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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, October 24, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 213

                            Headlines

ADIENT PLC: Schall Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
AJ BOGGS: California Court Denies Motion to Dismiss Class Action
ALL METRO: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss HHAs' Labor Suit
ALLIANCE MMA: Settlement in Shapiro Action Has Final Court Okay
ALLIED SOLUTIONS: McGuireWoods Attorneys Examine Court Ruling

ALNYLAM PHARMA: Robbins Arroyo Files Securities Class Action
ALNYLAM PHARMA: Rosen Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
ALTRA INDUSTRIAL: Parties Agree to Dismiss Merger-Related Suit
AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Herrera Seeks Unpaid Wages, Penalties
ATH HOLDING: Money Market Class in Bell ERISA Suit Certified

AV HOMES: Agreement Reached to Resolve Zucker and Franchi Suits
AZZ INC: Continues to Defend Mullins Class Suit
BANK OF NEW YORK: Wins Partial Summary Judgment in Henderson
BARTACO: Hepatitis Outbreak Suit Granted Class Action Status
BIG LOTS: Final Approval Hearing on Willis Accord Set for Oct. 30

BOKF NA: Court Dismisses Johnson Suit with Prejudice
BP AMERICAN: Wins Summary Judgment in Legros Deepwater Horizon Suit
CAFE ISTANBUL: Court Conditionally Certifies Nazih FLSA Class
CAFEPRESS INC: Bushansky Sues Over Securities Exchange Act Breach
CAL-MAINE FOODS: Continues to Defend Egg Products-Related Suits

CAMPBELL SOUP: Gainey McKenna Files Class Action Lawsuit
CAMPBELL SOUP: Nov. 27 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline
CANADA LINE: Property Owners' Compensation Delayed Until 2019
CARMAX INC: Wage & Hour Class Suits Still Ongoing in California
CERTIFIED TIRE: Cal. App. Affirms Judgment in Wage & Hour Suits

CHARTER COMMS: Constitutionality of TCPA Challenged
COLT OILFIELD: Oilfield Workers Sue to Recover Unpaid Overtime Pay
CONAGRA BRANDS: Class Suits over Pinnacle Foods Merger Underway
CONAGRA BRANDS: Continues to Defend Briseno Class Suit
CONAGRA BRANDS: Negrete Consolidated Class Suit Remains Pending

CONAGRA BRANDS: Rosenblatt Class Suit over Merger Deal Underway
CONCESIONARIA VUELA: Court Denies Bids to Dismiss Kindt Suit
CONTAINER STORE: Arbitration Ruling in Blind Federation Suit Upheld
DAIRYAMERICA INC: $40MM Settlement in Carlin Has Prelim Approval
DEBT MANAGEMENT: Court Denies Dismissal of FDCPA Suit

DELTA AIR: 11th Cir. Affirms Final Judgment in 1st Bag Fee Suit
DELTA AIR: Hit With Class Action Over Insurance Sales
DRAFT HOUSE: Vidal Labor Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
DUN AND BRADSTREET: William Bird Files Suit Over Sale to CC Capital
ERBA DIAGNOSTICS: Final Settlement Approval Hearing in Jan. 2019

EVERSOURCE ENERGY: Breiding Antitrust Suit Dismissed
EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Charges Exorbitant Records Fees, Suit Says
FACEBOOK INC: Faces Data Breach Class Action in California
FALLS FESTIVAL: Class Action Over Crowd Crush to Proceed
FLINT, MI: Attorneys Want Governor Snyder Added Back as Defendant

FOOT LOCKER: Pays $97M in Fees to Osberg Counsel
FORD MOTOR: Sued Over Duratec Engines with Faulty Water Pumps
FORTIS HEALTHCARE: Shareholder Class Action Mulled
FYRE FESTIVAL: Ja Rule Stands by Idea Despite Class Action
GLOBAL DIGITAL: Court Denies Bids to Dismiss Hull Securities Suit

GLOBAL POWER: Budde Securities Suit Dismissed With Prejudice
GRAYCO COMMUNICATIONS: Cable Guys Seek to Recover Unpaid Wages
GRIECO FORD: Papa Seeks to Certify Two Classes
HORSEHEAD HOLDING: Court Won't Dismiss Securities Fraud Suit
IAS WARRANTY: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Radner Suit as Moot

IDT CORP: Appeal Ongoing in JDS1 LLC Class Suit
IDT CORP: Bid to Dismiss Dennis Class Suit Underway
IDT CORP: Parties in Sanchez Suit Agree to Dismissal
ILLINOIS: Class Action Seeks Stricter Gun Control Measures
IMPINJ INC: Faces Schultz Class Suit in California

IMS TRADING: Court Narrows Claims in 3rd Amended Dopico Suit
INVERSIONES Y REPRESENTACIONES: Securities Class Action Tossed
J&J PALLET: Avoided Paying Overtime Wages, Cook Suit Says
KOL BERAMA: Faces Fine Following Civil Rights Class Action
KROGER CO: 9th Cir. Flips Dismissal of Hawkins UCL Suit

LELAND, NC: Faces Class Action Over Illegal Utility Fees
LIBERTY TAX: Bid to Dismiss New York Securities Suit Underway
LIBERTY TAX: Class Suit by Broward Psychology P.A. Settled
LIBERTY TAX: Continues to Defend Labrado Class Action
LIBERTY TAX: Trial in Del. Stockholder Suit Set for March 2019

LOUISIANA: Court Affirms Dismissal of Section 1983 Suit
LYFT INC: Tecson Sues Over Illegal Recruitment SMS Blasts
M&T BANK: Court Narrows Claims in Consolidated Amended ERISA Suit
MAKE IT RIGHT: Lower 9th Ward Residents File Class Action
MASTERCARD INT'L: Judgment on Pleadings Bid EMV Tech Suit Denied

MDL 2185: Bid for Judgment on Pleadings in Securities Suit Granted
MDL 2785: Court Grants Bid to Compel Subpoena Compliance
MENZGOLD GHANA: Customer Mulls Suit Over Transparency Issues
MGT CAPITAL: Nov. 27 Class Action Lead Plaintiff Deadline Set
MONAKER GROUP: McLeod Class Action Voluntarily Dismissed

MONDA WINDOW: Dancy Lin Dismissed from FLSA Suit
MORRISTOWN MEMORIAL: Frazier FDCPA Suit Dismissed with Prejudice
MOVIEPASS: Unlimited Plan Enrollment May Prompt Class Action
NAMASTE TECHNOLOGIES: Rosen Law Firm Files Class Action
NEW MEXICO: CYFD Sued Over "Broken" Foster Care System

NEW MEXICO: Foster Care Fails to Help Traumatized Children
NIAGARA BOTTLING: Claims in Frompovicz Infringement Suit Narrowed
NICOR ENERGY: Pyles Suit Moved to Southern District of Indiana
OCEAN HARBOR: State Appeals Court Tosses Medicare Class Action
OHIO: Prisoner's Sec. 1983 Claim vs. Zariwala Can Proceed

OIL STATES: $2.3MM Attys' Fees Awarded in Mozingo FLSA Suit
PERRY ELLIS: Witmer Drops Class Action
PIER 1: Appeal in Davie Police Pension Plan Suit Underway
PIER 1: Still Defends Wage-and-Hour Suits in California Court
PLAINS ALL AMERICAN: Nov. 10 Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set

POAGE BANKSHARES: Faces Parshall Suit in Baltimore Court
POLARITYTE INC: Bid to Consolidate Moreno and Lawi Suits Underway
PRAXAIR INC: Garcia Wage Suit Moved to C.D. Calif.
PRINCIPAL LIFE: Averts ERISA Class Action Over 401(k) Plan Funds
PROMPT NURSING: Class of Filipino Nurses Certified

RENT A CENTER: Faces Four Merger-Related Class Suits
RITE AID: Akile Class Action Voluntarily Dismissed
RITE AID: Court Grants Motion to Dismiss Hering Class Suit
RITE AID: Jan. 2019 Final Hearing to Approve Hall Settlement
RITE AID: Wilson Class Action Remains Dormant

ROADRUNNER INTERMODAL: Court Amends Prelim Approval of Singh Deal
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, CA: Summary Judgment in Newberry Affirmed
SAN DIEGO, CA: Faces Class Action Over Privacy Violations
SEATTLE SERVICE: Reyestorre FDCA Suit Dismissed With Prejudice
SERVICOM LLC: Bramlett Sues Over WARN Act Violation

SHUTTERFLY INC: Can Compel Arbitration in Taylor Suit
SIRTEX: Ex-CEO Faces Insider Trading Charges Amid Class Action
SMALL COMMUNITY: Summary Judgment Bid in Yergovich FDCPA Suit OK'd
SOLOMON & SOLOMON: 3d Cir. Affirms Daniels FDCPA Suit Dismissal
SOOTHE INC: Sent Unsolicited SMS Ads, Herrera Suit Says

SPERIAN ENERGY: Brady Sues Over Deceptive Business Practices
SUPERVALU INC: Merger-Related Suits Voluntarily Dismissed
SUPERVALU INC: Summary Judgment Order under Appeal in 11th Cir.
SYNNEX CORP: Bid for Preliminary Injunction in Zalvin Suit Denied
SYNNEX CORP: Continues to Defend Franchi Class Action

TD AMERITRADE: Court Certifies Class in Klein Securities Suit
TICKETMASTER CANADA: Sotos Launches Lawsuit
TIGER NATURAL: Ct. Strikes 32nd, 33rd Affirmative Defenses
UBER TECH: Settles Pa. Drivers' Data Breach Class Action
UBER TECH: Sexual Harassment Class Actions Pending

UNITED AIRLINES: Gets Insurance Kickback from Airfare, Says Flores
UNITED HEALTHCARE: Court Trims Claims in ERISA Suit
UNITED STATES: ACLU Challenges Immigrant Abortion Ban Policy
UNITED STATES: Appeals Court to Hear Spain H-Bomb Case Against VA
VEREIT INC: Inks Settlement with 8 Class Action Opt-Out Entities

WALGREENS BOOTS: Bid to Dismiss Pennsylvania Suit Underway
WALGREENS BOOTS: Merit Discovery Ongoing in Illinois Class Suit
WALMART INC: Sued for Discriminating Against Pregnant Workers
WD HENRY: Migrant Farm Workers File Class Action in New York
WELLLIFE NETWORK: Alsaidi Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay, Damages

WENDY'S: Faces Class Action Over Fingerprint Data Collection
WESTGATE SMOKY: Faces Consumer Fraud Class Action in Tennessee
WYETH INC: Judgment on Pleadings Bid in Antitrust Suit Partly OK'd
[*] Businesses in Europe Brace for Data Breach Class Actions
[*] Collective Action Not a Popular Civil Remedy in India

[*] CPA Most Effective Remedy for Product Liability Claims in India
[*] Fine Arts Association et $25,000 Cy Press Distribution
[*] Initial Coin Offering-Related Class Actions Pile Up

                            *********

ADIENT PLC: Schall Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
on Oct. 8 announced the filing of a class action lawsuit against
Adient plc (Adient or the Company) (NYSE: ADNT) for violations of
Secs. 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's shares between October 31,
2016 and June 11, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are
encouraged to contact the firm before December 3, 2018.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall, or Sherin Mahdavian,
of the Schall Law Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los
Angeles, CA 90067, at 424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of
charge. You can also reach us through the firm's website at
www.schallfirm.com, or by email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Adient touted efficiency improvements in
its SS&M business, claiming it was solidly on track to achieve a
200-basis-point margin improvement by 2020. This business was
actually facing significant challenges and was not likely to
achieve the margin improvement target. On January 17, 2018, Adient
admitted that near-term results were significantly impacted by
SS&M. Even at that date, the Company claimed the margin improvement
plan was still viable. On May 3, 2018, the Company announced an
impairment charge related to the SS&M business and finally admitted
the 200 basis points of margin expansion . . . is no longer going
to be achievable. On June 11, 2018, the CEO of Adient suddenly
resigned without explanation. Based on these facts, the Companys
statements were false and materially misleading throughout the
class period. When the market learned the truth about Adient,
investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation. [GN]


AJ BOGGS: California Court Denies Motion to Dismiss Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fred Donovan, writing for HealthITSecurity, reports that the
California Superior Court has denied a motion to dismiss a class
action lawsuit against A.J. Boggs & Company for a health data
breach that exposed confidential medical records of 93 individuals
with HIV, Lambda Legal, who is representing the plaintiffs,
announced Oct. 4.

A.J. Boggs & Company administered the online enrollment system for
the California AIDS Drug Assistant Program (ADAP), which is a
federally funded program to provide financial assistance for
medication to people living with AIDS who are not eligible for
Medicaid.

"We are very pleased California's Superior Court rejected A.J.
Boggs & Company's attempt to have this case dismissed.  A.J. Boggs
& Company must be held responsible for failing to secure the
private and confidential HIV-related medical information of
Californians with HIV who rely on the ADAP for life-saving
medication," said Jamie Gliksberg, the Lambda Legal attorney
leading this case.

In 2016, the California Department of Public Health contracted with
A.J. Boggs & Company to administer the ADAP enrollment program.
Lambda Legal is accusing A.J. Boggs & Company with developing and
launching an enrollment portal without adequate security testing.

In February 2017, CDPH discovered that an unknown third party
accessed the portal and downloaded medical information of 93 people
with AIDS. As a result, CDPH canceled the contract with A.J. Boggs
& Company on March 1, 2017, and notified those affected by the
breach in April 2017.

"When members of already vulnerable communities -- transgender
people, women, people of color, undocumented people, individuals
with low incomes -- already face challenges in accessing health
care, undermining the trust they have in the ADAP is not just a
breach of security, it creates a barrier to care," commented Lambda
Legal Counsel and HIV Project Director Scott Schoettes.

Lambda Legal filed a complaint on April 3, 2018, against A.J. Boggs
& Company alleging that the company violated California's medical
privacy laws, including the California AIDS Public Health Records
Confidentiality Act and the California Confidentiality of Medical
Information Act.

"This class action is brought to vindicate the privacy rights of
Plaintiff and all other persons living with HIV whose identities,
personal data, and medical information were accessed by
unauthorized individuals because Defendant A.J. Boggs failed to
adequately protect and secure this highly sensitive information,"
the complaint argued.

"Between August 2016 and November 2016, Plaintiff and the putative
class members were participants in California's AIDS Drug
Assistance Program ("ADAP"). The program participants relied on
A.J. Boggs, the company contracted to administer program
enrollment, to aid them in procuring life-saving medications to
keep HIV under control," the complaint alleged.

"Instead of treating the private health information of its clients
with the care it was due, A.J. Boggs left the database containing
this information open to exploitation. As a result of A.J. Boggs's
negligent or willful conduct, ninety-three participants in
California's ADAP program had their private information accessed by
individuals who subsequently could reveal participants' HIV status
to an unknown number of additional individuals," it added.

Alan Doe, the lead plaintiff who uses a pseudonym for purposes of
the lawsuit, stated that the HIV medications "are life-saving for
me, and I could only afford them through the AIDS Drug Assistance
Program."

"That does not mean, however, that I deserved to have my
confidential medical information exposed publicly. With whom, when
and how I share my HIV status is my right and my decision, and A.J.
Boggs & Company took both away from me. Lambda Legal is here to
make sure a breach like this never happens again," he added.

In addition to Gliksberg and Schoettes, Alan Doe and the other
plaintiffs in the class-action lawsuit are being represented by
Lambda Legal's Anthony Pinggera and Cozen O'Connor's Lawrence
Gordon -- lgordon@cozen.com -- Andrew M. Hutchison --
ahutchison@cozen.com -- and Nandini Kavuri. [GN]


ALL METRO: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss HHAs' Labor Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Judge Barbara Jaffe of the Supreme Court for the New York County
denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss the case, CHEREDA IVORY,
JACQUELINE SISTRUNK, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER
PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, v. ALL METRO HEALTH CARE,
OR ANY OTHER RELATED ENTITIES, ALL METRO HOME CARE SERVICES OF NEW
YORK, INC., ALL METRO FIELD SERVICES WORKERS PAYROLL SERVICES
CORP., ALL METRO AIDES INC., ALL METRO HOME CARE SERVICES INC., ALL
METRO MANAGEMENT AND PAYROLL SERVICES CORP., ALL METRO PAYROLL
SERVICES CORP., Defendants, Docket No. 160341/2017 (N.Y. Sup.).

Plaintiffs Ivory and Sistrunk bring the putative class action on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated who are or had
been employed by the Defendants to provide home health aide
services from November 2011 to the present at the New York State
residences of the Defendants' clients.

Ivory has worked for the Defendants since 2015 as a home health
aide ("HHA").  She alleges that from September 2017 to October
2017, she worked three 24-hour weekly shifts during her employment,
did not "live in" the homes of her clients, and was required to
stay overnight and be ready to aid the clients throughout her
shift.  Ivory also claims that she was only paid for approximately
13 out of the 24 hours in her shift, had no one-hour break for each
of the three daily meals, received no benefits, was not paid the
requisite additional hour for hours worked over ten hours, the
so-called spread of hours premium, and, in violation of the New
York Labor Law (Labor Law), was not paid the applicable overtime
hourly rate for hours worked over 40 in one week.

Sistrunk was employed by the Defendants as a home and community
support services aide ("HCSS") from April 2014 to November 2017.
She states that she generally worked five 12-hour weekly shifts
and, among other things, received no spread of hours premium.

The Plaintiffs commenced the action on Nov. 21, 2017 and filed a
first amended complaint on Jan. 8, 2018.  The HHA Plaintiffs
allege, in the first and second causes of action, that the
Defendants violated Labor Law Section 663 and 12 New York Code of
Rules and Regulations ("NYCRR") Sections 142-2.1 and 142-2.2 by
failing to pay their statutory minimum wages and overtime.  In the
third cause of action, on behalf of both classes of the Plaintiffs,
it is alleged that the Defendants violated 12 NYCRR Section 142-2.4
by failing to pay the spread-of-hours premium.

In the fourth cause of action, all the Plaintiffs claim that the
Defendants violated Labor Law Sections 191 and 193 by failing to
pay them timely all the wages to which they are entitled and by
taking unauthorized deductions from their pay.  In their fifth
cause of action, for breach of contract, they allege that the
Defendants' contracts with government agencies require that they be
paid wages as required by the Public Health Law Section 3614-c,
also known as the Home Care Worker Wage Parity Act, which
establishes minimum rates of compensation for home care aides and
conditions Medicaid reimbursement for home health care agencies
based on certification that aides are paid a minimum wage.

In the sixth cause of action, the Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
breached the "City Service Contract(s)" by not paying them the
living wages and health benefits or health benefit supplements for
all labor performed, and that Administrative Code Section 6-109,
which sets living wage and benefits requirements for city service
contractors that provide home care services.  They assert that, in
addition to unpaid wages, they are entitled to recover attorneys'
fees, costs, and pre- and post-judgment interest due to the
Defendants' violations of the Labor Law.

On Jan. 3, 2018, Roslyn Ruddock filed a putative class action
against the Defendants on behalf of herself and other persons
similarly situated, all of who had been employed by the Defendants
to provide home health aide services to the Defendants' clients at
any New York location ("FLSA Plaintiffs").  Ruddock resides in
Virginia and has been employed by Defendants since 2015 as a
consumer directed personal aide.  She works 24-hour shifts and does
not "live in" with her clients.

In her first and second causes of action, Ruddock alleges that the
Defendants failed to pay her and the FLSA Plaintiffs the federal
minimum wage and overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Acts ("FLSA").  Her third, fourth, and fifth causes of action set
forth violations of 12 NYCRR Sections 142-2.1, 142-2.2. 142-2.4 and
Labor Law Section 663, and that the Defendants failed to pay the
Plaintiffs the statutory minimum wage, overtime compensation, and
spread-of-hours compensation.

In the sixth cause of action, it is alleged that, in violation of
Labor Law Section 195, the Defendants failed to provide FLSA
Plaintiffs with the required notices, along with the allegation
that theey seek pre- and post-judgment interest, attorneys' fees
and costs under Labor Law Section 198 for successful wage claims.
And the seventh cause of action, advancing a claim for breach of
contract, contains the allegation that the Defendants entered into
contracts with government agencies to pay the Plaintiff and the
Class members wages as required by the Wage Parity Act, NY Public
Health Law Section 3614-c, and New York City's Fair Wages for
Workers Act.

The Defendants move to dismiss the instant action based on the
pendency of Ruddock's federal action.  They allege that the amended
complaint, dated Jan. 8, 2018, was filed five days after the
federal action, and that neither lawsuit has progressed beyond
service of the complaint and an answer filed in the federal case.
They also argue that there is a substantial identity of the parties
and claims that warrant dismissal in favor of the federal action,
and that in both actions, Defendant All Metro Field Service Workers
Payroll Services Corp. is a named defendant and employer.

While the individually-named Plaintiffs differ, the Defendants
claim that the putative classes, comprised of home health care
workers employed by them, are the same and that in the instant
action, the Plaintiffs rely on the Labor Law to assert unpaid wage
claims, and in the federal action, they rely on the same Labor Law
claims as well as the "companion" FLSA claims.  Moreover, they
argue, similar relief is sought: unpaid wages, statutory liquidated
damages, and attorneys' fees.  According to the Defendants, all
claims can be completely adjudicated in the federal action, and
allowing the instant action to proceed could result in inconsistent
judgments.

Judge Jaffe finds that the Defendants do not establish a complete
identity of the causes of action and relief sought, nor do they
demonstrate that a determination in the federal action would
necessarily dispose of all the issues in both actions.  Although
both sets of the Plaintiffs seek unpaid wages, they allege distinct
causes of action based on different statutes.  While both actions
contain causes of action under the Wage Parity Act, the instant
action includes a cause of action based on the separate and
distinct Administrative Code Section 6-109.

She says, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants breached the
City Service Contract by failing to pay them the living wages or
health benefits in accordance with Administrative Code Section
6-109.  Whereas the Wage Parity Act references New York City's
Living Wage Law as a baseline for its compensation rate, the Wage
Parity Act regulates Medicaid reimbursement, which is a matter of
state, rather than local, concern.  Moreover, the Wage Parity Act
was not in effect until March 1, 2012, and was phased in over time;
employers were not required to compensate home care aides 100
percent of the living wage until March 1, 2014.  Therefore, if the
action were dismissed, the Plaintiffs would be precluded from
potentially recovering under Administrative Code Section 6-109 from
Nov. 21, 2011 to March 1, 2012, as well as from recovering the full
compensation rate under the Wage Parity Act until March 1, 2014.

For these reasons, Judge Jaffe denied in its entirety the
Defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that another action is
pending.  She directed the Defendants to answer the first amended
complaint within 20 days of notice of entry of the Decision and
Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2018 Decision and Order
is available at https://is.gd/c8mzsk from Leagle.com.


ALLIANCE MMA: Settlement in Shapiro Action Has Final Court Okay
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Shapiro v. Alliance MMA, Inc. et al., Case No.
1:17-cv-02583 (D.N.J.), Judge Robert B Kugler on October 15 granted
the Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Motion
for Attorney Fees Reimbursement of Expenses, and Award to Lead
Plaintiffs in this case.

Alliance MMA, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q/A Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 10, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2018, that in April and May 2017,
respectively, two purported securities class action complaints
Shapiro v. Alliance MMA, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-2583 (D.N.J.), and
Shulman v. Alliance MMA, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-3282 (S.D.N.Y.) were
filed against the Company and certain of its officers in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey and the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
respectively.

The complaints alleged that the defendants violated certain
provisions of the federal securities laws, and purported to seek
damages in an amount to be alleged on behalf of a class of
shareholders who purchased the Company's common stock pursuant or
traceable to the Company's initial public offering.

In July 2017, the plaintiffs in the New York action voluntarily
dismissed their claim and, on March 8, 2018, the parties reached a
settlement to the New Jersey action in which the carrier for the
company's directors and officers liability insurance policy has
agreed to cover Alliance's financial obligations, including legal
fees, under the settlement arrangement, subject to our payment of a
deductible of $250,000, of which approximately $103,000 is included
within accounts payable. The complaint is scheduled for final
dismissal in October 2018.

Alliance MMA, Inc. focuses on mixed martial arts (MMA) promotional
activities. It operates through three segments: Promotions, Ticket
Services, and Athlete Management. The company was founded in 2015
and is based in New York, New York.


ALLIED SOLUTIONS: McGuireWoods Attorneys Examine Court Ruling
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bryan A. Fratkin, Esq. -- bfratkin@mcguirewoods.com -- and Heidi E.
Siegmund, Esq. -- hsiegmund@mcguirewoods.com -- of McGuireWoods
LLP, in an article for Lexology, examined the Seventh Circuit's
recent holding that an employment applicant's missed opportunity to
address a background check constitutes sufficient injury to confer
standing.

On August 29, the Seventh Circuit reentered the multi-front fray
that has broken out among lower courts in the wake of the Supreme
Court's 2016 decision in Spokeo v Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
Robertson v. Allied Solutions began with a familiar fact pattern:
Robertson applied for a job with Allied, and Allied decided not to
hire her based on a negative, but accurate, background check.
Robertson then sued on behalf of a putative class, claiming that
Allied had made its decision without first providing her with a
copy of the background check and an opportunity to address its
contents, as required by the FCRA. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681b(b)(3).
(Allied allegedly also failed to provide properly formatted
pre-background check disclosures, but Robertson did not press that
claim on appeal.) The parties tentatively settled the case and
sought the district court's approval of the settlement. Rather than
rule on the motion, however, the district court dismissed the
action of its own accord for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
finding that Robertson had not suffered concrete harm sufficient to
confer standing.

The Seventh Circuit reversed. Robertson v Allied Solutions LLC, --
F.3d -- , 2018 WL 4113815 (Aug. 29, 2018). It began by
acknowledging that Robertson had been denied information that, by
law, she should have received. That fact alone, however, was not
enough to confer standing: the Seventh Circuit emphasized that
so-called "informational injury" is only concrete where the
plaintiff was deprived of the opportunity to use the information
for a substantive purpose. In the context of "pre-adverse action"
notices, the court reasoned, that substantive purpose is to give
employees the chance to provide context for negative information in
their background checks, regardless of the information's truth.
Because Robertson had been denied that opportunity, her claims
could proceed.

Notably, the panel rejected Allied's argument that Robertson lacked
standing because she could not have changed or corrected the
report, for two reasons. First, the court inferred that because the
FCRA specifically addresses accuracy of consumer reports in other
sections, accuracy is not this subsection's primary goal. Rather,
Sec. 1681b(b)(3) aims to facilitate dialogue between applicants and
employers. Second, the court noted that Article III's standing
requirements do not require a plaintiff to show that she was
deprived of some benefit, but only that she was deprived of the
chance to obtain the benefit.

Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of this decision is its clash
with the Ninth Circuit's recent holding in Dutta v State Farm, 895
F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2018). According to Dutta, State Farm had
withdrawn his job offer based on an admittedly inaccurate
background check, and had not given him a chance to explain it.
State Farm, like Allied, countered that it would have made the same
decision regardless of any explanation Dutta could have offered
because it based its decision on a part of the background check
that was correct. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Dutta had
plausibly pled a violation of § 1681b(b)(3), but nonetheless found
standing lacking because he could not have gotten the job.

In light of the Ninth Circuit's historically high tolerance for
comparable claims, this rebuff was surprising—particularly so
because both it and the Seventh Circuit reached opposite
conclusions regarding standing to contest pre-background check
disclosures under 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681b(b)(2). See Syed v M-I LLC,
853 F.3d 492 (9th Cir. 2017) (standing); Groshek v Time Warner
Cable, Inc, 865 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 2017) (no standing). Ultimately,
however, all of these decisions merely underscore that the debate
over Spokeo's impact on class actions is far from over. [GN]


ALNYLAM PHARMA: Robbins Arroyo Files Securities Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Shareholder rights law firm Robbins Arroyo LLP on Oct. 8 disclosed
that purchasers of Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NASDAQ: ALNY)
have filed a class action complaint against the company's officers
and directors for alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 between February 15, 2018 and September 12, 2018. Alnylam
is a global biopharmaceutical company developing therapeutics based
on RNA interference ("RNAi"). Alnylam's lead drug candidate is
Onpattro (patisiran), an intravenously administered RNAi
therapeutic targeting transthyretin for the treatment of hereditary
ATTR amyloidosis.

View this information on the law firm's Shareholder Rights Blog:
https://www.robbinsarroyo.com/alnylam-pharmaceuticals-inc/

Alnylam Overstated the Efficacy of its Onpattro Lipid Complex
Injection

According to the complaint, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") approved patisiran for the treatment of polyneuropathy of
hereditary transthyretin-mediated amyloidosis in adults in August
2018. On September 12, 2018, Nomura/Instinet analyst Christopher
Marai stated that a review document released by the FDA's Center
for Drug Evaluation and Research "highlights greater risk" with
respect to certain trials of Alnylam's patisiran lipid complex
injection, and notes "concerns over cardiac deaths in patients
treated with ONPATTRO" suggesting a "limited market opportunity in
TTRcardiomyopathy, and a potential platform safety risk." On this
news, Alnylam's stock fell $5.60 per share to close at $94.75 on
September 12, 2018.

Then, on September 27, 2018, Alnylam announced an issue with
another drug " givosiran " which reported 22% of its patients
suffered serious side effects compared to 10% of patients on
placebo. Alnylam's stock fell even further on this news, and
continues to trade below its pre-disclosure price.

Alnylam Shareholders Have Legal Options

If you would like more information about your rights and potential
remedies, contact attorney Leonid Kandinov at (800) 350-6003,
LKandinov@robbinsarroyo.com, or via the shareholder information
form on the firm's website.

Robbins Arroyo LLP -- http://www.robbinsarroyo.com-- is a
nationally recognized leader in shareholder rights law. The firm
represents individual and institutional investors in shareholder
derivative and securities class action lawsuits, and has helped its
clients realize more than $1 billion of value for themselves and
the companies in which they have invested. [GN]


ALNYLAM PHARMA: Rosen Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, disclosed the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NASDAQ: ALNY) from
February 15, 2018 through September 12, 2018, inclusive (the "Class
Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Alnylam
investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Alnylam class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1420.html or call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

No class has yet been certified in the above action. Until a class
is certified, you are not represented by counsel unless you retain
one. You may retain counsel of your choice. You may also remain an
absent class member and do nothing at this point. An investor's
ability to share in any potential future recovery is not dependent
upon serving as lead plaintiff.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Alnylam overstated the efficacy and safety of its
Onpattro (patisiran) lipid complex injection; and (2) as a result,
Alnylam's public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times. When the true details entered the market, the
lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than November
26, 2018. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1420.html

         Phillip Kim, Esq.
         Zachary Halper, Esq.
         Laurence Rosen, Esq
         The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
         275 Madison Avenue, 34th Floor
         New York, NY 10016
         Telephone: (212) 686-1060
         Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
         Fax: (212) 202-3827
         Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                pkim@rosenlegal.com
                zhalper@rosenlegal.com[GN]


ALTRA INDUSTRIAL: Parties Agree to Dismiss Merger-Related Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Altra Industrial Motion Corp. said in its Form 8-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission that the plaintiff and all
defendants in the merger-related class action lawsuit have agreed
to dismiss the case without prejudice.

On March 7, 2018, Altra Industrial Motion Corp. ("Altra") and
Fortive Corporation ("Fortive") announced that they and certain
affiliates had entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger and
Reorganization (the "Merger Agreement"), dated March 7, 2018, among
Altra, Fortive, McHale Acquisition Corp. ("Merger Sub") and Stevens
Holding Company, Inc. ("Newco"), pursuant to which, subject to the
terms and conditions of the Merger Agreement and a Separation and
Distribution Agreement, dated March 7, 2018, among Altra, Fortive
and Newco, (1) Fortive will transfer certain assets, liabilities
and entities within its Automation & Specialty platform, but
excluding its Hengstler and Dynapar businesses (such businesses to
be transferred, the "A&S Business") to Newco, (2) Fortive will
distribute to its stockholders all of the issued and outstanding
shares of Newco common stock held by Fortive by way of an exchange
offer or a combination of an exchange offer and a pro rata dividend
and (3) Merger Sub will merge with and into Newco, with Newco as
the surviving corporation, and the issued and outstanding shares of
Newco common stock will be converted into shares of Altra common
stock (the "Merger").

On August 8, 2018, a purported class action was filed against Altra
and each of the members of its board of directors and Fortive in
the Superior Court of Norfolk County, Massachusetts, by an
individual who purports to be a stockholder of Altra. In connection
with the complaint, the plaintiff, among other things, filed a
motion to preliminarily enjoin the stockholders' vote on matters
related to the Merger at the special meeting of stockholders of
Altra (the "special meeting").

On August 31, 2018, the Superior Court of Norfolk County,
Massachusetts denied plaintiff's motion to preliminarily enjoin the
special meeting. On September 4, 2018, Altra held the special
meeting and its stockholders approved the issuance of shares of
Altra common stock required to complete the Merger. On September
13, 2018, the plaintiff and all defendants named in the complaint,
by and through their respective counsel, agreed to dismiss the
class action without prejudice.

Altra Industrial Motion Corp. designs, produces, and markets
mechanical power transmission components worldwide. The company
operates through three segments: Couplings, Clutches and Brakes;
Electromagnetic Clutches and Brakes; and Gearing. The company was
founded in 2004 and is headquartered in Braintree, Massachusetts.


AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Herrera Seeks Unpaid Wages, Penalties
----------------------------------------------------------
Isabell Herrera, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. AMAZON.COM Services, Inc., a Delaware
Corporation and Does 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
18-cv-02068 (C.D. Cal., September 26, 2018), seeks unpaid wages and
interest for Defendant's failure to pay for all hours worked and
the minimum wage rate, failure to pay wages of terminated or
resigned employees, and failure to authorize or permit required
rest periods; statutory penalties for failure to provide accurate
wage statements; injunctive relief and other equitable relief; and
reasonable attorney's fees, costs and interest pursuant to
California Labor Code and applicable Industrial Welfare Commission
Wage Orders.

Amazon sells products via the internet and distributes products to
consumers through local distribution centers. Herrera worked as a
warehouse laborer from October 2016 through February 6, 2017 in the
Defendant's Moreno Valley warehouse. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Christopher A. Olsen, Esq.
      OLSEN LAW OFFICES
      1010 Second Ave., Suite 1835
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Telephone: (619) 550-9352
      Email: caolsen@caolsenlawoffices.com


ATH HOLDING: Money Market Class in Bell ERISA Suit Certified
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARY BELL, JANICE GRIDER, CINDY PROKISH individually
and as representatives of a class of similarly situated persons of
the Anthem 401(k) Plan (formerly the WellPoint 401(k) Retirement
Savings Plan), JOHN HOFFMAN, and PAMELA LEINONEN, Plaintiffs, v.
PENSION COMMITTEE OF ATH HOLDING COMPANY, LLC, ATH HOLDING COMPANY,
LLC, and BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ATH HOLDING COMPANY, LLC,
Defendants. VANGUARD GROUP, INC., Interested Party, Case No.
1:15-cv-02062-TWP-MPB (S.D. Ind.), Judge Tanya Walton Pratt of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
Indianapolis Division, (i) granted the Defendants' Motion for Leave
to File a Supplemental Brief in Support of Their Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification; (ii) granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Respond to Defendants' Proposed
Supplemental Brief; (iii) denied the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify
the Investment and Management Class; and (iv) granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify the Money Market Class.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Pension Committee, ATH, and the
Board breached their fiduciary duties by causing their retirement
plan to pay excessive investment and management fees to Vanguard,
and also invested in an imprudent money market fund, resulting in
tens of millions of dollars of Plan losses.  The Plaintiffs seek to
represent two classes for the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty:
1) the Administrative and Investment Management Fee Class and 2)
the Money Market Fund Class.

The Plan is a defined contribution plan within the meaning of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").  It is
sponsored by ATH and, as of Dec. 31, 2014, is one of the largest
401(k) plans in the United States, with over $5.1 billion in total
assets.  It provides retirement income for employees of ATH and any
direct or indirect subsidiary of the company that has been offered
the Plan.  The Plaintiffs are current and former participants of
the Plan.

The Defendants select and determine the available investment
options offered in the Plan.  These decisions are made at the Plan
level, therefore the available options and the associated expenses
are the same for all Plan participants.  The Plan offers three
tiers of investment options: 1) Tier 1, the Target Date Funds; (2)
Tier 2, the Core Funds; and Tier 3, the Vanguard Brokerage Option.
The Plan's investment options vary based on risk and return
profiles.

Vanguard is the Plan's recordkeeper, and the Plan pays Vanguard
investment management fees which are deducted from participants'
accounts on a pro rata basis, based on each fund's expense ratio.
Until 2013, the Defendants compensated Vanguard for its
administrative services (primarily recordkeeping) through revenue
sharing payments from the Plan's mutual funds, paid through a
portion of the Plan's mutual funds expense ratios.  Effective July
22, 2013, the Defendants charged a flat annual recordkeeping fee of
$42 to each participant's account with a balance over $1,000.

On March 23, 2017, the Court denied in part and granted in part the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.  It dismissed the Plaintiffs' claim
regarding the Vanguard Prime Money Market Fund without prejudice.
The Plaintiffs then filed the operative Second Amended Complaint,
which provides additional facts supporting the Money Market Fund
claim.

The Plaintiffs summarize their allegations against the Defendants,
contained in the Second Amended Complaint as the following: 1) the
Defendants provided investment options charging unreasonable
management fees compared to available superior institutional
investment products; 2) the Defendants failed to monitor and
control the excessive administrative expenses paid to Vanguard; 3)
the Defendants provided the Money Market Fund as the Plan's sole
capital preservation option even though it did not provide any
meaningful retirement benefits; and 4) the Defendants failed to
prudently and regularly monitor the Money Market Fund.

The Plaintiffs seek certification of the following classes:

     i. Administrative Fee and Investment Management Fee Class:
All participants and beneficiaries of the Anthem 401(k) Plan
(formerly the WellPoint 401(k) Retirement Savings Plan) from Dec.
29, 2009 through the date of judgment.

     ii. Money Market Fund Class: All participants and
beneficiaries of the Anthem 401(k) Plan (formerly the WellPoint
401(k) Retirement Savings Plan) who, from Dec. 29, 2009 through the
date of judgment.

Judge Pratt finds that although the remaining class representatives
(Bell, Hoffman, and Leinonen) demonstrate adequate representation
by showing a general understanding of the Fee Class allegations,
because the class fails the typicality requirement, the Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification will be denied.

As to the Money Market Fund Class, the Judge concludes that
certification is appropriate under both Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and
(b)(1)(B).  The Defendants' actions with regards to the Money
Market Fund took place on a plan-wide basis.  For this reason,
there is a risk of incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants
if individual participants pursue their own adjudications over the
alleged imprudent management of the Money Market Fund, which also
could substantially impair or impede the ability of other
participants' ability to protect their interests.  Because
certification under Rule 23(b)(1) is mandatory where its
requirements are satisfied, it controls over Rule 23 (b)(3).  Thus,
she needs not address the Plaintiffs' alternative request for
certification under Rule 23(b)(3).  In any event, common issues of
law and fact predominate which would make certification under Rule
23(b)(3) appropriate as well.

Judge Pratt granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification,
and granted in part and denied in part the appointment of the class
representative and the counsel.  It denied as to the Administrative
Fee and Investment Management Fee Class, and granted as to the
Money Market Fund Class.  Additionally, the Judge granted the
Defendants' Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief in
Support of Their Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification, and the Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Respond to
Defendants' Proposed Supplemental Brief concerning the class
certification.

She certified the class, which it has modified, of all participants
and beneficiaries of the Anthem 401(k) Plan (formerly the WellPoint
401(k) Retirement Savings Plan) who, from Dec. 29, 2009 through the
date of judgment, invested in the Vanguard Money Market Fund and
whose investment in the Vanguard Money Market Fund underperformed
relative to the Hueler Index.

Further, the Judge appointed John Hoffman as the representative of
the Money Market Fund Class, and Schlichter, Bogard & Denton, LLP
as the class counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 14, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/5AbhZa from Leagle.com.

MARY BELL, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron E. Schwartz --
aschwartz@uselaws.com -- SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac
vice, Alexander L. Braitberg -- abraitberg@uselaws.com --
SCHLICTHER BOGARD DENTON LLP, pro hac vice, Andrew D. Schlichter --
aschlichter@uselaws.com -- SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac
vice, Heather Lea -- hlea@uselaws.com -- SCHLICHTER, BOGARD &
DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice, Jerome J. Schlichter --
jschlichter@uselaws.com -- SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro
hac vice, Kurt C. Struckhoff -- kstruckhoff@uselaws.com --
SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice, Michael A. Wolff --
nwolff@uselaws.com -- SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac
vice, Sean Soyars -- ssoyars@uselaws.com -- SCHLICHTER BOGARD &
DENTON LLP, pro hac vice & Troy A. Doles -- tdoles@uselaws.com --
SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice.

JANICE GRIDER & CINDY PROKISH, individually and as representatives
of a class of similarly situated persons of the Anthem 401(k) Plan
(formerly the WellPoint 401(k) Retirement Savings Plan),
Plaintiffs, represented by Aaron E. Schwartz, SCHLICHTER BOGARD &
DENTON, LLP, Alexander L. Braitberg, SCHLICTHER BOGARD DENTON LLP,
pro hac vice, Andrew D. Schlichter, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON,
LLP, pro hac vice, Heather Lea, SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP,
pro hac vice, Jerome J. Schlichter, SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON,
LLP, pro hac vice, Kurt C. Struckhoff, SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON,
LLP, pro hac vice, Michael A. Wolff, SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON,
LLP, pro hac vice & Troy A. Doles SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP,
pro hac vice.

JOHN HOFFMAN & PAMELA LEINONEN, Plaintiffs, represented by Aaron E.
Schwartz, SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, Alexander L. Braitberg,
SCHLICTHER BOGARD DENTON LLP, pro hac vice, Andrew D. Schlichter,
SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice, Troy A. Doles,
SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP & Jerome J. Schlichter,
SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP, pro hac vice.

PENSION COMMITTEE OF ATH HOLDING COMPANY, LLC & ATH HOLDING
COMPANY, LLC, Defendants, represented by Ada W. Dolph --
adolph@seyfarth.com -- SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, pro hac vice, Ian Hugh
Morrison -- imorrison@seyfarth.com -- SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, Jason
Priebe -- jpriebe@seyfarth.com -- SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, pro hac vice &
Shannon M. Callahan -- SCallahan@Seyfarth.com -- SEYFARTH SHAW LLP,
pro hac vice.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ATH HOLDING COMPANY, LLC, Defendant,
represented by Ada W. Dolph, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, pro hac vice, Ian
Hugh Morrison, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP & Jason Priebe, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP,
pro hac vice.

VANGUARD GROUP, INC., Interested Party, represented by Laura H.
McNally -- laura.mcnally@morganlewis.com -- MORGAN, LEWIS &
BOCKIUS, LLP.


AV HOMES: Agreement Reached to Resolve Zucker and Franchi Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
AV Homes, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission that the company reached an agreement to
resolve the Lawrence Zucker v. AV Homes, Inc. et al. and Franchi v.
AV Homes, Inc. et al.

On September 14, 2018, AV Homes, Inc. ("AV Homes") reached an
agreement to resolve two purported stockholder class action
lawsuits on behalf of AV Homes stockholders filed in the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware.

The actions, captioned Lawrence Zucker v. AV Homes, Inc. et al.,
Case 1:18-cv-01091 (the "Zucker Action"), and Franchi v. AV Homes,
Inc. et al., Case 1:18-cv-01161 (the "Franchi Action," and together
with the Zucker Action, the "Actions"), challenge the proposed
combination of AV Homes and Taylor Morrison Home Corporation
("Taylor Morrison" and the combination, the "Merger"), in
particular the adequacy of the disclosure found in the Definitive
Proxy Statement/Prospectus, filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 27, 2018 (the “Definitive Proxy
Statement/Prospectus”).

In connection with resolution of the Actions, AV Homes has agreed
to make an amended and supplemental disclosures (the "Amended and
Supplemental Disclosures") to the Definitive Proxy
Statement/Prospectus. The Amended and Supplemental Disclosures
should be read in conjunction with the Definitive Proxy
Statement/Prospectus, which should be read in its entirety.

Plaintiffs have agreed that, following the filing of the Current
Report on Form 8-K ("Report"), they will dismiss the Actions in
their entirety, with prejudice as to the named plaintiffs only and
without prejudice to all other members of the putative class.

The resolution of the Actions will not affect the timing of the
special meeting of AV Homes stockholders, which is scheduled to be
held on September 26, 2018, or the amount of the consideration to
be paid to AV Homes stockholders in connection with the Merger. The
resolution of the Actions is not, and should not be construed as,
an admission of wrongdoing or liability by any defendant.

AV Homes said, "Defendants deny that any further disclosure
regarding the Merger is required under applicable laws other than
that which has already been provided in the Definitive Proxy
Statement/Prospectus. However, to avoid any risk of the Actions
delaying or adversely affecting the Merger, to minimize the
expense, burden, distraction and inconvenience of continued
litigation and to resolve plaintiffs' claims asserted in the
Actions, AV Homes has agreed to make these Amended and Supplemental
Disclosures to the Definitive Proxy Statement/Prospectus.

A copy of the amended and supplemental disclosure is available at
https://goo.gl/1Fv2Lp.

AV Homes, Inc. engages in the homebuilding and community
development businesses in Florida, the Carolinas, Arizona, and
Texas. The company was formerly known as Avatar Holdings Inc. and
changed its name to AV Homes, Inc. in February 2012. AV Homes, Inc.
was founded in 1970 and is based in Scottsdale, Arizona.


AZZ INC: Continues to Defend Mullins Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------
AZZ Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on October 9, 2018, for the quarterly period
ended August 31, 2018, that the company continues to defend a
putative class action suit entitled, Logan Mullins v. AZZ, Inc.

On January 11, 2018, Logan Mullins, acting on behalf of himself and
a putative class of persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the
Company's securities between April 22, 2015 and January 8, 2018,
filed a class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas against the Company and two of its
executive officers, Thomas E. Ferguson and Paul W. Fehlman. Logan
Mullins v. AZZ, Inc., et al., Case No. 4:18-cv-00025-Y.

The complaint alleges, among other things, that the Company's SEC
filings contained statements that were rendered materially false
and misleading by the Company's alleged failure to properly
recognize revenue related to certain contracts in its Energy
Segment in purported violation of (1) Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and Rule 10b-5 and (2) Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. The
plaintiffs seek an award of compensatory and punitive damages,
interests, attorneys' fees and costs.

The Company denies the allegations and believes it has strong
defenses to vigorously contest them. The Company cannot predict the
outcome of this action nor when it will be resolved. If the
plaintiffs were to prevail in this matter, the Company could be
liable for damages, which could potentially be material and could
adversely affect its financial condition or results of operations.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

AZZ Inc. provides galvanizing and metal coating services, welding
solutions, specialty electrical equipment, and highly engineered
services to the power generation, transmission, distribution,
refining, and industrial markets. The company operates through two
segments, Energy Segment and Metal Coatings. AZZ Inc. was founded
in 1956 and is headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas.


BANK OF NEW YORK: Wins Partial Summary Judgment in Henderson
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ASHBY HENDERSON and THOMAS HERSHENSON, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, N.A., Defendant, Civil Action No.
15-10599-PBS (D. Mass.), Judge Patti S. Saris of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts (i) granted in part and
denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification; (ii)
granted in part and denied in part BNY Mellon's motion for summary
judgment; and (iii) denied the Plaintiffs' motion for partial
summary judgment.

The proposed class action claims that BNY Mellon breached its
fiduciary duty to its trust beneficiaries by charging excessive and
undisclosed fees for the preparation of the trusts' tax returns.
Henderson and Hershenson both seek to represent the proposed class.
Henderson is a beneficiary of the Walter H. Wesson Trust ("Wesson
Trust"), a trust created under Massachusetts law.  Hershenson is a
beneficiary of T/D of Morris A. Hershenson Trust, for the benefit
of Lee M. Hershenson ("Hershenson Trust"), a trust created under
Pennsylvania law.1 Both trusts are irrevocable trusts.  The trustee
of both trusts is BNY Mellon.  BNY Mellon administers thousands of
trusts, with tens of thousands of trust beneficiaries.

In February 2015, Henderson filed the original complaint, which
raised class action claims that the Defendant breached its
fiduciary duty when it made imprudent investments of trust assets
into affiliated funds.  In March 2016, Henderson filed the First
Amended Complaint, which added the class claims relating to the
tax-preparation fees.  After some procedural skirmishing, a Second
Amended Complaint ("SAC") was filed in November 2016, adding
Hershenson as a named Plaintiff with respect to the tax-preparation
claims.  The SAC is the operative complaint.

In late 2017 and early 2018, the parties attempted to settle the
case.  However, in February 2018, Henderson on her own sent the
Court a letter objecting to her own attorneys' proposed settlement.
She later withdrew that objection.  After a hearing on the
proposed settlement, the Court found Henderson's objections
compelling and rejected the settlement.

Henderson has since moved to withdraw her individual and class
claims alleging the imprudent investment of trust funds so that she
may pursue them in a separate case in Pittsburgh.  After an ex
parte hearing just with Henderson (but not her warring attorneys)
in August 2018 to assess the voluntariness of her decision, the
Court dismissed those claims without prejudice.  Because of this
withdrawal, only Counts IV and V of the SAC remain; both pertain
solely to the tax-preparation theory.  Count IV asserts a breach of
fiduciary duty claim, and Count V seeks an accounting.

Both Henderson and Hershenson seek to represent the The Unlawful
Fees Class, to pursue those claims, defined as From 2008 to the
present, all personal trusts: (1) for which BNY Mellon served or
serves as trustee, and charged a tax preparation fee or fiduciary
fee for one or more of the covered years, and (2) the paid preparer
of the fiduciary return covered by the tax preparation fee or
fiduciary fee was PricewaterhouseCoopers for one or more of the
covered years.

Also before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment.  Each side seeks summary judgment on the tax markup
claims.  The Plaintiffs argue that BNY Mellon's own documents
conclusively establish that BNY Mellon outsources all of its
tax-preparation work to PwC and pays PwC a per-trust cost for that
work.  According to them, BNY Mellon passes on that cost to each
trust, plus a profit margin of hundreds of dollars per trust every
year, and fails to disclose this markup to its customers.  They
claim this results in a breach of the bank's fiduciary duties of
loyalty and candor, and requires summary judgment in their favor.

The bank counters that the Plaintiffs' claim is based on two
demonstrably false premises: (1) that BNY Mellon outsourced "all"
tax-preparation work to PwC, and (2) that BNY Mellon "marked up"
what PwC charged in order to earn a profit.  Further, the bank
argues that it disclosed the tax-preparation fees in question to
customers, which entitles it to summary judgment on the affirmative
defenses of statute of limitations, ratification and acquiescence,
and laches.

The Court held separate hearings on each.

Judge Saris finds that the proposed class, as modified, satisfies
the requirements of Rule 23.  Accordingly, she will grant in part
and deny in part the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

As to Mellon's motion for summary judgment, among other things, the
Judge finds that (i) the record contains conflicting evidence on
whether, and to what extent, BNY Mellon retained tax-preparation
work after it entered into the contract with PwC; (ii) the question
of whether BNY Mellon imposed a markup for tax-related services is
best addressed by splitting the types of tax-preparation fees into
two groups: the line-item fees and the bundled fees; (iii) a
rational fact-finder could readily conclude that neither the
Plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that the
tax-preparation fee included the markup now complained of; (iv) the
bank makes no assertion that Dr. Hershenson ratified or acquiesced
in the line-item fee; and (v) a rational fact-finder could
determine that Dr. Hershenson did not and could not reasonably know
about the markup, and thus did not lack due diligence by not
bringing this claim sooner.

For these reasons, Judge Saris allowed in part and denied in part
the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.  She certified the
"The Unlawful Fees Class" defined as from 2008 to the present, all
personal trusts for which: (1) BNY Mellon served or serves as
trustee; (2) BNY  Mellon charged line-item tax-preparation fees
amounting to at least $400 per year for grantor trusts, at least
$750 per year for revocable and simple irrevocable trusts, or at
least $950 per year for complex irrevocable trusts for one or more
of the covered years; and (3) the paid preparer of the fiduciary
return covered by the line-item tax-preparation fee was
PricewaterhouseCoopers.

The Judge allowed in part and denied in part BNY Mellon's motion
for summary judgment, and denied the Plaintiffs' motion for partial
summary judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 14, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/UTBtFT from Leagle.com.

John Bernard & William Bernard, Intervenor Plaintiffs, represented
by David J. Grais, Grais & Ellsworth LLP, Kathryn C. Ellsworth,
Grais & Ellsworth LLP, pro hac vice, Peter E. Gelhaar, Donnelly,
Conroy & Gelhaar, LLP & Alexander R. Zwillinger, Donnelly, Conroy &
Gelhaar, LLP.

Ashby Henderson, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by J. Brian McTigue, McTigue Law
LLP, pro hac vice, Regina M. Markey, McTigue Law, LLP, pro hac
vice, Benjamin Lajoie, Bailey & Glasser LLP, Derek G. Howard --
derek@dhowlaw.com -- Derek G. Howard Law Firm, Inc., pro hac vice,
Elizabeth A. Ryan -- eryan@baileyglasser.com -- Bailey & Glasser
LLP, Gregory Y. Porter -- gporter@baileyglasser.com -- Bailey &
Glasser LLP, pro hac vice, John J. Roddy --
jroddy@baileyglasser.com -- Bailey & Glasser LLP & Michael Murphy,
Bailey & Glasser LLP, pro hac vice.

Thomas J. Hershenson, Plaintiff, represented by John J. Roddy ,
Bailey & Glasser LLP, Benjamin Lajoie, Bailey & Glasser LLP,
Elizabeth A. Ryan, Bailey & Glasser LLP & Gregory Y. Porter, Bailey
& Glasser LLP.

The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, National Association &
BNY Mellon, National Association, Defendants, represented by K.
Issac deVyver -- kdevyver@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, pro
hac vice, Mary J. Hackett -- mhackett@mcguirewoods.com --
McGuireWoods LLP, pro hac vice & Nellie E. Hestin --
nhestin@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP.


BARTACO: Hepatitis Outbreak Suit Granted Class Action Status
------------------------------------------------------------
David Robinson, writing for Rockland/Westchester Journal News,
reports that a judge granted class-action status in the lawsuit
over a hepatitis outbreak at bartaco, opening the door to thousands
of legal claims against the popular Port Chester restaurant.

State Supreme Court Justice Gerald Loehr ordered the case opened to
other patrons who got hepatitis A vaccinations, or blood tests,
after a bartaco worker tested positive for the food-borne illness.

The exposure happened between Oct. 12 and 23 last year at the
Westchester County waterfront eatery. More than 3,000 people
received hepatitis vaccines after a public-health warning about the
outbreak involving food or beverages served during that time
period.

Bartaco's attorneys and chief financial officer, Matthew Wilber,
tried to prevent the class-action designation, arguing the
restaurant was making voluntary payments to those affected. It has
paid out nearly $150,000 to reimburse people for vaccinations and
other costs.

The judge, however, agreed with patrons already suing bartaco who
argued the case required class-action designation, which could
involve public-health officials contacting everyone vaccinated to
notify them of their eligibility to join the case.


Phillip Oswald, an attorney for bartaco, said he disagreed with the
judge's order but expected the case would be resolved before a
trial. He said negotiations are ongoing with the patrons' attorney,
Bill Marler.

"We're close to reaching a settlement where my client would pay all
of his clients the out-of-pocket costs related to this incident,"
Oswald said, declining to discuss specifics, such as the potential
payment amount per client.

The settlement details

Mr. Marler, a Seattle-based attorney specializing in food-borne
illnesses, said settlement talks are progressing and would likely
follow examples from similar cases across the country.

The average payment has been about $200 to $300 per patron in
similar outbreak cases historically, according to Mr. Marler. That
means bartaco could be paying up to $900,000 overall for the
outbreak.

There are also occasionally payments related to the cost of the
vaccination, but the county and state health departments covered
that portion in the bartaco matter.

The state and county health departments combined spent about
$263,000 on vaccinations and related costs, The Journal News/lohud
reported.

Mr. Marler noted the settlement wouldn't address reimbursing the
health departments, and as a result taxpayers.

"I have urged (bartaco) to consider reimbursing the county and
state for costs," Mr. Marler said, adding municipalities and states
historically don't seek payments in court.

Westchester health department officials have said they weren't
aware of any efforts by county government to seek reimbursement
from bartaco.

The viral liver disease often causes mild to serious illnesses, and
it is typically spread through contaminated food and drinks. In
extreme cases, such as patients with weak immune systems, it has
been known to be fatal.

Oswald noted bartaco plans to continue to make voluntary payments
to help the community recover in addition to the potential court
settlement.

Bartaco hired an independent company to set up and publicize a
hotline to handle the situation.

The phone number directed bartaco customers to vaccination and
testing clinics. It previously reimbursed customers a total of
about $74,000 for vaccinations, testing, medical treatment, meals
at the restaurant, travel and lost earnings.

The hotline is 844-617-8242.

Further, bartaco officials said they paid about $75,000 to fund
some of the clinics at commercial sites locally, as well as for
customers across 28 different states and abroad.

The next court date is in January. [GN]


BIG LOTS: Final Approval Hearing on Willis Accord Set for Oct. 30
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Big Lots, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
August 4, 2018, that a final approval hearing is set for October
30, 2018, with respect to the settlement of the securities class
action lawsuit entitled, Willis, et al. v. Big Lots, Inc., et al.

On July 9, 2012, a putative securities class action lawsuit
captioned Willis, et al. v. Big Lots, Inc., et al., 2:12-cv-00604
(S.D. Ohio) was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio on behalf of persons who acquired the company's
common shares between February 2, 2012 and April 23, 2012.  The
lawsuit was filed against the company, Lisa Bachmann, Mr. Cooper,
Mr. Fishman and Mr. Haubiel. The complaint in the putative class
action generally alleges that the defendants made statements
concerning the company's financial performance that were false or
misleading. The complaint asserted claims under sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 and
sought damages in an unspecified amount, plus attorneys' fees and
expenses. The lead plaintiff filed an amended complaint on April 4,
2013, which added Mr. Johnson as a defendant, removed Ms. Bachmann
as a defendant, and extended the putative class period to August
23, 2012.

Effective May 16, 2018, the parties executed a Stipulation of
Settlement. On May 18, 2018, plaintiffs filed a Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement with the Court. On
June 25, 2018, the Court issued an Order granting preliminary
approval of the Settlement and setting a Final Approval Hearing for
October 30, 2018.

Big Lots, Inc., through its subsidiaries, operates as a community
retailer in the United States. The company offers products under
various merchandising categories, such as furniture category that
includes upholstery, mattress, case goods, and ready-to-assemble
departments; seasonal category, which comprises Christmas trim,
lawn and garden, summer, and other holiday departments; soft home
category that consists of fashion and utility bedding, bath,
window, decorative textile, home organization, area rugs, home
décor, and frames departments; and food category that includes
beverage and grocery, candy and snacks, and specialty foods
departments. Big Lots, Inc. was founded in 1967 and is
headquartered in Columbus, Ohio.


BOKF NA: Court Dismisses Johnson Suit with Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------
Judge Karen Green Scholer of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, granted BOKF's Renewed
Motion to Dismiss the case, SHARONDA L. JOHNSON, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, v. BOKF, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-0663-S (N.D. Tex.).

Pursuant to Special Order 3-318, the case was transferred from the
docket of Judge Jane J. Boyle to the docket of the Court on March
8, 2018.  The case arises out of allegations that the extended
overdraft fees charged by BOKF are interest charges and that the
rate of interest charged by BOKF is usurious under the National
Banking Act ("NBA").  Plaintiff Johnson has a checking account with
Bank of Texas, which is a division of BOKF.  That account is
governed by written Agreements and Disclosures.

Johnson was charged overdraft fees several times during 2016.  For
instance, on July 5, 2016, Johnson overdrafted and was charged an
initial overdraft fee of $32.50.  She failed to remedy the
overdraft over the course of the next 16 days.  On the fifth
business day after the initial overdraft, Bank of Texas charged
Johnson an Extended Overdraft Fee of $6.50 pursuant to the
Agreement.  Bank of Texas then charged Johnson the same $6.50 fee
every day for eight business days until she cured the overdraft.
Johnson's account was overdrawn by as much as $473.80 during this
period.

Johnson filed the putative class action, alleging that BOKF's
Extended Overdraft Fee is actually interest in the form of a flat
late fee for the use, forbearance, or detention of money.  Thus,
she concludes, the fee should be treated as interest, and the rate
of interest far exceeds the NBA's usury limit.  Johnson does not
challenge the initial overdraft fee.

BOKF moved to dismiss Johnson's original complaint on April 6,
2017.  Judge Boyle heard oral argument on that motion on Oct. 24,
2017.  That same day, the Court granted BOKF's motion but allowed
Johnson to amend her complaint to cure the deficiencies identified
at the hearing.

The Court articulated these deficiencies as follows: The way the
case has been pled, Johnson hasn't under 12(b)(6) standards,
articulated plausible facts in view of the court's reliance upon
what the Judge thinks is the persuasive balance of the case
authority because she does not see in these cases that she could
adequately draw a distinction between extended overdraft fees and
overdraft fees.  They all seem to rest on this analysis that these
flow from deposit accounts with Non-Sufficient Funds, insufficient
account charges.  And she's not convinced from the cases, even with
the distinctions you are making in cases in different contexts,
that it is enough of a distinction to say that Johnson has pled a
claim.

Johnson filed an amended complaint on Dec. 15, 2017, and BOKF again
moved to dismiss.  BOKF asserts that its Extended Overdraft Fees
are not interest under the NBA.  In support of its position, BOKF
cites a litany of district court cases from around the country that
stand for the proposition that extended overdraft fees are not
interest.

In an attempt to win this uphill battle, Johnson advances several
arguments in support of the proposition that, in the case, the
extended overdraft fees are actually interest.  Many of these
arguments were considered and rejected by Judge Boyle in ruling on
the prior motion to dismiss and by district courts around the
country in the opinions.  Thus, Johnson was on notice that these
arguments are ineffective.

First, Johnson contends that, pursuant to an Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") regulation, the definition of
"interest" is broad enough to encompass extended overdraft fees.
The OCC is entitled to substantial deference regarding
interpretation of its regulations under the NBA.  Judge Scholer
finds that Johnson's argument regarding the definition of
"interest" has been considered and rejected by multiple courts, and
she joins them in declining to interpret the term "interest" to
include extended overdraft fees.

Second, Johnson asserts that when BOKF covers an overdraft, it
extends credit to the accountholder.  The Judge disagrees.  Under
Johnson's reasoning, both initial and extended overdraft fees would
constitute interest, because BOKF records all overdrafts as loans.
However, Johnson has conceded that initial overdraft fees are not
interest.  Johnson attempts to overcome this obstacle by arguing
that initial and extended overdraft fees are distinguishable based
on their purpose, timing, and method of assessment.  This argument
has been considered and rejected by prior courts.

Finally, Johnson argues that BOKF cannot point to persuasive
authority supporting its proposition.  Johnson criticizes BOKF's
reliance on several OCC sources, including its 2001 amendment to
its rules regarding banking activities and operations, Interpretive
Letter 1082, and overdraft opt-in form.  However, prior courts have
endorsed two of these sources in determining that extended
overdraft fees are not interest, and BOKF appears to have abandoned
its reliance on the third.  The Judge Court concurs that such
sources, created by the most pertinent regulator, the OCC,
constitute persuasive authority supporting BOKF's position.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Scholer granted the Motion and
dismissed the Plaintiff's claims with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/6X6PCU from Leagle.com.

Sharonda L Johnson, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Warren T. Burns --
wburns@burnscharest.com -- Burns Charest LLP, Anna Haac --
ahaac@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey
Kaliel , Tycko & Zavareei LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey Miles Ostrow
-- ostrow@kolawyers.com -- Kopelowitz Ostrow Ferguson Weiselberg
Gilbert, pro hac vice, Jonathan Marc Streisfeld --
streisfeld@kolawyers.com -- Kopelowitz Ostrow Ferguson Weiselberg
Gilbert, pro hac vice, Mallory Toby Biblo --
mbiblo@burnscharest.com -- Burns Charest LLP & Spencer Morgan Lee
Cox -- scox@burnscharest.com -- Burns Charest LLP.

BOKF National Association, Defendant, represented by John Daniel
Clayman -- jclayman @fdlaw.com -- Frederic Dorward Lawyers, Brett
Field -- brett@strombergstock.com -- Stromberg Stock, J. Michael
Medina, Frederic Dorwart Lawyers, pro hac vice & Sarah Wishard
Poston -- sposton@fdlaw.com -- Frederic Dorwart Lawyers, pro hac
vice.


BP AMERICAN: Wins Summary Judgment in Legros Deepwater Horizon Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana issued an Order and Reasons granting Defendant Defendants
BP Exploration & Production Inc. and BP America Production Company
(BP)'s Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned ALLISON
LEGROS, Plaintiff, v. BP AMERICAN PRODUCTION COMPANY, ET AL.,
Defendants, SECTION: "E" (1). Civil Action No. 16-3050. (E.D.
La.).

The Plaintiff filed suit pursuant to the Back End Litigation Option
(BELO) approved in the DEEPWATER HORIZON Medical Benefits Class
Action Settlement Agreement (Medical Settlement) as part of the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Litigation, MDL 2179.  The Medical
Settlement permits certain class members, including clean-up
workers like Plaintiff, to sue BP for Later-Manifested Physical
Conditions, (LMPCs) as defined in the agreement.

According to BP's statement of uncontested facts, the Plaintiff
cannot prove her LMPC was legally caused by exposure to DEEPWATER
HORIZON related substances. BP's uncontested facts and the
Plaintiff's deposition reveal that none of the Plaintiff's treating
physicians connected her meningioma with her work on the oil spill.
Additionally, the Plaintiff produced no expert reports or testimony
connecting her meningioma with her work on the oil spill, despite a
deadline to produce expert reports by no later than September 14,
2018.

A party moving for summary judgment may satisfy Rule 56's burden by
demonstrating to the Court that the nonmoving party's evidence is
insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving
party's claim.  The Plaintiff has failed to oppose this motion and
put forth any evidence that she may have of causation. As such, the
evidence is insufficient to establish that the Plaintiff's LMPC was
legally caused by exposure to DEEPWATER HORIZON related substances.
Because the Plaintiff cannot prove an essential element of her
claim, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 4, 2018 Order and
Reasons is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybmcwk6k from
Leagle.com.

Allison Legros, Plaintiff, represented by Andre F. Toce, Toce Firm,
APLC.

BP American Production Company & BP Exploration & Production, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Russell Keith Jarrett --
rkjarrett@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis, Charles B. Wilmore --
cbwilmore@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis, Devin C. Reid --
dcreid@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis, Don Keller Haycraft --
dkhaycraft@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis & Patrick B. Reagin, Liskow
& Lewis.

Bureau Veritas North America, Inc., Movant, represented by John H.
Hughes, Allen & Gooch.


CAFE ISTANBUL: Court Conditionally Certifies Nazih FLSA Class
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANASS NAZIH, Plaintiff, v. CAFÉ ISTANBUL OF COLUMBUS,
LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-947 (S.D. Ohio), Judge
Algenon L. Marbley of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, Eastern Division, granted the Plaintiff's Motion
to Conditionally Certify an FLSA Collective Action and to Authorize
Notice.

Nazih and Opt-In Plaintiff Saad Bouhajra worked as servers at
Defendant Café Istanbul, a restaurant located in Easton Town
Center.  Café Istanbul is or has been owned and operated by
Defendants Ismail Altinok, Ali Emre Bektas (also known as John
Bektas), and Osman Saki.  According to Mr. Nazih and Mr. Bouhajra,
the Defendants did not properly compensate them for all time worked
at the restaurant.

Specifically, they declared that the Defendants shorted their time
in three ways: (1) simply deducting hours from their time records
generated by the Point of Sale system; (2) requiring them to
complete side work such as cleaning before clocking in or after
clocking out; and (3) requiring them to sign in to the POS system
under the names of owners and managers.  

Mr. Nazih and Mr. Bouhajra stated that they were never paid any
actual wages, but instead received only tips from their customers.
They further aver that no one at Café Istanbul informed them that
a "tip credit" would be taken from their wages, but their paystubs
indicate Defendants paid them $4.08 hour.  Mr. Nazih and Mr.
Bouhajra further declare that the Defendants engaged in a number of
other practices, including requiring servers to pay 2% of their
sales to the restaurant, keeping the tips made on to-go orders,
requiring servers to work for large parties with no tip, requiring
employees to pay for their uniforms, and requiring them to
occasionally pick up food or alcohol for the restaurant and not
reimbursing them.

Mr. Nazih commenced the collective and class action against the
Defendants on Oct. 26, 2017, alleging that they violated the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the Ohio Constitution, Article II,
Section 34a, the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, Ohio Revised
Code Section 4113.15, and Ohio Revised Code Section 2307.60.  Mr.
Bouhajra opted in to the lawsuit on Nov. 2, 2017.  The next day, on
Nov. 3, 2017, Mr. Nazih filed the instant Motion to Conditionally
Certify.

Mr. Nazih seeks to conditionally certify the collective action
class under the FLSA of all servers or other tipped employees who
worked at Café Istanbul in Easton Town Center at any time during
the three years prior to the granting of the Motion to the
present.

Judge Marbley granted the Plaintiff's Motion to Conditionally
Certify, and conditionally certified the collective action class of
all servers or other tipped employees who worked at Café Istanbul
in Easton Town Center at any time during the three years prior to
the granting of the Motion to the present.

He approved the substance of the proposed Notice and Consent Form,
Email, and Text Message, with the exception of all references to
the opt-in Plaintiffs' ability to proceed anonymously with respect
to the Defendants, which must be stricken.  He ordered the
Plaintiffs to submit a revised Notice, Consent Form, and Email
striking the proposed references to anonymity and making clear that
the opt-in Plaintiffs' identity will be shared with the Defendants
but not third-parties within seven days from the date of the Order.


The Defendants will have seven days after such revised notice is
submitted to object to the language regarding anonymity.  The
revisions and any objections to the notices will be limited to the
language regarding anonymity, as the Court has approved the
remainder of the notices.  Once the Court approves the revised
notices, the Plaintiffs are permitted to send notice via first
class mail, email, and text message.  The putative class members
will have 90 days to opt into the case and will be allowed to
proceed pseudonymously on the public record, but their identities
will be shared with the Court and the Defendants under seal.

In light of this decision, the Judge directed the Clerk of Courtsto
remove Document Number 11 from the public docket.  The Defendants
are directed to re-file their Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion to Conditionally Certify an FLSA Collective
Action and to Authorize Notice without the Annual Reconciliations
exhibit, pages 9-14 (Page ID # 130-135).  

They are further directed to re-file one copy of Annual
Reconciliations Exhibit (pages 9-14) as is under seal, and file one
copy with the names of all employees other than Mr. Nazih and Mr.
Bouhajra redacted within seven days from the date of the Order.
The Plaintiffs are directed to submit a proposed protective order
consistent with this decision to U.S. Magistrate Judge Deavers for
approval within 30 DAYS from the date of the Order.

Finally, Judge Marbley ordered the Defendants to produce to the
Plaintiffs a computer-readable list of the names, last known
addresses, telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, dates of
employment, and job titles for members of the putative class within
15 days from the date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 11, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/UyN9rr from Leagle.com.

Anass Nazih, On behalf of himself and those similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Biller -- abiller@msdlegal.com --
Markovits, Stock & DeMarco, LLC, Eric Kmetz -- ekmetz@msdlegal.com
-- Markovitis, Stock & De Marco, LLC, Philip J. Krzeski, Markovits,
Stock & DeMarco, LLC & Andrew P. Kimble -- akimble@msdlegal.com --
Markovits, Stock & DeMarco, LLC.

Cafe Istanbul of Columbus, LLC, Ismail Altinok, Ali Emre Bektas,
also known as John Bektas & Osman Saki, Defendants, represented by
Charles William Hess -- chuck@leegurneyhess.com -- Brickstone
Commons.


CAFEPRESS INC: Bushansky Sues Over Securities Exchange Act Breach
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Bushansky, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Cafepress Inc., Fred E. Durham, III,
Anthony C. Allen, Mary Ann Arico, Kenneth T. Mcbride and Alan B.
Howe, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-01607-UNA (D. Del., October 17,
2018) is a class action brought on behalf of the public
stockholders of CafePress Inc. against CafePress and the members of
its Board of Directors for their violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
and to enjoin the expiration of a tender offer on a proposed
transaction, pursuant to which CafePress will be acquired by
Snapfish LLC, through its wholly owned subsidiary Snapfish Merger
Sub, Inc.

On September 28, 2018, CafePress and Snapfish entered into an
Agreement and Plan of Merger to sell CafePress to Snapfish.
Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, Merger Sub commenced
the Tender Offer to purchase all outstanding shares of CafePress
for $1.48 in cash per share of CafePress common stock. The Tender
Offer is scheduled to expire at midnight, New York time, on
November 8, 2018.

In connection with the Proposed Transaction, the Defendants filed a
Solicitation/Recommendation Statement on Schedule 14D-9 with the
SEC, which recommends that CafePress stockholders tender their
shares in favor of the Proposed Transaction.  However, the
Statement omits or misrepresents material information concerning,
among other things: (i) the background leading to the Proposed
Transaction; (ii) potential conflicts of interest faced by Company
insiders; and (iii) the data and inputs underlying the financial
valuation analyses that support the fairness opinion provided by
Needham & Company, LLC, asserts the complaint.

The failure to adequately disclose such material information
constitutes a violation of Sections 14(d), 14(e) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act as CafePress stockholders need such information in
order to make a fully informed decision whether to tender their
shares in support of the Proposed Transaction or seek appraisal,
says the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff is, and has been at all times relevant hereto, a
common stockholder of CafePress.

Defendant CafePress is a Delaware corporation and maintains its
principal executive offices at 11909 Shelbyville Road, Louisville,
Kentucky 40243. Founded in 1999, CafePress is the recognized
pioneer of customizable products. Its global online platform
enables people to express themselves through engaging community
generated designs and licensed and personalized one-of-a-kind
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Ryan M. Ernst, Esq.
     O'Kelly Ernst & Joyce LLC
     901 N. Market St., Suite 1000
     Wilmington, DE 19801
     Phone: (302) 778-4000
     Email: rernst@oelegal.com

          - and -
     
     Richard A. Acocelli, Esq.
     Michael A. Rogovin, Esq.
     Kelly K. Moran, Esq.
     WEISSLAW LLP
     1500 Broadway, 16th Floor
     New York, NY 10036
     Phone: (212) 682-3025
     Fax: (212) 682-3010



CAL-MAINE FOODS: Continues to Defend Egg Products-Related Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Cal-Maine Foods, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 1, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 1, 2018, that the company
continues to defend itself against the remaining lawsuits involving
the sale of egg products.

On September 25, 2008, the Company was named as one of several
defendants in numerous antitrust cases involving the United States
shell egg industry. The cases were consolidated into In re:
Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation, No. 2:08-md-02002-GP,
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania (the "District Court"), in three groups of cases --
the "Direct Purchaser Putative Class Action", the "Indirect
Purchaser Putative Class Action" and the "Non-Class Cases."

The Company has settled all of the Direct Purchaser Putative Class
Action cases and the Indirect Purchaser Putative Class Action
cases.  The Company has settled all Non-Class cases except for the
claims of certain plaintiffs who sought substantial damages
allegedly arising from the purchase of egg products (as opposed to
shell eggs).

The remaining plaintiffs are Conopco, Inc., Kraft Food Global,
Inc., General Mills, Inc., Nestle USA, Inc., and The Kellogg
Company. These egg products plaintiffs seek treble damages and
injunctive relief under the Sherman Act and are attacking certain
features of the UEP animal-welfare guidelines and program used by
the Company and many other egg producers.

On September 6, 2016, the District Court granted defendants' motion
for summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice all claims based
on the purchase of egg products. That ruling was appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and on
January 22, 2018, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's
grant of summary judgement and remanded the case to the District
Court.

Even though the appealing egg-products plaintiffs had asked the
Third Circuit to remand the case for trial, the Third Circuit
declined, instead remanding the case for further proceedings,
including the suggestion that the District Court determine whether
the egg-products plaintiffs had sufficient evidence of causation
and damages to submit the case to a jury.

On March 5, 2018, defendants filed a motion in the District Court
seeking leave to file a motion for summary judgment in light of the
remand statements in the Third Circuit's opinion. Plaintiffs
opposed that motion, and on March 26, 2018, the defendants filed a
reply in support of the motion.

On July 16, 2018, the court granted the defendants' motion for
leave and on August 17, 2018, defendants filed their motions for
summary judgment and requested oral argument. The plaintiffs' filed
their responses on September 21, 2018, and the defendants' replies
are due on October 12, 2018. The District Court held a status
conference on September 20, 2018, but did not set a trial date for
any remaining cases. The District Court stated that it may hear
oral argument on the renewed motions for summary judgment in
December.

Cal-Maine Foods said, "The Company intends to continue to defend
the remaining cases as vigorously as possible based on defenses
which the Company believes are meritorious and provable. While
management believes that the likelihood of a material adverse
outcome in the overall egg antitrust litigation has been
significantly reduced as a result of the settlements and rulings
described above, there is still a reasonable possibility of a
material adverse outcome in the remaining egg antitrust litigation.
At the present time, however, it is not possible to estimate the
amount of monetary exposure, if any, to the Company because of
these cases. Adjustments, if any, which might result from the
resolution of these remaining legal matters, have not been
reflected in the financial statements."

Cal-Maine Foods, Inc. produces, grades, packages, markets, and
distributes shell eggs. The company offers specialty shell eggs,
such as nutritionally enhanced, cage free, organic, and brown eggs
under the Egg-Land’s Best, Land O’ Lakes, Farmhouse, and
4-Grain brand names, as well as under private labels. The company
was founded in 1957 and is based in Jackson, Mississippi.


CAMPBELL SOUP: Gainey McKenna Files Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Campbell Soup Company ("Campbell" or the
"Company") (NYSE: CPB) in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey on behalf of a class consisting of investors
who purchased or otherwise acquired Campbell securities between
August 31, 2017, and May 17, 2018, both dates inclusive (the "Class
Period"), seeking to recover damages caused by Defendants’
violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

The Complaint alleges that: (1) Defendants failed to disclose known
trends that were negatively impacting the profitability of the
Campbell Fresh division; and (2) as a result of the foregoing,
Defendants’ positive statements about Campbell’s and the
Campbell Fresh division’s business, operations, and prospects
were materially false and/or misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis.

On May 18, 2018, Campbell disclosed disappointing financial results
for the third straight quarter, including a $19 million loss for
the Campbell Fresh division in the third quarter fiscal 2018,
forcing the company to take a $619 million pre-tax non-cash
impairment charge for the division and to further revise its fiscal
year 2018 earnings guidance.  Campbell simultaneously announced
that Denise Morrison was stepping down immediately as Chief
Executive Officer of the Company.  Following this news, the price
of Campbell common stock fell over 12%, from a close of $39.22 per
share on May 17, 2018, to close at $34.37 per share on May 18,
2018.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares during the
Class Period should contact the Firm prior to the November 27, 2018
lead plaintiff motion deadline.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  If you wish to discuss your rights or
interests regarding this class action please;

         Thomas J. McKenna, Esq.
         Gregory M. Egleston, Esq.
         Gainey McKenna & Egleston
         Telephone: (212) 983-1300,
         Email: tjmckenna@gme-law.com
                gegleston@gme-law.com. [GN]


CAMPBELL SOUP: Nov. 27 Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, on Oct. 8
announced the filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of
purchasers of the securities of Campbell Soup Company (NYSE: CPB)
from August 31, 2017 through May 17, 2018, inclusive (the "Class
Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Campbell
investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Campbell class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1427.html or call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Campbell failed to disclose known trends that were
negatively impacting the profitability of the Campbell Fresh
division; and (2) as a result of the foregoing, Campbell's positive
statements about Campbell's and the Campbell Fresh division's
business, operations, and prospects were materially false and/or
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis. When the true details
entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered
damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than November
27, 2018. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1427.html or to discuss your
rights or interests regarding this class action, please contact
Phillip Kim, Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll
free at 866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
zhalper@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm -- http://www.rosenlegal.com-- represents investors
throughout the globe, concentrating its practice in securities
class actions and shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm
was Ranked No. 1 by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number
of securities class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been
ranked in the top 3 each year since 2013. [GN]


CANADA LINE: Property Owners' Compensation Delayed Until 2019
-------------------------------------------------------------
Glen Korstrom, writing for Vancouver Is Awesome, reports that more
than 80 owners of properties and small businesses who suffered
through noise, dust and fencing that impeded customer access while
the Canada Line was being built along Cambie Street between 2005
and 2009 must wait until at least next year to get compensation.

That is if they get compensation at all.

Defendants in the merchants' class action lawsuit, which has
dragged on since around 2010, on Oct. 2 appealed a Sept. 4 B.C.
Supreme Court judgment that was in favour of the merchants. That
judgment provided a formula for how the compensation should be
doled out.

Leonard Schein, whose Festival Cinemas would have been entitled to
$128,000 in compensation was disappointed with the appeal.

He pointed to some of the defendants that he said are connected
with the provincial government -- Canada Line Rapid Transit Inc.,
Intransit BC LP, Intransit British Columbia G.P. Ltd. and South
Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority -- and said that it
does not make sense for public money to be spent on lawyers to
continue to fight paying compensation to the merchants.

B.C.'s Ministry of Attorney General told Business in Vancouver in
an emailed statement that it is "not a defendant in these
proceedings and so has no comment."

Mr. Schein, however, pointed to how the B.C. government appoints
TransLink's board of directors, so the province does have some sway
in whether an appeal is launched.

"In 2008, the CEO of TransLink and the vice-president of major
projects wanted to compensate the Cambie Village Business
Association with an offer of $5 million, which we accepted,
however, the TransLink board appointed by the government vetoed our
settlement and told us to sue them," he said. "So from our
experience with the previous government, they got what they wanted
and overruled TransLink management. The government can certainly
tell the board to drop the appeal if they want to."

Class action lawsuits have three parts.

The first part of the class action is to get the court to certify a
case as a class action. After the merchants were able to get their
case certified, the defendants unsuccessfully appealed.

The second part of the class action was for the merchants to prove
that there was an actual law that the defendants broke that would
then entitle the merchants to damages.

"We won on that, and the government did not appeal that," Schein
said.

The third trial was in May and related to the formula for which the
merchants would be compensated.

"They wanted to basically give us very, very little for our losses,
basically claiming that after the line was finished, everything was
back to normal so we shouldn't get much," he said.

Justice Christopher Grauer in September awarded damages for the
three representative cases within the class action lawsuit by way
of a formula that could be used by all the eligible merchants.

Schein was one of the representative cases.

The others were then-Thai Away Home restaurant owner Dale
Dubberley, who was granted $44,560 in compensation, and
Gary Gautam, who was granted $7,600 in compensation because he
owned Cambie General Store during the construction period.

BIV reported in 2016 that, in November 2015, B.C. Supreme Court
found that although the merchants affected by construction couldn't
sue the SkyTrain line's builders for any loss of revenue, they
could sue if they could prove that their leases or properties were
devalued during the construction.

Small-business owners then had to fill out forms and attach
financial records to prove that their businesses were performing
better before Canada Line construction launched than during the
construction period from 2005 to 2009.

One tenant who suffered during construction and is not eligible for
compensation is Susan Heyes, who then owned the maternity-wear
company Hazel & Jools.

She launched a separate individual lawsuit against the Canada Line
builders and therefore was not eligible to be part of the
class-action lawsuit.

Ms. Heyes won a $600,000 judgment in BC Supreme Court and then lost
that award when the defendants appealed and won in B.C. Court of
Appeal. Her attempt to take the case to the Supreme Court of Canada
was unsuccessful and she told BIV in 2011 that she had spent
$400,000 in legal fees. [GN]


CARMAX INC: Wage & Hour Class Suits Still Ongoing in California
---------------------------------------------------------------
CarMax, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on October 5, 2018, for the quarterly
period ended August 31, 2018, that the company continues to defend
four wage and hour class action suits in California.

CarMax entities are defendants in four proceedings asserting wage
and hour claims with respect to CarMax sales consultants in
California. The asserted claims include failure to pay minimum
wage, provide meal periods and rest breaks, pay
statutory/contractual wages, reimburse for work-related expenses
and provide accurate itemized wage statements; unfair competition;
and Private Attorney General Act claims.

On September 4, 2015, Craig Weiss et al., v. CarMax Auto
Superstores California, LLC, and CarMax Auto Superstores West
Coast, Inc., a putative class action, was filed in the Superior
Court of California, County of Placer. The Weiss lawsuit seeks
civil penalties, fines, cost of suit, and the recovery of
attorneys' fees.

On June 29, 2016, Ryan Gomez et al. v. CarMax Auto Superstores
California, LLC, and CarMax Auto Superstores West Coast, Inc., a
putative class action, was filed in the Superior Court of the State
of California, Los Angeles. The Gomez lawsuit seeks declaratory
relief, unspecified damages, restitution, statutory penalties,
interest, cost and attorneys' fees.

On September 7, 2016, James Rowland v. CarMax Auto Superstores
California, LLC, and CarMax Auto Superstores West Coast, Inc., a
putative class action, was filed in the U.S. District Court,
Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division. The Rowland
lawsuit seeks unspecified damages, restitution, statutory
penalties, interest, cost and attorneys' fees.  

On October 31, 2017, Joshua Sabanovich v. CarMax Superstores
California, LLC et. al., a putative class action, was filed in the
Superior Court of California, County of Stanislaus. The Sabanovich
lawsuit seeks unspecified damages, restitution, statutory
penalties, interest, cost and attorneys' fees.  

CarMax said, "We are unable to make a reasonable estimate of the
amount or range of loss that could result from an unfavorable
outcome in these matters."

CarMax, Inc., through its subsidiaries, operates as a retailer of
used vehicles in the United States. The company operates in two
segments, CarMax Sales Operations and CarMax Auto Finance. CarMax,
Inc. was founded in 1993 and is based in Richmond, Virginia.


CERTIFIED TIRE: Cal. App. Affirms Judgment in Wage & Hour Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re CERTIFIED TIRE AND SERVICE CENTERS WAGE AND HOUR
CASES (Cal. App.), Judge Joan K. Irion of the Court of Appeals of
California for the Fourth District, Division One, affirmed the
trial court's judgment in favor of Certified Tire.

The instant appeal is based on multiple wage and hour class action
lawsuits filed against Certified Tire in superior court in
Riverside County and San Diego County by Plaintiffs Oscar
Gutierrez, Pascal Jeandebien, and Michael Rehse.  After the
lawsuits were coordinated in San Diego County Superior Court, a
first amended coordinated complaint was filed.

On Dec. 22, 2015, the trial court certified the class action with
respect to several defined classes, two of which are relevant here:
(1) All Technicians employed by Defendant from March 6, 2009, to
the present to whom the Defendant failed to pay a separate minimum
wage for non-productive time; and (2) All Technicians employed by
Defendant from March 6, 2009, to the present to whom the Defendant
failed to pay for off duty rest periods.  The trial court also
found that Gutierrez, Jeandebien and Rehse would adequately
represent the class.

The trial court conducted a bench trial in December 2016.  In their
joint trial readiness conference report, the parties agreed that
the only issue for resolution in Phase I is the legality of the
Technician Compensation Program ("TCP").  Any other liability and
injunctive/damages issues, if necessary, are deferred until after a
ruling on Phase I.  The parties identified the issue to be
determined by the trial court as whether the Plaintiffs have met
their burden to show that Certified Tire's TCP violates California
law.

The parties also entered into stipulations concerning the
applicable legal standards.  Specifically, the parties stipulated
that Certified Tire is governed by the California Labor Code and
Wage Order 4-2001].  They agreed that under Wage Order 4, every
employer will pay to each employee, on the established payday for
the period involved, not less than the applicable minimum wage for
all hours worked in the payroll period, whether the remuneration is
measured by time, piece, commission, or otherwise.  The parties
identified the applicable minimum wage as not less than $9 per hour
for all hours worked, effective July 1, 2014, and not less than $10
per hour for all hours worked, effective Jan. 1, 2016.  

In addition, the parties agreed that Wage Order 4 provides for rest
period that every employer will authorize and permit all employees
to take rest periods, which insofar as practicable will be in the
middle of each work period.  The authorized rest period time will
be based on the total hours worked daily at the rate of 10 minutes
net rest time per four hours or major fraction thereof.  Authorized
rest period time will be counted as hours worked for which there
will be no deduction from wages.

The trial court held a bench trial at which several witnesses
testified, including the Plaintiffs, other technicians formerly or
currently employed by Certified Tire, supervisors from Certified
Tire, a Certified Tire employee in charge of payroll, and Certified
Tire's president.  The evidence regarding the details of the TCP
was largely undisputed, and it was also undisputed that technicians
at Certified Tire were required to clock in for all hours while at
work, and they took their required rest breaks while clocked in
during the work day.

The trial court issued a statement of decision in favor of
Certified Tire.  After extensively setting forth the testimony and
evidence presented at trial and the governing case law, it
explained that the Plaintiffs had not established any violation of
the wage and hour laws.  The trial court entered judgment in favor
of Certified Tire on April 12, 2017.  On May 9, 2017, a notice of
appeal was filed.

Judge Irion concludes that Certified Tire makes payments to its
technicians on an hourly basis at an hourly rate above the minimum
wage for all hours worked, and it provides paid rest periods on the
clock as required by law.  Thus, based on the undisputed facts
regarding the manner in which technicians are compensated under
Certified Tire's TCP, the Plaintiffs have not established that
Certified Tire is in violation of the minimum wage requirement and
rest period requirement in Wage Order 4.  For these reasons, she
affirmed the judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/JRjqju from Leagle.com.

Law Offices of Kevin T. Barnes, Kevin T. Barnes, Greg Lander; Scott
Cole & Associates, Jeremy A. Grahams; Righetti Glugoski, Matthew
Righetti, John Glugoski, and Michael C. Riguetti for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.

Carothers DiSante & Freudenberger, Timothy M. Freudenberger --
tfreud@cdflaborlaw.com -- Robin E. Largent --
rlargent@cdflaborlaw.com -- and Garrett V. Jensen --
gjensen@cdflaborlaw.com -- for Defendants and Respondents.


CHARTER COMMS: Constitutionality of TCPA Challenged
---------------------------------------------------
Eric J. Troutman, writing for TCPAland, reports that "I've said
enough on the subject of the watered-down version of strict
scrutiny being applied to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
('TCPA') and how that might impact the future of free speech in the
country. And here are the words of appellate counsel challenging
the Constitutionality of the TCPA before the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeal in the case of Gallion v. Charter Communications, Inc., case
no. 18-55667 (9th Cir):

"Privacy obviously is an important interest, and there is no
question that the government may sometimes restrict speech to
protect privacy and tranquility. Even-handed, nondiscriminatory
limitations on sound trucks, megaphones, protestors on the
doorstep, and even telephone calls thus are upheld where they
safeguard privacy in an appropriately tailored manner. But the
First Amendment cannot tolerate a speech regulation based loosely
on 'privacy' if it prefers favored speakers and messages
--particularly where, as here, those messages are just as
destructive of 'privacy' as the messages that are prohibited (or
even more so). If the government could constitutionally justify
these sorts of content-based speech restrictions based on a
purported 'compelling' interest in 'privacy,' the government would
become the arbiter of whether messages are desirable or undesirable
to listeners, which would be anathema to the First Amendment."

"Plaintiff Steve Gallion brought this putative class action
alleging that Defendants Charter Communications, Inc. and Spectrum
Management Holding Company, LLC (collectively, 'Spectrum') violated
the TCPA's Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) by placing a single call to
his cell phone to promote Spectrum services. ER1. Based on this one
allegedly unauthorized call, Plaintiff seeks to recover millions of
dollars in purported "damages" on behalf of himself and a putative
class.

"As originally enacted in 1991, the call restrictions at issue here
were designed to preserve content neutrality, and this Court twice
sustained the statute as imposing a content-neutral and reasonable
time, place, and manner restriction. Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 973
(9th Cir. 1995); Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871, 876
(9th Cir. 2014), aff'd on unrelated grounds, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016).
Since that time, however, Congress amended the statute to exempt
any call that 'is made solely to collect a debt owed to or
guaranteed by the United States.' 47 U.S.C. Sec. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).
Courts and the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") have also
recently clarified that calls made by governmental entities and
their private contractors are categorically exempt from the call
restrictions. And the FCC has promulgated numerous other
content-based exemptions for favored content pursuant to Section
227(b)(2)(C) of the Communications Act, as amended by the TCPA. As
the Supreme Court recently clarified in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
such preferences render the call restrictions content-based and
subject to strict scrutiny. 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227-30 (2015). No
court of appeals has yet evaluated the constitutionality of the
call restrictions in light of these important developments
(although the Fourth Circuit has held unconstitutional, under
strict scrutiny, an analogous state law statute, Cahaly v. Larosa,
796 F.3d 399, 408 (4th Cir. 2015)).

"Under the well-established precedent of both this Court and the
Supreme Court, the presumptively unconstitutional, content-based
call restrictions do not survive strict scrutiny. In fact, given
the extremely demanding standard of review and the complete absence
of evidence justifying a selective, discriminatory restriction on
speech, it is not a close question. In particular, the district
court erred by identifying a new 'compelling' interest in privacy
sufficient to justify a content-based speech restriction. The
district court also applied a watered down version of strict
scrutiny that did not properly account for the fact that the
statute's content-based carve-outs render it both fatally
underinclusive and overinclusive . . .

"With strict scrutiny correctly applied, the speech restriction
does not come close to passing constitutional muster. The
interlocutory order of the district court concluding otherwise
should be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to enter
judgment in Spectrum's favor. "

The above was an excerpt from the Introduction in the Opening Brief
of Defendants-Appellants Charter Communications, Inc. and Spectrum
Management Holding Company, LLC. Gallion, Dkt. No. 7-1, filed
August 30, 2018.

Appellants take noticeable focus on the TCPA's exemption for
government-backed debt. It is that exemption -- among others --
that makes the TCPA a pernicious content/viewpoint restriction on
speech. So isn't the fix here to merely strike the exemption from
the statute? As the U.S. Chamber of Commerce–serving as amicus–
explains, of course not:

"First, the Supreme Court has ruled that the appropriate remedy for
a speech restriction with an impermissible content-based exemption
is to set aside the restriction, not to set aside the exemption.
For example, in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972), and Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), the Supreme Court
confronted ordinances that prohibited school picketing (Mosley) and
residential picketing (Carey) -- each containing a content-based
exemption for picketing on labor issues. In each case, the Court
ruled that the ordinance violated the Constitution. Each time, the
Court remedied the violation by invalidating the entire picketing
ordinance, not by invalidating just the content-based exemption for
labor picketing. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 102 (invalidating
ordinance prohibiting picketing outside schools, not just exemption
for labor picketing); Carey, 447 U.S. at 471 (same with respect to
picketing outside residences). "

"Similarly, in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S.
221 (1987), a state applied its general sales tax to magazines, but
granted exemptions to religious, trade, professional, and sports
magazines. The Supreme Court ruled that this taxing scheme violated
the Constitution. The Court resolved the constitutional problem by
invalidating the application of a state's general sales tax to
magazines, not just the content-based tax exemptions for religious,
trade, professional, and sports magazines. Id. at 234.

"These decisions reflect the well-established principle that courts
must employ remedies that "create incentives to raise
[constitutional] challenges." Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055
n.5 (2018) (punctuation omitted). In a free-speech case, only
leveling up -- eliminating the restriction on speech -- creates
such an incentive. A speaker would have little incentive to
challenge a discriminatory restriction on speech, if the only
remedy it could obtain is the expansion of that restriction to
cover more speech.

"These decisions also reflect the reality that the invalidation of
an ex-emption can itself raise new constitutional problems. When a
court invalidates an exemption, it retroactively imposes liability
on speakers who reasonably relied on that exemption while it was on
the books. Such retroactive liability clashes with the principle
that the government must give speakers "fair notice" before
restricting their speech. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567
U.S. 239, 253 (2012). Leveling up is thus the only remedy that
solves the constitutional problems created by the defective statute
without creating new problems to take their place.

"These precedents require invalidation of the ATDS restriction,
rather than invalidation of its content-based exemptions. That is
the only course that preserves an incentive to raise challenges to
content-discriminatory laws such as the TCPA. A litigant such as
Charter Communications would have little reason to bring such a
challenge, if all it could get is the application of the TCPA to
even more callers."

The above was an excerpt from the Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of
Commerce of the United State of America Supporting Appellants.
Gallion, Dkt. No. 12., filed September 6, 2018.

We will be keeping a very close eye on developments in Gallion as
the case obviously has bigger dimensions that just those impacting
TCPAland. [GN]


COLT OILFIELD: Oilfield Workers Sue to Recover Unpaid Overtime Pay
------------------------------------------------------------------
Sergio Avelar, Ignacio Ceja, Craig Harmon and Antonio Ceja,
individually and on behalf of all current and former employees of
Colt Oilfield Services, Plaintiffs v. Colt Oilfield Services, LLC
and Eddie Aguilar, Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-01007 (W.D. Tex.,
September 26, 2018), seeks to recover overtime compensation,
liquidated damages, interest and attorneys' fees and costs under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

Colt is based in San Antonio, Texas and provides oilfield services
to drilling and production sites throughout the State of Texas and
United States. Plaintiffs worked for Colt within the last two years
as oil field personnel and were paid a fixed salary plus an hourly
job bonus for all hours worked in the field, but did not receive
overtime for all hours worked over forty in each workweek, says the
complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     J. Mitchell Clark, Esq.
     Robert C. Hilliard, Esq.
     John B. Martinez, Esq.
     Rudy Gonzales, Jr., Esq.
     Catherine D. Tobin, Esq.
     Marion M. Reilly, Esq.
     Bradford M. Klager, Esq.
     Jessica J. Pritchett, Esq.
     HILLIARD MARTINEZ GONZALES LLP
     719 S. Shoreline Boulevard
     Corpus Christi, TX 78401
     Telephone No.: (361) 882-1612
     Facsimile No.: (361) 882-3015
     Email: hmgservice@hmglawfirm.com
            Mitchell@hmglawfirm.com
            bobh@hmglawfirm.com
            john@hmglawfirm.com
            rudyg@hmglawfirm.com
            catherine@hmglawfirm.com
            marionmreilly@gmail.com
            brad@hmglawfirm.com
            jpritchett@hmglawfirm.com


CONAGRA BRANDS: Class Suits over Pinnacle Foods Merger Underway
---------------------------------------------------------------
Conagra Brands, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended August 26, 2018, that the company is facing
multiple class action lawsuits in connection to its merger
agreement with Pinnacle Foods Inc.

On June 26, 2018, the company entered into a definitive merger
agreement with Pinnacle Foods Inc. ("Pinnacle") under which the
company will acquire all outstanding shares of Pinnacle common
stock in a cash and stock transaction valued at approximately $10.9
billion, including Pinnacle's outstanding net debt.

Conagra Brands said, "We are involved in certain litigation matters
in connection with our planned acquisition of Pinnacle. On August
7, 2018, a purported stockholder of Pinnacle filed a complaint in a
putative class action in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, captioned Alexander Rasmussen v. Pinnacle
Foods Inc. et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-12501. On August 9, 2018, a
purported stockholder of Pinnacle filed a complaint in a putative
class action in the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey, captioned Robert H. Paquette v. Pinnacle Foods Inc.
et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-12578. On August 9, 2018, a purported
stockholder of Pinnacle filed a complaint in a putative class
action in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, captioned Wesley Lindquist v. Pinnacle Foods Inc. et al.,
Case No. 2:18-cv-12610.

The Rasmussen Action, the Paquette Action, and the Lindquist Action
allege that Pinnacle's preliminary proxy statement, filed with the
SEC on July 25, 2018, omits material information with respect to
the merger, rendering it false and misleading and thus that
Pinnacle and the directors of Pinnacle violated Section 14(a) of
the Exchange Act as well as Rule 14a-9 under the Exchange Act.

The Rasmussen Action, the Paquette Action, and the Lindquist Action
further allege that the directors of Pinnacle violated Section
20(a) of the Exchange Act. The Rasmussen Action and the Paquette
Action seek, among other things, to enjoin the transactions
contemplated by the merger agreement unless Pinnacle discloses the
allegedly material information that was allegedly omitted from the
proxy statement, an award of damages and an award of attorneys'
fees and expenses.

The Lindquist Action seeks, among other things, to enjoin the
transactions contemplated by the merger agreement unless Pinnacle
discloses the allegedly material information that was allegedly
omitted from the proxy statement, an award of rescissory damages
should the merger be consummated, including pre-judgment and
post-judgment interest, and an award of attorneys' fees and
expenses.

Conagra Brands, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
food company in North America. The company operates through Grocery
& Snacks, Refrigerated & Frozen, International, and Foodservice
segments. Conagra Brands, Inc. was founded in 1919 and is
headquartered in Chicago, Illinois.


CONAGRA BRANDS: Continues to Defend Briseno Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------
Conagra Brands, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended August 26, 2018, that the company continues
to defend itself against a putative class action lawsuit entitled,
Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.

Conagra Brands said, "We are party to a number of putative class
action lawsuits challenging various product claims made in the
Company's product labeling."

These matters include Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., in which it
is alleged that the labeling for Wesson(R) oils as 100% natural is
false and misleading because the oils contain genetically modified
plants and organisms. In February 2015, the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California granted class certification to
permit plaintiffs to pursue state law claims.

The Company appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, which affirmed class certification in January 2017.
The Supreme Court of the United States declined to review the
decision and the case has been remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.

Conagra Brands said, "While we cannot predict with certainty the
results of this or any other legal proceeding, we do not expect
this matter to have a material adverse effect on our financial
condition, results of operations, or business."

A Status Conference was held in the csae on October 22 before Judge
Cormac J. Carney.

Conagra Brands, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
food company in North America. The company operates through Grocery
& Snacks, Refrigerated & Frozen, International, and Foodservice
segments. Conagra Brands, Inc. was founded in 1919 and is
headquartered in Chicago, Illinois.


CONAGRA BRANDS: Negrete Consolidated Class Suit Remains Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
Conagra Brands, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended August 26, 2018, that the company continues
to defend itself against a consolidated class action suit entitled,
Negrete v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., et al.

The company is a party to matters challenging the Company's wage
and hour practices. These matters include a number of putative
class actions consolidated under the caption Negrete v. ConAgra
Foods, Inc., et al, pending in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, in which the plaintiffs allege a
pattern of violations of California and/or federal law at several
current and former Company manufacturing facilities across the
State of California."

Conagra Brands said, "While we cannot predict with certainty the
results of this or any other legal proceeding, we do not expect
this matter to have a material adverse effect on our financial
condition, results of operations, or business."

On the court's own motion, the Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment was taken off the Sept. 20, 2018 calendar and
placed under submission.

Conagra Brands, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
food company in North America. The company operates through Grocery
& Snacks, Refrigerated & Frozen, International, and Foodservice
segments. Conagra Brands, Inc. was founded in 1919 and is
headquartered in Chicago, Illinois.


CONAGRA BRANDS: Rosenblatt Class Suit over Merger Deal Underway
---------------------------------------------------------------
Conagra Brands, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 2, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended August 26, 2018, that the company together
with Pinnacle Foods Inc. faces a putative class action suit,
captioned Jordan Rosenblatt v. Pinnacle Foods Inc. et al.

On June 26, 2018, the company entered into a definitive merger
agreement with Pinnacle Foods Inc. ("Pinnacle") under which the
company will acquire all outstanding shares of Pinnacle common
stock in a cash and stock transaction valued at approximately $10.9
billion, including Pinnacle's outstanding net debt.

On August 15, 2018, a purported stockholder of Pinnacle filed a
complaint in a putative class action in the Court of Chancery of
the State of Delaware, captioned Jordan Rosenblatt v. Pinnacle
Foods Inc. et al., Case No. 2018-0605. The Rosenblatt Action
alleges that the directors of Pinnacle breached their fiduciary
duty of disclosure by filing a preliminary proxy statement that
contained materially incomplete and misleading information.

The Rosenblatt Action further alleges that Pinnacle, Conagra, and
Patriot Merger Sub Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Conagra
("Merger Sub"), aided and abetted the directors' alleged breach of
fiduciary duty. The Rosenblatt Action seeks, among other things, to
enjoin the transactions contemplated by the merger agreement,
rescission of the merger or an award of rescissory damages should
the merger be consummated, an award of damages and an award of
attorneys' fees and expenses. Conagra and Merger Sub believe the
Rosenblatt Action is without merit and intend to vigorously defend
it.

Conagra Brands, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
food company in North America. The company operates through Grocery
& Snacks, Refrigerated & Frozen, International, and Foodservice
segments. Conagra Brands, Inc. was founded in 1919 and is
headquartered in Chicago, Illinois.


CONCESIONARIA VUELA: Court Denies Bids to Dismiss Kindt Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MALINA KINDT, Plaintiff, v. CONCESIONARIA VUELA
COMPANIA DE AVIACION S.A.P.I. DE C.V., Defendant, Case No.
17-cv-04333-JD (N.D. Cal.), Judge James Donato of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California denied Volaris'
motion dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and for
pre-emption by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 ("ADA").

In the putative class action for damages and injunctive relief,
named Plaintiff Kindt alleges that Defendant Concesionaria Vuela
Compañia de Aviación S.A.P.I. de C.V. ("Volaris"), a commercial
airline company, violated California state law by recording
customer calls without notice.  The case was originally filed in
the Superior Court for the County of Alameda.  Volaris removed on
the basis of the Class Action Fairness Act, which is a special
application of diversity jurisdiction.  Kindt did not challenge the
removal.

As alleged in the complaint, Volaris operates passenger airline
services between the United States, Mexico and Central America.
Kindt called a toll-free customer service number offered by Volaris
to purchase airline tickets for travel to and from Mexico.  She
alleges that Volaris recorded her call without notice.  She alleges
a single claim under California Penal Code Sections 632.7 and
637.2, which provide a private right of action for individuals
whose communications have been surreptitiously recorded.  She sues
on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated California
residents.

Volaris moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and for
pre-emption by the ADA.

Judge Donato finds that Volaris operates regular passenger airline
services and flights in and out of the Oakland and San Jose
international airports, both of which are located in the district.
Volaris provides toll-free numbers for customers within the
district to call about its airline services.  These undisputed
facts amply establish specific personal jurisdiction in the Court.


The Jduge also finds taht the question of pre-emption under the ADA
is more nuanced.  The ADA expressly pre-empts any state law related
to a price, route or service of an air carrier.  Volaris'
pre-emption argument is premised mainly on the contention that
"service" includes the communications between the airline and its
customers that are the basis of the allegations in the complaint.

Rather curiously, he finds that Volaris' opening brief made no
mention of the circuit's discussion of the scope of "service" in
National Federation of the Blind v. United Airlines Inc., which is
a highly relevant decision.  The plaintiffs in the case sued under
California anti-discrimination laws for equal access
accommodations.  United kiosks provided an amenity and a
convenience for passengers that facilitated their travel, but not a
"service" in the public utility sense.  Consequently, the
California state law claims were not pre-empted.  

So too, in Kindt's case.  Volaris' toll-free customer service lines
offer many of the same amenities as United's kiosks.  Customers use
them to check on information and manage their travel plans.  The
toll-free lines do not affect Volaris' control of its prices,
routes, flights, and other transportation services any more than
the kiosks did for United.  For the same reasons, then, Kindt's
California Penal Code claims are not subject to pre-emption.
Volaris makes no effort to distinguish National Federation of the
Blind.  In addition to omitting the case entirely from its opening
brief, it made only a passing reference to it in the reply brief,
even though it was the centerpiece of Kindt's argument in
opposition to pre-emption.

For these reasons, Judge Donato denied Volaris' motions to
dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/XjOVtJ from Leagle.com.

Malina Kindt, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Eric A. Grover --
eagrover@kellergrover.com -- Keller Grover LLP, Rachael Ga-Yue Jung
-- rjung@kellergrover.com -- Keller Grover LLP & Scot Bernstein --
swampadero@sbernsteinlaw.com -- Law Offices of Scot D. Bernstein.

Concesionaria Vuela Compania de Aviacion SAPI de CV, Defendant,
represented by Shelley Gershon Hurwitz -- Shelley.Hurwitz@hklaw.com
-- Holland & Knight LLP, Christopher G. Kelly --
christopher.kelly@hklaw.com -- Holland & Knight LLP & Sarah G.
Passeri -- Sarah.Passeri@hklaw.com -- Holland & Knight LLP.


CONTAINER STORE: Arbitration Ruling in Blind Federation Suit Upheld
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE BLIND, on behalf of their
members and themselves; MIKA PYYHKALA, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated; LISA IRVING, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated; JEANINE KAY LINEBACK, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated; ARTHUR JACOBS, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
Appellees, MARK CADIGAN, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated; HEATHER ALBRIGHT, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE CONTAINER STORE,
INC., Defendant, Appellant, Case No. 16-2112 (1st Cir.), Judge
Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Container Store's
motion to stay the proceedings in district court and compel
arbitration.

The Appellees/Plaintiffs filed a complaint in district court
against Appellant/Defendant, Container Store, alleging several
violations of federal and state discrimination laws.  The
allegations stem from the Container Store's failure to utilize at
the time tactile keypads on its point-of-sale ("POS") devices in
its stores that could be independently used by customers who are
blind.

As a class action in September 2015, the Plaintiffs filed a
12-count first amended complaint, alleging a violation of Title II
of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), several violations
of Massachusetts, New York, Texas, and California discrimination
laws, and seeking declaratory relief.

Citing an arbitration provision in the terms and conditions of a
loyalty program of which the individual Plaintiffs were members,
the Container Store sought to stay the proceedings in district
court and compel arbitration.  A magistrate judge filed a report
and recommendation on the Container Store's motion, which denied
its requested relief and the Container Store objected to the report
and recommendation before the district judge.

In support of its objection, the Container Store submitted a new
piece of evidence: excerpts from a training manual for Container
Store employees indicating they were trained to allow the customer
the opportunity to review [the terms and conditions on the POS
device/screen and then ask them to press the "I Accept button," and
that, in the event the customer cannot enter their information on
the tablet and would like to enroll in the loyalty program, at the
customer's request, you can turn the tablet around and enter the
information on the customer's behalf.

In a written decision adopting the magistrate judge's report and
recommendation, the district court denied the Defendant's motion to
compel arbitration, enforce class waivers, and stay action --
concluding that this one piece of new evidence did not change its
agreement with the magistrate judge's recommendation.  Accordingly,
the judge entered an order denying the Container Store's motion to
compel arbitration, enforce class action waiver, and stay action.

The Defendant appealed to the Court.  On appeal, the Container
Store characterizes the case as a classic example of judicial
hostility towards arbitration and assigns five errors to the
district court's decision. According to the Container Store, the
district court overstepped its boundaries and erred as a matter of
law when it: (1) ruled in the first instance on whether the
Plaintiffs had agreed to arbitrate all their claims; (2) found that
the parties had not formed an agreement to arbitrate their ADA or
state-law claims; (3) determined that the Plaintiffs had not
ratified post initial enrollment the loyalty program agreement
(including the arbitration provision) when they participated in its
loyalty program after signing up; (4) found the contract was
illusory; and (5) ruled the contract was unconscionable.

For their part, the Plaintiffs maintain that the district court got
everything right.

Judge Thompson finds that a close look at the heart of their
arguments in support of their objection to arbitrate reveals they
are challenging the very basic elements of contract formation
relative to the arbitration provision: i.e., offer and acceptance
of same.  The in-store Plaintiffs primarily argue that they could
not have accepted the terms of a contract to arbitrate that was
never communicated to them.  Therefore, she rejects the Container
Store's attempt to re-package the Plaintiffs' arguments as one,
regarding validity of the entire agreement rather than formation of
a contract to arbitrate.  Accordingly, she agrees with the district
court that it was the proper forum to consider the issue.

Based upon the lack of any evidence that the in-store Plaintiffs
had any knowledge, actual or constructive, that arbitration terms
applied to their enrollment in the loyalty program, the Judge
concludes that the Container Store failed to meet its burden of
establishing that an agreement to arbitrate was ever consummated
between it and the in-store plaintiffs.  Therefore, the district
court correctly denied the Container Store's motion to compel
arbitration as to the in-store Plaintiffs.

The Judge also affirms the district court's order denying the
Container Store's motion to compel arbitration as to Lineback
because she finds no agreement was formed between her and the
Container Store relating to her enrollment in the loyalty program.

Finally, while a party may ratify a contract to which it otherwise
was not bound by reaping the benefits awarded in a contract's
terms, the Judge agrees with the Plaintiffs that the Container
Store has not shown how the Plaintiffs benefited from the loyalty
program following their initial enrollment.  Moreover, while there
was testimony that this email was customarily sent following
enrollment, the Container Store failed to present a copy or sample
of the "welcome" email containing the arbitration terms, or of the
monthly promotional emails that also contained the provisions.

For the reasons discussed, Judge Thompson affirmed the district
court order denying the Container Store's motion to compel
arbitration.  Costs to the Appellees/Plaintiffs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 14, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/hGleZ2 from Leagle.com.

Gregory F. Hurley -- ghurley@sheppardmullin.com -- with whom
Michael J. Chilleen -- mchilleen@sheppardmullin.com -- and
Sheppard, Mulin, Richter & Hampton LLP were on brief, for
Appellants.

Karla Gilbride -- kgilbride@publicjustice.net -- with whom Jeremy
Y. Weltman -- jweltman@hermesnetburn.com -- Kerstein, Coren,
Lichtenstein LLP, Jana Eisinger -- jeisinger@eisingerlawfirm.com --
Law Office of Jana Eisinger, Dani Zylberberg , Public Justice,
P.C., Scott C. LaBarre -- slabarre@labarrelaw.com -- LaBarre Law
Offices, P.C., Timonthy Elder, and TRE Legal Practice were on
brief, for Appellees.


DAIRYAMERICA INC: $40MM Settlement in Carlin Has Prelim Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GERALD CARLIN, JOHN RAHM, PAUL ROZWADOWSKI and DIANA
WOLFE, individually and on behalf of themselves and all other
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. DAIRYAMERICA, INC., and
CALIFORNIA DAIRIES, INC., Defendants, Case No. 1:09-CV-0430 AWI-EPG
(E.D. Cal.), Judge Anthony W. Ishii of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California granted the Plaintiffs' motion
for conditional certification of the proposed class under Rule 231
and for preliminary approval of the class action settlement.

The Plaintiffs, as purported class representatives, have alleged
various claims against Dairy America and California Dairies
concerning the misreporting of milk prices.  During the relevant
period, they received a monthly check for selling their raw milk;
the amounts paid to them were calculated by Federal Milk Marking
Orders (FMMO's).  The FMMO rates were calculated by collecting
market prices from large milk sellers via weekly surveys.  One of
the organizations that provided data was Defendant DairyAmerica, a
marketing association of nine cooperative members, including
Defendant California Dairies.

The Plaintiffs allege that between 2002 to 2007, DairyAmerica
shaped the raw milk prices paid to farmers by fraudulently
modifying the data it reported to the USDA each week through a
variety of schemes and artifices.  The Defendants' conduct
allegedly depressed raw milk prices and protected their profits.
The Defendants deny these contentions.

In 2009, the Plaintiffs, as purported class representatives, filed
suit against the Defendants.  In the currently-operative Fourth
Amended Complaint, they have alleged claims for negligent
misrepresentation, intentional misrepresentation, and conspiracy to
violate RICO.

After nine years of litigation, the parties have reached a
settlement agreement governing the proposed class of all dairy
farmers located in the United States who sold raw milk that was
priced according to a Federal Milk Marketing Order during the
period Jan. 1, 2002 through April 30, 2007.

The Settlement Class includes tens of thousands of dairy farmers,
who would each receive a portion of the $40 million Settlement
Fund.  The Class Counsel's attorney fees, costs, and any expenses
related to the suit are to be reimbursed from this fund, and the
Defendants have agreed they will not oppose the class counsel's fee
requests.  The settlement provides that attorney fees are not to
exceed 33.33% of the Fund.

The parties have also agreed to a service award of up to $90,000
for each of the named Plaintiffs, up to $10,000 to each former
named Plaintiff, up to $300,000 for settlement administration
costs, up to $20,000 for escrow agent costs, and any amount for
required taxes on income earned in the Settlement Fund.  The
remaining balance is not specified in the settlement agreement, due
in part to the number of unfixed sums.

However, assuming full reimbursement of the above expenses, the Net
Settlement amount would be approximately $26 million to be
distributed on a proportional basis to the Class Members who submit
valid claim forms.  The amounts distributed to each Approved
Claimant is to be determined by dividing (i) the volume of the
Claimant's total raw Grade A milk produced and pooled on a Federal
Milk Marketing Order during the period Jan. 1, 2002 to April 30,
2007, by (ii) the total volume of raw Grade A milk produced and
pooled on Federal Milk Marketing Orders during the same period.
Any residual amounts left in the Settlement Fund may be
re-distributed, proportionally, to the Approved Claimants or, if
not, then to a cy pres beneficiary selected by the Plaintiffs'
Counsel.

The Settlement Agreement also provides that notice of class
settlement is to be given by the claims administrator after the
Court preliminarily approves the settlement agreement.  The claims
administrator will attempt to identify -- and individually notify
-- each member of the Settlement Class reasonably ascertainable via
the FMMO's; or if not, then by other sources.

Judge Ishii granted the Plaintiffs' motion for conditional class
action certification and preliminary approval of the class action
settlement.  He conditionally certified the class of all dairy
farmers located in the United States who sold raw milk that was
priced according to a Federal Milk Marketing Order during the
period Jan. 1, 2002 through April 30, 2007.

The Judge designated Gerald Carlin, Paul Rozwadowski, John Rahm,
and H. Diana Wolfe as the Class Representatives; and Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll PLLC, Keller Rohrback L.L.P., and Berman Tabacco as
the Class Counsel.

He approved the establishment of an escrow account, as set forth in
the Settlement Agreement, as a Qualified Settlement Fund.  He
authorized the Class Counsel and their designees are authorized to
expend funds from the escrow account to pay Taxes, Tax Expenses and
Notice and Administration Costs, as set forth in the Settlement
Agreement.  

The parties may retain Rust Consulting, Inc. as the Settlement
Administrator, with reasonable administration costs (upon proper
proof) estimated not to exceed $300,000.

The Judge approved the Class Notice Package, and directed the
parties to implement the notice schedule.  The class counsel will
file (i) a motion for attorneys' fees, costs, and service awards by
Dec. 14, 2018; and (ii) a motion for Final Approval of the
Settlement, with the appropriate declarations, supporting evidence,
any objections, and any requests for exclusion by Feb. 4, 2019.
The parties will appear on March 4, 2019, 1:30 p.m. for a final
settlement approval hearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 14, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/5ER8cL from Leagle.com.

Gerald Carlin, individually and on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, John Rahm, individually and on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated & Paul Rozwadowski,
individually and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by A. Chowning Poppler --
apoppler@bermantabacco.com -- Berman Tabacco, Anthony David
Phillips -- aphillips@bermandevalerio.com -- Berman DeValerio,
Benjamin Doyle Brown -- bbrown@cohenmilstein.com -- Cohen Milstein
Sellers & Toll PLLC, Brent W. Johnson, Cohen Milstein Hausfeld and
Toll PLLC, 1100 New York Avenue, NW. Suite 500, West Tower.
Washington, DC 20005, pro hac vice, Cari C. Laufenberg --
claufenberg@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac
vice, Christopher Heffelfinger -- cheffelfinger@bermantabacco.com
-- Berman Tabacco, George F. Farah, Cohen Milstein Hausfeld and
Toll PLLC, 1100 New York Avenue, NW. Suite 500, West Tower.
Washington, DC 20005, pro hac vice, Juli E. Farris --
jfarris@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller Rohrback LLP, Justin N. Saif
-- jsaif@bermandevalerio.com -- Berman DeValerio, pro hac vice,
Leslie M. Kroeger, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, 1100 New
York Avenue, NW. Suite 500, West Tower. Washington, DC 20005, pro
hac vice & Ryan McDevitt -- rmcdevitt@kellerrohrback.c0, -- Keller
Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice.

Diana Wolfe, Plaintiff, represented by A. Chowning Poppler, Berman
Tabacco, Anthony David Phillips, Berman DeValerio, Benjamin Doyle
Brown , Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Brent W. Johnson, Cohen
Milstein Hausfeld and Toll PLLC, pro hac vice, Cari C. Laufenberg,
Keller Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice, Christopher Heffelfinger,
Berman Tabacco, George F. Farah, Cohen Milstein Hausfeld and Toll
PLLC, pro hac vice, Juli E. Farris, Keller Rohrback LLP, Justin N.
Saif , Berman DeValerio, pro hac vice & Ryan McDevitt, Keller
Rohrback L.L.P., pro hac vice.

DairyAmerica, Inc., Defendant, represented by Charles M. English,
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, pro hac vice, E. John Steren --
esteren@ebglaw.com -- Ober Kaler, pro  hac vice, Joseph Michael
Marchini -- jmm@bmj-law.com -- Baker, Manock & Jensen, Wendy M.
Yoviene -- wyoviene@bakerdonelson -- Ober Kaler, pro hac vice,
Allison Ann Davis -- allisondavis@dwt.com -- Davis Wright Tremaine
LLP, Joy G. Kim -- joykim@dwt.com -- Davis Wright Tremaine LLP &
Sanjay Mohan Nangia --  sanjaynangia@dwt.com -- Davis Wright
Tremaine LLP.

California Dairies, Inc., Defendant, represented by Lawrence
Michael Cirelli -- lcirelli@hansonbridgett.com -- Hanson Bridgett,
Shannon Marie Nessier, Hanson Bridgett LLP & Megan Oliver Thompson,
Hanson Bridgett LLP.

Bimemiller Candice, Non-Party Candice Bimemiller, Unknown,
represented by Edward Zusman, Markun Zusman Freniere & Compton
LLP.

James Rehberg & Ronald Hayek, ThirdParty Plaintiffs, represented by
J. Barton Goplerud, Hudson Law Firm, pro hac vice & Jon A. Tostrud,
Tostrud Law Group, P.C.

Michael K. Schugg, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by J. Barton
Goplerud, Hudson Law Firm, pro hac vice & Juli E. Farris, Keller
Rohrback LLP.

Timothy L. Rawlings, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by
represented by J. Barton Goplerud, Hudson Law Firm, pro hac vice,
Juli E.  Farris, Keller Rohrback LLP, Mark A. Griffin, Keller
Rohrback LLP, pro hac vice & Raymond J. Farrow, Keller Rohrback
LLP, pro hac vice.

Land O' Lakes, Inc., Amicus, represented by Gregory M. Schweizer --
gschweizer@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP, pro hac vice, Scott
C. Solberg --ssolberg@eimerstahl.com -- Eimer Stahl LLP, pro hac
vice & Seth D. Hilton -- sethhilton@stoel.com -- Stoel Rives LLP.

California Farmers Union & California Dairy Campaign, Amicuss,
represented by Daniel Bennett Harris.

Lani Ellingsworth, Movant, represented by Darin M. Dalmat --
dmdalmat@jamhoff.com -- James & Hoffman, P.C. & Glenn Rothner,
Rothner, Segall & Greenstone.


DEBT MANAGEMENT: Court Denies Dismissal of FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned CHRISTINA
FABEC, Plaintiff(s), v. DEBT MANAGEMENT PARTNERS, LLC, et al.,
Defendant. Case No. 1:18 CV 1537. (N.D. Ohio).

This matter comes before the Court on the Joint Motion of
Defendants Debt Management Partners, LLC (DMP) and Capital
Management Holdings, LLC (CMH) to Dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff Christina Fabec filed a class action complaint against
Defendants DMP and CMH, on behalf of herself and a purported
nationwide class of similarly situated consumers, asserting claims
for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TPCA), Ohio's Consumer Sales
Practices Act (CSPA) and state law claims of Invasion of Privacy
and Civil Conspiracy.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
a defendant may move to dismiss a case for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Once the defendant makes such a motion, the plaintiff
bears the burden of proof that the Court does indeed have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.  

Under Ohio law, personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants
is available only if (1) the long-arm statute confers jurisdiction
and (2) jurisdiction is proper under the Federal Due Process
Clause. The critical constitutional due process inquiry is whether
the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state
so that the district court's exercise of jurisdiction over it
comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.

General jurisdiction exists where a defendant's continuous and
systematic contacts with a forum render the defendant amenable to
suit in any lawsuit brought against it in the forum.  

Specific jurisdiction exists if the subject matter of the lawsuit
arises out of or is related to the defendant's contacts with the
forum.

Ohio's Long Arm Statute Confers Personal Jurisdiction Over
Defendants

The Plaintiff argues that Ohio's long-arm statute, O.R.C. Section
2307.382, permits this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
the Defendants because the Plaintiff has articulated claims for
tortious conduct in violation of Ohio's CSPA, the FDCPA and the
TCPA. As such, the Plaintiff argues that this Court has personal
jurisdiction over the Defendants because she alleges that they
acted directly or by an agent to cause tortious injury in this
state.  

Review of the facts and law with respect to each Defendant leads to
the conclusion that both CMH and DMP are subject to personal
jurisdiction under R.C. 2307.382 (A)(3) and (6). First, with
respect to CMH, the Plaintiff alleges that CMH or its agent or
subagent made at least 30 threatening and harassing phone calls to
Ms. Fabec and members of her family, along with other conduct which
allegedly violates the FDCPA, TCPA or the Ohio CSPA. Plaintiff's
lawyer, Mr. Fine asserts in his declaration that he was told by DMP
that DMP had placed Plaintiff's debt with CMH for collection.

Mr. Fine further states that he was told by Mr. Delia of CMH that
CMH had owned Plaintiff's debt but sold it to Global.

Nevertheless, Mr. Delia claimed to know details of the calls made
by Global to Plaintiff and wanted to negotiate a resolution for
Global. These alleged facts, which for the purposes of this motion
the Court must accept as true, state that either CMH acted as the
debt collector assigned to Plaintiff's account for DMP or after CMH
purchased Plaintiff's account, engaged Global to collect the debt
and was aware of the methods and actions of Global with respect to
its interactions with Ms. Fabec. By allegedly taking these actions
themselves, or through an agent, in violation of the FDCPA. TCPA
and the Ohio CSPA, defendants should reasonably have expected that
the Ohio recipient of the phone calls related to an Ohio account
holder would have been injured in Ohio.

Accordingly, these allegations are sufficient to satisfy either
(A)(3) or A(6) of the Ohio long-arm statute.

Exercising Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants Would Not Violate
Defendants' Due Process Rights Under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Purposeful availment is the first prong of the Southern Machine,
Southern Machine Company v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381
(6th Cir. 1968), specific jurisdiction test, and requires a showing
that defendant's contacts with the forum state proximately result
from actions by the defendant himself that create a substantial
connection with the forum state and when the defendant's conduct
and connection with the forum are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there.

Here, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendants have purposefully
availed themselves of Ohio's jurisdiction because Defendants,
either acting on their own behalf or through a retained agent, made
multiple contacts with Plaintiff in Ohio to collect on a delinquent
account in Ohio. Further, the numerous contacts, allegedly in
violation of the FDCPA, TCPA and the Ohio CSPA, create the sort of
substantial connection to Ohio for which DMP and CMH should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court. Moreover, Defendants'
contacts with Ohio, either directly or through an agent, were
intentional, not random, fortuitous or accidental. While the number
of Defendant's contacts with Ohio are relatively minimal, these
contacts are intentional, caused Plaintiffs injury in Ohio and form
the basis of Plaintiff's causes of action. As such, Defendants'
contacts with Ohio meet the purposeful availment prong of the
Southern Machine specific personal jurisdiction test.  

The Defendants argue that the exercise of jurisdiction would be
unreasonable because their contacts with Ohio are minimal and
superficial and participating in litigation in this forum would
constitute an unnecessary hardship. However, where the first two
elements of the specific jurisdiction test are satisfied, the
exercise of jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant is
presumed to be reasonable. The Defendants have not shown that they
would be unreasonably burdened by litigating in this forum where
their conduct or the conduct of their agent triggered claims under
the TCPA, FDCPA and Ohio common law. Any burden imposed on
Defendants is outweighed by the interest of both the Plaintiff and
the State of Ohio in Plaintiff obtaining legal relief. Therefore,
the third element of the Southern Machine test is satisfied.

Having determined that personal jurisdiction over the Defendants is
proper under the Ohio Long Arm Statute and comports with Federal
Due Process. The Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 4, 2018 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9djeqdt from
Leagle.com.

Christina Fabec, on behalf of herself and all similarly-situated
consumers, Plaintiff, represented by Michael L. Berler, Frederick &
Berler, Michael L. Fine, Frederick & Berler &Ronald I. Frederick,
Frederick & Berler.

Debt Management Partners, LLC, Defendant, represented by David E.
Gutowski -- dgutowski@zsa.com -- Zdarsky, Sawicki & Agostinelli,
Dennis M. Coyne -- denniscoyne@yahoo.com -- & Leslie E. Wargo --
Leslie@Wargo-Law.com -- Wargo Law.

Capital Management Holdings, LLC, Defendant, represented by Dean S.
Hoover, Hoover & Gialluca.


DELTA AIR: 11th Cir. Affirms Final Judgment in 1st Bag Fee Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Delta Air Lines, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 11, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 1, 2018, that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has affirmed the final judgment
made by the U.S. District Court of Northern District of Georgia in
the case related to the First Bag Fee Antitrust Suit.

In May-July 2009, a number of purported class action antitrust
lawsuits were filed against Delta and AirTran Airways ("AirTran"),
alleging that Delta and AirTran engaged in collusive behavior in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act in November 2008 based
upon certain public statements made in October 2008 by AirTran's
CEO at an analyst conference concerning fees for the first checked
bag, Delta's imposition of a fee for the first checked bag on
November 4, 2008 and AirTran's imposition of a similar fee on
November 12, 2008.

The plaintiffs sought to assert claims on behalf of an alleged
class consisting of passengers who paid the first bag fee after
December 5, 2008 and seek injunctive relief and unspecified treble
damages.

All of these cases were consolidated for pre-trial proceedings in
the Northern District of Georgia.

On March 29, 2017, the District Court granted the defendants'
motions for summary judgment. On March 9, 2018, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this final judgment.

On June 8, 2018, the Eleventh Circuit denied the plaintiffs'
petition for rehearing en banc. The time period for the plaintiffs
to file a petition for a writ of certiorari at the U.S. Supreme
Court has not yet expired.

Delta Air Lines, Inc. provides scheduled air transportation for
passengers and cargo in the United States and internationally. The
company operates through two segments, Airline and Refinery.  Delta
Air Lines, Inc. was founded in 1924 and is headquartered in
Atlanta, Georgia.


DELTA AIR: Hit With Class Action Over Insurance Sales
-----------------------------------------------------
Lyle Adriano, writing for Insurance Business America, reports that
two of the biggest airline names in America -- Delta and JetBlue --
are facing separate class actions that allege that the companies
are not disclosing to their customers that they receive kickbacks
from the sales of travel cancellation insurance policies endorsed
on their websites.

The lawsuits come a month after Democrat Senator Edward J. Markey
of Massachusetts released a report which found that airline and
online travel agency websites pressure consumers to purchase travel
insurance -- with minimal coverage and a lot of exclusions --
before they can even buy tickets.

Leon Cosgrove, a Florida-based law firm, filed nearly identical
lawsuits that claim that the airline companies give consumers the
"false impression" that the cost of trip insurance is a
pass-through fee from another entity that the airlines have no
financial interest in. Both Delta and JetBlue, however, receive
payments for selling policies on their websites, the documents
suggest.

"Consumers are required to make an insurance election, as they are
unable to proceed with purchasing their airline tickets on [Delta
and] JetBlue's website[s] until they choose whether to purchase a
trip insurance policy," the lawsuit directed at JetBlue read. "The
consumer cannot simply ignore the insurance offering and move on to
purchasing a ticket."

CBS News reported that the travel insurance coverage endorsed by
both Delta and JetBlue comes from AGA Service. The plans themselves
are underwritten either by Jefferson Insurance or BCS Insurance,
and are provided by Allianz Global Assistance.

The suits additionally claim that the payments to the carriers are
illegal, since the airlines are not providing anything
insurance-related in return. Delta and JetBlue also lack licenses
to sell insurance, which means they cannot accept payments from the
sale of policies.

The two airlines are not the only ones that have been hit by
lawsuits; Leon Cosgrove informed CBS News in an email that American
Airlines had settled elements of a similar lawsuit that the law
firm had filed earlier.[GN]


DRAFT HOUSE: Vidal Labor Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Adolfo Humberto Almazo Vidal, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. The Draft House LLC, Maurizio
Salierno, Luigi Ghidetti, and Fabrizio Pellizzon, Defendants, Case
No. 18-cv-08819, (S.D. N.Y., September 26, 2018), seeks to recover
unpaid minimum, overtime and spread-of-hours wages pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and New York Labor Law, including
applicable liquidated damages, interest, attorneys' fees and
costs.

Defendants own, operate, or control a restaurant located at 3473
Broadway, New York, NY 10031 under the name "The Draft House,"
where Vidal was employed as a delivery worker and dishwasher. He
claims to have worked in excess of 40 hours per week, without
appropriate overtime compensation. Defendants failed to maintain
accurate recordkeeping of the hours worked, failed to pay them for
any hours worked, either at the straight rate of pay or for any
additional overtime premium and the required "spread of hours" pay
for any day in which he had to work over 10 hours a day, says the
Plaintiff. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Faillace, Esq.
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Tel: (212) 317-1200
      Email: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com


DUN AND BRADSTREET: William Bird Files Suit Over Sale to CC Capital
-------------------------------------------------------------------
William Bird, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. The Dun & Bradstreet Corporation, Cindy
Christy, L. Gordon Crovitz, James N. Fernandez, Paul R. Garcia,
Anastassia Lauterbach, Thomas J. Manning, Randall D. Mott and
Judith A. Reinsdorf, Defendants, Case 18-cv-14301 (D. N.J.,
September 26, 2018) seeks to enjoin defendants and all persons
acting in concert with them from proceeding with, consummating, or
closing the acquisition of Dun and Bradstreet by CC Capital, Cannae
Holdings and funds affiliated with Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P.;
rescinding it and setting it aside or awarding rescissory damages
in the event defendants consummate the merger; and seeks costs of
this action, including reasonable allowance for attorneys' and
experts' fees and such other and further relief under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Under the proposed transaction, Dun & Bradstreet's stockholders
will receive $145 in cash for each share of Dun & Bradstreet common
stock they hold.

The complaint says the registration statement filed in connection
with the proposed transaction omits Dun and Bradstreet's financial
projections, relied upon by its financial advisors, J.P. Morgan
Securities LLC in connection with the rendering of their fairness
opinions.

Dun & Bradstreet is a provider of business information and
technology solutions, which help its customers reduce credit risk,
manage business relationships, and collect cash and receivables.
The Company’s databases include information regarding both public
and private companies around the world. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Aaron Rubin, Esq.
      RUBIN & MENDLOWITZ, LLC
      2623 Hooper Avenue
      Brick, NJ 08723
      Tel: (516) 590-0544
      Fax: (516) 506-0832

             - and -

      Richard A. Acocelli, Esq.
      Michael A. Rogovin, Esq.
      Kelly C. Keenan, Esq.
      Alexandra E. Eisig, Esq.
      WEISSLAW LLP
      1500 Broadway, 16th Floor
      New York, NY 10036
      Tel: (212) 682-3025
      Fax: (212) 682-3010


ERBA DIAGNOSTICS: Final Settlement Approval Hearing in Jan. 2019
----------------------------------------------------------------
ERBA Diagnostics, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission filed on October 3, 2018, that
the final approval hearing of the settlement in the class action
lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Florida is to be held on January 23, 2019.

On December 2015, a class action was filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida against ERBA
Diagnostics, Inc. (the "Company") and certain of its current or
former executive officers. The original Complaint was replaced by
an Amended Complaint that added, as defendants, certain other of
the Company's former executive officers, the Company's executive
chairman, the entity that is the Company's majority stockholder
(ERBA Diagnostics Mannheim GmbH), the company that owns the
majority stockholder (Transasia Bio-medicals Ltd.), and the
Company's independent registered public accounting firm at the time
the Amended Complaint was filed (Mayer Hoffman McCann P.C.).

The Amended Complaint alleged generally that during the purported
class period of June 14, 2013 through November 20, 2015, the
Company and the other Company-related defendants knowingly or
recklessly disseminated or approved statements about the Company's
financial position and results of operations, business operations,
and prospects that were materially false and misleading or lacked a
reasonable basis. The Amended Complaint asserted claims for
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, and Section 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and sought damages in the amount that the
class members allegedly lost on account of the allegedly false and
misleading statements.

The Company, together with those of its current and former officers
and directors who were named as defendants and served, filed a
motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint; the Company's former
auditors also moved to dismiss. On February 16, 2017, the court
heard oral argument on the motions to dismiss. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the judge ruled from the bench (i) granting the
motions to dismiss; (ii) denying the plaintiff's request for
permission further to amend the Amended Complaint; and (iii)
dismissing the case. On March 23, 2017, the plaintiff filed a
Notice of Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit.

On June 28, 2018, the Company, the other named defendants and the
plaintiff entered into a Stipulation of Settlement pursuant to
which the parties agreed to settle and resolve the matter, subject
to court approval, for a settlement amount equal to $1,215,000, of
which $1,100,000 will be paid by the Company and the Company's
current and former officers and directors named as defendants, and
$115,000 will be paid by Mayer Hoffman McCann P.C.

The settlement amount to be paid by the Company and the Company's
current and former officers and directors is within the limits of
the Company's insurance coverage and is expected to be paid either
directly by the Company's insurance provider or by the Company
subject to reimbursement from its insurance provider.

As consideration for the payment of the settlement amount, the
plaintiff agreed, on behalf of himself and the settlement class, to
release any and all claims related to the subject matter of the
Amended Complaint and such additional claims as set forth in
further detail therein.

On September 28, 2018, the district court entered an order granting
the plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval of the class action
settlement. The preliminary approval is subject to further
consideration at a final approval hearing which the district court
originally scheduled for December 12, 2018.

On October 1, 2018, the plaintiff filed an unopposed motion to
adjourn the final approval hearing requesting that the final
approval hearing be moved to a date no earlier than January 11,
2019. On October 2, 2018, the district court entered an endorsed
order granting the plaintiff's motion and scheduled the final
approval hearing to be held on January 23, 2019. Notices of the
settlement will be sent to class members and class members will
have the opportunity to object to or opt out of the settlement.

The Company, its current and former directors and officers and all
of the defendants in this action denied and continue to deny that
any of them violated any laws or committed any wrongdoing
whatsoever, and this Stipulation of Settlement should not be deemed
to be an admission, concession, or finding of any fault, liability,
or wrongdoing whatsoever by any of the defendants.

ERBA Diagnostics, Inc., through its subsidiaries, develops,
manufactures, and markets diagnostic test kits or assays, and
automated systems that are used to aid in the detection of disease
markers primarily in the areas of autoimmune, infectious diseases,
clinical chemistry, hematology, and diabetes testing. The company
was founded in 1980 and is headquartered in Miami Lakes, Florida.
ERBA Diagnostics, Inc. is a subsidiary of ERBA Diagnostics Mannheim
GmbH.


EVERSOURCE ENERGY: Breiding Antitrust Suit Dismissed
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, SCOTT BREIDING, AMY POLLUTRO MIKAELA ORSTEIN-OTERO,
BENJAMIN ROSE, MARGARET LEWIS AND RICHARD LEWIS, ERIC LONG, PETER
STEERS, ERIK ALLEN, BRADFORD KEITH, JOHN ODUM, DAVID LEIGHTON,
DONNA CORDEIRO, JANICE ANGELILLO, ANNA MARIA FORNINO, MICHELE
CASETTA, JUDY CENNAMI, JANICE BRADY, OPAL ASH, MARK LEJEUNE, AND
ROBERTO PRATS, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. EVERSOURCE ENERGY and AVANGRID, INC.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-12274 (D. Mass.), Judge Denise J.
Casper of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
granted the Defendants' motions to dismiss the consolidated amended
complaint.

A putative class of retail electricity consumers residing in New
England, have filed the lawsuit against Eversource and Avangrid,
alleging violations of the Sherman Act, and various state consumer
protection and antitrust laws.  The Plaintiffs assert that the
Defendants restricted New England's supply of natural gas, a key
component in the generation of over half the electricity in New
England.

The Plaintiffs allege that Eversource and Avangrid consistently
cancelled substantial volumes of transmission capacity in the last
three hours of the day every day during the class period.  In so
doing, they reduced the Algonquin Pipeline's daily effective
capacity by 14% on average.  The reduced gas supply caused by the
Defendants resulted in natural gas prices on the spot market that
were, on average, 38% higher than they would otherwise have been.
The increase in spot market natural gas prices impacted the
wholesale price of electricity and, in turn, increased retail
electricity prices by 20%.  The Plaintiffs estimate that over the
course of at least three years, the Defendants allegedly caused New
Englanders to overpay for retail electricity by at least $3.6
billion

The Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief, including under
the Clayton Act.  They assert the state and the federal law claims
on behalf of themselves and similarly situated classes of persons
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

On Nov. 16, 2017, the named Plaintiffs instituted the action
against the Defendants.  Shortly thereafter, a related class action
complaint was filed against the Defendants on Feb. 6, 2018 and
assigned to the Court.  On Feb. 21, 2018, the Court consolidated
the actions.  The Plaintiffs subsequently filed a consolidated
amended complaint.  The Defendants have now moved to dismiss.  The
Court heard the parties on the pending motions on Aug. 1, 2018 and
took these matters under advisement.

The Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' federal and state law
claims are foreclosed by the filed rate doctrine.  Under the filed
rate doctrine, where FERC determines that a rate is just and
reasonable, courts cannot approve a departure from that rate.

Judge Casper concludes that the cases the Plaintiffs cite in
support of the purported exception to the filed rate doctrine for
alleged anticompetitive business decisions are inapplicable.  In
lieu of an applicable exception, the Plaintiffs cannot escape the
fact that FERC authorized the business choices that allegedly
caused their injury.  Because the Plaintiffs' requested relief
would require the Court to determine the reasonableness of rates
and tariffs approved by FERC and because the Plaintiffs have failed
to establish a pertinent limitation on or exception to the filed
rate doctrine, the Judge holds that the doctrine bars the federal
and state law claims in the amended complaint.

Even if the filed rate doctrine did not bar the Plaintiffs'
antitrust claims, those claims would not survive the Defendants'
motions to dismiss because they lack standing to bring their claims
and for the additional reason that they have failed to state a
cognizable antitrust monopolization claim.

Where the allegations here do not allege the Defendants' individual
capacity to control the retail electricity market, the Plaintiffs
have not met their burden under the elements of either
monopolization or attempted monopolization.  Accordingly, the Judge
holds that the Plaintiffs have not stated cognizable antitrust
claims.

Finally, the Judge concludes that the Plaintiffs' injury is too
remote to satisfy the causation prongs of the various state law
claims.  He, nevertheless, has dismissed all of the Plaintiffs'
federal claims and declines to exercise jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court granted the Defendants'
motions to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 11, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/0NwWoB from Leagle.com.

Nicholas Correia, Consolidated Plaintiff, represented by Thomas M.
Sobol -- tom@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Donna Cordeiro, Janice Angelillo, Anna Maria Fornino, Michele
Cassetta, Judy Cennami, Janice Brady, Opal Ash, Roberto Prats &
Mark Lejeune, Consolidated Plaintiffs, represented by Thomas M.
Sobol, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, David F. Sorensen --
dsorensen@bm.net -- Berger Montague PC, pro hac vice, Glen L.
Abramson -- gabramson@bm.net -- Berger & Montague, P.C., pro hac
vice & Michael Dell'Angelo -- mdellangelo@bm.net -- BERGER MONTAGUE
PC, pro hac vice.

Scott Breiding, Amy Pollutro, Mikaela Ortstein-Otero, Benjamin
Rose, Margaret Lewis, Richard Lewis, Eric Long, Peter Steers, Erik
Allen, Bradford Keith, John Odum & David Leighton, Plaintiffs,
represented by Jeff D. Friedman -- jefff@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens
Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice, Kristie A. LaSalle --
kristiel@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Steve W.
Berman -- ‎steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
pro hac vice, Bradley J. Vettraino -- bradleyv@hbsslaw.com -- Block
& Leviton LLP & Thomas M. Sobol, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Eversource Energy, A Massachusetts voluntary association,
Defendant, represented by John D. Donovan, Jr. --
John.Donovan@ropesgray.com -- Ropes & Gray LLP, Chong S. Park --
Chong.Park@ropesgray.com -- Ropes & Gray LLP, Douglas Green --
dgreen@steptoe.com -- Steptoe & Johnson LLP, pro hac vice & Shannen
Coffin -- scoffin@steptoe.com -- Steptoe & Johnson LLP, pro hac
vice.

Avangrid, Inc., A New York Corporation, Defendant, represented by
Allyson M. Maltas, Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Marguerite
M. Sullivan, Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice & U. Gwyn Williams,
Latham & Watkins LLP.


EXPRESS SCRIPTS: Charges Exorbitant Records Fees, Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
Evan Sweeney, writing for Fierce Healthcare, reports that a new
class-action lawsuit filed in Pennsylvania is accusing Express
Scripts of overcharging for patient records, an alleged violation
of state and federal laws.

The lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court in the Western
District of Pennsylvania, says the pharmacy benefit manager charges
a flat fee of $75-$90 for any request for pharmacy records,
regardless of the volume.

The company attributes the fee to "data processing," according to
the complaint. The Pennsylvania man that brought the case said he
paid the $90 fee for six pages of records.

"Defendant charges and collects excessive and inflated amounts
which are in no way related to the actual costs incurred, and thus
constitutes unfair, unreasonable, and/or unconscionable price or
fee under the common law," the complaint (PDF) says.

The lawsuit says Express Scripts raised its nonrefundable fee to
$90 in April without "any explanation for how or why the cost was
increased or whether it was reasonable."

It's the third such lawsuit that has been filed against Express
Scripts over the last several years. Two separate class-action
complaints, filed in Florida and Kentucky, have made similar
claims. The Pennsylvania plaintiff alleges there are "more than
1,000" third-party requests from patient representatives in
Pennsylvania that paid fees to Express Scripts.

"Express Scripts intends to vigorously defend these allegations,"
an Express Scripts spokesperson said in an emailed statement.

Under HIPAA, covered entities may charges "reasonable, cost-based
fees for the cost of copying and postage." The law allows covered
entities to charge a flat fee of $6.50 to obtain their medical
records or more by calculating the allowable fees to fulfill the
request.

That regulation has been challenged in court by medical records
request company Ciox.[GN]


FACEBOOK INC: Faces Data Breach Class Action in California
----------------------------------------------------------
The Week reports that Facebook could face its largest ever class
action lawsuit after the personal data of up to 90 million users,
including its founder and chief operating officer, were hacked.

The huge data breach, which is believed to have affected tens of
thousands of Facebook's 30m-plus UK users, "has turned out to be
more severe than was first thought, with concerns hackers were able
to access not only Facebook accounts but also other apps that use
Facebook for their sign-in functions" says The Sunday Times.

It is also believed to have affected the company's founder and CEO
Mark Zuckerberg, chief operating officer, Sheryl Sandberg, and
European vice-president, Nicola Mendelsohn.

Just hours after Facebook revealed details of the hack on Friday,
which prompted its share price to drop 3%, a class action lawsuit
was filed against the social media giant in America.

Carla Echavarria of Calilfornia and Derrick Walker of Virginia
allege Facebook's lack of scrutiny has left them more vulnerable to
identity theft, and are suing for statutory damages and penalties.

Keith Oliver at the London law firm Peters & Peters told The Times
that the company "could conceivably face the largest class action
ever with millions of claimants -- although that requires
individuals to be aware they have a claim".

"Facebook has a headquarters in London, so who is to say somebody
won't a launch a claim here?" he added.

The breach "comes at a time when the firm is struggling to convince
lawmakers in the US and beyond, that it is capable of protecting
user data", says the BBC.

It has prompted calls from MPs to allow regulators in to
investigate and renewed demands for Mr. Zuckerberg to appear in
Parliament to answer questions about data security.

Damian Collins, the chair of the Commons digital, culture, media
and sport committee responsible for investigating the illegal use
of user data during the Brexit referendum, said there is "no
outside scrutiny" at Facebook and that there was now a "lack of
trust" in the social media giant.

MarketWatch says the hack rounds off a "horrible week" for
Facebook, "showing off in just a few days why any investor should
be concerned about the world's largest social network right now".

The New York Times reported that the co-founders of Instagram,
which was bought by the social media giant in 2012 were leaving
Facebook over alleged concerns about privacy. Then Forbes published
an interview with Brian Acton, one of the co-founders of WhatsApp,
in which he said he disagreed with Zuckerberg over how to make
money from the messaging service.

It compounds a miserable 12 months for Facebook, and Zuckerberg in
particular, after claims the platform was used to spread propaganda
in the run-up to the 2016 EU referendum in Britain and the US
presidential election and it was revealed user data had been
illegally used by analytics firm Cambridge Analytica to
micro-target swing voters. [GN]


FALLS FESTIVAL: Class Action Over Crowd Crush to Proceed
--------------------------------------------------------
Rob McLennan, writing for bay93.9, reports that a class action
lawsuit over a crowd crush at the Falls Festival in Lorne will
proceed after organisers failed to stop it from going ahead.

19 people were taken to hospital after a crowd surge at the event
on the 30th of December, 2015.

A further 70 people were treated on-site by first aid teams.

The company behind the event had argued that individual court
hearings and arbitrations was amore appropriate way of dealing with
the matter.

The class action comes despite a WorkSafe decision not to prosecute
organisers due to insufficient evidence.

The matter will be heard in the Melbourne Supreme Court on November
19. [GN]


FLINT, MI: Attorneys Want Governor Snyder Added Back as Defendant
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Roberto Acosta, writing for mlive.com, reports that attorneys for a
Flint water class action lawsuit want Gov. Rick Snyder and other
state officials added back as defendants in the case.

An amended complaint filed on Oct. 5 in U.S. District Court seeks
to add Gov. Snyder, former Department of Environmental Quality
Director Dan Wyant, former Flint emergency manager
Darnell Earley, former Mayor Dayne Walling and DHHS official Nancy
Peeler and several as defendants. A judge dismissed them from the
suit in an Aug. 1 opinion.

The amended complaint alleges, in part, that Gov. Snyder and staff
were aware of the health risks associated with the city's
transition to Flint River water, including the risk of
Legionnaires' disease, for months before an official announcement
was made and that they concealed this information from the public.

"The citizens of Flint were both forgotten and mistreated by those
involved in the Flint water disaster," said attorney Theodore J.
Leopold, an attorney representing Flint residents and businesses in
the lawsuit, in a news release. "To this day, residents continue to
suffer because of the reckless decisions of senior state and local
officials."

In the amended complaint, Gov. Snyder and other city and state
officials are accused of treating Flint differently based on its
majority African-American population while providing safe, clean
water to county residents that are predominately white.

Ari Adler, a spokesman for Snyder, on Oct. 7 declined comment on
the amended complaint as it is part of pending litigation.

The bid to name state officials defendants comes after U.S.
District Judge Judith Levy issued a 128-page opinion Aug. 1 in
which she dismissed Gov. Snyder and others, including former state
Treasurer Andy Dillon and Genesee County Drain Commissioner Jeff
Wright, from the case.

Judge Levy's opinion said her decision was an attempt "to fairly
evaluate the claims brought in this case by these (12) individuals
and three businesses against these defendants."

Emergency managers appointed by Gov. Snyder changed the city's
water source to the Flint River in April 2014, triggering the Flint
water crisis.

Despite problems with bacteria, elevated levels of total
trihalomethanes, sharp increases in the level of lead in water and
suspicions that Flint water was connected to outbreaks of
Legionnaires' disease, Flint residents continued to receive river
water until October 2015. [GN]


FOOT LOCKER: Pays $97M in Fees to Osberg Counsel
------------------------------------------------
Foot Locker, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
August 4, 2018, that the company has paid $97 million to the class
counsel in the case, Osberg v. Foot Locker Inc. et ano.,
representing the court-approved fees.

For the last several years, the Company and the Company's U.S.
retirement plan have been defendants in a class action (Osberg v.
Foot Locker Inc. et ano., filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York) in which the plaintiff alleged that,
in connection with the 1996 conversion of the retirement plan to a
defined benefit plan with a cash balance formula, the Company and
the retirement plan failed to properly advise plan participants of
the "wear-away" effect of the conversion.

In early 2018, the Company exhausted all of its legal remedies and
is required to reform the pension plan consistent with the trial
court's decision and judgment.

During the second quarter of 2018, the court entered its final
judgment, including the ruling on the fairness of the class counsel
fees. The amount accrued as of February 3, 2018 was $278 million.
During the first quarter of 2018 the amount of the accrual was
increased by $7 million related to a change in the estimated value
of the judgment, based on additional facts as to how the
reformation should be calculated.

Additionally, interest was accrued as mandated by the provisions of
the required plan reformation of $2 million and $6 million for the
thirteen and twenty-six weeks ended August 4, 2018, respectively,
bringing the total amount accrued to $291 million.

In June 2018, the Company paid $97 million to class counsel
representing the court-approved fees. The remaining balance of $194
million was reclassified to the pension plan obligation in
connection with the reformation.

Foot Locker, Inc., through its subsidiaries, operates as an
athletic shoes and apparel retailer. The company operates in two
segments, Athletic Stores and Direct-to-Customers.  Foot Locker,
Inc. was founded in 1879 and is headquartered in New York, New
York.


FORD MOTOR: Sued Over Duratec Engines with Faulty Water Pumps
-------------------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that a Ford
water pump class-action lawsuit alleges millions of vehicles from
2007 to the present are equipped with Ford Cyclone (Duratec)
engines at risk of engine failures.

The lawsuit alleges the Duratec engines eventually fail because
coolant leaks from the water pumps directly into engine parts or
the oil pans and mixes with engine oil.

The mixture of coolant and oil is allegedly sent throughout the
engines and causes premature engine failures, sometimes with no
warning.

Arkansas plaintiff Bobby Roe purchased a 2011 Ford Edge in April
2018, but three months later the water pump allegedly caused the
engine to fail while driving on a highway. The Edge had about
95,000 miles on it at the time and Roe says he was forced to pay
$1,200 to replace the engine with a used engine.

Washington plaintiff Donald M. Christenson purchased a 2011 Ford
Edge and when the SUV had about 63,500 miles on it, the water pump
failed and allegedly caused complete engine failure. Christenson
says he had no choice but to pay nearly $7,600 to buy a new
engine.

According to the water pump class-action lawsuit, Ford has failed
to warn consumers since 2007 about the Duratec engines and how the
water pumps fail before they should.

Court documents claim the Cyclone engine has an internal
chain-driven water pump connected with the timing chain that
provides the power the water pump needs to circulate coolant
through the engine when the engine is running.

The plaintiffs say it's a huge job to work on the parts because the
chain-driven water pumps are located inside the Duratec engines
behind numerous engine components, including the timing chain
covers.

According to the class-action, an internal chain-driven water pump
should last for 150,000 miles, something Ford is allegedly aware of
because the automaker omitted the water pump from the maintenance
schedules for vehicles with Duratec engines.

The class-action alleges customers complain about the water pumps
but Ford conceals the alleged defects and transfers the cost of
repairs onto customers.

The owner of a 2008 Ford Edge describes the ordeal necessary when
the water pump goes out.

"The water pump is located inside the engine and when a simple $160
part failed, it circulated anti-freeze through the engine
necessitating a complete engine replacement. This happened within
the span of 5 minutes with the first symptom the heat went off
inside the cabin. No engine lights came on, the heat came back on
and went off again, still no indication of engine or trouble lights
going on."

The 2008 Edge driver goes on to complain the oil warning light came
on and within seconds the engine overheated and failed.

"This is the most basic kind of irresponsibility in creating an
expensive product like a car. American companies owe it to the
public not to foist a huge design defect on an unsuspecting public
and should willingly pay 100% of any and all claims for this
issue."

By placing the water pump inside the engine, what should be a
simple purchase of a part less than $200 turns into major repairs
of $1,500 to replace the pump, or as much as $8,500 to replace the
damaged engine.

Ford water pump class action lawsuit

(Replacing the entire engine as a result of a failed water pump)

The plaintiffs also allege the water pumps make driving dangerous
because the Ford vehicles suddenly stall when the pumps and engines
fail, causing problems with acceleration, steering, braking and
other issues.

The water pump lawsuit describes the Cyclone engines as using two
camshafts that are connected to the crankshafts by timing chains.
The engines contain the water pumps and are intended to be closed
systems so the coolant doesn't leak or mix with the engine oil.

But when the water pumps fail the coolant is allegedly unable to
escape the closed systems and ends up leaking into other engine
components.

According to the plaintiffs, the mixture of oil and coolant creates
a substance that looks like chocolate milk that spreads throughout
the engine and causes the engine to totally fail.

The Ford water pump class-action lawsuit was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern
Division -- Bobby Roe and Donald M. Christenson, et al., v. Ford
Motor Company.

The plaintiffs are represented by the Miller Law Firm, P.C.,
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Keil & Goodson, P.A., and the
Edwards Firm, PLLC. [GN]


FORTIS HEALTHCARE: Shareholder Class Action Mulled
--------------------------------------------------
Puneet Shah and Niharika Rao, writing for Moneycontrol, report that
the time is ripe for the first class action suit in India.

The allegations of oppression and mismanagement in the entities
connected to the Singh brothers, promoters of Fortis Healthcare and
Religare Enterprises, suggest reasonable grounds for initiating a
class action suit by shareholders of these firms.

A class action suit is one that allows a large number of people
having a common cause of action to jointly file or pursue a
litigation. Under the Companies Act 2013, 100 or more shareholders,
or shareholders having 10 percent or more voting interest in the
company can collectively approach National Company Law Tribunal
(NCLT) for redressal of their grievances.

In the Singh brothers case, the allegations primarily relate to two
loans: One, an inter-corporate deposit of Rs 473 crore by Fortis
Healthcare in three entities connected to the Singh brothers. Two,
an alleged diversion of Rs 750 crore from Religare Finvest (a
non-banking finance arm of listed Religare Enterprise) to RHC
Holding, the flagship holding company of the Singh brothers.

Earlier in September, Shivinder Singh, the former promoter of
Fortis Healthcare, moved the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT)
against older brother Malvinder, and a former employee of Religare
Enterprise alleging oppression and mismanagement into the affairs
of Fortis Healthcare. The NCLT application was subsequently
withdrawn, but these kinds of allegations require closer scrutiny.

Undertaking related party transactions without appropriate
approvals in place and siphoning of funds for the benefits of
promoters' related entities indicate a serious governance failure
at these entities and questions the role of audit committee,
independent directors, statutory and internal auditors in ensuring
the transparency and adequacy of internal control.

While SEBI and SFIO have started probing the dealings of these
firms, should the aggrieved shareholders consider a class action?

In the developed world, class actions are the most prominent form
of shareholder activism. The USD 6.1-billion settlement in
shareholder fraud litigation in the WorldCom case, the USD
7.2-billion verdict in favour of Enron's defrauded shareholders,
and the USD 3.1-billion settlement in favour of investors in the
Cendant case are a few noticeable examples.

India had its first brush with class action suits in 2009 when the
Satyam Computer Services scam erupted. While shareholders of Satyam
in the US (it was also listed on the New York Stock Exchange)
successfully filed class action suits against Satyam and its
defaulting promoters, and were swiftly awarded compensation, Indian
shareowners  were helplessly chasing capital market regulator
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the Serious Fraud
Investigation Office (SFIO). That's because the erstwhile 1956
Companies Act which was in force at that time had no specific
provisions allowing class action or derivative suits against the
delinquent promoters and expert advisors involved in wrongdoings.

Unlike 1956 Act, the 2013 Companies Act allows shareholders to seek
damages or compensation from the company, its directors, auditors
and even advisors for any fraudulent, unlawful or wrongful act or
omission.

Apart from class action, the law also provides an individual
holding at least ten percent voting interest to approach NCLT for
redressing oppression and mismanagement in a company. This was the
provision used by the family investment firms of Cyrus Mistry that
alleged oppression and mismanagement in Tata Sons.

However, such a remedy comes with its own set of limitations.
First, shareowners holding less than ten percent voting interest
cannot take any such action. Second, multiple suits instituted by
interested shareholders, each holding at least ten percent of the
voting interest will lead to multiple court proceedings that may
delay the resolution process and may prove to be financially
inefficient. Other alternatives are approaching SEBI, other
regulatory authorities, filing a public interest litigation,
initiating a collective civil action, and so on are all
inefficient.

Despite such clear benefits, not a single class action suit has
been filed in India so far. One key reason is that Indian lawyers
are not allowed to charge a contingent fee on a case-success basis.
In other words, clients don't have to pay any upfront fee unless
the case is won. Such a practice is prevalent in the US, but the
current Indian law prohibits such payments to lawyers. In the US,
it acts as a natural incentive and encourages aggrieved parties to
approach law firms to initiate class action without worrying about
the potential outcome of the case as they don't need to bear any
upfront cost of litigation. Litigating lawyers, on the other hand,
are incentivised to win the case as their fee depends on the case
success.

It's high time that India allows lawyers to charge their fee on
success basis. In the meantime, SEBI and other regulatory
authorities in India should utilise the investor education and
protection corpus to fund such expenses for class action.

In India, despite having strong and lengthy legal provisions in the
rulebook, the protection of investor interest through efficient
enforcement mechanisms has always been missing. Although, of late,
there is a wave of increasing shareholders' activism and any such
class action by the aggrieved parties may set a precedent in the
right direction. [GN]


FYRE FESTIVAL: Ja Rule Stands by Idea Despite Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Alicia Adejobi, writing for METRO, reports that Ja Rule is "not
ashamed" of his controversial Fyre Festival. The Always On Time
rapper came under fire when the Bahamas music event, which promised
to deliver the utmost luxury for festival-goers, culminated in
chaos, dangerous conditions and all-round disappointment. Fyre
Festival was scheduled to take place across two weekends in April
and May 2017 but was cancelled before it even began when photos of
the shambolic event surfaced on social media. Organisers of the
festival, which include Ja Rule and entrepreneur Billy McFarland,
are facing a class-action lawsuit filed by several Fyre Festival
attendees and even the FBI got involved. Despite the fallout
though, Ja Rule proudly stands by his idea and attempt at creating
a luxury music event.

The rapper, real name Jeffrey Bruce Atkins, told Revolt TV's Drink
Champs: "I'm not ashamed of Fyre at all. Because man, the idea, it
was brilliant. It was fucking beyond brilliant . . . It was
amazing, but it wasn't what I dreamed it of being, and what I
envisioned of it being, and what I wanted it to be. It wasn't done
properly. "People didn't really know I had anything to do with the
festival until it went wrong. And then it was like, "Ja Rule's
festival!" The 42-year-old goes on to shift a portion of the blame
onto other organisers who seemingly failed to provide adequate
living conditions for festival-goers.

Ja Rule continued: "It was my idea, my vision to do this. And I'm
no way, shape or form ashamed of my vision of what it was to do
this . . . I wanted to create something amazing. "I should've been
more on top of things. I should've not trusted people with certain
things. And maybe, I'm positive things wouldn't have been like
that. That part of it, I take all responsibility."

It's an understatement to say that Fyre Festival didn't live up to
expectations. Many guests struggled to get on flights to the
private island of Exuma, where the festival was located, partly
down to poor weather conditions. Those who did manage to get across
to the island found that the luxury tents they were promised
weren't erected properly and the top-notch food was actually basic
cheese sandwiches. Ja Rule denies culpability and is seeking to
have the lawsuit dismissed. [GN]


GLOBAL DIGITAL: Court Denies Bids to Dismiss Hull Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JEFF HULL, on behalf of himself and all those
similarly-situated, Plaintiff, v. GLOBAL DIGITAL SOLUTIONS, INC.,
et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-5153 (FLW) (D. N.J.), Judge
Freda L. Wolfson of the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey denied both (i) Defendants GDS, William J. Delgado, and
David Loppert's motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint; and
(ii) former Chief Financial Officer David Loppert's motion to
dismiss the SAC.

Lead Plaintiff Michael Perry brings the putative securities class
action, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated
individuals, against GDS, a company involved in specialty-vehicle
manufacturing, as well as GDS' former CEO Richard J. Sullivan,
former CFO Loppert, former director and Executive Vice President
William J. Delgado, and former directors Arthur F. Noterman and
Stephanie C. Sullivan, alleging violations under, inter alia,
various provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the
rules promulgated thereunder.

GDS is a company that, through its subsidiary, builds mobile
command/communications and specialty vehicles for emergency and law
enforcement operations.  During all relevant periods, GDS' stock
traded on an over-the-counter exchange, OTCQB, under the ticker
symbol "GDSI."  The putative class period is Oct. 8, 2013 through
Aug. 11, 2016.

The Plaintiff alleges that the individual Defendants participated
in the day-to-day management and operations of GDS at the highest
level, were privy to confidential information, and were directly or
indirectly involved in drafting, producing, reviewing, approving,
and/or disseminating false and misleading statements to deceive
investors.  More specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that during
the class period, unbeknownst to investors, GDS's stock was
"worthless."  The Plaintiff accuses the Defendants of disseminating
false and misleading statements and participating in several
schemes designed to artificially inflate the price of GDS's common
stock.

In the SAC, Plaintiff sets forth various alleged "schemes"
perpetuated by the Defendants: (i) by way of press releases, the
Defendants misrepresented a failed merger with Airtronic USA, Inc.
for $95 million; (ii) the Defendants issued a misleading press
release announcing that GDS expects to announce several agreements
regarding potential acquisitions, when in reality, Defendants knew
GDS had neither the cash nor credible financing to acquire any
company; and (iii) the Defendants falsely issued press releases in
March 2014, announcing an unsolicited bid to acquire, inter alia,
Remington Outdoor Company, Inc. for over $1 billion in cash and
stock, when, in fact, GDS had very little cash on hand, and no
credible financing options.  The Plaintiff further avers that the
Defendants used the artificially inflated stock to finance
acquisitions.

On Aug. 11, 2016, the SEC filed a civil complaint charging
Defendants GDS, R. Sullivan, and Loppert with multiple counts of
securities fraud, including claims related to the $95 million
Airtronic contract, GDS' allegedly knowingly false revenue forecast
for the first quarter of 2014, the documents announcing GDS'
Remington offers, and the allegations concerning additional
acquisitions.  Upon this news, GDS shares dropped 52% on Aug. 12,
2016.

The Plaintiff alleges that only with the filing of the SEC
complaint did the public learn of an SEC investigation into GDS and
its officers.  According to the Plaintiff, the SEC Complaint
revealed, for the first time, the full extent of the Defendants'
alleged schemes to artificially inflate the price of its stock,
despite lacking any working businesses or revenue, in order to use
the inflated stock to finance acquisitions.

Based on these allegations, on Aug. 24, 2016, the Plaintiff brought
the putative class action against the Defendants, asserting two
causes of action under the Securities Exchange Act: 1) violation of
Section 10(b) against all the Defendants; and 2) violation of
Section 20(a) against the Individual Defendants.  On Dec. 19, 2017,
the Court granted the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss on certain
grounds but granted the Plaintiff leave to amend his Amended
Complaint.  

With respect to the Section 10(b) claim, the Court found that while
the Plaintiff adequately alleged material misrepresentations,
scienter, economic loss, and loss causation, the Plaintiff failed
to allege that GDS's stock traded in an efficient market, which is
required for pleading reliance under a fraud-on-the-market theory.
The Court also dismissed without prejudice, the Section 20(a)
claim, which is derivative of the Section 10(b) claim.

On Jan. 18, 2018, the Plaintiff filed the SAC, which is the current
operative complaint.  In the SAC, the Plaintiff made additional
factual allegations supporting his fraud-onthe-market presumption
of reliance.  

In particular, he alleged the following: (i) GDS' stock was listed
on the over-the-counter stock market, which is an efficient and
automated market; (ii) GDS' stock had an average weekly trading
volume of nearly 3.4 million shares, or 10.65% of outstanding
shares during the Class Period; (iii) GDS regularly disseminated
press releases to national newswire services; (iv) there were at
least 195 news articles about GDS published during the Class
Period; (v) there were 25 market makers for GDS stock during the
class period; (vi) from Jan. 22, 2014 to Jan. 24, 2014, and on
March 12, 2014, GDS was eligible for S-3 registration with a
tradeable float in excess of $75 million; (vii) GDS stock reacted
quickly to unexpected GDS-related news; and (viii) false and
misleading statements directly impacted the price of GDS stock.

The Plaintiff alleges 17 specific instances of price impact,
including how the stock rose and fell in response to allegedly
false or misleading statements in connection with the the
Airtronic, Remington, and revenue forecast allegations, as well as
the filing of the SEC complaint.

In the instant matter, the Defendants seek dismissal of the
Plaintiff's SAC for failure to state a claim on the basis that the
Plaintiff did not adequately plead that GDS traded in an efficient
market.  In addition, Loppert separately moves for dismissal of the
SAC for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue.  The
Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that the additional
allegations in the SAC support a finding of reliance, and that
Loppert waived personal jurisdiction and venue objections.

Judge Wolfson finds that the Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded
their Section 20(a) claim against Individual Defendants.  First,
they have adequately alleged a primary violation of Section 10(b).
Further, the Complaint alleges that Individual Defendants,
including Delgado and Loppert, were high-level officers and
executives of GDS during the Class Period who controlled the
Company's SEC filings and other public disclosures.  It is,
therefore, reasonable to find that the Defendants were responsible
for the information contained in the SEC filings because of the
nature of their positions.  The Individual Defendants, thus, fall
within the meaning of controlling persons under Section 20(a).  The
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's Section 20(a) claim
will therefore be denied.

The Judge also finds that Loppert neglected his opportunity to
timely raise personal jurisdiction and venue defenses in his
initial motion to dismiss.  This very act voluntarily submitted
Loppert to the Court's jurisdiction and constituted meaningful
participation in the proceedings.  

Loppert asks the Court, in the alternative, to exercise its
discretion to excuse Loppert from the requirements of Rule 12 and
dismiss the SAC.  As Loppert notes, a court may exercise its
discretion to consider defenses that would otherwise be barred if
such consideration would advance the court's charge to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.  The Judge declines to exercise this discretion.  A
denial of Loppert's 12(b)(2) motion in accordance with Rule 12
better serves the principles of justice and efficiency in the case.
Accordingly, she will deny Loppert's motions to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction and improper venue.

For these reasons, Judge Wolfson denied the Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss the SAC.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 14, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/Ipdye2 from Leagle.com.

Gary Blum & Marjorie Berg, Movants, represented by ALEXANDER H.
SCHMIDT, WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP.

Debbie Campbell, Movant, represented by EDUARD KORSINSKY --
ek@zlk.com -- LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP.

Michael Perry, Movant, represented by LAURENCE M. ROSEN --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, PA.

Jonathan Cox, David Beasley & BETTY CAM LITTLE, Lead Plaintiffs,
represented by NEIL GROSSMAN -- neil@bgandg.com -- BRONSTEIN,
GEWIRTZ & GROSSMAN, ESQS.

MICHAEL PERRY, Lead Plaintiff, represented by GONEN HAKLAY --
ghaklay@rosenlegal.com -- THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A. & LAURENCE M.
ROSEN, THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, PA.

JEFF HULL, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by LAURENCE M. ROSEN, THE ROSEN
LAW FIRM, PA.

GLOBAL DIGITAL SOLUTIONS, INC. & WILLIAM J. DELGADO, Defendants,
represented by JOSHUA D. BRINEN, BRINEN & ASSOCIATES, LLC.

DAVID A. LOPPERT, Defendant, represented by JONATHAN L. GOLDSTEIN
--  jlgoldstein@hlgslaw.com -- HELLRING, LINDEMAN, GOLDSTEIN &
SIEGAL, ESQS.


GLOBAL POWER: Budde Securities Suit Dismissed With Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARGARET BUDDE, Lead Plaintiff, and DANIEL REAM,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, v. GLOBAL POWER EQUIPMENT GROUP, INC., RAYMOND K. GUBA,
LUIS MANUEL RAMIREZ, and DAVID L. WILLIS, Defendants, Civil Action
No. 3:15-cv-1679-M (N.D. Tex.), Judge Barbara M.G. Lynn of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division,
granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Class
Action Complaint.

Global Power is a corporation that provides equipment and services
to the energy industry.  It notified the public throughout 2015 and
2016 that its prior financial reports would have to be restated.
On March 15, 2017, Global Power issued the restatement and
identified several causes for the errors.  Among them, it
acknowledged that it recognized certain revenues and expenses in
the wrong period for its Electrical Solutions ("ES") Segment, had
deficiencies in internal controls over financial reporting, and
incorrectly accounted for goodwill upon the sale of a subsidiary
company, Deltak.

Budde and Ream, on behalf of all persons who acquired Global Power
stock between May 9, 2013, and May 6, 2015, filed a class action
lawsuit against Global Power and some of its former officers --
Raymond K. Guba, Luis Manuel Ramirez, and David L. Willis. Guba was
Global Power's Senior Vice President and CFO from November 2013 to
September 2015.  Ramirez was the President and CEO from July 2012
to March 2015.  Willis was the CFO from January 2008 to November
2013.  The Plaintiffs asserted that the Defendants issued false and
misleading financial reports in violation of Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Court previously dismissed the Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint for failing to plausibly allege (1) scienter against the
individual Defendants and (2) loss causation for misrepresentations
related to the sale of Deltak.  The Plaintiffs timely filed the
TAC, but declined to address the pleading defects regarding
scienter as to Willis and regarding the sale of Deltak.  

The Defendants move to dismiss the TAC, arguing that the Plaintiffs
have again failed to plausibly allege scienter as to Guba and
Ramirez, and since only their conduct is at issue as agents of
Global Power, their bases for dismissal also apply to the company.
The Court held a hearing on the Defendants' Motion on July 19,
2018.

Judge Lynn finds that the allegations support the conclusion that
Guba and Ramirez knew they were publishing false information.  The
allegations, however, do not support the conclusion that Guba and
Ramirez knew they were publishing materially false information.
The TAC does not attempt to connect either Ramirez or Guba to
knowledge of the other, larger accounting errors driving the
restatement, such those related to percentage-of-completion, job
cost, goodwill, and warranty reserves, none of which are in issue.
Furthermore, knowledge as to errors in the ES Segment alone does
not support knowledge or reckless disregard of errors in other
parts of Global Power.  The compelling inference is that Guba and
Ramirez knew of immaterial errors limited to the ES Segment.

Other allegations in the TAC also fail to support a strong
inference of scienter.  The Plaintiffs allege that Ramirez and Guba
knew of or recklessly disregarded Global Power's lack of internal
controls.  However, they also allege that Guba and Ramirez hired
consultants from outside staffing agencies to handle almost all
internal accounting-related work.  The inference to be drawn is
that Ramirez and Guba addressed BDO's concerns by hiring outside
consultants in favor of an in-house staff.  Accordingly, the
Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that Ramirez and Guba knew of or
recklessly disregarded Global Power's lack of internal controls.

The Plaintiffs also highlight the magnitude of the restatement as
supporting scienter.  The Judge finds that the magnitude of the
misstated financials, while surely significant, does not support a
strong inference of scienter without allegations that Guba or
Ramirez knew that they were publishing materially false information
or were severely reckless in publishing such information.

Also unpersuasive are allegations related to Guba and Ramirez's
motive to make misrepresentations because their compensation was
tied to Global Power's financial performance.  Such allegations,
the Judge holds, are not the types of motive that support a strong
inference of scienter.  Incentive compensation can hardly be the
basis for which an allegation of fraud is predicated because if the
Court were to hold otherwise, the executives of virtually every
corporation in the United States would be subject to fraud
allegations.

Finally, under Section 20(a), every person who, directly or
indirectly, controls any corporation that is found liable under any
provision of this chapter will also be liable jointly and severally
with the corporation.  The Plaintiffs must therefore establish a
primary violation under Section 10(b) before liability arises under
Section 20(a) against the individual Defendants.  Because the
Plaintiffs do not state a claim for any violation of Section 10(b),
their Section 20(a) claims must also be dismissed.
For the reasons stated, Judge Lynn granted the Defendants' Motion.
The Plaintiffs conceded at the hearing that they do have new
factual allegations to supplement the TAC.  Accordingly, their
claims are dismissed with prejudice.  A final judgment consistent
with the Order will be promptly issued.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 11, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/CxzmWK from Leagle.com.

Margaret Budde, Lead Plaintiff pursuant to 7/29/2015 Order, Consol
Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey C. Block -- jeff@blockesq.com --
Block & Leviton LLP, pro hac vice, Jacob Allen Walker --
jake@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP, pro hac vice, Jamie Jean
McKey -- jmckey@kendalllawgroup.com -- Kendall Law Group LLP & Joe
Kendall -- jkendall@kendalllawgroup.com -- Kendall Law Group LLP.

Daniel Ream, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jacob Allen Walker, Block &
Leviton LLP, pro hac vice & R. Dean Gresham, Steckler Gresham
Cochran.

Global Power Equipment Group Inc, Defendant, represented by David
G. Januszewski -- djanuszewski@cahill.com -- Cahill Gordon
& Reindel, pro hac vice, Bradley J. Bondi -- BBondi@Cahill.com --
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, pro hac vice, Rachel Kingrey --
rkingrey@gardere.com -- Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP, Scott Louis Davis
-- sdavis@gardere.com -- Gardere Wynne Sewell, Tammy L. Roy, Cahill
Gordon -- troy@cahill.com -- & Reindel LLP, pro hac vice.

Raymond K Guba, Defendant, represented by Paul Edward Coggins --
pcoggins@lockelord.com -- Locke Lord LLP & Kiprian E. Mendrygal --
Locke Lord LLP.

Luis Manuel Ramirez, Defendant, represented by Scott Louis Davis --
sdavis@gardere.com -- Gardere Wynne Sewell & Arthur Harold Aufses,
III -- aaufses@kramerlevin.com -- Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel
LLP, pro hac vice.

David L. Willis, Defendant, represented by arah L. Cave, Hughes
Hubbard & Reed LLP, pro hac vice, Rachel Kingrey, Gardere Wynne
Sewell LLP, Sara E. Echenique, Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, pro hac
vice, Scott Louis Davis, Gardere Wynne Sewell, Terence Healy,
Hughes Hubbard & Reed, pro hac vice & Todd A. Murray, Gardere Wynne
Sewell LLP, pro hac vice.


GRAYCO COMMUNICATIONS: Cable Guys Seek to Recover Unpaid Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Tony Joseph George and Raynell Wickware, on behalf of themselves
and other persons similarly situated v. Grayco Communications,
L.P., and Protek Communications, Inc., Case No. 18-cv-08953, (E.D.
La., September 26, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid wages, minimum
wages, and overtime pay, liquidated damages, reasonable attorney
fees, costs of suit and expert fees, prejudgment and post-judgment
interest and all other relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and Louisiana Law.

Plaintiffs worked for defendants as cable technicians and/or
installers, installing and servicing Cox equipment. They claim to
be improperly misclassified as independent contractors. They said
they were improperly paid on a pay-per-point scheme where they
would receive points from an arbitrary point system based on the
number and type of jobs completed, rather than the actual number of
hours worked. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Douglas R. Kraus, Esq.
     Chelsea B. Cusimano, Esq.
     Lisa Brener, Esq.
     Susannah McKinney, Esq.
     BRENER LAW FIRM, LLC
     3640 Magazine Street
     New Orleans, LA 70115
     Tel: (504) 302-7802
     Email: dkraus@brenerlawfirm.com
            cbcusimano@brenerlawfirm.com
            lbrener@brenerlawfirm.com
            smckinney@brenerlawfirm.com


GRIECO FORD: Papa Seeks to Certify Two Classes
----------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Vincent Papa, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
Grieco Ford Fort Lauderdale, LLC, a limited liability company, the
Defendant, Case 1:18-cv-21897-JEM (S.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff asks
the Court for an order:

   1. granting class certification of:

      Text Class:
  
      "all persons within the United States who, within the four
years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a text
message from Defendant through the Twilio platform or anyone on
Defendant's behalf, to said person's cellular telephone number,
promoting Defendant's goods or services";

      Voicemail Class:

      "all persons within the United States who, within the four
years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a
prerecorded "ringless” voicemail message through the SlyBroadcast
case platform from Defendant or anyone on Defendant's behalf, to
said person’s cellular telephone number, promoting Defendant's
goods or services".

      Excluded from the Classes is the Judge presiding over this
case and his staff, Grieco, Grieco's directors and officers,
immediate families of Grieco’s directors and officers, or the
legal representatives, agents, affiliates, heirs,
successors-in-interests or assignees of any such excluded person.

   2. appointing him as representative of the Class;

   3. appointing Edelsberg Law, P.A., Hiraldo P.A., and Shamis &
Gentile, P.A., as class counsel; and

   4. establishing a deadline for submission of the proposed class
notice and notice plan.

The Plaintiff moves to certify the class with respect to two claims
for violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.[CC]

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Class:

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          19495 Biscayne Blvd No. 607
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: 305-975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com

               - and -

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 400 4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

               - and -

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 400
          Miami, Florida 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479 2299
          Facsimile: (786) 623 0915
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

HORSEHEAD HOLDING: Court Won't Dismiss Securities Fraud Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Christopher J. Burke of the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware issued a Report and
Recommendation denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case
captioned IN RE HORSEHEAD HOLDING CORP. SECURITIES LITIGATION.
Civil Action No. 16-292-LPS-CJB. (D. Del.).

In this consolidated securities class action, the Plaintiffs assert
claims against Defendants James M. Hensler (Hensler) and Robert D.
Scherich (Scherich) (Defendants), pursuant to Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Sections
78j(b) and 78t(a) (Exchange Act), and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5.

Defendants' Arguments Regarding Five Specific Statements and
Particular Cautionary Language Contained Therein

August 6, 2014

In an earnings conference call on August 6, 2014, Hensler was asked
a question about when Horsehead would consider expanding capacity
at the Facility beyond the initial 155,000 tons. In response to
this question, Defendants point out that Hensler replied: "As I
think we've said in the past, we believe that the capacity is there
to get to the 170,000, 175,000 range, and it's a matter of getting
additional zinc units to feed it."

The Defendants suggest that the statement is not only
forward-looking, but that it also contains meaningful cautionary
language.

The problem for the Defendants, however, is that the subject matter
of this statement is unrelated to the Plaintiffs' assertions in the
CAC as to why the Defendants made false or misleading statements
about operating capacity on this August 2014 conference call. The
CAC does call out as false and misleading one of Hensler's
statements on that call. But the CAC is there referring to
Hensler's earlier statement that: "We expect to continue ramping up
production to our full operating capacity of 155,000 tons per year
through the remainder of the year."

Thus, Hensler's statement about exceeding nameplate capacity on the
August 6, 2014 conference call cannot establish safe harbor
protection for the other statements highlighted in the CAC made on
that same call. Therefore, the statement provides no basis for
granting the Motion.

February 24, 2015

The CAC alleges that on February 24, 2015, the Company filed a Form
8-K, signed by Scherich, attaching a press release announcing
fourth quarter 2014 results. The Form 8-K stated:

"Since the beginning of 2015, the daily average production rate
continued to improve compared with the fourth quarter rate. During
January 2015 we produced approximately 4,600 tons of zinc metal. We
reduced the plating rate for several days in January to perform
some needed maintenance in the cell house. We also experienced
intermittent equipment reliability issues, particularly with some
key pumps, which were further exacerbated by recent extreme cold
weather conditions. On February 20, 2015 we began a planned seven
day outage to address several of these issues. We expect to ramp up
production following this outage. Our interim target is to
demonstrate that no bottlenecks exist to operating the facility at
75% of nameplate capacity, or 330 tons per day, by the end of the
first quarter of 2015. We believe that our ability to achieve this
higher level of production will depend primarily on the absence of
further unplanned equipment issues."

This appears to be a forward-looking statement, in that it is an
expression of management's plans and objectives for future
operations. According to the CAC, however, this statement was false
or misleading, because Defendants knew or were reckless in not
knowing that that they had no basis in fact to be able to
demonstrate "that no bottlenecks exist to operating the facility at
75% of nameplate capacity, or 330 tons per day, by the end of the
first quarter of 2015," given that the bleed treatment bottleneck
would allow at best 60% of nameplate capacity.

March 2, 2015

In the CAC, the Plaintiffs allege that in a March 2, 2015 Form 10-K
for 2014, the Company stated that it "believed it had cash on hand,
credit access and expected cash flow sufficient to satisfy our
liquidity and capital requirements, including capital requirements
related to our capital needs based on the expected ramp-up to full
production of the new zinc facility, for the next twelve months."

The CAC alleges that the Defendants then knew that the Company did
not and would not have sufficient access to cash and credit over
the relevant period. The cautionary statement, in contrast, is
focused not on whether the Company can satisfy its current expected
liquidity and capital requirements, but about the prospects of
obtaining additional credit and/or reducing the company's capital
requirements (and about future contingencies that might make that
more difficult in the future). For these reasons, the statement
does not qualify for safe harbor protection.

July 2, 2015

On July 2, 2015, the Plaintiffs allege that Horsehead issued a Form
8-K, signed by Scherich, that attached a press release containing
the following statement from Hensler:

"We are encouraged by the improvements implemented in June. We
better understand the bottleneck issues in bleed treatment and we
have successfully implemented measures which have allowed us to
increase production. We have developed a concept for the final
solution to the design limitation in bleed treatment and will be
installing temporary equipment to test this concept before we
engineer and install the permanent solution. Currently, the
production rate is paced by the rate at which we are able to add
electrodes to the cellhouse. We remain focused on ramping up to our
interim goal of 75% of nameplate capacity which we still hope to
achieve during the third quarter."

Here again, the cautionary language called out by the Defendants
does not relate to the subject matter of the allegedly false or
misleading statements at issue. The cautionary statement at issue
relates to whether the Company would have sufficient liquidity to
support full zinc production.

But the false statement at issue in the CAC relates to whether, in
light of physical limitations to the bleed treatment area, it was
even operationally possible for the Company to exceed 60% of
nameplate capacity in this quarter. Therefore, the statement
identified by Defendants cannot establish safe harbor protection
for the allegedly false and misleading statement identified in the
CAC.

August 7, 2015

On August 7, 2015, the Company held an investor conference call
after issuing a Form 8-K signed by Scherich (accompanied by a press
release) and its 2Q 2015 Form 10-Q. The Plaintiffs identify
numerous allegedly false or misleading statements made by the
Defendants in the conference call. These include Hensler's
statement that the Company was making steady progress toward
addressing the various design deficiencies and equipment issues
that we have discovered since startup and that as to the bottleneck
associated with the bleed treatment system, the Company was
implementing a plan to mitigate this bottleneck. In the CAC, the
Plaintiffs alleged that statements like these were false in that,
as of that month, the bleed treatment area continued to have
significant problems and Defendants were still trying to figure out
solutions to those problems.

Since the Plaintiffs allege with supporting facts that those
statements were knowingly false when made, the statements are
potentially actionable.

Defendants' Arguments Regarding the Presence of Certain Asserted
Meaningful Cautionary Statements that Accompanied All of
Defendants' Statements at Issue

The Defendants argue that nearly every regulatory filing, press
release, or investor call put at issue by the CAC contained similar
cautionary statements, the Defendants assert that this standard
language was extensive, specific, and directly related to
Horsehead's future operational performance, future profitability
and future capital and liquidity needs such that it should
implicate the safe harbor and absolve them from liability.

The Plaintiffs respond that Horsehead's boilerplate language
warning of generic risks that could apply to any investment does
not shield Defendants from liability.  

The Court agrees with the Plaintiffs. The above language is not (as
it must be to qualify as a meaningful cautionary statement tailored
to the specific future projections, estimates, or opinions which
the plaintiffs challenge.

The Court notes that when the above-referenced generic statement
shows up in Horsehead filings or press releases or the like, it
tends to be followed by some additional language relating to risk
factors. Representative is a February 2014 Horsehead press release
that contained the above-referenced language in a paragraph titled
Cautionary Statement about Forward-Looking Statements.

There are many reasons for the requirement that a movant must make
its arguments for dismissal clearly and cogently in the Argument
section of its opening brief. Chief among them are the need for
efficiency and fairness in the briefing process. The Argument
section of a party's opening brief, after all, is the place where
the legal arguments supporting a motion are supposed to be located.
It is the place where Plaintiffs are meant to look to see why the
CAC is supposedly subject to dismissal and to know what they have
to respond to. If Defendants did not make their best arguments
clearly in that part of their opening brief, or if they hid such
arguments in the lengthy Statement of Facts section of the brief,
this would not fairly warn Plaintiffs of what they must respond to
in their answering brief.

With the Defendants having failed to clearly assert in their
opening brief that statements like the above should absolve them
from liability pursuant to the PSLRA's safe harbor, the Motion
cannot be granted on such grounds now.

Accordingly, the Magistrate recommends that the District Court deny
the Motion in its entirety.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 4, 2018 Report and
Recommendation is available at https://tinyurl.com/ya7s84w2 from
Leagle.com.

Javier Soto, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joel E. Friedlander --
jfriedlander@friedlandergorris.com -- Friedlander & Gorris, P.A.,
Christopher P. Quinn – cquinn@friedlandergorris.com --
Friedlander & Gorris, P.A., Jeffrey M. Gorris –
jgorris@friedlandergorris.com --  Friedlander & Gorris, P.A. &
Peter B. Andrews -- pandrews@andrewsspringer.com -- Andrews &
Springer LLC.

Rory Johnson, Plaintiff, represented by Brian D. Long, Rigrodsky &
Long, P.A. 919 N Market Street Ste 980, Wilmington, DE, 19801 &
Peter B. Andrews, Andrews & Springer LLC.

Umesh Jani, Individually and on Behalf of ALl Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Peter B. Andrews, Andrews &
Springer LLC, Craig J. Springer -- cspringer@andrewsspringer.com
-Andrews & Springer LLC & David M. Sborz --
dsborz@andrewsspringer.com -- Andrews & Springer LLC.

James Hensler, Defendant, represented by Geoffrey Graham Grivner --
geoffrey.grivner@bipc.com -- Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney P.C.,
Gretchen L. Jankowski  -- gretchen.jankowski@bipc.com -- Buchanan
Ingersoll & Rooney PC, pro hac vice & Stanley Yorsz --
stanley.yorsz@bipc.com -- Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, pro hac
vice.

Robert D. Scherich & Gregory M. Belland, Defendants, represented by
Geoffrey Graham Grivner, Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney P.C.

Raymond Cook, Movant, represented by Sidney S. Liebesman --
sliebesman@foxrothschild.com -- Fox Rothschild LLP, Avi Wagner   --
avi@thewagnerfirm.com -- pro hac vice, Brian P. Murray  --
bmurray@glancylaw.com -- pro hac vice, Gregory B. Linkh  --
glinkh@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, pro hac vice &
Johnna M. Darby -- jdarby@foxrothschild.com -- Fox Rothschild LLP.


IAS WARRANTY: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Radner Suit as Moot
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Terrence G. Berg of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, Southern Division, denied as moot the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case, SOLOMON RADNER, Plaintiff,
v. IAS WARRANTY, INC., Defendant, Case No. 17-12704 (E.D. Mich.).

Attorney Radner brings the putative consumer class action against
the Defendant, alleging that IAS operated a "widespread and
intentionally deceptive campaign whereby the Plaintiff and the
Class were wrongfully and unfairly induced into purchasing IAS
service plans for tire/wheel and repair and replacement.  The
Plaintiff seeks to serve as representative of the class.

On Nov. 19, 2013, Mr. Radner purchased a Lincoln MKZ from a car
dealership in Troy, Michigan.  At the same time, Mr. Radner
purchased a "Tire & Wheel Road Hazard Service Contract" from IAS
that purported to reimburse him in the event of damage to his tires
or wheels.

On Sept. 20, 2014, Mr. Radner struck a pothole, causing damage to
one wheel and tire.  He then had his wheel and tire replaced at a
"Discount Tire" retail store for $450.50.  IAS then reimbursed Mr.
Radner an amount it apparently calculated as fair market value for
the new tire, a total of $360.40.  Mr. Radner alleges that the
amount he was reimbursed is substantially less than the fair market
value, and argues that IAS' reimbursement formula is necessarily
certain to undercompensate holders of this service contract who
attempt to replace their damaged wheels or tires.

In their Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, IAS raised
several issues, but most notably they stated that the class
allegations must be dismissed or stricken because Radner and Keith
Altman, the attorney who signed the complaint, practice as
attorneys together in one, and perhaps two, law firms.

Judge Berg finds that a cursory examination of publicly available
records concerning the affiliations of Plaintiff/Atty. Radner and
Atty. Altman yielded confusing and inconsistent information as to
the nature of the business relationship between them.  Before
considering the merits of the allegations, or the possible grounds
for class certification, the Judge must address whether Atty.
Radner may properly serve as the named Plaintiff and the class
representative in the lawsuit while he is involved in law practices
with Atty. Altman, who is Mr. Radner's named counsel in the same
case.

He attempted to answer the question by issuing a Show Cause Order
with questions to Messrs. Radner and Altman, but their answers
further clouded the issue.  Based on their answers and information
available publicly, he finds that there are multiple legal-business
relationships between the named-Plaintiff Mr. Radner and
named-counsel Mr. Altman.  These relationships raise the appearance
of a conflict of interest as to whether Mr. Radner may
independently, fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
class Plaintiffs while at the same time being involved in law
practice associations with Mr. Altman, who is the lead counsel.

To address the conflict, the Judge ordered the Plaintiff to elect
between either continuing as the class representative in the case
with different lead counsel, or to substitute another party as the
class representative while retaining Mr. Altman as the lead
counsel, within 21 days.  If no suitable alternative class
representative, or if no new counsel is found for Plaintiff Radner
within 21 days, he will dismiss the complaint without prejudice.
In the meantime, he denied as moot the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss First Amended Complaint.  It may be re-filed if the
Plaintiff cures the deficiencies noted in the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 12, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/SSzM9h from Leagle.com.

Solomon Radner, Plaintiff, represented by Keith L. Altman, Excolo
Law PLLC.

IAS Warranty, Inc., Defendant, represented by Douglas A. Albritton
-- doug.albritton@actuatelaw.com -- Actuate Law, LLC & Barry M.  
Rosenbaum -- BROSENBAUM@SEYBURN.COM -- Seyburn, Kahn.


IDT CORP: Appeal Ongoing in JDS1 LLC Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------
IDT Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 15, 2018, for the
fiscal year ended July 31, 2018, that an appeal is ongoing in the
consolidated class action lawsuit initiated by JDS1, LLC.

On July 5, 2017, plaintiff JDS1, LLC, on behalf of itself and all
other similarly situated stockholders of Straight Path, and
derivatively on behalf of Straight Path as nominal defendant, filed
a putative class action and derivative complaint in the Court of
Chancery of the State of Delaware against the company, The Patrick
Henry Trust (a trust formed by Howard S. Jonas that held record and
beneficial ownership of certain shares of Straight Path he formerly
held), Howard S. Jonas, and each of Straight Path's directors.

The complaint alleges that the company aided and abetted Straight
Path's Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer Davidi
Jonas, and Howard S. Jonas in his capacity as controlling
stockholder of Straight Path, in breaching their fiduciary duties
to Straight Path in connection with the settlement of claims
between Straight Path and the company related to potential
indemnification claims concerning Straight Path's obligations under
the Consent Decree it entered into with the FCC, as well as the
sale of Straight Path's subsidiary Straight Path IP Group, Inc. to
the company in connection with that settlement. That action was
consolidated with a similar action that was initiated by The
Arbitrage Fund.

The Plaintiffs are seeking, among other things, (i) a declaration
that the action may be maintained as a class action or in the
alternative, that demand on the Straight Path Board is excused;
(ii) that the term sheet is invalid; (iii) awarding damages for the
unfair price stockholders are receiving in the merger between
Straight Path and Verizon Communications Inc. for their shares of
Straight Path's Class B common stock; and (iv) ordering Howard S.
Jonas, Davidi Jonas, and the company to disgorge any profits for
the benefit of the class Plaintiffs.

On August 28, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On
September 24, 2017, we filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint. The company intends to vigorously defend the action. On
November 20, 2017, the Delaware Chancery Court issued an order
staying the case pending the closing of the transaction between
Verizon and Straight Path on the grounds that the claims are not
ripe. That transaction closed on February 28, 2018 and the Court
was so notified. The motion to dismiss was denied.

On July 13, 2018, the company filed a motion for an interlocutory
appeal with the Delaware Chancery Court. The Chancery Court granted
the motion and the Delaware Supreme Court accepted the appeal. On
September 5, 2018, the company filed the appeal with the Delaware
Supreme Court. On October 5, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed its
Answering Brief to the appeal.

IDT Corporation said, "At this stage, we are unable to estimate our
potential liability, if any."

IDT Corporation operates primarily in the telecommunications and
payment industries in the United States and internationally. The
company operates in two segments, Telecom & Payment Services, and
net2phone-Unified Communications as a Service. IDT Corporation was
founded in 1990 and is headquartered in Newark, New Jersey.


IDT CORP: Bid to Dismiss Dennis Class Suit Underway
---------------------------------------------------
IDT Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 15, 2018, for the
fiscal year ended July 31, 2018., that the company, together with
IDT Telecom, has filed a motion to dismiss the putative class
action lawsuit filed by Erik Dennis.

On May 21, 2018, Erik Dennis filed a putative class action against
IDT Telecom and the company in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia alleging violations of Do Not Call
Regulations promulgated by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission. The
company is evaluating the claim, and at this stage, the company is
unable to estimate its potential liability, if any.

On August 13, 2018, the company and IDT Telecom filed a motion to
dismiss or in the alternative to strike class allegations. The
plaintiff opposed the motion.

IDT Corporation said, "We and IDT Telecom intend to vigorously
defend this matter."

IDT Corporation operates primarily in the telecommunications and
payment industries in the United States and internationally. The
company operates in two segments, Telecom & Payment Services, and
net2phone-Unified Communications as a Service. IDT Corporation was
founded in 1990 and is headquartered in Newark, New Jersey.



IDT CORP: Parties in Sanchez Suit Agree to Dismissal
----------------------------------------------------
IDT Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 15, 2018, for the
fiscal year ended July 31, 2018, that the parties in the putative
class action lawsuit by Jean Carlos Sanchez have filed a
stipulation of dismissal.

On May 2, 2018, Jean Carlos Sanchez filed a putative class action
against IDT Telecom in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois alleging that the company sent unauthorized
marketing messages to cellphones in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991.

On July 26, 2018, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal.

IDT Corporation said, "We are evaluating the claim, and at this
stage, we are unable to estimate our potential liability, if any.
We intend to vigorously defend this matter."

IDT Corporation operates primarily in the telecommunications and
payment industries in the United States and internationally. The
company operates in two segments, Telecom & Payment Services, and
net2phone-Unified Communications as a Service. IDT Corporation was
founded in 1990 and is headquartered in Newark, New Jersey.


ILLINOIS: Class Action Seeks Stricter Gun Control Measures
----------------------------------------------------------
Lauren von Bernuth, writing for Citizen Truth, reports that the
guardians of children who were diagnosed with PTSD stemming from
exposure to gun violence are suing the state of Illinois for
stricter gun control measures.

Two mothers and one grandmother in Illinois are taking on the state
of Illinois and fighting for stricter gun control measures. The
three women filed a class-action lawsuit on Oct. 3 alleging
Illinois' failure to stem the flow of guns in the state
disproportionately affect black children and black communities.

The women are guardians of three African-American children who are
also named as plaintiffs in the lawsuit (the names are withheld)
and accuse Illinois, the Illinois Department of State Police and
Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner of violating the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Illinois Civil Rights Act.

According to the lawsuit, 40 percent of guns used in gun-related
crime in Chicago are purchased at gun shops outside of the city of
Chicago in the nearby suburbs and most are bought at seven gun
shops named in the suit. The lawsuit states gun trafficking and
violence could be easily and reasonably curbed.

"Under current law, and without cost, the Illinois Department of
State Police can adopt reasonable regulations that would curtail
the gun trafficking by these gun shops, and thereby reduce the gun
violence in Chicago, and in turn reduce the terrible effect such
gun violence has on the African-American children bringing this
case.

"The defendants' failure to adopt these reasonable regulations
constitutes a violation of Title II of the ADA, in that they are
failing to offer a reasonable accommodation for the disabilities
these plaintiff children suffer and a violation of the Illinois
Civil Rights Act, in that the ongoing gun violence, which
defendants can curb, has an adverse impact on these
African-American children, thus violating their civil rights," the
lawsuit states.

Chicago Gun Violence Results in Childhood PTSD
The lawsuit is brought on behalf of African-American children under
eighteen who live or have lived in Chicago and are "disabled under
the terms of the ADA" or "at risk of becoming disabled" as a result
of their exposure to gun violence.

Eighty percent of homicide and shooting victims in Chicago are
African-American and twenty percent of shootings involve teenagers
or younger children according to the lawsuit, but
African-American's make up only one-third of Chicago's population.

The children and grandchildren of the women bringing forth the
lawsuit have all been diagnosed with PTSD as a result of losing
close family members to gun violence and in some cases witnessing
the shootings themselves. The children's guardians also claim the
children grew up in an environment where they experienced gun
violence regularly which contributed to their PTSD.

"When a child, particularly a young child, is exposed to gun
violence, there is a dramatic and lasting impairment of the child's
basic life activities," the lawsuit states. "This includes deficits
in the child's ability to care for himself or herself, the child's
sleep, reading abilities, learning capacity, concentration,
thinking and communication. As a result of these deficits, gun
violence directly undermines the child's academic performance and
his or her educational opportunities."

Lawsuit Lists Steps Illinois Could Take to Prevent Gun Violence
The lawsuit outlines 12 steps that Illinois could take without
changing existing Illinois law and also lists multiple studies
which support their claim that meaningful regulation of gun markets
will reduce the number of guns available and thus, the number of
gun-related crimes.

Some of the steps the lawsuit recommends are:

   -- Conducting background checks on all gun store and gun show
employees
   -- Installing video recorders at the point of sale in gun stores
to discourage traffickers, the use of fake IDs, and assist
lawmakers to identify "straw purchasers of 'crime guns'"
   -- Train employees and managers of gun stores techniques to
identify straw purchasers
   -- Not allowing the sale of a gun to a person whom the gun
dealer knows is not purchasing the gun for their use but rather to
quickly transfer it to another individual
   -- To maintain an alphabetical list of gun sales where the gun
was later used in a crime and to prohibit the purchaser of the
crime gun from purchasing another gun unless they properly
transferred the gun ownership or filed a loss or theft report

According to Courthouse News, Illinois gun dealers are required by
law to be licensed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(ATF); however, the lawsuit alleges the ATF does little to monitor
the sale of guns in these stores.

"As a matter of law," the complaint says, "the regulation of gun
trafficking in Illinois is a state matter, over which the state of
Illinois has claimed preemption." [GN]


IMPINJ INC: Faces Schultz Class Suit in California
--------------------------------------------------
Impinj, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended July 31,
2018, that the company faces a class action suit entitled, Schultz
v. Impinj, Inc., et al.

On August 7, 2018, a class action complaint for violation of the
federal securities laws was filed in the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California against the company, its chief
executive officer and chief operations officer.

Captioned Schultz v. Impinj, Inc., et al, the complaint,
purportedly brought on behalf of all purchasers of the company's
common stock from May 7, 2018 through and including August 2, 2018,
asserts claims that the company's quarterly statement filed on Form
10-Q for the first quarter of 2018 and a concurrent press release
made false or misleading statements about our business prospects
and financial condition. The complaint seeks monetary damages,
costs and expenses.  

Impinj, Inc. operates a platform that enables wireless connectivity
to everyday items by delivering each item’s unique identity,
location, and authenticity to business and consumer applications.
Impinj, Inc. was founded in 2000 and is headquartered in Seattle,
Washington.


IMS TRADING: Court Narrows Claims in 3rd Amended Dopico Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARIE DOPICO, for Plaintiff and the class of members
defined herein, et al., Plaintiffs, v. IMS TRADING CORP., et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-1874-BRM-DEA (D. N.J.), Judge
Brian R. Martinotti of the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey granted in part and denied in part the Defendants filed
the Motion to Dismiss Counts I and IV of the Plaintiffs' Third
Amended Complaint.

The Defendants are engaged in the business of manufacturing,
producing, marketing, distributing, advertising, and/or selling dog
treats, including the Chinese-made duck jerky dog treats at issue
in the litigation.  The Plaintiffs are purchasers of the duck jerky
dog treats, who allege their dogs became ill after ingesting the
Defendants' product.

The Defendants made several representations on the packaging of the
dog treats they manufactured, including (i) no artificial colors
and no artificial additives; (ii) no artificial fillers; (iii) no
by-products; (iv) the ingredients were duck breast fillets,
vegetable glycerin, soy protein, isolate, salt; (v) healthy and
natural treats with only the finest ingredients; (vi) they
guarantee their product 100%; (vii) inspected and independently
tested; and (viii) a healthy natural treat for dogs.  The
Defendants also made two representations regarding the treats on
their website that they go to great lengths to maintain the quality
and consistency of their products; and offer the best treats for
one's pet.

The Plaintiffs contend the representations found on the packaging
were false.  The FDA allegedly issued warnings, as early as 2007
and as recently as Nov. 18, 2011, about dog illnesses after
consuming duck jerky dog treats, which were made in China.
However, the Defendants' packaging did not warn purchasers of the
danger and side effects of the treats.  The Plaintiffs also contend
that prior to October 2013, the Defendants had received complaints
regarding their dog treats stating their product has caused dogs to
become ill or die.

Dopico commenced the class action in the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex Count in January 2014.  The matter
was removed on March 20, 2014, and on April 17, 2014, Dopico filed
a First Amended Complaint alleging: (1) Count I, breach of express
warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"); (2) Count II,
breach of implied warranty under the UCC; (3) Count III, violation
of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; (4) Count, IV violation of
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"); (5) Count V, unjust
enrichment; (6) Count VI, failure to warn (products liability); and
(7) Count VII, defective design or manufacture (products
liability).  

On May 7, 2014, IMS moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint, and on
April 20, 2015, Judge Peter G. Sheridan, who has since then assumed
senior status, dismissed Counts II, III, and V with prejudice as
being subsumed by the New Jersey Products Liability Act.

On Sept. 18, 2015, Dopico filed a Motion to Amend the First Amended
Complaint, naming two additional class representatives, one a
resident of New Jersey, Banks, and the other a resident of Arizona,
Locke.  The proposed Second Amended Complaint included claims
applicable to the Arizona plaintiff.  On Feb. 1, 2016, the Court
granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, and on Feb. 2, 2016, the
Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint.  On Feb. 16, 2016,
the Defendants filed an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint.

On June 23, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed another Motion to Amend the
Second Amended Complaint.  On June 28, 2017, the Defendants
requested an extension of time to file an opposition to the
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to file a Third Amended Complaint and
permission to file a dispositive motion with respect to all breach
of warranty claims set forth in the Plaintiffs' Complaint.

On June 30, 2017, the Court considered the Plaintiffs' letter and
granted all requests.  On July 24, 2017, the Defendants filed a
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint.  On Jan. 30,
2018, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the Second
Amended Complaint and administratively terminated without prejudice
the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.  The Plaintiffs filed the Third
Amended Complaint on Jan. 30, 2018.  On Feb. 13, 2018, the
Defendants filed the Motion to Dismiss Counts I and IV of the
Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint.  The Plaintiffs oppose the
Motion.

Judge Martinotti granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.  The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the breach of
warranty claim (Count I) as to the labeling of the dog treats is
denied but granted as to the Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants'
website contains express warranties that were breached.  The
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the MMWA claim (Count IV) as it
pertains to the labeling of the dog treats is granted.  The
Plaintiffs' implied warranty MMWA claim pertaining to the website
is only dismissed as to the New Jersey Plaintiffs.  All implied
warranty claims as to out-of-state residents will proceed.

The Judge finds that the Defendants' website statements do not
amount to express warranties.  The website statements are more akin
to puffery and affirmations merely of the value of the goods or
statements purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or
commendation of the goods.  Both words were used in the phrases
quoted from the Defendants' website.  Accordingly, the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' claim that their website contains
express warranties that were breached is granted.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiffs argue the Defendants
website warranty claims are unaffected by 15 U.S.C. 2311(d) because
websites are not regulated by the FDA or FDCA.  This argument he
says is immaterial.  Claims under the MMWA depend upon the
disposition of the underlying state law warranty claims.  The Court
has dismissed the Plaintiffs' New Jersey state law express warranty
claim as to the website.  Therefore, the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' MMWA express warranty claim is also dismissed
as to that claim.  

The Plaintiffs' implied warranty claim pertaining to the website is
also dismissed as to the New Jersey Plaintiffs because they are
inextricably linked to state law implied warranty claims that have
already been dismissed by the Court.  All implied warranty claims
as to out-of-state residents will proceed.  Accordingly, the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count IV of the Third Amended
Complaint is granted as to all express warranties.  It is also
granted as to New Jersey Plaintiffs' implied warranty claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/eA4yws from Leagle.com.

MARIE DOPICO, for Plaintiff and the class of members defined
herein, Plaintiff, represented by BRUCE HELLER NAGEL --
nagel@nagelrice.com -- NAGEL RICE, LLP, MICHAEL J. EPSTEIN, THE
EPSTEIN LAW FIRM, P.A. & RANDEE M. MATLOFF --
rmatloff@nagelrice.com -- NAGEL RICE, LLP.

CARLY HERON, for Plaintiff and the class of members defined herein,
Plaintiff, represented by RANDEE M. MATLOFF, NAGEL
RICE, LLP.

JOHN BANKS, for Plaintiff and the class of members defined herein &
CALVIN LOCKE, for Plaintiff and the class of members defined
herein, Plaintiffs, represented by BRUCE HELLER NAGEL , NAGEL RICE,
LLP & MICHAEL J. EPSTEIN , THE EPSTEIN LAW FIRM, P.A.

IMS TRADING CORP. & IMS PET INDUSTRIES, INC., (names fictitious as
presently unknown), Defendants, represented by MICHAEL J. MARONE --
MMARONE@MDMC-LAW.COM -- MCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY & CARPENTER,
MICHAEL DAVID CELENTANO -- MCELENTANO@MDMC-LAW.COM -- MCELROY
DEUTSCH MULVANEY & CARPENTER LLP & RICHARD J. WILLIAMS, JR. --
RWILLIAMS@MDMC-LAW.COM -- MCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY & CARPENTER,
LLP.


INVERSIONES Y REPRESENTACIONES: Securities Class Action Tossed
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ambrogio Visconti, writing for Global Legal Chronicle, repors that
on September 10, 2018, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Judge Broderick) granted Defendants' motion
to dismiss a securities class action complaint against IRSA
Inversiones y Representaciones Sociedad Anonima and Cresud Sociedad
Anonima Comercial, Inmobiliaria, Financiera y Agropecuaria
(collectively, "Defendants"). Judge Broderick granted Defendants'
motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, holding that
Plaintiffs failed to plead any material misstatement or omission
and failed to demonstrate scienter. The dismissed claims included
claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act.

The Simpson Thacher team on this case was Bryce Friedman, George
Wang and Eamonn Campbell (Litigation). [GN]


J&J PALLET: Avoided Paying Overtime Wages, Cook Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------
Eric Cook, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated
Plaintiff, v. J&J Pallet Solutions, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
18-cv-04505 (N.D. Ga., September 26, 2018), seeks to recover unpaid
wages, liquidated damages, costs and disbursements and reasonable
allowances for fees of counsel and experts, reimbursement of
expenses, prejudgment and post judgment interest and such other and
further relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

J&J Pallet Solutions is in the business of building wooden shipping
pallets where Cook worked as a maintenance worker. J&J allegedly
avoided paying overtime by paying its employees for all hours up to
40 per week through a third-party payroll provided by South East
Personnel Leasing and then paying a flat hourly rate separately on
a check provided directly to the employee. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Rachel Berlin, Esq.
      BUCKLEY BEAL, LLP
      600 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 3900
      Atlanta, GA 30308
      Telephone: (404) 781-1100
      Facsimile: (404) 781-1101
      Email: rberlin@buckleybeal.com

             - and -

      Chris P. Wido, Esq.
      THE SPITZ LAW FIRM, LLC
      25200 Chagrin Boulevard, Suite 200
      Beachwood, OH 44122
      Phone: (216) 291-4744
      Fax: (216) 291-5744
      Email: chris.wido@spitzlawfirm.com


KOL BERAMA: Faces Fine Following Civil Rights Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Cleveland Jewish News reports that the haredi-Orthodox Kol Berama
radio station was fined some $280,000 for keeping women's voices
off the air.

The Jerusalem District Court on Sept. 20 also ordered that the
money, 1 million shekel, be held in a class action fund that will
give the money to programs that empower religious women.

The class action lawsuit was filed against the radio station, based
in Bnei Brak, six years ago by the Israel Religious Action Center
of the Reform Movement and by Kolech: , the Religious Women's
Forum, a religious women's rights group.

The lawsuit was filed after the groups documented that no women's
voice had appeared on the radio station for two years.

It is the first class action lawsuit on civil rights and gender
segregation in Israel, according to the Jerusalem Post.

The lawsuit said that the radio station's "total and deliberate
exclusion damages dignity and self-worth, deepens perceptions of
female inferiority and prevents the influence of women in public
discourse," according to The Times of Israel.

In his Kol Berama radio program titled "Halichot Olam," Rabbi
Aharon Butbul addressed the court's decision, calling Kolech "a
half-Reform organization that has nothing to do with religion."

He said that "on this radio station you hear smart people. This is
the only radio station that is really Haredi Orthodox."

The post Haredi Orthodox radio station fined for keeping women's
voices off the air appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
[GN]


KROGER CO: 9th Cir. Flips Dismissal of Hawkins UCL Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, issued an
Opinion reversing the District Court's judgment granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned SHAVONDA HAWKINS,
on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE KROGER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. No.
16-55532. (9th Cir.).

The district court dismissed Hawkins's use claims for lack of
standing because her alleged injuries were too speculative.

Hawkins brought a putative class action against Kroger seeking to
represent a class of consumers who were misled by the label and had
used the dangerous product. The complaint alleged violations of the
California Unfair Competition Law (UCL), False Advertising Law
(FAL). Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) and common law claims for
breach of implied warranty of merchantability and breach of express
warranty.

Labeling Claims

Standing

The Court turn first to Hawkins's statutory standing to bring her
labeling claims. California law requires plaintiffs alleging UCL
and FAL claims to show that they have suffered injury in fact and
have lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.
A plaintiff is required to show some form of economic injury' as a
result of his transactions with the defendant.

Hawkins alleges that she relied upon the label and would not have
bought the product without the misrepresentation. For example,
paragraph 76 of the complaint states: Plaintiff relied on
Defendant's `0g trans fat' claim as a substantial factor in her
purchases, paragraph 101 states: Plaintiff purchased the Kroger
Bread Crumbs believing they had the qualities she sought based on
the Products' deceptive labeling and paragraph 107 states:
Plaintiff, on at least one occasion, would not have purchased the
Kroger Bread Crumbs absent Defendant's misrepresentation.

In holding that Hawkins did not plead reliance, the district court
misread Hawkins's complaint. It interpreted the complaint as
alleging that she did not read the 0g Trans Fat per serving product
label until August 2015, fifteen years after she began purchasing
the product. However, the paragraph cited by the district court to
support its conclusion reads, Plaintiff first discovered
Defendant's unlawful acts described herein in August 2015, when she
learned that Kroger Bread Crumbs contained artificial trans fat.
This paragraph does not allege that she first read the label in
August 2015; it alleges she first discovered the label was
misleading on that date. The district court did not address the
three paragraphs where Hawkins concretely alleged that she relied
on the label.

Because Hawkins adequately alleged that she relied on the label's
misrepresentations and would not have purchased the product without
those misrepresentations, she has adequately alleged standing for
her labeling claim.

Preemption

The Court next turn to whether Hawkins's state law mislabeling
claim challenging the statement 0g Trans Fat per serving is
preempted by federal regulations.

The NLEA

The Nutritional Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) amended the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to establish uniform food labeling
requirements, including the familiar and ubiquitous Nutrition Facts
Panel found on most food packages.

The phrase not identical to means that the State requirement
directly or indirectly imposes obligations or contains provisions
concerning the composition or labeling of food that are not imposed
by or contained in the applicable federal regulation or differ from
those specifically imposed by or contained in the applicable
federal regulation.

Therefore, if FDA regulations expressly permit the claim 0g Trans
Fat per serving on the face of a product's packaging, any state law
claim to the contrary would be preempted.

The Nutrition Facts Panel and Nutrient Content Claims

Information that is required or permitted by Section 101.9  and
that appears as part of the nutrition label, is not a nutrient
content claim. If such information is declared elsewhere on the
label it is a nutrient content claim and is subject to the
requirements for [such] claims.

Without Section 101.13(c), this would be a simple case. At the time
Hawkins made the purchases, the relevant regulation provided that
within the Nutrition Facts Panel, if the serving contains less than
0.5 gram, the content shall be expressed as zero. Therefore, the
claim 0g Trans Fat per serving was not only permitted within the
panel, but mandated. However, since, under Section 101.13(c), a
statement as to the amount of a nutrient mandated inside the
Nutrition Facts Panel is not necessarily permitted by the FDCA
elsewhere on the packaging, further analysis is required to
determine if the FDCA allows the same 0g Trans Fat per serving
claim elsewhere on the label.

The district court erred by not performing this analysis.

Reid v. Johnson & Johnson

In Reid, 780 F.3d at 963, the Court determined that the statement
No Trans Fat was not allowed outside of the Nutrition Facts Panel
since the product did contain trans fat, notwithstanding that the
Nutrition Facts Panel reported that it contained 0g trans fat.

As he wrote:

"Though the nutritional label clearly contains information about
nutrient content, the claims made in it are not considered nutrient
content claims for the purposes of FDA regulations. While a
required statement inside a nutrition label escapes regulations
reserved for nutrient content claims, the identical statement
outside of the nutrition label is still considered a nutrient
content claim and is therefore subject to section 101.13."

No Trans Fat was an expressed nutrient content claim because it was
a direct statement about the level of trans fat in the food.
Therefore, under the regulations, it could only be made if it did
not in any way implicitly characterize the level of the nutrient in
the food and was not false or misleading in any respect. The Court
held that No Trans Fat was misleading because a reasonable consumer
might infer that the product did not contain trans fat.

The Court bolstered this conclusion in Reid by noting that under
Sections 101.62(b)-(c) the FDA has expressly allowed No Fat and No
Saturated Fat' nutrient content claims for products that contain
less than 0.5 grams of fat or saturated fat per serving. By
contrast, the FDA explicitly decided not to authorize a No Trans
Fat' nutrient content claim in light of a lack of scientific
information. Thus, the only interpretation which gave full meaning
to each word of the regulations was that the claim No Trans Fat was
not authorized.

Therefore, the Court rejected the defendant's argument that,
because it was required to state the product had 0 grams trans fat
per serving within the Nutrition Facts Panel, it should be allowed
to make an equivalent claim elsewhere on the label.  

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's October 4, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc5wvptl from Leagle.com.

Gregory S. Weston -- greg@westonfirm.com -- (argued) and David
Elliot -- davidelliot@elliotlawfirm.com -- The Weston Firm San
Diego, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jacob M. Harper -- jharper@dwt.com -- (argued) and Nicole S.
Phillis -- NicolePhillis@dwt.com -- Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Los
Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellee.


LELAND, NC: Faces Class Action Over Illegal Utility Fees
--------------------------------------------------------
Johanna Ferebee, writing for PortCityDaily, reports that Leland is
being named in a class action lawsuit for charging water and sewer
expansion fees that may be illegal.

The class action suit, filed last month, alleges the town has
unlawfully collected what are known as "impact fees" in recent
years; these fees have been used by utility providers to charge
customers for predicted future infrastructure costs. These fees
have padded the town's utility fund by millions, records show.

Though just one builder has signed on to the suit, it's possible
more could join. In a statement provided through its town attorney,
Leland empathetically denies all allegations.

Impact fees
Municipalities and water providers commonly collect fees from
individuals and businesses that wish to connect to new or existing
water and sewer lines.

"Tap on fees," or fees charged to connect to a town's
infrastructure, are different from fees Leland is being sued over.

Also referred to as "impact" or "capacity" fees, "system
development fees" are now regulated by both legal precedent and
state law. Compared to impact fees that were commonly charged
before, system development fees have been reigned in by statue, and
require extensive analysis before being collected by a utility
provider.

The plaintiff, Plantation Building Corporation, alleges Leland has
illegally collected impact fees for at least 19 of its new
properties over the last three years.

The new, regulated fees must represent the actual projected cost,
based on a professional analysis, to fund capital improvements to
expanded water and sewer lines to meet the new customer's needs. In
addition, system development fees can be calculated to include the
cost-estimate borne by existing facilities to serve the new
development.

That wasn't always the case: prior to 2016, these fees were often
calculated without professional analysis, estimated based on the
future cost of development in the area, charging an amount
determined by the town or utility provider. In other words, impact
fees could be used as a revenue stream to fund future utility
development and weren't restricted to the direct, calculated costs
of connecting new customers to the new utility services.

In 2016, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled impact fees that
estimated future service costs were unlawful. The court ruled in
favor of a builder, finding that towns do not have the power to
impose impact fees for future services.

Leland, one of many
"When the court ruled the way it did in 2016, I think for everybody
it was a wakeup call," Hunter Bryson -- hunter@wbmllp.com -- the
attorney who filed the case against Leland, said.

Mr. Bryson, an attorney for Whitfield, Bryson & Mason LLP, said his
firm has filed nine similar suits against municipalities since last
year.

Following the court's 2016 decision, the General Assembly both
legalized and clarified what towns could charge. Under House Bill
436, signed into law Oct. 2017, system development fees allow towns
to recoup capital improvement costs to service new development.

The law does not retroactively authorize municipalities to charge
impact fees. With a three-year statute of limitations, unlawful
fees charged after Oct. 2014 are technically still fair game for
builders who want to recoup their losses.

After the court ruled towns didn't have the authority to charge
impact fees, Bryson said Leland "panicked." On January 2017, months
after the law passed, Leland acknowledged the court's decision that
ruled impact fees illegal.

Instead, the town introduced "capacity fees," a move Bryson
describes as a shielded attempt to continue collecting the illegal
fees.

"They essentially renamed them from 'impact fees' to 'capacity
fees' in an attempt to legalize them," Mr. Bryson said.

These fees were introduced to cover for the loss of impact fees
while preventing water and sewer rates from increasing, according
to the town's January resolution.

Collected as a precondition of approving a building permit, Bryson
said Leland pocketed these fees before any development had taken
place. "There were other ways in which the town could have legally
come up with the money that it needed that the impact fees
provided," Mr. Bryson said.

Brian Edes, Leland's new town attorney, appointed early last month,
said the town is presently assessing Plantation Building
Corporation's allegations.

"Nevertheless, the Town of Leland is confident that it is in full
compliance with N.C. House Bill 436," Mr. Edes wrote in an email.
"The Town emphatically denies all allegations to the contrary."

Since the initial complaint filing in September, Leland has not yet
legally responded. Edes said as Leland prepares to present its
case, it stands by the fees it has charged in recent years.

"Moreover, the Town is confident that the fees it has charged are
appropriate; all fees relevant to this suit were calculated to
cover the costs and expenses associated with adequately and safely
providing water and sewer services to Town residents,"  Mr. Edes
said. "The Town looks forward to proving these matters in this
case."

Source of revenue
Impact fees have been a major revenue source for Leland.

Between 2014 and 2015, Leland collected over $1 million in impact
fees, according to the town's financial audit. In 2015 and 2016,
the town collected nearly $1.3 million in impact fees.

Impact fees are noticeably missing from Leland's 2016-2017
financial audit. However, they were budgeted to account for nearly
a third of the revenues feeding the town's utility fund.

These fees, rather than being based on actual costs, are
"arbitrary" and "capricious," the suit alleges. Plantation Building
Corporation -- whose CEO, Dave Spetrino, also happens to be the
president of Wilmington-Cape Fear Home Builders Association -- is
seeking a return of all fees, plus six percent interest.

Because the suit is a class action, Plantation Building Corporation
will represent any future party that may choose to join.

Since Whitfield, Bryson & Mason LLP's first filing against Holly
Springs last year, Bryson said his firm brought forth many more
cases.

"Since then we've learned more about towns across the state that
have charged these fees and learned more about the conduct that has
been going on." [GN]


LIBERTY TAX: Bid to Dismiss New York Securities Suit Underway
-------------------------------------------------------------
Liberty Tax, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 5, 2018, for the
fiscal year ended April 30, 2018, that a motion to dismiss has been
filed in the case entitled In Re Liberty Tax, Inc. Securities
Litigation in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York.

Rose Mauro, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Liberty Tax, Inc., Edward L. Brunot, John T. Hewitt,
and Kathleen E. Donovan, filed in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York on January 12, 2018, Case No.
18 CV 245.

Plaintiff filed a securities class action asserting violations of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
(the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5 against all defendants and a
second count for violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act
against the individual defendants.

According to the complaint, throughout the class period, LT, Inc.
allegedly issued materially false and misleading statements and/or
failed to disclose that: (1) Hewitt created an inappropriate tone
at the top; (2) the inappropriate tone at the top led to
ineffective entity level controls over the organization; and (3) as
a result, defendants' statements about the operations and prospects
were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis at all relevant times.

Patrick Beland, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated vs. Liberty Tax, Inc., Edward L. Brunot, John T. Hewitt,
and Kathleen E. Donovan, filed in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York on December 15, 2017, case
number 17 CV 7327.

Plaintiff filed a securities class action asserting violations of
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 against all
defendants and a second count for violations of Section 20(a) of
the Exchange Act against the individual defendants.

According to the complaint, throughout the class period, LT, Inc.
allegedly issued materially false and misleading statements and/or
failed to disclose that: (1) Hewitt created an inappropriate tone
at the top; (2) the inappropriate tone at the top led to
ineffective entity level controls over the organization; and (3) as
a result, defendants' statements about the business, operations and
prospects were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a
reasonable basis at all relevant times.

These actions were consolidated with the caption In Re Liberty Tax,
Inc. Securities Litigation, Case No. 27 CV 07327 and IBEW Local 98
Pension Fund was appointed the Lead Plaintiff ("Lead Plaintiff").

On June 12, 2018, Lead Plaintiff filed its Consolidated Amended
Class Action Complaint, which removed Brunot as a defendant, and
added additional securities claim based on Section 14(a) of the
Exchange Act and Rules 14-a3 and 14-a9. The Consolidated Amended
Class Action Complaint, among other things, asserts that the
Company's SEC filings over a multi-year period failed to disclose
the alleged misconduct of the individual defendants and that
disclosure of the alleged misconduct caused the Company's stock
price to drop and, thereby harm the purported class of
shareholders. The Class Period is alleged to be October 1, 2013
through February 23, 2018.

Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss the Consolidated Amended
Class Action Complaint on September 17, 2018. Lead Plaintiff will
file its opposition within forty-five (45) days thereafter, and
Defendants will have twenty-one (21) days to file their reply
brief(s).

Liberty Tax, Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides tax
preparation services in the United States and Canada. The company
also facilitates refund-based tax settlement financial products,
such as refund transfer products and personal income tax refund
discounting, as well as provides an online digital Do-It-Yourself
tax program in the United States. Liberty Tax, Inc. was founded in
1996 and is headquartered in Virginia Beach, Virginia.


LIBERTY TAX: Class Suit by Broward Psychology P.A. Settled
----------------------------------------------------------
Liberty Tax, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 5, 2018, for the
fiscal year ended April 30, 2018, that the case entitled, Broward
Psychology P.A., v. JTH Tax, Inc. (Case 0:18-cv-60412), has been
settled.

On February 26, 2018, a class action complaint was filed in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida by an
individual plaintiff for itself and on behalf of all other
"similarly situated" persons.

The Complaint alleges, among other things, that from March 10, 2014
to 2018, the Company allegedly violated the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act
of 2005 (collectively, the "TCPA"), by sending a facsimile
advertisement to plaintiff and other putative class members that
either were unsolicited and/or did not contain a valid opt-out
notice.

The complaint seeks certification of the lawsuit as a class action
and the award to class members of the greater of actual damages or
the sum of $500 for each violation and injunctive and other relief.


Under the TCPA, the statutory remedy of $500 per violation may be
trebled (i.e., $1,500 per violation) if the court finds the
violations to be willful or knowing. On March 30, 2018 the Company
filed a dispositive motion arguing that Plaintiff lacked Article
III standing to sue Company.

By Order dated August 21, 2018, the Court denied the Company's
motion. The Company plans on filing a motion for reconsideration of
the Court's August 21, 2018 Order. Discovery in the case is
proceeding. A mediation was held on September 20, 2018 and the case
was settled.

Liberty Tax, Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides tax
preparation services in the United States and Canada. The company
also facilitates refund-based tax settlement financial products,
such as refund transfer products and personal income tax refund
discounting, as well as provides an online digital Do-It-Yourself
tax program in the United States. Liberty Tax, Inc. was founded in
1996 and is headquartered in Virginia Beach, Virginia.


LIBERTY TAX: Continues to Defend Labrado Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
Liberty Tax, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 5, 2018, for the
fiscal year ended April 30, 2018, that the company continues to
defend itself from a class action complaint entitled, Rene Labrado
v. JTH Tax, Inc. (Case BC 715076).

On July 3, 2018, a class action complaint was filed in the Superior
Court of California, County of Los Angeles by a former employee for
herself and on behalf of all other "similarly situated" persons.

The Complaint alleges, among other things, that the Company
allegedly violated various provisions of the California Labor Code,
including: unpaid overtime, unpaid meal period premiums, unpaid
rest premiums, unpaid minimum wages, final wages not timely paid,
wages not timely paid, non-compliant wage statements, failure to
keep pay records, unreimbursed business expenses and violation of
California Business and Profession Code Section 17200.

The Complaint seeks actual, consequential and incidental losses and
damages, injunctive relief and other damages.

Liberty Tax said, "The Company highly contest the allegations set
forth in the Complaint and plans on filing a dispositive motion.
The Company intends to defend the case vigorously."

Liberty Tax, Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides tax
preparation services in the United States and Canada. The company
also facilitates refund-based tax settlement financial products,
such as refund transfer products and personal income tax refund
discounting, as well as provides an online digital Do-It-Yourself
tax program in the United States. Liberty Tax, Inc. was founded in
1996 and is headquartered in Virginia Beach, Virginia.


LIBERTY TAX: Trial in Del. Stockholder Suit Set for March 2019
--------------------------------------------------------------
Liberty Tax, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 5, 2018, for the
fiscal year ended April 30, 2018, that trial in the case entitled,
In Re: Liberty Tax, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, is set to begin on
March 18, 2019.

Asbestos Workers' Philadelphia Pension Fund, derivatively on behalf
of Liberty Tax, Inc., v. John Hewitt, Defendant, and Liberty Tax,
Inc., Nominal Defendant, Case No. 2017-0883, filed in the Court of
Chancery of the State of Delaware on December 12, 2017.

Plaintiff alleges that the Company's former CEO, John T. Hewitt
("Hewitt"), breached his fiduciary duties as an officer based upon
certain allegations of misconduct on his part. The Plaintiff also
alleges breach of fiduciary duty against Hewitt in his capacity as
a director of LT, Inc. The Complaint seeks compensatory damages and
attorney's fees. No claim or relief is asserted against the
Company, which is named solely as a Nominal Defendant.

Erie County Employees Retirement System, derivatively on behalf of
Liberty Tax, Inc., v. John T. Hewitt, Defendant, and Liberty Tax,
Inc., Nominal Defendant, Case No. 2017-0914, brought a second
derivative suit filed in the Court of Chancery of the State of
Delaware on December 22, 2017.

Plaintiff also alleges that Hewitt breached his fiduciary duties as
an officer based upon certain allegations of misconduct on his
part. The Plaintiff also alleges breach of fiduciary duty against
Hewitt in his capacity as a director of the Company. The Complaint
seeks to enjoin Hewitt from managing our business operations, and
seeks compensatory damages and attorney's fees.

On December 27, 2017, the two above-referenced shareholder matters
were consolidated into the case with the caption In Re: Liberty
Tax, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 2017-0883. On April 17,
2018, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint (the "Amended
Complaint").

The Amended Complaint added Gordon D'Angelo, Ellen McDowell, Nicole
Ossenfort, and John Seal, with Hewitt as individual defendants (the
"Individual Defendants") and asserted class action allegations.
Plaintiff seeks (i) a declaration that the Individual Defendants
have breached the Company's Nominating Charter; (ii) a declaration
that the Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary
duties; (iii) an award to the Plaintiffs and the Class in the
amount of damages sustained as a result of the Individual breaches;
(iv) certification of the action as a class action; (v) an award to
the Company in the amount of damages sustained as a result of the
Individual Defendants’ breaches of their fiduciary duties; (vi) a
grant of further appropriate equitable relief to remedy the
Individual Defendants' breaches, including injunctive relief; (vii)
an award to Plaintiffs of the costs and disbursements of this
action, including reasonable attorneys' fees, accountants' and
experts' fees, costs and expenses; and (viii) such further relief
as the Court deems just and proper.

The Company has answered the Amended Complaint and discovery is
underway. The individuals have filed a notice of motion to dismiss.
No briefing schedule has been set on the motion. A scheduling order
has been entered which currently schedules trial in this matter to
begin on March 18, 2019.

Liberty Tax, Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides tax
preparation services in the United States and Canada. The company
also facilitates refund-based tax settlement financial products,
such as refund transfer products and personal income tax refund
discounting, as well as provides an online digital Do-It-Yourself
tax program in the United States. Liberty Tax, Inc. was founded in
1996 and is headquartered in Virginia Beach, Virginia.


LOUISIANA: Court Affirms Dismissal of Section 1983 Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, issued an
Opinion dismissing the Appeal in the captioned DARWIN YARLS, JR.,
LEROY SHAW, JR., and DOUGLAS BROWN, on Behalf of Themselves and All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DERWYN BUNTON,
in his official capacity as Chief District Defender for Orleans
Parish, Louisiana; JAMES T. DIXON, JR., in his official capacity as
Louisiana State Public Defender, Defendants-Appellees. No.
17-30779. (5th Cir.).

The Appellants filed a proposed class action under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983, seeking to represent a class of Orleans Parish
arrestees who had been waitlisted. The Appellants first requested a
declaratory judgment that the waitlists violated their Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and their Fourteenth Amendment rights to
equal protection and due process. They asserted that due to Chief
District Defender Derwyn Bunton's and OPD's refusal to represent
them, they faced an unduly heightened risk of prolonged and
unnecessary pretrial detention.

After several months of negotiation, the parties submitted a Joint
Motion for Final Declaratory and Partial Injunctive Relief. The
accompanying Proposed Order declared that OPD waitlists violated
proposed class members' constitutional rights. The district court
went another route. It dismissed the case, citing Younger
abstention, justiciability, and federalism concerns. Appellants
then filed an unopposed Motion for Relief from Judgment. The
district court denied the motion, and Appellants appealed.

The Court review a district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo
and may affirm on any grounds supported by the record, including a
party's lack of standing. Lack of standing means lack of
jurisdiction. And lack of jurisdiction means lack of judicial
power.

Article III's case-or-controversy requirement imposes an
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing, which consists of
three elements: (1) a plaintiff must have suffered an injury in
fact, an invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete
and particularized and actual or imminent (2) there must be a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of
and (3) the injury must be likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision.

Here, both sides acknowledge that the Louisiana Legislature's
recent reallocation of indigent-defense funding has eliminated the
practice of putting non-capital defendants on waitlists. The State
Public Defender describes the current situation this way: None of
the districts currently in restriction of services report a
waitlist for the appointment of counsel for non-capital defendants.
Simply put, there remains no live controversy as to these
Appellants, and any relief they seek now would be meaningless. The
waitlists were controversial, but that controversy has concluded.

Here, neither side contends the case has ended, though both sides
concede the waitlists have ended. But no matter whose actions are
credited with mooting the case, Appellees for discontinuing the
waitlists, or the Legislature for reallocating the funding this
case neither invokes the skepticism normally associated with
defendant-induced mootness nor raises suspicions of litigation
posturing. This is in part because the Court is justified in
treating a voluntary governmental cessation of possibly wrongful
conduct with some solicitude. Absent evidence to the contrary, the
Court is to presume public-spiritedness, says the Supreme Court.
Government officials in their sovereign capacity and in the
exercise of their official duties are accorded a presumption of
good faith because they are public servants, not self-interested
private parties. So, without evidence to the contrary, the Court
assume that formally announced changes to official governmental
policy are not mere litigation posturing.

There is no reasonable expectation that the same complaining party
will be subjected to the same action again. Indeed, for that to
happen, Appellants would need to violate the law again, be
apprehended again, and be placed on a waitlist while in pretrial
custody again. Because we must assume that Appellants will follow
the law rather than flout it, the Court cannot deem their claims
capable of repetition.

A full-text copy of the Fifth Circuit's October 4, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yag8ktcs from Leagle.com.

John M. Landis, for Defendant-Appellee.

Mark Christopher Surprenant, for Defendant-Appellee.

Sara C. Valentine, for Defendant-Appellee.

Maggie Anne Broussard, for Defendant-Appellee.

Bruce Hamilton, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Brandon Buskey, for Plaintiff-Appellant.


LYFT INC: Tecson Sues Over Illegal Recruitment SMS Blasts
---------------------------------------------------------
Antonio Tecson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Lyft, Inc. and Does 1 through 10,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. CGC-18-570125 (Cal. Sup. Ct., San
Francisco Cty., September 26, 2018), seeks statutory and treble
damages, injunctive relief, compensation and attorney fees for
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991.

Lyft is an on-demand transportation company that develops, markets,
and operates the mobile application used to connect consumers in
search of transportation services. Tecson claims to have received
unsolicited SMS recruitment messages from Lyft inviting drivers to
their ride-sharing service. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael J. Jaurigue, Esq.
      Abigail A. Zelenski, Esq.
      David Zelenski, Esq.
      Ryan A. Stubbe, Esq.
      JAURIGUE LAW GROUP
      300 West Glenoaks Boulevard, Suite 300
      Glendale, CA 91202
      Telephone: (818) 630-7280
      Facsimile: (888) 879-1697
      Email: michael@jlglawyers.com
             abigail@jlglawyers.com
             david@jlglawyers.com
             ryan@jlglawyers.com


M&T BANK: Court Narrows Claims in Consolidated Amended ERISA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Frank P. Geraci, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of New York granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case, In re M&T Bank Corporation
ERISA Litigation, Case No. 16-CV-375 FPG (W.D. N.Y.).

The case is a putative class action brought under the Employee
Retirement Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") by Plaintiffs Sa'ud
Habib, Beverly Williams, J. Marlene Smith, Kenneth Sliwinski, and
Russ Dixon, all of whom are current or former employees of M&T Bank
and participate in the bank's 401(k) retirement plan.  The
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants M&T Bank and its retirement
plan's fiduciaries engaged in self-dealing at the expense of the
bank's employees.

According to the Complaint, in 2010, eight of the Plan's 23
designated investment alternatives were M&T Bank proprietary mutual
funds that cost significantly more than similar funds and performed
worse.  Rather than remove these overpriced and underperforming
funds, Defendants expanded their proprietary funds offerings in
2011, after M&T purchased Wilmington Trust and added six of
Wilmington's expensive, poor-performing mutual fund offerings.
According to the Plaintiffs, had the Defendants conducted an
impartial review of the Wilmington Funds, they would have
discovered that the Wilmington Funds was consistently one of the
worst performing mutual fund families in the United States, and
that their expenses were above average compared to many
alternatives within the marketplace that had a superior performance
history.  The failure to remove these proprietary funds from the
Plan allegedly cost Plan participants tens of millions of dollars
due to excess fees and underperformance.

In addition to using expensive and poor-performing proprietary
funds, the Plan failed to use its bargaining power as a large
institutional investor to obtain the lowest-cost class of shares
available, and in several instances, failed to prudently monitor
the Plan to determine whether it had invested in the cheapest
possible share class.  The Plaintiffs also allege that the
Defendants were aware of the benefits of alternative investment
vehicles such as collective trusts but failed to offer them to Plan
participants.  Instead, the Defendants left Plan participants in
costlier mutual funds that provided identical investment management
services.  The Defendants' passivity in this regard caused the Plan
to pay millions of dollars per year in unnecessary fees.

On May 11, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed the case individually and as
the representative of a putative class of participants and
beneficiaries of the Plan at any time on or after May 11, 2010.
The Complaint raises five claims for relief: (1) breach of
fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence under 29 U.S.C. Section
1104(a)(1)(A)-(B); (2) failure to adequately monitor fiduciaries
under 29 U.S.C. Sections 1109(a) and 1132(a)(2); (3) prohibited
transactions with a fiduciary under 29 U.S.C. Sections 11016(b)(1)
and (b)(3); (4) prohibited transactions with a party in interest
under 29 U.S.C. Sections (a)(1)(C), (D); and (5) equitable
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains under 29 U.S.C. Section
1132(a)(3).

On July 20, 2016, the Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint.
On Aug. 17, 2016, the Plaintiffs amended the Complaint as of right.
On July 26, 2017, the Court consolidated the case with Allen v.
M&T Bank Corp. et al., Case # 16-cv-704-FPG.  The Plaintiffs filed
a Consolidated Amended Complaint ("CAC") on Aug. 25, 2017.  On Oct.
10, 2017, the Defendants moved to dismiss the CAC.

Judge Geraci granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.  As the Company Defendants are not fiduciaries,
any breach of fiduciary duty claims against them are dismissed.
Additionally, the equitable disgorgement claim against them is
dismissed.  Finally, Wilmington Trust Corp. is dismissed from the
action.  The remainder of the Plaintiffs' claims stand.

Among other things, the Defendants argue that M&T Bank and M&T are
not fiduciaries to the Plan and therefore are not liable for the
Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim.  Judge Geraci agrees.
He finds that the Plaintiffs rely solely on the doctrine of
respondeat superior to assert that Defendants M&T Bank and M&T are
fiduciaries to the Plan's beneficiaries because the companies'
shared Board of Directors appointed or removed members of the
Committee.  Consequently, their breach of fiduciary duty claim is
dismissed as to Defendants M&T Bank and M&T.

The Defendants also argue that Wilmington Trust Investment Advisors
("WTIA"), which provided advisory services for the Wilmington Funds
to the Plan, and Wilmington Funds Management Corp. ("WFMC"), which
is the Wilmington Funds' adviser and manager, are not fiduciaries
under ERISA.  The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs raise only the
conclusory allegation that as investment managers, WTIA and WFMC
exercised discretionary authority.  To the extent that the
Plaintiffs allege WTIA and WFMC played some role in the Plan's
investment decisions, those allegations do not suffice to confer
fiduciary status on WTIA or WFMC.  The Plaintiffs' breach of
fiduciary duty claim is therefore dismissed as to Defendants WTIA
and WFMC.

While the CAC alleges that the Company Defendants had actual or
constructive knowledge that the profits they were receiving from or
in connection with Plan assets were being received as a result of
the Defendants' fiduciary breaches, the Plaintiffs cite no law
suggesting that knowledge combined with receipt of advisory fees is
sufficient to state a claim for knowing participation in the
fiduciary breach of another.  Accordingly, the equitable
disgorgement claim against the Company Defendants is dismissed.

By separate order, the case will be referred to a U.S. Magistrate
Judge for pretrial proceedings.  The Defendants must serve their
answer to the CAC by Sept. 25, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 11, 2018 Decision and Order
is available at https://is.gd/a3Jfvj from Leagle.com.

In re M&T Bank Corporation ERISA Litigation, Plaintiff, represented
by Lucinda Odell Lapoff , Trevett, Cristo, Salzer & Andolina P.C. &
Mark K. Gyandoh -- mgyandoh@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check, LLP, pro hac vice.

Sa'ud Habib, Beverly Williams, J. Marlene Smith, Kenneth Sliwinski
& Russ Dixon, individually and as representatives of a class of
similarly situated persons, and on behalf of the M&T Bank
Corporation Retirement Savings Plan, Plaintiffs, represented by
Carl F. Engstrom -- cengstrom@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP,
Jacob T. Schutz -- jschutz@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP, Kai H.
Richter -- krichter@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP, Mark K.
Gyandoh -- mgyandoh@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP
& Lucinda Odell Lapoff, Trevett, Cristo, Salzer & Andolina P.C.

Jacqueline Allen, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Lucinda Odell
Lapoff, Trevett, Cristo, Salzer & Andolina P.C. & Mark K. Gyandoh,
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, pro hac vice.

M&T Bank Corporation, Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company, M&T
Bank Employee Benefit Plans Committee, Wilmington Trust Investment
Advisors, Wilmington Funds Management Corporation, Janet Coletti,
Michele Trolli, Mark Czarnecki, Stephen Braunscheidel, Brian
Hickey, Kevin Pearson, Michael Spychala, Brent O. Baird, C. Angela
Bontempo, Robert T. Brady, T. Jefferson Cunningham, III, Gary N.
Geisel, John D. Hawks, Jr., Patrick W.E. Hodgson, Richard G. King,
Melinda R. Rich, Robert E. Sadler, Jr., Herbert L. Washington,
Robert G. Wilmers, Robert J. Bennett, Michael D. Buckley, Jorge
Pereira, Colin E. Doherty, Denis J. Salamon, Newton P.S. Merrill &
Darren King, Defendants, represented by Richard C. Pepperman, II --
peppermanr@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan & Cromwell, Jonathan Joseph
Ossip -- ossipj@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, M. David
Possick, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Matthew A. Schwartz --
schwartzmatthew@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan & Cromwell LLP & Maya
Krugman -- krugmanm@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan & Cromwell LLP.

Wilmington Trust Corporation, Defendant, represented by Richard C.
Pepperman, II, Sullivan & Cromwell, M. David Possick, Sullivan &
Cromwell LLP & Matthew A. Schwartz, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP.

John Does 1-20, Defendant, represented by Richard C. Pepperman, II,
Sullivan & Cromwell.

Edward Amoroso & Richard A. Grossi, Defendants, represented by
Jonathan Joseph Ossip, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Matthew A.
Schwartz, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Maya Krugman, Sullivan &
Cromwell LLP & Richard C. Pepperman, II, Sullivan & Cromwell.


MAKE IT RIGHT: Lower 9th Ward Residents File Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
Tiffany Wong, writing for WVUE, reports that an attorney filed a
class-action suit earlier in September for many Lower 9th Ward
residents.

Those who bought houses from Brad Pitt's Make It Right Foundation
said their structural problems date back almost a decade ago.

"You look at all the homes in the neighborhood with the same sort
of panel, all those homes are holding moisture," Attorney Ron
Austin said.

Mold is just one of the many problems some Lower 9th Ward residents
are facing after buying homes from Brad Pitt's non-profit, the Make
It Right Foundation, which sold homes to residents who lost
everything to Hurricane Katrina.

"You won't find someone that's not grateful. They're extremely
grateful. But here's the paramount, these people paid for these
homes. Nothing was given to them," Mr. Austin said.

Nine years later, many homeowners, like Alfreda Claiborne are
finding their homes falling apart.

"You just can't lean on anything. You know, you can't come out and
enjoy the porch. I mean what'd I pay for?" Ms. Claiborne said.

Just a year after buying her house, she noticed the railing coming
loose, and the wood on her porch rotting.

"As you can see, this wood is completely rotten. We had to patch it
up. We have a hole here, down the stairs, you can't come up the
stairs over there," Ms. Claiborne said.

Mr. Austin says they receive phone calls from many homeowners like
Ms. Claiborne, who are dealing with mold, water intrusion,
foundation problems and more.

"They would call and ask for request for service. Make It Right
would sort of pacify them, pushing them off, pushing them off,
pacifying them, promising they would come and never would show up
to make repairs," Mr. Austin said.

Earlier, Make It Right filed a $20 million lawsuit against its
chief architect.

"What's funny, is all of the allegations that we've alleged in our
petition, they're now alleging against their architect,"
Mr. Austin said, "why would they knowingly sell a bad product?"

He said these homes have little to no resale value.

"I'm afraid to let anyone come to my house, I'm angry because I
invested my money in this house and I hope someone can do something
to really make it right," Ms. Claiborne said.

FOX 8 was not able to reach the Make It Right Foundation for
comment.

Mr. Austin says they are waiting for the foundation to respond to
the lawsuit so they can proceed with litigation. [GN]


MASTERCARD INT'L: Judgment on Pleadings Bid EMV Tech Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, B & R SUPERMARKET, INC., d/b/a Milam's Market, GROVE
LIQUORS LLC, STROUK GROUP LLC, d/b/a Monsieur Marcel, PALERO FOOD
CORP. and CAGUEYES FOOD CORP., d/b/a Fine Fare Supermarket,
Plaintiffs, v. MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INC., VISA INC., VISA
U.S.A. INC., DISCOVER FINANCIAL SERVICES and AMERICAN EXPRESS,
Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-02738 (MKB) (JO) (E.D. N.Y.), Judge
Margo K. Brodie of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York denied Discover's motion for judgment on the
pleadings.

Plaintiffs B & R Supermarket, Inc., doing business as Milam's
Marke, Grove Liquors LLC, Strouk Group, LLC, doing business as
Monsieur Marcel, and Palero Food Corp. and Cagueyes Food Corp.,
doing business as Fine Fare Supermarket, commenced the class action
against Defendants MasterCard International Inc., Visa Inc., and
Visa U.S.A. Inc., Discover Financial Services, and American
Express, alleging violations of the Sherman Act, and state
antitrust and consumer protection laws of California, Florida, and
New York.  The Plaintiffs' claims arise out of the Defendants'
process for adopting EMV technology for card transactions in the
United States.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants conspired by entering
into an agreement to: (1) adopt the same policy for shifting
liability from banks to merchants for fraudulent charges; and (2)
make the Liability Shift effective on the same day for all four
networks to prevent merchants from steering customers to use cards
with more lenient terms.

Prior to Oct. 1, 2015, issuing banks generally absorbed liability
for fraudulent transactions.  According to the Plaintiffs, to
facilitate the transition process from using magnetic stripe to EMV
technology, the Defendants conspired to establish Oct. 1, 2015, as
an artificial date by which merchants had to have installed and
certified the EMV technology, otherwise merchants, rather than the
banks, would be responsible for any chargebacks.  If on or after
Oct. 1, 2015, a customer presented an EMV chip card to a merchant
but the merchant failed to use a certified EMV chip card reader to
process the transaction (and instead used a magnetic stripe), the
merchant became liable for any fraudulent charges incurred.

On Nov. 2, 2017, Discover moved for judgment on the pleadings
pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  On
Nov. 3, 2017, the Court referred the motion to Magistrate Judge
James Orenstein for a report and recommendation ("R&R").  By
("R&R") dated July 20, 2018, Judge Orenstein recommended that the
Court denies Discover's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

On Aug. 3, 2018, Discover filed its objections to the R&R.  The
Plaintiffs responded to Discover's objections on Aug. 17, 2018.

Discover contends that Judge Orenstein did not fully address all of
the points in Discover's brief and misstated its position and the
relevant law.  Judge Brodie finds that because there has not been a
change in the record, there is no basis for a new plausibility
determination under Rule 12(c).

Discover argues that the MDL Class Complaints are a part of the
record for the purposes of the Motion because they were attached to
the motion to transfer that the Plaintiffs "joined."  The Judge
finds that Discover cites no authority for its argument that a
transfer motion is a pleading for the purposes of deciding a motion
for judgment on the pleadings.  Accordingly, the MDL Class
Complaints attached to the transfer motion are not a part of the
record for the purposes of deciding Discover's motion for judgment
on the pleadings.

Discover then argues that the Court should take judicial notice of
certain allegations in the MDL Class Complaints attached to the
transfer motion, as well as the court opinions cited in the Amended
Complaint, for the truth of the factual assertions.  The Judge
declines to take judicial notice of the allegations in the MDL
Class Complaints for their truth.  She also finds that the
Plaintiffs' claims are plausible based on the timing of the
government's lawsuit and the role it could have plausibly played in
the Defendants' decision-making.

For these reasons, Judge Brodie adopted the R&R and denied
Discover's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/JPCkGv from Leagle.com.

B & R Supermarket, Inc., doing business as Milam's Market,
Plaintiff, represented by Ashley R. Rifkin, Robbins Arroyo LLP, pro
hac vice, Eric M. Carrino, Robbins Arroyo LLP, pro hac vice, George
C. Aguilar -- gaguilar@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP,
Gregory E. Del Gaizo -- gdelgaizo@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins
Arroyo LLP, Jenny L. Dixon -- jdixon@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins
Arroyo LLP, pro hac vice, John William Devine --
jdevine@devinegoodman.com -- Devine Goodman Rasco WattsFitzGerald
LLP, pro hac vice, Lawrence Dean Goodman --
lgoodman@devinegoodman.com -- Devine Goodman Rasco WattsFitzgerald
LLP, pro hac vice, Lindsey C. Herzik --
lherzik@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP, pro hac vice,
Michael Nicoud -- mnicoud@robbinsarroyo.com -- Robbins Arroyo LLP,
pro hac vice, Peter Barry Patterson, Jr., Law Offices of Thomas G.
Amon, Robert J. Kuntz, Jr. -- rkuntz@devinegoodman.com -- Devine
Goodman Rasco Watts-FitzGerald, LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas G. Amon,
Law Offices of Thomas G. Amon.

Grove Liquors LLC, Strouk Group LLC, doing business as Monsieur
Marcel & Palero Food Corp. and Cagueyes Food Corp., doing business
as Fine Fare Supermarket, Plaintiffs, represented by Ashley R.
Rifkin, Robbins Arroyo LLP, pro hac vice, Eric M. Carrino, Robbins
Arroyo LLP, pro hac vice, represented by George C. Aguilar, Robbins
Arroyo LLP, Gregory E. Del Gaizo, Robbins Arroyo LLP, Jenny L.
Dixon, Robbins Arroyo LLP, pro hac vice, John William Devine,
Devine Goodman Rasco WattsFitzGerald LLP, Lawrence Dean Goodman,
Devine Goodman Rasco WattsFitzgerald LLP, Lindsey C. Herzik,
Robbins Arroyo LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Nicoud, Robbins Arroyo
LLP, pro hac  vice, Peter Barry Patterson, Jr., Law Offices of
Thomas G. Amon, Robert J. Kuntz, Jr., Devine Goodman Rasco
Watts-FitzGerald, LLP & Thomas G. Amon, Law Offices of Thomas G.
Amon.

rue21, Inc., Plaintiff, pro se.

Visa Inc., Defendant, represented by Robert John Vizas --
bob.vizas@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold and Porter LLP, pro hac vice,
Karen Otto -- karen.otto@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter LLP,
pro hac vice, Laura J. Butte -- laura.butte@arnoldporter.com --
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, pro hac vice, Mark R. Merley --
mark.merley@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter LLP, pro hac vice,
Matthew A. Eisenstein -- matthew.eisenstein@arnoldporter.com --
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Adam Rubin
--
michael.rubin@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold and Porter Kaye Scholer
LLP, Robert C. Mason -- robert.mason@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold &
Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Ron Ghatan -- ron.ghatan@arnoldporter.com
-- Arnold & Porter LLP, Sharon D. Mayo --
sharon.mayo@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP,
pro hac vice & Stephanie Ilana Fine -- stephanie.fine@apks.com --
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, pro hac vice.

Visa U.S.A. Inc, Defendant, represented by Robert John Vizas --
bob.vizas@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold and Porter LLP, pro hac vice,
Karen Otto -- karen.otto@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter LLP,
pro hac vice, Laura J. Butte -- laura.butte@arnoldporter.com --
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, pro hac vice, Mark R. Merley --
mark.merley@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter LLP, pro hac vice,
Matthew A. Eisenstein -- matthew.eisenstein@arnoldporter.com --
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Adam Rubin
--
michael.rubin@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold and Porter Kaye Scholer
LLP, Robert C. Mason -- robert.mason@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold &
Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Ron Ghatan -- ron.ghatan@arnoldporter.com
-- Arnold & Porter LLP, Sharon D. Mayo --
sharon.mayo@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP,
pro hac vice & Stephanie Ilana Fine -- stephanie.fine@apks.com --
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, pro hac vice.

Mastercard International Incorporated, Defendant, represented by
Craig Benson -- cbenson@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison LLP, Adrienne J. Lighten --
alighten@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and
Garrison LLP, pro hac vice, Cheryl Ann Cauley --
ccauley@taylorpatchen.com -- Taylor & Patchen, LLP, Christopher Tom
-- ctom@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
LLP, Diana Viggiano Valdivia -- dvaldivia@paulweiss.com -- Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, and Garrison LLP, pro hac vice, Jessica A.
Morton -- jmorton@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison LLP, pro hac vice, Kenneth A. Gallo --
kgallo@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison,
LLP, pro hac vice, Melissa Alpert -- malpert@paulweiss.com -- Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, pro hac vice, Michelle
Katherine Parikh -- mparikh@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton and Garrison LLP, Rosa V. Gilcrease-Garcia --
rgilcrease-garcia@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison LLP, pro hac vice & Stephen E. Taylor --
staylor@taylorpatchen.com -- Taylor & Patchen, LLP.

Discover Financial Services, Defendant, represented by Dana Lynn
Cook-Milligan -- dlcook@winston.com -- Winston and Strawn LLP,
Elizabeth P. Papez -- epapez@winston.com -- Winston and Strawn LLP,
pro hac vice, Eva W. Cole -- ewcole@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn
LLP, James Franklin Herbison -- jherbiso@winston.com -- Winston and
Strawn LLP, Jeanifer Ellen Parsigian -- jparsigian@winston.com --
Winston and Strawn, Jeffrey L. Kessler -- jkessler@winston.com --
Winston & Strawn LLP, Johanna Rae Hudgens -- jhudgens@winston.com
-- Winston & Strawn LLP, Joseph Laurence Motto --
jmotto@winston.com -- Winston and Strawn LLP, Kelli Lynn Lanski --
klanski@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn, Robert Yale Sperling --
rsperling@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn LLP, pro hac vice & Sean
D. Meenan -- smeenan@winston.com -- Winston and Strawn, pro hac
vice.

Bank of America N.A., Defendant, represented by Jane Petersen
Bentrott -- jbentrott@mofo.com -- Morrison Foerster LLP, pro hac
vice, Mark P. Ladner -- mladner@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster,
pro hac vice, Michael B. Miller -- mbmiller@mofo.com -- Morrison &
Foerster LLP, pro hac vice, Natalie Anne Fleming Nolen --
nflemingnolen@mofo.com -- Morrison and Foerster, LLP, pro hac vice
& Tiffani B. Figueroa, Morrison Foerster, pro hac vice.

Capital One Financial Corporation, Defendant, represented by D.
Bruce Hoffman -- dhoffmann@hunton.com -- Hunton and Williams LLP,
pro hac vice, John Eliot Beerbower -- jbeerbower@cravath.com -- pro
hac vice, Leslie Kostyshak -- lkostyshak@hunton.com -- Hunton amd
Williams LLP, pro hac vice, Ryan A. Shores, Hunton and Williams LLP
& Susan S. Joo -- sjoo@hunton.com -- Hunton & Williams LLP.

Chase Bank USA, National Association, Defendant, represented by
Raoul Dion Kennedy -- raoul.kennedy@skadden.com -- Skadden Arps
Slate Meagher & Flom LLP, Boris Bershteyn --
boris.bershteyn@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP, pro hac vice, Evan R. Kreiner -- evan.kreiner@skadden.com --
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, pro hac vice, Harry P.
Koulos -- harry.koulos@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom LLP, pro hac vice & Peter E. Greene --
peter.greene@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP, pro hac vice.

Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. & Citibank N.A., Defendants,
represented by Benjamin Robert Nagin -- BNAGIN@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley
Austin LLP, pro hac vice, David F. Graham -- DGRAHAM@SIDLEY.COM --
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, Jennifer Michelle Wong, Sidley
Austin LLP, pro hac vice, Melissa Colon-Bosolet --
MCOLON-BOSOLET@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice, Paul
Belonick -- PBELONICK@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin & Peter K. Huston
-- PHUSTON@SIDLEY.COM -- Latham & Watkins.

PNC Bank National Association, Defendant, represented by Ashley
Lynn Shively, Reed Smith LLP, Conor Michael Shaffer, Reed Smith
LLP, pro hac vice, Courtney Bedell Averbach, Reed Smith LLP, pro
hac vice, Daniel I. Booker, Reed Smith LLP, pro hac vice, Frederick
N. Egler, Reed Smith, Michelle Ann Mantine, Reed Smith LLP, pro hac
vice & Scott D. Baker, Reed Smith LLP.

Wells Fargo Bank N.A., Defendant, represented by David Carlyle
Powell, McGuireWoods LLP, Casey Erin Lucier, McGuireWoods LLP, pro
hac vice, Howard Feller, McGuire Woods, LLP, pro hac vice, J. Brent
Justus, McGuire Woods, LLP, pro hac vice & Jamie Danielle Wells,
McGuireWoods LLP.

EMVCo, LLC, Defendant, represented by Paul Jeffrey Riehle, Sedgwick
LLP, Alexander Guney, Sedgwick LLP & Dennis Francis Murphy,
Sedgwick LLP.

U.S Bank National Association, Defendant, represented by Andrew
Baldwin Brantingham, Dorsey and Whitney LLP, pro hac vice, Angela
Maryssa Porter, Dorsey and Whitney LLP, pro hac vice, Frederick
Matthew Ralph, Dorsey and Whitney LLP, pro hac vice & Martha
Corcoran Luemers, Dorsey & Whitney LLP.

Elavon, Inc., Interested Party, represented by Martha Corcoran
Luemers Dorsey & Whitney LLP.

7-Eleven, Inc., Interested Party, represented by Adam Owen Glist,
Constantine Cannon LLP.


MDL 2185: Bid for Judgment on Pleadings in Securities Suit Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re: BP p.l.c. Securities Litigation, This document
relates to: Alameda County Emp. Ret. Assoc. et al. v. BP p.l.c. et
al. Avalon Holdings Inc. et al. v. BP p.l.c. et al. Stichting
Pensionenfonds Metaal en Techniek et al. v. BP p.l.c. et al. HESTA
Super Fund v. BP p.l.c. et al. New York City Employees' Ret. Sys.
et al. v. BP p.l.c. et al. Arkansas Teacher Retirement Sys. et al.
v. BP p.l.c. et al. Washington State Investment Board v. BP p.l.c.
et al. Helaba Invest Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH et al. v. BP
p.l.c. et al. Maryland State Ret. and Pension System v. BP p.l.c.
et al. GIC Private Limited v. BP p.l.c. et al. Pension Reserves
Inv. Mgmt. Bd. of Mass. v. BP p.l.c. et al. Virginia Retirement
System et al. v. BP p.l.c. et al. Louisiana State Emps.' Ret. Sys.
et al. v. BP p.l.c. et al. IBM U.K. Pensions Trust Ltd. et al. v.
BP p.l.c. et al. Universities Superannuation Scheme Ltd. v. BP
p.l.c. et al. Merseyside Pension Fund v. BP p.l.c. et al. The Bank
of America Pension Plan v. BP p.l.c. et al, Case No. 4:10-MD-2185,
Cons. Nos. 4:12-cv-01256, 4:12-cv-03715, 4:13-cv-00069,
4:13-cv-00129, 4:13-cv-01393, 4:14-cv-00457, 4:14-cv-00980,
4:14-cv-01065, 4:14-cv-01068, 4:14-cv-01072, 4:14-cv-01084,
4:14-cv-01085, 4:14-cv-01087, 4:14-cv-01279, 4:14-cv-01280,
4:14-cv-01281, 4:14-cv-01418 (S.D. Tex.), Judge Keith P. Ellison of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston
Division, granted the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings.

These actions arise from the Defendants' alleged misstatements and
omissions related to the Deepwater Horizon explosion.  The
Plaintiffs are individual investors who are pursuing causes of
action under the Exchange Act and English securities law.

The Defendants raised their statute of repose argument on two prior
occasions.  First, they raised the statute of repose argument in
their Amended Second Tranche Consolidated Motion to Dismiss, which
the Court decided in September 2014.  The Defendants asked the
Court to dismiss causes of action based on alleged misstatements
made more than five years before the filing of the individual
actions.  The Court applied the tolling rule set out in American
Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, which provides that the filing of
a class action tolls applicable statutes of limitations as to all
putative class members until class certification is denied or until
the individual ceases to be a member of the class.  At the time,
there was a circuit split regarding the application of American
Pipe tolling to statutes of repose.  The primary question was
whether American Pipe tolling was an equitable rule, in which case
it would not apply to statutes of repose.  The Court concluded that
American Pipe tolling was a legal rule, and further determined that
it applied to the Exchange Act claims in the case.

On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court held that American Pipe tolling
is equitable in nature and thus does not apply to the three-year
statute of repose that governs claims under Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933.  This precedent is the basis for the
Defendants' motion.

Defendant Malone raised the statute of repose argument in his
motion for reconsideration of the Court's decision on the Third
Motion to Dismiss.  The Defendants had not argued for dismissal
based on the statute of repose in their Third Motion to Dismiss;
briefing and argument had been completed prior to the ANZ
Securities decision.

In his motion for reconsideration, Defendant Malone briefly raised
the statute of repose argument in a footnote, stating that the
Plaintiffs' Exchange Act claims are also barred by the five-year
statute of repose because Mr. Malone's April 2007 statement was
made more than five years before any of the above-captioned actions
were filed.

The Plaintiffs countered that this presented a new legal theory
impermissibly raised for the first time in a motion for
reconsideration.  The Court declined to decide the statute of
repose issue raised in the motion for reconsideration, since it had
not been raised in the original briefing.

Pending before the Court is the Defendants' motion for judgment on
the pleadings to dismiss certain claims under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 as time-barred.  The Defendants argue that
Exchange Act claims based on alleged misstatements made more than
five years before the filing of the actions at issue are foreclosed
by the Exchange Act's statute of repose.  They filed a memorandum
and a reply in support of their motion.  The Plaintiffs filed a
combined response.

The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants' motion is procedurally
barred on multiple grounds.  First, they argue that the Court's
holding in its decision on the Second Tranche Motion to Dismiss
established the law-of-the-case regarding American Pipe tolling,
and that this prior holding cannot be disturbed.  They further
argue that the Defendants are improperly attempting to use a Rule
12(c) motion to litigate issues that were not timely raised in
their Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  Lastly, the Plaintiffs argue that the
Defendants are using their Rule 12(c) motion to re-litigate an
issue that was already rejected by the Court when it was raised in
Mr. Malone's motion for reconsideration.

Judge Ellison is not persuaded by the Plaintiffs' arguments that
the motion for judgment on the pleadings is procedurally barred.
First,  the Court's reasoning to reach its decision that the
Exchange Act's five-year statute of repose was subject to American
Pipe tolling -- that the rule was legal and not equitable -- has
been directly affected by the ANZ Securities decision.
Accordingly, it is appropriate for the Court to re-examine the
issue.  Second, there was no intervening change in law or other
circumstances that would have affected the Court's previous
analysis of the arguments.  Lastly, he finds that the Defendants
had good reason not to raise the issue in their Third Motion to
Dismiss -- Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec., Inc. had not
been decided until after briefing was complete and argument had
been heard.

The Defendants argue that the Exchange Act's statute of repose bars
the Plaintiffs' Exchange Act claims based on alleged misstatements
made more than five years before the filing of the actions.  The
Judge finds that the Defendants' arguments do not directly
contradict their prior argument about the applicability of
Securities Act cases to Exchange Act claims, since the arguments
relate to different statutory provisions and elements.  Estoppel is
not appropriate in the case.

After considering the parties' filings and the applicable law,
Judge Ellison finds that the Exchange Act's five-year statute of
repose applies to the Plaintiffs' Exchange Act causes of action.
He granted the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
The parties are directed to confer regarding which claims are
untimely under the five-year statute of repose and to submit a
stipulation.  If the parties cannot agree, then the Plaintiffs may
file a short brief identifying which claims identified in the
Defendants' Corrected Appendix A are contested.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/kTzZDy from Leagle.com.

Robert Ludlow, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph W. Cotchett, Esq. --
jcotchett@cpmlegal.com -- Mark C. Molumphy, Esq. --
mmolumphy@cpmlegal.com -- Matthew K. Edling, Esq. --
medling@cpmlegal.com -- Nancy L. Fineman, Esq. --
nfineman@cpmlegal.com -- and Victor S.  Elias, Esq. --
velias@cpmlegal.com -- COTCHETT PITRE & MCCARTHY LLP, Richard
Warren Mithoff, Jr., Esq. -- rmithoff@mithofflaw.com -- MITHOFF LAW
FIRM, Hester H. Cheng, Esq. -- hcnguyen@garciagurney.com -- GARCIA
& GURNEY, ALC.

Alan R. Higgs, Individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ana M. Cabassa, Esq. --
acabassa@zsz.com -- Robert S. Schachter, Esq. -- rschachter@zsz.com
-- and Sona R. Shah, Esq. -- sshah@zsz.com -- ZWERLING SCHACHTER &
ZWERLING LLP, Anthony Chu, Esq. -- anthonychu888@gmail.com -- and
Don K. Ledgard -- DLedgard@capretz.com -- CAPRETZ & ASSOCIATES --
and Mary K. Blasy, Esq. -- mblasy@rgrdlaw.com -- ROBBINS GELLER
RUDMAN & DOWD LLP.

Thomas P DiNapoli, Comptroller of the State of New York, Plaintiff,
represented by Erica G. Langsen, Block & Leviton LLP, Stephen
Douglas Bunch  Cohen Milstein et al, Autry W. Ross, Yetter Coleman,
Daniel S. Sommers, Cohen Milstein et al, Eric R. Nowak, Harrell and
Nowak, Jason M. Leviton, Berman DeValerio, Jeffrey C. Block, Block
& Leviton LLP, Joseph J. Tabacco, Jr., Berman DeValerio, Joshua S.
Devore, Dickenson Peatman & Fogarty, Joshua M. Kolsky, Cohen
Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Julie Reiser, Cohen Milstein Sellers
& Toll PLLC, Matthew Keith Handley, Cohen Milstein et al, pro hac
vice, Matthew D. Pearson, Berman Tabacco, R. Paul Yetter, Yetter
Coleman LLP, Richard Warren Mithoff, Jr., Mithoff Law Firm, Steven
J. Toll, Cohen Milstein et al, Glen DeValerio, Berman DeValerio et
al, Kristin J. Moody, Berman DeValerio & Mark Delaney, Block and
Leviton LLP.

Johnson Investment Counsel Inc, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, is represented by Dianne M.
Nast, Esq. -- dnast@nastlaw.com -- NAST LAW LLC, Richard J.
Arsenault, Esq. -- rarsenault@nbalawfirm.com -- NEBLETT BEARD ET AL
-- and Wilbert B. Markovits, Esq. -- bmarkovits@msdlegal.com --
MARKOVITS, STOCK & DEMARCO LLC

Thomas Yuen, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kirk B. Hulett, Hulett Harper
Stewart LLP, Robert P. Frutkin, Law Offices of Bernard M Gross PC,
Sarah P. Weber, Hulett Harper Stewart LLP, W. Mark Lanier, The
Lanier Law Firm & Mary K. Blasy, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

BP PLC, Defendant, is represented by Robert Mike Brock, Esq.
Kristopher S. Ritter, Esq. -- kristopher.ritter@kirkland.com -- and
Scott W. Fowkes, Esq. -- scott.fowkes@kirkland.com -- KIRKLAND &
ELLIS LLP, Thomas W. Taylor,  Esq. -- ttaylor@andrewskurth.com --
ANDREWS AND KURTH, Daryl A. Libow, Esq. -- libowd@sullcrom.com
--Diane Lee McGimsey, Esq. -- mcgimseyd@sullcrom.com --  Marc De
Leeuw, Esq. Richard C Pepperman, II, Esq. -- SULLIVAN & CROMWELL
LLP, George Denegre, Jr., Esq. John C. Anjier, Esq. --
jcanjier@liskow.com -- and Russell Keith Jarrett,  Esq. --
rkjarrett@liskow.com -- LISKOW LEWIS, Lois O. Rosenbaum, Esq. --
laura.rosenbaum@stoel.com -- STOEL RIVES LLP,  Morgan D. Hodgson,
Esq. -- mhodgson@steptoe.com -- and  Paul J. Ondrasik, Jr.,  Esq.
-- pondrasik@steptoe.com -- STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP -- and Frances
Floriano Goins, Esq. -- fgoins@ulmer.com -- and  Isaac J.
Eddington,  Esq. -- ieddington@ulmer.com -- ULMER & BERNE.

BP America Inc, Defendant, represented by Scott W. Fowkes, Kirkland
& Ellis LLP, Thomas W. Taylor, Andrews and Kurth, Daryl A. Libow,
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, George Denegre, Jr., Liskow & Lewis, John
C. Anjier, Liskow & Lewis, Kristopher S. Ritter, Kirkland & Ellis
LLP, Marc De Leeuw, Sullivan & Cromwell, Morgan D. Hodgson, Steptoe
& Johnson LLP, Paul J. Ondrasik, Jr., Steptoe & Johnson LLP,
Richard C. Pepperman, II, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Russell Keith
Jarrett, Liskow Lewis, Frances Floriano Goins, Ulmer & Berne LLP,
Isaac J. Eddington, Ulmer & Berne & Lois O. Rosenbaum, Stoel Rives
LLP.

Anthony Hayward, Defendant, represented by Scott W. Fowkes,
Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Thomas W. Taylor, Andrews and Kurth, Diane
Lee McGimsey, Sullivan and Cromwell LLP, George Denegre, Jr.,
Liskow & Lewis, John C. Anjier, Liskow & Lewis, Kristopher S.
Ritter, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Marc De Leeuw, Sullivan & Cromwell,
Morgan D. Hodgson, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Paul J. Ondrasik, Jr.,
Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Russell Keith Jarrett, Liskow Lewis, Daryl
A. Libow, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Frances Floriano Goins, Ulmer &
Berne LLP, Isaac J. Eddington, Ulmer & Berne & Richard C.
Pepperman, II, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP.

Andy Inglis, Defendant, represented by Thomas W. Taylor, Andrews
and Kurth, George Denegre, Jr., Liskow & Lewis, John C. Anjier,
Liskow & Lewis, Kathleen Goodhart, Cooley LLP, Marc De Leeuw,
Sullivan & Cromwell, Paul J. Ondrasik, Jr., Steptoe & Johnson LLP,
Russell Keith Jarrett, Liskow Lewis, Richard C. Pepperman, II,
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP & Stephen C. Neal, Cooley Godward Kronish.

Carl-Henric Svanberg, William Castell, Paul Anderson, Antony
Burgmans & Cynthia Carroll, Defendants, represented by Thomas W.
Taylor, Andrews and Kurth, George Denegre, Jr., Liskow & Lewis,
John C. Anjier, Liskow & Lewis, Kathleen Goodhart, Cooley LLP, Marc
De Leeuw, Sullivan & Cromwell, Paul J. Ondrasik, Jr., Steptoe &
Johnson LLP, Russell Keith Jarrett, Liskow Lewis, Richard C.
Pepperman, II, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP & Stephen C. Neal, Cooley
Godward Kronish.


MDL 2785: Court Grants Bid to Compel Subpoena Compliance
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas issued
a Memorandum and Order granting Mylan Defendants' Motion to Compel
Compliance with Subpoenas in the case captioned IN RE: EpiPen
(Epinephrine Injection, USP) Marketing, Sales Practices and
Antitrust Litigation (This Document Applies to All Cases), MDL No.
2785, Case No. 17-md-2785-DDC-TJJ. (D. Kan.).

This matter is before the Court on Mylan Defendants' Motion to
Compel Compliance with Subpoenas Directed to Horizon Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of New Jersey, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Massachusetts, Inc., and CareFirst, Inc.

In early March, 2018, Mylan served subpoenas on Horizon,
BCBS-Mass., and CareFirst pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45.
Similarly, in February, 2018, Mylan served Rule 45 subpoenas on
both Humana entities, Aetna, and Coventry.3 Counsel conferred and
corresponded a number of times, and the non-parties produced
additional materials. Ultimately, two areas of disagreement remain
and are the subject of the instant motion.

Mylan argues that Horizon, BCBS-Mass., CareFirst, Aetna, and
Coventry should be compelled to produce information responsive to
Request No. 10, categories (o), (p), and (q), which seeks data or
documents of claims and other information about EAI devices related
to factors that influence subscriber premiums, the actual
subscriber insurance premiums, and any amount of the premiums paid
by employers.

The non-parties argue the Premium Information Mylan seeks is not
available, but even if it were it is irrelevant and producing it
would be extraordinarily burdensome.4 CareFirst also argues that as
a non-party absent class member, it is protected from discovery.
That is the extent of CareFirst's argument in response to Mylan's
effort to obtain Other Products Information.

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 governs both motions to compel
compliance with and motions to quash a subpoena served on a
non-party. Under Rule 45(d)(2)(B), if the entity commanded to
produce documents serves written objections to the subpoena, the
serving party may seek compliance by filing a motion to compel
production of the documents. If the non-party wishes to challenge
the subpoena, it does so by filing a motion to quash.

Relevance

The non-parties argue the Premium Information is irrelevant to
Mylan's defense because they do not set their premiums based solely
on the cost of any particular drug product. As set out in their
supporting affidavits, the non-parties set premiums based on a
variety of factors, and no one can assign one particular cause to
any amount of premium increase.

Mylan counters that it seeks the information not in support of a
premium pass on defense, but to counter Class Plaintiffs' damages
claims resting on allegations that consumers were injured because
their insurance premiums were raised as a result of Mylan's
conduct. Clearly, the Premium Information is relevant for the
reasons Mylan offers.

Although CareFirst does not address the relevance of the Other
Products Information, consistent with the Court's rulings in
motions related to other non-party subpoenas, the Court finds
rebate and formulary information related to the four Sanofi
products is relevant.

Scope of requests and burden

Mylan has narrowed the scope of the Premium Information it seeks in
response to Request No. 10, categories (o), (p), and (q) based on
what it learned from the non-parties during their meet and confer
sessions and through written communication. Although the
non-parties continue to assert that Mylan seeks information the
non-parties do not possess and documents they do not keep in the
ordinary course of business, their argument is premised on the
notion that the non-parties would be required to create a file that
links group coverage payments to any specific EAI device
transaction.

Mylan denies that it seeks to force the non-parties to create
anything other than what they admittedly possess. Instead, Mylan
requests the following responsive materials. For Request No. 10(o),
Mylan seeks the information the non-parties detail in affidavits
they filed under seal describing how they calculate premiums. The
Court finds such information would be responsive to Mylan's request
and should be produced.

Rule 23 objection

CareFirst asks the Court to deny Mylan's motion as premature, and
alternatively seeks a protective order halting further non-party
discovery as to CareFirst.16 The other non-parties suggest a stay
of discovery might be appropriate pending the District Judge's
ruling on the motions to dismiss. Those motions have been ruled,
and the Court therefore declines to enter a stay.

The Court is not persuaded by the non-parties' Rule 23 objection.
The information Mylan seeks is relevant, and the non-parties are
uniquely able to provide their own responses. Local 282's premium
information is no substitute for or analog of any other third-party
payors. The Court will not deny Mylan's motions on the basis of
Rule 23, nor will the Court enter a protective order as
CareFirst requests.

The Rule 23 objection is the only one CareFirst raises with respect
to Mylan seeking Other Products Information in Request Nos. 5, 6,
and 7. Having overruled that objection, the Court will grant
Mylan's motion with respect to Other Products Information.

Mylan Defendants' Motion to Compel Compliance with Subpoenas
Directed to Horizon Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New Jersey, Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., and CareFirst, Inc.
is granted.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 4, 2018 Memorandum
and Order Recommendation is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ydy45fvm from Leagle.com.

All Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs, represented by Amanda Klevorn --
aklevorn@burnscharest.com -- Burns Charest, LLP, pro hac vice,
Korey Nelson -- knelson@burnscharest.com -- Burns Charest, LLP, pro
hac vice, Lynn Lincoln Sarko -- lsarko@kellerrohrback.com -- Keller
Rohrback, LLC, pro hac vice, Paul J. Geller -- PGeller@rgrdlaw.com
-- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP, pro hac vice, Rex A. Sharp --
rsharp@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA, Ryan C. Hudson --
rhudson@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA & Warren T. Burns --
wburns@burnscharest.com -- Burns Charest, LLP, pro hac vice.

Mylan N.V., Defendant, represented by Adam K. Levin --
adam.levin@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP, pro hac vice,
Benjamin Frederick Holt -- benjamin.holt@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan
Lovells US LLP, Brian C. Fries -- bfries@lathropgage.com -- Lathrop
Gage LLP, Brian R. Richichi -- brian.richichi@hoganlovells.com --
Hogan Lovells US LLP, Carolyn Anne DeLone -
carrie.delone@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP, Chad E.
Blomberg -- cblomberg@lathropgage.com -- Lathrop Gage, LLP,
Christopher D. Edelman , Hogan Lovells US LLP, Daniel Thomas Graham
-- dgraham@clarkhill.com -- Clark Hill, PLC, pro hac vice, David M.
Foster -- david.foster@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP,
pro hac vice, James Moloney jmoloney@lathropgage.com -- Lathrop
Gage LLP, Jon Myer Talotta -- jon.talotta@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan
Lovells US LLP, Justin Bernick -- justin.bernick@hoganlovells.com
-- Kathryn M. Ali -- kathryn.ali@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells
US LLP, pro hac vice, Sue Lin -- tony.lin@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan
Lovells US LLP, Timothy Robert Herman  -- therman@clarkhill.com --
Clark Hill, PLC, pro hac vice & Yuri Fuchs --
yuri.fuchs@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US, LLP.


MENZGOLD GHANA: Customer Mulls Suit Over Transparency Issues
------------------------------------------------------------
Edwin Lamptey, writing for YEN, reports an aggrieved customer of
Menzgold Ghana Company Ltd., is threatening to rally a class action
suit against the minerals trading company over some transparency
issues.

According to her, Menzgold had not been transparent about the
legality of their operations with its customers.

In an interview sighted by YEN.com.gh on Citi News, the customer,
who spoke on grounds of anonymity described the numerous assurances
given by the company as deceit.

This follows the decision of Menzgold to postpone its scheduled
reopening to September 28 after it had set an earlier date of
September 19.

Menzgold temporarily halted its gold trading activities on
September 13, 2018, following a directive from the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).

The company promised to resume work after six days of closure, but
had to extend the date due to incomplete meetings it was having
with SEC.

Whilst some customers are protesting against the suspension of the
operations of Menzgold, the woman who spoke to Citi News said, "now
we are sounding a caution to them that the government has been on
them. The next one will be us the clients being on them. If the
government wasn't able to bring them down, we the masses will bring
them down," the customer threatened.

She noted that the best course of legal action would be a
class-action suit against the company.

"You speak to the masses, you organize them and institute a
class-action against them for breaching their contract so we the
masses we give them up to the 28th [September] that they have said
right now . . . if we don't see any favorable terms from them, the
next action will be a class action against Menzgold."

Spokesperson of Menzgold, George Quaye has apologized for the late
notice of postponement of suspension on the company's gold vault
market.

"It is unfortunate that statement did come out later but to ensure
that the statement got to everyone, aside just releasing it, we
also blasted a bulk SMS to each and every customer," he told the
media.

George Quaye also said the "firm is dealing with all state agencies
to ensure that these bottlenecks that we are encountering at the
moment are all cleared and resolved and that is where the focus is
right now." Menzgold Ghana Limited was asked to suspend its gold
trading operations with the public by SEC.

According to the SEC, Menzgold had been dealing in the purchase and
deposit of gold collectables from the public and issuing contracts
with guaranteed returns with clients, without a valid license from
the Commission.

This, the SEC said, was in contravention of "section 109 of Act 929
with consequences under section 2016 (I) of the same Act."

The company was however cleared to continue its other businesses of
assaying, purchasing gold from small-scale miners and export of
gold. [GN]


MGT CAPITAL: Nov. 27 Class Action Lead Plaintiff Deadline Set
-------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, reminds
purchasers of the securities of MGT Capital Investments, Inc. (OTC:
MGTI) from October 9, 2015 through September 7, 2018, inclusive
(the "Class Period") of the important November 27, 2018 lead
plaintiff deadline in the class action. The lawsuit seeks to
recover damages for MGT Capital investors under the federal
securities laws. [GN]


MONAKER GROUP: McLeod Class Action Voluntarily Dismissed
--------------------------------------------------------
Monaker Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 15, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended August 31, 2018, that the class action
lawsuit entitled, McLeod v. Monaker Group, Inc. et al., has been
voluntarily dismissed.

On December 9, 2016, a class action lawsuit McLeod v. Monaker
Group, Inc. et al (Case No.: 0:16-cv-62902-WJZ) was filed against
the company, William Kerby, the company's Chief Executive Officer
and Chairman, Donald Monaco, the company's director, and D’Arelli
Pruzansky, P.A., the company's former auditor, in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Florida on behalf of persons who
purchased the company's common stock and exercised options between
April 6, 2012 and June 23, 2016 (the "Class Period").

The lawsuit focuses on whether the Company and its executives
violated federal securities laws and whether the Company's former
auditor was negligent and makes allegations regarding the
activities of certain Company executives. The lawsuit alleges and
estimates total shareholders losses totaling approximately
$20,000,000.

The lawsuit stems from the Company's announcement in June 2016 that
it would have to restate its financial statements due to issues
related to the Company's investment in RealBiz. On February 16,
2017, the company filed a Motion to Dismiss the lawsuit and on
March 3, 2017, the Court entered an order staying discovery and all
other proceedings pending resolution of the Motion to Dismiss. On
March 16, 2017, the plaintiffs responded to the Motion to Dismiss,
and on March 30, 2017, the company filed a Reply memorandum in
support of its Motion to Dismiss.

On January 24, 2018, the Court granted the company's Motion to
Dismiss and dismissed Plaintiff's complaint and gave Plaintiff
leave to file an amended complaint. On February 23, 2018, McLeod,
joined by new plaintiff, Ronald Mims, filed an Amended Complaint
with the same allegations of security fraud as alleged in the
original complaint.

On March 29, 2018, the company filed a Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, which the Plaintiffs have since
filed a response to. On September 26, 2018, the parties amicably
resolved the matter, resulting in the plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissing the lawsuit with prejudice as reflected by a Final Order
of Dismissal of the court on such date.

Monaker Group, Inc., a travel and technology company, operates an
online marketplace for the alternative lodging rental (ALR) market
worldwide. The company offers ALR products and auxiliary services
to property owners and managers, travelers, and other
travel/lodging distributors. It provides it products and services
through NextTrip.com, NextTrip.biz, Maupintour.com, or EXVG.com.
The company was formerly known as Next 1 Interactive, Inc. and
changed its name to Monaker Group, Inc. in June 2015. The company
was founded in 2002 and is headquartered in Weston, Florida.
Monaker Group, Inc. is a subsidiary of Extraordinary Vacations
Group Inc.


MONDA WINDOW: Dancy Lin Dismissed from FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------
In the case, JIAN PING LIN, Plaintiff, v. MONDA WINDOW & DOOR
SYSTEMS, INC., MONDA WINDOW & DOOR, CORP., MONDA WINDOW & DOOR,
MFG. LTD., WONDA LLC, RIBIAO WANG, DENIS WANG, MIN OUYANG, DANCY
LIN, and ELIAS ABUBEKER, Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-3737 (MKB)
(RER) (E.D. N.Y.), Judge Margo K. Brodie of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York (i) granted the Defendants
MWDS, Wonda LLC, and Dancy Lin's motion to dismiss with respect to
the Plaintiff's claims against Dancy Lin, any claims originating
before June 21, 2011, and the New York Labor Law claims against all
the Defendants; and (ii) denied their motion to dismiss MWDS and
Wonda as the Defendants in the action.

Plaintiff Jian Ping Lin commenced the above-captioned putative
class action on June 6, 2017, against the Defendants, asserting
claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), New York Labor
Law, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, and the Illinois Wage Payment
and Collection Act alleging, inter alia, nonpayment of minimum wage
and overtime.

On Sept. 26, 2017, the Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's
claims against them pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.  On April 5, 2018, the Court referred the
Defendants' motion to Magistrate Judge Ramon E. Reyes for a report
and recommendation.

By report and recommendation dated August 7, 2018 ("R&R"), Judge
Reyes recommended that the Court grants the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the Plaintiff's claims against Dancy Lin, any claims
originating before June 21, 2011, and the New York Labor Law claims
against all the Defendants.  Judge Reyes also recommended that the
Court denies the motion to dismiss MWDS and Wonda as the Defendants
in the action.  No party has objected to the R&R.

Judge Brodie has reviewed the unopposed R&R.  He found no clear
error and adopted the R&R in its entirety.  Accordingly, the Judge
(i) granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to the
Plaintiff's claims against Dancy Lin, any claims originating before
June 21, 2011, and the New York Labor Law claims against all the
Defendants.  He denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss MWDS and
Wonda as the Defendants in the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 14, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/yOygkE from Leagle.com.

Jian Ping Lin, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron Schweitzer --
troylaw@troypllc.com -- Troy Law, PLLC & John Troy, Law Office of
John Troy.


MORRISTOWN MEMORIAL: Frazier FDCPA Suit Dismissed with Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Esther Salas of the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey dismissed with prejudice the case, WANDA FRAZIER,
Plaintiff, v. MORRISTOWN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL; PRESSLER AND PRESSLER,
LLP; AND DOES 1-10, Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-6631 (ES) (JAD)
(D. N.J.).

The Pro se Plaintiff filed a putative class-action Complaint
againsttrh Defendants on Aug. 31, 2017.  She alleges that the
Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA"), New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act ("CFA"), and several
Pennsylvania consumer-protection statutes in their attempts to
collect debt for hospital services provided to her now ex-husband,
Ronald Frazier.

The crux of the Plaintiff's Complaint is that the Defendants have
uniformly engaged in a scheme of illegal and deceptive business
practices that violate both federal and state law in attempting to
collect hospital debt from her by using false information and
documentation.  The Plaintiff's Complaint references multiple
state-court actions in which the Hospital sought to collect debt
from the Plaintiff and Mr. Frazier for services rendered to Mr.
Frazier on Nov. 4, 2000 and March 17, 2002.

Specifically, in 2002, the Hospital (represented by Pressler) filed
an action against the Plaintiff and Mr. Frazier in the Superior
Court of New Jersey, under docket number DC-002051-02 seeking
approximately $4,000.  On Dec. 23, 2002, the state court entered
judgment against the Plaintiff and Mr. Frazier in the amount of
$4,210.25.  The Plaintiff moved to vacate the Collection Lawsuit
judgment on Oct. 12, 2007, but her motion was denied.  The judgment
against the Plaintiff and Mr. Fraizer remains open.

The Defendants collected a portion of the judgment through a wage
execution.  On March 16 and 27, 2017, Pressler mailed a letter to
the Plaintiff seeking to collect the remainder of the judgment.
Each letter contained a disclosure at the bottom of the page: "This
communication is from a debt collector.  This is an attempt to
collect a debt.  Any information obtained will be used for that
purpose.

Approximately two months after Pressler's March 2017 letters, on
May 25, 2017, the Plaintiff filed an action against Pressler in the
Superior Court of New Jersey, under docket number MRS-DC-003799-17,
alleging violation of the FDCPA for Pressler's efforts to collect
on the judgment from the Collection Lawsuit.  In the Prior FDCPA
Action, the Plaintiff alleged that (i) on March 6th, 18th, and 30,
2017, she mailed P&P LLP letters demanding that they fully validate
the debt and provide proof of ownership in its attempt to collect
the Debt; and (ii) despite having received her request to validate
debt P&P LLP are still attempting to collect on debt which they
have not verified nor validated the debt.  The Prior FDCPA Action
was dismissed for failure to state a claim New Jersey Court Rule
4:6-2(e) on July 12, 2017.

Pressler moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint on Feb. 9,
2018.  The Hospital followed suit on Feb. 21, 2018.  The Plaintiff
opposed both motions.  The Hospital and Pressler replied to the
Plaintiff's oppositions on March 22 and 23, 2018, respectively.
The Plaintiff then submitted several sur-replies without leave of
Court, which the Hospital requested that the Court disregard.

Judge Salas finds that based on the same evidence as was before the
New Jersey Superior Court, whether Pressler violated the FDCPA
would require a federal court to question the final judgment of a
state court.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal
Constitution, codified in statute, requires that federal courts
give full faith and credit to the judgments of state courts.
Accordingly, she will grant Pressler's motion and will dismiss with
prejudice the Plaintiff's claims against Pressler.

The Judge also finds that the FDCPA has a one-year initiation
period.  The Plaintiff appears to allege that the Defendants (i)
used false information and documentation to collect a debt; and
(ii) routinely and conspiratorially participate and engage in the
initiation and perpetuation of attempts to collect debt from and
against persons the documentation for which is knowingly false,
non-existent, or otherwise not available to substantiate the
cause(s) of action asserted in attempting to collect alleged debt
obligations, and the categories sought to be collected under the
Collection Lawsuit.  Holding pro se Plaintiff's Complaint to less
stringent standards and giving her every favorable inference, the
Judge finds that the only allegations against the Hospital appear
to relate to allegedly false medical statements from 2000 and 2002.
So, even assuming that the FDCPA applies to the Hospital, the
Plaintiff's time to file a claim under the FDCPA expired in 2003,
at the latest.  The Plaintiff's FDCPA claims against the Hospital
therefore are time-barred and must be dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Salas granted the Defendants'
motions to dismiss and dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiff's
Complaint.  Given that the Plaintiff's federal FDCPA claims have
been dismissed, the Judge declined to address the merits of the
Plaintiff's state law claims.  An appropriate Order accompanies the
Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/19kPTe from Leagle.com.

WANDA FRAZIER, Plaintiff, pro se.

MORRISTOWN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Defendant, represented by PETER A.
MARRA -- ptm@spsk.com -- SCHENCK, PRICE, SMITH, & KING, LLP &
THOMAS N. GAMARELLO -- tng@spsk.com -- SCHENCK, PRICE, SMITH & KING
LLP.

PRESSLER AND PRESSLER LLP, Defendant, represented by MICHAEL JON
PETERS, PRESSLER, FELT & WARSHAW, LLP.


MOVIEPASS: Unlimited Plan Enrollment May Prompt Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Tom McKay, writing for Gizmodo, reports that if e-ticketing startup
MoviePass isn't quite dead yet, there's been no mistaking the
telltale signs of a dead man walking for months now. After months
of reports that the service was about to hit a financial brick
wall, it suddenly ceased paying for major new releases, nuked its
unlimited plan, and offered customers who didn't want to continue
subscribing to a plan only good for three a la carte movie
selections a month and a discounted fourth ticket a cancellation
and refund. It's posted huge quarterly losses and is facing a
shareholder lawsuit over alleged fraud.

And now, the cardiac arrest has begun in earnest. According to the
Verge, the company is now sending emails to what it described as a
"select test group" of customers who it says did not opt in to the
new three movies a month plan. The emails say that these
subscribers' accounts will be re-activated on October 4th and be
put back on the monthly $9.95 billing cycle unless they click a
specific opt-out link.

In the email, MoviePass wrote that these subscribers will be rolled
back into a program that offers "unlimited movies (up to one new
movie title per day based on existing inventory)". It added that
the company has chosen to do this "Because we really hope you begin
enjoying your MoviePass subscription again... [this is] the same
subscription that you signed up for and previously enjoyed."

Of course, it is not, because those subscribers who left did so
because MoviePass is now a shell game that cycles the availability
of films according to their financial whims. For example, if you
wanted to see the horror thriller Hell Fest, the only upcoming date
listed was October 1st. MoviePass doesn't even have a list of
available films past October 3rd on its website.

The email also tells customers that if they do opt-out, their
"subscription will be canceled and no longer held in a
‘suspended' status, and [they] will not be able to re-join until
9 months have passed."

According to the Verge, MoviePass appears to believe it has the
right to re-enroll people whose accounts lapsed just because it
says it does:

The company claims its TOS gives it pretty much free reign to
change any aspect of the service regardless of when you subscribed
or when your next billing cycle happens to be. When MoviePass
realized that it had to change the terms of its subscription for
its annual members prior to the start of a new billing cycle -- a
move that opened it up to legal action -- the company tried to make
amends by offering refunds or the option to transition to a paid
out monthly plan.

Prior to that, members who cancelled the service in August during
the period of tumultuous and seemingly non-stop service changes
were automatically opted back into new plans, which the company
attributed to "bugs" in its service.

This is at least the second time since August when MoviePass has
used a shady tactic to re-enroll customers. But this latest move is
at the very least unethical, and it is questionably legal.
Customers on Twitter and Reddit are describing it as a form of
fraud, and some users claim to have explicitly canceled their
accounts (as opposed to just letting them lapse) or un-linked their
payment cards, yet still received the email. MoviePass has long
been plagued with allegations of absentee customer service, and the
unending string of changes to its service were frustrating enough.
But this is a whole other level.

This seems more likely to end in the complete and total destruction
of any remaining customer goodwill and/or a class action lawsuit
than a MoviePass revival, but it is also clearly a desperation
move. If you don't want MoviePass to start charging you $9.95 a
month without your consent, check your inbox for the following
email:

In August 2018, we announced a new offering for three movies a
month for $9.95, giving subscribers the ability to opt-in to this
plan if they wanted to continue as a MoviePass subscriber. However,
our records show that you have not yet taken any action on the new
plan, and because of that your subscription was suspended and your
monthly subscription charges have stopped.

Because we really hope you begin enjoying your MoviePass
subscription again, we have chosen you to be a part of a select
test group, who beginning Friday, October 5th will be restored to
unlimited movies (up to one new movie title per day based on
existing inventory) -- the same subscription that you signed up for
and you previously enjoyed. If you decide that you do not want this
you must "opt out" before Thursday, October 4th at 9:00PM ET.

To be clear, unless you opt out, your unlimited subscription will
be restored and you will begin enjoying unlimited movies again (up
to 1 movie per day, based on existing inventory) at $9.95 per
month, and your credit card on file will be charged on a monthly
basis beginning Friday, October 5th, 2018.

If you do opt out of the restoration of your subscription to the
unlimited plan, your subscription will be canceled and no longer
held in a "suspended" status, and you will not be able to re-join
until 9 months have passed.

Even if you're fine with the a la carte "unlimited" plan, we
encourage you to cancel, because there's just no telling what
tricks MoviePass will pull in the future at this point. [GN]


NAMASTE TECHNOLOGIES: Rosen Law Firm Files Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, on Oct. 6
disclosed that it has filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of
purchasers of the securities of Namaste Technologies Inc. (OTC:
NXTTF) from November 29, 2017 through October 4, 2018, inclusive
(the "Class Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for
Namaste investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Namaste class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1425.html or call Phillip Kim,
Esq. or Zachary Halper, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email
pkim@rosenlegal.com or zhalper@rosenlegal.com for information on
the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Namaste had sold its
wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary to Namaste executives; (2)
consequently, Namaste did not sell its U.S. subsidiary in an arm's
length transaction; and (3) as a result, defendants' statements
about the company's business, operations, and prospects, were
materially false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at
all relevant times. When the true details entered the market, the
lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than December
5, 2018. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-1425.html or to discuss your
rights or interests regarding this class action, please contact
Phillip Kim or Zachary Halper of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via email at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
zhalper@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm -- http://www.rosenlegal.com-- represents investors
throughout the globe, concentrating its practice in securities
class actions and shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm
was Ranked No. 1 by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number
of securities class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been
ranked in the top 3 each year since 2013. [GN]


NEW MEXICO: CYFD Sued Over "Broken" Foster Care System
------------------------------------------------------
Colleen Heild, writing for Albuquerque Journal, reports that
thousands of abused or neglected children in New Mexico are removed
from unsafe conditions at home only to end up in a "broken"
state-run foster care system that fails to treat their trauma and,
in some cases, puts them in inappropriate or overly restrictive
housing where they continue their downward spiral.

Some are locked in, drugged and physically restrained.

Those are among the allegations in a 95-page proposed class action
lawsuit filed on Sept. 22 in U.S. District Court in Albuquerque
against the state Children, Youth and Families Department, which
runs foster care, and the state Human Services Department, which
oversees Medicaid treatment for children in state custody.

"New Mexico has profoundly and consistently failed to fulfill the
federal legal obligations it owes to the foster children entrusted
to its care, with tragic and enduring consequences for the health,
safety and life chance of a generation of the nation's most
vulnerable children," says the lawsuit filed by a group that
includes New Mexico child advocates and their attorneys.

CYFD spokesman Henry Varela on Sept. 22 had no immediate comment
about the lawsuit.

"We haven't been served, and we're not even aware of it, especially
if it's just been filed," Varela told the Journal.

The lawsuit, which is filed on behalf of abused or neglected
children in state custody, says that 4,737 children spent time in
foster care in New Mexico during the 2017 fiscal year.

While a handful of tragic cases in which CYFD failed to take abused
or neglected children into custody have made headlines in recent
years, what happens when vulnerable children are removed from their
homes by CYFD is less public, because their case files are
confidential by law.

The new lawsuit contends that some abused and neglected children
end up with foster families who lack the training, ability and
support to care for them.

Some children taken into state custody are housed, at least
temporarily, at CYFD offices and emergency shelters. Others end up
in residential treatment centers -- some of them out of state --
where they can be subjected to psychotropic drugs and physical
restraint. None of those placements is designed for long-term care
or to help treat the child's trauma, the lawsuit states.

The result: Children are situated in "overly restrictive
environments, where they may suffer additional trauma from the
effects of restraint, seclusion or even violence," the lawsuit
says.

"This grim pattern is the inevitable consequence of CYFD and HSD's
failure to recruit, license, train and support sufficient numbers
of appropriate foster care placements and its failure to hire,
train and support staff and services providers in sufficient
numbers and with appropriate expertise," the lawsuit states.

The lawsuit doesn't seek monetary damages but asks for court
intervention to ensure children taken into state custody "avoid
retraumatization" by receiving timely and adequate mental and
behavorial health treatment. And the lawsuit wants CYFD to ensure
children receive "safe and stable placements that are the least
restrictive appropriate to their needs."

Young plaintiffs

The lawsuit names as plaintiffs 13 foster children and two
nonprofit organizations, Disability Rights New Mexico and Native
American Disabilty Law Center. The child plaintiffs, who range from
under 2 years old to 17, are identified by pseudonyms only.

For example, the lawsuit alleges:

   * One child plaintiff named Diana D. has been transferred to at
least 11 short-term, inappropriate placements over a two-year
period, including emergency crisis shelters, treatment foster care,
resident treatment facilities and multiple psychiatric hospitals.

   * Plaintiff Kevin S. has had at least 11 placements during two
stints in state custody. The second time in 2016, he was 12 years
old and spent a week in an emergency youth shelter for residents
age 16 to 21. After that, he spent two nights sleeping in a CYFD
office, which had neither a formal sleeping place nor a shower.

"Due to the fact that CYFD staff are not equipped to securely
monitor children in the office overnight, Kevin S. was able to run
away and was found dodging in and out of traffic."

CYFD then sent Kevin S. to a residential treatment center in
Colorado, where he was repeatedly harmed by both staff and other
residents.

   * Plaintiff Olivia L.'s aunt became her foster parent and
repeatedly asked for support services from CYFD but received none.
After less than one month, the aunt requested her niece be removed
from the home.

"When CYFD does place children with foster families … the agency
fails to provide foster families with the support and
trauma-informed training necessary to equip the foster parent to
care for the child," the suit says. "As a result, foster parents
often feel they cannot adequately meet a child's medical, mental
health and behavioral needs and have no choice but to request a
child's removal."

After Olivia L. was removed from her aunt's care, "Olivia L. was
then cycled through multiple short-term shelters and was raped by
two adults at one of those shelters," the lawsuit alleges.

The lawsuit alleges that HSD's failure to adequately ensure timely
medical, mental health and behavioral health services for children
contributes to CYFD's failed placement practices.

"As a result, the mental and physical health of children in CYFD
custody deteriorates, placements become unsustainable, and children
are unnecessarily removed and cycled through progressively more
restrictive placements."

Continued trauma

"New Mexico has the highest rate of childhood trauma exposure in
the country, with 18 percent of all children in the state having
experienced three or more significant traumatic experiences," the
lawsuit states.

Under the current system, New Mexico's child welfare practices
"systematically re-traumatize vulnerable children. The predictable
result of New Mexico's failure to recruit an adequate number of
foster care parents has been to subject children to a series of
temporary placements in which any bonds they can form with
caregivers are promptly broken."

Children are placed in residential treatment centers "not because
of medical necessity, but because no other placement options are
available." And residential treatment centers are among the most
restrictive placements for children in state custody, the lawsuit
states.

Moreover, CYFD is required by law to put a preference on placing
Indian children with a member of their family or with their tribe
but has not done so because it hasn't recruited enough Native
American foster families.

Compounding the problem, the lawsuit says, is that New Mexico "has
failed to adequately train its staff and foster parents on
childhood trauma or to help them in dealing with the secondary
trauma that they themselves often suffer.

"Ill-prepared to understand and respond to trauma, those on the
front lines of New Mexico's child welfare system may inadvertently
subject children in their care to additional trauma."

Since 2013, the state Legislature has pumped nearly $6 million into
CYFD's Protective Services Division for additional investigators
and permanency workers at a time when the majority of state
agencies experienced reduced funding because of declining state
revenues, according to a 2017 Legislative Finance Committee
report.

But the turnover rate of CYFD protective services workers reached
more than 26 percent earlier this year, according to CYFD reports.

Plaintiff Kevin S. was repeatedly restrained, often for over an
hour at a time, in his residential treatment center in Colorado,
the lawsuit alleges. As a result, he appeared at a court hearing
with bruised eyes and other facial wounds.

Chemical restraints, similarly dangerous to children's heath, are
routinely used on children in CYFD custody, the lawsuit alleges.

"For example, staff at one of the largest residential treatment
centers in Albuquerque routinely use or threat to use 'booty
juice,' a sedative or other psychotropic medications," the lawsuit
states.

Once CYFD sends foster children outside the state to residential
treatment centers, there is little to no monitoring of the cases,
the lawsuit alleges.

Even though CYFD received multiple incident reports detailing how
Kevin S. was repeatedly harmed at the Colorado residential
treatment center, CYFD kept him at this placement for a year, the
lawsuit says.

Afterward, due to CYFD's inability to secure a placement in New
Mexico, CYFD subsequently sent Kevin S. to another out-of-state
residential treatment center in Utah.

Across his placements, the lawsuit states, the 14-year-old has
received only phone counseling with his mother, inadequate
counseling or no counseling at all.

Looking for a wake-up call

In 2005, the state resolved a 25-year-old class action lawsuit
against CYFD that was filed over allegations that children were
languishing in foster care instead of being adopted.

Now New Mexico joins a number of other states, including Texas,
Oklahoma and Arizona, that have been sued in recent years over
alleged state foster care failings, including the lack of proper
placements for children.

Child advocates involved hope the New Mexico lawsuit will be a
wake-up call to state leaders.

"This lawsuit exposes where many of the problems lie and sheds
light on the steps we need to take as a state, as a community,"
said F. Michael Hart, a longtime child welfare attorney in
Albuquerque. "We can litigate about who is at fault and who has
failed in fulfilling responsibilities. Other states have chosen
that path. We believe that approach only wastes time and squanders
limited resources when we all know what needs to be done and can
start working together now."

"The abused and neglected children of New Mexico will continue to
suffer needlessly if we hesitate any longer."

State officials are well aware of the failings in the system, the
lawsuit alleges.

CYFD officials in recent years have touted improvements, but the
lawsuit contends that federal court intervention is needed to
overhaul the system before more children are harmed.

"CYFD and HSD know their broken child welfare system is inflicting
harm on the children in its care," the lawsuit states, "and they
also know how to fix it." [GN]


NEW MEXICO: Foster Care Fails to Help Traumatized Children
----------------------------------------------------------
Colleen Heild, writing for Albuquerque Journal, reports that the
three brothers are still kids. They like riding bikes, doing
gymnastics, flying a toy helicopter, playing with dogs.

In their short lives, though, they have watched their father kick
and beat their mother. They've been neglected, and witnessed the
death of their older sister in a fire that burned down their home.
One of the boys was sexually abused.

The youngest tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana at
birth.

They were taken into state custody due to neglect, but their
sustained and repeated exposure to trauma left its toll.

And New Mexico's foster care system, according to a newly filed
federal lawsuit, did little to help them heal.

At age six, one of the brothers, Justin, has a history of
self-harming, acting impulsively, and has post-traumatic stress
disorder. He has reported auditory and visual hallucinations of his
deceased sister. He has been on medications for nightmares and
anxiety.

The oldest, Maddie, age 10, has difficulty managing anger and
concentrating. He keeps thinking about his unstable home life and
his parent's drug use, and he worries about his little brothers.
The youngest is not yet two years old.

According to the proposed class action lawsuit, their experiences
illustrate the failings of New Mexico's foster care system.

The two older brothers didn't receive a neuropsychological
evaluation for more than eight months. There was no timely and
adequate therapy to address their grief, with Maddie waiting three
months for individual therapy. Their foster parent abruptly
canceled family counseling without adequate basis or oversight by
CYFD.

The boys lasted seven months at the foster home before "outbursts"
by Maddie and Justin's "behavioral challenges" returned, and the
three boys were removed by CYFD at the foster mother's request in
August 2017. They haven't been housed together since.

The lawsuit contends that their treatment, or lack thereof, by CYFD
led to their deteriorating behavior.

The trauma of being separated from one's parental figures is often
compounded by the trauma of being separated from one's siblings,
the lawsuit states. And the separation of siblings in foster care
is linked to increased behavioral health issues, including running
away.

For instance, 14-year-old Chris W., another plaintiff in the
lawsuit, was close to his mother, who died of asthma in 2016. His
father has been in and out of prison and is currently incarcerated.
Chris and his two brothers were placed in state foster care because
of their mother's death, but Chris didn't receive any individual
therapy until he had been in CYFD custody for nearly four months.

Two years since entering foster care, he hasn't been provided grief
counseling. After CYFD failed to provide support for his foster
parents, they asked him to be removed, the lawsuit states.

He's been housed in at least nine different places since 2016,
including short-term shelters and a residential treatment center.
There, he was repeatedly restrained, and relocated nearly every
night for months from one section of the center to another.

Chris went to a subsequent treatment foster care home, but CYFD
couldn't find any place that would accept him when that home wanted
him out. He ran away and was missing for a month. Ultimately, he
was housed in a juvenile detention center and is now living at an
Arizona treatment center.

His goal, according to the lawsuit, "is to be reunited with his two
brothers and to have a home." [GN]


NIAGARA BOTTLING: Claims in Frompovicz Infringement Suit Narrowed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STANLEY F. FROMPOVICZ, Plaintiff, v. NIAGARA BOTTLING,
LLC, ICE RIVER SPRINGS WATER CO, INC., CROSSROADS BEVERAGE GROUP
AND JAMES J. LAND, JR., Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-54 (E.D.
Pa.), Judge Wendy Bettlestone of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted in part and denied in part
the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).

The dispute bubbles up before the Court again, presenting the
question of who is selling genuine bottled "spring" water and who
is not.  The Plaintiff, a water extractor, alleges that the
Defendants have violated the Lanham Act, and Pennsylvania's unfair
competition law by mislabeling their water as "spring water."  One
of the Defendants extracts water and three of them bottle, sell,
and label the extracted water as "spring water."  

As a licensed extractor of spring water, the Plaintiff alleges that
the Defendants' labeling of their non-spring water as "spring
water" has damaged his business because the labels are designed to
entice purchasers to buy the Defendants' products under the false
belief that their "spring water" is at least equal, if not
superior, to the Plaintiff's true spring water.

The Plaintiff brings the case as a putative class action for all
persons in the United States who, within the applicable statute of
limitations preceding the filing of the action through class
certification, extract and/or bottle spring water for sale in the
United States, as well as a Pennsylvania subclass.

The Plaintiff filed an initial Complaint in January of 2018.  The
Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).  The Court dismissed the Lanham
and state law claims against the Bottler Defendants without
prejudice, but not against Defendant Land.  The Court also held
that the Plaintiff's Lanham Act claims were not precluded by the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act ("FDCA").

The Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in June of 2018 and the
Defendants again filed Motions to Dismiss under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The Defendants advance two separate
arguments in their Motions to Dismiss.  First, they argue the
Plaintiff lacks a "right to sue" under the Lanham Act and, because
the Pennsylvania common law cause of action for unfair competition
is "virtually the same" as the Lanham Act, the Complaint should be
dismissed in its entirety.  Second, the Defendants argue that,
whatever the merits of the Lanham Act claim, the Plaintiff's state
law claims are preempted by the FDCA.

Judge Bettestone finds that the Plaintiff has adequately alleged a
viable Lanham Act claim against the Defendant Land on both a theory
of commercial harm and commercial disparagement.  The Motion to
Dismiss will be denied as to Defendant Land.  The Plaintiff has
also adequately alleged a viable Lanham Act claim on theories of
both commercial harm and commercial disparagement against Defendant
Niagara, so that the Motion to Dismiss will be denied as to
Defendant Niagara.  As to Defendant Ice River, the Plaintiff has
alleged a viable Lanham Act claim on a theory of commercial harm.
The Motion to Dismiss will be denied.  Finally, the Plaintiff has
failed to make out a viable Lanham Act claim against Defendant
Crossroads.  The Motion to Dismiss will be granted as to Defendant
Crossroads.

As to Pennsylvania unfair competition statute, the Judge finds that
the combined effect of 21 U.S.C. Section 343-1(a) (1) and Section
337(a) preempt the Plaintiff's unfair competition claim, and the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to that claim will be granted.
Section 337(a) impliedly preempts the remainder of the Plaintiff's
unfair competition claim because the allegations are, in effect, an
attempt to enforce alleged violations of the FDCA and FDA
regulations.  The upshot is that the Plaintiff's "generic state law
claim" for unfair competition would not be actionable absent a
violation of the FDCA standard.  Because the Plaintiff's claim
would not exist but for a FDCA regulation, Section 337(a) impliedly
preempts the claim.

For these reasons, Judge Bettlestone granted the Defendants'
Motions to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/w3yX59 from Leagle.com.

STANLEY F. FROMPOVICZ, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by DAVID J. STANOCH --
dstanoch@golombhonik.com -- GOLOMB & HONIK, P.C.

NIAGARA BOTTLING, LLC, Defendant, represented by MATTHEW A. WHITE
-- WHITEMA@BALLARDSPAHR.COM -- BALLARD SPAHR LLP, EMILIA L. MCKEE
VASSALLO -- MCKEEVASSALLOE@BALLARDSPAHR.COM -- BALLARD SPAHR LLP &
LESLIE E. JOHN -- JOHN@BALLARDSPAHR -- BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS &
INGERSOLL LLP.

ICE RIVER SPRINGS WATER CO. INC., CROSSROADS BEVERAGE GROUP & JAMES
J. LAND, JR., doing business as PINE VALLEY FARMS SPRINGS,
Defendants, represented by BRETT A. DATTO --
brett.datto@weirpartners.com -- WEIR & PARTNERS LLP & LAUREN
SCHWIMMER -- lschwimmer@weirpartners.com -- WEIR & PARTNERS LLP.


NICOR ENERGY: Pyles Suit Moved to Southern District of Indiana
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DONALD PYLES; SUSAN SCHROEDER on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. NICOR ENERGY
SERVICES COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-00152-TMP (S.D.
Ohio), Judge Thomas M. Rose of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, lifted the stay and
transferred the action to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

The matter is before the Court on the Parties' Joint Motion to Lift
Stay and Transfer Venue to the Southern District of Indiana.
They've moved for the case to be transferred to the Southern
District of Indiana so that it can be heard along with another
similar action pending before U.S. District Judge William T.
Lawrence, Plummer v. Nicor Energy Services Company, No.
1:17-cv-02177-WTL-MPB.

Judge Rose concludes that the new forum will be convenient for both
Parties.  The Parties have represented that a proposed settlement
has been reached which would resolve claims pending in the case and
in the Plummer Action.  It is in line with the interests of justice
to transfer the action to the Southern District of Indiana to allow
the Parties to seek settlement approval in a single forum.  If the
cases are pending in the same forum, transferring the case would
promote efficient administration of justice as only one court would
have to provide preliminary approval, classwide notice, and final
approval of the proposed settlement agreement.

For the foregoing reasons, the Judge granted the Parties' Joint
Motion.  Accordingly, the stay is lifted and the action is
transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 14, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/YVofPC from Leagle.com.


OCEAN HARBOR: State Appeals Court Tosses Medicare Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Moline, writing for Florida Politics, reports that a state
appeals court has rejected a class action filed by a Medicare
Advantage organization seeking double reimbursements for its costs
of providing care that should have been covered by a no-fault auto
insurer.

In a unanimous ruling, the 3rd District Court of Appeal said such
organizations would have to establish each claim separately against
Ocean Harbor Casualty Insurance.

The court overruled Miami-Dade Circuit Judge Samantha Ruiz-Cohen,
who had certified a class potentially including 37 Florida Medicare
Advantage organizations, or MROs.

The lead plaintiff was an entity called MSPA, an assignee of the
defunct MRO Florida Healthcare Plus Inc.

"Proof that certain medical bills paid by MSPA's alleged assignor
should have been paid by Ocean Harbor as a primary payer will not
establish that other medical bills paid by a different MAO should
also have been paid by Ocean Harbor as a primary payer," Judge
Thomas Logue wrote.

"To the contrary, proof to establish liability will necessarily
devolve into a series of mini-trials under Florida no-fault law …
which precludes a finding of predominance and renders this case
inappropriate for class action treatment," Judge Logue wrote.

"Accordingly, we reverse the provisions of the certification order
under review in conflict with this opinion."

MAOs are private companies that contract with Medicare to provide
coverage at a flat rate per enrollee. They profit to the degree
they provide the required coverage for less than the flat rate.

The coverage is meant to be secondary to other, primary, coverage,
including personal injury protection policies.

Miami plaintiffs' attorney John Ruiz argued that he could establish
the common claims necessary to sustain a class action using an
algorithm that analyzes police reports of accidents and other
records that Ocean Harbor must report under state and federal law.

He argued that Ocean Harbor's obligation to pay was automatic once
his client established that it had made payments reimbursable by
the insurer.

The 3rd DCA disagreed.

"We reject the notion that MSPA claims reimbursement rights are not
governed by Florida law relating to the recovery of benefits under
a PIP policy, and are therefore automatic," Logue wrote.

"Instead, MSPA must demonstrate that, in addition to any
requirements of federal law, Ocean Harbor was required to make the
payment in the first instance under Florida no-fault law for each
reimbursement it claims."

William Large, president of the tort-reformer Florida Justice
Reform Institute, praised the outcome.

"The plaintiff has filed dozens of copycat cases against Florida
insurers raising the same claims -- this case was simply the first
to reach the class certification stage," Mr. Large said in a
written statement.

"In certifying the class, the trial court failed to rigorously
apply Florida's class action certification requirements, which are
necessary to protect defendants' due process rights. The 3rd DCA
recognized this overreach and ruled appropriately." [GN]


OHIO: Prisoner's Sec. 1983 Claim vs. Zariwala Can Proceed
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, affirmed and adopted a magistrate judge's report
and recommendation dismissing all claims against all Defendants
except for Zariwala in the case captioned William E. Martin,
Plaintiff, v. Zamvir Zariwala, et al., Defendants. Case No.
2:18-cv-270. (S. D. Ohio).

William E. Martin is a prisoner proceeding pro se. He sues Roger
Wilson, Chief Inspector for the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation
and Correction ("ODRC"), and the following employees at Madison
Correctional institution ("MaCI"): Zamvir Zariwala, Randall Hawk,
Unit Secretary Conn, Rhonda R. Richard, Zachery Gould, Unit Manager
Chie Workman, Malcolm Heard, and Deputy Warden Welch, under 42
U.S.C. Section 1983 for purported violations of the Plaintiff's
civil rights.

The Report & Recommendation (R&R) considered the Plaintiff's
Individual-capacity claims against each Defendant. The R&R
concluded that the Plaintiff failed to allege that Hawk violated
any of the Plaintiff's constitutional rights and instead alleged
only that Hawk conspired with Zariwala to file a false work
evaluation in order to fire the Plaintiff from his prison job in
violation of a state law or state administrative rule.

The R&R noted that, absent a separate and actionable constitutional
injury, the Plaintiff cannot state a claim for conspiracy under
Section 1983. Further, it concluded that even if the Plaintiff had
alleged such an injury, the Complaint failed to plead conspiracy
with particularity as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b).  

With respect to Zariwala, the R&R recommended dismissing (for the
same reasons just discussed) the Plaintiff's conspiracy claim and
any claim based on the filing of a false work evaluation.  It
recommended permitting the Plaintiff's remaining claims against
Zariwala to proceed.

The R&R recommended dismissing the Plaintiff's claims against Conn
because the Plaintiff alleged that Conn reclassified the Plaintiff
as a porter in violation of various Ohio Revised Code sections and
a policy statement, and his allegations of violations of state laws
and rules cannot serve as the basis of a Section 1983 claim. To the
extent the Plaintiff sought to bring a Section 1983 due process
claim against Conn, the R&R explained that the Plaintiff had no
protected liberty or property interest in prison employment. It
further recommended dismissing the Plaintiff's conspiracy claim
against Conn.

The Court overrules the Plaintiff's objection to the denial of his
motion to appoint counsel. There is no constitutional right to
appointed counsel in a civil case. Accordingly, prisoners have no
right to the appointment of counsel in order to pursue a prisoner
civil rights case, whether brought as an individual action or
whether class certification is sought. Indeed, the most a Court can
do is assist a civil litigant in obtaining pro bono counsel.  

Thus, the Plaintiff's objection to Magistrate Judge Deavers' denial
of appointment of class counsel is overruled.  Further, because the
Plaintiff cannot represent, pro se, a class in this case.
Magistrate Judge Deavers properly concluded that the Court must
dismiss the class allegations.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 4, 2018 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ycjogcx8 from
Leagle.com.

William E Martin, Plaintiff, pro se.


OIL STATES: $2.3MM Attys' Fees Awarded in Mozingo FLSA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SAMMY MOZINGO, et al., v. OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES,
L.L.C., et al, Civil Action No. 15-529 (W.D. Pa.), Judge Mark A.
Kearney of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania awarded reasonable attorney's fees of $2,263,904.50
and reasonable costs of $118,826.61.

Before Spring 2015, oil field workers in Texas filed a class action
alleging their former employer Oil States misclassified them as
exempt from overtime laws.  In Spring 2015, 29 frac hands, grease
operators, and crane operators opting out of the Texas class action
sued Oil States in this District for overtime wages under the Fair
Labor Standards Act and Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act.  They
claimed Oil States misclassified them as exempt from overtime
payments and failed to pay them overtime wages.

The 29 hired Pittsburgh's The Employment Rights Group, LLC to
represent them in the District.  Oil States hired experienced wage
and overtime lawyers from Texas.  Because each employee brought
their claim individually, Oil States sought discovery specific to
each employee and deposed each employee. Discovery originally
closed in early Summer 2016.  Immediately before the dispositive
motion deadline, 14 employees settled their claims with Oil States.
Oil States and the remaining 15 employees cross-moved for summary
judgment.  Oil States submitted 15 separate motions for summary
judgment with tailored statements of undisputed facts to each
remaining employee.  Upon reassignment to the Court, it denied the
pending motions for summary judgment in November 2016 as genuine
issues of material fact required a jury's consideration.

On the same day the Court denied summary judgment, Zachary K.
Warren -- the employees' lead trial counsel by January 2016 -- left
Pittsburgh and The Employment Rights Group and joined Williams &
Connolly LLP, a large law firm based in Washington, D.C.  

In Spring 2018, the Court entered judgment against Oil States and
in favor of the eight employees succeeding after trial.  Oil States
moved for a new trial and to remit the jury's award of damages in
the group one and group two trials.  Oil States also renewed its
motion for judgment as a matter of law in the group one trial.  The
Court denied Oil States' post-trial motions and its Orders (and
possibly Orders pre-dating our involvement) are now on appeal.

The employees now move for attorney's fees and costs under the Act.
They ask the Court to order Oil States pay: Williams & Connolly
$1,664,747 in fees for 4,956 hours and $112,124.34 in costs; and,
The Employment Rights Group, LLC $765,337.50 in fees for 1,968
hours and $28,162.39 in costs.  Attorney Warren presents a fulsome
affidavit and detailed invoice supporting Williams & Connelly's
requested hours and costs.  Attorney Joseph Chivers similarly
presents a fulsome affidavit and detailed invoice supporting The
Employment Rights Group's hours and costs.  Neither law firm
presents comparator affidavits to show the reasonableness of their
hourly rates in this community.  Instead, they ask the Court
accepts fees awarded in other cases where all parties agreed to pay
the requested fees.  The Court faces a much different situation
today as it must carefully review Oil States' many objections to
the requested fees and costs.

After two week-long trials for four similarly situated oil field
employees each, the juries returned verdicts for the eight
employees who went to trial.  Under federal law, the employees'
counsel are entitled to an award of reasonable fees and costs paid
by the employer.  The employer objects to the requested fees and
costs, largely arguing they are unreasonable because the lead
Pittsburgh pre-trial lawyer left before trial for a large
Washington, D.C. law firm and then many of his Washington
colleagues fully staffed and pursued the case at Washington hourly
rates.

Measuring an attorney's work through the prism of the relatively
limited length of the week-long trials is unfair.  Good lawyers
seek and marshal all material information and narrow issues for the
jury.  The relatively limited amount of trial time in the courtroom
is not a definitive barometer of the necessary legal work by a
lawyer or paralegals assisting her.  Lawyers must prepare for every
possible contingency in a jury trial with cutting-edge wage issues
in the energy industry.  The Court expects the employees' counsel
to strenuously work to maximize the verdict value, including
revising and proving larger damages models.  And it expects the
employer will strenuously work to limit damages.  The Court cannot
discount the lawyers' efforts because the jury awarded some, but
not all, of the overtime wages included in an extensively prepared
(and challenged) damages model.

After parsing through hundreds of pages comprising the employer's
many objections, reject most, but not all, of the employer's
objections.  Judge Kearney finds merit in its objections based on
hourly rates not tied to the legal community and limited merit in
challenging certain hours and costs.  He concludes that the lawyers
on all sides performed well and should be paid a reasonable rate
for the reasonable hours incurred for their clients.  The
employer's counsel relies on their contracted negotiated rate to
get paid.  The employees, having persuaded a jury of their right to
overtime pay under the Act, now ask the Court to award them
reasonable attorney's fees and costs for their efforts.

After arduous scrutiny of hundreds of pages of time sheets and
objections, the Judge entered his Order granting the employees'
motion in large part but denying their request to bill attorneys at
Washington D.C. hourly rates and for limited hours which the
lawyers did not specify their effort.  He awarded reasonable
attorney's fees of $2,263,904.50 and reasonable costs of
$118,826.61.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/0tvINQ from Leagle.com.

SAMMY MOZINGO, JAMIE HOLLOWAY, BARRETT DUPLECHAIN, MICHAEL FRANCIS,
CHRIS GRYMES, MILTON HOLIFIELD, DANIEL HOLIFIELD, MICHAEL
HOLIFIELD, CHADRICK LEOPAUL, DONALD LEWIS, GREG MORRILL, RYAN
SHOWS, BRIAN TULLY & STEPHEN WALTERS, Plaintiffs, represented by
Joseph H. Chivers -- jchivers@employmentrightsgroup.com -- &
Zachary K. Warren -- jwc@employmentrightsgroup.com -- Williams &
Connolly LLP.

GEORGE BOLEN, JR., DON BRATTON, MICHAEL BURCHIK, WAYNE EDDY,
MATTHEW FRICK, MICHAEL GEORGE, KARI GORDON, STEPHEN
SOLTESZ-HAUGHTON, RYAN KARMANN, JASON LETT, ROBERT PICKEL, SCOT
POND, JEFFREY STEFFISH & MATT WILLIAMS, Plaintiffs, represented by
Joseph H. Chivers, Michelle L. Hood -- mhood@wc.com --  Williams &
Connolly LLP, pro hac vice, Samuel B. Davidoff -- sdavidoff@wc.com
-- Williams & Connolly LLP, pro hac vice, Zachary K. Warren,
Williams & Connolly LLP, Janine M. Pierson -- jpierson@wc.com --
Williams & Connolly LLP, pro hac vice & John S. Connolly --
jconnolly@wc.com -- Williams & Connolly LLP, pro hac vice.

BRIAN KUBIAK, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph H. Chivers, Michelle
L. Hood, Williams & Connolly LLP, pro hac vice, Samuel B. Davidoff,
Williams & Connolly LLP, pro hac vice, Zachary K. Warren, Williams
& Connolly LLP & Janine M. Pierson, Williams & Connolly LLP, pro
hac vice.

OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES, L.L.C., formerly known as SPECIALTY
TANK SUPPLY, OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES HOLDING, INC. & OIL STATES
INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendants, represented by A. Patricia
Diulus-Myers -- apdm@segmend.com -- A. Patricia Diulus-Myers,
Attorney at Law, Talley R. Parker -- Talley.Parker@jacksonlewis.com
-- Jackson Lewis P.C., pro hac vice, William R. Stukenberg --
William.Stukenberg@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C., pro hac
vice, Bethany Swaton Wagner, Jackson Lewis P.C. & William L. Davis
-- William.Davis@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C., pro hac
vice.


PERRY ELLIS: Witmer Drops Class Action
--------------------------------------
A stipulation of dismissal was entered in the case, Witmer v. Perry
Ellis International, Inc. et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-23942 (S.D.
Fla.) on October 19, 2018.

Perry Ellis International, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filed on October 9,
2018, 2018, that on June 15, 2018, Perry Ellis International, Inc.
("Perry Ellis" or the "Company") entered into an Agreement and Plan
of Merger, by and among Perry Ellis, Feldenkreis Holdings LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company ("Parent"), and GF Merger Sub,
Inc., a Florida corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Parent
("Merger Sub"), pursuant to which Merger Sub will be merged with
and into the Company (the "Merger"), with the Company surviving the
Merger as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Parent.

On September 24, 2018, a putative class action complaint related to
the Merger was filed on behalf of Perry Ellis shareholders in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The case
is captioned Colleen Witmer v. Perry Ellis International, Inc. et
al., Case No. 1:18-cv-23942-CMA (the "Proxy Litigation").

The Proxy Litigation asserts claims under Section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"), and Rule
14a-9 promulgated thereunder, as well as claims under Section 20(a)
of the Exchange Act against Perry Ellis and the members of its
Board of Directors. The plaintiff alleges that the Company's
definitive proxy statement (the "proxy statement") filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on September 10, 2018
omitted certain information with respect to the Merger and seeks to
enjoin the Merger, rescission or an award of rescissory damages in
the event the Merger is consummated, and an award of the
plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs of the litigation.

The defendants deny all of the allegations made by the plaintiff in
the Proxy Litigation and believe that such allegations are without
merit and that the disclosures in the proxy statement are adequate
under the law.  However, to alleviate the costs, risks and
uncertainties inherent in litigation and provide additional
information to its shareholders, Perry Ellis has determined to
voluntarily supplement the proxy statement.  Nothing shall be
deemed an admission of the legal necessity or materiality under
applicable laws of any of the disclosures set forth.  

To the contrary, Perry Ellis specifically denies all allegations in
the Proxy Litigation that any additional disclosure was or is
required. The supplemental disclosures will not affect the merger
consideration to be paid to shareholders of Perry Ellis in
connection with the Merger or the timing of the special meeting of
Perry Ellis shareholders scheduled for October 18, 2018 at 10:00
a.m. local time at 3000 N.W. 107th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33172.

A copy of the supplemental disclosure is available at
https://goo.gl/QiVKMm.

Perry Ellis International, Inc. designs, sources, markets, and
licenses apparel products, accessories, and fragrances. It operates
through four segments: Men's Sportswear and Swim, Women's
Sportswear, Direct-to-Consumer, and Licensing. The company was
formerly known as Supreme International Corporation and changed its
name to Perry Ellis International, Inc. in 1999. Perry Ellis
International, Inc. was founded in 1967 and is headquartered in
Miami, Florida.


PIER 1: Appeal in Davie Police Pension Plan Suit Underway
---------------------------------------------------------
Pier 1 Imports, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 10, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 1, 2018, that a notice of appeal
has been filed in the case entitled, Town of Davie Police Pension
Plan, v. Pier 1 Imports, Inc., Alexander W. Smith and Charles H.
Turner.

Putative class action complaints were filed in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas - Dallas Division
against Pier 1 Imports, Inc., Alexander W. Smith and Charles H.
Turner in August and October 2015 alleging violations under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

The lawsuits, which have been consolidated into a single action
captioned Town of Davie Police Pension Plan, Plaintiff, v. Pier 1
Imports, Inc., Alexander W. Smith and Charles H. Turner,
Defendants, were filed on behalf of a purported putative class of
investors who purchased or otherwise acquired stock of Pier 1
Imports, Inc. between April 10, 2014 and December 17, 2015.

The plaintiffs seek to recover damages purportedly caused by the
Defendants' alleged violations of the federal securities laws and
to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. The
complaint seeks certification as a class action, unspecified
compensatory damages plus interest and attorneys' fees.

On August 10, 2017, the court granted the Company's motion to
dismiss the complaint, while providing the plaintiffs an
opportunity to replead their complaint. An amended complaint was
filed with the court on September 25, 2017. On June 25, 2018, the
court granted the Company's motion to dismiss the amended
complaint, with prejudice. On July 25, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a
notice of appeal.

Pier 1 said, "Although the ultimate outcome of litigation cannot be
predicted with certainty, the Company believes that this lawsuit is
without merit and intends to defend against it vigorously."

Pier 1 Imports, Inc. engages in the retail sale of decorative
accessories, furniture, candles, housewares, gifts, and seasonal
products. It offers decorative accents and textiles, such as rugs,
wall decorations and mirrors, pillows, bedding, lamps, vases, dried
and artificial flowers, baskets, ceramics, dinnerware, candles,
fragrances, gifts, and seasonal items; and furniture and furniture
cushions that are used in living, dining, office, kitchen and
bedroom areas, sunrooms, and patios. he company was founded in 1962
and is headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas.


PIER 1: Still Defends Wage-and-Hour Suits in California Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
Pier 1 Imports, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 10, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 1, 2018, that the Company
continues to be a defendant in lawsuits pending in federal courts
in California containing various class action allegations under
California state wage-and-hour laws.

These lawsuits seek unspecified monetary damages, injunctive relief
and attorneys. fees.

The Company sought to settle these cases on terms favorable to the
Company in view of the claims made, the continuing cost of
litigation and an assessment of the risk of an adverse trial court
or appellate decision. The Company has settled or agreed to settle
the pending cases, subject to completion of associated procedural
requirements.

The Company does not believe any reasonably foreseeable resolution
of these matters will have a material adverse effect on the
Company's financial condition, results of operations or liquidity.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Pier 1 Imports, Inc. engages in the retail sale of decorative
accessories, furniture, candles, housewares, gifts, and seasonal
products. It offers decorative accents and textiles, such as rugs,
wall decorations and mirrors, pillows, bedding, lamps, vases, dried
and artificial flowers, baskets, ceramics, dinnerware, candles,
fragrances, gifts, and seasonal items; and furniture and furniture
cushions that are used in living, dining, office, kitchen and
bedroom areas, sunrooms, and patios. he company was founded in 1962
and is headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas.


PLAINS ALL AMERICAN: Nov. 10 Class Action Opt-Out Deadline Set
--------------------------------------------------------------
The following is being released by the law firms Lieff Cabraser
Heimann & Bernstein LLP, Keller Rohrback LLP, Cappello & Noel LLP,
and Audet & Partners LLP about the lawsuit Andrews v. Plains All
American Pipeline, L.P., No. 2:15-cv-04113.

A class action lawsuit against Plains All American Pipeline, L.P.
("Plains Pipeline") has been certified as a class action for an
additional group and may be proceeding to trial.  This lawsuit
claims that due to the May 19, 2015 Santa Barbara oil spill,
individuals and businesses who owned or leased residential
beachfront property or property with a private easement to beaches
soiled by the oil spill were unable to use and enjoy these
properties.

Plains Pipeline denies these claims.  The lawyers for the Class
will have to prove their claims in Court.

Owners and lessees may be included in the Real Property Subclass if
they owned or leased a residential beachfront property on a beach
or with a private easement to a beach where oil from the 2015 Santa
Barbara oil spill washed up and the oiling was categorized as
heavy, moderate, or light.

The website, www.PlainsOilSpill.com, has more specific
information.

The Court has not decided that Plains Pipeline did anything wrong,
and the two sides have not reached a settlement.  The case may go
to trial.  There is no money available now and no guarantee that
there will be.

Some individuals or businesses may have received a notice about the
lawsuit in the mail or seen a previous notice to the fish and
fisher industry subclass that was already certified; the deadline
to opt-out of the fish and fisher subclass has passed.  For those
people who believe they are Class Members but did not receive a
notice, they can visit www.PlainsOilSpill.com or call
1-888-684-6801 for more information or to request a notice.

Important Information and Dates:
Affected individuals and businesses have a choice to remain members
of the Class or exclude themselves.  Those who choose to exclude
themselves must do so by November 10, 2018.  They can get more
information by visiting www.PlainsOilSpill.com or calling
1-888-684-6801.

If the case is not dismissed or settled, Plaintiffs will have to
prove their claims at a trial that will take place at the First
Street Courthouse, 350 West 1st Street, Courtroom 6A, 6th Floor,
Los Angeles, California 90012.  The trial date has not been set.
Once a trial date has been set, that information will be posted on
the website, www.PlainsOilSpill.com.

For more information:

Visit: www.PlainsOilSpill.com
Call: 1-888-684-6801
Write to: Santa Barbara Oil Spill Class Action, PO Box 2820, San
Francisco, CA 94111-3339
Email: info@plainsoilspill.com [GN]


POAGE BANKSHARES: Faces Parshall Suit in Baltimore Court
--------------------------------------------------------
Poage Bankshares, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission filed on October 10, 2018, 2018,
that the company has been named as defendant in a putative class
action lawsuit entitled, Parshall v. Bruce VanHorn et. al.

On September 27, 2018, Paul Parshall, a purported Poage
stockholder, filed, on behalf of himself and all Poage stockholders
other than the named defendants and their affiliates (the
"Purported Class"), a putative class action complaint in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland, captioned Parshall v.
Bruce VanHorn et. al., naming each Poage director (collectively,
the "Individual Defendants"), City and Poage as defendants. The
complaint identifies Poage as a nominal defendant.  

The complaint alleges that the Individual Defendants have breached
their fiduciary duties to the Purported Class by initiating a
process to sell Poage that undervalues Poage and that City and
Poage have omitted certain material information from City's
Registration Statement on Form S-4 filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "SEC"), which includes City's prospectus
with respect to the shares of City common stock to be issued to
Poage's stockholders in the proposed Merger and Poage's proxy
statement for the Poage special stockholders' meeting to be held on
October 30, 2018.  

The relief sought by the complaint includes preliminary and
permanent injunction from proceeding with, consummating, or closing
the proposed Merger, rescission and rescissory damages if the
proposed Merger is completed, and damages, including attorneys' and
experts' fees.

Poage Bankshares said, "The defendants believe the allegations in
the complaint are without merit and intend to defend against them
vigorously. Currently, however, it is not possible to predict the
outcome of the litigation or the impact the litigation may have on
Poage, City or the proposed Merger, if any."

Poage Bankshares, Inc. operates as a savings and loan holding
company for Town Square Bank that provides financial services to
individuals, families, and businesses. The company was founded in
1889 and is headquartered in Ashland, Kentucky.


POLARITYTE INC: Bid to Consolidate Moreno and Lawi Suits Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------------
PolarityTE, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
July 31, 2018, that plaintiffs Jose Moreno (Case No.
2:18-cv-00510-JNP) and Yedid Lawi (Case No. 2:18-cv-00541-PMW) have
filed motions to consolidate and for appointment as lead plaintiff,
which are pending.

On June 26, 2018, a class action complaint alleging violations of
the Federal securities laws was filed in the United States District
Court, District of Utah, by Jose Moreno against the Company and two
directors of the Company, Case No. 2:18-cv-00510-JNP (the "Moreno
Complaint").

On July 6, 2018, a similar complaint was filed in the same court
against the same defendants by Yedid Lawi, Case No.
2:18-cv-00541-PMW (the "Lawi Complaint").

Both the Moreno Complaint and Lawi Complaint allege that the
defendants made or were responsible for, disseminating information
to the public through reports filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and other channels that contained material
misstatements or omissions in violation of Sections 10 and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 adopted
thereunder. Specifically, both complaints allege that the
defendants misrepresented the status of one of the Company's patent
applications while touting the unique nature of the Company's
technology and its effectiveness. Plaintiffs are seeking damages
suffered by them and the class consisting of the persons who
acquired the publicly-traded securities of the Company between
March 31, 2017, and June 22, 2018.

Plaintiffs have filed motions to consolidate and for appointment as
lead plaintiff, which are pending, so that defendants have not
filed any responsive pleadings to the complaints.

The Company believes the allegations in the Moreno Complaint and
Lawi Complaint are without merit, and intends to defend the
litigation, vigorously.

PolarityTE said, "At this early stage of the proceedings the
Company is unable to make any prediction regarding the outcome of
the litigation."

PolarityTE, Inc., a translational regenerative medicine company,
develops functionally polarized human tissues to improve clinical
medicine and biomedical research. PolarityTE, Inc. was incorporated
in 2015 and is based in Salt Lake City, Utah.


PRAXAIR INC: Garcia Wage Suit Moved to C.D. Calif.
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, RITA GARCIA, Plaintiff, v. PRAXAIR, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-03887-WHO (N.D. Cal.), Judge William
H. Orrick of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California (i) denied Garcia's motion to remand and (ii) granted
the Defendants' motion to transfer the case to the Central District
of California.

On May 18, 2018, Garcia filed a class action complaint against her
employer Praxair Distribution, Inc. ("PDI") and its parent company
Praxair, Inc. ("Praxair") for unpaid wages and various illegal
employment practices.  On June 28, the Defendants removed the case
to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
("CAFA"), and Garcia filed a motion to remand on July 30.  

Louie Hassan worked as a truck driver for PDI until January 2016.
He filed a class action suit against Praxair, Inc. in Los Angeles
Superior Court on March 1, 2018.  The suit alleges (1) failure to
provide meal breaks, (2) failure to provide rest breaks, (3)
failure to pay minimum wages, (4) failure to provide accurate
itemized wage statements, (5) failure to provide compensation due
upon termination of employment, and (6) unfair business practices.


The Defendants removed the case to federal court and filed a motion
to dismiss on June 11.  Judge John Kronstadt indicated at a hearing
on July 9, 2018 that he was likely to grant in part and deny in
part the Defendants' motion.

On July 16, 2018, the Defendants filed a motion to transfer the
case to the Central District of California pursuant to the
first-to-file rule or section 1404(a).  On July 30, 2018, Garcia
filed a motion to remand the case to Superior Court, arguing that
it was improperly removed because the amount in controversy does
not meet the jurisdictional requirement of $5 million.  Judge
Orrick heard argument on both motions on Sept. 12, 2018.

Garcia seeks recovery for: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight
time wages, (2) failure to pay overtime, (3) failure to provide
meal periods and rest breaks, (4) failure to timely pay final wages
at termination, (5) failure to provide accurate, itemized wage
statements, and (6) unfair business practices.  Based on its
calculations for each allegation, the Defendants estimated that the
total amount in controversy ranges from $11 million to $16
million.

Garcia challenges the Defendants' calculations on only one basis,
that they improperly included exempt truck drivers in her class,
which her complaint limits to "hourly, non-exempt employees."  In
response to Garcia's challenge, the Defendants recalculated the
amount in controversy excluding truck drivers.  Because that group
of workers is allegedly exempt from overtime, the recalculations
did not affect (2) the figure for unpaid overtime pay.  The
resulting figures were: (1) $449,280 to $1,004,060 in unpaid
minimum wage and straight time, (3) $2,312,350.18 to $3,468,525.27
in missed meal periods and $2,312,350.18 to $3,468,525.27 in missed
rest breaks, (4) $613,519.20 in waiting time penalties, and (5)
$1,035,700 in wage statement penalties.

Judge Orrick finds that PDI's revised amount in controversy ranged
from $7,099,722.06 to $10,343,374.74.  Notwithstanding the
inclusion or exclusion of truck drivers from the class, he finds
that the Defendants reached reasonable estimates based on facts and
California law.  They showed by a preponderance of the evidence
that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional
requirement of $5 milllion.  Garcia's motion to remand will
therefore be denied.

The Judge also finds that the first-to-file rule applies to the
case, and it should be transferred to the Central District of
California where the Hassan Action is pending.  He finds that (i)
the parties do not dispute that the Hassan Action was filed in the
Central District of California on March 1, 2018, two and a half
months before Garcia filed the action in Alameda County Superior
Court on May 18, 2018; (ii) the parties do not dispute that PDI is
a defendant in both actions; (iii) both the Hassan Action and the
case  allege (1) failure to pay minimum wages, (2) failure to
provide meal periods and rest breaks, (3) failure to timely pay
final wages at termination, (4) failure to provide accurate,
itemized wage statements, and (5) unfair business practices; and
(iv) the parties do not present evidence of bad faith, anticipatory
suit, or forum shopping that would mediate against applying the
first-to-file rule.

Because the first-to-file rule applies, the Judge will not address
the Defendants' additional arguments under section 1404(a).  That
said, the factors did not weigh heavily in either direction.  For
the similarity reasons set forth, the currently pending Hassan
Action strongly supports transfer to the Central District of
California.

Judge Orrick concludes that the Defendants showed by a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount-in-controversy
requirement is met and that the first-to-file rule applies to the
case.  Accordingly, he denied motion to remand, and granted the
Defendants' motion to transfer the case to the Central District of
California.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/Ao6Keh from Leagle.com.

Rita Garcia, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated,, Plaintiff, represented by Justin F. Marquez --
justin.marquez@moonyanglaw.com -- Moon and Yang APC, Allen Victor
Feghali -- allen.feghali@moonyanglaw.com -- Moon and Yang APC &
Kane Moon -- kane.moon@moonyanglaw.com -- Moon and Yang APC.

Praxair Inc, a Delaware corporation & Praxair Distribution Inc, a
Delaware corporation, Defendants, represented by Carlos Jimenez --
cajimenez@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC & Kimberli A.
Williams -- kawilliams@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC.


PRINCIPAL LIFE: Averts ERISA Class Action Over 401(k) Plan Funds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Emily Brill, writing for Law360, reports that an Iowa federal judge
awarded a quick win to Principal Life Insurance Co. in an Employee
Retirement Income Security Act class action on Sept. 25. [GN]


PROMPT NURSING: Class of Filipino Nurses Certified
--------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROSE ANN PAGUIRIGAN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PROMPT NURSING EMPLOYMENT
AGENCY LLC d/b/a/SENTOSA SERVICES, SENTOSACARE LLC, SENTOSA NURSING
RECRUITMENT AGENCY, BENJAMIN LANDA, BENT PHILIPSON, BERISH
RUBENSTEIN a/k/a BARRY RUBENSTEIN, FRANCIS LUYUN, GOLDEN GATE
REHABILITATION & HEALTH CARE CENTER LLC, and SPRING CREEK
REHABILITATION AND NURSING CENTER, Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-1302.
(JO) (E.D. N.Y.), Judge Nina Gershon of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of New York granted the Plaintiff's motion for
class certification.

Paguirigan brings claims for violations of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act ("TVPA"), and declaratory judgment against the
Defendants.  They also brings a breach of contract claim against
Prompt Nursing, Landa, Philipson, and Rubenstein.

The Plaintiff is a Filipino national who, beginning in 2006, was
recruited in the Philippines by Luyun, Philipson, and Sentosa
Agency to work for a nursing home in New York owned and operated by
the Defendants.  Luyun is the sole proprietor of Sentosa Agency, a
recruitment agency located in the Philippines that recruits nurses
to work in the United States.  The parties' papers are ambiguous as
to Philipson's exact role in the recruitment process, but he
recruited the Plaintiff in his capacity as a "representative" of
Defendant Golden Gate.

In 2007, the Defendants submitted a visa application on the
Plaintiffs behalf to federal authorities.  The visa application
included a prevailing wage determination as of that time.  The
Plaintiffs prevailing wage determination for her employment as a
nurse in New York was $26.87 per hour.

It took eight years for the Plaintiffs visa application to be
approved and for her to receive an interview with the United States
Consulate in the Philippines.  At the time of the interview, the
Consulate required confirmation that a job was still available for
the visa applicant.  On April 22, 2015 -- after receiving
notification of the interview, but before the interview itself --
the Plaintiff signed a three-year employment contract to work for
Defendant Golden Gate, a nursing home on Staten Island owned and
operated by the Defendants.  Landa, CEO and Managing Partner of
Golden Gate, signed the contract as the employer.

There are three features of the employment arrangement that are of
particular relevance to the action.  First, Section IV(1) of the
contract contains the provision regarding wages.  Second,
physically affixed to the front of the employment contract at the
time of the Plaintiffs signing was a cover letter on Golden Gate
stationery from Defendant Landa to the Consul.  The letter states
that Golden Gate offered plaintiff a position as a Registered Nurse
for $29 per hour.  Third, the employment contract required the
Plaintiff to pay a contract termination fee -- the contract calls
it "Liquidated Damages" -- of up to $25,000 if she left the
Defendants' employment before the end of the contract term.

The Defendants claim the purpose of the contract termination fee is
to compensate for numerous expenses associated with the hiring of
Filipino nurses.  The Plaintiff and other Filipino nurses were
required to sign an acknowledgment of the costs the Defendants
expended in their recruitment.  The acknowledgment the Plaintiff
signed states that the Defendants paid a total of $3,685 for
attorneys' fees, filing fees, visa fees, airfare, and miscellaneous
fees in connection with her hiring and travel to the United States.
The Defendants also paid for some additional relocation expenses
and two months of rent upon the Plaintiffs' arrival in the United
States.

After the Plaintiff signed the employment contract, Defendant
Golden Gate verbally assigned the contract to Defendant Prompt
Nursing, a staffing agency with offices in New York.  On June 22,
2015, the Plaintiff began working at Defendant Spring Creek, a
nursing home in Brooklyn owned by the Defendants.  On March 7,
2016, the Plaintiff quit her job.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants have abused the law or
legal process as a means of coercing foreign nurses, including the
Plaintiff, to continue working for the Defendants.  While the
Defendants dispute that their actions amount to abuse of legal
process, they do not dispute that they have pursued legal action.

The Plaintiff sues on behalf of all nurses who were recruited by
defendants in the Philippines and were employed by the Defendants
in the United States at any time since Dec. 23, 2008.  The
Plaintiff brings claims for violation of the TVPA; violation of the
TVPA (trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary
servitude, or forced labor); conspiracy to violate the TVPA;
attempt to violate the TVPA; breach of contract; and declaratory
judgment as to the enforce ability of the termination fee and
confession of judgment.

The Plaintiffs breach of contract claim is premised on the
following: Her contract, as well as the contracts of all putative
class members, specifies that the employee's hourly wage would be
the prevailing wage as of the "Commencement Date."  Because the
Defendants paid a wage less than that wage, the Plaintiff asserts
the Defendants breached the contract.

The remainder of the Plaintiffs claims fit into a theory related to
the $25,000 contract termination fee and its allegedly true
purpose.  The $25,000 fee is not, the Plaintiff argues, truly
liquidated damages because the amount is far greater than the
Defendants' actual costs and, following the Anilao decision, the
Defendants knew the fee was not enforceable.  Instead, the
Plaintiff alleges, the Defendants used the $25,000 fee and threats
of legal action to pressure her and the putative class members to
continue working, in violation of various provisions of the TVPA.

All the Defendants previously moved under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss all TVPA claims and the declaratory
judgment claim; and Defendants Landa, Philipson, and Rubenstein
moved to dismiss the breach of contract claim.  Judge Gershon
denied the motion to dismiss in full.

The Plaintiff now moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23 to certify a class comprised of all nurses who were recruited by
the Defendants in the Philippines and were employed by the
Defendants in the United States at any time since Dec. 23, 2008.

Judge Gershon finds that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)
Prerequisites and Rule 23(b)(3) are satisfied.  Accordingly, she
granted the Plaintiffs motion to certify a class comprised of all
nurses who were recruited by the Defendants in the Philippines and
were employed by the Defendants in the United States at any time
since Dec. 23, 2008 is granted against all the Defendants and with
respect to all claims under Rule 23(b)(3).  The Plaintiffs counsel
is appointed the class counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g).  The Judge
directed the Plaintiff to submit, within 30 days of the date of the
Order, a proposed form of notice in accordance with Rule
23(c)(2)(B).

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 12, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/8QogIm from Leagle.com.

Rose Paguirigan, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Leandro Bolesa Lachica --
lblachica@gmail.com -- Howley Law Firm & John J.P. Howley --
jhowley@johnhowleyesq.com -- Law Offices of John Howley.

Prompt Nursing Employment Agency LLC, doing business as Sentosa
Services, Sentosacare, LLC, Sentosa Nursing Recruitment Agency, Mr.
Benjamin Landa, Bent Philipson, Berish Rubenstein, also known as
Barry Rubenstein, Francis Luyun, Golden Gate Rehabilitation and
Health Care Center, LLC & Spring Creek Rehabilitation and Nursing
Center, Defendants, represented by Elliot Hahn --
EHahn@hahn-law.org -- Hahn Eisenberger PLLC, Sheldon Eisenberger --
seisenberger@robinsonbrog.com -- Robinson Brog Leinwand Greene
Genovese & Gluck PC, Alan M. Pollack -- amp@robinsonbrog.com --
Robinson, Borg, Leinwand, Greene, Genovese & Gluck, P.C. & Seth
Eisenberger, Law Office of Seth Eisenberger.

Mr. Benjamin Landa, Golden Gate Rehabilitation and Health Care
Center, LLC, Bent Philipson, Spring Creek Rehabilitation and
Nursing Center, Prompt Nursing Employment Agency LLC, Berish
Rubenstein, Sentosacare, LLC, Francis Luyun & Sentosa Nursing
Recruitment Agency, Counter Claimants, represented by Elliot Hahn,
Hahn Eisenberger PLLC, Sheldon Eisenberger, Robinson Brog Leinwand
Greene Genovese & Gluck PC, Alan M. Pollack, Robinson, Borg,
Leinwand, Greene, Genovese & Gluck, P.C. & Seth Eisenberger, Law
Office of Seth Eisenberger.

Rose Paguirigan, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Counter Defendant, represented by Leandro Bolesa Lachica,
Howley Law Firm & John J.P. Howley, Law Offices of John Howley.


RENT A CENTER: Faces Four Merger-Related Class Suits
----------------------------------------------------
Four lawsuits over Rent-A-Center, Inc.'s proposed merger
transaction have been dismissed.  These are Stein v. Rent-A-Center,
Inc., et al., No. 1:18-cv-01152-RGA (filed August 2, 2018), Herz v.
Rent-A-Center, Inc., et al., No. 1:18-cv-01162-RGA (filed August 3,
2018), Robitaille v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., et al., No.
1:18-cv-01204-RGA (filed August 8, 2018) and Downing v.
Rent-A-Center, Inc., et al., No. 1:18-cv-01299-LPS (filed August
23, 2018) (collectively, the "Merger Litigation').

Rent-A-Center, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission that an Agreement and Plan of
Merger (as it may be amended from time to time, the "Merger
Agreement"), dated as of June 17, 2018, has been entered by and
among Rent-A-Center, Inc. (the "Company"), Vintage Rodeo Parent,
LLC, a Delaware limited liability company ("Parent"), and Vintage
Rodeo Acquisition, Inc., a Delaware corporation and a wholly owned
subsidiary of Parent ("Merger Sub"), pursuant to which, upon the
terms and subject to the conditions set forth therein, Merger Sub
will merge with and into the Company (the "Merger"), with the
Company continuing as the surviving corporation.

In connection with the Merger, four putative class action lawsuits
were filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware. The complaints, which were filed by purported Company
stockholders, generally allege that the preliminary and definitive
proxy statements that the Company filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") on July 16, 2018 and August 15,
2018, respectively, omitted certain material information in
connection with the Merger in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and SEC Rule 14a-9.

These complaints include demands for, among other things, an order
enjoining defendants from closing the Merger absent certain
disclosures of information identified in the complaints.

The Company believes that the claims asserted in the Merger
Litigation are without merit and that no supplemental disclosure is
required under applicable law. However, in order to avoid the risk
of the Merger Litigation delaying or adversely affecting the Merger
and to minimize the costs, risks and uncertainties inherent in
litigation, and without admitting any liability or wrongdoing, the
Company has determined to voluntarily supplement the definitive
proxy statement it filed with the SEC on August 15, 2018 in
connection with the Merger (the "Proxy Statement").

Nothing shall be deemed an admission of the legal necessity or
materiality under applicable laws of any of the disclosures set
forth herein. To the contrary, the Company specifically denies all
allegations in the Merger Litigation that any additional disclosure
was or is required.

A Notice of Voluntary Dismissal was filed in the Downing case on
October 19, in the Stein and Herz cases on October 18, and in the
Robitaille case on September 13.

A copy of the supplemental disclosure is available at
https://goo.gl/jhqLD3.

Rent-A-Center, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, leases
household durable goods to customers on a rent-to-own basis. The
company operates through four segments: Core U.S., Acceptance Now,
Mexico, and Franchising. Rent-A-Center, Inc. was founded in 1986
and is headquartered in Plano, Texas.


RITE AID: Akile Class Action Voluntarily Dismissed
--------------------------------------------------
Rite Aid Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 4, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 1, 2018, that the parties in the
case, Akile v. Rite Aid Corp., et al., have filed a stipulation and
proposed order of voluntary dismissal.

In connection with the then proposed merger between the Company and
Albertsons Companies, Inc. ("ACI"), on April 24, 2018, a Rite Aid
stockholder filed a putative class action lawsuit in the Court of
Chancery of the State of Delaware against Rite Aid, ACI, Ranch
Acquisition Corp. (Merger Sub I), Ranch Acquisition II LLC (Merger
Sub II, together with ACI and Merger Sub I, the ACI defendants) and
each of the Rite Aid directors (the Director defendants, together
with Rite Aid, the Rite Aid defendants), Del. C.A. No.
2018-0305-AGB (Akile v. Rite Aid Corp., et al).

Plaintiff contended that Rite Aid stockholders had appraisal rights
under Section 262 of the DGCL. Plaintiff alleged breach of
fiduciary duty claims against the Director defendants for their
alleged failure to provide alleged statutory appraisal rights under
Delaware law and for allegedly falsely informing Rite Aid
stockholders that they would not have appraisal rights.

Plaintiff further contended that the proxy statement/prospectus
related to the proposed merger, and which was filed on April 6,
2018, was deficient under Section 262(d)(1) of the DGCL for failure
to inform stockholders of their alleged appraisal rights. Plaintiff
sought declarations from the Court of Chancery that the action was
a proper class action and that the Director defendants breached
their fiduciary duties by failing to adequately inform class
members of their appraisal rights under Delaware law, to enjoin the
then proposed transaction from closing until such time as class
members were afforded the ability to seek appraisal of their
shares, or otherwise permit class members to petition the Court of
Chancery for appraisal, and attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs to
plaintiff.

On May 9, 2018, the Court of Chancery denied plaintiff's motion to
expedite and declined to schedule a preliminary injunction hearing,
ruling that plaintiff failed to state a colorable claim. On August
13, 2018, the parties filed a Stipulation and Proposed Order of
Voluntary Dismissal Pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule
41(1)(a)(ii), which the Court of Chancery entered on August 14,
2018.

Rite Aid Corporation, through its subsidiaries, operates a chain of
retail drugstores in the United States. It operates through two
segments, Retail Pharmacy and Pharmacy Services. Rite Aid
Corporation was founded in 1927 and is headquartered in Camp Hill,
Pennsylvania.


RITE AID: Court Grants Motion to Dismiss Hering Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Rite Aid Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 4, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 1, 2018, that a Pennsylvania
district court has granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the
amended complaint in Hering v. Rite Aid Corp., et al., thereby
dismissing all claims alleged against the Rite Aid defendants.

In connection with a proposed merger between the Company and
Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. (WBA), a lawsuit was filed in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania (the "Pennsylvania District Court"), asserting a claim
for violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule
14a-9 against the Rite Aid Defendants, WBA and Victoria and a claim
for violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against the
Individual Defendants and WBA (Hering v. Rite Aid Corp., et al.).

The complaint in the Hering action alleged, among other things,
that the Rite Aid Defendants disseminated an allegedly false and
materially misleading proxy and sought to enjoin the shareholder
vote on the proposed merger, a declaration that the proxy was
materially false and misleading in violation of federal securities
laws and an award of money damages and attorneys' and experts'
fees.

On January 14 and 16, 2016, respectively, the plaintiff in the
Hering action filed a motion for preliminary injunction and a
motion for expedited discovery. On January 21, 2016, the Rite Aid
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Hering complaint. At a
hearing held on January 25, 2016, the Pennsylvania District Court
orally denied the plaintiff's motion for expedited discovery and
subsequently denied the plaintiff's motion for preliminary
injunction on January 28, 2016.

On March 14, 2016, the Pennsylvania District Court appointed Jerry
Hering, Don Michael Hussey and Joanna Pauli Hussey as lead
plaintiffs for the putative class and approved their selection of
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP as lead counsel. On April 14,
2016, the Pennsylvania District Court granted the lead plaintiffs'
unopposed motion to stay the Hering action for all purposes pending
consummation of the merger.

On August 4, 2017, the Pennsylvania District Court entered an order
lifting the stay, noting that the original claims in the matter
were now moot and directed the plaintiffs to file a motion for
leave to amend the complaint, with brief in support thereof, which
motion was subsequently filed on September 22, 2017. Also on
September 22, 2017, the lead plaintiffs gave notice that plaintiffs
Don Michael Hussey and Joanna Pauli Hussey were withdrawing as lead
plaintiffs, and that plaintiff Jerry Hering (the "Lead Plaintiff")
would continue to represent the proposed class in the Hering action
going forward.

On November 27, 2017, the Pennsylvania District Court granted Lead
Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint, and Lead Plaintiff filed
the amended complaint (the "Amended Complaint") on December 11,
2017.

The amended complaint alleged claims for violations of Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 against the
Rite Aid Defendants, WBA, and certain WBA executives. On February
14, 2018, the Rite Aid Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended
Complaint, which the Pennsylvania District Court granted on July
11, 2018, dismissing all claims alleged against the Rite Aid
Defendants.

Rite Aid Corporation, through its subsidiaries, operates a chain of
retail drugstores in the United States. It operates through two
segments, Retail Pharmacy and Pharmacy Services. Rite Aid
Corporation was founded in 1927 and is headquartered in Camp Hill,
Pennsylvania.


RITE AID: Jan. 2019 Final Hearing to Approve Hall Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------
Rite Aid Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 4, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 1, 2018, that the final approval
hearing to approve the settlement in the case, Hall v. Rite Aid
Corporation, is scheduled to occur on January 11, 2019.

Rite Aid said, "In the employee seating lawsuit (Hall v. Rite Aid
Corporation, San Diego County Superior Court), the parties reached
a class action settlement for $18 million plus institution of a
two-year pilot seating program for front-end checkstands."  

On September 14, 2018, the Court granted preliminary approval of
the settlement. The hearing for final approval is scheduled to
occur on January 11, 2019.

Rite Aid Corporation, through its subsidiaries, operates a chain of
retail drugstores in the United States. It operates through two
segments, Retail Pharmacy and Pharmacy Services. Rite Aid
Corporation was founded in 1927 and is headquartered in Camp Hill,
Pennsylvania.


RITE AID: Wilson Class Action Remains Dormant
---------------------------------------------
Rite Aid Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 4, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 1, 2018, that the class action
lawsuit entitled, Wilson v. Rite Aid Corp., et al., remains
pending, but inactive.

After the announcement of the then proposed merger between the
Company and Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. ("WBA"), a putative
class action lawsuit was filed in Pennsylvania in the Court of
Common Pleas of Cumberland County (Wilson v. Rite Aid Corp., et
al.) by a purported Company stockholder against the Company, its
directors (the Individual Defendants, together with the Company,
the Rite Aid Defendants), WBA and Victoria Merger Sub Inc.
(Victoria) challenging the transactions contemplated by the merger
agreement.

The complaint alleged primarily that the Individual Defendants
breached their fiduciary duties by, among other things, agreeing to
an allegedly unfair and inadequate price, agreeing to deal
protection devices that allegedly prevented the directors from
obtaining higher offers from other interested buyers for the
Company and allegedly failing to protect against certain purported
conflicts of interest in connection with the merger.

The complaint further alleged that the Company, WBA and/or Victoria
aided and abetted these alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. The
complaint sought, among other things, to enjoin the closing of the
merger as well as money damages and attorneys’ and experts' fees.


Rite Aid said, "The matter remains pending, but inactive."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Rite Aid Corporation, through its subsidiaries, operates a chain of
retail drugstores in the United States. It operates through two
segments, Retail Pharmacy and Pharmacy Services. Rite Aid
Corporation was founded in 1927 and is headquartered in Camp Hill,
Pennsylvania.


ROADRUNNER INTERMODAL: Court Amends Prelim Approval of Singh Deal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JABIR SINGH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ROADRUNNER
INTERMODAL SERVICES, LLC; CENTRAL CAL TRANSPORTATION; and MORGAN
SOUTHERN, INC., Defendants, Case No. 1:15-cv-01497-DAD-BAM (E.D.
Cal.), Judge Dale A. Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California granted the Plaintiffs' motion
requesting modification of the order granting preliminary approval
of the class action settlement.

On May 29, 2018, the Court issued an order granting preliminary
approval of the class action settlement and preliminarily approving
class certification.  In granting the Plaintiffs' motion for
preliminary approval, the Court noted that the settlement amount
was based on the belief that the class comprised 796 drivers with
41,846 qualifying work weeks.

The Plaintiffs have now reported that on June 13, 2018, the
settlement administrator notified the Plaintiffs' counsel that the
Defendants produced a class list with 897 class members and
involving 49,376.02 work weeks.  This change reflects a 12.7%
increase in class members and 18% increase in work weeks.

On June 27, 2018, the parties met with Magistrate Judge Barbara A.
McAuliffe in an informal telephonic conference to discuss the
unexpected increase in class size.  Afterwards, the parties
attempted to negotiate an increase in the settlement with the
assistance of Mark Rudy, the mediator who facilitated the original
settlement.

On Aug. 6, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion
requesting modification of the order granting preliminary approval
of the class action settlement.  Their counsel Brian Kabateck
submitted a supplemental declaration in support of the motion on
Aug. 14, 2018, which included a fully executed addendum to a
stipulation of the class action settlement and release of claims.

The Plaintiffs request that the order granting plaintiffs' motion
for preliminary approval of the class action settlement be modified
to provide that the settlement now includes 897 class members and
49,376 qualifying work weeks.  Additionally, they request a new
implementation schedule leading up to the hearing date for final
approval.  No other material changes to the order granting
preliminary approval are requested.

Judge Drozd concludes that the settlement agreement with the
Plaintiffs' requested modifications still appears to be fair,
reasonable, and adequate.  The modifications do not affect whether
the settlement is procedurally fair.  Indeed, the parties attempted
to renegotiate the settlement with the assistance of a respected
mediator, which tends to support the conclusion that the settlement
process was not collusive.

Recognizing the risk of being deprived of any recovery that the
Plaintiffs realistically face, the Judge finds that the amount and
terms of the modified settlement of these actions still weigh in
favor of preliminary approval.  Therefore, he ordered the following
modified implementation schedule, as submitted by the parties:

     a. Deadline for the Defendant to supply class list to CPT
Group, Inc. - Five days from grant of preliminary approval

     b. Deadline for CPT Group, Inc. to mail notice to class
members - 10 days from receipt of class list packets

     c. Deadline for the Class Members to postmark Requests for
Exclusion, Objections, and Notice - 45 days from Notice Date --
date Packets are mailed (i.e. Response Disputes of Qualifying Work
Weeks Deadline) Extended

     d. Deadline for the Class Members with remailed Notice Packets
to postmark Requests for Exclusion, Objections, and Disputes of
Qualifying Work Weeks - 15 days from initial 45-day Response
Deadline

     e. Deadline for CPT Group, Inc. to provide to Class Counsel
regarding Counsel compliance with settlement administration
procedures and costs - 10 days prior to deadline for Co-Class
Declaration to file Motion for Final Approval

     f. Deadline for Co-Class Counsel to file - (1) Dec. 11, 2018
Responses to Class Members' Objections, if any, and (2) Motion for
Final Approval; Awards of Attorneys' Fees, Request for
Reimbursement of Costs; Class Representatives' Enhancements; and
Settlement Administrator's Costs

     g. Fairness Hearing and Final Approval - Jan. 8, 2019

The Judge notes that the notice and the manner of notice proposed
by the Plaintiffs still meet the requirements of Federal Civil
Procedure Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and that the proposed mail delivery is
still appropriate.

For the reasons stated, Judge Drozd granted the Plaintiffs' request
to modify the order granting preliminary approval of the class
action settlement agreement.  The hearing for final approval of the
proposed settlement is set for Jan. 8, 2019 at 9:30 a.m.  The
proposed settlement implementation schedule is adopted and the
Plaintiff's counsel is directed to submit a motion for final
approval of the settlement agreement, including an estimate of the
PAGA claims, and a response to any objections in accordance with
the schedule set forth in the order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 12, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/rTZ0Sv from Leagle.com.

Jabir Singh, Bany Lopez, Julio Vidrio, James Sliger, Derrick Lewis,
Jerry Leininger, Kristopher Spring & Jerry Wood, Plaintiffs,
represented by Andrew Butler Jones, Esq., Wagner, Jones, Kopfman, &
Artenia LLP, Brian S. Kabateck -- bsk@kbklawyers.com -- Kabateck
Brown Kellner, LLP, Cheryl Ann Kenner, Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP,
Daniel Myers Kopfman, Wagner, Jones, Kopfman, & Artenian LLP, Shant
Arthur Karnikian -- sk@kbklawyers.com -- Kabateck Brown Kellner
LLP, Angela Elizabeth Martinez, Wagner, Jones, Kopfman & Artenian
LLP, Lawrence Mark Artenian, Wagner, Jones, Kopfman & Artenian LLP
& Nicholas John Paul Wagner, Wagner, Jones, Kopfman, & Artenia
LLP.

Nicholas E Rich, an individual on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Butler Jones,
Esq., Wagner, Jones, Kopfman, & Artenia LLP, Brian S. Kabateck,
Kabateck Brown Kellner, LLP, Daniel Myers Kopfman, Wagner, Jones,
Kopfman, & Artenian LLP, Joshua H. Haffner, Haffner Law, PC, Kevin
Shawn Conlogue, Law Offices of Kevin S. Conlogue, Shant Arthur
Karnikian, Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP, Cheryl Ann Kenner, Kabateck
Brown Kellner LLP & Nicholas John Paul Wagner, Wagner, Jones,
Kopfman, & Artenia LLP.

Latrina Phillips, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew Butler Jones,
Esq., Wagner, Jones, Kopfman, & Artenia LLP, Brian S. Kabateck,
Kabateck Brown Kellner, LLP, Daniel Myers Kopfman, Wagner, Jones,
Kopfman, & Artenian LLP, Joshua H. Haffner, Haffner Law, PC, Kevin
Shawn Conlogue, Law Offices of Kevin S. Conlogue, Shant Arthur
Karnikian, Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP, Cheryl Ann Kenner, Kabateck
Brown Kellner LLP & Nicholas John Paul Wagner, Wagner, Jones,
Kopfman, & Artenia LLP.

Roadrunner Intermodal Services, LLC, Central Cal Transportation,
LLC & Morgan Southern, Inc., Defendants, represented by A. Jack
Finklea -- JFINKLEA@SCOPELITIS.COM -- Scopelitis Garvin Light
Hanson & Feary, P.C., pro hac vice, Adam C. Smedstad --
asmedstad@scopelitis.com -- Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson &
Feary, Christopher Chad McNatt, Jr. -- CMCNATT@SCOPELITIS.COM --
Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson & Feary, LLP, James H. Hanson --
JHANSON@SCOPELITIS.COM -- Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson & Feary,
P.C., pro hac vice, Megan E. Ross, Scopelitis Garvin Light Hanson &
Feary & Alaina Cathrine Hawley -- AHAWLEY@SCOPELITIS.COM --
Scopelitis, Garvin, Light, Hanson & Feary, P.C.


SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY, CA: Summary Judgment in Newberry Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RAYMOND NEWBERRY; PATRICIA MENDOZA; MARIA ABOYTIA;
JUANA PULIDO; JESUS PULIDO; JONATHAN PULIDO; RICHARD GONZALEZ
LOZADA; MELINDA McNEAL; BERTHA LOZADA; MILDRED LYTWYNEC; NICHOLAS
LYTWYNEC; GLORIA BASUA; LIZBETH BANUELOS; CARLOS OCHOA, and Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SAN
BERNARDINO, in its individual capacity and its official capacity;
TRACY MORENO, in his/her Individual Capacity and Official Capacity;
WILLIAM BROWN, in his Individual Capacity and Official Capacity;
JENNY ROSE PACINI, in her Individual Capacity and Official
Capacity, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 16-55466 (9th Cir.), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment to the Defendants, the denial of
the class certification, and the denial of terminating sanctions
for an alleged discovery violation.

The Plaintiffs-Appellants in the case are a subset of residents at
a San Bernardino apartment complex who maintain that their homes
were unlawfully searched for municipal code violations by officers
of the County of San Bernardino.  The Plaintiffs contend that the
code enforcement action at their homes was a pretext for a criminal
search for which the County lacked probable cause.  They contend
also that, even if an administrative search for code violations was
appropriate, the administrative search warrant executed at their
homes authorized a greater intrusion than justified under the
circumstances.  In particular, they object to the warrant being
issued and executed without advance notice, and they object to the
warrant authorizing entry into residents' homes by force and
without the residents' presence.

In their operative complaint, the Plaintiffs brought class-action
claims for violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.  The
district court granted summary judgment for the Defendants,
reasoning that the County officers reasonably relied on a facially
valid warrant.  The Plaintiffs appeal the grant of summary judgment
to the Defendants, the denial of class certification, and the
denial of terminating sanctions for an alleged discovery
violation.

The Ninthn Circuit reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo.
It affirmed, albeit on somewhat different reasoning than the
district court.

It finds that the uncontested record reflects that the Edgehill
search was initiated, coordinated, and for the most part conducted
by officers of the City of San Bernardino, not officers of the
County.  Three County officers participated in the Edgehill search.
Of those, only one had any interaction at all with a named
Plaintiff: According to Plaintiff Juana Pulido, she and other
members of her household encountered County Probation Officer
William Brown while waiting outside their apartment.  Brown
requested identification, and Pulido and the other members of her
household provided it.  

On the evidence in the record, the interaction went no further.
Pulido does not  allege that Brown had any direct relationship to
the search of her home.  Nor, for that matter, does she offer any
hint that the encounter with Brown was not voluntary, or that those
speaking to Brown did not feel free to leave or to refuse to
respond to his inquiry.  Accordingly, on the record available to
the district court on summary judgment, no evidence existed that
any County officer, including Brown, unlawfully searched or seized
a Plaintiff in the case.

It also finds that the record reflects that the Defendants were
participants only in the searches for which County officers were
physically present.  The County and its officers played no role in
planning the Edgehill search generally.  They played no role in
securing the warrant.  And except as passive observers, they played
no role in the operational briefing held on the morning the warrant
was executed.  County officers were assigned their roles in the
Edgehill search.  At most, then, the only conduct that can be
imputed to the Defendants under Boyd is the conduct of their team
members during the search -- those with whom the County officers
collaborated in deciding whether or how to search individual
apartments.  That conduct, the Court finds, that does not extend
the Defendants' liability to additional apartments or to additional
Plaintiffs.

The foregoing reasoning also disposes of the Plaintiffs' Monell
claims against the County.  A constitutional violation is a
prerequisite to a Monell claim.  As no County officer violated the
Fourth Amendment rights of a named Plaintiff, no named Plaintiff
has a Monell claim against the County.

Because it affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the Defendants
on the merits, the Court does not address the district court's
order denying class certification.

It reviews for abuse of discretion the district court's decision
not to impose sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
37(e).  The Court affirmed.  It finds that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in concluding that sanctions were not
warranted under either subsection of Rule 37(e).  The Plaintiffs
maintain that the County destroyed emails between Rohleder and
Moreno that might have demonstrated that County officers were more
closely involved in planning the Edgehill search than they
admitted.  But the district court reasonably concluded that the
missing emails caused no prejudice to the Plaintiffs, as the
existing record adequately demonstrated that the County officers
played only a minor role in the search, the details of which they
learned on the day it occurred.  Furthermore, the district court
properly exercised its discretion in finding spoliation unlikely in
this case, and terminating sanctions unjustified, given the
relative insignificance of any gap in the County's production.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/hoDSnp from Leagle.com.


SAN DIEGO, CA: Faces Class Action Over Privacy Violations
---------------------------------------------------------
Morgan Cook, writing for The San Diego Union-Tribune, reports that
three children who are suing the County of San Diego on allegations
that child welfare officials violated their rights have filed a
new, class action lawsuit accusing the government's lawyers of
looking through their confidential juvenile case files without
required judicial authorization.

The class-action lawsuit, filed on Sept. 25 in federal court by
children identified as A.C., A.E.1 and A.E.2, names as defendants
the county and two of its in-house civil lawyers,
Erica Cortez and Kate Jones. It asks the court for class-action
certification and other relief including an injunction, unspecified
damages and legal fees and costs.

A.C., A.E.1 and A.E.2 are among the plaintiffs in an ongoing
lawsuit filed against the county last year. The 2017 lawsuit
accused the county of violating the plaintiffs' constitutional
rights when social workers improperly detained the children in 2016
amid false allegations of abuse of another child.

Ms. Cortez and Ms. Jones are county civil attorneys who have been
defending the county and its Health and Human Services Agency in
the lawsuit.

The new, class-action lawsuit comes on the heels of the county's
agreement this month to pay $3 million to settle two lawsuits by
former foster children. One of the lawsuits accused the county of
privacy violations similar to those alleged in the new litigation
by A.C., A.E.1 and A.E.2.

San Diego-based attorney Shawn A. McMillan represented the former
foster children in the recently-settled litigation. He is also
among the attorneys representing plaintiffs in the new privacy
lawsuit.

Juvenile and child welfare case files are confidential and
protected by law. Any attorney representing a party in civil
litigation -- even when an attorney is in-house counsel defending
the county -- must seek judicial authorization before so much as
looking at the private records, according to the lawsuit.

Experts in juvenile law have said counties maintain child welfare
records, but they should not use their special access to provide
their defense lawyers with documents that other defendants or
plaintiffs have been unable to obtain through juvenile courts or
the normal discovery process.

According to the new lawsuit, Ms. Jones admitted on June 19 in Ms.
Cortez's presence that she had viewed confidential and protected
documents in the plaintiffs' juvenile case files. At that time, the
county had not asked the juvenile court for permission to view the
records, the lawsuit alleged.

The lawsuit did not include details about what Ms. Jones allegedly
said or what records she allegedly viewed without judicial
authorization.

Similar allegations against Ms. Cortez first surfaced this past
summer while she was defending the county in the unrelated lawsuit
filed in 2016 by two former foster children, twin brothers
identified in court records as A.G. and M.G.

In their lawsuit, A.G. and M.G. accused the county of ignoring or
failing to properly investigate more than a dozen reports of
suspected child abuse, leaving the boys at the mercy of their
foster parent, Michael Jarome Hayes, who abused them for years.

Mr. Hayes pleaded guilty in 2014 to sexually molesting A.G., M.G.
and a third boy the county also had placed in Mr. Hayes' care. He
is now serving a nearly 21-year sentence and was recently
transferred to the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility in Otay
Mesa.

While defending the county in the twins' lawsuit, Ms. Cortez made
reference to a record from A.G.'s juvenile case file that the
county had refused to give A.G. and M.G.'s lawyers, telling them
they had to petition the juvenile court for its release, the twins
claimed in the now-settled lawsuit.

The county accessed the record without seeking judicial permission
from the juvenile court, the lawsuit said.

At a hearing for the lawsuit in May, one of the twins' lawyers,
Stephen D. Daner, told the court about Ms. Cortez's allegedly
unauthorized access to A.G.'s juvenile case file, arguing that she
had failed to follow court rules requiring county attorneys to file
a request with the court and obtain judicial authorization.

Ms. Cortez defended the practice of viewing juvenile case files
without judicial authorization, arguing during the hearing that she
and other county lawyers also advise the county on policy and
compliance issues having to do with juvenile dependency cases.

"I would maintain that we need to review our client's records in
its entirety in order to serve in our multiple roles as in-house
counsel," Cortez told the judge.

Ms. Cortez also noted that the plaintiffs had not shown that the
county had used information in the records to harm the plaintiffs'
case.

"They have not proven that I am going into their records and
getting information willy-nilly in order to sandbag them or attack
them," Ms. Cortez said at the hearing.

Judge Anthony J. Battaglia agreed with Cortez that A.G.'s attorneys
had not shown that she used the record to harm A.G.'s case and he
would therefore decline to rule on the issue.

While he did not rule, he repeatedly told the county lawyers that
he was not convinced that county counsel has a unique right to
access juvenile case files when defending the agency in civil
court, where the information could be used as an unfair advantage.

"You can't have it both ways," Judge Battaglia told the county's
lawyers during the hearing. "You can't be in there, cherrypicking
information, keeping it from the plaintiffs' counsel, and then at
trial try to impeach A.G. or somebody on some documents you
sequestered under some veil that because you are county counsel and
this is an agency of the county, you get free rein and nobody else
gets to see it."

After the hearing, A.G. filed a second, related lawsuit this
summer, accusing the county and Ms. Cortez of violating his
constitutional right to privacy. The lawsuit was still in its
infancy when the parties told the court they intended to settle
both it and the 2016 lawsuit by A.G. and his brother.

The settlement was finalized with the county agreeing to pay $3
million (including legal fees) to settle both lawsuits.

Workman did not respond to questions about the county's current
policies and practices for when and how government civil defense
lawyers may access juvenile case files of plaintiffs suing the
county and its Health and Human Services Agency. Ms. Cortez and Ms.
Jones did not respond to requests for comment. [GN]


SEATTLE SERVICE: Reyestorre FDCA Suit Dismissed With Prejudice
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARIA G REYESTORRE, on behalf of herself and those
similarly situated; Plaintiff, v. SEATTLE SERVICE BUREAU, INC. DBA
NATIONAL SERVICE BUREAU, A Washington Corporation, Defendant, Case
No. 2:18-cv-00190-JCM-GWF (D. Nev.), Judge James C. Mahan of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada granted the parties'
Stipulation to dismiss with prejudice the action as to Reyestorre,
and to dismiss without prejudice the class action claims asserted
in the lawsuit pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(1)(A).

Each party will bear their own costs and expenses.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 12, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/lUti3P from Leagle.com.

Maria G Reyestorre, Plaintiff, represented by Keren E. Gesund --
keren@gp-nola.com -- Gesund & Pailet, LLC.

Seattle Service Bureau, Inc., doing business as National Service
Bureau, Defendant, represented by Kurt R. Bonds --
kbonds@alversontaylor.com -- ALVERSON TAYLOR & SANDERS & Trevor
Waite -- twaite@alversontaylor.com -- ALVERSON TAYLOR & SANDERS.


SERVICOM LLC: Bramlett Sues Over WARN Act Violation
---------------------------------------------------
Rebecca Bramlett, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Servicom LLC, and JNET
Communications LLC, Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-50333 (N.D. Ill.,
October 17, 2018) arises out of the Defendants' failure to provide
60 days' advance written notice to Plaintiff Bramlett and all other
similarly situated former employees of two separate plant closings,
in violation of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act.

The complaint says because the Defendants failed to provide advance
written notice to Bramlett and other similarly situated employees,
the Defendants are liable for unpaid compensation and other
benefits which should have been paid during the 60-day notice
period under the WARN Act.

Rebecca Bramlett is a resident of the Illinois who worked for
Defendants as a Human Resource Recruiter from July 2018 until she
was terminated, along with approximately 350 other employees, each
without cause, on or about September 29, 2018, notes the complaint.


Servicom is a Delaware limited liability company that is licensed
to do business in the State of Illinois. Servicom provides outside
sales, customer service, and billing services, and has locations in
Rockford, Illinois and Machesney Park, Illinois.

JNET is a Delaware limited liability company that is headquartered
in Warren, New Jersey. JNET is the parent company of Servicom.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     James B. Zouras, Esq.
     Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
     Stephan Zouras, LLP
     100 North Riverside Plaza, Suite 2150
     Chicago, IL 60606
     Phone: 312-233-1550
     Fax: 312-233-1560
     Email: jzouras@stephanzouras.com
            rstephan@stephanzouras.com



SHUTTERFLY INC: Can Compel Arbitration in Taylor Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, MEGAN TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. SHUTTERFLY, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-00266-BLF (N.D. Cal.), Judge Beth Labson
Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, (i) granted Shutterfly's motion to
compel arbitration and stay proceedings, and (ii) denied without
prejudice Taylor's motion for leave to file an amended complaint.

Taylor is an individual who lives in Illinois and alleges that she
has been a Shutterfly customer since 2011.  Shutterfly provides
image publishing services and helps customers turn photos into
photobooks, cards, photo gifts, personal websites, among other
things.

Taylor alleges that Shutterfly engaged in misleading and deceptive
advertising and induced her into purchasing a Shutterfly
promotional deal on Groupon's website.  According to Taylor,
Shutterfly did not disclose prior to her purchase that she was
purchasing a promotional code, rather than a dollar credit, gift
card or coupon with a $75 dollar value to spend on Shutterfly.com.
Taylor further alleges that Shutterfly did not disclose that the
promotion on Groupon could not be combined with any other sales or
promotional codes that were offered on Shutterfly's website.

On Dec. 8, 2017, Taylor sent Shutterfly a notice and demand that
within 30 days Shutterfly should correct, repair, or rectify the
allegedly unlawful and deceptive advertising practices.  A few days
later, on Dec. 12, 2017, Taylor initiated the action in state
court.

She asserts the following class action claims: (1) false
advertising (California Business and Professions Code Sections
17500, et seq.); (2) violation of the California Consumers Legal
Remedies Act (California Civil Code Sections 1750, et seq.); (3)
breach of contract; (4) fraud, deceit and/or misrepresentation; and
(5) unfair, unlawful and deceptive trade practices (California
Business and Professions Code Sections 17200, et seq.).  

Pursuant to section 382 of California Code of Civil Procedure and
section 1781 of California Civil Code, the Complaint pleads a class
action for the class of all persons who, between Dec. 8, 2013 and
the present, purchased in the United States a deal on the Groupon
website for dollar amount towards a purchase on the Shutterfly
website.

On March 7, 2018, Shutterfly filed its motion to compel arbitration
and stay proceedings.  On Aug. 9, 2018, Taylor filed a motion for
leave to file an amended complaint along with a proposed First
Amended Complaint ("FAC").  Taylor states that the FAC does not
amend the operative facts nor does it include any new causes of
action or new parties" but adds a request for monetary relief under
the California Legal Remedies Act.  According to Taylor, the FAC
adds allegations relating to Shutterfly's inclusion of and
attempted enforcement of the arbitration provision, class action
waiver, and public injunctive relief waiver in Shutterfly's Terms
of Service.  

The FAC also adds two additional putative classes:

     a. Compelled Arbitration Class: All California residents who
(1) asserted claims against the Defendant on behalf of a potential
class of persons, (2) asserted fraudulent conduct by the Defendant,
and (3) against whom, from Dec. 8, 2013 through the present, the
Defendant enforced, or attempted to enforce, the Terms of Service
arbitration provision.

     b. Public Injunction Relief Waiver Class: All California
residents who, from Dec. 8, 2013 through the present, were
customers of Defendant and subject to Terms of Service that
purported to bar customers from bringing a claim on behalf of a
class of similarly situated persons.

Taylor does not argue that her filing of the FAC would moot
Shutterfly's motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings.

Before the Court is Shutterfly's motion to compel arbitration and
stay proceedings. The motion to compel arbitration is based on an
arbitration agreement in Shutterfly's Terms of Use.  The Court
heard oral argument on June 14, 2018.

During the hearing, Taylor raised a new argument that the Court is
required to determine whether Shutterfly's assertion of
arbitrability is "wholly groundless" under Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia
Corp.  The parties filed supplemental briefing on this narrow
issue.

On Aug. 9, 2018, Taylor submitted a motion for leave to file an
amended complaint.  The briefing on Taylor's motion closed on Aug.
30, 2018.  Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court takes
Taylor's motion under submission without oral argument.
Accordingly, the hearing scheduled for Nov. 29, 2018 is vacated.

Judge Freeman concludes that the parties clearly and unmistakably
delegated the gateway issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator.
Due to the express delegation clause, she may not engage in the
limited two-part inquiry to decide the gateway issues of
arbitrability.  As such, she does not address the parties'
arguments relating to the two-part inquiry.

After reviewing the parties' papers and the cases cited therein,
the Judge is unconvinced by Taylor's arguments.  Taylor contends
that the Federal Circuit applied Ninth Circuit law in conducting a
"wholly groundless" inquiry and that district courts have followed
suit.  However, as a basis for conducting a limited inquiry to
determine whether the assertion of arbitrability is wholly
groundless, the court in Qualcomm cited to a case decided by the
California Court of Appeal not the Ninth Circuit.

Moreover, even if the "wholly groundless" inquiry was a
requirement, Taylor's position is unavailing.  Taylor argues that
Shutterfly's assertion of arbitrability is wholly groundless
because the Arbitration Agreement is void for containing a
purportedly unenforceable public injunctive relief waiver provision
and poison pill provision.  As such, she finds Taylor's argument is
directed to the enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement.
However, the limited "wholly groundless" test asks only whether the
asserted claims are arguably covered by the Arbitration Agreement
but not whether that agreement is enforceable.

Finally, Taylor's false advertising claim is based on her
allegations concerning Shutterfly's marketing of Groupon coupons
that could be used on Shutterfly's website and Shutterfly's
restrictions on the manner in which customers could redeem those
coupons to purchase Shutterfly's services.  The same allegations
form the basis for Taylor's claims based on California Consumers
Legal Remedies Act; breach of contract; fraud, deceit and/or
misrepresentation; and unfair, unlawful and deceptive trade
practices.  Because Taylor's claims are based on her purchase and
use of Shutterfly's services, the Judge holds it is at least
arguable that Taylor's claims arise out of or relate to the
Shutterfly service as set forth in paragraph 1 of the Arbitration
Agreement.

Moreover, to the extent that Taylor asserts a claim for public
injunctive relief, that claim arguably relates to the Arbitration
Agreement's restrictions on seeking injunctive relief and thus may
be covered by the parties' agreement to arbitrate.  The Judge
therefore finds that Shutterfly's assertion that Taylor's claims
are within the scope of arbitration is not "wholly groundless."
This ruling does not determine whether Taylor's claims are in fact
subject to arbitration.  That issue has been delegated to the
arbitrator.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Freeman concludes that
Shutterfly's Terms of Use clearly and unmistakably delegates
gateway issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator.  Shutterfly's
motion to compel arbitration is granted.

Shutterfly also requests that the Court stay the action pending
completion of the arbitration. Taylor's only response is that
"there is nothing to be referred to arbitration and thus no
justification for a stay.  The argument, however, has no basis
because the Judge granted Shutterfly's motion to compel
arbitration.  Therefore, Shutterfly's request for a stay of the
action is granted.

As to Taylor' motion for leave to file an amended complaint along
with a proposed FAC, the Judge holds that Taylor has not shown that
she is entitled to amend her complaint under Rule 15.  She
therefore denied Taylor's motion for leave to file an amended
complaint.  This denial is without prejudice to Taylor's ability to
submit her amended allegations and claims to the arbitrator.  If
Taylor does submit those claims and the arbitrator determines that
certain claims which are alleged in her proposed amended complaint
are beyond the scope of arbitration, Taylor may renew her request
for leave to amend her complaint to pursue those claims when the
stay in this case is lifted.

The Judge stayed the action pending the completion of arbitration.
Within seven days of the resolution of the arbitration, the parties
will file a joint status report advising the Court of the
resolution of the matter and any further action required by the
Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 11, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/fFKQI8 from Leagle.com.

Megan Taylor, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Gutride --
adam@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride Safier LLP, Seth Adam Safier --
seth@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride Safier LLP & Marie Ann McCrary --
marie@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride Safier LLP.

Shutterfly, Inc., Defendant, represented by Gregory Clement Cheng
-- gregory.cheng@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak &
Stewart, P.C., Lauren Michele Cooper -- lauren.cooper@ogletree.com
-- Ogletree Deakins, et al. & Brian Davis Berry --
Brian.Berry@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart, P.C..


SIRTEX: Ex-CEO Faces Insider Trading Charges Amid Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Business News Australia reports that within days of biotech company
Sirtex Medical Limited delisting from the ASX following its
takeover from China's CDH Investments for $1.9 billion, former CEO
Gilman Edwin Wong has been charged with insider trading.

The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) alleges
Mr Wong, who was also a director of the radioactive treatment
device company, was in possession of inside information about
Sirtex's sales when he sold 74,698 shares on 26 October 2016.

Mr Wong appeared on Sept. 25 at the Downing Central Local Court in
Sydney charged with one count of insider trading under the
Corporations Act and the matter was adjourned to 20 November 2018.


The matter is being prosecuted by the Commonwealth Director of
Public Prosecutions, and ASIC highlighted the maximum penalty for
an insider trading offence was 10 years' imprisonment.

The development comes amidst a shareholder class action, funded by
IMF Bentham and conducted by Maurice Blackburn Lawyers, against
Sirtex and Mr. Wong's alleged conduct.

"The claims will allege that the FY17 Dose Sales Growth Guidance
was misleading and lacked a reasonable basis, that Sirtex was in
breach of its continuous disclosure obligations under the
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) during the Relevant Period and that
Sirtex misled the market in relation to its former CEO's alleged
non-compliance with Sirtex's corporate governance policies," IMF
Bentham said in an overview of the case.

Even though Sirtex announced double-digit growth would continue in
FY17 and that claim was reiterated by Mr Wong at the company's AGM,
the day after the meeting he sold the shares for a value of almost
$2.14 million.

In December, Sirtex then lowered its worldwide first half sales
growth expectations to 4-6 per cent, sending the share price
plummeting down 37 per cent.

It is estimated that Mr Wong's early sale of those shares would
have saved him around $1 million.

"On 16 December 2016, Sirtex announced that its Board had appointed
lawyers to investigate Mr Wong's share sale in October. Mr Wong
voluntarily stood down during the investigation. Mr Wong's
employment was terminated on 13 January 2017 following receipt of
the lawyers' report," IMF Bentham said.

In September last year, Sirtex paid a penalty of $100,000 after
ASIC issued an infringement notice for the company's alleged
failure to comply with its continuous disclosure obligations.[GN]


SMALL COMMUNITY: Summary Judgment Bid in Yergovich FDCPA Suit OK'd
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT A. YERGOVICH, Plaintiff, v. SMALL COMMUNITY
SPECIALISTS LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-865 (E.D.
Va.), Judge T.S. Ellis, III of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, (i) granted the
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and (ii) denied the
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

Yergovich, owns and resides at a townhouse in Alexandria, Virginia.
The townhouse is located within a residential community called The
Village at Gum Springs.  The Village consists of 158 townhouses, a
parking lot and sidewalks.  It has no pool or community buildings.
The homeowners in The Village have a homeowners association known
as The Village at Gum Springs Homeowners Association, Inc.

Defendant Small Community Specialists ("SCS") is a Virginia limited
liability company that provides community management services for
The Village HOA.  Defendant Community Management Corp. is a
Virginia corporation and the parent company of SCS.  Defendant
Associations Inc. is a Texas corporation, that at all relevant
times, was acting as the parent company of SCS and Community
Management Corporation.

On May 24, 2016, The Village HOA entered into a management
agreement with SCS, designating SCS as the sole and exclusive
common interest community manager for The Village HOA.  The
Management Agreement requires SCS to collect assessments from
homeowners as they become due and authorizes SCS to demand payment
for payable sums and delinquency charges.  A prior Collections
Resolution enacted by The Village HOA also required the community
manager to collect due assessments.

The Defendants advertise on their website that they provide HOA
assessment collection services.  The Management Agreement
authorizes a schedule of periodic routine service charges, the
majority of which do not relate to delinquency processing or
debt-collection activity.

SCS took over as management company for The Village HOA effective
Aug. 1, 2016.  SCS immediately assumed control over the Plaintiff's
account, and continued collection of their allegedly delinquent
dues.  The Account History Report produced by the Defendants showed
the Plaintiff's account was in default by $713.94.

From August 2016 to December 2016, SCS mailed out between 11 and 48
delinquency notices per month to The Village homeowners and imposed
charges for delinquency status on four homeowners in November 2016
and nineteen homeowners in December 2016.  SCS's monthly invoices
to Village HOA from August to December 2016 reveal that fees for
delinquency processing comprised nineteen percent of the itemized
charges billed to The Village HOA and ten percent of SCS's total
charges billed to The Village HOA.

From August 2016 to October 2016, the Defendants sent the Plaintiff
written notices that his account was delinquent and demanded
payment of the delinquent charges and late fees.  On Oct. 17, 2016,
the Defendants sent the Plaintiff a certified letter titled Notice
of Intent to Accelerate Assessments and File Lien.  The letter
demanded payment of $883.94.  In December 2016, the Defendants
wrote off some of the charges on Plaintiff's account.

The Plaintiff is employed by the United States Marshal Service, for
which he has a top-secret clearance.  He has had previous
employment-related problems due to credit issues, which he wanted
to avoid repeating.  The Plaintiff has suffered stress, anxiety,
irritation, frustration, and loss of sleep because of the potential
impact the Defendants' written delinquency notices may have on the
Plaintiff's security clearance.  He has also suffered stress,
anxiety, irritation, frustration, and loss of sleep due to the
Defendants' threats to put a lien on his home and to accelerate the
payments of his HOA dues.  The Plaintiff has taken over-the-counter
medicine to help with the anxiety.

At issue on cross-motions for summary judgment in the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") case are: (i) whether the
complaint adequately alleges the injury in fact required to confer
standing on the Plaintiff; and (ii) whether the Defendants -- the
community manager of a home owner's association and its parent
entities -- are debt collectors under the FDCPA so as to be subject
to the Act's strictures.

The parties argue at length over whether the Plaintiff overpaid
what he properly owed or in fact paid an illegal charge.  In the
end, this argument is immaterial to the standing issue because a
violation of the FDCPA is itself a substantive injury regardless of
out of pocket loss, Judge Ellis finds.  Therefore, the Plaintiff's
allegations that defendants have violated the FDCPA by failing to
provide the disclosures required by the FDCPA, by attempting to
collect a debt through means prohibited by the FDCPA, and by
failing to cease collection of a debt after the Plaintiff gave
notice that the debt was disputed are sufficient to support
standing on each of these counts.  Likewise, the Defendants'
subsequent write-off of the allegedly improper charges does not, as
the Defendants argue, render the case moot because the write-off
does not erase the substantive injury created by the Defendants'
alleged FDCPA violations.

The Judge also finds that the undisputed record evidence clearly
demonstrates that the Defendants' debt-collection activity was
"incidental to" and not "central to" or "the primary purpose of"
their fiduciary obligations to The Village HOA.  The Defendants'
Management Agreement obligates SCS to perform a wide range of
duties, and SCS does much more than just collect assessments for
the HOA.  In fact, their invoices are powerful evidence that only a
minority of the work SCS performed for The Village HOA related to
debt collection.  Therefore, the undisputed record evidence of the
Defendants' numerous duties and activities unrelated to debt
collection demonstrates that their debt-collection activity was
"incidental" to -- not "central to, or the primary purpose of" --
the fiduciary obligation owed to The Village HOA.  The Defendants
accordingly are not debt collectors under Section 1692a(6)(F)(i) of
the FDCPA.

For these reasons, Judge Ellis granted the Defendants' motion for
summary judgment, and denied the Plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 11, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/4FfExL from Leagle.com.

Robert A. Yergovich, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Nathan Douglas Rozsa
-- NRozsa@smillaw.com -- Surovell Isaacs Petersen & Levy PLC &
Scott A. Surovell, Surovell Isaacs & Levy PLC.

Small Community Specialists, LLC., d/b/a Select Community Services
and/or Associa, Community Management Corporation, d/b/a Associa &
Associations, Inc., d/b/a Associa, Defendants, represented by
Danielle Deanna Giroux -- dgiroux@hccw.com -- Harman Claytor
Corrigan & Willman & Peter Christopher Nanov -- pnanov@hccw.com --
Harman Claytor Corrigan & Wellman.


SOLOMON & SOLOMON: 3d Cir. Affirms Daniels FDCPA Suit Dismissal
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Theodore McKee of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the case,
LATASHA DANIELS, On Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarily
Situated, Appellant, v. SOLOMON & SOLOMON P.C.; JOHN DOES 1-25,
Case No. 17-3017 (3d Cir.), for failure to state a claim.

Daniels claims that a debt collection letter she received from
Defendants violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA"), by suggesting the involvement of an attorney and
threatening legal action.  The letter was not signed by a Solomon
and Solomon attorney or employee.  The website to which the
correspondence directed Daniels linked to Solomon and Solomon's
webpage.  It is undisputed that Solomon and Solomon did not employ
an attorney licensed to practice law in Pennsylvania at any time
relevant to this dispute.

Daniels filed a class action complaint, arguing that the letter
violated 15 U.S.C. Sections 1692e(3), (5), and (10).  The District
Court later granted the Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, and the timely appeal followed.

Daniels first argues that the letter violates Sections 1692e(3) and
1692e(10) of the FDCPA because it falsely implies that an attorney
was meaningfully involved in the collection of her debt.  Daniels
also argues that the letter violates Section 1692e(5) because it
threatens to take legal action that cannot legally be taken.
Finally, she argues that the District Court improperly dismissed
her complaint with prejudice.

Judge McKee finds that a debt collection letter not reviewed by an
attorney but sent on law firm letterhead may not violate the FDCPA
if the letter contains a proper disclaimer.  Daniels cannot rely on
the content of the Defendant's webpage absent an allegation in the
complaint that would bring the webpage within the scope of the
inquiry.  Yet, the webpage was neither referenced in her complaint
nor attached to it.

The Judge next finds that the statement "act now to resolve this
problem" is little more than a statement urging Daniels to resolve
an outstanding debt.  It neither explicitly nor implicitly
threatens legal action.  Moreover, the letter is devoid of legal
jargon and, other than the possible inference arising from the
firm's name in the heading, makes no reference to legal action
whatsoever.

Fianlly, he finds that Daniels never sought leave to amend the
complaint.  The Court has long held that, to request leave to amend
a complaint, a plaintiff must submit a draft amended complaint to
the district court so that it can determine whether amendment would
be futile.  Since Daniels failed to take the required action to
amend her complaint, the District Court did not err in dismissing
it with prejudice.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge McKee affirmed the judgment of the
District Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 12, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/UyoLIa from Leagle.com.

Joseph K. Jones, [ARGUED], Benjamin J. Wolf, Jones Wolf & Kapasi,
375 Passaic Avenue, Suite 100, Fairfield, NJ 07004, Counsel for
Appellants,

William F. McDevitt, [ARGUED] -- william.mcdevitt@wilsonelser.com
-- Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, 2001 Market Street, Two
Commerce Square, Suite 3100, Philadelphia, PA 19103, Counsel for
Appellee.


SOOTHE INC: Sent Unsolicited SMS Ads, Herrera Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------
Antoinette Herrera, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Soothe, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-01753 (C.D. Cal., September
26, 2018), seeks statutory and treble damages, injunctive relief,
compensation and attorney's fees for violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991.

Soothe is a multinational in-home massage service provider
headquartered in Los Angeles, California. In an effort to
effectuate their business, they utilize bulk SMS messaging to reach
consumers, often without the recipients' consent, notes the
complaint.  [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Aaron D. Aftergood, Esq.
      THE AFTERGOOD LAW FIRM
      1880 Century Park East, Suite 200
      Los Angeles, CA 90067
      Telephone: (310) 551-5221
      Facsimile: (310) 496-2840
      Email: aaron@aftergoodesq.com

             - and -

      Steven L. Woodrow, Esq.
      Patrick H. Peluso, Esq.
      Taylor T. Smith, Esq.
      WOODROW & PELUSO, LLC
      3900 East Mexico Ave., Suite 300
      Denver, CO 80210
      Telephone: (720) 213-0675
      Facsimile: (303) 927-0809
      Email: swoodrow@woodrowpeluso.com
             ppeluso@woodrowpeluso.com
             tsmith@woodrowpeluso.com


SPERIAN ENERGY: Brady Sues Over Deceptive Business Practices
------------------------------------------------------------
Intira Brady, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Sperian Energy Corporation, Defendant, Case
No. 1:18-cv-06968 (N.D. Ill., October 17, 2018) seeks to redress
Defendant's deceptive conduct and bad faith pricing practices that
have caused thousands of Illinois consumers to pay considerably
more for their electricity than they should otherwise have paid.

The complaint says Sperian has exploited the deregulation of the
retail electricity market in Illinois by luring consumers into
switching energy suppliers using a bait-and-switch scheme designed
to deceive reasonable consumers.  Specifically, it offers teaser
rates that are fixed for a limited period of time and initially
lower than the local utilities' rates for electricity.  Once the
initial teaser rate expires, Sperian switches its customers over to
its market variable rate, which is invariably higher than the
initial teaser rate. When the market price goes down, Sperian's
rate remains at an inflated level significantly higher than the
market rate.   

The Defendant's violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act, and the common law are applicable
to all members of the Class, and the Plaintiff is entitled to have
Defendant enjoined from engaging in illegal and deceptive conduct
in the future, says the complaint.

Intira Brady was a customer of Sperian Energy beginning in April
2012 and incurred excessive charges for electricity.

Sperian Energy Corp. provides retail energy. It caters to both,
residential and commercial customers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Richard J. Burke, Esq.
     Jamie E. Weiss, Esq.
     Zachary A. Jacobs, Esq.
     QUANTUM LEGAL LLC
     513 Central Avenue, Suite 300
     Highland Park, IL 60035
     Phone: (847) 433-4500
     Email: rich@qulegal.com
            jamie@qulegal.com
            zachary@qulegal.com

          - and -

     Jonathan Shub, Esq.
     Kevin Laukaitis, Esq.
     KOHN SWIFT & GRAF, P.C.
     1600 Market Street, Suite 2500
     Philadelphia, PA 19103
     Phone: (215) 238-1700
     Email: jshub@kohnswift.com
            klaukaitis@kohnswift.com

          - and -

     Charles E. Schaffer, Esq.
     Daniel C. Levin, Esq.
     LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN LLP
     510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
     Philadelphia, PA 19106
     Phone: 215-592-1500
     Email: CSchaffer@lfsblaw.com
            DLevin@lfsblaw.com


SUPERVALU INC: Merger-Related Suits Voluntarily Dismissed
---------------------------------------------------------
These three lawsuits filed in Delaware district court against
SuperValu, Inc. have been voluntarily dismissed:

     -- Gusinsky Rev. Trust v. Supervalu Inc. et al., Case No.
1:18-cv-01323 (filed August 24, 2018),

     -- Wallace v. SUPERVALU, Inc. et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-01311
(filed August 24, 2018), and

     -- Svitek v. SuperValu, Inc. et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-01384
(filed September 5, 2018).

Supervalu Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission filed on October 9, 2018, 2018, that
pursuant to the Agreement and Plan of Merger (the "Merger
Agreement"), dated as of July 25, 2018, by and among SUPERVALU,
SUPERVALU Enterprises, Inc., a Delaware corporation and a wholly
owned subsidiary of SUPERVALU ("SUPERVALU Enterprises"), United
Natural Foods, Inc., a Delaware corporation (UNFI) and Jedi Merger
Sub, Inc., a Delaware corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of
UNFI ("Merger Sub"), pursuant to which Merger Sub will be merged
with and into the Company (the "Merger"), and the Company will
survive the Merger as a wholly owned subsidiary of UNFI.

In connection with the Merger Agreement and the transactions
contemplated thereby, three putative class action lawsuits were
filed on behalf of SUPERVALU stockholders in the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware.

In general, the complaints assert claims against SUPERVALU and the
SUPERVALU board of directors, alleging, among other things, that
the defendants failed to make adequate disclosures in the Company's
proxy statement relating to the Merger (in its definitive form, the
"Proxy Statement"). SUPERVALU believes that the allegations in the
complaints are without merit.

Supervalu said, "While SUPERVALU believes that the disclosures set
forth in the Proxy Statement comply fully with applicable law, to
moot plaintiffs' disclosure claims, to avoid nuisance, potential
expense and delay and to provide additional information to our
stockholders, SUPERVALU has determined to voluntarily supplement
the Proxy Statement. Nothing in the supplemental disclosure shall
be deemed an admission of the legal necessity or materiality under
applicable law of any of the disclosure set forth herein or in the
Proxy Statement. To the contrary, SUPERVALU denies all allegations
in the litigations that any additional disclosures was or is
required."

Each of the Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal on
October 22.

A copy of the supplemental disclosure is available at
https://goo.gl/zSiEY9.

Supervalu Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
grocery wholesaler and retailer in the United States and
internationally. It operates through two segments, Wholesale and
Retail. The company was founded in 1871 and is headquartered in
Eden Prairie, Minnesota.


SUPERVALU INC: Summary Judgment Order under Appeal in 11th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
SuperValu Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 15, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 1, 2018, that the plaintiff in a
class action lawsuit against the company over its 2003 transaction
with C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc., has taken an appeal to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit from a Wisconsin district
court's order granting the company's Daubert motion and motion for
summary judgment.

In December 2008, a class action complaint was filed in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin against
the company alleging that a 2003 transaction between Supervalu and
C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. ("C&S") was a conspiracy to restrain
trade and allocate markets. In the 2003 transaction, the company
purchased certain assets of the Fleming Corporation as part of
Fleming Corporation's bankruptcy proceedings and sold certain of
its assets to C&S that were located in New England. Three other
retailers filed similar complaints in other jurisdictions and the
cases were consolidated and are proceeding in the United States
District Court in Minnesota.

The complaints alleged that the conspiracy was concealed and
continued through the use of non-compete and non-solicitation
agreements and the closing down of the distribution facilities that
the company and C&S purchased from each other. Plaintiffs are
divided into Midwest plaintiffs and a New England plaintiff, and
are seeking monetary damages, injunctive relief and attorney's
fees.

On June 19, 2015, the District Court Magistrate Judge entered an
order that decided a number of matters including granting Midwest
plaintiffs' request to seek class certification for certain Midwest
distribution centers and denying New England plaintiff's request to
add an additional New England plaintiff and denying plaintiff's
request to seek class certification for a group of New England
retailers. In September 2015, the New England plaintiff appealed to
the 8th Circuit the denial of the request to add an additional New
England plaintiff and to seek class certification for a group of
New England retailers and the hearing before the 8th Circuit
occurred on May 17, 2016.

On September 7, 2016, the District Court granted Midwest
plaintiffs' motion to certify five Midwest distribution center
classes, only one of which sued the company (the non-arbitration
Champaign distribution center class). On March 1, 2017, the 8th
Circuit denied the New England plaintiff's appeals seeking to join
an additional New England plaintiff and the appeal seeking the
ability to move for class certification of a smaller New England
class. At a mediation on May 25, 2017, the company reached a
settlement with the non-arbitration Champaign distribution center
class, which is the one Midwest class suing the company.

The company and the Midwest plaintiffs entered into a settlement
agreement and the court granted final approval of the settlement on
November 17, 2017. The material terms of the settlement include:
(1) denial of wrongdoing and liability by us; (2) release of all
Midwest plaintiffs' claims against the company related to the
allegations and transactions at issue in the litigation that were
raised or could have been raised by the non-arbitration Champaign
distribution center class; and (3) payment by the company of $9.
There is no contribution between the company and C&S, and C&S did
not settle the claims alleged against it and on April 19, 2018, a
jury returned a verdict in favor of C&S determining that there was
no conspiracy between Supervalu and C&S to restrain trade.

The New England plaintiff is not a party to the settlement and is
pursuing its individual claims and potential class action claims
against the company, which at this time are determined as remote.
On February 15, 2018, the company filed a summary judgment and
Daubert motion, and the New England plaintiff filed a motion for
class certification and on July 27, 2018, the District Court
granted the company's motions. The New England plaintiff appealed
to the Eighth Circuit on August 15, 2018.

SuperValu, together with its subsidiaries, operates as a grocery
wholesaler and retailer in the United States and internationally.
It operates through two segments, Wholesale and Retail. The company
was founded in 1871 and is headquartered in Eden Prairie,
Minnesota.


SYNNEX CORP: Bid for Preliminary Injunction in Zalvin Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Synnex Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 9, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended August 31, 2018, that the motion for
preliminary injunction in the case, Zalvin v. Ayers, et al., has
been denied.

On September 10, 2018, a putative class action lawsuit (captioned
Zalvin v. Ayers, et al., Case No. A 1804888) (the "Zalvin Action"),
was filed in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County
against Convergys and individual members of Convergys' board of
directors, alleging breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the
Mergers.

The complaint filed in the Zalvin Action alleges that the
individual defendants breached their fiduciary duties by (i)
conducting an unfair sales process that was not designed to
maximize shareholder value and (ii) failing to disclose to
shareholders all material information necessary to make an informed
vote on the Mergers.

The Zalvin Action seeks, among other things, orders (i) declaring
that the Mergers were agreed to in breach of the defendants’
fiduciary duties or that the defendants aided and abetted such
breaches, (ii) declaring that the defendants breached their duty of
a full and fair disclosure, (iii) enjoining the defendants from
proceeding with or consummating the Mergers until the requested
disclosures are made, (iv) awarding plaintiffs compensatory
damages, and (v) awarding plaintiff's costs and attorneys' and
expert fees.

On September 20, 2018, plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction, which was denied by the Ohio Court on September 26,
2018.

Synnex Corporation provides business process services in North and
South America, the Asia-Pacific, Europe, and internationally. It
operates in two segments, Technology Solutions and Concentrix.
Synnex Corporation was founded in 1980 and is headquartered in
Fremont, California.


SYNNEX CORP: Continues to Defend Franchi Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
Synnex Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 9, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended August 31, 2018, that the lawyers for
plaintiff in Franchi v. Ayers, et al., stated that the additional
disclosures made by Convergys are sufficient to moot plaintiff's
claims.

On September 10, 2018, a putative class action and derivative
lawsuit (captioned Franchi v. Ayers, et al., Case No. A 1804876)
(the "Franchi Action"), was filed in the Ohio Court of Common
Pleas, Hamilton County against Convergys, individual members of
Convergys' board of directors, SYNNEX, Merger Sub I and Merger Sub
II, alleging breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the
Mergers.

The complaint filed in the Franchi Action alleges that the
individual defendants breached their fiduciary duties by (i)
conducting an unfair sales process that was not designed to
maximize shareholder value and (ii) failing to disclose to
shareholders all material information necessary to make an informed
vote on the Mergers.

The Franchi Action seeks, among other things, orders (i) enjoining
the defendants from proceeding with or consummating the Mergers,
(ii) rescinding the Mergers if consummated or, alternatively,
awarding unspecified rescissory damages, (iii) directing the
defendants to account for all damages suffered as a result of their
wrongdoing, and (iv) awarding plaintiff's costs and attorneys' and
expert fees.

On September 25, 2018, the lawyers for plaintiff in the Franchi
Action stated that the additional disclosures made by Convergys are
sufficient to moot plaintiff's claims.

Synnex Corporation provides business process services in North and
South America, the Asia-Pacific, Europe, and internationally. It
operates in two segments, Technology Solutions and Concentrix.
Synnex Corporation was founded in 1980 and is headquartered in
Fremont, California.


TD AMERITRADE: Court Certifies Class in Klein Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GERALD J. KLEIN, on behalf of himself and all
similarly situated; Plaintiff, v. TD AMERITRADE HOLDING
CORPORATION, TD AMERITRADE, INC., and FREDRIC TOMCZYK, Defendants,
Case No. 8:14CV396 (D. Neb.), Judge Joseph L. Bataillon of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Nebraska granted the Plaintiff's
motion for class certification, appointment of the class
representative, and appointment of the class counsel.

The matter is before the Court on an objection filed by lead
Plaintiff Roderick Ford to the Findings and Recommendation ("F&R")
of the U.S. Magistrate Judge on his motion for class certification,
appointment of the class representative, and appointment of the
class counsel.

The case is a putative class action filed by retail equity traders
harmed by uniform order routing practices implemented by the TD
Ameritrade.  The Plaintiff contends that teh Defendant's order
routing practices involve use of computer algorithms to send its
customers' equity orders to venues that pay the Defendant the most
money, without regard to whether the venues would provide the best
possible execution of those orders.  He further alleges the
Defendant failed to disclose the practice to its customers.  The
Plaintiff contends the practices are inconsistent with the
Defendant's duty of best execution and seeks remedies for
violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.  He contends that the purported class suffers economic
loss due to orders for securities trades being unfilled,
underfilled, filled at a suboptimal price, and/or filled in a
manner that adversely affects the order's performance
post-execution. He seeks, on behalf of the class, damages and
injunctive relief.

The Plaintiff seeks certification of a class defined as all clients
of TD Ameritrade between Sept. 15, 2011 and Sept. 15, 2014 who
placed orders that did not receive best execution, in connection
with which TD Ameritrade received either liquidity rebates or
payment for order flow, and who were thereby damaged

He also seeks certification of a class, for injunctive relief under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), defined as all clients of
TD Ameritrade between Sept. 15, 2011 and Sept. 15, 2014 who placed
orders in connection with which TD Ameritrade received either
liquidity rebates or payment for order flow and who continue to be
clients of TD Ameritrade.  The only relief sought by the purported
Rule 23(b)(2) class is an injunction requiring the Defendant to
change its common order routing practices.  Alternatively, the
Plaintiff seeks class certification of a limited issue class on
liability under Rule 23(c)(4).

In opposition to the Plaintiff's motion for class certification,
the Defendant argues that proof of economic loss and reliance will
require extensive individualized inquiries into evidence specific
to each class member and each of their orders.  Solely for purposes
of the class certification motion, TD Ameritrade does not dispute
that Ford's allegations regarding its order routing policie could
be proven or disproven with class-wide evidence.  It contends
however, that common evidence cannot prove the required elements of
economic loss and reliance and the individualized inquiries
relating to those elements predominate.

After a hearing on March 27, 2018, the Magistrate Judge recommended
that the Plaintiff's motion be denied.  The Magistrate Judge stated
that the Plaintiff has not shown that he can prove economic harm on
a class-wide basis through use of a tested, complete algorithm.
She also found there are certain aspects necessary to evaluate
economic loss in a best execution case that simply cannot be
captured through algorithmic analysis, namely, an individual's
state of mind or investment strategy.  She found that given the
individual, order-byorder inquiries necessary to determine whether
each individual customer actually sustained an economic loss, Rule
23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement has not been satisfied.  She
also found the proposed class fails to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s
superiority requirement, finding resolution of the claims through a
class action would create case management issues and would be an
inefficient allocation of judicial resources.  Further, she stated,
in light of those individual inquiries, a limited certification
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4) would not promote
efficiency or judicial economy.

The lead Plaintiff objects to the recommendation.  e reasserts the
arguments made to the Magistrate Judge and maintains that the class
certification is appropriate based on the common question of
whether the Defendant sought to maximize order flow revenue in such
a manner that caused a failure to satisfy the duty to provide best
execution of their clients' trades.

Judge Bataillon finds that the action involves serious and credible
allegations of securities fraud and misconduct by TD Ameritrade.
The allegations are grounded in TD Ameritrade's misrepresentation
and failure to disclose a systematic course of conduct -- receipt
of payment for order flow and liquidity rebates and order routing
to trading venues that paid them the most, without regard to the
duty of best execution, to the detriment of the Plaintiffs.  Such
alleged conduct, if proved, is recognized as securities fraud.

The action was filed in 2014 and merits discovery has yet to
commence.  The issues in the case have been vigorously pursued by
both sides and it is now time to litigate the merits of the action.
Without class action status, those harmed by TD Ameritrade's
alleged conduct will have no recourse.

Accordingly, the Judge sustained Ford's objection to the Findings
and Recommendation of the U.S. Magistrate Judge.  He adopted in
part and rejected in part the Findings and Recommendation of the
U.S. Magistrate Judge.  He granted the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification, appointment of the class representative, and
appointment of the class counsel.

A class consisting of the following is certified in the action: All
clients of TD Ameritrade between Sept. 15, 2011 and Sept. 15, 2014
who placed orders that did not receive best execution, in
connection with which TD Ameritrade received either liquidity
rebates or payment for order flow, and who were thereby damaged.

The Judge appointed lead Plaintiff Ford as the class representative
and the law firm of Levi & Korsinsky LLP as the class counsel.  He
directed the Clerk of Court to modify the case caption accordingly.
The parties are also directed to contact the chambers of
Magistrate Judge Susan M. Bazis within seven days of the date of
the Order to arrange further progression of the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 14, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/qgdu0s from Leagle.com.

Gerald J. Klein, on behalf of himself and all similarly situated &
Roderick Ford, Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher J. Kupka --
ckupka@zlk.com -- LEVI, KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Eduard
Korsinsky -- ek@zlk.com -- LEVI, KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice,
Gregory C. Scaglione  -- Greg.scaglione@koleyjessen.com -- KOLEY,
JESSEN LAW FIRM, Joseph J. DePalma -- jdepalma@litedepalma.com --
LITE, DEPALMA LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Nancy A. Kulesa --
nkulesa@zlk.com -- LEVI, KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Nicholas
Porritt, LEVI, KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Patrice D. Ott --
Patrice.ott@koleyjessen.com -- KOLEY, JESSEN LAW FIRM & Sebastiano
Tornatore -- stornatore@zlk.com -- LEVI, KORSINSKY LAW FIRM, pro
hac vice..

TD Ameritrade Holding Corporation, TD Ameritrade, Inc. & Fredric
Tomczyk, Defendants, represented by A. Robert Pietrzak --
rpietrzak@sidley.com -- SIDLEY, AUSTIN LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Alex
J. Kaplan -- ajkaplan@sidley.com -- SIDLEY, AUSTIN LAW FIRM, pro
hac vice, Daniel A. McLaughlin, SIDLEY, AUSTIN LAW FIRM, pro hac
vice, Jon Muenz, SIDLEY, AUSTIN LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Thomas H.
Dahlk -- tom.dahlk@kutakrock.com -- KUTAK, ROCK LAW FIRM & Victoria
H. Buter -- vicki.buter@kutakrock.com -- KUTAK, ROCK LAW FIRM.

PSLRA Class, Interested Party, represented by Gregory C. Scaglione,
KOLEY, JESSEN LAW FIRM.


TICKETMASTER CANADA: Sotos Launches Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------
Sotos Class Actions, a leading class action firm, has launched a
lawsuit seeking $250 million in damages on behalf of all persons
who purchased resold tickets from Ticketmaster Canada Holdings ULC
for live events occurring in Canada starting on September 1, 2013.

Ticketmaster is the largest ticket marketing platform in North
America.  For several years ticket buyers have complained that
regularly-priced tickets are often unavailable at the time that
they purportedly go on sale, while tickets from resellers show up
for sale contemporaneously, including on the Ticketmaster platform,
at prices much higher than the face value.

Ticketmaster has terms of use and policies that claim to prohibit
mass ticket purchases by resellers by electronic and other means;
however, a recent investigation by the CBC and Toronto Star has
revealed evidence that Ticketmaster in fact encourages mass
purchases by resellers and has developed a specific electronic
platform called Trade Desk for the purposes of assisting resellers
in listing tickets for sale en masse, including on the Ticketmaster
platform.

Ticketmaster profits from the resale by taking an additional
commission off the resale, in addition to the fee that it takes
from the primary sale.

The class action alleges that Ticketmaster's practices constitute
an arrangement to limit the supply of tickets on the primary
market, and therefore are in violation of the Competition Act. It
also alleges that the statements in its terms of use, to the effect
that it prohibits mass purchases, are misleading representations
contrary to the Consumer Protection Act.

Lead counsel for the class, Louis Sokolov, said "the media
investigation has provided strong evidence of what many ticket
buyers have long suspected -- the market is rigged in favour of
resellers and against consumers. If true, Canadian consumers have
paid many millions of dollars for inflated ticket prices and
additional fees.  The aim of this lawsuit is to stop those
practices and return the money to Canadian ticket buyers."

The Statement of Claim can be found at:
https://sotosclassactions.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Notice-of-Action.pdf


Persons who purchase Secondary Market tickets can register at
https://sotosclassactions.com/cases/current-cases/ticketmaster/ to
obtain updates on the class action. [GN]


TIGER NATURAL: Ct. Strikes 32nd, 33rd Affirmative Defenses
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EMILY FISHMAN and SUSAN FARIA, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TIGER
NATURAL GAS INC., an Oklahoma corporation; COMMUNITY GAS CENTER
INC., a Colorado corporation; JOHN DYET, an individual; and DOES
3-100, Defendants, Case No. C 17-05351 WHA (N.D. Cal.), Judge
William Alsup of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs'
motion to strike Tiger's affirmative defenses and, in the
alternative, for a more definite statement.

Prior to 2015, Plaintiffs Fishman and Faria purchased natural gas
from PG&E.  From approximately April to August of that year,
Defendant Tiger, through its agent defendant Community Gas Center
Inc. ("CGC"), called the Plaintiffs to solicit them to buy natural
gas from Tiger through its price protection program.  During those
sales calls, the Defendants represented that Tiger customers would
be charged a variable rate for natural gas based on the market
price, but with a price cap of $0.69 per therm.  The Plaintiffs
allege that the Defendants did not disclose that Tiger would add a
surcharge to the market price.  Although the Defendants advertised
the program as "free," Tiger also added a $0.05 daily charge on
customers' utility bills.

The Defendants also represented during their sales calls that PG&E
had recently increased its natural gas rates, and that it would
continue to do so in the coming years.  In reality, the California
Public Utilities Commission had only approved a rate increase for
gas delivery, not for gas procurement, an important distinction
because customers who bought natural gas from Tiger still had their
gas delivered by PG&E via its existing pipelines.  Accordingly,
while PG&E customers had a single line item for "gas charges" on
their utility bills, Tiger customers had a line item for gas
delivery and a separate line item for Tiger gas procurement
charges.  Nonetheless, these representations that PG&E's gas supply
rates were increasing made Tiger's price cap seem beneficial.  In
reliance on the Defendants' representations, or so it is alleged,
the Plaintiffs switched their gas procurement from PG&E to Tiger.

Based on these allegations, the operative complaint brings claims
on behalf of themselves and proposed sub-classes for: (1)
violations of California recording law; (2) breach of oral
contract; (3) violations of PG&E Gas Rule 23 Tariff; (4) breach of
third-party beneficiary contract; (5) violations of Consumers Legal
Remedies Act; (6) fraud; (7) negligent misrepresentation; (8)
violations of regulations on core transport agents; (9) violations
of false advertising law; and (10) violations of unfair competition
law.

Tiger's operative answer to the Plaintiffs' third amended complaint
contains 35 affirmative defenses.  Pursuant to Civil Local Rule
7-1(b), Judge Alsup finds the Plaintiffs' motion suitable for
submission without oral argument and vacated the hearing scheduled
for Sept. 27, 2018.

The Judge granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion
to strike.  Tiger's first to thirty-first and thirty-fourth to
thirty-fifth affirmative defenses are stricken.  The motion to
strike Tiger's thirty-second affirmative defense is denied.  To the
extent stated, Tiger may seek leave to amend its answer to add
affirmative defenses and will have until Oct. 4, 2018 to file a
motion, noticed on the normal 35-day track, for leave to file an
amended answer.  The motion must include a proposed pleading (and a
redlined copy) and must clearly explain why the foregoing problems
are overcome by the proposed pleading.  Tiger must plead its best
case.

The thirty-second affirmative defense alleges that in their
Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA") claim, the Plaintiffs failed
to provide Tiger with prior written notice and demand as required
by California Civil Code Section 1782.  The Judge finds that the
Defendant sufficiently alleges what the Plaintiffs failed to do --
provide Tiger with prior written notice -- and under what section
of law it bases that allegation.  Although the Plaintiffs also
argue that this defense fails as a matter of law, they provide no
authority for that assertion, and they could reasonably be
construed as consumers.  Because the Plaintiffs only argued that
this defense was factually insufficient and fails as a matter of
law, the Order does not address whether this defense is a true
affirmative defense or simply negates an element of the Plaintiffs'
prima facie case.  Even if it were, inclusion of this allegation as
an affirmative defense does not prejudice the Plaintiffs.  The
Order therefore denied the motion to strike Tiger's thirty-second
affirmative defense.

Tiger's thirty-third affirmative defense alleges that the
Plaintiffs' claims are barred because no agency relationship exists
between Tiger and any other defendant or third party that would
support a theory of vicarious liability against Tiger.  Tiger did
not have any control over the manner and means by which the alleged
calls were made by any third party.  This is too conclusory, the
Judge finds.  The Defendant just parrots the elements of the
affirmative defense.  The only "facts" the Defendant alleges are
that "calls" were made, but it alleges no facts that would
plausibly demonstrate that the Defendant had no control over the
calls or that no relationship existed between Tiger and any other
party that allegedly caused the Plaintiffs harm.  The Defendant
does not even identify over which relationships it claims no
responsibility.  Accordingly, this affirmative defense is
stricken.

The Judge denied the Plaintiffs' motion for a more definite
statement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/rU7NnW from Leagle.com.

Emily Fishman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Susan Faria, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel L. Balsam --
calbar@danbalsam.com -- The Law Offices of Daniel Balsam, Jacob N.
Harker -- harkerjacob@gmail.com --  Law Offices of Jacob Harker &
Kimberly Ann Kralowec -- kkralowec@kraloweclaw.com -- Kralowec Law,
P.C.

Tiger Natural Gas, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, Defendant,
represented by Janet Chung -- Janet.Chung@hklaw.com -- Holland and
Knight LLP, John Andrew Canale -- John.Canale@hklaw.com -- Holland
and Knight LLP, Leah E. Capritta -- Leah.Capritta@hklaw.com --
Holland & Knight LLP, Thomas Drew Leland -- Thomas.Leland@hklaw.com
-- Holland and Knight LLP & Vince Lee Farhat --
Vince.Farhat@hklaw.com -- Holland and Knight LLP.

John Dyet, 1301 Seminole Blvd., Suite 155, Largo, FL 33770,
Defendant, pro se.


UBER TECH: Settles Pa. Drivers' Data Breach Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Jason Laughlin, writing for The Inquirer, reports that Uber drivers
in Pennsylvania will receive settlement money because of the
company's failure to disclose a 2016 data breach, law enforcement
officials announced on Sept. 26.

The money, $5.7 million, will be distributed among at least 13,500
drivers by the state's Attorney General's Office. The New Jersey
Attorney General's Office received $3.75 million, but the 16,000
drivers there were determined to have not suffered financial harm
and will not receive a payment. That money will go toward a
consumer fraud account to support programs run by the Attorney
General's Office.

In Pennsylvania, the affected drivers will each receive $100, with
the rest of the settlement money, about $4.3 million, going toward
the Attorney General's Office's public protection section.

All 50 states and the District of Columbia participated in the data
breach case against Uber, and the San Francisco-based tech company
reached a $148 million settlement for about 600,000 drivers
affected nationwide. Up to 57 million drivers and passengers
worldwide were affected, according to the Attorney General's Office
of Washington state, one of the first offices to take legal
action.

Uber learned that digital data stored on a third-party software
platform was hacked in November 2016, according to authorities.
Intruders got log-in information to an Amazon Web Services account
Uber used, the New Jersey Attorney General's Office said, and
through that, gained access to drivers' names and license numbers,
and passenger information, including log-ins, encrypted passwords,
and geolocation data.

The company paid off the hacker and received assurances that the
information was deleted, authorities said, but didn't notify state
officials of the breach until about a year later, which violated
state laws requiring swifter notification when personal information
is stolen.

Along with the financial payment, Uber agreed to make changes to
its operation, including taking steps to protect user information
stored on third-party platforms, creating stricter password
policies for workers, creating a corporate security policy,
improving protections for data, and hiring an outside consultant to
regularly evaluate Uber security policies. [GN]


UBER TECH: Sexual Harassment Class Actions Pending
--------------------------------------------------
Avivah Wittenberg-Cox, writing for Forbes, reports that Uber has
conducted a study of internal pay differentials between men and
women, which they describe as "gender blind." Aired on a podcast by
Freakonomics' Steve Dubner, the researchers (one woman, four men)
took great pains to explore whether a pay gap between men and women
exists (it does) and how to explain it.

The study found a 7% pay gap in favor of men. They present their
findings as proof that there are issues unrelated to gender that
impact driver pay. They quantify the reasons for the gap as
follows:

Where: 20% is due to where people choose to drive
(routes/neighborhoods).

Experience: 30% is due to experience. More experienced Uber drivers
make more. N.B. There is a significant gender turnover gap at Uber,
over a six-month period, 60% of men quit, 76% of women

Speed: 50% was due to speed, they claim that men drive slightly
faster, so complete more trips per hour. N.B. in the study, speed =
"distance divided by time on the trip in a given driver-hour." This
measures efficiency, not speed. It could be more dependent on route
choice than driving speed, a skill developed through experience,
see above.

As always in these sorts of debates, the data can be interpreted in
many different ways, partly depending on who is doing the research,
and why they are doing it.

The Uber paper was written by five economists—two employed by
Uber, two Stanford professors; and the chairman of the University
of Chicago economics department, who "moonlights as head of the
ubernomics team at Uber." One of the economists is Jonathan Hall,
who leads the public policy and economics team at Uber.

It could be noted that Uber is probably not uninterested in
improving the company's image on gender issues, sexism and class
action suits pending on sexual harassment of passengers by drivers,
as well as simply dangerous driving.

The conclusion of the discussion is that, in the end, there is a
simple, rational explanation based on choices, preferences, and
behaviors of women vs. men. So this study can (and will) be used to
rationalize existing pay gaps. It's just the way women are, again.
We will hear many reactions like this one from the comments
section:

"So you end with a call for sexism? 'Wouldn't it be interesting if
one form of gender imbalance -- higher tips for women — wound up
closing the gender-pay gap at Uber?' Because women are not as
successful at a job -- for their own choices and/or genetic
differences -- let's tip women more? So reward them for not working
the worst hours, areas and being slower. Like as a disincentive?
While men keep doing the hard work, the bad hours, the crappy areas
and still being more effective, and you tip them less. That's
'fair" and "balancing'? You're not well . . .  Feminism really is a
form of cancer."

The podcast sounds eerily like the discussions I hear among the
executive teams we work with in large companies around the globe.
They look at the simple, factual data about gender in their own
companies, and come up with very similar, supposedly rational
interpretations for their own pay gaps, or the gender imbalances in
leadership, in development or in promotion statistics.

They will point to not dissimilar arguments:

Where: women choose to work in lesser paying sectors, functions, or
responsibilities eg. Women "choose" to work in staff rather than
line jobs, they don't "want" senior roles and the associated
pressures and sacrifices.

Experience: choices for promotion are always "gender-blind," but if
the man has more experience than the woman, you have to promote
based on competence, so he has more.

Speed: men are rewarded for following traditional career
trajectories (up or out, linear, unbroken), where women (or
parents) whose careers were affected by family responsibilities are
forever labelled "slower" and thus "less ambitious."

What is missing in these debates, and this report, is an
acknowledgment that the environment and culture of the company
itself may be impacting men and women differently. When you put a
minority of women into a system designed by men (Uber could check
the gender balance of the teams that designed their "gender blind"
algorithms), you usually get systems normed for male preferences
and perspectives.

The fact that Uber can barely retain anyone—male or
female—would give any employer pause. From a low base of 27%
female drivers, they suffer a female turnover rate of 76%. This is
not good for women drivers, and it hasn't proven particularly good
for women riders. Experience and speed are likely related to driver
turnover. Women would be more likely to stay if it weren't for the
company's toxic and female-unfriendly culture, and to the general
dubiousness of the ethics of the company's business model and roll
out practices, trailing fights with cities and governments around
the globe. The company has constantly been in the news for sexual
harassment abuses and the former HR director, Liane Hornsey,
resigned after an internal investigation over how she handled
racial discrimination issues. So did CFO Prabir Adarkar on similar
issues. And while the company under its new CEO Dara Khosrowshahi
is trying to clean up its culture, the new COO he brought in from
Expedia, Barney Harford, had to be "coached" to learn to stop
making misogynistic and racist remarks.

Forbes' Wittenberg-Cox asked Jennifer Cobbe, a Cambridge University
researcher and the Coordinator of Cambridge's Trustworthy
Technologies research initiative, what she thought of the
conclusions in the report. She noted the inherent value judgment in
people getting paid more to drive faster.

"When they say that women are paid less in large part because they
don't drive as fast as men, they're shifting the blame for women
being paid less onto women themselves – as if this was an
obvious, 'rational' explanation for the difference in pay which
required no further analysis. As if paying faster drivers more was
just the natural order of things. But, of course, it isn't."

"In fact, "speed" here also means risk. And let's not forget that
women have long been known to be safer drivers than men (despite
the stereotypes). I think it's strange that, in a service to which
people entrust their lives, faster, riskier drivers are paid more
than safer drivers, and I think that's a reflection both of Uber's
culture specifically and of society's culture more generally."

"Why are safer drivers not paid more than riskier drivers? Why is
performance evaluated in terms of speed and not other metrics like
safety? What kind of values are they encoding in their performance
criteria? And what role does the fact that as a company Uber is
dominated by men have in determining which values are encoded? None
of these questions are asked. And it's very easy to dismiss 50% of
the pay gap here if you uncritically accept that speed is a good
thing."

The company's reputation has been affected by its sexist and
unprofessional corporate culture, and its continued lack of gender
balance won't help. Nor, I suspect, will its insistence, with
research conducted by its own staff to prove it, that the pay gap
is fair. This simply adds insult to obnoxiousness.

But then, why would we have expected any different? The Uber case
study's conclusions may actually be almost the opposite of what
they were trying to prove. Rather than showing that the pay gap is
a natural consequence of our gendered differences, they have
actually shown that systems designed to insistently ignore
differences tend to become normed to the preferences of those who
create them.

It's a recurring challenge confirms Ms. Cobbe. "You often see this
in supposedly 'rational' analyses. They're grounded in so many
value-laden assumptions that themselves are rarely acknowledged and
never challenged in any meaningful way. There's nothing rational
about this kind of analysis at all. But then 'rationality' has for
centuries been a way for men to assert the inherent correctness of
whatever it is they're saying, regardless of evidence to the
contrary or the shallowness of their view, and to dismiss whatever
wholly reasonable concerns women are discussing."

This has far broader consequences than just Uber. Our entire world
is being shifted and designed by the tech platforms we are
beginning to discover we are at the mercy of. They have
overwhelmingly been designed by white men working in Silicon
Valley. The culture of the Valley is not unlike the culture of Uber
and is famously male-dominated, and normed to a particular sort of
bro-masculinity. CEOs, like Dara Khosrowshahi at Uber, are
increasingly hired to move companies into more balanced,
21st-century cultures, but some under-estimate the task. It takes
an aligned, skilled leadership team to redesign and balance
companies and systems designed by men. Uber is not quite there yet.
It will have to throw more than company-funded research at this
one. [GN]


UNITED AIRLINES: Gets Insurance Kickback from Airfare, Says Flores
------------------------------------------------------------------
Patricia Flores on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. United Airlines, Defendant, Case No.
18-cv-00654, (N.D. Ill., September 26, 2018) seeks to recover
damages, attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.

United's online process of purchasing a flight ticket implied that
its trip insurance is passed on to another entity. Flores claims
that United retains or ultimately receives an undisclosed kickback
from every policy sold. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      George A. Zelcs, Esq.
      KOREIN TILLERY, LLC
      205 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 1950
      Chicago, IL 60601
      Telephone: (312) 641-9750
      Facsimile: (312) 641-9751
      Email: gzelcs@koreintillery.com

             - and -

      Stephen M. Tillery, Esq.
      Aaron M. Zigler, Esq.
      KOREIN TILLERY, LLC
      One U.S. Bank Plaza
      505 North 7th Street, Suite 3600
      St. Louis, MO 63101
      Telephone: (314) 241-4844
      Facsimile: (314) 241-3525
      Email: stillery@koreintillery.com
             azigler@koreintillery.com

             - and -

      Scott B. Cosgrove, Esq.
      Alec H. Schultz, Esq.
      John R. Byrne, Esq.
      LEÓN COSGROVE, LLP
      255 Alhambra Circle, Suite 800
      Coral Gables, FL 33134
      Tel: (305) 740-1975
      Email: scosgrove@leoncosgrove.com
             aschultz@leoncosgrove.com
             jbyrne@leoncosgrove.com


UNITED HEALTHCARE: Court Trims Claims in ERISA Suit
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, OMEGA HOSPITAL, LLC v. UNITED HEALTHCARE SERVICES,
INC, and UNITED HEALTHCARE OF LOUISIANA, INC., Civil Action No.
16-00560-JWD-EWD (M.D. La.), Judge John W. deGravelles of the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana granted in part
and denied in part the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

The action was brought by Omega against United for alleged
violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA") and Louisiana state law.  In response to the original
Complaint, United filed a Motion to Dismiss.  After considering the
briefs and the arguments made during oral argument, the Court
granted in part and denied in part United's Motion.  

In particular, the Court denied United's Motion on the issue of
standing, finding instead that Omega had satisfied Article III
standing for purposes of a motion to dismiss.  It granted United's
Motion as to the lack of plausibility of Omega's ERISA claims, but
gave Omega 30 days to file an amended complaint to allege with
specificity the dates of service and claim numbers at issue with
respect to the identified patients.  

The Court also granted United's Motion finding that all of the
state law claims brought against the ERISA-plan participants were
preempted by ERISA; therefore, these claims were dismissed with
prejudice.  As for the state law claims asserted against the
non-ERISA plan participants under Louisiana's "prompt payment
statute" and Louisiana's recoupment laws, it dismissed them without
prejudice subject to Omega's right to amend these allegations in
order to plead these claims with greater particularity.  Finding
that Omega's remaining state law claim of negligent
misrepresentation satisfied Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court denied United's Motion as to this claim in
regards to the non-ERISA plan participants.

Pursuant to the Court's Ruling, on Oct. 20, 2017, Omega filed its
First Amended and Restated Class Action Complaint.  In response,
United has filed its second Motion to Dismiss Omega's claims.

Omega is a hospital and surgical center in Metairie, Louisiana,
that treats patients whose healthcare benefit plans are insured
and/or administered by United.  Omega treats United's insureds on
an out-of-network basis, which means that Omega does not have a
pre-existing provider contract with United concerning reimbursement
for medical services and equipment.  As in its Original Class
Action Complaint, Omega purports to bring ERISA claims on behalf of
two representative patients identified as "SJ" and "LL."  It Omega
now also brings state-law claims on behalf of a new representative
patient, "DB," who was allegedly a member of a United plan that was
not covered by ERISA.

United, as claims administrator, adjudicates claims submitted on
behalf of patients like "SJ," "LL," and "DB," and determines the
amounts to which each patient is entitled under the terms of his or
her respective plan.  For convenience, United pays patients'
benefits directly to a provider, if directed to do so by the
patient, as Omega alleges was done for "SJ," "LL," and "DB."  When
United pays benefits directly to a provider, it issues a Provider
Explanation of Benefits or a Provider Remittance Advice which
explains the costs that are allowed under the plan, the patient's
deductible and coinsurance obligations, the amount reimbursed by
United, and the amount paid to the provider.  A patient (or the
properly authorized representative provider) may challenge the
initial benefits determination through a multi-level appeals
process, as Omega claims that it unsuccessfully did on behalf of
"LL."

In order to expedite the initial payment of benefits, United claims
that insurers rely on automated systems to process the massive
volumes of submitted claims in the first instance.  Subsequently,
United conducts audits to validate paid claims.  In the event the
audit reveals an overpayment on a patient's claims, United issues
an overpayment notification to the provider in possession of the
overpaid funds for said claims with claim information. United
submitted such overpayment notifications to Omega for previous
claims' payments for "SJ," "LL," and "DB."  In each of these cases,
Omega objected to United's determinations that it was entitled to
reimbursement or recoupment of any overpayment.  Because the
recoupment amount was not paid, Omega contends that United offset
the overpayment it sought by reducing subsequent "payments for
services rendered by Omega to unrelated patient accounts, none of
which patient accounts and services were covered under the same
United Group plan" as patients "SJ," "LL," and "DB."

Omega contends that the process used by United to identify,
adjudicate, and then recover overpayments (via direct recoupment,
cross-plan recoupment, offset, and/or withholding unrelated
payments) made to providers and members of the putative classes
violates both ERISA and Louisiana law, depending upon the specific
plan at issue.

In its First Amended Complaint, Omega asserts that it brings the
action on its own behalf and on behalf of an "ERISA Plan Class"
which it defines as all healthcare providers in the State of
Louisiana who, from 10 years prior to the filing date of the action
to its final termination, provided or will provide healthcare
services or supplies to patients insured under healthcare plans
governed by ERISA and insured or administered by the Defendants,
and who, after pursuing reimbursement pursuant to an assignment
from the Defendants' insured, and after having received payments
from the Defendants, were subjected to retroactive requests for
repayment of all or a part of such payments and/or to recoupment
and/or to setoff, and/or cross-plan recoupment, or to compel or
coerce repayments of prior benefits.

Omega also brings the action on behalf of itself and a "Non-ERISA
Plan Class" which it defines as all healthcare providers in the
State of Louisiana who, from 10 years prior to the filing date of
the action to its final termination, provided or will provide
healthcare services or supplies to patients insured under
healthcare plans governed by ERISA and insured or administered by
the Defendants, and who, after pursuing reimbursement pursuant to
an assignment from the Defendants' insured, and after having
received payments from the Defendants, were subjected to
retroactive requests for repayment of all or a part of such
payments and/or to recoupment and/or to setoff, and/or cross-plan
recoupment, or to compel or coerce repayments of prior benefits.

Omega asserts four counts arising under ERISA in its First Amended
Complaint.  Because Omega has failed to identify the specific
statutory provisions upon which it bases its claims, the Court
construes the ERISA claims to be as follows: (1) a claim for
benefits under 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(1)(B); (2) a claim for
failure to provide "full and fair review" of overpayment
determinations that United later recouped in violation of ERISA
Section 503;22 (3) a breach of fiduciary duty claim seeking
prospective declaratory and injunctive relief under ERISA Section
502(a)(3)(A) barring United from pursuing future overpayment
recovery; and (4) a breach of fiduciary duty claim based upon
United's alleged failure to comply with the Plan terms, seeking
equitable relief under ERISA Section 502(a)(3)(B) compelling United
to return all funds received from Omega and the ERISA class and all
funds recouped or withheld from them.

Omega asserts two claims under Louisiana law.  In count five, Omega
asserts a negligent misrepresentation and fraud claim, and in count
six, Omega asserts a new breach of contract claim.

United now seeks dismissal of Omega's First Amended Complaint on
the following grounds: (1) Omega lacks standing to bring the case;
(2) Omega has failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (3) Omega
fails to state plausible ERISA claims; (4) the Court lacks
supplemental jurisdiction over Omega's state law claims; and, (5)
in the alternative, Omega's state law claims are implausible, and
Omega's breach of contract claim is preempted as to the ERISA
plans.

Judge deGravelles granted in part, and denied in part the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.  He dismissed Omega's ERISA claims
brought on behalf of patient LL without prejudice for lack of
standing.  Its claims for benefits brought on behalf of patient SJ
under ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. Section
1132(a)(1)(B)(Count I) and for failure to provide full and fair
review under ERISA Section 503, 29 U.S.C. Section 1133 (Count II)
are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.  Its
breach of fiduciary claims brought on behalf of patient SJ under
ERISA Sections 502(a)(3)(A) and 502(a)(3)(B)(Counts III and IV) are
dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing.  Finally, the
Judge dismissed without prejudice Omega's state law claims.

As to Count I, the Judge finds that Omega and ERISA Plan class
representative SJ has failed to allege a plausible claim for
benefits under ERISA.  Omega's claim does not fail because it did
not identify the specific plan language entitling it to benefits.
Nevertheless, he finds that Omega's claim must fail because it has
not plausibly plead that it is entitled to the benefits at
issue—those recouped by cross-plan offsetting.

As to Count II, the Judge finds that the relief sought by Omega is
clearly equitable in nature and United's argument fails on this
ground.  Omega appears to concede that 29 U.S.C. Section 1133 does
not provide an independent basis for a claim because it fails to
oppose United's contention.  Omega also appears to concede United's
point for failure to oppose it.  Instead, Omega has alleged that
United is the "Plan Administrator" and ERISA fiduciary.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 11, 2018 Ruling is available
at https://is.gd/JgHNEL from Leagle.com.

Omega Hospital, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Paul A. Lea --
jean@paullea.com -- Jr.

United Healthcare of Louisiana Inc. & United HealthCare Services,
Inc., Defendants, represented by Errol J. King, Jr. --
eking@bakerdonelson.com -- Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell, &
Berkowitz, P.C., Gregory F. Jacob -- gjacob@omm.com -- O'Melveny &
Myers, LLP, pro hac vice & Layna C. Rush -- lrush@bakerdonelson.com
-- Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC.


UNITED STATES: ACLU Challenges Immigrant Abortion Ban Policy
------------------------------------------------------------
Sam Dorman, writing for IJR, reports that after Judge Brett
Kavanaugh's nomination to the Supreme Court, the nation's attention
focused more on abortion and the potential that a more conservative
court could overturn protections on abortion access.

While some have doubted the court would overturn the landmark
abortion decision in Roe v. Wade, a conservative majority could
pare down abortion protections by ruling on one or more of the many
abortion laws passed by a long list of states in recent years.

As IJR has previously reported, states confronted legal challenges
to newly passed laws that regulated abortion by, among other
things, requiring abortion clinic inspections, blocking abortions
past a specific period of gestation, and banning surgical
abortions.

According to Jennifer Dalven, who serves as the executive director
of the American Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU) Reproductive Freedom
Project, about 400 abortion restrictions have passed at the state
level since 2011, and dozens are currently in the federal court
system.

"Many of those cases could make it to the Supreme Court, and any
one of those could curtail access to abortion," she told IJR. She
stressed that even without fully overturning Roe v. Wade, courts
could effectively "make abortion illegal for millions of women in
this country."

Even without Roe v. Wade, however, states could continue to allow
clinics to perform abortions. A direct repeal would merely grant
states the authority to impose greater burdens on access earlier in
the pregnancy.

Perhaps the most prominent recent decision on abortion was the
Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt decision in 2016, which the
Supreme Court ruled against Texas' regulations on abortion clinics.
According to Dalven, that decision interpreted Planned Parenthood
v. Casey -- a decision blocking states from placing undue burdens
on women's access to abortions -- and presented the latest standard
for pro-lifers to challenge on abortion.

"The Supreme Court, just in 2016, issued a ruling saying that you
can't impose laws that are medically unnecessary which was what
they decided those regulations were," she said.

"They were medically unnecessary and burdened women's access to
abortion. That's what they said those laws did -- that they didn't
have a medical purpose, they were unnecessary, and all they did was
to make it harder for women to get abortions."

Here Are Some of the More Recent State Laws That Might Raise
Questions Surrounding Abortion Precedent in the Judicial System
Indiana

Law: Earlier this year, Indiana passed regulations requiring
abortion clinics like Planned Parenthood to undergo annual
inspections and provide information on any complications that arose
during procedures in the past year.

Legal Challenges: Planned Parenthood chapters in Indiana and
Kentucky filed a lawsuit with the ACLU claiming that the law
violated patients' privacy by putting vague burdens on clinics.
Law: Indiana also appeared to deter a substantial amount of
abortions when it passed a law requiring that women undergo
ultrasounds at least 18 hours prior to their procedures.

Legal Challenges: A federal judge ruled in favor of claims brought
by the ACLU this summer. The judge ruled that the law put an undue
burden on women traveling in a state with only six Planned
Parenthood locations that provided ultrasounds. Earlier this
summer, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an injunction on
the law.
Missouri
Law: Missouri passed a law that required clinics to set up
ambulatory surgical centers and to have doctors with admitting
privileges to hospitals.

Legal Challenges: Although Planned Parenthood initially obtained an
injunction against the law, an appeals court remanded that decision
to a lower court.

South Carolina
Law: South Carolina became the latest state to try to defund
Planned Parenthood when Gov. Henry McMaster signed an executive
order blocking Medicaid reimbursements for abortion clinics. He
also vetoed millions of dollars in funding through Medicaid.

Legal Challenges: Planned Parenthood argued that McMaster's
decision violated federal law by interfering with patients'
Medicaid access. At the end of August, a federal judge issued an
injunction against McMaster's executive order, saying that
Medicaid's family planning funds didn't directly or indirectly fund
abortions.
Nebraska
Law: Nebraska similarly used its budget to attack Planned
Parenthood, removing funding for clinics that referred women for
abortions. The state focused on preventing federal Title X money
from going to clinics, something Trump's administration pursued as
well. As a condition for funding, the budget required that health
clinics separate from abortion facilities.

Mississippi
Law: Mississippi faced an immediate legal challenge in March when
it passed a law penalizing doctors for performing abortions after
15 weeks of gestation, the strictest in the nation.

Legal Challenges: A Mississippi clinic, Jackson's Women's Health
Organization, filed a legal complaint that claimed that before the
state passed the law, a woman had already scheduled an abortion
after the 15-week cutoff. A federal court granted a temporary
restraining order, blocking the state from enforcing the law. Both
the clinic and Planned Parenthood indicated the law was
unconstitutional. The state argued that the bill helped protect
"unborn life" and limited risks involved as the gestational age
increased from week to week.
Kentucky
Law: Kentucky passed a law effectively preventing women from
obtaining "dilation and evacuation" abortions. Generally performed
after 11 weeks of pregnancy, the procedure involves literally
crushing a fetus' skull and tearing its body to pieces.

Legal Challenges: The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued
the state and called that type of abortion a "safe and medically
proven" procedure.

What About Federal Laws?
At the federal level, the administration has come under fire for
pursuing a variety of pro-life initiatives, including a failed
20-week abortion ban that Republicans were unable to get through
the Senate.

The administration already faced a legal battle over a situation
involving an illegal immigrant minor whom, according to the ACLU,
the administration attempted to prevent from obtaining an
abortion.

Although the Supreme Court ruled in the administration's favor for
that particular case, the ACLU continued pushing a class-action
lawsuit challenging the policy as it applied to all illegal
immigrant mothers.

The Supreme Court's ruling only vacated a lower court's decision as
well, meaning that it didn't establish a final precedent on the
administration's policy as a whole. When Kavanaugh considered the
case last year, he dissented with the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision to grant the girl, "Jane Doe," an abortion.

He called the court's decision "a radical extension of the Supreme
Court's abortion jurisprudence." Kavanaugh has, however, indicated
that he would uphold the precedents established by Roe v. Wade and
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.

In his initial decision in the Jane Doe case -- later reversed in
the decision he dissented from -- Kavanaugh wrote that "all parties
to this case recognize Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey
as precedents we must follow." During his confirmation hearing,
Kavanaugh also said Roe was "important precedent" but wouldn't say
whether the court correctly decided that case.

President Donald Trump could also face pushback over two so-called
"gag rules" -- one domestic and one international -- that remove
federal funding for clinics that refer women to abortions.  Most
recently, Planned Parenthood slammed Trump's decision to defund it
and others through Title X family planning grants.

Like South Carolina and Nebraska, Trump and congressional
Republicans sought to defund Planned Parenthood through spending
measures. They haven't had much success at the federal level,
however, as they have repeatedly passed legislation that funded the
nation's largest abortion provider. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Appeals Court to Hear Spain H-Bomb Case Against VA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that a federal appeals court is set to
hear arguments involving U.S. veterans who say they were denied
disability benefits after becoming ill from radiation exposure
while responding to a 1966 accident involving American hydrogen
bombs in Spain.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims was scheduled to hear
the case on Sept. 25 in Washington, D.C.

At issue is whether a class-action lawsuit can be filed against the
Veterans Affairs Department for denying disability claims.

Yale Law School students in Connecticut are representing Air Force
veteran Victor Skaar, of Nixa, Missouri. They want to expand the
lawsuit to include hundreds of veterans.

Radioactive plutonium was released near Palomares, Spain, in
January 1966, after a U.S. B-52 bomber and refueling plane crashed.
Four hydrogen bombs crashed to the ground, but didn't explode.
[GN]


VEREIT INC: Inks Settlement with 8 Class Action Opt-Out Entities
----------------------------------------------------------------
Vereit, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission filed on October 2, 2018, 2018, that the
company has entered into settlement agreements with eight class
action opt-out entities.

On September 30, October 1 and October 2, 2018, VEREIT Inc., a
Maryland corporation, and VEREIT Operating Partnership, L.P. a
Delaware limited partnership (collectively "VEREIT" or the
"Company"), entered into Settlement Agreements and Releases (the
"Settlement Agreements") to settle the previously disclosed
litigations with eight class action opt out entities serving as
plaintiffs in the following actions pending in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York:

BlackRock ACS US Equity Tracker Fund, et al. v. American Realty
Capital Properties, Inc., et al., No. 1:15-cv-08464-AKH;

Clearline Capital Partners LP, et al. v. American Realty Capital
Properties, Inc., et al., No. 1:15-cv-08467-AKH;

Eton Park Fund, L.P., et al., v. American Realty Capital
Properties, Inc., et al., No. 1:16-cv-09393-AKH;

HG Vora Special Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd. v. American Realty
Capital Properties, Inc., et al., No. 1:15-cv-04107-AKH;

Pentwater Equity Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., et al. v. American
Realty Capital Properties, Inc., et al., No. 1:15-cv-08510-AKH;

PIMCO Funds: PIMCO Diversified Income Fund, et al. v. American
Realty Capital Properties, Inc., et al., No. 1:15-cv-08466-AKH;

Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., et al, v. American Realty Capital
Properties, Inc. et al., No. 1:17-cv-02796-AKH; and

Twin Securities, Inc., et al. v. American Realty Capital
Properties, Inc., et al., No. 1:15-cv-01291-AKH (collectively, the
"Actions", and such plaintiffs collectively, the "Opt Out
Plaintiffs").

The Opt Out Plaintiffs' claims arose out of the disclosures made by
the Company in October 2014 and March 2015 regarding its financial
statements, which included the Company's March 2015 restatement of
certain of its previously issued financial statements. Pursuant to
the terms of the Settlement Agreements, the parties have agreed
that the Opt Out Plaintiffs will dismiss all claims against the
Company and the other defendants with prejudice and the Company
will pay the Opt Out Plaintiffs the sum of $85 million in
connection with the settlement of the claims.

The Settlement Agreements contain mutual releases by both the Opt
Out Plaintiffs and the Company, although the Company retains the
right to pursue any and all claims against the other defendants in
the Actions and/or third parties, including claims for contribution
for amounts paid in the settlement. The Settlement Agreements do
not contain any admission of liability, wrongdoing or
responsibility by any of the parties.

Including the previously announced settlement with Vanguard
Specialized Funds and other Vanguard funds, the Company has now
settled claims brought by approximately 24 percent of VEREIT's
outstanding shares of common stock and swaps referencing common
stock held at the end of the period covered by the various pending
shareholder actions for a total of $175 million.

Vereit said, "There can be no assurance as to whether or how these
settlements may affect any potential future resolution of any other
pending lawsuit, the timing of any such resolution, or the amount
at which any other matter may be resolved."

Vereit, Inc. is a full-service real estate operating company which
owns and manages one of the largest portfolios of single-tenant
commercial properties in the U.S. VEREIT is a publicly traded
Maryland corporation listed on the New York Stock Exchange.


WALGREENS BOOTS: Bid to Dismiss Pennsylvania Suit Underway
----------------------------------------------------------
Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on October 11,
2018, for the fiscal year ended August 31, 2018, that the company
has filed a new motion to dismiss the class action suit filed in
the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, based on the named plaintiff's lack of standing.

As of August 31, 2017, the Company was aware of two putative class
action lawsuits filed by purported Rite Aid stockholders against
Rite Aid and its board of directors, Walgreens Boots Alliance and
Victoria Merger Sub, Inc. for claims arising out of the
transactions contemplated by the original Merger Agreement (prior
to its amendment on January 29, 2017) (such transactions, the "Rite
Aid Transactions").

One Rite Aid action was filed in the State of Pennsylvania in the
Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County (the "Pennsylvania
action"), and one action was filed in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (the "federal
action").

The Pennsylvania action primarily alleged that the Rite Aid board
of directors breached its fiduciary duties in connection with the
Rite Aid Transactions by, among other things, agreeing to an unfair
and inadequate price, agreeing to deal protection devices that
preclude other bidders from making successful competing offers for
Rite Aid, and failing to disclose all allegedly material
information concerning the proposed merger, and also alleged that
Walgreens Boots Alliance and Victoria Merger Sub, Inc. aided and
abetted these alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. There has been no
activity in this lawsuit since the complaint was filed.

The federal action alleged, among other things, that Rite Aid and
its board of directors disseminated an allegedly false and
misleading proxy statement in connection with the Rite Aid
Transactions. The plaintiffs in the federal action also filed a
motion for preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the Rite Aid
shareholder vote relating to the Rite Aid Transactions. That motion
was denied, and the matter was stayed. On March 17, 2017,
plaintiffs moved to lift the stay to allow plaintiffs to file an
amended complaint. That motion was granted, and plaintiffs filed
their amended complaint on December 11, 2017, alleging that the
Company and certain of its officers made false or misleading
statements regarding the Rite Aid Transactions.

On July 11, 2018, the Court denied the Company's motion to dismiss,
but narrowed the time scope of the subject statements. The Company
filed an answer and affirmative defenses on August 8, 2018, and on
August 24, 2018 filed a new motion to dismiss based on the named
plaintiff's lack of standing.

Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. operates as a pharmacy-led health
and wellbeing company. It operates through three segments: Retail
Pharmacy USA, Retail Pharmacy International, and Pharmaceutical
Wholesale. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. was founded in 1901 and
is based in Deerfield, Illinois.


WALGREENS BOOTS: Merit Discovery Ongoing in Illinois Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on October 11,
2018, for the fiscal year ended August 31, 2018, that merits
discovery is still ongoing in the securities class action suit
filed in the Northern District of Illinois.

On April 10, 2015, a putative shareholder filed a securities class
action in federal court in the Northern District of Illinois
against Walgreen Co. and certain former officers of Walgreen Co.
The action asserts claims for violation of the federal securities
laws arising out of certain public statements the Company made
regarding its former fiscal 2016 goals.

On June 16, 2015, the Court entered an order appointing a lead
plaintiff. Pursuant to the Court's order, lead plaintiff filed an
amended complaint on August 17, 2015, and defendants moved to
dismiss the amended complaint on October 16, 2015. On September 30,
2016, the Court issued an order granting in part and denying in
part defendants' motion to dismiss.

Defendants filed their answer to the amended complaint on November
4, 2016 and filed an amended answer on January 16, 2017. Plaintiff
filed its motion for class certification on April 21, 2017. The
Court granted plaintiff's motion on March 29, 2018 and merits
discovery is proceeding.

Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. operates as a pharmacy-led health
and wellbeing company. It operates through three segments: Retail
Pharmacy USA, Retail Pharmacy International, and Pharmaceutical
Wholesale. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. was founded in 1901 and
is based in Deerfield, Illinois.

WALMART INC: Sued for Discriminating Against Pregnant Workers
-------------------------------------------------------------
Milca P., writing for hnhh, reports that on Sept. 21 the United
States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a class
action lawsuit against Walmart alleging that women workers at a
Walmart warehouse in Menomonie, WI were targets of unlawful
pregnancy discrimination.

According to the complaint, Walmart failed to accommodate workers'
pregnancy-related medical restrictions while job modifications were
provided to non-pregnant employees with physical disabilities. Such
requests included a lighter workload and unpaid leave, which were
denied.

The EEOC, the agency that enforces federal laws about workplace
discrimination, filed the suit on behalf of Alyssa Gilliam and
other defendants. At the start of Ms. Gilliam's pregnancy in 2015,
she requested less physically-straining work as her role at the
time included tasks of heavy lifting. Despite putting in place a
"light-duy" program to accomodate worker's physical restrictions,
Gilliam was denied.

"What our investigation indicated is that Walmart had a robust
light-duty program that allowed workers with lifting restrictions
to be accommodated," says Julianne Bowman, the EEOC's district
director in Chicago. "But Walmart deprived pregnant workers of the
opportunity to participate in its light-duty program. This amounted
to pregnancy discrimination, which violates federal law."

Reuters also reports that the company, the nation's largest private
employer, is facing class action lawsuits in Illinois and New York
for allegedly denying accommodations to thousands of pregnant
workers at its retail stores.

"Walmart is a great place for women to work. We do not tolerate
discrimination, and we support our associates by providing
accommodations every day across all of our stores, clubs,
distribution centers and offices," said Walmart spokeman Randy
Hargrove.

"Our accommodations policy has been updated a number of times over
the last several years and our policies have always fully met or
exceeded both state and federal law and this includes the Americans
with Disabilities Act and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act." [GN]


WD HENRY: Migrant Farm Workers File Class Action in New York
------------------------------------------------------------
Gregg McQueen, writing for Manhattan Times, reports that the Worker
Justice Center of New York has filed a complaint in U.S. District
Court on behalf of migrant farm workers who were formerly employed
by W.D. Henry & Sons, an upstate produce company.

The workers, all residents of Villalba, Puerto Rico, were seasonal
employees who traveled each year at their own expense to Eden, New
York, to work in the company's fields and packing facilities.

Beginning in 2016, W.D. Henry & Sons began to take steps to replace
the Puerto Rican employees with temporary foreign guest workers
under the H-2A visa program, according to court documents.

Under federal law, agricultural employers are prohibited from
displacing U.S. workers in favor of foreign guest workers.

Five former workers are named in the lawsuit, which was brought on
behalf of over 60 other Puerto Rican laborers who claim they were
similarly discriminated against.

The lawsuit alleges that W.D. Henry & Sons violated federal H-2A
regulations, the Agricultural Worker Protection Act, the Fair Labor
Standards Act, and New York Labor Law.


"The company started drastically reducing their hours," said John
Marsella, Staff Attorney for the Worker Justice Center of New York,
a nonprofit that provides legal help for agricultural and other low
wage workers. "We have some who flew to New York and went to the
farm and were told that there was no work for them anymore."

According to court documents, some farm workers involved in the
lawsuit were evicted from their housing in order to make room for
H-2A guest workers. Also, the employer withheld wages and coerced
Puerto Rican workers into signing false declarations that
purportedly indicated they were abandoning their employment,
Mr. Marsella said.

"They didn't understand what they were signing," he remarked.

The lawsuit was filed on September 14 in U.S. District Court.

W.D. Henry & Sons did not immediately respond to a request for
comment.

Mr. Marsella suggested that agricultural employers are opting to
employ H-2A guest workers instead of domestic U.S. workers, as they
are more easily exploitable.

"Guest worker visas are tied to one employer, so they can't work
for anybody else," he said. "It gives the employer a lot of power.
An employer can fire the worker at any time. They can report a
worker to the government as out of status. It makes them afraid to
speak up if they're treated unfairly."

Additionally, H-2A workers are not entitled to unemployment
insurance benefits, and employers are exempt from paying U.S.
Social Security and Medicare taxes for H-2A guest workers.

Mr. Marsella said some of the Puerto Rican workers had been
employed by W.D. Henry & Sons for nearly 20 years. He said the
company moved to replace the workers at the same time they were
dealing with the aftermath of Hurricane María, which ravaged their
hometown.

The farm workers needed their jobs more than ever to help support
their families, Mr. Marsella said.

"Rather than helping these individuals, the employer took the
opportunity to get rid of these workers," he remarked. "They really
took advantage of a terrible situation to kick these workers when
they are down."

In the lawsuit, the workers are seeking compensation for lost wages
and travel expenses.

For more information, please visit wjcny.org. [GN]


WELLLIFE NETWORK: Alsaidi Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Pay, Damages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rasha Alsaidi, on behalf of herself, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly-situated, Plaintiff, v. Welllife Network Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-05404 (E.D. N.Y., September 26, 2018),
seeks to recover unpaid overtime compensation and liquidated
damages pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, New York Labor Law and the Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993.

Welllife is an institution primarily engaged in the care of the
mentally ill where Alsaidi worked as an intensive care
coordinator/manager. She claims to have worked well in excess of 40
hours per week, without uninterrupted rest breaks, without overtime
compensation. She also was denied medical leave following her
pregnancy and claims to have been terminated for such. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joan B. Lopez, Esq.
      Marjorie Mesidor, Esq.
      PHILLIPS & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, PLLC
      45 Broadway, Suite 620
      New York, NY 10006
      Tel: (212) 248-7431
      Fax: (212) 901–2107
      Email: jlopez@tpglaws.com
             mmesidor@tpglaws.com



WENDY'S: Faces Class Action Over Fingerprint Data Collection
------------------------------------------------------------
Tom McKay, writing for Gizmodo, reports that fast-food chain
Wendy's is facing down a lawsuit in Illinois over its use of
fingerprint scanners to track employees at work in retail
locations, according to court documents obtained by ZDNet.

The complaint, a class action filed by former Wendy's employees
Martinique Owens and Amelia Garcia, argues that Wendy's use of
Discovery NCR Corporation fingerprint scanners to track employee
hours and access to cash registers and point-of-sale systems is in
violation of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA).
Namely, BIPA requires employees to be notified in writing "of the
specific purpose and length of time for which their fingerprints
were being collected, stored, and used," ZDNet wrote, as well as
requires employers obtain "explicit consent" from staff in the form
of writing to collect and use their biometric data. The plaintiffs
say Wendy's does not do this.

According to ZDNet, the plaintiffs say Wendy's does not even inform
staff what will happen to their fingerprints if they quit, are
fired, or otherwise leave the company:

Wendy's also doesn't provide a publicly available retention
schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying employees'
fingerprints after they leave the company, plaintiffs said.

. . . Wendy's did not respond to a request for comment. Plaintiffs'
lawyers declined to comment when reached.

In the complaint, ZDNet added, the plaintiffs wrote that biometric
information like fingerprints are unique and permanent, and sloppy
handling of such information could expose staff to "serious and
irreversible privacy risks." They want Wendy's to pay out damages,
as well as clarify whether the fast food chain sold and/or leased
any of the data or used it to track employees.

BIPA itself was created in the aftermath of Pay By Touch, a "point
of sale biometric authentication" company that promised to
revolutionize retail by letting customers simply touch a sensor to
pay for products like groceries. It later crashed amid allegations
of mismanagement and securities fraud.

As the company collapsed, it became clear that fingerprint and
banking data collected by stores that had installed Pay By Touch
terminals was ending up in its central servers. That potentially
made it eligible for resale to the highest bidder, ZDNet noted.
Even at the time, newspapers noted that the theft of a unique
biometric identifier can be a bigger problem than losing other
data, like a Social Security number. (Just look at India's
sprawling Aadhaar database, which is allegedly rife with
counterfeiting and fraud, and the potential for the use of
biometrics in mass surveillance programs.)

BIPA's passage set off a number of legal battles between tech
giants like Facebook and Google on the one hand and consumers who
said biometrics were being collected without explicit opt-in
consent. Alphabet, Google's parent company, launched a lobbying
campaign aimed at exempting photos from the law after a similar one
by Facebook petered out, according to Bloomberg. Most of the
lawsuits filed under BIPA, however, have related to employers who
collected data on staff. [GN]


WESTGATE SMOKY: Faces Consumer Fraud Class Action in Tennessee
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP; Farmer Purcell White &
Lassiter, PLLC; Ritchie, Dillard, Davies & Johnson, P.C., and
Wallace & Associates on Sept. 26 announced the filing of a class
action consumer fraud lawsuit in federal court in the Eastern
District of Tennessee on behalf of purchasers of timeshare
interests at the Westgate Smoky Mountain Resort in Gatlinburg,
Tennessee, against Westgate Resorts, Ltd. and its related
entities.

The lawsuit alleges that Westgate engages in fraudulent conduct,
fails to disclose material facts and required disclosures, and
fails to provide purchasers adequate use and enjoyment of the
timeshares they have purchased, all in violation of Tennessee state
law. The complaint alleges that as part of its scheme, Westgate
utilizes a closing folio that contains a "secret pocket" which
closing agents often use to hide key disclosures. The complaint
also alleges that because Westgate oversells its units, restricts
their availability, and uses many of the units for nightly rentals
and for soliciting new buyers, units are often completely
unavailable for "owners" during the times they intend to use them.
In short, according to the complaint, Westgate's scheme leaves
purchasers with nothing but the obligation to pay additional fees
and charges.

"When consumers purchase timeshares, they should be treated
honestly and fairly, and be able to get the full benefit of the
contracts they are led to believe they are making," said
Mark Chalos, the managing partner of Lieff Cabraser's Nashville
office who represents the plaintiffs in the case. "Westgate's
alleged fraudulent and deceptive practices, which apparently go
back as far as a decade, have allegedly cheated thousands of buyers
out of the use and enjoyment of their timeshare units by themselves
and their families."

The lawsuit seeks class action status on behalf of all residents of
the United States and its territories who purchased a Westgate
vacation timeshare property in the "floating use plan" at the
Westgate Smoky Mountain Resort at Gatlinburg since July 1, 2008.

"Tennessee law provides important protections to purchasers of
timeshares," notes John Belcher of Farmer, Purcell, White &
Lassiter, PLLC, another attorney representing the plaintiffs and
the proposed class in the case, which alleges numerous violations
of the Tennessee Timeshare Act.

"Westgate's alleged deceptive conduct and practices are
widespread," notes Wayne Ritchie of Ritchie, Dillard, Davies &
Johnson, P.C., who also represents the plaintiffs. "All these
people wanted was to be able to use their timeshare units on a
reasonable basis based on the sales pitches they received. Instead,
as alleged in the complaint, they got strong-armed by high-pressure
sales tactics into deceptive deals that failed to deliver what they
expected."

"Instead of a having a place to go to enjoy a family vacation,
purchasers instead were left with oversold timeshare units that
they could not reasonably use," said John Spragens, an attorney in
Lieff Cabraser's Nashville office who represents the plaintiffs in
the case.

The lawsuit seeks class certification, compensation for monetary
losses, and injunctive relief, including a court order that
prevents defendants from using folders with secret pockets, from
using a "delayed closing" deed delivery system that invites fraud,
and specifically from selling timeshare properties while
restricting purchasers' ability to use them, from failing to
disclose that their availability is limited, and from failing to
disclose that purchasers have a right to rescind their purchase.
The complaint also seeks an order that plaintiffs have the right to
rescind (undo) their timeshare purchase contracts and that Westgate
and the other defendants must give back the profits received from
their alleged wrongful conduct.

                       About Lieff Cabraser

Recognized as "one of the nation's premier plaintiffs' firms" by
The American Lawyer, Lieff Cabraser is a national plaintiffs' law
firm with offices in Nashville, New York, San Francisco, and
Seattle.  It has successfully prosecuted scores of consumer fraud
class action lawsuits against many of the largest U.S. companies
and financial institutions.  Working with co-counsel, it has
achieved judgments and settlements in excess of $19 billion for
consumers in these cases.

          About Farmer Purcell White & Lassiter, PLLC

The law firm of Farmer Purcell White & Lassiter, PLLC represents
both individuals and businesses in a wide variety of legal matters
across the State of Tennessee.

        About Ritchie, Dillard, Davies & Johnson, P.C.

Ritchie, Dillard, Davies & Johnson has focused on litigation since
1966. Over the last 4 decades, RDDJ's attorneys have been
recognized for their work in handling significant and challenging
cases and for their commitment to the highest levels of
professionalism.  Hallmarks of the Firm's culture are its
attorneys' work ethic, service in leading professional
organizations, and commitment of time and resources to pro bono
work and organizations.

                   About Wallace & Associates

Wallace & Associates is the business name of Richard T. Wallace &
Associates, P.C. Mr. Wallace has represented victims for over
thirty-six years in civil lawsuits covering a wide range of tort
claims.  The firm is home based in Sevierville, Tennessee, and has
represented clients throughout the East Tennessee region in both
State and Federal Courts. [GN]


WYETH INC: Judgment on Pleadings Bid in Antitrust Suit Partly OK'd
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re EFFEXOR ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Civil Action No.
3:11-cv-5661 (PGS)(LHG)(D. N.J.), Judge Peter G. Sheridan of the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey granted in part
and denied in part the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings.

Presently before the Court is Defendants Wyeth and Teva's Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c), regarding End-Payer Plaintiffs' Third Amended
Consolidated Complaint.  The case arises from allegations that two
drug companies, Wyeth and Teva, engaged in an anticompetitive
scheme that prevented the generic drug of Effexor XR from entering
the market.  

The Plaintiffs are a collection of organizations including
insurance carriers, Taft-Hartley funds, municipalities, and
individuals, who have been indirectly affected by Defendants'
alleged schemes.  They are end-payor purchasers ("EPP") who claim
to have paid inflated costs for the brand-named drug, Effexor XR,
due to, among other things, a delayed entry provision included in
Wyeth and Teva's settlement agreement.  Unlike the Direct Purchaser
Plaintiffs, who assert claims under the Sherman Act, the EPPs base
their claims on their respective state's antitrust and consumer
protection acts.

In the Complaint, EPPs identify several anticompetitive schemes
that purportedly give rise to the present lawsuit.  Specifically,
the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants fraudulently obtained
three separate, but related patents, from the United States Patent
and Trademark Office ("PTO"); listed these patents in the book of
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations;
engaged in sham litigation relating to these patents; entered into
an unlawful reverse payment agreement with Teva; and manipulated
the 180 day first-to-file period to sustain Wyeth's and Teva's
exclusivity and collectively prevent other generic companies from
entering the market. The Court discusses each allegation in turn.

The Plaintiffs bring the case on behalf of themselves and all
End-Payor class members to recover damages, calculated by the
increased price they had to pay due to Wyeth's conduct in delaying
the market entry of generic Effexor XR.  The class contains
individuals or entities who purchased or paid for Effexor XR and/or
its generic version for consumption by themselves, their families,
or members, employees, insureds, participants, or beneficiaries in
Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
and the District of Columbia.  The Class sues for overage damages
occurred from June 14, 2008 until the effects of the Defendants'
conduct cease.

The Complaint outlines four different claims for relief in the
class action.  The first is for monopolization under state law
against Wyeth.  The conduct giving rise to this claim is the
fraudulent obtainment of the '171, '958, and '120 Patents, its
listing in the Orange Book, its sham litigation, and the unlawful
reverse settlement agreement with Teva.  The same factual
allegations and theories asserted in Count I are again alleged in
Count II against all the Defendants.  In Count III, the Plaintiffs
allege conspiracy to restrain of trade against all the Defendants.
Finally, the Plaintiffs allege a claim unfair or deceptive trade
practices against all the Defendants.  The Plaintiffs contend that
as a result of Wyeth's anticompetitive acts or practices, the
Plaintiffs and the Class were deprived of the opportunity to obtain
a less expensive, generic equivalent to Effexor XR.  As such, the
Plaintiffs seek compensation from the Defendants in the form of
damages.

The Defendants presently challenge EPPs' Complaint on five separate
bases.  First, they contend that EPPs' Complaint should be
dismissed in its entirety based on federal preemption principles.
Second, the Defendants argue that several state law claims are
time-barred.  Third, the Defendants contend that certain states
require pre-filing notices, which the Plaintiffs failed to comply
with, and proscribe class actions under their respective consumer
protection statutes.  Fourth, the Defendants aver that EPPs' state
antitrust claims fail because they lack standing and fail to plead
a concerted act.  Finally, the Defendants challenge EPPs' consumer
protection claims for failing to comply with various state consumer
protection law requirements.

Judge Sheridan granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.  He denied the Defendants'
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (i) based on preemption
principles; (ii) statute of limitations; and (iii) as to EPPs'
state consumer protection claims in California, Nevada, New Mexico,
New York, and North Carolina.

The Judge granted without prejudice the Defendants' Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings (i) as it pertains to EPPs' Arizona,
Nevada, and Utah antitrust claims, and EPPs are granted leave to
amend their Complaint to plead compliance with these notice
provisions and, with regards to Utah, include a named Plaintiff
from Utah; (ii) as it pertains to EPPs' antitrust claims under the
laws of the District of Columbia; (iii) as it pertains to EPPs'
Massachusetts, West Virginia, Rhode Island, and Tennessee consumer
protection claims; and the EPPs are granted leave to amend their
Complaint to plead compliance with Massachusetts and West
Virginia's notice provisions, individual claims in Tennessee, and
consumer claims under Rhode Island; and (iv) as it pertains to
EPPs' Illinois and Rhode Island antitrust claims, and the EPPs'
Illinois and Maine consumer protection claims.

He granted the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as
to Count I of EPPs' Complaint under Kansas, New York, and Tennessee
to the extent these claims are predicated on unilateral activity by
Wyeth.

Among other things, the Judge finds that (i) because the EPPs
claims are predicated on claims wholly separate from the federal
patent law, they are not preempted; (ii) because the Plaintiffs'
antitrust claims do not implicate federal patent law, he will not
dismiss these claims based on preemption; (iii) because the EPPs
filed their complaints the following year, September 2011, he finds
EPPs' claims are timely, under the continuing-violation doctrine,
and, therefore, he denies the Defendants' motion as it pertains to
these claims; (iv) because failure to comply with Maine's
pre-filing notice does not preclude a plaintiff from perusing his
or her claims under the Maine's Unfair Trade Practices Act, to the
extent the Defendants seek judgment under this statute, it is
denied; and (v) because the failure to provide pre-file notice
under Maine's Unfair Trade Practices Act does not bar pursuing a
claim under the Act, the Defendants' motion for judgment as it
relates to this statute is denied.

The EPPs have 30 days from the filing of the Memorandum and Order
to file an Amended Complaint, consistent with the Memorandum.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2018 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/nih6st from Leagle.com.

MAN-U SERVICE CONTRACT TRUST FUND, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by JOHN A.
MACORETTA -- jmacoretta@srkattorneys.com -- SPECTOR ROSEMAN &
KODROFF, P.C.

A.F. OF L.-A.G.C. BUILDING TRADES WELFARE PLAN, Consolidated from,
MC - UA LOCAL 119 HEALTH & WELFARE PLAN, Consoliated from, IBEW -
NECA LOCAL 505 HEALTH & WELFARE PLAN, Consolidated from, SERGEANTS
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION HEALTH AND WELFARE FUND, Consolidated fom,
PATRICIA SUTTER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Consolidated from & DARYL DEINO, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Consolidated from,
Plaintiff Consolidateds, represented by JAMES E. CECCHI --
JCecchi@carellabyrne.com -- CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY &
AGNELLO, P.C. & LINDSEY H. TAYLOR -- LTaylor@carellabyrne.com --
CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO.

PLUMBERS AND PIPEFITTERS LOCAL 572 HEALTH AND WELFARE FUND,
Consolidated from, Plaintiff Consolidated, represented by JAMES E.
CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY & AGNELLO, P.C., LISA J.
RODRIGUEZ, Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP & NICOLE M.
ACCHIONE, Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP.

NEW MEXICO UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION'S AND
EMPLOYERS' HEALTH AND WELFARE TRUST FUND, Consolidated from,
LOUISIANA HEALTH SERVICE & INDEMNITY COMPANY, Consolidated from &
NELSON MORALES RIVERA, Individually and on Behalf of all Others
Similarly Situated; Consolidated from, Plaintiff Consolidateds,
represented by JAMES E. CECCHI, CARELLA BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY
& AGNELLO, P.C.

THE SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY REGIONAL EMPLOYEE BENEFITS FUND,
Consoliated from, THE BERGEN MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE BENEFITS FUND,
Consolidated from & THE NORTH JERSEY MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
FUND, Consolidated from, Plaintiff Consolidateds, represented by
MICHAEL D. FITZGERALD.

WYETH, INC., Defendant, represented by LIZA M. WALSH --
lwalsh@walsh.law -- WALSH PIZZI O'REILLY FALANGA LLP, MEGAN
DEPASQUALE, WHITE AND CASE & RUKHSANAH L. SINGH, CONNELL FOLEY
LLP.

TEVA PHARAMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES LTD. & TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA,
INC., Defendants, represented by MICHAEL E. PATUNAS --
mpatunas@patunaslaw.com -- PATUNAS LAW LLC.

WYETH LLC, Defendant, represented by ELEONORE OFOSU-ANTWI --
ofosuantwi@walsh.law -- WALSH PIZZI O'REILLY FALANGA LLP & WILLIAM
T. WALSH, Jr. -- wwalsh@walsh.law -- Walsh Pizzi O'Reilly Falanga.

TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS, USA, INC., Consolidated from, Defendant
Consolidated, represented by ALLYN ZISSEL LITE, LITE DEPALMA
GREENBERG, LLC & MICHAEL E. PATUNAS, PATUNAS LAW LLC.

WYETH PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., Consolidated from, WYETH-WHITEHALL
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., Consolidated from & WYETH PHARMACEUTICALS
COMPANY, Consolidated from, Defendant Consolidateds, represented by
LIZA M. WALSH, WALSH PIZZI O'REILLY FALANGA LLP, ELEONORE
OFOSU-ANTWI, WALSH PIZZI O'REILLY FALANGA LLP & WILLIAM T. WALSH,
Jr., Walsh Pizzi O'Reilly Falanga.


[*] Businesses in Europe Brace for Data Breach Class Actions
------------------------------------------------------------
Mathew J. Schwartz, writing for Bank Info Security, reports that
breached businesses in Europe: Brace for more class action data
breach lawsuits.

"Class actions are here to stay for data breaches," says attorney
Jonathan Armstrong -- jonathan.armstrong@corderycompliance.com --
who's a partner at London-based Cordery.

"They're more likely to succeed here than in the U.S., albeit with
the caveat that their numbers will be smaller," he says in an
interview with Information Security Media Group. That's because at
least so far, most European class action lawsuits have required
victims to opt in, compared to the U.S. model of having to opt
out.

The first U.K. lawsuit sparked by a data breach involved U.K.
food-retailing giant Morrisons. Staff filed the lawsuit after an
employee -- senior internal auditor Andrew Skelton -- in 2014 stole
and leaked personal information, including salaries and bank
details, for nearly 100,000 employees. In 2015, Skelton was
sentenced to serve eight years in prison. While the breach case is
still working its way through the courts, Armstrong says it could
set a precedent that applies to older breaches.

GDPR's Impact
Since May 25, however, European data protection authorities have
been enforcing the EU's General Data Protection Regulation, which
gives breach victims the right to seek two types of compensation.
"Any person who has suffered material or non-material damage as a
result of an infringement of this regulation shall have the right
to receive compensation from the controller or processor for the
damage suffered," GDPR states.

Earlier in September, British Airways was threatened with a £500
million ($650 million) class-action lawsuit in U.K. court after it
warned that a hacker had stolen payment card data associated with
380,000 transactions, in one of the worst breaches to ever come to
light in the country (see British Airways Faces Class-Action
Lawsuit Over Data Breach).

The British Airways breach followed other big breaches at British
brand-name retailers, including Carphone Warehouse and Superdrug
Stores and Ticketmaster (see Europe Catches GDPR Breach
Notification Fever).

As more EU breaches come to light, Armstrong expects to see a
commensurate rise in European class-action lawsuits filed in
response.

"Things are changing," although GDPR isn't the only reason, he
says. "It's partly GDPR, and with the Britsh Airways breach
specifically and Carphone Warehouse similarly, there are other
regulations as well" that have been leading organizations to alert
authorities -- and often then victims -- about breaches.

In this audio interview, Mr. Armstrong discusses:

   -- How GDPR and other regulations continue to increase Europe's
knowledge about data breach landscape;
   -- Why Europe can expect to see more class action lawsuits
sparked by data breaches and leaks;
   -- Why British Airway's previous promise that online shopping
was "safe" might pose legal problems for the airline.

Mr. Armstrong is an experienced lawyer with a concentration on
technology, risk and compliance. He has handled legal matters in
more than 60 countries involving emerging technology, corporate
governance, ethics code implementation, reputation, internal
investigations, marketing, branding and global privacy policies.
Armstrong is a co-author of the LexisNexis technology law
publication, "Managing Risk: Technology & Communications."


[*] Collective Action Not a Popular Civil Remedy in India
---------------------------------------------------------
Smitha Verma, writing for Financial Express, reports that it's an
advertisement that was carried in all leading dailies. With the
header as 'Attention', the notice asks patients with ASR (articular
surface replacement) hip implants by DePuy International, a
subsidiary of pharma giant Johnson & Johnson (J&J), to follow up
with their orthopedic surgeons for evaluation of their hip implants
regularly. The notice further says that the government has
constituted a central expert committee and state level committee to
address concerns and assess the compensation claims of eligible
patients in respect of the ASR hip implants.

But Mumbai resident and patient Vijay Vojhala isn't amused. "It's
complete eyewash. What are they going to achieve by such an
advertisement? They are playing with our pain and the government is
in cohorts with them," an anguished Vojhala alleges. "The moment
you call the helpline, you are asked to fill a form and email it to
the company. And then, there is endless wait. At least that's what
has happened till now," the 44-year-old claims.

Mumbai-based Vijay Vojhala is among the 4,700 patients in India who
had Johnson & Johnson hip implants between 2006 and 2010. Vojhala
has a bone to pick with J&J. In 2008, he had undergone a hip
implant and, as suggested by his orthopedic surgeon, went with the
J&J product. But a few months after the surgery, he started
experiencing excruciating pain along with a pronounced limp,
reducing his mobility drastically. A medical representative with a
multinational, Vojhala then had a chance meeting with an orthopedic
surgeon in a medical conference and that changed his life
completely. "He told me about the defective implant and how it has
been recalled globally. He suggested that I undergo tests to check
the cobalt and chromium levels in my body," he says. Tests revealed
that he was suffering from various side-effects of the defective
device and, after living for two years with a defective implant, he
underwent a revision surgery.

The case in question isn't new. And it's not one restricted to
India. In 2010, ASR hip implants were globally recalled by J&J. The
device, comprising ASR XL Acetabular Hip System and ASR Hip
resurfacing system, was first introduced in India in 2006. The
company renewed its registration certificate for the product in
2009, even as it had begun recalling the product in Australia the
same year. The recall in Australia happened after an analysis by
the Therapeutic Goods Administration, the Australian regulatory
body under the department of health, indicated that it had a
higher-than-average replacement rate. In 2010, it was recalled from
the US and UK market as well, but it took Indian regulators two
more years to ban its import and cancel the product licence. "And
now, after so many years, they have come up with a joke of a
compensation amounting to Rs 20 lakh. What sort of justice is
this?" asks Vojhala.

Redressals & reimbursements
Vojhala is among the 4,700 patients in India who underwent J&J hip
implants between 2006 and 2010. It was only at the persistence of a
few patients like him that the Indian government finally formed a
committee. "I wrote to several politicians, the state health
minister and CM, central drug controller, National Human Rights
Commission and where not," he says.

The committee, which was formed in 2017, recommended that J&J be
made liable to pay at least Rs 20 lakh to each affected patient,
and that the reimbursement programme for revision surgeries should
continue till August 2025. Though the committee had submitted its
report in February this year, it was only after patient outcry that
the outcome was made public. "The constitution of the committee is
pointless, as it only has medical and pharma professionals.
Ideally, they should have had a social scientist, human rights
expert, an academic and social scientist besides aggrieved patients
and doctors," says Malini Aisola, co-convenor, All India Drug
Action Network, a public health group that works for patient
rights.

The implants in question are metal devices, with components of
cobalt, chromium and molybdenum. When the metal debris flakes off
and enters the bloodstream, it leads to an increase in cobalt and
chromium in blood, resulting in blood toxicity and metallosis that
can lead to several issues like deafness, thyroid problems, nerve
problems, heart problems and even death due to multiorgan failure.

In 2013, J&J agreed to pay an estimated $2.5 billion to 8,000 US
patients for the defective hip implant. The compensation, tipped to
be the highest ever for any medical device, came after thousands of
lawsuits were filed by individuals allegedly affected by the
company's product. "The compensation in the West points towards
damages that value life. Here, the drug controller and the pharma
giant seem to be in cohorts," alleges Vojhala.

In another major compensation case, J&J was ordered to pay $4.7
billion in damages to 22 women in the US who alleged that they got
cancer after using its talcum powder. In July, the jury in
Missouri, US, awarded $4.5 billion in punitive damages -- the
verdict was the fallout of some 9,000 legal cases, wherein women
alleged that J&J's asbestos-laden talcum powder caused them ovarian
cancer.

So what is it about the West that compensation amounts to
million-dollar suits, while in India, patients are left with a
pittance? "Lack of awareness and culpability of regulators have
been the biggest deterrents for consumers in India to seek
redressal, especially in medico-legal cases," points out
Delhi-based Supreme Court advocate Divya Kesar. In the US and UK,
class action suits or group litigation are a norm, wherein a large
number of affected parties come together to fight a legal battle. A
class action is a collective claim in which the court awards
permission to an individual or individuals to bring the claims of
others similarly situated in a single case. But in India, this kind
of legal battle is yet to pick up strength. "Although various
Indian statutes provide for collective action, such provisions are
rarely used… collective action is not a very popular civil remedy
in India due to lengthy court proceedings," says Kesar.

Experts argue that a well-oiled judiciary in the West also promotes
litigation cases. "The US courts are fairly rigorous in their
methodology for computing compensation. Indian courts, however,
have a rather jugaad quick-fix attitude when it comes to
determining such issues. Their approach is an ad-hoc one, as amply
demonstrated in the Bhopal (gas tragedy) case," says Shamnad
Basheer, founder and managing trustee, IDIA, a Bengaluru-based
not-for-profit that works for the elimination of inequities in
education, and former chair professor of intellectual property law
at West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata.

The victims of the 1984 Bhopal Gas tragedy are still fighting for
compensation. As per government figures, a total of 5,74,376 people
were exposed to the US-based Union Carbide Corporation's (UCC)
toxic gas, of which 5,22,000 received Rs 25,000 each as
compensation. "This was not given as a lump-sum amount . . . it
took anywhere, from eight to 10 years, for the victims to get it,"
says Bhopal-based Rachna Dhingra, a representative of the Bhopal
Group for Information and Action, one of the five organisations
working for the rights of the Bhopal gas disaster victims. As per
the central government, only 5,295 people died as a result of the
gas disaster -- these people earlier received Rs 1 lakh as
compensation and later Rs 10 lakh was disbursed.

But even that meagre compensation didn't come easily. "The onus
fell on the victim to prove that he/she was affected on that night.
They had to pay money to doctors to testify on their health status,
hire lawyers to fight in the claim court to prove that they were
victims. In a way, they were fighting their own government for
adequate compensation, whereas the state should have fought with
them against Union Carbide," Dhingra says. She points out how the
government's settlement in 1989 with the multinational for $470
million was not based on any medical or research figures. "When the
process of claims ended, it turned out that more than half a
million were affected and the compensation amount to the majority
ended up being less than $500," Dhingra adds.

In 2010, the central government decided to file a curative petition
in the SC, stating that it had underestimated the number of deaths
and injuries, and sought more compensation. The curative petition
seeks compensation of more than Rs 1,000 crore from UCC, now owned
by Dow Chemicals. "The government plans to reopen the settlement,
but eight years later, the case is yet to come up for hearing,"
Dhingra says. India's efforts to approach the US courts in hopes of
obtaining a larger compensation were thwarted on the grounds of
'forum non conveniens', a discretionary power that allows courts to
dismiss a case where another court -- in this case, Indian courts
-- or forum, is much better suited to hear the case. "Further, the
final settlement had barred all subsequent lawsuits. And,
therefore, all suits filed by the victims in the US courts at later
stages were also dismissed," says Basheer of IDIA.

Legal loopholes
Under the Indian legal system, damages may be awarded under general
principles of tort law (which is largely judge-made 'common law'),
or under any of the specific statutes, such as the Consumer
Protection Act (CPA), contracts act or Drugs and Cosmetics Act
(DCA). But it's not easy to claim compensation. "Unfortunately, the
DCA provides for compensation in very limited circumstances, such
as faulty clinical trials, for supply or
spurious/adulterated/sub-standard drugs. These provisions can't
apply to faulty medical devices such as J&J's ASR hip implant since
such implants can't qualify as 'spurious', 'adulterated' or
'sub-standard' under the terms of the Act and corresponding
rules/guidelines," says Basheer.

Although various Indian statutes provide for collective action,
such provisions are rarely used. "The contingency fees charged by
lawyers in the US are not permitted in the Indian legal system . .
. this is responsible for the absence of a plaintiff bar (an
informal designation for attorneys who generally represent people
suing someone). Also, since there is no certainty regarding
recovery, the plaintiffs are not motivated enough to file class
action suits," says advocate Kesar. Besides, in India, there is
also the major risk of the plaintiff not only losing the case, but
also not getting compensated. "They may even end up bearing the
legal cost of the defendant company," she adds.

A number of state laws in the US provide for strict liability. As
such, the consumer who buys a defective product does not need to
independently establish that the defect arose from manufacturers'
negligence. The producer is strictly liable for such defects even
if he/she took all reasonable care. "Unfortunately, in India, we
are yet to adopt strict liability standards the way the US has. The
time may have come, in fact, to legislate on this front. The Centre
has now sought to amend the consumer protection bill," says Basheer
of IDIA.

In the US, what works for the complainant is that damages are
generally of two broad types: compensatory and punitive.
Compensatory damages are categorised into economic damages that are
directly attributable to various economic costs. Non-economic
damages are for factors such as pain and suffering. More often than
not, non-economic damages are far more significant than economic
ones. "Illustratively, in the J&J case, a trial court in Los
Angeles awarded damages of $8.3 million to an aggrieved patient, of
which $8 million were damages for pain and suffering alone," points
out Basheer. He further states how punitive damages are meant to
teach a lesson to the corporation, so that it deploys safer norms
whilst manufacturing products and ensures that consumers are not
harmed. "Compared to the US, the Indian legal system does not offer
much, but this is changing slowly and courts are beginning to grant
punitive damages in a larger number of cases now," he adds.

Way ahead
Over the past few years, India is slowly inching its way up when it
comes to compensation claims. In a major development in 2015, the
government instituted action against Nestlé India for Maggi (on
reports that it contained excess lead) in the National Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission. The complaint was, by nature, a
collective action and filed on behalf of all consumers, seeking
damages of Rs 640 crore for alleged unfair trade practices, false
labelling and misleading advertisements. The complaint was filed
under Section 12(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act 1986, under
which the central or state government can—in its individual
capacity, or as a representative of the interests of consumers in
general—file complaints to the National Commission. "The
complaint opened up doors to future collective actions on behalf of
consumers and is a landmark case," says advocate Kesar.

Another landmark judgment where compensation became a talking point
involved the trademark/drug regulatory issue between Glenmark
Pharmaceuticals and Galpha Laboratories -- Glenmark Pharma alleged
that Galpha Labs had blatantly copied the artwork, colour scheme,
font style, manner of writing, etc, of its product CANDID-B calling
it CLODID-B. In August, the Bombay High Court handed out a
significant damage award of Rs 1.5 crore after taking note of the
fact that Galpha Laboratories was also a reckless violator of drug
safety norms.

Then there is the Uphaar Cinema fire tragedy case, where the
Supreme Court imposed a fine of Rs 60 crore to be paid by the
owners (Ansal brothers) to the victims—Rs 10 lakh to legal heirs
of the deceased aged above 20 years; Rs 7.5 lakh to legal heirs of
the deceased aged below 20 years; and Rs 1 lakh to those injured.
"The SC held in pertinent part that 'Article 21 of the Constitution
of India has to be read into all public safety statutes since the
prime object of public safety legislation is to protect the
individual and to compensate him for the loss suffered' . . . It's
a landmark judgment in terms of compensation," says Basheer of
IDIA.

As far as the J&J case is concerned, till last month, the company
claimed that it could trace only 1,080 patients -- in August, the
first batch of 15 patients were asked to appear before the
screening committee for claims.

Not everyone is happy, however, with the way things are moving
ahead. Vojhala feels the money for the same amount of pain and
suffering can't be so "significantly lower than what patients got
in the US." Though the committee report on J&J is well-drafted, the
execution of its observations is yet to begin on any serious note.
"Also, why is the company talking about compensation right away?
They should first reimburse the patients the medical costs for
follow-up surgeries. Then they should allow patients to decide
whether they want to take the compensation being offered or figure
out other options," says Aisola of All India Drug Action Network.

The jury is still out on that.


[*] CPA Most Effective Remedy for Product Liability Claims in India
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Shivani Saxena, writing for BloombergQuint, reports that in July
this year a jury in Missouri, USA ordered Johnson & Johnson to pay
$4.7 billion in compensatory and punitive damages to 22 women who
alleged that the company's talc products caused them to develop
ovarian cancer.

Over the last two years juries in federal court in Dallas have
ordered J&J to pay a total of more than $1.7 billion in damages
over artificial hips. One verdict was for more than $1 billion
though several awards were later cut by a U.S. District Judge.

Contrast that with the Rs 20 lakh compensation recommended by a
government panel in India for faulty hip devices supplied by J&J.

Two points here. First, the compensation is a much lower amount
than punitive damages awarded in the American mass tort cases cited
above. Two, punitive damages are rarely awarded in India.

Since the Consumer Protection Act came into force in India, over 48
lakh consumer cases have been filed and around 91 percent of these
cases have been resolved, according to the National Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission. Most of these are a result of
settlement and none of them have really resulted in blockbuster
damages, experts say.

The largest according to lawyers cited in this story was a Rs 1.10
crore compensatory and punitive damages award.

Existing Framework
In the legal context, 'punitive damages' unlike compensatory
damages do not exist to simply reimburse or compensate for losses.
Their objective is to punish the wrongdoer. To understand these
damages, let's look at the existing product liability framework in
India.

The term 'product liability' refers to the responsibility of a
manufacturer or a seller to compensate for any harm that is caused
to a person or property due to supply of a defective product or
deficient service.

As a recipient of defective goods (perhaps the same cancer-causing
talcum powder) or deficient services (say if a doctor was negligent
and left a syringe inside your body while performing a medical
procedure) a consumer may take action under a variety of laws,
including general tort law, contract law, consumer protection law
and even the Indian Penal Code.

But, the Consumer Protection Act is the most effective remedy,
experts say.

This is because in addition to the lawyer fees, the consumer has to
bear court fees as well, which in a civil court may be a percentage
of the amount the consumer is claiming. In contrast, the consumer
court fee to file a suit for claim amount over Rs 1 crore is just
Rs 5,000, Anay Shukla, Leader, Nishith Desai Associates, explains.

Vineet Shingal, partner at law firm Khaitan & Co, tells
BloombergQuint that the Consumer Protection Act is a more popular
choice for product liability claims for two reasons.

One, the consumer protection law permits overriding legal
principles like 'caveat emptor' (latin for 'let the buyer beware')
under which the buyer is responsible for checking quality and
suitability of goods before purchase.

Two, it permits the consumer to sue not just the direct seller, but
the manufacturer, the importer or the distributor, even though
there may be no direct contractual relationship between the
consumer and such third parties, he explains.

Interestingly, while the Consumer Protection Act provides for a
class action suit (suit filed by multiple persons having similar
claims), there are no precedents for a successful class action
suit.

Punitive and Compensatory Damages
Punitive damages may make headlines every other day in the U.S. But
in most jurisdictions like India, U.K. and Ireland they are
reserved for extreme cases which result in disproportionate harm.
In some jurisdictions like France, Germany and Switzerland, they
don't really form a part of the official legal framework.

One of the many reasons for this is that typically punitive damages
are awarded only in cases where high-handed, malicious, arbitrary
or highly reprehensible misconduct is evident,
Mr. Shingal adds.

For example, in the case of Indu Sharma vs Apollo Hospital,
compensatory damage of Rs 1 crore was awarded but punitive damages
of only Rs 10 lakh were imposed for professional misconduct which
included tampering with medical records and making false
submissions.

While the Consumer Protection Act does not cap the amount of
damages that can be awarded, the Supreme Court in the Charan Singh
case clarified that the damages are primarily compensatory and that
calculation of damages depends on the facts and circumstances of
each case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down for universal
application.

India – Revised Framework?
If a legal framework is not in tune with the realities of time, it
is bound to fail. Most of these laws that aim to protect consumers
are archaic, Mr. Shukla said. For example, the law enacted to
regulate medicines and medical devices dates back to 1940. Even the
regulator's hands are tied to a large extent due to the age-old
framework, he explains.

There is a need to introduce new laws and update legal standards
from time to time in order to help consumers access only the latest
and safer products, which would automatically reduce the incidence
of injury, he adds.

To this end, in January this year the Consumer Protection Bill,
2018 was introduced. It seeks to replace the existing framework and
codify product liability.

The revised framework will brings us one step closer to building a
functional and practical regime, Mr. Shingal said. But the true
impact of this can only be felt when consumers are made aware of
their rights. The willingness of the courts to impose harsher
liabilities to serve as true deterrent will also aid this cause, he
concluded.


[*] Fine Arts Association et $25,000 Cy Press Distribution
----------------------------------------------------------
The News-Herald reports that the Fine Arts Association announced it
has received a cy pres distribution through Dworken & Bernstein's
Ohio Lawyers Give Back initiative in the amount of $25,000.

The funds will be used to support FAA's education, therapies and
outreach programs, and for technology upgrades, according to a news
release.

Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A. founded Ohio Lawyers Give Back to
distribute class action settlements to charitable organizations
based on the cy pres doctrine, the release stated. Cy pres is an
ancient legal doctrine, historically used to distribute trust funds
to charities when the beneficiary was unavailable to receive them.


Through Dworken & Bernstein's Ohio Lawyers Give Back initiative,
over $37 million has been distributed to more than 200 deserving
organizations, the release stated.

The award was presented during a small reception held at The Fine
Arts Association. senior partner Patrick J. Perotti and Barb
Marlowe, the firm's marketing and public relations director
presented the check to Yvonne Thomas, FAA's director of
development. Members of FAA's Development Committee also in
attendance were Marvis Gillison, Jeff Ruple and Roy Smith.

"The Fine Arts Association is thrilled to receive this generous
award which will expand our arts education programs to further
enhance lives in Northeast Ohio and modernize our technology to
current standards," Ms. Thomas stated in the release. [GN]


[*] Initial Coin Offering-Related Class Actions Pile Up
-------------------------------------------------------
Kai Sedgwick, writing for Bitcoin.com, reports that the great ICO
rush of 2017 and early 2018 is over. The euphoria, the unironic
cries of "When Binance?", and the 10x returns are now a thing of
the past. Epic gains and moon missions have been replaced by
acrimony, recriminations and, increasingly lawsuits, both real and
threatened.

Crypto Lawyer Season Is in Full Swing

One of the big selling points with initial coin offerings (ICOs)
has been their inclusiveness. Almost anyone can participate. This
has made for a more egalitarian process, in contrast with
traditional IPOs which welcome accredited investors only. Lowering
the barriers to entry has come at a cost however. Among this new
wave of investors are many who lack the sense to distinguish a
solid project from a dubious one, and who believe that if things go
awry, they can call on their lawyer or even the SEC to ride to the
rescue.

Crypto doesn't work that way.

While ICO teams are still subject to the law, and evidence of clear
criminality can and will be prosecuted, the majority of failed
projects do not constitute exit scams or blatant deception; more
often, a team simply fails to deliver after blowing too much of its
budget on "expenses". In such cases, the chances of successfully
filing a suit are remote. The same people who ticked the Ts & Cs
without reading and skimmed over the legal disclaimers in their
haste to contribute ether to the next sure thing are the same ones
now re-examining them in search of clauses that will entitle them
to get their money back.

Bluster, Lawsuits, and Threats of Lawsuits
Security lawsuits concerning cryptocurrencies have tripled this
year. To date, around a dozen ICO-related class action lawsuits
have been filed including Paragon Coin, Cloud With Me, Tezos, and
Latium Network. Ripple is also facing one over claims that its
eponymous cryptocurrency is an unregistered security. Some naive
investors seem to believe the SEC will operate as their personal
army, filing on their behalf and bearing the legal costs. As
co-director of the SEC's Enforcement Division Stephanie Avakian
recently explained, however, ICO cases that do not involve fraud
are unlikely to feel the full force of the law.

The Telegram groups of many failed ICOs are seething with threats
of legal action from enraged investors desperately seeking their
tokens or ether back. Their anguish is piqued by trolls who show up
to fuel the flames and savor the salt. Shopin's ICO raised $46
million this year. Its CEO Eran Eyal has since been charged with
grand larceny and fraud over a previous project, and is out on bond
after being incarcerated on Rikers Island. Shopin tokens have yet
to be unlocked, meaning bag-holders don't even have their bags.

Other ICOs that have underperformed, from Polymath to Constellation
DAG, are subject to the same threats from angry investors. While a
handful of investors have the determination and the means to make
good on their promise, the majority are too rekt to file suit, even
if they knew how. Due to the multi-jurisdictional nature of
cryptocurrency projects, determining where and how a case should be
prosecuted is complex. Legal threats in Telegram groups come easy.
Following through on them in a court of law is almost impossible.
[GN]



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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