
received -- for at least the past decade -- revenues that equal
roughly 20 percent of what the District Attorney's Office has
received. And in Terrebonne, public defenders have typically
received revenues amounting to about 30 percent of what the
District Attorney's Office received in the past few years.

However, Plaisance argued the Lafourche Public Defender's Office
hasn't been ineffective.

"We certainly could use more money -- I'm not going to say we
can't," Plaisance said. "In Lafourche we run an extremely tight
ship. We're very effective in what we do and what we got."

Terrebonne Chief Public Defender Anthony Champagne couldn't be
reached for comment.

The lawsuit also notes the high caseloads many of the state's
public defenders have.

Although the Louisiana Public Defender Board has adopted maximum
caseload standards that are higher than national and some states
standards, the lawsuit says "nearly all district defender offices
annually exceed LPDB caseload standards."

In 2017, Lafourche public defenders had about three times the
caseloads recommended by the board for each attorney, marking an
increase over the office's 2016 numbers. But it was a drop from a
high point in 2012 when attorneys were handling 4.5 times the
recommended amount of cases, according to the the state board's
annual report.

But Plaisance said he disagrees with how the state counts
caseloads. Rather than count cases per person, he said, the state
counts caseloads per charge, meaning someone who was arrested on
multiple charges would count as multiple cases.

"I'm not saying we might not be above the curve -- we probably are
... (but) you can skew statistics any way you wanted to make your
story," Plaisance said.

And in Terrebonne, public defenders reported handling about 2.3
times more caseloads in 2017 than the state's recommended level,
according the report. Since 2010, the Terrebonne office has
reported caseload numbers between 1.48 times and 2.65 times the
recommended level.

For the Southern Poverty Law Center, the class action status marks
a victory.

"The decision represents a significant step forward in the battle
against mass incarceration," the group wrote on its website. "It is
also an unequivocal statement by the Louisiana judiciary that it
will not turn a blind eye to the inadequacies of a funding scheme
that relies primarily on fines and fees generated through traffic
tickets and sentences that are imposed on poor people."

The case goes to trial in January.[GN]


MABVAX THERAPEUTICS: Court Consolidates Securities Fraud Suits
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion for
Consolidation in the cases captioned  LIAM HARDY, Plaintiff, v.
MABVAX THERAPEUTICS HOLDINGS, et al., Defendants. JERRY VINSON,
Plaintiff, v. MABVAX THERAPEUTICS HOLDINGS, et al., Defendants.
Case Nos. 18-cv-01160-BAS-NLS, 18-cv-01819-BAS-NLS (S.D. Cal.).

Defendant Gregory P. Hanson, Sandor Capital Master Fund, JSL Kids
Partners, and John Lemak move, as the Lemak Investor Group (Lemak)
moved to consolidate complaints in two actions against MabVax, Liam
Hardy v. MabVax Therapeutics, et al., No. 18-cv-01160-BAS-NLS, and
Jerry Vinson v. MabVax Therapeutics, et al., No.
18-cv-01819-BAS-NLS.

This is a federal securities class action pertaining to allegedly
false and misleading statements made by Defendant MabVax
Therapeutics Holdings (MabVax), an entity whose subsidiaries
develop human anti-body based products and vaccines to address
medical needs and treatment of certain diseases.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) generally permits a district
court to consolidate actions when the actions involve a common
question of law or fact.

Lemak has moved to consolidate the Hardy and Vinson actions. Both
complaints allege claims against the same three defendants pursuant
to Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
based on alleged false or misleading representations about MadVax's
internal controls over financial reporting as well as MadVax's
alleged incorrect calculation and reporting of beneficial ownership
of MabVax shares and permitting the exercise of improper influence
over it. Compare Hardy, No. 18-cv-1160, with Vinson, No.
18-cv-1819. These common questions of law and fact weigh in favor
of consolidation.

In the Court's view, the particular differences between the Hardy
and Vinson actions do not outweigh the interests of judicial
economy served by consolidation. The class periods and the class
definitions overlap considerably and the complaints are otherwise
similar. Accordingly, the Court grants Lemak's request to
consolidate.

Accordingly, the Court consolidates Hardy v. MabVax Therapeutics,
et al., No. 18-cv-01160-BAS-NLS, and Jerry Vinson v. MabVax
Therapeutics, et al., No. 18-cv-01819-BAS-NLS. Each document filed
by a party in the consolidated litigation will bear the following
caption: In re MabVax Therapeutics Securities Litigation, No.
18-cv-01160-BAS-NLS.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ycdhaheo from Leagle.com.

Liam Hardy, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated & Jerry Vinson, Plaintiffs, represented by Lesley F.
Portnoy -- lportnoy@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Kevin Lappi, Movant, represented by Laurence M. Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

Lemak Investor Group, Movant, represented by Robert Vincent Prongay
-- rprongay@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

Ann Marie Friscia & Stephen Friscia, Movants, represented by
Jennifer Pafiti -- jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.


MARKETSOURCE INC: Compelled to Respond to Brum Discovery Requests
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JENNIFER BRUM and MICHAEL CAMERO, individually, and on
behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. MARKETSOURCE, INC. WHICH WILL DO BUSINESS IN
CALIFORNIA AS MARYLAND MARKETSOURCE, INC., a Maryland corporation;
ALLEGIS GROUP, INC., a Maryland corporation; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-241-JAM-EFB (E.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Edmund F. Brennan of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California granted the Plaintiffs' motions
to compel the Defendants to provide further responses to their
discovery requests.

Brum and Camero bring the putative class action against Defendants
MarketSource and Allegis, alleging claims for violations of the
California Labor Code and California Business and Professions Code
Sections 17200.  The action proceeds on the Plaintiffs' second
amended complaint ("SAC").

MarketSouce is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Allegis.  The
Defendants are a nationwide sales and marketing company, providing
personnel and services to companies throughout the United States.
Among other things, they provide retail sales personnel to dozens
of Target Mobile kiosks throughout California.

Plaintiff Brum worked as a Wireless Team Leader at several Target
stores in and around Stockton, while Camero worked as a Target
Mobile Manager at two Target stores in San Diego.  The Plaintiffs
claim that the Defendants violated overtime, meal, and rest period
laws, and failed to properly report wage statements.  They further
allege that the Defendants required new hires to take drug tests
and complete paperwork without payment for the time required to
complete such tasks and without reimbursement for related travel
expenses.

The Plaintiffs seek to assert claims on behalf of one class and one
subclass.  The SAC defines the proposed class as all persons who
worked for the Defendants as nonexempt, hourly-paid Account Sales
Representatives, including, but not limited to Mobile Managers,
Wireless Team Leads, Wireless Team Members, or similar positions,
at retail stores in California within four years prior to the
filing of the complaint until the date of trial.

The proposed subclass is defined as all persons who worked for
Defendants as nonexempt, hourly paid Account Sales Representatives,
including, but not limited to Mobile Managers, Wireless Team Leads,
Wireless Team Members, or similar positions, at retail stores in
California, within one year prior to the filing of the complaint
until the date of trial.

The Plaintiffs move to compel the Defendants to produce discovery
related to members of the proposed class and subclass.
Specifically, they seek to compel them to provide the name,
position, and contact information for the proposed class members
(Interrogatory No. 1) and to produce timekeeping data, payroll
data, and itemized wage statements for the putative class members
(Request for Production of Documents Nos. 11-13).

Judge Brennan finds that the more appropriate course is to permit
the requested class discovery.  The requests at issue seek
information relevant to numerosity, commonality, and typicality,
which the Plaintiffs must establish to certify the proposed class
and subclass.  Furthermore, the Defendants are the parties in
possession and control of the requested information, and absent an
order compelling them to produce the requested discovery,
Plaintiffs will not be able to obtain evidence necessary for a
class certification motion.  Accordingly, he finds that the
Plaintiffs are entitled to the statewide class discovery.

As for wage statements, the Judge finds that the Defendants'
evidence fails to show that the wage statements are inaccessible
because expenditure of resources is required to access the content
of the documents.  As to  electronic time and payroll records, the
Defendants' evidence fails to demonstrate an unreasonable burden in
producing records for all the putative class members, much less the
30% sample requested by the Plaintiffs.

Finally, the Defendants do not contend that providing the name,
position, and contact information for all putative class members
would be unreasonably burdensome.  Moreover, any privacy concerns
implicated in producing such information can be adequately
addressed by a properly tailored protective order.  Accordingly,
the Judge will require the Defendants to provide the requested
information, but only after the parties submit a proposed
protective order for the Court's review that addresses, at a
minimum, the use of names and contact information for the putative
class members.

Accordingly, Judge Brennan granted the Plaintiffs' motions to
compel.  Within 7 days of the Order, the parties will submit a
stipulated protective order addressing, at a minimum, the use of
the names and contact information of putative class members.
Within seven days of the Court's approval of a protective order,
the Defendants will provide the Plaintiffs with the information
requested in the Plaintiffs' Interrogatory Number 1.  Within 21
days of the Order, the Defendants will provide a 10% sampling of
wage statements and 30% samplings of time and payroll records for
the putative class members.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/G8OOjG from Leagle.com.

Jennifer Brum & Michael Camero, Plaintiffs, represented by Arnab
Banerjee , Capstone Law APC --
Brandon.Brouillette@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Capstone Law APC,
Jonathan Michael Lebe , Lebe Law, A Professional Law Corporation,
Ruhandy Glezakos -- Ruhandy.Glezakos@capstonelawyers.com --
Capstone Law APC & Rodney Mesriani -- rodney@mesriani.com --
Mesriani Law Group.

MarketSource, Inc., Doing business as Maryland MarketSource, Inc. &
Allegis Group, Inc., a Maryland Corporation, Defendants,
represented by Mike S. Kun -- mkun@ebglaw.com -- Epstein Becker &
Green, P.C. & Kevin Dennis Sullivan -- ksullivan@ebglaw.com --
Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.


MENARD INC: Griffith et al. Suit Transferred to N.D. Ohio
---------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled DEBRA GRIFFITH, et al. Individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
MENARD, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-00081, was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
Ohio to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
(Toledo) on Sept. 11, 2018. The Northern District of Ohio Clerk
assigned Case No. 3:18-cv-02074-JZ to the proceeding. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge Jack Zouhary. The suit alleges Labor
related violation.

The Plaintiffs brought this action individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated who worked for Menard, Inc. and were
not paid for all hours worked from three years preceding the
filing of the Original Complaint through the final disposition of
this matter.  The Plaintiffs seek all available relief, including
compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs,
pursuant the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Ohio's Minimum Fair Wage
Standards Act, the Ohio Prompt Pay Act, and the Illinois Minimum
Wage Law.

Menard Inc. is a chain of home improvement centers, located
primarily in the Midwestern United States.[BN]

Attorneys for Debra Griffith, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated:

          Jason C. Cox, Esq.
          Robert E. DeRose, II, Esq.
          BARKAN MEIZLISH HANDELMAN
          GOODIN DEROSE WENTZ
          250 East Broad Street, 10th Floor
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 221 4221
          Facsimile: (614) 744 2300
          E-mail: jcox@barkanmeizlish.com
                  bderose@barkanmeizlish.com

               - and -

          Austin Winters Anderson, Esq.
          Lauren Elizabeth Braddy, Esq.
          Molly Kathleen Tefend, Esq.
          ANDERSON2X, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452 1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452 1284

Attorneys for Defendant:

          Daniel O. Culicover, Esq.
          James E. Davidson, Esq.
          Paul L. Bittner, Esq.
          ICE MILLER
          250 West Street, Ste. 700
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 462 1135
          Facsimile: (614) 222 4725
          E-mail: daniel.culicover@icemiller.com
                  james.davidson@icemiller.com
                  Paul.Bittner@icemiller.com


MERCADO LATINO: Tapia Seeks OT & Minimum Wages under Labor Code
---------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE TAPIA, an individual, and on behalf of others similarly
situated Plaintiff, v. MERCADO LATINO, INC., a California
corporation; and DOES I through 50, inclusive, the Defendants, Case
No. BC719425 (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 31, 2018), seeks to recover
unpaid overtime wages and minimum wages under the California Labor
Code.

According to the complaint, the Defendants have knowingly and
willfully refused to perform their obligations to compensate
Plaintiff and Class Members for all wages earned and all hours
worked. As a proximate result, Plaintiff and Class Members have
suffered, and continue to suffer, substantial losses related to the
use and enjoyment of such wages, lost interest on such wages, and
expenses and attorneys' fees in seeking to compel the Defendants to
fully perform their obligations under state law.

Mercado Latino manufactures, imports, and distributes food and
specialty non-foods items for retail grocers and food service
companies in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J. Matem, Esq.
          Scolt A. Brooks, Esq.
          MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
          1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200
          Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
          Telephone: (310) 531 1900
          Facsimile: (310) 531 1901
          E-mail: inmatern@maternlawgroup.com
                  mstahle@matemIawgroup.com


MERRILL LYNCH: Kazerouni, Hyde & Swigart File Securities Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Kazerouni Law Group, APC, and Hyde & Swigart disclosed that a
class action has been commenced on behalf of United States persons
whose securities and/or cash were invested with Merrill Lynch
between January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2012. This action was
filed in the Southern District of California and is captioned
James, Jiao et al. v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. et
al., No. 3:17-cv-00409

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff in this action, you must
move the Court no later than 60 days from September 7, 2018. If you
wish to discuss this action or have any questions concerning this
notice or your rights or interests, please contact Plaintiffs'
counsel Abbas Kazerounian at (800) 400-6808, or
jiaolawsuit@kazlg.com.

Any member of the putative class may move the Court to serve as
lead plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may choose to do
nothing and remain an absent class member.

The Complaint charges that Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. ("MLPF&S") and Merrill Lynch Professional Clearing Corp.
("MLPro") (together "Merrill Lynch") engaged in a scheme to defraud
consumers by using client funds for Merrill Lynch's own business
purposes from the Reserve Account required under Section 15(c)(3)
of the Exchange Act – commonly referred to as the Consumer
Protection Rule.

Merrill Lynch made false or misleading statements that Merrill
Lynch would properly maintain the Reserve Account, such as
representing in writing that Merrill Lynch would comply with the
Consumer Protection Rule "through the use of segregated accounts
for our clients' securities at the major depositories."

In actuality, Merrill Lynch initiated a formal policy of making
Leveraged Conversion Trades to lower the amount of the Reserve
Account and use funds therefrom to make substantial profits for its
own business purposes, without compensating its clients for secret
use of their funds.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek to recover a risk premium that Merrill
Lynch did not pay to Plaintiffs or the members of the putative
class when Merrill Lynch involuntary used funds of the Plaintiffs'
or the putative class members.

The two named Plaintiffs, James Jiao and Samuel Nunez, are
represented by the two law firms Kazerouni Law Group, APC and Hyde
& Swigart who have extensive experience in prosecuting class action
on behalf of consumers.  [GN]


NATIONAL GAS: Ziedel Sues over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
----------------------------------------------------------
FRIEDA ZIEDEL, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL GAS & ELECTRIC LLC, a Texas
limited liability company, the Defendant, Case No. 2018CH11115
(Ill. Cir. Ct., Sep. 1, 2018), seeks to stop the Defendant's
practice of making unauthorized and unsolicited telephone calls to
consumer's cellular telephones and to obtain redress for all
persons injured by its conduct.

According to the complaint, in a misguided effort to promote the
sale of its energy services to consumer, National Gas, an operator
of electricity and gas services, engaged in an invasive and
unlawful form of marketing; making telephone calls while using an
automated telephone dialing system to contact the cellular
telephones of consumers throughout the nation.

By effectuating these unauthorized automated marketing calls, the
Defendant and its agents have violated the called parties·
statutory rights and have caused consumers actual harm not only
because consumers were subjected to the aggravation and invasion of
privacy that necessarily accompanies unauthorized automated
telephone calls, but also because consumers like Plaintiff, must
frequently pay their cell phone service providers or incur a usage
allocation deduction from their calling plans for the receipt of
such calls, notwithstanding that the calls were made in violation
of specific legislation on the subject.

National Gas supplies electricity and natural gas for homes and
businesses in Illinois, Ohio, Maryland, and New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William P. Kingston Esq.
          McGuire Law, P.C.
          55 W. Wacker Drive, 9th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 893 7002


NAVY FEDERAL: Faces Ronquillo FCRA Suit in S.D. Calif.
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Navy Federal Credit
Union. The case is styled as Kelissa Ronquillo individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Navy Federal
Credit Union, Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-02145-BEN-MDD (S.D. Cal.,
Sept. 14, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Navy Federal Credit Union is a US credit union headquartered in
Vienna, Virginia, chartered and regulated under the authority of
the National Credit Union Administration. Navy Federal is the
largest natural member credit union in the United States, both in
asset size and in membership.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Matthew M. Loker, Esq.
     Kazerouni Law Group, APC
     245 Fischer Avenue
     Unit D1
     Costa Mesa, CA 92626
     Phone: (800) 400-6808
     Fax: (800) 520-5523
     Email: ml@kazlg.com



NCAA: Sports Economist Testifies in Pay Limit Case
--------------------------------------------------
Helen Christophi, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that calling the National Collegiate Athletic Association a
"cartel," a San Francisco sports economist testified in a federal
bench trial on Sept. 4 that eliminating caps on how much
compensation student athletes receive increases demand for college
sports.

The testimony by University of San Francisco professor Daniel
Rascher contradicts the NCAA's contention that compensating
athletes above the cost of attendance blurs the line between
amateur and professional sports, eroding popularity and revenues
from ticket sales and broadcasts.

Mr. Rascher, testifying on behalf of three classes of men's and
women's football and basketball players, attributed a $700 million
increase in sports revenues during the 2016-2017 season to changes
in NCAA compensation rules implemented the previous year allowing
member schools to begin paying athletes up to the cost of
attendance and to offer additional benefits above the cost of
attendance.

"When [college] athletes started receiving more money, demand went
up," Mr. Rascher said in federal court in Oakland, "All of these
athletes are receiving compensation above the cost of attendance
and the market is, in a sense, happy to continue watching them play
football and basketball."

Accusing the NCAA of anti-competitive behavior under the Sherman
Act, former Clemson football player Martin Jenkins leads 53,000
current and former Division 1 football and men's and women's
basketball players seeking an injunction eliminating NCAA caps on
compensation and benefits.

They claim the caps unfairly barred them from earning money playing
sports while the NCAA receives multibillion-dollar payments from TV
networks and advertisers.

The NCAA initially sought dismissal, saying the claims were
identical to those litigated in O'Bannon v. NCAA, in which the
Ninth Circuit held in September 2015 that member schools need not
compensate athletes above the cost of attendance.

Two years later, presiding U.S. District Judge Claudia Wilken
approved a $208 million settlement in the case. But she said the
settlement didn't bar class members from pursuing an injunction,
clearing the way for a two-week trial on the issue.

On Sept. 4, Pac-12 Conference attorney Bart Williams --
bwilliams@proskauer.com -- with Proskauer Rose noted student
athletes received compensation above the cost of attendance even
before the 2015 rule change.

His observation boosted the defendants' argument, presented in a
written opening statement, that no injunction is necessary because
the recent increase in consumer demand noted by
Mr. Rascher didn't cross the line into the realm of professional
sports.

Mr. Williams also called Mr. Rascher's prediction that individual
conferences would pass their own compensation caps in the event an
injunction was granted "speculation." He hypothesized that if caps
are eliminated, schools could begin offering new recruits $1
million to play for them.

But Mr. Rascher said that would hurt demand, and conferences
wouldn't allow it. Case witnesses and the NCAA itself have said
they won't allow it either, he said.

"The NCAA claims that some of their fans care about restraints on
pay, so individual conferences would decide what level of restraint
they are willing to allow," he said. "The market itself helps them
dictate what those levels would be. I'd be shocked if individual
conferences started allowing unfettered competition."

The NCAA argues in its opening statement that paying student
athletes above the cost of attendance would destroy college sports,
because wealthy schools would compete for valuable players by
offering "millions of dollars in compensation," while poorer ones
would struggle to attract recruits.

"Plaintiffs' conference autonomy alternative would balkanize
college sports, making the product less interesting and thereby
reducing the popularity of college sports," its opening statement
says.

The plaintiffs, however, say the justifications for limiting
compensation "are nothing more than NCAA mythology."

"[T]he trial," their opening statement says, "will expose
amateurism as a mythical procompetitive justification devoid of
evidentiary support in the post-O'Bannon world—an emperor with no
clothes."


NCAA: Student Athletes' Lawyers Challenge Pay Caps
--------------------------------------------------
Helen Christophi, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that lawyers for student athletes challenging the National
Collegiate Athletic Association's caps on the amount of
compensation they get playing college sports failed to prove in a
federal bench trial on Sept. 6 the association's conferences would
enact their own caps if the national ones are scrapped.

Three classes of 53,000 current and former Division I football and
men's and women's basketball players are trying to convince U.S.
District Judge Claudia Wilken in Oakland to eliminate the caps.

They reason the NCAA's individual conferences will enact their own
limits on compensation to preserve amateurism in college sports,
which is valued by many fans and believed to be a significant
revenue driver.

But the NCAA says there is no guarantee the conferences would enact
them. More likely, it says, wealthier schools would begin offering
potential team members "millions of dollars" to play for them in
the absence of pay limits, essentially turning those players into
professional athletes.

Revenues from college sports would shrink, the NCAA argues, because
fans who value amateurism would stop buying tickets to games, and
television networks would pay conferences less money to broadcast
the games.

The case stretches back to 2014, when former Clemson University
football player Martin Jenkins sued the NCAA and its conferences
for anti-competitive conduct and an injunction eliminating caps on
compensation and benefits.

The NCAA sought dismissal, saying the claims were identical to
those litigated in O'Bannon v. NCAA. In that case, the Ninth
Circuit held that member schools need not compensate athletes above
the cost of attendance.

In 2015, the NCAA relaxed its rules to allow schools to compensate
athletes up to the cost of attendance. Many athletes already
receiving federal Pell grants and student assistance funds
administered by the NCAA were compensated above the cost of
attendance once the change took effect, according to the parties.

The NCAA settled with the Jenkins classes in 2017 classes for $208
million. But Judge Wilken said class members could still pursue an
injunction, clearing the way for a two-week bench trial on the
issue.

Seeking on Sept. 6 to convince Judge Wilken the conferences would
cap compensation under an injunction, class attorney Jeff Friedman
tried repeatedly to elicit testimony from NCAA expert witness
Kenneth Elzinga confirming the conferences wouldn't allow
unfettered competition.

The Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro attorney noted that American
Athletic Conference Commissioner Mike Aresco said in a deposition
he believed television stations would pay substantially less to
broadcast games if players were paid more money.

"Mr. Aresco's view is if players were paid, it would adversely
affect consumer demand," Friedman told Mr. Elzinga, an economist at
the University of Virginia. "Do you believe that a hypothetical
commissioner acting economically rationally -- who believed
consumer demand would go down if players were paid -- that that
hypothetical commissioner would advocate for his or her conference
to pay players?"

Mr. Elzinga replied potential lost profits from a perceived
reduction in amateurism wouldn't necessarily deter a school or
conference from increasing athlete pay.

"A rational commissioner could," he said, "because the rational
commissioner may decide engaging in a strategy that generates
immediate benefits" in the form of enlisting a star player would
offset the long-term costs of decreased revenues, as long as the
other conferences shouldered some of those costs.

"There is no doubt that an individual [school or conference] may be
penalized by having a degraded product, but it has to be offset by
potential benefits," he said.

To prevent a school or conference from benefiting at the expense of
others in the system by deviating from the rules, Mr. Elzinga said,
a national body like the NCAA must be allowed to set and enforce
compensation limits across conferences.

"You agree upon a common standard and enforce it within the joint
venture," he said.


NEW AGE DISTRIBUTION: Moses Flores Seeks Unpaid Wages
-----------------------------------------------------
MOSES FLORES, Individually and on behalf of all similarly-situated
employees of Defendants in the State of California, the Plaintiff,
v. NEW AGE DISTRIBUTION AGENCY, INC., LEFAMI DISTRIBUTION AGENCY,
LEANDRA ALE, and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, the Defendants, Case
No. BC720141 (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 31, 2018), alleges that the
Defendants failed to pay minimum and regular wages, failed to pay
overtime wages, and failed to pay vacation wages.

According to the complaint, in order to avoid paying additional
employment-related costs and decrease business-related expenses,
the Defendants willfully misclassified individuals as independent
contractors when they should have been classified as employees. As
a result, the Plaintiff and other similar misclassified employees
were denied the protections afforded to employees under the
California Labor Code and IWC Wage Orders. The Defendants
maintained and exercised the right to control their days and hours
of work, day-to-day duties, method and manner of carrying out their
duties and other policies and practices which demonstrate their
misclassification as independent contractors.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brum R. Short, Esq.
          SHORTLEGAL APC
          350 10th Ave., Suite 1000
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: 619 272 0720
          Facsimile: 619 839 3129
          E-mail: Brian@ShortLegal.com


NEW JERSEY: 3rd Cir. Affirms $9.59MM Deal in Tax Sales Cert. Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, affirmed the
District Court's judgment granting Class Action Settlement in the
case captioned IN RE: NEW JERSEY TAX SALES CERTIFICATES ANTITRUST
LITIGATION. ARLENE M. DAVIES, Appellant. Nos. 16-3965, 17-2451.
(3rd Cir.).

Davies challenges the District Court's order granting final
approval of those settlements.

In these associated appeals, Objector-Appellant Arlene Davies
challenges several decisions of the District Court in relation to
settlements in an underlying antitrust class action concerning New
Jersey tax sale certificates.

Fairness of the Settlement

To determine whether a class action settlement meets these
standards, courts in this circuit employ the test set forth in
Girsh v. Jepson, which requires consideration of the following
factors: (1) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the
litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement; (3)
the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed;
(4) the risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of
establishing damages; (6) the risks of maintaining the class action
through trial; (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a
greater judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement
fund in light of the best possible recovery; and (9) the range of
reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in
light of all the attendant risks of litigation.

Here, the District Court concluded that all but one of the
aforementioned Girsh factors weighed in favor of approving the
settlement. Most relevant to this appeal, the District Court
determined that the precise damages achieved by a winning verdict
were not possible to predict but that the significant risks of
establishing liability, damages, and maintaining a class action
nevertheless placed the proposed $9.59 million settlement within
the range of reasonableness.

Davies disagrees. She claims that, in approving the settlement, the
District Court incorrectly assessed both the relative strength of
the case and the eighth Girsh factor, the range of reasonableness
of the settlement in light of the best possible recovery.

Relative strength of the case

Davies claims that the District Court underestimated the relative
strength of the case by affording too little weight to the direct
evidence. She specifically cites the guilty pleas of several
defendants and representatives of the defendant companies in
connection to the alleged bid-rigging conspiracy and complains that
these guilty pleas contradict the District Court's assessment of
the strength of the case.

There is no error. Although they are somewhat helpful to
Plaintiffs' claims of liability as to specific defendants, the
guilty pleas do not define the scope of any bid-rigging. They do
not identify specific auctions that the defendants rigged or the
degree to which the rigging affected the eventual interest rate on
any given lien. Moreover, only fifteen of the fifty defendants
entered guilty pleas, and several defendants were acquitted of
criminal charges pertaining to the alleged scheme. Without more
detailed evidence as to the specific auctions that were affected by
these defendants' criminal activity, or the extent of the impact,
we cannot say that the District Court abused its discretion in
acknowledging the limited value of these criminal pleas in the
overall context of this complex antitrust class action.

Davies's reliance upon the allegations in the First Amended
Complaint is also misplaced.

Allegations are not evidence. Nor are they transformed into
evidence by a court's conclusion that they are sufficient to
survive a challenge under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Rule 12(b)(6) does not impose a probability requirement" for
inferring, as in this case, the existence of an illegal agreement
between the defendants. It simply calls for enough facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
Plaintiffs' claim, not a conclusion that such evidence has already
been revealed. Accordingly, Davies cannot support her high
estimation of the strength of Plaintiffs' case by pointing to the
District Court's appraisal of their allegations at the
motion-to-dismiss stage.

The Court finds the District Court's reliance upon such factors to
have been reasonable.
Range of reasonableness of the settlement

The eighth and ninth Girsh factors focus on the range of
reasonableness of a settlement in light of both the best possible
recovery and the risk the parties would face if the case went to
trial.

In order to assess the reasonableness of a proposed settlement
seeking monetary relief, `the present value of the damages
plaintiffs would likely recover if successful, appropriately
discounted for the risk of not prevailing, should be compared with
the amount of the proposed settlement.

Davies asserts, as a preliminary matter, that Class Counsel
presented no evidence of the class's damages or the factors bearing
thereupon that permit rational evaluation of the settlement amount.


She claims that the District Court therefore abused its discretion
by accepting the conclusory allegations of counsel regarding the
scope of the conspiracy.

Davies nevertheless claims that the strength of the case did not
justify the settlement because it constituted a mere 2.5 percent of
the best possible recovery, which she posited to be $400 million, a
figure the court accepted in its approval order. However, Davies's
calculation is based upon a mischaracterization of the scope of the
alleged bid-rigging conspiracy. Namely, it is founded not upon the
value of Plaintiffs' overall tax liens, but upon Plaintiffs'
statement in the First Amended Complaint that New Jersey's 566
municipalities auction up to $200 million in delinquent tax
obligations in total every year. The calculation also presumes that
the full $200 million in tax sale certificates would, in the case
of a best possible recovery, have been bought at an 18 percent
interest rate the initial interest rate set for a given tax sale
bid, such that there would have been only a single bid per lien.
Davies's calculation of the best possible recovery is necessarily
overbroad, as it pertains to the specifics of the alleged
bid-rigging scheme in this case, and it is more than unrealistic,
as it concerns the structure of New Jersey's tax sale certificate
auctions.

More critically, Davies provides no authority for her claim that a
settlement cannot be reasonable if it constitutes a certain
percentage of the best possible recovery. In fact, we have said
that an evaluating court must guard against demanding too large a
settlement since, after all, settlement is a compromise, a yielding
of the highest hopes in exchange for certainty and resolution. In
recognition that the outcome of litigation is always uncertain and
inevitably time-consuming and expensive, courts have long held that
a cash settlement providing only a fraction of the potential
recovery does not render a settlement inadequate or unfair.

Given the conclusion that the District Court did not err in
evaluating the complexity of this action, the risks of trying to
maintain class certification and of establishing damages and
liability, the court did not abuse its discretion in approving the
settlement as within the range of reasonableness.

The Court affirms the judgment of the District Court.

A full-text copy of the Third Circuit's September 6, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8lxpmbk from Leagle.com.


NEW JERSEY: 3rd Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Section 1983 Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, affirms the
District Court's judgment granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned ASHLEY ORTIZ, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE;
JOSEPH FUENTES, in his capacity as Superintendent of New Jersey
State Police; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; ELIE
HONIG, in her official capacity as Director of the Office of the
Attorney General Department of Law and Public Safety Division of
Criminal Justice; MARC DENNIS, individually and in his capacity as
Coordinator in the New Jersey State Police Alcohol Drug Testing
Unit. No. 17-3095. (3rd Cir.).

The District Court held that Ortiz's claims were barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and granted the defendants' motion
to dismiss.

Ashley Ortiz registered a 0.09% Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC)
on an Alcotest machine and pled guilty to Driving While Intoxicated
(DWI) under New Jersey law. It was later revealed that New Jersey
State Police (NJSP) Sergeant Marc Dennis allegedly failed to
calibrate properly the Alcotest machine Ortiz was tested on as well
as other Alcotest machines. Proceedings before the New Jersey state
courts regarding the effect of the improper calibration and
potential remedies have begun but have not yet concluded.

Ortiz filed a putative class action against Dennis and various New
Jersey law enforcement officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and
New Jersey state law, seeking monetary and injunctive relief for
wrongful prosecution and conviction.

No cause of action exists under Section 1983 for harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence
invalid or would necessarily imply the invalidity of the
conviction, unless the conviction or sentence has been reversed,
vacated, expunged, or otherwise favorably terminated. Heck, 512
U.S. at 486-87. A plaintiff's lawsuit is barred under Section 1983
if establishing the basis for the claim necessarily demonstrates
the invalidity of the conviction.

Thus, a plaintiff may not sue for alleged unconstitutional conduct
that would invalidate his or her underlying sentence or conviction
unless that conviction has already been favorably terminated.

Ortiz's claims that the defendants fabricated and suppressed
evidence are barred by Heck because success on those claims would
necessarily imply the invalidity of her conviction. To state a
successful Section 1983 claim for knowingly falsified evidence, a
plaintiff must show a reasonable likelihood that, absent that
fabricated evidence, she would not have been criminally charged.

Similarly, to succeed on her claim for suppression of evidence, she
would have to show that the defendants failed to promptly disclose
Defendant Dennis's fabrication of material, exculpatory evidence.
Establishing any of these would necessarily imply that her
conviction was invalid.

Ortiz's argument that Heck does not apply to her claims because her
Due Process rights were violated before she was convicted is
unavailing. Claims which accrue before convictions will
nevertheless be barred by Heck if success on those claims would
imply the invalidity of a plaintiff's conviction. Ortiz's proposed
exception would overshadow the rule in Heck, because government
misconduct that would render a conviction invalid will almost
always occur before the conviction itself.

The Court will affirm the District Court's Order of dismissal in
all respects except that the Court will modify the Order to reflect
that Ortiz's claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted rather than for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Third Circuit's September 6, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybnjldyj from Leagle.com.

Lisa J. Rodriguez [ARGUED] Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis, Counsel
for Appellant.

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General New Jersey, Melissa H.
Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher J. Riggs [ARGUED]
Office of Attorney General of New Jersey, Division of Law Tort
Litigation and Judiciary, Daniel M. Vannella , Office of Attorney
General of New Jersey Division of Law, Counsel for Appellees


NEW JERSEY: Settlement in Class Action Upheld on Appeal
-------------------------------------------------------
Charles Toutant, writing for New Jersey Law Journal, reports that
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has rejected a
challenge to a $9.59 million settlement in a New Jersey class
action over alleged rigging of bids for municipal tax sale
certificates.

The September 2016 settlement is fair and reasonable, and the
appellant's allegations of unequal treatment of class members are
unfounded, the appeals court said Sept. 6 in In Re: New Jersey Tax
Sales Certificates Antitrust Litigation.

Plaintiff-appellant Arlene Davies, who claimed she was charged
higher interest on tax certificates because of collusion by
investors who buy the certificates, challenged a U.S. District
Court judge's approval of the settlement as an abuse of
discretion.

But Third Circuit Judges Theodore McKee, Thomas Ambro and Jane Roth
said there had been no erroneous finding of fact, errant
conclusions of law or improper application of law to fact.

The settlement, approved in September 2016 by U.S. District Judge
Michael Shipp, ended four years of litigation over the state's
statutory scheme regulating the sale of tax liens for unpaid
property taxes. As the appeals court describes it, the auction
process is designed to be competitive, with bidding opening at an
interest rate of 18 percent, representing the interest that the
defaulted property owner must pay on the tax debt. The interest
rate decreases with each successive bid.

The class action involved a claim that bidders colluded to keep
interest rates higher than they would otherwise have been in truly
competitive auctions.

U.S. District Judge Michael Shipp, applying a test set out by the
Third Circuit in a 1975 case, Girsh v. Jepsen, said the $9.59
million settlement was "within the range of reasonableness" given
the "significant risks of establishing liability, damages, and
maintaining a class action."

Davies claimed Shipp underestimated the relative strength of the
case based on guilty pleas by several defendants and
representatives of defendant companies in a related criminal case.
She also said Shipp gave "undue emphasis" to the generic litigation
risks inherent in any class action, and by his supposition that
antitrust class actions are difficult to prove.

But McKee, writing for the circuit panel, said he could not find
that Shipp abused his discretion in acknowledging the limited value
of the antitrust case. He cited the lack of specific information
provided by the guilty pleas concerning which auctions were rigged
or the degree to which rigging changed the interest rate on any
individual lien.

The appeals court also found no abuse of discretion in Shipp's
discussion of the litigation risks. Davies, McKee said, supplied no
authority for her assertion that Shipp emphasized risks inherent in
any general class action or antitrust class action. Rather, Shipp
provided support for his conclusion that antitrust class actions
are complex to prosecute, the panel said. His observation "was
reasonable in light of the elements plaintiffs must demonstrate to
establish their claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, e.g.,
that the defendants engaged in a concerted action that produced
anticompetitive effects within the relevant product and geographic
markets, was illegal, and injured the class as a proximate result,"
McKee wrote.

According to the suit, the defendants frequented the auctions and
would agree beforehand which liens each would bid on, often
resulting in sales at 18 percent interest instead of lower rates.

The certified class consisted of owners of New Jersey real property
between Jan. 1, 1998, and Feb. 28, 2009, who had certificates
purchased by one of the defendants at auction for an interest rate
above zero percent.

Shipp in 2014 refused to dismiss state and federal antitrust
claims.

Bruce Greenberg, Esq. -- bgreenberg@litedepalma.com -- of Lite
DePalma Greenberg in Newark, who represents defendants Gila Bauer,
Melissa Jacobs, Frances Schmidt, Donald Schmidt, and Son Inc., said
in an email about the ruling, "We are very pleased that the Third
Circuit upheld Judge Shipp's approval of the settlement in this
case, which will provide millions of dollars in monetary relief and
other benefits to the many New Jersey citizens who comprise the
class."

Davies' lawyers, Dennis Drasco, Esq. -- ddrasco@lumlaw.com -- of
Lum, Drasco & Positan in Roseland and Justin Weiner, Esq. --
jweiner@mololamken.com -- of Molo Lamken in Chicago, did not
respond to requests for comment about the ruling.[GN]


NFL: 9th Cir. Reverses Dismissal of Retired Football Players' Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed the
District Court's judgment granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned RICHARD DENT; JEREMY NEWBERRY; ROY GREEN; J. D.
HILL; KEITH VAN HORNE; RON STONE; RON PRITCHARD; JAMES MCMAHON;
MARCELLUS WILEY; JONATHAN REX HADNOT, JR., On Behalf of Themselves
and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, a New York unincorporated association,
Defendant-Appellee. No. 15-15143. (9th Cir.).

This appeal requires the Ninth Circuit to decide whether a variety
of state-law claims brought against the National Football League
(NFL) by former professional football players are preempted by
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).

Dent and nine other retired players filed a putative class action
suit against the NFL in the Northern District of California,
seeking to represent a class of more than 1,000 former players.

They alleged that since 1969, the NFL has distributed controlled
substances and prescription drugs to its players in violation of
both state and federal laws, and that the manner in which these
drugs were administered left the players with permanent injuries
and chronic medical conditions.

The named plaintiffs sought to represent a class of plaintiffs who
had received or were administered drugs by anyone affiliated with
the NFL or an NFL team. They filed claims for negligence per se,
negligent hiring and retention, negligent misrepresentation,
fraudulent concealment, fraud, and loss of consortium. They sought
relief including damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief,
and medical monitoring.

The NFL filed two motions to dismiss, one arguing that the players'
claims were preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA and the other
arguing that the players failed to state a claim and their claims
were time barred. The district court held a hearing on the
preemption issue. It granted the NFL's motion to dismiss on
preemption grounds and denied the NFL's other motion to dismiss as
moot.

Section 301 of the LMRA is a jurisdictional statute that has been
interpreted as a congressional mandate to the federal courts to
fashion a body of federal common law to be used to address disputes
arising out of labor contracts. Congress intended for Section 301
to protect the primacy of grievance and arbitration as the forum
for resolving CBA disputes and the substantive supremacy of federal
law within that forum.

Accordingly, Section 301 preempts state-law claims founded directly
on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements, and also
claims substantially dependent on analysis of a
collective-bargaining agreement.

To state a claim for negligence in California, a plaintiff must
establish the following elements: (1) the defendant had a duty, or
an obligation to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the
protection of others against unreasonable risks  (2) the defendant
breached that duty, (3) that breach proximately caused the
plaintiff's injuries, and (4) damages.

The players argue that they were injured by the NFL's provision and
administration of controlled substances without written
prescriptions, proper labeling, or warnings regarding side effects
and long-term risks, and that this conduct violated the Controlled
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. Section 801 et seq.; the Food, Drugs, and
Cosmetics Act and the California Pharmacy Laws, Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code Section 4000 et seq.

Here, any duty to exercise reasonable care in the distribution of
medications does not arise through statute or by contract; no
statute explicitly establishes such a duty, and as already noted,
none of the CBAs impose such a duty. However, we believe that a
duty binding on the NFL or any entity involved in the distribution
of controlled substances to conduct its activities with reasonable
care arises from "the general character of that activity.

Carelessness in the handling of dangerous substances is both
illegal and morally blameworthy, given the risk of injury it
entails. Imposing liability on those involved in improper
prescription-drug distribution will prevent harm by encouraging
responsible entities to ensure that drugs are administered safely.
And it will not represent an undue burden on such entities, which
should already be complying with the laws governing prescription
drugs and controlled substances. Thus, the Court concludes that to
the extent the NFL is involved in the distribution of controlled
substances, it has a duty to conduct such activities with
reasonable care.

The NFL argues that to determine what duty, if any, it owed
plaintiffs, a court must interpret the CBAs to determine the scope
of the obligations the NFL and Clubs have adopted vis a vis the
individual clubs' physicians and trainers. Similarly, the district
court noted that the CBAs place medical disclosure obligations
squarely on Club physicians, not on the NFL. But the teams'
obligations under the CBAs are irrelevant to the question of
whether the NFL breached an obligation to players by violating the
law. The parties to a CBA cannot bargain for what is illegal.

Therefore, liability for a negligence claim alleging violations of
federal and state statutes does not turn on how the CBAs allocated
duties among the NFL, the teams, and the individual doctors.
Regardless of what if anything the CBAs say about those issues, if
the NFL had any role in distributing prescription drugs, it was
required to follow the laws regarding those drugs. To the extent
that the plaintiffs allege they were injured by the NFL's violation
of those laws, their claims can be assessed without any
interpretation of the CBAs.

The Court expresses no opinion regarding the merits of the
plaintiffs' negligence claim, which will require the players to
establish that the relevant statutes apply to the NFL, the NFL
violated those statutes, and the alleged violations caused the
players' injuries. Perhaps plaintiffs can prove these elements;
perhaps not. That must await completion of discovery. The Court
holds only that the plaintiffs' negligence claim regarding the
NFL's alleged violation of federal and state laws governing
controlled substances is not preempted by Section 301.

The Court do notes that at many points in the SAC, the plaintiffs
appear to conflate the NFL and the teams. But the plaintiffs are
pursuing a theory of direct liability, not vicarious liability. And
they have attempted to vindicate virtually identical claims against
the clubs themselves in separate litigation. Therefore, on remand,
any further proceedings in this case should be limited to claims
arising from the conduct of the NFL and NFL personnel not the
conduct of individual teams' employees. The Court leave it to the
district court to determine whether the plaintiffs have pleaded
facts sufficient to support their negligence claim against the
NFL.

Ordinarily, an employer may be liable to a third person for the
employer's negligence in hiring or retaining an employee who is
incompetent or unfit.

The SAC alleges that NFL doctors and trainers gave players
medications without telling them what they were taking or the
possible side effects and without proper recordkeeping. It also
alleges that the NFL hired individuals charged with overseeing,
evaluating, and recommending changes to distribution of Medications
and that the NFL knew or should have known that those individuals
were incompetent. As a result, the players say they were deceived
about the nature and magnitude of the dangers to which they were
subjected by the Medications and ultimately injured.

If the NFL did in fact hire doctors and trainers to treat players,
or hire individuals to oversee the league's prescription-drug
regime, there is clearly an employment relationship between the NFL
and those individuals. Injury arising from their incompetence is
foreseeable, given the dangers associated with controlled
substances. Therefore, to the extent that the NFL employed such
individuals, it had a common-law duty to use reasonable care in
hiring and retaining them.

That duty did not arise from the CBAs, which do not require the NFL
to hire employees to treat players or oversee the distribution of
medications. Nor does determining whether the NFL breached that
duty require interpreting the CBAs, which because they do not
require the NFL to hire such employees in the first place do not
specify any qualifications for them. Thus, the plaintiffs'
negligent hiring and retention claims are not preempted by Section
301.

To state a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must
allege misrepresentation of a past or existing material fact,
without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, and with
intent to induce another's reliance on the fact misrepresented;
ignorance of the truth and justifiable reliance on the
misrepresentation by the party to whom it was directed; and
resulting damage.

The plaintiffs argue that the NFL continuously and systematically
misrepresented the risks associated with the medications at issue,
that they reasonably relied on those misrepresentations, and they
were injured as a result.

In Atwater, 626 F.3d at 1183, players brought claims based on the
NFL's alleged negligence in conducting background checks on
potential financial advisers. But the CBA provision that dealt with
the relevant program explicitly stated that players were solely
responsible for their personal finances. The Eleventh Circuit held
that determining whether the plaintiffs' reliance on the NFL's
representations was reasonable would require interpreting that
particular provision.  

In Williams, 582 F.3d at 881, players argued that the NFL owed them
a duty to disclose that a certain dietary supplement contained a
banned substance, even though the NFL itself strongly encouraged
players to avoid the use of supplements altogether. But the NFL's
drug policy, which had been incorporated into the CBA, stated that
if you take these products, you do so AT YOUR OWN RISK! and that a
positive test result will not be excused because a player was
unaware he was taking a Prohibited Substance. The Eighth Circuit
stated that the reasonableness of the players' reliance on the
absence of a warning about the supplement could not be ascertained
apart from those terms of the Policy.

Here, unlike in Atwater or Williams, no CBA provisions directly
address the subject of the litigation: who was responsible for
disclosing the risks of prescription drugs provided to players by
the NFL. In Atwater and Williams, the nature of the claims and the
content of the CBAs meant that adjudicating the claim would require
interpreting the CBAs. But here, no provisions of the CBAs even
arguably render the players' reliance on the NFL's purported
representations unreasonable.

Therefore, interpretation of the CBAs will not be required, and the
negligent misrepresentation claim is not preempted.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's September 6, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8n4dwwr from Leagle.com.

Phillip J. Closius (argued), Andrew G. Slutkin --
aslutkin@mdattorney.com -- Steven D. Silverman --
ssilverman@mdattorney.com -- Stephen G. Grygiel --
sgrygiel@mdattorney.com -- and William N. Sinclair --
bsinclair@mdattorney.com -- Silverman Thompson Slutkin & White,
Baltimore, Maryland; Mark J. Dearman -- mdearman@rgrdlaw.com -- and
Stuart Andrew Davidson -- SDavidson@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman Boca Raton, Florida; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Paul D. Clement -- paul.clement@kirkland.com -- (argued),
Washington, D.C.; Daniel Nash -- dnash@akingump.com -- Stacey R.
Eisenstein -- seisenstein@akingump.com -- James E. Tysse --
jtysse@akingump.com -- Marla S. Axelrod, and Elizabeth England --
eengland@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP,
Washington, D.C.; Rex S. Heinke -- rheinke@akingump.com -- and
Gregory W. Knopp -- gknopp@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer
& Feld LLP, Los Angeles, California; Allen J. Ruby --
allen.ruby@skadden.com -- Jack P. DiCanio --
jack.dicanio@skadden.com -- and Timothy A. Miller --
tmiller@vallemakoff.com -- Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP,
Palo Alto, California; for Defendant-Appellee.


NFL: 9th Cir. Revives Class Action Over Painkillers
---------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Iovino, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
the Ninth Circuit on Sept. 6 revived a class action claiming the
National Football League pushed painkillers on hurt athletes to get
them back on the field, often causing permanent injuries.

A three-judge panel reversed the dismissal of the lawsuit, finding
the NFL had a duty to comply with state and federal laws when
doling out prescription painkillers.

"If the NFL had any role in distributing prescription drugs, it was
required to follow the laws regarding those drugs," U.S. Circuit
Judge Richard Tallman wrote for the panel in a 30-page opinion.

Lead plaintiff Richard Dent, a former Chicago Bear and NFL Hall of
Famer, sued the league in May 2014. He claims the NFL instructed
team doctors from at least 1969 to 2012 to dole out unprescribed
drugs without warning players of harmful side effects. Dent says he
ended his career with an enlarged heart, permanent nerve damage in
his foot and an addiction to painkillers because of the league's
conduct.

Dent and nine other players seek to represent a class of more than
1,000 retired players.

U.S. District Judge William Alsup dismissed the lawsuit in 2014,
finding the claims were governed by labor contracts between players
and 32 individual NFL teams and must therefore be resolved through
arbitration.

On Sept. 6, the Ninth Circuit overruled Judge Alsup, finding
evaluation of the players' claims does not require analyzing or
even looking at the labor contracts.

"Whether the NFL breached its duty to handle drugs with reasonable
care can be determined by comparing the conduct of the NFL to the
requirements of the statutes at issue," Tallman wrote. "There is no
need to look to, let alone interpret, the [collective bargaining
agreements].

The players' claims include negligence per se, negligent hiring and
retention, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment,
fraud, and loss of consortium.

Judge Tallman and the panel found the labor contracts only
mentioned the duty of individual NFL teams to retain certified
doctors and trainers and provide medical care to players. The
contracts said nothing about the league's obligations to players,
according to the panel.

The panel acknowledged the players' complaint lacks strong
allegations of a relationship between the NFL and team doctors that
would make the league liable for the conduct of those doctors. But
the judges concluded that does not mean the claims are pre-empted.

"We express no opinion about the ultimate merits of the players'
claims," Judge Tallman concluded in the opinion.

The panel remanded the case for Alsup to reconsider the claims as
not pre-empted by labor contracts.

Circuit Judges Jay Bybee and N. Randy Smith joined Tallman on the
panel. Judge Tallman replaced former U.S. Circuit Judge Alex
Kozinski on the panel after Judge Kozinski resigned last year amid
allegations of sexual harassment.

In July 2017, Judge Alsup dismissed a separate painkiller class
action against individual NFL teams. He found retired players can
only seek relief through workers' compensation.

NFL spokeswoman Taylor Rogers and plaintiffs' class attorney
Phillip Closius -- pclosius@mdattorney.com -- of Silverman Thompson
Slutkin & White in Baltimore, did not immediately return phone
calls seeking comment on Sept. 6.


NORTH CAROLINA: Amended Dillard Suit Dismissed
----------------------------------------------
In the case, THOMAS T. DILLARD, JR., Plaintiff, v. FRANK PERRY, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 5:17-CT-3119-D (E.D. N.C.), Judge James
C. Denver, III of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of North Carolina, Western Division, (i) denied Dillard's motion
for class certification; (ii) denied his motion for a preliminary
injunction; (iii) granted his remaining motions to the extent they
request to amend his complaint, but otherwise denied the motions;
and (iv) dismissed without prejudice Dillard's amended complaint.

On May 2, 2017, Dillard filed the action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and the
Rehabilitation Act.  On Feb. 13, 2018, Magistrate Judge Numbers
issued a Memorandum and Recommendation ("M&R"), and recommended
denying Dillard's class certification motion.  Judge Numbers also
ordered Dillard to particularize his claims.  Dillard objected to
the M&R, and filed numerous motions concerning Judge Numbers'
particularization order.  Dillard also requested injunctive
relief.

Judge Denver finds that the M&R properly recommended denying
Dillard's motion to represent other inmates in a class action.
Accordingly, he overruled Dillard's objections to the M&R and
denied his class certification motion.  He also overruled Dillard's
objections concerning the appointment of the counsel and requests
for discovery, but considers whether Dillard's amended complaint
complies with the particularization order.

As for Dillard's motion for injunctive relief, the Judge finds that
Dillard has not established that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent
injunctive relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor,
or that an injunction is in the public interest.  Thus, Dillard has
failed to meet his burden of proof.  Accordingly, he denied the
motion.

The Judge finds that Dillard's amended complaint does not comply
with the particularization order or notice pleading.  Dillard lists
76 Defendants.  His allegations include 10 different occurrences
taking place at eight different prisons over five years.  The
amended complaint is rambling and disjointed and fails to connect
specific Defendants to specific violations.  He says Dillard's
amended complaint fails to give the efendants notice of his claims
or the facts upon which it rests.  Dillard also has failed to
identify any Defendant responsible for violating his rights.  Thus,
Dillard's claims still fail to meet the requirements of notice
pleading.  Accordingly, Dillard's amended complaint is dismissed
without prejudice for failing to comply with the particularization
order.

In sum, Judge Denver adopted the conclusions in the M&R.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/FbdIGZ from Leagle.com

Thomas T. Dillard, Jr., Plaintiff, pro se.


NORTHLAND INVESTMENT: Judge Weighs Class Action Argument
--------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Peak, writing for New Heaven Independent, reports that
Church Street South's former tenants might have a basis to argue
that landlord Northland Investment Co. acted unscrupulously in
letting the complex fall apart, but they'd have a tougher time
proving the developer acted negligently.

Superior Court Judge Linda Lager dropped those hints about how
she's weighing the merits of a class action lawsuit that would
allow former tenants to argue their points collectively at one
trial, rather than at hundreds of separate proceedings.

Several families filed a case in state court in November 2016,
seeking monetary damages against Massachusetts-based Northland for
the respiratory problems, skin disorders, migraines, loss of
furniture, dislocation and homelessness suffered by the all the
families at the 301-unit, federally subsidized complex because of
rampant mold, leaking ceilings and other hazards. Those problems
led the government to condemn the 301-unit apartment complex across
from Union Station, which is now being demolished to make way for a
larger mixed-income, mixed-use development.

For months, Judge Lager has been considering how big the case
should be: Whether to restrict it to the five named plaintiffs and
their kids or to open it to hundreds more unnamed families.

The parties have submitted thousands of pages of legal precedents,
deposition excerpts, pictures and expert opinions in recent months.
The attorneys argued their points in person for the first time
before Judge Lager in state Superior Court in Waterbury last week.

Throughout the six-hour hearing, Lager instructed the parties to go
point by point through the legal requirements for a class-action
lawsuit, then asked how those applied to each of the charges in the
complaint.

"The job here is not to resolve factual issues," she said, "but to
identify any factual and legal issues that are common to the
class."

As the attorneys quibbled about how typical it was to find mold in
each apartment, a dozen former residents watched the proceedings.
At least two pulled on inhalers when their airways tightened from
asthma.

Past precedent has established that class action lawsuits save
everyone time and money. Moreover, they look out for clients who
can't afford to take on corporations alone, at the same that they
also protect companies from inconsistent orders in multiple
courtrooms.

The cases can be a headache for defendants who face larger
potential claims, and who lose the ability to pick off defendants
one by one with settlement offers.

David Rosen, a civil rights lawyer representing the tenants,
alleges that Northland violated the law in this case by collecting
rents for apartments that had become uninhabitable. The suit
accuses Northland of a large-scale "demolition by neglect" --
allowing conditions to deteriorate so badly that the complex would
need to be torn down -- at the expense of tenants' health and
safety.

Throughout the hearing, Rosen referred back to a June 2016 email
that Peter Standish, the senior vice president of Northland, sent
to Serena Neal-Sanjurjo, the director of New Haven's Livable City
Initiative, about jointly applying for grant money to rebuild
Church Street South. An attachment that Standish said he'd taken a
"first cut" at listed the complex's "design deficiencies,"
including a "proliferation of mold and moisture in dwelling units
due to water infiltration resulting from deteriorated roofs,
exterior wall structures, plumbing and drainage systems."

Rosen said that email proved Northland knew about problems at the
complex and didn't respond adequately.

"That identifies and frames the common issues," Rosen said. "The
defendant had knowledge of the danger to tenants of Church Street
South."

Rosen acknowledged differences in how badly individual apartments
deteriorated. But he argued that Northland's "entire course of
conduct" in largely ignoring moisture and mold was the same
throughout.

Northland's defense lawyers argued in response that the tenants'
experiences varied so widely that they can't be dealt with all at
once. They demanded individual proof of harm and damage.

Kevin McGinty, Esq. -- KMcGinty@mintz.com -- one of the defense
attorneys, sought to compare the case to a 2011 decision by the
U.S. Supreme Court to toss out a class action lawsuit filed by six
female Wal-Mart employees who had argued that the company's
policies resulted in lower pay and slower promotions for women. The
court ruled the plaintiffs' claims were too dissimilar to be dealt
with at once.

Lager said she doesn't think that precedent applies in this case.

"Discrimination isn't a leaking roof, bad pipes and broken windows
-- a complex that's 'functionally obsolete,' in the words of
Northland," she said, referring to language in the company's
September 2015 decommissioning plan. "It was built in a manner, as
[Northland's] experts talk about, that had a bad design from the
get-go for the Northeast."

In a thought experiment, she wondered aloud whether Northland would
make the same arguments about a 301-unit skyscraper with a
defective ventilation system. "If that [tower] blows up, who's
responsible?" she asked. Is there a difference if the same number
of units with the same fundamental problem are scattered across 22
buildings?

As the arguments went back and forth, Lager suggested that a single
narrative could be established for all of Church Street South. But
she questioned which specific violations of the law plaintiffs
could actually prove.

"The real issue, I'm inferring from [Rosen's] argument, is that the
claim appears to be that there were latent defects in the entirety
of Church Street South: defects that were unknown to the
prospective tenants, hidden on the roof, behind the walls, in the
plumbing," she concluded.

Lager seemed most open to claims under the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act (CUTPA), which the state legislature passed to
encourage lawyers to act like "private attorneys general."

CUTPA "doesn't require individualized proof as to how it affected
[Church Street South tenants], only an overarching scheme that
ultimately impacts the class," Lager said. "I don't think they'd
have to prove habitability [of individual units], but that
[Northland's overall strategy] was unfair, immoral and for the
purpose of getting the complex decommissioned. It is an issue, a
common issue, whether Northland's actions were unfair or
deceptive."

Lager said that a class-action lawsuit on those grounds would still
be complicated if the tenants won, because the court would have to
assign damages to each family, but she noted that a class-action
lawsuit would dramatically simplify the proceedings if Northland
won and the whole case could be snapped shut at once.
Lager did bring up one sticking point.

Along with Northland, two management companies are named as
defendants responsible for the complex's condition. But those
companies weren't in charge at the same time. When the William M.
Hotchkiss Company took over from DeMarco Management Corporation in
2015, at least 20 residents included in the proposed class had
already moved out.

"We're all lumped together. We didn't purchase the property, didn't
have a grand plan for its redevelopment. So much that's alleged, we
didn't have any role in," said Michael Neubert, Esq. --
mneubert@npmlaw.com -- Hotchkiss's lawyer. "It's very
individualized,"

Judge Lager said that breaking up tenants into subclasses could
make it too complicated, but the alternative of filling her docket
with hundreds of near-repeat cases doesn't seem much simpler.

"Do you have another three to four years to do one case after
another?" she asked.

Lager didn't issue a ruling on whether she'd certify the class. She
said she wantsd to give Rosen a chance to consider tweaking his
charges.[GN]


OMNI FINANCIAL: Ronquillo Files FCRA Suit in S.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against OMNI Financial Group
Inc. The case is styled as Kelissa Ronquillo individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. OMNI
Financial Group Inc., Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-02146-WQH-AGS
(S.D. Cal., Sept. 14, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case over consumer credit under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act.

Omni Financial Group Inc. was founded in 1997. The company's line
of business includes providing management consulting services.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Matthew M. Loker, Esq.
     Kazerouni Law Group, APC
     245 Fischer Avenue
     Unit D1
     Costa Mesa, CA 92626
     Phone: (800) 400-6808
     Fax: (800) 520-5523
     Email: ml@kazlg.com


OPHTHOTECH CORP: Shareholders File Derivative Complaint
-------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
shareholders say in a federal derivative complaint that directors
of Ophthotech Corp. overhyped the prospects of their experimental
macular degeneration drug Fovista, whose failure whacked 86 percent
off the share prices, erasing nearly $1.2 billion in market
capitalization.


ORANGE COUNTY, CA: Appeals Court Refuses to Dismiss Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Charmaine Little, writing for Northern California Record, reports
that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in
part and reversed in part a lower court's decision to dismiss a
class action lawsuit against the County of Orange after it changed
health benefits for retired employees.

The County of Orange faced complaints by retired employees after it
eliminated the Retiree Premium Subsidy and lowered the Grant
Benefit, according to the lawsuit.

The Retiree Premium Subsidy consisted of a pool of retired and
active employees so that the company could more efficiently
calculate medical insurance premiums, according to court documents.
The Grant Benefit gave retired employees a grant each month to help
provide for the cost of health care premiums, according to court
documents.

Gaylan Harris represented a class of other retired workers that
said they had an implied contract that would provide them with the
Grant Benefit for the entire term of their retirement. The appeals
court determined the plaintiffs gave enough evidence that the Grant
Benefit should continue for the duration of their retirement.

"The retirees alleged the existence of annual memorandum of
understanding between the union and the County, establishing a
right to the Grant Benefit; and the retirees' specific allegations
plausibly supported the conclusion that the County impliedly
promised a lifetime benefit, which could not be eliminated or
reduced," Judge Marsha S. Berzon wrote in the opinion.

Considering this, the appeals court reversed the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California's decision to dismiss
the case.

Still, it affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the
retirees' claims that the county violated the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). They said it allegedly
discriminated against them because of their age when it rejected
the Retiree Premium Subsidy. The appeals court pointed out the
retirees did not have a right to continue this program.

"We affirm the district court's dismissal of the FEHA claim, but
conclude that the district court erred in dismissing certain of
Retirees' contract claims. We accordingly reverse in part and
remand," according to the opinion.

The court added that California regulations do not block the
county's decision to offer different benefits to retired and active
workers. It ultimately determined the county is allowed to separate
retirees from other employees via the FEHA "taking into account
that the cost of providing medical benefits to the retiree group
was higher because the retires were on average older."

It affirmed the lower court's dismissal of this claim.

Circuit Judge Marsha S. Berzon authored the opinion. Circuit Judges
Johnnie B. Rawlinson, and Michael R. Murphy concurred.[GN]


PAPA JOHN'S: Brower Piven Files Class Action Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------
The securities litigation law firm of Brower Piven, A Professional
Corporation, announces that a class action lawsuit has been
commenced in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York on behalf of purchasers of Papa John's
International, Inc. (NASDAQ: PZZA) ("Papa John's" or the "Company")
securities during the period between February 25, 2014 through July
19, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period").  Investors who wish to
become proactively involved in the litigation have until October
29, 2018 to seek appointment as lead plaintiff.

If you wish to choose counsel to represent you and the class, you
must apply to be appointed lead plaintiff and be selected by the
Court.  The lead plaintiff will direct the litigation and
participate in important decisions including whether to accept a
settlement for the class in the action.  The lead plaintiff will be
selected from among applicants claiming the largest loss from
investment in Papa John's securities during the Class Period.
Members of the class will be represented by the lead plaintiff and
counsel chosen by the lead plaintiff.  No class has yet been
certified in the above action.

The complaint accuses the defendants of violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by virtue of the defendants'
failure to disclose during the Class Period that Papa John's
executives had engaged in a pattern of sexual harassment and other
inappropriate workplace conduct and that the Company's Code of
Ethics and Business Conduct was inadequate to prevent the foregoing
misconduct which would have a negative impact on Papa John's
business and operations and expose Papa John's to reputational
harm, heightened regulatory scrutiny and legal liability.

According to the complaint, following July 10, 2018 and July 11,
2018 reports that Papa John's founder had used a racial slur during
a conference call in May 2018 and a July 19, 2018 article reporting
on the sexual inappropriate conduct, the value of Papa John's
shares declined significantly.

If you have suffered a loss in excess of $100,000 from investment
in Papa John's securities purchased on or after February 25, 2014
and held through the revelation of negative information during
and/or at the end of the Class Period and would like to learn more
about this lawsuit and your ability to participate as a lead
plaintiff, without cost or obligation to you, please;
           
         Charles J. Piven, Esq.
         Brower Piven, A Professional Corporation
         1925 Old Valley Road
         Stevenson, Maryland 21153
         Telephone: 410-415-6616
         Email: hoffman@browerpiven.com [GN]


PARAGON SYSTEMS: Robinson Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
-------------------------------------------------------------
LOUISE ROBINSON, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC., an Alabama
corporation, licensed to do business in the State of California as
PARASYS, INC.; and DOES 1 to 100, Inclusive, the Defendant, Case
No. BC720142 (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 31, 2018), seeks to recover
unpaid and interest wages as a result of the Defendants' failure to
authorize or permit required meal and rest periods; failure to
provide accurate wage statements; failure to pay minimum wages for
all hours worked; failure to pay overtime wages; unfair business
practices; waiting time penalties; injunctive relief and other
equitable relief; reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to California
Labor Code sections 226(e), 2802, 218,5, and 1194; costs; and
interest brought on behalf of Plaintiff and others similarly
situated.

According to the complaint, the Defendants failed to pay premium
wages to Plaintiff and similarly situated employees to compensate
them for each workday the employees did not receive all legally
required duty-free meal periods.  The Defendants employed policies
and procedures which ensured employees did not receive any premium
wages to compensate them for the workdays in which they did not
receive all legally required meal periods.

Paragon Systems is a United States-based private security and
investigation firm, and is headquartered in Herndon, VA.  Paragon
Systems is a subsidiary of Securitas. In April 2008, Paragon
Systems was awarded a $56 million contract from the United States
Department of Homeland Security.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael R. Crosner, Esq.
          Zachary M. Crosner, Esq.
          David Watson, Esq.
          CROSNER LEGAL, PC
          433 N. Camden Dr., Ste. 400
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 496 4818
          Facsimile: (310) 510 6429
          E-mail: mike@crosnerleiial.com
                  zach@crosncrlcgal.com
                  david@crosnerleaal.com


PARAMOUNT EQUITY: Titus FLSA Class Has Conditional Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DENISE TITUS, an individual, Plaintiff, v. PARAMOUNT
EQUITY MORTGAGE, LLC; and DOES 1-100, inclusive, Defendants, Case
No. 2:17-cv-00349-MCE-KJN (E.D. Cal.), Judge Morrison C. England,
Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional
Certification.

The Plaintiff seeks conditional certification pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
Section  216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") of a class
of non-exempt employees employed by the Defendant. Judge England
finds that the Plaintiff has satisfied the lenient "similarly
situated" requirements of 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) of the FLSA.

He conditionally certified an FLSA class consisting of all current
and former hourly, non-exempt employees of Paramount Equity who
received commissions, non-discretionary bonuses and/or other items
of compensation and worked more than 8 hours in a day or 40 hours
in a workweek, and who were not included in the class action styled
as Tran, et al. v. Paramount Equity Mortgage, LLC, Orange County
Superior Court Case No. 30-2015-00827323-CU-OE-CJC, either by
having opted-out or by having not been included in the class
description in that action, from Feb.16, 2014 through March 1,
2016.

In accordance with the parties' stipulation to toll the statute of
limitations from May 19, 2017 until 30 days following the
conclusion of their mediation, which they anticipate completing by
Sept. 19, 2018, the Court issued a May 17, 2018 order tolling the
statute for that period.  Accordingly, the statute of limitations
issue raised by the Plaintiff has now been resolved.  Additionally,
given the Plaintiff's offer to meet and confer concerning the
propriety of the proposed notice to class members, and given what
appears to be Plaintiff's willingness to reconsider, if necessary,
the particular issues raised by the Defendant as to that notice,
the parties are directed to meet and confer concerning those issues
and to notify the Court as to whether any differences have been
resolved not later than the time the parties' Joint Status Report
is due in accordance with the Court's Order of May 17, 2018.  

The parties are further directed to submit a proposed order as to
any changes agreed upon to the notice for class members, and if
agreement is not forthcoming each side should proffer their own
proposed order for the Court's consideration.  

Judge England approved as unopposed the proposed 90-day notice
period from the sending of the Notice for Putative FLSA Class
Members to postmark their Consents to Join and mail such Consents.
He further appointed Mayall Hurley, P.C. as the Class Counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/q4ZDKn from Leagle.com.

Denise Titus, an individual, Plaintiff, represented by Robert
Joshua Wasserman -- rwasserman@mayallaw.com -- Mayall Hurley, PC,
Nicholas John Scardigli -- nscardigli@mayallaw.com -- Mayall
Hurley, P.C., Vladimir Joseph Kozina -- vjkozinaj@mayallaw.com --
Mayall Hurley P.C. & William J. Gorham, III -- wgorham@mayallaw.com
-- Mayall Hurley, P.C.

Paramount Equity Mortgage, LLC, Defendant, represented by Tracy Wei
Costantino -- costantino@lbbslaw.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C..


PENNSYLVANIA: Court Narrows Claims in McRae Discrimination Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss in the case captioned NADIRAH McRAE, individually and as
class representative, and RICHARD JEAN, as parent and guardian of
senior D.J., individually and as class representative, Plaintiffs,
v. THE SCHOOL REFORM COMMISSION, and SCHOOL DISTRICT OF
PHILADELPHIA, Defendants. Civil Action No. 17-4054. (E.D. Pa.).

Plaintiff Nadirah McRae, a black female former student athlete at
Strawberry Mansion High School, a public school in Philadelphia,
PA, filed suit against Defendant The School Reform Commission and
Defendant School District of Philadelphia for Defendants' alleged
violations of Title VI (race discrimination) and Title IX (sex
discrimination) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff McRae
brought suit as an individual and as a potential class
representative in a putative class action.

The Defendants advance three arguments in support of dismissal: (A)
the Defendants argue that neither the Plaintiff has standing to
pursue her claims; (B) the Plaintiffs' claims are also moot because
the Plaintiffs have graduated or will soon graduate from Strawberry
Mansion High School; and (C) the Plaintiffs have failed to allege
facts sufficient to state the prima facie case for either Title VI
race discrimination or Title IX sex discrimination.

Plaintiffs' Standing To Sue

To establish standing, a plaintiff must show that (1) the plaintiff
has suffered an injury, (2) that the injury suffered is fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and (3) that
the injury may be redressed by a favorable decision

Plaintiff McRae Has Standing To Pursue A Claim For Damages

Plaintiff McRae seeks monetary damages of more than $250,000.00
from Defendants stemming from the Defendants' alleged violations of
Title VI and Title IX. The Defendants' alleged violations consist
of the Defendants' dismissive and discriminatory attitude and
various discriminatory actions, which extended beyond the athletic
field and permeated the school and its counselors. In particular,
Plaintiff McRae contends that her Strawberry Mansion High School
counselor failed to submit documentation to the University of
Hartford and the NCAA to support Plaintiff McRae's application for
an NCAA eligibility waiver.  

Plaintiff McRae alleged (A) that she has suffered an actual injury
loss of $250,000.00 in athletics-based financial assistance from
the University of Hartford, (B) that her injury is fairly traceable
to Defendants' alleged violations of Title IV and Title IX, the
problems on the athletic field "permeated the school and its
counselors and (C) that a favorable decision in this case may
provide her with redress.

Plaintiff McRae Does Not Have Standing To Pursue A Claim For
Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff McRae also seeks injunctive relief.  Even if Defendants
changed their purportedly discriminatory practices and cease their
discriminatory actions, such changes would provide no benefit to
Plaintiff McRae as an alumnus of the Philadelphia School District.
Even though Plaintiff McRae may meet the first two prongs of the
standing requirement, Plaintiff McRae fails to meet the third prong
because a favorable decision on her claim for injunctive relief
would not provide redress for her injury.

The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, to the extent it seeks dismissal
of Plaintiff McRae's claims for injunctive relief, therefore, is
granted.

Plaintiff D.J. contends that the Defendants' Title VI violations
are evident in view of a number of factual allegations, which, when
considered together, are sufficient to state a prima facie claim
for actionable discrimination. Among other allegations, Plaintiff
D.J. points to the following in support of her Title VI claim
against Defendants:

   -- the Defendants have a history of refusing to provide field
hockey and lacrosse training and programming at predominantly black
schools.

   -- the Defendants grouped the Strawberry Mansion High School
field hockey and lacrosse teams with other predominantly black
schools to form a less prestigious school district athletic
league.

The Court concludes that these allegations are sufficient, when
read together, to establish (A) that Plaintiff D.J. has suffered
and, to the extent she remains a student athlete at Strawberry
Mansion High School, continues to suffer injury in the form of
unequal access to appropriate athletic facilities, unequal access
to uniforms and equipment, and unequal access to collegiate
recruitment events, among other things, (B) that Plaintiff D.J.'s
injuries are fairly traceable to Defendants' alleged violations of
Title VI and Title IX, and (C) that Plaintiff D.J.'s injury may be
fairly redressed by a favorable award of damages and/or an
injunction.

Plaintiffs Have Alleged Sufficient Facts To State The Prima Facie
Claims For Title VI and Title IX Discrimination

Allegations Of Title VI Claim Are Sufficient

The Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim
under Title VI because the allegations in the Amended Complaint
cannot support an inference that the Defendants intentionally
discriminated against the Plaintiffs.

The Court disagrees.

The Amended Complaint provides that the Defendants' employees
including athletic organizers, coaches, and support staff openly
referred to the Strawberry Mansion High School girls' lacrosse and
hockey teams as a member of the Negro League and that participation
in the Negro League would not provide meaningful exposure to
collegiate athletics recruiters. The Defendants allegedly failed to
investigate complaints of racial hostility by white coaches and
players toward black female student athletes.

Finally, the Plaintiffs allege that Defendants fired the Strawberry
Mansion High School girls' lacrosse and filed hockey coach
immediately after the coach lodged a complaint to Defendants about
the teams' treatment and relegation to the Negro League.

The Court concludes that these allegations are sufficient to state
a claim for intentional discrimination and the Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Title VI claim is denied.

Allegations Of Title IX Discrimination Are Sufficient

Title IX provides that no person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.

To state a claim under Title IX, a plaintiff must allege, at
minimum, that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex
or gender.

Here, the Amended Complaint sets forth a number of allegations to
support the claim that Defendants have and are violating Title IX.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants divide athletics into girls and
boys teams, and that Defendants took adverse actions against the
Strawberry Mansion High School girls Field Hockey and Lacrosse
teams. If proven, the fact that Defendants separated their athletic
program into girls and boys teams and then allegedly directed their
adverse actions against the girls' teams would support an inference
that Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiffs on
the basis of their sex.  

These allegations are sufficient to state a claim under Title IX
for sex discrimination under either a failure to accommodate or
unequal treatment theory. Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Title IX claim is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2018
Memorandum is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7l64b7j from
Leagle.com.

NADIRAH MCRAE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CLASS REPRESENTATIVE, Plaintiff,
represented by GLENN A. ELLIS -- gae@freiwaldlaw.com -- LAYSER &
FREIWALD PC & AARON J. FREIWALD -- ajf@freiwaldlaw.com -- FREIWALD
LAW, P.C.

RICHARD JEAN, AS THE PARENT AND GUARDIAN OF SENIOR D.J.,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CLASS REPRESENTATIVE, Plaintiff, represented by
GLENN A. ELLIS, LAYSER & FREIWALD PC.

THE SCHOOL REFORM COMMISSION & SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA,
Defendants, represented by BONNIE M. HOFFMAN --
bhoffman@hangley.com -- HANGLEY ARONCHICK SEGAL & PUDLIN & ASHTON
R. LATTIMORE -- alattimore@hangley.com -- HANGLEY ARONCHICK SEGAL
PUDLIN & SCHILLER.


PLACER COUNTY, CA: $1.4MM Fund OK'd in Inmate Abuse Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
Sam Stanton, writing for The Sacramento Bee, reports that a federal
judge in Sacramento signed off on a settlement on September 7 in
the Placer County Jail abuse case that calls for the county to
initiate sweeping new reforms in the county's two jails and to
create a fund of more than $1.4 million to pay off claims by
inmates.

U.S. Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Newman signed a tentative approval
in a class-action lawsuit brought against Placer County last year
following Sheriff Devon Bell's revelation that three sheriff's
officials had been arrested on allegations of using excessive force
on inmates and trying to cover it up.

A permanent settlement approval is expected in March, but officials
on both sides say changes already have been made in the sheriff's
office's training and at the jails to prevent a recurrence of
incidents that sparked several lawsuits by inmates and, ultimately,
the class action suit filed by Penn Valley lawyer Patrick Dwyer,
Esq. -- pdwyer@pdwyerlaw.com -- and Sacramento civil rights
attorney Mark Merin, Esq. -- mark@markmerin.com

"Mr. Merin and I believe that the county is making a serious effort
to change operations at the jails so this does not occur again,"
Dwyer said on September 7. "There's been real forward movement by
the county."

Sheriff's spokesman Lt. Andrew Scott said many of the changes
called for in the settlement agreement already have been made,
including adding video cameras to keep tabs on operations inside
the jails, tripling storage space for videos, a new use-of-force
policy and additional staffing.

"This is a step in the process toward getting this whole thing
resolved, and I'd say some of the most significant steps are making
improvements at the jails, and looking back and making sure these
things do not reoccur," Scott said.

Scott said the sheriff's office already has increased supervision
at the jails and that Bell had created a professional standards
unit for the office shortly after the scandal was discovered.

"That's one of the things that is seen as extremely important as
the sheriff's office goes forward," Scott said.

The agreement also calls for the office to track all use-of-force
incidents and provide quarterly reports on them to inmate lawyers
through December 2019.

The settlement stems from the sheriff's announcement in May 2017
that three officials had been arrested on charges involving
excessive force and falsifying evidence after a sheriff's deputy
who was reviewing video recordings found they did not match up with
details recorded in a use-of-force report.

Since then, six civil suits and a claim have been settled by the
county for a total of $1.25 million. Those include one by Beau
Bangert, a mentally ill man whose suit alleged he was Tased
repeatedly and beaten unconscious while being held at the Auburn
Jail.

Bangert, who eventually settled his suit for $250,000, also is the
main named plaintiff in the class-action matter and under terms of
the agreement will be paid another $50,000 as an "incentive fee"
for pursuing the action, according to court documents.

The agreement calls for the county to create a settlement fund of
$1,449,700 to cover claims submitted by inmates who were in the
jails between Aug. 11, 2015, through Aug. 14 of this year and who
file claims involving abuse.

Payments from the fund may range from $1,500 to $100,000, and all
members of the inmate class are to be mailed notices about the
settlement along with claim forms. Court documents also call for
the creation of a website providing basic information about the
claims, court documents say.

If more claims come in than expected, the payout amounts can be
reduced; if fewer claims come in the money left over goes back to
the county.

The settlement fund also includes paying the inmate's lawyers fees
of $478,401, documents say.

Supervising Deputy County Counsel Brett Holt said officials do not
yet know how many inmates are included in the class and noted that
the settlement does not include any admission of wrongdoing by the
county.

But Holt said the county has moved quickly to improve conditions at
the jails, including spending $1.41 million to increase video
surveillance and triple the amount of video storage to three years'
worth from 366 days.

The county is self-insured up to $1 million, meaning the county
paid that out for the settlements of the class-action suit and the
individual cases, with insurance covering the remainder of the
$2.75 million total.

Cases against two of the three jail officials arrested in 2017
still are pending; charges against a third were dismissed in April
for insufficient evidence.[GN]


QURATE RETAIL: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Class Action
---------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC, notifies investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed Qurate Retail, Inc. ("Qurate" or the
"Company) (NASDAQ : QRTEA ) and certain of its officers, on behalf
of shareholders who purchased or otherwise acquired Qurate
securities between August 5, 2015, and September 7, 2016, both
dates inclusive (the "Class Period"). Such investors are encouraged
to join this case by visiting the firm's site:
www.bgandg.com/qrtea.

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Qurate
was aggressively loosening the credit standards of its Easy-Pay
program to attract a large group of new customers; (2) Qurate's
strong sales growth was due to this loose credit policy; (3)
accounts receivable associated with this new group of customers
posed a high risk of write-off; and (4) consequently, Qurate's
positive statements about its business, operations, and prospects
lacked a reasonable basis.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
review a copy of the Complaint you can visit the firm's site:
www.bgandg.com/qrtea or you may contact Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or
his Investor Relations Analyst, Yael Hurwitz of Bronstein, Gewirtz
& Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If you suffered a loss in Qurate
you have until November 5, 2018 to request that the Court appoint
you as lead plaintiff.  Your ability to share in any recovery
doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

         Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
         Yael Hurwitz, Esq.
         Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC
         Telephone: 212-697-6484
         Email: peretz@bgandg.com [GN]


R&S HOSPITALITY: Sandman Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Law
-----------------------------------------------------------
JASON SANDMAN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. R&S HOSPITALITY, LLC d/b/a QUEENS BULLY and
ROHAN AGGARWAL, the Defendants, Case No. 713546/2018 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., Aug. 31, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages,
misappropriated tips, and other damages on behalf of all of the
Defendants' current and former bartenders, based on the Defendants'
violation of the New York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendants own and operate a
gastropub named Queens Bully in Forest Hills, New York.  The
Defendants paid Sandman and their other bartenders less than the
minimum wage by taking advantage of the tip-credit permitted by 12
N.Y.C.R.R section 146-1.3. The Defendants, however, were not
entitled to pay bartenders less than the minimum wage because they
did not permit bartenders to keep all of their tips and failed to
provide them with accurate wage statements (i.e., paystubs).[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Putative Class:

          Troy L. Kessler, Esq.
          Garrett Kaske, Esq.
          SHULMAN KESSLER LLP
          534 Broadhollow Road, Suite 275
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: (631) 499 9100


RAI GROUP: Baez Seeks Unpaid Wages under FLSA
---------------------------------------------
VANESSA BAEZ, and other similarly situated individuals, the
Plaintiffs, vs RAI GROUP LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company;
FABIO BURG MYLNARZ, individually; and ANDRE BALDEZ BOLOGNESI,
individually, the Defendants, Case No. 77312558 (Fla. Cir., 11th
Jud., Miami-Dade County, Aug. 31, 2018), seeks to recover damages
exceeding $15,000 excluding attorneys' fees or costs resulting from
the Defendants' violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff performed work for Defendants from on or about May
24, 2017 to July 14, 2017, as an Account Executive, The parties
entered into an agreement where the Defendants would pay Plaintiff
$1,500 monthly. The Plaintiffs performance of services created an
employment relationship between herself and the Defendants. The
Plaintiff was not fully compensated for all hours worked.

On or about July 2017, the Plaintiff has sent various emails to the
Defendants complaining about the unpaid wages and requesting her
check. The Defendants had or should have had full knowledge of all
hours worked by the Plaintiff including those hours worked in
excess of 40 in a given work week.

RAI Group offers a wide range of strategic and financial resources
and services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anthony M. Georges-Pierre, Esq.
          Max L. Horowitz, Esq.
          REMER & GEORGES-PIERRE, PLLC
          44 West Flagler Street, Suite 2200
          Miami, FL 33130
          Telephone: (305) 416 5000
          Facsimile: (305) 416 5005
          E-mail: agp@rgpattonreys.com
                  mhorowitz@rgpattorneys.com


RIPPLE LABS: Bid to Remand Coffey Securities Fraud Suit Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California denied the Plaintiff's motion to
remand the case, RYAN COFFEY, Plaintiff, v. RIPPLE LABS INC., et
al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-03286-PJH (N.D. Cal.).

The case is a putative securities class action brought by Coffey
against Defendants Ripple, XRP II, LLC, a subsidiary of Ripple, and
Bradley Garlinghouse, CEO of Ripple.  He filed the action in the
San Francisco Superior Court on May 3, 2018.

In 2013 Ripple created a digital currency called XRP.  According to
the complaint, unlike other cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin and
Etherium, Ripple fully generated 100 billion XRP prior to its
distribution. As of June 30, 2015, Ripple held approximately 67.51
billion XRP and all individuals -- including Ripple's founders --
held 32.49 billion XRP.

The Plaintiff alleges that in 2013, the Defendants began selling
XRP to the general public and wholesale to larger investors in a
"never ending ICO" -- initial coin offering.  In an ICO, digital
assets are sold to consumers in exchange for legal tender or other
cryptocurrencies.  The Plaintiff alleges that the XRP offered and
sold by defendants have all the traditional hallmarks of a security
and in fact is a security within the meaning of Securities Act of
1933 and/or the California Corporations Code.  Accordingly, he
contends that the Defendants "never ending ICO" constituted an
unregistered sale of securities in violation of the Securities Act
and the California Corporations Code.

On behalf of all persons or entities who purchased XRP from Jan. 1,
2013 through the present, the Plaintiff asserts four causes of
action for: (1) violation of Sections 5 & 12(a)(1) of the
Securities Act for the unregistered offer and sale of securities;
(2) violation of Cal. Corp. Code Sections 25110 & 25503 for the
unregistered offer and sale of securities; (3) violation of Section
15 of the Securities Act (control person liability); and (4)
violation of Cal. Corp. Code Section 25504 (control person
liability).  The Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, rescission of all XRP
purchases, damages, and a constructive trust over the proceeds of
the Defendants' alleged sales of XRP.

On June 1, 2018, the Defendants removed the action pursuant to the
Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), under 28 U.S.C. Section 1453.

The Plaintiff's motion to remand came on for hearing before the
Court on Aug. 1, 2018.  The parties agree that absent the
Plaintiff's Securities Act claims, the Defendants could properly
remove the action under CAFA based on the Plaintiff's state law
claims.  The Plaintiff, however, argues that Section 22(a) of the
Securities Act operates as a complete bar on removing any action
that includes a Securities Act claim.  The Defendant responds that
the Plaintiff's state law claims satisfy CAFA and therefore the
entire action may be removed pursuant to Section 1453, regardless
of Section 22(a)'s removal bar.

Judge Hamilton concludes that when an anti-removal provision such
as Section 22(a) is invoked, the threshold question is whether
removal is being effectuated by way of the general removal statute,
or by way of a separate removal provision that grants additional
removal jurisdiction in a class of cases which would not otherwise
be removable under the prior grant of authority.  If removal is
being effectuated through a provision, that confers additional
removal jurisdiction, and that provision contains no exception for
non-removable federal claims, the provision should be given full
effect.

He holds that Section 1453 grants the Defendant an additional,
independent basis for removing an action from state to federal
court.  The parties do not dispute and he finds that the
Plaintiff's California claims satisfy CAFA's removal requirements.
Because Section 1453 says nothing about incorporating Section
1441(a)'s except clause, or otherwise deferring to anti-removal
provisions, Section 22(a) does not bar removal of the action.

In addition, he finds that the Plaintiff's application of Section
22(a) to all removal provisions unnecessarily renders numerous
statutory clauses superfluous.  Lastly, removal in the situation
accords with Congress' overall intent to strongly favor the
exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction over class actions with
interstate ramifications.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Hamilton denied the Plaintiff's
motion to remand.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Cu8pDT from Leagle.com.

Ryan Coffey, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by James Quinn Taylor-Copeland --
james@taylorcopelandlaw.com -- Taylor-Copeland Law.

Ripple Labs Inc., a Delaware Corporation, XRP II, LLC, a South
Carolina limited liability company & Bradley Garlinghouse,
Defendants, represented by Peter Bradley Morrison --
peter.morrison@skadden.com -- Skadden Arps Slate Meagher and Flom
LLP, Andrew J. Ceresney -- aceresney@debevoise.com -- Debevoise and
Plimpton LLP, pro hac vice, John M. Neukom --
john.neukom@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP, Mary Jo White -- mjwhite@debevoise.com -- Debevoise and
Plimpton LLP, pro hac vice & Virginia Faye Milstead --
virginia.milstead@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom LLP.

Avner Greenwald, Interested Party, represented by Thomas L.
Laughlin, IV -- tlaughlin@scott-scott.com -- ScottScott, Attorneys
at Law, LLP.


RIPPLE: Counsel Departs Firm Amid Class-Action Dispute Over XRP
---------------------------------------------------------------
Josiah Wilmoth at CCN reports that a top lawyer at cryptocurrency
startup Ripple has left the company, a spokesperson confirmed to
CCN on Friday.

Brynly Llyr, who joined the San Francisco-based blockchain company
in Nov. 2016 as the firm's general counsel and has served in that
role in the nearly two years since, is no longer with the
organization. Llyr's departure from Ripple was first reported by
Quartz.

In a statement, a Ripple spokesperson confirmed the move and said
that the blockchain firm was "grateful" for her work at the
company.

"We can confirm that Brynly Llyr has moved on from Ripple. We're
grateful to all that she did to help build an incredible team that
will continue the work they've been focused on for the past year
and beyond. We wish Brynly all the best in her next endeavor and
the team here at Ripple looks forward to the next chapter where we
will continue to pave the way in this ever-evolving and unchartered
industry."

Previously, she had managed "class action litigation and complex
litigation" for eBay and also spent time at PayPal after it was
spun off from the e-commerce giant, according to her LinkedIn
profile.

Llyr's departure comes as Ripple prepares to defend itself against
a variety of class-action lawsuits alleging that the XRP
cryptocurrency -- whose majority owner is Ripple -- should be
regulated as a security and that the firm's distribution of XRP
(which is often colloquially referred to as "ripple") constitutes
an illegal securities offering.

The spokesperson did not respond to an inquiry about whether Llyr's
departure would have any impact on that legal battle. However as
Hacked reported in July, the company has hired a heavyweight to
oversee its case that XRP is not a security: Mary Jo White, the
former chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the
agency that determines whether an asset should be regulated as a
security by the federal government.

Ripple, for its part, has long denied that XRP is a security. The
SEC, meanwhile, has not commented on the matter publicly, though
officials have stated that bitcoin and ethereum -- the only two
cryptocurrencies with circulating valuations higher than those of
XRP -- should not be classified as securities under current U.S.
law. [GN]


ROBERT HALF: Cal. App. Affirms Arbitration Ruling in Gentry Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JESSICA GENTRY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROBERT
HALF INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant and Appellant, Case No. A147553
(Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of California for the First
District, Division Four, affirmed the trial court's order denying
RHI's motion to compel arbitration.

Gentry filed the underlying putative class action against her
former employer RHI, alleging that RHI's compensation policies
violate state wage and hour laws and the unfair practices law.  In
addition to damages and equitable relief, she penalties for alleged
Labor Code violations under the Private Attorneys General Act of
2004 ("PAGA").

Gentry worked in RHI's Accountemps division as a temporary employee
for several businesses, completing her last assignment in November
2014.  While Gentry was employed by RHI, she was not paid
compensation for time she was required to spend preparing for
potential job assignments.  Because of this policy, RHI failed to
provide Gentry and other employees with proper wage statements and
to pay all wages owed to them.

Gentry filed her First Amended Complaint against RHI on behalf of a
putative class of terminated RHI employees, and alleged that her
lawsuit was also a representative/qui tam type action, brought
under PAGA on behalf of the State of California and all current or
former RHI employees who worked in California within the maximum
allowable period of the claim.

Incorporating factual allegations, Gentry attempted to state cause
of action for (1) failure to pay wages, (2) failure to provide
proper wage statements, (3) failure to pay final wages, (4) unfair
business practices, and (5) penalties under PAGA, for violating
state labor laws.

In November 2015, RHI filed a motion to compel "individual
arbitration" of the first four causes of action in the FAC.  RHI
limited its motion to compel arbitration to the first four causes
of action in the FAC, arguing that those were Gentry's individual
claims and that she agreed to settle those controversies in
individual arbitration through written agreement.  Citing Iskanian
v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, RHI argued that Gentry's
agreement to individually arbitrate her claims against RHI was
fully enforceable and precluded her from pursing these claims on
behalf of a putative class in any forum.

On Jan. 4, 2016, the trial court denied RHI's motion to compel
arbitration.  RHI timely appealed.  RHI concedes that its
arbitration agreement with Gentry contains a provision waiving her
right to bring a PAGA claim, which is unenforceable under Iskanian.
However, RHI contends the trial court erred by concluding that the
entire arbitration agreement is void.

The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the RHI
Agreement is not enforceable.  First, the Claims Covered by the
Agreement section of the RHI Agreement contains a provision waiving
the employee's right to bring a representative PAGA action in any
forum.  Second, the "Construction and Severability" section of the
RHI Agreement states that if any provision of the section entitled
'Claims Covered by the Agreement' is determined to be void or
unenforceable, then the Agreement will be of no force or effect.

RHI concedes that the RHI Agreement contains an invalid waiver of a
PAGA claim.  First, and crucially, the Court finds that RHI
addresses the wrong question by arguing about whether a PAGA claim
is a covered claim.  Second, even putting aside the provision
containing the PAGA waiver, the "Claims Covered" section addressing
the scope of the parties' agreement to arbitrate does not exclude
PAGA claims as RHI contends.  Third, RHI's reliance on Iskanian is
misplaced.

Finally, RHI briefly repeats an argument it made below that the
PAGA claim is not a "Claim Covered by the Agreement" because the
"Claims Not Covered by the Agreement" section states that the RHI
Agreement does not cover claims that as a matter of law cannot be
subject to arbitration.  The Court holds that the dispositive issue
is not whether the broad arbitration clause covered a PAGA claim in
the first instance, but rather whether any provision in the "Claims
Covered" section of the RHI Agreement was determined to be void or
unenforceable.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appealed order.  The costs are
awarded to the Respondent.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/VJlaux from Leagle.com.


ROCKWELL MEDICAL: Sept. 25 Lead Plaintiff Bid Deadline
------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
commenced on behalf of shareholders of Rockwell Medical, Inc.
Shareholders interested in serving as lead plaintiff have until the
deadlines listed to petition the court and further details about
the cases can be found at the links provided. There is no cost or
obligation to you.

Rockwell Medical, Inc. (NASDAQ: RMTI)
Class Period: November 8, 2017 - June 26, 2018
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: September 25, 2018
Join the action:
http://www.zlk.com/pslra-d/rockwell-medical-inc?wire=3

About the lawsuit: Throughout the class period, Rockwell Medical,
Inc. allegedly made materially false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Rockwell was aware that The
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services will not pursue
Rockwell's proposal for separate reimbursement for the drug
Triferic; (2) the estimated reserves in the first quarter 2018 10-Q
are misstated; (3) there was a material weakness in Rockwell's
internal controls over financial reporting; (4) consequently,
Rockwell's internal controls over financial reporting were
ineffective during the Class Period; (5) Defendant Chioini withheld
material information regarding Triferic from Rockwell's auditor,
corporate counsel and five independent directors of the Board; and
(6) as a result, Defendants' statements about the Company's
business, operations and prospects were materially false and
misleading and/or lacked reasonable bases at all relevant times.

To learn more about the Rockwell Medical, Inc. class action contact
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com.

         Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
         Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
         55 Broadway, 10th Floor
         New York, NY 10006
         Telephone: (212) 363-7500
         Toll Free: (877) 363-5972
         Fax: (212) 363-7171
         Email: jlevi@levikorsinsky.com [GN]


RUSSIAN SCHOOL OF MATHEMATICS: Failed to Pay Wages, Loginova Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Irina Loginova, and those similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. The
Russian School of Mathematics, Inc., DOES 1-10, the Defendants,
Case No. RG18919000 (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 31, 2018), alleges that
Defendant failed to pay the Plaintiff and those similarly situated
wages for all hours worked, and failed to provide meal and rest
breaks according to California law.

Ms. Loginova began working for RSM in April 2015. Initially she
taught four classes per week and was paid $25.00 per hour for the
time spent in the classroom teaching. Presently, she is teaching
nine classes per week and paid $29.00 per hour for hours spent in
the classroom teaching. Ms. Loginova has taught a wide variety of
elementary school classes in several locations for RSM. Ms.
Loginova and others similarly situated spend many hours working for
RSM outside of the classroom for which they receive no wages.

The lawsuit says Ms. Loginova and other similarly situated teachers
perform a variety of tasks outside of class hours, which include
but is not limited to class preparation, cleaning classrooms,
checking and grading homework, writing and responding to e-mails
from parents, meeting with students and parents before and after
class and making copies of class material.

The Russian School of Mathematics is an after-school math program
for K-12 students.[BN]

Attorneys for Irina Loginova:

          Thomas E. Duckworth, Esq.
          DUCKWORTH & PETERS LLP
          369 Pine Street, Suite 410
          San Francisco, CA
          Telephone: (415) 433 0333
          Facsimile: (415) 449 5564
          E-mail: Tom@duckworthpeters.com


SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CA: Summons in Mays' Prisoners Suit Issued
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LORENZO MAYS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF
SACRAMENTO, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-2081 KJNP (E.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Newman of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California has issued summons to the
Plaintiffs for purposes of service of process.  

The Plaintiffs are state prisoners, proceeding through their
counsel, with a class action complaint.  They seek injunctive and
declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act;
and California Government Code Section 11135.  The Plaintiffs paid
the filing fee.  The proceeding was referred to the Court by Local
Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1).

The Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, various violations of inmates'
rights at both the Sacramento County Jail and the Rio Cosumnes
Correctional Center.  The complaint states potentially cognizable
claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, the ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act, the California Government Code, and 28 U.S.C.
Section 1915A(b), against the Defendant County of Sacramento.  If
the allegations of the complaint are proven, the Plaintiffs have a
reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits of the action.

Magistrate Judge Newman directed the Clerk of the Court directed to
issue and send the Plaintiff one summons for the Defendant County
of Sacramento.  The Clerk will also send the Plaintiffs copies of
the form "Consent to Proceed Before United States Magistrate Judge"
with the Order.  The Plaintiffs will complete service of process on
the Defendant within 60 days from the date of the Order.  They will
serve a copy of the Order and a copy of the form "Consent to
Proceed Before United States Magistrate Judge" on the Defendant at
the time the summons and complaint are served.

On or before close of business on Nov. 29, 2018, the parties will
file status reports as set forth.  The action is set for status
conference on Dec. 13, 2018, at 10:00 a.m.  Because Lorenzo Mays is
identified as the Lead Plaintiff, the Clerk of the Court will
change the short title of the case to Mays v. County of
Sacramento.

In addition, the parties should inform the Court whether additional
discovery is deemed necessary, and if so, the party desiring it
will state the nature and scope of the discovery and provide an
estimate of the time needed in which to complete it.  Also, they
should address the timing of the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.

The parties are informed that they may, if all consent, have the
case tried by a United States Magistrate Judge while preserving
their right to appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  An
appropriate form for consent to trial by a magistrate judge is
attached.  Any party choosing to consent may complete the form and
return it to the clerk of te Court.  Neither the magistrate judge
nor the district judge handling the case will be notified of the
filing of a consent form unless all parties to the action have
consent

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/VSJo6V from Leagle.com.

Armani Lee, Leertese Beirge, Ricky Lee Richardson, Jr., Cody
Garland, Lorenzo Mays & Jennifer Bothun, Plaintiffs, represented by
Aaron Joseph Fischer -- Aaron.Fischer@disabilityrightsca.org --
Disability Rights California.


SAN FRANCISCO, CA: Faces Class Action Over Excessive Docking Fees
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Maria Dinzeo, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
private yacht company's class action against San Francisco over
excessive docking fees survives, even as a federal judge dismissed
some of its claims on Sept. 4.

Lil' Man in the Boat Inc. sued the city in 2016 after refusing to
sign an "landing agreement" that raised daily dock fees at South
Beach Harbor from $160 to $220, and also imposed a new requirement
for commercial vessel operators to hand over 7 percent of their
gross monthly revenues when the revenue fee exceeds the base
landing fee.

The 2016 landing agreement also forced operators to sign a waiver
saying they wouldn't sue the city.

Lil' Man in the Boat claims the fees are diverted to the city's
general fund rather than to upkeep of the docks. The company has
been running chartered excursions in the San Francisco Bay aboard
the yacht Just Dreaming since 2006, using the north side dock of
Pier 40's South Beach Harbor as its pick-up and drop-off point. The
dock, the company points out in its lawsuit, isn't secured or
protected and the city rarely inspects or maintains it.

In 2017, U.S. District Judge Jon Tigar ruled that Lil' Man in the
Boat might have a case, finding fees could be an illegal violation
of the federal Tonnage Clause barring states from imposing taxes on
cargo. He also said the company had shown the fees are excessive.

But on Sept. 4 the judge sided with the city, which argued Lil' Man
cannot bring its lawsuit because it never signed the waiver and
isn't actually subject to it.

"Plaintiff must actually sign the waiver, then see if defendants
assert it. At that point, plaintiff can dispute its validity. But
Lil' Man may not bring a standalone claim for coercive waiver,
because the law does not recognize such a claim," Judge Tigar
wrote.

He also nixed Lil' Man's claim under California Business and
Professions Code section 23300, which prohibits unlicensed entities
like the city from sharing in any profits from alcohol sales, which
the company claims is part of the city's grab for 7 percent of
their gross monthly revenues. Lil' Man sought a declaration that
the city's charges were prohibited by the statute and wanted any
charges the city has already collected to be returned.

Judge Tigar said the city was correct to argue there is no private
right of action for violation of section 22330. But even if he were
to look at the merits of the claim Judge Tigar said it would still
fail since the city hasn't violated the statute.

"Here, defendants are not attempting to sell, manufacture, import
or otherwise exercise any privilege or perform any act that
reserved for those with a license. Thus, section 23300 does not
apply to the revenue-sharing agreement presented by defendants," he
said.

The company's attorney David Ongaro said his client will likely
appeal Judge Tigar's ruling.

"Judge Tigar is a good judge and he had a tough decision to make.
He had said these are fairly novel issues. But we're going to take
it to the Ninth Circuit and see what they have to say," Mr. Ongaro
said in an interview on Sept. 4.

Tiger did not mention the company's remaining claims for excessive
fees in violation of the Tonnage Clause and Rivers and Harbors Act,
which prohibits fees greater than the cost of the upkeep of the
harbor. Mr. Ongaro said those claims are moving forward.

"We will be moving for class certification within 30 days," he
said. "The crux of the case is the Tonnage Clause and Rivers and
Navigation Act."


SECURITY AUTO: Prelim. Conference in Benson Suit Set for Oct. 1
---------------------------------------------------------------
A preliminary conference will be held in the tort case styled as
Benson, Eric on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Security Auto Sales, Inc. d/b/a Security
Dodge Chrysler Jeep Ram, Vito Ilardi, Defendant, Case No.
611801/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty, Sept. 14, 2018) on October
1, 2018, at 10:00 a.m.

Security Auto Sales, Inc., doing business as Security Dodge
Chrysler Jeep Ram, retails automobiles and other related
accessories, as well as car financing, leasing, repair, and
maintenance services. Security Dodge Chrysler Jeep Ram operates in
the State of New York.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Frank & Boland P.C.
     500 Bi-County Blvd STE 465
     Farmingdale, NY 11735
     Phone: (631) 756-0400

The Defendant is represented by:

     Grunwald & Seman, P.C.
     100 Garden City PL, STE 203
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 248-8889


SERVICELINK FIELD: Loses Bid to Deny Class Certification in Britton
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington denied Defendant ServiceLink Field Services, LLC's
Motion to Deny Class Certification in the case captioned GINA L.
BRITTON, a single woman, and on behalf of others similarly
situated, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SERVICELINK FIELD SERVICES, LLC,
formerly known as LPS FIELD SERVICES, INC., Defendant. No.
2:18-CV-0041-TOR. (E.D. Wash.).

The instant suit involves a claim by Plaintiffs Gina L. Britton and
Tami J. Frase-Phillips, personally and on behalf of others
similarly situated, against Defendant ServiceLink Field Services,
LLC, for services performed by ServiceLink's predecessor in
interest, LPS Field Services, Inc., related to securing properties
subject to foreclosure.

The Defendant argues (1) the causes of action fail if the borrower
abandoned the property, gave express post-default consent, or where
the deed of trust included an assignment of rents provision, and
(2) as a result, the Court should not certify the class because
these defenses raise individualized factual issues that will
predominate over the common questions of law and fact thus taking
aim at Plaintiffs' reliance on Rule 23(b)(3).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class actions. Rule
23(a) lists the following four prerequisites for a class action:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable;(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class;(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and(4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.

As an initial matter, the Court is expressly declining to reach the
legal issues raised by the Defendant, whether assignment of rents
clauses, abandonment, or post-default consent are viable defenses
to the claims presented by the Plaintiffs. While the Defendant
couches these legal issues in terms of determining whether Rule
23(b)(3) is met, making an initial determination regarding these
issues is not necessary for the purposes of this Order. This is
because, even if the Court adopts the Defendant's position, it is
still not practicable for the Court to determine whether the common
questions of fact and law predominate over the individualized
questions without further discovery.

This is because, without discovery, there is no way of knowing
whether the individualized issues are more prevalent or important
than the common issues because the Court can only speculate as to
how many members the issue could affect. As such, making the legal
determination would have no bearing on this Order.

For the same reason, the Court finds that the Defendant's Motion
requesting the Court deny class certification is premature. The
pleadings demonstrate the Plaintiff has presented a prima facie
showing of the Rule 23(a) prerequisites, as the Plaintiff alleges
there are thousands of potential members, there are common
questions of law and fact, the claims of the representative parties
are typical of the claims of the class, and the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class. Only discovery will uncover whether the individualized
issues regarding the Defendant's posed defenses will predominate
over the common questions of fact or law.

Further, the Plaintiffs explains that, depending on what they learn
through discovery, the Plaintiffs may choose not to pursue some of
the claims they assert, may adjust their proposed class definition,
or may seek certification of subclasses. As such, some of the legal
issues raised by Defendant may become moot and discovery will flush
this out.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yaoegvyb from Leagle.com.

Gina L Britton, a single woman, and on behalf of others similarly
situated & Tami J Frase-Phillips, a married woman in her individual
capacity, and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Clay M. Gatens -- clayg@jdsalaw.com -- Jeffers
Danielson Sonn & Aylward PS, Devon A. Gray -- devong@jdsalaw.com --
Jeffers Danielson Sonn & Aylward PS, Beth E. Terrell --
bterrell@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC,
Blythe H. Chandler -- bchandler@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell
Marshall Law Group PLLC, Brittany J. Glass --
bglass@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC &
Michael D. Daudt, Daudt Law PLLC.

ServiceLink Field Services LLC, formerly known as LPS Field
Services Inc., Defendant, represented by Theron A. Buck --
tbuck@freybuck.com -- Frey Buck PS, Erica L. Calderas --
elcalderas@hahnlaw.com -- Hahn Loeser & Parks LLP, pro hac vice &
Steven Avery Goldfarb, Hahn Loeser & Parks LLP, pro hac vice.


SHRINATH BJM: Quarterman Files ADA Suit in N.D. Florida
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Shrinath BJM Inc. et
al. The case is styled as Lanie Quarterman individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Shrinath BJM
Inc. doing business as: Econo Lodge Gainesville, a Florida
Corporation, Choice Hotels International, Inc., Defendants, Case
No. 1:18-cv-00179-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla., Sept. 14, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990.

Shrinath Bjm Inc is a Florida for profit corporation based in
Daytona Beach.

Choice Hotels International, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
operates as a hotel franchisor worldwide. It operates through Hotel
Franchising and SkyTouch Technology segments. The company
franchises lodging properties under the brand names of Comfort Inn,
Comfort Suites, Quality, Clarion, Sleep Inn, Econo Lodge, Rodeway
Inn, MainStay Suites, Suburban Extended Stay Hotel, Cambria hotels
& suites, and Ascend Hotel Collection. It also develops and markets
cloud-based technology products to the hotel industry, including
inventory management, pricing, and connectivity to third party
channels and hoteliers; and provides onsite and remote
installation, training, and phone support services.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Jessica Lynn Kerr, Esq.
     JESSICA L KERR PA - FORT LAUDERDALE FL
     200 SE 6th Street, Suite 504
     Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Phone: (954) 282-1858
     Fax: (844) 786-3694
     Email: service@advocacypa.com


SIRNAIK LLC: IEI Fire Insurance Subject of Dispute
--------------------------------------------------
The Parkersburg News and Sentinel reports that in addition to
facing five class-action lawsuits over last year's fire at the
Intercontinental Export-Import Plastics warehouse in Parkersburg,
the Naik group of companies is engaged in legal action to determine
what, if anything, its insurance will cover related to the
incident.

In March, Arizona-based Gemini Insurance Company filed a complaint
seeking declaratory judgment from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia on whether it must cover claims
related to the fire and what companies and individuals are covered
by its policy with Sirnaik LLC and Green Sustainable Solutions, two
Naik companies. It says the policy excludes claims based on
pollution and situations that were not accidental, as some of the
suits against the companies allege.

"Gemini is denying coverage, and they've gone to federal court (to
get a ruling) that there is no coverage," said Michael Hissam, Esq.
-- mhissam@hfdrlaw.com -- with the Charleston firm of Hissam Forman
Donovan Ritchie that is representing the IEI warehouse owners.

The ruling could conceivably affect the state of West Virginia's
ability to recover more than $1.4 million paid to Wood County
authorities for costs associated with fighting the fire, which
burned for 10 days at the former Ames plant site. Representatives
with the governor's office and Department of Military Affairs and
Public Safety did not return a message seeking comment on September
7.

The defendants named in Gemini's complaint are the companies
Sirnaik LLC, Green Sustainable Solutions, Surnaik Holdings of WV,
Polymer Alliance Services and IEI, which are named in the lawsuits,
along with multiple individual members of the Naik family.

In their June response, the defendants argue they are entitled to
coverage and all named defendants are covered by the policy.

In July, an amended response was filed, including counterclaims
against Gemini, USI Insurance Services and one of its agents, John
Kehoe. The companies allege USI and Kehoe "negligently and
recklessly breached their duty" by failing to provide them with
insurance that would cover the claims related to the fire.

No response had been filed on behalf of USI and Kehoe as of
September 7.

An Aug. 29 motion asks the court to include the claims against
those third parties in the ongoing litigation with Gemini. The
court has not issued a ruling.

Gemini says it is currently providing legal defense to the entities
named in the class-action suits over damages from the fire, but
notes in its complaint that it is seeking "damages for any defense
costs spent for matters for which there is no coverage under the
policy."

Gemini's attorney argues in the filing that those include "coverage
for all damages caused by pollutants, which the policy defines as
smoke or soot which emanated from the fire" and "actions deemed not
to be accidental."[GN]


SMURFIT KAPPA: Protective Order Issued in Chavez Labor Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Steven Kim of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California has issued a Stipulated Protective
Order in the case, EDUARDO CHAVEZ, individually, and on behalf of
other members of the general public similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v. SMURFIT KAPPA ORANGE COUNTY LLC, an unknown business entity;
SMURFIT KAPPA NORTH AMERICA LLC, an unknown business entity, and
DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendant, Case No.
2:18-cv-05106-SVW-SK (C.D. Cal.).

Discovery in the action is likely to involve production of
confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special
protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose
other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted.
Accordingly, the parties stipulated to and petitioned the Court to
enter their Stipulated Protective Order.

The action is likely to involve trade secrets, customer and pricing
lists and other valuable research, development, commercial,
financial, technical and/or proprietary information for which
special protection from public disclosure and from use for any
purpose other than prosecution of this action is warranted.  Such
confidential and proprietary materials and information consist of,
among other things, confidential business or financial information,
information regarding confidential business practices, or other
confidential research, development, or commercial information,
information otherwise generally unavailable to the public, or which
may be privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure under
state or federal statutes, court rules, case decisions, or common
law.

The protections conferred by the Stipulation and Order cover not
only Protected Material, but also (1) any information copied or
extracted from Protected Material; (2) all copies, excerpts,
summaries, or compilations of Protected Material; and (3) any
testimony, conversations, or presentations by Parties or their
Counsel that might reveal Protected Material.  Any use of Protected
Material at trial will be governed by the orders of the trial
judge.  The Order does not govern the use of Protected Material at
trial.

Even after final disposition of the litigation, the confidentiality
obligations imposed by the Order will remain in effect until a
Designating Party agrees otherwise in writing or a court order
otherwise directs.  Final disposition will be deemed to be the
later of (1) dismissal of all claims and defenses in the Action,
with or without prejudice; and (2) final judgment after the
completion and exhaustion of all appeals, rehearings, remands,
trials, or reviews of this Action, including the time limits for
filing any motions or applications for extension of time pursuant
to applicable law.

Any Party or Non-Party may challenge a designation of
confidentiality at any time that is consistent with the Court's
Scheduling Order.

Any violation of the Order may be punished by any and all
appropriate measures including, without limitation, contempt
proceedings and/or monetary sanctions.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/AxW415 from Leagle.com.

Eduardo Chavez, individually, and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Edwin
Aiwazian -- edwin@lfjpc.com -- Lawyers for Justice PC, Jill Jessica
Parker, Lawyers for Justice PC, Michelle Lauren Page, Lawyers For
Justice & Vanessa Marie Rodriguez --
vanessa.rodriguez@pd.sbcounty.gov -- Lawyers for Justice PC.

Smurfit Kappa North America LLC, an unknown business entity
Erroneously Sued As Smurfit Kappa Orange County LLC, Defendant,
represented by Curtis Alan Graham -- cagraham@littler.comc --
Littler Mendelson PC, Bethanie Ella Barnes -- bebarnes@littler.com
-- Littler Mendelson PC & Michelle Rapoport --
mrapoport@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC.


SOUND TRANSIT: Judge Tosses Lawsuit Over Car-Tab Taxes
------------------------------------------------------
The Lewiston Tribune reports that a Pierce County judge on
September 7 dismissed a class-action lawsuit challenging Sound
Transit's ability to collect millions of dollars in car-tab taxes
that voters approved in 2016 for mass transit.

Superior Court Judge Kathryn Nelson sided with the transit agency,
ruling the 2015 law that put the transportation funding package
known as Sound Transit 3 on the ballot was constitutional.

"This is great news for the commuters of this region," Sound
Transit spokesman Geoff Patrick told The Seattle Times on
September7.

Seven Puget Sound residents filed a class-action lawsuit in June,
arguing in part that the 2015 law violated the constitution because
it did not include the full text of the statute it was amending.
The lawsuit said the 2015 law references an outdated formula for
calculating car-tab fees that resulted in higher taxes.

Joel Ard, Esq. -- joel.ard@immixlaw.com -- attorney for the
plaintiffs, argued Sound Transit has no authority to collect
car-tab taxes at inflated rates.

The lawsuit wanted Sound Transit to refund $400 million it says was
improperly collected from motorists.

Ard declined to say on September 7 if he would appeal, but
Republican state Sen. Steve O'Ban and anti-tax crusader Tim Eyman
both said an appeal was likely, The Times reported.

Car-tab taxes provide the second-largest source of money as the
transit agency expands bus and light-rail services in central Puget
Sound approved by voters.[GN]


SOUTHERN COMPANY: Bid to Dismiss Remaining Claims Still Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
The defendants' motion for dismissal of the remaining claims in a
putative securities class lawsuit against The Southern Company and
certain of its subsidiary's officers is still pending, according to
the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

In January 2017, a putative securities class action complaint was
filed against Southern Company, certain of its officers, and
certain former Mississippi Power officers in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, by
Monroe County Employees' Retirement System on behalf of all persons
who purchased shares of Southern Company's common stock between
April 25, 2012 and October 29, 2013.

The complaint alleges that Southern Company, certain of its
officers, and certain former Mississippi Power officers made
materially false and misleading statements regarding the Kemper
County energy facility in violation of certain provisions under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.  The complaint seeks,
among other things, compensatory damages and litigation costs and
attorneys' fees.

In June 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that
provided additional detail about their claims, increased the
purported class period by one day, and added certain other former
Mississippi Power officers as defendants.

In July 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs' amended complaint with prejudice, to which the
plaintiffs filed an opposition in September 2017.

On March 29, 2018, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, issued an order granting, in
part, the defendants' motion to dismiss.  The court dismissed
certain claims against certain officers of Southern Company and
Mississippi Power and dismissed the allegations related to a number
of the statements that plaintiffs challenged as being false or
misleading.

On April 26, 2018, the defendants filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's order, seeking dismissal of the
remaining claims in the lawsuit.

The Southern Company and its subsidiaries engage in the generation,
transmission, and distribution of electricity.  The Company also
constructs, acquires, owns, and manages power generation assets,
including renewable energy projects; sells electricity in the
wholesale market; and distributes natural gas in seven states, as
well as provides gas marketing services, wholesale gas services,
and gas midstream operations.  The Southern Company was founded in
1945 and is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia.


SQUARE H BRANDS: Fails to Pay for Overtime Work, Rodriguez Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
JULIO RODRIGUEZ, individually, and on behalf of other members of
the general public similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. SQUARE H
BRANDS, INC., a Delaware Corporation; and DOES l through 100,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. BC7l9423 (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug.
31, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid overtime under the California
Labor Code.

According to the complaint, the Defendants, jointly and severally,
employed Plaintiff as an hourly-paid, nonexempt employee, from July
2017 to 2018, in the State of California. The Defendants hired
Plaintiff and the other class members and classified them as
hourly-paid, non-exempt employees, and failed to compensate them
for all hours worked, missed meal periods, and/or missed rest
breaks. The Defendants directly hired and paid wages and benefits
to Plaintiff and the other class members. The Defendants continue
to employ hourly-paid or non-exempt employees within the State of
California. The Plaintiff and other class members worked over eight
hours in a day, and/or 40 hours in a week during their employment
with the Defendants.

Square-H Brands offers meat products. It provides beef franks, meat
wieners, smoked sausages, bacons, marinated ready-to-cook sirloin
tri tip roast, and corned beef. The company offers its products
online, as well as through retailers. Square-H Brands was
incorporated in 1995 and is based in Los Angeles, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas Han, Esq.
          Shunt Tata Vos-Gharajeh, Esq.
          Daniel J. Park, Esq.
          JUSTICE LAW CORPORATION
          411 North Central Avenue, Suite 500
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 230 7502


STANFORD UNIVERSITY: Faces Student Discrimination Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Anemona Hartocollis, writing for The New York Times, reports that
when Harrison Fowler heard about the counseling center at Stanford,
where he enrolled as a freshman last fall, he decided to finally do
something about the angst he had been struggling with for a long
time.

The results were not what he had expected. Asked if he had ever
considered suicide, he said yes. The center advised him to check
himself into the hospital. From there, he was sent to a private
outpatient treatment center, where he was prescribed an
antidepressant that he said triggered horrible suicidal fantasies.
It wasn't long before he was back in the hospital, being urged to
go home to Texas.

"No, I can't go home," Mr. Fowler, 19, recalled saying. "This is
partly y'all's fault for putting me on medication. I reached out
for help and now I'm suddenly getting blamed for it."

Mr. Fowler ended up having to take a year off. He is now part of a
class-action lawsuit accusing the university of discriminating
against students with mental health issues by coercing them into
taking leaves of absence, rather than trying to meet their needs on
campus.

Stanford says it has behaved properly. But the case lays bare the
conundrum universities face -- amid a national epidemic of students
dealing with depression, anxiety and suicidal thoughts — in
responding to a broad array of mental health issues on campus. Some
accuse colleges of being too detached, waiting too long to notify
parents when students are in trouble, if they notify them at all.
Others say schools are too quick to cast off students to avoid
lawsuits and bad publicity.

"Only half of college students experiencing a mental health crisis
seek help, largely due to the justified fear of stigma and negative
consequences," the court papers say. "Too often, universities
respond to disability-related behavior with exclusion, blame and
draconian measures such as a forced leave of absence."

The suit is the latest in a series of challenges to mental health
leave policies, at schools like Princeton, Hunter College, Western
Michigan University, George Washington University, Marist and
Quinnipiac.

Stanford's website says that a leave may be encouraged or required
for a student whose psychiatric, psychological or medical condition
"jeopardizes the life or safety of self or others, or whose actions
significantly disrupt the activities of the university community."

The cases described in the court papers include a student who had
an anxiety attack, one who was harming herself, and others who had
thoughts of suicide or tried to kill themselves. Legal experts say
that under federal regulations, it is clear that students can be
barred from campus if they pose a threat to others, but less clear
if they pose a threat only to themselves.

"The law is unsettled," said Karen Bower, a lawyer who has
represented students suing universities for making them take mental
health leaves. "'Disruption' is the new buzzword. Universities have
claimed that students who use too many resources, inform friends of
suicidal ideation or require wellness checks have all disrupted the
campus or campus operations."

The Stanford lawsuit says that students who were placed on leave
were effectively banished from the university and stripped of their
privacy and autonomy. Their own doctors were second-guessed by the
university's, the suit says, and the students were required to
immediately withdraw from all classes, programs and housing. To
return to campus, they had to write personal statements "accepting
blame" for their behavior.

The consequences of taking a leave for a student in crisis can be
dire. Students may lose touch with the friends they rely on, and
find themselves isolated and ashamed. Some who were made to take
leaves have tried to kill themselves at home. At the very least,
they will graduate months or even years late.

But staying on campus, where social and academic pressures can be
grueling, has its own risks for students in distress.

In a statement, Stanford said that it "cares deeply" about its
students, and that "in extraordinary circumstances, it may be in
the best interest of the student and the community that he or she
leave campus for a time."

It said it could not comment on the individual cases without
breaching confidentiality. But it denied that it forced students to
take leaves.

Dr. Victor Schwartz, a psychiatrist and chief medical officer of
the Jed Foundation, a suicide prevention group, said the leaves can
serve a good purpose. "It may be paternalistic, but it's actually
for the student's own good, to get them out of the jam that's
occurred that's leading to their inability to function," he said.

Some students say leaves have been good for them.

A stress fracture ended Rebecca Minsley's dream of becoming a
ballet dancer, and she was depressed when she arrived at Bates
College in 2014, she said. She swallowed a handful of pills but
quickly sought help at the campus health center, which wanted her
to leave, she said. Her mother and a dean successfully fought for
her to stay, arguing that she would just become more depressed at
home. By her second semester, she stopped getting out of bed and
going to class. When she was asked once again to take a leave, she
agreed.

Back in her mother's New York City apartment, she spent months in
bed, feeling like a failure. Eventually, with the right medication,
she was able to hold down a job and move into her own apartment.

Ms. Minsley, 23, returned to Bates last fall, after more than two
years away, and has been receiving support from Fountain House
College Re-Entry, a program that has sprung up to fill the niche of
helping students on mental health leave. "It was terrifying and
really, really difficult, but I really needed it," she said of her
leave. "I think I'm leading a much happier life."

A spokeswoman for Bates, Marjorie Hall, said the college gave every
case "individualized consideration."

Lark Trumbly, a former student at Stanford, is more ambivalent
about being sent home. Her freshman year, she passed out on the
bathroom floor of her dormitory from a mix of pills and alcohol. A
dean visited her at the hospital and told her that "students in my
situation tend not to succeed at Stanford," Ms. Trumbly, 23, said.

Her freshman housing was revoked, and she was told that if she was
not living on campus she could not take classes, so she would have
to take a leave, she said.

Going home to Sacramento was a disaster. Feeling isolated and
bored, she tried to kill herself again. Stanford did not know about
that attempt, and she was allowed to return. But after a sexual
assault, she began cutting herself, she said, and was sent home
again.

The second leave was better. Ms. Trumbly found a job teaching
science in an after-school program. She became a mental health
activist, and graduated from Stanford last year, one year late,
with a degree in psychology. Now she teaches at a private school.
"So far, so good," she said.

Her friends and her parents were supportive, and looking back, she
thinks she could have stayed in school if Stanford had been more
flexible. "I just wish I could have done it on my own terms," she
said.

It is clearly worth setting back someone's academic career by a
year or two if that will keep them alive, advocates say. But they
argue that universities, fearing lawsuits, too often have a blanket
policy of making students with mental health issues take a leave,
when federal disability law requires them to decide each case
individually.

"It's a horrible practice because it discourages students from
getting the help they need," said Ms. Bower, the lawyer.

Advocates note that it would be impractical to kick out everyone
who has a suicidal thought. "At any given moment in a college
classroom, there will be between 5 and 10 percent of students
who've had a suicidal thought in the previous, let's say, two to
three weeks," said Dr. Christine Moutier, chief medical officer at
the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention.

Stanford denied claims in the lawsuit that it had a blanket policy
of barring students who have been hospitalized from returning to
campus.

The question of how responsible universities are for the well-being
of their students has become more urgent, as schools face a rising
number of students with mental health issues. Many college
administrators say that medication and therapy have allowed more
students with these issues to enter college in recent years.

Mr. Fowler feels betrayed by a university he trusted. He went to
the campus counseling center his freshman year as part of a
self-improvement plan, he said.

"I wanted some help for once," he said. "I thought it was going to
be completely positive and beneficial."

Asked a series of questions at the center, he admitted having
suicidal thoughts and agreed to go to the hospital "to be safe," he
said. Then he agreed to go to a private outpatient treatment
facility, and ran the two or three miles each way, he said, because
"I didn't have money to get an Uber."

He believes that the antidepressant the outpatient center
prescribed him was the cause of the worst thoughts of suicide he
had ever had. He confided in a resident assistant, who called the
counseling center, saying it was protocol. When Mr. Fowler refused
to go to the hospital again, the police were called, and he was
taken there in handcuffs.

A dean came to visit; Mr. Fowler had met him before, during the
first hospitalization, and their exchange was "very friendly, two
black men talking," he said. This time Mr. Fowler was stunned when
the dean told him he would probably have to take a year off. He
signed a form agreeing to a leave of absence, he said, because he
believed it was the only way the hospital would let him out. "It
was almost like a plea deal for like a prison."

Stanford said in court papers that Mr. Fowler's leave was
voluntary.

Students placed on leave received letters from the dean of
students. Mr. Fowler's said that the student residence staff had
found him "disconnected" from other students, and that in October,
"it was determined that you had possession of a knife and you
stated the intention to take your own life."

"Being from Texas, Harrison carried the knife out of habit," Monica
Porter, a lawyer for the plaintiffs, said.

In November, according to the letter to Mr. Fowler, he had told a
friend that he planned to kill himself by overdosing on Tylenol.

He was not allowed to return to his dormitory from the hospital, he
said, so his mother packed his things. Being home in Beaumont,
Tex., has been "suffocating," he said. He misses Palo Alto. In
Beaumont, "people look at me crazy and call me racial slurs if I'm
going on runs," he said.

He is going back to Stanford in the fall, but he is still angry.
When he learned that a legal center called Disability Rights
Advocates was suing Stanford over its leave policy, he asked to
join. He signed on, he said, because "I don't want people to be
scared to reach out for help."

If you are having thoughts of suicide, call the National Suicide
Prevention Lifeline at 1-800-273-8255 (TALK) or go to
SpeakingOfSuicide.com/resources for a list of additional resources.
[GN]


SYNAPSE GROUP: Bid to Amend Protective Order in Price Denied
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHANNON DALE PRICE AND CHERYL EDGEMON, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
SYNAPSE GROUP, INC., SYNAPSECONNECT, INC., TIME, INC., AND DOES
1-50 inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 16CV1524-BAS (BLM) (S.D.
Cal.), Magistrate Judge Barbara L. Major of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of California denied the Defendants'
request for a modification of the protective order entered into on
Oct. 10, 2017.

The Plaintiffs filed a second amended class action complaint
alleging false advertising, violation of the California Consumers
Leal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), conversion, unfair competition, and
unjust enrichment on Aug. 23, 2016.  The Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendants are engaged in an illegal automatic renewal scheme for
magazine subscriptions.

Specifically, they Plaintiffs allege that after presenting
consumers with an opportunity for free or heavily discounted
magazine subscriptions, the Defendants misleadingly enroll
customers in an automatic renewal program that renews the magazine
subscriptions and results in a charge to the consumer's credit
card, debit card, or third party payment account without providing
the requisite disclosures and without obtaining the requisite
authorizations required by California law.  The Plaintiffs seek
restitution, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, compensatory
damages, punitive damages, costs of suit, and pre-judgment
interest.

On Sept. 23, 2016, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' SAC.  On July 24, 2017, the Court issued an order
granting in part and denying in part the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.  In the Order, the Court dismissed the portion of the
Plaintiffs' claims seeking injunctive relief and retained
jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' claims for other forms of
relief.

On Sept. 26, 2017, the Court issued a scheduling order regulating
discovery and other pretrial proceedings.  In accordance with that
order, on Oct. 10, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion for a
protective order that was granted by the Court with modification to
the language regarding the filing of confidential materials.

On June 28, 2018, the Plaintiffs' counsel filed a case in San Diego
Superior Court entitled Cruz v. Synapse Group, Inc.  The case
essentially involves the same putative class as the instant matter
and asserts largely the same claims against the same defendants for
the same alleged misconduct.  However, the plaintiffs in the Cruz
matter seek only injunctive relief and no monetary damages or
restitution.

On Aug. 1, 2018, the Defendants removed the Cruz matter to the
Court.  On Aug. 8, 2018, the Defendants moved to dismiss Cruz for
failure to state a claim, or, alternatively, to strike the class
allegations.  On Aug. 9, 2018, the Plaintiffs moved to remand the
Cruz matter.  The parties in Cruz are represented by the same
counsel that represents the Plaintiffs and the Defendants in the
instant matter.

On Aug. 7, 2018, the counsel for the Plaintiffs, Mr. Zachariah
Dostart, and the counsel for the Defendants, Mr. Thomas Warren,
contacted the Court regarding the Defendants' request for a
protective order for depositions scheduled to take place next week.
In light of the time sensitive nature of the dispute, the Court
ordered the parties to simultaneously file five page letter briefs
on Aug. 10, 2018 and to file any responses on Aug. 14, 2018.  The
parties timely filed their briefs and responses.

The Defendants seek an order from the Court modifying the existing
protective order in the case.  They seek a modification that
prevents the Plaintiffs' counsel from using any materials obtained
in discovery in the matter in the Cruz matter regardless of whether
the materials are "confidential" within the scope of the protective
order.  Additionally, they request that the Court orders the
Plaintiffs' counsel to state under oath what information they have
sought or used from this case to further their efforts in other
actions (filed or as-of-yet unfiled) and that the Court orders the
Plaintiffs' counsel to affirm that they did not use customer
information produced in this case to seek additional potential
named Plaintiffs in this or other actions, and to permit the
Defendants discovery into this potential violation of California's
anti-solicitation laws.

The Defendants argue that because Cruz was not filed when the
original protective order was entered by the Court and because the
Plaintiffs' counsel had not disclosed the names of any additional
potential named Plaintiffs in the matter, there is ample reason for
the Court to reconsider the scope of the protective order.

The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants have refused to produce
two of its employees for depositions that are scheduled to take
place on Aug. 16 and 17, 2018 because the Plaintiffs' counsel has
refused to agree to refrain from using information generated in
discovery in the case in other litigation pending against the
Defendants.  They request that the Court awards sanctions in
accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(3) and 37(a)(5) if the
Defendants' request is denied as there is no substantial
justification for (1) the Defendants interference with the
depositions, (2) seeking such an overbroad protective order, (3)
failing to meet and confer on all issues raised in the letter
brief.

Magistrate Judge Major will deny the Defendants' motion to modify
the protective order to prevent the Plaintiffs' counsel from using
any materials obtained in discovery in the matter in the Cruz
matter regardless of whether the materials are "confidential"
within the scope of the protective order.  Any other finding by the
Court would improperly allow the Defendants to use the modified
protective order as a shield to prevent access to otherwise
discoverable material.  

She also declines to order the Plaintiffs' counsel to state under
oath what information they have sought or used from this case to
further their efforts in other actions (filed or as-of-yet unfiled)
or to affirm that they did not use customer information produced in
this case to seek additional potential named Plaintiffs in this or
other actions, and to permit the Defendants discovery into this
potential violation of California's anti-solicitation laws as the
Defendants provide no legal basis for these requests and the Court
finds no legal or factual support for them.  She also reminds them
that they only may designate as Confidential or Confidential - For
Counsel Only those documents that they believe in good faith
satisfy the descriptions set forth in the existing Protective
Order.

With the Court's timely ruling, the Magistrate expects the
depositions of Ms. Jody Freire and Mr. Derek Hoffman to proceed
forward as noticed on Aug. 16 and 17, 2018.  And, she reminds the
Defendants that they must comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2)
during the depositions.

For these reasons, Magistrate Judge Major denied the Defendants'
request to modify the protective order.  She finds that their
motion was not substantially justified and that there are no other
circumstances that make an award of expenses unjust.  She lso finds
that the Defendants have improperly attempted to raise new issues
in their reply brief without properly meeting and conferring and
complying with the Court's Chamber Rules.  Accordingly, she granted
the Plaintiffs' request for sanctions.  On Aug. 28, 2018, the
Plaintiffs' counsel must file an application for expenses,
including attorneys' fees.  The Defendants must file any response
on or before Sept. 4, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/1oHvnr from Leagle.com.

Shannon Dale Price, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated & Cheryl Edgemon, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by James T.
Hannink -- jhannink@sdlaw.c -- Dostart Hannink & Coveney LLP &
Zachariah Paul Dostart -- zdostart@sdlaw.com -- Dostart Hannink
Coveney LLP.

Synapse Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation & SynapseConnect, Inc.,
a Delaware corporation, Defendants, represented by Darcie Tilly --
dtilly@cooley.com -- Cooley Godward Kronish, Michelle C. Doolin --
mdoolin@cooley.co -- Cooley LLP, Thomas David Warren, Baker &
Hostetler LLP, Heather Marie Speers -- hspeers@cooley.com -- c/o
Cooley LLP, Kyle Thomas Cutts & Michael Dominic Meuti, Baker &
Hostetler.


TESLA INC: Dua Sues over Go-Private Tweet, Share Price Drop
-----------------------------------------------------------
KEWAL DUA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. TESLA, INC.; and ELON MUSK, Defendants, Case
No. 4:18-cv-04948-HSG (N.D. Cal., Aug. 15, 2018) alleges violations
of the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

According to the complaint, on August 7, 2018, Defendant Elon Musk,
the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors
of Tesla, issued the following post on Twitter.com: "Am considering
taking Tesla private at $420. Funding secured." Later that day,
Musk issued another post on Twitter.com: "Investor support is
confirmed. Only reason why this is not certain is that it's
contingent on a shareholder vote."

However, the fraudulent nature of Musk's statements was uncovered
over the next two days when neither Tesla nor Musk substantiated
Musk's claim that there was secure financing for a going-private
transaction at $420 a share. On August 8, 2018, it was announced
that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") had made
inquiries to Tesla regarding the veracity of the tweet sent by Musk
and the reason the disclosure was made via a social media posting
rather than a filing with the SEC. Multiple financial news agencies
have reported that no investment banks or technology firms they
contacted were aware of Tesla's potential going-private transaction
and had denied being the source of the "secure" funding that Musk
had promised.

This news caused the price of the Company's stock to decline from
$379.57 per share on August 7, 2018, to close at $352.27 per share
on August 9, 2018.

Tesla, Inc. designs, develops, manufactures, and sells electric
vehicles, and energy generation and storage systems in the United
States, China, Norway, and internationally. The company was
formerly known as Tesla Motors, Inc. and changed its name to Tesla,
Inc. in February 2017. Tesla, Inc. was founded in 2003 and is
headquartered in Palo Alto, California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John T. Jasnoch, Esq.
          Joe Pettigrew, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          600 W. Broadway, Suite 3300
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 233-4565
          Facsimile: (619) 233-0508
          E-mail: jjasnoch@scott-scott.com
                  jpettigrew@scott-scott.com

               - and -

          Thomas L. Laughlin, IV, Esq.
          Rhiana L. Swartz, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10169
          Telephone: (212) 223-6444
          Facsimile: (212) 223-6334
          E-mail: tlaughlin@scott-scott.com
                  rswartz@scott-scott.com


TESLA INC: Labaton Sucharow Files Class Action Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------
Labaton Sucharow LLP disclosed  that it has filed a securities
class action lawsuit in San Francisco federal court on behalf of
its client Andrew E. Left of Citron Research against Tesla, Inc.
(NASDAQ : TSLA ) and its Chief Executive Officer Elon Musk,
alleging that Mr. Musk "artificially manipulated the price of Tesla
stock" by taking to Twitter to announce fictional plans to take the
publicly listed car company private.

The complaint asserts claims on behalf of Tesla short-sellers
forced to cover positions in response to Musk's market manipulation
at a loss.  The action also includes all investors that purchased
Tesla shares at inflated prices and suffered losses after the truth
behind Musk's supposedly 'secure' financing was exposed.  Former
federal prosecutor and Labaton Sucharow partner Michael Canty, who
has been widely quoted by major news organizations, including CNBC,
The New York Post and Reuters on the matter, states that Musk's
tweets "appear to be a textbook case of securities fraud."

The United States Securities and Exchange Commission has opened a
formal inquiry into Defendants' statements, and recently subpoenaed
Defendants as they dig deeper into the "factual basis" of the
going-private transaction.

If you purchased, sold, or otherwise transacted in Tesla securities
during the Class Period, you are a member of the "Class" and may be
able to seek appointment as Lead Plaintiff. Lead Plaintiff motion
papers must be filed with the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California no later than October 9, 2018. The Lead
Plaintiff is a court-appointed representative for absent members of
the Class. You do not need to seek appointment as Lead Plaintiff to
share in any Class recovery in this action. If you are a Class
member and there is a recovery for the Class, you can share in that
recovery as an absent Class member. You may retain counsel of your
choice to represent you in this action.

If you would like to consider serving as Lead Plaintiff or have any
questions about this lawsuit, you may;

         Francis P. McConville, Esq.
         Labaton Sucharow
         Telephone: (800) 321-0476,
         Email: fmcconville@labaton.com. [GN]


TESLA INC: Pomerantz Law Firm Files Class Action
------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP disclsoed that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against Tesla, Inc. ("Tesla" or the "Company") (NASDAQ :   TSLA)
and certain of its officers.  The class action, filed in United
States District Court, Northern District of California, and
docketed under index 18-cv-05470, is on behalf of a class
consisting of all persons other than Defendants who purchased or
otherwise acquired Tesla securities between August 7, 2018 through
August 17, 2018, both dates inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking
to recover damages caused by Defendants' violations of the federal
securities laws and to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act")
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, against the Company and
certain of its top officials.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Tesla securities between
August 7, 2018, and August 17, 2018, both dates inclusive, you have
until October 9, 2018, to ask the Court to appoint you as Lead
Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the Complaint can be obtained
at www.pomerantzlaw.com.  To discuss this action, contact Robert S.
Willoughby at rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or
888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 9980. Those who inquire by e-mail
are encouraged to include their mailing address, telephone number,
and the number of shares purchased.

Tesla Inc. designs, manufactures, and sells high-performance
electric vehicles and electric vehicle powertrain components. The
Company owns its sales and service network and sells electric
powertrain components to other automobile manufacturers.  It
primarily offers sedans and sport utility vehicles.

On August 7, 2018, Defendant Elon Musk, Tesla's co-founder,
Chairman, and Chief Executive Officer ("CEO"), issued the following
statement via Twitter: "Am Considering taking Tesla private at
$420. Funding secured."

In reaction to Musk's tweet, the price of Tesla's common stock
increased, reaching an intra-day high of $387.46 per share --
$45.47 per share higher than the previous day's closing price --
and closed at $379.57 per share on August 7, 2018, an increase of
$37.58 per share, or approximately 11%.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Defendants had not secured
funding for a transaction to take Tesla private; (ii) Tesla's Board
of Directors was unaware of any plan to take Tesla private; (iii)
Musk had not retained advisors in connection with his purported
plan to take Tesla private; (iv) the status and likelihood of Tesla
going private was therefore misrepresented to the market; and (v)
as a result, Tesla's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

On August 8, 2018, reports began to emerge that the SEC had made
inquiries into Musk's tweet and whether it was truthful that he
did, in fact, have "funding secured" to take Tesla private.

Following this news, Tesla's stock price fell $9.23 per share, or
2.4%, to close at $370.34 per share on August 8, 2018.

On August 9, 2018, Tesla's stock price continued to fall after
facts emerged after the market closed on August 8, 2018 and later
on August 9, 2018 that Musk's tweet had, in fact, triggered an SEC
inquiry. For example, The Wall Street Journal reported that the SEC
"has asked Musk to produce proof that he's secured funding. . ."
and numerous other media sources reported that Musk did not have
funding secured prior to issuing his statement to that effect via
Twitter.

Following this news, Tesla's stock price fell by more than $17.89
per share, nearly 5%, to close at $352.45 per share on August 9,
2018, resulting in a two-day decline of more than 7%.

On August 13, 2018, post-market, Musk stated via Twitter: "I'm
excited to work with Silver Lake and Goldman Sachs as financial
advisers, plus Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz and Munger, Tolles &
Olson as legal advisors, on the proposal to take Tesla private."
However, on August 14, 2018, Bloomberg reported that at the time of
Musk's August 13, 2018 Twitter announcement, neither Goldman Sachs
nor Silver Lake were yet working with Musk pursuant to a signed
agreement or in an official capacity.

On this news, Tesla's stock price fell $8.77 per share, or nearly
2.5%, to close at $347.64 per share on August 14, 2018.

Then, on August 16, 2018, The New York Times published an interview
with Musk in which he described the circumstances leading up to the
tweet, including his high stress levels and his use of the
sedative-hypnotic sleep medication Ambien in order to cope with his
stress.

On this news, the price of Tesla stock declined $29.95 per share,
or 8.93%, to close at $305.50 per share on August 17, 2018.

On August 24, 2018, Musk issued a statement on the Company's
website, stating that he would abandon his plan to take Tesla
private.

         Robert S. Willoughby, Esq.
         Pomerantz LLP
         Website: www.pomerantzlaw.com
         Email: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]


TRANSLINK: First Cambie Merchants Win Damages in Class-Action Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Simon Little and Emily Lazatin, writing for Global News, report
that it's been a decade in the making, but three Vancouver
businesses have finally won compensation for disruption during the
construction of the SkyTrain Canada Line.

Leonard Schein, owner of the Park Theatre; Dale Dubberley,
operating the Thai Away Home restaurant; and Gary Gautam, owner of
the Cambie General Store, brought their class-action suit against
TransLink in the wake of the 2005-2009 construction.

The trio claimed that the construction -- which involved digging a
massive trench rather than boring a tunnel, a method known as "cut
and cover" -- drove away customers and cost them hundreds of
thousands of dollars in lost profits.

In 2016, the BC Supreme Court ruled that members of the class
action couldn't sue for lost revenues, but were eligible to sue for
compensation over the effect on the rental value of the property
they owned or occupied.

"What the cut and cover method of construction caused, of course,
was the digging up of Cambie Street in a manner that greatly
restricted access to the plaintiffs' businesses over a lengthy
period of time," states the ruling.

"It was not, however, the degree of interference at any given
moment that was intolerable; rather, I find, it was the length of
time over which access was restricted that made the interference
intolerable to the businesses in question."

While the court was not ruling on lost revenues, it did open the
business' books, comparing net income and gross revenue for the
years before, during and after the Canada Line's construction in
order to determine impact and damages.

The damages are likely just the first that TransLink will be
ordered to pay.

In the judgment, the court says the three businesses' complaint
forms a test case, and that "it is contemplated that the claims of
the remaining plaintiffs will be resolved in accordance with the
parameters I set in this case."

The award comes just a week after businesses on Commercial Drive
threatened to sue Fortis BC over the alleged business impacts of a
gas line replacement that closed East 1st Avenue for two months.

It also comes the same week as the province unveiled new details
about the planned construction of a SkyTrain Millennium Line subway
along West Broadway.[GN]


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Settlement Supported by Former Engineer
----------------------------------------------------------
Peter Blumberg, writing for Bloomberg, reports that the former Uber
Technologies Inc. engineer whose blog post on the treatment of
women at the ride-hailing company helped drive out its chief
executive said she supports a $10 million settlement of pay equity
and harassment claims filed on behalf of almost 500 employees.

Susan Fowler, whose February 2017 post led to internal
investigations and ultimately the departure of Travis Kalanick,
said in a court filing on September 7 that the settlement will help
compensate others subject to "illegal conduct" and puts in place a
monitoring program "to ensure there is follow-through concerning
Uber's commitment to a new direction."

Fowler hopes for the best for Uber's talented and committed
workforce, and particularly the women and persons of color who
continue to work at Uber and make it a better place," her lawyer
wrote in the filing in federal court in Oakland, California.

Fowler, who was named a 2017 "Person of the Year" by Time magazine
for breaking the silence on harassment, tweeted this year with Uber
CEO Dara Khosrowshahi seeking to end a company policy of forcing
female riders to go through arbitration when they complain of
assault by their drivers. In May, the company announced it would
allow sexual assault and harassment victims to sue in court.

Uber, which denies wrongdoing as part of the settlement, has said
the accord is fair and reasonable.

Jahan Sagafi, Esq. -- jsagafi@outtengolden.com -- a lawyer for the
women who sued, said Fowler's statement is consistent with other
positive feedback his firm has received about "the substantial
payments and strong policy changes made possible by the
settlement."

Fowler said she continues to face harassment on line and via email
for speaking out in her post titled "Reflecting On One Very, Very
Strange Year At Uber." She commended the two "brave women" who
initiated the class-action suit last year.

She also said that under a May U.S. Supreme Court ruling that
bolsters the power of employers to force workers to use individual
arbitration instead of class-action lawsuits, women and minorities
"would receive nothing at all" if not for the settlement.

The settlement will provide an average of $11,000 for 487 women and
minority workers for alleged pay disparities, plus an additional
$34,000, on average, for 56 women who filed detailed claims of
harassment, according to an August court filing.

A hearing on final approval of the settlement is set for Nov. 6.

The case is Del Toro Lopez v. Uber Technologies Inc.,
4:17-cv-06255, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California
(Oakland).[GN]


UNITED AUTO WORKERS: Michigan EMTs File Class Action Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------------
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation reports that a
group of workers filed a class-action lawsuit in Michigan state
court against United Auto Workers (UAW) Local 708 and STAT
Emergency Medical Services to indicate their rights under the state
Right to Work law that makes union membership and dues payments
strictly voluntary. The workers filed the lawsuit, which seeks
refunds of over $25,000 in illegally seized union dues and fees,
with free legal aid from the National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation.

The lawsuit asks for injunctive relief and the return of three
years of dues and fees that were collected by UAW officials in
violation of Michigan's Right to Work law for private sector
workers. As the complaint notes, in addition to the illegal forced
dues, the workers have been required to be UAW members and dues
were automatically deducted from their paychecks without their
authorization, in violation of the law.

Both the required membership and automatic deduction policies
violate state labor law. Michigan's Right to Work law, which was
enacted in 2013, protects workers' choice by outlawing mandatory
union membership and union payments as a condition of employment.

The forced-dues monopoly contract was put in place by the UAW in
2015, more than two years after Michigan's Right to Work
protections came into effect. The lawsuit seeks refunds of all
illegal dues collected under that contract.

In addition to the class action suit, two of the workers filed
federal unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) against the UAW and their employer, STAT
Emergency Medical Services. The federal charges detail the
automatic dues deduction despite the lack of a check-off
authorization, which violates sections of the National Labor
Relations Act.

"Rather than work to earn the voluntary support of rank-and-file
workers, union officials are blatantly violating longstanding
federal and state law to extract dues from workers," said Mark Mix,
President of the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation.
"Whether or not a state has Right to Work protections, workers and
the Foundation will continue to remain vigilant to ensure that
employees' legal rights are not ignored by Big Labor
officials."[GN]


UNITED PARCEL: UPS-Delaware Dismissed as Defendant in Santos
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California dismissed with prejudice United Parcel
Service Inc., a Delaware Corporation, from the case, EMILIA SANTOS,
an individual, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated Plaintiffs, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., a Delaware
Corporation; UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., an Ohio Corporation; and
DOES 1 through 10, inclusive Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-03177-EMC
(N.D. Cal.).

On May 29, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a Class Action Complaint for
wage and labor violations on behalf of herself and all others
similarly-situated, current and former non-exempt employees of the
Defendants within the State of California who worked in a
distribution center as a part time supervisor, or a position with
similar duties and/or job titles, at any point from May 29, 2014 to
the present, and who suffered from violations arising out of the
Defendants failure to pay wages for all time worked and failure to
provide timely and uninterrupted meal and rest periods.

The Plaintiff filed the Class Action Complaint against Defendants
UPS-Delaware; UPS-Ohio; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive.

UPS-Delaware by and through its counsel of record, has disclosed
and certified to the Plaintiff that (i) it is a holding company
with no employees; (ii) it issues stock to the public and there are
no publicly held companies that own 10% or more of UPS' stock; (ii)
it wholly owns United Parcel Service of America, Inc., which wholly
owns UPS Worldwide Forwarding, Inc., which wholly owns UPS-Ohio;
and (iv) United Parcel Service of America, Inc., UPS Worldwide
Forwarding, Inc., and UPS-Ohio do not issue stock to the public.

After the information has been disclosed and certified to the
Plaintiff and her counsels of record, it can be concluded that
UPS-Delaware is not the employer entity.

Therefore, the parties, by and through their counsels of record,
stipulated, and Judge Chen granted that, notwithstanding the
provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), (i) any and all
claims against UPS-Delaware in the matter, are dismissed with
prejudice; and (ii) each party will bear their own attorneys' fees
and costs incurred in the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 10, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/EEtS1v from Leagle.com.

Emilia Santos, an individual, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by David Roger Markham
-- dmarkham@markham-law.com -- The Markham Law Firm, Maggie K.
Realin -- mrealin@markham-law.com -- The Markham Law Firm, Michael
Jesse Morphew -- mmoephew@markham-law.com -- The Markham Law Firm &
Walter Lewis Haines -- walterhaines@yahoo.com -- United Employees
Law Group, P.C.

United Parcel Service Inc. (Ohio), an Ohio Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Elizabeth Alexandra Brown -- lisabrown@gbgllp.com --
Grube Brown & Geidt LLP.


UNITED STATES: Arizona Activists Sue Over Police Actions at Rally
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Maria Dinzeo, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
activists in Arizona filed a federal class action on Sept. 4
claiming police officers fired indiscriminately into an anti-Trump
protest at the Phoenix Convention Center in August 2017, using
pepper spray, gas, pepper bullets, smoke grenades and tear gas on a
crowd that included pregnant women and the elderly.

Puente and Poder in Action, both nonprofit organizations, planned
the protest. They claim they were beset by a force of about 882
officers during a peaceful rally within the confines of a "free
speech zone' in downtown Phoenix starting around 7:00 p.m., about
half an hour after President Donald Trump arrived at the convention
center.

As attendees at the Trump rally began to leave around 8:30 p.m.,
the groups say, the police moved in on the protesters and Lt.
Benjamin Moore and Sgt. Douglas McBride ordered officers to fire
the pepper spray.

Both officers are named as defendants in the lawsuit, alongside
Phoenix Police Chief Jeri Williams, seven other police officers and
the city of Phoenix.

"Prior to the launch of the first pepper bullet and tear gas
canisters by [Phoenix Police Department], the Trump protest was
carried out by the thousands assembled in a lawful manner," the
groups say in the lawsuit. "Assuming some isolated incidents of
throwing plastic water bottles by a few, these did not justify
firing and harming the many. No Trump protester threw any dangerous
objects, nor initiated use of the weapons used by the PPD; they did
kick the gas canisters thrown by police away from anti-Trump
protesters, or were near the shaking fence. Rather than isolating
and dealing with the small number of people whose conduct it viewed
as improper, PPD resorted to violence against all."

The groups also claim "While breaking up the lawful demonstration,
PPD officers shouted obscenities at the peaceful protesters.
Contemporaneous with firing chemical and impact munitions at
anti-Trump protesters, PPD officers yelled: ‘Stun-bag that guy,
oh yeah, yep that'll teach him,' and ‘That's right motherfuckers,
you just smoked yourself, dumbasses.'"

In all, the groups say, police officers fired more than 590
projectiles at the crowd.

Cynthia Guillen, one of several individual plaintiffs in the
lawsuit, was hit by a projectile on the breast, stomach and near
her hip as she peacefully chanted and filmed the protest. The
lawsuit says the wind was knocked out of her and she later
contracted pancreatitis from the force.

Ira Yedlin, a 70-year-old, was gassed and hit in the face, legs and
back by projectiles, and had to be treated at the emergency room.

"I've been at, over the last 50 years, dozens of protests," he told
the Arizona Republic a few days later. "Never have I seen a police
reaction like that without any apparent provocation." He had driven
three hours from his home in Bisbee, Arizona, to attend the protest
with his wife.

"Under the direction of Chief Williams, Phoenix police disregarded
the constitutional rights of protesters that night," ACLU of
Arizona legal director Kathy Brody said in a statement emailed to
Courthouse News.

"At the precise moment when anti-Trump protesters intended to
deliver to the president and his supporters their messages
renouncing his policies, Phoenix police – without warning –
used incapacitating weaponry to silence and disperse hundreds of
peaceful anti-Trump protesters, including children, elderly people,
people with disabilities, and pregnant women."

The groups are represented by the ACLU, the Los Angeles-based law
firm Hadsell Stormer & Renick and civil rights attorney Dan
Pochoda.

They seek financial compensation and have asked that the city be
prohibited in the future from using excessive force against
protesters.

Phoenix Police spokeswoman Mercedes Fortune said the department is
aware of the lawsuit but cannot comment on pending litigation.


UNITED STATES: Federal Judge OKs Vietnamese Refugee Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Don Debenedictis, writing for Courthouse News Service, reports that
a federal judge ruled on September 6 that Vietnamese refugees here
a quarter century or more but who have lately been taken into
custody by immigration authorities -- despite not being eligible to
be deported -- may continue their national class action challenging
their detentions.

The refugees claim that the Trump administration is backing away
from a 10-year-old diplomatic agreement with Vietnam not to deport
anyone who came here prior to July 12, 1995, when the two countries
normalized relations.

U.S. District Judge Cormac Carney ruled that the plaintiffs in the
class action have presented a plausible claim that the government
is now not abiding by a "longstanding practice of not removing
pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants and [by] the 2008 diplomatic
agreement."

"This is a great win for the petitioners," said Tuan Uong, Esq. --
tuong@reedsmith.com -- a senior associate at Reed Smith in Los
Angeles, who is one of the lead attorneys in the case. "At the end
of the day, Judge Carney recognized that there is a serious due
process violation in play."

The plaintiffs in the class action all came to the U.S. before the
1995 date and became legal permanent residents. However, because of
criminal convictions, they all lost their green cards, making them
subject to deportation.

Under the formal diplomatic agreement, Vietnam may refuse to accept
the return of any pre-1995 refugees. In line with a 2001 U.S.
Supreme Court decision restricting overlong detention, the federal
government generally kept such immigrants in custody no more than
90 days and then released them under supervision.

But the Trump administration is trying to change that policy,
according to the class action.

Beginning in March 2017, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
officers began rounding up dozens of pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants
and putting them in months-long detention, even though returning
them to Vietnam was a remote possibility, the plaintiffs say.

"The government wants to detain these folks indefinitely," Uong
said. "I think what the government is trying to do is circumvent
the [diplomatic] agreement."

Two attorneys with the Department of Justice's Office of
Immigration Litigation who are handling the case did not return
phone messages on September 6 in the afternoon. The Justice
Department press office did not respond to an email about the
case.

The lawsuit seeks to release refugees in custody. It was filed Feb.
22 by the Asian Americans Advancing Justice's Asian Law Caucus in
San Francisco and by the group's Los Angeles and Atlanta branches
in the name of Orange County resident Hoang Trinh and six other
refugees who had been detained.

The named defendants include Thomas Homan, the head of ICE's
Enforcement and Removal Operations, Homeland Security Secretary
Kirstjen Nielsen and U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions.

Trinh had been detained by ICE from June 2017 to April 2018,
following a jail sentence on a drug charge, according to Carney's
ruling. He came to the U.S. in 1980 as a child and obtained his
green card. Trinh's "wife, two children, parents, and six sisters
are all U.S. citizens."

Another named plaintiff, Long Nguyen of Charleston, S.C.,
immigrated in 1987 and became a legal resident the next year. He
was convicted of a nonviolent drug offense in 2006 but detained in
2010 or 2011 while abroad. He was released when Vietnam refused to
take him back.

Then, in October last year, he was pulled over while driving to
work and put in detention until March this year, according to the
judge.

When the class action was filed, advocates said they knew of about
40 refugees in long-term custody, but they added they believed
8,000 to 10,000 more were at risk.

In his decision, Carney first rejected the government's argument
that the suit was moot because all seven named petitioners had been
released.

On the main issue, the refugees argued that their prolonged
detention violates immigration law and their due process rights
because, under the 2008 agreement, it is highly unlikely that they
can be returned to Vietnam.

The defendants countered that relations between the U.S. and
Vietnam are changing. Other agreements between the two countries
indicate that deportation "is no longer unlikely in the foreseeable
future," according to the defense.

Carney rejected that argument because he said it relied on
documents not part of the formal pleadings in the case.

He also allowed the class plaintiffs to continue their claim that
they each should have been given an individual bond hearing before
being detained.

Carney is scheduled to hear arguments on certifying the refugee
class on Oct. 15.

He has certified a class of Cambodian refugees raising somewhat
similar due process claims.[GN]


UNITED STATES: Moffat County to Join PILT Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
David Tan, writing for Craig Daily press, reports that the Moffat
County Board of County Commissioners decided on Sept. 4, it will
join a class action lawsuit alongside 27 other western Colorado
counties against the federal government for underpayment of payment
in lieu of taxes, or PILT, for fiscal years 2015, 2016, and 2017.

Commissioner Ray Beck stressed the lawsuit is separate from the
Anvil Points payment recently received by the county.

Natural Resources Department head Jeff Comstock said the lawsuit
was initiated by Kane County, Utah, claiming the federal government
had underpaid that county's PILT money.

Kane County is similar to Moffat County, Comstock said, as it
includes extensive federally owned lands. In its filing, Kane
County said it was "flat out illegal" for the federal government to
withhold full payment. Federal agencies make PILT payments because
they do not pay property taxes to counties containing federal
lands.

The lawsuit doesn't only impact the western United States, Comstock
said. It impacts every county across the country, which is why a
class action lawsuit was filed and Moffat County has the
opportunity to participate in it.

"First thing that came to mind when we first saw this lawsuit was
the fees," Comstock said. "Attorneys that are overseeing this are
getting a third of the payment."

The attorneys' fees are significant, and commissioners initially
wondered if the county should file a separate lawsuit, Comstock
said. After learning that other counties affected by the lawsuit
— including El Paso, Garfield, and Mesa — commissioners decided
it would be easier to join the class action suit.

Moffat County is owed about $27,000 by the federal government,
Comstock said, adding that, after fees, the county would receive
about $18,000. He noted there is no downside to joining the suit,
as the affected counties are almost guaranteed to get that money.

Moffat County Attorney Rebecca Tyree, Esq. said the lawsuit was
originally filed almost seven years ago, so the statute of
limitations might prevent Moffat County from claiming other money
owed to it.

Tyree said it makes sense to join the class-action lawsuit, as
there are no upfront fees to participate.

Included in the resolution to participate in the lawsuit,
commissioners named Tyree to act as point person to represent the
county and review related documents, she added.

The commission voted to approve of the resolution to participate in
the suit and appoint Tyree as its representative.[GN]


UNIVERSAL HANDICRAFT: Settlement in Mollicone Has Final Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Lisa Mollicone, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Universal Handicraft
d/b/a Deep Sea Cosmetics d/b/a Adore Organic Innovations, and
others, Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-21468-Civ-Scola (S.D.
Fla.), Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Florida granted the parties' Joint Motion
for Final of the Settlement, the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Application
for Service Awards and for Class Counsel's Attorneys' Fees and
Expenses.

The matter came before the Court on Aug. 10, 2018 for a Final
Approval Hearing pursuant to the Court's Preliminary Approval
Order.  Judge Scola carefully reviewed all of the filings related
to the Settlement and heard argument on the Joint Motion for Final
Approval and the Plaintiffs' Application for Service Awards and for
Class Counsel's Attorneys' Fees and Expenses.  He approved the
Settlement set forth in the Final Approval Order.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the Settlement
Class consists of all persons in the United States who purchased,
at any time between Sept. 29, 2012 and April 13, 2018, one or more
of the subject Adore Products marketed as containing a plant stem
cell formula.

Except for the individual claims of those who duly opted-out of the
Settlement Class, the Judge dismissed the Action with prejudice as
though after trial and a final adjudication of the facts and the
law as to all the Settlement Class Members and the Releasing
Parties for all the Released Claims against the Defendants and all
the Released Persons.

He awarded the Class Counsel $281,223.18 in attorneys' fees from
the gross Settlement Fund, consisting of 31.9% of the total
Settlement Fund, plus reimbursement of litigation costs and
expenses in the amount of $18,776.72.  Plaintiff Millie will be
paid a service award of $1,500 from the Settlement Fund and
Plaintiff Mollicone will be paid a service award of $3,500,
consistent with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a), the Judge will
enter Final Judgment in a separate document.  The Clerk of Court is
directed to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 14, 2018 Order is available at
https://is.gd/dmjv9j from Leagle.com.

Lisa Mollicone, on behalf of herself, all others similarly
situated, and the general public, Plaintiff, represented by Michael
Houchin -- mike@consumersadvocates.com -- Law Offices of Ronald A.
Marron, pro hac vice, Ronald Marron -- ron@consumersadvocates.com
-- Law Office of Ronald A. Marron, APLC, pro hac vice & Cullin
Avram O'Brien -- cullin@cullinobrienlaw.com -- Cullin O'Brien Law,
P.A..

Universal Handicraft, Inc., doing business as Adore Organic
Innovations & Shay Sabag Segev, Defendants, represented by Anna L.
Heller -- jimheller@cozen.com -- Cozen O'Connor, Brett Nicole
Taylor -- btaylor@cozen.com -- Cozen O'Connor, Jeffrey David
Feldman -- jfeldman@cozen.com -- Cozen O'Connor & Nathan Dooley --
ndooley@cozen.com -- Cozen O'Connor & Susan Joy Latham --
slatham@cozen.com -- Cozen O'Connor.


UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS: Doe Suit Moved to C.D. Illinois
-------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled John Doe I and Jane Doe I on behalf
of himself, and all other Plaintiffs similarly situated, known and
unknown, the Plaintiffs, v. University of Illinois, doing business
as: Illinois Business Consulting Inc.; Jeffery R Brown; Whitney
Smith; and Eric Swenson, Individually, the Defendants, Case No.
1:17-cv-08767, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois to the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of Illinois (Urbana) on Sept. 11, 2018. The
Illinois Central District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:18-cv-02227-CSB-EIL to the proceeding. The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge Colin Stirling Bruce. The suit alleges labor-related
violation.

The Plaintiff brought this case, on behalf of himself and other
past and present unpaid interns similarly situated, who have been
damaged by IBC's failure to comply with the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law.

Illinois Business is a student-run management consulting
organization in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John W Billhorn, Esq.
          Samuel David Engelson, Esq.
          BILLHORN LAW FIRM
          53 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 840
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 853 1450
          Facsimile: (312) 853 1459
          E-mail: jbillhorn@billhornlaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          William R Pokorny, Esq.
          Jeffrey Scott Nowak, Esq.
          Leah M Farmer, Esq.
          FRANCZEK SULLIVAN PC
          300 S Wacker Dr., Ste 3400
          Chicago, IL 60606-6785
          Telephone: (312) 786 6141
          Facsimile: (312) 986 9192
          E-mail: wrp@franczek.com
                  jsn@franczek.com
                  lmf@franczek.com


UOOLIGAN GAS: Vazquez Seeks Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages
-----------------------------------------------------
MARIA Y. VAZQUEZ and other similarly situated individuals, the
Plaintiffs, v. UOOLIGAN GAS STATION CONVENIENCE STORAGE INC.,
SAEEDA ULLAH, FARID ULLAH, individually, the Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-00611-SPC-CM (M.D. Fla., Sept. 11, 2018), seeks to recover
money damages for unpaid minimum and overtime wages and under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff worked in excess of 40
hours during one or more weeks on or about Oct. 1, 2017 without
being compensated minimum and overtime wage pursuant to the
FLSA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zandro E. Palma, P.A.
          9100 S. Dadeland, Blvd., Suite 1500
          Miami, FL 33156
          Telephone: (305) 446 1500
          Facsimile: (305) 446 1502
          E-mail: xep@thepalmalawgroup.com


US NATIONAL PERSONAL: Fails to Pay Wages, Dodds and Itric Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
ALMEKA DODDS and LINDA ITRIC, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs vs. US NATIONAL PERSONAL
CARE, LLC; and VICTOR VARGAS, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-01517
(D. Nev., Aug. 15, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for
unpaid regular hours, overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for
missed meal and rest periods.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as home healthcare
workers.

US National Personal Care, LLC is a Nevada limited liability
company engaged in providing in-home services to patients. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Don Springmeyer, Esq.
          Daniel Bravo, Esq.
          WOLF RIFKIN SHAPIRO
          SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP
          3556 E. Russell Road, 2nd Floor
          Las Vegas, NV 89120-2234
          Telephone: (702) 341-5200
          Facsimile: (702) 341-5300
          E-mail: dspringmeyer@wrslawyers.com
                  dbravo@wrslawyers.com

               -and -

          Jason J. Thompson, Esq.
          Rod M. Johnston, Esq.
          SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C.
          One Towne Square, Suite 1700
          Southfield, MI 48076
          Telephone: (248) 355-0300
          E-mail: jthompson@sommerspc.com
                  rjohnston@sommerspc.com


VELOCITY EXPRESS: Case Management Deadlines in Flores Extended
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Francisco Division, extended the Case Management
Deadlines in the case captioned  PHILLIP FLORES and DARAH DOUNG,
individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs, v. VELOCITY EXPRESS, LLC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Dynamex Operations East, LLC, TRANSFORCE, INC., and DYNAMEX
OPERATIONS EAST, LLC, Defendants. Case No. 3:12-cv-05790-JST. (N.D.
Cal.).

All Parties recognize that the substantial costs associated with
dozens of further depositions are likely to reduce the prospects of
a successful mediation and, further, that the logistics related to
scheduling a significant number of further depositions will limit
the Parties' abilities to simultaneously commit sufficient
resources to mediating the case.

The Parties request a short extension to the deadlines of CMO #4 in
order to permit the parties to mediate and, with hope, resolve the
claims in this action and the related Boconvi case.  

Pursuant to the Parties' stipulation and for good cause shown, the
deadlines related to Tranche 1 discovery and litigation are
extended as set forth in the table pasted below:

                          Previous    New
                          Deadline  Deadline
                          --------  --------
Discovery Period for
Tranche 1 Closes         11/12/18  12/21/18

Dispositive Motion
Deadline                 12/10/18  01/18/19

Discovery Period for
Tranche 2 Opens          12/10/18  01/18/19

Dispositive Motion
Opposition Deadline      12/31/18  02/08/19

Defendants Identify
Terminal/Area/Regional
Managers for Tranche 2   01/09/19  02/18/19

Dispositive Motion
Reply Deadline           01/14/19  02/22/19

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yaxjhhue from Leagle.com.

Phillip Flores, Plaintiff, represented by Timothy J. Becker --
tbecker@johnsonbecker.com -- Johnson Becker, PLLC, Alexandra
Whitney Robertson, Johnson Becker, PLLC, Caleb Marker --
caleb.marker@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed LLP, pro hac vice,
Charles R. Ash -- cash@sommerspc.com -- Sommers Schwartz, P.C., pro
hac vice, Christopher Paul Ridout --
christopher.ridout@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed LLP, Jacob R.
Rusch -- jrusch@johnsonbecker.com -- Johnson Becker, PLLC, Jason J.
Thompson -- jthompson@sommerspc.com -- Sommers Schwartz, P.C., pro
hac vice, Jennell Kristine Shannon , Johnson Becker, PLLC, pro hac
vice, Jesse L. Young -- lyoung@sommerspc.com -- Sommers Schwartz,
P.C., Molly Elizabeth Nephew, Johnson Becker, PLLC, Neil B. Pioch,
Sommers Schwartz, P.C., pro hac vice & Rod M. Johnston --
rjohnston@sommerspc.com -- Sommers Schwartz, P.C., pro hac vice.

Darah Doung, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated
individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Timothy J. Becker , Johnson
Becker, PLLC, Alexandra Whitney Robertson , Johnson Becker, PLLC,
pro hac vice, Caleb Marker , Zimmerman Reed LLP, pro hac vice,
Charles R. Ash , Sommers Schwartz, P.C., pro hac vice, Christopher
Paul Ridout , Zimmerman Reed LLP,Jacob R. Rusch , Johnson Becker,
PLLC, Jason J. Thompson , Sommers Schwartz, P.C., pro hac vice,
Jennell Kristine Shannon , Johnson Becker, PLLC, pro hac vice,
Jesse L. Young , Sommers Schwartz, P.C., Molly Elizabeth Nephew ,
Johnson Becker, PLLC, Neil B. Pioch , Sommers Schwartz, P.C., pro
hac vice & Rod M. Johnston , Sommers Schwartz, P.C., pro hac vice.

Velocity Express, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company &
TransForce, Inc., Defendants, represented by Robert G. Hulteng --
rhulteng@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C., Alexander Hurd
Scherbatskoy -- ahs@uber.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C., Andrew
Michael Spurchise -- aspurchise@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson,
P.C., Aurelio Jose Perez -- aperez@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson, P.C., Blair Amelia Copple -- bcopple@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson, Emily Erin O'Connor -- eoconnor@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson, P.C. & Paul Edward Goatley --
pgoatley@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C.

Dynamex Operations East, LLC, Defendant, represented by Robert G.
Hulteng , Littler Mendelson, P.C., Alexander Hurd Scherbatskoy ,
Littler Mendelson, P.C., Andrew Michael Spurchise , Littler
Mendelson, P.C., Aurelio Jose Perez , Littler Mendelson, P.C.,
Blair Amelia Copple , Littler Mendelson & Paul Edward Goatley ,
Littler Mendelson, P.C.

Ms. Elsa Lazarte, Miscellaneous, represented by Daniel Martinez de
la Vega -- dvega@vegalawyer.com -- Law Offices of Daniel Vega.


VERISMA SYSTEMS: Court Grants Stay on McCracken PHL Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of New
York granted Defendant's Motion to Stay the case captioned ANN
McCRACKEN; JOAN FARRELL; SARAH STILSON; KEVIN McCLOSKEY;
CHRISTOPHER TRAPATSOS; and KIMBERLY BAILEY, as individuals and as
representatives of the classes, Plaintiffs, v. VERISMA SYSTEMS,
INC.; UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER; STRONG MEMORIAL HOSPITAL; and
HIGHLAND HOSPITAL, Defendants. No. 6:14-cv-06248(MAT). (W.D.N.Y.).

Presently the Hospital Defendants' First Motion to Stay this matter
pending the resolution of an appeal before the Second Circuit in a
similar case, Spiro, et al. v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, et al.,
18-1034 (2d Cir. Apr. 11, 2018).

Plaintiffs allege that Verisma and the Hospital Defendants
systematically overcharged patients who requested copies of their
medical records, in violation of New York Public Health Law (PHL)
Section 18.

The Standard for Granting a Stay

The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent
in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its
docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and
for litigants. It is within the sound discretion of a district
court to enter a stay pending the outcome of independent
proceedings that are likely to affect a case on its calendar.

When deciding a motion to stay a civil action, courts in this
Circuit usually apply the following factors: (1) the private
interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with the
civil litigation as balanced against the prejudice to the
plaintiffs if delayed; (2) the private interests of and burden on
the defendants; (3) the interests of the courts; (4) the interests
of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the public
interest.

Prejudice to the Non-Movants

The Plaintiffs argue that the delay created by a stay whose end
date is dependent on the actions of another court will cause them
undue prejudice. However, the fact delay will result from a stay
does not, in and of itself, warrant denial of their motion. Because
delay results inherently from the issuance of a stay, courts have
found that mere delay does not, without more, necessitate a finding
of undue prejudice and clear tactical disadvantage.

Verisma asserts that it will be prejudiced by a stay because it is
entitled to a prompt resolution of this matter. This argument
appears to have been premised on Verisma's belief that its motion
for reconsideration would be granted. However, the Court recently
decided Verisma's request for reconsideration. Therefore, the
Court's current ruling on the scope of PHL Section 18(2)(e), which
is unfavorable to Verisma's position, remains in place. It would
seem that, given the Court's denial of Verisma's motion for
reconsideration, Verisma will not be prejudiced by delaying this
case until the appeal in Ruzhinskaya is resolved.

In sum, the Court finds that neither Plaintiffs nor Verisma have
persuasively articulated how they would be prejudiced by holding
this proceeding in abeyance, apart from citing the delay inherent
in all stays. It does not suffice for any party-plaintiff,
defendant, or otherwise-to assert an inherent right to proceed in
litigation and rest its case on that bald, abstract proposition,
without articulating in concrete terms the practical, real life
effects of the potential deprivation of that right under the
circumstances of the particular case at bar.

Hardship to the Movants

The Hospital Defendants argue that they will suffer considerable
hardship and inequity if the proceedings advance prior to the
appeal in Ruzhinskaya being decided. The Hospital Defendants'
argument on this point, however, essentially repeats its argument
concerning the Kappel test's judicial economy and public interest
factors. As discussed in the subsequent sections, these factors
weigh in favor of a stay.

The Court's Interests

The Hospital Defendants argue that it is in the Court's interests,
as well as the public interest and the interests of nonparties, to
stay this action. Without a stay, and with the Second Circuit's
view of the proper application of PHL Section 18(2)(e) in question,
the parties will expend significant resources in proceedings with
expert discovery and trial preparation based on this Court's
current holding that Verisma is subject to PHL Section 18(2)(e).
The defendants would have to address whether both a vendor's and
the provider's costs are considered in determining costs incurred"
under PHL Section 18 (2)(e). This is the subject of the other
question requested to be certified to the New York Court of
Appeals, namely, whether a reasonable charge for copies under PHL
Section 18 is limited to the costs incurred for the copies.   

The appellants devote a substantial portion of their brief arguing
that the district court erred in implicitly broadening the term
copies to include indirect costs involved in the whole ROI process
(e.g., overhead and supervisory labor costs, as well as the work of
retrieving a patient's medical records from within a hospital,
database, or outside storage facility. The answer to this question
will be of substantial importance to the instant matter. The key
issues in this case, which weighs in favor of a stay.  

The Public Interest

Considerations of judicial economy are frequently viewed as
relevant to the public interest, and, as noted, they weigh against
the investment of court resources that may prove to have been
unnecessary. As discussed above, the Court's interests are served
by a stay because stay will promote judicial efficiency and
minimize the possibility of conflicts between different courts.

The Interests of Non-Parties

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs here have not identified any
particularized harm to potential class members if a stay is entered
in this case. Rather, the interests of any possible nonparties to
this litigation would be better served by awaiting a decision,
which will provide invaluable guidance to the Court on key trial
issues in this case.  

The Court grants the Motion to Stay by Highland Hospital, Strong
Memorial Hospital, and the University of Rochester. Accordingly,
this action is stayed pending the resolution of the appeal in
Spiro, et al. v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, et al., 18-1034 (2d Cir.
Apr. 11, 2018).

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 6, 2018 Decision
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycwk924s from
Leagle.com.

Ann McCracken, Joan Farrell, Sara Stilson, Kevin McCloskey,
Christopher Trapatsos & Kimberly Bailey, Plaintiffs, represented by
Kai H. Richter -- krichter@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP, Kathryn
Lee Bruns, Faraci Lange LLP, Stephen G. Schwarz, Faraci Lange LLP,
Anna P. Prakash -- aprakash@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP & Mark
Edward Thomson -- mthomson@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP.

Verisma Systems, Inc., Defendant, represented by Caroline Jacobsen
Berdzik -- cberdzik@goldbergsegalla.com -- Goldberg Segalla LLP,
James D. Macri -- cberdzik@goldbergsegalla.com -- Goldberg Segalla
LLP, Ryan Grant Pitman -- rpitman@goldbergsegalla.com -- Goldberg
Segalla LLP & Christopher J. Belter -- cbelter@goldbergsegalla.com
-- Goldberg Segalla LLP.

Strong Memorial Hospital, Highland Hospital & University of
Rochester, Defendants, represented by Eric J. Ward --
eward@wardgreenberg.com -- Ward Greenberg Heller & Reidy LLP &
Amanda B. Burns -- aburns@wardgreenberg.com -- Ward Greenberg
Heller & Reidy LLP.

Strong Memorial Hospital, Highland Hospital & University of
Rochester, Cross Claimants, represented by Eric J. Ward , Ward
Greenberg Heller & Reidy LLP & Amanda B. Burns , Ward Greenberg
Heller & Reidy LLP.

Verisma Systems, Inc., Cross Defendant, represented by Caroline
Jacobsen Berdzik , Goldberg Segalla LLP, Ryan Grant Pitman ,
Goldberg Segalla LLP & Christopher J. Belter , Goldberg Segalla
LLP.


VICTORIA: 'In Lawsuit Territory' Over Document Breach
-----------------------------------------------------
The Guardian reports that a former privacy commissioner has warned
"we're in class action territory" after people's personal details
were revealed in an unprecedented document dump by the Victorian
parliament.

The personal details of a lawyer that were revealed in the release
have since been removed from the parliament's website but there are
no guarantees more privacy breaches won't occur.

The Andrews Labor government tabled about 80,000 pages of documents
on September 3 relating to opposition leader Matthew Guy's botched
rezoning of farming land near Ventnor at Phillip Island when he was
planning minister between 2011 and 2013.

Guy used his ministerial powers to intervene and rezone the land,
then rescinded the decision a week later following community
backlash. He then signed off on a $2.5m confidential settlement,
plus costs, with the buyer of the land, despite only receiving
cabinet approval for a lower settlement.

Among the documents were personal details of a lawyer including her
mental health, financial and familial details, which have now been
removed. The home addresses and contact numbers of other private
individuals and documents related to other court cases were also
released.

The Victorian premier, Daniel Andrews, told the ABC the release of
private information was "unfortunate and inadvertent" but the focus
should remain on Guy's decision to approve the multimillion-dollar
settlement.

The leader of the government in the lower house, Jacinta Allan, who
moved the motion to seek parliament's approval to release the
documents in March, accused the opposition of combing through the
documents in order to find personal information to feed to the
media.

On September 4 spokesman told Guardian Australia that: "Given the
volume of documents tabled, it would have been impossible to both
make the redactions and comply with the parliamentary direction."

There is no formal requirement to redact documents requested by
parliament.

Former privacy commissioner David Watts told 3AW that those people
whose details were revealed should seek legal advice.

"I think we're in class action territory," he said. "It is not a
minor breach, those affected would be well-advised to seek legal
advice on how best to prosecute this through the courts.

"Once your privacy has been breached, you can never, ever have it
returned to you. There have been substantial settlements made in
Australia. The matters rarely get to court to be decided because
they usually settle, and some of those settlements can be really,
really substantial."

The police minister, Lisa Neville, warned media against
republishing personal details that were originally published in the
unredacted documents tabled in parliament, drawing the ire of a
News Corp journalist who said that they, unlike the government,
de-identified the information.[GN]


VOLKSWAGEN GROUP: Settles American Investors' Emission Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Iovino, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
Volkswagen will pay $48 million to settle one of two lawsuits
claiming it misled American investors about its emissions cheating
scandal and compliance with U.S. environmental laws.

A group of investor plaintiffs, led by retirement funds for
Arkansas State Highway employees and the Miami police, filed a
motion for preliminary approval of the deal on Aug. 28.

If approved, $48 million would go to U.S. investors who purchased
American Depositary Receipts, or ADRs -- certificates of shares in
a foreign company -- for Volkswagen between Nov. 19, 2010, and Jan.
4, 2016.

"We are extremely pleased with the proposed settlement, which
represents an excellent recovery for the class of Volkswagen ADR
investors," class attorney James Harrod -- jim.harrod@blbglaw.com
-- of Bernstein Litowitz Berger and Grossmann in New York, said in
an email.

The plaintiffs had alleged that Volkswagen's "highest ranking
executives" omitted material information about its use of defeat
devices in "clean diesel" vehicles. The devices allowed the cars to
pass emissions tests and deceive regulators while spewing up to 40
times more nitrogen oxide than allowed on the road.

Volkswagen Group of America spokesman Mike Tolbert said of the
settlement in an email: "The proposed settlement agreement
eliminates the uncertainty and considerable costs of protracted
litigation in the United States and is in the best interests of the
company."

In June 2017, U.S. District Judge Charles Breyer advanced the
investor lawsuit but limited its scope to statements made after May
2014 when then-CEO Martin Winterkorn was allegedly put on notice
that researchers discovered its diesel cars were spewing more
pollution than allowed.

Volkswagen faces a separate securities class action brought by
institutional investors who purchased $8.3 billion in bonds between
May 2014 and May 2015. The lead plaintiff in that case is a
retirement fund for Puerto Rico's government employees.

In March, Judge Breyer granted a motion to dismiss that complaint
with leave to amend, finding the plaintiffs failed to show they
relied on allegedly misleading statements in a May 2014 offering
memo.

Volkswagen distributed more than 11 million diesel vehicles
worldwide with emissions cheating software. About 600,000 of those
vehicles were sold in the U.S.

The German automaker pleaded guilty in March 2017 to conspiracy and
obstruction of justice, and agreed to pay $4.3 billion in criminal
and civil penalties. Volkswagen has also struck three settlements
with U.S. car owners, regulators and dealerships, totaling more
than $17 billion, to settle claims related to the emissions
cheating scandal.

U.S. prosecutors filed criminal charges against Mr. Winterkorn in
May, but Germany only allows extradition of its citizens to another
European Union country or international tribunal.

A hearing on preliminary approval of the settlement is scheduled
for Oct. 5 in San Francisco.


WABTEC CORP: 9th Cir. Certifies Question in Busker
--------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, issued an Order
certifying Question to the Supreme Court of California in the case
captioned JOHN BUSKER, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated and the general public, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
WABTEC CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania corporation; MARK MARTIN, an
individual; DOES, 1 through 100, Defendants-Appellees. No.
17-55165. (9th Cir.).

The Ninth Circuit respectfully asks the Supreme Court of California
to exercise its discretion to decide the certified question set
forth in Part II of this Order.

Certified Question

The Court requests a decision by the Supreme Court of California on
the following question of state law that is now before the Court:

     Whether work installing electrical equipment on locomotives
and rail cars (the onboard work for Metrolink's PTC project) falls
within the definition of public works under California Labor Code
Section 1720(a)(1) either (a) as constituting construction or
installation under the statute or (b) as being integral to other
work performed for the PTC project on the wayside (the field
installation work)?

Plaintiff, John Busker, is a former employee of Wabtec. Busker was
one of over 100 workers Wabtec hired to execute the on-board work
specified in the Wabtec subcontract. Busker worked on the Metrolink
project for approximately two years, performing traditional
electrical and electronic technician work exclusively on the
locomotives and rail cars. Busker filed a prevailing wage complaint
with the California Department of Industrial Relations (DIR),
Division of Labor

Standards Enforcement (DLSE).

Wabtec removed the action to federal district court under the Class
Action Fairness Act. The district court denied Busker's motion for
an order remanding the case to state court, and we have affirmed
that decision. The parties then agreed the prevailing wage coverage
issue could be determined through a summary judgment motion. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wabtec.

Busker timely appealed.

Whether the on-board work constitutes construction or installation

California Labor Code Section 1771 requires that all workers
employed on public works be paid not less than the general
prevailing rate of per diem wages for work of a similar character
in the locality in which the public work is performed.

Busker argues that the work performed by Wabtec employees (the
on-board work) was construction and installation as those terms are
used in California Labor Code Section 1720(a)(1).

Wabtec cites various administrative materials in which DIR
officials have recognized that work performed on rolling stock does
not fall within the definition of public works. Additionally,
despite the policy in favor of liberal construction, courts cannot
interfere where the Legislature has demonstrated the ability to
make its intent clear and chosen not to act.

Whether the on-board work is sufficiently related to the covered
field installation work
Assuming the on-board work does not independently meet the
definition of public works, Busker argues the prevailing wage law
nonetheless covers the on-board work because such work is
sufficiently related to the field installation work performed on
the wayside. The parties agree that the field installation work
meets the statutory definition of public works.

This case likely turns on the selection of the appropriate
standard. From the language of the prime contract and the Wabtec
subcontract and the other information provided by the parties, it
is clear that both the on-board work and the field installation
work are integral to the operation of the completed project (the
PTC system). If that were the correct formulation, Busker should
prevail. But the contracts and other information about the project
do not suggest that completion of the on-board work is integral to
the completion of the field installation work. If that were the
correct formulation, Wabtec's work is probably analogous to
off-site work or off-hauling that courts have held to be
non-integral to the construction process and thus not covered by
the prevailing wage law.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's September 6, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8kz3maq from Leagle.com.


WENDY'S INTERNATIONAL: Owens Sues over Use of Biometric Data
------------------------------------------------------------
MARTINIQUE OWENS and AMELIA GARCIA, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. WENDY'S
INTERNATIONAL, LLC, an Ohio limited liability company, the
Defendant, and NCR CORPORATION, a Maryland Corporation, the
Respondent in Discovery, Case No. 018CH11423 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook
Cty., Sept. 11, 2018), seeks to put a stop to Defendant's unlawful
collection, use, and storage of Plaintiffs' and the putative Class
members' sensitive biometric data.

According to the complaint, when employees first begin their jobs
at Wendy's, they are required to scan their fingerprint in its
biometric time tracking system as a means of authentication,
instead of using key fobs or other identification cards. While
there are tremendous benefits to using biometric time clocks in the
workplace, there are also serious risks. Unlike key fobs or
identification cards -- which can be changed or replaced if stolen
or compromised -- fingerprints are unique, permanent biometric
identifiers associated with the employee. This exposes employees to
serious and irreversible privacy risks. For example, if a
fingerprint database is hacked, breached, or otherwise exposed,
employees have no means by which to prevent identity theft and
unauthorized tracking. Recognizing the need to protect its citizens
from situations like these, Illinois enacted the Biometric
Information Privacy Act, specifically to regulate companies that
collect and store Illinois citizens' biometrics, such as
fingerprints. Despite this law, Wendy's disregards its employees'
statutorily protected privacy rights and unlawfully collects,
stores, and uses their biometric data in violation of the BIPA.

Wendy's is a publicly-traded international chain of fast food
restaurant with over 6,500 locations worldwide and employs
approximately 37,000 employees.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          J. Eli Wade-Scott, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: 312 589 6370
          Facsimile: 312 589 6378
          E-mail: brichman@edelson.com
                  ewadescott@edelson.com

               - and -

          David Fish, Esq.
          John Kunze, Esq.
          THE FISH LAW FIRM, P.C.
          200 East Fifth Avenue, Suite 123
          Naperville, IL 60563
          Telephone: (630) 355 7590
          Facsimile: (630) 778 0400
          E-mail: dfish@fishlawfirm.com
                  jkunze@fishlawfirm.com


WHOLE FOODS: Investors Urge Court to Revive Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Cameron Langford, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that Whole Foods Market investors urged the Fifth Circuit on Sept.
6 to revive their securities fraud class action accusing the grocer
of inflating its share price by counting revenue from mislabeled
and overpriced products.

Founded in Austin, Texas, in 1980 with the merger of two local
health food grocers, Whole Foods steadily expanded over the next
three decades by buying out 15 competitors.

Its focus on organic food proved to be a lucrative niche market and
its profits topped $5 billion in 2014.

The king of online retail, Amazon, bought Whole Foods for $13.4
billion last year to expand its brick-and-mortar business.

But the buyout did not resolve Whole Foods' pre-merger legal
troubles.

Those came from its admission in an $800,000 settlement with
California in 2014 and a $500,000 deal with New York City in 2015
that it had mislabeled some packaged products to show they weighed
more than they actually did.

Whole Foods co-CEO Walter Robb promptly admitted the company made
some pricing mistakes but assured them it was not intentional.

"I want to emphasize these were not systematic, but rather caused
by inadvertent human error. The audit includes errors that were
favorable to customers as well," Mr. Robb said during a July 2015
conference call with investors, according to court records.

Mr. Robb said on the call that sales had dropped at its stores due
to media coverage of the overcharging, causing the share price to
drop $4.74 to $36.08.

Whole Foods shareholder Yochanan Markman brought a securities fraud
class action against the company in Austin, Texas, federal court in
August 2015. The Employees' Retirement System of the State of
Hawaii, comprised of 115,000 members, replaced Mr. Markman as lead
plaintiff two months later.

U.S. District Judge Lee Yeakel dismissed the lawsuit in August
2017.

Although the class claimed Whole Foods had made at least $127.7
million in New York and California alone from inaccurately labeling
its products' weight, Judge Yeakel found the figure is an estimate
based on a study by a Whole Foods data analyst, so the calculations
"do not qualify as a factual admission of unearned sales revenue."

The Hawaii retirement fund appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which
held a hearing on Sept. 6 at the Houston federal courthouse.

The fund's attorney Susan Alexander, partner in the San Francisco
firm Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, told the three-judge panel that
Whole Foods had made false earnings reports from 2013 to 2015
because it had included the $127.7 million from the alleged
overpricing scam, knowing it had not actually earned those
proceeds.

Ms. Alexander said under the generally accepted accounting
principles followed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
companies can only report what they earn, not their revenue, and
the money was not earned since Whole Foods put less food in
packages than represented and still collected the extra money.

U.S. Circuit Judge Catharina Haynes asked Alexander why the
retirement fund had sued over pricing errors that had increased the
value of its Whole Food shares.

"You're the owner. You benefit from the overcharging. Maybe this
should be a consumer suit," said Haynes, a George W. Bush
appointee.

"It's about the value of the company," Ms. Alexander replied.

U.S. Circuit Judge Jennifer Elrod weighed in.

"So they wouldn't have kept it in their portfolio?" Judge Elrod
asked.

"Right," Ms. Alexander said.

Whole Foods' attorney Gregory Casas urged the panel to affirm the
lower court's dismissal. He works in the Austin office of Greenberg
Traurig.

He said the investors could not prove loss causation, an element
needed to win a securities fraud case.

Mr. Casas said Whole Foods executives did not disclose any new
information about the product pricing issues, or admit any
wrongdoing, in the July 2015 conference call that sent the share
price tumbling -- they only said it was a risk factor that could
affect the share price.

"Acknowledging the occurrence of a known and disclosed risk factor
does not establish loss causation," Mr. Casas states in a rebuttal
brief.

The investors claim Whole Foods erred in not restating its earnings
in light of the overpricing revelations.

But Mr. Casas told the panel the lack of hard numbers for the
transactions in which Whole Foods overcharged customers negates any
fraud claims.

"We have no idea how many times it happened," Mr. Casas said.

The judges did not say when they would rule on the appeal. U.S.
Circuit Judge Carolyn King rounded out the panel.


[*] Shook Hires McGuireWoods' Class Action Co-Chairman
------------------------------------------------------
Xiumei Dong at law.com reportst that for the second time in 2018,
Shook, Hardy & Bacon is expanding its operations on the West Coast,
this time by bringing on class action expert Andrew Trask as of
counsel in San Francisco.

Trask will be based in San Francisco but split his time between the
Bay Area and Orange County, California. He previously worked in the
London office of McGuireWoods, where he served as co-chairman of
the firm's class action group.

"My practice has always been very class actions," said Trask,
adding that he will continue to represent clients in aggregate
litigation and class actions in areas such as products liability,
data privacy and consumer fraud.

Trask has 20 years' experience in class action cases. Before
joining McGuireWoods in 2008, he worked as a counsel in the
Washington, D.C., office of O'Melveny & Myers, where he worked
closely with of counsel Brian Anderson. The two litigators
partnered up and co-wrote "The Class Action Playbook," a class
action litigation manual published by LexisNexis.

"It offers a great opportunity to deep dive into what I was doing
anyway," said Trask about his class action guide.

Other tomes co-authored by the litigation veteran include "Betting
the Company: Complex Negotiation Strategies in Law and Business,"
which he wrote with longtime friend Andrew DeGuire, now vice
president of strategy transformation and advancement at The
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. That book was published by
Oxford University Press.

Trask said he was attracted to Shook because of the firm's focus
"in the class action arena." Shook, whose roots are in Kansas City,
Missouri, earned a reputation for defending tobacco companies, but
Trask said he was impressed by the firm's litigators that worked on
class action cases he was already involved in and the opportunity
to collaborate with them on other matters.

"I am a lawyer who has developed a reputation of not settling very
often," said Trask, noting that companies have increasingly been
the target of class action suits due to the rise of privacy and
data-related breaches. His goal, Trask explained, is "to dispose of
class actions early and, if they progress, to not only win on the
merits, but to keep a case from becoming a giant class action."

Federal courts in the Bay Area are seeing more class actions in the
data breach and privacy realm, as well as consumer fraud, products
liability and securities, Trask said. In addition to his class
action practice, Trask has defended mass tort cases involving data
breaches, financial regulations, government investigations and
patent misuse cases.

"We are very excited to be adding such a prominent class-action
litigator," said a statement announcing Trask's hire by Shook's San
Francisco office managing partner Amir Nassihi. "Andy's very
well-known nationally for his strategic thinking and class
litigation expertise, and he strengthens our already deep class
action litigation practice. Andy is already working with our class
action group co-chairs, Tristan Duncan and Holly Smith, on swiftly
integrating his practice here."

Shook's San Francisco office, which opened in 1998, earlier this
year brought on veteran trial lawyer Michael Healy, a former
chairman of now-defunct Sedgwick. With Trask's addition, Shook's
Bay Area base now has 29 lawyers. The firm, which saw its gross
revenue rise in 2017, has also been busy expanding elsewhere.

Shook hired Ricardo Ampudia, a partner with International Dispute
Resources LLC, as counsel for its arbitration and litigation group
in Miami. The firm also bolstered its 6-year-old office in
Philadelphia in March after landing former Morgan, Lewis & Bockius
litigator Thomas Sullivan.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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