CAR_Public/181012.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, October 12, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 205

                            Headlines

1IOTA PRODUCTIONS: Burbon Suit Asserts ADA Breach
ALLIANCE GROUND: Lall Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Law
ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Weinberg Sues over Debt Collection Practices
ALNYLAM PHARMACEUTICALS: Faces Leavitt Securities Suit in N.Y.
AQUENT LLC: Court Dismisses Action Against Individual Defendants

ARS NATIONAL: Finnell Files FDCPA Suit in New York
ARSTRAT LLC: Douglas Files Class Suit Under FDCPA
BANK OF AMERICA: Boyd Suit Alleges Breach of Contract
BANK OF AMERICA: Sanchez Appeals Ruling in Farrell Suit to 9th Cir.
BAYERISCHE MOTOREN: Court Narrows Claims in Kearney Suit

BERKELEY, CA: Class Action Over Homeless Encampment Sweeps Okayed
BERKELEY, CA: Court Certifies Class of Homeless People
BOULEVARD LATIN: Uribe Seeks to Recover Minimum & Overtime Wages
BRIDGER LOGISTICS: Smith Suit Moved to Eastern District of Texas
CARDINAL HEALTH: Continues to Defend Opioid-Related Class Suits

CAVALRY PORTFOLIO: Court OKs Summary Judgment in Gomez Suit
CHEGG INC: Faces Shah Securities Class Suit in N.D. California
CITIGROUP GLOBAL: Faces Saggio Class Suit in N.Y. Civil Sup. Ct.
CREST HILL: Luster Suit Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay Under FLSA
DOLCE & GABBANA: Diaz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

DUN & BRADSTREET: Witmer Balks at Merger Deal with CC Capital
ESPARZA ENTERPRISES: Faces Mayen Class Action in Cal. Super. Ct.
F.H. CANN: Lazarao Files FDCPA Suit in New Jersey
FIRST OHIO: Judgment in Mortgage Broker Act Suit Affirmed
FIRST STANDARD: Abante Rooter Suit Alleges TCPA Violation

FLAGSTAR BANCORP: Richardson Sues Over Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages
FOOTHILL TRANSIT: Gerlach Asserts Discrimination in Bus Services
FREEDOM MORTGAGE: Chittick Suit Alleges RESPA Violation
FUSHIMI GROUP: Diaz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
GLOBAL TEL LINK: Kron Appeals Ruling in Lee Suit to 9th Circuit

HEWITT CAPITAL: Perry Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. Indiana
ILKE INC: Does Not Pay Minimum and OT Wages, Sanchez Suit Says
INVUITY INC: Hurtado Seeks to Enjoin Tender Offer by Stryker
JETS STADIUM: 3rd Circuit Appeal Filed in Gengo Class Suit
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Hedrick Sues over Sale of Talcum Powder

KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS: Sued for Misclassifying Field Agents
KORMAN COMMUNITIES: Bishop Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
LENDINGCLUB SECURITIES: Court OKs $16.4MM Attorney's Fees
LIFE TIME: Rodriguez Seeks to Recover Past-Due Wages Under FLSA
LOANDEPOT.COM: Faces Diaz ADA Suit in New York

LOS ANGELES, CA: Court Denied without Prejudice Class Cert. Bid
LYFT: Drivers' Class Action Settlement Gets Final Court Okay
MANAGEMENT & TRAINING: Mendoza Suit Moved to S.D. California
MANHATTAN PHYSICIANS: Bishop Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MARSHALLS OF CA: Rodriguez Suit Asserts Labor Law Violations

MAXIMUS INC: 4th Cir. Appeal Filed in Steamfitters Securities Suit
MIDLAND CREDIT: 3rd Cir. Flips Dismissal of Schultz FDCPA Suit
MILTAN  MANAGEMENT: Faces Bishop ADA Suit in New York
MONSANTO COMPANY: Awads Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Dotson Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup

MONSANTO COMPANY: Elfers Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Johnson Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Rice Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
MONSANTO COMPANY: Shorr Wants Damages From Roundup-Related Injury
MONSANTO COMPANY: Walker Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup

NAVIENT SOLUTIONS: Nov. 30 Settlement Opt-Out Deadline Set
NBCUNIVERSAL: Faces Burbon ADA Class Action
NEW EQUIPMENT: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss ICFA Suit
NOLAN ENTERPRISES: Ct. Won't Compel Arbitration in Dancers' Suit
OPTIMA ADVOCATES: Rothman Files Suit Over Illegal Calls

PANASONIC CORP: Martinez Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
PETROBRAS: Settles Bribery Claims with SEC for $1.8 Million
PHILIP MORRIS: GPCPF Sues Over Misleading Statements on IQOS
PPDAI GROUP: Faces Vora IPO-Related Securities Suit in New York
PRIMARK US: Web Site Not Blind-Accessible, Burbon Claims

PROMPT NURSING: Seeks 2nd Cir. Review of Paguirigan Suit Ruling
REAL ESTATE: Conditional Certification Administratively Terminated
REIS INC: Scarantino Balks at Merger Deal with Moody's Corp.
ROCHE HOLDING: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Securities Suit
SAFEWAY INC: Helfand Appeals Order in Rodman Suit to 9th Cir.

SANDERSON FARMS: Appeal Ongoing in New York Class Action
SANDERSON FARMS: Bid to Dismiss North Carolina Class Suit Underway
SANDERSON FARMS: Discovery Ongoing in Broiler Chicken-Related Suit
SANTA FE, NM: Moya Seeks More Time to File Petition for Writ
SARGON ISAAC: Tyler Swain Alleges Racism & Unsafe Housing

SHANG SHANG: Jiao Files FLSA Suit in E.D. New York
SHELTER MUTUAL: Baggett Suit Moved to Eastern District of Arkansas
SONY MUSIC: Rick Nelson Sues over Royalties
SOOTHE INC: Herrera Seeks to Stop Sending of Unsolicited Texts
SPECIALTY RESCUE: Porter Seeks to Recoup Minimum & Overtime Wages

SPENCE FENCE: Slover Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
STARBUCKS CORP: 9th Cir. Revives Off-Clock Work Class Action
STREMICK'S HERITAGE: Mislabels Kern's Fruit Juices, Levin Alleges
TESLA ENERGY: Zamorano Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
THOMAS REUTERS: Court Stay Landry FCRA Suit

THRIVE CAUSEMETICS: Barker Suit Removed to W.D. Wash.
TOKASH ENTERPRISES: Venegas Seeks OT Pay under FLSA
TUESDAY MORNING: Court Approves Settlement in Castillo Suit
TUESDAY MORNING: Court Approves Settlement in Velarde Suit
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Can Force Drivers to Arbitrate Claims

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Class Action Settlement Gets Prelim. Court OK
UNITED STATES: USCIS Seeks 9th Cir. Review of A.A. Suit Ruling
VENETIAN CASINO: Court Conditionally Certifies Housekeepers Class
VF OUTDOOR: Faces Burbon Suit Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
ZWICKER & ASSOCIATES: Campo Files Suit Alleging FDCPA Violation


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 203 Cases vs. CECO Still Pending at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3rd Cir. Affirms Montana Claims Fit Injunction
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Albany Int'l Defends 3,677 Claims at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Albany Int'l. Still Defends Mount Vernon Lawsuits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ampco-Pittsburgh Has $137.3MM Liability Reserve

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ampco-Pittsburgh Has 7,146 Claims at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Appeal of New Rules on Asbestos Docket Rejected
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Appeals Court Rules Against Asbestos Companies
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Brandon Drying Defends 7,708 Claims at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cabot Corp. Has 35,000 AO Respiratory Claimants

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Companies Fined $195K foAsbestos Removal
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Corp. May Appeal Asbestos Cell Vote
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crane's Bid to Quash Subpoena Affirmed on Appeal
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Daughter Appeals for Help on Mum's Asbestos Death
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Dismissal of Biederman's Bid to Unseal Affirmed

ASBESTOS UPDATE: DOJ Intensifies Attack on Asbestos Trust
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Duffus May File Brief Amici Curiae in Juni's Suit
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Elderly Residents at Risk of Asbestos
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Emerson Electric Had $346MM Liability at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Employer Must Pay Asbestos Victim's Widow

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Everest Had $273.2MM Loss Reserves at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Farris Case Management Conference Moved to Nov. 28
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Final Dismissal of Kirkland vs. Huntington Entered
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Firm Fined for Exposing Employees to Asbestos
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Firm Fined for Unlicensed Asbestos Removal

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Fit & Healthy Woman Dies of Asbestos Cancer
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Flowserve Still Faces PI Lawsuits at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: GMS Units Still Face 37 Lawsuits at July 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Hall Employees Exposed to Asbestos for Months
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Homes Built Before 1990 May Contain Asbestos

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Houston Wire Still Defends PI Suits at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: J-M Manufacturing Appeal of Warren Suit Dismissed
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Jury Verdict Favoring BNSF Affirmed on Appeal
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Navistar Continues to Defend Claims at July 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Park-Ohio Industries Faces 92 Suits at June 30

ASBESTOS UPDATE: School Kitchen Shut Due to Asbestos
ASBESTOS UPDATE: TriMas Corp. Had 396 Pending Cases at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Union Carbide Faces 13,734 Claims at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Union Carbide Has $1.3BB Liability at June 30
ASBESTOS UPDATE: US Auto Parts Units Still Defend Suits at June 30

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Whittaker May Perfect Appeal Until May 2019 Term
UTAH: Summary Judgment in Suit Over Hospital Lien Statute Affirmed


                            *********

1IOTA PRODUCTIONS: Burbon Suit Asserts ADA Breach
--------------------------------------------------
Luc Burbon filed a class action lawsuit against 1IOTA Productions,
LLC under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Luc Burbon and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. 1IOTA Productions, LLC., Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-09209 (S.D. N.Y., Oct. 8, 2018).

1iota Productions specializes in connecting fans with thousands of
live nationwide events in the entertainment world, including
exclusive access to popular TV shows, red carpet events, sporting
events, movie premiers, music festivals and more. Founded by Rob
Crawford and Ben Biscotti in 2002, the company has since grown from
a two-man outfit to a bi-coastal operation with over 150 active
employees, and a fan base membership of millions of registered
users. Members can request free tickets with searchable features by
celebrity, television show, date, city and more. 1iota also works
behind the scenes to support their clients with premier solutions
for event management, ticketing, fan engagement, casting, data and
analytics, onsite logistics and more.

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


ALLIANCE GROUND: Lall Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Law
--------------------------------------------------------
LALL, MELISSA INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, the Plaintiff, v. ALLIANCE GROUND INTERNATIONAL, LCC, the
Defendant, Case No. 712814/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Court, Sept 24, 2018),
seeks recover all unpaid wages including her unpaid overtime wages,
and unlawful wage deductions, under the New York Labor. The case is
assigned to the Hon. Janice A. Taylor.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff worked 50 or more hours a
week for the Defendant, 5-6 days a week, but the Defendant failed
to pay the Plaintiff for each and all hours worked in each week
during her employment.  The Plaintiff was not paid any wages
including overtime wages for about 5-6 hours worked in a week, for
each week during her employment with the Defendant.  In addition,
the wage statements provided to the Plaintiff did not state the
hours worked in each weekly pay period, among other deficiencies.

Alliance Ground provides cargo, mail, and ramp handling services to
international airlines in Chicago, New York, Atlanta, Miami,
Orlando, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Fort Lauderdale.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          ABDUL HASSAN LAW GROUP, PLLC.
          215-28 Hillside Ave.
          Queens Village, NY 11427
          Telephone: (718) 740 1000

Attorneys for Alliance Ground International:

          AKERMAN LLP
          666 Fifth Avenue 20TH Floor
          New York, NY 10103
          Telephone: (212) 880 3800


ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Weinberg Sues over Debt Collection Practices
---------------------------------------------------------------
BRIAN E. WEINBERG and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff,
vs. ALLTRAN FINANCIAL, LP, a Texas Limited Partnership; and JOHN
DOES, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-011503 (E.D. Wisc., Sept.
25, 2018), alleges that the Defendants failed to provide in an
initial communication with a consumer the amount of the debt as
required by 15 U.S.C. section 1692g(a)(1), and used a false,
deceptive, or misleading representation or means in violation of 15
U.S.C. section 1692e.

The Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated for the illegal practices of Defendant
when attempting to collect an alleged debt from them in violation
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Such practices include
attempting to collect consumer debts by engaging in conduct
prohibited by, or failing to engage in conduct required by, the
FDCPA.

According to the complaint, ALLTRAN regularly engages in the
collection of defaulted consumer debts and regularly collects or
attempts to collect debts debts alleged to be owed. The Defendant
is a business the principal purpose of which is the collection of
others defaulted consumer debts. In attempting to collect debts,
ALLTRAN uses the mails, telephone, the internet, and other
instruments of interstate commerce. ALLTRAN sent WEINBERG a letter
dated January 11, 2018. The Letter alleged WEINBERG had incurred
and defaulted on a financial obligation. The alleged Debt arose out
of one or more transactions in which the money, property,
insurance, or services that were the subject of the transaction
were primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. The
Letter identified the current creditor of the Debt as "Elan
Financial Services".  Sometime prior to January 11, 2018, the
creditor of the Debt either directly or through intermediate
transactions assigned, placed, or transferred the debt to ALLTRAN
for collection.

The Letter was ALLTRAN's first written communication to WEINBERG in
connection with the Debt. The Letter stated: Amount Due as of
January 11, 2018: $6,615.52. The unsophisticated consumer would
understand the phrase "Amount Due as of January 11, 2018” to
imply that after January 11, 2018, the amount of the debt would be
greater due to accruing interest, late fees, and other charges that
vary from day to day. Prior to the Letter, the creditor had
charged-off and accelerated the Debt and, therefore, the amount of
the Debt was no longer increasing due to accruing interest, late
fees, and other charges that vary from day to day. Prior to the
charge-off and acceleration of the Debt the amount of the Debt was
increasing due to accruing interest, late fees, and other charges
that varied from day to day, the Case says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff,

          Philip D. Stern, Esq.
          Andrew T. Thomasson, Esq.
          Francis R. Greene, Esq.
          STERN THOMASSON LLP
          150 Morris Avenue, 2nd Floor
          Springfield, NJ 07081
          Telephone (973) 379-7500
          E-mail: Philip@SternThomasson.com
                  Andrew@SternThomasson.com
                  Francis@SternThomasson.com


ALNYLAM PHARMACEUTICALS: Faces Leavitt Securities Suit in N.Y.
--------------------------------------------------------------
CARYL HULL LEAVITT, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. ALNYLAM PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., JOHN M.
MARAGANORE, and MANMEET S. SONI, Case No. 1:18-cv-08845 (S.D.N.Y.,
September 26, 2018), alleges that the Company sold securities at
artificially inflated prices during the class period because the
Defendants made materially false and misleading statements
regarding its business.

Specifically, the Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Alnylam overstated
the efficacy and safety of its Onpattro (patisiran) lipid complex
injection; and (ii) as a result, Alnylam's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times, the
Plaintiff alleges.

Alnylam is incorporated in Delaware and its principal executive
offices are located in Cambridge, Massachusetts.  The Individual
Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.

Alnylam is a global biopharmaceutical company developing
therapeutics based on RNA interference ("RNAi").  RNAi is a
naturally occurring biological pathway within cells for
sequence-specific silencing and regulation of gene expression.
Alnylam purports to harness the RNAi pathway to develop a potential
new class of innovative medicines, known as RNAi therapeutics. RNAi
therapeutics are comprised of small interfering RNA, or siRNA, and
function upstream of today's medicines by potently silencing
messenger RNA, or mRNA, that encode for disease-causing proteins,
thus, preventing them from being made.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          Jonathan Lindenfeld, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com
                  jlindenfeld@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          10 South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 377-1181
          Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
          E-mail: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com


AQUENT LLC: Court Dismisses Action Against Individual Defendants
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Individual Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss in the case captioned ELIZABETH SEGAL, individually, and
on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. AQUENT LLC, a Massachusetts limited liability company, et al.,
Defendants. Case No. 18cv346-LAB (JLB). (S.D. Cal.).

Segal filed a Second Amended Complaint against the various
Defendants, alleging a variety of wage and hour violations on
behalf of herself and a putative class consisting of all the
Corporate Defendants' current and former employees who worked in
California during the last four years.

Each of the remaining Individual Defendants move to dismiss
Plaintiff's SAC for lack of personal jurisdiction, alleging that
there are insufficient contacts between the Defendants and
California to permit this Court to exercise jurisdiction over them.


John Chuang

John Chuang is the Chairman of Aquent. He states in an affidavit
that he is a citizen and resident of Massachusetts. He does not
maintain a residence in California, does not own any property in
California, and does not intend to reside in California.

The Plaintiff alleges that general personal jurisdiction is proper
over Chuang because Aquent LLC does business in California. Even if
doing business were the standard for jurisdiction over corporate
entities (it is not), Aquent's activity does not justify personal
jurisdiction over its employees.

General personal jurisdiction over Chuang is therefore improper
because he is not domiciled in California.  Specific personal
jurisdiction over Chuag is also inappropriate. Chuang's only
contacts with California are a small number of visits for vacations
or work-related purposes.  
This Court has neither general personal jurisdiction nor specific
personal jurisdiction over Chuang.

Douglas Kaplan

Douglas Kalpan is the CEO of Aquent.  Kaplan states in an affidavit
that he is a resident and citizen of Massachusetts. Like Chuang, he
states that he does not maintain a residence in California, does
not own any property in California, and does not intend to reside
in California.

The Plaintiff's arguments as to why this Court should exercise
jurisdiction over Kaplan are identical to her arguments regarding
Chuang, and they fail for the same reasons.

He did not supervise California employees, oversee California
operations, or develop any of the policies at issue. Kaplan's
contacts with the state of California thus do not give rise to
jurisdiction over him.

Cheryl King

Cheryl King is the President of Aquent Staffing and Studios, a
division of Aquent. King states in affidavit that she is a citizen
and resident of the state of Washington. Although she owns personal
property in California, she has no intent to reside there.
Plaintiff has made no allegation that King is domiciled in
California, nor has Plaintiff produced any evidence of such. There
is no evidence or even allegation of the necessary intent to reside
in California permanently.

For the reasons set out with respect to Chuang and Kaplan, this
Court finds that exercising jurisdiction over King would be
improper.

The Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction is GRANTED and those defendants are dismissed with
prejudice from the case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 24, 2018 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7vm3weu from Leagle.com.

Elizabeth Segal, individually, and on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas D.
Rutledge -- thomasrutledgelaw@gmail.com -- Law Office of Thomas D
Rutledge.

Aquent, LLC, a Massachusetts limited liability company, Defendant,
represented by Elizabeth Mary Levy, Seyfarth Shaw, Marjorie C.
Soto, McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Olivia Jee Un Wada, Seyfarth Shaw
LLP & Timothy M. Rusche, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP.


ARS NATIONAL: Finnell Files FDCPA Suit in New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against ARS National
Services, Inc. The case is styled as Debbie Finnell on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ARS
National Services, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-05638 (E.D.
N.Y., Oct. 9, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

ARS National Services, Inc. offers accounts receivable management
services. It caters to financial services organizations, banks, and
credit card companies. The company is based in Escondido,
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Daniel C. Cohen, Esq.
     Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West
     12th Floor
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (929) 575-4175
     Fax: (929) 575-4195
     Email: dan@cml.legal


ARSTRAT LLC: Douglas Files Class Suit Under FDCPA
-------------------------------------------------
Jamie J. Douglas has brought a class action lawsuit against
ARStrat, LLC under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The case is captioned Jamie J. Douglas individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ARStrat, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-05646 (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 9, 2018).

ARstrat is a collection and bad debt resolution provider for the
healthcare industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Sanders Law, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: csanders@sanderslawpllc.com


BANK OF AMERICA: Boyd Suit Alleges Breach of Contract
-----------------------------------------------------
Kevin G. Boyd, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. Bank of America, N.A. and Does 1 through 10, Case No.
2:18-cv-01207 (W.D. Wash., August 16, 2018), is brought against the
Defendants for breach of written contract and willful refusal to
pay wages.

This is a Washington class action for unlawful deductions and
failure to pay for rest breaks and time worked on non-sales
activities by mortgage brokers working for the Defendant. The
Defendant paid the Plaintiff and class members based on a
contractual sales commission, and unlawfully deducts money advanced
for rest breaks and non-sales work, notes the complaint. Plaintiff
seeks among other things, all wages and statutory remedies.

The Plaintiff Kevin G. Boyd was a resident and citizen of
Washington. The Plaintiff Boyd was employed by Defendant as a
mortgage broker in the State of Washington.

The Defendant Bank of America, N.A. is a bank that is authorized to
conduct and is actually conducting business in the State of
Washington, and designates its main office in North Carolina. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joshua H. Haffner, Esq.
      Graham G. Lambert, Esq.
      HAFFNER LAW PC
      445 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2325
      Los Angeles, CA 90071
      Tel: (213) 514-5681
      Fax: (213) 514-5682
      E-mail: jhh@haffnerlawyers.com
              gl@haffnerlawyers.com


BANK OF AMERICA: Sanchez Appeals Ruling in Farrell Suit to 9th Cir.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Objector Estafania Osorio Sanchez filed an appeal from a court
ruling in the lawsuit styled Joanne Farrell, et al. v. Bank of
America, N.A., Case No. 3:16-cv-00492-L-WVG, in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California, San Diego.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the District
Court granted preliminary approval of a class action settlement in
the case.  The Settlement Class consists of:

     All holders of BANA consumer checking accounts who, during
     the period between February 25, 2014 and December 30, 2017,
     were assessed at least one Extended Overdrawn Balance Charge
     that was not refunded.

The appellate case is captioned as Joanne Farrell, et al. v. Bank
of America, N.A., Case No. 18-56272, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by October 22, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on November 20, 2018;

   -- Appellant Estafania Osorio Sanchez's opening brief is due
      on January 3, 2019;

   -- Appellees Larice Addamo, Bank of America, Ronald Anthony
      Dinkins and Joanne Farrell's answering brief is due on
      February 4, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Objector-Appellant ESTAFANIA OSORIO SANCHEZ is represented by:

          Michael D. Luppi, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL D. LUPPI
          11366 Christy Avenue
          Sylmar, CA 91342
          Telephone: (818) 897-3344
          Facsimile: (323) 726-3106
          E-mail: luppiacct@gmail.com

Plaintiffs-Appellees JOANNE FARRELL, RONALD ANTHONY DINKINS and
LARICE ADDAMO, On behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, are represented by:

          Bryan Scott Gowdy, Esq.
          MILLS CREED & GOWDY, P.A.
          865 May Street
          Jacksonville, FL 32204
          Telephone: (904) 350-0075
          E-mail: bgowdy@appellate-firm.com

               - and -

          Walter W. Noss, Esq.
          SCOTT & SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          600 W. Broadway, Suite 3300
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 233-4565
          E-mail: wnoss@scott-scott.com

               - and -

          Hassan Zavareei, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          1828 L Street NW, Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 973-0900
          E-mail: hzavareei@tzlegal.com

Defendant-Appellee BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., is represented by:

          Brian D. Boyle, Esq.
          Jonathan Hacker, Esq.
          O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
          1625 Eye Street, N.W.
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 383-5327
          E-mail: bboyle@omm.com
                  jhacker@omm.com

               - and -

          Matthew W. Close, Esq.
          O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
          400 South Hope Street, 18th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 430-6000
          E-mail: mclose@omm.com

               - and -

          Danielle Nicole Oakley, Esq.
          O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
          610 Newport Center Drive
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 823-7921
          E-mail: doakley@omm.com


BAYERISCHE MOTOREN: Court Narrows Claims in Kearney Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVE KEARNEY, JAMES BARR, and ROBIN SCHOENE,
Plaintiffs, v. BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, and BMW
of NORTH AMERICA, LLC, Defendants, Civ. No. 17-13544 (WHW-CLW) (D.
N.J.), Judge William H. Walls of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant BMW North America ("BMW NA")'s motion to dismiss the
Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiffs initiated the action with a Dec. 22, 2017
class-action complaint.  An Amended Class Action Complaint followed
on March 13, 2008.  The Amended Complaint alleges that BMW NA and
Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft ("BMW AG") violated
common and statutory law by selling and leasing vehicles equipped
with defective sunroofs and moonroofs that are prone to sudden,
unexpected explosion or shattering.

Specifically, it alleges that the Defendants wrongfully and
intentionally concealed problems with the Defective Sunroofs,
exposing the Plaintiffs and class members to a shower of glass and
forcing them to incur out of pocket costs to repair or replace the
Defective Sunroofs and other vehicle parts.

The Amended Complaint is based in part on an October 2017 Consumer
Reports investigation detailing complaints of exploding sunroofs
across numerous brands, including BMW.  Many those complaints
relate to panoramic sunroofs, which have grown in popularity over
the past decade; the Defendants began installing them in 2004.  One
month after the Consumer Reports investigation, two United States
Senators requested information from BMW and others regarding
sunroof safety.

Affected vehicles include the following model years when equipped
with a sunroof or moonroof: model year (MY) 2005-2018 BMW 3 series;
MY 2005-2018 BMW 5 series; MY 2004-2018 BMW X5s; MY2005-2018 X3s;
MY 2009-2018 BMW X1s; MY 2008-2018 MINI Clubmans; MY 2006-2018 MINI
Coopers; MY 2011-2018 MINI Countrymans; MY 2009-2018 MINI Hardtops;
and MY 2013-2018 MINI Pacemans.

Panoramic sunroofs and moonroofs are not standard features in the
Defendants' base models; they are featured as part of an upgrade.
Yje Defendants have neither warned the Class Vehicle owners about
the defect, nor agreed to cover replacement of the Defective
Sunroofs under the Class Vehicles' applicable warranties.

The Plaintiffs bring the action on behalf of themselves and members
of the following proposed class and sub-classes:

     i. Nationwide Class: All persons or entities in the United
States that purchased, leased, own, or owned a Class Vehicle'

     ii. California Sub-Class: All persons or entities that
purchased or leased a Class Vehicle in the State of California and
all persons or entities in the State of California that purchased,
leased, own, or owned a Class Vehicle;

     iii. Song-Beverly Sub-Class: All persons or entities that
purchased or leased a Class Vehicle in the State of California;

     iv. Texas Sub-Class: All persons or entities that purchased or
leased a Class Vehicle in the State of Texas and all persons or
entities in the State of Texas that purchased, leased, own, or
owned a Class Vehicle; and

     v. Maryland Sub-Class: All persons or entities that purchased
or leased a Class Vehicle in the State of Maryland and all persons
or entities in the State of Maryland that purchased, leased, own,
or owned a Class Vehicle.

The Plaintiffs assert claims for: (i) fraud (Count 1); (ii)
negligent misrepresentation (Count 2); (iii) breach of express
warranty (Count 3); (iv) breach of implied warranty (Count 4); (v)
violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) (Count 5); (vi)
unjust enrichment (Count 6); (vii) violation of California's
Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (Count 7); (viii) violation of
California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Count 8); (ix) violation
of California's Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Count 9); (x)
violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act (DTPA) (Count 10); (xi) violation of Maryland's
Consumer Protection Act  (MCPA) (Count 11); and (xii) violation of
New Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act (NJCFA) (Count 12).

Defendant BMW NA now moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 9, and 12(b)(6).

Judge Walls granted in part and denied BMW NA's motion to dismiss.
He granted the motion as to Counts 3, 6, 9, and 12 in their
entirety, and as to Counts 2, 4, and 5 regarding Plaintiff Kearney
only.  The remainder is denied.

The Judge, among other things, finds that (i) Plaintiff Kearney's
express-warranty claim must be dismissed because he does not claim
to have experienced any sunroof-related issues with his Class
Vehicle; (ii) the Plaintiffs stipulate to the voluntary dismissal
of unjust enrichment claim (Count 6); (iii) Kearney offers no
indication that his Class Vehicle is not fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such vehicle is used which requires the
dismissal of Kearney's Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act claim;
and (iv) the consumer-fraud statutes of the Plaintiffs' home states
will apply to the allegations in Count 12, and because Counts 7, 8,
10, and 11 allege violations of those statutes, Count 12 is
dismissed.

The Plaintiffs are granted 45 days from the date of the Opinion to
seek leave to amend the Amended Complaint if they wish.  An
appropriate order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 29, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/Z1mIQH from Leagle.com.

DAVE KEARNEY, On behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by JOSEPH H. MELTZER --
jmeltzer@ktmc.com -- KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP, PETER A.
MUHIC -- pmuhic@ktmc.com -- KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP &
JAMES E. CECCHI , CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO,
P.C.

JAMES BARR & ROBIN SCHOENE, Plaintiffs, represented by JAMES E.
CECCHI -- JCecchi@carellabyrne.com -- CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN
BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C.

BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC, Defendant, represented by DOUGLAS HARRY
AMSTER -- Douglas.Amster@lewisbrisbois.com -- LEWIS BRISBOIS
BISGAARD & SMITH, LLC.


BERKELEY, CA: Class Action Over Homeless Encampment Sweeps Okayed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Iovino, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
homeless people who lost tents, sleeping gear and other belongings
in encampment sweeps can team up to sue Berkeley, California, on
claims of civil rights violations, a federal judge ruled on Sept.
25.

In granting class certification, U.S. District Judge William Alsup
found approximately 1,000 homeless people in Berkeley can seek
injunctive relief from the city.  However, they cannot seek
monetary damages because that would require evaluating claims of
property loss on an individual basis.

"It means that we can proceed on behalf of all homeless individuals
in the city of Berkeley in order to defend their rights to keep
their property, which may look like and be treated as trash by the
city of Berkeley but often times represents everything that
individual owns," said plaintiffs' attorney Emily Rose Johns --
emilyrose@siegelyee.com -- of Siegel Yee & Brunner in Oakland.

Ms. Johns said her clients want the city to give more warning
before clearing out encampments and provide more information on how
people can reclaim seized belongings or get help to retrieving
their lost property.

"Ideally people wouldn't be deprived of their property in the first
place," Ms. Johns said.  "Many of these individuals don't have the
resources to get their property back, such as cars or assistance
from able-bodied folks."

Berkeley says it respects the rights of homeless people, giving 72
hours' notice before any eviction deemed necessary for public
health and safety and holding property seized during evictions for
up to 90 days.

But Ms. Johns said the city doesn't always provide 72 hours'
notice.  When the city warned about a sweep five days before it
happened, it assumed people had adequate time to claim their
property and deemed everything left there as garbage destined for
the dumpster, Ms. Johns said.

Several members of the group First They Came For The Homeless,
which has organized multiple drug-free encampments in Berkeley,
also describe having lost all their possessions in past raids.

In asking Judge Alsup to deny class certification, the city
contended any loss of property resulted from isolated incidents or
employee misconduct, not an official city policy or custom. Judge
Alsup refused to consider that argument at this still-early stage
of litigation.

"The city has a long-standing written policy regarding the
collection, storage, and retrieval of property from homeless
encampments," Judge Alsup wrote.  "Commonality has therefore been
demonstrated."

But the judge declined to certify a separate class of campers
associated with the group First They Came For The Homeless.  That
group set up camps in prominent areas of Berkeley to raise
awareness about homelessness and affordable housing issues, and
claims the city specifically targeted them in retaliation for their
political activism.

Judge Alsup found that because the group members voiced their
opinions in different ways -- by protesting, making signs, writing
op-eds, and speaking at government meetings -- the activities were
too varied to be evaluated on a class-wide, rather than individual,
basis. He also found the proposed class size would be less than 40,
which courts generally find falls short of the threshold for class
certification.

Additionally, Judge Alsup refused to let two named plaintiffs --
Clark Sullivan and Adam Bredenberg -- represent the class of people
who lost possessions.  That's because Mr. Sullivan and
Mr. Bredenberg could not conclusively say the city, rather than
those helping them move before encampment sweeps, caused the loss
or damage of their property.

Judge Alsup appointed named plaintiff Benjamin Royer as the sole
class representative for the allegedly unlawful seizure of
property.  Mr. Royer says he lost his tarp, sleeping bag and
clothing during an early morning camp eviction in December 2016.

According to Ms. Johns, the next step will be to work with Berkeley
to craft a plan for notifying approximately 1,000 homeless people
about the litigation, giving them an opportunity to opt out of the
class action if they want to pursue their claims individually.

From there, the plaintiffs will continue to seek discovery from
Berkeley and possibly negotiate a settlement or ask Judge Alsup to
render a summary judgment ruling based on the evidence and merits
of the case, Ms.Johns said.

The named plaintiffs and members of First They Came For The
Homeless group will continue to pursue their claims of free speech
retaliation against the city individually, Johns added.

The homeless plaintiffs first sued the city of Berkeley and Bay
Area Rapid Transit, or BART, in October 2017 to block a planned
eviction from a South Berkeley encampment.  Judge Alsup denied the
group's request for an injunction at that time, but he allowed
claims of free speech retaliation, unlawful seizure of property and
due process violations to go forward this past January. BART was
dropped as a defendant this past April.

In November 2017, Berkeley told Judge Alsup that it lacked the
resources necessary to house more than 268 of the city's
approximately 1,000 homeless people, despite spending $3.9 million
per year on homeless services.

The city opened a $2.4 million navigation center in West Berkeley
in June, which can house 45 individuals and provides on-site access
to mental health counseling and social services.  The city also
told Judge Alsup last year that it was working to build an 89-unit
affordable housing complex and create another 50-bed shelter with
modular buildings.

Berkeley spokesman Matthai Chakko said the city is working to
improve the situation for its homeless residents.

"Over the past year, the city has started the Pathways Program
which created a structured environment for a broad range of
unhoused people to receive housing, meals and other services while
transitioning to permanent housing," Mr. Chakko said in a
statement.  "We've also created more year-round shelter, and we've
begun work on a storage program."


BERKELEY, CA: Court Certifies Class of Homeless People
------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled CLARK SULLIVAN, ADAM BREDENBERG,
and BENJAMIN ROYER, the Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF BERKELEY, the
Defendants, Case No. 3:17-cv-06051-WHA (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge
William Alsup entered an order on September 25, 2018:

     1. certifying a class of:

        "all homeless individuals in the City of Berkeley
        who are now subject to the City's policies and
        practices of property collection, storage and
        disposal";

     2. appointing Benjamin Royer as class representative;
        and  

     3. appointing Plaintiffs' counsel from Siegel, Yee &
        Brunner as class counsel.

The Court said, "By October 5 at noon, the parties shall jointly
submit a proposal for class notification with a plan to distribute
notice. In crafting their joint proposal, counsel shall please keep
in mind the undersigned judge's guidelines for notice to class
members in the "Notice and Order Regarding Factors to be Evaluated
for Any Proposed Class Settlement".[CC]


BOULEVARD LATIN: Uribe Seeks to Recover Minimum & Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE RODRIGO VARGAS URIBE (A/K/A RODRIGO), individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated v. BOULEVARD LATIN CUISINE LLC
(D/B/A BOULEVARD RESTAURANT), DD7 LLC (D/B/A BOULEVARD RESTAURANT),
SHOW LAIN CHENG, JACK CHENG, HOWARD CHENG, CONSUELO QUINTERO, SHAY
DOE, TOMAS RODRIGUEZ, and LILIANA DOE, Case No. 1:18-cv-05434
(E.D.N.Y., September 27, 2018), is brought pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law to recover alleged
unpaid minimum and overtime wages, and applicable liquidated
damages, interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

Boulevard Latin Cuisine LLC (d/b/a Boulevard Restaurant) is a
domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
state of New York.  DD7 LLC (d/b/a Boulevard Restaurant) is a
domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
state of New York.  The Individual Defendants serve or served as
owners, managers, principals, or agents of the Defendant
Corporations.

The Defendants owned, operated, or controlled a Colombian
restaurant, located at 82-24 Northern Blvd., in Jackson Heights,
New York, under the name "Boulevard Restaurant."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Michael@Faillacelaw.com


BRIDGER LOGISTICS: Smith Suit Moved to Eastern District of Texas
----------------------------------------------------------------
KENNETH SMITH, AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED UNDER 29 USC
216(B), the Plaintiff, v. BRIDGER LOGISTICS, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company, the Respondent, Case No. 2:18-cv-00193, was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Texas, to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas (Sherman) on Sept. 24, 2018. The Eastern District of Texas
Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:18-cv-00670-ALM-KPJ to the
proceeding. The suit alleges Fair Labor Standards Act violation.
The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Amos L. Mazzant, III.

The Defendant attempted to circumvent the Fair Labor Standards
Act's protections by misclassifying Plaintiff and other
similarly-situated workers as independent contractors in order to
deny them overtime wages. Instead of paying overtime, Defendant has
paid Plaintiffs a straight-pay rate and in a manner that has failed
to compensate them for overtime work. This collective action seeks
to recover the unpaid overtime wages and liquidated damages owed to
these misclassified workers. Defendant engaged in this behavior
willfully and without regard for the economic welfare of their
employees and with full knowledge that Plaintiffs were conferring
benefits upon Defendant that were improperly procured, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for Kenneth Smith and all others similarly situated under
29 USC 216(B):

          Jesse Hamilton Forester, Esq.
          FORESTER HAYNIE PLLC - DALLLAS
          1701 N. Market St., No. 210
          Dallas, TX 75202
          Telephone: (214) 288 8519
          Facsimile: (214) 346-5905
          E-mail: jay@foresterhaynie.com

Attorneys for Respondent:

          Emily A. Quillen, Esq.
          SCOPELITIS GARVIN ET AL
          777 Main Street, Suite 3450
          Fort Worth, TX 76012
          Telephone: (817) 869 1700
          Facsimile: (817) 878 9472
          E-mail: equillen@scopelitis.com


CARDINAL HEALTH: Continues to Defend Opioid-Related Class Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Cardinal Health, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
June 30, 2018, that the company continues to defend itself against
Opioid-related class action lawsuits.

Pharmaceutical wholesale distributors, including the company, have
been named as defendants in over 1,000 lawsuits relating to the
distribution of prescription opioid pain medications. These
lawsuits have been filed in various federal, state, and other
courts by a variety of plaintiffs, which are primarily counties,
municipalities and political subdivisions from 48 states.
Plaintiffs also include state attorneys general, unions and other
health and welfare funds, hospital systems and other healthcare
providers. Of these lawsuits, 32 are purported class actions.

The lawsuits seek equitable relief and monetary damages based on a
variety of legal theories including various common law claims, such
as negligence, public nuisance, unjust enrichment as well as
violations of controlled substance laws and various other statutes.
Many also name pharmaceutical manufacturers, retail pharmacy chains
and other entities as defendants.

The vast majority of these lawsuits have been filed in U.S. federal
court and have been transferred for consolidated pre-trial
proceedings in a Multi-District Litigation proceeding in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The court,
among other things, ordered that three lawsuits proceed to trial in
2019 depending on the outcome of pre-trial motions.

As a part of these proceedings, distributors have engaged in
preliminary discussions with various parties, including state
attorneys general, regarding possible resolution structures.

In addition, 39 state attorneys general have formed a multi-state
task force to investigate the manufacturing, distribution,
dispensing and prescribing practices of opioid medications.

Cardinal Health said , "We have received requests related to this
multi-state investigation, as well as civil investigative demands,
subpoenas or requests for information from these and other state
attorneys general offices. We are cooperating with the offices
conducting these investigations. We are vigorously defending
ourselves in all of these opioid matters. Since all of the
above-referenced lawsuits and investigations are in early stages,
we are unable to predict their outcome or estimate a range of
reasonably possible losses."

Cardinal Health, Inc. operates as an integrated healthcare services
and products company in the United States and internationally. It
provides medical products and pharmaceuticals, and solutions that
enhance supply chain efficiency for hospitals, healthcare systems,
pharmacies, ambulatory surgery centers, clinical laboratories, and
physician offices. Cardinal Health, Inc. was founded in 1979 and is
headquartered in Dublin, Ohio.


CAVALRY PORTFOLIO: Court OKs Summary Judgment in Gomez Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the case
captioned RICARDO A. GOMEZ and DEBORA GOMEZ, Plaintiffs, v. CAVALRY
PORTFOLIO SERVICES, LLC and CAVALRY SPV I, LLC, Defendants. No.
14-cv-09420. (N.D. Ill.).

This case concerns communications by Defendants Cavalry Portfolio
Services, LLC (CPS) and Cavalry SPV I, LLC (Cavalry SPV) to
Plaintiffs Ricardo Gomez and Debora Gomez regarding their defaulted
credit card debt. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), by misrepresenting the
amount of Plaintiffs' debt.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the admissible evidence
considered as a whole shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, even after all reasonable inferences are drawn in
the nonmovant's favor.

Waiver

The Plaintiffs' FDCPA claim stems from BOA's alleged waiver of its
right to post-charge-off interest prior to selling the account to
the Defendants. The Plaintiffs argue that BOA waived all
post-charge-off interest on their account, and consequently the
Defendants, as assignees, did not have the right to charge and
collect such interest. Therefore, when the Defendants sent letters
to the Plaintiffs that included the post-charge-off, pre-sale
interest as part of the debt owed, the Defendants were
misrepresenting the amount the Plaintiffs' owed on their account.

The Plaintiffs argue that BOA's actions following the charge off of
the Plaintiffs' account clearly demonstrate waiver. The Plaintiffs
note that BOA's decision not to charge interest was no mere
accident or oversight, but instead, as a BOA representative
testified, part of a broader policy to stop tracking and computing
post-charge-off interest that BOA implemented in 2007. The BOA
representative also testified, however, that their cardholder
agreements typically state that BOA's failure to exercise any of
its rights under the agreement does not waive those rights in the
future.

The Defendants argue that based on this testimony, BOA clearly did
not intend to give up the right to charge interest simply because
it chose not to exercise the right to do so. The Court does not
find this argument persuasive.

BOA's implied waiver of the right to charge interest on the
Plaintiffs' account retroactively is further evidenced by the fact
that BOA did not send periodic account statements to Plaintiffs.
Federal regulations require banks to send periodic statements on
all accounts, including defaulted accounts, for any period during
which interest or fees are charged on the account. BOA chose to
stop sending financial statements after accounts were charged off
for financial reasons, namely, it did not make sense to expend
resources on periodic statements for an account that was already
written off. This business choice reflects a conscious decision to
forego interest rather than continue to pay for periodic
statements. Defendants argue that the cessation of monthly
statements has no bearing on whether a creditor has waived its
right to seek interest. But the Illinois cases to which Defendants
point in support of their argument are inapposite.  

Given the evidence presented, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that
there is no genuine issue of material fact as to BOA's waiver of
its right to charge and collect post-charge-off interest. As the
assignee, Defendants only acquired the rights that BOA had as of
the date of assignment.

Since BOA waived its right to post-charge-off, pre-sale interest,
the Defendants did not acquire the right to this interest and could
not seek it from the Plaintiffs.

Cavalry SPV's Status as a Debt Collector

Even if Defendants improperly sought post-charge-off, pre-sale
interest, the FDCPA only regulates such behavior if Defendants are
debt collectors. The FDCPA defines a debt collector as any person
who "uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails
in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of
any debts or who regularly collects or attempts to collect,
directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or
due another.

Here, Cavalry SPV argues that it is a purchaser of non-performing
consumer accounts, not a debt collector, and therefore not covered
by the FDCPA. According to Cavalry SPV, CPS is the entity that
actually collects debts. Here, Cavalry SPV purchased Plaintiffs'
debt two years after the account was charged off, in other words,
Cavalry SPV acquired the debt long after it went into default.
Because Cavalry SPV is seeking to collect on a defaulted debt, it
is a debt collector under the FDCPA.

Statute of Limitations

Finally, Defendants argue that even if they acted as debt
collectors and violated the FDCPA, Plaintiffs' claim still fails
because they did not file this lawsuit within the statute of
limitations period.

A plaintiff must bring an FDCPA claim within one year from the date
on which the violation occurs.

Here, the initial letters notified Plaintiffs that Defendants were
attempting to collect the post-charge-off, pre-purchase interest,
thereby providing Plaintiffs with all the information they needed
to file a claim. Indeed, those initial communications lie at the
core of this lawsuit since they are the only communications
provided to the Court that evidence false, deceptive, or misleading
behavior. Because Plaintiffs' claims were ripe at the time they
received the initial collection letters, there is no continuing
violation. Without considering the initial collection letters,
however, the March 21, 2014 letter is devoid of false, deceptive,
or misleading information. Therefore, the March 21, 2014 letter
cannot form the basis of a FDCPA claim. And consequently,
Plaintiffs have no improper collection letters that fall within the
statute of limitations period.

Because Plaintiffs have not shown the existence of a claim that
falls within the statute of limitations period, Defendants' summary
judgment motion is granted and Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion
is denied.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied
and the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 24, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ydd8yojt from Leagle.com.

Ricardo A. Gomez & Debora Gomez, on behalf of plaintiffs and a
class, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel A. Edelman, Edelman,
Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC, Cassandra P. Miller, Edelman,
Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC, Cathleen M. Combs, Edelman, Combs,
Latturner & Goodwin LLC, Emiliya Gumin Farbstein, Edelman, Combs,
Latturner & Goodwin, LLC, Francis Richard Greene, Stern Thomasson
LLP, James O. Latturner, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC &
Paul Michael Waldera, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC.

Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC & Cavalry SPV I, LLC, Defendants,
represented by Anna-Katrina S. Christakis, Pilgrim Christakis LLP &
Matthew O'Hair Stromquist, Pilgrim Christakis LLP.


CHEGG INC: Faces Shah Securities Class Suit in N.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
BHUPENDRA V. SHAH, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. CHEGG, INC., and DANIEL ROSENSWEIG, Case No.
3:18-cv-05956 (N.D. Cal., September 27, 2018), seeks to pursue
remedies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 over inflated
prices of the Company's securities.

On September 25, 2018, the Company reported that an unauthorized
party had gained access on or around April 29, 2018, to
approximately 40 million users' data, including username, e-mail
address, shipping address, and hashed Chegg password.  On this
news, the Company's share price fell $3.91, or approximately 12%,
to close at $28.42 per share on September 26, 2018, on unusually
heavy trading volume.

According to the complaint, throughout the Class Period, the
Defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements, as
well as failed to disclose material adverse facts about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects.  Specifically, the
Defendants failed to disclose to investors: (1) that the Company
lacked adequate security measures to protect users' data; (2) that
the Company lacked the internal controls and procedures to detect
unauthorized access to its systems and to its data; (3) that as a
result, the Company would incur additional expenses and litigation
risks; and (4) that, as a result of the foregoing, the Defendants'
positive statements about the Company's business.

Chegg is incorporated under the laws of Delaware with its principal
executive offices located in Santa Clara, California.  Daniel
Rosensweig was the Chief Executive Officer of the Company at all
relevant times.

Chegg is a direct-to-student learning platform that provides
educational materials and services to high school and college
students.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
          Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
          Lesley F. Portnoy, Esq.
          Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
          E-mail: lglancy@glancylaw.com
                  rprongay@glancylaw.com
                  lportnoy@glancylaw.com
                  clinehan@glancylaw.com


CITIGROUP GLOBAL: Faces Saggio Class Suit in N.Y. Civil Sup. Ct.
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Citigroup Global
Markets, Inc. The case is styled as Greg Saggio on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Citigroup
Global Markets, Inc., Defendant, 610335/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau
Cty. Oct. 4, 2018).

Citigroup Global Markets Inc. provides investment banking and
financial advisory services. The firm offers equity and debt
financing, asset transaction, private equity, underwriting,
institutional sales and trading, and mergers and acquisitions
advisory services. Citigroup Global Markets Inc. was formerly known
as Salomon Smith Barney Inc. and changed its name in April 2003.
The firm is based in New York, New York. Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Citigroup Financial Products
Inc.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Westerman Ball Ederer Miller Zucker & Sharfstein, LLP
     1201 RXR Plaza
     Uniondale, NY 11556
     Phone: (516) 622-9200


CREST HILL: Luster Suit Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay Under FLSA
----------------------------------------------------------------
KOREY LUSTER, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated v.
MICHAEL MARANO, individually, CREST HILL CAPITAL, LLC, and MANTIS
FUNDING, LLC, Case No. 9:18-cv-81311-DMM (S.D. Fla., September 26,
2018), seeks to recover alleged unpaid overtime compensation,
declaratory relief, and other relief under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Crest Hill Capital, LLC, is a New York Corporation that operates
and conducts business in Palm Beach County, Florida.  Mantis
Funding, LLC, is a Delaware Corporation that operates and conducts
business in Palm Beach County.  Michael Marano is an owner of the
Corporate Defendants.

The Defendants provide business financing and loans.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gary A. Isaacs, Esq.
          COHEN NORRIS WOLMER RAY TELEPMAN COHEN
          712 U.S. Highway One, Suite 400
          North Palm Beach, FL 33401
          Telephone: (561) 844-3600
          Facsimile: (561) 842-4104
          E-mail: gai@fcohenlaw.com


DOLCE & GABBANA: Diaz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dolce & Gabbana USA
Inc. The case is styled as Edwin Diaz on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Dolce & Gabbana USA Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-09246 (S.D. N.Y., Oct. 9, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Dolce & Gabbana USA Inc. designs, produces, and markets clothing,
leather goods, footwear, and accessories. It also produces and
distributes fragrances, eyewear, timepieces, and jewels. The
company was incorporated in 1996 and is based in New York, New
York. Dolce & Gabbana USA Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Dolce &
Gabbana S.r.l.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
     Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (917) 299-6612
     Fax: (929) 575-4195
     Email: joseph@cml.legal



DUN & BRADSTREET: Witmer Balks at Merger Deal with CC Capital
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case, COLLEEN WITMER, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. THE DUN & BRADSTREET
CORPORATION, JAMES N. FERNANDEZ, CINDY CHRISTY, L. GORDON CROVITZ,
PAUL R. GARCIA, ANASTASSIA LAUTERBACH, RANDALL D. MOTT, and JUDITH
A. REINSDORF, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-01487-UNA (D. Del.
Sept. 25, 2018), stems from a proposed transaction announced on
August 8, 2018, pursuant to which The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation
will be acquired by an investor group led by CC Capital, Cannae
Holdings, and funds affiliated with Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P.
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated Sections 14(a)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with
a proxy statement related to the deal.

On August 8, 2018, Dun & Bradstreet's Board of Directors caused the
Company to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with Star
Parent, L.P. and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Star Merger Sub, Inc.
Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, if the Proposed
Transaction is approved by Dun & Bradstreet's shareholders and
completed, Dun & Bradstreet's stockholders will receive $145.00 in
cash for each share of the Dun & Bradstreet common stock they
hold.

According to the complaint, on September 12, 2018, the Defendants
filed a preliminary proxy statement with the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with the Proposed
Transaction. The Proxy Statement omits material information with
respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders the Proxy
Statement false and misleading. Since 1841, companies of every size
rely on Dun & Bradstreet to help them manage risk and reveal
opportunity. The Defendants filed the Proxy Statement with the SEC
in connection with the Proposed Transaction. The Proxy Statement
omits material information with respect to the Proposed
Transaction. The Proxy Statement omits material information
regarding the Company's financial projections as well as the
analyses performed by the Company's financial advisor in connection
with the Proposed Transaction, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC. With
respect to the Company's financial projections, the Proxy Statement
fails to disclose, for all cases of projections: (i) all line items
used to calculate Core EBITDA; (ii) all line items used to
calculate unlevered free cash flow; and (iii) a reconciliation of
all non-GAAP to GAAP metrics.

With respect to J.P. Morgan's Discounted Cash Flow Analysis, the
lawsuit contends that the Proxy Statement fails to disclose: (i)
all line items used to calculate unlevered free cash flow; (ii) the
range of terminal values of the Company; (iii) the inputs and
assumptions underlying the range of discount rates ranging from
8.25% to 8.75% and the perpetual revenue growth rate ranging from
1.50% to 2.00%; (iv) the Company's net debt and minority interest;
and (v) estimated after-tax pension underfunding. The disclosure of
projected financial information is material because it provides
stockholders with a basis to project the future financial
performance of a company, and allows stockholders to better
understand the financial analyses performed by the company's
financial advisor in support of its fairness opinion. Moreover,
when a banker's endorsement of the fairness of a transaction is
touted to shareholders, the valuation methods used to arrive at
that opinion as well as the key inputs and range of ultimate values
generated by those analyses must also be fairly  The omission of
the above-referenced material information renders the Proxy
Statement false and misleading, including, inter alia, the
following sections of the Proxy Statement: (i) Background of the
Merger; (ii) Recommendation of the Board and Reasons for the
Merger; (iii) Opinion of D&B's Financial Advisor; and (iv) Certain
Unaudited Prospective Financial Information. The omitted
information, if disclosed, would significantly alter the total mix
of information available to the Company's stockholders, the lawsuit
says.

Dun & Bradstreet provides commercial data and analytics.  The
Company gleans insight from data to enable its customers to connect
with prospects, suppliers, clients, and partner.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
          E-mail: rm@maniskas.com

               - and -

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com


ESPARZA ENTERPRISES: Faces Mayen Class Action in Cal. Super. Ct.
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Esparza Enterprises.
The case is styled as Julio Mayen, an individual, on his own behalf
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Esparza Enterprises, Inc. a California corporation, Defendant, Case
No. BCV-18-102526 (Cal. Super. Ct., Kern Cty., Oct. 4, 2018).

Esparza Enterprises, Inc. provides staffing services. The Company
offers employment services in agricultural labor, warehouse,
industrial, and dairy sectors. Esparza Enterprises conducts its
business in the State of California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Kevin A. Lipeles, Esq.
     Lipeles Law Group, APC
     880 Apollo St Ste 336
     El Segundo, CA 90245-4783
     Phone: (310) 322-2211
     Fax: (310) 322-2252
     Email: kevin@kallaw.com



F.H. CANN: Lazarao Files FDCPA Suit in New Jersey
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against F.H. Cann &
Associates, Inc. The case is styled as Cintron Lazarao individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. F.H.
Cann & Associates, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-14764 (D.
N.J., Oct. 9, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

F.H. Cann and Associates Inc., a receivables management company,
provides account receivables and debt collection services. The
company was founded in 1999 and is based in North Andover,
Massachusetts.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


FIRST OHIO: Judgment in Mortgage Broker Act Suit Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth District, Lorain County, issued
a Decision and Entry affirming the Trial Court’s judgment
rendering Final and Appealable the Judgment Entry in the case
captioned LYNN A. STRICKLER, et al., Appellees, v. FIRST OHIO BANC
& LENDING, INC., et al., Appellants. C.A. No. 17CA011117. (Ohio
App.)

Defendant-Appellant, First Ohio Banc & Lending, Inc. (First Ohio),
appeals all trial court decisions rendered final and appealable by
virtue of the judgment entry of the Lorain County Court of Common
Pleas.

Plaintiff-Appellees, Lynn Strickler and Keith Krese commenced this
action. The lengthy and complex procedural history involves
individual and class action claims against First Ohio and other
named Defendants. Relevant to this appeal is the class action claim
alleging First Ohio's violation of the Ohio Mortgage Broker Act and
the judgment entered thereon.

First Ohio moved the trial court to decertify the class. First Ohio
argued that decertification was necessary in light of the Supreme
Court of Ohio's decisions in Stammco, and a subsequently decided
case: Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 145 Ohio St.3d 329,
2015-Ohio-3430. The trial court determined that decertification was
unnecessary and issued a journal entry denying the motion.

First Ohio again appealed, contending the trial court erred when it
denied its motion to decertify.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the class, judgment
entry. First Ohio timely filed this current appeal, raising two
assignments of error for Court’s review.

Assignment of Error I

The trial court erred in certifying the class and/or in failing to
decertify the class based on the plaintiffs' failure to establish
the existence of an injury caused by a violation as mandated under
R.C. 1322.11.

In the first assignment of error, First Ohio seeks to revisit the
issue of class certification. In its merit brief, First Ohio
vaguely framed the argument assigning error, and omitted any
mention of the appropriate standard of review. First Ohio does not
clearly identify the assigned errors in the record, but seems to
assume that the trial court's order certifying the class, and our
decision in Strickler v. First Ohio Banc & Lending, Inc., 9th Dist.
Lorain No. 15CA010893, 2016-Ohio-5876 (Strickler III).affirming
certification, are subject to reconsideration in this appeal.

Certification of the Class

The Court affirmed the trial court's decision to grant the motion
to certify the class action in Strickler II. When the trial court
renders a decision on a particular issue, and that decision is both
final and appealable, then following such appeal or waiver of
appeal, the aggrieved party is precluded from resubmitting this
same issue to the trial court in an effort to obtain a different
result.

First Ohio has not specifically addressed the issue or argued any
foundation for disregarding the law of the case doctrine to
reexamine our prior decision in Strickler II. The Court concludes
that, because this Court has already reviewed and affirmed the
trial court's initial certification of the class, neither the trial
court's initial decision nor our affirmance thereof are the proper
subject of review in this appeal. However, subsequent to our
affirmance of the class certification, First Ohio prompted
reconsideration of the issue in the trial court when it filed its
motion to decertify, which the trial court ultimately rejected.
Therefore, the Court’s review is limited to a determination of
whether the trial court erred in declining to decertify the class.

Motion to Decertify

First Ohio's arguments in support of its motion to decertify the
class were premised upon First Ohio's contention that Strickler and
Krese had not established the existence of any actual injury'
necessary to participate in a class action under R.C. 1322.11.
Despite this argument having been previously rejected by the trial
court upon certifying the class and by this Court affirming
certification, First Ohio argued that the new controlling case law
in the Stammco and Felix decisions supported its position that the
loss of information under R.C. 1322.062 is not sufficient injury to
participate in the statutory remedy of R.C. 1322.11. See Stammco,
136 Ohio St.3d 231 (decided July 16, 2013), and Felix, 145 Ohio
St.3d 329 (decided August 27, 2015).

The Stammco decision did not alter the existing law or impose any
new obligation regarding the trial court's review of the merits of
the underlying claim to certify a class rather it clarified that
trial courts are not prohibited from undertaking such a review to
the extent necessary to make a Civ.R. 23 determination. In the case
at bar, there was no discernable issue involving the trial court
exceeding the permissible bounds of inquiry to consider the merits
of the claim in deciding the issue of certification.

Therefore, the Court concludes that First Ohio's reliance on
Stammco as an intervening decision is misplaced, and the trial
court did not err in declining to decertify the Class in light of
its holding.

Because the Court have determined that the law of the case doctrine
applied without exception, the Court further concludes that the
trial court did not err in denying the motion to decertify.

First Ohio's first assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error II

In this assignment of error, First Ohio cites a non-existent
subsection of former R.C. 1322.11 to contend that the trial court
erred by finding the printed fee calculation statement in a
disclosure form deficient.  

First Ohio asserts that the deficiency identified by the trial
court in support of class certification was premised on the printed
fee calculation' statement on First Ohio forms. First Ohio mentions
forms F0000349, F0000351, and F0000353 but does not clarify the
relevance of these three particular forms, and fails to indicate
where such forms may be located in the record.

Presumably in reference to those forms, First Ohio states: this
language came verbatim from that as contained on the state exemplar
form. Unfortunately, First Ohio fails to identify the actual
language at issue in the forms, and further neglects to specify
what language from the state exemplar form it seeks to compare to
the language in its own forms.

First Ohio has failed to comply with App.R. 16(A)(6), which
requires that First Ohio's brief include a statement of facts
relevant to the assignments of error presented for review, with
appropriate references to the record. Further, First Ohio's
woefully underdeveloped argument does not accurately relate to the
assigned error and also fails to comport with App.R. 16(A)(7).

Pursuant to that rule, an appellant's brief must include an
argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect
to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in
support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies.

First Ohio bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the
assigned error through a properly supported argument with citations
to legal authority and facts in the record, and it is not the
function of this court to construct an argument on First Ohio's
behalf. The Court concludes that First Ohio has not met this
burden; therefore, the Court is unable to determine whether the
trial court committed any reversible error. Pursuant to App.R.
12(A)(2) and App.R. 16(A), the  Court disregards this assignment of
error based on the deficiencies outlined above and the failure to
comply with the appellate rules.

First Ohio's second assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court of Appeals' September 24, 2018
Decision and Entry is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybgalew3
from Leagle.com.

CLIFFORD C. MASCH -- cmasch@reminger.com -- BRIAN D. SULLIVAN --
bsullivan@foxrothschild.com -- and ANTHONY CATANZARITE --
acatanzarite@reminger.com -- Attorneys at Law, for Appellant.

THOMAS R. THEADO, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.

JACK MALICKI, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.


FIRST STANDARD: Abante Rooter Suit Alleges TCPA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------
Abante Rooter and Plumbing, Inc., individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. First Standard Financial Company LLC
dba Standard Financing, and Does 1 through 10, Case No.
3:18-cv-05003 (N.D. Calif., August 16, 2018), is brought against
the Defendants for violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.

The Plaintiff is a corporation in the State of California, whose
principal place of business in the county of Alameda.

The Defendant is a financial services company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
      Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
      Meghan E. George, Esq.
      Tom E. Wheeler, Esq.
      LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
      21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
      Woodland Hills, CA 91367
      Tel: (877) 206-4741
      Fax: (866) 633-0228
      E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
              abacon@toddflaw.com
              mgeorge@toddflaw.com
              twheeler@toddflaw.com


FLAGSTAR BANCORP: Richardson Sues Over Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
Mark F. Richardson, Individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., and, Flagstar Bank FSB, Inc.,
Case No. 2:18-cv-01128-JLG-CMV (S.D. Ohio, September 27, 2018), is
brought for alleged unpaid minimum wages and unpaid overtime wages
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Ohio Constitution and the
Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act.

Flagstar Bancorp is a Michigan, for-profit, publicly traded
corporation with its principal place of business located in Troy,
Michigan.  FSB is a subsidiary of Flagstar Bancorp. also
headquartered in Troy.

Having assets of $17.7 billion, the Defendants offer full-service
banking and lending in 99 branches in Michigan and eight branches
in California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert E. DeRose, Esq.
          Jessica R. Doogan, Esq.
          BARKAN MEIZLISH HANDELMAN GOODIN DEROSE WENTZ, LLP
          250 E. Broad St., 10th Floor
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 221-4221
          Facsimile: (614) 744-2300
          E-mail: bderose@barkanmeizlish.com
                  jdoogan@barkanmeizlish.com


FOOTHILL TRANSIT: Gerlach Asserts Discrimination in Bus Services
----------------------------------------------------------------
RUTH GERLACH AND CAROL GERLACH, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated v. FOOTHILL TRANSIT, and DOES 1-10,
inclusive, Case No. 2:18-cv-08321 (C.D. Cal., September 26, 2018),
alleges that the Defendants discriminated against the Plaintiffs by
failing to ensure that individuals with mobility disabilities have
non-discriminatory and safe access to bus services.

Foothill Transit is a public entity governed by a Joint Powers
Authority of 22-member cities and the County of Los Angeles.
Foothill Transit operates a public bus network throughout Los
Angeles County.  The true names and capacities of the Doe
Defendants are currently unknown to the Plaintiffs.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          Thomas E. Wheeler, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard Street, Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                  twheeler@toddflaw.com


FREEDOM MORTGAGE: Chittick Suit Alleges RESPA Violation
-------------------------------------------------------
Stacy P. Chittick, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Freedom Mortgage Corporation and NYCB
Mortgage Company, LLC, Case No. 1:18-cv-01034 (E.D. Va., August 16,
2018), is brought against the Defendants for violation of the Real
Estate Settlement Procedure Act of 1974.

The Plaintiff, Stacy Chittick, is and was at all material times, a
resident of the Commonwealth of Virginia, residing at 108 Lake Cook
Dr., Alexandria VA 22304.

The Defendant Freedom Mortgage Corporation was the owner and
servicer of the mortgage and loan secured by the real property
located at 108 Lake Cook Dr., Alexandria VA 22304, after October
31, 2017 and during the time giving rise to this action. Freedom
Mortgage has a principal place of business in Mt. Laurel, New
Jersey and is incorporated in New Jersey.

The Defendant NYCB Mortgage Company, LLC was the mortgage lender
and servicer of the loan secured by the aforementioned real
property immediately prior to Freedom. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      John J. Beins, Esq.
      BEINS GOLDBERG LLP
      2 Wisconsin Circle, Suite 700
      Chevy Chase, MD 20815
      Tel: (240) 235-5040
      E-mail: jbeins@beinsgoldberg.com


FUSHIMI GROUP: Diaz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Fushimi Group LLC.
The case is styled as Edwin Diaz on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Fushimi Group LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-09251 (S.D. N.Y., Oct. 9, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Fushimi Group LLC is a restaurant that serves Japanese Cuisine. It
is located at 9316 4th Ave, Brooklyn, NY.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
     Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (917) 299-6612
     Fax: (929) 575-4195
     Email: joseph@cml.legal


GLOBAL TEL LINK: Kron Appeals Ruling in Lee Suit to 9th Circuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Objector Steve Kron filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit titled Alice Lee, et al. v. Global TelLink Corporation,
Case No. 2:15-cv-02495-ODW-PLA, in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Los Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the District
Court last year provisionally granted the motion for class
certification and preliminarily approved class settlement in the
case.

GTL will pay $8,800,000 into a common settlement fund.  Class
members, who submit a claim will receive a pro-rata share of the
balance of that amount -- after payment of notice and
administration costs, any Court-ordered award of attorneys' fees
and expenses, and any Court-ordered incentive award for the
Plaintiff.  Because the amount that class members will receive
depends on the number of claims submitted, the parties cannot
estimate with specificity the amount that members who submit claims
are likely to receive.  However, they conservatively estimate that
if the percentage of potential class members who submit claims is
in keeping with typical TCPA cases (roughly 5%), then each class
member will receive about $60.

In addition to the payment to class members who submit claims, GTL
will change its practices to include in all Notification Calls an
interactive-voice and/or keyactivated opt-out mechanism that the
called party may use to opt-out of all future Notification Calls.
The called party will also be provided with a toll-free number that
can be used to opt-out.  Finally, opting out is effective to block
all future calls, regardless of the number of times an inmate
attempts to call that number.

The appellate case is captioned as Alice Lee, et al. v. Global
TelLink Corporation, Case No. 18-56275, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by October 19, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on November 19, 2018;

   -- Appellant Steve Kron's opening brief is due on December 28,
      2018;

   -- Appellees Global TelLink Corporation, Alice Lee and David
      W. Martin's answering brief is due on January 28, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Objector-Appellant STEVE KRON is represented by:

          Caroline V. Tucker, Esq.
          TUCKER POLLARD
          2102 Business Center Drive
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (949) 253-5710
          E-mail: ctucker@tuckerpollard.com

Plaintiffs-Appellees ALICE LEE and DAVID W. MARTIN, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Patric Lester, Esq.
          PATRIC LESTER & ASSOCIATES
          5694 Mission Center Road, Suite 358
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Telephone: (619) 665-3888
          Facsimile: (314) 241-5777
          E-mail: pl@lesterlaw.com

               - and -

          Candice Renka, Esq.
          MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING
          10001 Park Run Drive
          Las Vegas, NV 89145
          Telephone: (702) 382-0711
          E-mail: crenka@maclaw.com

               - and -

          Brian Arnold Vogel, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF BRIAN A VOGEL PC
          770 County Square Drive
          Ventura, CA 93003
          Telephone: (805) 654-0400
          E-mail: brian@bvogel.com

Defendant-Appellee GLOBAL TELLINK CORPORATION is represented by:

          Tyler Ryan Andrews, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
          3161 Michelson Drive, Suite 1000
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (949) 732-6500
          E-mail: andrewst@gtlaw.com

               - and -

          Matthew Ryan Gershman, Esq.
          Robert James Herrington, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP
          1840 Century Park East, Suite 1900
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 586-7776
          E-mail: gershmanm@gtlaw.com
                  herringtonr@gtlaw.com


HEWITT CAPITAL: Perry Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. Indiana
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hewitt Capital LLC
under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The case is styled as Kayla Perry individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Hewitt Capital LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-03144-JMS-TAB (S.D. Ind., Oct. 9,
2018).

Hewitt Capital LLC is a financial company providing advanced
recovery solutions in the distressed receivables market. The
company is focused on all aspects of debt management, from accounts
receivable to contingency collections, debt recovery and call
center consulting.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Sanders Law, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: csanders@sanderslawpllc.com


ILKE INC: Does Not Pay Minimum and OT Wages, Sanchez Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE REYES FUENTES SANCHEZ, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated v. ILKE INC. (D/B/A CARNIVAL FRUIT &
VEGETABLES), ILKER KARAKAYA, RICHI DOE, VURAL DOE, and ERKAN DOE,
Case No. 1:18-cv-05437 (E.D.N.Y., September 27, 2018), accuses the
Defendants of requiring the Plaintiff and other employees to work
in excess of 40 hours per week without providing the minimum wage
and overtime compensation required by the Fair Labor Standards Act
and New York Labor Law.

ILKE Inc. is a domestic corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the state of New York.  The Individual Defendants serve
or served as owners, managers, principals, or agents of the
Defendant Corporation.

The Defendants owned, operated, or controlled a produce store,
located at 130 Church Ave, in Brooklyn, New York, under the name
"Carnival Fruit & Vegetables."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Michael@Faillacelaw.com


INVUITY INC: Hurtado Seeks to Enjoin Tender Offer by Stryker
------------------------------------------------------------
HERCULES HURTADO, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. INVUITY, INC., GREGORY T. LUCIER, SCOTT
FLORA, WILLIAM W. BURKE, RANDALL A. LIPPS, ERIC ROBERTS, and DANIEL
WOLTERMAN, Case No. 3:18-cv-05920-VC (N.D. Cal., September 26,
2018), seeks to enjoin the Defendants from closing the tender offer
by Stryker Corporation to acquire all of the issued and outstanding
shares of Invuity, unless and until certain material information is
disclosed to Invuity shareholders.

On September 10, 2018, Invuity entered into a definitive agreement
and plan of merger, whereby shareholders of Invuity common stock
will receive $7.40 in exchange for each share of Invuity stock they
own.

Invuity is a Delaware corporation and maintains its principal
executive office in San Francisco, California.  The Individual
Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.

Invuity is a medical technology company focused on developing and
marketing advanced surgical devices to improve the surgeon's
ability to perform minimal access surgery through smaller and
hidden incisions.

Stryker, incorporated on February 20, 1946, is a medical technology
company.  Stryker offers a range of medical technologies, including
orthopedic, medical and surgical, and neurotechnology and spine
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David E. Bower, Esq.
          MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
          600 Corporate Pointe, Suite 1170
          Culver City, CA 90230
          Telephone: (213) 446-6652
          Facsimile: (212) 202-7880
          E-mail: dbower@monteverdelaw.com

               - and -

          Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
          MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
          The Empire State Building
          350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4405
          New York, NY 10118
          Telephone: (212) 971-1341
          Facsimile: (212) 202-7880
          E-mail: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com


JETS STADIUM: 3rd Circuit Appeal Filed in Gengo Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff James T. Gengo filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
lawsuit styled James Gengo v. Jets Stadium Development, LLC, et
al., Case No. 2-18-cv-08012, in the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was removed from the Superior Court of the State of New Jersey,
Bergen County (Case No. BER-L-1955-18) to the District Court.

The Defendants in the case are Jets Stadium Development, LLC, and
New York Jets, LLC.  Jets Stadium operates the development,
financing, and marketing of professional football team New York
Jets.

New York Jets, LLC, owns a professional football team that
participates in the National Football League.  The Company offers
team management and training services, as well as operates a
training center.  The Company also markets match tickets and sports
merchandise.

The appellate case is captioned as James Gengo v. Jets Stadium
Development, LLC, et al., Case No. 18-3103, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant JAMES T. GENGO, Individually and on behalf of
all others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Jeffrey W. Herrmann, Esq.
          Alex A. Pisarevsky, Esq.
          COHN LIFLAND PEARLMAN HERRMANN & KNOPF LLP
          Park 80 West - Plaza One
          250 Pehle Avenue, Suite 401
          Saddle Brook, NJ 07663
          Telephone: (201) 845-9600
          E-mail: jwh@njlawfirm.com
                  ap@njlawfirm.com

Defendants-Appellees JETS STADIUM DEVELOPMENT LLC and NEW YORK JETS
LLC are represented by:

          Leah Kelman, Esq.
          Ronald J. Levine, Esq.
          HERRICK FEINSTEIN LLP
          One Gateway Center, 22nd Floor
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 274-2004
          E-mail: lkelman@herrick.com
                  rlevine@herrick.com

               - and -

          David R. King, Esq.
          HERRICK FEINSTEIN LLP
          2 Park Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (609) 452-3802
          E-mail: dking@herrick.com


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Hedrick Sues over Sale of Talcum Powder
----------------------------------------------------------
RAMONA J. HEDRICK, the Plaintiff, vs. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, a New
Jersey corporation doing business in California; JOHNSON & JOHNSON
CONSUMER INC. F/K/A JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER COMPANIES, INC., a
New Jersey corporation doing business in California; IMERYS TALC
AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of
business, the Defendants, Case No.: 18CV335040 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Sept. 24, 2018), contends that, despite the mounting scientific and
medical evidence regarding talc use and ovarian cancer development
over the past several decades, none of the warnings on the
Defendants' product labels or in other marketing materials informed
users, or similarly situated individuals, that use of the talcum
products in the genital area could lead to an increased risk of
ovarian cancer. For example, the only warnings on the Baby Powder
label are to "keep powder away from child's face to avoid
inhalation, which can cause breathing problems," and to "avoid
contact with eyes", the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Lee Cirsch, Esq.
          Michael Akselrud, Esq.
          THE LANIER LAW FIRM, PC
          21550 Oxnard Street, 3rd Floor
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (310) 277 5100
          Facsimile: (310) 277 5103
          E-mail: lee.cirsch@lanierlawfirm.com
                  michael.akselrud@lanierlawfirm.com



KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS: Sued for Misclassifying Field Agents
---------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
federal class action claims the Knights of Columbus, "a Catholic
fraternal society that sells billions of dollars of insurance to
Catholics across the nation," misclassifies its field agents as
independent contractors to cheat them of wages and benefits.


KORMAN COMMUNITIES: Bishop Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Korman Communities,
Inc. The case is styled as Cedric Bishop on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Korman Communities,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-09204 (S.D. N.Y., Oct. 8, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Korman Communities, Inc. engages in developing, managing, leasing,
and financing real estate properties in the eastern United States
and London. Its portfolio includes accommodations, furnished
residences and suites, mid-rise apartment buildings, and
garden-style apartments. The company also acquires and redevelops
high-rise buildings. The company was founded in 1909 and is based
in Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
     Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (917) 299-6612
     Fax: (929) 575-4195
     Email: joseph@cml.legal


LENDINGCLUB SECURITIES: Court OKs $16.4MM Attorney's Fees
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Lead Counsel's Motion for
Attorney's Fees and Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses in the
case captioned In re LENDINGCLUB SECURITIES LITIGATION. This
Document Relates to: ALL ACTIONS. Consolidated Nos. C 16-02627 WHA,
C 16-02670 WHA, C 16-03072 WHA. (N.D. Cal.).

Defendant LendingClub Corporation, which operated an online
peer-to-peer marketplace to match borrowers with lenders for
various loans, completed an initial public offering of its common
stock. However, numerous discrepancies, weaknesses, and
improprieties in LendingClub's business operations came to light,
causing its share price to drop and various securities rating
agencies to downgrade LendingClub.

After over a year of vigorous litigation, a prior order
preliminarily approved the proposed class settlement and approved
the parties' proposed mail notice to the class. That order also
advised that the requested attorney's fees was subject to reduction
at the final approval stage.

Counsel seek $16,384,087 in attorney's fees, comprising 13.1
percent of the total settlement fund, which would cover both
federal and state lead counsel fees and $456,084.63 in expenses,
plus interest on both amounts.

ATTORNEY'S FEES

A district court must ensure that attorney's fees are fair,
adequate, and reasonable, even if the parties have entered into a
settlement agreement that provides for those fees.  

As stated, lead counsel seeks $16,384,087 or 13.1 percent of the
gross settlement fund that would cover lead counsel's attorney's
fees in both federal and state actions. Counsel have agreed to
allocate 18 percent of the 13.1 total percent requested or 2.36
percent of the total recovery to co-lead counsel in the state
action and the balance to federal lead counsel.

Accepting this lodestar figure, the $16,384,087 requested fee
represents a multiplier of 1.32. The Court has probed counsel's
lodestar. To determine the reasonableness of the requested fee,
both state and federal lead counsel were ordered to submit a
detailed declaration, organized by discrete project, breaking down
all attorney and paralegal time sought to be recovered and an
itemized accounting for unreimbursed expenses.

In the judgment of the Court, the lodestar includes excessive and
hard-to-justify entries. As one nonexhaustive example, state lead
counsel spent 299.6 hours on class notice, which resulted in a
lodestar, merely for state lead counsel, of $208,534.50. This
equates to about 7.5 weeks worth of work by one competent attorney.
The class notice issues in this case, while atypical, did not
justify the hours spent by state lead counsel.

The motion for attorney's fees is granted.

EXPENSES

Lead counsel also request $456,084.63 (plus interest) in litigation
expenses: $277,841.84 for federal lead counsel and $178,242.79 for
state lead counsel. The requested amount includes, for example,
expert and consultant fees, court fees, travel and lodging costs,
legal research fees, and copying expenses. The largest component of
these expenses is the cost of lead counsel's experts. The second
largest component is the cost of transportation, hotels, and meals.
These expenses were a reasonable and necessary part of the
litigation and are of the type customarily billed to a fee-paying
client. No class member objected to recovery of these costs. The
motion for reimbursement of these costs is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 24, 2018 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yd72ve44 from Leagle.com.

Steeve Evellard, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz Grossman Hufford Dahlstrom &
Gross LLP, pro hac vice & Jennifer Pafiti -- jpafiti@pomlaw.com --
Pomerantz LLP.
Water and Power Employees' Retirement, Disability and Death Plan of
the City of Los Angeles, Plaintiff, represented by Carissa Jasmine
Dolan -- cdolan@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP,
Michael Albert  -- malbert@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and
Dowd LLP, Rachel Lynn Jensen -- rachelj@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Scott H. Saham -scotts@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Austin P. Brane --
abrane@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman Dowd LLP, Danielle
Suzanne Myers -- dmyers@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP, Darren Jay Robbins  -- sd@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman
& Dowd LLP, Jason A. Forge  -- jforge@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller
Rudman and Dowd LLP, Shawn A. Williams -- shawnw@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Theodore J. Pintar -:
TedP@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Thomas Harry
Peters -- thom.peters@lacity.org -- Los Angeles City Attorney's
Office.

LendingClub Corporation, Defendant, represented by David Michael
Grable -davegrable@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart
Sullivan LLP, Joseph Caldwell Sarles --
josephsarles@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Oliver and
Hedges,Beth A. Kaswan , ScottScott, Attorneys at Law, LLP, Diane M.
Doolittle -- dianedoolittle@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, John T. Jasnoch --
jjasnoch@scott-scott.com -- Scott+Scott Attorneys at Law LLP, John
Mark Potter  -- johnpotter@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Kyle Kenneth Batter --
kylebatter@gmail.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Sullivan, Mark
Cotton Molumphy  -- mmolumphy@cpmlegal.com -- Cotchett, Pitre &
McCarthy LLP, Robert Patrick Vance, Jr. --
bobbyvance@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan,
LLP, Sean Masson , Scott & Scott Attorneys At Law,Victoria Blohm
Parker -- vickiblohm@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart
Sullivan, LLP & William C. Fredericks --
wfredericks@scott-scott.com -- Scott and Scott Attorneys At Law.


LIFE TIME: Rodriguez Seeks to Recover Past-Due Wages Under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------------
GABRIEL RODRIGUEZ, and SARAH GIESMAN v. LIFE TIME FITNESS, INC., a
Minnesota corporation; LTF CLUB MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, a Delaware
Limited Liability Company; and LTF CLUB OPERATIONS COMPANY, INC., a
Minnesota corporation; and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, Case No.
2:18-cv-01123-ALM-CMV (S.D. Ohio, September 26, 2018), is brought
on behalf of the Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated
accusing the Defendants of violating the Fair Labor Standards Act
and Ohio labor laws.

The Plaintiffs bring the lawsuit as a collective action seeking
alleged past-due wages and an equivalent amount in liquidated
damages for putative class members, who opt-in.

Life Time Fitness, Inc., is a Minnesota corporation.  LTF Club
Management Company, LLC, is a Delaware Limited Liability Company.
LTF Club Operations Company, Inc., is also a Minnesota corporation.
The Defendants' corporate headquarter is located in Chanhassen,
Minnesota.

Life Time owns and operates fitness centers throughout the United
States and employed the Plaintiffs and thousands of other Personal
Trainers.  The true names and capacities of the Doe Defendants are
unknown to the Plaintiffs.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael L. Fradin, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL L. FRADIN
          8401 Crawford Ave., Suite 104
          Skokie, IL 60076
          Telephone: (847) 986-5889
          Facsimile: (847) 673-1228
          E-mail: mike@fradinlaw.com

               - and -

          Brian D. Chase, Esq.
          Jerusalem F. Beligan, Esq.
          BISNAR CHASE LLP
          1301 Dove Street, Suite 120
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 752-2999
          Facsimile: (949) 752-2777
          E-mail: bchase@bisnarchase.com
                  jbeligan@bisnarchase.com


LOANDEPOT.COM: Faces Diaz ADA Suit in New York
----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against LoanDepot.com, LLC.
The case is styled as Edwin Diaz on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. LoanDepot.com, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-09252 (S.D. N.Y., Oct. 9, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

LoanDepot.com, LLC focuses on originating, financing, and selling
of mortgage loans secured by residential real estate. The company
is based in Foothill Ranch, California. loanDepot.com, LLC operates
as a subsidiary of Loandepot Holdings, LLC.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
     Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (917) 299-6612
     Fax: (929) 575-4195
     Email: joseph@cml.legal


LOS ANGELES, CA: Court Denied without Prejudice Class Cert. Bid
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action styled Leonardo Gonzalez-Tzita, the Plaintiff
v. City of Los Angeles, et al., the Defendants, Case No.
2:16-cv-00194-FMO-E (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2018), the Hon. Judge
Fernando M. Olguin entered an order on September 25, 2018:

     1. denying without prejudice Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification and preliminary approval of class settlement;

     2. directing Plaintiffs to file a second revised motion for
class certification and preliminary approval of settlement
agreement no later than October 10, 2018; and

     3. advising Plaintiffs that the court will not consider the
Motion unless it includes discussion and evidentiary support, where
appropriate.

According to the Civil Minutes, failure to file the motion for
preliminary approval by the deadline set by the court shall result
in dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute and/or to comply
with a court order.

The Court said the motion is deficient in several ways, and does
not comply with the Court's Order of December 4, 2017, which set
forth the court's requirements for preliminary approval or the
Court's Order of August 22, 2018, which denied plaintiffs' first
motion for preliminary approval for its various deficiencies.
Previously, the section on the class notice was one sentence long,
which is substantially shorter than even the court's instructions
on what is required to demonstrate the adequacy of the class
notice. Now, there is no section on class notice in the memorandum
of points and authorities. The Motion is also not accompanied by
any "declarations from proposed class representatives as to the
adequacy of their representation of the class" as the Court's
Orders of December 4, 2017, and August 22, 2018, both require.
Counsel is advised that the court raises only the most egregious
deficiencies with the Motion. Counsel shall carefully review all of
the court's requirements set forth in this Order and its previous
orders, and file a renewed motion.[CC]


LYFT: Drivers' Class Action Settlement Gets Final Court Okay
------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that a
federal judge granted final approval on Sept. 26 to a $2 million
class-action settlement for drivers who claimed Lyft took portions
of prime-time ride fees from them, despite promising that drivers
would receive 100 percent of the fees.


MANAGEMENT & TRAINING: Mendoza Suit Moved to S.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------
Josue Mendoza, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly
situated individuals, and the general public, the Plaintiff, v.
Management & Training Corporation, and Does 1 to 100, inclusive,
the Defendants, Case No. 37-02018-00038572-CU-OE-CTL, was removed
from the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San
Diego, to the Southern District of California (San Diego) on Sept.
24, 2018. The Southern District of California Court Clerk assigned
Case No. 3:18-cv-02181-DMS-BLM to the proceeding. The suit alleges
labor related violation. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge
Dana M. Sabraw.

MTC is a contractor that manages private prisons and United States
Job Corps centers. Based in Centerville, Utah MTC's core businesses
are corrections, education & training, MTC medical, and economic &
social development. MTC operates 24 correctional facilities in
eight states.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Theodore R. Tang, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT STARR
          23901 Calabasas Rd. No. 2072
          Calabasas, CA 91302
          Telephone: (818) 225 9040
          Facsimile: (818) 225 9042
          E-mail: theodore@starrlaw.com

Attorneys for Management & Training Corporation:

          Shireen Yvette Wetmore, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
          560 Mission Street, Suite 3100
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 397 2823
          Facsimile: (415) 397 8549
          E-mail: swetmore@seyfarth.com

MANHATTAN PHYSICIANS: Bishop Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Manhattan Physicians
Laboratories I, Inc. The case is styled as Cedric Bishop on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Manhattan Physicians Laboratories I, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-09205 (S.D. N.Y., Oct. 8, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Manhattan Physicians Laboratories, LLC operates as a clinical
laboratory in New York. It offers urine, blood, stool/occult blood,
and cadmium tests; O&P and stool culture; vitamin B6 and C, and
chromium; and citric acid 24 HR urine/creatnine tests. The company
also offers C-DIFF and adenovirus; esoteric; and copper and
copper/RBC; and STAT tests. Manhattan Physicians Laboratories, LLC
was founded in 2008 and is based in New York, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


MARSHALLS OF CA: Rodriguez Suit Asserts Labor Law Violations
------------------------------------------------------------
Alicia Rodriguez, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. Marshalls of CA, LLC, and Does 1 through 10, Case No.
5:18-cv-01716 (C.D. Calif., August 16, 2018), is brought against
the Defendants violation of California's Unfair Competition Act.

This is a California state-wide class action for gender
discrimination and wage and labor violations arising out of, among
other things, the Defendant's policy and practice of conducting
security checks anytime its employees leave a store with a purse or
bag, without providing compensation for that time. This practice
disproportionately affects Defendant's female employees, as they
carry purses or bags in significantly greater frequency than
Defendant's male employees.

The Plaintiff has worked for the Defendant or its affiliates in
various non-exempt positions for approximately 17 years, and is
currently employed as a stockroom coordinator at Defendant's
Ontario, California store at the Ontario Mills Mall.

The Defendant operates a chain of retail department stores
throughout California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joshua H. Haffner, Esq.
      Benson E. Garrett, Esq.
      Graham G. Lambert, Esq.
      HAFFNER LAW PC
      445 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2325
      Los Angeles, CA 90071
      Tel: (213) 514-5681
      Fax: (213) 514-5682
      E-mail: jhh@haffnerlawyers.com
              benson@haffnerlawyers.com
              gl@haffnerlawyers.com


MAXIMUS INC: 4th Cir. Appeal Filed in Steamfitters Securities Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Lead Plaintiff Amalgamated Bank filed an appeal from a court ruling
in the lawsuit entitled IN RE MAXIMUS, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION,
Case No. 1:17-cv-00884-AJT-IDD, in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia at Alexandria.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sept. 7, 2018, the Hon.
Anthony J. Trenga granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss, with
prejudice, the amended complaint in the case.  The Court held that
the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to support
the Plaintiffs' claims under Sections 10(b) or 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  The Amended Complaint is
dismissed.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants made a variety of
materially false and misleading statements, or failed to disclose
material information, concerning the status of the Company's Health
Assessment Advisory Service project for the U.K. Department for
Work and Pensions from the period of October 20, 2014 through
February 3, 2016, and seeks damages to be proved at trial.

The appellate case is captioned as Amalgamated Bank v. Maximus,
Inc., Case No. 18-2127, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant AMALGAMATED BANK, as Trustee for the LongView
Collective Investment Funds, is represented by:

          Harvey B. Cohen, Esq.
          MILES & STOCKBRIDGE, PC
          1751 Pinnacle Drive
          Tysons Corner, VA 22102-3833
          Telephone: (703) 610-8655
          Facsimile: (703) 548-3181
          E-mail: hcohen@milesstockbridge.com

               - and -

          Stacey Rose Harris, Esq.
          DIMURO GINSBERG, PC
          1101 King Street
          Alexandria, VA 22314-2956
          Telephone: (703) 684-4333
          Facsimile: (703) 548-3181
          E-mail: sharris@dimuro.com

Defendants-Appellees MAXIMUS, INCORPORATED, RICHARD MONTONI,
RICHARD NADEAU and BRUCE CASWELL are represented by:

          Brooks Holton Spears, Esq.
          John David Wilburn, Esq.
          MCGUIREWOODS, LLP
          1750 Tysons Boulevard
          Tysons Corner, VA 22102-3915
          Telephone: (703) 712-5073
          E-mail: bspears@mcguirewoods.com
                  jwilburn@mcguirewoods.com


MIDLAND CREDIT: 3rd Cir. Flips Dismissal of Schultz FDCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, issued an
Opinion reversing the District Court's judgment granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned Robert A. Schultz,
Jr.; Donna Schultz, on behalf of themselves and those similarly
situated, Appellants, v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC.; JOHN DOES
1-10. Case No. 17-2244. (3rd Cir.).

The question before the Court in this matter is whether a statement
in a debt collection letter to the effect that forgiveness of the
debt may be reported to the Internal Revenue Service constitutes a
violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).

Midland sent letters to Robert Schultz, Jr., attempting to collect
three separate outstanding debts that had been outsourced to
Midland for collection after Robert had defaulted on them. Midland
sent Donna Schultz separate letters likewise attempting to collect
a separate outstanding debt from her. None of the Schultzes debts
exceeded $600. Each letter offered to settle the amount of
indebtedness for less than the full amount owing. The Schultzes
filed a putative class action complaint on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated asserting violations of the FDCPA.

Midland moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss on
the ground that the Schultzes failed to plead a plausible violation
of the FDCPA. The District Court granted Midland's motion,
concluding that the Schultzes indeed failed to plausibly allege a
violation of the FDCPA because the language set forth in the
dunning letters was not deceptive or otherwise violative of the
FDCPA.

The portion of the FDCPA relevant here, Section 1692e, states that
a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of any
debt. The section goes on to describe the following as violations
of the FDCPA:

The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that
is not intended to be taken.

The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect
or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning
a consumer.

On appeal, the Schultzes argue that by including the language, the
Court will report forgiveness of debt as required by IRS
regulations, Midland presented a false or misleading view of the
law one designed to scare or intimidate the Schultzes into paying
the outstanding debts listed on the debt collection letters even
though Midland knew that any discharge of the Schultzes' debt would
not result in a report to the IRS.

The Court agrees.

Here, the reporting requirement under the Internal Revenue Code is
wholly inapplicable to the Schultzes' debts because none of them
totaled $600 or more, and IRS regulations clearly state that only
discharges of debt of $600 or more must be included on a Form
1099-C and filed with the IRS. By including the reporting language
on collection letters addressing debts of less than $600, we
believe that the least sophisticated debtor might be persuaded into
thinking that the discharge of any portion of their debt,
regardless of amount discharged, may be reportable.

Midland argues that if the Court was to adopt the Schultzes'
interpretation of the language contained in the letters, the Court
would essentially give credence to a bizarre or idiosyncratic
interpretation of the letters, which does not preserve a quotient
of reasonableness and a basic level of understanding and
willingness to read with care.

For Midland, the use of the conditional might should signal to the
least sophisticated debtor that only under certain circumstances
will reporting occur. The problem with this argument, however, is
that, for the Schultzes, under no set of circumstances will
reporting ever occur. As we held in Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464
F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2006)., even if the language in a letter is
true, it can still be deceptive where it can be reasonably read to
have two or more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate.
And the facts here are not so different than those in Brown, such
that our holding here should be different. In Brown, a debt
collector suggested that if a debtor did not pay her outstanding
debt within five days it could result in a lawsuit against her.  

While the debt collector had the authority to bring such a suit,
because five days passed and it failed to do so and rarely had done
so in the past, the threat of legal action was considered deceptive
in violation of the FDCPA.   

While the Court recognizes that Midland, like many debt collection
companies, uses form letters when contacting its debtors, we must
reinforce that convenience does not excuse a potential violation of
the FDCPA. The Court therefore are obligated to reverse the order
of the District Court granting Midland's motion to dismiss, as a
reasonable juror may find a violation of the FDCPA in this
instance.

The Court will reverse the May 8, 2017, Order of the District Court
as the Court finds that the Schultzes have pled sufficient factual
allegations that state a plausible claim upon which a court may
grant relief under the FDCPA. The Court will therefore remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A full-text copy of the Third Circuit's September 24, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9guje3w from Leagle.com.

Cary L. Flitter, Esq., Andrew M. Milz, Esq., [ARGUED], Flitter
Milz, Yongmoon Kim, Esq., Kim Law Firm, Counsel for
Plaintiffs-Appellants Robert A. Schultz, Jr. and Donna Schultz

Han Sheng Beh, Esq., Ellen B. Silverman, Esq., Hinshaw &
Culbertson, Joel D. Bertocchi, Esq., David M. Schultz, Esq.,
[ARGUED], Hinshaw & Culbertson, Counsel for Defendant-Appellee
Midland Credit Management, Inc.


MILTAN  MANAGEMENT: Faces Bishop ADA Suit in New York
-----------------------------------------------------
Miltan Management Corporation is facing a class action lawsuit in
New York.

The case is styled as Cedric Bishop on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Miltan Management
Corporation doing business as: Helen Mills, Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-09203-ALC (S.D. N.Y., Oct. 8, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Miltan Management Corporation is a privately held company in New
York, NY and is a Single Location business. It is located at 135
West 26th Street # 4c, New York, NY 10001.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph H Mizrahi, Esq.
     Cohen & Mizrahi LLP
     300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
     Brooklyn, NY 11201
     Phone: (917) 299-6612
     Fax: (929) 575-4195
     Email: joseph@cml.legal


MONSANTO COMPANY: Awads Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
----------------------------------------------------------
VICKIE L. AWAD and SAMIR AWAD, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY,
the Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01627 (E.D. Mo., Sept. 25, 2018),
seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The
Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup,
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Dotson Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------------
BRENDA DOTSON, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant,
Case No. 4:18-cv-01624  (E.D. Mo., Sept. 25, 2018), seeks to
recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use.  The
Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup,
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Elfers Sue over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-----------------------------------------------------------
VICTORIA ELFER and WARREN ELFER, the Plaintiffs, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01628-PLC (E.D. Mo., Sept.
25, 2018), seeks to recover damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a
direct and proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and
wrongful conduct in connection with the design, development,
manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising,
distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM),
containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiffs maintain that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The
Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiffs bring this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup,
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Johnson Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
-------------------------------------------------------------
DEAN C. JOHNSON,, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01616 (E.D. Mo., Sept. 24, 2018), seeks
to recover damages suffered by Plaintiff as a direct and proximate
result of Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection
with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff maintains that Roundup
(TM) and/or glyphosate is defective, dangerous to human health,
unfit and unsuitable to be marketed and sold in commerce, and
lacked proper warnings and directions as to the dangers associated
with its use. The Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking
thousands of similarly situated victims across the country, were
avoidable.

"Roundup" refers to all formulations of Defendant Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, and Roundup Prodry Herbicide.

Monsanto Company, together with its subsidiaries, provides
agricultural products for farmers worldwide. It operates in two
segments, Seeds and Genomics, and Agricultural Productivity.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359


MONSANTO COMPANY: Rice Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
----------------------------------------------------------
ROSE M. RICE, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the Defendant,
Case No. 4:18-cv-01625 (E.D. Mo., Sept. 25, 2018), seeks to recover
damages suffered by the Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result
of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in connection
with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution, labeling, and/or
sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the active
ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The
Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup,
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Shorr Wants Damages From Roundup-Related Injury
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JACK SHORR v. MONSANTO COMPANY, Case No. 4:18-cv-01641 (E.D. Mo.,
September 27, 2018), is an action for damages allegedly suffered by
the Plaintiff as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's
negligent and wrongful conduct in connection with the design,
development, manufacture, testing, packaging, promoting, marketing,
advertising, distribution, labeling and sale of the herbicide
Roundup(R), containing the active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup(R) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use.

Monsanto Company is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters
and principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri.  Monsanto
was the entity that discovered the herbicidal properties of
glyphosate and the manufacturer of Roundup(R).

Monsanto is a multinational agricultural biotechnology corporation
and is the world's leading producer of glyphosate.  As of 2009,
Monsanto was the world's leading producer of seeds, accounting for
27% of the world seed market.  The majority of these seeds are of
the Roundup Ready(R) brand.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          D. Todd Mathews, Esq.
          Joseph B. Carnduff, Esq.
          GORI JULIAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          156 N. Main St.
          Edwardsville, IL 62025
          Telephone: (618) 659-9833
          Facsimile: (618) 659-9834
          E-mail: todd@gorijulianlaw.com
                  jcarnduff@gorijulianlaw.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Walker Sues over Sale of Herbicide Roundup
------------------------------------------------------------
GOVERNOR AND SONDA WALKER, the Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, the
Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01626 (E.D. Mo., Sept. 25, 2018), seeks
to recover damages suffered by Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate
result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup (TM), containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup (TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use.  The
Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable.

The Plaintiff brings this action for personal injuries sustained by
exposure to Roundup (TM), which contains the active ingredient
glyphosate and the surfactant polyethoxylated tallow amine (POEA).
As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to Roundup, the
Plaintiff developed diffuse Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.

Roundup refers to all formulations of Defendant's Roundup products,
including, but not limited to, Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and
Tough Brush Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak
Herbicide, Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide,
Roundup Fence & Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass
Killer, Roundup Grass and Weed Killer, Roundup Herbicide, Roundup
Original 2k Herbicide, Roundup Original II Herbicide, Roundup Pro
Concentrate, Roundup Pro Dry Herbicide, and Roundup Promax.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


NAVIENT SOLUTIONS: Nov. 30 Settlement Opt-Out Deadline Set
----------------------------------------------------------
Denise Baker v. Navient Solutions, LLC., Case No: 1:17-cv-1160
(LMB/JFA)

Why is this notice available?

This is a notice of a proposed settlement in a class action
lawsuit.  The settlement would resolve the lawsuit, which Denise
Baker ("Baker") filed against NSL.  Please read this notice
carefully.  It explains the lawsuit, the settlement and your legal
rights, including the process for receiving a settlement check,
excluding yourself from the settlement or objecting to the
settlement.

What is this lawsuit about?

Baker filed this lawsuit on October 16, 2017.  Baker was listed as
a credit reference a borrowers student loan application, and NSL
subsequently called her cellular telephone, using a dialing process
that it contends is manual, in connection with efforts to locate
that borrower.  Baker alleges that NSL violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C. Sec. 227, et seq., in
making these calls because the dialing technology constitutes an
automatic telephone dialing system, within the meaning of the TCPA,
and NSL did not have the requisite prior express consent to call
her.  The parties have agreed to a settlement.

Why is this a class action?

In a class action, one or more people called "class
representatives" file a lawsuit on behalf of people who have
similar claims.  All of these people together are a "class" or
"class members."  The Court accordingly resolves claims for all
class members, except for those who exclude themselves from the
class.

Why is there a settlement?

Baker, on the one hand, and NSL, on the other, have agreed to
settle the lawsuit to avoid the time, risk and expense associated
with it, and to achieve a final resolution of the disputed claims.
Under the settlement, participating class members will obtain a
payment in settlement of the claims raised in the lawsuit.  Baker
and her attorneys think the settlement is best for all class
members.

How do you know if your claims are included in the settlement?

The class covers calls made from October 16, 2013 to July 3, 2018
and is defined as: Each person throughout the United States who
was: (1) listed as a credit reference on a student loan
application; and (2) called by NSL on a cellular telephone number
using dialing technology manufactured and/or licensed by
Interactive Intelligence.  Excluded from the class definition are:
(1) persons who were listed as credit references on student loan
applications and who also have student loans serviced by NSL; (2)
persons or entities included within the class defined in the Final
Approval Order (Dkt. # 177) in Johnson v Navient Solutions, Inc.,
Case No.: 1:15-cv-0716 (S.D. Ind.); and (3) any employees, officers
or directors of NSL, any attorneys appearing in this case and any
judge assigned to hear this action.

What does the settlement provide?

NSL will establish a settlement fund in the amount of $2,500,000.
Out of the settlement fund, NSL will pay:

A. Settlement compensation to the class members;
B. The costs and expenses of administrating the class action
settlement;
C. An award of attorneys' fees in an amount up to one-third of the
settlement fund, or $833,333, subject to the Court's approval;
D. Costs and expenses incurred litigating this matter, not to
exceed $35,000, subject to the Court's approval; and
E. A service award to Baker in an amount up to $15,000, subject to
the Court's approval.

Each class member who submits a timely and valid claim form will be
entitled, subject to the provisions of the settlement agreement, to
his or her equal share of the settlement fund as it exists after
deducting: the costs and expenses of administrating the settlement;
the attorneys' fees, subject to the Court's approval; the costs and
expenses of the litigation, subject to the Court's approval; and
the service award for Baker, subject to the Court's approval.  How
much each class member receives depends on how many people make
approved claims.  Plaintiff estimates that the amount of the cash
award may be $50.00.  Any remaining monies from uncashed settlement
awards may be redistributed in a second distribution to class
members who submitted valid and timely claims.  However, if a
second distribution would result in less than $5 per qualifying
claimant, the remaining monies will instead be donated to the
National Endowment for Financial Education.  In the event a second
distribution is made, any remaining monies from uncashed second
distribution settlement checks will also be donated to the National
Endowment for Financial Education.

How can you get a payment?

You must submit a valid claim form by November 30, 2018.  You can
file online at https://bakertcpasettlement.com/File-a-Claim.  Or
you can mail your claim form to the Baker Settlement Administrator
Postmarked by November 30, 2018.  

         Baker Settlement Administrator
         PO Box 44
         Minneapolis, MN 55440-0044

If you did not receive a post card claim form in the mail.  You can
download the claim form at https://is.gd/kU1Eay.  Complete and mail
to the Baker Settlement Administrator.

When will you be paid?

If the Court grants final approval of the settlement, settlement
checks will be mailed to class members who timely mailed or
submitted valid claim forms no later than 30 days after the
judgment in the lawsuit becomes final.  If there is an appeal of
the settlement, payment may be delayed.

What rights are you giving up in this settlement?

Unless you exclude yourself from the settlement, you will be
considered a member of the class, which means you give up your
right to sue or continue a lawsuit against NSL over the released
claims.  Giving up your legal claims is called a release. Unless
you formally exclude yourself from the settlement, you will release
your claims against NSL.  For more information on the release,
released parties and released claims, you may obtain a copy of the
class action settlement agreement from the settlement
administrator, at 1-866-404-0137, or visit
https://bakertcpasettlement.com/Documents

How can you exclude yourself from the settlement?

You may exclude yourself from the settlement, in which case you
will not receive a payment.  If you wish to exclude yourself from
the settlement, you must mail a written request for exclusion to
the settlement administrator, at the addresses set forth below,
postmarked by November 30, 2018.  You must include in your request
for exclusion your:

A. Full name
B. Address
C. Telephone number called by NSL; and
D. A clear and unambiguous statement that you wish to be excluded
from the settlement, such as "I/we request to be excluded from the
settlement in the Baker action."

You must sign the request personally.  If any person signs on your
behalf, that person must attach a copy of a power of attorney or
other official document authorizing that signature.

When and where will the Court decide whether to approve the
settlement?

The Court will hold a final fairness hearing on February 8, 2019,
at 10:00 a.m.  The hearing will take place in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 401 Courthouse
Square, Alexandria, VA 22314, before the Honorable Leonie M.
Brinkema.  At the final fairness hearing, the Court will consider
whether the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate and, if so,
whether final approval of the settlement should be granted.  The
Court will hear objections to the settlement, if any.  The Court
may make a decision at that time, postpone a decision or continue
the hearing.

Do you have to attend the hearing?

No. You are not required to attend the hearing. But you are welcome
to attend the hearing at your own expense. You cannot speak at the
hearing if you have excluded yourself from the class settlement.
Once you have excluded yourself, the class settlement does not
affect your legal rights.

What if you want to object to the settlement?

If you do not exclude yourself from the settlement, you can object
to the settlement if you do not believe it is fair, reasonable and
adequate.  If you wish to object, you must mail a written notice of
objection, postmarked by November 30, 2018, to class counsel, NSL's
attorneys, and to the Court, at the following addresses:

Class Counsel:           
William L. Downing    
CONSUMER LEGAL SOLUTIONS, PC
1071 Bay Breeze Drive  
Suffolk, VA 23435    

NSL's Counsel:
Lisa M. Simonetti         
VEDDER PRICE (CA), LLP  
1925 Century Park   
Suite 1900 Los Angeles, CA 90067

Court:
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
401 Courthouse Square
Alexandria, VA 22314

You must include in your objection your:
A. Full name
B. Address
C. Telephone number called by NSL to demonstrate that you are a
person in the Settlement Class
D. A statement of the specific objection(s)
E. The grounds for the objection(s)
F. Identification of any documents to show that you are a person in
the Settlement Class or which you desire the Court to consider;
and
G. A statement noting whether you intend to appear at the fairness
hearing.

By when must you enter an appearance?

Any class member who objects to the settlement and wishes to enter
an appearance must do so by November 30, 2018.  To enter an
appearance, you must file with the Clerk of the Court a written
notice of your appearance and you must serve a copy of that notice,
by U.S. mail or hand-delivery, upon class counsel and NSL's
attorneys, at the addresses set forth above.

What if you do nothing?

If you do nothing and the Court approves the settlement agreement,
you will not receive a share of the settlement fund, but you will
release any claim you have against NSL related to the allegations.
Unless you exclude yourself from the settlement, you will not be
able to sue or continue a lawsuit against NSL over the released
claims.

What will happen if the Court does not approve the settlement?

If the Court does not finally approve the settlement or if it
finally approves the settlement and the approval is reversed on
appeal, or if the settlement does not become final for some other
reason, you will receive no benefits and the lawsuit will
continue.

Who are the attorneys for Baker?

The attorneys are:
William L. Downing               
CONSUMER LEGAL SOLUTIONS, PC     
1071 Bay Breeze Drive                        
Suffolk, VA 23435       

Henry A. Turner
TURNER LAW OFFICES, LLC
403 W. Ponce de Leon Ave., Suite 207
Decatur, GA 30030

The Court has appointed these attorneys to act as class counsel.
You do not have to pay class counsel.  If you want to be
represented by your own lawyer, and have that lawyer appear in
Court for you in this case, you must hire one at your own expense.

Who are NSL's attorneys?

NSL's attorneys are:

Lisa M. Simonetti
VEDDER PRICE (CA), LLP
1925 Century Park East, Suite 1900
Los Angeles, CA 90067

Where can you get additional information?

This notice is only a summary of the settlement.  All documents
filed with the Court, including the full class action settlement
agreement, may be reviewed or copied at the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.  In addition, you can
obtain pertinent case materials by visiting
https://bakertcpasettlement.com/Documents.

If you would like additional information about this matter, please
contact:

         Baker Settlement Administrator
         PO Box 44
         Minneapolis, MN 55440-0044
         Telephone: 1-866-404-0137

Please do not call the Judge or the Clerk of the Court about this
case. Neither the Judge, nor the Clerk of Court, will be able to
give you advice about this case.  Further, neither NSL nor NSL's
attorneys represent you, and they cannot give you legal advice or
information.  If you wish to speak with someone, contact William
Downing, class counsel, at 757-942-2554.

The online filing says, "A claim form has already been submitted
for this record."

It appears a claim has been filed with your Claimant ID or your
phone number.  If you believe this is an error, please submit your
valid claim form by mail Postmarked by November 30, 2018.  

         Baker Settlement Administrator
         PO Box 44
         Minneapolis, MN 55440-0044

If you did not receive a post card claim form in the mail.  You can
download the claim form at
https://bakertcpasettlement.com/Documents
Complete and mail to the Baker Settlement Administrator.


NBCUNIVERSAL: Faces Burbon ADA Class Action
-------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against NBCUniversal Media
LLC. The case is styled as Luc Burbon and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NBCUniversal Media LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-09210 (S.D. N.Y., Oct. 8, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

NBCUniversal Media, LLC, a media and entertainment company,
develops, produces, and distributes entertainment, news and
information, sports, and other content for audiences worldwide. The
company operates in four segments: Cable Networks, Broadcast
Television, Filmed Entertainment, and Theme Parks.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Avi Naveh, Esq.
     Law Office of Avi A. Naveh
     175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
     New York, NY 10014
     Phone: (646) 881-4471
     Email: court@navehlaw.com


NEW EQUIPMENT: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss ICFA Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned
TARTAN CONSTRUCTION, LLC, individually and on behalf of a class of
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. NEW EQUIPMENT
SERVICES CORPORATION d/b/a NES Rentals, NES RENTALS HOLDINGS, and
UNITED RENTALS (NORTH AMERICA), INC., Defendants. Case No.
17-cv-5950. (N.D. Ill.)

Plaintiff Tartan Construction, LLC alleges that Defendants NES
Rentals, NES Holdings, and United Rentals charged two illegitimate
fees as part of their standard rental agreements for heavy
equipment. Plaintiff claims that these fees unjustly enriched
Defendants and violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Trade Practices Act (ICFA).

The Defendants first seek to dismiss the Plaintiff's claims as
time-barred under their respective statutes of limitations.

Statute of Limitations

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's TAC should be dismissed
in its entirety because the statutes of limitations on all claims
expired before Plaintiff became a party to the suit in December
2017.  

Actions for damages under the ICFA are subject to a three-year
statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for Plaintiff's
unjust enrichment claim is five years.  

Both limitations periods are subject to the discovery rule that is,
neither begins to run until plaintiffs know or reasonably should
know that they have been injured and that their injuries were
wrongfully caused.  While the discovery rule does not require a
plaintiff to file suit immediately after learning of an injury, it
does not permit a plaintiff to sit on his or her rights until such
time as the plaintiff knows that he or she has a cause of action.

Substance of Plaintiff's Arguments Addresses the Discovery Rule

The Plaintiff appears to misstate its statutes of limitations
arguments. In its response to the Defendants' motion to dismiss,
Plaintiff includes a header stating: The Statute of Limitations Was
Tolled for the ICFA and Unjust Enrichment Claims. But rather than
discuss equitable tolling, the subsequent section goes on to argue
that the discovery rule simply postponed the beginning of both
limitations periods until November of 2017.

In this same section, the Plaintiff's contention that NES Rentals
intentionally concealed material facts from Plaintiff also
indicates that it is seeking to toll the statute of limitations
based upon fraudulent concealment, yet Plaintiff fails to allege
any fraudulent concealment outside of this one statement. Moreover,
fraudulent concealment implies deliberate efforts by the defendant
to prevent the plaintiff from suing within the applicable statute
of limitation. Plaintiff has not claimed that Defendants
deliberately prevented Plaintiff from suing within the statute of
limitations period; this alleged failure to disclose information
about the two fees is no different from the alleged wrongdoing upon
which Plaintiff bases its ICFA and unjust enrichment claims.

Discovery Rule Time-Bars Plaintiff's ICFA Claim

First, the Plaintiff does not dispute that it conducted no
investigation and made no inquiries as to the fee between 2009 and
2017. Instead, it claims it had no reason to believe the Fees were
not what Defendant NES Rentals purported them to be and regardless,
any inquiry regarding such Fees would have been futile as Defendant
NES Rentals' employees would certainly not have disclosed to
customers that the Fees were not what they purported to be.

This excuse for not conducting any sort of inquiry is purely
speculative. Without any explanation as to why its alleged facts
could not have been discovered before November 2017, the beginning
of the limitations period cannot be postponed.  

Second, because the Plaintiff concedes that it made no
investigation into the Defendants' fees on its own, the only
ostensible reason as to why it could not have discovered the
information underlying its ICFA cause of action before 2017 is that
it needed a consultation with its attorneys. But the discovery rule
does not permit plaintiffs to wait comfortably until advised by a
lawyer that he or she can sue. Allowing otherwise would undermine
one of the primary purposes behind statutes of limitations in the
first place: to encourage claimants to investigate and pursue
causes of action in order to discourage delay. Thus, without
pleading sufficient facts to demonstrate why Plaintiff's cause of
action could not have been discovered between 2009 and 2012, the
discovery rule cannot toll the three-year limitations period for
Plaintiff's ICFA claim.

This Court thus dismisses Count Two.

Discovery Rule Time-Bars Plaintiff's Unjust Enrichment Claim

The Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of a proposed class, also
claims that NES Rentals and United Rentals unjustly enriched
themselves by collecting the LDW fee. But as this Court noted in
its prior opinion, Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim depends upon
the same conduct that forms the basis of its ICFA claim: the
misrepresentations that allegedly deceived Plaintiff as to the true
nature of the fees and made it unjust for Defendants to retain the
money they collected for those fees. Because Plaintiff's unjust
enrichment and ICFA claims depend upon the same conduct, the TAC
similarly contains no factual support to justify postponing the
beginning of the unjust enrichment limitations period until
November 2017 under the discovery rule. Count One is thus also
dismissed.

Because this Court finds that both counts of the Plaintiff's TAC
are dismissed with prejudice as time-barred, it need not consider
the Defendants' alternative arguments for dismissal.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 24, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y9l5juda from Leagle.com.

Tartan Construction, LLC, individually and on behalf of a class of
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Robert M.
Foote -- rmf@fmcolaw.com -- Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil LLC,
Elizabeth Christine Chavez -- ecc@fmcolaw.com -- Foote, Mielke,
Chavez & O'neil, LLC, Glenn Alexander McTavish --
amctavish@fmcolaw.com -- Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil & Matthew
J. Herman -- mjh@fmcolaw.com -- Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O'Neil
LLC.

NES Equipment Services Corporation, doing business as & United
Rentals (North America), Inc., Defendants, represented by Matthew
R. Devine -- mdevine@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP, Abraham
Michael Salander -- asalander@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block,
Elizabeth D. Adler -- eadler@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding Llp, pro
hac vice, Nicholas G. Hill -- nhill@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding
LLP, pro hac vice, Precious Stephanie Jacobs -- pjacobs@jenner.com
-- Jenner And Block LLP & S. Stewart Haskins, II --
shaskins@kslaw.com -- King & Spalding, pro hac vice.


NOLAN ENTERPRISES: Ct. Won't Compel Arbitration in Dancers' Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, issued an Opinion and Order denying Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss or to Stay and Motion to Compel Arbitration in
the case captioned STEPHANIE DE ANGELIS, Plaintiff, v. NOLAN
ENTERPRISES, INC., Defendant. Case No. 2:17-cv-926. (S.D. Ohio).

Centerfold is an adult entertainment club in Columbus, Ohio.
Plaintiff, Ms. Stephanie De Angelis, alleges that she worked at
Centerfold as a dancer. Ms. De Angelis alleges that Centerfold did
not pay its dancers any wages. Instead, she avers that Centerfold
misclassified all of its dancers as independent contractors, rather
than employees, and that the dancers are only compensated through
tips from customers.

Ms. De Angelis filed this lawsuit as a collective and class action
against Centerfold, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1983 (FLSA), the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act
(OMFSWA) and the Ohio Semi-Monthly Payment Act, as well as common
law unjust enrichment by failing to pay dancers minimum wage for
all hours worked, including failure to pay overtime.

Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), arbitration contracts
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. If a party who signed an arbitration contract fails or
refuses to arbitrate, the aggrieved party may petition the court
for an order directing the parties to proceed in arbitration in
accordance with the terms of an arbitration agreement. The Court
must then determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the
dispute at issue.

Here, Ms. De Angelis argues that the Amendment Provision is an
attempt to retain the ability to modify the agreement at any time,
making Centerfold's promises illusory.  

This Court agrees. The Amendment Provision reads:

     THE CLUB RESERVES THE RIGHT TO MODIFY, DELETE, OR ADD TO ANY
OF THE CONDITIONS CONTAINED HEREIN WITHOUT NOTICE, AND RESERVES THE
RIGHT TO CANCEL ENTERTAINER TENANT SPACE LEASE AT ANY TIME, WITH OR
WITHOUT NOTICE OR CAUSE UPON BREACH OF THIS SPACE LEASE AGREEMENT
OR SPACE LEASE USAGE TERMS.

With this language, Centerfold reserved the right to modify or
cancel the terms of the Agreement at any time without notice, and
its promise was therefore illusory. An illusory contract is not
binding obligation, and the Agreement, including the delegation
provision, thus lacks mutuality of obligation and consideration. As
such, the delegation provision and the arbitration agreement are
void and unenforceable.

Centerfold relies on Blakley v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., No. 1:
12-CV-30, 2013 WL 360378, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2013), report
and recommendation adopted, No. C-1-12-30, 2013 WL 866470 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 7, 2013) to argue that the arbitration agreement is
enforceable because the amendment provision appears in a separate
section from the arbitration provision, and the duty of good faith
and fair dealing prohibits them from actually amending the
arbitration agreement.  

In Blakley, the Magistrate Judge recommended finding that the
clause giving the employer the right to modify the agreement did
not make the arbitration agreement unenforceable. Blakley is
distinguishable, however, because there the employer was required
to provide notice of any changes by posting them on its internal
intranet.   

In Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 667-68 (6th
Cir. 2003), concluding that arbitration agreement was supported by
sufficient consideration and mutuality of obligation when amendment
provision gave the employer the authority to alter the agreement on
only one day of each year and required them to provide its
employees with thirty days' notice before doing so.

The Blakley court acknowledged that advanced notice, rather than
just notice, was required in Morrison, but found that the lack of
advanced notice in the agreement did not make the arbitration
agreement unenforceable because the amendment provision was not
specific to the arbitration provision and was instead contained in
a different section. As an initial note, the Amendment Provision at
issue here requires no notice, so whether mere notice is sufficient
or notice must be given in advance is neither relevant nor decided
here.

Additionally, this Court disagrees that the location of the
Amendment Provision is relevant to whether such a provision makes
the employers' promise illusory under Ohio law. In Stanich, WL
3732129, at *6, this Court held that an amendment provision on the
first page of an employee handbook rendered the employer's promise
illusory and the entire contract, including the arbitration
provision, unenforceable under Ohio law.   

The Court therefore rejects Centerfold's argument that because the
amendment provision appears in a separate section as the
arbitration provision, the arbitration clause should not be
invalidated and finds Blakley unpersuasive.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 24, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8v6dlyr from
Leagle.com.

Stephanie De Angelis, Plaintiff, represented by Steven Charles
Babin, Jr. -- steven.babin@chapinlegal.com -- Chapin Legal Group
LLC, Courtney Werning -- cwerning@meyerwilson.com -- Meyer Wilson
Co, LPA, Lance Chapin -- lance.chapin@chapinlegal.com -- Chapin
Legal Group, LLC, Matthew R. Wilson -- mwilson@meyerwilson.com --
Meyer Wilson Co., LPA & Michael J. Boyle, Jr. --
mboyle@meyerwilson.com -- Meyer Wilson, LPA.

Nolan Enterprises, Inc., Defendant, represented by Charles William
Klausman, IV, Klausman Law Ltd., Ilya L. Polyakov --
ilp@olrblaw.com -- Onda LaBuhn Rankin & Boggs Co., LPA & Timothy S.
Rankin -- tsr@olrblaw


OPTIMA ADVOCATES: Rothman Files Suit Over Illegal Calls
-------------------------------------------------------
BEN ROTHMAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. OPTIMA ADVOCATES, INC.; DOES 1-10 Inclusive, Case No.
2:18-cv-08341 (C.D. Cal., September 27, 2018), accuses the
Defendants of negligently contacting the Plaintiff on his cellular
telephone in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,
thereby, invading his privacy.

Optima Advocates, Inc., is a company engaged in financial advising.
The true names and capacities of the Doe Defendants are currently
unknown to the Plaintiff.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com


PANASONIC CORP: Martinez Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
--------------------------------------------------------------
PEDRO MARTINEZ, Individually and as the representative of a class
of similarly situated persons v. PANASONIC CORPORATION OF NORTH
AMERICA, Case No. 1:18-cv-05410 (E.D.N.Y., September 26, 2018), is
brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act against Panasonic
for its failure to design, construct, maintain, and operate its Web
site -- http://www.shop.panasonic.com/-- to be fully accessible to
and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired persons.

Panasonic Corporation of North America is a Delaware Foreign
Business Corporation with its principal place of business located
in Newark, New Jersey.

Panasonic provides to the public the Web site, which provides
consumers with access to an array of goods and services, including,
the ability to view the various lines of consumer electronic goods
including cameras, audio and video equipment, kitchen appliances
and many more related products, and find deals, amongst other
features.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
          44 Court Street, Suite 1217
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (917) 373-9128
          E-mail: ShakedLawGroup@gmail.com


PETROBRAS: Settles Bribery Claims with SEC for $1.8 Million
-----------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kahn, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
Petrobras, the Brazilian oil giant at the center of a giant
political corruption scandal, reached a $1.8 billion settlement on
Sept. 26 to resolve bribery and bid-rigging allegations from the
Securities and Exchange Commission.

The settlement stems from a U.S. inquiry into Petrobras's alleged
role in facilitating payments to politicians and political parties
in Brazil, as well as a related Brazilian investigation.


PHILIP MORRIS: GPCPF Sues Over Misleading Statements on IQOS
------------------------------------------------------------
GREATER PENNSYLVANIA CARPENTERS' PENSION FUND, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. PHILIP MORRIS
INTERNATIONAL INC., ANDRE CALANTZOPOULOS, MARTIN G. KING and JACEK
OLCZAK, Case No. 1:18-cv-08814 (S.D.N.Y., September 26, 2018),
accuses the Defendants of violating the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 by issuing materially false and misleading statements that
result to the trading of the Company's stock at artificially
inflated price levels.

During the Class Period, the Defendants emphasized a "wide array of
benefits" of heat-not-burn products, such as IQOS -- including the
"potential to reduce the risk of smoking-related diseases" and less
harmful than cigarettes, according to the complaint.  However, the
Plaintiff alleges, the Defendants' statements were materially false
and misleading because the Defendants failed to disclose that there
were irregularities in the clinical experiments underpinning Philip
Morris' applications to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for
IQOS -- the Company's leading reduced-risk product -- in the United
States.

Philip Morris is a Virginia corporation with its principal
executive offices located in New York City.  The Individual
Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.  In 2008, the
Company was spun off from operating company Altria Group, Inc.,
which focuses on the sale of tobacco products inside the United
States.  Marlboro is the Company's most recognized and best-selling
product.

Philip Morris is one of the largest and most recognizable cigarette
and tobacco manufacturing companies in the world.  The Company's
subsidiaries and affiliates and their licensees are engaged in the
manufacture and sale of cigarettes and other nicotine-containing
products in markets outside of the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christopher J. Keller, Esq.
          Eric J. Belfi, Esq.
          Francis P. McConville, Esq.
          LABATON SUCHAROW LLP
          140 Broadway
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 907-0700
          Facsimile: (212) 818-0477
          E-mail: ckeller@labaton.com
                  ebelfi@labaton.com
                  fmcconville@labaton.com


PPDAI GROUP: Faces Vora IPO-Related Securities Suit in New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
RAVINDRA VORA, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. PPDAI GROUP INC., JUN ZHANG, TIEZHENG LI, HONGHUI HU,
SIMON TAK LEUNG HO, SHAOFENG GU, RONALD CAO, ZEHUI LIU, CONGLIANG
LI, QIONG WANG, NEIL NANPENG SHEN, CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA)
LLC, CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC. and KEEFE, BRUYETTE & WOODS,
INC., Case No. 654777/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty., September
27, 2018), is brought on behalf of those who purchased or otherwise
acquired PPDAI American Depositary Shares issued in an initial
public offering completed on November 14, 2017, pursuant or
traceable to the prospectus and Form F-1 Registration Statement and
F-6 Registration Statement filed with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.

On November 9, 2017, the Defendants commenced the IPO, issuing 17
million PPDAI ADSs to the investing public at $13 per share, all
pursuant to the Offering Documents.

According to the complaint, the Offering Documents contained untrue
statements of material fact and omitted to state material facts
both required by governing regulations and necessary to make the
statements made not misleading.  Far from experiencing rapid growth
in its largest market, China, PPDAI was, in truth, engaging in
predatory lending practices and mismanagement, all of which were
having a materially negative impact on PPDAI's revenues, margins,
and market share, the Plaintiff alleges.

PPDAI is a Cayman Islands corporation with principal executive
offices located in Shanghai, China.  The Individual Defendants are
directors and officers of PPDAI.

PPDAI is an online consumer finance marketplace with primary
operations in China.  The Company, launched in 2007, is the first
online consumer finance marketplace in China connecting borrowers
and investors.  The Company provides a proprietary platform
featuring an automated loan transaction process.  As of June 30,
2018, the Company claimed over 78 million cumulative registered
users.

Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC is a Delaware limited liability
company with principal executive offices located in New York City.
Credit Suisse is dually registered with the SEC as a broker-dealer
and an investment advisor.

Citigroup Global Markets Inc. is a New York corporation with
principal executive offices located in New York City.  Citigroup is
registered as a securities broker dealer and investment advisor
with the SEC, and a municipal securities dealer and advisor with
the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board.

Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, Inc., is a New York corporation with
principal executive offices located in New York City.  Keefe is
principally a broker-dealer in securities and a market-maker in
certain financial services' stocks and is subject to regulation and
oversight by the SEC and the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority, Inc.

Credit Suisse, Citigroup and Keefe served as underwriters of the
IPO and are liable for the false and misleading statements in the
Registration Statement.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Samuel H. Rudman, Esq.
          Mary K. Blasy, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          58 South Service Road, Suite 200
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: (631) 367-7100
          Facsimile: (631) 367-1173
          E-mail: srudman@rgrdlaw.com
                  mblasy@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Brian J. Robbins, Esq.
          Stephen J. Oddo, Esq.
          ROBBINS ARROYO LLP
          600 B Street, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 525-3990
          Facsimile: (619) 525-3991
          E-mail: brobbins@robbinsarroyo.com
                  soddo@robbinsarroyo.com


PRIMARK US: Web Site Not Blind-Accessible, Burbon Claims
--------------------------------------------------------
LUC BURBON, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
v. PRIMARK US CORP., Case No. 1:18-cv-08878 (S.D.N.Y., September
27, 2018), alleges that the Defendant violates the Americans with
Disabilities Act by operating a Web site, http://www.primark.com/,
that is not equally accessible to blind and visually-impaired
consumers.

Primark is a Delaware Corporation licensed to do business and doing
business in the state of New York.  The Company operates PRIMARK
clothing stores, and advertises, markets, distributes, and sells
clothing and related accessories in New York and throughout the
United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (929) 575-4175
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: Joseph@cml.legal

               - and -

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003-2461
          Telephone: (212) 228-9795
          Facsimile: (212) 982-6284
          E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
                  danalgottlieb@aol.com


PROMPT NURSING: Seeks 2nd Cir. Review of Paguirigan Suit Ruling
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Prompt Nursing Employment Agency, LLC, et al., filed an
appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit styled Paguirigan v.
Prompt Nursing Employment Agency, LLC, et al., Case No. 17-cv-1302,
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(Brooklyn).

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sept. 20, 2018, the
Hon. Nina Gershon grants the motion for class certification filed
in the lawsuit.  The class is comprised of all nurses, who were
recruited by the Defendants in the Philippines and were employed by
the Defendants in the United States at any time since December 23,
2008.

Ms. Paguirigan brings claims for alleged violations of the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act.  She also brings a breach of
contract claim against Defendants Prompt Nursing, Benjamin Landa,
Bent Philipson and Berish Rubenstein.

The appellate case is captioned as Paguirigan v. Prompt Nursing
Employment Agency, LLC, et al., Case No. 18-2833, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Respondent Rose Paguirigan, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          John Howley, Esq.
          THE HOWLEY LAW FIRM P.C.
          350 5th Avenue
          New York, NY 10118
          Telephone: (212) 601-2728
          E-mail: jhowley@johnhowleyesq.com

Defendants-Petitioners Prompt Nursing Employment Agency, LLC, DBA
Sentosa Services; Sentosacare, LLC; Sentosa Nursing Recruitment
Agency; Benjamin Landa; Bent Philipson; Berish Rubenstein, AKA
Barry Rubenstein; Francis Luyun; Golden Gate Rehabilitation &
Health Care Center LLC; and Spring Creek Rehabilitation and Nursing
Center are represented by:

          Elliot Hahn, Esq.
          HAHN EISENBERGER PLLC
          969 East 27th Street
          Brooklyn, NY 11210
          Telephone: (347) 410-5800


REAL ESTATE: Conditional Certification Administratively Terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion and Order administratively terminating
Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification in the case
captioned PATRICIA THOMPSON, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE NETWORK,
INC., et at., Defendants. No. 11-1494 (KM)(MAH). (D.N.J.).

This is a putative class action against employers for allegedly
failing to compensate employees for overtime work, in violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New Jersey Wage and
Hour Law (NJWHL).  Plaintiff' Patricia Thompson to conditionally
certify a collection action under the FLSA and to equitably toll
the statute of limitations of the FLSA for a putative class of
opt-in plaintiffs.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Employers brought this motion for
partial summary judgment in lieu of properly filing a cross-motion
to the Plaintiff's motion for conditional certification. The
abominable result, the Plaintiff says, is that (a) the Defendants
will receive more pages to make their arguments; and (b) the
Defendants will get the 'last word' on the tolling issue.

The Plaintiffs argue that the summary judgment motion should be
struck because it is at odds with the mandate of Fed. R. Civ. P. 1
that the rules be construed, administered, and employed by the
court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding. A motion for summary
judgment, however, is not an inappropriate means of challenging
time-barred FLSA claims. Indeed, if appropriately granted and I do
not prejudge that issue such a motion may streamline the case and
contribute to a just,4 speedy, and inexpensive determination of the
merits.

The Court will exercise that discretionary case-management power,
however not to strike the motion, but to reorder the presentation
of issues here. The summary judgment and arbitrability issues may
profitably be addressed in advance of the conditional certification
issues. The partial summary judgment motion however, has never
gotten underway because of quibbles over page limits, replies, and
the like. The Court is therefore pressing the reset button.

The motion for partial summary judgment motion and to compel
arbitration and the conditional certification motion are
administratively terminated.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 24, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8tcatc7 from
Leagle.com.

PATRICIA THOMPSON, Plaintiff, represented by MITCHELL A. SCHLEY,
LAW OFFICES OF MITCHELL SCHLEY, LLC.

REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE NETWORK, INC., SECURITY ATLANTIC MORTGAGE
COMPANY, INC., NOEL CHAPMAN, an Individual & SAMUEL LAMPARELLO, an
Individual, Defendants, represented by KATHARINE THOMAS BATISTA --
kbatista@offitkurman.com -- Offit Kurman, P.A..


REIS INC: Scarantino Balks at Merger Deal with Moody's Corp.
------------------------------------------------------------
RICHARD SCARANTINO, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. REIS, INC., THOMAS J. CLARKE,
JR., JONATHAN GARFIELD, LLOYD LYNFORD, M. CHRISTIAN MITCHELL, BYRON
C. VIELEHR, MOODY'S CORPORATION, and MOODY'S ANALYTICS MARYLAND
CORP., the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-08780 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 25
2018), seeks to enjoin the Defendants and all persons acting in
concert with them from proceeding with, consummating, or closing a
proposed transaction, and in the event the Defendants consummate
the proposed transaction, rescinding it and setting it aside or
awarding rescissory damages.

The action stems from the proposed transaction announced on August
30, 2018, pursuant to which Reis, Inc. will be acquired by Moody's
Corporation and Moody's Analytics Maryland Corp.  On August 29,
Reis's Board of Directors caused the Company to enter into an
agreement and plan of merger with Moody's.  Pursuant to the terms
of the Merger Agreement, Moody's commenced a tender offer, set to
expire on October 12, and shareholders of Reis will receive $23.00
in cash for each share of Reis common stock.  On September 13, the
Defendants filed a solicitation/Recommendation Statement with the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with
the Proposed Transaction.

The Solicitation Statement omits material information with respect
to the Proposed Transaction, which renders the Solicitation
Statement false and misleading. Accordingly, the Plaintiff alleges
that the Defendants violated Sections 14(e), 14(d), and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the
Solicitation Statement, the lawsuit says.

Reis is a commercial real estate data source, providing an
advantage to firms with debt or equity exposure across capital
markets.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800

               - and -

          Timothy J. MacFall, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          825 East Gate Boulevard, Suite 300
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 683 3516

               - and -

          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295 5310


ROCHE HOLDING: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued an Opinion granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case
captioned THOMAS BIONDOLILLO, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ROCHE HOLDING AG., SEVERIN
SCHWAN, ALAN HIPPE, DANIEL O'DAY, and GOTTLIEB A. KELLER,
Defendants. Civ. No. 17-4056. (D.N.J.).

This class action, brought on behalf of purchasers of certain
securities in Roche, arises from allegations that Defendants made
false and misleading statements about the results of a breast
cancer treatment study, artificially inflating Roche's stock price.
The Amended Complaint alleges that all Defendants violated Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 78j(b), and
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) imposes a more
demanding pleading standard. To allege a false or misleading
statement or omission, the complaint must, specify each statement
alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the
statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the
statement or omission is made on information and belief, the
complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that
belief is formed.

The PSLRA requires that a complaint alleging scienter state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind.

Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5

All Defendants are alleged to have violated Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 by making any untrue statement of a material fact or omitting
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading.

To establish this cause of action, Plaintiff must prove (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant (2)
scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or
omission and the purchase or sale of a security (4) reliance upon
the misrepresentation or omission (5) economic loss; and (6) loss
causation.

Material Misrepresentation

Roche's March 2 Press Release

The press release issued by Roche on March 2, 2017 announced
positive results, and also made the following specific claims about
APHINITY: it found a statistically significant improvement in
invasive disease-free survival, it met its primary endpoint, the
safety profile of the Perjeta-based regimen was consistent with
that seen in previous studies and no new safety signals were
identified. The press release also stated that full results would
be announced at the ASCO meeting, but made no other warning that
the announced headline results should be discounted.

Of the specific claims made, the study did find a statistically
significant improvement in disease-free survival, and the study did
meet its primary endpoint. The press release's statements
concerning safety signals were also accurate.

Likewise, the press release taken as a whole is not misleading. The
press release called the APHINITY results positive, but such
interpretations of trial data are matters of opinion and the
Amended Complaint offers no evidence that this opinion lacked a
reasonable basis.

O'Day's Remarks During the April 27 Conference Call

During the April 27, 2017 call, O'Day repeated the press release
claims that APHINITY met its primary endpoint and that the data
shows a reduction in risk recurrence.  

His claims, specifically his claims that the Perjeta-based regimen
can improve the standard of care systematically and that the
APHINITY data are clinically meaningful were later doubted by
analysts and medical professionals. But his statements are still,
like those made in the press release, interpretations of a clinical
trial and matters of opinion.  That O'Day's statements were
opinions is shown by an expert's remark that, A determination of
clinical significance is necessarily more nuanced than the hard
numbers that determine statistical significance. And Plaintiff does
not show that O'Day did not honestly believe these opinions or
lacked a reasonable basis for them.  

O'Day therefore did not make false or misleading statements during
the conference call.

Scienter

Scienter is a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate,
or defraud, encompassing reckless or conscious behavior,  

Here, the Amended Complaint adequately pleads scienter for
Defendants Roche and O'Day. Roche, as co-author of the press
release, and O'Day, as issuer of statements during the conference
call, are impliedly conscious of, or reckless in regard to, the
allegedly false content contained in their respective statements.
But Plaintiff fails to infer scienter for the three remaining
Individual Defendants: Schwan, Hippe, and Keller. Their senior
positions at Roche are insufficient, as the Third Circuit does not
apply the group pleading doctrine. The Amended Complaint makes no
allegations specifically tying these Defendants to the drafting of
the press release or any meetings related to the APHINITY study.
While these Defendants did sell stock between the March press
release and the June ASCO meeting, Plaintiff does not show how
these sales were unusual in scope or timing.

Because of the Amended Complaint's defects regarding both false and
misleading statements and scienter, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
must be granted as to the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims.

Section 20(a)

Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act states that:

Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person
liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as such controlled person  unless the
controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or
cause of action.

Liability under Section 20(a) is derivative of an underlying
violation of Section 10(b) by the controlled person. Thus, where no
Section 10(b) violation has been successfully pled, a Section 20(a)
violation must fail as well.

The Amended Complaint must therefore be dismissed with regard to
Section 20(a).

The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 24, 2018 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9268rg7 from Leagle.com.

Kevin Gardeck, Movant, represented by LAURENCE M. ROSEN --
lrosen@rosenlega.com -- THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, PA.

THOMAS BIONDOLILLO, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by LAURENCE M. ROSEN ,
THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, PA.

ROCHE HOLDING AG, SEVERIN SCHWAN & ALAN HIPPE, Defendants,
represented by MICHAEL R. GRIFFINGER -- mgriffinger@gibbonslaw.com
-- GIBBONS, PC, CALVIN KUSHNIR MAY -- cmay@gibbonslaw.com --
GIBBONS PC & SAMUEL ISAAC PORTNOY -- sportnoy@gibbonslaw.com --
GIBBONS PC.

Daniel O'Day & Gottlieb Keller, Defendants, represented by MICHAEL
R. GRIFFINGER , GIBBONS, PC.


SAFEWAY INC: Helfand Appeals Order in Rodman Suit to 9th Cir.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Objector Steven F. Helfand filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit styled Michael Rodman, et al. v. Safeway, Inc., Case
No. 3:11-cv-03003-JST, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Francisco.

The appellate case is captioned as Michael Rodman, et al. v.
Safeway, Inc., Case No. 18-16854, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Oct. 4, 2018, Judge Jon
S. Tigar (i) approved the distribution plan, and (ii) granted in
part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees,
expenses, and an incentive award.

Mr. Rodman brought the breach of contract case against the
Defendant, on behalf of himself and all other individuals similarly
situated.  The Plaintiffs' claims arise from their purchase of
groceries from Safeway's website for home delivery.  Safeway
promised its online customers that the prices charged for
Safeway.com products would be those charged in the physical store
proximate to where the groceries were delivered.  In fact, Safeway
charged more for online purchases than it did for purchases from
its brick-and-mortar stores.

The Court certified the class of all persons in the United States
who registered to purchase groceries through Safeway.com at any
time prior to Nov. 15, 2011, and made one or more purchases subject
to the price markup implemented on or about April 12, 2010.  There
are 297,822 class members.  On Nov. 30, 2015, the Court entered
judgment in favor of the certified class.  After pre- and
post-judgment interest, the total judgment amounts to
$42,321,355.45.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript must be ordered by October 22, 2018;

   -- Transcript is due on November 20, 2018;

   -- Appellant Steven F. Helfand's opening brief is due on
      January 3, 2019;

   -- Appellees Michael Rodman and Safeway, Inc.'s answering
      brief is due on February 4, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.

Objector-Appellant Steven F. Helfand, of Miami Beach, Florida,
appears pro se.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee MICHAEL RODMAN, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Timothy N. Mathews, Esq.
          Steven Alan Schwartz, Esq.
          CHIMICLES & TIKELLIS LLP
          361 W. Lancaster Avenue
          Haverford, PA 19041
          Telephone: (610) 642-8500
          E-mail: TimothyMathews@chimicles.com
                  SteveSchwartz@chimicles.com

               - and -

          James C. Shah, Esq.
          Scott R. Shepherd, Esq.
          SHEPHERD FINKELMAN MILLER & SHAH, LLC
          35 E. State St.
          Media, PA 19063
          Telephone: (610) 891-9880
          E-mail: jshah@sfmslaw.com
                  sshepherd@sfmslaw.com

Defendant-Appellee SAFEWAY, INC., is represented by:

          Scott D. Baker, Esq.
          James A. Daire, Esq.
          Jonah Mitchell, Esq.
          Christine M. Morgan, Esq.
          REED SMITH LLP
          101 Second Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 659-5600
          E-mail: sbaker@reedsmith.com
                  jdaire@reedsmith.com
                  jmitchell@reedsmith.com
                  cmorgan@reedsmith.com


SANDERSON FARMS: Appeal Ongoing in New York Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Sanderson Farms, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
July 31, 2018, that the appeal is still ongoing in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the putative
class action suit filed against the company in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York.

Sanderson Farms, Inc.; Joe F. Sanderson, Jr., the Chairman of the
Registrant's Board of Directors and its Chief Executive Officer;
and D. Michael Cockrell, director and Chief Financial Officer, were
named as defendants in a putative class action lawsuit filed on
October 28, 2016, in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.

On March 30, 2017, the lead plaintiff filed an amended complaint
adding Lampkin Butts, director, Chief Operating Officer, and
President, as a defendant, and on June 15, 2017, the lead plaintiff
filed a second amended complaint.

The complaint alleges that the defendants made statements in the
Company's SEC filings and press releases, and other public
statements, that were materially false and misleading in light of
the Company's alleged, undisclosed violation of the federal
antitrust laws.

The complaint also alleges that the material misstatements were
made in order to, among other things, "artificially inflate and
maintain the market price of Sanderson Farms securities." The
complaint alleges the defendants thereby violated the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), including
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, and, for the individual defendants, Section 20(a) of
the Exchange Act, and seeks damages, interest, costs and attorneys'
fees.

On January 19, 2018, the Court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss and entered judgment for the defendants. On January 31,
2018, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the case is scheduled
for argument on August 31, 2018.

Sanderson Farms said, "The Company cannot predict the outcome of
this action or the appeal. If the plaintiffs were to prevail in the
action, the Company could be liable for damages, which could have a
material, adverse effect on our financial position and results of
operations."

Sanderson Farms, Inc., an integrated poultry processing company,
produces, processes, markets, and distributes fresh, frozen, and
prepared chicken products in the United States.  Sanderson Farms,
Inc. was founded in 1947 and is headquartered in Laurel,
Mississippi.


SANDERSON FARMS: Bid to Dismiss North Carolina Class Suit Underway
------------------------------------------------------------------
Sanderson Farms, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
July 31, 2018, that the motion to dismiss the lawsuit in the
Eastern District of North Carolina is pending.

On January 27, 2017, Sanderson Farms, Inc. and the company's
subsidiaries were named as defendants, along with four other
poultry producers and certain of their affiliated companies, in a
putative class action lawsuit filed in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. On March 27, 2017,
Sanderson Farms, Inc. and the company's subsidiaries were named as
defendants, along with four other poultry producers and certain of
their affiliated companies, in a second putative class action
lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma.

The Court ordered the suits consolidated into one proceeding, and
on July 10, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended
complaint. The consolidated amended complaint alleges that the
defendants unlawfully conspired by sharing data on compensation
paid to broiler farmers, with the purpose and effect of suppressing
the farmers' compensation below competitive levels. The
consolidated amended complaint also alleges that the defendants
unlawfully conspired to not solicit or hire the broiler farmers who
were providing services to other defendants. The consolidated
amended complaint seeks treble damages, costs and attorneys' fees.


On September 8, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
amended complaint, on October 23, 2017, the plaintiffs filed their
response, and on November 22, 2017, the defendants filed a reply.
On January 19, 2018, the Court granted the Sanderson Farms
defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The motion to dismiss the complaint filed in the Eastern District
of Oklahoma on its merits is pending as to the remaining
defendants.

On February 21, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a substantially similar
lawsuit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina against Sanderson Farms and the company's
subsidiaries and another poultry producer. Defendants subsequently
moved to consolidate this action with the Eastern District of
Oklahoma action in the Eastern District of Oklahoma for pre-trial
proceedings, which was denied.

On July 13, 2018, the defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit in
the Eastern District of North Carolina. That motion is pending.

Sanderson Farms said, "We intend to defend this case vigorously;
however, the Company cannot predict the outcome of this action. If
the plaintiffs were to prevail, the Company could be liable for
damages, which could have a material, adverse effect on our
financial position and results of operations."

Sanderson Farms, Inc., an integrated poultry processing company,
produces, processes, markets, and distributes fresh, frozen, and
prepared chicken products in the United States.  Sanderson Farms,
Inc. was founded in 1947 and is headquartered in Laurel,
Mississippi.


SANDERSON FARMS: Discovery Ongoing in Broiler Chicken-Related Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Sanderson Farms, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
July 31, 2018, that discovery is still ongoing in the Broiler
Chicken-related lawsuit.

Between September 2, 2016 and October 13, 2016, Sanderson Farms,
Inc. and the company's subsidiaries were named as defendants, along
with 13 other poultry producers and certain of their affiliated
companies, in multiple putative class action lawsuits filed by
direct and indirect purchasers of broiler chickens in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

The complaints allege that the defendants conspired to unlawfully
fix, raise, maintain, and stabilize the price of broiler chickens,
thereby violating federal and certain states' antitrust laws, and
also allege certain related state-law claims. The complaints also
allege that the defendants fraudulently concealed the alleged
anticompetitive conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy.

The complaints seek damages, including treble damages for the
antitrust claims, injunctive relief, costs, and attorneys' fees.
The Court has consolidated all of the direct purchaser complaints
into one case, and the indirect purchaser complaints into two
cases, one on behalf of commercial and institutional indirect
purchaser plaintiffs and one on behalf of end-user consumer
plaintiffs.

On October 28, 2016, the direct and indirect purchaser plaintiffs
filed consolidated, amended complaints, and on November 23, 2016,
the direct and indirect purchaser plaintiffs filed second amended
complaints. On December 16, 2016, the indirect purchaser plaintiffs
separated into two cases. On that date, the commercial and
institutional indirect purchaser plaintiffs filed a third amended
complaint, and the end-user consumer plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint.

On January 27, 2017, the defendants filed motions to dismiss the
amended complaints in all of the cases, and on November 20, 2017,
the motions to dismiss were denied. On February 7, 2018, the direct
purchaser plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint, adding
three additional poultry producers as defendants. On February 12,
2018, the end-user consumer plaintiffs filed their second amended
complaint, in which they also added three additional poultry
producers as defendants, along with Agri Stats. On February 20,
2018, the commercial indirect purchaser plaintiffs filed their
fourth amended complaint. The parties are currently engaged in
discovery.

Sanderson Farms said, "We intend to continue to defend the lawsuits
vigorously; however, the Company cannot predict the outcome of
these actions. If the plaintiffs were to prevail, the Company could
be liable for damages, which could have a material, adverse effect
on our financial position and results of operations."

The company further disclosed that, between December 8, 2017 and
August 16, 2018, additional purported direct-purchaser entities
individually brought twelve separate suits against 17 poultry
producers, including Sanderson Farms and Agri Stats, in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and the
United States District Court for the District of Kansas. These
suits allege substantially similar claims to the direct purchaser
class complaint described above. Those filed in the Northern
District of Illinois are now pending in front of the same judge as
the putative class action lawsuits. The parties are currently
engaged in discovery. On June 26, 2018, the defendants filed a
motion to transfer the case filed in the District of Kansas to the
Northern District of Illinois. That motion is still pending. It is
possible additional individual actions may be filed.

Sanderson Farms, Inc., an integrated poultry processing company,
produces, processes, markets, and distributes fresh, frozen, and
prepared chicken products in the United States. Sanderson Farms,
Inc. was founded in 1947 and is headquartered in Laurel,
Mississippi.


SANTA FE, NM: Moya Seeks More Time to File Petition for Writ
------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Mariano Moya, et al., ask Justice Sonia Maria Sotomayor
to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from
October 8, 2018, to November 23, 2018, in the lawsuit titled
Mariano Moya, et al. v. Robert Garcia, et al., Case No. 18A326, in
the Supreme Court of United States.

Robert Garcia is the Sheriff of Santa Fe County, New Mexico.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Plaintiffs
Mariano Moya and Lonnie Petry filed an appeal from a court ruling
in their lawsuit.  The appellate case is captioned as Moya, et al.
v. Garcia, et al., Case No. 17-2037, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

The lawsuit is brought over alleged civil rights violations.  The
District Court case is entitled Moya, et al. v. Garcia, et al.,
Case No. 1:16-CV-01022-WJ-KBM, in the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Mexico - Albuquerque.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioners Mariano Moya, et al., are represented by:

          Todd A. Coberly, Esq.
          COBERLY & MARTINEZ, LLLP
          1322 Paseo de Peralta
          Santa Fe, NM 87501
          Telephone: (505) 989-1029
          E-mail: todd@coberlymartinez.com

Defendants-Respondents ROBERT GARCIA, Santa Fe County Sheriff; MARK
CALDWELL, Warden of Santa Fe County Adult Correctional Facility;
MARK GALLEGOS, former Warden Santa Fe County Adult Correctional
Facility, in their individual capacities; and BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS OF SANTA FE COUNTY are represented by:

          Brandon Huss, Esq.
          Dennis K. Wallin, Esq.
          WALLIN, HUSS & MENDEZ, LLC
          P.O. Box 696
          Moriarty, NM 87035
          Telephone: (505) 832-6363
          Facsimile: (505) 814-5805
          E-mail: bh@whmlawfirm.com
                  dkw@whmlawfirm.com


SARGON ISAAC: Tyler Swain Alleges Racism & Unsafe Housing
---------------------------------------------------------
TYLER SWAIN, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated
persons, the Plaintiff, v. SARGON ISAAC, individually and d/b/a "SI
Properties" and/or "Simla Properties," and RICHARD SAMUELS, the
Defendants, Case No. 2018CH11987 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook Cty., Sept.
24, 2018), seeks to put a stop to Sargon Isaac's racism, and compel
him to provide to his tenants the equitable, safe, and sanitary
housing required by the law.

According to the complaint, Sargon Isaac is a slumlord with an
empire of crumbling properties across Chicago and Evanston. He
rents damaged houses and apartments which are barely habitable, if
at all. Most, if not all, of his properties have infestations, mold
problems, water damage, and/or sewage leaks. He doesn't fix those
problems, though -- instead, he simply demands rent. And if his
tenants withhold rent based on the conditions in the apartment, or
complain repeatedly about those conditions, Sargon evicts them.
He's filed dozens of evictions in the last 18 months, representing
himself in most of them.

But Sargon is more than a slumlord, the lawsuit contends.  Sargon
doesn't return security deposits, doesn't pay security deposit
interest, and on move-out charges tenants to fix problems which
existed when they moved in. But he will repair the problems in the
units of his white tenants. He will work with his white tenants if
they fall behind on rent. But if the tenant is a person of color or
LGBTQ, Sargon harasses them, refusing to make repairs and charging
hundreds of dollars for the few repairs he does make, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Sheryl Ring, Esq.
          Christopher Riehlmann, Esq.
          OPEN COMMUNITIES LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
          990 Grove Street, Suite 500
          Evanston, IL 60201
          Telephone: (847) 501-5760
          E-mail: sheryl@open-communities.org


SHANG SHANG: Jiao Files FLSA Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Shang Shang Qian Inc.
The case is styled as Guanglei Jiao, Nan Yu, Ruiji Zhai, Yanjun Li
on their own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. Shang Shang Qian Inc, Yuan Yuan Wu also known as:
Andy Wu, Zhaorui Fan, Dan Wu also known as: Stephy Wu, Meiling Zou
also known as: Denise Zou, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-05624 (E.D.
N.Y., Oct. 9, 2018).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

SSqian, whose full name is Shang Shang Qian, serves companies in
the Internet finance, online travel, property and B2B e-commerce
firms, where the need for electronic signing is high.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear pro se.




SHELTER MUTUAL: Baggett Suit Moved to Eastern District of Arkansas
------------------------------------------------------------------
Samuel Baggett, On Behalf of Himself and all Similarly Situated
Persons and Entities, the Plaintiff, v. Shelter Mutual Insurance
Company, the Defendant, Case No. 60CV-18-01542, was removed from
the Pulaski County Circuit Court, to the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Arkansas (Helena) on Sept. 25, 2018. The
Eastern District of Arkansas Court Clerk assigned Case no. Case No.
2:18-cv-00134-BRW to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Billy Roy Wilson. The suit alleges motor vehicle related
violation.

Shelter Insurance Company is a mutual insurance company which
focuses on Auto, Property, Business, and Life Insurance. It
operates in fifteen U.S. states and the headquarters is in
Columbia, Missouri.[BN]

Attorneys for Samuel Baggett:

          David S. Mitchell, Esq.
          DAVID S. MITCHELL, P.A.
          Prospect Building
          1501 North University, Suite 640
          Little Rock, AR 72207
          Telephone: (501) 663 3322
          Facsimile: (501) 663 3320
          E-mail: DavidMitchell@DavidMitchellLaw.com

               - and -

          Kenneth Jerald Mitchell, Esq.
          TAYLOR KING & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
          5209 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
          North Little Rock, AR 72116
          Telephone: (870) 246 0505
          E-mail: rustymitchell@taylorkinglaw.com

               - and -

          Marcus Neil Bozeman, Esq.
          THRASH LAW FIRM
          1101 Garland Street
          Little Rock, AR 72201
          Telephone: (501) 374 1058
          Facsimile: (501) 374 2222
          E-mail: mbozeman@thrashlawfirmpa.com

Attorneys for Shelter Mutual Insurance Company:

          James Melton Sayes, Esq.
          MATTHEWS, SANDERS & SAYES
          825 West Third Street
          Little Rock, AR 72201
          Telephone: (501) 378 0717
          E-mail: msayes@msslawfirm.com

               - and -

          Sarah E. Greenwood, Esq.
          Munson, Rowlett, Moore & Boone, P.A.
          Regions Center, Suite 1900
          400 West Capitol Avenue
          Little Rock, AR 72201
          Telephone: (501) 374-6535
          E-mail: sarah.greenwood@mrmblaw.com


SONY MUSIC: Rick Nelson Sues over Royalties
-------------------------------------------
THE RICK NELSON COMPANY, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, a Delaware corporation,
the Defendant, Case 1:18-cv-08791-LLS (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 25, 2018),
alleges that the Defendant failed to properly account to the
Plaintiff and Class members for income derived from the
exploitation of their works.

According to the complaint, Sony Music is a record label which
obtained the rights to exploit the artistic works of Plaintiff and
Class members in exchange for the payment of certain monies to
these individuals and entities as required by standard contracts.
The terms of the Compensation Agreements between the Defendant and
the Plaintiff and Class members contain the same, if not,
identical, language regarding the method of accounting for and
paying the artists their share of the revenues based on all of the
revenue received by the Defendant.  The Defendant is contractually
required to pay artists a portion of the international revenue it
receives from the exploitation of the Plaintiff's and Class
members; artistic works from digital streaming abroad.  The
Compensation Agreements do not allow the Defendant to assess an
"intercompany charge" for international sales reported by the
Defendant through its wholly-owned subsidiaries.  Despite this
fact, the Defendant did, and continues to, assess an intercompany
charge for international sales.  By assessing an intercompany
charge for international sales, the Defendant impermissibly takes
up to 68% off the top of the international revenue earned from
streaming sales, and bases the artist's royalty rate on the
remainder, which methodology directly violates the terms of the
Compensation Agreements.

The Defendant under reports revenue generated from foreign sales by
improperly assessing an intercompany charge on revenues collected
through its wholly-owned foreign affiliates, thereby impermissibly
reducing the share owed to Plaintiff and Class members by the same
amount.  The Defendant does not have a contractual or equitable
right to assess this intercompany charge on Plaintiff and Class
members.  The Defendant has unilaterally breached the Compensation
Agreements by deciding to pay the Plaintiff and Class members less
than the full amount owed to them under the express terms of the
Compensation Agreements in connection with the distribution of
their works, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class:

          Laurie Rubinow, Esq.
          James C. Shah, Esq.
          SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP
          52 Duane Street, 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 419 0156
          Facsimile: (866) 300 7367
          E-mail: lrubinow@sfmslaw.com
                  jshah@sfmslaw.com

               - and -

          Neville L. Johnson, Esq.
          Douglas L. Johnson, Esq.
          Arun Dayalan, Esq.
          JOHNSON & JOHNSON LLP
          439 N. Canon Dr. Suite 200
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 975 1080
          Facsimile: (310) 975 1095
          E-mail: njohnson@jjllplaw.com
                  djohnson@jjllplaw.com
                  adayalan@jjllplaw.com

               - and -

          Clifford H. Pearson, Esq.
          Daniel L. Warshaw, Esq.
          PEARSON, SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP
          15165 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 400
          Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
          Telephone: (818) 788-8300
          Facsimile: (818) 788-8104
          E-mail: cpearson@pswlaw.com
                  dwarshaw@pswlaw.com
                  bpouya@pswlaw.com

               - and -

          Paul R. Kiesel, Esq.
          Jeffrey A. Koncius, Esq.
          Nicole Ramirez, Esq.
          KIESEL LAW LLP
          8648 Wilshire Boulevard
          Beverly Hills, CA 90211-2910
          Telephone: (310) 854 4444
          Facsimile: (310) 854 0812
          E-mail: kiesel@kiesel.law
                  koncius@kiesel.law
                  ramirez@kiesel.law


SOOTHE INC: Herrera Seeks to Stop Sending of Unsolicited Texts
--------------------------------------------------------------
Antoinette Herrera, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Soothe, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Case
No. 2:18-cv-08318 (C.D. Cal., September 26, 2018), seeks to stop
the Defendant's alleged practice of sending unsolicited text
messages to cellular telephones without procuring consumers' prior
express written consent, in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

Soothe, Inc., is a corporation incorporated and existing under the
laws of the state of Delaware whose primary place of business and
corporate headquarters is located in Los Angeles, California.

Soothe is a multinational in-home massage service provider.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Aaron D. Aftergood, Esq.
          THE AFTERGOOD LAW FIRM
          1880 Century Park East, Suite 200
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 551-5221
          Facsimile: (310) 496-2840
          E-mail: aaron@aftergoodesq.com

               - and -

          Steven L. Woodrow, Esq.
          Patrick H. Peluso, Esq.
          Taylor T. Smith, Esq.
          WOODROW & PELUSO, LLC
          3900 East Mexico Avenue, Suite 300
          Denver, CO 80210
          Telephone: (720) 213-0675
          Facsimile: (303) 927-0809
          E-mail: swoodrow@woodrowpeluso.com
                  ppeluso@woodrowpeluso.com
                  tsmith@woodrowpeluso.com


SPECIALTY RESCUE: Porter Seeks to Recoup Minimum & Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LYNDON PORTER, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated under 29 USC 216(b) v. SPECIALTY RESCUE & FIRE SERVICE,
LLC, Case No. 3:18-cv-02584-G (N.D. Tex., September 27, 2018),
seeks to recover alleged unpaid minimum wage and overtime
compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

Specialty Rescue & Fire Service, LLC, is a Texas limited liability
company.  The primary function of the Defendant's business is
Emergency Response training, Consulting and Equipment service, to
include servicing confined space equipment, such as silos.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Drew N. Herrmann, Esq.
          Pamela G. Herrmann, Esq.
          HERRMANN LAW, PLLC
          801 Cherry St., Suite 2365
          Fort Worth, TX 76102
          Telephone: (817) 479-9229
          Facsimile: (817) 887-1878
          E-mail: drew@herrmannlaw.com
                  pamela@herrmannlaw.com


SPENCE FENCE: Slover Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Spence Fence Company
Enterprises. The case is styled as Jimmy Slover on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Spence Fence Company Enterprises,
a California Corporation, Defendant, Case No. VCU275839 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Tulare Cty., Oct. 5, 2018).

Spence Fence does many different styles of ornamental iron fencing.
They produce wood fencing for most major homebuilders from Tulare,
Kings, and Fresno counties to Paso Robles. They also do specialty
jobs such as The College of the Sequoias' ballfield, which you can
see when driving down Route 198 in Visalia. Chain link fencing is
done for residential and commercial properties and they make their
own chain link gates in their in-house welding shop.[BN]





STARBUCKS CORP: 9th Cir. Revives Off-Clock Work Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that following guidance by the
California Supreme Court received in July, a Ninth Circuit panel on
Sept. 25 revived a potential labor class action by Starbucks
employees in the Golden State who claim they should be paid for
menial tasks like closing and locking up stores.


STREMICK'S HERITAGE: Mislabels Kern's Fruit Juices, Levin Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DEBORAH LEVIN, on behalf of herself, all others similarly situated,
and the general public v. STREMICK'S HERITAGE FOODS, a Delaware
Limited Liability Company, Case No. 8:18-cv-01748 (C.D. Cal.,
September 26, 2018), alleges that the Defendant falsely advertised
certain products in California, including Kern's Guava, Apricot,
and Peach Nectar.

The Products' labels convey to the consumer that these are healthy,
natural beverages, brimming with healthful fruit juices. But this
is simply false, Ms. Levin contends.  She alleges that the Products
consist of water and high fructose corn syrup with minimal amounts
of fruit puree and 31% or less of the juice of the fruit the
Products are named for.

Stremick's Heritage Foods, LLC, is a Delaware limited liability
company with its headquarters and principal place of business in
Santa Ana, California.

Stremick's manufactures, packages, labels, advertises, markets,
distributes, and sells the Products in California and throughout
the United States.  Stremick's sells fruit-flavored beverage
products under the trade name "Kern's."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ronald A. Marron, Esq.
          Michael T. Houchin, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF RONALD A. MARRON
          651 Arroyo Drive
          San Diego, CA 92103
          Telephone: (619) 696-9006
          Facsimile: (619) 564-6665
          E-mail: ron@consumersadvocates.com
                  mike@consumersadvocates.com


TESLA ENERGY: Zamorano Seeks Unpaid Wages under Labor Code
----------------------------------------------------------
SALVADOR ZAMORANO on behalf of himself, all others similarly
situated, and on behalf of the general
public, the Plaintiff, v. TESLA ENERGY OPERATIONS, INC. and DOES
1-100, the Defendants, Case No. 37-2018-00043430-CU-OE-CTL (Cal.
Super. Ct., Sept. 25, 2018), alleges that the Defendants did not:

     -- pay compensation for all time worked at the straight or
        overtime rate,

     -- provide accurate itemized wage statements,

     -- provide paid sick days for all hours worked, and

     -- pay wages due upon termination under the California
        Labor Code.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff worked a shift of at
least five hours without receiving a meal period and worked four
hours, or a major fraction, without receiving a 10 minute net rest
break. The Plaintiff was employed in the State of California by the
Defendants as a non­-exempt panel installer in California during
the relevant time period. The Plaintiff was employed in a
non-exempt capacity.

The Defendants are engaged in the ownership and operation of
facilities which manufacture and distribute solar energy equipment
located within San Diego County and throughout California.[BN]

Attorneys for Salvador Zamorano, on behalf of himself, all others
similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public:

          William Turley, Esq.
          David Mara, Esq.
          Jill Vecchi, Esq.
          Nikki Ousdahl, Esq.
          THE TURLEY & MARA LAW FIRM, APLC
          7428 Trade Street
          San Diego, CA 92121
          Telephone: (619) 234 2833
          Facsimile: (619) 234 4048


THOMAS REUTERS: Court Stay Landry FCRA Suit
-------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire
issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Stay in the case
captioned Ryan Landry, Plaintiff, v. Thomson Reuters Corporation,
Defendant. Case No. 16-cv-507-SM. (D.N.H.)

Pending before the court is TRC's motion to stay these proceedings
pending resolution of the ongoing arbitration between Landry and
Time Warner.

Plaintiff, Ryan Landry, filed this proposed class action against
his former employer, Time Warner Cable, as well as Thomson Reuters
Corporation. Landry alleged that Time Warner violated various
provisions of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), as well
as New Hampshire's statutory analogue.

Authority to Stay Proceedings

In determining whether it is appropriate to stay litigation pending
the outcome of related arbitration proceedings, courts consider
several factors, including: (1) whether a stay will unduly
prejudice or tactically disadvantage the nonmoving party; (2)
whether a stay could serve to clarify and/or simplify the remaining
issues to be litigated; and (3) whether the case is at an early
stage (e.g., whether discovery has been completed, whether a trial
date has been set, etc.).

Here, TRC asserts that all relevant factors counsel in favor of
granting its requested stay. But, its focus is primarily on the
second of those factors: whether staying this proceeding while
Landry arbitrates his claims against Time Warner would clarify
and/or simplify the issues to be litigated in this case.

Standing and the Nature of Landry's Claims

In the context of an FCRA claim, the Court concluded that, to have
standing, a plaintiff must have suffered some actual harm   that
is, an injury in fact. A claim alleging a bare procedural violation
of the FCRA, divorced from any concrete harm, is insufficient.
Consequently, the Court noted, a plaintiff does not necessarily
have standing simply because he or she can identify some procedural
statutory violation in a setting in which Congress has made
statutory damages available to those who are unable (or for whom it
would be difficult) to prove actual damages.

Here, Landry's amended complaint adequately alleges that TRC's
violations of the FCRA actually harm, or present a material risk of
harm to, the concrete interests Congress enacted the FCRA to
protect. Specifically, he alleges that TRC's various violations of
the FCRA resulted in the dissemination of a consumer credit report
without his knowledge or permission that contained outdated and
materially false information including the false statement that he
was convicted of a crime, and served a prison sentence, in Texas.
Plainly, those are the types of reputational harms flowing from the
publication of false and damaging information that Congress sought
to prevent when it enacted the FCRA.  

Consequently, even if Landry cannot demonstrate that his discharge
was related to TRC's credit report, his amended complaint
adequately alleges concrete and particularized harms, proximately
caused by TRC's violations of the FCRA, sufficient to vest him with
standing.

A Stay is Appropriate

In his amended complaint, Landry alleges that, as a result of TRC's
willful violations of the FCRA, he and other members of the
proposed classes have suffered and continue to suffer damages.

But, the amended complaint does not allege that any of the
inaccurate or outdated factual statements about Landry as contained
in the TRC report were disseminated to anyone outside of the two
members Time Warner's Corporate Security Division with whom he met.
He does not, for example, claim he lost employment opportunities
with other entities as a result of the TRC report, or that he was
denied credit, or that he suffered reputation injury in the
community.

Accordingly, his efforts to recover actual damages from TRC would
appear to be linked directly to his ability to establish that Time
Warner relied upon TRC's report when it decided to terminate his
employment.

On balance, then, the factors relevant to the court's determination
regarding appropriateness of a stay counsel in favor of such a
stay. First, the pending arbitration proceedings will likely
clarify and/or simplify material issues to be litigated in this
action. Moreover, Landry has not suggested that a stay would cause
him to suffer undue prejudice or tactically disadvantage him. And,
finally, this proceeding is at a relatively early stage: Landry
filed his amended complaint against TRC less than two months ago, a
scheduling order has yet to issue, and the parties have yet to
engage in discovery.

Thomson Reuters Corporation's Motion to Stay Proceedings is
granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 24, 2018 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7w7qc9e from Leagle.com.

Ryan Landry, Plaintiff, represented by Amy E. Tabor, Caddell &
Chapman, pro hac vice, Michael A. Caddell, Caddell & Chapman, pro
hac vice, Benjamin J. Wyatt, Wyatt Law Offices & Michael Varraso,
Wyatt Law Offices.

Thomson Reuters Corporation, Defendant, represented by Eric Bosset
-- ebosset@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP, pro hac vice,
Geoffrey J. Vitt -- gvitt@vittandassociates.com -- Vitt &
Associates PLC & Neil K. Roman -- nroman@cov.com -- Covington &
Burling LLP, pro hac vice.


THRIVE CAUSEMETICS: Barker Suit Removed to W.D. Wash.
-----------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Sara M. Barker, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Thrive Causemetics,
Inc. a Delaware corporation, Karissa Bodnar, an individual,
Defendants, Case No. 18-00002-21685-1 was removed from King County
Superior Court to the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington on Oct. 5, 2018, and assigned Case No.
2:18-cv-01470.

Thrive Causemetics, Inc. develops eyeliners, false eyelashes and
related adhesives. The company was incorporated in 2015 and is
based in Seattle, Washington.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Elizabeth Ann Hanley, Esq.
     REED LONGYEAR MALNATI & AHRENS
     801 SECOND AVE
     1415 NORTON BLDG
     SEATTLE, WA 98104-1522
     Phone: (206) 624-6271
     Fax: (206) 624-6672
     Email: ehanley@reedlongyearlaw.com

          - and -

     Eric Riley Nusser, Esq.
     TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC
     936 NORTH 34TH STREET, STE 300
     SEATTLE, WA 98103-8869
     Phone: (206) 816-6603
     Email: eric@terrellmarshall.com

          - and -

     Toby James Marshall, Esq.
     TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC
     936 NORTH 34TH STREET, STE 300
     SEATTLE, WA 98103-8869
     Phone: (206) 816-6603
     Fax: (206) 319-5450
     Email: tmarshall@terrellmarshall.com

The Defendants are represented by:

     John S. Devlin, III, Esq.
     LANE POWELL PC
     1420 FIFTH AVENUE, SUITE 4200
     SEATTLE, WA 98111-9402
     Phone: (206) 223-7000
     Fax: 223-7107
     Email: devlinj@lanepowell.com

          - and -

     Erin M Wilson, Esq.
     LANE POWELL PC
     1420 FIFTH AVENUE, SUITE 4200
     SEATTLE, WA 98101-2338
     Phone: (206) 233-7432
     Email: wilsonem@lanepowell.com

          - and -

     Taylor Washburn, Esq.
     LANE POWELL PC
     1420 FIFTH AVENUE, SUITE 4200
     SEATTLE, WA 98111-9402
     Phone: (206) 223-7000
     Email: washburnt@lanepowell.com



TOKASH ENTERPRISES: Venegas Seeks OT Pay under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------
JUAN VENEGAS on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. TOKASH ENTERPRISES, INC. d/b/a DEAN'S
GREENS, GILLETTE AMOCO, INC., ROBERT TOKASH, individually, and
NADINE TOKASH, individually, the Defendants, Case No. Case
2:18-cv-14264 (D.N.J., Sept. 25, 2018), seeks recovery against the
Defendants for its violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the New Jersey State Wage and Hour Law.

The Plaintiff brings this lawsuit against the Defendants as a
collective action on behalf of himself and all other persons
similarly situated laborers who suffered damages as a result of the
Defendants' violations of the FLSA pursuant to the collective
action provisions of 29 U.S.C. section 216(b), and as a class
action pursuant to Rule 23.

According to the complaint, beginning in 2004, and continuing
through November 2017, the Defendants engaged in a policy and
practice of requiring the Plaintiff and members of the putative
collective to regularly work in excess of 40 hours per week,
without providing overtime compensation as required by applicable
federal and New Jersey state law. The Plaintiff has initiated this
action on behalf of himself and similarly situated employees to
recover the overtime compensation that the Plaintiff and similarly
situated employees were deprived of, plus damages, attorneys' fees,
and costs.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class:

          Andrew I. Glenn, Esq.
          Jodi J. Jaffe, Esq.
          JAFFE GLENN LAW GROUP, P.A.
          301 N. Harrison Street, Suite 9F, #306
          Princeton, NJ 08540
          Telephone: (201) 687-9977
          Facsimile: (201) 595-0308
          E-mail: Aglenn@jaffeglenn.com
                  jjaffe@JaffeGlenn.com


TUESDAY MORNING: Court Approves Settlement in Castillo Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Tuesday Morning Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year
ended June 30, 2018, that the court approved the parties settlement
in the purported class action suit initiated by Jerry Castillo.

The Company was a defendant in a purported class action lawsuit,
Jerry Castillo v. Tuesday Morning Inc., which was filed on December
28, 2017 in the United States District Court, Middle District of
Florida. The case was brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and included allegations that the Company violated various wage and
hour labor laws. Relief was sought on behalf of current and former
Company employees.

The lawsuit sought to recover damages, penalties and attorneys'
fees as a result of the alleged violations.

The matter settled for an amount not material to the Company on
July 6, 2018 and the Court approved the settlement on July 9,
2018.

Tuesday Morning Corporation operates as a retailer of products for
the home in the United States. The company offers various products,
such as upscale home textiles, home furnishings, housewares,
gourmet food products, toys, and seasonal décor products. Tuesday
Morning Corporation was founded in 1974 and is headquartered in
Dallas, Texas.


TUESDAY MORNING: Court Approves Settlement in Velarde Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Tuesday Morning Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year
ended June 30, 2018, that court approved the parties settlement in
the purported class action lawsuit filed by Hector Velarde.

The Company was a defendant in a purported class action lawsuit,
Hector Velarde, on behalf of himself and all other similar
situated, Pltf. vs. Tuesday Morning, Inc., which was filed on
February 26, 2018 in state court and was pending in the United
States District Court, Central District of California.

The case was brought under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California
Code Section 51 ci seq. ("Unruh Act"), the California Disabled
persons Act, California Civil Code Section 54 et seq. ("CDPA"), and
Cal. Civ. Code Section 55 et seq. and included allegations that the
Company violated various public access laws.

The lawsuit sought to recover damages, penalties and attorneys'
fees as a result of the alleged violations.

The matter settled for an amount not material to the Company on
July 2, 2018 and the Court approved the settlement on July 11,
2018.

Tuesday Morning Corporation operates as a retailer of products for
the home in the United States. The company offers various products,
such as upscale home textiles, home furnishings, housewares,
gourmet food products, toys, and seasonal décor products. Tuesday
Morning Corporation was founded in 1974 and is headquartered in
Dallas, Texas.


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Can Force Drivers to Arbitrate Claims
--------------------------------------------------------
Matthew Renda, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
in a key legal victory for ride-hail giant Uber, a Ninth Circuit
panel on Sept. 25 found an arbitrator, not a judge, has authority
to decide whether drivers' beef over being classified as
independent contractors should be arbitrated or resolved via class
action.

The three-judge panel unanimously ruled that a federal judge
erroneously asserted jurisdiction when he denied Uber's motion to
compel arbitration in favor of a class action.  Accordingly, the
panel also tossed the judge's certification of the class since the
matter of whether the claims can be arbitrated must be decided
first.

The Sept. 25 opinion, written by Senior U.S. Circuit Judge Richard
Clifton, comes amid increasing concern over arbitration agreements
that employees sign, sometimes mandatorily as a condition of
employment, that forfeits their right to join class actions while
promising to handle any disputes in arbitration.

Consumer advocates decry the trend of arbitration agreements,
saying arbitration is less transparent and can't be appealed.  But
proponents say the process is more streamlined, just as fair,
prevents frivolous lawsuits and helps companies save money by not
having to defend a litany of suits aimed at shaking them down.

The Uber case centered on whether employees are appropriately
categorized as independent contractors or if Uber avoids
categorizing drivers as employees to duck offering benefits like
health insurance, overtime and retirement plans.

At oral argument, the plaintiffs said the panel should not let Uber
compel arbitration for several of its class members because the
lead plaintiff opted out of arbitration -- a decision that was good
enough for the entire class.

But the panel called the legal reasoning flawed.

"Nothing gave the O'Connor lead plaintiffs the authority to take
that action on behalf of and binding other drivers," Judge Clifton
wrote in the 19-page opinion.

The plaintiffs also argued the arbitration agreement violated labor
laws, a point that led the panel to wait for the U.S. Supreme Court
to decide a similar question in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis.  The
high court's 2018 in Epic invalidated the plaintiffs' argument in
the Uber case.

"The district court's orders denying Uber's motions to compel
arbitration in O'Connor, Yucesoy, and Del Rio must be reversed,"
Clifton wrote.

Finally, because the case against Uber was brought by some who
opted out of arbitration and some who did not, the panel held class
certification must be revisited.

"The class as certified includes drivers who entered into
agreements to arbitrate their claims and to waive their right to
participate in a class action with regard to those claims," Judge
Clifton noted, adding it's up to the arbitrator -- not the federal
judge -- to decide whether the agreements are enforceable.

The panel remanded the case to the lower court for further
proceedings.


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Class Action Settlement Gets Prelim. Court OK
----------------------------------------------------------------
Helen Christophi, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported
that a federal judge in San Francisco said on Sept. 27 he'll
preliminarily approve a $345,622 class action settlement between
Uber and a class of drivers accusing the ride-hail of shortchanging
them using its "upfront" pricing model.

But U.S. District Judge William Alsup said in an afternoon hearing
he'd sign off on the deal only if Uber agrees to release only the
specific contract claim certified in the case, brought by North
Carolina driver Martin Dulberg in February 2017.

"You're only releasing the breach of contract claim asserted here,"
Judge Alsup told Uber's attorney Randall Edwards --
redwards@omm.com -- of O'Melveny & Myers.  "If you don't want to do
that, I'm going to reject your deal.  I'm not going to let Uber get
away on wiping the slate clean on claims not litigated in this
case."

In his complaint, Mr. Dulberg claimed Uber stopped giving drivers
the 80 percent of fares it had promised them in a 2015 driver
contract when it switched to its upfront pricing model the
following year.

The 2016 pricing model calculated fares before a ride so riders
knew how much they would be charged.  Uber previously calculated a
rider's fare at the end of a ride based on actual time and distance
driven.

Mr. Dulberg alleged the upfront pricing model used "aggressive"
time and distance estimates to calculate fares, often resulting in
fares higher than what a passenger would have paid under the old
model.

But instead of giving drivers the higher payments they were owed
for the higher upfront fares, Mr. Dulberg said, Uber performed a
separate calculation after the ride was over based on actual time
and distance driven, and paid drivers 80 percent of that lower
fare. Ultimately, drivers got less than the 80 percent of the
rider-assessed fare promised them under their contract, he said.

Uber, however, insisted drivers were paid based on actual time and
distance driven.  It said drivers' fare calculations remained the
same under the upfront model, and that most drivers got more money
under it.

In the Sept. 27 hearing, Judge Alsup said he was concerned with the
claim-release language in the proposed settlement agreement. The
language states the release covers only claims related to contract
cause of action related to the alleged breach of the driver
agreement based on Uber's upfront pricing model.

And Mr. Edwards said Uber was entitled to release of good faith,
unjust enrichment and other claims brought in the original
complaint.

But Judge Alsup ordered the parties to redo the release language to
specify only the certified contract claim would be released, so
Uber wouldn't try to get similar class actions dismissed.

"I'm not going to let you wipe the slate clean of future contract
cases," Judge Alsup reiterated to  Mr. Edwards, adding that
otherwise, "some other class gets the shaft."

The judge also said he would likely deny Mr. Dulberg's request for
a $5,000 award for prosecuting the case.

"If it's not good enough for the plaintiff, it's not good enough
for the class members," Judge Alsup said.

The class contains 4,594 members nationwide, according to the
proposed settlement agreement.

After the hearing, class counsel Samuel Moorehead of Napoli
Shkolnick was optimistic Judge Alsup would green-light the
settlement.

"We have a full and fair settlement of these claims, the judge
recognizes that," he said. "The judge, in extra consideration of
other non-related claims that might come up, has asked us to
basically tighten up the language, but it does appear the
settlement is going through and that the drivers who were
prejudiced by Uber's pricing scheme will be fully compensated for
their damages."

An Uber spokesperson did not return an email seeking comment on
Sept. 27.


UNITED STATES: USCIS Seeks 9th Cir. Review of A.A. Suit Ruling
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, et
al., filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit titled
A.A., et al. v. USCIS, et al., Case No. 2:15-cv-00813-JLR, in the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington,
Seattle.

The appellate case is captioned as NWIRP, et al. v. USCIS, et al.,
Case No. 18-35806, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Judge James L.
Lobart (i) granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
motion to supplement the administrative record, and (ii) granted in
part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' cross-motion to supplement
the administrative record.

Through the injunctive class action, the Plaintiffs seek to compel
USCIS to abide by regulatory deadlines for adjudicating
applications for employment authorization documents ("EADs") filed
by asylum applicants.  The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants
have failed to adjudicate EADs within the regulatory timeframe,
which constitutes unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed
agency action.

The Plaintiffs filed the putative class action on May 22, 2015,
because the Defendants failed to adjudicate I-765 forms within the
regulatory deadline.  On Nov. 4, 2016, they Plaintiffs filed a
third motion for class certification, and the Defendants
subsequently filed a third motion to dismiss.  The Court denied and
dismissed the Plaintiffs' proposed "90-Day" subclass, but certified
their "30-Day" subclass.

The "30-Day" class is defined as noncitizens who have filed or will
file applications for employment authorization that were not or
will not be adjudicated within 30 days and who have not or will not
be granted interim employment authorization.  This class consists
of only those applicants for whom 30 days has accrued or will
accrue under the applicable regulations.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellants L. Francis Cissna, Kirstjen Nielsen, U.S.
      Department of Homeland Security and United States
      Citizenship and Immigration Services' opening brief is due
      on November 20, 2018;

   -- Appellees A. A., W. H. and Antonio Machic Yac's answering
      brief is due on December 20, 2018; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees W. H., Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, A. A. and ANTONIO MACHIC YAC are
represented by:

          Trina A. Realmuto, Esq.
          AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL
          100 Summer Street, 23rd Floor
          Boston, MA 02110
          Telephone: (617) 513-0802
          E-mail: trealmuto@immcouncil.org

               - and -

          Christopher Strawn, Esq.
          NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT
          615 Second Avenue
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (206) 957-8628
          E-mail: strawn@uw.edu

               - and -

          Devin T. Theriot-Orr, Esq.
          SUNBIRD LAW, PLLC
          1001 Fourth Avenue, 3200
          Seattle, WA 98154
          Telephone: (206) 962-5052
          E-mail: devin@sunbird.law

               - and -

          Marc Van Der Hout, Esq.
          VAN DER HOUT, BRIGAGLIANO & NIGHTINGALE, LLP
          180 Sutter Street
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 981-3000
          Facsimile: (415) 981-3003
          E-mail: mv@vblaw.com

Defendants-Appellants UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVICES; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; L. FRANCIS CISSNA,
Director of USCIS; and KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, Secretary of DHS are
represented by:

          Helen J. Brunner, Esq.
          DOJ - OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY
          700 Stewart Street
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 553-5172
          E-mail: micki.brunner@usdoj.gov

               - and -

          Jeffrey S. Robins, Esq.
          DOJ - U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          P.O. Box 868
          Ben Franklin Station
          Washington, DC 20044
          Telephone: (202) 616-1246
          E-mail: jeffrey.robins@usdoj.gov


VENETIAN CASINO: Court Conditionally Certifies Housekeepers Class
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class for
Conditional Certification in the case captioned USTAFA YOUSIF and
SHARONE WALKER on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE VENETIAN CASINO RESORT, LLC; LAS VEGAS
SANDS, CORP.; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants. Case
No. 2:16-cv-02941-RFB-NKJ. (D. Nev.).

The Defendants employed the Plaintiffs as non-exempt hourly paid
housekeepers at the Venetian/Palazzo. At the time of separation of
employment, Plaintiffs Mustafa Yousif and Sharone Walker were each
making about $17.44 per hour. The Plaintiffs regularly worked five
shifts per week, at least eight hours per shift, and at least forty
hours per workweek.

Conditional Certification

In a suit brought under the FLSA, an action may be maintained
against an employer by any one or more employees for and in behalf
of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. No
employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he
gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such
consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.

The Plaintiffs' proposed notice states:

     To participate in this lawsuit, you must have been employed as
a housekeeper by THE VENETIAN/PALAZZO CASINO RESORT, LLC; LAS VEGAS
SANDS, CORP at any time from October 27, 2013 to the present and
you were not paid compensation for the time it took you to obtain
your work station assignment for the day, load and fill your
cleaning carts with items required to complete your daily work
duties, and attend pre-shift meetings prior to clocking in for your
regularly scheduled shift and/or completing room assignments after
clocking out.

The proposed class is sufficiently similarly situated. The
Plaintiffs provide substantial allegations that the putative class
members worked pre-shift and post-shift hours without pay while
employed as housekeepers by Defendants, supported by the
declarations of several employees with personal knowledge of the
relevant policies.

The Defendants' various contentions that the proposed notice is
misleading and lacks required
information are without merit.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 24, 2018 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/ydbxukej from Leagle.com.

Mustafa Yousif & Sharone Walker, Plaintiffs, represented by Joshua
D. Buck -- josh@thiermanbuck.com -- Thierman Buck, LLP, Leah Lin
Jones -- leah@thiermanbuck.com -- Thierman Buck, LLP & Mark R.
Thierman -- mark@thiermanbuck.com -- Thierman Buck, LLP.

The Venetian Casino Resort, LLC & Las Vegas Sands, Corp.,
Defendants, represented by Anthony L. Martin --
anthony.martin@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart, P.C., Patrick F. Hulla -- Ogletree Deakins, pro hac vice &
Dana B. Salmonson -- dana.salmonson@ogletree.com -- Ogletree
Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C.


VF OUTDOOR: Faces Burbon Suit Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
--------------------------------------------------------------
LUC BURBON, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
v. VF OUTDOOR, LLC d/b/a NORTHFACE, Case No. 1:18-cv-08879
(S.D.N.Y., September 27, 2018), is a civil rights action brought
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act arising from the
Defendant's alleged failure to design, construct, maintain, and
operate its Web site -- http://www.thenorthface.com/-- to be fully
accessible to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other
blind or visually-impaired people.

VF Outdoor, LLC, is a Delaware Limited Liability Company licensed
to do business and doing business in the state of New York.  The
Company operates NORTHFACE clothing stores and its Web site.  The
Company advertises, markets, distributes, and sells clothing and
related accessories.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Telephone: (929) 575-4175
          Facsimile: (929) 575-4195
          E-mail: Joseph@cml.legal

               - and -

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003-2461
          Telephone: (212) 228-9795
          Facsimile: (212) 982-6284
          E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
                  danalgottlieb@aol.com


ZWICKER & ASSOCIATES: Campo Files Suit Alleging FDCPA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------------
Zwicker & Associates, P.C. is facing a class action lawsuit under
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The case is styled as Susanne Campo on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Zwicker & Associates, P.C.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-05637 (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 9, 2018).

Zwicker & Associates, P.C. operates as a law firm. The Company
offers debt collection and other legal services to various sectors.
Zwicker & Associates serves clients in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Mitchell L. Pashkin, Esq.
     775 Park Avenue, Ste. 255
     Huntington, NY 11743
     Phone: (631) 335-1107
     Email: mpash@verizon.net


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: 203 Cases vs. CECO Still Pending at June 30
------------------------------------------------------------
CECO Environmental Corp. still defends itself against 203 pending
asbestos-related cases as of June 30, 2018, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Our subsidiary, Met-Pro Technologies LLC
("Met-Pro"), beginning in 2002, began to be named in
asbestos-related lawsuits filed against a large number of
industrial companies including, in particular, those in the pump
and fluid handling industries.  In management's opinion, the
complaints typically have been vague, general and speculative,
alleging that Met-Pro, along with the numerous other defendants,
sold unidentified asbestos-containing products and engaged in other
related actions which caused injuries (including death) and loss to
the plaintiffs.  Counsel has advised that more recent cases
typically allege more serious claims of mesothelioma.  The
Company's insurers have hired attorneys who, together with the
Company, are vigorously defending these cases.  Many cases have
been dismissed after the plaintiff fails to produce evidence of
exposure to Met-Pro's products.  In those cases, where evidence has
been produced, the Company's experience has been that the exposure
levels are low and the Company's position has been that its
products were not a cause of death, injury or loss.  The Company
has been dismissed from or settled a large number of these cases.
Cumulative settlement payments from 2002 through June 30, 2018 for
cases involving asbestos-related claims were US$2.9 million, of
which, together with all legal fees other than corporate counsel
expenses, US$2.8 million has been paid by the Company's insurers.
The average cost per settled claim, excluding legal fees, was
approximately US$37,000.

"Based upon the most recent information available to the Company
regarding such claims, there were a total of 203 cases pending
against the Company as of June 30, 2018 (with Illinois, New York,
Pennsylvania and West Virginia having the largest number of cases),
as compared with 218 cases that were pending as of December 31,
2017.  During the six months ended June 30, 2018, 53 new cases were
filed against the Company, and the Company was dismissed from 29
cases and settled 39 cases.  Most of the pending cases have not
advanced beyond the early stages of discovery, although a number of
cases are on schedules leading to, or are scheduled for trial.  The
Company believes that its insurance coverage is adequate for the
cases currently pending against the Company and for the foreseeable
future, assuming a continuation of the current volume, nature of
cases and settlement amounts.  However, the Company has no control
over the number and nature of cases that are filed against it, nor
as to the financial health of its insurers or their position as to
coverage.  The Company also presently believes that none of the
pending cases will have a material adverse impact upon the
Company's results of operations, liquidity or financial
condition."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2y9HeNA


ASBESTOS UPDATE: 3rd Cir. Affirms Montana Claims Fit Injunction
---------------------------------------------------------------
Mass-tort liability of entities with asbestos operations typically
results in their filing for bankruptcy protection. The Bankruptcy
Code allows a court to supplement a confirmed plan of
reorganization by entering an injunction that channels this
liability to a trust set up to compensate persons injured by the
debtor's asbestos. In certain circumstances, channeling injunctions
can also protect the interests of non-debtors, such as insurers.

The Plaintiffs are a group of individuals suffering from asbestos
disease as a result of exposure to the asbestos mining and
processing operations in Libby, Montana of W.R. Grace & Co. and its
related entities. They seek to hold Grace's insurers, Continental
Casualty Company and Transportation Insurance Company (collectively
"CNA"), liable under various state-law negligence theories for
their injuries (the "Montana Claims"). CNA, however, seeks to
enforce third-party-claims channeling injunction entered under
Grace's confirmed plan of reorganization to bar the Montana
Plaintiffs' action.

Plaintiffs filed the Montana Claims in that State against CNA,
alleging it breached a duty of care. Plaintiffs alleged that CNA
was negligent in inspection of the Grace Libby operations, in
failing to report and act upon known hazardous conditions due to
insufficient worker education, insufficient warnings to workers,
their families and to the community, insufficient dust control . .
., and insufficient medical monitoring. As a direct and proximate
result of the negligence of CNA, Plaintiffs have suffered from
asbestos-related bodily injuries and incurred the damages alleged
herein.

CNA filed a complaint in the Bankruptcy Court seeking a declaratory
judgment that the Montana Claims fall under the Injunction and
accordingly must be enjoined and channeled to the Trust. The
Montana Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss and CNA filed a motion
for summary judgment. The Asbestos PI Trust filed a brief as amicus
curiae in support of CNA. The court, after hearing oral argument on
the motions, decided the Montana Claims must be enjoined and thus
denied the Montana Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss and granted
summary judgment to CNA.

The court then decided the Montana Claims can only exist "by reason
of" CNA's provision of insurance to Grace because any alleged duty
CNA has to conduct industrial hygiene services arises from the
parties' insurance policies. The court also ruled the Injunction
does not exceed the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction because the
Trust has a contractual obligation to reimburse CNA for liability
from personal injury claims (including the Montana Claims)
affecting the assets of the bankruptcy estate. Finally, it rejected
the Montana Plaintiffs' assertion that CNA's providing insurance is
not legally relevant to the Montana Claims, finding instead that
they stem from CNA's insurance to Grace.

The question raised in the appealed is whether the claims of
plaintiffs in the litigation that begun in Montana fit a channeling
injunction's coverage.

As the Montana Claims fit the text of the Injunction and are not
excluded from it, the Third Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals affirms the Bankruptcy Court's decision as it pertains to
this issue. The Court, however, does not decide whether it could
bar the Montana Claims within the limits of 11 U.S.C. Section
524(g)(4). Instead, the Court vacates this portion of the court's
decision and remands for it to make this determination with these
guidelines:

     (a) to determine whether a claim seeks to hold a third party
derivatively liable for the debtor, the Court must decide whether
the third-party's alleged liability is "wholly separate" from the
debtor's liability under the applicable law or instead depends on
it; and

     (b) even assuming the statutory relationship must be a
"legally relevant factor" to the third-party's alleged liability,
the court should decide whether it is relevant to the elements
required for the liability alleged under the applicable law.

Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes bankruptcy courts
to form a trust and issue an injunction to channel certain claims
to that trust in conjunction with a confirmed plan of
reorganization in asbestos bankruptcies. The injunction bars
asbestos-related actions against the debtor and claims against
certain third parties who are alleged to be directly or indirectly
liable for the debtor's conduct along with claims or demands
against it. Instead, those actions are directed to the trust,
"generally funded by insurance proceeds and securities in the
reorganized debtor," which assumes the asbestos liabilities

The Third Circuit concludes that the CNA Policies are among those
covered by the Injunction's terms, though buried in a befuddling
maze of defined terms, and that the Montana Claims do not fall
under the Injunction's workers' compensation exclusion. Claims
barred by the Injunction include tort claims made against certain
protected third parties directly or indirectly resulting from
personal injury and exposure to Grace's asbestos. Third parties
protected from these claims include CNA and other insurance
companies who entered into settlement agreements with Grace. They
are protected, however, only to the extent their policies are
identified as subject to a settlement agreement.

The Third Circuit finds that twenty-five CNA policies are
identified in the Settlement Agreement, along with a catch-all for
"all known and unknown policies, or portions of policies," issued
by CNA to Grace through June 30, 1985 that actually or potentially
provide insurance coverage for asbestos-related claims of bodily
injury. These asbestos-related claims include any made against
Grace or CNA "arising in whole or in part (directly or indirectly)
by reason of" CNA's provision of insurance to Grace, if these
claims involve bodily injury caused by Grace's asbestos. The
Settlement Agreement specifically covers any claims alleging CNA
has a duty to provide industrial hygiene, conduct inspections,
provide warnings or educational services, or protect third parties
from the danger of asbestos exposure. As noted, excluded from
protection are any rights or obligations that pertain solely to
CNA's coverage for state workers' compensation benefits.

The Montana Plaintiffs argue the CNA Workers' Compensation &
Employers' Liability Policies are not included among the 25 listed
policies and thus are not covered by the Injunction. The Third
Circuit, however, finds that CNA entered into a settlement
agreement with Grace, that the catch-all for all "known and unknown
policies" includes the CNA Policies, and that the CNA Policies
provide coverage for bodily injuries caused by Grace asbestos.
Hence they are covered by the Injunction though they are not
specifically listed.

Plaintiffs further contend that claims against CNA may not be
enjoined because it is a workers' compensation insurer. The Third
Circuit explains that this argument misreads the workers'
compensation carve-out: "it excludes from the Injunction rights or
obligations that pertain solely to workers' compensation benefits."
The Third Circuit points out that CNA provided not only workers'
compensation coverage but also employers' liability coverage;
provisions of the CNA Policies that pertain to both workers'
compensation and employers' liability coverage do not "pertain
solely" to workers' compensation and thus are not excluded. The
provisions relevant to the Montana Claims -- those that give CNA
the right, but not the obligation, to inspect the Libby Facility's
industrial hygiene -- apply to both types of coverage. They appear
outside the sections on employers' liability and workers'
compensation, and, unlike other provisions in the CNA Policies,
they contain no indication that they apply to one type of coverage
to the exclusion of the other. Accordingly, claims tied to these
provisions are barred by the Injunction's terms.

The Third Circuit clarifies that the provisions of the CNA Policies
that solely cover claims to state workers' compensation benefits
are excluded from the terms of the Injunction, and, moreover, the
Montana Plaintiffs do not allege any violation of state workers'
compensation laws. In this context, the Third Circuit finds no risk
that the Grace Plan or the Settlement Agreement would preempt
Montana workers' compensation law.

The Montana Plaintiffs also argue that the Settlement Agreement
provision allowing for $13 million in reimbursements to CNA for any
payments made for asbestos personal injury claims does not confer
jurisdiction on the Bankruptcy Court to enjoin the Montana Claims.
Whether the Court had jurisdiction was not an issue before it.
Rather, the Court discussed its jurisdiction in the context of
addressing the Montana Plaintiffs' argument that third-party-claims
channeling injunctions under Section 524(g)(4) are limited to
claims against insurance proceeds. The Court rejected this argument
and stated correctly that the relevant jurisdictional inquiry is
whether the claims affect the assets of the bankruptcy estate. In
this case the indemnification provision in Grace and CNA's
Settlement Agreement does so.

The Third Circuit agrees with CNA's argument that the Montana
Plaintiffs misread the Court's precedent in Combustion Engineering,
391 F.3d 190 and jurisdiction was not an issue before the Court. In
that case, the Third Circuit reiterated its oft-repeated Pacor
standard for "related to" jurisdiction in bankruptcy: a proceeding
is "related to" a Chapter 11 proceeding if "the outcome of that
proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being
administered in bankruptcy." "Related to" jurisdiction exist] over
actions against non-debtors involving contractual indemnity
obligations between the debtor and non-debtor that automatically
result in indemnification liability against the debtor." Such is
the case here, as the Trust is obligated by contract to indemnify
CNA up to $13 million for its asbestos personal injury liability
within the meaning of Section 524(g)(4). Hence, the Court does not
doubt the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction to enforce the
Injunction.

The appealed case is In re: W.R. Grace & Co., et al, Reorganized
Debtors. Continental Casualty Company; Transportation Insurance
Company, v. Jeremy B. Carr, et al., Jeremy B. Carr, et al.,
Appellants, No. 17-1208, (3d Cir.),

A copy of the Opinion dated August 14, 2018, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ybk6d98o from Leagle.com.

Michael Busenkell -- mbusenkell@gsbblaw.com -- Gellert Scali
Busenkell & Brown, 1201 North Orange Street, Suite 300, Wilmington,
DE 19801.

Daniel C. Cohn -- dcohn@murthalaw.com -- Taruna Garg --
tgarg@murthalaw.com -- Murtha Cullina, 99 High Street, 20th Floor,
Boston, MA 02110.

Allan M. McGarvey , McGarvey, Heberling, Sullivan & Lacey, P.C.,
345 First Avenue East, Kalispell, MT 59901, Counsel for
Appellants.

Brian T. Burgess -- bburgess@goodwinlaw.com -- Michael S. Giannotto
-- mgiannotto@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin Procter, 901 New York
Avenue, N.W., Suite 900 East, Washington, DC 20001.

Scott D. Cousins -- scousins@bayardlaw.com -- Evan T. Miller --
emiller@bayardlaw.com -- Bayard P.A., 600 North King Street, Suite
400, Wilmington, DE 19801, Counsel for Appellees.

Robert M. Horkovich -- rhorkovich@andersonkill.com -- Anderson
Kill, 1251 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor, 41-154W, New York,
NY 10020.

Edward J. Longosz, II -- elongosz@eckertseamans.com -- Mark A.
Johnston -- mjohnston@eckertseamans.com -- Kennedy L. Cabell ,
Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, 1717 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.,
12th Floor, Washington, DC 20006.

Jeffrey C. Wisler -- jwisler@connollygallagher.com -- Connolly
Gallagher, 1000 West Street, The Brandywine Building, Suite 1400,
Wilmington, DE 19801, Counsel for Amici Appellees.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Albany Int'l Defends 3,677 Claims at June 30
-------------------------------------------------------------
Albany International Corp. is defending 3,677 claims as of June 30,
2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Albany International Corp. is a defendant in
suits brought in various courts in the United States by plaintiffs
who allege that they have suffered personal injury as a result of
exposure to asbestos-containing paper machine clothing synthetic
dryer fabrics marketed during the period from 1967 to 1976 and used
in certain paper mills.

"We anticipate that additional claims will be filed against the
Company and related companies in the future, but are unable to
predict the number and timing of such future claims.  Due to the
fact that information sufficient to meaningfully estimate a range
of possible loss of a particular claim is typically not available
until late in the discovery process, we do not believe a meaningful
estimate can be made regarding the range of possible loss with
respect to pending or future claims and therefore are unable to
estimate a range of reasonably possible loss in excess of amounts
already accrued for pending or future claims.

"While we believe we have meritorious defenses to these claims, we
have settled certain claims for amounts we consider reasonable
given the facts and circumstances of each case.  Our insurance
carrier has defended each case and funded settlements under a
standard reservation of rights.  As of June 30, 2018 we had
resolved, by means of settlement or dismissal, 37,699 claims.  The
total cost of resolving all claims was US$10.3 million.  Of this
amount, almost 100% was paid by our insurance carrier, who has
confirmed that we have approximately US$140 million of remaining
coverage under primary and excess policies that should be available
with respect to current and future asbestos claims."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2RdDDH8


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Albany Int'l. Still Defends Mount Vernon Lawsuits
------------------------------------------------------------------
Albany International Corp. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018, that it remains a direct defendant in
some asbestos cases as the "successor in interest" to Mount Vernon
Mills.

The Company states, "In some of these asbestos cases, the Company
is named both as a direct defendant and as the "successor in
interest" to Mount Vernon Mills ("Mount Vernon").  We acquired
certain assets from Mount Vernon in 1993.  Certain plaintiffs
allege injury caused by asbestos-containing products alleged to
have been sold by Mount Vernon many years prior to this
acquisition.  Mount Vernon is contractually obligated to indemnify
the Company against any liability arising out of such products.  We
deny any liability for products sold by Mount Vernon prior to the
acquisition of the Mount Vernon assets.  Pursuant to its
contractual indemnification obligations, Mount Vernon has assumed
the defense of these claims.  On this basis, we have successfully
moved for dismissal in a number of actions."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2RdDDH8


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ampco-Pittsburgh Has $137.3MM Liability Reserve
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ampco-Pittsburgh Corporation has US$137,304,000 reserve at June 30
2018, for the total costs, including defense costs, for Asbestos
Liability claims pending or projected to be asserted through 2026,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018.

The Company states, "In 2006, the Corporation retained Hamilton,
Rabinovitz & Associates, Inc. ("HR&A"), a nationally recognized
expert in the valuation of asbestos liabilities, to assist the
Corporation in estimating the potential liability for pending and
unasserted future claims for Asbestos Liability.  Based on this
analysis, the Corporation recorded a reserve for Asbestos Liability
claims pending or projected to be asserted through 2013 as of
December 31, 2006.  HR&A's analysis has been periodically updated
since that time.  Most recently, the HR&A analysis was updated in
2016, and additional reserves were established by the Corporation
as of December 31, 2016, for Asbestos Liability claims pending or
projected to be asserted through 2026.  The methodology used by
HR&A in its projection in 2016 of the operating subsidiaries'
liability for pending and unasserted potential future claims for
Asbestos Liability, which is substantially the same as the
methodology employed by HR&A in prior estimates, relied upon and
included the following factors:

   * HR&A's interpretation of a widely accepted forecast of the
population likely to have been exposed to asbestos;

   * epidemiological studies estimating the number of people likely
to develop asbestos-related diseases;

   * HR&A's analysis of the number of people likely to file an
asbestos-related injury claim against the subsidiaries and the
Corporation based on such epidemiological data and relevant claims
history from January 1, 2014, to September 9, 2016;

   * an analysis of pending cases, by type of injury claimed and
jurisdiction where the claim is filed;

   * an analysis of claims resolution history from January 1, 2014,
to September 9, 2016, to determine the average settlement value of
claims, by type of injury claimed and jurisdiction of filing; and

   * an adjustment for inflation in the future average settlement
value of claims, at an annual inflation rate based on the
Congressional Budget Office's ten year forecast of inflation.

"Using this information, HR&A estimated in 2016 the number of
future claims for Asbestos Liability that would be filed through
the year 2026, as well as the settlement or indemnity costs that
would be incurred to resolve both pending and future unasserted
claims through 2026.  This methodology has been accepted by
numerous courts.

"In conjunction with developing the aggregate liability estimate,
the Corporation also developed an estimate of probable insurance
recoveries for its Asbestos Liabilities.  In developing the
estimate, the Corporation considered HR&A's projection for
settlement or indemnity costs for Asbestos Liability and
management's projection of associated defense costs, as well as a
number of additional factors.  These additional factors included
the Settlement Agreements then in effect, policy exclusions, policy
limits, policy provisions regarding coverage for defense costs,
attachment points, prior impairment of policies and gaps in the
coverage, policy exhaustions, insolvencies among certain of the
insurance carriers, and the nature of the underlying claims for
Asbestos Liability asserted against the subsidiaries and the
Corporation as reflected in the Corporation's asbestos claims
database, as well as estimated erosion of insurance limits on
account of claims against Howden arising out of the Products.  In
addition to consulting with the Corporation's outside legal counsel
on these insurance matters, the Corporation consulted with a
nationally recognized insurance consulting firm it retained to
assist the Corporation with certain policy allocation matters that
also are among the several factors considered by the Corporation
when analyzing potential recoveries from relevant historical
insurance for Asbestos Liabilities.  Based upon all of the factors
considered by the Corporation, and taking into account the
Corporation's analysis of publicly available information regarding
the credit-worthiness of various insurers, the Corporation
estimated the probable insurance recoveries for Asbestos Liability
and defense costs through 2026.  Although the Corporation believes
that the assumptions employed in the insurance valuation were
reasonable and previously consulted with its outside legal counsel
and insurance consultant regarding those assumptions, there are
other assumptions that could have been employed that would have
resulted in materially lower insurance recovery projections.

"Based on the analyses, the Corporation's reserve at December 31,
2016, for the total costs, including defense costs, for Asbestos
Liability claims pending or projected to be asserted through 2026,
was US$171,181,000 of which approximately 70% was attributable to
settlement costs for unasserted claims projected to be filed
through 2026 and future defense costs.  The reserve at June 30
2018, was US$137,304,000.  While it is reasonably possible that the
Corporation will incur additional charges for Asbestos Liability
and defense costs in excess of the amounts currently reserved, the
Corporation believes that there is too much uncertainty to provide
for reasonable estimation of the number of future claims, the
nature of such claims and the cost to resolve them beyond 2026.
Accordingly, no reserve has been recorded for any costs that may be
incurred after 2026.

"The Corporation's receivable at December 31, 2016, for insurance
recoveries attributable to the claims for which the Corporation's
Asbestos Liability reserve has been established, including the
portion of incurred defense costs covered by the Settlement
Agreements in effect through December 31, 2016, and the probable
payments and reimbursements relating to the estimated indemnity and
defense costs for pending and unasserted future Asbestos Liability
claims, was US$115,945,000 (US$91,292,000 at June 30, 2018)."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2IyoBbg


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ampco-Pittsburgh Has 7,146 Claims at June 30
-------------------------------------------------------------
Ampco-Pittsburgh Corporation has 7,146 asbestos-related claims
pending at June 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Claims have been asserted alleging personal
injury from exposure to asbestos-containing components historically
used in some products manufactured by predecessors of Air & Liquid
("Asbestos Liability").  Air & Liquid, and in some cases the
Corporation, are defendants (among a number of defendants, often in
excess of 50) in cases filed in various state and federal courts.

"Included as "open claims" are approximately 480 claims as of June
30, 2018, and 2017, classified in various jurisdictions as
"inactive" or transferred to a state or federal judicial panel on
multi-district litigation, commonly referred to as the MDL.

"A substantial majority of the settlement and defense costs was
reported and paid by insurers.  Because claims are often filed and
can be settled or dismissed in large groups, the amount and timing
of settlements, as well as the number of open claims, can fluctuate
significantly from period to period."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2IyoBbg


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Appeal of New Rules on Asbestos Docket Rejected
----------------------------------------------------------------
Forbes reported that asbestos defendants failed to convince New
York's highest court to intervene in a long-running fight over how
the New York City asbestos court known as NYCAL does business,
leaving them with few options as hundreds of lawsuits march toward
trial in the plaintiff-friendly venue.

Hundreds of solvent companies including Ford Motor Co., Honeywell,
Bayer Crop Sciences and Dow Chemical's Union Carbide unit filed
constitutional objections after NYCAL changed its rules in 2017,
allowing plaintiffs to seek punitive damages and creating an
"Accelerated Docket" forcing defendants to prepare for dozens of
cases in less than six months.

They filed appeals with the New York Court of Appeals -- the
state's supreme court -- after an intermediate appellate court
rejected their complaint that the new Case Management Order
violated their due process rights under the New York Constitution.

That gambit failed when the Court of Appeals also rejected the
defendants' appeal, saying NYCAL's new Case Management Order "does
not finally determine an action or proceeding within the meaning of
the Constitution."  New York law allows defendants in civil cases
to appeal court rulings all the way up to the state's highest court
under narrow circumstances, but the Court of Appeals frequently
dismisses them with identical language, in effect rejecting the
appeal as being too early.

In this case, defendant companies said the new CMO was final and
had an immediate and damaging effect on their constitutional
rights. They argued the CMO prevents them from mounting an
effective defense since they don't have the resources to
simultaneously prepare dozens of cases for trial without knowing
which ones will actually go before a jury. Each case requires
expensive depositions, expert witness testimony and extensive
background investigations to determine whether the plaintiff was
actually exposed to a defendant's products.

The high court's action leaves asbestos defendants with only a few
options, none of them attractive. They can again petition the high
court for review, arguing the Case Management Order strips them of
their constitutional rights. The court considers these appeals the
same way as the U.S. Supreme Court considers applications for
certiorari, or review -- and has a similarly low rate of
acceptance.

The other alternative is to take a case to trial, arguing each step
of the way that the NYCAL rules deprive the defendant of its due
process rights, and appeal the verdict. That exposes the defendant
company to a potential jury verdict of tens of millions of dollars,
including punitive damages to deter conduct that in virtually every
case the company either never engaged in -- many of the solvent
defendants are named because they acquired businesses that once had
a connection to the asbestos industry -- or ceased decades ago.

A month after the intermediate court of appeals refused to modify
the case management order in March of this year, a New York City
jury hit defendants with a $60 million verdict, including
punitives.

Plaintiff lawyers have targeted solvent companies with increasingly
remote links to the asbestos industry as they have driven the
primary manufacturers and distributors of the deadly fiber into
bankruptcy. NYCAL is home to one of the country's largest asbestos
dockets and a primary battleground for the more than 300 solvent
companies seeking to avoid the same fate as bankrupt manufacturers.
The American Tort Reform Association has, in recent years,
maintained the jurisdiction is a "Judicial Hellhole" in its annual
report.

The new CMO was issued by Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Peter
Moulton in 2017 after being in the works for nearly two years.
Written at the urging of plaintiff lawyers, and over the objections
of defendants, it restored punitive damages and created the
Accelerated Docket, ostensibly to speed cases to trial for
plaintiffs who are in danger of dying.

Defendants complain the docket requires them to prepare for dozens
of cases at a time without knowing which ones plaintiffs actually
intend to take to trial. Plaintiff lawyers typically bundle cases
that carry the risk of high potential damages with lower-value
cases in an effort to negotiate bigger settlements. Since many
solvent defendants are public companies, their executives have a
fiduciary duty to consider the risk a large jury verdict could
place on their share price, regardless of whether it survives
through appeal.

Lawyers for the defendant companies declined to comment, although
it is likely they are considering their options for appealing this
latest rejection back to the Court of Appeals.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Appeals Court Rules Against Asbestos Companies
---------------------------------------------------------------
Mesothelioma.net reported that when people are diagnosed with
malignant mesothelioma, they have several decisions that they need
to make, including what type of treatment protocol they want to
pursue, how to handle their family affairs, and whether to pursue
legal action against those who are responsible. In many cases, the
responsible parties are companies whose products were contaminated
with asbestos. Though many of these companies have been forced into
bankruptcy over the years, others remain solvent and are frequently
called to defend themselves in the New York City asbestos court
known as NYCAL, which is known to be particularly sympathetic to
mesothelioma victims. Some of the most recognized brands in United
States chemical and manufacturing industries, including Dow
Chemical's Union Carbide, Ford Motor Company, and Honeywell are
named in these suits, and recently took legal action to prevent
that court from allowing victims to seek punitive damages, as well
as to expedite their cases in the face of a terminal diagnosis.
They were disappointed when their effort was defeated.

The companies facing mesothelioma lawsuits heard from New York's
highest court that they would not hear their appeal of a recent
ruling that would allow victims to continue to hear their cases in
an expedited manner. The companies were looking for the New York
Court of Appeals to overturn what has been called the "accelerated
docket" on the grounds that it forced them to prepare for multiple
cases in a short period of time, even though the cases might not
ever make it into a court room, but their argument was denied, with
the court saying that the new order "does not finally determine an
action or proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution." The
higher court'S decision leaves the asbestos companies with few
options, despite their argument that they would be burdened by
having to prepare depositions, testimony and investigations for
cases that might never be heard.

Though the companies accused of causing mesothelioma can still ask
for another review, based on historic refusals to overturn these
types of decision their consideration of the case is unlikely. That
leaves them having to defend themselves and possibly face
multi-million dollar verdicts compounded by punitive damages. These
companies unanimously deny their role in causing mesothelioma,
though there is extensive evidence supporting the notion that they
put profits over people in their decision making process over the
use of asbestos.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Brandon Drying Defends 7,708 Claims at June 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
Albany International Corp.'s subsidiary, Brandon Drying Fabrics,
Inc., had 7,708 asbestos-related claims as of June 30, 2018,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018.

The Company states, "The Company's subsidiary, Brandon Drying
Fabrics, Inc. ("Brandon"), is also a separate defendant in many of
the asbestos cases in which Albany is named as a defendant, despite
never having manufactured any fabrics containing asbestos.  While
Brandon was defending against 7,708 claims as of June 30, 2018,
only ten claims have been filed against Brandon since January 1,
2012, and no settlement costs have been incurred since 2001.

"Brandon was acquired by the Company in 1999, and has its own
insurance policies covering periods prior to 1999.  Since 2004,
Brandon's insurance carriers have covered 100% of indemnification
and defense costs, subject to policy limits and a standard
reservation of rights."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2RdDDH8


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cabot Corp. Has 35,000 AO Respiratory Claimants
----------------------------------------------------------------
There were approximately 35,000 claimants as of June 30, 2018 in
pending cases asserting claims against Cabot Corporation's American
Optical Corporation in connection with respiratory products,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
June 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Cabot has exposure in connection with a safety
respiratory products business that a subsidiary acquired from
American Optical Corporation ("AO") in an April 1990 asset purchase
transaction.  The subsidiary manufactured respirators under the AO
brand and disposed of that business in July 1995.  In connection
with its acquisition of the business, the subsidiary agreed, in
certain circumstances, to assume a portion of AO's liabilities,
including costs of legal fees together with amounts paid in
settlements and judgments, allocable to AO respiratory products
used prior to the 1990 purchase by the Cabot subsidiary.

"In exchange for the subsidiary's assumption of certain of AO's
respirator liabilities, AO agreed to provide to the subsidiary the
benefits of: (i) AO's insurance coverage for the period prior to
the 1990 acquisition and (ii) a former owner's indemnity of AO
holding it harmless from any liability allocable to AO respiratory
products used prior to May 1982.

"The respirator liabilities generally involve claims for personal
injury, including asbestosis, silicosis and coal worker's
pneumoconiosis, allegedly resulting from the use of respirators
that are alleged to have been negligently designed and/or labeled.
Neither Cabot, nor its past or present subsidiaries, at any time
manufactured asbestos or asbestos-containing products.  At no time
did this respiratory product line represent a significant portion
of the respirator market.

"As of June 30, 2018 and September 30, 2017, there were
approximately 35,000 and 37,000 claimants, respectively, in pending
cases asserting claims against AO in connection with respiratory
products.  Cabot has a reserve to cover its expected share of
liability for existing and future respirator liability claims.  At
June 30, 2018 and September 30, 2017, the reserve was US$17 million
and US$18 million, respectively.  The Company made payments related
to its respirator liability of US$1 million and US$3 million in the
first nine months of fiscal 2018 and fiscal 2017, respectively."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2Qpwgv4


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Companies Fined $195K foAsbestos Removal
---------------------------------------------------------
George Barnes  of Worcester Telegram reported two companies have
agreed to pay a total of $195,000 in penalties for illegal removal
of asbestos in two houses in the city.

The penalties settle a lawsuit brought by the state attorney
general’s office against Capstone General Contracting of
Worcester and its owners Charbel and Christine Najem and its
subcontractor Simulis Plumbing and Heating of Worcester alleging
they violated state law at one of the homes by illegally removing
asbestos-wrapped heating pipes, stripping the pipes of asbestos and
improperly disposing of the material, according to state Attorney
General Maura Healey’s Office.

At the other home, a worker illegally smashed and removed siding
containing asbestos to make way for the installation of new
windows, Healey’s office said. The worker was not informed of the
presence of asbestos at the site or of a survey that had determined
the siding contained asbestos.

Under the agreement, Capstone and the Najems will pay $150,000 in
penalties to the state, $25,000 of which may be suspended if the
company and its employees complete additional training and submit
all asbestos surveys required for their construction and renovation
jobs over the next two years to the state Department of
Environmental Protection. Simulis agreed to pay $45,000 to the
state, $20,000 of which may be suspended if its employees complete
asbestos training.



ASBESTOS UPDATE: Corp. May Appeal Asbestos Cell Vote
----------------------------------------------------
Jarrod Whittaker of Latrobe Valley Express reported that Morwell
Power Station liquidator Energy Brix Australia Corporation will
appeal to VCAT or transport asbestos off-site if Latrobe City
Council rejects its application to store the hazardous material
on-site.

Councillors are set to consider EBAC's application for an on-site
cell asbestos removed from the Morwell Power Station at their
meeting, having twice voted to defer a decision on the matter.

At a community consultation meeting, EBAC site remediation manager
Barry Dungey ruled out the possibility of using Hazelwood Power
Station's planned asbestos cell due to the prohibitive cost.

The company considered the option of sharing Hazelwood's asbestos
cell at the request of councillors, but found the cost of storing
the asbestos at Hazelwood was much higher than transporting it to
licensed landfill at Bulla, west of Melbourne, or at an on-site
cell.

EBAC hopes to begin removing asbestos from the site in November,
while the Hazelwood cell would not be available until April 2019.

According to EBAC, the cost of storing asbestos at Hazelwood varies
depending on the quantity but rises to about $2 million at 10,000
cubic metres, compared to $1 million for the same amount in an
on-site cell.

The cost of transporting the asbestos to Bulla sits between the
other two options.

Latrobe City councillors were concerned about the establishment of
an asbestos cell so close to Commercial Road, Morwell.

But Mr Dungey said he would have to either transport the asbestos
to Bulla or fight the matter in the Victorian Civil and
Administrative Tribunal if the on-site asbestos cell was rejected
by council.

"The difficulty with VCAT is that process, by definition, takes
another three or four months," he said.

"If you look at our project which is due to start in November, by
the time we get a decision, potentially we've already sent half our
material down the road."

The meeting was attended by about 30 people and heard about the
company's plans to remove asbestos from the Morwell Power Station
before demolishing it by structurally weakening it and pulling it
down, rather than using explosives.

The Environment Protection Authority will be responsible for
ensuring any on-site cell design meets regulatory and licensing
requirements.

If approved, EBAC would build the cell away from ground water and
asbestos would be double wrapped in plastic bags or placed in
sealed 44-gallon drums to prevent the release of fibres during cell
loading.

Asbestos would be deposited in the cell two to three times a month
to minimise dust creation and material would not be deposited
during high wind days when the wind blows towards housing areas.

Moe community activist Cheryl Wragg, who sought to have the Morwell
Power Station preserved, raised concerns about whether the proposed
dump was suitable to store asbestos forever.

"I think the asbestos problem coming out of the Latrobe Valley
power industry is such that it dictates an in-perpetuity dump
somewhere, properly constructed, concrete lined that can never be
disturbed and I think that that is owed to this community," Ms
Wragg said.

Just one attendee at the meeting identified herself as a resident
who lived near the former Morwell Power Station site.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crane's Bid to Quash Subpoena Affirmed on Appeal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the appealed case In Re New York City Asbestos Litigation. Ann
Marie Idell, etc., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Aerco International,
Inc., et al., Defendants, Crane Co., et al.,
Defendants-Respondents, Jenkins Bros., Defendant-Appellant,
190219/16, 6938, 6937, 6936, (N.Y. App. 1st Dept.), the First
Department of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
York affirms the Orders entered on August 15, 2017, which granted
defendants Crane Co. and Warren Pumps LLC's respective motions to
quash trial subpoenas issued to them as such subpoenas was
improperly served.

The Court finds that defendant was properly precluded from
eliciting testimony from plaintiff's expert regarding exposure to
asbestos in the alleged nonparty tortfeasors' products because the
it was found that defendant failed to establish specific causation
against such alleged nonparty tortfeasors. The Court also finds
that the defendant was properly precluded from introducing evidence
of plaintiff's alleged exposure to asbestos in Scotland before he
emigrated to the United States because such evidence was
speculative.

On the issue of recklessness, the Court finds that there was
sufficient evidence from which a jury could determine that
defendant was aware that workers such as plaintiff were at risk
from exposure to asbestos based on the circumstances of the case,
which include plaintiff's continued exposure to defendant's valves
through 1986.

In addition, the Court modifies the Order entered December 15,
2017, which denied defendant Jenkins Bros.' motion pursuant to CPLR
4404 to set aside the verdict, and granted plaintiff's motion
pursuant to CPLR 4404 to set aside the verdict to the extent of
directing a new trial unless defendant stipulated to an increase in
the jury awards of $1.8 million and $1.5 million for past and
future pain and suffering, respectively, to $4 million and $2.5
million, respectively.

Contrary to defendant's contention that General Obligations Law
Section 15-108 requires that the settled defendants be included on
the verdict sheet for apportionment purposes regardless of whether
any evidence of their liability was presented, the Court maintains
that failure to present a prima facie case of their liability
"constitutes a waiver of the nonsettling tortfeasor's right to
reduction of the verdict based on an apportionment of fault, but
not based on the amount of the settlement."

The Court finds that a new trial on damages as to past pain and
suffering would be proper unless defendant agrees to increase that
award to $4 million. However, the Court ratifies that the jury's
award for future pain and suffering of $1.5 million should be
reinstated as such award did not deviate materially from reasonable
compensation.

A copy of the Decision and Order dated September 13, 2018, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8rht45y from Leagle.com.

Clyde & Co US LLP, New York ( Peter J. Dinunzio --
Epeter.dinunzio@clydeco.us -- of counsel), for appellant.

Simmons Hanly Conroy LLC, New York ( James Kramer of counsel), for
Ann Marie Idell, respondent.

K & L Gates, LLP, New York ( Tara L. Pehush --
tara.pehush@klgates.com -- of counsel), for Crane Co., respondent.

Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, P.C., New York ( Daniel
W. Levin -- dwlevin@mdwcg.com -- of counsel), for Warren Pumps LLC,
respondent.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Daughter Appeals for Help on Mum's Asbestos Death
------------------------------------------------------------------
Hull Daily Mail reported that the daughter of an East Yorkshire
woman who died from a disease linked to asbestos has appealed for
help after watching her mum struggle to breathe and eat in the
final months of her life.

Clarinda Owst worked in the offices at Capper Pass smelting works
for 17 years and sadly died last year from mesothelioma -- a cancer
that most commonly affects the lining of the lungs.

Ms Owst, a mum and grandma who lived in Beech Road in Elloughton
while working at the Melton site, walked through the factory on a
daily basis and interacted with other staff who were working on the
ground.

Now, Renee Raper, her daughter, is appealing for anyone who worked
there at the time to come forward to help her understand how her
mum, an office-based staff member, could become exposed to what she
believes ultimately killed her.

Clarinda, known to most as Linda, was affected badly years after
working at the site when "she couldn't breathe because her lungs
were full of fluid" and as "growths were pressing on her gullet and
windpipe."

Ms Raper says she believes she contracted it through her time at
the smelting works.

"She didn't discover it until late on. She was ill and started
getting breathing issues. She thought it was a problem with her
heart but doctors thought it was ok," Ms Raper said.

"She couldn't breathe because her lungs were full of fluid so she
had to have them drained.

"It was so horrible for her at the end. She couldn't breathe at
all. She couldn't eat because growths were pressing on her gullet
and windpipe.

"She kept saying 'this isn’t life.' In March, she was given one
to three years to live. She died within six months of being told
that.

"It was so horrible the way she went down."

She passed away in September 2017

Now, a year on from her death, Ms Raper has filed a compensation
claim after believing that during her mum's day-to-day routine at
the works, she came into contact with asbestos. She says she
believes that is what triggered her breathing problems and,
latterly, cancer.

She has contacted solicitors to assist her with an asbestos disease
compensation claim following her mother's death last year.

Discussing her next steps, she said: "I want to speak with anyone
who can shine a light on my mum's employment and how she could have
been exposed to asbestos. As a personnel officer, she would have
been known to a large number of workers and other members of staff,
which we hope will increase our chances of finding someone who can
help.

"Any information provided could be the missing piece of the puzzle
we desperately need, so please get in touch with Thompsons
Solicitors if you think you can help."

Asbestos is the single biggest cause of work-related deaths in the
UK, causing thousands of deaths and serious illnesses. The number
of asbestos deaths is expected to rise until 2020.

Capper Pass, on the banks of the Humber, closed in 1991.

Helen Jones, a solicitor supporting Rene, said: "Linda worked at
Capper Pass, later Rio Tinto, for a large part of her career and
may have come into contact with asbestos in a variety of ways.

"We are hoping there will be someone out there who can remember
Linda."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Dismissal of Biederman's Bid to Unseal Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the appealed case Christine Cole Biederman, Appellant, v.
Beverly Jean Brown, Individually and as Personal Representative of
the Estate and Heirs of Glenn Edward Brown, Sr., and Baron & Budd,
P.C., Appellees, No. 01-17-00263-CV, (Tex. App. 1st), the Hon.
Evelyn V. Keyes of the First District of the Court of Appeals of
Texas affirms the order of the trial court dismissing Biederman's
motion for want of jurisdiction.

Appellant Christine Cole Biederman is a journalist and documentary
film producer seeking to unseal a deposition taken in 1997 in a
case filed by appellee, Beverly Jean Brown, individually and as the
personal representative of the estate and heirs of Glenn Edward
Brown, Sr., alleging various tort causes of action for Glenn
Brown's asbestos-related wrongful death (the Brown Case). Brown was
represented in the Brown Case by the law firm Baron & Budd, P.C.,
which is also an appellee in this appeal.

The law firm Baron & Budd filed the underlying Brown Case in 1993
on behalf of Beverly Jean Brown, alleging various tort theories for
recovery of damages for Glenn Brown's asbestos-related death.

Biederman filed the instant actions as a motion to intervene in the
long-closed Brown Case. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
76a, Biederman sought to unseal the 1997 deposition of Russell Budd
on the topic of the discoverability of a memo created by Baron &
Budd and used in various asbestos-related cases, including the
Brown Case. The appellees Baron & Budd filed a plea to the
jurisdiction, which the trial court granted, dismissing Biederman's
motion to unseal for want of jurisdiction.

In her sole issue on appeal, Biederman argues that the trial court
erred by granting the plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing the
case without deciding the motion to unseal on the merits because
Rule 76a expressly grants continuing jurisdiction in the
circumstances of this case.

According to the briefing and pleadings of the parties, at some
point before the fall of 1997, in an unrelated asbestos case, an
attorney for Baron & Budd mistakenly disclosed the existence of a
memo that the law firm used to prepare witnesses for deposition.
Biederman alleges that the Memo "appeared to coach Baron & Budd
clients on how to identify products and exposures that they might
not actually remember and, in fact, might never have been exposed
to." The defendants in that unrelated case distributed the Memo,
which led to extended discovery in multiple cases, including the
Brown Case, regarding whether and how the Memo was used in Baron &
Budd's asbestos cases.

Defense counsel in the Brown Case discovered that the Memo had been
used in Brown's case and sought to compel Baron & Budd to produce
the Memo through discovery. Baron & Budd resisted, arguing that the
Memo was privileged as work product or as an attorney-client
communication. In order to determine whether the Memo was
discoverable, the trial court -- at that time, the Hon. John Dietz
-- ordered the in camera inspection of the Memo and other relevant
discovery.

Although most of the pleadings, motions, and orders filed in the
Brown Case have been destroyed, the record on appeal contains Judge
Dietz's September 29, 1997 order. The order stated that it was a
protective order pursuant to (now former) Rule of Civil Procedure
166b. Specifically, the order provided: "The discovery ordered by
this Court, which will include the Memo and the deposition of the
Baron & Budd corporate representative, will be sealed and
distribution will be for counsel of record only in Travis County
asbestos-related Baron & Budd cases, and may not be disseminated,
distributed or disclosed to any third party."

According to the parties' pleadings and briefing, Biederman became
involved in the Brown Case in 1998. At that time, Biederman was a
reporter for the Dallas Observer. Baron & Budd came to believe that
she had improperly obtained confidential documents from the law
firm, and it sought to depose her regarding those allegations.
Biederman filed a motion to quash her deposition. The record does
not reflect the outcome of Baron & Budd's efforts to depose
Biederman, nor does it reveal any further involvement of Biederman
in the Brown Case. Eventually, Judge Dietz dismissed the Brown Case
for want of prosecution on July 7, 2006.

On November 9, 2016, Biederman filed the instant suit as a motion
to intervene in the long-since dismissed Brown Case, seeking to
unseal the 1997 Budd Deposition taken in the underlying Brown Case
pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 76a.

Biederman identified "two relevant pleadings" in the Brown Case
from the electronic docket sheet that she surmises Brown filed,
"presumably in response to the Defendant's deposition notice(s)": a
"Motion to Seal Court Records" and a "Notice of Motion to Seal
Court Records" filed on September 29, 1997. Neither of these
motions is contained in the record in this case, but Biederman
alleged "on information and belief" that "Baron & Budd's Motion to
Seal invoked Rule 76a in order to seek an order sealing certain
records relating to the [Memo] and other issues relevant to Mr.
Budd's deposition, as well as the deposition itself."

Biederman recounted other events in her motion to intervene in this
case that occurred in the Brown Case, again citing her own
suppositions about what had happened based on the electronic docket
sheet and the few remaining records from that case, as set out
above. These included the trial court's September 29, 1997 order in
the Brown Case compelling the Budd Deposition and ordering certain
discovery protected pursuant to former Rule 166b and the trial
court's October 8, 1997 order in that case finding that the Memo
was not privileged and ordering Baron & Budd to produce it.

Biederman moved the trial court to unseal the Budd Deposition,
asserting "on information and belief, it is relevant to issues that
have arisen in ongoing asbestos litigation currently pending in a
number of courts, a topic upon which she has reported extensively
in the past and which is the subject of a documentary film project
upon which she currently working."

Biederman observed that "the underlying lawsuit has long since been
resolved," but she alleged that the trial court retained
jurisdiction to unseal the court records sought pursuant to Rule of
Civil Procedure 76a(7), which provides in relevant part that the
trial court that issues a sealing order retains continuing
jurisdiction to enforce, alter, or vacate that order. Biederman
further argued that the Budd Deposition was a "court record" within
the meaning of Rule 76a(2), stating that, although most depositions
are not submitted to the court clerk, "it appears that Mr. Budd's
deposition was in fact 'filed' with the Court." She cited a
footnote, stating summarily that the Budd Deposition and its
exhibits were filed under seal, from an uncertified, unsigned copy
of a "Reply in Support of Motion to Quash and Motion for Protective
Order" purportedly filed on her behalf in the Brown Case in 1998.
However, this document does not bear a file stamp or other
indication that it was, in fact, ever filed with the trial court.

Biederman also argued that "it is likely that Budd's deposition may
have been filed with the court clerk and included as part of the
transcript sent to the appeals court." Biederman argued that "Baron
& Budd's original Motion to Seal apparently took the position that
Rule 76a's requirements applied to Mr. Budd's deposition," but that
motion to seal was not included in the record for this case.
Baron & Budd filed a plea to the jurisdiction in response to
Biederman's motion to unseal. Baron & Budd argued that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to hear Biederman's motion because the
court's plenary power expired August 6, 2006, and because the trial
court did not have continuing jurisdiction under Rule 76a(7).

Baron & Budd argued, in part, that the September 29, 1997 order was
not a "sealing order" as referenced in Rule 76a(7), but rather was
a protective order under former Rule 166b. Baron & Budd further
argued that the Budd Deposition was not a "court record" as defined
in Rule 76a(2) because it was not "filed," but it was taken and
submitted in camera on issues of privilege from discovery and it
did not concern a matter that had a "probable adverse effect upon
the general public health or safety," the administration of public
office, or the operation of government. It also argued, in the
alternative, that Biederman's motion to unseal was barred by waiver
and estoppel. Baron & Budd attached as exhibits a certified copy of
the September 29, 1997 order and certified copies of the relevant
record management policies from the trial court and the Austin
Court of Appeals.

Baron & Budd asserted that, Biederman could not establish that the
Budd Deposition was a court record under Rule 76a, and so the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to hear her motion to unseal. And it also
argued that, due to Biederman's delay in bringing her motion, the
parties had been prejudiced in that the documents were destroyed
according to regular document retention schedules. Baron & Budd
described the case as being an argument "about a deposition that
apparently never was filed, that was protected by Judge Dietz 20
years ago. And we don't have the documents, as she admits in her
motion, and we have searched and searched."

Baron & Budd filed a plea to the jurisdiction challenging
Biederman's pleadings -- her motion to intervene and unseal the
Budd Deposition -- that the trial court had jurisdiction over the
case. Biederman's motion acknowledges, and the jurisdictional
evidence before the trial court established, that the trial court
dismissed the Brown Case for want of prosecution on July 7, 2006.

Absent the filing of a motion to reinstate, the Court explains that
a trial court loses plenary power over a case thirty days after
dismissing it for want of prosecution. Plenary power refers to
period of time in which trial court may vacate, modify, or correct
its judgment and that plenary power generally expires thirty days
after final judgment is signed. Thus, the trial court's plenary
power expired August 6, 2006. The Court finds in this case that in
spite of the fact that plenary power expired in August 2006,
Biederman affirmately alleged that the trial court had jurisdiction
pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 76a to grant her intervention
and unseal the Budd Deposition. She alleged in her motion to
intervene and unseal the deposition that the Budd Deposition was a
"court record" within the meaning of Rule 76a. Baron & Budd
challenged these allegations in its plea to the jurisdiction,
asserting that Rule 76a did not apply to Biederman's request and,
thus, the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider the motion to
unseal.

Biederman and the amicus argue that Biederman is entitled to a
hearing on her motion "even if the status of the sealed discovery
as a 'court record' for purposes of Rule 76a(2) is disputed by
another party." However, the trial court had an obligation to
determine whether it had the constitutional or statutory authority
to decide Biederman's motion before allowing the case to proceed
any further. Consequently, the court held a hearing to determine
the relevant jurisdictional issues. Biederman failed to demonstrate
that the Budd Deposition was a court record as defined by Rule 76a,
and, thus, she failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court
to consider her motion any further.

Considering the pleadings and the jurisdictional evidence, the
Court concludes that Biederman failed to meet her burden to allege
facts that affirmatively establish the trial court's subject matter
jurisdiction over her motion to intervene and unseal the Budd
Deposition. Biederman failed to provide any evidence that the Budd
Deposition was a "court record" as required to invoke the
procedures set out in Rule 76a, and thus, the Court resolves that
the trial court's implied ruling that the Budd Deposition was not a
"court record" as defined in Rule 76a(2) was correct.

Because Biederman failed to establish that the Budd Deposition was
a court record, the Court concludes that Biederman failed to
demonstrate that the provisions of Rule 76a, including the
jurisdictional provision in Rule 76a(7), applied to her motion. As
a general proposition, before a court may address the merits of any
case, the court must have jurisdiction over the party or the
property subject to the suit, jurisdiction over the subject matter,
jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, and capacity to act
as a court. And because the plenary power of the trial court had
long expired, the Court sustains that the trial court correctly
determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Biederman's
request.

A copy of the Opinion dated August 14, 2018, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ycc79rea from Leagle.com.

Jason M. Panzer , Charles Herring , for Baron and Budd, P.C.,
Appellee.

Christine Cole-Biederman, Paul C. Watler -- pwatler@jw.com --
Matthew Entsminger , for Christine Cole Biederman, Appellant.

Kevin Dubose -- kdubose@adjtlaw.com -- Jason M. Panzer , Charles
Herring , for Beverly Jean Brown, Individually and as Personal
Representative of the Estate and Heirs of Glenn Edward Brown, Sr.,
Appellee.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: DOJ Intensifies Attack on Asbestos Trust
---------------------------------------------------------
Alison Frankel of Reuters reported that Jeffrey Prol of Lowenstein
Sandler spent two years negotiating a deal to get his client, the
sheet metal manufacturer Duro Dyne, in and out of Chapter 11
bankruptcy as quickly as possible. The company has exposure to
about 1,000 asbestos plaintiffs, Prol said, but is otherwise
healthy. So Prol began talks with Caplin & Drysdale, which
represents an ad hoc committee of plaintiffs' firms with asbestos
claims against Duro Dyne, about establishing a trust to cabin off
asbestos liability.

The company and the committee recognized they'd also have to
account for the interests of people who may yet file asbestos
claims so they brought in Lawrence Fitzpatrick, a
highly-credentialed lawyer who has represented future claimants in
an array of asbestos bankruptcies.

Between them, the lawyers reached an agreement to establish an
asbestos trust funded with at least $10.5 million in cash, a $13.5
million note and rights to Duro Dyne's asbestos insurance coverage.
On Sept. 11, Duro Dyne filed its prepackaged Chapter 11 in federal
bankruptcy court in New Jersey. "We wanted to get in and get out,"
Prol said.

The U.S. Justice Department had other plans.

On Wednesday, the DOJ, acting through the U.S. trustee's office,
filed an objection to Duro Dyne's motion to appoint Fitzpatrick as
the official representative of future asbestos claimants. In its
press release announcing the filing -- a first of its kind -- the
Justice Department said it was concerned about Fitzpatrick's
"apparent conflicts of interest and close connections with lawyers
representing current claimants," even though it was the company
that moved for his appointment.

DOJ's brief elaborated the argument: "The debtors would have the
court quickly approve the selection of (a future claims
representative) who was vetted and selected by the very parties he
will supposedly be negotiating against," the brief said. "Although
Mr. Fitzpatrick undoubtedly has significant experience in asbestos
cases, those very same past and current engagements give rise to
numerous connections and potential conflicts that have neither been
fully disclosed nor investigated."

The DOJ brief called for U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge Michael Kaplan
of Trenton to investigate Fitzpatrick's involvement in the
negotiations preceding the Chapter 11 filing, his relationships
with plaintiffs' lawyers and his financial interest in serving the
trust that will be created in the proposed plan of reorganization.
The tone of the brief, quite frankly, is accusatory. DOJ contends
that the burden lies with Duro Dyne to prove Fitzpatrick is not
conflicted and is capable of serving as an independent fiduciary.

The filing is more evidence that this Justice Department has
asbestos trusts in its sites. Earlier this month, you'll recall,
the Justice Department filed what is apparently its first-ever
statement of interest in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of a company
proposing the establishment of a trust for asbestos claimants.

In that case, Kaiser Gypsum, DOJ argued that the company and a
committee of asbestos plaintiffs didn't build in sufficient
safeguards to prevent fraudulent claims against the trust. Its
brief echoed years of tort reform allegations that asbestos trusts
-- which have already doled out about $15 billion to purported
victims and still contain $25 billion, according to a March 2018
report by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Institute for Legal Reform
-- are rife with abuse and end up funneling unwarranted
compensation to plaintiffs' lawyers, at the expense of current and
future legitimate victims.

DOJ's brief in the Duro Dyne case is a different vehicle but
travels the same terrain. Lawrence Fitzpatrick, the proposed future
claimants representative whose appointment DOJ opposes, declined to
comment on the filing and asbestos claimants; committee counsel
James Wehner of Caplin & Drysdale didn't respond to a phone
message. But Duro Dyne counsel Prol told me that DOJ's targeting
sends the wrong message. The company and its asbestos creditors, he
said, brought Fitzpatrick into negotiations because of his
impeccable record and deep experience with asbestos trusts like the
one Duro has proposed. DOJ claims that very experience should
provoke an inquiry into the lawyer's conflicts. "Follow that logic
and that means a future claims rep can only do the job once," Prol
said. "I hear their concerns, but attacking the futures rep, I
don't think is the answer."

Prol said DOJ warned the company about its new determination to
police asbestos trusts. But he contends that discouraging repeat
players will hurt companies trying to negotiate pre-packaged
bankruptcies to minimize the disruption to their businesses. It's
notable, he said, that the U.S. trustee's office has never
previously objected to a future claims representative selected by a
bankrupt company and asbestos claimants. (Debtors' insurers have
occasionally raised objections, Prol said, but courts have
overruled them.)

Prol also said it's not clear from the DOJ brief exactly what
process or standards the Justice Department wants to impose for the
selections of future claims representatives. And that uncertainty,
he said, could add time and expense to the corporate bankruptcy
process.

DOJ's new engagement with asbestos trusts is exactly what the
business lobby has been demanding for years. But sometimes, as the
old saying goes, you have to be careful what you wish for.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Duffus May File Brief Amici Curiae in Juni's Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of New York has granted John Henderson Duffus,
et al.'s Motion for leave to file a brief amici curiae on the
appealed case entitled In The Matter Of New York City Asbestos
Litigation. Mary Juni, etc., Appellant, v. A.O. Smith Water
Products Co., et al., Defendants, Ford Motor Company, Respondent,
Motion No. 2018-916, (N.Y. App. Div.), and has accepted the
proposed brief as filed.

A copy of the Order dated September 18, 2018, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y899ku69 Leagle.com.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Elderly Residents at Risk of Asbestos
------------------------------------------------------
BrixtonBuzz reported that since January 2018, elderly residents at
Macintosh Court in Streatham have had their health put in danger as
works by Lambeth Council to upgrade their homes have gone horribly
wrong.

The sheltered housing scheme was given grade 2 protection in 2015
after the residents thwarted the council's plans to sell the site
to private developers by persuading English Heritage to list their
homes. The community of over 55's renamed the estate in honour of
its architect -- Kate Macintosh -- most famous for her landmark
scheme Dawsons Heights, in nearby Southwark.

Last year, Lambeth council authorised a spend of 1.5 million at
Macintosh Court to make good 40 years of neglect. Kate was
consulted and came up with a series of improvements to make the
building suitable for the 21st century, including better insulation
and the removal of ugly exterior pipes that had been added after
the scheme had gone up.

A series of architects and consultants were paid to work on plans
for the upgrade.

But when builders arrived late last year, all this was ignored.
Instead subcontractors working for the council began a series of
chaotic works on the building and the residents’ nightmare
began.

The first sign that things were going wrong was when newly
installed  roofing started to leak. The first resident to be
affected noticed water gushing through her ceiling when she
returned from her Christmas break. By January 5th the flooding was
so bad that her waterlogged ceiling was unsound and needed taking
down.

Workers for Lambeth's contractor Engie noticed that the ceiling had
an Artex covering: and that this almost certainly contained
asbestos. While artex remains safe if left undisturbed, if the
ceiling were to break up it would have been possible for the
resident and workers to inhale potentially lethal asbestos fibres.
Engie called in an emergency team from asbestos specialists
Clifford Devlin to remove the ceiling under controlled conditions.

It was fortunate that the workers recognised the signs of asbestos
in the ceiling, because Lambeth had failed to check the interior of
the flats for asbestos before starting work. This was because
they'd only carried out safety surveys on the outside of the
building.

But strangely having eventually realised in early January that the
roof works could potentially cause asbestos exposure inside the
flats, the council and it's principal designer, Playle and
Partners, appear to have carried on without taking any measures to
mitigate this newly identified risk.

The re-roofing continued, and as it did, more flats were flooded.
Building professionals have advised me that normal practice would
have been to pause work to find out what was causing the leaks, and
meanwhile to erect a temporary waterproof covering to protect the
roofs.

On the 29th January Mr John Harris an elderly widower and his
neighbour next door were flooded after their roofs were renewed.
Both required their asbestos riddled ceilings to be removed as they
were at risk of collapse. Frail Mr Harris was forced to sleep on
the floor of his living room on a damp mattress for over 4 weeks
until the council's workers came to renew his bedroom ceiling.

Yet still the work went on. By March Mrs Janet Gayle had floodwater
gushing through her asbestos coated bathroom ceiling. She reported
the leak and the builders came in with buckets to catch the drips.
At first the ceiling developed what she describes as a "huge
crack," but after a second downpour of rain small pieces of
plasterboard with its asbestos coating were breaking away, falling
onto the floor and into the buckets below.

Lambeth made no offer to evacuate Mrs Gayle to alternative
accommodation. Eventually on 29th March Clifford Devlin came in to
strip out Mrs Gayle’s ceiling under controlled conditions, but by
then both Mrs Gayle and the bucket-emptying labourers had already
been put at risk -- a risk that Lambeth should have anticipated
after the first asbestos incident more than three months earlier.

It was only in May that Lambeth called in a specialist asbestos
survey for the building's interiors. By July the resident's
association chair Mr John Beechey made formal request to see the
survey, yet the council somehow never got round to handing it over
to him.

It was only on 19th September that Mr Beechey on his own initiative
walked into the contractor's office on site and took a photos of
the asbestos records held there. The records revealed that 43 out
of 45 dwellings at Macintosh Court definitely contained asbestos.
The remaining 2 flats contained suspected asbestos.

More worryingly, many of the flats had not only white asbestos in
the floors and ceilings, but blue asbestos in panels behind kitchen
units. Blue asbestos is the deadliest form of the material,
breaking easily into long sharp fibres that embed into the lungs of
anyone who breathes them.

A small amount of blue asbestos is enough to cause terminal cancer.
Two residents have reported to me that they believe that these
panels were ripped out from their flats without any protective
measures taken, and we are awaiting information from Lambeth's
project manager Andrew Marshall to find out if their fears could be
true.

As if this was not enough, heating contractor Mitie have spent the
summer installing a network of hideous black-lagged pipework all
over the outside of the building.

This was illegal, because they didn't have listed building consent.
Architect Kate Macintosh reported this breach 9 times to Lambeth's
conservation officers Nicola Xureb and her boss Doug Black, yet to
date they have refused to take action. It appears that Lambeth's
officers had greater loyalty to each other than respect for the
rule of law.

Meetings with Councillor Paul Gadsby, Lambeth's new housing chief,
elicited sympathy but no remedial action. Rather like a Soviet
apparatchik spouting tractor production figures, Commissar Gadsby
sent me figures boasting of Lambeth's rate of bathroom and kitchen
upgrades, but has done nothing to end the resident's misery.

John Beechey the long-suffering chair of the resident’s
association at Macintosh Court is a man who's determined to find
humour in the darkest of moments. And Lambeth's chief press officer
Lawrence Conway did the honour of providing light relief in a
series of creatively written press releases sent to me about the
work.

First on the 19th September Conway insisted that only two flats
contained asbestos, which had been removed according to all legal
requirements. I asked him if he was sure.  He demanded evidence, so
I sent the asbestos survey summary snapped by John Beechey from the
contractor's office.

Within minutes, Conway emailed back to say he'd prepare a new
statement. He also demanded I take down a copy of his earlier
statement, after the residents had uploaded to Twitter as proof of
the council's dishonesty. In my 20 year media career, it was the
first off-the record press release I'd ever encountered.

Sure enough the next day Conway admitted he'd got his facts wrong
-- completely unintentionally of course -- but insisted that no
one's health had been put at risk. And the council's officers stuck
to this story during that evening's Oversight and Scrutiny
Committee.

But they were anxious to insist that only two flats had needed
their ceilings removed, those dealt with on the 29th January.

Why had they forgotten the incidents on the 5th January and the
29th March? I only found out about the more extensive asbestos
removal by calling asbestos contractors Clifford Devlin myself.
Could it be that Lambeth understood that the fuller picture
revealed that they had been negligent in their duty to protect
their workers and the elderly residents?

But back to Comical Conway the inventive press officer: for his
final joke, he claimed that Lambeth hadn't deliberately withheld
the asbestos survey from the residents. He insisted that the
contractors had "provided" John Beechey with the asbestos report
when he snapped a photo of it in the contractor's office.  Conway
insisted all this happened on the council's instruction -- perhaps
a new strategy on Lambeth's quest to save paper? John knows he's
been asking for the report for months but wonders: why Lambeth
didn't just email it to him?

Playle and Partners were contacted for comment but have yet to
reply. Lawrence Conway has yet to respond to my latest request for
clarification sent on 20th September.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Emerson Electric Had $346MM Liability at June 30
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Emerson Electric Co. has US$346 million as liability related to
asbestos litigation at June 30, 2018, according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The Company states, "Other long-term assets include US$136 million
of asbestos-related insurance receivables."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2P4ZfEb


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Employer Must Pay Asbestos Victim's Widow
----------------------------------------------------------
WorkCompCentral reported that the Montana Workers' Compensation
Court ruled that the last employer responsible for exposing a
worker to asbestos was liable for the payment of death benefits to
the man's widow.

The case is Atchley v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., No. 2014-3383,
09/26/2018.

Facts and procedural history: Edward Atchley served in the U.S.
Navy between 1951 and 1955. He worked in an engine room, and part
of his job was repairing lagging, which contained asbestos.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Everest Had $273.2MM Loss Reserves at June 30
--------------------------------------------------------------
Everest Re Group, Ltd. had net asbestos loss reserves of US$273.2
million, or 96.6%, of total net A&E reserves at June 30, 2018, all
of which was for assumed business, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The Company states, "On July 13, 2015, we sold Mt. McKinley to
Clearwater Insurance Company.  Concurrently with the closing, we
entered into a retrocession treaty with an affiliate of Clearwater.
Per the retrocession treaty, we retroceded 100% of the liabilities
associated with certain Mt. McKinley policies, which had been
reinsured by Bermuda Re.  As consideration for entering into the
retrocession treaty, Bermuda Re transferred cash of US$140.3
million, an amount equal to the net loss reserves as of the closing
date.  Of the US$140.3 million of net loss reserves retroceded,
US$100.5 million were related to A&E business.  The maximum
liability retroceded under the retrocession treaty will be US$440.3
million, equal to the retrocession payment plus US$300.0 million.
We will retain liability for any amounts exceeding the maximum
liability retroceded under the retrocession treaty.

"Ultimate loss projections for A&E liabilities cannot be
accomplished using standard actuarial techniques.  We believe that
our A&E reserves represent management's best estimate of the
ultimate liability; however, there can be no assurance that
ultimate loss payments will not exceed such reserves, perhaps by a
significant amount.

"Industry analysts use the "survival ratio" to compare the A&E
reserves among companies with such liabilities.  The survival ratio
is typically calculated by dividing a company's current net
reserves by the three year average of annual paid losses.  Hence,
the survival ratio equals the number of years that it would take to
exhaust the current reserves if future loss payments were to
continue at historical levels.  Using this measurement, our net
three year asbestos survival ratio was 5.6 years at June 30, 2018.
These metrics can be skewed by individual large settlements
occurring in the prior three years and therefore, may not be
indicative of the timing of future payments."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2xWl3LF


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Farris Case Management Conference Moved to Nov. 28
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case styled Gary Farris and Melva Farris, Plaintiffs, v. 3M
Company, et al. Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-04186-JST, (N.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Jon S. Tigar of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California has issued an order
approving the Stipulation between the Plaintiffs and the defendants
who have appeared in the matter to date: Carrier Corporation, Crane
Co., General Electric Company, Imo Industries, Inc.,
Parker-Hannifin Corporation, Ricoh Company, Ltd., Ricoh Company,
Ltd. and Ricoh USA, Inc.

Based on the stipulation by the Parties, the Court orders that:

      (1) That the Case Management Conference be continued to
November 28, 2018; December 5, 2018, at 2:00 p.m.;

      (2) That the deadline for the Parties to meet and confer
concerning a Joint Case Management Statement be continued to
November 7, 2018;

      (3) That the deadline to file the Joint Case Management
Statement be continued to November 21, 2018,

Plaintiffs Gary Farris and Melva Farris filed a complaint in
Alameda County Superior Court alleging causes of action for Strict
Liability, Negligence, Fraud, Conspiracy to Defraud, and Market
Share, arising out of alleged exposure to asbestos. The matter was
removed from the Alameda County Superior Court to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California.

Plaintiff's counsel recently discovered that many of the defendants
in the matter have not been served. A Case Management Conference is
calendared for October 24, 2018 and the Parties are to meet and
confer concerning a Joint Case Management Statement by October 3,
2018 and file said same on October 15, 2018. Accordingly, the
Parties requested that these dates be pushed out so the Plaintiffs
can complete service of all defendants.

A copy of the Order dated October 2, 2018, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y8235b5p Leagle.com.

Gary Farris & Melva Farris, Plaintiffs, represented by Trey Jones ,
Law Offices of H.W. Trey Jones.

Carrier Corporation, Defendant, represented by James P. Cunningham
-- james.cunningham@tuckerellis.com -- Tucker Ellis LLP & Ronald Q.
Tran -- ronald.tran@tuckerellis.com -- Tucker Ellis LLP.

Crane Co., individually and successor-in-interest to Cochrane
Corporation, Chapman Valve Company & Jenkins Valves, Defendant,
represented by Geoffrey M. Davis -- Geoffrey.Davis@klgates.com --
K&L Gates LLP & Peter Edward Soskin -- peter.soskin@klgates.com --
K&L Gates LLP.

General Electric Company, Defendant, represented by Derek S.
Johnson -- djohnson@wfbm.com -- WFBM, LLP, Charles T. Sheldon --
csheldon@wfbm.com -- WFBM, LLP, Emily Elizabeth Anselmo --
eanselmo@wfbm.com -- WFBM, LLP & Katherine Paige Gardiner --
kgardiner@wfbm.com -- WFBM, LLP.

IMO Industries, Inc., sued individually and as
successor-in-interest to Delaval Turbine, Inc., Defendant,
represented by Bobbie Rae Bailey -- bbailey@leaderberkon.com --
Leader & Berkon LLP, Frederick W. Gatt -- fgatt@leaderberkon.com --
Leader & Berkon LLP & Olga Guadalupe Pena -- opena@leaderberkon.com
-- Leader & Berkon LLP.

Parker-Hannifin Corporation, individually and as
successor-in-interest to Sacoma-Sierra Inc., Defendant, represented
by Robert Kum -- RKum@duanemorris.com -- Duane Morris LLP &
Christopher Sean Patterson -- CSPatterson@duanemorris.com -- Duane
Morris LLP.

Ricoh Company, Ltd., individually and as successor-in-interest to
Savin Corporation and served through its General Manager Ricoh USA,
Inc., Defendant, represented by Mary Katherine Back --
mback@mgmlaw.com -- Manning Gross + Massenburg LLP & Tina Broccardo
Van Dam -- tvandam@mgmlaw.com -- Manning Gross + Massenburg LLP.

Ricoh USA, Inc., individually and as successor-in-interest to Savin
Corporation and as general manager of Ricoh Company, Ltd.,
Defendant, represented by Mary Katherine Back -- mback@mgmlaw.com
-- Manning Gross + Massenburg LLP.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Final Dismissal of Kirkland vs. Huntington Entered
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Halil Suleyman Ozerden of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi has issued a final
judgment of dismissal of the civil action styled Johnny Kirkland,
Plaintiff, v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated, Defendant, Civil No.
1:17-cv135-HSO-JCG, (S.D. Miss.) with prejudice.

Invoking federal question jurisdiction, Kirkland filed a pro se
Complaint [1] in this Court on May 2, 2017, naming as Defendants
Ingalls Shipyard, John (sic) Manville, and Fibre Board. Plaintiff
asserts that while he was employed at Ingalls Shipyard, he was
exposed to asbestos which resulted in his illness. Kirkland seeks
damages in the amount of $2.8 Million.

In either 1971 or 1978, Plaintiff Johnny Kirkland was hired by
Defendant Huntington Ingalls Incorporated. According to Ingalls,
the actual last workday of Kirkland's employment was September 18,
1978, and he was released from employment on September 25, 1978.

Kirkland alleges that Ingalls Shipyard was his employer, while John
(sic) Manville and Fibre Board were suppliers, and that Defendants
"failed to protect my safety and health from harmful chemicals"
that were sold by John (sic) Manville and Fibre Board to Ingalls
Shipyard. Kirkland asserts that his rights under the Eighth
Amendment was "violated by hollowing at me, and threatening to fire
me if I didn't do what he told me to do, and by working me under
age." Kirkland states that he began working at Ingalls Shipyard in
1971 at the age of 13, although he stated on his application that
he was 18. Kirkland worked as a third class laborer, which included
cleaning up, painting, cleaning insulation, grinding rust off
tanks, cleaning out chemical tanks, and pipe fitting, all in the
bottom of ships without any safety gear.

Based upon the Exhibits attached to Plaintiff's Response to the
Magistrate Judge's Order, the Magistrate Judge directed the Clerk
of Court to "alter the docket to reflect that Defendants' proper
names are: The Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation, Johns Manville,
and Fibreboard Corporation."

Kirkland next filed an Amended Complaint, without leave of Court,
on October 4, 2017, naming additional Defendants but dismissing
Johns Manville. Kirkland states, in pertinent part, that he worked
at age 13 as a laborer in the "27th Department" painting, cleaning
up, carrying out insulation in the trash, sand blasting, and rust
grinding. Kirkland further asserts that, in addition to the illness
he suffers from asbestos exposure, he experienced chemical burns on
his skin and hearing loss due to the loud noise at the shipyard and
due to a piece of "hot steel" that flew into his ear. Kirkland
seeks damages in the amount of "5 or Ten Billion Dollars," and
claims that his father worked at Ingalls and was exposed to
asbestos, which somehow contributed to Plaintiff's illness.

On December 4, 2017, Kirkland filed a Second Amended Complaint
which was stricken from the record by the Magistrate Judge for
noncompliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Kirkland
then filed a Motion to Amend Pleadings on February 2, 2018,
apparently seeking to supplement his Amended Complaint with an
allegation that Ingalls failed to screen his employment
application, or it would have discovered that he was a minor and
that he had used his cousin's Social Security number to obtain
employment. The Court granted this Motion as unopposed.

Ingalls has filed a Motion to Dismiss or, alternatively, for
Summary Judgment, Specifically, Ingalls contends that Kirkland's
claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) and are barred by the
exclusive remedy provision of Section 905(a) of that Act. In the
alternative, to the extent Plaintiff's claims are not preempted by
the LHWCA, his claims fail to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted because they are implausible and/or time barred by
Section 15-1-49(1) of the Mississippi Code.

In support of its Motions, Ingalls attaches the Affidavit of Steve
Pierce, Manager-Risk Management of Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding,
Inc., which avers that while Kirkland was employed there in 1978,
Ingalls maintained workers' compensation coverage under both the
Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act and the LHWCA. In addition,
Ingalls required all of its subcontractors to carry workers'
compensation coverage.

In response, Kirkland admits that Ingalls is "covered under the
LHWCA" but argues for the first time that, in addition to any
claims that fall within the purview of the LHWCA, he is also "suing
Huntington Ingalls Incorporation (sic) under the Dual Capacity
Doctrine for strict liability in tort, breach of duty, negligence,
punitive damages, and illegal underage working," citing Mississippi
Code Section 71-1-17. Kirkland also posits that his claims are not
barred and that the LHWCA would not want anything to do with
Ingalls "hiring underage children and exposing them to asbestos."

Ingalls replies that to the extent Kirkland's claims are not
preempted by the LHWCA, they are barred by the three-year statute
of limitations found at Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49(1).
Ingalls maintains that although Kirkland is asserting for the first
time in his Response that his injuries were latent, such that they
fall within the exception set forth at Mississippi Code Section
15-1-49(2), Kirkland has failed to come forward with relevant
material evidence to support such a contention.

The Court is of the opinion that Ingalls has carried its burden of
establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kirkland
concedes that a portion of his claims against Ingalls fall within
the purview of the LHWCA. To the extent Kirkland's pleadings could
be construed to assert any additional tort claims that may somehow
fall outside the purview of the LHWCA, the Court agrees with
Ingalls that those claims would be barred by the three-year statute
of limitations found at Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49(1).

The LHWCA provides a cause of action for injuries sustained by a
broad range of land-based maritime workers. The LHWCA provides a
no-fault workers' compensation scheme against a worker's employer
for the death or disability of anyone engaged in maritime
employment to receive medical costs, prejudgment interest, and
two-thirds of the worker's salary for as long as the disability
persists. Accordingly, a person who receives LHWCA benefits may not
sue his employer under state law for any additional compensatory
damages related to his on-the-job injury.

Because it is beyond dispute that Kirkland's claims arise out of
his employment with Ingalls in either ship construction or repair,
the Court concludes that his claims are preempted by the LHWCA,
which affords Ingalls immunity from the allegations raised by
Kirkland in this matter.Thus, Kirkland's claims should be dismissed
pursuant to the LHWCA.

Giving Kirkland every benefit of the doubt, to the extent his
pleadings could be construed to advance any state law claims not
subject to the provisions of the LHWCA, such claims are barred by
the relevant statute of limitations. In Mississippi, "all actions
for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be
commenced within three years next after the cause of such action
accrued, and not after." Based upon the dates contained in the
Employee Separation Certificate provided by Kirkland, and giving
Kirkland every benefit of the doubt in terms of the dates of his
employment, he worked at Ingalls in either 1971 or 1978 for a brief
period of time.

Taking as true Kirkland's allegation that he was only thirteen
years of age when he worked at Ingalls in either 1971 or 1978, the
Court points out that the three-year statute of limitations would
have started running once he attained the age of twenty-one, either
in 1979 or 1986. Mississippi Code Section 15-1-59 provides that if
any person entitled to bring any of the personal actions mentioned
shall, at the time at which the cause of action accrued, be under
the disability of infancy or unsoundness of mind, he may bring the
actions within the times in this chapter respectively limited,
after his disability shall be removed as provided by law. However,
the saving in favor of persons under disability of unsoundness of
mind shall never extend longer than twenty-one (21) years.
Therefore, the statute of limitations on any state law tort claim
expired three years after Kirkland attained the age of twenty-one
in either 1979 or 1986, long before he filed his Complaint in
2017.

The Court finds that although Kirkland raises the issue of a latent
injury in his Response, he did not plead that he suffered a latent
injury. To the contrary, Kirkland stated in his Response that he
left work because of breathing problems. In his Amended Complaint,
Kirkland alleges that while at work he suffered chemical burns on
his skin and hearing loss due to loud noise and hot metal flying
into his ear. The record thus supports the conclusion that Kirkland
was sufficiently aware of his alleged injuries at the time he left
his employment with Ingalls that any cause of action he may be
asserting in this case accrued once he reached the age of
twenty-one. Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49(2) provides that "in
actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and
which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does
not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable
diligence should have discovered, the injury."

To the extent any of Kirkland's claims could be construed to fall
outside the purview of the LHWCA, the Court opines that they are
barred by Mississippi's catchall three year statute of limitations,
and any such claims should be dismissed with prejudice.

To the extent Kirkland alleges that Ingalls violated his rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, the Court determines the proper vehicle for raising
such claims is through an action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983,
which imposes liability upon any person who, acting under color of
state law, deprives another of federally protected rights. However,
Kirkland has failed to plausibly state a claim that, at the time of
his employment, Ingalls was a state actor or that it acted under
color of law, as required by Section 1983. Since his allegations of
constitutional violations are insufficient to state a claim, the
Court concludes that his case should be dismissed with prejudice.

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion and Order dated September 11,
2018, is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9de5x2g from
Leagle.com.

Johnny Kirkland, Plaintiff, pro se.

Huntington Ingalls Incorporated, Defendant, represented by Richard
P. Salloum , Franke & Salloum, PLLC & Traci M. Castille , Franke &
Salloum, PLLC.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Firm Fined for Exposing Employees to Asbestos
--------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reported that a wood processing mill where four workers
died in an explosion has been fined for exposing staff to
asbestos.

Three men and a woman died in 2015 at Wood Treatment Ltd in
Cheshire when the four-storey building collapsed.

The Health and Safety Executive said after the blast staff removed
cladding in 2016 without being told about the asbestos, although
the firm was aware.

The company was fined GBP2,000 at Manchester and Salford
Magistrates' Court and must pay £3,000 costs.

Wood Treatment Ltd, of Tunstall Road, Bosley, pleaded guilty in
August to a breach of the Health and Safety at Work Act.

Following the explosion in July 2015, the company was told by the
HSE to fit new explosion-relief panels to an asbestos cement-clad
warehouse.

Although an external company had been hired, they did not work with
materials that contained asbestos and staff at the wood processing
plant removed them instead.

Image captionWill Barks, Derek Moore, Jason Shingler and Dorothy
Bailey all died on 17 July 2015 in the blast.

After the panels were installed, the old asbestos sheets were cut
to size and refitted to fill holes left in the wall, the HSE said.


Although the company was fully aware of the asbestos and had an
asbestos survey and action plan, the HSE said the information was
not shared with employees and measures not put in place to contain
the risks involved.

HSE inspector Ian Betley said: "Asbestos is responsible for
thousands of deaths in the UK every year but it only becomes
dangerous when it is broken up and fibres are released into the
air.

"Asbestos should only be removed by specialist contractors, Wood
Treatment Ltd put workers at risk by not following the correct
safety procedures."

The HSE's investigation into the explosion -- described by rescue
teams as the "worst incident of its kind" in a decade -- is still
on-going.

Derek Moore, 62, from Stoke-on-Trent, William Barks, 51, from Leek,
Jason Shingler, 38, from North Rode, and Dorothy Bailey, 62 died in
the blast.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Firm Fined for Unlicensed Asbestos Removal
-----------------------------------------------------------
Construction News reported that Bristol Magistrates' Court heard
that a Health and Safety Executive investigation found that
materials including asbestos insulation board were left lying
outside during TW Parker’s work on the Cherry Tree pub in Oldland
Common.

Asbestos-containing materials, which require a licence to remove,
were also discovered among the debris and in the building
structure.

TW Parker had been advised that a refurbishment survey was to be
undertaken before works commenced.

The firm failed to request information from the client regarding
the possible presence of asbestos, despite some material being
marked as containing asbestos, and failed to use a licensed
contractor to undertake the removal works.

TW Parker (Building & Groundworks) Ltd of Hicks Common Road,
Winterbourne, Bristol pleaded guilty to breaching Section 5, 8(1)
and 16 of the Control of Asbestos Regulations 2012.

The company was fined GBP7,000 and ordered to pay GBP1,254.60 in
costs.

Speaking after the hearing, HSE inspector Ian Whittles said: "The
dangers associated with asbestos are well known and a wealth of
advice and guidance is freely available from the HSE website.

"Companies should be aware that HSE will not hesitate to take
appropriate enforcement action against those that fall below the
required standards."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Fit & Healthy Woman Dies of Asbestos Cancer
------------------------------------------------------------
Daily Mail reported that a 'fit and healthy' young woman died from
asbestos-related cancer -- 15 years after helping build a school
using the material in her gap year, an inquest heard.

Medical researcher Rose Wharton, 33, fell ill from mesothelioma,
which is normally associated with older workers involved in the
construction industries.

The only time she could have been exposed to asbestos was while
building a school in Argentina during her gap year when she was 18,
her family told the hearing.

Oxfordshire coroner Darren Salter said it was a 'very unusual' case
because the illness usually only affects those who worked around
asbestos for decades.

'I don't think I have seen a case like this,' she told the
hearing.

'Mesothelioma normally affects men working as plumbers or heating
engineers for 30 or 40 years, but this is very different from
that.'

Ms Wharton, who worked as a medical statistician and was born in
Cambridge, was described as 'fit and well' with no medical problems
except asthma.

She was diagnosed in September last year and died at her home in
Oxford on May 20.

As the source of the asbestos exposure could not be confirmed, Mr
Salter recorded a narrative verdict, stating the cause of her
cancer was not known.

A JustGiving crowdfunding page set up in her memory has raised
almost GBP3,000 towards research into peritoneal mesothelioma.

In a tribute, her colleagues at the Nuffield Department of Clinical
Neurosciences at the University of Oxford said Ms Wharton would be
'greatly missed'.

She studied Mathematics and Statistics in Newcastle University
followed by an MSc in Medical Statistics at the University of
Leicester before joining Oxford in 2010.

Her group of friends are running the Oxford Half Marathon on Sunday
7th October in her memory.

Rose's family added that they wanted to thank John Radcliffe and
Churchill Hospitals in Oxford and the Sobell House Hospice who
provided excellent care and support and St Ebbe's Church in
Headington who provided moral support.

WHAT IS MESOTHELIOMA?
Mesothelioma is a type of cancer that develops in the lining that
covers the outer surface of some of the body's organs. It's usually
linked to asbestos exposure.

It mainly affects the lining of the lungs (pleural mesothelioma),
although it can also affect the lining of the tummy (peritoneal
mesothelioma), heart or testicles.

More than 2,600 people are diagnosed with the condition each year
in the UK. Most cases are diagnosed in people aged 60-80 and men
are affected more commonly than women.

Unfortunately it's rarely possible to cure mesothelioma, although
treatment can help control the symptoms.

The symptoms of mesothelioma tend to develop gradually over time.
They typically don't appear until several decades after exposure to
asbestos.

Mesothelioma is almost always caused by exposure to asbestos, a
group of minerals made of microscopic fibres that used to be widely
used in construction.

These tiny fibres can easily get in the lungs, where they get
stuck, damaging the lungs over time. It usually takes a while for
this to cause any obvious problems, with mesothelioma typically
developing more than 20 years after exposure to asbestos.

The use of asbestos was completely banned in 1999, so the risk of
exposure is much lower nowadays. However, materials containing
asbestos are still found in many older buildings.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Flowserve Still Faces PI Lawsuits at June 30
-------------------------------------------------------------
Flowserve Corporation remains a defendant in various
asbestos-related personal injury lawsuits, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The Company states, "We are a defendant in a substantial number of
lawsuits that seek to recover damages for personal injury allegedly
caused by exposure to asbestos-containing products manufactured
and/or distributed by our heritage companies in the past.  While
the overall number of asbestos-related claims has generally
declined in recent years, there can be no assurance that this trend
will continue, or that the average cost per claim will not further
increase.  Asbestos-containing materials incorporated into any such
products were encapsulated and used as internal components of
process equipment, and we do not believe that any significant
emission of asbestos fibers occurred during the use of this
equipment.

"Our practice is to vigorously contest and resolve these claims,
and we have been successful in resolving a majority of claims with
little or no payment.  Historically, a high percentage of resolved
claims have been covered by applicable insurance or indemnities
from other companies, and we believe that a substantial majority of
existing claims should continue to be covered by insurance or
indemnities.  Accordingly, we have recorded a liability for our
estimate of the most likely settlement of asserted claims and a
related receivable from insurers or other companies for our
estimated recovery, to the extent we believe that the amounts of
recovery are probable and not otherwise in dispute.  While
unfavorable rulings, judgments or settlement terms regarding these
claims could have a material adverse impact on our business,
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows, we
currently believe the likelihood is remote.

"Additionally, we have claims pending against certain insurers
that, if resolved more favorably than reflected in the recorded
receivables, would result in discrete gains in the applicable
quarter.  We are currently unable to estimate the impact, if any,
of unasserted asbestos-related claims, although future claims would
also be subject to then-existing indemnities and insurance
coverage."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2RilIza


ASBESTOS UPDATE: GMS Units Still Face 37 Lawsuits at July 31
------------------------------------------------------------
GMS Inc.'s subsidiaries are still defending themselves against 37
pending asbestos-related personal injury lawsuits as of July 31,
2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
July 31, 2018.

The Company states, "The building materials industry has been
subject to personal injury and property damage claims arising from
alleged exposure to raw materials contained in building products as
well as claims for incidents of catastrophic loss, such as building
fires.  As a distributor of building materials, we face an inherent
risk of exposure to product liability claims in the event that the
use of the products we have distributed in the past or may in the
future distribute is alleged to have resulted in economic loss,
personal injury or property damage or violated environmental,
health or safety or other laws.

"Such product liability claims have included and may in the future
include allegations of defects in manufacturing, defects in design,
a failure to warn of dangers inherent in the product, negligence,
strict liability or a breach of warranties.  In particular, certain
of our subsidiaries have been the subject of claims related to
alleged exposure to asbestos-containing products they distributed
prior to 1979.

"Since 2002 and as of July 31, 2018, approximately 976
asbestos-related personal injury lawsuits have been filed and we
vigorously defend against them.  Of these, 931 have been dismissed
without any payment by us, 37 are pending and only 8 have been
settled, which settlements have not materially impacted our
financial condition or operating results."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/SdrRh5


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Hall Employees Exposed to Asbestos for Months
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jeff McDonald of The San Diego Union-Tribune reported that San
Diego city officials allowed hundreds of employees to remain in
leased office space despite months of construction that exposed
workers to cancer-causing asbestos, according to a legal claim
filed on behalf of a longtime building inspector.

Weeks after employees were moved from a rented high rise south of
City Hall early this year, Deputy Chief Operating Officer Ronald
Villa told employees a planned relocation had been delayed so the
city would not be on the hook for $1 million or more for breaking
the lease.

"The city exposed its employees to deadly asbestos for months while
they occupied the 1010 Second Ave. building, and then the city
concealed the significance of the asbestos exposure its employees
suffered," the claim states.

City officials declined to discuss specific allegations in the
legal claim, a formal filing that is generally required before a
public agency can be sued in court. But they issued a statement
saying that protecting employees from any dangerous work conditions
is a top priority.

"The city takes the workplace conditions of its employees seriously
and that's why action was taken to remove all employees from the
building once potential asbestos was discovered," the statement
said. "City employees were instructed to leave all their equipment
and personal belongings inside to prevent additional
contamination."

City leaders said they expect to sue the building owner on behalf
of the city and its employees.

The employee claim was filed Sept. 14 on behalf of city building
inspector Bryan Monaghan. It was signed by San Diego attorney Maria
Severson, who said up to 550 employees may eventually join the
litigation.

"They're nervous," Severson said of the city employees. "Some
people have acute illnesses and symptoms as a result of the
exposure but what the majority of them have is a fear of cancer,
which is a recognizable claim.

"They are forced to live their life wondering if it is going to
materialize."

The two-page claim seeks unspecified damages. A 16-page attachment
details the history of the building renovations and a timeline
showing asbestos-removal work and subsequent complaints from
employees about headaches, nausea and other symptoms.

According to the attachment, the city began moving employees into
the building in January 2016. They came from the planning
department, auditor's office, homeland security, information
technology and other offices.

In July 2017, the county Air Pollution Control District was
notified by Clauss Construction that the building owners, Tower 180
Owner LLC, planned to remove approximately 5,000 square feet of
asbestos-containing fireproofing.

It was not immediately clear whether the county or contractor
alerted the city or other tenants in the building to the removal
project. Clauss Construction did not respond to a message Tuesday
and a county spokesman said the county is not required to make such
notifications.

By August, city employees in the tower known as the Executive
Complex began complaining about side effects of the construction
work, the claim says.

In January, county air-pollution officials received an emergency
notification that asbestos had been disturbed during renovation
work in the building lobby -- and the material required immediate
removal.

During subsequent inspection and air-testing, county officials
noted that "poorly constructed polyvinyl sheeting containing holes
was all that separated the construction zone and the occupied
office space," the claim states.

Samples from late January tested positive for two types of
asbestos, the claim alleges.

Between Jan. 25 and Jan. 29, seven separate samples came back with
asbestos contents of 20 to 65 percent in fireproofing material and
wall debris, the claim said. Four of those samples were taken on
floors that were occupied, results showed.

On Jan. 31, the city announced that "in an abundance of caution" it
was moving 550 employees from the high rise.

"The city's lease of Executive Complex was slated to terminate on
June 30, 2019," the statement said. "However, the city has an
option to terminate sooner and planned to shift all operations
currently located at Executive Complex to 101 Ash St., which the
city leased-to-own and is starting renovations in the next few
months."

Five weeks later, at a March 2 meeting with city workers called to
address health concerns of the asbestos exposure, Villa told
employees something different.

"The reason why it took so long is there was no way for us to break
the lease and we would have been held liable for all of that," he
said, according to a transcript of the meeting cited in the claim.
"Now that is over $1 million. Is that worth everybody's whatever?
Maybe, maybe not.

"The fact is there is a cost to that and we would have been in
litigation over that," added Villa, who also pledged to post test
results on the city website and provide copies of a pending report
to employees when completed.

Also attending the March employee meeting were an environmental
services expert and an occupational medicine physician, each of
whom told workers that their long-term health risks were minimal.

"Everything was within tolerable levels, breathable air levels that
would be just as safe as for a hospital or school," the
environmental services expert said.

The city did not explain the discrepancy between its Jan. 31 press
release stating the lease was breakable and Villa's comment to
employees in March. Additionally, no test results were posted
online and no report was given to employees, the claim alleged.

Plans to move hundreds of city employees into the office tower at
101 Ash St. also hit a snag.

Last year the city agreed to spend just over $200 million on a
lease-to-own deal to acquire the building, former headquarters for
Manchester Financial and, before that, Sempra Energy.

Aides to Mayor Kevin Faulconer told the City Council the building
just needed a $10,000 power wash before hundreds of employees could
be moved in by July 2017. That schedule was delayed amid design
changes and unexpected renovations.

The city has been paying $18,000 a day to lease that vacant
building since January 2017, with move-in expected late next year.
In August, the council agreed to spend an additional $30 million on
renovations for the Ash Street high rise.

Tower 180 Owner LLC issued a statement Tuesday saying the company
responded prudently to the exposure.

"Once notified of the environmental issues on the evening of
Friday, Feb. 9, the owners immediately began working closely with
the tenants and regulatory agencies to address the concerns
surrounding the building," the statement said. "Tenants were
notified via an official notice by email on the morning of Feb. 10,
2018."

In a report earlier this year, the county Air Pollution Control
District said it was "gravely concerned for the potential of
repeated and ongoing exposure of the public to harmful asbestos
debris both inside and outside the building," the claim states.

County spokesman Michael Workman said the asbestos-removal project
was written up by air-pollution inspectors for multiple
violations.

"They were cited and now are in compliance and are checked
routinely," Workman wrote in an email.

Many of the workers exposed to asbestos in the Executive Complex
are represented by the San Diego Municipal Employees Association.

Michael Zucchet, the former councilman who now runs the union, said
even before he and his members learned about the asbestos exposure
in January, working conditions inside the Executive Complex were
difficult.

"It wasn't just about the asbestos," he said. "There was dust and
noise and walled-off windows. Anybody who has lived through a home
remodel knows it's terrible. The city just kept saying they had
nowhere else to place the employees."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Homes Built Before 1990 May Contain Asbestos
-------------------------------------------------------------
Barb Brouwer of Salmon Arm Observer reported that there is a danger
lurking in many homes that residents may not know about.

Any building constructed before the 1990s is likely to have
asbestos in the drywall, advised Ben Van Nostrand, environmental
health team leader, to directors at the Sept. 20 Columbia Shuswap
Regional District board meeting.

"Demolition and renovation materials, including ceiling and other
textured drywall, drywall mud and tape, floor tile and attic
insulation manufactured through to the late 1980s has been
determined to likely contain asbestos," wrote Van Nostrand in his
report to the board. "Asbestos was added to these materials to make
it more noise absorbent, to improve fire resistant capabilities and
to make it stronger."

The regional district began recycling drywall in 2010 and, in 2013,
partnered with the North Okanagan and Okanagan-Similkameen Regional
District to send drywall to a composting facility in Alberta.

But in October 2017, the CSRD was informed that, due to
uncertainties related to the potential for the drywall to contain
asbestos, they would no longer be able to accept it at their
facility.

As a result, landfills in the Southern Interior, including CSRD
facilities, ended up with large stockpiles of drywall, some of
which likely contained asbestos.

CSRD staff worked with neighbouring regional districts, consultants
and Work Safe BC to develop guidelines to ensure the general
public, CSRD contractors and staff are protected when disposing of
the stockpiles.

"At the time of writing this report, all CSRD stockpiles of drywall
have either been appropriately landfilled or are in the final
process of being removed," wrote Van Nostrand.

Directors expressed the concern that many residents may not be
aware of the danger of asbestos, or that they might have it in
their homes.

Van Nostrand pointed out that CSRD staff will continue to explore
recycling options for new construction drywall, as landfilling
drywall has negative environmental impacts such as the production
of hydrogen sulphide gas, which is toxic to humans and can be
lethal at higher concentrations.

At this point, operations manager Darcy Mooney advised directors
that the gas caused a fatality at the landfill a number of years
ago.

Van Nostrand then noted staff will begin reviewing drywall
recycling options, in conjunction with the bylaw and tipping fee,
and will potentially advance amendments in 2019 to reflect program
changes.

"In the meantime, staff will ensure that CSRD workers, contractors
and customers of CSRD refuse disposal facilities are educated on
the changes in the way in which these demolition and renovation
materials are managed and accepted at CSRD facilities," he noted.

Individuals wishing to dispose of drywall and associated materials
that were manufactured prior to 1990 must ensure they are
double-bagged and sealed in plastic bags that are at least 6 mm
thick -- before they are taken to the landfills or transfer
stations.

"The issue is really renovation and demolition stuff and the key
point there is 1990, so pre-1990 that you know may contain
asbestos, if you want to bring it to the site without some proof
that it doesn’t contain asbestos, you can double bag it," says
Van Nostrand, noting that the material will be accepted without
being bagged if a professional has done a risk assessment and
signed off that it doesn't contain asbestos. Or, individuals can
sign a waiver declaring the material to be post 1990.

Van Nostrand said he wanted to create a number of avenues for the
public and hopes to come up with another drywall recycling program
in the future.

"The problem there is they need to sign off to say it's asbestos
free; if it shows up at the Richmond facility, we risk being fined,
so the new program will be restricted to construction and brand-new
drywall, companies that have signed off that they're bringing clean
drywall only."

Van Nostrand says the regional district will be providing
instructions on demolition, how people can become aware of the
risks of asbestos, how to take precautions, or where to find
somebody to do a risk assessment.

Information will be available on the regional district's website at
www.csrd.bc.ca


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Houston Wire Still Defends PI Suits at June 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
Houston Wire & Cable Company still defends itself against lawsuits
alleging personal injury due to asbestos that may be in certain
wire and cable, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2018.

The Company states, "The Company, along with many other defendants,
has been named in a number of lawsuits in the state courts of
Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota alleging that certain
wire and cable which may have contained asbestos caused injury to
the plaintiffs who were exposed to this wire and cable.  These
lawsuits are individual personal injury suits that seek unspecified
amounts of money damages as the sole remedy. It is not clear
whether the alleged injuries occurred as a result of the wire and
cable in question or whether the Company, in fact, distributed the
wire and cable alleged to have caused any injuries.

"The Company maintains general liability insurance that, to date,
has covered the defense of and all costs associated with these
claims. In addition, the Company did not manufacture any of the
wire and cable at issue, and the Company would rely on any
warranties from the manufacturers of such cable if it were
determined that any of the wire or cable that the Company
distributed contained asbestos which caused injury to any of these
plaintiffs.

"In connection with ALLTEL's sale of the Company in 1997, ALLTEL
provided indemnities with respect to costs and damages associated
with these claims that the Company believes it could enforce if its
insurance coverage proves inadequate."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2IxSMiA


ASBESTOS UPDATE: J-M Manufacturing Appeal of Warren Suit Dismissed
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of New York has dismissed the appeal in the
case styled In The Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation.
Theresa Warren, etc., Respondent, V. Amchem Products, Inc., et al.,
Defendants, J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc., Appellant, Motion No.
2018-648, (N.Y. App. Div.) upon the ground that the order sought to
be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the
meaning of the Constitution.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Jury Verdict Favoring BNSF Affirmed on Appeal
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of Montana affirms the jury verdict in favor of
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF), entered in the
Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County.

On appeal, Plaintiff Kenneth Daley's arguments broadly assert that
BNSF obtained favorable rulings to its requests to exclude
evidence, and then made arguments that would have been contradicted
by the excluded evidence.

Kenneth Daley brought this case against Burlington Northern Santa
Fe Railway Company (BNSF) under the Federal Employers Liability Act
and the Locomotive Inspection Act. Daley worked at the Somers rail
tie treatment plant operated by BNSF's predecessor from 1967 until
it closed in 1986, and alleged injury from exposure to asbestos
during his work there. The case was heavily litigated, with many
pretrial motions. In July 2017, after a seven-day trial, a jury
determined that BNSF had not violated the standard of care under
FELA and had not violated the LIA. After trial, Daley moved the
court to enter default judgment against BNSF for asserted
litigation misconduct, which was deemed denied.

The Court explains that the authority to grant or deny a motion in
limine rests in the inherent power of the court to admit or exclude
evidence and to take such precautions as are necessary to afford a
fair trial for all parties. The Court has previously held that,
when one party "opens the door" by broaching a topic that has been
excluded, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by
permitting the other party to offer evidence to correct a false
impression. District courts to have broad discretion to determine
the extent to which a party may respond once the other party opens
the door, the Court further said.

The district court granted BNSF's motion in limine to exclude the
argument that BNSF had placed "profits over safety," reasoning that
BNSF's profits were irrelevant to its standard of care under FELA
to provide a "reasonably safe" workplace. BNSF's 2004 Form 10-K was
referenced in the court's order as evidence that could be offered
in support of the prohibited "profits over safety" argument. Form
10-K, a report required by the Securities and Exchange Commission
for distribution to shareholders, stated in part: "The company is
party to a number of personal injury claims by employees who worked
around asbestos. The heaviest exposure for BNSF employees was due
to work conducted in an around the use of steam locomotive engines
that were phased out between the years of 1950 and 1967. However,
other types of exposure, including exposure from locomotive
component parts and building materials, continued after 1967, until
substantially eliminated by 1985.

The Court finds that the Form 10-K was referenced within the
court's "profits over safety" order, and the court could have
reasonably interpreted the order as excluding that document when
the issue was revisited. Even if Form10-K had not been previously
referenced, the district court could have later extended its ruling
to the Form. Daley did not establish that the general reference in
the Form to other "personal injury claims by employees who worked
around asbestos" involved circumstances that were "substantially
similar" to his claims and "not too remote." Given the lack of
demonstrated comparable circumstances between the claims mentioned
on the Form 10-K and Daley's experience at the Somers plant, the
Court is not convinced that the district court abused its broad
discretion, by excluding the evidence, even after BNSF argued Daley
had not been exposed to asbestos.

The Court notes that despite Daley's argument that he "was not
allowed to present the truth," the district court admitted, over
BNSF's repeated objections, extensive historical documentation of
BNSF's predecessors' understanding of asbestos-related disease,
dating back to the 1930s, including documents demonstrating their
awareness of the health risks and recommended control measures. The
district court also admitted extensive evidence concerning asbestos
exposure at the Somers plant, and allowed Dr. Spear, Daley's
industrial hygiene expert, significant latitude in his testimony,
including about other employees exposed to asbestos who had
different jobs than Daley.

The Court also finds that the district court granted BNSF's motion
in limine to preclude admission of evidence, including several
letters, which referenced non-asbestos OSHA violations by BNSF and
its refusal to permit access, at other plants, to OSHA inspectors
without a warrant. The district court acknowledged the evidence
could be admissible under Rule 406 as habit evidence, but excluded
it under Rule 403, reasoning that "the evidence does not appear
particularly relevant to show that there were violation of OSHA
regulations concerning occupational asbestos exposure at the Somers
Tie Plant. . . the risk of prejudice, confusion of the issues, and
amount of time to develop the evidence from other facilities
concerning non-asbestos OSHA regulations militates against its
admissibility."

Daley argues the district court erred by excluding the letters,
first, as evidence of habit or as a party admission, and then by
not admitting them in response to BNSF's "opening the door" by
asserting during opening statement it was a workplace safety
leader, which Daley contends left the jury with "an intentionally
false image of the railroad's safety record that was irreconcilable
with the excluded evidence." BNSF answers that the incidents
referenced in the letters had no relation to Daley or the Somers
plant, and that Daley did not preserve the asserted error for
appeal. Given the remoteness between the infractions referenced in
the letters and either the Somers plant or Daley's asbestos claim,
the Court could not conclude the district court's initial exclusion
of the letters under Rule 403 was arbitrary or exceeded the bounds
of reason. First, the district court admitted significant evidence
regarding asbestos-related violations of industry standards and
OSHA rules at the Somers plant, including failure to test for
asbestos, post required safety posters, provide safety equipment,
including respirators, train workers on the proper use of safety
equipment, provide medical evaluations, and remove asbestos.
Secondly, the Court finds it doubtful that Daley preserved the
issue of BNSF's "opening the door" to admission of the evidence.

The Court explains that in order to preserve an objection to the
admission of evidence for appeal, the objecting party must make a
timely and specific objection on the record. The Court finds,
however, that Daley does not demonstrate from the record that he
argued BNSF's opening statement had opened the door to admission of
the letters. Daley points to an "Offer of Proof" he filed with the
district court five days into the trial, which offered further
argument regarding nine evidentiary rulings he asserted were error,
including this one, but that document made no request for relief.
It was filed days after the opening statements were made, and it is
questionable whether this filing timely provided an opportunity for
the court to remedy any error. Further, given the plethora of
issues then raised, with no suggested remedy, the Court cannot see
how the trial court could have viably addressed them. The Court,
therefore, concludes that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by excluding the letters.

Richard Wang and Robert Fuller, both deceased, were coworkers with
Daley at the Somers plant. Both filed lawsuits against BNSF for
asbestos exposure in the 1990s. The district court admitted some of
their deposition testimony, including their testimony about
exposure to asbestos at the Somers plant, reasoning it was relevant
to Daley's claim. The district court excluded any reference to Wang
and Fuller's illnesses and death, because there was no evidence in
their depositions that they had suffered from asbestos-related
diseases, and excluded reference to the lawsuits they had filed,
reasoning these were irrelevant.

On appeal, Daley argues BNSF opened the door to the issue of Wang
and Fuller's asbestos claims by mentioning the term "claims" and
asserting that Wang and Fuller had not been exposed to asbestos.
BNSF responds that the district court appropriately balanced the
issue, admitting Wang and Fuller's testimony about their asbestos
exposure but excluding evidence about their legal claims on
relevance grounds, given that their asserted injuries were not
substantially similar, and the lack of evidence from the
depositions that the co-workers had been diagnosed with
asbestos-related diseases.

While Defense Counsel's reference during opening statement to Wang
and Fuller's "claims" was likely a violation of the district
court's order, any prejudice or false impression given to the jury
from this singular mention, made in passing with no additional
detail, was minimal. Daley was permitted to present both Wang and
Fuller's testimony regarding their exposure to asbestos at the
Somers plant, including Fuller's testimony that there was dry
"asbestos laying all over the place" and was regularly cleaned up
with brooms by everyone working at the plant. The Court cannot
conclude that the district court abused its discretion by
determining that BNSF's reference had not opened the door to a
discussion of the co-workers' illnesses and claims. The Court
maintains that it was not improper for BNSF to attack the
credibility of Wang and Fuller's testimony by pointing out
inconsistencies with each other, and the contradictory test
results.

In discovery, Daley identified Richard Funk, another of his former
co-workers, as a potential witness. However, Daley did not list
Funk as a witness on the final pretrial order. Shortly before
trial, one of Daley's experts suffered a medical emergency, and the
trial was postponed. When the parties submitted a second final
pretrial order before the rescheduled trial, Daley added Funk as a
witness. BNSF objected, arguing Funk had not been listed in the
initial pretrial order, and that, in discovery, Daley had not
provided contact information for Funk, leaving BNSF unable to
contact Funk about his testimony. The district court barred both
parties from adding witnesses to the first pretrial order and
disallowed Funk's testimony, reasoning that both parties indicated
they were ready for trial when the first pretrial order was filed,
and it would not permit a party to "take advantage" of the
continuance granted for a medical emergency.

Daley argues the district court erred by accepting BNSF's
"misrepresentations about surprise and concealment," and that it
was "hyper technical" to exclude Funk, given that BNSF had notice
that he was a witness and his contact information was available in
the local phonebook. The Court confirms the trial judge "is in the
best position to determine both whether the party in question has
disregarded the opponent's rights, and which sanctions are most
appropriate," and thus, the Court cannot conclude that the district
court acted arbitrarily or exceeded the bounds of reason by
disallowing witnesses not disclosed on the first pretrial order.

Daley propounded discovery to identify other injuries to BNSF
employees. One interrogatory, for instance, requested that BNSF
"identify all claims filed against your company by employees who
worked around asbestos" from 1962 to the present. In December 2015,
BNSF responded to this interrogatory and other similar requests by
objecting that the requests were overly broad and unduly
burdensome, stating the requests spanned fifty years and covered
all locations, crafts, facilities, and types of injuries. However,
along with its objections, BNSF offered to conduct a search and
produce information about prior employee exposure to asbestos.

Apparently, Daley did not respond to BNSF's proposed search prior
to the close of discovery. In June 2016, BNSF similarly objected to
Daley's further discovery requests that sought information
regarding other accidents, and discovery closed in July 2016. The
motions deadlines passed and, in September 2016, Daley certified at
a pretrial conference he was ready for trial and did not mention
any discovery disputes. Daley made an emergency motion to continue
trial, due to a medical emergency of one of his experts, which the
District Court granted. Trial was reset for July 2017.

Then, in March 2017, Daley filed a motion to compel, arguing BNSF
had made improper objections to his discovery requests and withheld
documents of other claims, and asserting "it is clear that BNSF has
not produced responsive information that Plaintiff has located on
his own and that BNSF is well aware of from asbestos litigation
against it." BNSF also argued the requests were overbroad, and
explained that it had offered in 2015 to conduct a search within
proposed parameters for other claims, but that Daley had not
responded. BNSF included a spreadsheet providing raw data about
BNSF injury claims in Montana that would have been used for the
proposed search.

The district court denied Daley's motion, ruling that Daley's
motion was untimely. The court did not want the parties to use the
emergency trial continuance to conduct additional discovery, and
set a new motion deadline only because the first final pretrial
order referenced unbriefed trial issues that needed to be resolved.
Daley's discovery motion was filed more than eight months after the
close of discovery and over a year after receiving BNSF's initial
objections. The district court found that "Daley's counsel should
have recognized his concerns regarding BNSF's objections" before
discovery closed, and that Daley's explanation for his delay --
that he was unaware of other claims against BNSF until recently --
was "not compelling" and "not persuasive."

Further, the district court found Daley did not comply with the
good faith conferral requirement under M. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1).
Based on the timing of the motion, giving BNSF only four days to
respond before filing, the district court concluded the motion
"smacked of gamesmanship." The district court found that Daley's
assertions about the existence of withheld documents were "based
fundamentally on assumptions and speculation," and that many of
Daley's discovery requests were "overbroad and burdensome requests
which do not appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence." Finally, the district court granted BN's
attorney fees for defending against the motion under M. R. Civ. P.
37(a)(5)(B), which it reasoned was mandatory under the Rule, absent
certain exceptions.

On appeal, Daley argues that the district court abused its
discretion by not granting its motion to compel, and should have
entered a default against BNSF for this "discovery misconduct," as
BNSF failed to produce sufficient information in response to his
requests. However, under the district court's extensive reasoning,
the Court cannot conclude that the district court acted arbitrarily
or exceeded the bounds of reason. The Court deliberates that broad
discovery requests by a plaintiff and broad discovery objections by
a defendant may be anticipated, and a party who believes he is
aggrieved by discovery abuse must diligently follow the Rules to
pursue relief. The Court has previously recognized the "dim view"
taken by courts to inaction or dilatory responses to asserted
inadequate discovery answers. An aggrieved party must confer and
compel in a timely fashion under the court's scheduling order.

Having found that Daley filed the motion well over a year after
BNSF first lodged its objections, and having failed to pursue the
issue until well after discovery had closed and shortly before the
second trial date, the Court concludes that BNSF's tactics and
patterns of conduct do not constitute cumulative misconduct that
warrant either the entry of a default judgment against BNSF or new
trial.

A copy of the Opinion dated August 14, 2018, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ya3kjxbs from Leagle.com.

The case is Kenneth Daley, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Burlington
Northern Santa Fe Railway Company, a Delaware for Profit
Corporation; Great Northern Railway Company, a Foreign for Profit
Corporation, and DOES A-Z inclusive, Defendants and Appellees, No.
DA 17-0681, (Mont.)

John F. Lacey , Ethan Aubrey Welder , McGarvey, Heberling, Sullivan
& Lacey, P.C., Kalispell, Montana.

James T. Towe , Kimberly L. Towe , Toe & Fitzpatrick, PLLC,
Missoula, Montana, for Appellant.

Chad M. Knight -- knight@knightnicastro.com -- Anthony M. Nicastro
-- nicastro@knightnicastro.com -- Nadia H. Patrick --
npatrick@knightnicastro.com -- Steven T. Williams --
williams@knightnicastro.com -- Knight Nicastro, LLC, Boulder,
Colorado, for Appellees.


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Navistar Continues to Defend Claims at July 31
---------------------------------------------------------------
Navistar International Corporation still faces asbestos claims
related to its facilities and older vehicle models, according to
the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended July 31, 2018.

The Company states, "Along with other vehicle manufacturers, we
have been subject to an increased number of asbestos-related claims
in recent years.  In general, these claims relate to illnesses
alleged to have resulted from asbestos exposure from component
parts found in older vehicles, although some cases relate to the
alleged presence of asbestos in our facilities.  In these claims,
we are generally not the sole defendant, and the claims name as
defendants numerous manufacturers and suppliers of a wide variety
of products allegedly containing asbestos.

"We have strongly disputed these claims, and it has been our policy
to defend against them vigorously.  Historically, the actual
damages paid out to claimants have not been material in any year to
our financial condition, results of operations, or cash flows.  It
is possible that the number of these claims will continue to grow,
and that the costs for resolving asbestos related claims could
become significant in the future."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2wMlyXg


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Park-Ohio Industries Faces 92 Suits at June 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
Park-Ohio Industries, Inc. is still defending itself in around 92
asbestos-related personal injury cases, according to the Company's
Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The Company states, "We were a co-defendant in approximately 92
cases asserting claims on behalf of approximately 199 plaintiffs
alleging personal injury as a result of exposure to asbestos.
These asbestos cases generally relate to production and sale of
asbestos-containing products and allege various theories of
liability, including negligence, gross negligence and strict
liability, and seek compensatory and, in some cases, punitive
damages.

"In every asbestos case in which we are named as a party, the
complaints are filed against multiple named defendants.  In
substantially all of the asbestos cases, the plaintiffs either
claim damages in excess of a specified amount, typically a minimum
amount sufficient to establish jurisdiction of the court in which
the case was filed (jurisdictional minimums generally range from
US$25,000 to US$75,000), or do not specify the monetary damages
sought.  To the extent that any specific amount of damages is
sought, the amount applies to claims against all named defendants.

"There are four asbestos cases, involving 21 plaintiffs that plead
specified damages against named defendants.  In each of the four
cases, the plaintiff is seeking compensatory and punitive damages
based on a variety of potentially alternative causes of action.  In
three cases, the plaintiff has alleged three counts at US$3.0
million compensatory and punitive damages each; one count at US$3.0
million compensatory and US$1 million punitive damages; one count
at US$1.0 million.  In the fourth case, the plaintiff has alleged
compensatory and punitive damages, each in the amount of US$20.0
million, for three separate causes of action, and US$5.0 million
compensatory damages for the fifth cause of action.

"Historically, we have been dismissed from asbestos cases on the
basis that the plaintiff incorrectly sued one of our subsidiaries
or because the plaintiff failed to identify any asbestos-containing
product manufactured or sold by us or our subsidiaries.  We intend
to vigorously defend these asbestos cases, and believe we will
continue to be successful in being dismissed from such cases.
However, it is not possible to predict the ultimate outcome of
asbestos-related lawsuits, claims and proceedings due to the
unpredictable nature of personal injury litigation.  Despite this
uncertainty, and although our results of operations and cash flows
for a particular period could be adversely affected by
asbestos-related lawsuits, claims and proceedings, management
believes that the ultimate resolution of these matters will not
have a material adverse effect on our financial condition,
liquidity or results of operations.  Among the factors management
considered in reaching this conclusion were: (a) our historical
success in being dismissed from these types of lawsuits on the
bases mentioned; (b) many cases have been improperly filed against
one of our subsidiaries; (c) in many cases the plaintiffs have been
unable to establish any causal relationship to us or our products
or premises; (d) in many cases, the plaintiffs have been unable to
demonstrate that they have suffered any identifiable injury or
compensable loss at all or that any injuries that they have
incurred did in fact result from alleged exposure to asbestos; and
(e) the complaints assert claims against multiple defendants and,
in most cases, the damages alleged are not attributed to individual
defendants.  Additionally, we do not believe that the amounts
claimed in any of the asbestos cases are meaningful indicators of
our potential exposure because the amounts claimed typically bear
no relation to the extent of the plaintiff's injury, if any.

"Our cost of defending these lawsuits has not been material to date
and, based upon available information, our management does not
expect its future costs for asbestos-related lawsuits to have a
material adverse effect on our results of operations, liquidity or
financial position."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/4xRkZw


ASBESTOS UPDATE: School Kitchen Shut Due to Asbestos
----------------------------------------------------
BBC News reported that the kitchen at a school in Skye had to be
closed off following concerns about asbestos in fragments of
coating that fell from the ceiling of the room.

Sandwiches were provided as lunch to pupils at Broadford Primary.

Highland Council said the type of asbestos in the fragments posed a
"very low risk".

However, the parent council has said the incident was another
example of the poor state of the school.

Following the closure of the school's kitchen, Highland Council
said: "We have thoroughly checked the building and done any
remedial work required.

"The school is open as normal today and lunches will be served."


ASBESTOS UPDATE: TriMas Corp. Had 396 Pending Cases at June 30
--------------------------------------------------------------
TriMas Corporation has 396 pending asbestos-related personal injury
cases as of June 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The Company states, "As of June 30, 2018, the Company was a party
to 396 pending cases involving an aggregate of 4,841 claims
primarily alleging personal injury from exposure to asbestos
containing materials formerly used in gaskets (both encapsulated
and otherwise) manufactured or distributed by certain of its
subsidiaries for use primarily in the petrochemical, refining and
exploration industries.

"In addition, the Company acquired various companies to distribute
its products that had distributed gaskets of other manufacturers
prior to acquisition.  The Company believes that many of its
pending cases relate to locations at which none of its gaskets were
distributed or used.

"The Company may be subjected to significant additional
asbestos-related claims in the future, the cost of settling cases
in which product identification can be made may increase, and the
Company may be subjected to further claims in respect of the former
activities of its acquired gasket distributors.  The Company is
unable to make a meaningful statement concerning the monetary
claims made in the asbestos cases given that, among other things,
claims may be initially made in some jurisdictions without
specifying the amount sought or by simply stating the requisite or
maximum permissible monetary relief, and may be amended to alter
the amount sought.  The large majority of claims do not specify the
amount sought.

"Of the 4,841 claims pending at June 30, 2018, 60 set forth
specific amounts of damages (other than those stating the statutory
minimum or maximum).  At June 30, 2018, of the 60 claims that set
forth specific amounts, there were no claims seeking specific
amounts for punitive damages.

"In addition, relatively few of the claims have reached the
discovery stage and even fewer claims have gone past the discovery
stage.

"Total settlement costs (exclusive of defense costs) for all such
cases, some of which were filed over 20 years ago, have been
approximately US$8.7 million.  All relief sought in the asbestos
cases is monetary in nature.  To date, approximately 40% of the
Company's costs related to settlement and defense of asbestos
litigation have been covered by its primary insurance.

"Effective February 14, 2006, the Company entered into a
coverage-in-place agreement with its first level excess carriers
regarding the coverage to be provided to the Company for
asbestos-related claims when the primary insurance is exhausted.
The coverage-in-place agreement makes asbestos defense costs and
indemnity insurance coverage available to the Company that might
otherwise be disputed by the carriers and provides a methodology
for the administration of such expenses.  Nonetheless, the Company
believes it is likely there will be a period within the next six to
12 months, prior to the commencement of coverage under this
agreement and following exhaustion of the Company's primary
insurance coverage, during which the Company will be solely
responsible for defense costs and indemnity payments, the duration
of which would be subject to the scope of damage awards and
settlements paid.

"Based on the settlements made to date and the number of claims
dismissed or withdrawn for lack of product identification, the
Company believes that the relief sought (when specified) does not
bear a reasonable relationship to its potential liability.  Based
upon the Company's experience to date, including the trend in
annual defense and settlement costs incurred to date, and other
available information (including the availability of excess
insurance), the Company does not believe these cases will have a
material adverse effect on its financial position and results of
operations or cash flows."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2NgGSKI


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Union Carbide Faces 13,734 Claims at June 30
-------------------------------------------------------------
Union Carbide Corporation has 13,734 unresolved asbestos-related
claims at June 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

Union Carbide states, "The Corporation is and has been involved in
a large number of asbestos-related suits filed primarily in state
courts during the past four decades.  These suits principally
allege personal injury resulting from exposure to
asbestos-containing products and frequently seek both actual and
punitive damages.  The alleged claims primarily relate to products
that UCC sold in the past, alleged exposure to asbestos-containing
products located on UCC's premises, and UCC's responsibility for
asbestos suits filed against a former UCC subsidiary, Amchem
Products, Inc. ("Amchem").  In many cases, plaintiffs are unable to
demonstrate that they have suffered any compensable loss as a
result of such exposure, or that injuries incurred in fact resulted
from exposure to UCC's products.

"Plaintiffs' lawyers often sue numerous defendants in individual
lawsuits or on behalf of numerous claimants.  As a result, the
damages alleged are not expressly identified as to UCC, Amchem or
any other particular defendant, even when specific damages are
alleged with respect to a specific disease or injury.  In fact,
there are no personal injury cases in which only the Corporation
and/or Amchem are the sole named defendants.  For these reasons and
based upon the Corporation's litigation and settlement experience,
the Corporation does not consider the damages alleged against it
and Amchem to be a meaningful factor in its determination of any
potential asbestos-related liability."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/GdoWFO


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Union Carbide Has $1.3BB Liability at June 30
--------------------------------------------------------------
Union Carbide Corporation's asbestos-related liability for pending
and future claims and defense and processing costs was US$1,310
million at June 30, 2018, according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

Union Carbide states, "The Corporation is and has been involved in
a large number of asbestos-related suits filed primarily in state
courts during the past four decades.  These suits principally
allege personal injury resulting from exposure to
asbestos-containing products and frequently seek both actual and
punitive damages.  The alleged claims primarily relate to products
that UCC sold in the past, alleged exposure to asbestos-containing
products located on UCC's premises and UCC's responsibility for
asbestos suits filed against a former UCC subsidiary, Amchem
Products, Inc. ("Amchem").  In many cases, plaintiffs are unable to
demonstrate that they have suffered any compensable loss as a
result of such exposure, or that injuries incurred in fact resulted
from exposure to the Corporation's products.

"The Corporation expects more asbestos-related suits to be filed
against UCC and Amchem in the future, and will aggressively defend
or reasonably resolve, as appropriate, both pending and future
claims.

"Since 2003, the Corporation has engaged Ankura Consulting Group,
LLC ("Ankura"), a third party actuarial specialist, to review the
Corporation's historical asbestos-related claim and resolution
activity in order to assist UCC management in estimating the
Corporation's asbestos-related liability.  Each year, Ankura has
reviewed the claim and resolution activity to determine the
appropriateness of updating the most recent Ankura study.

"Based on the December 2017 Ankura review and the Corporation's own
review of the data, the Corporation's total asbestos-related
liability through the terminal year of 2049, including
asbestos-related defense and processing costs, was US$1,369 million
at December 31, 2017, and was included in "Asbestos-related
liabilities - current" and "Asbestos-related liabilities -
noncurrent" in the consolidated balance sheets.

"Each quarter, the Corporation reviews claims filed, settled and
dismissed, as well as average settlement and resolution costs by
disease category.  The Corporation also considers additional
quantitative and qualitative factors such as the nature of pending
claims, trial experience of the Corporation and other asbestos
defendants, current spending for defense and processing costs,
significant appellate rulings and legislative developments, trends
in the tort system, and their respective effects on expected future
resolution costs.  UCC management considers all these factors in
conjunction with the most recent Ankura study and determines
whether a change in the estimate is warranted.  Based on the
Corporation's review of 2018 activity, it was determined that no
adjustment to the accrual was required at June 30, 2018.

"The Corporation's asbestos-related liability for pending and
future claims and defense and processing costs was US$1,310 million
at June 30, 2018, and approximately 16 percent of the recorded
liability related to pending claims and approximately 84 percent
related to future claims."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://is.gd/GdoWFO


ASBESTOS UPDATE: US Auto Parts Units Still Defend Suits at June 30
------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc.'s subsidiaries continue to face
lawsuits involving claims for damages caused by installation of
brakes that contained asbestos, according to the Company's Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2018.

The Company states, "A wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company,
Automotive Specialty Accessories and Parts, Inc. and its
wholly-owned subsidiary Whitney Automotive Group, Inc. ("WAG"), are
named defendants in several lawsuits involving claims for damages
caused by installation of brakes during the late 1960's and early
1970's that contained asbestos.  WAG marketed certain brakes, but
did not manufacture any brakes.  WAG maintains liability insurance
coverage to protect its and the Company's assets from losses
arising from the litigation and coverage is provided on an
occurrence rather than a claims made basis, and the Company is not
expected to incur significant out-of-pocket costs in connection
with this matter that would be material to its consolidated
financial statements."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/2OvWFtV


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Whittaker May Perfect Appeal Until May 2019 Term
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the appealed case In Re: New York City Asbestos Litigation.
Claudia Discala, As Administrator of the Estate of Joan Robusto,
Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Charles B. Chrystal Company, Inc., et al.,
Defendants, -And- Whittaker Clark & Daniels, Inc.,
Defendant-Appellant, Motion No. M-3795, Index No. 190413/13.,
40000/88, (N.Y. App. 1st Dept.), the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York, First Department has granted
Defendant-Appellant, -And- Whittaker Clark & Daniels, Inc.'s for
motion to the extent of enlarging the time to perfect the appeal to
the May 2019 Term.

The Defendant-Appellant  moved for an enlargement of time to
perfect their appeal until the earlier of 1) 20 days after the
Court of Appeals decides or disposes of the appeal entitled Juni v
A.O. Smith Water Prods. Co. (154 A.D.3d 441 [1st Dept 2017]),
presently sub judice, or 2) until February 19, 2019, with leave to
seek further enlargements, if necessary.

A copy of the Order dated September 13, 2018, is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ycrgll6k from Leagle.com.


UTAH: Summary Judgment in Suit Over Hospital Lien Statute Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of Utah issued an Opinion affirming the District
Court's judgment granting the Hospital's Motion for Summary
Judgment in the case captioned ZACHARY BRYNER, NENITA R. EZAR,
MICHELLE GALLAGHER, and CHRISTOPHER FURR, Appellants, v. CARDON
OUTREACH, LLC, IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC., ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL,
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HEALTH CARE, and STATE OF UTAH, Appellees. No.
20160818. (Utah).

The question before the state Supreme Court is not a particularly
thorny one: what is the correct interpretation of Utah's Hospital
Lien Statute?

This proposed class action involves persons injured in car
accidents who filed personal injury claims against the third
parties at fault. All had hospital liens placed on any potential
recovery from those claims, and all reached settlement agreements,
paying their attorney fees by way of a contingent fee on the
recovery. The patients contend that the hospitals failed to pay
their fair share of the attorney fees including court costs and
other necessary expenses the patients incurred in generating the
settlement proceeds.

The plaintiffs argued that the Hospital Lien Statute requires a
hospital to pay its proportional share of an injured person's
attorney fees and costs when a hospital lien is paid due to the
efforts of the injured person or his or her attorney.

The defendants countered that the statute contains no such
language, and that the statute operates instead to establish a
priority system as to entitlement to settlement funds to allow
hospitals to get paid.

The district court concluded that the hospitals' interpretation was
correct, as it was the only reasonable interpretation that made
sense given the context of the statute read as a whole.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court affirms a grant of summary judgment when the record shows
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

The parties disagree about the effect of the Hospital Lien Statute
in allocating the attorney fees and costs of the personal injury
litigation. In particular, the parties disagree about the meaning
of subsections 1(a) and 1(b) of the statute. These subsections
state.

"(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3), a hospital located
within the state that furnishes emergency, medical, or other
service to a patient injured by reason of an accident is entitled
to assert a lien upon that portion of the judgment, settlement, or
compromise going or belonging to the patient, or, in the case of
death, to the patient's heirs or personal representatives, less the
amount paid by the patient, or on behalf of the patient by heirs or
personal representatives, for attorney fees, court costs, and other
necessary expenses incidental to obtaining the judgment,
settlement, or compromise.

"(b) No reduction of the asserted lien amount is allowed other than
the amount paid by the patient, or the patient's heirs, or personal
representatives for attorney fees, court costs, and other necessary
expenses incidental to litigation, unless otherwise agreed to in
writing by the lien claimant."

The Whole-Text Canon and the Grammatical Structure of Subsection
(1)

The whole-text canon calls on the judicial interpreter to consider
the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and
logical relation of its many parts.

Read as a whole, Utah Code section 38-7-1(1) creates a priority for
the distribution of the judgment, settlement, or compromise going
or belonging to the patient. The judgment is first used to pay
attorney fees, court costs, and other necessary expenses accrued in
obtaining the judgment. Subsection 1(a) allows a hospital to assert
a lien on the remaining amount of the judgment to obtain payment
for medical expenses incurred in treating the patient as a result
of the action being litigated provided that the amount is greater
than $100.  

Subsection 1(b) establishes that the hospital has priority over any
other creditor or the patient to the entirety of the net judgment
(total judgment less attorney fees) up to its asserted lien unless
expressly agreed to by the hospital.

In other words, the total amount of the judgment going or belonging
to the patient is first used to pay or reimburse attorney fees,
with the net judgment becoming available to cover the entirety of
the hospital lien. Any remaining funds go to other lien holders, if
they exist, and then the patient receives the final amount.

The Substantive Terms Canon

Nothing in the language of the Hospital Lien Statute allows for
assessing the hospitals with a proportional share of the attorney
fees. The patients' reading of the statute to incorporate
proportional sharing does not comport with the language in the
statute; in fact, substantive terms must be added to read it as
assessing hospitals for a portion of the attorney fees. This goes
four square against our case law. The Court will not infer
substantive terms into the text that are not already there.

Rather the interpretation must be based on the language used, and
the Court have no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an
intention not expressed. In short, where the legislature has not
indicated an intention to enact an unprecedented legal requirement,
we will not alter the statutory terms to surmise one.

The Court rejects the patients' notion of proportional fee
sharing.

Common Fund Doctrine

The patients' argument that the doctrine would avoid unjust
enrichment because the hospitals otherwise would bear none of the
litigation costs is inapposite. The relationship between a hospital
and a patient is generally a contractual oneeither expressed
through signing the forms upon admission and consenting to
treatment or implied through receiving emergency treatment even
without signing the forms.  

The existence of a claim, or right to payment, is at the heart of
the debtor-creditor relationship. When hospitals have provided
medical services to patients in accordance with the law, they are
entitled to payment from the patients. This establishes a
debtor-creditor relationship between the patients and the
hospitals. The Hospital Lien Statute is just one mechanism that
hospitals may use to recover the debt owed for treatment-an amount
that would be owed regardless of whether a lawsuit against a
tortfeasor ensued. To expect a creditor to help pay attorney fees
for a lawsuit when they are entitled to collect on the debt owed
them-regardless of whether a suit is filed or the outcome-is
unrealistic and illogical.  

The Court affirms the district court in its grant of summary
judgment to the hospitals.

A full-text copy of the state Supreme Court's September 24, 2018
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9ysaos7 from
Leagle.com.

Robert B. Sykes, Alyson Carter McAllister, Daniel Oswald, for
appellants

Gregory John Wilder, Provo, for appellant Nenita R. Ezar

Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Peggy Stone, Asst. Sol. Gen., Salt Lake
City, for appellees University of Utah Health Care and State of
Utah.

Derek J. Williams , P. Matthew Cox , Nathaniel J. Mitchell , Salt
Lake City, for appellee Cardon Outreach, LLC

Alan C. Bradshaw , Steven C. Bednar , Salt Lake City, for appellee
IHC Health Services, Inc.
Andrew G. Deiss , Billie Jean Siddoway , Salt Lake City, Sean
Gallagher, Denver, CO, for appellee St. Mark's Hospital.



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