CAR_Public/181030.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, October 30, 2018, Vol. 20, No. 217

                            Headlines

1ST CLASS STAFFING: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Buntun Suit Says
A10 NETWORKS: Still Defends Securities Class Action in California
ACETO CORP: Motions for Lead Plaintiff, Counsel Still Pending
AKORN INC: Bid to Intervene in Securities Fraud Suit Denied
ALLAN COMPANY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Avila et al. Suit Say

ALLSTATE FIRE: Faces Schoenborn et al. Suit in M.D. Georgia
ALTABA: Reaches Agreement in Principle in Data Breach Suit
ALTABA: Shareholder Class Action Agreement Gets Final Court Okay
AMCREST INDUSTRIES: Horner Sues over Sale of Unlicensed Radio
AMERICAN FAMILY: Court Dismisses G. Anderson's Suit

AMERICAN HONDA: Hamilton Suit Moved to District of Minnesota
AMP: Analyst Estimates $6-Bil. for Customer Refunds
APPLEWOOD WINERY: Faces Wu Suit in S.D. New York
ASTA FUNDING: Maintains $2.3M Reserve for Class Action Settlement
BALDWIN VINEYARDS: Faces Wu Suit in S.D. New York

BAYADA HOME: Ct. Conditionally Certifies 2 Subclasses in FLSA Suit
BCA FINANCIAL: Court Won't Reconsider Reyes Class Certification
BHP BILLITON: Bid to Drop Samarco Bondholders Suit Still Pending
BHP BILLITON: Reaches Tentative Settlement of Shareholders Suit
BHP BILLITON: Still Defends Shareholder Suits in Australia

BIG 5: Espinoza Seeks Unpaid Wage under Labor Code
BMW: Settles Class Action Over Excessive Oil Consumption
BNSF RAILWAY: WRG Workers' Asbestos Suit Remanded to State Court
BURGER KING: Faces Arrington Suit over No-Poach Agreement
CALIFORNIA: Dismissal of Class Claims in Flores Suit Recommended

CARNIVAL CORP: Cruise Line Receives Kickbacks, Wolfe Suit Claims
COBIZ FINANCIAL: Plaintiff Dismisses Class Action on BOK Merger
CONNECTICUT: Class Action Mulled Over Garner Radon-Exposure
CONVERGYS: Files Supplemental Disclosures to Appease Merger Suits
CSX TRANSPORTATION: More People Speak Out on Railway Underpass

CULPEPER, VA: Inks MOA with ICE Amid Class Action
CVS RX: Summary Judgment Bid on PAGA Claim in Cabrera Granted
DELEK: Faces Class Action in Haifa Court Over Vehicle Prices
DENKA PERFORMANCE: Environmental Tort Suit Remanded to State Court
DEUTSCHE BANK: Blackrock Advisors RMBS Suit in N.Y. Still Stayed

DEUTSCHE BANK: Discovery Still Ongoing in BlackRock Suit in Calif.
DEUTSCHE BANK: Royal Park's 2nd RMBS Lawsuit Remains Stayed
ELECTROLUX HOME: Court Allows Alternative Service in Rice Suit
ESSENDANT INC: Faces Nguyen Suit over Staples Merger
EVERETT FINANCIAL: Baretich Labor Suit Remanded to State Court

FERRELLGAS PARTNERS: Appeal in N.Y. Class Action Still Pending
FERRELLGAS PARTNERS: Still Defends Class Action in Missouri
FIVE GUYS: Court Conditionally Certifies Class in Finefrock Suit
FORSTER & GARBUS: Antonov Sues over Debt Collection Practices
FORT SMITH, AR: Recycling Cost Estimates Differ in Lawsuit

FRED'S INC: 2 Suits Stayed Pending 11th Cir. Decision in "Taylor"
FRED'S INC: Class Status Bid Pending in Southern Independent Suit
FRED'S INC: Eddington Wage and Hour Class Lawsuit Still Ongoing
FRED'S INC: Whitley Class Action Lawsuit in Ohio Still Ongoing
FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS: Beets Sues over Internet & Phone Services

FUNKO INC: Court Denies Carl Berkelhammer's Lead Plaintiff Bid
GENERAL INFORMATION: Court Dismisses Amended Morris FCRA Suit
GRETNA, LA: Nelson Class Certification Bid Dismissed
GUARANTY BANCORP: Files Supplemental Disclosures on Merger Accord
HACOR INC: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Salazar Suit Alleges

HARVARD COLLECTION: Hanks Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections
IDT ENERGY: Faces Mackey and Hernandez Suit in N.D. Illinois
INTUITIVE SURGICAL: Final Settlement Approval Hearing on Dec. 20
J JILL INC: Still Defends Pension Trust Suit in Massachusetts
JAMESPORT VINEYARDS: Wu Sues in Eastern District of New York

K2M GROUP: Plaintiff in Brown Suit Drops Injunction Bid
KEYS PRODUCTIONS: Fails to Pay OT to Dancers, Lasoyti Suit Claims
KIMBERLY CLARK: Still Defends Bahamas Surgery Center's Suit
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Autrey Alleges
LG ELECTRONICS: Fridge Compressors Defective, Jackson et al. Say

MAB COMMUNITY: Underpays House Managers, Duncan Suit Alleges
MAGNANINI FARM: Faces Wu Suit in Southern District of New York
MARVEL & MALONEY: Steinberg Alleges Wrongful Debt Collection
MCGOWEN ENTERPRISES: Leary Class Settlement Has Final Approval
MDL 2827: Court Denies Bid for Relief in iPhone Battery Suit

MGT CAPITAL: Bragar Eagel Files Class Action Lawsuit
MGT CAPITAL: Schall Law Firm Files Class Action Lawsuit
MIDLAND CREDIT: Court OKs Bid to Dismiss Blackwell FDCPA Suit
MONSANTO COMPANY: Lasseigne Suit Removed to N.D. California
MONSANTO COMPANY: Ocasio Suit Removed to N.D. California

MONSANTO COMPANY: Stevens et al. Suit Removed to N.D. California
MOTT'S LLP: Rahman Remanded to California Superior Court
MOUNTAIN AMERICA: Court Dismisses Tilley EFTA Suit
MURRAY ENERGY: Court Allows Amendment to Mitchell WARN Suit
NATIONAL FOOTBALL: Court Denies Certification of Treviso Class

NATIONAL GRID: Nightingale Alleges Illegal Debt Collection
NEIMAN MARCUS: Connolly Suit Stayed Pending Attia Settlement Deal
NEIMAN MARCUS: Final Court OK on Cyber-Attack Suits Accord Pending
NEIMAN MARCUS: Healthcare Plan Beneficiary Drops Class Claims
NEIMAN MARCUS: Nguyen's PAGA Claims to be Resolved in Attia Pact

NEIMAN MARCUS: NLRB Proceedings over Class Action Waiver Pending
NEIMAN MARCUS: Roces Case Stayed Pending Approval of Attia Deal
NEIMAN MARCUS: Rubenstein Settlement Wins Final Approval
NEIMAN MARCUS: Settlement of Attia Suit Gets Initial Court Approval
NEIMAN MARCUS: Still Defends NY Class Suit by Visually Impaired

NEW AGE MEDICAL: Made Unsolicited Calls, Abedi Suit Alleges
NEW LEGEND: Underpays Drivers, Nichols Suit Alleges
NEW ORIENTAL: Bid to Drop Securities Class Lawsuit Still Pending
NEW PRIME: Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments in Trucker's Case
NEWPORT TOWNSHIP, IL: Dismissal of Amended Reno Suit Affirmed

NEXSTAR MEDIA: One Source Suit Moved to Northern Dist. of Illinois
OHIO CIVIL SERVICE: Nathaniel Ogle Sues over Agency Fees
PENN-RIDGE TRANSPORTATION: Removes Castellon Suit to C.D. Cal.
PENNSYLVANIA: Court Dismisses R. Harold's Suit
PETTA ENTERPRISES: Court Grants Settlement Deal Final Approval

PETTA ENTERPRISES: Final Approval of Graybill Settlement Endorsed
PINNACLE FOODS: Files Supplemental Info to Appease Merger Suits
POST CONSUMER: Lima et al. Allege Cereal Products Mislabeled
PRETIUM RESOURCES: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Class Action
PRINCE DELI: Ochoa Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA

REA ENERGY: Dismissal of Suit Over Patronage Capital Affirmed
RIPPLE LABS: Greenwald Securities Suit Remanded to Superior Court
ROYAL WINE: Faces Wu Suit in Eastern District of New York
SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CA: Court Dismisses Kononov Suit
SANTANDER BANK: Court Dismisses Aversano TILA Suit

SELIP & STYLIANOU: Court Narrows Claims in FDCPA Suit
SHELBY COUNTY, TN: Court Narrows Claims in Unlawful Detention Suit
SINCLAIR BROADCAST: My Philly Lawyer Suit Moved to Illinois
SOUTH CAROLINA FARM: Underpays Agents, Laney and Steller Allege
STATE FARM: 6th Cir. Affirms Denial of Bid to Dismiss Hicks Suit

STERLING BANCORP: Parties Agree to Drop O'Connell Merger Suit
SUBARU: Faces Class Action Over Engine Tuning Problems
SYNTEL INC: Files Supplemental Disclosures to Appease Merger Suits
TIME INC: Court Awards $2.96MM Attorney's Fee in Perlin Suit
TRANS WORLD: Continues to Defend Store Manager Class Actions

TRI-STATE CAREFLIGHT: Conditional Certification of Payne Denied
UBER TECH: 9th Cir. Flips Denial of Arbitration Bid in O'Connor
ULTA SALON: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Tellez Suit Alleges
UNITED STATES: ACLU Files Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
UNITED STATES: Court Certifies Class in Smith-Williams FTCA Suit

UNITED STATES: Justice Association Mulls Class Action v. Brown
US BANK: Still Faces Various Lawsuits over RMBS Trusts
VAN RU CREDIT: Court Certifies Class in FDCPA Suit
VISA INC: Amends Settlement for Damages Class in Interchange MDL
WALMART: Settles Class Action Over Lack of Seating for Cashiers

WELLS FARGO: Still Faces RMBS Investors' New York Class Lawsuit
WILLIAM PENN: Court Narrows Claims in 1st Amended Rich Suit
[] New York State Urged to Establish Water Contamination Standards

                            *********

1ST CLASS STAFFING: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Buntun Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
RAYNISHA BUNTUN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. 1ST CLASS STAFFING, LLC; and DOES 1 THROUGH
100, INCLUSIVE, Defendants, Case No. STK-CV-UOE-2018-12531 (Cal.
Super., San Joaquin Cty., Oct. 5, 2018) is an action against the
Defendants for failure to pay minimum wages, overtime compensation,
authorize and permit meal and rest periods, provide accurate wage
statements, and reimburse necessary business expenses.

The Plaintiff Buntun was employed by the Defendants as hourly-paid,
non-exempt employee in California.

1st Class Staffing, LLC is an Arizona limited liability company
providing staffing services in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas Han, Esq.
          Shunt Tatavos-Gharajeh, Esq.
          Daniel J. Park, Esq.
          JUSTICE LAW CORPORATION
          411 North Central Avenue, Suite 500
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 230-7502
          Facsimile: (818) 230-7502


A10 NETWORKS: Still Defends Securities Class Action in California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A10 Networks, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filed on September
24, 2018, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2018, that an operative amended
complaint remains to be filed in a putative securities class action
suit.

On March 22, 2018, the Company, our Chief Executive Officer, our
Chief Financial Officer, and certain former officers, were named as
defendants in a putative class action lawsuit filed in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California,
captioned Shah v. A10 Networks, Inc.  et al., 3:18-cv-01772-VC (the
"Securities Action").  The complaint in the Securities Action
alleges claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and
seeks unspecified damages and other relief.  On August 31, 2018,
the court appointed a lead plaintiff.  An operative amended
complaint remains to be filed.

A10 Networks, Inc. provides software and hardware solutions in the
United States, Japan, other Asia Pacific and EMEA countries, and
internationally.  The Company was incorporated in 2004 and is
headquartered in San Jose, California.


ACETO CORP: Motions for Lead Plaintiff, Counsel Still Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Joseph F. Bianco of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York on October 23, 2018, directed the parties in
the class action lawsuits against Aceto Corporation to appear
in-person on November 26, 2018, at 4:30 p.m. in Courtroom 1040, 100
Federal Plaza, Central Islip, New York 11722 for oral argument on
IBEW Local 98 Pension Plan's motion for consolidation, appointment
as lead plaintiff, and approval of selection of lead counsel.  Oral
argument will address the motions for consolidation, appointment as
lead plaintiff, and approval of selection of lead counsel filed in
both 18-CV-2425 (Mulligan v. Aceto Corporation, et al.) and
18-CV-2437 (Yang v. Aceto Corporation, et al.).

On October 25, 2018, Charles Bouley, Stephen Cornell, Andrew
Goodwin, Robert Herpst and Joseph Mun advised the Court that the
so-called Aceto Investor Group has withdrawn its Motion to
Consolidate Cases, Motion to Appoint Counsel, and Motion to Appoint
Lead Plaintiff in class action lawsuits against Aceto Corporation
et al.

Aceto disclosed in its Form 10-K filed on September 28, 2018, with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year
ended June 30, 2018, that the Company and certain of its current
and former officers are named defendants in two putative securities
class actions (the "Securities Class Action Lawsuits") filed in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
in April 2018, captioned Mulligan v. Aceto Corporation, et al, No.
2:18-cv-02425, and Yang v. Aceto Corporation, No. 1:18-cv-02437.
The complaints arise from the April 19, 2018 drop in the Company's
stock price following the Company's announcement on April 18, 2018
that it would recognize a substantial impairment charge for the
third fiscal quarter.  The complaints generally allege that the
defendants violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by making
false and misleading statements in public filings with the SEC, and
seek unspecified damages.

On June 26, 2018, five motions were filed seeking to appoint lead
plaintiff and approve lead plaintiff's counsel pursuant to the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, as well as to
consolidate the Mulligan or Yang actions.  Three motions were
subsequently withdrawn or abandoned, and the remaining two motions
are pending before the Court.

Following the appointment of a lead plaintiff, the Company expects
that the appointed lead plaintiff will file a single consolidated
amended class action complaint to supersede the earlier complaints.
The Company intends to vigorously defend itself.

Port Washington, N.Y.-based ACETO Corporation, is an international
company engaged in the development, marketing, sale and
distribution of Human Health products, Pharmaceutical Ingredients
and Performance Chemicals.


AKORN INC: Bid to Intervene in Securities Fraud Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, SHAUN A. HOUSE, individually and on behalf of all
other similarly situated, Plaintiff, ROBERT CARLYLE, Plaintiff,
DEMETRIOS PULLOS, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. AKORN, INC.; JOHN N. KAPOOR; KENNETH S.
ABRAMOWITZ; ADRIENNE L. GRAVES; RONALD M. JOHNSON; STEVEN J. MEYER;
TERRY A. RAPPUHN; BRIAN TAMBI; ALAN WEINSTEIN, Defendants, Case
Nos. 17 C 5018, 17 C 5022, 17 C 5026 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Thomas M.
Durkin of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted in part and denied in part
Theodore Frank's motion for reconsideration of the Court's denial
of his motion to intervene.

Six named Plaintiffs each filed an action against Akor and members
of its board of directors in order to force Akorn to make certain
revisions to the proxy statement it filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission in connection with Frensenius Kabi AG's bid
to acquire Akorn.  Akorn made the changes to its proxy statement,
which the Plaintiffs conceded mooted their claims, and led them to
stipulate to dismissal without prejudice of all six cases pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1).  Although five of the
six cases were filed as class actions, the cases were voluntarily
dismissed before any class was certified or any motion for class
certification was filed.

In the one of the six cases originally assigned to the Court, the
motion seeking entry of a stipulation of dismissal provided that
the Court would retain jurisdiction over all parties solely for the
purposes of any claim by any Plaintiff for attorneys' fees and/or
expenses.  Two months later, on Sept. 15, 2017, the parties in that
case filed another stipulation providing that the Plaintiffs in all
six cases had reached a settlement agreement with the Defendant
providing for $322,500 in attorneys' fees, and that there being no
reason for the Court to retain jurisdiction over the matter, the
case should be closed for all purposes.

Three days later, before the Court could take any action with
respect to the September 15 proposed order, Frank, an owner of
1,000 Akorn shares, filed motions to intervene in all six cases for
purposes of objecting to the attorneys' fee settlement.  Frank
contends that the cases are part of a "racket," known as "strike
suits," pursued for the sole purpose of obtaining fees for the
Plaintiffs' counsel, which are successful because victim defendants
like Akorn find it cheaper, and therefore rational, to pay nuisance
value attorneys' fees rather than contest them, and further delay
the merger.  Frank contends that this is a misuse of the class
action device for private gain

Frank also sought to consolidate all six cases before the Court.
The Court withheld ruling on that motion. Proceedings on Frank's
motions in the five other cases paused while the Court addressed
Frank's motion to intervene in the case before it.  The Court
denied Frank's motion, finding that Frank had failed to identify an
interest in the case upon which his intervention could be based.

Because the Court was concerned with the Plaintiff's apparent
success in evading the requirements of Rule 23, the Court invited
Frank to file a motion to reconsider addressing the questions the
Court raised in its opinion denying intervention.  Frank filed a
renewed motion for intervention arguing that the Plaintiffs'
counsel had breached their fiduciary duties to the putative class
by abusing the class mechanism to "extort" attorneys' fees from
Akorn, which were against the class members' interests as
shareholders of Akorn.
Whether in light of Frank's renewed motion, or possibly because the
Akorn-Frensenius merger had failed and devolved into litigation, or
for some other reason entirely, the Plaintiffs' counsel in three of
the six cases disclaimed attorneys' fees and sought to withdraw
their representations.  At subsequent status hearings, the Court
explained that, rather than consolidate all six cases, the Court
would recommend to the district's executive committee that the five
other cases be reassigned to the Court.

Anticipating reassignment, the Court ruled that Frank's motions to
intervene in the three cases in which counsel had disclaimed fees
were moot, and that the Court's original denial of Frank's motion
to intervene, and his motion for reconsideration, were deemed to be
filed in all three of the remaining cases, with continued briefing
being filed in case 17 C 5018.  Remaining counsel filed a joint
brief in opposition to Frank's motion for reconsideration, and
Frank filed a reply.

Frank's primary argument for intervention is that he has stated a
claim against the Plaintiffs' counsel for breach of fiduciary duty.
Judge Durkin finds that it is true that the counsel who file a
case as class action have a fiduciary duty to the putative class
even before it is certified.  But the authority setting forth such
a duty indicates that it is limited to protecting the class
members' legal rights that form the basis of the claims at issue.
In other words, the class counsel have a duty not to act in a
manner that prejudices the class members' ability to secure relief
for the alleged injuries at issue in the case.

Next, the Judge finds that Frank does not claim that th
ePlaintiffs' counsel caused any such prejudice.  Rather, he alleges
that the attorneys' fees paid to the class counsel are a loss to
Akorn and thereby harmed Akorn shareholders, including the class
members.  Frank makes no allegation that the Plaintiffs' counsel
prejudiced the class members' claims in any of the six cases.  In
fact, his underlying rationale for seeking to intervene is that the
Plaintiffs' claims are worthless, which would mean that class
members are not entitled to any recovery.  It is difficult to see
how worthless claims could ever be prejudiced.

Moreover, the injury Frank identifies is not to the class members
qua class members.  Rather, it is an injury to Akorn that the class
members might realize through their shares of Akorn. But an injury
to Akorn can only be pursued by class members through a derivative
action, which is not the procedural posture of any of the six
cases.  And in any event, the fact that all the class members are
Akorn shareholders does not mean that plaintiffs' counsel's
fiduciary duty to the putative class extends to a duty to refrain
from injuring Akorn.  Indeed, plaintiffs' claims are designed to
compel Akorn to act in a way it otherwise had not, thereby causing
some form of expense and injury. Clearly, the class members' claims
and Akorn's interests are not coextensive. As such, there is a
break in the causal chain connecting the class members to Akorn
that Frank relies upon to support his theory of intervention.

It is unsurprising that Frank must rely on injury to Akorn and
cannot identify any prejudice to the class members since no class
was ever certified and the claims were dismissed without prejudice.
Without a certified class, Rule 23's mechanism for judicial review
of class settlements is inapplicable.  At least some of the class
members' claims or rights to relief had been released, establishing
an equitable basis for them to demand a fair portion of the
settlement.  Neither circumstance is present in the case, so the
Judge will not permit Frank to intervene as a party.

However, the Judge will exercise its inherent powers to police
potential abuse of the judicial process -- and abuse of the class
mechanism in particular -- and require the Plaintiffs' counsel to
demonstrate that the disclosures for which they claim credit meet
the Walgreen standard.  This authority extends to any
unprofessional conduct, including conduct that involves the
exaction of illegal fees.  Failure to demonstrate compliance with
Walgreen's "plainly material" standard will result in the Court
ordering the Plaintiffs' counsel to disgorge the attorneys' fees
back to Akorn.

Although the Court has denied Frank's motion to intervene, the
Court invites him to continue to participate in the case as an
amicus curiae, because the Defendants have abandoned the adverse
perspective necessary for the Court to determine this issue.  In
the prior briefing, the Plaintiffs' counsel made arguments as to
why certain disclosures met the Walgreen standard.  Frank only
briefly addressed these issues, as they were not immediately
relevant to his motion to intervene.

Judge Drukin Court requires further briefing to address this issue.
The Plaintiffs' counsel should file a brief of no more than 15
pages in support of their position by Nov. 1, 2018, including
addressing the arguments Frank has already made that the
disclosures are not plainly material.  Frank may then file  a brief
of no more than 15 pages in response by Dec. 3, 2018.  The
Defendants may also file a brief stating their position by Nov. 1,
2018.

In sum, the Judge denied in part and granted in part Frank's motion
for reconsideration.  He is not granted leave to intervene as a
party.  But his motion is granted insofar as the Court will
exercise its inherent authority to apply the standard set forth by
the Seventh Circuit in Walgreen to the settlement at issue in the
case, and Frank is granted leave to file a brief as an amicus
curiae as described.  Frank should file a notice in case 17 C 5018
by Oct. 1, 2018, stating whether he will accept the Court's
invitation to participate as amicus curiae.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 25, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/Ioqh4F from Leagle.com.

Shaun A. House, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher James Kupka --
ckupka@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, Lewis S. Kahn --
lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com -- Kahn Swick & Foti, Llc & Paul D.
Malmfeldt, Blau & Malmfeldt.

Akorn, Inc., John N. Kapoor, Kenneth S. Abramowitz, Adrienne L.
Graves, Ronald M. Johnson, Steven J. Meyer, Terry A. Rappuhn, Brian
Tambi & Alan Weinstein, Defendants, represented by Robert B. Bieck,
Jr. -- rbieck@joneswalker.com -- Jones Walker LLP, Alexander
Breckinridge, V -- abreckinridge@joneswalker.com -- Jones Walker
LLP, Anthony C. Porcelli -- aporcelli@polsinelli.com -- POLSINELLI
PC, Robert H. Baron -- rbaron@cravath.com -- CRAVATH, SWAINE &
MOORE LLP, pro hac vice & Sohil M. Shah -- sshah@polsinelli.com --
Polsinelli, PC.

Theodore H. Frank, Intervenor, represented by M. Frank Bednarz --
info@cei.org -- Center For Class Action Fairness.


ALLAN COMPANY: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Avila et al. Suit Say
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARIA AVILA; PEDRO GUZMAN; and BLANCA PETRONA, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. ALLAN
COMPANY, INC.; SOURCE ONE STAFFING, LLC; INVO PEO, INC. III;
GUILLERMO LRA; and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, Case No.
37-2018-00050709-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super., San Diego Cty., Oct. 5,
2018) is an action against the Defendants for failure to pay wages
and overtime compensation.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants to sort waste
materials in the Defendants' recycling facility located at San
Diego, California.

Allan Company Inc. operates as a full-service recycling company.
The Company engages in the brokerage, packing, and exporting of
recovered materials. Allan Co. provides services such as recyclable
collection, collection and recycling equipment, curbside
processing, on-site trucking, and recycling programs. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Justin Hewgill, Esq.
          Efaon Cobb, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF HEWGILL & COBB
          2169 First Avenue
          San Diego, CA 92101-3542
          Telephone: (619) 786-7459
          Facsimile: (619) 377-6026


ALLSTATE FIRE: Faces Schoenborn et al. Suit in M.D. Georgia
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Allstate Fire and
Casualty Insurance Company. The case is captioned as DANIEL
SCHOENBORN, and JILL SCHOENBORN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 5:18-cv-00368-MTT (M.D. Ga.,
Oct. 5, 2018). The case is assigned to Judge Marc Thomas
Treadwell.

Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company was founded in 1931
and is based in California. Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance
Company operates as a subsidiary of The Allstate Corporation. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Adam P. Princenthal, Esq.
          750 Hammond Drive Bldg 12 Suite 200
          Sandy Springs, GA 30328
          Telephone: (678) 534-1980
          E-mail: adam@princemay.com

               - and -

          C. Cooper Knowles, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF C. COOPER KNOWLES, LLC
          3405 Piedmont Road, N.E., Suite 500
          Atlanta, GA 30305
          Telephone: (404) 431-5900
          E-mail: cknowles@cckfirm.com

               - and -

          Clinton W. Sitton, Esq.
          5855 Sandy Springs Circle, Suite 300
          Atlanta, GA 30328
          Telephone: (404) 351-5900
          E-mail: clint@kopelmansitton.com

               - and -

          James C. Bradley, Esq.
          PO Box 1007
          Mt. Pleasant, SC 29465
          Telephone: (843) 727-6500
          E-mail: jbradley@rpwb.com

               - and -

          Kimberly Keevers Palmer, Esq.
          1037 Chuck Dawley Blvd Bldg A
          Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464
          Telephone: (843) 727-6500
          E-mail: kkeevers@rpwb.com

               - and -

          Michael J. Brickman, Esq.
          PO Box 1007
          Mt. Pleasant, SC 29465
          Telephone: (843) 727-6520
          E-mail: mbrickman@rpwb.com

               - and -

          Nina Fields Britt, Esq.
          PO Box 1007
          Mt. Pleasant, SC 29465
          Telephone: (843) 727-6500
          E-mail: nfields@rpwb.com

               - and -

          Richard Kopelman, Esq.
          5855 Sandy Springs Circle, Suite 300
          Atlanta, GA 30328
          Telephone: (404) 351-5900
          E-mail: richard@kopelmansitton.com


ALTABA: Reaches Agreement in Principle in Data Breach Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Altaba Inc. disclosed in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission dated September 17, 2018, that
the parties in the U.S. and California consumer class actions have
entered into an agreement in principle to resolve all pending
claims.

The cases are In Re: Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Security Breach
Litigation, Case No. 5:16-md-02752-LHK (N.D. Cal.) and Yahoo! Inc.
Private Information Disclosure Cases, Case No. JCCP 4895 (Cal. Sup.
Ct.).

Altaba, Verizon Communications Inc. and plaintiffs' counsel have
reached an agreement in principle to resolve all pending claims.

The agreement in principle is subject to certain conditions,
including Court approval and therefore may not result in a final
settlement. If a definitive agreement is reached which receives
Court approval, Altaba would be responsible for one-half of the
total settlement costs (with Verizon responsible for the other
one-half pursuant to a commitment entered into in connection with
its acquisition of Altaba's legacy Internet business).

Altaba Inc. operates as a non-diversified, closed-end management
investment company in the United States.  Its assets consist
primarily of equity investments, short-term debt investments, and
cash.  The company was formerly known as Yahoo! Inc. and changed
its name to Altaba Inc. in June 2017.  Altaba Inc. was founded in
1994 and is based in New York, New York.


ALTABA: Shareholder Class Action Agreement Gets Final Court Okay
----------------------------------------------------------------
A U.S. court on September 6, 2018, granted final approval to the
settlement agreement in the federal securities class action styled
In re Yahoo! Inc. Securities Litigation, Case No. 5:17-cv-00373-LHK
(N.D. Cal.), according to the Company's Form 8-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission dated September 17, 2018.

Altaba Inc. operates as a non-diversified, closed-end management
investment company in the United States.  Its assets consist
primarily of equity investments, short-term debt investments, and
cash.  The company was formerly known as Yahoo! Inc. and changed
its name to Altaba Inc. in June 2017.  Altaba Inc. was founded in
1994 and is based in New York, New York.


AMCREST INDUSTRIES: Horner Sues over Sale of Unlicensed Radio
-------------------------------------------------------------
Paul Horner; and David Byron, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Amcrest Industries, LLC.;
and Fujian Nan'an Baofeng Electronics Co., Ltd., Defendants, Case
No. 2:18-cv-14409-DMM (S.D. Fla., Oct. 5, 2018) alleges violation
of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants manufactured and caused
to be sold throughout Florida and throughout the United States, a
series of radio transceivers under the general designation of UV-5
since 2013 and continues to do so.

The UV-5 was certified by the Defendants solely under Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") Part 90, as Private and Mobile
Radio Services. Operation outside FCC Part 90 is unlawful and thus
the UV-5 series may not be sold or used in the United States.

The UV-5 radio series manufactured by Fujian are unlawful to be
sold in the United States as the UV-5 series may not have the
capability to transmit on frequencies allocated to other services.

Amcrest Industries, LLC is a security products manufacturer and
distributor servicing customers worldwide primarily across the
United States, Canada, the UK, Germany and France. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Herbert R Kraft, Esq.
          3030 N. Rocky Point Drive., Suite 150
          Tampa, FL 33607
          Telephone: (813) 343-4466
          E-mail: herb344@aol.com


AMERICAN FAMILY: Court Dismisses G. Anderson's Suit
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia, Macon Division, issued an Order granting Defendant
American Family Insurance Company (AFIC)'s motion for summary
judgment on the claims of Plaintiff Garth Anderson in the case
captioned GARTH ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendant. Case No. 5:15-CV-475 (MTT). (M.D. Ga.).

This is one of several putative class action cases filed in this
Court by insureds, all represented by the same lawyers, who claim
that their insurers have failed to pay for the diminished value
their homes suffered as the result of a loss that is otherwise
covered by their insurance policies. In this context, diminished
value has a very specific meaning: the loss in value of a property
notwithstanding full repairs due to an intangible stigma owing to
the circumstances of the loss.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether a
genuine dispute of material fact exists, the evidence of the
non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to
be drawn in his favor.

Whether There Is Sufficient Evidence for a Reasonable Jury to Find
that Anderson's Home Suffered Diminished Value

AFIC contends that Anderson's claim for diminished value fails
because the record contains no evidence supporting his allegation
that stigma reduced the market value of his physically-improved
home. AFIC points to undisputed facts and argues that nothing about
the sale process of Anderson's home in 2016 suggests that a written
disclosure of fully repaired damage affected the sale of Anderson's
home in any way.

Because Anderson is the non-moving party but bears the burden of
proving his claim at trial, once AFIC has met its burden on summary
judgment, Anderson must show a genuine dispute regarding AFIC's
failure to pay.  Anderson argues that the facts, when construed in
the light most favorable to him, show that his home did suffer
diminished value because of stigma arising from the water damage.
Anderson points to two pieces of evidence to meet his burden: his
deposition testimony that he believes his home lost value and what
he claims is Kilpatrick's expert opinion that the post-repair
diminished value attributable to the Anderson's January 2014 water
loss was 13%.

Anderson's Deposition Testimony that His Home Suffered Diminished
Value Because of Stigma

Anderson argues that this is evidence that his home suffered
diminished value, and he cites a district court order stating that
in Georgia, the owner of property is considered to be qualified to
state his opinion as to value when based upon a proper foundation.
Matthews v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2012 WL 12964370, at *7
(N.D. Ga. 2012)

The court in Matthews relied on a well-known principle of codified
Georgia common law that likely conflicts with Federal Rules of
Evidence 701 but which Georgia nevertheless retained when it
adopted most of the rest of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  

The plaintiff in Matthews was a building contractor who argued that
he could give lay opinions on the cost of repairs. The district
court did not disagree that Georgia law allowed lay witnesses to
testify about market value but nevertheless granted the insurer's
motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff had not
established a proper foundation for his opinion.

It is apparent that Matthews, if anything, demonstrates that
Anderson's one-word affirmative response is not admissible evidence
of his claimed loss.

This is for at least two reasons. First, a lay opinion on value
must be based upon a proper foundation, and Anderson offers no
foundation for his opinion that his home suffered diminished value.
There is nothing to suggest that he had an opportunity to form a
reasoned opinion that his home suffered diminished value. He has
certainly not been shown to have adequate relevant knowledge nor
has he given reasons for his or her opinion as the plaintiff did in
the Georgia Court of Appeals case which Matthews cites. There, the
plaintiff had testified that he is a real estate investor, that he
repairs houses, and that he has done contracting work and he had
inspected the property after the fire, took many pictures, and
listed the items that needed repair. Anderson, by contrast, has not
testified to any basis for his opinion.

Second, by its terms O.C.G.A. Section 24-7-701(b) contemplates
evidence regarding the market value of an article or property.
Anderson does not opine on the market value of his home.

Rather, he offers his testimony that stigma caused the value of his
home to decrease. Anderson has not shown any authority supporting
his application of O.C.G.A. Section 24-7-701(b) to his causation
opinion.

Anderson's testimony does not constitute evidence of diminished
value as the result of stigma.
Dr. Kilpatrick's Opinion that Anderson's Home Suffered Diminished
Value Because of Stigma
AFIC was also confounded by Anderson's argument in response to its
motion for summary judgment that Kilpatrick had found that
Anderson's home diminished by 13% in value as a result of stigma.

Notably, this 13% figure does not correspond to percentages
reported for either the `case studies' or the contingent valuation
survey, but only Kilpatrick's AVM analysis. AVM refers to automated
valuation models, the method Kilpatrick used to determine the
expected price of Anderson's home when it sold in 2016. Apparently,
AFIC did not pick up on Anderson's admission that Kilpatrick's
opinion based on the 2016 sale of his house was not evidence of
diminished value resulting from stigma. But AFIC's point is well
taken the 13% figure" is not found in Kilpatrick's case studies or
survey.

Tellingly, Kilpatrick also discusses in his report further steps
that he could take in order to calculate diminished value if the
class is certified. In paragraph 223, Kilpatrick states: If the
class is certified, then my staff and I would conduct a new focus
group in the exact same way in Atlanta, Georgia and, for the class,
a Georgia-wide survey. His summary of the surveys he discusses in
his report is found in Table 6 of his report, which is entitled
Open-Ended Results for Water Damage Scenario in the Thompson v.
State Farm Matter.

Clearly, the survey Kilpatrick did in Thompson was not intended for
use in this case, hence the need for the Atlanta survey. Thus, the
new survey would be used to establish the diminished value of
Anderson's home. Although Kilpatrick says he would expect the new
survey to produce similar results within a reasonable level of
statistical confidence due to the recentness of the previous survey
in the same geographical location, the point is that a new study
would be necessary. Kilpatrick clearly contemplated taking
additional measures before opining on diminished value resulting
from stigma in this case.

But even assuming the Thompson survey could have been used to
support an opinion that diminished value due to stigma exists here,
Kilpatrick never did that. In short, Kilpatrick's report talks
about what he will do, not what he has done, and certainly not what
he has done to appraise Anderson's home for diminished value.

Anderson has not presented any evidence that would allow a
reasonable jury to find that AFIC is liable to him for failure to
pay for diminished value due to stigma.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 15, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8zfhlvd from Leagle.com.

GARTH ANDERSON, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by ADAM P. PRINCENTHAL --
adam@princemay.com -- C. COOPER KNOWLES, Law Office of C. Cooper
Knowles, LLC, CLINTON W. SITTON, JAMES C. BRADLEY --
jbradley@rpwb.com -- KIMBERLY KEEVERS PALMER -- kkeevers@rpwb.com
-- MICHAEL J. BRICKMAN -- mbrickman@rpwb.com -- NINA FIELDS BRITT &
RICHARD KOPELMAN.

AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, represented by
COLLIER WEST MCKENZIE, HEATHER CARSON PERKINS --
heather.perkins@FaegreBD.com -- MICHAEL S. MCCARTHY --
michael.mccarthy@FaegreBD.com -- DULANY LUCETTA POPE --
lucetta.pope@FaegreBD.com -- FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP & ROBERT C.
NORMAN, Jr.


AMERICAN HONDA: Hamilton Suit Moved to District of Minnesota
------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Hamilton, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs American Honda Motor Company, Inc., the
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-04367, was transferred from the U.S.
District of Georgia, to the U.S. District Court for the District of
Minnesota on Oct. 15, 2018. The District of Minnesota Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 0:18-cv-02933-DSD-LIB to the proceeding. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Senior Judge David S. Doty.

The American Honda Motor Company, Inc. is a North American
subsidiary of the Honda Motor Company, Ltd.  It was founded in
1959.[BN]


AMP: Analyst Estimates $6-Bil. for Customer Refunds
---------------------------------------------------
Adele Ferguson, writing for Financial Review, reports that leading
banking analyst Brett Le Mesurier has put an estimate of at least
$6 billion on consumer refunds, reviews and litigation for the big
four banks and AMP.

It comes as investors speculate that National Australia Bank will
release some updated figures for its compensation scheme ahead of a
grilling in the House Economics Committee on Oct. 12.

The other big banks took some of their medicine in the lead-up to
their appearance in parliament, where they apologised profusely for
any number of things.

Le Mesurier's $6 remediation billion figure is calculated on a
pre-tax basis, and includes the cost of implementing the programs
as well as forecasts for 2019.

It is worth noting that the $6 billion-plus compensation bill is by
no means definitive. It has been calculated as an explosion of
litigation erupts, the corporate regulator gets tougher and more
shoddy practices come to light.

Since July 2011 the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (ASIC) has secured $1.83 billion in remediation for
customers.

The Commonwealth Bank has been embroiled in the most scandals in
recent years and it is therefore little surprise it has the highest
remediation payout at $2.3 billion. This includes a settlement with
Austrac in relation to the money laundering scandal, where it was
alleged CBA had "serious and systemic non compliance" and its
controls and procedures were not effective, which in some cases
enabled customers to create fake names, enabling organised crime
syndicates and terrorists to launder money.

CBA issued a statement to shareholders which showed it had spent
$580 million in pre-tax improving the processes and administration
of its advice business as well as determining the amounts to be
refunded to customers. Only $270 million of that money had been
spent remediating customers.

The amount relates to the periods 2012 to 2018. CBA bought these
advice businesses nearly 20 years ago, which begs the question what
was happening in the first decade of ownership and why it took so
long to start fixing things up. It is also worth noting that its
Colonial Financial Planning business was subject to a two-year
enforceable undertaking from ASIC in late 2011 due to rampant
misconduct.

Separately, Slater and Gordon lodged a "Get Your Super Back" class
action against CBA and Colonial First State in the Federal Court,
with the law firm estimating it could exceed $100 million. The case
alleges trustees, who are supposed to act in the best interests of
members, invested members' savings with CBA and received
uncompetitive bank interest rates.

CBA denies the allegations and is defending the claim.

This is one of a number of class actions expected to be launched in
the coming months.

Other law firms are looking at misconduct in relation to credit
cards, life insurance definitions and irresponsible lending.

Le Mesurier of Shaw and Partners ranks ANZ Bank second highest in
remediation costs at $1.2 billion pre-tax, with over $200 million
spent on customer remediation in 2017 and the first half of 2018.
The majority of the remediation relates to banking products.

In the second half of 2018 ANZ allocated a further $300 million to
customer remediation, again mostly related to banking products, and
$230 million was spent setting up and running the scheme.

AMP ranked a close third at $1.17 billion. AMP's remediation and
associated costs in the first half of 2018 of more than $500
million pre-tax might seem like a large number but when it is put
into the context that it has the largest funds under advice it
starts to look inadequate, particularly given what has come out of
the royal commission.

Some of the sensational revelations that poured out of the royal
commission triggered five separate class actions as AMP admitted it
deliberately charged consumers fees for no services on a systematic
basis. It then misled the corporate regulator, in the process
letting down shareholders and decimating the share price.

Westpac's remediation bill ranks fourth highest at an estimated $1
billion pre-tax. Unlike CBA, the majority of its $1 billion is
likely to find its way into customer pockets.

NAB's bill is likely to become clearer. Given the recent
announcements from ANZ, Westpac and CBA, an after tax figure of
more than $200 million, is unlikely to surprise the market. The
total cost may well be larger than this.

For instance, on July 26 NAB's super fund trustee NULIS agreed to
refund 305,000 superannuation customers an average of $220 after
failing to explain to customers they could switch off a financial
planning fee. This amounts to $67 million and then there is
interest on top of that.

Since then ASIC has taken legal action against NULIS Nominees and
MLC Nominees, alleging it misled super customers and wrongly took
$100 million in fees.

There is also a lot of interest in the sale of ANZ's OnePath
Pensions and Investments business to IOOF after the boss of IOOF
gave testimony at the royal commission that raised a series of
issues and misconduct. The upshot was questions, including at a
parliamentary hearing on Oct. 12 by shadow financial services
minister Clare O'Neil, as to whether it was in the best interests
of ANZ's OnePath members to be offloaded to a company that had
serious regulatory issues.

After the parliamentary hearing, ANZ executive Alexis George said
the transaction with IOOF was scheduled for completion at the end
of the first quarter of next year. The final report into the Hayne
commission is due for release on February 1, which is expected to
include findings on IOOF.

She said ANZ and the trustees separately have been having a lot of
discussions with IOOF, including the independence of the board,
governance and controls it has in place. She said IOOF was being
asked for "certain" commitments on governance and policies.

She also admitted that some of the royal commission revelations
were a surprise.

During the royal commission it became known that the Australian
Prudential Regulatory Authority had written to IOOF at various
times outlining serious issues such as "difficulty in obtaining
accurate and current information in relation to issues such as ...
culture, identification of responsible persons and the information
flow and relationship between the board and management and the
Fairfax Media matter".

That "Fairfax Media matter" related to serious misconduct including
insider trading, allegations of front-running, misrepresentation of
performance figures and the boss of the research division getting
staff to cheat on his behalf on compliance exams.

In mid-2017 an internal memo stated: "Since December 2015, APRA has
identified a number of instances where IOOF has failed to
adequately identify conflicts of interest and either avoid or
appropriately deal with them."

The lack of regard for governance and processes was highlighted
when a board meeting held the week before IOOF boss Chris Kelaher
gave testimony resulted in the production of handwritten minutes on
scraps of paper. When asked by council assisting Michael Hodge, QC,
if Kelaher understood what was on the bits of paper, he retorted
that he wasn't a handwriting expert.

If ANZ and the trustees determine it is in the best interests of
ANZ members that the sale proceeds it will leave them open to
litigation and reputational damage if the royal commission makes
damning findings or something blows up in the future.

The duty of trustees to act in members' best interests has opened
up a huge can of worms for financial institutions that own retail
funds. Entrenched underperformance in many cases and the conflict
between acting in shareholders' best interests and members best
interests is problematic.

Opposition Leader Bill Shorten raised the issue when he said Labor
would consider forcing for-profit funds to outsource the
trusteeship to an independent organisation and give APRA the power
to sack trustees of funds that regularly underperform.

It is steeped in politics but given super is compulsory and
conflicts have been on full display during the royal commission, it
is an issue that needs to be addressed. In the meantime, there will
be a lot of remediation to bandage up the wound. [GN]


APPLEWOOD WINERY: Faces Wu Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Applewood Winery LLC.
The case is captioned as Kathy Wu, individually and on behalf of
all other similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Applewood Winery LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 7:18-cv-09186-KMK (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 7, 2018). The
lawsuit alleges violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The case is assigned to Judge Kenneth M. Karas.

Applewood Winery LLC produces over a dozen wines and ciders on
their farm in New York's Hudson Valley. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM PC
          175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Telephone: (646) 770-3775
          Facsimile: (646) 867-2639
          E-mail: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


ASTA FUNDING: Maintains $2.3M Reserve for Class Action Settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Asta Funding, Inc. said in its Form 10-K filed on October 12, 2018,
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal
year ended September 30, 2017, that it currently has a reserve for
settlement costs of US$2.3 million to cover a class action
lawsuit.

In June 2015, a punitive class action complaint was filed against
the Company, and one of its third-party law firm servicers,
alleging violation of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practice Act
and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO") and
state law arising from debt collection activities and default
judgments obtained against certain debtors.

The Company filed a motion to strike the class action allegations
and compel arbitration or, to the extent the court declines to
order arbitration, to dismiss the RICO claims.  On or about March
31, 2015, the court denied the Company's motion.  The Company filed
an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.  A mediation session was held in July 2015, at which the
Company agreed to settle the action on an individual basis for a
payment of US$13,000 to each named plaintiff, for a total payment
of US$39,000.  Payment was made on or about July 24, 2015.  The
third-party law firm servicer has not yet settled and remains a
defendant in the case.

The plaintiffs' attorneys advised that they are contemplating the
filing of another punitive class action complaint against the
Company alleging substantially the same claims as those that were
asserted in this matter.  In anticipation of such an eventuality,
the Company agreed to non-binding mediation in order to reach a
global settlement with other putative class members, which would
avert the possibility of further individual or class actions with
respect to the affected accounts.  Through March 31, 2016, the
parties had attended two mediation sessions and were continuing to
discuss a global settlement.  In connection with such discussions,
the settlement demand from plaintiffs was US$4 million and the
counteroffer from the Company and its third-party law firm servicer
was US$3.875 million (which would be split equally between the
Company and the law firm servicer).  The Company and law firm
servicer had also offered, as part of the counteroffer, to cease
collection activity on the affected accounts.  Accordingly, the
Company set up a reserve for settlement costs of US$2.0 million
during the three months ended March 31, 2016, which was included in
general and administrative expenses in the Company's statement of
operations.

The Company reassessed the situation as of September 30, 2016 and
deemed that an additional US$0.3 million was necessary to account
for legal expenses, which were made during the three month period
ended September 30, 2016.

Asta Funding, Inc., together with its wholly owned significant
operating subsidiaries Palisades Collection LLC, Palisades
Acquisition XVI, LLC ("Palisades XVI"), VATIV Recovery Solutions
LLC ("VATIV"), ASFI Pegasus Holdings, LLC ("APH"), Fund Pegasus,
LLC ("Fund Pegasus"), GAR Disability Advocates, LLC ("GAR
Disability Advocates"), CBC Settlement Funding, LLC ("CBC"), Simia
Capital, LLC ("Simia") and other subsidiaries, not all wholly
owned, is engaged in several business segments in the financial
services industry including structured settlements through its
wholly owned subsidiary CBC, funding of personal injury claims,
through our 80% owned subsidiary Pegasus Funding, LLC ("Pegasus"),
social security and disability advocates through its wholly owned
subsidiary GAR Disability Advocates and the business of purchasing,
managing for its own account and servicing distressed consumer
receivables, including charged off receivables, and semi-performing
receivables.


BALDWIN VINEYARDS: Faces Wu Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
Kathy Wu, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Baldwin Vineyards, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-09187-JPO (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 7, 2018). The lawsuit alleges
violation of the American with Disabilities Act. The case is
assigned to Judge J. Paul Oetken.

Baldwin Vineyards, Inc. is engaged in the winery business. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM PC
          175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Telephone: (646) 770-3775
          Facsimile: (646) 867-2639
          E-mail: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


BAYADA HOME: Ct. Conditionally Certifies 2 Subclasses in FLSA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SONYA IVANOVS and KATIE HOFFMAN, ON BEHALF OF
THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHER OPINION SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES,
Plaintiffs, v. BAYADA HOME HEALTH CARE, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:17-cv-01742-NLH-AMD (D. N.J.), Judge Noel L. Hillman of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey granted the motion of
the Plaintiffs to conditionally certify their collective action
claims.

Ivanovs and Hoffman, on behalf of themselves and all those
similarly situated, allege that the Defendant unlawfully classifies
all of its Client Service Managers ("CSMs") nationwide as exempt
from the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA").

According to the Plaintiff, BAYADA is a home healthcare provider
with more than 330 office locations in 21 States, and its
operations are generally divided into two primary business lines:
Home Health and Home Care.  The Home Health business line offices
provide home visit services (typically one hour or less) by various
medical professionals and paraprofessionals providing nursing,
therapeutic, and rehabilitative care primarily on a short-term
basis.  The Home Care business line offices provide nursing and
personal care to people with chronic illness, injury, or
disability, primarily on an ongoing shift (two hours or more)
basis.

Each office location typically employs one or more CSM.  Plaintiff
relates that Home Heath CSMs and Home Care CSMs perform the same
primary duty but the method by which that duty is carried out
differs slightly between Home Health CSMs and Home Care CSMs, as do
their secondary duties.  Ivanovs was a Home Health CSM and Hoffman
was a Home Care CSM.

The Plaintiffs claim that BAYADA classifies CSMs as exempt despite
the fact that it requires CSMs to perform non-exempt duties as
their primary duties, including but not limited to: scheduling
health care professionals for patients, calling health care
professionals for assignments, performing patient intake calls,
contacting patient referrals, and verifying insurance coverage for
patients.  They claim that based upon this unlawful exempt
classification, BAYADA has willfully refused to pay the CSMs the
required overtime compensation for overtime hours worked.

The Plaintiffs have moved for conditional certification of their
FSLA collective action, and have proposed these two nationwide
sub-classes:

     i. Sub-class 1, the BAYADA Home Health CSMs: Those who worked
for BAYADA at any location nationwide during the three years prior
to the Court's order allowing notice.  

     ii. Sub-class 2, the BAYADA Home Care CSMs: Those who worked
for BAYADA at any location nationwide during the three years prior
to the Court's order allowing notice.  

The Plaintiffs have also provided forms of notices to be sent out
to all the potential opt-in Plaintiffs, as well as proposed the
modes of dissemination of those notices.

The Defendant has objected to the Plaintiffs' motion, arguing that
because the duties of CSMs differ significantly across its 330
offices, and the determination of whether an employee should be
classified as exempt or non-exempt requires a very fact-specific
analysis, the Plaintiffs' FLSA claims cannot be pursued as a
nationwide collective action.  The Defendant also opposes the
Plaintiffs' forms of notice and methods of dissemination.

Judge Hillman concludes that the Plaintiffs have met the standard
for conditional certification of their two proposed sub-classes on
their claims that the Defendant violated the FLSA by classifying
Home Health CSMs and Home Care CSMs as exempt instead of
non-exempt.  Accordingly, he granted the conditional certification
of the Plaintiffs' two nationwide sub-classes, which confers onto
the Plaintiffs the right to distribute a notice of the putative
collective action to all the potential opt-in Plaintiffs, the
Defendant is obligated to participate in this process.

The parties will have 30 days to meet and confer on a form of
notice, the method of dissemination of that notice, and the
database of employees to which the notice will be distributed.  The
Plaintiffs will provide the Court with a status update at the
expiration of the thirtyday period, if not earlier.  Although the
Court strongly encourages the parties to come to an agreement on
these issues, the parties may inform the Court via letter filed on
the docket of any unresolved disputes.  An accompanying Order will
be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 25, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/BDJfuJ from Leagle.com.

SONYA IVANOVS & KATIE HOFFMAN, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL
OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES, Plaintiffs, represented by
MICHAEL JOHN PALITZ -- mpalitz@shavitzlaw.com -- SHAVITZ LAW GROUP,
P.A.

BAYADA HOME HEALTH CARE, INC., Defendant, represented by MICHAEL D.
HOMANS -- MHomans@HomansPeck.com -- HOMANS PECK LLC.


BCA FINANCIAL: Court Won't Reconsider Reyes Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, Miami Division, issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion
for Reconsideration of the Court's ruling on the class
certification motion in the case captioned ESTRELLITA REYES,
Plaintiff, v. BCA FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., Defendant. Case No.
16-24077-CIV-GOODMAN. (S.D. Fla.).

Plaintiff Estrellita Reyes, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, sued Defendant BCA Financial Services, Inc. for
allegedly violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).
The TCPA prohibits, among other things, the use of an automatic
telephone dialing system (ATDS) or an artificial or prerecorded
voice to call a person's cellphone absent an emergency or prior
express consent.

To begin, the Court will not reconsider rulings on issues already
resolved in the class certification motion unless BCA shows that
there is a (1) manifest error of fact; (2) manifest error of law;
or (3) newly discovered evidence.

BCA has not established that the Court committed manifest errors of
fact or law when resolving those issues in Reyes's favor. Nor does
BCA present any newly discovered evidence relevant to those issues.
Instead, BCA simply raises the same arguments on these issues and
concludes that the Court got it wrong in the first place. A motion
for reconsideration, however, is not a vehicle to re-argue issues
resolved by the court's decision.

The Court denies the reconsideration motion as to those
already-resolved issues that BCA improperly reargues on
reconsideration. The Court sees no reason to repeat the prior
rulings on those issues in this order, so nothing else will be
discussed now on those issues.

Next, the Court rejects, on both procedural and substantive
grounds, BCA's argument that the Court violated the prohibition
against one-way intervention by certifying a TCPA class after it
granted summary judgment on Reyes's individual claim. In her
opposition response to the reconsideration motion, Reyes argues
that BCA has waived the one-way intervention doctrine argument
because, among other reasons,2 BCA never raised the issue before,
despite multiple chances to do so. Reyes also disagrees with the
merits of BCA's argument, positing that, according to Eleventh
Circuit precedent and other authorities, the Court has the
discretion to rule on summary judgment before class certification.

The Court finds that BCA has waived its one-way intervention
doctrine argument because it was raised too late. Just like a
movant cannot on reconsideration reargue already-resolved issues, a
movant cannot on reconsideration make additional argument on
matters not previously raised by counsel. And yet BCA improperly
raised the one-way intervention doctrine for the first time in its
motion for reconsideration of the class certification order,
despite multiple earlier opportunities to highlight that argument.

BCA also failed to raise the one-way intervention doctrine in the
intervening weeks between the Court's order granting summary
judgment in Reyes's favor on her individual claim (May 14, 2018)
and its later order granting class certification. And this omission
occurred even though BCA also moved for reconsideration of the
summary judgment ruling. But, again, BCA did not mention in any way
directly or indirectly, expressly or implicitly the one-way
intervention doctrine.

Indeed, BCA did not file anything before the class certification
order was issued to alert the Court that the summary judgment order
supposedly required a summary denial of the class certification
motion. It was only after the Court ruled against BCA on summary
judgment and class certification that BCA advanced for the first
time its one-way intervention argument.

The Court denies Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 15, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y73rwlje from Leagle.com.

Estrellita Reyes, on behalf of herself others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Michael Lewis Greenwald --
mgreenwald@gdrlawfirm.com -- Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC, Alex
Kruzyk -- akruzyk@gdrlawfirm.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd
& Aaron D. Radbil -- aradbil@gdrlawfirm.com -- Greenwald Davidson
Radbil PLLC.

BCA Financial Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by Ernest
Henry Kohlmyer, III -- SKohlmyer@Shepardfirm.co -- Shepard, Smith,
Kohlmyer & Hand, P.A., Joseph Charles Proulx, Golden Scaz Gagain,
Charles James McHale, Jr., Golden Scaz Gagain, PLLC, Dale Thomas
Golden -- dgolden@gsgfirm.com -- Golden Scaz Gagain, PLLC, Mary
Grace Dyleski, Shepard, Smith, Kohlmyer & Hand, P.A & Rachel
Malkowski Ortiz, Shepard Smith Kohlmyer & Hand, P.A.


BHP BILLITON: Bid to Drop Samarco Bondholders Suit Still Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
A motion to dismiss the second amended complaint in a U.S.
bondholders' class action lawsuit against BHP Billiton Limited,
among other entities, remains pending, according to the Company's
Form 20-F filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2018.

On November 14, 2016, a putative class action complaint (Complaint)
was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York on behalf of all purchasers of Samarco's ten-year bond
notes due 2022-2024 between October 31, 2012 and November 30, 2015
against Samarco and the former chief executive officer of Samarco.
The Complaint asserts claims under the U.S. federal securities laws
and indicates that the plaintiff will seek certification to proceed
as a class action.

On March 6, 2017, the Complaint was amended to include BHP Billiton
Limited, BHP Billiton Plc, BHP Billiton Brasil Ltda and Vale S.A.
and officers of Samarco, including four of Vale S.A. and BHP
Billiton Brasil Ltda's nominees to the Samarco Board.  On April 5,
2017, the plaintiff dismissed the claims against the individuals.
The remaining corporate defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss
the plaintiff's Complaint on June 26, 2017.

On March 7, 2018, the District Court granted the defendants' motion
to dismiss the Complaint; however, the District Court granted the
plaintiff leave to file a second amended Complaint, which it did on
March 21, 2018.  On May 21, 2018, the defendants' moved to dismiss
the Complaint.  The defendants' motion is pending before the
District Court.

The Company said, "The amount of damages sought by the plaintiff on
behalf of the putative class is unspecified.  Given the preliminary
status of this matter, it is not possible at this time to provide a
range of possible outcomes or a reliable estimate of potential
future exposures to BHP Billiton Limited, BHP Billiton Plc and BHP
Billiton Brasil Ltda."

BHP Billiton PLC is a global resources company.


BHP BILLITON: Reaches Tentative Settlement of Shareholders Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Parties in the U.S. shareholders class action complaint against BHP
Billiton Limited has reached a US$50-million in-principle
settlement of the lawsuit, according to the Company's Form 20-F
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
fiscal year ended June 30, 2018.

In February 2016, a putative class action complaint was filed in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on
behalf of purchasers of American Depositary Receipts of BHP
Billiton Limited and BHP Billiton Plc between September 25, 2014
and November 30, 2015 against BHP Billiton Limited and BHP Billiton
Plc and certain of its current and former executive officers and
directors.  The Complaint asserts claims under US federal
securities laws and indicates that the plaintiff will seek
certification to proceed as a class action.

On October 14, 2016, the defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint.
In a decision of the District Court dated August 28, 2017, the
claims were dismissed in part, including the claims against the
current and former executive officers and directors.

On August 6, 2018, the parties reached an in-principle settlement
agreement of US$50 million to resolve all claims with no admission
of liability by the Defendants.  The agreement is subject to Court
approval.  BHP expects to recover the majority of the settlement
payment under its external insurance arrangements.

BHP Billiton PLC is a global resources company.


BHP BILLITON: Still Defends Shareholder Suits in Australia
----------------------------------------------------------
BHP Billiton Limited continues to face shareholder class action in
Australia, according to the Company's Form 20-F filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
June 30, 2018.

On May 31, 2018, a shareholder class action was filed in the
Federal Court of Australia (Melbourne) against BHP Billiton Ltd on
behalf of persons who, during the period from October 21, 2013 to
November 9, 2015, acquired BHP Billiton Ltd shares on the
Australian Securities Exchange or BHP Billiton Plc shares on the
London Stock Exchange or Johannesburg Stock Exchange.

On August 31, 2018 an additional shareholder class action that
makes similar allegations was filed in the Federal Court of
Australia against BHP Billiton Ltd on behalf of persons who, during
the period from August 27, 2014 to November 9, 2015, entered into a
contract to acquire BHP Billiton Ltd shares on the Australian
Securities Exchange or BHP Billiton Plc shares on the London Stock
Exchange or Johannesburg Stock Exchange.

Orders have been made for the Court to consider how to manage the
competing shareholder class actions on October 29, 2018.

The amount of damages sought by the plaintiff on behalf of the
class is unspecified.

BHP Billiton PLC is a global resources company.


BIG 5: Espinoza Seeks Unpaid Wage under Labor Code
--------------------------------------------------
YERI ESPINOZA, an individual, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. BIG 5 CORP., a Delaware
corporation; and DOES l through 100, inclusive, the Defendants,
Case No. RG18924341 (Cal. Super. ct., Oct. 12, 2018), alleges that
the Defendants failed to compensate for all hours worked, failed to
provide adequate rest periods, failed to provide meal periods,
failed to provide wages and waiting-time penalties, failed to
provide accurate wage statements, and failed to pay overtime
premium pay, pursuant to the California Labor Code.

Big 5 Corp. operates as a retailer of sporting goods in the western
United States. It provides products in a traditional sporting goods
store format.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff

          Stephen Frayne, Esq.
          Craig Nicholas, Esq.
          Shaun Markley, Esq.
          NICHOLAS & TOMASEVIC, LLP
          3090 Glascock Street, Suite 101
          Oakland, CA 9460 l
          Telephone: (510) 479-1081
          Facsimile: (619) 325-0496
          E-mail: sfravne@nicholaslaw.org
                  cnicholas@nicholaslaw.org
                  smarklev@nicholaslaw.org


BMW: Settles Class Action Over Excessive Oil Consumption
--------------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that a BMW
excessive oil consumption class-action lawsuit settlement may help
owners and lessees who complained about multiple oil changes and
drained batteries.

The BMW class-action lawsuit includes the following vehicles
purchased or leased in the U.S. or Puerto Rico and equipped with
N63 engines.

   -- 2009-2012 BMW 7 Series Sedan (Built from March 2009 to June
2012)
   -- 2010-2013 BMW 7 Series Active Hybrid (Built from April 2010
to June 2012)
   -- 2010-2012 BMW 5 Series Gran Turismo (Built from March 2009 to
June 2012)
   -- 2010-2013 BMW 5 Series Sedan (Built from March 2009 to July
2013)
   -- 2011-2012 BMW 6 Series Convertible (Built from March 2011 to
July 2012)
   -- 2011-2012 BMW 6 Series Coupe (Built from July 2011 to July
2012)
   -- 2010-2013 BMW X5 SAV (Built from March 2010 to June 2013)
   -- 2009-2014 BMW X6 SAV (Built from July 2008 to June 2014)
   -- 2009-2012 BMW X6 Active Hybrid SAV (Built from September 2009
to September 2011)

The lawsuit, Bang v. BMW, alleges the vehicles consume excessive
amounts of engine oil and require repeated oil changes, in addition
to suffering from premature drained batteries and battery
replacements.

According to the terms of the class-action settlement, customers
may be eligible for numerous benefits, if certain conditions are
met.

Reimbursement for Past Oil Changes

A customer can be reimbursed for the cost (not to exceed $75 each)
of up to 3 past oil changes if the repair invoices are provided and
if the work occurred prior to 10 years/120,000 miles from the date
the vehicle first entered service. In addition, the oil change must
have taken place less than 12 months or 10,500 miles after the
previous oil change.

In place of that, owners can choose to receive one free future oil
change instead of reimbursement for past oil changes.

Affected BMW customers are also eligible to be reimbursed for the
cost of up to seven quarts of oil that were purchased between oil
changes, up to $10 per quart, but only under these conditions:

1. The oil must of been of the same type and grade specified for
the vehicles in the owner's manual and supported with proof of
purchase, repair order or service invoice.

2. In addition, at least one prior oil consumption complaint must
have been made with BMW or a BMW dealer, and there must be proof of
the complaint as evidenced by a repair order, customer service
report or other written documentation.

3. Along with meeting all those conditions, the vehicles must have
had less than 120,000 miles (or less than 10 years old) at the time
the oil was purchased. An owner will need to show proof of that by
providing the service records from before and/or after the oil was
bought.

Reimbursement for Towing/Rental/Roadside Assistance
It's possible to receive reimbursement up to $50 for the cost one
one towing, rental or roadside assistance service related to oil
consumption or premature battery failure, but only if a customer
can provide proof.

The lawsuit settlement says the BMW vehicle must have been towed to
a BMW dealer or a third-party repair center as evidenced by a
repair or service order. And the invoice must say the reason was
related to premature battery failure or oil consumption problems.

Reimbursement for Past Replacement of a Battery that Was Less than
3 Years Old
A BMW owner can receive reimbursement for the cost of one
replacement 90 Ah or 105 Ah battery purchased prior to the mailing
of the class-action lawsuit notice. But the customer must provide
proof the discharged battery was less than 3 years old and the new
replacement battery was purchased outside the 4-year/50,000 mile
vehicle warranty.

In order to obtain reimbursement for eligible past expenses, you
must submit a claim form and include all of the documentation
described above.

N63 Customer Care Package
BMW has already made available to current owners and lessees of the
vehicles the "N63 Customer Care Package," described as BMW service
bulletin SI B11 06 14. The N63 service is intended to get rid of or
reduce excess engine oil consumption and premature battery failure,
and the campaign is available regardless of the age or mileage of a
vehicle.

Each affected BMW vehicle is entitled to receive the N63 package
only once, but vehicles that haven't received the service can still
get the service performed at BMW dealers.

Three Free Future Oil Changes
Current owners or lessees will receive three future oil changes (up
to $75 per oil change) performed at a BMW dealer during the earlier
of 10 years or 120,000 miles from the in-service date of the
vehicle.

Oil Consumption Testing
Under certain conditions such as the mileage of the vehicle, BMW
will perform up to three oil consumption tests if the low oil level
light illuminates before other warning indicators such as the "oil
service" light.

The settlement says the test will help determine if the BMW vehicle
is consuming too much oil, and if the vehicle fails the oil
consumption test, BMW will provide repairs up to the earlier of 10
years or 120,000 miles from the in-service date at the time of the
failed test.

BMW N63 Engine Replacement
The affected vehicles may be eligible to receive one replacement
engine which includes the cylinder heads during the earlier of 10
years or 120,000 miles from a vehicle's in-service date.

However, there are numerous conditions that must be met for BMW to
replace the engine. In addition, there is a good chance the car
owner would still need to pay something for the new engine.

According to the N63 settlement terms, the vehicle must have
already went through the N63 customer care package and the vehicle
must have failed two oil consumption tests. In addition to those
conditions, BMW must have failed to completely resolve the
excessive oil consumption problems after the second failed oil
consumption test and second repair attempt.

In addition to all those conditions, a BMW dealer would need to
confirm there is still an oil consumption problem before the engine
is replaced.

After all that, a customer will likely still need to "contribute"
to cover the cost of replacing the engine. For example, if a
vehicle has 50,000 - 60,000 miles on it, an owner would need to pay
5 percent of the cost to replace the engine.

If the car has 70,000 to 80,000 miles, the owner would need to pay
30 percent of the replacement cost of the engine. If a vehicle has
100,000 to 110,000 miles, the owner would need to pay 75 percent to
replace the engine and BMW would cover 25 percent of the cost.

Replacement Battery
For a vehicle that can be retrofitted with a 105Ah battery, BMW
will provide one new 105Ah battery to replace the 90Ah battery if
the owner did not previously receive a replacement battery, and,
thereafter, 105Ah replacement batteries at a BMW dealer, if the
105Ah battery fails within two years of installation (not due to
customer negligence) as evidenced by a prior invoice for
replacement of the battery.

For a vehicle with a 90Ah battery that cannot accommodate the 105Ah
battery, BMW will provide a current owner or lessee with 90Ah
replacement batteries at a BMW dealer if any such battery fails
within two years of installation (not due to customer negligence)
as evidenced by a prior invoice for replacement of the battery.

And BMW says it will not guarantee any repairs performed at
third-party (non-BMW) repair shops.

New Vehicle Credit Voucher
Affected customers will also receive a voucher good for $1,500
towards the purchase or lease of a new BMW 6 or 7 Series vehicle or
$1,000 towards the purchase or lease of any other new BMW vehicle.
The voucher will be transferable to immediate family members and
will be valid for one year from the date of the settlement.

Attorneys for the plaintiffs have requested more than $3 million in
fees and expenses.

Affected BMW customers may call 877-832-4402 or visit
BangClassSettlement.com. [GN]


BNSF RAILWAY: WRG Workers' Asbestos Suit Remanded to State Court
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Montana, Great
Falls Division, issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion to
Remand the case captioned KOREY L. AARSTAD, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, et al., Defendants. No. CV-17-72-GF-BMM-JTJ.
(D. Mont.).

Plaintiff Korey L. Aarstad, along with 191 other named plaintiffs
sought an order remanding this case to state court on the basis
that the case was improperly removed from Montana state court based
on defendant John Swing's (Mr. Swing) Montana citizenship.

WRG operated the mill until 1990. The Plaintiffs were all workers
of WRG or Zolonite Company. As a result of toxic asbestos present
in the vermiculite ore, thousands of residents of Libby have been
diagnosed with mesothelioma, asbestosis, or other asbestos-related
diseases over the course of several decades.

Standard of Review

A defendant may remove an action from state court to a federal
court if the federal court would have possessed original subject
matter jurisdiction over the matter. A federal court possesses
original jurisdiction if the parties are completely diverse and the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

Mass Action

A mass action is a class action which can be removed to federal
court if it meets the following elements: (1) numerosity: the
action must involve the monetary claims of 100 plaintiffs or more;
(2) amount in controversy: $5,000,000 or more in the aggregate
excluding interests and costs (3) diversity: minimal diversity must
be met, and; (4) commonality: plaintiffs' claims involve common
questions of law and fact.

Judge Johnston determined that this action constitutes a mass
action. It is undisputed that this action sets out monetary claims
of 100 or more plaintiffs and that the amount in controversy
exceeds five million dollars exclusive of costs and interest. Judge
Johnston also found that Plaintiffs' claims all involve common
questions of law or fact. In the Complaint, every single Plaintiff
alleges a negligence claim and a strict liability claim against
BNSF, which shows a common question of law.

Local Controversy Exception

The Local Controversy Exception states that if two-thirds of the
plaintiffs are citizens of the State in which the action was filed,
the district court shall decline jurisdiction if: (1) at least one
defendant from whom significant relief is sought and whose alleged
conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by the
plaintiffs is a citizen of the State in which the action was
originally filed, and the alleged conduct of that one defendant
also occurred in the State, or (2) the primary defendants are
citizens in the State in which the action was originally filed.  

Two-thirds requirement

The Plaintiffs must show that at least two-thirds of the members of
the class are citizens of the State in which the action was
originally filed. The Court may look to extrinsic evidence to
determine a party's citizenship. Judge Johnston found that
Plaintiffs met their burden of proving citizenship from the
affidavit provided by Plaintiffs that alleged that over two-thirds
of the class members are Montana citizens.  

Local Controversy

The Plaintiffs must demonstrate that at least one of the
defendants, who is a citizen of Montana, is a defendant: (1) from
whom significant relief is sought and (2) whose alleged conduct in
Montana forms a significant basis for the claims asserted. Judge
Johnston found, and it was not contested, that Mr. Swing is a
Montana citizen for the purposes of the analysis.  

Judge Johnston determined that the Court is not permitted to assume
that Mr. Swing is indigent and cannot satisfy Plaintiffs' claim of
damages. Accordingly, Judge Johnston determined that Plaintiffs had
met their burden to show that they are seeking significant relief
from Mr. Swing.

Judge Johnston acknowledged that the Complaint set forth
allegations that distinguish Mr. Swing's individual wrongful acts
from those of BNSF. Judge Johnston looked to the Complaint which
alleges that Mr. Swing personally knew of the danger of asbestos
and personally failed to warn the Plaintiffs. Accordingly, based on
the allegations set forth in the Complaint, Judge Johnston found
that Plaintiffs met their burden to show that their claims against
Mr. Swing form a significant basis for the claims.  

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand is granted and this
case is to be remanded to the Montana 8th Judicial Court, Cascade
County.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 15, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ya8jdwbu from Leagle.com.

Korey L. Aarstad, et al., Scott A. Albert, Mark D. Anderson, David
B. Anderson, Albert C. Anderson, Charles H. Ashley, Jr., John E.
Bache, Cecil F. Bache, P.R. Glenda Larson, Linda J. Backen, Daniel
P. Backen, Randall W. Baeth, Richard D. Barnett, Gerald L. Bass,
Douglas K. Bibb, Donna M. Black, Jimmy R. Blixt, Shelley A.
Boursaw, Rhonda R. Braaten, Glenn L. Bredeson, Darlene K. Brese,
P.R. Jack Brese, Michael E. Brooks, Daniel W. Brossman, Hazel M.
Brossman, Douglas L. Brown, Kirk C. Brus, Robbin R. Butkus, James
E. Butler, Larry L. Calloway, Joseph G. Camp, Hermine M. Campbell,
P.R. Joseph Campbell, James T. Carabin, Sr., John E. Carlock, Betsy
E. Carpenter, Gordon V. Carr, Cheri L. Carr, Violet M. Carroll,
Keith Cassel, David L. Chapel, Wendy D. Christensen, Brian L.
Coldiron, Robert A. Coleman, Katherine M. Craigmile, Stuart G.
Crismore, Kurt C. Croucher, Cymon A. Curtiss, Robert L. Day, Roxann
L. Dentlinger, David L. Doney, Linda L. Dorrington, Todd A. Dotson,
Kenneth L Drake, Sheri A Edwards, Robert C Engebretson, Kelly W
Evans, Rhonda S Farnes, Debra J Ferch, Ronald A Foote, Alton O
Fore, Ralph E Fox, Anita F Fund, PR - Alvin Funk, Dale L Ginger,
Kristine A Godsey, Joseph A Gostnell, Rick L Gullingsrud, Wayne W
Hartmann, Dianna L Haywood, Joel B Hefty, Jeanette H Hoffman, Cheri
L Javorsky, Robert J Javorsky, Ramona J Jellesed, Jimmy D Johnson,
Melody L Johnson, Orville D Johnson, PR - Brenda Neuman Brunscher,
Darald E Kelley, Sandra S Kenelty, David A Kingery, Benjamin F
Klin, Lynn M Koskela, Leonard H Koskela, Bradley L LaBelle, Lee S
Lampton, Linda L Lampton, Sidney L Leir, David L Leim, Deborah K
Loomis, Steven R Madison, Terry D Magone, Sandra J Maile, Linda A
Masterson, David D McDonald, Roberta J McNulty, Margaret A
Molinelli, Norma T Munro, Sharon L Munson, Sandra D Murch, Shayne A
Nelson, Kevin R Neubauer, Shirley M Nixon, Scott N Noble, Paulette
D Nosler, Patrick H O'Brien, Drilda J O'Brien, Mark D Olsen, Wade L
Olson, John M O'Neill, Carl L Orsborn, Lyndeen J Osborne, Michael J
Parker, Betty L Pennock, PR - Alfred Pennock, Greg W Phillips, Dale
B Phillips, Wayne B Posselt, James M Powers, Sr., A. Tony Price,
Dennis G Quinn, Daniel K Quinn, Allan V Randall, Alvin G Randall,
Clayton R Rayson, Pat N Rayson, Steven J Richard, Roberts Joellen,
Todd E Robins, Gerald D Robins, June J Roose, Valerie D Root,
Claire C Rose, William R Rowberry, PR - Clarise Rowberry, Peggy S
Ruff, Patrick H Ryan, Rebecca J Saller, Salvador F Saracino, Marvin
C Sather, Kathleen E Scharen, Dietmar G Schauss, Harold L Schiele,
Jeffrey M Shelton, Leonard K Shoemaker, Betty A Sikes, David W
Skranak, Florence E Slater, Donald Ray Smith, PR - Calvin Smith,
Brenda S Stamper, Terry L Steiger, PR Tami M. Steiger, Timber K
Stevens, Ellis D Stewart, Glenn N Stubbs, Melvin G. Sundt, Thomas V
Swearingen, Hugh E Swimley, Lee Ann Switzer, Daniel W Torgison,
Betty R Van Alstine, G. Michael Van Alstine, Betty F Vinion, Julie
A Volkenand, Lana M Walen, Debbra K Welcome, Peggy A Kelley, Steven
R Magone, Greg McNulty, Rebecca N Messick, Jessie M Parker, Steven
J Riddle, Mary A Stineback, Thomas D. Thompson, George L West, Sue
C West, Edwin B Weston, PR Melba Weston, Sara A Whitehouse, Robert
D Wilburn, Larry J Wiley, David M Williams, Clarence J Winn, Harold
M Wise, Judy M Woller, Patrick J Youso, David J Zwang, Debra K
Chamberlain, Michael D Chapman, Michael J Clairmont, Delbert L
Collins, Wesley M Decker, Mark D Dodge, Suzanne Dodge, Clarence
Hunter, Sammy L Knowles, Shirley Y Koskela, Carol A Lockwood &
Grover W Lockwood, Plaintiffs, represented by Allan M. McGarvey ,
McGARVEY HEBERLING SULLIVAN & McGARVEY, John F. Lacey , McGARVEY
HEBERLING SULLIVAN & McGARVEY, P.C., Roger M. Sullivan , McGARVEY
HEBERLING SULLIVAN & McGARVEY, Dustin A. Leftridge , McGARVEY
HEBERLING SULLIVAN & McGARVEY, P.C. &Ethan A. Welder , McGARVEY
HEBERLING SULLIVAN & McGARVEY, P.C. 345 1st Ave E, Kalispell, MT
59901

Ruth A. Choate, Plaintiff, represented by Allan M. McGarvey ,
McGARVEY HEBERLING SULLIVAN & McGARVEY, Dustin A. Leftridge ,
McGARVEY HEBERLING SULLIVAN & McGARVEY, P.C., Ethan A. Welder ,
McGARVEY HEBERLING SULLIVAN & McGARVEY, P.C. &John F. Lacey ,
McGARVEY HEBERLING SULLIVAN & McGARVEY, P.C.

BNSF Railway Company, a Delaware corporation & John Swing,
Defendants, represented by Anthony Michael Nicastro --
nicastro@knightnicastro.com -- KNIGHT NICASTRO, LLC, Chad M. Knight
-- knight@knightnicastro.com -- KNIGHT NICASTRO, LLC, Kathryn T.
Alsobrook , KNIGHT NICASTRO, LLC, pro hac vice, Nadia A. Patrick --
npatrick@knightnicastro.com -- KNIGHT NICASTRO, LLC & Steven T.
Williams -- williams@knightnicastro.com -- KNIGHT NICASTRO, LLC.

Maryland Casualty Company, a Maryland Corporation & Robinson
Insulation Company, a Montana Corporation for profit, Defendants,
represented by Allan M. McGarvey , McGARVEY HEBERLING SULLIVAN &
McGARVEY, Dustin A. Leftridge , McGARVEY HEBERLING SULLIVAN &
McGARVEY, P.C., Ethan A. Welder , McGARVEY HEBERLING SULLIVAN &
McGARVEY, P.C.,John F. Lacey , McGARVEY HEBERLING SULLIVAN &
McGARVEY, P.C. & Roger M. Sullivan , McGARVEY HEBERLING SULLIVAN &
McGARVEY.


BURGER KING: Faces Arrington Suit over No-Poach Agreement
---------------------------------------------------------
Jarvis Arrington, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Burger King Worldwide, Inc.; and
Burger King Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-24128-JEM
(S.D. Fla., Oct. 5, 2018) alleges violation of the Sherman Act.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendants
incorporate an employee no-solicitation and no-hiring clause in the
standard form franchise agreement to all Burger King franchisees.
This no-solicitation and no-hiring agreement was an illegal
contract, combination and conspiracy between and among the
Defendants and Burger King franchisees. The "no-poach" agreement is
a naked restraint of trade and a per se violation of the federal
antitrust laws.

Burger King Worldwide, Inc., through its subsidiaries, owns,
operates, and franchises a chain of fast food hamburger restaurants
under the Burger King brand in the United States and
internationally. It offers flame-grilled hamburgers, chicken and
other specialty sandwiches, French fries, soft drinks, and other
food items. The company was founded in 2012 and is based in Miami,
Florida. Burger King Worldwide, Inc. operates as a subsidiary of
Restaurant Brands International Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter Prieto, Esq.
          John Gravante, Esq.
          Matthew P. Weinshal, Esq.
          Alissa Del Riego, Esq.
          PODHURST ORSECK, P.A.
          One S.E. Third Ave., Suite 2300
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 358-2800
          Facsimile: (305) 358-2382
          E-mail: pprieto@podhurst.com
                  jgravante@podhurst.com
                  mweinshall@podhurst.com
                  adelriego@podhurst.com

               - and -

          Joseph H. Meltzer, Esq.
          Kimberly A. Justice, Esq.
          Peter A. Muhic, Esq.
          Melissa L. Troutner, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          Facsimile: (610) 667-7056
          E-mail: jmeltzer@ktmc.com
                  kjustice@ktmc.com
                  pmuhic@ktmc.com
                  mtroutner@ktmc.com


CALIFORNIA: Dismissal of Class Claims in Flores Suit Recommended
----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of California recommended that the Court
grants the Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the class allegations in
the case, ROSENDA FLORES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF CALIFORNIA
CITY, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00703 DAD JLT (E.D.
Cal.).

On July 18, 2017, officers received a report that Ciriaco Flores
"racked" a shotgun in response to a juvenile near his home.  The
officers arrived at the home about 20 minutes after Flores "racked"
the shotgun.  Officer Whiting attempted to convince the residents
to exit the home but, when they did not, he drew his weapon and
demanded they comply.  As Ciriaco Flores exited the home, the
officers arrested him and placed him in handcuffs.  The officers
also placed Rosenda and Jesus Flores in handcuffs and, while they
remained restrained, took statements from them.  During this time,
officers searched the home where they found a "broken .22 rifle."

Afterward, Acting Chief of Police Frank Huizar assigned an
inexperienced officer, Alwaw, to write the report.  The officer
wrote that there were only two more occupants in the home though
there were four and failed to include that Rosenda and Jesus Flores
were handcuffed while they gave their statements.  Two of the other
officers, Whiting and Guillen, did not write reports.  Huizar
approved Alwaw's report.  The charges were later dismissed.

The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants seized them, arrested
Ciriaco Flores and searched their home in violation of the
Constitution.  Upon these facts they allege causes of action for
trespass, denial of equal protection and/or due process, for
violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth1 and Fourteenth Amendments,
wrongful arrest and false imprisonment.  They claim that this
conduct resulted from a policy of the City of California City and
that others, similarly situated, have suffered the same unlawful
conduct.  Thus, they seek to state a class action.

Repeatedly in the complaint, the Plaintiffs refer to Frank Garcia
Huizar in an inflammatory manner without providing factual support
for the references.  How these facts bear on the case at hand is
not demonstrated and it appears they are included only for
harassment purposes.  After the hearing, the Plaintiffs moved the
Court to strike the last sentence of paragraph 51 (which is the
assertion that that the Defendant molested a child).

Thus, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the matter related to
Huizar's prior conviction, his prior firing and other inflammatory
material, e.g., referring to him as "corrupt," implying he is a
child molester, and that he unlawfully engineered the removal of
the prior Chief of Police, be stricken.

The Magistrate also finds that the allegations against the entity
are insufficient.  First, it is not clear whether the Plaintiffs
contend there are official policies that caused their damages or if
they contend there were widespread customs at issue.  Second, there
are insufficient facts to support that the "policy" related to poor
report writing caused the constitutional violations at issue.
Finally, there are no facts to support the claim of a policy of
hiring "corrupt" police officers.  Thus, she recommends that the
motion to dismiss the complaint as to the Monell claim be granted
with leave to amend.

After the hearing, the Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the class
allegations.  Thus, the Magistrate recommends that the Court grants
the motion and the class claims be dismissed.

Because the complaint fails to allege sufficient factual support
for the Monell and class claims and because it asserts material
that is included only for harassment purposes, Magistrate Judge
Thurston recommended that the Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the
complaint be granted with leave to amend; and that the material as
to Defendant Huizar's previous arrest and conviction and claims
that he is a child molester, should be stricken.

The Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the U.S. States
District Court Judge assigned to the case.  Within 14 days after
being served with a copy of the Findings and Recommendation, any
party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy
on all parties.  Such a document should be captioned "Objections to
Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation."  Replies to the
Objections will be served and filed within seven days after service
of the Objections.  The Court will then review the Magistrate
Judge's ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636 (b)(1)(C).  The
Magistrate advised the parties that failure to file objections
within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the Order
of the District Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 25, 2018 Findings &
Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/b9NzCf from
Leagle.com.

Rosenda Flores, Juan Flores, Jesus Flores, Rosanna Flores & Ciriaco
Flores, Plaintiffs, represented by Olaf Arthur Landsgaard --
Olaf@OlafLegal.com -- Law Offices Of Olaf Landsgaard.

City of California City, Defendant, represented by Daniel J. Dubin,
Manning & Kass Ellrod Ramirez Trester, LLP & Eugene P. Ramirez --
epr@manningllp.com -- Manning & Kass Ellrod Ramirez Trester LLP.

Steven Whiting & Frank Garcia Huizar, Defendants, represented by
Daniel J. Dubin, Manning & Kass Ellrod Ramirez Trester, LLP.


CARNIVAL CORP: Cruise Line Receives Kickbacks, Wolfe Suit Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
Carnival Corporation disclosed in its Form 10-Q filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
August 31, 2018, that the "Wolfe" complaint alleges that Carnival
Cruise Line concealed that it received "kickbacks" on the sale of
the travel insurance portion of the product from an underwriter.

On August 24, 2018, a proposed class-action lawsuit was filed by
James Wolfe and others against Carnival Corporation in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida relating
to the marketing and sales of our Carnival Vacation Protection
product. The plaintiffs purport to represent an alleged class of
passengers who purchased the Carnival Vacation Protection product.

The Company further said, "We believe we have meritorious defenses
to the claim and that any liability which may arise as a result of
this action will not have a material impact on our consolidated
financial statements."

Carnival Corporation operates as a leisure travel and cruise
company.  The Company offers cruises under the Carnival Cruise
Line, Holland America Line, Princess Cruises, and Seabourn brands
in North America; and AIDA, Costa, P&O Cruises (Australia), Cunard,
and P&O Cruises (UK) brands in Europe, Australia, and Asia.  The
Company operates approximately 100 cruise ships and owns Holland
America Princess Alaska Tours, a tour company in Alaska; and the
Canadian Yukon, which owns and operates hotels, lodges, glass-domed
railcars, and motor coaches.


COBIZ FINANCIAL: Plaintiff Dismisses Class Action on BOK Merger
---------------------------------------------------------------
The plaintiff in a class action lawsuit related to CoBiz Financial
Inc.'s proposed merger with BOK Financial Corporation has agreed to
drop the case, according to CoBiz Financial's Form 8-K filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission dated September 20,
2018.

On August 30, 2018, a purported individual shareholder of CoBiz
Financial Inc. filed a lawsuit in the District Court for the City
and County of Denver, Colorado (the "Court"), under the caption
Richard Scarantino v. CoBiz Financial Inc., et al., Case No.
2018CV33236 (the "Action").  The complaint, which was filed as a
putative class action on behalf of the individual plaintiff and the
public shareholders of CoBiz Financial, generally alleges that
CoBiz Financial's directors breached their fiduciary duties to
CoBiz Financial and its shareholders by agreeing to the proposed
merger with BOK Financial Corporation ("BOK") and by failing to
disclose to CoBiz Financial shareholders in the proxy
statement/prospectus (the "Proxy Statement/Prospectus") certain
information alleged to be material to the shareholders of CoBiz
Financial concerning the proposed merger.  The complaint also
alleges that BOK aided and abetted those alleged fiduciary
breaches.  The complaint seeks, among other things, injunctive
relief against consummation of the merger and additional, allegedly
corrective disclosures as well as attorneys' and expert fees.  

Solely to avoid the costs, risks, nuisance and uncertainties
inherent in litigation and to allow CoBiz Financial shareholders to
vote on the proposals required in connection with the proposed
merger with BOK at the special meeting of CoBiz Financial
shareholders to be held on September 27, 2018 (the "Special
Meeting"), CoBiz Financial supplements the disclosures contained in
the Proxy Statement/Prospectus (the "Additional Disclosures").  The
Additional Disclosures are set forth in the Company's 8-K filing
should be read in conjunction with the Proxy Statement/Prospectus.

A full-text copy of the Form 8-K is available at
https://is.gd/N30DjX

In light of the Additional Disclosures, plaintiff has agreed to
dismiss the Action with prejudice as to his individual claims and
without prejudice to the claims of the members of the putative
class.  In dismissing the Action, plaintiff has reserved the right
to seek an award of attorneys' fees from the Court.

The agreement to make the Additional Disclosures will not affect
the merger consideration to be paid to CoBiz Financial shareholders
or the timing of the Special Meeting.

CoBiz Financial and the other defendants, including BOK, vigorously
deny that the Proxy Statement/Prospectus is deficient in any
respect and that the Additional Disclosures are material or
required.  CoBiz Financial and BOK believe that the claims asserted
in the Action are without merit, and that the Additional
Disclosures do not provide information required by the federal
securities laws or that is material to the decision of the CoBiz
Financial shareholders as to how to vote their shares at the
Special Meeting.  The Additional Disclosures are being made solely
to eliminate the burden, expense, and nuisance of further
litigation, and to avoid any possible delay to the closing of the
merger that might arise from further litigation.  Nothing in this
document shall be deemed an admission of the legal necessity or
materiality under any applicable laws for any of the disclosures
set forth herein.

CoBiz Financial Inc., a diversified financial services company,
provides various financial products and services in the United
States.  It operates through Commercial Banking and Fee-Based Lines
segments.  The Company was formerly known as CoBiz Inc. and changed
its name to CoBiz Financial Inc. in May 2007.  CoBiz Financial
Inc., was founded in 1980 and is headquartered in Denver,
Colorado.


CONNECTICUT: Class Action Mulled Over Garner Radon-Exposure
-----------------------------------------------------------
Pat Eaton-Robb, writing for Associated Press, reports that guards
and inmates at a Connecticut prison find themselves on the same
side of a legal fight against the state, which they say did not do
enough to prevent their exposure to radon.

A federal judge last month ruled against the state's attempt to
dismiss a lawsuit by 13 inmates inside the Garner Correctional
Institution in Newtown. They allege Correction Department officials
exposed them to high levels of the radioactive gas, creating
unconstitutional and inhumane conditions of confinement inside the
maximum-security prison.

A separate lawsuit was filed in state court in August by 16 former
guards and staff members, several of whom suffer from respiratory
ailments. It asserts the staff should have been informed of the
radon problem.

"They told the current guards, but they didn't tell the retirees,"
said Lori Welch-Rubin, an attorney who finds herself in the unusual
position of representing both prisoners and their former guards.
"There was one gentleman who found out two years later that he had
Stage 4 lung cancer and died four months after the diagnoses. Had
he known to get tested, they could have caught it earlier and saved
his life."

Frank Crose, who served as warden between 1992 and 1996, became the
lead plaintiff after being diagnosed with nodules on his lungs.

Ms. Welch-Rubin alleges the state knew about the potential for
problems with radon at Garner when it was opened in 1992 but did
not begin testing until 2013, when it was requested by a teacher at
the prison's school. The state has required radon testing at all
schools since 2003, she said.

Those tests found extremely high levels of radon inside the
classrooms, which are on the second floor, she said.

"We're talking about levels in some places that are equivalent to
smoking 2 ½ packs of cigarettes a day," she said. "Not just being
exposed to smoke, actually smoking 2 ½ packs a day."

Connecticut Correction Department spokesman Andrius Banevicius said
the state now routinely tests for radon in the prison and recently
completed the installation of a radon mitigation system there.

The state, he said, is reviewing the Sept. 27 decision by U.S.
District Judge Janet Bond Arterton, which rejected the state's
attempt to have the federal lawsuit dismissed based on claims of
qualified and sovereign immunity.

Welch-Rubin asserts the mitigation system doesn't cover all areas
of the prison and used pipes that were too small to properly vent
the gas, which is naturally occurring and seeps into the prison
from the surrounding bedrock. She plans to seek class-action status
for the lawsuit on behalf of all inmates who have been housed at
Garner.

After the 2013 testing, she said, current guards were told to get a
baseline chest X-ray and file forms that would allow them to seek
workers compensation if they develop health problems in the
future.

"They still haven't tested where the prisoners are," she said, "so
we don't know if what they are now doing is even adequate." [GN]


CONVERGYS: Files Supplemental Disclosures to Appease Merger Suits
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In an effort to avoid the risk of litigation delaying or adversely
affecting the its merger plan with SYNNEX Corporation, among other
entities, Convergys Corporation has provided supplemental
disclosures to its Definitive Proxy Statement by filing its Form
8-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission dated
September 25, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2AsPKtu

On June 28, 2018, Convergys Corporation, an Ohio corporation,
entered into that certain Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of
June 28, 2018, as amended by Amendment No. 1 to the Agreement and
Plan of Merger, dated as of August 22, 2018 (as it may be amended,
modified or supplemented from time to time, the "Merger
Agreement"), with SYNNEX Corporation, a Delaware corporation
("SYNNEX"), Delta Merger Sub I, Inc., a Delaware corporation and
wholly owned subsidiary of SYNNEX ("Delta Merger Sub I") and
Concentrix CVG Corporation, a Delaware corporation and a wholly
owned subsidiary of SYNNEX ("Concentrix CVG Corporation"), pursuant
to which Delta Merger Sub I, Inc.  will be merged with and into
Convergys, and Convergys will continue as the surviving corporation
and a wholly owned subsidiary of SYNNEX, and, immediately
thereafter, Convergys will be merged with and into Concentrix CVG
Corporation, and Concentrix CVG Corporation will continue as the
surviving company and a wholly owned subsidiary of SYNNEX (the
"Mergers").

On August 28, 2018, the Company filed its Definitive Proxy
Statement on Schedule 14A (the "Definitive Proxy Statement") to
obtain shareholder approval for the transactions contemplated by
the Merger Agreement.

On September 10, 2018, after the filing of the Definitive Proxy
Statement, two lawsuits were brought by and/or on behalf of
Convergys shareholders (the "Actions").

The first action, a putative class action and derivative lawsuit
(captioned Franchi v. Ayers, et al., Case No. A 1804876) (the
"Franchi Action"), was filed in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas,
Hamilton County against Convergys, individual members of the
Convergys Board, SYNNEX, Delta Merger Sub I and Concentrix CVG
Corporation, alleging breach of fiduciary duty in connection with
the Mergers.  The complaint filed in the Franchi Action alleges
that the individual defendants breached their fiduciary duties by
(i) conducting an unfair sales process that was not designed to
maximize shareholder value and (ii) failing to disclose to
shareholders all material information necessary to make an informed
vote on the Mergers.  The Franchi Action seeks, among other things,
orders (i) enjoining the defendants from proceeding with or
consummating the Mergers, (ii) rescinding the Mergers if
consummated or, alternatively, awarding unspecified rescissory
damages, (iii) directing the defendants to account for all damages
suffered as a result of their wrongdoing, and (iv) awarding
plaintiff's costs and attorneys' and expert fees.  A copy of the
complaint filed in the Franchi Action is attached as Exhibit 99.1
hereto and incorporated by reference herein.

The second action, a putative class action lawsuit (captioned
Zalvin v. Ayers, et al., Case No. A 1804888) (the "Zalvin Action"),
was filed in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County
against Convergys and individual members of the Convergys Board,
alleging breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the Mergers.
The complaint filed in the Zalvin Action alleges that the
individual defendants breached their fiduciary duties by (i)
conducting an unfair sales process that was not designed to
maximize shareholder value and (ii) failing to disclose to
shareholders all material information necessary to make an informed
vote on the Mergers.  On September 20, 2018, plaintiff filed a
motion for a preliminary injunction.  The hearing on that motion is
scheduled for September 26, 2018.  The Zalvin Action seeks, among
other things, orders (i) declaring that the Mergers were agreed to
in breach of the defendants' fiduciary duties or that the
defendants aided and abetted such breaches, (ii) declaring that the
defendants breached their duty of a full and fair disclosure, (iii)
enjoining the defendants from proceeding with or consummating the
Mergers until the requested disclosures are made, (iv) awarding
plaintiffs compensatory damages, and (v) awarding plaintiff's costs
and attorneys' and expert fees.  A copy of the complaint filed in
the Zalvin Action is attached as Exhibit 99.2 hereto and
incorporated by reference herein.

The defendants believe that these Actions are without merit, and
that no further disclosure is required under applicable law.
Nonetheless, to avoid the risk of the litigation delaying or
adversely affecting the Mergers, the defendants are making
supplemental disclosures (the "litigation-related supplemental
disclosures") related to the Mergers, as set forth herein.  Nothing
in this Current Report on Form 8-K shall be deemed an admission of
the legal necessity or materiality under applicable laws of any of
the supplemental disclosures set forth herein.

Convergys Corporation provides customer management services to
communications and media, technology, financial services, retail,
healthcare, government, travel and hospitality, and other vertical
markets worldwide.  The Company operates through 140 contact
centers.  Convergys Corporation was founded in 1998 and is
headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio.


CSX TRANSPORTATION: More People Speak Out on Railway Underpass
--------------------------------------------------------------
Nia Watson, writing for WMBF News, reports that as the city of
Lumberton deals with another blow from mother nature, more people
are speaking out after a class action lawsuit against CSX
transportation claimed some of the flooding was preventable.

The lawsuit claims the railroad company was aware that the
underpass they own was a threat for major flooding in the area and
CSX ignored it.

Rick Foreman, the pastor of The West Lumberton Baptist Church,
knows first-hand of the amount of damage the opening can cause.

The church is located right in front of the CSX railway under I-95.
Foreman said currently they're in the process of repairing the
church for the second time in two years because of the flooding
that comes through that gap.

"It looks like a small opening. You wouldn't think that it causes
all the damage that it causes, that water just comes through with
so much force," Foreman said.

Foreman said the church got its first taste of what the opening
could cause during Hurricane Matthew in 2016.

"It washed out all our foundations. It just caused a tremendous
expense," Foreman said.

The cost of damages was 1.3 million dollars Foreman continued. Now,
most of the repair is swept away with the flood waters of Hurricane
Florence rushing through the opening again.

"It was all brand new just a little over a year ago and you can see
the damage today for the force of that water," Foreman said.

Foreman said during Matthew 700 people in West Lumberton were
displaced. Now with Hurricane Florence, he said it's caused the
same impact to the same people that haven't fully rebuilt their
lives.

"West and South Lumberton has many, many people who are living in
poverty and it's just hard for them to bounce back," Foreman said.

Knowing what the gap caused during Matthew, Foreman said local
officials asked CSX permission to build a temporary berm but claim
CSX denied the request, as Florence moved across the Carolinas.
Governor Roy Cooper issued an emergency order go through with it

At that point, everyone from the national guard to residents worked
tirelessly to fill the gap as a desperate attempt to prevent the
flooding.

"Filling 5,000 sandbags, they brought in concrete barriers, they
brought truck load after truck load of dirt," Foreman said.

He admitted the temporary berm did serve its purpose to some
extent, but agrees a permanent floodgate would have helped even
more.

"Matthew taught us a lot of lessons and a lot of us have learned a
lot of things, but CSX railroad hasn't learned a lot of things
because they knew… this time they knew," Foreman said.

We did reach out to CSX. Through email, a spokesperson with the
company sent the following:

"While CSX does not comment on pending litigation, it is important
to point out that Hurricane Florence was an extraordinary storm
that brought record flooding and left many communities throughout
the region devastated including Lumberton. CSX has extensive
operations in the impacted communities where so many of our
employees, customers, and suppliers call home. Our thoughts are
with those impacted by Hurricane Florence and we remain fully
committed to working with the City of Lumberton to implement a
permanent solution."

The church is not a part of the class action lawsuit, but Foreman
said they are considering the option. [GN]


CULPEPER, VA: Inks MOA with ICE Amid Class Action
-------------------------------------------------
Fredericksburg.com reports that seventy-eight jurisdictions in 20
states, including Culpeper and Prince William counties in Virginia,
have signed a Memorandum of Agreement with U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. Based on Section 287(g) of the federal
Immigration and Nationality Act, the MOA authorizes and trains
local law enforcement to assist in "the identification,
apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present
in the United States" -- including the controversial practice of
holding criminal aliens on detainers for up to 48 hours after their
jail release dates.

"If your poor decisions cause you to enter our jail, after already
being an illegal guest in our community, then I cannot understand
why you think you shouldn't be handed over to ICE through this new
screening process we're about to implement," Culpeper Sheriff Scott
Jenkins said shortly after signing the MOA in April. Jenkins
responded to critics by noting that the 287(g) program only affects
criminals in custody, adding that immigrants who obey the law have
nothing to fear.

The Falls Church-based Legal Aid Justice Center and Alexandria
attorney Victor Glasberg filed a federal class action lawsuit
against Jenkins on behalf of Francisco Guardado Rios, who was
arrested in August 2017 for driving without a license and
contributing to the delinquency of a minor, both misdemeanors under
Virginia state law.

After being denied bail and spending three months in custody, Mr.
Guardado Rios was convicted in the Culpeper General District Court
and sentenced to 30 days in jail, according to the lawsuit. Due to
time already served, the judge ordered him to be immediately
released, but Jenkins continued to hold him on an ICE detainer.

The lawsuit claims that since immigration detainers are not signed
by a judge, the sheriff had "no legal authority" for holding Mr.
Guardado Rios -- and nearly 100 other criminal aliens held beyond
their release dates -- based on a 2015 written opinion by Virginia
Attorney General Mark Herring, which stated that "an ICE detainer
is merely a request and does not either impose a mandatory
obligation or grant legal authority for a law enforcement agency to
maintain custody of an individual who is otherwise subject to
immediate release."

There's no good reason why convicted criminals should be held in
jail even 48 hours past their release dates, which are known well
in advance. Once ICE has been notified of the date by local
officials, it's up to the federal agency to have personnel waiting
to intercept them at the county jail and initiate deportation
proceedings.

Neither the lawsuit nor Herring's opinion argued that foreign
nationals convicted of crimes while illegally present in the U.S.
cannot or should not be deported. Crimes have consequences, and
possible deportation is one of them.

Although many people are convinced that ICE removals under the
Trump administration have dramatically increased, that is not
actually the case. "Overall, ICE monthly custodial arrests since
President Trump assumed office are actually down slightly since
October 2014 during the last month of Secure Communities under
President Obama," according to Syracuse University's Transactional
Records Access Clearinghouse on Immigration.

Two-thirds (74 percent) of all immigrants arrested by ICE last year
had past criminal convictions, with the most common offense being
driving under the influence, according to the Pew Research Center.

Another 16 percent had criminal charges pending, with just 11
percent having no known convictions or pending criminal charges.

In addition, Pew reported that the number of non-criminal arrests
has dropped precipitously from 182,031 in 2009, the year Obama took
office, to 37,734 in 2017, indicating that ICE is doing a much
better job of targeting and deporting criminals who have shown by
their actions that they don't deserve to stay in the U.S. By
identifying criminal aliens while they are still incarcerated in
local jails, the 287(g) program helps ICE do exactly that.

That said, a recent study of the 287(g)program in North Carolina, a
non-border state like Virginia, by the libertarian CATO Institute
found "no statistically significant impact of 287(g) program
participation on either violent or property crime rates" and "no
significant relationship between the number of 287(g) program
deportations and the major index crime rates …. Combined, these
results demonstrate that the 287(g) program did not reduce crime in
North Carolina.

"Given the prior justifications for 287(g) programs as a means to
assist law enforcement to reduce violent crime, no statistical
change in violent crime rates associated with 287(g) removals
suggests that this goal was not achieved."

Although the 287(g) program does not appear to reduce the overall
level of crime where it is in effect, it does help ICE to remove
convicted criminals who have already shown their contempt for state
and local laws.

And that's at least half of the battle. [GN]


CVS RX: Summary Judgment Bid on PAGA Claim in Cabrera Granted
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SIGFREDO CABRERA, ENKO TELAHUN, and CHRISTINE McNEELY,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. CVS RX SERVICES, INC., a New York corporation, CVS
PHARMACY, INC., a Rhode Island corporation, GARFIELD BEACH CVS,
LLC, a California limited liability company, and DOES 1 to 10
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. C 17-05803 WHA (N.D. Cal.), Judge
William Alsup of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Califoria granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment on
the Plaintiffs' PAGA claim.

The Defendants provide pharmacy services and operate retail stores.
CVS employed Plaintiff Telahun as a pharmacist and pharmacy
manager between June 2013 and February 2017.  CVS also employed
Plaintiff Cabrera as a pharmacy tech trainee from January 2016
through January 2017.

Cabrera initiated the action in August 2017 in state court.  He
amended the complaint in September 2017 to add Telahun as a
Plaintiff and to include a claim pursuant to California's Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004.  In October 2017, CVS removed the
action to the district court and later moved to compel the
Plaintiffs to bring their claims in individual arbitration.

In the face of CVS' motions to compel, the Plaintiffs moved for
leave to file a second amended complaint.  The proposed second
amended complaint dropped all of Cabrera and Telahun's putative
class claims (keeping only their PAGA claim) and added Christine
McNeely as a Plaintiff and putative class representative with
respect to the non-PAGA claims.

A March 16 order granted the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend
and granted in part CVS' motions to compel arbitration.  In
allowing the Plaintiffs to add McNeely as a class representative,
the March 16 order held that CVS had failed to show that her
addition to the case would be futile.  The March 16 order also held
that the question of whether McNeely opted out of CVS's arbitration
policy should be decided by the Court, not the arbitrator.  An
order later granted CVS' unopposed motion to stay the proceedings
as to Plaintiff McNeely pending resolution of CVS'  appeal of these
issues.

The operative complaint alleges that CVS required the Plaintiffs to
complete ongoing training sessions outside of working hours or
during breaks without compensation and failed to reimburse the
Plaintiffs for expenses incurred as a result of their employment.
The Plaintiffs also allege that CVS had a policy and practice of
instructing pharmacy employees to work off-the-clock and during
meal and rest breaks to meet the demands of the pharmacy.

CVS now moves for summary judgment on Cabrera and Telahun's PAGA
claim for civil penalties.

Judge Alsup finds that in seeking leave to amend the complaint,
Cabrera and Telahun abandoned their individual claims under the
Labor Code, explaining that they didn't want to go to individual
arbitration.  As their counsel represented at the hearing on the
Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend, the Plaintiffs gave up their
individual rights for those individual damages.  Upon the his
further inquiry, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs counsel also
represented that the Plaintiffs were not going to re-file their
dropped claims in another court.  Cabrera and Telahun accordingly
waived their individual claims under the Labor Code and lost
standing to sue under PAGA.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiffs' remaining attempts to
avoid summary judgment are similarly unavailing.  First, they do
not dispute that they received fair notice of CVS' affirmative
defense that the Plaintiffs are not "aggrieved employees" with
standing to sue under PAGA.  Second, they request leave to
substitute in another representative who has standing.  The
Plaintiffs ignore, however, that they have already been afforded
two opportunities to add new representatives.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Alsup concluded the Plaintiffs
Cabrera and Telahun lack standing to sue under PAGA.  CVS' motion
for summary judgment is accordingly granted.  The only claims that
remain in the action are those asserted by Plaintiff McNeeley,
which claims remain stayed pending CVS' appeal of the March 16
order granting the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend and
granting in part CVS' motions to compel arbitration.  The
Plaintiffs' discovery letter brief is accordingly denied without
prejudice to renewal upon a lifting of the stay.  The parties will
please file a joint status report on the progress of the appeal by
Nov. 20, 2018 at noon.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 25, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/gMpepE from Leagle.com.

Sigfredo Cabrera, as individuals, on behalf of themselves and all
other similar persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
R. Craig Clark -- cclark@clarklawyers.com -- Clark Law Firm, Walter
Lewis Haines -- walter@whaines.com -- United Employees Law Group,
P.C. & Monique R. Rodriguez -- mrodriguez@clarklawyers.com -- Clark
Law Group.

Enko Telahun & Christine McNeely, Plaintiffs, represented by R.
Craig Clark, Clark Law Firm & Monique R. Rodriguez, Clark Law
Group.

CVS RX Services, Inc., a New York corporation, CVS Pharmacy, Inc.,
a Rhode Island Corporation & Garfield Beach CVS, LLC, a California
limited liability company, Defendants, represented by Tyler Ryan
Andrews -- andrewst@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, Christiana Lynn
Signs -- signsc@gtlaw.com -- GREENBERG TRAURIG & James Norman
Boudreau -- boudreauj@gtlaw.com -- Greenberg Traurig, LLP, pro hac
vice.


DELEK: Faces Class Action in Haifa Court Over Vehicle Prices
------------------------------------------------------------
Efrat Neuman, writing for Haaretz, reports that a request to join a
class-action suit was filed last month with the Haifa District
Court against Israel's major car importers, alleging that they only
show part of the price of vehicles they sell. The principle
plaintiff, Itai Hoefler, claims he was looking for a new car and
discovered that car importers display prices on their websites
without all taxes and fees, thereby making it harder to make a fair
price comparison. It states that in wake of his request, some
companies (Delek, Carasso and Champion Motors), corrected their
prices. The plaintiff cited the consumer protection law, which
obliges sellers to present all payments for a property or service,
including any taxes collected by the seller. The lawsuit seeks 3.6
million shekels ($1 million) in damages, based on an estimated
96,000 shekels per person for wasting half an hour of time. [GN]


DENKA PERFORMANCE: Environmental Tort Suit Remanded to State Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana issued an Order and Reasons granting Plaintiffs' Motion
to Remand the case captioned LEATRICE W. ARLIE, ET AL., v. DENKA
PERFORMANCE ELASTOMER LLC; E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY; ET
AL., SECTION "F". Civil Action No. 18-7017. (E.D. La.).

Before the Court is the plaintiff's motion to remand on the ground
that the District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

This environmental tort litigation arises from the production of
neoprene, which allegedly exposes those living in the vicinity of
the manufacturing plant to concentrated levels of chloroprene well
above the upper limit of acceptable risk, resulting in a risk of
cancer more than 800 times the national average.

Once a case has been removed, the removing party bears the burden
of proving that the court has jurisdiction to hear the case.
Should there be any doubt as to the propriety of removal, it should
be resolved in favor of remand. If the matter is removed based on
diversity of citizenship, the amount in controversy must exceed
$75,000.00, complete diversity must exist and none of the parties
in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen
of the State in which such action is brought.

The plaintiffs move to remand the action to state court on the
grounds that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. Section 1332(a). Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that
because they filed with their petition a binding pre-removal
stipulation which waives their rights to any damages in excess of
$50,000.000, the amount in controversy will not exceed $75,000.00.


Here, each plaintiff attached their stipulation to their state
court petition and filed before the defendants filed their notice
of removal. Thus, if the plaintiffs can establish to a legal
certainty that total recovery for each individual is less than
$75,000.00, the analysis ends, both for purposes of 28 U.S.C.
Section 1332(a) and the mass action provisions of CAFA, and the
case must be remanded.

First, the Court considers whether the plaintiffs' claims are for
monetary damages, injunctive relief, or both. In the prayer for
relief, the plaintiffs request:

   (a) All damages as are just and reasonable under the
circumstances, both physical and mental, including but not limited
to, compensation for reasonable and justified fear of cancer due to
chloroprene exposure, nuisance, and civil battery, not to exceed
$50,000.00 per plaintiff, including all penalties and attorneys'
fees, but exclusive of interest and costs;

   (b) Interest from the date of the judicial demand; and

   (c) The value of each Plaintiff's claims is equal to or less
than $50,000.00, including all penalties and attorneys' fees, but
exclusive of interest and costs. Plaintiffs and undersigned counsel
stipulate that they will not amend these pleadings to seek greater
than $50,000.00 per plaintiff, including all penalties and
attorneys' fees, but exclusive of interest and costs. Plaintiffs
and undersigned counsel further stipulate that they will renounce
any right to enforce or collect any judgment for each Plaintiff
over and above $50,000.00, including all penalties and attorneys'
fees, but exclusive of interest and costs.

The Court is satisfied that this stipulation is sufficiently broad
in scope and binding on the plaintiffs, restricting each from
collecting any judgment, inclusive of injunctive relief, that
exceeds $50,000.00. Consequently, the Court finds that the
plaintiffs have established to a legal certainly that the
stipulation restricts recovery in excess of the jurisdictional
$75,000.00 amount in controversy, both for purposes of 28 U.S.C.
Section 1332(a) and the mass action provisions of CAFA.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 15, 2018 Order and
Reasons is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybkf2wbx from
Leagle.com.

Helen J Schnyder, Kernell P Butler & Milton Wingate, Jr.,
Plaintiffs, represented by Cayce Christian Peterson --
cpeterson@thelambertfirm.com -- Lambert Firm, APLC, Darryl Jude
Tschirn, Law Office of Darryl J. Tschirn, Hugh Palmer Lambert --
lambert@thelambertfirm.com -- Lambert Firm, APLC, John J. Cummings,
III, Cummings & Cummings, PLC.

Joseph M. Bruno, Bruno & Bruno, 855 Baronne StreetNew Orleans, LA
70113 & Sylvia Elaine Taylor, Law Office of Sylvia Taylor, L.L.C..

Antonio A. Tovar, Jr. & Jamal R Toney, Plaintiffs, represented by
Randal Leroy Gaines, Randal L.Gaines Law Office, Cayce Christian
Peterson, Lambert Firm, APLC, Darryl Jude Tschirn, Law Office of
Darryl J. Tschirn, Hugh Palmer Lambert, Lambert Firm, APLC, Joseph
M. Bruno, Bruno & Bruno & Sylvia Elaine Taylor, Law Office of
Sylvia Taylor, L.L.C.

Denka Performance Elastomer LLC, Defendant, represented by James
Conner Percy -- jpercy@joneswalker.com -- Jones Walker, Justin J.
Marocco -- jmarocco@joneswalker.com -- Jones Walker & Michael R.
Rhea -- mrhea@joneswalker.com -- Jones Walker.

Dow Chemical Company, DowDuPont Inc. & E.I. DuPont de Nemours and
Company, Defendants, represented by Deborah DeRoche Kuchler,
Kuchler Polk Weiner, LLC, Joshua Doguet, Kuchler Polk Weiner, LLC &
Sarah E. Iiams, Kuchler Polk Schell Weiner & Richeson, L.L.C.


DEUTSCHE BANK: Blackrock Advisors RMBS Suit in N.Y. Still Stayed
----------------------------------------------------------------
Discovery remains stayed in a class action filed in New York on
behalf of private-label RMBS trusts against Deutsche Bank National
Trust Company (DBNTC) and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
(DBTCA), according to GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-GCJ7's Form
10-D filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the monthly distribution period from August 11, 2018 to September
12, 2018.

On June 18, 2014, a group of investors, including funds managed by
Blackrock Advisors, LLC, PIMCO-Advisors, L.P., and others, filed a
derivative action against DBNTC and DBTCA in New York State Supreme
Court purportedly on behalf of and for the benefit of 544
private-label RMBS trusts asserting claims for alleged violations
of the U.S. Trust Indenture Act of 1939 ("TIA"), breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence based on DBNTC
and DBTCA's alleged failure to perform their duties as trustees for
the trusts.  Plaintiffs subsequently dismissed their state court
complaint and filed a derivative and class action complaint in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf
of and for the benefit of 564 private-label RMBS trusts, which
substantially overlapped with the trusts at issue in the state
court action.

The complaint alleges that the trusts at issue have suffered total
realized collateral losses of U.S. US$89.4 billion, but the
complaint does not include a demand for money damages in a sum
certain.  DBNTC and DBTCA filed a motion to dismiss, and on January
19, 2016, the court partially granted the motion on procedural
grounds: as to the 500 trusts that are governed by pooling and
servicing agreements, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction.
The court did not rule on substantive defenses asserted in the
motion to dismiss.

On March 22, 2016, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in federal
court.  In the amended complaint, in connection with 62 trusts
governed by indenture agreements, plaintiffs assert claims for
breach of contract, violation of the TIA, breach of fiduciary duty,
and breach of duty to avoid conflicts of interest.  The amended
complaint alleges that the trusts at issue have suffered total
realized collateral losses of U.S. US$9.8 billion, but the
complaint does not include a demand for money damages in a sum
certain.

On July 15, 2016, DBNTC and DBTCA filed a motion to dismiss the
amended complaint.  On January 23, 2017, the court granted in part
and denied in part DBNTC and DBTCA's motion to dismiss.  The court
granted the motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiffs'
conflict-of-interest claim, thereby dismissing it, and denied the
motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiffs' breach of contract
claim (with some exceptions) and claim for violation of the TIA,
thereby allowing those claims to proceed.

On January 26, 2017, the parties filed a joint stipulation and
proposed order dismissing plaintiffs' claim for breach of fiduciary
duty.  On January 27, 2017, the court entered the parties' joint
stipulation and ordered that plaintiffs' claim for breach of
fiduciary duty be dismissed.

On February 3, 2017, following a hearing concerning DBNTC and
DBTCA's motion to dismiss on February 2, 2017, the court issued a
short form order dismissing (i) plaintiffs' representation and
warranty claims as to 21 trusts whose originators and/or sponsors
had entered bankruptcy and the deadline for asserting claims
against such originators and/or sponsors had passed as of 2009 and
(ii) plaintiffs' claims to the extent they were premised upon any
alleged pre-Event of Default duty to terminate servicers.

On March 27, 2017, DBNTC and DBTCA filed an answer to the amended
complaint.

On April 6, 2018, the court entered the parties' joint stipulation
to dismiss the claims of Sealink Funding Limited and ordered that
Sealink's claims be dismissed with prejudice.  On April 24, 2018,
the court entered the parties' joint stipulation to dismiss the
claims of Kore Advisors LP and ordered that Kore's claims be
dismissed with prejudice.

On January 26, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a motion for class
certification.  On August 7, 2018, the presiding magistrate judge
issued a report and recommendation recommending that the court:
(i) deny Plaintiffs' motion for class certification; (ii) dismiss
Plaintiffs' TIA claims as to 39 trusts; and (iii) decline to extend
jurisdiction over, and therefore dismiss without prejudice,
Plaintiffs' remaining claims as to the same 39 trusts, which claims
all arise under state law.

On August 9, 2018, the court stayed all discovery pending the
resolution of any FRCP 72 objections to the report and
recommendation that Plaintiffs may file.


DEUTSCHE BANK: Discovery Still Ongoing in BlackRock Suit in Calif.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Discovery is ongoing related to a request for voluntary dismissal
with prejudice in a potential class action suit against Deutsche
Bank National Trust Company (DBNTC) and Deutsche Bank Trust Company
Americas (DBTCA) in California, according to GS Mortgage Securities
Trust 2012-GCJ7's Form 10-D filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission for the monthly distribution period from August
11, 2018 to September 12, 2018.

On March 25, 2016, the BlackRock plaintiffs filed a state court
action against DBTCA in the Superior Court of California, Orange
County with respect to 513 trusts.  On May 18, 2016, plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint with respect to 465 trusts, and included
DBNTC as an additional defendant.  The amended complaint asserts
three causes of action:  breach of contract; breach of fiduciary
duty; and breach of the duty to avoid conflicts of interest.
Plaintiffs purport to bring the action on behalf of themselves and
all other current owners of certificates in the 465 trusts.  The
amended complaint alleges that the trusts at issue have suffered
total realized collateral losses of U.S. US$75.7 billion, but does
not include a demand for money damages in a sum certain.

On August 22, 2016, DBNTC and DBTCA filed a demurrer as to
Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty cause of action and breach of
the duty to avoid conflicts of interest cause of action and motion
to strike as to Plaintiffs' breach of contract cause of action.  On
October 18, 2016, the court granted DBNTC and DBTCA's demurrer,
providing Plaintiffs with thirty days' leave to amend, and denied
DBNTC and DBTCA's motion to strike.  Plaintiffs did not further
amend their complaint and, on December 19, 2016, DBNTC and DBTCA
filed an answer to the amended complaint.

On January 17, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a motion for class
certification.  On May 30, 2018, the court denied that motion.  On
June 8, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from the denial
of that motion.  On July 16, 2018, the court stayed all trial court
proceedings during the pendency of Plaintiffs' appeal from the
denial of class certification.

On July 18, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a request for voluntary
dismissal with prejudice as to all claims asserted by Sealink
Funding Limited, Kore Advisors LP, and the Nationwide plaintiffs,
as well as all claims asserted by the AEGON plaintiffs related to
one trust.  Discovery is ongoing.


DEUTSCHE BANK: Royal Park's 2nd RMBS Lawsuit Remains Stayed
-----------------------------------------------------------
The second RMBS lawsuit of Royal Park Investments SA/NV against
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (DBNTC) in New York is still
stayed pending the resolution of Royal Park's underlying case,
according to GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2012-GCJ7's Form 10-D
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
monthly distribution period from August 11, 2018 to September 12,
2018.

On June 18, 2014, Royal Park Investments SA/NV filed a class and
derivative action complaint on behalf of investors in ten RMBS
trusts against DBNTC in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York asserting claims for alleged violations of the
TIA, breach of contract and breach of trust based on DBNTC's
alleged failure to perform its duties as trustee for the trusts.
Royal Park's complaint alleges that the total realized losses of
the ten trusts amount to over U.S. US$3.1 billion, but does not
allege damages in a sum certain.

On February 3, 2016, the court granted in part and dismissed in
part plaintiffs' claims: the court dismissed plaintiff's TIA claim
and its derivative theory and denied DBNTC's motion to dismiss the
breach of contract and breach of trust claims.  On March 18, 2016
DBNTC filed an answer to the complaint.  On May 26, 2016, Royal
Park filed a motion for class certification.  On March 21, 2017,
the court denied Royal Park's motion for class certification, but
granted Royal Park leave to renew its motion to propose a redefined
class.

On May 1, 2017, Royal Park filed a renewed motion for class
certification.  On March 29, 2018, the court denied Royal Park's
motion for class certification with prejudice.  On April 13, 2018,
Royal Park filed a petition to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
seeking appellate review of the district court's denial of Royal
Park's motion for class certification.  On August 7, 2018, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals denied Royal Park's petition for
appellate review.  Discovery is ongoing.

On August 4, 2017, Royal Park filed a separate, additional class
action complaint against DBNTC in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York asserting claims for breach of
contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of trust, equitable
accounting and declaratory and injunctive relief arising out of the
payment from trust funds of DBNTC's legal fees and expenses in the
other, ongoing Royal Park litigation.  On October 10, 2017, DBNTC
filed a motion to dismiss Royal Park's separate, additional
complaint.

On August 13, 2018, the court issued an order: (i) staying Royal
Park's separate, additional case until the resolution of Royal
Park's underlying case; and (ii) denying DBNTC's motion to dismiss
Royal Park's separate, additional complaint without prejudice to
the motion's refiling once the stay is lifted.


ELECTROLUX HOME: Court Allows Alternative Service in Rice Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs' Ex
Parte Motion to Allow Alternative Service on Defendants Midea
Microwave and Electrical Appliances Manufacturing Co., Ltd. and
Sharp Appliances Thailand Limited Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(f)(3) in the case captioned ELAINE RICE, ALEX KUKICH,
ERIKA MENDOZA, JAMES HUNT, and DEAN MAURO, Individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ELECTROLUX
HOME PRODUCTS, INC., SHARP MANUFACTURING COMPANY OF AMERICA, a
division of SHARP ELECTRONICS CORPORATION; SHARP APPLIANCES
THAILAND LIMITED; MIDEA AMERICA CORP.; MIDEA MICROWAVE AND
ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES MANUFACTURING CO., LTD; LOWE'S HOME CENTERS,
LLC; MODESTO DIRECT APPLIANCE, INC.; and ABC CORP. 1-10,
Defendants. No. 4:15-CV-00371. (M.D. Pa.).

The Plaintiffs are to serve the Amended Consolidated Class Action
Complaint on Midea Microwave and Electrical Appliances
Manufacturing, Company, Limited through the Central Authority of
the People's Republic of China pursuant to Hague Conference on
Private International Law and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)
and 4(f)(1).

Service of the Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint on Sharp
Appliances Thailand Limited shall be effectuated by the Clerk
pursuant to Rule 4(h) and 4(f)(2)(C)(ii), which requires mail that
the clerk addresses and sends to the corporation and that requires
a signed receipt at the following address: 64 MOO 5 Tambol
Bansamuk, Amphur, BangPakong, Chachoengsao Province, Thailand.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 15, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yb354m77 from Leagle.com.

Elaine Rice, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Charles J. Kocher, Saltz,
Mongeluzzi, Barrett & Bendesky, P.C., pro hac vice, Daniel E.
Gustafson -- dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com -- Gustafson Gluek PLLC,
Jason S. Kilene -- jkilene@gustafsongluek.com -- Gustafson Gluek
PLLC, pro hac vice, Joseph G. Price -- jprice@dlplaw.com --
Dougherty Leventhal & Price, LLP, Patrick Howard, Saltz,
Mongeluzzi, Barrett & Bendesky, P.C., Sean P. McDonough, Dougherty,
Leventhal & Price, L.L.P., Simon Bahne Paris, Saltz, Mongeluzzi,
Barrett & Bendesky, P.C. & Raina C. Borrelli , Gustafson Gluek
PLLC.

Electrolux Home Products, Inc., Defendant, represented by Eric C.
Rusnak -- eric.rusnak@klgates.com -- K&L Gates LLP, Caitlin
Comstock Blanche  -- caitlin.blanche@klgates.com -- K&L Gates LLP,
David R. Fine  -- david.fine@klgates.com -- K&L Gates LLP, pro hac
vice, David R. Osipovich -- david.osipovich@klgates.com -- K&L
Gates LLP, pro hac vice, Loly G. Tor  -- loly.tor@klgates.com --
K&L Gates, LLP, pro hac vice, Michael S. Nelson --
michael.nelson@klgates.com -- K & L Gates, LLP, pro hac vice &
Patrick J. Perrone -- patrick.perrone@klgates.com -- K&L Gates,
LLP.

Sharp Manufacturing Company of America, a Division of Sharp
Electronics Corporation, Defendant, represented by Bridget E.
Montgomery -- bmontgomery@eckertseamans.com -- Eckert Seamans
Cherin & Mellott, LLC, Kelly Robreno Koster , Eckert Seamans Cherin
& Mellott, LLC & Steven R. Kramer -- skramer@eckertseamans.com --
Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, pro hac vice.


ESSENDANT INC: Faces Nguyen Suit over Staples Merger
----------------------------------------------------
LONG NGUYEN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. v. ESSENDANT INC.; RICHARD D. PHILLIPS;
CHARLES K. CROVITZ; DENNIS J. MARTIN; SUSAN J. RILEY; ALEXANDER M.
SCHMELKIN; STUART A. TAYLOR, II; PAUL S. WILLIAMS, and ALEX D.
ZOGHLIN, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-01546-UNA (D. Del., Oct. 5,
2018) is an action against the Defendants for violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and to enjoin the expiration of a
tender offer on a proposed transaction, pursuant to which Essendant
will be acquired by Staples, Inc., through its direct wholly owned
subsidiary Egg Merger Sub Inc.

According to the complaint, on September 14, 2018, Essendant issued
a press release announcing that it had entered into an Agreement
and Plan of Merger (the "Merger Agreement") to sell Essendant to
Staples. Under the terms of the Merger Agreement, Merger Sub
commenced the Tender Offer to purchase all outstanding shares of
Essendant for $12.80 in cash per share of Essendant's common stock
(the "Offer Price"). The Proposed Transaction is valued at
approximately $996 million including debt. Staples commenced the
Tender Offer on September 24, 2018 and the Tender Offer is
scheduled to expire one minute after 11:59 p.m., New York City
time, on October 22, 2018.

On September 24, 2018, Essendant filed a
Solicitation/Recommendation Statement on Schedule 14D-9 (the
"Recommendation Statement") with the SEC. The Recommendation
Statement, which recommends that Essendant stockholders tender
their shares in favor of the Proposed Transaction, omits or
misrepresents material information concerning, among other things:
(i) the background leading to the Proposed Transaction; (ii)
potential conflicts of interest faced by the Company's financial
advisor, Citigroup Global Markets Inc. ("Citi") and Company
insiders; and (iii) the data and inputs underlying the financial
valuation analyses that support the fairness opinion provided by
Citi as well as Essendant management's projections (the "Management
Projections") relied upon by Citi in connection with its analyses.
The failure to adequately disclose such material information
constitutes a violation of the Exchange Act as Essendant
stockholders need such information in order to make a fully
informed decision whether to tender their shares in support of the
Proposed Transaction or seek appraisal.

The Proposed Transaction will unlawfully divest Essendant's public
stockholders of the Company's valuable assets without fully
disclosing all material information concerning the Proposed
Transaction to Company stockholders. To remedy Defendants' Exchange
Act violations, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the expiration of the
Tender Offer unless and until such problems are remedied.

Essendant Inc. operates as a distributor of workplace items in the
United States and internationally. It offers janitorial and
sanitation supplies, breakroom items, foodservice consumables,
safety and security items, and paper and packaging supplies. The
company was formerly known as United Stationers Inc. and changed
its name to Essendant Inc. in June 2015. Essendant Inc. was founded
in 1922 and is headquartered in Deerfield, Illinois. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan M. Ernst, Esq.
          O'KELLY ERNST & JOYCE, LLC
          901 N. Market St., Suite 1000
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 778-4000
          E-mail: rernst@oelegal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Acocelli, Esq.
          Michael A. Rogovin, Esq.
          Kelly K. Moran, Esq.
          WEISSLAW LLP
          1500 Broadway, 16th Floor
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 682-3025
          Facsimile: (212) 682-3010

               - and -

          Melissa A. Fortunato, Esq.
          BRAGAR EAGEL & SQUIRE, P.C.
          885 Third Avenue, Suite 3040
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 308-5858
          Facsimile: (212) 486-0462
          E-mail: fortunato@bespc.com


EVERETT FINANCIAL: Baretich Labor Suit Remanded to State Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Michael M. Anello of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California remanded the case, RICHARD BARETICH,
individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EVERETT FINANCIAL, INC. d/b/a
SUPREME LENDING, a Texas Corporation, Defendant, Case No.
18cv1327-MMA (BGS) (S.D. Cal.), to the Superior Court of
California, County of San Diego.

The Plaintiff, a California resident, previously worked for the
Defendant as a non-exempt employee in California from October 2016
through March 2017.

On May 18, 2018, the Plaintiff filed the putative class action in
San Diego Superior Court on behalf of himself and all other
similarly situated California employees, alleging eight claims for
relief: (1) failure to pay overtime wages; (2) failure to provide
meal periods; (3) failure to provide rest periods; (4) failure to
pay minimum wages; (5) failure to timely pay wages; (6) failure to
provide complete and accurate wage statements; (7) failure to
reimburse necessary business-related expenses and costs; and (8)
unfair and unlawful business practices.

The Plaintiff defines the proposed class as all current and former
non-exempt employees who worked for any of the Defendants within
the State of California at any time during the period from four
years preceding the filing of the Complaint to final judgment.

The Defendant removed the action to the Court on June 19, 2018
pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").  On July 19,
2018, the Plaintiff filed a motion to remand the action back to
state court.  The Defendant filed an opposition, to which the
Plaintiff replied.  The Court further permitted the Defendant to
file a sur-reply, which it filed on Aug. 31, 2018.

Judge Anello finds that there is no dispute that the action
involves more than 100 employees, or that minimal diversity exists.
The sole issue is whether the Defendant has shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million.  He proceeds by analyzing the Defendant's
burden in removing the action, and then addresses the amount in
controversy with respect to the Plaintiff's claims for relief.

He finds that finds that the Defendant has failed to carry its
burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.  As such, the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction and remand is proper.

Finally, the Plaintiff seeks and award of attorneys' fees incurred
in filing the instant motion because the Defendant lacked an
objectively reasonable basis in removing the action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1447(c).  Upon due consideration, the Judge finds
that the Defendant did not lack an objectively reasonable basis for
removing the case to federal court.  Accordingly, he will deny the
Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Anello granted the Plaintiff's motion
to remand, and remanded the action back to the state court.  The
Judge denied the Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees.  The
Clerk of Court is instructed to terminate all pending motions,
deadlines, and hearings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 25, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/DrpUWO from Leagle.com.

Richard Baretich, Individually, and on behalf of other members of
the general public similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Douglas Han -- dhan@justicelawcorp.com -- Justice Law Corporation &
Shunt Tatavos-Gharajeh -- statavos@justicelawcorp.com -- Justice
Law Corporation.

Everett Financial, Inc., doing business as, Supreme Lending, a
Texas Corporation, Defendant, represented by Charles L. Post --
cpost@weintraub.com -- Weintraub Genshlea Chediak and Sproul,
Katherine A. Collins -- kcollins@weintraub.com -- Weintraub Tobin
Chediak Coleman Grodin & Ryan E. Abernethy --
rabernethy@weintraub.com -- Weintraub Tobin Chediak Coleman
Grodin.


FERRELLGAS PARTNERS: Appeal in N.Y. Class Action Still Pending
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ferrellgas Partners, L.P. disclosed in its Form 10-K filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
July 31, 2018, that the parties are preparing appellate briefs
related to the dismissed securities class action lawsuits in New
York.

The Company has been named, along with several current and former
officers, in several class action lawsuits alleging violations of
certain securities laws based on alleged materially false and
misleading statements in certain of the Company's public
disclosures.

The lawsuits, the first of which was filed on October 6, 2016 in
the Southern District of New York, seek unspecified compensatory
damages.  Derivative lawsuits with similar allegations have been
filed naming Ferrellgas and several current and former officers and
directors as defendants.

On April 2, 2018, the securities class action lawsuits were
dismissed with prejudice.  On April 30, 2018, the plaintiffs filed
a notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit and the parties are preparing appellate briefs.

The Company said, "At this time the derivative lawsuits remain
stayed by agreement.  We believe that we have defenses and will
vigorously defend these cases.  We do not believe loss is probable
or reasonably estimable at this time related to the putative class
action lawsuits or the derivative actions."

Ferrellgas Partners, L.P. distributes and sells propane and related
equipment and supplies.  The Company was founded in 1939 and is
headquartered in Overland Park, Kansas.


FERRELLGAS PARTNERS: Still Defends Class Action in Missouri
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ferrellgas Partners, L.P. continues to face consolidated class
action lawsuits in Missouri, according to the Company's Form 10-K
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
fiscal year ended July 31, 2018.

The Company has been named as a defendant, along with a competitor,
in putative class action lawsuits filed in multiple jurisdictions.
The lawsuits, which were consolidated in the Western District of
Missouri on October 16, 2014, allege that the Company and a
competitor coordinated in 2008 to reduce the fill level in barbeque
cylinders and combined to persuade a common customer to accept that
fill reduction, resulting in increased cylinder costs to direct
customers and end-user customers in violation of federal and
certain state antitrust laws.

The lawsuits seek treble damages, attorneys' fees, injunctive
relief and costs on behalf of the putative class.  These lawsuits
have been consolidated into one case by a multidistrict litigation
panel.  The Federal Court for the Western District of Missouri
initially dismissed all claims brought by direct and indirect
customers other than state law claims of indirect customers under
Wisconsin, Maine and Vermont law.  The direct customer plaintiffs
filed an appeal, which resulted in a reversal of the district
court's dismissal.

The Company filed a petition for a writ of certiorari which was
denied.  An appeal by the indirect customer plaintiffs resulted in
the court appeals affirming the dismissal of the federal claims and
remanding the case to the district court to decide whether to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims.

The Company said, "We believe we have strong defenses to the claims
and intend to vigorously defend against the consolidated case.  We
do not believe loss is probable or reasonably estimable at this
time related to the putative class action lawsuit."

Ferrellgas Partners, L.P. distributes and sells propane and related
equipment and supplies.  The Company was founded in 1939 and is
headquartered in Overland Park, Kansas.


FIVE GUYS: Court Conditionally Certifies Class in Finefrock Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JODY FINEFROCK and JULIA FRANCIS, individually and on
behalf of a collective of others similarly-situated, Plaintiffs, v.
FIVE GUYS OPERATIONS, LLC, Defendant, Civil No. 1:16-CV-1221 (M.D.
Pa.), Judge Sylvia H. Rambo of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
conditional collective action certification under 29 U.S.C Section
216(b).

Finefrock and Francis filed their amended complaint on Jan. 31,
2018, asserting claims individually and on behalf of a collective
of others similarly situated.  The single count amended complaint
asserts violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
("FLSA"), as amended by the Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA"), alleging
that Five Guys discriminated against the Plaintiffs and the members
of the collective action class by paying them less than similarly
situated male employees who performed jobs which required equal
skill, effort, and responsibility, and were performed under similar
working conditions.  Specifically, they assert that corporate-owned
Five Guys restaurants maintain centralized control over its
employees, including hiring and wage decisions, and utilizes a
rigid top down, hierarchical corporate structure, which results in
wage discrimination.

From July 2012 through September 2015, Plaintiff Finefrock worked
at various Five Guys corporate-owned locations.  On Feb. 6, 2013,
she became an Assistant General Manager earning an annual salary of
$30,000.  On Aug. 12, 2013, Plaintiff Finefrock was promoted to
General Manager with an annual salary of $38,000 per year and
transferred to the Haines Road Store in York, Pennsylvania.  Around
August 2014, she was given a raise to $38,950 per year and on Feb.
9, 2015, Plaintiff Finefrock was transferred to the High Point
store in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.  Shortly thereafter, on June 26,
2015, Plaintiff Finefrock was placed on a Performance Improvement
Plan.  Five Guys terminated Plaintiff Finefrock's employment on
Sept. 1, 2015, citing the cause as a failure to meet the
requirements of her Performance Improvement Plan.

Plaintiff Francis was working as a General Manager with an annual
salary of $38,000 at the Jonestown franchise store when Five Guys
reacquired it.  She was hired by the corporate-owned store on May
15, 2012, in the same position and salary.  In May 2014, Plaintiff
Francis received a raise to $40,413.  She was subsequently
transferred to the High Point store in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania on
Nov. 17, 2014.  In February 2015, Plaintiff Francis voluntarily
left employment with Five Guys.

During the time Plaintiff Finefrock and Francis were employed by
Five Guys, both learned that Brandon Ridgeway, a male Assistant
General Manager that was promoted to General Manager, earned
$35,000 and $42,000, respectively.  The Plaintiffs also learned
about a male General Manager named James Tyler (last name unknown)
who reportedly earned between $41,000 and $42,000 according to
Plaintiff Francis, and $55,000 according to Plaintiff Finefrock.
Separately, Plaintiff Finefrock learned that Michael De Rosa, a
male Assistant General Manager, was paid $35,000.

The Plaintiffs initiated the lawsuit by filing a complaint on June
21, 2016, which Five Guys answered on Aug. 12, 2016.
Contemporaneously to filing the answer, Five Guys also submitted a
motion to dismiss arguing that the Plaintiffs failed to adequately
plead that separate Five Guys restaurants are a single
establishment for purposes of the Equal Pay Act, and that the
Plaintiffs failed to name specific male comparators who allegedly
received higher pay.

On March 31, 2017, the Court denied the Defendant's motion, and the
Defendant thereafter filed an amended answer.  Following limited
discovery, the Plaintiffs' filed their motion for conditional
collective action certification and brief in support.  Meanwhile,
the Plaintiffs' filed an amended complaint on Jan. 31, 2018, which
the Defendant answered on Feb. 14, 2018.

Presently before the court is the Plaintiffs' motion for
conditional collective action certification under 29 U.S.C Section
216(b).  They move for conditional certification of a collective
action for their EPA claim, request that the Court issues an order
providing notice to the collective, and request that the
Plaintiffs' counsel be appointed as the counsel for the
conditionally certified collective.

The Plaintiffs submitted depositions of Sara Ortiz, Five Guys' Vice
President of Human Resources, Plaintiff Finefrock, and Plaintiff
Francis; several versions of the Assistant General Manager and
General Manager job descriptions; and multiple versions of the Five
Guys' Employee Handbook.  Ms. Ortiz testified that all Assistant
General Managers, regardless of location, have the same job
responsibilities, perform the same tasks, and require the same
baseline qualifications.  The same is true nationwide for the
General Manager position.

Judge Rambo finds that the information submitted by the Plaintiffs
shows that Assistant General Managers and General Managers,
respectively, had the same job descriptions and responsibilities,
required the same baseline qualifications nationwide, and were paid
less than some allegedly similarly situated males.  Compensation
decisions, although based initially on input from their District
Managers, were finalized by a central, common office, i.e. Mr.
Kozura, Vice President of Operations.  

Although the parties presented limited evidence of actual salaries,
the information submitted shows that Plaintiffs Finefrock and
Francis, at various times, earned less than their alleged male
comparators. Because the focus of the inquiry at this conditional
certification stage is not whether there was an actual violation of
law, but rather whether the proposed Plaintiffs are similarly
situated, the court finds that Plaintiffs have met their modest
factual burden.  Accordingly, the Judge will grant the Plaintiffs'
motion and conditionally certify the collective.

Regarding the Plaintiffs' request that the Court authorizes an
opt-in notice to be sent to all the potential members of the EPA
collective action, the Judge recognizes that by monitoring
preparation and distribution of the notice, a court can ensure that
the notice is timely, accurate, and informative, and can settle
disputes about the notice's content before it is distributed.
Thus, the parties will submit a joint proposed notice to the court
for approval by Oct. 25, 2018.  If they cannot agree on the notice
language, they will submit an explanation of disputes and proposed
alternative language by Oct. 25, 2018.  Finally, the Judge will
appoint the Plaintiffs' counsel -- George A. Hanson and Alexander
T. Ricke of Stueve Siege Hanson, and Larry A. Weisberg and Derrek
W. Cummings of McCarthy Weisberg Cummings, P.C. -- as the counsel
for the conditionally certified collective.

Accordingly, Judge Rambo granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
conditional collective action certification, appointed the
Plaintiffs' counsel to represent the conditionally certified class,
and require a joint proposed notice to be submitted by Oc. 25,
2018.  An appropriate order will be issued.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 25, 2018 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/h1YSE4 from Leagle.com.

Jody Finefrock, individually and on behalf of a collective of
others similarly-situated & Julia Francis, individually and on
behalf of a collective of others similarly-situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Derrek William Cummings -- dcummings@mwcfirm.com --
McCarthy Weisberg Cummings, P.C., Larry A. Weisberg --
lweisberg@mwcfirm.com -- McCarthy Weisberg Cummings, P.C.,
Alexander T. Ricke -- ricke@stuevesiegel.com -- Stueve Siegel
Hanson LLP & George A. Hanson -- hanson@stuevesiegel.com -- Stueve
Siegel Hanson LLP.

Five Guys Operations, LLC, Defendant, represented by Emilie R.
Hammerstein -- ehammerstein@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, Sarah
J. Miley -- smiley@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, PC, pro hac
vice & Theodore Allen Schroeder -- tschroeder@littler.com --
Littler Mendelson PC.


FORSTER & GARBUS: Antonov Sues over Debt Collection Practices
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fedor Antonov, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v Forster & Garbus LLP, Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-05613-PKC-SMG (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 8, 2018) seeks to stop the
Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt. The
case is assigned to Judge Pamela K. Chen and referred to Magistrate
Judge Steven M. Gold.

Forster & Garbus LLP provides legal services. The Company
specializes in collecting debts. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Maxim Maximov, Esq.
          Maxim Maximov, LLP
          1701 Avenue P
          Brooklyn, NY 11229
          Telephone: (718) 395-3459
          Facsimile: (718) 408-9570
          E-mail: m@maximovlaw.com


FORT SMITH, AR: Recycling Cost Estimates Differ in Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------
John Lovett, writing for Times Record, reports that the amount Fort
Smith Sanitation spent on recycling and garbage trucks over the
course of 20 months is under contention in a class-action lawsuit
filed last year.

A difference of nearly $667,000 is at odds between an unofficial
baseline amount the city has offered to its attorneys and the $1.2
million figure released on Oct. 12 by attorneys for plaintiff
Jennifer Merriott.

Attorneys W. Whitfield Hyman of Fort Smith and Monzer Mansour of
Fayetteville filed a lawsuit last June on behalf of Merriott, who
claims "misuse of public funds" by the city of Fort Smith when it
made "indiscriminate and unnecessary" use of recycling trucks to
dump most of the city's recyclables in the landfill between
mid-October 2014 and May 2017 without the public's knowledge.

Colby Roe of Daily & Woods in Fort Smith, the city's legal team,
said the number that will be presented in a potential trial over
the matter would be even less than the $571,777 figure the city has
offered. The number is calculated using the city's average monthly
cost for the recycling function at $17,868 multiplied by 32
months.

In an email, Mr. Roe labeled the figure an "approximation of the
costs to run the recycling trucks during the time period at issue
in the lawsuit" and the number "has not been reduced by the costs
of picking and transporting the residential recyclables to the
landfill via the garbage trucks."

The city's approximation "does not take into consideration the
costs which the city would have incurred had it used the garbage
trucks to pick up and transport the residential recyclables to the
landfill," Mr. Roe noted in the same email.

"They claim somebody had to pick up the recycling anyway and get
rid of it," Hyman said. "Our witness says the total tonnage is of
so low volume that it would have been absorbed by the trash
collection, and people may have taken it upon themselves to find a
recycling alternative."

Both sides are still in discovery mode, but no depositions have yet
been scheduled.

Somewhat complicating the matter is a defamation and Whistleblower
Act lawsuit by Mark Schlievert, the former Sanitation director,
against Fort Smith City Administrator Carl Geffken and Deputy City
Administrator Jeff Dingman. A Sebastian County Circuit judge
recently denied Mr. Schlievert's request for a deposition by video
with city attorneys in that case.

Mr. Hyman said the plaintiff's estimate of more than $1,238,000
being spent by the city for the recycling program over 32 months
was conducted by a certified forensic accountant.

The differences between the plaintiff's analysis and the
defendant's, Hyman states, include the city's claim of a 15 percent
discount from residential curbside recycling workers who help out
with trash collection.

"They say 50 percent of curbside recycling labor is for yard waste,
35 percent is for recycling, and 15 percent is for trash," Mr.
Hyman writes. "Why does that 15 percent only come out of
recycling?"

The plaintiff's number also includes temporary worker's pay, fringe
benefits in the labor costs, usage costs for two vehicles -- 118
and 101 -- they claim the city hasn't put into the equation, and
fuel costs that are about 13 cents a gallon cheaper than the
plaintiff's.

The city does not include costs for recycling containers or the
container's depreciation or the salary of a supervisor, Hyman
added. Other factors the plaintiff's attorney says are not being
calculated by the city include "all work codes that made up the
pay, only overtime and standard pay."

"We include insurance and estimated tag costs for the vehicles,
they did not," Mr. Hyman wrote. "Our estimates are very
conservative based on the information we have. We are not
overreaching in anyway."

Hyman also said the plaintiff's figure discounts $131,223 in grants
the city received to pay for recycling carts because they were not
being used and because those costs were not paid for by the
customers of the Fort Smith Sanitation Department.

Sebastian County Judge Stephen Tabor issued an order in July
granting plaintiff Merriott's motion to strike the city's defense
of sovereign immunity. Tabor also denied the city's request in May
to have the case dismissed.

As previously reported by the Times Record, the city dumped
recyclable materials from October 2014 until June 2017 and allowed
residents to assume it was still being recycled. At first, the city
took a portion of the collected materials to Green Source Recycling
in Clarksville, but began dumping all of it in June 2016. From
October 2014 to June 2016, 89 percent of the recyclable material
was dumped in the landfill. [GN]


FRED'S INC: 2 Suits Stayed Pending 11th Cir. Decision in "Taylor"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fred's, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
August 4, 2018, that the "Wallace" and "Williams" actions remain
stayed until the U.S Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit decides
on the appeal in the "Taylor" lawsuit.

On March 30, 2017, a lawsuit entitled Tiffany Taylor, individually
and on behalf of others similarly situated, v. Fred's Inc. and
Fred's Stores of Tennessee, Inc. was filed in the United Stated
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama Southern
Division.  The complaint alleges that the Company wrongfully and
willfully violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
("FACTA").

On April 11, 2017, a lawsuit entitled Melanie Wallace, Sascha
Feliciano, and Heather Tyler, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, v. Fred's Stores of Tennessee, Inc. was
filed in the Superior Court of Fulton County in the state of
Georgia.  The complaint alleges that the Company wrongfully and
willfully violated FACTA.

On April 13, 2017, a lawsuit entitled Lillie Williams and Cussetta
Journey, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
v. Fred's Stores of Tennessee, Inc. was filed in the Superior Court
of Fulton County in the state of Georgia.  The complaint also
alleges that the Company wrongfully and willfully violated FACTA.

The complaints are filed as Class Actions, with the class being
open for five (5) years before the date the complaint was filed.
The complaint seeks statutory damages, attorney's fees, punitive
damages, an injunctive order, and other such relief that the court
may deem just and equitable.

The Company filed a Motion to Dismiss the Taylor complaint, and
this Motion has been granted by the Court.  Plaintiff's counsel has
appealed the Taylor complaint, which appeal is pending before the
11th Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Company filed, and the Court granted Motions to Remove and
Motions to Transfer the Williams and Wallace matters to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.  Since the
Williams and Wallace matters were removed and transferred to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, the
Company has filed a Motion to Consolidate the Williams and Wallace
matters.

When the court granted the Company's motion to dismiss in the
Taylor case, the court simultaneously denied the Motion to
Consolidate, in light of the dismissal in Taylor.

In the Wallace and Williams actions, the District Court entered an
order staying both cases until the U.S Court of Appeals for the
11th Circuit decides on the appeal.

The Company said, "Future costs and liabilities related to this
case may have a material adverse effect on the Company; however,
the Company has not made an accrual for future losses related to
these claims as future losses are not considered probable and an
estimate is unavailable."

Fred's, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, sells general
merchandise through its retail discount stores and full service
pharmacies.  The Company was founded in 1947 and is headquartered
in Memphis, Tennessee.


FRED'S INC: Class Status Bid Pending in Southern Independent Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A motion for class certification in a lawsuit initiated by Southern
Independent Bank is currently pending before the U.S. District
Court, Middle District of Alabama, according to the Form 10-Q of
Fred's, Inc. filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
for the quarterly period ended August 4, 2018.

On October 15, 2015, a lawsuit entitled Southern Independent Bank
v. Fred's, Inc. was filed in the U.S. District Court, Middle
District of Alabama.  The complaint includes allegations made by
the plaintiff on behalf of itself and financial institutions
similarly situated ("alleged class of financial institutions") that
the Company was negligent in failing to use reasonable care in
obtaining, retaining, securing and deleting the personal and
financial information of customers who use debit cards issued by
the plaintiff and alleged class of financial institutions to make
purchases at Fred's stores.

The complaint also includes allegations that the Company made
negligent misrepresentations that the Company possessed and
maintained adequate data security measures and systems that were
sufficient to protect the personal and financial information of
shoppers using debit cards issued by the plaintiff and alleged
class of financial institutions.  The complaint seeks monetary
damages and equitable relief to be proved at trial as well as
attorneys' fees and costs.

The Company has denied the allegations and has filed a motion to
dismiss all claims.  This motion has since been denied, and the
Company filed a motion to reconsider by certifying the question to
the Alabama Supreme Court for clarity.  However, the Company's
motion was denied, and the Company has now completed discovery and
is moving to trial.

A motion for class certification is currently pending before the
U.S. District Court, Middle District of Alabama.

The Company said, "Future costs or liabilities related to the
incident may have a material adverse effect on the Company.  The
Company has not made an accrual for future losses related to these
claims at this time as the future losses are not considered
probable.  The Company has a cyber liability policy with a US$10
million limit and US$100,000 deductible."

Fred's, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, sells general
merchandise through its retail discount stores and full service
pharmacies.  The Company was founded in 1947 and is headquartered
in Memphis, Tennessee.


FRED'S INC: Eddington Wage and Hour Class Lawsuit Still Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fred's, Inc. continues to defend itself against a class action suit
over alleged violations of Federal and state wage and hours laws,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
August 4, 2018.

On March 3, 2018, a lawsuit entitled Abel Eddington and Judy
Hudson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. Fred's Inc., and Fred's Stores of Tennessee, Inc. was
filed in the United States District Court Eastern District of
Texas, Marshall Division.  The complaint alleges that the Company
committed various Federal and state wage and hours violations.  The
complaint is filed as Class Action and seeks back wages, attorneys'
fees, and all other damages allowable by law.

The Company denies these allegations and believes it acted
appropriately in its wage and hour calculations and payments.
Future costs and liabilities related to this case may have a
material adverse effect on the Company; however, the Company has
not made an accrual for future losses related to these claims as
future losses are not considered probable, and an estimate is
unavailable.

The Company has multiple insurance policies which the Company
believes will limit its potential exposure.

Fred's, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, sells general
merchandise through its retail discount stores and full service
pharmacies.  The Company was founded in 1947 and is headquartered
in Memphis, Tennessee.


FRED'S INC: Whitley Class Action Lawsuit in Ohio Still Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fred's, Inc. continue to face a class action lawsuit initially
filed in Tennessee and is now proceeding in Ohio, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended August 4, 2018.

On March 16, 2018, a lawsuit entitled Roxie Whitley, individually
and as next friend of Baby Z.B.D., and Chris and Diane Denson,
individually and as next friends of Baby L.D.L., on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, v. Purdue Pharma
L.P.; Purdue Pharma, Inc.; The Purdue Frederick Company, Inc.;
McKesson Corporation; Cardinal Health, Inc.; AmeriSourceBergen
Corporation; Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.; Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.; Cephalon, Inc.; Johnson & Johnson;
Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Ortho-McNeil-Janssen
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. n/k/a Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Janssen
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. n/k/a Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Endo
Health Solutions Inc.; Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc; Allergan PLC;
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. n/k/a Actavis, Inc.; Watson
Laboratories, Inc.; Actavis LLC; Actavis Pharma, Inc. f/k/a Watson
Pharma, Inc.; and Fred's Stores of Tennessee, Inc. was filed in the
Circuit Court of Fayette County, Tennessee for the 25th Judicial
District at Somerville.

The complaint fails to allege any wrong-doing by the Company.  The
Complaint is filed as a class action seeking various remedies
allowed under Federal and state laws.  The Company denies any
purported wrong-doing.

On May 9, 2018, the Company filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Standing, a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Product Liability Causes
of Action, a Motion to Dismiss for Statute of Limitations, and a
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim on which Relief may
be Sought (collectively, the "May 9, 2018 Motions").

The Court has not ruled on the May 9, 2018 Motions.

On May 9, 2018, this matter was transferred to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio as part of the
National Prescription Opiate Litigation Multidistrict Litigation.

The Company said, "Future costs and liabilities related to this
case may have a material adverse effect on the Company; however,
the Company has not made an accrual for future losses related to
these claims as future losses are not considered probable, and an
estimate is unavailable.  The Company has multiple insurance
policies which the Company believes will limit its potential
exposure."

Fred's, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, sells general
merchandise through its retail discount stores and full service
pharmacies.  The Company was founded in 1947 and is headquartered
in Memphis, Tennessee.


FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS: Beets Sues over Internet & Phone Services
------------------------------------------------------------------
CARRI BEETS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION,
Defendant, Case No. 18STCV00005 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty.,
Oct. 5, 2018) alleges that the Defendant represents through its
written mailers that its lifeline internet services will be
provided at a particular price when this is in fact false. In
addition, the Defendant represents to its consumers that there will
be no installation charges, activation fees or other miscellaneous
fees other than the advertised price of its service plans when this
is in fact false as well. The Defendant misrepresented and falsely
advertised to the Plaintiff and others similarly situated consumers
these lifeline home internet and phone service.

The Defendants conceal the fact that its lifeline home internet and
telephone services are not going to be provided at the advertised
price, in order to deceive consumers into paying more than they
agreed to for the same level of service.

Frontier Communications Corporation provides communications
services to consumer, commercial, and wholesale customers in the
United States. The company was formerly known as Citizens
Communications Company and changed its name to Frontier
Communications Corporation in July 2008. Frontier was founded in
1927 and is based in Norwalk, Connecticut. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          Thomas E. Wheeler, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St. Suite 780,
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com
                  mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                  twheeler@toddflaw.com


FUNKO INC: Court Denies Carl Berkelhammer's Lead Plaintiff Bid
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, issued an Order denying Carl Berkelhammer's
Motion for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and Approval of His
Selection of Lead and Liaison Counsel in the captioned
SATYANARAYANA KANUGONDA, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. FUNKO, INC., et al., Defendants.
Case No. C18-812RSM. (W.D. Wash).

The Plaintiff contends that Funko's Form S-1, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, contained untrue statements of
fact and omissions with regards to Funko's profits and growth,
insulation from adverse industry, sales, and earnings trends, and
materially misleading statements regarding Funko's business,
operations, and prospects.

This is the second round of motions seeking appointment of a lead
plaintiff in this putative securities fraud class action. On the
same day that the Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, Mr. A. Parikh
sought to be appointed as lead plaintiff.

Legal Standard

In securities class actions under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA), the Court is to appoint a lead plaintiff who is
intended to monitor, manage, and control the litigation and who
owes a fiduciary duty to all members of the proposed class.

Proper Notice Was Not Provided

The Plaintiff's notice in this action was not sufficient to fulfill
its statutory purpose of aiding identification of the most adequate
plaintiff. As the Court noted in its prior order, the PSLRA's
notice requirement is intended to broaden the number of potential
plaintiffs seeking to be appointed lead plaintiff.  

The notice Movant relies upon in this action indicated that the
Plaintiff's counsel had filed a class action lawsuit, but did
nothing to identify that lawsuit and allow potential class members
to consider whether to seek appointment as the lead plaintiff.
Providing adequate notice is also important to the PSLRA's
statutory scheme as qualified investors must decide whether to
intervene or compete for lead plaintiff appointment and to
negotiate attorney arrangements so that the class representative
that emerges is the `most capable of adequately representing the
interests of the class.

The notice relied upon, however, gave no information that would
assist potential class members in obtaining information about the
case.  Much like Haung, Haung v. Acterna Corp., 220 F.R.D. 255 (D.
Md. 2004), the notice did not identify the action or what court it
was filed in and directed potential class members to contact
Plaintiff's counsel's firm for information on the class action.
While the notice did alert the class that if you wish to serve as
lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than August 27,
2018, it gave no indication that the action was pending before this
Court. The notice directed the class to Plaintiff's counsel's
website for information and that webpage also did not give an
indication of what court the action was pending.

The Plaintiff may republish notice of this action that complies
sufficiently with the requirements of the PSLRA.

Accordingly, the Court finds and orders the Motion and Memorandum
of Law of Carl Berkelhammer for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and
Approval of His Selection of Lead and Liaison Counsel is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 15, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y7smr6na from Leagle.com.

Satyanarayana Kanugonda, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Phillip C. Kim --
pkim@rosenlegal.com -- THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, PA, pro hac vice,
Spencer Hall, Jr. -- shall@hallgeorge.com -- HALL & GEORGE PLLC &
Colin M. George -- cgeorge@hallgeorge.com -- HALL & GEORGE PLLC.

Funko, Inc, Brian Mariotti, Russell Nickel, Ken Brotman, Gino
Dellomo, Charles Denson, Diane Irvine, Adam Kriger & Richard
McNally, Defendants, represented by Benjamin Naftalis --
benjamin.naftalis@lw.com -- LATHAM & WATKINS, pro hac vice, Kevin
M. McDonough -- kevin.mcdonough@lw.com -- LATHAM & WATKINS, pro hac
vice,Stellman Keehnel -- stellman.keehnel@dlapiper.com -- DLA PIPER
US LLP & David Ian Freeburg -- david.freeburg@dlapiper.com -- DLA
PIPER US LLP.


GENERAL INFORMATION: Court Dismisses Amended Morris FCRA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANTOINETTE MORRIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL
INFORMATION SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants, Civil Action No.
3:17cv195 (E.D. Va.), Judge M. Hannah Lauck of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division,
granted USPS' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiffs each applied for positions with USPS in October 2014
and September 2015.  As part of its hiring process, USPS conducts
background checks on applicants.  In order to gain authorization to
procure a background check, USPS provides applicants with Form
2181-A, which the applicants sign and return.  USPS provided both
the Plaintiffs with Form 2181-A, which they signed and returned.
Form 2181-A was the only document USPS provided to the Plaintiffs
that pertained to criminal background checks.  Shortly after the
Plaintiffs applied for employment, USPS, through General
Information Services, Inc. ("GIS"), procured background checks for
each of them.

The Plaintiffs bring the action on behalf of a proposed Class,
defined as all natural persons residing in the United States
(including all territories and other political subdivisions of the
United States), who (1) applied for an employment position with
USPS within the five years immediately preceding the filing of the
Complaint in this matter, (2) who executed a form substantially
similar to form 2181-A as part of the USPS application process and
(3) on whom the USPS obtained a background report.

The Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, alleging that GIS
(Count I) and USPS (Count II) willfully violated the FCRA by
failing to provide a clear and conspicuous written disclosure in a
document that consists solely of the disclosure to the Plaintiffs
that a consumer report may be obtained about her [or him] for
employment purposes and by thereby failing to obtain from the
Plaintiffs a valid, written authorization to procure a consumer
report for employment purposes, as required by 15 U.S.C. Section
1681 b(b)(2)(A).

The Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief, statutory damages, punitive
damages, and attorneys' fees, litigation expenses, and costs.  On
May 1, 2017, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed GIS as a defendant.
Accordingly, only Count II of the Amended Complaint remains.  USPS
moved to dismiss Count II.

USPS moves to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, arguing
that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because, inter
alia, Plaintiffs lack standing.  It contends that the Plaintiffs
fail to establish a concrete injury in fact.  The Plaintiffs assert
that they have standing because they have suffered a concrete,
in-fact injury that is directly traceable to USPS's conduct and
that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.

Judge Lauck finds that, as alleged, the Plaintiffs lack standing
because they have failed to plead facts that can establish an
injury in fact.  The Plaintiffs do not plead facts supporting a
reasonable inference that they suffered the type of harm Congress
sought to prevent by requiring disclosure.  They do not allege that
they were deprived of any statutorily-required information.

The only factual allegations Plaintiffs plead regarding Form 2181-A
are the contents of the form itself, that the Plaintiffs signed it,
and that USPS therefore ran background checks on them.  They
Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they were either unaware of
the disclosure or uncertain of its meaning, which are among the
harms Congress sought to prevent in passing Section 1681b(b)(2)(A).
Accordingly, the Judge cannot find on the facts as pled that the
Plaintiffs have alleged any real harm with an adverse effect
flowing from the alleged violation.

The Judge concludes that the Plaintiffs' spartan allegations as to
the effects they experienced from USPS' failure to comply with the
stand-alone disclosure requirement cannot establish standing.
Therefore, she granted the Motion to Dismiss.  However, in part
because of the most recent enunciation of standing law in the
Circuit, the Judge granted the Plaintiffs leave to amend their
complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 25, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/JfxKUV from Leagle.com.

Antoinette Morris & Jaylen Cotman, Plaintiffs, represented by
Elizabeth W. Hanes -- elizabeth@clalegal.com -- Consumer Litigation
Associates, Leonard Anthony Bennett -- lenbennett@clalegal.com --
Consumer Litigation Associates & Craig Carley Marchiando --
craig@clalegal.com -- Consumer Litigation Associates.

United States Postal Service, Defendant, represented by Jonathan
Holland Hambrick, Office of the U.S. Attorney & Jennifer Elle
Flurry, United States Attorney's Office.


GRETNA, LA: Nelson Class Certification Bid Dismissed
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, TAMARA G. NELSON and TIMOTHEA RICHARDSON, ET AL, v.
MAYOR BELINDA CONSTANT, ET AL, SECTION "B" (1), Civil Action No.
17-14581 (E.D. La.), Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed without
prejudice the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class.

On Dec. 05, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint
seeking to rectify due process and equal protection violations in
the Mayor's Court of Gretna, Louisiana.  Specifically, the
Plaintiffs allege that the Mayor's Court is improperly operated by
the Defendants as a source of income for the municipality.  The
fines and fees that are assessed by the Mayor's Court fund the City
of Gretna, the Mayor's Court, and the salaries of police officers,
prosecutors, and judges.

The Defendants and other officials of the Mayor's Court, who none
of is disinterested or neutral, are incentivized to maximize
arrests and prosecutions.  A disproportionate number of those
arrested are African American citizens of Gretna.  The Plaintiffs
further allege that the Defendants target the poor through their
Deferred Prosecution Program.

The instant motion seeks to certify two classes of prospective
Plaintiffs, Class A and Class B.  The Class A, purportedly
represented by Plaintiff Nelson, is comprised of aall persons with
criminal prosecutions pending before the Gretna Mayor's Court who
are awaiting trial of their criminal or traffic offenses.  The
Class B, purportedly represented by Plaintiff Richardson, is
comprised of persons who in the past year were denied participation
in, terminated from, or threatened with termination from the
Deferred Prosecution Program due to their inability to pay program
fees.

On June 20, 2018, the Court held oral argument on the Motion.
Since then, pursuant to an Order by the Court, the parties have
completed limited discovery and submitted additional briefing on
legal questions raised at oral argument, including but not limited
to sub-classes, standing, applicability of Younger, and numerosity.


Judge Lemelle dismissed without prejudice the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Certify Class to give the parties additional time to conduct
discovery and pursue, in good faith, an amicable resolution.  It
appears that the case has core issues that preclude certification
of a class, including individualized calculations of a potential
claimant's financial ability to pay associated costs for deferred
prosecution and workable alternatives to same.  Those and related
issues should be collectively considered by all parties with
assistance of counsel.  To that end, the Judge directed the parties
to jointly propose agreeable status conference dates to meet with
the undersigned no later than Oct. 23, 2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 25, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/nehbs3 from Leagle.com.

Tamara G Nelson, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated & Timothea Richardson, individually and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Eric A. Foley -- eric.foley@macarthurjustice.org --
Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center, James William Craig
-- jim.craig@macarthurjustice.org -- Roderick and Solange MacArthur
Justice Center & Katharine Murphy Schwartzmann --
katie.schwartzmann@macarthurjustice.org -- Roderick and Solange
MacArthur Justice Center.

Walter J LeBlanc, in his official capacity as City Prosecutor for
the City of Gretna, Gretna City, Belinda C Constant, in her
official capacity as Mayor of the City of Gretna, Louisiana,
Raymond A Osborn, Jr., in his official capacity as Magistrate of
the Gretna Mayor's Court & Olden C Toups, Jr., in his official
capacity as Magistrate of the Gretna Mayor's Court, Defendants,
represented by E. John Litchfield, Berrigan & Litchfield, LLC &
Michael J. Marsiglia, Berrigan & Litchfield, LLC.

Terri Brossette, in her official capacities as Clerk of the Gretna
Mayor's Court and Lieutenant of the Gretna Police Department &
Arthur Lawson, Jr., in his official capacities as Chief of Police
and Marshal, Defendants, represented by Leonard Louis Levenson --
info@levensonlaw.com -- Leonard L. Levenson & Associates, Christian
Wayne Helmke, Leonard L. Levenson & Associates & Donna R. Barrios,
Leonard L. Levenson & Associates.


GUARANTY BANCORP: Files Supplemental Disclosures on Merger Accord
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Guaranty Bancorp continues to defend itself against a securities
class suit related to its proposed merger with Independent Bank
Group, Inc., according to Guaranty's Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission dated September 14, 2018.

A putative securities class action complaint was filed in the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado on August
22, 2018, against Guaranty, the members of the Guaranty board of
directors and Independent.  The complaint alleged, among other
things, that the defendants violated Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and certain rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder by not disclosing certain
allegedly material facts in the Joint Proxy Statement/Prospectus.

The Joint Proxy Statement/Prospectus dated as of August 15, 2018
(the "Joint Proxy Statement/Prospectus") was filed by Guaranty
Bancorp ("Guaranty") and Independent Bank Group, Inc.
("Independent") with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"SEC") on August 16, 2018, and mailed on or about August 17, 2018
to Guaranty stockholders of record as of the close of business on
August 14, 2018 and to Independent shareholders of record as of the
close of business on August 14, 2018 in connection with the
previously announced proposed merger between Independent and
Guaranty (the "Merger").

Guaranty believes that the claims asserted in the lawsuit are
without merit.  However, to avoid the risk that the lawsuit may
delay or otherwise adversely affect the consummation of the Merger
and to minimize the expense of defending the lawsuit Guaranty
wishes to voluntarily make the supplemental disclosures related to
the Merger.

A full-text copy of the Form 8-K is available at
https://is.gd/6zIVIg


HACOR INC: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Salazar Suit Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------
MIGUEL SALAZAR, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HACOR, INC.; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive, Case No. BC723638 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., Oct.
5, 2018) is an action against the Defendants for unpaid regular
hours, overtime hours, minimum wages, wages for missed meal and
rest periods.

Mr. Salazar was employed by the Defendants as non-exempt employee
in California.

HACOR Inc. produces and sells in-flight meals. The company was
founded in 1983 and is based in Los Angeles, California. As of July
25, 2018, HACOR Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Ourhome Co. Ltd.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Nourmand, Esq.
          James A. De Sario, Esq.
          Melissa M. Kurata, Esq.
          THE NOURMAND LAW FIRM, APC
          8822 West Olympic Boulevard
          Beverly Hills, CA 90211
          Telephone: (310) 553-3600
          Facsimile: (310) 553-3603


HARVARD COLLECTION: Hanks Alleges Wrongful Debt Collections
-----------------------------------------------------------
TEDRA HANKS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HARVARD COLLECTION SERVICES, INC.; PENDRICK
CAPITAL PARTNERS II, LLC; and JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-00541-RGD-RJK (E.D. Va., Oct. 8, 2018) seeks to stop the
Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Harvard Collection Services Inc was founded in 1982. The company's
line of business includes collection and adjustment services on
claims and other insurance related issues. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Aryeh E. Stein, Esq.
          MERIDIAN LAW, LLC
          600 Reisterstown Rd., Ste 700
          Baltimore, MD 21208
          Tel: (443) 326-6011
          Fax: (410) 653-9061
          E-mail: astein@meridianlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Yaakov Saks, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Tel: (201) 282-6500
          Fax: (201) 282-6501
          E-mail: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com


IDT ENERGY: Faces Mackey and Hernandez Suit in N.D. Illinois
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against IDT Energy, Inc. The
case is captioned as Scott Mackey, and Daniel Hernandez,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. IDT Energy, Inc., Case No. 1:18-cv-06756 (N.D. Ill.,
Oct. 5, 2018). The case is assigned to Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo.

IDT Energy, Inc. operates as a retail energy provider. The company
supplies electricity and natural gas to residents, and small and
medium enterprises in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Illinois, and Washington, D.C. It also provides home services,
rewards, and green electricity supply. The company was founded in
2004 and is based in Newark, New Jersey. IDT Energy, Inc. operates
as a subsidiary of Genie Energy Ltd. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Anthony Paronich, Esq.
          BRODERICK & PARONICH, P.C.
          99 High St., Suite 304
          Boston, MA 02360
          Telephone: (508) 221-1510
          E-mail: anthony@broderick-law.com

               - and -

          Alan W. Nicgorski, Esq.
          HANSEN REYNOLDS LLC
          150 S. Wacker Drive, 24th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 265-2253
          E-mail: anicgorski@hansenreynolds.com

               - and -

          Michael C. Lueder, Esq.
          HANSEN REYNOLDS LLC
          301 N. Broadway, Suite 400
          Milwaukee, WI 53202
          Telephone: (414) 255-3044
          E-mail: mlueder@hansenreynolds.com


INTUITIVE SURGICAL: Final Settlement Approval Hearing on Dec. 20
----------------------------------------------------------------
Intuitive Surgical, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 22, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that a final approval
hearing is set for December 20, 2018, in the case entitled, In re
Intuitive Surgical Securities Litigation, No. 5:13-cv-1920.

On April 26, 2013, a purported class action lawsuit entitled Abrams
v. Intuitive Surgical, et al., No. 5-13-cv-1920, was filed against
a number of the Company's current and former officers and directors
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California.

On October 15, 2013, plaintiffs in the Abrams matter filed an
amended complaint. The case has since been retitled In re Intuitive
Surgical Securities Litigation, No. 5:13-cv-1920. The plaintiffs
seek unspecified damages on behalf of a putative class of persons
who purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's common stock
between February 6, 2012, and July 18, 2013. The amended complaint
alleges that the defendants violated federal securities laws by
allegedly making false and misleading statements and omitting
certain material facts in certain public statements and in the
Company's filings with the SEC.

On June 11, 2018, the Company reached an agreement in principle to
enter into a settlement agreement which stipulates a payment of
$42.5 million by the Company, subject to approval by the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California. The
agreement in principle is subject to certain conditions, including
court approval of a final settlement agreement. Plaintiffs filed an
unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the settlement on
September 11, 2018. The court granted preliminary approval on
October 4, 2018, and set a final approval hearing for December 20,
2018.

Intuitive Surgical said, "There can be no assurance that the
parties will enter into a final settlement agreement or that such
agreement will be approved by the court. During the three and nine
months ended September 30, 2018, the Company recorded a pre-tax
charge of zero and $42.5 million, respectively, for this matter."

Intuitive Surgical, Inc. designs, manufactures, and markets da
Vinci surgical systems, and related instruments and accessories.
Intuitive Surgical, Inc. markets its products directly and through
distributors in the United States, Europe, Asia, and
internationally. The company was founded in 1995 and is
headquartered in Sunnyvale, California.


J JILL INC: Still Defends Pension Trust Suit in Massachusetts
-------------------------------------------------------------
J.Jill, Inc. continues to defend itself against an amended
shareholder class action complaint captioned The Pension Trust v.
J.Jill, Inc., et al., according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended August 4, 2018.

On October 13, 2017, a securities lawsuit was filed in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the
Company, several members of our Board of Directors and our Chief
Financial Officer, among others.  The complaint was brought under
the Securities Act of 1933 and sought certification of a class of
plaintiffs comprised of all shareholders that acquired stock issued
by the Company in its initial public offering in March 2017.  The
plaintiffs sought compensation for losses they incurred since
purchasing the stock.

Following the filing of this lawsuit, two additional, similar
actions were brought in the same court.  The three matters were
eventually consolidated, and a lead plaintiff was appointed by the
court.

On March 9, 2018, an amended complaint captioned The Pension Trust
v. J.Jill, Inc., et al. was filed.  The Company filed a motion to
dismiss on May 14, 2018, which was opposed by the plaintiffs on
July 17, 2018.

The Company said it believes the claims in the case are without
merit and intends to defend the matter vigorously.  No material
amount has been accrued.

J.Jill is a premier omnichannel retailer and nationally recognized
women's apparel brand committed to delighting customers with great
wear-now product. The brand represents an easy, relaxed, inspired
style that reflects the confidence and comfort of a woman with a
rich, full life. J.Jill provides guiding service through more than
270 stores nationwide and a robust e-commerce platform. J.Jill is
headquartered outside Boston.


JAMESPORT VINEYARDS: Wu Sues in Eastern District of New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action has been filed against Jamesport Vineyards Inc. The
case is captioned as Kathy Wu, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Jamesport Vineyards Inc.,
Case No. 1:18-cv-05602-ERK-RML (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 8, 2018). The
lawsuit alleges violation of the American with Disabilities act.
The case is assigned to Judge Edward R. Korman and referred to
Magistrate Judge Robert M. Levy.

Jamesport Vineyards Inc. is engaged in selling wines. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          The Marks Law Firm, PC
          175 Varick Street, 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Telephone: (646) 770-3775
          Facsimile: (646) 867-2639
          E-mail: brad@markslawfirm.net


K2M GROUP: Plaintiff in Brown Suit Drops Injunction Bid
-------------------------------------------------------
K2M Group Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission filed on October 22, 2018, 2018,
that the plaintiff in Brown vs K2M Group Holdings, Inc. et al., has
agreed to withdraw the motion for preliminary injunction seeking to
enjoin the stockholder vote on the merger pending the publication
of additional disclosures.

K2M Group Holdings, Inc. made an announcement of Agreement and Plan
of Merger, dated August 29, 2018, together with Stryker
Corporation, a Michigan corporation ("Stryker"), Austin Merger Sub
Corp., a Delaware corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of
Stryker ("Merger Sub), pursuant to which, on the terms and subject
to the conditions set forth in the merger agreement, Merger Sub
will merge with and into K2M, with Merger Sub ceasing to exist and
K2M surviving as a direct or indirect wholly owned subsidiary of
Stryker (the merger).

On October 18, 2018, two purported class action lawsuits were filed
on October 11, 2018, in the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware, challenging the merger. These lawsuits, Brown
vs K2M Group Holdings, Inc. et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-01567-UNA and
Franchi vs K2M Group Holdings, Inc. et al., Case No.
1:18-cv-01568-UNA (the "Actions"), name K2M and individual officers
and members of the K2M Board of Directors as defendants.

The Actions allege, among other things, that the defendants failed
to disclose certain information relating to K2M's financial
projections set forth in the proxy statement filed with the SEC on
October 5, 2018. On October 17, 2018, plaintiff in the Brown
lawsuit filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to
enjoin the stockholder vote on the merger pending the disclosure of
additional information.

K2M believes that the Actions are without merit and that no further
disclosure is required to supplement the proxy statement under
applicable law; however, to eliminate the burden, expense, and
uncertainties inherent in such litigation, and without admitting
any liability or wrongdoing, K2M has agreed to make certain
supplemental disclosures to the proxy statement as. Nothing in the
supplemental disclosures shall be deemed an admission of the legal
necessity or materiality under applicable law of any of the
disclosures set forth herein. The defendants have vigorously
denied, and continue vigorously to deny, that they have committed
any violation of law or engaged in any of the wrongful acts that
were alleged in the Actions. In consideration for such supplemental
disclosures by K2M, plaintiffs in the Actions have agreed to
voluntarily dismiss the Actions, and plaintiff in the Brown lawsuit
has agreed to withdraw the motion for a preliminary injunction
seeking to enjoin the stockholder vote on the merger pending the
publication of additional disclosures.

A copy of the supplemental disclosure is available at
https://goo.gl/KSfcAx.

K2M Group Holdings, Inc., a medical device company, provides spine
and minimally invasive solutions in the United States and
internationally. The company offers implants, disposables, and
instruments primarily to hospitals for use by spine surgeons to
treat spinal pathologies, such as deformity, trauma, and tumor. The
company was founded in 2004 and is headquartered in Leesburg,
Virginia.


KEYS PRODUCTIONS: Fails to Pay OT to Dancers, Lasoyti Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LARISA LASOYTI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. KEYS PRODUCTIONS, INC. D/B/A RED GARTER
SALOON, Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-10198-JLK (S.D. Fla., Oct. 5,
2018) is an action against the Defendant to recover overtime and
minimum wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Lasoyti was employed by the Defendant as dancer.

Keys Productions, Inc. d/b/a Red Garter Saloon is a Florida
corporation operating an adult entertainment club in Monroe,
Florida. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christopher J. Saba, Essq.
          WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, P.A.
          1110 North Florida Avenue, Suite 300
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 224-0431
          Facsimile: (813) 229-8712
          E-mail: csaba@wfclaw.com


KIMBERLY CLARK: Still Defends Bahamas Surgery Center's Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Kimberly-Clark Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 22, 2018, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2018, that the company
continues to defend itself from a class action suit entitled,
Bahamas Surgery Center v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation, et al.

Kimberly-Clark said, "We are party to certain legal proceedings
relating to our former healthcare business, Avanos Medical, Inc.
("Avanos", previously Halyard Health, Inc.), as described in our
Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2017."

During the first quarter of 2018, in the California consumer class
action Bahamas Surgery Center v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation, et
al., the Court reduced the punitive damages award against Kimberly-
Clark from $350 to approximately $19.

As a result, the total compensatory and punitive damages plus
pre-judgment interest awarded against Kimberly-Clark is
approximately $25.

Kimberly-Clark said, "We intend to continue our vigorous defense of
the Bahamas matter."

Kimberly-Clark Corporation, together with its subsidiaries,
manufactures and markets personal care, consumer tissue, and
professional products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Personal Care, Consumer Tissue, and K-C Professional.
Kimberly-Clark Corporation was founded in 1872 and is headquartered
in Dallas, Texas.


LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Autrey Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KURT AUTREY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; and DOES 1
THROUGH 50, INCLUSIVE, Defendants, Case No. 18CV335899 (Cal.
Super., Santa Clara Cty., Oct. 5, 2018) is an action against the
Defendants for failure to provide accurate wages itemized
statements.

Level 3 Communications, LLC provides switched access services. Its
services include local switching, local transport, and carrier
common line. The company was founded in 1997 and is based in
Broomfield, Colorado. Level 3 Communications, LLC operates as a
subsidiary of Level 3 Parent, LLC. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Larry W. Lee, Esq.
          Kristen M. Agnew, Esq.
          Nicholas Rosenthal, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554
          E-mail: lwlee@diversitylaw.com
                  kagnew@diversitylaw.com
                  nrosenthal@diversitylaw.com

               - and -

          William L. Marder, Esq.
          POLARIS LAW GROUP, LLP
          501 San Benito Street, Suite 200
          Hollister, CA 95023
          Telephone: (831) 531-4214
          Facsimile: (831) 634-0333
          E-mail: bill@polarislawgroup.com

               - and -

          Dennis S. Hyun, Esq,
          HYUN LEGAL, APC
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554


LG ELECTRONICS: Fridge Compressors Defective, Jackson et al. Say
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KEVIN JACKSON; JANET EICHENLAUB; DAVID LAW; LINDA DECKER; and EMILY
MANN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. LG ELECTRONICS USA, INC., Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-06746 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 5, 2018) is an action against the
Defendant for selling refrigerators with a faulty or defective
compressors.

The Plaintiffs allege in the complaint that the Defendant design,
manufacture, market, and sale refrigerators with a faulty design or
manufacturing process that results in defective compressors (the
"Compressor Defect"). The Compressor Defect occurs in refrigerators
designed, manufactured, marketed, and sold by LG ("Class
Refrigerators").

The Compressor Defect prevents the refrigerators from cooling
consumers' food and beverages, ultimately causing the food and
beverages to spoil and rendering the refrigerators unusable for
their intended purpose. The Compressor Defect usually manifests
shortly after purchase and well before the end of the anticipated
useful life of the Class Refrigerators.

LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. manufactures and sells home appliances,
entertainment products, mobile communications products, and
business solutions in the United States. LG Electronics U.S.A.,
Inc. operates as a subsidiary of LG Electronics Inc. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Katrina Carroll, Esq.
          Kyle A. Shamberg, Esq.
          LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG LLC
          111 W. Washington Street, Suite 1240
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone (312) 750-1265
          Facsimile: (973) 623-0858
          E-mail: kcarroll@litedepalma.com
                  kshamberg@litedepalma.com

               - and -

          Bruce D. Greenberg, Esq.
          Susana Cruz Hodge, Esq.
          LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC
          570 Broad Street, Suite 1201
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 623-3000
          Facsimile: (973) 623-0858
          E-mail: bgreenberg@litedepalma.com
                  scruzhodge@litedepalma.com
                  Joseph G. Sauder

               - and -

          Matthew D. Schelkopf, Esq.
          Joseph B. Kenney, Esq.
          SAUDER SCHELKOPF LLC
          555 Lancaster Avenue
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (610) 200-0580
          Facsimile: (610)727-4360
          E-Mail: jgs@sstriallawyers.com
                  mds@sstriallawyers.com
                  jbk@sstriallawyers.com


MAB COMMUNITY: Underpays House Managers, Duncan Suit Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
HOLLIE DUNCAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MAB COMMUNITY SERVICES, INC.; MICHAEL
O'FRIEL & GEORGE HERTZ, Defendants, Case No. 18-3129F (Mass.
Super., Suffolk Cty., Oct. 5, 2018) is an action against the
Defendants' failure to pay the Plaintiff and the class overtime
compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff Duncan was employed by the Defendants as house
manager.

MAB Community Services, Inc. was founded as the Massachusetts
Association for the Blind, and is the oldest social service agency
in the country providing services to individuals who are blind or
visually impaired. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam J. Shafran, Esq.
          Nicholas J. Schneider, Esq.
          RUDOLPH FRIEDMANN LLP
          92 State Street
          Boston, MA 02109
          Telephone: (617) 723-7700
          Facsimile: (617) 227-0313
          E-mail: ashafran@rflawyers.com
                  nschneider@rflawyers.com


MAGNANINI FARM: Faces Wu Suit in Southern District of New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kathy Wu, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Magnanini Farm Winery, Inc., Case No.
1:18-cv-09189-VSB (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 7, 2018). The lawsuit alleges
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is
assigned to Judge Vernon S. Broderick.

Magnanini Farm Winery, Inc. produces and sells wines. The Company
is also engaged in the restaurant business. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM PC
          175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Telephone: (646) 770-3775
          Facsimile: (646) 867-2639
          E-mail: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


MARVEL & MALONEY: Steinberg Alleges Wrongful Debt Collection
------------------------------------------------------------
SONIA STEINBERG, Executor to the Estate of GARY STEINBERG,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. MARVEL & MALONEY, Defendant, Case No.
3:18-cv-14660-BRM-DEA (D.N.J., Oct. 5, 2018) seeks to stop the
Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt. The
case is assigned to Judge Brian R. Martinotti and referred to
Magistrate Judge Douglas E. Arpert.

Marvel & Maloney is a law firm in Neptune, NJ. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ari Hillel Marcus, Esq.
          MARCUS ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (732) 695-3282
          Facsimile: (732) 298-6256
          E-mail:ari@marcuszelman.com

               - and -

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS ZELMAN, LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (347) 526-4093
          Facsimile: (732) 298-6256
          E-mail: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


MCGOWEN ENTERPRISES: Leary Class Settlement Has Final Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania issued a Memorandum granting Parties' Motion for Final
Approval of Settlement Agreement in the case captioned ALISON LEARY
& TIMOTHY LEARY, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarlysituated, Plaintiffs, v. McGOWEN ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Defendant. Civil Action No. 17-2070. (E.D. Pa.)

Alison and Timothy Leary argue that McGowen Enterprises included an
illegal tying provision in a warranty that the Learys received when
they purchased a vehicle from CarSense, a car dealership which was
owned by McGowen at the time. They claim that the warranty required
the Learys to use a certain brand of motor oil or risk having the
warranty voided. The Learys filed a class action contending that
McGowen's actions violated the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA).

Settlement Terms

The proposed settlement agreement provided a number of forms of
relief to the Class, as well as an incentive award to the named
Plaintiffs. Under the settlement agreement, each claimant is
entitled to a one-time cash payment of $30.

Settlement

The decision of whether a settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate is guided by the nine-factor test enunciated in Girsh. The
Girsh test directs the court to examine: (1) the complexity,
expense, and likely duration of the litigation (2) the reaction of
the class to the settlement (3) the stage of the proceedings and
the amount of discovery completed; (4) the risks of establishing
liability (5) the risks of establishing damages (6) the risks of
maintaining the class action through the trial  (7) the ability of
the defendants to withstand a greater settlement; (8) the range of
reasonableness of the settlement in light of the best possible
recovery; and (9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in
light of all the attendant risks of litigation. Girsh, 521 F.2d at
157.

Complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation

The Court agrees that in the absence of this settlement, the
parties would face a lengthy and expensive discovery process. This
process would have included fact and expert witnesses, discovery on
damages, and lengthy litigation on whether or not to certify a
class. The Court also suspects that regardless of the outcome of
the trial, post-trial motions and an appeal would follow.

Although this case is not particularly complicated, it is likely
that this case would be costly to prosecute and would proceed well
into the future. Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor
weighs in favor of approving the settlement.

Reaction of the class to the settlement

The class administrator sent email notice to 31,086 class members
whose email addresses were available and mailed a postcard notice
to 1,192 class members who did not have a valid email address. No
objections were received and only two requests for exclusion from
the class were received. This response (or, rather, lack thereof)
weighs in favor of approving the settlement.
Stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed.

Counsel has had ample time and information to learn the strengths
and weaknesses of the case. The parties conducted significant
discovery and briefed a number of issues. The Court is convinced
that this factor weighs heavily in favor of approving the
settlement.

Risks of establishing liability and damages

It would be difficult for Plaintiffs to establish liability in this
case, as Defendant has raised a number of defenses that could allow
it to avoid liability. Defendant also takes issue with Plaintiffs'
damages assessment. Defendant also claims that its warranty did not
include an illegal tying provision. Given these hurdles, the Court
finds that these factors weigh heavily in favor of approving the
settlement.

Risk of maintaining the class action through the trial.

The parties have not pointed the Court to any specific argument
beyond the general legal principle that class certification is
always open to review. This factor is neutral.

Ability of Defendants to withstand a greater judgment

The Court has little information in the record to form a conclusion
about this factor. Although the Court has no reason to believe that
a greater judgment would pose an economic hardship for McGowen, the
Court also has no reason to believe that McGowen's continued
solvency should weigh against approving the settlement. This factor
is therefore neutral.

Range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of the best
possible recovery and in light of all the attendant risks of
litigation

Plaintiffs contend that this "is a very favorable settlement for
the Class.The Court agrees that class members will receive a
tangible benefit. Also, importantly, Defendant has agreed to
injunctive relief that ensures both that the warranty at issue here
remains intact and that future warranties do not include an
improper tying provision. The injunctive relief here is important
to current class members. Weighed against the very real possibility
that class members would receive nothing, these factors weigh in
favor of approval of the settlement.

Prudential factors

The Court also concludes that the Prudential factors weigh in favor
of approving the settlement. First, this litigation has proceeded
far enough that the lawyers and this Court can assess the possible
outcome of a trial on the merits. Second, there are no objections
to the settlement and only two class members opted-out of the
settlement class. Third, as will be discussed below, the request
for attorneys' fees is reasonable. Finally, the procedure for
processing individual claims is fair and reasonable.

The Court concludes that the requirements of Rule 23 have been
satisfied, and that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate. Similarly, the request for attorneys' fees and costs is
also reasonable. The Court therefore grants the motion to approve
the settlement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 15, 2018
Memorandum is available at https://tinyurl.com/yd4ar8o5 from
Leagle.com.

ALISON N. LEARY & TIMOTHY M. LEARY, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF
ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, represented by EDWIN J.
KILPELA -- ekilpela@carlsonlynch.com -- CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA
& CARPENTER LLP, GARY F. LYNCH -- glynch@carlsonlynch.com --
Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela & Carpenter, LLP & MARK T. JOHNSON --
MJohnson@schneiderwallace.com -- SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY
WOTKYNS LLP.

MCGOWEN ENTERPRISES, INC., Defendant, represented by MELISSA B.
HIRST -- mbhirst@jonesday.com -- JONES DAY & KIMBERLY A. BROWN --
kabrown@jonesday.com -- JONES DAY.


MDL 2827: Court Denies Bid for Relief in iPhone Battery Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, issued an Order denying Plaintiffs'
motion for relief pursuant to Rule 23(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in the case captioned IN RE: APPLE INC. DEVICE
PERFORMANCE LITIGATION. Case No. 18-md-02827-EJD. (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs contend that Apple Inc.'s pre-certification
communications with putative class members regarding Apple's iPhone
discounted battery replacement program are intensely misleading and
trick the class members into releasing or limiting claims in this
action.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d), in conducting a class
action the Court may issue orders that require to protect class
members and fairly conduct the action giving appropriate notice to
some or all class members of: (i) any step in the action (ii) the
proposed extent of the judgment; or (iii) the members' opportunity
to signify whether they consider the representation fair and
adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or to
otherwise come into the action.

Apple contends that Rule 23(d) is inapplicable for the simple
reason that Apple is not communicating about the litigation, much
less communicating misleading information about the litigation.

Apple's Communications Do Not Threaten the Fairness Of The
Litigation

The Plaintiffs contend that Apple's communications with putative
class members regarding the battery replacement program threaten
the fairness of the litigation because the communications are
designed to obtain class members' uninformed consent to waive,
release, or settle some or all of the proposed class claims.

The relevant portions of Apple's letter state as follows, inter
alia:

"Nothing in your letter demonstrates any sort of actionable conduct
under the CLRA or any other law, as battery aging and associated
device performance impact are innate characteristics of lithium-ion
batteries.Your letter demands that Apple take the following action
to address plaintiffs' unspecified claims:

(1) Identify or make a reasonable attempt to identify to Co-Lead
Counsel those individuals and entities who purchased the Devices;

(2) In a format provided by Co-Lead Counsel, notify all such
purchasers so identified that, upon their request, Apple will offer
an immediate remedy for past wrongful conduct, including a full
refund of the purchase price, plus interest, costs, and attorneys'
fees;

(3) Undertake (or promise to undertake within a reasonable time if
it cannot be done immediately) the actions described above for all
purchased Devices and

(4) Cease from expressly or impliedly representing to consumers who
purchased Devices are non-defective, as more fully described in the
previously-filed complaints."

As is evident from the cited text, Apple was simply replying to the
relief Plaintiffs requested in the letter. Apple's July 5, 2018
letter does not support the Plaintiffs' contention that Apple is
soliciting putative class members' uninformed consent to waive,
release, or settle some or all of the proposed class claims.

In Slavkov, plaintiffs asserted claims against their employer for
wage and hour violations. Slavkov v. Fast Water Heater Partners I,
LP, 2015 WL 6674575, at *1. The defendants sent two letters to the
putative class members offering a settlement in exchange for a
release of claims in the case. The Slavkov court held that the
releases were both misleading and potentially harmful.
Specifically, the Slavkov court found misleading the requirement in
the release that the signor agree not to disclose any information
concerning the dispute which resulted in the Agreement, because the
requirement could reasonably be interpreted to mean that anyone who
accepted the agreement could not talk to plaintiffs' counsel about
the events surrounding the class action, whether as a witness or
otherwise. The letter was also misleading insofar as it failed to
notify putative class members that releases for certain claims
required judicial approval.  

In Marino v. CACafe, Inc., No. 16-6291 YGR, 2017 WL 1540717 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 28, 2017), the court granted corrective action in a wage
and hour case. While the case was pending, the defendant sent
putative class members an email stating that the company was
restructuring its processes and that to ensure there is no
outstanding issue based on the member's relationship with the
defendant, defendant was offering members $500 for their
cooperation. The email stated that the $500 would be immediately
wired to the member's bank account upon the member signing and
returning a general release of claims and waiver of rights. The
email made no mention of the pending lawsuit.

The instant action is readily distinguishable from Slavkov and
Marino. Apple has not issued any misleading or coercive
communications to putative class members. Furthermore, Apple has
repeatedly stated that the releases in the U.S. Retail Repair Terms
and the Global Repair Terms do not extend to the claims in this
case. Apple also stands ready to enter a stipulation establishing
that participation in the $29 battery discount program or the
related $50 credit program does not waive claims in this
litigation.

In sum, because Apple's communications are not misleading,
coercive, and do not potentially interfere with class members'
rights, there is no basis for the Court to take corrective
measures.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion for relief pursuant to Rule
23(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and related discovery
is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 15, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8eo4gyo from Leagle.com.

Keaton Harvey, Plaintiff, represented by Dina Elizabeth Micheletti,
Fazio & Micheletti LLP & Jeffrey Louis Fazio, Fazio & Micheletti
LLP.

Nicole Gallmann, Plaintiff, represented by Laurence D. King --
lking@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP, Mario Man-Lung
Choi -- mchoi@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP, Matthew
B. George -- mgeorge@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP,
Aaron L. Schwartz -- ASchwartz@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox and
Kilsheimer LLP, pro hac vice, Amy E. Keller --  akeller@dlcfirm.com
-- DiCello Levitt & Casey LLC, David A. Straite --
dstraite@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP, Donald R.
Hall -- dhall@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox and Kilsheimer, Frederic
S. Fox -- ffox@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer, Joseph W.
Cotchett -- jcotchett@cpmlegal.com -- Cotchett Pitre & McCarthy
LLP, Mark Dearman -- mdearman@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman
and Dowd LLP &Mark Cotton Molumphy -- mmolumphy@cpmlegal.com --
Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy LLP.

Apple Inc., Defendant, represented by Christopher Chorba --
cchorba@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, George
Charles Nierlich, III -- gnierlich@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, Rachel S. Brass -- rbrass@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson
Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Theane Evangelis -- rbrass@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. --
tboutrous@gibsondunn.com -- Attorney at Law Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
LLP & Timothy William Loose -- tloose@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher LLP.


MGT CAPITAL: Bragar Eagel Files Class Action Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., disclosed that a class action lawsuit
has been filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey on behalf of all persons or entities who purchased or
otherwise acquired MGT Capital Investments, Inc., securities
between October 9, 2015 through September 7, 2018 (the "Class
Period").  

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, defendants
made false and misleading statements to the market.  The SEC filed
a lawsuit against a former MGT Capital officer and others alleging
a pump & dump scheme to artificially drive up the price of the
Company's stock price.  The management of MGT Capital was
influenced by the scheme, ultimately resulting in the Company's
stock being delisted by the New York Stock Exchange.

On September 7, 2018, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") filed a lawsuit against a former officer of MGT Capital as
well as other individuals and corporations, alleging violations of
the federal securities laws.  The SEC complaint alleges that
defendants were participants in "highly profitable 'pump-and-dump'
schemes . . . from 2013 through 2018" in the stock of three public
companies, including MGT Capital, that, "while enriching Defendants
by millions of dollars, left retail investors holding virtually
worthless shares."

On this news, MGT Capital's share price fell over 25%, closing at
$0.44 per share on September 7, 2018.

If you purchased MGT securities during the Class Period or continue
to hold shares purchased before the Class Period, have information,
would like to learn more about these claims, or have any questions
concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with
respect to these matters, please contact Brandon Walker or Melissa
Fortunato by email at investigations@bespc.com, or telephone at
(212) 355-4648, or by filling out this contact form.  There is no
cost or obligation to you.

For additional information concerning the MGT lawsuit, please go to
https://bespc.com/mgti www.bespc.com.

         Brandon Walker, Esq.
         Melissa Fortunato, Esq.
         Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.
         Telephone: (212) 355-4648
         Website: www.bespc.com
         Email: fortunato@bespc.com
                walker@bespc.com [GN]


MGT CAPITAL: Schall Law Firm Files Class Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
disclosed the filing of a class action lawsuit against MGT Capital
Investments, Inc., for violations of Sec. 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's shares between October 9,
2015 and September 7, 2018, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are
encouraged to contact the firm before November 27, 2018.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall, or Sherin Mahdavian,
of the Schall Law Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los
Angeles, CA 90067, at 424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of
charge. You can also reach us through the firm's website at
www.schallfirm.com, or by email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. The SEC filed a lawsuit against a former
MGT Capital officer and others alleging a pump & dump scheme to
artificially drive up the price of the Company's stock price. The
management of MGT Capital was influenced by the scheme, ultimately
resulting in the Company's stock being delisted by the New York
Stock Exchange. Based on these facts, the Company's public
statements were false and materially misleading throughout the
class period. When the market learned the truth about MGT Capital,
investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

         Brian Schall, Esq.
         Sherin Mahdavian, Esq.
         The Schall Law Firm
         Telephone: 310-301-3335
         Email: brian@schallfirm.com
                sherin@schallfirm.com [GN]


MIDLAND CREDIT: Court OKs Bid to Dismiss Blackwell FDCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, Charleston Division, issued an Order and Opinion granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned Terrence
Blackwell, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., Midland
Funding, LLC, and John Does 1-25, Defendants. Civil Action No.
2:18-cv-2205-RMG. (D.S.C.).

The Plaintiff alleges that a collection letter sent by the
Defendants was deceptive and misleading because the letter implied
that the Defendants chose not to sue rather than disclosing that
the debt being time-barred and the Defendants failed to disclose
that making a partial payment on their debt could restart the
statute of limitations and expose Plaintiff to liability for the
full amount of his debt.

The Defendants identify an earlier filed putative class action in
this District with allegedly similar claims. The case, Jonathan
Alston et al. v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., No. 8:18cv-0014
(Alston), was filed on January 3, 2018. The Alston complaint,
included with Defendants' motion to dismiss,1 includes similar
allegations as the Complaint here but was only filed against
Defendant Midland Credit Management, Inc. The Alston complaint
alleged that debt collection letters sent by Midland Credit
Management violated the FDCPA because they did not advise the
plaintiffs that making a partial payment on their time-barred debt
could restart the statute of limitations and expose them to a
lawsuit.

Legal Standard

A case in federal court may be dismissed for reasons of wise
judicial administration whenever it is duplicative of a parallel
action already pending in another federal court.

The Plaintiff argues that this Court can only apply the first to
file rule where there is an earlier action pending in a different
jurisdiction, rather than in the same jurisdiction as is the case
here. Plaintiff is incorrect. Other district courts in the Fourth
Circuit have made clear that the first to file rule applies even
where both actions are pending in the same district.

Here, there is no dispute that the Alston action was filed first,
over seven months before the Complaint in this action. The Court
next determines whether the issues are substantially similar. The
issues in these cases are almost identical. Both here and in the
Alston action the parties have claims pending solely under Section
1692(e) of the FDCPA. Notably, in the Alston action while the case
initially also included a claim under Section 1692(f), that claim
has since been dismissed.

Furthermore, both cases bring claims regarding almost identical
collection letters. The letters in both cases offered three options
for payment of the debt, contained identical disclosure language,
and involved debt owned by Midland Funding LLC with a letter sent
by Midland Credit Management, Inc. The plaintiffs in both actions
also allege the same harm based on the defendants' alleged failure
to inform the plaintiffs that making a partial payment on their
time-barred debt could restart the statute of limitations and
expose them to liability.
Finally, both actions seek the same relief: actual damages,
statutory damages, and attorneys' fees.  Therefore, these actions
involve substantially similar issues and facts.

The Plaintiff further argues that the defendants in the two actions
are different, as the Alstonaction includes only Midland Credit
Management, Inc. as a defendant, whereas this action also includes
Midland Funding, LLC.2 However, the same exact identity of the
parties is not required for the first to file rule, and instead the
parties must be substantially similar. Indeed, multiple courts have
applied the first to file rule even where different actions include
or omit additional defendants.  

Therefore, the Court rules that the Plaintiffs' addition of Midland
Funding, LLC, does not defeat the application of the first to file
rule. According to the Plaintiffs Complaint, Midland Funding
contracted with Midland Credit Management to collect the debts they
owed, and both the Alston complaint and the Complaint here assert
claims based on debts owned by Midland Funding which Midland Credit
Management attempted to collect. The Defendants therefore share
similar interests, and the inclusion of Midland Funding, LLC does
not defeat application of the first to file rule.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 15, 2018 Order and
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/ybumotfo from
Leagle.com.

Terrence Blackwell, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kenneth Edward
Norsworthy, Jr. , Norsworthy Law Ltd Co.

Midland Credit Management Inc & Midland Funding LLC, Defendants,
represented by Robert Lesley Brown -- rlbrown@wjlaw.net -- Willson
Jones Carter and Baxley PA.


MONSANTO COMPANY: Lasseigne Suit Removed to N.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled STACEY LASSEIGNE, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MONSANTO
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01459, was removed from the
U.S. District Court for the District of Missouri, to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California on October
5, 2018. The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned
Case No. 3:18-cv-06152-VC (N.D. Cal., Oct. 5, 2018) to the
proceeding. The Case is assigned to the Hon. Vince Chhabria.

Monsanto Company, together with its subsidiaries, provides
agricultural products for farmers worldwide. The company was
formerly known as Monsanto Ag Company and changed its name to
Monsanto Company in March 2000. Monsanto Company was founded in
2000 and is based in St. Louis, Missouri. As of June 7, 2018,
Monsanto Company operates as a subsidiary of Bayer
Aktiengesellschaft. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Ocasio Suit Removed to N.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled ANGEL OCASIO, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO
COMPANY; BAYER CORPORATION; and BAYER AG, Defendants, Case No.
4:18-cv-01058, was removed from the Eastern District of Missouri,
to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
on October 5, 2018. The Northern District of California Court Clerk
assigned Case No. 3:18-cv-06150 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 5, 2018) to the
proceeding. The Case is assigned to the Hon. Vince Chhabria.

Monsanto Company, together with its subsidiaries, provides
agricultural products for farmers worldwide. The company was
formerly known as Monsanto Ag Company and changed its name to
Monsanto Company in March 2000. Monsanto Company was founded in
2000 and is based in St. Louis, Missouri. As of June 7, 2018,
Monsanto Company operates as a subsidiary of Bayer
Aktiengesellschaft. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Stevens et al. Suit Removed to N.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit titled JAN STEVENS, and MARJORIE STEVENS,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-01451,
was removed from the Eastern District of Missouri, to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California on October
5, 2018.  The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned
Case No. Case No. 3:18-CV-06151-VC (N.D. Cal., Oct. 5, 2018) to the
proceeding.

Monsanto Company, together with its subsidiaries, provides
agricultural products for farmers worldwide. The company was
formerly known as Monsanto Ag Company and changed its name to
Monsanto Company in March 2000. Monsanto Company was founded in
2000 and is based in St. Louis, Missouri. As of June 7, 2018,
Monsanto Company operates as a subsidiary of Bayer
Aktiengesellschaft. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Seth S. Webb, Esq.
          BROWN & CROUPPEN, P.C.
          211 North Broadway, Suite 1600
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 222-2222
          Facsimile: (314) 421-0359
          E-mail: sethw@getbc.com


MOTT'S LLP: Rahman Remanded to California Superior Court
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MOHAMMED RAHMAN, Plaintiff, v. MOTT'S LLP, Defendant,
Case No. 13-cv-03482-SI (N.D. Cal.), Judge Susan Illston of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (i)
denied Rahman's motion for reconsideration of the Court's Oct. 14,
2014 order that determined he lacked Article III standing to pursue
injunctive relief; and (ii) remanded the case to the Superior Court
for the County of San Francisco.

The case is a consumer class action.  Mott's is the manufacturer of
various food products containing the statement "No Sugar Added" on
their labels and/or packaging.  Rahman alleges that the use of the
statement "No Sugar Added" on Mott's 100% Apple Juice does not
comply with applicable Food and Drug Administration regulations,
specifically 21 C.F.R Section 101.60(c)(2).

On Aug. 12, 2014, the Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment
of the Plaintiff's SAC.  The ourt granted in part and denied in
part the Defendant's motion.  As relevant in the instant motion,
the Court held the Plaintiff lacks Article III standing for
injunctive relief because he cannot plausibly prove that he will,
in the future, rely on the 'No Sugar Added' statement to his
detriment.

On Dec. 3, 2014, the Court denied the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.  The Plaintiff appealed the Court's decision, and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision on July 5, 2017.  The Ninth
Circuit issued its mandate on Oct. 19, 2017.

On Oct. 20, 2017, the Ninth Circuit held that a previously deceived
consumer may have standing to seek an injunction against false
advertising or labeling, even though the consumer now knows or
suspects that the advertising was false at the time of the original
purchase, because the consumer may suffer an 'actual and imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical' threat of future harm.

Now before the Court is the Plaintiff's motion to reconsider, filed
on Dec. 1, 2017.  The Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the
Court's finding that he lacks Article III standing for injunctive
relief in light of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Davidson v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp.  Alternatively, he asks the Court to remand
the action to state court if he lacks standing.

Judge Illston finds that even if the Plaintiff were misled by the
"No Sugar Added" statement to believe that Mott's 100% Apple Juice
contained less sugar than, and was healthier than, other 100% apple
juices, he is now aware that such a belief was unfounded.  The
Judge agrees with the reasoning in Fernandez v. Atkins
Nutritionals, Inc. and finds that there is no future risk that the
Plaintiff will be misled by the "No Sugar Added" label.  Unlike
Davidson, where a consumer's inability to rely on packaging
misrepresentations in the future was an ongoing injury, Rahman is
able to rely on the packaging now that he understands the "No Sugar
Added" label.

The Plaintiff asserts that under California law, if he has Article
III standing to pursue injunctive relief, he can do so without an
order certifying a class.  As he discussed, the Judge holds that
the Plaintiff does not have Article III standing and is not
entitled to injunctive relief under federal law.

Finally, the Plaintiff's claims for relief under the UCL, CLRA, and
FAL do not arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.  Accordingly, the Judge will remand the action to
the Superior Court for the County of San Francisco for lack of
federal jurisdiction.

For the foregoing reasons, tJudge Illston denied Rahman's motion to
reconsider and remanded to the Superior Court for the County of San
Francisco.  The clerk is directed to close the file in the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 25, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/wiuEuw from Leagle.com.

Mohammed Rahman, individually, and on behalf of other members of
the general public similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Bevin Elaine Allen Pike -- Bevin.Pike@CapstoneLawyers.com --
Capstone Law APC, Jordan L. Lurie --
Jordan.Lurie@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Capstone Law APC, Robert
Kenneth Friedl -- Robert.Friedl@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Capstone Law
APC, Cody Robert Padgett -- Cody.Padgett@CapstoneLawyers.com --
Capstone Law, APC, Lee Adam Cirsch -- lee.cirsch@lanierlawfirm.com
-- Capstone Law, APC, Tarek H. Zohdy --
Tarek.Zohdy@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Capstone Lawyers, APC & Trisha
Kathleen Monesi -- Trisha.Monesi@CapstoneLawyers.com -- Capstone
Law APC.

Mott's LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership, Defendant,
represented by Kevin Marshall Sadler -- kevin.sadler@bakerbotts.com
-- Baker Botts L.L.P., Ryan Lee Bangert --
ryan.bangert@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Botts L.L.P. & Van H. Beckwith
-- van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Botts L.L.P.


MOUNTAIN AMERICA: Court Dismisses Tilley EFTA Suit
--------------------------------------------------
Judge Jill N. Parrish of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Utah granted Mountain America's motion to dismiss the case,
LEWIS TILLEY, Plaintiff, v. MOUNTAIN AMERICA FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,
Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-01120-JNP-BCW (D. Utah).

Tilley had a checking account at Mountain America and had agreed to
participate in its overdraft service.  Under this service, the
credit union agreed to cover a charge when there were insufficient
funds in the account.  Mountain America charged a $20 fee for each
overdraft draw it covered.  The opt-in agreement to Mountain
America's overdraft service described the conditions under which it
assesses an overdraft fee.

There are two principal methods for determining the amount of money
in a checking account.  The first is the ledger balance method,
which is the amount that a credit union member sees when he or she
looks up their account balance.  It includes the full amount of
deposits even if the funds have not yet cleared.  The second is the
available balance method.  The available balance takes into account
authorized debit card charges that have not yet posted to the
account and excludes deposits if the funds have not yet been
cleared by the credit union.  Mountain America uses the available
balance method to determine whether a member has overdrawn his or
her checking account.

On Jan. 10, 2016, Tilley had a ledger balance of $49.31 in his
checking account.  He made a debit card purchase for $11.86.  But
the available balance of the account was insufficient to cover this
charge, so Mountain America assessed a $20 overdraft fee.

On Oct. 10, 2017, Tilley filed a complaint against Mountain America
based upon this overdraft charge.  He asserted a federal claim
under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act ("EFTA").  Tilley also
asserted six state-law claims: breach of contract, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment,
money had and received, common law unconscionability, and a claim
under the Utah Truth in Advertising Act.  The complaint sought
certification of a class-action lawsuit so that Tilley can
represent similarly-situated individuals.

Mountain America filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that
Tilley failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Judge Parrish concludes that Tilley failed to state a claim under
the EFTA for two reasons: (1) he did not file his complaint within
the applicable limitations period and (2) Mountain America is
insulated from liability by the EFTA's safe harbor provision.

Leave to amend would be futile.  The safe harbor provision is a
fundamental legal impediment to the EFTA claim.  Because the only
facts that are relevant to the safe harbor defense are the language
of the opt-in agreement and the language of Model Form A-9,
pleading additional facts cannot change the operation of the safe
harbor provision.  The Judge, therefore, dismisses the EFTA claim
with prejudice.

As to the Plaintiff's state law claims, the Judge finds that the
sole basis for him to hear the state-law claims against Mountain
America is supplemental jurisdiction.  The Court may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if the district
court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.  The Judge, therefore, declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims and
dismisses them without prejudice.

Finally, in support of its motion to dismiss, Mountain America
requested that the Court takes judicial notice of its opt-in
agreement and its membership agreement.  Because the complaint
references the opt-in agreement and its authenticity is undisputed,
the Judge takes judicial notice of this document.  He, however, has
no occasion to consider the membership agreement in resolving the
motion to dismiss the ETFA claim.  Accordingly, Mountain America's
request to take judicial notice of the membership agreement is
denied as moot.

Tilley also requests judicial notice of several other documents and
state-court orders.  The Judge concludes that these documents are
either not relevant to the motion to dismiss the EFTA claim or are
not binding authority.  He, therefore, denies Tilley's request for
judicial notice.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Parrish granted Mountain America's
motion to dismiss.  He dismissed with prejudice EFTA claim, and
dismissed without prejudice the remaining state-law claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 25, 2018 Memorandum Decision
and Order is available at https://is.gd/iaXD2I from Leagle.com.

Lewis Tilley, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jae K. Kim --
jkk@mccunewright.com -- MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP, pro hac vice,
Jon V. Harper -- jharper@jonharperlaw.com -- HARPER LAW PLC,
Richard D. McCune -- rdm@mccunewright.com -- MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO
LLP, pro hac vice, M. Denise Dalton, HARPER LAW PLC & Taras Kick,
THE KICK LAW FIRM APC, pro hac vice.

Mountain America Federal Credit Union, Defendant, represented by
Joseph A. Skinner , SCALLEY READING BATES HANSEN & RASMUSSEN,
Andrew J. Demko -- andrew.demko@kattenlaw.com -- KATTEN MUCHIN
ROSENMAN LLP, pro hac vice & Stuart M. Richter, KATTEN MUCHIN
ROSENMAN LLP, pro hac vice.


MURRAY ENERGY: Court Allows Amendment to Mitchell WARN Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois issued an Order granting Plaintiff Mitchell's Motion for
Leave to Amend Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint in the case
captioned JETSON MITCHELL, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MURRAY ENERGY CORPORATION,
AMERICAN COAL COMPANY, INC., and JOHN DOES 1-20, Defendants. Case
No. 3:17-cv-444-NJR-RJD. (S.D. Ill.).

This is a proposed class action brought pursuant to an alleged
violation of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
(WARN Act). The Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to provide the
required 60-day advanced notice of a mass layoff at its New Future
Mine in Galatia, Illinois.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that a party may
amend a pleading and that leave to amend should be freely given
when justice so requires. The Seventh Circuit maintains a liberal
attitude toward the amendment of pleadings so that cases may be
decided on the merits and not on the basis of technicalities.

Here, the Court finds it appropriate to allow the Plaintiff leave
to file his amended class action complaint. When considering
whether a proposed amendment is unduly delayed, courts look to the
similarity of the factual basis for the claims in the original
complaint to the newly-asserted claims, the moving party's
explanation for their delay in raising the new claims, and whether
granting the motion to amend will require new or duplicated
discovery efforts.  

First, with regard to timing, it is not apparent that the Plaintiff
was unduly delayed in seeking leave to amend. As the Plaintiff
explains, only after receiving the Defendants' responses to certain
discovery requests on March 22, 2018, did he become aware of
Defendants' alleged failure to provide 60 days advance written
notice of the plant closing at Galatia. Although proposed plaintiff
Rider may have been laid off on October 3, 2017, Plaintiff Mitchell
may not have been aware of the facts giving rise to his claim until
he was in possession of Defendants' discovery documents.  

The Court is also not convinced that allowing the Plaintiff leave
to amend would unduly prejudice Defendants. Although various
employees and management representatives may have moved to
different employers or geographic regions, and documentary evidence
may be housed in Ohio, such circumstance is not sufficient for the
Court to deny Plaintiff's motion as these issues would be present
even if Plaintiff's motion was denied. Further, it appears there
may be at least some overlap in the discovery related to the claim
Plaintiff now seeks to add and the original claim, thus, the Court
does not find that the proposed amendment would unduly increase
discovery.

The Court finds that the Defendants' futility arguments are better
suited for a motion to dismiss that will allow for more robust
briefing on the issues.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 15, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc4ef4qg from Leagle.com.

Jetson Mitchell, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas J. Lech, Goldenberg
Heller & Antognoli PC, Thomas P. Rosenfeld, Goldenberg Heller &
Antognoli PC, Thomas C. Horscroft, Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli PC
& Kevin P. Green, Goldenberg Heller & Antognoli PC.

Murray Energy Corporation & American Coal Company, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by R. Lance Witcher --
lance.witcher@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins et al, Harrison C.
Kuntz -- harrison.kuntz@ogletree.com -- Ogletree, Deakins, Nash,
Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Joseph T. Charron, Jr., Smith Amundsen, LLC,
& Sarah Jean Kuehnel, Ogletree Deakins et al.

John Doe, 1-20, Defendant, represented by Harrison C. Kuntz ,
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. & Sarah Jean
Kuehnel, Ogletree Deakins et al.


NATIONAL FOOTBALL: Court Denies Certification of Treviso Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CARMELO TREVISO, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL
MUSEUM, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:17CV472 (N.D. Ohio), Judge
Christopher A. Boyko of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, Eastern Division, denied Treviso's Motion for
Class Certification.

On Aug. 23, 2016, Plaintiff Greg Herrick, on behalf of himself and
a putative class, filed the action with the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California against the National Football
League ("NFL") and the National Football Museum, Inc., doing
business as the Pro Football Hall of Fame.  The Plaintiff purchased
a ticket to attend the Hall of Fame Game set for Aug. 7, 2016 in
Canton, Ohio between the Green Bay Packers and the Indianapolis
Colts.  Due to the alleged mismanagement of the Defendants, the
game was cancelled on the very day the game was set to be played,
causing injury to the Plaintiff and the putative class.

The class discovery is complete and the Plaintiff has dismissed his
claims against the NFL.  On March 16, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a
First Amended Complaint substituting a new class representative,
Carmelo Treviso.  In his First Amended Complaint for Breach of
Contract, Treviso, a resident of Wisconsin, alleges he purchased a
ticket to the 2016 Hall of Fame Game.  The Plaintiff alleges the
Court has subject matter jurisdiction under the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA") as the purported class exceeds 100
members and their damages, in aggregate, exceed $5 million.  Venue
is proper as the Defendant resides in the Court's judicial district
and the events giving rise to the claims occurred therein.

According to the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, fans suffered
damages including: out of pocket ticket costs, lodging and travel
expenses, food and souvenir purchases and missed employment time.
He brings a single claim for Breach of Contract on his own behalf
and on behalf of a nationwide class of similarly situated ticket
holders defined as all persons who paid for and/or acquired tickets
to the 2016 NFL Hall of Fame Game ("The Canceled Game Class").  The
Plaintiff seeks economic loss damages, reasonable attorneys' fees,
court costs, pre and post judgment interest and all other relief to
which they are entitled.

The Plaintiff seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(3) made up of people who paid for and/or acquired
tickets to  the game.  In the alternative, he seeks to certify a
liability class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) to determine whether
the Defendant breached its contracts with ticket holders by
cancelling the game.

The Plaintiff's Class Certification Motion seeks to certify the
defined class of ticket purchasers who purchased their game tickets
in one of five versions, 1) a commemorative ticket, 2) a thermal
ticket, 3) the Etix ticket, 4) the print-at-home ticket and 5) the
mobile ticket.  These tickets formed a contract between the
purchaser and the Defendant wherein, according to the Plaintiff,
the purchasers paid money for the seats to the game in exchange for
the Defendant providing them a game to watch.  None of the tickets
absolved the Defendant from liability to pay legal damages if it
cancelled the game nor do the tickets limit the types of damages
recoverable for breach.

The Plaintiff's damages expert, Dr. Justine Hastings, an economist,
has opined that she can calculate classswide aggregate expenses in
each of three categories of damages (tickets, lodging, travel).
Dr. Hastings, Professor of Economics and International and Public
Affairs at Brown University, has submitted three reports, all of
which are subject to the Defendant's pending Motion to Strike.

The Defendant opposes certification, contending that individualized
inquiries are necessary to determine the validity of each class
member's claim for breach of contract and damages.  It also
contends that almost 90% of the putative class has already settled
their claims with the Defendant by accepting its settlement offer.
According to the Defendant, of the approximately 22,000 tickets
sold, nearly 19,000 ticket purchasers have accepted its
reimbursement offer.

The Defendant further contends Treviso cannot adequately represent
the class because he lacks generalized knowledge of the case.
Finally, it contends bifurcation and/or certification of a
liability only class are inappropriate because the highly
individualized damages inquiries would necessitate thousands of
mini-trials rendering the superiority of class action meaningless
as it will do little to streamline the litigation.

Judge Boyko finds that the putative class numbers is approximately
3,000.  Any attempt to determine damages would necessarily involve
3,000 mini-trials, defeating the purposes of a Rule 23 class
action.  Therefore, he finds individual questions of damages
predominate over common question of law or fact and the Plaintiff
has failed to meet its burden demonstrating that a class action is
the superior method for resolving the breach of contract claims.
Thus, he will deny the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification.

The Plaintiff has asked in the alternative that the Court certifies
a liability only class.  Rule 23(c)(4) allows for certification of
a class with respect to particular issues.  However, this issue,
the Judge says, was only discussed briefly in the alternative and
the Court has insufficient briefing on the issue to decide.
Furthermore, he acknowledges that the class definition could be
redrafted to exclude from the class those members who have already
signed releases.

Therefore, the Judge will entertain a renewed motion for class
certification on a liability only the class with a different class
definition.  The motion will also discuss whether subclasses are
necessary based on the differing terms and conditions presented by
the different tickets.  The Motion should also discuss how the
Court should consider the damages portion of the case should it
certify a liability only class.

Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Judge Boyko denied the
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification.  The Plaintiff may file
a Renewed Motion for Class Certification no later than Oct. 15,
2018.  Also, having considered Dr. Hastings' expert report, he
denied the Defendant's Motions to Strike.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 25, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/4EuqY9 from Leagle.com.

Carmelo Treviso, Individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Michael J. Avenatti
-- mavenatti@eaganavenatti.com -- Eagan Avenatti & Romney B.
Cullers, Becker Law Firm.

National Football Museum, Inc., doing business as Pro Football Hall
of Fame, Defendant, represented by Scott M. Zurakowski --
szurakowski@kwgd.com -- Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty,
Aletha M. Carver -- acarver@kwgd.com -- Krugliak, Wilkins,
Griffiths & Dougherty, Amanda M. Connelly -- aconnelly@kwgd.com --
Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty, James M. Williams --
jwilliams@kwgd.com -- Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty &
Joseph J. Pasquarella -- jpasquarella@kwgd.com -- Krugliak,
Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty.


NATIONAL GRID: Nightingale Alleges Illegal Debt Collection
----------------------------------------------------------
Robert Nightingale, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs National Grid USA Company, Inc., the
Defendant, Case No.: 18-3190H (Mass. Super. Ct., Oct. 12, 2018),
alleges that the Defendant repeatedly violated the Massachusetts
Consumer Protection Act and the Massachusetts Debt Collection
Regulations, in its illegal efforts to collect consumer debts.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff allegedly incurred a
financial obligation.  The debt arose from services which were
primarily for family, personal, household purposes. National Grid
attempted to collect the Debt from the Plaintiff and as such,
initialed and engaged in "communications" as defined in 940 CMR
section 7.03.  In or around June 2018, National Grid began calling
the Plaintiff s cellular telephone in an attempt to collect the
Debt.

National Grid called the Plaintiff at an excessive and harassing
rate, placing more than two calls within a seven-day period.  The
Plaintiff suffered actual damages as a result of National Grid's
unlawful conduct. As a direct consequence of National Grid's acts,
practices and conduct. The Plaintiff suffered anger, anxiety,
emotional distress, fear, frustration and embarrassment, the
lawsuit says.

National Grid USA, through its subsidiaries, operates as an
electricity, natural gas, and clean energy delivery company in the
United States.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Sergie Lemberg, Esq.
          LEMBERG LAW, LLC
          Danbury Road
          Wilton, CT 06897
          Telephone: (203) 653-2250
          Facsimile: (203) 653-3424
          E-mail: slemberg@lemberglaw.com


NEIMAN MARCUS: Connolly Suit Stayed Pending Attia Settlement Deal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC said in its Form 10-K filed on
September 18, 2018, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the fiscal year ended July 28, 2018, that the
California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA")
representative action filed by Milca Connolly has been stayed
pending the settlement approval process in Holly Attia case.

As previously reported by the Class Action Reporter, former
employee Milca Connolly filed a representative action on July 28,
2016, alleging only PAGA claims against The Neiman Marcus Group
raising substantially identical claims to those raised in both
Attia and Nguyen.  The Company filed a motion to dismiss or stay
the case in light of Attia and Nguyen.  In November 2016, the court
granted the Company's motion to stay the case.

At a status conference on September 5, 2017, the court maintained
the stay and set a further status conference for November 8, 2017,
Neiman Marcus said in its Form 10-K report for the fiscal year
ended July 29, 2017.

In its Form 10-Q Report for the Quarterly Period Ended October 28,
2017, Neiman Marcus said that at a status conference on November 8,
2017, the court maintained the stay and set a further status
conference for January 29, 2018.

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC is one of the largest omni-channel
luxury fashion retailers in the world, with approximately $4.7
billion in revenues for fiscal year 2017, of which approximately
31% were transacted online. Its Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman and
MyTheresa brands represent fashion, luxury and style to its
customers. The company offers a distinctive selection of women's
and men's apparel, handbags, shoes, cosmetics and precious and
designer jewelry from premier luxury and fashion designers to its
loyal and affluent customers "anytime, anywhere, any device."


NEIMAN MARCUS: Final Court OK on Cyber-Attack Suits Accord Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------
Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC disclosed in its Form 10-K filed on
September 18, 2018, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the fiscal year ended July 28, 2018, that the motion
for final approval of the Cyber-Attack Class Actions Litigation
settlement remains pending.

In January 2014, three class actions relating to a cyber-attack on
the Company's computer systems in 2013 (the "Cyber-Attack") were
filed and later voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs between
February and April 2014.  The plaintiffs had alleged negligence and
other claims in connection with their purchases by payment cards
and sought monetary and injunctive relief.  Three additional
putative class actions relating to the Cyber-Attack were filed in
March and April 2014, also alleging negligence and other claims in
connection with plaintiffs' purchases by payment cards.  Two of the
cases were voluntarily dismissed.  The third case, Hilary Remijas
v. The Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, was filed on March 12, 2014 in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

On June 2, 2014, an amended complaint in the Remijas case was
filed, which added three plaintiffs (Debbie Farnoush and Joanne
Kao, California residents; and Melissa Frank, a New York resident)
and asserted claims for negligence, implied contract, unjust
enrichment, violation of various consumer protection statutes,
invasion of privacy and violation of state data breach laws.  The
Company moved to dismiss the Remijas amended complaint, and the
court granted the Company's motion on the grounds that the
plaintiffs lacked standing due to their failure to demonstrate an
actionable injury.  Plaintiffs appealed the district court's order
dismissing the case to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
ruling, remanding the case back to the district court.  The Company
filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals denied.

The Company filed a motion for dismissal on other grounds, which
the court denied.  The parties jointly requested, and the court
granted, an extension of time for filing a responsive pleading,
which was due on December 28, 2016.

On February 9, 2017, the court denied the parties' request for
another extension of time, dismissed the case without prejudice,
and stated that plaintiffs could file a motion to reinstate.

On March 8, 2017, plaintiffs filed a motion to reinstate, which the
court granted on March 16, 2017.

On March 17, 2017, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking preliminary
approval of a class action settlement resolving this action, which
the court granted on June 21, 2017.

On August 21, 2017, plaintiffs moved for final approval of the
proposed settlement.  In September 2017, purported settlement class
members filed two objections to the settlement, and plaintiffs and
the Company filed responses to the objections on October 19, 2017.

At the fairness hearing on October 26, 2017, the Court ordered
supplemental briefing on the objections.  Objectors filed a
supplemental brief in support of their objections on November 9,
2017, and plaintiffs and the Company filed their supplemental
responses to the objections on November 21, 2017.

On January 16, 2018, an order was issued by the District Court
reassigning the case to Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman due to the
prior judge's retirement.  The motion for final approval of the
settlement remains pending.

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC is one of the largest omni-channel
luxury fashion retailers in the world, with approximately $4.7
billion in revenues for fiscal year 2017, of which approximately
31% were transacted online. Its Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman and
MyTheresa brands represent fashion, luxury and style to its
customers. The company offers a distinctive selection of women's
and men's apparel, handbags, shoes, cosmetics and precious and
designer jewelry from premier luxury and fashion designers to its
loyal and affluent customers "anytime, anywhere, any device."


NEIMAN MARCUS: Healthcare Plan Beneficiary Drops Class Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC disclosed in its Form 10-K filed on
September 18, 2018, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the fiscal year ended July 28, 2018, that it has
entered into a tentative settlement of a putative class action
filed by a plan beneficiary.

On October 24, 2017, a putative class action complaint was filed
against The Neiman Marcus Group LLC and the Company's Health and
Welfare Benefit Plan in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington by a plan beneficiary alleging violations of
the Federal Mental Health Parity Act and the Affordable Care Act
through the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA") in connection with the alleged failure to cover
particular treatments for developmental health conditions.

Plaintiffs have agreed not to pursue their class claims and the
parties have agreed to a tentative settlement with the named
plaintiff.

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC is one of the largest omni-channel
luxury fashion retailers in the world, with approximately $4.7
billion in revenues for fiscal year 2017, of which approximately
31% were transacted online. Its Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman and
MyTheresa brands represent fashion, luxury and style to its
customers. The company offers a distinctive selection of women's
and men's apparel, handbags, shoes, cosmetics and precious and
designer jewelry from premier luxury and fashion designers to its
loyal and affluent customers "anytime, anywhere, any device."


NEIMAN MARCUS: Nguyen's PAGA Claims to be Resolved in Attia Pact
----------------------------------------------------------------
Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC disclosed in its Form 10-K filed on
September 18, 2018, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the fiscal year ended July 28, 2018, that the
California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA")
representative action filed by Xuan Hien Nguyen will be resolved in
connection with the settlement of Holly Attia's claims, as Nguyen
and her claims have been amended into Attia.

As previously reported by the Class Action Reporter, a PAGA
representative action was filed on June 1, 2016 against The Neiman
Marcus Group, Inc. in the same court as Attia by Xuan Hien Nguyen
pleading only PAGA claims and asserting the same factual
allegations as the plaintiffs in Attia.  The Company filed a motion
to dismiss or to stay the case. In September 2016, the court
granted the Company's motion and stayed the Nguyen case in light of
Attia.

At a status conference on September 5, 2017, the court maintained
the stay and set a further status conference for November 8, 2017,
Neiman Marcus said in its Form 10-K report for the fiscal year
ended July 29, 2017.

At a status conference on November 8, 2017, the court maintained
the stay and set a further status conference for January 29, 2018,
Neiman Marcus said in its Form 10-Q Report for the Quarterly Period
Ended October 28, 2017.

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC is one of the largest omni-channel
luxury fashion retailers in the world, with approximately $4.7
billion in revenues for fiscal year 2017, of which approximately
31% were transacted online. Its Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman and
MyTheresa brands represent fashion, luxury and style to its
customers. The company offers a distinctive selection of women's
and men's apparel, handbags, shoes, cosmetics and precious and
designer jewelry from premier luxury and fashion designers to its
loyal and affluent customers "anytime, anywhere, any device."


NEIMAN MARCUS: NLRB Proceedings over Class Action Waiver Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC disclosed in its Form 10-K filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year
ended July 28, 2018, that the remanded portion of the case related
to the Company's Arbitration Agreement and class action waiver is
pending before the National Labor Relations Board.

In August 2015, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB")
affirmed an administrative law judge's recommended decision and
order finding that the Company's Arbitration Agreement and class
action waiver violated the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").
The Company filed its petition for review of the NLRB's order with
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  This case has
been stayed while another similar case has been pending before the
U.S. Supreme Court, which was decided on May 21, 2018 and held that
class action waivers in arbitration agreements are lawful under the
NLRA and must be enforced under the Federal Arbitration Act.

On June 1, 2018, the NLRB filed a motion to remove this case from
abeyance, grant the Company's petition for review regarding the
class action waiver issue consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision, and remand the remainder of the case to the NLRB.

On June 11, 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
granted the NLRB's motion, and the remanded portion of the case is
pending before the NLRB.

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC is one of the largest omni-channel
luxury fashion retailers in the world, with approximately $4.7
billion in revenues for fiscal year 2017, of which approximately
31% were transacted online. Its Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman and
MyTheresa brands represent fashion, luxury and style to its
customers. The company offers a distinctive selection of women's
and men's apparel, handbags, shoes, cosmetics and precious and
designer jewelry from premier luxury and fashion designers to its
loyal and affluent customers "anytime, anywhere, any device."


NEIMAN MARCUS: Roces Case Stayed Pending Approval of Attia Deal
---------------------------------------------------------------
Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC disclosed in its Form 10-K filed on
September 18, 2018, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the fiscal year ended July 28, 2018, that the
putative class and representative action filed by Ondrea Roces and
Sophia Ahmed has been stayed pending the settlement approval
process in Holly Attia case.

As previously reported by the Class Action Reporter, the case
styled ONDREA ROCES and SOPHIA AHMED, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. The Neiman Marcus
Group, LTD, LLC; and the Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, the Defendant,
Case No. CGC-17-562858 (Cal. Super. Ct., Dec. 5, 2017), alleges
that Neiman Marcus has systematically failed to pay Plaintiffs and
all other Sales Associates for the full amount of time they have
worked at Neiman Marcus.  Sales Associates are paid on a commission
basis.  Neiman Marcus fails to pay Sales Associates for time
performing non-commission-generating duties assigned by the
Company. This practice deprives Sales Associates of the wages to
which they are rightfully entitled under the law and constitutes a
violation of state law.

The case was removed from the San Francisco County Superior Court,
CGC-17-562858, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California, Case No. 4:18-CV-0221-YGR, on Jan. 10, 2018.

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC is one of the largest omni-channel
luxury fashion retailers in the world, with approximately $4.7
billion in revenues for fiscal year 2017, of which approximately
31% were transacted online. Its Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman and
MyTheresa brands represent fashion, luxury and style to its
customers. The company offers a distinctive selection of women's
and men's apparel, handbags, shoes, cosmetics and precious and
designer jewelry from premier luxury and fashion designers to its
loyal and affluent customers "anytime, anywhere, any device."


NEIMAN MARCUS: Rubenstein Settlement Wins Final Approval
--------------------------------------------------------
Judge S. James Otero on October 1, 2018, entered a final judgment
approving the settlement in the case, Linda Rubenstein v. The
Neiman Marcus Group LLC et al., Case No. 2:14-cv-07155 (C.D. Cal.),
as fair and reasonable.  As to the request for attorney's fees,
costs, and service award, the Court has completed a thorough
analysis of the basis for the request. The Court finds that an
award of 30% of the Common Fund, in the amount of $870,000 in fees
to Class Counsel, Kirtland and Packard LLP, is appropriate, along
with reimbursement of costs in the amount of $32,574.41, and
Service Award to the Class Representative consisting of a $5,000
payment.  The Court finds that the sum of $902,574.41 is reasonable
compensation for Settlement Class Counsel's Fees and Litigation
Expense Payment. Within 30 days after the Settlement Effective
Date, ARX Management shall pay Settlement Class Counsel the
Settlement Class Counsels Fees and Litigation Expense Payment.

According to Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC's Form 10-K filed on
September 18, 2018, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the fiscal year ended July 28, 2018, a final
approval hearing was scheduled for October 1, 2018.

On August 7, 2014, a putative class action complaint was filed
against The Neiman Marcus Group LLC in Los Angeles County Superior
Court by a customer, Linda Rubenstein, in connection with the
Company's Last Call stores in California.  Ms. Rubenstein alleges
that the Company has violated various California consumer
protection statutes by implementing a marketing and pricing
strategy that suggests that clothing sold at Last Call stores in
California was originally offered for sale at full-line Neiman
Marcus stores when allegedly, it was not, and that the Company
lacks adequate information to support its comparative pricing
labels.

In September 2014, the Company removed the case to the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California.  After
dismissing Ms. Rubenstein's original and first amended complaint,
the court dismissed her second amended complaint in its entirety in
May 2015, without leave to amend, and Ms. Rubenstein appealed.

In April 2017, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Ms.
Rubenstein's allegations were sufficient to proceed past the
pleadings stage of litigation.  The case was transferred back to
the district court.

On September 7, 2017, the district court issued an order permitting
Ms. Rubenstein to file a proposed Third Amended Complaint, which
modifies the putative class period.

Additionally, Ms. Rubenstein filed a motion for class
certification, which was fully briefed by both parties.  The
parties reached an agreement in principle to settle the case,
subject to court approval.  A notice of settlement was filed, and
the hearing on Ms. Rubenstein's motion for class certification was
vacated.

On May 21, 2018, the court granted the motion for preliminary
approval of the settlement and scheduled a final approval hearing
for October 1, 2018.

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC is one of the largest omni-channel
luxury fashion retailers in the world, with approximately $4.7
billion in revenues for fiscal year 2017, of which approximately
31% were transacted online. Its Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman and
MyTheresa brands represent fashion, luxury and style to its
customers. The company offers a distinctive selection of women's
and men's apparel, handbags, shoes, cosmetics and precious and
designer jewelry from premier luxury and fashion designers to its
loyal and affluent customers "anytime, anywhere, any device."


NEIMAN MARCUS: Settlement of Attia Suit Gets Initial Court Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC disclosed in its Form 10-K filed on
September 18, 2018, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the fiscal year ended July 28, 2018, that the
district court has preliminarily approved the settlement of the
putative class action initiated by Holly Attia.

The Company has several wage and hour putative class action matters
pending in California.  The earliest, filed in December 2015 and
amended in February 2016, was filed against The Neiman Marcus
Group, Inc. by Holly Attia and seven other named plaintiffs,
seeking to certify a class of non-exempt employees for alleged
violations for failure to pay overtime wages, failure to provide
meal and rest breaks, failure to reimburse business expenses,
failure to timely pay wages due at termination and failure to
provide accurate itemized wage statements.  Plaintiffs also allege
derivative claims for restitution under California unfair
competition law and a representative claim for penalties under the
California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"), and
all related damages for alleged violations (restitution, statutory
penalties under PAGA, and attorneys' fees, interest and costs of
suit).

The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California in March 2016, and the Company filed a
motion to compel arbitration and requested to stay the PAGA claim.
In June 2016, the court granted the motion and compelled
arbitration of the individual claims.  The court retained
jurisdiction of the PAGA claim and stayed that claim pending the
outcome of arbitration.

In October 2016, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration of the arbitration decision based on a recent
decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Morris v. Ernst &
Young, LLP, and reversed its order compelling arbitration.  The
Company appealed.  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari of the
Morris decision, and the Ninth Circuit appeal is currently stayed
pending the Supreme Court's decision.  In June 2017, the district
court stayed the entire case pending the Supreme Court's decision
in Morris.

The parties reached an agreement in principle to settle this case,
subject to court approval.  The motion for preliminary approval of
the settlement was filed with the court on July 24, 2018.  On
September 5, 2018, the district court preliminarily approved the
settlement.

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC is one of the largest omni-channel
luxury fashion retailers in the world, with approximately $4.7
billion in revenues for fiscal year 2017, of which approximately
31% were transacted online. Its Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman and
MyTheresa brands represent fashion, luxury and style to its
customers. The company offers a distinctive selection of women's
and men's apparel, handbags, shoes, cosmetics and precious and
designer jewelry from premier luxury and fashion designers to its
loyal and affluent customers "anytime, anywhere, any device."


NEIMAN MARCUS: Still Defends NY Class Suit by Visually Impaired
---------------------------------------------------------------
Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC said in its Form 10-K filed on
September 18, 2018, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the fiscal year ended July 28, 2018, that the
defendant companies in a putative class suit filed by Victor Lopez
have filed a joint answer denying the claims.

On October 27, 2017, a putative class action complaint was filed
against Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., The Neiman Marcus Group LLC, and
Bergdorf Goodman, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York by Victor Lopez, an allegedly
visually-impaired and legally blind individual, in connection with
his visits to Bergdorf Goodman, Inc.'s website.  Mr. Lopez alleges,
on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, that Bergdorf
Goodman, Inc.'s website is not fully and equally accessible to
legally blind individuals, resulting in denial of access to the
equal enjoyment of goods and services, in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the New York State and City
Human Rights Laws.  The defendant Companies have filed a joint
answer denying the claims.

Neiman Marcus Group LTD LLC is one of the largest omni-channel
luxury fashion retailers in the world, with approximately $4.7
billion in revenues for fiscal year 2017, of which approximately
31% were transacted online. Its Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman and
MyTheresa brands represent fashion, luxury and style to its
customers. The company offers a distinctive selection of women's
and men's apparel, handbags, shoes, cosmetics and precious and
designer jewelry from premier luxury and fashion designers to its
loyal and affluent customers "anytime, anywhere, any device."


NEW AGE MEDICAL: Made Unsolicited Calls, Abedi Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------
DEEBA ABEDI, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. NEW AGE MEDICAL CLINIC PA; and DOES 1-10,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-14680-KM-SCM (D.N.J., Oct.
5, 2018) is an action for damages, injunctive relief, and any other
available legal or equitable remedies, resulting from the illegal
actions of the Defendants in negligently contacting the Plaintiff
on the Plaintiff's cellular telephone, without any express consent,
in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

New Age Medical Clinic PA provides nutritional and dietary related
services in California. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ross H. Schmierer, Esq.
          DeNITTIS OSEFCHEN PRINCE, P.C.
          525 Route 73 North, Suite 410
          Marlton, NJ 08053
          Telephone: (856) 797-9951
          E-mail: rschmierer@denittislaw.com

               - and -

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@ toddflaw.com


NEW LEGEND: Underpays Drivers, Nichols Suit Alleges
---------------------------------------------------
JAMES NICHOLS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. NEW LEGEND, INC.; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 18STCV00003 (Cal. Super., Los
Angeles, Cty., Oct. 5, 2018) is an action against the Defendants
for failure to pay minimum wages, overtime compensation, authorize
and permit meal and rest periods, and provide accurate wage
statements.

Mr. Nichols was employed by the Defendants as driver.

NEW Legend, Inc., doing business as Legend Transportation, provides
transportation services. The Company offers asset based trucking,
dry and refrigerated van freight, and warehousing services. Legend
Transportation operates in the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward W. Choi, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF CHOI & ASSOCIATES, APLC
          515 S. Figueroa St. Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 381-1515
          Facsimile: (213) 465-4885

               - and -

          Larry W. Lee, Esq.
          Nicholas Rosenthal, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.
          515 S. Figueroa St., Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554
          E-mail: lwlee@diversitylaw.com
                  nrosenthal@diversitylaw.com

               - and -

          David Lee, Esq.
          DAVID LEE LAW
          515 S. Flower Street, Suite 3600
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 236-3536
          Facsimile: (866) 658-4722
          E-mail: David@DavidJLeeLaw.com


NEW ORIENTAL: Bid to Drop Securities Class Lawsuit Still Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
New Oriental Education & Technology Group Inc.'s motion to dismiss
a putative securities class action in New Jersey remains pending,
according to the Company's Form 20-F filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended May
31, 2018.

New Oriental said, "Our Company and certain of our officers and
directors have been named as defendants in a putative securities
class action filed in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey: Amy Chan v. New Oriental Education &
Technology Group Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 16-cv-9279-KSH-CLW
(filed on December 15, 2016).  On March 30, 2017, the court entered
an order appointing lead plaintiffs of this action.  On May 30,
2017, the lead plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.

"The pending action was purportedly brought on behalf of a class of
persons who allegedly suffered damages as a result of their trading
in our ADSs between September 28, 2016 and December 1, 2016.  The
amended complaint alleges that our Company's public filings
contained material misstatements and omissions in violation of the
federal securities laws.  On July 31, 2017, our Company filed a
motion to dismiss the amended complaint, which motion is currently
pending before the court.

"The action remains in its preliminary stages, with the court still
to rule on New Oriental's motion to dismiss.  We believe the case
is without merit and intend to defend the action vigorously."

New Oriental Education & Technology Group Inc. provides private
educational services under the New Oriental brand in the People's
Republic of China.  It operates through Language Training and Test
Preparation Courses, and Others segments.  The Company was founded
in 1993 and is headquartered in Beijing, the People's Republic of
China.


NEW PRIME: Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments in Trucker's Case
---------------------------------------------------------------
Leisa Boley Hellwarth, writing for Ohio Country Journal, reports
that on Oct. 3, the US Supreme Court heard oral arguments in New
Prime v. Oliveira, No. 17-340. While this is not an agricultural
case, it is an important matter that impacts all of us, whether it
is through increased transportation costs (if Oliveira prevails) or
costs society bears from poorly paid workers (if New Prime
prevails). Oliveira is a long-haul trucker with New Prime, although
the trucking company considers him an independent contractor not an
employee. That means any issues regarding pay disputes must be
handled by arbitration according to New Prime.

Arbitration is favored by companies, including New Prime, as it is
streamlined and less expensive than litigation. Plaintiffs like
Oliveira, however, dislike the practice because it denies them
their day in court, and arbitration is viewed as less impartial.
Furthermore, arbitration may be much less convenient for the worker
in terms of location and time.

New Prime, Inc. is a national trucking company that recruits and
trains new drivers through an apprenticeship program. Student
apprentices participating in this program are unpaid, except during
one phase of the program when they receive 14 cents per mile
driven. New Prime waives the tuition of student apprentices who
agree to work for New Prime for one year after completing the
program.

After Dominic Oliveira successfully completed the apprenticeship
program, New Prime encouraged him to become an independent
contractor and referred him to other entities with offices in the
same building and owned by the same company as New Prime to help
him form a limited liability company named Hallmark Trucking LLC
and to secure a truck. Oliveira, through Hallmark, signed an
Independent Contractor Agreement with New Prime. The contract
specified that there was no employer-employee relationship between
Oliveira and New Prime, and that Oliveira was an independent
contractor. The contract also contained an arbitration clause.

Oliveira alleges New Prime under paid him and exercised such
control over him that he was unable to work for other companies. He
stopped driving for New Prime as an independent contractor. He did,
however, later rejoin New Prime as a company driver. Dissatisfied
with the pay as a company driver as well, Oliveira sued New Prime
in the US District Court for the District of Massachusetts in a
putative class action proceeding. Oliveira alleged that New Prime
had failed to pay minimum wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and the Missouri minimum wage statute. He also claimed breach of
contract or unjust enrichment.

New Prime's apprenticeship program enables the company to put two
drivers in a truck, one unpaid, and allow New Prime's trucks to
remain on the road for longer periods of time. While the apprentice
does gain new skills and knowledge as a truck driver, he also
incurs liability for training and equipment that is only forgiven
if he goes to work for the company. If he leaves the company as an
unhappy contractor before the apprenticeship charges are fulfilled,
New Prime will pursue him for thousands of dollars for training and
New Prime will fight hard to prevent the case from getting to court
in the first place, which is what transpired in this case and why
the Supreme Court is now deciding the outcome.

New Prime invoked the Federal Arbitration Act and insists that
Oliveira is forced to arbitrate his claim. To date, Oliveira has
mostly prevailed with his claims in the lower courts. The major
issue seems to be the meaning of "contracts of employ" which is
language from 1925 and the days of President Calvin Coolidge.

On Oct. 3 when oral arguments were heard by the Supreme Court, only
eight justices were on the Court, and since Oliveira prevailed in
the lower court, he only needs four votes to tip the scales of
justice in his favor.

Trucking companies claim a decision in favor of Oliveira will lead
to a significant increase in transportation costs. Those in support
of Oliveira, however, claim this case is fundamentally about
whether companies that routinely violate the law -- in this case by
underpaying their workers who are called "independent contractors"
can use that law breaking to deny working people access to the
courts.

Independent contractor agreements are common in the agricultural
industry, namely vertical integration grower contracts. Anyone
signing an independent contractor agreement might want to watch for
the Supreme Court's decision in New Prime v. Oliveira. [GN]


NEWPORT TOWNSHIP, IL: Dismissal of Amended Reno Suit Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DOUGLAS RENO, Individually and as the Representative
of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
NEWPORT TOWNSHIP; THE NEWPORT TOWNSHIP HIGHWAY DISTRICT; RANDY
WHITMORE, in His Official Capacity as Supervisor of Newport
Township; RODGER EDMONDS, in His Official Capacity as Newport
Township Highway Commissioner; COREY KIRSCHHOFFER, DIANE
CRITTENDEN, RON MILLER, and BETH HARTFORD, in Their Official
Capacities as Trustees of Newport Township; and CARLA WYCKOFF, in
Her Official Capacity as Clerk of the County of Lake,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 2-17-0967 (Ill. App.), Judge Kathryn
E. Zenoff of the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Second
District affirmed the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County
granting the Defendants' motions to dismiss the amended complaint
pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Reno, filed in the circuit court of Lake County a class-action
complaint challenging a permanent road tax that was assessed on
properties in Newport Township.  He named as Defendants, Newport
Township; the Newport Township Highway District; the Newport
Township supervisor, Randy Whitmore; the Newport Township highway
commissioner, Rodger Edmonds; and the Newport Township trustees,
Corey Kirschhoffer, Diane Crittenden, Ron Miller, and Beth
Hartford.  He also named Carla Wyckoff in her capacity as the
county clerk.

In his amended class-action complaint, the Plaintiff challenged
what he termed a permanent New Road Fund Levy, which appeared on
Newport Township residents' property tax bills for tax year 2014.
He asked the Court to certify a class consisting of all owners of
real property in Newport Township who have been charged and paid
the New Road Fund Levy.

It is undisputed that the levy was imposed on properties in the
township without having been submitted for the approval of the
voters at a general election.  Instead, Wyckoff extended the levy1
after the measure was approved by a majority of the residents who
attended a special township meeting in September 2014 that was held
for the purpose of addressing whether to impose the tax.

The Plaintiff alleged in his amended complaint that the manner in
which the levy was approved and extended deprived the proposed
class of its right to vote on the measure at a general election, in
violation of section 18-190(a) of the Property Tax Extension
Limitation Law ("PTELL").  He further contended that the September
2014 township meeting was not properly noticed and that certain
township officials acted inappropriately by (1) depleting the
permanent road fund prior to September 2014 to make it seem that
there was a dire need for a tax to be imposed at the maximum rate
allowed by law; (2) orchestrating the September 2014 meeting with
knowledge that the levy would not pass at a general election; (3)
packing the September 2014 meeting with their supporters and
friends; (4) requiring the residents who attended the September
2014 meeting to publicly state their stances on the issue; and (5)
intending to use the unlawful levy as a slush fund to pay certain
expenses that ought to be paid from a different fund.

Through the action, the Plaintiff sought both a refund of the
levied funds taken under the illegally adopted measure and an
injunction requiring the Township to comply with PTELL.  The
Plaintiff requested additional relief for the deprivation of the
substantive right of the prospective class to vote on and authorize
property taxes pursuant to the Illinois Constitution, the Election
Code and the Property Tax Code.

Specifically, in Count I, the Plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment plus damages against all the Defendants for the violation
of PTELL.  In Count II, the Plaintiff requested an injunction
against all the Defendants to prevent future violations of PTELL
resulting from the levy.  In Count III, he alleged unjust
enrichment against only Newport Township and the Newport Township
Highway District for retaining money that was collected in
connection with the levy.  In Count IV, he alleged that all the
Defendants deprived the class of due process of law, in violation
of section 1983 of the federal Civil Rights Act.

The Township Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint,
pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code.  They offered four
distinct reasons why the amended complaint, or portions thereof,
were subject to dismissal pursuant to section 2-619: (1) under
Shirar v. Elbridge Township, a circuit court lacks jurisdiction to
hear a complaint regarding conduct at a township special meeting;
(2) the Plaintiff's lawsuit was actually a property-tax-objection
case for which the sole and exclusive remedy was provided in
article 23 of the Property Tax Code; (3) the levy was not a "new
rate" within the meaning of section 18-190(a) of PTELL; and (4) the
Plaintiff's request for punitive damages and attorney fees in Count
IV was barred by section 2-102 of the Local Governmental and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act.

Wyckoff filed a separate motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
She argued that the matter should be dismissed pursuant to both
section 2-619(a)(1) and section 2-615 of the Code, as the Plaintiff
was limited to filing a tax-objection complaint in accordance with
the Property Tax Code.  Alternatively, she argued, count IV, which
asserted a section 1983 claim, should be dismissed for three other
reasons: (1) a purported violation of state law does not afford a
basis for relief, (2) the Plaintiff failed to avail himself of the
adequate remedy provided in the tax-objection procedures set forth
in the Property Tax Code, and (3) Wyckoff's conduct in extending
the levy was a ministerial duty.

The court dismissed all counts of the amended complaint with
prejudice.  It agreed with the Defendants that Plaintiff was
required to file a tax-objection complaint instead of pursuing
class-wide equitable relief.  Accordingly, it dismissed the entire
amended complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code.  Although
the Court recognized that its ruling on this point was probably
enough to have the parties on their way to the Appellate Court, it
nevertheless addressed certain of the Defendants' remaining
contentions.

The Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.  He argues that the
case presents a clear violation of PTELL, as the levy was not
approved by voters at a general election.  According to him, a
lawsuit, such as his, alleging a willful violation of PTELL is not
truly a tax objection, because he is not challenging the actual
assessment process.  Moreover, although property owners generally
are barred from seeking redress outside of the statutory
tax-objection procedures, the Plaintiff claims that his amended
complaint implicated the recognized "unauthorized-by-law" exception
to that rule.  He further maintains that the statutory
tax-objection procedures do not provide an adequate remedy at law
for intentional violations of PTELL, because the tax imposed on any
particular property owner might easily be less than the fee to file
a tax-objection complaint, and property owners would have to file
new objections each year.

Judge Zenoff holds that the trial court properly dismissed the
amended complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code, as the
statutory tax-objection procedures provide the Plaintiff an
exclusive and adequate remedy at law and no exception applies so as
to allow his current claims to proceed.  In light of her holdings,
the Judge needs not address the numerous other reasons why the
Defendants believe the Court may affirm the trial court's judgment.
For the reasons stated, Judge Zenoff affirmed the judgment of the
circuit court of Lake County.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 25, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/yYpEuQ from Leagle.com.


NEXSTAR MEDIA: One Source Suit Moved to Northern Dist. of Illinois
------------------------------------------------------------------
ONE SOURCE HEATING & COOLING, LLC PO Box 739 Gardendale, Alabama
35071, the Plaintiff, vs. GRAY TELEVISION, INC. 4370 Peachtree
Road, NE, Suite 400 Atlanta, Georgia 30319; HEARST COMMUNICATIONS
INC. 300 West 57th Street New York, New York 10019; NEXSTAR MEDIA
GROUP, INC. 545 East John Carpenter Freeway, Suite 700 Irving,
Texas 75062; SINCLAIR BROADCAST GROUP, INC. 10706 Beaver Dam Road
Hunt Valley, Maryland 21030; TEGNA, INC. 7950 Jones Branch Drive
McLean, Virginia, 22107;
TRIBUNE MEDIA COMPANY 515 North State Street Chicago, Illinois
60654; and TRIBUNE BROADCASTING COMPANY, LLC 435 N. Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60611, the Defendants, Case No.: 1:18-cv-02765,
was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois (Chicago) on Oct. 15, 2018. The Northern District of
Illinois Court Clerk assigned Case No.: 1:18-cv-06882 to the
proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Virginia M.
Kendall.

This antitrust class action arises from a conspiracy among
Defendants and their co-conspirators to fix prices for commercials
to be aired on broadcast television stations throughout the United
States in violation of Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act, by
sharing competitively sensitive information through their
advertising sales teams. Defendants' and their co-conspirators'
unlawful collusion led to supracompetitive prices in the market for
the sale of television advertising.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          James M. Terrell, Esq.
          MCCALLUM, METHVIN & TERRELL, P.C.
          2201 Arlington Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: (205) 939-0199

               - and -

          Jayne Conroy, Esq.
          Justin Presnal, Esq.
          SIMMONS HANLY CONROY LLC
          112 Madison Avnenue, 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 784-6400
          E-mail: jconroy@simmonsfirm.com
          jpresnal@simmonsfirm.com

               - and -

          Lesley E. Weaver, Esq.
          BLEICHMAR FONTI & AULD LLP
          555 12th Street, Suite 1600
          Oakland, CA 94607
          Telephone: (415) 445-4004
          E-mail: lweaver@bfalaw.com

               - and -

          Jonathan Schochor, Esq.
          SCHOCHOR FEDERICO AND STATON PA
          1211 Saint Paul St
          Baltimore, MD 21202
          Telephone: (410) 234 1000
          Facsimile: (410) 234-1010
          E-mail: jschochor@sfspa.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          John Augustine Bourgeois, Esq.
          KRAMON AND GRAHAM PA
          One South St Ste 2600
          Baltimore, MD 21202
          Telephone: (410) 752-6030
          E-mail: jbourgeois@kg-law.com

               - and -

          Daniel H. Levi, Esq.
          Jay Cohen, Esq.
          William B. Michael, Esq.
          PAULO, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
          1285 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10019-6064
          Telephone: (212) 373-3497
          E-mail: dlevi@paulweiss.com
                  jaycohen@paulweiss.com
                  wmichael@paulweiss.com


OHIO CIVIL SERVICE: Nathaniel Ogle Sues over Agency Fees
--------------------------------------------------------
Nathaniel Ogle, on behalf of himself and a class similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, v. Ohio Civil Service Employees
Association, AFSCME, Local 11, the Defendant, Case:
2:18-cv-01227-ALM-CMV (S.D. Ohio, Oct. 15, 2018), seeks redress
from the Ohio Civil Service Employees Association for its
unconstitutional seizure of agency fees from public employees
without their consent.

According to the complaint, Ogle was compelled to pay fair share
fees to OCSEA, which were automatically deducted from his paycheck.
OCSEA's collective bargaining agreements with other public
employers in Ohio also contain forced fee clauses that compelled
nonmembers of the union to pay fees to the union as a condition of
their employment.

On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court held in Janus v. AFSCME,
Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018), that forced fee
requirements is unconstitutional under the First Amendment and that
unions could not constitutionally collect union dues or fees from
public employees without their affirmative consent.  OCSEA's
seizure of fair share fees from Ogle, and from other employees who
did not affirmatively consent to paying such fees prior to their
exaction, violated their First Amendment rights, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs:

          Donald C. Brey, Esq.
          TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP
          65 E. State Street, Suite 1000
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 334-6105
          E-mail: dbrey@taftlaw.com

               - and -

          Aaron B. Solem, Esq.
          William L. Messenger, Esq.
          NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK
          LEGAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION
          8001 Braddock Road, Suite 600
          Springfield, VA 22160
          Telephone: (703) 321-8510
          E-mail: wlm@nrtw.org
                  abs@nrtw.org


PENN-RIDGE TRANSPORTATION: Removes Castellon Suit to C.D. Cal.
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CARLOS CASTELLON; ALEJANDRO AVILLA; JUAN GABRIEL
ACOSTA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. PENN-RIDGE TRANSPORTATION, INC.; BEST BUY
CO., INC. D/B/A MN BEST BUY CO.; BEST BUY ENTERPRISE SERVICES,
INC.; BEST BUY PURCHASING LLC; BEST BUY WAREHOUSING LOGISTICS,
INC.; BEST BUY STORES, L.P.; PACIFIC SALES KITCHEN AND BATH
CENTERS, LLC; PATRICK MCCUSKEY; JILL REMICK; DONALD STANLSZEWSKI;
KATHLEEN M BRUCE; FOX RIVER ACCOUNTING SERVICES, LLC; CONTROL
TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, INC.; PENN-RIDGE TRANSPORTATION, INC.;
XOCHITL I. PAZOS D/B/A JIREH LOGISTICS; and ROES 1 THROUGH 20
INCLUSIVE, Defendants, the Defendants a notice to remove the
lawsuit from the Superior Court of the State of California, County
of San Bernardino (Case No. CIVDS1508746) to the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California on October 5, 2018.
The Central District of California clerk of court assigned Case No.
5:18-cv-02136-AG-KK (C.D. Cal., Oct. 5, 2018). The case is assigned
to Judge Andrew J. Guilford, and referred to Magistrate Judge Kenly
Kiya Kato.

Penn-Ridge Transportation Inc provides trucking transportation
services. The Company offers shuttle operations, cross-dock
operations, warehouse inventory management, and home delivery
services. Penn-Ridge Transportation serves customers in the United
States. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David P Myers, Esq.
          Jason T Hatcher, Esq.
          Robert M Kitson, Esq.
          MYERS LAW GROUP APC
          9327 Fairway View Place Suite 100
          Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730
          Telephone: (909) 919-2027
          Facsimile: (888) 375-2102
          E-mail: dmyers@myerslawgroup.com
                  jhatcher@myerslawgroup.com
                  rkitson@myerslawgroup.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Christopher Chad McNatt, Jr., Esq.
          Megan Emslie Ross, Esq.
          SCOPELITIS GARVIN LIGHT HANSON AND FEARY LLP
          2 North Lake Avenue Suite 560
          Pasadena, CA 91101
          Telephone: (626) 795-4700
          Facsimile: (626) 795-4790
          E-mail: cmcnatt@scopelitis.com
                  mross@scopelitis.com

               - and -

          Christopher John Taylor, Esq.
          MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          600 Anton Blvd Suite 1800
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: (714) 830-0698
          Facsimile: (949) 399-7001
          E-mail: christopher.taylor@morganlewis.com

               - and -

          Barbara J Miller, Esq.
          MORGAN LEWIS AND BOCKIUS LLP
          600 Anton Bouleard Suite 1800
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: (714) 830-0600
          Facsimile: (714) 830-0700
          E-mail: barbara.miller@morganlewis.com


PENNSYLVANIA: Court Dismisses R. Harold's Suit
----------------------------------------------
In the case, RUSSELL HAROLD and SEAN WILLIAMS, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated Plaintiffs, v. LESLIE
RICHARDS, in her official capacity as Secretary of Transportation
of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation; LEO BAGLEY, in
his official capacity as Executive Deputy Secretary of the
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation; KURT MYERS, in his
official Capacity as Deputy Secretary for Driver and Vehicle
Services of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation; and TOM
WOLF, in his official capacity as Governor of Pennsylvania
Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-115 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Cynthia M.
Ruffe of the U.S. District Court for the Eatern District of
Pennsylvania (i) granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss, and
(ii) dismissed as moot the Plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary
injunction and for class certification.

The Plaintiffs have filed a proposed class action on behalf of
Pennsylvania residents whose driver's licenses are suspended upon
conviction of any offense involving controlled substances, under
Pennsylvania law, federal, law, or the law of any other state,
regardless of whether the offense involved a vehicle or traffic
safety.1 Defendants, sued in their official capacities, are the
governor of Pennsylvania and officials of the Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation, which has the exclusive authority to
suspend or revoke driver's licenses.

They allege that the suspension of their driver's licenses violates
equal protection because it discriminates against people with drug
convictions without a rational connection to a legitimate state
purpose (Count One); violates procedural due process because it
creates an irrebuttable presumption against Plaintiffs, depriving
them of their property rights (Count Two); and violates substantive
due process because it deprives them of the fundamental right to
intrastate travel without being narrowly tailored to achieve a
significant government interest (Count Three).  The Plaintiffs
request declaratory and injunctive relief barring the suspension of
driver's licenses for drug offenses that do not involve traffic
safety and ordering the reinstatement of their driver's licenses.

The Plaintiffs move for a preliminary injunction and to certify the
class of all individuals whose Pennsylvania driver's licenses are
currently suspended or will be suspended due to a conviction of any
offense involving the possession, sale, delivery, offering for
sale, holding for sale, or giving away of any controlled substance
under the laws of the United States, Pennsylvania, or any other
state, pursuant to 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Section 1532(c).

The Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.

Judge Ruffe holds that the Court in no way minimizes the burdens
imposed by the suspension of a driver's license, and the Plaintiffs
raise strong policy arguments against continued enforcement of the
Pennsylvania statute that they may raise with the Governor and the
legislature.  But as the late Hon. Louis H. Pollak wrote, it is
not, however, the province of a federal court to guard states from
unwisdom unless that unwisdom transcends constitutional
limitations.  A state law that may be unwise, improvident, or out
of harmony with a particular school of thought is not thereby
unconstitutional.  In the strong words of Justice Frankfurter, much
that should be rejected as illiberal, because repressive and
envenoming, may well be not unconstitutional.

The Court does not make policy decisions and takes no position as
to whether the current framework is wise or socially beneficial.
That is a decision to be made by the Pennsylvania legislative and
executive branches in the first instance.  The Court only
determines that as a matter of law the Plaintiffs have not alleged
a violation of rights secured under the Constitution of the United
States.

For these reasons, the Judge therefore dismissed the Complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 25, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/iJ7gjm from Leagle.com.

RUSSELL HAROLD & SEAN WILLIAMS, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, represented by ZAK T. GOLDSTEIN --
ztg@goldsteinmehta.com -- Goldstein Mehta LLC, CATHERINE SEVCENKO
-- catherine@equaljusticeunderlaw.org -- EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW,
MARISSA HATTON -- mhatton@equaljusticeunderlaw.org -- EQUAL JUSTICE
UNDER LAW, PHIL TELFEYAN -- ptelfeyan@equaljusticeunderlaw.org --
EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW & REBECCA RAMASWAMY --
rramaswamy@equaljusticeunderlaw.org -- EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW.

LESLIE RICHARDS, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
TRANSPORTATION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
LEO BAGLEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE DEPUTY SECRETARY
OF THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, KURT MYERS, IN
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR DRIVER AND VEHICLE
SERVICES OF THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION & TOM
WOLF, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Defendants, represented by A. MICHAEL PRATT --
prattam@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER, HAMILTON & SCHEETZ, BARAK BASSMAN
-- bassmanb@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, HEDYA ARYANI,
SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P., JANINE P. YANIAK --
yaniakj@pepperlaw.com -- PEPPER HAMILTON, JOSEPH ZAFFARESE --
jzaffarese@azlawllc.com -- AHMAD ZAFFARESE LLC & KAY KYUNGSUN YU --
kyu@azlawllc.com -- Ahmad Zaffarese LLC.


PETTA ENTERPRISES: Court Grants Settlement Deal Final Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Unopposed
Motion for Final Approval of the Settlement Agreement in the case
captioned JESSE GRAYBILL, Plaintiff, v. PETTA ENTERPRISES, LLC,
Defendant. Case No. 2:17-cv-418. (S.D. Ohio).

The United States Magistrate Judge issued a Report and
Recommendation recommending that the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion
for Final Approval be granted and that the Settlement Agreement be
approved by the Court.

The Report and Recommendation is adopted and affirmed.  For the
reasons set forth in detail in the Report and Recommendation, the
Court finds that the Plaintiff has met his burden of showing that
the prerequisites for the certification of a class action pursuant
to Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) have been satisfied in this case,
that the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate,
and that Class Counsel's requested award of fees and expenses is
fair and reasonable.

Accordingly, it is ordered that because the proposed settlement of
the action on the terms and conditions set forth in the Settlement
Agreement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interest
of the Class, that Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Final Approval
be granted and that the Settlement Agreement be finally approved by
the Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 15, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y82svex8 from Leagle.com.

Jesse Graybill, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew James Porter
Coffman, Coffman Legal, LLC & Peter Alan Contreras, Contreras Law,
Peter Alan Contreras, Contreras Law.

Petta Enterprises, LLC, Defendant, represented by Daren S. Garcia
-- dsgarcia@vorys.com -- Vorys Sater Seymour & Pease, Benjamin Adam
Shepler -- bashepler@vorys.com -- Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease LLP
& Jesse A. Meade -- jameade@vorys.com -- Vorys, Sater, Seymour and
Pease.


PETTA ENTERPRISES: Final Approval of Graybill Settlement Endorsed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JESSE GRAYBILL, Plaintiff, v. PETTA ENTERPRISES, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-418 (S.D. Ohio), Judge Elizabeth A.
Preston Deavers of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, Eastern Division, recommended that the Court
grants Graybill's Unopposed Motion for Final Approval and his
counsel's Unopposed Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of
Costs as well as a supplement to that request.

The case is a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
and a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, in which the Representative Plaintiff alleges the
Defendant, a for-profit liability company that provides
environmental and oil rig cleaning services for its oil and gas
industry customers, failed to compensate individuals working as
field supervisors or technicians with overtime pay in violation of
the FLSA, the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, the Ohio Prompt
Pay Act, and the Ohio Constitution, Article II Section 34(a).

Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' field
supervisors and technicians spent off-the-clock time before and
after their shifts preparing the trucks for service and breaking
them down at the end of the shift.  The Defendant denies that any
such violations occurred, taking the position that field
supervisors were sufficiently paid for pre-shift and post-shift
work and that technicians were not required to perform any
pre-shift or post-shift work.

After the case was filed, the parties engaged in informal discovery
and private mediation.  Thereafter, the parties reached a
settlement and the Representative Plaintiff moved, unopposed, for
the Court to preliminarily approve settlement of the Section 216(b)
and Rule 23 class action claims.

On April 25, 2018, the Court granted the Representative Plaintiff's
unopposed motion and preliminarily approved the parties' settlement
and preliminarily certified the settlement class and collective
action, pursuant to Rule 23 and Section 216 of the FLSA, of all
individuals who work or worked for the Defendant at any time from
May 16, 2015, through April 25, 2018, as non-exempt and/or hourly
employees and performed work as a field supervisor or technician.

Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the Defendant would make funds
available for settlement in the gross amount of $97,500, with
$38,955 of that total available amount to be used for attorneys'
fees to class counsel; $2,099.12, to be used for costs expended by
class counsel; and $5,500 of that to be paid as a service award to
the Representative Plaintiff.

The Court appointed Coffman Legal, LLC and Contreras Law, LLC as
the class counsel for purposes of the settlement and approved Jesse
Graybill as the Representative Plaintiff.  The Court further
approved Optime Administration, LLC as the claims administrator for
the purpose of the settlement, authorized notice to be sent to the
potential Plaintiffs, and approved the proposed procedure for
opting out of the class.  The Court also referred the matter to the
Magistrate Judge to conduct a fairness hearing and to issue a
report and recommendation.

Consistent with Paragraph 53(c), (e) of the Settlement Agreement,
the Claims Administrator provided notice to the Settlement Class.
The 60-day notice period began on May 21, 2018, when the Claims
Administrator mailed out the notices.  The Claims Administrator
received no objections and no objections were filed with the
Court.

The Representative Plaintiff has filed an Unopposed Motion for
Final Approval and his counsel has filed an Unopposed Motion for
Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Costs as well as a supplement
to that request.  On Sept. 18, 2018, a fairness hearing was
conducted.

Magistrate Judge Preston Deavers finds that the Plaintiff has met
his burden of showing that the prerequisites for the certification
of a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) have
been satisfied in the case, that the Settlement Agreement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate, and that the Class Counsel's requested
award of fees and expenses is fair and reasonable.

Accordingly, she recommended that:

     (1) because the proposed settlement of the action on the terms
and conditions set forth in the Settlement Agreement is fair,
reasonable, adequate, and in the best interest of the Class, the
Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Final Approval be granted and that
the Settlement Agreement be finally approved by the Court;

     (2) the FLSA claims be finally certified pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
Section 216(b), and that the following Settlement Class be finally
certified pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and
(b)(3):  All individuals who work or worked for the Defendant at
any time from May 16, 2015, through April 25, 2018, as non-exempt
and/or hourly employees and performed work as a field supervisor or
technician;

     (3) the action be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the
terms of the Settlement Agreement;

     (4) the Settlement Class, the Representative Plaintiff, and
the Defendant be bound by the release as set forth in the
Settlement Agreement; and

     (5) the Class Counsel's Unopposed Motion for Fees and Costs be
granted and that the Class Counsel be awarded reasonable attorneys'
fees in the amount of $38,955, and reimbursement of expenses in the
amount of $2,099.12, for a total combined amount of $41,054.12; and
that the Representative Plaintiff be awarded a service award in the
amount of $5,500, in addition to recovery for unpaid time expended
on pre-shift and post-shift work.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 25, 2018 Report &
Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/7DwBlf from
Leagle.com.

Jesse Graybill, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew James Porter
Coffman -- mcoffman@mcoffmanlegal.com -- Coffman Legal, LLC & Peter
Alan Contreras -- peter.contreras@contrerasfirm.com -- Contreras
Law.

Petta Enterprises, LLC, Defendant, represented by Daren S. Garcia
-- dsgarcia@vorys.com -- Vorys Sater Seymour & Pease, Benjamin Adam
Shepler -- bashepler@vorys.com -- Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease LLP
& Jesse A. Meade -- jameade@vorys.com -- Vorys, Sater, Seymour and
Pease.


PINNACLE FOODS: Files Supplemental Info to Appease Merger Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
In order to avoid the risk of class actions delaying or adversely
affecting its merger with Conagra Brands, Inc., and to minimize the
costs, risks and uncertainties inherent in litigation, and without
admitting any liability or wrongdoing, Pinnacle Foods Inc. has
determined to voluntarily file supplemental disclosures in its
definitive proxy statement, which was filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

A full-text copy of the supplemental disclosures as part of the
Pinnacle's Form 8-K dated September 27, 2018 is available at
https://bit.ly/2RgShws

On June 26, 2018, Pinnacle Foods Inc., a Delaware Corporation (the
"Company" or "Pinnacle Foods"), entered into an Agreement and Plan
of Merger (the "Merger Agreement") with Conagra Brands, Inc., a
Delaware corporation ("Conagra"), and Patriot Merger Sub Inc., a
Delaware corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Conagra
("Merger Sub").  The Merger Agreement provides for the merger of
Merger Sub with and into the Company (the "Merger"), with the
Company surviving the Merger as a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Conagra.

Since the June 27, 2018 announcement of the Merger Agreement, three
putative class action complaints have been filed in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey against the
Company and its directors.  The three complaints are captioned as
follows: Alexander Rasmussen v. Pinnacle Foods Inc.  et al., Case
No. 2:18-cv-12501 (filed August 7, 2018), Robert H.  Paquette v.
Pinnacle Foods Inc. et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-12578 (filed August 9,
2018), and Wesley Lindquist v. Pinnacle Foods Inc. et al., Case No.
2:18-cv-12610 (filed August 9, 2018) (collectively, the "Federal
Merger Litigation").

The plaintiffs in the Federal Merger Litigation (the "Federal
plaintiffs"), who purport to be stockholders of the Company,
generally allege that the Company's preliminary proxy statement
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") on July
25, 2018 (the "Preliminary Proxy Statement") omitted certain
material information in connection with the Merger.  The Federal
plaintiffs seek various remedies, including, among other things,
injunctive relief to prevent the consummation of the Merger unless
certain allegedly material information is disclosed, an award of
damages and an award of attorneys' fees and expenses.

Separately, one putative class action complaint has been filed in
the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware against the Company
and its directors, Conagra and Merger Sub.  The complaint is
captioned Jordan Rosenblatt v. Pinnacle Foods Inc. et al., Case No.
2018-0605 (filed August 15, 2018) (the "Delaware Merger Litigation"
and, together with the Federal Merger Litigation, the "Merger
Litigation").

The plaintiff in the Delaware Merger Litigation (the "Delaware
plaintiff"), who purports to be a stockholder of the Company,
generally alleges that the directors of the Company breached their
fiduciary duty of disclosure by filing the Preliminary Proxy
Statement that contained materially incomplete and misleading
information.  The Delaware plaintiff further alleges that Pinnacle,
Conagra and Merger Sub aided and abetted the directors' alleged
breach of fiduciary duty.  The Delaware plaintiff seeks various
remedies, including, among other things, injunctive relief to
prevent the consummation of the Merger, rescission of the Merger or
an award of rescissory damages should the Merger be consummated, an
award of damages and an award of attorneys' fees and expenses.

The Company believes that the claims asserted in the Merger
Litigation are without merit and no supplemental disclosure is
required under applicable law.  However, in order to avoid the risk
of the Merger Litigation delaying or adversely affecting the Merger
and to minimize the costs, risks and uncertainties inherent in
litigation, and without admitting any liability or wrongdoing, the
Company has determined to voluntarily supplement the definitive
proxy statement filed with the SEC on September 17, 2018 (the
"Definitive Proxy Statement").

The Company specifically denies all allegations in the Merger
Litigation that any additional disclosure was or is required.

Pinnacle Foods Inc. manufactures, markets, and distributes branded
convenience food products in North America.  It operates through
four segments: Frozen, Grocery, Boulder, and Specialty.  Pinnacle
Foods Inc. is headquartered in Parsippany, New Jersey.


POST CONSUMER: Lima et al. Allege Cereal Products Mislabeled
------------------------------------------------------------
ANITA S. LIMA; and SUSAN WRUBLEWSKI, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. POST CONSUMER BRANDS,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-12100 (D. Mass., Oct. 5, 2018) is
an action against the Defendant for falsely and deceptively selling
and marketing cereal products sweetened primarily by honey.

The Plaintiffs allege in the complaint that the Defendant made a
false, deceptive and misleading representations to their product
known as "Honey Bunches of Oats." The Defendants branded and
packaged the cereal conveying that honey is the primary sweetener,
or at the very least the significant sweetener. However, the
cereals are sweetened primarily with sugar, corn syrup, and other
processed substances, and contain only a miniscule amounts of
honey.

Post Consumer Brands (previously Post Cereals and Postum Cereals)
is an American consumer cereal brand that includes Honey Bunches of
Oats, Pebbles, Great Grains, Post Shredded Wheat, Post Raisin Bran,
Grape-Nuts, Honeycomb, Frosted Mini Spooners, Golden Puffs, Oh's,
Cinnamon Toasters, Fruity Dyno-Bites, Cocoa Dyno-Bites, Berry
Colossal Crunch and Malt-O-Meal hot wheat cereal. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kenneth D. Quat, Esq.
          QUAT LAW OFFICES
          929 Worcester Rd.
          Framingham, MA 01701
          Telephone: (508) 872-1261
          E-mail: ken@quatlaw.com

               - and –

          Michael R. Reese, Esq.
          Carlos F. Ramirez, Esq.
          REESE LLP
          100 West 93rd St., 16th Floor
          New York, NY 10025
          Telephone: (212) 643-0500
          E-mail: mresses@ressellp.com
                  cramirez@reesellp.com


PRETIUM RESOURCES: Bronstein Gewirtz Files Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman, LLC, notifies investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed against Pretium Resources Inc.
("Pretium" or the "Company) (NYSE: PVG) and certain of its
officers, on behalf of shareholders who purchased or otherwise
acquired Pretium securities between July 21, 2016 and September 6,
2018,both dates inclusive (the 'Class Period). Such investors are
encouraged to join this case by visiting the firm's
site:www.bgandg.com/pvg.

This class action seeks to recover damages against Defendants for
alleged violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) the
Brucejack Project is not a high-grade, high-output mine; and (2)
consequently, defendants' statements about Pretium's business,
operations, and prospects were materially false and/or misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to
review a copy of the Complaint you can visit the firm's
site:www.bgandg.com/pvgor you may contact Peretz Bronstein, Esq. or
his Investor Relations Analyst, Yael Hurwitz of Bronstein, Gewirtz
& Grossman, LLC at 212-697-6484. If you suffered a loss in Pretium
you have until November 6, 2018 to request that the Court appoint
you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any recovery
doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff. [GN]


PRINCE DELI: Ochoa Seeks Overtime Wages under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------
LUIS ANTONIO ORTIZ OCHOA, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. PRINCE DELI GROCERY CORP.
(D/B/A PRINCE DELI GROCERY) and ABDO S. ANAM (A.K.A. ABDO SALEH),
the Defendants, Case 1:18-cv-09417-ER (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 15, 2018),
seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, Mr. Ortiz is a former employee of
Prince Deli Grocery Corp. The Defendants own, operate, or control a
deli, located at 1461 5th Ave, New York, NY 10035 under the name
"Prince Deli Grocery".  Plaintiff Ortiz worked for the Defendants
in excess of 40 hours per week, without appropriate overtime and
spread of hours compensation for the hours that he worked.

Rather, the Defendants failed to maintain accurate record-keeping
of the hours worked, failed to pay the Plaintiff appropriately for
any hours worked, either at the straight rate of pay or for any
additional overtime premium. Further, the Defendants failed to pay
Plaintiff Ortiz the required "spread of hours" pay for any day in
which he had to work over 10 hours a day, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620


REA ENERGY: Dismissal of Suit Over Patronage Capital Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned LEONARD CESSNA, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; GEORGE WORK,
on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Appellants,
v. REA ENERGY COOPERATIVE, INC. No. 18-1397. (3rd Cir.).

They now appeal the Court's interpretation of the federal officer
removal statute and its dismissal of their contract claims.

Leonard Cessna and George Work brought a class action in
Pennsylvania state court against their non-profit electrical
utility, REA Energy Cooperative, Inc. They claim that, by retaining
all the members' Patronage Capital for years at a time and failing
to pay its members with any regularity, REA has violated its
bylaws, which incorporate 15 Pa.C.S. Section 7330. The statute
requires Pennsylvania electrical cooperatives to return, from time
to time, to the members revenues not required for operating
expenses, loan payments, new projects, or other contingencies.

The District Court correctly granted REA's motion to dismiss for
Cessna and Work's failure to state a claim for breach of contract.
Such a claim requires a plaintiff to plead (1) the existence of a
contract (including its essential terms (2) a breach of the
contract, and (3) damages. Omicron Sys., Inc. v. Weiner, 860 A.2d
554, 564 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).

Both parties agree that the bylaws establish the existence of a
contract and that Cessna and Work allege money damages. As for
element two, we are not persuaded of any breach. They argue REA
breached the contract by failing to distribute Patronage Capital.
However, the bylaws read in pertinent part: If, at any time prior
to dissolution or liquidation, the Board of Directors shall
determine that the financial condition of the Cooperative shall not
be impaired thereby, the capital then credited to members' accounts
may be returned in full or in part. Because this provision is
plainly permissive, there is no claim for breach of contract.

Cessna and Work further argue that the District Court erred when it
failed to read the covenants of good faith and fair dealing into
REA's bylaws. Although good faith and fair dealing may be used as a
tool to interpret a contract, it cannot be used to override an
express contractual term. Here, the plain language of the bylaws
addressed both Patronage Capital and the relief sought by Cessna
and Work. Thus the District Court did not err in granting REA's
motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Third Circuit's October 15, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9fbj8dg from Leagle.com.


RIPPLE LABS: Greenwald Securities Suit Remanded to Superior Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand
the case captioned AVNER GREENWALD, Plaintiff, v. RIPPLE LABS,
INC., et al., Defendants. Case No. 18-cv-04790-PJH. (N.D. Cal.).

This is a putative securities class action brought by plaintiff
Greenwald against defendants Ripple Labs, Inc. (Ripple), XRP II,
LLC, a subsidiary of Ripple and various individual defendants. In
summary, plaintiff alleges that Ripple created a digital currency
called XRP and from 2013 to the present, defendants and their
affiliates have been engaged in an ongoing scheme to sell XRP to
the general public. Plaintiff Greenwald, a resident of Israel,
alleges that he bought and sold XRP in both USD and Bitcoin and
suffered losses on those investments as a result of the defendants'
scheme

Pursuant to CAFA, a defendant may remove an action under Section
1453 if the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, the putative
class has more than 100 members, and the parties are minimally
diverse.

First, defendants argue that Luther only addressed removal based on
CAFA's minimal diversity jurisdiction, whereas the present action
was removed based on CAFA's alienage jurisdiction because plaintiff
Greenwald is a citizen of Israel. Neither Luther nor CAFA supports
that distinction. Nothing in Luthersuggests that the decision
hinged on removal being premised on minimal diversity jurisdiction,
rather than alienage jurisdiction.

Second, defendants' alienage jurisdiction-related policy arguments
also do not move the needle. As an initial matter, those arguments
do not override Luther. Moreover, Congress has already made clear
that removal bars trump the policy considerations unique to
alienage jurisdiction. Section 1332(a)(2) gives district courts
original jurisdiction over actions between citizens of a State and
citizens or subjects of a foreign state.

Third, defendants reliance on this court's decision in Coffey is
misplaced. In Coffey, plaintiff's state law claims satisfied the
removal requirements of Section 1453. Coffey, 2018 WL 3812076, at
*2. That allowed the entire action, including the Securities Act
claims, to be removed.  

Fourth, defendants argue that CAFA's plain language allows removal
despite Section 22(a), and that Luther was wrongly decided and
should be limited or reconsidered. Regardless of what defendants
think CAFA's plain language allows, Luther held that Section 22(a)
bars removal of pure Securities Act claims. And while defendants
are free to argue to the Ninth Circuit that Lutherwas wrongly
decided, those arguments fail to persuade this court

Accordingly, the court grants the plaintiff's motion and remands
the action to San Mateo County Superior Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 15, 2018 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybb3h9pf from Leagle.com.

Avner Greenwald, Plaintiff, represented by John T. Jasnoch --
jjasnoch@scott-scott.com -- Scott+Scott Attorneys at Law LLP &
Thomas L. Laughlin, IV -- tlaughlin@scott-scott.com -- Scott+Scott,
Attorneys at Law, LLP, pro hac vice.

Ripple Labs, Inc., XRP II, LLC, Bradley Garlinghouse, Christian
Larsen, Ron Will, Antoinette O'Gorman, Eric van Miltenburg, Susan
Athey, Zoe Cruz, Ken Kurson, Ben Lawsky, Anja Manuel & Takashi
Okita, Defendants, represented by John M. Neukom --
john.neukom@skadden.com -- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP, Virginia Faye Milstead -- virginia.milstead@skadden.com --
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & Peter Bradley Morrison
-- pmorriso@skadden.com -- Skadden Arps Slate Meagher and Flom
LLP.


ROYAL WINE: Faces Wu Suit in Eastern District of New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Royal Wine
Corporation. The case is captioned as Kathy Wu, individually and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Royal
Wine Corporation, Case No. 1:18-cv-05608-ERK-CLP (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 8,
2018). The lawsuit alleges violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. The case is assigned to Judge Edward R. Korman
and referred to Magistrate Judge Cheryl L. Pollak.

Royal Wine Corp. produces, imports, and distributes kosher wines,
liquors, spirits, and grape juices in the United States and
internationally. The company was founded in 1848 and is based in
Bayonne, New Jersey. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM, PC
          175 Varick Street, 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Telephone: (646) 770-3775
          Facsimile: (646) 867-2639
          E-mail: brad@markslawfirm.net


SACRAMENTO COUNTY, CA: Court Dismisses Kononov Suit
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order dismissing the case captioned VITALY V.
KONONOV, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants. No. 2:18-cv-02171 AC. (E.D. Cal.).

That case is a prisoner civil rights class action filed, inter
alia, by the Prison Law Office and Disability Rights California.
The duplicative nature of the present action requires its
dismissal. If plaintiff seeks to be included as a member of the
class in Armani Lee, he should contact counsel of record for that
plaintiff class.

The Plaintiff is further informed that, because he proceeds pro se,
he may only represent himself. Although a non-attorney may appear
in propria persona in his own behalf, that privilege is personal to
him. He has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than
himself.

This action be dismissed because duplicative of Armani Lee et al.
v. County of Sacramento, Case No. 2:18-cv-2081 TLN KJN P and the
Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis be denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 15, 2018 Order and
Findings is available at https://tinyurl.com/yc4aexlu from
Leagle.com.

Vitaly V. Kononov, Plaintiff, pro se.


SANTANDER BANK: Court Dismisses Aversano TILA Suit
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
issued a Memorandum and Order denying Defendant Santander Bank,
N.A.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint in the case
captioned PAUL AVERSANO, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SANTANDER BANK, N.A., Defendant.
Civil Action No. 17-12694 (MAS) (TJB). (D.N.J.).

The Plaintiff filed a purported class action Complaint, which he
later amended. The Amended Complaint asserts: (1) violations of
Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) (2) breach of contract; (3) common law
fraud; (4) fraudulent inducement; (5) violation of the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act; and (6) unjust enrichment.

Legal Standard

The court must accept as true all of the plaintiff's well-pleaded
factual allegations and construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. In doing so, however, the court is free
to ignore legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations
that merely state the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me.

TILA

The Defendant argues that the TILA claim fails both because it is
time-barred and because the Complaint does not state a viable TILA
claim. TILA requires lenders to make certain disclosures, such as
the payment schedule, annual percentage rates, and charges imposed
due to a late payment. A party has a private right of action if
disclosures are inaccurate.  

A statute of limitations defense is permitted to be raised in a
motion to dismiss if the time alleged in the statement of a claim
shows that that cause of action has not been brought within the
statute of limitations. A complaint may be dismissed for
untimeliness under Rule 12(b)(6) when its untimeliness is apparent
on its face.  

Here, the Plaintiff's Complaint explicitly recognizes that the TILA
disclosures were provided in June of 2007. The Defendant,
therefore, argues that the claim is clearly time-barred. The
Plaintiff argues, however, that the claim should be equitably
tolled.

Equitable tolling is appropriate when: (1) the defendant actively
misled the plaintiff regarding the plaintiff's cause of action (2)
the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented from
asserting his or her rights or (3) the plaintiff has timely
asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong forum. The
Plaintiff argues that the doctrine is appropriate because the Bank
actively mislead the Plaintiff.  

The allegations in the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint do not support
equitable tolling in these circumstances. The Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint acknowledges that the Plaintiff was in possession of the
loan documents explaining how the figure on the first page was
calculated but did not read the document until after he noticed a
discrepancy ten years later. The Plaintiff, therefore, cannot now
claim that tolling should apply because of the Plaintiff's own
failure to review the loan documents. The Plaintiff's claim that
the documents he signed to skip payments were misleading is also
insufficient.

Notwithstanding the fact that the last representation occurred in
2012, the document merely stated interest will continue to accrue
on the entire outstanding balance, including the month I skip my
payment. This is not the type of active misleading that would
necessitate the extraordinary remedy of equitable tolling.  

Here, therefore, taking all of the allegations in the Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint as true, equitable tolling is inappropriate on
the complaint currently before the Court.

State Law Claims

In addition to his TILA claim, the Plaintiff pled state law claims.
As the Plaintiff's only federal claim is time-barred, however, and
as the Plaintiff's only asserted basis for federal jurisdiction is
28 U.S.C. Section 1331, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction
over the state law claims.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 15, 2018
Memorandum and Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yd82flez
from Leagle.com.

PAUL AVERSANO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by SOFIA BALILE, LEMBERG LAW,
LLC.

SANTANDER BANK, N. A., Defendant, represented by DIANE A. BETTINO
-- dbettino@reedsmith.com -- REED SMITH, LLP, HENRY F. REICHNER --
hreichner@reedsmith.com -- REED SMITH, LLP & SIOBHAN ANNE NOLAN --
snolan@reedsmith.com -- REED SMITH LLP.


SELIP & STYLIANOU: Court Narrows Claims in FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of New
York issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendants' Motion for Judgment in the Pleading in the captioned
BETH BRADLEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. SELIP & STYLIANOU, LLP, et al., Defendants.
Case No. 17-CV-6224-FPG. (W.D.N.Y.).

Midland and Encore have filed their answers to the amended
complaint and now move for judgment on the pleadings,

Plaintiff Beth Bradley, both individually and on behalf of a
putative class action, brings this action against Defendants Selip
& Stylianou, LLP (Selip), Midland Funding, LLC (Midland), and
Encore Capital Group, Inc. (Encore), for alleged violations of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c) is judged by the same standard applicable to a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).  To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face. A complaint is plausible when a plaintiff pleads
sufficient facts that allow the Court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.

Whether the March 2017 Letter Was Sent in Connection with the
Collection of Any Debt

The Defendants first argue that no FDCPA liability can attach based
on Selip's March 2017 letter because Selip did not send the letter
in connection with the collection of a debt. Under Section 1692e, a
debt collector may be held liable for using any false, deceptive,
or misleading representation or means in connection with the
collection of any debt.

As the March 2017 letter indicates, the Plaintiff's allegation of
fraud far from being a unilateral inquiry was itself a response to
Selip's ongoing collection efforts. Although the letter is
primarily concerned with obtaining the documents necessary to
review Plaintiff's fraud claim, the letter contains elements that
could lead a reasonable consumer to believe that Selip is also
acting in furtherance of its efforts to collect the debt. The
letter states that it is from a debt collector who represents the
creditor, and it discloses the allegedly misleading balance due.
Most important is the manner in which the letter requests
information regarding the fraud claim.

The firm asks the Plaintiff to obtain several documents, including
prior letters disputing the debt, a police report, and proof of
residence from 2007, and return all of the requested documents
within ten business days. Despite the possible difficulty of
finding and submitting those documents in such a short time frame,
the firm remarks that collection efforts may continue if Plaintiff
fails to do so. A reasonable consumer could view the letter as a
subtle form of pressure to forego the hassle and just settle the
debt. Put differently, the Court cannot conclude that a reasonable
consumer would be able to separate Selip's request for documents
from its overall efforts to collect the debt, particularly given
that Selip ties such request to its collection efforts.  

Therefore, the Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that a consumer
receiving the March 2017 letter could reasonably interpret the
misleading representation as being made in connection with the
collection of any debt. The court will not dismiss Count I based on
the Defendants' first argument.

The Defendants contend that neither Midland nor Encore can be
considered a debt collector under this definition. They allege that
neither entity has any employees. They claim that Midland only
invests in debts and does not engage in the act of collection while
Encore is merely Midland's parent company. Defendants rely on the
case of Gold v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 82 F.Supp.3d 1064 (N.D.
Cal. 2015), for the proposition that a debt purchaser is not a debt
collector under the FDCPA if it does not directly or indirectly
engage in the collection of its purchased debts. In Gold, a court
in the Northern District of California held that Midland was not a
debt collector because it merely holds debts and engages a debt
collector to collect on those debts.

Regardless, even if the Court accepts Gold as an accurate summation
of the law, Plaintiff has plausibly pleaded that Defendants do more
than passively purchase and hold debt. Specifically, Plaintiff
alleges that the principal business purpose of Midland and Encore
is the collection of debts; that more than half of their respective
revenues is derived from debt collection; that they oversee and
control Selip's collection activities, including Selip's use of
form collection letters; and that, in Plaintiff's case, Midland
filed a lawsuit against Plaintiff to collect on the debt. These
allegations suffice for purposes of the present procedural posture.
Defendants' contrary factual claims and overall disagreement with
Plaintiff's allegations do not alter this conclusion.   

The motion to dismiss will not be granted on this ground.

Whether the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Bars Count II

The Defendants' final argument is that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
bars the Plaintiff's second claim. In Count II, the Plaintiff
alleges that, by proceeding with wage garnishment and attempting to
collect a debt that the Plaintiff does not owe, Selip thereby
misrepresented the character and legal status of the debt, i.e.,
that the Plaintiff owed the debt.  

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack
subject matter jurisdiction over suits that are, in substance,
appeals from state-court judgments. A federal court should abstain
from considering a claim when four requirements are met: (1) the
plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff complains of
injuries caused by the state court judgment, (3) the plaintiff
invites district court review of that judgment, and (4) the state
court judgment was entered before the plaintiff's federal suit
commenced.

The Court agrees with the Defendants. To be sure, an underlying
state-court judgment can be perfectly valid, and the [defendant]
can still have violated the FDCPA by making false, deceptive, or
misleading communications or using unfair or unconscionable means
in the course of attempting to collect on the judgment. That is not
the sort of claim that Plaintiff is raising, however: she is
contending that Defendants' attempts to collect on the judgment are
unlawful solely because the debt on which that judgment is based is
invalid and unenforceable against her. Her injuries arise from the
default judgment, and her challenge to the validity of the debt
would necessarily require the Court to review and reject that
judgment. The Court may not do so.

All four requirements are satisfied, and Count II will therefore be
dismissed.

Accordingly, Midland and Encore's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings is granted in part and denied in part, in that the Court
denies the motion with respect to Count I, and grants the motion
with respect to Count II.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 15, 2018 Decision
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y8xnhccj from
Leagle.com.

Beth Bradley, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander Jerome Douglas,
Douglas Firm, P.C.

Selip & Stylianou, LLP, a New York LLP, Defendant, represented by
Alicia S. Bursky-Stillman, Selip & Stylianou, LLP.

Midland Funding, LLC, a Delaware LLC & Encore Capital Group, Inc.,
a Delaware corporation, Defendants, represented by Ellen Beth
Silverman -- esilverman@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP
& Han Sheng Beh -- hbeh@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson
LLP.

Midland Funding, LLC, a Delaware LLC & Encore Capital Group, Inc.,
a Delaware corporation, ThirdParty Plaintiffs, represented by Han
Sheng Beh, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.


SHELBY COUNTY, TN: Court Narrows Claims in Unlawful Detention Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee, Western Division, issued an Order granting in part and
denying Defendant Tyler Technologies, Inc.'s (Tyler) Motion to
Dismiss the case captioned SCOTT TURNAGE, CORTEZ D. BROWN, DEONTAE
TATE, JEREMY S. MELTON, ISSACCA POWELL, KEITH BURGESS, TRAVIS BOYD,
TERRENCE DRAIN, and KIMBERLY ALLEN on behalf of themselves and all
similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. BILL OLDHAM, in his
individual capacity and in his official capacity as Sheriff Of
Shelby County, Tennessee, ROBERT MOORE, in his individual capacity
and in his official capacity as Jail Director of Shelby County,
Tennessee, CHARLENE MCGHEE, in her individual capacity and in her
official capacity as Assistant Chief Jail Security of Shelby
County, Tennessee, DEBRA HAMMONS, in her individual capacity and in
her official capacity as Assistant Chief of Jail Programs in Shelby
County, Tennessee, SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE, and TYLER
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendants, No. 16-2907, Consolidate With Nos.
17-2015, 17-2795. (W.D. Tenn.).

The Plaintiffs claim they were unlawfully detained at the Shelby
County Jail following the County's installation of a new computer
tracking system. That system included Defendant Tyler's Odyssey
software. The Plaintiffs bring claims against Shelby County
Defendants under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for violations of
Plaintiffs' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs
bring negligence claims against Tyler.

Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows dismissal of a
complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

When evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
the Court must determine whether the complaint alleges sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.

The Plaintiffs bring two claims against Tyler: (1) negligence; and
(2) negligent training and supervision.  

Negligence Claim

To make a prima facie claim of negligence under Tennessee law, a
plaintiff must establish five elements (1) the defendant owed a
duty of care to the plaintiff (2) the defendant breached the
applicable standard of care (3) the plaintiff suffered an injury
(4) defendant's conduct was a cause in fact of the in-jury and (5)
defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of the injury.

Tyler makes three arguments about the sufficiency of the
Plaintiffs' factual allegations. Tyler contends that (1) the
allegations are untrue (2) the Plaintiffs do not plead sufficient
facts to connect Tyler to the events at the Jail and (3) the
Plaintiffs' allegations are contradicted by the Contract.

Tyler argues that the Plaintiffs offer no plausible basis for
relief because their factual allegations assert in an entirely
conclusory manner that Tyler and its Odyssey software, which was
installed at the Shelby County Criminal Courts, were responsible
for problems at the Shelby County Jail.

The Plaintiffs respond that the factual allegations in the Third
Amended Complaint plausibly connect Tyler's software to the
problems at the Jail. The Plaintiffs cite several allegations
including their assertion that successful integration of Odyssey
was essential for the full Computer Tracking System to be
operational so that, among other things, inmates would not become
lost in the Shelby County Jail and that their booking numbers,
charges, bonds and other information would appear at all stages of
their incarcerations in the Computer Tracking System.

The Plaintiffs' allegations, taken together, are not mere
conclusory statements. The Plaintiffs allege sufficient detail
about the nature of Tyler's software, how it was intended to
function, and how the software contributed to the problems at the
Jail. Plaintiffs' allegations connecting Tyler to the events at the
Jail are sufficient to satisfy the liberal pleading standard of
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Tyler argues that, under the Contract, it had a limited role in the
iCJIS. Tyler points to the section of the Statement of Work
providing that all data translations that need to be done in order
to map data from Odyssey to the Hub/ESB and other agencies
integrated via the Hub/ESB will be performed by the County's
System's Integrator, which at the time [the Contract] was written
had yet to be awarded. Although this provision appears to
contemplate that some other provider will integrate Odyssey's data
exchange functions with the ESB, it does not establish that Tyler
itself did not eventually perform that task. This provision also
does not establish that there were no problems with Tyler's
software arising from some feature other than its integration with
other systems.

At this stage of the litigation, the Court must view the facts in a
light most favorable to Plaintiffs and resolve all factual
questions in their favor. Because no provision of the Contract
explicitly contradicts Plaintiffs' allegations that Tyler was
involved with the events at the Jail, the Court must accept
Plaintiffs' allegations as true.

Causation and Proximate Causation

Under Tennessee law, causation in fact and proximate causation are
distinct elements of negligence. Causation in fact refers to the
cause and effect relationship between the defendant's conduct and
the plaintiff's injury. The defendant's conduct is a cause in fact
if an injury would not have occurred but for that conduct. It is
not necessary that the defendant's act be the sole cause of the
plaintiff's injury, only that it be a cause.

The Third Amended Complaint alleges that Tyler failed to tailor the
Odyssey software adequately to the Shelby County government system
and caused the massive and disturbing problems with the Shelby
County and the Jail systems. The Third Amended Complaint also
alleges that Tyler did not properly integrate Odyssey with the
Computer Tracking System and failed to properly test Odyssey.

Proximate cause encompasses the whole panoply of rules that may
deny liability for otherwise actionable causes of harm. To
establish proximate cause, Tennessee courts apply a three-prong
test: (1) the defendant's conduct must have been a "substantial
factor" in bringing about the plaintiff's harm; (2) there is no
rule or policy that should relieve the defendant from liability
because of the manner in which injury occurred; and (3) the harm
that the plaintiff suffered must have been reasonably foreseeable
by a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence.  

Tennessee has adopted the meaning of substantial factor given in
the Restatement Second of Torts Section 413. A factor is
substantial when it has such an effect in producing the harm as to
lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word in the
popular sense rather than the so-called philosophic sense, which
includes every one of the great number of events without which any
happening would not have occurred. Assuming Plaintiffs' allegations
to be true, Tyler's failure to integrate and design its software
properly is more than a mere philosophical cause of Plaintiffs'
over-detainments. The Third Amended Complaint adequately alleges
hat Tyler's conduct was a substantial factor.

Tyler cites no rule or policy that should relieve it from liability
because of the manner in which the negligence has resulted in the
over-detainments. The Court has found no such rule or policy.

Economic Loss Doctrine

Tyler argues that the economic loss doctrine bars Plaintiffs'
negligence claim because Plaintiffs seek to recover purely economic
damages. Tyler contends that, because Plaintiffs' negligence claim
seems to relate to the ability of Tyler's Odyssey software to
perform in the manner required by the Contract in that the Odyssey
software was defectively developed and implemented, the economic
loss doctrine precludes Plaintiffs' claim. Tyler also argues that
the Contract was predominantly for goods and that Plaintiffs'
damages are purely economic.  

Plaintiffs argue that Tyler provided services to which Tennessee's
economic loss doctrine has no application. Plaintiffs also contend
that the economic loss doctrine does not apply because Plaintiffs
do not seek purely economic damages.

Under Tennessee law, a plaintiff injured by another's negligence is
entitled to compensatory damages. There are two kinds of
compensatory damages: (1) economic damages and (2) noneconomic
damages. Economic damages compensate the plaintiff for the actual
pecuniary losses that naturally result from the defendant's
wrongful conduct.

Tennessee's economic loss doctrine prohibits the recovery of purely
economic damages for negligence when the plaintiff lacks privity of
contract with the defendant. The economic loss doctrine does not
apply when the plaintiff seeks damages for nonpecuniary losses
including personal injuries and mental anguish.

Unlawful imprisonment is not a purely economic injury. Economic
losses may accompany the loss of liberty, such as when an
incarcerated individual cannot work and earn wages. Unlawful
imprisonment also implicates mental, emotional, and dignitary
injuries that are inherently nonpecuniary. Damages for unlawful
imprisonment redress the denial of free movement and the violation
done to an individual's dignity. Because the remedies Plaintiffs
seek do not constitute purely economic damages, the economic loss
doctrine does not apply.

Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled factual matter to state a
negligence claim against Tyler that is plausible on its face and
that is not barred by the economic loss doctrine.

Accordingly, Defendant Tyler's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs'
negligence claim is denied.

Negligent Training and Supervision Claim

Tyler argues that the Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for
negligent training and supervision because: "Plaintiffs have not
plead a single fact regarding what training or supervisory role
specifically Tyler had, how Tyler was negligent in its training or
supervision, what errors are attributable to negligent training or
supervision, how such negligent training or supervision is the
proximate cause of any specific Plaintiffs' alleged injury, whether
specific employees were unfit for the job, or whether Tyler had
knowledge of the employees' alleged unfitness for the job."

Under Tennessee law, a plaintiff may recover for negligent hiring,
supervision, or retention of an employee if he establishes, in
addition to the elements of a negligence claim, that the employer
had knowledge of the employee's unfitness for the job.

In their response to Tyler's Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiffs
represent that, had Tyler conducted the end-to-end testing set
forth in their contract, they would have known that the County
employees were improperly trained to operate the iCJIS system and
Odyssey. The Plaintiffs represent that Tyler should have known the
employees it trained and supervised were unfit, but Tyler willfully
ignored the employees' lack of training by failing to test its
system. The Plaintiffs do not allege in the Third Amended Complaint
that Tyler willfully ignored Shelby County employees' unfitness to
operate the new computer system. The Court may not consider new
facts alleged in Plaintiffs' Response.  

Because the Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts to establish
a plausible claim for negligent training and supervision, Defendant
Tyler's Motion to Dismiss that claim is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 15, 2018 Order is
available at
https://tinyurl.com/y9offgcx from Leagle.com.

Issacca Powell, Plaintiff, represented by Brice Moffatt Timmons,
BLACK MCLAREN JONES RYLAND & GRIFFEE, P.C., John C. Ryland, BLACK
MCLAREN JONES & RYLAND, Michael G. McLaren, BLACK MCLAREN JONES &
RYLAND, Warren Patrick Campbell, BLACK MCLAREN JONES RYLAND &
GRIFFEE, William E. Cochran, Jr., BLACK MCLAREN JONES & RYLAND,
Black McLaren Jones Ryland & Griffee, P.C., Claiborne Hambrick
Ferguson, THE CLAIBORNE FERGUSON LAW FIRM, P.A. & Frank L. Watson,
III, WATSON BURNS, LLC.

Shelby County Sherif Bill Oldham, Sheriff of Shelby County,
Individually and in his official capacity, Defendant, represented
by Robert E. Craddock, Jr., WYATT TARRANT & COMBS P.O.,Amber D.
Floyd, WYATT TARRANT & COMBS, LLP, Emmett Lee Whitwell, Shelby
County Attorney's Office & Odell Horton, Jr., WYATT TARRANT &
COMBS.

Shelby County Sherif Bill Oldham, in his individual capacity and in
his official capacity as Sheriff of Shelby County, TN, Robert
Moore, in his individual capacity and in his official capacity as
the Jail Director of Shelby County, TN, Charlene McGhee, in her
individual capacity and in her official capacity as the Assistant
Chief Jail Security of Shelby County, TN & Debra Hammons, in her
individual capacity and in her official capacity as the Assistant
Chief of Jail Programs of Shelby County, TN, Consol Defendants,
represented by Robert E. Craddock, Jr., WYATT TARRANT & COMBS P.O.,
Amber D. Floyd, WYATT TARRANT & COMBS, LLP, Emmett Lee Whitwell,
Shelby County Attorney's Office & Odell Horton, Jr., WYATT TARRANT
& COMBS.

Shelby County Tennessee, a Tennessee municipality, Consol
Defendant, represented by Robert E. Craddock, Jr., WYATT TARRANT &
COMBS P.O., Amber D. Floyd, WYATT TARRANT & COMBS, LLP & Odell
Horton, Jr., WYATT TARRANT & COMBS.


SINCLAIR BROADCAST: My Philly Lawyer Suit Moved to Illinois
-----------------------------------------------------------
MY PHILLY LAWYER, 1500 John F. Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1410
Philadelphia, PA 19102 Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. SINCLAIR BROADCAST GROUP,
INC. 10706 Beaver Dam Road Hunt Valley, MD 21030 Baltimore County;
TRIBUNE MEDIA COMPANY 515 North State Street Chicago, IL 60654;
TRIBUNE BROADCASTING COMPANY, LLC 435 N. Michigan Avenue Chicago,
IL 60611; and DOES 1-20, the Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-02713,
was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the District of
the Maryland, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois (Chicago) on Oct. 15, 2018. The Northern District of
Illinois Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:18-cv-06881 to the
proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge  Virginia M.
Kendall.

According to the complaint, the lawsuit arose out of an alleged
contract, combination and conspiracy among the Defendants and their
co-conspirators to fix, raise, stabilize, and maintain prices for
commercials to be aired on broadcast television stations throughout
the United States in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, by
sharing competitively sensitive information through their
advertising sales teams.

The Defendants' and their co-conspirators' unlawful collusion led
to supracompetitive prices in the market for the sale of television
advertising. Defendants have significant market penetration for
advertising in the United States, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

          Eugene A. Spector, Esq.
          William Caldes, Esq.
          SPECTOR ROSEMAN & KODROFF, P.C.
          1818 Market Street, Suite 2500
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 496 0300
          E-mail: espector@srkattorneys.com
          bcaldes@srkattorneys.com

               - and -

          John Ritchie Solter, Jr., Esq.
          AZRAEL FRANZ SCHWAB AND LIPOWITZ LLC
          101 E Chesapeake Ave Fifth Fl
          Baltimore, MD 21286
          Telephone: (410) 821-6800
          Facsimile: (410) 821-1265
          E-mail: jsolter@azraelfranz.com

Attorneys for Defendants:

          John Augustine Bourgeois, Esq.
          KRAMON AND GRAHAM PA
          One South St Ste 2600
          Baltimore, MD 21202
          Telephone: (410) 752-6030
          E-mail: jbourgeois@kg-law.com

               - and -

          Daniel H. Levi, Esq.
          Jay Cohen, Esq.
          William B. Michael, Esq.
          PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
          1285 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10019-6064
          Telephone: (212) 373-3497
          E-mail: dlevi@paulweiss.com
                  jaycohen@paulweiss.com
                  wmichael@paulweiss.com


SOUTH CAROLINA FARM: Underpays Agents, Laney and Steller Allege
---------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN LANEY; and ALEXANDROS STELLER, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. SOUTH CAROLINA FARM
BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY; SOUTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY; PALMETTO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY; SOUTHERN
FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY; SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-02730-TLW (D.S.C.,
Oct. 8, 2018) seeks to recover from the Defendants unpaid overtime
compensation, prejudgment interest, liquidated damages, reasonable
attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as agent.  Mr. Laney
was employed from July 1999 to December 31, 2016; Mr. Steller from
February 2006 to February 2018.

South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company offers personal
and commercial automobile, property, farm, home, business, life,
and group and individual health services insurance in South
Carolina. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company was
founded in 1955 and is based in Cayce, South Carolina. South
Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company operates as a
subsidiary of South Carolina Farm Bureau Federation. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Amy L. Gaffney, Esq.
          Regina Hollins Lewis, Esq.
          Susan Rawls Strom, Esq.
          GAFFNEY LEWIS & EDWARDS, LLC
          3700 Forest Drive, Suite 400
          Columbia, SC 29204
          Telephone: (803) 790-8838
          Facsimile: (803) 790-8841

               - and -

          David B. Yarborough, Jr., Esq.
          William E. Applegate, IV, Esq.
          Christopher J. Bryant, Esq.
          YARBOROUGH APPLEGATE LLC
          291 East Bay Street
          Charleston, SC 29401
          Telephone: (843) 972-0150
          Facsimile: (843) 277-6691
          E-mail: david@yarboroughapplegate.com
                  william@yarboroughapplegate.com
                  chris@yarboroughapplegate.com


STATE FARM: 6th Cir. Affirms Denial of Bid to Dismiss Hicks Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the judgment of the District Court denying
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned SUSAN HICKS, et
al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO.,
Defendant-Appellant. No. 18-5104. (6th Cir.).

Before is Defendant’s appeal on District Court’s judgment
denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

The Plaintiffs initially filed a complaint in state court, which
State Farm removed. The Plaintiffs claimed that State Farm breached
its contract with the insured when it estimated the full repair or
replacement cost of the damaged property, including labor and
materials, and then depreciated labor costs when calculating ACV
payments.

State Farm argued that the two-step loss settlement provision is
permitted both under State Farm policies and Kentucky law.

The district court (Judge Henry Wilhoit) denied State Farm's motion
to dismiss, thereby allowing the case to proceed on the breach of
contract claim. It held that the purpose of insurance is to
indemnify the insured and under Kentucky law, an insured is
entitled to receive the cash equivalent of the damaged property as
it existed immediately prior to the loss. Although State Farm could
depreciate the materials component of the replacement cost value
when calculating ACV, the district court held that depreciation of
labor in calculating ACV is improper and that depreciated labor
costs would result in underindemnification.

State Farm acknowledges that whether Kentucky permits labor
depreciation in the calculation of insurance payments is a novel
question of law. However, it argues that including full payment for
labor would overstate the ACV and results in an improper windfall
to the insured.

The Plaintiffs respond that the district court did not err and that
Kentucky law does not allow an insurer to depreciate labor costs.

What is ACV?

Homeowner's insurance policies typically offer two forms of
coverage: ACV and replacement cost. Generally speaking, ACV is the
dollar amount required to restore a policyholder to where he or she
was before the loss.

By contrast, the purpose of replacement cost coverage is to remedy
the shortfall in coverage which results under a property insurance
policy compensating the insured for actual cash value alone.

State Farm's Policies Rely on an Ambiguous Regulation

Here, the State Farm policies are ambiguous because they do not
define ACV but simply incorporate Kentucky's ACV Regulation which
does not define depreciation. Thus, there are two levels of
ambiguity: the contract is ambiguous because it relies on a
regulation that is subject to multiple reasonable interpretations.


In the insurance context, Kentucky applies the reasonable
expectations doctrine which interprets ambiguous terms in favor of
the insured's reasonable expectations. The reasonable expectation
doctrine is based on the premise that policy language will be
construed as laymen would understand it' and applies only to
policies with ambiguous terms, e.g., when a policy is susceptible
to two (2) or more reasonable interpretations.

Ambiguous Insurance Policies Construed In Favor of Insured

In interpreting the actual insurance policy, Kentucky law is clear:
A contract of insurance will be construed strictly against the
insurer and liberally in favor of the insured. Since the policy is
drafted in all details by the insurance company, it must be held
strictly accountable for the language used.

Effect of Section 9(2)(b)

Finally, if the Court was to adopt State Farm's argument, Section
9(2)(b) of the ACV Regulation would be rendered meaningless. State
Farm contends that as property ages, it will always be roughly
proportionate to its market value.

As Plaintiffs correctly note: "Subsection (b) of the ACV Regulation
plainly recognizes that ACV valuation will sometimes produce
disproportionate values and overvalue property that has nominal or
no economic value. But in State Farm's view, that eventuality could
never occur. ACV would always value valueless properties as
valueless, and always value low-value properties in rough
proportion to their market value. Were State Farm correct,
subsection (b) would have no application and would never have
needed to be written."

The district court's holding that labor costs should not be
depreciated is the most reasonable interpretation of Kentucky law.

A full-text copy of the Sixth Circuit's October 15, 2018 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y8wvla3z from Leagle.com.


STERLING BANCORP: Parties Agree to Drop O'Connell Merger Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Sterling Bancorp reports in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission that parties in the single,
consolidated action styled O'Connell v. Astoria Fin. Corp., et al.,
have agreed that the case should be voluntarily dismissed in light
of the Court's August 21, 2018 rejection of a proposed settlement.

On March 6, 2017, a press release announced that Astoria Financial
Corporation ("Astoria") and Sterling Bancorp ("Sterling) had
entered into a definitive merger agreement dated March 6, 2017
whereby Sterling would acquire each share of Astoria common stock
in exchange for 0.875 shares of Sterling common stock (the
"Transaction"), subject to, among other things, stockholder
approval.  In connection with the merger, on April 5, 2017,
Sterling filed a Form S-4 Registration Statement (the "Registration
Statement") with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") in connection with the Transaction that included
a preliminary Proxy Statement/Prospectus for the stockholder vote
on the Transaction.  On May 1, 2017, Astoria filed a definitive
proxy statement on Schedule 14A with the SEC (the "Proxy
Statement") in connection with the Transaction, which, among other
things, set June 13, 2017 as the date for the special meeting of
Astoria common stockholders to cast their vote with respect to the
Transaction.

On June 6, 2017, Sterling and Astoria, respectively, entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding containing the essential terms of an
agreement-in-principle (the "MOU"), to settle claims brought by
plaintiffs in certain putative class actions captioned as follows:

   * Jenkins v. Astoria Financial Corporation, et al (Case No.
1:17-cv-02608) brought in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York;

   * Minzer v. Astoria Financial Corporation, et al (Case No.
2017-0284) brought in the Court of Chancery of the State of
Delaware;

   * MSS 1209 Trust v. Astoria Financial Corporation, et al (Index
No. 602161/2017) brought in the Supreme Court of the State of New
York in Nassau County;

   * O'Connell v. Astoria Financial Corporation, et al (Index No.
603703/2017) brought in the Supreme Court of the State of New York
in Nassau County; and

   * Parshall v. Astoria Financial Corporation, et al (Case No.
2:17-cv-02165) brought in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York (collectively, the "Astoria Merger
Class Actions").

Pursuant to the MOU, Sterling filed a Form 8-K with the SEC on June
8, 2017 containing certain additional disclosures (the
"Supplemental Disclosures") not contained in the Registration
Statement and Proxy Statement.  The Supplemental Disclosures
effectively mooted the Astoria Merger Class Actions, and on October
2, 2017, Sterling and Astoria completed the Transaction.

In further accordance with the terms of the MOU, plaintiffs in the
Jenkins Action, Minzer Action, and Parshall Action agreed to
voluntarily dismiss their respective actions without prejudice, and
on May 2, 2018, with the consent and agreement of the parties, the
remaining Astoria Merger Class Actions proceeded as a single,
consolidated action bearing the caption: O'Connell v. Astoria Fin.
Corp., et al., Index No. 603703/17 (N.Y.  Sup.) (the "Action").

On August 2, 2018, the parties submitted a proposed settlement
agreement and requested that the Court grant the parties' request
for preliminary approval of the settlement, conditional
certification of an opt-out settlement class, and approval of the
notice of settlement.

On August 21, 2018, the Court rejected the parties' settlement
request.  In light of the Court's rejection of the settlement, the
parties have agreed that the Action should be voluntarily
dismissed.

Sterling Bancorp operates as the bank holding company for Sterling
National Bank that provides various banking services to commercial,
consumer, and municipal clients in the United States.  The Company
accepts deposit products, including checking, money market,
savings, time, and interest and non-interest bearing demand
deposits, as well as certificates of deposit and mortgage escrow
funds.  It was founded in 1888 and is based in Montebello, New
York.


SUBARU: Faces Class Action Over Engine Tuning Problems
------------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that Subaru
engine tuning problems are at the heart of a lawsuit that alleges
2014-2016 Subaru Forester XT, Subaru WRX and WRX STI cars and SUVs
have engines too highly tuned, problems that cause the engines to
stall or surge.

The plaintiff claims a 2016 recall was ordered to fix problems with
the ignition timing but the recall was allegedly just a cover to
secretly update the operating systems of the Subaru vehicles.

The lawsuit goes on to allege the repairs de-tuned the engines in
an attempt to fix engine damage that had already been done.

The plaintiff claims Subaru called it an "emissions recall" to
force Forester and WRX customers to get their vehicles to dealers
to have the secret operating system updates performed. In other
words, by calling it an official emissions recall, an owner
wouldn't be able to renew their vehicle registration until the
recall work was complete.

This ensured Subaru dealers would allegedly be able to perform the
secret updates that affected the tuning of the engines.

All the cars and SUVs are equipped with turbocharged engines, and
although the class-action lawsuit names the Forester XT, WRX and
WRX STI, the plaintiff says it's possible more models are
affected.

Plaintiff Cheryl Sauer says she leased a new 2014 Subaru Forester
XT in April 2013 and brought her vehicle into the dealership for
the mandatory emissions recall in 2016. Sauer claims Subaru
re-tuned the engine in an effort to fix the engine being tuned too
highly, but technicians didn't inform her the engine would be
re-tuned.

According to Sauer, the recall repairs caused her Subaru to suffer
from engine problems such as surging and stalling, so she took the
vehicle back to the dealership. The plaintiff says the automaker
initially refused to correct the engine problems but finally
offered to replace the engine after the plaintiff kept
complaining.

However, Sauer claims she was told the replacement engine wouldn't
be available for months and that Subaru would not replace or buy
back the Forester XT.

Subaru should have told customers about the alleged engine tuning
problems and further should have admitted the emissions recall was
really an attempt to repair the engines.

Additionally, the plaintiff claims the automaker should have warned
Forester XT and WRX owners and lessees about the allegedly secret
software patch that was installed when the vehicles were recalled.

According to the lawsuit, drivers often complain about vehicles
that suddenly accelerate or stall, then having to listen to Subaru
dealer technicians who say they can't find anything wrong with the
vehicles.

The driver of a 2014 Subaru Forester XT complained about the
vehicle having problems on cold starts and stalling while traveling
uphill. The driver said the Subaru dealer blamed it on bad fuel
used in the SUV, then later the vehicle started idling at 3500-4000
RPM and the check engine and emission lights came on.

"I was in an underground garage and had no choice but to try to
move the car to the outside for a tow, reverse gear worked and the
car was still idling very high, put the it in drive and the car was
not responding to accelerator and could barely make it up the ramp
from the garage."

The Subaru driver made his opinion clear about what others should
do.

"At this point I feel the car is unsafe and will not take it back
until the dealer has either figured it out or replaces the car. DO
NOT BUY THIS CAR IF YOU ARE CONSIDERING ONE. If anyone else is
having this problem this is a potential hazard if the car
malfunctions at high speed."

Another 2014 Forester XT driver told of the frustrating wait of
more than three months for a replacement engine.

"It was supposed to take 2-3 weeks. Told them today I'm done. I
don't trust this vehicle anymore. What are they finding that a
simple engine swap (1-2 day job) has still not been completed after
9 days and after waiting 3 months - MONTHS - for the new motor??"

According to the class-action lawsuit, the engine tuning problems
cause drivers serious safety issues and also lead to decreased
vehicle values, something Subaru should pay for.

The Subaru engine tuning lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey - Cheryl Sauer, et al., vs.
Subaru of America, Inc.

The plaintiff is represented by DeNittis Osefchen Prince, P.C., and
the Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman.

CarComplaints.com has complaints about the Subaru Forester, Subaru
WRX and Subaru WRX STI. [GN]


SYNTEL INC: Files Supplemental Disclosures to Appease Merger Suits
------------------------------------------------------------------
Syntel, Inc. has voluntarily filed supplemental disclosures with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in order to avoid the
expense and distraction of class action lawsuits related to its
merger deal with Atos S.E.

The Company said in its Form 8-K filing with the SEC dated
September 21, 2018, "Nothing in the Supplemental Disclosures shall
be deemed an admission of the legal necessity or materiality under
applicable law of the Supplemental Disclosures.  To the contrary,
the Company specifically denies all allegations that any of the
Supplemental Disclosures, or any other additional disclosures, were
or are required."

A full-text copy of the Form 8-K is available at
https://is.gd/Nsr0zy

On July 20, 2018, Syntel, Inc. entered into an Agreement and Plan
of Merger by and among the Company, Atos S.E., a societe europeenne
(European company) organized under the laws of France ("Parent" or
"Atos"), and Green Merger Sub Inc., a Michigan corporation and a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Parent ("Merger Sub").  Pursuant to the
Merger Agreement, Merger Sub will be merged with and into the
Company (the "Merger"), with the Company continuing as the
surviving company in the Merger.  On August 28, 2018, the Company
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") a
definitive proxy statement (the "Definitive Proxy Statement") with
respect to the special meeting of the Company's stockholders
scheduled to be held on October 1, 2018, in connection with the
Merger (the "Special Meeting").

Three putative class action lawsuits have been filed in connection
with the Merger.  On August 16, 2018, a putative shareholder class
action entitled Mahesh Veer Satya Tolapu v. Syntel, Inc., et al.,
No. 2:18-cv-12562-SJM-SDD, was filed in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (the "Tolapu Action").
The Tolapu Action alleges claims for breach of fiduciary duty in
connection with the Merger against the Company's co-founders and
for aiding and abetting against the other members of the Company's
board of directors, the Company and Merger Sub.  The Tolapu Action
also alleges that the Company's preliminary proxy statement
concerning the Merger was materially incomplete and/or misleading
in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder.  The Tolapu Action seeks, among
other things, to enjoin the stockholder vote concerning the Merger,
money damages and an award of attorneys' fees.

On August 17, 2018, a second putative shareholder class action
entitled Richard Scarantino v. Syntel, Inc., et al., No.
2018-167788-CZ, was filed in the Michigan Circuit Court for Oakland
County (the "Scarantino Action").  The Scarantino action alleges
claims for breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the Merger
against the members of the Company's board of directors and for
aiding and abetting against the Company.  The Scarantino Action
seeks, among other things, to enjoin the stockholder vote
concerning the Merger, money damages and an award of attorneys'
fees.

On August 23, 2018, the third putative shareholder class and
derivative action entitled Shiva Stein v. Bharat Desai et al., No.
2018-167927-CB, was filed in the Michigan Circuit Court for Oakland
County (the "Stein Action").  The Stein Action alleges class claims
for breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the Merger against
the members of the Company's board of directors and for aiding and
abetting against Atos and Merger Sub.  The Stein Action also
alleges derivative claims on behalf of the Company for breach of
fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment in connection with the Merger
against the members of the Company's board of directors.  The Stein
Action seeks, among other things, to enjoin the stockholder vote
concerning the Merger, money damages and an award of attorneys'
fees.

While the Company believes that the actions lack merit and that the
disclosures in the Definitive Proxy Statement comply fully with
applicable law, in order to avoid the expense and distraction of
litigation and following discussions with counsel for plaintiffs in
the Tolapu, Scarantino and Stein Actions, the Company has
determined to voluntarily supplement the Definitive Proxy Statement
with the supplemental disclosures set forth in its latest 8-K
filing (the "Supplemental Disclosures").

Syntel, Inc. provides digital transformation, information
technology (IT), and knowledge process outsourcing (KPO) services
worldwide.  The company operates through Banking and Financial
Services; Healthcare and Life Sciences; Insurance; Manufacturing;
and Retail, Logistics, and Telecom segments.  Syntel, Inc.  was
founded in 1980 and is headquartered in Troy, Michigan.


TIME INC: Court Awards $2.96MM Attorney's Fee in Perlin Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan granted final approval of the settlement agreement in the
case captioned CAROLYN PERLIN, individually and on behalf of the
settlement class, Plaintiff, v. TIME INC., a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant. Case No. 16-cv-10635. (E.D. Mich.).

The Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval
of Class Action Settlement, conditionally certifying a Class
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) of all persons with Michigan
street addresses who purchased a subscription to a Time Publication
directly from Time, but in a manner other than through a Time
website.

This Court now gives final approval to the Settlement Agreement,
and finds that the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable,
adequate, and in the best interests of the Settlement Class. The
settlement consideration provided under the Settlement Agreement
constitutes fair value given in exchange for the release of the
Released Claims against the Released Parties.

The Court finds that the consideration to be paid to the Settlement
Class Members is reasonable, and in their best interests,
considering the total value of their claims compared to (i) the
disputed factual and legal circumstances of the Action, (ii)
affirmative defenses asserted in the Action, and (iii) the
potential risks and likelihood of success of pursuing litigation on
the merits. The complex legal and factual posture of this case, the
amount of discovery completed, and the fact that the Settlement is
the result of arm's-length negotiations between the Parties support
this finding.

The Court finds that these facts, in addition to the Court's
observations throughout the litigation, demonstrate that there was
no collusion present in the reaching of the Settlement Agreement,
implicit or otherwise.

The Court has also considered Plaintiff's Motion and supporting
declarations for attorneys' fees to Class Counsel and adjudges that
the payment of $2,960,000 is reasonable in light of the
multi-factor test used to evaluate fee awards in the Sixth Circuit.


The Court has also considered Plaintiff's Motion and supporting
declarations for an incentive award to the Class Representative,
Carolyn Perlin. The Court adjudges that the payment of an incentive
award in the amount of $5,000 to Ms. Perlin, to compensate her for
her efforts and commitment on behalf of the Settlement Class, is
fair, reasonable, and justified under the circumstances of this
case. Such payment shall be made pursuant to and in the manner
provided by the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 15, 2018 Judgment
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7czalda from
Leagle.com.

Carolyn Perlin, Plaintiff, represented by Benjamin Scott Thomassen
-- bthomassen@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Eve-Lynn Rapp --
erapp@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Roger J. Perlstadt --
rperlstadt@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Schuyler R. Ufkes --
sufkes@edelson.com -- Edelson PC & Ari J. Scharg --
ascharg@edelson.com -- Edelson P.C.

Time Inc., Defendant, represented by Jacob A. Sommer --
jake@zwillgen.com -- Zwillgen, PLLC, Jeffrey G. Landis --
jeff@zwillgen.com -- ZWILLGEN PLLC, Lara F. Phillip --
lara.phillip@honigman.com -- Honigman, Miller, Marc J. Zwillinger
-- marc@zwillgen.com -- Zwillgen, PLLC & Nury R. Siekkinen,
ZwillGen PLLC.


TRANS WORLD: Continues to Defend Store Manager Class Actions
------------------------------------------------------------
Trans World Entertainment Corporation is still facing class action
claims filed on behalf of all Store Managers and Senior Assistant
Managers, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
August 4, 2018.

Two former Store Managers filed actions alleging claims of
entitlement to unpaid compensation for overtime.  In one action,
the plaintiff seeks to represent a class of allegedly similarly
situated employees who performed the same position (Store Manager
and Senior Assistant Manager) while the other plaintiff seeks to
represent a class of allegedly similarly situated employees who
performed the same position (Store Manager).

Specifically, Carol Spack filed a complaint against Trans World
Entertainment Corporation (Trans World) in the United States
District Court, District of New Jersey, on April 20, 2017 (Case
No.: 3:17-cv-02687-BRM-LHG) alleging that she is entitled to unpaid
compensation for overtime under the Federal Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA).  She brings a nationwide collective action under the
FLSA on behalf of all Store Managers and Senior Assistant Managers.
She also brings class action claims under New Jersey and
Pennsylvania law on behalf of all persons who worked as Store
Managers in New Jersey or Senior Assistant Managers in
Pennsylvania.

On May 19, 2017, Natasha Roper filed a complaint against Trans
World in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New
York (Case No.: 1:17-cv-0553-TJM-CFH) in which she also alleges
that she is entitled to unpaid compensation for overtime under the
FLSA.  Ms. Roper brings a nationwide collective action under the
FLSA on behalf of all similarly situated Store Managers.

Trans World Entertainment Corporation, together with its
subsidiaries, operates as a specialty retailer of entertainment
products.  The company operates in two segments, For Your
Entertainment (fye) and etailz. The fye segment offers trend,
video, music, electronics, and related products, as well as used
compact discs, DVDs, Blu-Ray, and video games through its retail
stores and e-commerce sites.  Trans World Entertainment Corporation
was founded in 1972 and is headquartered in Albany, New York.


TRI-STATE CAREFLIGHT: Conditional Certification of Payne Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM D. PAYNE; NICOLE PAYNE; LESLIE B. BENSON;
KEITH BASTIAN; JACQUELINE FERNANDEZ-QUEZADA; CASON N. HEARD;
GREGORY OLDHAM AND SHERRY K. WELCH, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TRI-STATE CAREFLIGHT, LLC
and BLAKE A. STAMPER, Defendants. KRISTY BELL; DEBORAH BEREST;
DANIEL BERGMAN; WILLIAM DALLAS BUNDRANT, JR; ROCKY H. BURROWS, II;
CHASE CARTER; BRENDA CASAREZ; KARA CERVANTES; THOMAS CISLO; DAVID
DANIELS; ADAM DOYLE; DARREN EEN; TOBY EICHER; LON ENOS; WALTER
FABIAN; HAROLD JOSEPH FISHER; CHRISTINA FLEEMAN; LUKE FORSLUND;
SALUSTIANO FRAGOSO; REHANNON GONZALES; KRISTEN GRADO; COURTNEY
GUERRA; DARRIN HAMILTON; ALEXANDER HOWELL; DANIELLE IRVIN; ALLEN
JACOBS; ALEX JONES; DONALD LUKE KEENAN; DANIEL KUHLER; SIMON
LUCERO; RAPHAEL MAHAIM; NATHAN MAPLESDEN; ORLANDO MARQUEZ; CINDY D.
MAXWELL; JENNIFER MAZZANTI; BETHANY MCCANDLESS; WILLIAM J.
MCCONNELL; DAN MEEHAN; KEVIN NAPP; JAMES O'CONNOR; KATHY
ONSUREZ-WILSON; ERIC PARKER; JASON PERRY; AMANDA PETERSEN; BRENT
PLACE; JIMMY RONALD PRIMM, JR; PHILIP QUBAIN; PAUL RATIGAN; JOSEPH
ROOT; DARON RUCKMAN; FREDERIC RUEBUSH; JENNIFER SALAVERRY; LAUREN
SALAZAR; PAUL SERINO; CHRISTIAN SPEAKMAN; DANIEL ST. PETERS; IAN
STEPHENS; USVALDO R. TRUJILLO; PAUL VACULA; GRACIELA VILLALOBOS;
ERIC VOGT; GREG WALSH; TYLER WILKINS; VIRGINIA WILLIAMS; SARA
YURKOVICH; TERRY ZACHARIAS and MICHAEL ZULASKI, Plaintiffs, v.
TRI-STATE CAREFLIGHT, LLC and BLAKE A. STAMPER, Defendants, Case
No. Civ 14-1044 JB\KBM, Consolidated with No. Civ 17-0796 JB\CG (D.
N.M.), Judge James O. Browning of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Mexico denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Conditional Certification of Collective Action Pursuant to New
Mexico Minimum Wage Act, filed Sept. 7, 2017.

The Plaintiffs bring a representative action pursuant to N.M. Stat.
Ann. Section 50-4-26(D), on behalf of themselves and all other
similarly situated former Tri-State CareFlight employees.  In the
alternative, the Plaintiffs bring the matter as a class action
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.  The Amended Complaint contains two
counts: (i) violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. Sections 50-4-19 et seq.;
and (ii) unjust enrichment.

The Plaintiffs filed their case in federal court on Aug. 3, 2017.
They invoked diversity jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action
Fairness Act, asserting that the present action is a class action
lawsuit, with a matter in controversy exceeding $5 million, and
complete diversity of citizenship between the original Plaintiffs
and the Defendants.

Approximately three weeks later, Tri-State CareFlight and Stamper
filed an Answer, asserting that a representative action may be
pursued in federal court only under rule 23, and denying that the
Plaintiffs can meet rule 23's requirements.  The Plaintiffs filed
the Amended Complaint.  Tri-State CareFlight and Stamper filed an
Answer.

The matter comes before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Conditional Certification of Collective Action Pursuant to New
Mexico Minimum Wage Act; and on the Plaintiffs' Request for Rule 16
Scheduling Conference.  In the Hearing Motion, the Plaintiffs
requested that the Court sets a Rule 16 Scheduling Conference to
establish case management deadlines, and to consider the Motion.

The Court granted the Hearing Motion, and the Rule 16 Scheduling
Conference was reset for June 26, 2018, before the Hon. Carmen E.
Garza, Chief United States Magistrate Judge for the District of New
Mexico.  The Court held a hearing on the Motion on June 21, 2018.

The primary issues in the Motion are: (i) whether, under Shady
Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., the collective
action standard in rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
or in the NMMWA should be applied to the Plaintiffs' conditional
certification of their state law overtime claims as a collective
action; and (ii) whether, applying the appropriate standard, the
Plaintiffs have met the requirements for conditional certification
of their overtime claims.

Judge Browning concludes that, applying the test set forth in
Justice Stevens' concurring and controlling opinion in Shady Grove,
(i) the correct standard is rule 23, because N.M. Stat. Ann.
Section 50-4-26(D)'s provision is a procedural rule.  He further
concludes finds that the Plaintiffs have not yet demonstrated their
compliance with the requirements that rule 23 establishes for
bringing a class action.  At the hearing, the Court confirmed that
they had not briefed that issue and would need to do so if the
Court ruled that they needed to do so.

For these reasons, the Judge denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Conditional Certification of Collective Action Pursuant to New
Mexico Minimum Wage Act; and granted the Plaintiffs' Request for
Rule 16 Scheduling Conference, filed Dec. 21, 2017.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 25, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/GF20LR from Leagle.com.

Usvaldo R. Trujillo, Daniel Bergman, Danielle Irvin, Michael
Castro, Alex Jones, Jason Perry, William Dallas Bundrant, Jr.,
Alexander Howell, Shane Herron, Greg Walsh, Shailendra Basnet,
Philip Qubain, Donald Luke Keenan, Courtney Guerra, Kevin Napp,
Paul Ratigan, Kristy Bell, Kristen Grado, Erin Johnson, Ron
McDearmid, Daron Ruckman, Eric Parker, Joseph Root, Ian Stephens,
Paul Serino, Luke Forslund, David Daniels, Thomas Cislo, Cindy D.
Maxwell, Kara Cervantes, Virginia Williams, Adam Doyle, Amanda
Petersen, Tyler Wilkins, Christian Speakman, Chase Carter, Harold
Joseph Fisher, Kathy Onsurez-Wilson, Darren Een, Daniel Kuhler,
Daniel St. Peters, Darrin Hamilton, Bethany McCandless, Dan Meehan,
Christina Fleeman, James O'Connor, Jennifer Mazzanti, Allen Jacobs,
Jennifer Valdez, William J. McConnell, Graciela Villalobos, Brent
Place, Paul Vacula, Walter Fabian, Nathan Maplesden, Salustiano
Fragoso, Toby Eicher, Deborah Berest, Rocky H. Burrows, II, Terry
Zacharias, Frederic Ruebush, Jennifer Salaverry, Jimmy Ronald
Primm, Jr., Michael Zulaski, Brenda Casarez, Simon Lucero, Eric
Vogt, Raphael Mahaim, Rehannon Fisher, Josh Martinez, Matthew
Jansson, Benjamin Aguilar, Shane Engelauf, Sara Yurkovich, Gregory
Steiner, Satoshi Mori, Ted McGill, Orlando Marquez, John Munn,
Sherryn Terblanche, Alison Lopez, Diane Sarno, Anita Nelson,
Annette Shivers, Lauren Salazar, Keegan Stokes, Laurie Pittman, Lon
Enos, Jennifer Jones & William Mallonee, Intervenor Plaintiffs,
represented by Christopher M. Moody, Moody & Stanford PC.

Tri-State Careflight, LLC & Blake A. Stamper, Individually,
Defendants, represented by Charles J. Vigil -- cvigil@rodey.com --
Rodey Dickson Sloan Akin & Robb, P.A., Melanie B. Stambaugh --
mstambaugh@rodey.com -- Rodey Dickason Sloan Akin & Robb PA &
Jeffrey L. Lowry -- jlowry@rodey.com -- Rodey, Dickason, Sloan,
Akin & Robb, P.A.


UBER TECH: 9th Cir. Flips Denial of Arbitration Bid in O'Connor
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, DOUGLAS O'CONNOR; THOMAS COLOPY; DAVID KHAN; MATTHEW
MANAHAN; WILSON ROLLE, JR.; WILLIAM ANDERSON, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant-Appellant. DOUGLAS O'CONNOR;
THOMAS COLOPY; MATTHEW MANAHAN; ELIE GURFINKEL, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant-Appellant. HAKAN YUCESOY, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant. RICARDO DEL RIO; TONY MEHRDAD SAGHEBIAN,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; RASIER-CA, LLC, a
Delaware Limited Liability Company, Defendants-Appellants. ABDUL
KADIR MOHAMED, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant, and RASIER, LLC; HIREASE, LLC, Defendants.
DOUGLAS O'CONNOR; THOMAS COLOPY; MATTHEW MANAHAN; ELIE GURFINKEL,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee. HAKAN YUCESOY, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES,
INC., Defendant-Appellee. ABDUL KADIR MOHAMED, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated; RONALD GILLETTE; SHANNON
WISE; BRANDON FARMER; MEGHAN CHRISTENSON, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant-Appellee. DOUGLAS O'CONNOR;
THOMAS COLOPY; MATTHEW MANAHAN; ELIE GURFINKEL, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant-Appellant, Case Nos. 14-16078,
15-17420, 15-17532, 15-17422, 15-17534, 15-17475, 15-17533,
16-15000, 16-15001, 16-15035, 16-15595 (9th Cir.), Judge Richard R.
Clifton of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court's (i) denial of Uber's motions to compel
arbitration in O'Connor, Yucesoy, and Del Rio; (ii) class
certification orders in O'Connor; and (iii) orders entered under
Rule 23(d).

Current and former Uber drivers filed several putative class
actions alleging on behalf of themselves and other drivers that
Uber violated various federal and state statutes by, among other
things, misclassifying drivers as independent contractors rather
than employees.  Multiple cases were consolidated for appeal to the
Court.

Uber appeals the district court's orders denying Uber's motions to
compel arbitration, orders granting class certification in
O'Connor, and orders controlling class communications pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d).

Judge Clifton finds that the Court previously considered and
reversed the district court's orders denying Uber's motions to
compel arbitration in Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, Inc.  The
Plaintiffs offer additional arguments in the current appeal why the
arbitration agreements are unenforceable, but those arguments are
unpersuasive.  As the class certification by the district court was
premised on the district court's determination that the arbitration
agreements were unenforceable, the class certification must also be
reversed.

Moreover, the Rule 23(d) orders were based on the district court's
denial of the motions to compel arbitration and its granting of
class certification.  As both of those decisions must be reversed,
there is no longer a basis for the district court's restrictions on
Uber's communication with class and putative class members, so
these orders are moot and must be reversed as well.

For these reasons, Judge Clifton reversed the district court's
denial of Uber's motions to compel arbitration in O'Connor,
Yucesoy, and Del Rio, based on Mohamed.  Because the arbitration
agreements are enforceable, he also reversed the district court's
class certification orders in O'Connor.  The orders entered by the
district court under Rule 23(d) orders are moot and are thus
reversed as well.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 25, 2018 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/9yqyh4 from Leagle.com.

Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. (argued) -- tboutrous@gibsondunn.com --
Theane D. Evangelis -- tevangelis@gibsondunn.com -- and Kevin J.
Ring-Dowell -- kringdowell@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher
LLP, Los Angeles, California; Joshua S. Lipshutz --
jlipshutz@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, San
Francisco, California; for Defendants-Appellants.

Shannon Liss-Riordan (argued) -- sliss@llrlaw.com -- and Adelaide
H. Pagano -- apagano@llrlaw.com -- Lichten & Liss-Riordan P.C.,
Boston, Massachusetts, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Jeffery Burritt (argued), Attorney; Kira Dellinger Vol, Supervisory
Attorney; Linda Dreeben, Deputy Associate General Counsel; John H.
Ferguson, Associate General Counsel; Jennifer Abruzzo, Deputy
General Counsel; Richard F. Griffin Jr., General Counsel; National
Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae National
Labor Relations Board.

Andrew J. Pincus, Evan M. Tager, and Archis A. Parasharami, Mayer
Brown LLP, Washington, D.C.; Jed Glickstein, Mayer Brown LLP,
Chicago, Illinois; Kate Comerford Todd and Warren Postman, U.S.
Chamber Litigation Center Inc., Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America.


ULTA SALON: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Tellez Suit Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------
RAYCHEAL TELLEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ULTA SALON, COSMETICS & FRAGRANCE, INC.; and
DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
37-2018-00050739-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super., San Diego Cty., Oct. 5,
2018) is an action against the Defendants for failure to pay
minimum wages, overtime compensation, authorize and permit meal and
rest periods, and provide accurate wage statements.

The Plaintiff Tellez was employed by the Defendants as non-exempt,
hourly-paid employee.

Ulta Salon, Cosmetics & Fragrance, Inc. sells cosmetics,
fragrances, skin and hair care products, appliances, and
accessories. The Company also offers hair salon services,
manicures, pedicures, massages, and other beauty and spa
treatments. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew R. Bainer, Esq.
          THE BAINER LAW FIRM
          1901 Harrison St., Suite 1100
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 922-1802
          Facsimile: (510) 844-7701
          E-mail: mbainer@bainerlawfirm.com


UNITED STATES: ACLU Files Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
----------------------------------------------------------------
KTAR.COM reports that President Donald Trump is returning to the
Valley, more than a year after police and protesters clashed
following his last appearance in the Phoenix area.

The president was set to hold a campaign rally on Oct. 12 at
International Air Response at Phoenix-Mesa Gateway Airport in
Mesa.

The rally was set to start at 6:30 p.m., with doors opening at 3:30
p.m. Free tickets were available online on a first-come,
first-served basis.

It's part of three-day western swing during which Trump also will
visit Missoula, Montana and Elko, Nevada.

The president will campaign for U.S. Senate hopeful Martha McSally
and other Republican candidates during the Arizona visit.

Ms. McSally is in a contentious battle with fellow U.S. Rep.
Kyrsten Sinema, a Democrat, to replace Republican Jeff Flake, who
didn't seek re-election.

The seat is a key to Democrats' efforts to take control of the
Senate, which would be a major blow to the Trump administration.

Trump previously has endorsed Ms. McSally as well as Republican
Gov. Doug Ducey, who is facing Democrat David Garcia in the Nov. 6
midterm election.

Trump last appeared in the Phoenix area on Aug. 22, 2017.

After his rally at the Phoenix Convention Center that night,
Phoenix Police used tear gas and pepper spray to disburse
protesters. Police said they were responding to bottles and rocks
being thrown at them.

The American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona filed a class-action
lawsuit last month against the city for the police department's
actions that night.

The lawsuit on behalf of four individuals and two community
organizations alleged that protesters had their First Amendment
rights violated by police.

In August, Trump's camp reached out to the Arizona State
Fairgrounds and Phoenix Convention Center about visiting in early
September, but the venues couldn't accommodate him.

He also reportedly was exploring a later September visit, but those
plans never went through. Around the same time, he canceled two
scheduled rallies because of Hurricane Florence's impending threat
to the East Coast.

As rumors of a potential Trump visit swirled, the ACLU filed a
motion to get a temporary restraining order against Phoenix
police.

Attorneys for the city of Phoenix filed a notice in response to
that motion and requested that the ACLU withdraw its request for a
restraining order because no Trump visit had been scheduled at the
time. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Court Certifies Class in Smith-Williams FTCA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge William M. Conley of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
case, CONSUELA SMITH-WILLIAMS, FRED RIVERS, RICHARD MURPHY, ROBERT
RISTOW, ROGER SUHR, and SALVADOR FUENTES, on behalf of themselves
individual and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-823-wmc (W.D. Wis.),
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

The proposed class action is brought against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA").  The named Plaintiffs
seek to represent a class of individuals that was notified of
lapses in infection control procedures after receiving dental
treatment at the Tomah VA Medical Center.

As veterans of the United States military, the Plaintiffs were all
treated by Dr. Tomas Schiller at Tomah VA Medical Center's Dental
Clinic between Oct. 5, 2015, and Oct. 21, 2016.  Dr. Schiller
allegedly: (1) used unsterile dental burs; (2) re-used single use
dental burs on multiple patients; (3) sprayed an inappropriate
disinfectant on unsterile dental burs between procedures; (4) did
not follow basic infection control procedures such as hand washing;
and (5) did not wear personal protective equipment.  This conduct
violated infection control and prevention standards established by
the American Dental Association, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, Center for Disease Control and Prevention, and
Department of Veterans Affairs

As early as December 2015, a number of the employees at Tomah VA
were allegedly aware of Dr. Schiller's conduct, but no action was
taken until after Oct. 20, 2016, when managers confronted Schiller
about his practices following a report by a substitute dental
hygienist to the acting chief of dental services.  At that time,
Schiller admitted to re-using unsterile dental burs, but claimed
that he believed it was a common practice.

After completing a risk assessment, the Tomah VA sent a
notification letter to the Plaintiffs.  Nevertheless, the potential
class members claimed to have suffered severe emotional distress
between their receipt of the notification letter and their blood
test results, as they were forced to consider that they may have
been infected with deadly viruses, may die as a result of having
been infected, and/or may have unknowingly infected their loved
ones with deadly viruses.

The Plaintiffs propose a class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to
encompass all Tomah VA Medical Center patients who received dental
care between October 2015 and October 2016, received a letter from
the Tomah VA Medical Center informing them of their potential
exposure to Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C, and HIV and subsequently
tested negative for newly acquired active viral infections.

They Plaintiffs also propose a sub-class of patients who received
dental care during the six-month period preceding the mailing of
the notification letter, as they were made to wait an additional
six months for conclusive test results: All Tomah VA Medical Center
patients who received dental care between October 2015 and October
2016, received a letter from the Tomah VA Medical Center informing
them of their potential exposure to Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C, and
HIV, subsequently tested negative for newly acquired active viral
infections, and were forced to wait an additional six months for
further blood testing to confirm that they were not infected with
Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C, and HIV.

The Plaintiffs assert claims for (1) negligent infliction of
emotional distress and (2) negligent training, supervision and
retention.  The Defendant argues the pleadings are insufficient to
support a finding of proximate causation or severe emotional
distress on either claim.  Alternatively, it argues that all the
unnamed Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies
as required by the FTCA.

Judge Conley finds that the Bowen v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty
Company public policy factors do not necessitate application of the
contaminated source rule on the pleadings alone.  While the
Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs lacked reasonable grounds for
emotional distress because the letter they received informed them
that the risk of infection was low, there is no evidence that the
letter was correct in this assertion, and it may be that exposure
to a low risk of a deadly infection provides reasonable grounds for
emotional distress, at least where the exposure is to a large
enough population.  At the same time, it may ask too much of a
group of patients to expect them to set aside their fears based on
the assurances of a medical facility that admittedly did not adhere
to basic professional standards during their treatment.  All of
this will need to be sorted out on summary judgment or at trial.

Moreover, while the Defendant argues its ability to settle was
hindered because it was unaware if the named Plaintiffs possessed
the authority to represent the unnamed Plaintiffs, the Judge holds
that this would also be the case if a class action was brought
after each potential member separately exhausted their
administrative remedies.  These proposed class members may
ultimately opt-out to pursue different claims or no claim at all,
which limits the authority of the named Plaintiffs to negotiate on
their behalf.  Such matters are, however, best addressed at the
class certification phase.  Accordingly, the unnamed class members
will not be dismissed at this time.

For these reasons, Judge Conley denied the Defendant's motion to
dismiss.  He also denied the Defendant's motion to stay class
certification briefing as the motion to dismiss has now been
resolved.  Each of the three deadlines related to the Plaintiffs'
class certification motion is extended one week, with the
Plaintiffs' initial motion now due Oct. 26, 2018, the Defendant's
response due Nov. 23, 2018, and the Plaintiffs' reply due Dec. 14,
2018.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 25, 2018 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/Xnss26 from Leagle.com.

Consuela Smith-Williams, Individually, and on behalf of all
similarly situated, Fred Rivers, Individually, and on behalf of all
similarly situated, Richard Murphy, Individually, and on behalf of
all similarly situated, Robert Ristow, Individually, and on behalf
of all similarly situated, Roger Suhr, Individually, and on behalf
of all similarly situated & Salvador Fuentes, Individually, and on
behalf of all similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Christ
Kishish, II -- Ckishish@kishishlaw.com -- Kishish Law Group,llc,
Matthew A. Biegert -- mbiegert@doardrill.com -- Doar, Drill and
Skow, S.C. & William Thomas Rieder, Jr. --
wrieder@downslawgroup.com -- Downs Law Group.

The United States of America, Defendant, represented by David Daly
Conway, United States Attorney's Office.


UNITED STATES: Justice Association Mulls Class Action v. Brown
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jim Letizia, writing for Associated Press, reports that a North
Canton businessman with a questionable ethical background is suing
Democratic U.S. Senator Sherrod Brown of Ohio, claiming a campaign
ad calling him a "crooked businessman" with ties to Mr. Brown's
Republican opponent has defamed him.

Mr. Brown's campaign ad targets his Republican opponent, Republican
Jim Renacci. It claims Mr. Renacci tried to intervene in a
California consumer complaint filed against Ben Suarez in exchange
for donations to Mr. Renacci's 2012 congressional campaign.

Mr. Suarez's lawsuit says statements in the ad are false and
defamatory.

Mr. Suarez was acquitted in 2014 on federal charges of making
illegal contributions to Mr. Renacci and then-U.S. Senate candidate
and current state Treasurer Josh Mandel. Mr. Suarez was sentenced
to 15 months for witness tampering.

Mr. Brown's campaign has yet to comment.

In June, the Associated Press reported Mr.Suarez' company organized
employees and suppliers in a retaliatory effort to bring down two
prominent Ohio Democrats.

A memo obtained by the AP detailed The Justice Association LLC's
plans for legal and political attacks against U.S. Senator Sherrod
Brown and Attorney General nominee Steven Dettelbach.

The association is offering "rewards" of up to 100 thousand dollar
for evidence it could use to bring class-action racketeering claims
against the Obama-era Justice Department. Suarez Corporation
Industries is behind the effort.

Ben Suarez went to prison for witness tampering following a 2014
investigation led by Mr. Dettelbach into contributions made to
Mandel and Mr. Renacci. [GN]


US BANK: Still Faces Various Lawsuits over RMBS Trusts
------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Bank National Association is currently a defendant in multiple
actions alleging individual or class action claims with respect to
multiple trusts, according SG Commercial Mortgage Securities Trust
2016-C5's Form 10-K/A filed on September 24, 2018, with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2017.

Since 2014 various plaintiffs or groups of plaintiffs, primarily
investors, have filed claims against U.S. Bank National Association
("U.S. Bank"), in its capacity as trustee or successor trustee (as
the case may be) under certain residential mortgage-backed
securities ("RMBS") trusts.  The plaintiffs or plaintiff groups
have filed substantially similar complaints against other RMBS
trustees, including Deutsche Bank, Citibank, HSBC, Bank of New York
Mellon and Wells Fargo.  The complaints against U.S. Bank allege
the trustee caused losses to investors as a result of alleged
failures by the sponsors, mortgage loan sellers and servicers for
these RMBS trusts and assert causes of action based upon the
trustee's purported failure to enforce repurchase obligations of
mortgage loan sellers for alleged breaches of representations and
warranties concerning loan quality.  The complaints also assert
that the trustee failed to notify securityholders of purported
events of default allegedly caused by breaches of servicing
standards by mortgage loan servicers and that the trustee
purportedly failed to abide by a heightened standard of care
following alleged events of default.

Currently U.S. Bank is a defendant in multiple actions alleging
individual or class action claims against the trustee with respect
to multiple trusts as described above with the most substantial
case being:  BlackRock Balanced Capital Portfolio et al v. U.S.
Bank National Association, No. 605204/2015 (N.Y.  Sup.  Ct.) (class
action alleging claims with respect to approximately 770 trusts)
and its companion case BlackRock Core Bond Portfolio et al v. U.S
Bank National Association, No. 14-cv-9401 (S.D.N.Y.).  Some of the
trusts implicated in the aforementioned Blackrock cases, as well as
other trusts, are involved in actions brought by separate groups of
plaintiffs related to no more than 100 trusts per case.

U.S. Bank cannot assure as to the outcome of any of the litigation,
or the possible impact of these litigations on the trustee or the
RMBS trusts.  However, U.S. Bank denies liability and believes that
it has performed its obligations under the RMBS trusts in good
faith, that its actions were not the cause of losses to investors
and that it has meritorious defenses, and it intends to contest the
plaintiffs' claims vigorously.


VAN RU CREDIT: Court Certifies Class in FDCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEBORAH AL, Plaintiff, v. VAN RU CREDIT CORPORATION,
Defendant, Case No. 17-CV-1738-JPS-JPS (E.D. Wis.), Judge J.P.
Stadtmueller of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin granted the Plaintiff's third motion for class
certification.

The Plaintiff allegedly owed a debt to "Monroe & Main," through
which she had earlier opened a store credit card.  The Defendant
sent her a letter attempting to collect that debt on March 10,
2017.  The Plaintiff's overarching theory of liability is that
failing to include a better description of the parameters of the
settlement offer misleads the recipient into believing that the
offer may shortly expire, when this is not true.  She maintains
that the Letter thereby violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act ("FDCPA") and the Wisconsin Consumer Act ("WCA").

The Plaintiff brought the lawsuit as a class action on the theory
that the Defendant sent an identical letter to many other people.
This belief was borne out in discovery; 180 people received similar
correspondence.

On July 5, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a motion for class
certification.  She proposes that the Court certifies the class of
all natural persons in the State of Wisconsin (b) who were sent a
collection letter, (c) seeking to collect a debt allegedly owed for
personal, family or household purposes, (d) between Dec. 13, 2016
and Dec. 13, 2017, (e) that was not returned by the postal
service.

Judge Stadmueller finds that the Plaintiff has carried her burden
with respect to each required element for class certification. The
Judge will, therefore, grant her motion and certify her desired
class.  He will also appoint her as the class representative and
her attorneys as the class counsel.

Though class certification is appropriate, there are still a number
of loose ends as to class treatment for the case.  On Aug. 1, 2018,
the Plaintiff filed an expedited motion requesting that the Court
rule on her motion for class certification prior to issuing a
decision on the pending motions for summary judgment filed by each
party.  She states that a ruling on summary judgment prior to
deciding class certification may render the class "fail-safe,"
meaning that a potential class member would know which side has won
on the merits of the case before deciding whether to join.  It
appears that the best practice is to decide class certification
first, and if a class is certified, allow for the class members to
opt in or out, and then address summary judgment.

The Defendant did not oppose the motion, and so the Judge must
assume it agrees with the Plaintiff.  He will, therefore, issue the
decision on class certification and stay the pending summary
judgment motions until the class-related procedures are completed.
In that vein, he notes that the Plaintiff has also not proposed any
procedures for providing notice of the action to the class.  The
Jduge will direct the parties to confer on the procedures necessary
for managing the class and present them to the Court in the form of
a stipulation.  Upon receipt of the stipulation, he will determine
whether the trial schedule in the matter needs to be altered to
accommodate a notice period.

Accordingly, Judge Stadtmueller denied as moot the Plaintiff's
first motion for class certification, to stay, and for relief from
briefing requirements.  He also denied as moot the Plaintiff's
second motion for class certification.  He granted the Plaintiff's
third motion for class certification.

The Judge certifies the class of (a) all natural persons in the
State of Wisconsin (b) who were sent a collection letter in the
form represented by Exhibit A to the complaint in the action, (c)
seeking to collect a debt allegedly owed for personal, family or
household purposes, (d) between Dec. 13, 2016 and Dec. 13, 2017,
(e) that was not returned by the postal service.

He appointed the Plaintiff as the class representative; and her
counsel as the class counsel.

The Judge granted the Plaintiff's motions to seal related to the
class certification briefing, and the Plaintiff's motion seeking
the Court's ruling on class certification prior to a ruling on
summary judgment.  He stayed the parties' motions for summary
judgment and related motions to seal pending further order of the
Court.  The parties confer and file a stipulation addressing the
issues identified in the Order within 14 days.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 25, 2018 Order is available
at https://is.gd/KhWCMQ from Leagle.com.

Deborah Al, Plaintiff, represented by Ben J. Slatky --
bslatky@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, Jesse Fruchter --
jfruchter@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, John D. Blythin --
jblythin@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP & Mark A. Eldridge --
meldridge@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP.

Van Ru Credit Corporation, Defendant, represented by Nicole M.
Strickler -- nstrickler@messerstrickler.com -- Messer Strickler Ltd
& Stephanie A. Strickler -- sstrickler@messerstrickler.com --
Messer Strickler Ltd.


VISA INC: Amends Settlement for Damages Class in Interchange MDL
----------------------------------------------------------------
Visa Inc. disclosed in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission that on September 17, 2018, the Company;
its wholly owned subsidiaries, Visa U.S.A.  Inc. and Visa
International Service Association; MasterCard Incorporated;
MasterCard International Incorporated; various U.S. financial
institution defendants; and plaintiffs purporting to act on behalf
of the putative class primarily seeking damages (the "Damages
Class") signed an amended settlement agreement (the "Amended
Settlement Agreement") that supersedes the original settlement
agreement entered into on October 19, 2012, to resolve the claims
of the Damages Class in the matter styled In re Payment Card
Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, No.
05-MD-1720 (MKB) (JO) (the "Multi-District Litigation").  The
claims were originally brought in 2005 by several plaintiffs
purporting to represent a class of U.S. retailers.

The Amended Settlement Agreement includes, among other terms:

   * A release from participating class members for liability
arising out of conduct alleged by the Damages Class in the
litigation, including claims that accrue no later than five years
after the Amended Settlement Agreement becomes final.
Participating class members will not release injunctive relief
claims as a named representative or non-representative class member
in the putative class action seeking injunctive relief in Barry's
Cut Rate Stores, Inc., et al. v. Visa, Inc., et al., MDL No. 1720
Docket No. 05-md-01720 (MKB) (JO).

   * An additional settlement payment from all defendants of US$900
million, with the Company's share of the additional settlement
payment being US$600 million.  The Company's share will be paid
from the previously funded litigation escrow account established
pursuant to the Company's retrospective responsibility plan (the
"Retrospective Responsibility Plan").  The additional settlement
payment will be added to the approximately US$5.3 billion
previously paid by the defendants pursuant to the original 2012
settlement agreement in the Multi-District Litigation.  More
information on the Retrospective Responsibility Plan and the
original 2012 settlement agreement is described in the Company's
Form 10-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
November 17, 2017.

   * Up to US$700 million may be returned to defendants (with up to
US$467 million to the Company) if more than 15% of class members
(by payment volume) opt out of the class.  The amount that may be
returned to defendants is calculated using a formula based on the
payment volume attributable to class members that opt out of the
class. If more than 25% of class members (by payment volume) opt
out of the class, defendants may terminate the Amended Settlement
Agreement.

The Company said, "The Amended Settlement Agreement is the result
of extensive negotiations and mediation among the parties. It
remains subject to court approval, which the Company cannot assure
will be obtained."

Visa Inc. operates as a payments technology company worldwide. The
company facilitates commerce through the transfer of value and
information among consumers, merchants, financial institutions,
businesses, strategic partners, and government entities. Visa Inc.
was incorporated in 2007 and is headquartered in San Francisco,
California.


WALMART: Settles Class Action Over Lack of Seating for Cashiers
---------------------------------------------------------------
Emma Hinchliffe, writing for Fortune, reports that Walmart could
soon pay $65 million in a 9-year-old class action lawsuit over its
lack of seating for cashiers.

Nisha Brown brought the suit in 2009, according to the Los Angeles
Times, and 100,000 current and former California Walmart cashiers
are eligible to receive part of the payout.

The onetime Walmart employees said the retailer violated a 2001
California wage order that determined that employees must be given
"suitable seats when the nature of the work reasonably permits."

Walmart, however, has maintained that the nature of the work as a
cashier does not permit cashiers to sit down. Among its reasons,
per the LA Times: cashiers need to move around to greet customers
and look inside carts; cashiers are less efficient when they sit
down; customers prefer standing cashiers; and providing seating to
cashiers would lead to a loss of revenue.

The two sides in the case filed a proposed settlement, and a judge
still has to approve the $65 million settlement amount.

As part of the settlement, Walmart would begin a "pilot program"
providing stools to cashiers who request them and would agree not
to retaliate against workers who choose to sit down.

"Both sides are pleased to have reached a proposed resolution and
look forward to the court granting preliminary approval to the
settlement," Walmart spokesman Randy Hargrove told the LA Times.

The lawsuit is similar to one CVS lost over the same issue in 2016.
[GN]


WELLS FARGO: Still Faces RMBS Investors' New York Class Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. still defends itself in a class action
complaint by a group of institutional investors, according to UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2017-C5's Form 10-K/A filed on September
19, 2018, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2017.

On June 18, 2014, a group of institutional investors filed a civil
complaint in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York
County, against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo Bank") in its
capacity as trustee under 276 residential mortgage backed
securities ("RMBS") trusts, which was later amended on July 18,
2014, to increase the number of trusts to 284 RMBS trusts.  On
November 24, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion to voluntarily
dismiss the state court action without prejudice.  That same day, a
group of institutional investors filed a putative class action
complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (the "District Court") against Wells Fargo
Bank, alleging claims against the bank in its capacity as trustee
for 274 RMBS trusts (the "Federal Court Complaint").  In December
2014, the plaintiffs' motion to voluntarily dismiss their original
state court action was granted.

As with the prior state court action, the Federal Court Complaint
is one of six similar complaints filed contemporaneously against
RMBS trustees (Deutsche Bank, Citibank, HSBC, Bank of New York
Mellon and US Bank) by a group of institutional investor
plaintiffs.

The Federal Court Complaint against Wells Fargo Bank alleges that
the trustee caused losses to investors and asserts causes of action
based upon, among other things, the trustee's alleged failure to:
(i) notify and enforce repurchase obligations of mortgage loan
sellers for purported breaches of representations and warranties,
(ii) notify investors of alleged events of default, and (iii) abide
by appropriate standards of care following alleged events of
default.  Relief sought includes money damages in an unspecified
amount, reimbursement of expenses, and equitable relief.  Other
cases alleging similar causes of action have been filed against
Wells Fargo Bank and other trustees in the District Court by RMBS
investors in these and other transactions, and these cases against
Wells Fargo Bank are proceeding before the same District Court
judge.

A similar complaint was also filed May 27, 2016 in New York state
court by a different plaintiff investor.  On January 19, 2016, an
order was entered in connection with the Federal Court Complaint in
which the District Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over 261
trusts at issue in the Federal Court Complaint; the District Court
also allowed plaintiffs to file amended complaints as to the
remaining, non-dismissed trusts, if they so chose, and three
amended complaints have been filed.  On December 17, 2016, the
investor plaintiffs in the 261 trusts dismissed from the Federal
Court Complaint filed a new complaint in New York state court (the
"State Court Complaint").

In September 2017, Royal Park Investments SA/NV ("Royal Park"), one
of the plaintiffs in the District Court cases against Wells Fargo
Bank, filed a putative class action complaint relating to two
trusts seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and money damages
based on Wells Fargo Bank's indemnification from trust funds for
legal fees and expenses Wells Fargo Bank incurs or has incurred in
defending the District Court case filed by Royal Park.

The Company said, "With respect to the foregoing litigations, Wells
Fargo Bank believes plaintiffs' claims are without merit and
intends to contest the claims vigorously, but there can be no
assurances as to the outcome of the litigations or the possible
impact of the litigations on Wells Fargo Bank or the RMBS trusts."

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is the Certificate Administrator for UBS
Commercial Mortgage Trust 2017-C5.


WILLIAM PENN: Court Narrows Claims in 1st Amended Rich Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LESLIE S. RICH, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM PENN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Defendant, Civil Action No.
GLR-17-2026 (D. Md.), Judge George L. Russell, III of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland granted in part and
denied in part William Penn's Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
First Amended Complaint.

On July 20, 2017, Rich, the trustee for the Richard S. Wallberg
Insurance Trust, brings the putative class action against William
Penn for breach of contract and fraud in connection with certain
universal life insurance policies that the Trust and putative class
members purchased.

William Penn issues certain universal class policies: (1) Longevity
UL 100; (2) Penn UL; (3) Life Umbrella UL 120; and (4) Advantra.
Regular policies expire or "lapse" if the cash value of the policy
is insufficient to cover the policy's insurance charges and other
expenses.  One such expense is the cost of insurance ("COI") fee,
which William Penn deducts monthly from the account value of each
life insurance policy, including the Class Policies.  Rich's
specific policy featured a $500,000 death benefit with a 10-year
no-lapse-guarantee, as long as Rich paid the minimum premium.

On July 15, 2015, Rich and the putative class members received a
letter from William Penn informing them that the monthly COI rate
would increase in August 2015.  The COI rate increased dramatically
over the next year.  In August 2015, Rich paid a COI rate of
$317.88 per month, and the policy's account value was $34,798.22.
In September 2015, Rich paid a COI rate of $342.31 per month.  The
COI rate continued to rise, increasing to $555.39 in February 2016
and to $620.72 in November 2016.  With these increases, the COI fee
began to exceed the minimum premium amount.  Accordingly, the
deduction of the COI fee will soon drain the cash value of the
policy entirely so that there will be insufficient cash value to
fund the policy beyond the guaranteed 10-year period.  As of Nov.
2016, the policy value had dropped to $29,455.67.

Rich alleges the reason provided by William Penn for the COI rate
increase is specious.  According to Rich, William Penn's financial
instability was the real reason for the increase. Rich contends
William Penn has been concealing its financial instability through
a captive and affiliate reinsurance scheme.  Rich maintains that
William Penn impermissibly increased COI rates based on past
experience to appear financially sound.

Although William Penn appeared to be financially stable on paper
because of these captive reinsurance transactions, it had been
facing financial difficulties for some time.  After the Great
Recession, William Penn was suffering financially because of poor
investment performance and low interest rates.  Five years after
the Great Recession, on July 15, 2015, it sent the COI Notification
Letter to its policyholders.

William Penn moved to dismiss on Sept. 29, 2017.  In response, Rich
filed an Amended Complaint, alleging two causes of action based on
the COI rate increase: (1) breach of contract (Count I) and (2)
fraud (Count II).  Rich seeks compensatory and punitive damages,
restitution, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorney's fees
and costs.

On Nov. 13, 2017, William Penn filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint.  William Penn's Motion
addresses Count II of Rich's Amended Complaint: fraud.  William
Penn raises five defenses: (1) Rich lacks standing; (2) the claim
is barred by the statute of limitations; (3) the claim is barred by
the source of duty rule; (4) the claim is barred by the economic
loss rule; and (5) Rich fails to state a claim for fraud.

Rich filed an Opposition on Nov. 22, 2017.  On Dec. 20, 2017,
William Penn filed a Reply.

Judge Russell granted in part and denied in part William Penn's
Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint.  He
granted the Motion as to the fraud claim regarding the COI
Notification Letter, but denied as to the Policy Statements,
Corporate Reports, and website.  He denied as moot William Penn's
Motion to Dismiss.  A separate order follows.

The Judge finds that Rich cites the COI Notification Letter as an
example of a fraudulent statement, contending William Penn
misstated the reason for the COI rate increase.  The terms of the
Class Policies governed William Penn's COI rate increases.  The
terms provide the only limitations on William Penn's ability to
change the COI rate; William Penn has no duty under tort law to
refrain from raising the COI rate for any particular reason.  The
Court reached the same conclusion in Dickman.

In Dickman, the plaintiffs cited letters informing them of the
increase as another example of a fraudulent statement on which they
relied to their detriment.  In explaining that the Dickman
plaintiffs' claim for fraud would be limited in scope, the Court
stated, whether the COI increase was improper is a matter of
contract, not tort.  

Further, the damages sought in connection with the
misrepresentations in the COI Notification Letter would be no
different than the damages Rich seeks for the breach of contract
claim.  Thus, the claim of fraud for the COI Notification Letter is
barred by both the source of duty and economic loss rules.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 25, 2018 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/E0ws9b from Leagle.com.

Lesley S Rich, trustee for Richard S. Wallberg Insurance Trust,
Plaintiff, represented by Christopher T. Nace, Paulson and Nace
PLLC, Andrew E. Brashier, Beasley Allen Crow Methvin Portis and
Miles PC, pro hac vice, George Walton Walker, III --
gwwalker@thefinleyfirm.com -- The Finley Firm PC, pro hac vice,
Marybeth V. Gibson -- MGibson@thefinleyfirm.com -- The Finley Firm
PC, pro hac vice, Paul W. Evans, Beasley Allen Crow Methvin Portis
and Miles PC, pro hac vice, Rachel Nichole Boyd, Beasley Allen Crow
Methvin Portis and Miles PC, pro hac vice & W. Daniel Miles, III,
Beasley Allen Crow Methvin Portis and Miles PC, pro hac vice.

William Penn Life Insurance Company of New York, Defendant,
represented by Brian Coleman -- brian.coleman@dbr.com -- Drinker
Biddle & Reath LLP, Christopher F. Petillo --
christopher.petillo@dbr.com -- Drinker Biddle and Reath LLP, pro
hac vice & Timothy J.O. Driscoll -- timothy.odriscoll@dbr.com --
Drinker Biddle and Reath LLP, pro hac vice.


[] New York State Urged to Establish Water Contamination Standards
------------------------------------------------------------------
James Bilsborrow, writing for Times Union, reports that  dangerous
chemicals from local manufacturing plants have contaminated the
water supply in communities across New York state for decades, but
the Environmental Protection Agency has failed to take timely
action to address this growing public health crisis. On October 17,
New York state's Drinking Water Quality Council will meet to
address the new federally recommended minimum risk levels for
emerging contaminants. It is time for state lawmakers and
regulators to take the lead in protecting New Yorkers from
continued exposure to these harmful chemicals by establishing
sensible and enforceable standards for New York state.

From Long Island to upstate, communities across New York are
confronting the consequences of contaminated drinking water
resulting from the use and disposal of dangerous chemicals called
PFAS (per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances) by industrial
manufacturing plants and military bases. In particular, a chemical
called perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) used to manufacture products
ranging from non-stick pans to dental floss to stain-resistant
fabrics has been found in drinking water in Petersburgh and Hoosick
Falls in Rensselaer County. One groundwater sample revealed PFOA
levels in Hoosick Falls at 130,000 parts per trillion (ppt), more
than 18,000 times the EPA's acceptable level of 70 ppt.

The contamination has left residents susceptible to a range of
health issues, including low infant birth weights, immune system
hazards, and increased cancer risks, as well as depressed property
values after locations in both towns were declared Superfund sites.
Petersburgh and Hoosick Falls residents have filed lawsuits against
local manufacturers whose plants knowingly discharged the toxic
chemicals, and a New York Supreme Court justice recently certified
a class action of current and former community members in the
Petersburgh case. This is the first time a class was certified for
PFOA contamination in New York.

Meanwhile, residents continue to advocate for government
intervention, but the EPA has not taken tangible action to remedy
the contamination. In fact, former EPA head Scott Pruitt actively
sought to block the publication of a federal health study that
found PFAS chemicals posed health risks at lower levels than the
EPA initially determined were safe. At the state level, Gov. Andrew
Cuomo signed the Clean Water Infrastructure Act in 2017 and
recently announced an additional $200 million in grant funding to
upgrade state drinking water and wastewater infrastructure, fund
modern filtration systems, and regularly test for known
contaminants.

Despite these initiatives, New York state still lacks a safe
standard for PFAS contamination. A recently released study by the
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry finds acceptable
health advisory levels should be around 7 to 11 ppt, far lower than
EPA's current guidelines of 70 ppt.

In light of the EPA's inaction, other states have taken steps to
adequately protect the drinking water of their residents. Last
November, New Jersey's Department of Environmental Protection
imposed the strongest maximum contaminant levels (MCL) limit for
PFAS in the country at 14 ppt for PFOA chemicals. If New York
lawmakers truly wanted to be national leaders for water
contamination protection, they could follow, or better yet, exceed
the minimum risk levels outlined in August by the U.S. Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and set New York state's MCL
range no greater than between 10 ppt and 20 ppt, the safest
currently known level of PFOA and PFOS exposure.

As communities across the country continue to face water
contamination crises, state lawmakers must take action and regulate
these dangerous chemicals by establishing a safe, sensible,
enforceable maximum contaminant level to protect New York state
residents from serious health risks. [GN]



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

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